[ home / rules / faq ] [ overboard / sfw / alt ] [ leftypol / siberia / hobby / tech / edu / games / anime / music / draw / AKM ] [ meta / roulette ] [ cytube / git ] [ GET / ref / marx / booru / zine ]

/AKM/ - Guns, weapons and the art of war.

"War can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun." - Chairman Mao
Name
Email
Subject
Comment
Flag
File
Embed
Password (For file deletion.)

SERVER MAINTENANCE IN PROGRESS
Join our Matrix Chat <=> IRC: #leftypol on Rizon


 No.1969

Have you guys ever heard of the Littoral Combat Ships? Of course not, cause they're useless hunks of junk designed when the US decided they needed a wet F-35.

In all seriousness though, the LCSs are not only a failure in engineering of the individual ships and classes but also in initial concept. The LCS came about as a response to a need for small, fast, CHEAP ships to perform non-combat duties such as ASW and minesweeping. Almost every country in the 80s-90s had their fleet of support vessels nearing the end of their lifespan and so were busily working on next-generation replacements.

In both the East and West the form of this next generation of ships took two forms: Hydrofoils based on the design of the HMCS Bras d'Or which had perfected the design of hydrofoils as far as stability was concerned, and ground-effect vehicles. Ground effect vehicles are basically hovercrafts, OR Ekranoplans. The Ekranonplans planned to take over support roles were ironically larger versions of the Luna class since the weird thing about GEVs is that the bigger they are, the easier they are to control and are cheaper to maintain, so bigger=better in every way.

So while the rest of the world was designing their next generation on cutting-edge technology that had been proven in the last generation, what did the US do? They out-sourced their shipbuilding programme to a fucking aircraft designer; Lockheed-Martin. Lockheed did exactly what every US military contractor does and essentially created this concept of a Littoral Combat Ship to be a shallow water frigate with a streamlined hull. As many of you are going to point out, that's just a regular frigate. Because that's exactly what it was. The LCS was just a rebranded frigate meant for shallow water operations in the Gulf near the Middle East, with special gimmicks such as modular combat systems, 2 engine types to propel the ships at 70 knots, and a low radar silhouette. The latter is absolute BS btw, since "low radar silhouette" has been disproven by the Zumwalt fiasco.

Anyways, the first class of the series, the Independents failed every single one of the mentioned requirements. The 2 different engine types, a gasoline AND diesel turbines, failed miserably because they forgot each engine type had different torque and as a result broke the ship's gearbox, so instead of 70 knots the top speed was a whopping 5 knots… you walk faster than that. The system modules? Turned out they built the ship BEFORE the modules, and the modules turned out to be too big. OK but surely it's cheaper because of its small size right? Nope. Despite being a small frigate, the LCSs cost more to operate than the Allen Burke Destroyers. And they couldn't even perform ANY role.

OK but that's just the first class right? Surely it got better since there's been 3+ classes since 2002? Wrong. The follow up to the Independents was the Freedom Class(The US can't go 5 minutes without naming something after their ego), while these were better, that's not exactly a high bar. The best thing about the Freedoms was that there weren't total failures in that it mostly worked. However their ability was extremely scaled back, now they were just semi-hydrofoil frigates with some more automation. It worked fine as a frigate, except that's all it did. Even its automation didn't work as advertized, so for all intents and purposes it was just a more expensive regular frigate with a nifty semi-hydrofoil design that didn't actually work as a proper hydrofoil and more existed simply to wow Pentagon staff into thinking it was a new design. The Freedoms have since been cancelled for going 50% over budget and not offering any real advantages.

So where does that leave the LCSs today? Well I shit you not, but they've decided to bring back the Independents, because Lockheed promises they've fixed the gearbox issues, while all the other issues still remain. What that means is that they're scrapping all the old Independents, 9 in total and the newest being less than a year old, and building another 9 in the next 2 years to replace them…. instead of just fixing the old ones. While it is expensive to gut a ship's powerplant it's nowhere near the cost of building an entire new ship, so it's all just about that contract money surprise surprise.

