

Originally written in 1969 by Carlos Marighella, one of the leaders of the Brazilian guerrilla organization National Liberation Action (ALN), the *Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla* is probably one of the most famous documents to come out of the guerrilla struggles in Latin America. Widely reprinted and translated into numerous languages it became a guide for many guerrilla movements around the globe. With the massive technological changes that have reshaped the world, many parts of the Mini-Manual have become dated and in some cases completely irrelevant. Nonetheless it does serve as a framework for urban guerrilla strategies and tactics when adapted to the current world situation. It also serves as a historical cautionary tale when looking back at the many failed urban guerrilla movements. This edition includes two other documents by Marighella; *Problems And Principles Of Strategy* and *Questions Of Organization* as well as an 1970 interview with liberated Brazilian political prisoners from several different Brazilian guerrilla organizations and finally a chronology of the guerrilla struggle in Brazil from 1964-73.

Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla

Carlos Marighella



**"It is better to err acting than
to do nothing for fear of erring.
Without initiative there is
no guerrilla warfare."**

- Carlos Marighella



★ Arm The Spirit

**PRESSE
ABRAHAM
GUILLEN
PRESS**

ISBN 1-894925-02-5



Also Includes: *Problems And Principles Of Strategy & Questions Of Organization* by Carlos Marighella and An Interview With Liberated Brazilian Political Prisoners

Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla
by Carlos Marighella

This edition published by
Abraham Guillen Press & Arm The Spirit
December 2002

ISBN 1-894925-02-5

Abraham Guillen Press
C.P. 48164
Montreal, QC
H2V 4S8, Canada
email: abrahamguillenpress@yahoo.com

Arm The Spirit
P.O. Box 6326, Stn. A
Toronto, Ontario
M5W 1P7, Canada
email: ats@etext.org
web: <http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats>

Write to Abraham Guillen Press for wholesale
distribution orders. Single copies can be ordered
from both groups.

Disclaimer: Naturally, the information contained in
this pamphlet is for information and research
purposes only. Honest.

Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla

I would like to make a two-fold dedication of this work; first, to the memories of Edson Souto, Marco Antonio Bras de Carvalho, Nelson Jose de Almeida (*Escoteiro*) and so many other heroic fighters and urban guerrillas who fell at the hands of the assassins of the Military Police, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the DOPS, hated instruments of the repressive military dictatorship.

Second, to the brave comrades - men and women - imprisoned in the medieval dungeons of the Brazilian Government and subjected to tortures that even surpass the horrendous crimes carried out by the Nazis.

Like those comrades whose memories we revere, as well as those taken prisoner in combat, what we must do is fight.

Each comrade who opposes the military dictatorship and wants to oppose it can do something, however small the task may seem.

I urge all who read this mini-manual and decide that they cannot remain inactive, to follow its instructions and join the struggle now. I ask this because, under any theory and under any circumstances, the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.

Another important point is not merely to read this mini-manual here and now, but to circulate its contents. This circulation will be possible if those who agree with its ideas make photocopied copies or print it in a booklet, although in this latter case, armed struggle itself will be necessary.

Finally, the reason why this mini-manual bears my signature is that the ideas expressed or systematized here reflect the personal experiences of a group of people engaged in armed struggle in Brazil, among whom I have the honour to be included. So that certain individuals will have no doubts about what this mini-manual says, and can no longer deny the facts or continue to say that the conditions for armed struggle do not exist, it is necessary to assume responsibility for what is said and done. Therefore, anonymity becomes a problem in a work like this. The important fact is that there are patriots prepared to fight like soldiers, and the more there are the better.

The accusation of "violence" or "terrorism" no longer has the negative meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing; a new colour. It does not divide, it does not discredit; on the contrary, it represents a center of attraction.

Today, to be "violent" or a "terrorist" is a quality that ennoble any honourable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its atrocities.

Carlos Marighella
1969

A Definition Of The Urban Guerrilla

The chronic structural crisis characteristic of Brazil today, and its resultant political instability, are what have brought about the upsurge of revolutionary war in the country. The revolutionary war manifests itself in the form of urban guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, or rural guerrilla warfare. Urban guerrilla warfare or psychological warfare in the city depends on the urban guerrilla.

The urban guerrilla is a person who fights the military dictatorship with weapons, using unconventional methods. A political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. The area in which the urban guerrilla operates is in the large Brazilian cities. There are also criminals or outlaws who work in the big cities. Many times, actions by criminals are taken to be actions by urban guerrillas.


The urban guerrilla, however, differs radically from the criminal. The criminal benefits personally from his actions, and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploiters and the exploited, which is why there are so many ordinary people among his victims. The urban guerrilla follows a political goal, and only attacks the government, the big businesses and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans.

Another element just as harmful to the guerrillas as the criminal, and also operating in the urban area, is the right-wing counter-revolutionary who creates confusion, robs banks, throws bombs, kidnaps, assassinates, and commits the worst crimes imaginable against urban guerrillas, revolutionary priests, students, and citizens who oppose fascism and seek liberty.

The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the regime, and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the people who dominate the country and exercise power. The primary task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear down, to demoralize the military regime and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the foreign managers and the Brazilian upper class.

The urban guerrilla is not afraid to dismantle and destroy the present Brazilian economic, political and social system, for his aim is to aid the rural guerrillas and to help in the creation of a totally new and revolutionary social and political structure, with the armed people in power.

The urban guerrilla must have a certain minimal political understanding. To gain that he must read certain printed or mimeographed works such as: **Guerrilla Warfare** by Che Guevara, **Memories Of A Terrorist**, **Some Questions About The Brazilian Guerrillas**, **Guerrilla Operations And Tactics**, **Problems And Principles Of Strategy**, **Certain Tactical Principles Of Comrades Undertaking Guerrilla Operations**, **Questions Of Organization**, *O Guerrilheiro*, newspaper of the Brazilian revolutionary groups.



Personal Qualities Of The Urban Guerrilla

The urban guerrilla is characterized by his bravery and his decisive nature. He must be a good tactician, and a good marksman. The urban guerrilla must be a person of great cleverness to compensate for the fact that he is not sufficiently strong in weapons, ammunition and equipment.

The career military officers and the government police have modern weapons and transport, and can go about anywhere freely, using the force of their own power. The urban guerrilla does not have such resources at his disposal, and leads a clandestine existence. The guerrilla may be a convicted person or one who is out on parole, and must then use false documents.

Nevertheless, the urban guerrilla has an advantage over the conventional military or the police. It is that, while the military and the police act on behalf of the enemy, whom the people hate, the urban guerrilla defends a just cause, which is the people's cause.

The urban guerrilla's weapons are inferior to the enemy's, but from the moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority.

This moral superiority is what sustains the urban guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his principle duty, which is to attack and survive.

The urban guerrilla has to capture or steal weapons from the enemy to be able to fight. Because his weapons are not uniform - since what he has are expropriated or have fallen into his hands in various ways - the urban guerrilla faces the problem of a variety of weapons and a shortage of ammunition. Moreover, he has no place in which to practice shooting and marksmanship.

These difficulties have to be overcome, forcing the urban guerrillas to be imaginative and creative - qualities without which it would be impossible for him to carry out his role as a revolutionary.

The urban guerrilla must possess initiative, mobility and flexibility, as well as versatility and a command of any situation. Initiative especially is an indispensable quality. It is not always possible to foresee everything, and the urban guerrilla cannot let himself become confused, or wait for instructions. His duty is to act, to find adequate solutions for each problem he faces, and to retreat. It is better to err acting than to do nothing for fear of making a mistake. Without initiative, there is no urban guerrilla warfare.

Other important qualities in the urban guerrilla are the following: to be a good walker, to be able to stand up against fatigue, hunger, rain or heat. To know how to hide, and how to be vigilant. To conquer the art of dissembling. Never to fear danger. To behave the same by day as by night. Not to act impetuously. To have unlimited patience. To remain calm and cool in the worst of conditions and situations. Never to leave a track or trail. Not to get discouraged.

In the face of the almost insurmountable difficulties in urban guerrilla warfare, sometimes comrades weaken and give up the fight.

The urban guerrilla is not a businessman in an urban company, nor is he an actor in a play. Urban guerrilla warfare, like rural guerrilla warfare, is a pledge which the guerrilla makes to himself. When he can no longer face the difficulties, or if he knows that he lacks the patience to wait, then it is better for him to

relinquish his role before he betrays his pledge, for he clearly lacks the basic qualities necessary to be a guerrilla.

How The Urban Guerrilla Lives

The urban guerrilla must know how to live among the people, and he must be careful not to appear strange and different from ordinary city life.

He should not wear clothes that are different from those that other people wear. Elaborate and high-fashion clothing for men or women may often be a handicap if the urban guerrilla's mission takes him into working class neighbourhoods, or sections where such dress is uncommon. The same care has to be taken if the urban guerrilla must move from the South of the country to the North, and vice versa.

The urban guerrilla must make his living through his job or his professional activity. If he is known and sought by the police, he must go underground, and sometimes must live hidden. Under such circumstances, the urban guerrilla cannot reveal his activity to anyone, since this information is always and only the responsibility of the revolutionary organization in which he is participating.

The urban guerrilla must have a great ability for observation. He must be well-informed about everything, particularly about the enemy's movements, and he must be very inquisitive and knowledgeable about the area in which he lives, operates, or travels through.

But the fundamental characteristic of the urban guerrilla is that he is a man who fights with weapons; given these circumstances, there is very little likelihood that he will be able to follow his normal profession for long without being identified by the police. The role of expropriation thus looms as clear as high noon. It is impossible for the urban guerrilla to exist and survive without fighting to expropriate.

Thus, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points towards two essential objectives:

1. the physical elimination of the leaders and assistants of the armed forces and of the police;
2. the expropriation of government resources and the wealth belonging to the rich businessmen, the large landowners and the imperialists, with small expropriations used for the sustenance of the individual guerrillas and large ones for the maintenance of the revolutionary organization itself.

It is clear that the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla also has other objectives. But here we are referring to the two basic objectives, above all expropriation. It is necessary for every urban guerrilla to always keep in mind that he can only maintain his existence if he is able to kill the police and those dedicated to repression, and if he is determined - truly determined - to expropriate the wealth of the rich businessmen, landowners and imperialists.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the Brazilian revolution is that, from the beginning, it developed around the expropriation of the wealth of the

major business, imperialist and landowning interests, without excluding the largest and most powerful commercial elements engaged in the import-export business. And by expropriating the wealth of the principle enemies of the people, the Brazilian revolution was able to hit them at their vital center, with preferential and systematic attacks on the banking network - that is to say, the most telling blows were leveled at the businessman's nerve system.

The bank robberies carried out by the Brazilian urban guerrillas hurt big businesses and others, the foreign companies which insure and re-insure the banking capital, the imperialist companies, the federal and state governments - all of them are systematically expropriated as of now.

The fruit of these expropriations has been devoted to the tasks of learning and perfecting urban guerrilla techniques, the purchase, production and transportation of weapons and ammunition for the rural areas, the security precautions of the guerrillas, the daily maintenance of the fighters, those who have been liberated from prison by armed force, those who have been wounded, and those who are being persecuted by the police, and to any kind of problem concerning comrades liberated from jail or assassinated by the police and the military dictatorship.

The tremendous costs of the revolutionary war must fall upon the big businesses, on the imperialists, on the large landowners, and on the government too - both federal and state - since they are all exploiters and oppressors of the people. Men of the government, agents of the dictatorship and of foreign imperialism, especially, must pay with their lives for the crimes they have committed against the Brazilian people.


In Brazil, the number of violent actions carried out by urban guerrillas, including executions, explosions, seizures of weapons, ammunition and explosives, assaults on banks and prisons, etc., is significant enough to leave no room for doubt as to the actual aims of the revolutionaries; all are witnesses to the fact that we are in a full revolutionary war and that this war can be waged only by violent means.

This is the reason why the urban guerrilla uses armed struggle, and why he continues to concentrate his efforts on the physical extermination of the agents of repression, and to dedicate 24 hours a day to expropriations from the people's exploiters.

Technical Preparation Of The Urban Guerrilla

No one can become an urban guerrilla without paying special attention to technical preparation.

The technical preparation of the urban guerrilla runs from a concern for his



One of the most common combat weapons in the world, the AK-47.

physical condition to a knowledge of and apprenticeship in professions and skills of all kinds, particularly manual skills.

The urban guerrilla can have a strong physical constitution only if he trains systematically. He cannot be a good fighter if he has not learned the art of fighting. For that reason, the urban guerrilla must learn and practice the various forms of unarmed fighting, of attack, and of personal defense. Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking, camping, the practice of survival in the woods, mountain climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving and training as a frogman, fishing, harpooning, and the hunting of birds and of small and big game.

It is very important to learn how to drive a car, pilot a plane, handle a motor boat and a sailboat, understand mechanics, radio, telephone, electricity and have some knowledge of electronics techniques.

It is also important to have a knowledge of topographical information, to be able to determine one's position by instruments or other available resources, to calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale, make timings, and work with an angle protractor, a compass, etc.

A knowledge of chemistry, of colour combination and of stamp-making, the mastery of the skills of calligraphy and the copying of letters, and other techniques are part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obliged to falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy.

In the area of "makeshift" medicine, the urban guerrilla has the special role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, drugs, basic surgery and emergency first aid.

The basic question in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla is, nevertheless, to know how to handle weapons such as the submachine gun, revolver, automatic pistol, FAL, various types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, bazookas, etc.

A knowledge of various types of ammunition and explosives is another aspect to consider. Among the explosives, dynamite must be well understood. The use of incendiary bombs, smoke bombs, and other types is also indispensable prior training. To know how to improvise and repair weapons, prepare Molotov cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destructive devices, how to blow up bridges, tear up and put out of service railroads and railroad cars, these are necessities in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla that can never be considered unimportant.

The highest level of preparation for the urban guerrilla is the training camp for technical training. But only the guerrilla who has already passed a preliminary examination can go to this school - that is to say, one who has passed the test of fire in revolutionary action, in actual combat against the enemy.

The Urban Guerrilla's Weapons

The urban guerrilla's weapons are light arms, easily obtained, usually captured from the enemy, purchased, or made on the spot. Light weapons have the advantage of fast handling and easy transport. In general, light weapons are characterized as being short-barreled. This includes many automatic weapons. Automatic and semi-automatic weapons considerably increase the firepower of the urban guerrilla. The

disadvantage of this type of weapon, for us, is the difficulty in controlling it, resulting in wasted rounds or a wasteful use of ammunition - corrected for only by a good aim and precision firing. Men who are poorly trained convert automatic weapons into an ammunition drain.

Experience has shown that the basic weapon of the urban guerrilla is the light submachine gun. This weapon, in addition to being efficient and easy to shoot in an urban area, has the advantage of being greatly respected by the enemy. The guerrilla must thoroughly know how to handle the submachine gun, now so popular and indispensable to the Brazilian urban guerrillas.

The ideal submachine gun for the urban guerrilla is the INA .45 calibre. Other types of submachine guns of different calibers can also be used - understanding of course, the problem of ammunition. Thus, it is preferable that the manufacturing capabilities of the urban guerrillas be used for the production of one type of submachine gun, so that the ammunition to be used can be standardized. Each firing group of urban guerrillas must have a submachine gun handled by a good marksman. The other members of the group must be armed with .38 revolvers, our standard weapon. The .32 is also useful for those who want to participate. But the .38 is preferable since its impact usually puts the enemy out of action.

Hand grenades and conventional smoke bombs can also be considered light weapons, with defensive power for cover and withdrawal.

Long-barreled weapons are more difficult for the urban guerrilla to transport, and they attract much attention because of their size. Among the long-barreled weapons are the FAL, the Mauser guns or rifles, hunting guns such as the Winchester, and others.

Shotguns can be useful if used at close range and point blank. They are useful even for a poor shot, especially at night when precision isn't much help. A pressure airgun can be useful for training in marksmanship. Bazookas and mortars can also be used in action, but the conditions for using them have to be prepared and the people who use them must be trained.

The urban guerrilla should not attempt to base his actions on the use of heavy weapons, which have major drawbacks in a type of fighting that demands lightweight weapons to insure mobility and speed.

Homemade weapons are often as efficient as the best weapons produced in conventional factories, and even a sawed-off shotgun is a good weapon for the urban guerrilla fighter.

The urban guerrilla's role as a gunsmith has a basic importance. As a gunsmith, he takes care of the weapons, knows how to repair them, and in many cases can set up a small shop for improvising and producing effective small arms.

Experience in metallurgy and on the mechanical lathe are basic skills the urban guerrilla should incorporate into his manufacturing plans for the construction of homemade weapons. This production, and courses in explosives and sabotage, must be organized. The primary materials for practice in these courses must be obtained ahead of time, to prevent an incomplete apprenticeship - that is to say, so as to leave no room for experimentation.

Molotov cocktails, gasoline, homemade contrivances such as catapults and

mortars for firing explosives, grenades made of pipes and cans, smoke bombs, mines, conventional explosives such as dynamite and potassium chlorate, plastic explosives, gelatin capsules, and ammunition of every kind are indispensable to the success of the urban guerrilla's mission.

The methods of obtaining the necessary materials and munitions will be to buy them or to take them by force in expropriation actions specially planned and carried out. The urban guerrillas will be careful not to keep explosives and other materials that can cause accidents around for very long, but will always try to use them immediately on their intended targets.

The urban guerrilla's weapons and his ability to maintain them constitute his firepower. By taking advantage of modern weapons and introducing innovations in his firepower and in the use of certain weapons, the urban guerrilla can improve many of the tactics of urban warfare. An example of this was the innovation made by the Brazilian urban guerrillas when they introduced the use of the submachine gun in their attacks on banks.

When the massive use of uniform submachine guns becomes possible, there will be new changes in urban guerrilla warfare tactics. The firing group that utilizes uniform weapons and corresponding ammunition, with reasonable care for their maintenance, will reach a considerable level of effectiveness.


The urban guerrilla increases his effectiveness as he increases his firepower.

The Shot; The Urban Guerrilla's Reason For Existence

The urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and survives, is to shoot. The urban guerrilla must know how to shoot well, because it is required by this type of combat.

In conventional warfare, combat is generally at a distance with long-range weapons. In unconventional warfare, in which urban guerrilla warfare is included, combat is at short range and often very close. To prevent his own death, the urban guerrilla must shoot first, and he cannot err in his shot. He cannot waste his ammunition because he does not possess large amounts, and so he must conserve it. Nor can he replace his ammunition quickly, since he is a part of a small team in which each guerrilla has to be able to look after himself. The urban guerrilla can lose no time, and thus has to be able to shoot at once.

One fundamental fact, which we want to emphasize completely, and whose importance cannot be overestimated, is that the urban guerrilla must not fire



Common handguns used by police and military forces: 9mm Sig Sauer 228 (also known as the M11 in the U.S. military), Desert Eagle .50 and the 9mm Glock 19.

continuously, using up his ammunition. It may be that the enemy is responding to this fire precisely because he is waiting until the guerrilla's ammunition is all used up. At such a moment, without having the opportunity to replace his ammunition, the guerrilla faces a rain of enemy fire, and can be taken prisoner or killed.

In spite of the value of the surprise factor, which many times makes it unnecessary for the urban guerrilla to use his weapons, he cannot be allowed the luxury of entering combat without knowing how to shoot. And when face-to-face with the enemy, he must always be moving from one position to another, since to stay in one place makes him a fixed target and, as such, very vulnerable.

The urban guerrilla's life depends on shooting, on his ability to handle his weapons well and to avoid being hit. When we speak of shooting, we speak of accuracy as well. Shooting must be practiced until it becomes a reflex action on the part of the urban guerrilla. To learn how to shoot and have good aim, the urban guerrilla must train himself systematically, utilizing every practice method shooting at targets, even in amusement parks and at home.

Shooting and marksmanship are the urban guerrilla's water and air. His perfection of the art of shooting may make him a special type of urban guerrilla - that is, a sniper, a category of solitary combatant indispensable in isolated actions. The sniper knows how to shoot at close range and at long range, and his weapons are appropriate for either type of shooting.

The Firing Group

In order to function, the urban guerrillas must be organized into small groups. A team of no more than four or five is called a firing group.


A minimum of two firing groups, separated and insulated from other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two persons, this is what makes a firing team.

Within the firing group, there must be complete confidence among the members. The best shot, and the one who knows best how to handle the submachine gun, is the person in charge of operations.

The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and stores weapons, and studies and corrects its own tactics.

When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But there is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason, it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the guerrilla organization, in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the firing group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional revolutionaries, doesn't exist in our organization.

This means that, except for the priority of the objectives set by the strategic



The Benelli Super 90 (M4) is a standard combat shotgun used by many police agencies and military forces throughout the world.

command, any firing group can decide to raid a bank, to kidnap or execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a foreign spy, and can carry out any type of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy, without the need to consult with the general command.

No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so, and thus becomes a part of the organization.

This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to greatly increase the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it onto the defensive.

The firing group is the instrument of organized action. Within it, guerrilla operations and tactics are planned, launched and carried through to success.

The general command counts on the firing groups to carry out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country. For its part, the general command helps the firing groups with their difficulties and with carrying out objectives of a strategic nature, and to do so in any part of the country.

The organization is an indestructible network of firing groups, and of coordinations among them, that functions simply and practically within a general command that also participates in attacks - an organization that exists for no other purpose than that of pure and simple revolutionary action.

The Logistics Of The Urban Guerrilla

Conventional logistics can be expressed with the formula **FFEA**:

- F** - food
- F** - fuel
- E** - equipment
- A** - ammunition

Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance problems for an army or a regular armed force, transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply lines.

Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an army but small armed groups, intentionally fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear areas. Their supply lines are precarious and insufficient, and they have no fixed bases except in the rudimentary sense of a weapons factory within a house. While the goal of conventional logistics is to supply the war needs of the *gorillas* who are used to repress rural and urban rebellion, urban guerrilla logistics aim at sustaining operations and tactics which have nothing in common with conventional warfare and are directed against the government and foreign domination of the country.

For the urban guerrilla, who starts from nothing and who has no support at the beginning, logistics are expressed by the formula **MMWAE**, which is:

- M** - mechanization
- M** - money
- W** - weapons
- A** - ammunition
- E** - explosives

Revolutionary logistics takes mechanization as one of its bases. Nevertheless, mechanization is inseparable from the driver. The urban guerrilla driver is as important as the urban guerrilla machine gunner. Without either, the machines do not work, and the automobile, as well as the submachine gun becomes a dead thing. An experienced driver is not made in one day, and apprenticeship must begin early. Every good urban guerrilla must be a driver. As to the vehicles, the urban guerrilla must expropriate what he needs. When he already has resources, the urban guerrilla can combine the expropriation of vehicles with his other methods of acquisition.

Money, weapons, ammunition and explosives, and automobiles as well, must be expropriated. The urban guerrilla must rob banks and armouries, and seize explosives and ammunition wherever he finds them.

None of these operations is carried out for just one purpose. Even when the raid is to obtain money, the weapons that the guards carry must be taken as well. Expropriation is the first step in organizing our logistics, which itself assumes an armed and permanently mobile character.

The second step is to reinforce and expand logistics, resorting to ambushes and traps in which the enemy is surprised and his weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other resources are captured.

Once he has weapons, ammunition and explosives, one of the most serious logistics problems facing the urban guerrilla is a hiding place in which to leave the material, and appropriate means of transporting it and assembling it where it is needed. This has to be accomplished even when the enemy is alerted and has the roads blocked.

The knowledge that the urban guerrilla possesses of the terrain, and the devices he uses or is capable of using, such as scouts specially prepared and recruited for this mission, are the basic elements in solving the eternal logistics problems faced by the guerrillas.

Characteristics Of The Urban Guerrilla's Tactics

The tactics of the urban guerrilla have the following characteristics:

1. It is an aggressive tactic, or, in other words, it has an offensive character. As is well known, defensive action means death for us. Since we are inferior to the enemy in firepower, and have neither his resources nor his power base, we cannot defend ourselves against an offensive or a concentrated attack by the *gorillas*. That is the reason why our urban technique can never be permanent, can never defend a fixed base nor remain in any one spot waiting to repel the circle of repression.
2. It is a tactic of attack and rapid withdrawal, by which we preserve our forces.
3. It is a tactic that aims at the development of urban guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare, which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war.

The Initial Advantages Of The Urban Guerrilla

The dynamics of urban guerrilla warfare lie in the guerrilla's violent clash with the military and police forces of the dictatorship. In this conflict, the police have superiority. The urban guerrilla has inferior forces. The paradox is that the urban guerrilla is nevertheless the attacker.

The military and police forces, for their part, respond to the conflict by mobilizing and concentrating greatly superior forces in the pursuit and destruction of the urban guerrilla. The guerrilla can only avoid defeat if he depends on the initial advantages he has and knows how to exploit them to the end, to compensate for his weakness and lack of material.

The initial advantages are:

1. He must take the enemy by surprise.
2. He must know the terrain of the encounter.
3. He must have greater mobility and speed than the police and other repressive forces.
4. His information service must be better than the enemy's.
5. He must be in command of the situation, and demonstrate a decisiveness so great that everyone on our side is inspired and never thinks of hesitating, while on the other side the enemy is stunned and incapable of acting.

Surprise

To compensate for his general weakness and shortage of weapons compared to the enemy, the urban guerrilla uses surprise. The enemy has no way to combat surprise and becomes confused and is destroyed.

When urban guerrilla warfare broke out in Brazil, experience proved that surprise was essential to the success of any guerrilla operation. The technique of surprise is based upon four essential requirements:

1. We know the situation of the enemy we are going to attack, usually by means of precise information and meticulous observation, while the enemy does not know he is going to be attacked and knows nothing about the attackers.
2. We know the strength of the enemy we are going to attack, and the enemy knows nothing about our strength.
3. Attacking by surprise, we save and conserve our forces, while the enemy is unable to do the same, and is left at the mercy of events.
4. We determine the time and place of the attack, fix its duration and establish its objectives. The enemy remains ignorant of all of this information.

Knowledge Of The Terrain

The urban guerrilla's best ally is the terrain, and because this is so he must know it like the palm of his hand. To have the terrain as an ally means to know how to use with intelligence its unevenness, its high and low points, its turns, its irregularities, its fixed and secret passages, its abandoned areas, its thickets, etc.,

taking maximum advantage of all of this for the success of armed actions, escapes, retreats, covers, and hiding places. Impasses and narrow spots, gorges, streets under repair, police checkpoints, military zones and closed-off streets, the entrances and exits to tunnels and those that the enemy can close off, corners controlled or watched by the police, traffic lights and signals; all this must be thoroughly known and studied in order to avoid fatal errors.

Our problem is to get through and to know where and how to hide, leaving the enemy bewildered in areas he doesn't know. Being familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, ins and outs, the corners of the urban centres, its paths and shortcuts, its empty lots, its underground passages, its pipes and sewer systems, the urban guerrilla safely crosses through the irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police, where the police can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trap at any moment. Because he knows the terrain, the urban guerrilla can pass through it on foot, on bicycle, in a car, jeep or small truck, and never be trapped. Acting in small groups with only a few people, the guerrillas can rendezvous at a time and place determined beforehand, following up the initial attack with new guerrilla operations, or evading the police cordon and disorienting the enemy with their unexpected audacity.

It is an impossible problem for the police, in the labyrinthine terrain of the urban guerrilla, to catch someone they cannot see, to repress someone they cannot catch, and to close in on someone they cannot find.

Our experience is that the ideal guerrilla is one who operates in his own city and thoroughly knows its streets, its neighbourhoods, its transit problems, and its other peculiarities. The guerrilla outsider, who comes to a city whose streets are unfamiliar to him, is a weak spot, and if he is assigned certain operations, he can endanger them. To avoid grave mistakes, it is necessary for him to get to know the layout of the streets.

Mobility And Speed

To insure a mobility and speed that the police cannot match, the urban guerrilla needs the following:

1. Mechanization
2. Knowledge of the terrain
3. A disruption or suspension of enemy transport and communications
4. Light weapons

By carefully carrying out operations that last only a few moments, and leaving the site in mechanized vehicles, the urban guerrilla beats a rapid retreat, escaping capture.

The urban guerrilla must know the way in detail, and, in this manner, must go through the schedule ahead of time as a training, to avoid entering alleyways that have no exit, or running into traffic jams, or being stopped by the Transit Department's traffic signals.

The police pursue the urban guerrilla blindly, without knowing which road he is using for his escape. While the urban guerrilla escapes quickly because he knows the terrain, the police lose the trail and give up the chase.

The urban guerrilla must launch his operations far from the logistical centres of the police. A primary advantage of this method of operation is that it places us at a reasonable distance from the possibility of capture, which facilitates our evasion.

In addition to this necessary precaution, the urban guerrilla must be concerned with the enemy's communication system. The telephone is the primary target in preventing the enemy from access to information, by knocking out his communications systems.

Even if he knows about the guerrilla operation, the enemy depends on modern transportation for his logistics support, and his vehicles necessarily lose time carrying him through the heavy traffic of the large cities. It is clear that the tangled and treacherous traffic is a disadvantage for the enemy, as it would be for us if we were not ahead of him.

If we want to have a safe margin of security and be certain to leave no tracks for the future, we can adopt the following methods:

1. Deliberately intercept the police with other vehicles, or by seemingly casual inconveniences and accidents; but in this case the vehicles in question should neither be legal nor have real license numbers.
2. Obstruct the roads with fallen trees, rocks, ditches, false traffic signs, dead ends or detours, or other clever methods.
3. Place homemade mines in the way of the police; use gasoline or throw Molotov cocktails to set their vehicles on fire.
4. Set off a burst of submachine gun fire or weapons such as the FAL aimed at the motor and tires of the cars engaged in the pursuit.

With the arrogance typical of the police and the military authorities, the enemy will come to fight us equipped with heavy guns and equipment, and with elaborate maneuvers by men armed to the teeth. The urban guerrilla must respond




Diagram from a U.S. Field Army Manual of an above and below ground urban assault.

to this with light weapons that can be easily transported, so he can always escape with maximum speed without ever accepting open fighting. The urban guerrilla has no mission other than to attack and quickly withdraw. We would leave ourselves open to the most crushing defeats if we burdened ourselves with heavy weapons and with the tremendous weight of the ammunition necessary to use them, at the same time losing our precious gift of mobility.

When our enemy fights against us with the cavalry, we are at no disadvantage as long as we are mechanized. The automobile goes faster than the horse. From within the car, we also have the target of the mounted police, knocking him down with submachine gun and revolver fire or with Molotov cocktails and hand grenades.

On the other hand, it is not so difficult for an urban guerrilla on foot to make a target of a policeman on horseback. Moreover, ropes across the street, marbles, and cork stoppers are very efficient methods of making them both fall. The great disadvantage faced by the mounted policeman is that he presents the urban guerrilla with two excellent targets - the horse and its rider.

Apart from being faster than the horseman, the helicopter has no better chance in pursuit. If the horse is too slow compared to the urban guerrilla's automobile, the helicopter is too fast. Moving at 200 kilometres an hour, it will never succeed in hitting from above a target that is lost among the crowds and street vehicles, nor can the helicopter land in public streets in order to capture someone. At the same time, whenever it flies too low, it will be excessively vulnerable to the fire of the urban guerrillas.

Information

The chances that the government has for discovering and destroying the urban guerrillas lessens as the power of the dictatorship's enemies becomes greater and more concentrated among the population.

This concentration of the opponents of the dictatorship plays a very important role in providing information about the actions of the police and government officials, as well as hiding the activities of the guerrillas. The enemy can also be thrown off with false information, which is worse for him because it is a tremendous waste.

By whatever means, the sources of information at the disposal of the urban guerrilla are potentially better than those of the police. The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people transmits information to the urban guerrillas. The military and the police are hated by the people for the injustices and violence they have committed, and this facilitates obtaining information which is damaging to the activities of government agents.

Information, which is only a small segment of popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla.

The creation of an intelligence service, with an organized structure, is a basic need for us. The urban guerrilla has to have vital information about the plans and movements of the enemy; where they are, how they move, the resources of their banking network, their means of communication, and the secret activities they

carry out. The reliable information passed on to the guerrillas represents a well-aimed blow at the dictatorship. The dictatorship has no way to defend itself in the face of an important leak which facilitates our destructive attacks.

