Some Secondary Sources on Hegel

(Listed in order of importance for understanding Hegel’s philosophy)

Introductory Works

Beiser, Frederick. Hegel. New York: Routledge, 2005. Beiser covers all the requisite ground with a compelling through-line. He plays up Hegel’s devaluing of the individual more than is appropriate and sees Hegel as fundamentally progressive (which is misleading), but one probably couldn’t ask for anything more in an introduction. As a result, this is the best introduction to Hegel that exists. Moderately difficult, however.

Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”: A Reader’s Guide. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. This is a first-rate commentary on the Phenomenology, even better than Stern’s good commentary. The only downside is that Houlgate goes into great detail on the early, more well-known sections, and then only briefly touches on the later ones, which are more difficult and obscure. Very readable.

Stern, Robert. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Routledge, 2002. Stern presents not only a clear interpretation of his own, but he also alludes to the competing interpretations, such as Pippin’s and Kojève’s. He essentially sees the Phenomenology as Hegel’s attempt to allow us to feel at home in the world. This is a good commentary on the Phenomenology of Spirit. Very clear.

McCarney, Joseph. Hegel on History. London: Routledge, 2000. Like all the books in the Routledge philosophy guidebook series, this one is quite good and provides an excellent introduction to Hegel as a philosopher of history. McCarney often moves past the typical readings, even though this is an introduction. The highlight is the defense of Hegel’s dealings with other cultures and races. Rather than accept these critiques, McCarney refutes all of them and proclaims Hegel an anti-racist. Easy and readable.

Althaus, Horst. Hegel: An Intellectual Biography. Trans. Michael Tarsh. Malden, MA: Polity, 2000. This is a better biography than Terry Pinkard’s though it was written earlier (published in 1992 in German). Althaus alternates between discussion of Hegel’s life and his work, even if the discussion of the latter is only introductory. There were nice details, especially about Hegel’s relationship with Hölderlin and Schelling. Easy.

Pinkard, Terry. Hegel: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pinkard displays a vast knowledge of Hegel’s thought, but the biography lacks a sense of what is essential about Hegel. Pinkard seems to simply be chronicling the events of Hegel’s life and the history surrounding it without any real sense of the importance of anything. Much of the tone is debunking—throwing light on the myths that have developed about Hegel. But as a result, Pinkard doesn’t see any greatness in him either. The discussion of the works is similarly lacking with no sense of how the works come out of Hegel’s life or any relation between the two. The fact that the life and works are treated in separate
chapters is thus symptomatic. Easy.

Rockmore, Tom. *Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Rockmore’s main thesis concerns the idea of a system, and he sees Hegel’s great breakthrough as doing away with the need for a first principle in the system, which is of crucial importance. Fichte did away with the need for foundation, and Hegel just took this further. Rockmore sees that this is why Hegel’s philosophy is necessarily circular, which means that the end, not the beginning, is what matters. The last half of the book—the discussion of Hegel’s specific works and those who followed him—is less rewarding than the first half, but it still makes for good reading. Easy.


Harris, H. S. *Hegel: Phenomenology and System*. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995. A beginning introduction to the *Phenomenology*. Harris stresses the role that experience plays in Hegel's thought. He also describes the historical and philosophical situation which the *Phenomenology* emerged from and responded to. Most importantly, however, Harris goes through each section of Hegel’s text in very clear, helpful terms. Harris is an important commentator on Hegel, but this work is also somewhat dated. Relatively easy.


Kaufmann, Walter. *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978. A very basic account of Hegel's life and work, with a general section on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but nothing addressed in detail. Simple, but informative. Although one can learn some basics about Hegel from this easy read, it has the downside of radically simplifying this thought and thus misrepresenting several key points. It’s very dated as well and probably best avoided. Nonetheless, easy.

Singer, Peter. *Hegel*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. A wildly incorrect but brief general introduction to Hegel’s thought. Interesting to look at if one wants to see how not to understand Hegel. Easy, but also easy to be misled by.
Works for the Intermediate Hegelian

Comay, Rebecca. *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. This is a really an outstanding book on Hegel, though the first two chapter devoted to Kant and the French Revolution cover more basic ideas. The book dramatically picks up, however, when it presents the idea of the absolute as the moment of disinheritance that allows one to break from the past. For Comay, the absolute is an event. Mourning becomes a way of forming the new, whereas melancholia, which is where Kant is stuck, can never constitute a break. A difficult book, but one can get through it because of the lively style.