Even if the LCSs did work perfectly, their concept of "Shallow Water Support Ships" is utterly stupid. The US has had a fixation for shallow water operations since the first Gulf War, even making their current generation of SSNs, the Virginia Class, designed for shallow water operations(Even though that goes against the entire concept of submarines and coastal submarines were deemed stupid over a century ago), yet since the Gulf War there's been no need whatsover for shallow water ships, and considering most of the ocean is deep water, making it so that ships are tied only to 5% of its entirety severely limits the strategic positioning of your fleets. Plus, if you build the shallow water ships, you're just going to have to build deep water equivalents for your main battlegroups, so you're doubling the cost of your ships overall when you could have just built half the number of ships but that do both. Which is exactly what the Ekranoplans and Hydrofoils from the 80s were supposed to do, since a large part of support ships is that they have to be flexible which LCSs are inherently not.

But it's the US, how could you ever expect them to design something proper? And the largest argument out there for the LCSs is that they provide building experience for the naval engineers, yet they're on 2 and a half classes now and STILL having the same issues, I don't know what lessons they're learning but they don't seem to be related to ship building.

TL;DR: US Built stupid ship that is stupid.

 No.1971

More like Clitoral Combat Ships

 No.1974

>>1971
Why would you insult the clitoris like that anon

 No.1975

>>1969
I don't get what you're saying, why aren't shallow water craft useful?

I guess the real question with all these things is the cost to me. The US spends so much money on military and the amount of actual things they have is small. More ships for less money would be way better. Especially fighting low tech enemies like the war on terror. They say they made the LCS to combat Somali pirates in speed boats, so why don't they just fight the pirates in speedboats themselves? Just bring more speedboats than the enemy and they should be fine. Cost of a dozen speedboats has to be way less I'm sure.

 No.1976

>>1969
LCS is literally just a pointlessly expensive patrol ship.

 No.1977

>>1974
Eyyy Yugo anon is back, glad to see ya!

 No.1978

File: 1653410650345.gif (987.81 KB, 427x427, Tog 1 Jumpscare.gif)

>>1975
Because shallow water operations are very limited. Unless the US wants to go back to the 1880s style of navy where they have 5 battleships with a range of 50km so they don't have to go beyond spitting range of the US coast it's absolutely useless in terms of naval projection. The only place the US ever estimated they would use shallow water vessels would be in the Gulf for their (then) future Second Gulf War so they could just sit off the shore and bombard Iraq. It's useless in any other scenario, even the Med or Black Sea is deeper with heavier seas than is wanted with the Virginia and LCSs.

Imagine if the USSR built the Kirovs but were only meant for the Caspian Sea, that's how fucking stupid LCSs are. Or well I guess the Moskva fits that bill and look how it ended up…

Also yeah you do want more small cheap ships for support roles, but the LCSs don't fit that. The reason why hydrofoils and Ekranoplans were the go-to for the projected replacements back in the day was because they could go really fast on really cheap engines; they both reduced water friction on a semi-large vessel, meaning the powerplant doesn't have to be as big, which is usually the most expensive part of a ship, so if the US had built those it would have been a lot cheaper than fielding even the older fleet support vessels that they had in service. Instead what they built was overhyped conventional ships that act and look as if some Silicon Valley startup built them as a "wow that's cool" thing while not actually innovating in any way shape or form.

Even the name Littoral Combat Ship is stupid, just say frigate or corvette and be done with it, but no Lockheed wanted to make it look like the reinvented the wheel and could copyright the term. The LCSs are truly the F-35 of the sea.
>>1976
Yee

 No.1979

>>1978
>Moskva fits that bill
No it doesn't, its perfectly fine as a Blue Water cruiser and it ending up like that has no relevance here.

