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The Oxford Handbook *of*
POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY

THIRD EDITION

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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INTRODUCTION
Theoretical Foundations of Political Psychology

LEONIE HUDDY, DAVID O. SEARS, JACK S. LEVY, AND JENNIFER JERIT

POLITICAL psychology, at the most general level, is an application of what is known about human psychology to the study of politics. It draws upon theory and research on biopsychology, neuroscience, personality, psychopathology, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and intergroup relations. It addresses political elites—their personality, motives, beliefs, and leadership styles, and their judgments, decisions, and actions in domestic policy, foreign policy, international conflict, and conflict resolution. It also deals with the dynamics of mass political behavior: voting, collective action, the influence of political communications, political socialization and civic education, group-based political behavior, social justice, and the political incorporation of immigrants.

The field of political psychology has experienced healthy growth since the publication of the second edition of the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* in 2013. Research continues to be fueled by a mix of age-old questions and recent world events. Social psychologists and political scientists have turned to psychology to understand the origins of support for nationalist and populist political leaders (Forgas et al., 2021; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), political conservatism (Brandt et al., 2014; Jost, 2017), partisan polarization (Iyengar et al., 2019), compliance with COVID-related public health guidelines (Druckman et al., 2021; Pennycook et al., 2022), mass political violence (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022), racial politics (White & Laird, 2020; Jardina, 2019), anti-immigrant sentiment (Davidov et al., 2020; Sirin et al., 2016), signaling resolve in international politics (Kertzer, 2016), and the underpinnings of collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Sustained interest in the topics addressed by political psychologists goes hand in hand with a strong and increasingly global organization, the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), and the growing circulation of *Political Psychology*, its well-respected journal. The journal has retained its stature as the leading journal in the field, increasing its two-year (4.80) and five-year impact factor (5.57) in the 2021 Journal Citation Reports

database. There are also vibrant political psychology sections of major national and regional organizations such as the organized section of the American Political Science Association (APSA), the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group, the Political Studies Association, the British Psychological Society, and standalone associations such as the German Political Psychology Network.

There is a continued growth in textbooks, handbooks, edited volumes, and monographs devoted to the field. Textbooks by Cottam and colleagues (2015) and Houghton (2015) have been recently updated, and Mintz and colleagues (2021) recently published a new text. Recent handbooks include *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Political Psychology* (Nesbitt-Larking et al., 2014), the *Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology* (Osborne & Sibley, 2022), and *Political Psychology in Latin America* (Zúñiga & López-López, 2021). Several major presses, including Cambridge, Oxford, Routledge, and Palgrave have book series in political psychology. There is also a steady stream of monographs published in the field each year, leading to the existence of three annual book prizes dedicated to political psychology: the Robert E. Lane book prize awarded by the Political Psychology Section of the American Political Science Association, and the Alexander George and David O. Sears prizes awarded by the International Society for Political Psychology.

The current edition of the Handbook takes stock of the past decade's developments in political psychology, building closely on the second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Huddy et al., 2013). In this third edition of the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, widely respected political scientists and psychologists summarize what psychology has contributed to our understanding of the political behavior of both political elites and ordinary citizens, and the insights into basic psychology obtained from research on political behavior. The chapters in the Handbook provide an overview of key terms, major theories, and cutting-edge research within both psychology and political science and will be an essential reference for scholars and students interested in the intersection of these two fields.

We designed the Handbook to provide a comprehensive and expertly distilled account of research in many subfields of political psychology for both the beginning graduate student and the more advanced scholar who may be new to a specific subfield or topic. But we should note that the first two editions of the Handbook will remain useful references because they contain topics and discussions that are omitted from the current volume. Moreover, political psychology is a diverse and growing subfield, and by necessity not all topics could be included in a single volume. Topics that did not make it into this volume include the political psychology of inequality, political extremism, populism and autocracy, and climate change. These topics are touched on within different chapters but may constitute distinct chapters in a future edition of the Handbook.

In compiling this volume, we acknowledge the growing international flavor of contemporary political psychology, which explores topics as diverse as the dynamics of American presidential elections, resistance to immigration in a globalized economy, and the role of emotion and threat in the decisions of political leaders. Where possible, authors of chapters in this volume have chosen examples of good political psychology research from around the globe, demonstrating the broad explanatory power of common psychological forces within different polities. Cognitive biases, authoritarianism, patriotism, ethnocentrism, and social conformity are not constrained by geographic boundaries but are evident throughout the world, albeit in interaction with specific cultures and political systems.

1. What Is Political Psychology?

At its core, political psychology concerns the behavior of individuals within a specific political system. Psychology alone cannot explain the Holocaust, intractable conflicts, war, or most other behavior of states or collective political actors in complex environments. Individuals do not act within a vacuum. Their behavior varies with, and responds to, differences in political institutions, political cultures, leadership styles, and social norms. As Levy notes in chapter 10 (this volume), psychology influences foreign policy behavior primarily through its interaction with specific aspects of the international system, national governments, and distinct societies. The same logic applies to a wide range of different phenomena. Feldman and Weber develop this point more fully in chapter 20 (this volume) on authoritarianism. Do we look to the behavior of leaders or their followers to understand why citizens in the 1930s and 1940s followed fascist leaders who persecuted and killed millions of people? Were the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia a function of political leadership, the support (acquiescence) of the public, or both? Some scholars attribute the Holocaust squarely to the psychology of authoritarian followers (Adorno et al., 1950); others view it as a function of leadership and the pervasive human propensity to obey authority (Milgram, 1974); still others view it as the reaction of authoritarian individuals to social and political discord (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). In the end it is difficult to believe that someone with authoritarian tendencies will behave the same way under a fascist regime as in a liberal democracy.

A complex mix of individual psychology and political context also shapes public reactions to terrorism as discussed by Snider and colleagues in chapter 14 (this volume). Public support for anti-terrorism policies depends on how a threatened government reacts, the government's perceived competence and effectiveness in combatting terrorism, and a person's felt vulnerability to a future terrorist event. External forces such as the strength of government national security policy or terrorist determination and capabilities vary over time and across contexts, and they influence, in turn, whether a citizen feels anxious or angry in response to a terrorist event. Powerful terrorists and a weak government tend to generate anxiety among a threatened population, whereas a powerful government and weak terrorists will likely generate feelings of anger. Moreover, not everyone responds to threat in the same way, and individual psychological dispositions play an added role in determining whether someone reacts to terrorism with anger or anxiety. In general, a society dominated by feelings of anger may support aggressive antiterrorism action, whereas a population dominated by feelings of anxiety may oppose aggressive action that exacerbates the risk of terrorism (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Huddy & Feldman, 2011). Neither individual psychology nor political circumstances alone is likely to fully explain these reactions.

In a more general sense, questions about public reactions to terrorism or an authoritarian response to fascist rule are closely linked to one of the perennial questions raised by political psychology: How well are citizens equipped to handle their democratic responsibilities (Le Cheminant & Parrish, 2011)? Can they deliberate over the issues of the day fairly to arrive at a reasoned judgment, or conversely do they succumb to internecine enmities and fall victim to irrational intolerance? Many of the chapters in this Handbook grapple with such issues, underscoring the democratic capabilities of the citizenry while highlighting

ways in which leaders and citizens fall short of the democratic ideal. The question of a citizenry's democratic competence is addressed very directly by Jerit and Kam in chapter 15 (this volume) as they consider the variability in information processing and the conditions under which citizens update their beliefs and attitudes in response to new information. It is also central to Young and Miller's account of contemporary political communications research in chapter 16 (this volume). Both citizens and leaders exhibit distorted reasoning and a slew of cognitive and emotional biases that are well cataloged in this volume. Partisan resistance to new information, ethnocentric reactions to immigrants, automatic and pre-conscious reactions to a political candidate's facial features, greater risk-taking in the face of losses than gains—the list goes on. Many of these same processes are at work among political leaders for whom partisan loyalties loom large, threat impairs their ability to deliberate rationally, and emotions such as humiliation and anger affect their political decisions. In that sense leaders are vulnerable to emotional and cognitive psychological biases like those observed within the electorate.

Yet democratic societies more or less work, and political psychology has focused in recent years on individual differences among citizens to explain why a characterization of the public as biased, ethnocentric, fearful, or any other singular characterization is erroneous. Individual differences grounded in early socialization, genetic makeup, social context, and personality generate liberals and conservatives, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, tolerant and intolerant individuals, more and less well-informed citizens, and sectarian partisan elites. Politics emerges from such individual differences, leading to political disagreements that are visible and widely debated within well-functioning democratic societies. Even if citizens engage in biased reasoning, competing arguments are pervasive and difficult to avoid completely; the passionate are free to make their case, and the dispassionate can evaluate their efforts and arguments. The democratic process may be messy, unsatisfying, and frustrating, but it is an inherently human activity. As scholars we need to know something about both a political system and human psychology to make sense of it. The interplay of psychology and politics, especially within democratic processes, is a central theme of this volume and lies at the core of many of its chapters.

2. Intellectual Underpinnings of Political Psychology

As we noted in the very first edition of this Handbook, there is no one political psychology (Sears et al., 2003). Rather, researchers have employed several different psychological theories to study political behavior and attitudes. Some theories are more appropriate than others for analyzing certain political phenomena, as seen in many of the chapters in the Handbook. For example, Freudian psychodynamics can be applied to questions concerning the psychology of political leaders, and discourse theory is applied specifically to the analysis of political rhetoric and communications. But some of the psychological approaches employed across these chapters are marshaled to understand diverse political phenomena. For example, the influence of cognitive and emotional processes on elite and citizen decision-making is discussed in several chapters. Basic aspects of the affective and

cognitive system such as the link between anger and risk seeking or the limits of working memory and attention have broad ramifications for the study of political behavior across diverse political topics. To deepen insight into the intellectual underpinnings of political psychology, we lay out the major classes of psychological theories that have been applied to the study of political behavior (see also Cottam et al., 2015; Marcus, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2002). Each of the broad approaches we discuss contains several different theories and concepts yet are brought together by their focus on broadly similar psychological processes and mechanisms.

2.1. Rational Choice

Over the last six decades, rational choice theory has been a major influence on political science models of both elite and mass political behavior. This is understandable since democratic theory is predicated on the notion of a well-informed citizenry capable of handling and digesting information on issues of the day to arrive at well-informed decisions. As Chong explains in chapter 4 (this volume), rational choice theory is built on a set of basic assumptions about human behavior that resemble the requirements for a well-functioning citizenry: first, individuals have consistent preferences that reflect their desires and goals, which are often defined as the pursuit of economic self-interest; second, individuals assign a value or utility to these goals which helps them choose among multiple preferences; and third, probabilities are assigned to the different ways of achieving such goals. This culminates in Chong's definition of rational choice as "choosing the course of action that maximizes one's expected utility." If utilities, or goals, are equated with economic self-interest, as they often are, a rational choice model predicts that an individual will be motivated to act in ways that are most likely to pay the highest financial dividend. In politics, this translates into support of candidates and policies that are most likely to improve voters' economic bottom line and benefit them personally. Expectancy-value theory was formalized in psychology as an early version of the rational choice idea (Edwards, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

As Chong notes, however, pure rationality is something of a fiction when applied to human behavior. Downs (1957) was the first to identify the paradox of voting, a major problem for rational choice theory, in which the costs of voting far exceed its expected benefit to one's self-interest, suggesting that it is irrational even though frequently practiced (see also Green & Shapiro, 1994). Since Downs, it has become increasingly clear that neither leaders nor citizens make entirely rational political decisions. Researchers are moving away from or modifying a rational model of human behavior in many branches of political science, as reflected in Chong's discussion of bounded and low-information rationality. At the forefront of this effort lies pioneering research by social psychologists on systematic biases in human decision-making (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1982).

In chapter 11 (this volume), Stein provides a succinct account of a rationalist approach to threat perception in the field of international relations and highlights its inadequacy to fully explain elite behavior and decision-making (see also Caster and Yarhi-Milo, chapter 12). Stein documents several cognitive, motivational, and emotional biases that distort elite threat perceptions and reactions to threat. Levy (chapter 10, this volume) develops these themes further. He summarizes prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as an alternative to rationalist expected utility as a theory of choice under conditions of risk. He also

reviews the literature on intertemporal choice, on how people make trade-offs between current and future outcomes, noting the limitations of standard rationalist models of discounting over time (Loewenstein et al., 2003).

At the level of mass politics, among the earliest challenges to rational choice were observations that major political attitudes were in place well before adults began contemplating the political arena, in studies of political socialization and voting behavior (see Sears and Brown, chapter 3, this volume). Later challenges came from Kahneman and Tversky's findings on cognitive heuristics and biases, which blossomed into the subfield of behavioral decision theory and behavioral economics (Camerer et al., 2004), fields that intersect quite closely with political psychology. Behavioral economics and other well-documented psychologically based deviations from rationality are discussed at some length by Lau and Redlawsk (chapter 5, this volume) on citizen political decision-making.

In conclusion, it is difficult to overstate the importance of rational choice theory as a foundational basis for democratic theory and a stimulus to political psychology research. Its emphasis on the structure of information, careful deliberation, and weighting of one's interests as essential to the formation of informed positions on political matters continues to serve as a baseline for much political psychology research. Rational choice theory may provoke political psychologists to document the ways in which human behavior fails to conform with its stringent expectations, but even in that role it is highly influential. Moreover, even to political psychologists the public's democratic shortcomings are cause for consternation no matter how well explained psychologically, suggesting some lingering desire for the normative standard of rational deliberation and well-informed political decisions.

2.2. Biopolitics

Over the last decade or so, social scientists have begun to view human behavior through the prism of biology with intriguing results: neuroscience sheds light on information processing and emotion, evolutionary psychology underscores the biologically adaptive role of various social behaviors, and behavioral genetics uncovers the heritability of many social and political behaviors (Hatemi & McDermott, 2011). Political psychology has adopted this perspective, leading to a key focus on biological reasoning and evidence in several chapters in the volume, and a passing reference to biological evidence in many others.

At one level an explanation of human behavior grounded in evolutionary thinking seems consistent with a focus on rationality since human behavior is functional, geared toward enhanced reproductive fitness via the process of natural selection. In the Handbook, Bang Petersen explains the evolutionary approach to political psychology in chapter 7, beginning with the distinction between "proximate" and "ultimate" explanations. A proximal explanation describes the psychological mechanism responsible for producing political behavior— for example, how partisan social identities influence political participation. An ultimate explanation engages the question of why those identities form in the first place. Although politics may seem busy, technical, and complex, Bang Petersen observes that many ancient challenges were political in nature: "who is in the outgroup, how to divide resources within the group, and how to sanction those who take more than their share." While classic rational choice theory postulates a conscious goal of maximizing utility, an evolutionary approach views citizens as "adaptation executioners"—making decisions based on evolved

psychological mechanisms that increased fitness in ancestral environments. This perspective is at odds with other branches of political psychology that lament the sophistication of the average citizen. However, and as Bang Petersen notes, the adaptations that evolved to solve the problems of the ancestral past may "fail in predictable ways when applied to the problems that are unique to the politics of modern mass societies."

Evolutionary psychology focuses on attributes of psychology common to all members of the species, but some questions tackled by biopolitics deal with marked individual variation in human behavior. Why are some people open to experience and others closed, or some conscientious and others not? In chapter 8, Settle and Detert pick up where Bang Petersen leaves off, providing an overview of how political scientists have integrated biology into the study of politics. This work has taken place in four domains: genetics, neuroscience, physiology, and hormones. Settle and Detert evaluate the research on genetics, concluding that heritability shapes a range of fundamental political orientations and behaviors, including political ideology, strength of partisanship, political interest, and political participation. In a sign that the field of biopolitics is no longer in its infancy, progress has been made elaborating the mechanisms (e.g., operating at the hormonal or neurocognitive level) that link genetic variation to downstream attitudes and behaviors. One of the fastest growing areas of biopolitics explores physiologically instantiated responses, measured by heart rate or skin conductance, to external stimuli such as campaign ads, news content, or political discussions.

Other chapter authors allude in passing to the growing field of biopolitics. Stein discusses developments in the neural understanding of emotions in reference to the perception of threat among political elites. Bakker notes that political ideology and aspects of personality have heritable components. This point is reinforced by Feldman and Weber, who discuss the heritability of an authoritarian tendency, and Ben-Nun Bloom indicates that popular measures of values and morality have a common genetic basis. Petersen discusses a genetic basis to pathogen sensitivity that is linked to political preference but also makes clear that evolutionary psychology is distinct from behavioral genetics. Attention to the biological bases of political behavior will hopefully reinforce existing insights into political behavior and help to identify basic biological pathways that may be central to an understanding of political psychology.

2.3. Personality and Psychodynamics

Many political psychologists have examined an individual's personality or characterological predispositions to explain the behavior of political leaders and the ideological choices of citizens. Personality is usually defined as a collection of relatively persistent individual differences that transcend specific situations and contribute to the observed stability of attitudes and behavior. In the last fifteen years, political psychologists have shown renewed interest in stable personality traits and their effects on political attitudes and behavior based, in part, on growing consensus on the basic structure of personality traits.

Psychologists commonly identify five basic clusters of personality characteristics or traits—neuroticism, openness to experience, extraversion, conscientiousness, and agreeableness—commonly referred to as the five-factor or Big Five framework of personality. These dimensions are described in some detail and their links to political ideology

examined in the Handbook by Bakker in chapter 2. The five-factor model has broad influence in political psychology and is touched on in Handbook chapters by Settle and Detert, Jerit and Kam, Federico and Malka, Ben-Nun Bloom, and Feldman and Weber. Bakker goes beyond conventional accounts of personality, first by describing other theoretical approaches such as the HEXACO model and the Dark Tetrad, and second, by noting the challenges of measuring personality and identifying its effects on political attitudes and behavior. There is growing evidence regarding the relationship between personality and vote choice, political engagement, and the strength of political loyalties. Yet as Bakker points out, "the cross-sectional research designs that make up most of the personality-politics literature do not allow for causal interpretations." He explains how the adoption of open science practices (e.g., replication, preregistration) can move the field forward.

Sigmund Freud had a great deal of influence on early political psychologists because his psychoanalysis of specific individuals lent itself well to the analysis of the personalities of specific political leaders. Harold Lasswell, in his *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930), was a pioneer in analyzing the personalities of political activists in terms of the unconscious conflicts that motivated their political activities. This approach led to numerous psychobiographies of famous leaders, such as the analysis of Woodrow Wilson by George and George (1956), or of Martin Luther by Erik Erikson (1958). Mohls and colleagues critique past scholarship on leadership for its dependence on personality explanations, noting recent trends that emphasize its subjective and context-dependent nature. The idiographic approach to personality and politics pursued in past psychobiographies can also be contrasted with the nomothetic approach discussed by Bakker, which statistically places large numbers of people at various positions on specific dimensions of personality.

Federico and Malka (chapter 17) also add an important caveat to the study of personality and politics, outlining the interplay between dispositional predictors of ideology and the political environment. Personality and temperament remain influential in the origins of ideological reasoning, but this relationship is moderated in predictable ways by issue domain, national context, and exposure to elite discourse.

2.4. Cognitive and Affective Psychology

Cognitive psychology and neuroscience have had profound influence on political psychology through their discovery of key features of the cognitive system: limited attention and working memory, implicit attitudes that lie outside conscious awareness, the rapid formation of habitual mental associations, and the interplay of affect and cognition. In essence, the cognitive system is highly efficient, processing a great deal of information with relatively little mental exertion. Under appropriate conditions, individuals can override the human tendency toward fast and efficient decision-making (Kahneman, 2011). But political decision-making is often beset with biases that privilege habitual thought and consistency over the careful consideration of new information. This is not always bad. Indeed, in the realm of consumer and other choices, such fast gut-level decisions are often superior to reasoned thought. But in the realm of politics, reliance on this form of reasoning privileges consistency through the process of motivated reasoning in which disagreeable or challenging information is quickly rejected. This can lead, in turn, to biased and suboptimal political decisions (Bartels, 1996).

In myriad ways, cognitive psychology has undermined the rational choice model of elite and public decision-making, and we briefly describe how awareness of each aspect of the cognitive system has shaped the study of political psychology over the last decade. Much of this research is dedicated toward understanding how well (or poorly) democratic citizens function and the degree to which they deviate from the normative ideal of rational decision-making.

2.4.1. *Cognitive Economy*

Clear limits on human information-processing capacity underlie the widespread use of cognitive heuristics or shortcuts, which can distort the decision-making of elites (Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985) and members of the public. These limits often lead to what Herbert Simon (1957) refers to as "bounded rationality," discussed at some length in the Handbook chapter by Chong.

Lau and Redlawsk turn to the use of cognitive heuristics among citizens and review work on behavioral decision theory, contrasting normative models with behavioral descriptions of how ordinary people make political decisions. Here too the cognitive limits on rationality lead to a variety of problem-solving strategies that involve cognitive shortcuts. The use of mental shortcuts is not necessarily pernicious, however. The chapter by Lau and Redlawsk suggests that the use of cognitive shortcuts for reasoned political deliberation may not be as bad for mass political decision-making as once feared (also see Pierce & Lau, 2019). Brader and Gadarian also note that anxiety reduces reliance on heuristics but can have other negative effects on reasoning such as an increased attention and reliance on threatening information.

Cognitive economy represents one end of the epistemic continuum. In the Handbook, Jerit and Kam describe features of individuals and contexts that can impart the motivation to devote more rather than less effort to politics. Someone who is low in the need for closure, for example, will make judgments in a different manner than someone who is high in this trait. Likewise, in particular settings such as an uncertain election outcome or a high stakes foreign conflict citizens may be compelled to invest more effort in the decision-making process. The notion of a continuum of effort is at the core of dual-process models, with labels such as "System I–System II" or "Heuristic–Systematic." These models are described at length by Jerit and Kam and featured in chapters by Lau and Redlawsk, Bang Petersen, Ben-Nun Bloom, and Chong.

2.4.2. *Implicit Attitudes and Automaticity*

Conscious cognitive activity is a limited commodity, and decisions are often made, and opinions influenced, by information outside conscious awareness. The brain is largely devoted to monitoring the body, and most of its activity lies outside consciousness, reserving conscious thought for important higher-level activities. Political psychologists might regard political decisions as a high-level activity warranting conscious deliberation, yet political attitudes can be influenced by information of which someone may be unaware. Jerit and Kam discuss this phenomenon most fully in their chapter, noting that System I processing can occur automatically and unconsciously. Examples include rapid, unreflective trait inferences based on candidate attractiveness or instantaneous positive/negative affect

in response to political objects. Several chapters discuss implicit attitudes and the widely used Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Kinder extends this discussion to implicit racial attitudes, examining their nature and political effects. Schneider and Bos discuss the use of implicit gender-bias measures to examine bias against women political candidates. The measure of implicit attitudes continues to shed light on the political effects of racial, gender, and other group biases.

The notion of automaticity shares an intellectual link with behaviorist theories that were much in vogue in the middle half of the 20th century. One version of behaviorist theories emphasizes the learning of long-lasting habits, which in turn guide later behavior. They were inspired by the classical conditioning studies of Pavlov, who showed that dogs could be conditioned to salivate at the sound of a bell if it were always followed by food; by the instrumental conditioning studies of Watson and Skinner, who showed that animals could develop complex habits if their behavior proved instrumental to the satisfaction of their basic needs such as hunger or thirst; and the imitative learning examined by Bandura, who showed that children would engage in imitative behavior without any involvement of need satisfaction. Such theories long dominated the analysis of mass political attitudes. The field of political socialization, as described in chapter 3 by Sears and Brown, developed from the assumption that children learned basic political attitudes (such as party identification and racial prejudice) from their families and friends, and that the residues of these early attitudes dominated their later political attitudes in adulthood, such as their presidential vote preferences, triggering a host of automatic associations not readily subject to conscious scrutiny.

2.4.3. *Spreading Activation and Habitual Association*

The process of automaticity is linked to the axiomatic notion, developed by Hebb (1949), that neurons that fire together, wire together. The simultaneous pairing of two objects in the environment leads to the firing of their relevant neurons. If this pairing persists, the brain associates the two objects habitually and recalls the second when primed with the first in a process of spreading activation. For example, if the word liberal is frequently associated in popular conversation with loose-living, pot-smoking, intellectual, or impractical dreamers, or the media depict African Americans in settings that emphasize their poverty, unemployment, and drug-related crimes, the terms will become connected mentally. This set of mental associations may lie at the heart of implicit racial, gender, and other group stereotypes discussed in the Handbook by Donald Kinder in chapter 27.

The existence of habitual associations in the brain results in consistent thought patterns that link, for example, abortion and liberal-conservative ideology, or positive feelings about capitalism and support for government fiscal austerity measures. These associations are typically constructed through political rhetoric, as discussed by Hopkins in chapter 9. In general, such associations anchor policy positions and contribute to attitude stability over time, especially among those who connect policies to stable political attitudes such as political ideology or other basic values. But habitual mental associations also vary among individuals; political sophisticates with strongly anchored political beliefs show stronger habitual mental associations than those with few or weakly held beliefs. The existence of consistent mental associations helps to explain why reframing a political issue—discussing

a tax cut in terms of reduced government waste rather than growing inequality, for example—will be effective for citizens for whom the concept of a tax cut is not anchored by other stable political beliefs but will be less successful among political sophisticates.

Understanding the factors or situations in which someone scrutinizes their habitual mental associations is of critical interest to political psychology and the study of a democratic citizenry more generally. In chapter 6 on political emotion, Brader and Gadarian present evidence that habitual thought is less common when individuals feel anxious. Under those circumstances, citizens seek out new information, process it carefully, and are motivated to reach the "right" decision. The distinction between more and less effortful information processing is captured within dual-process models that posit both a superficial and more deliberate path to attitude change. The delineation of conditions under which citizens engage in careful political deliberation and are open to new information remains of key interest to political psychologists and will continue to stimulate research in both psychology and political science.

2.4.4. *Interplay of Affect and Cognition*

Contemporary political psychology draws increasingly on affective processes. We noted in the previous version of the Handbook a tilt away from reliance on purely cognitive explanations to a greater consideration of affect and emotion. This trend has strengthened in the last decade, leading to an even greater reliance on "hot" cognition and an increasingly emotional view of political behavior in the current edition. It is difficult to find a chapter in the volume that does not make at least passing reference to the role of political emotions in research on citizens or political elites.

Levy discusses the impact of cognitive biases and motivated biases (motivated reasoning) on foreign policy decision-making. Cognitive biases, sometimes referred to as "cold" cognitions, are based on the application of cognitive heuristics such as anchoring, in which prior probability assessments exert a disproportionate weight and in which the updating of priors based on new information is slow and inefficient. Motivated reasoning is driven by "hot" affective processes, by people's interests and policy preferences and by their psychological needs and emotional well-being. Wishful thinking and related patterns help to maintain cognitive consistency and to preserve the integrity of one's belief system, but at the costs of potentially serious distortions in the processing of information. Such biases in adulthood force an examination of the origins of attitudes and beliefs that require such vigorous defense, as developed in the chapter on childhood and adult development by Sears and Brown.

In addition to Brader and Gadarian's detailed discussion of political emotions, emotions surface in numerous ways in this edition of the Handbook. Young and Miller describe how the change to a more decentralized and micro-segmented media landscape has increased the emotional content of the information environment. Levy comments on growing interest over the past decade in the study of emotions within international relations, at both the elite and mass level. Stein discusses the influence of emotions on elites' perceptions of, and responses to, external threats. She builds on Brader and Gadarian's discussion of the origins and cognitive consequences of different classes of emotions to explain the likely consequences of fear, humiliation, and anger for elite decision-making. Kertzer describes

several emotion-based explanations for the rally effect in which leaders experience increased public support in times of war. Snider and colleagues discuss the varying political effects of emotional reactions to terrorism and war.

Positive and negative affect is an integral component of implicit attitudes, as noted by Jerit and Kam, and in that sense emotion plays a very central role within modern attitude research in both psychology and political science. The integral role of emotions in the public's political decision making is made clear in numerous chapters. Young and Miller discuss the role of anger and anxiety in driving selective information exposure. Ben-Nun Bloom discusses at length a modern approach to the study of morality in which it is regarded as an emotional and intuitive basis of political judgement. Mason underscores the contribution of intergroup emotions to help explain partisan reactions to political threat and the development of partisan cohesion and action. Kinder discusses the importance of affect to the study of racial prejudice. Cohen-Chen and Halperin discuss the key role play by emotions such as anger, hatred, fear, and hope in both inflaming and deescalating intractable group conflicts, shedding light on important processes of emotion regulation.

Brader and Gadarian review research on political emotions in considerable detail. Their chapter underscores a fourth crucial aspect of the cognitive system, the intricate interplay between affect and cognition. Hot cognition underscores the degree to which motivational and affective states influence decision-making, and is discussed at some length by Jerit and Kam. Motivated reasoning serves as a pervasive example of hot cognition in which individuals are motivated to preserve their beliefs, oppose challenging or contradictory views, and dismiss the other side's arguments as far weaker than one's own. In essence, it produces rapid (and perhaps preconscious) dismissal of opposing views. The existence of motivated reasoning generates a paradox, however, when it comes to political sophisticates, who turn out to be most subject to automaticity and motivated reasoning. In Chong's words, "the beliefs of the best informed may reflect an ideologically distorted perspective rather than the objective state of the world," raising real questions about the rational basis of public opinion. If those with the information needed to make a fully informed decision are also the most biased in their reasoning, rational deliberation seems like an unattainable political ideal.

2.5. Intergroup Relations

In tandem with a growing interest in emotions, contemporary political psychology is also increasingly focused on collective behavior and theories of intergroup relations as explanations for political behavior. This trend has accelerated in the past decade. The second edition of this Handbook contained numerous chapters linked to intergroup relations. This focus continues and has been expanded in the current volume. Chapters explicitly devoted to intergroup relations have increased to additionally include the political psychology of gender, authoritarianism as a form of group defense, an explicitly group-based account of leadership, public reactions to terrorism, nationalism, the politics of minority status, and status hierarchies. Moreover, the increased focus on group-based political behavior is entwined with other changes that have occurred within politics and the field of political psychology. There is a very noticeable increase in references to intergroup theories such as social identity theory in the current Handbook. The political importance of group identities

is discussed at length in Mason's chapter on political identities but is also referred to as a basis of political attitudes and behavior in chapters on political rhetoric, communications, authoritarianism, collective action, nationalism, minority status, status hierarchies, and intractable conflict.

The field of intergroup relations does not embody a single theoretical approach; rather it draws on diverse psychological theories. But it is fair to say that many, if not most, analyses of collective behavior deviate from a rational choice account of human behavior. For instance, Bang Peterson notes the power of collectives within human evolution and how solutions to the problems of cooperation (e.g., cheater detection) have implications for contemporary political attitudes and behavior. Early research on intergroup relations, conducted in the 1950s and 1960s, stressed the biased and emotional nature of out-group animosity, especially toward Jews and Negroes (Allport, 1954). Much attention has been paid to the childhood socialization of prejudice and stereotyping, as indicated in the chapter by Sears and Brown. Feldman and Weber discuss research on the authoritarian personality, a highly influential study of prejudice, which emphasized the importance of interrelated and emotionally motivated aspects of personality such as authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression in the development of racial prejudice and anti-Semitism (Adorno et al., 1950).

Some accounts of intergroup behavior, such as realistic conflict theory, are consistent with rational choice and are often pitted against symbolic explanations of group political cohesion and conflict. Mason highlights the distinction between social identity theory, which stresses social prestige and intergroup respect as motives for intergroup behavior (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and realistic interest theories, which place emphasis on shared material interests and conflict over tangible resources (Blumer, 1958; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). A similar distinction between realistic and affective responses to members of an out-group surfaces in research on racial attitudes in Snider and colleagues' discussion of public reactions to terrorism, Kinder's discussion of prejudice, and Green and Staerkle's chapter on immigration and multiculturalism. On balance, there is greater support for symbolic than realistic sources of political group cohesion and conflict.

Threat plays a special role in the political life of a collective. It can galvanize and unify an in-group while leading to vilification of an out-group and is thus particularly potent politically. Threat is widely discussed in Handbook chapters dealing with the political psychology of mass politics, including Snider et al.'s overview of public reactions to terrorism, Feldman and Weber's chapter on authoritarianism, Mason's chapter on political identities, Huddy's discussion of nationalism, Green and Staerkle's consideration of immigration and multiculturalism, Kinder's overview of racial prejudice, and Chen-Cohen and Halperin's overview of intractable conflicts. The concept of threat has long dominated research on conflict within international relations, as noted at some length in chapters by Stein, Casler and Yarhi-Milo, and Kertzer. Research on both mass and elite politics assesses the rationality of threat reactions and generally rejects that interpretation, at least in broad stroke. Highly distorted subjective judgments often influence elites' perception of threat, as noted in chapters by Levy, Stein, and Kertzer. Moreover, economic threats are typically less politically potent than cultural and other less tangible noneconomic threats in mass politics, as discussed in chapters by Craig and Phillips, Kinder, and Green and Staerkle.

Finally, humans' impressive capacity for cooperation, a topic discussed at length by Bang Petersen, leads us back to consider the political psychology of positive normative change.

Cooperation can extend to groups as reflected in Craig and Phillips discussion of allyship and contexts in which members of a dominant group seek to reduce social inequality. Tropp and Dehrone consider strategies, such as intergroup contact and changing social norms, that reduce prejudice. Cohen-Chen and Halperin describe various conflict-resolution strategies, including new interventions designed to facilitate emotional regulation. As social animals, humans are profoundly affected by social norms, which are often learned early and well in the socialization process, as indicated by Sears and Brown. Such norms hold the potential for good as well as evil.

Have the scales tipped toward a more humane and cooperative world? Such a claim would undoubtedly be disputed by scholars of international conflicts, indigenous oppression, economic inequality, and other societal ills. Nonetheless, research on values and social justice opens political psychology to the positive forces of cooperation, tolerance, and respect on which modern democratic societies pivot. Adherence to a norm of cooperation may not be rational for an individual (if defined as the pursuit of self-interest) but can have clear advantages to human groups. We had suggested in the previous edition of the Handbook that positive forces in human society may come to play a larger role in future political psychology research, and we have seen some greater research emphasis on individual and intergroup empathy in the last decade (see Sirin et al., 2021; Newman et al., 2015).

3. Organization of This Volume

We begin this volume with a section on broad psychological theories. This section includes basic theories that concern personality, early childhood and adult development, rational choice, decision-making, the study of emotion, evolutionary psychology, biopolitics, and political language. Then we move to the substantive focus of different areas of political psychological research, which tend to cut across theoretical approaches. We start with international relations, focusing on elite judgment and decision-making and on public opinion on foreign policy and domestic terrorism. The next section focuses on mass political behavior, including an analysis of information processing, political ideology, moral values, gender, political communications, and authoritarianism. The final section considers collective behavior, including nationalism, political leadership, identities, status hierarchies, collective action, prejudice, migration and multiculturalism, discrimination, and intractable conflict.

We characterize political psychology as the application of psychology to politics, but we would like to see greater two-way communication between disciplines. Feldman and Weber discuss problems posed by the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, common in psychology, for political scientists because of the explicit ideological content of some scale items. From their perspective, psychologists could benefit from the adoption of a measure of authoritarianism that lacks any reference to political content. Huddy notes that political scientists would benefit from the adoption of language common in social psychology, which distinguishes clearly between patriotism and nationalism as two distinct forms of national attachment. Likewise, Mols and colleagues discuss the benefits to political scientists of adopting a psychological social identity approach to leadership that emphasizes the need for shared leader and follower identity.

Before closing, we also want to refer the interested reader to several other recent volumes with different goals from our own but with somewhat similar titles. This Handbook is intended as a comprehensive statement of the current state of knowledge in political psychology. There are several other volumes in the Oxford Handbooks series that touch on related aspects of political behavior. Handbooks edited by Kaltwasser and colleagues on populism (2017), Della Porta and colleagues on social movements (2015), and Uslaner on social and political trust (2018) go into greater detail on some of the topics addressed in this Handbook.

In contrast to those handbooks, the current volume goes more deeply into original psychological research, includes authors from both psychology and political science, and is unique in combining research on both elite and mass politics. The current Handbook is the place to go to find out what is currently known about the many different fields in the umbrella topic of political psychology and learn more about psychology, political science, and their vibrant intersection.

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PART I

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

CHAPTER 2

PERSONALITY APPROACHES TO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

BERT N. BAKKER

1. INTRODUCTION

THE question of whether personality is relevant for understanding political behavior has a long tradition in political psychology.[1] Seminal studies in psychology and political science argued that a persons' psychological dispositions such as their "individual needs" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 2), "underlying needs" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 511) or "own inner feelings" (McClosky, 1958, p. 40) are important for political behavior. Over time slightly different theoretical approaches and specific personality traits have appeared. Nevertheless, the basic questions in the literature remained the same: can personality help us understand the variation in people's political preferences and behaviors?

Up to today, research on personality and politics contributes to fundamental research questions such as the nature of ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014) and the origins of political participation (Dawkins, 2017; Weinschenk et al., 2019). Moreover, political developments in the years before writing this chapter such as Brexit and the elections of Donald Trump and Bolsenaro lead academics (Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Dunn, 2015; Ludeke et al., 2018) and pundits (Taub, 2016; Worthen, 2018) to turn to personality as—part of—the answer for these political developments.

This chapter provides the historical context and discusses state-of-the-art theories on the role of personality in political behavior. At the same time, I outline a research agenda with essential questions and methodological innovations for the next generation of research.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, prominent models of personality will be discussed. Next, some shared features of the research designs in the personality-politics literature will be discussed. This is followed by a discussion about the associations between personality and various aspects of political behavior: political ideology, voting behavior, the strength of political loyalties, participation, engagement, and news consumption. A separate section reviews the relationship between the personality of politicians and their political behavior. The chapter ends with a discussion of open-ended questions and the call to adopt open science practices.

2. What Is Personality?

Allport (1937, p. 48) defined personality as the study of the "dynamic organization within the individual of those psychological systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment." This chapter follows Mondak (2010, p. 6), who defined personality as "a multifaceted and enduring internal, or psychological, structure" usually consisting of multiple traits. Traits are "broad internal dimensions . . . that account for consistencies in behavior, thought, and feeling across situations and time" (McAdams & Olson, 2010, p. 519).

There are various models of personality and different theories (see for discussions, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968; Feher & Vernon, 2021; Goldberg, 1990). It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of them. Here the Big Five personality traits, HEXACO model, Dark Tetrad, and the traits Authoritarianism and Disgust Sensitivity will be discussed.

2.1. The Big Five Personality Traits

The Big Five model of personality is a prominent model in the personality-politics literature. The *lexical hypothesis* underlying the Big Five suggests "that natural languages such as English would have evolved terms for all fundamental individual differences" (McCrae & Costa, 1985, p. 711). In a series of pioneering studies, Allport and colleagues (Allport, 1937; Allport & Odbert, 1936) isolated thousands personality-descriptive terms from an English-language dictionary, categorized these terms and created a list of terms they considered to be stable traits. Factor analyses suggested that personality is best represented using a five-factor structure (Digman, 1990; Fiske, 1949; Goldberg, 1992; Tupes & Christal, 1992). These traits were coined the "Big Five" and labelled: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Intellect (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1992).

Inspired by the research in the lexical tradition, Costa Jr. and McCrae (1992) developed the Five-Factor Model with the traits Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.[2] The Five-Factor Model differed a bit from the "Big Five": the model relied upon short sentences instead of single-word person-adjectives to measure personality, the content of the Openness (vs. Intellect in the Big Five) trait differed, and the traits consisted of lower-order facets. Both models have been used in the literature, and throughout the chapter the term Big Five will be used.[3]

The Big Five integrates a wide variety of individual differences into five traits. Key characteristics of the five traits are:

- **Openness:** Openness encapsulates variation in the sensitivity for art, beauty, and feelings. It also captures variation in the willingness to try new activities, the tendency to consider new ideas and to re-evaluate one's social and political beliefs (McCrae, 1996).
- **Conscientiousness:** Conscientiousness captures the tendency to resist impulses and plan, organize and carry out tasks (Costa Jr. et al., 1991).

Conscientiousness has a pro-active and an inhibitive side. As Costa Jr. et al. (1991, p. 889) explain "the proactive side of Conscientiousness is seen most clearly in the need for

achievement and commitment to work." "The inhibitive side" of Conscientiousness "is seen in moral scrupulousness and cautiousness" (Costa Jr. et al., 1991, p. 889).

- **Extraversion:** Extraversion is associated with the experience of positive emotions, a tendency to be outgoing and prefer action, as well as excitement seeking. Highly extraverted individuals are outgoing, socially engaged; seek excitement; like to be in the center of attention; and experience positive emotions. Those lower on Extraversion are shy and prefer to stay in the background.
- **Agreeableness:** Agreeableness "is primarily a dimension of interpersonal behavior" (Costa Jr. et al., 1991, p.889). Yet, Agreeableness "also influences the self-image and helps to shape social attitudes and philosophy of life" (Costa Jr. et al., 1991, p.889). Those higher on Agreeableness are trusting, caring, believe in the good intentions of others, avoid conflict, and are tender-minded (Costa Jr. et al., 1991). Those lower on Agreeableness are distrusting, cynical, tough-minded, and conflict-seeking.
- **Neuroticism:** Neuroticism is a trait that captures variation in the tendency to experience negative affect, anger, anxiety, and depression. Moreover, Neuroticism captures variation in the extent to which people are self-conscious and insecure.

The Big Five's characteristics received widespread scholarly attention. The traits show high rank-order stability over time (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). There is also a considerable degree of correspondence between self-ratings and observer-ratings of the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1988). The Big Five structure has been replicated in samples representative of populations in different countries across cultures (Schmitt et al., 2007)—but see Laajaj et al. (2019). The Big Five traits have a sizeable heritable component (Vukasović & Bratko, 2015) and manifest themselves in childhood (Edmonds et al., 2013). Finally, the Big Five traits reliably correlate with a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors (Soto, 2019).

2.2. HEXACO model

The HEXACO model of personality is, just like the Big Five, derived upon lexical studies across different languages (Lee & Ashton, 2008). However, the HEXACO model suggests that personality consists of six broad traits (or domains) (Ashton & Lee, 2007). There is considerable overlap between the HEXACO traits and those in the Big Five. Here, the six traits are, briefly, discussed:

The traits Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion in the HEXACO are similar to those in the Big Five. The HEXACO trait Emotionality is related to Neuroticism but "excludes the anger that defines" those high Neuroticism in the Big Five (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 152). Moreover, the HEXACO trait Emotionality "includes the sentimentality that mainly defines Big Five Agreeableness" (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 152). Agreeableness is a trait that "is somewhat reminiscent of Big Five Agreeableness but excludes sentimentality and includes (lack of) anger," which is part of Neuroticism in the Big Five (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 152). Honest-Humility is the, unique, sixth dimension of the HEXACO model (Ashton et al., 2014). Honest-Humility captures variation in "sincerity, unassumingness, and fairness versus slyness/deceit, pretentiousness, and greed" (Ashton et al., 2006, p. 853). Like the

Big Five traits, the psychometric properties, such as internal consistency, test-retest relability, and convergent validity—of the HEXACO are acceptable (see, De Vries, 2013; Lee & Ashton, 2006).

2.3. Dark Tetrad

The Dark Tetrad—an updated version of the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002)—consists of the traits Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, and Sadism (Buckels et al., 2013) and captures antisocial personality traits that are not well represented in the Big Five (Block, 2010). Those higher on Narcissism seek power and attention and are self-absorbed and entitled (Emmons, 1984). Machiavellianism is the trait that captures variation in the tendency to be self-interested and deceive and manipulate others (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006). High levels of Psychopathy are associated with higher levels of impulsiveness and thrill-seeking as well as lower levels of anxiety and empathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Finally, higher levels of everyday Sadism are associated with the degrading treatment of others, aggression, and cruelty (Buckels et al., 2013). The Dark Tetrad traits are positively correlated with each other and have acceptable psychometric properties (Buckels et al., 2013; Jonason & Webster, 2010). The Dark Tetrad traits are to some extent correlated with the Big Five and HEXACO traits but these associations are modest (Fernández-del Río et al., 2020; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).

2.4. Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism has been a concept of interest for political psychologists dating back to work by Adorno et al. (1950). Authoritarianism is a personality trait "that values social cohesion and conformity to in-group norms over personal freedom and individual autonomy" (Engelhardt et al., 2021, p. 4). Questions tapping into child-rearing values provide a valid and reliable measure of Authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003). Using this measure, Authoritarianism is stable over time and exogenous from politics (Engelhardt et al., 2021) and relatively independent from other personality traits such as the Big Five (Bakker et al., 2016; Bakker et al., 2021).[4]

2.5. Disgust Sensitivity

Disgust Sensitivity is an individual difference in the tendency to experience the emotion of disgust. As Fournier, Petersen, and Soroka (2021, p.1) explain, "neurotypical individuals are all able to experience the feeling of disgust," but "research suggests that individuals differ in how easily the feeling is elicited." Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius (2009) isolated three domains of individual differences in Disgust Sensitivity: individual variability in sensitivity to pathogens, sexual acts, and immoral behavior. Individual differences in Disgust Sensitivity are pretty stable across situations and over time (Sherlock et al., 2016). Moreover, Disgust Sensitivity is relatively independent of the Big Five traits (Aarøe et al., 2017; Druschel & Sherman, 1999).

3. Common Approaches to Study the Relationship between Personality and Politics

This section contains a discussion of the design features of studies that are discussed in this chapter.

3.1. Measurement of Personality

When measuring psychological traits, it is considered a best practice to rely upon more elaborate inventories (Cronbach, 1949). Commonly used measures of the Big Five range from 50 (Goldberg, 1999) to 240 items (Costa Jr. & McCrae, 2008) with excellent psychometric properties. However, the inclusion of 50 to 240 items is not always feasible. Longer surveys are costly and could lead to survey fatigue (Burisch, 1984). Moreover, many researchers rely upon measures of personality included in omnibus surveys—like the American National Election Studies or British Election Studies—in which space is scarce and costly. As a consequence, many studies discussed in this chapter rely upon highly abbreviated measures of personality which capture personality with 1, 2, or 3 items per trait (see for overviews Bakker & Lelkes, 2018; Bromme et al., 2022; Sibley et al., 2012).

Brief measures of personality show acceptable test-retest reliability (Gerber et al., 2013; Gosling et al., 2003) and acceptable convergent validity—for example, the degree to which a brief measure correlates with a longer measure of the same trait (Donnellan et al., 2006; Rammstedt & John, 2007). Brief measures, however, also have more problematic psychometric properties. Not surprisingly (Cronbach, 1949), brief measures are less reliable compared to longer measures (Bakker & Lelkes, 2018; Gosling et al., 2003). But relying upon brief measures could also affect the conclusions researchers reach when it comes to the strength and the direction of the association with political behavior.

The use of brief measures could lead to a Type M (magnitude) error (Gelman & Carlin, 2014) by wrongly concluding that a trait is not—or much weaker—associated with an outcome of interest (Bakker & Lelkes, 2018; Credé et al., 2012). For example, Bakker and Lelkes (2018) show that the association between personality and ideology is weaker when relying on brief personality measures than more elaborate ones.

The possible Type-M error is not limited to brief measures of the Big Five. For example, an eight-item measure of Authoritarianism leads to better predictive validity compared to the commonly used four-item measure (Engelhardt et al., 2021). Likewise, a one-item measure of Disgust Sensitivity leads to substantially weaker associations with political preferences compared to more extensive measures of disgust sensitivity (Fournier et al., 2021).

Throughout this chapter, the reader should remain cautious that null-findings in the personality-politics literature could result from the brief measures used in the literature discussed in this chapter.

The use of brief measures also increases the risk of a type S (sign) error (Gelman & Carlin, 2014) when a brief personality measure taps into one sub-dimension of the trait.

When the sub-dimension differentially correlates with the criterion measure compared to the broader trait, then the sign of the association might differ. Bakker and Lelkes (2018) do not find much evidence for a type-S error for the association between brief measures of personality and political ideology. Nevertheless, the risk of type S errors is there, and readers of the personality-politics literature should be mindful of this possibility, especially for bodies of research that only consist of a few studies and so far have resulted in conflicting findings.

3.2. Study Design

The most common research design in the personality-politics literature is the cross-sectional design in which the personality inventory and the political outcome variables are measured in the same survey (see for recent overviews, Federico & Malka, 2018; Johnston et al., 2017). However, these studies by design cannot address the causal relationship between personality and politics.

Panel studies that run over multiple years now include measures of personality. When personality is included at least once, it makes it possible to study whether personality is associated with change in certain political outcomes such as the change and stability in party preferences (Ekstrom & Federico, 2019), vote choice (Bakker et al., 2016), party identification (Bakker et al., 2015), and political preferences (Bloeser et al., 2015). Multiple measures of personality and politics among the same people open up the opportunity to study whether the relationship between personality and political outcomes is reciprocal (Bakker et al., 2021b; Boston et al., 2018; Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015; Luttig, 2021).

Finally, personality traits are included in survey experiments (Aarøe et al., 2017; Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Bakker et al 2020a; Bakker et al., 2021c; Kalmoe, 2014; Kam & Estes, 2016; Lyons et al., 2016), field experiments (Gerber et al., 2013), and laboratory experiments (Bakker et al., 2020c) to serve as moderators of treatment effects.

3.3. Samples

The personality-politics literature relies upon convenience samples of students, online opt-in panels, and population-based studies. Results based upon convenience samples do not seem to differ from population-based studies (Clifford et al., 2015; Vitriol et al., 2019). Yet, convenience samples are problematic if the variation in the dependent variable is limited (Druckman & Kam, 2011). If a researcher is, for instance, interested in the association between personality and voting for populist parties, using a sample of college students could become problematic as it might be hard to find a lot of populist voters among college students.

Cross-cultural surveys that include personality and political preferences or behavior measures are rare. The World Values Survey (WVS), in its sixth wave, had a brief measure of the ten-item Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007) in twenty-five countries. The WVS thereby provides a unique opportunity to study the association between personality and politics across various countries. Yet, the measure of personality in the WVS has problematic psychometric properties. Aside from being very brief—only

two items per trait—Ludeke and Larsen (2017) showed there is a more fundamental psychometric problem with the measure of personality in the WVS. In the Netherlands and Germany—the two Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) countries in the WVS—the inter-item correlations were positive and in line with earlier evidence. Yet in the non-WEIRD countries, Ludeke and Larsen (2017, p. 105) showed "there was typically no relationship between two items intended to assess a given trait." When "two items intended as the sole indicators of a trait do not correlate with each other, there is no reason to suppose that either item provides any meaningful information about that trait in that population" (Ludeke & Larsen, 2017, p. 105). Ludeke and Larsen (2017, p. 105) call to "carefully reconsider" the evidence-based upon this data. Studies that rely upon the WVS (e.g., Fatke, 2017) should thus be read with some degree of caution. The problems in the WVS should not discourage the study of personality across contexts, but careful assessment of the psychometric properties of the personality measures is needed.

3.4. Personality and Survey Responses

Personality might condition the tendency to participate in surveys. In panel studies, unit non-response—for example, not participating in one or more survey waves—is positively correlated with Openness and negatively with Conscientiousness (Cheng et al., 2020). Using data from the American National Elections Studies, Valentino, Zhirkov, Hillygus, and Guay (2020) show that those higher on Openness have a lower probability of participating in an online survey, perhaps due to the individual and solitary nature of online surveys. However, Openness is also a robust correlate of ideology. As such, "Openness to Experience has both a direct effect on political preferences and an indirect one via differential propensities to participate in each mode" (Valentino et al., 2020, p. 457). These "results suggest that discrepancies in public opinion estimates driven by personality-related differences between fresh cross-sections and professionalized survey panels may be significant" (Valentino et al., 2020, p. 465).

Personality might also correlate with behavior in surveys. For example, item non-response—the tendency to report "don't know" or "don't answer a question"—is higher among people who are high in Neuroticism (Klingler et al., 2018). A possible explanation for this finding is that those higher on Neuroticism are self-conscious and sensitive to making mistakes on questions that are difficult. Extreme response styles as well as acquiescence bias—for example, the tendency to provide confirming answers in response to survey questions—are both positively correlated with Openness and Conscientiousness using data from the United States and Latin America (Hibbing et al., 2019).

3.5. Context

The majority of the literature discussed in this chapter draws upon samples from people who originate from Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) countries (Henrich et al., 2010). At the same time, there are increasingly studies that rely upon samples from other contexts such as eastern Europe (e.g., Greene & Robertson, 2017; Malka

et al., 2014), Latin America (e.g., Mondak et al., 2011), or Asia (e.g., Beattie et al., 2022; Ha, 2019; Ha et al., 2013; Hasmath et al., 2019; Truex, 2022). Sometimes the data from different contexts have been used to show that personality has robust associations with the political outcome across contexts (Bakker et al., 2021c; Gravelle et al., 2020; Mondak et al., 2011). In contrast, others use context as a moderator of the association between personality and politics (Malka et al., 2014). More—not less—research should take context into account.

4. Personality and Political Ideology

Early theories of political behavior have put forward that deeper-seated personality traits are essential to understand political ideology (Adorno et al., 1950; Campbell et al., 1960; McClosky, 1958). McClosky (1958, p. 40), for instance, explained that people align their perceptions of the world with their "own inner feelings," whereby an "individual creates a set of perceptions that express, or that are consonant with, his own needs and impulses." In support of this claim, McClosky (1958, pp. 37–38), found that conservatives are more hostile, suspicious, rigid, compulsive, defensive, anxious, and guilt sensitive compared to liberals. These findings lead McClosky (1958, p. 28) to conclude there is a "considerable regularity and coherence . . . in the relation between certain casts of character and personality on the one side and the degree of conservatism or liberalism expressed on the other." Up to today, there is an ever-growing number of studies that continue to provide evidence that the personality traits are associated with political ideology (for a recent review, see Federico & Malka, 2018). This literature assumes that citizens adopt ideological positions that provide the best fit with the motives and needs rooted in their personality (Jost et al., 2009; for a recent critique, see Costello et al., 2021).

The Big Five personality traits have been widely used in the study of ideology (for instance, Bakker, 2017; Beattie et al., 2022; Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Sibley et al., 2012; Zmigrod et al., 2021). Across samples and contexts, Openness is negatively associated with conservative ideology, whereas Conscientiousness is positively associated with conservative ideology (Sibley et al., 2012). A meta-analysis by Sibley et al. (2012, p. 664) showed that "Openness to Experience (r = .18) and Conscientiousness (r = .10) were significantly but weakly correlated with political conservatism." The size of these correlations suggests that the effect is small (Funder & Ozer, 2019). Explaining these associations, Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter (2008, p.825) argued that "left-wingers are more motivated by creativity, curiosity, and diversity of experience, whereas right-wingers are more motivated by self-control, norm attainment, and rule-following."

Traditionally, the unidimensional left-right scale captures support or opposition to social change and support or opposition to government intervention (Jost et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2003). Among the mass public, for most people, ideology consists of (at least) two dimensions (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Treier & Hillygus, 2009): one for cultural policies and one for economic policies. Acknowledging that ideology is multi-dimensional, there is growing evidence that the direction and strength of the association between personality and ideology differ across ideological dimensions (Bakker, 2017; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Gerber et al., 2010).

Generally, the associations between personality traits and cultural conservatism are similar to those reported for left-right ideological self-placement. There is, for instance, pretty

consistent evidence that the Big Five trait Openness to Experience is negatively associated with cultural conservatism, while the Big Five trait Conscientiousness is positively associated with cultural conservatism (Ackermann et al., 2018a; Bakker, 2017; Bakker & Lelkes, 2018; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Gerber et al., 2010).[5]

Regarding the personality correlates of economic ideology, at least four different perspectives exist. The first perspective suggests no (or a much weaker) resonance between economic ideology and psychological needs. Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2014, p. 340), for instance, in their review of the literature, conclude that "psychological and biological characteristics are less relevant to economic issues . . . than they are to social issues." There is quite some evidence that traits like Openness and Conscientiousness have a weaker association with economic conservatism or that there is no statistically significant association between personality traits and economic conservatism (for a review see Johnston et al., 2017).

The second perspective follows Mondak and Halperin (2008, p. 339), who argued that "full attention to the possible political significance in [personality] traits will require expanded exploration of possible indirect effects." Malka et al. (2014), for instance, found that those higher on the needs for security and certainty hold more left-wing economic ideology. But this association is weaker as engagement increases. Johnston et al. (2017, p. 3) showed that, in the United States, Openness is uncorrelated with economic ideology, but that engagement conditions its relationships. Specifically, Johnston et al. (2017) reported that among those with high levels of engagement, closed-minded citizens (i.e., those low on Openness) tend to gravitate toward conservative (right-wing) economic policies. Conversely, closed-minded citizens with low levels of engagement gravitate toward liberal (left-wing) economic policies.

A third perspective is that some traits—other than Openness, Conscientiousness, and other traits in the Open vs. Closed personality family (Johnston et al., 2017)—correlate with economic ideology. For example, those higher on Agreeableness express support for left-wing economic policies such as a strong welfare state, helping those that need help, and a "big" government who can be trusted to take care of other people (Bakker, 2017; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Gerber et al., 2010). Likewise, neurotic individuals support left-wing economic policies because these policies would accommodate their anxiety and insecurity (Bakker, 2017; Gerber et al., 2010; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004). Finally, outside the Big Five framework, dispositional empathy (Feldman et al., 2020) is positively correlated with support for left-wing economic policies.

A fourth perspective suggests that lower-income levels attenuate the association between personality and economic ideology. Lane (1955) argued that among people with lower income levels, support for social welfare "has a quality of self-interest which obscures and overrides the relationship of personality (Authoritarianism) to attitudes toward the welfare state." Using population-based samples from Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Bakker (2017) reports that the association between Agreeableness and economic ideology is indeed weaker among people with a low income compared to people with a higher income.

More research should try to disentangle when the association between personality and economic ideology is direct or conditional upon factors such as engagement.[6]

4.1. Moving beyond the Big Five Personality Traits

Johnston et al. (2017) argued that ideology is associated with a general dimension of Open versus Closed personality. Openness is according to Johnston et al. (2017, p. 7) "a general

dimension of personality tapping tolerance for threat and uncertainty in one's environment." Closed-minded citizens "prioritize order, certainty, and security in their lives . . . value tradition, self-discipline, group cohesion, and respect for authority, and . . . have conventional cultural tastes" (Johnston et al., 2017, p. 7). Open-minded citizens are "attracted to novelty, skeptical of traditional sources of authority, prioritize self-direction and individualism" and have "unique and unconventional tastes and preferences" (Johnston et al., 2017, p. 7). Open versus Closed personality is captured by the Big Five traits Openness and Conscientiousness but also by Authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), Need for Closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), risk-taking (Kam & Simas, 2012), and openness to change versus conservation (Schwartz, 1992). Johnston et al. (2017) report consistent evidence that those with a more closed personality are more conservative compared to those with a more open personality. These findings align with the results from meta-analyses of traits related to the open vs. closed personality (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017).

The argument by Johnston et al. (2017) is persuasive as it bundles much research on specific traits into an overarching argument. However, recent work also suggests that other personality traits have meaningful correlations with political ideology. There is generally a positive association between Authoritarianism and right-wing ideology (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Zmigrod et al., 2021). The HEXACO trait Honesty-Humility correlates negatively with various measures of conservatism (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010; De Vries et al., 2022; Leone et al., 2012). The Dark Tetrad traits Narcissism, Psychopathy, and Machiavellianism are positively associated with conservatism (see for instance, Hodson et al., 2009; Jonason, 2014; Zeigler-Hill et al., 2020; but for a more nuanced pattern of results see Hatemi and Fazekas, 2018). Finally, Disgust Sensitivity—especially the sensitivity to experience disgust toward pathogens—has been positively associated with conservatism (a uni-dimensional measure). Disgust Sensitivity was also positively associated with culturally conservative policy attitudes such as anti-immigrants attitudes (Aarøe et al., 2017) and attitudes toward gay people (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011) and premarital sex (Smith et al., 2011).[7] To conclude, there are meaningful correlations between personality traits and ideology beyond the family of Open versus Closed personality.

5. (Critical) Reflections on the Personality-Ideology Literature

This section will reflect on the state-of-the-art in this field, focusing on the role of sample characteristics, context, sub-dimensions, and the assumed causal effect of personality on ideology.

5.1. Does the Context Condition the Association between Personality and Ideology?

A plausible hypothesis is that context conditions the association between personality and ideology. Mondak (2010, p. 90), for instance, formulates the expectation that "the expression of personality traits will vary by situation." The "threat-constrained model" suggests

that "that personality should be most predictive of behavior when situational factors (e.g., extreme social norms or chronic perceptions of the social world) do not inhibit individual tendencies" (Sibley et al., 2012, p. 673). Sibley et al. (2012, p. 673) find support for their model as "increases in nation-wide systemic danger attenuated the relationship between Openness to Experience and political orientation." If the threat in a nation is low, then the association between Openness and conservatism is negative and of modest effect size. Yet, when threat in a country is high, then the association is "trivial" (Sibley et al., 2012, p. 674). More evidence for the "threat-constrained model" was documented by Malka et al. (2014), who reported that the association between the Need for Structure and right-wing (conservative) political preferences was stronger in countries with higher levels of human development.

The historical context could also moderate the association between personality and ideology. Malka et al. (2014, p. 1034) explained that "under circumstances in which the historically prevailing ideology is strongly egalitarian, [closed-personality] characteristics might yield preference for economic equality (i.e., left-wing economic preferences). This is because those seeking security and certainty will prefer to keep social and institutional conditions as they have been." In eastern European countries—compared to other countries—a closed-personality (a high level of the Need for Structure) had a stronger correlation with left-wing economic policy preferences (Malka et al., 2014). Finally, a recent study by Beattie et al. (2022) suggest that patterns of associations between personality and ideology in Western countries do not directly replicate in China. In fact, the pattern reverses: "the liberal Right in China mostly evinces traits of the psychological Left in the West, while the 'conservative Left' mostly evinces traits of the psychological right in the West" (Beattie et al., 2022).[8]

The work by Sibley et al. (2012), Malka et al. (2014), and Beattie et al. (2022) offers some evidence that the association between Openness and conservatism might be conditional upon context. More, not less, research is needed to answer the question of how context conditions the association between personality and ideology.

5.2. Do Sample Characteristics Condition the Association between Personality and Ideology?

Students do not reflect the general population: they are younger, higher educated, and privileged (not always). The consequences of this "narrow subject pool" for political psychology have been well known (Sears, 1986; but see Druckman and Kam, 2011). Importantly, across the board, the association between personality and ideology does not seem to be affected by whether the participants in the students were students, members of a local community, workers on Amazon's Mechanical Turk or drawn from the general population (Best et al., 2001; Clifford et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2010; Sibley et al., 2012; Vitriol et al., 2019).

5.3. Should Research Turn to the Lower Order Sub-dimensions of Personality?

Personality traits have lower-order sub-dimensions—depending on the specific model of personality per trait two (DeYoung et al., 2007), three (Soto & John, 2017), or six sub-dimensions

(Costa Jr. et al., 1991). Sub-dimensions "offer more nuanced characterizations of the types of motivations and behaviors associated with each broad trait" (Xu et al., 2021, p. 2). Studies outside of the domain of politics show that the sub-dimensions give important additional information compared to the higher-order traits in predicting a variety of social, emotional, and behavioral outcomes (Denissen et al., 2019; Soto & John, 2017). This supports the conclusion that "much important information can be lost when one's focus on personality is exclusively at the Big Five" traits (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001, p. 85). The same might be true for the association between personality and ideology. For Openness and Conscientiousness it seems that some, but not all, sub-dimensions are associated with ideology (Aichholzer et al., 2018; Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2011a; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Xu et al., 2021). These findings suggest that the associations between these traits and ideology might be more heterogeneous than so far assumed.

Facets might also be relevant for another reason. Xu et al. (2021, p. 2) explain that "a weak or nonsignificant association between a particular Big Five domain and political orientation may be due to a strong association between one of that domain's lower-level traits and political orientation, but a weak (or even reversed) association between another lower-level trait and political orientation." For example, Agreeableness is not systematically associated with ideology (Sibley et al., 2012). However, when decomposing Agreeableness into the sub-dimensions Compassion and Politeness, then Politeness is positively associated with conservatism, while Compassion is *negatively* associated with conservatism (Hirsh et al., 2010; Osborne et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2021). To summarize, the focus upon the trait might hide specific patterns of associations between personality and ideology.

5.4. Is Personality Causing Ideology?

The majority of the research showing evidence for the link between self-reported personality traits and self-reported ideology relies upon cross-sectional research designs. Often these studies explicitly or implicitly assume that personality is the cause and politics the effect. There is, however, less research that disentangles the extent to which personality causes political ideology. Correlation does not imply causation, and the correlation between the traits and political ideology could be spurious or endogenous. The subsequent sections discuss a series of research lines that question whether personality indeed *causes* political preferences.

Problems with content overlap. Content overlap is the problem that the content of a personality battery overlaps with the content of the ideology measure. This problem has been discussed in detail by Malka et al. (2017). Content overlap could be an issue in the association between Openness and ideology. Openness to Experience in the Five-Factor Model contains a sub-facet called "Openness to Values." Someone low on Openness was described as a person who "favors conservative values" (Costa Jr. & McCrae, 1992, 657). Indeed, Openness batteries can contain items directly tapping into politics such as "Believe that criminals should receive help rather than punishment" in the measures of Openness in the International Personality Inventory Project (see, https://ipip.ori.org/newNEOKey.htm#Liberalism).

Likewise, Agreeableness might also suffer from content overlap. For example, the sub-dimension (facet) Tender-mindedness is measured using items such as "Sympathize with the homeless," and "Believe people should fend for themselves" in the NEO PI-R (see, https://ipip.ori.org/newNEOKey.htm#sympathy). As such, Agreeableness might have some content overlap with measures of economic conservatism that often ask about political issues such as income redistribution and social welfare policies (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). To conclude, the risk of content overlap is present, and researchers should be careful about uncovering potentially tautological relationships between personality and ideology.

Studies assessing the reciprocal relationship between personality and ideology. So far, only a few longitudinal studies have more directly addressed whether personality is causing ideology. First, using panel data from Australia (Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015) and New Zealand (Osborne & Sibley, 2020) spanning multiple years, no lagged effect of Openness on conservatism was found. Second, Luttig (2021) finds a reciprocal relationship between Authoritarianism and support for the Republican party. Third, Bakker, Lelkes, and Malka (2021b) use panel studies in the Netherlands, Germany (preregistered), and the United States (preregistered). They find reciprocal relationships between the Big Five traits Openness and Conscientiousness (Netherlands and Germany) and Authoritarianism (United States) and political ideology. To conclude, at best, the evidence is mixed. And if personality causes ideology, the effects are small (Bakker et al., 2021b; Luttig, 2021).

Why would political ideology influence personality? First, people are aware of the stereotypes that belong to "their" ideological group (Ahler & Sood, 2018; Rothschild et al., 2019). Indeed, people's ideology motivates them to express their personality in a socially desirable or stereotypical manner (Ludeke et al., 2016; Ludeke et al., 2013). Second, people surround themselves with politically like-minded others (Boutyline & Willer, 2017; Huber & Malhotra, 2017) and could adopt the personality of these politically like-minded others.

Bakker, Lelkes, and Malka (2021b) reported that ideology causes Openness and Conscientiousness using panel studies in the Netherlands and Germany and that ideology causes Authoritarianism using a panel study in the United States (see also Luttig, 2021). Using survey experiments, (Bakker et al., 2021b) also found that the personality traits (Big Five and Authoritarianism) are stronger associated with political ideology—assessed a week before—when the political context is made salient compared to a placebo control condition. These studies provide some evidence that personality is causing political ideology and that ideology is also causing personality. The fact that the relationship is reciprocal has at least two implications. First, this means that cross-sectional studies' estimates of the association between personality and ideology could be biased. Second, this suggests that personality is not only the cause of political polarization as is often assumed (see for instance, Hibbing et al., 2013) but also the consequence. As such, polarization effects also non-political outcomes, such as self-reported personality.

Is childhood personality causing adult ideology? One possible design to answer whether personality is causing ideology is a design where the personality of children—before attaining political preferences—is linked to ideology later in life (Landau-Wells & Saxe, 2020).

Block and Block (2006b) assessed the personality of 95 children from two different nursery schools in the San Francisco Bay Area at both ages three and four. The same respondents reported their political ideology at age 23. Block and Block (2006a) found that conservative adult men were in childhood visibly deviant, felt unworthy and guilty, were easily offended, were anxious when confronted by uncertainties, and were distrustful of others. Likewise, conservative women were as children inhibited, easily victimized, indecisive, fearful, shy, compliant, anxious when confronted by ambiguity, and fearful. These correlations lead Block and Block (2006a, p. 12) to conclude that conservatives in adulthood were viewed in childhood "as uncomfortable with uncertainty, as susceptible to a sense of guilt, and as rigidifying when experiencing duress."

Relying upon the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development study in the United States, Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, and Roisman (2012); Wegemer and Vandell (2020) reported two conceptual replications. Childhood personality was measured when children were 54 months old and age 18 and 26 the completed measures of political ideology. Children who had difficulty paying attention had lower levels of activity or restlessness and had higher levels of fearfulness were more conservative in adulthood (Fraley et al., 2012; Wegemer & Vandell, 2020). However, two conceptual replications by Fasching, Arceneaux, and Bakker (2023) in the United Kingdom—with large samples that were sufficiently powered to detect small effects and one preregistered study—failed to find any indication for a consistent association between childhood personality and adult ideology. To summarize, the evidence for the association between childhood personality and ideology is in its infancy, and the results are mixed.

Evidence from behavior genetics. Research using twin-study designs can partly address the question of whether personality has a casual effect on ideology. A meta-analysis by Hatemi et al. (2014) showed that the genetic influence on ideology accounts for 40% of the total variation in ideology. One possibility is that personality is the missing link between genes and ideology. Studies addressing this possibility show that there is a genetic overlap between personality and ideology (Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015; Kandler et al., 2015; Verhulst et al., 2012). Dawes and Weinschenk (2020) explain that the overlap between personality and ideology could mean that: (a) genes influence personality and personality influences ideology, or (b) genes influence ideology and ideology influences personality, or it could suggest that r (c) there is a reciprocal relationship whereby personality and ideology are both cause and consequence of each other, or it could suggest that (d) the same genetic component influences personality and ideology, but this is happening largely independent from each other. Right now, "additional research is needed to develop a better understanding of the pathways that connect genes to political ideology" (Dawes & Weinschenk, 2020, p. 175).

Is personality causing ideology? The best answer to this question, at this point, is "we don't know." Studies that rely upon panel studies, experiments, cohort studies, and twin-study designs illustrate that the assumed uni-directional effect of personality on ideology requires careful reconsideration. It is safe to say that this is a reconsideration of one of the central research questions in political psychology. More research is needed to solve this question. It will not be easy, and perhaps the outcomes challenge the core assumptions of this literature. However, as Merton (1942) already outlined, scientists need to challenge the foundations of their field.

6. Personality and Voting Behavior

A rich literature in both political science and psychology has assessed the extent to which support for specific political parties correlates with certain personality traits. The dominant assumption in this literature is that ideology mediates the association between personality and vote choice. While the patterns differ a bit across context, measures, and samples, a couple of general patterns can be observed.

Openness is associated with support for left-wing (liberal) parties in the United States (Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Cooper et al., 2013; Gerber et al., 2012; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Rentfrow et al., 2009), United Kingdom (Aidt & Rauh, 2018), Italy (Capara et al., 1999; Caprara et al., 2006; Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010), Germany (Bakker et al., 2015; Riemann et al., 1993; Schoen & Schumann, 2007), and New Zealand (Osborne & Sibley, 2012). A comparative study drawing upon convenience samples from Italy, Germany, Spain, Greece, and Poland draws a similar conclusion (Vecchione et al., 2011). Osborne and Sibley (2012, p. 744) show that the association between Openness and voting for left-wing parties is stronger for those with a higher level of political sophistication—who are able "to identify which political party supports the issues that best resonate with their personality."

In line with the research on personality-ideology there is pretty consistent evidence for a positive association between Conscientiousness and support for right-wing parties in a variety of countries in the Western world including, but not limited to, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and New Zealand (Aidt & Rauh, 2018; Bakker et al., 2015; Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Capara et al., 1999; Caprara et al., 2006; Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010; Cooper et al., 2013; Gerber et al., 2012; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Osborne & Sibley, 2012; Rentfrow et al., 2009; Riemann et al., 1993; Schoen & Schumann, 2007; Vecchione et al., 2011).

Agreeableness and Neuroticism also show pretty consistent positive associations with support for left-wing political parties—that is, higher agreeable and/or higher neurotic people are more supportive of left-wing parties (Aidt & Rauh, 2018; Bakker et al., 2015; Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Capara et al., 1999; Caprara et al., 2006; Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010; Cooper et al., 2013; Gerber et al., 2012; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Osborne & Sibley, 2012; Rentfrow et al., 2009; Riemann et al., 1993; Schoen & Schumann, 2007; Vecchione et al., 2011; Wang, 2016).

Outside the Big Five, the HEXACO trait honest-humility correlates positively with support for left-wing parties Chirumbolo and Leone (2010). When it comes to the dark personality traits, Nai, Maier, and Vranić (2021) conclude that "voters that themselves score higher on 'dark' personality traits (Narcissism, Psychopathy, Machiavellianism) tend to like dark candidates." Finally, in a series of studies in the United States and Denmark, Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux (2020) find that those higher on pathogen disgust—a dimension of Disgust Sensitivity—vote for socially conservative political parties.

Some studies explicitly test the mediation argument that the association between personality and voting behavior is mediated by ideology (or core political values). Schoen and Schumann (2007), for instance, showed that in Germany, the association between personality and vote choice is mediated by factors such as party identification, ideology, postmaterialism, and materialism as well as specific policy preferences. Schoen and

Schumann (2007, p. 492) explain that this shows "how deep-seated personality traits can be linked to partisan feelings and vote choice in theoretically consistent ways: They influence predispositions and attitudes that in turn affect opinions about political parties and vote choice." As such personality "influence[s]" vote choice "indirectly rather than directly" (Schoen & Schumann, 2007, p. 492). Along the lines of Schoen and Schumann (2007), Wang (2016, p. 32) concludes that in the United States:

> higher levels of extraversion, conscientiousness, and emotional stability indirectly decrease the probability of voting for Obama by weakening individual Democratic identification, triggering negative feelings toward the Democratic candidate, preferring the policy of the Republican Party, and possessing negative evaluations of presidential performance. By contrast, higher levels of openness to experience indirectly increase the probability of voting for Obama by strengthening individual Democratic identification, triggering positive feelings toward the Democratic candidate, preferring the policy of the Democratic Party, and possessing positive evaluations of presidential performance.

The idea that ideology mediates the association between personality and vote choice is persuasive, however, it is not uncontested. First, in cross-sectional survey designs, upon which most studies rely, it is impossible to disentangle the causal ordering of the variables. One might wonder whether ideology is indeed causally prior to vote choice as vote choice is endogenous to political ideology (e.g., Harteveld et al., 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2016), core political values (McCann, 1997), as well as party and leader evaluations (Bølstad et al., 2013; Mullainathan & Washington, 2009). Personality might also be endogenous to political ideology (Bakker et al., 2021b; Luttig, 2021) and approval of political parties and candidates (Boston et al., 2018). Even if the causal ordering is correct, it is methodologically hard, if not impossible, to get an unbiased estimate of a mediation effect (Bullock et al., 2010). The next generation research should move beyond cross-sectional study designs and disentangle the relationship between personality, ideology, and vote choice.

6.1. Different Perspectives on Personality and Vote Choice: The Case of Voting for Populist Parties

The dominant perspective, the "mediation hypothesis" (discussed in the previous section), is that ideology mediates the association personality and vote choice. However, the "resonance-hypothesis" is an alternative perspective that explains the link between personality and vote choice. This hypothesis builds upon the idea that politicians speak the language of the personality of their voters. In particular, Caprara and Zimbardo (2004, p. 584) argued that "a crucial skill for politicians is . . . to speak the language of personality" of their electoral base. According to this model, the congruence between personality and the political message leads to a vote choice. Along these lines, the "differential susceptibility to media effects model" in communication puts forward that the content of a message is appreciated by some, but not by others, and that this is dependent on personality (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013).

The literature on personality and voting for populist parties tests the "mediation hypothesis" and the "resonance hypothesis." It is, therefore, essential to define populism. Populists communicate an anti-establishment message (e.g., elites in The Hague are evil,

corrupt, and working for their gain) combined with a message the places the people central (e.g., politicians are disinterested in the common Dutch people) (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004). The anti-establishment message and people-centrist message that units all populists, while their ideology *distinguishes* populists: they can, for instance, be left-wing, right-wing, or centrists.

First, evidence for the "mediation hypothesis" is provided in studies that link Authoritarianism with populism. Authoritarians prefer social order, structure, and obedience. It is not clear why Authoritarianism would be receptive to the anti-elitism message of populists. Yet, Authoritarianism is positively associated with support for populist politicians with a right-wing host ideology (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012; Bakker et al., 2016; Bakker et al., 2021c; Dunn, 2015). More conclusive support for the argument that Authoritarianism is associated with a vote for populists via the host-ideology of some (right-wing) populist politicians was provided by Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn (2021c). In their conjoint experiment Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn (2021c) show that among high authoritarian citizens, an anti-immigration message increases support for politicians compared to pro-immigration messages. However, the anti-establishment message does not persuade those higher on Authoritarianism. Second, a series of studies provide evidence for the resonance hypothesis. Specifically, the anti-establishment message of populist politicians portrays elites as evil, corrupt and self-centered. The anti-establishment message should resonate with those lower on Agreeableness who shy away from conflict (Skarlicki et al., 1999), are cynical, uncooperative, and distrusting of others (Costa Jr. et al., 1991). Indeed, those lower on Agreeableness are more supportive of populists with nationalist and exclusionist ideology such as Donald Trump (Abe, 2018; Bakker et al., 2021c; Fortunato et al., 2018), the Tea Party (Bakker et al., 2016; Bakker et al., 2021c), the Austrian FPO (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016), the Swiss SVP (Ackermann et al., 2018b; Bakker et al., 2021c), and Marine Le Pen in France (Vasilopoulos & Jost, 2020).[9] But the associations between Agreeableness and voting for populist parties also occurs when populists have a left-wing ideology such as Die Linke (Germany), Podemos (Spain), or Chaves (Venezuela) (Bakker et al., 2016; Bakker et al., 2021c).[10]

All the discussed studies correlated Agreeableness with the populist vote and can, by design, not address whether it is indeed the populist rhetoric that is congruent with low Agreeableness as the resonance-hypothesis suggests. In a conjoint-experiment in the United States, Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn (2021c) addressed the proposed resonance directly. They measured Agreeableness and afterward let participants vote in a series of mock elections between two politicians. An anti-establishment message or a pro-establishment message was randomly assigned to each politician. At the same time the conjoint-experiment allowed Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn (2021c) to vary the host-ideology of the politicians. Indeed, the anti-establishment message leads to more support for a politician among the low agreeable voters. This experiment provides direct evidence that a message congruent with a person's personality leads to more support for the politician.

To summarize, the literature on personality and populist vote demonstrates two routes from personality to vote choice. One via the host-ideology as the mediation hypothesis suggests and one via the resonance between the populist message and personality as the resonance hypothesis suggests. The personality-populism literature is just an illustration of the two possible links between personality and vote choice. More research addressing if and how personality is associated with vote choice will bring the field closer to understanding the role of personality in the voting booth.

7. Personality and the Strength of Political Loyalties

Personality might also be associated with the strength of political loyalties captured in the strength of political partisanship and electoral volatility.

In the domain of politics, extraverts discuss politics more often, participate in political campaigns (Mondak & Halperin, 2008) and are committed to organizations (Erdheim et al., 2006). In addition, extraverts have a stronger partisanship (Bakker et al., 2015; Gerber et al., 2012). Moreover, in Denmark, but not in the United Kingdom, extraverts are more likely to stay loyal to their party over time (Bakker et al., 2016). This null finding in the United Kimgdom could be due to the highly abbreviated measure of personality used in the UK sample.

The curiosity, open-mindedness, and willingness to try new activities should make those higher on Openness less likely to commit to a party. Gerber et al. (2012) found a negative association between Openness and the strength of party identification. Relying upon multi-wave panel studies, Bakker et al. (2016) documented that in Denmark and the United Kingdom, those higher on Openness to Experience are more likely to change their vote choice between subsequent elections.[11] Further support for the idea that the open-minded are less likely to commit to political parties comes from the research on related traits, such as the Need for Cognition and risk-taking. Those who enjoy thinking and are open to ideas—as indicated by a higher score on the Need for Cognition—tend to have more ambivalent partisanship (Rudolph & Popp, 2007). Kam and Simas (2012) showed that those who take more risks vote for the challenger candidate.

Conscientious people prefer order, adhere to social norms, plan and organize tasks, control impulses, are goal-oriented, and are reluctant to change. These characteristics could make those higher on Conscientiousness strongly identify with a party. Indeed, Gerber et al. (2012) found a positive association between Conscientiousness and the strength of party identification. This finding is consistent with Bakker et al. (2015), who, in one of two tests, reported a positive association between Conscientiousness and stronger party identification. Yet, Bakker et al. (2016) found no association between Conscientiousness and the tendency to stay loyal to a party over time.

Agreeable citizens might identify with their in-group as they are attracted by the "communal and cooperative components" of group identification (Gerber et al., 2012, p.661). One might expect that the more agreeable respondents are stronger affiliated with political parties, but the empirical evidence is mixed. Gerber et al. (2012) reported a positive association between Agreeableness and the strength of party identification, while Bakker et al. (2015) found a negative and significant association in 2004 and a negative but insignificant association in 2009. Moreover, Bakker et al. (2016) did not find any meaningful association between Agreeableness and the stability of vote.

Neurotic individuals are prone to experience anxiety, anger, and depression. They also tend to feel vulnerable and have a heightened level of self-consciousness. Neurotic individuals might find shelter in the identification with a group. Yet, Neuroticism seems unrelated to the strength of partisanship (Bakker et al., 2015; Gerber et al., 2012) or party loyalty (Bakker et al., 2016).

To conclude, the evidence discussed here suggests that Extraversion and Openness are the traits most consistently associated with the strength of political loyalties.

8. Personality and Political Engagement

Political engagement has various dimensions ranging from actual behavior—such as voting or protesting—to attitudes such as internal and external political efficacy. This section briefly reviews the evidence from a systematic literature review—including 56 independent samples—that was recently performed by Bromme et al. (2022) on the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and various aspects of political engagement.

Political involvement. In their review of the literature on political involvement—which contains measures of political interest, internal political efficacy, as well as political participation—Bromme et al. (2022), find some consistent patterns. The majority of the studies show that Openness is positively associated with political participation. In 84% of the cases, Bromme et al. (2022) reported positive correlations between Openness and political involvement. Likewise, in 71% of the cases Extraversion correlated positively with political participation (Bromme et al., 2022). When it comes to Conscientiousness, it seems that a small majority of the studies report a positive and statistically significant correlation between the trait and political interest as well as internal political efficacy. For political participation, the evidence is mixed but most correlations were not statistically significant (Bromme et al., 2022). A majority of the studies find a negative association between Neuroticism and political interest and between Neuroticism and internal political efficacy. The association between Neuroticism and political participation is less consistent: some negative associations, some positive, but most of the associations are not statistically significant. Finally, for Agreeableness, the pattern was inconclusive.

As is relevant in all personality and politics literature, it is important to consider the implied (or assumed) causal nature where personality causes involvement. The studies are cross-sectional and do not allow for a test of the causal relationship. Political involvement is at least partly heritable (e.g., Arceneaux et al., 2012; Klemmensen et al., 2012a; Klemmensen, 2012b), and Mondak et al. (2010) have argued that personality traits could mediate the relationship between the biological factors and political participation. Some studies have been able to test the argument that personality traits are indeed mediators of this association utilizing twin-study designs. Using two samples from the United States, Weinschenk and Dawes (2017, p. 475) conclude that "most of the relationship between personality and political interest can be explained by the same set of genes" (see also Dawes et al., 2014; Weinschenk et al., 2019). However, more research is needed to determine what this association means (see, Dawes & Weinschenk, 2020).

Political trust. When it comes to trust in politicians, trust in political institutions and external political efficacy Bromme et al. (2022) find that for Neuroticism a small majority of of the correlations were negative, and for Agreeableness a small majority of the correlations were positive The correlations between political trust and the other three Big Five traits yielded predominantly null findings. The literature on Agreeableness and trust might suffer from potentially content-overlap. Agreeableness contains a lower order facet "Trust," which captures "the tendency to attribute benevolent intent to others; distrust as the suspicion that

others are dishonest or dangerous" (Costa Jr. et al., 1991, p. 888). It is not surprising—and perhaps tautological—that Agreeableness correlates with trust in political actors.

9. Personality and News Consumption

The use of mass media and the selection of the specific outlet is—for most citizens—part of their daily routines. Generally, people seek out news "that reflects and reinforce aspects of their personalities" (Rentfrow et al., 2011, p. 250). The selection of news that resonates with their personality should occur "irrespective of the medium through which it is conveyed" (Rentfrow et al., 2011, p. 250). This paragraph discusses the associations between personality traits and the types of news consumption, irrespective of the medium.

News can be divided in hard news and soft news (Esser et al., 2012; Reinemann et al., 2012). Hard news addresses "coverage of breaking events involving top leaders, major issues, or significant disruptions in the routines of daily life, such as earthquake or airline disasters" (Patterson, 2000, p. 4). Interview/news shows, news magazines, news programs on TV, and daily newspapers deliver hard news (Baum, 2003; Boukes et al., 2014). Soft news is "typically more sensational, more personality-centered, less time-bound, more practical, and more incident-based than other news" (Patterson, 2000, p. 4). Moreover, soft news is "personal and familiar in its form of presentation and less distant and institutional" (Patterson, 2000, p. 4). Accordingly, entertainment programs and tabloid newspapers bring soft news (Baum, 2003; Boukes et al., 2014).

Extraverts are more interested in politics and discuss politics more often (Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). In order to be informed about politics and to foster political discussions, extraverts consume more news (Gerber et al., 2011b; Rentfrow et al., 2011; Trilling & Schoenbach, 2013). In particular hard news might be appealing as extraverts need "information on recent events for use in subsequent social discussions or talks with others" (Shim & Paul, 2007, p. 291) in order "to ensure that they are not left out of conversations" (Mondak, 2010, p. 94). Preliminary evidence in the United States suggests that extraverts watch more national news shows—which provide immediate information about the current events in the world (Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Extraverts also watch more political talk shows—which are generally covering hard news—because they are social and focus upon interpersonal exchange between people (Gerber et al., 2011b).

Openness is positively associated with the consumption of news (Xu & Peterson, 2017) via television (Gerber et al., 2011b) and newspapers (Finn, 1997; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; but see Gerber et al., 2011a). Beyond the general news consumption, Openness is positively associated with a preference for hard news such as informative television programs (Kraaykamp & Van Eijck, 2005) and television news (Gerber et al., 2011b). Yet, the evidence is not conclusive as others found no association between Openness and television news (Mondak & Halperin, 2008) or between Openness and exposure to other sources of hard news such as political talk shows, daytime talk shows, or late night shows (Gerber et al., 2011b). When it comes to soft news, open-minded citizens express a lower preferences for amusements programs (Kraaykamp & Van Eijck, 2005) and watch fewer amusement programs (Xu &

Peterson, 2017) but read books and watch movies (Finn, 1997). Moreover, open-minded citizens report to have a preference a preference for cultural television programs (Kraaykamp & Van Eijck, 2005) and watch alternative films, books, and television programs (Xu & Peterson, 2017).

The associations between other traits and news consumption are less clear-cut. Some studies reported a positive association between Neuroticism and a preference for informative TV programs (Weaver III, 1991) as well as the exposure to talk shows on TV (Gerber et al., 2011b; Shim & Paul, 2007). The findings suggest that Neuroticism is positively associated with news consumption to escape negative feelings and alleviate positive affect. Alternatively, Neuroticism could be negatively associated with news consumption because the conflictual nature of politics could create more negative affect. However, most studies fail to find empirical evidence for the association between Neuroticism and the consumption of news (Finn, 1997; Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak, 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Shim & Paul, 2007).

There is no evidence that Agreeableness should be associated with consumption of news (Finn, 1997; Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak, 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Evidence is mixed and inconsistent when moving beyond the measures of general news consumption. Agreeableness was unrelated with a preference for informative (i.e., news) programs in the Netherlands (Kraaykamp & Van Eijck, 2005), while in the United States, agreeable citizens might watch more television news and television talk shows during the day but not in the evenings (Gerber et al., 2011b)—but see (Mondak & Halperin, 2008).

To summarize, Extraversion and Openness seem relatively consistent correlates of news consumption.

10. Personality of Politicians and Their Political Behavior

10.1. Studying the Personality of Politicians

There is increasing attention to studying the personality of political elites. Generally, there are three approaches used to study their personality. First, elite surveys in which politicians complete a survey. Elite surveys follow roughly the same approach as most of the work focused upon citizens: politicians receive a survey—via email, regular mail, or in a face-to-face conversation—and complete this survey. This approach has advantages: the research design aligns with the broader personality-politics literature and relies upon validated measures of both personality and politics, and politicians can participate whenever they want. However, there are also downsides and risks of this approach. The response rates of these surveys differ quite dramatically across studies: from only 4% (Hanania, 2017) and 10% (Caprara et al., 2003) to 33% (Schumacher & Zettler, 2019) and even 46.3% (Nørgaard & Klemmensen, 2019). The context, the goal of the study, the network of the researchers (are they well connected with politicians), incentives, and other unknown differences between the research designs could explain the origins of the differences in these response rates.

Another point of attention is the measurement of personality. Politicians are busy, and their time is valuable. Often, the personality measures are part of a larger omnibus study with many different other measures. As such it common, and justifiable (Gosling et al., 2003), that studies rely upon highly abbreviated measures of personality with only one (Dietrich et al., 2012) or two items (Joly et al., 2019; Scott & Medeiros, 2020) per trait. At the same time, the use of highly abbreviated measures negatively affects the predictive validity (Bakker & Lelkes, 2018; Credé et al., 2012). It is therefore a positive development that studies also measured personality with four (Schumacher & Zettler, 2019), 10 (Caprara et al., 2003; Hanania, 2017) or even 12 items (Francescato et al., 2020; Nørgaard & Klemmensen, 2019) per trait.

A second approach to study the personality of elites is to let experts—political scientists, psychologists, historians—evaluate the personality of politicians. This is possible as personality ratings of people who are very familiar with the person—a partner, family member, or close friend—are strongly correlated with the personality ratings of the person (Costa & McCrae, 1988). As an example, political scientists with expertise in elections and/or political psychology (Nai & Maier, 2018) and psychologists (Visser et al., 2017) have provided scores on the Big Five personality traits for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump—the two primary candidates in the 2016 US presidential elections.

Relying upon expert ratings, researchers can go back in time and get scores of the personality of politicians who are now dead (see for instance, Rubenzer et al., 2000). Moreover, researchers can get measures of the personality of the most prominent politicians who would, most likely, not participate in their survey or commit to an interview. However, there are also pitfalls. The political ideology of expert raters correlates with the personality assessment of the politicians (Wright & Tomlinson, 2018). Liberal expert raters evaluated the personality of Trump more extreme compared to more ideologically moderate expert raters (Wright & Tomlinson, 2018). This led Wright and Tomlinson (2018, p. 24) to "caution against interpreting expert personality ratings of political candidates when the samples of experts are politically imbalanced" (for a response to this critique see Nai and Maier, 2019).

A third approach to study the personality of elites is to rely upon computational methods to get an estimate of politicians' personalities based upon their speeches (Hall et al., 2021; Klingler et al., 2019; Ramey et al., 2019; Ramey et al., 2017). Using computational methods has advantages: it is unobtrusive, it does not cost politicians any time, researchers can get scores of the personality of all politicians they want to study and can go back in time, and they do not need to worry about response rates or social desirability bias in the survey responses. At the same time, there are also pitfalls. Politicians have speech writers who write their speech, and it is unclear if and how this affects the measure of personality derived upon the speeches (Schoonvelde et al., 2019). Moreover, politicians might "act" in a certain way when giving speeches or debating with other politicians. This public act might differ from their actual personality and bias the derived personality scores in unknown ways.

Rice, Remmel, and Mondak (2021) assessed the correlation between measures of the personality of the same politicians derived upon computational methods and scores from their staffers. They found that the two measures are very weakly related to each other. This raises concerns about the concurrent validity of the measures of elite personality: do different

measures of elite personality capture the same construct? More research is needed that assesses the validity of measures of elite personality.

(Preliminary) Results from studies on the personality of politicians. Whether the personality of elites differs from the general population is a question that a series of recent studies tackle. Most studies, relying upon self-reported personality of politicians, reported that politicians (elected members of parliament) in Denmark (Nørgaard & Klemmensen, 2019; Schumacher & Zettler, 2019), Germany (H. Best, 2011), Italy (Caprara et al., 2003), Canada (Scott & Medeiros, 2020), and the United States (Hanania, 2017) scored higher on Extraversion compared to ordinary citizens.[12] Moreover, these studies found—with the exception of Italy—that MPs scored higher on emotional stability (reverse coded Neuroticism) compared to ordinary citizens.[13]

When it comes to whether personality is associated with the ideology or partisanship of politicians, the evidence is mixed. Across the studies that there is no clear pattern of associations between personality and ideology (Caprara et al., 2003; Dietrich et al., 2012; Joly et al., 2018; Nai & Martinez i Coma, 2019; Nørgaard & Klemmensen, 2019; Rice et al., 2021; Schumacher & Zettler, 2019; Visser et al., 2017). Differences in personality measurement, response rates, context, and other known and unknown differences in the research design could explain these differences. More comparative studies should address the extent to which politicians' personalities differ across ideological lines.

Personality might also correlate with the behavior of politicians inside and outside parliament. Personality could, for instance, be associated with the ambitions to run for office. Indeed, using self-reported measures of personality, those higher on Extraversion and Openness were more likely to aspire to a career in politics (Blais & Pruysers, 2017; Dynes et al., 2019). Using a similar research design, Dietrich et al. (2012) documented that US legislators higher on Extraversion are more interested in running for a higher office.

Personality could also be associated with electoral success. Here the evidence is mixed. Politicians who score lower on Agreeableness, compared to those higher on Agreeableness, have more electoral success: they get more votes, stay longer in office, and achieve higher ranks in their party (Joly et al., 2019) but not in a sample of local Canadian politicians (Scott & Medeiros, 2020). Instead, Scott and Medeiros (2020) finds that higher levels of Openness, Extraversion, and Emotional stability are positively associated with an increased chance of winning an election. Nai (2019), using expert ratings of personality, report that Extraversion is *negatively* associated with electoral success, while Conscientiousness and that Psychopathy, part of the Dark Tetrad, were positively associated with electoral success.

Finally, personality could be associated with behavior in parliament. In US Congress, those higher on Conscientiousness "propose fewer ceremonial/symbolic bills, instead [of] dedicating their energies to [a] more substantive arena" (Ramey et al., 2017, p. 177). Those higher on Agreeableness have fewer leadership positions in the US Congress, introduce fewer bills, and support more bipartisan bills (Rice et al., 2021). Finally, Extraverts have more leadership positions and support less bipartisan bills (Rice et al., 2021). Across the board the traits Openness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism are unrelated to congressional behaviors (Dietrich et al., 2012; Ramey et al., 2017; Rice et al., 2021). In all these studies, personality was correlated with many possible behaviors, increasing the risk of chance findings.

11. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: BIG QUESTIONS AND A CALL FOR THE ADOPTION OF OPEN SCIENCE PRACTICES

Theoretically, many studies discussed in this chapter assume that personality is causing all sorts of political "outcomes." By design, the cross-sectional research designs that make up most of the personality-politics literature do not allow for causal interpretations. Moreover, recent studies in the personality-ideology question whether personality is causing ideology (Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015; Osborne & Sibley, 2020) or whether the pattern is reciprocal (Bakker et al., 2021b; Luttig, 2021). Future research needs to address the theoretical puzzle in recent studies: is personality causing political outcomes? Answering this question will require the design of studies that allow researchers to disentangle the relationship between personality and politics. No one design will provide the definitive answer, but there are underused possibilities such as:

- Studies that rely upon behavioral indicators of personality (Carney et al., 2008; Koppensteiner, 2011). Doing so would solve the problem of correlating self-reported personality with self-reported political constructs and avoid the problem of content overlap (Malka et al., 2017).
- Panel studies that run over longer time periods allow researchers to assess whether personality is causing the political outcome of interest or whether the pattern is reciprocal.
- (Multi-wave) survey-experiments, or other types of experiments, in which politics or personality are manipulated or made more salient (see for instance, Bakker et al., 2021). These designs allow researchers to get causal control over one (or both) of the concepts.
- Genetically informed samples with measures of both personality and politics can assess the extent to which a shared genetic component underlies personality and politics (Dawes & Weinschenk, 2020).

A second open question facing the personality-politics literature is whether the associations between personality and politics are direct or indirect. That personality could interact with other factors in the environment has been long recognized (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Mondak and Halperin (2008, p. 339), for instance, argued that "full attention to the possible political significance in [personality] traits will require expanded exploration of possible indirect effects." There are at least two possible "indirect" associations.

First, another concept could mediate the association between personality and the political outcome of interest. Ideology could mediate the association between personality and vote choice (Schoen & Schumann, 2007; Wang, 2016). It is tempting to conceptualize a mediation effect, but it requires a strict causal ordering of the concepts of interest. Recent studies question whether personality is indeed causally prior to ideology and vote choice (Bakker et al. 2021b; Boston et al., 2018; Luttig, 2021). Moreover, mediation analyses are challenging, if not impossible, to reliably establish (Bullock et al., 2010).

Second, as Mondak (2010, p. 90) explains, "the expression of personality traits will vary by situation." Indeed, context conditions the association between personality and ideology (Malka et al., 2014; Sibley et al., 2012). Others suggest that individual differences in a third moderating variable condition the association between personality and politics (Bakker, 2017; Johnston et al., 2017).

More research should theorize and test whether the associations between personality and political outcomes are direct and when they are indirect. It will require precise theorizing and the design of suitable studies to test the question of interest. Preregistration of studies will add to the credibility of the literature. This leads to the last point of this chapter: a call for the adoption of open science practices in the personality and politics literature.

11.1. A Call for the Adoption of Open Science Practices

The remainder of the discussion makes the case to adopt open science practices. Most of the studies covered in this chapter have not adopted open science practices such as systematic reviews of the literature, open data and materials, replication, and preregistration. This section will discuss four changes the field could make moving forward.

1. **Share data and materials.** Sharing data means researchers make the data they collected publicly available in a repository (Bowman & Spence, 2020). However, sharing data and materials does not seem to be a common practice as long as journals do not mandate this (see for instance Elson and Przybylski, 2017). When researchers share their data and materials on their personal (or institutional) web page, the access to the data quickly disappears as the URL stops working (Gertler & Bullock, 2017). Sharing data and materials facilitates an open exchange where other researchers directly access the underlying evidence. As such, sharing of data and materials aligns with *communality*, one of the core values of science as defined by Merton (1942). *Communality*, according to Merton (1942), holds that sharing of evidence, discussion, and open exchange are what defines science. Providing access to data and materials will facilitate an open exchange. Going forward, researchers should, whenever possible, make their data and materials publicly accessible and guarantee they do this following the principles of FAIR—Findable Accessible Interoperable and Reusable—data.

   At the same time, data sharing is not always possible. Sometimes data is not collected by the authors, and user agreements prevent researchers from sharing data (see for instance Bakker, Lelkes, and Malka, 2021b; Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn, 2021c). Other times, privacy concerns prevent researchers from sharing their data (Bowman & Spence, 2020). These are legitimate reasons for not sharing data. Yet, in these instances, researchers could make explicit why data cannot be shared and, ideally, how the access could be provided by sharing a data processing agreement.

2. **Replication of results.** Replication is the process where a researcher—or a team of researchers—tries to replicate a published finding "by duplicating the methodology as exactly as possible" (Chambers, 2019, p. 48). Replication is essential as it provides the empirical evidence that informs theories in the personality-politics literature and allows us to test the foundational claims in the literature (Chambers, 2019). Replications differ in the extent to which they are more direct—following the original

procedures and analysis as closely as possible—or more conceptual, testing the same underlying idea (Brandt et al., 2014a). In a recent large replication project in the personality literature, Soto (2019) finds that the literature on personality and a host of non-political outcomes is relatively robust and replicable. On the other hand, research in the social sciences shows that the replicated effects are often much weaker than those published in the original studies (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018).

Scholars engaging in replications could consider two things. Following Nuijten, Bakker, Maassen, and Wicherts (2018), they could verify the original results of the study they want to replicate and test the robustness of these results. If the reproduction of findings is not successful, then it is, according to Nuijten et al. (2018), not worth trying to replicate the finding using a different sample. Moreover, if alternative modeling strategies show the association is not robust, then it is not worth engaging in replication (Nuijten et al., 2018). Second, scholars could preregister their replication and document all their decisions before collecting and analyzing the data (see next point)—for example, see Bakker, Schumacher, Gothreau, and Arceneaux (2020b). The "replication recipe," developed by Brandt et al. (2014a), is a template that stimulates researchers to think about all possible research decisions in advance. Replications are becoming more common, for instance, Gillisen et al. (2023) who replicate a study on the effects of trait empathy on affective polarization (e.g., Simas et al. 2020); Fasching et al. (2023) who replicate the associations between childhood personality and adult ideology (e.g., Block & Block 2006b), and Zmigrod et al. (2022) who study the cognitive correlates of ideology.

3. **Preregistration.** Preregistration means that researchers outline and register their hypotheses, design, and analysis plan, generally, before data collection (Nosek et al., 2018). Why is this important? The "credibility crisis" in psychology has shown that researchers chase p-values, post-hock theorizes, and selectively report findings that "worked." Questionable research practices are widespread in psychology (Franco et al., 2016) and political science (Franco et al., 2015) as well as other social science disciplines such as communication (Bakker et al., 2021a). Studies that are derived using these and other, "questionable" research practices have a small chance of replicating (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2011) and impact the credibility of the field (Anvari & Lakens, 2018). Preregistration safeguards, at least partially, against some of these more questionable research practices such as p-hacking and HARKing.

P-hacking is the process where conscious and unconscious modeling lead people to arrive at a p-value just below .05—the commonly accepted threshold for statistical significance (Gelman & Loken, 2014). In the personality-politics literature, p-hacking could occur as a researcher has to decide to adjust for covariates or not, account for measurement error or not, account for missing data or not, and so on. Preregistration invites researchers to be explicit about their modeling decisions before data collection and prevents, at least partly, that conscious or unconscious modeling decisions affect the results.

Presenting posthoc findings as if they were predicted from the start is known as Hypothesizing After the Results are Known (HARKing, Kerr, 1998). HARKing is a research practice that was, for generations, considered acceptable and recommended practice. For instance, in the primer on writing a "good" scientific journal article Bem (1987, p. 172), explain: "There are two possible articles you can write: (a) the article

you planned to write when you designed your study or (b) the article that makes the most sense now that you have seen the results. They are rarely the same, and the correct answer is (b)." Option (b) is acceptable when researchers are transparent that the interpretation is posthoc and the findings are exploratory. However, option b becomes problematic if exploratory findings are presented as expected from the start (Vermeulen & Hartmann, 2015). The personality-politics literature could be vulnerable to HARKing: expectations are not very specific, and researchers often correlate multiple traits with an outcome variable. At the same time, researchers might not always have a priori expectations about all of them. Preregistration forces researchers to be explicit about what were predictions from the start and what came up later (Nosek et al., 2018).

Once researchers start preregistering their studies, it is also important to carefully consider the sample size requirements. Many of the associations between personality and politics discussed in this chapter are small. To reliably detect small associations, large samples are needed (Simmons et al., 2011). Most studies discussed in this chapter indeed rely upon relatively large samples. But not that many studies consider whether sample is capable of reliably detecting a specific effect (for a more detailed discussion of the role of power in the study of personality, see Giner-Sorolla et al., 2019). For studies relying upon correlations between trait x and political construct y, the sample sizes might not need to be that large (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). However, the required sample size goes up quickly if more complex models, such as moderation effects, are specified (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2019). Going forward, more a priori power analyses should be conducted and/or posthoc sensitivity analyses reported (see for instance Peruginiet al., 2018).

Recently, some studies in the personality-politics literature were preregistered (for instance, Bakker et al., 2021b; Bromme et al., 2022; Xu et al., 2021) also when they relied upon publicly available datasets Bakker, Lelkes, and Malka (2021b).

4. Transparency in the communication of results. It is not uncommon for personality and politics studies to be covered in articles with titles like: "Conservatives are from Mars, Liberals from Venus" (Edsall, 2012), "How your personality predicts your attitudes towards Brexit" (Mackenzie, 2018), or "Secrets of the right-wing brain: New study proves it—conservatives see a different, hostile world" (Rosenberg, 2014). These titles, and the substance in these articles, often include strong causal claims. Moreover, the headlines and coverage suggest that personality is *the* important factor explaining the specific political phenomena. Yet, many studies in the personality-politics literature cannot address the nature of the causal ordering of the variables, and the effects in this literature are generally small. Journalists and university press offices are partly responsible for the misrepresentation of the research. At the same time, researchers bear the ultimate responsibility for a fair and balanced reporting of their findings.

To conclude, this chapter showed the personality-politics has contributed to our understanding of ideology, voting behavior, and political participation. At the same time, this literature will benefit from adopting open science practices, such as sharing data and materials, replication, and preregistration. Doing so will increase the replicability (Asendorpf et al., 2013), transparency (Vermeulen & Hartmann, 2015), and ultimately also the credibility (Anvari & Lakens, 2018) of this literature and political psychology as a field.

The next volume of this handbook will, hopefully, show the progress this literature, and the field at large, has made.

Notes

1. The author wants to thank editor Jennifer Jerit for the extensive feedback on this chapter. Conversations with Vin Arceneaux, John Bullock, Robert Klemmensen, Yphtach Lelkes, Ariel Malka, Alessandro Nai, Matthijs Rooduijn, Gijs Schumacher, Claes de Vreese and members of the Hot Politics Lab inspired many of the points raised in this chapter.
2. Costa and McCrae (1995, p. 23) use the word "domain" where the word "trait" is used here.
3. In the chapter, Openness instead of Intellect will be used as this seems to be the more common labeling for the trait in the personality-politics literature.
4. The F-scale and right-wing authoritarianism show substantial content overlap with political ideology (see for a detailed discussion Malka et al., 2017) and will not be discussed in this chapter.
5. The association between personality and anti-immigration attitudes, and prejudice in general, has been widely studied but will not be discussed in detail (see for some recent examples Ackermann & Ackermann, 2015; Brandt et al., 2014b; Crawford & Brandt, 2019; Dinesen et al., 2016; Gallego & Pardos-Prado, 2014; Talay & De Coninck, 2020; Ziller & Berning, 2021) because anti-immigration attitudes are strongly connected to cultural conservatism (see for instance, Caughey et al., 2019).
6. Foreign policy attitudes and attitudes towards supra-national institutions are relatively independent of cultural and economic conservatism. Across the board there is no real consistent pattern of associations between personality attitudes and different EU attitudes in the published work (Aichholzer & Rammstedt, 2021; Bakker & de Vreese, 2016; Curtis, 2016; Curtis & Miller, 2021; Curtis & Nielsen, 2018, 2020; Duckitt & Sibley, 2016; Sagiv et al., 2012; Schoen, 2007; Tillman, 2013). This inconsistent pattern could be due to differences in the independent and the dependent variable, the time period, the context, or other differences between the studies. It could also mean that personality traits are not linked to attitudes towards supra-national institutions.
   Some studies assessed the association between personality and foreign policies, see Gravelle et al. (2020); Mondak (2010); Schoen (2007).
7. Preliminary studies also document individual differences in disgust sensitivity as captured with physiological arousal (i.e., changes in skin conductance levels in response to disgusting images) was positively associated with socially conservative policies Aarøe et al. (2017); Smith et al. (2011). A preregistered and well-powered direct replication failed to find evidence for the existence of an association between physiological disgust sensitivity and socially conservative policy positions.
8. Due to the problems with the WVS measure of personality the findings by Fatke (2017) are not discussed in detail here.
9. Other studies have relied upon populist attitudes instead of populist vote. The association between Agreeableness and populist attitudes is less consistent (Fatke, 2019; Galais & Rico, 2021; Pruysers, 2020). Yet, populist attitudes and vote choice are not equivalent (Akkerman et al., 2014). Some people who express populist attitudes do not vote for populist parties and vice versa. Moreover, there is an ongoing discussion about the measurement and validity of populist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2020; Wuttke et al., 2020).

The use of different measures of populist attitudes leads to different conclusions about the psychological correlates (Erisen et al., 2021).

10. Vasilopoulos and Jost (2020) do not find this pattern when it comes to Melanchon—a left-wing populist.

11. But Bakker et al. (2015) found that those higher on Openness have a stronger party identification.

12. It is noteworthy that comparing Danish local politicians to higher-level bureaucrats the differences in personality traits are much smaller (Florczak et al., 2020).

13. Note that Scott and Medeiros (2020) report that local Canadian politicians score higher on Openness compared to the population.

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CHAPTER 3

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CHILDHOOD AND ADULT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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DAVID O. SEARS AND CHRISTIA BROWN

IF the study of history considers human affairs through the lens of time as an independent variable, the study of human psychological development views individuals in terms of their life histories, employing the tool of time within the human life span. Accordingly, this chapter examines the life histories of political orientations as they evolve from early childhood through old age (for an earlier version, see Sears & Brown, 2013).

The life history perspective has a unique niche in political psychology in a variety of respects. It addresses the constant tension between continuity and change as played out throughout an individual's life span. Such an historical emphasis contrasts with more ahistorical approaches such as the rational choice theories drawn from the field of economics (see chapter 4, Chong, this volume), or the behavioral decision theories drawn from psychology (see chapter 5, Lau & Redlawsk, this volume), or cognitive psychology more generally (see chapter 15, Jerit & Kam, this volume). Moreover, it helps us to understand the origins of orientations that are politically consequential among adults, whether concerning politics specifically (see Federico & Malka, chapter 17, on ideology; Feldman, chapter 20, on authoritarianism; Huddy, chapter 21, this volume on national attachments, all in this volume) or intergroup relations (see Mason, chapter 24; Kinder, chapter 27; and Tropp & Dehrone, chapter 29, all in this volume). At a more practical, or ultimately perhaps impractical, level, the utopian spirit ranges far and wide among humans, including such disparate types as liberal social scientists, Jesus Christ, Adolf Hitler, and Vladimir Lenin. That spirit sometimes centers on the hope that human progress might be aided by intervention early in the life span, whether through formal education or otherwise.

Time appears as an independent variable most often in three ways. One concerns the persisting effects of early experiences. The first empirical studies of political socialization documented the appearance in childhood and adolescence of racial prejudice, national and other identities, party identification and ideology, and support for political leaders, regimes, and systems (see Renshon, 1977; Sears, 1975). Such youthful predispositions were generally assumed to be meaningful and to have lasting influence throughout the life span.

A second focus is upon "the times." Individual life histories are inextricably connected to what happens in the broader environment. Sometimes "the times" show dramatic changes,

such as during the French Revolution, the emancipation of African American slaves, World War II, China's Cultural Revolution, or the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union. More often change is significant but gradual, as in the slow changes since the New Deal in the American party system. Or sometimes change is so glacial it appears nonexistent, as in the American polity's commitment to freedom of speech and worship.

A third general approach looks for politically distinctive features of different life stages. Young children may have difficulty cognitively linking various aspects of their experience, delaying their appreciation of abstract concepts such as Congress or the Supreme Court. Adolescents may be especially vulnerable to "storm and stress" and drawn to unconventional behavior and to political rebellion, such as in the old French adage, "He who is not a revolutionary at 20 has no heart; he who is a revolutionary at 40 has no head." Young adults may be especially concerned about their own independent identity and be somewhat unmoored in society, and so more open to influence. Mature adults, embedded in work, home, and family, may show a stronger sense of self-interest. The elderly may flag in mental and physical energy, with consequences for the consistency and stability of their attitudes and for their level of political participation.

Previous review essays have been titled "political socialization" and have focused largely on the childhood acquisition of specifically political orientations (Hyman, 1959; Merelman, 1986; Niemi, 1973; Sears, 1975). The application of preadult developmental approaches to political psychology has subsequently undergone considerable cycling in popularity. Half a century ago, Greenstein (1970, p. 969) felt that "political socialization is a growth stock," and Sears (1975, p. 94) noted that in that field "research output has increased at a geometric rate."

Revisionism then set in, characterizing political socialization as in a "bear market" (Cook, 1985). Two often overly enthusiastic claims of that field were challenged: of a "primacy principle," the staying power of early-acquired predispositions, and a "structuring principle," that early-acquired predispositions had special political power in adulthood (e.g., Searing et al., 1973, 1976). Some called for recognition of more openness to change through the life course; for example, that "change during adulthood is normal" (Sapiro, 1994, p. 204), and that "learning and development are [not] completed by adulthood; rather, they [constitute] a lifelong process" (Sigel, 1989, p. viii). Some trends in political science more generally also contributed to de-emphasis on preadult experience, especially economic theories focusing on the rational choices made by adults. Still later, at least in some eyes, political socialization research experienced a "rebirth" (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995).

In contrast to that original focus on preadults, we broaden our scope to the full life span. We begin with a discussion of the preadult acquisition of basic political predispositions, with particular focus on the paradigmatic case of party identification in America. Then we consider children's attitudes about the role of government, civic engagement, and attitudes about social inequalities, as well as their ethnic and racial prejudices and identities, and the moderating role of children's own social identities in shaping their political development. We then turn to the later life history of such early-acquired predispositions, with particular attention to their persistence, and to the related "impressionable years" model postulating particular susceptibility to change in late adolescence and early adulthood. That turns us to applications to political generations. We confess at the outset our limited focus primarily on the United States, as the most thoroughly researched case. But at the close we briefly consider immigration as a way to partially counteract those limits (also see chapter 28, Green and Staerkle, this volume; Neundorf & Smets, 2017).

1. Childhood and Adolescence

1.1. Party Identification

The paradigmatic case of the development of political attitudes among preadults has been Americans' party identifications. In large part that is because party identification is by far the strongest and most consistent predictor of voting preferences in the world's oldest democracy.

The early conventional wisdom was that "a man is born into his political party just as he is born into probable future membership in the church of his parents" (Hyman, 1959, p. 74). A more complex theory was then developed in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960), perhaps the most influential study of American voting behavior. Its treatment of party identification was based on a sequence of two questions asked of each respondent in the American National Election Surveys (ANES, a national survey conducted on representative samples of adult US citizens in presidential election years since 1952). The first asked for self-categorization as "Democrat, Republican, or Independent." The second asked partisans whether they were "strong" or "not so strong," and Independents, whether they leaned toward one of the two parties. It described party identification as an attitudinal predisposition, typically acquired in preadult life, often from the parental family; highly stable over the life span; the most powerful single factor in determining candidate evaluations and voting choices in partisan elections, and often issue preferences as well; usually acquired and maintained without an elaborate accompanying ideological understanding about the positions of the two parties; with the strength of party identification (or its "crystallization," to use our term) being thought to increase through the life cycle as the individual accumulated experience with the partisan electoral system, at least in periods of a stable party system (Campbell et al., 1960).

This early theory relied on less direct empirical assessment of these propositions than has later research. It relied on adults' recall of their earlier lives to establish early acquisition, familial influence, and stability over the life span; on cross-sectional correlations to establish its influence over candidate and issue preferences; on the paucity of adults' ideological thinking to establish that early acquisition of partisanship was not usually informed by larger ideologizing understandings; and only later on empirical tests of the strengthening of party identification with age (Converse, 1969; 1976).

Later research tested for the crystallization of preadults' party identifications directly (Sears & Valentino, 1997), using three criteria: consistency across attitudes in the same domain, stability over time, and power over attitude formation toward new attitude objects (building on Converse's, 1964, classic work). That found that the crystallization of adolescents' party identifications had increased quite sharply through a presidential campaign, almost to adult levels. A similar study found that the party identifications of a large sample of entering college students had already crystallized approximately to adult levels, and that the adult demographic and value correlates of partisanship were largely in place already (Sears et al., 2008).

The original hypothesis of preadult family transmission was later more directly tested by Jennings and Niemi (1974; 1981), in their classic "Youth-Parent Socialization Panel"

(henceforth YPSP). That interviewed a national sample of high school seniors and their parents in 1965, followed up with both samples again in 1973 and 1982, and again with the student sample in 1997, adding a sample of their own children. They found substantial, though not perfect, parental transmission of party identification to their adolescent children, and lesser transmission of other political attitudes (Jennings et al., 2009). This model was later extended to party systems in other nations (see Kroh & Selb, 2009, for the German multiparty system; Rico & Jennings, 2016, on Catalonia; and Aggeborn & Nyman, 2021, on Swedish politicians' families).

Families vary considerably in their ability to pass their partisanship on to their offspring. The most politicized parents, and those with the most stable party identifications themselves, were consistently the most successful (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings et al., 2009). Politicized parents successfully imbued their children with more political interest (Neundorf et al., 2016). And greater parental political interest is associated with greater influence, at least while the offspring continue to live with their parents (Fitzgerald, 2011). But the child's own independent political interest ultimately plays a role, suggesting that preadults are sometimes not mere passive recipients of political socialization but active participants (see similar findings from England and Germany; Zuckerman et al., 2007). In the words of the authors of *The American Voter Revisited*, an updated reassessment of *The American Voter*, adolescents from politically uninvolved homes find themselves "largely adrift in partisan terms" (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, p. 141).

Politicized parents seem to be particularly successful because they most accurately communicate their political positions to their children (Niemi, 1974; Tedin, 1980). Similarly, Wolak (2009) found greater crystallization of preadults' partisanship among adolescents who converse more politically with their parents. Accuracy of perception of parental positions also helps to explain differences in transmission across attitude domains: parental attitudes are communicated more clearly in some (e.g., candidate choices in hotly contested elections) than others (e.g., political efficacy). Family transmission of other identities can occur in fraught locations and domains, such as Catalonian identities in Spain (Rico & Jennings, 2012). Parent-child similarity in partisanship declined through the offspring's early adulthood as their own issue preferences had increasing influence (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Niemi & Jennings, 1991).

Nevertheless, working in favor of parental transmission of partisanship is that it usually displays one of the strongest correlations of any attribute between spouses, suggesting that it plays a relatively important role in mate choice (Alford et al., 2011). Indeed, partisan agreement between parents, and between parents and offspring, has increased over the past half century as partisan polarization has increased. The home has become more of a partisan "echo chamber" (Iyengar et al., 2018). There is also some evidence that in-person campaign contacts mobilize voters more in politically heterogenous than homogeneous households, perhaps by stimulating more political discussion at home (Foos & Rooij, 2017). Similarly, Fitzgerald and Curtis (2012), analyzing panel surveys in several countries, found that parental discord over politics tends to produce higher levels of political engagement over time in their offspring.

In contrast to the role of clear communication of parental preferences, the quality of parent-child relationships, such as rebellions against parents, seems generally not to be central in success of parental influence (Jennings & Niemi, 1974). "Parenting styles" may play a moderating influence, however (Murray & Mylvaney, 2012). The centrality of family

transmission was originally proposed in an era of more frequently intact two-parent families than is the case now, with higher rates of divorce and never-married mothers, and in an era seemingly marked by more ritualized parent-child contact than today. Even so, the extension of that Michigan socialization study (YPSP) to the children of the original students shows quite convincingly that parent-child transmission in those families showed very much the same pattern as it had in the original families (Jennings et al., 2009). Indeed in some attitude domains it was even higher, such as in political ideology and racial attitudes. Nevertheless, parental absence, especially divorce (even more than death), weakens preadults' political involvement (Sances, 2013).

"The times" are also implicated in the preadult acquisition of party identification. The original theory implied that it was transmitted in piecemeal fashion in the course of daily life. But if one key to successful political socialization is clear communication of stable parental attitudes, vivid political events might be important catalysts because their heavy information flows could provide occasions for such communication. As noted above, Sears and Valentino (1997) found that the crystallization of adolescents' partisanship increased dramatically through the course of a presidential campaign. No such increase occurred in their parents' partisanship, which was already at high levels; nor in attitudes and dispositions peripheral to the campaign; nor during the less information-intense post-campaign year. Crystallization increased most among adolescents most engaged in interpersonal political communication (Valentino & Sears, 1998), suggesting that the importance of external events is partly in stimulating such further discussions. Indeed, longer-term interest in politics may be sparked if preadults enter the age of political awareness at times of heightened activity in the political arena (Wolak and McDevitt, 2011; also see Fitzgerald, 2011). Another study showed that highly visible female candidates produced more political involvement among adolescent girls due to greater political discussion within the family (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006). Other political events, such as 9/11, have also been shown to contribute to adolescents' political socialization (Gimpel et al., 2003).

An interesting variant on the family socialization model is evidence that offspring sometimes influence parental attitudes, especially in domains in which they introduce more "modern" attitudes to their families (Sapiro, 2003; also see Fitzgerald, 2011 regarding nontraditional "rising parties" in Switzerland; or Zuckerman et al., 2007, in England and Germany). US Court of Appeals judges, especially Republicans, consistently voted more favorably on gender issues if they had daughters than judges who only had sons (Glynn & Sen, 2015). In the Vietnam era, parents with sons at risk of being drafted or living in a town with at least one war casualty had higher turnout in the 1972 presidential election, in which the Democratic nominee was outspokenly antiwar (Davenport, 2015). Similarly, men whose first children were daughters were more likely to vote for the first female major-party presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton, in 2016 than men whose first children were sons (Greenlee et al., 2020).

1.2. Role of Government

At one time, childhood political socialization was thought to be a key element in installing a sense of government legitimacy and diffuse system support in mass publics. One vehicle for accomplishing that goal was to capitalize on children's supposed admiration for the

most visible and personal symbol of government, the chief of state. In the United States, most children learn about their presidents in the early school years (Easton & Dennis, 1969; Hess & Torney, 1967; Picard, 2005). At that age, children have a basic sense of the president being the leader of government. Their understanding of the methods, purposes, and effects of government increases across elementary school (Abraham, 1983). This line of research has been less active in recent years, perhaps due to the recognition that children's supposed idealization of the American president in early studies was partly a function of the unusual popularity of the then-incumbents, Eisenhower and Kennedy, among both adults and children.

Later cohorts of American preadults were generally less positive toward their government and its symbols, beginning to mirror adults' sometimes negative attitudes, such as in the case of the disgraced President Nixon. Affect toward less controversial symbols of the nation generally remained positive, however, such as toward the American flag and British monarchy (Sears, 1975). It seems likely that children's attitudes toward the president usually reflect much the same influence of parental socialization, and so variations among parents, as other partisan attitudes.

1.3. Civic Engagement

The early adolescent years mark the formation of attitudes toward civic engagement (Metz & Youniss, 2005). This is important because civic engagement in youth may be an important predictor of voting in adulthood (Youniss et al., 1997). At least having civic knowledge in high school is associated with whether youth think they will vote in the future (Krampen, 2000). One challenge is defining civic engagement in a population too young to vote. Descriptions of civic engagement used in large international studies include social responsibility, loyalty, patriotism, a sense of political efficacy, trust in the government, participation in political discussions, knowledge of democracy, and having a concern for the welfare of others beyond oneself (Sherrod et al., 2002). Others (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) go further and argue that developing citizenship should also include awareness of human rights, including respect for the political rights of women and ethnic minorities.

Not surprisingly, civic engagement increases across adolescence, in some respects attaining adult levels and in others falling short. For example, Moore, Lare, and Wagner (1985) found that almost all adolescents believe that adults should vote and obey the law, though only half believed adults should be affiliated with a political party. About half of American adolescents in another study gave a correct definition of "democracy," divided among mentions of the freedoms and rights of the individual, majority rule, and the promise of civic equality, with correct responses increasing with age (Flanagan et al., 2005).

Adolescents' subjective civic engagement, such as feeling politically competent and influential in shaping others' political views, is associated with greater participation in political activities in everyday life, such as having political discussions and watching political news reports (Krampen, 2000). Youths whose parents were more educated, who engaged in family discussions of current events, and who were themselves civically engaged were more likely to be civically engaged (Flanagan et al., 1998), paralleling the evidence on family political socialization cited earlier. Cognitive development may be involved as well: 14-year-olds

have greater ability to view multiple sides of social problems and consider others' opinions than do 10-year-olds (Gallatin & Adelson, 1971).

There usually are gender gaps in adolescents' civic engagement, doubtless for several reasons. Politics may seem more self-relevant for boys, because there are more same-gender models for boys (Carroll, 1994; Levy, 2013), and because gender may be perceived as a barrier to political participation for girls (Neff et al., 2007). Boys at times seek out information and show greater knowledge about politics than do girls (Bigler et al., 2008; Simon, 2017; van Deth et al., 2011; Wolak & McDevitt, 2011). This gender difference lacks nuance in how girls anticipate being involved in politics. Hooghe and Stolle (2004) found that teenage girls had a higher anticipation of being politically engaged (e.g., voting, volunteering, protesting) than boys, and were especially interested in being engaged in political activities around social movements, whereas boys favored activities involving leadership, such as running for office.