The enemy also wants to know what actions we are planning so he can destroy us or prevent us from acting. In this sense, the danger of betrayal is present, and the enemy encourages betrayal and infiltrates spies into the guerrilla organization. The urban guerrilla's technique against this enemy tactic is to denounce publicly the spies, traitors, informers and provocateurs. Since our struggle takes place among the people and depends on their sympathy - while the government has a bad reputation because of its brutality, corruption and incompetence - the informers, spies, traitors and the police come to be enemies of the people, without supporters, denounced to the urban guerrillas and, in many cases, properly punished.

For his part, the urban guerrilla must not evade the duty - once he knows who the spy or informer is - of physically wiping him out. This is the proper method, approved by the people, and it minimizes considerably the incidence of infiltration or enemy spying.

For complete success in the battle against spies and informers, it is essential to organize a counter-espionage or counter-intelligence service. Nevertheless, as far as information is concerned, it cannot all be reduced to a matter of knowing the enemy's moves and avoiding the infiltration of spies. Intelligence information must be broad - it must embrace everything, including the most insignificant material. There is a technique of obtaining information, and the urban guerrilla must master it. Following this technique, intelligence information is obtained naturally, as a part of the life of the people.

The urban guerrilla, living in the midst of the population and moving about among them, must be attentive to all types of conversations and human relations, learning how to disguise his interest with great skill and judgment.

In places where people work, study, and live, it is easy to collect all kinds of information on payments, business, plans of all kinds, points of view, opinions, people's state of mind, trips, interior layout of buildings, offices and rooms, operations centers, etc.

Observation, investigation, reconnaissance, and exploration of the terrain are also excellent sources of information. The urban guerrilla never goes anywhere absentmindedly and without revolutionary precaution, always on the alert lest something occurs. Eyes and ears open, senses alert, his memory is engraved with everything necessary, now or in the future, to the continued activity of the guerrilla fighter.

Careful reading of the press with particular attention to the mass communication media, the research of accumulated data, the transmission of news and everything of note, a persistence in being informed and in informing others, all this makes up the intricate and immensely complicated question of information which gives the urban guerrilla a decisive advantage.

Decisiveness

It is not enough for the urban guerrilla to have in his favour surprise, speed,

knowledge of the terrain, and information. He must also demonstrate his command of any situation and a capacity for decisiveness, without which all other advantages will prove to be useless.

It is impossible to carry out any action, however well-planned, if the urban guerrilla turns out to be indecisive, uncertain, irresolute. Even an action successfully begun can end in defeat if command of the situation and the capacity for decision falter in the middle of the execution of the plan. When this command of the situation and a capacity for decision are absent, the void is filled with hesitation and terror. The enemy takes advantage of this failure and is able to liquidate us.

The secret of the success of any operation, simple or complex, easy or difficult, is to rely on determined men. Strictly speaking, there are no simple operations: all must be carried out with the same care taken in the most difficult, beginning with the choice of the human elements - which means relying on leadership and the capacity for decision in every situation.

One can see ahead of time whether an action will be successful or not by the way its participants act during the preparatory period. Those who fall behind, who fail to make designated contacts, are easily confused, forget things, fail to complete the basic tasks of the work, possibly are indecisive men and can be a danger. It is better not to include them.

Decisiveness means to put into practice the plan that has been devised with determination, with audacity, and with an absolute firmness. It takes only one person who hesitates to lose all.

Objectives Of The Guerrilla's Actions

With his tactics developed and established, the urban guerrilla trains himself in methods of action leading to attack, and, in Brazil, has the following objectives:

1. To threaten the triangle within which the Brazilian state and North American domination are maintained, a triangle whose points are Rio, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte, and whose base is the axis Rio - San Paulo, where the giant industrial, financial, economic, political, cultural, military, and police complex that holds the decisive power of the country is located.
2. To weaken the local militia and the security systems of the dictatorship, given the fact that we are attacking and the *gorillas* defending, which means catching the government in a defensive position with its troops immobilized in the defense of the entire complex of national maintenance, with its ever-present fears of an attack on its strategic nerve centers, and without ever knowing where, how or when the attack will come.
3. To attack every area with many different armed groups, small in size, each self-contained and operating independently, to disperse the government forces in their pursuit of a thoroughly fragmented organization, instead of offering the dictatorship the opportunity to concentrate its forces in the destruction of one tightly organized system operating throughout the country.

4. To give proof of its combativeness, decision, firmness, determination, and persistence in the attack on the military dictatorship, in order to allow all rebels to follow in our example and to fight with urban guerrilla tactics. Meanwhile, the government with all of its problems, incapable of halting guerrilla actions within the cities, will lose time and suffer endless attrition, and will finally be forced to pull back its repressive forces in order to mount guard over all the banks, industries, armouries, military barracks, prisons, public offices, radio and television stations, North American firms, gas storage tanks, oil refineries, ships, airplanes, ports, airports, hospitals, health centers, blood banks, stores, garages, embassies, residences of high-ranking members of the regime such as ministers and generals, police stations, official organizations, etc.

5. To increase urban guerrilla actions gradually into an endless number of surprise raids, such that the government cannot leave the urban area to pursue guerrillas in the rural interior without running the risk of abandoning the cities and permitting rebellion to increase on the coast as well as the interior of the country.

6. To force the Army and the police, their commanders and their assistants, to give up the relative comfort and tranquility of their barracks and their usual rest, for a state of fear and growing tension in the expectation of attack, or in a search for trails which vanish without a trace.

7. To avoid open battle and decisive combat with the government, limiting the struggle to brief, rapid attacks with lightning results.

8. To insure for the urban guerrilla a maximum freedom of movement and of action, without ever relinquishing the use of armed action, remaining firmly oriented towards helping the formation of rural guerrilla warfare and supporting the construction of a revolutionary army for national liberation.

On The Types And Nature Of Missions For The Urban Guerrilla

In order to achieve the objectives previously listed, the urban guerrilla is obliged, in his tactics, to follow missions whose nature is as different or diversified as possible. The urban guerrilla does not arbitrarily choose this or that mission. Some actions are simple; others are complicated. The inexperienced guerrilla must be gradually introduced into actions and operations which run from the simple to the complex. He begins with small missions and tasks until he becomes completely experienced.

Before any action, the urban guerrilla must think of the methods and the personnel at his disposal to carry out the mission. Operations and actions that demand the urban guerrilla's technical preparation cannot be carried out by someone who lacks the technical skill. With these precautions, the missions which the urban guerrilla can undertake are the following:

1. assaults
2. raids and penetrations
3. occupations
4. ambushes
5. street tactics
6. strikes and work stoppages
7. desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriation of weapons, ammunition and explosives
8. liberation of prisoners
9. executions
10. kidnappings
11. sabotage
12. terrorism
13. armed propaganda
14. war of nerves

Assaults

Assaults are the armed attacks which we make to expropriate funds, liberate prisoners, capture explosives, submachine guns, and other types of weapons and ammunition.

Assaults can take place in broad daylight or at night.

Daytime assaults are made when the objective cannot be achieved at any other hour, such as the transport of money by banks, which is not done at night.

Night assault is usually the most advantageous for the guerrilla. The ideal is for all assaults to take place at night, when conditions for a surprise attack are most favourable and the darkness facilitates escape and hides the identity of the participants. The urban guerrilla must prepare himself, nevertheless, to act under all conditions, daytime as well as night.

The most vulnerable targets for assaults are the following:

1. credit establishments
2. commercial and industrial enterprises, including plants for the manufacture of weapons and explosives
3. military establishments
4. commissaries and police stations
5. jails
6. government property
7. mass communications media
8. North American firms and properties
9. government vehicles, including military and police vehicles, trucks, armoured vehicles, money carriers, trains, ships, and airplanes

The assaults on businesses use the same tactics, because in every case the buildings represent a fixed target. Assaults on buildings are planned as guerrilla operations, varied according to whether they are against banks, a commercial enterprise, industries, military bases, commissaries, prisons, radio stations, warehouses for foreign firms, etc.

Ambushes to halt passenger trains are for propaganda purposes, and, when they are troop trains, the object is to annihilate the enemy and seize his weapons.

The urban guerrilla sniper is the kind of fighter specially suited for ambush, because he can hide easily in the irregularities of the terrain, on the roofs and the tops of buildings and apartments under construction. From windows and dark places, he can take careful aim at his chosen target.

Ambush has devastating effects on the enemy, leaving him unnerved, insecure and fearful.

Street Tactics

Street tactics are used to fight the enemy in the streets, utilizing the participation of the population against him.

In 1968, the Brazilian students used excellent street tactics against police troops, such as marching down streets against traffic and using slingshots and marbles against mounted police.

Other street tactics consist of constructing barricades; pulling up paving blocks and hurling them at the police; throwing bottles, bricks, paperweights and other projectiles at the police from the top of office and apartment buildings; using buildings and other structures for escape, for hiding and for supporting surprise attacks.

It is equally necessary to know how to respond to enemy tactics. When the police troops come wearing helmets to protect them against flying objects, we have to divide ourselves into two teams - one to attack the enemy from the front, the other to attack him in the rear - withdrawing one as the other goes into action to prevent the first from being struck by projectiles hurled by the second.

By the same token, it is important to know how to respond to the police net. When the police designate certain of their men to go into the crowd and arrest a demonstrator, a larger group of urban guerrillas must surround the police group, disarming and beating them and at the same time allowing the prisoner to escape. This urban guerrilla operation is called *the net within a net*.

When the police net is formed at a school building, a factory, a place where demonstrators gather, or some other point, the urban guerrilla must not give up or allow himself to be taken by surprise. To make his net effective, the enemy is obliged to transport his troops in vehicles and special cars to occupy strategic points in the streets, in order to invade the building or chosen locale.

The urban guerrilla, for his part, must never clear a building or an area and meet



Student demonstration (1968) in Rio de Janeiro being attacked by police.

in it without first knowing its exits, the way to break an encirclement, the strategic points that the police must occupy, and the roads that inevitably lead into the net, and he must hold other strategic points from which to strike at the enemy.

The roads followed by police vehicles must be mined at key points along the way and at forced roadblocks. When the mines explode, the vehicles will be knocked into the air. The police will be caught in the trap and will suffer losses and be victims of an ambush. The net must be broken by escape routes which are unknown to the police. The rigorous planning of a withdrawal is the best way to frustrate any encircling effort on the part of the enemy.

When there is no possibility of an escape plan, the urban guerrilla must not hold meetings, gatherings or do anything, since to do so will prevent him from breaking through the net which the enemy will surely try to throw around him.

Street tactics have revealed a new type of urban guerrilla who participates in mass protests. This is the type we designate as the "urban guerrilla demonstrator", who joins the crowds and participates in marches with specific and definite aims in mind. The urban guerrilla demonstrator must initiate the "net within the net", ransacking government vehicles, official cars and police vehicles before turning them over or setting fire to them, to see if any of them have money or weapons.

Snipers are very good for mass demonstrations, and along with the urban guerrilla demonstrator can play a valuable role.

Hidden at strategic points, the snipers have complete success using shotguns or submachine guns, which can easily cause losses among the enemy.

Strikes And Work Interruptions

The strike is a model of action employed by the urban guerrilla in work centers and schools to damage the enemy by stopping work and study activities. Because it is one of the weapons most feared by the exploiters and oppressors, the enemy uses tremendous firepower and incredible violence against it. The strikers are taken to prison, suffer beatings, and many of them wind up killed.

The urban guerrilla must prepare the strike in such a way as to leave no track or clue that can identify the leaders of such an action. A strike is successful when it is organized by a small group, if it is carefully prepared in secret using the most clandestine methods.

Weapons, ammunition, Molotov cocktails, homemade weapons of destruction and attack, all of these must be supplied beforehand in order to meet the enemy. So that the action can do the greatest possible amount of damage, it is a good idea to study and put into effect a sabotage plan.

Strikes and study interruptions, although they are of brief duration, cause



Two military assault weapons: the Russian armour piercing AN-94 assault rifle and the U.S. Colt M4 with grenade launcher

severe damage to the enemy. It is enough for them to crop up at different locations and in differing sections of the same area, disrupting daily life, occurring endlessly, one after the other, in true guerrilla fashion.

In strikes or in simple work interruptions, the urban guerrilla has recourse to the occupation or penetration of the site, or he can simply make a raid. In that case, his objective is to take captives, to capture prisoners, or to capture enemy agents and propose an exchange for arrested strikers.

In certain cases, strikes and brief work interruptions can offer an excellent opportunity for preparing ambushes or traps, whose aim is the physical destruction of the police.

The basic fact is that the enemy suffers losses as well as material and moral damage, and is weakened by the action.

Desertions, Diversions, Seizures, Expropriation Of Ammunition And Explosives

Desertion and the diversion of weapons are actions carried out in military bases, ships, military hospitals, etc. The urban guerrilla soldier or officer must desert at the most opportune moment with modern weapons and ammunition, to hand them over to the guerrillas.


One of the most opportune moments is when the urban guerrilla soldier is called upon to pursue his guerrilla comrades outside the military base. Instead of following the orders of the *gorillas*, the military urban guerrilla must join the ranks of the revolutionaries by handing over the weapons and ammunition he carries, or the military vehicle he operates.

The advantage of this method is that the rebels receive weapons and ammunition from the army, navy, air force, military police, civilian guard or the police without any great work, since it reaches their hands by government transportation.

Other opportunities may occur in the barracks, and the military urban guerrilla must always be alert to this. In case of carelessness on the part of commanders or in other favourable conditions - such as bureaucratic attitudes or the relaxation of discipline on the part of lieutenants or other internal personnel - the military urban guerrilla must no longer wait but must try to inform the guerrillas and desert with as large a supply of weapons as possible.

With information from and participation of the military, urban guerrilla raids on barracks and other military establishments for the purpose of capturing arms can be organized.

When there is no possibility of deserting with weapons and ammunition, the military urban guerrilla must engage in sabotage, starting fires and explosions in munitions dumps.



The M60 is a portable heavy machinegun used by the U.S. military.

This technique of deserting with weapons and of raiding and sabotaging the military centers is the best way of wearing out and demoralizing the enemy and leaving them confused.

The urban guerrilla's purpose in disarming an individual enemy is to capture his weapons. These weapons are usually in the hands of sentinels or others whose task is guard duty.

The capture of weapons may be accomplished by violent means or by cleverness and tricks or traps. When the enemy is disarmed, he must be searched for weapons other than those already taken from him. If we are careless, he can use the weapons that were not seized to shoot the urban guerrilla.

The seizure of weapons is an efficient method of acquiring submachine guns, the urban guerrilla's most important weapon. When we carry out small operations or actions to seize weapons and ammunition, the materiel captured may be for personal use or for armaments and supplies for the firing teams.

The necessity to provide firepower for the urban guerrillas is so great that, in order to take off from the zero point, we often have to purchase one weapon, divert or capture a single gun. The basic point is to begin, and to begin with a spirit of decisiveness and boldness. The possession of a single submachine gun multiplies our forces.

In a bank assault, we must be careful to seize the weapons of the bank guard. The rest of the weapons will be found with the treasurer, the bank tellers or the manager, and must also be seized.

Quite often, we succeed in capturing weapons in police stations, as a result of raids.

The expropriation of weapons, ammunition and explosives is the urban guerrilla's goal in assaulting commercial businesses, industries and quarries.

Liberation Of Prisoners

The liberation of prisoners is an armed action designed to free jailed urban guerrillas. In daily struggle against the enemy, the urban guerrilla is subject to arrest, and can be sentenced to unlimited years in jail. This does not mean that the battle ends here. For the guerrilla, his experience is deepened by prison, and struggle continues even in the dungeons where he is held.

The imprisoned guerrilla views the prisons of the enemy as a terrain which he must dominate and understand in order to free himself by a guerrilla operation. There is no jail, either on an island, in a city penitentiary, or on a farm, that is impregnable to the slyness, cleverness and firepower of the revolutionaries.

The urban guerrilla who is free views the jails of the enemy as the inevitable site of guerrilla actions designed to liberate his ideological comrades from prison.