 No.1981

>>1979
The Atlant class is a budget Kirov, even during development it ran into problems with the hull form because it kept having to get smaller and trying to use them in an area that's smaller than the range of her P-500s where there aren't any other capital ships in a brown water environment is a stupid idea. It's the modern version of the Blucher in Norway.

 No.1982

>>1981
This is a very one sided understanding of the class. The current use of this ship class isn't the same as its actual capabilities.
>budget Kirov
Ok and?
>ran into problems with the hull form
That got solved.

 No.1983

File: 1653429745697.png (511.41 KB, 726x625, Join Duty.png)

>>1982
Because they expected the same out of the Atlants as a Kirov and even gave it the Flotilla leader designation despite being on the light side for a cruiser. It's essentially wanting the same for less, which put extreme pressure on how the ship actually handles. The hull form wasn't really ever fixed, they managed to make it stop flexing in heavy seas but not to the point of making it function as intented; that's why the P-500 tubes are above deck on the superstructure similar to Soviet patrol boats and escorts instead of imbedded in the hull which is the standard for Soviet cruisers since the hull was under enough stress already. The Atlants are the result of trying to pack a Kirov into a hull half the size, that's cheaper too rather than tempering expectations and making it a proper cheaper alternative.

Ironically I think it falls victim to the Battlecruiser curse. Battlecruisers were originally meant to only hunt cruisers, but because they had capital grade guns they got shoved into the capital ship role, the Atlants are the same. They're light cruisers, but because they're pocket Kirov's they're now flagships and Flotilla leaders, and this effected the class during the design process too. It's a class that given even a refit would perform well in another role, so saying that's just because of how they're used is a misnomer, since while technically true the ship's design and equipment is also at fault since it was rushed to fulfill its current role as a flagship for some of the smaller fleets. It's not an inherently bad design like the LCSs, just asking too much out of too small of a ship and that's stressing parts of the ship out way beyond the limit.

 No.1985

>>1983
>they expected the same out of the Atlants as a Kirov
Not really, it's meant to have similar fire-power on a smaller scale, but only as supplement to the Kirovs. The reason they're overstressed is because the Kirovs got mothballed and so did like half the Soviet fleet. If Russia could raise the Ukrainian ship of the same class (and the Moskva) they'd be able to more efficiently do this, so it's more a lingering fault of the Russian government from the 90s.
>gave it the Flotilla leader designation
Yes in areas not having Kirov's to lead and act as fleet centres, because they have the armament and defenses capable of doing so.
>that's why the P-500 tubes are above deck
<vertical launch tubes? What's that?
The hull is fine and the P-500 tubes are fine
>It's not an inherently bad design like the LCSs, just asking too much out of too small of a ship and that's stressing parts of the ship out way beyond the limit.
I'd argue that its fine as it had been and the Moskva is just a case of bad luck and sabotagae.

 No.1986

>>1985
Similar firepower on a smaller scale is exactly the problem, the Kirov's weren't as big as they were just for kicks, on ships space is a big premium, and trying to fit that much firepower in a ship half the size means you're going to have to cut corners, which again is fine but the with the Atlants they couldn't compromise. That's what's causing them to be overstressed, I'm not talking about wear-and-tear kind of stressed I am talking about the actual hull of the ship not being the right size to accommodate the missiles, FCS, communication systems for a Flotilla leader etc. Which once again would have been fine if not for the fact that late into their design period they had to tack on all the FCS and communication equipment. It can be a cruise missile cruiser or a command ship for a ship its size, not both. That's not an issue with how Russia operates them since they came out of the yard like this due to a runaway design process. And no, the P-500 tubes are NOT fine like that. On cruiser hulls and above missile tubes are meant to be uniform with the hull, this is because during fighting the superstructure is considered non-primary (That's part of the reason why the Moskva was lost because the superstructure burned to the hull, which for ships is 100% OK but the untrained crew thought the ship was sunk along with modifications in the 2000s that made her even more top heavy for such a light ship but anyways the sinking is largely secondary to the issues I have with it), so the launch tubes not being part of that for cruisers is important. Patrol boats, destroyers etc can have it since they're not meant to be at the centre of fire anyways and need every ounce of weight savings they can get, the P-500s being as they are is a sign of compromise due to construction constraints. Which is not the good kind of compromise in terms of capability but more a compromise in terms of its stability and integrity. It's one of the few Soviet designs that fell down this hole, the only other one I can name off the top of my head was the Udaloy II and that was a Russian modification of the Udaloy.

 No.1998

>>1969
What gets me about the LCS is that other nations (some of them at least) just use corvettes or even fast missile and gunboats for littoral/shallow water operations. Most of coastal Europe has some kind of indigenous corvette design that they make to whatever specifications they need including LO in some cases. Those boats don't take years to iron out problems with.

I know the USN does not have the same sort of "need" or "tradition", but its not some super-secret, overly specialist knowledge thing. Chalk it up as another "easy elsewhere, exceedingly difficult in the US for no reason at all".

 No.2002

>>1998
The LCS is American exceptionalism at it's finest; they made a light attack craft but not like the others, no no no this one was designed to be special. Because it's a complete utter failure.

They tried to make a revolutionary craft using conventional methods without any real innovation and failed even along those lines, it's impressive even.

 No.2003

>>1986
I disagree in places, you're not entirely incorrect, but I feel that you are over-tating the problems of the ship, especially considering modernization resulting in stronger compacter command systems.

 No.2005

>Even though that goes against the entire concept of submarines and coastal submarines were deemed stupid over a century ago
Coastal operations with submarines are common. You can't hide a submarine from active sonar in the open ocean, only coastal areas can hide submarines effectively.

 No.2007

>>2003
It still doesn't change the fact tit lacks the capabilities for the role it's being pressed into, and the modernizations actually hurt the class somewhat because while modern electronics are a lot smaller, they decided rather than save on that weight, they'd use the savings to put more stuff in. Not good. Also that only tackles one of the many facets of the issue at hand, so while all the problems could be fixed in a good refit and it's not flawed as a concept like the LCS, the commication systems were only one out of five or six problems that needed to be rectified. And I don't think that I'm overstating them at all, any ship which even goes slightly over its tonnage in terms of capability is a serious hazard and a failure to curb expectations during the design process. It's dangerous and easily avoidable.
>>2005
While that is true, designing SSNs entirely for that purpose is a stupid idea. See the thing that makes SSNs better than diesel is their endurance and speed, which is completely lost in shallow waters, hence why stuff like the 205s, Tangos, and Kilos exist. Designing your entire line of mainline SSNs specifically for coastal operations with blue water navy is idea. The option for shallow water operations? Perfectly fine. Designing them ONLY for shallow water operations and limiting their deep water capability to boot? Came about only as a weird fixation with the Gulf War and now producing such vessels is incredibly lucrative for the contractors and that's why they intend to keep building them up to 2070 despite no apparent need for them in future conflicts and that a life-span until 2070 does not line up at all with technologal advancement and generally ships do not last 70 fucking years let alone submarines.

 No.2008

>>2007
>any ship which even goes slightly over its tonnage in terms of capability is a serious hazard and a failure to curb expectations during the design process. It's dangerous and easily avoidable.
The USSR planned these ships out carefully, I'm fairly sure that they took into account these issues and avoided or made compromises to execute an optimal design.
I suggest you look at the design process for the ships - their main issues are almost negligible due to the various innovations taken to supplement problems, thus the P-500 tubes got built in such a fashion rather than vertical launch tubes that could technically have been done on the same platform. The Russian Navy´s post Soviet scrapping of most ships is the cause for the problems. The class could lead the Black/Mediterranean fleets because it's a much smaller marine environment than the other Fleets contend. In any other areas it had been an intended supplement and backup for the Kirov-class capable of leading the fleet if the main ship had been disabled but not being the main leading force for Blue-Water operations.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B0_1164#%D0%9E%D0%B1%D1%89%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%B0_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B0