Žižek, Slavoj. *Sex and the Failed Absolute*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2019. Perhaps Žižek’s masterpiece and his most refined reading of Hegel that explains clearly the relationship between epistemology and ontology in Hegel’s thought. Žižek includes important discussions of Hegel’s relationship to Kant and how his move beyond Kant pushed him toward what Žižek calls dialectical materialism. Žižek’s most accessible book on Hegel.

Buck-Morss, Susan. *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. The most important book ever written on Hegel’s relationship to questions of race and colonialism. Through an analysis of what Hegel was reading when he wrote the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Buck-Morss uncovers that he creates the master/slave dialectic in response to the Haitian Revolution, which he was followingly closely. This dialectic was his way of taking the side of the revolting slaves, though this position would have been too dangerous for him to assert more straightforwardly. Very accessible.

Rose, Gillian. *Hegel Contra Sociology*. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981. This is the best book on Hegel from the latter half of the 20th century. It presents a sophisticated understanding of Hegel. Part of the book is intended to show how sociology, which Rose sees is beset by a neo-Kantian dichotomy, is caught in a problem that was solved by Hegel. Hegel shows, in a way that cannot be abstractly stated, that theory and practice—necessity and freedom—are not two separate realms, but the same thing. They only appear separate because of contradictions within the actuality. This book is mostly a sustained attack upon bourgeois law and private property. For Rose, Hegel is the great critic of private property; this shines through every one of his works, though he could only attempt to create the conditions of possibility for something else, not actually say what that would be. Very difficult, not for the faint of heart.

Kojeve, Alexandre. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. The most significant interpretation of Hegel in the 20th century. Kojeve’s reading had a major impact on continental philosophy (especially in France) and basically shaped the entire field by establishing Hegel as the figure to pose one’s thought against, which is what Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Bataille, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty all did. Kojeve’s
reading focuses on the struggle between the master and the slave (what Hegel actually calls the “Dialectic of Lordship and Servitude)—making this its basis. Kojève sees the struggle for recognition as the defining struggle of human history, and he interprets Hegel’s Philosophy of History on the basis of the master/slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, identifying the end of history with the end of the struggle for recognition. Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, though important, is highly tendentious. Thus, one should definitely know it but at the same time not put too much stock into it. He interprets the Phenomenology as a work of philosophical anthropology. Kojève’s first chapter is the most simple and a very good introduction to the master/slave dialectic. His interpretation moves much wider than this is some of the untranslated lectures, but unfortunately these are available only in French. Moderately difficult, but also interesting reading.

Malabou, Catherine. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic. Trans. Lisabeth During. New York: Routledge, 2005. Malabou has written an amazing justification for Hegel. The first chapter on man is by far the best, and the book slows down quite a bit during the discussion of God. But then things pick back up a bit in the final chapter, where Malabou talks about a specific reading practice for speculative philosophy. It is with temporality and the concept of plasticity that the real originality of the book lies. But that is in no way to diminish it. Difficult, not a starting point.

Avineri, Shlomo. Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). This is the best book on Hegel’s political philosophy, and it’s hard to believe that Avineri wrote it in 1972. Avineri does a great job of defending Hegel against the charge that he was a conservative or reactionary. Perhaps the most convincing point in this regard is the fact that Hegel was rooting for the army fighting against his own country, even when this army burned his house down and threatened the survival of his great book. This is very impressive. But the key point of the book is the question of civil society. It is capitalism, Hegel believes, that protects particularity in the state, and we require the opposition between civil society and the state in modernity. The problem is that civil society always produces poverty, and the state cannot remedy this. Avineri really anticipates the point that Frank Ruda makes on this issue in his book Hegel’s Rabble. Avineri really tries to claim Hegel as a figure of the Left here, and even more so than Marx, who wrongly believes that we can overcome contradiction, which Hegel rejects. Accessible and fun to read.

Pippin, Robert B. Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pippin is one of the most important Hegel scholars of our time, and this is his most important book (and the one that established his importance). This book is so significant that its central thesis—that Hegel is responding to Kant in his philosophy—has become common sense. Pippin reads Hegel as first and foremost concerned with epistemology (the problem of knowing) rather than metaphysics (the problem of being). In this way, Pippin refutes the major criticism of Hegel—that he proposes a naive metaphysics. But Pippin fails to see how Hegel works back to metaphysics through epistemology, which becomes clear in the works of Slavoj Žižek, Catherine Malabou, and Rebecca Comay. Difficult but clear.
Henrich, Dieter Henrich. *Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism*. Ed. David S. Pacini. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. Henrich is the most important interpreter of Hegel in Germany, and this is the only one of his works to be translated. (*Hegel im Kontext* is the more significant work, but it exists only in German). Here, Henrich basically provides a nice history of German Idealism. It’s very smart and reads well, but the historicist bent is so heavy that there aren’t any great theoretical insights that come through. The discussion is primarily about Fichte, whom Henrich highly esteems, because he sees the necessity of establishing a first principle. Henrich sees Hegel’s first principle as negation, but Hegel himself claims that philosophy cannot have a first principle. Moderately difficult.