Educators in K–12 have, of course, long attempted to heighten civic engagement. A century ago, in the midst of a surge in immigration from other countries, American educators put great stock in "civic education" in public schools as a way to integrate newcomers into American democracy. Over the years, perhaps not surprisingly, the quality of its implementation has been quite variable, so the average effect has been modest (Langton & Jennings, 1968; Hart & Youniss, 2018). Among the obstacles are social and economic inequality, and the racial and ethnic segregation of public schools, both of which produce inequalities in educational outcomes as well.

Still, the picture is not all bleak (Hart & Youniss, 2018). Reports of the effectiveness of especially inspired teachers can be found. Also, adolescents are particularly sensitive to growing environmental problems, such as climate change, and perhaps that is a promising target for intervention in K–12. Studies from Belgium and the United States find that civic education classes often do promote civic engagement especially for young people who do not get much parental political socialization (Neundorf et al., 2016) Other studies point to specific skills taught in schools that promote later-life polreference that is in reference listitical participation, including psychosocial skills acquired in school that have been shown to be associated with greater turnout 20 years later (Holbein & Hillygus, 2020), or verbal skills acquired in adolescence (Condon, 2015).

1.4. Race and Ethnicity

A further domain of Americans' preadult socialization concerns race and ethnicity. In a diverse society, they are important social categories, influencing individuals' political and social attitudes and identities, among other things. Both outgroup antagonisms, such as prejudice and stereotypes, and ingroup attachment, such as racial identity, are potentially involved (Citrin & Sears, 2014; Dawson, 1994; Jardina, 2019; Pérez and Vicuña, chapter 25, this volume; Sears & Henry, 2005). Although there are important distinctions between race and ethnicity, children rarely make the distinction, so racial and ethnic attitudes and identities develop similarly and have similar implications. We will discuss the findings of race and ethnicity together.

Prejudice and stereotyping. Most early research on the development of racial prejudice examined American and Canadian children (see Aboud, 1988 for a thorough review). More

recent work with international samples has shown very similar findings. Children often endorse racial stereotypes and show racial biases very early, before age three, even before they can correctly identify their own race or ethnicity. In one American study, when children age two and a half were asked to choose photographs of unfamiliar peers they would like to play with, a majority of white and black children picked a same-race face (Katz & Kofkin, 1997). By age three, however, a majority of American white and black children alike began to choose a white peer.

For white children, a bias favoring whites continues to increase until approximately age seven or eight. Among black children, however, this white preference typically continues until about age six, at which point they begin to show an own-race preference when picking a potential playmate (Katz & Kofkin, 1997). Kelly and Duckitt (1995) found a similar white preference among young black South African children. Originally it was argued that this early white preference was due to poor self-esteem (Clark & Clark, 1939). More recent researchers argue instead that it reflects children's recognition that being white is desirable because it is associated with higher social status. In any case, by around age 10, most white, black, Asian, and Latino children all show a slight preference for their own racial group (Aboud, 1988; Brown et al., 2011; Katz & Kofkin, 1997).

Even when children show preferences for members of their own racial group, they do not necessarily express dislike or derogation toward members of other racial or ethnic groups. In one study, American children attributed positive traits and qualities to their own racial group and were neutral toward other racial groups (Cameron et al., 2001). However, in social contexts with more explicitly negative intergroup relations, such as in the midst of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, children have been shown to endorse negative attitudes about the out-group (Bar-Tal, 1996; Brenick et al., 2010).

Although children show conventional prejudices and stereotypes very early, their understanding of them develops more slowly, perhaps dependent on their cognitive development. In interviews with Mexican American and black children, Quintana (2007) found that children's understanding of ethnic prejudice was related to their more general perspective-taking abilities. For example, young children (ages three to six) attributed prejudice to physical and observable preferences, such as, "They don't like their color." Even slightly older children (ages six to eight) attributed prejudice to literal, nonsocial reasons, such as, "They may not like Mexico." This parallels young children's general tendency to attend to observable, rather than abstract, characteristics of the environment.

A big leap forward in the understanding of race, prejudice, and stereotypes occurs in late childhood, around ages eight to 10. Children at that age generally accept the view common among American adults that race is stable and inherited (Alejandro-Wright, 1985). They also often recognize the social components of prejudice, even suggesting that others might be prejudiced because of what they are taught at home (Quintana, 2007). Further, across this developmental period, children's knowledge of group differences in stereotyping increases steadily (e.g., "White people think black people are not smart"; McKown & Weinstein, 2003, p. 5). Children also become increasingly aware through the elementary school years of the implications of these stereotypes for group status. For example, many black children rate occupations performed by blacks rather than whites as lower status (i.e., earn less money, require less education; Bigler et al., 2003).

Although culturally often confounded with race and ethnicity, social class is a more complex and abstract construct, with somewhat less visible and concrete markers than skin

color. So children's understanding of social class develops more slowly than their understanding of race, developing first in elementary school. But the two domains show striking parallels, at least in research on American children. Qualitative research with elementary school children living below the poverty line has shown that they often assume society views the poor as "troublemakers," "dirty," "stupid," and "disgusting" (Weinger, 1998, p. 108). They believe that the poor are not welcome in wealthier neighborhoods, that the poor are social outcasts, and that more affluent children are happier and more worry-free. Regardless of their own social class, however, children typically perceive income discrepancies based on occupation to be justified (Emler & Dickinson, 1985).

With age, stereotypes about the poor become more differentiated. In one study, fourth-graders considered wealthy individuals to be better at sports, academics, and music relative to poor individuals. Sixth- and eighth-graders considered poor people advantaged in sports and disadvantaged in academics compared to wealthy people, while music tended to be a stereotype-neutral domain (Woods et al., 2005). American adolescents' explanations for, and evaluations of, poverty and economic inequality mirror those about racial differences, more often attributing poverty to such personal characteristics as work ethic and effort than to structural factors such as job availability, government supports, and discrimination (Leahy, 1990).

Decreasing stereotyping in adolescence. Despite the continuing general preference for own-race members, racial stereotypes typically start to decline at around age 10, as demonstrated with a variety of methods (Aboud, 1988; Williams et al., 1975) and in a variety of nations (Monteiro et al., 2009; Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001).

Why do children show this early increase and then a later decline in own-race biases as they approach adolescence? A cognitive developmental theory of prejudice argues that young children are initially biased toward the ingroup because of early cognitive limitations. Then as they become more cognitively sophisticated, their racial attitudes become more tolerant (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1993). For example, children gradually develop multiple classification skills, such as the ability to recognize that people can simultaneously belong to two different categories. As a result, they may begin to understand that children from different ethnic groups can look different from them externally but be similar to them internally, such as in interests and tastes (Aboud, 1988). Indeed, children who were taught to classify stimuli along multiple dimensions within an experimental paradigm showed lower levels of stereotyping after the acquisition of this cognitive skill (Bigler & Liben, 1993).

A different explanation for this age-related shift appeals to social learning. Children may just become more familiar with social norms against openly expressing racial biases. If so, explicit racial attitudes might show more reduced bias with age than would such implicit attitudes as more quickly associating positive qualities with white faces than with black faces (and vice versa for negative qualities). Consistent with that view, early research indicated that white children had equivalent explicit and implicit racial biases at age six, but by age 10 they showed reduced explicit racial bias but no reduction in implicit associations favoring whites over blacks (Baron & Banaji, 2006). This shift with age could be due to children's growing awareness of social norms. But it still could also be due to their growing cognitive sophistication, such that they increasingly can hold both unbiased conscious and biased subconscious attitudes simultaneously. These two arguments are often pitted against one another, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In any case, many adolescents come to understand prejudice at a broader, societal level and can compare their own attitudes about their ingroup to how that group is portrayed in the media (e.g., "If one [Mexican] did something, it's like all the Mexicans in the world did everything bad"). In addition, some adolescents begin to become aware of structural forms of racism and cultural differences in the endorsement of stereotypes (Brown & Bigler, 2005).

Racial and ethnic identity. Not only do children show preferences for some racial and ethnic groups and develop an awareness of prejudice, they also begin to place themselves within a racial or ethnic group and come to terms with their own group membership. Research has shown that children can label their own and others' race "correctly" (in terms of prevailing societal norms) by age six (Aboud, 1988; Katz & Kofkin, 1997). Racial and ethnic minority children are more likely to mention their ethnicity than are white children, however, and consider it more central to their sense of self (Ruble et al., 2004).

This early-acquisition point should be qualified, however. Although elementary-school-age children are capable of identifying themselves by race, they may or may not consider race to be the most salient aspect of their identity. Indeed, when describing themselves, few young children begin with race or ethnicity. Moreover, this early racial and ethnic identification is not necessarily terribly stable. One of the most important factors affecting ethnic identification seems to be context, particularly the school context. In one study, 85% of the youths who identified themselves as black/African American in sixth grade did so again when asked in eighth grade, but only if they attended a black majority school (the other students changed their identification to multiethnic). If they attended a Latino majority school, only 65% of such early black identifiers did so again later (Nishina et al., 2010).

Middle to late childhood (toward the end of elementary school) appears to be an important developmental period in which ethnic minority individuals begin to think about and explore their ethnic identity (Marks et al., 2007). Following such a period of searching, most adolescents acquire a clear ethnic identity (Phinney, 1990). In the United States, the ethnic identity of white adolescents is typically later acquired, less salient, less developed, and less positive than that of ethnic minorities (e.g., Brown et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 1999; Sears et al., 2003). Some research suggests that this ethnic difference only becomes evident among children in early adolescence (DuBois et al., 2002). Whether this has continued to be true in an era of resurgent white identity among adults (Jardina, 2019) is an open question.

Regardless of the exact timing of development, the attainment of a well-developed ethnic identity is thought to be an important developmental milestone for racial or ethnic minority adolescents (Phinney, 1990; Quintana, 2007). It is a primary aspect of adolescents' developing self-concept and directly impacts a wide range of factors central to adolescents' daily lives (see Brown & Chu, 2012; Chao & Otsuki-Clutter, 2011). By college age, minorities' ethnic identification has become quite stable (Sears et al., 2003). It has been shown to be a complex and multidimensional component of the self-concept (Sellers et al., 1997; see Ashmore et al., 2004 for a review).

Perceived discrimination. Researchers have also started to focus increasingly on another dimension of racism, the target's perceptions of discrimination. Among very young children, exclusion of others based on social group membership appears to be the most recognizable form of discrimination (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001). Later, during the elementary school years, children develop a more detailed and nuanced awareness of discrimination.

Discrimination by peers seems to be the most common type perceived by both children and adolescents (Brown et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2000). For example, one study found that the majority of black 10- to 12-year-olds reported having experienced at least one instance of racial discrimination from a peer, most commonly verbal insults and racial slurs (Simons et al., 2002). Fisher et al. (2000) report similar perceptions from a sample of black, Latino, South Asian, East Asian, and white adolescents. Most Dutch children (92%) were familiar with the meaning of "discrimination" by the age of 10, with name-calling being the most frequently cited example, followed by an unequal sharing of goods and by social exclusion (Verkuyten et al., 1997). Many children also reported being excluded from activities because of their race, with a small number reporting being threatened with physical harm (Simons et al., 2002). In another study, the majority of children (90%) inferred that individuals' stereotypic beliefs had led them to engage in discrimination (McKown & Weinstein, 2003). Children avoided classifying negative behavior as discriminatory, however, if they considered either the target to have been responsible for the negative behavior, or the perpetrator to have acted unintentionally.

Children and adolescents also perceive discrimination within institutions, by teachers, and in public settings (Brown et al., 2011; Rosenbloom & Way, 2004). More than half of one sample of black and Latino adolescents perceived themselves to have been hassled by store clerks and to have received poor service at restaurants because of their race and more than a quarter reported being hassled by the police (Fisher et al., 2000). Half of them reported that they had been graded unfairly because of their race, and approximately a quarter felt they had been discouraged from joining advanced-level classes and disciplined wrongly by teachers because of their race. Another study found adolescents perceiving discrimination by teachers to occur at least a couple of times a year (Wong et al., 2003). Many children and adolescents also reported being suspected of wrongdoing (Simons et al., 2002).

Although the frequency of perceived peer-based discrimination seems to remain stable across adolescence, perceptions of adult-based discrimination (which can include educational and institutional discrimination) increases with age (Greene et al., 2006; Fisher et al., 2000). For example, eighth-grade black students, but not fourth- or sixth-grade students, blamed the government's response to Hurricane Katrina on race and class discrimination (Brown et al., 2007). Not surprisingly, youth of color and those with a strong ethnic identity perceive more discrimination than white youth and/or those with a less important ethnic identity (e.g., Fisher et al., 2000; Romero & Roberts, 1998).

Political inequalities. Children also begin to perceive social inequalities within the political system and election. The crux of this research reflects both "the times" perspective, as the particular social inequalities in question are specific to that moment in time, and a "life stage" approach, as understanding broad social inequalities is cognitively complex and becomes more advanced with cognitive development. In general, by elementary school, children understand racial/ethnic and gender stereotypes and discrimination, and by adolescence, understand prejudice at a broader, societal level (Brown, 2017).

This developing perception of societal prejudices is linked with youthful political development. For example, in 2005 (prior to the election of Barack Obama), research indicated that elementary school-aged children perceived bias within presidential elections. Specifically, most five- to 10-year-old elementary school students were aware of the lack of gender and racial diversity among past presidents, a reflection of "the times" when only

white men had been president. This awareness was most pronounced among older children and black children (Bigler et al., 2008).

Children's most common explanations for this lack of gender and racial diversity indeed reflected perceived biases by voters, namely that men or white people would not vote for women or people of color. Furthermore, a majority of the girls and black and Latino children perceived that boys and White people were happy that no woman, black person, or Latino person had ever been President. In contrast, only one-quarter of children made stereotypical attributions to the excluded groups' inadequacies, such as that women or candidates of color lacked leadership abilities.

Attitudes about the role of politics in addressing social inequalities also apparently reflects a life stage effect. For example, older adolescents (e.g., 16–17 year olds), but not younger ones (e.g., 14–15 year olds), show racial differences in their attitudes about race-conscious social policies. Specifically, black youth are more supportive of affirmative action relative to white youth in late, but not early, adolescence (Hughes & Bigler, 2011). This support for affirmative action was more closely linked to knowledge about historical racism among black youth. So the increasing support over the life stages may reflect a growing awareness of structural inequalities, perhaps as a function of more parental socialization around racism and more experiences with discrimination. Similarly, older adolescents were more aware of racial disparities than younger adolescents, and more likely to support desegregating schools by making changes to school zoning.

Attitudes about the role of government in addressing social inequalities are also shaped by children's own social identities and life experiences. Even when social inequality occurred at the micro-level (i.e., the child's individual school), middle school black students believed that politicians and public officials (e.g., mayor, president, superintendent) should be responsible for improving social conditions as a function of their job (Hope & Bañales, 2019). Black and Latino youth may be particularly attentive to the influence of racial/ethnic bias in government actions or policies (Brown et al., 2007). This greater awareness of bias within politics and government may in turn actually lead to greater political engagement (e.g., Bigler et al., 2008), as experiences with discrimination sometimes promote civic engagement, and promote explicit support for political parties that actively address minority rights and interests (e.g., Sanders et al., 2014).

Conclusions. In general, children hold biases about social groups from an early age. With age and cognitive development, these biases lessen, albeit never disappear entirely. Children continue to hold biases and make internal attributions, however, about socioeconomic status. With increasingly complex cognitive abilities, children begin to understand how biases, such as discrimination, can contribute to social inequalities in contexts such as presidential elections. As children enter adolescence, they can better understand the role of institutions (because of more advanced perspective-taking abilities). Thus, adolescents have distinct attitudes about government and their role in the political process. Some groups (e.g., African Americans) are more supportive than other groups of the government playing a role in addressing social inequalities, and these early differences seem to foreshadow racial differences among adults. Gender differences are exacerbated because children have tended to view the US presidency as a stereotypically masculine occupation (e.g., Liben & Bigler, 2002).

2. ADULT LIFE HISTORY

The American Voter's (Campbell et al., 1960) theory of party identification described earlier, with its focus on early learning, persistence, and later influence on voting behavior, provided a clear exemplar for thinking about development through adulthood. It has been of lasting importance for that case. But is it a useful model for thinking about political life histories more generally?

Building on the various ways of thinking about time that we started with, four alternative models of the full political life cycle have often been contrasted: (1) persistence: the residues of preadult learning persist through life; (2) a variant, impressionable years: orientations are particularly susceptible to influence in late adolescence and early adulthood, but tend to stabilize thereafter; (3) its major alternative, lifelong openness: individuals remain open to influence throughout later life, including by "the times"; and (4) life cycle: people show distinctive specific propensities at different stages of life (e.g., Alwin et al., 1991; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Sears, 1975; Sears, 1983).

2.1. Persistence

Stability within individuals. What is the plasticity of important political and social attitudes through the life span? From a political perspective, if the most important attitudes are essentially static after the individual reaches adulthood, public opinion would always be frozen in anachronisms. Modernizing change would occur primarily by "compositional change," the replacement of older individuals by younger ones with fresher attitudes as different birth cohorts move through life, rather than by conversion of adults based on the merits of new views.

The most straightforward method for assessing persistence tracks a given orientation in the same set of respondents at multiple points in time, using "longitudinal" or "panel" studies. Those in the United States that have used the most representative samples come from several four-year panels conducted by the ANES. Party identification was the most stable attitude measured in those studies. Indeed, it was almost perfectly stable with some correction for measurement unreliability (Converse & Markus, 1979). Similar conclusions have emerged from other such studies in the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany (Green et al., 2002).

Three other studies yield similar evidence of stability across much longer periods of adulthood, though using less representative samples. The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel (YPSP) described earlier found that party identification was highly stable through the mature adult years (Stoker & Jennings, 2008). The appraisal of its findings by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008, p. 143) was that in the parent cohort, "the degree of persistence over a nearly 20-year span is impressive, while in the student cohort, spending its youth in a particularly turbulent time in American politics and society," party identification "proves less stable" (p. 143) between the first two interviews, but highly stable through mature adulthood (i.e., from age 25 to 57; also see Peterson et al., 2020, using the same study).

The classic "Bennington study" tracked a cohort of women who had attended Bennington College during the 1930s for nearly half a century afterward (Alwin et al., 1991). Their partisanship showed extremely high stability from college graduation through adulthood: "The stability coefficient linking a latent attitude variable over roughly 50 years of the life-span is in the .70 to .80 range" (Alwin, 1993, p. 68; also see Alwin et al., 1991). The long-term Terman Study of Gifted Children tested the partisanship of a considerably larger and more heterogeneous sample, selected from high-IQ children in California public elementary schools after World War I, from 1940 to 1977 (approximately ages 30 to 67). Their party identifications were quite stable through the period, with a coefficient of .65 corrected for measurement error (Sears & Funk, 1999). The overall conclusion drawn from these panel studies is that party identification is "firm but not immoveable" (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, p. 142).

Americans' party identification, then, has become the paradigmatic case for attitudinal persistence. One caveat should be mentioned, however. The customary indicator of stability, a high test-retest correlation, can be somewhat misleading if there has been a systematic swing toward one party or the other. If the marginal frequencies have changed, individual attitudes may have changed even though relative rank orders may not have. The conclusion that party identification is highly stable requires both high stability coefficients and a period in which basic party divisions remain more or less constant (Converse, 1976).

Some other attitudes in American politics seem also to have shown considerable stability over time. The conventional wisdom is that racial attitudes and self-reported ideological position are also among the most stable of Americans' political attitudes, though less so than party identification (Converse & Markus, 1979; Sears, 1983; Stoker & Jennings, 2008). For example, white Americans in the YPSP growing up in more racially mixed contexts were more racially prejudiced than others later in adulthood, but their adult racial context had no such effect (Goldman & Hopkins, 2020). Similarly, whites who grew up in the South were, as adults, most racially prejudiced, but region of adult residence had no effect (Glaser & Gilens, 1997). In terms of ideology, only 13% changed from "liberal" to "conservative," or vice versa, from about age 30 to retirement age in the Terman gifted children study (Sears & Funk, 1999). Moral attitudes, such as those toward abortion and marijuana, have also been found to be highly stable in some of these studies (Converse & Markus, 1979; Stoker & Jennings, 2008). Elites should show even more stable core orientations, across a broader set of attitudes. Indeed, members of the British House of Commons showed "remarkable stability" in socio-political values in a 40-year panel study (Searing et al., 2019).

Political engagement is another product of preadult socialization that seems to be quite stable across the life cycle. Prior (2010) analyzed numerous panel surveys in four different countries and found adolescents' self-reported political interest highly stable well into adulthood. Men tend to be more psychologically involved in politics in adulthood than women are, and Wolak and McDevitt (2011) found that that gender gap exists already in adolescence. They also found that the occurrence of a political campaign season bolsters adolescents' political engagement but does not eliminate the gender gap. It is distressing to learn, then, that in Britain, at age 15 there was already a large (20%) gender gap in political interest, presumably as a result of gendered prior socialization. Follow-up surveys showed the gap had expanded by about 10% ten years later, though it remained constant in the years following (Fraile & Sánchez-Vítores, 2020). Perhaps that finding is somewhat dated, though, as women have become increasingly engaged in politics in recent decades.

Rather than one model of the political life cycle fitting all, the trajectories of individual attitudes seem to vary across orientations. For example, the mass public's attitudes in many policy domains intensely debated by political elites seem to show much less stability over time (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). Why do some preadult orientations persist for so long when others are more open to change? The evidence on family transmission is a suggestive parallel. Persistence may stem from a high-volume and/or one-sided flow of communication in the individual's microenvironment. The opportunity to practice the orientation in conversation and behavior may also facilitate it. The periodic recurrence of partisan elections provides many opportunities for reinforcement of partisan predispositions (Sears, 1983).

The meaning of the political object may need to be constant as well. For example, Americans' party identifications and racial attitudes are cases of relatively high levels of information flow, and so presumably are sources of conversation and opportunities for behavioral practice, conditions favorable to persistence (Valentino & Sears, 1998). But many policy issues scarcely come to public attention at all, generating fewer such opportunities (Sears, 1983). And the cognitive meaning of the two parties, especially in terms of their positions on racial issues, diverged dramatically in the 1960s, resulting in significant movement in white southerners' party identifications away from the Democrats (Green et al., 2002; Osborne et al., 2011; though Schickler, 2016, argues that partisans in the mass public began to polarize about racial issues earlier, in the 1930's).

By this reasoning, persistence also should be greater for orientations toward attitude objects salient in early life than for those that only become salient later in life, even if in the same general domain. Here election campaigns as occasions for the socialization of partisanship may serve as a model, as indicated earlier. White adults' migration between the most racially conservative South and the somewhat less conservative remainder of the country is another example. Region of origin dominated whites' adult attitudes about issues most salient in the earlier Jim Crow era, such as racial intermarriage, while region of adult residence was more clearly associated with issues prominent in the post-civil rights era, such as busing for school integration or affirmative action (Glaser & Gilens, 1997).

Many policy attitudes, however, have not shown as much stability over time (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979). Converse (1964; 2000) speculated that many were "non-attitudes," that many people simply had no fixed attitudes toward issues they were only vaguely familiar with. Alternatively, Achen (1975) suggested that much observed attitude instability may simply be due to measurement error, perhaps due to ambiguous survey items. Yet a third possibility is that it reflects respondent ambivalence about such issues. Unstable responses may result if different and conflicting associations to an issue come to mind in two different interviews (Zaller & Feldman, 1992). These matters remain somewhat unresolved, though in our view, Converse's original insights remain quite powerful (also see Converse, 2000; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017).

Aggregate Stability. Longitudinal panel studies are expensive and difficult to execute. Existing long-term studies usually examine just one period and/or birth cohort, limiting their ability to distinguish persistence from birth-cohort effects or those of the period of interviewing. Cohort analysis is a partially satisfactory method around that obstacle. It can assess aggregate-level persistence by tracking the same birth cohorts across cross-sectional surveys conducted at different times with different samples. It can provide indirect evidence of individual-level persistence if each birth cohort maintains the same distribution

of opinion in the aggregate as it ages. In contrast, changes of birth cohorts over time may reflect underlying individual-level changes. For example, the greatly increased support for general principles of racial equality among white Americans in the half-century after World War II (Schuman et al., 1997) is likely to have been due primarily to a mixture of cohort replacement (more prejudiced older cohorts were gradually replaced by less prejudiced younger ones) with some liberalizing individual attitude changes within cohorts (Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). These liberalizing trends within cohorts began to slow by the 1980s, especially on newer racial issues (Steeh & Schuman, 1991; for a similar analyses on broader ranges of attitudes, see Davis, 1992; Danigelis et al., 2007). The substantial liberalization of attitudes toward gay marriage in the early 21st century reflects an even greater influence of individual attitude change (Lee & Mutz, 2019).

Natural experiments also can provide indirect evidence about individual-level persistence. Do presumably early-acquired attitudes change when the political complexion of individuals' attitudinal environments change? For example, individual migration between congressional districts dominated by opposite parties may influence adults' voting preferences and party identification (Brown, 1988). Some direct personal experiences in adulthood might also be expected to produce change. One common expectation is that the emergence of economic interests in adulthood will influence individuals' political attitudes. However, extensive research has found surprisingly limited evidence that new interests have much effect on adults' political attitudes, as if earlier-acquired, persisting, sociopolitical attitudes resisted such influences in adulthood (Citrin & Green, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1991; but see Chong et al., 2001).

Most of this literature has interpreted persistence, when it occurs, as a product of the psychological strength of early-acquired orientations. An alternative is that hereditary transmission is responsible (Funk, 2013; Smith et al., 2011, 2012). Any impact of the direct indicators of family political socialization described earlier, such as clear parental attitudes and strong family communication, is inconsistent with the hereditary account. A nuanced version of the hereditary hypothesis has been offered by Hatemi et al. (2009), however. They too found convincing evidence of the family's role in preadult socialization, as reflected in similar cross-twin correlations for fraternal (dizygotic) and identical (monozygotic) twins. But from age 21 on, cross-twin correlations begin to be larger for identical than for fraternal twins, a key finding for the hereditary view. The argument is that family influences slowly are replaced by inherent hereditary tendencies when the individual leaves the parental nest.

2.2. The Impressionable Years

The "impressionable years" model is a variant of the persistence idea, suggesting a "critical period" in early adulthood when political orientations are especially open to influence, but they tend to persist thereafter. It embodies three psychological propositions. One is that core orientations are still incompletely crystallized when the individual enters that period, but crystallization increases through early adulthood. Mannheim (1952), an early promoter of this idea, speculated that the critical period might be approximately from ages 18 to 25. Second, that process should be complete as the individual enters mature adulthood, so crystallization should show only modest gains thereafter. And third, people may experience elements of political life as "fresh encounters" during that critical

period, one that can seldom be duplicated later. In Erikson's (1968) terms, young adults are becoming more aware of the social and political world around them just when they are seeking a sense of self and identity. As a result, they may be especially open to attitude change at that stage.

On the first point, even attitudes that may be relatively highly crystallized by late adolescence, as reflected in high levels of stability over time, may crystallize still further in early adulthood. For example, the party identifications of the student sample followed that pattern in the YPSP, showing both greater stability than almost all other attitudes after the students left adolescence, and impressive continuing gains through early adulthood (Jennings & Niemi, 1981; also see Sears et al., 2008). Similar gains in crystallization in early adulthood have been shown in other fundamental predispositions, such symbolic racism, religiosity, and social dominance orientation (Henry & Sears, 2009; Ho et al., 2012; Sears & Henry, 2008).

That increased crystallization as the individual enters adulthood can also result in increased influence of such predispositions on other attitudes. We started with the quote from Hyman (1959) to the effect that children are "born into" a party just as certainly as they are born into a church. That remained the consensus in the field of political socialization in its early years (Sears, 1975). But more recently, Margolis (2018) has turned it on its head. She argues that partisan preferences continue to crystallize in late adolescence and early adulthood, consistent with the impressionable years hypothesis. But simultaneously, many young adults tend to distance themselves from their family's habitual religious practices. Then as they leave the impressionable years, many begin a family of their own. They are then faced with decisions about whether or not to seek out a religious community, and if so, which one. In today's era of intense partisan polarization over religion (see chapter 24, Mason, this volume), their choice of a religious home can be strongly influenced by their earlier-acquired partisan preferences leanings. That sorting into different churches may produce "echo chambers" that persist for many years (also see Campbell et al., 2018, for another approach to the reciprocal influences of religion and partisanship).

Second, such core orientations should stabilize over time once the individual is past the impressionable years. Analyses of the YPSP showed that the high school seniors' party identifications were substantially less stable through early adulthood than were those of their parents through the same time period. After the students reached their thirties, though, their attitudes became just as stable as their parents' (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Stoker & Jennings, 2008). Similarly, a pair of four-year ANES panel studies, one from the 1950's and one from the 1970's, found that the early-adult cohort had substantially less stable party identifications than did any of the mature adult cohorts (Alwin et al., 1991; Sears, 1983). However, the young-adult cohort in the earlier panel study also showed greatly increased stability when re-sampled in the later panel study, when the new respondents were 16 years older than the original respondents had been, suggesting increased crystallization with age (Alwin, 1993).

The third implication is that core predispositions should become more resistant to influence after the individual leaves early adulthood. Three surveys analyzed by Visser and Krosnick (1998) yielded such effects. Another found that changes in early adults' social environments, as indexed by demographic locations, had considerably greater influence on levels of racial tolerance than did later-life changes (Miller & Sears, 1986). As indicated above, migration between congressional districts dominated by opposite parties influenced

adults' voting preferences and party identification (Brown, 1988). But the influence was greater if they migrated earlier in life.

The changes during the impressionable years, and their later persistence, are not always liberalizing or supportive of democracy. A natural experiment compared French youths before and after the suspension of the national service requirement, finding that it had suppressed subsequent civic engagement (Garcia, 2015). Similarly, Vietnam veterans who were exposed to severe combat trauma later showed reduced political efficacy and trust (Usry, 2019). The damage may not stop with those directly affected. A study of the offspring of Vietnam-era draft-eligible men found that the sons of the fathers who had been most at-risk showed, much later, reduced public participation (Johnson & Dawes, 2016).

The impressionable years hypothesis would also suggest that orientations later subjected to strong information flows and regularly practiced after early adulthood might become even stronger with age (Converse, 1969; Sears, 1983). Indeed, cohort analyses in the United States show that each cohort expresses stronger party identifications as it ages, at least during what Converse (1976) described as the "steady state era" of roughly constant partisan divisions prior to the 1970s (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller & Shanks, 1996). Such aging effects have been obtained in the UK as well (Cassel, 1999). Repeated acts of voting for one's preferred party, all by themselves, bolster partisan attachment (Dinas, 2014).

If indeed attitudes that are well practiced become stronger with age after the impressionable years, one might expect that the elderly would show the least change of all. Surprisingly enough, in some cases the relationship of age to attitude stability follows an inverted-U pattern. Racial prejudice among whites in the 1972–1976 ANES panel study was least stable over time for the youngest cohort (under 30), as might be expected. However, the oldest cohort (over 60) also showed reduced stability. Moreover, in a period of generally liberalizing racial attitudes, the oldest cohort of whites actually liberalized the most. That difference held up with education controlled and was not due to greater measurement unreliability among the elderly (Sears, 1981). Similar late-life decreases in the stability of party identification occurred in two ANES panel studies, even with corrections for measurement unreliability (Alwin, 1993; Alwin et al., 1991). Another extensive cohort analysis of tolerance-related attitudes found as much intracohort change over time among older (60-plus) as among younger (under 40) adults (Danigelis et al., 2007). Why such core orientations might become more unstable in old age is unclear. True, some social networks often change later in life, in such areas as work, residence, and family. Such changes could destabilize political attitudes.

The third psychological proposition is that some events and life changes during the impressionable years might have unusually strong and long-lasting effects. An intriguing natural experiment supporting that hypothesis examined the long-term attitudinal effects of randomized variations in vulnerability to the draft among young men during the Vietnam War (Erikson & Stoker, 2011). In 1969, the federal government switched away from college deferments to a lottery system in which young men were randomly assigned to draft-eligible status, replacing the previous system that had been criticized as class-biased. The YPSP was a convenient source of data because its student sample was exactly of the age to be included in the lottery. Only those with expiring college deferments were vulnerable, since the noncollege men had not had deferments and had already passed through exposure to the draft.

The impressionable years hypothesis is a good fit for what happened. The newly draft-eligible were, in interviews several years later, much more strongly opposed to the war than were those whose military status had already been resolved one way or the other. In the next presidential election, in 1972, having been assigned a draft-eligible lottery number earlier trumped pre-lottery party identification as a predictor of preferences for the antiwar presidential candidate, George McGovern. Almost thirty years later, in 1997, when the original student sample was middle-aged, such long-past draft eligibility still strongly predicted opposition to the Vietnam War. Moreover, post-lottery party identification dominated pre-lottery party identification in predicting key political attitudes only among the draft-eligible, and not among their counterparts whom the lottery had spared. In other words, the attitude changes generated by lottery outcomes during the impressionable years were highly stable, with continuing political influence for many years.

Analogous to the draft lottery study, other examples of the lasting impact of events during the impressionable years can be cited. The Teach for America program integrates college graduates into service roles in low-income communities for two years. A natural experiment comparing selected with non-selected applicants found that such engagement with the poor produced relatively stronger commitments to social justice and less prejudice (Mo & Conn, 2018). Another compared nations that varied in the proportion of female political leaders. Having more female leaders reduced the usual gender gap in political knowledge, but only among the college-aged (Dassonneville & McAllister, 2018).

Political Generations. The impressionable years hypothesis focuses on the particular susceptibility to influence of individuals' attitudes in late adolescence and early adulthood. But if "the times" (aka the *zeitgeist*) embody compelling new ideas, sometimes people in that life stage can be influenced in common, producing generational differences. Mannheim (1952) suggested, a bit more narrowly, that "generational units," or subsets of those in that impressionable stage (which, as indicated above, he arbitrarily defined as ages 18 to 25), may share powerful experiences that will mark them distinctively for life. Either way, such generational effects require that individuals have a particular psychological openness at that life stage, that a cohort be exposed to unique and evocative political experiences in common, and that their shared responses to such experiences persist into the future.

Several such generational effects have received intensive empirical study. One is the "New Deal generation" in the United States, composed of youthful new voters who first entered the electorate during the 1930s. The incumbent Democratic president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was enormously popular at that point. That generation swung heavily behind him and remained substantially more Democratic than its predecessors or successors into the 1950s, both in voting behavior and in party identification (Campbell et al., 1960; Centers, 1950; Elder, 1974). Not just new voters, either. Previous Republicans most supportive of New Deal policies sometimes converted to being Democrats too (Caughey et al., 2020).

Generational differences in whites' racial attitudes later became quite prominent and politically consequential, whether measured in the Jim Crow terms common before the civil rights era or in the more contemporary terms of "racial resentment" (DeSante & Smith, 2020). Osborne et al. (2011) found both generational and within-cohort changes as southern whites moved from the Democratic to the Republican Party following the full commitment of the national Democratic Party to civil rights in the mid-1960's. After the election of Barack Obama in 2008, Nteta & Greenlee (2013) found evidence of an "Obama

generation" in which young whites' racial attitudes were distinctively liberal primarily in terms of rejecting the most contemporary version of racism.

The young protestors in the United States and Europe in the 1960s became another quite self-conscious generational unit. Most evidence indicates that their left-liberal distinctiveness persisted for many years thereafter, especially among those who actively engaged in protest as youths. For example, the students in the YPSP who said in 1973 that they had been active in protests continued, even as late as 1997, to be considerably more liberal than were even the college-educated non-protestors (Jennings, 1987; also see Fendrich & Lovoy, 1988; Marwell et al., 1987; McAdam, 1989). Interestingly enough, their offspring were also more liberal than the offspring of non-protestors (Jennings, 2002). Even "engaged observers"—those who had been attentive to the political movements of the civil rights and Vietnam eras, but not very active in them—showed lasting political liberalism years later (Stewart et al., 1998). Davis (2004), however, cautions against expecting too many broad, sharp, and uniform generational differences in social and political attitudes (also see Danigelis et al., 2007; Converse & Schuman, 1970).

Partisanship in the generation that immediately followed "the '60's" is another case in point. Both political parties were quite divided internally from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s on a number of hot-button issues, including civil rights, conflict over the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal. Disenchantment within each party seems to have reduced the strength of partisanship in the generation then entering the electorate. Debates continued for a time over whether partisan strength among incoming youthful cohorts turned back up in subsequent generations (Miller & Shanks, 1996), or whether that era foreshadowed a more lasting dealignment (Dalton, 2013; Hajnal & Lee, 2011; Wattenberg, 1998).

A more recent debate is whether the American public is now more politically polarized than ever (Abramowitz, 2010) or remains mainly ideologically moderate but has simply "sorted" itself into more ideologically homogeneous parties (Fiorina et al., 2011; Levendusky, 2009). Looking back, dealignment seems to have been quite temporary and has been replaced by partisan polarization (Abramowitz, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2012). How generational differences play into those changes is uncertain.

Finally, a potentially rich line of investigation concerns persisting possible long-term generational effects of political or social traumas, though much of this work has been done by nonquantitative historians. Loewenberg (1971), for example, suggests that the powerful support for the Nazi regime in the 1930's and 1940's among the generation of Germans born from 1900 to 1915 can be ascribed in part to the many traumas they had experienced in Germany's troubled years in their youths. Their early lives, during and after World War I, had been marked by malnutrition and starvation, disease, parental neglect and permanent father absence, and hyperinflation. Direct exposure to political violence has been shown to increase the likelihood of psychopathology in studies from Israel and South Africa (Slone et al., 1998; Slone et al., 2000). Direct exposure to combat among females in the Israeli Defense Forces turns out to have had traumatic effects whether or not they were personally exposed to violence and abuse (Daphna-Tekoah & Harel-Shalev, 2017).

Even exposure to far-away violence, such as the assassination of a popular leader, can have profound emotional effects in the short run (Raviv et al., 2000; Wolfenstein & Kliman, 1965), and perhaps long-term political effects as well (Sears, 2002). Less uniformly traumatic but equally momentous political changes can generate profound generational differences. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the resulting rise of democratic capitalism in nations

formerly controlled by the USSR, yielded long-lasting generational differences in Eastern Europe not seen to the same extent in Western Europe. Support for both democracy and capitalism was much greater among the young, while nostalgia for authoritarian communist systems was strongest among the elderly (Prusik & Lewicka, 2016; Ichpekova, 2014).

A cautionary note should be added. Generational effects usually appear, when they do, in the midst of a cloud of inter-cohort similarities. Perhaps the most dramatic case of mass long-term opinion change in the history of systematic survey research is the rapid rise in support for gay marriage in the US during the past couple of decades. Much individual attitude change occurred in all cohorts, building on pre-existing generational differences, as indicated in a three-wave panel study by Lee and Mutz (2019). Similarly, Harding and Jencks (2003) found that pre- marital sex has become more morally acceptable in America since the early 1960s. They also found that younger cohorts have been more liberal throughout. But that may not be a generational effect. They found that the sharpest liberalizing changes occurred in all cohorts during a narrow window of time from 1969 to 1973

Collective memory. Closely related to political generational effects are "collective memories." These are defined as "memories of a shared past that are retained by members of a group, large or small, that experienced it," especially "shared memories of societal-level events" (Schuman & Scott, 1989, pp. 361–362; also see Halbwachs [1950] 1980). Howard Schuman (e.g., Schuman & Corning, 2012) has extensively tested for collective memories in public opinion surveys. He hypothesized that the most widespread collective memories were among the generation of people who were about 20 when a particular event occurred; i.e., whether "national or world changes" occurring in the impressionable years are especially likely to be recalled later as "especially important." In surveys of American adults in the 1980's, the generation most likely to select World War II had been 20, on average, in 1943. The Vietnam War was most often selected by those averaging age 20 in 1968, the year usually regarded as the tipping point in the war leading to increased Vietnamese successes. Ascribing great importance to the assassination of JFK peaked among those who had been in childhood and adolescence at his death in 1963. Even simple pieces of knowledge, such as FDR's party, or the New Deal program called the WPA, showed marked generational differences years later. Outside the US, elderly Germans and Japanese were especially likely to mention World War II as "especially important" in 1991 (Schuman et al., 1998).

Generational differences in collective memories can be politically consequential. Survey respondents were asked in 1990 about the best analogy for the conflict in the Persian Gulf created by the Iraq leader Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Was it the incumbent President G. H. W. Bush's "Hitler" metaphor of an expansionist dictator, or the opposition Democrats' "Vietnam" metaphor of a Third World quagmire? Those over 40 strongly preferred the Hitler analogy, whereas those under 40 were split evenly between the two analogies (Schuman & Rieger, 1992). Tellingly, once the American-led coalition went to war against Iraq, the Hitler metaphor became the overwhelming favorite, and generational differences disappeared.

Even long-past, remote events can be politically evocative through collective memories. For example, a common cliché is that wars are won as much by who controls the narrative histories written in their aftermaths as on the battlefield itself. As a result, these collective memories can be the stuff of intense political debate. In America, the period after 1880 is sometimes known as the "Second Civil War," as former Confederates and Unionists struggled to control the dominant narrative history of the original Civil War. A number

of issues were (and still are) intensely debated, including whether slavery or "states' rights" was the dominant issue triggering the war, whether Ulysses S. Grant of the Union or Robert E. Lee of the Confederacy was the superior general, which army was the more courageous, and whether the Northern victory was due to superior soldiering or to its greater material and industrial wealth (Fahs & Waugh, 2004; Waugh, 2009).

Collective memories of long-ago political traumas can be transmitted to much later generations. A case in point is Stalin's deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944 that caused many deaths from disease and starvation. Their descendants seventy years later had distinctively high identification with their ethnic groups and greater hostility toward Russia (Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017). Similarly, interventions that remind later generations of historic traumas can affect attitudes about current political events. Israel's annual "Holocaust Day" seems to increase Israelis' nationalism (Ariely, 2019). The widespread migration of Syrian refugees into Greece and Germany in recent years triggered especially high levels of sympathy in those receiving countries among people whose own ancestors had been forcibly displaced during World War II, seventy years earlier (Dinas et al., 2021).

Robert Jervis (1976) applied this notion of collective memory to the question of how foreign policy decision-makers "learn from history." Political leaders who have dramatic and important firsthand experiences in politics when they are in the "impressionable years" may later apply those "lessons" to issues they must deal with as public officials. For example, Harry Truman, confronting the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, and Lyndon Johnson, facing the Vietnam War, both recalled that the buildup to World War II had taught them the danger of not facing up to aggressors at an early stage. Colin Powell and other military leaders who had been young officers in the Vietnam era later applied the main lesson of that war to, among other things, the Persian Gulf War: don't go to war half-heartedly, they said; either stay out or go in with overwhelming force. Those early-learned "lessons," as with any persisting generational effects, of course, can be misleading. They may be long out of date by the time the young person becomes a mature adult, as reflected in the cliché that the military is always "fighting the last war."

And sometimes the collective memories held by ordinary people may not correspond to those of the political classes, as seen in Palestinians' beliefs about the 1948 Palestinian exodus from what is now Israel (Nets-Zehngut, 2011). The political classes emphasized Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli efforts to expel Palestinians from what became Israeli territory, a theme less common in ordinary Palestinians' collective memories.

Higher education. Various events that disproportionately often occur during the impressionable years may open people up to influences with lasting political impact. A prominent example is higher education. Normally, people who complete four-year college degrees do so in the impressionable years. American college graduates have long been associated with particularly liberal attitudes on a wide-ranging set of issues, including civil liberties (Stouffer, 1955), civil rights and racial issues (Schuman et al., 1997), lower ethnocentrism (Kinder & Kam, 2010), gay marriage (Lee & Mutz, 2019), secularism (D. E. Campbell, et al., 2018), and opposition to Donald Trump (Jardina, 2019; Abramowitz, 2018). A cross-national study found that greater education was associated with reduced "blind patriotism" in a study of 33 countries, especially in countries with more democratic government systems (Sumino, 2021). Higher education is also regularly associated with more political involvement, such as more ideological thinking, higher voter turnout and other indicators of civic engagement (Converse, 1964; 2000; Putnam, 2000; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).

The associations of higher education with these political dispositions are typically strong, and the conventional inference is causal; e.g., conservatives charge that persuasion of innocent youths by a liberal professoriate is responsible. A college education may also contribute to various skills and interests that promote political sophistication, participation, and so on. Alternatively, selection effects may explain the association, such as self-selection of the college experience by the offspring of liberal families. And perhaps the college-bound are more politically engaged even before attending a single class (Highton, 2009; Kam & Palmer, 2008). Or anticipatory socialization may be a factor: young people who are college-bound may be sensitive to the dominant political norms on campus and move in that direction even before starting classes.

This conundrum has long generated a large and inescapably messy literature. Perhaps it is understandable that an independent variable like educational level that is almost impossible to manipulate experimentally and that is so intertwined with so much else, in the end often does not yield clear and uniform effects independent of other factors. However, a few studies have used panel designs to assess attitude changes through the college experience.

The classic is the "Bennington study" by Newcomb and colleagues (Alwin et al., 1991) cited earlier. It found girls who attended Bennington College in the 1930's moved to the political left, especially those who were most identified with the college. The interpretation was that they had most fully adopted the liberal college's political norms. More recently, a panel study of UCLA students showed general liberalization through the four years of college, especially among foreign-born Asian Americans (Sears & Henry, 2008). A rare natural experiment embedded in that same longitudinal study of UCLA students found reduced racial prejudice among students who had been randomly assigned members of racial minority groups as dormitory roommates (Levin et al., 2008).

Not all presumed effects of higher education are liberalizing. Mendelberg and colleagues (2017) hypothesized that in an era of radical wealth inequality, colleges with disproportionate numbers of students from affluent families would develop norms that favored economic conservatism, such as opposing taxes on the wealthy. They would influence affluent students, especially those most socially embedded in their colleges, to support such views. Their evidence, based on very large samples from the 1990's, from many colleges, seems quite persuasive. The more affluent colleges did not have any systematic effects on their students' attitudes on non-economic issues such as civil rights or abortion.

However, these findings usually do not rule out some selection effects as well. Indeed, that UCLA study showed nearly adult-high levels of crystallization in partisanship, ideology, and symbolic racism before attending classes (Sears et al., 2008). A panel study of Swiss families (Kuhn et al., 2021) shows self-selection in pro-EU attitudes among future college students who disproportionately came from highly educated parents, and then little change in students' attitudes as they passed through college. Matching on non-school factors in a long-term cohort study in Britain erased the direct effects of educational level on political participation (Persson, 2014).

2.3. Lifelong Openness

The persistence and impressionable years models most directly challenge rational choice models (see Chong, chapter 4, this volume). Researchers in that tradition generally argue

for more lifelong openness than these models would expect. The lifelong openness view has been developed even in the archetypical case of party identification in the influential theory of "retrospective voting." It argues that adults' partisanship is in fact responsive to "the times," that individuals' party identifications are running tallies, constantly being modified by new information about the parties' performances (Fiorina, 1981). In parallel, at the aggregate level, the notion of "macropartisanship" (Erikson et al., 2002) describes fluctuations over time in the overall distribution of party identification, sometimes over just a few days. Such fluctuations are interpreted as meaningful responses to political events. Other research shows the influence of changes in candidate images, issues, or events on adults' party identifications (Niemi & Jennings, 1991; Dalton, 2013). In social psychology, social identity theory challenges the fixity of the residues of early learning, arguing that we all have multiple identities, and they vary in salience over time and contexts (see Mason, chapter 24, this volume; Huddy, 2013).

In that latter tradition, Egan (2020) argues that political psychology has tended to treat identities such as ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation as "unmoved movers" in the chain of causality that ultimately leads to policy and candidate preferences. He utilizes a large-scale panel study to show that "small but significant shares of Americans engage in identity switching" in some of these domains over a 4-year time span. Even studies showing widespread persistence over much longer time spans reveal small, but potentially politically meaningful changes (Alwin et al., 1991; Jennings et al., 2009; Sears & Funk, 1999).

Perhaps the most dramatic recent mass change in Americans' party identifications, and the most politically important, has been the substantial long-term shift of the once "Solid South" of southern whites from Democratic to Republican beginning in the 1960s. Generally, such widespread individual-level changes in adults require changes in the broader political context. In this case, the important change was the polarization of national party elites on racial issues in the civil rights era. The shift away from Jim Crow racism in the white public after the civil rights era (Schuman, et al., 1997) was presumably facilitated by elite rejection of the southern system of racial segregation. The exact mixture of cohort replacement and individual-level change is not clear-cut, but both were clearly involved (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Green et al., 2002; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Osborne et al., 2011).

A second dramatic exception to the general stability of early-learned core political dispositions is the sharp rise over the past couple of decades in support for gay marriage (Lee & Mutz, 2019). That has been particularly surprising given the strong historic stigmatization of LGBTQ individuals. Youthful cohorts were the forerunners in this change, so a generational effect is partly responsible. But even older cohorts have shown substantial liberalization. It is likely that multiple factors contributed, not all mutually exclusive, including increased contact with self-professed gays and lesbians (many of whom had "come out" to family and friends), broader access to higher education, and declining religiosity. More generally, moral issues have shown increasing liberalization among both Democrats and Republicans, though earlier among the former (Baldassari & Park, 2020).

At the individual level, mature adults sometimes change their political attitudes when they undergo major discontinuities in their attitudinal environments (Hobbs, 2019). A study using the YPSP suggests that new environments can resocialize adults later in the life span if they conflict politically with early family socialization (Lyons, 2017). As mentioned earlier, migration from an area dominated by one political party into an area dominated by its opponents does sometimes affect partisanship (Brown, 1988).

However, relatively few people are exposed to such discontinuities after early adulthood. That migration was almost three times as likely among young adults as among their elders. As noted earlier, white adults who migrated between North and South sometimes adapted their racial attitudes to the new region's dominant norms. But only about 10% had engaged in such migration, pooling both directions combined (Glaser & Gilens, 1997). Normally environmental continuity is quite great, and when it breaks down, change may occur. However, both environmental change and any consequent attitudinal change are more common in the "impressionable years."

In that same vein, an impressive series of mostly qualitative studies collected by Sigel (1989) examines the political effects of other such discontinuities within adulthood, such as entering the workplace, serving in the military, immigrating to a new country, participating in social movements, entering college, getting married, or becoming a parent. Each of these cases, as she notes, incorporates three elements that potentially can change political attitudes: the full development of an individual's own unique identity, assumption of new roles, and coping with the novel and unanticipated demands of adulthood. However, all these specific discontinuities also most often occur in late adolescence or early adulthood, suggesting that such findings again best fit the impressionable years model. And even the mostly youthful but clearly powerful personal experience of military service in Vietnam was found, using the YPSP, to have only "modest" lasting political effects (Jennings & Markus, 1977).

2.4. Life Stages

These questions about the persistence of early learning, whether through, or only after, the impressionable years, as opposed to the continuing openness to new experience, by no means exhaust the possible contributions of a life-span development approach to political psychology. A fourth possibility is that people gravitate to particular political orientations at specific life stages.

Weak youth turnout and civic engagement. Young Americans usually show low levels of voter turnout and other forms of political engagement. This can be politically consequential. Hart and Youniss (2018) argue that weak youth turnout cost Hillary Clinton the presidency in 2016. Such low youth engagement is a special puzzle, because educational level is almost always correlated with more political engagement, as noted earlier, and recent generations have received much more formal education than their predecessors (e.g., Delli Carpini, 2000).

Why weak voter turnout in early adulthood? The conventional answer points to a life cycle effect, that the young are not yet psychologically engaged in politics more generally. Yet they may not lack political interest or motivation. Holbein and Hillygus (2020) argue that young adults show strong pre-election intentions to vote, despite their subsequently weak actual turnout. They contend that the American political system, compared to some other mature democracies, makes voting a relatively costly political act, usually requiring opt-in voter registration prior to Election Day, not setting aside a holiday for Election Day, often holding local and federal elections on different days, and so on.

This may most affect the young, especially the less educated. "Non-cognitive skills" such as "grit," tenacity, perseverance and social skills may be required to overcome these

obstacles (Holbein & Hillygus, 2020). Some subgroups may be especially disadvantaged, with inequality and segregation being especially hard on low income and minority citizens (Hart & Youniss, 2018), The decline in the tradition of public schools common for all, and the widening gap in the advantages accrued to those with college educations, have left many youths behind. Increased partisan polarization has reduced the incentives for parties to do outreach to low propensity voters outside of their respective bases as well as disillusioning the young about conventional electoral politics (Hart & Youniss, 2018).

Finally, if the chronically low voting turnout of young people is a life stage effect, it could reflect either psychological or more sociological processes. The psychological interpretation cited earlier is that consistent turnout develops through repeated acts of voting and greater experience with the political system (Converse, 1976). If so, that should partly depend on the stability of the party system itself. As noted earlier, in the United States, intraparty disputes in the period around the early 1970s resulted in reduced strength of partisanship in most cohorts as they aged, contrary to its usual trajectory. More generally, Converse (1969) found that age was associated with stronger party identifications in the mature democratic systems of the United States and UK, but considerably less so in the interrupted democratic systems in Germany and Italy and in the relatively immature electoral system of Mexico. In general, the persistence model of party identification seems to work best for parties that are large and/or old, consistent with the notion that people are most likely to acquire and maintain strongly crystallized attitudes about visible and stable attitude objects (Converse & Pierce, 1992; Sears, 1983).

A more sociological alternative would be that young people are distracted from civic duties by the press of various transitions into adult roles, such as leaving home, leaving school, entering the workforce, getting married, owning a home, and, often, moving geographically. If so, turnout might increase with age merely because people ultimately mature past such obstacles. As indicated above, Sigel (1989) has collected several such cases in point, though largely based on qualitative research.

Comparing the psychological and sociological views, Highton and Wolfinger (2001) found that successfully transitioning into such adult roles had mixed effects on turnout, whereas aging all by itself greatly increased it: having accomplished all six of some of those adult tasks increased voting turnout by only 6%, a small fraction of the 37% turnout gap between the young and those over age 60. The authors prefer the more psychological explanation that "pure learning" may be responsible (p. 208).

Complicating matters still further, low youth turnout may be partly a generational effect as well as a life stage effect. Putnam (2000) famously found declines in voter turnout, and in communal and organizational participation, in more recent generations. He argues that they reflect a generational decline in "social capital." that the rise of television, and, perhaps more recently, social media, has disrupted such broader communal activities. Others implicate declines in newspaper reading and/or reduced perceived duty to vote as reducing voter turnout among the young (Dalton, 2008; Wattenberg, 2008).

Various proposals for increasing youth turnout have been made recently (Hart & Youniss, 2018; Holbein & Hillygus, 2020). One is to promote the afore-mentioned "non-cognitive skills" in K-12 schools since they have been shown to be associated with higher turnout. Another is to reduce the cost of voting with such reforms as pre-registration of 17-year-olds who will be eligible to vote in the next election. Or perhaps the habit of voting could be instilled earlier by allowing 16 and 17-year-olds to vote in local elections or trying to engage

them around issues they care most about, such as climate change and other environmental issues. Unfortunately, such proposed reforms can run into harsh political realities. The highest-propensity voters today are the elderly, who tend to vote Republican. Republican officeholders who control state legislatures may not be likely to support reforms that would increase greater turnout among their opponents.

Aging and conservatism. Perhaps the next most common life cycle hypothesis is that people become more conservative with age, as in the old French saying cited at the outset. Correlations between age and conservatism are often used as evidence for this hypothesis. For example, in the 1950s, older voters tended to be more Republican than younger voters (Crittenden, 1962). Age also correlated positively with support for Jim Crow racism among whites in the first half of the 20th century (Schuman et al., 1997).

Such evidence is not definitive, however. A correlation of age with conservatism in a single cross-sectional survey could indeed reflect either the life stage effect of being elderly. Or, equally logically, it could reflect a generational effect, since the elderly Republicans in the 1950's had come from pre–Depression generations, a period of Republican dominance. But in the 1960's, the elderly tilted toward the Democrats, and were predominantly from the "New Deal generation," a heavily Democratic generation in their youths. A later generation of youths, young voters in the 1980's, showed unexpected support for the Republicans during the Reagan era (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller & Shanks, 1996). A similar example is the support for Jim Crow racism among elderly whites in the 1970's and 1980's. But they were from the pre-civil-rights generation, and cohort analyses have shown less support for Jim Crow racism among younger cohorts of white Americans, even as they aged, during that period (Sears, 1981; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Danigelis & Cutler, 1991). That is more consistent with generational effects than with life stage effects in white racial conservatism. Longitudinal panel studies might seem to be a better test of the aging-conservatism hypothesis since they are able to track changing attitudes of specific individuals. For example, the YPSP respondents (Peterson et al., 2020) were more likely to shift over their lifetimes in a conservative than in a liberal direction (though the changes were small).

Conclusions. In general, life stage effects on attitudes are intrinsically difficult to pin down with single-shot cross-sectional surveys (Alwin, 1993; Dangelis et al., 2007), since they rest on only two pieces of information (age and time of measurement; see Mason et al., 1973), and track neither individuals nor birth cohorts over time. But sometimes other information can help. For example, party identification and racial prejudices tend to be highly stable over shorter periods of time, suggesting generational differences are more likely than life stage effects. Other attitudes are less stable and may require other explanations.

2.5.   Immigration

As with many areas of political psychology, the available evidence about preadult and adult development rests heavily on the American political experience. That is not obviously the most typical case, given, among other things, America's highly stable two-party system, even compared to other developed democracies. Examining people in a stable political context risks overestimating the psychological bases for continuity within individual life histories. As international migration has surged, a look at immigrants who have changed

from one political system to another can be one check on such biases (also see Green and Staerkle, chapter 28, this volume).

National and ethnic identities. We start with the trajectory of national and ethnic identities after childhood. A persistence hypothesis would suggest that identification with the original nationality would be stable within immigrants' own life spans. If so, immigrants might maintain a strong ethnic/national identity, leading to strong ethnic group consciousness and ethnically-based politics, even within the immigrant's generation or their children's. That would resemble the supposed history of the European immigrants to America of a century ago (Alba, 1990; Alba & Nee, 2003; Wolfinger, 1965). A variant of the persistence hypothesis is "segmented assimilation." That views the status of different nationality groups as essentially frozen at the time of immigration, with some following a trajectory of straight-line assimilation (Gordon, 1964), while others, rebuffed by discrimination and stuck in poverty, reject core American values, ultimately developing an identity as members of alienated American ethnic groups (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

An alternative would expect immigrants to gradually internalize the identity of the host nation in whole (e.g., "American") or in part (e.g., a hyphenated identity such as "Mexican American"), or even adopt a pan-ethnic identity specific to the new nation (e.g., "Latino"). Such new identities might accompany acculturation in other ways as well, through intermarriage, residential and occupational integration, socio-economic mobility, and naturalization (Hainmueller et al., 2017). The timing of such changes might vary across the life cycle. They might occur only between generations, as per the persistence view. Or they might occur later in life and then stabilize, as in a delayed version of the impressionable years model. Or possibly, consistent with the lifelong openness view, they might occur gradually even within the immigrant's adult lifetime.

Various studies have found evidence of the persistence of immigrants' original nationality identities through their adult lives. A large study of Asian Americans (Wong et al., 2011) found that non-citizens were more likely to identify with their nationality group than were either naturalized citizens or the US-born, and less likely to use either a hyphenated identity incorporating their new nation or an Americanized pan-ethnic identity.

Similar differences in identity according to immigration status were obtained in general population surveys of Latino adults in Los Angeles (Citrin & Sears, 2014). They were asked, "How do you primarily think of yourself: just as an American, both as an American and (ethnicity), or only as an (ethnicity)?" They tended to pass through a sequence of three distinct stages. Most non-citizen immigrants tended to identify themselves as ethnics, and to show the strongest ethnic identity. Naturalized immigrants overwhelmingly said "both," and also had a strong ethnic identity. In contrast, US-born Latinos were quite unlikely (only 5%) to think of themselves primarily as ethnic, and their ethnic identity was much weaker. Similar differences between immigrants and non-immigrants emerged in the large study of incoming Asian and Latino undergraduates at UCLA cited earlier (Sears et al., 2003). These findings yield evidence both of the persistence of early identities and of the gradual acculturation in later generations after immigration; i.e., persistence within individuals, but change between generations.

Incorporation into the party system. Another potential area of immigrant acculturation is psychological incorporation into the party system in terms of partisan identities. We contrast three basic theories. First, immigrants provide a further test of *The American Voter's* theory of party identification (Campbell et al., 1960). That centers on familial socialization

of preadults, as seen earlier. In that view, pre-adult immigrant children, and even US-born children in immigrant families, should be handicapped in acquiring strong partisanship. In many cases, their immigrant parents are not citizens and cannot vote in the United States, so they may have only weak partisan preferences, if any, and so may not expose their children to much family transmission. That theory leaves the early-adulthood period somewhat indeterminate. The immigrants themselves might simply show a delayed impressionable years pattern, with incorporation into the party system slowed as they gradually learn about it through adulthood. Perhaps those who become naturalized and develop the habit of voting might be especially likely to acquire partisanship in adulthood, per the lifelong openness model, yielding within-generation political assimilation. Or if the initial non-incorporation persists, widespread partisanship might only develop in the next generation. If so, between-generation rather than within-generation assimilation might dominate.

An alternative two-stage theory has been proposed by Hajnal and Lee (2011). In the first stage, immigrants often fail to acquire a partisan identity because the concept has little meaning for them. Instead of identifying as "Democrat," Republican," or "Independent," they may respond "none," "neither," "other," or "don't know," suggesting non-incorporation. In the second stage, many members of heavily immigrant groups, both the immigrants themselves and their children, may remain non-incorporated, disillusioned by political parties which often seem too busy attending to their bases rather than to recent immigrant groups. As a result, immigrants and their children may not show the usual strengthening of partisanship as they age. Indeed, longer residence in the US, and consequent increasing political information, may actually be associated with continued non-incorporation into the party system because of cynicism about the parties.

A third theory (Sears et al., 2016) grows out of the dual process approach to information processing (see Jerit & Kam, chapter 15; Kahneman, 2011). It applies the distinction between System 1 processing—speedy, automatic, affective, and uncontrollable, resembling the common-sensical "intuitive" or "gut-level processing"—and System 2 processing—slower, reflective, controllable, and more cognitive, sometimes closer to "rational" processing. As applied to immigrants' acquisition of partisanship, it proposes that even new immigrants are likely to become familiar with the most salient and ubiquitous symbols of partisanship, such as presidential candidates and their parties, and engage in rapid System 1 processing about them. Immigrants may then develop crystallized partisan preferences about such objects, even without the benefits of parental socialization or much detailed political information. If so, immigrants may engage with the most salient political objects, the parties and presidential candidates, but not with those that require more information and System 2 processing, such as ideology or complex issue preferences.

Generally, immigrant incorporation into the party system increases in each generation after immigration, at least in the US. For example, in one national sample of Asian American adults, 59% of recent immigrants (arriving within the previous four years) were non-identifiers, but that declined sharply with greater time in the US, to 29% among long-term immigrants (those present for at least 25 years) and 24% of the US-born (Wong et al., 2011). Similarly, in a national sample of Latino adults, 56% of the foreign-born were non-identifiers, but that declined to 25% of the long-term immigrants and 26% of the US-born (Hajnal & Lee, 2011). In the large survey of UCLA undergraduates cited earlier, immigrant Latino and Asian students had the least crystallized partisanship (consistent and/or stable

partisan attitudes), much less than the US-born from each group, while the white students (almost all US-born) had the most (Sears et al., 2008).

Indeed, the most numerous non-incorporated are immigrants in the very earliest stages of their more general acculturation to a new society rather than among those with a long and disillusioning experience with the party system. For example, a 2012 nationally representative sample of Latino immigrants showed that only the non-naturalized had especially high levels of non-incorporation (36%), falling to 19% of the naturalized immigrants and 24% of the naturalized Latinos. In the 2012 ANES survey of citizens, the fewest non-incorporated were those with the most experience with the party system, the US-born (19%; Sears et al., 2016).

Other indicators of acculturation show the same pattern of declining non-incorporation. In the same study, non-incorporation was twice as likely (41%) among Latino immigrants scoring in the top third of non-political acculturation (e.g., not having drivers' licenses, speaking only Spanish at home, or having plans to move back to their original home country permanently) as those in the bottom third (21%). In the ANES survey, Latinos and whites showed almost identical rates of non-incorporation with income or education controlled, belying a distinctive distancing of Latinos from the parties.

Of course, immigrants enter their new nation at a variety of different ages, so age does not bear a uniform relationship to the amount of political experience they have had with the political system of the receiving nation. Rather, the strength of their partisanship should be a function of time since immigration. Indeed, the longer immigrants have lived in the United States, and the greater the number of family generations in the United States, the more likely they are to develop a party identification and identify as a strong partisan (Cain et al., 1991; Sears et al., 2016; Wong, 2000). Age of arrival does not matter uniformly.

Rather than disillusionment with the parties, an important source of immigrants' partisan non-incorporation seems to lie in the absence of early partisan socialization, in keeping with the expectation from the original Campbell et al. (1960) theory. In a study of Asian Americans, those with parents who were non-identifiers were far more likely to be non-identifiers themselves than those with partisan parents. Only 37% of Asian American offspring were Democrats and 34% non-identifiers, whereas 66% of those with Democratic fathers were Democrats and only 10% non-identifiers (Wong et al., 2011).

The importance of early political socialization to politicization is further shown in the study of Latino immigrants cited above (Sears et al., 2016). Those in the highest third of continued psychological engagement in the politics of their home countries (e.g., how often they had voted there, or how much interest they currently had in the politics there) were half as likely to be non-identifiers in American partisan politics (38%) as those in the bottom third (21%). Both more non-political acculturation to the US and more political engagement in the home country significantly predicted incorporation into the American party system and stronger party identification in the US, even with controls on age of immigration, years in the US, and gender and education. The Canadian case seems similar. Black (1987) found that participation and partisanship in the Canadian political system were higher among the immigrants who had been the most interested in politics and politically active in their home countries.

Finally, as well as bringing pre-existing levels of politicization with them. immigrants may also bring old loyalties and antagonisms from their native countries, as the persistence

model would suggest. For example, a majority of the immigrants from Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan, heavily composed of refugees from Communism during the vigorously anti-Communist Reagan era, became Republicans in the US, especially those fleeing at the height of Communist power. Democrats have commanded large majorities among immigrants from Mexico or Puerto Rico, who tend to immigrate more for reasons of economic opportunity (Hajnal & Lee, 2011).

Variations across attitude domains. The four life history models we started with surely do not apply equally to all domains of political attitudes. Parents discuss some aspects of politics with their children more than others, as indicated earlier. For example, partisanship receives much more family discussion than most other domains, and consequently, parents have the most influence over their offspring's partisan attitudes (Jennings & Niemi, 1974).

Similarly, in immigrants' adulthoods, some political domains are likely to be the subject of more political communication than others, both in the media and interpersonally. Dual process theories may provide some guidance in understanding such differences. Immigrants are likely to over-learn rapid associations to high-frequency political objects, leading to highly affective System 1 processing. Objects in more obscure domains that require more information and reflection, may draw slower and more cognitive responses, and System 2 processing. During a presidential campaign, even immigrants who are not yet incorporated into the party system are likely to be quite aware of the rival candidates and their parties. Many may have clear and crystallized partisan preferences, even without a partisan identity or being able to base them on abstract ideologies or specific issue positions. That is, the absence of parental socialization may not leave them helpless in a world of extensive campaign advertising, social media, and communication with friends and families.

This view was tested using the study cited above, based on the 2012 nationally representative sample of adult Latino immigrants and the Latino citizens in the ANES (Sears, et al., 2016). Crystallization was indexed with both the stability of individuals' attitudes from pre-election to post-election and the consistency of party with candidate evaluations. Even immigrants failing to report a party identification showed almost as strongly crystallized attitudes about the candidates and parties when asked separately about them as did those with a party identification. However, their attitudes in domains less salient in the 2012 campaign, such as ideology and specific issues, including immigration, did not show the same crystallization (Sears & Danbold, 2018).

Presidential campaigns are usually the best occasions for partisan socialization for both immigrants and non-immigrant children, because they generate the highest volume of political communication. As a result, they are likely to produce the most crystallized partisan attitudes, whether or not they are already fully incorporated into the party system. The study of adolescents cited earlier (Sears & Valentino, 1997) found that their attitude crystallization increased over the course of the 1980 presidential campaign, but only about the candidates and parties, not about issues largely absent from the campaign, such as political efficacy or support for civil liberties.

In sum, the most recent immigrants' weak partisanship seems not to arise from disappointment about the parties' indifference to immigrant groups, but from a lack of partisan parental socialization and because of being in the early stages of acculturation to a new society. Indeed, non-incorporation into the party system seems to be similarly present among the poor and less educated of all social groups, whether immigrants or not.

3. Conclusions

We close with just a brief final observation. Much has been made about the increasing polarization of American politics, including the mass public. One feature is the collapsing of a variety of social and political cleavages into polarization along party lines (e.g., Mason, 2018), not to mention increasing signs of racism and racial polarization (Jardina, 2019; Kinder, chapter 27, this volume). This review has suggested that partisan predispositions are most likely to be acquired in early development, if not quite as uniformly early as originally thought. Yet little recent research has looked specifically at the more youthful phases of life. It seems surprising that events that seem to be ripping the society, and its democratic system of government, asunder receive so little current research attention.

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RATIONAL CHOICE AS AN EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE MODEL OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

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DENNIS CHONG

RATIONAL choice theory is both a normative standard and empirical model of behavior. As a theory of behavior, it predicts (or prescribes) how individuals will (or should) choose from alternative courses of action given their objectives and beliefs about the instrumental relationship between those alternatives and their goals. The economic version of the theory is often referred to as omniscient rationality because it assumes perfect, unbounded, or substantive rationality (Becker, 1976; Elster, 1989; Rubinstein, 1998; Simon, 1995). A perfectly rational individual has a complete and coherent set of preferences, gathers an appropriate amount of information depending on the significance of the choice, forms beliefs about the alternatives that reflect the relevant information or evidence needed to make the decision, and chooses the action that is optimally related to his beliefs and goals.

The extent to which ordinary citizens behave rationally in politics is an empirical question considered in this chapter. Do people choose actions that are optimally related to their beliefs and goals? Are their preferences coherent, and do their beliefs correspond to the evidence they have gathered? Do individuals seek the proper amount of evidence, given their goals and beliefs?

As we shall see, in studying the political psychology and behavior of citizens, every facet of the rational choice model appears to be violated to some degree. People prefer policies and engage in behavior such as voting that do not further their self-interest. Their preferences are often unstable, inconsistent, and affected by how alternatives are framed. They do not always respond to new information by updating their beliefs and modifying their preferences in accord with their goals. They gather insufficient information to make the optimal choice.

Such departures from rational choice, however, raise a paradox. The paradox is that it is irrational for the average citizen to invest much time and effort becoming informed and making political decisions (Downs, 1957; Hardin, 2006; Schumpeter, 1942). The economics

of information constrain rational choice, because all political preferences and decisions may be compromised by the initial choice of citizens to economize on their effort. Given that substantive rationality depends critically on the optimal use of information to achieve one's goals, can citizens who rationally pay slight attention to politics still make rational political decisions? We would expect the quality of decisions to *vary* depending on the circumstances of the decision and the decision-maker.

In evaluating the rationality of preferences and behavior, much depends on our standards of rationality. In the omniscient or perfectly rational model, if we know people's goals and objective circumstances, we can predict their choices because we assume they have the capacity and knowledge to make the proper inferences. In contrast to the theoretical ideal of perfect economic rationality, bounded rationality assumes that people are instrumental in their actions, but will devote only so much time and resources to achieving their goals (Conlisk, 1996; Rubinstein, 1998; Simon, 1985, 1995). Try as they might to make good decisions, they can make mistakes gathering and assessing evidence and reasoning from means to ends (Hirschman, 1982; Riker, 1995).

The decision-making procedures of boundedly rational individuals will vary according to the demands of the problem and the abilities of the decision-maker. To explain and predict people's behavior, we have to study their subjective motivations and goals, the information they possess, and their inferences about the consequences of alternative courses of action. All such deliberative procedures may be construed as being boundedly rational even if they vary in the degree to which they produce substantively rational outcomes (Simon, 1985, p. 294). If people are not universally rational, perhaps they are more likely to be rational when making decisions in some contexts (e.g., when decisions involve greater stakes or when they are more determined to make the right choice). And if their choices are not objectively rational, perhaps they are rational within the bounds of their limited knowledge, capacity, and motivation.

In this chapter, I explore both the economic and the psychological rationality of political choice. I begin by outlining the assumptions of rational choice theory and discussing variations on those assumptions to accommodate a more realistic individual psychology. I then evaluate the political attitudes and behavior of citizens in different contexts of decision-making. I focus specifically on the degree to which people make self-interested policy choices, whether low or limited information rationality is nonetheless substantively rational (and whether individuals who gather more information do better), whether beliefs are updated and information is processed rationally, and whether preferences are consistent across alternative framings of issues.

In discussing the empirical results in these areas of research, we shall see that the major deduction of rational choice theory that citizens do not have an incentive to devote much attention to politics casts a shadow on all of the topics we examine. When individuals are not motivated, they have less knowledge of the implications of policies, rely more heavily on partisan and ideological cues and other shortcuts to make choices, are less affected by substantive arguments, and more likely to engage in motivated reasoning. A more psychologically realistic model of political decision-making, however, can explain when decisions will deviate to a greater or lesser degree from optimal rational choice. Because decision-making exacts costs and can be improved through practice, incentives, and learning, bounded rationality, with its imperfections, should be regarded as an extension of economic reasoning rather than its contradiction (Conlisk, 1996).

Throughout, I will discuss how normative standards of decision-making vary and are applied inconsistently across these topics of research. In particular, responsiveness to information is valued in some contexts, but stability of preferences (or resistance to information) is considered desirable in other instances. I will close with other examples of inconsistency in the normative evaluation of decision-making including the treatment of party cues and motivated reasoning.

1. ASSUMPTIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Rational choice theory[1] assumes that individuals have preferences that reflect their desires and goals. The goals that people aspire to can be left open-ended in the model,[2] although many rational choice analyses assume further that individuals are self-interested and more likely to give priority to goals (both economic and social) that bring benefits to themselves rather than to others (e.g., Chong, 2000; Harsanyi, 1969).

However people define their goals is secondary to having a consistent set of preferences for these goals. An individual's preferences among a set of alternatives can be ordered if preferences are complete (*a* is preferred to *b*, or *b* is preferred to *a*, or one is indifferent between *a* and *b*) and internally consistent or "transitive" (if *a* is preferred to *b*, and *b* is preferred to *c*, then *a* is preferred to *c*). An individual is rational only if these preferences are coherent and if choices are logically derived from them (i.e., a rational individual chooses the most preferred outcome).

Intransitive preferences arise when people switch dimensions when evaluating different pairs of outcomes (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1996). This can occur, for example, when different pairs of candidates evoke different dimensions of evaluation (domestic vs. foreign policy or character traits) so that candidate *x* trumps candidate *y* on foreign policy, candidate *y* trumps candidate *z* on domestic policy, and candidate *z* trumps candidate *x* on character issues. As I will discuss later, these are framing issues that presumably can be moderated if all of the evaluative criteria are made explicit in the context of choice.

What is the rule or principle that leads to the preference ordering? Because people have multiple goals (e.g., money, profits, power, social status) and costs accompany the actions taken to obtain these goals, there are invariably trade-offs among the available alternatives. Intuitively, people are able to choose between such alternatives, so they must possess a method for comparing them. The concept of utility allows us to make comparisons among different kinds of costs and benefits by reducing them to a common underlying scale. A utility function translates the goods that people seek into a value.

People select the best available means to satisfy their preferences given their beliefs about what different actions will produce. Because the relationship between alternative means and ends is often uncertain, it is instrumentally rational to act in accord with one's beliefs about the likelihood that different courses of action will achieve one's goals. Outcomes are therefore assigned a utility value, and beliefs about the likelihood that an action will lead to the preferred outcome are assigned a probability. If choices lead to outcomes with certainty, then the rational choice is a simple matter of selecting the alternative at the top of the preference ordering. When there is uncertainty about the consequence of actions, the expected

utility of an action combines the respective utilities of the possible outcomes of an action with their corresponding probabilities.

A rational choice therefore entails choosing the course of action that maximizes one's expected utility.

1.1.   Economic and Psychological Rationality

Economic rationality and bounded rationality make different assumptions about the information level and cognitive ability of individuals (Hogarth & Reder, 1987; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1995). Unlike the fully informed agent in the omniscient model who is aware of all options and their consequences, bounded rationality assumes there is individual and contextual variation in decision-making processes and outcomes (Conlisk, 1996; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1994; Simon, 1985, 1990, 1995; Lau & Redlawsk, Chapter 5, this volume). Decision-making procedures will vary by the importance of the issue and the motivations, abilities, and predispositions of the individuals forming judgments.

People, therefore, are not naturally or intuitively capable of making optimal choices in the more realistic psychology of bounded rationality. Rather, they sometimes choose poorly when compromising between effort and optimization. Hirschman (1982) suggested that "mistake making is one of the most characteristic of human actions, so that a good portion of the social world becomes unintelligible once we assume it away" (p. 81). Likewise, Riker (1995) noted: "There are degrees of difficulty in choosing instruments. Hence the model does not require instrumental accuracy, although it does require that . . . people do try to choose instruments that they believe, sometimes mistakenly, will achieve their goals" (p. 25).

Psychological and experimental research has produced a catalog of studies demonstrating the irrationality of individuals within particular contexts (Rabin, 1998). Clearly people are fallible in how they make decisions, often make mistakes, do not always seek to maximize utility, or fail to do so because of cognitive limitations. People often lack rational consistency in their preferences (Tversky & Thaler, 1990). They use evidence incorrectly or prejudicially and often draw overly confident conclusions from insufficient data (Gilovitch, 1991).

Whether these are conclusive demonstrations of widespread irrationality or only limited exceptions to rationality is debated. Among the major objections to the external validity of survey and experimental demonstrations of irrational behavior are that participants are not provided sufficient incentives to perform well on pencil-and-paper exercises, they are given novel problems without an opportunity to learn from their errors of reasoning, and there is usually no debate and discussion in the experiments to guide how individuals evaluate their alternatives (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Chase et al., 1998; Gigerenzer, 1991; Riker, 1995, Wittman, 1995). Inconsistencies of choice and miscalculations are presumed more likely when there is little at stake and the alternatives are unfamiliar to the chooser. As Elster (1990) notes: "The central issue is whether people deal irrationally with important problems" (p. 40).

Of course, the necessity of incentives, education, and debate to induce rational choice acknowledges individual and situational influences on the substantive rationality of decisions. Decision-making can be aligned on a continuum that ranges from intuitive

to effortful processing or "System 1" (intuition) versus "System 2" (reasoning) decision processes (Kahneman, 2003; Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume). Intuition is fast, automatic, affective, and effortless judgment, while reasoning is slow, objective, rule-based, and effortful. Similarly, dual-process cognitive models differentiate between "central" (or systematic) and "peripheral" processing of information depending on the effort expended by the decision-maker (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999). Deliberate reasoning can override automatic reactions to objects and events but automatic processes can interfere with the selection and evaluation of information from memory (Epley & Gilovich 2016).

Incentives can improve performance by motivating increased effort, but only if effort is relevant to achieving better outcomes. The effect of effort often depends on having sufficient cognitive capital (skills, experience, expertise), without which simply trying harder to make a good decision may be fruitless (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Witness the consequential errors people make in their financial investments (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2003).

A separate issue is the extent to which incentives, education, and debate are relevant to mass political decision-making. For example, it is not clear how frequently we can depend on errors of perception and framing being corrected. "The fact that behavior may be changed after the subjects have been informed of their 'mistakes' is of interest, but so is behavior absent the revelation of mistakes because, in real life, explicit 'mistake-identifiers' rarely exist" (Rubinstein, 1998, p. 22). The impact of incentives also needs to be evaluated in light of the small expected value of most decisions (such as voting) that citizens make in politics. Much political analysis therefore concerns the quality of reasoning and choice when people are not well informed and highly motivated.

In the following sections, we will observe that people often fall short of the standards of rational choice not only because they are paying limited attention to politics, but also because of natural biases in how people process information. There is also evidence consistent with a boundedly rational framework that consistency of preferences and the quality of judgment and choice varies systematically with changing motivations and incentives.

2. Do People Maximize Self-Interest?

A direct test of a narrow, egoistic version of rational choice theory is whether people are maximizing their self-interest when they take positions on public policies. Self-interested optimizers ought to prefer policies that yield the greatest benefits for themselves.

In public opinion surveys, however, the influence of self-interest on policy preferences has often proved to be weaker than general orientations such as political ideology, party identification, and political values. Compared to self-interest, people's values and their sociotropic evaluations (i.e., the effect of policies on society or the nation as a whole) are better predictors of their candidate preferences and their views in a variety of domains, including government spending, law and order, race and gender issues, immigration, social welfare policy, and foreign affairs (Citrin & Green, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1991). Likewise, in elections, voters are more apt to evaluate how the national economy, rather than their

own personal economic status, will be affected by different candidates' policies (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).

The minor influence of self-interest on political choice is puzzling in light of the centrality of economic performance and standard-of-living issues in electoral campaigns (Vavreck 2009). Politicians spend much of their efforts trying to convince voters that life will be materially better under their policies. Yet the respondents in mass opinion surveys seem to care less about their own personal stakes in policies than about whether those policies promote the national welfare or serve longstanding values.

Part of the explanation for these results lies in the conceptualization and measurement of interests, and part lies in the cognitive and political constraints on the pursuit of self-interest through public policy. In keeping with a contextual approach to decision-making, the question to explore is not whether but *when* self-interest matters. Self-interest is more likely to matter when people actually have a stake in a policy and can see that they have a stake. Whether they recognize those stakes depends on the transparency of the policy and their capacity to understand its implications. A number of dynamic studies using panel data indicate that self-interested motives can be heightened by abrupt life changes resulting in material gains and losses. When objective interests are debatable, when the implications of a policy are hard to discern or are obscured by political persuasion, or when they are not directly affected by the policy, people will rely more heavily on general political orientations (such as ideology and partisanship) that offer guidance in the absence of other criteria. At the same time, research on self-interest indicates that people are motivated more broadly by noneconomic interests such as the defense of cultural values and norms that have implications for their social status and political and economic opportunities.

2.1. Defining and Measuring Self-Interest

In testing the influence of self-interest, conceptual problems disentangling the sources of one's interests have been circumvented to some extent by defining self-interest narrowly as the tangible, relatively immediate, personal or family benefits of a policy. By definition, this conceptualization of self-interest excludes the possibility that self-interest includes nonmaterial goals and may be pursued through expressive or other-regarding actions or through long-term calculations. Broader conceptions of interests may yield somewhat different interpretations of the findings (see, e.g., Weeden and Kurzban 2017 and the discussion below of economic and cultural motivations), but existing studies tend to concentrate on the conditions under which narrowly defined self-interests will influence policy positions.

Survey analyses of self-interest have generally sidestepped people's stated reasons for their policy preferences. Researchers typically make inferences about respondents' self-interest by making their own analysis of the consequences of the policy for different social groups in society and testing whether groups with a greater interest are more likely to support the policy. There is often no independent confirmation that respondents share the researchers' beliefs about the impact of the policy.

One reason for avoiding subjective measures of interests is the risk that such self-reports are merely rationalizations for preferences that have other origins. However, this creates the ambiguity that when people express preferences that contradict their objective interests,

they may knowingly eschew their self-interest, or their preferences may align with their own analysis of their interests given their (possibly mistaken) beliefs about the policy. For example, the reluctance of African Americans to be vaccinated against the coronavirus appears to be contrary to their self-interest given the greater vulnerability of the black community to COVID-19 exposure. Yet their preferences are consistent with the distrust that blacks feel toward science, medicine, and government, because of their historic mistreatment by these institutions (Callahan et al. 2021).

The economics of information provides little incentive for citizens to acquire much policy knowledge even if some public policies (e.g., Social Security and health care reform) can have an immediate impact on citizens, and in these instances we would expect people to be motivated to learn more about the policy (Campbell, 2002). Thus a possible explanation for why self-interest exhibits only modest influence in shaping opinions is that people are frequently unaware of the implications of the policies for themselves and their families. The little information they have will often be partisan and ideological information that provides tidy though not necessarily accurate information about the costs and benefits of policies.

2.2. When Costs and Benefits Are Magnified

We still might expect ideology and partisanship to be overridden when there is a clear understanding (even if sometimes simplistic) of what side of the policy benefits one the most. Indeed, studies that report more substantial self-interest effects have typically focused on policies that offer unambiguous benefits or impose tangible costs (Citrin & Green, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1991). Sears and Citrin (1985) found a strong relationship between owning one's home and voting for Proposition 13, a measure that slashed property tax rates in California. Along these lines, becoming a property owner in California and Texas leads to significantly higher levels of participation in local politics on zoning and planning issues that affect home values (Yoder 2020). Smokers are significantly more opposed to smoking restrictions and cigarette taxes than are nonsmokers (Green & Gerken 1989; Dixon et al., 1991). Regular drinkers are less likely than nondrinkers to support enhanced efforts to control drunk driving and underage drinking (Crowe & Bailey 1995). And gun owners are consistently less likely than those who do not own guns to support proposals to ban handguns or to impose a waiting period for purchasing a gun (Wolpert & Gimpel 1998).

The common element in all of these studies is that the policy being considered was clearly going to help or hurt some elements of the population more than others. Therefore, instrumental reasoning and self-interested decision-making (i.e., rational choice) are more likely to be manifest when people can see that a policy will have a significant impact on their lives. On this point, analysts in both the social psychological and rational choice traditions are in agreement (Aldrich, 1993; Chong, 2000; Citrin & Green, 1990; Elster, 1990; Taylor, 1989).

2.3. Accessing and Priming Self-Interest

In addition to the variation in issue content, individual differences in awareness and attentiveness can affect the connection between self-interest and policy choices. Both one's level of stored information and the content of cueing communications modify the priority

given to self-interest in decision-making. People who are generally informed about politics or who constitute the attentive public on a particular issue are more likely to know how alternative policy proposals would affect them (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). For those who are less cognitively skilled or engaged, the cues available to them at the moment of choice should be more influential in determining whether they will be motivated by self-interest (Sears & Lau, 1983; Taylor et al., 1994).

Critical to the role of self-interest in political reasoning, then, is whether the material benefits of a policy are visible, or cognitively accessible, to the decision-maker (Young et al., 1991). Pursuing this line of thinking, Sears and Lau (1983) showed that the relationship between self-interest and vote choice became stronger when respondents were asked about their personal economic situation *before* they were asked their candidate preference. Moreover, when their self-interest is primed, respondents are more likely to agree with egoistic justifications for a policy and less likely to accept reasons founded on broader, symbolic attitudes (Young et al., 1991; Fisman et al., 2015). Similarly, telling people where they stand socioeconomically relative to others changes their views toward redistribution consistent with their economic interests (Fernández-Albertos & Kuo, 2015).

Self-interest can moderate the influence of partisanship and political ideology when those interests are made salient by recent events or immediate pressures. Worries about health care costs reduce the probability that strong Republican identifiers will follow the party line in opposing the Affordable Care Act (Henderson & Hillygus, 2011). Similarly, Danish union members' self-interest in better wages and working conditions during intense collective bargaining tempers (but does not negate) the influence of party leaders who argue for a moderation of demands (Bisgaard & Slothuus, 2021).

Chong, Citrin, and Conley (2001) illustrate the conditional effects of self-interest in their survey experimental analysis of three policy issues—Social Security, the home mortgage interest tax deduction, and health benefits for domestic partners. They show that people in the key beneficiary categories (i.e., the elderly, homeowners, and unmarried individuals) recognize their own self-interest and act upon it without prompting when the policy has obvious implications for them; however the influence of self-interest is magnified significantly when people are primed to think about the personal costs and benefits of the policy. In contrast, people with a smaller stake in an issue are less likely to choose on the basis of self-interest and more likely to be influenced by their values and symbolic predispositions, especially when exposed to information that cues such concerns.

2.4. Changes in Self-Interest

Cross-sectional survey tests of the influence of self-interest, using statistical controls, assume that individuals are alike in all respects except their belonging to different beneficiary classes, but of course there may be unmeasured and uncontrolled factors that contribute to their different life states and preferences. An alternative method that is less vulnerable to this problem is to use panel data to examine the effect of changes over time in individual circumstances, such as an improvement or decline in economic condition.

The global financial crisis and recession of 2008 as well as the economic dislocations created by the forces of globalization have given rise to numerous dynamic studies using panel data of the effect of a change in one's economic status. Declines or improvements in

one's economic security can produce a corresponding change in the self-interest that one has on a policy issue that motivates a change of preference. Furthermore, recent impactful changes in personal status may make it more likely that self-interest is primed and salient, creating conditions that theoretically would strengthen a self-interest effect.

Indeed, many studies have confirmed that negative economic experiences tend to shift attitudes to the left in favor of greater government redistribution of resources. Margalit's (2013) panel study of American workers between 2007 and 2011 found that workers who lost their jobs became more favorable to government spending on social welfare programs and support for the poor and unemployed. Economic shocks that were proximate in occurrence during the Great Recession were especially likely to influence the attitudes of individuals in the most vulnerable households toward government proposals that addressed economic risks (Hacker et al. 2013). Similar studies in Europe have found that loss of employment leads to greater support for government social policies (Martén, 2019; Naumann et al., 2015). Owens and Pedulla (2014) use the General Social Survey panel data to show that individuals favor more redistributive policies when they experience a drop in income or face unemployment. In Wehl's (2020) study of German workers who experience positive or negative employment changes, positive shifts were associated with lowered support for government labor market policies (LMPs), and vice versa—negative employment changes resulted in increased support for LMPs. These shifts hold across both objective and subjective measures of economic changes.

Other studies of significant changes in life circumstances have found similar attitude changes in line with new interests. Positive economic fortune by way of a lottery win motivates a rightward shift in economic preferences (Doherty et al., 2006; Powdthavee & Oswald, 2014; Peterson, 2016). Erickson and Stoker (2011) studied the effects of the military draft lottery on attitudes toward the Vietnam War in the 1960s–1970s. Young college educated men who were most vulnerable to being drafted into service were more likely to turn against the war and to change their party identification from Republican to Democratic. These partisan changes matched their newfound self-interest in Democratic Party policy toward the war and persisted through the life cycle.

Contrary to the assumptions underlying symbolic models of attitudes, economic changes also can affect policy preferences indirectly by influencing broad political values such as authoritarianism, trust, and the role of effort versus good fortune in accounting for success (Margalit, 2019). While there is evidence of motivated reasoning in response to economic shocks, with reactions conditional on prior political dispositions, there is no consistent finding across studies except that effects typically vary by partisanship and ideology (e.g., Peterson, 2016; Wehl, 2020).

2.5. Rationality of Economic and Cultural Motivations

A number of recent studies have attempted to partition the relative contribution of economic and socio-cultural factors on preferences toward immigration, trade, and globalization, and electoral support for populist politicians and parties in the United States and Europe (Alesina & Tebellini, 2020; Inglehart & Norris, 2019; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Ocampo, 2019). There is an implicit but questionable assumption in this research that actions instigated by changes in economic status are more self-interested

than actions motivated by cultural changes that alter the social status of individuals and groups. What these studies instead appear to indicate is that individuals are instrumentally motivated to pursue their economic goals *and* to defend their cultural values. Groups that find themselves on the losing end of cultural shifts experience a loss of social status that redounds to their political and economic opportunities and outcomes.

According to economic explanations of attitudes toward trade and immigration, (Margalit, 2019), domestic workers in industries that must compete against imported goods should express the greatest support for protectionism and restricted borders. Imported goods from China are a particular threat to American industries that produce similar products. Certain local markets and populations therefore can be identified as being vulnerable to job losses and increased unemployment as a result of foreign competition. Discontent in these constituencies might also translate to greater support for populist candidates who take a clear stance against trade and globalization. Immigration is yet another potential economic threat, as foreign workers compete for jobs with natives; the theoretical expectation is that native workers will be most threatened by similarly skilled immigrants.

Empirically, one of the strongest predictors of support for free trade is a person's education level. Although this relationship is consistent with the self-interest hypothesis, since high skilled workers enjoy the greatest job security and benefit the most from open markets (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005), the mechanism may actually be that education promotes a more cosmopolitan and tolerant orientation to foreign exchange (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009). Also, education level reflects classroom instruction and exposure to media stories about the beneficial effects of trade for the national economy. These alternative interpretations of the education effect suggest that attitudes toward free trade reflect socialization and cultural attitudes rather than pocketbook calculations (Kertzer, Chapter 13, this volume).

Studies of attitudes toward immigration have employed a variety of objective and subjective measurement strategies to gauge the relative influences of economic interests (self and sociotropic), prejudice, and cultural attitudes. At the risk of oversimplifying a voluminous literature, on balance, objective measures of self-interest based on the degree of competition for employment that respondents face from immigrants (usually indexed by high or low skilled immigrants) or the fiscal burden imposed by immigrants (e.g., higher taxes and expanded social services) take a back seat to sociotropic and psychological and cultural factors (Citrin et al., 1997; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Attitudes vary depending on a respondent's evaluations of whether immigrants impose social and economic costs on American society rather than their degree of direct economic competition with the respondent. The public is concerned less with the effect of immigration on their personal pocketbook than on the national economy as a whole. As with trade preferences, better-educated respondents, whether in the labor force or not, consistently express greater support for immigration of all skill levels.

Cultural attitudes about national identity, the prerequisites of citizenship, and the ability of immigrants to conform to the norms and values of the recipient country are stronger predictors of attitudes toward immigration (Levy & Wright, 2020). In some studies, the predictive power of cultural attitude measures benefits from sharing overlapping attitude objects with the dependent variables. For example, Sides and Citrin's (2007) measure of people's attitude toward national identity asked respondents if "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions." This item proved to be the

strongest factor in their model of European public opinion about the desired level of immigration to their country.

Part of the explanation for the weakness of objective measures of self-interest may be the discrepancy between objective and subjective economic threats from immigration. Self-interest effects have been more prevalent in studies that have employed subjective evaluations of economic costs (Gerber et al., 2017) and that have isolated a subset of respondents who are likely to feel threatened by a particular type of immigration. Thus, Malhotra et al. (2013) find that high tech workers are more likely than workers employed in other sectors to oppose providing visas to immigrants who will be working in their industry. However, a more comprehensive examination of US workers across multiple industries with varying skill levels found little variation in immigration attitudes by labor market competition from immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2013).

Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012), nonetheless, show that even when economic interests are measured subjectively based on perceived economic impacts, cultural attitudes still explain the bulk of the variance in immigration attitudes. They analyzed the 2002 European Social Survey to compare the relative impact of economic beliefs about the effects of immigration on wages, employment, and fiscal balances, and cultural attitudes toward shared religion, customs, language, and traditions. Using the term "compositional amenities" to refer to the cultural implications that natives associate with immigration, they find that such cultural concerns explain between two and five times the variance in attitudes relative to concerns about economic impact. Moreover, these cultural concerns account for variations in attitudes by education level and age.

Cultural attitudes also tend to outweigh material motives in most analyses of the factors behind popular support for populist parties and policies in the United States and Europe. Norris and Inglehart (2019) find that the demographic groups that are most threatened by progressive shifts in cultural values—men, the less educated, older generations, holders of traditional values—are more likely to support populist parties, while measures of economic status are secondary. In the 2016 US presidential election, objective changes between 2012 and 2016 in personal finances and economic security did not account for increased support for Trump; however, an increase in social dominance orientation (SDO), reflecting a preference for maintaining existing hierarchical structures, and greater agreement with Trump than Clinton on issues pertaining to trade and China did predict higher support for Donald Trump (Mutz, 2018). Mutz interprets these increases in nativist attitudes and opposition to foreign influences to be manifestations of status threat more than personal economic vulnerability (cf. Morgan, 2018).

The economic explanation for populist voting may benefit from more focused analysis of subpopulations. The economically disadvantaged are spatially separated from the groups that support a more open society and tend to be concentrated in regions that have been most affected by foreign trade and globalization. In contrast to individual level studies, aggregate analyses have found a correspondence between the regions in the United States that were especially affected by trade policies with China and vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 election (Autor et al., 2020).

Efforts to parse the economic and cultural dimensions of populist support may be stilted, as economic developments initiate corresponding cultural changes, and vice versa. Gidron and Hall (2017) postulate that economic and cultural factors operate in tandem to induce status anxiety in groups that leads to voting for right-wing populist parties. Economic

changes that place a premium on college education and technical and analytical skills and a cultural transformation toward postmaterial values such as multiculturalism, globalization, and feminism have reduced the standing of certain groups, especially men without college degrees and those with socially conservative values. Supporters of populist causes, such as Brexit, are both more critical of the economic state of the nation and more hostile toward liberal value trends in society.

Groups on the losing end of these socioeconomic shifts experience a loss of social status that is not merely symbolic, but also material. Prejudice against members of the less educated working class in the United States exceeds that expressed toward other disfavored social groups (Sandel, 2020). Working class concerns are underrepresented by mainstream political elites, practically all of whom have college degrees (Gest, 2016; Jardina, 2019; Cramer, 2016). This creates an opening for populist politicians to rally those who feel left behind by fanning their economic and cultural discontents, combining arguments against trade agreements and immigration with reflective appeals to traditional norms and values (Gest et al., 2018).

The receptivity of the working class to such campaigns suggests that individuals respond to the impact of policies on their social status as well as material well-being. People's current interests are contingent on their past decisions, as bygones are not bygones (Chong, 2000). The evaluation of present-day alternatives depends on choices—to obtain education and skills, and to subscribe to a system of values—made in the past that affect an individual's capacity to take advantage of current opportunities. Early life decisions create or foreclose prospects later in life. Consequently, there are individuals and groups who have a greater stake in protecting the culture they were raised in because social change leads to a loss of economic and social standing.

This logic explains generational differences in the rate at which change is embraced. Aging is often associated with increasing conservatism or resistance to social change. As Gary Becker (1996, p. 37) explained: "To change their behavior drastically, older persons have to either disinvest their capital that was attuned to the old environment, or invest in capital attuned to the new environment." Those individuals with the least portable skills, such as the less-educated working class, will be most strongly wedded to the status quo and more apprehensive about social change because they have less capacity to adjust. Therefore, there are instrumental reasons, quite apart from prejudice and psychological rigidity, that reduce acceptance of institutional and technological changes.

3. Low-Information Rationality

In politics, citizens will seek economical strategies to reason through their choices and hope to make adequate decisions even if they are generally not well informed. An obvious question is the quality of their political choices, which is analogous to the issue raised by economists of whether boundedly rational economic behavior leads to the same market outcomes as optimal behavior (e.g., Akerlof & Yellen, 1985). To what extent does economizing on deliberation produce outcomes that deviate from substantive or unbounded rationality?

The consequences of being uninformed may not be as severe as once thought. Although citizens devote little time to politics, they may learn just enough to make reasonable choices by capitalizing on politically relevant information available as a by-product of everyday routines (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Popkin 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). Voters may be unfamiliar with substantive issues, but they nevertheless can evaluate candidates using more easily acquired data, such as recent economic trends, the partisanship and personal characteristics of candidates, the candidates' ideologies, and the identities of opinion leaders and interest groups that endorse the candidates (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966; Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; 2001; Popkin, 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991). In so doing, voters can draw conclusions without making a detailed study of the issues.

3.1. Measuring Performance

If we are using a normative standard of rationality, the right preference toward policies and candidates would be the position taken by a person who possessed all relevant information about the alternatives, analyzed and weighed that evidence properly, and chose the alternative that maximized his or her expected utility. Perfectly informed individuals in the electorate are an ideal type, like the omniscient rational actor. Researchers could analyze the issues and candidates and substitute their well-informed definition of the optimal choice for different types of voters, which is essentially the strategy taken in the studies testing for self-interested policy preferences. The analyst infers that a policy benefits some groups more than others and tests whether individuals in those groups actually provide greater support for the policy.

A more agnostic method to define optimal choice focuses on the preferences of individuals who are significantly more knowledgeable than others because of their social position, educational level, or interest in following public affairs. If politically knowledgeable individuals can be assumed to have gathered sufficient information to understand the consequences of public policies, they should be more likely to identify the side of a policy that furthers their interests. Therefore we might take the preferences of the most-informed members of the public and compare them against the preferences of less-informed individuals, controlling for their demographic characteristics. Differences in preference by general information levels would suggest that information changes beliefs about the implications of the alternatives and improves the fit between preferences and goals.

A related approach to gauging the efficacy of low-information choice is to provide individuals with specific information about the alternatives and to measure the extent to which the new information changes their preferences. This can be done experimentally by randomly assigning individuals to a treatment group in which they receive relevant information about a policy; these individuals are then compared to a control group that was not provided this information. A before-after design can also be used to measure the preferences of a panel of individuals before and after they are informed about the alternatives.

Finally, an approach used specifically to test the value of possessing easily acquired and potentially useful heuristic information is to compare the preferences of individuals who possess the heuristic information against the preferences of those who are more fully informed about the alternatives.

3.2. The Impact of Information on Preferences

Virtually all studies that examine the effect of knowledge on political choices find that better-informed individuals hold different preferences, which suggests that less informed citizens are not making optimal choices (Althaus, 1998; Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Gilens, 2001). Differences in public opinion across knowledge levels imply that heuristics are unable to compensate for lower levels of information, and, therefore, inattention probably results in worse choices. However, studies simulating how political knowledge changes the preferences of voters do not actually observe low information voters' using heuristics. Instead, these studies infer that, *if* low information voters are employing heuristics, those heuristics are not providing them with the relevant clues needed to vote like those who are highly informed.

There is no handy criterion to assess whether citizens are doing adequately albeit suboptimally with the trade-off they are making between gathering more information and the quality of their decisions. In their study of voter choice, Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2006; Chapter 5, in this volume) take the sanguine position that *most* voters choose the candidate who is consistent with their stated beliefs and interests. By their definition, the correct vote is the vote that one would make with complete information about the candidates. Using two alternative measures of correct voting, they conclude from experimental and survey data that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the electorate is voting correctly. Whether an error rate of one-quarter to one-third of the electorate is excessive in a democratic system is an open question (cf. Bartels, 1996).

Even if additional information does change beliefs and choices, it is a separate question whether the cost of obtaining that information is worth the benefits associated with the new preferences. People may be more likely to "get it right," but the consequences of making good political choices for one's life may be minor.

3.3. Knowing Just Enough versus Knowing a Lot

Demonstrating that general and specific knowledge leads to different (more optimal) policy or candidate preferences suggests that heuristics are not fully compensatory for those with low information levels. This may be an overstatement because some people may acquire the relevant cues in policy campaigns when an issue is salient, and the key test is whether heuristics can substitute adequately for more detailed knowledge in this context. In Lupia's (1994) study of several California initiatives on auto insurance rates, voters' knowledge of the details of the initiatives made little difference in their voting behavior beyond their knowledge of the auto insurance industry's position on each initiative. Voters who knew only the insurance industry's stance voted similarly to those who knew additional factual details of the initiatives.

There is of course an inherent ambiguity in using the well informed as a standard for evaluating whether people are expressing optimal preferences. If information does not provide new knowledge, then it ought not change preferences (as defined by Lupia & McCubbins, 1998, knowledge helps to predict the consequences of a policy relative to one's goals). In such cases, the marginal value of the information is zero, and people should

not pay anything to obtain it. By definition, if the information has value, it should affect preferences. We cannot always tell, simply by comparing the preferences of informed and uninformed people, whether the information has marginal value or not. If there is no difference between these groups, the heuristic may have substituted for valuable information. But, alternatively, the information may not have been valuable *or* the well informed failed to make rational use of the information. Thus, in Lupia's study, voters of moderate and high information levels may have derived no additional value from the details of the initiative measures, or they may have ignored such information and focused primarily on the alignment of the lobbying and consumer interest groups on the measure. We cannot escape this ambiguity unless we have a separate standard for the relevance of the information to the decision.

The upshot of these studies is mixed. There is a price paid for cutting corners in gathering information. Nonetheless the drop-off in performance may be tolerable depending on one's standards for decision-making. The deviations in preferences produced by more information are consistent and statistically significant, but there is also evidence indicating that most voters tend to choose the right candidate given their priorities and criteria.

As will be apparent in the following discussion of motivated reasoning, the best informed may be an imperfect standard of good decision-making because they are also the most partisan and ideological members of the electorate. Ideology and party identification can motivate biased interpretations of evidence, especially when that evidence has partisan implications. Therefore, the distinct preferences of the best informed may reflect an ideologically distorted perspective rather than the objective state of the world. Those who are less ideological may have more accurate beliefs about aspects of the world that are subject to ideological or partisan conflict. The stronger tendency of more informed individuals to engage in motivated reasoning raises question about using this group as the standard for optimal preferences.

4. ARE BELIEFS FORMED AND UPDATED RATIONALLY?

In the normative model of rational decision-making, individuals gather information and weigh its applicability to the choice they have to make. If the evidence is relevant to the choice at hand, they will modify their beliefs to take account of the new information. If these new beliefs change their evaluation of the relationship between the alternatives and their goals, they will change their preference among the alternatives.

One of the biases of human decision-making is that people will shape their beliefs of the world to make them consistent with their preferences rather than form their preferences based on an objective assessment of the state of the world (Kunda, 1990). In politics, where disputes over the interpretation and significance of information are common, people often interpret the same facts or events from a biased partisan or ideological perspective. Although motivated reasoning is often warranted by the circumstances of the decision-maker and can even be logically coherent, it can reduce the influence of information in politics relative to simpler and sometimes more superficial cues.

4.1. Biased Information Processing

A fundamental tenet of rationality is that one's desires should not guide one's beliefs, as in motivated reasoning or cognitive dissonance reduction (Elster, 1990). The classic demonstration of motivated reasoning is Lord, Ross, and Lepper's (1979) study of attitudes toward the death penalty. After reading arguments on both sides of the issue, supporters and opponents of the death penalty became more polarized and sure of their original positions. Each side accepted the arguments consistent with their position and argued against inconsistent claims, resulting in stronger attitudes following the debate than before.

People who are motivated to maintain a belief will usually be able to cite evidence that they feel supports their beliefs, but the same amount of contradictory evidence will be insufficient to get them to believe something that is unpleasant or does not fit with their belief system (Epley & Gilovich, 2016). Such motivated reasoning makes sense within limits, as "it is also inappropriate and misguided to go through life weighing all facts equally and reconsidering one's beliefs anew each time an antagonistic fact is encountered. If a belief has received a lifetime of support, it is justified to be skeptical of an observation or report that calls the belief into question, but to readily accept evidence that supports its validity" (Gilovitch, 1991, pp. 50–51; see also Hardin, 2009, p. 8). Ideological and religious belief systems may receive greater reinforcement and social support from those we know and respect than objective beliefs about the world. Therefore, we should anticipate that partisanship and ideology might have a greater influence on how people interpret the political world than objective facts. The crux of the issue is how responsive individuals are to new information that has the potential to improve their decisions. If they are responsive, are they using evidence properly? To what extent do existing (prior) evaluations persist in the face of contrary evidence?

Studies pointing to the rationality of voters have offered evidence of their responsiveness to changing information. Page and Shapiro (1992) argue that public opinion, as a collective entity, is generally stable when conditions are constant and dynamic in response to new events and information "that rational citizens would take into account" (p. 56). Similarly, Stimson's (2004) theory of the public mood describes a responsive electorate (led by *some* attentive citizens) that moderates and influences the ideological thrust of public policy. The theory of retrospective voting (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966; Popkin, 1994) maintains that voters are capable of evaluating and responding to the recent performance of the incumbent administration even if they are not well informed on the policy platforms of the parties. In general this research credits the public with being able to discern the direction of public policy, evaluate the competence of the party in power, and respond to political events in a reasonably accurate manner (Healy & Malhotra, 2013; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).

Responsiveness to events alone provides evidence that people have reasons for their actions (a minimum standard of rationality) but does not mean that voters are giving proper weight to the available information in their opinions and preferences. For example, Achen and Bartels (2016) made a closer examination of what voters appear to key on when they make retrospective assessments of the administration's performance. They found that voters react to many irrelevant events, have a short memory and time frame (focusing only on recent performance and ignoring earlier events), and base their decisions

on outcomes, such as natural disasters, that are beyond the control of the administration (cf. Healy & Lenz, 2014; Fowler & Hall, 2018; Achen & Bartels, 2018). These appear to be further instances of myopic or misguided voter choice, although it is arguably defensible for voters to punish governments for their failure to prepare for or respond competently to hurricanes, wildfires, and the like (Ashworth et al., 2018).

4.2. Partisan Biases

If individuals are motivated by desires for both accuracy and consistency, then partisan responses to factual questions (Bartels, 2002) may reflect the dominance of the consistency goal. Partisan perceptions may be more accessible than facts, and surveys may not provide respondents with sufficient incentive to retrieve the correct answer from their memories (Prior, 2007). Alternatively, people may lack the specific knowledge they are being tested on, so they use their political beliefs and values as a heuristic to fill in details they do not know. This is a shortcut that sometimes works, as in the case of the likeability heuristic (Brady & Sniderman, 1985) that allows people to infer the policy positions of social groups. Likewise, stereotypes of the demographic composition of the Democratic and Republican Parties are heuristics that allow voters to estimate where the parties stand on policy issues (Ahler & Sood, 2018). However, because voters exaggerate the group differences between the parties, such as overestimating the proportion of wealthy individuals in the Republican Party, they tend to perceive larger policy differences between the parties than is actually the case.

Such illustrations suggest another interpretation of the apparently widespread misinformation that is revealed in public opinion surveys (Jerit & Zhao, 2020). When queried on surveys, people answer incorrectly about many subjects, but this does not mean they have encountered and learned this misinformation from others. Even when people express confidence about an incorrect factual belief, such as the unemployment rate, their responses are often the product of incorrect guesses based on momentary cues and intuitive reasoning rather than the retrieval of stored misinformation (Graham, 2020). For example, a Republican who assumes that Republicans are better managers of the economy than Democrats may infer (possibly incorrectly) that the economy has improved since Republicans took office. The inference is based on partisan heuristics rather than exposure to false communications about the economy.

In policy discussions, the impact of substantive information is weakened when people are inclined to impute facts using their partisan values, or if their interpretation of the information is shaped by their prior attitudes and beliefs. Cohen's (2003) ingenious experiment on the relative influence of partisan cues and policy features shows how party cues affect the subjective meaning and interpretation of seemingly objective information. The experiment presented participants with two contrasting versions—generous or stringent—of a social welfare policy. Judged on its own merits, respondents preferred the version that was consistent with their ideological values. But when the policies were attributed to either the Democratic or Republican Party, liberal respondents favored the Democratic-sponsored policy whether it was generous or stringent, and conservatives favored the Republican-sponsored policy irrespective of details. Furthermore, greater cognitive effort did not change partisan biases in evaluating the policies.

Within the confines of the experiment, this type of motivated reasoning appears irrational, but in the real political world, such assumptions about the relative sympathies of the two parties toward social welfare policy are warranted, and relying on party cues might be a more reliable decision rule than an independent analysis (where would one begin?) of the features of the policies. There is valid reason, rooted in long-term party reputations, to doubt that a Republican program would be more sympathetic to the poor; it may appear so in the capsule summary, but in the respondent's mind, there must be strings attached to undermine the attractiveness of the program. However, consider what would happen if the experimenter added the proviso: these are *identical* programs and will be implemented *identically*, except for variations in spending levels and duration? In this alternative scenario, we might expect respondents to pay more attention to comparing absolute spending levels and time frames for the competing programs.

4.3. The (Ir)Relevance of Certain Facts

Specific quantitative facts, especially when they are presented in isolation without context, are probably irrelevant for most policy preferences. People do not form their attitudes toward welfare programs based on their knowledge of the actual level of government spending (Kuklinski et al., 2000; Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000). Nor does their attitude toward immigration rest on the annual number of immigrants who enter the country (Hopkins et al., 2018). Instead, people have a more ordinal (and numerically elastic) belief that, for example, there are "too many" people drawing welfare or the pace of immigration is "too fast." Such qualitative judgments can accommodate virtually any actual statistics. Learning the exact numbers will not change those impressions because the belief that is being changed is not relevant to their policy evaluations; instead the meaning of the actual numbers (too high or too low) will be shaped by one's attitudes, not vice versa.

New facts do not change opinions as much as the perceived implications of those facts, which are themselves subject to partisan biases. Gaines et al. (2007) substantiate this point in a panel study of attitudes toward the US-Iraq war. They show that new information about growing American casualties and failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq tended to be discounted when it ran against strong partisan predispositions. Republicans were much slower than Democrats to revise their beliefs, and those who did supplied new reasons to justify the war, such as the need to overthrow a brutal dictator or to prevent Iraq from being a haven for Al-Qaeda (see also Jacobson, 2006; Prasad et al, 2009).

The general point is that people are uncertain about facts and how facts apply to the policy they are evaluating. Substantive information competes with simpler cues that people receive about a policy. These cues also indicate which policy is best for them and which facts are relevant. Source cues especially can deflect attention from the content of messages as well as shape interpretation of the information, so that the persuasiveness of the message depends on one's attitude toward the source.

People's certainty about a source's credibility can cause them to change their beliefs about both facts and applicability, especially if their prior beliefs are weak. As in the case of public opinion toward the US-Iraq war, if an original position in favor of a policy is supported by a credible source and a set of beliefs about the facts, but these beliefs change because of new

information, the new facts may be judged irrelevant if the source remains steadfast and changes its rationale for the policy.

The source prevails because its policy position at any given time presumably incorporates all of the information in the situation that has a bearing on the decision. When source cues are so strong, information takes a back seat. Furthermore, following a source cue is not necessarily based on peripheral processing of information. Individuals may scrutinize the credibility of the source carefully. Therefore, party identification is a simple cue to follow, but relying on it can reflect either central or peripheral processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).

4.4. Overcoming Bias: Individual and Contextual Limits on Motivated Reasoning

The prevalence of motivated reasoning varies by individual characteristics and the context in which decisions are made. Nearly all of the evidence consistent with the demonstrations of confirmation and disconfirmation biases in Taber and Lodge's (2006) study is confined to those who are most politically knowledgeable and hold strong prior attitudes about the topics of discussion. People with weak priors on the issues, and political neophytes generally, show almost no evidence of motivated reasoning (Bolsen et al., 2014; Druckman & Leeper, 2012; Miller et al., 2016; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Taber et al., 2009). Likewise, many people have ambivalent feelings toward political parties and are not driven to view their party favorably irrespective of evidence (Lavine et al., 2012). Motivated reasoning also differs by individuals' cognitive drives. People with a high need for cognition and low need for affect are more likely to be motivated by accuracy goals and to exhibit behavior consistent with Bayesian updating (Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; see also Nir, 2011). Recognizing such individual moderators of directional motivations alters our assessment of the breadth and pervasiveness of biases in attitude formation in the broader population.

Motivated reasoning can also be attenuated by informational contexts (Leeper & Slothuus, 2014). The amount, type, and manner in which relevant information is communicated to people affect the degree to which directional motivations alter decision-making. People do not always seek confirming information when a wider choice of information sources is available; nor do they continue to resist contrary information indefinitely if it accumulates.

Several studies highlight specific types of policy information and arguments that restrain the influence of directional motives. Salient policies (Arceneaux, 2008; Ciuk & Yost, 2016), information from nonpartisan sources (Kernell & Mullinix, 2019), and messages that highlight the personal relevance of an issue (Mullinix, 2016) can offset the effect of party cues, and moderate their influence when forming judgments. Furthermore, lengthy descriptions of policies (Bullock, 2011), and information that clarifies the groups that benefit or are hurt by a policy constrain the range of positions that parties can adopt without alienating their supporters (Chong & Mullinix, 2019).

Experiments show that when people are restricted to viewing ideological programs, they are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning, but when given opportunities to choose from a range of media options, these effects dissipate with broader exposure (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). Most of the public, excepting those who are intensely ideological, appears to obtain its news by sampling across content domains in the media, which runs contrary

to the confirmation bias claim (Prior, 2013; Nelson & Webster, 2017). Peralta et al. (2016) found that even so-called issue publics with a strong interest in health care and climate change preferred balanced communications over one-sided communications about these subjects (see also Feldman et al., 2013; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Levendusky, 2013) because they wished to make a correct judgment of these issues and were more secure in counter-arguing against views that challenged their attitudes.

Studies also indicate that partisan motivated reasoning is diminished when elite partisan divisions are downplayed in communications (Druckman et al., 2013). Robison and Mullinix (2016) show that when party conflict is criticized in the media, respondents are more likely to consider the opposing party's arguments, which suggests that certain types of news coverage stimulate more deliberative evaluations of arguments. It follows that removing partisan or ideological cues altogether in political communications is a reliable method of constraining motivated reasoning. This seemingly obvious rule helps to explain Guess and Coppock's (2020) finding that pro and con arguments for gun control, minimum wage, and the death penalty originating from scientific and academic sources failed to polarize attitudes; indeed, they frequently produced attitude change in the intended direction of the message.[3]

4.5. Incentives for Accuracy

Increasing the incentive for accuracy where directional motives are present can also lead to more careful processing of information and reduce cognitive biases (e.g., stereotyping, group bias, primacy effects, anchoring effects in probability judgments, fundamental attribution errors) (Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Tetlock, 1983, 1985). In many of the decision and judgment tasks in these studies, the participants were only motivated to care about arriving at an accurate judgment, and did not prefer one outcome to another. Nonetheless, similar results have been reproduced on political topics where directional motives are present.

Outright monetary incentives can diminish partisan differences in factual beliefs about the economy and other objective political information. Bullock et al. (2015) suggest that money induces more careful thought and counters the expressive pleasure some people get from knowingly stating biased beliefs about the world that reflect favorably on their own party and poorly on the opposing party. They find that if respondents are paid for providing correct answers, partisan gaps in responses to factual questions about states of the world, such as the inflation and unemployment rates, decline by more than 50% (see also Khanna & Sood, 2018; Prior et al., 2015; Schaffner & Luks, 2018; but see Peterson & Iyengar, 2021, for a dissenting position).

Telling people they have to justify their opinion to others (Bolsen et al., 2014) or having them discuss alternative policies with people with contrasting perspectives (Klar, 2014) diminishes biased information processing. These results provide a degree of optimism with respect to people's ability to make more deliberative and reasoned decisions, but of course only so far as people actually engage in these types of discussions with people from the "other side" (e.g., Mutz, 2006). In carefully regulated deliberative contexts that emphasize rational evaluation of competing evidence—where people in effect are required to hear the other side—Fishkin and colleagues (Fishkin et al., 2002; Fishkin, 2006) show that

citizens develop coherent preferences across issues, become more informed about issues, and change their policy preferences following discussion with policy experts and fellow citizens.

Although Achen and Bartels (2016) found a preponderance of motivated reasoning in their analysis of National Election Survey data, they did confirm that information effects are larger when individuals have personal concerns for the issue and receive considerable information about it. Their prime example is how women's attitudes toward abortion rights changed as Democratic and Republican Party positions evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. Women cared more than men about this issue, and informed women were more likely than informed men to change parties during the 1980s as the abortion issue and contrasting party positions became salient.

In their studies of vote choice, Lau, Anderson, and Redlawsk (2008) hypothesize that correct voting is related to increased motivation to make a good decision (operationalized as caring who wins), expertise (political knowledge and education), the availability of an effective heuristic, more informative campaigns (reflected in increased campaign spending), and simplicity and clarity of choice (i.e., ideologically distinct candidates, and fewer candidates should make correct voting easier to accomplish). Likewise, Hillygus, and Shields (2009) found that voters respond to campaign information about the issue positions of candidates if the issue is sufficiently important to them. A contrary perspective (e.g., Lenz, 2009; Barber & Pope, 2019; Broockman & Butler, 2017) is that voters modify their views over the course of the campaign to match those of the candidate they prefer. This alternative explanation does not apply to the persuadable partisans identified by Hillygus and Shields because their issue preferences were measured early in the campaign and the issues examined were deemed important by the voters, making it more likely that they had strong opinions on these issues that would not easily be changed.

In general, exposure to strong contrary arguments and their repetition should reduce biased processing because it is more difficult to discount strong arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 164). There is evidence that motivated reasoning among voters can be gradually overcome with an accumulation of evidence, as voters do not indefinitely reject contrary evidence once they have formed a preference (Redlawsk et al., 2010). The latitude for motivated reasoning to alter views of the economy depends on the variance in the information. Partisans disagree most about the economy when economic news is mixed, allowing partisans to selectively choose their facts, but partisans tend to converge in their economic assessments when economic reports are uniformly favorable or unfavorable (Parker-Stephens, 2013). Similarly, while Democrats were predictably quicker than Republicans to accept that WMDs did not exist in Iraq, Republicans eventually succumbed to this conclusion as evidence mounted against their prior belief (Gaines et al., 2007). As Kunda (1990) noted in drawing bounds on motivated reasoning, "people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to support it" (pp. 482–483).

In sum, we assume that rational citizens will incorporate information that is relevant to the decision. Accuracy is pursued if the decision is salient and the consequences are important. More information is sought and evidence is reviewed more evenhandedly. But

in politics this process can be muddled by the quality of information and debate over the facts and the applicability of those facts to the decision. In order for accuracy incentives to reduce cognitive biases, individuals have to possess and employ reasoning strategies that improve choice (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Some kinds of problems may not benefit from greater effort if the effort promotes resorting to reasoning processes that are faulty, or if the problem is too difficult to solve so that effort is irrelevant or even counterproductive. A common circumstance in politics is that information is disputed among experts, and many people do not have the knowledge or ability to sort through competing claims even if they were motivated to do so.

Most of our information is obtained by trusting sources, not by independently verifying the truth of a claim. Virtually all public policy claims are disputed in varying degrees (see Chong & Druckman's 2010b analysis of the large number of opposing frames used in political debates), making it difficult for citizens to identify what is true or relevant. In the following section, I will discuss how the prevalence of framing effects means that citizens rarely have a clear understanding of what facts and consequences are relevant to the policy. Ironically, motivated reasoning from partisan preferences to beliefs about policies is one of the ways that individuals resist framing effects.

5. FRAMING OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Rationality presumes that individuals have coherent preferences that are invariant to how the alternatives are described. The research on framing offers pervasive evidence that alternative (and sometimes logically equivalent) descriptions of the same policy can produce significantly different responses. In perhaps the most famous example, devised by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), individuals reversed their preferences in selecting between risky choices by preferring the risk-averse option when it was framed in terms of gains, but the risk-seeking alternative when the same outcomes were framed as losses.

In politics, changes in the labeling of alternatives can have marked effects on public opinion. Familiar examples include substituting "the poor" for "those on welfare," or referring to groups that oppose the right to an abortion as "anti-abortion" rather than "pro-life" (Bartels, 2003). Similarly, public preferences can be influenced by selectively highlighting or emphasizing certain positive or negative characteristics or consequences of a policy. A frequently cited example involves a political extremist group that is planning a public rally (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Nelson et al., 1997; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). If respondents are reminded by the framing of the survey question that free speech rights are at stake, they are inclined to support the group's right to stage the rally. But if the question instead suggests that the rally might spark violence, they switch their position and prefer to stop the rally from taking place.

Framing effects undermine the assumption of consistent preferences that underlies rational choice theory. In all of these instances, preferences should be invariant to changes in the framing of the alternatives. If framing effects are sufficiently common, they reduce the validity of public preferences expressed in surveys and elections, and open the door to elite manipulation of the electorate.

5.1. The Psychology of Framing

To understand how framing occurs, consider the structure of an attitude. A person's attitude toward an object is the product of his beliefs about it (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Framing presumes a mixture of positive and negative beliefs about an object and therefore some degree of ambivalence in one's evaluation of it. For example, a person may believe that an extremist group is entitled to free speech but may also believe that a rally would pose a danger to public safety. Whichever belief dominates at the moment of evaluation biases one's attitude on the issue. Framing influences people's attitudes by affecting the relative weights they give to competing considerations. Equivalence frames (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) are logically equivalent but convey different connotations or meaning, and issue frames emphasizing alternative considerations of the policy are not equivalent, but they represent the same basic options with alternative descriptions of their features (Jou et al., 1996). Both equivalence and emphasis frames steer respondents to a particular interpretation or formulation of the problem.

Stability of preferences toward an idea or object therefore depends on individuals' being able draw upon the same considerations about it regardless of how it is framed. When people do not have such reliable attitudes, they are more likely to passively accept the narrow conceptualization of the issue or problem provided to them (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1459) and are unable or unmotivated to generate independently additional features of the problem. For example, lawyers and judges display stable preferences on civil liberties issues when they consistently apply general legal principles to a variety of controversies involving the rights of unpopular groups, but ordinary citizens who are not as well informed about the law are highly susceptible to framing effects on the same topics (Chong, 1996).