It is this combination of the urban guerrilla in freedom and the urban guerrilla in jail that results in the armed operations we refer to as "liberation of prisoners".

The guerrilla operations that can be used in liberating prisoners are the following:

1. riots in penal establishments, in correctional colonies or camps, or on transport or prison ships;

2. assaults on urban or rural prisons, detention centres, prison camps, or any other permanent or temporary place where prisoners are held;
3. assaults on prisoner transport trains or convoys;
4. raids and penetrations of prisons;
5. ambushing of guards who move prisoners.

Executions

Execution is the killing of a foreign spy, of an agent of the dictatorship, of a police torturer, of a dictatorial personality in the government involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots, of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent or police provocateur. Those who go to the police of their own free will to make denunciations and accusations, who supply information and who finger people, must be executed when they are caught by the urban guerrillas.

Execution is a secret action, in which the least possible number of urban guerrillas are involved. In many cases, the execution can be carried out by a single sniper, patient, alone and unknown, and operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood.

Kidnapping

Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret place a spy, political personality or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement. Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned revolutionaries or to force the suspension of torture in jail by the military dictatorship.

The kidnapping of personalities who are well-known artists, sports figures or who are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda for the guerrillas, provided it occurs under special circumstances, and is handled so the public understands and sympathizes with it. The kidnappings of foreigners or visitors constitutes a form of protest against the penetration and domination of imperialism in our country.

Sabotage

Sabotage is a highly destructive type of attack using very few persons - and sometimes requiring only one - to accomplish the desired result. When the urban guerrilla uses sabotage, the first step is isolated sabotage. Then comes the step of dispersed and general sabotage, carried out by the population.

Well-executed sabotage demands study, planning and careful action. A characteristic form of sabotage is explosion, using dynamite, fire or the placing of mines. A little sand, a trickle of any kind of combustible, a poor lubrication job, a screw removed, a short circuit, inserted pieces of wood or iron, can cause irreparable damage.

The objective of sabotage is to hurt, to damage, to make useless and to destroy vital enemy points such as the following:

1. the economy of the country;
2. agricultural or industrial production;

3. transport and communication systems;
4. military and police systems and their establishments and depots;
5. the repressive military-police system;
6. the firms and properties of exploiters in the country.

The urban guerrilla should endanger the economy of the country, particularly its economic and financial aspects, such as its domestic and foreign banking network, its exchange and credit systems, its tax collection system, etc.

Public offices, centers of government and government depots are easy targets for sabotage. Nor will it be easy to prevent the sabotage of agricultural and industrial production by the urban guerrilla, with his thorough knowledge of the local situation.

Factory workers acting as urban guerrillas are excellent industrial saboteurs, since they, better than anyone, understand the industry, the factory, the machinery or the part most likely to destroy an entire operation, doing much more damage than a poorly-informed layman could do.

With respect to the enemy's transport and communications systems, beginning with railway traffic, it is necessary to attack them systematically with sabotage. The only caution is against causing death and injury to passengers, especially regular commuters on suburban and long-distance trains. Attacks on freight trains, rolling or stationary stock, stoppage of military transports and communications systems, these are the major objectives in this area. Sleepers can be damaged and pulled up, as can rails. A tunnel blocked by a barrier of explosives, or an obstruction caused by a derailed car, causes enormous harm.

The derailment of a train carrying fuel is of major damage to the enemy. So is dynamiting a railroad bridge. In a system where the size and weight of the rolling equipment is enormous, it takes months for workers to repair or rebuild the destruction and damage.

As for highways, they can be obstructed with trees, stationary vehicles, ditches, dislocation of barriers by dynamite, and bridges destroyed by explosions.

Ships can be damaged at anchor in seaports or riverports, or in the shipyards. Aircraft can be destroyed or damaged on the ground.

Telephone and telegraph lines can be systematically damaged, their towers blown up, and their lines made useless.

Transport and communications must be sabotaged immediately because the revolutionary movement has already begun in Brazil, and it is essential to impede the enemy's movement of troops and munitions.

Oil lines, fuel plants, depots for bombs and ammunition arsenals, military camps and bases must become targets for sabotage operations, while vehicles, army trucks and other military or police vehicles must be destroyed wherever they are found.

The military and police repression centers and their specialized organs must also claim the attention of the guerrilla saboteur.

Foreign firms and properties in the country, for their part, must become such frequent targets of sabotage that the volume of actions directed against them surpasses the total of all other actions against enemy vital points.

Terrorism

Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of an explosive or firebomb of great destructive power, which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the enemy.

Terrorism requires that the urban guerrilla should have adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of how to make explosives.

The terrorist act, apart from the apparent ease with which it can be carried out, is no different from other guerrilla acts and actions whose success depends on planning and determination. It is an action which the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest calmness and determination.

Although terrorism generally involves an explosion, there are cases in which it may be carried out through executions or the systematic burning of installations, properties, plantations, etc. It is essential to point out the importance of fires and the construction of incendiary devices such as gasoline bombs in the technique of guerrilla terrorism. Another thing is the importance of the material the urban guerrilla can persuade the people to expropriate in the moments of hunger and scarcity brought about by the greed of the big commercial interests.

Terrorism is a weapon the revolutionary can never relinquish.

Armed Propaganda

The coordination of urban guerrilla activities, including each armed action, is the primary way of making armed propaganda.


These actions, carried out with specific objectives and aims in mind, inevitably become propaganda material for the mass communication system.

Bank robberies, ambushes, desertions and the diverting of weapons, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism and the war of nerves are all cases in point.

Airplanes diverted in flight by guerrilla action, ships and trains assaulted and seized by armed guerrillas, can also be carried out solely for propaganda effect.

But the urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press, and must be able to turn out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electric plates and other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine newspapers, pamphlets, flyers and stamps for propaganda and agitation against the dictatorship.

The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the incorporation of large numbers of people into the struggle, by opening a permanent work front for those willing to carry on propaganda, even when to do so means to act alone and risk their lives.



Some submachine guns: the Israeli-made Uzi, Russian Bizon and Heckler & Koch MP5

With the existence of clandestine propaganda and agitational material, the inventive spirit of the urban guerrilla expands and creates catapults, artifacts, mortars and other instruments with which to distribute the anti-government propaganda at a distance.

Tape recordings, the occupation of radio stations, the use of loudspeakers, graffiti on walls and other inaccessible places are other forms of propaganda.

A consistent propaganda by letters sent to specific addresses, explaining the meaning of the urban guerrilla's armed actions, produces considerable results and is one method of influencing certain segments of the population.

Even this influence - exercised in the heart of the people by every possible propaganda device, revolving around the activity of the urban guerrilla - does not indicate that our forces have everyone's support.

It is enough to win the support of a portion of the population, and this can be done by popularizing the motto, "Let he who does not wish to do anything for the guerrillas do nothing against them."

The War Of Nerves

The war of nerves or psychological warfare is an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass media and rumours in order to demoralize the government.

In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage because it imposes censorship on the media and winds up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through.

At this point, it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is liable to be broken at any moment.

The objective of the war of nerves is to mislead, spreading lies among the authorities in which everyone can participate, thus creating an atmosphere of nervousness, discredit, insecurity, uncertainty and concern on the part of the government.

The best methods used by urban guerrillas in the war of nerves are the following:

1. Using the telephone and the mail to announce false clues to the police and government, including information on the planting of bombs and any other act of terrorism in public offices and other places - kidnapping and assassination plans, etc. - to force the authorities to wear themselves out by following up on the false information fed to them;
2. Letting false plans fall into the hands of the police to divert their attention;
3. Planting rumours to make the government uneasy;
4. Exploiting by every means possible the corruption, the mistakes and the failures of the government and its representatives, forcing them into demoralizing explanations and justifications in the very communication media they wish to maintain under censorship;
5. Presenting denunciations to foreign embassies, the United Nations,

the papal nunciature, and the international commissions defending human rights or freedom of the press, exposing each concrete violation and each use of violence by the military dictatorship and making it known that the revolutionary war will continue with serious danger for the enemies of the population.

How To Carry Out The Action

The urban guerrilla who correctly carries through his apprenticeship and training must give the greatest possible importance to his method of carrying out actions, for in this he cannot commit the slightest error.

Any carelessness in learning tactics and their use invites certain disaster, as experience teaches us every day.

Common criminals commit errors frequently because of their tactics, and this is one of the reasons why the urban guerrillas must be so insistently preoccupied with following revolutionary tactics, and not the tactics of bandits.

And not only for that reason. There is no urban guerrilla worthy of the name who ignores the revolutionary method of action and fails to practice it rigorously in the planning and execution of his activities.

The giant is known by his toe. The same can be said of the urban guerrilla, who is known from afar by his correct tactics and his absolute fidelity to principle.

The revolutionary method of carrying out actions is strongly and forcefully based on the knowledge and use of the following elements;

1. investigation and intelligence gathering
2. observation and vigilance
3. reconnaissance, or exploration of the terrain
4. study and timing of routes
5. mapping
6. mechanization
7. careful selection of personnel
8. selection of firepower
9. study and practice in success
10. success
11. use of cover
12. retreat
13. dispersal
14. the liberation or transfer of prisoners
15. the elimination of evidence
16. the rescue of wounded

Some Observations On Tactics

When there is no information, the point of departure for planning the action must be investigation, observation and vigilance. This method produces good results.

In any event, even when there is information, it is essential to make observations to see that information is not at odds with observation or vice versa.

Reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain and the study and timing of routes are so important that to omit them is to make a stab in the dark.

Mechanization, in general, is an underestimated factor in the tactics of conducting an action. Frequently, mechanization is left to the end, on the eve of the action, before anything is done about it.

This is a mistake. Mechanization must be seriously considered. It must be undertaken with considerable foresight and with careful planning, based on careful and precise information. The care, conservation, maintenance and camouflaging of stolen vehicles are very important details of mechanization.

When transportation fails, the primary action fails, with serious material and morale problems for the urban guerrillas.

The selection of personnel requires great care in order to avoid the inclusion of indecisive or wavering persons who present the danger of contaminating others, a danger that must be avoided.

The withdrawal is equally or more important than the operation itself, to the point that it must be rigorously planned, including the possibility of defeat.

One must avoid rescue or transfer of prisoners with children present, or anything to attract the attention of people passing through the area. The best thing is to make the rescue appear as natural as possible, winding through different routes or narrow streets that scarcely permit passage on foot, in order to avoid an encounter between two cars. The elimination of tracks is obligatory and demands the greatest caution - also in removing fingerprints and any other sign that could give the enemy information. Lack of care in the elimination of evidence is a factor that increases nervousness in our ranks, which the enemy often exploits.

Rescue Of The Wounded

The problem of the wounded in urban guerrilla warfare merits special attention. During guerrilla operations in the urban area, it may happen that some comrade is wounded by the police. When a guerrilla in the firing group has a knowledge of first aid, he can do something for the wounded comrade on the spot. Under no circumstances should the wounded guerrilla be abandoned at the site of the battle or left in the enemy's hands.

One of the precautions we must take is to set up first-aid courses for men and women, courses in which guerrillas can learn the rudiments of emergency medicine.

The urban guerrilla who is a doctor, nurse, medical student, pharmacist or who simply has had first aid training is a necessity in modern guerrilla struggle. A small manual of first aid for urban guerrillas, printed on mimeographed sheets, can also be produced by anyone who has enough knowledge.

In planning and carrying out an armed action, the urban guerrilla cannot forget the organization of medical support. This must be accomplished by means of a mobile or motorized clinic. You can also set up a mobile first aid station. Another solution is to utilize the skills of a medical comrade, who waits with his bag of equipment in a designated house to which the wounded are brought.

The ideal would be to have our own well-equipped clinic, but this is very expensive unless we appropriate all of our materials.

When all else fails, it is often necessary to resort to legal clinics, using armed force if necessary to force a doctor to treat our wounded.

In the eventuality that we fall back upon blood banks to purchase blood or plasma, we must not use legal addresses and certainly no addresses where the wounded can really be found, since they are under our care and protection. Nor should we supply the addresses of those involved in the guerrilla organization to the hospitals and health care clinics where we may take them. Such caution is indispensable to covering our tracks.

The houses in which the wounded stay cannot be known to anyone but the small group of comrades responsible for their care and transport. Sheets, bloody clothing, medicine and any other indications of treatment of comrades wounded in combat must be completely eliminated from any place they visit to receive treatment.

Guerrilla Security

The urban guerrilla lives in constant danger of the possibility of being discovered or denounced. The primary security problem is to make certain that we are well-hidden and well-guarded, and that there are secure methods to keep the police from locating us.

The worst enemy of the urban guerrilla, and the major danger that we run into, is infiltration into our organization by a spy or informer.

The spy trapped within the organization will be punished with death. The same goes for those who desert and inform to the police.

Good internal security means there are no spies or agents infiltrated into our midst, and the enemy can receive no information about us even through indirect means. The fundamental way to insure this is to be strict and cautious in recruiting.

Nor is it permissible for everyone to know everything and everyone. This rule is a fundamental ABC of urban guerrilla security.

The enemy wants to annihilate us and fights relentlessly to find us and destroy us, so our greatest weapon lies in hiding from him and attacking by surprise.

The danger to the urban guerrilla is that he may reveal himself through carelessness or allow himself to be discovered through a lack of vigilance. It is impermissible for the urban guerrilla to give out his own or any other clandestine address to the police, or to talk too much. Notations in the margins of newspapers, lost documents, calling cards, letters or notes, all these are evidence that the police never underestimate.



Modern counter-insurgency: "anti-terrorist" police units.

Address and telephone books must be destroyed, and one must not write or hold any documents. It is necessary to avoid keeping archives of legal or illegal names, biographical information, maps or plans. Contact numbers should not be written down, but simply committed to memory.

The urban guerrilla who violates these rules must be warned by the first one who notes this infraction and, if he repeats it, we must avoid working with him in the future.

The urban guerrilla's need to move about constantly with the police nearby - given the fact that the police net surrounds the city - forces him to adopt various security precautions depending upon the enemy's movements.

For this reason, it is necessary to maintain a daily information service about what the enemy appears to be doing, where the police net is operating and what points are being watched. The daily reading of the police news in the newspapers is a fountain of information in these cases.

The most important lesson for guerrilla security is never, under any circumstances, to permit the slightest laxity in the maintenance of security measures and precautions within the organization.

Guerrilla security must also be maintained in the case of an arrest. The arrested guerrilla must reveal nothing to the police that will jeopardize the organization. He must say nothing that will lead, as a consequence, to the arrest of other comrades, the discovery of addresses or hiding places, or the loss of weapons and ammunition.

The Seven Sins Of The Urban Guerrilla

Even when the urban guerrilla applies proper tactics and abides by its security rules, he can still be vulnerable to errors. There is no perfect urban guerrilla. The most he can do is make every effort to diminish the margin of error, since he cannot be perfect. One of the means we should use to diminish the possibility of error is to know thoroughly the seven deadly sins of the urban guerrilla and try to avoid them.

The first sin of the guerrilla is inexperience. The urban guerrilla, blinded by this sin, thinks the enemy is stupid, underestimates the enemy's intelligence, thinks everything is easy and, as a result, leaves evidence that can lead to disaster. Because of his inexperience, the urban guerrilla may also overestimate the forces of the enemy, believing them to be stronger than they really are. Allowing himself to be fooled by this presumption, the urban guerrilla becomes intimidated and remains insecure and indecisive, paralyzed and lacking in audacity.

The second sin of the urban guerrilla is to boast about the actions he has undertaken and to broadcast them to the four winds.

The third sin of the urban guerrilla is vanity. The guerrilla who suffers from this sin tries to solve the problems of the revolution by actions in the city, but without bothering about the beginnings and survival of other guerrillas in other areas. Blinded by success, he winds up organizing an action that he considers decisive and that puts into play the entire resources of the organization. Since we cannot afford to break the guerrilla struggle in the cities while rural guerrilla warfare has not yet erupted, we always run the risk of allowing the enemy to attack us with decisive blows.

The fourth sin of the urban guerrilla is to exaggerate his strength and to undertake actions for which he, as yet, lacks sufficient forces and the required infrastructure.

The fifth sin of the urban guerrilla is rash action. The guerrilla who commits this sin loses patience, suffers an attack of nerves, does not wait for anything, and impetuously throws himself into action, suffering untold defeats.

The sixth sin of the urban guerrilla is to attack the enemy when they are most angry.

The seventh sin of the urban guerrilla is to fail to plan things, and to act spontaneously.



Popular Support

One of the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to win public support.

Where government actions become inept and corrupt, the urban guerrilla should not hesitate to step in and show that he opposes the government, and thus gain popular sympathy. The present government, for example, imposes heavy financial burdens and excessively high taxes on the people. It is up to the urban and goes through the unpleasantness of seeing them rise up again out of their own ashes.

The men who are best trained, most experienced, and dedicated to urban guerrilla warfare and at the same time to rural guerrilla warfare, constitute the backbone of the revolutionary war and, therefore, of the Brazilian revolution. From this backbone will come the marrow of the revolutionary army of national liberation, rising out of guerrilla warfare.

This is the central nucleus, not the bureaucrats and opportunists hidden in the organizational structure, not the empty conferees, the clichéd writers of resolutions that remain on paper, but rather the men who fight. The men who from the very first have been determined and ready for anything, who personally participate in revolutionary actions who do not waver or deceive.

This is the nucleus indoctrinated and disciplined with a long-range strategic and tactical vision consistent with the application of Marxist theory, of Leninism and of its Castro-Guevara developments, applied to the specific conditions of the Brazilian situation. This is the nucleus that will lead the rebellion through its guerrilla phase.

From it will come men and women with politico-military development, one and indivisible, whose task will be that of future leaders after the triumph of the revolution in the construction of the new Brazilian society.

As of now, the men and women chosen for guerrilla warfare are workers; peasants whom the city has attracted as a market for manpower and who return to the countryside indoctrinated and politically and technically prepared; students, intellectuals, priests. This is the material with which we are building - starting with

urban guerrilla warfare - the armed alliance of workers and peasants, with students, intellectuals and priests.

Workers have infinite knowledge in the industrial sphere and are best for urban revolutionary tasks. The urban guerrilla worker participates in the struggle by constructing arms, sabotaging and preparing saboteurs and dynamiters, and personally participating in actions involving hand arms, or organizing strikes and partial paralysis with the characteristics of mass violence in factories, workshops and other work centers.

The peasants have an extraordinary intuition for knowledge of the land, judgment in confronting the enemy, and the indispensable ability to communicate with the humble masses. The peasant guerrilla is already participating in our struggle and it is he who reaches the guerrilla core, establishes support points in the countryside, finds hiding places for individuals, organizes the sowing and harvesting of grain for use in the guerrilla war, chooses the points of transport, cattle raising posts, and sources of meat supplies, trains the guides that show the rural guerrillas the road and creates an information service in the countryside.

Students are noted for being politically crude and coarse thus they break all the taboos. When they are integrated into urban guerrilla warfare, as is now occurring on a wide scale, they show a special talent for revolutionary violence and soon acquire a high level of political-technical-military skill. Students have plenty of free time on their hands because they are systematically separated, suspended and expelled from school by the dictatorship and so they begin to spend their time advantageously, on behalf of the revolution.

The intellectuals constitute the vanguard of resistance to arbitrary acts, social injustice, and the the terrible inhumanity of the dictatorship of the *gorillas*. They spread the revolutionary flame and they have great power in communication and great influence on people. The urban guerrilla intellectual or artist is the most modern of the Brazilian revolution's adherents.

Churchmen - that is to say, those ministers or priests and religious men of various hierarchies and persuasions - represent a sector that has special ability to communicate with the people, particularly with workers, peasants, and the Brazilian woman. The priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingredient in the ongoing Brazilian revolutionary war, and constitutes a powerful arm in the struggle against military power and North American imperialism.

As for the Brazilian woman, her participation in the revolutionary war, and particularly in urban guerrilla warfare, has been marked by an unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity, and it is not by chance that so many women have been accused of participation in guerrilla actions against banks, quarries, military centers, etc., and that so many are in prison while others are sought by the police.

As a school for choosing the guerrilla, urban guerrilla warfare prepares and places at the same level of responsibility and efficiency the men and women who share the same dangers fighting, rounding up supplies, serving as messengers or runners, as drivers, sailors or airplane pilots, obtaining secret information, and helping with propaganda and the task of indoctrination.

Problems And Principles Of Strategy

The most important problem of the Brazilian revolution is that of strategy, and regarding this - the sense in which it should be directed - there exists no complete accord among revolutionaries. Our organization has adopted a determined strategic concept through which it has been oriented, but it is evident that other organizations have different viewpoints.

The concepts and principles expressed here refer, therefore, to those questions about which our organization can give an opinion acquired from experience. For us the strategy of the Brazilian revolution is guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare forms part of revolutionary people's warfare. In *Some Questions About The Brazilian Guerrilla* we have already established the principles that orient our strategy, and for those wish to them it is sufficient to refer to the mentioned work. To the principles already enumerated there, we would like to add some others which will help form an idea of our strategic concepts regarding the Brazilian revolution.

Study and application of these principles by revolutionary groups combined with the personal experience of militants will contribute to a better comprehension not only of the desired objectives of our struggle, but also of the fundamental means to reach them. The following are the strategic principles to which we refer:

The Strategy Of The National Liberation Action

1. In a country like Brazil, where a permanent political crisis exists resulting from a deepening of the chronic structural crisis together with the general crisis of capitalism and where, as a consequence, military power has been established, our strategic principle is to transform the political crisis into an armed struggle of the people against military rule.
2. The basic principle of revolutionary strategy under the conditions of a permanent political crisis is to release, in the city as well as in the countryside, such a volume of revolutionary action that the enemy will be obliged to transform the political situation into a military one. Then dissatisfaction will reach all the strata of society, and the military will be held absolutely responsible for all failures.
3. The main aim of revolutionary strategy in the transformation of the permanent political crisis into an armed struggle and of the political situation into a military solution, is to destroy the bureaucratic-military machine of the state and replace it with the people in arms.
4. To destroy the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the Brazilian state, revolutionary strategy starts from the premise that that apparatus, within the conditions of the permanent political crisis that characterizes the national situation, entails ever closer relations with the interests of North

American imperialism. This machine cannot be destroyed unless the main blow is aimed against North American imperialism, which is the common enemy of humanity and primarily of the Latin American, Asian and African peoples.

5. Our conception of revolutionary is global both in the sense that its main function consists in countering the global strategies of North American imperialism and in the sense that the political and military strategies exist and act as one, rather than as two separate entities. At the same time, tactical functions are subordinate to strategy, and there exists no possibility of their employment outside of this subordination.

6. Given the global character of our strategy, in undertaking the struggle for the overthrow of the military, we must take into account as a strategic principle the radical transformation of the class structure of Brazilian society toward the goal of socialism. North American imperialism is our principal enemy and we must transform the struggle against it into a national liberation and anti-oligarchic action.

Thus, in the face of revolutionary attacks, the military will be compelled to come to the defense of North American imperialism and of the Brazilian oligarchy and will become publicly discredited. On the other hand, with the overthrow of military power and the annihilation of its armed forces, we shall expel the North Americans and destroy the Brazilian oligarchy, eliminating the obstacles in the road to socialism.

Strategies Of Urban And Rural Struggle

1. The urban struggle acts as a complement to the rural struggle, and thus all urban warfare, whether from the guerrilla front or from the mass front (with the support of the respective supply network), always assumes a tactical character.
2. The decisive struggle is one in the strategic area (i.e., the rural area) and not the one that evolves in the tactical area (i.e., the city).
3. If by some mistake, urban guerrilla warfare were to be conducted as the decisive struggle, the strategic conflict in the rural area of the peasantry would become relegated to a secondary level. Noting the weak or non-existent participation of the peasantry in the struggle, the bourgeoisie would take advantage of such circumstances to suborn and isolate the revolution; it will try to manoeuvre the proletariat which, lacking the support of its fundamentally ally, the peasantry, will try to preserve untouched the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state.
4. Only when the reactionary armed forces have already been destroyed and the military-bourgeois state cannot continue to act against the masses, can a general strike in the city be called which, in combination with guerrilla struggle, will lead to victory. This principle, derived from that

which affirms that the primary end of revolutionary struggle is the destruction of the military-bureaucratic apparatus and its substitution with the people in arms, is employed to prevent the bourgeoisie from subverting the general strike and resorting to a coup d'état in order to seize the initiative from the revolutionaries and cut their road to power.

Strategy Of The Urban Guerrilla

1. Because the city is the complementary area of struggle, the urban guerrilla must play a tactical role in support of the rural guerrilla. We must make of the urban guerrilla therefore an instrument for the destruction, diversion, and containment of the armed forces of the dictatorship in order to avoid their concentration of repressive operations against the rural guerrilla.
2. In the process of unleashing the urban guerrilla, the forms of struggle that we employ are not those of mass struggle, but those of small armed groups supplied with firepower and dedicated to the battle against the dictatorship. Seeing that the firepower of the revolutionaries is directed against their enemies, the masses, who until then were powerless before the dictatorship, will look upon the urban guerrillas with sympathy and lend them their support.
3. The forms of struggle that characterize the urban guerrilla are guerrilla tactics and armed actions of all types, actions of surprise and ambush, expropriations, seizure of arms and explosives, revolutionary terrorist acts, sabotage, occupations, raids, punishment of North American agents or police torturers, in addition to flash meetings, distribution of leaflets, painting of murals by armed groups, etc.
4. The infrastructure of the urban and rural guerrilla have common points: the training and specialization; physical conditioning; self-defense; the utilization of professional skills; the technical preparation of homemade weapons; the development of firepower and training for its handling; information networks; means of transportation and communication; medical resources and first aid. Our aim is to rely on both infrastructures, in order not to be reduced to one or the other guerrilla forms, and to combine the two correctly.
5. Revolutionaries engaged in guerrilla warfare give enormous importance to the mass movement in the urban area and to its forms of struggle, such as acts of restitution, strikes, marches, protests, boycotts, etc. Our strategic principle with respect to the urban mass movement is to participate in it with the objective of creating an infrastructure for armed struggle by the working class, students, and other forces: to employ urban guerrillas and to unleash their operations through the use of armed mass groups.

Strategy Of The Rural Guerrilla

1. Peasant struggles resulting from demands against landlords, or from the organization of rural syndicates, will develop into armed clashes and in this sense are positive. However, without firepower the peasants will be crushed by the forces of reaction. It is unlikely that rural guerrillas will emerge, in a strategic sense, out of peasant conflicts. The Brazilian peasantry has a very limited political consciousness and its tradition of struggle does not reach farther than mysticism or banditry; its experience of class struggle under the direction of the proletariat is recent and limited.

Under the present conditions of the country, dominated by the dictatorship, the strategic struggle in the rural area will develop from a guerrilla infrastructure emerging among the peasantry. Seeing in their midst the emergence of a firepower that combats the landlords and does not violate their interests, the peasants will support and participate in guerrilla warfare.

2. The main strategic principle of guerrilla struggle is that it can neither have any consequence nor any decisive character in revolutionary warfare unless it is structured and consolidated in an armed alliance of workers and peasants united with students. Such an alliance, supplied with growing firepower, will give the guerrillas firm foundations and advance their cause. The armed alliance of the proletariat, peasantry, and the middle class is the key to victory.

3. Rural guerrilla warfare is decisive because, in addition to the extreme mobility possible in the interior of the country, it leads to the formation of the revolutionary army of national liberation which can be built from an embryo constituted by the armed alliance of workers and peasants with students. The peasants, without whom the revolution cannot reach its ultimate consequences, are impossible to incorporate into the urban guerrilla.



ENCOURAGE

Carlos Marighella
1911 - 1969

More information and background on Carlos Marighella can be found at the following web site:

www.carlos.marighella.nom.br

CARLOS MARIGHELLA

4. In no event should the Brazilian guerrilla defend areas, territories, regions, or any base or fixed position. If we were to do such, we would permit the enemy to concentrate its forces in campaigns of annihilation against known and vulnerable targets.

5. The Brazilian rural guerrilla should always be mobile. Similarly, the urban guerrilla ought to be extremely mobile and never stage an occupation without meticulously organizing a retreat. Revolutionary warfare in Brazil is a war of movement, whatever the circumstances.

6. The guerrilla plays the principal strategic role in revolutionary warfare, and its political objective is the formation of a revolutionary army of national liberation and the seizure of power. In the revolutionary struggle we must avoid the distortion of this political objective and prevent the guerrilla, urban or rural, from transforming itself into an instrument of banditry, or unifying with bandits or employing their methods.

Organizational Strategy

1. The continental size of the country, the varying strategic importance of its areas, and the principle of diversity of revolutionary action combine with other factors to determine the existence or emergence of multiple revolutionary centres with regional coordination. Such revolutionary centres will dedicate themselves to implementing a guerrilla infrastructure to unleash the revolutionary struggle and dispose freely of political and tactical action at the regional level.

2. The strategic direction and global tactics of our organization - i.e., the unified political and military direction - will not emerge at once. Such leadership is formed through a permanent process in which armed struggle assumes the fundamental form of guerrilla warfare, going from the strategic field to the tactical and vice versa, until affirming itself in a group of men and women identified with revolutionary action and capable of carrying it to its ultimate consequences.

3. The revolutionary unity of our organization exists in terms of the strategic, tactical, and organic principles that we have adopted and not in terms of names and personalities. It is the identity of ideology, theory, and practice which will ensure that unconnected revolutionaries in various parts of the country will perform acts that will identify them as belonging to the same organization.

Carlos Marighella

(Source: "Teoria y Accion Revolucionarias", Carlos Marighella - Editorial Diogenes, Cuernavaca, Mexico, 1971.)

Questions Of Organization

Our organization was formed to apply a practical revolutionary policy with guerrilla warfare as its strategy. The principles of the organization should not be confused with those of the traditional political organizations of the Brazilian Left whose functions seem to include only establishing a meeting place for elaborating documents and occasionally conducting more or less bureaucratic tasks, dictated by the leadership and never put into practice.

The functioning of our organization, on the contrary, is based on freeing action in the revolutionary struggle, thus emphasizing the initiative taken by the groups that constitute our base. The small initial group of combatants is oriented toward construction of an infrastructure that will permit action, instead of worrying about building a hierarchical structure through meetings of delegates or the calling together of leaders of the old conventional parties.

The Initial Structure Of Our Organization

Given these premises, our organization emerged, based upon a strategic and tactical sector which was dedicated to conducting secret work in the strategic area of guerrilla operations and initiating the clandestine formation of a guerrilla training center. This branch of our organization is mobile in character, since its functions in accord with the strategic interests and immediate tactics of the guerrilla and is subject to dismantling operations.

Our organization consists of this sector and of local revolutionary groups of two types:

1. groups derived from the transformation of old conventional organizations into revolutionary groups;
2. unconventional groups, freed of party bonds, which have opted for our principles and reinforced our ranks.

Uniting the existing groups is the urban organization, broadened by other groups which have appeared with the advance of the movement. At the same time, in various parts of the country, small autonomous organizations and some sectors of revolutionary activists, including clerics and independent revolutionaries, have integrated into our organization.

Changes Produced By The Formation Of Special Groups And The Importance Of Perfecting These Groups

Our organizational concept is neither static nor dogmatic, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory which holds that no organization exists in the abstract, but that, rather, organization always serves a political purpose. In our judgment, qualitative changes in the revolutionary movement must induce qualitative changes in the revolutionary organization. As the revolutionary movement advances, changes are introduced into the revolutionary organization. In turn, certain changes in the organization's staff will influence the movement's progress.

In our organization a change occurred when the guerrilla training center began to produce results, so that we were able to provide some groups for strategic and tactical tasks and to reinforce local activity. Our primary preoccupation with the training center and with better selecting personnel should produce results. This may bring about a change in the quality of our revolutionary organization and in the form and content of guerrilla operations and tactics, as well as in local activities.

The Emergence Of Mobile Units

Another change in our organization resulted in the appearance of two mobile units: the strategic task force and armed tactical group. The task force and the armed tactical group have developed essential activities, independent of each other and with scarcely a link between them. The armed tactical group was a great support for the strategic group. It considerably increased the latter's firepower, effected important operations against enemy positions, and with its notable experience and capacity for action will permit in the immediate future the launching of an open struggle against the dictatorship in the strategic area-the countryside.