 No.2009

File: 1653594492749.jpg (1.98 MB, 2000x1429, slava class.jpg)

>>2008 (me)
>>2007
The only major problems I can recall for the design of the Atlant is the hull lengthening and bow, but it's not a major operation issue. The draft is fairly decent and the raised bow had been a response to issues of frontal swamping for Blue Water operations. The hull-length made up for the increased tonnage and relatively slight imbalance in front-back heaviness of the design. The rather unique power-plant made up for the hull length and increased tonnage allowing it to have good maneuverability and high speeds, something that internalizing the P-500s could compromise as they'd force the width to increase and worsen hydrodynamics of the ship.
http://www.and-kin2008.narod.ru/drawingpr1164.html

 No.2010

>>2008
>>2009
The fact that the P-500s being internalized would have compromised the stability and speed is proof that it was too small for its firepower and role, I don't understand why you're acting like that's a good reasoning for it. Decrease the number, decrease the speed and therefore the size of the powerplant, compromises have to be made, but instead the Soviets here wanted their cake and to eat it to. The firepower of a Kirov on a frame half the size with none of the drawbacks is bad enough as is, but then asking it to be cheaper is just nonsense. I mean the Kirovs themselves compromised by using the subsonic P-700s because space WAS an issue but they considered external tubes as too much of a hazard, and that's why they spent so much time on the nuclear powerplant in order to squeeze it down as much as possible to make room and compromising on P-700s.

And while you can blame a lot on the Russians it's still a fact that the Atlants came out of the yards with a command suite, the Russians didn't stick those on later. I see your image mentions them as insurance against the potential failure of the Kirovs which isn't something I've thought of before but it would explain a lot. Would explain the command suite despite being second line ships and why it takes up so much space. I'm guessing the image is from Modern Naval Combat or something other from the weird NATO perspective. I'm getting most of my info out of the 1984 and 85 version of Jane's.

 No.2012

>>2010
>the P-500s being internalized would have compromised the stability and speed
<proof
No it isn't, they literally just used the deck for a better purpose than it had been used for, it's not a dreadnought battleship, it's a light rocket cruiser meant to hit heavy and and fast. It's rocket tubes being on the deck don't matter.
>Kirovs themselves compromised by using the subsonic P-700s
That got replaced using supersonic missiles once made available.
>considered external tubes as too much of a hazard
Because if you look at the design of said tubes they are far different to the Slava configuration and ARE an obvious hazard, the Slave embedded them into the deck in a reclined position. The initial Kirov plans that got discarded had them mounted over th deck on hinges similar to to the Moskva-clas Heli-carrier but rather than for 4 tubes, it had been for single tubes, 4 on each side, fully exposed and tall. There is a marked difference in this.
>Janes 1984-85
That explains it, you're using information that's out of date and/or based on the speculations that they had at the time.
My image is sourced from Modern Naval Combat by Chris and David Miller, but my information is largely from Russian naval sources.

 No.2013

>>2012
you literally said
>>2009
>something that internalizing the P-500s could compromise as they'd force the width to increase and worsen hydrodynamics of the ship.
Also the Kirovs haven't actually been equipped with any other missiles in place of the P-700s, only now is Russia planning on replacing them with the 3M22 and that's only because they're ASMs being retrofitted for naval usage, on the Kirovs they're going to be used with Sabots(Quite clever actually) to fit in the tubes of the P-700s. But that's also besides the point since I was trying to point out that the Kirovs were designed with the P-500s or more specifically the intended specifications of the P-500's prototype requirements but scaled back during the design process as a compromise to allow considerations for other parts of the ship. And also to simplify logistics with the 3rd generation SSGNs that ended up becoming the Oscars.