Marcuse, Herbert. *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. 2nd Ed. New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1983. For Marcuse, the point is that Hegel thinks we must realize rationality, make the real rational. This runs directly contrary to the prevailing idea articulated by Rose, Žižek, and Comay. The problem with his reading is that Marcuse sets Hegel up for the critique made by Jacques Derrida and others: he is imposing reason upon reality, forcing everything that isn’t reasonable into the box of reason. But Marcuse nonetheless makes an appealing case for his reading, despite the great apotheosis of reason that he is guilty of. Marcuse contends that it is only through reason that one has any appeal beyond the given. Otherwise, you have to just take what you get. It is reason that gives us negativity and thus freedom. This idea and Marcuse’s explanation of it are the main strengths of the book, but so also is his exculpation of Hegel from the equation of him with Nazism. The final chapter, which is very important for situating Hegel politically, nicely shows how the Nazis really detested Hegel, precisely because they understood him better than the rest of us. What is excellent is that Marcuse sees how Hegel’s celebration of the state was actually, even in his own time, an attack upon a form of fascism, rather than the opposite. Readable and not difficult.

Sedgwick, Sally. *Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Sedgwick really repeats her main thesis—Hegel is critical of Kant’s dichotomizing concepts and intuitions or intellect and nature—but it’s a sound point. Her main idea is that for Hegel the content always infects the form. This is a solid book on Hegel that makes an important point about the nature of his critique of Kant. In fact, it shows just how devastating Hegel’s critique of Kant is for the Kantian project and that he fails because he couldn’t be the formalist that he thought he was. The points where she makes clear how Kant smuggles content into the form are the highlights. Moderately difficult.

Davis, Walter. *Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity In/And Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. Includes a chapter offering a detailed reading of the first two sections of the *Phenomenology*, informed by an eclectic blend of existentialism, Marxism, and psychoanalysis, and is thus able to bring out many aspects of Hegel’s thought neglected by other interpreters. It is the phenomenological bent of the book that causes it to minimize the importance of the later chapters in the *Phenomenology*. The style is very conversational and readable,
though moderately difficult.

Stewart, Jon, ed. *The Hegel Myths and Legends*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996. The best two essays in the collection are Pippin’s and Hanna’s toward the end that make the case for Hegel as a philosopher of contradiction and explain just what this implies. Pippin does it through a discussion of Essence in the *Science of Logic*, and Hanna does it through a critique of formal logic. Hanna helps to clarify what Hegel means by truth. Most of the other essays debunk legends (though one wrongly invokes synthesis in reference to Hegel), but the points are usually pretty obvious. Easy.

Beiser, Frederick C., ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. The top Hegel scholars contribute to this volume, providing their different perspectives on Hegel’s thought and making this a key aid in understanding Hegel. Important essays cover Hegel’s dialectical method, his idealism, the difficult transitions in the *Phenomenology*, and Hegel's relation to other philosophers. This collection is somewhat dated since so many important books on Hegel have come out in the 2000s, but it remains a useful reference. Varying degrees of difficulty.

**Works for the Advanced Hegelian**

Žižek, Slavoj. *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism*. New York: Verso, 2012. Žižek is the foremost living interpreter of Hegel, and this is his masterpiece. But it’s over a 1,000 pages long and is not easy to read. Žižek sprinkles his commentary with jokes and allusions to movies, which makes it easier going. His main argument is that Hegel is the philosopher who conceives a split in being. Difficult.

Henrich, Dieter. *Hegel im Kontext*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971. This is one of the best books written on Hegel, especially amazing for when it was written. Years went by before Henrich’s portrait of Hegel began to replace the dominant caricature. The early chapters on how Hegel emerged out of his relationship with Hölderlin are great, but the real highlight comes afterward, when Henrich explains the beginning of the *Science of Logic*, the role that immediacy plays in essence, and the necessity of contingency in Hegel’s system. Henrich is not yet tackling issues like the absolute or the end of history, but he does provide very clear analyses of these great difficulties. Probably the most important act is that of giving contingency its due in Hegel’s system, which no one else wanted to do prior to Henrich. Moderately difficult if one reads German.