The armed tactical group represents with special relevance in our organization the shift from a situation where we had nothing and no firepower to a situation in which we have reasonable firepower: a most important qualitative change. This alone is evidence that we have progressed in revolutionary terms. The armed tactical group is a special instrument to be used in the most complex operations which need the greatest firepower. The management of this firepower requires more specialized and technical knowledge, which will condition and mold the armed tactical group into a special instrument. For this reason, the armed tactical group should not be confused with less technically prepared revolutionary groups, which lack firepower and thus the means to carry out operations. The sources of recruitment for the armed tactical group are the most decisive and determined independent revolutionaries and those experienced militants who opt for transfer to the armed tactical group and accept the demands of that change -in-their situation.

The Emergence Of The Three Fronts

As far as the activity of the local revolutionary groups is concerned, the new factor whose emergence caused the most decisive change in our organization was the appearance in 1968 of three fronts of activity against the dictatorship: the guerrilla front; the mass front; and the support network. These three fronts are typical of local activity throughout the country. Nevertheless, the characteristic of the revolutionary movement is that it develops unevenly, with the result that in some parts of the country one of these fronts disappears or develops more than the others. The next objective, with reference to local activity, is to ensure that the three fronts develop in all parts of the country and that their effects are as forceful as possible. The combination of the three fronts should result in the intensification of urban guerrilla warfare.

The Guerrilla Front

The guerrilla front is characterized by: the capture of arms and explosives;

terrorist revolutionary acts, sabotage, and armed anti-imperialist actions of all types; agitation produced by armed groups who paint walls, distribute leaflets, hold flash meetings, and operate the clandestine anti-dictatorial press. The guerrilla front results from the formation of an infrastructure based on the production of the arms and materiel necessary for war. This infrastructure, together with captured arms and explosives, is one of the decisive factors in changing both the nature of the revolutionary movement and its organization. A guerrilla front which is constantly growing should go as far as a scorched-earth policy in order to assail the dictatorship and divert a good part of the forces of repression, thus preventing them from pursuing the guerrilla. In whatever part of the country, local activity should count on the existence of the guerrilla front and direct its efforts to forming local revolutionary organizations.


The Mass Front

The mass front, led by the student movement, has played an unprecedented role in the struggle against the dictatorships. Occupations, demonstrations, protests, strikes, the fight against censorship, the capture of police and their exchange for political prisoners, all constitute elevated forms of mass struggle. Continued activity by local revolutionary groups among workers, peasants, and exploited sectors of the population will signify a great advance in the anti-dictatorial struggle. The role of students and priests has been important in terms of showing that the Brazilian middle class repudiates the dictatorship and constitutes one of the most combative forces in the present revolutionary process.

The mass front requires the organization of revolutionary groups both in places of work and study in the city and in rural areas. Besides this, it is necessary to give the mass front reasonable firepower. Mass movement activities should be armed activities, and an infrastructure identical to that of the guerrilla front should be mounted in the mass front. Above all, we should construct an infrastructure among the peasantry, given the pressing need for radicalizing the rural struggle. However, we should not confuse "mass front" with "mass work." The mass front is the edge of the struggle, an action front on an elevated level leading to armed struggle. Mass work involves the infiltration of the masses and the creation of consciousness and demands through the cultural media. Revolutionaries should neither deprecate these means nor confuse them with the mass front.

The Support Network

The support network is the great logistics front behind the Brazilian revolution and guerrilla warfare. Here too, revolutionary support groups are necessary as centers of



A young Marighella talks to a Brazilian worker.

individual and collective support in the city, and, especially, in the countryside. Houses, addresses, hiding places, financial resources, supplies, and information: such are the needs of the support network whose formation merits the special attention of revolutionaries.

Characteristics Of Our Organization

Due to changes and new developments, the structure of our organization has evolved to its present form, with the following fundamental features:

1. We have a strategic command in which the problems of rural guerrilla warfare are related to secret strategic affairs and to the control of combat training centers.
2. We have mobile units, such as the strategic task force and tactical armed group. These units are subordinate to the strategic command concerned with the rural guerrilla and they have no fixed place of operation, working wherever the strategic command decides.
3. In each large important urban area we have regional coordinators. Regional coordinators maintain the infrastructure for armed struggle and are responsible for the urban guerrilla. They create the firepower necessary for the urban guerrilla and promote the functioning of the three fronts of activity: the guerrilla front; the mass front; and the support network. Regional commands, if necessary, should be able to complement the infrastructure of the armed struggle and intensify the urban guerrilla warfare. The regional command does not establish permanent contact with any mobile unit subordinate to the strategic command, in order to avoid everyone knowing -everyone and everything. The strategic



Guerrillas of the Real IRA training in the countryside.

command is tied to the regional command through the communications network.

4. Small autonomous organizations and individual revolutionary militants, or free shooters, may enter our organization with entire freedom of action and tactical liberty if they accept, defend, and fulfill without reservation our strategic and tactical principles.
5. The backbone of our organization is formed by the revolutionary groups, which are characterized by their initiative and combativeness. The revolutionary groups have the right to reject anyone who, in the name of the command, impedes the revolutionary initiative of the groups based on the principles and tactics of our organization.
6. In our organization there is no complex chain of command, in order to allow simplicity of functioning, rapidity of action, mobility, and the group's capacity for initiative. Neither do we have any type of official as in traditional organizations; everything is based on the application of our principles and on the revolutionaries' capacity for initiative.
7. Leadership in our organization, and in the coordination and command groups in particular, is very simple and is always based upon a small number of comrades who, in order to merit confidence, distinguish themselves in the most hazardous and responsible actions by their capacity for initiative and their intransigence in the defense and application of the revolutionary principles to which we are committed.

A New Experiment In Revolutionary Organization And Leadership

This form of revolutionary organization is a new experience for the Brazilian revolutionary movement. Thus, there exist new problems concerning the national and global functioning of our organization which will only be resolved after we advance further in the execution of guerrilla tactics and operations. Autonomy and freedom of political and revolutionary action are necessary and even indispensable to the functioning of the local organization, although revolutionary leadership should never be spontaneous. Leadership is the direct result of mobile strategic and tactical actions of a broad kind, together with the greatest volume of efficient and technically capable firepower.

Our Principles Of Organization

1. The basic principle of our revolutionary organization is to wage guerrilla warfare and to make the organization an instrument of the political policy which follows from this strategy.
2. For an organization to be revolutionary it should permanently exercise the practice of revolution, it should never relinquish its strategic conception, its ideological and organizational principles, or its discipline.
3. A revolutionary organization is not converted into the vanguard by

the act of calling itself such. To be the vanguard it is necessary to act and accumulate a convincing revolutionary practice, since action alone makes the vanguard.

4. Our principal activity is not to construct a party, but to initiate revolutionary action.
5. What is fundamental in a revolutionary organization is not to hold unproductive meetings about general and bureaucratic themes, but rather to dedicate oneself systematically to planning and executing even the smallest revolutionary activity.
6. The decisive propelling element in the functioning of a revolutionary organization is the capacity for initiative of the revolutionary groups. No command has the authority to impede any initiative of the revolutionary groups.
7. We do not have a separate political and military policy with the military policy subordinate to the political policy. Our policy is a unique revolutionary policy which contains both military and political aspects.
8. The guerrilla is not the armed wing of a party or political organization. The guerrilla is both the political and military command of the revolution.
9. What determines the emergence and growth of political leadership is the practice of revolutionary action, its success and consequence, and the definitive, constant, direct, and personal participation of leaders in the execution of these actions.
10. There is no political leadership without sacrifice and direct participation in revolutionary action. Political leaders have neither merit nor recognition because of their office or position in the hierarchy. Office has no value. In a revolutionary organization there are only missions and tasks to complete.
11. The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.
12. We ask license of no one to perform revolutionary actions.
13. We have a commitment only to the revolution.
14. The limits of our revolutionary organization are those of our influence and revolutionary capacity.
15. The most fundamental obligation of our revolutionary organization is to maintain the strictest vigilance against the class enemy and in particular against the police. Informers, spies and traitors within revolutionary organizations should exemplarily.
16. Our basic principle in matters of security is that everyone should only know that which relates to his own work. Without this, it is impossible to guarantee the clandestine functioning of the revolutionary organization.

Carlos Marighella

Interview With Liberated Brazilian Political Prisoners

This interview was conducted in Algeria in 1970 following the release of 44 guerrillas in exchange for the kidnapped West German ambassador. This action was carried out by a joint commando of the ALN and VPR. The four freed revolutionaries interviewed are: Ladislav Dobor (VPR); Carlos Eduardo Fleury (ALN); Fernando Nagle Gabeira (MR-8); and Angelo Pezzutti.

Q: There has been a great deal of publicity in the United States about the kidnapping of diplomats who are then traded for political prisoners. Can you describe how one of these kidnappings was accomplished?

Dobor: The kidnapping of the Japanese consul was really rather funny. On one side of the place where we seized him is the federal police headquarters; on the other, less than 100 yards away, is the headquarters of the civil police; on the third side is the district police station; and only 50 yards away is the state security agency! Militarily this type of action is usually very simple. He was in his car with a chauffeur. One person in a Volkswagen began to swerve about the road as if his car were out of control, and he motioned to the ambassador's chauffeur to stop, which of course he did because he didn't want to ram into the VW. Six of our people stepped in at this point. I was on the corner and explained to the ambassador's chauffeur that he should remain calm. Two people then took the consul and put him into a car and drove away.

There was also a second car. We always have one main car and one security car. Both cars have firing teams and if there is any police intervention we try to get the police car in the middle between the two. That's what happened in this case. A few kilometres away, the police managed to find us, seemingly by coincidence. They took a look at our car. The car behind blocked them; we turned to the left and the police just went straight. They didn't want any trouble.

Q: Why did you choose kidnapping as a tactic?

Gabeira: In Brazil the only way to get a person out of jail is through kidnapping. We have about 500 revolutionaries in jail. The judicial system is very closely linked to those responsible for the repression. When we go before the judges, we know they will condemn us to about 20 years in jail. It is not possible to contact a lawyer or to make a defense. So the



Brazilian political prisoners circa October 1969.

only way to get people out is to kidnap an important personality. We see nothing "unfair" in kidnapping "an innocent person", since the authorities arrest not only revolutionaries but many ordinary as well. Besides, as Carlos Lamarca, the head of the VPR, has said, "A diplomat who can live with a dictatorship can live with us for three days."

We have found that large numbers of people relate very positively to the kidnappings. When the American ambassador, Elbrick, was kidnapped, the police received hundreds of anonymous phone calls saying he is here, he is there. And when the government, as one of the conditions of the release, was forced to broadcast our message on the official radio station, many small groups of people with transistor radios appeared on the street - it was a form of demonstration.

Q: You have been able to capture many of your weapons from the government. How are you able to do this?

Dobor: I can tell you about a raid on a military police barracks in which I participated. We had 12 people and we staged the raid at ten o'clock at night. We put out people as sentinels; they pretended they had come to find some girls to bring into the barracks for the soldiers. Our people went inside. I was directing the outside part. I had a walkie-talkie. They had a second one inside, so that if they had problems we could give them help. We usually take no chances; we have a lot of arms.

On this raid we had two cars and a small truck that we sent. There was no resistance. We caught everybody sleeping. We didn't even have to take their arms. They were very scared since they were victims of the government propaganda which says we like to kill and slaughter the poor soldiers. They were so happy that we were not killing them that they actually helped us gather up the rifles and machine guns and hand grenades and load them in the truck. It took 20 minutes. A lot of people watched the action, but nobody called the police. From the car where I was sitting, I saw some MPs coming. I signalled the others with the walkie-talkie, and they took the MPs prisoner the minute they came in. They had no chance to run and they didn't try any heroics. They knew that when a police headquarters is attacked it is the revolutionaries, and they were afraid.

In fact, during several actions we have had a police car pass right by. They don't stop because they know if they do they may be killed. They know it is a political action, and they don't understand what it is about. They usually don't even radio in for help, because if they did they would later have to explain why they didn't stop.

This barracks raid was one of the longest actions we have done. Usually our actions in banks last three or four minutes. Grabbing the Japanese consul took about 40 seconds.

Q: How is an action planned?

Dobor: The actions are usually very simple. We prepare them very carefully, usually for two or three weeks. Everyone is perfectly acquainted with the terrain and the habits of the police in the vicinity. We plan everything well because we don't want to fire a shot. In the VPR we have never fired a shot, except when I was captured.

Q: How did that happen?

Dobor: The police had tortured a young girl very badly and she had told them where I could be found. Some 20 plainclothes police jumped me from behind. I managed to get off one shot at a policeman as I was being thrown down. I missed. I had a Luger and there are many problems with automatic pistols. The second shot didn't go off and they managed to take me alive.

Q: How did you come to choose the urban battleground?

Pezzutti: In the beginning our objective in the cities was to get money and arms - resources necessary to initiate rural guerrilla warfare. We didn't intend to begin the fight in the big cities yet. But in 1968 to 1969 we realized that the urban actions themselves had a very good impact. They were very well received by the workers and the students.

So we started to engage in acts more directly linked to the immediate needs of the workers. In the industrial city of Belo Horizonte in October 1968, workers in the metal industries and the banks were on strike. The police were arresting and attacking strikers who went back to the factory to agitate, and they were forcing the workers at the banks to continue work. So we decided to rob a government bank in Belo to symbolize the oppression of the workers and to show the power a small number could have by using the tactics of the guerrilla - surprise, organization, and a concentration of force.

Nine of us went into the bank. In three minutes we had peacefully subdued the 40 people inside, taken all the money, and distributed pamphlets explaining the reason for the action. There were troops near the bank and police cars passing in front every five minutes. But they never saw a thing.

Q: How do you choose your actions?

Dobor: We try to pick actions which speak for themselves. We have attacked supermarkets - especially American supermarkets - and distributed the food, inviting the people from the *favelas* (shantytowns) to help themselves. And they do. Or we seize a truck with American canned food, such as Armour or Swift, take it to a slum, leave it there and write on it the American slogan, "What is good for America is good for Brazil?" Many people in the slums understand the joke.

We follow one basic rule: we do not use violence that is not understood by the people. If the people don't understand it, the government can use it against us. This is why we must be gradual. For example, we kidnap a company owner who does not pay his wages, and force him to pay. What can the government say? We are forcing the owner to abide by the law. This kind of action will never turn the people against us. After we leave food in the slums, the people don't give a damn for propaganda that says we are bandits and murderers. On the other hand, the army always reacts against us in such a situation. By firing on workers, the army makes the people angry and brings them to the point of understanding action on yet another level - that is, action directed against the military.

And the people, especially poor people, often do support us. Sometimes when militants have gotten into armed fights with the police, they have escaped into the

favelas, often holding their guns. When the police question the people there, they say they saw nothing. Sometimes, due to inexperience, we get into a situation where hundreds of people are observing an action and laughing. In the first bank action I did, people were watching, but no one called the police. One man wanted to call them and went to a bar and asked to use the telephone. The man there refused to let him use it. "It's not my money", he said.

It is very wrong to imagine that we are highly trained agents, able to do things very skilfully. It's not like that. We are simply people who are very determined in what we do. That is why the police and army are afraid of us.

Q: Do you use bombs?

Dobor: No. We do not use forms of violence that can be twisted by the government. If the people heard that we use bombs, the government would do exactly what the United States does in Vietnam, and what the French did here in Algeria. They would put a few bombs in a movie house on a Saturday afternoon, when it is full of children. And then we would have the entire population running after us in streets.

We choose very selective targets whose meaning cannot be distorted by the government.

Q: What is the meaning of the bank robberies?

Dobor: We try to show the people that the big capitalists are robbers and that the government uses the army against the workers to stop strikes, even killing people. This helps the capitalists get more money. We go to get the money where they put it: in the banks. Tactically, we always characterize the bank actions as "getting the money back", and we do get a lot of it back. We also rob generals and politicians who are in the pay of the Americans. They are so tremendously corrupt that they cannot put their money into banks. They keep it at home - so we go there to get it.

In one case we got \$2.4 million cash. It was very funny: it was one of the biggest robberies ever made in Latin America, but instead of accusing us, as they always do, the government suppressed the story for six months because so many in the government had their hands in this money. They finally admitted that the robbery had happened, but only because it had become a "scandal" - a fairly large number of people had seen us do it. We had to take out a safe weighing 250 kilos, which required the use of a truck.

Q: Are many people in the organization actually underground?

Gabeira: Yes, those people who are actually sought by the police cannot have a job because they might be recognized. One such person is the leader of the VPR, Carlos Lamarca, who is the most wanted man in Brazil. But many members do have "cover" identities and lead a seemingly normal life.

Q: How do you guard against infiltration by government spies?

Dobor: First, we accept only people whom several members of the organization have known for at a few years, or even before 1964. We try to take no chances. Although according to our intelligence section the Brazilian Army has trained



Carlos Lamarca training VPR cadre

800 infiltrators, we have never had an infiltration. On the other hand, we are taking counter, which means that we ourselves are infiltrating the various intelligence service of the government. We can do this more easily now because many people in the army are disgusted by the dictatorship.

Gabeira: Before a person actually comes into our organization, he is given a series of small tests - some

small actions to see how he performs. In some cases a person will be functioning for a long time with no contact with the organization.

Q: When the police killed Marighella, the government said the Dominicans had betrayed him. Is that what had happened?

Fleury: Marighella was very hard to disguise. He was very tall, quite dark, and very big. The police recognized him in the street; then encircled him. There was an exchange of shots and he was killed. He had nothing to do with the Dominican fathers. The government blamed the priests in order to demoralize the movement, to split the leftist movement in general from the leftist Church.

Q: Brazil is known for having won independence from Portugal, abolished slavery, overthrown the monarchy, and made the revolution of 1930, all with little or no actual violence. What brought you to the point of armed struggle?

Gabeira: We did not choose this way of fighting; it was chosen by the dictatorship and by its ally, the United States. Before 1964, we thought change might come in Brazil through peaceful means, but with the right-wing military coup, the only way left to us was armed struggle.

Q: After the coup, how did the armed struggle get its start?

Dobor: In the first years after the coup, we had many discussions and splits. By 1967 only a few small groups had taken up arms - though one group even assassinated the CIA agent Norman Chandler (*sic*). But then in 1968, very large mass movements among the students and workers erupted and the government had the police shoot into the strikers and demonstrators. Many were killed. The mass movements practically disappeared, but some of the leaders and cadres wanted to continue to fight. Since the government had closed off the peaceful forms, they came into the armed organizations. It was then that the urban guerrillas commandos really began.

Our organization grew tremendously. We didn't know what to do with all the people who wanted to join and begin fighting. But it is not as simple as that. To join an armed organization you have to be contacted in a secure manner, you have to know how to fight, you have to know how to shoot, how not to be followed, how to write codes, how to organize. It's difficult. It's a big investment, and our problem is that we simply have too many people to train adequately with the resources available.

We did a lot of actions, and our people were very heroic. But they were inexperienced so it ended up as a slaughter. Many were killed, many arrested and put in prison, where they were unprepared to resist the tortures. Many of the revolutionaries are still in prison. I was arrested in November 1968, managed to come out and was arrested again two months ago. Now, as you see, we are developing better techniques to get people out.

Another problem was that initially the police were not working very hard against us. As a result, we did not build the type of organizational structure that could withstand the concerted assault by the police which came later. We also did not expect so much violence and torture. After days of torture and electric shock, many people could not resist, and gave away information. Thus the police managed, with a little luck, to take the important sectors of the organization. Most of the initial structures we had built are now gone.

Now we are building a different kind of movement. We have fewer people, but they are much better trained. Most have been shooting and fighting some two years. We can already speak of experienced cadres. We have good organization, good arms and a lot of money. Gradually it has become a stable, more intelligent, and more organized movement. A few months ago we even gave orders to one of our sectors in Rio de Janeiro to stop all recruiting because the problem is not to get more people but to give the people we already have the ability to fight. To do this for even one person can work with and train five or six others at most. This is the way in which our new commando groups are formed, and it is working quite well.

Q: Where are the new recruits coming from? What kind of people are they?

Gabeira: With a few exceptions, the members are under 30, some as young as 16. There are many students from sociology, the letters and arts, and law, fields with few prospects on the job market. We are beginning to recruit a few workers, mainly those who participated in the 1968 strikes. Although there are fewer women than men, the women perform the same functions as the men, and we hope that as the revolutionary process escalates, more women will join.

Q: How do you relate your military and political strategies?

Dobor: At this point our goals are not so much military in the sense of inflicting military losses; what is more important is the political tactic of getting people on our side and isolating the government. When that happens there will be no stopping us because we have a social base, a base of sympathetic people to support us and hide us and join us. This will also mean that we have a military effect, and that when we perform purely military actions the people will accept it.

Right now, we are not interested in making a show of strength, because we are very few and very weak. Mostly we want to show the people that we are fighting for them. The fact that the government is torturing us, the fact that dozens of us are prepared to die for our country - all this penetrates to the population. And they will easily come to despise the police because they know that they are corrupt and morally deficient, while the people who are opposing them are clearly idealistic... While the gun is always a political instrument, in the beginning it is almost wholly that.

Gabeira: Our plans for the coming year also involve working on two other problems. First, we want to continue to unify and centralize the revolutionary organizations. At the moment, groups are planning actions together - the kidnapping of the German ambassador was done by two organizations, VPR and ALN. This sort of action can really lead to integration; you can find out what you have in common. Whereas if you only discuss, you usually find out what you don't have in common.

Our common experience, both in jail and here in exile, will no doubt also contribute to unification.

Second, we want to establish ourselves in the countryside, which many of us feel will ultimately be the more important arena of battle. Right now we are laying the basis for this by beginning to mount isolated incidents in the countryside. For example, sugar plantations in several regions have been burned to the ground.

Q: You are still interested in rural guerrilla warfare?

Pezzutti: We think the most exploited class in Latin America is the peasantry. They are a potential revolutionary force that will prove very important. Also, the country is a better place to wage guerrilla warfare.

Gabeira: There are other factors, too. The working class in Brazil is very small. Also, many of the workers have only recently come from the countryside. They are just entering the consumer economy, which seems a step up for them. They are getting some privileges - they have more privileges than their brothers in the countryside. And the agricultural sector of the economy is in stagnation.

Pezzutti: We believe that the machinery of the dominant classes power is stronger in the cities, so the opportunities for a popular army are better in the country. We think the urban fight is slightly secondary, but the popular army must be built in the revolutionary fight, both urban and rural.

Q: Does the revolution have a platform or program?

Dobor: At the moment our movement is mostly a movement of young people, especially students. We feel it is part of a general youth movement that has sprung up in many parts of the world - in the United States, in Poland, and tomorrow probably in Russia. Most of all, this is a movement of revolt against the world as it is, and as such it brings something new into politics - a kind of morality.

Since our movement is a popular movement, we cannot have a narrow and precise program. But what we basically want is to bring the initiative in politics back to the people. We are not going to be presidents and prime ministers; we want

to start a popular movement which will allow the masses of people to have their say as to what kind of government and society will be constructed in Brazil.

We in the VPR do have a general program, which is the same as that of Marighella's group, the ALN.

First, we are fighting for the freedom of the Brazilian. We want to abolish the dictatorship; we want freedom of organization, freedom of association, all those rights which allow the people to stand up with a minimum of dignity. When the people are afraid, they don't usually have dignity.

Second, we are fighting for independence. Our development has always before been linked to foreign powers, first to Portugal, then to England, now to the United States. Because of this intolerable dependency, we have, amidst great luxury, people dying of hunger and of simple, controllable diseases. We need development that is linked to the basic need of the people: real independence, to be economically independent of other countries, especially the United States.

Third, Brazil is now a land of gross inequalities. We are fighting for political, economic, and social justice.

Gabeira: We all think that the revolution will be socialist, and at the same time a popular revolution in which all the people will participate.

Dobor: Most important, we believe that we can achieve this program only through arms. We are willing to fight alongside any movement that has taken up arms against the dictatorship and against U.S. imperialism. We are much closer to a priest who is fighting for the freedom of the country, for example, to a speaker from the Communist Party who likes talking and won't get involved in the fight.

We are a small movement, and we will not take power immediately. But we think that whenever a small group forms and takes up arms, it is very important. One small group is nothing; but we know that people are forming small groups all over the world, and that they will develop into a powerful force which will change the whole situation.

Q: You have all spent a lot of time in the jails. What are they like?

Pezzutti: The regular prisoners are treated much better than the political prisoners, who are kept in small isolated cells 19 hours or more a day. It is very difficult to have visitors, see an attorney, or prepare a defense. You are denied access to writing materials, you cannot prepare petitions, and you can say nothing about the torture, which the government officially does not acknowledge. It is very bad.

Q: Then the torture continues, despite the publicity and protests?

Pezzutti: All of the people who are here were tortured. Torture is now an institution, a systematic, standard form of interrogation. Usually it is "scientifically" administered, for the purpose of obtaining information. Doctors are present to determine the victim's physical capacity for torture. Nevertheless, the interrogators sometimes get carried away and cannot stop. This has resulted in at least 20 deaths. A political prisoner, when first arrested, is almost invariably tortured. This can go on for a long time, for many people it lasted two months. And whenever the police get some new information they start all over again. I myself was a guinea

pig for a class of 100 army sergeants who were being taught the techniques of torture.

The methods include: beating; electric shock, often applied to the tongue or genitals; having needles thrust under the fingernails; strangling; and simulated drowning. Women are often stripped and sexually assaulted. Sometimes pincers are applied to their breasts, leaving wounds. Another technique is the "hydraulic" torture, in which water under pressure is inserted in the nose, with the mouth closed, causing choking and ultimately loss of consciousness. The interrogators also make use of "truth serum" drugs during the interrogations.

Q: They have imprisoned families. Do they also torture the children?

Fleury: Among the families freed in exchange for the Japanese consul last March, there was a nine-year-old boy whom they beat savagely in an attempt to get information from his mother. Another case involved a woman with a two-year-old child, whom they dropped from a height while she watched; they would catch him in the next of time. The smallest of the four children here was present while his parents were being tortured. This is a great trauma for a small child.

Q: Is the United States government involved in any of this?

Dobor: The American involvement in Brazil has become more "rationalized". Since people like less and less to see Americans around, they now train Brazilian officers mainly in the United States, rather than sending Americans to Brazil. We know that many army and police officers, including the torturers, are being trained in the United States. Some have undergone anti-guerrilla training at the U.S. base in Panama. Some have also studied at the FBI academy.

In the interior, another kind of work is done by the Peace Corps. While no doubt many Peace Corps people have much idealism and little comprehension of the situation, the Peace Corps is also infiltrated by agents with other purposes. For example, a university researcher may come "to study social conditions" for the purpose of pinpointing the most politically explosive regions in the interior. U.S. personnel are also busy preparing aerial photography maps of regions of the interior that may become centers of guerrilla activities. We use such American-made maps which we manage to get - they are much better than the Brazilian ones.

Gabeira: Edward Kennedy gave a speech against the Brazilian government, but he did not have the true details of what was going on. The CIA is now sending into Brazil groups to organize small groups of rightists to kill people; they are preparing a military organization among the right wing to fight against us. The CIA agent Chandler was training the right wing. But they have many people. Even U.S. Ambassador Elbrick has said that there are many CIA agents working in Brazil.

Q: What can people in the United States do to help your struggle?

Gabeira: First, you can help isolate the Brazilian dictatorship, expose what they are doing. Second, you can expose and denounce the participation of the U.S. government in the repression in Brazil, in training our torturers. But more important, the fight we are waging will be in many places, even inside the United States. We

think that the main contradiction in the world today is not between capitalism and socialism but between the giant monopolies and the people they exploit.

Such organizations as SDS and the organization of people of colour inside the U.S. are part of this struggle because they are oppressed too. Personally, I think that the level of repression in the United States is getting very high, and I am worried about the necessity for the organizations to face this.

What can stop the capacity of the U.S. to intervene is the fight inside the U.S. itself, plus a fight all around the world. I think that one day the force inside the United States will be very important in protecting us. But at the moment, this is not the case.

(Interview by Andy Truskier. Originally published in Ramparts Magazine, October 1970, under the title *The Politics Of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla In Brazil*)

Brazilian Guerrilla Organizations

ALN (*Ação Libertadora Nacional - National Liberation Action*): Formed around a group of ex-PCB (Brazilian Communist Party) members led by Carlos Marighella and Joaquim Câmara Ferreira; it had good relations with Cuba as Marighella had headed the Brazilian OLAS delegation; began armed struggle in February 1968 in Sao Paulo.

VPR (*Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria - Popular Revolutionary Vanguard*): Began as a merger of the São Paulo branch of POLOP (a Marxist student group) and ex-military survivors of the MNR (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, precursor to armed groups in the mid-60s); devastated by repression at the beginning of 1969, the VPR began to regroup in July 1969 around COLINA (National Liberation Command - an armed faction of POLOP), resulting in VAR-Palmares (Armed Revolutionary Vanguard - Palmares, a mass organization that split from the larger VAR and utilized armed struggle); shortly thereafter one wing, led by Carlos Lamarca, split and returned to the name VPR.

MRT (*Movimento Revolucionario Tiradentes - Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement*): Named for a Brazilian national hero, the MRT was the action team of the Red Wing of the (Maoist) PC do B (Communist Party of Brazil - Maoist splinter from the PCB); became independent in 1969, led by José de Carvalho and his brothers.

MR-8 (*Revolutionary Movement of October 8*): Named in commemoration of Che Guevara's death, the MR-8 began rural guerrilla warfare in October 1968; its structures were hard hit during March and April 1969; subsequently worked closely with the ALN in cities; formed around dissidents of POLOP and the PCB.

PCBR (*Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party*): Formed by dissidents from the PCB who left with Marighella in 1967 (Mario Alves, Apolonio de Carvalho and Jacob Gorende); adopted name in early 1968; initially reticent about armed struggle, the PCBR took up the gun in 1969 when its Rio branch coalesced with MR-26 (Revolutionary Movement - July 26, Cuban-influenced revolutionary organization formed after 1964 coup) remnants.

(Adapted from *Urban Guerrilla Warfare In Latin America* by Kohl and Litt.)

Chronology Of Events In Brazil 1964-73

1964

March 31-April 2: Revolution of March 31; military coup overthrows populist regime of João Goulart.

April 9: Institutional Act I institutes "revolutionary government".

April-July: Wholesale purges throughout military, unions, Congress, judiciary, civil service, state and local governments.

April 16: General Castelo Branco elected president by Congress.

May 9: Carlos Marighella injured in shootout with police.

July: Purges decline as regime consolidates; Carlos Lacerda, one of the initiators of the coup, goes into opposition.

October: Leadership of Brazilian Communist Party arrested; purge re-instituted.

November 26: Goiás Governor Borges ousted for subversion.

November 27: Two hundred jailed in Rio Grande do Sul for allegedly plotting leftist insurrection in conjunction with Borges and ex-deputy Leonel Brizola.

1965

March 17: *New York Times* reports 2,000 people in jail without charges.

March 27: Guerrilla raid on barracks in Rio Grande do Sul.

May 18: Bomb found in United States Embassy.

October 27: Institutional Act II; Castelo Branco dissolves political parties, increases executive powers, decrees appointment of judges and indirect election of future presidents.

1966

February 5: Bombing of home of United States consul in Pôrto Alegre.

June 24: U.S.I.S. building in Brasilia bombed.

July: Bomb at Recife airport kills three; assassination attempt on General Costa e Silva; hundreds arrested.

September 15-23: Students demonstrate and clash with police in Rio.

October 4: Bombings of war, finance and foreign ministers' homes.

December 1: A.P. Pimentel sentenced to 5 years in prison for attempted assassination of Castelo Branco in 1965.

December 10: Carlos Marighella and others resign from Communist Party Executive Committee.

1967

Early 1967: Mario Alves and others found Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party.

March 15: Costa e Silva becomes president; new Constitution inaugurated.

Early April: Rural *foco* in Serra de Caparaó aborted; MNR and (allegedly) Leonel Brizola involved.

August: First OLAS (Organization of Latin American Solidarity) Conference held in Havana; Carlos Marighella is one of the Brazilian delegates.

August 1: Peace Corps office in Rios bombed.

August 20: 170 suspected guerrillas seized in Mato Grosso; led by Tarzan de Castro.

September 27: United States air attaché's residence in Rio bombed.

October 15: 5 persons arrested for attempting to form guerrilla band in Amazonas.

December 30: Ten boxes of dynamite and 200 detonators taken from Cajamar cement company.

Late 1967: Marighella returns to Brazil and begins mobilizing ALN.

1968

January: Beginnings of several guerrilla groups: VPR in São Paulo and MR-8 in Niteroi.

March 19: United States Consulate in São Paulo bombed.

March 28: Edson Luis Soto, 16-year-old student, killed by police in Rio de Janeiro.

March 30: Student demonstration in Rio protests killing of students by administration.

April 15: French and Italian Bank armored car attacked; 100,000 NCr (New Cruzeiros) expropriated.

April 20: Conservative newspaper *O Estado do São Paulo* bombed by VPR.

April 23: Commerce and Industry Bank in São Paulo robbed by guerrillas.

May 1: Governor Abreu Sodre stoned by mob in Sao Paulo.

June 20-21: Students clash with police in Rio and demonstrate in São Paulo and Brasília; 1,500 arrested.

June 22: São Paulo Army Hospital raided for weapons in first direct attack on army by the VPR.

June 26: One hundred thousand students demonstrate in protest against repression. Second Army headquarters in Ibirapuera bombed by VPR.

June 28: Nineteen boxes of dynamite and blasting caps stolen from Fortaleza stone quarry by VPR.

July: Students occupy University of São Paulo Philosophy Faculty; first death-squad attacks initiate backlash to 1968 turmoil. Osasco metal workers strike, led by union head and VPR leader Jose Ibrahim; increased repression follows.

July 13: Peasant leader Manoel Conceicao shot by police; he eventually loses a leg from gangrene.

August 10: Payroll train attacked; 110,000 NCr expropriated.

October MR-8 *foco* in Parana begun; first support action executed.

October 12: U.S. Captain Charles Chandler assassinated by VPR in Sao Paulo. Eight hundred students arrested for holding congress of outlawed National Student Union.

October 14: Seizure of 180,000 NCr from Bank of Sao Paulo.

October 27: Sears, Roebuck & Company store bombed.

November Bank assault linked to Marighella and the ALN; realization by police of "subversive threat".

December 12: Congress balks at government demand for trial of Deputy Marcio Moreira Alves for insulting military honour; climax of a long "constitutional crisis".

December 13: Costa e Silva closes Congress; Institutional Act V promulgated, giving president dictatorial powers.

December 14-18: Hundreds arrested including 94 government party deputies, ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek and Carlos Lacerda.

1969

January 22: Planned action against IV Army Quitauna barracks uncovered, exposing VPR.

January 25: Captain Carlos Lamarca, with three non-commissioned officers and 70 automatic weapons, defects to VPR.

February 25: Expropriation of 120,000 NCr from Auxiliary Bank of São Paulo.

March: Residence of General Ademar de Rocha Santos bombed.

April: Monguagua Conference held to reorganize VPR and attempt merger with COLINA: initially there is little success, but soon after the two groups join to form VAR-Palmares.

May 1: Guerrillas seize São Bernardo radio station and broadcast message.

May 5: Seizure of 248,000 NCr from National Credit Bank.

May 27: Six guerrillas escape Lemos de Brito prison and become involved in MAR *foco*.

June: Operation Bandeirante launched nationwide to combat subversion.

June 22: Military police barracks attacked; weapons and ammunition expropriated.

July: Political parties reorganized by government decree. Over 30 MR-8 members arrested.

July 8: Two theatres showing "The Green Berets" bombed.

July 18: \$2.4 million taken from estate of politician Adhemar de Barros.

August: MAR guerrillas driven out of forests of Angra dos Reis, 200 miles south of Rio de Janeiro. Over 200 revolutionaries arrested during mid-1969.

August 15: Marighella speech read over Radio Sao Paulo during occupation by guerrillas.

September 4: United States Ambassador Burke Elbrick kidnapped by ALN and MR-8; 15 prisoners exchanged for Elbrick.

September 10: Institutional Act XIV decrees death penalty for subversion; first time death penalty has been decreed since 1891; some 1,800 persons arrested following Elbrick kidnapping.

September: Tarresopolis Conference results in split within VAR-Palmares; armed struggle wing leaves and calls itself VPR again.

Late September: Thirteen ALN factories raided by authorities.

November 4: Carlos Marighella trapped and shot to death.

December 17: Shooting incident leads to discovery of PCBR urban guerrilla activity; campaign against PCBR begins.

1970

January: João Domingues Palmares commando (VAR) hijacks airplane. Subsequently the VAR is hit hard by repression.

January 13: PCBR continues to face repression, culminating in arrests of Mario Alves (who dies under torture) and Apolonio de Carvalho.

February 20: Death of Antonio Raimundo de Lucena, VPR leader, during police raid.

March 11: Japanese consul Nobuo Okuchi abducted by VPR; 5 prisoners exchanged for Okuchi.

April 5: Curtis Cutter, United States consul in Pôrto Alegre, thwarts kidnap attempt.

April 21: ALN leader Juarez Guimarez de Brito killed in attempted kidnapping of West German Ambassador von Holleben.

April 21-May 31: Operation Vale de Ribeira mobilizes thousands of troops to eliminate VPR training camp headed by Lamarca.

June 11: West German ambassador kidnapped by Juarez Guimarez de Brito commando of ALN and VPR; 44 prisoners released in exchange for him.

July 12: Eduardo Leites (VPR) arrested in attempted skyjacking to free prisoners.

July: ALN, MR-8, VPR, MRT begin merger into United Front.

August 12: Carlos Franklin Peiyao de Araujo (VAR) arrested.

September: PCBR joins United Front effort. VAR suffers another split, led by Adilson Ferreira da Silva.

October 1-3: Operation Sao Paulo; police campaign against Sao Paulo guerrillas; 500 arrested, including most of VAR-Palmares, Sao Paulo branch.

October 23: Joaquim Camara Ferreira, successor to Marighella as head of ALN, arrested and dies of "heart attack" in prison.

November: Grandson of Marshall Lott savagely tortured; Lott kills army captain in revenge, and demands public trial; military quietly retires him. Arms cache in Sao Paulo tombs discovered.

November 4-5: Operation Cage launched to pre-empt guerrilla actions commemorating Marighella's death; 5-10,000 people detained.



Carlos Marighella's funeral procession as it passes by where he was shot and killed by police.

November 15: Elections: 30% of electorate abstain despite illegality of abstention; 55% cast blank ballots.

December 3: Education Minister Jarbas Passarinho admits to occasional use of torture in jails.

December 7: Swiss Ambassador Giovanni Bucher kidnapped by Juarez Guimarez de Brito commando of ALN; 70 prisoners released.

December 8: Police announce death of three guerrillas, including Eduardo Leite (VPR).

December 10: Expropriation of 64,000 NCr from Itau-America Bank; police claim 9 of 14 commandos captured within 2 days.

1971

January 12: VAR-Palmares distributes food to slum dwellers.

January 20: Rubens Paiva (labour party ex-deputy linked to guerrillas) and family arrested; Paiva dies under torture.

February 6: Raids in Recife lead to captured documents and whereabouts of guerrillas, including Tarzan de Castro.

March 11: \$35,000 expropriated from 3 private firms.

March 12: Five VAR-Palmares members arrested.

March 14: \$13,800 seized from supermarket.

March 23: Marcio Leite Toledo (VPR) killed in Sio Paulo; links leading to Carlos Lamarca allegedly discovered.

April 5: MRT leader Devanir Joss de Carvalho arrested and killed.

April 14: Major Toja Martinez assassinated in Rio.

April 15: Conservative industrialist Henning Albert Boilesen assassinated by MRT in retribution for death of Carvalho.

April 18: Dimas Antonio Cassemiro of MRT killed.

April 23: MR-8 student cell at Rio de Janeiro Federal University broken.

May 1: Zilda Xavier Periera (ALN) escapes Pinel Hospital in Rio.

May 16: Two presses seized by guerrillas from printing press factory.

May 28: Five guerrillas from VAR-Palmares arrested. MR-8 cell broken up.

June 23: Jose Anselmo dos Santos, ex-navy corporal and leader of naval insurrection of March 26, 1964, allegedly dies in prison.

July 22: Guerrillas seize 350,000 NCr from bank.

July 24: Joao Carlos dos Santos, leader of group which kidnapped von Holleben, captured.

August 5: Jose Raimundo Costa (VPR) shot to death resisting arrest.

September 18: Carlos Lamarca killed in Salvador, Bahia.

1972

January 19: Alex de Paula Xavier-Pereira (ALN) killed.

January 23: Peasant leaders Manoel de Conceicao and Luis Campos arrested.

April: Armed resistance begins in Amazonia State.

April 11: Antonio Carlos Nogueira Cabral (ALN) killed in Rio de Janeiro

April 29: Eighteen AP members sentenced to prison. Garage of Myers Craig (director of Brazilian Johnson & Johnson) bombed.
June 14: Luri de Paula Xavier Pereira (ALN)
July 18: Trial of 55 VPR members in Sao Paulo.
August 2: Aloisio dos Santos Filhos (PCB foreign affairs committee) taken.
August 12: Fuad Saad (head of PCB foreign affairs) arrested.
September 22: Manoel de Conceicao brought to trial.
September 25: 5000 troops sent to Xambia, Amazonia in counter-insurgency action.
September 28: Police station in Garibaldi, Rio Grande do Sul, raided for weapons.
October 3: Seventeen AP and PRT cadres put on trial.
October 21: Nineteen urban guerrillas (MLN) arrested.
November 2: Two guerrillas (MOLIPO) killed in Sao Paulo shootout.
November 22: Twenty-two PCB members arrested in Sao Paulo.
December 3: Joao Felipe de Sampaio Lacerda (PCB) arrested; 6 other foreign affairs cadre taken soon after.
December 6: Six PCB members arrested in Campo Grande district of Rio de Janeiro.
December 8: PCB sections hit in Goias and Rio de Janeiro.
December 11: Four Trotskyites arrested in Sao Paulo.
December 29: Six PCB members killed and one captured including two National Command members.

1973


January 5: Six bombings in Fortaleza, Ceara.
January 10: 6th VPR cadre (including 1 Paraguayan) shot in 1 week near Recife.
January 11: Government announces arrests of 32 members of ALN splinter group MOLIPO in Sao Paulo. VPR denounces Jose Anselmo for defection; his information allegedly set up recent assassinations in Recife, plus others.
January 17: Nine leftists killed in Rio de Janeiro.
January 24: EX-PCB deputy Jose Maria Crispim and daughter sentenced in absentia for association with VPR. Anatalia de Melo Alves (PCB) tortured to death in Pernambuco.
February 7: Rubens Berado, deputy and former vice-governor of Guanabara, killed by unknown assailants. British naval officer David Cuthberg assassinated in Rio.
February 21: Manuel Henrique de Olivera, Portuguese national and alleged police informer, executed by Aurora Maria Nacimiento Furtado command.
March 1: Sao Paulo police agent Octavio Gonzalves Moreira killed in Guanabara.

Suggested Reading Materials

Over the last few decades there have been countless books, essays, studies, etc. written from a number of political perspectives. Of course, there are the "classics" written by Guevara, Giap, the IRA and so on, but to list all of the literature on guerrilla warfare would easily fill this pamphlet. Listed below is only a small sampling and should by no means be considered definitive...

Theory & History


150 Questions To A Guerrilla - Alberto Bayo
Armed Insurrection - A. Neuberger
Armed Struggle; Both A Strategy And A Tactic - Massoud Ahmad-Zadeh
BLA Study Guide - Black Liberation Army
The Concept Of The Urban Guerrilla - Red Army Fraction
Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana - Abraham Guillén
Fighting For Ireland?: The Military Strategy Of The Irish Republican Movement - M.L.R. Smith
F.L.Q.: The Anatomy Of An Underground Movement - Louis Fornier
Guerrilla Warfare - Che Guevara
The Guerrilla, The Resistance And The Anti-Imperialist Front - Red Army Fraction
Handbook For Volunteers Of The Irish Republican Army: Notes On Guerrilla Warfare - Irish Republican Army GHQ Staff
Handbook Of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide To The Armed Phase Of The African Revolution - Kwame Nkrumah
How We Won The War - Vo Nguyen Giap
Just War, Unjust War - S.J. Leonard
Message To The Black Movement - Black Liberation Army
On Guerrilla Warfare - Mao Zedong
People's War, People's Army - Vo Nguyen Giap
Strike One To Educate One Hundred - Chris Aronson Beck, Reggie Emilia, Lee Morris & Ollie Patterson
The Ghetto Fights - Marek Edelman
The I.R.A. - Tim Pat Coogan
The Tupamaro Guerrillas - Maria Esther Gilio
Tunnel To Canto Grande - Claribel Alegria & Darwin Flakoll
Urban Guerrilla Warfare In Latin America - James Kohl & John Litt
See also the documents from the European guerrilla organizations, eg. Red Army Fraction,



Marighella's early writings.

Suggested Reading Materials

Action Directe, Fighting Communist Cells, Rote Zora, GRAPO, Red Brigades, Revolutionary Cells, Irish National Liberation Army, Revolutionary Cells, Red Brigades, November 17, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), etc. and of course the writings from many other guerrilla struggles in languages other than English that haven't been translated.




Technical Manuals

There are countless books, pamphlets, etc., that have been produced for decades in every part of the world, on the technical details of guerrilla warfare. Many guerrilla movements produced their own, and some like those authored by the Vietnamese liberation forces, are/were quite good. On the other hand, particularly in North America, there are many badly written and some cases outright dangerous "manuals" and "how-to" guides. Literature ranging from the notorious "Anarchist Cookbook" to publications from Paladin Press and Loompanics should be avoided completely. Ultimately the best produced and most easily accessible are those from the U.S. military and below is a selection of some the most relevant U.S. Army Field Manuals (FM):

- U.S. Army FM 21-75 - Combat Skills Of The Soldier
- U.S. Army FM 21-76 - Survival Manual
- U.S. Army FM 34-2-1 - Reconnaissance, Surveillance & Intelligence Support
- U.S. Army FM 21-76-1 - Survival, Evasion & Recovery
- U.S. Army FM 3-25-26 - Map Reading & Land Navigation
- U.S. Army FM 21-60 - Visual Signals
- U.S. Army FM 90-10-1 - Guide To Combat In Built-Up Areas
- U.S. Army FM 7-93 - Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations
- U.S. Army FM 20-3 - Camouflage, Concealment & Decoys
- U.S. Army FM 21-150 - Combatives
- U.S. Army FM 3-90 - Tactics
- U.S. Army FM 90-8 - Counter-Guerrilla Operations
- U.S. Army FM 25-35 - Combat Training With Pistols & Revolvers
- U.S. Army FM 23-10 - Sniper Training
- U.S. Army FM 3-23-30 Grenades & Pyrotechnic Signals
- U.S. Army FM 5-250 - Explosives And Demolitions Manual
- U.S. Army FM 31-20 - Special Forces Operational Techniques

...for a much larger selection see the following U.S. military site, the General Dennis J. Reimer Training And Doctrine Digital Library at: www.adtdl.army.mil

Recommended Reading



Revolutionary Armed Struggle

A handbook on revolutionary armed struggle written by an anonymous Black Liberation Army soldier in the 1970s. It details strategies and tactics for urban and rural guerrilla warfare.

saddled stitched, 47 pages
ISBN 1-894925-05-X

\$3 US/ \$4.50 Cdn (plus \$2 postage)

Jalil Muntaqim

On the Black Liberation Army



On The Black Liberation Army

An updated version of former BLA member Jalil Muntaqim's brief history and introduction to the Black Liberation Army (BLA), a clandestine politico-military offshoot of the Black Panther Party. A portion of the profits from the sale of this pamphlet go to its author.

saddle stitched, 22 pages
ISBN 1-894925-13-0

\$3 U.S./\$4.50 Cdn (plus \$2 postage)

**Single Copies Available From
Abraham Guillen Press Or Arm The Spirit
Wholesale Distribution Available
From Abraham Guillen Press**