5.2. Qualification of Framing Effects

Some scholars (e.g., Wittman, 1995; Riker, 1995) have argued that experimental demonstrations of framing lack external validity because they exclude features of the political world (incentives, debate, learning) that would mitigate the effects generated in the laboratory. Studies have shown the magnitude of equivalence-framing effects can be moderated by the wording of problems, changing numerical details, the strength of respondents' attitudes and their expertise and cognitive ability, increased contemplation, and the need to provide a rationale for one's preferences (Druckman, 2001; Kuhberger, 1998; Miller & Fagley, 1991). Counterframing and group discussion also temper equivalence-framing effects by increasing the accessibility of alternative interpretations of the problem (Druckman, 2004).

A number of issue-framing studies have focused on the moderating role of individual-level characteristics. Frames that resonate with one audience have little to no effect on other individuals, depending on their values, partisanship, and ideology (Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). For example, alternative framings of handgun legislation shift policy attitudes and attributions of blame for school shootings, but these effects are moderated by individual predispositions and partisan attachments (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001). Although these studies are not typically

discussed under the rubric of motivated reasoning, they identify circumstances where directional motivations act as a type of "check" or constraint on people's over-responsiveness to frames. Evidence of the moderating effects of political knowledge, awareness, and education is more mixed, as these factors both facilitate and suppress framing effects under different circumstances, similar to their conditional effects on motivated reasoning and the use of heuristics (Barker, 2005; Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010).

Sniderman and Theriault (2004) show that simultaneous competition between issue frames increases the likelihood that people will choose policy alternatives that are consistent with their values. Chong and Druckman (2007, 2010a) demonstrated that competing frames offset framing effects only when the opposing frames are of comparable *strength*, as reflected in their persuasive qualities. When competing frames vary in strength, the stronger frame tends to be favored. However, they also found that the canceling effects of simultaneous competition between equally strong frames do not extend to dynamic competition between the same frames received over time. When competing frames are received sequentially over time, as in a political campaign, most individuals become newly susceptible to the last frame they receive because early framing effects tend to decay. An important qualification on this result is that people who engage in effortful processing of initial messages develop surprisingly stable—and sometimes rigid—opinions that are resistant to framing compared to those who rely on memory-based processing.

5.3.   Information or Framing Effects?

A charitable interpretation of many framing effects is that people are being guided by the substantive elaborations provided by the frames rather than being misled or deceived. Alternative frames change the problem for the respondent by providing new information and highlighting what is relevant. For example, respondents are reasonable to believe the hate group rally poses a threat to public safety if the survey item explicitly mentions "the possibility of violence," but not otherwise. This interpretation of framing fits well with Simon's (1985) description of the problem solver as one "who is provided in advance with a knowledge of neither alternatives nor consequences—and who may even discover what his or her goals are in the course of the problem-solving process" (p. 295).

Framing and information effects have a different normative status in the study of public opinion even though they can describe similar processes. Susceptibility to framing supposedly undermines the validity of public opinion, whereas responsiveness to information demonstrates the public is attentive to substantive policy details. A possible distinction is that an information effect involves learning new knowledge that changes people's beliefs and possibly their preferences. In contrast, framing might operate by increasing the accessibility and applicability of existing beliefs rather than creating new ones. Many examples of framing, however, probably reflect a combination of the learning and framing processes in which new arguments and beliefs are introduced and made applicable through exposure to them (Chong & Druckman, 2010a).

A telling example of the parallels between research on information and framing is Gilens's (2001) study, cited above, of the effect of specific policy information on policy preferences.

Gilens showed that support for foreign aid increases when respondents are informed that less than 1% of federal spending goes toward such assistance. But all information is framed, and this information could have been framed to induce a different effect on policy preferences. If respondents are told instead that about $50 billion of the current budget is devoted to foreign aid, they may be more likely to feel this is excessive. This illustrates how information effects, as they are frequently construed in public opinion research, can be as problematic as framing effects in raising doubts about the reliability of public preferences.

5.4. Normative Assessments of Framing

The idea that people can evaluate the relative credibility of alternative frames according to their *strength* is among the more encouraging results from studies of competitive framing, as it suggests rational information processing. The evidence implies that people judge the applicability or relevance of the assorted messages they encounter over the course of a campaign, and respond only to those that are substantively compelling. Unfortunately, this favorable assessment has been tempered by research showing the impact of both strong and weak frames can be significantly moderated by *sources*, especially political parties. In competitive contexts, strong frames may no longer carry more influence than weak frames if the source of the frame lacks authority or is incongruent with the respondent's group affiliations.

That party cues can sometimes dominate strong frames and bolster weak frames is another instance of the potentially detrimental effects of motivated reasoning. After finding that respondents ignored the a priori strength of the frames based on content alone and simply toed the party line in their evaluation of public policies, Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus's (2013) tentative conclusion is that partisan motivated reasoning reduces the quality of judgments. The validity of this normative appraisal depends significantly on whether we view the content of the frames as substantive arguments or "information" rather than strategic "frames" designed to manipulate public opinion. Here is where our evolving assumptions about framing have modified our normative interpretation of framing effects. When strong frames are assumed to reflect argument quality, citizens are judged to be more competent (or rational) when they give greater weight to strong frames over weak frames. However if the side with the better argument loses once partisan sources are added to the mix, then it is arguable that the party cue has derailed the reasoning process and reduced the quality of decision-making. In short, our normative evaluation of partisan biases in the processing of frames depends on the degree to which a framing effect is viewed as a response to information or as a cognitive bias produced by strategic elite communications.

The argument that respondents *would* have made a better decision by ignoring partisan cues and attending only to the relative strength of the frames they received implies that citizens *should* decide on the basis of how an issue is momentarily framed, even when they have not been given all relevant arguments. But when information is incomplete, and competing parties are strategic and often deceptive in what they communicate about an issue, the party can serve a useful defensive function. People who follow their party will sometimes do better than when they submit to biased frames, especially if competition is unbalanced and one side enjoys significantly greater resources to get its message across.

5.5. Do Strong Frames Contain Superior Information?

There is validity to the observation that framing research has become difficult to distinguish from general research on persuasion, as framing has taken a cognitive turn with its focus on the processing of pro and con arguments (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014; Cacciotare et al., 2016). Future research on the quality of reasoning in competitive framing conditions should address why some frames prove to be more effective than others (O'Keefe, 2016). Our normative assessment of framing effects in competitive contexts depends on how we evaluate the substantive content of frames. If we regard competing frames as rival pieces of information that should be used to update beliefs and preferences, then we will applaud when people respond to these substantive policy details. If strong frames actually convey better-supported claims, then people who are persuaded by them are being moved by superior arguments, as they ought to be. This is the positive interpretation of a framing effect. A more cynical interpretation holds that while frames can inform, they are also strategic instruments (Arbour, 2014; Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Glazier & Boydstun, 2012; Hanggli & Kriesi, 2010; Sides, 2006). Elites, in this view, will employ any message that will shape public opinion in the manner they wish, and do not care if the arguments they use are sound or defensible. In environmental conservation campaigns, consultants use polling to test run a laundry list of arguments for and against a ballot measure to gauge which arguments increase or decrease the probability that voters will support it (Chong & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2005). The primary consideration for the list is not the relevance of the argument or whether the argument is true or supported by evidence, but whether the argument is able to move public opinion and the degree to which it stands up when paired against opposing claims.

The meaning of frame strength adopted in Chong and Druckman (2007, 2010a) carried no connotation that the stronger frame was a superior argument and ought to be followed for rational reasons. Indeed, there was a presumption that strong frames could be specious and be influential for irrelevant reasons, regardless of whether the strong frames developed in their experiments contained reasonably good and truthful substantive arguments for and against such issues as urban development and free speech for political extremists.

To reach the conclusion that the strength of a frame reflects the merits of the argument it contains requires an independent method of assessing the quality of a frame aside from its subjective capacity to move opinions (O'Keefe & Jackson, 1995). The strong frames used as treatments in competitive framing experiments are typically drawn from media coverage of the policy issues employed in the experiment. The selected frames indeed often have the features of arguments that have desirable normative qualities—that is, they provide clearly stated and seemingly valid reasons for the position recommended.

But whether the strong frames *ought* on rational grounds to be given greater weight in the decision than the claims found in weaker frames is a separate matter because strong frames are not limited to true, scientifically supported, or substantively relevant frames. In politics, there are always false and misleading frames that can be constructed to mimic the features of valid substantive claims. The susceptibility of people to specious arguments that are embedded in a coherent narrative opens the door to many types of arguments that have a deceiving plausibility because they ring true, perhaps because they connect to the dominant ideological beliefs and conventional wisdom of the political culture (Gamson, 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 2001; Lakoff, 2002; Hardin, 2009; Jones & Song, 2014). In the conservation

campaigns referenced earlier, a common theme is that protection of natural spaces will safeguard the water supply and promote "clean water" (Chong & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2005). Proponents of tax reductions routinely argue that lower taxes will pay for themselves by boosting economic productivity and generating additional jobs. Opponents of the estate tax tell stories of families that have been forced to sell the family farm in order to pay the tax (Graetz & Shapiro, 2005). Although there is limited evidence for each of these claims, they nonetheless are intuitively plausible, so they are perceived to be highly effective frames and featured in policy debates.

Research on misinformation has found that a message that is coherent, fluent, sensible, or easy to comprehend, that connects with existing beliefs, and that appears to be believed by others will be more likely to be thought to be true (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). An effective ploy is to package falsehoods using the same structure as reasoned, evidence based, authoritative arguments. If we examine the types of misinformation that are believed by large numbers, the claims often have an intuitive plausibility because of their blending of false claims and facts. The lie that Barack Obama was born outside the country, or that he is a Muslim corresponds with certain facts about his life—a father from Kenya, years spent as a child in Indonesia, which is a predominantly Muslim nation, a middle name (Hussein) that implies a foreign origin. Add elite sources to these false rumors and you increase the likelihood that they will be credible and will spread in the general public. By implication, trusted elite sources are also in the best position to correct misinformation among their followers (Berinsky, 2015).

5.6. Juxtaposing Framing and Motivated Reasoning

It is instructive to juxtapose motivated reasoning and framing. The problem of motivated reasoning can be summarized as too little responsiveness to information that is relevant to the decision. Conversely, the problem of framing is too much responsiveness to the description of alternatives. The paradox is that in the framing research, resistance to framing usually is viewed positively (i.e., reflecting well on respondents), while in the motivated reasoning research, individuals who do not respond to information generally are evaluated negatively.

The inconsistent treatment of partisan motivations in these two areas of research highlights the need for a consistent criterion. Linking options to partisan endorsements is an especially effective way to reduce framing effects (Druckman, 2001) as endorsements provide supplemental cues to respondents about how to choose consistently between alternative framings of the same policy. But although partisanship can diminish the effects of framing, this may be due mainly to motivated reasoning. Partisan consistency potentially comes at a cost (cf. Cohen's findings on party versus policy) if it causes one to overlook relevant arguments that would change one's decision. Those who are able to choose consistently with the assistance of a party cue may also be led by party cues to adopt positions they would not support on the strength of arguments. Weak arguments could just as easily be bolstered by strong peripheral cues as are stronger arguments. As discussed, whether this leads to better or worse decisions depends on the relevance or applicability of the arguments, which is not the same as their strength as defined in the framing research. It is not necessarily the

case that either strong arguments or frames are more compelling on substantive grounds. Their appeal may simply be their ease of comprehension, emotional resonance, or association with an attractive source.

In sum, framing is inherently a reflection of ambivalence (Chong & Druckman, 2010a; Popkin, 1994; Zaller, 1992). Ambivalence can be resolved (and stability achieved) in different ways, including reliance on ideological values or partisan cues, online processing, motivated reasoning, or rational deliberation. Stability allows for consistency of preferences, which is a minimal qualification for rationality. But we should not assume that anything that increases stability of opinions and reduces framing effects is a positive outcome. It is a separate research question to analyze whether those preferences reflect reliable information and efficient matching of means to ends.

On normative grounds, ambivalence is best resolved through reconciliation of competing ideas—aggregation and evaluation of relevant information to make choices that are instrumentally related to one's goals. In experiments on framing, however, only a small subset of people aggregate and balance information received over time (Chong & Druckman, 2007, 2010a). More often, individuals are vulnerable to the vagaries of the timing and framing of communications because they do not engage in effortful processing of information.

6. Conclusion

In everyday life, people assume that others are rational in the sense of having reasons for their actions that often derive from self-interest. This is an unstated assumption that guides human interaction. It is not always true, but it is sufficiently valid that people are able to explain and anticipate the behavior of others. Rationality therefore is the baseline against which behavior is measured.

Research in political psychology and behavior is similarly framed by assumptions of rationality. We assess the quality of individual decision-making and public opinion by comparing it against a normative standard of how people ought to evaluate information, policies, and candidates. It is desirable that political actors not only have coherent beliefs and preferences, but that they hold reasonably accurate perceptions of the world, and are open to new information and able to correctly choose the best means to their goals in light of these (reasonable) beliefs. Elster (1990) refers to rational choice as a normative theory first and an explanatory theory only when it assumes that people will abide by the normative standard of rationality.

Decision-making is assumed to be constrained by the economics of information: knowledge has value but is costly to obtain. Sometimes the costs are too high and cannot be justified by the expected benefit of obtaining the knowledge, such as the cost of gathering detailed information about candidates for election. Much knowledge is therefore discovered as a byproduct of other activities. People acquire it freely as part of their daily routines—for example, listening to the news while driving to work—and by relying on sources that share their interests and subsidize costs by analyzing and distilling information for them.

If it is rational to limit one's attention to politics, it is also rational to restrict one's political participation. The rational choice explanation for voting, of course, is seen as the problem

that falsified the theory (Green & Shapiro, 1994). The average individual derives negligible instrumental benefits from voting because any material policy differences between the parties are discounted by the almost-zero probability that one's vote will affect the outcome of the election (Downs, 1957). The logical deduction from this assumption is that if voters are concerned only about policy benefits, no one would ever bother to vote because the cost exceeds the benefit.

For some reason, this deduction has been regarded as significantly more problematic than the corollary deduction that voters also will have little or no incentive to gather information. Whereas no analysis of political attitudes and behavior questions the economics of information, the calculus of voting is dismissed as false. It *is* false in the sense that some people do indeed vote in large-scale elections, but some people also possess political knowledge, and it is not clear whether even the modest amounts of information held by the public is too much for a rational actor concerned only with the instrumental value of knowledge. The kinds of noninstrumental explanations (e.g., politics as recreational or expressive behavior) given for highly knowledgeable citizens have not undercut the economic theory of information in the same way that noninstrumental motives for voting have been seen as fatal to the theory of participation.

If there is general acceptance that rational choice theory is the best explanation for the limited engagement of citizens, there is much less agreement about the rationality of decisions that citizens make when they pay so little attention to politics. We encountered several instances in which the same findings were interpreted and evaluated differently depending on whether the focus of research was on framing, information processing, updating of beliefs, cues and heuristics, or the stability and consistency of preferences. Researchers draw ambiguous and often conflicting normative implications from studies of information processing despite sharing a common focus on the interactions of three groups of variables that systematically predict decision-making outcomes: (1) political heuristics; (2) information, arguments, or frames describing the alternatives; and (3) the capacities, motives, and attitudes of the decision-maker. Such disagreements stem from different criteria for a good (i.e., rational) decision, based on varying assumptions about the kinds of information people ought to attend to and factor into their choices.

The benefit of paying attention to information is simply the reduction in the likelihood of making a mistaken choice (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). Surprisingly, studies of information processing gloss over the attributes of the information that respondents are provided, so it is difficult to evaluate whether and how people *ought* to factor it into their decisions. The information contained in motivated reasoning, heuristics, and framing experiments runs the gamut from highly partisan arguments and symbolic value appeals to expert opinion and scientific evidence. Moreover, this information is typically attributed to representatives of political parties and ideological camps as well as to more neutral sources, such as experts, newspapers, and nonpartisan groups.

Rarely if ever do studies establish the premise that the information presented to respondents is valuable or suspect, informative or manipulative. Many of the political communications used in experimental treatments have the characteristics of tendentious appeals to ideological values. These types of biased messages are familiar to respondents and, not surprisingly, are counter-argued and rejected by those with strong contrary positions on the issues. For example, the "information" conveyed to participants in the classic Taber and Lodge (2006) study of motivated reasoning consisted of contentious

claims that were attributed to political sources and written in an argumentative style (see also Lodge & Taber, 2013). For example, one argument about affirmative action policies stated, "Affirmative action plans treat people based on race, not past or present circumstances. Middle class blacks are given preferences while lower class whites are not! This is unfair reverse discrimination and is itself a form of discrimination. Affirmative action programs must stop" (Lodge & Taber, 2013, p. 155). Such ideological messages, especially when amplified by a partisan source, are familiar to respondents and, not surprisingly, are counter-argued and rejected by those with strong contrary positions on the issues. This discounting of opposing viewpoints is considered to be motivated reasoning, but in the context of research on framing, resistance to such persuasive messages is often regarded as salutary. The only way to choose between these contrasting normative perspectives is by evaluating whether the information provided is sufficiently valid and reliable that one ought to take account of it in one's attitude.

All political decisions have to be explained and evaluated within the context in which they are made, as the procedures used to make decisions should be judged differently when the consequences are either large or small. The broad lesson from studies of information processing is that citizens are economical in their investments in politics. They try to do more with less and take shortcuts whenever possible. They use group cues and stereotypes to draw inferences about public policies, and lean on trusted sources to evaluate arguments and information more than they scrutinize the information themselves. They conform to the beliefs and values of their reference groups, and the resulting partisan and ideological worldviews developed in this manner facilitate political choices. Across studies of information processing, people show they can and often do behave reasonably, given the proper incentives and social and political contexts, though they also commit the kinds of errors we expect owing to low attention and knowledge.

A recurring theme here is there are no easy solutions to the low incentives to participate in mass electoral politics. Low motivation encourages limited information acquisition, peripheral processing of evidence, uncertain and unstable preferences, and motivated reasoning. Politics encourages the use of heuristics because the nature of interests are disputed and hard to discern, and the credibility of factual claims often cannot be judged independently of the partisan and ideological cues attached to them. Although there is evidence consistent with bounded rationality that increased incentives and motivation can moderate biases and errors in decision-making, an inherent and inescapable feature of mass democratic politics that limits individual participation is the diluted value of a single opinion or vote.

Notes

1. See Elster (1986); Kreps (1990); Little (1991); Rubinstein (1998); Shepsle & Bonchek (1996); also Redlawsk & Lau, Chapter 5, this volume.
2. According to Simon (1983, p. 8) reason is a "gun for hire" that can be employed to serve any objective.
3. Similarly, across five experiments, Wood and Porter (2019) find no instances where backfire effects were triggered.

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POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING

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RICHARD R. LAU AND DAVID P. REDLAWSK

1. Introduction: Preferences, Inferences, Judgments, and Decisions

As we sit down to update this chapter on political decision-making, "March Madness," the annual US college basketball tournament where the 64 best men's teams and the 64 best women's teams gather for three-week, six-round, single-elimination tournaments to determine the national champions, is about to begin. Teams are "seeded" from 1 to 16 in four separate brackets, where the top-seeded team plays the 16th seeded team in every bracket, the second seeded team plays the 15th seeded team, and so on. The winners of each bracket gather for the "final four" (semi-finals) on the third weekend of the tournament, followed by the national championship game two days later.

This annual tournament dominates popular culture in the United States as few sporting events can. Every game is nationally televised, and every games is "do or die." Upsets and last-second "buzzer beaters" abound, all of which makes for great excitement, great television, and of course wonderful opportunities for socializing . . . and betting. Normally well over 40 million American adults will enter at least one contest to pick the most winners during the tournaments. Many work, school, and social groups will organize their own contests, but there are also huge national contests as well. Die-hard basketball fans participate, of course—and watch as many of these games as they can—but so do many casual fans, including those who have not watched a single basketball game all year, just to be part of the social group and the fun.

The task of picking winners in a basketball tournament provides a useful analogy to many types of mass political decisions such as voting, which is also always performed by citizens of varying levels of interest, knowledge, expertise, and motivation. Formally,

- A **decision** involves a *choice* between two or more alternatives: *whether* to take drugs, *whom* to marry, *when* to retire, *which* candidate to support in the election, what team is more likely to win the game.

- Each alternative is associated with a set of outcomes about which the decision maker holds a particular **value or preference**.[1]
- Those outcomes can occur with certainty or with some probability less than one. If the probability of an outcome occurring is known, we can call this a **risk**. If the probability is unknown, we should refer to it as an **ambiguity** or **uncertainty**.[2]

Any strategy or procedure for making a choice must involve both judgment and decision-making.

- If a decision is a choice between two are more alternatives, **judgment** involves the evaluation of a single entity along some dimension: how heavy or light, or bright or dark, an object is (psychophysical judgment); how attractive/funny/likable/smart some person is (person judgment); how likely some event is to occur (probabilistic judgment).
- Judgment thus involves mapping some ambiguous stimuli onto a perceptual system. The tendency to make judgments is particularly true of entities—that is, people—in the social world.

We can further distinguish between two different types of judgments:

- Attitudes, or **preferences**, are subjective value judgments. You may prefer mocha chip while I always choose rum raisin; you may prefer big government while I prefer smaller government. Preferences have to come from somewhere, and we can certainly study their origins, as public opinion researchers do, but we cannot judge the "correctness" of those value judgments. Preferences are therefore exogenous to the decision-making process.[3]
- Beliefs or **inferences**, on the other hand, typically have verifiable answers and thus in theory can often be judged as correct or incorrect—although if the beliefs involve some future state of the world, such as the rise of sea levels because of global warming, we may have to wait for that future world to arrive before the verdict is in.

In a Trumpian world of "alternative facts," this once clear distinction between preferences and inferences begins to blur.[4]

Political scientists rarely differentiate between "judgment" and "decision-making." The two have often been linked (e.g., Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Billings & Scherer, 1988; Gilovich & Griffin, 2010), and are normatively equivalent in the sense that normally a decision maker *should* choose an alternative if and only if it is preferred more than any other. However, as Johnson and Russo (1984) argue, "*choosing* one alternative from a set can invoke different psychological processes than *judging* alternatives which are presumably evaluated one at a time." Making a choice implies more *commitment* to the chosen alternative than making a judgment suggests about the judged entity, and may well involve searching for reasons to *justify* the choice (Slovic et al., 1982).

Social scientists often treat decisions as if they are nothing more than choosing the most highly evaluated alternative. This is a mistake, for at least two reasons. To begin, people (and institutions) make all sorts of decisions without first globally evaluating the various

alternatives. "Spur of the moment" and "gut" decisions are of this type, as are habitual or "standing" decisions (Quadrel et al., 1993). We suspect, however, that the vote decision in particular—or any choice between different *people—is* rarely made without first forming some global evaluation of the different candidates involved, no matter how little information goes into the evaluation. Thus, we believe candidate evaluation is intimately involved in the vote choice.

A second reason that it is wrong to equate judgment and decision-making is that global evaluations, even when they are made, do not necessarily dictate choice. People may vote "strategically"—that is, choose a less preferred alternative because their most preferred candidate has little or no chance of winning (Stephenson et al., 2018). People may vote for a candidate they do not particularly like for some reason largely external to the decision itself (acting "against my better judgment"), for example, to please a parent or significant other. Alternatively, they may simply find it a challenge to figure out who the "best," value-maximizing candidate is (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997).

1.1. Institutional/Organizational vs. Individual Decision-Making

One very important thing to know before you "fill out your brackets" and pick your winners is how "winning" is determined. The casual basketball fan may be oblivious to these refinements, but experts are not. There are a total of 63 games during each tournament, for example; does each correctly picked game count one point, including the #1 vs #16 games that ought to be blowouts? Alternatively, are there algorithms in place that give more value to correctly picking upset winners? Are there several million people competing in the same contest, or are you vying against a dozen friends from your office, half of whom do not even know what double dribble is, and the odds of winning just by chance are much better? These "rules of the game" could well influence the strategy you want to follow in picking your winners, in the same way that institutional rules can influence the vote choices of ordinary citizens, and the decisions that political leaders make about international trade or wars.

Indeed, political decision-making falls into two broad domains, one of which considers how the *institutions* of politics—the legislative, executive, judicial, and bureaucratic branches of government, as well as national and international organizations (e.g., the United Nations, the World Bank) that interact with them—make decisions. All institutions are comprised of individuals, of course, but all institutions also have their own particular ways—laws, traditions, standard operating procedures—for gathering information, aggregating preferences, and taking actions. In many instances, institutional norms and procedures can override individual decision-making processes. For good overviews of research aimed more at the institutional level, see the many works of March (e.g., 1988, 1994; March & Simon, 1958; March & Olsen, 1989) and the earliest research of Simon (1947). See also more recent research by Klijn and Koppenjan (2000), Schulz and Konig (2000), Hoefer and Green (2015), or Keohane and Hoffmann (2018). We should never forget that in just about everything social scientists study, the social context/environment/institution matters—and often matters *a lot*.

The second domain concerns how *individual* political actors, whether politicians or ordinary citizens, make political decisions. For the most part this second perspective views decision-making as a question of individual psychology: individual preferences, information search, judgment/evaluation, and choice. Without meaning to minimize the importance of institutional factors in political decisions, in this chapter we focus on how individual actors make political decisions in their natural social environment or context. The two literatures are largely distinct; both are voluminous.[5]

As with the task of filling out a March madness bracket, judgment and choice are at the core of all politics, of the "authoritative allocation of values," to quote Easton (1953). We believe that political psychology should address, as a central organizing theme, how those authoritative allocation decisions are made. Our goal in this chapter is to provide a general framework for studying individual decision-making that applies to both everyday citizens and to political elites. Elites and common citizens differ not only in the amount of expertise they typically bring to the decision-making task, however, but also in the *type* of decisions they are asked to make. One very important topic of elite decision-making, foreign policy, is the specific focus of Levy (Chapter 10), Stein (Chapter 11), and Casler and Yarhi-Milo (Chapter 12), in this volume.

We focus here on the decision-making of everyday citizens, however, and in particular on voter decision-making, the most common and important political decisions that people living in democracies make. We develop our framework within a broader cognitive psychology perspective of humans as *limited capacity information processors* (Miller, 1956; Simon, 1957; Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Anderson, 1983), who have developed at least two quite distinct modes of processing. We start this chapter with a brief review of that dual processing perspective before turning more specifically to theoretical approaches for studying human decision-making. After a brief foray into rational choice theory, we spend much more time with behavioral decision theory (Edwards, 1961; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Hastie & Dawes, 2010), a field of psychological research which is related to but distinct from cognitive psychology, devoted to accurately describing and understanding judgment and decision-making.

2. COGNITIVE LIMITS AND DUAL SYSTEMS FOR PROCESSING INFORMATION

It would be convenient if humans were "ambulatory encyclopedias" (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998) filled with limitless information and demonic calculating abilities, but they are not. The limits of human information processing are thoroughly discussed by Jerit and Kam in Chapter 15 of this volume, but for our purpose it is sufficient to focus on one feature about which almost all cognitive psychologists would agree, that humans have developed (at least) two distinct modes of processing incoming information/stimuli (Stanovich, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2011):

- *System 1* (sometimes called associative, experiential, heuristic, holistic, impulsive, intuitive, reflexive) is preconscious/unconscious, automatic, low effort, fast, concrete and

contextualized, high capacity/parallel, evolutionarily old, nonverbal, reflexive, shared with animals, universal, and independent of general intelligence.

- **System 2** (sometimes called analytic, higher order, rational, reflective, rule based, systematic) is conscious, controlled, explicit, high effort, slow, evolutionarily recent, linked to language, abstract, general, logical, rule-based, sequential, heritable, and associated with general intelligence. System 2 processing thus exhibits the two key concepts of consciousness: awareness and volition (Evans, 2008).

Although some dual process theorists view these two systems as parallel and often competitive in nature (e.g., Sloman, 1996), we think it is more accurate to assume that System 1 is the default processing system which can be monitored and overruled by System 2, but rarely is. In this default/interventionist view, System 2 requires access to some sort of goal-directed "executive monitor" that can control processing (Hastie, 1986), while System 1 does not.

2.1. Coping with Cognitive Limits

Before moving on it is important to address a crucial issue that, at first glance, seems obvious, but becomes more and more ambiguous, the longer you think about it. If System 1 processing is automatic, reflexive, and unconscious, should we even call something that is guided by it a "decision"? And why then, even bother discussing System 1 processing in a chapter on decision-making? The answer has to do with the cognitive limitations that all organisms must confront. Cognitive limits affect these two modes of information processing in very different ways. Because System 1 processing is very fast and almost effortless, it is limited primarily by the abilities of our sense organs to perceive and process incoming information. Human beings do not have eyes in the back of their heads nor ears that can hear distant conversations. Long ago, the five sense organs each evolved their own relatively independent and self-contained modules in the brain with very limited storage capacity and direct—and therefore very fast—access to the central nervous system. Many other brain functions have similarly developed relatively independent cognitive structures. This basic architecture of cognition (Anderson, 1983) allows for very rapid, multi-channeled System 1 parallel processing in all of us.

Not so for System 2 processing. Even limiting consideration to sights that are somehow before our eyes and sounds that are nearby, there is usually more in our visual and auditory fields than can be processed because all incoming stimuli must pass through "short-term" or "working" memory, which has a very limited capacity (of approximately 7, ± 2, bits of information; Miller, 1956). This attention bottleneck is in practice the most important "bound" on System 2 processing. Therefore *attention* and the factors that influence it are, as a consequence, crucially important to all types of information processing, including the active monitoring of System 1 processing that occurs in the centralized limited-capacity working memory. These limits on working memory also dictate that most System 2 information processing will occur *serially*, that is, one goal at a time.

If an incoming stimulus is processed by working memory—and again, that is a big IF—it can be more or less permanently stored in long-term memory, which is usually envisioned as an associative network of nodes and the connections between them, that for all practical purposes has an unlimited capacity. *Retrieval* from long-term memory, on the other hand,

is far from perfect, and is another important limitation on System 2 processing. Memory is a function of how the initial stimulus was processed—that is, what was associated with it—pre-existing memory structures (schemas) related to it, the frequency and recency of exposure to the same stimulus (which influences the strength of the connections between nodes), and so on (Simon, 1957, 1979; Anderson, 1983).

Even if one is concerned primarily with System 2 intentional deliberative decision-making then, we have to be aware of and consider System 1 processes because they strongly influence, consciously and unconsciously, the attentional and memory inputs into deliberative decision-making. We have to consider System 1 processing because it is simply impossible to ignore it.

3. Theoretical Approaches for Studying Decision-Making: Is vs. Ought

3.1. Rational Choice Theory (and System 2 Processing)

The most knowledgeable and devoted college basketball fans will have been watching games and studying these teams all season long before filling out their March Madness brackets. They will know who the best players are, how consistently they play at the top of their game, and which teams have recently lost starters to injury that will prevent them from playing in some or all of the games in the tournament. They will know which teams are "hot" coming into the tournament, having won a number of games in a row and thus playing with great confidence, and which teams are not. They will know where the games are being played, how far teams have had to travel to get there, and how many of their fans are likely to be in the stands to root them on. They will know which of these teams have already played each other earlier in the season, and who won those games. They will judge which of these various considerations are most important, weigh them accordingly, and update/revise initial impressions they may have formed about these teams earlier in the season. They will understand that none of these factors are deterministic, and try to estimate and factor in the probabilities that any of these causes will actually come to bear on the game at hand. They will bring all of this knowledge to bear to made decisions about who will win each individual game, spending hours filling out their brackets.

Such people are good examples of expert "rational" decision makers. Although not nearly as fun and exciting as filling out your brackets during March Madness, one could imagine a citizen trying to decide whether to vote for Joe Biden or Donald Trump in a similar manner. The process is deliberate, conscious, relatively difficult, and therefore slow. It is the epitome of a System 2 process. It assumes that people *have* relatively fixed and stable pre-existing preferences for different outcomes, and further that those preferences are immediately available to decision makers. The earliest theoretical model of decision-making, the classic economic *rational choice* approach associated with von Neuman and Morgenstern (1947), assumed such a process (see Oppenheimer and Kelso, 2015, for a brief history of the rational choice approach). Thus classic economic rational choice theory (RCT) views humans as "omniscient calculators" (Lupia et al., 2000) who can readily perform the cognitive

manipulations required to reach a decision. Although even a cursory understanding of psychology and the limitations of human cognition makes us realize such an assumption is unwarranted, other social sciences, including social psychology (see Gilovich & Griffin, 2010) and political science (e.g., Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1968) adopted these theories to describe their own types of decision-making.

One of the things that makes RCT so attractive is that if its dictates are followed—that is, if the information a decision maker has collected is accurate, comprehensive, and the estimates of probability prescient—the resulting decision promises the highest probability of producing the best value-maximizing result. Thus rational choice is how decision makers *should* decide—at least if they want to make a value-maximizing choice. This makes rational choice theory an attractive *normative* standard against which to judge actual decision-making processes. At the same time, much RCT research seems to suggest people *can* behave in the "rational" ways described by the theories. If people failed to meet normative standards, it is due to errors—biases —that could, given sufficient information, ample learning opportunities, and appropriate effort, be overcome. RCT has long been employed to help understand many types of decisions—including political decisions—from the most mundane vote choices (Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968; Aldrich, 1993; Hinich & Munger, 1994) to the most earth-shaking, existential foreign policy decisions (e.g., Fearon, 1995; Levy, 1997). See also Chong's review in Chapter 4 and Levy's discussion in Chapter 10, this volume.

Unfortunately, the term "rational" has become loaded, and has many different meanings (March, 1978; Rubenstein, 1998). For the most part our interest is in *procedural rationality— that* is, has a rational process been followed during information search, evaluations, and choice? A "rational choice," then, is one based on relatively fixed preferences and following a *logic of consequence*, by which current actions are dictated by anticipation of the value associated with future outcomes (March, 1994). Rational decision makers are motivated to maximize their "interests," although the theory is silent about what those interests ought to be. This restriction on the meaning of rationality also draws attention to the fact that RCT does not guarantee that the value-maximizing outcome *will* be obtained, only that it is the most likely outcome.

But would anyone actually do this? A rational decision maker must seek out all relevant information (with "relevance" usually defined subjectively) about every possible alternative. Even assuming the decision maker has a "utility register" in his brain that can easily assign utilities to different outcomes, once there are more than a few outcomes to keep in mind, each weighed by some subjective probability of occurring, keeping track of the calculations becomes quite challenging. Many rational choice models, most notably Downs (1957), consider the cost of gathering information as a means of limiting the burdens on the decision maker. Such models can be viewed as "optimization under constraints." New information should be gathered until the marginal costs of additional information exceed the marginal returns from that information. Although considering information costs seems at first glance a plausible way of limiting cognitive effort, in fact any "stopping rule" actually takes more cognitive effort to employ (Vriend, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). In practical terms, information search—data gathering—is probably the most effortful and influential aspect of decision-making, yet it is outside the realm of most RCT models.

There are two issues here, one concerning ability, the second concerning motivation. Is it *possible* for the unaided decision maker to craft anything but the simplest decisions in

the manner directed by the rational choice approach? Given the number of computations involved, and the limitations of working memory, the answer must be "No." Give that same person a pencil and paper, however—or better yet, a personal computer or smartphone—and the answer is probably "Yes": for the most part the computational demands are within reason, and the memory problem can be overcome by simply making lists of pluses and minuses associated with any alternative.[6]

But *would* many decision makers go to all this effort to make a decision? Here the issue of motivation arises as a serious challenge to Rational Choice Theory. Perhaps citizens *could* follow most of the dictates of RCT for arriving at a good voting decision—but why would they bother? It is a lot of work to learn everything there is to know about the competing candidates. According to the theory, it is only rational for someone to expend all of this effort if the expected value of making the correct vote choice is greater than the cost of all of this information gathering and computation. A serious conundrum in Rational Choice Theory is the problem of *stopping* information search. How can anyone know if the cost of the next piece of information exceeds its value? As best as we can tell, RCT is silent on this question (but see Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).[7]

That so many people nonetheless *do* bother to vote suggests either that many people are irrational or that RCT is somehow flawed. The flaw, we think, is not in assuming that people want to be rational, but in *pretending that people actually make decisions* this way. March (1994) captures this perfectly when he asks whether "decision makers pursue a logic of consequence, making choices among alternatives by evaluating their consequences in terms of prior preferences" (p. viii). This "logic of consequence" simply does not describe how people make the vast majority of the decisions they make in all aspects of their lives, including (but certainly not limited to) politics.

3.2. Behavioral Decision Theory (and System 1 Processing)

The vast majority of people who vote in elections and enter March Madness contests do not have the knowledge or time to make decisions in such a deliberate, rational manner, however. People can, of course, just pick winners randomly, and if you do not care about winning and only enter the contest because of social pressure to be part of the crowd, there is little reason to do anything else. Curiously, electoral politics does provide at least one instance where such decision-making is arguably likely to occur, in countries such as Australia, Belgium, and Brazil, where *compulsory voting laws* are relatively strongly enforced, and many "reluctant" voters show up at the polls and vote only because they are required to. Would such reluctant voters put much effort into figuring out how they want to vote, or would they, for all intents and purposes, just vote randomly? Compulsory voting laws definitely increase turnout (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Birch, 2008), as they are meant to do, but they may do so at the cost of lower quality decision-making on the part of at least some voters (Selb & Lachat, 2009; Hooghe & Stiers, 2017; Dassonneville et al, 2019).

Most people do want to win contests they enter, however, just like they do care about the outcome of elections. They just do not have the time, knowledge, and motivation of political wonks or die-hard college basketball experts to devote to these decisions. In contrast to the normative focus of RCT, *behavioral decision theory* (BDT) takes as its primary goal describing—and thus understanding—how people actually do make decisions. Every

study of decision-making in the real world has shown that rarely are all alternatives known, all outcomes considered, or all values evoked simultaneously. People generally settle for alternatives that are "good enough" rather than value maximizing. Named by Edwards (1961), behavioral decision theory begins with the view of humans as limited information processors, with neither the motivation nor the ability to make the sort of "consequential" System 2 calculations described by rational choice (Simon, 1979; Anderson, 1983; Gilovich & Griffin, 2010; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Takemura, 2021). From this perspective, the term *bounded rationality*, coined by Simon (1947, 1957), aptly characterizes human cognition.

Behavioral decision theory assumes that people generally *want* to make good decisions—they just cannot do so in the ideal manner described by RCT. Instead, humans have developed mechanisms, or rules, to deal with information overload. These mechanisms are typically employed automatically without conscious forethought—which is to say, they are essentially System 1 processes. Most are quite general and have ramifications for many aspects of human life. For example, *categorization* or grouping seems to be a basic property of human perception, such that when a new stimulus is perceived, the first thing people try to do is categorize it as another instance of some familiar group (Rosch, 1978). Categorical, or schema-based, processing is cognitively efficient because once a stimulus is perceived as another instance of some preexisting category, the details of the new stimulus can be largely ignored and "default values" associated with the category can be assumed to hold. Conover and Feldman (1989) and Lodge (Hamill et al., 1985; Lodge & Hamill, 1986) provide many political examples of such processing.

More generally, decision makers seem to simplify their task in at least three fundamental ways: decomposition, editing, and heuristic use.

- *Decomposition* means breaking a decision down into component parts, each of which is presumably easier to evaluate than the entire decision. Problem decomposition is closely related to the specialization and division of labor that is essential in any successful organization.
- *Editing* refers to eliminating (i.e., ignoring) relevant aspects of a decision. Voters might simplify their task by restricting attention to familiar candidates, effectively removing one or more alternatives from the choice set. "Single-issue voters" limit the number of "outcomes" associated with each candidate to a manageable number, thus also largely avoiding the need to resolve goal conflicts. A decision maker could simply count the number of pluses and minuses associated with each alternative rather than trying to weight them by importance or devise an evaluative scale with more than two levels. All of these editing procedures would greatly simplify any decision.
- *Heuristics* are problem solving strategies (again, often employed automatically or unconsciously) that serve to "keep the information processing demands of the task within bounds" (Abelson & Levi, 1985, p. 255). They are cognitive shortcuts, rules of thumb for making certain judgments or inferences that are useful in decision-making. Their key attribute is that heuristics reduce the need for the complete search for alternatives and their consequences dictated by RCT.

While editing in particular would seem to align nicely with processes described by political scientists such as single issue voting, there has been little research into the first two mechanisms, while a large literature has developed within psychology about heuristics

and their role in decision-making. This literature takes two directions. In one, exemplified by the heuristics and biases program of Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974), heuristics are unavoidable but inevitably lead to bias—failures of rational decision-making. This is the predominate view of heuristics in psychology. The use of heuristics is not so much adaptive as something to be minimized as much as possible in order to make better decisions. Heuristics that developed and must have been adaptive in pre-technological environments may now often lead to bias in the complex environment of modern society.

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identify three common cognitive heuristics employed in lieu of detailed information gathering and analysis. While allowing decision makers to simplify complex judgments by focusing on a small subset of all possible information, they come with the likely cost of failing to maximize utility. These heuristics include *availability—judging* frequency, probability, and causality by how accessible or available concrete examples are in memory, or how easy it is to generate a plausible scenario; *representativeness—assigning* specific instances to specific categories (stereotypes, schemata) according to how well the specific instance fits the essential properties of one category rather than another; and *anchoring and adjustment—forming* (or somehow being given) a tentative response first and then adjusting by reviewing relevant data. These processes are ubiquitous; the problem is how to make good decisions in spite of them. The overarching conclusion of this program of research is that in the end, decision makers do cope with their cognitive limits by using heuristics, but using these heuristics results—most often—in a lower quality decision than if a fully rational process had been used.

The heuristics and biases program examines the limits of rational decision-making while arguing that rational choice/utility maximizing and Bayesian updating of preferences is the normative standard against which actual decisions should be tested. This is not the only possibility. Earlier work by Simon (1957) rejects this normative criterion for an alternative standard of *bounded rationality* through satisficing. Decision makers can cope with their cognitive limits and make reasonably rational decisions if we loosen the definition to be "good enough" rather than maximizing. *Satisficing* assumes that decision makers set aspiration levels for every attribute of judgment about which they care, and consider alternatives one-at-a-time, continuing search until an alternative is discovered that meets or exceeds the aspiration level for every criteria. Search then stops and this alternative is chosen. If no such alternative is found, aspiration levels are lowered and the process repeated until an alternative that "satisfies" all criteria is found. Satisficing involves relatively simple cognitive processes. An alternative is sought that is satisfactory on every criterion of judgment, *without* comparing the alternatives to each other. Indeed, some alternatives may be totally ignored, and there is no guarantee that anything approaching the "best" alternative will be selected. Obviously the *order* in which alternatives are considered can completely determine which alternative is selected.[8]

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that all three of these mechanisms can at times lead to poor decisions. Decomposition, for example, can lead to very embarrassing results when the components of a decision are treated as independent when in fact they are not. A candidate who stresses one set of policies in personal appearances and another set of policies in political advertisements at best puts forth a very diffuse and unfocused message and at worst can be caught espousing contradictory policies. Editing can lead to poor decisions when the ignored aspects of the decision would result, cumulatively, in a

new preference order across alternatives if those ignored aspects had been considered. In addition, heuristics can lead to systematic biases when the reason the heuristic is generally effective (e.g., more frequent occurrences really *are* easier to recall; numerical anchors provided by the decision context usually *are* reasonable) is not true in some particular instance.

3.3.   A Compromise: Ecological Rationality and Fast & Frugal Decision-Making

Satisficing provides a framework for the second perspective on the role of heuristics, the "adaptive toolbox" of Gigerenzer and his colleagues (1999, 2008, 2011). Their "fast and frugal" heuristics build on Simon's insight that decision-making operates within the interaction between an organism's cognitive limits and the environment in which it exists, and thus their research clearly falls into the BDT camp. They posit an "ecological rationality" where fast and frugal heuristics are an even more efficient and effective decision-making approach than satisficing. By "ecological," they mean a logic that is defined and based upon the context or situation in which the decision must be made. The best way for an emergency room doctor to make triage decisions in a crisis might be very different from how that same doctor might make treatment decisions if she had more time. Fast and frugal heuristics are adaptive mechanisms—rules of thumb—that can be fruitfully used in the modern world. Satisficing is the most complicated of these "simple heuristics." Much easier is applying an ignorance-based heuristic like *recognition*, which draws from our innate ability to recognize a cue from experience and to apply it quickly and effectively. In deciding which of two cities has a larger population, for example, adopting the rule that if you recognize one city but not the other, the one you recognize is larger, can be quite successful.

Additional heuristics in the adaptive toolbox include a series of one-reason heuristics, such as "Take the Best," which posits simply using the most accessible or apparently relevant information to make a quick decision. Casual basketball fans who enter March Madness contests mostly for fun can use a Take the Best heuristic in filling out their brackets, applying the rankings of the NCAAP experts who created the brackets in the first place to always pick the team with the higher seed to win. On average, this approach is far superior to picking randomly. More generally, Take the Best includes rules for information search, stopping search, and making a choice, and thus is also more comprehensive than standard RCT models which have a hard time explaining how and when information search stops. An application of Take the Best by Graefe and Armstrong (2012) finds that identifying what voters consider the "most important problem" in polls, and assuming they use that one issue to determine their preferred candidate—that is, they "take the best" candidate on this one issue—results in a model that predicts election outcomes as well as much more complicated econometric models.

Such voters make good use of low information, low effort decision-making that is still likely to be reasonably successful—rationality with constraints (Simon, 1957; Popkin, 1991; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). No one would call this "rational choice," although it is certainly not mindless, nor would we expect it to be as effective in most circumstances as the deliberate, high-information high-effort decision process described earlier. American politics abounds with such decision makers in just about all of its elections, people who follow the most obvious and powerful political heuristic and simply "pull the party lever" when they enter

the voting booth, voting for every candidate affiliated with the political party with which they identify. These are low-information, but not no-information, decision makers. One can easily imagine situations when such a heuristic-based one-reason strategy would not work very well (see Lau & Redlawsk, 2001a, for one example), but in reality, those situations do not occur very frequently.

While there are other fast and frugal heuristics, the point here is that decision makers can rely on multiple heuristics adaptable to particular decision environments. With ecological rationality, a decision's "rationality" is based not on some careful cost/benefit analysis and complicated information search, but on how well the decision fits with the environmental structure in which it is made. We can adopt an evolutionary perspective and conclude that common heuristics must, in general, "work," in the sense of producing choices that are, if not optimal, at least "good enough" most of the time to encourage their reproduction—and rarely bad enough to lead to extinction (Simon, 1957; Santos & Rosati, 2015). Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) argue that the value of heuristics should not be judged against some abstract and impossible-to-reach "value maximizing" standard, but comparatively against other models of how decisions might actually be reached. This strategy assumes that there is some standard, some criterion of "correctness," against which the accuracy of choices can be judged. As such, it represents a reasonable compromise between the value-maximizing decisions promised by RCT and the impossible cognitive demands required to get there. We will have more to say about decision quality in section 8 Fbelow.

4. Methods for Studying Decision-making

We can make sense of many of the diverse findings from the BDT literature by suggesting that decision makers are generally guided by two competing goals: (1) *the desire to make a good decision*, and (2) *the desire to reach a decision with the minimal cognitive effort* (Payne et al., 1993; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). This leads to another important distinction between rational choice theory and behavioral decision theory. RCT focuses attention on the *structure* or *elements* of a decision—the multiple alternatives in the choice set, and the mean value of the different "considerations" or outcomes that are associated, with some probability, with each alternative.

4.1. Multivariate Analysis of a Decision

Typical political science research on the vote choice follows this general pattern. The standard procedure is to gather representative survey data shortly after an election and regress reports of the vote choice on a set of attitudinal and demographic predictors. As an illustration of this standard practice, the authors employed data from the 2016 ANES survey to consider vote choice in the 2016 US presidential election, regressing vote for Trump over Clinton on a set of demographic indicators, personality variables, political values, general political self-identifications, and specific policy views. American politics, with its deeply entrenched two-party system, makes life easier for the analyst by restricting the serious alternatives to two, but there are still innumerable dimensions across which those two candidates can differ. Our simple analysis reveals that a vote for Trump was significantly associated with

being White and not Black, thinking of oneself as lower working class, holding sexist and moral-traditional beliefs, Republican and conservative self-identification, and conservative policy views on Obamacare, affirmative action, immigration policy, abortion, and isolationism. These are the elements, criteria, or attributes of judgment that led to Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 US presidential election.

Multivariate regressions summarize average direct effects in a sample, but do not tell us anything about how individual voters reached their decisions. It is reassuring to see that on average people with more conservative policy views reported voting for the more conservative candidate, and vice versa. Indeed, it is easy to explain the direction of most of the coefficient estimates in our equation—even those that are not statistically different from zero. However, have we learned anything from such an analysis about how this decision was actually reached? Even very high quality election surveys such as the ANES that gather most of the information used to "predict" the vote choice in a pre-election wave of interviews, are gathering the information from respondents who have already decided how they are going to vote. Almost 96% of the pre-election ANES respondents who preferred Clinton to Trump reported voting for her in the election, while almost 98% of the respondents who preferred Trump at the time of the pre-election survey reported voting for him. We readily acknowledge the inherent difficulty of studying decisions in election campaigns, which extend over relatively long periods of time and are designed to try to change opinions, but are often embedded in longstanding, historically and culturally rich electoral systems. It is never clear, with such data, if the "predictors" in the equation are the cause, or the result, of the vote decision.

4.2. Decision-Making Scales Measuring Cognitive Styles

In an attempt to extract more information about actual decision-making processes from survey data, Lau, Kleinberg, and Ditonto (2018) devised the *PolDec-5*, a 13-item, five-factor political decision-making scale. Modeled after the work of Lau and Redlawsk (2006), this instrument asks respondents to describe how they typically make political decisions. There are subscales designed to measure deliberative System 2 (rational choice) decision-making, intuitive System 1 heuristic-based decision-making, fast and frugal decision-making, partisan-based motivated reasoning decision-making, and strictly affective "gut" decision-making. These subscales have solid internal consistency, significantly high predictive validity, and reasonably high discriminant validity in that they are relatively distinct from prior more general measures of decision-making. Although there is to date little published research employing this scale, it is a promising route for future researchers to follow if they hope to be able to say more about decision-making styles from election survey data, particularly if the scale could be administered in the early waves of a panel study at the outset of an election campaign, before many people have decided how they are going to vote.

4.3. Process Tracing Methods

In contrast to RCT's focus on the structure of decisions, behavioral decision theory is much more likely to be concerned with the dynamic *processes* of *how decisions are made*, focusing on information search and strategies for making choices. The underlying assumption of much of the behavioral decision theory research is that the best way to study

decision-making is to observe it *while the decision is being made* (Abelson & Levi, 1985). It is hard to argue with such a commonsense conclusion, but actually accomplishing that task requires specialized tools that many social scientists have not learned to use.

Fortunately, BDT researchers have developed various *process tracing* methodologies for observing decisions "while they happen." As described in a recent review article by Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. (2017), these methods differ in how intrusive (i.e., unnatural, reactive, likely to distort) and time-resolute (how closely a method maps a process) they are. These methods include verbal protocols that ask decision makers to "think aloud" while they are making a choice (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1984), computer-based information boards that provide decision makers with an attributes X alternatives matrix of decision-relevant information and records the amount, nature, and sequence of information search (e.g., Johnson & Ratcliff, 2014; Andersen et al., 2019), eye-tracking technology that records what someone is looking at (usually on a computer screen; see Russo, 2011), muscle tension (EMG) indicators that track facial expressions while people are making decisions (e.g., Ravaja, et al., 2018), and fMRI neuro-imaging that tracks blood flow through different regions of the brain while a person is making a decision (e.g., Garrigan et al., 2016).

Lau and Redlawsk (2006; see Andersen et al., 2019, for a general description) developed the *Dynamic Process Tracing Environment* (DPTE) experimental platform with the specific goal of observing decision-making in ongoing, dynamic social situations such as political campaigns. DPTE was a free, web-based client-server system that allows researchers to design experiments in a large variety of ways, designing specific information environments and recording detailed information about what people consider while making decisions in those different environments. The key feature of DPTE was an indelible aspect of our modern media environment—it allowed decision makers tremendous *discretion* over what to look at, and what to avoid or ignore.

The DPTE system was widely employed by social scientists over the past dozen years to study decision-making in many different contexts, including attitudes toward climate change (Peralta et al., 2016); Italian mayoral elections (Russo, 2017); motivated reasoning (Redlawsk, 2002; Redlawsk et al., 2010); offloading (Kleinberg & Lau, 2021); partisan preferences over time (Andersen & Ditonto, 2020), personality and interpersonal disagreement (Lyons et al., 2016); sexism, gender, and appearance biases in electoral campaigns (Ditonto et al., 2014; Ditonto, 2016, 2018, 2019); social media cues (Pierce et al., 2017); social networks and information search (Levitant & Wronski, 2014); Supreme Court nominations (Chen & Bryan, 2018); and terrorism and confidence in government (Hoffman & Shelby, 2017). Chen (2021) provides a useful summary of key research that made use of this methodology.

Unfortunately, technological changes—in particular, the demise of Adobe's flash player—rendered the DPTE system unusable and it was retired. Until DPTE can be re-written to run in html5, researchers will have to devise other techniques for detailed study of information process in rapidly changing dynamic environments.

5. Decision Strategies

Process tracing allows the researcher to observe the decision strategies that people use. *A decision strategy is a set of mental and physical operations employed in reaching a decision.* It includes identifying alternatives, searching for information about the possible outcomes

associated with each alternative, making probabilistic judgments about the likelihood of those different outcomes, and searching through memory to determine how much each of those outcomes is valued, and how important it is in this particular context, and so on. A decision strategy also includes a method for choosing among the alternatives. Elsewhere (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Lau, 2021; Redlawsk & Habegger, 2021), we have described decision strategies in some detail; here we will just quickly summarize.

5.1. Confronting/Avoiding Value Tradeoffs

Decision strategies differ in terms of how cognitively difficult they are to use, how much of the available information they consider, how balanced or evenly divided information search is across alternatives, and their likelihood of reaching a "best" decision. They are typically categorized in the literature by the extent to which they confront or avoid conflict (Billings & Marcus, 1983; Ford et al., 1989). If one alternative is preferred to all others on every dimension of judgment, it "dominates" the other alternatives (Hastie and Dawes, 2010), and there should be no conflict in making a decision. When one alternative is preferred on one dimension of judgment but a different alternative is preferred on another dimension, however, the potential for value conflict or tradeoffs exists.

- *Compensatory* strategies are cognitively complex information integration rules where decision makers are assumed to assign a value to every attribute associated with each alternative. Expected utility is perhaps the most famous compensatory strategy (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1951). Some of those values can be positive and others negative, but when they are combined into an overall evaluation or decision, a positive value on one dimension can *compensate for* or trade-off against a negative value on another dimension. Thus value tradeoffs are explicitly confronted and reconciled.

Different compensatory strategies vary on the extent to which information is weighted and whether outcome importance or probability is considered, but they all assume full information—that is, the decision maker includes all relevant attributes and outcomes for all relevant alternatives. Rational choice clearly assumes compensatory decision strategies, as does any process that assumes Bayesian updating (e.g., Hill, 2017).[9] Multiple regression assumes a compensatory process in making its predictions.

- *Noncompensatory* strategies rely on incomplete information search to avoid conflicts. Negative values on one attribute or possible outcome cannot trade off against positive values on another attribute or outcome; instead, alternatives are eliminated once negative information is encountered or some attributes are simply ignored.

A great deal of research has shown that most decision makers, most of the time, try to avoid value tradeoffs (Hogarth, 1987; Sidarus et al., 2019). This avoidance has a cost, however: potentially lower quality decisions. Some noncompensatory strategies rely on considering only a limited subset of attributes for all alternatives, while others focus on a subset of alternatives. Described earlier, Simon's satisficing heuristic (1957) was the first and most

famous noncompensatory strategy identified. Satisficers are looking to meet an aspiration level and take the first alternative they run across that meets that level. Another well-known noncompensatory strategy is the elimination-by-aspects strategy (Tversky, 1972) whereby decision makers consider the attributes of judgment in order of their relative importance, eliminating alternatives as soon as they do not meet or exceed the aspiration level for the attribute under consideration. This process is fairly complex, but it does avoid conflict by eliminating alternatives as soon as conflicts occur.

A review by Shaddy, Fishbach, and Simonson (2021) argues that people have essentially two general approaches to resolving value conflicts, either following some sort of mixed, compromise solution, or adopting an extreme, one-sided strategy. A person who stops at Starbucks on their way into work in the morning has to trade off cost versus quantity. Someone who typically buys the medium coffee, rather than the small or the large, has adopted a mixed solution, balancing between two conflicting goals. That same person may opt for the large coffee on particular (long) workdays, when the need for caffeine outweighs cost concerns. In this case, the decision is reached by highlighting one of the two conflicting goals. With repeated choices, that person can return to a mixed solution if they justify their large coffee yesterday by saving money and getting a small coffee today. These same authors suggest that novices in a choice domain, concrete quantitative framing of considerations, options that are relatively independent of each other, and available cognitive resources, all encourage compromise solutions; while expertise in a particular domain; abstract qualitative framing of considerations, options that form a gestalt, and limited mental resources, all encourage extreme solutions.

5.2. A Typology: Categorizing Decision Strategies

Given this brief summary, one may well ask, how can you tell which strategy a decision maker is using? A very important finding of BDT research is that *different patterns of information search clearly reflect distinguishable choice strategies*. If decision makers use compensatory strategies, process tracing will show reasonably equal information search across alternatives and attributes. But if the cognitively limited decision maker uses heuristics and other simplifying strategies, this will typically appear as imbalanced search, with some alternatives and attributes receiving more attention than others, as with noncompensatory strategies. Thus, a key to understanding any decision is observing how people acquire information, because this in turn sheds light on the decision rules or heuristics that people follow in making their choice.

As displayed in Figure 5.1, Lau and Redlawsk (2006) placed decision strategies into four broad categories that differed in the quantity of information that would have to be gathered (or otherwise had in hand), and the comparability of the information sought about the different alternatives in the choice set. Their focus was on voter decision-making, but the same basic framework can be applied to any type of decision. Rational choice System 2 strategies, which assume that decision makers gather as much information as they possibly can about every alternative in the choice set, and carefully consider and balance the positive and negative aspects of every alternative, clearly fall into the first (Model 1) category. We label this category *dispassionate* decision-making to emphasize the assumption that this strategy presumes careful objective information processing of decision-relevant

A Typology: Four Kinds of Decision Strategies

| | | Comparability of Search | |
		Balanced	*Imbalanced*
Depth of Information Search	*Deep*	Model 1 Rational Choice *Dispassionate decision making*	Model 2 Affect-driven motivated reasoning and cognitive consistency *Confirmatory decision making*
	Shallow	Model 3 Ecological Rationality *Fast & Frugal decision making*	Model 4 Bounded rationality, cognitive shortcuts, and heuristics *Intuitive decision making*

FIGURE 5.1 A typology: Four kinds of decision strategies

information. The other extreme, Model 4, which we label *intuitive* decision-making, includes all of the more informal intuitive strategies that are guided primarily by very rapid (and sometime automatic, and thus relatively "mindless") System 1 processes identified by BDT. These strategies all employ quite shallow information search that is often imbalanced across alternatives—if more than a single alternative is even considered. We place the ecological rationality of *fast and frugal* strategies in a distinct category (Model 3) because, while they by definition involve fast and therefore relatively shallow information search, the promise of ecological rationality means that the limited decision criteria (such as recognition) must be applied to all of the alternatives in the choice set. We therefore place these strategies under the balanced heading.

We have not yet talked about the remaining Model 2 category of decision strategies, which we label *confirmatory* decision-making. In a time of polarized politics, it seems like just about every political decision all of us are making would fall into this category. We place it in the "deep search" row, but it would be more accurate to describe our expectations as intermediate: no requirement for either the comprehensive as-deep-as-possible search of Model 1 rational choice, or the definitional shallow search of Models 3 and 4. The defining characteristic of Model 2 strategies is that they are guided—either implicitly or explicitly—by the goal of confirming prior affective judgments or decisions a person has made rather than accurately updating them. We address this topic more thoroughly in section 6 below.

5.3. Deciding *How* to Decide

The framework for categorizing different types of decision strategies presented in Figure 1 is meant to be comprehensive, applicable to any type of decision. Having described these broad types of decision strategies, we should now ask whether everyone uses these different strategies, or do different people tend to *specialize* in the use of one or another type of strategy, employing them across different types of decisions? Asked differently, are there some people who tend to be very rational and methodical in their decision-making, while others typically employ more intuitive and heuristic-based decision strategies? The broad answer is that there is little evidence for systematic individual differences in use of these different strategies. Instead, almost all people seem to have available a wide variety of different decision strategies that they can and do employ in making decisions. Choice of

decision strategy seems to be highly contingent on the nature of the decision task (Payne et al., 1993; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Hence, BDT research has primarily focused on contextual factors that make it more likely that one or another strategy will be employed.

One very important set of factors involves the complexity or size of the decision task. *Task complexity* is usually defined in terms of the number of alternatives under consideration and the number of different attributes across which they vary; the more complex the task the more reliance on simplifying decision heuristics. This is true for both variation in the number of alternatives (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001b) and the number of attributes under consideration (Keller & Staelin, 1987), although the former seems to have much more consistent effects than the latter. As a rule, decision makers rely on noncompensatory decision strategies when there are more than two alternatives, but they may use compensatory strategies if there are only two alternatives (Tversky, 1972).

The more *important* the decision is to the decision maker, the more she will be motivated by decision accuracy rather than decision ease, and the greater will be the effort expended in making the decision (Payne et al., 1993). Thus, information search should be deeper, and compensatory decision strategies will be more likely to be employed (Lindberg et al., 1989). Moreover, motivated reasoning effects should be attenuated by a focus on accuracy (Redlawsk, 2002). This reasoning assumes that deeper information search leads to better decisions, a conclusion that is easy to reach granted omniscient rationality and demonic abilities, but may not actually hold for limited information processors. Indeed, we (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006) as well as Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999; Czerlinski et al., 1999) have demonstrated at least some instances when additional information actually results in lower quality judgments.

There are additional factors that can affect the difficulty of the choice facing decision makers, holding task size constant. One is *time pressure*, which may shift a decision maker's goals from accuracy to efficiency. Thus decision makers faced with time pressure—say the deadline of election day—may accelerate processing (that is, work faster); reduce the amount of information considered, focusing on the most important factors; or change decision strategies, shifting from a compensatory to a noncompensatory strategy (Holsti, 1989; Payne et al., 1988). Another factor that affects task complexity is the similarity of the alternatives to each other. When alternatives are very *dis*similar, it is relatively easy to distinguish between them and choose the best one. A noncompensatory choice strategy might very well lead to a different choice than a compensatory strategy, however. When alternatives are relatively similar to each other, it is much more difficult to find the best alternative (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001a; Pierce & Lau, 2019). Depth of search should increase (Bockenholt et al., 1991), and decision makers may be more likely to employ a compensatory decision strategy.

Variations in *how information is displayed* or becomes available are also known to affect decision-making. Information rarely becomes available in an orderly, controllable manner, especially in the context of political decisions. If information is obtained about alternatives sequentially, the decision maker has little choice but to engage in alternative-based decision strategies, while simultaneous acquisition of information about multiple alternatives makes attribute-based search possible (Tversky, 1969). More subtle variations of information display can also make alternative-based or attribute-based processing more likely (e.g., Herstein, 1981) and even determine whether particular information is utilized at all (Russo, 1977). During an election campaign, for instance, watching a rally, speech, or party

convention for a single candidate provides primarily alternative-based information; a political debate, on the other hand, provides largely attribute-based information (Rahn et al., 1994). The *completeness* of the information—that is, whether the same information is available about every alternative—determines whether inferences about the missing data are necessary (Ford & Smith, 1987) but can also influence whether information "outside of the box" is even considered in making the decision.

5.4. Behavioral Economics and Nudging Behavior

Behavioral Economics—a direct outgrowth of BDT—is a growing subfield of economics that takes as its starting assumption that people are *not* rational in the expected utility, Bayesian updating, and conscious deliberative System 2 processing sense described above. This large and rapidly growing literature was recently reviewed by Wilson (2011) and has been summarized in several large collections of scholarly work (e.g., Zanir & Teichman, 2014; Bernhiem et al., 2018; Del Ponte et al., 2021). It is our sense that at the level of individual decision-making, the behavioral economics literature pretty much replicates what is in the psychology literature, while giving more emphasis to tangible economic incentives, as opposed to less tangible "psychological" rewards. What we find to be much more interesting in this literature is research that attempts to experimentally manipulate institutional/organizational arrangements. But that takes us outside of the narrower scope of this chapter.

We should briefly mention one line of research that has gotten particular attention, however—nudging—that is based on behavioral decision theory research (and common sense) and that attempts to change people's behavior. A "nudge" is a subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) attempt to change behavior without actually restricting choice. A prime example is trying to get more people to become organ donors by changing the default option when people are renewing their driver's license. Must people actively choose to "opt in" to become an organ donor when the no-action default is no, or actively choose to "opt out" from being an organ donor if the default is yes? In both cases, people have two options, to "decide" to become an organ donor, or to decline to become one, so no one's freedom of choice has been restricted. To no one's surprise, changing the "do nothing" default can often dramatically alter the number of people selecting one alternative or the other (from large majorities for to large majorities against, and vice versa), so much so that we would probably call this more of a "shove" than a nudge. Such decisions are guided by mindless System 1 processes, not deliberative System 2 processes. A popular book by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) discusses this and many more examples. "Nudging" has become a bit of a controversial topic because the technique can be used for societally good or narrowly self-interested, nefarious purposes (see Goldmacher, 2021, for one notorious example of the latter). A useful summary of the research on nudging can be found in Moseley (2021).

6. How *Voters* Decide

Given the basic precepts of behavioral decision theory described above, what can we say about how voters decide? We turn now to an overview of recent voter decision-making

research in political psychology that implicitly or explicitly takes a perspective supported by BDT. This literature is huge; indeed, we have written an entire book focusing explicitly on this topic. We are not going to summarize that book, nor pretend to cover comprehensively the larger literature. Instead, we will focus on a few key strands of particularly important research.

6.1. Heuristics and Voter Decision-Making

Political scientists have looked to rehabilitate voter decision-making ever since *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) taught us that the capacity of American voters appears to fall well below the standards thought necessary for voters to hold their representatives accountable. They argued that voters have no sense of ideology, no real interest or knowledge of issues, and seem to vote guided mainly by the "nature of the times." A decades-long debate ensued over voters' ability to make reasonably intelligent decisions. Either through lack of ability or lack of motivation, voters in even the most longstanding electoral democracies are not coming anywhere close to the standards set by democratic theorists (Taber & Young, 2013).

In *The Reasoning Voter* (1991), Popkin took issue with this accepted wisdom, arguing voters could make perfectly fine decisions using "gut rationality" or "limited information rationality." Voters can use the information they receive through daily life as a kind of heuristic to make sense of politics. Although Popkin offered only anecdotal evidence, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) extended this positive view of heuristic-based voting by arguing citizens could reason through political issues by simplifying the tasks and relying on the interaction of cognition and affect. That is, voters typically can identify what they like and do not like. They may in fact be able to identify groups as well and use the affect they have toward them to help make sense of the political world. The *likeability heuristic* can be applied so that knowing what group one likes and knowing what political actor the group likes (endorsements) can allow the voter to transfer that affect to the political actor. However, while heuristics may thus facilitate decision quality, they also require a modicum of information—if one does not know what the ACLU stands for, then knowing the ACLU endorses a candidate or an issue is not very useful. Sniderman and colleagues were careful to note that heterogeneity in political sophistication leads to different expectations on the effectiveness of heuristic and non-heuristic processing.

But Sniderman et al. (1991) could not actually tell with survey data if voters were using heuristics, who was using them, and what heuristics were in use; they could only assume that sophisticates did not need to use heuristics and non-sophisticates did use them, and used them badly. In order to do more than assume, we (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001a, 2006) employed the DPTE system to create a simulated presidential election campaign, asking subjects to vote in both a primary election where each party selected its leader, and then a general election campaign where the two winners faced each other. Ultimately there were 45 distinct attributes of judgment (i.e., policy stands, performance evaluations, background information, personality descriptions) about each of the six candidates who were running in either the Democratic or Republican primary elections—far more than anyone could possibly examine and process, especially given a limited amount of time.

A priori, we defined certain types of information—images of the candidates, party affiliations, interest group endorsements, liberal-conservative ratings, and poll results—as having particular heuristic value. By "heuristic value," we mean saving time and cognitive effort. Learning which candidate the National Rifle Association endorses, for example, saves voters the time and energy required to gather, process, and compare the gun control/rights policies of all of the candidates in the election. The voter essentially trusts the interest group to do all of that hard work for them. Our results suggest that while everyone uses heuristics—both sophisticated and non-sophisticated—their effectiveness in improving voter decision quality varies. In particular, some heuristics help *sophisticated* voters when the political environment is predictable, but lead to lower quality decisions when the political environment is not aligned as they expect. Our findings suggest that non-sophisticates gain little from the heuristics we tested. Kuklinski and colleagues (2001) make a similar point, finding that the nature of the information environment can either improve or detract from political decision-making.

Yet a number of studies have shown where heuristics appear to help non-sophisticates make some decisions that are better than they might otherwise make. Boudreau (2009) reports experiments where an endorsement cue leads to better decisions by unsophisticated experimental participants, closing their gap with sophisticates. Petersen (2012) and Hansen (2019) provide evidence that citizens are much more likely to endorse liberal welfare policies when the recipients are viewed as clearly deserving of the aid. Levendusky (2010) finds that as elite cues become clearer—because of political polarization of elites—the mass public is better able to adopt more consistent attitudes; similarly Pierce and Lau (2019) associate polarized elite cues with higher quality decisions. Hobolt (2007) shows that voters in European Union referendums rely on an endorsement heuristic and that this aids some voters—those who know party positions in the first place. Likewise, Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009) find in a field experiment that endorsements provided some voters with a useful heuristic that compensates for a lack of awareness. Interestingly, this worked only if the endorsement included contextual information about who the endorser was. These latter two studies comport with Sniderman et al.'s (1991) likeability heuristic.[10]

6.2. Learning by Description vs. Learning by Experience

We want to stop for a moment and highlight an important methodological difference in how heuristic "use" is studied. Psychologists typically *describe* a decision problem and infer heuristic use based on the choices the subjects make. If for example, many people, based on a brief description of her background, commit the conjunctive fallacy of thinking Linda is more likely to be a "bank teller active in the feminist movement" than simply "a bank teller," we infer they are falling prey to what Kahneman and Tversky (1972) call the representativeness heuristic. If most (non-German) subjects correctly guess that Berlin is a larger city than Dusseldorf, we infer they are using the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The vast literatures on the framing of decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) and decision-making under risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are similarly based on situations where the exact probability or different outcomes is presented to decision makers. Hertwig and colleagues call this *learning from description* (Hertwig et al. 2004; Hertwig & Erev,

2009; Hertwig et al., 2018). Usually subjects are responding to a discrete event or problem and making a choice only once.

On the other hand, we define heuristic use based on the information subjects gather in the process of making a decision. The earlier subjects accessed candidate's party affiliations, the greater they were relying on a party heuristic. The greater the number of interest group endorsements subjects considered during an election campaign, the more they were relying upon an endorsement heuristic. Herwig et al. call this *learning from experience*. Both methods are valid ways to study heuristic use in decision-making. What is exciting about this distinction is emerging evidence that the type of decisions that people make—and thus the processes they presumably used to reach those decisions—is affected by how people learn about the alternatives and choices before them. When people learn from description, for example, they tend to *overweight* the likelihood of rare events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). When they learn from experience by gathering information and making repeated choices over time, however, they tend to *underweight* the likelihood of rare events (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004). We suspect this distinction between learning from description and learning by experience will become more prominent in future political psychology research.

6.3. Online Processing

Much like heuristics, *online processing* (Lodge et al., 1989; Redlawsk, 2001) builds on the well-established tendency of humans to make relatively effortless evaluations of other people rapidly, with no need to recall from memory what went into those evaluations (Hastie & Park, 1986). Evaluation takes place as information is encountered, and an online tally (Lodge et al., 1989) summarizing the affective value of that information is updated, after which the actual information itself can be discarded. Contrasted with *memory-based processing*, online processing can be quick and easy, in the sense that when a decision must be made, a voter need only query the online tallies for the candidates and choose the more highly evaluated one. Memory-based decisions require the extra effort of querying memories for the candidates, and then forming an evaluation and making a choice (Kelly & Mirer, 1974). The important implication of online processing is that candidate evaluation (and by implication, a vote choice between two or more candidates) may be based on much more information than can be remembered in the election booth or when survey researchers ask citizens to tell them what they like and dislike about the candidates.

At the same time, we are not sure that Lodge's methodology gives memory a fair shake. The results of the original Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) experiment were driven by the processing limitations of short-term memory, rather than failures of long term memory. Study participants could not possibly process the 60 policy stands they were presented over a very brief period of time. Moreover, there was no need for memory in the follow-up Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995) study, as all available information about two competing congressional candidates was provided on a single page in an easy-to-compare format. Our own work using DPTE (Redlawsk, 2001, 2004; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006) finds an important role for memory in voter decision-making, given the asymmetric information flows of the typical political campaign that occurs over some period of time. Perhaps the most realistic tests of applying the online model to decision-making during election campaigns comes

from research carefully studying decision-making in panel studies lasting up to 12 weeks (Mitchell, 2012, 2014; Lau et al., 2016)—a time frame much closer to that of actual election campaigns. Both of these programs of research conclude that memory plays a much larger role in the vote choice than accorded to it by Lodge's research.

6.4. Motivated Reasoning

More important for present purposes is evidence that online processing is part of a broader evaluative process that may limit "accurate" updating in the face of new, contradictory, information. Online processing clearly falls into Figure 5.1's second category of affect-driven decision strategies. When processing online, *directional (and partisan) motivated reasoners* (Kunda, 1987, 1990; Redlawsk, 2002; Lodge & Taber, 2005, 2013) may assess new information in the service of maintaining existing evaluations by discounting, counter-arguing, and otherwise dismissing it when such information runs contrary to those preferences. These processes fly in the face of rational evaluations, where new negative information must lower an evaluation as readily as new positive information must increase it. It can be quite difficult to move voters with existing evaluations and preferences in the correct direction, however (Redlawsk, 2002; Redlawsk, 2006; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Redlawsk et al., 2010). One way in which directional motivated reasoning may be overcome is by holding people accountable for their decisions (Redlawsk, 2001; Scholten et al., 2007), which can activate accuracy goals that inhibit online processing and directional motivated reasoning. Which type of goal is activated may depend on the salience of the decision context (Groenendyk & Krupnikov, 2021) or the extent to which identity-protection or conformances to the expectations of an important identity group are salient (Bayes, Druckman, Goods, and Molden, 2020; Kahan, 2017).

Partisan motivations are at the core of much of politics, however. If partisan motivations are in opposition to accuracy goals, then voters are unlikely to meet even low standards for rational decision-making. Gaines et al. (2007) show how interpretations of the same information create divergent beliefs on the Iraq war, which led to divergent opinions, with better informed citizens most likely to show this effect. Lebo and Cassino (2007) identify how partisan motivated reasoning has implications for presidential approval ratings; Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott (2017) show that motivated reasoning affects the perceived credibility of public opinion polls; Schaffner and Roche (2017) demonstrate how motivated reasoning affects the accuracy or perceptions of economic news. In addition, Kopko, et al (2011) find motivated reasoning effects in ballot counting, especially when rules governing assessing voter intent are ambiguous. Their results are mirrored in 2021 by a large majority of Republican Party voters, who seem convinced that the 2020 US presidential election was somehow "stolen" from Donald Trump through the actions of fraudulent voters, despite the total lack of any credible evidence that such fraudulent voters actually existed.

While motivated reasoning effects are consistent and perhaps even inevitable, not all hope for accurate voter decision-making is lost. At some point, the amount of information encountered that is in opposition to the existing evaluation may overwhelm motivated processes (Redlawsk et al., 2010). At this tipping point, voters seem to recognize that the world is not what they thought it was, and they update with greater accuracy. As the amount of incongruence grows, anxiety about the lack of agreement between the existing

evaluation and the mounting new evidence appears to increase. This may then act to motivate a different process—what Marcus, Neumann, and MacKuen (2000) call "affective intelligence" switching processing from the maintenance of existing evaluation to an effort to more systematically evaluate new information.

7.   The Effect of Affect/Feelings/Emotions on Decision-Making

Returning once more to our running example of March madness decision-making, there are often irrational, implicit, unconscious semi-automatic reasons that people make decisions about which they may not even be aware. "Gut" decisions are like this; choices that we cannot quite put our finger on and explain, but somehow know/feel are going to be correct (Dane, Rockmann, and Pratt, 2012). During March Madness, for example, you might always pick your alma mater to win ("Go Bruins!") or some rival team to lose ("I hate Duke")[11] irrespective of judgments about the relative qualities of those teams and their opponents in the upcoming game. In such cases, the goal of the decision maker is not to be correct but to express allegiance for or against some social group. Other times there is just a "feeling" of unknown origin that one team or the other is going to win, and it can be very hard to ignore those feelings and follow a more cognitive, deliberate, informed strategy.

Politics abounds with affect-driven decisions like this, particularly in the voting booth. Affect from common social stereotypes could bias a voter for or against a particular Black/female/Muslim/older candidate and in some cases overrule party affiliation or policy agreement (Redlawsk & Lau, 2006). Physical attractiveness or perceptions of competence can often influence vote choices (Crawford et al., 2011; Ditonto, 2016, 2018, 2019). Much of the early research demonstrating the effects of "emotion" on decision-making actually manipulated positive versus negative valence rather than specific emotions. But "feelings" are more than just valence, as abundant basic research in social psychology has demonstrated (e.g., Izard, 1977; Davies, 1980; Russell, 1980; Abelson et al., 1982; Roseman et al., 1986; Marcus, 1988; see Redlawsk & Mattes, 2022, for recent reviews). Emotions such as anger, disgust, contempt, and fear (or enthusiasm, hope, and pride on the positive side of the spectrum) are essentially automatic effort-free inputs that can strongly influence choices without any awareness or knowledge of where those emotions came from (Marcus et al., 2000; Huddy et al., 2005; Valentino et al., 2011; Redlawsk et al., 2018; Roseman et al., 2020).

That said, understanding emotion is challenging, and for years decision theorists and political scientists paid it scant attention. However, feelings and emotions, we have learned, are critical to decision-making. People without the capacity for emotion are generally without the capacity for making decisions, even if otherwise psychologically undamaged (Damasio, 1999). Arguing that research on emotions has "the potential to create a paradigm shift in decision theories," Lerner et al. (2015, p. 799) state, "Emotions constitute potent, pervasive, predictable sometimes harmful and sometimes beneficial drivers of decision making." While emotions are covered in detail by Brader and Gadarian in Chapter 6 of this volume handbook, we want to make a few points here with specific focus on how emotions

can influence decision-making. (See also Stein, Chapter 11, and Cohen-Chen & Halperin, Chapter 30, this volume).

First, both integral and incidental emotions can influence decision-making. *Integral emotions* arise from the judgment or choice at hand. Anxiety arising from my first post-pandemic visit to a restaurant is integral to that decision itself; I would not be feeling anxious if I had decided to stay home and cook for myself. Such emotions can influence decisions both unconsciously and consciously. I may be unaware of what led me to further decide to sit outside at the restaurant rather than inside in the air conditioning; or consciously reason that my fear of infection will be substantially reduced if I sit outside, and thus I am more likely to enjoy a stress-free meal outside even if the ambient temperature is a bit warmer than I like. "Affect as information"—both experienced and anticipated—can be consciously incorporated into a decision strategy in the same way any other criteria may be considered information (see Wyer et al., 1999, for a review). Although the example above suggests that the emotion improves the quality of the decision, it is easy to imagine situations where an emotion can bias judgment and lead to bad choices. Fear of sharks may lead someone to visit a farm rather than the ocean, for example, even though actuarial data show that far more people are kill by cows and horses than by sharks every year (Ingraham, 2015).

Second and somewhat less obvious is overwhelming evidence that *incidental emotions—emotions* that are felt at the time a decision is made but that have nothing logically or normatively to do with the decision at hand—can also influence a decision (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Pham, 2007). Anger about something that happened at work may lead you to kick the dog or snap at your spouse when you get home, even though neither target had anything to do with why you were feeling angry in the first place. In a similar vein, chronic moods such as anxiety or depression can influence decisions (Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Bernardi & Johns, 2021). Even weather (Kamstra et al., 2003) or the success of a local sports team (Edmans et al., 2007) can have demonstrable effects on decision-making. The effects of such incidental emotions are much more likely to be unconscious than conscious.

Third, emotional states trigger processing styles, so that people in positive moods process information differently than those feeling negative. Emotions can influence decisions through the content of thought (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001), goal activation (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Han et al., 2012), and the depth of processing (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Park & Banaji, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). For example, Lerner and Keltner (2001) show that fear increases risk estimates and risk-averse behavior by making the negative consequences of some action more salient, while anger decreases risk estimates and increases risk-seeking behavior by making the positive consequences of some action more salient. Attention, after all, is a finite resource.

The best-known line of emotions research in political psychology is Marcus, Neumann, and MacKuen (2000; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) *Affective Intelligence Theory* (AIT).[12] Although this theory is quite broad and wide-ranging, it makes several clear predictions about voter decision-making that are consistent with the idea that emotions trigger different processing styles that in turn have very different consequences. Enthusiasm is associated with the disposition system, signals that everything is OK, and therefore easy habitual heuristic-based System 1 processing can proceed. In contrast, anxiety, associated with the surveillance system, is an "interrupt" mechanism that signals that everything in not OK, that habitual modes of responding are not likely to be successful, motivating more effortful information search and learning, and conscious deliberative System 2 processing. Anxiety

should lead to increased awareness of candidates' policy positions and comparative issue voting. The result, they suggest, is that anxious voters more closely approach the democratic ideal. A recent meta-analytic review of the emotions literature, however, while supporting certain predictions of AIT, found no reliable evidence for these predictions about the differential effects of emotions on System 1 and System 2 processing (Funck & Lau, in press).

We find the *Appraisal Tendency Framework* proposed by Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) to be most useful in linking discrete emotions to decision-making processes. The underlying assumption of this approach is that "emotions serve a coordination role, automatically triggering a set of concomitant responses (physiological, behavioral, experiential, communication) that enable the individual to address problems or opportunities quickly" (Lerner et al., 2015, p. 805). This framework sketches out how discrete emotions can be associated with different appraisals of certainty and pleasantness, anticipated effort and control, and attributions of responsibility. Anger, for example, has high certainty, low pleasantness, high-anticipated effort and control, and strong attributions of responsibility to someone else. Fear, in contrast, has low certainty and pleasantness, high-anticipated effort but low anticipated control, and less clear attributions of responsibility.

8. So What? Decision Quality as a Consequence of Decision Strategy

Elections are typically studied by historians, journalists, and political scientists, all of whom are chiefly concerned with understanding and explaining why one particular candidate or party won the most votes. While the answer to that question is of obvious importance and interest, there is another way to look at the vote decision that is more compatible with a behavioral decision theory perspective: Did the voter choose *correctly*—that is, did the voter select the candidate who, in some normative sense, was the best one? This has been a primary focus of our research (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2008; Redlawsk, 2002, 2004, 2006; Lau et al., 2008, 2014; Patel, 2010; Redlawsk et al., 2010; Pierce & Lau, 2019). Correct voting accepts as given the "naïve preferences" of citizens (typically as reported on representative election surveys, or on pre-experiment questionnaires), but then tries to establish objective standards of where the candidates or parties "stand" on those same dimensions of judgment, adopting the normative judgment that any standard used to judge one candidate should be applied to all of them.

Given a standard for voter decision quality, we need to ask whether there are identifiable institutional/organizational contexts in which voters do a better or worse job. In the context of American elections, we find that a major third party candidate on the ballot increases the difficulty of the choice and commensurately lowers the probability of a correct choice (Lau et al., 2008). Similarly, a crowded ballot—defined as the presence of initiative and referenda on the ballot—decreases the attention voters can devote to the presidential election and decreases the level of correct voting. On the other hand, the more intense (competitive) a campaign—and thus the more relevant information available to voters—the more likely a correct vote. Lau et al. (2014) have extended this line of research by examining correct

voting across 33 different democracies and 69 national elections. This research suggests that information availability (political rights), the ideological distinctiveness of the candidates, and clear lines of responsibility (parliamentary systems with single-party governments, and presidential systems with unified government), are all associated with higher levels of correct voting—while incentives for personal (as opposed to party) votes, which increase learning requirements for each election, and (as in the United States) the number of parties on the ballot, are associated with lower levels of correct voting (see also Hines, 2008).

Environmental contexts might affect correct voting, in particular the social networks in which voters are embedded. Richey (2008), examining the political discussion environment, finds that as voters interact with more knowledgeable discussants, correct voting is increased. But McClurg, Sokhey, and Seib (2009), using their own dynamic process tracing approach, find that disagreements within a social network may drive down the level of correct voting. Socially mediated information can cause voters to pay attention, but as Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan (2010) find, "when the subject's prior beliefs conflict with the informant's message, the subjects are generally well advised to rely on their own priors. This is especially true among the well-informed" (Ahn et al., 2010, p. 780). Ryan (2010) further shows that while expertise available within social networks can improve voter decision-making, an individual's own knowledge plays an important role. Much remains to be done to better understand the contexts under which decision quality—a correct vote—is more or less likely.

The question of "correct voting" is vitally important because it gets to the very heart of democratic representation. Political science research that tries to say something about the "quality" of different democratic systems has typically relied almost exclusively on the proportion of citizens who bother to turn out and vote in national elections (Franklin, 1999). The belief that free and fair elections allow representative democracies to reflect the "will of the people" is based on the assumption that citizens vote for the party or candidate that best represents their desires. Research on correct voting shows that this assumption is not always true—indeed, that there is tremendous variation across electoral systems in their ability to deliver on this democratic promise. No level of turnout can compensate for low levels of correct voting. More importantly, however, this research shows that observed levels of correct voting respond in theoretically consistent manner to variations in institutional design. One important goal for future research on political decision-making is to learn more about institutional factors that improve the quality of voter decision-making.

8.1.   The *Causal* Impact of Decision Strategy on Learning and Correct Voting

Various individual difference factors, including knowledge, interest, and motivation, have all been linked to correct voting (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Lau et al, 2008). Such findings are very consistent with research on decision quality in many other contexts. But we have also looked at the correct voting consequences of many of the decision strategies described earlier. Probably the most important finding from our initial research is that voters' decision strategies influence the *quality* of the choices they make—a finding with implications extending well beyond political campaigns. We found that voters often make *better* decisions

with *less* information, a result clearly at odds with rational decision-making models (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). We should be careful to acknowledge that this research—like all process tracing research in BDT—is based on *observing* how voters make decisions. We can control statistically on any number of individual difference variables that ought to be associated with decision quality, but we cannot be certain that it is the decision strategies per se—rather than some other, unknown factor—that is driving these results.

A new line of research by McCabe and Lau (2021; Lau & McCabe, 2020) adopts the behavioral economics notion of nudging to see if they could subtly alter the strategies that people use in making a decision without significantly changing the information environment or restricting freedom of choice. In the context of mock presidential election campaigns employing the DPTE experimental platform, these authors attempted to manipulate the depth of information search and the comparability of search across alternatives—that is, to vary whether voters were employing a classically "rational" decision strategy. These authors manipulated the depth of information search by randomly varying how soon "early voting" became possible—a factor that has considerable natural variation across electoral contexts. They manipulated the comparability/balance of information gathering across alternatives by varying the order that different types of information (i.e., considerations) became available during the campaign—another factor that has substantial natural variation depending on where people obtain most of their political information. Consistent with the definition of "nudging," no one in these experiments was forced to look (or not look) at anything. The same information was equally available for access to all subjects in every experimental condition.

Across three experiments, the authors found that these subtle manipulations significantly increased the depth and comparability of the information that subjects decided to collect in making their vote decisions. Furthermore, depth (but not comparability) of search was significantly associated with greater learning about the candidates running in the election. What did not change across any of the three experiments, however, was the probability of casting a correct vote. Neither the depth nor the comparability of information search was directly related to the quality of the observed decisions. It is getting increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that there are many conditions in which following the dictates of procedural rationality—gathering as much information as you possibly can, about all of the alternatives in the choice set—will not markedly improve decision quality.

9. Summary and Conclusion

We echo Kahneman (1994) in arguing that instead of asking *whether* decisions are rational or not, or revising our definition of "rationality" so that it can include more actual choice behavior, a better question for future decision research to address is *under what conditions* decision makers are at least "reasonably" rational in their decision processes; and when they are not, *what cognitive shortcuts or heuristics do they employ* in lieu of thorough information search and value-maximizing choice strategies? People can, and often do, follow a logic of consequence, if not omnisciently, at least reasonably, given their cognitive limitations. And people can, and often do, make many decisions automatically, by unconsciously following well-learned rules for making decisions. The question for political psychologists

is not whether people are always or ever procedurally rational in their decision processes, but what they do when they are not, and what effect it has on the quality of the decision that they reach.

As political scientists, we are interested in the implications of information processing and decision-making for institutional design. As described in the previous section, there is the possibility of assessing different institutions and systems according to the degree they do or do not improve the quality of decision-making. Our own idea of "voting correctly" is one possible way for doing this. It is not immediately clear whether the same information processing or institutional factors that improve decision-making in novices would have the same effect on experts, but until we learn otherwise, we should assume they do.[13] One reasonable (and testable) hypothesis is that expertise could moderate the observed effectiveness of different decision strategies.

Robertson (2005) suggests another possible implication: knowing how voters process information might allow us to design systems that "support information gathering, organizing, and sharing, deliberation, decision-making, and voting." As the world moves increasingly online, decision tasks like voting become both simultaneously more information rich, and yet potentially more difficult. Decision research can help us understand both the strengths and weaknesses of how people make decisions, leading to system designs that play to the strengths and minimize the weaknesses. Robertson's goal strikes us as one that is well worth pursuing.

Notes

1. In *well-structured* decisions (such as elections), the alternatives are known from the outset. It is usually assumed that the set of outcomes associated with each alternative are also known. *Ill-structured* decisions, on the other hand—such as many foreign policy crises—often involve situations in which the decision maker must generate at least some of the alternative courses of action, in addition to choosing among them.
2. One important area of ongoing research is whether the perception of risk and ambiguity follow the same or different psychological processes. See research by Camerer and Weber (1992), or the review by Santos and Rosati (2015) for more discussion.
3. Preferences can also *change* or *result from* decisions, however, as in Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Abelson et al., 1968), but then we are talking about attitude formation or change rather than decision-making.
4. See Weber and Johnson (2009) for further discussion and elaboration. The fact that the same psychological mechanisms seem to be involved in both preference formation and inference could be one reason that so many people today seem to be living in very different realities.
5. Allison and Zelikow (1999), which does an excellent job of contrasting the two perspectives in the context of the Cuban missile crisis, is one notable exception.
6. However, the ability to follow RCT also hinges on the ability to assess each new piece of information independently of prior information, on its own terms, as making the alternative a better or worse choice. Further, the search for new information cannot be dependent on how prior information was perceived. This is also unrealistic. What we have already learned regularly influences what we look for next and how we evaluate it. For example, Redlawsk & Pierce (2018) show that the first impressions of a candidate not

previously known to voters guides not just evaluations, but also the search for new information, making the information search order important to the final assessment of a candidate.

7. It is important to realize that we are not just trading off the greater expected utility of, say, Roger Republican winning rather than Debra Democrat, against the information gathering and computation costs that it takes to figure out which candidate to support. That utility could be substantial, but it must be discounted by the probability that one vote will determine the outcome of the election, which is, for all practical purposes, nil. In other words, even if the difference in utilities associated with either candidate's victory is quite large, *everyone is still going to receive that utility irrespective of how they vote*. See Green and Shapiro (1994) for an elaborate presentation of this argument, Simon (1985, 1995) for its essence, and Aldrich (1993) or Friedman (1995) for various responses from the rational choice perspective. More recently, Aytac and Stokes (2019) provide an interesting twist to this dilemma, focusing on minimizing the costs associated with abstention.

8. The order in which alternatives are considered could be random, but is more likely to be structured in some say, such as starting with the status quo alternative, if there is one.

9. This includes Kahneman and Tversky's *prospect theory* (1979), a BDT alternative to rational choice, that is also clearly compensatory.

10. See research by Dancey & Sheagley (2013), or Carnes & Sadin (2015), for examples of where heuristics prove to be more biasing than helpful.

11. Let it be noted that this sentiment reflects the opinion of the first author only.

12. Redlawsk and Pierce (2017) describe three programs examining emotions in political psychology. In addition to AIT, they examine the work represented by Lodge and Taber's (2013) *The Rationalizing Voter*, which takes a positive/negative valence perspective on emotions, and Lavine et al.'s (2012) *The Ambivalent Partisan*, challenging AIT as simply a subset of an expectancy violation process. Halperin and Schori-Eyal (2021) examine another new focal point, the influence of moral emotions.

13. It seems only fair to report on the success your intrepid authors had in their own attempt at selecting the winners in this year's (2022) college basketball March Madness tournaments. Neither one of us, mind you, claim to be basketball experts, although we are both solid fans. If you had followed a take-the-best heuristic of always assuming the higher-seeded team would win every game this year, you would have gotten 37/63 games correct in the men's tournament, and 49/63 games correct in the women's contest—not nearly good enough to win any decent size tournament, but considerably better, it turns out, than either of the authors were able to do following some combination of strategies.

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CHAPTER 6

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EMOTION AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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SHANA KUSHNER GADARIAN AND TED BRADER

1. INTRODUCTION

EMOTIONS are central to human behavior and thus not surprisingly to politics as well. One need not look far to see them at work. Election campaigns are replete with emotion, from efforts to whip up enthusiasm with rallies, party conventions, and advertising, to the jubilation of the victors and disappointment of the defeated when the results are tallied. Social movements may draw on and inspire pride, sympathy, guilt, shame, or moral outrage, as they seek to expand support, maintain cohesion, and apply pressure for change. Warfare breeds fear and hatred, while often leaving a legacy of sadness and resentment. Citizens confront an array of anxieties about the economy, health, crime, climate change, and shifting norms that shape policy debates. And they become angry in the face of perceived injustice or attempts to deprive them of cherished benefits, freedoms, or traditions.

For many years political psychology and scholars of politics in general neglected the study of emotion. Emotions were noticed perhaps, but not subjected to deeper investigation. Some may have seen them as ephemeral or epiphenomenal, adding little to explanation beyond the affective component (liking/disliking) of attitudes. Others may have seen emotions as manifestations of "irrationality" that resist or elude explanation—agents of chaos, in contrast to the order imposed by rational thought. Whatever the reasons for neglect, it no longer holds true. A small body of pioneering studies emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Abelson et al. 1982; Kinder 1994; Conover and Feldman 1986; Sullivan and Masters 1987; Marcus and MacKuen 1993) coinciding with and contributing to a renaissance in the understanding of emotion in psychology, neuroscience, and across the social and behavioral sciences. The pace and diversity of research has picked up considerably over the past two decades. Emotions now occupy a more appropriate position as a core concept in political psychology (see Cohen-Chen and Halperin, Chapter 30, for discussion of the role of emotion in intractable conflicts). Researchers increasingly seek to explicate their role in the formation of public opinion, political communication, voter decision-making, intergroup relations, foreign policy, and social movements.

We take stock of these developments in the present chapter, beginning with a review of major theoretical approaches and questions of methodology in the study of emotion. The remainder of the chapter focuses heavily on research into the causes of politically relevant emotions and their consequences for political behavior across a wide variety of settings. We also draw attention to the ways in which elite actors attempt to manipulate emotions of citizens to further their political goals.

2. KEY CONCEPTS

Emotions are an integral part of life. Every day, people feel them, talk about them, grapple with them, sing songs about them. In recent decades, scholars across the social sciences and humanities have taken a strong interest in the study of emotions. Given this wide interest, as well as their inherent complexity and origins inside of us, it is not surprising that emotions have been defined in a multitude of ways. No consensus prevails. Even when definitions diverge or are contested, science can proceed and flourish, so long as scientists adopt and transparently communicate the working definition that informs their research. The characterization of emotions we offer in this chapter accords in most details with much of the contemporary work in political psychology.

In our view, *emotions* are best understood as reactions to signals about the significance that circumstances hold for an individual's goals and well-being. The source of those signals can be external or internal. A person, for example, may become apprehensive when startled by a loud, unexplained noise occurring nearby or, alternatively, when a series of sharp pains are felt in the abdomen. These reactions—which may be variously labeled apprehension, anxiety, or fear—are an emotional response to uncertain and potentially harmful events. The "reaction" (and thus, emotion) itself consists of a complex array of physiological and psychological processes that unfold in response to the signals in question. If we unpacked that reaction to consider its components, we might note appraisals about the relevance of environmental signals (see below), shifts in autonomic activity (e.g., breathing, sweating, heart rate), motor neural activity affecting muscle readiness and movements (e.g., a sudden smile, the clenching of a fist), and perhaps also conscious awareness of these bodily responses. From an evolutionary perspective, we might see each constellation of responses as having evolved to prepare and adjust the body—including the mind—in a way that is well suited (relatively and on average) to coping with the different types of circumstances in which humans find themselves (Tooby and Cosmides 2008). Thus, the function of emotions is to adapt behavior to meet (changing) situational needs: Should I engage or withdraw? Relax or prepare for action? Coast on habit or attend carefully to details? Fight or make amends? Laugh or growl? The term *appraisal* is commonly used to refer to the brain's perception or interpretation of the relevance of incoming signals for one's goals and well-being; the appraisals therefore play a critical role in determining which emotional reaction occurs. We will say much more about appraisals later.

Researchers characterize emotions in terms of arousal, valence, and general behavioral motivation. The *arousal* dimension describes the extent to which an emotional reaction is activating or energizing, which might be reflected in the degree of change in autonomic response or in subjective feelings. The *valence* dimension describes the extent to which it is a positive or negative reaction. Sometimes researchers also describe emotions in terms of

their motivational impulse to *approach* or *avoid* the triggering stimuli or other objects in a person's environment.

Emotions often occur unbidden and spontaneously in the moment. Although one can attempt to initiate or control an emotional state, most of the time we experience emotions as something happening to us rather than as something we choose. However, emotions are not only reactions in the moment, but can also be prospective or retrospective—that is, brought about by anticipating future events or recalling past events. A person may feel anxious about an upcoming job interview, hopeful about the safe return of a loved one, or ashamed by the prospect of a personal failure becoming more widely known. Likewise, one might feel proud reflecting on a past achievement or angry in recalling an insult received the day before.

It can also be helpful to parse conceptual and semantic distinctions between emotions and other closely related phenomena (Ekman 1994; (Gross 2010) As noted earlier, definitions and semantic usage can vary across fields and even within political psychology, but some distinctions are prevalent among emotion researchers. *Affect* is often an umbrella term for all emotion-related or emotion-like phenomena (Joseph et al. 2020). It encompasses any positive or negative reaction to sensory stimuli and mental representations, including not only specific emotions, but also liking and disliking, the experience of pain and pleasure, moods, and any other feeling states. In this way, researchers have long discussed the core *affective component* of attitudes or schemas as how a person feels about an attitude object, that is, whether and how intensely she likes or dislikes the object (Fiske 2014). Similarly, recent debates about partisan polarization in mass publics have distinguished polarization in ideological or policy positions from *affective polarization*, understood as a widening gap in how opposing partisans feel about one another (Mason 2016; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

The term *feelings* refers to the subjective or conscious experience of the bodily reactions that comprise an affective state, including emotions—literally what it *feels* like to be angry at one's neighbor or to like that favorite song that comes on the radio (Damasio 2004). Emotional and other affective reactions occur rapidly and frequently, often eluding conscious awareness. Feelings are thus a possible but not necessary component of emotions, emerging only on those occasions when the emotional response is of sufficient intensity or duration to trigger conscious awareness. However, because they are part of conscious awareness, feelings are the predominant way most people—including researchers in political psychology—come to understand emotions.

Finally, *mood* typically refers to a less intense and more diffuse affective state. Moods can be described in simple valence terms (good/bad, positive/negative, etc.) or in emotional terms (angry, depressed, silly, etc.) (Cassino and Lodge 2007). One feature that typically distinguishes them from emotions is that moods are not necessarily linked to a specific triggering event or object. Moods may be relatively brief or prolonged (for a review see Gray and Watson 2007).

3. Theories of Emotion

Efforts to explain the causes and effects of emotions in political psychology draw from numerous sources. Political psychologists rely most heavily on models and insights from

social psychology. Most of the research is deeply *theoretical*, in that the work proceeds from a rich conceptualization of emotions and clearly-stated propositions explaining their causes, consequences, or both. However, to date, few political psychologists have advanced general *theories*, in the sense of a systematic account of the *role of emotions in political life*. We describe below the research in this domain in terms of several broad theoretical approaches and then discuss important theoretical work on the distinction and relationship between individual and collective emotions. In subsequent sections of the chapter, we provide more detail on theoretical propositions regarding the causes and consequences of specific emotions, as well as their application to the study of politics.

3.1. Broad Theoretical Approaches

Valence approaches emphasize affective processes that differentiate stimuli into positive and negative categories. Although this is consistent with the treatment of "affect" in psychological theories of attitudes, it is also at the center of contemporary research explicitly focused on illuminating the nature and role of affect. The most prominent and fully developed valence account in political psychology is the *theory of hot cognition* advanced by Milton Lodge and Charles Taber (Lodge and Taber 2013). They argue that the political "judgments" and "choices" of individuals are largely the product of automatic, unconscious affective reactions to environmental stimuli; these rapid affective reactions shape (i.e., bias) all subsequent evaluations, memories, inferences, and other cognitive processes. The hot cognition approach builds on at least two earlier insights. The first is social psychologist Robert Zajonc's (1984) contention that the brain triggers a learned affective reaction to an environmental stimulus prior to—and even in the absence of—conscious awareness that the stimulus is present, something he dubbed the "primacy of affect." The second is evidence from neuroscience that individuals automatically assign and recall affective tags to stimuli based on their experiences and that these affective tags are an inextricable element—a sort of gut instinct—that guides almost all human reasoning and behavior (Damasio 1994). According to the theory of hot cognition, citizens do engage from time to time in rational calculation and reasoned deliberation about politics, but the conclusions of those processes are nearly always a form of rationalization or motivated reasoning that has been shaped—even pre-determined—by automatic affective processes. Other examples of research that adopts a valence approach in the treatment of affect include work on affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), research on partisan ambivalence (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012), and Wendy Rahn's (2000) model of public mood.[1]

Dimensional approaches go beyond a concern with binary, positive-negative affect to consider the role of specific emotions. They nonetheless seek to simplify and integrate our understanding of emotions by conceiving of specific emotional states as organized along a relatively small number of underlying dimensions. For example, Watson and Tellegen (1985) describe a two factor structure of positive affect (a "zest for life") and negative affect (unpleasant arousal). These two dimensions are based on a factor analysis of self-rated mood words and are independent and uncorrelated with one another. Other scholars have proposed a two-dimensional "circumplex" intersecting valence and arousal/activation (Feldman Barrett and Russell 1998). Still others have proposed dimensional models specifically with respect to "moral emotions," in which a harm-help dimension and agent-patient

dimension intersect to yield sympathy/sadness, anger/disgust, relief/happiness, or admiration/inspiration (Gray and Wegner 2011).

The most prominent example in political psychology is *affective intelligence theory* (AIT), proposed by George Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen (2000). This account is rooted in neuropsychological models that identify affective processes or "systems" in the brain that generate distinct emotions, depending on their level of activation (Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio 1998; Adolphs and Spezio 2006; Bechara et al. 1997; LeDoux 2000; Gray 1990; Panksepp 1998; Rolls 1999). In its most recent form, AIT explains the role of emotions in politics through reference to three systems or dimensions, each based on distinct appraisals of a person's environment (MacKuen et al. 2010; Marcus et al. 2019). The disposition system modulates habitual behaviors based on signals of failure or success in the pursuit of one's goals, triggering emotions ranging from depression to enthusiasm, and motivates withdrawal or engagement from one's current political commitments and activities. The surveillance system monitors the environment for signals of threat or the unfamiliar, triggering emotions ranging from calm to anxiety/fear, and interrupts habitual processes and redirects attention and thinking toward the threatening or novel stimuli. The aversion system detects normative violations and threats from familiar foes, triggering anger and contempt, and motivates solidarity with allies and confrontation with foes. Consistent with hot cognition, AIT holds that emotional processes occur automatically and often precede conscious processes. However, in contrast to the former approach, AIT emphasizes the lessons from neuroscience (Damasio 1994) that conceive emotions as working in tandem with and even enabling reasoned action. Many studies have drawn or built on AIT to study the role of emotions in politics (Brader 2005; Erhardt et al. 2021; Feldman and Hart 2018; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Groenendyk 2016; Heiss 2021; Karl 2021; Lyons and Sokhey 2014; Marquart, Brosius, and de Vreese 2019; Mayer and Nguyen 2021; Stolwijk, Schuck, and de Vreese 2017; Vasilopoulos et al. 2019).

A third broad approach is characterized by a focus on discrete emotional states. As is the case for dimensional accounts, researchers are concerned with specific emotions. But discrete accounts focus on one or more specific emotions, emphasizing the origins, expressions, and motivational functions of each emotion, while deemphasizing any underlying dimensional structure that may organize or link these emotions. It is useful to recognize two distinct types of research that one might label a "discrete emotion" approach. The first refers to a venerable class of theories dating back to Charles Darwin (1872) and Silvan Tomkins (1962, 1963) that is often formally labeled *discrete emotion theory*. These theories posit the existence of a small number of "core," "basic," or "fundamental" emotions that are innate, universal, and rooted in human biology (Ekman and Friesen 1986; Ekman 1992; Izard 1991; Plutchik 2003). Most such lists of basic emotions include joy/happiness, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and surprise; some might include additional states such as interest, contempt, or shame. The hundreds of words used to describe emotional states in our language(s) reflect cognitive interpretations about the context and intensity of the emotional experience layered on top of these more fundamental emotional processes. This is the type of approach that will spring readily to mind if you say "discrete emotions" to researchers steeped in the psychology of emotions.

However, another strand of research—one common in the fields of political psychology, political communication, and political science—might be accurately described as adopting a discrete emotion approach in the literal meaning of that term. Many studies

take up a single emotion—hate, disgust, fear, hope, and so on—and consider its causes and consequences in isolation. Some consider two, three, or more emotions simultaneously, drawing important distinctions among them, but still treating each in turn without reference to underlying dimensions or larger frameworks. Although such research is less concerned with constructing or testing overarching theories, propositions typically rest on theoretical understanding of the focal emotions drawn from a diverse array of sources, including cognitive appraisal theories in social psychology, research in affective neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology.

Some researchers argue that both discrete and dimensional perspectives may be necessary for a complete understanding of human emotional experiences (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, and Summerell 2017; Barrett 1998). The next approach we consider blends those elements (Roseman and Smith 2001). Appraisal theories—sometimes, "cognitive appraisal theories"—are among the leading contemporary approaches to emphasize distinctions between specific emotions. We say "theories," plural, because this is a class of theoretical models rather than a single unified framework (Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001). Two key features these models share is a focus on understanding the origins of emotions in terms of appraisals and the consequences of emotions in terms of coping and adaptation. *Appraisals* are evaluations of the significance a perceived situation holds for an individual's well-being and goals; they are a starting point that trigger an emotional response. Appraisals often occur automatically in the brain outside of conscious awareness but can also be generated through conscious, effortful processing (Roseman & Smith 2001). The function of this appraisal-emotion process is to help people cope effectively and efficiently with changes in their environment by adapting their behavior—primarily through specific action tendencies—to meet the needs of the situation (Lazarus 1991). That said, it is important to note that appraisal theories, much like other accounts, do not assume that emotions lead invariably to ideal or even helpful adaptation; for example, appraisals may be incomplete or in error, there may be multiple conflicting appraisals, and coping responses may be ineffective (Roseman and Smith 2001; Ellsworth and Smith 1988).

Appraisal theories blend the approaches described earlier by focusing on a relatively finite number of discrete emotional states and then organizing them as the product of a (slightly) smaller number of core appraisal dimensions (Frijda 2007; Lazarus 1991; Roseman 1991; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Each model posits a different inventory of appraisals and emotions, though there is considerable overlap and the models are often updated in light of new evidence. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) for example map six appraisal dimensions on fifteen emotions. The dimensions include pleasantness, certainty, attention, anticipated effort, responsibility, and situational control. Roseman (1996) find that seven appraisals work best to predict seventeen emotions. Lazarus (1991) identifies a "core relational theme"—what each emotion signals about the on-going relationship between a person and her environment. Six appraisals—three primary, three secondary—evaluate the meaning of a situation and trigger the appropriate emotion. Primary appraisals, which concern "the stakes," include goal relevance, goal congruency, and type of ego-involvement. Secondary appraisals, which concern how the situation will be resolved, include blame/credit, coping potential, and future expectations. A situation must be perceived as "goal relevant" for any emotion to be triggered. Numerous studies draw on appraisal theories to isolate the causes and explain the emergence of distinct emotions with political consequences (Banks, White, and McKenzie 2019; Brader et al. 2017; Valentino et al. 2011; Erhardt et al.

2021; Heiss 2021; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Just, Crigler, and Belt 2007; Karl 2021; Tolbert, Redlawsk, and Gracey 2018; Redlawsk et al. 2018; Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017; Roseman, Abelson, and Ewing 1986; Steenbergen and Ellis 2006; Wagner 2014).

Finally, evolutionary psychological models seek to understand human behavior by conceiving of mental processes as the product of natural selection and adaptive solutions to recurring situations faced by humans over vast stretches of time (Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume). Tooby and Cosmides (2008) propose an evolutionary-psychological theory that conceives emotions as superordinate programs governing human attention, learning, motivation, memory, and regulation. These programs govern systems that help avoid harms/predators, increase the potential for reproduction, and allow for flourishing. Emotions coordinate multiple types of cognitive and feeling states along with behaviors. Although many researchers in political psychology recognize the evolutionary roots and adaptive functions of emotions, applications of an explicitly evolutionary approach have so far been limited primarily to investigating the impact of disgust (Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017, 2020; Clifford and Wendell 2016; Billingsley, Lieberman, and Tybur 2018).

3.2. Collective versus Individual Emotions

Studies of the political psychology of emotion tend to focus on individual level emotion—how experiences, political leaders, or events affect what individuals feel and how that in turn shapes how they vote, what information they want, what policies they support, and so on. But emotions can also originate from and be attached to social groups, and measuring group-level emotions can help us understand how people can be reactive to events or objects that do not affect their self-interest or personal safety directly (Von Scheve and Ismer 2013; De Rivera 1992). That is, the appraisals of situations (i.e., certainty, aversion, deservingness, etc.) (Roseman 1984) that lead to specific emotions and action tendencies are not only related to the self but also can be attached to group identities (Smith 1993). As Smith (1993) writes, "[t]o the extent that a self-categorization becomes salient as an element of (social) identity, therefore, it should also possess affective and motivational significance. Thus, people can experience affect on behalf of the group and be moved to act toward group goals" (p. 302). Just as people can feel pride in their own accomplishments, they can also feel pride when their country's athletes win an Olympic medal, sadness when an injury cuts an athlete's career short, or anger at an unfair call from a referee.

The perspective of group-level emotions is that people are affected by like others and their social groups and can become emotional through interactions with those people and on behalf of those people (Kessler and Hollbach 2005). These group-based emotions or "collective emotions" may be shared by a large portion of society and felt by individuals because of their membership in a group or society (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and De Rivera 2007; Tajfel and Turner 2004) or through interacting with outgroups (Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2021). Similarities in the emotional experiences based on membership in small groups comes from the sharing of values and norms, identity with group members, and similar exposure to eliciting events (Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2005). Emotions are socially embedded and can be contagious (Le Bon 1897; Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1992, 1993).

The intergroup emotion literature focuses on two parts: (1) emotions such as anger, fear, envy can be targeted at a specific outgroup, and (2) people may feel different emotions when they consider themselves to be part of a social identity group (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). Collective emotional states can be consistent or inconsistent with individual-level feelings. When there is a match between the felt emotions of the individual and the group that she/he belongs to, this can increase identification with the group and be a source of potential collective action (Livingstone et al. 2011). For example, Phoenix (2019) finds that group-based enthusiasm motivates black voters to turn out at election time. Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos (2021) argue that group-level empathy emerges because of socialization and that historically marginalized groups are better able to understand discrimination and the needs of other marginalized groups, even when they are in direct economic competition with each other. This group-based empathy increases pro-social behaviors such as the likelihood of volunteering to help other groups and rallying to defend the rights of those groups (Sirin, Villalobos, and Valentino 2016; Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2016).

Collective emotions that are focused on out-groups, like anger, fear, and hatred, can bind people to past experiences, cause mistrust across groups (Gordon and Arian 2001), and hinder the resolution of conflict (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, and Freund 1995; Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross 2011; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009; Halperin, Canetti, and Kimhi 2012). Collective hatred is a hostile feeling directed toward another group and involves an evaluation that the other group is malicious and intends to cause harm. In conflict situations, these societal-level emotions shape individual-level behavior (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and De Rivera 2007) and preserve conflict by making de-escalation more difficult, shaping collective memories (Halperin 2008), and diminishing moral emotions like regret or shame that might resolve conflict (Wohl and Branscombe 2005). In the United States, the identity-based elements of partisanship and ideology can drive anger toward out-partisans and exacerbate affective polarization (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Mason 2018). Recognition that group-based emotions matter separately from and in concert with individual-level emotions can help broaden our understanding of affective politics.

4. Antecedents and Functions of Specific Emotions

Despite the diversity of theoretical perspectives, there is considerable overlap in their conceptions of specific emotions, and political psychologists often focus on a relatively small number of emotional states in any given study. The primary goal of this section is to provide readers with a sense of the most relevant distinctions among emotions, as suggested by research to date. We discuss the antecedents and functions of each emotion or "family of emotions." These categories may not completely reflect the claims of any particular theory, but instead identify for readers distinctions that have proven useful for social and political psychologists across a variety of studies and perspectives. As noted earlier, one theory might argue for tying multiple categories to a single affective dimension, while another theory might insist on splitting a single category apart into even finer distinctions. This is

also not an exhaustive list. Some emotions—surprise, jealousy, regret, sympathy, calmness, to name a few—have received little or no attention from political psychologists to date. We begin with a few general observations about the origins of emotions.

4.1. Causes of Emotions

Emotions come from a variety of sources: individual-level personality traits (Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene 1984), situational triggers from events (Gadarian 2010), attached to symbols (Sears et al. 1980) and elicited directly by communications from political actors (Brader 2006). Which emotion one feels depends not only on the valence of an object or situation (negative or positive), but also appraisals, such as how pleasant/unpleasant a situation is, whether there is a threat of loss or opportunity for gain, who has control in a situation, whether an individual has capacity to counter a potential harm, whether the situation is familiar or the outcomes uncertain, and whether the focus is on the self or others (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989; Roseman, Spindel, and Jose 1990; Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Marcus et al. 2019).

Emotions have both a trait element that is a more fixed and constant disposition and states where the felt emotion is transitory and can be induced by context (Levitt 2015). Our review focuses more heavily on situational or state emotions, paralleling the preponderance of current work in political psychology. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the role traits play in emotional experiences. Traits are relatively stable individual differences in proneness to emotions and can predict sensitivity to situations and subsequent state emotions (Spielberger et al. 1983). Emotions like fear and disgust are key to survival—avoiding physical threats and toxins are important for continued thriving, so traits like disgust sensitivity and trait anxiety serve a useful purpose (Al-Shawaf and Lewis 2017). Empathic ability, the ability to connect with the feelings of others (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004), is another trait that may affect emotional reactiveness and, in turn, policy attitudes and behavior toward outgroups. Empathy is a disposition that is stable across the life course, varies in strength across individuals (Davis 1980; Davis, Luce, and Kraus 1994), and facilitates understanding the emotions of another person. Highly empathic individuals are more reactive to emotional stimuli, but this ability is costly, particularly when faced with the negative emotions and suffering of others (Dovidio et al. 1991). People high in empathic ability are more ambitious (Clifford, Kirkland, and Simas 2019) and demonstrate more pro-social behaviors (Wilhelm and Bekkers 2010). Empathy may also enhance political polarization (Allamong and Peterson 2021; Simas, Clifford, and Kirkland 2020) because people express empathy more toward ingroup members (Cikara, Bruneau, and Saxe 2011). Emotional traits also affect political life indirectly by conditioning which people in the public are most sensitive to emotional cues and directly by shaping responses to policy.

4.2. Enthusiasm, Hope, Pride, and Joy

This set of emotions illustrates well the tension between vernacular labels that attempt to assign meaning to our experiences and scientific categories that mark distinct psychological processes. They are central examples of what are often called positive or "feel-good"

emotions, and they are indeed associated with pleasurable feelings and an approach orientation. There are some differences in the way people use these terms in everyday life. Joy and happiness often refer most directly to feelings of pleasure and may describe even more broadly a positive mood or general satisfaction with life (Fredrickson 2003; Ward 2020). Enthusiasm suggests a more specific state of excitement and expectation for what's happening and what's ahead. Hope implies a prospective orientation, yearning for better things. Pride, in contrast, is a more retrospective feeling of pleasure and confidence due to personal or in-group successes.

Thus, one might be tempted to treat these as distinct categories and yet, for all the differentiation in meaning attached to the labels, it has been difficult to differentiate these emotions both observationally (e.g., based on self-reports) and especially by their consequences.[2] They appear very similar in terms of neural, physiological, expressive, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Several scholars have argued that these feelings emerge from one emotional system—variously labeled the behavioral approach system (Gray 1987), the seeking system (Panksepp 1998), or the disposition system (Marcus et al. 2000)—that functions to regulate and adapt behavior toward the pursuit of rewards. People experience the emotional state associated with feelings of enthusiasm, joy, and so on, when the system receives positive feedback about that pursuit, namely when rewards appear within reach, are getting closer, or have been attained. This emotion generates the physical and mental resources for maintaining and focusing interest and engagement with the pursuit of those rewards, motivating the expenditure of further effort to reach the goal. In the service of such goal-seeking, this system also facilitates the learning of routines (habits of mind and body) and regulates their execution.

Political psychologists have shown that enthusiasm—typically measured as a scale that combines self-reported feelings from this set of emotions (e.g., "hopeful," "proud," "enthusiastic," "happy")—increases interest in political processes, motivates political action, and strengthens reliance on prior convictions in making political choices (Brader 2006; Erisen 2018; Groenendyk 2016; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). What triggers enthusiasm in the political domain? In general, political psychologists have devoted less effort to uncovering the antecedents of politically consequential emotions than the effects, but experimental research has highlighted a few sources of political enthusiasm. These can be substantive in origin, such as reassuring news stories about the enactment of desired policies (MacKuen et al. 2010), the positive economic impact of social trends (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008), or the lead one's party has in the polls (Valentino et al. 2008). Enthusiasm can also be triggered in somewhat more superficial (yet equally consequential) ways, such as by the smile of a charismatic politician (Sullivan and Masters 1988) or the use of uplifting music and feel-good imagery in campaign advertising (Brader 2006).[3]

There is much more to learn about this set of emotions. Despite the difficulties mentioned earlier, there has been some effort to differentiate further among so-called positive emotions. For example, some associate pride with an expressive impulse (Lazarus 1991) and argue, therefore, it may particularly motivate people to put their views and accomplishments on display through public discussion or the wearing and posting of political messages (Corrigan and Brader 2011). Pride is also unusual among emotions in that key expressive indicators lie beyond the face—for example, in body posture, angle of the head, and position of the arms (Tracy and Robins 2007). Research on "self-conscious emotions"

also differentiates pride by highlighting its relationship to feelings of shame and guilt (see below). Other work on positive emotions spotlights the unique role of hope in shaping the political engagement of members of long-oppressed social groups (Phoenix 2019), and the role of joy and amusement in stimulating creative thinking and recovery from stressful events or emotions (Fredrickson 2003).

4.3. Sadness and Disappointment

If the preceding set of emotions is associated with the successful pursuit and acquisition of rewards, sadness and disappointment are clearly related to the reverse: failure and loss. Not surprisingly, therefore, dimensional accounts such as the theory of affective intelligence posit these emotions as products of negative feedback from the same emotional system that generates enthusiasm. Vernacular usage can again imply subtle distinctions in meaning for how feelings are labeled in this category: one is sad, not disappointed, at the loss of a loved one. But this may simply reflect differences in intensity; a person who failed to achieve a goal she had been pursuing might describe herself as disappointed, sad, or depressed, as the importance of the goal and the magnitude of the failure increase. Is there an emotional difference between the loss of something valued and the failure to obtain rewards? Evidence on the behavioral consequences does yet not fully support such a distinction. Sadness and disappointment motivate withdrawal and more effortful processing of information, encouraging individuals to accept the loss, reflect on their situation, and change goals and plans accordingly (Bonanno, Goorin, and Coifman 2008).

   Although these emotions are ubiquitous and explicitly part of prominent theories, their political antecedents and implications are little studied. In a rare exception, Small and Lerner (2008) find that personal sadness spills over into decisions about welfare assistance, increasing support for such policies. So much of politics seems to be about stirring up passions, the heavy emphasis on high arousal emotions such as enthusiasm, fear, and anger is perhaps understandable. However, sadness and disappointment are hardly irrelevant to the political domain. How does sadness affect the behavior of citizens experiencing a sense of collective and, at times, personal loss following events such as deadly terrorist attacks, a devastating natural disaster, or the death of a beloved leader? Or what about the consequences of disappointment felt at the failure of one's "side" in an election, a war, or international competition? By and large, the answers still await further study.

4.4. Fear and Anxiety

Fear is the most studied emotion, not only within political psychology (e.g., see Stein, Chapter 11, this volume), but also in the social sciences writ large. The terms "fear" and "anxiety" typically refer to the same emotion in everyday discourse, conveying at most differing intensities of feeling. Although scholars broadly agree that these are at least very closely related "defensive" emotions, some draw distinctions between the terms. For example, clinical psychologists distinguish between generalized anxiety disorders and specific fears (phobias) that afflict individuals (Öhman and Soares 1994; Öhman and Mineka 2001). Other researchers have pointed to neurological and behavioral differences between

an emotional state (fear) associated with clear threats and more purely avoidance reactions, on one hand, and a state (anxiety) associated with ambiguous threats and a mix of approach reactions and risk aversion, on the other (McNaughton and Gray 2000; Perkins et al. 2012). Nonetheless, to date, most political psychologists use these labels interchangeably. On a practical level, research subjects in surveys and experiments seem to use the terms to report the same latent emotional experience, and such self-reports remain the principal method of measuring emotions. It remains to be seen whether political psychologists can isolate more subtle differences in these emotional responses and trace them in turn to meaningfully distinct political consequences.

The disproportionate scholarly attention focused on fear clearly reflects the centrality and importance of its function. Fear is a product of an emotional system—sometimes named the behavioral inhibition system (Gray 1987), the surveillance system (Marcus et al. 2000), or simply the fear system (Panksepp 1998)—that monitors the environment for potential threats and adapts behavior accordingly. It may be activated as an innate response to certain classes of events that portend danger (e.g., unexpected loud noises, large objects quickly approaching) or as a learned response to just about anything that has become associated with danger (LeDoux 1996). Fear occurs when people appraise a situation as being unpleasant, highly threatening, and uncertain (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Roseman and Evdokas 2004), and when the situation seems beyond one's control (C. A. Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Novelty or uncertainty can trigger anxiety because what is unknown may also be dangerous (Steenbergen and Ellis 2006).

Fear interrupts on-going behavior, while redirecting attention and other cognitive activity toward dealing with the threat. Specifically, it prompts individuals to seek out information related to the threat and to reconsider courses of action to deal with the danger in light of present circumstances. It motivates people to remove the danger, if that is readily doable, or, if not, to remove themselves from the danger. Thus, fear motivates (and prepares the body for) risk aversive behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001), including actions aimed at prevention and protection, conciliatory acts, hiding, and flight. It even makes risk perceptions more pessimistic (Johnson and Tversky 1983). Fear matters most for changing behaviors and attitudes when threats are personally relevant and when people feel capable of responding to that threat (Witte and Allen 2000; Tannenbaum et al. 2015). The impact of fear on memory is more complex, with evidence that it can both enhance and disrupt the encoding and recall of memories.

What arouses fear among citizens? As with enthusiasm, political psychologists have demonstrated that it can be triggered by both substantive and superficial stimuli. Subliminal images of snakes and skulls (Way and Masters 1996b, a) and the discordant music and violent images that serve as a backdrop to campaign advertising (Brader, 2006) generate anxiety that spills over to affect the way voters process political information and make decisions. Of course, fear is often activated directly by threats conveyed by the very events, people, and policies at the heart of political life, including for example: the worried or uncertain expressions of political leaders (Sullivan and Masters 1988), campaign news suggesting a preferred candidate is losing (Valentino et al. 2008) or does not have the policy positions or character one hoped (Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010), stereotypic portrayals of threatening out-groups (Brader et al. 2008), news of deadly viral outbreaks (Brader et al. 2017), or images of terrorist attacks (Gadarian 2010; Fischhoff et al. 2003; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).

4.5. Anger

The status of anger has posed difficulties for dimensional models of emotion. Although people clearly experience anger as distinct from fear, self-reported feelings of anger often accompany those of fear and structural analyses have typically placed anger and fear in very close proximity (Tellegen, Watson, and Clark 1999b, a). This makes considerable sense in light of the fact that many of the same situations that produce fear also produce anger (Berkowitz 1988; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004). Nevertheless, anger appears to be an "approach" emotion (Carver 2004), and, as such, its consequences often seem to have more in common with enthusiasm than fear. Considering this, Carver recasts the dimension underlying the behavioral approach system such that sadness anchors the low end when rewards vanish or are recognized as unobtainable, but anger and frustration emerge along the middle of the dimension when rewards are seen as slipping away but still within reach. Another dimensional account, affective intelligence theory, has also evolved to argue that anger or aversion—defined as a cluster of feelings that includes anger, disgust, contempt, and hatred—is activated by the same system that produces enthusiasm (i.e., the disposition system), specifically when familiar disliked or threatening stimuli present themselves (MacKuen et al. 2010; Marcus et al. 2019).

Whatever the challenges to defining its "place" in the structure of emotions, anger clearly has distinct effects and has received considerable attention from political psychologists in the past decade. Indeed, one of the most important contributions of political psychology's growing attention to emotions in recent years has been to explain why aversive circumstances in politics often produce such divergent reactions. Anger is a threat response characterized by certainty. When we are angry, we feel sure that we know who is blameworthy for what we find offensive (Banks 2014). Because of this certainty, anger is associated with optimistic risk assessments—the direct converse of anxiety (Lerner and Keltner 2000). In contrast to those who are anxious, angry citizens cling tightly to their prior convictions and are less receptive to new considerations or opposing points of view (MacKuen et al. 2010), become less trusting (Webster 2018, 2020), forcefully counter-argue and defend their policy positions and partisan identities (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Suhay and Erisen 2018), and thus contribute to political polarization (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Clifford 2019; MacKuen et al. 2010). Anger also makes correcting misinformation more difficult (Weeks 2015).

Anger is a particularly powerful mobilizing force that motivates people to take and support risky, confrontational, and punitive actions. Anger affects citizens' likelihood of participating in politics, especially when it comes to costly behaviors like attending a rally or working for a campaign (Valentino et al. 2011). As anyone scanning social media outlets and online comments sections can attest, citizens made angry by ads will click through to find out more and express their feelings (Ryan 2012). Anger makes people more sensitive to threats and increases support for policies that punish the actors that people see as doing them harm (Zeitzoff 2014; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2019; Skitka et al. 2006; Liberman and Skitka 2017, 2019; Brader 2011; Fisk, Merolla, and Ramos 2018; Renshon and Lerner 2012).

What triggers anger? Anger emerges in situations when people are threatened or find obstacles blocking their path to reward. Its primary function is to marshal the cognitive

and physical resources necessary to overcome such obstacles or threats. But we have already noted that anger and fear frequently co-occur. Moreover, fear is also a response to threats, and sadness is also a response when rewards are not obtained. So, what distinctively triggers anger? Beyond the presence of threats and obstacles, several antecedents receive considerable discussion in the literature: (1) an external cause, especially the intentional actions of some "freely acting" agent who can be blamed (Lazarus 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 1985); (2) coping potential, or the perception that one has some control over the situation (Carver 2004; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991); (3) perception that the situation is unfair, illegitimate, or undeserved (Averill 1983; Roseman 1991); and (4) the familiarity of a threat (Marcus 2002). Some have argued that these factors may constitute sufficient rather than necessary conditions for the arousal of anger; no one is essential, but each strengthens the likelihood and experience of an anger response (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004).

By conducting further research to isolate the causes of anger as distinct from other "negative" emotions, political psychologists can shed light on the origins of public outrage and contribute to a greater understanding of anger among psychologists generally (Krosnick and McGraw 2002). Steenbergen and Ellis (2006), for example, draw on survey data to suggest that anger toward presidential candidates may be rooted in assessments of unfair or morally wrong actions. Other studies have found that intentionality of the wrongdoer increases anger in criminal justice opinions (Petersen and Zukerman 2010) and the assignment of blame to specific actors heightens angry reactions to financial crises (Wagner 2014). Experimental manipulation of situational factors—specifically, the degree of external control and culpability—triggered public anger about events such as a threatening viral outbreak and a ferry accident in which innocent passengers were harmed (Brader et al. 2017).

4.6. Disgust

Much as it requires effort to disentangle anger from fear, even more effort is required to pull apart disgust and anger (Hutcherson and Gross 2011). This not surprising given vernacular usage of "disgusted" and "angry" as synonyms (Nabi 2002). The co-occurrence of self-reported disgust and anger to any specific elicitor is high; numerous studies use "disgusted" as an indicator term in constructing scales for anger (Conover and Feldman 1986; MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2011).

Despite this close entanglement with anger, however, disgust reactions also clearly arise from distinctive and very old neural and physiological processes that have evolved to detect, avoid, and expel pathogens (Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley 2008)—a set of mechanisms that have been labeled the *behavioral immune system* (Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume; Schaller and Park 2011). Like other emotions, it has a physiological component as well as behavioral manifestations. When people smell decomposing bodies or urine-saturated alleyways, when they see cockroaches crawling across food or maggot-infested wounds, they automatically wrinkle their nose, curl their upper lip, and may feel nauseous (Rozin, Lowery, and Ebert 1994; Tracy, Steckler, and Heltzel 2019). Disgust also can slow the heart rate (Konishi, Himichi, and Ohtsubo 2020). It motivates avoidance, prompting individuals to stay away from noxious or impure stimuli—poisons and pathogens—and, if necessary, to purge and cleanse themselves of the possible contaminants.

Scholars have begun to examine more fully the political implications of disgust, building on the recognition that disgust reactions in human societies seem to have extended beyond the realm of physical impurity to the realm of moral impurity (Haidt et al. 1997; Schnall et al. 2008, Yoder, Widen, and Russell 2016). Disgust not only induces avoidance of physical threats of contamination, but also creates a desire to police social boundaries and avoid social contamination. Disgust is most connected to groups or individuals perceived to pose a danger to self or group hierarchy—outsiders, foreigners, immigrants, social deviants (Nussbaum 2009; Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017). Disgust is linked by social and political elites to behaviors seen as "degrading, defiling or unnatural" and undermining traditional social norms (Brenner and Inbar 2015).

The trait of disgust sensitivity—measured as a combination of pathogen, moral, and bodily disgust—is related to support for more conservative social policy and "purity" measures to enhance safety and cleanliness (Clifford and Piston 2017; Inbar et al. 2009; Kam and Estes 2016; Smith et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2012; Clifford and Wendell 2016), as well as to conservative self-identification and support for socially conservative parties and politicians, such as Donald Trump (Billingsley, Lieberman, and Tybur 2018; Brenner and Inbar 2015; Shook et al. 2017). Kam and Estes (2016) find that women and Black Americans report higher levels of disgust sensitivity; in comparison, women and people with lower levels of education report more trait anxiety (Zeidner 1988). Self-reported disgust sensitivity and physiologically measured state disgust are strongly related to negative attitudes about gay marriage, premarital sex, affirmative action, and abortion attitudes (Inbar et al. 2009; Kam and Estes 2016), but not to economic conservatism or foreign policy attitudes.

4.7. Shame, Embarrassment, Guilt, and Pride

This set of emotions more fully represents a family or class of emotions. Although there has been difficulty and disagreement in distinguishing among some of these feelings, no scholars propose that they all constitute a single emotional state or dimension. Many scholars instead consider it useful to categorize these affective states together under the label "self-conscious emotions" (Tracy, Robins, and Tangney 2007). They are triggered by preconscious or conscious appraisals evaluating the self, specifically comparing how well or poorly oneself has performed with respect to a socially prescribed standard or norm (Lewis and Haviland-Jones 2000). Both the experience as well as the anticipation of experiencing these emotions can influence behavior, typically motivating people toward greater adherence with social standards.

Ordinary people (and some researchers) use shame and guilt interchangeably, but mounting research suggests two clearly distinct emotional processes are at work (Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek 2007): the first, labeled shame, is triggered when negative self-evaluation is leveled at the whole self ("I am a bad person"), while the second, guilt, is triggered when negative self-evaluation is focused on a specific behavior ("I did a bad thing"). The divergent consequences are stark. Shame, by far the more painful experience, causes feelings of powerlessness and worthlessness; motivates a desire to hide, deny, or escape the situation; inhibits empathy; provokes externalization of blame and destructive anger; and is associated with a host of psychological disorders (depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal thoughts, etc.). In contrast, guilt elicits feelings of remorse and

regret over actions; causes heavier focus on the consequences of behavior for others; and motivates reparative actions such as confession, apologies, efforts to make amends, and desire to improve future behavior. Embarrassment manifests as a relatively mild feeling (Lewis 2008), triggered by norm violations, social awkwardness, and feeling exposed (i.e., conspicuous); it motivates conciliatory behavior, attempts to win the approval of others in the group, and conformity with social norms (Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek 2007). Finally, pride is triggered by a positive self-evaluation for meeting standards or other socially valued outcomes and encourages further conformity with standards.

These emotions bear ample relevance for politics. Self-conscious emotions facilitate the informal policing and maintenance of group norms (e.g., reciprocity, civility, acquiescence) that enable cooperation and reinforce power structures in communities, formal organizations, social movements, or any peer network. For example, the experience of embarrassment or pride at finding oneself out of or in line, respectively, with the political values of one's group elicits greater adherence and application of those values (Suhay 2015). Politicians and activists try at times to explicitly "shame" (usually meaning guilt or embarrassment, by the definitions above, and so illustrative of the confusion over terms) citizens or leaders into "doing what is right." During the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King, Jr., used these emotional tactics when he pointed to the hypocritical gap between American principles and the realities of racial inequality, and again when he told white audiences that the "tragedy" of their times lay not in the violent actions of bad people, but rather in the "appalling silence and indifference of the good people." Without directly measuring emotions, recent studies highlight the way get-out-the-vote efforts can motivate greater adherence to civic duty and thereby boost turnout—ostensibly by evoking self-conscious emotions through the actual or threatened publication of names and voting records to neighbors (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008, 2010; Panagopoulos 2010). When shame is turned inward to one's own community, it can act to support punitive policies (Jefferson 2023) or withdraw from the political community (Harris-Perry 2011). Citizens may experience collective guilt for the harmful actions of group members (past or present), which in turn may motivate support for reparative policies and political action on behalf of such goals (Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen 2006; Pagano and Huo 2007).

5. How We Study Emotions

Researchers adopt a variety of strategies to study emotions. Data collection takes multiple forms, including heavy use of surveys and experiments, recording of somatic arousal or expression, semantic content analysis, and qualitative observations and interviews. Emotions are often latent, manifest through multiple components—autonomic arousal, facial expression, neurological activation, conscious feeling states—to varying degrees, and can have overlapping characteristics with other emotions. These properties make it difficult for researchers to detect and isolate specific emotions. For this reason, researchers should consider using multiple methods within or across studies to strengthen confidence in their findings (Albertson and Gadarian 2016). In this section, we review several issues and approaches that arise in measuring, eliciting, and coding emotions.

5.1. Prospects and Pitfalls in the Measurement of Emotions

Issues of measurement pose both familiar and unique challenges to the study of emotions. Psychologists use a variety of tools to try to measure the presence or activation of emotions, including most notably verbal self-reports, psychophysiological measures, and human coding of facial or other body movements (Larsen and Fredrickson 1999). Self-reports are by far the most common form of measurement in social and political psychology owing to ease of use and low cost. But reliance on verbal reports is tricky for at least three reasons. First, people have tenuous access to their emotional states—indeed, emotions frequently occur outside of conscious awareness. Second, as with any self-reported behavior, subjects can censor or edit their answers to meet perceived social expectations. Third, the vagaries of everyday language do not align perfectly with scientific conceptions. A person might equally well use the terms "disgusted" or "angry" to describe his reaction at another individual's transgression, and yet also use "disgusted" to describe his feelings at seeing insects in his food, when "angry" would not be a suitable descriptor.

Because of these problems, it can be tempting to turn to biological aspects of emotional response that do not require conscious awareness, cannot be easily controlled, and are not filtered through linguistic conventions. Paul Ekman and his students, for example, developed and refined a detailed system for coding facial expressions—the Facial Action Coding System (FACS)—that has been subject to extensive cross-cultural validation and application in numerous domains (Ekman and Rosenberg 1997). One significant line of research, including some of the earliest work on emotion in political psychology, analyzes the expressive facial displays of political leaders, as well as how citizens interpret and respond emotionally to those displays (Bucy and Newhagen 1999; Bucy 2000; Bucy and Grabe 2007; Glaser and Salovey 1998; Sullivan and Masters 1988; Masters 2001; Stewart, Waller, and Schubert 2009; Stewart and Ford Dowe 2013; Stewart, Bucy, and Mehu 2015). An emphasis on the emotional expressions of political elites is not surprising, as the raw material—photographic and video recordings of facial displays and other nonverbal behavior—is more readily available for candidates and leaders than for ordinary citizens. As a result, there have been very few citizen-focused applications of facial coding in the domain of politics. However, technological advances are making the collection of such data more viable and attractive to political psychologists. Researchers can capitalize on the increasing ubiquity of digital cameras embedded in or attached to computers and mobile devices, as well as the development of computer algorithms and software for automating the coding and classification of facial expressions (Fridkin, Kenney, et al. 2021; Joo, Bucy, and Seidel 2019; Ottler, Mousa-Kazemi, and Resch 2016; McDuff et al. 2013).

Other approaches to collecting somatic data on emotions involve monitoring bodily reactions such as heart rate, skin conductance, muscle tension, electrical activity, and blood flow. Such "psychophysiological" measures typically require the use of specialized equipment and software, but their value lies in directly measuring physical responses over which the individual often has little control or even awareness. Some of the most accessible approaches measure autonomic processes like skin conductance and heart rate and thus may work reasonably well for researchers primarily interested in capturing emotional arousal (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Oxley et al. 2008; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2014; Soroka, Fournier, and Nir 2019; Soroka and McAdams 2015). Researchers also have sought to collect

these measures in conjunction with other types of data, such as self-reports, to improve detection of discrete emotional responses (Bakker, Schumacher, and Homan 2020; Karl 2021, Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2014), though such studies remain relatively rare in political psychology. Recent studies have highlighted the potential value of using changes in vocal pitch, caused by the tightening of vocal cord muscles, to measure emotional arousal of, for example, legislators making speeches or Supreme Court justices during oral arguments (Dietrich, Enos, and Sen 2019; Dietrich, Hayes, and O'brien 2019). Those interested in distinguishing positive and negative emotional responses can utilize facial electromyography (EMG), which is better suited to capturing emotional valence through detection of even subtle movements of the muscles near the eyes and mouth that are central to emotional expression (Larsen and Fredrickson 1999). Despite the more elaborate demands of this method, several studies have used facial EMG to measure reactions to political stimuli, often in conjunction with self-report or other physiological data (Bakker, Schumacher, and Homan 2020; Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn 2021; Fino et al. 2019; McHugo et al. 1985; McHugo, Lanzetta, and Bush 1991). Finally, researchers can use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the correspondence between activation of specific regions in the brain and emotional responses to politics (Knutson et al. 2006; Westen et al. 2006).

Although the preceding techniques help avoid many of the shortcomings of self-report data, they come with their own serious limitations. Both facial coding and physiological monitoring are often laborious, require specialized training and expensive equipment, and necessitate direct observation of subjects, often under highly controlled conditions. Some methods—EMG, fMRI, and electroencephalogram (EEG)—are particularly apt to feel invasive and artificial to human subjects. Moreover, while emotions are clearly tied to patterns of visceral and brain activity, decades of research have failed to yield consensual evidence of a clear one-to-one correspondence between specific emotional states and autonomic, visceral, and brain indicators (Larsen et al. 2008). In view of the particular strengths and weaknesses of each measurement approach, we return to the observation that specific studies and especially extended research programs tend to benefit from triangulating through the use of multiple methods (Alberton and Gadarian 2016; Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999).

5.2. Improving Self-Reports

Greater attention is warranted to best practices in obtaining reliable and valid emotional self-reports given their predominance. Collection of self-report data typically takes the form of a checklist or battery of questions asking respondents to indicate how they feel (or felt), either in general or about a particular "target." The questions often include multiple response options to measure the degree or intensity of emotions felt on, say, a five-point scale (e.g., not at all angry, a little angry, somewhat angry, very angry, extremely angry). There is no single, agreed-upon battery for measuring emotional states; researchers often tailor the set of questions to suit the needs of a particular study—which emotions, past or present, general or targeted, etcetera. That said, there is considerable overlap in the construction of these self-report batteries, as researchers learn across multiple studies and from each other what tends to "work well" in terms of discriminating among distinct emotional states and strengthening scale reliability. One long-used 20-item inventory is the Positive

and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Although it was originally developed as a tool for measuring emotional valence (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988), its creators offered an expanded 60-item version to capture more specific emotional states (Watson and Clark 1994). Due to time and cost constraints, many political psychologists use shorter, tailored batteries containing something more in the range of 5 to 10 questions.

Regardless of the particular battery used, two guidelines emerge from earlier work (Marcus et al. 2006): First, asking about the intensity (how much?) of emotions toward some target yields comparable results to asking about the frequency (how often?) of such emotions. Both are superior to offering binary response options or a checklist. That said, recent work argues for the value of combining the checklist and intensity scale approaches—illustrated with yet another revised version of the PANAS (PANAS-M)—in order to reduce measurement error stemming from the experience of multiple simultaneous emotions (Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre, and Utych 2021a). Second, as with any latent construct, multiple item scales yield stronger measures. Specifically, it is typically critical to include at least two and preferably three or more cognate terms—for example, afraid, worried, nervous, scared—for each emotion (dimension) the researcher seeks to tap, especially if the goal is to differentiate among highly correlated positive or negative emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger).

Recent research assesses the costs and benefits of question and response formats in self-administered questionnaires, relevant both for laboratory studies and the increasingly prevalent use of Internet surveys. For example, the use of a vertical continuous slider generates more reliable and valid measures in many situations, compared to asking respondents to select a specific button or box on the response scale (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2017). Consistent with other work on survey methods, the use of a grid format to administer a battery of emotion items notably reduces completion time over asking items sequentially. However, these formats also seem to produce different results, perhaps because respondents are more self-consciously "fine-tuning" answers across categories when all emotion items are listed simultaneously in a grid (Brader, Valentino, and Karl 2012).

Another question that arises is the specificity required vis a vis the target of emotion. For example, if one wishes to examine the impact of anxiety on voting decisions, what is the appropriate target for the self-report question? Should we expect only anxiety about the candidates or the choice between them to be relevant? How about more diffuse anxiety about the current conditions or future direction of the country? Or anxiety over salient issues, such as healthcare, terrorism, or cultural change in the face of immigration? Finally, is it possible that anxiety over seemingly unrelated matters—stresses about an impending deadline at work, or nervousness over an upcoming romantic date—could affect political decisions as well? Research to date suggests that both integral and incidental affect produce similar behavioral consequences (Adolphs 2009; Brader 2005; Ottati et al. 2012; Way and Masters 1996a; Fischhoff et al. 2003). That said, studies in political psychology largely have failed to compare directly whether target specificity moderates the impact of emotional responses (but see Lu 2020).

5.3. Content Analysis

Another source of data has been systematic content analysis where, for example, a research subject's statements (written or spoken), political messages, or news stories are coded for

their emotionality, among other attributes (Young and Miller, Chapter 16, this volume). For decades, this data has been collected by generating a detailed coding scheme and relying on human coders to review and classify all observations—for example, subjects' autobiographical discussions of their emotional experiences in experiments (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Banks 2014) or the emotions being appealed to in televised campaign advertising (Brader 2006). The past two decades have seen major developments in the coding and analysis of textual data. Researchers have increasingly turned to automated coding methods to distill attributes of written or oral texts, allowing for a much greater volume of data to be processed. Some researchers use a supervised machine learning approach by developing a canonical set of codes from a smaller corpus of text, use these data to "train" computer algorithms how to accurately classify text, and then apply the algorithms to code the much larger remainder of raw material. Other researchers use a pre-established dictionary that tells the computer to look for and count specific words that are (purported to be) associated with each concept (e.g., emotion) of interest. To date, most examples from the study of emotion and politics use dictionary-based methods to assess the valence of emotion (Osnabrugge, Hobolt, and Rodon 2021; Roberts et al. 2014; Widmann 2021) and/or discrete emotional content of politically relevant texts (Soroka and McAdams 2015), but some recent research adopts a more open-ended or supervised learning process (Roberts et al. 2014).

5.4. Eliciting Emotions

Researchers who wish to study a specific emotion or to compare the impact of multiple distinct emotions may find it particularly useful to elicit the emotion(s) intentionally. In doing so, the researcher can isolate and enhance the specific emotion in a (sub)sample of subjects who otherwise might be experiencing a variety of different emotions collectively and individually. There are many *emotion induction* techniques (Maryam Fakhrhosseini and Jeon 2017; Martin 1990). Most fall into two broad categories: (1) asking respondents to describe in detail their own experience of the specified emotion in a situation of either their or the researcher's choosing (e.g., see Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Groenendyk 2016; Lerner et al. 2003; Small and Lerner 2008; Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno 2018; Young 2019; Zeitzoff 2014); and (2) exposing subjects to vignettes, images, music, videos, facial expressions, odors, or situations designed to elicit the emotion in question (e.g., see Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Brader 2006; Clifford and Jerit 2018; Kam and Estes 2016; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015; Suhay 2015). A recent meta-analysis of over 500 studies found that, on average, these techniques are effective at shifting emotions over one standard deviation in the expected direction, though there is considerable variation depending on the emotion targeted and technique (Joseph et al. 2020). Scholars also have taken steps to compile and organize a wide variety of emotional stimuli that are available for research purposes (Diconne et al. 2022). Regardless of technique, researchers face a choice between explicitly focusing the stimulus or task on emotions evoked by the domain of interest— *integral affect*, for example, emotions about the current election campaign, or in response to a recent terrorist attack—or generating the emotions through an unrelated task: *incidental affect*, for example, asking about candidate evaluations in a room scented with freshly baked cookies or rotting eggs. Integral affect has obvious value in corresponding to the way emotions are evoked and have consequences in a particular domain, such as politics,

while incidental affect offers greater leverage for isolating the impact of the emotional state independent of substantively relevant cognitions. Both integral and incidental emotion inductions have been found to trigger political consequences in line with expectations, though they do not always produce the same results and direct comparisons are rare.

5.5. Causal Mediation

In keeping with greater attention to issues of causal identification and design in the social sciences, researchers have increasingly employed formal tests of mediation, especially in experimental studies. Emotional states, as situational reactions that produce strong behavioral tendencies, readily invite consideration as potential mediators in causal models (Jost 2019; Lambert et al. 2014; Lu et al. 2020; Stolwijk, Schuck, and De Vreese 2017). Recent statistical advances improve the ability of researchers to estimate direct and indirect effects in mediation models, taking account of dependence on covariates, as well as to specify the sensitivity of results to unobserved confounders (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010). In fact, multiple methodological papers use a study on the political psychology of emotion as a central case for demonstrating the value of these advances. In the original study, researchers found that the impact of stereotypical news portrayals of the threat posed by Latino immigrants on public opposition to immigration was partially mediated by increases in anxiety (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). When new techniques were applied, researchers arrived at more precise estimates of anxiety's mediating role, ranging from 15% to 22% to 54%, depending on the assumptions and tests (Imai et al. 2011; Linden, Huber, and Wodtke 2021). Another paper takes account of the dependence of anxiety on a second potential mediator—perceived harm—and finds support for a model in which the effect of the news story works in part by triggering harm perceptions, which trigger anxiety, which then influence behavioral outcomes (Imai and Yamamoto 2013), a finding consistent with appraisal theory expectations for harm as a precursor of anxiety/fear. Proponents of these new methods have created the *mediation* and *rwrmed* packages for use with R and Stata software, respectively (Linden, Huber, and Wodtke 2021; Hicks and Tingley 2011). These methodological developments appear to have encouraged an increased focus on mediation models in the political psychology of emotion (Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2021; Myers and Tingley 2016; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015; Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2020; Stapleton and Dawkins 2022; Suhay and Erisen 2018; Valentino and Neuner 2017; Young 2019; Zeitzoff 2014).

6. The Effects of Emotions on Political Behavior

We have noted that emotions serve many adaptive functions (Lazarus 1991; Panksepp 1998; Tooby and Cosmides 2008) and can affect a person's physiology, perceptions, and behavior (Clore and Isbell 2001; Gross and Thompson 2007). Research on their political consequences to date has spanned several important substantive domains of politics,

including: voter decision making in election campaigns; reactions to war, terrorism, and disaster; the effects of mass mediated messages; the formation of policy preferences; and the evolution of political activism and social movements. Negative emotions, particularly anxiety, anger, and—increasingly—disgust, are most commonly the focus of political science research on emotion, though positive emotions like enthusiasm and empathy also matter in vote choice, attitude formation, and intergroup relations. We offer a brief and necessarily selective overview of a fast-growing body of evidence demonstrating that emotions shape political outcomes in a multitude of ways. We organize this discussion according to types of effects, ranging from how emotions affect preferences over individual and collective political actions, to how they influence the very processes of attention, information processing, and decision making.

6.1. Attention, Information seeking, and Learning

Attention to politics is a limited resource; both time and motivation preclude most people from learning deeply about politics most of the time. Emotions can provide the impetus for people to gather information and, with some emotions, that increased information seeking can lead to learning. People do not pay attention to all information equally or accept all information they encounter, and affect can prompt people to focus on the root causes of these feelings. In work on motivated reasoning, Lodge and Taber (2005) argue information is tied to affect. When people encounter new information, they seek to maintain their affective balance, which can lead to the discounting or undercutting of information that does not agree with or even disconfirms prior beliefs. Redlawsk (2002) demonstrates how this "hot cognition" biases information in the realm of campaigns. In an experiment that mimicked a dynamic campaign environment, voters spent more time searching for liked candidates than disliked candidates, meaning that they potentially ignored useful but incongruous information because of initial negative affect.

Discrete emotions also matter in motivating the search for information generally as well as for particular types of information. Much of the research focuses on the role of anxiety, anger, and disgust on these processes. Because anxiety arises from uncertainty and threat, it increases the desire for information and prompts engagement with the information environment. By increasing the amount of information that people seek, anxiety also decreases their reliance on heuristics in decision making (Wagner and Morisi 2019). Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) find that voters worried about the presidential candidates of their own party spend more time on news and are less likely to rely on their partisan identity in voting. However, it is not the case that anxiety-fueled information seeking is indiscriminate; people look for and choose information that they believe will be most useful in countering the threats that caused them to worry in the first place (Brader 2006; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus 2000, Redlawsk, Civinetti, and Lau 2007; Valentino et al. 2008; Valentino et al. 2009). Anxiety increases the consumption of information and attention to the contemporary political environment but not all information is weighted equally (Valentino et al. 2009). Because anxiety motivates individuals to avoid danger, seek protection, and create a safer environment, anxiety increases attention to threatening information in particular, as threatening information might be most useful in avoiding harms (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006; Nabi 1999; Roseman and Evdokas 2004). In a study on

immigration anxiety, Gadarian and Albertson (2014) find that experimental participants made anxious about immigration were more likely to seek out, remember, and agree with news that portrayed immigrants and immigration in a threatening way.

Anger and disgust also impact information seeking by narrowing and biasing attention. Angry people are not as open to new information (Valentino et al. 2011) and are more likely to rely on the expertise of a particular trusted source than anxious individuals, who are more likely to double check information (MacKuen et al. 2010b). The aversive nature of anger prompts more engagement with politics (Ryan 2012) but leads people toward narrow rather than broad information engagement. Angry people read more for confirmation than learning, reinforcing loyalty to prior attitudes and convictions (MacKuen et al. 2010b). Anger fuels biased reactions to issue arguments and plays a major role in motivating individuals to engage in unbalanced assimilation of political information (Suhay and Erisen 2018). In a study after the Boston Marathon bombing in the United States, Huddy et al. (2021) demonstrate one implication of how anger shapes attitudes through information seeking. Anger increased consumption of violent news footage and, in turn, support for punitive anti-terrorism policies. Similarly, disgust directs attention toward the source of the feeling, which may be useful for identifying pollutants that could make a person ill, but may lead to reinforcement rather than openness to new information (Jerit and Barabas 2012). Disgust undermines ongoing information seeking and enhances memory for objects that created feeling in first place, but it can narrow memory of other events and objects not related to disgust.

6.2. Political Judgment and Decision making

Emotions affect political decisions indirectly by shaping how much and what type of information people rely on when voting and evaluating policy and more directly by shaping risk tolerance (see Lau and Redlawsk, Chapter 5). Anger is characterized by feelings of control over surroundings, whereas anxiety reflects a feeling of lack of control over threats and insecurity about one's capacity to cope (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Anxious people rely less on predispositions and heuristics, are more open to counter-attitudinal persuasion, but are also more sensitive to risk (Brader 2006; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Marcus et al. 2000; Marcus et al. 2019; Nai, Schemeil, and Marie 2017; Seawright 2012). Due to this risk sensitivity, especially in times of crisis, anxiety can increase support for incumbents when the incumbent party is not blamed for the anxiety (Merolla, Ramos, and Zechmeister 2007; Merolla and Zechmeister 2013; Erhardt et al. 2021). A greater sense of certainty and control, and lower perception of risk, leads angry people to make faster decisions and rely on predispositions and heuristic cues (Tiedens and Linton 2001; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Marcus et al. 2019).

Anger also increases the desire for people to punish perpetrators and outgroup members (Zeitzoff 2014; Clifford 2019; Webster 2020) for real or perceived harms. Support for populist leaders is often fueled by anger at mainstream parties and systems for economic failures and changing social dynamics (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017; Marcus 2021; Seawright 2012). Similarly, support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election was fueled by a combination of anger, ethnocentrism, and sexism (Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno 2018).

There is evidence that anger after a terror attack can also boost support for parties and candidates that will punish those blamed for attacks (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017). Looking at the effect of terrorism in France, Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) find that attacks provoked both anxiety and anger, but that these emotions had different effects on vote choice. Anger about terrorism increased support for the far right, which expresses anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment, and the effects were particularly strong among those high in authoritarian personality (cf. Feldman and Stenner 1997). In contrast, terrorism anxiety depressed support for the far right as anxious people were more open to counterarguments against far-right positions. Similarly, exposure to terrorist attacks and the threat of rocket fire in Israel has moved voting toward right-wing parties, even for those who did not experience the attacks directly, by increasing negative emotions (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Berrebi and Klor 2006; Snider et al., Chapter 14, this volume). Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) find that exposure to rocket fire in Israel increases the right-wing vote share by 4 to 6 percentage points among Israeli Jews. Similarly, terrorism fears increase the vote share for Turkish nationalist parties after attacks by Kurdish militants (Kibris 2011).

Disgust also influences political judgments separately from other negative emotions. Ben-Nun Bloom (2014; Chapter 18, this volume) finds that disgust increases moral convictions, and this moralization increases harsh judgments (e.g., support for severe punishments), on issues ranging from gay adoption to military intervention. Disgust moralizes issues when attached to arguments about harm, but sadness does not. Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux (2020) show that the behavioral immune system (BIS), developed to arouse disgust and motivate avoidance from pathogen threats, also affects political choices and identification. Having a more developed BIS (i.e., higher disgust sensitivity) is correlated with prejudice toward outgroups like immigrants and the homeless (Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017; Clifford and Piston 2017), and this system also predicts support for socially conservative parties because those parties are likely to be more in line with cultural norms.

6.3. Personal and Political Action

Researchers have increasingly come to realize that emotions have a critical role to play in explaining political action (Elster 1998, 1999)—why people sometimes act on their preferences and desires but, other times, do not, as well as which types of actions they choose to undertake. In adapting behavior to meet situational needs, emotions prepare the body for appropriate action. On a general level, this preparation may take the form of mustering and expending the resources required for energetic action or conserving resources by withdrawing into inaction. This parallels the distinctions between high arousal emotions (e.g., anger, enthusiasm, fear) and low arousal emotions (e.g., sadness, relaxation). On a more granular level, emotions provide an impulse toward specific courses of action, sometimes called action tendencies (Frijda 1986). As a result, they can shape both the private and public actions of citizens. This directional impulse can also be conceived in general and particular terms. Emotions are often labeled as "approach" and "avoidance" based on whether they direct an individual toward or away from, respectively, the phenomena eliciting the reaction (Carver 2004). Fear, anger, and disgust are all high-arousal negative emotions, but fear and disgust tend to generate an avoidance response, while anger generates an approach (confrontation) response. Action tendencies also manifest at a more

specific level by, for example, motivating individuals to remove or punish (anger), expel and cleanse (disgust), freeze or run (fear), stand tall and show off (pride), comfort and console (sympathy), shrink and conceal (shame), make amends (guilt), and so on.

High arousal emotions can provide the motivation for citizens to become engaged with and participate in politics generally (Marcus et al. 2000). Enthusiasm and anger most reliably boost the inclination to engage in a wide range of political activities including voting, volunteering, donating, discussion, and protesting (Brader and Cikanek 2019; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Lyons and Sokhey 2014; Groenendyk 2019), and some studies suggest that anger is a uniquely powerful resource for mobilization (Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino and Neuner 2017). The impact of fear, by comparison, is much more variable, in keeping with its status as both a high arousal and avoidance emotion, as well as one tied to hard-wired survival strategies for fight, flight, or freezing in place. Researchers have found evidence of fear (or anxiety) boosting participation (Marcus et al. 2000), exerting no impact, or even demobilizing political action, sometimes all three in the same set of studies (Valentino et al. 2011).

Given such variability, researchers have sought to identify the factors that moderate the behavioral impact of fear and other emotions. In fact, the motivational effects of both fear and anger have been found to depend on the resources or efficacy of the individual (Brader 2006; Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens 2000; Tannenbaum et al. 2015; Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, and Davis 2009). Beyond individual differences, participatory implications also vary across ethnic and racial groups, suggesting the importance of considering how emotional experiences intersect with social identities (Banks et al. 2019; Phoenix 2020; Phoenix and Arora 2018). For example, centuries of oppression, broken promises, and inadequate reforms leave African Americans more often feeling frustration rather than a mobilizing sense of anger in response to adverse circumstances; as a result, hope is a more critical emotion in bringing the black community to the polls (Phoenix 2019). A substantial body of work further documents the important and conditional role of emotions in motivating and sustaining collective action in protests, social movements, and other forms of political activism (Gould 2004, 2009; Jasper 2011; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009; Jasper 1998; Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor 2009a, 2009b; van Zomeren, Kutlaca, and Turner-Zwinkels 2018; Lu 2021) (see also van Stekelenburg and Gaidyte, Chapter 26, this volume).

Although many early studies drew evidence from democratic participation in the United States, research on the implications of emotions for political action now extends to both democratic and non-democratic contexts around the globe. For example, Aytaç and Stokes (2019) argue that anger plays an equally central role in helping us understand why people vote in liberal democracies like Great Britain or Sweden and why they turn out to protest in repressive regimes like Turkey (see also Erisen 2018). In contrast, fear can be an effective instrument of oppression in autocracies like Zimbabwe because it reduces the motivation to undertake acts of dissent (Young 2019). Indeed, Pearlman (2013) argues that we can better understand where political uprisings occurred and did not occur during the "Arab Spring" of 2011, by the prevalence of risk-seeking, high-efficacy emotions (anger, joy, pride) or of risk-averse, low-efficacy emotions (fear, sadness, shame) respectively. A growing number of studies also document the impact and strategic use of emotions, including anger and humiliation, in ethnic conflicts, the recruitment of suicide bombers for acts of terrorism, and the mobilization of political violence generally (Fattah and Fierke 2009; Longo, Canetti, and Hite-Rubin 2014; Petersen 2011, 2002).

The action tendencies ascribed to fear, anger, enthusiasm, sadness, and other emotions are quite distinct of course, though many such implications remain relatively under-explored in political psychology. Fear and anger, for example, have divergent effects not only on the assessment of risks, but also actual risk-taking behavior. In the shadow of terrorist attacks, fearful citizens perceive greater risks and are more like to engage in precautionary actions like screening mail and restricting travel, while angry citizens perceive less risk and engage in more risk-acceptant behaviors (Lerner et al., 2003). Similarly, facing a potentially deadly viral outbreak, angry citizens were more likely to write officials demanding investigation and prosecution of those who caused the outbreak, while fearful citizens were more likely to engage in preventative or protective behaviors, such as wearing a mask, increased hand washing, and reading up on the disease (Brader et al., 2017). Citizens disgusted at the threat of infectious diseases are more strongly motivated to alter personal travel plans to avoid the danger and support stronger protective policies from the government (Kam 2019). We should expect similar emotion-specific patterns for explicitly political actions where this is a fit between action tendency and type of behavior; for example, anger ought to motivate participation in confrontational protests or other forms of political aggression (Banks, White, and McKenzie 2019; Petersen and Zukerman 2010).

7. Emotion and Politics: Selected Applications

Interest in the political relevance of emotions has spread beyond an initial emphasis on electoral behavior and social movements to many domains of politics. To give readers a better feel for how the concepts and theories discussed in this chapter are being applied, we spotlight a few recent areas—especially issues of social identity or intergroup conflict that tend to arouse strong emotions—where a good deal of new research has sprung up. This includes work on racial identities and attitudes; the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) citizens; immigration; and issues of foreign policy, war, and terrorism. Applications have proceeded in numerous other domains, including partisanship and the spread of (mis) information on social media (Brady et al. 2017; Fan, Xu, and Zhao 2018; Hasell 2021; Hasell and Weeks 2016; Heiss 2021; Kosmidis and Theocharis 2020; Osmundsen et al. 2020; Weeks et al. 2019; Weeks 2015) fractures in traditional party systems and the rise of authoritarianism and populism (Magni 2017; Mayer and Nguyen 2021; Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017; Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre, and Utych 2021b; Salmela and von Scheve 2017; Seawright 2012; Vasilopoulos et al. 2019), studies of gender and emotional expression (Brooks 2011; Boussalis et al. 2021; Fridkin, Gershon, et al. 2021; Karl and Cormack 2021), and many, many more examples.

7.1. Racial Identities and Attitudes

Much of the work on racial attitudes, prejudice, and stereotyping in political psychology focuses on beliefs and values (Enos 2017; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Piazza

1993; Mendelberg 2001; Kinder, Chapter 27, this volume), but racial politics is also emotive. Here, we focus on racial politics in the United States, but there are distinct but similarly affective politics around race in countries like France, Brazil, and the United Kingdom. Some of the most stirring scenes from American politics in the last decade have been images of black Americans in the streets protesting for racial justice in both somber and angry marches. Prompted by anger over the removal of Confederate statues in Virginia, White supremacist protestors at the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville demonstrate another side of the emotive politics of race. Holding lighted torches, far-right groups marched through the town, screaming "Jews will not replace us" and violently clashed with counter-protestors and police (Lind 2017). Emotions about Black Americans underlie White Americans' attitudes toward social and redistributive policies such as affirmative action, reparations, Confederate flag displays, and even healthcare (Banks 2013; Banks and Valentino 2012). Banks (2014) argues that White racial attitudes are linked to feelings of anger more than other negative emotions, and the two are so closely tied that even non-political anger can activate the effects of racial beliefs. Using an experiment and American National Election Studies data, Banks and Valentino (2012) show that anger (but not fear) increases opposition to racial policies among people high in symbolic racism and both anger and disgust trigger the effect of biological/old fashioned racist beliefs on policy. In a study of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election, Tolbert, Redlawsk, and Gracey (2018) demonstrate that positive emotions interact with racial attitudes as well. Using a survey of Republican caucus attendees and a nationally representative survey, they show that campaign-generated enthusiasm increased support for Donald Trump among those high in racial resentment.

A burgeoning literature on emotion and race (Jackson 2019; Burge and Johnson 2018; Burge 2020; McGowen and Wylie 2020; Phoenix 2019) calls our attention to the fact that much of the literature on emotion, threat, and racial attitudes, focuses on Whites' perceptions of Black Americans and other minorities as threats. Black Americans, however, are also vulnerable to threats (economic, security, state power) (Jackson 2019), and our theories of affect and political action need to shift to think about whether and when the effects of emotions may be group specific. Black Americans have stronger and more negative reactions to events like Hurricane Katrina, the Ferguson protests, lynching, the murder of George Floyd and many others by police (McGowen and Wylie 2020; White et al. 2007; Pickett, Graham, and Cullen). Drawing on work in intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Ybarra, and Rios Morrison 2009) and linking back to the earlier discussion of collective emotion, this work argues that Black Americans not only experience individual emotions but are also affected by communal emotion, agency, and history, and this double consciousness must be accounted for in theories of political emotion (Phoenix 2019; Burge and Johnson 2018). Pickett, Graham, and Cullen (2021) find a large racial gap in fears about police violence, with black Americans both more fearful of being a victim of police violence than those of other races and higher on what they label "altruistic fear"—fear of a friend or loved one's victimization. Both types of fears shape attitudes toward police funding and personal protective behavior. Jefferson's (2023) work on support for respectability politics among Black Americans takes note of how ingroup shame and anger increases support for punitive policies that might harm ingroup members who risk embarrassment or unwanted scrutiny for the group.

As Alberston (2020) points out, the field needs to study Black Americans' emotional reactions directly and how they apply those emotional reactions to opinion formation. More oversamples of racial minority populations in survey and experimental data would be helpful, but political psychologists also need to be open to reconceptualizing the role that emotion plays in collective action, information seeking, and voting decisions, separately by group identity. Similar to other groups, enthusiasm and pride motivate voter turnout among Black voters (Collins and Block 2020), but the role of anger is more contingent for this group. Using ANES data, Collins and Block (2020) find that enthusiasm and civic duty both drive African Americans to the polls on election day and that enthusiasm can substitute for a larger sense that voting is a responsibility. While studies of anger find that anger motivates participation in collective action and particularly electoral politics (Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014), Phoenix's work on Black voters provides added nuance to this theory (Phoenix 2019, 2020). For white Americans, anger might motivate voting and other behaviors that maintain the political systems that work in their favor, but anger is a riskier emotion for black Americans and can lead to a sense of resignation with the current political system rather boosting turnout. Black anger does lead to engagement but is more powerful for contentious politics (Phoenix 2019) and in organizational acts that are geared toward benefiting black communities directly (Banks, White, and McKenzie 2019); in contrast, hope is more critical in mobilizing black voters to the polls (Phoenix 2019).

7.2. LGBT Rights

Disgust not only shapes political choices and identities, but also attitudes toward social groups, as concerns about physical harm and contamination are transferred to concerns about social contagion (Nussbaum 2009; Petersen 2019). Political disgust is not simply a psychological concept, it is intimately connected to the hierarchy of groups in society. Which groups and what objects create disgust reflect the cultural and social norms that are reinforced through the emotion (Casey 2016). There is a substantial literature on the role of disgust on attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Disgust influences political attitudes by increasing negative affect toward some groups and by lowering support for policies that benefit the targeted group. The LGBT community is widely stigmatized and connected to disgust and moral/social purity by political leaders (Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2012; Inbar and Pizarro 2014). Using a nationally representative survey, Miller et al. (2017) demonstrate that authoritarian personality and disgust sensitivity predict opposition to transgender civil rights, particularly "body centric" policies. Individuals with stronger disgust dispositions are particularly averse to transgender people who challenge what the authors call "body norms" by showing gender through their appearance in ways that do not match their gender at birth. Casey (2016) also traces the impact of disgust on attitudes about gay rights and argues that the avoidance behavior that comes from disgust also make contact more difficult. If contact is a main way that attitudes on gay rights change (Broockman and Kalla 2016), then this avoidance contributes to the maintenance of prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups like sexual minorities. Casey argues that "from the history of homosexuality as a diagnosable disease, to HIV/AIDS and fears of potential disease transmission, to modern day 'culture wars' and fear of 'moral contamination' or corruption, the historical association between homosexuality and disease/contagion has been and continues to be

employed in political rhetoric to evoke and perpetuate disgust reactions among the public" (2016, p. 2).

The link between disgust and LGBT rights is so strong that it can be triggered with physical reminders. In lab studies, Adams, Stewart, and Blanchar (2014) find that exposing respondents to disgusting smells can increase support for socially conservative views on sex and decreases support for same-sex marriage. However, if disgust comes from social norms, as those norms change and disliked groups become more liked and tolerated, disgust may have a more contingent impact. For people who have more positive affect toward LGBT people and rights, this appeal to disgust is less effective than among people who have cold feelings toward LGBT people. Gadarian and van der Vort (2017) argue personal contact, persuasion, and media effects have all combined to shift the emotional substrates of attitudes toward lesbians and gays in a way that has made disgust less relevant for at least some portions of the population and that disgust can cause a pro-egalitarian backlash by creating anger toward the person or group sending disgust messages (Herek and Glunt 1993; Brewer 2003; Garretson 2014; Harrison and Michelson 2017).

7.3. Immigration

Immigration attitudes are also shaped by multiple emotions, including anxiety, disgust, and empathy. When people perceive threats, they are more likely to support policies that will reduce the power of groups perceived to be dangerous (Stephan and Stephan 2017). This integration of realistic or physical threats to safety with symbolic threats to culture and language are particularly powerful in shaping intergroup relations (Stephan, Ybarra, and Rios Morrison 2009) and attitudes on immigration (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). Increasing the public's anxiety about immigration is generally a successful strategy for lowering support for immigration and immigrant rights (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Albertson and Gadarian 2015), particularly when the immigrants are religious or ethnic minorities (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Brader et al. 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Anxiety can lower empathy for outgroups and this gap in empathy causes opposition to policies that can help groups in need, like immigrants (Arceneaux 2017). In the realm of immigration politics, political leaders who argue for restrictions to the number or types of immigrants also argue that immigrants are inherently threatening to the nature of the native population (Huntington 2004; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013; Pérez 2016) because of issues around language, job competition, and physical security (Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson 2014; Enos 2014; Abrajano, Hajnal, and Hassell 2017; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017).

Immigration opponents from ancient Rome to the COVID-19 pandemic have connected immigrants to disease and accuse them of bringing pathogens to the native population, enhancing xenophobia (Reny and Barreto 2020; Hartman et al. 2021). Scholars have found a link between disgust sensitivity and immigration opposition in the United States and Europe, although the immigrant groups differ across countries (Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux 2017, 2020; Petersen 2019; Kam and Estes 2016). In six studies, Faulkner et al. (2004) look at both chronic and state disgust reactions to foreigners and find that perceived vulnerability to disease predicts anti-immigration sentiment but that the group of

immigrants matters as well. Disgust works less well with immigrants who are more familiar, but powerfully shapes attitudes about immigrant groups from less familiar places. In two Dutch samples, Brenner and Inbar (2015) find that trait disgust is related to nativism and thinking of immigration as a threat to the country. There are potentially multiple pathways by which disgust works to decrease support for immigration—a concern that foreign people bring foreign substances that endanger natives with their germs or because foreign people have different cultures around food processing (Karinen et al. 2019). Karinen et al. (2019) find that outgroup prejudice is shaped more by resistance to foreign norms rather than the avoidance of new diseases.

Not everyone in the public is averse to immigration, and empathy can increase support for humanitarian policies toward immigrants and refugees. Empathy is both a trait that comes from some combination of biology, socialization, and experiences (Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2016; Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2017) as well a cognitive-affective state that can emerge situationally (Duan and Hill 1996). Individuals vary in their abilities or motivation to take the perspectives of others, and on average, empathy is easier to create and maintain among individuals who are similar to one another (Duan and Hill 1996; Davis 1980). In a study of attitudes toward immigration, Newman et al. (2015) find that people higher in empathic ability supported more humanitarian relief and socil welfare for immigrants and were more opposed to policies that limited immigration. Using a per-spective taking exercise, Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018) demonstrate that Americans—both Democrats and Republicans—can be moved to act on behalf of Syrian refugees, even as their attitudes are unaffected. Empathy can lower the barriers for cooperation across groups and increase support for immigration, but its effect may depend on which outgroups people think of when they think about immigration (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013).

7.4. Foreign Policy, War, and Terrorism

In the domain of foreign policy, the threat of terrorism is associated with increased support for retaliatory action by the government (Healy et al. 2002; Huddy et al. 2002), greater support for overseas involvement (Huddy et al. 2003; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Gadarian 2010) and support for the president and strong leaders (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Zechmeister, Montalvo, and Merolla 2010; Merolla and Zechmeister 2013; Willer 2004; Willer and Adams 2008; Landau et al. 2004; Snider et al., Chapter 14, this volume).

Threat is related to a range of shifts toward more conflictual preferences (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007) and behavior, and what specific policies citizens want is a function of the specific emotions they feel. Terrorism fears make group differences more prominent and increase ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and closed-mindedness (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Gautier, Siegmann, and Van Vuuren 2009; Kam and Kinder 2007). Anxiety increases risk aversion and is correlated with more support for isolationist policy preferences (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, and Small 2005; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav 2005; Lambert et al. 2010; Lerner et al. 2003; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, and Morgan 2006; Small, Lerner, and Fischhoff 2006). Anger about terrorism and victimization leads to support for more conflictual foreign policy (Lambert et al. 2010; Wayne 2019). In a study in Georgia, Kupatadze and Zeitzoff (2019) find that reminders of Russian aggression and anger lead Georgians to view Russia

as more threatening and support more hardline foreign policy like Georgia joining NATO. In the United States, anger over terrorism increased support for the Iraq War. Liberman and Skitka (2017, 2019) provide an explanation for why anger drove Americans to support war against a country that did not perpetrate the 9/11 attacks. They argue that, in the case of the Iraq War, anger led not only to a desire for ordinary retribution, or the punishment of the direct perpetrators of a crime, but also to vicarious retribution. Vicarious retribution involves targeting and punishing people not involved in the crime but who share an identity with the person or group who committed the original crime (Lickel et al. 2006; Vasquez et al. 2015). Support for vicarious retribution is higher when a group is perceived as homogenous, cohesive, or both, which may be more likely when the perpetrator is a member of an out-group, as in the 9/11 attacks.

8. How Political Elites Try to Manipulate Emotions

While there is considerable psychological research on individuals' efforts to regulate their own emotions, research on efforts to influence the emotions of others for political purposes is relatively less common. Studies of the antecedents of political emotions lag behind studies of effects and have focused predominantly on the individual appraisals, situational outcomes, and events depicted in news stories. In contrast, few studies examine explicit efforts to influence emotions, especially those with a recurring or institutionalized basis.

There has been a modest accumulation of research on emotional strategies in political communication. This includes investigations into how electoral candidates and advocacy organizations embed emotional appeals in their political messaging to sway audiences (Young and Miller, Chapter 16, this volume). These studies document the way imagery and music are used to elicit emotions, which types of appeals are most prevalent, and the effectiveness of these appeals at persuading and mobilizing citizens (Brader 2006; Fowler and Ridout 2013; Gadarian 2014; Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir 2000; Roseman et al. 1986; Ryan and Krupnikov 2021; Weber, Searles, and Ridout 2011). Other studies examine the ability of political elites to trigger emotional responses by framing issue or campaign messages with appeals to social groups or moral values (Clifford 2019; Gross and Wronski 2021; Kam et al. 2017; Lipsitz 2018), or by signaling their own emotions to partisan followers (McHugo et al. 1985; Stapleton and Dawkins 2022). Recently researchers have begun to use automated text coding methods to study patterns in emotive political rhetoric. Cross-national research on press releases and social media posts suggests that populist political parties are more likely to appeal to negative emotions and that parties generally tend to vary their use of discrete emotional appeals to serve distinct goals (Widmann 2021). Evidence from Great Britain shows that legislators are more likely to use emotive rhetoric when they anticipate larger public audiences for their parliamentary speeches (Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon 2021). The latter finding is also consistent with evidence from broader cross-national investigations: election campaigns deemed by experts to have relied most heavily on emotional appeals also tend to receive the most media attention (Gerstlé and Nai 2019; Maier and Nai 2020).

Overall, this body of work to date focuses somewhat more on the effectiveness of specific emotional triggers and less on the strategy and tactics adopted by candidates, political parties, and interest groups. There are many more questions we could ask about such emotional strategies in political communication (Brader and Corrigan 2005; Ridout and Searles 2011; Weber et al. 2011): What factors best explain the emotion or mix of emotions political actors try to evoke in their audiences? Does the desire to elicit specific emotions affect decisions about who is targeted and when? To what extent do political actors condition their emotional strategies on the emotional strategies of their rivals? Answers to these and similar questions should be grounded in a political psychological understanding of emotions and likely would help strengthen that understanding in turn.

Political efforts at manipulating emotions of course extend well beyond campaign and issue ads. Numerous other recurring events in and out of election campaigns are occasions for eliciting public emotions: party conventions, campaign rallies, national parades, state funerals, and high-profile political speeches (e.g., the State of the Union speech, with its perennial presidential invocation of national achievements and future goals delivered to a regular refrain of congressional applause and cheers). From time to time, political leaders launch "campaigns" to persuade the public toward some course of action (e.g., extending rights to protect previously marginalized groups, passing legislation to reform healthcare access, preparing the country for war). In studying how and why politicians try to elicit emotions in these persuasive campaigns, it is equally important to consider the limits on their capacity to generate the desired emotions (Lupia and Menning 2009).

9. Considerations Going Forward

Whether created by noisy, excited crowds at campaign rallies, candidate ads, fiery rhetoric, or global pandemics, emotions matter in politics. These whole-body feelings affect what individuals learn about political issues, what types of policies they prefer, what types of leaders they will turn to in crises, and whether they turn out in the streets or the voting booth. This chapter maps out the antecedents and effects of emotions across a wide range of policy areas and political behaviors. We conclude by considering some lingering questions about the state of the field and areas for future research.

Political psychologists of emotions spend a great deal of time on measurement and research design issues. A question far less discussed is under what circumstances *should* we manipulate emotions experimentally? Obviously, human subjects research must go through the institutional review board process to make sure that studies comply with regulations, respect the autonomy of subjects, ask for their consent to participate (in lab and survey studies), and debrief them adequately. However, we invite researchers to consider the ethics of their studies broadly in terms of *context, timing, and dosage*. To be clear, we use experiments in our own work and are *not* advocating that researchers refrain from eliciting emotions. We instead raise several considerations for researchers to keep in mind as they design studies to test the causal impact of emotion on political outcomes. We are not the first researchers to raise concerns about the ethics of experiments and particularly ones that induce emotions (Frazer 2020; Desposato 2018; Whitfield 2019; Teele 2014), but we

encourage researchers to weigh the potential risks of eliciting emotions against alternative designs such as observing emotions in survey data or using text-as-data methods to measure sentiment in mass media (Young and Soroka 2012).

In terms of context, for example, should experimenters manipulate emotions that provoke behavior if that behavior may be costly to the individual, particularly in authoritarian settings? If people already live in fear, does the scientific benefit of knowing how emotion works in those contexts override concerns about (re)traumatizing people? Researchers also should consider how the timing of emotion elicitation matters. During moments of crisis, researchers may be practically limited in their ability to move emotional responses due to ceiling (or floor) effects. Ethically, researchers may want to ask whether they should try to stimulate greater anxiety during the height of a pandemic or immediately after a terrorist attack. Lastly, researchers designing emotional treatments meant to induce disgust, shame, or other emotions should consider the optimal dosage of emotion—for example, enough to differentiate it from a control condition, yet relatively short lived. Adapting and enhancing the typical language, tone, and imagery of manipulations from the real world (e.g., ads, speeches, news stories) is one way to calibrate dosage in line with what individuals routinely face while satisfying the needs of tight experimental control (Albertson and Gadarian 2016). If the expected effects are potentially deleterious for democracy and peace (e.g., lowering voter turnout or increasing ethnic conflict), researchers should also consider the mode of experiment and consider whether a lab or even survey experiment is preferable to a field experiment.

Lingering questions about the dynamic facets of emotions are ripe for further research. For instance, how long do emotions created by political events or messages last and what is their long-term imprint? Emotions themselves are often short-lived but could impact policy attitudes or vote decisions even much later because they affect the type of information that people look for and how those memories are encoded (Abelson 1963). Many studies of emotions are based on cross-sectional survey data or one-shot experiments, limiting the ability of researchers to measure the half-life of emotions or what the long-term direct or indirect impacts might be. Panel studies or even repeated cross-sectional surveys can add needed insight on the duration of effects and whether there is an affective tipping point over time when emotional effects recede entirely (Schemer 2012).

We also have much more to learn about interactions between emotions. How are emotions related to each other, and can they enhance or be antidotes to one another (Clifford and Jerit 2018; Jasper 2011)? Over time, do people grow weary of being scared about national security threats and grow angry about being victimized (cf. Nussio 2020)? Can disappointment and embarrassment over the outcome of an election be turned into anger toward the electoral system by losing candidates? Can certain emotions neutralize or undercut the potency of other emotions? For instances, can immigration activists blunt anti-immigration sentiment by inducing empathy by sharing stories of the plight of immigrants (cf. Kalla and Broockman 2020)? Can hopeful messages about the future of the country relieve anxieties about current conditions?

In fact, political psychologists stand to benefit generally from paying more attention to efforts to inhibit or lessen emotional arousal, a topic they have to date largely ignored, for such efforts play a role in both ritual and extraordinary aspects of political life. Take for example courtroom rituals in the United States. Officers of the court convey and expect a

serious, civil demeanor. A bailiff or other officer instructs those present to rise and be silent. A judge may insist on keeping "order in the court" in the face of emotional outbursts and limit the introduction of evidence when she deems its emotional impact to outweigh its probative value. Such rituals can serve other important purposes as well, but they are designed in part to inhibit the role of emotions in judicial proceedings.[4]

In a less ritualistic but certainly recurring example, leaders often try to calm their citizens during crises or when they worry that fear will turn into panic or anger into violence—speaking to the country in the wake of military attacks, civil unrest, terrorism, natural or civil disaster, the onset of a viral pandemic, political shootings, or economic collapse ("the only thing we have to fear is fear itself"). One challenge faced by governments following terrorist attacks has been how to balance encouraging the public to stay alert while also reassuring them that they are safe or, alternatively, assuaging angry calls for immediate and intemperate retribution (Wayne 2019). Autocratic leaders try to manage emotions at least as much as their democratic counterparts. Just as leaders in China, Iran, or elsewhere may foment public anger at foreign powers, for example, they may also try to restrain such emotions in service of their domestic and foreign policy goals (e.g., Stockmann 2013). How effective are such attempts to keep public emotions "under control" or to assuage fear, anger, or other already-aroused emotions? These and many other important questions related to elite management and manipulation of emotions await further scholarly attention.

Notes

1. Rahn's concept of "public mood" focuses on an individual's affective state tied to their membership in a political community (e.g., the nation); operationally, it may be measured from responses to questions about discrete emotions, but such responses are aggregated into positive and negative affect. This is distinct from the concept of "public mood" offered by political scientist James Stimson (1999), which is a collective attribute of public opinion measured by aggregating the ideological (left-right) tilt of current policy attitudes across a wide range of issues and is not explicitly concerned with emotions or affect.

2. In his cognitive appraisal account, Lazarus (1991) in fact differentiates them into at least three categories: joy/enthusiasm, pride, and hope. But this is consistent with our argument in that Lazarus' distinctions are based on the relational (self-environment) meaning of the emotions, not on evidence of their empirical consequences.

3. Although, in many cases, it may seem obvious what makes people feel happy or enthusiastic, it is not always so. For example, Hutchings and colleagues (2006) experimentally manipulated news stories to emphasize either similarity or difference in the racial policy stances of George W. Bush and Al Gore in the 2000 election. Blacks responded with significantly higher enthusiasm for Gore in the "difference condition," even though what differed was not a more positive take on Gore's position, but instead the implication that Bush was more hostile to Black interests (than in the similarity article).

4. At the same time, of course, some aspects of court proceedings are clearly intended to arouse emotions. For example, in criminal trials, prosecutors may use horrific photos of the crime scene to elicit disgust and harsher judgments, or some jurisdictions may allow emotional testimony from family and friends at sentencing hearings.

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THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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WHY do you eat? This may seem like a simple question. But there are in fact multiple different ways of answering this question correctly. One immediate—and correct—way of answering this question is to say, "I eat because I am hungry." But another equally correct way of answering this question is to say, "I eat to acquire necessary nutrients and energy." The first answer describes how the phenomenon of eating appears to our own conscious senses: I feel hunger and then I go to the fridge to get some food. The second answer describes the *function* of that phenomenon: the reason why we have a sense of hunger and why we are so motivated to act on it. Note that this second form of answer or explanation may in itself help us flesh out the first answer in more detail. Knowing that we eat to acquire energy and nutrients may help us predict, for example, which kinds of foods we find particularly delicious.

Evolutionary approaches to political psychology apply this second form of explanation to the domain of politics, focusing on the potential functions of the psychological mechanisms that guide political decisions and behaviors. Such mechanisms are instantiated in the human brain and must therefore have a biological basis. Within biology, there is only one explanation of the existence of functionality: Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why and how to theorize about political psychology using evolutionary theory—and what are the implications for discussions within the field of political psychology—is the topic of this chapter.

It may seem strange to propose that biological evolution—and, hence, the deep prehistoric past of humans—has any relevance for political psychology. Afterall, is there anything more modern, technical, and complex than politics? Yet, the core argument of this chapter is that underneath this complexity is a number of fundamental problems of social life that we, as a species, have been recurrently facing for thousands and thousands of years. If evolution had not designed us to deal with these problems, we would not be here today, and, accordingly, we should expect the human mind to contain a large number of psychological mechanisms specifically dedicated to political decision-making. While much

research in political psychology laments the political sophistication of the average citizen, evolutionary approaches in contrast highlight the opposite. As will also be clear, however, our political nature was designed to solve problems in the particular environments of the ancestral past and, hence, will fail in predictable ways when applied to the problems that are unique to the politics of modern mass societies.

The chapter will review core concepts from evolutionary biology and the field of evolutionary psychology, which was specifically invented to bridge the natural and social sciences (Buss, 2019). The evolutionary approach reviewed here are thus applications of the wider field of evolutionary psychology to political psychology. The chapter then applies these outlined concepts to political psychology and provides a number of illustrations from recent research using an evolutionary approach. Finally, the chapter ends with trying to clear up a number of misunderstandings about evolutionary political psychology, which are widespread or may occur during the reading of the chapter. Thus, the reader should be warned that some of the conceptual framework is rather complex (and cannot be given full justice here) and will clash with a number of intuitions about how people make decisions. At the same time, however, the overall message of the chapter can be phrased in simple terms: just as fish are designed by natural selection to navigate through water, humans are designed to navigate swiftly and effectively through the political problems that pervaded the lives of previous generations. The implications of this message, however, are wide-ranging.

1. Asking Evolutionary Questions

To understand both the conduct and the goals of an evolutionary approach to political psychology, some rudimentary vocabulary from evolutionary biology is required. While a full treatment is far beyond the scope of this chapter, it will briefly introduce two important distinctions. The first is the distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations. The second is the distinction between adaptations and by-products. The first distinction highlights the categories of questions pursued by evolutionary biologists—and, by extension, evolutionary political psychologists—and the second distinction highlights the categories of answers they provide.

Evolutionary biologists distinguish between, at least, two types of explanations: one is called ultimate or functional explanations. The other is called proximate or mechanistic explanations. As carefully laid out in introductions to these different explanations there is no rivalry between these two types (Scott-Phillips et al., 2011). They are fully complementary and seek to accomplish two different but equally valuable things.

Proximate explanations are explanations that traditional political psychology often revolve around. These explanations often proceed questions of *how*? How do partisan social identities influence political participation? How is anger triggered in the context of political discussions? How do stereotypes about welfare recipients influence support for the welfare state? These explanations involve descriptions of the psychological mechanisms responsible for producing political motivations and behavior. In the introductory example of eating, the explanation "I eat because I am hungry" is an example of a proximate explanation that highlights the proximate motivations involved in the production of a behavior.

Evolutionary political psychology is unique in making active use of ultimate or functional explanations. Ultimate explanations are explanations that are often proceeded by questions of *why*? In the introductory example of eating, the ultimate explanation is that eating provides essential nutrients and calories for developing, sustaining, and propelling the organism. This is the function of eating. In political psychology the questions that would invite ultimate explanations would be questions like the following: Why do people form strong political identities? Why do people become angry with lazy welfare recipients? Why are people prejudiced toward people of another race or ethnicity?

In evolutionary biology there is only one explanation for the existence of functional processes ingrained in our biology: adaptation via natural selection. Natural selection is, in short, the cumulative effect of the environment over generations on the differential reproduction of genes that mutate randomly. To elaborate, organisms are composed of genes and genes build these organisms and, hence, influence the way organisms interact with the environment in which they are localized. Organisms reproduce, and, in the reproduction process, some genes will randomly mutate. Some mutations will make the next generation of organisms slightly better adapted to their environment in the specific sense that this next generation will leave relatively more offspring in this environment. Some other mutations will make the next generation slightly less adapted. The environments provide what is called a selection pressure. Over generations the differential reproduction rates created by this pressure will imply that better adapted genetic designs accumulate (i.e., are being selected) and spread in the gene pool that defines a species. They become species-typical adaptations.

Some of these adaptations will be physical in nature. The heart, for example, is a physical adaptation that evolved specifically to circulate blood and, hence, serves the function of bringing oxygen and nutrients to all parts of the body. The eyes are another physical adaptation that functions as an interface that allows the organism to process and react to distal objects by catching the light they transmit and turning these light signals into nerve signals that can be transmitted within the organism. The eyes also serve as an example of how adaptations can serve psychological and not just physical functions (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Essentially, the eyes serve the psychological function of building the basis for the mental imagery that plays an essential role in decision-making.

Human life is filled with choices. Some of the choices you make will harm you. Some of the choices will benefit you. Accordingly, an extraordinary number of adaptations exist with the exclusive purpose of aiding decision-making. While such a claim might have been controversial a few decades ago, the evidence for the psychological influence of genes is now so powerful that the claim is almost trivial but important nonetheless (Penke et al., 2007). What may still be controversial, however, is the claim that some of these psychological adaptations evolved specifically to aid *political* judgment and behavior.

The genes underlying any adaptation—whether physical or psychological—spread because the adaptation helped generations of organisms solve a specific problem. Such problems are referred to as adaptive problems (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). As with any other efficient problem-solving device, adaptations are problem-specific. Think of the craftsman's toolbox. There is a dedicated tool for hammering in nails, a dedicated tool for putting in screws, and a dedicated tool for sawing wood. The demands of the problem dictate the features of the tool. In Denmark, where I am living, there was once a long-running TV quiz show where two teams were presented with an old—and often quite obscure—tool. By examining the features of the tool, they tried to predict what it was for. And because of the

match between form and function, the teams were surprisingly good at making educated guesses.

The predictable match between form and function lies at the heart of the methodological approach of evolutionary psychologists when they derive ultimate explanations. Thus, by examining the features of an adaptation, it is possible to build educated and testable hypotheses about the adaptative problems that an adaptation evolved to solve. Furthermore, the connection between form and function is a methodological two-way street. Evolutionary psychologists do not just predict function from form. They also predict form from function. That is, by examining the specific demands of an adaptive problem in the evolutionary past of a species it is possible to build predictions about the current structure of the specific adaptation that evolved to solve that problem. Thus, by examining the adaptive problems of politics in ancestral life, an evolutionary approach entails developing testable hypotheses about the structure of political psychology.

Adaptations are functional. Adaptations, however, are not the only product of biological evolution; evolutionary psychologists are also oriented toward another product: by-products. By-products are, as indicated by the term, features that are produced by adaptations but are not in themselves adaptations. An example is the color of bones. There is no inherent functionality to the white color of bones. They could fulfil their function as easily being red, blue, or purple. But given that bones are built of calcium, they just happen to be white. The color is a by-product. Evolutionary psychologists sometimes use by-products in two slightly different senses. One is in the strict sense that the feature has no functional purpose whatsoever. The white color of bone is one such example. Another is in the sense that the feature of an evolved decision-making mechanism is adapted for a different purpose than how it is currently utilized (sometimes referred to as being caused by a "mismatch" between current and ancestral environments; we return to this later). One example is the tendency to pay attention to the race of others, which is arguably not an adaptation in itself but reflects the structure of decision-making mechanisms for detecting alliances (Kurzban et al., 2001). Another example is disgust reactions to people with another skin color, which may reflect the structure of decision-making mechanisms for using physical deviations from a psychological prototype as indicators of infection (Petersen, 2017). Despite the acknowledgment of other products of evolution, evolutionary psychologists often focus on adaptations because evolutionary biology provides the tools for developing hypotheses about adaptations: functional analyses of the demands posed by specific adaptive problems.

2. How to Derive Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Psychology?

The philosopher of science Karl Popper argued that there are no rules for theorizing, only for testing your theories. Hypothesis formation entails a "creative intuition" or an "irrational element" in his view (Popper, 2005 [1959]). Yet, evolutionary psychology offers exactly a toolbox for theorizing: a set of principles, grounded in one of the best validated scientific frameworks, for deriving testable predictions about the structure of psychological mechanisms.

Methodologically, evolutionary psychologists derive these predictions by relying on the relationship between the form of psychological mechanisms and their function. One method (sometimes referred to as reverse engineering, Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) entails building predictions about the function of a mechanisms by knowing their structure. Another method (sometimes referred to as forward engineering, Nairne, 2014) entails building predictions about the structure of mechanisms from their presumed function. Most often, however, the concrete research process entails going back and forth between these methods of inquiry. First, a function is often proposed by examining what is known about a psychological mechanism in the existing literature (reverse engineering), and, second, predictions about previously unknown features of the psychological mechanisms are then derived on the basis of this function (forward engineering). After deriving the predictions, doing research is business as usual: run empirical studies to test whether the mechanisms operate as predicted.

The core purpose of much evolutionary psychology is thus to validate and uncover the proximate structure of relevant mechanisms. Importantly, this structure is also the only explanation being supported by the empirical tests. Empirical confirmation of the hypotheses does not prove the ultimate explanation used to generate the proximate predictions. The primary purpose of the ultimate explanations is to assist us in making better predictions. When used in this way, evolutionary political psychology conforms to the views about science formulated by another key philosopher of science (and student of Popper), Imre Lakatos: research programs contain a set of a "hard core" of assumptions that are never put directly to test; they are only tested in combination with further auxiliary assumptions that generate the direct observable implications (Lakatos, 1976). While the ultimate explanations constitute such a "hard core" in much evolutionary political psychology research, this does not mean that they are not put to test by anyone. In fact, testing the core principles—the logic of evolution, the nature of adaptions, the history of human evolution, and so forth—is exactly the business of other, more fundamental disciplines in the hierarchy of the sciences. What constitutes assumptions for the psychologist and social scientist are the direct objects of empirical investigation for the biologist.

3.   Why Are Ultimate Explanations Relevant for Political Psychologists?

It is a tough job to raise and answer questions about ultimate explanations. So, why should you as a political psychologist nonetheless try? In addition to the argument in the preceding section that evolutionary psychology helps researchers theorize about the structure of psychological mechanisms, there are, at least, two other reasons why an evolutionary approach to political psychology can be worthwhile.

3.1.   Generating a More Complete Understanding

The first reason is that pursuing ultimate explanations provides a more complete understanding of the world we are living within. That is, after all, the business of all science—to

pursue explanations—even when (or exactly because) it is difficult. In fact, the viewpoint from an evolutionary approach, which is likely to be controversial among many political psychologists, is that this is the *only* way to actually explain behavior. In traditional political psychology, questions of *why* are also routinely raised and answered but often the explanations provided are proximate explanations disguised as ultimate explanations. For example, social identity theorists often argue that people seek strong social identities to manage self-esteem (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). And it is certainly true that the mechanisms that regulate the acquisition of social identities produce self-esteem as an output when the individual is part of a high-status social group. But this is not an ultimate explanation. Ultimate explanations are functional explanations that require a feedback mechanism whereby the functional behavior creates the machinery that produces the behavior. Evolution does not care about your feelings including your self-esteem. No matter how good a certain kind of behavior makes your feel, this does not make that behavior more likely to become fixed in the pool of genes that makes up our species' nature. Still, making and testing ultimate predictions about how, when, and why certain social behaviors evolved is extremely difficult. The good news is that most often the most difficult parts are of less relevance to the political psychologist. Whether the adaptations underlying a particular behavior evolved 100,000 years ago or 250,000 years ago is often of little importance for their purposes.

3.2. Consilience as a Solution to the Replication Crisis

Evolutionary psychology is first and foremost a bridge—a set of principles that connects the natural and the social sciences by using assumptions verified by natural science to build predictions on human psychology and therefore ultimately all human behavior. The view of science as a unified enterprise with a clear division of labor as well as a clear hierarchy (starting with physics then chemistry, biology, psychology and, finally, the social sciences) is sometimes referred to as consilience (Wilson, 2000). At the simplest level, the conduct of evolutionary political psychology is nothing more than a deep commitment to consilience: ensuring that the theories put forward in your research are as consistent as possible with the vast body of knowledge produced by all the sciences. Accordingly, the exact content of an evolutionary approach will continuously evolve as knowledge accumulates. Currently, evolutionary psychologists are mainly concerned with selection pressures operating within the small hunter-gatherer groups of our stone age ancestors because of the extremely limited pace of adaptation through natural selection. But if evolutionary biologists begin to discover examples of complex adaptations to modern environments, then this focus will shift too.

The chief benefit of this commitment is that it serves as a straitjacket for the researcher's imagination. The need of such a straitjacket is clear from what is known as the replication crisis—the fact that the many published findings in the most prestigious psychology journals are most likely false or, at least, cannot be replicated by independent teams (Nosek et al., 2012). A central example of such non-replicable findings is the notion of subtle priming effects such that reminders of old age will induce you to walk slower (Doyen et al., 2012).

A consilient approach works against non-replicability by increasing the a priori robustness of a prediction by making it constrained by observations from biology, primatology, anthropology, history, and so forth. By narrowing the space for possible predictions,

consilient approaches can speed up the scientific process. The old Popperian notion that science proceeds one falsification at a time leads to incredibly slow scientific progress, if all products of human imagination need to be tested and refuted. In contrast, consilience implies that we zoom in on those with greatest support from higher-order disciplines.

4. Why Adaptations for Politics? The Politics of Ancestral Life

Evolution is a slow process and takes generation after generation of stable selection pressures for complex adaptations to emerge. Evolutionary biologists have identified a number of recent adaptations relating to, for example, lactose tolerance and immunity against malaria (Cochran & Harpending, 2009). The commonalities of these adaptations are, first, that the adaptive problems they respectively solve are substantial and, second, that they only involve small genetic mutation. For complex psychological adaptations with more distal effects on reproduction, such as those involved in political judgment, it is the deep past that explains the present (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).

This implies that for adaptations for political judgment and behavior to exist the human past has had to be a political one. And there is indeed evidence for this. This claim may seem surprising if we think about politics in the sense of presidential elections, national media coverage, complex negotiations of bills, and so forth. It is less surprising if we zoom in on the essentials of politics. According to a classical definition, politics is about "who gets what" (Lasswell, 2018). In this perspective, politics is the process of negotiating access to resources. This requires, among other things, judgments about who is in the ingroup, how to divide resources within the group, and how to sanction those who take more than their share. If we strip away many of the legal and technical complexities of modern, national politics, these questions are at the core of most political debates about, for example, immigration, redistribution, and criminal justice. And such questions confronted our ancestors each day of their existence.

The human species has spent a predominant period of its existence as hunters and gatherers on the East African savannah, living in small groups of between 25 to 150 individuals and using stone age technology (Boyd & Silk, 2014; Kelly, 2013). The core parts of human psychology (including human political psychology) are accordingly expected to have been adapted to this life.

Part of this life was oriented toward cooperation. The archaeological record shows a clear, early, and important role of food-sharing and collective hunting in human evolutionary history, and these aspects are also present in closely related species, including chimpanzees (Kaplan et al., 2000). The archaeological record also shows that there is substantial fossil evidence for traces of what in present terms would appear as empathy. Thus, archaeological investigations provide clear demonstrations of health care for immobile or severely handicapped group members, which kept them alive over several years (Hublin, 2009).

While this may be reminiscent of Rousseau's notion of ancestral humans as "noble savages," it is important to note that from an evolutionary perspective cooperation is always a wary enterprise. As will be discussed in more detail, there are always selective advantages

to free-ride, in particular, if the free-rider can keep the cooperation going but subtlety extract more from the cooperative enterprise than is being invested. There is clear evidence of such complex cooperative dynamics within non-human primates (De Waal, 1996), and, of course, the importance of free-riding in humans is extremely well-documented (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985).

But the complexities of ancestral human social life go further. Thus, there is also significant evidence for the alternative notion to Rousseau's: the Hobbesian notion that the ancestral life could be "nasty, brutish, and short." There is clear fossil evidence of weapon-inflicted injury and death (Churchill et al., 2009). While prehistoric evidence in favor of more widespread conflict such as direct war is disputed (Gat, 2008), there is clear evidence of mass killing from about 10,000 years ago (Bowles, 2009), leading researchers to argue that warfare has constituted a heavy selection pressure on our species. Furthermore, while warfare—in the sense of group behavior with the purpose of killing members of other groups—is zoologically rare, it is relevant to note that two of the few species that engage in warfare are humans and chimpanzees. This provides some suggestive evidence that the last common ancestor may have engaged in such behavior too, implying that warfare may date back as early as 1.7 million years ago (Wrangham & Glowacki, 2012).

This was the likely life of our ancestors, a life-long camping trip without supermarkets, hospitals, and professional law enforcement. Our ancestors were constantly dependent on other individual's willingness to channel resources toward them in the form of food, social support, and healthcare; constantly needing to monitor whether others were exploitive; and constantly in danger from not just predators (from big cats to cave bears) but also from other groups who were seeking to gain violent access to food-related resources and mates. Kenrick et al. (2010) has provided an overview of some of the most central adaptive problems in this environment, reproduced here as Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 is organized around seven sets of adaptive problems that have influenced our ancestors' survival and reproduction substantially. The columns lists the adaptive costs ("Threats to fitness") and the adaptive benefits ("Benefits to fitness") associated with the problems and their solutions, respectively. Furthermore, the columns list some key cues that the evolved mind is expected to use in order to identify situations that may entail either costs ("Example cues to threats") or benefits ("Example cues to benefits"). For example, problems associated with self-protection entails numerous threats including the threat of physical violence and the threat of infection. Importantly, however, self-protection can also be increased by relying on other individuals who can either provide support against attackers or provide health care when sick. Threats to self-protection are identified using a number of cues including the presence of angry males in unfamiliar surroundings. The presence of familiar others, in contrast, serve as a cue of safety.

For the present purpose, the key point is that navigating the compound of adaptive problems laid out in Table 7.1—especially self-protection, affiliation, and status-related problems—required a sense of politics: an understanding of "who gets what, when, and how" (Lasswell, 2018). And the fact that you, the reader, is able to read this book—even the mere fact that you exist—is a testament to just how well-developed and effective this sense was and is.

The human group that gave rise to the rest of the world's population ventured out of East Africa around 60,000 years ago (Boyd & Silk, 2014). It took their descendants perhaps 20,000 years to reach Europe, a little more to reach Asia and Australia, and 20,000 years

Table 7.1 Overview of Families of Adaptive Problems and their Involved Threats, Benefits, and Cues

Family of Adaptive Problems	Threats to Fitness	Benefits to Fitness	Example Cues to Threats	Example Cues to Benefits
Physiological needs	Starvation, dehydration, overheating, etc.	Nutrients, liquids, etc.	Internal physiological imbalances	External incentives associated with past reductions of physical needs (e.g., smell of food cooking)
Self-protection	Violence from other people; contagious diseases	Safety provided by others	Presence of unfamiliar, dissimilar, angry males; being in unfamiliar surroundings; darkness; unfamiliar smells	Presence of familiar, similar others; being in familiar surroundings
Affiliation	Exposure to disease, cheating/free-riding, incompetence, excessive demands	Share resources, receive material support, enhanced self-protection, access to mates	Subject "foreignness" of others; unfamiliarity of other; other's acts of cheating or norm violation	Familiarity; past acts of reciprocity, trustworthiness; others' adherence to group norms; facial characteristics signaling trustworthiness
Esteem/status	Loss of status, social regard, status-linked resources, and mates	Status-enhancing alliances, access to resources and (for males) status opportunities	Nonverbal dominance displays by others; shifts in exchange rules; lack of apparent respect from others	Nonverbal status-conferring displays (e.g., eye contact, bodily orientation, etc.) by others; shifts in exchange rules; others' willingness to invest in oneself
Mate acquisition	Presence of desirable, same-sex others	Availability of desirable, opposite-sex others	Same-sex others' age, status, symmetry, masculinity/femininity, flirting behaviors	Opposite-sex others' age, attractiveness, status, bodily symmetry, morphological abnormalities, scent, nonverbal flirting behaviors
Mate retention	Sexual infidelity, mate poaching	Long-term parental alliances	Partner flirtation behaviors; presence of nearby, high mate-value, opposite-sex individuals	Others' expressions of love, intimacy, commitment; others' and own age (i.e., postmenopausal females)
Parenting	Especially high costs imposed by children, cuckoldry (for males)	Enhanced reproductive fitness	Signs of distress in own children; apparent physical (dis)similarity of child	Proximity of own children; nonverbal cues eliciting care (e.g., smiles)

Notes: Table adapted from Kenrick et al. (2010).

more to reach the Americas. Throughout this conquest of Earth, they lived in small groups of hunters and gatherers with stone age technology, aided chiefly by an incredible social and political mind. Ten thousand years ago, agriculture emerged, sustaining larger sedentary groups, and, as result, cultural evolution accelerated with incredible speed. Within what is the evolutionary equivalent to the blink of an eye, the human political mind exploited this new dynamic to concentrate power within increasingly powerful and technologically advanced states, a process that has continued until the present.

5. How Evolution Builds Adaptive Minds

We just discussed how adaptive problems drive forward the process of natural selection to create adaptations with tailored designs to solve particular reproductive challenges. As noted, many such adaptations will be psychological adaptations and many of those will have evolved to deal with issues of political judgment and behavior. We will now dissect what this actually means.

Imagine that you were playing a computer game, and in the game your job was to program an avatar. The avatar was placed in an environment equivalent to ancestral human environments, and the avatar had physiological needs equivalent to a human in terms of energy, oxygen, and so forth. Also, the avatar could—with the help of another avatar—replicate itself. The goal of the game was to get the avatar to reproduce as much as possible.

If you think of this challenge, you will quickly realize two things. First, you will realize that you cannot simply tell the avatar to "go reproduce" (sometimes referred to as a preference for fitness maximization; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) because reproduction requires the solution of an extraordinary amount of other, more specific problems: avoiding being eaten by predators, finding food, finding a mate, nurturing the offspring, and so forth.

Second, you will realize that the challenge is that a computer avatar is exactly that: an unthinking computer product without everyday notions of consciousness, free will, or rationality. Accordingly, you need to program the avatar through conditional rules: if x then y.

For each problem, the decision rule needs to solve two subproblems: *cognitive identification* and *behavioral solution* (Tooby et al., 2005). To solve the problem of cognitive identification, a decision rule needs to contain lists of cues (and sub-algorithms for adding cues to that list) that discloses an adaptive problem (e.g., identifying an approaching enemy, identifying a valuable cooperation partner, or identifying an act of exploitation in a social relationship).

To solve the problem of a behavioral solution, the decision rule—upon identification of a problem—needs to activate the mental and behavioral set of responses that solve the problem (e.g., running away when a predator is detected at a distance, preparing to fight when an enemy approaches, or putting on the charm when an attractive potential mate expresses interest in you). In this regard, there is nothing to hinder you from programming the avatar with learning processes in the form of feedback systems that learn from trial and error or imitation that allow it to emulate successful other avatars. But the key point is that the systems required for learning are themselves highly structured if-x-then-y rules. The flexibility of your avatar that is necessary for success in the game hinges on the existence of having scores of decision rules rather than having a few (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).

In many ways, the functional target of natural selection and the mechanics of this game are not radically different, and, accordingly, building hypotheses about how evolution has structured the human mind is very much similar to engaging in this thought experiment.

The functional perspective on the human mind entails that content-rich decision-making mechanisms exist and emerge as a reliable part of normal developmental processes. The notion that these mechanisms are content-rich implies that they contain, first, cognitive categories—sometimes referred to as types, templates or schemata—such as "parent," "sibling," "offspring," "friend," "enemy," "cheater," "ally," "follower," and "leader"; second, that they contain algorithms for the identification of each of these categories; and, third, that they contain algorithms for activating adaptive behavior toward each of these categories (Boyer, 2008a).

As an illustration, take the concept of "sibling." It is key to reliably track who you are closely genetically related to. To increase so-called inclusive fitness (i.e., the total fitness of yourself, your offspring, your offspring's offspring, etc.), you need to direct resources toward them. To ensure genetic recombination, however, a specific type of positive emotion (romantic feelings) should be directed away from them. The issue is that our ancestors had no access to the underlying feature of hard reality—the degree of overlapping genes—that really determined whether this emotional and behavioral package of "brotherly love" was adaptive. Nonetheless, natural selection could act on the statistical regularities of ancestral environments to select for information-processing mechanisms that were able to identify siblings through cues that predicted relatedness under these circumstances. In particular, research shows that humans identify older siblings through the number of years of co-residence, while young siblings are identified by observations of perinatal nurture from one's mother (Lieberman et al., 2007; Tanskanen et al., 2021). These cues activate the narrow set of motivations that are adaptive toward siblings: increased feelings of altruism as well as increased disgust reactions toward the idea of engaging in sexual activity. In modern societies cues such as co-residence may not be a good actual predictor of relatedness. Modern family patterns imply that we may grow up with someone who we are not related to and may not grow up together with those we are related to. For modern individuals, there may thus be a disconnect between who they know are their siblings and which individuals fulfil the input conditions of the mechanisms designed by evolution to detect siblings. Research shows that in those circumstances the cues rather than explicit knowledge dominate our emotional responses toward others (Lieberman et al., 2007).

This example contains a key point: evolved psychological mechanisms process cues. If a cue fits the input conditions of a specific psychological mechanism, this mechanism will be activated, even if it leads to outcomes that are not necessarily adaptive today. In this way, modern citizens use their evolved psychology from small-scale ancestral groups to solve problems inherent to large-scale modern groups such as redistribution, crime and punishment, and immigration. It also implies that the factors and solutions that this evolved psychology pushes our attention toward are primarily the factors and solutions that were relevant in small-scale societies and which may or may not be helpful in the context of today.

5.1. A Non-intuitive Perspective on Decision-Making

As a reader, you might have a knee-jerk reaction against this comparison between your own psychology and a computer program. Yet, the key insight from cognitive science is that both

the computer and the mind do the exact same thing: computations (Pinker, 2003). So, at least, some parts of your psychology will work in a way similar to a computer. The discussion within cognitive science is mostly how much. In this discussion, the position among (most) evolutionary psychologists is both simple and extreme as the computer-metaphor is seen as applicable to *all* parts of the human mind.

To understand this position, it may be relevant to compare it to the positions of other approaches to the mind. Many political scientists will be familiar with if-*x*-then-*y* decision rules from the early work in political science and political psychology on *heuristics*, that is, easy-to-use rules of thumb (Sniderman et al., 1993). One well-studied heuristic in political reasoning is the heuristic to use information about the proposer of a political proposal to predict the content of the proposal (Kam, 2005). The information-processing mechanisms studied by evolutionary psychologists are in logic similar to such heuristics in that they are facultative rules for decision-making. At the same time, the details of these accounts differ dramatically.

The classical claim within the political science research on heuristics has been that such decision-rules are (a) few in number, (b) learned from exposure to political debate, and (c) provide a shortcut to reach conclusions that could also be reached through effortful political reasoning (Sniderman et al., 1993). In contrast, an adaptationist perspective entails that such decision-rules (a) are incredibly plentiful, corresponding to the incredible number of adaptive problems our ancestors would need to solve to survive and reproduce; (b) emerge reliably as part of the normal developmental process of our species; and (c) are designed to propel behavior, contingent on the specific parameters of the situation, that would have been fitness-enhancing under ancestral circumstances (Petersen, 2015).

This contrast between the traditional perspective on decision-making mechanisms within political science and an adaptationist perspective is essentially about contrasting views about the psychological reality of the sense of self. The traditional view takes the phenomenological experience of making a decision at face value: In this view, there is indeed a central controller—you—who is able to figure out "smart moves" for making decisions (Sniderman & Bullock, 2018). In the cognitive psychological perspective underlying evolutionary approaches, there is no such central controller. Just as the feeling of the solidity of a table is a misleading representation, created by our minds, of the actual quantum physics of the table, so too is the feeling of the existence of a central decision-maker (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007). Rather, your mind—including your sense of control—emerges from a massive collection of information-processing mechanisms (referred to as the principle of massive modularity), each designed to carry out a specific function (referred to as the principle of domain-specificity).

Think of the way you catch a ball. Underneath that feeling of "this is when and where I need to put out my hand to catch the ball" there is a multitude of extremely well-designed mechanisms operating, continuously solving differential equations to predict the trajectory of the ball. The position of many evolutionary psychologists is that this is the rule rather than the exception for how decision-making works.

In recent decades, a popular midway position has been formulated by behavioral economics and social psychology in the form of dual-process theories. This midway position suggests that parts of our mind are a collection of parallel and unconsciously operating mechanisms as captured by the adaptationist notion of evolved domain-specific mechanisms (often referred to as "system 1" processes), and parts of our mind conform to the felt sense

of central control, whereby conclusions are derived through effortful reasoning (often referred to as "system 2" processes) (Jerit and Kam, Chapter 15, this volume; Kahneman, 2011). Within dual-process theory, these two systems are often seen as alternatives such that you can reach a given decision either through one type of process or through the other (by either thinking fast or thinking slow). This midway position conforms strongly to the phenomenology of being human, with centrally set goals that are constantly disturbed by impulses and urges, which is also reflected in the age-old distinction between affect and reason.

While dual-process theories openly acknowledge the influence of evolved decision-making mechanisms, many evolutionary psychologists are still critical of such theories (Barrett, 2014; Kurzban, 2011). Evolutionary psychologists would agree that decision-making can indeed be either slow or fast. But the time and effort spent does not reflect the use of qualitatively different processes placed along a bipolar continuum from slow to fast. Instead, decision-making time and effort reflects the *quantity* of domain-specific processes being activated to solve a specific decision-making problem. Slow decision-making reflects the application of *more* functional mechanisms rather than fewer. Indeed, some of these domain-specific mechanisms may have evolved for tasks of slow reasoning such as causal reasoning (Quillien & German, 2021) or mental time travel (Boyer, 2008b). At a more philosophical level, many evolutionary psychologists would also argue that dual-process theories face significant problems as such theories do not solve the deep theoretical problems related to the presumed existence of a centrally controlled "self," even if this "self" retreats to occupy just some parts of the human mind (Barrett, 2014).

In the view of evolutionary psychologists, your sense of self emerges from myriads of more or less independently operating mechanisms (Kurzban, 2011). This may seem unbelievable. But, if you think about, it is not more unbelievable than something that we know is a fact: this sense of self, in the end, is nothing more than electric signals moving along the appendages of cells as little as a few micrometers in diameter. In this sense, a core requirement of an adaptationist approach is to put aside your folk (i.e., everyday) intuitions about how you and your fellow con-specifics reason and follow the logic of adaptationism wherever it brings you. In this sense, an adaptationist stance is remarkably similar in spirit to quantum physics with its dictum of "shut up and calculate" (Mermin, 2004).

6. ILLUSTRATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

In their understanding of politics, most political psychologists focus on the mass level, that is, at the level of states and nations. From an evolutionary perspective, however, politics is a process that is being played out at many other levels. Politics is about resource allocation and, hence, is also something that occurs, for example, within families and in the local community. In fact, the problems of resource distribution and allocation within these smaller-scale social domains will better reflect the kinds of problems we evolved to deal with. Furthermore, because politics is fundamentally about resource allocation, politics is shaped by each and every problem that humans face, today and ancestrally. All of the problems listed in Table 7.1—and the psychological mechanisms selected to efficiently solve these problems—will accordingly shape the political attitudes and behaviors of modern citizens.

For example, there is already evidence that problems related to immediate physiological needs shape modern political cognition. Sleep patterns, for example, are associated with political ideology, such that conservatives are more likely to be morning people (Ksiazkiewicz, 2020). Also, experiences of hunger and lack of access to calories have been found to increase support for helping the poor, potentially reflecting that sharing was a key strategy for buffering hunger ancestrally (Aarøe & Petersen, 2013).

The problems of mate acquisition and retention have also been found to shape political choices. For example, individuals who seek more sexual partners have consistently been found to reject the influence of authorities on life choices, making them more left-wing on a number of cultural issues. In contrast, individuals who are seeking to retain their partners are more likely to endorse strong regulation of life choices (Petersen, 2018). Furthermore, research shows that people who are trying to attract new partners are more likely to hide their partisan allegiances (Klofstad et al., 2012), potentially because such allegiances are intuitively viewed as group attachments that hinder the possibility of cross-group bonding.

Problems of parenting also shape political choices. Both parenthood and the subjective motivation to become a parent have been found to increase risk aversion and make people more conservative (Kerry & Murray, 2018). This effect presumably reflects that conservative social policies are often protection-oriented and, hence, cater to the increased sensitivity to risks.

Problems of physiological needs, mating, and parenting may seem distal to politics, but nonetheless they shape political choices. In the following, we will take a more detailed look at the remaining problems from Table 7.1—problems of self-protection, affiliation, and status—and discuss research that illustrates how these problems have selected for powerful political-psychological mechanisms that shape modern political attitudes and behavior. As these problems relate to problems of social relationships between non-kin, they are particularly relevant for the study of politics in modern mass society. At the same time, it is important to stress that these three adaptive problems are not uniquely relevant to politics.

6.1. Self-protection: The Politics of Disease Avoidance

Pathogens are one of humanity's oldest enemies—in fact, one of the oldest enemies of all living creatures. Most people are acutely aware of how pandemics have killed millions throughout modern history and the biological immune system is a standard part of school curricula. Yet, still most people may not appreciate just how fundamentally the human species has been shaped by the fight against pathogens. For example, a central hypothesis in evolutionary biology is that sexual reproduction—that is, that it takes two sexes to reproduce—evolved as a protective feature against pathogens as continuous genetic recombination limits their possibilities of adaptation (Tooby, 1982). Similarly, there is emerging evidence that humans developed several and distinct dynamic protective systems against exposure to pathogens. The immune system protects the body once pathogens get inside. In addition, psychological science shows the existence of mechanisms for avoiding exposure to pathogens in the first place.

This *behavioral* immune system evolved to detect cues that ancestrally disclosed the presence of a potential pathogen threat and, upon detection, motivate avoidance of the

source through the emotion of disgust (Schaller & Park, 2011). This helps explain disgust reactions and avoidance behavior toward feces, blood, rotten food, and so forth. Furthermore, because the detection of invisible threats such as pathogens is difficult and because a failure to detect the threat is potentially fatal, the evidence suggests that the behavioral immune system operates in a hypervigilant manner ("better safe than sorry") and, accordingly, may trigger in circumstances that may not be objectively threatening. Studies show, for example, that people experience disgust reactions against harmless props that simply look like excrements or completely disinfected glasses that only touched disease vectors prior to disinfection (e.g., Rozin et al., 1986). Finally, the key disease vector over human evolutionary history was other humans, and, hence, the behavioral immune system is also highly vigilant toward signs of human infection symptoms such as rashes. However, the hypervigilant operations of the system also imply that even non-infection-related deviations from the average phenotype can trigger the system such as birthmarks or obesity (Petersen, 2017; Ryan et al., 2012).

The behavioral immune system is intimately tied to social behavior. It is triggered by the presence of other people and it motivates avoidance of other people (Aarøe et al., 2016). Accordingly, it is also expected that the operations of the behavioral immune system influence political attitudes and behavior. Researchers have, in particular, studied this influence through the lenses of individual differences in the activity of theescriioral immune system. Some people—largely due to genetic factors (Sherlock et al., 2016)—are more sensitive to the presence of pathogens, and a range of studies have looked at how individual differences in this sensitivity predict political individual differences.

The general finding from these studies is that the behavioral immune system does indeed shape political attitudes and behaviors in multiple ways. In particular, it shapes the perceptions of other people in society. People who are more prone to experience disgust are more distrusting of strangers (Aarøe et al., 2016) and especially of groups that deviate from the mainstream such as immigrants, homosexuals, and the homeless (Aarøe et al., 2017; Clifford & Piston, 2017; Terrizzi et al., 2010). This also directly influences political opinions such that people who are higher in behavioral immune sensitivity are more likely to, for example, oppose policies that allow for immigration and same-sex marriage.

The opinion effects of the behavioral immune system have broader downstream effects. Leeriness of outgroups is, for example, associated with right-wing positions on cultural and social issues. Consistent with this, research finds that behavioral immune sensitivity is associated with a more right-wing self-placement on the ideological spectrum and a greater tendency to vote for right-wing parties (Aarøe et al., 2020; Terrizzi et al., 2010). This association between culturally right-wing views and behavioral immune sensitivity expands beyond the anglophone world, which has been the location of the majority of studies. Specifically, Tybur and colleagues examined the relationship between behavioral immune sensitivity and right-wing authoritarianism in 30 countries from all parts of the world, finding a culturally robust positive association (Tybur et al., 2016).

The initial work on the political psychology of disease avoidance focused on attitudes toward foreigners (Faulkner et al., 2004; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006), and, in general, this is the area where most work has been done to understand exactly why disease-avoidance motivations fuel political attitudes and why it matters. As an illustration of how to unpack empirical evolutionarily grounded relationships, it is helpful to discuss this work in further detail.

Psychologically, it may seem surprising why heightened vigilance toward pathogens will lead to opposition to immigration and leeriness of foreigners. One possibility raised in early work was that the behavioral immune system was designed by evolution to specifically attach higher disease threat to people from outgroups because they could host pathogens that the ingroup's physiological immune systems were not adapted to fight (e.g., Faulkner et al., 2004). In this perspective, the effect would reflect an adaptation. For a number of reasons, however, this argument is evolutionarily implausible (see Aarøe et al., 2016), in part because our ancestors were travelling on foot and would very seldomly get into contact with groups with completely different pathogen ecologies. Consistent with this, empirical research finds that foreigners with infection symptoms are not viewed as a greater disease threat than ingroup members with similar infection symptoms (van Leeuwen & Petersen, 2018).

Another possibility is that the relationship between the behavioral immune system and opposition toward foreigners reflects the hypervigilance of the system. Put bluntly, a difference in skin color is wrongfully mentally tagged as a potential infection symptom in the same way that a birthmark is (Aarøe et al., 2017; Petersen, 2017). In this perspective, the effect of the behavioral immune system on xenophobia would not be an adaptation but a by-product. There is some evidence for this possibility. Thus, research using unobtrusive measures of mental categorization shows that people mentally tag healthy but racially different foreigners as similar to ingroup members with a physical infection symptom such as a rash (Petersen, 2017). Hence, skin color is treated as equivalent to an actual infection symptom. In this perspective, the relationship between disease-avoidance motivations and xenophobia reflects a maloperation of a hypervigilant psychological system that evolved within a monoracial ancestral environment.

It should be noted that these two explanations do not exhaust the universe of possibilities. Especially, there is also evidence to suggest a third possibility (Karinen et al., 2019). The premise for this third possibility is that a key bulwark against pathogens is and was cultural practices related to, for example, cleaning, hygiene, and food-preparation. In this perspective, the relationship between disease concerns and xenophobia does not reflect that foreigners as such are mentally tagged as pathogen hosts but that the presence of foreigners is tagged as a threat against cultural equilibria that partly serve a disease-protection function.

Independent of the exact psychological mechanism underlying the relationship between disease-avoidance motivations and avoidance of outgroups, this relationship is important in the sense that it changes the challenges associated with establishing cooperative between-group relationships. In the literature on tolerance, for example, it is sometimes argued that people will be more tolerant toward members of other groups if these are presented as hardworking and willing to contribute to society. Yet, some evidence suggests that if intolerance is grounded in disease concerns, then information about the cooperativeness of foreign groups does not increase tolerance (Aarøe et al., 2017; but see Karinen et al., 2019). After all, the perception of threat is not grounded in the intentions of the individual but in the autonomous pathogens that the individual is misperceived to host. Furthermore, the literature on tolerance consistently promotes the argument that social contact is key for the promotion of tolerance (e.g., Crisp & Turner, 2009). Yet, if intolerance is grounded in disease concerns, then the avoidance of social contact is deliberatively sought. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that individuals high in behavioral immune sensitivity have a preference for racial segregation policies exactly because these entail social avoidance

(Aarøe et al., 2017). In other words, knowing and understanding the way the evolved behavioral immune system shapes modern politics is key for understanding the challenges of achieving peaceful multiethnic societies.

6.2. Affiliation: The Politics of Cheater Detection

The adaptive problem captured by Kenrick et al.'s (2010) term "affiliation" has been intensely studied within evolutionary biology under the heading "cooperation." In fact, the evolution of cooperation is probably one of the most studied questions within the broader evolutionary sciences as applied to humans. The extent of human cooperation is so zoologically distinctive that it is sometimes referred to as a key defining characteristic of our species (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Humans are, in the words of Tomasello (2014), ultra-social.

Cooperation has not only attracted significant attention because of its role in human life but also because it was—even for Darwin—an evolutionary puzzle. Cooperation entails sacrificing resources for another organism, which seems to clash with the notion of evolution as "survival of the fittest."

The puzzle was solved in two steps. The first step was taken by William Hamilton (1964) in his research on kin altruism. To the extent two organisms share genes, the helping behavior of one organism toward the other could have evolved as the first organism essentially promotes its own genes through the behavior. This principle—and the underlying formalizations—readily explained cooperation between human kin and how this systematically varies according to genetic relatedness and also explains the behavior of other ultrasocial species such as ants, because ants within any single colony are highly related.

The second step was taken by Robert Trivers (1971) in his work on reciprocity. Trivers turned toward the problem left unsolved by Hamilton: cooperation between *non*-related organisms. Trivers argued that such cooperation could have evolved if it was reciprocal, that is, if a helping act from organism A to organism B is returned and that for each act the benefit to the receiver is larger than the cost to the giver. The latter condition is fulfilled in many cases in which a need is present. The expected benefit to the receiver is often higher than the expected cost to the actor when saving one from drowning, when sharing food with one who is hungry, when supporting a friend against an aggressor, when showing how to build a tool, and so forth.

The more challenging condition is the former: ensuring that help is directed toward those who are disposed to return help. The formidability of this challenge reflects that there are strong selection pressures for free-riding or cheating, as Trivers termed the behavior. Cooperation is a collective action problem and as is well-known among most students of politics—in part, because of how Trivers' work shaped the work of political scientists such as Robert Axelrod and Elinor Ostrom—such problems involve the opportunity to harvest benefits without paying the costs. There are incredible evolutionarily returns to cooperation but the problem of cheating implies that it has only evolved in non-kin forms within a select number of species. Furthermore, even for cooperative organisms such as humans, there is a constant selection advantage in so-called subtle cheating: cheating that is not so blatant that it curtails cooperation altogether but which nonetheless implies that someone reaps more than invested in the cooperative relationship.

Consistent with this, evolutionary psychologists have produced a consistent line of evidence that humans have extraordinary capacities to detect violations of social expectations in exchange relationships (Cosmides & Tooby, 2015), that these exist cross-culturally, operate independently of formal education (Sugiyama et al., 2002), and rely on functionally dedicated brain regions (Stone et al., 2002). Being a hyper-cooperative species involves balancing hyper-vigilance toward potential situations of cooperation with hyper-vigilance toward potential acts of cheating. As demonstrated by decades of research in behavioral economics, the detection of such cheating leads to a quick withdrawal of cooperation, the elicitation of punitive sentiments, and a search for signs of remorse, if cooperation is to be reestablished (Ostrom & Walker, 2003).

Beyond solving the problem of non-kin cooperation, Trivers' major achievement was an initial analysis of how the selection pressures related to reciprocity has profoundly shaped almost all aspects of human social cognition as also suggested in the preceding paragraph. From this analysis, researchers were provided with the building blocks for understanding key political phenomenon such as group formation (Tooby et al., 2006), leader choice (Price & Van Vugt, 2014), punishment, and reconciliation (Petersen, Sell et al., 2012). In short, there is probably not a set of adaptive problems more important than reciprocity for understanding political behavior (see also Alford & Hibbing, 2004).

An illustration is provided by research on the relevance of cheater detection for social welfare attitudes. Modern welfare states are probably the most complex system of exchange to have existed. Resources are exchanged between future, current, and past selves, between the fortunate and the unfortunate, and between generations. At the same time, the welfare state is an object of political disagreement. Some people in established democracies support having a large welfare state, others are more opposed.

A finding in early work on variation in welfare state attitudes was that this variation did not simply track self-interest but was strongly related to perceptions of welfare recipients and their so-called deservingness, that is, the degree to which these recipients were morally praiseworthy (see Oorschot, 2000). Furthermore, early work suggested that this moral judgment in particular tracked people's perceptions of whether the recipients were in control over their plight. For example, if recipients could work but chose not to, they were seen as significantly less deserving. Welfare is supported for recipients who are deemed to be unlucky but opposed for recipients deemed to be "lazy."

A number of different theories have been used to explain this variation. Some argued that the use of deservingness judgments as a decision-making heuristic—with their focus on individual responsibility—is part of a right-wing ideology (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Others have argued that deservingness judgments as heuristics are acquired from individualistic cultures such as the American (Gilens, 1999). Early explanations, in other words, pointed to a high degree to culturally particularistic explanations.

In an evolutionary perspective, in contrast, the focus on luck and effort in help-giving situations follows directly from the logic of cheater detection, even if those situations are related to a complex modern institution such as the modern welfare state (Petersen, 2012; Petersen, Sznycer et al., 2012). The basis for variation between people in welfare attitudes is not whether people base their help-giving decisions on notions of desert but rather the content of the perceptions of their recipients, formed in part by the cues available about the specific recipient and in part on the basis of general impressions of the entire relevant social group (i.e., stereotypes built on personal experiences, cultural tropes, etc.).

Evolutionary work on cheater-detection had already established how people in both Western societies and small-scale horticultural societies rely on cues about luck and effort in their help-giving decisions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Establishing that these mechanisms also underlie deservingness judgments in modern politics, however, is not straightforward. It essentially entails what is sometimes called abduction, that is, inference to the best explanation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, providing direct evidence for ultimate explanations is difficult. Instead, an ultimate explanation is often seen as supported within evolutionary psychology, if it constitutes the simplest inference on the basis of the available observations. Consistent with this, the argument that the evolved logic of cheater detection underlies modern welfare attitudes reflects numerous different lines of evidence that together make a strong case.

One critical experiment used a so-called memory confusion paradigm to demonstrate that the psychological mechanisms that we use to guide everyday decisions about help giving are the exact same psychological mechanisms that we use to guide political decisions about social welfare (Petersen, 2012). The crux of the paradigm is that situations processed by the same mechanisms are confused when recalled. In the specific study, participants were presented with a series of people receiving help in an everyday situation (e.g., getting help move to a new apartment) and a series of people receiving social welfare. In some of the situations, the recipient was clearly a reciprocator and in other situations theescrient was clearly a cheater. Upon recall, people confused cheaters with cheaters and reciprocators with reciprocators, independently of whether these had received everyday help or social welfare.

Another set of studies demonstrated a logical implication: deservingness judgments in welfare opinions should rely on automatic psychological mechanisms and be charged with emotions (Petersen et al., 2011; Petersen, Sznycer et al., 2012). For example, these studies showed that decisions were made more quickly when clear deservingness cues were available and relied on emotions such as anger (toward recipients low in effort) and compassion (toward unlucky recipients).

A third series of studies showed that deservingness judgments were not limited to particular cultural contexts. Thus, both people in individualistic countries, such as the United States, and people in more collectivistic countries, such as Denmark and Japan, rely on deservingness cues when forming welfare opinions (Petersen & Arceneaux, 2020). One study examined the association between welfare opinions and deservingness judgments across 49 countries and found a significant association in all but one (Petersen, Sznycer et al., 2012).

Probably the best evidence against the argument that deservingness judgments are tied to particular cultures or ideologies comes from evolutionarily informed studies that focus on "crowding out" effects, that is, how the presence of one type of consideration can crowd out peoples' reliance on other types of considerations. These studies show that the presence of just two sentences of deservingness cues essentially crowd out otherwise substantial cultural and ideological differences in welfare opinions. While Americans and Danes differ in their general support of their respective welfare states, these cultural differences disappear when judging specific welfare recipients described in ways that fit the evolved cheater-detection systems. Americans' and Danes' opposition toward granting welfare to a low-effort recipient are statistically indistinguishable, as are their support for welfare for an unlucky recipient (Aarøe & Petersen, 2014). Similarly, while people on the left-wing and right-wing differ in their general support for welfare benefits, these differences disappear

in the face of cues that fit evolved cheater-detection mechanisms (Petersen, Sznycer et al., 2012). When Americans, Danes, people on the left-wing, and people on the right-wing have different social welfare attitudes, it is not because they are psychologically different in any fundamental way. It is because they have different understandings of whether the average welfare recipient is a free-rider or a reciprocator and those understandings trigger different evolved intuitions.

These findings imply that it is, at least, possible that social welfare opinions are heavily shaped by evolved mechanisms for cooperation. Prior to the application of an evolutionary perspective to welfare opinions, it was already known that welfare recipients' luck and effort played an important role in attitudes toward them. The evolutionary perspective contributes by providing an understanding of why this is the case. At the same time, this explanation also has important implications. One of them is that everyone should be swayed by political arguments that tap into evolved mechanisms related to cheater detection. Research has already provided some evidence for this, suggesting that framing individuals as cheaters is a universally strong strategy in political communication (Petersen & Arceneaux, 2020).

6.3. Status: The Politics of Status Seeking

The examples of how the psychologies of disgust sensitivity and cheater detection shape attitudes to immigration and welfare attitudes, respectively, illustrate two ways in which evolutionary psychology can inform political psychology. Disgust reactions is an example of a factor that researchers would probably not have thought of as socially and politically relevant without an evolutionary framework and shows how evolutionary psychology can point researchers in new directions. In contrast, political psychologists already knew that luck and effort played a major role in welfare attitudes prior to the application of evolutionary psychology. Here, the contribution of this application was instead to provide a deeper understanding—an ultimate explanation—of *why* these factors mattered.

In this section, we will examine a third and final illustration: status seeking as a way to explain hostile behaviors on social media. This illustration provides an example of yet another way in which the application of evolutionary theory can contribute to political psychology: challenging popular—and perhaps intuitive—explanations of phenomenon by considering a larger base of evidence.

Humans are group-living animals and, as noted earlier, harvest enormous cooperative surpluses from social life. Social life, however, is not just structured by horizontal relationships of cooperation but also by vertical relationships of hierarchy. The evidence from both human and non-human primates suggests that there are substantial selection benefits in terms of quantity and quality of offspring from having higher social status. As such there are substantial selection benefits from having psychological mechanisms that facilitate the climbing the social hierarchy (Maner, 2017).

Psychologically, social status is a shared expectation about a person's entitlement to resources. According to evolutionary models of hierarchy, this entitlement can be based on prestige (i.e., the delivery of services to voluntary followers) or on dominance (i.e., the extraction of resources from others through the induction of fear) (Maner, 2017). Evolutionary research suggests that individual differences that predict the success of each of these two strategies predict their use. For example, individuals with greater physical strength—a

major predictor of ancestral cost-imposition ability—are more likely to use aggression and dominance (Sell et al., 2009). This also applies to modern politics where physical strength predicts support for the use of military power and engagement in political violence (Bartuševičius, 2021; Sell et al., 2017). In fact, dominance motivations are some of the best predictors of actual participation in political violence across the world (Bartuševičius et al., 2020).

One particularly important feature of humans is that much conflict is group-based and, accordingly, that we also ascribe status to groups and compete over status in groups. In essence, it is a collective good to be a member of a high-status group because of the special access to resources such membership entails (Tooby et al., 2006).

A number of psychological mechanisms therefore also exist for advancing the status of one's group vis-à-vis other groups. Some of these mechanisms evolved to identify threats from other groups. Other mechanisms exist to mobilize your own group against other groups. One of the key tools for such mobilization is coordination of ingroup members' attention toward the threat by rapid information sharing (Petersen, 2020). Some of the best analyzed examples of such dynamics are from anthropological research on ethnic massacres. In his systematic review of what happens before, during, and after ethnic massacres, Donald Horowitz (2001) describes the role of rumor sharing in the following way:

> A rumor is a short-lived, unverified report, usually anonymous in its origin. No rumor that is disseminated widely enough to help precipitate collective violence can be understood as merely a chance falsehood or, as is commonly thought, a bit of misinformation that gains currency because official news channels have been remiss in putting out the truth. Concealed threats and outrages committed in secret figure prominently in pre-riot rumors. . . . Rumors are structurally embedded in the riot situation, because they are satisfying and useful to rioters and their leaders, and so efforts to counter rumors may be misdirected. Rumor is likely to prevail over accurate information. . . . Rumor prevails because it orders and organizes action-in-process.

In many domains it is key to have evolved machinery that provides the individual with accurate perceptions of the world. Our ancestors would, for example, need extremely accurate perceptions to be efficient hunters. But in social life accuracy is not always the key factor for selection (Kurzban, 2011). If improvements of personal or group status can be achieved by selectively dispensing with the truth, it is likely that this will be favored by evolution. For a strategic social animal, information sharing is as much about influencing other people's behaviors in ways that are beneficial to the self as it is about broadcasting accurate portrayals of the world (Kurzban, 2011; Petersen, 2020). Essentially, that is Horowitz's point: Sharing misinformation is *useful* when mobilizing for conflict.

These theoretical notions stand in contrast to some of the ways in which a particular kind of rumor sharing has been explained: "fake news" sharing on social media. It may seem intuitive that people care about truth and when asked directly people also overwhelming emphasize the importance of only sharing true information (Pennycook et al., 2021). From this it seemingly follows that people who share misinformation mistakenly think the information is true or are distracted and do not attend to the information's truth value.

At the same time, misinformation in the form that has been the focus of the "fake news" debates in the United States shares multiple features with the kind of rumors that have been

shown to be useful for mobilizing: They highlight that (1) there is an enemy group, which is (2) strong and (3) ready to aggress (Petersen et al., 2020). In the context of US party politics dominated by a two-party system, this enemy group is most often the other political party.

The empirical evidence suggests that ignorance certainly plays a role when it comes to beliefs in misinformation (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Yet, the theoretical point from an adaptationist perspective is that there may be a disconnect between beliefs and sharing. Sharing is a social act, aimed at accomplishing specific social goals such as mobilizing your ingroup and here accuracy might not always be that useful. Indeed, the evidence is also much weaker for the role of ignorance when it comes to sharing decisions. In fact, people who share false information online are more, not less, knowledgeable about politics than the average American (Osmundsen et al., 2021). Instead, empirical research shows that what really drives fake news sharing is partisan animosity: hating members of the other political party (Osmundsen et al., 2021). Not only the content but also the psychological drives of the sharing of misinformation in contemporary democracies is horrifyingly similar to drives in ethnic riots.

Further evidence suggests that these sharing decisions are, at least in part, driven by attempts to acquire individual and group status through dominance. Psychological measures of dominance motivations are hugely predictive of the motivations to share false and hostile information online (Petersen et al., 2023). Research has also shown that the predictive power of dominance motivations extends to other problematic online phenomenon such as being hateful or engaging in so-called moral grandstanding in online debates (Bor & Petersen, 2021; Grubbs et al., 2019; Petersen et al., 2021). In a nutshell, the same psychological factors that predict hostility in offline contexts also predict it in online contexts. Humans are human, whether they are online or offline. Indeed, there is evidence that dominance motivations (i.e., craving status among those who feel that prestige is outside their reach) are the common denominator of a very large range of the behavior that observers associate with the turmoil that many democratic societies face in current times, including online hate, the sharing of misinformation, violent protest, and support for dominant leaders that can further mobilize the masses against the perceived enemy (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Petersen et al., 2021).

A deeper psychological—or, perhaps, even philosophical—point raised by these findings is about the relationship between beliefs and behavior. Do people who instrumentally share misinformation to gain the upper hand in status competitions with other groups believe in the misinformation or not? Few people would admit to circulating information they believed to be blatantly false, and most would argue that they do believe the information they share. But that often raises the question: Do they *really* believe it? From an adaptationist perspective such a series of questions is misguided. What is consciously accessible to us—what we in some sense of the word "believe"—is what is useful to us, given the adaptive problem we are facing. Sometimes it is useful to hold beliefs that accurately represent reality. Sometimes it is not. Both are, from a phenomenological perspective, equally valid beliefs. Indeed, sometimes it is most useful for us to convince ourselves that what is useful is really accurate. The first step in persuading others is often to persuade yourself. Self-deceit (meaning that as there is no true "self," some parts of the mind are able to dominate conscious thinking at the expense of other parts of the mind) may be an adaptive strategy (Kurzban, 2011).

7. When the Past Does Not Look Like the Present: The Role of Evolutionary Mismatches

The earlier illustrations focus to a large extent on how adaptations for navigating ancestral politics allow people to navigate in modern politics with high degrees of efficiency. People intuitively react with avoidance toward those activating disease concerns, carefully tailor support for help-giving based on cues of reciprocity, and strategically share those types of information that are most likely to mobilize others.

This efficiency may seem to completely clash with the orthodoxies of political psychology: citizens do not really care about politics, they do not even know the most basic facts of politics, and they are not able to put together a coherent set of beliefs or even a stable political position (Achen & Bartels, 2017). In a sense, for ostensible political animals, citizens are surprisingly politically unengaged (Petersen & Aarøe, 2012).

In the earlier sections, we focused on how the similarities between adaptive problems and modern political issues trigger sophisticated decision-making machinery to guide political opinion formation and political behavior. The key trigger in this regard is the modern existence of information that resembles evolutionarily recurrent cues with adaptive significance. Yet, it is also clear that modern societies differ radically from ancestral societies in many respects. First, modern societies are technologically unrivalled, which creates a suit of political problems for which there simply does not exist specific psychological adaptations to handle (such as nuclear power, genetically modified crops, and vaccine technology). Second, modern society involves interactions with millions of anonymous strangers, which implies that most political decisions are related to groups and people that individuals only have a faint, if any, acquittance with. As noted by Walter Lippmann (1929, p. 43), "our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe." Both of these features of modern societies are examples of what evolutionary psychologists call "mismatches," that is, differences between the environment in which an adaptation evolved and the environment in which an adaptation is executed, which may cause adaptations to misfire or not fire at all.

The first mismatch—that is, the existence of novel problems in modern societies—implies that if domain-specific psychological adaptations are activated, the intuitions they generate may not be helpful in actually solving the problem. Multiple examples come from people's intuitions about macro-economic problems where intuitions tailored to small-scale social interaction miss key features of how the economy works (Boyer & Petersen, 2018). Other examples come from the work on disgust sensitivity. For example, technological advances like genetically modified crops contain cues that activate disease-avoidance concerns (e.g., the tampering with something "natural"), which cause individual differences in disgust-sensitivity to predict opposition to such crops, although there is no actual link to contamination risk (Clifford & Wendell, 2016).

The second mismatch—that is, the need to make political decisions about unseen others in mass societies—entails that the psychological mechanisms that rely on cues from face-to-face interaction in small-scale groups often cannot be executed. From an adaptationist

perspective, this is the core reason why the political animal is so politically ignorant: this feature of mass societies obscures the linkages between many modern political problems and core adaptive problems of social interaction (Petersen & Aarøe, 2012). Consistent with this, research has shown that a key difference between those who are and those who are not able to produce a strong opinion on a topic is the extent to which they are able to mentally simulate a clear representation of evolutionarily recurrent cues with relevance on the topic (Petersen & Aarøe, 2013). Specifically, those who have a strong opinion on social welfare policies are those who clearly see social welfare recipients in general as either cheaters or reciprocators. Those holding ambiguous representations, or those lacking mental representations of this social group, cannot produce strong opinions, until provided with a clear specific description of a welfare recipient.

When making political decisions our minds were designed to scan for problems that recurrently occurred in small groups of hunters and gatherers and to implement solutions that recurrently solved problems in the same context. Accordingly, formulating hypotheses of whether our minds correctly identify problems and solutions in modern politics requires careful attention to similarities and differences between politics of now and then. This is consistent with the concept of ecological rationality, that is, that a psychological mechanism can only be said to be rational within the very narrow scope conditions that the mechanism evolved to deal with (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). From this perspective, ignorance and irrationality do not reflect random reasoning mistakes but rather a systematic—and therefore predictable—response to mismatches between environments and mechanisms.

8. What Evolutionary Psychology Is Not?

In this chapter, I have tried to introduce a way of approaching political psychology that was considered unorthodox a few years ago and may still seem that way for some. As a consequence, more misunderstandings are likely to occur compared to an approach that is older and more well-acquainted. In this last section of the chapter, I will try to address some of the common misunderstandings by quickly describing what an evolutionary approach to political psychology is not.

8.1. An Evolutionary Approach Is Not Behavior Genetics

Evolutionary psychology is not the only biological approach that has gained prominence within political psychology. The other approach is behavior genetics (Settle and Detert, Chapter 8, this volume). Evolutionary psychology is oriented toward understanding the species-typical traits of humans, that is, what makes us similar. Behavior genetics is oriented toward understanding how genetic differences contribute to behavior differences, that is, what makes us different. Yet, sometimes even people well-versed in both approaches can conflate the two and make the leap that genetic effects on individual differences in a trait (a behavior genetics claim) imply that this trait evolved through natural selection (an evolutionary claim) (see, e.g., Smith et al., 2017, p. 432). But this is simply not the case.

It may sound strange but the fact of the matter is that many evolved traits will turn up as having zero genetic heritability when studied using behavior genetics methods such as twin studies. A somewhat extreme example can demonstrate this point. It should be clear to everyone that having two arms is a trait that evolved through natural selection and is genetically heritable. Yet, sometimes because of accidents, people will lose an arm or even both. In the classical twin design, this implies that the number of arms a person has will turn out to be driven by environmental and not genetic factors (e.g., one twin being the victim of a work-related accident lost their arm). From the perspective of behavior genetics, this is completely true because this approach is oriented toward individual differences and the causes of this difference are indeed environmental. But it should also be clear—as behavior geneticists will recognize—that this has little implication for whether the species-typical trait (here, having two arms) is an evolved, genetically heritable trait.

All this does not imply that evolutionary political psychologists are not and should not be interested in the origins of individual differences. They are and should be. The approach of the evolutionary psychologist is here to focus on the structure of any information-processing machinery that determines the variation across individuals and on this basis build a hypothesis on the drivers of this variation. As discussed in detail by Buss (2009), these drivers can include genetic, developmental, and situational factors.

8.2. An Evolutionary Approach Is Not Rational Choice Theory

Because of its focus on fitness costs and benefits, an evolutionary approach may appear as if it is simply a form of rational choice theory, where the cost-benefit calculations are in terms of reproduction rather than money. It is indeed true that there are similarities in the tools used by rational choice theorists and evolutionary biologists: evolutionary biologists also make repeated use of game theory. But the psychological theories of evolutionary psychology and rational choice are completely different.

Organisms are not fitness maximizers in the sense that they have a conscious goal of maximizing reproduction in the same way that rational choice theorists postulate a conscious goal of maximizing utility. Organisms are, instead, adaptation executioners, making decisions on the basis of psychological mechanisms that on average increased fitness in ancestral environments but may or may not do so in the specific application and in the current environment (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). For example, while the logic of reciprocity has shaped our help-giving psychology, it does not mean that we help one another with the conscious goal of being helped in return. We may simply help because we sympathize with the other or feel compassion. But these emotions, in turn, have been selected to be regulated, in part, by cues that under ancestral circumstances tracked the likelihood of reciprocation.

8.3. An Evolutionary Approach Is Not Opposed to Learning, Socialization, and Culture

Individuals vary and societies vary across time and space. Evolutionarily minded researchers are interested in understanding this variation. While many standard political psychology

approaches would use terms such as learning, socialization, or culture to explain such variation, evolutionary psychologists would focus on (1) the structure of relevant universal psychological mechanisms and (2) variations in the local availability of information to activate those mechanisms. Thus, a constant can explain variation if this constant is a specification of an input-output relationship (like a mathematical function or a psychological mechanism).

It is relevant to think of the way this local variation in information ecologies is turned into local variation in behavior through highly structured information-processing mechanisms as instances of what we would call "learning," "socialization," and "culture." Essentially, evolutionary psychologists would argue that this more complex description is an attempt to open up the "black box" arguments that often underlie people's allusions to, for example, learning.

8.4. An Evolutionary Approach Is Not a Normative Theory

We have noted how mismatches between ancestral and modern environments may create irrational responses. Yet, it is also relevant to highlight a different form of mismatch: human nature as it is empirically and what we as a community find normatively desirable. As is well-known from political philosophy, there is a gulf between *is* and *ought*, and natural selection has selected many traits that are deeply problematic from a normative perspective.

It is of key importance to stress that theories from evolutionary approaches are not normative theories in the sense that they do not entail anything about the desirability of the traits under investigation. Even within the environments in which our psychology evolved to operate, we cannot assume that evolved responses are necessarily good, just, or fair, as the earlier illustrations relating to prejudice, violence, and misinformation make clear.

At the same time, raising awareness of these problematic traits—and exploring their exact origin and structure—will most likely help researchers and policymakers achieve fairer and more just societies; for example, by enabling policymakers to create institutions that buffer against the obstacles that such traits create.

9. Conclusion

Any student of psychology will quickly observe that human psychology operates in mysterious ways. According to the observations in this chapter, however, human psychology is even more mysterious than one may realize from mere observation. An evolutionary framework implies that the human mind is comprised of endless numbers of task-specific mechanisms, optimized by natural selection to solve the myriads of problems that our ancestors faced, generation after generation, in their small-scale groups of hunters and gatherers. What seems like an "I" in charge of decision-making is nothing more than the format by which the negotiated output of these mechanisms reveals itself in conscious thought (Wright, 2017).

Many of the problems facing our ancestors were strictly political in nature and related to the division of resources within and between groups. We are born with political minds,

containing mechanisms that continuously scan our environments for political problems in need of solutions. In contrast to the standard view of citizens as politically ignorant, citizens are, by nature, politically sophisticated, with minds that evolved to, for example, invest resources in particular individuals, aggress against others, and if needed, mobilize their group to help carry out these tasks.

Yet, politics is no longer just a small-scale community phenomenon. For example, the alleviation of the plight of those in need is now carried out by welfare states of millions; punishments of norm violators are meted out by criminal justice systems, regulated by criminal codes; and the migration of individuals from one social group to another is regulated by international law. Still, our evolved minds continue to scan for the problems of small-scale social living and intuitively reach for the solutions that worked within such an environment.

While citizens are politically sophisticated, their attitudes and behavior in modern society will therefore often appear ignorant and irrational. Perhaps paradoxically, this ignorance and irrationality is the product rather than refutation of the sophistication of the mind's political machinery. It is exactly because the human mind was built to assume an ancestral environment, that it often fails in the modern one. By understanding the structure of ancestral social environments and the psychological imprints left by them, researchers can thereby encompass both the rational and irrational sides of modern politics within a single coherent framework and predict when one will dominate the other. This is the promise of an evolutionary approach to political psychology.

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CHAPTER 8

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BIOLOGY AND POLITICS

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JAIME SETTLE AND LAUREL DETERT

EVIDENCE for the biological origins of politics first emerged as early as the 1970s (Wahlke and Lodge 1972; Tursky et al. 1979), and the *Politics and the Life Sciences* journal was founded in 1982, a testament to nascent interest in the discipline. Recognition of the potential for biological measurement of political attitudes persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., Masters 2001). However, it has only been in the last 15 years that the biology and politics research agenda has emerged as a robust area of inquiry that integrates biological processes into the study of a wide variety of political attitudes and behaviors. Although certain facets of the research agenda have inspired controversy, there has come to be wide recognition that biological approaches to understanding politics—often rooted in evolutionary perspectives—can be informative and complementary to a broad range of topics within political psychology, such as threat sensitivity, policy preferences, media influence, and voter turnout, just to name a few.

This chapter is organized in four sections. We begin with a brief review of the evolutionary reasoning that underpins much biopolitics research, although we refer the interested reader to Bang Petersen (Chapter 7, this volume) for a more thorough review of the topic. We then focus on the foundational theories and methodological approaches that are used in the study of biology and politics. Next, we review the pattern of findings utilizing these methods, noting where there is emerging consensus and where more work needs to be done to replicate initial results. Finally, we assess the future directions of the field, elaborating how challenges facing political science as a discipline apply to this area of research, as well as the unique challenges posed by these methodological techniques and theoretical framework.

1. EVOLUTIONARY REASONING

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Evolutionary frameworks to explore political behavior arose in response to the limitations of socialization and rational choice theories to fully explain variation in the origin of preferences between people who face the same set of institutional constraints and incentive structures (Hatemi and McDermott 2011). This focus on "opening the black box" of the origin of preferences positions biopolitics to complement other theories of behavior, filling

in the gaps in our knowledge by emphasizing the way evolutionarily adaptive innate and instantiated biological predispositions can shape the way people respond to political stimuli in their environments.

Scholars studying biological influences on social behavior reject the false dichotomy of the "nature-nurture" debate and instead focus on theorizing about the way that environmental influences and biological predispositions or instantiations work together to shape attitudes and behavior. Even those studies that identify specific associations between a political outcome and genetic variants or hormonal activation clearly articulate that these relationships are not deterministic and that biological mechanisms operate via people's engagement within their cultural, social, and political contexts.

How do we move from theories that identify evolutionary pressures as the origin of behavioral adaptation to theories that use evolutionary reasoning to explain variation across individuals, cultures, and historical context? A rich literature exploring the relationship between genes, memes, and the evolution of culture (Dawkins 1976; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Blackmore 1999) suggests that adopting a "population genetics" approach is helpful in understanding when variation in traits in a population may be in equilibria, leading to the relatively stable distribution of competing solutions to the same adaptive pressures. For example, in-group bias could stem from human ancestors who had to be fearful of foreigners, as they may have posed a threat to the fragile equilibrium of life. In-group bias may have allowed early humans with a certain set of genes to survive longer and pass those genes to offspring. However, if everyone shared the genes associated with strong in-group preference, the necessary interconnections with outsiders for trade and reproduction would never have emerged. Thus, a second adaptive genetic profile that predisposed individuals to be open-minded and novelty-seeking with respect to outgroups could also be an adaptation that favored the survival of one's offspring.

As outlined more thoroughly in Chapter 7, evolutionary theory has impacted the study of biopolitics in several ways. Here we focus on the idea that using an evolutionary framework orients us to think about the social and political dilemmas faced by contemporary society in the longer trajectory of the pressures facing societies over the course of human history. The earliest evolutionary theorization about politics focused on preferences related to conflict, cooperation, trust, and risk-taking behaviors, all concepts that underpin the institutional rules and norms that are critical for the formation of society. Other veins of thought focus on the ways in which current human behaviors result from thousands of years of adaptation to human dilemmas. For example, evolutionarily speaking, humans have had to evolve adaptive strategies for dealing with energy depletion and hunger. Hungry individuals can either take food from others or they can persuade others to peacefully share their resources. In the modern world, the sharing of resources occurs via the social welfare state. Thus, adaptive strategies evolved to regulate behavior in situations of scarce food resources could shape attitudes surrounding the distribution of resources more broadly within a society.

Chapter 7 identifies many of the pressing issues and controversial debates that have been raised by the application of evolutionary theory to study social dilemmas. In the review that follows, we highlight where evolutionary theory may be a useful foundation for understanding how researchers derived their hypotheses about the biological origins of specific political attitudes, identities, and behaviors. As Smith et al. (2011) suggest, people do not have evolutionarily influenced preferences for Medicare-for-all or national defense policy; rather, they have preferences for how society should operate that map onto the political

decisions and choices they face in contemporary society. Evolution as a lens through which we evaluate politics is thus helpful in opening new lines of inquiry to understand more generalized and foundational elements of the manifestations of contemporary political attitudes and behavior.

2. Foundational Concepts and Methodological Approaches

Engaging with research utilizing biological approaches is often intimidating at first glance because of the perceived necessity of specialized topical knowledge to understand and interpret a study's methods and findings. However, this perception is inaccurate, and a working familiarity with key concepts and approaches is possible for those without a background in biology. To date, political scientists have deployed methods from four major domains in work integrating biology into politics—genetics, neuroscience, psychophysiology, and hormones—and below we review the guiding theory, core concepts, and methodological approaches used from each domain. For more detail, we recommend several review articles and books: Medland and Hatemi (2009) for genetics, Jost et al. (2014) for neuroscience, Settle et al. (2020) for psychophysiology, and Unit 7 of Urry et al. (2016) for hormones.

2.1. Genetics

The foundational assumption of genopolitics is that, like many other social behaviors and attitudes, political behaviors and attitudes can be influenced by our genes. Behavioral genetics work is premised on the idea that our genes are inherited—50% of our genes are inherited from our father and 50% of our genes are inherited from our mother—and are stable over the course of the lifespan. The expression of genes can vary over time, but the genetic code itself is fixed throughout a person's life. However, one of the most exciting areas of research in genetics, epigenetics, examines heritable changes stemming from environmental influences that affect genetic expression yet do not alter people's DNA, resulting in environmental exposure in one generation that affects genetic expression in the next. Thus, genes predispose people to act in a certain way, but genes are not rigidly deterministic of people's preferences, attitudes, or behaviors as human behavior is almost always a combination of a biological drive and a response to an environment.

Genopolitics studies most commonly take one of three forms: studies that rely on the concept of heritability to understand the contribution of genetics in explaining variation between people in a behavior or attitude (heritability studies), studies that assess regions of the human genome to find associations between chromosomal segments and behavior or attitudes (genome wide association, or GWAS, studies), and studies that look for associations between particular candidate genes and particular behaviors or attitudes (candidate gene studies).

As the name suggests, heritability studies are based on the concept of heritability, or the proportion of variation between people in a certain trait or behavior that is due to

differences in genetics. A trait is highly heritable if there is strong evidence that variation in that trait can be attributed to genetic factors. Several studies, for example, have indicated that smoking is highly heritable. However, high heritability does not imply that a behavior is immune to influence by the environment and estimates of the heritability of a trait are sensitive to the cultural and political environment in which the traits are measured. For example, Boardman et al. (2010) show that the heritability of smoking increased after 1964, as laws, regulations, and surgeon general reports made it harder, more inconvenient, and less socially acceptable to smoke. When smoking was widely acceptable and commonly practiced, genetic proclivities toward addiction did not explain variation in smoking behavior. But as smoking became less acceptable, harder, and costlier, genetic forces became more influential. The implication for biopolitics work is that estimates of heritability are sensitive to the way that cultural norms and political institutions structure people's decision-making.

Most heritability studies utilize the classic twin design, which compares the genetics of monozygotic and dizygotic twins. These designs leverage the fact that monozygotic (MZ) twins, or identical twins, share 100% of their genes, whereas dizygotic (DZ) twins, or fraternal twins, share on average 50% of their genes. However, twins are reared in the same environment and are thus assumed to have the same shared environment, allowing researchers to examine genetic influences on a trait while controlling for environmental influences.[1] Large-scale registries or government records provide relatively easy and affordable access to large twin populations. In twin studies, if a behavior is influenced by genes, the similarity in display of that behavior should be higher in MZ twins than in DZ twins, whereas if a behavior is independent from genes, the frequency of concordance in behavior between the two twin populations should be similar. The classic twin design can be expanded to the full family design including additional family members, like siblings or parents, leveraging known rates of shared genes between relatives of different types.

Several assumptions must be made in order to draw accurate conclusions from the analysis of twin data (Medland and Hatemi 2009). The most important assumption is the equal environments assumption, which states that if MZ and DZ twins are reared together in the same household, they have the same postnatal environment, or a common environment. This assumption has been controversial, but Medland and Hatemi (2009) show that no study so far has found that MZ and DZ twins are treated differently enough to influence the variance of a trait. Researchers should also be familiar with concerns related to assortative mating, defined as an increase in genetic variance for a trait that contributes to mate selection. This can complicate the interpretation of results as it can bias upward heritability estimates and is important in the study of genopolitics given that people are more likely to mate with others who share their political attitudes (Alford et al. 2011), even if they are not doing so consciously (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2013; McDermott, Tingley, and Hatemi 2014).

Heritability analysis identifies both shared and nonshared variance in traits or behaviors in twin populations (Medland and Hatemi 2009). Shared variance includes additive genetics (A), or the cumulative gene effect for a certain behavior, and the common (C), or shared, environment. Twins share a certain portion of their genes depending on if they are mono- or dizygotic and, if reared in the same household, share a significant portion of their environment. Nonshared variance includes the unique environment (E) that each twin experiences, such as an event only one twin experiences. These three factors (A, C, and E) can be used in structural equation modeling to create an ACE model that optimally

explains the proportion of variance in a behavior, trait, or attitude that can be attributed to each of the factors. Multivariate modeling can then be used to explore how much of the covariation between two behaviors can be attributed to the same genetic source. This modeling produces a genetic correlation that suggests how similar the genes influencing two outcomes are. For a more detailed explanation of the mathematical models involved in heritability analysis, see Medland and Hatemi (2009).

Heritability studies are useful for establishing a genetic basis for a trait or behavior but cannot identify the exact genes that contribute to a certain behavior. Once heritability is established, other methods must be used to search for specific chromosomal regions or genes that are associated with the outcome of interest. These other methods require collecting DNA samples, but researchers often collect additional self-report or voting history information from preexisting samples in genetic registries, requiring no additional, expensive genetic data collection.

One such method is a genome wide association study (GWAS) capturing markers across the entire genome. Markers are often single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or a known mutation in a gene that is found at a relatively high density in human DNA (Hatemi et al. 2011). The frequency of the marker or mutation in a population can be compared to the frequency of a certain behavior to identify if they covary. For example, a GWAS determined 18 SNPs that were more frequently found in Caucasians with Type 1 Diabetes (Reddy et al. 2011). If a certain SNP does reach statistical significance with an outcome of interest, the gene containing the SNP can be explored to identify potential biological mechanisms that link the gene and the outcome, either directly or as a mediator. A strength of GWAS analysis is the possibility of revealing novel biological pathways linking genes and attitudes or behaviors. However, this strength comes at a cost: the GWAS approach necessitates extremely large samples in order to power significance testing and requires collecting DNA from subjects, a procedure more invasive than what is required in heritability studies.

Genetic association studies, or candidate gene analyses, explore if a polymorphism, or a set of mutations in a specific gene, can be linked to a behavior of interest. For example, monoamine oxidase A (MAO-A) is a gene that has been linked to social interaction and behavior in previous studies and may influence political behavior (McDermott et al. 2012). Genetic association studies test if a mutation in a gene appears more frequently in one group. A case-control design compares mutation frequency between those with and without a trait, whereas a family-based design compares mutation frequency and trait frequency across family members. If a certain polymorphism does appear significantly more in one group, there are three possible conclusions: the gene influences behavior; the gene is in "linkage disequilibrium" and a nearby gene is actually responsible for the behavior; or the relationship is a false positive due to population stratification, meaning the study population encapsulates two groups of individuals that have different frequencies of the polymorphism due to different ancestry or physical separation historically. The third conclusion is often eliminated by running candidate gene analyses on a sample including only one race or ethnic group to remove any ancestral genetic variation, an obvious limitation to the ability to generalize findings to diverse populations.

There are several limitations embedded within genopolitics work. First, researchers must be aware of the selection biases that could affect which twins or families opt into participating in a twin study or genetic registry. This is less of a concern in several European countries where nationwide registries are maintained. Second, genetic approaches require

large sample sizes to account for multiple testing issues in hypothesis testing. Ideally, genopolitics findings are replicated with samples drawn from several regions or countries. Both factors make the study of genopolitics a time and resource-intensive approach, necessitating collaboration and the development of research consortiums to increase researcher access to the necessary data and to create opportunities for replication.

2.2. Neuroscience

Neuroscience is the study of the structure and function of the nervous system, a network of specialized cells, called neurons, that regulate the spread of information to and from different areas of the body. This system translates information from the external environment into internal signals to communicate with other regions of the body. Neurons transmit information in the form of electrical impulses, which can be sent to other neurons, muscle cells, organs, or glands. There are two main branches of the nervous system: the central nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system (PNS). Research focusing on the structure or function of the brain explore the CNS (discussed in this section) while research focusing on physiological responses assess the peripheral nervous system (discussed in the next section).

The CNS contains all of the neurons found in the brain and spinal cord. Over 100 billion neurons are found in the brain and can be divided into distinguishable regions or substructures. The goal of much neuroscience work examining political behaviors and attitudes is to find associations between the structure or activity level of particular regions of the brain and particular political outcomes. This may be done by comparing differences between groups of subjects who differ on a trait of interest (e.g., partisans versus non-partisans, or voters versus non-voters) or by monitoring brain activity while people are engaged in a social task.

The main method that political psychologists use to study the brain is Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI). This is a non-invasive way to collect images of the brain's structure or activity while performing a task. Participants lie flat on their back and are inserted into a large round tube, which runs magnets around the head for a period of time to collect images of the brain. The two main kinds of MRI, structural MRI and functional MRI, achieve different goals for the researcher. Structural MRI is ideal for allowing a researcher to explore the size or shape of the brain and specific sub-regions; it combines several 2D images of the brain to create a 3D image with incredible spatial resolution that allows for easy identification of brain structures. Often, structural MRI is used to investigate variations in brain matter volume in a certain region across a sample (see Kanai et al. 2011), keeping in mind the structure of a certain brain region may not be related to function.

Functional MRI (fMRI) scans are more commonly used in political psychology research, as they measure brain *activity*, in either the whole brain or specifically at a pre-identified region of interest (ROI). An fMRI scan measures a change in blood flow in the brain. Essentially, participants are given a detectable compound that is absorbed into their blood. A fMRI scan can pick up on the presence of this compound to follow the movement of the blood in the brain. This generates a blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal for each region of the brain, where regions with a larger BOLD signal are those receiving more blood and, thus, more oxygen, indicating that they were more active at that time. Often, studies

using MRI scans have participants view images or questions while in the scanning machine and press a button to make a decision or indicate an image has been viewed. Afterward, areas with the strongest BOLD signal can be identified and associated with a tested dimension in the stimuli (e.g., disgust).

Another common method used to study the CNS is electroencephalography (EEG). Participants wear a cap with electrodes that touch the scalp and capture the electrical signal of neurons firing as event-related potentials (ERPs), voltage changes that reflect the synchronized firing of a group of neurons. EEG is a spatially poor but temporally precise method used to identify increases in brain activity while participants are viewing an image, making a decision, or performing a task. It is also relatively inexpensive compared to other methods.

Once a brain region or increase in neural activity is identified by the methods listed above, researchers can explore the information provided by other studies that have investigated the function of that brain region to hypothesize how that region could be involved in a certain political outcome. However, it is important to keep in mind that any identified neural region or process is merely a small portion of the brain involved in any behavior, not the sole driving region.

These methods are expensive; the machinery involved is costly and it is necessary to pay trained technicians to conduct the scans and interpret the data. Additionally, most MRI studies use very small samples because of the large operating costs, which complicates generalizability of results. Finally, these methods only allow one to identify correlation, not causation. Longitudinal studies could identify if changes in a certain brain region cause changes in political attitudes (or vice versa), but these kinds of studies are rare as they are even costlier to conduct.

2.3.   Physiology

The second branch of the nervous system, the peripheral nervous system (PNS), includes all the neurons in the body that are not in the brain or spinal cord, like those that innervate muscles or organs. There are two branches of the PNS: the somatic nervous system and the autonomic nervous system. The somatic nervous system creates movement by interacting with the skeletomuscular system; the activity of these neurons stimulates the contraction of muscle fibers. Some of this movement can occur without conscious awareness, like blinking or a reflex, but all of this movement can be controlled or stopped when desired. The autonomic nervous system is responsible for unconscious, automatic bodily functions, like sweating or breathing. There are two branches of the autonomic nervous system, the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems, which work in tandem. The sympathetic nervous system prepares the body to fight, flight, or freeze, and the parasympathetic nervous system calms the body to rest and digest. Physiology methods used in political science research capture the activity of one of these divisions of the PNS.

Physiological studies have become increasingly prevalent in recent years, made popular in part because the techniques allow researchers to move beyond self-reports of emotions or attitudes, bypassing the concerns of social desirability effects or people's limited ability to understand or recognize the emotions they are experiencing (Cacioppo et al. 2007). Capturing physiological measurements can complement survey research and help infer a

participant's psychological state without interference from cognitive bias. Specific patterns of physiological activation, like an elevation in heart rate or a certain facial expression, are associated with emotion, arousal, or attention. Collecting and interpreting these patterns during an experiment can be used to identify new mechanisms, or provide new support to existing mechanisms underpinning certain political ideologies or behavior. For example, eye-tracking studies have found differences in gaze-cueing effects between liberals and conservatives (Dodd, Hibbing, and Smith 2011), suggesting that attentional differences to stimuli in the political environment might explain people's worldviews. In other words, liberals and conservatives do not just interpret stimuli in different ways, but they may be inclined to pay differential levels of attention to stimuli, as well.

We will touch on three commonly used physiological measurements. The first, electrodermal activity (EDA), is a measure of unconscious, sympathetic nervous system activation. When a sympathetic response occurs, eccrine skin glands secrete moisture in an attempt to regulate body temperature, which makes the skin more electrically conductive. Electrodes, attached to the index and middle fingers, can detect this change in electrical conductivity and communicate this to a device placed around the wrist. EDA is a direct representation of sympathetic nervous system activity with elevations in EDA caused by increased arousal and attention (Dawson et al. 2007). Often, EDA is collected while participants view images or video, have a conversation, or make a set of decisions. To analyze EDA data, skin conductance levels are compared between the stimuli of interest and a resting baseline level. If EDA is higher during the experimental manipulation, the sympathetic nervous system was activated. However, it is impossible to determine the valence behind this activation with EDA data alone, as increased EDA can be due to arousal from a positive or negative response.

Another commonly used measurement is heart rate (HR). HR is regulated by both branches of the autonomic nervous system; activation of the sympathetic nervous system increases HR, and the parasympathetic nervous system slows HR back down to a resting rate. HR is often measured by electrocardiogram (ECG) electrodes that are placed on the body and measure changes in voltage caused by the heart's activity, although pulse plethysmography (PPG) can also be used to calculate HR by wrapping a single sensor around a fingertip to measure the rate of blood penetration into the distal regions of the body. As the heart beats, it emits a characteristic change in electrical activity that can be used to calculate a beats-per-minute (bpm) measure. Both ECG and PPG electrodes also allow for the calculation of heart rate variability (HRV), which measures the time interval between two peaks of electrical activity and compares this time interval to a mean value. Like EDA, HR, and HRV capture unconscious physiological activation, but cannot be used to assess the valence behind this arousal.

Third, facial electromyography (fEMG) can be used to capture somatic nervous system activity by placing electrodes directly over a muscle. These electrodes detect and amplify the tiny electrical impulses that are generated by the muscle fibers as they contract, specifically used to capture facial expressions. For example, electrodes placed on the zygomaticus major, the muscle that draws up the corners of the mouth, can detect when someone smiles. fEMG electrodes placed over the orbicularis oculi muscles below the eye can also detect an involuntary, eyeblink reflex present when someone is startled or reacting to a bright light. Using fEMG in political science studies gives evidence for the emotions a participant experienced while viewing a stimulus, for example. However, the electrodes can feel invasive and take away from the authenticity of the emotional reaction.

Overall, physiological measurement is well suited to capture arousal, attention, and emotion without the biases inherent in self-reported data. Compared to neuroscience techniques, the equipment is relatively affordable and often portable. However, research assistants need training in how to use the equipment and how to process or analyze the data. At present, there is a lack of standardization across the field in the execution of the techniques and the analysis of resultant data, although researchers in this area are working toward consensus about best practices (Settle et al. 2020).

2.4.   Hormones

The endocrine system is composed of various glands located throughout the body and brain that produce and secrete hormones, molecules used by the body for sleep, metabolism, development, reproduction, mood, and more. Each hormone, once secreted, targets certain organs or tissues and binds to receptors at the target location to cause an effect. The level of a specific hormone fluctuates naturally depending on stressors, disease infection, hunger levels, or time of day, for example. Individual variations in hormone levels are also caused by differences in genetics.

Political psychologists can study how individual variations in hormone levels influence political attitudes or beliefs. Natural hormone fluctuations, independent of genetic variation, can greatly influence behavior. For example, Aaroe and Petersen (2013) determined that low body energy and depletion of metabolic resources, as demonstrated by low blood glucose levels, increases support for social welfare and sharing behaviors. Additionally, variations in genetics identified by heritability studies can manifest as variations in internal hormone levels; identifying these hormones and their role in the human body can unpack the mechanism about how a certain gene is linked to a certain political attitude or behaviors. For example, French et al. (2014) studied how variations in stress hormone levels, like cortisol, are implicated in political involvement.

To study the fluctuation of an individual's hormone levels, researchers usually must draw blood from a participant several times or collect several salivary samples. Hormone studies bring participants into the lab at a standardized time of day to prevent variations in hormone levels due to natural fluctuations. Once in the lab, researchers collect an initial sample for calculating a baseline hormone level. Then, researchers can either try to alter a specific hormone level (e.g., by giving a participant a certain drink or injection), or participants can undergo a specific task to try and induce a natural change in hormone levels (such as a stress task). After the experimental manipulation, researchers collect several more samples over the next 30–90 minutes. Multiple blood or salivary samples are necessary for providing a solid timeline of hormone spikes and recovery to baseline levels. The change in hormone levels can then be compared to any collected dependent variables, such as political ideology or involvement.

Humans can also detect certain hormone levels in others using the olfactory system, the sensory system used for smell, which has evolved to help humans avoid pathogens, reproduce, and communicate with other humans (Friesen et al. 2020). The human nose contains thousands of receptors that detect chemicals from food or odors associated with reproduction and sociability. Hormones found in human sweat or saliva can be detected by the olfactory system to provide information that is used for social perception, judgments,

and favorability. These hormones have a wide variation in intensity across the population and are detected differently by every person. How strongly someone can smell a certain hormone in others and how favorably they view that scent can help an individual form judgments and perceptions about an individual or group that guides their decision making and behaviors in a larger context.

In order to explore the detection of other hormones, experiments often have participants smell several unmarked bottles with various odors and detectable hormones in them. Participants can then rank the strength of the odor in the bottle and if the odor is pleasant or unpleasant. To effectively run an olfactory test, participants must be screened for any interfering conditions, such as seasonal allergies or asthma, that may interfere with their sense of smell. Variations in the dependent variables such as political beliefs can then be analyzed alongside variations in hormone detection intensity or favorability to identify significant relationships.

Overall, exploring individual variations in internal hormone levels and in the detection of others' hormone levels can provide key insight into political decision making and attitude formation. Given that fluctuations in hormones and olfaction often occur unconsciously, this method suggests that opinion formation or decision-making may occur in part below conscious awareness, an idea that has huge implications for the field's attempts to measure the outcomes of these processes, such as political polarization (McDermott, Tingley, and Hatemi 2014). However, directly measuring hormone levels is invasive and requires specific equipment to draw, store, and analyze salivary or blood samples.

3. Key Findings

As we discussed above, the theory underpinning a biological origin for political behavior posits that there are evolutionary reasons why we might expect heterogeneity for preferences related to how society should operate or behaviors that relate to risk-taking, decision-making, and pro-sociality. The challenge for researchers is to match those latent preferences to measures that reflect the political choices in the context of a contemporary society. In the sections below, we review the pattern of findings related to political attitudes, identities, and behavior.

3.1. Political Attitudes and Ideology

Political behavior scholars make a distinction between latent preferences for the operation of society, manifest in a political ideology, and identification with a political party (also see Federico and Malka, Chapter 17, this volume). Biopolitics scholars also differentiate these concepts, with an expectation of a genetic basis for political ideology but a reduced expectation for a role for genetic factors in explaining political party choice, especially in eras or settings where political parties are not well-mapped to ideology. Any genetic contribution to political party preference would be a byproduct of a party's alignment with particular ideological preferences.

In the American context, a clean test of the competing expectations about the biological origins of ideological preference versus party preference is complicated. The American party system transformed in the aftermath of the Civil Rights era, as conservatives migrated to the Republican Party and liberals found a home in the Democratic Party. Circa 2023, while ideological preference and party identification remain distinct theoretical concepts, the white American electorate has sorted to the degree that empirically, ideology and partisanship are very highly correlated with one another. Thus, we might expect partisan identification to be heritable now, even if we would not have expected it to be so circa 1970. However, we are limited in our ability to test for this change over time because of the question wording used in the earliest work exploring biological foundations for ideology, which was conducted not by political scientists but by behavioral geneticists who were interested in the genetic foundations of social attitudes more broadly. As a result, the earliest published findings establishing a genetic basis for ideology and specific policy attitudes relied on scales not used with regularity in the political science literature, such as the Wilson-Patterson Index. Consequently, we do not have the full set of measures differentiating ideology and partisanship, or symbolic versus operational ideology, that political scientists ideally would have to fully track the heritability of political attitudes and identity over time.

In this review we endeavor to match findings from the biopolitics literature to the distinctions that political scientists currently make between attitudinal and identity measurement facets of ideology and partisanship. In this section, we focus on measures of policy preference as well as measures of ideology that are constructed by aggregating policy preferences, aligning with notions of operational ideology. In the next section, we focus on measures of ideology and partisanship based on self-report, which capture symbolic ideology and identity-oriented interpretations of partisanship. However, we caution readers to interpret these patterns in light of when the data were collected, as there are reasons to think that the interpretation of these concepts has evolved over time.

The earliest work focused on biological contributions to ideological attitudes found a clear pattern: ideology, measured by preferences for particular policies, is heritable. This finding was first published by behavioral geneticists (Martin et al. 1986; Eaves et al. 1999) using samples of twins from England, Australia, and the United States and a measure of ideology called the Wilson-Patterson Index, a 28-item battery of policy preferences designed by psychologists to capture preferences for policies that map to political conservatism, sexual conservatism, economic spending preferences, opinions on the military, and religious inclinations. These studies revealed that variation in the W-P Index was between 18 and 65% heritable, a finding that has been replicated in a number of studies in multiple different country contexts (Martin et al. 1986; Eaves et al. 1999; Bouchard et al. 2003).

An interesting study by Hatemi et al. (2009) used longitudinal twin surveys to determine the sources of liberal-conservative orientations over a lifetime; most heritability studies use adult samples and ignore how genes interact differently with the environment at various ages to have more or less influence over attitudes and behaviors. The authors found that consistent liberal or conservative preferences appear around age 17 with attitudes gradually emerging starting around age 14. However, during adolescence, ideology is influenced only by shared and unique environmental influences and not until age 21 do genetic influences on political attitudes appear and persist. Analysis suggested that genetic influence emerges almost wholly from twins that are no longer living at home, suggesting a role for genetic

influences that emerges only when someone steps away from the powerful social pressures of the home environment.

Later work has focused on thinking about clusters of ideological attitudes in order to more precisely characterize the genetic components of these preferences. For example, using the Swedish Twin Registry, Oskarsson et al. (2015) found heritability estimates for five indices of policy preferences (economic policy, economic redistribution, immigration, environmentalism, and foreign policy) to be significantly different from zero, with an average heritability estimate of 31%. Other studies have found similar estimates. Attitudes toward foreign policy in the United States using a dove-hawk scale and opinions on military spending in the United States were both found to be heritable (Cranmer and Dawes 2012).

Many of the attitudes found to have heritable differences relate to egalitarianism. Batrićević and Littvay (2017) find in a heritability study that almost half of the variance in a latent economic egalitarianism variable was due to genetic factors, while the remainder was due to unique environmental influences. Three sub-dimensions of economic egalitarianism—equality of wealth, equality of chance, and equality of income—also had some heritable component. These results comport nicely with earlier work exploring neural foundations of egalitarian behavior. Using the fMRI approach, Dawes et al. (2012) identify a region in the insular cortex, a part of the brain implicated by previous studies in other-oriented and prosocial behaviors, where activation was significantly correlated with both a self-reported index of egalitarianism and egalitarian behavior as captured by a series of dictator games.

Evolutionarily, it has been advantageous to have selfish preferences about the redistribution of fragile resources. These preferences likely map to current preferences about welfare and egalitarianism. Petersen et al. (2013) found that hungrier individuals had more egalitarian responses than satiated individuals: they took more resources in a "taking game" (a reverse version of a standard ultimatum bargaining game), were more positively disposed toward welfare recipients, and viewed welfare recipients more as unfortunate victims of forces beyond their control. In a second study, Aaroe and Petersen (2013) manipulated hunger levels by giving participants either a carbohydrate drink to satiate subjects or an artificial sweetener drink to leave participants hungry. They found that participants given the artificial sweetener drink were significantly more supportive of social welfare than individuals given the carbohydrate drink. Interestingly, the hungry subjects did not *actually* share more resources when participating in a dictator game; they just believed that others ought to, employing what the authors call "cheap talk" to get others to transfer resources (Aaroe and Petersen 2013).

Another approach to understanding heritable components of issue-preference ideology has been to look for shared sources of genetic variation between ideology and other social preferences. Friesen and Kziazkiewsicz (2014) hypothesized that the positive correlations between religiosity and conservatism suggest that political preferences and religious attitudes are not completely independent belief systems and could be rooted in the same psychological construct. They find a common genetic factor underlying socially conservative policy positions, traditional bedrock values, and religious importance; while there are genetic factors that are unique to each variable, a sizeable portion of all three factors are influenced by the same set of genes.

Cognition has also been linked to ideology and issue preferences. Oskarsson et al. (2014) first verify that cognitive ability and five of six measures of political attitudes were heritable, and that cognitive ability was positively correlated to left-right ideology, right-wing

economic redistribution attitudes, foreign policy opinions, and immigration policy opinions. They then push further to demonstrate that the relationships between these political orientation measures and cognitive ability are largely driven by shared genetic factors, and that the genetic variance in cognitive ability accounts for 10–14% of the genetic variance in political traits.

Other scholarly work has focused on cognitive style. Specifically, two traits have received attention in the broader political science literature on cognition: need for cognition (the desire to engage in and be rewarded by effortful cognitive ability) and need for cognitive closure (the need to remove ambiguity). Kziazkiewicz et al. (2016) suggest that these traits are additional mediators between genes and political attitudes. Using a twin design, they find that those who are high in need for cognition score more highly on measures of liberalism and those high in need for cognitive closure score higher on measures of conservatism. Additionally, there is a significant genetic correlation between these two cognitive style factors and political ideology, indicating that the connection between cognitive style and political beliefs is primarily genetic. Trivariate analysis showed that the set of genes responsible for the relationship between need for cognition and political ideology include the same genes behind the relationship between need for cognitive closure and political ideology, as well as a set of novel genes not accounted for by need for cognitive closure. This indicates that there is one set of genes that influence political ideology, need for cognition, and need for cognitive closure, and a second set of genes that only influence political ideology and need for cognition.

Despite the consistent findings of heritable components of issue-based ideology, the effort to understand the genetic foundations of policy preferences writ large has been unsuccessful in linking specific genetic variants with ideology. Benjamin et al. (2012) found that the variance in three of ten tested dimensions of economic and political preferences could be explained by commonly genotyped SNPs when looking at the SNPs in mass.[2] However, when looking at individual SNPs, none of the ten economic and political preference traits were associated with any SNPs that passed genome-wide significance. Hatemi et al. (2011) identified four regions of the genome that were linked to an issue preference-based measure of ideology in a standard GWAS analysis, but only one region of the genome that was significantly associated using a more conservative methodological approach. Upon examining the genetic markers that fall within the genomic regions that were linked to ideology, evidence suggests that NMDA and glutamate-related receptors—a type of neurotransmitter in the brain directly involved in cognitive functions—are worthy of further examination. However, Hatemi et al. (2014) were unable to find any SNPs that could explain variations in political preferences in a GWAS that used samples from several different regions and time periods.

Taken together, the results from these studies point to the polygenic nature of political policy preferences: a single gene or a small group of genes cannot explain ideology. Instead, there are likely thousands of genetic variants that all have undetectable effects individually but together can indirectly influence policy-oriented measures of ideology. Future research using larger samples and more sophisticated techniques may help identify some of the many genetic variants that play into these preferences.

As a result of this robust body of work, there is a clear pattern from both the behavioral genetics and neuroscience literatures indicating a biological basis for overall issue-based ideology as well as its subfacets. The remaining questions are the mechanisms through

which these heritable differences might be expressed, and as a result how biological instantiation might differ between liberals and conservatives in the way that they process external stimuli. While scholars have made headway in addressing these questions, the pattern of results is considerably more mixed.

One line of inquiry turned toward differences in physiological sensitivity, particularly threat sensitivity and disgust sensitivity. In an experiment that measured EDA and a startle-blink response while participants viewed a series of images, Oxley et al. (2008) found that participants whose policy positions, as determined by the Wilson-Patterson battery, were more socially conservative had a larger increase in EDA when viewing threatening images than participants with less socially conservative political identities. The same relationship was seen with the amplitude of the startle-blink response: higher blink amplitudes correlated with stronger social conservatism. The authors posit that the results suggest a common source underlying physiological responses to threat and social conservatism as a political identity.

Dodd et al. (2012) expanded on this finding in a study where participants viewed both aversive (threatening and disgusting) images and appetitive (happy) images while the researchers measured their EDA activation. Those on the political right[3] had greater EDA increases for aversive images than appetitive images, whereas those on the political left had greater EDA increases for appetitive images than aversive images. Eye-tracking studies demonstrate that this pattern also holds true when looking at attention: individuals who were more conservative spent more time looking at aversive images, whereas individuals who were more liberal spent more time looking at appetitive images. Combining the results of the physiological study and the attentional study suggest that people on the political right and political left may experience the world differently: conservatives are more attuned to the aversive things in life, which could explain why they tend to take more socially traditional and protective stances.

A related vein of research explored the idea that opposition to same-sex marriage may stem from feelings of disgust—a fundamental and evolved emotion to avoid toxins or pathogens—through activation of the evolved "behavioral immune system." Researchers examined the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes toward same sex-marriage, finding a positive and significant correlation between increased EDA response to disgusting images (images completely unrelated to sexuality) and opposition to gay marriage (Smith et al. 2011). Physiological disgust sensitivity was a better predict of same-sex marriage support than self-report disgust sensitivity for men, but that the opposite was true for women (Balzer & Jacobs 2011) and individuals who had larger increases in EDA in response to sexually explicit images were more likely to oppose gay marriage and abortion (Friesen et al. 2016).

Ahn et al. (2014) examine whether different brain regions were more or less active when viewing disgusting images, and if these regions varied depending on ideology. Participants looked at disgusting, threatening, positive, and neutral images while lying in an fMRI scanner. Later analysis determined that there were two completely different sets of brain regions that were activated while looking at disgusting images depending on whether an individual was conservative or liberal. These multivariate patterns of brain activity differentiated liberals and conservatives while they were processing emotional stimuli.

However, the findings about differences between liberals' and conservatives' physiological sensitivity have not been fully replicated. Looking at seven total studies, Osmundsen

et al. (2022) raise methodological concerns about previous research linking ideological differences to differences in physiological measures of threat sensitivity. Running a conceptual replication of Oxley et al. (2008), they were able to replicate results among subjects in the United States but not in the Danish sample or the combined sample. Perhaps of more consequence, they found extremely poor measurement properties for the EDA measures capturing response to images designed to evoke different responses. A separate replication study, Bakker et al. (2020), found no statistically significant associations between EDA responses to disgusting or threatening images and social or economic conservatism in a sample four times the size of the Oxley study. As we discuss at the end of the review, transparency and replication remain major challenges for all political science research, but this is especially true for biopolitics work using complex protocols.

3.2. Political Identities

The findings above focus on biological associations with specific policy preferences or issue-based measures of ideology. However, one of the most active areas of research within the field of American political behavior has been the debate over whether partisanship and ideology are better conceived of as social identities (see Mason, Chapter 24, this volume) or issue-based attachments. Most scholars of American politics have arrived at a consensus that increasing levels of polarization at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st have resulted in partisan identities that are rooted in social identities, although issue-based partisan affiliation predominates in some other countries. The evidence is more mixed for ideological views. While there is a meaningful distinction between symbolic and operational ideology in the American context, it is not entirely clear how different measures of ideology map to each of these theoretical constructs.

The distinction between issue-based and identity-based conceptualizations of ideology and partisanship has important implications for the biopolitics field, as it suggests different evolutionary explanations and biological mechanisms may be involved. Preferences for the organization of society—rooted in attitudes related to hierarchy, allocation of resources, and perceptions of threat—could underpin issue-based ideological preferences. However, different pathways could contribute to identity-based measures of political preference. For example, biological contributions to one's preference for in-group members or propensity to join social groups might better explain the attachment one feels to an ideological group or political party.

There is a clear case to be made for a biological basis for policy-oriented ideological preferences, as outlined in the section above. These results seem to extend to self-reported ideology, as well. Several of the studies previously described also found that ideology as reported on a five-point or seven-point scale also has a heritable component (e.g., Cranmer & Dawes 2012, though see Oskarsson et al. 2015), or that a self-report measure of ideology combined with other measures into a single index measure of left-right political orientation has a heritable component (Dodd et al. 2012).

There has been fairly limited research examining specific genetic variants associated with self-identified ideology. Settle et al. (2010) explore how the interaction between a variant of the DRD4 gene and the number of friendships an individual has influences political behavior. The DRD4 gene has been previously associated with reward, attention disorders,

and novelty-seeking. Particularly, the long form variant (DRD4 7R) has been significantly linked to openness to experiences and novelty. The authors argue that this gene variant interacts with the social environment to influence political ideology. Having the 7R variant may make an individual more likely to seek novel experiences, which could drive them to have a wide and diverse array of friends. This gives an individual the opportunity to learn about various political viewpoints, eventually adopting a liberal political stance. Findings suggest that an increased number of friends among those with one or more of the 7R alleles was associated with liberal ideology. Gene x environment interaction studies reinforce the notion that the effects of biological predispositions are conditional on the experiences an individual has, and the same context can affect people very differently based on their genes.

The physiological differences between liberals and conservatives are not always robust to measuring ideology based on self-report compared to issue preferences: Osmundsen et al. (2022) find no relationship between left-right self-placement and EDA responses to threat, although they did replicate the findings of Oxley et al. (2008) using issue-based scales. However, self-report measurements of ideology have been associated with differences in brain activity. Amodio et al. (2007) were some of the first researchers to investigate how specific brain structures may play into political self-identification, noting that differences in traits like openness to novel experiences map onto the self-regulatory process of conflict monitoring, when a habitual response is at odds with the response a certain situation needs, and, thus, the brain must identify this conflict and change its output. Amodio and colleagues recorded the brain activity of participants using EEG technology while participants performed the Go/No-Go task and found differences between liberals and conservatives, suggesting that ideological orientation is, in part, due to differences in a neurocognitive mechanism surrounding conflict, with liberals being more sensitive neurologically to these conflicts and conservatives being less willing to adapt to the conflict.

After Amodio et al.'s (2007) work was published, researchers were eager to identify other brain regions linked to ideology. Zamboni et al. (2009) used fMRI scans to identify brain regions involved in three dimensions of political identities: individualism, conservatism, and radicalism. Participants read a set of 80 statements that fit these dimensions and were asked to indicate whether they mostly agreed or disagreed with the sentiment while in the fMRI machine. Analysis of the neural activity patterns produced when participants read each of the statements allowed the researchers to identify certain brain regions that were linked to the three political dimensions. For example, when participants were reading more individualistic statements, there was more brain activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), whereas collectivism statements produced more activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Zamboni et al. (2009) posit that the results suggest there is a complex psychological architecture underlying political identity; political beliefs depend on an entire set of cognitive processes, some of which become more or less active depending on the political information or task at hand.

Kanai et al. (2011) expanded on previously published work by looking for differences in brain *structure* between conservatives and liberals, not brain *activity*. Using structural MRI scans, the authors found that increased gray matter volume in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the same region identified by Amodio et al. (2007), was significantly associated with liberalism; liberal individuals tended to have larger ACCs. Additionally, increased gray-matter volume in the right amygdala was significantly associated with conservatism. Given the amygdala has previously been linked to emotional processing, it could be concluded

that conservatives have larger amygdalas and are more sensitive to threat or fear, which is why they lean toward protective policies. Kanai et al. (2011) also used these two brain regions to create a classifier that could predict whether someone was very conservative or very liberal. Looking at the volume of the ACC and amygdala could determine someone's political ideology with extremely high accuracy. Thus, it is not only brain activity that is involved in the formation of political identities, but also brain structure.

Turning to assess the biological origins of *partisan* identities, the evidence is much more mixed. In theory, genetics could explain variations in both direction and strength of political partisanship. Previous research has suggested that partisanship can be relatively stable over a lifetime, which could be because partisanship is partially passed down from generation to generation via genetics (Cowden and McDermott 2000). If parties are consistently branded with their link to policies, and those policies clearly map to more enduring preferences about society, then we would expect direction of partisanship to be heritable. However, if parties are not closely tied to ideological or issue preferences, a heritable basis for the direction of partisan identification makes less sense. Settle et al. (2009) found that the direction of party identification was not influenced by genetics, but Fazekas and Littvay (2015) argue that the heritability of partisan direction should be contingent on the nature of the relationship between partisan identification and specific attitudes. When they assessed the partisanship (using a trichotomous measure) of a group of twins immediately before the 2008 election, they found that 63% of the variation in direction of partisanship was genetically based. As noted previously, our ability to disentangle this relationship is complicated by the unavailability of standardized question wording over time.

There is much more consistent evidence about the heritability of the strength of partisanship.

Settle et al. (2009) found that heritability generates about 46% of the variation in strength of partisanship in a twin sample with unshared environmental factors making up the remainder of the variation, a result replicated by Fazekas and Littvay (2012), although they found a much lower magnitude of heritability, with only 20% of the variation in partisanship strength due to genetic factors. This same paper further tested one of the pivotal questions of the implication of strong partisanship: proximity versus directional theories of vote choice. Heritability analyses showed that 18% of individual differences on voter decision strategies is due to genetics, indicating that whether someone chooses to vote by proximity or direction is partially due to their genetic dispositions. Specifically, the likelihood of a voter choosing the directional strategy was predominantly driven by genetic effects, suggesting that there may be a biological origin that makes more intense or extreme political attitudes and figures more appealing.

Pushing beyond heritability estimates, early explorations of particular genetic variants associated with political identities looked toward possible associations with social behavior more broadly to identify genes that could be related to a person's propensity to identify as a partisan. For example, dopamine is a key neurotransmitter that has been linked to cognition, emotion, and social attachment in previous studies, and the D2 dopamine receptor (DRD2) has been linked to social attachment and cognition in particular. Individuals with more D2 receptors in the brain (which is associated with the A2 allele of the DRD2 gene) have more social relationships and better cognitive processing. Given this pattern, Dawes and Fowler (2009) hypothesize that individuals with one or two A2 alleles will be more likely to identify as partisans, given they are not as impaired by social alienation and other

psychological processes associated with the A1 alleles. Their findings show that this is, in fact, the case; the odds of someone with a single A2 allele being a partisan are 1.2 times greater than an individual with no A2 alleles and the odds of someone with two A2 alleles being a partisan are 1.4 times greater. These results cannot be deemed causal, but variations in the dopaminergic system could influence an individual's social attachments or cognitive functioning such that they will be more likely to form an attachment with a political party. Consistent with the pattern of heritability described previously, the authors note that there is no link between DRD2 gene variants and which party the person will identify with (Democrat or Republican).

Simultaneously, others were looking for evidence of social cognition that could be traced through the brain. Schreiber et al. (2020) find differences between partisans and nonpartisans in three regions of the brain often engaged during social cognition. Other work suggests neural variation between Democrats and Republicans (Schreiber et al. 2013) that implicate different cognitive processes when each group thinks about risk.

What can we distill about biological origins of political identities? Although not entirely settled, the pattern of results from heritability studies suggest that the strength of people's political identities is heritable, but their direction is only heritable when party identification is a proxy for ideological views. The consistent patterns with respect to strength of identities implies that the channels linking biological propensities to political identifications may run through mechanisms that underpin social cognition and evaluation. Full exploration of this will require an expansion of data collection in a wider variety of institutional contexts. To date, most twin registries and genetically informative data have been collected in stable, Western democracies with well-established political parties. A fuller understanding of the biological origins of identity would benefit from analysis under more heterogeneous political contexts.

3.3. Political Participation

One of the driving questions of political science research is why some people engage in politics, while others shy away. The plethora of canonical studies examining the effects of individual characteristics and institutional influences suggest many theory-driven inquiries about the way that biology might shape participatory behaviors. The most foundational is the idea that many forms of political participation are pro-social behaviors, building on a robust pattern of findings in the behavioral genetics research in other fields that has determined that prosocial behaviors are heritable (Eaves et al. 2008; Son and Wilson 2010).

This study of the biological underpinnings of voter turnout is bolstered by a methodological advantage as well: the act of voting is unique because of the availability of verified public records data in addition to self-report data, which can be subject to social desirability bias. Entrepreneurial researchers approached extant twin registries and genetic databases to match in voting records. Using this approach, Fowler, Baker and Dawes (2008) were the first to suggest that voter turnout was heritable: they found that over 50% of the variance in validated voter turnout could be attributed to additive genetic factors, and they replicated this result in a separate sample, finding that voter turnout behavior was 72% heritable. Dawes et al. (2014) found a similar relationship in a Swedish sample with voter turnout in a parliamentary election showing 41% heritability, although turnout in an election for the

European Union did not appear to be heritable, and Dawes et al. (2015) estimate that 27% of the variance in voter turnout is due to genetic factors.

This replicated pattern of findings about the heritability of voting encouraged as assessment of particular genetic variants that might be associated with turnout. Fowler and Dawes (2008) suggest that the MAOA and 5HTT genes are two prime candidates because of their relationship to the metabolism of serotonin and the ability to process social stress; the mutated alleles of these genes decrease the efficiency of serotonin mutation and have been linked to anti-social behavior. They found that MAOA was directly associated with voter turnout, but that the effect of the 5HTT gene on voter turnout was moderated by religious attendance. Other work implicated two more genes that have been previously associated with impulsive behaviors, CHRNA6 and CHRNB3, building on the theory that individuals who are more patient and more willing to wait for a payoff are also more likely to vote, as they are willing to pay the present costs of voting in order to gain benefits from their vote in the future (Dawes and Loewen 2009).

Although the authors of these studies are careful to note that they are not looking to identify "the voting gene," these early works sparked intense criticism and backlash. Although most of these criticisms were based on misunderstandings of the authors' methods or motivations, one important point the critics made was the importance of replication. Fowler and Dawes (2013) respond effectively to these criticisms by replicating their 2008 study with an entirely new wave of data, and while they did replicate the moderated findings between 5HTT and voting, they did not replicate the original MAOA result. The 5HTT result was again replicated by Deppe et al. (2013), who introduce a continuous measure of voting behavior and include a range of other self-reported political participation variables, like volunteering for a campaign. While this replication is not robust to all modeling specifications, finding the same pattern in three different samples suggests a meaningful relationship exists.

Later work thus turned to better understanding the mechanisms linking genetic predispositions and voting behavior, such as other psychological dispositions that are known to be associated with voting. Much work focused on civic duty, but the pattern of results is not entirely clear. Using a twin study design, Loewen and Dawes (2012) found that genetic factors did play a significant role in how much duty a participant felt to vote, estimating that anywhere from 34 to 46% of the variation in a sense of duty to vote could be explained by genetic factors. However, Klemmensen et al. (2012) did not replicate this finding when assessing the heritability of political participation in Denmark and the United States. While political participation and efficacy were significantly heritable in both cultures, civic duty was not. Weinschenk and Dawes (2017a) find that civic duty was significantly heritable, as were four of five Big Five personality traits (all but agreeableness). Further, all four of the genetic correlations between personality traits and civic duty were significant and large in magnitude, indicating that common genes underlie the majority of the relationship between civic duty and personality traits.

In addition to a role for psychological dispositions in mediating the relationship between genes and political participation, there is evidence for a role of physiological activation as well. Gruszcyznski et al. (2012) examine the relationship between political participation and EDA response, captured while participants viewed a series of diverse images that ran the gamut from inducing positive to negative emotions and strong to mild reaction intensities. They found that EDA responsiveness to these images in general was correlated with political

participation; the more physiologically aroused an individual was to these stimuli, the more politically involved they were (as measured by increased odds of registering to vote, voting, campaigning, and contacting officials). Interestingly, EDA responsiveness interacted with levels of education to influence political engagement, such that someone with low EDA responsiveness and low levels of education had very low levels of participation.

Another important physiological response underpinning political participation is the stress response, as measured by cortisol levels. Theorizing that individuals with low stress thresholds, as measured by an elevated level of cortisol at baseline, may be less likely to vote as they find the process too stressful, French et al. (2014) use a protocol designed to induce social and evaluative stress and measured participants' cortisol levels before, during, and after the stress test. Interestingly, individuals who had higher levels of cortisol *before* the stress test were less likely to vote, even when controlling for demographic factors, but the measure of cortisol elevation during the stress task was not predictive of voting behavior. Further evidence for a role for stress response can be found in Settle et al. (2017), who conduct a voter mobilization field experiment on a sample of individuals for whom they have information about their genetic propensity toward negative affectivity, a trait related to anxiety and neuroticism. Suggestive results indicate that subjects with higher levels of negative affectivity were less likely to vote after being reminded about the level of competitiveness of the election. This pattern of results sheds light on why, for example, we see a mixed pattern of findings about the relationship between increased electoral competition and voter turnout: people have heterogeneous responses to the stress induced by election uncertainty and voting.

Interestingly, there is also evidence for heritable components of other forms of political engagement as well. Dawes et al. (2015) find that an index of civic engagement behaviors is heritable, as are volunteering, public service, and contributing to charitable causes. Finally, the decision to run for office appears to have heritable components, perhaps related to the genetic propensity for occupying a leadership role (De Neve et al. 2013). Using a unique sample of both adopted children and children who were reared by their biological parents, Oskarsson et al. (2017) find strong evidence in favor of transmission of political ambition from parent to offspring with both genetics and environmental factors being equally important in the transmission process. Neither cognitive ability nor personality traits appeared to mediate the relationship.

3.4. Political Interest, Efficacy, and Sophistication

As noted throughout the analyses above, biopolitics researchers are very interested in finding shared sources of influence between political outcomes and intervening traits. The findings described above about shared genetic pathways—including relationships with personality, religiosity, and foundational attitudes like civic duty—suggest important causal pathways linking biological predispositions to political attitudes and behaviors. In this section, we focus on a cluster of traits related to people's interest in, and awareness of, politics.

There is a wide assortment of factors that influence how someone thinks about political issues and forms political attitudes. An individual who is politically sophisticated can easily make sense of the complex issues and rhetoric surrounding political discourse to adopt preferences that align with their underlying predispositions. Schreiber (2007) argues

that the neural architecture, including "mirror neurons," developed to help humans reason through social situations in the past can be deployed to help people navigate the world of politics, building on work in his 2005 dissertation where, using fMRI techniques, he showed that partisans had activation in the parts of the brain associated with the default state network when answering questions about national politics, indicating that they lowered their level of explicit cognitive effort as compared to non-sophisticates. Westen et al. (2006) found similar results.

Political scientists have measured political sophistication in various ways, but typically capture it using some combination of educational attainment, interest in politics, political efficacy, and political knowledge. Although conceptually distinct from these concepts, political sophisticates on average have higher levels of education and higher levels of political efficacy.[4] A number of studies have examined the relationships of these concepts, finding significant sources of shared genetic factors between these traits.

Klemmensen et al. (2012) examine political interest and political efficacy, two traits that are typically highly correlated, in two populations from the United States and Denmark, and find that genetic factors explained a significant portion of the variance in political interest as well as efficacy; bivariate analysis showed that a large part of the covariation between political interest and efficacy is due to a shared genetic factor. Arceneaux et al. (2012) find that educational attainment, interest in politics, and political knowledge are in part heritable, and that a common set of genes does influence all three of these political sophistication factors, but that there are still unique genes and environments that play a role in each factor alone. They further show that these two traits and ideology are influenced by many of the same genetic factors.

Using two samples of twins, Weinschenk and Dawes (2017b) first verify that political interest is significantly heritable, finding levels of heritability similar to those found by Klemmensen et al. (2012), and find that four of the five Big Five traits (all except agreeableness) were found to be heritable in both samples. Genetic factors account for anywhere from 50% to 72% of the correlations of the three traits most associated with political interest and were found to be primarily driven by shared genes. Weinschenk et al. (2019) expand on the results of Weinschenk and Dawes (2017b) using a novel German sample of twins, and find that political interest, all five Big Five traits, cognitive ability, and self-efficacy were all highly heritable.

Other work has focused on the relationship between these traits and with downstream political outcomes like political participation. Littvay et al. (2011) found that voting, political efficacy, and general efficacy were significantly heritable with estimates of the genetic component reaching 50%. There was a significant correlation between voting and general efficacy, and decomposition of this relationship showed that it was mainly driven by common genetic variation. This finding was reinforced in another study that found a strong genetic correlation between political participation and political efficacy, suggesting a common set of genetic components influences both of these variables (Klemmensen et al. 2012), but this pattern was not replicated in Weinschenk et al. (2019).

Political scientists have also posited a role of cognitive ability and education as potential contributing factors to increased voter turnout, a relationship that finds support in the biopolitics literature. Heritability studies modeling the relationship between three civic behaviors (voting, volunteering, and donating to charity) and a number of other factors (positive emotionality, negative emotionality and emotional stability, and verbal

and performance IQ) found that the largest genetic correlations existed between the indices of civic engagement, positive emotionality and verbal IQ and can be accounted for by shared genetic factors (Dawes et al. 2015). These patterns were reinforced by Weinschenk et al. (2019) who find that all five of the Big Five traits, cognitive ability, and self-efficacy were significantly heritable as well as political participation. Openness and cognitive ability showed notable correlations, the majority of which could be explained by genetic factors. In fact, the genetic correlation between political participation and cognitive ability was almost identical to that seen by Dawes et al. (2015) between civic engagement and verbal IQ. This suggests that common genes account for a notable proportion of the relationship between political engagement and cognitive ability.

3.5. Political Information Processing

Related to the study of political sophistication is the study of political information processing, how people engage with political information in their environment, focusing on the physiologically instantiated response people have to external stimuli (see Jerit and Kam, Chapter 16, this volume). This work complements the robust body of work in political behavior that focuses on elite cues, media effects, and campaign effects, for example. This research agenda is one of the fastest growing in the field of biopolitics, and dovetails with the growing body of work about the role of psychophysiology in political decision-making (Hibbing, Baker, and Herzog 2019).

An early example of this work found that people had stronger physiological activation to watching a video of politicians engaging in uncivil interactions compared to civil interactions (Mutz and Reeves 2005). Interestingly, people seem to have a much stronger physiological response (as measured by EDA or heart rate) to the anticipation of discussing politics than they do to watching interactions on a screen (Carlson and Settle 2022). During a political discussion, subjects who disagreed with their discussants or perceived that they did had higher EDA activation compared to subjects who were in dyads in agreement (Carlson and Settle 2022). Subjects' whose heart rates increased the most were most likely to have homogenous political discussion networks (Carlson, McClean, and Settle 2019). Combined, these findings suggest that people's physiological activation during political interactions may have subsequent effects on the decisions people make about their future exposure to disagreement.

Relatedly, Bradley et al. (2007) captured startle reflexes (via fEMG electrodes), fEMG recordings of the muscles associated with smiling, and EDA while participants watched an assortment of political ads from the 2000 presidential campaign and found that the emotional ads (those pre-rated as negative or positive) elicited both more self-reported arousal and more physiological arousal than the "neutral" ads. Additionally, the negative ads produced larger eyeblink startle reflexes than the other ads and the positive political ads produced greater EMG activity over the facial muscles associated with smiling. Wagner et al. (2014) found small but statistically insignificant associations between respondents' self-reported responses to images of Obama and their physiological response to those images. However, physiological reactions in response to the image of Obama were a robust predictor of attitude strength regarding Obama's job performance, independent of self-report measures; higher physiological arousal was associated with stronger attitudes

(positive or negative) toward Obama and his signature policy. This pattern suggests that the way people think an image makes them feel does not truly capture their genuine reaction, and that physiological measurement is well-suited to capturing these "gut-level responses."

Soroka and colleagues have explored physiological differences in media consumption in the most comprehensive way, zeroing in on the negativity bias, or the idea that people pay more attention to negative news (Soroka 2014). Subsequent work extends this finding in a 17-country study using an experiment with real video news as stimuli that measures negativity bias using psychophysiological measurements of skin conductance and heart rate variability (Soroka, Fournier, and Nir 2019), but they do not find differences between liberals and conservatives (Fournier, Soroka, and Nir 2020). Moreover, they argue that psychophysiological reactions to news content captures not only a predisposition toward negativity but also other information processing-related reactions (Soroka et al. 2019). Emotional activation may also affect people's policy attitudes: Renshon, Lee and Tingley (2015) find that higher levels of EDA activation in response to an anxiety-inducing stimulus were associated with more anti-immigration attitudes, suggesting that physiological reactivity may mediate the relationship between anxiety and attitudes. Moreover, some evidence suggests that regions of the brain associated with both affective and evaluative processing, the anterior cingulate cortex and the insular cortex, are activated differentially in response to information with varying levels of uncertainty and policy congruence to the subject's beliefs, suggesting that both emotion and cognition are involved in political information processing (Haas, Baker, and Gonzalez, 2021).

4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Biopolitics research is no longer in its infancy. A rapidly growing body of research has demonstrated the value of these methodological approaches to answer a wide set of questions at the heart of political science research. As with any area of scholarship that challenges conventional understandings or methods, biopolitics scholars have faced criticism about the assumptions underpinning their theories or the application of the methods developed in other fields of study. But over the past 15 years, scholars interested in the biological origins of politics have addressed successfully these criticisms. For example, an extended exchange about candidate gene association studies (Fowler and Dawes 2008; Charney and English 2012; Fowler and Dawes 2013) made clear that criticisms about medical genetics research broadly, and genetic mutation and transcription specifically, were largely founded on misunderstandings about the methods or claims made.

As we look ahead to the next era of biologically informed political science scholarship, three important tasks seem most pressing. The first is a continued effort to explain why this work benefits scholars who don't care about biology per se, and to demonstrate the myriad ways that biopolitics research can address significant questions about public life (see Schlozman 2013 for a critique). One strong argument relates to the benefits of the methods to get around measurement problems that challenge more traditional techniques. Another is the potential of these techniques to point to new causal pathways explaining key political behaviors; if we care about interventions to achieve normative aims, we need to think creatively about what kinds of interventions could work. Finally, solutions to some of our most

pressing problems, such as political polarization, depend on accurate understandings of the way people experience politics. Biology is a foundational part of that. Political psychologists stand to benefit immensely from consideration of the way that the physiological experience of politics can affect people's decision-making processes. For example, Carlson and Settle (2022) argue that calls for the possibility of contact theory to ameliorate relationships across partisan lines do not take into account the altered physiological state that many people experience during an uncomfortable discussion.

The second task incumbent upon the subfield of biopolitics is to continue to be a leader in the transparency movement sweeping the discipline of political science. Replication is essential in all of social science but is especially imperative in the domain of biopolitics. Utilizing cutting-edge techniques can unearth potentially transformative changes to our knowledge base. But the fact that the field is rapidly evolving and adapting new methodologies means there are fewer established standards for data collection and analysis, and thus a greater risk that differences in procedures between research teams might lead to results that cannot be replicated. For example, EDA is heavily influenced by factors that are likely to vary arbitrarily from person-to-person, like body movements, body temperature, and breathing patterns. In order to ensure that the results of any one study are not just capturing these inherent differences, multiple, well-powered samples from several different locations should be used whenever possible. The work highlighted above about physiological differences between liberals and conservatives in threat sensitivity highlights the importance of communication between different teams of researchers working together to validate and extend initial findings. Moving forward, pre-registration and increased access to datasets and analysis procedures will be even more important.

The need for transparency highlights the reality that the strongest work triangulates findings using different methodological approaches to test theory-driven hypotheses that build on previous research. While this is true for much work in the social sciences, the promise of biopolitics work can only be realized if scholars push beyond the "low hanging fruit" to unpack the mechanisms that link predispositions and biological instantiations to downstream political attitudes and behaviors. As we elaborated above, there is much left to understand about the innate and instantiated differences between liberals and conservatives, but the interconnected findings showing the contribution of biological systems is an important counterweight to traditional approaches that focus solely on environmental factors. We can ask different questions using the full range of tools available to us, as long as we are mindful of the implications and limitations of those approaches when we draw conclusions from the work.

Finally, we must study the implications of the growing societal recognition of the contribution of biology to political behaviors. Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2013) argue that making people aware of innate differences between people might help people be more tolerant, understanding, and empathetic about how other people arrive at their viewpoints. However, the story is likely more complicated. Suhay and colleagues suggest that liberals and conservatives are likely to endorse biological explanations for behavior in strategic ways (Suhay and Jayaratne 2012; Morin-Chasse, Suhay, and Jayaratne 2017), nor is there evidence that a better understanding of biology might persuade people to change their opinions (Suhay and Garretson 2018). As we come to fully recognize the extent of psychological forms of polarization among the mass public, in the United States but also in other divided societies around the world, it will be critical to understand whether knowledge

about the biological origins of politics can serve to bring people together or whether it will only serve to drive us further apart.

Notes

1. MZ and DZ twins that were separated at birth provide a unique sample that allows researchers to better separate environmental influences from genetic influences, but this population is rare and protected by law.
2. A standard GWAS study tests individual SNPs for association with an outcome of interest. A technique known as GREML directly estimates genetic relatedness from the SNP data, using dense SNP data to explain the proportion of variance in a trait that can be jointly explained by all the genotyped SNPs together. Heritability estimates derived from this approach are generally on the lower-bound of all estimates of heritability for a trait.
3. Here, ideology was measured as an aggregate of standardized scores on the Wilson-Patterson index, society-works-best items, a seven-point political ideology scale, and a seven-point party identification scale. The aggregate was scored such that higher values indicate political orientations toward the right of the political spectrum. Thus, this finding contains elements of both issue-based and identity-based measures of ideology and partisanship.
4. Self-efficacy is an individual's opinions about their ability to change outcomes generally, while political efficacy is a task-specific case of self-efficacy that captures an individual's belief that their engagement in the political process makes a difference (Littvay et al. 2011).

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CHAPTER 9

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POLITICAL LANGUAGE

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NICK HOPKINS

THE study of words may seem a far cry from the domains of social life that so obviously impact our lives, for example, legal authority and the economy. However, political behavior is a function of people's understanding of their context and interests such that the challenge for political psychology is to explore how such understandings develop. Indeed, as Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher (2011) put it:

> We do not search for political psychology by measuring the populace against our own representations of the political field. We become political psychologists by interrogating the processes by which people achieve their own representations (whether of the explicitly "political" or indeed of anything else).
>
> (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011, p. 733)

These representations do not arise spontaneously. Nor do they arise in a social void, a silent world. Rather, we are surrounded by a multitude of others who vie to persuade us to represent our world (and our place in it) in particular terms, rather than others. Viewed in this light, political language is far from a surface manifestation of deeper currents shaping our behavior. Rather, it is at the heart of political life with much politics taking the form of "a struggle for people's imagination" (Bottici & Challand, 2006, p. 330). This struggle is conducted in and through language with diverse social actors constructing and advancing strategically significant representations of the world against the alternatives advanced by their opponents.

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the scope to any study of political language must be broad: there is more to political language than party political speeches and broadcasts. Work addressing the framing of issues as social or political problems which require solution (Benford & Snow, 2000) alerts us to the breadth of "the political." Across all manner of fora (e.g., televised speeches, interviews, activist events, street graffiti, policy discussion), across all manner of domains (e.g., health, crime, poverty), and diverse social and political issues (e.g., drug use, abortion, immigration policy, military operations), we find topics of debate where significant political work is done in mobilizing sentiment and action. Moreover, it rapidly becomes apparent that much of the power of political language resides in it not being seen as obviously "political" (and therefore motivated by partisan interests), but rather as apparently "commonsense," as what everyone knows. Indeed, as Edelman (1977) observes:

> The *fundamental* influences upon political beliefs flow . . . from language that is not perceived as political at all but nonetheless structures perceptions of status, authority, merit, deviance, and the causes of social problems. Here is a level of politics that conventional political science rarely touches, but one that explains a great deal of the overt political maneuvering and governmental action that focuses public attention.
>
> <div align="right">(Edelman, 1977, p. 21, original emphasis).</div>

Over the last thirty years, there have been three major developments that allow a radically different approach to the study of political language. First, there has been an emphasis on the *content* of what is said in text and talk. At first sight, a focus on content may seem an obvious starting point. However, analyses of political communication have traditionally tended to omit detailed analyses of communication content (Billig, 1987; see also Young & Miller, Chapter 16, this volume). For example, Hovland's classic program of research focused on such issues as how qualities of the communicator (e.g., their status, credibility and trustworthiness; e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951) or the audience (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) impacted message reception. Furthermore, when message content was addressed it was in very general terms (Billig, 1987) as when researchers explored the degree to which fear-arousing material could motivate action (Janis & Fesbach, 1953), whether one-sided or two-sided arguments were more influential (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield,1949; Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953), or whether implicit or explicit conclusions were most impactful (Hovland et al., 1953). Throughout this, and much subsequent work, researchers explored the factors thought to influence the processing of information (e.g., the Elaboration Likelihood Model: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In fact, much work on the psychology of communication came to focus on the limited capacity of human beings' cognitive resources and the ways in which this limitation might be exploited (e.g., through the invocation of emotion) in order to circumvent thoughtful deliberation (Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume; Pratkanis & Aronson, 1992). As will become apparent, a focus on the argumentative content of political communications allows a radically different conceptualization of political language (Billig, 1987).

Second, and associated with the above, there has been renewed interest in language as a research topic in its own right (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Across a range of disciplines, researchers have come to the view that the language we is not a neutral or passive vehicle that simply communicates thoughts but rather allows people to actively create situated versions of social reality that *do* things and achieve various functions (such as allocating blame and responsibility: Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1988). In turn, this perspective draws our attention to the ways in which speakers actively assemble their versions so as to promote particular projects. Moreover, this approach emphasizes the point that to be effective, this constructive work must be obscured such that the speaker's version of the social and material world appears a factual description.

Third, our understanding of the basis for social behavior has been radically transformed through research building on the insight that people routinely conceptualize themselves in terms of social categories (Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). As the way in which these social categories are defined shapes the behavior of those adopting such social categories as self-relevant, analysts of political language have begun to consider how those seeking to recruit support for their political project construct the social identity of their audience in such a manner that their message (rather than their opponent's) can be taken on by their audience as their own (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000).

Before elaborating upon the conceptual framework necessary for the analysis of political language, the chapter starts with a practical example which illustrates the relevance of these developments and lays bare some of the challenges for a political psychology that takes argumentative content seriously.

1. Reading Political Language: Anti-Abortion Rhetoric

The issue of abortion continues to feature in many national legislatures and court rooms (Friedman, 2013), and the wider public sphere. At the heart of such debates is the categorization of the fetus. As the fetus is both similar to and different from children and adults, its categorization depends upon which dimensions are invoked as significant (Condit, 1990). These are not a given but a social choice. That is, the categorization of the fetus is a site of argument, and any one categorization is an argumentative achievement, accomplished in and through the strategic use of imagery and language.

Take anti-abortion rhetoric. Although a ten-week fetus looks very different from a newborn, its feet look very similar such that if we focus on them and disregard other visual features, we are led to read the image as an "unborn child." In fact, such is the social and political power of ten-week-old fetal feet to stand in for the whole (and so convey a categorization of the fetus as "unborn child") that this image was popularized in the form of a campaigning lapel badge (Condit, 1990). Similar points may be made with regard to the language of the anti-abortion movement: it is also organized to attribute distinctively human attributes to the fetus. For example, one speaker describing the movements of the "unborn child" in the womb maintained "we move with much more agility and co-ordination and ease and grace of movement . . . the baby leaps around like a ballet dancer, like an acrobat" (cited in Hopkins & Reicher, 1997, p. 274). Again, such references to the culturally familiar movements of the "ballet dancer" and "acrobat" attribute the fetus socially recognizable human qualities such that rather being a strange entity we categorize it as a fellow social being.

Yet, for such constructions to gain traction they must appear objective, and it is in this regard that the deployment of fetal visual imagery has particular rhetorical significance. Perhaps the most famous fetal image (appearing in *Life* magazine, 30.04.1965) appeared to show an autonomous person floating in empty space (Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987; Stabile, 1992). In part, this is because the imagery was constructed with the woman entirely absent: the photographer used autopsied fetuses from which it was possible to cut away the sacs and placentas (such that as Stabile observes, "what has been patched together . . . to simulate 'life' is—ironically—death," 1992, p. 185). It is also because although photographs appear to be "a mechanical analogue of reality," a "message without a code" (Barthes, 1982, cited in Petchesky, 1987, p. 269), their reading is shaped by all manner of cultural referents. Indeed, such referents were invoked in this image's accompanying caption: "Like an astronaut in his capsule the fetus floats in its amniotic sac." At first sight these 13 words may appear of little interest to a political psychologist. However, the fetus/astronaut simile draws on wider culturally available tropes (e.g., the silent solitude of the

astronaut away from earth; the fetal Star Child in Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey*; Sofia, 1984) such that the reader is encouraged to attribute to the fetus the fully human qualities and emotions of the astronaut (on intertextuality, i.e., the processes whereby written or visual materials are interpreted in the light of each other to produce new meanings, see Werner, 2004). Similar observations apply to the use of ultrasound imagery in film (Boucher, 2004; Palmer, 2009). Such films "do not 'speak' their meaning of their own accord" and "cannot bear the burden of proof of the ontological status of the embryo or fetus" (Boucher, 2004, p. 8). Rather, their reading is guided by the narrator's language (e.g., the description of what we see as revealing the "beautiful continuity of the unborn": cited in Boucher, 2004, p. 8), and it is in such narration that a significant political argument is constructed and communicated.

Analytically speaking, perhaps the most striking feature of such constructions is the repeated use of diverse forms of anthropomorphizing labels. Referring to innovations in ultrasound imagery, one anti-abortion campaigner argued that "until now babies in the womb have been unseen *citizens*" ("Room in the womb for those first steps," *Daily Mail*, June 29, 2004, pp. 6–7, added emphasis). Similarly, a campaigner addressing an audience of medics referred to "child" or "children" 14 times, "baby" five times, "unborn child" twice, "patient" twice, and "person" once (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a). Given the nature of the audience (medics), the choice of "patient" is particularly interesting: it constructs the fetus as relating to the medical practitioner in its own right, and with particular rights. Indeed, on these rights the speaker was explicit: "When the pregnant mother presents herself to her doctor, there are two patients . . . both entitled to the love, care, respect and practical support of those whom the patients are being presented to" (cited in Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, p. 305). "Unborn child," "patient," "citizen," and so on are small words, but carry big political connotations and can accomplish important political work. Lest there be doubt concerning their significance, experimental research shows their connotations matter: Participants reading a text that featured "unborn child" rather than "fetus" reported greater opposition to abortion (Mikołajczak & Bilewicz, 2015). Moreover, this effect was mediated by participants attributing more human nature-related traits (e.g., "active," "curious," "impulsive") to the "unborn child" than the "fetus."

It is also striking that such campaigning rhetoric is not simply focused on the fetus but includes references to a range of social actors—most obviously the protagonists in the debate and the wider audience to whom they must appeal. As might be expected, the characterization of these actors is also of immense strategic importance: routinely, speakers characterize the debate's protagonists in ways that frame the issue so that their own position is represented in positive terms and their opponents' negatively. Definitions of the abortion debate as between those who are "pro-" and "anti-choice," or between those who are "pro-" or "anti-life," are not neutral, but constitute the debate in strategically significant terms. They help talk into being particular opinion-based social categories (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009) with values that can recruit support to one's own position. Moreover, speakers routinely characterize the audience to whom they must appeal in ways that allow their own project to be taken on by their audience as their own. Thus, the speaker addressing an audience of medics (referred to above) defined that professional identity to imply that just as he opposed abortion, so

too must his medical audience and to do otherwise would be to violate core values of their medical identity. Take this construction of the medic's social identity:

> [abortion] places the doctor or nurse in the position of being destroyer of life rather than defender of life. Where does this leave the Hippocratic ideal? Where does this leave the United Nations' great statement of human rights of 1948 which said that everyone, everyone, had the right to life?

<div align="right">(cited in Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, p. 304)</div>

1.1. Observations

This brief exploration of the contents of anti-abortion rhetoric illustrates something of the significance of the three developments in the analysis of political language noted in the introduction. First, it makes the point that political communication can be conceptualized as involving the construction of an argument which is advanced against the alternatives articulated by one's opponents. Second, it highlights the importance of attending to how such arguments are constructed yet the process of construction obscured (such that one's version of the world appears but a simple and veridical description of reality). Third, it hints at the scope to such argumentation. It alerts us to the point that we can expect much effort to be devoted to the construction of social categories and identities such that the interests and concerns of the speaker and those of the audience are represented as closely aligned, and the concerns of the former can be adopted by the latter.

2. Analyzing Political Language

The broad implication of such observations is that a political psychology of language must adopt a critical stance in relation to the production of any piece of political communication, asking how it is assembled and naturalized to prosecute a particular project. This involves exploring the argumentative nature of such communication, the ways in which political arguments are made to appear non-partisan but common-sense, and the ways in which speaker-audience relationships are constructed. In what follows I more thoroughly outline the emergent conceptual framework that has put the content of political language center stage.

2.1. Argument and Argumentative Resources

A shift of focus from the form of political language (as when one asks whether a one-sided or two-sided case is more persuasive, etc.) to its contents highlights the significance of argumentation. This is brilliantly explored in Billig's *Arguing and Thinking* (1987) which revisits the insights to be found in classic rhetorical theory. Billig observes that the word "argument" has two meanings. The first refers to a piece of reasoned discourse in which a case is progressively built up. The second is more social in that it refers to a dispute between people

(Billig, 1987, p. 44). However, these two meanings of argument are intimately connected: the individual piece of reasoned argument is a contribution to a debate, an argument against an alternative. Applying these insights to the study of political language alerts us to the importance of exploring the ways in which speakers marshal their case to counter alternatives and to do so in as convincing a manner as possible.

Analyses of the construction of such arguments emphasize that speakers likely invoke concepts, symbols, and topics familiar to the audience they are addressing. With regard to political language, the most obvious are the stories that communities (e.g., nations) tell about themselves. These do not have a fixed meaning but can be invoked strategically. For example, although the logic to nationalism "makes history a necessity and generates thinking in historical terms" (Holy, 1996, p. 117), it clear that such histories can be narrated differently such that nationalism "can be seen as a discursive agreement that history matters without necessarily agreeing on what that history was and what it means" (Holy, 1996, p. 118). Other culturally available resources which can feature as argumentative building blocks have been conceptualized in a variety of ways: Billig (1987) refers to the "common place" topics of common sense; Potter and Wetherell (1987) propose the concept of "interpretative repertoires"; and Moscovici (1961/2008, 1984) the concept of "social representations." Although there are significant differences between these approaches (see Potter & Litton, 1985; Voelklein & Howarth, 2005), all imply a multitude of culturally familiar resources that are available for the construction and communication of speakers' preferred version of the social and material world. Often these culturally recognizable ways of talking cohere around a key metaphor such that to deploy one interpretative repertoire rather than another, or to invoke one social representation rather than another, is to represent the issue at hand in a noticeably different manner.

2.2. Conceptualizing Language

Although these traditions share an interest in the diverse socially available ways of thinking and talking about all manner of issues, the traditions described above have significantly different philosophical origins and emphases. Those subscribing to the logic of the Social Representations tradition have tended to focus on the cognitive implications of such culturally available resources (Moscovici, 1961/2008, 1981, 1984). Moscovici's starting point is that whereas previously there may have been totalizing myths, social structural differentiation has resulted in the circulation of a wide variety of systems of values, ideas, and practices within any one community. Such "social representations" provide the conceptual frameworks necessary for the interpretation of the material and social world. More specifically, they allow new phenomena to be given meaning through reference to already existing perspectives (what Moscovici calls "anchoring"), and more abstract concepts to be rendered intelligible through their being represented in more concrete terms (what Moscovici calls "objectification"). Political argument can be conceptualized as involving the development and dissemination of such representations. However, speakers rarely start from scratch—rather they invoke and draw upon already circulating representations. Indeed, because such established representations provide a ready vocabulary for naming features of our worlds, they play an important role in allowing communication and debate.

The logic and practice of Discourse Analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 1988) brings a sharper analytic focus on the ways in which people use language to construct particular and situated versions of the world (Potter & Litton, 1985). According to this approach, the language we use is not a neutral or passive vehicle which simply reveals our thoughts. Rather, it allows us to actively create situated versions of social reality that *do* things (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 1988). This emphasis on the discursive constitution of social reality is well illustrated in its conceptualization of attitudes. Potter and Wetherell argue that rather than thinking of the attitudinal object as existing separately from its evaluation, the analysis of language suggests that "the nature of 'the object' is formulated in the course of evaluating it" (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, p. 56). That is, "people do not construct neutral versions—whatever they would be—of attitudinal objects and then evaluate them; they construct versions of the world which *display* evaluations" (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, p. 56, original emphasis). Indeed, it is here, in this process of construction, that action is accomplished: as we have seen, those arguing against abortion do not work with a neutral version of the to-be-aborted entity but rather construct versions of it (e.g., as an "unborn child") that demand a particular treatment. However, this accomplishment depends on the process of construction being concealed such that the speaker's version of reality is presented as "simply" a disinterested factual description of an out-there reality (Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). As the earlier discussion of anti-abortion rhetoric shows, this is a complex rhetorical task. Speakers must simultaneously establish their own version of the issue at hand as a veridical description of reality and subvert similar claims made by their opponents. Specifically, they must avoid their version being attributed to their political motivations and partisan interests (see Dickerson, 1997), yet attribute their opponents' versions to precisely such concerns.

Both the concept of "social representations" and the concept of "interpretative repertoire" have analytic utility in exploring the content of political language. Both encourage us to examine the diverse systems of meaning available within any community. However, whereas the former tends to emphasize the cognitive dimension, the latter emphasizes the importance of exploring the situated invocation and reworking of such resources and the discursive functions this accomplishes.

2.3. Social Categories as Topics in Political Discourse

Across the social sciences there is increasing awareness that the social categories through which people come to define themselves are psychologically and socially consequential (Mason, Chapter 24, this volume). Such self-definitions can be opinion-based categories (Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009) with individuals identifying with a particular position in a social controversy (e.g., as someone opposed to abortion), or categories based on national, religious, or ethnic belonging, and so on. The key point is that all such categories (even those that seem so solid and timeless) are social constructions. This is not to imply that these social categories have no psychological reality: they do, and they have considerable purchase on the human imagination.

The most sustained social psychological analysis of how social categories shape our behavior is to be found in the concept of *social identity*. Tajfel (1978) drew a distinction between individual-level and group-level processes that was developed by Turner (1982) in what

became known as *self-categorization theory* (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This argues that the self and others may be defined at various levels of abstraction—sometimes in terms of individual uniqueness, sometimes in social categorical terms—and that any one individual can identify in terms of a range of social categories with the corollary that what they think and do will depend upon which social categorical identity is psychologically salient at the time and the way it is defined (i.e., its norms and values). Evidence for these core assumptions is strong. Experimental research in social psychology routinely involves investigating the impact of manipulating participants' understandings of which social category is relevant for their thinking and behavior (e.g., Levine, Evans, Prosser, & Reicher, 2005) or showing how manipulations of the normative contents associated with any one social category (e.g., Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002), including real-world social groups (e.g., Wakefield, et al., 2011), impact attitudes, and behavior. More generally, the logic to the social identity approach implies that as we can conceptualize ourselves in terms of a variety of identities, our conception of our self-interest is complex: what is in our self-interest will depend on which identity is salient and how it is defined (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000).

With regard to political language, the significance of the social identity conceptualization of the identity-behavior relationship is that it provides a psychological mediation between the ways in which such communities are constructed and community members' behavior (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000). That is, if people's behavior is shaped by how they categorize themselves, we could expect political speakers to construct their audience's social identity in terms that allow the speaker's project to be taken on by that audience as their own. Most obviously, we could expect speakers to build a representation of the social field in which the speaker and audience are defined in terms of a common categorization and the speaker's opponents as standing outside this category (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b). Moreover, we could expect the speaker's proposed attitudes/behaviors to be represented as embodying the norms, values, and interests of this common category (and those of the opposition as incongruent with such values) (Young & Miller, Chapter 16, this volume).

2.4.   Observations

Having outlined the case for taking the content of political language (broadly defined) seriously and having outlined something of the conceptual framework needed for a political psychology of such content, it is now possible to sketch the contours to the remainder of this chapter. First, I explore how categories and identities feature as *topics* in political rhetoric. Specifically, I consider the ways in which politically significant identities are invoked and defined strategically. Second, I explore one of the key concerns of political psychology—intergroup conflict and harmony—and consider how an analysis of political language contributes to such a domain of inquiry. This involves exploring the mobilization rhetoric of those advocating various forms of intergroup conflict (e.g., war, racist hate) and solidarity. Next, I explore the argumentative resources drawn upon in political language. These include culturally specific systems of meaning (especially the political myths associated with particular communities) and the more generally available ways of talking about people, events, and social processes (especially metaphors). I then consider the significance of two genres of talk (emotion-related language and humor) and how they feature in the

grounding and subversion of particular versions of reality. Finally, following the logic of conceptualizing political communication as argumentative, I discuss how the protagonists in any political debate must counter their opponents' constructions and respond to attacks on their own position.

3. CATEGORIES AND IDENTITIES AS *TOPICS* IN POLITICAL RHETORIC

The social identity perspective places much emphasis upon the cognitive determination of behavior (it argues people act in terms of their understandings of the norms and values associated with their self-defining categories). This is not to retreat to a psychologism in which what goes on in people's heads is privileged over what goes on in the social context or in public (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004). Rather, the promise of a cognitive approach to identity is that it "may help connect our analyses of what goes on in people's heads with our analysis of what goes on in public" (Brubaker et al., 2004, p. 46). More specifically, our attention is drawn to the various group-making activities and practices that invoke and maintain particular self-categories (and without which they would not exist) and ascribe them particular contents (e.g., norms, values, interests). Such identity constitutive rhetoric is particularly apparent in periods of political upheaval as social actors of all persuasions devote enormous energy to reconfiguring people's understandings of themselves, their interests, and how they relate to others. However, it is also important to recognize that the political categories we take for granted (e.g., our national identities) are also actively produced and reproduced in and through everyday language (and language that we hardly see as political at all). Below, I consider the role of language in the invocation and strategic definition of two rather different politically significant categories. As will become clear, it is through constructing self- and other-defining categories that speakers create a framework with which people can make sense of their environment. Such identities provide the vantage point from which events are interpreted, meanings created, and self-relevant interests identified.

3.1. Revolutionary Rhetoric: The Islamic Revolution in Iran

The significance of political language in periods of radical social transformation can be illustrated through reference to what we have come to know as the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Opposition to the Shah came from many quarters (liberals, nationalists, leftists of all persuasions), and the fact the revolution came to take the form it did cannot be understood without exploring the processes whereby a particular set of social categories was progressively constructed as relevant in rhetoric and practice, and alternatives undermined. It was Khomeini's rhetorical victory in his use of religious concepts, symbols, and personas that lay at the heart of his success (Zickmund, 2003), and understanding this process of category construction is crucial if political psychology is to avoid the temptation to slip into misleadingly irrationalist accounts of "religious fanaticism" as driving events.

At the heart of Khomeini's political rhetoric were the categories of the *mustad'afun* ("the oppressed" or "downtrodden") and *mustakbarun* ("the oppressors"). These categories allowed Khomeini to represent the many inequalities in Iran in terms that brought diverse social actors together under what Zickmund (2003) describes as an Islamic "umbrella." Most obviously, the category of the *mustad'afun* was used to include Iranian workers within the broader category of the oppressed or downtrodden—but not as class-conscious actors. This was particularly apparent in Khomeini's reappropriation of May Day celebrations and the channeling of potential action in terms of a class-based identification into action based upon a new (religious) Iranian revolutionary identity. For example, one May Day poster declared, "Islam is the only supporter of the workers" and featured workers kneeling at prayer alongside items such as a rifle, a spanner, and hammer, and items used in Shi'ite prayer (Morgana, 2018, p. 247). The result was such that "the incorporation of 'workers' and 'labor' into the Islamic Republic's official narrative meant an incremental dissolution of both concepts as sources of political mobilization" (Morgana, 2019, p. 134). In turn, as identity constructions are key to the identification of one's interests, this formulation of identity promoted a particular vision of the masses' political priorities (indeed, the pursuit of class-based priorities was actively condemned: Morgana, 2018, 2019).

It is also important to note that the norms and values of this new identity were elaborated through the construction of a narrative which wove together familiar cultural products into a framework that allowed meaning to be ascribed to unfolding events through the processes of anchoring (the process whereby events are given meaning through reference to established frameworks) and objectification (the process whereby more abstract concepts are made intelligible through being represented in concrete terms). For example, the Shah was depicted as Yazid (the evil ruler responsible for the death of the now revered Shi'i martyr Husain at the battle of Karbala) and the United States as Shaitan (Satan). This allowed Khomeini to capitalize on the mythic relationship between Yazid and Shaitan (in which the former was a pawn of the latter) to represent the Shah as serving the United States, and the *mustad'afun* (the "oppressed" or "downtrodden") as victims of American imperialism (Zickmund, 2003). Indeed, all were enjoined to treat Husain as a role model for protest against the tyranny of the *mustakbarun* ("the oppressors"). In doing so they would be enacting key (Islamic) identity-relevant values and pursuing identity-relevant interests.

3.2. Banal Nationalism

If periods of revolutionary social change make such group-making language particularly visible, such activity is hardly exceptional. It is a prominent feature of all social movement activism (Hunt & Benford, 2004; Ulug & Acar, 2019) and all manner of political speeches (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006, 2009). Moreover, such group-making language supports and sustains the most taken-for-granted and seemingly "given" of social categories—our national identities (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995; Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume). Although these self-categories appear natural features of our political imagination, they are produced and reproduced through everyday representational practice and ways of talking. Indeed, Billig (1995) coins the term "banal nationalism" to make the point that even in the most established of nations, the "nation" is routinely "flagged" in everyday rhetoric. For example, Billig observes that even the way we talk about such mundane topics

as "the weather" is nationalized, such that the citizenry is "unmindfully reminded of their national identity" (Billig, 1995, p. 154). At first sight, the notion that talk of "the weather" could be conceptualized as politically significant seems fanciful. However, As Calhoun emphasizes, Billig's analysis reminds us that more dramatic action on the basis of national categories "depends on the seemingly apolitical deployment of the rhetoric of nation; 'hot' nationalism depends on 'banal nationalism'" (Calhoun, 2017, p. 27).

The wider implication of the taken-for-granted nature of "the nation" made possible by banal nationalism is that many everyday political contests are conducted through arguments over the nature of national identity (Holy, 1996). This is particularly apparent if we consider the implications of electoralist politics being organized around national categories: those seeking to win support must represent themselves as speaking for the nation as a whole, rather than sectional interest (Przeworski, 1980), and they typically do so through representing their policies as rooted in the nation's identity (and their opponents' as contradicting that identity). This is well illustrated in an analysis of the speeches given by the leaders of the two largest British political parties during the year-long (1984–1985) British Miners' strike (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b). In their televised set pieces, both presented the dispute in terms that allowed each to present their party's position as representative of British national opinion. Indeed, the speeches had a common structure. Both defined the position they sought to attack as a fringe minority, and both did so through constructions which had discursive effects akin to peeling an onion: successive layers of potential support for the opposition were stripped away to leave a limited core with a narrow base. For the Conservative prime minister (Margaret Thatcher), the strike entailed a militant minority within the Trade Union movement attacking British democracy ("an organized revolutionary minority who are prepared to exploit industrial disputes but whose real aim is the breakdown of democratic parliamentary government," cited in Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, p. 361). For the opposition Labour leader (Neil Kinnock), the strike was a response to a politically motivated coterie around the prime minister intent on attacking ordinary people and British traditions ("Thatcherism is a personal fixation turned into a system of government," cited in Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, pp. 366–367).

In turn, and as a corollary, each enlarged the category associated with their own position. For Thatcher, it included all who valued British traditions of democracy. In her words the nation faced "the most testing crisis of our time—the battle between the extremists and the rest. ( ) This nation will meet that challenge. Democracy will prevail" (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, p. 362). For Kinnock, it included "the men and women struggling in the coal mining communities now, up to the Lords and judges and all stations and classes and ages and sexes in between" (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, p. 366). Finally, both allied themselves with this enlarged category.

Sometimes "Britishness" was explicitly referenced when describing this majority position with the speaker depicting themselves as defending British traditions against their (minority) opposition. More often, there were repeated references to "us," "we," and "the" people, with these words' interpretation shaped by the context in which they appeared. That is, in what Billig (1995) calls the *deixis* of small words, references to "us," "we," and "the" people implied not just any people but British people and the slippage in such terms' usage (sometimes referring to the speaker, their party or the wider national community) allowed their elision, with the implication that the speaker embodied a national consensus. Needless to say, the ambiguity in these referents is strategically significant in obscuring

these referents' potentially diverse interests, for "so long as 'we' do not specify what 'we' mean by 'we,'" there is the potential for "the first person plural to suggest a harmony of interests and identities" (Billig, 1995, p. 90).

3.3. Observations

Social categories and identities are prominent topics in everyday social and political dispute for good reason. It is through their strategic construction that speakers can recruit others to adopt particular positions as their own (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000). Accordingly, rather than reserving the term "identity politics" for a distinctive form of political activity, we should perhaps conceptualize all political activity as involving (and being prosecuted through) the argumentative construction of social categories. Inevitably the nature of these identities must depend on the particulars of the issue at hand. However, from an analytic perspective the processes involved are generalizable: borrowing from Besson (1990), Reicher and Hopkins (2000) argue that political speakers should be seen as "entrepreneurs of identity" defining the identities (and hence political interests) of those they wish to mobilize so as to entail the speaker's policies and proposals.

4. THE RHETORIC OF CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

Much political psychology explores the issue of intergroup conflict and how intergroup relations may be improved. Most obviously, research addresses how intergroup relations are negatively affected by perceptions of threat (Green & Staerkle, Chapter 28, this volume; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2009), and improved through intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tropp & Dehrone, Chapter 29, this volume) or a common ingroup identification (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). Typically, such work pays relatively little regard to the ways in which political actors' rhetoric features in the development of understandings of intergroup relations (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004ab) and would benefit from an analytic shift from talking about processes of "perception" to process of "construction." Such a shift allows us to appreciate that intergroup conflict is not as some would suggest a "natural" outcome of group processes, but rather is a political accomplishment in which the argumentative construction of social categories and category relations (e.g., "threat") is key (Hopkins, Reicher & Levine, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

4.1. Mobilizing Hate

Reicher, Haslam, and Rath (2008) offer a useful five-step framework for conceptualizing the mobilization of hostility (whether by state actors or local activists) against a target. Drawing on the argument that collective behavior is behavior in accordance with community

members' understandings of their collective interests, they highlight how speakers (i) construct an ingroup identity that includes those they wish to mobilize, (ii) define those they wish to target as outside this group membership, (iii) define this outgroup as endangering and threatening in-group identity, (iv) characterize the ingroup identity as possessing distinctive and to-to-be-protected virtues, and (v) represent attacks on the outgroup target as defensive and thoroughly justified (see also Cohen-Chen & Halperin, Chapter 30, this volume).

Applying this analytic framework to speeches made by a far-right politician (Geert Wilders) in the Netherlands, Verkuyten (2013) showed how Wilders spoke of the Dutch as distinctive community; represented Islam as an alien and incompatible tradition that threatened Dutch values of freedom, tolerance, and democracy; and called for policies of exclusion and control. As an additional justification for such exclusionary policies, Wilders anticipated the charge that he was prejudiced against Muslims through presenting his focus as being on Islam as an intolerant ideology (rather than on Muslims as people).

This five-step model has also been used to structure the analysis of a Finnish party election broadcast by the popularist Finns Party (Sakki & Martikainen, 2020). The broadcast took the form of a satirical multimodal film featuring a corrupt political elite who welcomed threatening refugees and finished with a monster (embodying the national citizenry) violently saving the country. Again, all manner of cultural resources were invoked to ground this construction in a national narrative, for example, the film finished with the words "Should corruption rear its head again, the nation's defender will return," which evokes themes in the Finnish national epic—the Kalevala—whose mythical hero Väinämöinen promises to return if the nation is threatened (Sakki & Martikainen, 2020, p. 619). In addition, the authors analyzed the film's reception through exploring viewers' comments and found evidence for the glorification of the ingroup and schadenfreude toward those mocked by the video. Related work considers how the organization of digital media and their communicative features (e.g., hyperlinking to external sources, presenting strong audio-visual material) facilitates the establishment of a sense of common identity between the activist-blogger and their readership with the latter being drawn into "dialogue and collaborative meaning-making, which creates a sense of togetherness and like-mindedness" (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016, p. 167).

Building category definitions that mobilize hate presents many rhetorical challenges. Most obviously the architects of such representations must anticipate the charge that their representation of the world says more about them than the world they depict. That is, they must anticipate (and counter) the charge that their representation of the world speaks volumes about their prejudices. Historical studies comparing contemporary and earlier examples of nationalist political rhetoric suggest that while there are continuities, more recent constructions of a target's Otherness seem to require much more rhetorical work geared to grounding such constructions as "reasonable" through greater use of "factuality-enhancing strategies," for example, citing statistics and experts (Sakki, Hakoköngäs, & Pettersson, 2018, p. 175) and other rhetorical strategies that allow racist views to be expressed while avoiding the label of racism (see Billig, 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). These include the use of liberal arguments for "illiberal" ends, the use of de-racialized discourse, and the contestation of what counts as racism (Augoustinos & Every, 2007, 2010; Durrheim, Greener, & Whitehead, 2014; Fozdar & Low, 2015; Goodman & Burke, 2011). For example, Wood and Finlay's (2008) analysis of British far-right rhetoric revealed the ways in which Muslims were presented as anti-White fascists and non-Muslim proponents of

multi-culturalism as unwitting stooges in a Muslim conspiracy to attack Britain. Of particular interest is the way in which this version of reality was made to appear "reasonable." For example, one element involved what Antaki and Wetherell (1999) label a "show concession" in which a proposition is made (the Qur'an justifies terrorism), which is followed by a concession (yes, it is politically incorrect to say this), followed by a reprise (but we believe in telling the truth) (Wood & Finlay, 2008, p. 716). Such insights underscore the importance of attending to the detail of political language and how it functions (in this case to legitimate the voicing of a "truth" that conventional politicians censor).

4.2. Mobilizing Solidarity

Just as there is a need to investigate the language used in the mobilization of hate, so there is a need to explore the language of solidarity. For example, the fact so many of Bulgaria's Jews survived at a time when other Jewish communities were dispatched to their death highlights the significance of the way in which they were represented. While elsewhere Jews were represented as an alien and problematic presence, in Bulgaria they were represented as fellow citizens such that to act against them was to act against the community as a whole. This is not to say there were no antisemites in Bulgaria. Rather it is to say that anti-deportation arguments were successful in mobilizing mass protests that impacted government policy. Analyzing these anti-deportation speeches reveals Bulgaria's Jews were construed as ingroup members deserving the same rights as their fellow citizens and that Bulgarian values were defined as requiring protective measures be taken (Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006). For example, developing this latter argument, one campaigner maintained that to fail to protect the Jews would be to deny Bulgaria's essential qualities:

> When the Bulgarian people lose their sense of justice that they have nurtured over the course of centuries and that is so much a part of their national identity, they will lose their moral and spiritual uniqueness, their Slavic essence, their Bulgarian face.
>
> (Reicher et al., 2006, p. 63)

Contemporary United Kingdom anti-deportation campaigns in defense of migrants deploy similar category constructions (see Ryan & Reicher, 2019). For example, rebutting representations that depict migrants as a problematic presence, anti-deportation campaigners presented those they sought to protect as members of the local and national community, and deportation as violating the norms and interests associated with such local and national identities.

Again, the point is that whether addressing the psychology of hate or of solidarity, categorization processes are key. Yet the question of which categories are invoked and how category relations are represented is contested, with people's fates depending on which arguments win out and so have the potential to mobilize collective effort.

4.3. Collective Victimhood

Thus far, the examples of category construction in the context of mobilizing hate and solidarity have focused on the rhetoric of those within the majority group. However, minority

group members also feature in such debates, for example, when they debate upon their experiences of discrimination. Minorities' understandings of such experiences take a number of forms (Vollhardt, 2020). Some will be more personal and idiosyncratic, others more collective in nature, and as Elcheroth (2006) observes, these latter community-level understandings and representations "cannot be reduced to the sum of the symbolic processes and contents that result from community members' interpretations of their personal experiences" but rather "have to be studied on their own right" (Elcheroth, 2006, p. 911). Inevitably, any such exploration of collective sense-making practices requires attention to within-community debate (Hopkins & Dobai, 2020).

A good example can be found in debates taking place within the British Muslim community as they deliberate on the nature of Islamophobia (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006). As Sayyid observes, to name something as Islamophobic "is a constitutive act; it enables the gathering of disparate elements into recognizable formations of cruelty and injustice, which is the first task of making demands for their rectification" (Sayyid, 2014, p. 22). However, if the term is now a recognized analytic concept in political psychology, it is also a concept available to, and used by, diverse social actors to impose meaning on a disparate range of experiences, to frame events and actions, and to motivate collective responses (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006; Hopkins & Dobai, 2020).

For some in the United Kingdom, Islamophobia represents an irrational fear involving stereotypes based upon misperceptions of history couched in terms of a clash of civilizations. Arguing that the reality was different, those subscribing to such a diagnosis encouraged intergroup contact (e.g., inter-faith dialogue) as a means to break down homogenizing stereotypes and identify common interests. That is, a solution was to be found in exposing diversity with the Muslim community and developing a common categorization with non-Muslims. Yet, for others, Islamophobia was construed as a timeless hatred of the faith, a hatred that the Prophet himself experienced when beginning to preach in Makkah, and a hatred more recently manifested in the violence meted out to the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006). This implied a very different understanding of the basis for the derogation of the community: rather than entering into dialogue, Muslims were encouraged to be suspicious of inter-group contact and to look instead to building powerful autonomous political organizations with which to resist sustained attack (indeed, interfaith dialogue was construed as constituting a strategy designed to subvert Muslim unity). Accordingly, if the one construction encouraged Britain's Muslims to look to non-Muslims as allies in the search for mutual understanding and common purpose, the latter encouraged a re-orientation of Muslims' psychological investments toward a very different set of allies—a global Muslim community that could provide a basis for social and political empowerment and resistance. In other words, Britain's Muslims were encouraged to re-categorize themselves such that rather than adopting self-definitions that divided them one from another (e.g., as British, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) they identified in terms of an alternative political category (the *ummah*) that could provide a basis for the political power that comes from large-scale solidarity (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006).

4.4. Observations

Reviewing these various examples prompts three observations concerning the language of intergroup relations. The first concerns the centrality of category construction. Whether

it is the mobilization of hate or the mobilization of solidarity, whether it is majority group members' rhetoric or that of minorities, social category construction is key. Everything, be it the range of a category's inclusiveness, its norms, values, and interests, or the history of its relationship with other categories, is contested to promote divergent representations of the social relationships that obtain and the political projects that are appropriate. The second is a point well-made by Wood and Finlay: many of the topics that psychology typically conceptualizes as perceptual phenomena (e.g., group homogeneity, cultural essentialism, intergroup difference, threat) feature in rhetoric "as part of real-world processes of social influence" (Wood & Finlay, 2008, p. 722) providing people with the resources to argue a particular case (both to themselves and others). The third is that in approaching such arguments, our focus must be upon their strategic dimension and the political projects that they advance. This is very different from asking whether they are accurate or not. Indeed, a preoccupation with accuracy (even if that could be judged) is in many ways to miss the point. These constructions can have a self-fulfilling quality: to the degree that such constructions capture people's imagination and shape action, there is a sense in which these category definitions can be talked into being and become a reality (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000).

5. Argumentative Resources: Political Myths

The culturally available resources with which to fashion a strategically organized argument in support of a particular political project are many and varied. The most obvious include references to a community's history, its myths, and narrative traditions. These include national myths (e.g., 'American Exceptionalism," Esch, 2010; "The American Dream," Wolak & Peterson, 2020; England's Magna Carta, Atkins, 2016; Polish messianic martyrology, Zubrzycki, 2011) and religious narratives and texts (e.g., Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004b, 2006, 2009; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002) and so on. All can be invoked to lend legitimacy to a speaker's project as exemplifying a social category's timeless essence and values.

   Such narratives are not of interest for their truth value but for the work they do as "mapping devices through which we look at the world" (Bottici & Challand, 2006, p. 321). Through the processes of anchoring and objectification, they give meaning to new and otherwise puzzling phenomena and allow more abstract processes to be conceptualized in concrete terms. Moreover, through their invocation, contemporary social actors are invited to see themselves in unfolding dramas. For example, the study of US presidents' war rhetoric show they are permeated with narratives that map out good and evil and legitimate American military action as action in the pursuit of "freedom" (Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Loseke, 2009). Indeed, Coles (2002) describes how the US national myth of "Manifest Destiny" (which featured so prominently in various US presidents' war rhetoric) functioned to call upon the US citizenry to recover and rejuvenate its national essence through their support for the virtuous action of challenging "evil."

   It is important to recognize that the meaning of such resources is always dependent on the context of their invocation. Take the terms *mustad'afun* and *mustakbarun* in Khomeini's speeches. As these are Qur'anic terms, many may be tempted to assume they have a fixed

political meaning—a temptation apparent in Lewis's classic text *The Political Language of Islam* (1988), which, as critics note, tends to assume that "the religious origins of words determine political thinking to a special degree" (Halliday, 1993, p. 152). However, the meaning ascribed to such terms is actually contingent on the argumentative context in which they are read. For example, the meanings attributed to *mustad'afun* and *mustakbarun* in Khomeini's anti-Shah rhetoric were colored by the earlier publication of Fanon's (1961, translated 1965) *Wretched of the Earth* (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1990). This classic anti-colonial manifesto addressed the violence (physical and psychological) of imperialism, the need for the colonized to liberate themselves from Western-imposed categories and modes of thought, and the revolutionary potential of the poorest and most apparently "backward" sections of society.

This contingency is not only apparent in the changing meaning of concepts over time. It is also apparent in the way that the same resources are interpreted by different political actors in any given context. Take the Qu'ranic verse that refers to the Muslim community as the *ummatan wasatan* (variously translated as "Thus We have appointed you a middle nation" or "Thus have We made of you an *Ummah* justly balanced": see Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009). Many, many Muslims regard organizations such as Al Qaeda to be extremist. However, others might argue that Al Qaeda deserve a hearing, and Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2009) explored how this same Qur'anic verse could be interpreted differently to either define Al Qaeda as beyond the pale of acceptable opinion or as *bone fide* members of a community of debate. For one activist arguing the former position, the definition of the Muslim community as the *ummatan wasatan* implied a norm of Muslim moderation and thus a rejection of Al Qaeda as extremist. However, another countered that the verse did not refer to any one position, but rather to "an approach to finding the correct path (or the best of possible correct paths) through the myriad of different understandings put forward, a path somewhere between the many possible extremes" (cited in Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009, p. 110). In turn they argued that as Al Qaeda marked one pole of such extremity with others lying at another, inclusive debate with all was appropriate and in accordance with a proper understanding of Islamic tradition. Only through such inclusive debate could a middle and balanced path be found.

Such variation is by no means exceptional: given the political potential of such cultural products, it should come as no surprise to find the same materials being invoked in order to prosecute quite different political projects and there is a sense in which these cultural resources' meanings are always transformed through the process of their invocation. Indeed, for Tudor (1972), the meaning of any myth or narrative is inevitably shaped by the speaker's project such that "an individual stamp will be left upon it no matter how orthodox the narrator tries to be" (Tudor, 1972, p. 48).

To those tempted to assume that there is value in distilling down a singular meaning from the many versions on display, Tudor (1972) warns this would result in a product so bland and empty as to be meaningless. Take the popular Scottish saying "we're a' Jock Tamson's bairns" (i.e., "we are all the children of Jock Tamson"). In the abstract, this saying conveys the idea that Scots recognize that beneath the surface of socially created difference, people share a basic humanity. However, its political implications are ambiguous: only when deployed to advance a practical politics does the saying gain rhetorical significance. Couched in terms of a call for a politics of re-distribution, it can come to imply an anomaly between primordial equality and humanly constructed inequality such that Scots must

support programs of redistribution. Yet, it can also be deployed to argue the opposite, and feature in an argumentative defense of an inequitable status quo, for "if man is primordially equal, social structural inequalities do not matter, so nothing needs to be done" (McCrone, 1992, p. 90). In a similar vein, the myth of the "freeborn Englishman" only takes on meaning in the context of argument such that it can be used to galvanize support for all manner of political causes—both progressive and regressive: As Schwarz (1982, p. 88) observes: "The 'freeborn Englishman defending his home' is abstract until we know who he is defending it from—Nazi invasion and fascism, or Asians who have moved next door."

The wider significance of these observations is to underscore the point that the meanings of such resources (and hence the meanings of the identities with which they are associated) are sites of political dispute. They are the vehicle through which social and political action is organized, and political debate routinely takes the form of identity-related dispute. Accordingly, while culture is routinely spoken of as a given, in reality "there is an infinite regress or a reflexivity built into human communication: the uttering of every statement about "who we are" changes if only slightly, our relationship to who we are" such that "to talk about identity is to change or construct it despite the dominant epistemology of identity, which specifies immutability" (Handler, 1994, p. 30). The fundamental social and political significance of language is similarly emphasized in Martin's (1995) observation that "the production and utterance of an identity narrative transforms the very group it means to preserve and defend" (Martin, 1995, p. 9). All this implies that just as any analysis of political language can be enhanced by attention to the construction of social categories, so too our understanding of social identity processes (a key topic in political psychology) can be enhanced through attention to the role of language in their construction and contestation.

Needless to say, to demonstrate that identities are sites of dispute is not to say that each and every construction stands an equal chance of wider acceptance: much will depend on its capacity to give form to experience in a way that resonates with people's lived experience. Yet, if success is not guaranteed, it is also clear that a political psychology of categorization and identity that ignores issues of construction and communication must overlook key elements in the process by which opinion is recruited and political action mobilized.

6. Argumentative Resources: Representations, Repertoires, and Metaphor

Just as (versions of) culture, history, and political myth advance strategically significant understandings of the challenges facing an audience, so too do metaphors. They are routinely deployed to invoke concrete, vivid, and familiar referents with which to make sense of otherwise abstract and unfamiliar domains (Ortony, 1975). Indeed, it is because of these properties that both the "social representations" (Moscovici, 1981, 1984) and the "interpretative repertoires" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) approaches to conceptualizing the wider culturally available resources for communication emphasize the significance of metaphors. Accordingly, to invoke a particular representation or repertoire is to invoke certain metaphors rather than others.

Analyses of political communication show metaphors are prominent in such diverse domains as talk about the economy (Arresse & Vara-Miguel, 2016; Morris, Sheldon, Ames & Young, 2007; Rae & Drury, 1993), social issues such as drug use (Hawdon, 2001; Mackey-Kallis, & Hahn, 1994), and social conflicts and war (Ferrari, 2007; Lakoff, 1992). Through accomplishing particular understandings of such topics, they advance specific projects. For example, the Nazi-propagated organism-based metaphor of the Jew as "a noxious bacillus" worked to define the Jew as an alien other contaminating order and virtue. In turn, such discursive social action legitimated a policy of segregation from "the body politic" (O'Brien, 2009): initially the ghetto, eventually the gas chamber. Yet, if metaphors foreground certain ideas, they obscure others. Indeed, herein lies the potency of metaphor in political language: metaphors "limit what we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with" (Lakoff, 1992, p. 481). Accordingly, their consequences can be enormous. An unintended consequence may be a disregard of alternative policy options. For example, conceptualizing the issue of drug use in terms of a war metaphor transformed what could be conceptualized as a social-medical domain into one featuring an "enemy" (drug suppliers) who should be "fought" (Hartman, 2012), which resulted in something of a moral panic (Hawdon, 2001) and a narrowed range of policy options (Mackey-Kallis & Hahn, 1994). However, often the omission is more strategically motivated, legitimating what could otherwise by resisted. Thus, in war-related rhetoric, a medical metaphor to describe attacks on military targets (as in "surgical strike") can imply there is a malignancy that can be removed with such precision that the potential for large-scale civilian casualties is overlooked and military intervention judged acceptable (Herrera, 2003; Lakoff, 1992).

From a Discourse Analytic perspective (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), the analytic task is to identify the function of a piece of text and the resources ("interpretative repertoires") that allow that function to be accomplished. For example, in an analysis of the various ways in which members of the Päkehä community (White European New Zealanders) spoke about contemporary Maori political protest in a manner that delegitimated it, Potter and Wetherell (1987) identified two interpretative repertoires based on rather different metaphors. The one referred to culture as something to be preserved. The other depicted culture as a psychological resource that kept people "rooted." Neither way of talking about culture necessarily accomplishes a particular version of the world. However, both featured in arguments that questioned the basis for Maori protest. The first (with its emphasis on culture as a form of heritage) featured in arguments that implied contemporary Maori protest was "out of tune" with "real" Maori tradition. The second featured in arguments to the effect that the social problems experienced by the Maori community arose not because of structural disadvantage but because Maoris were not "fully rooted" in their culture. Needless to say, if both metaphor-based repertoires could be invoked to delegitimate Maori protest, much depended on the speakers' abilities to weave such argumentative resources into coherent narratives that appeared factual rather than motivated by a racist denial of racism. To the degree that a speaker is successful in this regard, there is a sense in which the racism evidenced in such talk can be regarded as a discursive accomplishment in which the use of metaphor is key.

If the logic and practice of the Discourse Analytic tradition is to inspect naturally occurring speech and identify the resources employed in the crafting of political argument, another is to investigate the cognitive implications of adopting a particular metaphor. Here,

experimental research shows that the choice of metaphor can shape participants' selection and integration of information from the wider message in which they are embedded (Spory & Dillard, 2006; Hartman, 2012). In the United States, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found talking about crime as a "virus" or as a "beast" resulted in people reasoning about crime in a manner consistent with the metaphors' logic: whereas the "virus" metaphor resulted in participants proposing social interventions that could treat crime's root causes (e.g., poverty), the "beast" metaphor resulted in proposals favoring harsher enforcement. Moreover, when seeking new information, participants focused on material aligned with the metaphors' entailments. Of note is the observation that the metaphorical framing in this study had greater effects than participants' party affiliation (Democrat vs Republican). In a similar vein, talking of immigration into the United States in terms of water flows (e.g., "flooding," "pouring," building "a levee against the incoming floodwaters") resulted in more support for a border wall than talking of immigration without such figurative language (Jimenez, Arndt, & Landau, 2021). Research also shows the reception of such metaphoric framings can be affected by the recipients' motivational states. Landau, Sullivan, and Greenberg (2009) found participants primed with concerns about protecting their own body from bacterial contamination were particularly responsive to immigration metaphors that subtly invoked the human body, and that this was despite the fact that the primed motivations (protecting the body from bacteria) and the political topic (immigration control) were unrelated in a literal sense.

Yet, fancy words do not guarantee success: citizens do not necessarily integrate speakers' metaphors into their thinking. Rather, the representation associated with a metaphor must have a practical adequacy in making sense of the audience's context and experience. Sometimes a metaphor lacks a cultural or physical correspondence with the policy being proposed or fails to align with the audience's values (Heo, 2020). On other occasions, the audience may routinely employ alternative metaphors that are experienced as having greater practical utility in making sense of their experiences (Bougher, 2012). However, when located in a coherent narrative, metaphors can crystalize sentiment and action. For example, metaphorical references to the Tutsi as *inyenzi* (cockroaches) in Hutu anti-Tutsi radio propaganda worked to mobilize the sense of threat and distrust that so motivated the Rwandan genocide:

> A Tutsi is somebody who seduces by his word but whose wickedness is incommensurable. A Tutsi is somebody for whom the desire of revenge never dies out, somebody whom you can never know what they think, who laughs when he suffers atrociously. In our language, a Tutsi is called a cockroach because it takes the advantage of the night, who makes use of concealment to achieve his goals.
>
> (Hutu radio broadcast, cited in Rothbart & Bartlett, 2008, p. 241)

If a key task of political psychology is to explore social actors' use of metaphor to strategically shape our reasoning and motivate action, another is to alert those charged with a degree of neutrality (e.g., those in the news media) as to how metaphors work and to their need to reflect on the figurative language they use and how this may have unintended implications. For example, reviewing the metaphors used by the news media in the prelude to the 2003 Gulf War, Lule (2004) argues that news media outlets' critical "attention to the language of news can help inform reporting of war and guard against metaphors that kill" (Lule, 2004, p. 189). Lule does not criticize the news media's use of metaphor per se, but

rather the use of *particular* metaphors—especially those that inadvertently contributed to conflict escalation and war. For example, when, in the build-up to war with Iraq, newsrooms talked of the "White House losing patience," there is a sense in which such talk cast the Bush Administration "in an authoritative, almost parental role" (Lule, 2004, p. 186), with the corollary that progress to war was in some sense normalized. Citing Sontag's observation that "metaphors cannot be distanced just by abstaining from them" but "have to be exposed, criticized, belabored, used up" (1990, p. 182), he urges the news media to more critically reflect upon (and dissect) their own use of metaphors that all too easily function to normalize and naturalize the political projects of the political leadership they report on.

7. Argumentative Genres

If political communication can be conceptualized as entailing an argument that involves the reworking of culturally familiar resources, research shows that such arguments can adopt rather different styles or genres. Research in this area has focused on two particular styles. The one features emotion, the other humor.

7.1.   Emotion

Historically, psychology has been wary of the emotional dimension to political language (for an overview see Brader & Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). Adopting the familiar contrast between emotion and reason, researchers feared "citizens might be swept away by skillful propagandists" and that "emotional appeals might override rational ones" (Kinder, 1994, p. 309). However, the role of emotion in political language can be considered from a number of perspectives. Here I contrast an approach based on a Discourse Analytic perspective (Edwards, 1999) from other, more familiar perspectives.

Starting with the latter, some research suggests emotional appeals can be deployed in order to win support. For example, de Castella, McGarty, and Musgrove (2009) explored how an Australian prime minister used fear-inducing content after the Twin Towers attacks in New York as a response to declining public support (see too de Castella & McGarty, 2011). In a similar vein, Matsumoto, Hwang, and Frank (2013, 2014) report that political leaders' expressions of anger, contempt, and disgust increased in speeches running up to acts of violence and, on the basis of this correlational evidence, suggest the expression of emotion could be instrumental in building support for violent action. Other research considers how political language may create particular audience emotions. For example, in an exploration of the emotions of those exposed to populist and non-populist communications, Wirz (2018) found the former elicited stronger emotional reactions than the latter and that these reactions mediated the persuasiveness of the populist material. Still others question the emotion—reason counterpoint (Martin, 2013) and consider how emotion-evoking materials may augment (rather than subvert) reasoning (Erisen, Lodge, & Taber, 2014; Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000). The shift toward a rehabilitation of emotion in rhetoric is also apparent in an interest in how the invocation of emotion in political language can function to communicate "feeling rules" (Lee & Ungar, 1989) that guide

people's understandings of how they ought to feel. Such "feeling rules" can be important in constituting the issue at hand as a moral issue (rather than simply a matter of preference) such that certain options can be talked out of being an issue of "taste" and into a context of "censure." Research has also begun to consider how moral appeals (which elicit strong emotional reactions) may be particularly consequential (Lipsitz, 2018).

A very different approach to emotion is associated with research that centers on the content of political language. Rather than exploring how emotion impacts reason, work conducted in the tradition of Discourse Analysis considers how emotion-related talk can work to establish particular versions of people and events (Edwards, 1999). This approach starts from the observation that "the discourse of mind and emotion is first of all a participants' discourse, and it is rich and various, full of contrasts and alternatives, and marvelously useful in working up descriptions of human actions, interpersonal relations, and in handling accountability" (Edwards, 1999, p. 273). For example, Locke and Edwards (2003) explored how emotion discourse featured in President Clinton's responses when he was under grand jury cross-examination over his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. They show how Clinton invoked references to emotion to characterize Lewinsky as emotionally vulnerable and irrational (and himself as caring and rational), with all manner of implications for his moral accountability and political standing. In other contexts, the identities of those spoken about may be more categorical. For example, a study of the campaign rhetoric of groups opposed to bullfighting in Spain found it characterized those in favor of this tradition as emotionally challenged. They were variously represented as: emotionally deficient, such that they were unable to appreciate suffering, governed by deep-seated emotional frustrations that resulted in a desire to hurt, or governed by emotions that they could not keep under control (Valor, Lioveras, & Papaoikonomou, 2021). These diverse formulations worked to delegitimate their opponents' support for bullfighting: Such support was represented as saying more about their opponents' emotional ill-health than the merits of the tradition.

Other research considers how the characterization of social actors' emotions can work to ground representations of social and material reality as veridical. As Edwards explains, emotions can be "conceived to be natural bodily experiences and expressions, older than language, irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate, genuine rather than artificial, feelings rather than thoughts" (Edwards, 1999, p. 273). One implication of such complexity is that just as attributing emotion to social actors can work to imply their ability to reason is compromised, so too people's emotional reaction can be construed as implying an unmediated and embodied testament to the nature of reality. That is, people's emotional reactions can be construed as *revealing* the nature of reality.

Applying this perspective to abortion-related communications, Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt (2005) explored how readers of anti-abortion campaign imagery were invited to view ultrasound imagery from the emotional vantage point of those who were happily pregnant and excitedly anticipating parenthood. In such texts, the joyous emotion of the happily pregnant women was construed as speaking volumes about the reality of the "unborn child." Moreover, such texts went on to create a sharp contrast between the reality testified to by ordinary people's strong positive emotional reactions and the language employed by their opponents. Most obviously, the latter's use of the terms "embryo" and "fetus" was construed as entirely discrepant with the reality evinced by the happily pregnant woman's emotional reactions to her "baby." That is reference to the ultrasound viewer's emotion worked to

naturalize the categorization "unborn baby" and problematize as sophistry the terminology routinely employed by the opposition.

In a similar vein, Ntontis and Hopkins (2018) explored how anti-abortion activists attributed emotions to two categories of social actors: women experiencing an abortion and pro-abortion campaigners. Analysis showed these social actors' emotions could be represented as both providing unmediated authentic access to the truth and as impeding access to that reality. More specifically, when anti-abortion activists attributed negative emotions to women having abortions, they implied such pain provided direct (embodied) evidence of the reality that abortion involves the killing of an "unborn child." However, when discussing their opposition's emotions, the connotations of emotion differed in that now emotion was depicted as blocking their opponents' ability to rationally appraise reality. Again, the point is that culturally familiar yet diverse ways of talking about emotion are available with which speakers can (selectively) establish or subvert particular versions of reality (Edwards, 1999; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

7.2.   Humor

Politics is a serious business, yet humor, so often assumed to be a frivolous distraction, can do serious political work. Addressing such political work, research has traditionally tended to focus on the potential for humor to reproduce hierarchical arrangements and social exclusion. Humor provides an easy vehicle with which to communicate and reproduce ethnic and sexist stereotypes (Hobden & Olson, 1994; Woodzicka & Ford, 2010). In part this is because judgement couched in the form of a "joke" allows individuals to manage the interactional complexities of expressing prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) and make disparagement acceptable (Ford, 2000; Hodson & MacInnis, 2016; Hodson, Rush, & MacInnes, 2010). Such humor is no laughing matter: research shows sexist humor impacts women's treatment (Ford, 2000; Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, & Kochersberger, 2013; Woodzicka & Ford, 2010) because it legitimates the release of existing prejudice (Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008; Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, Kochersberger, & Holden, 2014; Ford, Richardson, & Petit, 2015).

However, humor can also have a subversive quality. Labor union activists use humor to subvert their employer's authority in wage negotiations (Teng-Calleja, Montiel, & Baquiano, 2015). Here, the meta-communicative signaling that explains that what is being said is "humorous" (Tannen, 1993) allows difficult issues to be raised while avoiding the risks (e.g., retribution) of direct confrontation. Indeed, Teng-Calleja et al. propose that as humor can be "a discursive means of expressing opposition, protest, defiance, dissatisfaction, and recalcitrant and outrageous ideas in a non-threatening way," it can be conceptualized as "the less dominant's version of doing power in conversations" (Teng-Calleja et al., 2015, p. 16).

More generally, sarcasm, irony, and parody can allow dominant representations to be subverted (Dobai & Hopkins, 2020). As humor often entails a shifting between different framings (the conventional framing and an alternative), it can create a subversive sense of contingency in which the familiar begins to seem strange and new imaginings are made possible. Little wonder Orwell (1945) once observed, "every joke is a tiny revolution." Moreover, minorities subject to racist or sexist humor may re-appropriate such "jokes" to mock the

absurdity of racist or sexist beliefs and practices (Boskin & Dorinson, 1985; Saucier, O'Dea, & Strain, 2016), and protestors may humorously re-appropriate the derogatory labels applied to them, transforming them into identity-affirming labels. For example, Gezi Park protestors in Istanbul (for an account, see Morva, 2016) embraced Erdoğan's derogatory characterization of them as *çapulcu* (variously translated as "riffraff" or "looters"). This was particularly apparent in the playful graffiti that quickly became a feature of the protests (e.g., "Everyday I'm *Chapulling*"), which turned a derogatory slur into a celebratory statement of resistance. Other examples of playful graffiti included "Welcome to Fight Club" (a reference to the well-known film: cited in Morva 2016) and "Winter is coming" (a reference to a motto in the TV series "Game of Thrones," which conveys an intimidating message to their enemies: cited in Kaptan, 2016). In other examples, humorous references to famous Turkish poetry helped locate the protest in the history and culture of Istanbul and Turkey (Morva 2016), while other references (e.g., "Revolution Party, Pilavlı!" or "Revolution Party, Rice will be served!," cited in Kaptan, 2016) linked the Turkish protest with a global movement (e.g., Occupy, the Arab Spring). All such examples of humor worked to locate the movement within a culturally recognizable framework of understanding in which resistance was celebrated and authority mocked.

Such humor is unlikely to convince the powerful of the error of their ways. It might even fail to persuade the wider community to get involved. However, interviews with Gezi Park protestors (Ulug & Acar, 2019) confirm this symbolic reappropriation of the *çapulcu* label was adopted as self-defining by crowd members and used to create the solidarity required for protest to be maintained (see too, Odag, Ulug, & Solak, 2016). That is, the humorous subversion of dominant representations can be significant in helping consolidate a community of protest.

7.3.   Observations

This discussion of these different genres or styles of argument illustrates something of the variety of perspectives on the role of emotion in political language. Whereas some continue to counterpose reason and emotion and regard the latter as essentially manipulative, others have begun to consider how emotion can be spoken of in different ways—sometimes to imply a position rests upon the distortion of reason, but sometimes to imply a position that is rooted in (and testifies to) the nature of reality. With regard to humor, there is also evidence of its ability to be deployed so as to reaffirm and consolidate established assumptions or to subvert them. The wider implications of such observations for political psychology are twofold. First, political language comes in many guises (e.g., witty graffiti). Second, to the degree that particular ways of talking can establish or subvert particular representations of reality, political work is accomplished.

8. Engaging with the Opposition

In this final section, I consider the wider implications of conceptualizing political communication as argumentative. Specifically, I review research addressing the ways in which the

protagonists in any dispute must counter the constructions of their opponents and counter their opponents' attacks on their own case.

8.1. Countering One's Opponents

Research identifies many ways to counter one's opponent's appeals. One entails a refusal to accept the social category they propose as relevant to the conceptualization of one's interests. This is nicely captured in the advice offered by a Trade Union organizer whenever faced with an appeal to patriotism: "Son, when they raise your flag, raise your eyebrow" (cited in Kitching, 1985, p. 116). Another entails acceptance of the category invoked by the opposition but a challenge to the opponent's commitment to it. For example, one Scottish politician questioned his opponent's commitment to Scotland's interests through referring to the "Union Jack" (as the United Kingdom flag is often labelled) and his opponent's underpants: "He's Scottish on the outside, British on the inside. Tartan ties, Union Jack underpants" (cited in Reicher & Hopkins, 2000, p. 172). Related strategies involve denunciation in which one's opposition is defined as a traitor—rejecting their ingroup membership and identity, being subservient to an out-group, acting out of self- rather than group-interest, and so on (Finlay, 2014). Such denunciation is especially common in scenarios where some group members wish to sharpen intergroup tensions through marginalizing more moderate in-group voices (Finlay, 2007).

More elaborate strategies involve defining the other's position as not simply one among several before the community (and therefore a legitimate choice), but as fundamentally identity incongruent. Adopting this strategy, those opposed to the ordination of women in the Church of England defined the tradition of a male-only clergy as at the heart of the church, with the corollary that the proposal's proponents were in effect a deviant sect outside the "real" church (Sani & Reicher, 2010). A related move is illustrated in Finlay's (2005) exploration of how the concept of "Jewish self-hate" is invoked to marginalize fellow Jews' anti-Zionist voices. Not only is their Jewishness (and hence their authority to speak) problematized, but the concept implies the target's position says more about their psychological problems than reality (thereby further marginalizing their position). Moreover, the charge of self-hate recovers that which the other decries (e.g., the logic and practice of Zionism) as an essential feature of Jewish identity (Finlay, 2005).

8.2. Countering One's Opponent's Counter Arguments

Research addressing speakers' responses to attacks on their position highlights the ways in which speakers seek to shore up their version of events as widely shared by others. For example, Rapley (1998) describes how a newly elected Australian politician countered the charge that her views were those of an extreme racist minority through contrasting herself from Australia's political elite and presenting herself as exemplifying ordinary Australian commonsense (Rapley, 1998). That is, she celebrated her position as authentically rooted in mass culture. In a similar vein, when US President Nixon faced mass opposition to his hawkish military policy in Vietnam, he famously evoked an alternative reference group— the "silent majority." As the attitudes of those *not* protesting were undoubtedly diverse, the invocation of a "majority" that cannot be observed or measured because it is silent is

rhetorically potent in creating the impression of a supportive policy consensus. Moreover, for those looking for "a reason to support the president and the war, the 'silent majority' served its purpose, even if it did not exist" (Edelman, 1975, p. 136).

Similar issues arise in relation to the use of labels in the process of argument. Single word labels such as "racist," "fascist," or "extremist," work as a discursive shorthand (van den Broek, 2015) to depict another's position as beyond the pale of reasonable opinion. Unsurprisingly, those receiving such designations are rarely passive in the face of such condemnation and routinely return them upon their detractors. White nationalist activists rebut their opponents' accusations of racism with the counter claim that it is the opposition who are the real racists (e.g., through seeking to destroy a people through the imposition of multiculturalist thinking and practice: Wood & Finlay, 2008). In a similar vein, left-wing nationalist activists in the Basque Country contested the charge that their street violence warranted the label "fascist" through countering: "Fascism is the refusal [of the Spanish state] to fully respect the Statute of Autonomy. That is fascism. Our actions are defensive and may be violent all right, but we are not fascists" (cited in van den Broek, 2015, p. 127). Again, it needs emphasizing that such rhetoric is not guaranteed to be successful. Much will likely depend on the audience. Turning around a charge against one's position is unlikely to persuade one's opposition. It may not even persuade more neutral onlookers. However, such rhetoric can be significant in reassuring those whose position is being censured that their cause is indeed justified. That is, batting back a censure can be important in maintaining and solidifying commitment (a key task for any political project).

In other contexts, rather than resisting the opposition's labelling, it may be accepted, yet reworked to one's advantage. Perhaps the most famous illustration is Dr. Martin Luther King's response to the charge that he was an "extremist" (which carried enormous implications for the moral and political legitimacy of his program of Civil Rights activism). Writing from jail on scraps of paper in his seminal *Letter from Birmingham Jail* (April 1963, reprinted in King, 2000), King admitted he was initially hurt by the accusation that he was an extremist, but gradually gained "a measure of satisfaction from the label" (King, 2000, p. 76). At the heart of this response was King's argument that Jesus was as an extremist for love, Amos an extremist for justice, and Lincoln and Jefferson extremists for liberty and equality. As a corollary, a term of abuse was re-appropriated and an alternative representation of the social field established: As King put it,

> the question is not whether we will be extremist but what kind of extremist will we be. Will we be extremists for hate or will we be extremists for love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice—or will we be extremists for the cause of justice? (King, 2000, pp. 76–77)

This did not simply take the sting out of the opposition's attack. Rather, it asserted King's moral position and made it clear there could be no place for moderation. Indeed, all were called to King's program of activism (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009).

8.3. Appropriating the Opposition's Vocabulary

One other notable counter to an opposition's attack is to wrest control of their vocabulary and use it against them in such a manner that elements of their case can be marshalled in favor of one's own position. Hints of this strategy may be found in the response of those in the United States who defend the death penalty. Charged with being driven by a lack

of compassion, some have responded through framing the death penalty as a means for victims' families to get "closure," with the corollary that if one is concerned with well-being and the promotion of healing one should support the death penalty (Berns, 2009).

Another example can be found in the response of anti-abortion activists to the charge that their focus on the rights of the fetus pits them against women. Central to their response was their development of the concept of "Post-Abortion Syndrome" (PAS: see Speckhard & Rue, 1992), which (drawing on the psychological discourse associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) crystallized the idea that abortion results in trauma but that the symptoms are delayed. Although epidemiological research reveals little evidence for such a syndrome (Biggs, Upadhyay, McCulloch, & Foster, 2016), the concept of Post-Abortion Syndrome has considerable rhetorical power. Such a quasi-medical rhetoric implies that when women report no post-abortion ill-health, they are mistaken: their trauma is real, and their denial only serves to confirm its magnitude. As a corollary, this discourse has the effect of privileging the activists' characterization of abortion as a significant public health risk over the experiences of women reporting no ill effects (Hopkins, Reicher, & Saleem, 1996). Moreover, this rhetoric allows anti-abortion activists to reverse the charge that they neither understand nor care about women's experience to claim that they, and only they, properly represent women's interests (Hopkins, Reicher, & Saleem, 1996; Saurette & Gordon, 2013). Such a vocabulary of concern allows anti-abortion activists to redefine themselves as fundamentally "pro-woman" (Cannold, 2002; Rose, 2011) and the real feminists (Ntontis & Hopkins, 2018).

The wider significance of such observations is that it is in and through the dynamic of argument and counter argument that rhetorical innovation develops (Billig, 1987). In turn, such innovation contributes to the stock of culturally available argumentative resources that are available for others to deploy and reproduce, and it is striking how this "woman-centered" anti-abortion rhetoric now features prominently in all manner of domains (Kelly, 2014; Lee, 2003; Saurette & Gordon, 2013) including legal contexts (Leinwand, 2009; Ziegler, 2013).

9. DISCUSSION

In many ways, a chapter such as this must inevitably do something of a disservice to the richness and power of political language. Of necessity, it resembles an anatomist's dissection table where the various elements that together make an organic whole are stripped out, isolated, and labelled. While such a process of dissection helps identify the many features of language that political psychology must address (e.g., the construction of social categories, the role of metaphor, the dynamics to argumentative innovation), there is a danger that in the process, we lose sight of the ways in which they can combine and function to capture minds.

However, a little imagination allows us to breathe life into such talk and text, and to appreciate how such elements may cohere into arguments designed to garner audience engagement and investment. At the heart of such rhetoric, we could expect to find arguments that imply the speaker and their audience are positioned alongside each other, and the norms, values, and interests of this shared categorization characterized in terms that allow

the speaker's project to be taken on by the audience as their own (and that of their opponents as entirely distanced from such values, norms, and interests). The resources available for such rhetorical work are many and varied. Some are more obviously political in nature (e.g., national myths), others less so. However, if such outcomes are to be realized, the speaker's craft is key: as analysts of discourse emphasize, all speakers face the challenge of presenting their argument as but a neutral description of reality rather than as a motivated construction in which they have a stake.

Determining the impact of such a rhetorical package is difficult. At present we have experimental evidence concerning the impact of some of the various constituent elements of the larger whole (e.g., category constructions, metaphors, jokes). Investigating the reception of a package featuring the many rhetorical and discursive elements considered in this chapter remains a challenge and necessitates a widening in political psychology's research methods. Whereas much research tends to dissect the talk and text of just one party to a debate (e.g., a leader mobilizing support for war), research could more fully explore the dynamics to how a particular debate develops over time as each party responds to the arguments of the other. The longitudinal development of specific debates can reveal something about the challenges each party experiences in getting their message across when faced with opposition, and how new vocabularies and alternative framings develop so as to bring relative advantage. For example, one of the lessons of studying the development of the abortion debate is the way in which an anti-abortion rhetoric focused on the rights of the "unborn child" constituted something of a rhetorical Achillies' heel (in the sense that it left anti-abortion activists open to the charge that they ignored women's experiences), which prompted the significant shift in language associated with the development of a "woman-centered" rhetoric (Hopkins et al., 1996; Saurette & Gordon, 2013). Such research could be complemented with ethnographic investigation of how the protagonists in such debates conceptualize the rhetorical challenges before them and how they could and should refashion their text and talk accordingly (for an example relating to developments in anti-abortion rhetoric, see Trumpy, 2014).

More generally, future research would benefit from considering the ways in which the potential power of the representations elaborated in text and talk are shaped by the degree to which they have some practical adequacy in making sense of the context as experienced by various audiences. For a representation of the social field so carefully crafted in text or talk to garner support, it must, in some sense, "work" to explain events and processes. This requires students of political language to look beyond language per se to the wider context. One opportunity for such research would be an ethnographically informed study of the recruitment and socialization of social movement activists. This could allow investigation of how recruits are exposed to a new vocabulary with which to name and communicate their experiences, the ease or difficulty they experience in using such a framework to conceptualize the scenario before them, and so on (for an example of such a style of research, see Husain & Kelly, 2016).

Political language has something of a negative reputation. In a blistering essay published in 1946, Orwell described how in his time, "political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind." Orwell's warnings retain considerable force (as do his tips on how to improve the quality of political language). Certainly, our analytic approach to language must always be guided by a sensitivity to their strategic purpose and to the ways in which such

social constructions are made to appear "solid" rather than "pure wind." Yet, political language is not the preserve of a particular politics. All politics are dependent upon, and are prosecuted through, the crafting of representations that configure the social world in particular (and strategically advantageous) ways. Whether reactionary or emancipatory, whether obviously "political" or not, the language we use is integral to the organization of our social relations and so must lie at the heart of the discipline we know as political psychology.

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PART II

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING
The Psychological Dimension

JACK S. LEVY

THE last two decades have witnessed a noticeable increase in scholarly attention to psychological approaches to the study of foreign policy and international relations. This research is still dominated by security studies, with new work on the psychology of signaling, resolve, and reputation, and with greater interest in the role of emotions. We see new work, however, in other substantive areas, including the psychological dimensions of public opinion on trade policy, human rights, international organization, morality, and other issues. Methodologically, there has been a sharp increase in the use of experimental methods. IR scholars have also explored genetic, biological, and evolutionary approaches, and made some attempts to build on recent work in neuroscience. The growing influence of political psychology in the IR field is reflected in the 2017 special issue of *International Organization* devoted to "The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).[1]

This chapter combines a brief introduction to the study of political psychology in international relations with a more focused survey of research on foreign policy decision-making.[2] After examining the place of political psychology in the IR field and its evolution over time, we turn to the study of decision-makers' belief systems and information processing. We then look at models of decision-making, including prospect theory, time horizons and intertemporal choice, groupthink and related models, and crisis decision-making. I leave IR research on threat perception, signaling and resolve, public opinion, terrorism, and emotions to Stein, Casler and Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Snider et al. in the next four chapters and to Cohen-Chen and Halperin in Chapter 30.[3]

1. THE PLACE OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELD

The growing scholarly interest in the psychology of foreign policy and international relations is a welcome development, given the more modest attention given to this topic for

many years. One recent study suggests that less than thirteen percent of scholarly journal articles in IR from 1980 to 2015 focused on Waltz's (1959) "first-image," or individual-level variables, as opposed to nation-state or international system-level variables (TRIP, 2019).[4] In the second edition of the *Handbook* I describe political psychology as occupying an "uncertain space" in the IR field. Stein (2017, S249) notes the "minority" position of psychological explanations in the IR field and the "obstacles to diffusion" of this work. Few basic graduate IR theory field seminars devote even a full week to psychological approaches. Hudson and Day (2020, 7) conclude that "virtually none of our mainstream IR theories over the decades of the Cold War placed human beings in the theoretical mix."

How do we explain the growth of psychologically oriented IR scholarship? Real-world events undoubtedly contributed (Kertzer & Tingly, 2018, 3). Some argue that the Trump presidency has led to a "First Image Renaissance" in IR theory, the study of which had "languished for three decades" (Parajon, Jordan, & Holmes, 2019). Perhaps, but this was certainly not the first time that individual leaders, their belief systems, and their personalities have had a leading causal impact on state foreign policies. Few would think of explaining World War II or the Holocaust without Hitler, Soviet policy in the 1930s and 1940s without Stalin, Chinese foreign policy without Mao, Iraqi foreign policy without Saddam, or contemporary Russian foreign policy without Putin. This pattern is not confined to autocracies. The literature on American diplomatic history is littered with books entitled "Jefferson's War," Mr. Madison's War," "Mr. Polk's War," "Kennedy's Wars," "Bush's Wars," and "Obama's Wars." Many argue that George W. Bush was a necessary condition for the Iraq War (but see Harvey, 2012). That event, coming soon after calls for a stronger focus on political leaders (Hermann et al, 2001; Byman and Pollack, 2001), did little to significantly increase attention to psychology in IR scholarship.

Perhaps that will change with "Putin's War" in Ukraine, but there is a pattern here. IR scholars often emphasize psychology in explaining discrete historical episodes but not in constructing generalizable theories of international relations. There is a tension between the tasks of constructing parsimonious theoretical explanations, which has been prioritized in the IR field, and of developing nuanced and descriptively accurate explanations of individual historical episodes. Many IR scholars believe that the inclusion of psychological variables is advantageous in the latter but that it complicates the former task. They might accept the argument that Stalin and Putin have disproportionately shaped Soviet and Russian foreign policy, but not the more general theoretical statement that individual leaders are the dominant determinants of state foreign policies, as reflected in the "great man" theory of history (Carlyle, [1840]1888).

The growing interest in psychological models of foreign policy and strategic interaction owes more to the changing nature of the IR field. The field has long been dominated by a sequence of debates between paradigms: between realism and idealism; realism, liberalism, and Marxism; and realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Lake, 2013; Schmidt, 2013). These paradigms (the "isms") are schools of thought or research traditions, each based on a set of shared assumptions and very general propositions. But they generate few testable hypotheses and give little attention to the theory's underlying microfoundations.

These paradigmatic debates have left little space for psychological variables. Classical realism emphasizes psychology in the form of a fixed human nature, but was essentially supplanted by structural realism (Waltz, 1979). Neoclassical realism (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016) allows for the exogenous impact of leaders' psychology on perceptions

of power without exploring the underlying psychological mechanisms. Liberal international theory traces foreign policy primarily to the nature of a regime, its political and economic institutions, the interests of key groups within society, and, to a certain extent, "ideas" (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Only the last is directly conducive to incorporating psychology, but liberal theorists treat ideas as exogenous and focus on their impact without considering their psychological sources.

Constructivism—particularly with its emphasis on identities, socialization, and meanings (Krebs, 2015)—in principle meshes nicely with political psychology (Jervis, [1976]2017, xxvi–xxx), but scholars have been slow to develop these connections. Alexander Wendt's (1999) influential constructivist theory explicitly adopted a state-as-unitary-actor framework that neglected domestic and individual-level influences. That has gradually changed in the last decade, after a call for constructivist attention to emotions (Ross, 2006) and after critiques of constructivism's neglect of psychology (Hymans, 2010; Shannon & Kowert, 2012).

A recognition that psychological models do not by themselves provide complete explanations of international behavior reinforced this pattern. In the first major collection of social psychological scholarship on war and peace, Herbert Kelman (1965, 5–7) argued that too much of this work was "removed from the interaction between nations," and that

> . . . it makes little sense to speak of *a* psychological theory of war or of international relations. There cannot be a psychological theory that is complete and self-contained. . . . There can only be a general theory of international relations in which psychological factors play a part, once the points in the process at which they are applicable have been properly identified. Within such a framework, however, psychological—and, particularly, social-psychological—analyses can potentially make a considerable contribution . . . [5]

The most obvious way for psychological factors to make a contribution would be through their integration into models of foreign policy decision-making. But foreign policy analysis as a subfield was slow to develop (Hudson & Day, 2020, chap. 1), and was itself sidelined from the paradigm debates, at least between realism and liberalism. Prior to the mid-1950s the analysis of foreign policy was more idiographic, country-specific, descriptive, and interpretive than theoretical or comparative, more interested in foreign policy outcomes than the processes through which political leaders made and implemented policy. As Allison (1971) later pointed out, the dominant approach implicitly assumed a rational and unitary state actor model.

The first serious attempt to development a comprehensive framework for the analysis of the foreign policy process was the "decision-making" approach of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962). This work focused on political elites, their conceptions of the national interest and "definition of the situation," the domestic political contexts in which they operated, and the nature of information and communication. Although this framework was in principle open to the incorporation of psychological variables, in practice it included little explicit theorizing about their influence. It generally treated decision-makers' world views as exogenous and made little attempt to explain the social, intellectual, and psychological processes that generated them.

The "second wave" of decision-making studies (Art, 1973), which emerged with Allison's (1971) elaboration of an organizational process model based on standard operating procedures and a governmental (bureaucratic) politics model based on bargaining between the heads of different agencies, devoted even less attention to psychological variables.[6] For

all of these reasons, middle-range psychological models were marginalized from paradigmatic debates between realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Over the last decade, however, the conception of the IR field as a series of debates between grand theories has receded (Lake, 2013), as has the commitment to highly parsimonious theory as the preferred path to understanding a complex world. The result is an increasing interest in middle-range theory and problem-driven research, and a willingness to utilize a more eclectic set of theories and methods to analyze them. Included in this shift is a greater interest in the potential utility of incorporating psychological variables into explanations of foreign policy and international relations.

One notable feature of this new research is that it goes beyond the traditional focus on threat perception and decision-making on security issues to encompass a wider range of topics. There has been an explosion of work on public opinion (Kertzer, Chapter 13, this volume), driven both by theoretical interest in the distinctive foreign policies of democracies and by the decreased cost of online survey experiments. IR scholars have also begun to give more attention to the psychology of international political economy (Elms, 2008), where debates have traditionally focused on system-, state-, and society-centered approaches while neglecting the individual level (Ikenberry, Lake, & Mastanduno, 1988). Examples of recent work include studies of financial decision-making (Stein, 2013) and of public opinion on trade policy, the latter often involving the question of why trade preferences do not align with economic self-interest (Rho & Tomz, 2017). IR scholars have also explored public attitudes toward fairness in international relations (Powers et al., 2022), the psychology of shaming in human rights policies (Snyder, 2020), and other issues.

The field has also witnessed new approaches to the study of political leaders by scholars employing formal and large-N observational studies. One line of this new "leader-centric" research focuses on the political (and personal) survival of leaders, how it is affected by victory and defeat in war, and whether that varies across democratic and non-democratic regimes and the political institutions within them (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Chiozza & Goemans, 2011). This research is almost exclusively rationalist, as leaders are "interchangeable" (Carter & Chiozza, 2018, 9), with institutional differences explaining variations in behavior (McGillivray & Smith, 2008). More psychological is the "personal attribute" approach, with variations in leaders' experiences and attributes explaining variation in state behavior (Hermann, 1980; Horowitz, Stam, & Ellis, 2015; Horowitz & Fuhrmann, 2018). I say more about this in the next section.

This "leader-level" approach has made important contributions to the political psychology of international relations, but some go too far in emphasizing its novelty. In their excellent book on the relationship between leader attributes and international conflict behavior, Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015, 20) write that "the past sixty years of political science scholarship has mostly" been "ignoring states' leaders." This is highly misleading. Psychological studies of international relations by political scientists for most of the last sixty years have focused primarily on political leaders and their beliefs, cognitions, emotions, personalities, and decision-making.[7]

This long line of work on political leaders includes George's research programs on presidential personality, decision-making, management styles, and operational codes (George, 1969, 1974, 1980; George & George, 1956, 1998); Hermann's (1980) analyses of personality traits of leadership; Holsti's (1967) analysis of enemy images; North's (1967), C. Hermann's (1972), Holsti's (1972), and Brecher & Geist's (1980) work on crisis decision-making and the

impact of stress; Steinbrunner's (1974) "cybernetic" and cognitive models of foreign policy decision-making; Jervis's ([1976]2017) analysis of perception and misperception; work on the psychology of deterrence by Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1985; Lebow 1981; Jervis, 1982/83); Cottam's (1977) work on foreign policy motivations; Stein and Tanter's (1980) detailed case study of limits of rational decision-making; and Larson's (1985) psychological explanation of the origins of the US containment doctrine.

The application of psychological models to the study of leaders is a longstanding tradition in the IR field. What is distinctive about the recent "behavioral revolution in IR," which we might call the "second wave" after the first wave in the late 1960s, is the widespread use of quantitative and especially experimental methods. Large-N observational studies have been facilitated by the development of new data sets on leader attributes (described later), so that "leaders are no longer relegated to the error term of quantitative international relations" (Wolford 2021, 245). Although experimental studies in IR have focused primarily on public opinion, we are beginning to see studies of elites based on elite samples (discussed later).

Another characteristic of the second wave of the behavioral revolution in IR is greater attention to the institutional and political context of decision-making. This reflects an implicit appreciation of the point highlighted by Kelman (1965) a half century ago—that the impact of psychological factors on foreign policy is felt through their interaction effects with other variables in the foreign policy process. Research on leaders' psychology needs to be integrated into a broader theory of the foreign policy process, one that specifies the role that various psychological variables play in the complex causal processes leading to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

This point relates to a renewed recognition that although the evidence driving the new behavioral revolution is based on individual behavior that deviates from standard economic models of rational behavior, the key actors in international relations are collective decision-making bodies like states, foreign and defense ministries, advisory groups, domestic interest groups, and so on. We need to understand how individual judgments and preferences get transformed into collective decisions at the group level, which some have described as the "aggregation problem" (Levy, 1997, 102). Scholars associated with the behavioral revolution in IR agree on the need for greater attention to this issue and to the political, institutional, socio-economic context of decision-making (Hafner-Burton et al., 2017; Powell, 2017; Stein, 2017; Saunders, 2017). If we want to go beyond state actions to explain their mutual interactions in the international system, as we ultimately do, we need to engage the "strategic interaction problem" (Levy, 1997, 104–105). This is comparable to the move from behavioral decision theory to behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2003).

2. Belief Systems and Information Processing

2.1. Beliefs, Images, and Operational Codes

Leaders' beliefs play a central role in shaping their policy preferences and strategies, and help explain variations across decision-makers and across state policies over time. An

individual's prior beliefs are particularly important because those beliefs have a significant impact on how that individual perceives and interprets new information. I focus primarily on descriptive beliefs about the state of the world and causal beliefs about how the world works, and give less attention to normative beliefs that influence preferences. Actors have beliefs about the international system and interactions among states, about the workings of political and economic systems (their own and others'), and about themselves and others.

Despite their importance, beliefs tend to be undertheorized (Jervis, 2006, 641). Scholars have proposed different categorizations of the variety of individual beliefs about international relations. One early classification of beliefs was Boulding's (1959) theory of national images, with images of adversary and of self. The key dimensions were the perceived hostility/friendliness and strength/weakness of other actors. This led to studies of enemy images (Gladstone, 1959; Holsti, 1967; Finlay, Holsti, & Fagan, 1967), and of self-images, which are often subconsciously designed to highlight the contrast with enemy images.[8] White (1968) posited a diabolical enemy-image, virile self-image, and moral self-image, and applied these concepts to the two world wars and to the Vietnam War. Leaders often manipulate enemy images to advance their domestic political support, sometimes to the point of justifying a "diversionary war" based on conflict/cohesion theory (Coser, 1956, chap. 5; Levy, 1989).[9] Lebow (1981, 202) added the important category of images of the adversary's images of oneself, which is particularly important for bargaining situations.

The interaction of images of self and adversary often involve "mirror images" (White, 1968), where views of adversary hostility/strength and the virtuous self are each exaggerated and feed off one another.[10] If you believe that your adversary is fundamentally hostile but at the same time responsive to your own demonstrations of strength and coercive threats (a "paper tiger" image), you may perceive the adversary's aggressive actions as reflecting its innate hostility and its conciliatory actions as reflecting its response to your own resolute behavior. Holsti (1970) labeled this the "inherent bad faith model."[11] There is little evidence that might disconfirm such beliefs, which impedes opportunities for conflict resolution.

George (1969) constructed a broader framework for classifying leader beliefs by building on Nathan Leites' (1951) concept of "operational code." George (1969) eliminated the psychoanalytic components of Leites' operational code and grounded it in social-psychological theories of cognition, in an attempt to incorporate the concept into a more useful social-scientific framework. George (1969, 195) urged analysts to focus on those beliefs that "can be inferred or postulated by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists."

An individual's beliefs about the political world are interdependent, consistent, hierarchically organized around a small set of "master beliefs," and resistant to change. The operational code includes philosophical beliefs about the nature of politics and of conflict, and instrumental beliefs about the efficacy of alternative strategies for advancing one's interests. Philosophical beliefs include questions about the fundamental nature of politics and conflict, the extent to which political outcomes are predictable or subject to chance, and the ability of political leaders to influence the flow of events and images of the opponent. Instrumental beliefs include ideas about optimal strategies for achieving political ends, issues of timing, and conceptions of risk. The operational code soon developed into a major research program, with scholars applying the concept to a variety of American and non-American political leaders.[12]

A useful theoretical extension of operational code analysis for the study of international conflict is Rogers' (1991) "crisis bargaining code" model, which includes actor images of the adversary, of crisis dynamics, and of optimal bargaining strategies. Images of the adversary include beliefs about the adversary's objectives, its decision-making style, and its bargaining strategy in a crisis. Images of crisis dynamics include beliefs about the causal paths through which wars normally occur—deliberate aggression by states that prefer war to peace, or the inadvertent, unwanted, and unexpected consequence of an escalating spiral of perceived hostile actions. Beliefs about the ideal mix and sequencing of coercive and accommodative strategies are also important. A leader eager for a compromise outcome that minimizes risks of escalation may nevertheless begin with coercive threats to demonstrate that bullying tactics will not work.[13]

One important source of leaders' beliefs about international politics derives from leaders' traits, political socialization, and prior experiences. After important early work by Hermann (1980), scholars have more recently constructed two valuable datasets: "Archigos," on all heads of state in all countries from 1875 to 2004 (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009),[14] and Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) (Horowitz, Stam, & Ellis, 2015). The LEAD dataset includes information on the family, military, and educational backgrounds of over 2,400 heads of state. It also includes the institutional context, which enables the analysis of how the effects of leader background characteristics vary across regime type.[15]

With a primary aim of explaining international conflict, Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015, 12) create a "Leader Risk Index," which they define as "the probability that a leader will engage in interstate military conflicts while in office" and which controls for relevant domestic and system-level causal variables.[16] They find, in large-N studies supplemented by brief case studies, that a leader's past military service is among the most important factors predicting to the initiation and escalation of international conflict, but with an important qualification. Leaders with past military service but without combat experience are particularly likely to engage in international conflict, whereas combat experience tends to reduce tendencies toward involvement in conflict, at least among leaders in democratic states. Combat experience appears to be associated with more conflict-proneness in autocratic states. The authors hypothesize that the processes of selection into office in autocratic political systems favors more risk-acceptant individuals, including those who led military coups or rebel units (Horowitz, Stam, & Ellis 2015, 13; also Colgan, 2013).

A leader's age while in office also makes a difference, with older leaders being more likely to initiate military conflicts. This relationship holds for many autocratic regimes, but not extreme autocratic regimes. Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015) find that leaders who experienced troubled childhoods (e.g., being raised in unstable households, or experiencing war as a child) are more likely to engage in foreign conflict as a leader. Leaders' educational backgrounds appear to have little impact on conflict propensity. Nor does gender, according to Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015), who find that male and female leaders on average have similar risk profiles, though there is no female "outlier" comparable to Hitler or Stalin. As the authors concede, however, the small number of female heads of state makes it difficult to generalize. In addition, it is not clear that the authors' controls pick up conditions under which female leaders are selected into office.[17]

A related question is whether foreign leaders (and domestic publics) treat female leaders differently than they do male leaders with respect to their resolve to stand firm,

and whether the anticipation of such an effect influences the behavior of female leaders. Unlike their male counterparts, female leaders may face pressures to counteract traditional gender stereotypes by demonstrating their resolve through hardline policies (Schwartz and Blair, 2020), even to the point of being more likely to initiate war (Schramm & Stark, 2020).[18] Turning to a different causal mechanism, most research shows that men are more risk-seeking than are women (Harris, Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006; Johnson et al., 2006; McDermott, 2015).[19] At the domestic level, we know that women have less hawkish attitudes than men (Kertzer, Chapter 13, in this volume). Thus the relationship between gender and conflict incorporates multiple causal mechanisms that analysts need to distinguish and explore.

A leader's earlier political experiences are also important.[20] As Arthur Schlesinger argues, leaders "are prisoners of their own experience" (quoted in Hermann, 2014, 125). Experiences early in a president's term are particularly consequential. In her study of leaders' reputations for resolve in international politics, Daniel Lupton (2020) shows that what leaders say and do early in their tenure shape external adversaries' perceptions of their reputations and resolve, perceptions that change only slowly. Lupton demonstrates this with both a quantitative analysis and case studies, including a particularly instructive study of Kennedy in the 1961 Bay of Pigs crisis, subsequent Vienna summit meeting with Khrushchev, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.[21] Experiences before a leader comes to office can also shape others' perceptions (Lupton, 2020, chap. 5).

Leaders with substantive expertise are more likely to rely on their knowledge drawn from experience and also to utilize historical analogies based on their experience (Dyson & Preston 2006), whereas leaders without expertise are more likely to rely on their personal predispositions or turn to those whom they trust (Hermann 2014, 127). In an influential study that develops some of these themes, Saunders' (2017) analyzes the interaction effects of the substantive foreign policy experiences of American presidents and their advisors. She argues that experience influences a leader's ability to monitor their advisors, the credibility of their delegation of authority to experienced advisors, and the diversity of advice they receive. Applying her theory to US decision-making in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, Saunders (2017, S219) concludes that "a seasoned team cannot substitute for an experienced leader."

2.2. Information Processing and Belief Change

After important early work by Wohlstetter (1962) and DeRivera (1968), Jervis's ([1976]2017) seminal work on perception and misperception transformed the study of how political leaders process information and how that contributes to changes in their foreign policy beliefs. Jervis integrated a plethora of discrete findings in social psychology into a more unified framework and illustrated their relevance for foreign policy decision-making with references to the historical record. Influenced by the "cognitive revolution" in social psychology, Jervis emphasized cognitive processes.[22] Following Janis and Mann (1977) in social psychology, however, IR scholars began to give more attention to affective considerations (Lebow, 1981; Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, 1985; Stein, 1988). The underlying theoretical concepts are covered in chapters 4 (Chong), 5 (Lau & Redlawsk), 11 (Stein), and 15 (Jerit & Kam), so I will be brief, and focus on applications to international relations.

2.2.1. *The Rational Model*

IR scholars have traditionally framed their psychological models of judgment and decision-making around deviations from an idealized rational model.[23] Some have been moving away from this conception of the psychology of information processing as a "theory of errors" (Mercer, 2005; Kertzer & Tingley, 2018, 321–322), but it remains sufficiently common among IR scholars that a brief description of the rationalist baseline would be useful, however difficult that is to define.

Rational decision-making is generally defined as value maximization under constraints.[24] This imposes requirements on both preferences and information processing. Preferences must be complete and transitive.[25] Actors must be able to make tradeoffs among their multiple and often conflicting goals, which requires that at a minimum they be able to rank order their goals and ideally do so on an interval scale. Because strategies sometimes bring short-term benefits and long-term costs, or vice-versa, actors often need to make intertemporal tradeoffs between the short term and long term. This requires actors to have some sense of their intertemporal time preferences or time horizons. How much long-term gain is necessary to compensate for short-term losses?

A rational decision-making process requires the specification and prioritizing of goals, an information search, and analysis to develop alternative strategies to advance those goals and to assess the consequences of each of those strategies, and the selection of the strategy (or combination of strategies) that maximizes goals. The assessment of consequences must acknowledge uncertainty and estimate the approximate probability associated with each possible outcome. Probability assessment, along with other beliefs about the world, must be independent of actors' preferences and the desirability of particular outcomes.[26] Actors must also understand how outcomes are shaped by the actions and reactions of others, and incorporate strategic interaction into their assessments. A rational actor must behave reasonably consistently with the laws of probability (in terms of dealing with compound probabilities), and combine probabilities in a linear fashion, as required by expected utility theory. Finally, because information search is costly in time and resources (Downs, 1957), it must be informed by the importance of the issues at stake (Elster, 1990, 21).

One final requirement of rational decision-making, neglected in some treatments, is to recognize that most decisions of interest in politics are not single decisions but instead sequential decisions. The rational actor should observe the consequences of their own and others' actions and incorporate feedback into their beliefs about other actors and the state of the world. This updating of beliefs involves the informational requirement that at all stages of information processing an actor should combine their prior probability assessments (priors) with newly observed information in an optimal way. There is not perfect agreement on what constitutes the normative ideal here, but the dominant view is that the integration of new information with prior information should follow "Bayesian updating."[27]

2.2.2. *Cognitive Biases*

Perfect rationality is impossible to satisfy and difficult to approximate. This led Simon (1957) to introduce the concept of "bounded rationality." Individuals generally try to act rationally, but they lack the cognitive ability to deal with a complex informational environment

involving uncertainty and value conflicts.[28] They resort to simplified mental representations of reality, often based on pre-existing categories or schemas, as cognitive shortcuts that involve minimal cognitive effort. These strictly cognitive factors, or "cold cognitions," reflect the way the brain is "hard-wired," and operate independently of human motivations and emotions. We first consider cognitive, "unmotivated biases," and then turn to motivated biases, or motivated reasoning.[29] Although these simplifying mental shortcuts are necessary to make sense of the external world, they often generate some important cognitive distortions or biases (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Tversky and Kahneman (1974; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) systemized a wide variety of cognitive biases from social psychology into the unifying concept of heuristics and biases.[30]

Jervis ([1976]2017) and other IR scholars have argued that many of these cognitive heuristics contribute to misperceptions, policy failures, and international conflict. Most recently, Kahneman and Renshon (2009) argue that most of these biases promote "hawkish" beliefs, defined as tendencies toward suspicion, hostility, and aggression and away from cooperation and trust. It is important to note, however, that under some conditions cognitive biases and motivated reasoning can lead to the under-perception of threat as well as to the overestimation of threat, to erroneous beliefs that the adversary's intentions are benign. This is a common source of intelligence failure (Betts, 1978; Jervis, 2010).[31] If accurate threat perception could have led the state to take action to deter or otherwise avoid an attack, then the underestimation of threat would constitute a cause of war.[32]

One of the most important cognitive biases involves the influence of an individual's prior beliefs on how they perceive and interpret information. People have a strong tendency to see what they expect to see based on their prior beliefs. They tend to be more receptive to information that is consistent with their beliefs than to information that contradicts their beliefs. This "selective attention" to information generates a "confirmation bias" that tends to support one's preexisting beliefs. This phenomenon is nicely captured by the "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Prior beliefs serve as a cognitive anchor, impeding the proper adjustment to new information. As a result, information processing tends to be more theory driven than data driven (Jervis, [1976]2017).[33]

One consequence of selective attention to information and the confirmation bias is a tendency toward "premature cognitive closure." Instead of engaging in a complete search for information relevant to the problem at hand, people tend to end their search for information after their pre-existing views gain adequate support, rather than continue to search for additional information.[34] Reinforcing this pattern is a tendency, once a decision has been made, to retrospectively see arguments in favor of the chosen alternative as even better, and those alternatives as even worse, than initially thought. Difficult decisions look easier in retrospect, reducing the need for any reconsideration of those decisions or additional information search. These tendencies lead to the "perseverance of beliefs" beyond the point that the evidence warrants. The power of pre-existing beliefs is suggested by evidence that new information that contradicts pre-existing beliefs often actually strengthens those beliefs (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Tetlock, 2005). Core beliefs about the world are often so ingrained that belief change at the top of a political system often requires a change in political leadership or regime (Tetlock, 1991, 27–31; Levy, 1994, 286).

Still, beliefs can change. Belief change is most likely if discrepant information is particularly powerful and salient, if it arrives all at once, if there are relatively objective

indicators to provide a baseline for the evaluation of the accuracy of beliefs, and if decision-makers are self-critical in their styles of thinking, and, at the collective level, if they operate in "multiple advocacy" decision-making units (Jervis, [1976]2017; George, 1972).

Another cognitive bias with important implications for IR scholars is the "fundamental attribution error" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). People tend to interpret others' behavior, particularly undesirable behavior, as reflecting dispositional factors (flawed character or hostile intent) rather than situational pressures. They minimize the extent to which apparently hostile behavior by the adversary might reflect a defensive reaction to their own actions that the adversary perceives as threatening. This lessens state leaders' sensitivities to the security dilemma—the tendency for actions designed to increase their security to result in decreasing their security through the actions the adversary takes in response.[35] This pattern is compounded by the actor-observer discrepancy (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), the tendency to explain (and hence justify) one's own behavior in terms of situational pressures rather than dispositional factors. Moreover, since we believe that our own actions are defensively motivated, and since we assume that the adversary understands that, we interpret the adversary's hostile behavior as further evidence of its hostile character and/or intentions. This leads to mutually reinforcing negative feedback and often to an escalating conflict spiral.

There is a related tendency to perceive the adversary's regime as more centralized than it actually is, to underestimate the impact of domestic political and bureaucratic constraints on adversary leaders, and consequently to attribute too much intent to the adversary's actions (Jervis, [1976]2017, chap. 8). A state may take an uncompromising position in order to pacify a domestic constituency, but its adversary often infers that the behavior reflects hostile intentions. Bureaucratic pressures may force a state to increase military spending, but the adversary tends to interpret the increased spending as part of a more coherent and hostile foreign policy on the adversary's part.

2.2.3. *Motivated Reasoning*

It is common to distinguish cognitive biases from motivated reasoning, which leads people to discount information that runs contrary to their goals, preferences, and interests or to their psychological needs and emotional well-being (Kunda, 1990; Redlawsk, 2002; Lau & Redlawsk, Chapter 5, this volume). People have a difficult time facing up to information that makes it harder to achieve their goals or that would leave them feeling emotionally uncomfortable. Motivated reasoning underlies cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which posits that maintaining inconsistent beliefs leads to emotional discomfort and subconscious efforts to ensure cognitive consistency. Peoples' beliefs about the world are often convenient rationalizations for their underlying political interests or unacknowledged emotional needs, and for the policies that serve those interests and needs. Motivated reasoning is generally most pronounced in decisions involving high stakes and tradeoffs between important values, or "value complexity" (George, 1980). The psychological difficulty of making tradeoffs between important values often leads decision-makers to deny the existence of value conflict. Instead, they tend to interpret incoming information so that their preferred strategies advance all of their ends, which contributes to overconfidence in their policy choices (Janis & Mann, 1977; Lebow, 1981).

Scholars in American politics generally link "directional" motivated reasoning to partisan motivations (Cohen, 2003; Lau & Redlawsk, Chapter 5, this volume), but a wide range of motivations can induce this tendency.[36] If political leaders believe that they are most likely to achieve their preferred policy outcomes if particular conditions hold, then they may be motivated to interpret incoming information in a way that satisfies those conditions, especially if the information environment is inherently uncertain, as it often is. The standard interpretation of British appeasement of Hitler in the late 1930s is that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's abhorrence of war led him to believe Hitler's statement that this was his "last territorial demand" in Europe, and to convince himself that extensive concessions would avoid war.[37] One interpretation of George W. Bush's 2002–2003 statement that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program is that he believed, based in part on public opinion surveys and focus groups, that the existence of such a program would be more likely than any other factor to generate public support for the war that he wanted for other reasons (Kaufman, 2004). In this view, motivated reasoning led Bush to interpret inherently ambiguous intelligence to confirm the existence of the Iraqi nuclear program.[38]

This line of argument raises a potential analytic problem in interpreting potential cases of motivated reasoning once we move away from individual decision-making. Another possible explanation for Bush's behavior is that he knew very well that incoming intelligence did not provide clear support for the existence of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and engaged in strategic deception to gain public support for the war that he wanted. He may also have put pressure on US intelligence agencies to produce the intelligence that would give him additional leverage with the public to advance his preferred policies (Rovner, 2011). This "politicization of intelligence" involves the strategic manipulation of information based on an accurate reading of the situation, not motivated reasoning.

2.2.4. *"Hawkish Biases"*

Let me return to Kahneman and Renshon's (2009) argument that many common cognitive distortions generate hawkish biases in international behavior. In addition to the fundamental attribution error, discussed above, they describe a set of "positive illusions." These take several forms, including unrealistically positive images of one's own "abilities and character" (Kahneman and Renshon 2009, 81–82).[39] In international relations, exaggerated beliefs about one's relative military capabilities can lead to misplaced confidence in one's bargaining leverage and to failed negotiations, conflict escalation, and an increased risk of war (Jervis, [1976]2017; Levy, 1983; Johnson, 2004; Mitzen & Schweller, 2011; Ransom, 2018).[40] Exaggerated confidence in one's bargaining skills can also contribute to bargaining failure and conflict escalation.[41] Positive images of one's own character are best treated in a separate category, with different causal effects. Such images can reinforce the "illusion of transparency" (Kahneman & Renshon, 2009, 84–85). People overestimate the extent to which their own good intentions are apparent to adversaries and other outside observers (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). This reinforces the fundamental attribution error in exacerbating the security dilemma.

Contributing to overconfidence in a competitive environment is "competition neglect," or "reference group neglect," a concept neglected by IR scholars. This is the tendency to focus myopically on one's own capabilities while giving minimal attention to one's competitor's

capabilities. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) invoke the concept to explain overconfidence and excess entry into economic markets, as evidenced by the high rate of failure of new businesses. They argue that individuals and organizations making decisions about entering a market focus on their own skill level, gather insufficient information about the nature of their competitors, and ignore the self-selection of more skilled competitors into the market. Scholars in other fields have applied competition neglect to various research areas (Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma, 2007; Radzevick & Moore, 2008; Kahneman, 2011, 259–261). IR scholars need to incorporate the concept into their theories of overconfidence, conflict initiation, and strategic interaction.[42]

Closely related to positive illusions about one's abilities is the "illusion of control," an exaggerated belief regarding the extent to which outcomes depend on one's own actions (Kahneman & Renshon, 2009, 81; Langer, 1975). The illusion of control can lead actors to take greater risks, on the assumption that they will be able to manage any risks their actions generate.[43] In this way the illusion of control contributes to the loss of control, a major theme in the literature on crisis stability and inadvertent war (Lebow, 1987, chap. 3; Jervis, 1989, chap. 5), a literature that incorporates organizational as well as psychological sources of loss of control (Sagan, 1993).

The illusion-of-control hypothesis raises a puzzle. It is at odds with the common argument, consistent with numerous historical cases, that state leaders often experience a sense of the loss of control at high levels of crisis escalation. They sometimes respond by shifting from a strategy of trying to manage a crisis to avoid war to a strategy of preparing for the war they believe to be inevitable, which can generate a self-fulfilling prophecy (Williams, 1976, chap. 6; Lebow, 1987, chap. 3; Jervis, 1989, 153–164). One task for future research is to understand the conditions under which people experience the illusion of control, feelings of the loss of control, and perhaps the shift from the former to the latter, and how the sense of control varies with personality type, context, and issue, including international crises.

These various kinds of positive illusions tend to persist in people over time. They are reinforced by tendencies toward selective attention and the confirmation bias, which screen out information contradicting these self-images. It is important to note that experts are as vulnerable as novices to positive illusions. In fact, the greater an individual's confidence in particular beliefs based on their expertise, the greater their tendencies to dismiss evidence that contradicts those beliefs (Tetlock, 2005).

The abovementioned biases each concern information processing. Kahneman and Renshon (2009, 85–90) also include "loss aversion" (over-weighting of losses) and "risk-seeking in losses" as hawkish biases. I discuss these in more detail later in the context of prospect theory, but each concerns decision-making once basic informational parameters of the choice problem are set. Consequently, they belong in a separate category of biases—if they are "biases" at all. Loss aversion is not inconsistent with rational utility theory because it reflects preferences, which are exogenous in utility theory. Being more pained by the loss of $100 than pleased by the gain of $100 does not reflect informational biases. It does, however, reflect a broader category of "negativity" that is not limited to greater sensitivity to information, events, or beliefs likely to lead to bad outcomes (Johnson & Tierney, 2018/2019). It also includes the overweighting, in decision-making calculations, of those bad outcomes themselves, relative to positive outcomes.

2.2.5. *Analogical Reasoning and Learning from History*

IR scholars have given considerable attention to another source of beliefs: historical analogies (Jervis, [1976]2017, chap. 6; Khong, 1992). Generals are always fighting the last war, and political leaders are always trying to avoid the mistakes of the past. The 1938 "Munich analogy," associated with the presumed lesson that appeasement never works, had a profound effect on American decision-making in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War. The "quagmire" lesson from the Vietnam War continues to influence American foreign policy, as no doubt will "lessons" inferred from American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Scholars often explain reliance on the lessons of history in terms of analogical reasoning based on the "availability" heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Judgments of probability are shaped by events that are familiar, salient, and come easily to mind, neglecting statistical base rates. The problem is that these events do not constitute a representative sample for the purpose of drawing inferences, and consequently judgments based on availability can be quite misleading.[44] The number of historical analogies from which decision-makers might learn is enormous, but people have a tendency to learn from events that have a major impact, affect them or their society directly, occur recently in time, and that are observed first-hand and at a formative period in a person's life. People tend to ignore the role of contextual factors and draw universal lessons rather than conditional lessons. As Jervis ([1976]2017, 228) argues, "People pay more attention to *what* has happened than to *why* it has happened. Thus learning is superficial, overgeneralized. . . . Lessons learned will be applied to a wide variety of situations without a careful effort to determine whether the cases are similar on crucial dimensions." Superficial learning is driven in part by the failure to think through the appropriate counterfactual. The Munich analogy is based on the counterfactual assumption that standing up to Hitler at Munich would have prevented war. Most historians reject this argument based on evidence that Hitler was bent on war (Steiner, 2011).[45]

Hypotheses on learning from history provide potentially powerful explanations of political leaders' beliefs and judgments, but demonstrating that leaders actually learn from history (accurately or otherwise) and that lessons learned have a causal impact on behavior is often a daunting task. Instead of lessons of history influencing policy, policy preferences may influence the selection and interpretation of historical analogies, with leaders strategically invoking those analogies that are most useful in gaining political support for their policies. Analysts need to construct research designs to distinguish genuine learning from history from the strategic or rhetorical use of history. They also need to integrate individual learning with politics. Learning has little impact if those who learn are not in a political position to implement their lessons (Jervis, [1976]2017, chap. 6; Levy, 1994, 300–302).

2.2.6. *A Behavioral Bargaining Model?*

The biases discussed in previous sections each affect negotiation and bargaining between adversaries. The "bargaining model of war" has been one of the most influential research programs in the IR field over the last quarter-century. This strictly rationalist theory begins with the uncontroversial assumption that war and other forms of violent conflict are costly and consequently inefficient ways to resolve conflicts between adversaries because they destroy resources that might be shared. In principle, there is some negotiated settlement short

of war that unitary rational actors mutually prefer to fighting. The puzzle is why rational actors sometimes engage in violent conflict.

Fearon (1995) raises and answers this puzzle by theoretically demonstrating that there are only three paths through which unitary rational actors might end up in war with each other: private information and incentives to misrepresent that information, "commitment problems," and indivisible issues.[46] Here we focus on the first, which encompasses "information problems."[47] The argument is that if adversaries have similar expectations about the likely outcome of war,[48] they should be able to reach a negotiated settlement based on those shared expectations, based on a division of goods proportionate to the two adversaries' relative power.[49] However, if states have "private information" about their capabilities and resolve, along with incentives not to disclose that information, the two states may disagree about their relative power, and one might conclude that it could gain more through war than through a settlement. Fearon (1995) and others define "private information" in strictly rationalist terms, without distorting biases.

This powerful theoretical model has propelled an enormously successful research program, but one that has involved relatively few empirical or experimental tests (but see Tingley, 2011; Quek, 2017). Lake (2010/11) accepts the basic framework of the bargaining model but questions its fit with the outbreak of the 2003 Iraq War. He argues that the bargaining failures that led to the war were not the ones predicted by the theory. Instead, self-delusions, biased decision-making, and the failure to update prior probabilities led to disagreements about relative power.[50] Lake (2010/11, 52) calls for a "behavioral theory of war" that integrates decision-making biases into a theory of strategic interaction.[51]

Streich and Levy (2016) make a similar argument in their study of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war. They argue that analysts should not confound the rationalist concept of private information (and incentives to misrepresent that information) with disagreements about relative power, which can have psychological and cultural sources. They demonstrate that the primary source of disagreements about relative power that led to a bargaining breakdown between Russia and Japan was Russian racial and cultural stereotypes of Asians as militarily weak and consequentially unwilling to fight. They also emphasize domestic competition between rival Russian factions that distorted information flows and created an incoherent decision-making process that sent confusing signals to Japan. The Lake (2010/2011) and Streich and Levy (2016) studies suggest that the incorporation of cognitive and motivated biases into influential bargaining models, along with more detailed empirical studies, are important tasks for future IR research.

Another highly influential rationalist theory that could benefit from incorporating psychological factors is audience costs theory (Fearon, 1994). Audience costs refer to the domestic punishment of leaders who publicly make a foreign threat and fail to follow through if the adversary does not comply with the threat. Among the theory's predictions are that leaders are more likely to follow through on public threats than private threats, more domestically accountable leaders can generate greater audience costs and consequently have greater bargaining leverage, leaders rarely bluff, and that by increasing costs of backing down audience costs can contribute to crisis escalation. Whether opposing leaders actually understand these dynamics and respond in predicted ways can be quite subjective, opening many paths for the study of the political psychology of audience costs, and of the impact of internal politics (Schlesinger and Levy, 2021, 344). For example, the predicted tendencies

for leaders not to bluff and to follow up on threats might also be influenced by their risk propensities, time horizons, or other dispositional characteristics.

3. DECISION-MAKING

Our earlier discussion of rationality suggested that decision-makers need to make a value-maximizing choice based on an expected utility decision rule. In this section we consider several theories that question that assumption, including prospect theory and theories of intertemporal choice, groupthink, and crisis decision-making.

3.1. Prospect Theory

Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is the leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of choice under conditions of risk.[52] Countering the long-standing argument that non-rational behavior is too unpredictable to model, prospect theory and its supporting evidence demonstrates that deviations from rationality are systematic and predictable, that "choices are orderly" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, 317). As Wakker (2010, 2) argues, prospect theory is "the first rational theory of irrational behavior." In political science, prospect theory has been particularly influential in the IR field, where individual leaders have a greater impact than in domestic policy. Here I summarize the theory, briefly mention some of its implications for foreign policy and international relations, and note some limitations.[53]

In contrast to expected-utility theory's conception of value as net assets, prospect theory defines value in terms of changes in assets. People "frame" choice problems around a reference point ("reference dependence"), give more weight to losses than to comparable gains ("loss aversion"), and make risk-averse choices when possible outcomes are positive and risk-acceptant choices where possible outcomes are negative (the domain of gains and losses, respectively).[54] A strong aversion to losses, particularly to "dead" (certain) losses, lead people to take significant risks in the hope of avoiding a certain loss, even though the result may be a greater loss and even though the expected value of the gamble may be considerably lower than the value of the dead loss. In addition, people value things they possess more than comparable things they do not possess (the "endowment effect"), so actual losses hurt more than do foregone gains. A change in reference point can lead to a change in preference ("preference reversal") even if the values and probabilities associated with possible outcomes remain unchanged.[55]

Despite the centrality of the reference point in prospect theory, we do not fully understand how people select reference points. Prospect theory remains a "reference-dependent theory without a theory of the reference point" (Levy, 1997, 100). But we do have a limited number of plausible hypotheses (Frisch, 1993). In static situations, people often frame choice problems around the status quo. But not always, as reference points are sometimes influenced by expectation levels (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2007), aspiration levels (Levi & Whyte, 1997; Niv-Soloman, 2016), emotions (Druckman & McDermott, 2008), historical analogies (McDermott, 1998), operational codes (Feng & He, 2018), and social comparisons. In

more dynamic situations, people have a strong tendency to "renormalize" their reference points more quickly after making gains than they do after incurring losses (Ledgerwood & Boydstun, 2014). The "stickiness" of losses helps to explain why people go to such lengths to recover "sunk costs," and why basketball players are more likely to commit a foul soon after they lose the ball than at other times.

Peoples' reference points can also be influenced by conscious actions by other strategic actors. In bargaining with an adversary, I want to influence the adversary to treat their concessions as foregone gains rather than as losses (because the former are less painful), and to believe that I regard my own concessions as losses (because people overweight losses).[56] In collective decision-making, I might try to increase support for my policy preferences by influencing how others frame their reference points.[57] In approaching a necessary war, you want to convince the public that the likely costs are low enough to be tolerable but not so low that higher-than-expected costs create a problem later. Political leaders may have an intuitive grasp of these ideas, but IR scholars have done little systematic research on "strategic framing" (Levy, 1997).[58]

Another central component of prospect theory builds on substantial evidence that people respond to given probabilities in a non-linear fashion, contrary to expected utility theory's assumption of a linear weighting of utilities and probabilities. First, people overweight outcomes that are certain relative to that are merely probable (the "certainty effect"). Second, they overweight small probabilities and underweight (by a more significant margin) moderate and high probabilities, as reflected in the "probability weighting function."[59] Consequently, for all but small probabilities people overweight utilities relative to probabilities. Third, behavior for extreme probabilities, at the tails of the distribution, is highly unpredictable (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, 303; Camerer, 1995, 620–622; Taleb, 2007). Note that probability weights are not erroneous beliefs, but are weights applied to known probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Barberis, 2013, 177).[60]

Probability weighting is important because it generates a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, one that depends on both the value function and the probability weighting function.[61] This allows for risk acceptance for low probability gains (gambling on low probability, high payoff bets, because the low probability is over-weighted), and risk aversion for low probability losses (accepting the certain loss of an insurance premium to the gamble of a substantial but highly unlikely loss, for example) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, 306–308). Whereas economists generally give more attention to probability weighting, political scientists generally neglect probability weighting and focus exclusively on reference point framing, loss aversion, and the value function.

Applications of these basic principles to foreign policy and international relations have led to a variety of interesting and intuitively plausible propositions.[62] Beginning with foreign policy decisions of states, (1) because decision-makers usually take the status quo as their reference point, and because the costs of moving away from the status quo are treated as losses and over-weighted relative to the benefits of doing so, states and other actors have a greater-than-expected tendency to remain at the status quo.[63] This "status quo bias" (Samuelson & Zechhauser, 1988) helps explain policy inertia. (2) State leaders take more risks to maintain their international positions, territory, and reputations against potential losses than they do to enhance their positions.[64] This pattern is reinforced by (3) a tendency of domestic publics and legislatures to punish political leaders more for incurring losses than to reward them for making gains (Nincic, 1997).

In dynamic situations, (4) If a state makes gains in territory or resources or prestige, follows the common pattern of renormalizing its reference point around its gains, and then retreats from those gains and returns to the status quo ex ante, it will see itself in a worse position than it was before because it over-weights the loss from its new reference point.[65] (5) The failure to renormalize reference points after losses contributes to entrapment in escalating conflicts (Brockner & Rubin, 1985), as illustrated by the protracted wars of the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Taliaferro, 2004). (6) Leaders of declining states tend to frame their reference point around their current position, define inaction and continued decline as a loss, and take excessively risky actions in attempt to avoid losses and maintain its current position. This reinforces incentives for preventive war strategies (Levy, 2008a).

With respect to strategic interaction between states, (7) reaching a negotiated settlement is more difficult than a standard cost-benefit analysis predicts because people overweight what they concede in bargaining relative to what they get in return. This "concession aversion" (Neale & Bazerman, 1985) is comparable to the status quo bias in individual decision-making.[66] (8) If one state makes gains at another's expense, the winner renormalizes its reference point around its gains and takes excessive risks to defend its new position against subsequent losses, while the loser fails to renormalize and takes excessive risks to recover its losses and return to the status quo ex ante. The result is an increase in the probability of further conflict. (9) Deterring an adversary from making gains is easier than compelling it to accept losses or deterring it from recovering losses.[67] (11) The overweighting of small probabilities and the underweighting of larger probabilities makes smaller probabilities of larger punishments more effective deterrents than modest probabilities of less costly deterrence threats, even if expected values of the two outcomes are the same.[68] (12) It is easier for states to cooperate in the distribution of gains than in the distribution of losses, because political leaders will take more risks and bargain harder to minimize their share of the costs than to maximize their share of the gains. This explains why distributive issues are easier to resolve than redistributive issues.

Many of these hypotheses resonate well with common understandings of international politics, but validating them empirically raises difficult conceptual and methodological problems (Levy, 1997; O'Neill, 2001; Vis & Kuijpers, 2018). Generalizing experimental results on reference dependence, loss aversion, preference reversals, and probability weighting to the empirical world of international relations raises a host of new issues. The key variables of interest in international relations—relative power, reputation, status, domestic security of political elites, and other concepts, as well as the probabilities of various outcomes, are extraordinarily difficult to measure. This plagues the testing of IR theories based on expected utility theory as well as those based on prospect theory, but the latter has the additional problems of identifying the reference point and the shape of the probability weighting function. This makes it difficult to demonstrate convincingly that choice is determined by framing, loss aversion, and risk orientation instead of by the maximization of expected value.

These problems are exacerbated by the fact that in situations involving relatively small probabilities, risk orientation is shaped by probability weighting as well as by the loss/gain domain. Complicating things further, in international relations, decision-makers make choices in a world in which probabilities are unknown, leaving us in the realm of uncertainty rather than risk, where probabilities are known and numerically measurable.[69]

Experimental evidence suggests that uncertainty generates more risk aversion than does risk (Ellsberg, 1961). As Camerer (1995, 646) explains, "subjects would rather bet on known probabilities p than on known probability distributions of probability (compound lotteries) with a mean of p." That is, people are more risk averse in response to "unknown unknowns" than they are to "known unknowns."[70]

Another complication is that unlike experimental studies or consumer behavior, where alternative sources of risk attitudes are eliminated by randomization or controls, the same is not true for decision-making in international relations. Other possible sources of risk attitudes include individual personality, socialization, and experience; gender; salient historical analogies; culture and ideology; and regime-specific leadership selection (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Kowert & Hermann, 1997; Vertzberger, 1998; Harris, Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006; Kertzer, 2016). Validation of a prospect theory explanation requires in principle ruling out these alternative sources of risk attitudes.

3.2. Time Horizons and Intertemporal Choice

Standard theories of decision-making involve one-time choice problems. Most choices facing political leaders, however, involve a dynamic component with future payoffs as well as current payoffs. As Machiavelli advised, "You have to keep an eye, not only on present troubles, but on those of the future. . . ." (cited in Edelstein, 2017, 3). Political leaders constantly make choices involving tradeoffs between short-term and long-term costs, benefits, and risks, both for the country and for their own political fortunes. How they make these tradeoffs varies with their time horizons and estimates of whether time is on their side. It is often said that political leaders, and especially democratic political leaders, have short time horizons. Decisions about whether to initiate a preventive war against a rising adversary are significantly influenced by the tradeoffs one is willing to make between the risks of war now and the risks of war (or forced concessions) under increasingly unfavorable circumstances later.

Although IR scholars have long recognized the importance of time horizons, they rarely incorporate them into their models. One exception is Axelrod's (1984) influential model of cooperation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. In contrast to the single-play game, in which defection is a dominant strategy, mutual cooperation can emerge in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game if actors' "shadow of the future" (discount factor) are sufficiently high. Axelrod follows the standard practice in economics of using an exponential discounting model based on the assumption that the discount rate is constant from one period to the next.

IR scholars are beginning to incorporate time horizons into their models. The most common approach is to examine the effects of exogenously and usually dichotomously defined time horizons (short/long) on behavior rather than on the psychology of time horizons and their determinants. Examples include Barkin (2004) on cooperation and collective action problems, Toft (2006) on the bargaining model of war, Kreps (2011) on military coalitions and interventions, Kertzer (2016) on resolve, Edelstein (2017) on the interaction of established great powers with rising powers, and Haynes (2019) on the credibility of signaling. We need more studies like this on the effects of time horizons. We also need more research on the sources of actors' time horizons in international relations—on both

universal patterns of human decision-making and on sources of variation across individuals (Kertzer, 2016). We focus on the first, which has attracted most scholarly attention.

A growing body of experimental and field research in behavioral economics and social psychology questions the standard economic assumption of a constant discount rate over time. It demonstrates that discount rates for most people tend to decline over time (Loewenstein & Elster, 1992; Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister, 2003).[71] People discount the immediate future more, but the distant future less, than the exponential discounting model suggests. The "discounted present value" of what you expect to happen tomorrow is less than standard exponential discounting models predict.[72] A more descriptively accurate discount function is steeper for the near future and flatter for the more distant future. This pattern generates preference reversals. An actor may prefer to receive x now over $x + y$ tomorrow, but prefer $x + y$ at a point t periods in the future over x the period before.

This pattern of discounting behavior is better captured by a hyperbolic function than by an exponential function (Laibson, 1997). Unlike the exponential discounting function, the hyperbolic discounting model is not mathematically tractable. It fails to converge, does not permit analytic solutions to many economic models, and generates preference reversals. Consequentially, it is rarely used in economic modeling despite its greater descriptive accuracy. Some have proposed a "quasi-hyperbolic discount function" (Laibson, 1997), which incorporates a steep drop in the first period but constant-rate discounting after that. This function provides a closer fit to the data than does the exponential function while permitting analytic solutions. This raises some interesting possibilities for future research. Streich and Levy (2007) demonstrate that if actors behave as quasi-hyperbolic discounters rather than as exponential discounters, cooperation in iterated prisoner's dilemma games is more difficult than Axelrod (1984) implies.

Research has uncovered additional patterns that run contrary to the assumption of constant discounting (Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister, 2003; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). Discount rates are lower for large payoffs than they are for small payoffs, so that that people give proportionately greater weight (in terms of discounted present value) to large future payoffs than to smaller future payoffs. People tend to discount future gains more than they do future losses, giving more weight to future losses than to future gains. This pattern of temporal loss aversion works against negotiated solutions because it leads people to overweight the future costs from current concessions relative to their future benefits. Finally, contrary to the standard economic assumption that people prefer larger positive payoffs sooner rather than later because latter payoffs are discounted, people often prefer improving sequences.[73] Theories of negotiation, bargaining, and conflict resolution would do well to incorporate some of these patterns.[74]

The abovementioned studies of intertemporal choice focus on the relative weight people give to current and future outcomes. They assume that people think the same way (i.e., follow the same mental processes) about current and future outcomes. Temporal construal theory, or construal-level theory, questions this basic assumption (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000). The theory, backed by substantial experimental evidence, posits that people think about near-term outcomes and strategies in relatively low-level, concrete, and context-dependent terms. In contrast, they think about more distant outcomes and strategies in more abstract and decontextualized terms, which leads to more optimistic expectations because they exclude "the devil in the details." Lower-level representations of the immediate future include more details and facilitate calculations of the feasibility of

achieving short-term goals. The absence of these concrete details in distant outcomes make such causal and probabilistic assessments more difficult. Consequently, whereas people evaluate outcomes in the immediate future in terms of their feasibility or probability, they tend to evaluate more distant outcomes in terms of their desirability.

Construal-level theory has important implications for foreign policy and international relations. Krebs and Rapport (2012) apply temporal construal theory to a wide range of questions in international relations, including international cooperation, preventive war, and coercion. They argue that temporal construal makes international cooperation somewhat less difficult than standard cooperation theories suggest. Actors' focus on the desirability of distant outcomes rather than on their feasibility generates greater optimism about the future, less concern about the future enforcement of current bargains, and a greater willingness to reach a negotiated settlement. In a more detailed empirical study, Rapport (2015) uses the theory to explain the widely-recognized tendency for states to underestimate the long-term costs of military interventions and to fail to plan for the ending phases of a war or for a possible occupation. Examples include the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan and the United States in Iraq. Rapport (2015) demonstrates that actors with long time horizons think about the future in abstract terms, emphasize the desirability of future goals, but neglect their feasibility and the details of implementation. Those who place less weight on the future tend to focus on operational details and the feasibility of various strategies.

Our discussion so far has focused primarily on the psychology of individual decision-making. We now turn to a brief discussion of the psychology of group decision-making, and then to the impact of international crises at both the individual and group levels.

3.3. Groupthink

"Groupthink," developed by Irving Janis (1972),[75] is a social-psychological model of small group decision-making that has had considerable influence in the IR field. Groupthink is a "concurrence-seeking tendency within cohesive groups." Group members try to conform to group norms and reach a policy consensus under conditions of high-stakes decisions and enormous stress, motivated by social pressure, not political pressure. Policy unanimity enhances the integrity of the group, reduces anxiety, heightens self-esteem, and provides psychological security in the context of politically and morally difficult decisions (Janis & Mann, 1977). Groupthink is most likely to arise in groups that are socially cohesive and relatively insulated from outside sources of intelligence, and in decisions involving moral dilemmas. Groupthink tendencies are reinforced if the group leader actively promotes their policy preferences, if there is no devil's advocate to make contrary arguments, if the group has recently suffered a significant failure, and if group members are psychologically insecure (Janis, 1972).[76]

Janis (1972) argues that the "symptoms" or consequences of groupthink include illusions of invulnerability, unanimity, and moral superiority; discounting and rationalization of information that contradicts the collective beliefs of the group; and active efforts by self-appointed "mindguards" to shield the group against adverse information and to put social pressure on dissenters. Loyalty to the group becomes the highest priority goal. As a result, these groups are selective in their information search. They discount discrepant

information, make little effort to acquire additional information from experts, and consider a limited number of policy alternatives. They fail to reexamine the possible risks of policies preferred by a majority, to reconsider possible benefits of alternatives once they are rejected, or to develop contingency plans in the event of policy failure. Consequently, cohesive groups tend to take riskier courses of action, increasing the probability of conflict escalation and war (Janis, 1972; Janis & Mann, 1977, 130–131). Janis (1972) applies his theory to several cases of what he regards as American foreign policy failures, including the Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam War, and policy successes, including the Marshall Plan and the Cuban Missile Crisis. He finds that the symptoms of groupthink are much less evident in the policy successes than in the policy failures.

The groupthink model has attracted considerable interest, critiques, and tests, which have generated alternative descriptive and normative models of small-group decision-making (Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Tetlock et al., 1992; Esser, 1998; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998; Sunstein & Hastie, 2015). The theory has also been influential among IR scholars, who have added their own critiques and incorporated small group dynamics into alternative models of foreign policy decision-making (Minix, 1982; Maoz, 1990; Verbeek, 2003; 't Hart, 1990; 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1997; Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). The high-stakes condition for groupthink has led most applications of the theory to focus on decision-making on war and peace issues, but the theory might be profitably applied to decision-making during financial collapses or perhaps certain issues in international political economy.

One critique of particular interest to IR scholars concerns Janis's (1972) central hypothesis that groupthink leads small groups to adopt riskier courses of action than the same individuals acting on their own. Most evidence suggests instead a "group polarization hypothesis," in which small groups produce either significantly more risky or more cautious behaviors relative to predictions from a direct aggregation of members' individual policy preferences (Myers & Lamm, 1976; Minix, 1982; Vertzberger, 1998, chap. 3). More research is necessary to explore the conditions conducive to each of these tendencies in international contexts.

Another issue for IR scholars, and for political scientists in general, is that Janis's (1972) emphasis on social-psychological pressures for concurrence-seeking neglects political processes that could conceivably lead to several of the same decisional pathologies that he attributes to groupthink. Conformity with the group might be the product of political pressure or career incentives rather than social pressures and internalized group norms. Janis (1972) made little effort in his case studies to rule out these alternative explanations. These considerations led 't Hart (1990) and colleagues ('t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1997) to construct a theory of small-group decision-making that incorporates both political and social-psychological factors.[77]

Some question whether cohesive groups necessarily lead to concurrence-seeking and its predicted pathologies. A highly cohesive group with experience working together might feel comfortable questioning each other and challenging the majority opinion. Stern and Sundelius (1994) hypothesize that pressures for conformity and other decision-making pathologies normally associated with groupthink might be greatest in relatively newly formed, inexperienced, and weakly institutionalized groups, where members look to the group for emotional comfort. They call this the "newgroup syndrome." Stern (1997) argues that the newgroup syndrome provides a better explanation for flawed decision-making during the Bay of Pigs crisis than does Janis's (1972) groupthink model. More empirical

research is necessary, but the newgroup syndrome has potentially important implications for decision-making on high-stakes issues in international relations, particularly in democratic states, where frequent regime changes often produce new and relatively inexperienced high-level decision-making groups.

3.4. Crisis Decision-Making

Many of the processes of judgment and decision-making surveyed in earlier sections are affected by context, especially the presence an acute international crisis.[78] Scholarly interest in crisis decision-making accelerated after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most researchers conclude that crisis decision-making systematically differs from foreign policy decision-making in non-crisis contexts. These differences manifest themselves at several different levels of analysis, including individual, organizational, and small-group levels.[79] We focus here on the psychological dimensions of crisis decision-making.

For individuals, international crises lead to an information overload, an increased number of tasks, more limited time for making decisions, and the threat to important values and the real possibility of war, each of which increases stress. Although people often claim to function best under high stress, laboratory studies demonstrate that the relationship between performance and stress follows an inverted U-shaped curve (Holsti, 1989). Moving from low to moderate levels of stress, people increasingly recognize that they face an issue that requires attention and effort. After a point, however, stress increases cognitive rigidity, limits the capacity to make subtle distinctions, reduces creativity, increases the selective filtering of information, and reduces individuals' tolerance for ambiguity and their sensitivity to others' perspectives. Stress increases the reliance on predispositions, prior beliefs, and historical analogies. It reduces the number and variety of alternative options considered, and enhances preferences for alternatives that increase one's sense of control over events (Friedland et al., 1992, 93; Kahneman & Renshon, 2009, 81). Stress also increases tendencies toward scapegoating (Holsti & George, 1975; Janis & Mann, 1977; Holsti, 1989). Each of these effects detracts from rational processes of judgment and decision-making.

Some of these patterns also characterize crisis decision-making at the group and organizational levels, but with some differences and complications. Crises decision-making groups tend to consider a reduced number of alternatives, increase their reliance on ideological preconceptions and organizational routines, engage in less creative problem solving, and discount the future while attending to short term diplomatic and political objectives (Wilensky, 1967; Holsti & George, 1975; Brecher & Geist, 1980; Holsti, 1989; Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2000). More fundamentally, the nature of the decision-making unit in foreign policy decision-making differs under conditions of crisis. Decisions made by mid-level officials in many ministries shift to the top levels of the government, the size of the decision-making group decreases, and the dominant decision-maker is more likely to get involved at an earlier stage. They often rely less on standard organizational units than on ad hoc advisory groups—such as the ExComm that President Kennedy organized during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Some argue that the short time for decision-making elevates the weight given to the national interest, and restricts the influence of parochial organizational interests, Congress or parliament, interest groups, and the public (Verba, 1969, 158–160). Many question this.

Allison (1971) essentially argues that the overwhelming threat to the national interest in the Cuban Missile Crisis makes it the equivalent of a "most-likely" case for a rational unitary actor model and a "least-likely" case for a bureaucratic/organizational model (he does not use those specific concepts). The demonstration that bureaucratic politics and organizational processes played an important role in the 1962 crisis provides inferential leverage for arguing that these processes should be influential in more routine, non-crisis decisions.[80]

4. Conclusion

The study of the political psychology of foreign policy has progressed enormously over the last half-century. Before that time, most research in this area was conducted by psychologists who gave little attention to the political and strategic contexts in which foreign policy was made. By the mid-1970s, however, IR scholars began to develop a more systematic cognitive research program that built on new developments in social psychology and that recognized the importance of the political context of decision-making. Within a few years, scholars gradually began incorporating motivational and affective dimensions of judgment and decision-making. However, the IR field's preoccupation with grand theory, the impact of Waltz's (1979) neorealist theory, and a preference for parsimonious theory helped to sideline psychological models from many mainstream debates in the IR field.

Several things have changed in the last decade. They include the IR field's growing disillusion with the contribution of paradigmatic debates to the cumulation of knowledge in the field, and an increased openness to middle-range theory. At the same time, IR scholars have demonstrated a growing interest in experimental methods, especially survey experiments of public opinion, driven by the success of the democratic peace research program and the increasingly central role of public opinion in many IR theories. This has enabled IR scholars to investigate new questions and provide better answers to some old questions, especially when combined with other methods, including quantitative content analyses, aggregate data analysis, and archival studies.

The increased use of experimentation has led to discussions regarding the utility of experimental methods for better understanding the behavior of political leaders. At issue is the question of the external validity of studies commonly based on convenience samples of the mass public and somewhat artificial situations (Findley, Kikuta, & Denly, 2021). This is an old question (Sears, 1986) but one that is particularly salient for foreign-policy decision-making, especially on national security issues that involve high stakes and stress that cannot easily be replicated in laboratory or survey settings.[81] Regarding subjects, one issue is whether elites are different than typical experimental subjects, which has generated considerable debate (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, & Victor, 2013; Hyde, 2015, 406–408; Kertzer, 2022). A separate question concerns variations among elites, including the extent to which high-level foreign policy experience is important in foreign policy decision-making (Saunders, 2017). One encouraging development is that we are beginning to see experiments with elite samples (Mintz, Redd, & Vedlitz, 2006; Hyde, 2015, 408–409; Renshon, 2017, chap. 3; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, & Renshon, 2018; Tomz, Weeks, & Yarhi-Milo, 2020). This is a welcome development, but enough questions of external validity remain, especially regarding high-stakes

and high stress national security crises, that mixed-method approaches that combine experiments with detailed historical and archival studies would be a useful development.

Some of the most significant growth areas in applications of political psychology to international relations concern the role of emotions in threat perception, in signaling and resolve, in public opinion, and in terrorism. I leave it to the authors of the next four chapters to discuss some of the most promising directions for future research in those areas. One area in which applications of political psychology has been lagging but that could benefit enormously is elite decision-making in foreign economic policy and international political economy. This field has been dominated by structural approaches that focus primarily on systemic and societal sources of behavior but that ignore individual-level belief systems and information processing. Yet it is hard to look at governmental and non-governmental responses to financial crises, including those of 2008–2009 and 2020 (Tooze, 2018), without concluding that individual belief systems, judgments, and decision-making played a key role, and that other individuals in the same positions might have made different decisions with different consequences. We need more research on how decision-making on economic issues is shaped by actors' economic beliefs, the economic lessons they draw from history, their time horizons and the kinds of tradeoffs they are willing to make between current and future costs and benefits, and how these individual level factors interact in group deliberation and decision-making. With respect to analogical reasoning and learning from history, if generals often prepare for the last war, might economic policy makers responding to a recession or economic downturn be disproportionately influenced by the previous recession or economic crisis and the perceived effectiveness of policy responses to it?[82]

As the study of the psychology of foreign policy and international relations moves move ahead, we need to acknowledge Kelman's (1965) concern that psychological factors cannot by themselves provide a satisfactory explanation of foreign policy behavior and international outcomes. We need to give more attention to interaction effects between psychological variables and the institutional, political, and strategic contexts of decision-making. In the process of identifying these interaction effects, we need to specify where in the causal chain psychological variables have an impact, and through what mechanisms. We also need more attention to the processes through which individual preferences and judgments are aggregated in collective decision-making groups. Psychology plays an critical role in foreign policy decision-making, but as Clemenceau said of war and the generals, the psychology of foreign policy is too important to leave to the psychologists.[83]

Notes

1. For reviews of recent developments in political psychology of international relations, see Jervis ([1976]2017, preface), Davis & McDermott (2021), and Kertzer & Tingley (2018), which includes a visual description of the distribution of substantive focus and methodologies of recent research. For reviews of earlier work see Larson (1985), Goldgeier (1997), Tetlock (1998), McDermott (2004), and Houghton (2014).

2. Foreign policy refers to the externally-directed behavior of states; international relations refers to the interaction of states and other actors in the world system.

3. Other recent research areas that I do not have space to review here include the psychology of trust (Wheeler, 2018), face-to-face diplomacy (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Wong, 2015;

Holmes & Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Holmes, 2018; Wheeler, 2018), status and humiliation (Paul, Larson, & Wohlforth, 2014; Renshon, 2017; Greve & Levy, 2018; Larson & Shevchenko, 2019; R. Stein, 2019; Barnhart, 2020), and illness and decision-making (McDermott, 2008). Applications of neuroscience to international relations are in their early stages (McDermott & Hatemi, 2014; Holmes, 2018; Davis & McDermott, 2021).

4. Waltz (1959) conceived of first-image explanations as based on a universal human nature. However, most contemporary treatments of individual-level explanations in IR focus on causal factors that vary across individuals, including belief systems, emotions, political socialization, personality, learning from history, leadership style, risk propensity, time horizons, and other factors.

5. This point is reinforced by Jervis's ([1976]2017, 4) emphasis on the importance of considering alternative explanations, the neglect of which often leads to "over-psychologizing" behavior that can be better explained by structural and political variables. See also Jervis's (2013) discussion of the various ways in which leader characteristics interact with these other variables.

6. On the rationalist essence of Allison's (1971) governmental (bureaucratic) politics model, see Bendor & Hammond (1992). However, one can imagine an alternative bureaucratic politics model in which psychology shapes both actor preferences and inter-agency bargaining.

7. Early psychobiographies (George & George, 1956; Erikson, 1958) have declined in influence after considerable criticism (Greenstein, 1975, 73–86; Tetlock, Crosby, & Crosby, 1981). More modern personality studies in IR do not generally utilize the standard "Big Five" framework (Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume), but see Gallagher & Allen (2014).

8. Constructivists have developed self-images or self-conceptions in the form of identity.

9. Studies of diversionary theory could benefit from more attention to the literatures on national identity, nationalism, and patriotism (Huddy, Chapter 21, in this volume), along with work in comparative politics.

10. For good reviews see Lebow (1981, 192–221) and Herrmann (2013).

11. This parallels the fundamental attribution error, discussed later.

12. These leaders include John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1970), Henry Kissinger (Walker, 1977), Woodrow Wilson (Walker, 1995), Jimmy Carter (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998), Mao Zedong (Feng, 2005), Kim Il Sung (Malici and Malici, 2005), Tony Blair and Bill Clinton (Schafer & Walker, 2006), and others. See Walker (2003) for a review of the theories and methods of operational code analysis.

13. Kennedy's behavior in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is a good example (George, 1994).

14. Archigos focuses primarily on when and how leaders entered and exited from office (through a democratic election or military coup), and includes information such as the age and gender of leaders and their personal fate a year after leaving office.

15. On democratic leaders see Saunders (2011). On autocratic leaders see Levitsky & Way (2013), Weeks (2014), Talmadge (2015), and Moghaddam (2019). For more attention to the various causal mechanisms through which leader attributes and socialization experiences affect decision-making, along with problems of selection into office, see Krcmaric, Nelson, & Roberts (2020).

16. The "risk score" differs from the microeconomic concept of risk propensity, which we discuss later.

17. If countries facing a threatening external environment selected their leader with attributes best suited for dealing with external security threats, then causality would rest primarily

in the external environment rather than with individual traits. But leadership selection might also be based on expected economic performance, and might be influenced by the types of people who aspire to leadership positions in particular political systems (Hermann, 2014).

18. Schwartz and Blair (2020) find that backing down after making threats generates greater domestic (audience) costs for female leaders than for male leaders, which enables female leaders to make more credible threats. But male leaders suffer substantial costs if they back down against a female leader.

19. On gender differences in international relations and in general, see Reiter (2015) and Chapter 19 in this volume.

20. It is useful to distinguish between substantive expertise and executive administrative experience, though these are sometimes confounded in the literature. This factor complicates experimental designs.

21. Lupton (2020) neglects to mention that the importance of early actions is explained by the perseverance of beliefs and anchoring adjustment heuristic, which we discuss later. On the varying psychology underlying leaders' willingness to fight to maintain their reputations, see Yarhi-Milo (2018).

22. On the impact of the cognitive revolution in psychology on political science see Larson (1985).

23. Social psychologists distinguish between judgment and decision-making, between assessments about the nature of the world and making choices given those assessments. IR scholars are rarely explicit about this distinction.

24. This discussion is informed by March (1978), Elster (1990), and Thaler (2015). See also Chong, Chapter 4, in this volume.

25. Completeness requires that for any two outcomes an actor either prefers one outcome to the other or is indifferent between the two. Transitivity requires that an actor who prefers A to B, and B to C, must prefer A to C.

26. That is, actors must not engage in motivated reasoning, discussed later.

27. For an accessible discussion of Bayesian updating see Silver (2015, 240–261). For complications see Jervis ([1976]2017, xivii–lii), and Lau & Redlawsk, Chapter 5, in this volume.

28. As Chong notes (Chapter 4, this volume), people can be rational "within the bounds of their limited knowledge, capacity, and motivation."

29. IR scholars often refer to "motivated bias" instead of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990), which is more common in other fields.

30. From an evolutionary perspective, these cognitive heuristics serve an adaptive function, enabling humans to deal effectively with their environments (Gigerenzer et al, 1999; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Santos & Rosati, 2015). For an argument that heuristics continue to have beneficial as well as detrimental effects on decision-making on security issues, see Johnson (2020). Instead of asking *whether* people are rational, it is probably more useful to think of the degree of rationality as a variable and to ask what kinds of actors are rational under what conditions. For a recent application to IR see Rathbun, Kertzer, & Paradis (2017).

31. Most theoretical analyses of individual-level sources of intelligence failure focus on universal human biases. For an emphasis on the beliefs, personalities, and leadership styles of particular individuals, see Bar-Joseph & Levy (2009).

32. On the various and complex paths from different types of misperception to war or peace, see Levy (1983, 82–93).

33. For an interesting argument that different mechanisms drive selective attention by political leaders and by intelligence organizations, see Yarhi-Milo (2014). One question here is which influences dominate when a political leader formerly headed an intelligence organization (e.g., Vladimir Putin or George H. W. Bush).

34. This pattern leads Jervis (2010) to recommend that intelligence analysts be conscious of what information might contradict their estimates and to maintain a constant and unbiased search for that information.

35. Booth & Wheeler (2008, 7; Wheeler, 2018) suggest the important concept of "security dilemma sensibility" to capture one's ability to understand the extent to which fear—particularly fear induced by one's own actions—might play in shaping an adversary's beliefs and behavior.

36. One might be protecting one's belief system, which can be an important part of one's identity. This would imply a narrowing of the distinction between cognitive and motivated biases, between seeing what you expect to see based on your world views and seeing what you want to see based on your interests and emotions. For difficult conceptual issues relating to motivated reasoning, see Groenendyk & Krupnikov (2021).

37. For a summary of alternative interpretations and a different view, see Ripsman & Levy (2008).

38. On the inherent uncertainty of information about Iraq's nuclear program at the time, and for an unmotivated bias interpretation, see Jervis (2010). On the role of public opinion and the press in the Iraq War, see Feldman, Huddy, & Marcus (2015).

39. In addition to generalized positive illusions (Svenson, 1981), most people believe that they are better than average decision-makers and negotiators (Bazerman, 1998, 69).

40. For an evolutionary perspective on overconfidence see Johnson and Fowler (2011). Men tend to be more overconfident than women (Barber & Odean, 2001; Johnson et al., 2006), though this is dependent on task domain (Lundeberg, Fox, & Punccohar, 1994). Excessive male overconfidence can reinforce male tendencies toward risk-seeking. Overconfidence and strong risk-seeking propensities are analytically distinct but often confounded.

41. In a reversal of the causal arrow from overconfidence to conflict, the anticipation of militarized conflict can also contribute to overconfidence and other pathologies of judgment, as Johnson & Tierney (2011) argue in their "Rubicon model of war."

42. In the only application I have seen, Pischedda (2022) uses competition neglect to explain British foreign policy toward Germany in 1937–1938. With respect to Britain's failure to respond militarily to the rapid rise of German power in the 1933–1936 period, Ripsman and Levy (2012) emphasize the British military's belief that they were not yet "ready for war," which the British defined primarily in organizational and monadic terms, with insufficient attention to German capabilities and preparation. Even if this pattern is infrequent, it has significant implications for realist theory's basic proposition that states always think in terms of *relative* military power.

43. On the distinction between the perceived magnitude and "controllability" of risks, see George & Smoke (1974, 489, 527–530).

44. Experimental evidence demonstrates that availability and other heuristics, including anchoring and representativeness (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), lead people to flawed thinking about probability and statistics. In fact, people, including foreign policy officials, are averse to making probabilistic judgments and try to avoid them (Tetlock, 2005; Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein, 2021; Friedman, 2019; Stein, Chapter 11, this volume).

45. Scholars continue to debate the counterfactual of whether a war in 1938 would have been fought on more favorable terms for the Allies than the war they eventually fought. On methodological rules for evaluating the plausibility of counterfactual arguments, see Levy (2015).

46. Fearon (1995) recognizes that psychological, domestic, and governmental factors can cause war, but starts with the most simple case of two rational and unitary state actors.

47. Commitment problems (Powell, 2006) refer to the inability of state actors, in an anarchic international system, to provide a credible commitment to honor any agreement that it reaches. The clearest case of a commitment problem involves shifting power, the declining state's incentives for preventive war (Levy, 2008a), and the difficulty of reaching a settlement under those conditions.

48. Technically, this means the same subjective probability distribution of feasible outcomes.

49. If issues are indivisible, no proportionate division is possible. See Goddard (2010).

50. Lake (2010/11) also mentions the influence of domestic actors and multiple international actors, which deviate from the model's assumptions of dyadic bargaining between two unitary actors.

51. For an attempt to incorporate such variables into a formal model of bargaining, see Little and Zeitzoff (2017).

52. The behavioral finance scholar Barberis (2013, 173) says prospect theory is the "best available description of how people evaluate risk in experimental settings."

53. For theoretical developments, experimental tests, and interdisciplinary applications of prospect theory, see Kahneman & Tversky (2000).

54. Risk attitudes are also affected by the probability weighting function, discussed below.

55. People facing decisions over medical treatments, for example, respond differently to the likelihood of a 90% survival rate than to a 10% mortality rate, although the two are mathematically equivalent.

56. de Dreu, Emans, & de Vliert (1992) find that people are more likely to cooperate if they are in a gain frame and they perceive others to be in a loss frame.

57. For a recent experimental study about influencing public tolerance for risks in deterrence crises by reference point framing, see Berejikian and Zwald (2020).

58. American politics scholars have done more on framing strategies (Hanggli & Kriesi, 2010; Glazier & Boydstun, 2012; Chong, Chapter 4, this volume). Much of that work focuses on broader conceptions of framing that induce changes in the perceived values of outcomes, rather than on reference point framing involving mathematically equivalent choice problems, labeled "equivalency framing" by Druckman (2001, 228). For experimental work on strategic framing in labor-management negotiations see Neale and Bazerman (1985).

59. Scholars have yet to empirically establish a well-defined "crossover point" from small to moderate. Neilson (2003, 180) mentions .25–.50, while Barberis (2013, 177) suggests .35.

60. For a review of probability weighting functions see Takemura & Murakami (2016). Some models specify that probability weighting is influenced by payoffs that are particularly "salient" or unusual (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012) or that generate affective responses (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). See Stein, Chapter 11, this volume.

61. Some argue that probability weighting has the greater impact. Barberis (2013, 191) argues that "within the risk-related areas of finance, insurance, and gambling, probability weighting plays a more central role than loss aversion and has attracted significantly more empirical support."

62. See the special issues of *Political Psychology* (June 1992, April and June 1994), McDermott (1998), Levy (2003), Berejikian (2004), Taliaferro (2004), and He (2016).

63. I define "greater than expected" tendencies or "excessively risky" actions relative to the predictions of expected utility theory for a risk neutral actor.

64. This is consistent with defensive realist theory (Taliaferro, 2004).

65. To quote from the 1987 movie "Wall Street," "When you've had money and lost it, it's much worse than never having had it at all."

66. Kahneman & Renshon (2009, 80) argue that loss aversion and the endowment effect constitute a hawkish bias by impeding concessions necessary for cooperative agreements. True, but the same logic also works against initiating conflict to improve one's position from a reference point.

67. This provides a prospect theory explanation for Schelling's (1966) well-known argument that deterrence is easier than compellence. But it qualifies that argument by emphasizing that deterring an adversary from recovering losses is more difficult than deterring them from making gains.

68. This hypothesis applies to criminal justice as well as to international relations. Deterrence is enhanced more by large punishments than by a high probability of getting caught.

69. The fact that even the set of possible outcomes is often unknown compounds the ambiguity or vagueness of the situation.

70. In addition, the probability weighting function is more complex for uncertainty than for risk because people react differently to different types or domains of uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, 316–317).

71. The discount rate r is inversely related to the discount factor δ, so that $\delta = 1/(1+r)$.

72. Discounted present value refers to current valuations of future outcomes. Psychologists commonly interpret the sharp discounting of the immediate future as reflecting the lack of willpower, and often contrast it to rational decision-making. Thaler (2016, 1578) argues that standard economic theory (erroneously) assumes "infinite willpower" and that people "choose what is best, not what is momentarily tempting."

73. This might be the result of an "anticipation effect," in which the process of waiting and thinking about a positive future payoff creates positive utility (Loewenstein 1987). It might also result from reference dependence, in that after receiving larger payoffs early people treat lesser payoffs as losses.

74. IR scholars also need to develop a more nuanced conception of time horizons, which is a multidimensional concept. The discounted present value of future outcomes is shaped not only by the size of the discount rate but also by the functional form of the discount function. The distinction between short and long time horizons may be useful for some explanatory purposes but is too simplistic for others.

75. A 1982 edition included theoretical revisions and additional cases.

76. Some journalists and public intellectuals have coopted the groupthink concept and misapplied it, taking it out of the small-group context and using it to refer to conformity of thought at a broader governmental or societal level. An example is the attribution of the American 9/11 intelligence failure to organizational or societal-level groupthink.

77. Mintz & Wayne (2016) develop a "polythink" model and contrast it with groupthink. Polythink includes some psychological elements, but the primary mechanisms driving decision-making have more to do with power, politics, and institutional context than with psychology. More psychological is the "poliheuristic" model of political decision-making (Mintz, 2004).

78. An international security crisis is a sequence of interactions characterized by a severe threat to important values, a high probability of war, and a finite time for coping with the threat (Snyder & Diesing, 1977, chap. 1; Brecher & Geist, 1980, 1–6; Lebow, 1981, 7–12; Holsti, 1989, 12). I exclude the element of surprise, included by some (C. Hermann, 1972), because even anticipated actions can trigger crises in the presence of other defining characteristics.

79. For a good review of research at all three levels see Holsti & George, 1975; Holsti, 1989. On crisis management, see Lebow (1987) and George (1991).

80. Least-likely case logic follows what I call the "Sinatra inference": if I can make it there, I can make it anywhere (Levy, 2008b, 12).

81. Evidence suggests that samples from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) are generally more representative of the American public than are typical in-person convenience samples but less representative than national probability samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).

82. For an application to the pandemic-induced economic crisis of 2020 see Irwin (2021).

83. Undoubtedly psychologists have a similar view about leaving the study of politics to political scientists.

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PERCEIVING THREAT
Cognition, Emotion, and Judgment

JANICE GROSS STEIN

Tʜɪs chapter examines the contribution of political psychology to the analysis of threat perception and assessment by individual leaders in international politics. The focus is on the perception of threat and two analytically distinct but closely related concepts, the perceptions of the credibility of the threat, and the resolve of the threatener to follow through. I include these variants because perceptions of credibility and resolve can intensify the perception of the threat itself.

I begin by briefly defining the two concepts of threat and perception. I look next at five non-psychological explanations of threat perception that scholars of international relations have identified and then move to the analysis of cognitive and emotion-driven theories of threat perception. I also look at threat assessment, a subset of threat perception that examines how leaders judge the likelihood and intensity of threat and pay special attention to the way people weigh probabilities. The chapter concludes with an analysis of psychological theories of the credibility of threats and situates these within broader explanations by evolutionary psychologists of threat perception.

Before turning to the examination of theories of threat perception, I briefly define the two key terms, threat and perception. Threats can be verbal and physical. Verbal threats are conditional statements designed to signal the capacity and intention to inflict harm if desired results are not forthcoming. Verbal threats usually take the form of if-then statements: if you do not do as I ask, I will inflict the following harm on you. Deterrent threats require the target to refrain from committing acts that the threatener does not like and compellent threats require the target to engage in actions that the target does not want to do (Schelling, 1966). Leaders do not always threaten verbally; they can also use non-verbal signals to communicate the seriousness of their intent to punish undesirable behavior. In international politics, they may withdraw their ambassadors, put their forces on alert, or move forces to contested borders.

Complicating the perception of threat in international politics, the accumulation of economic, military, and technological power may be perceived as threatening by others, even if that is not its principal or even intended purpose. Threats do not unambiguously speak for themselves. Understanding the meaning of threats is mediated by the perception of the target. Perception is the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognizing and

interpreting what is processed. Psychologists think of perception as a single unified awareness derived from sensory processes when a stimulus is present. Perception is the basis for understanding, learning, and knowing. It is also closely connected to the predictions and judgments that motivate action. Especially important in processes of threat perception are cognitive patterns and heuristics, information processing, emotional states, patterns of inference and attribution, and patterns of assessment of the likelihood and intensity of threat.

1. Hiding Psychology: Structural Explanations of Threat Perception

Scholars in international relations have long given threat perception a central role in theories of war, deterrence and compellence, alliances, and conflict resolution. Thucydides wrote the foundational text on threat perception and the need to balance against or ally with a threatening power. Yet at the core of theories of balance of power, of alliances, and of war was a largely unexamined concept of threat perception. Threat was conveniently equated to power, largely to military power, and scholars moved easily from "objective" measures of power to threat perception, assuming equivalence between the two. Only in the last several decades have scholars begun to look seriously at intention as a source of threat that is independent of military capabilities and build models that focus explicitly on perception of intention in their explanations of the causes of war (Walt, 1985). This strand of scholarship produced what is generally considered "rationalist" models of deterrence and of war where signaling and credibility are the core analytic puzzles (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Fearon, 1995).

Central to many rationalist accounts of threat perception is the argument that leaders perceive threat and go to war because they do not have complete information. Privately held information creates uncertainty, and in this context, states at times have an incentive to misrepresent information about their capabilities and their intentions (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). This deliberate misrepresentation and the consequent difficulty in establishing the credibility of signals is an important part of the story of threat perception, prediction, crisis escalation, deterrence failure, and war. If both parties accurately and completely represented their privately held information, rationalists expect that states could determine the outcome of a hypothetical confrontation and the "loser" would logically forego engagement. This logic sees war as a result of inaccurate threat perception which flows from deliberate misrepresentation, signals that are not credible, or signals that are difficult to interpret.

The emphasis of these rationalist accounts is largely on the dilemmas that the "sender" of the signals confronts in formulating credible commitments rather than on the perceptual dynamics of the perceiver. Implicit in these accounts, nevertheless, is the argument that if the sender's commitments are not credible to the receiver, the receiver may not perceive their meaning, generate poor predictions, and consequently choose an inappropriate course of action. The silent, largely unexamined variable in rationalist accounts is the dynamics of threat perception by those who are the target of the signal. As Robert Jervis (1976, 2002, 2017) argues, the logic of signaling implies a logic of perception; signals that are sent acquire meaning when they are perceived.

When is the credibility of threats, a concern primarily of the sender rather than the perceiver, especially difficult to establish? Changes in the distribution of capabilities have long been identified as one condition that complicates credibility. "Offensive realists" tend to draw a straightforward equivalence between rising power and the likelihood of aggressive behavior as the balance shifts, and tend to assess a rising trajectory of power as inherently threatening (Mearsheimer, 2003; Elman, 2004; Friedberg, 2000, 2005; Goldstein, 2005, 2007). Some strategic commentary casts China as a rising power that will threaten the interests of the United States as the military balance shifts (Christensen, 2001, 2006).

The line between rising capabilities and threat is not as direct as these arguments suggest. First, credibility is established, as Mercer argues, not by the sender but by the perceiver (1996, 2010; Press, 2005; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon, 2018). Second, declining capabilities can also contribute to an exaggerated perception of threat. Rationalists argue that leaders have strong incentives to bluff or deceive, to exaggerate their capabilities to conceal their weakness, especially when they fear attack. Evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein deliberately did not reveal that that he had ended his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. That unwillingness to make a credible commitment increased the intensity of threat perception among those in the Bush White House who were already inclined to see Saddam as a threat to US interests (Lake, 2011). The difficulty of making credible commitments complicates signaling for the sender, but it simultaneously complicates threat perception for the receiver.

Signaling and threat perception also become more difficult when intentions are difficult to read because of the workings of the security dilemma (Jervis, 1976, 1978, 2017; Glaser, 1977, 1992, 2010; Kydd, 1997a, 1997b, 2005; Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Tang, 2009; Fearon, 2011). A security dilemma arises between two states who are both "security seekers." When one takes defensive action to protect itself, but that defensive action can also be read as offensive, the other misperceives intention and misreads the type of state the other is. This process begins a mutual misperception of each other's defensive intentions as threatening that can culminate in a spiral into war. When sovereignty is contested, for example, the consolidation and defense of the territorial status quo can be viewed as aggressive, especially when it entrenches a disadvantage for one side. As a result, both sides may see their own actions as defensive and the others as threatening, resulting in spirals of hostility as each seeks to bolster its control of contested territory. The culprit is not directly in the way leaders process information, but in the inherent ambiguity of the information they get and the poor diagnostics available to distinguish defensive from offensive intent.

The security dilemma is exacerbated and threat perception complicated under three closely related and at times overlapping conditions. When offense is indistinguishable from defense, when technology is dual use—suitable for civilian and military purposes—and when nuclear and non-nuclear domains become increasingly entangled, signaling and threat perception become more difficult (Glaser and Kaufman, 1988; Jervis, 1978; Acton, 2018). A renewed great power rivalry between the United States and China as China's relative power increases set the context for the interplay and overlap among all three conditions in the contemporary international system. This interplay and overlap make exaggerated threat perception more likely.

A growing concern among analysts is the entanglement of the nuclear and nonnuclear domains as a consequence of new technologies and the evolution of doctrine. Of particular concern is the increasing reliance on dual-use delivery systems and on nuclear command,

control, communications, and intelligence assets that support both nuclear and nonnu-
clear missions. This blurring is exacerbated by the development of advanced conven-
tional missiles that can threaten both nuclear weapons and their command and control
capabilities. Also worrying are the advanced artificial intelligence systems that are in-
creasingly embedded in command, control, communication, and intelligence systems that
are vulnerable to hacking and disruption. Conventional war-fighting doctrines have also
evolved to encourage attack on conventional command and control systems that would
inadvertently compromise nuclear systems (Acton, 2018; Lieber and Press, 2017; Long and
Green, 2015). Further complicating threat perception is the growing scope of cyber warfare,
the challenge of quick attribution, and the dependence of sophisticated systems, in the ci-
vilian as well as the military sphere, on networked digital infrastructure. Cyber warfare may
provide a safer alternative to other kinds of warfare and slow down attribution and predic-
tion, but here too the intermingling of technologies makes threat perception more difficult
and potentially dangerous (Lindsay, 2021; Goldfarb and Lindsay, 2022). These overlapping
and interlocking conditions set the stage for exaggerated threat perceptions by stimulating
a set of cognitive biases such as the negativity bias, the drive to consistency, and overconfi-
dence that I explore in the next section of this chapter.

Closely related are "status dilemmas" that can explain competitive behavior among se-
curity seekers. Here states value status independently of security. A status dilemma occurs
when two states would be satisfied with their status if they had perfect information about
the others' beliefs. Without this kind of information, one set of leaders may perceive that
its status is being challenged even when it is not. These leaders then take action to reas-
sert their status, action which the other perceives as threatening. And so the spiral begins
(Lebow, 2010; Wohlforth, 2009).

A third set of variables that can shape threat perception are the attributes of the political
system. Organizational and bureaucratic politics can produce pathologies where advisers
structure problems in ways that increase their importance and push hard for solutions that
advance their institutional interests. These institutional interests can generate and benefit
from either a heightened or reduced level of threat perception. Those who seek to draw
resources, for example, from those agencies that are responsible for preventing threat and
managing the response tend to push for lower threat perceptions of the capability and in-
tention to inflict harm and assessments of the likelihood that an adversary will inflict harm.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, these kinds of politics operate even during crises, despite
leaders' attempts to extract national perspectives and limit parochial and institutional threat
perceptions (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). A related but distinct argument focuses on organi-
zational failure, on the inability of large and complex organizations to get information up the
chain of command to leaders in a timely way. Investigations of the failure of US intelligence
to read accurately the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and *al-Qaeda* highlighted the diffi-
culty in sharing information across agencies and the challenge of capturing the attention of
senior leaders in a noisy and crowded environment. Here leaders underestimated the threat
not because parochial institutions succeeded in biasing the flow of information but because
information simply did not flow in a timely and coordinated way.

A fourth set of variables in the explanation of threat perception is socio-cultural.
Domestic society and its accompanying identities influence how a state's decision makers
perceive threat (Hopf, 2002; Huddy, Chapter 21, and Cohen-Chen and Halperin, Chapter 30,
this volume). Identity conditions threat perceptions so that the material balance of power

becomes less important (Rousseau, 2006). Some evidence suggests that conservatives tend to perceive threat more easily, but that evidence is part of a larger argument about the impact of the negativity bias that I explore in the next section. A related argument suggests that political cultures which promote militarism and hyper-nationalism tend to be distrustful of outsiders, prone to defensiveness and worst-case thinking, and invested in the heightened perception of threat from external enemies. Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, justifies the sacrifices the impoverished population must make by repeated references to the existential threat posed by the United States and South Korea. For much of the Cold War, leaders in the Soviet Union and the United States made constant references to the threat posed by the other, as do leaders in Beijing and Washington today.

These heightened threat perceptions can be explained in several different ways. It is possible that North Korea's leaders accurately perceive the threat from the United States, but deliberately exaggerate and manipulate the threat to mobilize domestic forces and constrain opposition. Here they would be instrumentally rational, using a heightened level of threat perception to achieve domestic goals. At times, states have gone further and engaged in "diversionary wars," as Argentina did in the Malvinas (Levy and Vakili, 1992; Tir, 2010). Scholarly analysis of the US perception of the Soviet threat during the Cold War provides little support for an argument of instrumental rationality. Rather, the threat was exaggerated because of cognitive patterns, incomplete information, poor probability estimation, emotional beliefs, institutional dynamics, and cultural practices (Lebow and Stein, 1994). Threat becomes culturally routine and embedded in political institutions, and it acquires an almost taken-for-granted quality. Under these conditions, collective threat perceptions become highly resistant to change.

Finally, scholars have identified the breaking of norms as a critical signal that elevates threat perception. The principal factor that elevated Roosevelt's perception of the threat posed by Nazi Germany was Hitler's violation of the norm of political accommodation in the Munich crisis. What mattered most were not the growing military capabilities of Germany, but rather Roosevelt's perception of German intentions that were shaped by the violation of a well-accepted procedural norm and his disdain for the rules of the game (Farnham, 2003). Violating norms and breaking rules by one increases the perception of threat by the other because, at a minimum, it makes behavior less predictable (Cohen 1978).

These five sets of variables—changing balances of power and the attendant difficulty the sender faces in making commitments credible to the perceiver, security and status dilemmas that make intentions difficult to read and threats difficult to assess, institutional interests, political culture, and the violation of norms—all complicate threat perception. The first of these variables—changing balances of power—is systemic and can create incentives for senders to withhold private information and thereby complicate the perception of threat by those who receive the signals. The second derives from ambiguity in the environment that makes threat perception immensely more difficult. Both these arguments mask the role of psychological variables. The next two are domestic and shape the environment in which threat perceptions are developed. These arguments edge close to psychological arguments insofar as they assume implicitly, in interest-based arguments, that in an uncertain environment, people are motivated to perceive threats one way rather than another. The last is grounded in normative theory and the expectations that are derived from adherence to norms. None of these explanations, however, explicitly builds in psychological explanations which help to explain what appear to be anomalous patterns of threat perception at the

individual level, nor do they deal with heterogeneity across individuals in patterns of threat perception.

2. Psychological Explanations of Threat Perception

A recent study of the Iraq War in 2003 concludes that rationalist explanations of war are incomplete and need to be complemented by psychological explanations of threat perception and decision making. Lake sets the rationalist model of privately held information and deliberately deceptive signals against a psychological model of cognitive biases that impaired threat perception and decision making. Although the key players were intentionalist, or minimally rational, he argues, "the key information failures were rooted in cognitive biases in decision making, not intentional misrepresentations by the opponent. Both the United States and Iraq engaged in self-delusions, biased decision making, and failures to update prior beliefs that are inconsistent with the assumption that actors will seek out and use all available information" (2011: 9).

This is a strong indictment of purely rational models of incomplete information and signaling as a sufficient explanation, an indictment that is rooted in evidence of exaggerated threat perceptions by the Bush administration and Saddam's underestimation of the threat posed by the Bush administration to the survival of his regime. Bargaining models fail to provide a robust explanation not only because of the challenges that privately held information creates, but also because of psychological and cultural sources of disagreements about relative power (Streich and Levy, 2016).

Judgments of the accuracy of threat perception are both conceptually and empirically difficult to make, in part because the term is used to describe both an outcome and a process (Jervis, 1976: 49; 1988; 2017). When threat perception is conceived as an outcome, it can be understood as a judgment people make about the likelihood of harm (Oren and Brummer, 2020: 73). Misperception as an outcome describes the difference between perceptions *ex ante* and the outcome *ex post*. It is only possible, however, to make these judgments of accuracy or inaccuracy *ex post*; we make *ex ante* judgments either under conditions of risk, where probabilities are known, or more likely in international politics, under conditions of uncertainty where the threat is sufficiently infrequent or rare that we cannot estimate the "true" probabilities. In most fields, Kahneman, Sibony, and Sunstein conclude, "a judgment may never be evaluated against a true value and will at most be subjected to vetting by another professional who is considered a *respect-expert*" (2021: 369). Leaders elide the difficulty that the probability that China will use force against Taiwan in the next five years is unknowable and substitute subjective probability estimates to make their judgments of the likelihood of threat more manageable. I use the term "threat assessments" to describe these judgments of likelihood.

When perception is used as a process, it describes how people sense and interpret a threat (Oren and Brummer, 2020: 73). Misperception as process generally refers to how people deviate from some standard model of rational information processing (Stein, 1982). Again, what the standard is and how elastic the boundaries are is open to question: What, for

example, constitutes a rational or optimal search for information? How much information is enough? When does additional search provide diminishing marginal returns? These are extraordinary difficult questions to answer empirically and scholars themselves are vulnerable to the "hindsight bias" when answering the question after the fact; they know where the needle is in the haystack (Fischoff, 1975).

Arguments of "misperception" and "miscalculation" are built on the assumption that "accurate" perception and calculation are possible, that there is some standard, some boundary, that separates inaccuracy from accuracy. Yet this boundary is extraordinarily difficult to establish, even after the fact. Historians writing years later with full access to documentary evidence argue about intentions. There are multiple, at times overlapping, explanations of why leaders would deliberately distort the signals they send about their capabilities and their intentions.

As we have seen, leaders may send distorted signals because they are attempting to cover weakness. A second, quite different, explanation emphasizes interests and the constraints imposed by multiple constituencies in "two-level" games (Evans, Jacobsen, and Putnam, 1993). Leaders may be speaking to multiple constituencies simultaneously and therefore have an incentive to distort either their intentions or their capabilities or both. Saddam Hussein did so when he refused to acknowledge publicly that he had ended his unconventional weapons program. He therefore faced enormous difficulty in making his commitments credible to the United States. These difficulties have led scholars to set aside the question of accuracy, to abandon the systematic study of misperception, and to focus rather on patterns of perception under different circumstances (Jervis, 1976; Levy, 2003: 262). Are certain kinds of actors, situations, or crises associated with particular patterns of threat perception?

A second challenge is that most scholars have identified patterns of perception that deviate from rationality in the context of crises and war. They have not paid commensurate attention to identifying patterns of perception when threat assessments are stable and probabilities are moderate, or when threat perception does not culminate in violence. It is likely that leaders systematically make cognitive "errors" in their information processing; if that is the case, then these "errors" are not a significant contributor to crisis escalation or the outbreak of war. It is more than three decades since Jervis called for the systematic study of perceptions across a range of outcomes, but little research of that kind exists (Jervis, 1988: 680; Bar-Joseph and McDermott, 2017).

In the rest of this chapter, I look at the impact of different psychological processes on perceptions and assessments of threat, beginning with cognitive patterns and heuristics. There is evidence of the systematic impact of these processes, but they vary across situations and individuals.

3. Cognitive Patterns and Heuristics

Forty years ago, psychologists started a "cognitive revolution" as they rejected simple stimulus-response models based on reinforcement learning and looked again at the way people made inferences and judgements. They brought the "mind" back into psychology. Although this was not its purpose, until recently the cognitive revolution was widely understood as a commentary on the limits to rationality; some psychologists explicitly developed

models that demonstrated the "deviations" from rationality. At the time, rationality was formulated in precise micro-economic terms as the maximization of subjective expected utility.

To put the argument differently, human reason was translated quite narrowly as rationality defined in micro-economic terms and "misperception" and "miscalculation" as well as other patterns of cognition were defined as "biases" against this narrow template. In this chapter, I generally do not use the term "bias." I consider it misleading insofar as it suggests fault or error defined against a norm that has limited empirical support. Instead, I use the terms "cognitive patterns," "heuristics," and cognitive shortcuts.

How is this "cognitive revolution" relevant to the study of international politics? Political psychologists drew on the cognitive revolution to inform their study of inference, estimation, judgment, and decision-making by political leaders engaged in interactive bargaining with others even as they negotiated domestically with important constituencies. Situated at the apex of these complex strategic and multi-layered games, political leaders, like everyone else, are limited in their capacity to process information. Their rationality is bounded by the need to conserve cognitive energy (Simon, 1957; March, 1978; Jones, 1999). Because their rationality is bounded, people use cognitive short cuts and heuristics to simplify complexity, manage uncertainty, process information, and make inferences (Kahneman et al., 1982; Hogarth and Goldstein, 1996; Dawes, 1998; Hastie and Dawes, 2001; Gilovich et.al., 2002; Chong, Chapter 4, and Lau and Redlawsk, Chapter 5, this volume). Analysis of these cognitive shortcuts helps to explain the threat perceptions of individual leaders.

People need simple rules of information processing and judgment that are necessary to make sense of environments that are both uncertain and complex. Although cognitive psychologists have identified a large number of these heuristics and patterns, they are all broadly consistent with a fundamental need to conserve cognitive energy by constructing frames to simplify what would otherwise be an overwhelming environment, and to avoid dissonance and inconsistency. They are also disposed to pay more attention to the negative than to the positive and to make fundamental errors in attributing intentions (Dawes, 1998; Tetlock, 2005). Within these general patterns, there is individual heterogeneity in patterns of information processing (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013, 2017). This variation in cognitive patterns and heuristics across individuals adds to the "noise" already inherent in the patterns of threat perception (Kahneman et al., 2021). Some of the factors that produce noise or variation in perceptions—mood, fatigue, time of day, political orientations, differences in risk tolerance—are known, but others are not. All these factors, individually and cumulatively, help to explain differences in patterns of threat perception.

Simplifying complex environments. Political leaders trying to assess a threat need to make a very complex world somewhat simpler. To do so, they unconsciously strip the nuance, the context, the subtleties out of the problems they face, to build simple frames. Stripping out the context when assessing threat can lead to very oversimplified judgments. President George H. Bush famously said when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 that Saddam Hussein was "another Hitler." Whatever Saddam was, it is difficult to argue that he was comparable to Hitler either in his intentions or his capabilities: the scope of his ambition or the numbers that he had killed did not compare to Hitler nor did his relative military capabilities. That kind of simplified reasoning by analogy to develop a perception of threat is not uncommon.

Maintaining Consistency: Deny and Discount. Cognitive psychologists have produced robust evidence that people strongly prefer consistency, that they are made uncomfortable

by dissonant information, and that they consequently deny or discount inconsistent information to preserve their beliefs. They have a strong tendency to see what they expect to see based on their existing beliefs. This drive for consistency impairs the updating of perceptions and assessments. Exposure to contradictory information does not necessarily improve performance; on the contrary, it frequently results in the strengthening of beliefs (Anderson et al., 1980; Andersen, 1983; Hirt and Sherman, 1985). The lengths policy makers will go to defend forecasts gone wrong are quite remarkable (Tetlock, 1998). Threat perception and assessment resemble forecasting; they generate an assessment of what others are likely to do in the future. The contemporary debate about the trajectory of China, for example, is in part a debate about whether China is likely to use military force to overturn the status quo in Taiwan as it grows relatively stronger.

Much of the work of cognitive psychology has been done in the laboratory with students, and experts have questioned how well the results travel into international politics. That question was largely put to rest by a remarkable study of the forecasts made by foreign policy experts in different cultures (Tetlock, 2005). Experts on foreign policy generally continued to defend the forecasts they had made, even after what they expected did not happen. Tetlock identifies seven categories of belief system defenses: challenging whether the local conditions required by the forecast were satisfied, invoking the unexpected occurrence of a shock, invoking a close-call counterfactual ("I almost got it right"), using an "off-on-timing" argument ("I'm ahead of my time; history will prove me right"), declaring that international politics is hopelessly indeterminate and consequently unpredictable, defiantly asserting that they made the "right mistake" and would do it again, and insisting that unlikely things sometimes happen (2005: 129).

The same kind of dynamic in information processing that cognitive psychologists have documented in the laboratory has also been confirmed among political experts. Tetlock finds a relationship between the size of the mistakes and the activation of defenses. The more confident experts were in their original forecast, the more threatened they were when they were faced with disconfirming evidence, and the more motivated they were to use one or more of the seven defenses to preserve their beliefs. "Defensive cognitions," Tetlock argues, "are activated when forecasters most need them" (2005: 137). When political experts most needed to revise their judgments, they were least open to revision. If these patterns of thinking are characteristic among experts in international politics, they are as likely, if not more so, to be present among political leaders estimating threat. Deeply rooted cognitive processes systematically work against appropriate updating in the face of what proves subsequently to be diagnostic information.

Yet conservatism does not hold unconditionally. Change is partly a function of the rate at which discrepant information occurs, and how diagnostic the information is. Contradictory evidence dispersed across many instances should have a greater impact on estimates than a few isolated examples (Crocker and Weber, 1983; Crocker et al., 1983). As people consider information inconsistent with previous knowledge, they incorporate into their estimates the conditions under which the belief does not hold, permitting gradual change and adjustment (Higgins and Bargh, 1987: 386). When people are faced with repeated inconsistencies, they change their least central beliefs first (Tetlock, 1998). Important beliefs are challenged only when there is no other way to account for contradictory data that people consider diagnostic. Greater change will occur when information arrives in large batches, rather than bit by bit (Jervis, 1968, 1976). President George H. Bush did not change his estimate of the

threat posed by the Soviet Union even though the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made a series of unilateral gestures to the United States. Only when information about large changes arrived in a rush did he finally change his threat perception. Even the strongest beliefs cannot withstand the challenge of strongly incongruent information over time (Markus and Zajonc, 1985).

Within this general pattern, there is also evidence of heterogeneity. Not all experts were resistant to change all the time. Drawing on a well-known distinction made by Isaiah Berlin, Tetlock classified foreign policy experts as "foxes" or "hedgehogs." Hedgehogs know "one big thing" extremely well and extend what they know into other domains of foreign policy analysis. Foxes, on the other hand, know many small things, are generally skeptical of grand overarching schemes, stitch together assessments with different threads of knowledge, and are skeptical of prediction in world politics (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996: 263–268; Berlin, 1997; Tetlock, 2005: 73–75;).

The evidence shows that the foxes do much better at short-term forecasting within their broad domain of expertise than do hedgehogs. The worst performers were hedgehogs who made long-term predictions, usually with considerable confidence. Hedgehogs are generally people with strong needs for structure and closure, who are most likely to discount and dismiss inconsistent evidence when it contradicts their preconceptions. The more knowledge hedgehogs have, the better equipped they are to defend against inconsistency. Foxes are skeptical of deductive approaches, more likely to qualify analogies by looking for disconfirming information, more open to competing arguments, more prone to synthesize arguments, more detached, and, not surprisingly, more likely to admit they were in error in their threat assessment. The hallmark of the foxes was their more balanced perceptions and assessments and style of thinking about the world. Foxes had "a style of thought that elevates no thought above criticism" (Tetlock, 2005: 88, 118).

Predisposition to negativity. Psychologists have identified a related pattern, the "negativity bias," which that suggests that "negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in combinations and generally efficacious than positive events" (Rozin and Royzman, 2001: 297; Tierney and Baumeister, 2019). People generally pay more attention to and give more weight to negative elements of their environment. A striking feature of this predisposition to negativity is that it appears to vary individually and situationally.

Compared to liberals, some evidence suggests that conservatives tend to register greater physiological responses to these negative stimuli and to devote more psychological resources to processing features of the environment that are negative (Landau-Wels and Saxe, 2019). They are psychologically, physiologically, and neurologically more sensitive to threats in the environment (Johnson et al., 2012: 119). Some evidence also suggests that conservatives have a lower bar for labelling stimuli as negative and threatening (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford, 2014: 301). Although conservatives have a predisposition to negativity, this may vary with different kinds of threats and in different domains (Landau-Wells and Saxe, 2019; Pompattananangkul et al., 2014).

Related evidence, drawn largely from experiments with college undergraduates, suggests the proposition that policy makers are predisposed to believe advisers who are hawks rather than doves. Scholars constructed a comprehensive list of cognitive shortcuts and heuristics identified in the last forty years of research and, in a remarkable result, found that all the biases predisposed leaders to believe the hawks. Basic psychological impulses

incline national leaders to exaggerate the threatening intentions of adversaries (Kahneman and Renshon, 2007: 36).

The evidence, however, is not consistent and suggests that political ideologies are multi-dimensional (Feldman and Huddy, 2014). Liberals do not have a "positivity bias," and part of the discrepancy between liberals and conservatives may be a function of their disagreement over whether the same state of affairs is negative or positive (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford, 2014: 306; Charney, 2014: 311).Varying orientations to threats may also be correlated with political orientations (Culotta, 2012; Lillienfeld and Latzman, 2014; Landau-Wells and Saxe, 2019; Rathbun, 2019; Rathbun et al., 2017). Teasing out what causes what is not easy, but some evidence suggests political orientations are the consequence of psychological traits (Fraley et al., 2012; Brandt, Wetherell, and Reyna, 2014; cf. Jost, Noorbaloochi and Van Bavel, 2014). And although differences in attention to negative elements are related to differences in political orientations, these differences do not translate into differences in responses to threats. Some responses to threat, particularly those associated with universal values, are associated with more left-wing political orientations (Inbar and Pizarro, 2014; Schwartz, 2006).

Time sensitivity also affects the strength of sensitivity to threats. Temporal sensitivity may be partly explained by temporal construal theory, especially by its proposition that proximate events are treated with greater "concreteness," leading to greater attention to their probabilities (Levy, 2013: 317–320; Trope and Liberman, 2000; Rapport, 2012/2013). Negative events become disproportionately salient as they become closer in time or distance (Rozin and Royzman, 2001: 304–305). Generally, threat sensitivity increases when a leader is conservative, the threat is closer in distance and immanent, and the threat has a human face (Johnson and Tierney, 2019: 121). More research is needed to conceptualize and measure the negativity bias, to uncover its origins, to distinguish more sharply between neuroticism and negativity, to distinguish more carefully between negativity and threat sensitivity, and to disaggregate responses to different environmental elements and their relationship to more refined sets of political predispositions in different contexts (Hogan, 2014; Morgan, Skitka, and Wisneski, 2014).

The fundamental attribution error. Significant change in perceptions of threat also occurs when subjects are inconsistent in their pattern of attribution. A common cognitive pattern, the fundamental attribution error, is that people generally tend to use double standards in making attributions. People exaggerate the importance of dispositional over situational factors in explaining the behavior that they dislike by others but explain the behavior that they like by others by their circumstances rather than by their character (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Gilbert and Malone, 1995). Closely related is the actor-observer bias, in which people tend to over-emphasize the role of a situation in their own behaviors and under-emphasize the role of their own attributes. More recent research has identified some cross-cultural variance in attributions of undesired behavior, highlighting differences between individualist and collectivist cultures but the argument that the fundamental attribution error is not-hard wired but a cultural artifact is contested (Nisbett, 2004; cf. Chan and Yan, 2007).

The implications of these two pervasive patterns of attribution are clear: people generally will tend to perceive the threatening behavior of others as intentional and systematically overestimate the threat that others represent in part because they attribute the intentionally threatening behavior as dispositional (Johnson, 2020: 117–118). They also minimize the threat that others may perceive in their own behavior. When the government of North

Korea makes a threatening statement, leaders in Washington see that threat as a function of the kind of regime that Pyongyang is, but explain their own response as evidence of the difficult situation that they confront. The double standard in reasoning is clear and can lead to significant and reciprocal exaggeration of threat in strategic interactions that take place against a background of enmity and ambiguity. The fundamental attribution error and the actor-observer bias, working together, can explain reciprocal patterns of escalating threat perception and the dynamics of the spiral model that occur when the security dilemma is acute. The two can reinforce each other to enable exaggerated threat perception, reciprocal escalatory steps, and a spiral of hostility. They can also explain the embedding of conflict over time so that it becomes protracted and resistant to resolution.

The impact of these cognitive patterns and heuristics can pull in different directions. At times, some are likely to increase while others are likely to lower threat perception. Clearly exaggerated threat perception is most likely when simplification and denial of information that are inconsistent with prior beliefs are layered on top of a predisposition to pay attention to the negative and to the fundamental attribution error. When leaders engage in these reinforcing patterns of thinking in environments where offense is indistinguishable from defense, technologies are dual use, nuclear and non-nuclear systems are entangled, and power balances are changing, threat perception is likely to be significantly escalated. That is the worst-case scenario. Changing the direction of any one of these seven interacting variables should help to reduce the intensity of threat perception.

4. Assessing Threat: Making Probability Estimates

A critical component of threat perception is the assessment of the probability that opponents not only have the capability and the intention to do harm but that they are likely to do harm. Foreign policy decision makers face special challenges because many of the threats they consider occur in an environment where the underlying probability distributions are not available. Leaders work in a world of uncertainty, where underlying probabilities are unknown, as distinct from a world of risk where probability distributions are known. Even when probability distributions are known and robust, people are generally not intuitive probability thinkers. They depart systematically from what objective probability calculations would dictate in the estimates they make. "Human performance suffers," argues Tetlock, "because we are, deep down, deterministic thinkers with an aversion to probabilistic strategies that accept the inevitability of error" (2005: 40). People generally think in causal and narrative ways rather than in statistical terms (Kahneman et al., 2021). Foreign policy decision makers tend to use cognitive short cuts to estimate the likelihood of threats and, like decision makers in general, tend to be loss averse and, under specific conditions, overweight the likelihood of a threatening loss. To make matters worse, people tend to be overconfident in the estimates that they generate. Within these general patterns, there is variation across individuals. This section takes up each of these issues in turn.

Likely states of the world are very difficult to estimate in world politics. There are few repeated trials with large numbers. Leaders responsible for estimating threat generally

do not live in a world of risk, where the probability distributions are known and the task is to estimate the likelihoods. Analysts, even the best informed, do not have probability distributions of attacks by militants against civilian infrastructure in the United States, the United Kingdom, or Pakistan. Nor do they have a large data base on the number of attacks by great powers on offshore islands close to their territory. There have been too few such attacks to generate a probability distribution. This world of structural uncertainty without known probability distributions is one that is particularly uncomfortable psychologically, and it is under these conditions that leaders, just like experts, are most likely to seek the false certainty of order and control. Sociologists and philosophers label this pattern the search for ontological security.

Thinking about probability through cognitive short cuts. An analysis of the probability estimates of foreign policy experts shows that they do surprisingly poorly. Highly educated specialists in foreign affairs approached only 20% of the ideal across all exercises (Tetlock, 2005: 77). They performed poorly because they think causally rather than pay attention to the frequencies with which events occur and use statistical reasoning (Kahneman et al., 2021). Experts tend to overestimate the likelihood of threat, for example, because they can easily imagine the causal pathways to war, a highly salient occurrence that they have likely experienced or studied (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Koehler, 1996). They pay less attention to the threats that did not lead to war and to the frequency of threats over an extended period of time.

Cognitive psychology has identified heuristics and cognitive patterns that people use in environments of both risk and uncertainty that can impair processes of probability estimation and threat perception (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1982; Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Jervis, 1986; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986; Johnson et al., 2012). Heuristics are convenient short-cuts or rules of thumb for processing information. Two of the best-documented heuristics directly related to estimating the likelihood of threats are representativeness and anchoring. The heuristic of representativeness refers to people's proclivity to exaggerate similarities between one event and a prior class of events, typically leading to significant errors in probability judgments (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). The heuristic of anchoring refers to an estimation of magnitude or degree by comparing it with an "available" initial value as a reference point and making a comparison (Fiske and Taylor, 1984: 250–256, 268–275). In a world of uncertainty, leaders search for the relevant reference classes to anchor their judgments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Initial judgments or prior beliefs serve as a conceptual anchor on the processing of new information and the revision of estimates. Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that processes of information processing are weighed down by prior beliefs and initial estimates. The implications for threat perception and assessment are considerable; once an estimate of threat is generated, it anchors subsequent rates of revision so that revision tends to be slower and less responsive to diagnostic information. Anchoring leads to threat estimates that can be too low or too high, in part because they become embedded and resistant to change.

These conservative processes of information processing are present in almost all intelligence failures. Josef Stalin ignored evidence that was inconsistent with his belief that Adolf Hitler would not turn away from the western front and attack the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the United States, although a few very senior officials warned of the intention of *al-Qaʿeda* to strike the United States, officials generally failed to update their estimates as they receive

disconnected pieces of information before September 11th. Similar conservatism explained the failure of leaders to update their assessment of a likely pandemic even though there was strong evidence by mid-January of 2020 that something extraordinary was happening in the city of Wuhan in China.

There is also good evidence that people tend to be non-linear in the way they weight probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). There is some disagreement about how leaders distort their subjective probability estimates and about the determinants of individual variation. Some consider either underweighting or overweighting not as errors, but rather as decision weights (Barberis, 2013: 176). It is useful first to distinguish between probabilities that fall within the distribution (low probabilities) and those at the most extreme end of the tail of the distribution (extremely low probabilities). Decision makers tend to overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities within a normal distribution (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992: 311–313; Gonzales and Wu, 1999). Decision makers tend then to give more weight to the utility of a possible outcome when probabilities are high or low, when they should give equal weight to both (Levy, 1997: 91–92).

When the probability of a consequence is extreme, the pattern of probability estimation tends to be different. Cumulative prospect theory, where weightings apply to cumulative probabilities—the probability of gaining *at least* $100 or losing at least $100 *or more*—finds that people tend to systematically underweight very low probabilities and overweight extremely high probabilities. Under these conditions, they tend to treat them as impossible or certain (Barberis, 2013: 176–177). Economists and psychologists advance at least three different explanations for these variations in patterns of probability weighting: diminishing sensitivity (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzales and Wu, 1999), differences in affective reactions of potential outcomes (Rottenstreich and Hsee; 2001), and the salience of payoffs where decision makers construct context-dependent representations in which "true" probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2012). Since probability estimates are such an important component of threat assessment, more research needs to be done on the conditions that give rise to these variations in probability weightings.

Loss aversion. Foreign policy decision makers, like people generally, are not neutral about risk. Prospect theory is among the most influential theories of risk propensity, and while it is a primarily a theory of response to risk, it also speaks to estimating the likelihood and valuation of threatening losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The fundamental argument that delivers the analytic punch of prospect theory is the unequal valuation of equivalent gains and losses and the impact that value has on probability estimates. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue first that the pain of a loss is greater than the pleasure of an equivalent gain. People frame choice around a reference point and give more weight to losses from that reference point than to comparable gains in constructing their assessments of the likelihood of the consequences of options. Because losses are far more painful than gains, people are risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses when probability estimates are high.

Within this general pattern, there is variation. Domain has an impact not only on the weighting of loss but also on the estimation of its likelihood. The tendency toward risk-seeking is greater in human life problems than in money problems (Mandel, 2001: 71). Prospect theory is more likely to be relevant, therefore, to estimation of the likelihood of

security threats than it is to threats arising from international trade or finance (Carnevale, 2008; Kanner, 2004; McDermott, 2009; Stein, 2017). When their survival or the survival of those they represent is not assured, decision makers tend to weigh that threat as very costly and overestimate its probability. To complicate explanation even further, as we have seen, there is variation in the ways individuals estimate probability (McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov, 2008: 345; Schaub 2004; Stein and Sheffer, 2019).

The impact of loss aversion on threat perception is considerable (Jervis, 1992; Stein and Pauly, 1992; Farnham, 1994; Levy, 1997, Chapter 10, this volume; McDermott, 1998; Davis, 2000). Leaders are likely to be more sensitive to threats to what they already have because they tend to value what they have—the "endowment effect"—more than comparable assets that they do not have (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990: 1342; Jervis, 1992). Prospect theory, although primarily a theory of decision, is nevertheless a very useful screen for the "defender" to assess the likelihood of threat from a would-be "challenger." In 1973, Egypt's President Sadat, who had never normalized for the loss of the Sinai in 1967, chose as his reference point not the status quo but Egyptian possession of the Sinai. He was consequently in the domain of loss and prepared to be extraordinarily risk-acceptant in his choices. He designed around Israel's deterrence—its superiority in the air and on the ground— and his generals planned a limited strike across the Suez Canal under the protection of a missile shield (George and Smoke, 1974; Stein, 1985). Israel's decision makers systematically underestimated the threat from Egypt because they missed the impact of loss aversion on Sadat's estimation of probabilities and subsequent decision. Prospect theory would have been a far more useful theoretical screen for Israel's leaders to assess the likely threat from Egypt than a rational model of deterrence based on net assets and a balance of military capabilities. The argument and the evidence suggest that leaders need to be especially vigilant in their threat assessment when their adversary is in the domain of loss (Levy, 2003: 271). Under these circumstances, leaders need to correct for the risk of underestimating rather than overestimating threat (Stein and Sheffer, 2019).

Overconfidence amplifies the impact of forecasting errors (Arkes, 2001; Johnson and Fowler, 2011). People who are overconfident tend, by definition, to be more confident than they are accurate; they exaggerate the true likelihood of an outcome (Johnson, 2020: 51; McDermott, 2020; Tetlock, 2005; Kahneman et al., 2021). Overconfidence is a tendency toward optimism that blocks disconfirming evidence (Johnson, 2020: 52; Sharot, 2011; Moore and Healy, 2008). Accuracy is a function of the ability of people to make predictions and then get feedback so that they can adjust their future estimates (Agrawal et al., 2018; McDermott, 2020). In world politics, feedback is generally slower and more ambiguous, leaving greater scope for people to reinforce rather than adjust their prior beliefs and avoid revising their estimates (Tetlock, 2005). In this domain, decision makers are likely to remain overconfident far longer than in domains where feedback comes quickly and is undisputable. Only after their estimates of likelihood have been proven wrong do leaders acknowledge that they were overconfident. There is strong evidence that decision makers tend to be overconfident both in their estimation of threats and in their performance should they choose to use force to respond to the perceived threat (Levy, 1983). Overconfidence varies significantly across individuals, genders, domains, or cultures. Experimental war games find that men are more likely to be overconfident than women, and that overconfident men are especially likely to fight (Johnson, 2020: 53; Johnson et al., 2006).

Improving assessment. Predictions in international politics that are at the core of threat perceptions and assessments are remarkably difficult to improve, not only because people

generally tend to be poor at estimating probabilities. The largest source of prediction errors are not only cognitive patterns and heuristics or variation within and across individual judgments—what Kahneman and his colleagues call "noise"—but objective ignorance. So much is unknown in international politics where in many domains cases tend to be few as are repeated estimates that tend to be comparable. Without repeated estimations by one individual over many cases or the judgments by multiple people across the same case, it is very difficult to estimate the noise in leaders' predictions. In addition, the further out into the future leaders estimate likelihoods, the greater the impact of objective ignorance (Kahneman et al., 2021).

Some scholars have encouraged decision makers to systematically consider alternative explanations for the indicators that are most diagnostic in shaping their estimates (Arkes, 2001; Jervis, 2010). Others have looked to institutionalize challengers, suggesting that decision makers build in "red teams" or "devil's advocates" who can challenge estimates early enough in the process, before they become deeply embedded. Some of these have had short-term success, but they have proven difficult to sustain over time.

The most sustained attempt to improve estimates and forecasts of geopolitical events is the Good Judgment Project that, in a four-year tournament, consistently outperformed intelligence analysts who had access to classified data. Analysis of a data base of more than 800,000 forecasts finds significant variation across individuals in their capacity to predict. The primary attributes of "superforecasters" are open-minded thinking and the belief that forecasting is a skill to be cultivated (Tetlock and Gardner, 2015). Training can improve performance in forecasting as people become better at distinguishing signals from noise (Satopaa et al., 2021). Encouraging decision makers and analysts to use clearer and more precise probability estimates that are consistent with natural language-based descriptions improves performance as does making frequent, small updates to estimates (Friedman et al., 2018; Atanasov et al., 2020). In settings where there are several decision makers, early exposure to the most reliable information can have a significant impact, as can aggregating multiple independent judgments in a forecast, using shared scales grounded in outside views, and providing guidelines to reduce variability among the analysts (Kahneman et al., 2021).

It is also likely that machine learning, using large amounts of data where they are available, can remove the noise, though not necessarily the bias, from predictions (Agrawal et al., 2018). AI is likely more helpful for certain kinds of predictions and more suitable for pattern recognition and improving the reliability of estimates when the quality of information that is available is relatively high. Semi-supervised machine-learning models, using publicly available text sources, are already being used to identify and measure elite perceptions of international threat, and to measure and track variation in the assessments of the intensity of foreign threats over time (Trubowitz and Watanabe, 2021). Machine learning will play an increasingly important role in generating threat assessments, but human judgment will remain essential in integrating probability estimates into choices (Kahneman et al., 2021; Goldfarb and Lindsay, 2021).

5. Emotion and Threat Perception

The understanding of the impact of emotion on perception and assessment has changed dramatically in the last few decades (Brader and Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). Once constructed as a constraint on rationality, neurologists and political psychologists now consider emotion as integral to rationality (Mercer, 2005, 2010). No longer do we think of

thinking and feeling as separable processes, but rather as deeply intertwined, with profound implications for the way we understand perception both as process and as outcome.

Information processing is the result not only of a deliberative thought process, but also of preconscious neurological processes. The unconscious brain manages the overwhelming amount of information that the brain processes. Research in neuroscience finds that about 2% of the brain's activities operate at the conscious level; all the rest is unconscious appraisal (LeDoux, 1996: 53, 128; Markwica, 2018). Emotion is primary in both preconscious processing and in perception and thought. It is connected to threat perception directly and indirectly to analyses of deterrence, reputation, signaling, nuclear proliferation, and the war on terror (Mercer, 1996, 2005, 2010; Bennett, 2002; Saurette, 2006; Bleiker and Hutchinson, 2008; Crawford, 2009; Hymans, 2006). Specific emotions such as fear, anger, and humiliation also inform the analysis of threat perception and motives for war (Gries, 2004; Saurette, 2006; Löwenheim and Heimann, 2008; Lebow, 2010; Cohen-Chen and Halperin, Chapter 30, this volume).

Emotion and cognition. Emotions are complex, largely automated programs of action that have evolved over time and are in part culturally conditioned (Markwica, 2018: 4). Emotions are the physiological processes carried out in our bodies, tied to the body's autonomic nervous system, from changes in facial expressions, the surface of our skins, and body posture to internal bodily changes (Damasio, 1994; 2010: 116.) Feelings of emotion are not emotions. They are the composite perceptions of what happens in our body and mind when we are emotional. Emotional feelings are mostly perceptions of what our bodies are doing when we are emotional, along with perceptions of our state of mind during that same period of time.

Emotions work when image processes in the brain activate emotion-triggering regions of the brain. Recent meta-analyses find that whole-of-brain networks of neurons, particularly the interoceptive and control networks, trigger emotions. Emotion is constructed in the moment by core systems that interact across the whole brain (Barrett, 2017). Physiological processes begin that stimulate changes in the body and mental processes of appraisal. They are followed by feelings of emotion. Emotions and feelings build in the components that regulate our human machinery that evolved over time—the sensing of conditions in the environment, the assessment of internal needs, and the activation of the prediction machinery (Damasio, 2010: 117–118).

Evolutionary psychologists and neuropsychologists, who begin by emphasizing the materiality of emotions, reject a separation between cognition and emotion as untenable. The one is embedded within the other and neurologically intertwined (LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 1999; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005; Markwica, 2018: 7, 22–23). There is growing consensus that emotion is "first," because it is automatic and fast, and, operating below the threshold of conscious awareness, it plays a dominant role in shaping perception (Winkielman and Berridge, 2004). Emotions shape what and how people think through their "appraisal tendencies" (Markwica, 2018: 67). They may help people make good assessments quickly by enabling them to focus on the key elements of a threat or may lead to processes where threat is over or under-estimated, depending both on the emotion and the intensity of emotional activation.

Robin Markwica, who in his analysis of the perception and responses to coercive threats develops a logic of affect, draws on evolutionary psychology, the social sciences, and philosophy to provide a comprehensive definition. "Emotions are transient, partly biologically

based, and partly culturally conditioned responses to a stimulus, which give rise to a coordinated process including appraisals, feelings, bodily reactions, and expressive behavior, all of which prepare people to deal with the stimulus" (Markwica, 2018: 58).

How do neuroscientists analyze the relationship between emotion and cognition? "Dual-process" theories in psychology provide an account of how a phenomenon can occur as a result of two different processes, one implicit and the second explicit (Barrett, Tugade, and Engle, 2004; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Sun, 2002; Lau and Redlawsk, Chapter 5, and Jerit and Kam, Chapter 15, this volume). Implicit systems are automatic, fast, evolved early, use parallel processing, have high capacity, are not reflexive, and are effortless, while explicit systems are conscious, controlled, relatively slow, evolved late, use sequential processing, are limited by attentional and working memory resources, and are effortful (MacDonald, 2008).

Kahneman (2011) calls the first, emotion-based system of processing "intuitive" and "associative" and the second system "reasoned" and "rule-governed" (Kahneman, 2003, 2011). The first system is preconscious, automatic, fast, effortless, associative, unreflective, usually with strong emotional bonds, and slow to change. The second system is conscious, slow, effortful, reflective, rule-governed, and flexible. The vast majority of processing occurs through the first system, which draws heavily on emotions and, in a competition between the two, always trumps the rule-governed, reasoned system. It is extraordinarily difficult, Kahneman concludes, for the second system to educate the first.

Emotion, appraisal and perception. There is ongoing debate about the impact of emotion on information processing and perception. One approach treats emotion as information that stimulates appraisal. Emotions carry information to people about their unconscious processes, which then become conscious thoughts and feelings and affect their perceptions and beliefs (Clore, 1992; Clore and Gasper, 2000; Clore, Schwarz, and Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Mercer, 2010; Holmes, 2016). In this sense, emotion does not follow cognitive appraisal but create appraisals through the information they provide (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein, 2004).

Psychologists suggest that specific emotions stimulate specific "appraisal tendencies" (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Appraisal tendencies are cognitive predispositions to appraise the environment to prepare people to respond to the triggering event. They influence the content and the cues that people pay attention to, as well as the processes of thought. The more intense an emotional experience, the greater its impact is likely to be on appraisal tendencies. Recent evidence suggests that decision makers tend to pay selective attention to emotionally vivid information and use this information to assess an adversary's intentions and level of threat (Yarhi-Milo, 2014: 17–18). A comparison of threat perception by Nikita Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis and Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 finds that emotions were the primary drivers of threat perception in half the cases, far more so than any other driver (Markwica, 2018: 258–259).

Evolution and emotion. Evolutionary psychologists have long seen emotions as adaptive programs of action that evolved over time to ensure survival and reproduction (Frijda 1988; Berkowitz, 1999). They understand emotions as superordinate programs that gather information from the environment and organize the raw data of experience prior to conscious processes of thought. Emotions serve as switches, turning on and off depending on the environmental demands of the moment (Barkow et al., 1995; Tooby and Cosmides, 2003: 116). People are programmed to detect threat because these rapid and efficient judgments about

the significance of threat are important for survival (Green and Phillips, 2004; Bauman and DeSteno, 2010; Johnson, 2020).

Political and social psychologists see evolutionary arguments as necessary but not complete. What, they ask, governs these switches, beyond the imperative of physical survival? It is social context which makes emotions meaningful (Saurette, 2006: 507–508; Markwica, 2018). It is only with a shared sense of what constitutes appropriate social behavior that a person, a people, or a government feels humiliated or threatened. When the flag of one nation is burned by another, the humiliation and anger that follow flow from a shared understanding that the burning of a flag is a deliberately insulting and threatening act. Physiological processes are layered by social knowledge, which shapes the appropriateness of anger and fear and the perception of threat. It is in this sense that emotions need to be conceived not only as an individual but also as a socially constructed process (Ross, 2006; Markwica, 2018). I explore the contribution of evolutionary psychology to the understanding of threat perception in greater detail in the conclusion to this chapter.

Fear and threat perception. Six emotions—joy, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and surprise—are widely considered to be basic in that facial displays of these emotions are recognized across cultures (Parkinson et al., 2005: 57–58). Other scholars argue that even the most basic emotions are social constructions, the product of people's social and cultural environments (Barrett, 2017; Matsumoto and Hwang, 2012; Markwica, 2018: 56).

Among these six "basic" emotions, the impact of fear is the most directly related to threat perception and the most widely studied (Bauman and DeSteno, 2010; Huddy et al., 2005). Fear has been central to the study of foreign policy and international politics. From Thucydides, the great student of the Peloponnesian Wars, to Hobbes, who wrote about the state of anarchy that induced fear, to Morgenthau, the twentieth-century classical realist, who started his analysis of international politics with a Hobbesian analysis of international anarchy that generated fear and an unending search for power, realists have premised their analyses of international politics on the ubiquity of fear. In these realist and rationalist accounts, however, fear remains an assumption, unexplored, rather than a dynamic process that is experienced.

Neuropsychologists and behavioral economists treat fear very differently. Fear is an aversive emotion that is evoked when people sense an immediate physical or psychological threat and when they are uncertain about whether they can cope (Markwica, 2018: 73). A novel context with high uncertainty is especially likely to increase the feeling of fear and the perception of threat (Erisen, 2018). Fear is the product of evolved sensory mechanisms that operate unconsciously and consciously to sound an alarm of imminent threat and danger. Fear is both non-cognitive, unconscious, and sub-cortical, on the one hand, and cognitive, conscious, and cortical, on the other (Gil, 2016). The sensory mechanisms are adaptive insofar as they heighten attention and vigilance and prepare people to respond to what they perceive as imminent threat in one of three ways: flight, fight, or freeze. Flight is an impulse to avoid the danger and is the result of a lightening quick appraisal that escape is possible (Frijda, 1986: 18, 100). Fight is an impulse when people feel they can prevail, but also when failing to fight is likely to elicit stigma. The third impulse—to freeze—is triggered by an appraisal that both fighting and escape will fail. Respiration and heart rates slow. All three impulses are associated with physiological processes that prepare the body to act: spikes of adrenalin and release of cortisol or slowing respiration rates (Markwica, 2018: 73) In all these cases, fear influences how people think as well as how they feel. It

interrupts normal cognitive processes and heightens attention to threat, which in turn can intensify perception of threat and set off a spiraling up of fear. It also inhibits complex cognitive processing.

There are individual differences in sensitivity to threats (Landau-Wells and Saxe, 2019). Recent evidence demonstrates that conservatives and liberals are sensitive to different kinds of threats (immigration or climate change, respectively) and the kind of potential harm that is threatened (physical pain or contamination). Individual differences in sensitivity to threats relate in part to people's political orientations that highlight one kind of threat rather than another.

Neuroscientists have now demonstrated that fear conditioning may be permanent, or at least far longer lasting than other kinds of learning. Fear may last longer than the threat and can become a learned response that is embedded over time. Fear also has a social and political dimension (Gil, 2016). Once a threat is perceived, internalized, and institutionalized, it tends to become self-perpetuating. It consequently becomes far more difficult to wind down well-established embedded threat perceptions that may drive conflict over the longer term.

Humiliation, anger, and threat perception. When people perceive threats as humiliating, they are likely to become angry and may seek revenge if they have the capacity to do so. Anger reduces information seeking and attention to disparate cues and is likely to provoke an aggressive response. Both Nikita Khrushchev and Saddam Hussein in 1990 each felt humiliated by the coercive threats made by the United States (Markwica, 2018: 262). The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were deliberately designed to humiliate the United States, by attacking its visible symbols of power, by piercing its sense of invulnerability, and by violating its sense of self-respect and honor. President Bush, humiliated and angered, lashed back, first against those who gave *al-Qaeda* shelter but then inexplicably against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in a campaign described as "shock and awe" to give forcible description to American power (Saurette, 2006). There are also gender differences in both fear- and anger-driven appraisals of threats that translate into different action responses (Taylor et al., 2000; Taylor, 2011).

6. Perception of the Credibility of Threats

The credibility of threats, an essential component in theories of deterrence, compellence, and bargaining, is not only or largely a property of the sender's resolve, past reputation, or audience costs, as some formal models of signaling suggest, but far more a function of the perceptions of the target of the threat driven by cognition and emotion (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985; Lebow and Stein, 1994; Mercer, 2010; Brutger and Kertzer, 2018; Kertzer, 2017; Yarhi-Milo, 2014, 2018; Casler and Yarhi-Milo, Chapter 12, this volume).

Evidence suggests individual differences matter in patterns of perception (Markwica, 2018: 261; Rathbun, 2019). Leaders and publics vary in how credible they perceive threats to be, depending on their foreign policy dispositions, experiences, emotional responses, and even their physical strength. Physically stronger males are more attuned to threats and more inclined to support the use of force in international conflict (Petersen, 2015). Individuals' tendencies to discount inconsistent information has important implications for how signals

are interpreted and threats perceived (Kertzer et al., 2020). Hawks tend to perceive public threats as less credible than do doves, and individuals low in international trust perceive public threats as less credible than those who are high in international trust (Yarhi-Milo, 2014; Yarhi-Milo et al., 2018). Hawks are more inclined than doves to perceive "deeds" as meaningful signals of the credibility of threat. Finally, some evidence contradicts theories that consider audience costs an important determinant of the credibility of a threat; publics in democracies tend to see their own governments as less likely to stand firm than their authoritarian counterparts (Kertzer et al., 2021). And authoritarian targets of threats issued by leaders of democracies do not perceive costs in the same way that theorists of audience costs do (Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Fearon, 1995).

Research also demonstrates that credibility, a fundamental component to theories of action in international politics, is emotional as well as cognitive. The belief that another's threat is credible depends on the selection and interpretation of evidence and on the assessment of probability, both of which rely in part on emotion (Mercer, 2010; Yarhi-Milo, 2014). Russia's credibility is a function of not only what its leaders say and do, or have said and done, but also what Ukraine's leaders feel and think Moscow will say and do. Markwica finds that the efficacy of coercive threats that are issued publicly as "costly signals" depends heavily on the emotional responses that they elicit in target leaders and how these emotional responses shape their perceptions of threat (2018: 267). The targets' perceptions are shaped by their cultural background, their emotional experiences and feelings, and their need for self-esteem (Markwica, 2018: 271).

A comparison of the perception of an adversary's long-term intentions, though analytically distinct from credibility, shows similar patterns. Leaders' perceptions are a function in large part of the emotional salience of information as well as organizational responsibility and experience. Leaders pay "selective attention" to especially vivid evidence that becomes especially salient in face-to-face communication. Vividness refers to the emotional interest of information, as well as to its concreteness and imaginability and the sensory, spatial, and temporal proximity of information (Yarhi-Milo, 2013: 11–13, 17–21). Organizational interests and practices also influence which types of indicators shape threat perceptions. Intelligence organizations, in contradistinction to political leaders, typically prioritize the collection and analysis of "hard" data on the adversary's military inventory (Yarhi-Milo, 2013).

Leaders in deterrent relationships tend to worry, even obsess, about their credibility, about the other's perception of their determination to fulfil their threats should compliance not be forthcoming. Under these conditions, an infinite regress of emotional expectations about resolve is likely (Mercer, 2010). Because Israel's leaders believe that what Hamas' leaders think of them matters, their emotional beliefs about what Hamas' leaders think about Israel matter. Israel's leaders' beliefs may be—and have been in the past—significantly at variance from what Hamas' leaders actually believe about Israel's resolve. Israel's leaders nevertheless became locked into a conversation with themselves about their fragile or deteriorating reputation for resolve and have gone to war to preserve their reputation, even though they do not and cannot control how Hamas' leaders will perceive Israel's threat to go to war should Hamas launch rockets across the border.

Emotion can be understood as an assimilation mechanism that influences the selection and interpretation of evidence in threat perception. In 2009, Israeli and American leaders had access to almost all the same data and evidence on Iran's nuclear program; there was extensive intelligence sharing among the two countries. Yet American officials estimated a

much longer time horizon—five years—for the development of a nuclear weapon by Iran than did Israel's officials who estimated a year or two. The difference in threat perception is not explainable by the evidence but by the higher emotional loading of the likelihood of an Iranian bomb for Israel's leaders that shaped threat perception.

Building emotions—fear, anger, and humiliation—into the analysis of threat perception illuminates the complexity of designing threat-based strategies that are subtle and calibrated to likely emotional responses. Threat-based strategies that rely exclusively on rational calculation by an adversary and ignore the interaction among cognitive heuristics and emotional states, as well as the political and institutional context, are likely to misfire badly (Stein, 1988; Markwica, 2018).

This understanding of the interconnectedness of emotion and perception opens an important research agenda for scholars of psychology and international politics. First, scholars will have to grapple systematically with the impact of fear, anger, and humiliation on threat perception at the individual level of leaders. Do different kinds of emotions produce differences in threat perceptions which in turn produce different responses? Although scholars have long called for this kind of systematic and controlled inquiry, little progress has been made.

The lack of progress is attributable in part to the difficulty of systematically studying emotion outside the laboratory. New research findings are coming from work done with individuals subject to imaging technology under controlled laboratory conditions. How can these arguments be examined, exported and refined in the political world? How can they inform the big research questions that have long preoccupied scholars of international relations? These are difficult but not impossible challenges, challenges that political psychologists have long grappled with. Thinking and feeling outside the laboratory cannot be directly observed, but scholars can draw on archives, documents, diaries, leaked cables, interviews, and polls to assess what leaders and publics feel, what they perceive, and what they think. Scholars working with this kind of evidence have long known that no one source is determining, that multiple streams of evidence increase confidence, and that the interpretative skills of the trained scholar matter. Experimental research and simulation may be valuable complements to the detailed search for emotional traces in documents and interviews as well as machine learning from large amounts of texts.

Second, scholars in international relations ask: How important is the psychology of emotion and cognition in comparison to other explanations of threat perception? To ask this question is to ask a larger question: How important is agency in the explanation of these kinds of international outcomes? Once we move away from exclusively structural explanations and acknowledge a role for human agency, then any explanation of threat perception encompasses the analysis of feeling and information processing as essentials, as the core constitutive elements at the individual as well as the collective level. The interesting question then becomes: What kinds of emotions have what kinds of impact on information processing and perception, under what kinds of political conditions? When, for example, does fear-driven threat perception lead to loss aversion and risky behavior, and when does it lead to retreat and risk-averse behavior? When does humiliation-driven threat perception provoke anger and revenge, and when does it lead to retreat and passivity? Answers to these kinds of questions are critical to theories of all threat-based strategies. Scholars need to specify how emotion would modify existing theories as well as the range and types of emotions that matter.

Third, more challenging will be integrating psychological theories into broader theories of international relations. Central will be the "aggregation problem," or aggregating individual decision makers' perceptions when they interact collectively in decision-making units (Levy, 1997; Hafner-Burton et al., 2017). Lake's analysis of the patterns of threat perception and the road to war in 2003 leads him to call for a "behavioral theory of war," a suggestion that requires solving the challenge of aggregating the perceptions of actors that interact to produce decisions and action (Jervis, 2002; Levy, 2003, 272–273; Lake, 2011: 45–47).

7. Conclusion

Evolutionary psychologists situate the cognitive patterns, heuristics, and emotions that play such an important role in threat perception within a long time frame. They consider heuristics as evolved adaptations that respond to cues with minimal cognitive effort to solve recurrent adaptive problems. These heuristics are well-matched to the small scale environments of our ancestors and many optimize for the quick adaptive solutions that were necessary to survive and reproduce. Natural selection enabled over time the ". . . representational systems able to make predictions about the situation under informational uncertainty from indirect cues" (Petersen, 2015, 54; Davis and McDermott, 2021; Hatemi and McDermott, 2011, 2012; Johnson, 2020; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). Evolutionary arguments are intuitively appealing because they make sense of prevalent cognitive patterns, heuristics, and emotional triggers. They explain why we are "wired" the way we are, not as a default from a normative model of rationality, but as the consequence of natural selection to survive and reproduce over time.

Cognitive patterns that evolved over time because they provided adaptive solutions in the past do not necessarily generate adaptive behavior in the present. Evolutionary psychologists raise the possibility of a mismatch between these evolved cognitive patterns, heuristics, and emotions, and the large, complex, modern environments of decision makers today (Petersen, 2015; Johnson, 2020). The fundamental attribution error leads people to attribute disliked behavior of an adversary to their disposition and likely raises their perception of threat. Much of the literature labels these cognitive patterns as "biases" and explains the exaggeration of threats by their prevalence. Johnson (2020) agrees when he argues that strategic instincts, or amalgams of cognitive and emotional patterns, are only likely to confer advantages today if the contemporary situation is sufficiently analogous to those in which they evolved.

Fit is especially challenging when evolved patterns of thinking are applied to international politics. Adaptive problem-solving strategies that evolved in small-scale communities do not travel easily to the contemporary international environment where leaders engage with complex technological systems that are difficult to reverse once they are set in motion. Johnson analyzes the advantages of overconfidence in sustaining American rebel forces against the British, but McDermott warns about the dangers of overconfident decision makers who have to make rapid-fire decisions about deployment of nuclear weapons under conditions of strategic instability (Johnson, 2020; McDermott, 2020; cf. Stein and Lotan, 2019). It is unlikely that cognitive patterns that evolved over time will be well suited to

adaptive problem solving when complex systems of highly lethal weapons that can inflict mass destruction shape security environments.

In the last two decades, some evolutionary and political psychologists have challenged that argument and put forward the counter-intuitive proposition that treats heuristics not as bugs but as adaptive design features that bring benefits even in our complex modern environment (Johnson, 2020: 40l; Landau-Wells and Saxe, 2019). Overestimating threat may be a design feature rather than a bug because, over time, it helped people to survive by avoiding the worst (Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). Drawing on "error management theory," Johnson puts forward the provocative argument that, in particular contexts, these "biases" privilege certain kinds of judgments to avoid the worst mistakes and are consequently adaptive (Haselton et al., 2015; Haselton and Buss, 2000; Johnson et al., 2013; Johnson 2020; Petersen and AarØe, 2014). Neville Chamberlain, the prime minister of the United Kingdom before World War II, made an almost fatal mistake because he and many of his colleagues did *not* commit the fundamental attribution error. There are better odds of survival, Johnson concludes, if leaders overestimate threats many times but avoid underestimating the one serious threat to their survival. Ours is a world where the costs of one serious false negative, he argues, far exceeds the costs of numerous false positives.

Is that argument correct under all conditions? To imagine a hypothetical, a government that always saw threats as intentional and developed consistently exaggerated threat perceptions, armed itself to the outer limits of its capacity, and preemptively attacked at the first opportunity would likely sooner or later exhaust its material and human reserves and make itself vulnerable to an opportunity-seeking antagonist that also saw threatening behavior as intentional. And antagonists aplenty there would be, as other states inferred threatening intent from the growing military capabilities and aggressive behavior. Thomas Hobbes's world of "the war of all against all" advantages the largest and the richest that can sustain the cost of struggle the longest.

Johnson argues that these strategic instincts work only in moderation. Cognitive patterns taken to extremes are dangerous. But how exactly can leaders practice moderation in assessing threatening intentions when they are predisposed to explaining threatening behavior as intentional rather than as a response to situational constraints? Layer on top of that an embedded pattern of thinking that foregrounds the asymmetrical costs of even one error, and moderation becomes difficult in theory as well as in practice, as do the concepts of error management and balancing risks. Even for the largest and the richest states, consistent attribution of threatening intent with no regard for false positives is likely a self-defeating strategy over time. If this argument is correct, the evolutionary advantages of the fundamental attribution error, at a time when the costs of war are very high, are questionable.

Evolutionary theory suggests that some of our most fundamental ways of thinking are design features to solve adaptive problems and that it is not helpful to think of them as bugs. But some are bugs in some contexts and we need to be able to identify those. The important questions then become which of these design features match the adaptive problems we face today and which do not. And for those that do not, how do we build in decision protocols and constraints to reduce the harm of these patterns as we seek solutions to the adaptive problems of the world we live in today.

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SIGNALING, RESOLVE, AND REPUTATION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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A substantial literature in international relations (IR) concerns the relative importance of reputation to state behavior. Indeed, IR is hardly unique in political science, let alone related fields like economics or sociology, in assuming that reputations are a powerful force that shapes actors' words and deeds (Alt et al., 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Selten, 1978). In this chapter, we diagram the basic questions at stake in the research agenda on reputation, resolve, and signaling. If signaling refers to a major avenue through which states attempt to communicate their intentions to one another, reputation for resolve is a quality that policymakers and scholars believe enhances states' ability to convey their desired impressions through actions and statements that demonstrate the willingness to run risks and pay costs.

We begin by offering conceptual clarity on the meaning of key terms to establish a common baseline of understanding. We next present an overview of traditional rationalist approaches to the study of signaling, resolve, and reputation, which emphasize the role of costly signals (i.e., statements and behavior that are difficult or expensive to undertake) in distinguishing which actors in international politics possess resolve. We then contrast the rationalist tradition with insights derived from psychology, demonstrating how theories of cognitive and motivated bias both complicate and complement the process of drawing reputational inferences. We conclude with a series of suggestions for new scholarship in currently understudied corners of this vibrant research program.

1. CONCEPTUAL CLARITY: UNPACKING REPUTATION, RESOLVE, AND REPUTATION FOR RESOLVE

Before assessing the state of literature on signaling, resolve, and reputation, it is important to establish analytical clarity by unpacking the key concepts. What do scholars mean

when they use the concepts of reputation, resolve, and reputation for resolve? How have key debates in the literature shaped, and been shaped by, our understanding of these terms?

Reputation refers to beliefs about an actor's persistent characteristics or behavioral tendencies based on the latter's past behavior (Dafoe et al., 2014). The perceived importance of reputation derives from what these characteristics or tendencies may predict about the actor's future behavior; for example, creditors are unlikely to extend new loans to a state that has a history of defaulting on its sovereign debt (Tomz, 2007b). Reputation then involves judgments about an actor's "type," with the implication that there are certain inalienable features of an actor's disposition that lead her to behave according to a predictable pattern. In this way, reputation can be very general and pertain to a broad variety of behaviors. States may be known as either "status quo" or "revisionist" powers based on whether their past record of behavior indicates a preference for stasis or change in the international system. Reputation can also be quite specific and attach to only a subset of actions. States may be known for living up to their word in the particular context of promises or threats (Jervis, 1970). Additionally, states can acquire reputations for such disparate and distinct qualities as honesty, violence or hostility, and dealing with secessionists (Guisinger & Smith, 2002; Peterson, 2013; Sartori, 2005; Walter, 2009).

Importantly, however, reputation is not a quality that states or leaders "own" for themselves, but rather exists chiefly in the eye of the beholder—that is, from the perspective of other states or leaders who observe the former's statements and behavior. For this reason, it is the perceiver's worldviews, rather than those of the signaler, that demand close examination. If one's reputation ultimately hinges on others' beliefs, it is important to understand both where those beliefs come from and how stable they are. On the one hand, states tend not to bluff, and leaders try to avoid lying to their international counterparts, because it is difficult to shake being tarred as a dishonest type (Mearsheimer, 2011; Sartori, 2002). In this view, reputations are sticky and thus hard to change once formed. On the other hand, states' experiences and interactions can influence the degree to which observers update their reputational beliefs. From this perspective, a perennial debtor state who suddenly pays its bills on time or a relatively anonymous state who joins an international organization known for cultivating certain qualities in its members can alter its type if these actions shift perceivers' impressions (Gray & Hicks, 2014). Therefore, while reputations may be resistant to change, surprising or unexpected circumstances can still lead observers to draw new or updated inferences.

One specific type of reputation concerns that for resolve. Resolve constitutes an actor's willingness to stand firm and pay costs in the face of pressure to back down (Kertzer, 2016; Lupton, 2020). Resolve is akin to willpower: it reflects not what an actor wants, but rather their force of determination in seeking a given objective, often (though not always) in the context of warfighting. Actors in international politics tend to care about resolve because they believe it is linked with both material, security-oriented benefits and non-material, status-oriented accolades; because resolve is often synonymous with the willingness to initiate military action, continue fighting in the face of mounting costs, and/or inflict violence on others, policymakers and scholars believe that possessing resolve keeps states safe from adversaries' threats and confers respect from other members of the international system. Indeed, mainstream theories of international politics have long attributed a central role to resolve in explaining outcomes such why wars start, how they end, and who is victorious at the bargaining table (Blainey, 1988; Fearon, 1995; Pape, 1996; Schelling, 1966; G. H. Snyder & Diesing, 1977).

Reputation for resolve, then, is the belief that during crises, a state's leaders will take actions that demonstrate willingness to pay high costs and run high risks, and will thus stand firm while seeking their goal (Yarhi-Milo, 2018). States or leaders who seek to project or maintain a reputation for resolve often exhibit the willingness to employ military instruments in shaping others' beliefs about their lack of willingness to back down. During crises, a reputation for resolve is useful insofar as it conveys an impression of a state's strength and toughness that helps compel or coerce an adversary into giving up on its own objectives, warns other potential challengers about the likely consequences of their actions, and provides allies with evidence about how the state is likely to behave in a crisis affecting the former's interests. Prior research has also indicated that the state's domestic audience has its own preferences regarding resolve; leaders who make public threats and then back down from them receive punishment in terms of domestic approval, or "audience costs," when they put the country's reputation for resolve at stake (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007a). Therefore, policymakers and many IR scholars view cultivating and demonstrating a reputation for resolve, even if it involves costs and risks, as a major component of effective foreign policy.

At the same time, reputation for resolve is often confused with another related but distinct concept, credibility. Credibility is the perceived likelihood that an actor will follow through on their threats or promises (Press, 2005). Though usually associated with the possibility of using force, credibility can apply to a variety of foreign policy instruments, including diplomatic or economic sanctions, as well as to other dimensions of policy, like its consistency or competence. The differences between credibility and reputation for resolve are therefore subtle, but important. If a reputation for resolve is about standing firm when the chips are down, credibility is more narrowly about an actor's record of keeping commitments, regardless of the costs associated with doing so. Previous studies of reputation in IR, however, have theorized that the former contributes to the latter: credibility is a combination of an actor's interests, capabilities, and reputation for resolve. In other words, an actor's past record of demonstrated willingness to stand firm and pay costs, as well as its perceived interest and capability in doing so, create the impression that it will act similarly in the future, especially where threats or promises and the use of force are concerned (Tang, 2005).

However, there are two important caveats to this statement. The first is that reliability—operationalized in Jervis's concept of "signaling reputation," or an actor's propensity to live up to its word—is also a key dimension of credibility, and it may or may not be synonymous with resolve depending on the circumstances. For example, if a dispute between China and Taiwan escalated to the use of force, and the United States intervened militarily on Taiwan's behalf, the United States might get credit from other countries for being reliable (i.e., by honoring its commitment to a peaceful resolution of cross-strait conflict) and being resolved (i.e., by sending its own forces into harm's way). By contrast, in seeking a halt to Iran's nuclear program, the United States has threatened and then imposed economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic. These actions demonstrate reliability (i.e., for following through on the threat) but not necessarily resolve (i.e., the sanctions are relatively costless for the United States to maintain). More broadly, these examples remind us that the potential correlation between resolve and reliability remains an open theoretical and empirical question.

The second is that scholars have disagreed sharply over which of the underlying variables—interests, capabilities, and reputation for resolve—are most influential in how

observers assess others' credibility. Some have argued that credibility is largely situational in nature, suggesting that states and leaders rely on a "current calculus" of potential adversaries' interests and capabilities rather than their record of previous behavior. For instance, just as German policymakers did not downgrade British and French credibility at Munich following their repeated concessions to German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, British and American decision makers continued to take Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threats against Berlin seriously despite his repeated failure to carry them out, because in both cases, official assessments relied on the other actor's capabilities and interests at stake in the moment (Press, 2005). Similarly, Soviet policymakers were internally divided over whether the United States remained a credible adversary following its defeats in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Third World, suggesting that inferences about credibility do not necessarily assign significant weight to past actions (Hopf, 1994). Under this view, reputations only develop in specific circumstances and according to the fundamental attribution error, or based on what constitutes undesirable behavior from the perceiver's perspective. States and leaders generally want their adversaries to be quiescent and for their allies to back them up. So, when adversaries stand firm, they can garner a reputation for resolve because perceivers interpret their behavior as confirming an aggressive nature. On the flip side, when allies fail to stand firm, they can acquire a reputation for irresolution because perceivers deduce that their actions reflect weakness and a lack of will (Mercer, 1996).

In response, however, other researchers have cited the importance of reputational inferences in credibility assessments. Theoretically, they argue that it is improper to juxtapose past actions against interests when past actions may themselves shape observers' perceptions of a state or leader's interests. Empirically, they show that states who back down from challenges are more likely to receive subsequent probes on similar issues, suggesting that capabilities and interests do not tell the whole story (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). Indeed, states who are locked in enduring rivalries, such as the United States and North Korea, accrue reputations with one another that shape mutual assessments of threat credibility and influence the likelihood of either side mounting a future challenge (Jackson, 2016).

Furthermore, observers are likely to view past actions as increasingly informative about current credibility in the degree of similarity between previous examples and the present one. For instance, because the United States hesitated to intervene with ground forces during the 1990s Balkans crisis due to concerns about putting its troops at risk, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein inferred that US leaders would not wage a land war against Iraq in the early 2000s for fear of American casualties (Harvey & Mitton, 2016). In this way, there is often a basic "the friend of my friend is my friend" logic at work where reputational inferences are concerned: state A's behavior toward state B can substantially condition judgments by state C, especially if B and C occupy similar niches within the international system in terms of their alliances, trade partners, UN voting records, diplomatic connections, and relative power (Crescenzi, 2018).

At the level of individual leaders, reputations for resolve form through statements and behavior that occur early in a president or prime minister's tenure. While context matters (such as the state in question's prior reputation or communicated interest in the issue at hand), these initial words and actions tend to be decisive. For example, through a pattern of firm statements and behaviors, President Dwight Eisenhower succeeded where President John Kennedy later failed in establishing a reputation for resolve with Khrushchev, an impression that proved difficult for Kennedy to change (Lupton, 2020).

While studies backing the salience of reputation and centrality of resolve to policymakers comprise the literature's emerging consensus, scholars continue to pursue a variety of related inquiries that are helping to establish scope conditions on reputation's effects and shifting the focus from *whether* reputation matters in international politics to *when* and *why* decision makers find it important (Jervis et al., 2021). Examining the United States' decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in 2021 through a reputational lens is instructive in this regard.

On the one hand, many commentators lamented the damage to the United States's reputation that they believed would result from the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and resulting chaos at the Kabul airport, arguing that allies and adversaries would subsequently be more likely to question American resolve and reliability (Mead, 2021; Sly, 2021). Based on recent research, these analysts are not wrong to suggest that the United States' behavior in Afghanistan could have reputational consequences, at least in future conflicts of a similar nature with similar stakes (Crescenzi, 2018; Harvey & Mitton, 2016). Furthermore, given that the crisis occurred relatively early in President Joe Biden's tenure, it may have been pivotal in establishing different varieties of reputation with foreign audiences (Lupton, 2020). Because Biden campaigned on withdrawing from Afghanistan and followed through on his promise, observers may have concluded that he was the sort of leader who would keep his word. But the chaotic manner in which the withdrawal was carried out may also have downgraded the United States' reputation for competence and good judgment in foreign policy (Walt, 2021).

On the other hand, it is less clear that the withdrawal from Afghanistan hurt the credibility of US commitments elsewhere. If Soviet officials did not infer a substantial loss of US credibility following the Vietnam War, it stands to reason that observers of the events in Afghanistan did not project a general unwillingness on the part of the United States to protect its interests or allies if either were threatened (Hopf, 1994). And whereas the Trump and Biden administrations acknowledged only limited American interests in Afghanistan, the United States routinely communicates its interest in and demonstrates its capability to defend its treaty partners in Europe and Asia (Press, 2005). Thus, while recent literature affirms that reputations do form and matter to policymakers, inferences about credibility may be more contingent and context-specific.

Having delineated the core concepts at stake, indicated how they are often employed by states, leaders, and scholars, and described how they related to central controversies in the literature, we turn to an examination of traditional rationalist theories and approaches to studying questions of signaling, perception, reputation, and resolve.

2. Traditional Explanations for Signaling and Perceiving Reputation for Resolve

Traditional explanations for signaling and perceiving reputation for resolve rely on a rational choice framework. Under this view, states and leaders signal and communicate resolve in crises through statements and actions that clearly demonstrate their strength of commitment to a given objective (Kydd & McManus, 2017; Schelling, 1960, 1966; Sechser,

2010). In turn, perceivers assess signals of resolve according to the sender's observable characteristics, such as its military capabilities, its leaders' tenure in office, and its past actions. Since rationalist approaches view resolve as information that only the state or leader in question knows with certainty *ex ante*, actors will fight for reputation for resolve in order to reveal that information, thereby separating themselves as resolute and thus not to be trifled with.

How do states and leaders signal or communicate resolve in crises? Rationalist scholarship places substantial weight on costly signals, defined as gestures or actions that are difficult to carry out and/or raise the risk of escalation and, in doing so, showcase one's willingness to pay costs. More formally, states and leaders seek to indicate their "type" to others, but face two challenges. First, resolve is private information unless otherwise revealed; only the state or leader in question knows exactly how resolved she is to stay the course. Second, all actors have incentives to misrepresent their level of resolve and so need to engage in behaviors costly enough to distinguish them from unresolved types; because talk is cheap, simply stating one's intentions in words is typically not considered sufficiently costly (Fearon, 1995, 1997; Fuhrmann & Sechser, 2014; Kydd, 2005; Morrow, 1994; Slantchev, 2005). Statements of resolve are then most effective when states and leaders have the clear ability to follow through on them. More specifically, when leaders do not face major obstacles or unacceptable risks in the form of punishment by the domestic public, encounter resistance from veto players within government, and possess relevant military capabilities, they are better able to convey resolute intentions (McManus, 2017).

Scholars in this tradition define two main types of costly signals: "sinking costs" and "tying hands," each of which represents a distinct device for actors to reveal information about their type. Sinking costs means taking actions that are financially or militarily costly *ex ante*, such as forward-deploying forces or mobilizing those troops for battle (Reiter & Poast, 2021). While sunk costs affect bargaining in the short term, they do not (and are typically not intended to) influence longer-term payoffs associated with possible future behavior. By contrast, tying hands involves the creation of costs that states or leaders incur *ex post* if they fail to meet a promise or threat that has been outlined in a previous public statement. A flourishing literature on audience costs suggests that leaders, whether democratic or autocratic, face punishment from their domestic publics for backing down from threats and thus have strong incentives to carry out their pledges (Downes & Sechser, 2012; Fearon, 1994; Weeks, 2008).

How, in turn, do perceivers assess signals of resolve and reputation for resolve? We can place the relevant variables into three buckets (Kertzer et al., 2021). First, state-level characteristics such as military capabilities, the nature of the interests at stake, and regime type can affect perceptions of resolve. Perceivers may view actors with more capability as more resolute than those with less capability because the former can stand firm at a lower marginal cost (Morrow, 1989). Perceivers may similarly see actors with high as opposed to low stakes in a situation as more resolute because the former has more to lose and will thus be less willing to yield (Arreguín-Toft, 2001). Perceivers may also view democracies as more resolved than autocracies—whether because structural features of democratic government make it easy to see if political elites are united or divided in support for standing firm, because democracies are more strategic in the conflicts they choose, or because they are better at seizing the battlefield initiative (Reiter & Stam, 2002; Schultz, 1999). However, additional

research suggests that the democratic advantage may not be so pronounced (Weeks, 2008; Weiss, 2013).

Second, leader-level characteristics like military service, tenure in office, gender, and mix of previous life experiences can shape inferences regarding resolve. Democratic leaders who have served in the military (though not in combat) have proven more likely than their non-serving counterparts to initiate both militarized disputes and wars, whereas the opposite is true for autocratic leaders (Horowitz & Stam, 2014). It less clear, however, whether previous military or combat experience shapes interpretation of whether signals such as public threats or military mobilization are costly (Yarhi-Milo et al., 2018). Meanwhile, leaders who are early in their tenures, particularly in democracies, may lack relevant experience with signaling to other actors, yet face incentives to develop a reputation for resolve by forcefully meeting challenges when they first assume office, and the importance of doing so varies with how much influence observers perceive the leader to have under particular circumstances (Gelpi & Grieco, 2001; Renshon et al., 2018; Wolford, 2007). Female leaders face particular pressure, compared with their male counterparts, to counteract gender stereotypes by demonstrating their toughness and competence by issuing threats and initiating conflicts (Schramm & Stark, 2020; Schwartz & Blair, 2020).

Third, behavioral indicators, including past and current actions, influence the perceiver's view of the signaler's resolve. Past actions loom large as a predictor of reputation for resolve in both scholarly treatments of reputation for resolve and the conventional wisdom among foreign policy decision makers, especially in the United States. This view dates to Thomas Schelling's assertion that fighting in Korea between 1950 and 1953 was "undoubtedly worth it" in saving face for the United States and establishing Soviet expectations for future American behavior, but has also been reaffirmed in more recent theoretical and empirical work (Copeland, 1997; Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). The logic is straightforward and akin to how reputation functions in everyday life: just your friend who routinely runs late is more likely to show up a few minutes after the time at which you agreed to meet them, actors who have exhibited resolute behavior in the past are expected to do so again in the present or future.

The current actions of a state or leader during a given crisis, however, may also guide perceivers' assessments. Perceivers may interpret costly signals, in real or near-real time, as indicators of resolve. Current actions may even overwhelm inferences about past actions under certain circumstances. As previously discussed, some research has found that perceivers rely less on the signaler's previous behavior and more on what the signaler's capabilities and interest are in the moment based on the issue in question (Press, 2005). Either way, rationalist approaches place significant value on behavioral indicators as proof of whether an actor is a resolved or unresolved type.

Why and when do states and leaders fight for reputation for resolve? From a rationalist perspective, initiating the use of force is a major means for signalers to reveal private information about their willingness to stand firm; this in turn allows signalers to make credible threats by eliminating problems with misrepresentation or deception. States can then bank "resolve credits" with adversaries through firmness and "loyalty credits" with allies through demonstrations of support (Mercer, 2013; G. H. Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Because states and leaders think that allies value loyalty, as well as reliability, they seek to avoid the potentially disastrous consequences of disloyalty, like punishment and disillusionment from their partners as well as accusations of cheap talk from adversaries (Henry, 2020). State and

leaders may then fight for their reputation for resolve both *reactively*, or when they believe it is flagging in the eyes of allies or adversaries, and *proactively*, or to prevent these sorts of impressions from forming in the first place (Clare & Danilovic, 2012; Jervis, 1970).

To draw parallels and contrasts with the rationalist tradition, we next address psychological accounts of signaling, reputation, and resolve that problematize or augment assumptions about how states and leaders communicate with one another.

3. Incorporating Psychology into the Study of Reputation and Resolve

While rationalist approaches to signaling and perception rely on costly signals as indicators of resolve, a growing body of theoretical and empirical research on the psychology of sending, perceiving, and interpreting signals problematize and/or complement these explanations. This body of research has concentrated on how perceivers process (or fail to process) signals and what information is being communicated via actions intended to sink costs or tie hands.

One major issue that psychological perspectives have raised with rationalist explanations is that signals tend to be lost in translation or missed altogether. On the one hand, the "spiral model" of deterrence is rooted in the expectation that mutual misperception of intentions and capabilities often explains the incidence of international conflict; these insights lie at the heart of the security dilemma (Jervis, 1976). On the other hand, recent work suggests that a lack of mutual understanding can actually sustain cooperation so long as both parties think (even if incorrectly) that the other agrees with their position; détente between the United States and USSR may have lasted as long as it did in part because American leaders thought that the Soviets had accepted their second-place status, while Soviet leaders thought that the Americans had finally decided to treat them as equals (Grynaviski, 2014). Either way, psychological approaches consider missed or poorly understood signals to be a fact of life in international politics. Yet rationalist theories of costly signaling leave little room for misinterpretation and instead assume perfect transmissibility between sender and perceiver. In reality, such objective information processing is rare. Individuals instead see what they expect to see based on their own prior beliefs and personal needs while ignoring or explaining away any anomalies (Jervis, 1989; Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Lau & Redlawsk, Chapter 5, and Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume).

Various forms of cognitive and motivated bias interfere with the purely rational processing of signals, which in turn has several implications for reputational inferences. First, individuals' desire to avoid psychological stress and achieve cognitive closure shape how perceivers read signalers (Davis & McDermott, 2021; Kertzer et al., 2020; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For instance, part of the reason that President Franklin Roosevelt viewed Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, however brutal and paranoid he could be, as a plausible partner in constructing a peaceful postwar world order might have been because Roosevelt recognized the depth of the challenge that the United States would face if Stalin was instead incorrigibly bent on world domination. To take another example, prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev may have seen Kennedy as weak precisely because Khrushchev

found himself in fairly dire political straits; he was acutely aware not just of the Soviet Union's own inferiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also that Kennedy and the rest of the world knew that the Soviets were behind the Americans, too. Deploying short- and medium-range missiles to Cuba offered Khrushchev the means to see himself, and be perceived by others, as strong relative to Kennedy. We therefore should not underrate leaders' desire for psychological comfort as a driver of signal intake and interpretation.

Second, observers' proclivity for forcing new information to conform with their preexisting worldviews may actually be essential in sustaining reputational beliefs. For example, one possible reason why President Barack Obama was publicly pilloried, and President Donald Trump generally praised, for his response to the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons against civilians is that these episodes easily fit popular images of each leader. After "leading from behind" during the Libya intervention in 2011, Obama was regarded as a weak president on foreign policy issues, while following his brash campaign and surprising electoral victory, Trump was viewed as a strong leader whose belligerent style proved that he was not to be crossed. These perceptions lingered despite Obama's brokering of a successful agreement to divest Syria of its weapons stockpile and despite Trump's failure to pressure Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad following credible reports of continued poison gas use against civilians. What matters, then, is how observers' prior beliefs shape their intake of information.

Third, while a range of biases affect observers' beliefs and perceptions, they each do so in different degrees for different people, and so certain features of a given situation will be more salient to some than others. For example, the Biden administration's decision to accommodate Germany's wishes on completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline struck some American commentators as needlessly emboldening Moscow while squeezing Ukraine by allowing Europe's natural gas supply to bypass the latter's territory (Herbst, 2021). One possible implication is that Moscow, and perhaps even Beijing, read this choice as indicating that the United States is beholden to the whims of its less powerful allies. Yet it is also plausible that Russian leaders were simply pleased that the project would be completed and saw previous US sanctions on pipeline-related work, in addition to its joint pledge with Germany to invest 200 million euros in Ukraine's energy security, as an indication that the United States can still cajole allies into countering Russian pressure (Macias, 2021). Similarly, returning once again to the Cuban Missile Crisis, many American observers have lauded Kennedy's wit and imagination as key qualities that shaped a peaceful resolution of the standoff. But what Khrushchev found most meaningful was Kennedy's ability to prevent the military from mounting a more forceful response, which indicated to Khrushchev that Kennedy both wanted to address the spiraling tensions between the superpowers and could do so over the objections of his more hawkish advisers. While American observers knew that Kennedy was ultimately calling the shots and were thus not impressed by his capacity to resist the likes of Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, Khrushchev did not share this understanding of the US political system, and so he found Kennedy's behavior to be quite influential (Jervis et al., 2021).

Though signals are more difficult to interpret than rationalist accounts assume, all is not necessarily lost—but the proper contextual conditions must be in place for states and leaders to truly understand one another. Some types of signals, such as those attached to alliance commitments, appear to be uniquely powerful in deterring aggression and reassuring allies who might otherwise seek outside options or reduce their dependence on the patron-client

relationship (Blankenship, 2020; Johnson & Leeds, 2011). Democratic states and leaders can use "offstage" signals, such as arms sales and military aid, to demonstrate support for their autocratic proteges while avoiding the domestic political costs of "frontstage" signals like formal defense pacts and leader visits. For example, US leaders have pursued the off-stage route with nondemocracies including the Shah's Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Franco's Spain (McManus & Yarhi-Milo, 2017).

Alliances with a nuclear-armed states substantially decrease the likelihood of being targeted in a militarized interstate dispute. However, the physical deployment of nuclear forces on the ally's territory appears to have little independent deterrent effect, perhaps indicating that the hands-tying effect of the alliance is a more important signal than the sunk cost generated by the prepositioning of the weapons themselves (Fuhrmann & Sechser, 2014). There seem to be similar limits on the deterrent impact of forward-deployed "tripwire" forces on an ally's territory. Theoretically, these small contingents of troops are supposed to boost deterrence by increasing the likelihood of intervention should anything happen to them rather than by shifting the local balance of military power. But in reality, and precisely because tripwire forces tend to be small, adversaries may be able to achieve a fait accompli before reinforcements arrive, and thus the tripwire may not constitute an especially credible signal. For instance, North Korea elected not to attack South Korea in 1949 while a substantial contingent of US troops were present in the country, but went ahead with an invasion in 1950 when only a tripwire contingent of US forces remained in the south (Reiter & Poast, 2021).

As either a substitute for or complement to an alliance commitment, arms transfers can provide powerful signals of reassurance to a great power's partners. Relative to the potential costs of an alliance, sending arms can mitigate the partner's fears of abandonment while minimizing entrapment risks for the great power. To take a practical example, after the late 1960s, the United States shifted from an alliance pact to arms sales in its relationship with Taiwan in order to maintain deterrence and reassurance while avoiding being dragged into a potential cross-strait conflict with China. In a similar timeframe, the United States upgraded its partnership with Israel to include arms sales, but not a formal alliance, to help the Israeli military retain a qualitative edge in the region while avoiding blowback from Israel's Arab neighbors (Yarhi-Milo et al., 2016).

Leader visits to an ally or partner's territory or capital city can also constitute a reassurance pledge by generating personal audience and/or reputational costs for the leader in question. With his first overseas trip to the United Kingdom in June 2021, President Biden followed a long line of US leaders, including Kennedy (Berlin), Nixon (South Vietnam), and George H. W. Bush (Saudi Arabia), who have used personal visits to indicate commitment (McManus, 2018).

Therefore, the forum in which signals get conveyed matters a great deal. Face-to-face diplomacy has proven critical in generating empathy—or an ability to understand (but not necessarily sympathize with) others' cognitive and affective states—between leaders and/or representatives of warring parties. Empathy works by allowing individuals to understand their counterparts' intentions, motives, perspectives, and interests; it is typically a precursor to the level of trust required for surmounting the biases and enmities that often otherwise hinder cooperation (Casler and Groves, 2023; Wheeler, 2018). Expressive signaling, in the form of largely involuntary bodily behaviors and facial movements that occur during in-person interactions, can credibly demonstrate to one party whether the other will negotiate

in good faith precisely because these reactions are difficult to fake (Holmes, 2018; Markwica, 2018). The empathy generated through face-to-face diplomacy can therefore undercut the security dilemma by increasing the odds that negotiating partners will arrive at good rather than bad faith judgments of each other's intentions and, in turn, reach a mutually acceptable solution to their dispute.

While rationalist approaches typically dismiss the information gleaned from these interactions as inconsequential noise, person-to-person contacts are an important source of vivid, or emotionally engaging, observations that help leaders size one another up. The empirical record is rife with examples of leaders, ranging from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to President Ronald Reagan, who have drawn on their personal impressions of others' sincerity as gleaned from one-on-one interactions to make strategic choices. Chamberlain (however unfortunately for world history) based his beliefs about Hitler's sincerity almost exclusively on three private meetings with the German leader during the 1938 Sudeten Crisis. Meanwhile, Reagan (more fortunately) came to believe that a significant, conciliatory shift in Soviet foreign policy was afoot not just through costly Soviet actions, such as the conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but also through the series of private meetings he held with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev during four summits between 1985 and 1988 (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012).

Therefore, these interactions play an important role in both process and outcomes. For instance, the interpersonal connections (or lack thereof) forged through face-to-face meetings can explain why the Camp David negotiations concerning the peace process in the Middle East succeeded in 1978 but failed in 2000. During the earlier episode, President Jimmy Carter was a highly invested and effective mediator between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat because he was able to sincerely convey his assessment of each side to the other protagonist. In the latter case, President Bill Clinton's failure to build similar levels of empathy with, and ultimately between, Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak scuttled hopes for a peace deal (Holmes & Yarhi-Milo, 2017). As President Biden remarked after his summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2021, "All foreign policy is the logical extension of personal relationships. It's the way human nature functions" (Ward, 2021).

Even when signals do get through, though, there is reason to believe that neither tying hands nor sinking costs is especially informative to the perceiver. This is partly due to issues with the internal consistency of rationalist accounts and partly a function of psychological factors that affect what observers see (Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; J. Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012).

First, a few general issues cast doubt on the internal logic of rationalist explanations. Theoretically, while military mobilization is typically thought of as a sunk cost because states pay for these operations regardless of what happens next, it can also be a form of hands-tying because it increases the probability of victory should war occur. If mobilizing troops both separates types and changes the expected value of fighting, we are left with questions about what exactly this behavior is signaling as well as to whom (Slantchev, 2005). Empirically, experimental analyses have not only shown that those on the receiving end of a costly signal do not necessarily acquiesce as a result, but also indicated that elite decision makers rate troop mobilization and public threats as equally credible signals of resolve (Quek, 2017; Yarhi-Milo et al., 2018). Continuing in the vein of experiments, a wealth of studies have shown that the public does not always impose audience costs according to the

theory's predictions—whether because leaders can find ways to mute them through strategic behavior (Levy et al., 2015; Lin-Greenberg, 2019), because different observers care to different extents about leaders' inconsistency versus belligerence (Brutger & Kertzer, 2018; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016), or because the costs only apply in the context of threats made in the security domain (Casler & Clark, 2021; Chaudoin, 2014). Additional scholarship has shown, contra the logic of publicity inherent in tying hands and sinking costs, that these signals need not be public to be effective in reaching target audiences such as strategic adversaries and local allies. Covert action not only represents a sunk cost, but also runs risks in terms of counter-escalation (i.e., that an opponent will respond in kind) and domestic politics (i.e., that elites or voters will find out about and be unhappy with the leader's choices). For instance, during conflicts in Angola and Afghanistan, Soviet and American officials, as well as their local partners on the ground, both observed and drew inferences about others' resolve on the basis of each side's covert lethal aid programs (Carson & Yarhi-Milo, 2017).

Second, and perhaps more importantly, psychological perspectives highlight several specific inconsistencies in rationalist explanations. What kinds of signals a perceiver will find costly varies widely from person to person—not just as a function of the characteristics mentioned earlier, such as military experience or time in office, but also based on individuals' beliefs and personalities. In this way, psychological factors influence both whether signals get lost or missed in the first place and what observers do with them once received. Cognitive biases and bureaucratic interests result in selective attention to certain indicators based on decision makers' own expectations and needs, which derive from the mental models they carry around in their heads. For example, the "Munich analogy" was highly influential in shaping both what lessons US policymakers took from Britain's appeasement of Germany prior to World War II and how they assumed that observers would apply those lessons to American behavior, particularly with regard to the Vietnam War (Khong, 1992; Larson, 1985; Vertzberger, 1990). Given the searing consequences that that followed from failing to check Hitler's expansionist aims more quickly, this analogy became so entrenched in American thinking that it has often obscured a more thorough reconsideration of what other options Britain realistically had to address a growing German threat during the 1930s (Ripsman & Levy, 2008). With the benefit of hindsight, however, we can also recognize that Chamberlain—known today as the much-maligned architect of the appeasement strategy—discounted other ostensibly dispositive signals of German intentions in favor of Hitler's private assurances about Germany's limited goals (Yarhi-Milo, 2013).

Thus, the overarching point is that policymakers assign their own, often idiosyncratic, levels of subjective credibility to incoming information based on how vivid or memorable it is and regardless of whether the word or deed is objectively "costly" in the sense of being expensive or difficult to carry out. For instance, the initial beliefs and theories held by President Carter, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about the nature of the Soviet Union influenced how each processed Soviet actions during the late 1970s. While Brzezinski held a dark view of Soviet intentions and was highly concerned about their behavior in the Horn of Africa, Vance saw this same behavior as opportunistic and not portending expansionist impulses. For his part, Carter hued closer to Vance until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. While Vance saw this development as an aberration and defensive in nature, Carter was furious and felt blindsided by Soviet

Premier Leonid Brezhnev, with whom Carter believed he had developed frank rapport and understanding during their most recent summit (Yarhi-Milo, 2014).

If what counts as costly varies among individuals, then so too will the propensity to fight for reputation for resolve. Rationalist accounts stress structural factors, like the balance of capabilities, and situational conditions, such as the material costs and benefits or stakes, in predicting who will be perceived as resolved, and on the flip side, who has a deficit in this regard. But these approaches assume that all signalers and perceivers will reach similar conclusions on the basis of the military balance and stakes involved.

However, a significant body of research has demonstrated that not all individuals will seek to fight for resolve. The willingness to stand firm and pay costs instead hinges on a range of individual-level characteristics and psychologically-grounded phenomena. Actors with long as opposed to short time horizons are more willing to pursue resolve because they are more inclined to discount present costs in favor of future benefits; in practice, this means that leaders who are early in their tenures will be more worried about reputation as they not only face long time horizons but have also had fewer opportunities to establish themselves as resolute (Dafoe, 2012). Risk aversion is associated with an unwillingness to back down among foreign policy hawks, who fear that inconsistency between stated commitments and actual actions will lead others to infer weakness; this is also referred to as the "hard-liner" bias that hawks share (G. H. Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Yet risk aversion is linked with an opposition to standing firm among foreign policy doves, who fret about giving off an impression of belligerence (Brutger & Kertzer, 2018; Kertzer, 2016, 2017). Leaders who are born into a "culture of honor," as is the case for US presidents from the South, are more concerned than those who were not raised under these conditions about maintaining a reputation for resolve (Dafoe & Caughey, 2016). Personality traits such as self-monitoring, which measures how much individuals care about how others perceive them, not only dispose individuals to care about resolve, but also exacerbate the underlying tendency among hawks to care about looking tough while moderating doves' general desire to avoid hostilities. For instance, even though both were dovish Democrats hailing from the South, Presidents Carter (a low self-monitor) and Clinton (a high self-monitor) exhibited very different inclinations to use force for the sake of resolve (Yarhi-Milo, 2018).

4. New Avenues for Research

To conclude, we highlight gaps and limitations in existing understanding of these concepts. We place special emphasis on the importance of talking about reputation for different units (other than leaders and states) such as regimes or groups, the need to study how reputation for resolve interacts with other types of reputations, and how psychology can generate new questions about the microfoundations of reputational beliefs.

While existing literature has made significant strides in examining how states and leaders think about reputation for resolve, scholarship in this research program has yet to explore the sources of or potential variation in reputational beliefs at other units of analysis. Can certain bureaucracies within a state, such as the senior military staff, get their own reputation for resolve? What happens if other organizations, like the diplomatic corps, are

believed to be more dovish? Do perceivers aggregate over or average out these tendences, and how would we know?

Similarly, while we know plenty about reputation for resolve in democracies, our knowledge about how resolve works among and within autocracies is far more limited. Thus far, it is apparent that reputations can adhere to different regime types: observers give democracies better odds of winning wars than autocracies, but see them as less likely to stand firm in crises, because their domestic publics and leaders tend to be dovish as well as highly sensitive to both the human and financial costs of war. Yet observers see victory in war is seen as more likely for democracies than autocracies because they are more selective about the wars they fight and have strong reputations for military effectiveness, not just in terms of alliance relationships but also regarding troop training and morale (Renshon et al., 2023). Though there is reason to believe that autocracies are not so different from democracies on net, the former's leadership recruitment methods may incentivize individuals with a different mix of personality traits and risk appetites to compete for power than we tend to observe in democracies (Weeks, 2014). These incentives may also vary depending on whether the autocracy is a personalist, military, or single-party regime. Do different types of autocracies think about signaling resolve differently? Are they also perceived differently by democracies or other autocracies?

Current research has also effectively plumbed the depths of resolve as a quality worth having, but almost myopically so and almost certainly to the exclusion of other potentially interesting types. There notable exceptions to this rule: scholars have examined reputations for qualities like honesty (Sartori, 2005), keeping promises (Crescenzi, 2007), and alliance reliability (Gibler, 2008; Miller, 2012). But at present, this research agenda has almost nothing to say about several related and interesting questions. For example, are different types of reputation—including leaders' domestic reputation for getting things done or being a tough negotiator—interdependent (Goldfien et al., 2023)? If so, to what degree? And why? Are decision makers aware that pursuing a reputation for resolve could backfire along other potentially meaningful dimensions of reputation, such as for violence or hostility? To what degree are they trading off (whether actively or passively) between different types of reputation when considering whether to escalate a dispute, comply with an agreement, or fulfill an alliance commitment?

If we already know a lot about how resolve functions in the context of traditional crisis bargaining, we are only just beginning to understand whether similar principles apply in new domains such as cyberspace. On the one hand, establishing or conveying resolve with cyber tools may both be uniquely difficult and subject to extreme psychological pressures not present in other forms of signaling. First, the "cyber commitment problem" comprises a delicate balance between demonstrating capability and maintaining operational secrecy: an attacker who shows the capacity to exploit vulnerabilities in a target's systems can prove that they are not bluffing at the cost of prompting the target to fix the problem (Borghard & Lonergan, 2017; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2017). Second, because the cyber arena is one where surprise, time sensitivity, and uncertainty often figure prominently, emotions such as fear, anxiety, and anger may be especially prevalent and accordingly interfere with purely rational signal processing (McDermott, 2019; Stein, Chapter 11, this volume).

On the other hand, however, cyber technologies like ransomware solve the issue of credible commitments. Ransomware only needs to stay hidden up to the point where the software encrypts the target's data, after which the attacker has both signaled its capability and

prevented the target from mitigating its vulnerability (Jun, 2021). While it remains to be seen whether a "dominant" form of cyber warfare rises to special prominence, ransomware attacks have proved quite effective for attackers seeking to signal resolve against a variety of corporate targets (Wolff, 2021). This pattern has likely not escaped the notice of various state actors, who may increasingly view ransomware as a viable means to extract concessions from adversaries without resorting to kinetic force. Yet as with many other ostensibly costly actions, different signalers and perceivers may still reach different conclusions about the utility, intentions, and consequences of cyber operations.

We suggest that psychologically grounded theories may provide compelling answers to the above questions. Previous scholarship has identified foreign policy dispositions such as hawkishness, along with various personality traits, as key predictors of reputational judgments, and for this reason is likely a good place to start (Kertzer et al., 2014; Rathbun et al., 2016). The answers to these questions may not look the same as they do for resolve, and while we do not have enough evidence at the moment to reach any conclusions either way, we believe that the future promise of this research agenda lies in theorizing about these tradeoffs and exploring the microfoundations of beliefs about reputation.

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CHAPTER 13

PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY

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1. INTRODUCTION

PUBLIC opinion about foreign policy occupies a unique place in the study of political psychology. Traditionally, the assumption was that public could not be trusted to handle foreign policy: the public was seen as being too uninformed and disconnected (Lippmann, 1955; Rosenau, 1961), moralistic (Morgenthau, 1948; Kennan, 1951), and mercurial (Almond, 1950) to form well-structured views about the world around it. If public opinion occupied a marginal place in the study of international relations, it was because of a conventional wisdom that argued both that public opinion did not shape foreign policy, and that public opinion should not shape foreign policy. Although more optimistic readings of the public's ability to respond meaningfully and systematically to world events emerged—especially after the Vietnam and Gulf Wars (Mueller, 1973; Jentleson, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992), it remained largely insulated from theoretical frameworks from political psychology (Kertzer and Tingley, 2018). The study of political psychology in foreign policy was therefore largely the study of political elites: their operational codes (Leites, 1951; George, 1969), belief systems (Holsti and Rosenau, 1979; Larson, 1985), personality traits and leadership styles (Greenstein, 1969; Etheredge, 1978; Hermann, 1980), perceptions and misperceptions (Jervis, 1976; Levy, 1983; Stein, 1988), and so on. This is also reflected in how psychological approaches to the study of international relations were incorporated into previous editions of the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*: the domain of elite decision-making, rather than mass political behavior (e.g., Levy, 2013; Herrmann, 2013; Stein, 2013).

Gradually, however, that conventional wisdom has shifted. Today there is a large and robust literature on public opinion in foreign policy, increasingly influenced by the study of political psychology. This shift has been driven by two trends: one theoretical, and another methodological.

The first is an increase in the number of theories in international relations that place the mass public at the fore. Starting in the 1980s, IR scholars became increasingly interested in the extent to which democracies conducted their foreign policies systematically differently

than non-democracies (Rummel, 1983; Doyle, 1986), in areas ranging from conflict (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Lake, 1992; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Reiter and Stam, 2002), to cooperation (Martin, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Milner and Kubota, 2005). One frequently posited explanation for democratic distinctiveness, especially in regard to war and crisis bargaining, had to do with the constraining effects of public opinion (Fearon, 1994; Baum and Potter, 2015; Gelpi, 2017).[1] This turn to public opinion to provide microfoundations for our theoretical models in IR (Kertzer, 2017) has led to an increased demand for scholarship seeking to better articulate the linkage between public opinion and foreign policy (Foyle, 1999; Oktay, 2018; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo, 2020) and better understand how the public forms judgments in foreign affairs.

This increase in demand as a result of theoretical changes in the discipline was also met by an increase in supply as a result of methodological changes in the kinds of data available to test these theoretical frameworks. Although notions of public opinion predate the development of large-scale survey methods, for much of the second half of the twentieth century the latter came to represent the former (Geer, 1996; Sanders, 1999; Igo, 2007). Since large-scale face-to-face and telephone surveys of nationally representative samples were prohibitively costly, however, scholars of public opinion on foreign policy often had to rely on secondary data—either polls fielded by polling firms like Gallup or Pew, or large-scale dedicated studies of public opinion toward foreign policy such as that fielded by the then Chicago Council on Foreign Relations beginning in 1974, which were designed more to provide a snapshot of public attitudes toward current events rather than test psychological frameworks.[2] The rise of survey experiments administered to large-scale samples—first through computer-assisted telephone interviews (Sniderman, 2011), then multi-investigator online studies, and finally diverse online samples at relatively low cost (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012) thus not only reduced researchers' barriers to entry, but also allowed scholars to incorporate longer batteries of individual differences and dispositional traits into studies that were explicitly intended to test psychological theories on large and diverse samples.

The literature on public opinion about foreign policy is now so vast that it is impossible to do it justice in the confines of a short review essay, but the discussion that follows has three parts.[3] It begins with the puzzle of how the public expresses such strong views about foreign policy issues even if they know relatively little about international politics, which political scientists have tried to answer in two different ways, each of which borrows from a different quadrant of political psychology: top-down models of public opinion, which understand the public as taking cues from political elites, and bottom-up models of public opinion, which point to the role of individual differences such as ideological orientations, core values, and images. Second, it turns to a series of attempts to provide psychological microfoundations for a number of theoretical models in international security, including the democratic peace, audience cost theory, rally-around-the-flag effects, against type models, and nuclear weapons. Third it turns to an area where there has traditionally been less work in political psychology: public opinion toward foreign economic issues like trade, where researchers have gradually discovered that material economic interests may play less of a role than classic theories in political economy once assumed. It concludes by discussing directions for future research, encouraging scholars to do more work to broaden the geographic scope of the evidence we use to build and test our theories of public opinion in foreign policy.

2. THE PUZZLE OF FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

Much of the study of public opinion about foreign policy is driven by a puzzle. On the one hand, most members of the public are "rationally ignorant" about politics in general (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lau and Redlawsk, Chapter 5, this volume), especially international politics, which is far removed from many citizens' daily lives (Guisinger, 2009). On the other hand, despite this lack of knowledge, the public has relatively strong views on many foreign policy issues; Americans are routinely willing to send troops to countries they cannot otherwise place on a map (Dropp, Kertzer, and Zeitzoff, 2014). Against the skepticism of postwar cynics (Almond, 1950; Kennan, 1951), the mass public's foreign policy attitudes show considerable structure, and are in fact better organized "than a bowl of cornflakes" (McGuire, 1989, 50). The question is where this structure comes from. Political psychologists have pointed to two different families of explanations to account for these findings: top-down models pointing the importance of elite cues, and bottom-up models emphasizing the role of foreign policy orientations, core values, and images.

2.1. Top-Down Models: Elite Cues

One class of theoretical models points to the role of elite cues, arguing that the public is largely ignorant about foreign policy, such that it makes up its mind by listening to the recommendations of trusted partisan elites (Berinsky, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017). Although elite cue-taking models are popular in the study of domestic political behavior as well (e.g., Zaller, 1992; Lenz, 2013), they are seen as particularly relevant in the study of public opinion about foreign policy given the extent to which many international events are seen as being relatively far removed from ordinary citizens' lives (Rosenau, 1961). Foreign economic policy issues like trade are typically understood as a "hard" rather than an "easy" issue (Carmines and Stimson, 1980), with the nuances of trade theories like Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner too technical for many citizens to understand (Hiscox, 2006; Guisinger, 2017; Rho and Tomz, 2017). At least in the United States, foreign security policy issues typically involve events taking place on the other side of the globe, about which citizens are often unaware and do not directly experience themselves (Kertzer, 2013). According to top-down models of public opinion in foreign policy, citizens therefore form judgments by listening to what their preferred partisan political elites have to say: when Democratic and Republican leaders in Washington are united on foreign policy issues—as the two parties traditionally were during the period of Cold War consensus when both parties largely stood behind liberal internationalism (Schlesinger Jr., 1949; Gowa, 1998)—Democrats and Republicans in the public will be united as well. When partisan elites are divided—as they were during the Iraq War (Berinsky, 2009; Baum and Groeling, 2009b), these divisions will be mirrored at the public level as well.

Top-down models rely on important sets of psychological microfoundations. The Zaller (1992) receive-accept-sample (RAS) model, in which individuals' political attitudes are a function of (i) what information they are exposed to, (ii) whether they resist or accept the information they do receive, and (iii) which of these considerations most easily come to

mind when answering survey questions, builds on earlier work in psychology differentiating between online and memory-based processing, for example (Hastie and Park, 1986; Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989). Similarly, much of the explanatory power of the role of partisanship in politics hinges on partisanship as a social identity, tying elite-driven theories into a broader literature on the psychology of intergroup relations (Huddy, 2001; Mason, 2018). Yet top-down theories of public opinion in foreign policy can also be relatively psychologically sparse and privilege structure over agency—focusing more on the political information environment that citizens are embedded in rather than the cognitive properties of the citizens themselves.

Of course, partisan elites are not the only sources individuals can get information from in foreign policy, and subsequent work has focused on the extent to which individuals also take cues in foreign policy from social peers and interpersonal discussion (Radziszewski, 2013; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017), which becomes particularly important with the rise of social media, which is altering how citizens receive political information (Settle, 2018; Young and Miller, Chapter 16, this volume). They can also turn to foreign voices (Hayes and Guardino, 2011; Murray, 2014; Leep and Pressman, 2019), particularly those offered by international institutions like the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which provide citizens in member states uncertain about the merits of a given military intervention a chance to "get a second opinion" (Thompson, 2009; Chapman, 2011; Grieco et al., 2011; Walter et al., 2018; Greenhill, 2020). The powerful effect of the endorsements of international institutions is one reason why powerful countries like the United States often choose to conduct military interventions multilaterally rather than go it alone, even though doing so means accepting constraints imposed by allies who might not be bringing as many military resources to the table: by securing the blessing of other members of the international community, it helps bring reluctant members of their publics on board.

Since the chief causal force in top-down theories of public opinion is the broader information environment, these theories tend to be very good at explaining longitudinal changes in public opinion over time. For example, top-down theories are well suited to explain the extent to which the partisan split in American attitudes toward Russia reversed itself from 2015–2017, or to which Republicans soured on immigration and embraced protectionism when Donald Trump entered office (Kertzer, Brooks, and Brooks, 2021). However, these theories also face a number of challenges. For example, they have difficulty explaining the presence of strong attitudes in the absence of elite cues (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017), the many political issues in which public and elite opinion diverge (Page and Bouton, 2007, though see Kertzer, 2022), or why left- and right-wing political parties across Western democracies in very different contexts nonetheless feature similar ideological divides on many foreign policy issues (Rathbun, 2004). Looking cross-nationally, for example, why does support for economic redistribution tend to be positively correlated with support for fighting climate change, but negatively correlated with support for military spending? (Enke, Rodríguez-Padilla, and Zimmerman, 2020) These cross-national similarities raise the possibility that there is something substantive about how people think about political issues themselves: rather than publics' political attitudes being entirely orchestrated by opportunistic elites from above, it suggests that certain types of policy preferences can also congeal from below.

2.2. Bottom-Up Models: Orientations, Values, and Images

In contrast to top-down models that emphasize the role of political elites and the mass media in shaping how people think about foreign policy issues, bottom-up models build on the psychological literature on ideology, values, stereotypes, and schema to explain why foreign policy attitudes often cluster together in systematic and meaningful ways (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). This work does not deny the importance of political elites in placing issues on the political agenda or mobilizing their supporters, but also points out that political issues often have a number of intrinsic properties of their own that affect how people think about them. Work in this tradition tends to focus on one of two types of models (Kertzer and Powers, forthcoming).

The first are *horizontal* models that show how foreign policy attitudes tend to cluster along a small number of ideological orientations. The central intuition behind many of these models is that foreign policy attitudes are not random, but they are not unidimensional either. Although we sometimes situate foreign policy preferences on a single isolationist-internationalist continuum, the former reflecting a desire for one's country to focus more on its own problems, and the latter indicating a desire to play an active role in world politics (e.g., Klingberg, 1952; Kertzer, 2013), horizontal models suggest this intuition is too simple, since there are multiple ways individuals can want their countries to be involved in or engaged with international politics (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; Holsti, 1979).

The most popular horizontal model of foreign policy attitudes maps foreign policy preferences onto two dimensions, which Wittkopf (1990), Holsti (2004), and others refer to as *militant internationalism* (MI), which measures individuals' beliefs about the desirability and efficacy of the use of force, and *cooperative internationalism* (CI), which measures the extent to which individuals are multilateralists interested in working with other members of the international community and international institutions like the United Nations to solve global problems.[4] Both individuals high in MI and individuals high in CI are internationalists, neither of whom want their country to turn inwards and focus less on the world's problems and more on their own, but their internationalism takes different forms. For militant internationalists, international engagement is crucial to deterring your country's adversaries and protecting your country's national security interests, whereas for cooperative internationalists, solving global problems is necessary to make the world a better place. These two dimensions are orthogonal to one another, such that individuals can be hawks (high in MI but low in CI, like former Donald Trump–era national security advisor John Bolton), doves (high in CI and low in MI, like former US president Jimmy Carter), internationalists high in both dimensions (such as former Clinton-era secretary of state, Madeleine Albright), or isolationists low in both (such as US senator Rand Paul).

Although developed in the American mass public context, subsequent support for this two-dimensional structure has been obtained in a range of samples, including publics in Sweden (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999), Britain (Reifler, Scotto, and Clarke, 2011), India (Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017), and France (Gravelle, Reifler, and Scotto, 2017), as well as elite policy-makers in the United States (Wittkopf, 1987; Rathbun, 2007). And, although the MI/CI framework was developed by political scientists, psychologists have recently argued in favor of a similar two-dimensional model (Bizumic et al., 2013), largely developed independently of this prior work. Constructs like militant internationalism or

cooperative internationalism are what public opinion scholars call *orientations* or *postures*, in that they are general tendencies on which individuals tend to systematically differ from one another, and which are relatively stable through time. It is true, for example, that in times of external threat, individuals tend to express more hawkish views than in non-threatening contexts (Gadarian, 2010). Yet it is also true that individuals who were relatively hawkish in one time period tend to be relatively hawkish in others: Murray (1996), for example, shows that individuals high in militant internationalism before the Berlin Wall fell were no less hawkish after the Cold War ended; their threat perceptions had just shifted from the Soviets to other potential targets.

One challenge with purely horizontal models of foreign policy attitudes, however, is that they were largely inductively derived by researchers sifting through public opinion data using factor analysis, and lack an overarching theoretical framework. These models tell us that some people are systematically more acceptant of the use of force than others, for example, but do not seek to explain this variation theoretically, or with reference to overarching psychological theories. They tell us *that* some people are more hawkish than others, but do not tell us *why*.

Seeking to meet these challenges are *vertical* or hierarchical models of foreign policy preferences. Hierarchical models understand foreign policy attitudes as being organized between constructs existing at different levels of generality, with the most specific policy attitudes at the bottom of the hierarchy, foreign policy orientations like MI or CI in the middle of the hierarchy, and general values at the top. Thus, hierarchical models show not just that these general foreign policy orientations predict foreign policy preferences on more specific issues (individuals who were supportive of the United States remaining in Afghanistan tend to be high in MI more generally), but that these foreign policy postures are themselves predicted by deeper values or orientations (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Crucially, these values or orientations can transcend or come from outside of the domain of foreign policy, like moral values (Kertzer et al., 2014; Kreps and Maxey, 2018) or personal values (Rathbun et al., 2016). People who care about retribution in general, for example, are more likely to support punitive wars (Liberman, 2006) and oppose financial bailouts that let borrowers off the hook unconditionally (Rathbun, Powers, and Anders, 2019); people who conceptualize fairness in terms of the proportionality between effort and rewards are averse to free-riding in alliances (Powers et al., 2022); individuals who emphasize the value of self-transcendence are more supportive of cosmopolitan foreign policies associated with cooperative internationalism (Bayram, 2015), and less supportive of military campaigns associated with militant internationalism (O'Dwyer and Çoymak, 2020).

Other vertical models root foreign policy preferences in other ideological orientations, such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which tends to be associated with hawkish or hardline policy preferences against both state and non-state actors (Doty et al., 1997; Cohrs and Moschner, 2002; McFarland, 2005; Albuyeh and Paradis, 2018), or social dominance orientation (SDO) (Mutz and Kim, 2017), although the relationship here is less straightforward (Henry et al., 2005). Rathbun (2020) integrates horizontal and vertical models of foreign policy into a dual process model of foreign policy preferences illustrated in Figure 13.1, linking CI to motivational goals of equality and taking care of others (and thus, core values such as harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and self-transcendence), and MI to motivational goals of protecting the ingroup from physical threats (and thus, core values of conformity and tradition, authority and loyalty).[5]

	Militant internationalism (MI)	Cooperative internationalism (CI)
Foreign policy preferences	Using threats and force to deter adversaries and protect allies	Working with the international community to solve global problems (fighting climate change, global poverty, etc.)
Motivational goal (Janoff-Bulman 2009)	To protect the ingroup from danger	To provide for the well-being of others
Moral foundations (Graham et al 2009)	Binding values: authority and loyalty	Individualizing values: harm/care and fairness/reciprocity
Personal values (Schwartz et al 1992)	Conservation	Self-transcendence
Worldview and ideology (Duckitt et al 2002)	Dangerous world beliefs Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)	Competitive jungle beliefs (–) Social dominance orientation (SDO) (–)

FIGURE 13.1 Linking foreign policy orientations to other frameworks in political psychology Modified from Rathbun's (2020) dual process model of foreign policy orientations, which illustrates how the two basic orientations that structure foreign policy attitudes are themselves rooted in distinct motivational goals, values, and worldviews.

The Big Five personality traits have similarly been found to systematically predict foreign policy attitudes (Schoen, 2007; Nielsen, 2016; Gravelle, Reifler and Scotto, 2020). Individuals high in openness to experience and agreeableness, for example, tend to be more supportive of redistributive global justice. Since a substantial portion of these core values, ideological orientations, and personality traits are formed prior to members of the public entering a given foreign policy situation, the takeaway of this literature has been to show how an important part of foreign policy attitudes are prepolitical, shaped by the same psychological and ideological predispositions that guide our choices and behaviors in everyday life. These predispositions offer an alternative route to opinion formation in the absence of elite cues: even individuals who lack the political sophistication necessary to think ideologically about international politics can rely on their core values to form judgments about foreign policy questions (Rathbun et al., 2016).

2.3. Image Theory

Another body of literature examines the structure of foreign policy attitudes from a different perspective, focusing not on the policies we want our countries to carry out, but on the images or perceptions we have of other states on the world stage (Boulding, 1959; Holsti, 1967; Cottam, 1994; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995; Herrmann, 2013; Castano, Bonacossa and Gries, 2016). Citizens in democratic countries generally have fairly strong feelings about which countries are their friends, and which are not (Gries et al., 2020): image theory provides one way of understanding how these feelings come about.

Image theory can best be understood as an interactionist middle ground between nomothetic structural theorizing and idiographic thick description. To one side, the study of images is a counterpoint to structural or rationalist theories that reduce behavior to the environments actors find themselves in (e.g., Waltz, 1979; Lake and Powell, 1999): image

theory argues that perceptions, rather than structure, determines behavior, since actors can define the situations they face in myriad ways. However, this emphasis on unit-level attributes does not necessarily mean forgoing nomothetic theorizing, particularly if the content of actors' perceptions share underlying structures. Image theory, then, can also be distinguished from purely ideographic accounts, which emphasize the uniqueness of actors and their relationships without striving to achieve a generalizable framework about how those relationships are structured.

In the most influential contemporary incarnation of image theory (Herrmann, 2013), both leaders' and ordinary citizens' perceptions of other countries are understood as a schematic judgment structured along three dimensions illustrated in Figure 13.2: relative power, the degree of perceived threat or opportunity, and perceived status or cultural sophistication. Observers can classify countries in three different ways along each of these dimensions. Along the first dimension, an actor can be evaluated as less powerful, equally powerful, or more powerful than the observer; along the second dimension, an actor can be considered to pose a threat, a chance for mutual gain, or an opportunity for exploitation; along the third, the actor can be perceived as of lower status, equal status, or higher status. Although 27 different combinations of evaluations are possible (e.g., O'Reilly, 2007, argues that the "rogue state" is a combination of an enemy image and a degenerate image), in practice, the framework focuses upon the five combinations that appear particularly frequently.

FIGURE 13.2 Images of cother countries
Modified from Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995), who argued that images of other countries are structured along three dimensions: relative capabilities, perceived threat, and perceived status. Although 27 (33) different combinations are possible, in practice the framework tends to focus on five combinatorial constructs in particular: the enemy image (equal in power and cultural status, but with threatening intentions), ally image (comparable in power and cultural status, but who pose an opportunity for cooperation), imperialist image (greater in power, equal in cultural status, and who pose a threat), degenerate image (comparable in power, inferior in status, and who offer an opportunity for exploitation), and colony image (weaker in power, inferior in status, and who offer an opportunity for exploitation).

First is the enemy image, which refers to an actor of comparable power and equal cultural status that is seen as posing a threat (e.g., US views of the Soviet Union during the Cold War). Second is the ally image, which is given to actors of comparable power and equal cultural status that are seen as posing opportunities for cooperation (e.g., US views of NATO allies during the Cold War). Third are imperialist images, which are given to actors of superior power and equal cultural status that are seen as posing a threat (e.g., Iranian views of the United States during the 1980s). The final two types of images, degenerate and colony images, are both given to actors perceived as being of inferior cultural status. Of those, degenerate images are given to actors of comparable capability but who are seen as being in cultural decay and thus who offer an opportunity for exploitation (e.g., Iraqi views of Iran in the 1980s), while colony images are given to actors with inferior capabilities and an opportunity for exploitation (e.g., US views of the South Vietnamese in the 1960s).

Three considerations here are relevant. First, images are stereotypes about other countries, and although image theory was developed independently of work on stereotypes in social psychology, it is striking the extent to which it reaches similar conclusions as popular psychological approaches to the study of stereotypes such as Fiske et al.'s (2002) stereotype content model (SCM), which posits that stereotypic content can be understood on two dimensions: warmth and competence, mapping onto perceived intentions, and perceived capabilities, respectively. Moreover, in the SCM warmth is determined by the presence or absence of competition (further relating to goal compatibility in the traditional image framework), while competence is determined by the group's power within society (analogous to capability). In this sense, images in international politics are inherently relational: the images we have about other countries are functions of what we think they can do for us—or, to us.

Second, images are sticky. Once they become embedded, they are resistant to change, and affects how subsequent information is interpreted. This serves as a challenge both to models of reassurance in international relations that argue that actors can overcome distrust by engaging in costly signals (Kertzer, Rathbun, and Rathbun, 2020), and to theories of public diplomacy (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009; Schatz and Levine, 2010), which posit that actors can use foreign visits, state broadcasting, and so on to win over hearts and minds of foreign publics. It is not that images make persuasion impossible, but rather, that they act as prisms through which we interpret even the grandest of gestures: in response to costly signals, for example, the individuals who update the most are often those who are already convinced (Kertzer, Rathbun and Rathbun, 2020).

Third, images are integrated schemas (Castano, Bonacossa, and Gries, 2016): because these are holistic judgments, when individuals are primed with one component of an image they can fill in the blanks (Herrmann et al., 1997). Knowing a target is inferior in capability and lower in cultural status, for example, primes individuals to adopt a colony image and perceive the target as representing a perceived opportunity for exploitation. One of the striking tendencies in foreign policy is the extent to which these schemas recur both across space and across time: for example, the narratives many Americans offered in the early phases of the war in Afghanistan (of a local population in need of protection from an oppressive regime, requiring outside intervention) is similar to the same narratives offered in earlier interventions in Vietnam, and similar to narratives European imperial powers frequently adopted in their own interventions. In this sense, what makes images powerful is the extent to which they are also linked to strategic scripts (Herrmann and Fischerkeller,

1995), implicating specific action tendencies: the stereotypes we have about other actors tells us how we should treat them. As the dehumanization literature reminds us, when we develop images of adversaries that deny their human qualities, we are able to morally disengage with them, permitting us to use violence against them (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014; Bruneau and Kteily, 2017). In this way, as with core values, images offer another bottom-up solution for individuals in the mass public who may lack knowledge about individual countries to nonetheless espouse policy preferences about them.

3. PUBLIC OPINION IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

As noted above, one reason why the public opinion about foreign policy literature has flourished in recent years is because international relations itself has become increasingly interested in domestic politics more generally. This is especially the case in the study of international security and conflict, which has emphasized the role of public opinion in a variety of different contexts. Much of the research in this space adopts a microfoundational approach (Kertzer, 2017), showing that even the grandest of macro-level theories in IR often rest on a set of causal mechanisms operating at the individual level, such as the beliefs, preferences, and reactions of members of the public in response to external events. This scholarship seeks to test empirically whether these micro-level assumptions are true, often borrowing explicitly from psychological theoretical frameworks in the process. I discuss four such examples below.

3.1. The Democratic Peace

The first of these concerns what international relations scholars refer to as the *democratic peace*: the observation that while democracies often go to war with non-democratic regimes, they do not fight one another (Doyle, 1986; Oneal and Russett, 1991). While this claim is not without its critics—from unease about how democracies are coded, to questions about whether democracy's purported effects are confounded with other factors (Layne, 1994; Oren, 1995; Farber and Gowa, 1997)—it nonetheless is relatively widely established, such that Levy (1988, 662) famously characterizes the democratic peace "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."

There are a number of different theoretical reasons why we might expect democracies not to fight one another, ranging from shared liberal values, to democratic leaders avoiding costly foreign policies because they are subject to greater institutional constraints (Owen, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993). One important class of explanations, however, relates specifically to the political incentives of democratic leaders who want to remain in office (Schultz, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, 1999). If the reason democracies readily fight non-democracies but do not fight each other is due to democratic leaders being constrained by public opinion, this implies that democratic publics have a particular aversion to fighting democracies—a pattern that should manifest itself in lab and survey experiments, in which researchers present respondents with a hypothetical military intervention, manipulate the regime type of the target, and test how it

affects support for the use of force.[6] As a result, a number of political scientists began testing these propositions directly, often drawing on psychological mechanisms in the process (Mintz and Geva, 1993; Johns and Davies, 2012; Lacina and Lee, 2013). Tomz and Weeks (2013) find that the central mechanism driving the democratic peace in the context of public opinion are moral judgments: democratic citizens perceive fighting other democracies to be fundamentally morally wrong—another instance of the important role that moral considerations play in shaping public opinion in foreign policy (e.g., Herrmann and Shannon, 2001; Kertzer et al., 2014; Kreps and Maxey, 2018; Rathbun, Powers, and Anders, 2019). In subsequent work, they show that these moral judgments are core to public opinion about alliances, which may help explain why democratic allies are more reliable (Tomz and Weeks, 2021).

Another potential set of psychological mechanisms underlying the democratic peace concerns democracy as a social identity. According to this argument, democracies do not fight one another because they perceive each other to be part of a common ingroup (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Hayes, 2016); we might use violence to resolve disputes with outsiders, but not with those who we perceive are like us. While some of this work focuses on these identity-based mechanisms at the elite level (Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Schafer and Walker, 2006), Hayes (2012) shows it extends to publics writ large: Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger failed to "securitize" India because the American public saw India as a fellow democracy, and thus as inherently unthreatening. Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007) use survey experiments to demonstrate a similar mechanism, showing that threat perception in the context of public opinion in foreign policy is a function of perceptions of shared social identity, not just military power as realists might predict.

Most of public opinion research on the democratic peace have focused on public opinion in democratic contexts. One exception is Bell and Quek (2018), who obtain similar findings in mass publics in an authoritarian regime, raising interesting questions about how to think about the causal mechanisms at work. This also raises a broader point about the evidentiary base we use to test our theories of public opinion in foreign policy, a point to which I return in the conclusion.

3.2. Audience Costs

Democratic distinctiveness in foreign policy does not just extend to who democracies go to war with, but also how they conduct themselves in crises more generally (Schultz, 2001). As a result, another established literature in international relations involves *domestic audience costs* (Fearon, 1994). The intuition behind the audience cost model is simple: if leaders face domestic constituencies who dislike it when leaders issue threats but fail to follow through on them—whether because they reveal the leader to be incompetent, or sully the national honor—then leaders who face these constraints should only issue threats when they truly intend to follow through (Guisinger and Smith, 2002). Threats should therefore be more credible when issued in public (though see McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Katagiri and Min, 2019). In this manner, audience cost models also implicate the democratic peace: if democratic threats are seen as more credible than non-democratic ones because democratic audiences have institutionalized mechanisms of punishing leaders whose conduct they find wanting, this provides another potential explanation for why democracies are less

likely to fight one another, since democracies should be better able to signal their resolve than their non-democratic counterparts.[7]

Both audience cost theory and theories emphasizing the greater credibility of democratic threats more generally are not without their critics (e.g., Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Downes and Sechser, 2012), much of which focuses on observational data. But, although audience cost theory is often studied using observational data (e.g., Partell and Palmer, 1999; Kurizaki and Whang, 2015; Schlesinger and Levy, 2021), given the challenges of strategic selection and the extent to which the key microfoundations of the theory reside at the individual level, it is also fruitfully studied using survey experiments, which have perhaps become the dominant approach through which they have been investigated in the past decade. These experimental studies test audience cost theory's microfoundations by probing the extent to which respondents dislike leaders who issue empty threats more than they do those who pledged to stay out in the first place (e.g., Tomz, 2007; Trager and Vavreck, 2011; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Levy et al., 2015; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Lin-Greenberg, 2019; Nomikos and Sambanis, 2019; Schwartz and Blair, 2020). Much of this work focuses more on varying situational features rather than probing psychological mechanisms. One exception is Trager and Vavreck (2011) and Levendusky and Horowitz (2012), who focus on how partisanship complicates audience cost theory. Another is Kertzer and Brutger (2016), who incorporate a series of dispositional characteristics from political psychology, showing that different segments of the public punish empty threats for different reasons. Hawks, high in militant internationalism (MI), for example, punish leaders for failing to follow through on the intervention, whereas doves dislike empty threats because they dislike threats in general. Similarly, individuals low in international trust care more about their country maintaining a reputation for resolve so as not to be exploited by others, and therefore more likely to punish leaders for showing weakness, whereas individuals high in international trust punish leaders for threatening to use force. More recently, Schwartz and Blair (2020) examine how gender stereotypes complicate audience cost models, showing that female leaders pay steeper costs for backing down on empty threats, as do male leaders who back down against female rivals.

Although public reactions to leader behavior constitute an important microfoundation for audience cost models, another key assumption involves the role of the mass media, since a free press better allows citizens to monitor their leaders' foreign policy behavior (Slantchev, 2006). Potter and Baum (2014) show that countries that feature greater media access—particularly in multiparty democracies, where opposition parties have incentives to draw attention to leaders' foreign policy missteps—are less likely to have their threats reciprocated in international crises. This also points to the relationship between public opinion and intra-elite bargaining; if leaders co-opt key regime insiders—advisers, cabinet members, and so on—foreign policy failures are more likely to escape the public's notice (Saunders, 2015). Yet it is not that elite politics necessarily trump mass politics, since it is elites' ability to loop in the public that provides a key source of their power.

3.3. Rally-Around-the-Flag-Effects

If audience cost models focus on how publics react to empty threats issued by their leaders, another class of theoretical models in IR focus on how publics react to the international

threat environment more broadly, and the tendency for public support for leaders and their policies in times of increased threat (Mueller, 1973; Lee, 1977; Baum, 2002). These surges in public support can come in response to one's country coming under attack: for example, public opinion polls suggest that public support for Jimmy Carter soared by 26% following the onset of the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979 (Callaghan and Virtanen, 1993), while George W. Bush's popularity soared by 35% the week of the September 11th attacks (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003). They can also occur when leaders decide to go war or commit troops—as was the case in both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq war in the United States, or in the Falklands War in the United Kingdom (Lai and Reiter, 2005), and has been detected in experimental studies in non-Western contexts as well (e.g., Kobayashi and Katagiri, 2018).

Explanations for rally effects focus on two different classes of mechanisms: information-based theories, and affective theories. Information-based theories of rally effects, like top-down theories of public opinion in foreign policy more generally, focus on the unique nature of the information environment during times of crisis. Some of these theories argue that in times of crisis, the public comes together because opposition criticism of the executive—especially in Congress—subsides, thereby bringing partisan opponents of the president on board (Brody, 1991). Others point to the nature of media coverage during times of crisis, noting that the "marketplace of ideas" often fails (Kauffmann, 2004), or that journalistic incentives means that the media is always more likely to cover opposition praise than cross-party criticism (Groeling and Baum, 2008). Another informational argument is advanced by Colaresi (2007), who notes that national security issues feature marked informational asymmetries between the public and the executive, and that the public is more likely to rally in circumstances where leaders are likely to be punished if a mission is against the public interest. A related informational argument comes from Haynes (2017), who, building on an earlier literature on how leaders launch risky foreign policies in order to "gamble for resurrection" (Downs and Rocke, 1994), argues that leaders often initiate force against powerful targets in order to demonstrate competence to their constituents.[8]

In contrast with these cognitive theories, affective accounts of rally effects emphasize the role of emotions in political behavior (Marcus, 2000; Huddy et al., 2005; Mercer, 2010). These include patriotism-based explanations, which argue that international crises cause citizens to gravitate towards leaders as symbols of national unity (Mueller, 1973; Lee, 1977), a classic conflict-cohesion theory in which external threat causes internal divisions to be set aside as members of the ingroup band together (Coser, 1956; Stein, 1976; but see Myrick, 2021). Another class of emotion-based theories focus on the distinct role of anxiety, which ground accounts of rallies in psychological theories of threat and emotional appraisal, arguing that it is specifically threat-induced anger (rather than, say, anxiety) that produces rally effects (Lambert et al., 2010). These affective-based theories argue that information-based explanations of rally effects suffer from endogeneity, in that a lack of opposition criticism may be better seen as a consequence of rally effects rather than a cause of them (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003). In contrast, information-based theories argue that affective-based explanations of rally effects are underspecified, in that they cannot explain why rally effects vary in magnitude (Baum, 2002) and duration (Kam and Ramos, 2008).

Whatever their cause, the presence of rally effects has important implications for the domestic politics of foreign policy. Rally effects often serve as a microfoundations for a broader research agenda on diversionary war, which explores the extent to which leaders have incentives to enter into foreign policy crises in order to redirect domestic discontent

and increase their regime's popularity at home (e.g., Lian and Oneal, 1993; Fordham, 1998; Theiler, 2018). Leaders may also have incentives to fight in order to satisfy their public's desire for status (Powers and Renshon, 2021), or respond to humiliation (Barnhart, 2017; Masterson, 2021). Yet even setting aside other critiques of diversionary war theories (Levy, 1989), one potential challenge is that rallies typically consist of a sudden surge of support followed by a gradual decay as the public "loses heart" (Fletcher, Bastedo, and Hove, 2009). By themselves, then, they are thus unlikely to be able to sustain lengthy military interventions, particularly those that do not show immediate signs of success (Eichenberg, 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2009), or for left-wing governments whose domestic constituencies are typically less enthusiastic about the use of force (Koch and Sullivan, 2010).

3.4. Against Type Models

Like audience costs, another class of theoretical models in IR also focuses on credibility, but from a different angle. Whereas audience cost models focus on how leaders make threats more credible by making them in public, *against type models* focus on how leaders make their policy proposals more credible by acting out of character. Although the logic of against type models was formalized in the context of models of legislative bargaining in American politics (Krehbiel, 1991), in IR it is often understood specifically in the greater ability of hawks to deliver the olive branch, as in the notion that only Nixon could go to China (e.g., Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998; Schultz, 2005; Fehrs, 2014; Kane and Norpoth, 2017).

The intuition behind against type models is relatively straightforward: an audience is uncertain about the quality of a policy being proposed by a leader, so it uses knowledge it has about the leader's predispositions (either based on her previous behavior, or the political party she represents) to evaluate the proposal's credibility or merit. Biased signalers can therefore send the most informative signals (Calvert, 1985): if a leader with a reputation for hawkishness supports a peace deal, it is seen as more credible than if a leader with a reputation for dovishness does the same, just as it is more credible when Fox News criticizes Republicans than when MSNBC does (Baum and Groeling, 2009a). This same logic is also implicated in scholarship on the informative value of cues from international institutions: if voters know that the United Nations is opposed to international conflict more generally but the UN Security Council nonetheless endorses a given international intervention, its endorsement should send a more informative signal (Thompson, 2009; Chapman, 2011)

As with the other theoretical models described above, against type models rely on a number of microfoundations in public opinion that are conducive to being tested empirically using survey experiments. Saunders (2018) shows that the public is more likely to oppose the use of force when advisers with reputations for hawkishness endorse it. Trager and Vavreck (2011) find that Democrats derive more political rewards from going to war than Republicans do. Mattes and Weeks (2019) find that hawks face fewer domestic costs to pursuing rapprochement than doves do—making it easier for hawks to deliver the olive branch. Yet other work suggests against type models have some important limitations. Mattes and Weeks (2022) shows that even while domestic audiences respond more favorably to cooperative attempts when they come from hawks rather than doves, foreign audiences find hawkish reconciliation efforts to be less sincere. And, while much of the against type

literature presumes that audiences infer leaders' types from their political party (with left-leaning parties being having reputations for dovishness, and right-leaning parties having reputations for hawkishness), Kertzer, Brooks, and Brooks (2021) build on psychological research on stereotypes to show that in the United States, the Democratic and Republican parties have much weaker and less distinct types in foreign policy issues than domestic political ones, suggesting that against type effects in foreign policy may be weaker than these models assume.

3.5. Nuclear Weapons

One recent area of growth in public opinion research in foreign policy concerns public opinion about nuclear weapons use. In an influential article, Tannenwald (1999) argued that the United States has not used nuclear weapons in combat since 1945 due to the emergence of an anti-nuclear norm that rendered the tactical use of nuclear weapons taboo. As with other theories in international security, this argument rests on particular individual-level microfoundations: assumptions about how people understand and form preferences about nuclear weapons. The result is a rapidly growing literature using survey experiments to examine public opinion about nuclear weapons.[9] Some of this literature focuses specifically on the question of the nuclear taboo, comparing how public attitudes toward the use of force vary between nuclear attacks versus their conventional counterparts (e.g., Press, Sagan and Valentino, 2013; Carpenter and Montgomery, 2020; Rathbun and Stein, 2020; Koch and Wells, 2021; Smetana and Wunderlich, 2021). Others turn to nuclear acquisition rather than use, exploring the depth of nuclear forbearance on questions ranging from the breadth of public support in Japan for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) (Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog, 2020), to the effects of extended deterrence and security guarantees on support for nuclear weapons acquisition in South Korea (Ko, 2019; Sukin, 2020).

The precise observable implications of nuclear taboo arguments in survey or experimental contexts are sometimes ambiguous. For example, should nuclear taboos be manifest in public opinion, elite opinion, or both (Pauly, 2018)? Most pressingly, what patterns of public support for nuclear weapons would affirm or challenge the existence of a nuclear taboo? Is the relevant quantity of interest the absolute level of support for nuclear weapons use? (If so, what proportion of the public supporting nuclear weapons use would indicate the absence of a taboo?) Or is it about whether support for nuclear weapons use increases as nuclear weapons become more instrumentally useful, under the presumption that taboo reasoning prohibits instrumentalized tradeoff calculations? Or is it a difference-in-difference, in which researchers compare the elasticity of demand for nuclear weapons at different levels of instrumental value, with the elasticity of demand for other types of weapons? Given the extent to which a robust psychological literature exists on sacred values and taboo tradeoffs more generally (e.g., Fiske and Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, 2003; McGraw, Tetlock and Kristel, 2003; Ginges and Atran, 2013), further research putting the nuclear taboo in comparative context with other types of taboos, or borrowing research designs or theoretical frameworks from this related literature, could be valuable in further increasing our understanding of how nuclear taboos work in practice, and how we know one when we see one.[10]

4. Public Opinion about International Political Economy

Much as in the study of international security and conflict, research on international political economy (IPE) has also become increasingly interested in the role of public opinion. Work in this research tradition typically relies on an Open Economy Politics (OEP) framework, in which actors are understood as having preferences over outcomes, which are then aggregated through domestic institutions to shape state behavior (Milner, 1997; Lake, 2009). Crucially, actors' preferences are traditionally assumed to be based on their economic interests: those who stand to materially gain from an economic policy should support it, while those who stand to materially lose from it should not. For example, immigration attitudes should be driven by concerns about labor market competition, such that citizens should oppose immigration from immigrants with similar skill levels, but support it from immigrants with different skill levels (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), since they should be competing over jobs with the former but not the latter. Attitudes toward offshoring should reflect its distributional consequences on different types of jobs, with workers whose occupations are highly susceptible to offshoring (computer programmers and telemarketers, for example) opposing it more than workers in occupations whose occupations are less likely to be offsourced (e.g., watch repairers and postal service mail sorters) (Blinder, 2009; Mansfield and Mutz, 2013). Attitudes toward foreign direct investment (FDI) should reflect its expected income effects, with skilled labor in recipient countries supporting it in particular (Pandya, 2010), since they represent the segment of society in recipient countries who will gain the most from it. In this sense, public opinion research in IPE has traditionally been less closely tied to political psychology than public opinion research in international security (Kertzer and Tingley, 2018), since it was largely content to ground its microfoundations in economic models rather than psychological ones. This has begun to change.

This is particularly the case in the study of public opinion about international trade. Economic frameworks like Hecksher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner make clear predictions about who the winners and losers from free trade should be. The Heckscher-Ohlin model suggests that free trade should benefit the owners of factors of production in which countries are abundantly endowed relative to the rest of the world (e.g., in industrialized countries like the United States, skilled labor), and harm the owners of factors of production that are relatively scarce. Highly skilled workers should thus be more supportive of trade than low-skilled workers. The Ricardo-Viner model predicts that trade preferences will depend on the specific industries that individuals work in: individuals working in sectors in which their country has a comparative advantage will be more supportive of free trade than those in sectors that are disadvantaged (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).

An earlier generation of work found evidence consistent with these models, but often using somewhat indirect measures of economic interests, using education as a measure of skill, for example (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; O'Rourke et al., 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). While education may serve as a reasonable proxy for an individual's skill level, it also serves as a reasonable proxy for a number of other quantities: the likelihood of being exposed to cues from political elites (Zaller, 1992), exposure to basic economic principles

(Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), and cosmopolitanism and attitudes toward outgroups more generally (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003).

As a result, a later wave of work employing more fine-grained measures of economic interests has tended to find weaker relationships with material economic interests, and stronger relationships with more psychological constructs—consistent with the political behavior literature more broadly, which tends to find relatively little support for personal pocketbook-based models of political behavior (e.g., Sears et al., 1980; Feldman, 1982; Kinder, Adams, and Gronke, 1989). Herrmann and Shannon (2001) show that trade attitudes are shaped by neorealist and Rawlsian ideas, while Wolfe and Mendelsohn (2005) point to the role of values and ideology. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) suggest that trade attitudes are sociotropic (implicating beliefs about trade's effects on the country as a whole) rather than egotropic (implicating beliefs about its effects on one's own pocketbook), consistent with Ellison, Lusk, and Briggeman (2010) and Naoi and Kume (2011), who point to the centrality of altruism and sympathy, respectively. Along these lines, Margalit (2012) points to cultural factors, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2013) to the role of social trust, Johnston (2013) to cognitive style, Rathbun (2016) to beliefs about liberty, Wu (2019) to beliefs about the government's role in the economy, Jedinger and Burger (2020) to authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, Brutger and Rathbun (2021) about fairness, and so on. Similar patterns have been detected in attitudes toward other types of foreign economic policies as well, such as immigration (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Newman, Hartman, and Taber, 2014; Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015; Dinesen, Klemmensen, and Nørgaard, 2016; Kustov, 2021).

IPE scholars have sought to explain these findings in three ways. One is to point to the challenges involved in measuring self-interest, particularly when our measures of self-interest in these studies are often less fine-grained than the measures of dispositional characteristics (Owen and Walter, 2017; Owen and Johnston, 2017), and where the relevant economic interests might be at the community level rather than the individual level (Broz, Frieden and Weymouth, 2021). Another is to flip the causal arrow around and show that the dispositional characteristics that seem to powerfully predict political behavior are themselves shaped by material economic forces. Ballard-Rosa et al. (2021), for example, show that individuals living in areas of Great Britain highly affected by economic shocks from increased import competition from China displayed higher levels of authoritarianism. Colantone and Stanig (2018) use a similar identification strategy to show that import competition in Western Europe causes increases in supports for nationalist, isolationist, and radical-right parties. Margalit and Shayo (2020) find that randomly assigning individuals to invest in the stock market causes rightward shifts in their socioeconomic values.

A third is to point to the role of the information environment. The most prominent cases where political attitudes do map onto personal self-interest—smokers opposing smoking bans (Citrin et al., 1997), voters supporting opioid treatment funding as long as the clinics are not located near their home (De Benedictis-Kessner and Hankinson, 2019)—are those where the issues are highly salient, and where pocketbook calculations are relatively straightforward. Foreign economic policy issues like trade, on the other hand, are more complex and often less salient. It is harder for a recently unemployed individual to attribute their job loss to increased import competition as a result of lower tariff rates than it is a smoker to attribute an increase in cigarette prices to government anti-smoking policy (Guisinger,

2017). If less than 40% of Americans can define what free trade is (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 70), it is also likely that how they think about trade may be more shaped by questions of ethnocentrism and perceptions of national relative gains (Mutz and Kim, 2017) than the nuances of Stolper-Samuelson.

Political scientists have therefore turned to experimental methods to study how information causally shapes trade preferences. Guisinger (2017) find that citizens have misperceptions about trade (e.g., who America's most important trading partner is), and that once these misperceptions are corrected, support for free trade grows (though see Flynn, Horiuchi and Zhang, 2022). Bearce and Tuxhorn (2017) show that individuals' monetary preferences become more aligned with their material interests once they are taught how monetary policy operates. Rho and Tomz (2017) and Jamal and Milner (2019) show that respondents are more likely to espouse trade preferences consistent with their material interests if they are presented with information about trade's distributional effects, while Bearce and Moya (2020) find that providing respondents with information about trade's employment effects is more effective in bolstering support for free trade than providing information about trade's benefits for consumers. Schaffer and Spilker (2019) find that randomly assigning individuals to receive information about how trade affects them personally has a larger effect than assigning individuals to receive information about how trade affects their country.

These developments in the IPE literature reinforce the importance of incorporating theories of the media into our understanding of public opinion in foreign policy issues, since the media represents an important source through which individuals receive information about policy issues. At the same time, however, they also raise broader philosophical questions about the underlying data-generating processes in the real world that the experiments are simulating. Studying what public attitudes would look under fully informed public opinion is valuable for normative reasons (Althaus, 1998), but these studies are perhaps better understood as telling us what public opinion about trade *would be* like in a world where citizens were all taught the precepts of trade theories, rather than probing the origins of trade preferences themselves. Moreover, the psychological traits noted above that shape trade preferences seem to operate equally strongly among more and less informed individuals, such that it is not the case that information makes the effects of dispositional traits go away (Kertzer et al., 2021). Further engagement with theoretical frameworks from political psychology will thus likely enrich our understanding of the microfoundations of public opinion about foreign economic issues, similar to how it has enriched our understanding in public opinion about security issues.

5. Future Directions

For both substantive and methodological reasons, the public opinion literature in foreign policy literature continues to grow at a remarkable rate. This has been reflected in a surge of research on the areas identified above: the structure of foreign policy attitudes, the domestic politics of international security (including the democratic peace, audience costs, rally-around-the-flag effects, against type models, and public opinion about nuclear weapons), and the microfoundations of international political economy issues like trade.

Despite this growth, there remain a number of areas in particular where more work is sorely needed, three of which I discuss here. First, much of the existing research on public opinion in foreign policy relies on evidence from a relatively small number of Western industrialized democracies (Narang and Staniland, 2018). There has been far less work understanding public opinion in foreign policy in non-democratic, hybrid, or transitional regimes (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller, 2013; Huang, 2015; Bell and Quek, 2018; Quek and Johnston, 2018; Weiss and Dafoe, 2019; Clary, Lalwani and Siddiqui, 2021). This asymmetry is partially due to matters of data availability, and partially to the presumption that public opinion is most worth studying in the contexts where it has the ability to more directly influence policy outcomes. Yet recent research on authoritarian accountability suggests that non-democratic governments are far more sensitive to public sentiment than political scientists once presumed (e.g., Truex, 2016; Meng, Pan, and Ping, 2017), suggesting the merit of studying public opinion in non-democratic contexts as well.

Moreover, there is a variety of theoretical reasons to suppose that public opinion dynamics may operate differently outside of the narrow set of Western industrialized contexts that constitute a plurality of the data sources utilized in many of our discipline's top journals (Colgan, 2019; Levin and Trager, 2019). Not only are the institutional contexts different (Narang and Staniland, 2018), but so too are many of the assumptions we might have about the nature of public opinion itself. For example, since much of the research on public opinion in foreign policy uses evidence from the United States, political scientists tend to think of foreign policy as relatively less salient than domestic political issues. In countries embroiled in territorial conflicts, however, the opposite is true, and foreign policy issues often constitute the central political axis: in Israel, for example, attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict are as highly correlated with partisanship as partisanship is with left-right political ideology in the United States (Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon, 2018). Similarly, Kleinberg and Fordham (2010, 691) note that tests of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in public opinion about trade tends to perform better in industrialized countries than in developing ones. More generally, in countries that are highly dependent on trade, the dynamics of public opinion about foreign economic policy may likely be quite different than in countries where trade makes up a relatively small proportion of GDP, and trade may be more distant from citizens' daily lives (e.g., Kim and Cha, 2021).

Second, this curtailed geographic focus has also led to an asymmetric focus on public opinion in *sender* states rather than in *recipient* states. We know much more about the microfoundations of foreign aid donors' preferences (Milner and Tingley, 2013; Dietrich, Hyde, and Winters, 2019), rather than foreign aid recipients' preferences (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood, 2014; Findley et al., 2017; Alrababa'h, Myrick, and Webb, 2020), or natives' attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Aarøe, Petersen, and Arceneaux, 2017) rather than immigrants' attitudes toward the countries to which they are migrating (Holland and Peters, 2020). There is a considerable amount of work on public opinion toward military interventions, but it largely focuses on domestic support within the intervening country (e.g., Mueller, 1971; Larson, 2000; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2009) rather than of the targets of the intervention itself (Hirose, Imai, and Lyall, 2017; Bush and Prather, 2018; Dill, 2019; Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye, 2020). This asymmetry means the public opinion literature sometimes paints an image of the public as spectators watching foreign policy uninterestedly from the sidelines, rather than as the players in the field, but this perhaps better portrays the American experience than it does the dynamics

of public opinion about foreign policy writ large. Broadening the geographic scope of the public opinion literature in foreign policy can help rectify this imbalance; there is more to public opinion about foreign policy than is dreamt of by Americanists.

Third, a rich literature exists on the role of gender in public opinion about foreign policy. Much of it focuses on better understanding the nature of the "gender gap" between men and women in their support for the use of force (e.g., Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Togeby, 1994; Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996; McDermott and Cowden, 2001; Brooks and Valentino, 2011; Eichenberg, 2016; Crawford, Lawrence, and Lebovic, 2017); similar efforts have also been made to understand why women in the United States are significantly less supportive of free trade than men are (Burgoon and Hiscox, 2004; Mansfield, Mutz, and Silver, 2015; Kleinberg and Fordham, 2018; Brutger and Guisinger, 2022). Others focus on double standards in how male and female leaders (Croco and Gartner, 2014; Post and Sen, 2020; Schwartz and Blair, 2020) or combat fatalities (Gartner, 2008; Cohen, Huff, and Schub, 2021) are treated. This literature is shedding new light on important dynamics in public opinion, and it should continue to be developed further. In comparison to the robust literature on gender, however, there is relatively little research on the role of race in public opinion about foreign policy—and the literature that does exist is predominantly (though not exclusively) focused on race as it relates to the attitudes of majority-group members (e.g., Gartner and Segura, 2000; Baker, 2015; Mutz, Mansfield, and Kim, 2022), rather than the foreign policy preferences of minority group members themselves (Green-Riley and Leber, 2021). As international relations scholars become more reflexive about the role of race in the discipline (e.g., Vitalis, 2016; Búzás, 2021; Freeman, Kim, and Lake, 2022), this remains an important area for future research in public opinion as well, further broadening our understanding of the dynamics of public opinion in foreign affairs.

Notes

1. Though see Weeks (2014); Hyde and Saunders (2020).
2. There is also a rich tradition of lab experiments in foreign policy, but which originally tended to use mass samples to model elite behavior, rather than being interested in the dynamics of public opinion about foreign policy in its own right (e.g., Mintz and Geva, 1993; Beer et al., 1995; Herrmann et al., 1997; McDermott and Cowden, 2001; see Hyde 2015 for a review).
3. Among the topics I lack the space to cover in any reasonable detail and thus sidestep here include: the evolving role of the media in foreign policy (Nacos, Shapiro, and Isernia, 2000; Robinson, 2001; Berinsky and Kinder, 2006; Warren, 2014; Baum and Potter, 2019), the relationship between military casualties and public opinion (Mueller, 1971; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Larson, 2000; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006; Voeten and Brewer, 2006; Gartner, 2008; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2009; Kertzer, 2016), the relationship between public opinion and terrorism or political violence (Kam and Kinder, 2007; Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009; Zeitzoff, 2014; Balcells and TorratsEspinosa, 2018; Huff and Kertzer, 2018; Littman, 2018; Nair and Vollhardt, 2019; Tellez, 2019; Gilbert, 2023), public opinion about foreign policy as it relates to international law and cooperation (Brutger and Strezhnev, 2018; Kim, 2019; Lee and Prather, 2020; Dill and Schubiger, 2021; De Vries, Hobolt and Walter, 2021; Morse and Pratt, 2022), and public

opinion about a broader range of issues in foreign economic policy, such as aid, investment, globalization, or climate cooperation (Milner and Tingley, 2013; Chilton, Milner, and Tingley, 2020; Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters, 2018; Carnegie and Dolan, 2020; Naoi, 2020; Tingley and Tomz, 2020; Ferry and O'Brien-Udry, 2021; Mahajan, Kline, and Tingley, 2022).

4. Isolationism is also sometimes identified as an additional, third dimension (e.g., Chittick, Billingsley and Travis, 1995).

5. On motivational goals underlying political ideology, see Janoff-Bulman (2009); on moral and personal values, see Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) and Schwartz (1992); on the relationship between worldviews and ideological orientations, see Duckitt et al. (2002).

6. Note that if leaders were merely constrained by democratic publics being more war averse in general, the democratic piece should be monadic (that is, democracies should fight less more generally), but most treatments of the democratic peace find it to be dyadic instead (democracies do not fight one another, but are just as likely to fight non-democratic states).

7. Of course, even if democracies are better able to signal their resolve, it may also be the case that democracies who end up in a crisis with one another would also find it more difficult to back down—which should also reduce the likelihood of these crises occurring. I am grateful to Jack Levy for this point.

8. Of course, this raises interesting questions about why foreign policy aggressiveness signals competence—suggesting the limits of juxtaposing a "psychological rally effect" with "increased perceptions of leader competence" (Haynes, 2017, 340), since it is arguably difficult to understand the latter without the former. On the centrality of competence in public opinion about foreign policy, see Friedman (2023).

9. There is also a related literature exploring public attitudes towards other types of emerging technologies, such as drones and satellites (Kreps, 2014; Lin-Greenberg and Milonopoulos, 2021), killer robots (Horowitz, 2016; Young and Carpenter, 2018), and cyber (Gomez and Whyte, 2021; Kostyuk and Wayne, 2021; Shandler et al., 2022).

10. This also applies to other taboo arguments, such as the chemical weapons taboo (Price, 1995) or water taboo (Grech-Madin, 2021).

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CHAPTER 14

THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM

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TERRORISM is widely perceived by the public as the single greatest threat facing modern society (Brenan, 2021). Contrary to popular opinion, terrorism is not a modern phenomenon. In fact, it has existed for millennia. In ancient Palestine, in the first century BCE, pioneering insurgents used newly designed short daggers to conduct assassinations and spread terror among the local population (Law, 2016). By the 7th century, Indian radicals introduced special rope to terrorize the public by means of strangulation (Marsella & Moghaddam, 2005). Kidnappings and arson characterized terror events in the French revolution in the 18th century (Law, 2016). Meanwhile, in modern times, bombs, guns, missiles, planes, drones, and biological and chemical weapons are all employed in terror attacks (LaFree et al., 2014).

In the modern era, the notion of terrorism was irreversibly imprinted on the public consciousness with the September 11 attacks that shook the foundations of the world. Since then, several major terror events in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Mumbai (2008) have raised the specter of terrorism which has continued to influence ongoing conflicts, elections, and public discourse. Terrorism is a contemporary form of political violence that advances political or ideological causes by triggering fear, dread, or anger in predominantly civilian populations (Canetti et al., 2013; Besser et al., 2009; Huddy et al., 2005; Galea et al., 2002).

Even though there has been a steady decline in the number and fatality of terrorism incidents since 2015 (Global Terrorism Database, 2021), the threat remains remarkably stubborn, and persists as an option for extreme actors so long as it is has a chance to successfully reorder the political status quo. Part of the reason for the persistent public fear of terrorism is that a flurry of sensational incidents has captured the public's attention and solidified terrorism as a cause for concern. In recent years, there have been a succession of bombings, shootings, and vehicle-ramming attacks in central European cities. Paris was struck twice in 2015, Nice, Brussels, and Berlin were hit in 2016, the United Kingdom was struck three times in 2017, and the wave of terrorism also spread to Barcelona (Global Terrorism Database, 2021). Further beyond the western centric media glare, terror attacks

continue to occurred in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, northern and sub-Saharan Africa, and south and southeast Asia, with thousands of casualties each year.[1]

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and those that followed, increasing attention has been directed toward understanding the profound effects of terrorism on societies and their members (Besser et al.,2009; Canetti et al., 2013; Galea et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2005). In many ways, the specter of terrorism has exceeded its objective threat. A potent and pervasive fear of terrorism should not be surprising, since terrorism directly targets the democratic fabric of society and specifically exploits the inherent tension between the basic need for security and the aspiration to sustain democratic values (Besser et al., 2009; Canetti et al., 2013; Galea et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2005).

Research on the political consequences of terrorism has centered on several substantive domains of politics. These include its effects on the public's political ideology (Bonanno & Jost 2006; Huddy et al., 2002; 2005; Huddy & Feldman, 2011), its influence on domestic- and foreign-policy attitudes (Canetti et al., 2019, 2021; Fisk et al., 2019; Huddy et al., 2005), views on the exclusion of minorities and migrants (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Green, 2009; Kalkan et al., 2009; Hatton, 2015), and support for the erosion of civil liberties (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Bozzoli & Müller, 2011; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). We have also seen changes in voting behaviors and support for more militant paramilitary groups following terror attacks (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006; Kocher et al., 2011).

Terrorism, like other traumatic events, affects people in different ways. What factors account for the differences in people's reactions to and attitudes toward terrorism? What types of reactions to terrorism lead to support for specific types of political outcomes? We argue that understanding the psychological processes behind the political responses to terrorism is crucial because of their significant political implications. We assert that the growth and prominence of political psychology research into terrorism since September 11 warrants a comprehensive review into the development of the field. This is especially pertinent given that the last chapter on terrorism in the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology appeared in Hermann's 1986 edition (Crenshaw, 1986), which focused on the psychology of terrorist perpetrators. Since that time, key research agendas relating to terrorism have investigated the strategic logic of terrorism (Crenshaw, 2000; Pape, 2003), the psychology of terror perpetrators (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), as well as counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategies (Huq, 2013). Each of these is a worthy topic of research and has produced laudable results. However, since it is not possible to cover all aspects of terrorism research in this chapter, we choose to focus on the psychology of the public response to terrorism. This chapter emphasizes how psychological reactions to terrorism play a central role in analyzing its political effects.

Before we begin, we must engage with the question of how to define terrorism. The problem of defining terrorism has hindered its analysis since the earliest terrorism research in the 1970s (Crenshaw, 2000), as terrorism frequently means different things to different people. The term is sometimes applied to state actors, and in other cases to non-state groups. Some use the word only when an attack is waged against civilians, while others argue that attacking security personnel can also be considered terrorism. The issue of defining particular groups or organizations as terrorists is controversial too, with myriad commentators pointing to the age-old motif of one person's terrorist being another's freedom fighter (Levin & Asal, 2017; Schmid, 2012).

Nevertheless, even in the absence of an agreed-upon definition, we can still identify certain common attributes in the various definitions of terrorism (Richards, 2014). Almost all definitions agree that physical violence, or a threat thereof, is a requisite ingredient of terrorism. The goal of this violence must be to instill terror, fear, or dread among predominantly civilian targets (Schmid, 2012). While this minimalist definition still leaves open an enormous number of loopholes and difficulties, the analytical consequences of the definitional flashpoints that remain may be overstated (Levin & Asal, 2017). This position is especially apt in this chapter where we focus on public responses to terrorism. Thus, we feel justified in using this bare-bones definition as a basis to examine the intersection between political psychology and terrorism.

The chapter is organized in four sections. The first section presents an overview and critical reflections on the dominant theoretical approaches regarding exposure to terrorism and traumatic incidents. We discuss theories that regard acts of terror as group-based attacks as well as individual actions. In the second section, we examine the political consequences of terrorism via empirical research that delineates the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral processes in response to terror attacks. Reflecting the diversity of classic and recent empirical work on the effects of terrorism, we present research covering a wide range of methodological approaches and examine different contexts in which attacks take place (isolated attacks versus ongoing terrorism as part of prolonged conflicts). Third, we present a short review of the emerging research into the new era of cyberterrorism. In the concluding section of the chapter, we highlight a series of unresolved issues that remain open in the field.

1. Theoretical Approaches

Several broad approaches have emerged in the political psychology literature that explain why people have different political reactions to stressful events, or more specifically, to threatening or harmful incidents that elicit some combination of intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, anger, fear, helplessness, and distress (Canetti et al., 2013; Huddy et al., 2005). Collectively, the research on the effects of terrorism demonstrates how psychological reactions to terrorism undermine people's sense of security and helps foster a view of the world as a chaotic and scary place (Canetti et al., 2019; Galea et al., 2002; Miguel-Tobal et al., 2006). Below, we review several broad classes of theory, each of which underscores a slightly different set of active elements in the development of political reactions to terrorism. Given that we can analyze an act of terror at the group level and the individual level, we review several approaches that link terrorism to group reactions as well as to people's individual responses.

1.1. Reactions to Realistic Threat

1.1.1. *Strategic Reactions to Terror*

Some theorists argue that the public reacts rationally and strategically to terror threats. The basis for this claim stems from research into international conflicts. In that literature, factors such as number of casualties or interests affected by a conflict play a role in understanding the nature of public reactions. The number of casualties could be one indicator of

the realistic interests at stake in a conflict, although theorists have moved away from this explanation (Berinsky, 2007).

Jentleson's work (1992, 1998) on the *pretty prudent public* marked the next step in this research, suggesting that the nature of the mission itself can predict whether it will receive public support. The public, according to Jentleson, can differentiate between military interventions based on its perceived stakes (or costs).[2] Thus, Jentleson's assumption of the public's rationality served as an antecedent for attitudes toward and beliefs about political issues. The political consequences, the public support for military force, varies according to the policy objective for which force is used.

Jentleson's research lends insight into our understanding of the public's decision-making process—during times of conflict, when a country's security is threatened, the public is more likely to support military action against threatening groups. However, despite the innovation of his work, this approach, like other existing theories of public support for military action, fails to identify the mechanisms through which members of the public determine, as a group and at the individual level, whether to support or oppose various foreign policies. Consistent with the assumption that the public is rational, several intergroup approaches help us understand the role that perceptual and cognitive processes play in the escalation and perpetuation of conflict.

1.1.2. *Intergroup Conflict Approaches*

Realistic conflict theory suggests that threats to the interests and privileges of the in-group, whether actual or perceived, drive group members' political attitudes and decisions (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983). Emphasizing shared material interests and conflicts over tangible resources, this theory posits that perceived threats—defined as cognitive evaluations of how external threats interfere with the achievement of individual or group goals (Landau et al., 2004; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009)—are key determinants in the outbreak of conflict.

One important categorization of threat perception is rooted in the differentiation between personal and collective threats (Huddy et al., 2002, 2005). Threats can be posed to the interests of the individual or to the interests of the collective, or to both. Personal threats refer to those that pose a physical danger to oneself and one's loved ones. Collective threats refer to the fear that the out-group poses a danger to the in-group's resources or its physical well-being.

Following terror attacks, where threats to the physical well-being of national in-group members became salient, studies found that personal threats were far more potent than threats to the nation as a whole, both in the wake of single attacks (Goodwin & Gaines, 2009; Huddy et al., 2002), and in situations of prolonged conflict (Gross et al., 2017; Hobfoll et al., 2006). On the other hand, perceptions of a collective threat can at times override personal threats due to the power of in-group solidarity (Lavi & Bar-Tal, 2015).

1.2.   Reactions to Symbolic Threat

1.2.1. *Social Identity Theory*

Symbolic approaches focus more on symbolic threats to a group or nation's status, culture, or values than to physical or strategic threats. They have their origins in *social identity theory* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which maintains that group membership creates in-group

self-categorization that favors the in-group at the expense of the out-group. It also links the individual and collective levels by providing a context for the mechanism by which group membership shapes individual cognitive and emotional processes. Social identities relate to people's internalized sense of membership in a particular group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When salient, it is an important determinant of a person's responses to external stressors (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In times of conflict, strong identification with a group often determines one's attitude toward a conflict, creates a positive collective identity, binds members of society together, and gives meaning to societal life (Canetti et al., 2017). Social identity theory complements the propositions of realistic conflict theory. However, according to social identity theory, the antecedent of intergroup animosity is linked to how one categorizes others and assigns them to the out-group. In addition, physical threats are not required for the development of animosity but arise in response to symbolic threats to a group's status and values. In other words, we can understand intergroup behavior only by looking at the individuals' or groups' interaction in the context of their memberships in social categories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tausch et al., 2007).

Investigating the impact of a terrorism-related social identity on psychological and behavioral responses, Fischer and colleagues (2010) suggested that group-level factors shape the psychology of the individual. Manipulating British nationality (versus gender identity) when priming photos of the 2005 London terrorist bombings, they found that "stressors in the social environment are perceived to be most significant for, and potentially detrimental to, the social self when there is a fit is given between the group membership that informs a person's sense of self (i.e., salient social identity) and the relevance of the stressor to that salient social identity" (p. 147). In short, national identification has emerged as an antecedent of more intense feelings of threat.

1.2.2. *System Justification Theory*

System justification theory (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2004) is a motivated social cognitive approach, which posits that most individuals and groups are fundamentally motivated to believe that the world as they perceive it is just, legitimate, and beneficial (Jost et al., 2004). Accordingly, people are motivated to justify societal behavior when people think that it is threatened (Jost et al., 2012). Times of extreme social threats, such as those caused by terrorist attacks, will therefore cause greater cognitive closure, increased conservatism in the general public (Jost et al., 2004), and stronger feelings of dependence on authority for desired resources. These factors increase the legitimacy of that authority and explain why terror threats produce more conservative thinking via cognitive narrowing and motivational needs (Jost et al., 2003).

1.3. Intergroup Threat Theory

The intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Ybarra & Rios, 2009) is a social psychological theory that focuses on *perceptions* of threat. It considers the effect of two main types of threats on intergroup relations—realistic and *symbolic threats—and* examines reactions at two units

of analysis: the group and individual levels.[3] *Realistic* threats at the group level constitute threats to tangible or concrete objects associated with one's in-group, such as power or natural resources, whereas *realistic* threats at the individual level are threats to the individual's physical or economic well-being. *Symbolic* threats at the group level relate to threats to the group's identity and its systems of values or beliefs, as expressed in its language, religion, or moral code (Bizman & Yinon, 2001). To that end, *symbolic individual* threats refer to individual's loss of self-identity or self-esteem (see also Craig & Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume).

In many ways, the intergroup threat theory provides a bridge between realistic and symbolic approaches as it encompasses both types of threats as key determinants in the outbreak of intergroup conflicts. Realistic conflict theory considers threats to the tangible interests and privileges of the in-group as the foremost driver of political attitudes and behaviors and ignores the importance of the group's identification. However, social identity theory posits that in times of conflict, strong identification with a group drives political preferences, and physical threats are not required to arouse animosity between groups. By incorporating intergroup and cultural antecedents of threat, as well as situational and individual-level antecedents, the intergroup threat theory recognizes that both realistic and symbolic threats predict people's responses to intergroup conflict. Realistic threats are hypothesized to elicit behaviors designed to cope with the threat, such as heightened support for aggression. Symbolic threats are more likely to predict cognitive shifts such as changes in people's levels of ethnocentrism, intolerance, and empathy toward the out-group. Threats against one's in-group are strong predictors of hostility and aggression toward the out-group. While threats perceived to be directed at the individual level tend to prompt cognitive biases.

In the field of terrorism, research has confirmed that both realistic threats (that endanger existential harm to one's group) and symbolic threats (that endanger the group's cultural discontinuity) trigger a collective and personal angst, leading to support for exclusionist policies against out-group members (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008, 2009; Huddy et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2005; Sniderman et al., 2004).

Over the years, the intergroup threat theory has been used primarily to predict intergroup attitudes under the assumption that attitudes affect different types of behaviors, particularly negative, hostile, and discriminatory behaviors directed at out-group members (Canetti et al., 2009, Canetti et al., 2016; Fischer et al., 2010; Huddy et al., 2002; 2005; Marcus et al., 1995) as well as at in-group members (Elad-Strenger et al., 2021). By providing a full theoretical framework for threat, the intergroup theory shed light on the various consequences of threat among groups and group members.

1.4. Appraisal Theories and Emotional Reactions to Terrorism

The theories we reviewed in previous sections employed emotions in a predictable light. For example, the intergroup threat theory predicts that intergroup threats elicit certain emotions (e.g., anger), while individual-level threats arouse other kinds of emotions (e.g., fear) (Stephan et al., 1999). Yet these theories rely on an assumption that a particular threat will elicit similar type of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. In recent years, political psychologists have shifted their focus to concentrate on emotions as distinct

antecedents of political phenomena. One trend has been to use appraisal theories to explain why individuals experience different emotions in similar situations (Brader & Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). Cognitive appraisals are the way in which people subjectively perceive and interpret a given situation (Frijda et al., 1989; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, et al., 1994).

Several studies have used appraisal theories to explain the formation of distinct emotions with political consequences at the individual level (Gross, 2008; Halperin, 2014; Iyer et al., 2003) and the collective one (Mackie et al., 2000). Below, we highlight two prominent ways in which appraisal theories help us understand people's responses to terrorism.

1.4.1. *Interpersonal Emotions*

In the terrorism field, several studies have used appraisal theories to explain the formation of distinct emotions underlying people's appraisals of terror acts. Different appraisals can evoke distinct emotions that have specific political consequences (Gross, 2008; Halperin, 2014; Iyer et al., 2003). Extensive research has demonstrated how fear and anger, for example, can predict individuals' support for specific counter-terrorism policies. However, they have divergent effects not only on the assessment of risks, but also on actual risk-taking behavior (Iyer & Oldmeadow, 2006; Lerner et al., 2003).

Fear usually prompts people to seek safety by fleeing the source of the threat (Roseman et al., 1994) or attempting to appease those responsible (Frijda et al., 1989; Iyer & Oldmeadow, 2006). Research has indicated that fearful individuals can adopt strategic responses in their choice of methods for self-preservation (Iyer et al., 2015; Spanovic et al., 2010). Specifically, Iyer et al. (2014) showed that terrorism predicts support for aggression only when there are few direct costs for the in-group. Likewise, fear often predicts support for government aggression, but only when the costs to the in-group are low (Iyer et al., 2003). By contrast, anger motivates antagonistic responses such as challenging those responsible for a transgression or unfair situation (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). When individuals feel angry about the illegitimate harm suffered by others, they are more likely to support the goal of taking action against those responsible for the harm (Gordijn et al., 2006).

In sum, rather than a linear path between situational stimuli and effects, the appraisal theory posits that people assess situations along several dimensions. The appraisal determines the emotional reaction to the situation (see Brader & Gadarian's chapter on appraisal theory, this volume).

Based on what has been learned about the function and consequences of specific emotions, several group membership-based approaches have moved beyond the individual and interpersonal contexts in which the appraisal theory was originally developed and applied. These theories paved the way for distinct predictions about political attitudes and behavior depending on the out-group involved.

1.4.2. *Intergroup Emotions Theory*

Theory and research on interpersonal emotions suggest a possible mutual relationship between appraisals and emotions. However, when emotions were investigated in the context

of intergroup conflict, the focus shifted to identifying the predictors of differentiated emotional reactions. Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2004) provided a theoretical framework that allowed us to look at the important role emotions play in intensifying the political effects of strong group identities. According to this theory, different intergroup behaviors follow specific intergroup emotions that were triggered by certain appraisals of events linked to the group's social identity. Specifically, the intergroup emotions theory provides insights into the conditions that promote anger (offensive intergroup behavior) versus anxiety (non-offensive intergroup) in the context of intergroup conflicts, as it links the emotional appraisal theory and the social identity theory.

According to the intergroup emotions theory, threats are most likely to produce anger among group members who are certain that a negative event has occurred and can attribute it to a specific individual or entity. In the context of national threats, people who strongly identify with their nation are motivated to view their group positively and thus see it as stronger than a threatening opponent. As such, individuals who strongly identify with their nation are more likely to get angrier when the nation is threatened than individuals who identify less strongly with the country. In other words, an external threat is most likely to produce anger among group members who are convinced that a negative event has occurred, attributing it to a specific group, individual, or entity (Mackie et al., 2000).

In the wake of a terrorist attack against civilians, some evidence suggests the need to distinguish between threat perceptions and the anxiety it can evoke, as distinct outcomes that drive different political consequences (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Gadarian, 2010; Huddy et al., 2021; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2006).

Anxiety arises when group members see their group as unable to address an external threat. Once aroused, anxiety prompts people to view a future risk as severe and encourages risk aversion as a method of reducing anxiety. In the context of conflicts, studies have identified a strong relationship between anxiety and risk aversion (Rydell et al., 2008), expressed oftentimes through a lack of support for military action (Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2006). By contrast, anxious individuals were found to be highly supportive of domestic counter-terrorism policies (such as surveillance programs) that did not involve measures perceived to be highly risky (Huddy et al., 2005). On the other hand, studies have documented a positive relationship between anger and perceptions about a lack of risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Rydell et al., 2008), support for military action (Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2006), and more aggression and greater support for the war on terror (Fischer et al., 2010).

Experimental research has also isolated the role of *hatred*, defined as a feeling that is targeted toward another's malicious intent and malevolent nature. While anger and anxiety are malleable emotions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, 2008; Halperin et al., 2011), hatred is an unadaptable characteristic linked to the target of hate, regardless of their actions (Allport, 1954; Schoenewolf, 1996; Sternberg, 2003; see also Halperin & Cohen-Chen, Chapter 30, this volume). As a group-based emotion, hatred is provoked in reaction to actions committed against the individual or his or her group. As such, ongoing terror was found to serve as a catalyst for increasing hatred toward groups regarded as responsible for the terror. As such, Halperin (2008) claims that "group-based hatred reflects despair of any potential change and, hence, will not support correction attempts" (p. 729).

1.5. Terror Management Theory

Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986) is an evolutionary-based psychology theory, which proposes that a basic psychological conflict emerges during traumatic events because they force people to confront the inevitability and unpredictability of death, and activate instincts of self-preservation (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). The theory suggests that cultural worldviews help buffer the anxiety resulting from awareness of the inevitability of death (Greenberg et al., 2001). As a result, in order to avoid increasing awareness of their own mortality, people take steps to defend their cultural worldview, including their nationality and religion, in light of the mortality salience that terrorist attacks elicit in them[4] (Burke et al., 2010; Greenberg et al., 2001).

Similar to the predictions of social identity and emotions theories, terror management theory predicts that mortality salience will intensify the stereotyping of out-group members (Landau et al., 2004a), which, in turn, translates into exclusionary attitudes (Canetti, 2017; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). However, according to the terror management theory, people's worldview functions as a buffer that reduces distress. Therefore, experiences of anxiety or emotional distress should not mediate the effect of mortality salience on defending one's worldview, at odds with appraisal theory. The theory challenges Jost and colleagues' (2003, 2007) contention that self-identified conservatism is related to the aversion to uncertainty and threat, claiming that people under threat hang onto their pre-existing ideologies— liberals to liberal ideas, conservatives to conservative ideas.[5]

Salience concerns about mortality are also predicted to intensify the appeal of charismatic leaders, as one of the leader's basic functions is to help people manage a deeply rooted fear of death that is inherent in the human condition. Following the 9/11 attacks, several studies provided evidence that mortality salience heightens the appeal of a leader with a charismatic style (President Bush) and significantly reduces the appeal of other leaders (Landau et al., 2004b).[6]

2. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

Research on the political consequences of terrorism spans several important substantive domains of politics, including political ideology, public opinion pertaining to foreign and domestic policy, out-group animosity toward minorities and migrants, and civil liberties restrictions.

In examining the effects of exposure to terrorism, we are confronted with a dilemma about what constitutes exposure to such attacks. As a rule, scholars have adopted a broad definition of what counts as exposure to terrorism. Some define it as being physically close to an event or suffering direct physical harm (Galea et al., 2002; Besser et al., 2009), others consider emotional proximity in lieu of a purely geographical indicator (Huddy et al., 2002), and still others consider both factors (Galea et al., 2002; Lerner et al., 2003; Schlenger et al., 2002). Exposure can range from knowing someone who was killed or hurt in an attack, through to experiencing an injury to oneself or a close other, to personally witnessing an act of terror (Canetti et al., 2019; Galea et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2002; Snider et al., 2023).

In the context of ongoing terrorism, a narrower definition that requires some level of direct or indirect harm is usually used, since otherwise exposure would be attributed to entire communities (Hobfoll et al., 2006; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016).

2.1. Ideological Effects

It is now widely accepted that terrorism holds the power to sway people's political orientation. Some scholars argue that terrorist attacks increase the endorsement of right-wing and authoritarian policy preferences, following the *conservatism shift hypothesis* (Bonanno & Jost 2006; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Godefroidt, 2022). Others rely upon the *worldview defense hypothesis* in claiming that terror attacks merely intensify people's pre-existing political worldview—be it liberal or conservative (Pyszczynski et al., 2004, 2006; Burke et al., 2010, 2013; Landau et al., 2004b).

Building on *system justification theory*, Jost and colleagues (2003, 2007) proposed that conservatives regard the level of threat in their daily lives as greater than liberals. Therefore, their reactions to threatening events are more constrained than liberals, whose attitudes are more likely to shift to the right following situational threats. In other words, after terror attacks, when attitudes shift to the right, the attitudes of liberals move further along the spectrum. Bonanno and Jost (2006) claimed that such an ideological shift can occur even 18 months after the attacks.

Drawing on two American samples, before and after the 9/11 attacks, Nail and McGregor (2009) found conservative shifts among liberals and conservatives regarding two main issues—support for President Bush and increasing the military budget. Researching the consequences of terror in the context of a prolonged conflict, Berrebi and Klor (2008) reported that exposure to terror attacks is associated with a significantly higher vote share of right-wing parties in subsequent elections in Israel (see also Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016).[7] Yet several other studies in Israel found that, over time, political attitudes that shifted after terror attacks eventually shifted back, making people more favorably disposed to supporting peace (Gould & Klor, 2010; Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Halperin & Gross, 2011).

The *worldview defense hypothesis*, advanced by TMT scholars, suggests that terrorism causes people to confront the inevitability of death. As such, increasing mortality salience intensifies people's pre-existing political ideologies—be it liberal or conservative (e.g., Burke et al., 2010, 2013). Other TMT studies claim that it is mortality salience and the associated anxiety it produces that increase political preferences for candidates who are ideologically close to one's pre-existing worldview.

Contrary to the conservatism shift hypothesis, Huddy and Feldman (2011) found support for a more circumscribed reaction of Americans to the 9/11 attacks, a reaction that is limited to relevant policy domains. Their findings suggest the attacks chiefly affected the public's support for anti-terrorism policies, but not their unrelated ideological positions. For example, they found little or no change in Americans' views regarding issues such as gun control, death penalty, or legalized abortion, issues that traditionally polarize liberals and conservatives. Terrorism, according to Huddy and Feldman, cause "more intense politics on both the political left and right and no net change in broad political ideology after a terrorist attack" (p. 2).

This *ideological intensification hypothesis* found support in a number of recent studies. For example, in the wake of the 2004 bombing in Madrid, Lago, and Montero (2006) reported that the bombings reinforced existing negative feelings among Spaniards about the government's activity, rather than swaying the electorate. Van de Vyver et al. (2016), who examined the effects of the 2005 London bombings, concluded that the attack caused more prejudiced views of Muslims and immigrants, and more favorable views of people's in-group. In other words, they found no evidence of an ideological shift, but rather that the political views of people on both sides of the spectrum became intensified.

The contradictory findings we reviewed leaves unresolved the question about how exposure to terrorism influences people's ideological leaning. Much of this complexity stems from the luck of distinction between reactions to groups (especially those seen as connected to attackers),political ideology (a broad-based political belief system concerning government, free market economics, and the influence of religion and moral dilemmas (Bloom et al., 2020). Such distinction allows us to examine other political reactions to terrorism events, that have been interpreted as ideological but fit better into more circumscribed reactions.

2.2. Foreign Policy Preferences

If the above section examined how terrorism influences general political attitudes, the next sections focus our attention on specific policy outcomes. The policy position mostly directly associated with terrorism is naturally—foreign policy preferences and support for military action. It is now widely accepted that the psychological reaction to terrorism prompts heightened support for a range of foreign policies including aggressive military actions and retaliation against attackers (Huddy et al., 2002, 2005; Canetti et al., 2017, 2019; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Zipris et al., 2019).

We can draw upon several of the theorical frameworks reviewed above to help us predict public foreign policy preferences in the aftermath of terror attacks. In accordance with the *intergroup threat theory*, personal and collective threats increase in the wake of terror attacks (Stephan & Stephan, 1985, 2001). We can also draw upon *intergroup emotions theory*, which teaches us that people do not respond to terror threat in a uniform manner. Huddy and colleagues' (2005) work, for example, demonstrated that the effects of terror threats depend on people's psychological sense of security. Those who perceived the United States as facing a concrete threat of future terror attacks were more likely to demand harsh counter-terrorism policies, demonstrated the strongest support for going to war in Afghanistan, and expressed high levels of support for President George W. Bush following the attacks (Huddy et al., 2007), and in his second presidency (Willer, 2004). However, those who experienced high levels of anxiety found such counter-terrorism policies to be risky, and their risk-aversion corresponded with low levels of support. In other words, as predicted by social identity theory, among those who identify strongly as Americans, the perceived threat of terrorism increased prejudice against the threatening out-group and fueled support for punitive actions.

Increased support for militant policies in times of threat is not limited to the American political context. In the Mexican context, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) concluded

that terror threats were associated with stronger support for tougher security policies and heightened support for engaging the enemy abroad. In France, following a series of terror attacks in Paris (2015) and in Nice (2016), Brouard et al. (2018) reported clear attitudinal changes surrounding security policies among exposed respondents. Within the framework of a prolonged conflict, studies in Israel have shown that continuously high levels of threat perception has the effect of reducing support for peace efforts (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016), increasing support for militant attitudes (Ben Shitrit et al., 2017), and heightening support for enacting policies that socially distance Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel (Ben Shitrit et al., 2017).

Both collective and individual threats were found to generate a strong reaction to terrorism. Perceiving the state as being under threat elicits anger and support for retaliatory military actions (Huddy et al., 2005; Canetti et al., 2009; Lavi & Bar-Tal, 2015; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). Personal threats were found to arouse fear and anxiety following both isolated terror attack incidents (Huddy et al., 2002; Goodwin & Gaines, 2009), and in the context of ongoing conflict (Hobfoll et al., 2006; Gross, 2008). Several studies have documented that psychological distress[8] and perceived threat are the mechanisms that link exposure to violence with greater militancy, aggression, hostility, and resentment (Hobfoll et al., 2006; 2011; Canetti et al., 2009; 2014; 2021).

Scholars have also looked at emotions to explain support for aggressive foreign policy. In accordance with *intergroup emotions theory*, researchers have verified that participants primed with anxiety experienced the world as a riskier place than those primed with anger (Huddy et al., 2005; Fisk et al., 2019; Liberman & Skitka, 2019). As such, people who experienced high levels of anger following the September 11 attacks were more supportive of President Bush, and more supportive of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Huddy et al., 2005). In contrast, anxious people were less supportive of these elements of American foreign policy as they saw them as risky and dangerous.

Experimental studies have corroborated many of these findings, with participants primed to feel anger exhibiting higher support for harsh policies against suspected terrorists than participants primed to feel anxiety or fear (Fischhoff et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2003). Similarly, in an experimental study outside of the American scene, Fisk et al. (2019) investigated the effects of threat perception and anger on individuals' support for drone strikes. In a cross-national study of French, American, and Turkish participants, Fisk and colleagues found that the effect of symbolic terror threats (being reminded about democratic values, not economic threats) on support for drone strikes was mediated by anger. Building on this result, in a more recent study, Huddy and colleagues (2021) reinforced how anger increases self-selected exposure to violent terror content and enhances support for punitive and retaliatory anti-terrorism policies.

Studies have also used mortality salience to predict support for aggressive military actions in the aftermath of terror attacks. From the perspective of *terror management theory*, an immediate result of terror attacks is a heightened sense of mortality salience characterized by greater awareness of the inevitability of one's own death (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Greenberg et al., 1986; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). This awareness creates a state of anxiety that triggers various psychological processes. In the Israeli context, Hirschberger and Ein-Dor (2006) found that mortality salience increased support for military force against the Palestinians among right-wing Israelis.

2.3. Anti-immigrant and Anti-minority Attitudes

The political consequences of terrorism extend beyond the issue of foreign security policies. Another consequence is the development of anti-immigrant attitudes. The link between terrorism and immigrants has been part of the "securitization of migration" discourse. Initiated following the 9/11 attacks, the discourse includes studies that measure the effects of terrorist acts on exclusionist attitudes toward migrants.

The logic underpinning the link between terrorism and anti-immigrant attitudes is that terror attacks can lead people to feel that their nation is under threat, which then leads to support for exclusionist policies against all out-group members (Huddy et al., 2005; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Weise et al., 2012). In the context of an existential threat, in-group solidarity and out-group hostility act as defense mechanisms, which are felt to be essential for group survival. There are two psychological effects involved in anti-immigrant attitudes in the wake of terror attacks: perceptions of insecurity, and perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the safety and security of one's identity group. Increases in perceptions of threat prompt people to agree to sacrifice fundamental values in exchange for a feeling of security. As a result, they are much more willing to deny entry to immigrants (Green, 2009), reject Islam as a legitimate religion and culture among minorities (Kalkan et al., 2009), and generally develop more exclusionist attitudes (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Zeitzoff, 2014; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006).

After the September 11 attacks, Americans who perceived the country as being under threat were more likely to support counter-terrorism acts such as increased surveillance of Arabs in the United States, tougher restrictions on visas for foreign students (Huddy & Feldman, 2011), and more prejudice against Arabs and Mexicans (Hitlan et al., 2007). Similarly, in London, after the July 2005 bombing, British citizens who reported higher levels of stress and felt they were personally at risk of becoming a victim expressed more prejudicial opinions about Muslims (Rubin et al., 2005; 2007). Thus, the threat of terrorism against a country, which is a form of a group-based threat, is likely to increase prejudice against out-group members—even if they are not connected to the threat itself.

An interesting study by Lahav and Courtemanch (2012) shows consensus support for anti-immigration policies among right-wing supporters when immigration was framed as a tangible threat. Liberals, on the other hand, were influenced by other framings. "When . . . reminded of the cultural implications of immigration, they were more likely to support a lax immigration policy than when the issue was framed in terms of security. The presence of security threats however, decreased the tendency for individuals left of the ideological spectrum to support liberal immigration policies" (p. 494).

This discourse accelerated during the last decade due to the confluence of a wave of Jihadi terrorism in Europe alongside a massive influx of asylum seekers. During this time, popular media and nationalist political campaigns have exploited and conflated these issues, asserting tenuous links between migration and terrorism (McKay et al., 2011; Hatton, 2015) and fueling increasingly negative public attitudes toward migrants and asylum seekers (see also Greene & Staerkle, Chapter 28, this volume).

As innuendo and allusions abounded about the involvement of immigrants in terror attacks, the already sensitive topic erupted in the popular media, resulting in increased support for the extreme right (Dinas et al., 2019), and massive support for imposing strict

migration policies to curb the flow of asylum seekers (Bandyopadhyay & Sandler, 2014; Böhmelt et al., 2020). One recent study even went so far as to report that terrorist attacks in one country can influence migration attitudes across the region. Using data from the Eurobarometer, Bohemlet and colleagues (2020) measured the influence of immigration salience (the mentioning of immigration as one of the leading issues their country was facing) on such policies. Their findings suggest that feelings of danger, group identification, and the salience of the migration threat were stronger in neighboring countries than in those further away. However, comparing German participants' level of threat before and after a terror attack in neighboring France, Jungkunz, Helbling, and Schwemmer (2019) found that immigration attitudes worsened only among students with conservative political beliefs.

In the context of prolonged conflict, perceptions about the threat of terrorism mediate the relationship between exposure to terror and the adoption of hardline or exclusionist attitudes toward different minority groups (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) examined whether exposure to political violence in Israel during the Al Aqsa Intifada (2004)—a period of ongoing severe terrorist attacks—led to hostility against Palestinian citizens of Israel (the largest minority in Israel). Using a panel design, they interviewed Israeli Jewish respondents on three occasions. Their results indicated that exposure to terrorism leads to exclusionist political attitudes through the mediation of psychological distress and perceived threat. Studying attitudes toward African asylum seekers within the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Snider and colleagues (2023) found evidence of a conflict spillover effect, whereby exposure to terrorism influenced public opinion about migration. During intense periods of terrorism, people who were more exposed to terrorism (measured via geographic proximity and self-reports of human loss) exhibited greater support for exclusionary asylum policies, even if the asylum seekers were unrelated to the terror group.

An additional avenue of research has theorized about attitudes toward migrants in the wake of terrorist acts while focusing on mortality salience (Burke et al., 2013). Scholars found that alongside increased awareness of their mortality, people become more in-group oriented and less favorable to out-groups—Muslims and immigrants in particular (Hitlan et al., 2007; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009).

It is important to consider evidence from recent studies that did not find conclusive evidence of increasing out-group hostility as a direct consequence of terror events (Bove & Böhmelt, 2016; Dreher et al., 2017). In a panel study, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006) reported that mortality salience connected to the Madrid railway attack in 2004 affected prejudice against out-groups in general, including Muslims and Jews. According to the authors, anti-Jewish prejudice was related more to conservative attachment in the face of terror threats than anything else. In another study, using a similar method, Brouard et al. (2018) found no evidence that mortality salience from the terror attacks in Paris (2015) and Nice (2016) affected attitudes toward immigrants. Nevertheless, the attacks had a significant impact on attitudes toward security. Similarly, Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) detected an immediate increase in expressed fear after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks but could not find a significant change in support for immigration policies.

Looking at the recently emerging evidence of a declining impact of terrorism on anti-immigration attitudes, Nussio (2020) claims that one can interpret such null and

inconclusive findings as evidence that people have become increasingly desensitized to terror. According to the cognitive desensitization assumption (Funk et al., 2004), as exposure to terror attacks becomes more common, people gradually develop a belief that terrorism is an expected and normal occurrence. Hence, its power to change attitudes weakens. Using a quasi-experimental design, Nussio (2020) compared the political attitudes and emotions of respondents who were surveyed directly before and after the Berlin Christmas Market terror attack in 2016. The study found no change in German participants' political attitudes, national identification, or views on Islam.

2.4. Erosion of Civil Liberties

Are we more willing to compromise civil liberties and democratic values amid terror attacks? Terrorism directly targets the democratic fabric of society and specifically exploits the inherent tension between the basic need for security and the desire to uphold democratic values (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Huddy et al., 2005). Attacks confront the public with a complicated equation: whether they are willing to trade civil liberties for security. Examples of such dilemmas include the question of whether to permit intrusive surveillance policies allowing the government to monitor private communications (sometimes without warrants), and to search personal belongings. Other policies include permitting indefinite detention, targeted killing, trial by military commissions, and torture.

As opposed to being inviolable principles, support for civil liberties are better treated as involving value trade-offs that depend on the circumstances (Huddy et al., 2002; Davis & Silver, 2004; Greenberg et al., 2004). In other words, the trade-off between security and liberty is sensitive to new information and new threats.

In the aftermath of September 11, Huddy and colleagues (2005) found a direct connection between the perceived threat of future terrorism and support for the introduction of compulsory national identification cards and government monitoring of citizens' communications. In this case, group-based threats against the nation were associated with more acceptance of the need for authorities to combat terrorism, rather than concerns about undue restrictions on civil liberties. More so, while not supportive of aggressive foreign policies, anxious individuals were supportive of domestic counter-terrorism policies that do not involve high-risk measures (such as introducing surveillance policies). In other words, those high and low in anxiety were equally supportive of domestic counter-terrorism polices. When people feel threatened, they "become significantly more supportive of measures that restrict the rights of groups broadly associated with terrorism, and policies that limit civil liberties for all citizens more generally" (p. 605).

Along similar lines, conducting a quasi-experiment before and after the 2005 London bombing, Bozzoli and Müller (2011) reported that perceptions about the risk of a future terror act increased preferences for a tradeoff of civil liberties for security (see also Davis & Silver, 2004; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). Interestingly, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) established a link between authoritarian personality traits and perceptions about terror threats with respondents' approval of restricting civil liberties. Once threatened with terrorism, even those who scored low in authoritarianism supported government policies that conflicted with civil liberties such as surveillance, posting of CCTV in public, the torture of suspects, and agreeing to carry national identity cards. Those who scored high on authoritarianism tended to have such preferences regardless of any threats.

In the context of prolonged exposure to violence, individual direct exposure to terrorism influenced the willingness to sacrifice civil liberties—with exposed individuals supporting the denial of social and political rights to minority group members (Cohrs et al., 2005; Canetti-Nissim et al., 2009; Gross, 2008).

Emotions are also relevant predictors in this matter. In a study focusing on group-based hatred, Halperin et al. (2009) examined issues of political intolerance among Jewish Israelis toward Palestinian citizens of Israel. Using a two-wave panel design and two cross-sectional surveys, Halperin and his colleagues found that group hatred played a crucial role in predicting political intolerance (Anger and fear also predicted political intolerance, however, only indirectly—anger via hatred and fear via threat perceptions and hatred).

3. Looking Ahead—A New Age of Cyberterrorism?

Terrorism as a technique is not limited to any one particular weapon. The theories discussed in this chapter apply uniformly to terrorism waged through the use of bombs, guns, missiles, planes, knifes, cars, and myriad other tools of warfare. Yet looking ahead, we can presage the outline of a new approaching menace—cyberterrorism. We pay special attention to this emerging phenomenon for three reasons. First, cyberterrorism is an extremely salient and highly concerning issue for the public. A 2021 Gallup poll found that the public views cyberterrorism as the single greatest threat facing the country—greater even than the spread of COVID or nuclear proliferation, and far more than conventional terrorism (Brenan, 2021). Second, security officials have long (perhaps hyperbolically) prophesied the catastrophic potential of cyberterrorism—more than any other tool—to disrupt critical infrastructure and levy tremendous damage (Barnes, 2021). Third, and most importantly, initial political psychology research into cyberterrorism demonstrated that the public experiences and reacts to cyberattacks in a qualitatively different manner than to conventional terrorism (Shandler, Snider et al., 2022; Shandler, Gross et al., 2021).

In applying the approaches reviewed throughout this chapter to the case of cyberterrorism, several theories seem particularly pertinent. A series of controlled cyberterrorism studies reported that cyberattacks trigger heightened demands for military retaliation, though only when the cyberattacks reach a minimal threshold of destructiveness (Shandler, Gross, et al., 2022; Gross et al., 2017). These findings support Jentleson's (1992, 1998) notion of the rational public that weighs up factors in the aftermath of violence, and which justifies military action depending on the lethality of the attack suffered.

However, many other findings have observed divergent effects for cyberterrorism that require rethinking how political psychology theories apply in a cyber era. A key factor that distinguishes cyberterrorism from conventional terrorism is that cyber-attacks seem to elicit different emotional responses than those covered earlier in this chapter. We learned through this chapter that anxiety and anger are the two most salient emotions that drive political effects following conventional political violence (Huddy et al., 2007). However, when it comes to cyber-attacks, the data indicates that anxiety is less germane (Backhaus et al., 2020), than other variables such as dread (Gomez & Whyte 2021; Shandler & Gomez, 2022; Kostyuk & Wayne, 2020) or threat perceptions (Snider et al., 2021).

The materiality of distinct psychological reactions in response to cyber incidents explains, for example, why deadly cyber-attacks do not trigger a "rally 'round the flag" effect in the same way as conventional terrorism. Cyber-attacks lead people to doubt whether the government is capable of combating seemingly irrepressible cyber-perpetrators, and in this context, the accumulated perception of threat is likely to cause voters to lose confidence in the government rather than rallying ineffectively behind leaders (Shandler & Gomez, 2022).

Collective threat perceptions have also been linked to policy preferences in the cyberspere. In a series of studies, Snider and colleagues (2021; under review) concluded that threat perceptions play an important intervening role in the relationship between exposure to cyberterrorism and support for cybersecurity policy preferences. Examples of relevant cybersecurity policies include those that require the government to alert citizens about cyberattacks, increased oversight of business activity amid cyberattacks, allowing governmental monitoring of people's emails and mobile phones, and the use of CCTV as part of counter-terror activity.

An alternative explanation focuses on the anonymity of cyber perpetrators. The lack of certainty about the identify of cyber-attackers leads to heightened perceptions about the gravity of the threat. Cyber-attackers attain an aura of omniscience, and the public believes that they are able to strike at any time, from any place, without warning (Dunn Cavelty, 2012). In many cases, the public is persuaded that security authorities are unable to identify cyber attackers who operate in an environment of impunity. Together, these factors influence the public response to damaging cyber threats.

Scholars have sought to explain why cyberterrorism triggers distinct emotional and political effects, yet these attempts require further substantiation and this area remains a ripe avenue for future research. One plausible explanation centers on the almost unfathomable complexity and novelty of cyberspace. It is likely that the confusion stemming from the uncertainty associated with cyberspace means that emotions such as confusion, fear, and inflated threat perception are likely to drive public responses (McDermott, 2019). The public has shown the ability to grow inured to conventional political violence since the effects are constrained and well-known. Yet mysterious and scary cyber-attacks can trigger emotional responses beyond what the facts of an attack warrant.

One implication of these divergent findings is, unfortunately, that we cannot simply apply to cyberterrorism the lessons learned from past decades of research into conventional political violence. While there will certainly be overlap with the political psychology of terrorism literature, we have highlighted several areas where cyberterrorism operates according to new rules. As cyberterrorism continues to emerge in the decades ahead, the research community will need to engage further with the gaps that we identified.

4. Conclusion

Twenty years of research since the September 11 attacks has established the centrality of psychological processes in predicting political responses to terrorism. However, our current understanding of how terrorism shapes political attitudes remains incomplete.

As our review indicates, research on the political consequences of terrorism has spanned several areas of politics but left some unresolved issues. First, how are we to interpret the ideological leanings of those who changed their opinions in the aftermath of a terrorist attack? Does terrorism shift people's underlying political beliefs, along with all relevant

policy preferences? If so, for how long? Alternatively, does terrorism intensify people's pre-existing political ideologies—be they liberal or conservative? Answering these questions may require breaking down political ideology into specific policy preferences.

Second, recent studies have suggested that the impact of terrorist attacks on public opinion is short-lived. Some have even documented that attacks do not change political attitudes beyond short-lived initial fluctuations. It is likely that the use of particular empirical methodologies have distorted the intensity and longevity of outcomes. To counter this effect, it is imperative that future research continue to reconcile experimental and correlational evidence and coordinate the various forms of experimental manipulations with data collected via online survey panels, social media, or through snowball methods.

In addition, we encourage future research to extend the boundaries of the literature to the Global South, which is poorly represented in the literature despite being the epicenter of current terrorism. It is not clear if our understanding of terrorism holds in all global contexts. Just as importantly, further research is required to add nuance to the unsatisfactory binary division between single terror attacks and prolonged exposure to terrorism. Is this dichotomy still worthwhile in light of the numerous terror attacks in European countries? Can repeated direct and indirect exposure to terrorism explain why Europeans today are less threatened by future terror attacks?

Third, an area that demands additional research is the purported link between threat perceptions and negative emotions as predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes. Nearly all research in this area has focused on anti-Muslim attitudes, raising the question whether the results can generalize to other out-groups. This question is especially relevant in the context of the ongoing European migration crisis and the salience of the illegal migration issue in the United States and other Western countries. The nexus between terrorism, migration, and out-group attitudes will continue to be a pressing concern in coming years.

Furthermore, we are now witnessing the introduction of a new generation of intrusive surveillance policies, with techniques now able to detect, monitor, intercept, collect, and identify data at an unprecedented scale. What do people agree to when supporting surveillance policies these days? Are they aware of extent to which they sacrifice their civil liberties in the name of security?

Last, cyberterrorism is a nascent phenomenon. The nature and scope of the threat are still not entirely clear, partly due to ongoing technological developments, and partly due to pervasive misinformation and hyperbole surrounding the subject. While some initial theories have sought to explain how cyberterrorism affects the public's attitudinal preferences, their contentions require further substantiation. We encourage further investigation of the psychological mechanisms that drive the public's political preferences amid cyberattacks. Drawing upon the decades of extensive research into the political psychology of conventional terrorism is a good place to start.

Notes

1. See the Global Terrorism Database, 2021, for a full list of countries and casualty counts. Even though most terror attacks target countries in the Global South, the majority of empirical studies has focused on Western countries (Godefroidt, 2022). This constitutes a major gap in the literature, and we encourage future research to extend terrorism research to incorporate a more global understanding of its effects.

2. According to Jentleson (1992, 1998), missions designed to stop foreign aggression against the United States and its allies will be supported even if the cost is high, whereas support for missions intended to promote internal political change will be granted only if the costs continue to be low.

3. The original version of the theory, the *integrated threat theory* (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) included additional two types of threats—intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes—which were afterward found to be predictors for realistic and symbolic threats. More so, the distinction between threats to the group and to the individual levels shifted as well. The original theory considered threats to the individual only as a function of their membership in a particular ingroup. The current version of the theory enables scholars to investigate reactions at both levels level.

4. It should be noted that the terror management theory was developed as a response, not to terrorism, but to the terror people felt in the face of death.

5. It is also important to mention that, unlike the former theories, in studies that use the terror management theory, effects of mortality salience are only seen shortly after the events or experimental manipulations that increased this salience. These results raise questions regarding its long-term effect. Nevertheless, in examining the effects of exposure to terrorism in a prolonged conflict in Israel, Canetti-Nisim and colleagues (2009) documented that such exposure over a period of a year had a cumulative effect. They maintained that the effects of exposure to terrorism extend beyond short-term increases in mortality salience.

6. According to Landau et al. (2004), the terror management theory helps explain why external threats intensify in-group favoritism and unanimity. This contention contradicts the common enemy explanation that results in responses such as the "rally 'round the Flag" response (Mueller, 1973).

7. Studies of single terror acts outside the United States have also pointed to a conservative shift though measures of specific policy responses to terrorism. Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede (2006), for example, found more anti-Arab and anti-Semitic prejudices, authoritarianism, and conservative values following the 2004 Madrid railway attack. Similarly, Van de Vyver et al. (2016), who examined the effects of the 2005 London bombings, reported more prejudiced views of Muslims and immigrants, and more favorable views of people's own in-group.

8. Exposure to terrorism at the individual level can result in impaired mental health, which at extreme levels can manifest as post-traumatic stress (PSS), and which is known to promote militancy, hostility, resentment, and rebellion (Canetti et al., 2009; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, et al., 2006). Symptoms of PSS include a re-experiencing of the traumatic event, avoidance of reminders of the trauma, emotional numbing, and hyperarousal (Spitzer et al., 1999). Research into the psychological implications of terror attacks in the United States (Schuster et al., 2001), Spain (Miguel-Tobal et al., 2006), and the United Kingdom (Rubin et al., 2007) have also pointed to PSS as a severe emotional outcome.

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PART III

MASS POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

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INFORMATION PROCESSING

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JENNIFER JERIT AND CINDY D. KAM

1. THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INFORMATION PROCESSING

ALTHOUGH a century old, the observations of journalist and commentator Walter Lippmann ([1922]1997) still hold true. The beliefs and attitudes that ground public opinion and political behavior span beyond the direct environment in which we inhabit. We have seen lands we have never visited, we intimately know public figures we have never met, and we generalize about peoples with whom we have never personally interacted. What we think we know or we think we believe results from *information processing*. As Lippmann ([1922]/ 1997) so aptly noted, ". . . what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him" (25). We only "know" because we have each done the work of perceiving, interpreting, and retrieving information to render judgments.

The political psychology of information processing explores how individuals construct these pictures inside their heads—and how these pictures in their heads inform what people say and do when it comes to politics. How is information acquired, interpreted, stored in memory, and then later used in political judgments?

Throughout this chapter, we will make the case that information-processing belongs to citizens. Just as developmental psychologists such as Piaget argued that children are not "empty vessels" waiting to be filled with knowledge from adults, democratic citizens[1] also are not empty vessels waiting to be filled with information from the political environment. Citizens, we will argue, actively construct their pseudo-environments. Citizens have motivations that shape how they engage in this practice. Citizens have agency. These are fundamental aspects of information processing.

We begin by articulating the democratic importance of understanding the political psychology of information processing. We will then situate our discussion of information-processing using dual-process theories from psychological research. These theories are premised on the notion that there is variability—across individuals, and even within individuals, across contexts—in the motivations that guide information processing and the cognitive effort thus employed in processing incoming stimuli and coming to judgment.

Some people, some of the time, are motivated by accuracy; others by affiliation; still others by a principle of least effort. Motivations vary with individual differences as well as contexts, and we highlight research that identifies politically relevant variation in these factors. We next use our dual-process framework to situate the growing research on *mis*information, and we urge a closer conversation between scholars intrigued by misinformation and scholars who study information-processing more generally. Finally, we close with considerations of methodological innovations and suggestions for future directions in this exciting field of political psychology.

2. Democratic Implications of Information Processing

Understanding political information processing has multiple implications for democratic politics. At the applied level, understanding how people process information provides lessons for political practitioners. Candidates, advocates, and policymakers seeking (a) to persuade the public (e.g., through electioneering or advocacy), (b) to mobilize the public (e.g., to vote, to donate, to volunteer, to sign petitions), (c) to anticipate the public's reactions to given communications or events, or (d) to influence citizen behavior even in apolitical contexts ranging from retirement decisions to school lunch servings (Thaler and Sunstein 2009) all benefit from understanding the nature of citizen information processing. For example, public policies that use the "nudge" paradigm (Thaler and Sunstein 2009) meet citizens where they are by designing effective policies that can enhance decision-making within each citizen's modus operandi. Political psychologists' basic science discoveries about the nature of information processing can have material impacts on applied politics and everyday life.

At a systemic level, understanding political information processing can assist in evaluating the nature of citizen competence and the quality of democratic decision-making. A storied line of democratic observers has identified standards for citizen decision-making that elevate deliberation, reasoning, and effort (see Achen and Bartels 2017 for a discussion of this "folk theory of democracy"). Empirical examinations of information processing can shed light on the conditions under which citizens rise to the occasion, muddle along, or are led astray. Furthermore, empirical examinations of information processing can further our understanding how durable (or fickle) public opinion might be and illuminate the factors that enhance the formation of opinions that are held with conviction and grounded in information.

3. Concepts and Definitions

As they go about their daily lives, people are exposed to political information, even if they do not actively seek it out. An enduring question for political psychologists is how people process that information—that is, what do they *do* with it, if anything. *Information processing*

refs to the various brain activities that become implicated at this point—namely, how a person encodes, stores, and retrieves stimuli in long-term and short-term memory. More concretely, information processing is thought to proceed through a series of stages: (1) exposure and attention; (2) comprehension; (3) encoding, interpretation, and elaboration; (4) organization and storage in memory; and (5) retrieval (Vonnahme 2019).

Consequently, political psychologists focus on both the taking *in* of information as well as the operations performed on information stored in memory en route to developing an opinion or engaging in a behavior. This involves attention to the interrelationship between cognitive and affective processes and the role (passive to active) that the receiver plays in such processes. Work in this tradition is guided by the assumption that memory is organized as a series of associative networks, with information stored as nodes that are connected by links. Nodes represent concepts or objects of thought (e.g., candidates, groups, issues) and links represent the relation between concepts. Importantly, associations can vary in strength and thus in their accessibility from memory.

In drawing attention to the processes that *intervene* between a person's exposure to political information and subsequent opinions and behavior, it becomes clear that "information" is conceptually distinct from the opinions and beliefs a person may have (and later express) about a political object. Before proceeding further down this path, we define several important concepts.

Information, or stimuli: A necessary feature of information-processing is *information* or *stimuli*. We take an expansive view of the stimuli that may become the subject of information processing. This can include objects that are explicitly political in nature (e.g., a news story about Congress), as well as stimuli where the implications for political attitudes and behaviors may be indirect and even unknown to the individual at the time they were encountered. Stimuli can be received via multiple sensorial modes, including visual (via text or images), auditory (e.g., the timbre of voices), and even olfactory (e.g., disgust-inducing smells).

Attitude: Psychologists define an *attitude* as the association in memory between a given entity and a summary evaluation of the entity (Fazio et al. 1982). Attitudes are latent, unobserved psychological tendencies. Because they are evaluative, attitudes can be characterized by directional valence (positive or negative) and intensity (mild to extreme). Attitudes have been conceptualized as temporary constructions and as stored summary evaluations. (Their form might vary depending on the object and the individual.)[2]

Another important characteristic of attitudes pertains to the explicit-implicit distinction. Explicit attitudes can be verbalized and measured with survey questions—implying that they are (at some level) consciously considered. Implicit attitudes, by contrast, form from automatically activated evaluations. They represent stored affect "that one cannot control or consciously reason about" (Lodge and Taber 2013, 48; also see Wilson et al. 2000).

Beliefs: As political psychologists use the term, *beliefs* refer to the "linkages that people establish between the attitude object and various attributes" (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 11). Beliefs reflect "all thoughts that people have about attitude objects" (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 11), which can be evaluative in nature (e.g., "the death penalty is immoral") or not (e.g., "the death penalty exists in 27 of out the 50 US states").

Knowledge: The evaluative aspect of an attitude distinguishes it from another concept, *knowledge*, which represents factual information about objects in memory (e.g., Delli

Carpini and Keeter 1996). Implicit in this definition is the assumption that the information is an accurate reflection of the true state of the world.[3]

Misinformation: A related concept, *misinformation*, refers to incorrect or false beliefs that are held with confidence (Kuklinski et al. 2000; also see Hochschild and Einstein 2015).

To illustrate these concepts, consider the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. A given individual may possess an underlying attitude about the outcome of the 2020 presidential election: say an extremely positive or extremely negative attitude. That latent attitude may be observed in any number of ways: through an explicit survey question assessing how satisfied they are with the outcome, through a physiological measure assessing their facial movements when they are asked to think about the outcome, through a subliminal priming exercise to assess the degree to which a positive or negative prime facilitates recognition of the outcome, or through a behavioral measure that examines whether they protested or celebrated in the months following the election.

Holding an attitude about the outcome of the 2020 presidential election may rest upon some (albeit rudimentary) factual knowledge of how presidential elections operate within the United States (i.e., that a presidential election occurred; who the two candidates were, what procedures governed individual voting, how the Electoral College functions, what the popular vote was). But highly developed factual knowledge is not necessary for holding an attitude, as attitudes can be generated unconsciously without factual knowledge (e.g., through perceptual fluency or classical conditioning). An extremely positive attitude about the outcome of the 2020 presidential may be grounded in subjective beliefs about the traits and issues associated with the candidates as well as beliefs about the lack of evidence of fraud surrounding the conduct of the election; the latter set of beliefs may be nominally evaluatively neutral but inform a positive evaluation. An extremely negative attitude about the outcome of the 2020 presidential election may also be grounded in misinformation: incorrect or false beliefs that are held with confidence. This is particularly apparent in the substantial percentage of Republican citizens who believe that the election was marked by widespread voter fraud.

With these definitions in place, several important points follow:

Citizens, as political information processors, are not blank slates. Their knowledge structures, beliefs, and attitudes shape the reception and interpretation of new stimuli. These existing knowledge structures are informed by socialization, lived experiences, as well as the current and past information environment. Thus, people can respond quite differently from each other even when they are presented with the same stimuli.

This is why it is possible for two people to hear the same quote about race relations but react very differently to it (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). This is why it is possible for people to be exposed to the same objective realities but draw very different conclusions from it (Bartels 2002; Gaines et al. 2007; Jerit and Barabas 2012). This is why it is possible for partisans who see an image of their candidate with an American flag to update their vote intentions in opposing ways (Kalmoe and Gross 2016).

In other words, there are instances where people update their beliefs and attitudes in response to new information (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2018; Bullock 2011). Conversely, there are situations where people resist or counterargue new information, leaving opinion unchanged or even more polarized (Taber et al. 2009; Zhou 2016). The study of information-processing helps us understand when we observe resistance versus updating. The study of information processing also helps us understand when, under what circumstances, and

for whom these various conditions hold. The rich body of psychological work in dual-processing models provides a helpful framework for situating our discussion.

4. Variability in Information Processing: Dual-Process Models

How we process information varies, across individuals and within individuals across contexts. As much as we might like to caricature the citizen as "mindlessly engaged in a routinized form of mental accounting when it comes to political affairs" (Kam 2012, 546), such characterizations are overly general and ignore what decades of psychological research on dual-process models has taught us regarding variability in how citizens process information and come to judgment.

4.1. System I and System II Processing: Description and Examples

Social and cognitive psychologists have developed many types of *dual-process models*—so named because of the claim that there are two modes of information processing (Chaiken and Trope 1999). Figure 15.1 summarizes aspects of the two endpoints of information processing, commonly labeled System I and System II. Despite variation across models, most agree that System I is less effortful, unconscious, or automatic, while System II is more effortful, conscious, or deliberate.[4]

The use of specific labels, such as "System I–System II" or "Heuristic–Systematic," can obscure the variability across and within these modes of processing. Bohner et al. (1995) characterize these models as reflecting "a continuum that reflects the amount of processing effort utilized in forming social judgments" (35). Moreover, these processes can operate

Less effortful	More effortful
System I	System II
Peripheral	Central route
Heuristic	Systematic
Absorption of stimuli	Scrutiny of stimuli
Acceptance of arguments	Generate counterarguments
Indiscriminate acceptance of arguments	Discrimination among arguments
Snap judgments	Deliberate judgments
"Off the top of the head"	Pausing and reflecting
Fast & frugal decision strategies	Weighing of possibilities
Intuition	Rumination
Top-down (category-based)	Bottom-up (individuating)
Habitual micro-foundations	Situation-specific micro-foundations
Automatic	Controlled

FIGURE 15.1 Schematic Illustration of Continuum of Effort

independently or in tandem with each other. There can be substantial variation within each mode of information processing, as we will describe below.

In general, System I thinking is seen as less effortful. It is often (but not always) considered the "default" processing mode. Some models assert that this processing occurs automatically (at the subconscious level, without the awareness of the perceiver: Bargh 1999; Fazio 1999; Giner-Sorolla 1999), while other models allow for conscious reliance upon simplistic decision-making rules. System I thinking may employ top-down processing, where categories or schemas are used to inform judgments (as opposed to bottom-up, individuating strategies). The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) characterizes it as *heuristic processing*, during which the perceiver (consciously or subconsciously) employs simple rules, or heuristics, in making social judgments. System I also includes reliance on the minimal effort principle, whereby we are oriented toward acceptance of incoming stimuli; counterarguing and rejection entail some level of cognitive effort.[5]

Minimal effort also implies that citizens who engage in System I processing are unlikely to engage in broad and deep searches of memory before coming to judgment. In Taylor and Fiske's (1978) "top of the head" theorizing, individuals "respond with little thought to the most salient stimuli in their environment" (252). They note:

> A "top of the head" answer implies that the respondent has spent little time on the matter, gathered little or no data beyond that of the immediate situation, and responded with an opinion nonetheless. The further implication is that the individual is not to be blamed, should the opinion be changed or forgotten. (252)

Numerous examples from political psychology illustrate how System 1 processing can occur automatically and unconsciously. One fascinating line of research focuses on thin slice judgments: the judgments people make with little to no information. Thin slicing refers to "the ability of our unconscious to find patterns in situations and behavior based on very narrow slices of experience" (Gladwell 2005, 23). As one example, a line of research in political science has examined citizens' thin slice impressions of candidates' faces. Todorov et al. (2005) argue that people make "rapid, unreflective trait inferences from faces" (1623) and find that such judgments can predict election outcomes. Todorov and colleagues exposed naïve subjects to photographs of candidates and asked them to rate candidates on competence, one of the most important trait attributes used to evaluate politicians. The authors then found a correlation between the competence gap and the vote gap: those candidates seen as more competent won in 72% of Senate races and 67% of House races. In a follow-up study, subjects were asked to gauge competence in one second: the authors were able to accurately predict the outcome of 68% of Senate elections. Notably, the Todorov et al. (2005) finding has been replicated in multiple countries as well as in children as young as age five (Antonakis and Dalgas 2009).[6]

Other research on thin-slice judgments has examined the effects of facial dominance (Laustsen and Petersen 2016), voice pitch (Klofstad 2017; Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad 2015), and attractiveness (Lev-On and Waismel-Manor 2016; Mattes and Milazzo 2014; Milazzo and Mattes 2016) on candidate evaluation. Kam and Zechmeister (2013) demonstrate that perceptual fluency gleaned from subliminal priming and supraliminal yard signs can influence vote choice. These studies all point to the fact that citizens can formulate split-second impressions, often automatically or unconsciously, based on thin

slices of information, and these impressions can guide electoral decision-making, especially in low-information elections where little other information may be accessible to the voter.

Another example of automaticity results from affective transfer: the transfer of positive (or negative) affective reactions to a given stimulus to an associated stimulus. According to this line of research, attitude-objects are stored in memory with some affective tag (positive or negative). Perception of that stimulus in the environment evokes an automatic reaction—a reaction that can be outside of awareness. Perhaps the most notable example of an automatic affective reaction involves the instantaneous positive (negative) feelings that arise upon seeing a representation of the political parties (Lodge and Taber 2013, chapter 4; Theodoridis 2017).[7] Pairing that affectively charged stimulus with another stimulus can result in affect transfer, where the affect associated with the first stimulus becomes transferred to the second through conditioning. For example, political symbols such as the American flag evoke automatic reactions; researchers in this vein have examined the effects of pairing the American flag with candidates on willingness to support said candidates (Carter et al. 2011; Kalmoe and Gross 2016). Social categories such as racial groups can also trigger automatic reactions and activate associated concepts in memory (Payne 2006). In political science, news media accounts that pair policies with particular groups can generate associations between the two that are automatically activated; Gilens (1999), for example, argues that Americans' hostility toward welfare is a product of the repeated pairing of welfare coverage with visual images of African-Americans. All of this suggests that spontaneous activation of affectively laden concepts in memory can shape views of new stimuli presented in close proximity.

System I processing also engages categorical thinking in a "top-down" fashion that allows activated stereotypes to "fill in the blanks" (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). In this fashion, prior knowledge structures can enable perceivers to make quick and effortless judgments (Bohner et al. 1995). Work in political psychology has investigated the application of stereotypes in a variety of contexts, including candidate perception, especially in the context of social categories such as partisanship, race, and gender. Stereotypes are knowledge structures that facilitate quick and effortless social judgments; partisan, racial, and gender stereotypes can influence the impressions that voters form regarding candidates' traits, competencies, issue positions, and ideology. For example, citizens who know that a given candidate affiliates with the Democratic Party versus the Republican Party will expect that candidate to take partisan-stereotype consistent positions on a variety of issues (Rahn 1993). Social sorting has generated partisan stereotypes about apolitical objects and lifestyles (Lee 2021). The visual pairing of candidates with nominally apolitical objects (that are partisan-stereotypical) can shape citizens' expectations about candidates' partisanship (Hiashutter-Rice et al. 2021; Deichert 2019). Voters expect female candidates to possess feminized traits such as warmth and to handle feminized compassion issues with greater aplomb than male candidates (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; see Bauer 2019 for a review). Racial stereotypes influence voters' expectations of candidates' ideological and issue positions (McDermott 1997; Boudreau et al. 2019). Importantly, stereotypes can even be activated without awareness (Devine 1989) and can thereby influence perceptions and decision-making.

A more conscious and controlled version of System I processing has focused on the utilization of heuristics in judgment. According to social psychological models, when

individuals engage in System I processing, they are more likely to pay attention to peripheral cues as opposed to issue-specific information (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). System I processing rests upon heuristics such as "Experts can be trusted," "Likeable people say likeable things," or "Length means strength," meaning people are more persuaded by arguments that experts relay, that likeable people say, and that have more rather than fewer words, holding argument quality constant (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). System I processing also rests upon other heuristics such as the availability bias, the law of small numbers, recency bias, and primacy bias (Kahneman 2011). When attention is focused upon easily processed peripheral cues, individuals engaged in System I processing do not discriminate between strong versus weak arguments (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Opinions formed by System I are easy to change and less predictive of behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).

In political psychology, a long line of research has examined the degree to which citizens rely on cues in judgment and decision-making. Much of this work emerged as an outgrowth of dual-process models such as the ELM and HSM, where cues such as policy endorsements have influenced public opinion. This includes research on source cues such as political elites, celebrities, experts, or groups (Mondak 1993; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lupia 1994; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Kam 2020; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2021), party cues (Rahn 1993; Kam 2005; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; for a review see Bullock 2020), and consensus cues from the mass public (Mutz 1998). Collectively, these works show that knowing where a given source or group stands on an issue can influence a citizen's opinion on that issue, without the citizen needing to expend the cognitive effort to acquire encyclopedic knowledge of the policy. Such low-effort decision-making is exemplified by the "Fast and Frugal" decision maker in Lau and Redlawsk's (2006) typology (also discussed by Lau and Redlawsk in Chapter 5 of this volume). Political identities can play an important role here in citizens' willingness to follow these cues, especially when they do so with little additional cognitive effort; when identities themselves are strongly held, people are willing to trust and follow cues that are aligned with those identities. While identities can be fiercely held, the policy opinions that result from cue-taking may themselves be quite malleable. For example, Zaller's (1992) multiple examples of how public opinion has moved as a consequence of changes in the elite message environment demonstrate how political identities can shape policy opinions, and how policy opinions themselves can shift quickly when elites associated with those identities change their tune. More recently, consider former President Donald Trump's abandonment of the conventional Republican position on free trade. During his administration, as part of his "American First" initiative, Trump engaged in a number of actions that weakened free trade, including the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the implementation of new tariffs. Researchers have documented an ensuing change in anti-free trade views among Trump supporters in the mass public (Essig et al. 2021).

Partisanship is an important example of a cue that may exhibit the superficial properties of peripheral processing, such as when a person uses partisanship to make a quick decision about a candidate or issue. However, partisanship, when it operates as a revered social identity, can also motivate more effortful forms of processing, such as the selective search for information or counterarguing (Taber and Lodge 2006; Schaffner and Roche 2017). We return to the complexities of partisanship in a separate section below.

When individuals engage in System II processing, they invest more cognitive effort. In the ELM, this second mode is called *central route processing*, and it concerns "relatively

extensive and effortful information processing activity" (Petty and Wegener 1999, 42), where perceivers evaluate the content of the messages they receive. System II processing includes higher-order mental operations such as abstraction and hypotheticals as well as tasks such as double-digit multiplication, focused visual searching, and self-conscious inhibition of behavior (see Kahneman 2011 for a discussion). In the HSM, *systematic processing* consists of "a relatively analytic and comprehensive treatment of judgment-relevant information" (Chen and Chaiken 1999, 74). In Fazio's (1999) MODE model, he contrasts *spontaneous processing* with *deliberative processing*, where the latter is characterized by "effortful reasoning, as opposed to flowing spontaneously from individuals' appraisals in the immediate situation" (98). This more effortful mode of processing commonly entails a wider search for and sampling of considerations as well as a more systematic transformation of those considerations into the final response.

In the psychological literature, evidence of System II processing manifests when individuals discriminate between strong and specious arguments, when they counterargue disconfirmatory information, and when they heed issue-based information over peripheral cues (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). System II processing also occurs when individuals consciously override initial "gut" responses (Calanchini, Lai, and Klauer 2021). System II processing is also characterized by greater complexity in the nature of people's cognitive responses (Tetlock 1983).

In political science, there is less focus on System II thinking, due to an assumption that System I thinking dominates or due to complexities in studying System II thinking. Yet ironically, many normative models of idealized citizen engagement resemble System II processing (see Achen and Bartels 2017 for a characterization, or Lau and Redlawsk's 2006 "Rational Choice/ Dispassionate Decision Maker"). In politics, System II thinking appears when individuals are "motivated to think more deeply and more evenhandedly about their political options" (Lavine et al 2012, 17; also see Kam 2006). For example, Lavine et al. (2012) report wide-ranging evidence of systematic processing among a subset of voters they identify as "ambivalent partisans." Among these individuals, partisanship was less influential than a person's socioeconomic status when it came to updating policy preferences over the course of an election campaign. In addition to drawing upon different types of information when forming opinions about issues, ambivalent partisans organize their opinions differently. As a result of their deeper level of thinking, the attitudes of the ambivalent are structured more by values (e.g., limited government, moral traditionalism) than by partisan identity. Finally, these authors demonstrate that economic retrospections were more accurate for ambivalent partisans—even when this entailed giving credit to the outparty for good economic performance. Underlying these patterns, Lavine et al. (2012) argue, is more effortful processing: "By simultaneously reducing partisan bias and heightening attention to diagnostic information, partisan ambivalence leads to more accurate perceptions of the economic and social environment" (139).

In another example, Kam (2006) shows that intense political campaigns led people to be more open-minded in their reactions to congressional candidates (and less likely to default to a pro-incumbent bias). Kam (2007) demonstrates that people who were reminded about the importance of being informed and exercising the right to vote using a citizen duty appeal exhibited behaviors that were indicative of systematic processing: greater cognitive elaboration, better recall of candidate issue positions, and balanced, rather than biased, information seeking. Taken together, the Kam studies demonstrate that political contexts can encourage citizens to devote more cognitive effort to thinking about politics.

System II thinking is also apparent when people actively seek out information and evaluate issue-relevant arguments. Such behavior is at odds with the underlying premise of Zaller's (1992) elite-influence model, but Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus (2015) maintain that Democrats and independents engaged in precisely this kind of effortful activity in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. These authors link Democratic and independent opposition to the war with consumption of print news, which took a more aggressive posture than TV news in challenging the Bush administration's rationale for war. In the domestic context, Bullock (2011) challenges the elite-influence model with an experiment that permits a comparison between the effects of party cues versus policy information. He reports that people—especially those who enjoy thinking—pay attention to substantive information about policy, even when party cues are present. Chong and Druckman (2007) demonstrate that the persuasiveness of weak (or specious frames) is forestalled by the presence of competing frames; System II processing in this account reflects an accounting for alternative ways of understanding a given political issue.

Although System II processing "involves far greater thoughtful effort and much more scrutiny of factual arguments . . . this does not necessarily ensure an unbiased decision" (Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus 2012, 25). In subsequent development of the HSM, Chaiken and colleagues distinguish the *level* of motivation (i.e., whether a person engages more or less effortful forms of cognition) from the *type* of motivation, which refers to the "nature or direction" of the cognition that occurs (Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 1999, 44).

This important distinction has not been lost on political psychologists (Leeper and Slothuus 2014). As Taber and Lodge aptly note, "Being a motivated reasoner takes effort" (2006, 757). These effortful and motivated mental activities look different than the thoughtful systematic processing posited by social psychologists. In Lodge and Taber's JQP model, "all socio-political concepts are affect-laden" (2013, 43), and this preexisting affect provides the directional goals that make people impervious to new information, via confirmation and disconfirmation biases (Taber et al. 2009; Stanley et al. 2020; Kahan 2013). Evidence that people engage in effortful processing to protect prior beliefs and attitudes is accumulating (e.g., Erisen et al. 2018; Petersen et al. 2013; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014). Moreover, the resulting attitudes are more polarized (Taber and Lodge 2006), held with greater confidence (Stanley et al. 2020), harder to change, and more predictive of behavior. This may be normatively troublesome for those opinions derived from partisan motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Cook, and Druckman 2014; also see Lavine et al. 2012).

Our discussion has highlighted the differences between System I and System II, but few scholars would argue that the two processes are entirely distinct. Ajzen (1999) notes: "It may be true that these two processing modes do not differ in kind, and that they may better be viewed as endpoints on a continuum of processing depth, from shallow or heuristic on one end to deep or systematic on the other" (111). Because System I processing occurs rapidly and automatically, it is very likely to inform and shape System II processing (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994) unless it is expressly overridden (Devine 1989). It is also worth noting that with the acquisition of expertise and practice, judgments that formerly required System II processing can become automatic (i.e., in the case of chess masters for whom pattern-matching becomes automatic). In one example from political science, Bartels and Mutz (2009) expressly suggest some form of a hybrid between System I and System II processing in understanding the role of institutional cues on public opinion.

5. Party Cues: System I or System II (or Both)?

The distinctive nature of partisanship—as an attachment formed early in life, transmitted across generations, relatively stable over a person's lifetime, and as an identity incorporated into their sense of self—merits special consideration. This is because decisions based on partisan cues can vary in the amount of effort that is required (Leeper and Slothuus 2014).

There is abundant evidence regarding the effort-saving nature of party cues: they help people formulate opinions in the absence of detailed information or large stores of political knowledge (Kam 2005; Mondak 1993; Rahn 1993). But because party identification reflects a "distinctive group attachment that is psychologically important" (Petersen et al. 2013, 835), party cues can activate effortful mental activities in specific situations. One dissonance-producing context that Petersen et al. (2013) examine is when a person supports a disliked policy because the policy is endorsed by their party (the "Costly Support" scenario). Using response latency measures, Petersen et al. (2013) show that "individuals increase their reasoning effort when they abandon ideological beliefs to toe their party's line" (850). While partisanship can serve as a decision-making short cut, it can also act as a trigger for effortful directional reasoning.[8]

There is a related lesson that one should draw: not to conflate content—that is, the type of information that influences opinion—with depth of processing. Early work following in the tradition of the Elaboration Likelihood Model, including Kam (2005), assumed that content could proxy for effort (i.e., source cue/peripheral cue processing indicates low effort; issue-based consideration indicates high effort), but more recent work is challenging this notion, such as the Petersen et al. (2013) study showing that party cues may be associated with more cognitive effort. Similarly, Bolsen et al. (2014) find that the inclusion of a party cue increases response latency time, suggesting more elaborate processing. Finally, work on stereotype activation and suppression notes that reliance on stereotypes in and of itself is not dispositive of which system is triggered: stereotype application may be unreflective and automatic (System I) *or* motivated and effortful (System II) (e.g., Kunda and Sinclair 1999 for a discussion). This research calls for more creative methodologies that enable researchers to identify cognitive processing strategies without assuming that influence of a cue necessarily implies System I processes are at work; we will return to this topic below.

6. Motivations for System I and System II Processing

Humans are motivated by a broad and diverse set of goals, some of which are consciously and intentionally formulated and others of which are unconsciously activated (for a review, see Bargh et al. 2010). Motivations for information processing vary widely as well, by individual and by context. Thematically, as they refer to information-processing, we organize motivations into two broad categories: epistemic and directional. As Kruglanski (1996) notes, "A major tenet of the dual-process models is that the choice of information processing modes depends importantly on motivation" (495).

Epistemic motivations focus on the *process* of acquiring evidence to generate subjective knowledge about the world (Kruglanski 1989). These epistemic motivations relate to the extent to which people engage in information-processing: by minimizing (or maximizing) cognitive effort or by coming to judgment quickly or more slowly.

The assumption that people are guided by cognitive economy (Allport's [1954] "principle of least effort") or the characterization of ordinary citizens as "cognitive misers" (Taylor 1981) reflects epistemic motivations. As Kahneman (2011) notes, "Laziness is built deep into our nature" (35). This principle suggests that "people seek to maximize outcomes with the least amount of work possible, choosing cognitive economy as a strategy to allow them the ability to maneuver through a complex stimulus environment" (Moskowitz et al. 1999, 28).[9] As we will elaborate below, individuals who are averse to engaging in cognitive elaboration (for example, those scoring low in Need for Cognition) would be generally likely to minimize cognitive effort unless the situation warrants it (Cacioppo et al. 1996). Individuals who are averse to ambiguity and/or who score high in the need for cognitive closure would be likely to engage in information-processing and judgment that close off the process sooner than individuals who are comfortable with ambiguity and lack of closure (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Situations that reduce time or suppress mental capacity through distraction or cognitive load would also engage the minimal effort motivation. What these examples have in common is that the process of using evidence to generate subjective knowledge is cut short not because of the judgmental outcome reached but because of the desire to minimize time or effort. On the flip side, some individuals in some circumstances will invest in greater cognitive effort.

Greater cognitive effort may be spurred by a desire for accuracy. Some individuals, in some contexts, may be characterized as accuracy-minded, or motivated to hold "correct" attitudes. This principle manifests itself in the ELM's first postulate ("The Correctness Postulate"), which states that "People are motivated to hold correct attitudes" (Petty and Wegener 1999, 44). Eagly and Chaiken's (1993) HSM also incorporates this idea in the sufficiency principle, which states that while "people's primary motivational concern is to attain accurate attitudes that square with relevant facts," they must balance this goal against the costs of systematic processing (326). Druckman (2012) notes that the accuracy motivation "serves as a realistic and flexible standard by which one can evaluate democratic competence" (209). Motivational triggers such as highlighting personal relevance (or financially incentivizing correct answers) can induce this accuracy-motivation. For example, when individuals know that a given decision may have a direct financial impact on them, they may become more motivated to come to the "correct" decision (but see Sears and Funk 1991 on the limits of short-term pecuniary self-interest in public opinion formation). It also is worth noting that even though individuals may *believe* they are processing information in an even-handed manner, they may be operating under an "illusion of objectivity" (Armor 1998; Pronin et al. 2002; Ehrlinger et al. 2005). Moreover, even when individuals hold accuracy goals, it is possible that they will engage in decision-making strategies that accentuate, rather than attenuate, bias (Kunda 1990).

Directional motives focus on the outcome, rather than the process, of a decision. Examples include a defensive motivation ("the desire to hold attitudes and beliefs that are congruent with one's perceived material interests or existing, self-definitional attitudes and beliefs") and an impression motivation ("the desire to hold attitudes and beliefs that will satisfy current social goals") (Chen and Chaiken 1999, 77–78). For example, some individuals may

be motivated to control prejudice; this desire to control prejudice might not change the unconscious activation of stereotypes in memory, but it might influence the explicit attitudes that an individual reports (Devine 1989). Some individuals may be motivated to engage in partisan cheerleading; this would shape the ways in which they interpret incoming information, say, about the state of the economy (Peterson and Iyengar 2021; Bartels 2002). Both defensive and impression motivations imply that processing will occur with a *directional* goal in mind. These motivations may be induced by stable individual differences (i.e., group identity, self-monitoring, partisan strength) or contextually triggered, and notably, they may imply *more or less* cognitive effort. The burgeoning literature on motivated reasoning (e.g., Kunda 1990) and its political analogue, partisan motivated reasoning (Leeper and Slothuus 2014), is grounded in *directional* motivations.

Thus, the dual-process models literature suggests that as individuals encounter stimuli and form opinions, both individual differences and contextually induced motivations, be they epistemic or directional, will influence the type of processing in which they engage.

6.1. Individual Differences

Individual differences in information-processing refer to stable characteristics that establish variation across people in how they engage with, scrutinize, and interpret incoming stimuli in attitude formation. Some seek out as much information as possible and scrutinize it, while others rely on preexisting or habitual knowledge structures. Some want to rush to judgment whereas others tolerate or even enjoy ambiguity. Thus, "people do not just want different things; they also go about making up their minds about what they want in different ways" (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2017, 10). In this section, we will discuss several individual-difference measures that tap these chronic motivations.

Need for Cognition (NFC) and political awareness are two individual-difference measures frequently employed in past research. NFC, as originally defined by Cacioppo and Petty, refers to stable individual differences in people's "tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking" (1982, 116). Scoring high on this disposition is thought to promote System II processing. Driven by accuracy goals, people who are high in NFC rely on substantive information when making decisions (e.g., Bullock 2011; Nir 2011; Rudolph and Popp 2007; Zhang and Buda 1999). The second factor, political awareness, is a domain-specific measure of the propensity to think effortfully in the realm of politics (Kam 2005). The difference between NFC and political awareness is apparent in how the two constructs are operationalized. NFC asks respondents to self-reflect on the degree to which they enjoy thinking and entertaining complex concepts, while political awareness is measured with survey items that assess factual knowledge about politics. Yet Kam (2005) shows that political awareness does not just convey who can recall more facts; the measure predicts who relies on issue-relevant information as opposed to low-effort cues (also see Arceneaux 2008).[10]

Political awareness has complex effects on how it relates to motives. People with high levels of political awareness form attitudes toward many objects, and the presence of preexisting affect can impart a defensive motivation (Lodge and Taber 2013; Jerit and Davies 2018). Thus, the highly aware exert significant effort toward attitude maintenance, as evidenced by the "sophistication effect" documented by Taber and Lodge (2006). In that study, the confirmation and disconfirmation biases were most apparent among the highly

aware (also see Erisen et al. 2018 or Slothuus and de Vreese 2010 for a parallel result in the framing literature).

Additionally, there is evidence that politically sophisticated people are sensitive to another directional motivation: impression goals. Across a series of experiments, Bakker, Lelkes and Malka (2020) demonstrate that cue taking allows the politically aware to signal identity-consistent issue stands, as opposed to an effort-saving device employed by the least aware. Political awareness plays a similar role in how it moderates the relationship between personality—specifically, a closed versus open disposition—and preferences for economic redistribution (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017). Whereas people with low levels of political engagement form economic preferences based on instrumental concerns (leading to a positive association between a closed personality and preferences for economic redistribution), people with high levels of political engagement adopt economic positions that signal their fidelity to divisions at the elite level (resulting in a negative relationship between a closed personality and redistributive preferences).

Finally, a growing body of work examines the influence of psychological dispositions (e.g., needs, personality) on information processing (for a review of the personality literature see Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume). An early example is the Need to Evaluate (NE; Jarvis and Petty 1996), which has been shown to moderate framing effects. People with high levels of NE "efficiently process and store information," which leads them to form strong attitudes that are resistant to opposing arguments (Chong and Druckman 2010, 677–678). More recently, Arceneaux and Vander Wielen (2017) introduce a stable individual difference called "reflection." Operationalized as the combination of Need for Cognition (high levels) and in Need for Affect (low levels), reflection refers to a person's ability to question the "affectively laden intuitions that arise from unconscious processing" (2017, 42). In this way, Arceneaux and Vander Wielen modify Lodge and Taber's (2013) argument regarding automatic affect: certain people, by virtue of their disposition, are willing to second guess their partisan instincts and are receptive to new information.

In addition to cognitive style variables, personality traits shape processing mode through their influence on epistemic motivation. Authoritarianism is associated with cognitive rigidity, even on non-ideological tasks (Duncan and Peterson 2014; also see Kruglanski and Webster 1996). Net of the need for structure, Kemmelmeier (2010) finds that authoritarianism is related to greater heuristic processing (in particular, the representativeness heuristic and conjunction error). In a study where situational threat was manipulated, high authoritarians were more likely than low authoritarians to engage in biased information search that protected existing attitudes, and these stronger opinions were in turn more resistant to change (Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005; for a review of the literature on authoritarianism see Feldman and Weber, Chapter 20, this volume).

The personality trait Openness to Experience (OE) has the opposite effect on information processing. OE is associated with a motivation to "expose oneself to diverse viewpoints and perspectives" (Sparkman and Blanchar 2017, 49) and "a willingness to adopt novel, unconventional ways of thinking and behavior" (Amit and Sagiv 2013, 107). In the political realm, people who are high in openness "seek information of virtually all sorts" (Mondak 2010, 50), resulting, for example, in a higher (self-reported) number of discussion partners and more frequent political discussions. Consistent with findings regarding the association between political ideology (i.e., a liberal orientation) and Openness to Experience (Mondak

2010; Carney et al. 2008), Jost and Krochik (2014) report the expected differences between self-described liberals and conservatives in a large internet sample: liberals are more likely to process information systematically (e.g., recognizing differences in argument quality) while conservatives are more likely to process information heuristically (e.g., attending to message-irrelevant cues such as source credibility).

6.2. Contextual Triggers

Although there are stable individual differences in information processing, variation in information-processing occurs not just *across* individuals but *within* individuals. Particular contexts can alter information-processing by amplifying or attenuating motivations; a given individual who is not ordinarily prone to engaging in cognitively taxing thought when it comes to politics might exert effort when an election outcome seems uncertain and the stakes appear to be high. Someone who typically reads the news with a directional partisan commitment might loosen that commitment when they confront surprising information. Below we describe a variety of situational contexts that can evoke different types of information processing.

6.2.1. *The Unexpected*

Our default approach to the world is one based upon categorization (Bruner 1957); the world is too complex and detailed, and our time and effort is too limited to permit individuated processing (Lippmann [1922]1997). But as we engage in this categorization process, encountering the unexpected can trigger attention and effort. For example, Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) find that subjects override a consensus cue when they are confronted with unexpected issue-based information, thus suggesting that incongruity between a cue and additional information may trigger more systematic processing. More broadly, this perspective aligns with expectancy violation theory, where unexpected or incongruent stimuli force perceivers to try to make sense of the unexpected, thus channeling attention and effort where otherwise it would not be warranted.

Political analogues include unexpected information, counter-stereotypical information, or mixed/ambiguous signals. "When the contemporary political world is strongly at odds with partisan expectations, citizens are likely to set aside their partisan lenses and turn to more effortful judgment strategies to reach their confidence thresholds" (Johnston et al. 2015). In *The Ambivalent Partisan*, Lavine et al. (2012) explain that discrepant information from the political world causes citizens to question the reliability of the party cue and motivates them to adopt a more effortful approach to decision-making. These "exogenous shocks" take different forms; their crucial feature is that they trigger partisan ambivalence: "When one's own party presides over a poor economy, performs ineptly during a crisis, becomes mired in scandal, or fails to deliver on desired policy change—or equally, when one's partisan opponents govern well—contemporary partisan evaluations may become out of step with long-term expectations, generating partisan ambivalence" (2012, 36; also see Basinger and Lavine 2005; Groenendyk 2013; Erisen et al. 2018). Similarly, Redlawsk et al. (2010) note that modest amounts of incongruent information will encourage motivated reasoning, but a sufficient amount will lead to an "affective tipping point," where

disconfirming information will undercut motivated reasoning and encourage considera-
tion of alternative information.

Citizens may be motivated to discount or ignore modest amounts of discrepant infor-
mation. Indeed, the nature of categorical perception performed by System I suggests that
individuating details may be glossed over in favor of broad-brush processing. Thus, any
signal or set of signals indicating the unexpected needs to be sufficiently disarming to
trigger reduced directional motivations and to engage accuracy motivations (e.g., Lavine
et al. 2012; Redlawsk et al. 2010). Consistent with this, Arceneaux (2008) finds that partisan-
counter-stereotypical information reduces reliance on party cues only on high-salience, but
not low-salience, issues.

6.2.2. *Emotions*

The political environment contains emotive triggers, which can encourage different types of
processing (Brader and Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). At the most basic level, "people
in positive (negative) affective states [are] more (less) influenced by heuristic cues, such as
the expertise, attractiveness, or likeability of the source, and by the length, rather than the
quality of the message" (Lerner et al. 2015, 807). This pattern is consistent with Affective
Intelligence Theory (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), which posits two types of in-
formation processing that parallel the System I–System II distinction: one mode governed
by habitual reactions like party identification, the other characterized by thoughtful
deliberation.

It is essential to look beyond the positive-negative distinction, however. Appraisal theory
suggests that emotions of the same valence can produce different attentional, attitudinal,
and behavioral tendencies (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). As such, they can have different
effects on information processing (because of the cognitive appraisals associated with dis-
crete emotions). For example, sadness and anger are negative emotions, but they diverge
in the degree to which they stimulate systematic thought as opposed to reliance upon
stereotypes and heuristic cues (Bodenhausen et al. 1994). In the political context, Small,
Lerner, and Fischoff (2006) examine the effects of sadness and anger on blame attribu-
tion after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Consistent with the appraisal themes related to
anger (e.g., others' responsibility), anger results in more causal attributions than sadness.
Small and Lerner (2008) distinguish the influence of anger and sadness with respect to
welfare preferences. Anger is associated with a sense of certainty that makes people feel
confident in their judgment and promotes heuristic processing. Sadness, by contrast, is as-
sociated with less certainty and stimulates careful consideration of information (Small and
Lerner 2008; also see Tiedens and Linton 2001). The two emotions also differ in appraisals
related to individual versus environmental control. As a result, angry people are more likely
than sad people to attribute personal responsibility to welfare recipients (the low-cognitive-
effort response).

Another robust finding relates to the contrasting effects of anxiety and anger, particularly
in the domain of information search. In general, anxiety is thought to promote informa-
tion seeking and openness to alternative views while anger leads to superficial information
processing that prioritizes confirmatory information (MacKuen et al. 2010). Yet the empir-
ical record with respect to both emotions is more nuanced than the preceding description

would suggest. Take anxiety: depending on how an individual appraises a specific threat, anxiety-induced information search can be balanced or biased (Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Valentino et al. 2009). Thus, the extent to which anxiety leads to an open-minded search for information (and subsequent learning) is conditioned by contextual factors such as the degree of incongruent/challenging information in the environment (Redlawsk et al. 2010).

There are noteworthy subtleties in the research on anger. Generally speaking, anger is associated with peripheral processing and the reliance on preexisting heuristics (Huddy et al. 2007). However, there is evidence that anger mediates the process of partisan motivated reasoning—specifically, the *effortful* activities of counterarguing and rationalization (Suhay and Erisen 2018).

Johnston et al. (2015) offer an overarching account of the variable influence of discrete emotions. Building on expectancy violation theory, Johnston et al. (2015) argue that the discrete emotions of enthusiasm, anxiety, and anger can motivate heuristic or deliberative processing, depending on the interaction between the emotion and its relationship to the eliciting object. For example, *in*-party enthusiasm reinforces partisan expectations and promotes a heuristic style of processing, while *out*-party enthusiasm undermines confidence in partisan cues and prompts a more effortful style of processing.

6.2.3. *Personal Relevance of the Issue*

Political issues vary in their relevance to individuals (Krosnick 1990), a notion that dates to Converse's (1964) discussion of "issue publics." Accordingly, researchers have speculated that "personal relevance" or "issue involvement" (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1986) or "vested interest" (Crano 1995) predict when people will devote more attention and effort to issues. Relevance (or importance) can stem from perceptions of short-to-medium term financial self-interest (Sears and Citrin 1985),[11] but this subjective state also can come about when an issue has implications for cherished values or social groups (Lavine et al. 2000; Crano 1995).[12] Irrespective of the specific antecedents, a recurring conclusion is that "citizens are affected differently by information when they care about an issue" (Lecheler, de Vreese, and Slothuus 2009, 400).

For example, Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus (2012) observe that when issues are "broadly accessible" to the public because "they touch on citizens' everyday lives," people may be less influenced by (peripheral) elite cues (501). Bullock echoes this idea when he observes that a systematic consideration of policy attributes is more likely when "people have stronger prior beliefs about the issues or are better able to connect their values to positions on those issues" (2011, 510). Bullock contrasts health care benefits (the topic of his study) with more distal topics such as monetary policy and environmental regulation and acknowledges that "the balance of effects . . . might have been different if subjects had read about a different issue" (510). Bolsen and Leeper (2013) find that having a vested interest in an issue increases exposure to information about that issue. Thus, issues that are personally relevant or engage vested interest receive more effortful processing. Moreover, people with vested interest are more likely to act on their attitudes (Sivacek and Crano 1982)—as is the case when partisans defect from their standing party predisposition because the opposing candidate shares their view on a personally important policy issue (Hillygus and Shields 2008).

It is important to note that while personal relevance can heighten epistemic motivations (to devote more time and cognitive effort to information processing), this cognitive effort might be motivated either by accuracy *or* directional motivations, depending upon the nature of the personal relevance. When the issue is personally relevant due to financial considerations, for example, a desire for accuracy may dominate; however, when personal relevance stems from deep-seated identity or social considerations, ego-defensive or impression-management desires may instead prevail.

6.2.4. *Social Obligation*

Information-processing might be caricatured as a lonely activity, in which an atomized organism receives and interprets incoming stimuli. Yet human beings are situated within social collectives, and psychological research suggests that the presence of other individuals can influence the ways in which we process information.

On the one hand, group-based decision-making can reduce a sense of individual accountability, thereby inducing shirking and diffusing responsibility; this is the standard freeriding result. The psychological phenomenon of cognitive loafing suggests that the presence of other individuals can reduce a given individual's personal effort, especially when individual contributions are anonymized and social sanctions for freeriding can be escaped (Weldon and Gargano 1985; Petty et al. 1980).

On the other hand, groups can be constituted with formal and informal norms and expectations that reduce these perverse incentives. Shared responsibility that includes individual accountability can induce greater cognitive effort by increasing the complexity of decision-making strategies (Weldon and Gargano 1988). Individuals display higher levels of cognitive complexity when they face the prospect of having to defend their views to someone who does not already agree with them (Tetlock 1983). Individuals who anticipate that they will be discussing politics with others report engaging in more cognitive elaboration (Eveland 2004). Experimental manipulations that inform participants that they will need to "justify the reasons for your judgment" (to the survey researchers or to other research participants) can be used to provoke further accountability. For example, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014) find that this manipulation reduces partisan motivated reasoning. Bayes et al. (2020) also find that an instruction set designed to encourage evenhanded review of information, paired with anticipatory explanation, can reduce partisan motivated reasoning. Moreno and Bodenhausen (1999) provide an important qualifier, noting that this accuracy invocation needs to be paired with cognitive resources to reduce stereotyping. Still, this encouragement to engage in more effortful processing does *not* guarantee which type of motivation (accuracy versus directional) will be triggered. In a different study, Druckman et al. (2013) finds that having to justify one's views to a group of *like-minded* individuals can shift the type of motivation from accuracy-oriented to directional in nature.

At a broader level, invocations of citizen duty can trigger individuals' sense of accountability to an imagined community of others. Kam (2007), for example, finds that invocations of citizen duty can induce citizens to learn more about political candidates' issue stances, think more about the candidates, and search for information about candidates in an open-minded fashion. Mullinix (2018) reports evidence that priming civic duty (a concept that he notes is "closely linked to accountability and cognitive effort in making 'correct' decisions")

will heighten accuracy motivations, thus attenuating the impact of party cues and increasing the persuasiveness of issue-related information.

Altogether, these works suggest that, under the right conditions, accountability to others can encourage citizens to engage in more effortful, and potentially more accuracy-motivated, information processing. Selected work that manipulates experimental conditions to trigger more effortful processing provides evidence of what *might* happen, and as Druckman (2012) notes, "The role of social expectations in prompting accuracy seems to be a particularly fruitful area in need of more study" (206). Moreover, mapping these experimental conditions where accountability has successfully induced accuracy orientations to ecologically valid contexts in the real world has not yet been done. If it is the case that having to justify our views to an unknown set of others induces effort, how often do ordinary Americans find themselves in that position? When we talk politics, we generally converse with congenial partners (Mutz 2002; though see Klofstad et al. 2013). Thus, the occasions when this accountability lever might be engaged might be infrequent.

7. The Political Context Shapes *How* People Think

In his much-cited model of opinion formation, Zaller (1992) notes that the political context provides the raw stimuli for citizens to engage in a more-or-less automatic mode of information processing. In his model, citizens utilize the same routinized peripheral strategy, and it is the information environment that varies in volume and tone, supplying messages that are either unified or polarized. Such a broad-based characterization might be expected, given the fragmented nature of public opinion (Converse 1964), low levels of political knowledge in the citizenry (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and the view that politics are but a "sideshow in the great circus of life" (Dahl 1961, 305).

But as we have argued in this chapter, situational contexts also influence *how* people think. Campaigns and elections, for example, vary tremendously in ways that can trigger more or less effortful thinking. Elections vary with respect to institutional features such as whether they are general elections featuring partisan or nonpartisan slates, or whether they are primary elections where party cues are less informative. General elections featuring party labels may enable quicker decisions among citizens (as evidenced by straight-line party voting), but they may also trigger more effortful, partisan-motivated information-seeking and processing, especially if partisans feel that deeply held values are at stake in the election. When campaigns revolve around specific issues of personal relevance, citizens may pay more attention, seek more information, and engage in more effortful thinking. Campaign appeals that evoke emotions such as anxiety may trigger more information-search, while those that evoke anger may spur quicker (and more hot-headed) reactions.

The nature of the messages in the information environment can also influence processing. Consider the contemporary American political context, where elite polarization has increased sharply within the past few decades and where the media environment is highly fragmented and horizontally flat. To the extent that the political context conveys messages about elite polarization (e.g., Hetherington 2001; Carsey and Layman 2006),

"partisans should become less ambivalent about (i.e., more sure of) their own partisan identity" (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013, 60). And in that situation, people will be more likely to engage partisan motivated reasoning. Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) find evidence for this pattern in an experiment that manipulates the degree of polarization by either emphasizing or deemphasizing the differences between political parties. In a polarized environment, people were more biased in their evaluation of policy arguments—to the point that study participants moved in the direction of their party even after being offered a "weak" argument. At the same time, the research by Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) implies that in situations where the differences between parties are non-existent or unclear, people are moved more by argument quality than partisan cues (i.e., "substance outweighs partisan cues," 70).

Political elites can also be the source of competing, ambiguous, or mixed signals. For example, Chong and Druckman (2007) demonstrate that contexts with competing rather than one-sided frames can impede the persuasiveness of specious or weak frames; these competitive framing contexts "tend to stimulate individuals to deliberate on the merits of alternative interpretations" (651). Feldman, Huddy, and Marcus (2015) link systematic processing (on the part of Democrats) with ambiguity in the political environment—specifically, mixed signals sent by Democratic elites about the merits of invading Iraq. In this situation, Democratic citizens were motivated to seek out information and evaluate the arguments for and against invasion. Similarly, people can be motivated by accuracy goals during extraordinary moments that generate anxiety (e.g., pandemics, natural disasters, foreign conflict, and terrorist attacks; see Atkeson and Maestas 2012). As another illustration, intense political campaigns can make people feel like something is at stake, which has been shown to promote cognitive engagement and open-minded thinking (Kam 2006). Finally, institutions can impose a sense of social obligation.

For example, the American jury system provides a setting in which groups of individuals are convened for information-processing and decision-making. Accuracy motivations are explicitly set forth, and jurors are instructed to engage in effortful and unbiased decision-making. The stakes are high (for the parties involved) and real (as opposed to hypothetical). Some evidence suggests that citizens do engage in System II processing, but evidence also suggests that jurors can fall prey to heuristics and biases (for a review, see Bornstein and Greene 2011). While juries are intended to be *apolitical* (that is, nonpartisan), they are politically constituted institutional bodies in which citizens engage in an important function of self-governance, and where obligations to others and to the system are invoked. Additional institutions include Deliberative Polling events, which provide one example of a forum in which randomly selected individuals are invited to participate in deliberative group discussions (Fishkin 1995) or civic forums (Karpowitz and Raphael 2014). New England town halls, which residents engage in self-governance through participating in these meetings, also provide an institutionalized forum to encourage more elaborate processing among attendees (Bryan 2004).

Thus, the political world *can* alter people's motives in a way that leads to effortful, accuracy-oriented thinking. But how often does this occur? Two influential books—*The Ambivalent Partisan* (Lavine et al. 2012) and *The Rationalizing Voter* (Lodge and Taber 2013)—come to opposite conclusions. According to Lavine and colleagues, voters display a "critical partisan loyalty" and shift to systematic thought whenever they lack sufficient

confidence in the party cue. For Lodge and Taber, affective reactions to political stimuli (e.g., political parties) are automatic, which conceivably should prevent a person from becoming ambivalent in the first place (see Schaffner and Roche 2017 for compelling evidence on this point).

8. Misinformation Processing Is Information Processing

Misinformation is a topic with obvious normative importance and growing contemporary relevance. Hochschild and Einstein (2015) refer to the phenomenon as "dangerous" (14), and Flynn et al. (2017) write that misinformation has "distorted people's views about some of the most consequential issues in politics, science and medicine" (127). Not too surprisingly, a vast literature on misinformation has accumulated. However, this work has developed independently from research on information processing—in the sense that it rarely references dual process models (Pennycook and Rand 2019 is a notable exception). The separation between these two literatures is puzzling to us, for the processing of <u>mis</u>information is no different than the processing of "regular" <u>in</u>formation. That is: misinformation processing *is* information processing.

Being misinformed may reflect low-effort processing or a systematic effort to maintain prior attitudes. An example of the former comes from Pennycook and colleagues, who show that fluency can contribute to the problem of misinformation. In their study, repeated exposure to fake news headlines lead to greater perceptions of their accuracy due to the use of a low-effort heuristic (Pennycook, Cannon, and Rand 2018). By contrast, other examples of misinformation would seem to result from effortful processing. When asked which of two (unlabeled) photographs showed a larger crowd, highly educated Trump supporters were more likely than less educated Trump supporters to choose the "wrong photo" (i.e., they selected the photo representing Trump's 2017 inauguration rather than the photo representing Obama's 2009 inauguration). According to the authors of that study, this response required contextual knowledge of the crowd size controversy *and* the motivation to knowingly give an incorrect response (Schaffner and Luks 2018).[13]

As with information processing more generally, individual differences and contextually induced motivations can shed light on the problem of misinformation.

Researchers have documented that dispositions such as science curiosity (Kahan et al. 2017) and analytic thinking (Pennycook and Rand 2019) reduce a person's susceptibility to fake news and increase the chance they will expose themselves to correct but identity-challenging information on topics where misinformation abounds (e.g., global warming). In other words, some individuals possess epistemic motives that lead them to "seek out and consume scientific information for personal pleasure" (Kahan et al. 2017, 180). Or as Pennycook and Rand write: "Humans are cognitive misers . . . [but] some are less miserly than others" (2019, 40).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, directional motives—to desire to be consistent with a previous attitude or to signal affinity with a valued political identity—underlie much partisan-based misinformation. The previously described crowd-size study (Schaffner and

Luks 2018) and Kahan's research program on Motivated System 2 Reasoning (MS2R) illustrate this motivational dynamic.

Likewise, contextual factors can ameliorate or reinforce misinformation. A subtle rating task has been shown to prime accuracy motives and reduce a person's intention to share misleading information (Fazio 2020; Pennycook et al. 2021). At present, the duration of such treatments effects is unknown. Moreover, the public is exquisitely sensitive to partisan cues in the political environment (e.g., Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Thus, the prospects for combatting misinformation turn on political elites' willingness to "disrupt the process within parties and ideological groups by which false claims become established components in group messages" (Nyhan 2021, 5).[14]

One area where the study of misinformation processing demands additional scrutiny concerns the ethics of research design. We believe that social scientists have a responsibility to refrain from propagating and reinforcing misperceptions among the mass public. If researchers knowingly disseminate inaccurate information (even when asking people if they have heard of a particular rumor or false claim), they run the risk of enhancing perceptual fluency through repetition (Schwarz and Jalbert 2021) or by lending legitimacy (e.g., Grice 1975). Given the challenges of correcting misinformation (Nyhan and Reifler 2010, 2015; Thorson 2016), we urge caution as researchers design studies that introduce misinformation to research participants. In addition to the usual precautions (e.g., debriefing), the scholarly community might benefit from greater introspection regarding the ethics of studying misinformation, especially given our position that misinformation processing *is* information processing.

9. Methodological Considerations

Here we consider how researchers have studied information processing (generally speaking) and then describe measurement strategies in applications of dual-process models.

Political psychologists are ecumenical in their empirical approach, employing experimental *and* non-experimental (i.e., survey) methods, depending on whether they seek to manipulate a conceptual variable or measure it. A common feature of both experimental and non-experimental research is the use of questionnaires to assess outcomes (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, emotions). This measurement approach requires that ordinary citizens introspect about specific, sometimes complex, mental states and then explicitly report their feelings, beliefs, intentions, and behaviors. Such responses colloquially are referred to as "self-reports." Naturally, there can be challenges with these kinds of data which can include self-presentational concerns (Berinsky 2004; Tourangeau and Yan 2007) and limitations in people's ability to introspect about their mental processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Thus, some researchers use less obtrusive methods that do not rely on a person's ability to verbalize a response (e.g., task-based measures; for discussion see Taber and Young 2013).

Once we leave the realm of reactions that people can conjure up and explicitly report, measurement becomes more challenging. A key aspect of information processing relates to information exposure, attention, and usage. While individuals can offer recollections or self-reports on what information they have come across or attended to, behavioral measures of information-seeking can provide more reliable measures of the information

they attend to and draw upon as they render judgments. The Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE), pioneered by Lau and colleagues, demonstrates methodological innovation in identifying the information-seeking strategies that individuals employ (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2006). In these environments, users are situated within a dynamic information environment, the contents of which researchers can populate. Within the DPTE, researchers can pinpoint what types of information users elect to read, and for how long, and analyze the extent to which that information maps to subsequently measured dependent variables such as vote choice or candidate preference.

Psychophysiological measures based upon eye-tracking and pupillometry provide even finer-grained possibilities for studying information processing (Cavanagh et al. 2014; Wang 2011). Eye-tracking measures capture ocular fixations at specific points on a screen, thus enabling researchers to identify which pieces of information individuals avoid or attend to (at the granular level of a word or image), for how long and with what frequency (Bode et al. 2017; Sülflow et al.2019; Schmuck et al. 2020). Pupil dilation has long been used as a measure of cognitive effort (Kahneman and Beatty 1966; Beatty 1982), with exciting potential implications for engagement with politically relevant stimuli.

Implicit techniques such as sequential priming provide insight into the automatic activation of concepts in memory and their subsequent implications for judgment. For example, Burdein et al. (2006) utilized sequential priming experiments to demonstrate that affect for political candidates and political identifications can be automatically invoked; from an information-processing standpoint, this finding supports the notion that political concepts in memory can be automatically activated and thus may influence or prime subsequent judgments.

When it comes to studying the effect of information on citizens, scholars have adopted a diverse set of approaches—employing both explicit and unobtrusive measures, as well as experimental and non-experimental research designs. As we have noted above, motives exert a powerful influence on information processing (Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 1999). In many studies, directional goals are presumed to be the default when people process information about politics (e.g., Gaines et al. 2007; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Taber et al. 2009; for discussion see Flynn et al. 2017). Scholars also have developed techniques for experimentally manipulating motivations and estimating the effect on decision-making (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Groenendyk and Krupnikov 2021; Kam 2007; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Pennycook et al. 2021; Pietryka 2016; van Stekelenburg, Schaap, Veling, and Buijzen 2020).

Likewise, *information*, or the stimuli to which citizens respond, can be measured (e.g., with questions about media exposure) or experimentally manipulated. In cross-sectional data, measures of information exposure and attitudes are contemporaneous, making it difficult to distinguish opinion change from other processes, such as rationalization. Experiments, in which different information treatments can be randomly assigned to respondents, offer more promise. Here, researchers have investigated motivated reasoning/ peripheral processing by gauging support for a heuristic (e.g., party, stereotype cue) and observing how it interacts with different messages/content (e.g., Guess and Coppock 2020). Unobtrusive measures such as response-latency techniques provide further insight into psychological processes, especially when the researcher can relate response time to theoretically relevant constructs. As an illustration, Bolsen et al. (2014) use response latency to distinguish between party cues as heuristics versus party cues as effortful motivated reasoning

(also see Petersen et al. 2013 or Boudreau and MacKenzie 2018). Lodge and Taber (2006) employ response latency to tap cognitive effort in counterarguing attitudinally incongruent arguments (also see Schaffner and Roche 2017).

As a general matter, experimental work in political psychology tends to involve more *mundanely* realistic stimuli and study settings than corresponding dual-process studies from psychology. This feature is both a strength and a weakness. The variability in topics (whether related to issues or candidates) provides an opportunity to build a broader set of expectations about how abstract features of the topic influences information-processing, attitude formation, and attitude change. Yet, this kind of meta-theorizing is rare (but see Chong and Mullinix 2019), making it difficult to assess the cumulative wisdom across a large literature, diverse in its empirical findings.

Furthermore, most studies of information-processing utilize one-shot experimental designs, where the effect of a stimulus is inferred through the treatment effect on some dependent variable such as a policy opinion. We encourage methodological extensions beyond this model to expand our understanding of information-processing and its implications. For example, designs using dynamic as opposed to static information boards can expand our understanding of information exposure (Andersen and Ditonto 2018). Designs that build in an over-time component (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2010; Andersen and Ditonto 2020) can assess the evolution of opinions, and the stability and behavioral predictability of attitudes formed by System I versus System II processing. Such design modifications would enable researchers to expand our substantive understanding of the nature of information-processing and its implications.

10. Future Directions

Zaller called the information environment crafted by political elites the "the *dynamic* part" of his model (1992, 1, emphasis added). Our discussion of information processing makes clear that citizens also lay claim to dynamics: dynamics are not merely in the information environment. While there are stable individual-level differences in how citizens think about politics, even more importantly, there are also contextual factors that shift citizens' motivation and capacity. Information-processing belongs to citizens, as their capacities and motivations orient them toward variable modes of processing. *They* also constitute part of the dynamic aspect of public opinion formation.

Moreover, the dynamic aspect of the information environment that Zaller highlighted—whether elites were unified or divided—may be less relevant in a polarized era where mainstream messages increasingly are rare. Simply consider the death toll from COVID-19. More Americans died during the pandemic than several past wars combined (Hollingsworth and Webber 2021). Yet this public health crisis most certainly did not produce a sustained unified elite message environment.

In the contemporary United States, citizens will more often than not face an information environment rich with partisan cues. To the extent that people lack detailed information and the motivation to seek it out, they can rely on (readily available) partisan cues to save effort. But those same cues can trigger more effortful mental activities when loyalty to the party entails an ideological cost (Peterson et al. 2013). Additionally, in the absence of epistemic

motives that elevate accuracy over partisan loyalty, strong partisans will exert effort to counter information that challenges their predispositions (Erisen et al. 2018; Schaffner and Roche 2017; Taber and Lodge 2006). In contexts that are less polarized by party, such as low-stimulus or non-partisan elections, different types of System I decision-making come into play, such as thin-slice judgments or the use of demographic cues. Thus, even within a polarized environment, citizens may exert more or less cognitive effort in processing it.

Yet there is a sense in which the information environment *is* dynamic. Across the three editions of this volume, there have been enormous changes in the nature and organization of the information environment, specifically in the media environment: from the continued growth in cable news options to the explosion of social media as a platform for acquiring and sharing information about the political world (Young and Miller, Chapter 16, this volume). For scholars studying information processing, there has never been more variety (in the messages and stimuli people encounter), nor have citizens had greater agency (in selecting and curating their information environments). We briefly consider the implications of these changes for themes raised in this chapter (see Chapter 16 for a broader treatment).

The contemporary environment, in which the *social* transmission of information looms large, influences both the content of information and the motivation to engage with it. Research exploring the consequences of two-step information flows document powerful effects for socially supplied information. For example, people who do not watch partisan media, but who talk with people who did, form political preferences that look like those who were exposed (Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain 2018). This occurs because "watchers" have accessible (partisan) arguments that they repeat in discussions with "non-watchers." The pattern is moderated somewhat by the composition—homogenous versus heterogenous—of discussion groups, but the impact of partisan media clearly spreads beyond its direct audience. Even information from an ostensibly objective source (e.g., the Bureau of Economic Analysis) can become distorted as it is conveyed through social transmission—becoming more biased and conveying less information (Carlson 2019).

Scholars working in this area have observed that the "typical" social media environment generates motives related to identity affirmation and the signaling of group membership (e.g., Pennycook et al. 2021; Fazio 2020). In line with this, Brady et al. (2017) show that on hot-button topics such as gun control, same-sex marriage, and climate change, moral-emotional language is more likely to diffuse on Twitter than other kinds of language—and its spread is confined largely to a person's ideological ingroup. However, in contexts where people care less about attracting and pleasing followers and more about accuracy, behavior changes. For example, Pennycook and colleagues (2020, 2021) demonstrate that a subtle behavioral intervention can increase the degree to which people consider the accuracy of information before they share it—leading to an increase in the proportion of accurate versus inaccurate information that is shared with others.

Consistent with broader themes in this literature, the context created by social media can activate motives that are epistemic or directional. Indeed, new forms of media, including but not limited to Twitter and Facebook, may trigger *any* of the previously noted levers, for example, unexpected information and discrete emotions. Empirical study of socially transmitted information is in its infancy, with research taking place largely at "data outcroppings" where concepts of interest are most apparent (Luker 2008). Moreover, most existing work has been conducted in randomized experiments where there is a substantial degree of researcher-induced artifice (but see Pennycook et al. 2021 for a novel field

experiment). Thus, much remains to be learned about how (and when) socially supplied information changes opinions.

In an apt description of this challenge, Vonnahme (2019) writes that, "While the architecture and nature of memory has not changed in the digital age, what has changed is the means by which information is transmitted and the information itself" (14). Political psychology, with its focus on the individual and contextual factors that shape the processing of information, is uniquely poised to elucidate the implications of those changes.

Notes

1. We use the term "citizen" broadly here, to include any members of the democratic polity. This term includes but is certainly not limited to the formalistic designation of adults who have been born in or naturalized into legal citizenship in a given country.

2. Political psychologists often use the term "opinion" as a synonym for "attitude," but the psychological literature generally treats attitudes as unobservable, latent associations that can manifest themselves in implicit measures, in verbal reports such as survey responses, or in observable behaviors.

3. We take it as uncontroversial that for some aspects of reality, a "true state of the world" does in fact exist. A useful source on this point is Merriam-Webster dictionary, which defines knowledge as "the sum of what is known: the body of truth, information, and principles acquired by humankind." For example, knowledge of the length of a US senator's term constitutes a fact that exists. It is important to distinguish those cases where a true state of the world actually does exist (knowledge) from cases where the truth is unknown (or unknowable) and from cases where we are dealing with opinion/evaluation as opposed to fact.

4. There are a multitude of dual-process models in the social cognition literature: the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) (Eagly and Chaiken 1993), the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) Model (Fazio 1999), and the Continuum Model of Impression Formation (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). In cognitive psychology, Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) developed a "two-process theory of human information processing," which identified automatic and controlled elements. The origin and development of dual process models differs across the two branches of psychology, which has implications for their applications to political science.

5. As Kam (2012) notes, "The accumulating psychological evidence, from developmental psychology to social and cognitive psychology . . . [suggests that] [a]ssent comes more easily, quickly, and less effortfully than doubt . . . These general tendencies manifest themselves more often when citizens lack the motivation, cognitive resources, or factual basis to dispute incoming information—conditions that most political scientists accept as commonplace in political life" (553).

6. However, Atkinson, Enos, and Hill (2009) argue that winning faces are the result of selection processes and that competent faces do not win elections.

7. By some accounts, affect precedes cognition (Zajonc 1980). People *feel* their reaction to a political object before any semantic associations come to mind. With its distinctive focus on affect, Lodge and Taber's John Q. Public (JQP) model more closely reflects the development of dual process models in cognitive psychology.

8. Nelson and Garst (2005) make a similar observation in an early application of dual process models: "A shared party identification or value orientation between speaker and recipient could appeal to the recipient's sense of personal involvement and relevance and so promote central or systematic processing of political speeches . . . [but] a common party identification or value system could *alternatively* function as a direct persuasive cue [i.e., heuristic processing]" (493, emphasis original).

9. Analogous ideas appear in treatments of "satisficing" and bounded rationality (Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1984; Simon 1985; Lau and Redlawsk 2006). For comments on this "cognitive miser" view, see Bargh (1999).

10. One disadvantage of the domain specific measure is that it is to some degree endogenous to the political environment (e.g., Jerit and Barabas 2009).

11. A venerable stream of literature in public opinion has established the minimal impact of self-interest as conceptualized and measured as "(1) short-to-medium impact of an issue (or candidacy) on the (2) material well-being of the (3) individual's own personal life (or that of his or her immediate family)" (Sears and Funk 1991, 148). Exceptions to this general rule exist (e.g., Sears and Citrin 1985; Green and Gerken 1989) but are few and far between. Still, our focus is not on whether self-interest correlates with a policy opinion; instead, we focus on whether self-interest triggers more effortful processing *regardless* of what the policy opinion might be.

12. Researchers operationalize relevance by asking people how important an issue is to them personally (i.e., the measure is meta-attitudinal; Miller and Peterson 2004).

13. Conspiracy belief is distinct from misinformation, but effortful in the protection of a particular worldview. To illustrate, it takes effort to believe narratives about a stolen presidential election and former President Trump's return to power, particularly given repeated falsification in the form of court rulings and failed prophecies (Barkun 2018). Berinsky (2018) asserts that most people who hold such beliefs "do so because they *genuinely believe* [them]" (223, emphasis added). It nevertheless takes some effort to sustain these beliefs.

14. In the previously described Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) study, those authors conclude that "Party endorsements, particularly under conditions of polarization, do not appear to simply serve as cues people follow. *Instead, cues seem to shape how the public views arguments put forth by different sides*" (2013, 73, emphasis added). This finding explains how partisans may come to believe specious arguments made by in-party elites.

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CHAPTER 16

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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DANNAGAL G. YOUNG AND JOANNE M. MILLER

ALL disciplines evolve and expand over time. With advances in analytical procedures and data availability, as well as paradigm shifts prompted by younger scholars and increased interdisciplinarity, such evolutions are to be expected. But when a discipline's theories and processes are rooted in assumptions that no longer hold and contexts that no longer exist— it is high time for a fundamental reconsideration and reimagination. It is in that spirit that we approach our discussion of the field of political communication.

In 2005, after having studied political communication for 40 years, Doris Graber, founding editor of the field's flagship journal, *Political Communication*, proposed a definition of political communication framed in terms of impact. Graber and Smith wrote, the field of political communication "encompasses the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of messages that potentially have a significant direct or indirect impact on politics. The message senders or message receivers may be politicians, journalists, members of interest groups, or private, unorganized citizens" (Graber & Smith, 2005, p. 479). In this chapter, we embrace and expand upon Graber and Smith's (2005) already-broad definition and conceptualize political communication to encompass intentional, strategic, campaign-oriented discourse, but all forms of communications that "potentially have a significant direct or indirect impact on politics" (p. 479). Political communication is a discipline that is inextricably linked to context. As such, the logic, structure, and action-potential of media technologies (also known as "media affordances"; see Faraj & Azad, 2012) are central to any understanding of the ways in which the media shape and are shaped by public opinion and political behavior. We propose that the shift away from traditional mass media models to networked, decentralized media systems through digital technologies has crucial implications for: (a) the scope of what constitutes political communication and (b) the integration of political psychology into the study of political communication.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, we briefly review the accepted narrative of the field. Next, we discuss the ways in which the media landscape has changed, focusing on two broad and overlapping dynamics: (1) the decentralized, interpersonal, networked capacity of digital technologies, and (2) the economics of micro-segmentation. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of these dynamics for the study of the political psychology of communication processes—in terms of both what we study and how we study it—and thoughts about implications and future research.

1. Established History of Political Communication

As readers of comprehensive reviews of any research domain as vast as political communication are aware, authors must impose a structure on the literature, lest the text becomes a cacophony of theories, methods, findings, and implications. