

Cedric J. Robinson
An Anthropology
of Marxism

SECOND EDITION

PREFACE BY

Avery F. Gordon

WITH A NEW FOREWORD BY

H. L. T. Quan

AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF MARXISM



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Cedric J. Robinson

OF MARXISM

Second Edition

With a new foreword by H. L. T. Quan

Preface by Avery F. Gordon

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FOREWORD

It is no small matter that Cedric J. Robinson's *An Anthropology of Marxism*, first published in 2001, is back in circulation. It is particularly poignant that his passing in June 2016 "went virtually unnoticed in the media," despite the fact that "today's insurgent black movements against state violence and mass incarceration call for an end to 'racial capitalism' and see their work as part of a 'black radical tradition' — terms associated with Robinson's work."¹ It is no exaggeration, then, to say that *An Anthropology of Marxism* (hereafter, *Anthropology*) is likely one of the most important works that one can read on socialism and the perseverance of our collective struggles for justice. For students of socialism and, by extension, Marxism (as theories and praxes), Robinson's inquiry is fairly straightforward: what to make of the historical disfigurement, which is a consequence of an intellectual priority that privileges Marx's "own ideological rules of discursive formation," and, in so doing, deprives "his own work of the profound and critical insights" (115). For Robinson, Marx, Engels, and Lenin erred both in judgment and in their lack of research thoroughness. As *Anthropology* makes clear, the entire edifice of Marx's theory of capitalism, and, by extension, of revolutionary transformation, relies on the assumption that bourgeois society is a precondition of socialism; yet historical accounts reveal that "the rudiments of Western socialism appeared as early as the thirteenth century—without industrial production" (59). In other words, insofar as Robinson's historical sleuthing is concerned, socialism appears to have occurred independently of industrialization and the advent of bourgeois society. To suggest that a thing (i.e., a social formation) cannot occur before something else (another social formation) happens first is to prioritize that something else over all other things.² And in the ordering of things, especially in the case of capitalism and its achievements, to suggest that the socializing of resources for

shared wealth cannot occur prior to the systematic exploitation of land and labor, and the wholesale privatization and accumulation of property, means that our very sense of sociality and its associated values are those of capital and its savage *terms of order*.³ Moreover, the marginalization and trivialization of actual historical experience in theory building reflect a general hostility to so-called distractions from “pure theory,” with grave consequences, not least of which is the vulgar reductionism that ludicrously celebrates bourgeois achievements, all the while privileging the industrial working class over all others (as if such a discrete phenomenon could ever exist).

In its earliest incarnation, *Anthropology* served as a course reader for a political theory graduate seminar at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where Robinson taught for more than three decades.⁴ Until the 2001 publication, this reader introduced Robinson’s students to an entirely different historiography and, thus, a different approach to studying socialism—one that elucidated the fact that socialism (re)appears constantly in different contexts, with different actors. At a minimum, this phenomenon suggests that it must be possible to study a culture of socialism and, hence, an anthropology. The reader, like the book, begins with the phrase “According to legend,” allowing Robinson to unmask one of the most celebrated modern fictions—that bourgeois society is a precondition of socialist transformation. Key to Robinson’s critique of Marx’s theory of social change is his recuperation of democratic history from bourgeois historiography and Marxian historical materialism.⁵ *Anthropology* suggests that when one is not encumbered by capitalism as a love object, it is possible to excavate an archive wherein both the socialist critique of property and socialism predated capitalism. As Robinson demonstrated, there is a “disconnect” between historical formations of socialism and its representations—a “profound discontinuity existed between the inspirations of earlier Western socialist discourse and Marxism” (115). The reader ends at precisely the same point as its book form: “The socialist impulse,” *Anthropology* concludes, “will survive Marxism’s conceits just as earlier it persevered the repressions of the Church and secular authorities” (123). In other words, just as it historically predated Marx and Marxism, socialism will assuredly prevail beyond the nominally understood terms of Western socialism. This is a remarkable declaration in the wake of the political and historical developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the West, when many pronounced socialism to be dead

or dying.⁶ For Robinson, one could say that the writings have always been on the wall because the privileging of the Marxian discourse necessarily engenders a disconnect between the potentialities of actual socialist struggles that are people-led and the decays of elitist vanguardism, as exemplified by the implosion of the many state-managed economies that were occurring during this time.

While Robinson's contributions to reforming our understanding of Marxism and Marx's writings are many and invaluable,⁷ *Anthropology* should not be read simply as a critique of Marxism or even a rehabilitation of Marxian historiographies. Instead, Robinson's sight is on socialism *writ large*, and *Anthropology* opens up new terrains for unearthing historical verifications of our collective *socialist impulse*. In a typically transparent fashion,⁸ Robinson states that his objective "is not to simply critique the self-serving historical practices of Marxism or renounce Marxist conceits" (17). Rather, *Anthropology* "diverges" from the many studies of Marxism that "are enveloped in hagiography," and thus is chiefly "concerned with those socialist discourses in the West which *preceded* Marxism" (16, emphasis added). Robinson's clear-eyed understanding of the historical formations of socialism is especially notable when contrasted with the generally breathless reception evident in the works of his contemporaries. Both Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* and Samuel P. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* prematurely and erroneously celebrated the end of ideological struggles, especially those between capitalism and socialism.⁹ With the dissolutions of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and Europe's Eastern Bloc in December 1989, socialism was presumed to be no longer viable in the "New World Order" of corporate globalization and the neoliberalization of everything.¹⁰ Capitalism, in the form of neoliberalism, was thus presumed to have already demonstrated its own mastery and triumph over its existentialist foe, socialism.¹¹ In the wake of these developments and within the context of what Martin Jay characterizes as "*fin de siècle* socialism," Robinson's optimism is an unwavering act of faith¹² in the ability and role of ordinary women and men to make their society anew. It is a counterdistinction from the ever-fretful wondering about whether there might still be "a Left left."¹³ For Robinson, it is neither historically accurate nor analytically sound to even contemplate binding the fate and politics of the *demos* with an elitist hagiographic endeavor whose conceits have long been exposed. His insistence that history matters, especially those historical antecedents

of socialism that predated Marxism, is a tonic against the general misapprehension of socialism in the West. It is especially so given the idea that socialism is an intellectual property of certain German intellectuals with a bounded destiny, genealogically tied to the scientific self-discovery of the seventeenth-century emergent capitalist formations, and unique only to bourgeoisie achievements.¹⁴ And so, *Anthropology* suggests that the antidote to this misapprehension is the coming to terms with the fact that “since it can be demonstrated that Marxian socialism was not the first expression of socialism, it is probable that it will not be the last” (17). This digging up and fleshing out of “the popular germination of socialist discourse” (19) are also the balm that make it possible to hope, and even yearn, for a socialist future.

The weight and promise of *Anthropology* are thus even more considerable when placed within the context of the current unjust world order—a world where inequality is manufactured, where wars are waged in the interest of corporations, where hundreds of thousands of farmers’ solution to debt is suicide, where entire communities are warehoused behind prison walls, where more than 3 billion people live on less than \$2.50 a day, where the richest 1 percent owns more than everyone else, and where “ghosts” could be everywhere.¹⁵ As *An Anthropology of Marxism* is being reprinted, the nominal religious leader of the Western world, Pope Francis, appears to be the most potentially consequential of interlocutors for the secular world as it confronts a host of disasters and tyrannies—ranging from big and small autocrats and proto-fascists to extreme wealth concentration and environmental calamities. The journalist Robert Fisk recently observed that it was “an odd sight to see the head of the Catholic Church—whose anti-war, anti-corruption, anti-violence and pro-environment beliefs must surely now represent the secular world—greeting the present if very temporary leader of the secular world [Donald J. Trump], whose policies are most surely not those of the Western people he would claim to represent.”¹⁶ To be sure, the pope’s encyclical on the environment, *Laudato Si*, centers on the importance of caring for the “common home” against the scourge of materialism, instrumentalism, and capitalism.¹⁷ Since its publication in 2015, he regularly denounces the “new colonialism” of structural adjustment programs, calls attention to neoliberal unrestrained greed or “the dung of the devil,” and demands that we honor the sacred rights of “the three Ls”—land, lodging, and labor. In a speech in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, the pope put it this way: “The

system is by now intolerable: farm workers find it intolerable, labourers find it intolerable, communities find it intolerable, peoples find it intolerable. The earth itself—our sister, Mother Earth, as Saint Francis would say—also finds it intolerable.”¹⁸

Indeed, as “one of the world’s most high-profile social activists and a ferocious critic of twenty-first-century capitalism,” Naomi Klein was recruited to help spread the word about the pope’s message on the environment and justice.¹⁹ Klein, whose work *The Shock Doctrine* has become required reading on neoliberalism and corporate globalization for activists and scholars alike, argues that morality, “even the language of sin, is absolutely critical” for drawing attention to the adverse effects of climate change.²⁰ The moral authority vested in the pope’s position, she argues, is imperative for the struggle against capitalism and for environmental justice. People of faith, Klein tells us, “believe deeply in something that a lot of secular people aren’t so sure about: that all human beings are capable of profound change. They remain convinced that the right combination of argument, emotion and experience can lead to life-altering transformations. That, after all, is the essence of conversion.”²¹ Thus, and in this era of neoliberalism run amok, that Pope Francis, the most celebrated critic of unfettered capitalism, appears as one of the most formidable interlocutors of these times is not odd in and of itself. What may be odd is the fact that it has taken secular analysts, even ones as astute as Fisk and Klein, such a terribly long time to be open to the idea that some of the most potent critics of property and wealth have always been those who are governed by something other than the logic of accumulation and secularist instrumentalism. As Robinson demonstrated, the resistance to mysticism and religious inspirations is itself a symptom of the bourgeois science fantasy of total mastery of all things human, and, as *Anthropology* tells us, the Church and its ecclesial order, even as early as the twelfth century, had already contended with and partially conceded to the demands and passions of many a heretic, whose visions compelled them to rebel for a better world.

Robinson’s magnificent analytics notwithstanding, it is his unyielding faith—in the rightness of our collective moral authority when we contest malice and tyranny—that extends aid and comfort in times of injustice and unfreedom. As verifications of the “socialist impulse” and as an “irrepressible response to social injustice,” *Anthropology* excavates the archives of popular antiproperty sentiments and collective struggles

against the Church and the ecclesial orders, along with secular authorities not unlike our own. Even if, as Robinson cautioned, we could never fully understand or come to terms with this “human spirit” (76), *Anthropology* suggests that it is imperative that we yearn and seek out alternative terrains to those delineated by the terms of capital and the state, precisely because “Western socialism had older and different roots” than those that have come to distract and disable our sensibilities away from “expressions as diverse as the politically secular, the mystical, and the heretical” (123). These alternative sites, as “manifested in mass movements of violent rebelliousness, in hysterical devotion as well as ecclesiastical debates” (123), contain “visions of an alternative social order”—the very terrains that bourgeois historiography ignores and delimits. These visions, as Robinson argued, are not emblems of “class hegemony,” as Marx would have us believe, but the “dialectic between power and resistance to its abuses” (123). Such terrains are indeed fertile grounds for the retooling of what Arundhati Roy calls “a new imagination” and “the right to dream into a system that tried to turn everyone into zombies.”²²

H. L. T. Quan

PREFACE

This preface introduced the publication of An Anthropology of Marxism by Ashgate in 2001. It was written because when I suggested to Cedric that the book, whose manuscript I had read, might benefit from an introduction, he told me to write it. It was both a challenge and an honor to do so. The book's reissue after languishing for so long unaffordable and unavailable is very welcome. The preface remains mainly as it was when first published with some minor revisions and editing.

They came to Thessalonica . . . and Paul . . . reasoned with them out of the Scriptures. . . . And some of them believed . . . and of the chief women not a few. But the Jews which believed not, moved with envy, took unto them certain lewd fellows of the baser sort, and gathered a company, and set all the city on an uproar . . . crying. These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also.—*The Acts of the Apostles* 17:1–6

Sometimes, there's a wonderful moment in reading when, all of a sudden, a book's importance becomes apparent as an embodied insight. Such a moment of profane illumination is always well prepared in advance but usually arrives, unpredictably of course, in the form of a revelation. When first I had the opportunity to read *An Anthropology of Marxism* that moment came for me at the close of chapter 4, "The Discourse on Economics." Robinson writes:

A more profound discontinuity existed between the inspirations of earlier Western socialist discourse and Marxism. Where once the dispositions of power, property, and poverty had been viewed as affronts to God's will and subversions of natural law, for Marx they were the issue of historical laws and personal and class ambition. . . .

By evacuating radical medieval philosophy from socialism's genealogy, Marx privileged his own ideological rules of discursive formation, providing a rationale for distinguishing a scientific socialism concomitant with the appearance of capitalist society from the lesser ("utopian") and necessarily inadequate articulation of socialism which occurred earlier. So doing, he deprived his own work of . . . profound and critical insights. . . . Notwithstanding their keen appetites for history, Marx and Engels had chosen to obliterate the most fertile discursive domain for their political ambitions and historical imaginations. Possibly even less troubling for them, they displaced a socialist motivation grounded on the insistence that men and women were divine agents for the fractious and weaker allegiances of class. (116)

It was the image of men and women as *divine agents* that registered, for me, the significance of *An Anthropology of Marxism's* critique of Marxism. This image did not conjure up religious solidarity or collectivities of well-dressed parishioners or regressive notions of posthumous justice, although it did remind me of the famous passage from *The Acts of the Apostles* about those "baser sorts" who "turned the world upside down." Rather, it pinpointed the moral stakes of the Marxian objective and the grace it promises, described eloquently by Robinson as "the recovery of human life from the spoilage of degradation" (1). And it located the impulse to realize that objective in our sovereign and creative divinity, that is, in our spirited consciousness and in our proven ability to remake the conditions and the history in which we live. For me, in this image, the confines of Marxism's powerful worldview—historical laws, class ambitions, scientific socialism, capitalist society—were lifted and the heterodox grounds for an alternative worldview set in place, right there in the insistence that men and women were *divine agents* and not just "the fractious and weaker" subjects of capitalism's class struggles. For what is illuminated here is a utopian socialism, unnecessarily narrowed and slighted by Marx, in which it is possible to realize the "scandal of the qualitative difference" because it is already part of who we are and how we conceive of ourselves as a people.¹ To conceive of ourselves as divine agents is to see ourselves as the executors—not the supreme rulers, but the guarantors—of our world and our imaginations. To ground socialist aspirations in a divine agency is to remove the stigma attached to the

utopian and to measure our freedom less by what subordinates us and more by what we are capable of divining.

Such a possibility is a profound and dissident challenge, particularly in an era when capitalism appears ascendant, ubiquitous and more dominant than ever and in which socialist alternatives, to the extent that they can be heard, must respect the supremacy of capitalism or neoliberalism to rule our current lives and the means by which we imagine living otherwise. A utopian socialism which holds fast to the urgency of recovering “human life from the spoilage of degradation” and which rejects the sovereignty or the inevitable authority of that which appears to rule us will inspire some, frighten others, and surely annoy even a few more. However, for those familiar with Cedric J. Robinson’s scholarship, this unorthodox warrant will come as no surprise. In *The Terms of Order*, *Black Marxism*, *Black Movements in America*, *An Anthropology of Marxism*, and *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning*, Robinson pursued a consistent and rigorous deconstruction of the terms of Western civilization—its politics, its historiography, its economics, its racial ontologies, its “intoxications,” and its “trivializations.”² At the heart of Robinson’s critical project is the exposure of the philosophical and historical compromises Marxism and Liberalism have made with bourgeois society, compromises which, among other results, wedded the foundations and promise of socialism to capitalism. It is, in my view, the distinctive contribution of *An Anthropology of Marxism* to refuse those compromises on the grounds that they are not now nor ever have been necessary. It is a critical contribution, like all of Robinson’s work, forged in an enormously erudite and gracious spirit of reconstruction.

Marxism’s Blind Spots

In order for there to be any sense in asking oneself about the terrible price to pay, in order to watch over the future, everything would have to be begun again. But in memory, this time, of that impure . . . history of ghosts.—JACQUES DERRIDA, *Specters of Marx*³

An Anthropology of Marxism is concerned with the Western origins of Marxism, with the place of capitalism and bourgeois society in the longer history of Western civilization’s modes of domination and comprehension, and with rehabilitating the socialist tradition by placing it on a different

footing. These themes and concerns were already evident in the book for which Cedric Robinson is probably best known, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. First published in 1983, this magisterial work questioned Marxism's indebtedness to Western "constructions" in light of the black radical tradition and the "denigration" to which it had been subjected. While acknowledging the significance and influence of Marxist opposition to class rule and the socialist vision that underwrites it, *Black Marxism* nonetheless stands as a rebuke to its "ominous" limitations. As Robinson states:

However, it is still fair to say that at base . . . at its epistemological substratum, Marxism is a Western construction—a conceptualization of human affairs and historical development which is emergent from the historical experiences of European peoples mediated, in turn, through their civilization, their social orders, and their cultures. Certainly its philosophical origins are indisputably Western. But the same must be said of its analytical presumptions, its historical perspectives, its points of view. This most natural consequence . . . has assumed a rather ominous significance since European Marxists have presumed more frequently than not that their project is identical with world-historical development. Confounded it would seem by the cultural zeal that accompanies ascendant civilizations, they have mistaken for universal verities the structures and social dynamics retrieved from their own distant and more immediate pasts. Even more significantly, the deepest structures of "historical materialism" . . . have tended to relieve European Marxists from the obligation of investigating the profound effects of culture and historical experience on their science. The ordering ideas which have persisted in Western civilization . . . have little or no *theoretical* justification in Marxism for their existence. One such recurring idea is racialism. . . . Though hardly unique to European peoples, its appearance and codification, during the feudal period, into Western conceptions of society was to have important and enduring consequences.⁴

In an effort to explain how Marxism could provide "no *theoretical* justification" for the historical emergence and persistence of a racialism so embedded in Western culture and so consequential to its development and existence, Robinson showcases his signature method of critical in-

quiry and *Black Marxism* realizes its most significant achievements. To summarize a work rendered far more complex than I can do it justice here, these achievements are three-fold.

First, Robinson painstakingly and persuasively rewrites the history of the rise of the West, demonstrating the significance of the pre-capitalist history of racism within the West to the development of a fundamentally “racial capitalism” and a racialized working class consciousness consistently mistaken by Marx and Marxists as derivative and epiphenomenal. Marxism’s brief for the “universality of class” and for the essentially autogenetic origins of capitalist society are confounded, in Robinson’s presentation, by the “particularities of race” and by the persistence of “architectonic possibilities previously embedded in [Western] culture.”⁵

Second, Robinson exposes a costly reductionism at the center of Marxian socialism’s attachment to the figure of the revolutionary proletariat. As Robinson shows, this intellectual, moral and libidinal investment bound the development of Marxian socialism to nationalism, racism, and bourgeois epistemology in such a way as to create a blind field at the very center of the socialist vision, a point to which he will return in *An Anthropology of Marxism*. This blind field created a historiography, a politics, and a morality, in short, a structure of anticipation or expectation, comprising an entire way of seeing. “When in its time Black radicalism became manifest within Western society as well as at the other junctures between European and African peoples, one might correctly expect that Western radicalism was no more receptive to it than were the apologists of power.”⁶

If Marx’s historical materialism was unable to understand black radicalism’s struggle, consciousness, and truth on “its own terms,” but only able to receive it as “merely an opposition to capitalist organization,” then *Black Marxism*’s greatest contribution was to have established this radical tradition’s distinction and authority, an authority that provided the intellectual basis for the revisionist history of the West Robinson proposed and that provided a distinct ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics of social struggle. The black radical tradition, however much it is an ongoing and contentious invention, is not in Robinson’s thinking only or mostly a colossal example of a blind-spot in the Marxist point of view. Rather, the black radical tradition stands, living and breathing, in the place blinded from view. It is, in the deepest sense of the term, a theoretical standpoint and not merely a set of particular data. Indeed, to

my mind, the remarkable accomplishment of *Black Marxism* was to brilliantly demonstrate just what was in the place of a missed opportunity to see the rich thought and the complex struggle comprising the black radical tradition—its collective wisdom—as an empirical and historical evidence worthy of theorization and thus of generalization. As the book makes abundantly clear, the black radical tradition is not a supplement to be appended to a partially flawed, but basically sound theoretical edifice of Marxism. “The difference,” Robinson states, is “not one of interpretation but comprehension. . . . Western society . . . has been [black radicalism’s] location and its objective condition but not—except in the most perverse fashion—its specific inspiration.”⁷ It is precisely the mistake of taking what are ultimately contingent conditions and locations, what Robinson calls the “social cauldron,” as the limit of comprehension and inspiration which *Black Marxism* corrects and which *An Anthropology of Marxism* extends. And, it is precisely the vision of what has been and could be comprehended, as inspiration and as aspiration, which fulfills *Black Marxism*’s ambition.

The Liberation of Socialism

An Anthropology of Marxism extends and completes Robinson’s critique of Marxism undertaken in *Black Marxism*.⁸ Indeed, the book could easily be subtitled, “The Making of the European Socialist Tradition,” where the term “making” carries the meaning of “an active process, which owes as much to agency as to conditioning,” as E. P. Thompson put it.⁹ If in their “historical imagination Marx and Engels had believed that socialism was the objective construction of the future, representing a decisive break with the pre-modern past” (119), in Robinson’s revisionist history, “socialist thought did not begin with or depend on the existence of capitalism” (13). As he states, “Socialism and Marxian socialism in particular were not the dialectical issue of the contradictions emergent in the capitalist era. . . . The socialist ideal was embedded in Western civilization and its progenic cultures long before the opening of the modern era” (16). While Marx and Marxism became the principal owners of nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialism, they did not, Robinson argues, invent socialism. They gave a “destiny” to scientific socialism by putting “older” socialist “currents into a secular format” (16) and creatively formulated

“a historical system which put the critique nurturing the political movement on empirical groundings, some of which were spurious” (35). As Robinson notes, they produced a “remarkable and fecund portrait of modern capitalism’s early development” and “without their intervention, radical politics in both the West and elsewhere might very well have lacked the conceptual purchase which proved so important” (123). However, these contributions, harnessed as they were to a “scientific destiny,” were made at the expense of the “displacement” and the trivialization of “previous and alternative socialisms,” which became in the course of time “poorly detailed blueprints or dead-end proto-forms” (17) of the destined socialism awaiting its future arrival.

Robinson puts proof to these points as he investigates the “taxonomy” and philosophical antecedents of Marxist historiography, the social origins of materialism and socialism, and the ancient genealogy of political economy. What we learn, among other important lessons, is that Marx’s fundamental claim that bourgeois society was a necessary precondition for socialism was mistaken. In an especially fascinating historical and theoretical excavation of pre-Marxian and pre-capitalist socialist discourses, poor rural and urban rebels, female mystics and “pious women,” Latin medieval philosophers, radical communitarians and communists, as well as “thieves, exiles, and excommunicates” take center stage in the making of a socialist tradition forged in a “heretical attack on the Church and revolutions against the ruling classes” (43). Focusing especially on twelfth- and thirteenth-century heretical Christian opposition to wealth, feudal power, and authoritarian corruption and on the variant of socialism institutionalized “in the most reactionary institution of medieval Europe: the Catholic Church” (58), Robinson delineates the “identification of wealth with evil” that bequeathed to Marx the “sign of the capitalist, the hoarder of material possessions, the thief” (58).

The antecedent sources of Marx’s appropriations are an important part of *An Anthropology’s* archaeological work and Robinson offers some truly surprising turns and canny discoveries, especially in the chapters on German philosophy and on economics. However, enhancing our knowledge of the genealogy of Marxism per se is not what motivates, in the Robinsonian meaning of that word, the book’s historical and philosophical inquiries. The purpose of Robinson’s investigation into pre-Marxian socialist discourses is to identify a fundamental “conceit” in Marx’s historical

judgment, in the way in which he comprehended the past, the present, and the future, and to stake out the consequences of this comprehension for the development and future trajectory of socialist thought. At issue for Robinson is the extent to which Marxism can lay claim, not to being a vital theory and practice of liberation, which is certain. The issue is whether Marxism can lay claim to being “*the* radical alternative to political economy” and the “emblematic opposition of the capitalist world-system, and as such, the modern world’s injustices” (89) for having discovered “the secrets of value or historical change” (89). For Marx and Engels, the secrets of value and change were to be found precisely in the bourgeoisie’s compulsion to, as they put it, “create a world after its own image” (119). Marx and Engels were also deeply informed by this compulsion and “in the enterprise of imagining and narrating a world history or a history of a world-system—in part derivative of Eurocentrism, in part a habituation to the epistemological presumptions of modern science as well as the Judeo-Christian monotheism” (118), they too created a world in the image of their own.

In suggesting that Marx and later Marxists truncated “the historical development of socialism” (89) on the assumption that a scientific socialism could not either logically or politically preexist the critique of political economy and bourgeois society, Robinson raises the stakes of his queries: “If a socialist discourse can be recovered from earlier (‘pre-capitalist’) eras, such a discovery would rupture the epochal confines of bourgeois epistemology sacred to both Liberalism and Marxism” (90). The confines of bourgeois epistemology are marked, at its boundaries, by the centrality of the capitalist world system, by what J. K. Gibson-Graham named a “capitalcentrism” that encloses all previous and future human affairs and arrangements in “the evolutionary history of capitalism” (118). Some of the consequences of capitalcentrism are better known today, but they are concisely and powerfully articulated in *An Anthropology*: the “exaggerated” importance of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (117); the “dismissive treatment of non-industrial labor” (119)—whether slaves, or the indentured, or peasants, or women—and their relegation to the “dustbin” of history; the “evangelical politics” of class struggle as the “penultimate competition for power” (117–18); and the “economistic conceit” that prevented “a more comprehensive treatment of history, classes, culture, race-ethnicity, gender, and language” (118).

It is worth emphasizing that Robinson's argument is not that Marx was a man of his time and consequently could not see or anticipate what we can today. (Or, conversely, that Marx's diagnostic analysis of capitalism is, ironically given the widespread obituaries of Marxism's demise, more true today than it was in the nineteenth century.¹⁰) Robinson's argument is that Marx dismissed, as anomalous, anachronistic, primitive, and pre-historical, evidence, especially of an older socialism, which did not reflect the world as it was reflected to him. That dismissal inevitably led Marx to build into a theory and practice of revolutionary change some of the key ordering terms of the society he was trying to undermine. And, subsequently Marxism inherited a diminished capacity to imagine, anticipate, and receive—to comprehend or to interpret without subordination—those potent injuries, diagnoses, and remedies not well reflected in a mirror of capitalist production that had been deracinated and sexually neutered. Robinson's judgment here is clear: "Notwithstanding their keen appetites for history, Marx and Engels had chosen to obliterate the most fertile discursive domain for their political ambitions and historical imaginations" (116).

The idea that the inability to see beyond your own worldview and your own historical moment is a presumption and not an inevitable or immutable law of (capitalist) history itself was already well developed in *Black Marxism* where the "Black radical tradition cast doubt on the extent to which capitalism penetrated and re-formed social life and on its ability to create entirely new categories of human experience stripped bare of the historical consciousness in culture."¹¹ In fact, already in *The Terms of Order* Robinson had begun to question the assumption that we cannot fundamentally disturb human knowledge—"the relationship between existential consciousness and truth systems"—without resorting to a naive romanticism of "self-creation."¹² A systematic critique of the phenomenology of the political, *The Terms of Order* shows how the illusion of the density and immutability of social order is not only at the center of Western political thought, but is "the dominating myth of our consciousness of being together."¹³ In demonstrating the contingency and replaceability of this myth, Robinson developed a method of deconstruction that finds fruition in *An Anthropology*. On the one hand, this method involves exposing the internal logics, the assumptions, the rules of enunciation, and the privileged objects and subjects which establish what a paradigm

understands and anticipates and what power/knowledge formation it thus sustains.¹⁴ As Robinson puts it in *The Terms of Order*, “I have sought to expose from the vantage point inherited from a people only marginally integrated into Western institutions and intellectual streams, those contradictions within Western civilization which have been conserved at the expense of analytical coherence.”¹⁵ On the other hand, this method involves denaturalizing (the anthropological function) what appears to us as natural history by revealing those subversive events, thoughts, behaviors, and potentialities which are covered over by a natural history’s references. Robinson’s anthropology is, in this sense, a historiography: “to refer the exposition of the argument to historical materials . . . served the purpose of resurrecting events which have systematically been made to vanish from our intellectual consciousness.”¹⁶ The selection of the points of reference makes all the difference here.¹⁷ For it is from the “vantage point” of these all too real vanishing points—Tonga philosophy and everyday life, black radicalism, pre-capitalist socialism—that it becomes possible to not only expose the terms of order from whose vantage point what’s illusory and what’s authentic is consistently mistaken and often reversed, but to liberate ourselves from them.

The goal of liberation is what the critique aims for. It is to the ends of “emancipating” socialism from the “ideological regime rigidly circumscribed by an attenuated and bourgeois construction of class struggle” (90) that Robinson pushes his critical argument that Marx suppressed an earlier history of Western socialism by “transfixing” (120) its origins to capitalist society. This fixation not only locked socialism into a proprietary relationship to Marxism, it also trivialized and marginalized an achieved socialist discourse that could neither be derived from nor reduced to a class-based opposition to capitalism. To liberate or emancipate socialism from “bourgeois constructions,” to put Robinson’s point in bold relief, is to see “resistance to capitalism” as a “derivative oppositional discourse, whose origins suggest a submerged and perhaps more profound historical crisis” (90).

The socialist tradition that Robinson uncovers and which finds its exemplar in medieval heretical radicalism was indeed more than an opposition to capitalist exploitation. It issued a morally authoritative analysis of the corrosive abuse of power, of the indignities of unrelieved poverty, and of the sacrificial value of private property ownership. It had a “conscious-

ness of female liberation,” of popular democracy, and of the inhumanity of slavery and “imperialist excess.” As Robinson puts it:

Both the ancients and . . . [Marx’s] own immediate predecessors . . . contributed to an inferior, more ambiguous, and misogynist consciousness of female liberation to that constituted in medieval radicalism. Similarly, the elevation of natural law philosophy by renegade medieval scholars into a formidable opposition to private property, racism, and imperialist excess was neglected. The alternative discourses, both of the ancient world and of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were directly implicated in the legitimization of slave economies, slave labor, and racism. Democracy, too, fueled by centuries of popular resistances, had acquired its better champions among medieval socialists. (116)

For Marxism, the implications of this “older and deeper” western socialism are humbling, but not fatal. “If not the privileged place claimed for it, it is certain that Marxism occupies a place in socialist history. Western socialism had older and deeper roots . . . radiat[ing] from the desperation, anguish and rage of the rural poor of the medieval era. . . . Its persistent reinvigoration in visions of an alternative social order was the consequence not of class hegemony but of a dialectic between power and resistance to its abuses” (123). For the moral project which Marxism has shared with many others—the *recovery of human life from the spoilage of degradation*—the implications provoke an inspiration we would be especially wise to recall today. As Robinson concludes the book:

Both in the West and the world beyond, the socialist impulse will survive Marxism’s conceits just as earlier it persevered the repressions of the Church and secular authorities. The warrant for such an assertion, I have argued, is located in history and the persistence of the human spirit. As the past and our present demonstrate, domination and oppression inspire that spirit in ways we may never fully understand. That a socialist discourse is an irrepressible response to social injustice has been repeatedly confirmed. On that score it has been immaterial whether it was generated by peasants or slaves, workers or intellectuals, or whether it took root in the metropole or the periphery. (124)

The Dialectic of Power and Resistance

Of course we know how to walk on the water, of course we know how to fly.—GRANDMA DOROTHY¹⁸

If *An Anthropology of Marxism* is, at heart, an effort to rehabilitate socialism for today on the guarantee that it is a persistent and “irrepressible response to social injustice,” then who or what “generates” it may be more “material” than Robinson implies. Indeed, the restoration of and incitement to a socialist movement may require an entirely different understanding of historical materialism. I believe that Robinson offers such a radically revised conception in *An Anthropology*. The historical materialism Robinson proposes is, in its own way, a dialectics, but it trades even the most sophisticated Marxist notions of totality for a dialectic of power and resistance to its abuses. In *Black Movements in America*, Robinson quotes Frantz Fanon, but he could be summarizing his own position: “It was not the *organization of production* but the persistence and *organization of oppression* which formed the primary basis for revolutionary activity.”¹⁹ There are several aspects of Robinson’s historical materialism that are worth describing.

First, Robinson’s historical materialism is grounded in the primacy of social struggle, not the primacy of racial capitalism, and thus yields a dialectics without determinism, but with a strong notion of internal contradiction. Occupying a paradigmatic place in Robinson’s historical anthropology is the story of how the Catholic Church appropriated the most radical impulses of mass poverty movements, of its renegade philosophers and “pious women” in an effort to contain their challenges to its delinquent and exploitative rule. The example of medieval heresy and the elevation of heresy itself to a model of oppositional consciousness not only demonstrates that it is often from within the most “reactionary institutions” that a critical discourse of poverty, property, and power arises as the measure of internal contradiction.²⁰ It also provides a generative conception of internal contradiction without its usual complement and container, determinism. The Church’s appropriation of its internal heretics is not, in Robinson’s example, a sign of the determinant power of the institution, but a sign of its weakness. As many writers as diverse as James Baldwin, Patricia Williams, and Toni Morrison have eloquently argued, the exercise of power is a taxing enterprise,

which perverts and weakens those who sustain its exercise precisely because it is sacrificial and it is always resisted. To see the powerful as weak and the weak as powerful is not to deny, in an act of willful disregard, the calamities of unrestrained authority, the dehumanization of bonded or “free” servitude, the alienations of exploited labor, or the violence of dictatorial ideas. Rather, it is a way to expose the illusion of supremacy and unassailability dominating institutions and groups routinely generate to mask their fragility and their contingency. It is a way to see through to a vision of the authority of our heretical beliefs and resistance as the very material source of historical development and change.

The vantage point of Robinson’s historical materialism is not the unassailability of the powerful and their systems of production, governance, and consciousness, but their weakness and instability. In all his work, Robinson points to the chaos or the incoherence of that which escapes the illusions of order and sense-making; he points to the fugitive reality that unsettles and that constitutes an alternative way of living and thinking. In this sense, if the core proposition of Marx’s historical materialism, simplified, is that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but on the contrary their social existence that determines their consciousness,” then we might say that the core proposition of Robinson’s historical materialism, simplified, is exactly the reverse.²¹ This is very clear in *Black Marxism* where Robinson argues that racial capitalism is the location and objective condition in which black radicalism emerges but is not its “inspiration.” Like that of the capacious socialism that preexists capitalism evoked in this book, black radicalism’s inspiration for a livable existence is, in effect, a negation of that which seeks to determine it.

Robinson’s dialectics without determinism, grounded in the primacy of social struggle and independent thought, produces a dialectics without messianic agents, but rich with legends of people who can fly home across the sea, walk on the water, and traffic with ghostly or divine spirits; who produce profound and enduring knowledge without sanctioned authority, who courageously and quietly rebel against subordinations and inhibitions, and who forge seemingly impossible alliances. The legends which populate Robinson’s historical materialism narrate a heresy that dispenses with savior subjects, such as the proletariat, autocratic leadership, and identitarian hierarchies based on specious racialisms, whether of culture, ethnicity or gender. Robinson’s historical materialism offers

a mode of anticipation and reception that naturalizes the persistent opposition to power and its abuses as its historiography and as its futurity. In this historical materialism, the cultivation of critical discourses of poverty, property and power, wherever they may arise, is all we have. The only certainty, such as it is, lies in the “resistances, which are the inevitable companions to oppression.” In a series of lectures Robinson gave in 2012, he said, with some vehemence: “One of the weaknesses of Black radicalism in most of its forms is that it lacks the promise of a certain future. Unlike Marxism [where] victory is inevitable eventually, in Black radicalism it is not. Only when that radicalism is costumed . . . in Black Christianity is there a certainty to it. Otherwise it is about a kind of resistance that does not promise triumph or victory at the end, only liberation. No nice package at the end, only that you would be free. . . . Only the promise of liberation, only the promise of liberation!”²²

Robinson’s historical materialism is, thus also, a dialectics without the presumption of Western science and its natural laws, but with a mode of knowledge production in which the history of power and resistance to its abuses is the test of theoretical and ethical adequacy. Here history—and Robinson’s historical materialism is deeply historical—is neither a fetish nor a substitute positivism. Rather, it is the source of a vantage point centered on an understanding of how we could live more justly and humanely with each other. Robinson’s historical materialism and his politics are, in this sense, an expression, not of scientific thought, but of utopian thought for they “confront bad facticity with its better potentialities.”²³ As Herbert Marcuse put it, “when truth cannot be realized within the established order, it always appears to the latter as mere utopia.” “Mere utopia” is nowhere we can really live. It is the impossible, unrealizable, a paradise for unrealistic dreamers, a luxury for those who can afford to be impractical, and a “breeder of illusions and . . . disillusion.”²⁴ Robinson rejects the repressive reality principle contained in the dismissal of utopian aspirations as “mere utopia” because from the vantage point he establishes it is the trivialization of these aspirations and their manifestations that breeds the illusion of their irreality and social irrelevance. The possibility of “the scandal of the qualitative difference” is what Robinson’s historical materialism emphasizes. Such a vantage point, one must say without embarrassment, is the standpoint of the beloved.²⁵ And, indeed, implied in *An Anthropology* is a severe warning about the dangers of being too much in love with (too committed to) what

one hates and hopes to destroy. In a letter to Marisela Marquez, he wrote that his earliest intentions were “to re-open a door to a special universe where justice reigned as historical practice; as a constant inspiration for present conduct; and as a realizable project.”²⁶ Robinson did not like the word “utopian” because of its connotation of naiveté and impossibility, but one could see this “special universe where justice reigned as historical practice” as a kind of utopian world, the kind that emerges precisely from the “accretion, over generations, of collective intelligence gathered from struggle.”²⁷

In other words, Robinson’s historical materialism is very much an immanent materialism: a dialectics without fatalism or teleology yet sensitive to the question of fate. In the struggle against power and its abuses, three questions of fate, which are also questions of individual and collective trust, become paramount. These questions are: What is fated for us? Who cares about our fate? And, to whom can our fate be entrusted? In such a struggle, the unpredictability of the outcome can become itself a kind of fatalism, a way in which we conceive of and think about fate. Fatalism can take many forms—it can be cynical, apocalyptic, fanatical, smartly intellectualized, or just resigned. It can also, as in the dominant tradition of Marxism, be built into the very architecture of a theory of history and revolutionary change. We return here to the problem of the nature of a capitalist world system whose power is so vast that it determines not only what is but what could be as well, a system not only capable of obliterating the traces of its origins but capable of determining its own future trajectory, including its demise. Robinson’s historical materialism rejects capitalcentrism of whatever variety because it yields a biased preoccupation with and investment in the fate of a seemingly sovereign system. There is an implicit standpoint in capitalcentrism tied to the question of fate. This standpoint is the standpoint of the life of the capitalist world system. The life of the system is the source of analytical attraction and cathexis. The life of the system is the source of intellectual and political authority. The life of the system pulls us in tow and sometimes in thrall. The life of the system sets the fundamental parameters for what is to be known and done. The life of the system is the measure of our freedom, the image out of which our will to change it and the effective exercise of that will is carved and beholden. As I’ve suggested, Robinson operates from a different standpoint and offers an alternative notion of fate in which “we are not the subjects of or the subject formations of the

capitalist world-system. It is merely one condition of our being.”²⁸ If we are not the subjects of the capitalist world system, then we do not need its sovereign authorization to direct and protect our fate. We may instead, with the force of the history of the dialectic of power and resistance to its abuses in mind and in hand, insist that we possess precisely the divine agency to motivate a socialism which can eliminate all those fractious and weaker allegiances that degrade our existence.

From the first to the last . . . *An Anthropology of Marxism* augurs that Marxism was not the first expression of an authentic and viable socialism and that it will not be the last. Our socialism today will no doubt take global capitalism as one crucial and deathly condition of our being and our opposition. Robinson’s critique of Marxism is not a rejection in toto of Marx’s insights nor a denigration of the commitments made by Marxists. The target of Robinson’s critique is the “proprietary impulse” of Marxism: the presumption of the ownership of the properties—the resources, rules, definitions, histories, agencies, legends, imaginations—necessary for an adequate practice of liberation. The proprietary impulse and the havoc it wreaks is by no means unique to Marxism. But neither, Robinson asserts, is the socialist critique of private property. One invaluable contribution of *An Anthropology of Marxism* is the means it gives us to imagine a non-proprietary socialist critique of private property.

Robinson was an uncompromising critic of what he called “fictive radicalisms,” whether these are the fables of American democracy, the “conceits” of Marxism, or the simplifications of ethno-nationalisms. The goal of these critiques and the selection of the vantages or standpoints from which the critiques were undertaken—the black radical tradition, the pre-capitalist heretical socialists, the motley crew of American rebels—was to free or emancipate the radical impulse from the exclusivities, rigidities and vanities that too frequently characterize radical thought and action. The historical materialism Robinson proposed had one root—“the recovery of human life from the spoilage of degradation”—but many branches or traditions. Cedric Robinson’s contributions and loyalty to the black radical tradition are legendary. Perhaps with the publication of this book, Robinson’s historical materialism will become more well-known. But readers be aware: Since as a theoretical system, it is not terribly systematic, lacking clear rules and postulates; as a basis for an intellectual school, it lacks the requisite ambitions; as instruction, it is reasonably

clear but leaves you to figure it out collectively with others; and as a political identity, it is rather promiscuous and autonomous.

“He . . . pursued a critique . . . that implicated an alternative historical agency, an alternative signification of liberation, an alternative reconstruction of modern history, an alternative epistemology of human desire.”²⁹ Cedric Robinson used these words to introduce Richard Wright. I can think of no better ones with which to conclude my introduction to Cedric Robinson’s book and to thank him for the rare and precious work he has given us.

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Avery F. Gordon



AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF MARXISM



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Coming to Terms with Marxian Taxonomy

An army I have muster'd in my thought,
 Wherewith already France is overrun.

—*King Henry VI*, part 1, act 1

According to legend, the modern proletariat, the army which Marx envisioned as the “material weapon” of philosophy, had appeared first during the French Revolution.¹ Historically, whether it was just such a class which stormed against power, wealth, and exploitation in revolutionary France (in concert with a “revolutionary bourgeoisie”), early industrial Britain and Germany, or even Czarist Russia is dubious. In nineteenth-century England, for one example, William Reddy gleaned from the research of E. P. Thompson that “the majority of those who engaged in protest or resistance were clearly from artisanal trades, often independent craftsmen . . . wheelwrights, stockingers, saddlers, shoemakers, and tailors.”² In contemporary France, Reddy reports that the rebellious crowds consisted of “variegated groupings of shopkeepers, artisans, peasants, laborers, and their middle-class leaders.”³ And in the next century, in revolutionary Russia, the proletariat was barely a fraction of the laboring classes. Notwithstanding Marx’s misrepresentation (and narrowing) of the social agencies opposing exploitation in modern Europe, the ultimate Marxian objective, the recovery of human life from the spoilage of degradation, retains its urgency. And one must presume that despite any previous historical omissions and slights it is still possible to distill from human experience a comprehension of just what is to be done. Part of that project may lie in the critique of Marxism itself. Since it is essential to accept the fact that the struggle for freedom began long before Max and his companion Engels constructed a “science” of historical change, we must entertain

the possibility that they were informed by such events, but only poorly and perhaps in an entirely or fundamentally mistaken way. To determine whether this occurred it is necessary to approach Marxism independent of its presuppositions. The results could prove invaluable.

It may seem surprising that an anthropology is required to understand the emergence of the socialist movement in Western Europe in the eighteenth century and the mature articulation of historical materialism by Marx and Engels a generation later. Anthropologists, after all, normally study the existential selectivity of human groups as arranged by cultures and civilizations and the mundane social practices and fabulist and technical habits which sustain them. Their investigative and analytical routines generally stop short of disruptive collective action and revolutionary regiments, that is, transformative practices. Despite these and related exclusionary customs, anthropology inscribes the appropriate vantage point.

In this study I shall demonstrate that both Western socialism and historical materialism were each an expression of the ferment of a *civilization*, rather than the simple products of a particular event (say the French Revolution), a specific era (industrial capitalism), or a select intellectual cohort (the Hegelians). More particularly, Western socialism and historical materialism were two elements of a general discourse which resulted from the clash and ruptures of beliefs, structures, and previous discourses fashioned in the culture and historical societies comprising Western civilization. The possibilities for each were consequently prescribed by a civilization and not some universal human desire. It is curious, then, that much of the literature on socialism and Marxism indicates otherwise. Both socialism and Marxism have come to be understood as natural histories. Socialism, we are instructed, was an inevitable reaction to absolutism, while the advent of Marxism is presented in the scientific narrative of discovery. Such presumptions are less than explanatory—indeed, they themselves require explanation.

The canon for the study of classical Marxism, or the “science of socialism,” as Engels termed it, was inscribed in his published review of Marx’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and in his quasi-polemic *Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring, 1877–78)* more than one hundred years ago. Marxism, Engels insisted, was a synthesis of specific intellectual traditions which had been brought to material maturity in England, France, and Germany by the early nineteenth

century.⁴ But where his predecessors had failed, Marx had succeeded: “Two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production through surplus value, we owe to Marx.”⁵ And as George Lichtheim cynically observed: “Marxism came to mean what Engels, in his writings between 1875 and 1895, said it meant.”⁶ Karl Kautsky, Engels’s most illustrious apprentice, tried to make it otherwise, advancing Darwinism (in the form of technological determinism) as a brace to historical materialism in his bid for pride of place.⁷ But for the most part, among Marxian and non-Marxian intellectuals, Engels’s revelation has been adhered to—either as a matter of historical convention or of doctrine.

Though the broader construction was originally Engels’s, it was Lenin’s authority as a successful revolutionist which made that particular interpretation into a theoretical and doctrinal regimen. Eclipsing the reformist luminaries of the Second International—Kautsky, Plekhanov, and Bernstein—Lenin’s supremacy of the triumphal tradition of revolutionary Marxism in the present century granted him a unique eminence among Marxists. And according to Lenin, the most influential figure among the second generation of Marxists, the intellectual, ideational, and philosophical bases for Marxism consisted of three elements. He put it this way: “The genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate *continuation* of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.”⁸ And elsewhere, Lenin further identified these approaches specifically with *national* European intellectual currents: “Marx . . . continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines in general.”⁹

For Engels, as Lenin interpreted him, English political economy, German philosophy and French socialism were the three pillars of Marxism. Following the determinist tracing in the historical theory found in both Marx and Engels (“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness”¹⁰), Lenin fashioned a geopolitical narrative of intellectual development. And even more than his predecessors, whose historical writings did lead them often beyond the constraints of their theory, Lenin seemed

captivated by an image of the state, and more particularly the possibility of a state consciousness. This becomes evident when we examine his foundations of Marxism in the rough historical sequence of their appearances.

English Political Economy

Lenin somewhat overstated the importance of the English economists by ignoring a rather remarkable company of other contributors: the French mathematicians and economists Pierre Le Peasant de Boisguillebert, François Quesnay, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Antoine Cournot, the “American” economist Benjamin Franklin, and the Swiss Jean Charles Sismondi.¹¹ But he was correct in drawing attention to Marx’s British (English *and* Scot) predecessors. Summarizing their contributions, A. V. Anikin suggested:

The classics of bourgeois political economy, particularly Adam Smith and David Ricardo, were the first to develop the theory of the economy as a system in which objective laws operate, independently of human will, but are accessible to human understanding. They believed that the economic policy of the state should not go against these laws, but rest upon them. William Petty, François Quesnay and other scholars laid the foundations for the quantitative analysis of economic processes. They sought to examine these processes as a kind of metabolism and to define its directions and scope.¹²

In the narrowest sense, *British* political economics began with William Petty’s *Political Arithmetick* in the mid-seventeenth century and proceeded through the treatises of Franklin, Smith, and Ricardo. Petty, credited as one of the “discoverers” (along with Franklin, Smith, and Ricardo) of the labor theory of value, also pioneered (in the company of the Italian Francesco Sansovino, d’Avity in France and de Linda in Holland) the use of statistics (a science which matured and earned its name in the eighteenth century) and the notion of national income (an analytical procedure which fully matured in the nineteenth century).

Marx and Engels believed William Petty was the most critical of the early English economists.¹³ Again, Anikin observes: “Petty’s striking and unusual personality greatly attracted Marx and Engels. ‘Petty regards

himself as the founder of a new science, 'Even this error has genius' [from Engels, *Anti-Dühring* 1969, p. 275], 'In content and form it is a little masterpiece'—these comments in various works by Marx give an idea of his attitude to 'the most brilliant and original of economic investigators.'¹⁴

In a sense, however, the construction we find in Lenin reflects a conceptual idiosyncrasy to be found throughout the writings of his predecessors, Marx and Engels: the presumption that a field of knowledge, a science, could be an expression of a particular *national culture*. A more careful historical reconstruction does not confirm their assertions about an "English" political economy. The "English" science, we see, was British and European, and even assisted by a New World "creole" such as Franklin. Long-distance trade, banking, state budgeting, and increasingly expensive warfare spawned economists and economic theorists in several locales.

Even more stunning, this reconstruction of a science completely erases the phenomenal development of "reckoning schools" (*botteghe*) for the commercial mathematical arts in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italy.¹⁵ Statistics had one precedent in the fractional computations taught in the fifteenth-century practica *Treviso Arithmetic* (1478); just as elements of national income and a labor theory of value were anticipated by fifteenth- and sixteenth-century treatments of partnerships like *colleganza* ("a merchant would contribute his skill and labor and his partner would be the financial backer") and *compagnie* (shared financial investments).¹⁶ Flourishing where medieval urban merchant centers and trade fairs were established, commercial arithmetic was founded on the appearance (or reappearances) of money economies in medieval Europe beginning most likely in Florence and Venice in the twelfth century.¹⁷ It is not too harsh, then, to suggest that Lenin's sparse conceptualization of political economy was marked by the historical imaginary of the modern bourgeoisie. But before we turn to the implications of his seduction by the notion of national culture as a basis for intellectual development, let us proceed with our present task.

German Philosophy

The second pillar of historical materialism, according to Lenin, was German philosophy or what historians of philosophy refer to as that period of "German idealism." Here, too, a number of figures appear. But they are not confined to the nineteenth century and just where one begins is

somewhat arbitrary. Of the major figures whose work reappears in Marxian discourse, the first is Immanuel Kant. Then come G. W. F. Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach. What is at issue in German idealism's relationship to historical materialism is the modern West's notion of *history*, a construct formulated as late as the eighteenth century.

Throughout much of the human past, what we now take as the natural linear construction of history would have been taken as an aberration. Among some people, for instance, we are told that until recently there were not even words in their languages for the past, the present, and the future, the critical integuments of our linear conception of history.¹⁸ Instead, time was measured by phases of the moon (among the Babylonians), the appearances of stars (Egyptians), climatic seasons, the reigns of monarchs and emperors (in Europe through the High Middle Ages), and other recurrent spectacles which confirmed the cyclical structure of life. And history, most frequently discontinuous fragments from the past, adhered to these diverse chronological parameters. The linear notion of history is consequently rather unique in human consciousness.¹⁹ And for some of the earliest of Christian thinkers like Augustine, as Robert Nisbet suggests, it was also rather urgent: "An infinite success of Falls, Nativities, and Redemptions? . . . The mere thought of the cycle of Christian genesis and decay repeating itself was an abhorrent one."²⁰ Not surprisingly, less than two centuries later, Christian chronology was established by a monk, Dionysius Exiguus, in the early sixth century. Thus in the West, religious expectations and prophecy became the template of history.

This peculiarity is barely disguised in the Western eschatological ordering of history. Modern Western civilization derives from its cultural predecessor, Judeo-Christianity, a notion of secular history which is not merely linear but encompasses moral drama as well. The narratives of providential history are sufficiently familiar to most of us as to not require repeating. But there are some nuances which are not entirely apparent. As C. K. Barrett commented on the Jewish and Christian apocalyptic texts,

While both prophecy and apocalyptic were concerned with the future they conceived it in different ways. Prophets and apocalyptists alike believed that the future lay entirely within the prevision and control of God; but whereas the former saw the future developing continuously out of the present, good and evil bearing their own fruit and reaping their own reward, the latter saw the future as

essentially discontinuous with the present. . . . The apocalyptists “foreshortened” history even more radically than the prophets, and for them the last days are almost always at hand.²¹

Even secular historical conceptions like historical materialism reflect the “good news” presumption of the Judeo-Christian gospel: the end of human history fulfills a promise of deliverance, the messianic myth. When Marx and Engels maintained in *The Communist Manifesto* that human history has been the record of class struggle and then proffer the socialist society as one without classes, it is implied that history will then come to an end. Socialist society—a social order which displays no classes, no class struggle, and therefore no history—reflects a kind of apocalyptic messianism.²² Marxism thusly contained remnants of the thing to which Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach were responding successively in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the attempt to construct human experience and consciousness without a God, without a Divine Order, without a Divine plan or promise.

Kant asked the basic question which was a precondition for thinking in these terms: how can human consciousness be verified? How can human beings know? Kant concluded that human consciousness was incapable of certain knowledge, that some things were beyond human comprehension. He distinguished between the capacities of science in the empirical world, and the absolute nature of the universe. Kant left room for the Church as a guiding instrument through the transcendent realm but claimed for man the possibilities for understanding the material world. This was for Kant the basis for the inevitable conflict between the *noumena* and the *phenomena*. “Kant’s explanation [for the individual’s failure to achieve self-perfection] is that man has a twofold nature, half godly and half human. He is a divided being, a dual personality: *homo noumenon* and *homo phenomenon*. The former is the godlike self of man; the latter, his merely human self. . . . Hence *homo noumenon* is man-in-himself, and *homo phenomenon* is man-as-he-appears.”²³ For the individual, no resolution of this divided and conflicted self is possible short of death. And history, the human experience, remains a realm of chaos.

Hegel disagreed and attempted to resolve the Kantian dichotomy between the “is” and the “ought.” Hegel’s solution required him to assert that human beings were capable of a qualitative transformation. For Hegel, human experience was the record of sub-humans in the process

of achieving their species identity. In this fashion, Robert Tucker asserts: “The Kantian dichotomy of *homo noumenon* and *homo phenomenon* reappears in Hegelianism writ large as a dichotomy of noumenal world-self and phenomenal world-self. The division of Kantian man against himself in the quest for moral perfection has turned into spirit’s division against itself, or self-alienation, in the quest for self-knowledge.”²⁴

History is thus reconstituted as a cosmic theater of transcendence; each age, each civilization, a false or authentic stage toward species-realization, species-knowledge, and the ultimate perfection of consciousness. For Hegel, the German people were the highest development of the human species. He resolved Kant’s dichotomy between the real and the divine by arguing that the human species was in the process of achieving absolute understanding, i.e., of becoming divine. Hegel cautioned that this was a painful process over which the species had no control: it involved catastrophic changes, violent and brutal changes (negation of the negation). The human species was becoming REASON. Hegel maintained that Kant had confused an episodic and tragic-filled moment of human development for the process of human development.

Feuerbach then interceded and announced that Hegel must be turned upside down. Hegel was standing on his head (idealism) and must be placed back on his feet (the real world). For Feuerbach mankind was the alpha and omega—there was nothing beyond humanity: the impulse of consciousness was the human species. For Feuerbach it was human experience which provided the basis for human vision and consciousness. God was the projection of perfected humanity. The projections of gods were a consequence of the variety of human experience. According to Feuerbach, neither Hegel nor Kant before him understood that the real world was the basis for consciousness. As Feuerbach insisted in his *Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy*: “All we need do is always make the predicate into the subject . . . in order to have the undisguised, pure and clear truth.”²⁵ It is true then that German idealism wrestled with notions of the significance of human historical experience. But the meanings of history to which German philosophers contributed were older than German culture itself. Moreover, as we shall see later, the stadial architecture of history which came to characterize the past was diffused throughout European literature.

French Socialism

The third foundation for historical materialism, according to Lenin, was French Socialism. This referred to an intellectual and ideological tradition as well as to the historical advent of the French Revolution and particularly the Jacobin Revolt of 1792–94. The Revolution itself, quite apart from providing Marx the first ill-defined but positive evidence for what he would designate the historical Subject—a mobilized proletariat—also inspired other intellectuals to radical politics, thought, and organization. It linked F.-N. (Gracchus) Babeuf, Filippo Buonarroti, Auguste Blanqui, Étienne Cabet, Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Henri de Saint-Simon. As E. J. Hobsbawm has observed: “A direct line of descent links Babeuf’s Conspiracy of the Equals through Buonarroti with Blanqui’s revolution societies of the 1830s; and these in turn, through the ‘league of the Just’—later, the ‘Communist League’—of the German exiles which they inspired, with Marx and Engels, who drafted the Communist Manifesto on its behalf.”²⁶

The communists (Babeuf, Buonarroti, and Blanqui), Hobsbawm maintains, were “mainly marginal intellectuals.” Their influence on French socialism was largely programmatic: the transformation of political outrage into organization, praxis, and the strategy and tactics of revolutionary theory. On the other hand, the “utopian” thinkers—Saint-Simon and Fourier—embedded in socialist thought a critique of industrialism, capitalism, and the bourgeois state.

Saint-Simon, the financier and speculator who had played an active part in the French Revolution,²⁷ abstracted from French history many of the insights which would later characterize Marxian literature. Saint-Simon conjectured that “social systems are determined by the mode of organization of property, historic evolution on the development of the productive system, and the power of the bourgeoisie on its possession of the means of production.”²⁸

Thus Saint-Simon suggested a historical materialism. And from the Revolution itself, Saint-Simon extracted a notion of class struggle which anticipated Marx. As Engels exclaimed in *The Anti-Dühring*: “[For Saint-Simon] to recognize the French Revolution as a class war, and not simply one between nobility and bourgeoisie, but between nobility, bourgeoisie, and the non-possessors, was, in the year 1802, a most pregnant discovery.”²⁹

Saint-Simon praised, as later would Marx, the social and historical developments which the intensity of capitalist industry (particularly in Britain) had achieved. And though sympathetic to the propertyless classes—Engels was to maintain, “what interests him first, and above all other things, is the lot of the class that is the most numerous and the most poor,” Saint-Simon believed the reformation of society would come at the hands of an elite drawn from the educated and technologically developed elements among *les industriels* (a term he is said to have coined to indicate manufacturers, technicians, bankers, merchants, artists, scholars, and laborers). And as Engels noted, Saint-Simon recognized from the primacy of economics over politics that the State would eventually dissolve: “The knowledge that economic conditions are the basis of political institutions appears here only in embryo. Yet what is here already very plainly expressed is the idea of the future conversion of political rule over men into an administration of things and a direction of processes of production—that is to say, the ‘abolition of the state,’ about which recently there has been so much noise.”³⁰

On the other hand, Fourier, according to Engels, had raised the specter of bourgeois society. At once, Fourier had suggested the basic architecture of history in which bourgeois society was to be located, and the dialectic of history which gave bourgeois society its contradictory character.

Fourier is at his greatest in his conception of the history of society. He divides its whole course, thus far, into four stages of evolution—savagery, barbarism, the patriarchy, civilization. The last is identical with the so-called civil, or bourgeois, society of today—i.e., with the social order that came in with the sixteenth century. He proves . . . that civilization moves in “a vicious circle,” in contradictions which it constantly reproduces without being able to solve them; hence it constantly arrives at the very opposite to that which it wants to attain, or pretends to want to attain, so that, e.g., “under civilization poverty is born of super-abundance itself.”

Fourier, as we see, uses the dialectic method in the same masterly way as his contemporary, Hegel.³¹

Fourier’s critique of “civilization” provided a pessimism which distinguished him from other socialist thinkers. Engels observed: “As Kant introduced into natural science the idea of the ultimate destruction of the earth, Fourier introduced into historical science that of the ultimate

destruction of the human race.”³² And finally, in his determination “that in any given society the degree of woman’s emancipation is the natural measure of the general emancipation,”³³ Fourier had anticipated Marx’s philosophical speculation on the social significance of the proletariat.³⁴

What Marx and Engels achieved then was not the invention of socialist theory but the formulation of a historical system which put the critique nurturing the political movement on empirical groundings, some of which were spurious. Engels, with his vast historical literacy and acute sociological observations, was particularly effective in his writings at glossing over their theoretical or conceptual lapses with dense historical materials. Marx, on the other hand, more frequently employed literary devices or philosophical pretenses to distract from theoretical flaws or conceits.³⁵ Lenin, who was intensely programmatic and often indifferent to contradictions in his writing, also on occasion inadvertently exposed weaknesses in classical Marxian theory. His “pillars” thesis was one such instance.

Historical Materialism and National Culture

One of the most important failures of the historical theory composed by Marx and Engels was its misappropriation of cultural and intellectual development. As a theoretical articulation of the processes of cultural formation and diffusion it largely consisted of a perverse and self-subverting misdirection. Lenin literally reiterated Engels’s political (or national) construction of the intellectual sources of historical materialism. In so doing, he revealed the anomaly consequent to juxtaposing the materialist explanation of cultural forms and the nineteenth-century European convention which signified culture in national terms.

Marx and Engels had frequently explained “the formation of ideas from material practice.”³⁶ Their treatment of feudal society was a case in point: “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people.”³⁷

How this understanding of culture might be reconciled with their insistence on “German Ideology,” “English Political Economy,” or “French

Socialism” is perplexing since there existed no corresponding national mode of production. Feudalism was, of course, not confined to any particular state; it was an economic system, a mode of production in which states of monarchical, imperial, and theocratic structures existed. And though Marx’s study of capitalism was drawn largely upon England’s manufacturing and industrial economy, that was for heuristic and nomothetic purposes. Marx insisted (or understood) that capitalism was a world system transcending political boundaries. In *Capital*, Marx’s description of capitalism’s triumphal appearance in the sixteenth century left little doubt of the matter: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre.”³⁸ This transnational character was not only true for mature capitalism as Marx and Engels indicated in *The Communist Manifesto*; it also characterized capitalism from its inception.³⁹

Nevertheless, as intellectuals Marx and Engels were influenced by the anthropological and historiographical significations dominant in their times. And in the nineteenth century, as Marvin Harris maintains, “The racial interpretation of nationhood imparted to the physical, cultural, and linguistic hodgepodes known as England, France, Germany, etc., a sense of community based on the illusion of a common origin and the mirage of a common destiny.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, as Gilbert Allardyce succinctly captures, Marx and Engels were receptive to “a Western perception of civilization as a process that began in the ancient Near East, evolved through classical Greece and Rome, and was transmitted to medieval and modern Europe. European ‘civilization,’ in this way, was the sum of world history. In Europe, historians during the nineteenth century divided this universal history into separate national strands. Nation-states became the interest of historians.”⁴¹

Marx and Engels, unconcerned with its implications for their materialist conception of history, utilized the nation as a scientific, political, and cultural agency. It is also certain that Marx (and Lenin) was acutely conscious of having originated in a “backward” region of the world-system. Marx pilloried his fellow German intellectuals for their consequent

provincialism in writings like “The Introduction to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*.” Thus in common with the bourgeoisie, this *nouveau* bourgeois was particularly susceptible to the lure of a national discourse.

Marx and Engels, and subsequently Lenin and his contemporaries, then, had little firm theoretical ground for their formulation of national culture and national thought. It follows that the same was true when Engels and later Lenin authoritatively assigned the forethought for historical materialism to the discrete intercessions of English, French, and German agencies. Indeed, by such, they managed to obscure if not obliterate the historical and cultural materials of Marxism.

What is at issue here is not the disfigurement of Marxism by some simplistic cultural geometry, but the whole enterprise undertaken by generations of Marxists which amounts to the foreshortening of socialist thought, the proprietary impulse which appropriates “true” or “scientific” socialism to Marxism; in short, the insistency that socialism and Marxism constitute an identity. Socialist thought did not begin with or depend on the existence of capitalism as Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and later Marxists have dictated. But historical materialism demanded that for a socialistic mode of production, capitalism had to be prior. Thus any expression of socialist principles prior to the maturation of the capitalist system was “primitive” or utopian. As Kautsky commented on his study of Thomas More, “He was the father of Utopian Socialism, which was rightly named after his *Utopia*. The latter is Utopian less on account of the impracticability of its aims than on account of the inadequacy of the means at its disposal for their achievement.”⁴² (As we will demonstrate in the following chapter, we are particularly interested in Kautsky for what he did not comprehend as the antecedents of Western socialism.)

This practice of historical reconstruction for a proletarian-centered theory of radical social change is paradoxically anchored in the practices and performances of elites. Again, Kautsky demonstrates: “It is sometimes debated whether the honor of having inaugurated the history of Socialism should fall to More or to [Thomas] Müntzer, both of whom follow the long line of Socialists, from Lycurgus and Pythagoras to Plato, the Gracchi, Catalina, Christ, His apostles and disciples, who are sometimes mentioned in proof of the assertion that there have always been Socialists without the goal ever coming nearer.”⁴³ And it was Kautsky’s project to settle this question in More’s favor.⁴⁴ And Kautsky was never more certain of his selection than when he discerned More’s intimacy with

England's "economic life": "And he became acquainted with it from the most modern standpoint that was then possible, from that of the English merchant, for whom world trade was then opening up. In our view, this close connection of More with mercantile capital cannot be too strongly emphasized."⁴⁵ Thus Kautsky sutured socialism's history to an eminent and powerful class, to the appearance of capitalism, and to the encounter between a bourgeois intellectual and the dislocation and degradation of an alternative class.

Kautsky's arguments and methodology were characteristically and derivatively bound to classical Marxism. Formally trained in "Ancient" Western philosophy, Marx had quite early on displayed a tendency to equate radical (meaning profound) social criticism with the intelligentsia; and the tenet that the realization of modern socialism had capitalism as its precondition as shared by him and Engels. Partly this was a residue of the Enlightenment's privileging of formal knowledge and the notion of progressive social perfection, but as long ago as Pythagoras and Plato philosophers have tended to proffer their strata as transcendent. In his introduction to his critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, the young Marx had declared that philosophy was the negation of an unfree society: "The emancipation of Germany will be an emancipation of man. Philosophy is the head of this emancipation and the proletariat is its heart. Philosophy can only be realized by the abolition of the proletariat, and the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of philosophy."⁴⁶ It is not certain whether Marx ever emended this belief. As Monty Johnstone documents, in 1859 Marx had written to Engels: "We had received our appointment as representatives of the proletarian party from nobody *but ourselves*." But Johnstone quickly adds, "After a real movement [of working-class organizations] came once more into existence in the 1860s they never again saw themselves as self-appointed representatives of the proletarian party."⁴⁷ Unquestionably, however, Marx (if not Engels) returned more than once to the dependency of the proletariat on some external social agency. And on the matter of socialism and capitalism, no one has expressed more eloquently the classical Marxian view than Rosa Luxemburg. In her refutation of Bernstein's reformism, Luxemburg wrote: "The greatest conquest of the developing proletarian movement had been the discovery of grounds of support for realization of socialism in the *economic conditions* of capitalist society. As a result of this discovery, socialism was changed

from an ‘ideal’ dreamt by humanity for thousands of years to a thing of *historic necessity*.”⁴⁸

The severe periodization of a truly realizable socialism to what was termed the era of capitalism meant prioritizing an industrial proletariat which would perform historically as it was imagined the bourgeoisie had done earlier. But since industrial wage labor was in actuality only one segment of the working classes, all other classes of labor, serfs, peasants, slaves, clericals, domestic workers, etc., either disappeared in Marxian theory or were consigned to political, ideological, and economic subordination to the proletariat or the bourgeoisie (thus the nominative constructions of classes such as the lumpen-proletariat and the petty-bourgeoisie). Politically, this required socialists to merge with the organizations of industrial wage workers: i.e., trade unions, labor parties, and other formal associations. In the revolutionary lexicon, however, these were most frequently conservative organs: they tended to exclude foreign and/or minority workers and championed the rights of working men over working women and children; often extended their own imprimatur to occupational divisions between clerical, craft, skilled and unskilled workers, urban and rural workers, the unemployed, and part-time laborers; and pursued electoral, parliamentary, and legislative stratagems which lent support to the “national interests” of colonial and imperialist regimes. As Joseph Schumpeter somewhat jeeringly wrote of the Social Democratic Party in Germany during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “The party not only developed satisfactorily but also settled down. A party bureaucracy, a party press, a staff of elder statesmen developed, all adequately financed, as a rule secure in their positions and, on the whole, highly respectable in every—and also in the bourgeois—sense of the word.”⁴⁹

Finally, this litany of the historical achievements of preeminent individuals and classes tended towards the evisceration of social, political, and intellectual achievements stemming from the less conspicuous or unremarked-upon masses. In much of the Marxian imagery, slaves contributed nothing to revolutionary thought or organization; neither did serfs, peasants, or women from any class or strata. As Kautsky had presumed, the history of socialism could be traced and reconstructed through the genealogy of radical elites situated at critical junctures of economic formation and disturbance. The Marxian evacuation of popular

voices from the history of socialism (and history in general), of course, had political as well as doctrinal and theoretical consequences. But of equal significance it perverted historical studies. For the full term of the Middle Ages, Kautsky's subject, peasants, women, and slaves constituted either the predominant populations of the several estates, or, in the instance of slaves, rather sizable numbers.⁵⁰ From these ranks, as we shall see in the next chapter, emerged rebels and ideologists, men and women who made a history of socialism which was alternative to Kautsky's. In a similar vein, both classical and subsequent Marxian thought disqualified labor by gender and location from any economic or political significance in the modern era. But that is another story.⁵¹

Marxian Socialism and Its Antecedents

This work is concerned with those socialist discourses in the West which preceded Marxism. The purpose is not merely to reaffirm that Marxian socialism had historical precedents or to indicate a genealogy for Marxism. Though this is one justifiable result of the interrogation there is much more at issue.

For one, this study diverges from so many of the origins-of-Marxism studies which are enveloped in hagiography. Marxist socialism, I am arguing, is not the brain child of an individual genius, a succession of radical German intellectuals or a legendary collaboration. Those narratives are drawn from the distorting domain of bourgeois historiography. Similarly, socialism and Marxian socialism in particular were not the dialectical issue of the contradictions emergent in the capitalist era. It is the case that Marxian socialism was influenced by the scientism and architectonic historical writing which began to make their appearances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but the socialist ideal was embedded in Western civilization and its progenic cultures long before the opening of the modern era.

Marxian socialism, just as its concurrent tributaries, utopian socialism and anarcho-socialism, was an attempt to configure these older currents into a secular format with a distinctive historical stratigraphy. This achievement assigned a specific destiny to "scientific" socialism by displacing and obliterating its social and cultural antecedents. Marxism crafted a historical pedestal for itself by transmuting all previous and

alternative socialisms into poorly detailed blueprints or dead-end proto-forms of itself.

My objective, however, is not to simply critique the self-serving historical practices of Marxism or renounce Marxist conceits. Rather it is to suggest that since it can be demonstrated that Marxian socialism was not the first expression of socialism, it is probable that it will not be the last.

The Social Origins of Materialism and Socialism

More than any other religion, Jewish religion centers on the expectation of a future Golden Age; Christianity . . . inherited that expectation.—NORMAN COHN¹

For Lenin, as we have seen, Marxism resulted from the confluence of a form of economics, a critical reaction to a philosophical tradition, and the ideological and social effluence of the French Revolution. In the previous chapter, I have maintained that this was an inadequate architecture or genealogy. Challenging Lenin's formulation, however, brings forward the additional duty of replacing the epistemological conceits and historical texts woven into his truth claims. In appealing to preeminent intellectual systems like political economy, idealism, and utopian socialism, Lenin's assertions clearly appropriated from them a certain political authority. And because these were very nearly contemporary systems of knowledge, they also bore, and shared with historical materialism, the legitimating seal of the modern. Moreover, and at a more profound level, the epistemological justifications domiciled in these newer disciplines were transferred almost unnoticeably with Lenin's claims. These theoretical foundations were, of course, empiricism, positivism, and historicism. And in turn, each of these philosophical positions was embedded in the materialist posture of Marxism.

Marx, Engels, and others answering to Marxism all insisted that their economic facticity, their comprehension of the most basic human activity, extended to them the superior authority to supersede alternative discourses on the meaning of history. But what on the face of it might seem arrogant was in one sense a rather modest claim: Marxists maintain that it is possible for them to construct a science of history largely because capitalist forces of production have made property and class

relations transparent for the first time in human history. As Engels put it, “The abolition of social classes has as its presupposition a stage of historical development at which the existence not merely of some particular ruling class or other but of any ruling class at all, that is to say, of class difference itself, has become an anachronism.”² Unlike previous (“pre-capitalist,” Marxists would say) modes of production, capitalism could not conceal or justify exploitation through ideology. So the extraordinary comprehension of human society of which we are now capable is both a consequence of an accident of birth and the ineluctable accretion of productive forces over millennia.

The premise, however, that alone of all social orders, capitalist society unmasks itself, relegates all social understanding before the capitalist era mired in the ideological muck of their own eras. But neither the facts surrounding the epistemological foundations and antecedents of historical materialism nor the emergence of pre-Marxian socialist discourses bear out these presumptions. And so to confirm these insufficiencies, I intend a reconsideration of Lenin’s genealogy through the poisoning of a fourth and a fifth element, each of very different material. The first of these appends and swells our comprehension of the several historical sources of materialism. This authorizes the investigation of the epistemological contributions of “primitive materialism” (Engels’s terms). The second, in a similar quest, sleuths out the popular germination of socialist discourse. What I have in mind is interrogating these events as consorts to the social and ideological formations of late medieval Christianity and the Roman Church. We shall use the Church’s history as a means of resolving the misapprehensions of Lenin’s list. With respect to Christianity and its relationship to the eventual appearance of Marxism, we shall mark two developments: the evolving idea of materialism, and the historical advent of Western socialism.

Materialism

As a concept, materialism refers to the physical being of the world and the motion of matter. But more than the trivial reference to matter, materialism designates an epistemological posture: the presumption that all human experience, all human consciousness proceeds from our species’ encounter with the objective world, that consciousness is a product of, and is inevitably bounded by, the experience of the world as a concat-

enation of things. We feed on things, we breathe things, we stand on things, our whole lives we are surrounded by things: the world as the objective earth, the world as the material universe. What remains, then, is to determine whether the material world is apprehended through the mind or the soul.

Philosophical materialism maintains that the matter which surrounds us and of which we are a part defines our human existence and our consciousness. And no matter how ancient the social philosophy or the social creed or the received tradition, some reference to the thingness of the world intrudes.³ Thus in absolute materialism, the material world possesses priority and physical change is the precept of all consciousness. Matter and matter in motion come first and provide the basis for human order, perception, language, conceptualization, etc. Inevitably, then, as A. E. Taylor suggests, it is possible to reason that the material world is beyond our comprehension: “In general we have to admit that, except for that small portion of physical nature in which we can directly read purposive experience of a type specially akin to our own, we are quite unable to say with any confidence how nature is organized.”⁴ Such a possibility has shadowed materialistic monism for more than two millennia. This, however, has not obstructed the present influence of materialism, i.e., the acceptance of theories like evolution or the “Big Bang” origins of the universe as the most widely held tenets of Western science.

In the “Western” experience, the first division between philosophical materialists and idealists was to be found in sixth-century (BC) Greek thought. Hellenist scholars have alluded to the division as between the Ionian (materialist) and Italian (idealist) traditions. The materialist tradition was associated with the Milesians—Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes—and the notion of Atomism. As Aristotle testified, originating in the Hellenic East (Ionia), materialism (Atomism) was the first dominant epistemology: “Most of the first philosophers,” he observed, “thought that principles in the form of matter were the only principles of all things.”⁵ The idealists, the most prominent among the ancient Greeks being Pythagoras and then Plato, posited that the mysteries of the cosmos were profoundly sympathetic to numbers and the human souls. “They supposed,” Aristotle recorded, “the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things and the whole heaven to be a *harmonia* and a number.”⁶ And their tradition, like that of the Ionians, has endured the millennia.

At the turn of the present century, Ionian philosophy, to the extent

that it could be known from the fragmentary references to it by the fifth- and fourth-century writers, had come to be known as “naïve materialism.” Technically encapsulated by the term “hylozoism” (attributing to matter properties belonging to life), as its modern nomination suggests it was assumed to be of little significance in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, it was employed by historical materialists as a demonstration of the derivative character of thought, the mirroring of production. George Thomson, the Marxist historian and philosopher, maintained that early Greek materialism was grounded in a metaphysics drawn from an even earlier social order. Commenting on Anaximander’s cosmology, Thomson insisted that “this theory rest[ed] on three preconceived ideas—common origin, perpetual motion, and the conflict of opposites—all of which are derived from primitive thought, being in origin nothing more than a projection of the structure of the tribe.”⁷

Thomson’s interpretation might, at first blush, appear eccentric, but it is echoed by non-Marxist scholars who have undertaken the study of ancients. Jonathan Barnes, for instance, has argued that drawing from Phoenician and pre-Hellenic tribal organization and myths, the “pre-Socratics” crafted a natural philosophy from the most rudimentary precepts of socio-political order: *cosmos*, *arche*, *phusis*, and *logos* (derived, respectively, from the cognate verbs: to order; to begin/rule; to grow; and to say/state).⁸ In this view, the preclassical Greek materialists/naturalists thus are thought to have constructed a notion of an autonomous, ordered, intelligible nature—materialism—which was *pre-European* historically and culturally.⁹

Marx, as he himself acknowledged, came much too late to be the first European materialist. Moreover, as Thomson suggests, materialism was not simply the product of an intellectual genius. As an ideologeme, it inspired philosophies, each of which was an apprehension of a particular historical moment. Indeed, as we review the extraordinary events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the social revolutions which overturned the traditional orders of Western Europeans, we discover that classical materialism, the modern variant which prioritized the objective world, had sprung from the attack on Christianity and the political order (absolutism) it had come to authorize. The absolute monarchies and aristocracies of the feudal and late Middle Ages were more than social and political orderings; they were a divine order, a natural ordering as sacrosanct as God. As Georges Duby described feudal political authority, “Like

the bishop, this personage [the king or prince] was *prelatus*, designated by God because of the virtue in his blood. God had set him over the rest of mankind as their leader.”¹⁰

However, let us review the development of materialist philosophies in their reverse order: proceedings from those to which Marx was closest and then to their predecessors.

The materialist interpretation to which Marx responded was a mere two hundred years old. The materialist philosophy to which Marx objected had been constructed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Earlier, we had observed, the cultural construction of history which became dominant and to which Marxism is obligated could be traced to Judeo-Christian traditions and more immediately to the intervention of Kant and Hegel. What Marx was implicated in was the reconciliation between German idealism and classical materialism and his immediate objects were the works of Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach.

Marx distinguished his beliefs from those of his predecessors by referring to their philosophy as “classical” materialism. These “classical materialists,” however, were not intellectuals of aristocratic origins like their ancient antecedents nor of peasant or working-class backgrounds. They were, to the contrary, closely linked to the commercial strata emerging in Germany, France, and Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Marx referred to this class as a *bourgeoisie* (generally meaning “town-dwellers”). The bourgeoisie was implicated in a long-distance trade, industrial and manufacturing production, and the bureaucracies of the Absolute and nation-states. Such were the origins of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and many of the other intellectuals we have already mentioned. So, too, were those of Engels and Marx: Engels’s family was commercial bourgeois (textile manufacturers). Marx’s civil service. The intellectuals nurtured in this class reinvented materialism and quite naturally their reformulation became an expression of their class’s interests.

Despite the protestations of Engels and Marx, historical materialism and classical materialism shared in common the social origins of their adherents: both were philosophies which originated with intellectuals drawn from the bourgeoisies. Moreover, as theories of history, historical materialism and classical materialism drew on the materialist implications found in an identical stadial architecture of history. More specifically, when Marx eventually argued that culture, politics, and consciousness were based on the organization of production, he was reiterating

a social theory which emerged from an earlier attempt by bourgeois intellectuals to arrange human history into specific stages of economic development.

Marx first articulated the relationship between economics (what Marxists call the *Base*) and the legal, political, and customary structures of society (what Marxists call the *Superstructure*) in the preface to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859). There he wrote:

A guiding thread for my studies can be briefly formulated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.¹¹

Every historical moment, Marx argued, has a specific organization of production which “conditions” a particular superstructure, “the social, political and intellectual process in general.” This seems to make clear that the one—material productive forces—held primacy. And the convention of Anglophone Marxists of employing “base” and “superstructure” as designators was meant to settle the question, definitely one might say. However, S. H. Rigby recites a cautionary tale which must be kept in mind: “Marxists have been unable to agree on whether it is society’s productive forces (its specific forms of tools, raw materials, labor power, and technological knowledge) or its relations of production (its class and property relations) which enjoy an ultimate social primacy.”¹² Notwithstanding the existence of these two terrains of human activity provided Marx and Engels a powerful historical tool: “It is this hierarchy of social forces which, for better or worse, gives Marxism its distinctiveness as a theory of the social world and history.”¹³

Marx reasoned that the conflict which led to profound change in every period of human history implicated the “correspondence” between productive forces and the relations of production:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. . . . No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.¹⁴

The *Base* produces a *Superstructure*, a legal, political, and ideological complement to the way production is organized. The *Base*, however, has its own momentum or inertia. It continues to develop dynamically until a new *Base* is configured. This new organization of production, *Base1*, is no longer complemented by the original *Superstructure*. When this occurs, “an era of social revolution” begins, and this whole immense *Superstructure* (law, political order, ideology) is transformed.

One of the critical implications of this theory is that historical change is intrasocietal, the idea that the motive forces of change come from within the society. This is underscored by Marx’s insistence on a paradox: “No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed.” Each social order obtains its own perfection and in that perfection is its ultimate destruction. Thus social orders destroy themselves. Marx was not submitting an episode from a national history for his readers to peruse in the comfort of their clubs. His was not a theory of history based on some particularly fascinating or compelling era. His was a grand theory of history, encompassing nations, civilizations, and indeed the human species. Thusly, Marx contrasted his method to previous historical explanations which were dependent upon external interventions: wars, invasions, etc. To the contrary, he argued, internal contradictions produce historical change—the revolutionizing of production results in the revolutionizing of the relations of production. Social Revolution is an accommodation of momentous economic change. In these remarks we can begin to see revealed what historical materialism owed to classical materialism.

When we review the writings of some of Marx's immediate predecessors—Montesquieu in France, John Millar and Adam Smith in Scotland, etc.—all of whom wrote in the mid-eighteenth century—we are struck by their adherence to a four-stage history. Each believed that human history began with a hunting stage, and then was progressively succeeded by pastorage, agriculture, and finally commerce. First the domestication of animals (“why should we have to chase animals?”), and then the domestication of plants. Hunting (and gathering) was succeeded by pastorage (animal domestication—with its attendant sexual taboos), and then agriculture: the domestication of plants. And then finally came commerce, a kind of domestication of other peoples. And each of these intellectuals asserted that these “modes of subsistence” (an anticipation of what Marx called mode of production) directly affected human institutions.

In Montesquieu, perhaps, we find the weakest or most qualified relationship between modes of subsistence and the forms of social order. Considering the ethnographic disguise he had assumed so successfully as the author of the *Persian Letters*, it is not surprising that the baron would display a certain sensitivity to the several local variables (climate, religion, etc.) which might influence the institutions and cultures of nations. In his *The Spirit of Laws*, Montesquieu observed that laws “have a very great relation to the manner in which the several nations procure their subsistence.” A perplexing stylist, but nevertheless Montesquieu was clear that laws are made by people in definite circumstances. But as Ronald Meek has observed, “There is certainly no indication in *The Spirit of Laws* that Montesquieu regarded the mode of subsistence as being in any sense the *key factor* in the total situation.”¹⁵ However, for Adam Smith, as we can gather from his writings and lectures from the 1750s and 1760s, the mode of subsistence was central. He wrote, “In a certain view of things all the arts, the sciences, law and government, wisdom and even virtue itself tend all to this one thing, the providing meat. Drink, raiment, and lodging for men.”¹⁶ Each of the stages of human history: hunting, pastorage, agriculture, and commerce, constituted a different set of arts, sciences, laws, governments, and social philosophies. And ten years later, another Scot, John Millar, in his quest to penetrate “beneath that common surface of events which occupies the details of the vulgar historian” concluded:

In searching for the causes of those peculiar systems of law and government which have appeared in the world, we must undoubtedly

resort, first of all, to the differences of situation, which have suggested different views and motives of action to the inhabitants of particular countries. Of this kind, are the fertility or barrenness of the soil, the nature of its productions, the species of labor requisite for procuring subsistence, the number of individuals collected together in one community, their proficience in arts, the advantages which they enjoy for entering into mutual transactions, and for maintaining an intimate correspondence. There is thus, in human society, a natural progress from ignorance to knowledge, and from rude to civilized manners, the several stages of which are usually accompanied with peculiar laws and customs.¹⁷

Much of this is now terribly familiar. But in the eighteenth century, it was a substantial break from previous conceptualizations of history, primarily those dominated by Christian philosophies of history. Here the engine, the motive force of history, of change, was to be found in the mode of subsistence, not the writ and will of god. They were constructing a secular history, sometimes quite aware that in their break with the Christian tradition there would be all sorts of spiritual, moral, and intellectual consequences.

Marx, of course, agreed with his predecessors and defined the institutions and beliefs of law and property as a basis for securing the “relations of production” for each stage of history.¹⁸ The reasons for this concurrence between Montesquieu, Smith, Millar, Marx, and others is suggested by Meek in his discussion of the Scot and French intellectuals:

In the 1750s and 60s, in cities like Glasgow and in areas such as the more advanced provinces in the north of France, the whole social life of the communities concerned was being rapidly and visibly transformed, and it was fairly obvious that this was happening as a result of profound changes taking place in economic techniques and basic socio-economic relationships. And the new forms of economic organization which were emerging could be fairly easily compared and contrasted with the older forms of organization which still existed, say, in the Scottish Highlands, or in the remainder of France—or among the Indian tribes in America. If changes in the mode of subsistence were playing such an important and “progressive” role in the development of contemporary society, it seemed a fair bet that they must also have done so in that of past society.¹⁹

The intellectuals of the bourgeoisie projected the social forces of their own experiences back into their constructions of previous social orders. Such was the onset of a modernist materialism, picking up from the logical method employed by Hobbes and Locke who imagined some primordial “state of nature” which mirrored their own tumultuous seventeenth century. But rather than sovereigns and states, neither of which had proven to secure the social peace that Hobbes and Locke had promised, eighteenth-century philosophers of history sought to situate their own class at the helm of social advancement. Sovereigns could not plan an economy or organize trade, conduct science or create new mathematics. Sovereigns and the state were superfluities, second-order instruments of social organization. Rather it was businessmen and the landlords who made states and sovereigns possible, who provided states with the means of diplomacy, war, and social regulation. It was commerce which drove nations to greatness, which transformed villages into towns and towns into cities, which destroyed or fertilized whole populaces. It was the economy which was at the center of human achievement, not politics, not religion. And whatever affected the economy most powerfully—and ambition seemed to be an obvious first choice—became manifest through the creation of new technologies, the true source of social change.

This, then, was the primary intellectual character of the materialism, classical materialism, which preceded historical materialism. It was history seen as political economy by intellectuals and publicists sympathetic to the commercial revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And when radical intellectuals like Joseph Barnave (or Marx) took over this conception of history, part of what they added to it was the obvious. Of the agricultural stage, Barnave would write: “When the agricultural stage supervenes, ‘the inequality of possession soon becomes extreme,’ and it is not long before landed property becomes ‘the foundation of aristocracy.’ And eventually, ‘just as landed property is the basis of aristocracy and federalism, commercial property is the principle of democracy and of unity.’”²⁰

Commerce shortened the social distance between the bourgeoisie and the old feudal ruling classes, commerce leveled the differences between those who ruled by right of birth and those who conducted the affairs of the nation by right of intellect, ambition, and concentrations of wealth. Commerce democratized and unified. And by democracy Barnave did not mean the poor or the many. Rather he meant the displacement of the

few (the nobility and monarchs) by the more numerous (the commercial classes). Marx, of course, not satisfied with what other bourgeois intellectuals and the bourgeoisie would define as democracy, would push political economy to a critique of commercial property.

These then were the intellectual strands which provided one of the bases for Marx's construction of historical materialism.

The Feudal Order and the Medieval Bourgeoisie

There is, however, an even older conception of materialism to which we must attend in our pursuit of the historical, theoretical, and philosophical anticipation of historical materialism. And as I have suggested, it is to be discovered in the history of the Roman Church. This materialism was associated with an earlier bourgeoisie which would not be triumphant over feudalism or the Church, those twinned (but never equal or coterminous) institutions which served as the foundations of the Absolute State of the Middle Ages. It was also associated with a renegade peasantry whose organized opposition to both their temporal and spiritual masters drove them to be linked with social philosophies and political ideologies which challenged the moral order of the ruling class.

Over and above the identity between Marx's critical historiography and its predecessors in classical materialism, the real history of bourgeois development in the West has two other uses. It is useful for subverting the "natural history" of the bourgeoisie which they invented for themselves. It also provides the occasion for ascertaining an even older meaning to the notion of materialism, one which implicates the Catholic Church.

The discrete stages which appear in Western bourgeois historiography repress the appearances of earlier commercial classes and an older world economy. As a rationalization of history, the bourgeois historiography which begins to make an appearance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attempts to conclude history with the emergence of their particular social order. However, commercial classes, bourgeoisies, had appeared a number of times in European history before the advent of that commercial and civil bourgeoisie which began to achieve significant political as well as economic impact in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. To understand how earlier bourgeoisies were incapable of transcending the social, political, and economic orders in which they appeared, one must pay close attention to the development of Europe.

Reviewing a map of the Old World, one inevitably discovers that Europe is not a continent but a peninsular projection from a continent. It might as easily have come to be known as the Asian continent. In point of fact the continent became the locus of several civilizations, most if not all of them prior to the invention of Europe. Indeed, Europe as the marker of a distinct civilization came into being as a colonial backwater of the ancient civilizations which had appeared and flourished in Asia, the Indus Valley, the Near East, and Africa. As such it would be anachronistic, at least, to state that the development of Europe—which is normally assigned at the close of the Dark Ages (sixth to eleventh centuries)—required access to the non-European world. The more significant error, however, is the presumptive one: since there was no Europe, the notion of the non-European conceals the truer positivity; that is, Europe emerged from the negation of the era. In order to fabricate Europe, institutional, cultural, and ideological materials were consciously smuggled into this hinterland from afar by kings and popes, episcopals, clerics, and monastic scholars. No reality, then, substantiates the imagined, autonomous European continent. But as we proceed, this myth of the autochthonous will constitute only one of the many suspicious narratives concerning the origins of the West.

The Dark Ages were such because of the retreat of knowledge, the atrophy of civilization, the interdiction of long-distance trade, nomadic invasions, the eventual fragmentation of the social order into rural self-subsistent political units, and the disintegration of imperial structures in the hinterland between the Pyrenees and the Elbe which would become known as Europe. Further, the Dark Ages are associated with the significant decline—for still undiscovered reasons—of Europe’s population over four centuries, “dropping to 26m by AD 600—25% less than the AD 200 peak.”²¹ Bourgeois historiography, however, had no provision for the retreat of civilization.

Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones report that: “The Roman Empire declined and fell, classical civilization crumbled away and in its place a new society began to form, the feudal society of the medieval period.”²² During this Dark Age, the pre-Europe was fragmented into rural manors, demesnes, etc. Warren Hollister has maintained:

Specialists in medieval history are inclined to limit “feudalism” to the network of rights and obligations existing among members of

the knightly aristocracy—the holders of fiefs. Although resting on the labor of peasants, the feudal structure itself encompassed only the warrior class of lords and vassals. There was, in other words, a world of difference between a vassal and a serf. Beneath the level of the feudal warrior class, 80 or 90 percent of the population continued to labor on the land, producing the food that sustained society. Yet the peasants were scorned by the nobility as boors and louts, and were largely ignored by the chroniclers of the age.²³

People were consolidated into rural units, most were peasants in villages of a few hundred, some few were serfs bound to wealthy monastic communities. The cities of an earlier age were for the most part “shells” bereft of “administration, ceremony, or commerce,” Lester Little insists.²⁴ To the extent that the countryside was governed, it was where the land-controlling class set up households supported by peasant labor generally commanded by a defensive structure or institution. More in the retrospective view of historians than in reality, the model countryside assumed a geometry of a patchwork of warlords, each lord of a fortress or burg (from which the term “bourgeoisie” derived). Between the Pyrenees and the Elbe, the burg was the center of the medieval city, a clustering of communities which gradually grew up under the protective shadow of the burg. The vagabonds who eventually took up trade established warehouses (*ports*) in the proximity of the fortresses.²⁵ And eventually as the populations and the wealth of the towns amassed into cities, their inhabitants frequently demanded of the lords separation and free or *citizen* status. They wished to be excused from the duties and responsibilities which bound the serfs and other vassals under the lord’s protection to the feudal legal order. When the political balance was fortuitous, the free cities of the Middle Ages arose. But the merchant strata grew up through servicing the inevitable imbalances in the primitive self-subsistent systems of feudal agriculture—transferring commodities (foodstuffs, manufactures, cloths, etc.) to demesnes which were temporarily rendered insufficient or whose manufactures had exceeded local demands.

However, in terms of long-distance trade and a moneyed economy, the businesses which were characteristically associated with mature bourgeoisies, it was not the European hinterlands of Germany and France which served as their primary sites of operation. As Lester Little reports:

The first area of intense commercial activity . . . was northern Italy, an area that united the head of the Adriatic Sea with the Valley of the Po. . . .

. . . The earliest significant commercial activity of Latin Christendom was located at the periphery, and was directed outwards to Byzantine Italy, Islamic Spain, and the Scandinavian northern seas. The economic history of the period from the late tenth century through the early twelfth century consists, in part, of the tying into one network of these externally oriented frontier areas, of their amalgamation into a single interdependent economy.²⁶

The most important bourgeoisies which emerged with Europe out of the Dark Ages were located in the Mediterranean and the Low Countries of the north.

By the eighth and ninth centuries, Islam had come to dominate Europe's access routes to the precious metals, manufactures, silks, and textiles produced in Africa and Asia. Henri Pirenne, the Belgian historian (*Mohammed and Charlemagne*), had characterized this historical moment by declaring (in somewhat poetic terms) that by the eighth century, the Mediterranean had been transformed into a "Muslim lake." Summarizing Pirenne's argument, the English historian Trevor-Roper (now Lord Dacre) wrote:

Gold and silk are used in the barbarian courts. Spices and papyrus find their way to the monasteries of northern Europe. But about AD 700 all these cease. Gold disappears from European currency; eastern luxuries and Syrian merchants from barbarian Europe. A new European society presents itself before us. It is a society based on rural self-sufficiency: self-sufficiency which will afterwards find its expression in the forms of feudalism. . . .

So Europe was turned in on itself, and society was gradually systematized on its new basis. It was systematized, again in one word, by Charlemagne.²⁷

Pirenne had argued that the Dark Ages were characterized by Islamic control over the seats of civilization and the trade routes of long-distance trade. And until mechanisms were found in Europe to open its doors to peoples of the book, European thought, too, was confined: sequestered in monastic cells in remote locations in Ireland and England or the liter-

ary and cultural conservatories—the domiciles of the knowledge which would serve in the reconstruction of Europe—were so radically dissimilar that rather substantially different narratives have emerged to describe these events. Paradoxically those historians who focus on the monastic role, on those communities of the “most perfect men” since their members claimed to be wholly dedicated to prayer and the study of scriptural exegesis, have stressed the importance of secular rulers in the origins of Europe. On the other hand, those historians persuaded that it was the higher Church, bishops, archbishops, and popes, which brought Europe into being, are struck by an anomaly: recognizing that these clerics were drawn from the warrior caste, they nevertheless pursued a theory of governance which would make the Church paramount.

Historians committed to the first interpretation, like Trevor-Roper and Lester Little, argue that the notion of Europe begins with Charlemagne. And they insist that the notion of Europe is closely identified with the reemergence of the Church: Europe is *Latin Christendom*. Secular authority, from Charles Martel to Charlemagne, used the Church to unify Europe against the Muslim infidel:

When the family of Charles Martel sought to re-create western life, it was not on that old secular basis that they sought to do it. A new impulse was needed; and that new impulse had to be religious. Monasticism, puritanism, rigid doctrine—these were the forces which alone, it seemed, could re-inspire the West, provide the spiritual or intellectual or ideological force to animate the new “feudal” resistance. So Charles Martel, though he secularized Church property, had no intention of undermining the Church. On the contrary, he summoned monks from England and Ireland to reorganize the Frankish Church, and his grandson Charlemagne and his great-grandson Louis the Pious used the great monasteries they founded—“the cultural centers of the Carolingian empire,” as they have been called—as a source of power for a new policy: a policy of alliance with the pope, support of the pope, emancipation of the pope from the still secular Eastern Empire and, ultimately, puritan reform of the papacy. By these methods they would unite the two new cells of religious and feudal power.²⁸

But as Little says somewhere, Charlemagne was essentially a Germanic warrior-king who occupied himself during much of his long reign with

fighting wars and preparing to fight wars.²⁹ Governance, as a result, was not the king's strongest suit. And so he became more and more dependent upon a retinue of educated officials. Teasing out that caveat Trevor-Roper argues that the inspiration for Charlemagne's administration and its rationale came out of Ireland and England:

By the year 700 European learning had fled to the bogs of Ireland or the wild coast of Northumbria. It was in the monasteries of Ireland that fugitive scholars preserved a knowledge of the Latin and even of the Greek classics. It was in a monastery in Northumbria that the greatest scholar of his time, the greatest historian of the whole Middle Ages, the Venerable Bede, lived and wrote. And it was from the monasteries of Ireland and England, in the eighth and ninth centuries, that English and Irish fugitives would return to a devastated Europe: men like the Englishmen St. Boniface, who would convert the Germans to Christianity, Alcuin of York, the teacher of Charlemagne, or the Irishman John Scotus Erigena, who went to teach at the court of the Emperor Charles the Bald.³⁰

Despite the evident necessity of conceding that much of what was of significance occurred outside the British Isles, Lord Dacre's account is essentially Anglocentric: Bede, Boniface, Alcuin, and John Scotus came from England bearing the gifts of ancient knowledge. It also lays great emphasis on secular authority, showing particular affection for monarchs. However, in their narratives of this intellectual fertilization which coincided with the appearance of Europe, William Ullmann and Georges Duby explicitly or implicitly took issue. They represent the second mode of interpretation.

Ullmann presented testimony that the collaboration between Charlemagne and Alcuin actually failed, collapsing under the assault of the papacy, another manifestly more sophisticated and centralized seat of learning. Unlike Lord Dacre's tale of the quest of Anglo-Saxon and Irish holy men, this different narrative reflects something of the intrigues and literary machinations so frequently encountered in the medieval history of the Bishop of Rome's court.

On Christmas Day in 800 when Charlemagne was anointed "emperor of the Romans" by Pope Leo III, he was being ushered into a world-vision far beyond his imagination. Ullmann assures us that Charlemagne had rejected the pope's fuller nomination to "supreme governorship of the

world”: “Charlemagne objected. For universal governorship, that is, Roman emperorship, he had not intended nor had agreed to accept. His governmental intention was to be in the West what the Byzantine was in the East. What he wanted to see was a parity of position, a kind of co-existence with the East. . . . Charlemagne was simply a Frankish monarch who had no understanding of the whole involved and (to him) abstruse Roman emperorship ideology.”³¹

Charlemagne (and Alcuin) resisted, but in 823 with the coronation of his grandson, Lothar I, the papacy had secured the Carolingian rulers as an affirmation of its primacy over the Eastern church, as its protectors, and as instruments of its policies in the creation of Europe: “More important, through the accentuation of the Western ‘Empire’ as a wholly Latin-Christian body, the gulf between East and West considerably widened. The implications of the concept of Europe—and this is what Byzantium clearly perceived—was that the ‘Greeks,’ that is, the Eastern empire, did not belong to Europe. . . . The empire ruled from Constantinople was considered alien to Europe.”³²

In order to avoid the fate of the Church in the East, where the Emperor ruled over the prelates, the high officials of the Roman Church had divided a once united Christendom into two: the Latin Church and the Greek Church. But the two could not be perceived as equals, one had to be superior. This was achieved through a new geography: Europe and non-Europe; and the manufacturing of a new past.³³

The power of bishops and popes over the Carolingian kings was part magic and partly due to the fact that the “bishop was the repository of classical culture,” Duby asserts.³⁴ The liturgical act combining anointing and crowning was a mixture of Byzantine and Frankish rituals, legitimated by the supposedly inherited (by “blood”) gift of *sapientia*, the knowledge of hidden truths, and the industry of the episcopal conservatory: “From the episcopal see a continual renaissance of Latinity flowed forth. This cultural labor was carried out in the school, that workshop that stood alongside the cathedral—there, a small crew of men of all ages set themselves to copying texts, to analyzing sentences, to dreaming up etymologies, endlessly exchanging what they knew with one another, constantly working over that most precious raw material, that treasure of homilies and incantations, the words of God.”³⁵

Among them were the forgers of the *Pseud-Isidore* and the *Benedictus Levita*, documents which purportedly provided the doctrine of hierocratic

principle just as seven hundred years earlier, a similarly spurious document, a letter from Pope Clement I, had established papal succession from St. Peter.³⁶ Forgeries of other sorts abounded: For one example, having once embraced slavery, the Church now condemned the sale of enslaved Christians to pagans (Muslims) by resurrecting scriptural authorities which had been ignored for centuries.³⁷ And when the time was thought propitious, they brought forward the knowledge of the ancient pagan. The lifting of the veil of the Dark Ages was thus due in part to the introduction into Europe of “pagan” knowledge—the works of Egyptian and Greek scientists and philosophers, a process which germinated during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries. The stage was thus set for the disruptive appearance of a medieval bourgeoisie. The moment at which we shall intervene in our pursuit of the antecedents of historical materialism is the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

According to Fernand Braudel, the European world-economy began at the two poles: Italy and the Low Countries. The north was more “industrial,” while the Italian city-states commanded trade and commerce. Braudel characterized the merchants of Bruges, Antwerp, and Lubeck (the Hansa) as carrying on “an elementary kind of capitalism.” But Italy was by far the stronger force—clearly dominant from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries.³⁸ Indeed, in the late thirteenth century, the Italian merchant capitalists (Venetian and Genoese) could be said to have begun the colonization of the trade of the Low Countries and the hinterland just as they would colonize Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century.

In 1277, the first Genoese ships put in to Bruges. The establishment of a regular maritime link between the Mediterranean and the North Sea ushered in a decisive invasion by the southerners—for the Genoese were but a foretaste of what was to come: the last of the newcomers, the Venetian galleys, arrived in 1314. For Bruges this could be described both as an annexation and as a new departure. . . . The arrival of the sailors, ships, and merchants of the Mediterranean brought in a wealth of goods, capital, and commercial and financial techniques.³⁹

This was the first *European* bourgeoisie, the commercial class which appeared at the beginnings of feudalism. In Classical Athens, more than a millennium and a half before, there are several indications that the Athenians had nurtured a bourgeoisie of aliens and resident aliens (*metics*)⁴⁰

but the Greeks had not considered themselves European. Indeed in cultural as well as populational terms, “European” would have been more than a little premature: the *Keltoi* (Celtics), of whom the ancient Greeks were aware, had not yet been joined by the Germanic, Scandinavian, and Viking tribes to form the basis of the medieval European populations. Regardless, during the Hellenistic Age, this bourgeoisie, like democracy, was extinguished. De Ste. Croix argues that the effective cause of their disappearance was the collaborations secured by the Greek propertied classes, first with the Macedonian and later their Roman overlords.⁴¹ Later, as documented in Roman Law, the Roman republic and empire had their commercial classes (*negotiators* or *mercatores*), as well. But the last commercial class under Roman authority atrophied with the collapse of the empire.⁴²

As it happens, the medieval commercial class would also come to a dead end, quite literally. The Black Plague of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the tyrants and monarchs of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries extinguished this first bourgeoisie.⁴³ They did not survive to transcend feudalism. The bourgeoisie which did had a very different site of development. The first European world-economic bourgeoisie flourished in the Mediterranean and gradually colonized and spawned from Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean towards the west. Eventually it moved north and was then succeeded by bourgeois formations in Western Europe and Britain. But the process would take nearly five hundred years and it would involve external (that is, long-distance) trade and commercial relations to the west, that is, across the Atlantic.

Medieval Heresy and Rebellion

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, in the midst of social, political, and ideological upheavals which would endure for a further two centuries the Church institutionalized a variant of socialism in the forms of the Franciscan and Dominican orders. In 1209 the Catholic Church incorporated the Franciscans, and in 1213, the Dominicans. They were soon joined by the Carmelites and the Augustinians. These four orders were described as mendicant (begging) orders and penitents (devoted to poverty). They were not a first cause, but a reaction; the Church’s reaction to a social phenomenon which threatened to destroy the Roman Church.

As a consequence of its Carolingian stratagem for the reconstruction

of Europe, the Church had become enormously wealthy and closely identified with secular authority. And with the formation of the first bourgeoisie—the bourgeoisie of the Italian city-states which dominated the Middle Ages: Venice, Genoa, Milan, Florence (based on the long-distance Mediterranean trade with Asia and Africa)—vast dislocations occurred in European social stratigraphy. The vastly wealthy houses of the Italian city-states and the feudal royalties were the source of the Church's higher prelates. And the Church had become identified with the protection of the merchant bourgeoisies and the feudal states. Michael Goodich observes: "Every royal family of Europe was credited with at least one . . . saint, and more if its policies adhered more closely to those of Rome. The Andrechs of central Europe could boast no less than twenty-one saints and beati between 1150 and 1500. The Castilian royal family numbered four local saints in the thirteenth century alone."⁴⁴ There was an identity between wealth and the Church, not simply in institutional terms but family interlocks. The officers of the Church most frequently came from the wealthy and the nobilities. And the Church rewarded its allies with sainthoods.

To be certain, the source of the Church's wealth was in no way restricted to nepotism. At Rome, Lester Little records that "nearly every operation of the papal government required a money payment, whether a salary, a tax, a fee, a fine, or a bribe."⁴⁵ There and elsewhere, high prelates sold offices, and along with the lesser clergy collected tithes and sold indulgences. The result was a "self-financing elite" which could deploy many of its members in the most powerful secular offices in the administrations of kings, princes, barons, and untitled landlords.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Rodney Hilton recounts, "by the thirteenth century, monasteries not only were recipients of lay benefactions, but actively entered the land and commodity markets, buying land to enlarge or round off their estates, accumulating cash by selling wool, grain or wine, and using their cash reserves to lend money to the chronically embarrassed nobility, usually on the security of land."⁴⁷ Such was the result of the Carolingian stratagem of European reconstruction.

The inevitable opposition to this identity between wealth, feudal power, and the Church resulted from the massive dislocation of wealth associated with merchant capitalism, the increasing conflict between the cities and their countrysides, and the onus of exploitation and repression associated with feudal relations and authority.

Between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries, it is estimated that the population of Europe increased some 300 percent, much of this increase resulting in new villages, some of it swelling the urban populations of regions now designated Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the Low Countries, and England.⁴⁸ In the same period, economic specialization appeared: "Cloth was sent from Flanders to the Parisian basin; grain from the Parisian basin to Scandinavia; timber from Scandinavia to the Low Countries; cheese from the Low Countries to Iceland; fish from Iceland to Germany; salt from Germany to England; beer and bacon from England to Flanders."⁴⁹ Wool and cloth industries appeared in Flanders, England, and Spain; construction industries ("churches, castles, town walls, communal palaces, covered market-places, and bridges") appeared all over the area. And as long-distance trade encouraged the organization of fairs in northern Europe, coinage became common by the twelfth century as did the visas of members of Italian merchant companies.⁵⁰ Adapting to the practices innovated in northern Italian cities, "Merchants held money on deposit from other persons; they exchanged money in varying currencies; and they sometimes extended credit to their depositors by allowing them to overdraw their accounts. In such a way, certain of the essential functions of banking were served by merchants, some of whom, as the economy became increasingly specialized in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, became full-time bankers."⁵¹

As a concomitant to the wealth being amassed by the Church and the commercial classes, peasants, the rural and urban poor suffered calamitously in the twelfth century. Actually, the disasters which heaped upon poverty began at the end of the eleventh century. In 1095, droughts ravished the harvests in England and much of France; in 1097, floods rotted the wheat in Anjou which had been devastated by the drought two years earlier. In the 1120s, Portugal, Anjou, Germany, and Bruges were visited by famine, while merchants hoarded grain or marketed it at prices which were prohibitive. In the 1140s, food was scarce in the Low Countries, France, England, and Catalonia. Famines struck France again in the 1160s, and from 1194 to 1196, heavy rains brought floods and food prices soared in much of Europe. The numbers of poor increased, according to contemporary chroniclers, and little relief was at hand: "At Val-Saint-Pierre seventeen hundred were said to have died each day in 1197."⁵² Michel Mollat writes that there are no means of determining the number of the twelfth century's poor, except that "it seems to have been

large. . . . Without the escape valve provided by the First Crusade, the West might have experienced as early as the end of the eleventh century troubles similar to those that arose in the period 1180–1200. On the fringes of rural society, which remained stable, and even on the outskirts of the cities, which with their newfound vitality were more than hospitable to newcomers, groups of marginals and rebels lived beyond the pale and outside the faith.”⁵³

But Mollat suspects the portents were already present in the early eleventh century: “In 1038 . . . in Bourges, [bishop] Aymo of Bourbon, led a ‘multitude of unarmed commoners’ (*multitudo inermis vulgi*) against those who had violated an oath to keep the peace. Was this insurrection one episode in a sporadic series of popular uprisings?”⁵⁴ Even earlier, Rodney Hilton reports on the sparse evidence of a peasant war in Normandy in 996; but he is in doubt that peasant movements increased in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. And Mollat seems substantiated that Pope Urban II’s call for the First Crusade was more domestic than a concern for Christendom. One evidence for this is that the first crusade was not the one Urban anticipated or authorized. At the appointed hour in 1096, few of the noble crusaders were prepared and so an army of 300,000, mostly peasants, set off for the holy land under the leadership of Peter the Hermit and Walter the Penniless. By the time the Peasants’ Crusade reached Constantinople, only a third had survived (“a trail of bones reached back to the Rhineland and to France”); and most of the rest were slaughtered when they crossed the Bosphorus.⁵⁵ Such fanaticism, it is safe to assume, had both social as well as religious origins. The “First” Crusade, two years later, was more noble, thus more professionally military, and ultimately more successful. But when its army took Jerusalem in 1100, Hilton reminds us, “it was the poor in that army, especially those from southern France, who were responsible for the pressure which forced the land-hungry lords to press on to the end.”⁵⁶

Urban lied in 1095 when at Clermont in France he apparently described eastern churches being defiled and depicted eastern Christians being raped, tortured, mutilated, and murdered by infidels (the Turks). As Marcus Bull discerns: “Most Westerners’ understanding of the politics and peoples of the Middle East was vague at best, and Urban exploited this.”⁵⁷ The fanciful catastrophe in the East, however, masked the real catastrophe in the West where in northern Italy a peasant communal movement had sprung forth and gained momentum in the 1090s in Verona, Caprino,

and Padovano;⁵⁸ and by the second decade of the twelfth century, peasant uprisings were everywhere: "In 1110 peasants of the Beauvaisis burned forests belonging to their bishop. In the Bray region peasants set fire to the suburbs of Poix in 1112. The peasants of Ponthieu invaded Saint-Riquier in 1125, and in Cambresis a castellan was stoned to death in 1127. At the other end of Europe, in Galicia, the bishop of Sahagun had to confront an uprising of 'field workers and little people' in 1110."⁵⁹ And Immanuel Wallerstein mentions that peasant republics were established in Frisia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.⁶⁰ Contemporaneously, first in Parma in 1260 under the leadership of the illiterate Gerard Segarelli, and then in Brescia, Novara, Bergamo, Trento, and Modena with Fra Dolcino, the son of a priest, a revolutionary movement termed the Apostles appeared. After three years of siege, some 1,400 Apostles had been defeated by an army under the Bishop of Vercelli in 1307. But before that awful massacre and even afterwards, the popular revolt had attracted peasants, artisans, workers, and even a canon and some nuns.⁶¹

Even among the canons of the Church, there were some who made their stands with the poor. In the second quarter of the eleventh century, Peter Damian had denounced avarice and the practice of simony, and then in the 1050s had rejected the possession of private property by priests. In the next century, Arnold of Brescia, whose native city had fomented a communal revolt in the 1130s, took up the cause that Peter Damian had championed. Seeking reconciliation with the Bishop of Rome, Arnold of Brescia had traveled to Rome in 1147 only to be stunned by the wealth he discovered in the papal court. So instead of a truce, Arnold and the cardinals engaged in mutual denunciations; Arnold was expelled from the court and then joined the communal revolt in Rome which had begun in 1143. He was among the leaders of the Roman Commune when it was crushed by the emperor's army. Ten years later he was hanged and his corpse burned by Frederick Barbarossa. And the emperor's uncle, Otto of Freising, recorded: "After his corpse had been reduced to ashes in the fire, these were scattered on the Tiber, lest his remains be held in veneration by the mad populace."⁶² Like Peter Damian and Ivo of Chartres before him, and like his contemporary, Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Arnold of Brescia had come to the conclusion that "voluntary poverty . . . was the key to the holy life."⁶³ But unlike the others, Arnold of Brescia had resorted to violence to reform the Church. On this latter score his closest spiritual companions were heretics like Tanchelm (killed by a priest in

1115), the heretical priests of Ivois (ca. 1120), Henry of Lausanne, Peter de Bruys (the founder of the Petrobrusians), and Éon de l'Étoile.⁶⁴

The peasant as well as the urban rebellions of the thirteenth century were indisputable class wars, even in the eyes of contemporary chroniclers. Jacques (James) of Vitry, a thirteenth-century monk (and disciple of the Beguine leader, Marie d'Oignies) who would eventually assume the bishopry of Acre, is one of the most famous reporters:

All that the peasant amasses in one year of stubborn toil, the noble devours in an hour. Not content with his lawful revenues, he despoils them by illicit exactions. As wolves devour carrion while the crows croak overhead, awaiting their share of the feast, so when knights pillage their subjects the provosts [their agents] and others of the hellish crew rejoice at the prospect of devouring the remainder. . . . Ye nobles are ravening wolves; therefore shall ye howl in hell [for you] despoil your subjects and live on the blood and sweat of the poor.⁶⁵

In northern Italy, the rural commune movement won victories in the diocese of Padua, Milan, and at Bassano, securing the nomination of officials and juridical powers from feudal nobles or high clergy. In France, as the market economy transformed feudal service duties into taxes, urban communes won charters which regulated legal rights and the abolition or regulation of customary taxes. In Lorraine, some 280 charters were established; in the Parisian region, nearly 60; in Picardy, 120 villages won chartered rights.⁶⁶ Peasants relied on collective action, sometimes (as at Itteville in 1268) on force. In 1233–34, urban mobs associated with the Alleluia movement pillaged in Bologna while the movement swept from city to city throughout Lombardy and Romagna.⁶⁷ And in 1251, the Pastoureaux movement anticipated the mass and largely peasant uprisings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: “The revolt in maritime Flanders 1323–27; the Jacquerie in the Paris region in 1358; the Tuchin movement in central France, from the 1360s to the end of the fourteenth century; the English rising of 1381; and the wars of the *remansas* in Catalonia during the 1460s and the 1480s.”⁶⁸ Apocalyptic, anti-clerical, and often egalitarian, Hilton concludes: “There was one prominent feature which they had in common: the emergence, among some of the participants, of a consciousness of class.”⁶⁹

Long before Urban's magnificent distraction, the Church and civil au-

thorities had begun to formulate a stratagem which would marshal Latin Christendom against moral dissent and social rebellion. In 1022, heretics were burned at Orléans and at Milan in 1028; a group similarly designated had been hung at Goslar in 1052. R. I. Moore maintains that these are some of the beginning of a persecuting society: "Religious persecution had, of course, been familiar in the Roman Empire, and remained so in the Byzantine world throughout its history. But in the West, far from being 'normal' in medieval society, it faded away with the Roman Empire, and did not reappear until the eleventh century; even then . . . it became regular and established only gradually during the next hundred years or so."⁷⁰

In England, in 1166, Henry II had forbidden assistance by any of his subjects to the heretics he had ferreted out at Oxford. And in 1179, the Third Lateran Council had denounced the Cathari, Paterines, and other heretics; and in 1216, the Fourth Lateran Council had resumed the attack on the enemies of the Church (Cathari) who for two generations had grown rapidly in Languedoc, Provence, and Lombardy.⁷¹ By then, of course, the Church was already in the seventh year of its decades-long brutal and bloody war (1208–29) against the Cathars of Albi, the Albigenians.

Rent, taxation, land clearances, famines, and the inflation of food prices, however, were more constant than the wars on the poor that the Church or its secular allies could mount. As Mollat had indicated, though there is no creditable means by which the poor could be numbered, the mass movements of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries provide evidence that they were sufficiently numerous to organize in impressive collectives. In 1212, the Children's Crusades (one began in Vendôme and marched to Paris; the second, marched from Cologne to Genoa, Venice, Pisa, and Rome) were launched by quite literally visionary young shepherds, massing largely adolescent herdsmen.⁷² Forty years later, in the midst of devastating famines which reached from England to Italy, very likely one of those young shepherds led the Pastoureaux movement in Orléans and Bourges. Mollat, quoting from contemporary sources (Primat and Saint-Denis) tells us that "leaving animals in their pastures they set out without bidding farewell to either mother or father and entrusted their messianic hopes to the ministrings of outlaw priests who styled themselves bishops."⁷³ Now, according to Hilton, thieves, exiles, fugitives, and excommunicates joined the herdsmen, quickly transforming into a radical anti-clerical movement: "In particular they attacked in detail the religious orders of the church for their characteristic sins: the

Dominicans and Franciscans as vagabonds and hypocrites; Cistercians as greed amassers of flocks and lands; the Benedictines for their pride; the canons for their secular lives; and the bishops and their officials for their pursuit of money. Nor was the Roman curia exempt from attack; the audience welcomed these attacks on the clergy.”⁷⁴ And though they were dispersed in 1251 when their Shepherd was killed, the movement began again in 1320 at Rouen. But even before the twelfth century, what the Church decried as heresy had begun to loosen the bonds of the poor, transforming them into a noble estate.

From the perspective of eight hundred years or more, the oppositions to feudal rule can be said to have assumed two discrete forms: a heretical attack on the Church and revolutions against the ruling classes.⁷⁵ And each achieved a socialist discourse. Nonetheless to their contemporaries, particularly those who left their impressions in documents (letters, legislature, decrees, chronicles, and the like), the notion of heresy concealed different social and ideological origins.

Jonathan Sumption believes that it was the lesser clergy, the merchants, and the recruits of the Crusading armies which were the ideological carriers of the heretical opposition. Its form was Manichaeism, dualism.

Already in the first half of the eleventh century, sporadic outbreaks of heresy were occurring in northern Europe, which contemporaries who had read their Augustine described as “Manichaeism.” . . . The cloth merchants of the northern towns often had commercial links with the east. So had many Italian merchants, who might have encountered dualism in Constantinople, in the Dalmatian cities of Ragusa and Spalato, or even, rather later, in Serbia and Croatia. Pilgrims too generally followed the great imperial road from Belgrade to Constantinople which took them through the heartland of Paulician dualism. More important than these causal carriers of the eastern heresy were the crusaders, who encountered dualism both in the Balkans and in Asia Minor.⁷⁶

R. I. Moore, on the other hand, argues that the sources and forms of heretical doctrine were more complex. Distinguishing between what he terms learned and popular heresy, Moore maintains that early in the eleventh century, indeed some seventy years before the First Crusade, evidence of learned heresy among the educated strata had already surfaced.

Among those branded as heretics in 1024 and 1028 there were implications of their exposure to classical literature. Gerard was the leader of the band (which included a countess) executed in 1028. Interrogated by Aribert, the archbishop of Milan, Gerard proclaimed their vow of chastity, abhorrence of meat-eating, and their commitment to communal property and prayer: "It is now established that the formative influence on them . . . was the Neoplatonist approach to the understanding of the scriptures which had been developed in the late Carolingian schools and was much in vogue both north and south of the Alps at this time. This view laid heavy emphasis on the liberation of the individual from the bonds of fleshly preoccupation through personal abstinence, and on the allegorical interpretation of the scriptures, especially the New Testament."⁷⁷

Gerard was described as a peasant, and four years earlier, in 1024, a heretical group made up entirely of illiterate peasants and unfree persons (evidenced by the use of torture in their interrogations) had been discovered by Bishop Gerard of Cambrai. This was an instance of the popular heresy for Moore. Yet their beliefs closely resembled those of the Milan heretics: "They lived, they said, according to the tenor of the Gospels and the Apostles, which they summed up as being 'to abandon the world, to restrain the appetites of the flesh, to do injury to nobody, to extend charity to everybody of our own faith.' 'If these rules are followed,' they continued, 'baptism is unnecessary; if they are not it will not lead to salvation.'"⁷⁸

Marx had declared in 1844 that the "criticism of religion is essentially complete." But here some eight centuries before a quite different criticism of religion had made its appearance. Instead of a philosophic school of rigorously trained scholars exposing the ideological cover of the State, we find peasants and some drawn even from the enslaved taking a stand against a religious estate which constituted an apparatus of actual power. And rather than the rigors of academic arguments and refutation, these men and women braved torture and death. They understood the risks, and quite frequently went to their deaths proclaiming the rightness of their faith.

It was, of course, partly the times: Christians, even renegade or heretical Christians, believed in the millennium. It had been a thousand years since the birth of Christianity, and it was generally believed that sometime between 1000 and 1033 AD, the world of pain and sin would be overturned. In medieval cultures, the practice of alloying magic with

chronology was mixed again with eschatological expectations for the eleventh century which gave free reign to the imaginations of Christians of every estate.⁷⁹ Ralph Glaber (the Bald), in his *Five Books of History* written sometime before the first half of the eleventh century, expressed these expectations by illustrating “the apocalyptic prophecy that ‘Satan will be released when a thousand years have passed.’ Accordingly Ralph grouped ominous happenings around the years 1000 and 1033.”⁸⁰ So among these heretics there was no purpose in adhering to the rules of a Church in which wealth was amassed and corruption of the flesh flourished. And in the course of the eleventh century as their faith in the millennium failed, many heretics seized on a religion based on the teachings of Mani (d. 276), which was no Christianity at all:

They called themselves Christians, based their teachings on the parts of the Bible that they recognized, notably the Gospels and the Acts, clothed much of their doctrine in Christian garb, and increasingly as time went on, some historians now argue, drew closer to Christianity in their attitudes and assumptions. But they differed from Christians at a fundamental point: they believed not in one God but in two. . . . All their life and teaching was derived from one premise of overwhelming importance, that creation was a dual process: there was a kingdom of good which was immaterial, and a kingdom of evil—the material world—into which their souls had fallen or been led captive, and to which belonged their bodies, the prisons of the evil god.⁸¹

And thus through the purest of syllogisms the Christians’ Jehovah became Satan, the evil god. As one dualist told the bishop of Alet: “Everything that exists under the sun and the moon is but corruption and chaos.” And Peter Garcia, another Manichaean, declared during his interrogation by an Inquisition court: “God is perfect; nothing in the world is perfect; therefore nothing in the world was made by God.”⁸²

Manichaeism was for Europeans a new conception of the universe, a conception which was philosophically substantiated when Aristotle’s writings became a part of intellectual life in Europe from the eleventh century. Aristotle’s division of the world between the incorruptible circular motion of the heavens and the corruptible and oppositional rectilinear movement of the terrestrial world confirmed dualist mysticism: the earth as the creation of Satan, the heavens as the creation of God.⁸³

Remnants of this argument would reappear in Kant and Hegel seven hundred years later. Aristotle imposed an opposition between the celestial and terrestrial worlds, and the medieval mystics transposed this into an opposition between God and Satan.⁸⁴ The Church, in commanding the terrestrial arena, the arena belonging to Satan, marked itself as a creature of Satan. “[The dualist congregations] avoided meat and milk, disapproved of procreation, and ridiculed the sacraments. They were strict dualists, ascribing the creation of all matter to the Devil, and holding the Devil to be coeval with God. They divided themselves into believers and initiates, the latter class being called Cathars, a name which was henceforth used to describe all western dualists. The Greek word ‘Cathar’ (‘purified’) itself suggests an eastern origin for their creed.”⁸⁵

Aristotle seemed to corroborate this dualism. Since circular motion had no opposition, Aristotle had argued (in *De Caelo*) it was incorruptible, that is, unchangeable. No change had ever been observed in the heavens, Aristotle insisted. The terrestrial world, on the other hand, was eminently corruptible, changeable. This confirmed the Manichaean vision, an anti-Christian theology. And the justification of dualism was the rotteness and decadence of the Church and secular authority.⁸⁶ An alternative social vision was needed and Manichaeism provided that.

Manichaeism delivered a theological framework for the heretical ideas and unorthodox opinions which much before dualism stormed into Europe could be found among peasants and others of the lower levels of society. And long after the Inquisition had driven dualism into remote retreats in the mountains and secret little urban communities, rationalist, naturalist, and materialist ideas persisted. But during its years of greatest influence, Manichaeistic dualism coupled with the poverty movement which began in the eleventh century (and continued into the sixteenth) inspired the formation of fanatical sects.

Two of the most important of the radical sects were the Cathari and the Waldensians. These were the heresies (in company with such communist sects as the Humiliati and Communiati) which defined heresy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These heresies, concomitant with the mass movements of “plebians of town and country,”⁸⁷ required the Church to mount Crusades, armies, and the Inquisition. They were also the heresies which compelled the Church to incorporate or construct an alternative: the Franciscans (who included the Poor Clares), the Dominicans, the Augustinians, and the Carmelites.⁸⁸ And by the thirteenth

century, following on the role their founder had played in the Albigensian Crusade, the Dominican order was the Church's primary repressive tool with regard to heresy. St. Dominic's order received its papal approval for the purpose of suppressing heresy. Still the vows of these orders adopted many of the characteristics of the poverty movements: they renounced property (retaining no possessions from one day to the next) and adopted poverty and begging as the *vita apostolica*. For these heretics, this was following the life of Christ. To live like Christ meant to renounce property and material things. In amassing wealth, the Church had pursued an un-Christ-like existence. The instruction of Christ's life was in poverty, the renunciation of property.

On the margins between dualistic heresies and the mendicant orders stood the religious or pious women who would so radically influence theological debate from the thirteenth century onwards. Forbidden clerical office and largely beyond official supervision and approval, they came to dominate criticism of official corruption. Sometimes as nuns (the Poor Clares, Catherine of Siena, Douceline of Digne), sometimes as lay mystics (Marie of Oignies, Margaret of Cortona, Ida of Nivelles, Marguerite Porete, Margaret of Ypres, Ida of Louvain, Mechthild of Magdeburg, etc.), and sometimes as heretics (Margarita d'Arco, Guglielma, Heilwige Bloemardinne) they appropriated the *vita apostolica* with a vengeance: experiencing and declaring a special relationship with Christ through Eucharist-inspired visions; preaching the gospel; living lives of poverty; and organizing communes.⁸⁹ One, Mayfreda de Pirovano, even declared herself "the first pope of the Holy Spirit."⁹⁰ Another, Na Prous Boneta, who was burned as a heretic in 1325, had confessed to the Inquisition at Carcassonne, France, that the papacy had been annulled for perpetuity by God after she had been appointed as the body of the Holy Spirit. For ten years, Na Prous had been persecuted as a heretic and heresiarch. Nevertheless, at the end she persisted in her loyalty to St. Francis and Peter John Olivi ("Jesus Christ told her that St. Francis began his order in that same perfection and attitude as had Christ, when he began with his apostles to hold to poverty"), while certain that John XXII, in condemning lepers, Spirituals, and Beguines to death, was the Antichrist.⁹¹ Indeed, many women did assume priestly authority and men as well as women were to be found in their religious communities. Caroline Bynum insists that at base, the women's movement were anti-dualist, encompassing Aquinas's rejoinder to the Cathars that "the person is his body, not just a soul using

a body.”⁹² Equally significant, it was the sheer number and charismatic force of pious women which transmitted their criticism of corrupt clergy into the foreground of religious discourse: “There is no question that this aspect of thirteenth-century religious women was particularly stressed by men, that it was men in particular who saw women as an alternative to and a criticism of wealth, power and office.”⁹³

As Max Weber had determined, women, particularly women from the privileged classes, were a disproportionately large representation in the learned heretical movements of the thirteenth century. But Bynum agrees with Herbert Grundmann that the presence of women in both heterodox and orthodox movements was remarkable.⁹⁴ This was not a demographic but an ideological and political effect. Despite the fact that women were denied clerical office, they were held in awe by monastics and their ecstatic spirituality was deemed a counter to the radical anti-materialism of the dualists. John Coakley has detailed how thirteenth-century friars revealed in letters, vitae, and other writings a persistently unfavorable comparison of themselves with women: “The friars’ admiration tended to carry with it an awareness of something lacking in themselves, specifically the privileged contact with God that they ascribed to the women.” In their dreams, ecstasies, and visions, women were thought to have direct and privileged communication with God, an experience denied to most of their male superiors and confessors. “In these friars’ case, the fascination and sense of difference were focused on the women’s relationship to the divine, which the friars saw as privileged, unique, and remote from their own experience.”⁹⁵ Friars pleaded with their female communicants to intercede with the divine: to correct their ministerial failures and egoistic conceits; to advise them on whether their lives were pleasing to their divine overlords; and to provide substantiation of their holiness. And in her discussion of the social context for this gendered construction of spirituality and mystery, Bynum reminds us of the political:

Theologians and prelates found women’s experiential piety useful in the thirteenth-century fight against heresy. The increased emphasis on bodily miracles and indeed the appearance of new miracles of bodily transformation came at exactly the time of the campaign against Cathar dualism. Women whose bodies became one with the crucified man on the cross in stigmata, and visions in which the consecrated wafer suddenly turned into bleeding

meat, were powerful evidence against the Cathar assertion that matter and flesh could not be the creations of a good God. Some of the earliest supporters of this bodily aspect of women's piety, James of Vitry and Thomas of Cantimpré, held it up explicitly as a reproach to the dualists.⁹⁶

But women were used by anti-heretic theologians, prelates, and crusaders in another way: as proof that heresy was ungodly.

The vast majority of holy or pious women documented by medieval chroniclers were from the upper classes, the higher and lesser nobility and prominent merchant families.⁹⁷ The documentation, as such, directly reflects the practice of restricting access to nunneries to wealthy women, just as the Beguine movement was predominantly practiced by women of means who took vows of chastity. Among those women becoming nuns or joining the Beguines, then, there were most naked expressions of disgust for the accumulation of wealth.⁹⁸ The more radical Poor Clares, of course, emulated Christ and St. Francis in their commitment to voluntary poverty. Nevertheless, these females from the noble or wealthy classes were significantly outnumbered by the women who participated in communes, rebellions, and heretical movements. The presence of these females drawn from the peasant and unfree, the rural and urban poor, is largely attested to by the frequency with which chroniclers typified whores and fornicators among the dissenters and heretics. Moore instructs us that the poor of Christ (*paupers Christi*) really signified the powerless of Christ, and one of the functions of the guardians of the Church was to reassign them as "somebody else's poor."⁹⁹ Satan's realms of heresy and prostitution were two such receptacles. Anticipating much of the propaganda to be found in the denunciation of heretics and rebels, the eleventh/twelfth century priest/hermit Robert of Arbrissel saw the women among them as "whores and spurners of men."¹⁰⁰ James Capelli, so Lester Little informs us, was one of the few thirteenth-century anti-Catharists to insist that such charges were false.¹⁰¹

Socialism in Thought and Practice

A religious consciousness, Catholic or Cathar, blanketed the elements of feudal and post-feudal socialism. Consciousness of class and the struggle against a ruling class, for instance, assumed an anti-clerical as well as a

secular form, and distilled from millenarian prophecy apocalyptic and then revolutionary expectations. Property was an issue of the voluntary poverty movements and as well, in the peasant uprisings and urban revolts, as an articulation of exploitation in the use if not the ownership of the things labor produced. The idealistic impulse of religious consciousness was universalistic—Christendom—making the persistent demands on the Church or its secular ruling class confederates similarly Congregationalist: the claims of the many whom Christ represented or God protected against the conceits of the few who were ungodly. And moral authority, moral superiority resided among the humble and the poor: the poor of Christ, the poor men of Lyon, the pious women who renounced wealth and class privilege. And the thread of a disgust with the world, the domain of Satan and the Antichrist, inspired a rejection of material wealth and a hatred of those whose lives were propelled by greed and decorated with ostentatious accumulations of material things.

Joachim of Fiore (d. 1199 or 1202) was the principal ideologist of the radical poverty movements in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. This is attested to by the condemnation of Joachim's teaching by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.¹⁰² And it was subsequently substantiated by Joachim's doctrinal reach across the generations and centuries. Joachim's apocalyptic vision of the coming of a communist society influenced prominent activists in the two centuries which followed his death: among them the Spirituals or Zealots in the Franciscan Order and Fra Dolcino at the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the next. As the condemnation of his works attests, Joachim also inspired institutional as well as intellectual opposition, the latter not always consistent. Among the Scholastics (university-trained and, from 1270 on, increasingly influenced by Aristotle and Averroes), Thomas Aquinas, the most eminent of these scholars, opposed Joachim's prophecies of the proximity of the world's end. On the other hand, the Franciscan Minister General, Bonaventura of Bagnoregio, appropriated much of Joachim's historical prophecy as an antidote to Aristotelianism.¹⁰³

A Cistercian abbot, Joachim had taken up voluntary poverty during his pilgrimage to the Holy Land. And from his hermitage in southern Italy he authored his three principal works: *Concordia Novi et Veteris Testamenti*, *Expositio in Apocalypsim*, and *Psalterium Decem Chordarum*. And in these writings, he synthesized the apocalypsim of the Old and New Testaments into secular history and social criticism: "Joachim believed that the his-

tory of the world was divided into three periods—the Age of the Father, or the Old Testament; that of the Son, or the New Testament; and the final epoch was that of the Holy Ghost, when spiritual understanding of the Scriptures would be given to all men. According to him this new age would begin after the destruction of the Antichrist, and would be preached by an order of bare-footed monks.”¹⁰⁴

Among the Franciscans, the Order split into two warring factions, the Spirituals and the Conventuals. The Spirituals identified closely with Joachim’s prophecy, some concluding that one of several popes was the Antichrist.¹⁰⁵ Joachimism became even more extreme after the passing of 1260, the year Joachim had prophesized which would mark the beginning of the Age of the Holy Ghost. In consequence, many Spirituals (and their heirs, the Beguines of Provence), in defiance of their Superiors and successive popes, were declared heretics and fell into the hands of the Inquisition and its secular appendages.¹⁰⁶ The famous Dominican inquisitor, Bernard Gui, had summarized their beliefs at the beginning of the fourteenth century, drawing no doubt from his tortured victims:

At the end of the sixth age of the world—in which the world was at that moment—Christ would reject the carnal church. Antichrist would at this time persecute all the religious orders, so that only one-third of the Franciscan Order out of all of them would survive. From this surviving rump about a dozen poor and evangelical men-of-the-spirit would found the spiritual church of the seventh and final stage. Antichrist would die and the whole world would become good and benign. All goods would be held in common, all men would love one another under one shepherd. This golden age would last one hundred years, but through a failure of love, evil would re-enter society, so that Christ would come and usher in the day of the Last Judgement.¹⁰⁷

Principal Franciscan-Joachimist ideologists like Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, Pontius Portugati, and Leonard were condemned to perpetual imprisonment; Peter John Olivi was branded a heretic, his followers persecuted and his writings condemned; and many others suffered inquiries, exile, and death. Ubertino da Casale, one of the most prominent Spiritualist intellectuals and a disciple of Angela of Foligno, seems to have kept his head by political and doctrinal evasion before simply disappearing from history.¹⁰⁸ It was Fra Dolcino, however, who pushed Joachimism to its

revolutionary limits, professing a fourth age when “a good, last emperor would arise . . . who would kill the cardinals, the secular clergy and most of the religious orders. He would then establish an Angelic Pope chosen by God. Dolcino and all the spiritual men would reign over a society in which private wealth was to be eschewed, but (a significant departure from Franciscan doctrine) in which there would be no mendicancy.”¹⁰⁹ As Umberto Eco put it in his novel *The Name of the Rose*, Dolcino was “a man who did insane things because he put into practice what many saints had preached.”¹¹⁰

The social and political influence of hereticals and near-hereticals, the Franciscan “Spirituals,” the Beguines of Provence, the Dolcinians, the Cathari, the Waldensians, and the other radical sects, emanated less from their heretical ideologies than their coincidence with revolutionary movements. Perhaps this is what Marx had in mind when he referred to “the accidental support which the poor found in the monasteries.”¹¹¹ Drawn largely from the “more privileged strata of society, notably from the mixture of noble and merchant families which formed the dominant class in the Italian towns,”¹¹² the divergences of the sects were themselves inspired by the recurrent social upheavals which beset rural and even urban Europe:

It was always in the midst of some great revolt or revolution that the revolutionary millenarian group first emerged into daylight. This is equally the case with John Ball and his followers in the English peasants’ revolt of 1381; the extreme Taborites during the early stages of the Hussite revolution in Bohemia, 1419–1421; Thomas Müntzer and his “League of the Elect” in the German peasants’ revolt of 1525; and the Radical Anabaptists who, in the midst of a wave of revolts in the capitals of the ecclesiastical states in northwest Germany, established the “New Jerusalem” at Munster in 1534–1535. What is seldom realized—and what Marxist and right-wing historians have united in concealing—is how little these groups had in common with the mass uprisings which they tried to exploit.¹¹³

Among the rural poor, interred in the “backwater” of unrelieved repression and exploitation, the opposition to the first European world economy assumed the form of rebellions. But among the urban privileged, the

revulsion against the venalities and social extremes of merchant capitalism was made manifest in a socialistic variant of Christianity.¹¹⁴

So the record of the opposition to materialism begins with Manichaeistic mysticism, and assumes an ideological construction when it converges with social movements of the eleventh century. The Inquisition and centuries-long repression left little behind of the social ideology of the heretics and peasant rebels, but Norman Cohn has provided us with some sense of the latter's worldviews. In the popular proverbs from the twelfth century one finds: "The poor man works always, worries and labors and weeps, never laughing from his heart, while the rich man laughs and sings"; from their miracle plays: "each man ought to have as much property as every other, and we have nothing we can call our own. The great lords have all the property and poor folk have nothing but suffering and adversity"; and their satires: "Magistrates, provosts, beadles, mayors—nearly all live by robbery. . . . They all batten on the poor, they all want to despoil them. . . . They pluck them alive. The stronger robs the weaker"; "I would like to strangle the nobles and the clergy, every one of them. . . . Good working-men make the wheaten bread but they will never chew it; no, all they get is the siftings from the corn, and from good wine they get nothing but the dregs and from good cloth nothing but the chaff. Everything that is tasty and good goes to the nobles and the clergy."¹¹⁵ Cohn writes:

On occasion this sullen, passive resentment would give place to a militant egalitarianism. As early as the 1180s a carpenter in central France was moved—as usual by a vision of the Virgin—to found a fraternity which would clear the land of a plague of disbanded mercenaries turned brigand. At first these "crusaders of peace," as they called themselves, were a pious association . . . included people of all classes, sanctioned by bishops, pledged not to drink or gamble or swear. But by the time they had coped with the brigands, the *Caputiati*—so called from their white hooded uniform—had turned into a revolutionary movement of poor folk which proclaimed the equality of all men and insisted that all alike were entitled to the liberty which they had inherited from Adam and Eve. In the end the *Caputiati* became violent and began to kill nobles, until they were suppressed by armed force.

The socialist political discourse had begun.

When the rich layman came to be seen as Dives he was launched on a metamorphosis which in the course of time was to transform him into the Capitalist of present-day Communist mythology—a father-figure as demonic, in its destructiveness, its cruelty, its gross sensuality, its near-omnipotence, as the demonic cleric of the medieval chiliasts, and as great a deceiver as Antichrist himself. . . . If it was only towards the close of the Middle Ages that the rich were allotted their regular place in the hosts of Antichrist, a move in that direction started already in the twelfth century.¹¹⁶

For the next several hundred years, this radical ideology and its rationalist and naturalist concomitants would be sequestered in the Church's official teachings: in the vows, formal declarations (sometimes hypocritically)¹¹⁷ and scholarship of the penitent and missionary orders, in the Southern European mountain retreats of the surviving heresies, and of course in the imaginations and folk-cultures of the rural and urban poor.¹¹⁸

The role that elements among the Franciscans played in subverting feudal rule is suggested by the forty papal bulls issued between 1221 and 1297 to protect Franciscans from civil authorities. In his exegesis of the Encyclical Letter (1882) issued by Leo XIII on the occasion of the seventh centenary of St. Francis's birth, Rev. Zaremba maintains that "this papal protection of the rights of the Tertiaries [the Franciscan Third Order of lay penitents] considerably contributed to the popularity of the order and its consequent growth, as well as to the social change which weakened the power of the feudal lords over the masses. In particular these issues dealt with certain exemptions and privileges of the Tertiaries, namely: exemption from taking the oath of fealty [from military service, certain public offices, extraordinary taxes, secular judiciary, and] the right to own and freely administer corporate property." Zaremba concluded, "it is clear that the Third Order contributed greatly in dealing a deathblow to feudalism."¹¹⁹ During the first two centuries of their existence the Franciscans became famous for denouncing the abuses of the powerful and the profiteering of money lenders.¹²⁰ They also served to mediate some of the more acute social divisions of feudalism by acting as peace mediators between feuding monarchs and princes, and by founding poorhouses, hospitals, orphanages, and other charitable institutions.¹²¹ And in the passionate writings of Francis, Bonaventura, Olivi, Ubertino, and Marsilius of Padua, *dame Poverty* combated wealth, private property, and oppressive power.¹²²

While the early Franciscans did not live the *vita communis*, their renunciation of property (“even one’s thoughts”), their commitment to social equality (“fraternity”) with its concomitant absence of hierarchical organization, and their submission to a barter economy (“payment in kind, never in money”) purveyed an anticipation of many of the principles of socialism.¹²³ By accommodating many of the attributes of the popular rebellions, even when as the Spirituals they were reduced to minority factions (the Poor Clares, the Third Order, the Marches of Ancona, the Friars Minor, the Joachimists) within the Order, the Rule of the early Franciscans insinuated presocialist forms within the Church.¹²⁴

As fate would have it, however, it was the work of a very different sect, the Jesuit Order, which attracted the attention of influential writers in the eighteenth century.¹²⁵ In the sixteenth century, not long after the founding of the Order, Jesuit scholars like the political philosophers Francisco Suárez and Juan de Mariana had already interrogated contract theory and put forth defenses of the rights of the people in relation to the monarch and even tyrannicide.¹²⁶ Notwithstanding, the generals of the Society like Claudio Acquaviva, as well as prominent provincials like Edmond Auger, Claude Matthieu, and Henri Samier, were largely caught up in the perplexing politics of the Counter-Reformation. As the papal court’s “shock troops of the Counter-Reformation,” the Society’s “rigorous novitiate and education were designed to prepare Jesuits not for a contemplative life in a monastery but for an active life in the world.”¹²⁷ Accordingly, Jesuit intellectuals and politicians served as confessors and advisors to some of the most powerful Catholic (and, on occasion, Protestant) secular authorities. Two centuries later, however, the object of interest among European intellectuals was Jesuit missionary activity among South American Indians during the intervening centuries.

In 1549, just short of a decade from their official establishment in 1540, the Jesuit mission in Brazil was begun. And because, perhaps, of their unparalleled capacity for publicity through self-promotion, propaganda documentation, and historiography, the missions—or at least the Jesuit construction of the missions—among the Guarani of present-day Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay came to intrigue the European intelligentsia. Here were communes (*reducciones*) of Christian native agriculturalists, whose days were taken up with farming, textile-making, militia training, choral singing, and even the manufacture of European musical instruments. Among the Guarani, the Franciscans had preceded

the Jesuits by founding missions in 1580, and compared to the discipline which the Jesuits pursued from 1610 on, Margarita Durán Estragó maintains “Franciscan reductions were open, flexible and adapted to reality, as distinct from those of the Jesuits, where everything was ordered and preestablished.”¹²⁸ The Jesuit reductions, however, provided the Guarani an alternative to the Spanish Crown’s *encomienda* (tribute in labor), to slavery, and protection from native enemies.

But the Jesuits had acquired a rather special reputation in the New World and in Europe by their military assistance to the Guarani in the 1630s and 1640s. In those decades the Portuguese and “half breeds” had taken to the practice of taking off thousands of Guarani to São Paulo to be sold as slaves. In 1641, at the battle of Mborore, with Jesuit support the Guarani had defeated the slavers.¹²⁹ From that moment until the middle of the next century, Morner attests, the Guarani reductions “became a kind of privileged frontier garrison at the disposal of the Spanish authorities of Buenos Aires.”¹³⁰ All of this came to an end in the mid-eighteenth century with the Spanish-Portuguese treaty of 1750, the Guarani War of 1754–56, and the expulsions of the Jesuits from Latin America.

The founding of the Jesuit and Franciscan reductions in Latin America coincided with the Renaissance’s indulgence in literary utopias. These included Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1515–16), Johann Valentin Andreae’s *Christianopolis* (1619), Tommaso Campanella’s *City of the Sun* (1602 and published in 1623), Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantic*, and Gerrard Winstanley’s Digger defense, *The Law of Freedom* (1652). In the post-Renaissance, other utopias, indeed communist utopias followed: L. S. Mercier’s *Memoirs of the Year 2500* (1770), Abbé Morelly’s *Code of Nature* (1775), and Thomas Spence’s *History of Crusonon on Robinson Crusoe’s Island* (1782).¹³¹ And whether or not there is a direct connection to these utopian fantasies, there is evidence that the Jesuit version (rather than the Guarani version) of the reductions was very much in the consciousness of Europe’s intelligentsia. For Montesquieu, the “Jesuit State of Paraguay” (which in the eighteenth century comprised 100,000 people and thirty missions) was comparable to Plato’s Republic. Hegel supposed by “the creation of wants” that the Jesuit missionaries had inserted the Indians into the system of History.¹³² Commenting on the characterizations of the Jesuits in the writings of Voltaire, d’Alembert, and Montesquieu, Magnus Morner observes: “In spite of the fact that for them the Jesuits were the principal representatives of hypocrisy and superstition, the ‘Jesuit State’ appeared to the great leaders of the Age of

Enlightenment above all as an admirable experiment by which European intellect proved its ability to create a society according to given plans.”¹³³ Morner also informs us that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the collective character of the missions inspired the socialist Cunninghame Graham’s book *A Vanished Arcadia* and induced the Scot historian William Robertson to describe them as an “ideal community.” But while the ex-Jesuit historian Reynal praised the rationalistic and communistic character of the missions, Chateaubriand dwelt on their aesthetic and religious aspects.¹³⁴

Regardless of how different were the various interpretations of the “Jesuit State,” its very existence constituted an attempt at the realization of the socialist ideal insinuated into the Church five hundred years earlier. The Jesuit Doctrine, Robert Southey believed, skirted heresy; nevertheless in Paraguay the Jesuits sought to establish the perfect commonwealth among the Guarani Indians: “Acting upon these views, they formed a Utopia of their own. The first object was to remove from their people all temptations which are not inherent in human nature; and by establishing as nearly as possible a community of goods, they excluded a large portion of the crimes and miseries which embitter the life of civilized man. For this they had the authority of sages and legislators.”¹³⁵

For more than two hundred years (with only one brief interruption) the Jesuit missions in Paraguay persevered against hostile colonists, slavers, the private interests and royal and papal intrigues in the metropolises of the Old World, and their own flawed ambitions.¹³⁶ And Morner concludes: “The reasons for the political and economic influence of the Jesuits, as demonstrated in the Paraguayan Jesuit province, can all be traced back without very many intermediate stages, to theoretic and practical characteristics in the organization of the Jesuit Order, which in its turn was certainly conceived by a medieval Spanish intellect, but still so remarkably resilient that it has resisted the strain of the most widely differing epochs and environments.”¹³⁷

In 1759 the Jesuits were expelled from Portuguese America, and in 1767 they were expelled from Spanish America; in 1773 their order and their writings were suppressed by Rome and their libraries burned.¹³⁸ And though in Europe and the New World the Order survived in one guise or another, it was only in Russia and Prussia that Jesuits operated openly during the remainder of the eighteenth century.

The notions of materialism and socialism of the twelfth and thirteenth

centuries were embedded ideologically and institutionally in the most reactionary institution of medieval Europe: the Catholic Church. They survived through the rule of the mendicant orders and the efforts of missionary orders, and through the hidden heresies and the folk cultures of the masses.¹³⁹ Other mass movements of the poor would arise but neither the Church, its Inquisition or the State could entirely eradicate the identification of wealth with evil. Thus it was that eventually Marx and his more immediate intellectual predecessors would have available to them the sign of the capitalist, the hoarder of material possessions, the thief.

We have now explored four discourses which encompassed meanings for materialism:

1. The Aristotelian: a philosophic critique of the Ionian (Atomistic materialism) tradition. Aristotle denounced this materialism by subverting its premise: the objective world could not be the basis of existence since it is in constant flux, deterioration, corruption. Though originating in the fourth century BC, it reappeared in our interrogation during the reconstruction of Europe (eleventh/twelfth centuries).
2. Dualism (Manichaeism): Heretical mysticism which identified the world as Satanic. A popular mythology which was propagated by lesser clerics, hysterical merchants, crusaders, pilgrims, and peasant intellectuals. Its theological complement was “scientifically” confirmed by the reintroduction of Aristotle’s writings to European scholars.
3. Classical materialism: Modes of subsistence are the basis of law, politics, custom, consciousness. It was the hegemonic socio-historical construction of the mercantile bourgeoisies which triumphed in the seventeenth century. As the basis for discursive practices, it was reiterated in the human sciences initiated and developed in the nineteenth century.
4. Historical materialism: The organization of production is the basis of social order. And through the dialectic, the processing of matter has the capacity to qualitatively change the human condition. Socialism is possible because the bourgeoisie have provided the means of mastering nature—the precondition of Socialism.

The re-creation of Europe begun during Carolingian rule resulted in the formulation of an extensively exploitative Europe in collaboration

with the revivifying Church. By the thirteenth century, a world-economy had formed in Europe, commanded by the merchant capitalists in the South, supported by a more rudimentary and dependent bourgeoisie in the North. Resistance against the mature social order necessarily took form as an attack on the Church. The ideology of the social movement, that is, Manichaeistic dualism, originated from beyond Europe, in the hinterlands of Croatia, Serbia, Dalmatia, and Asia Minor. As such, the mass movements became identified with heresy. But their real social practice took the form of socialist communities: the destruction of private property as well as representatives of the propertied classes; the reinvigoration of communal property; the reconceptualization of the social and spiritual role of women, etc.¹⁴⁰ The ruling classes of Europe, the feudal-political classes, the prelates of the Church, and the wealthy bourgeoisies were compelled to co-opt these heresies in the form of mendicant Catholic orders. It was through these societies, the Franciscans, the Dominicans, and later the Jesuits, etc., that a socialist ethos survived over the next several hundred years. Then it reappeared as a popular impulse in the French Revolution and its attendant popular movements in Europe and Britain. Its secular expression eventually included Marxism.

Marx, however, took over many of the presumptions of bourgeois historiography as well. He accepted (with some modification) the stadial historiography as well as its ideological implications. Marx would argue that bourgeois society was a necessary precondition for socialism. He maintained that without the mastery of nature, the unique technological contribution of industrial society, socialism was not possible. We now know differently. The rudiments of Western socialism appeared as early as the thirteenth century—without industrial production.

German Critical Philosophy and Marx

The master is the consciousness that exists *for itself*.—HEGEL

When it becomes a matter of the discursive determinants and significations in which Marx's work gestated in the nineteenth century, we must attend to a very different form of bourgeoisie than those of early Europe. Unlike the bourgeoisies of the early Middle Ages among whom defection by disaffected renegades assumed the compulsion for communist orders and socialist visions, this later bourgeoisie was not principally commercial or theocratic. Nor, if Eric Hobsbawm is to be believed, were they revolutionary (as Marx and Engels presumed). Hobsbawm would remark: "Indeed in the nineteenth century we increasingly find (most notably in Germany) that they became unwilling to begin revolution at all."¹ This then was not a bourgeoisie which conformed to the moving portrait which Marx and Engels drew in *The Communist Manifesto*, the tract which had evoked a class which in its quest for property, markets, and power had overturned feudalism. Spawned by the experiences of wars and State-building rather than by markets, this bourgeoisie was nevertheless identified by some as that universal class which would secure humanity's historical destiny. Once a certain metaphysical system was in place, it was no longer possible to elude recognition of the class's historical role.

The idealist philosophy formulated by German bourgeois intellectuals was the episteme for a series of ideological texts narrated through a class characterized by "the overwhelming preponderance of the professionally educated state-service class."² And the ultimate contribution of German idealist philosophy to Marxism was to inscribe on it the logical system of the dialectic, notions of History as Freedom and the proletariat as the Subject of History, as well as the more perverse contribution of a Eurocentric view of history. We will trace the construction of these elements

genealogically and socio-historically: from Kant's notion of antinomy, to Hegel's notion of the dialectic, to Marx's notion of dialectical materialism.

The German Bourgeoisie

To understand the character of the German bourgeoisie, it is necessary to first examine their historical context: the Germanies of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. For these three hundred years or more (Hobsbawm had once determined that our subject extended in a long series of crises from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century)³ the German-speaking lands had served as the loci of wars, famines, epidemics, population losses, social fragmentation, peasant rebellions, and the inventions or adaptations of diverse and often oppositional state structures. The controversies over whether the Thirty Years' War caused or was caused by a Europe-wide monetary inflation, declining standards of living, the shifting of international trade to the northwest from the Mediterranean with its south German routes, plummeting agricultural prices, and so on have preoccupied historians for some time.⁴ Further, national historians (Germans, Spanish, British, Czech, etc.) have quarreled over the origins, epicenters, and even the best archival possessions of the crises. And it bears repeating, theories, doctrines, and national cultures have influenced the interpretations of when the crises began, whether they constituted the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the appearance of the absolute state, or the onset of bourgeois revolutions. Perhaps the only certain consequence on these several dissimilar societies in Europe and in the Germanies was the dramatic increases of a technical-bureaucrat class.⁵ It is also generally accepted that at least in the Germanies the legacies of the crises were still evident in the nineteenth century. Geoffrey Barraclough comments:

Germany in 1815 was still almost entirely an agricultural country with old-established handicrafts, such as the weaving of Silesia and the cutlery of Solingen, but without flourishing industries or a prosperous manufacturing class; and although in the next thirty years there was a rise in population amounting to no less than 38 percent, the proportions of town and country dwellers remained virtually unchanged [roughly 80 percent rural]. Few towns had recovered from the effects of the Thirty Years' War and the stagnation

of the eighteenth century, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century the total population of all the free cities and university towns of Germany was scarcely the equivalent of the population of Paris. Hence neither industrial capitalists nor industrial workers existed as a serious political force, and the towns were still, as in the eighteenth century, dominated by a professional and bureaucratic middle-class, which had little to gain by radical political change.⁶

Barraclough writes of a “country” of Germany, but obviously there was no such thing until Bismarck’s unification of the Germanies in the 1870s. For the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, Germany consisted of thirty-nine principalities and states, a substantial improvement over the previous two centuries but still hardly justifying the implications of unity.⁷

One of the reasons for what Marx would term Germany’s relative “backwardness” was the fact that the Germanies were ruled for the most part by *timocracies*: the ruling classes largely consisted of imperial or feudal landed nobilities, militarists of secular or ecclesiastical authority.⁸ This was a legacy of the crisis of the seventeenth century. And an important clue to the development of this political order is found in the “diplomatic” histories of the Germanies.

The Thirty Years’ War (which involved armies representing the Germanies, Sweden, France, Spain, England, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, and Denmark-Norway) ended in 1648. Its conclusion was called the Peace of Westphalia. It was apparently a nominal “peace” since it was necessary to conclude a war with Sweden, Poland, and Denmark in 1660 with the Treaty of Oliva. This, too, was insufficient since one Germany or another subsequently required numerous conclusions of war: the Peace of Nimeguen (1679: with France and Holland); the Peace of Ryswick (1697: with France); the Peace of Carlowitz (1699: with Poland, Vienna, and the Turks); the Peace of Utrecht (1713: with France); the Treaty of Rastadt (1738: with France); a war with the Turks (1737–39); the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748: the War of Austrian Succession); the Peace of Hubertsburg (1763: to end the Seven Years’ War); and the Peace of Teschen (1779: the Bavarian Secession). By this author’s count, at least thirteen wars in 130 years. “The result, following 1763,” John Gagliardo maintains, “was a kind of political disarray.”⁹

These wars were not the result of some excess of militarism in German

or Prussian mentality. To the contrary: the shifting international political and economic interest behind these wars quite deliberately conspired to invent the Prussian militarist order. In the “overlapping histories” (Fernand Braudel’s phrase) of Europe’s world-economy, the regression of Spain, Italy, and Portugal made possible the challenges for hegemony from first Holland, and then England and France—the zones of greatest political and economic dynamism. And for that reason, Immanuel Wallerstein has suggested that the Thirty Years’ War might “be thought of as the first world war of the capitalist world-economy.”¹⁰ It was a “war throughout Europe” and as J. V. Polisensky observes: “A precondition for the generalizing of the conflict was the presence in early seventeenth-century Europe, if not of an economic unity, at least of a framework for exchange and the first signs of a world market, whose center of gravity was the whole area between the Baltic, Atlantic and Mediterranean.”¹¹ Nevertheless, “many of the costs of the war, in terms of destruction, were in fact paid by Germany and, let us not forget, by Bohemia.”¹²

As several historians have demonstrated, those costs were considerable all over the German-speaking territories. The recruitment, quartering, and provisioning of territorial and Imperial troops themselves had a devastating economic impact on farming, trade, crafts, and markets; the looting and indiscriminate violence of hostile and allied invading armies devastated land, towns, and villages; and the accelerating expansion of taxes from all levels of government precipitated poverty, peasant rebellions, and urban revolts.¹³ H. Kamen observed: “There can be no doubt at all that the war was a disaster for most of the German-speaking lands. The material devastation caused in Germany was enormous. . . . Germany emerged from the war with a greatly diminished population—and a manpower problem because of the loss of workingmen and peasants through death or flight.”¹⁴ But despite the awful toll which plundering armies visited on the Germanies, the central motive forces for the war and its immediate aftershocks concerned powerful interests beyond the Germanies: in political terms, the national liberation of the Dutch from Spain; and in world-system terms, the struggle for hegemony between the proto-core economies of Holland, England, and France which required the consolidations of their state structures. The whole maelstrom, as Wallerstein sees it, marked the transfer of domination of the European world-economy from feudal to capitalist structures.¹⁵

Nonetheless, there were aspects of the crises which point to more local

structures. Sheilagh Ogilvie has persuasively argued that “economic theories of the crisis fail the test posed by German territorial fragmentation.”¹⁶ Following N. Steensgaard, who observed: “Behind the conflict we find the same thing everywhere, the State’s demand for higher revenues. . . . In every case it was the governments that acted in a revolutionary manner: the tax demands disrupted the social balance. They did not create a revolutionary situation: they were in themselves a revolution,” Ogilvie stresses the growth of state bureaucracies. These were the consequent to the exactions of revenue for war and standing armies, the administrative regulation of manufacturing, trade, markets, and commerce, the Solomonic refereeing of litigants and lobbyists representing peasants, nobility, towns, parishes, and guilds, and accumulating the expertise required in negotiation with the alternative bureaucracies of German state churches (Lutheran, Catholic, and Calvinist) and the civilian and military bureaucracies of the several European States.¹⁷ The result of the crisis, she maintains, “both in Germany and Europe at large, was to produce an all but legendary pinnacle of human misery in an era when the state was expanding faster than the resources available to support it, and provoking costly social conflict over its control.”¹⁸

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Brandenburg had been transfigured into Prussia as a consequence not only of the Great Elector Frederick William’s ambitions, but more significantly because a Prussian army was needed by the English and Dutch states to check the military power of Sweden.¹⁹ The wars which followed during the eighteenth century were largely to settle matters between the rival German territories of Austria and Prussia. And by the end of the eighteenth century, Prussia had emerged triumphant on the bases of its superior army, bureaucracy, and mercantile policy.²⁰

Kant and the German Social Contract

Under the expanding influence of Prussia, the Germanies were ruled by militarist ruling classes, preoccupied with wars or standing armies which by their very nature depressed the development of independent bourgeois classes. Charles Moraze observed, “In England it was the merchant’s way of life that threw light on the real social forces at work in the country, whereas in Germany it was the soldier who held the key to progress.”²¹ Germany had begun industrial development as early as the fif-

teenth century,²² but this later, different Germany was a society in which militarism had nurtured a bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the stead of capitalist bourgeoisies.²³ Ogilvie concurs: “The large number of courts, and the immense growth in government in this period, meant that in many German territories, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie were losing ground to a political bourgeoisie of bureaucrats, *Kameralunternehmer*, court bankers, and others dependent on state favor.”²⁴

The middling classes which had dominated the city-economies of the Middle Ages had been replaced by the more technocratic and administrative bureaucracies of the territorial war-states. And consistent with the state’s expanding appetites, the responsibilities of these bureaucracies drove deep into the population. For instance, Peter Taylor reckons that “in 1773, the Hessian army had a total of 18,600 troops under arms—a military participation ratio of one soldier for every fourteen Hessian subjects (males and females of all ages). . . . A census of 1793 allows us to calculate that in that year there were 343 soldiers for every 1000 Hessian males between the ages of 15 and 25.”²⁵ And though it is startling to learn that for “forty years of the eighteenth century . . . Hessian soldiers fought away from home,”²⁶ we are still aware that it was Prussia, not Hesse-Cassel, which was the strongest state in Europe. No wonder Charles Moraze describes Prussia as “a vast entrenched camp”!²⁷

Militarism and a vast civil bureaucracy was visited upon all the German lands. And as a concomitant the training of bourgeois technocrats (*Staatspatriziat*) and university-educated technocrats (*Kameralisten*) became a principal function of both Protestant and Catholic state universities.²⁸ The consequences for intellectual and scientific development are explored by Eric Hobsbawm: “Among German middle- and upper-class intellectuals a belief in the inevitability of progress and in the benefits of scientific and economic advance, combined with a belief in the virtues of an enlightened paternal or bureaucratic administration and a sense of responsibility among the upper classes, was perhaps the most common attitude, well suited to a class containing so many civil servants and state-employed professors. . . . Middle-class demands—often philosophically formulated as the inevitable working out of the tendencies of history—carried out by an enlightened state: these represented German moderate liberalism best.”²⁹ And for many in the German lower bourgeoisie, Pietism, with its emphasis on inner discipline, provided the resolve and vision which they needed to confront the ecstatic religion of state power.³⁰

German Pietism was an outgrowth from the Reformation, indeed a reform movement within its parent doctrine of Lutheranism. As Luther and his ilk had attacked the corruption and crumbling hegemony of the Catholic hierarchy, so Pietism confronted the bureaucratization of the Lutheran church. But unlike the Protestant Reformation of the early sixteenth century, the Pietist movement which matured in the second half of the seventeenth century was a controlled doctrinal revolt. The Reformation, on the other hand, had spun out of control. Carrying through some of the schismatic potentialities of medieval heresy, the Reformation had generated not only Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism but also the Radical Reformation (more particularly, the revolutionary communism of the Anabaptists) which had ultimately provided justification to the agrarian and urban rebellions so dramatically exemplified by the peasant rebellions of 1525 and the seizure of Münster in 1534–35.³¹ As a consequence of this earlier experience, and in the wake of the tumult of the Thirty Years' War, German Pietism was principally a clerical reform movement whose select social base would be the professional and urbane middle classes. Immanuel Kant was drawn from this bourgeoisie. And in his professional life as a professor of philosophy at the Prussian State University of Königsberg, and throughout his intellectual production, he exhibited both the caution and radical tendencies characteristic of his class.³²

As an intellectual, Kant's interests were expansive: he lectured and wrote on logic, metaphysics, mathematics, natural philosophy, natural law, moral philosophy, theology, and geography, as well as the more mundane subjects of state censorship, civil obligation, and political authority. And it might be added his consuming concern, with good reason, was for an internal order which would ensure a lasting peace. Thus at the end of the eighteenth century, in the midst of the torrid (but fast concluding) conflict between the warring houses of Prussia and Austria and the immense historical force of the French Revolution, Kant took it upon himself to build a system of moral philosophy which would serve the proto-nation state of Prussia. Rejecting the total anarchy which Thomas Hobbes had discovered in his imagined state of nature, Kant proposed an originary tale of a "state of wild freedom" in which certain constraints of force existed (for examples, strictors against assassins, poisoners, and breachers of agreement). More importantly, the claim of private rights in property and contracts in the state of nature anticipated "a future of

public justice and thus to the necessity of bringing about a civil society.” Thus, as Heiner Bielefeldt declares, Kant possessed “an idea of citizenship even in the state of nature.”³³

In a world-system where “traditional” authority was violently challenged, Kant sought the justification for political discipline, spiritual and intellectual submission, and rationality, i.e., a catechism for state bureaucrats.³⁴ And the form Kant’s system assumed, the text in which it was elaborated, was the resolution of the dualist opposition between materialism and idealism. To some real extent this was an expression of the conflict between the authority and reason, between the constraints imposed on the Prussian civil service and the imperatives of scientific inquiry, between “the ends of philosophers and the ends of the city.”³⁵

The Holy Roman Empire, the *Reich*, had been dying for two hundred years. And in its decay, the new Germany being generated required a new social contract. For Kant, obedience was the key, and moral philosophy provided the underpinnings of that contract. In his essay titled “On the Old Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’” (1793), and with the recent examples of revolutions in Switzerland, Holland, and England in mind, Kant opposed Achenwall’s suggestion “that the subject is justified, under certain circumstances, in using force against his superiors.” Eschewing all ambiguity, Kant confidently wrote: “Until the general will is there, the people has no coercive right against its ruler, since it can apply coercion legally only through him. But if the will is there, no force can be applied to the ruler by the people, otherwise the people would be the supreme ruler.” But then, while resisting Hobbes’s “terrifying” assertion that “the head of state has no contractual obligations towards the people,” Kant hesitated: “The non-resisting subject must be able to assume that his ruler has no *wish* to do him injustice. . . . Any injustice which he believes he has suffered can only have resulted through error . . . or through ignorance of the consequences of the laws. . . . Thus the citizen must, with the approval of the ruler, be entitled to make public his opinion on whatever the ruler’s measures seem to him to constitute an injustice against the commonwealth.”³⁶

As John Christian Laursen observes, for Kant the contractual *quid pro quo* was passivity in exchange for the freedom of the pen.³⁷ Kant insisted such a social contract was not a historical fact but the issue of the practical idea of reason. Feudal Germany could provide no basis for a rational social and political order.³⁸

But Kant soon learned the practical limits of Prussian freedom. That same year, finding himself censored for having dared in writing (*Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*) to address the public, Kant apologetically retreated, further restricting scholars like himself (philosophers) from any concourse except with the intelligentsia (the “higher faculties” of theology, law, and medicine)—that is, the servants through which the state secured “the strongest and most lasting influence on the public.”³⁹ Further immunizing himself from political displeasure, in his *Conflict of Faculties* (written in 1793 but published in 1798) Kant tortuously segregated the uses of reason in the “public” and “private” spheres. In “public” discourse, that is, among scholars and the reading public, reason was to be free; in the private arena, the bureaucracies of state, university, education, and church, reason “may be very narrowly restricted.”⁴⁰ To ensure common fealty to the contract, Kant took a leaf from Plato’s *Republic* by disenfranchising (ironically just as the French were about to invent the meaning of that term) from the public expression of opinion all those who were responsible for the instruction of the citizenry. In this adherence to Prussian political practice, Kant effusively reiterated Frederick the Great’s maxim: “Argue as much as you like and about what you like, *but obey*.”⁴¹ “Those ‘who are appointed to teach the people (in the schools and from the pulpits) . . . are bound to uphold whatever outcome of the debate the crown sanctions for them to expound publicly, for they cannot think out their own religious belief by themselves, but can only have it handed down to them . . . by the competent faculties of (theology and philosophy).’”⁴² Through Kant and then Fichte and Hegel, as Charles Moraze put it, “A political ideal was beginning to form in Germany.”⁴³

Materialism as Contamination

Caution, intellectual convention, and self-censorship drew Kant to the discourse of metaphysics. In the play of forces between materialism and idealism, Kant could oppose his ascetic (bureaucratic) ideal of obligation to the chaos implicit in the exercise of desire:

That our reason has causality, or that we at least represent it to ourselves as having causality, is evident from the *imperatives* which in all matters of conduct we impose as rules upon our active power.

“Ought” expresses a kind of necessity . . . which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is, what has been, or what will be. We cannot say that anything in nature *ought* to be other than what in all these time-relations it actually is. When we have the course of nature alone in view, “ought” has no meaning whatsoever.⁴⁴

For Kant, idealism, the extrication of human destiny from the empirical world, gave license for the invention of a political order based on philosophic reasoning—the preserve of the enlightened middle class.

Kant’s expression of this opposition between materialism and idealism is interesting because he attempted, in one aspect of his work, to humanize it. Within each human being, he argued, duality is manifested as opposing impulses. For Kant, the sphere of the Antichrist, of the Satanic in the Manichaeistic and Catharist heresies, becomes the body. He transposes their cosmology into a psychology of sensualness (the senses) and materiality. The body is the origin of our corruption, our degeneration, our degradation. The body is sensual, the body has compelling needs, desires. He designated this aspect of human existence as the *phenomenal*. The compulsive behavior of the sensual being had to be transcended. And he opposed to it the *noumenal*, the impulse toward ultimate reality and perfection.⁴⁵ The impulse towards perfection, the submission to superior authority, he insisted, must inevitably deny, negate the body.⁴⁶ “By revealing both the unalienable moral vocation and the unavoidable frailty of the human being,” Bielefeldt observes, Kant’s “moral law implicitly points to the idea of an absolute, divine justice which on earth can never be achieved.”⁴⁷ Kant’s thought thus replicated the character of the early medieval heretical debate except that he replaced the Church (as the instrument of the Antichrist) with the corporeal being.

Kant maintained further that the conflict within each individual was mirrored in the capacities of human consciousness.⁴⁸ He argued that human knowledge and comprehension were objectively limited by the actual antinomy of the universe—the “opposing laws” of the universe—but the conscious realization of that opposition resulted from the “desire” of reason for absolute scientific knowledge: “All antinomies occur because we seek the unconditioned in the sensual world.”⁴⁹ Human knowledge, according to Kant, was bound to the phenomenal, material world and its *mechanical* laws.

In a word, Kant, like many others before him and since, proposes completely to separate science and religion by restricting them to distinct realms, and by this simple device hopes to reconcile the scientific and the religious interpretations of the world. . . .

Speculative reason, he insists again and again, cannot prove anything regarding man's immortality, transcendental freedom, an intelligible world, or an unconditioned Being. It can merely point out that nothing in the empirical world, as we know it, contradicts these notions, and that they are therefore plausible possibilities. Thus once again limits have been set to speculative reason, and the pretensions of both positive and negative dogmatism have been disclosed. Speculative reason can never afford us knowledge of the nature of ultimate reality; but for identical reasons materialism, too, can never prove its case.⁵⁰

For Kant, our entire experience of the world was subject to the impossibility of opposing laws: Christian, teleological law and empirical, mechanical law. Science, speculative reason, had the capacity to recognize a system or mechanics of the world; but science was incapable of discovering the ultimate reality of the world. For Kant, "the order of nature, as far as its constituent determinants are concerned, is not found in nature but is imposed on it by the order of the mind itself. To this order belongs the arrangements of objects in time and space, as the basis of pure apprehension, and also the system of categories, i.e., non-mathematical concepts which give a unity to the empirical world but are not derived from it."⁵¹ Science cannot prove the existence of God, the "unconditioned Being," an agency which is suprahistorical and without prior conditions for being, an agency which is perfect and total. We know there is a God but cannot prove the basis for God's existence. The individual possessed an intuition of the good, of the perfect, of the virtuous. This is the noumenal, an unscientific impulse which constitutes the only proof of God. But science cannot explain life, the vital impulse.

Kant posited, then, a universe impenetrable by human thought. Its factor was God, not man, and thus it exceeds human comprehension. The antinomy of the universe, the existence of opposing and alternative "explanations" of the universe, signaled the bounds of human thought:

"That the world has a beginning, that my thinking self is of simple and therefore indestructible nature, that it is free in its voluntary

actions and raised above the compulsion of nature, and finally that all order in the things constituting the world is due to a primordial being, from which everything derives its unity and purposive connection—these are so many foundation stones of moral and religion.” To these theses Kant opposes four antitheses which seem to deprive us of a basis for religion, by maintaining, namely, that the world is infinite both spatially and temporally, that there exists in the world no room for human freedom, and that there nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being.⁵²

Kant attempted to resolve these contradictions by maintaining that there were two worlds: a world of appearances, subject to sensual investigation; and a world of ultimate reality, an “intelligible” world. Science could penetrate the first, not the second. But both were true.

For Kant, then, the “state of nature,” that is, the long memory of civil strife and war (“what is, what has been”), was an entirely insufficient and improper field upon which to interrogate the destiny of the species.⁵³ The historical record (that is, the texts of European peoples)⁵⁴ could provide only the most stunted apprenticeship for statecraft. “Bound to nature, the guarantees of history lack all theoretical certainty.”⁵⁵ His class, the civil and professional classes of Prussia, was conditioned by the character of the State they served to facilitate war, not peace. And Kant’s thought reflected the disenchantment which some in his class expressed from the long history of futile wars and the seemingly never-ending cycle of wars. Kant strove to release the frustrated energies of his class by arguing that morality was discoverable not in the state or its authority, but through individual reason. Indeed, Shell observes, Kant insisted: “Moral autonomy, the highest stage of reason, is in principle available to any man at any time, and so in the profoundest sense ‘unhistorical.’”⁵⁶ As Patrick Riley writes, “Kantian will is an uncaused causality, a moral cause, an undetermined power of spontaneous self-determination or of ‘absolute origination’ which is shaped neither by external nature, internal nature, or divine causality or ‘concurrence.’ It is a doctrine of absolute freedom and absolute responsibility, of taking reason-given ends as the motive of one’s actions.”⁵⁷

The imagination of the Prussian bureaucratic classes was the Archimedean point for the new science of politics.⁵⁸ Kant, we have been reminded repeatedly, was concerned for the nature and limits of understanding.

Perhaps the inherent importance of *that* question has disarmed us from seeking its preceding concern. Kant's epistemology had an immediate, political purpose: a soul-deep desire for a new social order.

Hegel, Kant, and the Problem of Germany

According to canon, one of the apparent ironies of Marxism as an expression of revolutionary intent is that its most critical inspiration was drawn not from the radical bourgeois philosophy mounted by Kant but rather a despairing system-philosophy crafted by Hegel from materials antithetic to Kant. As such, Marx's discoveries were a measure of his genius. But when one investigates Hegel's thought independent of the constructions in Marxism, a more complex and less ironic relationship between Hegel and Marx emerges. As John Edward Toews warns: "It is relatively easy to write the story of Hegelianism if one is convinced that it is informed by a teleological development toward a convincing resolution or conclusion in Marx, Kierkegaard, or Stirner and Nietzsche, or that it can be judged and dismissed from some external standpoint as a bizarre curiosity or dangerous delusion."⁵⁹ Indeed, Kant, Hegel, and Marx were all radicals. Marx's advantage over his predecessors as well as his unique identification with revolution was then more a matter of his time rather than the singular quality of his thought.

Hegel, too, was profoundly influenced by his circumstances and times. In his instance, born (in 1770) and raised in Old Württemberg, a predominantly Protestant German state which had been ruled in the eighteenth century for the most part by two Catholic dukes, Karl Alexander (1733–37) and Karl Eugen (1744–93), Hegel's earliest preoccupations were framed or centered by theology and religion. Specifically, Hegel's youth was impacted by the politico-religious crisis in the expectations of a Joachimite eschatology which had influenced Protestant belief to seek among political rulers an alternative to the papacy in the struggle against the Antichrist. According to Laurence Dickey, with the state now led by a ruler who could not assume the mantle of the "godly prince," the Protestant majority began the formulation of a new political ideal which required it "to detach the idea of religious endowment from the duke and to attach it to themselves as a Protestant people."⁶⁰ The ensuing Protestant political culture of Old Württemberg acquired a radical Pietist and in some instances a separatist cast, which secured the individual's

path to salvation in a collectivist striving for the construction of an ethical (*Sittlichkeit*) civic life.

From the 1790s, Hegel appropriated and extended this moral mission at various moments in his developing intellectual inventory, transferring in turn and in a rather direct succession his affection for an elect collective from his fellow Württembergers to Germany and, finally, to Europe. Württemberg Piety had conditioned him to reject the Kantian displacement of moral good to a divine realm, leaving to humankind the mere shadow (duty) of an ethical responsibility or aspiration. On the contrary, Hegel argued that the fullest moral perfection was to be undertaken by humanity. As Harry (Heinrich) Heine would put it when he encountered Hegel's writings, "I was young and proud, and it pleased my vanity when I learned from Hegel that it was not the dear God who lived in heaven that was God, as my grandmother supposed, but I myself here on earth."⁶¹ But it was initially Hegel's preoccupation with Württemberg's civil fate which had provided the enduring legend of perfection. One evidence of this are the overtones of his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* to be found in his earliest writings in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Dickey is instructive on this score when he summons from those writings: "Through the exercise of collective will, Hegel argued, Württembergers would be 'able to rise above' their 'petty interests' and, by so doing, reveal both their 'character' as a 'people' and their commitment to the idea of the 'general good.'"⁶² Over the next decade, Hegel would amplify his conceptual canvas: turning his attention from the particular political struggle of Württemberg to the historical realization of the human species; transmuting the pietistic moral asceticism of the individual to the concept of species-being, and recasting the notion of the general good into the notion of Absolute Spirit.

Hegel's encounter with the Scottish economists in the 1790s and his "discovery" of philosophy in 1800 provided him the further means for the interrogation and expression of some elements of the ethical objectives and systems which would mark his most mature writings. Indeed, from 1800 until his death, while Hegel described himself as a Lutheran and philosopher, he manufactured a philosophical system which admitted the progressive commercialization of society, and its threat to extinguish religious man. Confronted by the evidence mounted by the Scottish economists that, as Schiller put it, "physical man does in fact exist," Hegel launched a new crusade against "bourgeois" materialism. By distinguish-

ing between civil society and the State, between needs and ethics, Hegel would re-house the species' moral destiny in politics.⁶³

Hegel's generation, so Toews maintains, was confronted with three issues:

The first was the need to construct a metaphysical guarantee for the claim that man could and should structure his world according to the dictates of his autonomous rationality and that he was not hindered in his freedom by any "external"—natural, historical, or supernatural—power. [Secondly] How could the actualization of man's essence as an autonomous subject be reconciled with the revolutionary task of creating an integrated ethical community in the sphere of concrete natural and historical existence? Finally, both of these theoretical issues were tied to the practical problem of bridging the gap between the visionary ideals of the intellectuals and the collective desires and consciousness of the "people."⁶⁴

While Kant had constructed a moral philosophy which justified a science and administration of politics unencumbered by the irrational (feudal) past, the young Hegel (pre-1803) rearranged the ruins of historical experience, foreseeing the recovery of a "free organic" Germany, rescued from the "machine-state" which Prussian hegemony over the Germanies portended.⁶⁵ Unlike Kant, this Hegel was contemptuous of "bourgeois" Prussia, whose politics he characterized as all efficiency and calculation—"like a *bourgeois* who has made his fortune toilsomely penny by penny."⁶⁶ Indeed, Hegel was persuaded that the very emergence of Prussia had subverted German unity.⁶⁷ Consequently, the defeats of various German militaries by Napoleon's armies had proven that "Germany is a State no longer."⁶⁸ "The problem, then, was to return to the state such power as it required to be a state, that is, by Hegel's definition of what a state was: 'A group of people can . . . call itself a state if it is associated for the common defense of the totality of its property.'⁶⁹

In 1803, when Hegel concluded his early political writings, he proposed that the complete realization of the German peoples would only come in the creation of a modern State where the bourgeoisie were disciplined by the nobility under the imperial leadership of a "new Theseus."⁷⁰ For a time Hegel withdrew from the political arena, his vision betrayed by the Austrian emperor's ratification of Napoleon's reconstitution of Germany (the Final Recess of 1803); but as H. S. Harris concludes: "the earlier

Odyssey was by no means forgotten. It reappeared transmuted into an ideal pilgrimage, the ‘Phenomenology of the Spirit.’”⁷¹ Eventually, first at Heidelberg and then at the end of his university career at Berlin (1818–31), Hegel returned to politics with a vengeance, reassessing the historical role of Prussia in the process.⁷²

In contrast to the portrait of the fanciful, romantic, and reactionary Hegel that one encounters in Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”* and *The German Ideology*,⁷³ in the several overlapping periods in which his work treated with religion, politics, economics, and philosophy, Hegel provided a rich spring-head from which Marx and his contemporaries drew for their critical observations of capitalism or “civil society.” Years before the publications of his major philosophical treatises, *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* (1807) and *The Philosophy of Right* (1820), Hegel had undertaken an intensive investigation of the “rational and distinctly human” phenomenon of labor as subject to the “blind needs” of commodity production.⁷⁴ Dickey maintains “It was at Berne that he developed his interest in the fiscal policy of the Berne oligarchy, in the English debates on the Poor Law, in Steuart’s work on ‘political economy,’ and, if (H. S.) Harris is correct, in Adam Smith.”⁷⁵ From 1794 to 1804, under the sway of the Scottish political economists—John Millar, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Sir James Steuart—Hegel transmuted his self-confessed “passion for politics”—fueled as we have seen by the political chaos of the Germanies—into a preparation for a systematic critique of modern industrial society and its implications for the future of Germany.

Consequently, it was Hegel and not Marx who first synthesized British political economy with journalist accounts and parliamentary reports into a description of the historical development, the motive forces, and the social character of industrialism and commerce.⁷⁶ As Joseph O’Malley comments, Marx would later acknowledge this: “[In his *Critique*] Marx is not charging Hegel with empirical inaccuracy; the truth about existing political society is to be found in *The Philosophy of Right*, though expressed inaccurately by virtue of the speculative inversion of subject and predicate. Marx’s charge of pseudo-profundity is directed against Hegel’s way of considering and manner of speaking about political society. It is the philosophical form, not the empirical content of *The Philosophy of Right* which is under attack.”⁷⁷ And, of course, Marx was concerned with Hegel’s politics. Hegel was as deeply committed as Kant to the unification of Germany. He was unpersuaded, however, by Kant’s explanation for the

cause of Germany's horror. For Hegel, it was not a matter of "a deep split within the human psyche . . . between reason and passion, between duty and inclination" — between phenomenon and noumenon.⁷⁸ As early as his master's thesis, Hegel declared his intention to resolve Kant's antinomies. Hegel rejected what he believed were Kant's "unnecessary dualisms" because as Paul Guyer points out, "In Hegel's view, in every judgment we get at least a partial glimpse of the fundamental identity between the structure of our thought and the structure of reality itself."⁷⁹ Hegel rejected a system which exiled God to an extrarational world, and left mankind at the mercy of a social contract drawn on an individuated morality.⁸⁰ And later, encouraged by the advent of the French Revolution which he took as a manifestation of the imminent human spirit, he resolved the Kantian conflict through the invention of a new conceptualization: History as freedom.

To solve Kant's antinomy, Hegel was forced to move beyond the boundaries of Christian theology and eschatology, the closed universe of human consciousness to which he had initially adhered.⁸¹ Hegel maintained that history was an expression of *Reason*. The purpose of historical study, then, was to apprehend the "cunning of Reason," the evolution of the human species from alienation into absolute consciousness. The motive force of this development was Reason. History was the record of the progress of Reason's achievement in the human species. Until now, Hegel insisted and Marx would later concur, human history was really human *prehistory*. Humanity was in the process of evolving into its true *species-being*. The true destiny of the species was conditioned by its escape from its material being.

Hegel and Materialism

In contrast to the generally secular historical materialism of the Scots, with its architectonic of the four-stage construction of history, Hegel assigned a moral designator and the construct of the prehuman to the history of the increasing efficiency in addressing the species' physical needs. Thus, rather than celebrating the emergence and dominance of the commercial classes, Hegel insisted on the spiritual corruption which accompanied the appearance of market society. And the civil society produced by his contemporary stage of production was degenerate. On this latter score, Hegel reiterated two concerns embedded in the evolving text

of political economy: Adam Smith's (and Rousseau's) assertion that the commercial spirit "sinks the courage of mankind"; and Steuart's observation that money, i.e., "imaginary wealth" unleashes useless luxury and degrading ornamentation in society.⁸² These problematics would reappear in Hegel's work, as his critique of "bourgeois ethics" and its inability to establish objective restraint. He would observe that "the urge to increase wealth is nothing but the necessity for carrying to infinity the specific individual thing which possession is."⁸³

Dickey argues that it was as a result of the same sorts of reservations in Steuart's work that Hegel was most likely influenced by Steuart more than any of the other Scots. There was, of course, the local connection: Steuart had visited Old-Württemberg and written a tract on the "velocity" of money for Karl Eugen; but as the best-traveled of the Scottish economists, Steuart's economic model displayed a "lack of British conceit," i.e., a comparative sophistication respecting the several European national economies. Most importantly, Steuart was wary of the market's capacity for self-regulation of corruption, greed, vanity, and luxury, and provided Hegel with a complement to his religious ideal. Noting the market's capacity for inducing social degeneracy, Steuart had proposed the necessity of political intervention in the guise of a "statesman," the head of government. Dickey abbreviates: "As Steuart saw it, one of the statesman's principal duties was to manipulate 'the spirit of the people'—that is, its 'morals, government and manners'—so as to allow him and his subjects to take full advantage of new and emergent economic forces in history."⁸⁴ As a Württemberger, it might be presumed that Hegel was more circumspect about such a political authority. In any case, in Hegel's writings, the responsibilities of Steuart's statesman were to be transferred to a class (or Estate) to which Hegel appended the designation "first class."

In his *System of Ethical Life* (1802), the lecture notes he prepared for his course on Natural Law at Jena, Hegel posited that as a result of the increasingly complex relationship of needs, labor, tools, and economic relations, human development had proceeded from an original state of unmediated unity and harmony to a condition of alienation, subordination, and domination. Bernard Cullen summarizes:

With the increasing complexity and sophistication of needs, men began to labor. This led to the creation of tools, to the acquisition of goods, to the definition of certain types of human relationships . . .

to culture and language. . . . Freed from the shackles of immediate need, men developed economic relations; and, with them, concepts to govern property relations such as value, price, exchange and contract. At this stage, commerce emerged—having been made possible by the creation of money—and this brought about relationships of domination and subordination.⁸⁵

Eventually, estates (*Stände*) and then classes marked the social divisions of society, each with its own ethical consciousness and distinctive social function or task. In his Jena lectures (1805–6) on the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel identified five significant estates/classes or subdivisions: the peasant, the *Bürger*, the mercantile, the public (civil), and the military.⁸⁶ He characterized the peasant class as the “class of immediate trust and of crude concrete labor.”

Thus the peasant class is this unindividualized trust, having its individuality in the unconscious individual, the earth. Just as, in his mode of work, the peasant is not the laborer of the abstract [i.e., industrial] form, but rather provides approximately for most or all of his needs, so only in his inner life is his work connected to his activity. The connection between his end and its actualization is the unconscious aspect: nature, the seasons, and the trust that what he has put into the ground will come up of itself. He tills the soil, sows, but it is God who makes things grow, the activity being subterranean.⁸⁷

The peasantry thus exhibited a naïve and comforting psychology, an unvoiced intuition of divine or Absolute Spirit. Lacking an individuated or self-constituting recognition, the peasantry is an appendage of the universal class, providing its physical needs in economy and supplementing the universal class as a human resource in war.

Among the *Bürger*, “the class of business and of law,” work was characterized by “the abstract labor of individual handicrafts, a form independent from the earth.”⁸⁸ Consequently, the *Bürger* consciousness was based on the possession of property: “This imagination of his own worth, and of his universal selfhood in his particularity, becomes an immediate unity, in that the possessing and counting-for-something become synonymous.”⁸⁹ On the other hand, the work of the merchant class was “pure exchange” and “neither the natural nor the artificial production and

forming [of goods].”⁹⁰ And in his anticipation of Marx’s construction of the fetishism of commodities, Hegel declared: “The outlook of the mercantile class is therefore this understanding of the unity of a thing with its essence: a person is as real as the money he has. The self-image is gone. The [inner] significance has an immediate existence [of its own]. The essence of the thing is the thing itself.”⁹¹ And with undisguised contempt, Hegel referred to mercantile morality: “It is strict [adherence to] law: the deal must be honored, no matter what suffers for it. . . . Complete mercilessness. Factories, manufacturing, base their subsistence on the misery of one class.”⁹² Though in the end he constrained himself to the opinion that civil society consisted of three primary estates—the agricultural, business, and bureaucratic—Hegel did acknowledge a dynamic of a different character: he reserved the term “class” for the “business” class, with its subdivisions of craftsmen, traders, and wage- or factory-workers.⁹³ Under the rule of bourgeois ethics, with its “bestiality of contempt for all higher things,” society is disaggregated, “the people is dissolved.”⁹⁴

The two remaining classes or subdivisions of the universal class, however, were of a distinctly different and superior order. Both the “public class” and the military were historical expressions of the Rational State, the highest form of social and political organization. The public class, he insisted, was itself “necessity.” Its administration of the law, the police, and public wealth constituted the dissolution of the particular into the universal. The genius of the bureaucracy was in “modifying each system [Hegel refers to revenues, the judiciary, penal law, and labor relations] according to its class.”⁹⁵ Here was the notion of a “universal class” which Marx would appropriate for his proletariat.⁹⁶ Finally, the “missing element is supplied by the military class.”⁹⁷ Since in international relations, no binding force cements treaties and “morality has no part in these relations,” the military class and war are instruments of the “totality.”⁹⁸ War, Hegel declares, “is crime for [i.e., on behalf of] the universal.”⁹⁹ The model of course is Plato’s, the argument is pure Hegel.¹⁰⁰

Hegel’s view of England—the only example of modern industrial society available to him—was jaundiced. He reckoned England as a society dominated by the mercantile class and characterized by the necessary division of its people into the extremes of wealth and poverty. “In modern times, production for personal use has begun to give way to the mechanical production of surplus goods to exchange. There has arisen a system of ‘completely quantitative and repetitive labor’; within this

system of 'deadening mechanical labor,' the individual laborer has lost touch with the product of his own labor. Production of objects for the personal use of the producer has been transformed into the production of commodities destined for the market, which is in turn regulated by a system of exchange value, money, prices and contract."¹⁰¹ Thus, while Hegel was willing to acknowledge that the mechanization of work had emancipated workers from their dependence on Nature,¹⁰² he was more concerned with the resultant alienation. Echoing Ferguson's lament of the loss of "the common sense of occupation," Adam Smith's claim that such labor made workers "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become," and Schiller's notion of the "fragmented" laborer, Hegel observed: "In the machine, Man terminates his own formal activity and lets it do all the work for him. . . . The more mechanical labor becomes, the less value it has and the more [the worker] has to work in this manner. . . . Labor becomes more and more dead absolutely, it becomes mechanical work. The skill of the individual worker becomes all the more limited, to an infinite degree, and the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the ultimate state of dullness."¹⁰³

Ultimately, however, Hegel was less disturbed by the intellectual degradation of industrial workers than the moral degeneracy which resulted from the appearances of great wealth and poverty. "Great wealth" created "Masters," and it was "similarly bound up with the deepest poverty." Borrowing from Aristotle, Hegel insisted: "This inequality of wealth is in and for itself necessary," since wealth has a necessary inherent tendency to accumulate ad infinitum."¹⁰⁴ Such social disparity constituted an "unmitigated extreme of barbarism," transporting the "business class" into "bestiality." Germany could avoid this anarchic, irrational "system" only through the intervention of the state. Hegel insisted that the state must replace the market mechanism which condemned the bourgeoisie to a "[dis]respect for something divine" and the working class (*die arbeitende Klasse*) to extreme poverty (bereft of "productive property"): "The government has to work as hard as possible against this inequality and the destruction of private and public life wrought by it. It can do this directly in an external way by making high gain more difficult, and if it sacrifices one part of this class to mechanical and factory labor and abandons it to barbarism, it must keep the whole [people] without question in the life possible for it."¹⁰⁵ Such were the base elements of his condemnation of industrial capitalism: individual alienation, societal disintegration into

subordination and domination, and a terrifying economic division. The bourgeoisie could not rule because its ethical ideal was corrupted by money and materialism. Only the universal class preserved the wisdom to administer a society whose system of need (or mode of production) had obtained “quantitative” or “mechanical” universality. It was in the context of this horror of “civil society” that Hegel, in *The Philosophy of Right* (1820), revised his notion of Prussia, the “machine-state”; and in the earlier *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, reinterpreted the significance of history.

Hegel and History

Hegel’s revulsion to capitalism and his attack on “modern industrial society” was to play no part in Marx’s critiques of Hegel. Indeed, by tracing the arguments in the *Philosophy of Right* to the abstract categories developed in *Science of Logic* and not to the earlier and explicitly political writings, Marx was able to dismiss Hegel as a mystical idealist.¹⁰⁶ Subsequently, what remained of Hegelianism to be consciously and purposefully retrieved by Marxists was dialectical humanism, that is, Hegel’s philosophical construction of history. The fuller debt owed by Marxism remained hidden in the Hegelian machinery of History requisitioned by Marxian philosophy.

Hegel understood that a completed conceptualization of history required a philosophy of history which would supersede orthodox Christian eschatology. His new philosophy rested on the achievement of the consciousness of freedom, a more contemporary reading of the tradition of salvation. Notwithstanding, and in all likelihood quite unknown to Hegel, he was drawing upon the moral and metahistorical impulses of medieval heresy which had been woven into Protestantism. The renegades Joachim, Olivi, Fra Dolcino, and Ubertino had imagined a historical moment of egalitarian democracy, communitarianism, and perfect human knowledge, an age “beyond the fulfillment of prophecy in Jesus Christ.”¹⁰⁷ And in Joachim could be discovered an expression of Hegel’s dialectic. Steven Ozment suggested: “Joachim believed that each age was already latent and evolving within the preceding age.”¹⁰⁸ Like Joachim, Hegel came to believe that History is the persistent movement towards the achievement of the Absolute Spirit, the condition of perfect comprehension. “The structure of speculative thinking or Reason—the necessary dialectical self-movement of the ‘concept’ from the abstract,

unmediated, and implicit to the concrete, fully mediated, and explicit—was thus identical with the structure of ultimate reality or ‘Being.’ . . . In *The Phenomenology of the Spirit* the comprehension of the identity of identity and nonidentity was revealed as the culmination of the whole process of human cultural development, the necessary outcome of the dialectical progression, the negation and ‘supersession’ of the shapes of human experience and consciousness.”¹⁰⁹ It was not to humankind in general, however, that such perfection was destined. In Hegel’s apprehension of the historical dialectic, many human societies had failed, a few had not.

Hegel privileged Western civilization in his historical philosophy, citing the absence of Reason elsewhere. Those societies which had missed the interventions of world-historical individuals and the dialectic of the “universal principle” incorporate (e.g., China: “servile consciousness” and Africa: “land of childhood”) were doomed to arrested development or ahistoricity. For Hegel, ultimately, the historical development of the species-being was discoverable only in Europe.¹¹⁰ Hegel argued that the Rational State was the ultimate marker of species development. About the economy, the system of need, Hegel could only presume that its increasing sophistication was related only negatively to the human realization of totality. Marx’s materialism rearranged Hegel’s ethical system, asserting that man’s command of Nature was a precondition of emancipation. On that score, Marx like Hegel recognized the corruption and social disaggregation of industrial capitalism. But Marx would inherit Hegel’s Eurocentrism, too. Marx preserved that Eurocentrism, first through his inordinate praise of bourgeois imperialism (*The Communist Manifesto*), and eventually by his privileging of the development of capitalist industrialism as the singular and unprecedented historical development of modern human society.¹¹¹

Among the historical peoples, Hegel insisted, one of Reason’s extraordinary and frequent instruments for propelling the species into greater consciousness was the *world-historical figure*, an individual whose genius propels human society beyond its apparent and immediate limitations. In *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel insisted that such “world-historical individuals are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object. For the deeds of the world mind, therefore, they receive no honor or thanks either from their contemporaries or from public opinion in later ages. All that

is vouchsafed to them by such opinion is undying fame in respect of the subjective form of their acts.”¹¹² The historical consequence of such “great men” was the foundation of the state, or the successive founding of states: “All states have thus been established by the sublime power of great men.”¹¹³ Among unhistorical peoples, for example, the barbarians of the East, no such divine crystals eventuated—only the periodic appearances of “the brooms of God,” whose genius for destruction and bloodlust fell on cultures, sweeping “whole regions of the world completely clean.”¹¹⁴ Having no consciousness, the “brooms of God” did not replace the cultures they destroyed; unlike the world-historical figures of the West nothing of the Absolute Spirit, of Reason, could be deciphered from their occurrences. Hegel’s mind seems constantly to have worked in history (and politics) and here again he pursued his quarry in his own time.

Hegel was responding to the actual world of Western Europe—a political universe dominated, to be sure, by Napoleon and the revolutionary changes in political structure taking place—whose “truer” historical destiny, as far as Germany was concerned, fell to the post-revolutionary Prussian reform movement. Under Napoleonic rule, the south German states like Bavaria and Württemberg had experienced expanded territorial responsibilities, and post-war reforms focused on “political integration of new lands and the abrogation of the traditional privileges and liberties of the corporate bodies of the old regime.”¹¹⁵ In Prussia, defeat by Napoleon’s armies had resulted in a predominantly bureaucratic reform movement championed by the contending politics of the “pro-Napoleon” Prince Karl August von Hardenberg and the anti-Napoleonism of Baron Karl von Stein. Each faction had selected a favored propagandist: Hegel for the first and Friedrich Schleiermacher for the other. Schleiermacher had come to Berlin to join a secret anti-Napoleonic movement and, later, with Stein had openly promoted German national liberation and the notion of a populist state. Toews maintains, “After 1810, Hardenberg’s emphasis on rational administration and legal and economic reforms imposed from ‘above’ increasingly dominated the reform movement”; and it seems that it was particularly this bureaucratic faction which provided Hegel inspiration for the possibility of the Rational State.¹¹⁶ For Hegel, according to Avineri, Prussia was now a “modernized, rationally organized, relatively liberal monarchy. . . . The old feudal system of serfdom was abolished, the cities were granted municipal self-government, the army was transformed through universal conscription, an enlightened and

forward-looking bureaucracy took the place of the old military caste, and Berlin appeared to be replacing Jena or Heidelberg as the capital of German letters."¹¹⁷ Of such a state, Hegel declared: "it is the way of God in the world, that there should be the state."¹¹⁸

Hegel responded to the temerity which infected Kant's generation—the foreboding which drove Kant to assert that beyond the limits of Understanding stood only illusion—with the audacious notions of the Absolute Idea, the irrepressible dialectic of Reason in History, and the immanent majesty of the State. Marked by an era sandwiched between the Great Elector of the seventeenth century and Napoleon, Hegel recognized the imprimatur of Reason in the "world-historical" figure. Originally borrowed from Christian messianic dogma, the notion of a social being capable of propelling humanity towards its true being survived Hegel.

Hegel's "world-historical figure" provided Marx with the second critical aspect which he would append to the proletariat: not only was the proletariat a "universal" class, but it was also an agency of history which despite its own incomprehension is capable of catalyzing species transformation. The historical action of the proletariat, Marx insisted, was "prefigured" by its social condition.¹¹⁹ Human history progresses by leaps forward and catastrophes, by pain and unhappiness. And at certain moments, world-historical figures are necessary to push a society into its next threshold of development.

Hegel made history move. And having made it move, he gave it a direction immanent in Christian eschatology. He achieved this by maintaining that ultimately human development would obtain pure reason, pure freedom, pure and total comprehension. And the things which are recorded in the meanwhile (the rise and fall of civilizations and societies) are not important in and of themselves. They are merely the spore of Reason, the clues to Reason's purpose, the "phenomenology" of Reason. This is how Hegel employed the dialectic to resolve the dilemma between science and religion to which Kant had acquiesced. What Hegel constructed in its place was a means of comprehending human action and thought which was so radical and conclusive that it had led eventually to Marx's concession in *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"* that, "for Germany, the critique of religion has been essentially completed; and the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every critique. . . . The foundation of irreligious criticism is this: *man makes religion*; religion does not make man."¹²⁰ The critique of religion was completed through dialectical

thought, an engagement initiated by Hegel and completed by Feuerbach, Moses Hess, and Marx.

“Reason,” Hegel asserted in his final lectures (1830–31), “governs the world, and has consequently governed its history.”¹²¹ Marx, too, believed history had to be governed, or driven—even if not by Reason. Because of Hegel, Marx did not have to invent history or once it was invented signify that it had meaning. He did not have to extract history from Christian eschatology or challenge its motive force. All of that had been done for him by Hegel. Marx inherited a dynamic, purposive, even teleological history. And there is one more service that Hegel provided for the basis of historical materialism: Hegel supplied Marx with certain clues as to where the true species-being is located in any historical moment.

In his *Phenomenology of the Spirit [Mind]*, Hegel discussed the relationship of the Master and the Slave (or Bondsman). There Hegel maintained that the slave is more real than the master because the master depends on the slave’s existence but the slave depends upon his relationship with the objective world.

Just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. . . .

Through work and labor, however, this consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself. . . . Labor shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the *form* of the object, into something that is permanent and remains; because it is just for the laborer that the object has independence. This negative mediating agency, this activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externalized and passes into the condition of permanence. The consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self.¹²²

Hegel insisted that the consciousness of the master is a consciousness *for itself*, a false, dependent consciousness. On the other hand, the consciousness of the slave, of the worker, is real, permanent, and independent. Initially Hegel had posited the materialist basis for consciousness upon the labor of the peasantry and then had lamented its consequences

for the self-realization of other classes, particularly industrial (factory) labor. Hegel's formulation became the antecedent for Marx's notion of dialectical materialism, for the prioritizing of the consciousness of the proletariat as the producer of society. But for Marx, only the worker was capable of true consciousness; and inevitably (as Marx and Engels asserted in *The Communist Manifesto*) the greater consciousness of laborers warranted their rule of society. All of this depended on Hegel's dialectic: the NEGATION OF NEGATION.

Hegel reasoned that the laborer is confronted with the objective world and must necessarily change it, negate it. Yet the slave (or the proletariat), in his social-political aspect, is the property (or wage-slave) of a dominant other (master or capitalist). This relationship is a negation of the humanity of the slave or worker. As a manipulator of the objective world, however, the slave achieves certain habits of thought which inevitably mature into consciousness. "Labor, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labor shapes and fashions the thing."¹²³ And Marx concluded the one negation (work) would eventually mature into a social negation (rebellion, revolution).

If Toews¹²⁴ has correctly captured the socio-historical problematics of "Hegel's generation" in Germany—the desperate quest for a metaphysical base for a new and ethical social order which would reconcile the intelligentsia and the masses—it is imperative that we recognize the successive cultural determinations which enveloped the philosophical initiatives of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Kant recoiled from the civil chaos of the previous two hundred years, drawing back too from the presumptions about an authority he had come to hold responsible for the horror. In his reclusion, Kant had been content to consign individual achievement to the resignation of discipline. *Homo noumena* would have to dominate *homo phenomena*.¹²⁵ A science of politics had to be constrained by the intuition of the good. Hegel disagreed, shifting historical agency from the individual to a class.

While Kant, distrustful of the bureaucratic class, had sought to govern its characterological intellectualism through the supersession of a moral philosophy, Hegel privileged the bureaucracy *as a class*, indeed as the most mature expression of Reason. And the real world of the bureaucratic class, the universal class, was the State, the very instrument which Kant believed excessive and culpable.

By denying legitimacy to the State in his philosophic discourse, Kant set in motion in German thought a series of determinations to Marx's benefit. Since Kant's subject was both the feudal, aristocratic state and its state-service class, Hegel was forced to construct a new architecture to adorn German integration from the materials of History and the scraps of Christian theology. Transposing the bureaucracy, an administrative apparatus, into a class, or at least giving recognition to an actual process of a class formation, provided Hegel the standard by which to judge all social formations: the *Stände* of peasantry and nobility as well as the embryonic working and mercantile classes. That standard was *class consciousness*, and class consciousness, according to Hegel, emanated from *political activity*, i.e., work.

Unquestionably, these conceptualizations were developed in Hegel's work. They were there, then, in the body of German discourse to be appropriated by Marx and Engels for their own purposes.

The Discourse on Economics

At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity; it found its place without difficulty . . . within an epistemological arrangement that welcomed it gladly . . . since it rested entirely upon it. Marxism exists in nineteenth century thought like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else.¹—MICHEL FOUCAULT

In the service of a liberationist project, Marxism proposes itself as a radical and antagonistic break with the epistemological assumptions and ideological pretensions of its “bourgeois” competitors. The disavowal is a part of the revolutionary project since it exposes what is otherwise concealed: the historical tendency of capitalism to offend Just Order by the expropriation from the many and the accumulation of wealth by the few. As its opposition, Marxism, we are assured, is the expression of the oppressed, a forensic science to capitalism’s profound criminality. And with respect to (bourgeois) political economy, Althusser insisted: “Marx’s critique of Political Economy is therefore a very radical one: it queries not only the object of Political Economy, but also *Political Economy itself as an object*.”² We are indebted to Foucault, on the other hand, for the bold yet elegant turn by which he reinserted Marxism into bourgeois cosmology. Foucault’s pointed description of Marxism bears a strong resemblance to the conventional intellectual provenance which situates Marxist economics as a critique of and, at the same time, a successor to political economy. However, unlike other accounts—whether Marxian, non-Marxian, or anti-Marxian—Foucault’s observation contains a certain ironic inflection. His assertion suggests that Marxism constituted no luminous break; no fugitive tributary, no renegade apostasy to the discursive

substructure of bourgeois economics. Instead, he suggested, Marxism “rested entirely upon it.”

Foucault maintained that once David Ricardo had installed the recentering notion that all value is produced by labor, the halting advances of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century bourgeois anthropologies surged forward, seizing every ideational terrain as their spoils. In consort with the emphasis on an economics of production rather than circulation, bourgeois and “revolutionary economics” instanced a conception of “continuous” history, the forbidding specter of scarcity, and the certain knowledge that the end game of all human activity is to suspend the descent of the species into oblivion. “The great dream of an end to History,” he wrote, “is the utopia of causal systems of thought.”³ Foucault thus opposed the then and still reigning interpretation of the relationship between Marxism and political economy.

Notwithstanding Foucault’s intervention, the liturgy of a Marxian rupture is difficult to avoid in the history of nineteenth-century economics. No matter from which approach its achievements are subsequently evaluated, both radical and liberal observers accept the proposition that Marxism intercepted a fledgling economics. And this presumptive genealogy has quite important implications for both socialism as an ethical and political inference and economic discourse in general. While neo-classicist political economists were prone to quarantine Marxism as an astrology of economics, Marxist economists characterized the rupture with classical political economy as a profound discovery of the secrets of value or historical change.⁴ By the positing of Marxism as *the* radical alternative to political economy, it privileges this conjuncture as the emblematic opposition of the capitalist world-system, and as such, the modern world’s injustices. If we accept as evident that political economy was the inaugural expression of capitalist and bourgeois ideology, Marxism assumes a similar position in socialist discourse. The historical development of socialism is consequently foreshortened. Socialist thought becomes possible, then, only under the social and historical conditions put in place by the occurrence of the capitalist organization of production. As historical materialism maintains, without the preconditions of capitalist relations and productive organization, socialist ideology (no less socialist movements) is impossible. Such a conceptualization substantiates the authority of the Hegelian philosophy of history and its dialectic of negation.

Alternatively, if a socialist discourse can be recovered from earlier (“precapitalist”) eras, such a discovery would rupture the epochal confines of bourgeois epistemology sacred to both Liberalism and Marxism. More pointedly, with respect to socialist discourse itself, such a revelation would throw into doubt the preclusiveness of a revolutionary program whose singular historical agencies were the industrial laboring classes and a renegade bourgeoisie. The demonstration of an older and enduring oppositional discourse on poverty and property might then emancipate socialism from the ideological regime rigidly circumscribed by an attenuated and bourgeois construction of class struggle. The resistance to capitalism could then be understood as a derivative oppositional discourse whose origins suggest a submerged and perhaps more profound historical crisis.

The Concealed Origins of Western Economic Thought

For reasons best known to themselves but not wholly private, the West’s scholars have agreed to mark the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the historical locations of the appearances of economics as a system of thought. In this fashion, “Classical Economics” has been determined to be the direct issue of the efforts of possibly the mercantilists and Physiocrats and most definitely Adam Smith.⁵ John Kenneth Galbraith, who has shown at least some inclination to inspect the economic ideas of earlier thinkers, broadly concurs: before the seventeenth century there is little worthy of the name economics; even the patriarchs of Western scientific thought are negligible on the subject. Concealed in Aristotle’s ethics, for instance, Galbraith suspects there lies “a certain measure of eloquent incoherence on economics.”⁶ From the Romans, Galbraith consents that the yield is, if possible, even more “slight.”⁷ And after surveying what he divines as the paltry contributions of the medievalists (specifically Thomas Aquinas and Nicole Oresme), Galbraith proposes an explanation. The general absence of an economics in the millennia before the “era of merchants” (beginning in the mid-fifteenth century) is owed to the fact that “Economics in all modern manifestations centers on the market; in a world in which the market was a subsidiary, even esoteric, aspect of life, economics as now known still did not exist.”⁸ Galbraith’s certitude obviates a search for the discursive intuitions of modern economists among their non-existent predecessors.

Notwithstanding the concerted confidence of academic opinion, the anticipation of the socialist discourse on economics is recognizable in the surviving works of Aristophanes (ca. 445–388 BC), Plato (429–347 BC), Xenophon (ca. 420–388 BC), and Aristotle (384–322 BC).

In his comic poem *Ecclesiazusae* (392 BC), Aristophanes's spokesperson was Praxagora, the leader of the conspiracy of women. By cunning (rather than by force), the women of Athens have enfranchised themselves, and enacted radical reforms (including a total sexual liberation with primacy awarded to the old and ugly). One reform, however, lacks the broad, vulgar humor with which Aristophanes so frequently leavened his political objectives. Praxagora announced:

Briefly my scheme is: mankind should possess
In common the instruments of happiness.
Henceforth private property comes to an end—
It's all wrong for a man to have too much to spend,
While others moan, starving; another we see
Has acres of land tilled prosperously,
While this man has not enough earth for his grave. . . .
That's over: all things are owned henceforth by all.⁹

While Moses Hadas has insisted that Aristophanes's "introduction of communism" could only be interpreted as an ironic expression of a malaise in a defeated and impoverished Athens at the start of the fourth century BC, K. J. Dover insisted that there is good reason to suppose that Aristophanes (and, later, Plato) had appropriated notions of communism "anticipated by fifth-century intellectuals."¹⁰ Dover seems to have the weight of argument on his side. For generations, scholars have recognized that Aristophanes took on serious issues in his comedies.¹¹ Concerning an earlier work (411 BC), for instance, Gilbert Murray had maintained "The *Lysistrata* has behind it much suffering and a burning pity."¹² And respecting war, one of Aristophanes's most constant subjects, recent scholars have assured us of the social consciousness and political acuity in Aristophanes's thought.¹³ There is also sufficient reason to believe that Aristophanes was not relying on mere imagination in selecting citizen women as his radical reformers.

Sue Blundell notes an apparent paradox: that concomitant with the appearance of democracy was the deterioration of rights among the most privileged women, those of the aristocracy and propertied classes.

Blundell attributes this erosion to the profound changes in the Greek economy which marked the end of the Archaic Age: the transition from pastoralism to agrarianism, the displacement of the estate by the *polis* and the *oikos*, and in repressive legislation the designation of women as a source of threat to the stability of the *polis* (population control) and the *oikos* (transmission of property).¹⁴ Ushering in with it the societal forces which in Athens prepared the way for democracy, the *oikos* became the central economic unit. “Democracy might also be said in a very real sense to have robbed some women—those belonging to the aristocratic families—of the influence which they had exercised in former times. More pervasively, since democracy created a growing dichotomy between activities which were public and collective, and those which were private and individual, it accelerated the disparity between males and females. Increasingly, men in the democratic state were defined by their active involvement in political life, and women were defined by their exclusion from that sphere.”¹⁵

The prodigious classicist Geoffrey de Ste. Croix has surmised that women of the Athenian propertied class, because of their lack of property rights, their roles in the reproduction of their class, and domination by their male relatives and spouses, constituted a distinct class of their own.¹⁶ Susan Guettel Cole relates that “ritual responsibility in the priest-hoods of the city’s public cults . . . was the only context in which women were designated as ‘Athenian,’ because this was the only place where a woman could represent the polis.”¹⁷ And from the works of Aristophanes as well as civic documents surviving from classical Athens, Jane Gardner discerned that Athenian males worried that their wives—the strangers they brought into their *oikos*—might betray their households to lovers, steal their goods, forge the paternity or citizenship of children, or expose their husbands to indifferent care in old age or ritual neglect in death.¹⁸ These were the acts of an enemy, one, as Plato would put it in *The Laws*, characterized by “undue secrecy and craft.”¹⁹ Little wonder, then, that Aristophanes might hear rumors or surmise that behind the walls of traditional seclusion, resenting their peculiar exclusion, adult women conspired.²⁰

That the wives and daughters of the *politai* (the males who had preserved political rights for themselves)²¹ might be credited with a foolish communist agenda is not surprising. Women occupied what must have been a most irksomely liminal existence, somewhere between being

property, a form of securities, and being a necessary but sinister complement to the *oikos*.²² It is also possible that in addition the attribution of this program served to defuse a more powerful social origin for communism and to distract attention of Aristophanes's audience from the disastrous consequences of class warfare in Athens. Aristotle had sensed that political disaster lurked in the real economic disparities of his corporate society. Thucydides, never so candid as Aristotle as to undertake the naming of the problem, nevertheless seemed to approve of Pericles for his genius at dramatizing an imaginary Athens, mobilizing the city to the threshold of actual existence. But as the long debilitating war during the second half of the fifth century persisted, Aristophanes (and much later Isocrates and Aristotle) realized that the old conflict between the poor and the rich (*penia kai ploutos*) had not been extinguished by Solon's compromise, then simply camouflaged by the radical social reorganization of Cleisthenes, and only momentarily abated by Pericles's patriotic theater.²³ It would be quite possible, then, after the abortive and brutal coups by the *aristoi* in 411 BC and 404 BC, their traitorous collaborations with Sparta, and their role in the defeat of Athens that Aristophanes would seek to contribute to the morale of his class by assaulting two enemies with a single stone.²⁴ By transferring the communist impulse of poorer citizens to women he could expect his audience to revel in the mix of ribald gender character assassination with class conflict. The *demos*, now subsumed under the identity of cunning yet sexually depraved females, possessed no moral or political authority. The *demos* as badly formed women held no civic stature upon which a sustained indictment of the upper classes could be warranted. For certain, these women and the unpropertied classes were not slaves but any regime, like that of democracy, which tended to extend to them political credit was as absurd as the notion of rule by slaves.

In classical Athens, the surplus labor extraction which provided the propertied class the basis of its wealth was slave labor. Indeed, by most accounts the slave population of the *polis* substantially exceeded that of the citizenry. Notwithstanding, de Ste. Croix informs us that the most disruptive political conflict was between the propertied class and the poor citizenry, the *demos*. Democracy, he proclaims, "played a vital part in the class struggle by mitigating the exploitation of poorer citizens by richer ones."²⁵ He approvingly recounts that "[M. M.] Austin and [Pierre] Vidal-Naquet, following Aristotle, are at any rate willing to accept the existence of what they call class struggles in the Greek world, in the

sense of ‘antagonism . . . between the propertied and the non-propertied’; and they go on to say that ‘the antagonism between the propertied minority and the non-propertied majority was fundamental in Greek class struggles,’ although ‘class struggles could be expressed between citizens only.’”²⁶ Taking his cue from another ancient source, de Ste. Croix concurs but with a difference, noting that between slave owners and slaves though “an unceasing struggle” occurred, “only the masters could carry it on effectively: they would always be united, and be prepared to act, as Xenophon says in the *Hiero* (IV.3), ‘as unpaid bodyguards of each other against their slaves’ . . . in my picture the masters conduct a permanent struggle, if sometimes an almost effortless one, in the very act of holding down their slaves.”²⁷

Until the beginnings of the sixth century when the *archon* Solon had immunized Athenians by abolishing the practice of giving the body as security, slavery had been the ultimate fate of the indebted poor. But still in the fifth and fourth centuries, the ambition of the poor to preserve their legal status from the predations of the wealthy had continued. Indeed, as Aristotle himself observed in the mid-fourth century, it was in the nature of the propertied class to reduce the poor to slavery. Consequently, Aristotle insisted, no ethical Greek *polis* could be exclusively ruled by the wealthy. His mentor, Plato, disagreed.

In *The Republic* (457b–466d), Plato imagined a communist utopia for the ruling elite as a prescription against the Athenian aristocracy’s historical tendency towards factionalism.²⁸ Thus inoculated from private vice, his new aristocracy would rule a Just State quite different from the degraded spectacle of democracy. Communal property (including “wives” and children), the physical evasion of gold and silver, and state-directed breeding and education, Plato proclaimed, would sever the best citizens of Athens from those appetites which fueled tyranny and division and left them vulnerable to democracy and its demagogues. “Only so will they keep to their true character. . . . They will not rend the community asunder by each applying that word ‘mine’ to different things and dragging off whatever he can get for himself into a private home, where he will have his separate family, forming a center of exclusive joys and sorrows.”²⁹

And if it is objected that this is moral philosophy and not economics, it is only necessary to cite Xenophon, another and perhaps the more literal of Socrates’s student-biographers, who credited his mentor with an understanding of use-values and the artifice of scarcity.³⁰ Speaking for

himself, Xenophon ventured further into the critique of democracy by suggesting that it was the material resources required by the Athenian democrats for their imperial appetites which had induced war and the social disintegration occasioned at the end of the fifth century BC. The common people, he argued, “realize that it is inevitable that an imperial power will be hated by its subjects, but that if the rich and respectable elements in the subject states are strong, the rule of the Athenian people will only last for a very brief period; that is why they disfranchise the respectable elements, and fine, exile and kill them, but support the masses. . . . To the common people it seems more advantageous for individual Athenians to possess the wealth of their allies and for them to retain enough to live on, and to work without being in a position to plot.”³¹ Both Plato and Xenophon employed economic analyses against the democracy: Plato imagining a new oligarchy preserved by its own communist discipline; and Xenophon resorting to the old aristocratic charge that the greed and indolence of the *demos* required an empire.³²

But of all the ancients, it is Aristotle who is of singular interest for his thoughts on commodity exchange and the social consequences of money, his attempt to achieve a theory of value and price, and particularly his designation of the managerial role of women in what was to be designated in the eighteenth century as cottage industry. Finally, it was Aristotle’s negligent handling of slave labor—the major source of income for the dominant classes³³—which anticipates the marginalization of Third World labor in modern liberal economics as well as in Marx’s construction of the significance of “primitive accumulation” in the development of capitalism.

In the context of natural law theory and on the basis of his testimony concerning the *polis*, Aristotle established that in its etymological origins economics (*oikos-nomy*)—the routine management of the classical Greek household—was a female function: “Thus it was out of the association formed by men with these two, women and slaves, that a household was first formed. . . . Men and women have different parts to play in managing the household: his to win, hers to preserve.”³⁴ Further, with respect to ancient Athens, he distinguished economics from commerce and capitalism—the former falling within the realm of citizen wives, the latter, largely the activity of male *metics* (resident Greek aliens).³⁵ In a related fashion, he also segregated the rational, naturalness of household-management (“self-sufficiency”) from the irrational, unnaturalness of

unfettered acquisitiveness which he associated with money-lending and the exchange of (“surplus”) goods mediated through money.³⁶ This judgment, Steve Fleetwood reminds us, was based on Aristotle’s metaphysics which distinguished between entities and activities: “This ought to alert one to the fact that exchange value is not just a matter for ‘value theory’ but is inextricably connected with the ethics of society. Whether a society that pursues exchange value is one that is just and tends to pursue good ends is something Aristotle is keen to pursue. He argues that should exchange not be based upon some principle of justice, then it will not ‘hold the city together.’”³⁷

The polis, as Aristotle conceived it, had a natural form of development which could only be deflected by accident. Exchange-value was such a potential accident. Use-value as transmuted by money as a means of exchange opened the door to the overtaking of natural needs by artificial ones:

Sometimes on the other hand coinage (*nomisma*) is regarded as so much convention (*nomos*) and artificial trumpery having no root in nature, since, if those who employ a currency system choose to alter it, the coins cease to have their value and can no longer be used to procure the necessities of life. And it will often happen that a man with wealth in the form of coined money will not have enough to eat: and what a ridiculous kind of wealth is that which even in abundance will not save you from dying with hunger! . . . Coinage both limits the exchange and is the unit of measurement by which it is performed; and there is indeed no limit to the amount of riches to be got from this mode of acquiring goods.³⁸

Already beset by *penia kai ploutos*, how could any polis be expected to survive the appearance of men pursuing unlimited wealth? Aristotle’s revulsion from such men was total: “They are eager for life but not for the good life” (*The Politics* 1257b40).

For some critics (Schumpeter, Finley, Galbraith) Aristotle’s unwillingness to grant to nascent capitalist commerce an acceptable or natural role in the social order disqualified him as an economic thinker in the modern sense. Alternatively, for others, Aristotle’s characterization of early Greek capitalism, and his eventually unsuccessful attempts to discern a basis of commodity exchange through the construction of a theory of value, are the very grounds for his nomination as an economist.³⁹ Scott

Meikle queries: “Within which school of modern analysis, if any, does the nature of Aristotle’s efforts . . . become comprehensible? The answer, to cut a long story short, is the school of Marxian Political Economy.”⁴⁰ If this is, indeed, the crux of the ambivalence towards Aristotle’s economic thought, it has had ambiguous consequences.

The Aristotelian disjuncture between a praxis of economics localized in the household and frequently dominated by women and a male preserve of public commerce is routinely camouflaged in histories of economics. The proper domain of economics—the distribution of value or prices, international trade, state regulation, commodity production, exchange and distribution, the circulation of capital—is now understood to either exclude or envelop the household. Likewise, economics as a science or as a historical subject discounts whatever contributions or knowledge female household management might have accumulated. That just such a field of feminine intellect existed is affirmed by Schaps’s observation that “the early upbringing of children, the management of domestic slaves, and the production of food and clothing were matters of great importance to Greek women.”⁴¹ Aristotle, however, achieved his concealment of the influence of women by portraying their domain as inhabited by beings of inferior nature (females, slaves) or development (children).⁴² And modern economists marginalize most women by privileging wage labor, commonly supposed to be a largely male preserve. Whichever is designated as its starting points—Aristotle, the Roman law’s *dominium* (property rights) or the French mercantilists—the history of the scientific development of economics is preoccupied by those activities presumably male and dominated by the interrogations of males.⁴³

A second consequence for the modern practice of economics of the attention drawn by Aristotle was the conceptual division of labor between visible (human) and invisible (animal) workers. For Aristotle, the bulk of the Greek labor force, slaves, was nugatory: “The use made of slaves hardly differs at all from that of tame animals: they both help with their bodies to supply our essential needs.”⁴⁴ In Aristotle’s thought, as John Kenneth Galbraith observes, the concealment and disassociation of slave laborers from the moral body of the Greek community was a compelling and momentous force. “The most important reason that ethical questions were addressed to the exclusion of economic ones in the ancient world was the existence of slavery.”⁴⁵ Galbraith is on firmer ground here than when he postulates an epistemic explanation (the absence of the

market) for what he imagined as an ignorance of economics among the ancient Greeks. He is still, however, only partially correct. It was not that economic questions were obliterated by a slave-economy but that they were transcribed by a social context which de Ste. Croix characterized as an “almost effortless” class struggle. Such were the discursive protocols which permitted Plato and Aristotle (and Thucydides and Aristophanes) to discuss property, the possession of women, and the mastery of labor as the traditional or natural attributes of the *aristoi*. In this fashion, the forms and origins of wealth could be presented as derivative of virtue; an embedded and largely unassailable dimension of the best regime and the best of the regime.

In the ancient world, if Plato and Aristotle are any measure,⁴⁶ political and ideological considerations obliterated the real and necessary significance of slaves, and in the modern world, similar sensitivities segregated the manufacturing and industrial workforces of the metropole from the extractive workers of the periphery. A labor granted visibility by wage-capital relations and production-consumption priorities served, for example, as the genotype for Marx’s industrial workers or the national workforces treated in bourgeois economics. Invisible labor, the slaves to whom Aristotle and Plato infrequently referred when ruminating on the objectives of virtue or justice, became the rationale among modern economic thinkers (including Marx)⁴⁷ for the dismissive treatments of slaves, peasants, coerced laborers, colonial workers, and others (the lumpen-proletariat) who presumably lacked agency. Paradoxically, in their pursuit of a critical economics, Marx and Engels embraced the exclusivist precepts of a market economics while resolving to recenter their venture on the activity of the lower classes.⁴⁸

In sum, then, despite the disclaimers so frequently voiced by historians of science, it may be surmised that the empirical, conceptual, and moral precepts of the ancients did have consequences for modern economic thought. From those ancients genetic discursive faults can be traced to socialist imaginings as well as to economic constructions pertaining to the domains of women and workforces presumed “extraneous” by virtue of location, politics, divisions of labor, and race.

Socialist Discourse in the Medieval and Reformation Eras

As we have observed earlier (chapter 2), Aristotle's naturalistic teleology, inductive method of inquiry, and system of ethics provided some small epistemological and philosophical foundation to several varieties of subversive claims made by socio-religious dissidents and rebels in the Middle Ages. Yet it was not until the fourteenth century that Aristotle's thought was encompassed by a monumental work which articulated the epistemic ground for the premodern socialist imagination. At the end of the first quarter of that century, Marsilius dei Mainardini boldly and unapologetically imported Aristotle into a theory of political authority and governance which not only refuted papal and ecclesiastical privilege but as well translated the experience of the Italian commune into a political science. Born in Padua (and thus in the custom of the day known as Marsilius of Padua), Marsilius envisioned a "perfect regime" which eschewed utopianism by founding his proposed community on what he supposed as the history of human development and the observations recorded by Aristotle, "the foremost of philosophers in his *Civil Science [the Politics]*."⁴⁹ Copiously citing Aristotle, Marsilius candidly transferred the ancient thinker beyond his original ken ("Neither Aristotle nor any other philosopher of his time or before could have discerned the origin and species of this cause [of discord and strife]"), appropriating the Ancient into the spiritual and political controversies of the fourteenth century so as to authorize a radical democratic proposal.⁵⁰ Essentially contractual, Marsilius's proposal asserted that the natural end of human society, the perfect regime, is a community governed through communal justice.

The persistence of a socialist discourse in Europe's Middle Ages was largely contingent upon what Galbraith might represent as an inadvertent defect in medieval thought: the inability to distinguish ethical and religious issues from economic, specifically market, concerns. Confining himself to the market as the source of economic thought, Galbraith donates some small attention to Thomas Aquinas's speculations on the religious authority which obligated exchanges of goods based on the just price, prohibited the sale of defective goods, and condemned the taking of interest, and takes note of Nicole Oresme's preoccupation with the prince's proper management of money and the minting of coin. Suspended in this discursive regime, Galbraith has no time for Marsilius of Padua, arguably the most radical political and religious thinker of the

period. As Galbraith might rejoin, the market was not a concern for Marsilius;⁵¹ instead, he concentrated on the contradictions of power, property, and poverty, what I propose signified an alternative economic discourse. In so doing, Marsilius enunciated a socialist ethic against the Church of Rome, the most audacious form of privilege of his era.

Marsilius's preoccupations with peace and governance quite directly reflected the crises and the achievements of northern Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Civil strife and factualism in the *regnum Italicum* had degraded the politics of the communes. Founded in the mid-twelfth century, within two generations they had become the most powerful regimes of the region. In the stead of republican and proto-democratic constitutions, in the thirteenth century most of the city-states had been transfigured into autocratic states ruled by *Signori*. Notwithstanding, they had remained prosperous.⁵² Padua, however, had proven exceptional on several scores. In the middle of the thirteenth century (1256), Padua had successfully rebelled against its tyrant, Ezzelino, ending nineteen years of despotic rule. The restored commune would survive for sixty years, ruled by parties consisting of nobility, artisans (tailors, skimmers, shoemakers, etc.), and an administrative class.⁵³ Excluded from governance were the very poor (the vast majority of the population), and, interestingly, the *magnate* and *potentiores* ("They were those nobles and non-nobles who were believed to be too powerful or insufficiently reliable to be allowed to participate in the government of the commune").⁵⁴ And it was unlike the Florence commune, where an urban economy dominated by bankers, tradesmen, and merchants authorized conceits dividing town and country and the social exclusion of alien businessmen: "In Padua, commerce, manufacturing and even finance were relatively undeveloped, so that the purely merchant classes were comparatively unimportant; the international bankers and the great merchants of the Lana and the Calimala guilds had no equivalent in Padua . . . [and] the most powerful elements in Paduan society were the landowning magnates and the inflated administrative class, dominated by the professionally trained notaries and judges."⁵⁵ Thus the social and intellectual matrices for Marsilius's thought primed his pursuit of peace in directions radically different from the monarchism of Dante (*De Monarchia*, ca. 1312), the Florentine, and Aquinas, the Sicilian.⁵⁶

By the time that Marsilius had finished his *Defensor Pacis* (The Defender of Peace) in 1324, the Franciscan *Spirituals*—due to their insistence on

what they believed to be the authoritative poverty of Christ and St. Francis—had again resumed their position outside the Church as an official heresy.⁵⁷ Under the leadership of Peter Olivi (d. 1298), the Spirituals had disposed themselves towards a more publicly resolute aggressive stance on the obligatory nature of Christian poverty and the renunciation of property, rallying against their “pragmatist” *Conventional* brothers within the Order. Indeed, Olivi’s argument that “the denial of poverty was a sign of Antichrist” and that Christendom was entering an apocalyptic age in which Christ and St. Francis would overturn the established church, breached the boundaries of the Order, transporting the Spirituals into a confrontation with papal authority.⁵⁸ As a consequence of the public denunciations by Olivi and Marsilius, the critique of a corrupt clergy which had earlier been quarantined in dualist heresies, and in the thirteenth century commonly assigned as “the special responsibility of religious women” claiming “clerical” authority for themselves,⁵⁹ now threatened the Church’s highest political officials. This apostasy provided ideological support and spiritual comfort to the movements among the urban and rural poor which swelled into rebellions between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Innocent III, Nicholas III, and Clement V each had actively intervened on the side of the Spirituals. Unlike his more sympathetic, or perhaps otherwise preoccupied, predecessors, Pope John XXII (1316–34) was impatient with any further compromise with the radical clerics.⁶⁰ John threw his papal weight behind the Conventionals and initiated the persecution of the Spirituals as subversives. Between 1317 and 1323, John branded Olivi as a heretic, and “in a rapid series of bulls punctuated by Franciscan protest (1322–23), John, no fearful angel, rejected Bonaventura’s distinction between use and ownership, dismissed as a legal fiction the poverty of the Franciscan movement, and refused to let the papacy take the responsibility of fictive ownership for the Order’s lands and convents. . . . He denied also the primacy of Apostolic poverty. . . . Finally in *Cum inter nonnullos* (November 1323) he deemed the attribution of absolute poverty to Christ and the Apostles to be erroneous and heretical.”⁶¹ In the surge of the deep social and institutional crises which occupied papal and temporal authorities in the early fourteenth century: the persistent increase of peasant revolts and war-induced economic recessions,⁶² the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the continuing conflict between the papacy and the French monarchy, the suppression of the Knights Templar, the

maturing rivalries between the Italian city-states⁶³—the assumption of radical intellectual leadership fell to Marsilius of Padua.

Marsilius had had several predecessors in the realms of letters, political theory, and, of course, Aristotelianism. A dozen years or so before Marsilius's *Defensor Pacis*, Albertino Mussato, his friend and fellow Paduan, had written a tragedy, *Ecerinis*, which denounced the tyrant Ezzelino, and championed the republican traditions of Padua. Ptolemy of Lucca and the Florentine Remigio dei Girolami had each written and/or sermonized about the common good in audacious terms; Remigio declaring: "The commune must be loved more than oneself."⁶⁴ But where Mussato ambivalently sought to distinguish between wealth and avarice (Nicolai Rubenstein characterized Mussato's argument as "What is evil is not wealth itself, but the inordinate desire for it"⁶⁵), Marsilius, as we shall see, constructed a powerful justification for poverty.

Conal Condren's study of Marsilius considerably alters the consensus treatment of the latter as a political theorist.⁶⁶ Condren disputes the interpretation that Marsilius's primary concern was with providing what Quentin Skinner terms "exactly the sort of ideological backing which the City Republics of the *Regnum Italicum* most needed at this juncture in order to defend their traditional liberties against the Pope."⁶⁷ Skinner, for one, by emphasizing the factious political context and by his allusion to the influence on Marsilius of the Aristotelian principle that political faction produces tyranny, substantially explains only the first of the *Defensor Pacis*'s two principal Discourses. That Discourse presumes peace as the necessary condition for "sufficiency of life," and reiterates Aristotle's contention that their shared basis is good government. What Marsilius had in mind was a constitutional polity founded on consensus and popular sovereignty.⁶⁸ In the much longer Second Discourse, Marsilius insists that the Church's "despotic" rulers have misunderstood the nature of the Church; that the Church as a voluntary gathering of the faithful possesses no coercive or any other jurisdiction; that the Church can claim no coercive authority; that the rightful chief executive power of the Church lies in "a General Council composed of all Christians" (*Conciliarism*); and that the Church cannot make the doctrinal claim to ecclesiastical immunity from taxes or to the right to interfere with coercive secular judgments. This body of opinion, Skinner characterizes as a "Congregationalist theory of the Church," arguing that it reflected the genuine outrage which compelled Marsilius to transfer the supremacy of the popes to secular

authority, “the faithful human legislator.”⁶⁹ But Marsilius’s concerns for good government and the good life were more subversive, and his justifications far exceeded a warrant for a prince or a king.

Notwithstanding the hatred that Pope John and many of his thirteenth-century predecessors had inspired in Marsilius and his contemporaries, Condren persuasively argues that Marsilius was profoundly affected by the Franciscan-Spiritual legacy. In the Second Discourse, borrowing from Bonaventura’s defense of poverty (*Apologia Pauperum*), from Olivi’s attack on the corruption of the papacy, and the Spirituals’ radical condemnation of the Church’s material covetousness, Marsilius asserted that poverty was a principal spiritual value; that ownership (in opposition to use), in conferring the power of command, was foreign to the Christian life; and that the corollary to the Christian congregation was equality with the poor. In universalizing the Franciscan “heresy,” Marsilius sought to extend his reach beyond the dispute within the Order and the Church. “Rather than restricting his argument to the paradigmatic *topoi* of Franciscan controversy . . . the force of Marsilius’s argument is to make the connection, simply and consistently, between the claims to secular power by the Church (be it direct or indirect) and the economic independence and legal status necessary to sustain them.”⁷⁰

Marsilius’s relentless pursuit of the good life, the just social order, the “sufficiency of life,” had brought him to the point of absolute opposition to the established Church, the most evil repository of earthly possessions. In the place of congregation and an equality of mind and body, the rulers of the Church had exchanged material wealth, despotic coercive authority, and political power (Wallace Ferguson succinctly comments: “The Popes ruled a territorial state stretching right across the center of the [Italian] peninsula”).⁷¹ For Marsilius, the Christian faith was not a divine foundation for the proper regulation of market relations. The true apostle of Christ would embrace poverty and equality, not property and privilege. In contradistinction to John XXII, and citing scripture and glosses, Marsilius constructed a juridical right and moral justification for what he termed “virtuous,” “meritorious,” and “supreme poverty.” This status, Marsilius insisted, was necessary for “evangelical perfection,” and he continued: “This mode of meritorious poverty, or this status of a person who does not have possessions in private . . . or even in common with another . . . we shall henceforth, for the sake of brevity, call ‘supreme poverty,’ and the person who wishes to have this status we shall call, in keeping with

the custom of theologians, ‘perfect.’”⁷² And as he would later proclaim, “No perfect person can acquire the ownership . . . of any temporal thing”; a proscription which applied to the Church as well: “We have said that the *surplus* must be given to any poor person; for a community of men who save or have goods for certain definite persons only, such as the community of monks, canons, and the like, is not a perfect community; for the perfect community, like that of Christ and his apostles, extends to all the faithful, as is clear from the Acts, Chapter 4.”⁷³

As Condren insists, Marsilius’s concern was not merely for the political threat which the Church represented to the temporal princes of the *Regnum Italicum*. He was even more agitated by the “vicious” effect a “heretical pope” might exact on the whole body of Christendom and on the soul of each Christian. For that reason he magnified the discourse on poverty undertaken by the Franciscans to one on power. Marsilius hurled at the papacy and its supporters a moral and political challenge packed with socialist and democratic presumptions.⁷⁴ He contradicted their greed, arrogance, and despotism not only with the exemplary poverty and humility of Christ but with the argument that, according to the traditions of the primitive church, scriptural and legislative authority and a moral intuition for the just order had been divinely invested in the congregation of faithful ordinary men and women.⁷⁵ Marsilius’s conciliarist rationale stripped from the rulers of the Church any pretense that their office granted them greater jurisdictional authority than that residing in the community. It was the pope’s, and particularly John XXII’s presumptive claim to supreme legislative and juridical power in his dispute with the Spirituals, which most disturbed Marsilius’s communal sensibilities.

Marsilius, of course, was condemned and his works banned. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some immediate reflection of his primacy of community in contemporary economic thought, specifically in the property right argument employed by Oresme in the mid-fourteenth century. In his *Treatise on Money*, Oresme declared that “money is a property of the community.” And he justified this position on grounds which “anticipated” a labor theory of value: “If someone gives his bread, or the labor of his own body in exchange for money, this money belongs to him when he receives it, as much as his bread or the labor of his body he was free to use as he wanted, supposing he was not a serf.”⁷⁶ Oresme had studied at Paris where Marsilius and then Buridan had been rectors

(and even later Oresme a bursar), so it is entirely possible that Oresme's resolve that the prince was merely a convenience ("And since the Prince is a more public person, and of a higher authority, it is convenient that, for the community, he should have money made") devolved from Buridan's radical political theory (where the prince's authority was at the pleasure of his subjects) and Marsilius's communalism.⁷⁷

But for later political theorists in the West who would almost exclusively emphasize the tenets of the First Discourse, Marsilius's original intention to reinstitute the primitive church was concealed by historical events and ideological priorities. In the sixteenth century, however, in the wake of the Lutheran Reformation and the beginnings of absolutist doctrine, Marsilius's denunciations were used to justify constitutionalism, what Skinner reckoned as absolutism's "greatest theoretical rival, the theory that all political authority inheres in the body of the people."⁷⁸ And it was Marsilius's original message which reached Michael Gaismair, the Tyrolean radical reformer who led a peasant army during the Reformation two centuries later. When in 1526 Gaismair issued his revolutionary program for a "Christian order from which the godless exploiters, mainly the clergy but also the nobility as well as the sovereign will be excluded" and the confiscation of church property for the "common good,"⁷⁹ he found his justification in the writings of Marsilius.⁸⁰

The source of the influence of Marsilius's work two hundred years after its appearance can be traced to the critical part conciliarism played in the extrication of the Church from the Great Schism of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. It is, then, somewhat ironic that in 1535 Thomas Cromwell commissioned an attenuated English translation of *Defensor Pacis* as part of his campaign to establish the secessionist claims of Henry VIII to authority over the English Church (the Henrician Reformation or schism).⁸¹ For political theorists, however, Marsilius's more enduring influence was as a spokesman for conciliarism, which, according to Skinner, was "the most significant strand of radical political theory in the later Middle Ages."⁸² Marsilius thus became a radical champion to those political and intellectual formulators of constitutionalism while, alternately, standing in as a heretical target to the Thomist apologists for the Counter-Reformation.⁸³ And it was on the strength of these interests that Marsilius's contemplations on poverty, property, and power survived into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, influencing contract theorists like John Mair and John Locke who made good on the Franciscan

distinction between the use and ownership of property to reason the answerable basis of legitimate government.⁸⁴

Foucault would likely have located Marsilius's socialist discourse in an epistemic period which Foucault imagined represented the world through similitude and resemblance, the quest for the Same in the Different.⁸⁵ Marsilius's employment of natural law rested largely on the belief that a true Christian social order, both spiritually and politically, should reiterate and recapitulate the perfection of God. This "chain of similitude" proceeding from divine law and through each soul, the Christian congregation, and Christendom's temporal and ecclesiastical institutions and offices was a prerequisite even for those who would later oppose Marsilius's socialist vision. In the sixteenth century, its most prominent Western philosopher, Jean Bodin, appropriated the Decalogue for an identical nomological principle in order to privilege monarchy while insisting on the primacy of private property.⁸⁶ And in the fledgling discourse on economy—a proto-political economy—which Bodin and others were then initiating, it is unremarkable to discover that the "correct" relations between metallic money and price were predicated on the essential "preciousness" of metals—appropriate measures because in their "buried brightness" they were "the visible signature of all the wealth of the world."⁸⁷ For Bodin's economic discourse (as it might be said for Marsilius's heretical philosophy), the authority for human agency was derivative. Money signified the heavens ("because metal resembles the stars"⁸⁸) and not the processes of exchange nor those of labor it would come to represent, respectively, in what Foucault imagined as the later Classical and Modern Ages.

Of course, just as happened with his opinions on popular sovereignty, the more radical implications concerning property found in Marsilius's evocation of the *vita apostolica* were left unexplored. This was the fate of Marsilius's socialist predilections, at least in the secular debates. But in the besieged Roman Church itself, the explosive discursive contests concerning power, jurisdiction, and sovereignty had a different consequence. As had occurred in the thirteenth century, a radical social discourse became manifest within the Catholic Church in institutional form. Paradoxically, the most significant expression of internal radicalism in the Roman Church was concomitant to the appearance of the Jesuit Order, an expression of the Counter-Reformation.

For certain, the Order begun by Ignatius Loyola in 1534 and formally

recognized by Pope Paul III in 1540 bound its members to a rigid obedience of the pope. Nevertheless, the philosophical disputations undertaken by adjutant Jesuit intellectuals in support of papal authority and the Counter-Reformation led them to a number of radical arguments. Through the formidable scholarship of sixteenth-century Thomist philosophers like Luis de Molina, Francisco Suárez, and Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, the Jesuits not only politically superseded their rival Dominican scholars (e.g., Ginés de Sepúlveda, Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, and Domingo de Soto) but also enunciated a superior theory of the origins of political society and natural justice.⁸⁹ Under the signification of natural law, these Counter-Reformation theorists and philosophers eviscerated the domain of heretical interpretation: counterposing the authority of natural law against, for instances, Sepúlveda's Aristotelian thesis that the Spanish conquest of Indians ("slaves by nature") was an instance of just war; against Machiavelli's (and Martin Luther's) contention that the state was obligated only to its own self-conservation; against the jurisdiction assigned to humanist reason; and against the right of property as an instance of positive human law. And as Voltaire slyly averred in *Candide*, the contradictions of Jesuitical conservatism were never more acute than in their opposition to Spanish and Portuguese imperial ambitions in Paraguay.⁹⁰

Positing a state of nature grounded on the universal instinct towards a natural community governed by the law of nature, the Jesuit Thomists argued that the natural condition of all ("men") was that of natural freedom, equality, and independence. On these grounds the Jesuits (as had Vitoria and De Soto) supported de las Casas's defense of the Indians from Spanish conquest and enslavement: "All men are equally made in the image of God with a mind and reason," as Bellarmine puts it in *The Members of the Church*, so that "infidels, who possess this nature" must "without doubt be able to have true dominion."⁹¹ Thus, when Jesuit missionaries instituted communal property among the Indians in their missions in Paraguay, they did so on the basis of natural law:

This enabled them to suggest that while the communal as opposed to the private holding of property may in a sense be an injunction of the law of nature, it is only a negative injunction which serves the function of reminding us that (as Suárez puts it) "all property would be held in common by the force of this law if it had not

happened that men decided to introduce a different system.” This allowed them to argue that the law of nature can be used to sanction either the continuation or the abolition of communal ownership.⁹²

The socialist tenets of the primitive church were reiterated in the Jesuit missions as a practice consistent with both the traditions of Christianity and the “natural community” composed by the natives. Notwithstanding, while the missions helped to preserve and transmit a socialist impulse, in reality they were never idyllic or democratic.⁹³

As we have observed in chapter 2, the legends incited by the existence of these missions inspired the imaginations of bourgeois Europeans in the eighteenth century. Socialist utopia reappeared in the writings of secular philosophers, novelists, playwrights, and pamphleteers, extending socialist principles into the consciousness of the new middle classes. And as these classes increased in self-confidence and social ambitions, socialist ideals served as a basis for the critique of the classes which dominated them and the state structures which nurtured their formation.

Marxian Economics

Paradoxically, while romantic elements of the new middle classes appropriated the socialist imagination, other representatives of these same classes began the development of an alternative economic discourse, one, as William Petty insisted, expressed not in “superlative words, and intellectual arguments” but “in terms of number, weight or measure.”⁹⁴ Pierre Jeannin tells us that “merchandising, bookkeeping, a more quantitative mentality, and, finally, the elaboration of a mathematical world view” were the legacies of the sixteenth century’s merchant classes.⁹⁵ And by the eighteenth century, commercial arithmetic, only three centuries earlier the near exclusive monopoly of Venetian merchants and reckoning masters, now provided lexical protocols and a discursive practice for state functionaries, bankers, commercial agents, manufacturers, university mathematicians, scholars, and social critics in Western Europe and England.⁹⁶ These quantified descriptors provided their practitioners not only the means of ensuring their position and influence in the financial, revenue, and policy apparatuses of those states contesting for hegemony in the expanding world-system, but even more critically, established the

paradigmatic regiment for determining the superfluidity and redundancy of their social and political superiors, the landed aristocrats.

Thus long before the French Revolution obliterated the old world of aristocratic privilege, for the Mercantilists, “number, weight or measure” had preemptively subverted the conservative apologetics of the Physiocrats, the defenders of landed wealth.⁹⁷ As Howard and King insist: “Two related problems formed the core of the classical theory of value. One concerned the historical and analytical origins of non-wage incomes . . . surplus value. The other dealt with the perfection of a measure of value in terms of which both social output and the surplus product could be quantified.”⁹⁸ Obsessed with bullion accumulation, grants of commercial monopolies, and state protections against competition, the Mercantilists invented a calculus whose mystique justified the privileging of incomes from trade, manufacturing, and finance above the economic consequences and social priorities of inherited wealth. If statism and eventually nationalism were their creeds, political economy was the catechism of the ascendant capitalist classes.⁹⁹ And it was as an antagonist within this discourse rather than in adherence to medieval socialism that Marxian socialism arose.

For Engels and Marx, classical political economy was a signifier of abundant and overlapping meanings. As an ideologeme, the appearance of the proto-science of political economy signified the eminence of an empirical organization of knowledge which would evacuate superstition, religion, and moral philosophy—the dead weight of cultural life. As a historical coda, political economy signified the commercial triumph of capitalist industrial production, the social domination of a self-confident bourgeoisie, and the social oppression which would eventually end with the rule of the proletariat. And as a politics, political economy privileged Great Britain as the site at which the forces of production had objectified the rapprochement of history and philosophy. England was the womb of the industrial proletariat, the modern world’s universal class and its eventual master. And based upon the paradigm of English society, all fabulist social theory would be vanquished by scientific materialism.

Marxian economics constituted thus a *science* of history upon which a revolutionary political agenda might be based. And though Engels did eventually hint at its limitations, it does not appear that either he or Marx seriously entertained the possibility that in part their science was composed of autogenic, paradigmatic, and syntagmatic materials.¹⁰⁰ But

in truth, embedded in the rational fabric and the positivity of their “science” were hidden moral judgments (e.g., their revulsion to greed, their abhorrence of irrationality) and presumptive narratives (alienation as a motor of history, progressively higher stages of history, etc.). Inevitably, the several contours of meaning in their work, representing compelling and perhaps antonymous desires, propelled discrete and sometimes competing systems of significations.

One such conflict is inscribed on Engels’s and Marx’s musings on the social and economic relations affecting women. In 1884, Engels claimed that Marx had agreed that the first instance of class oppression in history was coincident with the appearance of monogamy with its intensification of the antagonism between men and women, and its concomitant sexual (and primordial) division of labor for “child breeding.”¹⁰¹ Forty years earlier, Marx himself identified the prostitution of women in bourgeois society as “only a *specific* expression of the *universal* prostitution of the worker” under capitalism.¹⁰² As the first class, then, women had signified for both Engels and Marx the state of repression associated with the private possession of labor power as property. Women were thus the archetype for the dispossessed subject. There was, however, a dialectical distortion in the oppression of women, or alternatively, a flaw in Marx’s theory of the basic motive-forces of history. For unlike the self-empowering classes which would eventually appear in history—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—women were incapable of liberating themselves. As a class, the liberation of women was dependent upon their absorption into the proletariat. As Engels put it: “The first premise for the emancipation of women is the reintroduction of the entire female sex into public industry.”¹⁰³ As a class women shared this characterological lack of historical agency with workers ensnared in “precapitalist” relations of production by the capitalist world-system. Just as “primitive accumulation” (slavery, peasantry, forced labor, etc.) inoculated Marxian historical space from any social desires embedded in labor beyond the metropole, domestic labor, in removing women from commodity (value) production and wage labor, provided a support for the notion of capitalism as a historical epoch, i.e., an independent self-reproducing mode of production.¹⁰⁴ Clearly, however, in their treatments of women and “invisible” labor, Marx and Engels exhibited the persistence of the discursive practices of the ancients and their modern predecessors.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, from its cultural and intellectual origins, Marxism absorbed

the conceits of bourgeois historical consciousness: a formal (mathematical), rationalist epistemology costumed in a teleological historicity which, in turn, gave primacy to commerce. Objectivity and necessity (the dialectical development of successive organizations of production) displaced tradition and the vagaries of creativity, imposing on historical movement the logic of the dialectic (the relations of production). And in bestowing the bourgeois narrative of class upon the proletariat, Marx and Engels inserted the working class into their own more familiar historical system. Ironically, however, with the assumption of the primacy of class as *the* social agency, Marx and Engels were themselves exposed. They acknowledged as much in a self-referential passage in *The Communist Manifesto*: “Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour . . . a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.”¹⁰⁶ By this proclamation Marx and Engels sought legitimation for their own political intervention. But just how a scientific political economy privileged a select and self-anointed group of “bourgeois ideologists” remained unfathomed. Nevertheless, this social and historical anomaly was of substantial import to the historical development of a Marxian political economy.

The Natural History of “Marxian” Economics

In essence the radical political project with which Marx and Engels enveloped themselves was the consequence of a moral conviction and not, as they insisted, a historical dialectic. They rejected “voluntarism,” however, preferring to cast their political vision and ambitions in the guise of a nomothetical social universe. Codified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their domain was the new history formulated by bourgeois intellects, a terrain at once mechanistic and economic. In the wake of this reassuring conceit the originating discourses in Western socialism became subjugated knowledges. In their place, socialism acquired an alternative and secularized natural history, one drawn from the discursive practices of scientific discourse and bourgeois hagiography. Marx and Engels justified this invention by declaring that the advent of the bourgeoisie had “drowned” all previous ideologies (“the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism”) in individualism (“the icy waters of egotistical calcula-

tion").¹⁰⁷ And though for generations (of Marxists) this astounding claim resisted inquiry, the special pleading of these two bourgeois ideologists could not be entirely concealed. Paradoxically, Marxist economics was vulnerable on its own terms.

In Foucault's genealogy of Marxian discourse, when Ricardo insisted that labor was more than a measure but, indeed, the source of all value, he disrupted the discourse of classical political economy, the "analysis of wealth." By displacing "circular and surface causality" with "continuous, historical time" ("a great linear, homogeneous series" of "successive productions") Foucault claimed that Ricardo had imagined an alternative ontological domain to that of Adam Smith's, one with a different paradigmatic regimen: a historical economics. While Smith had unearthed that "what is actually circulating in the form of things is labor—not objects of need representing one another, but time and toil, transformed, concealed, forgotten,"¹⁰⁸ Ricardo had envisioned work in a temporal series: modes of production. Consequently, Foucault declared, when Ricardo transferred the understanding of scarcity from the classical assumption of increasing needs to one presuming decreasing sufficiency ("humanity is henceforth laboring under the threat of death"), this different "empiricity" (data) summoned forth its own imaginary calculus of higher costs of production and declining rates of profit. Encapsulated in this alternative economic domain, it was foreclosed that Ricardo would logically contrive a suspension of history, a predictable immobilization of human activity determined by a point of equilibrium between the size of the labor force and "a nature that in itself is inert."¹⁰⁹ In Ricardo's estimation history would petrify. Foucault discerned: "History does not allow man to escape from his initial limitations. . . . We perceive that his anthropological situation never ceases its progressive dramatization of his History, never ceases to render it more perilous, and to bring it closer, as it were, to its own impossibility."¹¹⁰ In acquiring a history, the cognition of the economic activity of the human animal formally forfeited all pretensions to a more magnificent destiny. To the contrary, Foucault insisted, Marx rejected Ricardo's pessimism, substituting an alternative inheritance.

For Marx, history was the negation, the accumulation of successive forms of production and concomitant alienations which would compel a "whole class of [impoverished] men" to "re-apprehend this truth of the human essence." "But," Foucault maintained, Marx argued that "this can be achieved only by the suppression, or at least the reversal, of History

as it has developed up to the present: then alone will a time begin which will have neither the same form, nor the same laws, nor the same mode of passing.”¹¹¹ Marx appropriated Ricardo’s history and then converted it into a “prehistory,” a chamber of horrors from which the human animal was predestined to escape. For Foucault, however, the opposition between Ricardo’s anguished dystopia and Marx’s revolutionary utopia were “derived differences.” The constructs of Ricardo and Marx co-existed within a “new arrangement of knowledge . . . which accommodated simultaneously the historicity of economics . . . the finitude of human existence . . . and the fulfilment of an end of History.”¹¹² Marxian economics was not a radical political economy or a new science. Marxism occluded with the same discursive rules of formation and power/knowledge relations which nurtured and were the conditions for being of “bourgeois” political economy.¹¹³

A similar indifference to (or, in this instance, innocence respecting) authorial intention is apparent in *Metahistory*, Hayden White’s prescient critique of nineteenth-century Western historical consciousness. Arguing that all historical writing takes the form of narratives (Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, Satire), White assays that “history” is a “plenum of documents that . . . can be put together in a number of different and equally plausible narrative accounts.”¹¹⁴ Marxism is no exception: “The Marxist view of history is neither confirmable nor disconfirmable by appeal to ‘historical evidence,’ for what is at issue between a Marxist and a non-Marxist view of history is the question of precisely what counts as evidence and what does not, how data are to be constituted as evidence, and what implications for the comprehension of the present social reality are to be drawn from the evidence thus constituted.”¹¹⁵ White reads Marx’s representation of political economy as imagined within the genre of Tragedy (the transformation of production increases misery and intensifies class conflict), and Marx’s strategy of representation as metonymic—taking the part for the whole (modes of production are the sources of history). And in the place of Foucault’s utopia as the sign of history’s end, White suggested that Marx’s revolutionary theory unconsciously instantiated Comedy (conflicts dissolve into harmony). Eventually, however, in his own terms White achieves an approximation of Foucault’s location of Marxism: “The bourgeoisie becomes, in Marx’s emplotment of history, the Tragic hero through whose fall the proletariat is raised to consciousness of its uniquely Comic destiny in world history.”¹¹⁶ Though this appears to be a

reluctant concession on White's part ("because of the special place given to the proletariat, Marx was forced to endow the bourgeoisie itself with a special role in the historical drama"),¹¹⁷ the privileging of the bourgeoisie by Marx and Engels still serves as substantiation of their self-reflectivity as bourgeois ideologists.

What Foucault and White imply is that Marxian economics was neither a progression from nor a negation of classical or bourgeois political economy. For both, such a reading would be naïve if not complicitous. White has distilled that "the work of every master historian usually arises from an effort to wed a mode of emplotment with a mode of argument or of ideological implication which is inconsonant with it,"¹¹⁸ which is in part how we might approach Marx. Marx's socialist vision (Comic) was joined with a mechanistic historical system which sprung itself from commercial and bureaucratic imaginings. Revolted by a civil order which claimed a superior historical, moral, and cultural position while simultaneously exposing masses of humanity to numbing material degradation and spiritual repression, Marx collided explanatory tropes (modes of thought) embedded in its own epistemic imagination and narrative strategies. Marx, in white's words, "attempted to combine the Synecdochic strategies of Hegel with the Metonymical strategies of the political economy of his time in order to create a historical vision that was at once 'dialectical' and 'materialistic'—that is to say, 'historical' and 'mechanistic' simultaneously."¹¹⁹ The conceptual disruption consequent to the juxtaposition of metaphorical forms was no more evident than in *Capital*, where in the same chapter Marx interrupted his metonymically driven treatment of the sources of exchange and use values in commodities in order to contend with the "mystical character," the fetishism, of commodities.¹²⁰

But Foucault and White entirely neglected the fact that Marx's thought was also shaped by the retrieval of mythic, poetic, dramatic, and economic discourses crafted in antiquity. From the works of Homer and its reiteration in what Mircea Eliade termed the "Asiatico-Mediterranean world," Marx appropriated the notion of the "redeeming role of the Just"; and in Hesiod he found one of the first poetic expressions of the myth of the Golden Age which "many traditions put at the beginning and the end of history."¹²¹ As a student of Greek philosophy, drama, and poetry as well as German metaphysics, Marx could hardly escape these recurring emplotments and their influence on his poetics of agency and the writing of

history. And just as White, himself, would draw on ancient literary forms, Marx experimented with forms of organic metaphor which S. S. Praver notes “have a distinguished history in European cultural theory from Plato and Aristotle to Goethe.”¹²² Marx was not only familiar with Aristotle’s economic thought but, as Praver informs us, “the works of Homer, Hesiod, and Lucretius [were] searched for evidence of commercial and financial beliefs, practices, and conditions in the ancient world.”¹²³ And for similar purposes, Marx cited the thoughts of Euripides, Sophocles, Aristophanes, Xenophon, Virgil, and Horace.¹²⁴ Persuaded that “different cultures, different periods, may have stages that correspond to one another,” Marx insisted that such a correspondence existed between the philosophic developments of post-Aristotelian Hellenism and his own post-Hegelian period.¹²⁵ In both style and substance, Marx found much to attract him among the ancients.

A more profound discontinuity existed between the inspirations of earlier Western socialist discourse and Marxism. Where once the dispositions of power, property, and poverty had been viewed as affronts to God’s will and subversions of natural law, for Marx they were the issue of historical laws and personal and class ambition. Thus, though Marx was familiar with heretical rebelliousness (Martin Luther, the Anabaptists, etc.), in his economic works he more frequently drew upon secular dramatists (Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe) and pre-Christian literature (Sophocles, Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle) as sources of ideas contrary to bourgeois thought.¹²⁶ By evacuating radical medieval philosophy from socialism’s genealogy, Marx privileged his own ideological rules of discursive formation, providing a rationale for distinguishing the scientific socialism concomitant with the appearance of capitalist society from the lesser (“utopian”) and necessarily inadequate articulation of socialism which occurred earlier.¹²⁷ So doing, he deprived his own work of the profound and critical insights exemplified in Marsilius’s writings. Both the ancients and his own immediate predecessors, for instance, contributed to an inferior, more ambiguous, and misogynist consciousness of female liberation to that constituted in medieval radicalism. Similarly, the elevation of natural law philosophy by renegade medieval scholars into a formidable opposition to private property, racism, and imperialist excess was neglected. The alternative discourses, both of the ancient world and of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were directly implicated in the legitimation of slave economies, slave labor, and racism.

Democracy, too, fueled by centuries of popular resistances, had acquired its better champions among medieval socialists. Notwithstanding their keen appetites for history, Marx and Engels had chosen to obliterate the most fertile discursive domain for their political ambitions and historical imaginations. Possibly even less troubling for them, they displaced a socialist motivation grounded on the insistence that men and women were divine agents for the fractious and weaker allegiances of class.

Reality and Its Representation

Marxists may have to ask whether they have turned their backs too decidedly in the past on the fact that socialism itself is in many ways the offspring of Christianity.—V. G. KIERNAN¹

The invention of Marx (and Marxian socialism) begun by Marx and Engels themselves had several consequences for the historical representation of Western socialism and socialist consciousness. The iconography of Marxism displaced socialism historically, transferring its ideological, social, and material origins from the earliest recorded history to “the era of capitalism.” With the emergence of Marxism in the twentieth century as the dominant discourse in revolutionary socialism, it was possible to rhetorically conflate a fabricated history of socialism with the appearances of a modern bourgeoisie and a specific laboring class, the proletariat. It could then be claimed that two classes determined the character of modern society: one class, the bourgeoisie, embodying all that was evil in the world; the other, industrial labor, constituting human salvation.² And in privileging capitalism as the foundation of modern social forms an architecture was imposed on history (“precapitalist,” capitalist, and then socialist modes of production) which further exaggerated the importance and distinctiveness of the modern formations of the bourgeoisie and proletariat.³ Finally, the State, the ultimate form of modern political authority, could be apprehended by Marxists as merely an instrument of class rule. It was no more the Subject of history than its predecessors (chiefs, kings, absolute monarchs) had been. The modern State adjudicated, administered, regulated, surveilled, and policed, but it did not rule.⁴

In the presence of the pristine opposition between classes which historical materialism presumed, an evangelical politics could be forged from the focus on the class struggle, the penultimate competition for

power. “Renegade” middle-class intellectuals could proceed in the unrelenting critique and destruction of bourgeois society with the certain conviction that all other considerations were secondary to the eventual triumph of the proletariat. And what the proletariat themselves might desire, if to the contrary, such could be assigned to the immaterial or “false consciousness.”⁵ It was just such single-mindedness which originally inspired Marx’s prodigious scholarship on the nature of capitalism and the economic conceit which deflected him from a more comprehensive treatment of history, classes, culture, race-ethnicity, gender, and language.

As J. K. Gibson-Graham (Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson) has so effectively suggested, contrary to the “capitalcentrism” of classical Marxism and most of its later variants, socialism and non-capitalisms have histories, too.⁶ These histories, however, are encased by Marxism and political economy in the evolutionary history of capitalism. Thus slaves and peasants are conceptualized as pre-capitalist forms of labor or as “primitive accumulation” for capitalism; the self-employed are constructed as marginal forms; and socialism appears merely as an opposition to capitalism. Having no independent or autonomous being outside of capitalism’s hegemony, they warrant only the archaeological gaze Gibson-Graham queries of such conceits: “Who ever heard of the development in the contemporary western world of noncapitalist class processes like feudalism or slavery as prevalent forms of exploitation, or of independent commodity production as a locus of ‘self-appropriation’? Yet these are the greatest survival stories in the history of class. Our focus on the development of the different forms of capitalist enterprise (and by implication of capitalist exploitation) has made it difficult to conceptualize the permanence and establishment of many noncapitalist forms of exploitation in households, shops, small factories, farms, and communes.”⁷

In the enterprise of imagining and narrating a world history or a history of a world-system—in part derivative of Eurocentrism, in part a habituation to the epistemological presumptions of modern science as well as the Judeo-Christian monotheism—we are drawn into a Kantian construct of being and knowing. The template was no more forcefully or clearly expressed by Marx and Engels when they wrote that the bourgeoisie “compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst; *i.e.*, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word,

it creates a world after its own image.”⁸ It is now, however, more certain that, as Andre Gunder Frank has put it: “Not only was there no unilinear ‘progression’ from one ‘mode’ of production to another; but all manner of relations of production were and remain widely intermingled even within any one ‘society.’”⁹

Marx and Engels were equally intoxicated with industrialism, the most utilitarian manifestation of science and scientific engineering. As such, they were confirmed in their dismissive treatment of non-industrial labor, consigning such workers and the social sites where they predominated to the “dustbin” of history. For Marx and Engels to have extended credit to “backward” peasants, farmers, agrarian workers, or slaves for a critical role in the formulation of Western socialism would have been an improbable event. In *The German Ideology* (1845–46) Marx had insisted “that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture.”¹⁰ In North America, while Marx was developing his manuscript, nothing of the sort was taking place. Robert Fogel informs us that from 1810 to 1860, the demand for slaves in the South increased twentyfold, and tobacco and cotton production increased and expanded into the western slave states through the intervention of the steam engine in transportation (the steamboat and railroads).¹¹ By the beginnings of the American Civil War in the 1860s, indeed, slave labor had proven so productive that two-thirds of North America’s most wealthy lived in the South.¹² And, of course, the destruction of that slave system required a slave rebellion sutured from the ideological and social practices of slave and free blacks and non-blacks (marronage, insurrections, wars) which had their own history.¹³ Finally, when we survey the present, it is clear that neither industrialism nor capitalism extinguished slavery in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.

In their stadial historical imagination Marx and Engels had believed that socialism was the objective construction of the future, representing a decisive break with the pre-modern past. In the passage cited in the previous paragraph, Marx had ended with the declaration that “‘Liberation’ is a historical and not a mental act, and it is brought about by historical conditions, the [development] of industry, commerce, [agri]culture, the [conditions of intercourse].”¹⁴ The Haitian Revolution which preceded these thoughts did not adhere to this assertion; and, later, neither did the Mexican Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese, the Algerian,

the Cuban, the Nicaraguan, the Iranian. . . . None of these were deposed by what Marx meant when he deployed the notion of history. And each contained an un-Marxian mix of either slaves or peasants, farmers, and other noncapitalist laborers. And it is no rejoinder that they proved to be imperfect. Where in human experience do such resolutions appear?

As I have attempted to demonstrate in the preceding chapter, transfixing the origins of socialist theory to the work of Marx also served to suppress the natural history of Western socialism and to restrict its theoretical and practical development. Once Marx was ensconced at the conceptual pinnacle of socialist thought, the interrogation of its social bases was exchanged for the pursuit of its eponymic intellectual provenance: proceeding from Marx to Hess, and then to Hegel, to Kant, *ad infinitum*; leaping from text to precedent text. This socialist genealogy stood above and outside history, each preceding era producing a link in an ideational lineage. As such, the characteristic ambition of the modern intellectual, the desire to substitute a discernible phylogeny of thinkers for the messiness of human activity and historical experience was realized through the agency of a radical philosophy. And since a naïve scientism was the sovereign intellectual currency of the nineteenth century, socialism could be costumed as such a science, lending it a fateful authority which it might not otherwise obtain.

Marx claimed that what was unique in his analysis was not the existence of classes but proof that socialism would result from the agency of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”¹⁵ Interestingly, near the end of Marx’s life, Engels placed a very different emphasis on Marx’s contributions. Indeed, in the stead of Marx’s claim to have discovered the rigorous historical logic behind the appearance of socialism, Engels dwelt on two revelations of a conceptual nature: (1) that the mode of production formed “the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved”; and (2) that surplus value revealed “the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created.”¹⁶ This is Engels’s eulogy at Marx’s graveside in 1883.¹⁷ It is only a surmise, but it is possible that the author who had researched *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1880) had some doubts concerning the claims of his colleague with respect to the preconditions of socialism. More credibly, Engels confirmed Marx’s

originality in the construction of historical materialism and its application to their own era.

To be certain, as we have seen, the existence of a previous socialist discourse was subsequently investigated by a few Marxists. Marx himself had acknowledged older socialist impulses only to dismiss them as deceits or anachronisms.¹⁸ But Karl Kautsky, Engels's collaborator and the editor of several of Marx's posthumous publications, was one Marxist who examined early Christian communism as well as the socialist works of Thomas More in the sixteenth century. In his *Foundations of Christianity* (1908), Kautsky argued that the earliest Christian communities (until the fourth century) were dominated by "proletarians."¹⁹ But given their meager resources, Kautsky insisted, the communism of these communities was based on consumption (common meals, mutual aid organizations) rather than production, the latter persisting in the form of private production based on slave labor. The earliest Christian communism was thus subverted by its compromises with slavery ("Christianity was the first to raise the spineless obedience of the slave to a moral duty, something to be performed with gladness"),²⁰ by the strategies chosen to attract converts from the propertied classes ("As the community ceased to be a fighting organization and clarities came more and more to the fore within it, the stronger were its tendencies to temper its original proletarian hatred against the rich and to make staying in the community attractive to the rich, even if they stayed rich and held on to their money"),²¹ and by the increasing reliance of expanding Christian communities on hierarchical offices.²² In short, the Base was insufficient to sustain a fugitive radicalism in the Superstructure.

In his earlier work, *Thomas More and His Utopia* (190), which treated late medieval Catholicism and its influence on the socialist thought of More, Kautsky closely adhered to the canons of Marxist interpretation. For Kautsky the significant opposition to the Church was borne first by the landed classes, and then with the development of commodity production, by the rising burgher classes and its intelligentsia, the Humanists.²³ The Humanists, however, "attacked not the institutions of the Church, but the persons of its members and the spirit which animated them."²⁴ Similarly, the Jesuits received short shrift as "the greatest trading company of Europe."²⁵ And while Kautsky was willing to concede that "the revolt against the Papacy was essentially a struggle between exploiters and exploited,"²⁶ he found within the popular resistance to the church

little beyond “superstition and fanaticism, cruelty and bloodthirstiness, developed to insane lengths.”²⁷ In Kautsky’s hands, then, More’s utopian socialism, as the anachronistic product of a late medieval intellectual, merely became the doctrinaire means of affirming the sovereignty of Marx’s scientific socialism. When Kautsky insisted that “More has closer affinity with the so-called socialistic phenomena of Antiquity, above all, with Platonic Communism, than with present-day Socialism”²⁸ and remarked with respect to More’s concern with the emancipation of women that “More anticipated a principle of modern Socialism before the material conditions existed upon which this principle could be based,”²⁹ he was essentially paraphrasing Marx’s observation that “Don Quixote long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society.”³⁰

This discursive ordering did not merely do violence to the actual but concealed record of the development of Western socialist belief but as well aborted the close interrogation of that history. What Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin might have apprehended, for example, from the Jesuit “experiment” in Paraguay was denied them. The Jesuits had opposed Indian slavery through the promotion of native rebellions and the securing of slave labor from Africans. Rebellion exposed the missionaries to the contagion of power, just as earlier, African slavery had compromised the tenets of Dominican theology and their moral community. Similarly, the Russian revolutionists fell victim to the seductions of power insinuated in the empire to which they became heirs. And their failure to extend autonomy or civil rights to national groups like the Ukrainians or classes like the kulaks encrusted the communist state with ethnic and social oppositions.

In any case, Kautsky’s excavations of pre-Marxian socialism had little effect on later Marxist historians since his privileged apostolic status was eviscerated by the consequences of his opposition to Bolshevism. Despite, or perhaps because of his orthodox views, Kautsky ran afoul of Lenin who subsequently branded him a “renegade.” Combined with historical materialism’s inscribed reluctance towards “utopian” socialism, it is not remarkable that Kautsky’s example was shunned. As Cornel West comments, “Ironically, the major figures of so-called Western Marxism were preoccupied with culture—but none was materialist enough to take religion seriously.”³¹

The reductionism which became so characteristic of later Marxists was only partially the responsibilities of Marx and Engels. Indeed, as is

well known, Engels explicitly warned against such error.³² While it is the case that Marx and Engels considerably narrowed the domain of Western socialism's genealogy, it must be acknowledged with equal candor that they also achieved a rather remarkable and fecund portrait of modern capitalism's early development. Without their intervention, radical politics in both the West and elsewhere might very well have lacked the conceptual purchase which proved so important at the peripheries of the world-system in the resistances to imperialism and colonialism which have decorated the twentieth century. Neither can it be said that Marx and Engels were solely responsible for the doctrinaire and near-religious authority extended to their treatment of history. Theirs was an abundantly fertile legacy which, as Lenin, Mao, Fidel Castro, Amílcar Cabral, C. L. R. James, and other non-Western revolutionists have so effectively demonstrated, could inspire creative and imaginative thought as well as idolatry. But these come very close to the "mental act" with which Marx was not infatuated. Nevertheless, if not the privileged place so often claimed for it, it is certain that Marxism occupies a place in socialist history.

Western socialism had older and different roots. It radiated from the desperation, anguish, and rage of the rural poor of the medieval era, assuming expressions as diverse as the politically secular, the mystical, and the heretical. It manifested in mass movements of violent rebelliousness, in hysterical devotion as well as ecclesiastical debates. And its moral and social denunciations stung temporal rulers, the wealthy classes, and the clerical privileged alike. Socialist discourse survived the Inquisition by its insinuation into popular culture, the Church's teachings, and eventually bourgeois intellectual writ. And as I have shown, its persistent reinvigoration in visions of an alternative social order was the consequence not of class hegemony but of a dialectic between power and resistance to its abuses. Not surprisingly in the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, socialism resurfaced as one of the most frightful expressions of the aspirations of the poor and lower classes. And inevitably it brought inspiration to radicals of the next generation like Marx and Engels.

Both in the West and the world beyond, the socialist impulse will survive Marxism's conceits just as earlier it persevered the repressions of the Church and secular authorities. The warrant for such an assertion, I have argued, is located in history and the persistence of the human

spirit. As the past and our present demonstrate, domination and oppression inspire that spirit in ways we may never fully understand. That a socialist discourse is an irrepressible response to social injustice has been repeatedly confirmed. On that score it has been immaterial whether it was generated by peasants or slaves, workers or intellectuals, or whether it took root in the metropole or the periphery.

It is a matter there of an ethical and political imperative, an appeal as unconditional as the appeal of thinking from which it is not separated.—JACQUES DERRIDA³³

NOTES

FOREWORD

I want to acknowledge M. A. Bortner, Elizabeth Robinson, C. A. Griffith, and Brandon Proia for their wonderful suggestions and kind patience.

1. Robin D. G. Kelley, introduction to Walter Johnson with Robin D. G. Kelley, eds., *Race, Capitalism, Justice: Boston Review, Forum 1* (2017): 5–8.

2. More than a material precondition, bourgeois advents here function much like a precognition—a prescience or future vision *and* what Foucault might call historical *a priori*. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

3. Here I am appropriating Robinson’s term. See Cedric J. Robinson, *The Terms of Order: Political Science and the Myth of Leadership* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

4. The 1993 course reader and the Ashgate edition (2001) of *The Anthropology of Marxism* contain the same number of chapters, with identical chapter headings, and without extensive revision. The book version, however, contains a somewhat denser historical coverage of the medieval era. Also, as Elizabeth Robinson pointed out to me, in the early 1990s, no publisher was interested. See Cedric J. Robinson, *An Anthropology of Marxism* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001).

5. See Avery F. Gordon’s preface to this book for an instructive exposition of Robinson’s historical materialism.

6. It should be noted that, if we were to consider the peoples and lands that exist outside the province of the West or that of Western-centric historiographers, this perspective is bizarre, at best. Take, for instance, what transpired among feminists of color at the I Am Your Sister Conference (Boston, 1992) celebrating the life and work of Audre Lorde, the noted “black, lesbian, feminist, warrior, poet.” At a forum where activists coalesced to create a vehicle for mass action, they fervently argued and insisted that “socialist” appear in the name of the new organization—as socialist, feminist, women of color revolutionaries.

7. The historian Robin D. G. Kelley recently noted Robinson’s immense influence and suggested that it was likely “greater than perhaps [Robinson] may have realized” (Kelley, “Introduction,” *Boston Review*, 2017, 1). Excluding the legions of Robinson’s readers and students in and out of academia, the special issues of *Race & Class* (“Cedric Robinson and the Philosophy of Black Resistance,” ed. Darryl C. Thomas, vol. 47, no. 2 [2005]), *African Identities* (“Black Ontology, Radical Scholarship, and Freedom,” ed. H. L. T. Quan and Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, vol. 11, no. 2

[2013]), and *Boston Review's Forum* (see note 1, above), as well as the collected essays in *Futures of Black Radicalism*, ed. Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin (New York: Verso, 2017), are only a few examples where Robinson's countless contributions to radical thought and scholarship are enumerated.

8. Elsewhere I argue that the Robinsonian method is fundamentally democratic and transparency is essential to that approach. See H. L. T. Quan, "Emancipatory Social Inquiry: Democratic Anarchism and the Robinsonian Method," *African Identities* 11, no. 2 (2013): 117–32.

9. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). Fukuyama first advanced his thesis in a 1989 essay, "The End of History?" *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18. He argued that the developments associated with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc were greater than the ending of the Cold War, "but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Huntington's thesis, first advanced at a 1992 lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, later appeared in an essay titled "The Clash of Civilizations?" (*Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 [Summer 1993]: 22–49) and was then expanded upon in the book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Huntington's AEI lecture was a response to his former student (Fukuyama), in which he relied on Fukuyama's central arguments about the "end of history" as the end of ideology, but pointed to cultural conflicts as new flashpoints of the new world order.