Also the Atlant's tubes in a reclined position is a known hazard as it wasn't novel at the time, it was standard on both missile patrol boats, SSGN and smaller destroyers like the Sarychs, all of which used it due to weight saving and that they weren't going to be the focus of fire, and this was known as for the 3rd gen SSGNs after the Papa they wanted to make all cruise missile launch tubes imbedded but decided against it due to the absurd cost the Papa was already racking up although they did test with a couple with the Echo II testbeds for the P-500 but ultimately due to time and price constraints decided against it for the Oscars. Anyways the point is the external P-500s is a sign of refusal to compromise on firepower despite growing concerns on this placement at the time, and while it's a compromise, it's done at the expense of other departments of the ship rather than the firepower, which is what they should have done. Heck scaling back to the P-700s might have done the trick and also kept the firepower of a Kirov although I guess at that point the Kirov's hadn't switched to the P-700s on the drawing board.

Also actually I believe you have it mixed up, Modern Naval Combat is known for being a bit of a NATO shill, almost everything in it writes from the NATO perspective on such stuff even post-1991. Whereas Jane's is while I wouldn't say more accurate it definitely is a lot more direct from the source because of the weird context of Jane's in being a weird mutually agreed intel sharing phamphlet so that countries could spy on each other. The history of Jane's is weird.

 No.2018

File: 1653769790288.jpg (57.87 KB, 680x413, kursk interior.jpg)

>>2013
>they'd force the width to increase and worsen hydrodynamics of the ship
Yes, as in make it slower due to drag, not unstable, if anything it'd have made it MORE stable due to the increased horizontal draft.
>he Atlant's tubes in a reclined position is a known hazard
How?
>it wasn't novel at the time
And? It got used repeatedly for a reason. If it had been such a hazard the USSR'd not have used them, the costs would outweigh the benefits.
>it was standard on both missile patrol boats
No, those are different configurations as they had not been embedded into the deck and sat on mounts on the deck.
>SSGN
Not the same thing even remotely. The impact of water pressure at vertical angles is important in regards to missile launch and unless you're looking to create a system similar to Ballistic Missiles as is on Ohio class SSGNs, it's better to have the missiles angled slightly to aid in launch.
>ultimately due to time and price constraints decided against it for the Oscars
EXCEPT THE OSCARS DO HAVE EMBEDDED LAUNCH TUBES. And the Charlie class literally took the launch systems from the Papa class, just downgraded and simplified to cut costs. The Papa class's cost is due to the automation, experimental nuclear reactors and titanium hull among other reasons, not the cruise missile systems.
>it's done at the expense of other departments of the ship rather than the firepower, which is what they should have done
The Slava is not intended to be as complex as the Kirov and cutting back its firepower makes it pointless, it's not meant to have high-command capabilities, just act as a back up in case something happens. It is a problem today due to the Russian Navy pushing it into a leadership role even though it isn't meant to be, I never denied that, but that's not a ship design problem, that's a post-Soviet doctrine and corruption problem.
>Jane's is while I wouldn't say more accurate it definitely is a lot more direct from the source because of the weird context of Jane's in being a weird mutually agreed intel sharing phamphlet so that countries could spy on each other.
Except a lot of times countries lied about their capabilities in Janes
>Modern Naval Combat is known for being a bit of a NATO shill
True, but that's not my primary source, and their infographics are accurate and confirmed by Russian ones.

 No.2284

>>1969
>Independents
>Allen Burke
Are you using speech to text?

I thought the real goal of the LCS was muh Chyna?


Unique IPs: 9

[Return][Go to top] [Catalog] | [Home][Post a Reply]
Delete Post [ ]
[ home / rules / faq ] [ overboard / sfw / alt ] [ leftypol / siberia / hobby / tech / edu / games / anime / music / draw / AKM ] [ meta / roulette ] [ cytube / git ] [ GET / ref / marx / booru / zine ]