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Protracted People's War is the military strategy of the international proletariat, It is said to be a universal military doctrine, and to its credit, all top military advisors of all the most powerful countries of the world have accepted that it is an unbeatable strategy. However, its adaptation to the environment of developed capitalist states has yet to be seen. Therefore, my curiosity is piqued. That is exactly what I have set out to do in definite and clear terms. We will be going over them in this order:

The Three Stage of Protracted People's War

- Strategic Defensive
- Strategic Equilibrium
- Strategic Offensive

The Three Main Types of Environments

- Urban
- Suburban
- Rural

Funding and Mass Work

- Bring Food from the Suburbs to the Urban Centers
- Make Money in the Suburbs to Fund Activity in the Cities
- How Mass Work Changes in Different Stages of People's War

Squad Tactics and Details

- Recruitment
- 4 Person Squads
- Hit-and-Run Tactics (Drive-by)
- NEVER Directly Face the Enemy
- Fluid Front Line
- Prioritization of Anonymity
- Communication
- Urban Combat
- Only Attack When You Will Win
- Never Create Patterns
- Never Take a Defensive Position

Understanding the Enemy

- Greatest Strengths and Weaknesses (Blind Authority)
- Keep Notes on Patterns and Police Patrol Schedules
- Familiarize Yourself with Police Training and Their Tactics
- Identify Key Non-Military Targets

The Three Stages of People's War:

The three stages of the Protracted People's War are the Strategic Defensive, Strategic Equilibrium, and the Strategic Offensive. *"The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions."* In the theory of Protracted People's War the three stages represent the transition from an irregular guerrilla force into a regular army.

In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior. Thus, we may look at this as a simple quantity vs quality dialectic. The enemy currently has us all completely surrounded, they hold an absolute superiority in manpower, firepower, territory, logistics, and productive capacity. Therefore, in order to meet this overwhelming quantity, it is important that we have a greater quality of tactics and soldiers. If we manage to adhere strictly to the guerrilla doctrine, only attack when there is an overwhelming chance of success, maintain the element of surprise, never directly engage the enemy for longer than is absolutely necessary, and many other things which we will also be going over, then it is an absolute guarantee that we will inflict thousands of casualties on the enemy, drain them of arms and ammunition, deteriorate their morale, create popular discontent, deteriorate their economy, and drain their federal budget. This is a guarantee, and is really the best way to describe the objective of the first phase of the war: to degrade and deteriorate the enemy over a long period of time until we are able to break them down far enough, and build ourselves up big enough, to where we have reached an equilibrium.

“The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In the second stage, the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them his own by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments, while plundering the Chinese people to the limit; but again he will be confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage, and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there will still be widespread fighting. In this stage, our form of fighting will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still retain a large regular army, but she will find it difficult to launch the strategic counter-offensive immediately because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and along the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the other hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and co-ordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare, as is now being done in Shansi Province. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if it is well conducted the enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of his occupied territory, with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weather its hardships. It will be a very painful period for China; the two big problems will be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the traitors.”

“...Japan's military and financial resources will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare, popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of her troops will deteriorate further, and she will become more isolated internationally. As for China, she will make further progress in the political, military and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further; there will be some new economic growth on the basis of the small industries and the widespread agriculture in the interior; international support will gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from her inferior position, and Japan will lose her superior position; first the two countries will become evenly matched, and then their relative

positions will be reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have completed her preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will enter the stage of the counter-offensive and the expulsion of the enemy. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive will involve three things, namely, an increase in China's own strength, an increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China's superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive."

"The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recover our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself in strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought on strategically interior lines, but will shift gradually to strategically exterior lines. Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can this war be considered over. The third stage will be the last in the protracted war, and when we talk of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through this stage. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defence cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task. In the third stage guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in the second stage."

The Three Main Types of Environments:

The three types of environments that any person can find themselves in are the rural, the sub-urban, and the urban. Because I am American, and most of my audience is American, I will be talking about these environments from my understanding of them in my own country, but I know that cultural, economic, and political trends within these environments are not universal across borders. For instance, in the United States, most modern suburban areas were built relatively recently during the civil rights movement and homes in the suburbs were advertised specifically to wealthy whites looking to get away from the inner cities which tended to be populated with what they saw as "lesser peoples". This is not the case in two examples that I know of: Afghanistan, and Columbia, where the cities are the richest parts of the country, and the further you get from them the poorer and poorer people get.

In America, the rural environment is mostly of no concern to the guerrilla army, and the bulk of our conflict will take place in the urban environments. Not only are the bulk of our activities already concentrated in the cities, not only are the bulk of all enemy forces concentrated in the cities, but also most of the American rural environment is plagued by conservatism and reaction. Even if exceptions can be made to the rule, it cannot be denied that this is the majority of cases. This is very interesting, considering that in feudal and semi-feudal countries like China before the revolution, the rural areas were the most progressive due to the main antagonisms being between peasants and feudal lords. But America has very few peasants, and we are a fully developed capitalist state, so our activities are almost always going to take place in the urban environments.

The environment that your battle takes place in will be one of the main determining factors in the outcome of that battle, and because of that, it is more than necessary for anyone studying urban warfare to be well antiquated with the differences, disadvantages, and special strategic advantages that urban environments have that rural and suburban environments don't.

"Limited Mounted Maneuver Space--Buildings, street width, rubble, debris, and noncombatants all contribute to limited mounted maneuver space inside urban areas. Armored vehicles rarely are able to operate inside urban areas without Infantry support (DA, 2002a). One of the greatest

disadvantages of the guerrilla is his lack of vehicular and armor support to counter his enemy's mobility and armored combat power."

"Three-Dimensional Terrain--Combat in urban areas can occur on the surface, above the surface, and below the surface, as well as inside and outside of buildings (DA, 2002a)."

"Collateral Damage--Significant collateral damage can occur during combat in urban environments. This can be noncombatant collateral damage as well as structural or environmental, and can have an adverse effect on the population's support of the guerrillas (DA, 2002a)."

"Small Unit Battles--Combat in urban areas, even under high-intensity conditions with large formations, is a series of small unit battles (DA, 2002a). Success is determined by individual and unit initiative, command and control, unity of effort, and training."

"Snipers--The utility of snipers in urban combat is well documented throughout the spectrum of conflict from low intensity conflicts to total war. The use of precision long and short range fires can have a devastating effect on an enemy's morale and initiative (DA, 2002a)."

"The urban environment can be advantageous to gaining surprise through the increased cover and concealment and three-dimensional terrain. It can also put a guerrilla at a disadvantage due to the often increased number of enemy forces necessary to secure built-up areas and the decreased avenues of egress available."

"Guerrilla forces rarely have sophisticated intelligence gathering technology and must rely almost completely on human intelligence. The urban environment can provide both advantages and disadvantages for the collection of tactical intelligence for guerrilla combat operations. The sheer density of urban environment populations and the proximity of enemy forces can hinder the guerrillas contact with civilian supporters. The fear of civilian enemy collaborators and oppressive population control measures can also separate the guerrillas from their popular support, reducing their effectiveness."

Funding and Mass Work:

Keeping in-line with the three types of environments, how we conduct mass work differently in each environment is something which needs to be studied. Rural environments once again get little investment because there is little potential for return. Although it would be theoretically possible, and perhaps even quite easy for us to take over and control a small town, it would be reckless. Collaborating with farms as a means to get food (if no food can be shipped to the city) would be highly beneficial, but fighting won't spill over into the rural areas for a long time. Fighting may spill over into the suburbs, but the bulk of our focus should be in the cities. The prior analysis of the suburbs as wealthy white havens is still correct to this day, but from the experience I've had with suburban environments exposes that there are usually few community events, even less that the youth actually like. The suburbs are often barren, needing to travel away from them for entertainment. The result of this is usually a large portion of the youth getting into drugs like Marijuana. It would not be completely impractical to sell weed in the rich suburban areas in order to fund operations in the city proper. This was actually capitalized on by the IRA. There are numerous ways to make money in the suburbs, and the suburbs is where we should make our money. Furthermore, going door to door asking for canned goods in the suburbs is an excellent start to a Food Drive which would be hosted in the cities. That sort of practical work echoes further and wider than any slogan. Perhaps food drop-offs would be something we could work towards.

Mass work in the first stage of the war, the strategic defensive, will be focused on getting the people to like us, getting them to support us, and getting them to want us to win. The use of front organizations should be strategically employed to engage with sections of the population politically. While these people wouldn't be members of the Communist Party, nor would they be guerrilla fighters (at least not inherently), through the mass work of these organizations can the party line be

ingrained in the activity of the people. The front organizations should have no official ties to the party or guerrilla forces. We need to help the people and hear the people, understand their grievances and work to fix them. We need to help them with food security as a top priority.

Revolutionary base areas in urban environments are a point of great debate. They can only really be won over during the actual conflict, and Maoists in the imperialist countries are still grappling with how to even initiate the conflict. Truthfully though, the only way they really *could* operate would be in a similar function to gang territory. This really shouldn't be so much of a surprise, seeing as how gangs usually originate as groups trying to defend their own communities. Of course, I'm aware that saying revolutionary base areas will look like gang territory is a bad look and I don't mean to say that the party or the guerrilla forces should act like thugs or gang members, and it is to be taken more figuratively than literally. Unlike the gangs, the guerrilla fighters have a definite revolutionary goal. The way we hold territory is not through actual defensive units and entrenchment, but through popular support built up by mass work. The use of friendly informants and stirring of popular discontent through the front orgs should be able to turn these areas into safe-zones.

Then comes the 2nd stage of the war, the stalemate. This stage will be particularly brutal, and we are going to suffer a lot for it. *"Our tasks will then be to mobilize the whole people to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle and apply new wartime policies, and so to weather the hardships. In the second stage... ...we will have to oppose splits and systematically improve fighting techniques, reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and prepare for the counter-offensive."*

The content of our mass work has to significantly change from the first stage to the second, otherwise we'll lose the support of the people, and our guerrillas will be annihilated.

Squad Tactics and Details:

The logical question to ask now, of course, is how do we go about recruiting guerrillas? For that information, I believe it would be more beneficial to play part of an audiobook for a field manual on creating and training a militia unit.

How should guerrilla bands be organized then? IRA tactical experience and field manuals recommend that Active Service Units be composed of four personnel. Usually these people know each other, but have no natural connection such as familial relation. In the first phase of the war, a large emphasis should be placed on drive-by style hit-and-run operations like those used in inner-city gang conflicts, and all effort must be made to avoid any decisive battles. Sniping and sabotage (both economic and logistical) should also be prioritized. This is because the most effective way to directly engage the enemy is to never allow yourself to *directly* engage the enemy. Any time the guerrilla band actually fires at the enemy it should be done with an overwhelming element of surprise, and only when there is a 95% chance of a successful operation. Furthermore, any contact with the enemy should not exceed 3 minutes under any circumstances. This is because in the world we live in now, active shooter calls have become very common, and police have been drilled heavily to be able to respond to an active shooter within 3 minutes on average. Response times between different cities can be quite different, in LA it's 5 minutes, but in Houston it's 10. Despite this, any and all engagement should not ever exceed 3 minutes in the first phase of the war.

"There was a period of time in the early 1980s when the IRA attempted some raids on RUC stations and British military outposts, sometimes using homemade armored vehicles designed to penetrate the outer defenses of the outpost (Fay 2003). These raids were rarely successful primarily due to either the security apparatus around the target or a loss of operational security on the part of the IRA when planning a large operation that involved a greater number of personnel to execute than normal (Fay 2003). Essentially, raids involve too much risk because of the direct engagement necessary with the security forces (British Company Commander 2003)."

As stated before, during the strategic defensive, the enemy has quantitative superiority in almost all categories. Because of this, it should be quite obvious that any direct engagements would be fighting the enemy on their terms, where we have significant disadvantages. This should only be considered if suicide is our objective. Keeping in-line with this, attempting to hold on to any amount of territory for any significant amount of time would ultimately lead to the death of the entire guerrilla band -- because speed and surprise are our strengths. If speed and surprise are our strengths, then entrenchment is a death sentence. Their superior firepower alone would bog you down in the concrete jungle, and they would annihilate you.

“Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare depending exclusively on defence works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions. It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most effectively. In the face of the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow front for a defensive war of attrition, we would be throwing away the advantages of our geography and economic organization and repeating the mistake of Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles, and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat effectiveness of the enemy troops.”

Rather than a static front line and a regular army, we employ a guerrilla force and a fluid front line which is constantly changing, with guerrilla bands periodically revealing themselves for a surprise attack and then blending back in with the rest of society. Holding on to territory before entering a phase where you and the enemy are equals is a spit in the face to everything which has already been explained. Therefore any buildings or land held by the guerrillas is left back to the original owners once the operation has concluded, solidifying this war as one of attrition.

The security of the identity of all guerrilla fighters is not only to be one of the highest top priorities, but should be an independent goal for all individual personnel themselves. This can be achieved through the use of general secrecy in tandem with loyalty oaths. Psychologically, the act of swearing loyalty is of far greater value than the assumption of such, and generally historically has positive effects on group cohesion and combat effectiveness.

“Operational security hindered effectiveness during the rare large-sized raids, such as the raid on the Kabul Metropolitan Bus Transportation Authority which involved 120 Mujahideen fighters, where only the subcommanders knew the plan or final target to preserve security. The bulk of the guerrillas were informed of the plan and their individual duties once they were placed in position (Grau and Jalali 1999). This led to the Mujahideen having detailed plans to get to and from the target but not for actions on the objective.”

“Security for IRA guerrillas is maintained primarily through tight operational security of the information concerning the attack and an ability to disassociate the perpetrator from the action taken. The members of the ASUs travel separately to their objectives and after an operation will withdraw from the objective separately. Clothes will be changed or dropped off to separate the possible forensic evidence from the guerrilla who will then melt back into the population (British Company Commander 2003). Any weapons or equipment used in an attack will be taken by someone else to dispose of or hide. Reconnaissance of the objective or target will have been performed by a person or persons separate from those who will execute the action to maintain the operational security and disassociation (Fay 2003).”

Aside from simple hit-and-run tactics, which could potentially become predictable if handled incorrectly, there are other ways of indirectly engaging the enemy; *“The most common urban combat operations employed by the IRA are sniping, bomb ambushes (usually command detonated), mortar attacks, and RPG attacks (Fay 2003).”*

“Mortar attacks are a common means of attacking British and RUC patrols. Many varieties of homemade mortars have been developed by the IRA over the years (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 1999). They are often mounted in vans with their roofs cut out, positioned within range of their target, and then remotely detonated. Small arms and explosives have been the mainstay of IRA weapons since the beginning because they are easier to procure, train on, and transport (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 1999).”

“Bomb ambushes follow a common pattern. The first step is to create what the British call a “come-on,” basically a ruse or bait of some sort to get the soldiers to come into the kill zone. This could be a civil disturbance of some kind or even a small device that appears to be a bomb (British Company Commander 2003). Once the soldiers or RUC responding get to the designated area the guerrilla detonating the bomb waits to initiate until a predetermined amount of personnel or vehicles enter the kill zone. He often has some type of mark on a wall or feature of the street that designates where the majority of targets should be in order to initiate the explosive (Fay 2003). Finally, the guerrilla would detonate the device, which depending on the size and composition of the intended targets, could vary in size from a small canister to a vehicle packed with shrapnel. Fertilizer bombs are the most common, initiated with SEMTEX (Fay 2003). The limited maneuver space of the urban environment is certainly utilized by the IRA but not to the same degree as the guerrilla movements in the other case studies. This is primarily due to the fact that the IRA did not normally contend with large numbers of armored vehicles. The IRA would occasionally target the civilian vehicles used by the British military for general transport and logistics activity (Fay 2003). They would block the front and back with other vehicles and simply walk up and shoot those inside. This tactic was not used very long because it exposed the perpetrators for later identification (Fay 2003). The three-dimensional terrain of the urban environment, with its multistoried buildings, rows of housing units, and small streets and alleyways, is used by the IRA in a passive sense in that it makes British operations more difficult. British communications, reconnaissance, maneuver, and organized pursuit are all degraded in urban areas. Most actions by the IRA are conducted on the surface and street level because a very rapid withdrawal is necessary to avoid direct contact and capture. The IRA used underground firing ranges in the rural areas but there is no specific use of subsurface areas in the urban environments aside from burial caches of explosives, weapons, and other equipment (Fay 2003). Buildings above the street level are primarily used for observation and occasionally for sniping, but the nature of the conflict, essentially permissive with much civilian activity, makes prolonged engagements and rapid withdrawals from roofs or upper floors of buildings problematic (British Company Commander 2003).”

“Snipers are often employed in the come-on role to bait British and RUC forces into a bomb ambush. Sniper specific ASUs would be comprised of a shooter, two watchers to maintain security and observation, and one person to move the weapon after the shots were fired. At times, even children were used in the role of “weapon-mover.” This meant that the sniper himself only had physical possession of the weapon for about twenty minutes (Fay 2003). When employed as the primary method of engagement, the sniper would take one or two shots then withdraw (Fay 2003). When used in the come-on role to bait security forces, it was actually better not to hit their target. An injured or killed soldier or policeman meant the patrol would be occupied with the casualty and unable to attempt pursuit and continue on into the real engagement area or kill zone (British Company Commander 2003).”

“Collaboration with local populace is certainly an IRA strength that has allowed it to maintain urban guerrilla combat operations for many years. The IRA has a sophisticated network of human intelligence collection capabilities perfected through years of operations (Fay 2003). All manner of

support comes from different sections of the Catholic populace inside and out of Northern Ireland's borders. Most significant to their urban guerrilla warfare combat operations are reconnaissance and surveillance support. British forces and the RUC are constantly under observation by someone in the IRA's network to keep them informed of their movements (Fay 2003). One of the more obvious civilian IRA supporters encountered by security forces are the "dickers:" teenage boys with cell phones who loiter around security forces' barracks and on the streets, calling in locations and actions of the patrols (British Company Commander 2003)."

"Congruent with all successful guerrilla operations, the element of surprise was the decisive factor in the Mujahideen's ability to conduct successful combat operations in urban environments. This was primarily through the use of civilian contacts and auxiliary to prepare the area for operations, either through reconnaissance or actually aiding in the execution of the action (Grau and Jalali 1999)."

"As opposed to their rural guerrilla counterparts, the urban guerrillas were able to spend more time in reconnaissance and surveillance of their targets to determine patterns and vulnerabilities (Russian General Staff 2002). Their ability to move about in the local urban populace gave them this advantage whereas the rural guerrilla was forced to remain in hiding while not conducting operations."

"The urban Mujahideen wore no uniforms or distinctive insignia and intentionally blurred the line between combatant and non-combatant to deceive the Soviets and Afghan government forces. Elderly citizens were used to carry messages and explosives and civilian workers, sometimes even females, planted bombs in government offices (Grau and Jalali 1999). The use of enemy uniforms for deception was used in some circumstances. During one example a guerrilla dressed as a DRA officer in order to kidnap a Soviet advisor. One group even dressed as civilian farmers and sold fruit and vegetables from a cart to Soviet advisors at a bus stop for several days (Grau and Jalali 38 1999). The cart was outfitted with a false bottom and loaded with explosives and timed fuses that detonated when a crowd of Soviets was around it."

Now that we have a basic understanding of how to attack the enemy, emphasis should be placed on understanding *when* to attack the enemy. It would be unwise of us to attack and raid anytime we felt like it. First you have to know your enemy, you have to study them and their patterns, which we will be going over in this video. Once you have done that, then we can plan our attack. As stated earlier, you should only attack the enemy when the odds are overwhelmingly in your favor. In order to properly understand when such an opportunity presents itself, it is necessary to know the ins and outs of the enemy.

One way, if not the main way to keep the odds in your favor, to keep the element of surprise, and to maintain operational security is to actively avoid the development of patterns. Psychologically, humans love patterns, and will look for them in whatever they do, even unconsciously. The results of that fact are four-fold; the enemy develops patterns naturally, we develop patterns naturally, we can identify certain patterns in tactics from the enemy, and they can identify certain patterns in tactics from us. This alone would be enough information for any serious guerrilla to consciously change their tactics and strategies to avoid defeat, but we all also know for a fact that for some officials in the CIA, FBI, or armed forces, analyzing our patterns would be of great importance, and would most likely result in their gaining great prestige. It should be routine practice to look over prior operations and attempt to find overarching patterns that could be predicted. Vary the days, nights, locations, and methods that you use.

How should guerrillas communicate? A great privilege afforded to the people of imperialist countries is our easy access to cheap electronics. Cheap smartphones can be ordered online from \$40 to as little as \$20. Purchasing a cell phone plan for these devices is unnecessary and counter-productive. Instead, communication should go through secure messaging apps such as Telegram, which importantly offer Peer-to-Peer Encryption. If coordinating an operation which requires on-

field communication, other, even cheaper flip phones can be purchased with a certain amount of prepaid minutes for use. After such an operation, though, those flip phones should be destroyed and discarded. Do not use the burner smartphone for on-field communication as the smartphone is not meant to be destroyed, but is meant to be used as a consistent and reliable form of communication between guerrillas. Avoid making calls on the flip phone in public as they no longer blend in with the usual crowd.

The last note to be made under favorable conditions should be to never voluntarily take a defensive position. A defensive position is one where the enemy has you boxed in. Either attack or withdraw, if you are attacked, unleash the full extent of your firepower, neutralize the attack, and relocate. It has already been decided that attempting to take and hold territory is suicidal, but those kinds of decisions aren't always made consciously. You and your band may be forced into a position where you have to defend a single building. We shouldn't assume the best of odds will always be in our favor, shit happens and it sucks, sometimes things just go wrong. Perhaps somewhere along the line we will become over-confident and will plan some large-scale raid, or perhaps we are forced into engaging the enemy directly due to bad circumstances or planning. If the situation is one where your forces are many, and their forces are many, and you are not surrounded, you are to retreat until the enemy is made to divide itself between several streets and buildings. At that moment, see how they are divided. The goal is to identify which of these divisions you could be able to attack in detail. If you withdrew only one fighter from each squad, then each squad has had its firepower reduced by 1/4th. Additionally, if you send each of those single fighters to aid in the fight against a single one of those divisions, you could expand the firepower of the original group by 2, 3, or even 4 times. This is attacking in detail; it's another way for a smaller army to engage a much larger one by using the terrain to divide up the superior forces into inferior smaller groups which you could hold a strategic numerical advantage over if you concentrate your forces. If the situation is one where you are completely boxed in, your best bet would be to use the three-dimensional nature of the urban environment and go underground. A superior force would most likely not follow you into the sewers, and would get bogged down trying.

Understanding the Enemy:

The overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy has already been talked to death. But of course, guns don't make war, people make war. The enemy's greatest strength in the United States is that most of the population has been conditioned to usually blindly obey authority or symbols of authority. This is very convenient for them, because it means they can do almost anything that they want. This is also one of their greatest weaknesses. If you go anywhere with a yellow vest, a hardhat, and a tool belt, and you act like you are supposed to be there, no one will question your presence. This is especially useful for when day-time transportation of guerrillas, arms, and/or equipment has to be made. Under the right conditions, any weakness can be made a strength, and any strength can be made into a weakness. This is true for both sides.

Great effort should be expended keeping notes on enemy patterns and police patrol schedules. For example: at the end of my neighborhood, very often but always on Sundays, there are 2-3 patrol cars parked by the intersection, usually with a civilian vehicle behind them. They are always parked in the same order, either all patrol cars, or 2 patrol cars in front and one civilian vehicle in back. If you keep going straight, you'll see a small gas station which is a hotspot for police activity. Most police officers in the country carry a standard 9mm sidearm, usually a glock. Be familiar with the firearms used by the enemy, principally, be familiar with the number of rounds that can be held in them. This is important if you find yourself in a position where you need to wait for them to run out of ammunition. Other assessments must be made such as finding favorable positions, however, legally speaking I'm probably already in a lot of trouble and would like to state that I am not wishing any harm towards these individuals, it is simply for educational purposes.

Be familiar with police training and their tactics. Patrols usually only involve two officers, armed only with sidearms. According to the San Diego Police Department, when factoring in the additional equipment usually worn by police officers such as the vest, the boots, the belt, the gun and so on, police officers will weigh 25-30 pounds heavier than usual. This makes them inherently less mobile

on foot than the guerrilla soldier who won't even be wearing a uniform. Police training, as far as I can find, puts great emphasis on training officers to catch suspects on-foot. Police are also usually quite awful with firearms. Police training only lasts 6 months in most places in the country, and most of that time is spent not even holding a firearm. To emphasize this, in September of 2013, two NYPD officers gunned down a killer, but not before shooting 9 other separate people. Thankfully, police officers are such bad shots that all of them survived. It should be noted that after the first few initial operations, police accuracy training will likely be updated, improved, and mandatory, so we should not constantly underestimate them.

When studying the enemy, a list of key non-combatant targets may also be beneficial. Attacking targets with significant economic power could be strategically employed to degrade the economy, and the attacks may play special tactical roles if the targets in question are known contributors to and collaborators with the police department or whatever enemy force is present. For example, when the protestors burned down the Target during the riots, it was because Target was a known major financial contributor to the MPD.

I would like to re-emphasize that all of this information is displayed for information' sake. This is purely an educational video on a hypothetical situation. All information gathered was found online and free to access, and I cannot be held responsible for any of the actions that someone else might do with said available information. I would like to thank my patrons by name, but I'm unsure if they would like to have their names associated with this, so if you are a patron please know that you have my deepest possible thanks. With that, my name is Matthew Liles, thank you.

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