Lebrun, Gérard. *La Patience du concept: Essai sur le discours hégélien*. Paris: Gallimard, 1972. Undoubtedly the most important French commentator on Hegel whose work has not been translated, despite the efforts of Slavoj Žižek. Lebrun’s characterization of Hegel’s thought as a critique of representation is pretty compelling. He sees how representation of the mode of thinking of the understanding and how it leads to fixed oppositions that have no resolution. By positioning Hegel as a critique of representation, Lebrun can show the importance of contradiction in Hegel’s thought. Contradiction, according to Lebrun,
nothing but the unity of the opposition and their mutual dependence. Because he sees Hegel as opposed to opposition, Lebrun frames him as a wholly different kind of philosopher, one who doesn’t make arguments or try to convert readers. Difficult, even for those who read French.

Longuenesse, Béatrice. *Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics*. Trans. Nicole J. Simek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Longuenesse is basically a French version of Robert Pippin. She wrote this book at almost the same time he wrote *Hegel’s Idealism*, and it is almost as good. Her basic claim is that Hegel extends Kantian critical philosophy to the point where contradiction becomes evident. The chapter on contradiction is the highlight, but there is also a very good discussion of ground in chapter three and the actual in chapter four. The last two chapters were basically tacked on for the English edition and are not up to the others because Longuenesse had subsequently moved on to Kant and more or less abandoned Hegel. The great error of her position (and Pippin’s) is to strip Hegel of any ontological pretentions. It’s all just occurring within thought with no relation to being. She admits that this requires reading Hegel against what he says. In order to make contradiction central (but also in order to sustain this anti-ontological vision), Longuenesse contends that the Doctrine of Essence, not the Doctrine of the Concept, provides the key to the *Logic*. This is also Pippin’s move. The flaw here seems obvious: Hegel wasn’t smart enough to figure out where his real point was. Still, it’s quite a good book and probably among the top ten. Moderately difficult.

Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. The most thorough and insightful commentary on the *Phenomenology*. Unlike many commentators, Hyppolite never turns Hegel into a straw-man; he always present Hegel in all his complexity and erudition. This was first published in 1947 in French, but even after all these years it remains a standard. Moderately difficult and lengthy.

Lukács, Georg. *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1976. Lukács was the preeminent Hegelian Marxist in the world. In 1947, he wrote this classic account of Hegel’s importance as a political thinker. The limitation in Lukács’s thought is the dogmatic Marxism that he is working under, which wasn’t the case when he wrote *History and Class Consciousness*, his statement of Hegelian Marxist philosophy. Still, the attempt here is to show other Marxists that Hegel is, by and large, their friend. The most interesting idea in the book (which recurs several times) is that Hegel’s insight into society becomes greater when his politics become less progressive and more conservative. At these points, he begins to see society for what it is and to think more dialectically about the society. There is much of value here, despite the occasionally tedious turns. Moderately difficult.

Brandom, Robert. *A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019. Hegel’s expansive commentary on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* reads this book as a chronical of how we become agents by being taken as agents by others. Brandom sees Hegel’s philosophy as a way of establishing norms
into order to ultimately make sense of the objective world. This is probably the definitive attempt to articulate a vision of Hegel as a foundational thinker for the tradition of analytic philosophy. Difficult and long.

Adorno, Theodor W. *Hegel: Three Studies*. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993. Adorno first published this book on Hegel in 1963. It demonstrates much more appreciation for Hegel than Adorno shows elsewhere, even though he wrote the highly critical *Negative Dialectics* just afterward in 1966. In this book, even though at the end he sees certain limitations to Hegel, he never adopts the more dismissive attitude that permeates *Negative Dialectics* and his other works. None of his dismissive, anti-Hegelian statements like “The whole is the false.” What he captures instead is the great complexity of Hegel’s thought, and he adduces the reasons for this complexity: the fact that Hegel paid attention to the nonidentical and tried to speak it without destroying it. The final essay here is the best because it is all about how hard it is to read Hegel and how sometimes one just can’t make sense of what is there on the page. But all of the essays are great. The second essay on experience shows how experience isn’t something removed from speculative thought and the concept—but something arrived at through speculative thought. Difficult.

Pippin, Robert, *Hegel’s Realm of Shadows: Logic as Metaphysics in “The Science of Logic.”* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019. Pippin explains how we are to understand Hegel’s claim that logic is metaphysics. He contends that Hegel’s logic shows what categories must be necessary for our thought to have a metaphysical validity. Difficult.

Jameson, Fredric. *The Hegel Variations: On the “Phenomenology of Spirit.”* New York: Verso, 2010. Despite an understanding of the absolute that doesn’t reflect more recent interpretations of Hegel, Jameson’s book is very compelling. It is at its best when he talks about variation in relation to theme, but even more so when he discusses the polis and how the division that gives birth to the polis is at once what destroys it. This is related to the idea that internal schism is the key to political activity. But Jameson fails to see how absolute spirit facilitates the encounter with otherness through its very failure, which is written into it, as key later Hegelians like Gillian Rose, Catherine Malabou, and Slavoj Žižek have shown. Moderately difficult, but short for a book on Hegel.

Rosen, Stanley. *The Idea of Hegel’s “Science of Logic.”* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. A helpful commentary on Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. It is better on the first book of the *Logic* than on the subsequent books. In fact, Rosen gives incredible short shrift to the third book, which is by far the most important. Rosen correctly apprehends that the whole is contradiction, but then he fails to stick with this idea and gets caught up in the reference to the whole all the time. Rosen also insists on the identity of being and thinking, but this involves a reduction of being to thinking and thus a refusal to countenance an outside to thought, as if Hegel were a Kantian on steroids (which is also the position of Robert Brandom and, to some extent, Robert Pippin). But Hegel’s whole point is that thought requires an outside, a point of access to what limits it. The discussion of the absolute is not discovering the necessity of contradiction even in being, but instead
just a bland assertion of thought as the cause of everything, which doesn’t make any
sense at all. Rosen describes Hegel as the second coming and equates the development of
universal logic with the unfolding of European history, which turns Hegel into an
imperial thinker, as his critics contend. So much erudition and insight into the Logic ends
in a disappointment. Just a straightforward commentary would have been much better.
Difficult, but with some rewards.

Žižek, Slavoj. *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor*. London:
Verso, 1991. It is in this book that Žižek first formulates his reading of Hegel, which is
very distinctive and influential. This book has an important Hegelian refutation of
Jacques Derrida in the first two chapters. The real core of the book is the idea of
retroactivity and how this functions with ideology. Žižek sees how Hegel understands the
part that doesn’t fit, but that it requires the act of totalization to discover this part, which
other thinkers who criticize totalization don’t realize. Though shorter than Žižek’s major
book on Hegel *Less Than Nothing*, it is very difficult.

an excellent account of Hegel’s philosophy and the interpretation of it advanced
by Kojève and Hyppolite. Her discussion of the way consciousness finds itself frustrated
with natural objects and her elucidation of the “Force and Understanding” chapter nicely
make clear the turn from consciousness to self-consciousness in Hegel, which is dicey for
most other commentators. Butler also has a compelling discussion of Sartre and the
imaginary as part of the French inheritance of Hegel. Moderately difficult.

Pippin, Robert. *Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life*.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pippin emphasizes that Hegel
sees the philosophical priority of the practical. As a result, freedom emerges through a
practice rather than through a theoretical justification. But then Pippin sees freedom
in terms of mutual recognition, which has little textual warrant despite its popularity
among American Hegelian philosophers like Pippin, Robert Brandom, and Judith
Butler. Difficult.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. One of the leading philosophers of the
20th century offers an overview of what the *Phenomenology* aims to accomplish and how
some readers are misled. Heidegger then gives a detailed interpretation of the first
section of the *Phenomenology* (the section on Consciousness). Heidegger offers a
very tendentious and idiosyncratic account of Hegel. It’s worth knowing to see how
Heidegger positions his own thought relative to Hegel. Moderately difficult at times,
clear at others.

Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. Marcuse sees in Hegel an emphasis on the idea that life is
in constant motion, in a state of motility. But a struggle exists in Hegel’s thought between
spirit (which arrests motion) and life (which is motion). According to Marcuse’s
interpretation, it is spirit that is dependent upon life (not vice versa) and life which has priority. This was the dissertation that Marcuse wrote while studying under Heidegger and unfortunately bears the traces of the latter’s though. For that reason, unnecessarily difficult.


Ruda, Frank. *Hegel’s Rabble*. London: Bloomsbury, 2011. Ruda’s basic contention is that Hegel cannot think the rabble and that it is the only element that doesn’t have a place within his philosophical system. This work thus provides an interesting account of where Marx intervenes as a thinker in response to a lacuna in Hegel’s system. Moderately difficult.

Tayler, Charles. *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. A complete account of Hegel’s thought from the perspective of a non-believer, who interprets Hegel as a psychotic who believe that the universe unfolds according to the idea that God has of it prior to its creation. Taylor has some good readings of parts of Hegel’s system, but the book as a whole is too fanciful to take seriously. Easy.