10. Wendy Brown (*Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* [New York: Zone Books, 2015]) argues that one of the most insidious effects of neoliberalism is the extension of capitalist logic to the polity where the market "configures human beings exhaustively as market actors" (12) and where democracy is being unmoored and disemboweled (9). See also David Harvey, *A Brief Introduction of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

11. Fukuyama, *The End of History*.

12. In the foreword to the reprinted *The Terms of Order* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), Erica Edwards astutely observes that Robinson's very first monograph itself is "an act of faith in the truest sense: a deeply invested statement of belief in the power of language, of communal approaches to social organization, and of the rule of the people where the people . . . [is] the rabble, the mob, the motley crew" (x). I would argue that this act of faith is evident in Robinson's entire body of work, and especially in *Anthropology* where Robinson gifted humans, especially the heretical, as "divine agents" (16).

13. Martin Jay, *Fin de Siècle Socialism and Other Essays* (New York: Routledge, 1988). In the title essay, the eminently sensible intellectual historian Martin Jay evokes a form of melancholia generally associated with left-leaning individuals, though he warns us that the term "fin de siècle" (end of century) itself "conjures up the anxious and despairing mood associated with the decadents of late nineteenth century bourgeois culture, while the socialism of that same era was still in the full flush of the exuberant youth" (1). However, as we were approaching "the fin of another siècle . . . socialism, both as a theoretical tradition and a body of practices, may well find the means to transcend the current mood of what was, appropriately called 'left melancholy' in the century to come" (1–2).

14. Here *Anthropology* is explicitly counterdistinct from Jacques Derrida's argu-

ments about Fukuyama's end of history thesis and the relevance of Marxian radical critiques in *Specters of Marx* (New York: Routledge, 1994). Interestingly, while the first incarnation of *Anthropology* had difficulty getting published, the 1994 publication of *Specters of Marx*, a series of lectures by Derrida, was seen at the time as a necessary and radical counterpoint to Fukuyama and the other "neo-evangelese" of capitalist, liberal democracies. For Robinson and *Anthropology*, it is the specters of socialism, not necessarily of Marx and Marxism, that serve as counterpoints to neoliberalism and its vices. It should be noted that the 2001 printed version of *Anthropology* contains an epigram at the end of the book from the *Specters of Marx*, though the 1993 reader predates Derrida's publication by a year and, as such, is without the epigram. In contrast to the reception of Derrida's *Specters*, it is a matter of record that *Anthropology* was scantily reviewed and had limited circulation. With the exception of the reprint of Avery Gordon's preface in *Race & Class* 47, no. 2 (2005): 23–38, the reception of the book was muted.

15. In *Capitalism: A Ghost Story* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2014), based on research on the functions of private foundations and the spreading of market fundamentalism and neoliberal economic restructuring, Arundhati Roy astutely suggests that "capitalism's real 'gravediggers' may end up being its own delusional cardinals, who have turned ideology into faith" (46). As she argues, "despite having successfully powered through economic reforms, despite having waged wars and military occupied countries in order to put in place free market 'democracies,' Capitalism is going through a crisis whose gravity has not revealed itself completely yet" (45). This is so in part because these "cardinals of sin," Roy suggests, are having "trouble grasping a simple fact: Capitalism is destroying the planet" because "the old tricks . . . War and Shopping will simply not work" (46). For a more systematic exposition of racial capitalism and the manufacturing of inequality, and racial capitalist logic, see Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, *Waste of a White Skin: The Carnegie Corporation and the Racial Logic of White Vulnerability* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). For information on wealth concentration and hoarding, see the Oxfam Report, *Wealth: Having It All and Wanting More*, 2016, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/wealth-having-it-all-and-wanting-more-338125>.

16. "Donald Trump Has Just Met with the New Leader of the Secular World—Pope Francis," *Independent*, May 24, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-pope-francis-trip-new-leader-of-free-world-a7753621.html>.

17. http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium_en.pdf.

18. "Unbridled Capitalism Is the 'Dung of the Devil,' Says Pope Francis," *The Guardian*, July 9, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/10/poor-must-change-new-colonialism-of-economic-order-says-pope-francis>. For further reference on the general cruelty and violence of capitalist development, see H. L. T. Quan, *Growth against Democracy: Savage Developmentalism in the Modern World* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 2012).

19. Rosie Scammell, "Pope Recruits Naomi Klein in Climate Change Battle," *The Guardian*, June 27, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/pope-climate-change-naomi-klein>.

20. "Naomi Klein on Embracing Pope Francis' Critique of Capitalism," PBS News Hour, September 25, 2015, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/naomi-klein-popes-economics/>.

21. Naomi Klein, "A Radical Vatican," *The New Yorker*, July 10, 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-visit-to-the-vatican>.

22. Arundhati Roy, "Speech to a People's University," in Roy, *Capitalism*.

PREFACE

1. The phrase is from Herbert Marcuse, "The End of Utopia," in *Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1970), 69. See also Avery F. Gordon, *The Hawthorn Archive: Letters from the Utopian Margins* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017).

2. Cedric J. Robinson, *The Terms of Order: Political Science and the Myth of Leadership* (originally published in 1980), with an introduction by Erica R. Edwards (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (originally published in 1983), with an introduction by Robin D. G. Kelley (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Movements in America* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Cedric J. Robinson, *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning: Blacks and the Regimes of Race in American Theater and Film before World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). In addition to these major books, Robinson has written many essays, some of which have been collected and edited by Elizabeth Robinson and H. L. T. Quan in a volume forthcoming from Pluto Press.

3. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 175.

4. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 2.

5. *Ibid.* That revisionist history has been taken up and extended most directly and explicitly by Lisa Lowe in *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).

6. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 3.

7. *Ibid.*, 72–73. It's been my impression that often the title *Black Marxism* has been misconstrued as describing the identity of its author. In case it bears making more explicit, I do not think it is accurate to describe Robinson as a "black Marxist."

8. The published origin of this critique is actually *The Terms of Order*. And, as H. L. T. Quan pointed out to me, despite its prior publication date, *Black Movements in America* is usefully read as an application of the themes and concerns explored in *An Anthropology of Marxism*, particularly in its attention to the signal role of women and the black church in the history of mass black political movements in America, and in its analytic focus on visions of social justice. It might be worth noting here one way in which *An Anthropology of Marxism* departs from *Black Marxism*. The departure is not, I think, to be located in what appears to be the obvious contrast between a black radical tradition conceived as "the negation of Western civilization" and a socialist tradition squarely located within it, although *An Anthropology of Marxism's* object of analysis is a choice with tremendous significance for how we understand radical thought and movements today. The departure hinges on what appears to be a radical break in *An Anthropology of Marxism* with the dialectical power of racial capitalism to issue its most "formidable opposition." In Gibson-Graham's terms, *An Anthropology of Marxism* presumes "the end of capitalism (as we knew it)" not only as a future-oriented goal, but as a condition for recognizing, to quote Robinson from *Black Marxism*, that which "cements pain to

purpose, experience to expectation, consciousness to collective action.” See J. K. Gibson-Graham, *The End of Capitalism (as We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), and Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 317.

9. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London: Penguin, 1968), 9. Thompson’s definition of class as a “historical phenomenon” —not a “structure” or “even . . . a category,” but the mix of the “raw material of experience and consciousness . . . which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships” —is not unlike what Robinson means when he approaches the socialist tradition as a historical phenomenon.

10. When the preface was first written, this position was becoming increasingly popular. For its most succinct statement, see William Greider, “The Ghost of Marx,” chap. 3 in *One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).

11. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 170. This doubt is central to everything Robinson ever wrote, said, and did because it is always liberation or, as he eloquently put it in *Anthropology*, “the recovery of human life from the spoilage of degradation” (ooo) that motivates the critical excavations whether of the origin of Western civilization or the history of European socialism or of those racial regimes sutured by early Hollywood cinema to the making of a white supremacist capitalist nation.

12. Robinson, *The Terms of Order*, 214.

13. *Ibid.*

14. This method of critically examining discourse we commonly associate today with Michel Foucault. In both *An Anthropology of Marxism* (ooo) and *The Terms of Order*, Robinson notes the debt to Foucault for “the bold yet elegant turn by which he reinserted Marxism into bourgeois cosmology.” But there is only a superficial similarity between the two thinkers. For Robinson’s critique of Foucault, see *The Terms of Order*, chaps. 4 and 6; *An Anthropology of Marxism*, chap. 4; and *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning*, preface.

15. Robinson, *The Terms of Order*, xxiv–xxx.

16. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 307.

17. What Robinson intends by the notion of reference is considerably broader than its colloquial meaning: “The total institutions of Western society: disciplines, modern political parties, State bureaucracies and the scientific establishment, are not merely the germinal arenas for these metaphysics but their reference as well—the analogy of their subsequent application.” *The Terms of Order*, 129 (emphasis added).

18. Toni Cade Bambara, “The Education of a Storyteller,” in Bambara, *Deep Sightings and Rescue Missions: Fiction, Essays, and Conversations*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 255.

19. Robinson, *Black Movements in America*, 134.

20. See also Michael Taussig on the case of Roger Casement in *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

21. Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” (1859), in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, trans. Lucio Colletti (London: Penguin, 1975), 425.

22. Cedric J. Robinson and Elizabeth P. Robinson, preface to Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin, eds., *Futures of Black Radicalism* (New York: Verso, 2017), 7.

23. Herbert Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (1937), in *Negations: Essays*

in *Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Free Association, 1988), 143. Angela Y. Davis brought this passage to my attention many years ago. See also Marcuse, "The End of Utopia."

24. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," 143. The phrase "breeder of illusions and . . . disillusioners" is from Immanuel Wallerstein, *Utopistics: or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: New Press, 1998), 1.

25. I am thinking here not only of what Toni Morrison has taken the beloved to mean, but also how A. Sivinandan delicately locates it in the interstices of home-based political education and anticolonial struggle in his magnificent novel *When Memory Dies* (London: Arcadia, 1997).

26. Marisela Marquez, executive director of associated students at the University of California Santa Barbara, read from this letter at the memorial service for Robinson held on June 16, 2016, in Santa Barbara.

27. This is Robinson's description of the black radical tradition in *Black Marxism*, xxx.

28. Cedric J. Robinson, "Manichaeism and Multiculturalism," in Avery Gordon and Christopher Newfield, eds., *Mapping Multiculturalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 122.

29. Cedric Robinson, introduction to Richard Wright, *White Man, Listen!* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), xx.

CHAPTER 1

1. The proletariat was originally the term used to designate the large class of poor, free citizens of the early Roman empire. Cf. Keith Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). According to Herman E. Daly, "The literal Latin meaning of 'proletariat' is 'those with many offspring,'" and the full ancient Roman sense of the word is "the lowest class of a people, whose members, poor and exempt from taxes, were useful to the republic only for the procreation of children." "A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty and Development," *Population Studies* 25 (1971): 25.

2. William Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe: A Critique of Historical Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26; for E. P. Thompson see his *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1966).

3. Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe*, 27. Cf. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); George Taylor, "Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution," *American Historical Review* 72 (1967): 469–96; and Colin Lucas, "Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution," *Past and Present* 60 (1973): 84–126.

4. Cf. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978). Terrell Carver has persuasively argued that Engels borrowed this schema from Moses Hess's *The Triarchy of Europe*. Cf. Carver, "Engels and the French Revolution," paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings, Atlanta, September 1989.

5. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," 622.

6. Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 245. This was, of course, not precisely the case even in Engels's own lifetime. For

accounts of Engels's difficulties with alternative interpreters of Marxism, see Paul Kellogg, "Engels and the Roots of 'Revisionism,'" *Science & Society* 55, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 158–74. Engels, of course, had a considerable advantage: not only was he Marx's co-author (and sometimes actual stand-in), but he had often served as a publicist-reviewer of Marx's published works (Engels, for example, anonymously published seven reviews of the first volume of *Capital* in English and German periodicals). Terrell Carver, *Engels* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 40–41. For a critique of Lichtheim's treatment of Engels, see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 250ff.

7. John Kautsky, "Karl Kautsky's Materialist Conception of History," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 30, nos. 1–2 (1989): 80–92.

8. V. I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism," in *Lenin: Selected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1967), 41. George Lichtheim, one of the legion of writers who (sometimes reluctantly) have reiterated Engels's formula for the analysis of Marx's thought, asserted: "Our starting-point is not 'dialectical materialism,' or some such abstraction, but the French Revolution and its impact on Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century; along with the industrial revolution and its repercussions in the theoretical sphere, i.e., among the late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century British and French writers who were then engaged in working out the analytical tools appropriate to the study of the new society" (Lichtheim, *Marxism*, xviii). This is clearly a paraphrase of Engels and Lenin. For a non-Marxian instance, see Albert S. Lindemann, *A History of European Socialism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 87ff.

9. V. I. Lenin, "Karl Marx," in *Lenin: Selected Works*, 1:7.

10. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: International, 1970), 21.

11. E. J. Hobsbawm observes: "The economist of the 1780s would read Adam Smith, but also—and perhaps more profitably—the French physiocrats and national income accountants, Quesnay, Turgot, Dupont de Nemours, Lavoisier, and perhaps an Italian or two." *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962), 47.

12. A. V. Anikin, *A Science in Its Youth* (New York: International, 1979), 8. Of course, a much earlier treatment of an economy as a natural system could be found in Aristotle's *The Politics*, book 1.

13. For Marx's consideration of Petty, see Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*; and for Petty and Franklin, Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1987), 57n1.

14. Anikin, *A Science in Its Youth*, 55.

15. Frank Swetz, *Capitalism and Arithmetic: The New Math of the 15th Century* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 10ff.

16. *Ibid.*, 234ff.

17. Technically, of course, this arithmetic had as its preconditions the introduction in twelfth-century Spain of the Hindu-Arabic system of numeration and computation through the Latin translation of al-Khwarizmi (c. 825). *Ibid.*, 27–28.

18. John Mbiti maintains of traditional African cosmology: "Time is a two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present and virtually no future. The linear concept of time in western thought, with an indefinite past, present

and infinite future, is practically foreign to African thinking.” *African Religions and Philosophy* (London: Heinemann, 1969), 17.

19. The early Greeks, for instance, anticipated our belief in a linear historical order but with a difference. Hesiod (*Works and Days*), for one, reversed our historical order: the perfect age, the Golden Age, came first; all subsequent history (the Age of Silver, the Ages of Iron and Bronze) was progressive deterioration marked by human degradation. Plato, in his *Republic*, echoed Hesiod. Among others, primarily peasant agrarian societies, history has often been conceptualized as a cyclical order.

20. Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 71.

21. C. K. Barrett, ed., *The New Testament Background: Selected Documents* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 316.

22. See Gouldner’s discussion of millenarianism and Marxism in *The Two Marxisms*, chap. 5.

23. Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 34. As we shall see later, Kant’s dichotomy between the empirical (the “is”) and transcendent (the “ought”) anticipated by two centuries Freud’s later claim in *Civilization and Its Discontents* that civilization requires repression and therefore is coterminous with neurosis.

24. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth*, 50.

25. Quote from John O’Malley’s introduction to Karl Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,”* ed. John O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), xxix.

26. Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Marx, Engels, and Pre-Marxian Socialism,” in E. J. Hobsbawm, ed., *The History of Marxism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 6.

27. For biographical details on Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Owen, see Lindemann, *A History of European Socialism*.

28. Hobsbawm, “Marx, Engels, and Pre-Marxian Socialism,” 11.

29. Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” 689.

30. *Ibid.* The “noise” to which Engels refers continued into the twentieth century among Marxists. Lenin’s *State and Revolution* (1917) was much concerned with the controversy pertaining to the abolition of the state, and seems to have authoritatively resolved the issue. Lenin determined that what Marx maintained was that the abolition of the state was a process which first required the advent of a proletarian state.

31. *Ibid.*, 690.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. See Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” in Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth*, 62ff.

35. Three such instances in Marx’s writing concerning the historical identity and development of the proletariat are most glaring: in his *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,”* Marx refers to the proletariat as the “passive element” of radical philosophy (*criticism*); in *The Holy Family* he trivializes the voluntaristic impulses of the proletariat by declaring “It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the proletariat as a whole *pictures* at present as its goal. It is a

matter of *what the proletariat is in actuality*”; and in “*The Manifesto of the Communist Party*,” it was probably Marx who suggested that the formation of the proletariat was by a bourgeoisie acting as a sorcerer. While these are some of his earlier writings, each of these assertions raises serious issue with how Marx, even the mature Marx, understood the relationship between the proletariat and the radical intelligentsia, and the notion of the proletariat’s revolutionary role in history.

36. Marx, *The German Ideology*, in Ronald Meek, *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973), 164.

37. *Ibid.*, 154.

38. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1987), 703. Though Marx acknowledged that capitalist production had appeared earlier in “certain towns of the Mediterranean” in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, he insisted that “the capitalistic era dates from the sixteenth century.” *Ibid.*, 1:669.

39. “The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed.” Marx and Engels, “*The Manifesto of the Communist Party*,” in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 476.

40. Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 106.

41. Gilbert Allardyce, “The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,” *American Historical Review* 87, no. 3 (June 1982): 699.

42. Karl Kautsky, *Thomas More and His Utopia* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1959), 249.

43. *Ibid.*, 1.

44. Thomas Müntzer was disqualified, in part because of the contrasting economic and intellectual conditions in Germany and England. Kautsky wrote of Germany: “The rudeness, the barbarism, the boorishness into which Germany sank to an increasing extent after the sixteenth century . . . rendered the maintenance of science in Germany possible only by its being completely divorced from active life” (*ibid.*, 164). But of England, “Nowhere else in Europe . . . were the unfavorable reactions of the capitalist mode of production upon the working classes so immediately obvious as in England; nowhere did the unhappy workers clamor so urgently for assistance” (*ibid.*, 168).

45. *Ibid.*, 171.

46. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 23.

47. Monty Johnstone, “Marx and Engels and the Concept of the Party,” in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., *The Socialist Register* (London: Merlin, 1967), 130.

48. Quote from Luxemburg’s *Reform or Revolution* in Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms*, 137.

49. J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Unwin University, 1965), 344. For the other socialist movements in the United States and Europe, see *ibid.*, 341ff.

50. At the end of the eleventh century, for example, slaves represented some 9 percent of the population. Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free* (London: Methuen, 1982), 57. This proportion in the labor force would continue to expand as Mediterranean Europe became enmeshed in long-distance trade largely dependent upon

slave production. From the eleventh century, wars and crusades substantially reduced the percentages of men in Europe's population. As such, women of all estates, peasant, bourgeois, noble, became more influential as economic and intellectual forces. See Barbara Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror* (New York: Ballantine, 1978), *passim*.

51. See Nancy C. M. Hartsock, *Money, Sex and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983); and Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism* (London: Zed, 1983).

CHAPTER 2

1. Norman Cohn, "Medieval Millenarism: Its Bearing on the Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements," in Sylvia Thrupp, ed., *Millennial Dreams in Action* (New York: Schocken, 1970), 33.

2. Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (New York: International, 1966), 308.

3. In Christianity, for instance, the appearance of things as property or potential possessions precipitates the alienation of mankind from its creator. The Tree of Knowledge is a possession of God's which Adam and Eve violate; the penalties are the alienation from the company of the garden and mortality.

4. A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1961), 212.

5. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 983b, 6–11. See also Frank Leslie Vatai, *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World: From Early Times to the Hellenistic Age* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 30–42; and Gregory Vlastos, "Slavery in Plato's Thought," in Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). The idealist tradition, with which later philosophers sought to displace materialism, included the works of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. It derived its designation as "Italian" from the fact that Pythagoras, originally from the island of Samos in the Eastern Mediterranean, immigrated to Croton, Sicily, to found his school.

6. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 968a I.

7. George Thomson, *The First Philosophers* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1955), 159. Thomson (following on F. J. Cornford) reconstructed the narrative elements of primitive Greek myths—a primordial "undifferentiated mass" which eventually experiences strife due to a conflict of opposition—which appear in Anaximander's cosmology from epic literature (e.g., the Hesiodic Theogony).

8. Jonathan Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Penguin, 1987), 18–22. Stephen Mason further comments on the role of ideology among the Ionian naturalists: "The notion that there was a principle of retribution in natural processes was derived by analogy from the customs of human society in which the practice of vengeance preceded that of the due process of law. Thus the early meaning of the Greek word for cause, 'aitia,' was guilt. Such a notion was replaced ultimately by the conception that nature, like human society, was governed by laws." *A History of the Sciences* (New York: Collier, 1962), 27–28.

9. "According to tradition, Greek philosophy began in 585 BC and ended in AD 529. It began when Thales of Miletus, the first Greek philosopher, predicted an eclipse of the sun. It ended when the Christian Emperor Justinian forbade the teaching of pagan philosophy in the University of Athens." Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 9. Nearly three hundred more years would pass before the invention

of Europe in the ninth century. Cf. Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 47–49; and Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism* (London: Zed, 1983), 10ff.

10. Georges Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 15–16. For a dramatic substantiation of the divinity of European kings, see the detailed description of the execution of the failed regicide of Damiens in Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 3–5.

11. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: International, 1970), 20–21.

12. S. H. Rigby, “Historical Causation: Is One Thing More Important than Another?” *History* 80, no. 259 (June 1995): 228.

13. Ibid. Rigby is quoting from R. Lovell’s *Pictures of Reality*.

14. *The Grundrisse*, in Robert C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 4–5.

15. Ronald Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 34.

16. Ibid., 126.

17. Citation in *ibid.*, from the 1806 edition of Millar’s *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks*, 2–4.

18. Cf. Marx’s *Grundrisse* in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 229.

19. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage*, 128.

20. Ibid., 228.

21. Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (London: Penguin, 1978), 21.

22. Ibid., 21–22.

23. C. Warren Hollister, *Medieval Europe: A Short History* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 121–22.

24. Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 19.

25. Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, vol. 3, *The Perspective of the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 99.

26. Little, *Religious Poverty*, 8–9.

27. H. Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe* (London: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965), 72. The surviving long-distance commerce was dominated by the slave trade: “In the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries Western Europe had little to offer foreign traders except slaves, yet its privileged classes craved the luxuries and exotic goods which could be bought in the East.” Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800* (London: Verso, 1997), 43.

28. Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe*, 100.

29. The harsher characterization of Charlemagne is from Little’s biographical article in Microsoft’s *Encarta* ’95. In *Religious Poverty*, Little wrote: “All the characteristic traits of Germanic leaders, from the pillaging of the weak to the endowing of monasteries, are epitomized by Charlemagne (ca. 742–814). But the historical importance of his reign is less his traditional behavior than his attempts to have the Frankish crown take up what he saw to be some of the responsibilities of the Roman state” (6).

30. Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe*, 88–89.

31. Walter Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought* (London: Penguin, 1975), 68–69.

32. *Ibid.*, 70.

33. "Byzantium preserved inviolate the secret of its political longevity and bureaucratic stability, and remained the lonely and intolerant guardian of a political and intellectual order which had elsewhere been destroyed. Western Europe was not at home with its past, had not identified itself with its past, as Byzantium had done; but this Byzantine sense of being one with the past shut out all the more rigorously those who had strayed away from or had never known this past. Byzantium in western eyes aroused wonder, envy, hatred, and malice, and a sense of perplexity at the difficulties which were raised by all attempts at reunion; but it did not arouse respect or encourage understanding." R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 36.

34. Duby, *The Three Orders*, 14–15.

35. *Ibid.*, 15.

36. Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought*, 80ff and 23ff.

37. Earlier, in what would prove a futile gesture Charlemagne had opposed the sale of Christian slaves to Muslim infidels and heretics. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, however, with "renewed clashes with Islam in Spain and the Levant," the Church appropriated Charlemagne's position to negate the Muslim strategy of inciting slave revolts in Christendom, and to secure more constant loyalty to the Church among the servile population. Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, 43–44.

38. Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, 3:98–105; Oliver C. Cox, *The Foundations of Capitalism* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

39. Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, 3:99.

40. Alexander Fuks discusses "quasi-capitalism" in "Patterns and Types of Socio-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.," *Ancient Society* 5 (1974): 54; and see the discussion of Aristotle in chap. 4 below.

41. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 300ff and 340.

42. De Ste. Croix maintains "Rome's port Ostia . . . stands out as perhaps the one Western city in which far more wealth came to the local notables from commerce than from land. . . . The leading 'commercial city' of the whole empire, Alexandria, undoubtedly had some rich merchants among its citizens. . . . In the east, the one certain example of a city which must surely have had a governing class consisting at least partly of merchants is Palmyra, which was of no great importance until well into the last century B.C., but then grew rapidly into a prosperous commercial city." *Ibid.*, 128–29. See also James Q. Whitman, "The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence," *Yale Law Journal* 105, no. 7 (May 1996): 1841–89.

43. Janet Abu-Lughod proposed that the "pre-modern" world system of the thirteenth century consisted of four core areas: the Middle East, Central Asia and China, the Indian Ocean powers, and the Western Mediterranean city-states/Western European towns. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Elsewhere she writes: "Despite so promising a beginning, this incipient world-system began to unravel after the middle of the fourteenth century and, by the late fifteenth century, only small portions retained their former vigor. While historians have traditionally focused on local events to account for discrete declines, my analysis points to a set of causally-linked or

'systemic' forces set into motion by the Black Death . . . with commercially-linked core cities losing a third to a half of their populations within a few years. . . . Recovery in Europe shifted local power northward (away from Italy to formerly peripheral zones such as England)." Abu-Lughod, "Restructuring the Premodern World-System," *Review* 13, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 276-77.

44. Michael Goodich, "The Politics of Canonization in the Thirteenth Century: Lay and Mendicant Saints," *Church History* 44, no. 3 (1975): 295.

45. Little, *Religious Poverty*, 30.

46. The phrase is Alexander Murray's characterization of the clergy; see his "What the Dwarfs Saw," *Times Literary Supplement*, March 8, 1996, 3.

47. Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free* (London: Methuen, 1973), 51-52.

48. According to Lester Little, in Italy, Milan and Venice had obtained populations around 100,000, with Florence, Genoa, Rome, and Bologna in the 50,000-75,000 range; in France, Paris had close to 100,000 by the mid-fourteenth century, followed by Narbonne (30,000) and Toulouse (25,000); in Spain, Barcelona, Cordova, and Seville each exceeded 35,000; in Germany, Cologne could boast 50,000; in the Low Countries, Ghent claimed 55,000, with Bruges and Brussels "close behind"; and in England, London (50,000) was followed by York and Bristol (each around 15,000). *Religious Poverty*, 22-23.

49. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

50. "In the 1070s Pope Gregory VII referred to the many Italian merchants who went to France. . . . In 1127 there were 'Lombards' at Ypres. . . . There were Milanese merchants at the fairs by 1172, while during the thirteenth century this steady parade of Italians to northern Europe included a greater proportion of Tuscans." *Ibid.*, 12.

51. *Ibid.*, 17.

52. Michel Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages: An Essay in Social History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 62. The paragraph is a summary of *ibid.*, 59ff.

53. *Ibid.*, 57.

54. *Ibid.*, 53.

55. Henry Treece, *The Crusades* (New York: Mentor, 1962), 88-93.

56. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 98.

57. Marcus Bull, "The Pilgrimage Origins of the First Crusade," *History Today*, March 1997, 11.

58. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 76ff.

59. Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages*, 82.

60. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 24.

61. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 106-7.

62. Little, *Religious Poverty*, 110.

63. *Ibid.*, 111.

64. R. I. Moore, *The Birth of Popular Heresy* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1995), chap. 2.

65. Quoted by William Stearns Davis, *Life on a Mediaeval Barony* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1923), 271.

66. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 78-83.

67. Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages*, 125-26.

68. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 112.

69. *Ibid.*, 130.

70. R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 4, 8. In addition to Orléans (1022) and Milan (1028), Herbert Grundmann cites the interrogation of heretics at Arras in 1025. *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995 [orig. 1935]), 214.

71. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, 6–7.

72. Henry Treece maintains that 30,000 French children joined the 12-year-old Stephen of Cloyes, and thousands of them reached Algeria and Egypt—as slaves. Only one returned from the crusade. Among the slightly smaller number (20,000) of children crusaders who followed the German lad Nicholas to Genoa and then Rome, some 2,000 returned to their homes; others were enslaved by their Christian brethren. *The Crusades*, 182–85.

73. Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages*, 187.

74. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 101.

75. David L. Jeffrey observes: “At first the heresies were largely non-doctrinal—that is, they were expressions of anti-clericalism and spiritual zealotism . . . [eventually] a real divergence of doctrinal positions did develop.” “Franciscan Spirituality and the Growth of Vernacular Culture,” in David L. Jeffrey, ed., *By Things Seen* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), 144.

76. Jonathan Sumption, *The Albigensian Crusade* (London: Faber & Faber, 1978), 36.

77. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, 14. Plato’s most poetic renunciation of the physical and sensual on behalf of the soul is contained in his *Phaedo*.

78. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, 18.

79. Barbara Tuchman has commented on the medieval practical of mixing magic, mystery, and power: “The year was considered to begin at Easter and since this could fall any time between March 21 and April 22, a fixed date of March 25 was generally preferred . . . which leaves the year to which events of January, February, and March belong in the fourteenth century a running enigma—further complicated by use of the regnal year (dating from the reigning King’s accession) in official English documents of the fourteenth century and use of the papal year in certain other cases. Moreover, chroniclers did not date an event by the day of the month but by the religious calendar—speaking, for example, of two days before the Nativity of the Virgin, or the Monday after Epiphany, or St. John the Baptist’s Day, or the third Sunday in Lent.” *A Distant Mirror* (New York: Ballantine, 1979), xv.

80. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, 13.

81. Moore, *The Birth of Popular Heresy*, 2. Mani, a Persian noble, undertook his preaching mission throughout the Persian Empire and India around 242, when he was approximately 26 years old. He believed his revelation had called upon him to reconcile the teachings of Zoroaster, Buddha, and Christ. He was executed for heresy because of his doctrine of absolute dualism, the primal conflict between the gods of lightness and darkness. Augustine had been a Manichee for some nine years before he became an avowed anti-heretic. In the tenth century, Manichaeism reappeared, in Bulgaria, in the teachings of Bogomil. Bogomilism was first reported in the West in the mid-twelfth century. Jeffrey Richards, *Sex, Dissidence, and Damnation* (London: Routledge, 1990), 49ff.

82. Sumption, *The Albigensian Crusade*, 48.

83. See Edward Grant, "Celestial Matter: A Medieval and Galilean Cosmological Problem," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 157–86.

84. Walter L. Wakefield and Austin P. Evans, *Heresies of the High Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 494–510.

85. Sumption, *The Albigensian Crusade*, 39; and Wakefield and Evans, *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, 24–26.

86. "The chiliasm of the sectaries is always a mark of democratic claims and deep discontent; whenever it appears it betokens hatred of a secularized church and a foreign and selfish authority." F. W. Bussell, *Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages* (London: Scott, 1918), 779.

87. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 97ff.

88. Berard Marthaler, "Forerunners of the Franciscans: The Waldenses," *Franciscan Studies* 18 (1958): 133–42.

89. Caroline Walker Bynum, "Women Mystics and Eucharistic Devotion in the Thirteenth Century," *Women Studies* 2 (1984): 179–214.

90. Jo Ann McNamara, "De Quibusdam Mulieribus: Reading Women's History from Hostile Sources," in Joel T. Rosenthal, *Medieval Women and the Sources of Medieval History* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 248.

91. Elizabeth Alvilda Petroff, ed., *Medieval Women's Visionary Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 276–90.

92. Bynum, "Women Mystics and Eucharistic Devotion," 200–201.

93. *Ibid.*, 194–95.

94. Caroline Bynum, "The Mysticism and Asceticism of Medieval Women," in Bynum, *Fragmentation and Redemption* (New York: Zone, 1992), 57.

95. John Coakley, "Gender and the Authority of Friars: The Significance of Holy Women for Thirteenth-Century Franciscans and Dominicans," *Church History* 60, no. 4 (December 1991): 452, 450.

96. Caroline Bynum, "The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages," in Bynum, *Fragmentation and Redemption*, 195–96. Elsewhere, Bynum has asserted concerning medieval female emotionalism: "All but two documented cases of full and visible stigmata are female . . . and women account for all but two or three cases of what [Rudolph] Bell calls 'holy anorexia' (a self-starvation which is a kind of psychosomatic manipulation)." "The Mysticism and Asceticism of Medieval Women," 56.

97. C. H. Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism* (London: Longman, 1989), 216ff. Because these upper-class women and their male counterparts are largely the subjects of the research conducted by Caroline Bynum and Herbert Grundmann, both Bynum and Grundmann reject "Marxist" interpretations of the Poverty Movement. Bynum maintains: "As Herbert Grundmann pointed out many years ago, the Marxists were wrong to see medieval notions of the 'poor of Christ' as the revolt of either the economically disadvantaged or of the women; voluntary poverty *can* be a religious response only to those with some wealth to renounce." "Women's Stories, Women's Symbols," in Bynum, *Fragmentation and Redemption*, 50. In the mid-1930s, Grundmann insisted: "Yet there is never anything in the heretic doctrines in favor of the social or economic demands of the lower classes, never a slogan of 'class struggle.' That 'cursed gain' and 'ill-gotten goods' were reprehensible was only more bluntly stressed and more seriously accepted by Arnold of Brescia, Waldes,

and the others than by the ecclesiastical ban on usury and interest.” Grundmann, *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages*, 233.

98. Little, *Religious Poverty*, 131ff.

99. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, 103.

100. *Ibid.*, 102. Some Beguine communities were suspected of sexual improprieties because of their practice of begging. There, too, was the “erotic imagery” of Hadewijch of Nivelles’s “bridal” mysticism. See Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism*, 234–35. Medieval female prostitution was well “established.” Ruth Mazo Karras in her survey of research some years ago concludes: “Municipal authorities all over Europe recognized the social value of prostitution but tried to keep it as unobtrusive as possible, placing it under strict control without abolishing it totally. In many parts of medieval and early modern Europe this meant establishing licensed, or even municipally owned, brothels or official red-light districts. . . . Recent scholarship on municipal or municipally regulated brothels in Florence, Seville, Dijon, Augsburg, and the towns of Languedoc in the medieval and early modern periods agrees that regulated brothels were seen as a foundation of the social order, preventing homosexuality, rape, and seduction. They could also be important sources of income for the town itself or, in the case of licensed brothels, for wealthy individuals or institutions within the town.” “The Regulation of Brothels in Later Medieval England,” *Signs* 14, no. 2 (1989): 401; and Richards, *Sex, Dissidence, and Damnation*, 116ff.

101. Little, *Religious Poverty*, 144.

102. Fiona Robb, “The Fourth Lateran Council’s Definition of Trinitarian Orthodoxy,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 48, no. 1 (January 1997): 22–43.

103. Bernard McGinn, “The Abbot and the Doctors: Scholastic Reactions to the Radical Eschatology of Joachim of Fiore,” *Church History* 40, no. 1 (March 1971): 30–47.

104. Decima Douie, *The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1932), 6.

105. Douie describes the split thusly: “We find two parties growing up among the Franciscans even during the Saint’s lifetime—that of the Ministers or Superiors of the Order, headed by Elias, who desired some mitigation of the strictness of the rule of poverty, and a remodeling of the Order more on the lines of the Black Friars, and another, composed of certain of St. Francis’ most intimate companions, men generally drawn more to the contemplative life, who wished to adhere as closely as possible to the strictness and simplicity of the original manner of life. These two bodies were the forerunners of the two later parties, the Conventuals, and the Spirituals or Zealots.” *Ibid.*, 2.

106. The Beguines of Provence were a Joachimite order of both sexes, and were not connected with the communities of holy women. *Ibid.*, 248–58.

107. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 105; and McGinn, “The Abbot and the Doctors,” 34.

108. As Petroff recounts, Ubertino, at the age of forty, had been brought into the Spiritual Franciscan party by Angela. (Ubertino himself had written: “She restored, even a thousand-fold, all the gifts of my soul that I had lost through my sinfulness.”) Petroff, *Medieval Women’s Visionary Literature*, 237. Charles T. Davis, in his detailed treatment of Ubertino’s writings, indicates that Ubertino had incorporated Olivi’s apocalypticism in his 1305 work, *Arbor vite crucifixe Jesu*. Nevertheless, Ubertino had disagreed with Olivi regarding the papal privileges which absolved

the Franciscan Order from the literal observance of poverty. While Olivi temporized, "Ubertino ultimately condemned the whole system." With the accession of John XXII to the papacy in 1314, Ubertino reluctantly accepted the protection of Cardinal Napoleone Orsini and his transfer to the Benedictine Order, and was employed by Orsini "on diplomatic business, even in matter involving the Pope." Notwithstanding, Ubertino was queried during the 1322 poverty debate; and his response, *De altissima paupertate*, is said by some to have precipitated his flight from Avignon in 1325, and perhaps his eventual execution. Cf. Charles T. Davis, "Ubertino da Casale and His Conception of 'altissima papertas,'" *Studi Medievali* 17, no. 1 (1981): 1–56; and Theresa Coletti, *Naming the Rose: Eco, Medieval Signs, and Modern Theory* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 85.

109. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, 109.

110. The words are those of Eco's protagonist, William of Baskerville. Umberto Eco, *The Name of the Rose* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 119. For Eco's historical authority, see Coletti, *Naming the Rose*, 4–9.

111. "Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood," in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1975), 232.

112. Norman Cohn, "Medieval Millenarism," 35.

113. *Ibid.*, 37–38. "The fourteenth century was punctuated by desperate, sometimes terrible, peasant revolts. The peasants revolted in western Flanders from 1323 to 1328. In 1357 they revolted in France: it was the famous Jacquerie, which gave its name to all other purely peasant risings. In 1381 they revolted in England: it was the great Peasants' Revolt of Wat Tylor and Jack Straw whose names remained bogeys to alarm the gentry in the seventeenth century." Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe, 172*. See also Roland Mousnier, *Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth-Century France, Russia and China* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

114. V. G. Kiernan may have had this in mind when he cautioned: "Marxists may have to ask whether they have turned their backs too decidedly in the past on the fact that socialism itself is in many ways the offspring of Christianity." Kiernan, "Christianity," in Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, and Ralph Miliband, eds., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 71.

115. Norman Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 89. Cohn has considerably revised his work for the 1970 version, replacing some of the more harsh attacks on Marxism.

116. *Ibid.*, 89–91.

117. See Carolly Erickson, "The Fourteenth-Century Franciscans and Their Critics," *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976): 108–47.

118. David Jeffrey writes of "the emergent role of Franciscan spirituality, a great motive force in the transmission of late medieval popular culture." Jeffrey, "Franciscan Spirituality," 143. For examples of popular thought see Walter L. Wakefield, "Some Unorthodox Popular Ideas of the Thirteenth Century," *Medievalia et Humanistica* 4 (1973): 25–35; and Austin P. Evans, "Hunting Subversion in the Middle Ages," *Speculum* 33, no. 1 (January 1958): 22.

119. Rev. Theodore Anthony Zaremba, *Franciscan Social Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1947), 60–61. The Franciscans claimed to have amassed 3,000 friars by 1221 and 5,000 by the next year. Fr. Lazaro Iriarte, *Franciscan History* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 1982), 15.

120. According to Douie, this included the collection of property, money, and habits, as well as furnishings such as pictures, stained glass windows, and reredoses. Douie, *The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli*, 10.

121. Iriarte, *Franciscan History*, 130–31.

122. See chap. 4 and Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 1, *The Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

123. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 1:10–12.

124. John Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 108ff.

125. “Curiously enough, given latter-day developments, the nearest historical parallel to the Jesuitism of Inigo de Loyola is to be found in the Leninism of Vladimir Illyich Ulyanov.” Malachi Martin, *The Jesuits* (New York: Linden, 1987), 182. The Jesuits, founded in the sixteenth century, pursued a form of communism into the late eighteenth century, particularly in their Latin American missions. The order was abolished in 1773 (and suppressed everywhere except in Russia and Prussia), only to be reinstated at the beginning of the nineteenth century (1814). Cf. *ibid.*, 216ff; and the Reverends Francis Xavier Talbot and Edward A. Tyan, “Jesus, Society of,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 12, 1965.

126. Magnus Morner, ed., *The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America* (New York: Knopf, 1965), 9.

127. A. Lynn Martin, “The Jesuit Mystique,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 4, no. 1 (April 1973): 32, 35.

128. Quoted by James Schofield Saeger, “The Mission and Historical Missions: Film and the Writing of History,” *The Americas* 51, no. 3 (January 1995): 396.

129. *Ibid.*, 406; Morner, *The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America*, 13–14.

130. Morner, *The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America*, 14.

131. See Ian Todd and Michael Wheeler, *Utopia* (New York: Harmony, 1978).

132. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws . . .*; G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover, 1956), 81–82.

133. Magnus Morner, *The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the La Plata Region: The Hapsburg Era* (Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies, 1953), 194–95.

134. *Ibid.*

135. Robert Southey, “The Guarani Missions—The Despotism Welfare State,” in Morner, *The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America*, 57.

136. “Officially they acted only as chaplains, but in reality their authority over the Indians was unlimited in war and peace alike.” Morner, *The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America*, 14.

137. Morner, *The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits*, 213.

138. The motives behind the expulsions and subsequent disbanding of the Jesuits (1773–1814) are multiple and disputed. They include the visibility of the Jesuits in the international political conflicts and internal politics of Spain; the perceived (and thought sinister) Jesuitical dominance of education in Spain and the New World; personal hatred of the Jesuits among eminent political personages in Portugal and Spain; the rumors of a Jesuit conspiracy to rule the world; doctrinal and intellectual support by Jesuits of anti-imperialist and nationalist sentiments in the Spanish New World; Jesuit support of New World natives against slavery; and even Jesuit teachings supporting democracy. Morner, *The Expulsion of the Jesuits*

from Latin America, 19ff. There was, too, the rather immense wealth the Jesuits had accumulated as bankers in Europe, and “protectors” of peoples like the Guarani. Saeger reports that the seven Guarani missions to be transferred to the Portuguese in 1750 possessed lands, livestock, and buildings worth 7–16 million pesos; in 1754, the seven possessed 600,000 cattle and 500,000 horses; and in 1768, the Guarani possessed “700,000 cows, over 240,000 sheep, 73,850 mares and horses, 15,235 mules, and 8,063 asses.” Saeger, “*The Mission and Historical Missions*,” 399, 404, 404n43.

139. See note 121. From the medieval to the modern period, the histories of these orders are replete with cycles of dissident zeal and vigor, leading inevitably to confrontation with ecclesiastical authority, followed by submission and reformist schisms. From the fourteenth century, the Franciscans metamorphosed into the Spirituals/Fraticelli and Conventuals; the Observants in the fifteenth century; and the radical Capuchins of the sixteenth century. Cf. Rev. Michael David Knowles, “Franciscans,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 9, 1965.

140. For a useful treatment of medieval women, radical sects, and revolutionary movements, see Shulamith Shahar, *The Fourth Estate: A History of Women in the Middle Ages* (New York: Methuen, 1983); and Cohn’s comments in “Medieval Millenaries.”

CHAPTER 3

1. E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848* (New York: Mentor, 1962), 85.

2. John Edward Toews, *Hegelianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 16. Michel Foucault has invented the concept of the *episteme* to describe “what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory.” “What Is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 45.

3. According to J. V. Polisensky, “The Thirty Years’ War and the Crises and Revolutions of Seventeenth-Century Europe,” *Past and Present* 39 (1968): 35.

4. Christopher Friedrichs has written, “The debate between what has been called the ‘earlier decline’ and ‘disastrous war’ schools of thought has raged for many years. But the ‘earlier decline’ theory seems to be gaining ground, since German developments are increasingly placed in a pan-European context: it is now recognized that the seventeenth century represented a period of overall economic contraction in Europe after the boom years of the sixteenth century.” “The War and German Society,” in Geoffrey Parker, ed., *The Thirty Years’ War* (London: Routledge, 1997), 191.

5. Sheilagh C. Ogilvie, “Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis,” *Historical Journal* 35, no. 2 (June 1992): 417–41.

6. Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 413–14.

7. In the eighteenth century, the anarchy of the Germanies or “The Holy Roman Empire,” as they were known, was even more severe: “The Empire must be said to have consisted of 1,800 territories, ranging in size from quite large states, such as Austria, Bohemia, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Hanover, to tiny estates of only a few miles or less.” John Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763–1806* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 4–5.

8. Gagliardo distinguishes four types of territories: the ecclesiastical principalities, ruled by “prince-bishops of the German Catholic Church”; the secular prin-

cialities, whose rulers were the high nobility with titles “ranging from king . . . through duke, count, landgrave, margrave, and so on, down to simply ‘prince’”; the fifty-one imperial cities governed by “patrician oligarchies”; and the territories ruled by imperial counts and knights. *Ibid.*, 5–15. Heinrich Heine, another German Jew who converted to Christianity (in 1825), and who wrote for Marx’s *Forward*, had anticipated Marx’s characterization of Germany in his own 1834–35 essay, “On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany.”

9. Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation*, 50.

10. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 23.

11. J. V. Polisensky, *The Thirty Years’ War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 258. Cited by Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II*.

12. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II*, 24.

13. Cf. Henry Kamen, “The Economic and Social Consequences of the Thirty Years’ War,” *Past and Present* 39 (1968): 44–61; Gary Nichols, “The Economic Impact of the Thirty Years’ War in Habsburg Austria,” *East European Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (September 1989): 257–68. For some indication of the expansion of taxes, Nichols reports, “In 1624, a tax was levied on sweet and sour wines, beer, and brandy, followed by the chimney tax and a tax on guests staying overnight in inns. Meat was taxed in 1630, and coaches, horses, boats, shoes, slippers, skins of all kinds, wax, honey, silk wares, jewels, horse rentals, cheese, wood, floors and grounds, cultivated and uncultivated vineyards, shoe shops, and land were all taxed in 1645.” Nichols, “The Economic Impact of the Thirty Years’ War,” 258.

14. Kamen, “The Economic and Social Consequences of the Thirty Years’ War,” 48, 50.

15. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II*, 32.

16. Ogilvie, “Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis,” 421.

17. *Ibid.*, 421–34.

18. *Ibid.*, 441.

19. “The acquisition of Silesia [from Austria in 1748] by Prussia was thus a major event, aiding substantially the industrialization of the nineteenth century. It had been made possible by the creation of a Prussian army and state plus the needs of the English (and Dutch) to check Sweden and then frustrate Austria.” Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II*, 236. Wallerstein stipulates that in the late seventeenth century, Sweden was the fourth significant military power in Europe. *Ibid.*, 79. See also Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation*, chap. 5.

20. “The whole period from the Thirty Years’ War until the end of the Napoleonic era was an age of mercantilism (cameralism) in all the Germanies, indeed in all of central Europe.” Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II*, 233.

21. Charles Moraze, *The Triumph of the Middle Classes* (New York: Anchor, 1968), 20.

22. Cf. Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, vol. 3, *The Perspective of the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 548ff.

23. See W. H. Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Literary Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), chap. 2.

24. Ogilvie, “Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis,” 422.

25. See Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, 3:175; and Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, 28.

26. Peter Taylor, "Military System and Rural Social Change in Eighteenth-Century Hesse-Cassel," *Journal of Social History* 25, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 482, 486.

27. Moraze, *The Triumph of the Middle Classes*, 21.

28. One evidence of the support of universities from above is the paradox that the number of universities expanded in the eighteenth century while student enrollments declined. At the beginning of the century, twenty-eight German universities (outside of Austria) enrolled 9,000 students (the largest enrollments were at Cologne, Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Halle); by midcentury, three new universities were established but enrollments were down to slightly more than 7,000. The universities at Cologne, Trier, and Strasbourg closed down in the 1790s. Charles McClelland notes: "The crisis in student enrollments was only the quantitative sign of a deeper qualitative malaise in the German universities. Scholasticism was the method and orthodoxy the content of most instruction. Medicine was openly ridiculed, natural science was almost exclusively the province of the new royal academies, and the movements in philosophy and law that later came to be labeled 'enlightened' faced great hostility." *State, Society, and University in Germany, 1700–1914* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 28–29.

29. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, 294.

30. Laurence Dickey associates the appearance of German Pietism as one result of the Thirty Years' War; a reform movement within German Lutheranism which sought the marginalization of theology and its replacement by the practice of piety. See Dickey, *Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit, 1770–1807* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 68ff.

31. Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform, 1250–1550* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 343ff. Martin Luther condemned the "mischievous rebellion" and celebrated the execution of Thomas Muntzer, the ex-Lutheran minister, in a work titled *The Horrible History and Judgment of God upon Thomas Muntzer*. *Ibid.*, 285, 342.

32. The German universities drew students from the higher and lower middle classes (including artisans), classes from which their faculty were also drawn. Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century*, 246–53. Born in 1724, Kant was the son of a harness-maker. For Kant's temerity towards public officials, see John Christian Laursen, "The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of 'Public' and 'Publicity,'" *Political Theory* 14, no. 4 (November 1986): 584–603.

33. Heiner Bielefeldt, "Autonomy and Republicanism: Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of Freedom," *Political Theory* 25, no. 4 (August 1997): 549. The argument summarizing Kant's philosophy of history and the emergence of the civil constitution is appropriated by Bielefeldt from Kant's "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795), his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784) and his *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). Bielefeldt, "Autonomy and Republicanism," 547ff.

34. Even Kant's supporters acknowledge the dark side of his philosophy. "To emphasize the need to obey the law, as Kant did, could imply a bias in favor of authoritarianism. In Germany his theory has, indeed, been invoked to strengthen the executive prerogative in carrying out the law . . . the state in which obedience to political authority is writ large. In fact, his outlook was liberal. . . . But Kant's influence has been greatest in shaping the doctrine of the *Rechtsstaat*, the state governed according to the rule of law." Hans Reiss in the introduction to *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 11.

35. Michael Clarke, "Kant's Rhetoric of Enlightenment," *Review of Politics* 59 (Winter 1987): 60.

36. "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice'" in *Kant's Political Writings*, 82–84.

37. Laursen, "The Subversive Kant," 590.

38. Reiss, introduction to *Kant's Political Writings*, 28.

39. In an attempt to disavow any intention of disobeying the Edict on Religion (1788) which forbade public expression of religious conscience, Kant wrote to the king that his essay was "not at all suitable for the public, to them it is an unintelligible, closed book, only a debate among scholars of the faculty of which the people take no notice." The letter was published in 1798. Laursen, "The Subversive Kant," 591–92.

40. Clarke, "Kant's Rhetoric of Enlightenment," 60.

41. James Schmidt, "The Question of Enlightenment: Kant, Mendelssohn, and the *Mittwochsgesellschaft*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 2 (April–June 1989): 290–91. In his 1784 essay "An Answer to the Question: What Is the Enlightenment?" Kant had assured the State: "Only one who, himself enlightened, does not fear shadows, at the same time has at hand a numerous, well-disciplined army for the guarantor of public rest can say what a Republic is forbidden to risk: 'Argue as much as you want and regarding what you want, only obey.'" Quoted by Clarke, "Kant's Rhetoric of Enlightenment," 63.

42. Laursen, "The Subversive Kant," 591.

43. Moraze, *The Triumph of the Middle Classes*, 222.

44. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan, 1963), 472.

45. Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 96ff.

46. Michel Foucault has suggested an explanation for the repression of sexuality (the negation of the body) which became emblematic of European society in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: "One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a 'people,' but with a 'population.' . . . All this garrulous attention which has us in a stew over sexuality, is it not motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labor capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations: in short, to constitute a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative?" *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage, 1980), 25, 36–37.

47. Bielefeldt, "Autonomy and Republicanism," 530.

48. "According to Kant's conjectural psychology, morality begins with (sexual) refusal and self-denial. That this beginning is also a social moment only serves to emphasize the prominence of self-opposition as distinguished from social opposition. What makes sexual refusal a first moral moment is not the fact that one should deny another, but that one should accept that denial as binding on itself." Susan Meld Shell, *The Rights of Reason: A Study of Kant's Philosophy and Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 100.

49. Cited by *ibid.*, 32.

50. Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson, eds., introduction to Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (New York: Harper, 1960), xli.

51. Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 1, *The Founders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 44–45.

52. Greene and Hudson, introduction to Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, xl.

53. Shell, *The Rights of Reason*, 173.

54. “Only a learned public which has lasted from its beginnings to our own day, can certify ancient history. Outside it, everything else is *Terra incognita*; and the history of peoples outside it can only be begun when they come into contact with it. This happened with the Jews in the time of the Ptolemies through the translation of the Bible into Greek, without which we would give little credence to their isolated narratives. . . . And so with all other peoples.” Kant, “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” in Lewis White Beck, ed., *On History* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 24.

55. Shell, *The Rights of Reason*, 177.

56. *Ibid.*

57. Patrick Riley, “The ‘Elements’ of Kant’s Practical Philosophy,” *Political Theory* 14, no. 4 (November 1986): 557.

58. Of this period, Karl Mannheim would write: “The rise of the bourgeoisie was attended by an extreme intellectualism. . . . This bourgeois intellectualism expressly demanded a scientific politics, and actually proceeded to found such a discipline.” Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, original 1936), 122. For Kant’s treatment of bureaucracy as the site of reason, see Michael J. Meyer, “Kant’s Concept of Dignity and Modern Political Thought,” *History of European Ideas* 8, no. 3 (1987): 326ff.

59. Toews, *Hegelianism*, 2. See also *ibid.*, 370n2.

60. Dickey, *Hegel*, 35.

61. Quoted by *ibid.*, 144.

62. *Ibid.*, 143.

63. *Ibid.*, 183–85.

64. Toews, *Hegelianism*, 33–34.

65. Referring to Hegel’s attitude towards Austria and Prussia, H. S. Harris argues: “Hegel . . . shows a marked preference for the Athenian model of the Hapsburgs as against the Spartan model of the Hohenzollerns.” Harris, *Hegel’s Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 454. See also Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 48–49, 56.

66. Cited by Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, 472. Toews reminds us that Hegel was not Prussian. His parental home, Stuttgart, was in Old Württemberg, and his father “was an administrative official in the ducal bureaucracy, a secretary and later counselor in the Chamber of Accounts.” Toews, *Hegelianism*, 13.

67. In 1801, in his first published philosophical work, “The Difference between the Systems of Philosophy of Fichte and Schelling,” Hegel alluded to his new advocacy in the context of the emergence of Prussia and the disintegration of Germany after the Thirty Years’ War: “The need for philosophy emerges when the power of reconciliation disappears from the life of men and opposites have lost their living relation and reciprocity and achieve independence.” Cited by Bernard Cullen, *Hegel’s Social and Political Thought* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1979), 50.

68. This is the title given to Hegel's unpublished manuscript (1799–1802) reviewing the imperialist constitution. Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation*, 338n24.

69. *Ibid.*, 256–57.

70. “Hegel recognized and apparently approved (as productive of harmony) a certain tendency toward the assimilation of nobility with the bourgeoisie. But he thought of the monarchy, the ‘majestic principle,’ as a point of balance between these two classes, and he preferred to see it resting more on the nobility, as the Austrian monarchy did, than on the bourgeoisie, as was the case in Prussia and in revolutionary France.” Harris, *Hegel's Development*, 472–73.

71. *Ibid.*, 477. For the Final Recess, see Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation*, 193ff.

72. Cf. Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, 115–17.

73. This misrepresentation of Hegel as merely an idealist, and some of the then most prominent contributions to this Marxian characterization are rehearsed in George Boger, “On the Materialist Appropriation of Hegel's Dialectical Method,” *Science & Society* 55, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 26–59.

74. Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 66.

75. Dickey, *Hegel*, 192.

76. Cullen suggests: “It is extremely likely that Hegel arrived at his own analysis by supplementing his study of the political economists with his constant reading of English newspapers and journals. These publications would have carried long and detailed reports of social conditions in Britain; and reports of parliamentary debates on the Poor Laws, the first Factory Act of 1802, and other new legislation.” *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 71.

77. Joseph O'Malley, introduction to Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 33.

78. The phrase is from Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 4.

79. Paul Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy,” in Frederick Beiser, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 180.

80. In his defense of Kant from Hegel's claims that Kant's dualisms stemmed from a failure of nerve, Guyer never mentions the theological grounds of Hegel's work. *Ibid.*, 171–210.

81. Christian theology and philosophy did not allow for history. For the Christian, the human experience held no mystery: the choice was between God and the ungodly. This is Christian eschatology: in the end, the world's culmination will be in the division of human spoils between God and his opponent, the Devil. Christianity is premised on the existence of a Being who declares to its creations: “I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end.” All things are resolved, that is the message of the Apocalypse. There is no mystery, no problem to be resolved in human affairs.

82. See Dickey, *Hegel*, 221 and 245.

83. Dickey's quote from Hegel's *System of Ethical Life*, in *ibid.*, 248.

84. *Ibid.*, 199.

85. Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 58–59.

86. In the earliest version of his theory of social classes, Hegel employed a tripartite system somewhat reminiscent of the medieval model. Hegel stipulated an Absolute of Universal class (the nobility), a class of honesty (the Bürger), and a class of raw ethical life (the peasantry). Later (1805–6), Norbert Waszek maintains,

Hegel augmented his canvas: "Firstly, the tripartite structure is replaced by an initial distinction between the lower classes . . . and the class of universality. . . . Since the lower classes are divided into the farmers, the craftsmen, and the merchants . . . we can now speak of a four-part class division. The previous emphasis on the merchants has thus been strengthened by raising this group to the level of a distinct class, defined by 'pure exchange.' Secondly, the universal class is no longer equated with the nobility, but is subdivided into the three sections of civil servants, scholars, and soldiers." *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of "Civil Society"* (London: Kluwer, 1988), 173–74.

87. Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, in Leo Rauch, ed., *Hegel and the Human Spirit* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 163–64.

88. *Ibid.*, 165.

89. *Ibid.*

90. *Ibid.*, 166.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *Ibid.* Hegel described that misery as including those who worked and "the rabble of paupers," those who had no work at all. See Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 106.

93. Cullen remarks: "Even if we translate *Klasse* with an innocent, unloaded term such as 'group,' it seems to me to be undeniable that Hegel had an intuitive grasp—in an embryonic and unsystematic form, at least—of an institutionalized conflict within the manufacturing sub-*Stand* between the people who actually labor in the factories and those who own the factories and employ the laborers: groups that later came to be known as 'proletariat' and 'bourgeoisie.'" Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 104. Hegel's near elimination of a discussion of these classes in *The Philosophy of Right* is critiqued by Cullen in *ibid.*, 110ff.

94. Quoted by Dickey, *Hegel*, 245.

95. Rauch, *Hegel and the Human Spirit*, 167.

96. O'Malley confirms: "Marx took seriously Hegel's notion of a universal class, that is, a class within society whose interests are identical with the interests of society as a whole" (lii). Nevertheless, by the fall of 1843 Marx had not solved the problem of his universal class: "In the *Critique [of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right']* it remains to be seen whether a class can be found for which the identity is not imaginary. . . . It is a clear indication of the rapidity with which Marx's thought developed during this period that by February 1844 [*A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right']* he can identify the proletariat as the class within modern society which satisfies the criteria of the genuine universal class." O'Malley, introduction to Marx, *Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right,"* liii.

97. Rauch, *Hegel and the Human Spirit*, 170.

98. *Ibid.*, 171.

99. *Ibid.*

100. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox, in their edited and translated version of Hegel's *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), identified some of the ways Hegel differed from Plato: "Although Hegel's language about death in battle is full of Greek overtones, he thinks of modern warfare . . . as being truly ethical, just as the religion of 'the absolute grief' is higher than Greek religion" (66). "The 'absolute government,' the governing function as it is distinctly articulated within the 'absolute class,' is the

analog, in Hegel's account, of the Rulers, in Plato's *Republic*, as distinct from the Auxiliaries. But Hegel's Guardians are 'guardians of the law,' like the governing class of Plato's *Laws*; and this 'absolute government' is not recruited exclusively from the military nobility" (70).

101. Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 62.

102. This last notion is to be found in Marx as well. One reason for Marx's insistence on the significance of industrial capitalism was its mastery of nature. Capitalist industrialism freed man from necessity, from the dictates of nature. Capitalism thus marked the last stage of mankind's prehistory. And Marx was impatient. He announced, in effect, "We now have the means of human realization; only the bourgeois superstructure (private property and the State) stands in the way. Once we repossess the means of human reproduction, perfection is ours." Marx acquired this sense of historical evolution from German Idealism: i.e., from Kant's antinomial duality, and Hegel's dialectic.

103. Quoted in Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 67–68. For Ferguson, Smith, and Schiller, see Dickey, *Hegel*, 254–55.

104. Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, 63.

105. Harris and Knox, *System of Ethical Life*, 170–71. Harris interjects: "Hegel speaks rather glibly of 'sacrificing one part of the *bürger* class to mechanical and factory work and abandoning it to barbarism.' But he was actually much more disturbed by the emergence of an urban proletariat than his words here indicate." *Ibid.*, 75.

106. O'Malley, introduction to Marx, *Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right,"* xxxiv and 9ff.

107. Ozment, *The Age of Reform*, 104.

108. *Ibid.*, 105.

109. Toews, *Hegelianism*, 52–53.

110. Paradoxically, though Hegel's lectures on *The Philosophy of History* justified African slavery ("The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend for the very reason that in reference to it, we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all *our* ideas—the category of *Universality*"), the very terms by which he condemned Africa, exorcising it from History ("At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit"), became the basis of Marx's history. Hegel observed: "But even Herodotus called the Negroes sorcerers: now in *Sorcery* we have not the idea of a God, of a moral faith; it exhibits man as the highest power, regarding him as alone occupying a position of command over the power of Nature." Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 93ff. And like Kant and many other German intellectuals, Hegel also consigned Jews to historical refuse: Judaism is "marked by the absence of the principle of the Western world, the principle of individuality." Amy Newman, "The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 61, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 472–73.

111. See Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pt. 1.

112. Quoted by Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, 232. See also Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1965), 263.

113. Cited in Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, 230.

114. Harris and Knox, *System of Ethical Life*, 133. Hegel mentioned by name Genghis Khan and Tamerlane.

115. Toews, *Hegelianism*, 50.

116. *Ibid.*, 59. “In stark contrast to Schleiermacher, Hegel welcomed Napoleon’s victories as a triumph of the principle of modern rational politics over the irrational and obsolete social and political forms of the old regime. The ‘great political scientist’ from Paris would finally teach Germans, by force if necessary, how to organize a ‘free monarchy’ on the basis of universal law and a rational administrative and constitutional structure.” *Ibid.*, 58. See also Avineri, *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State*, 189.

117. Avineri, *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State*, 116.

118. *Ibid.*, 177.

119. Marx suggested: “If socialist writers attribute this world-historical role to the proletariat, this is by no means, as critical criticism assures us, because they regard the proletarians as *gods*. . . . It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the proletariat as a whole *pictures* at present as its goal. It is a matter of *what the proletariat is in actuality* and what, in accordance with this *being*, it will historically be compelled to do.” Robert C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 134–35.

120. O’Malley, introduction to Marx, *Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,”* 131.

121. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover, 1956), 25.

122. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 236–38.

123. *Ibid.*, 238. Commenting on Marx’s appropriation of Hegel, David Lamb insisted that for Marx: “Just as the object is not an independent pre-given entity, the human subject is not given a once and for all fixed set of cognitive faculties bestowed by nature. The cognitive faculties are the result of a long process of self-creation within and through technical activity.” “Hegelian-Marxist Millenarianism,” *History of European Ideas* 8, no. 3 (1987): 280.

124. See note 64.

125. Kant was a personally rigid man — “the citizens of Königsberg could set their watch by Kant.” Kant’s biographers chant this repeatedly (noting the two exceptions: when he obtained a copy of Rousseau’s *Emile*; and when he heard of the fall of the Bastille). Kant was obsessed with the necessity of dominating the human body as a precondition for achieving a higher destiny. And in this he anticipated Freud’s *Civilization and Its Discontents* by a hundred years. There Freud argued that civilization requires repression: neuroses, unhappiness. Freud recognized in the family a structure of domination and repression, and as such the primal unit of civilization. And for Freud, the necessary repression occupies the subconscious, the very intuition of the civilized individual.

CHAPTER 4

1. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (London: Tavistock, 1970), 261–62.

2. Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London: Verso, 1979), 158. Althusser criticized Mark Rosenthal, Antonio Gramsci, and Galvano Della Volpe as examples of “the more talkative and self-important discourses which deport Marx the philosopher entirely into the very ideology which he fought and rejected” (90). Concerning his student, Foucault, for the time being (1969) Althusser had only praise. See “A Letter to the Translator,” *ibid.*, 323–24.

3. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 263.

4. See Scott Meikle, “Making Nonsense of Marx,” *Inquiry* 29 (March 1986): 29–43.

5. William J. Barber, *A History of Economic Thought* (New York: Penguin, 1967), 17–18; and Terence Hutchison, *Before Adam Smith* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), chap. 1.
6. John Kenneth Galbraith, *A History of Economics* (London: Penguin, 1987), 10.
7. *Ibid.*, 19.
8. *Ibid.*, 25.
9. Moses Hadas, ed., *The Complete Plays of Aristophanes* (New York: Bantam, 1988), 348. Property now held in common would include wives, children, and slaves.
10. See Hadas's introduction to the play, *ibid.*, 417; and K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (Berkeley: University of California, 1972), 200–201.
11. A similar understanding must have been shared by many of Aristophanes's contemporaries since Plato recalled at Socrates's trial in 399 BC that the latter took great pains to distinguish himself from the portrait found in Aristophanes's *Clouds* (423 BC).
12. Gilbert Murray, *Aristophanes, a Study* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933), 180.
13. See H. D. Westlake, "The *Lysistrata* and the War," *Phoenix* 34, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 38–54.
14. Sue Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 74ff.
15. *Ibid.*, 129.
16. Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 98ff.
17. Susan Guettel Cole, "Oath, Ritual, and the Male Community at Athens," in Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick, eds., *Demokratia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 238.
18. Jane Gardner, "Aristophanes and Male Anxiety," *Greece & Rome* 36, no. 1 (April 1989): 51–62. It may be surmised that there were many more widows than widowers in late fifth-century Athens, for one because of the war, and secondly, because at the time of marriage females tended to be much younger (14–18) than husbands (around 30). Thus the anxiety among men of ritual observances after their deaths. See Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece*, 119–20.
19. Plato, *The Laws*, 805a.
20. "A few years ago the fact suddenly dawned upon me that Athenian women in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.—apart from a handful of expensive prostitutes . . . were quite remarkably devoid of effective property rights and were worse off in this respect than women in many (perhaps most) other Greek cities of the period, Sparta in particular." De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 100.
21. Blundell maintains *politai* "signifies citizens with full political rights, who were always male" (*Women in Ancient Greece*, 128), while de Ste. Croix states that *poletai* designated officials in Athens (*The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 189).
22. Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece*; Sarah B. Pomeroy in *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves* (New York: Schocken, 1975), and Eva C. Keuls in *The Reign of the Phallus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) have all explored these ambiguities in the Athenian male imaginary.
23. For Solon and Cleisthenes, see de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 278ff. In the fourth century, Isocrates proposed a pan-Hellenic campaign against Persia to distract the Greek poor from their civil war against the

rich. See Peter G. Van Soesbergen, "Colonisation as a Solution to Social-Economic Problems in Fourth-Century Greece: A Confrontation of Isocrates with Xenophon," *Ancient Society* 13/14 (1982/83): 131–45. See also de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 295. For Thucydides and Pericles, see Cynthia Farrar, who argues from Thucydides's presentation of Pericles's speech to the assembly after the plague and the second Spartan invasion: "Pericles seeks to prevent the indulgence of exclusive, partial, interests by showing that such behavior, based on a narrow perspective, is inimical to the continued well-being of the polis, and that the public interest does genuinely embody the real interests of all citizens." *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 161.

24. David Whitehead, "Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants," *Ancient Society* 13/14 (1982/83): 105–30.

25. De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 284.

26. *Ibid.*, 64–65.

27. *Ibid.*, 66.

28. Cf. Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), and Thomas W. Africa, *The Ancient World* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1969).

29. Francis MacDonald Cornford, ed., *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 165–66.

30. For Xenophon's Socrates, see "The Estate Manager" (or "Oeconomicus") in Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, eds., *Xenophon: Conversations of Socrates* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 289–94.

31. Xenophon's *The Constitution of the Athenians* in J. M. Moore, ed., *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 40.

32. "The practice of physical exercises and the pursuit of culture has been brought into disrepute by the common people as being undesirable because they realize that these accomplishments are beyond them." *Ibid.*, 39.

33. "The propertied classes in the Greek and Roman world derived their surplus . . . mainly from unfree labor of various kinds. . . . But in general slavery was the most important form of unfree labor at the highest periods of Greek and Roman civilization." De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 39.

34. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1252b9–10 and 1277b30. Earlier, Xenophon's Socrates had queried Critobulus: "Don't you entrust more of your affairs to your wife than to anyone else?" "The Estate Manager," 299. The Greek *oikos* refers to the household, i.e., women, children, and domestic slaves.

35. David Schaps mentions that "Plato describes the Athenian custom as 'piling up whatever one gathers into some one house, (where) we give all the money over to the women to manage.'" And that "Xenophon in the *Oeconomicus* recommended turning all the affairs of the house over to the wife, but he made no pretense of describing the normal situation." Schaps, *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), 15. Maurice Balme, "Attitudes to Work and Leisure in Ancient Greece," *Greece & Rome* 31, no. 2 (October 1984): 149–52.

36. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1256b40–1258b8. Aristotle insisted: "The most hated sort [of moneymaking], and with the greatest reason, is usury. . . . For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest." *Ibid.*, 1258a38–b8.

37. Steve Fleetwood, "Aristotle in the 21st Century," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 21, no. 6 (1997): 731–32.

38. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1257b10–1257b25. Scott Meikle's exposition of this notion of Aristotelian metaphysics as it relates to money is prescient. See Meikle, *Aristotle's Economic Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 20ff.

39. Galbraith writes: "Discussion of economic questions of this era is principally to be found in the writings of Aristotle, and there is not a rich yield . . . very few of the questions with which economics later became concerned applied to the society of which Aristotle spoke." *A History of Economics*, 10. As Scott Meikle indicates, Galbraith's presumption—following on M. I. Finley's work—that in the absence of wages and interest, Aristotle could only inquire into the *fairness* of prices is incorrect. "The *Ethics* chapter is not about the justice of each having his own. It is about how goods can possibly be *commensurable*, as somehow they must be since in every single daily act of exchange a *relation of equality* is established between one proportion of one good and some proportion of another. . . . The circuit M-C-M,' *kapelike*, with its profits from non-equivalent exchange, is a *particular* form of exchange activity. It makes its appearance only when exchange relations have, or rather when the particular form C-M-C has, reached a certain point of social and historical development. Aristotle is aware of that, and makes the point explicitly in the *Politics*." Meikle, "Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979): 65. For Finley, see "Aristotle and Economic Analysis" in Finley, *Studies in Ancient Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

40. Meikle, "Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis," 67.

41. Schaps, *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece*, 97. For Engels's very different reading of female seclusion in Athens, see *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1972), 500–502; and de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 98ff.

42. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1259b26–1260c14.

43. Schaps observes: "Most of the characters in the history books are male, not simply because it is men who write the books, but because the interests of history—politics, warfare, law, commerce—have in most times and places been the domain of men. . . . Social, cultural, and economic history, on the other hand, can hardly ignore women, who constitute half of society." *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece*, 1.

44. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1254b16–1254b32.

45. Galbraith, *A History of Economics*, 11.

46. Cf. Robert Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," and Geoffrey Vlastos, "Slavery in Plato's Thought," in M. I. Finley, ed., *Slavery in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1960).

47. "I am myself convinced that [in addition to the French Revolution] another seminal influence in the development by Marx of a theory of class struggle was his reading during his student years of Aristotle's *Politics*, a work which shows some striking analogies to Marx in its analysis of Greek society." De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 55–56.

48. Liberal and Marxist treatments of the household exclusively focus on the family as a site of capitalist or noncapitalist production rather than as a locus of female authority. Cf. Jane Humphries, "Class Struggle and the Persistence of the

Working-Class Family,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1 (1977): 241–58; and Joan Wallach Scott, “Women in History: The Modern Period,” *Past and Present*, no. 101 (1983): 141–57.

49. Alan Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy*, vol. 2, *The Defensor pacis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 4.

50. *Ibid.*, 2:5.

51. Without citing any historical documentation, Galbraith asserts that the one hundred years between Aquinas (1225–1274) and Nicole Oresme (1320–1382) constituted a “sea change,” resultant from the development of “merchant capitalism” from a marginal (Aquinas) to a central (Oresme) concern. See Galbraith, *A History of Economics*, 28. Galbraith ignores Jean Buridan (1300–1358), one of the more creative monetarists of the period, who revolutionized mechanics and optics, and was the nearer contemporary of Marsilius as well as Oresme’s probable teacher. Buridan’s commentaries on Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics* in the midst of a condemnation of a prince who would debase money (he “is only called a Prince, and he is not a Prince”) also reflected an awareness of the market. Cf. André Lapidus, “Metal, Money, and the Prince: John Buridan and Nicholas Oresme after Thomas Aquinas,” *History of Political Economy* 29, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 37ff.

52. J. K. Hyde, *Society and Politics in Medieval Italy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

53. J. K. Hyde, *Padua in the Age of Dante* (New York: University of Manchester and Barnes & Noble, 1966), 202ff.

54. *Ibid.*, 217.

55. *Ibid.*, 193.

56. Nearly a century ago Ephraim Emerton suggested: “It is almost impossible not to connect Marsiglio’s treatment of this question [whether there ought to be one single government for the whole civilized world] with the *De Monarchia* of Dante. . . . Marsiglio says that the subject is open to discussion, but is not pertinent to the present treatise. He does, however, go so far as to deny that the unity of the world is the model for the constitution of civil society. . . . The analogy, therefore, on which Dante bases his chief argument is expressly denied by Marsiglio.” Emerton, *The Defensor Pacis of Marsiglio of Padua: A Critical Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), 20. Concerning Aquinas, Nicolai Rubinstein points out: “The newly translated *Politics* had provided ample evidence to show that Aristotle was by no means as favorable to monarchy as might have been assumed from the *Ethics*; but St. Thomas continued to refer to its classification of constitution in support of his arguments in favor of monarchy. . . . But then St. Thomas, who belonged to the family of the counts of Aquino in the kingdom of Sicily, and had spent much of his life in Paris, viewed politics from the angle of the European monarchies.” Rubinstein, “Marsilius of Padua and Italian Political Thought of His Time,” in J. R. Hale, H. R. L. Highfield, and B. Smalley, eds., *Europe in the Late Middle Ages* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 52.

57. Malcolm D. Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty* (London: Church Historical Society, 1962), chap. 10. Known as the “Fratricelli” in Italy, the outcast spirituals were still being persecuted by the authorities in the fifteenth century. Decima Douie, “Some Treatises against the Fraticelli in the Vatican Library,” *Franciscan Studies* 38 (1978): 10–11.

58. Conal Condren, “Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory: Some Aspects

of the Poverty Controversy Reconsidered,” *Journal of Religious History* 13, no. 1 (June 1984): 20.

59. Caroline Walker Bynum, “Women Mystics and Eucharistic Devotion in the Thirteenth Century,” *Women Studies* 2 (1984): 193ff. Compulsory celibacy in the Catholic priesthood, with its consequent estrangement of women, was established between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries: “The first of these came in 1139, when Pope Innocent II proclaimed that ordination was an impediment to marriage . . . the leaders of the Church fashioned another instrument of control at the Council of Trent (1545–63), which introduced an obligatory form [marriage before a qualified priest and witnesses] for the solemnization of matrimony.” Uta Ranke-Heinemann, *Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven: Women, Sexuality, and the Catholic Church* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), 85. For the role of women as priests in the early Church and leaders of its heresies, see Carolly Erickson, *The Medieval Vision: Essays in History and Perception* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 184ff.

60. Much of the energies of Innocent III (1198–1216)—described by C. Warren Hollister as “history’s most powerful pope”—and of his immediate successors in the thirteenth century were devoted to building the political and financial power of the papacy. C. Warren Hollister, *Medieval Europe* (New York: John Wiley, 1968), 202ff.

61. Condren, “Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory,” 21. John’s opposition to the Spirituals became inquisitorial: “Convents had been seized by force, litigation had been undertaken, secular rulers had been involved, men had been burnt.” *Ibid.*, 24.

62. “That peasant revolts became widespread in western Europe from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth century seems to be in little doubt . . . in northern Italy and then in coastal Flanders at the turn of the fourteenth century; in Denmark in 1340; in Majorca in 1351; the Jacquerie in France in 1358; scattered rebellions in Germany long before the great peasant war of 1525. Peasant republics sprang up in Frisia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and in Switzerland in the thirteenth century.” Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 24. Wallerstein adds famines and epidemics to the list of causes for the *Wustungen*: “the recession of settlements from marginal lands, the disappearance of whole villages sometimes” (25).

63. Hollister, *Medieval Europe*, 204ff.

64. Rubinstein, “Marsilius of Padua,” 54; for Ptolemy, Remigio, and Mussato, see *ibid.*, 51ff.

65. *Ibid.*, 58.

66. Alan Gewirth insisted: “The permanent significance of Marsilius’s ideas is to be found not merely in his opposition to the papal and ecclesiastic institutions of medieval Christendom, but in the entire doctrinal structure which he adduces in support of such opposition.” Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace*, vol. 1, *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 9.

67. Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 1, *The Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 19.

68. *Ibid.*, 1:56ff.

69. *Ibid.*, 1:19–22. As Plato and Aristotle had done, Marsilius also attached himself to a powerful patron, Ludwig (Louis) of Bavaria. In 1328, Ludwig momentarily

deposed John XXII through military force legitimated by pronouncements written by Marsilius. Marsilius was then named “spiritual vicar” of Rome and suppressed loyalist clergy. Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua*, 1:22.

70. Condren, “Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory,” 25.

71. H. S. Harris, “Toward the Modern State,” in Wallace Ferguson, ed., *Renaissance Studies 2* (London: University of Western Ontario, 1963), 148.

72. Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua*, 2:205.

73. *Ibid.*, 2:210 and 208–9.

74. In the late fourteenth century, in her “conversations” with God, Catherine of Siena also took up Marsilius’s socialist discourse. Though she was a Dominican nun, Catherine’s father was a Franciscan tertiary, and she herself a “mystic activist.” In her *Dialogue* (1378), Catherine recorded God’s judgment of the apostasies of wealth which had beset the Franciscan and Dominican orders in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: “Thus you see that when the orders blossomed with the virtues of true patience and familial charity, they were never lacking in temporal sustenance but had more than they needed. But as soon as stinking selfishness and noncommunal living entered in and obedience fell by the wayside, they found themselves wanting in temporal goods.” God spoke of “Queen Poverty” as the “bride” of Francis and Dominic, and condemned those who live “not like religious but like nobles.” Suzanne Noffke, ed., *Catherine of Siena: The Dialogue* (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 9, 336–38, 341. Catherine’s “household” lived on alms; she died in 1380 at the age of 33 after several months when she “could no longer eat or even swallow water.”

75. Gewirth comments: “Now Marsilius, as we have seen, refers to Aristotle for corroboration of his position that the legislator is the ‘people’ (*populous*). But Marsilius defines the people in the Roman sense, as the *universitas civium*; he views it as comprising not only the *vulgus* (equivalent to the [*demos*] or *plebs*), that is, farmers, artisans, and the like; but also the *honorabilitas*, ‘who are few. . .’ The Marsilian constitution is thus rather a ‘polity,’ in which ‘every citizen’ shares power.” Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua*, 1:180–81.

76. Lapidus, “Metal, Money, and the Prince,” 41.

77. For Buridan, see *ibid.*, 40; and for the quotes from Oresme, *ibid.*, 41.

78. Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2, *The Age of Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 114.

79. Walter Klaassen, “Michael Gaismair: An Early Proponent of Social Justice,” in Hans-Jürgen Goertz, ed., *Profiles of Radical Reformers* (Kitchener, ON: Herald, 1982), 92.

80. *Ibid.*, 95. Ironically, the fugitive Gaismair was assassinated at his estate in Padua, Marsilius’s birthplace.

81. For certain, the authorized translation was “with the inconvenient passages on the popular origins of political authority judiciously omitted.” Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2:101. Cf. Harry S. Stout, “Marsilius of Padua and the Henrician Reformation,” *Church History* 43, no. 3 (September 1974): 308–18.

82. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2:114.

83. *Ibid.*, 179–80. “Although there are many radical elements in the political outlook of the counter-reformation theorists, and although these undoubtedly contributed to the later development of constitutionalist thought, it still seems a considerable overstatement to think of these writers as the chief originators of

a modern 'democratic' view of politics. . . . One of their concerns was of course to repudiate Marsiglio of Padua's heretical suggestion that all coercive power must be secular by definition, and thus that the Church cannot be regarded as a jurisdictional authority at all." *Ibid.*, 178–79.

84. *Ibid.*, 117ff. "Locke . . . was the recipient of a sophisticated and more recent conceptual inheritance of property debate predicated in part on the arguments generated in the thirteenth century. . . . It is, however, not unfair to modern theorists who have given Locke and his contemporaries so much attention to say that they have ignored or tended to simplify vaguely as 'Thomist' the legacy of the poverty controversy which helped to provide the circumscribing conceptual vocabulary with which Locke, Pufendorf, Grotius and others struggled in the seventeenth century." Condren, "Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory," 26n45.

85. "Foucault tells us that the episteme of the Western world from the end of the Renaissance to the end of the eighteenth century . . . differed radically from that of the sixteenth century before it and that of the modern world after it. . . . Foucault shows that in the sixteenth century the order of the world could be known only through the practice of 'reading' the world and discovering the forms of resemblance or similitude marked, as signs, on the face of all things." Jack L. Amariglio, "The Body, Economic Discourse, and Power: An Economist's Introduction to Foucault," *History of Political Economy* 20, no. 4 (1988): 587.

86. "With an appeal to the fact that the law of the Decalogue 'expressly forbids us to steal' . . . [Bodin took this] to show that the holding of private property is in fact presupposed by the law of nature, and thus that Plato's ideal of 'a community of all things' must be founded on a mistake." Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2:296.

87. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 174.

88. *Ibid.*, 173.

89. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2:137ff.

90. Charles Knight, "The Images of Nations in Eighteenth-Century Satire," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 22, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 501–2.

91. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2:168. True to his populist and democratic sympathies, Cardinal Bellarmine was one of the first Jesuit scholars to challenge the temporal authority of the pope. *Ibid.*, 174 and 179–80. Eventually, his last treatise, *The Supreme Pontiff*, "was treated by Pope Sixtus V as heretical, and was actually placed on the Index of Prohibited Books." *Ibid.*, 180.

92. *Ibid.*, 153–54.

93. Even Stephen Neill's sympathetic treatment avers: "Life was peaceful, happy, and well-ordered. Discipline was strict and harsh, but not cruel, Indians were appointed as overseers and headmen, but they had little authority. In reality, the Jesuit was master of all he surveyed." *A History of Christian Missions* (New York: Penguin, 1984), 172.

94. A. V. Anikin, *A Science in Its Youth* (New York: International, 1979), 70. Also Tony Aspromourgos, "The Life of William Petty in Relation to His Economics," *History of Political Economy* 20, no. 3 (1988): 337–56.

95. Pierre Jeannin, *Merchants of the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 111.

96. Frank Swetz, *Capitalism and Arithmetic: The New Math of the 15th Century* (LaSalle,

II: Open Court, 1987), 10ff. The first printed arithmetic book was the *Treviso Arithmetic*, a *practica* for “those who look forward to mercantile pursuits.” Published in 1478, the manuscript was named for its origins at Treviso city, a Venetian dependency. *Ibid.*, 40.

97. Though Anikin refers to the Physiocrats as a “bourgeois essence . . . disguised in feudal clothing” (*A Science in Its Youth*, 163), Physiocracy was identified by Marx in a draft of *The German Ideology* “as being directly ‘the economic dissolution of feudal property.’” Cited by Ronald Meek in his *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973), 139. Meek concluded that the Physiocrats were contradictory: suspended between their insistence on agriculture as the sole source of surplus and their formulation of a theoretical system which was a “capitalist system.” *The Economics of Physiocracy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 297–98.

98. M. C. Howard and J. E. King, *The Political Economy of Marx* (New York: Longman, 1975), 67.

99. Tracking the “new math,” the technical basis of political economy, to the rise of mercantilism and industrialization, Swetz reports: “Italy’s commercial progress is reflected by the publication of the Treviso book in 1478, Borgi’s work (1484), followed by that of Calandri (1491), Pacioli (1494), and Tartaglia (1556). Hanseatic League trade opened the commercial possibilities of Germany and writers such as Weidman (1489), Riese (1518), and Rudolff (1530) responded to the increased demand for mathematical knowledge. In the sixteenth century, the spirit of commercial adventure entered France, and Savonne (1553) expounded on the techniques of merchant arithmetic. The Netherlands awoke to her maritime potential and practical arithmetic appeared in the works of Van der Schuere (1600) and Raets (1580). England’s merchants, reacting to the continental tempo of trade, sought to establish their own markets and the writings of Recorde (1542) and Baker (1568) became popular.” *Capitalism and Arithmetic*, 294–95.

100. “The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure: political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas, also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.” Engels, “Letter to Joseph Bloch,” in Robert C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 760.

101. “The first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamian marriage, and the first class oppression with that of the female sex by the male.” Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, 503.

102. Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in T. B. Bottomore, ed., *Karl Marx, Early Writings* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 156n1.

103. Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, 510.

104. Susan Himmelweit, “Domestic Labour,” in Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, and Ralph Miliband, eds., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 135–37.

105. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were many among the scientific elite who insisted that women were incapable of rigorous thought.

Locke, for one, ascribed to female deceit and ignorance the origins of pernicious ideas and the source of human monstrosities. Cf. William Walker, "Locke Minding Women: Literary History, Gender, and the *Essay*," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 245–68. According to Genevieve Lloyd (*The Man of Reason*), "In Bacon's metaphors the control of the feminine became explicitly associated with the very nature of knowledge." Cited by Walker, "Locke Minding Women," 247–48. Also Sue Curry Jansen, "Is Science a Man? New Feminist Epistemologies and Reconstructions of Knowledge," *Theory and Society* 19 (1990): 235–46.

106. "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 481 (my emphasis).

107. *Ibid.*, 475.

108. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 225.

109. *Ibid.*, 255ff.

110. *Ibid.*, 259.

111. *Ibid.*, 261.

112. *Ibid.*, 262.

113. "[Marxism's] pursuit of scientificity has been synonymous with an acceptance of the institutions and the effects of power that invest scientific discourses, or to put the matter in a more familiar form, its embrace of scientificity has been synonymous with the exercise of a form of domination, rather than with a construction of the preconditions for emancipation and liberation." Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 80.

114. Hayden White, *Metahistory* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 283.

115. *Ibid.*, 284.

116. *Ibid.*, 316. For other treatments of Marx as tragedian, see Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and Charles Frankel, "Theory and Practice in Marx's Thought," in *Marx and Contemporary Scientific Thought: Papers from the Symposium on the Role of Karl Marx in the Development of Contemporary Scientific Thought, Organized by UNESCO* (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), 31.

117. White, *Metahistory*, 316.

118. *Ibid.*, 29.

119. *Ibid.*, 40. This is the basis of what Gouldner called the "two Marxisms," i.e., "critical" and "scientific" Marxism. Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

120. White, *Metahistory*, 289ff. and Hayden White, "Foucault Decoded: Notes from Underground," *History and Theory* 12, no. 1 (1973): 49n11.

121. Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), 206; cited in S. S. Prawer, *Karl Marx and World Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 287.

122. Prawer, *Karl Marx*, 295–96.

123. *Ibid.*, 292.

124. *Ibid.*, 301.

125. *Ibid.*, 25.

126. *Ibid.*, 320–47. "What Marx looks for, in Shakespeare and Sophocles, is the

forceful expression, or suggestion, of an outlook which is the exact opposite of that which he attributes to the modern capitalist." *Ibid.*, 330.

127. For Engels, utopian socialism consisted of "theoretical enunciations corresponding with the revolutionary uprisings of a class not yet developed." Among the utopians he included Morelly and Mably, Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen—all of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 400–401.

CHAPTER 5

1. V. G. Kiernan, "Christianity," in Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, and Ralph Miliband, eds., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 71.

2. The claim is still made that "the core normative ideal underlying the Marxist emancipatory project is *classlessness*." Erik Olin Wright, Andrew Levine, and Elliott Sober, *Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History* (London: Verso, 1992), 188. This is not a historical issue for Wright, Levine, and Sober, but a theoretical one. As Lesley Jacobs observes, "They believe that Marxists should concede that oppression has all sorts of different causes, including not only class but also race, gender, religion, and culture. Their point is that this concession does not defeat the Marxist emancipatory project because . . . what distinguishes Marxism is not the insistence that class explains everything, but rather for explaining certain phenomena, class is the most important but not sole cause." Jacobs, "The Second Wave of Analytical Marxism," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 26, no. 2 (June 1996): 288.

3. Theodor Mommsen, a contemporary of Marx and Engels and a materialist in his own right, had persuasively argued in his *History of Rome* (1854–56), for instance, that the Roman republic had been bourgeois and capitalistic despite an economy dependent on slave labor and a "reserve army" of rural proletariats. G. H. Muel-ler, "Weber and Mommsen: Non-Marxist Materialism," *British Journal of Sociology* 37, no. 1 (1986): 1–20. Marx replied: "In encyclopedias of classical antiquities we find such nonsense as this—that in the ancient world capital was fully developed, 'except that the free laborer and a system of credit was wanting.' Mommsen also, in his 'History of Rome,' commits in this respect, one blunder after another." Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1967), 168n1.

4. Beginning with Hegel and then Engels, there is a Marxist literature which argues that in the logic of the dialectic, State bureaucracies, whether civilian or military, may evolve into social powers "for themselves," to paraphrase Hegel.

5. Marx wrote: "It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the proletariat as a whole *pictures* at present as its goal. It is a matter of *what the proletariat is in actuality* and what, in accordance with this *being*, it will historically be compelled to do." "Alienation and Social Classes," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 134–35.

6. "When we say that most economic discourse is 'capitalocentric,' we mean that other forms of economy . . . are often understood primarily with reference to capitalism: as being fundamentally the same as (or modeled upon) capitalism, or as being deficient or substandard imitations; as being opposite to capitalism;

as being the complement of capitalism; as existing in capitalism's space or orbit." J. K. Gibson-Graham, *The End of Capitalism (as We Knew It)* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 6.

7. *Ibid.*, 117.

8. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 477.

9. Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 331.

10. *Ibid.*, 169.

11. Robert William Fogel, *Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 64–66.

12. *Ibid.*, 84.

13. Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Movements in America* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

14. Marx, *The German Ideology*, in Ronald Meek, *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973), 169.

15. "What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up with *particular historical phases in the development of production*, 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a *classless society*." Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852, in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 220.

16. Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx," in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 681.

17. In 1877, in a biographical sketch of Marx, Engels had made identical remarks. Cf. "Karl Marx" in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works*, vol. 1 (New York: International, 1972), 369–78.

18. Quite early in his intellectual development, Marx insisted that religion and socialism were incommensurable: "Socialism is man's *positive self-consciousness* no longer mediated through the *index annulment of religion*." *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 93. And with Engels, he was equally caustic towards "Feudal Socialism" and "Christian Socialism": "As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism. . . . Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat." *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*," in *ibid.*, 1:492.

19. "Christianity was in its initial stages undoubtedly a movement of the propertyless, of the most diverse sorts, whom we may lump together under the name of proletarians if we do not mean thereby only wage-workers." Karl Kautsky, *Foundations of Christianity* (New York: S. A. Russell, 1963), xiii. See also *ibid.*, 272ff.

20. *Ibid.*, 355. Of necessity, Plato and Aristotle had an earlier claim to the enunciation of the moral authority behind slavery.

21. *Ibid.*, 361.

22. *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

23. Karl Kautsky, *Thomas More and His Utopia* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1959), 47ff. In *Foundations of Christianity* (34–42), Kautsky considerably moderated the racial narrative animating the Marxism of the More study. In the latter, when the Teutons, originally a "democratic" people, invaded the "Roman world empire," they provided the proletariat and the communist ethos of early (i.e., medieval) Christianity. Seduced by Rome's wealth and the superior crafts and agricultural

methods monopolized by the Church, the Teutons were corrupted by private property and first experienced poverty. The Church itself fell under the domination of the Franks in a vain attempt by the “King of the Franks” at creating Western Christianity as a permanent union of secular and spiritual authorities. “No feudal king, whatever his race, could perform this task, which required an organization stronger than the monarchy—*vis.*, the centralized Church.”

24. Kautsky, *Thomas More and His Utopia*, 67.

25. *Ibid.*, 72.

26. *Ibid.*, 53.

27. *Ibid.*, 78.

28. *Ibid.*, 223. Leszek Kolakowski’s remarks on Thomas More (“More’s Utopia owed its origin to reflection on the first symptoms of capitalist accumulation”) reiterated Kautsky’s allegiance to the Marxian distinction between the pre-capitalist and capitalist eras. *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 1, *The Founders* (New York: Oxford University, 1978), 183–84.

29. Kautsky, *Thomas More and His Utopia*, 224.

30. Marx, *Capital*, 82n1.

31. Cornel West, “Religion and the Left,” *Monthly Review*, July–August 1984, 12.

32. Engels, “To Joseph Bloch,” in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 760–65.

33. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 30.

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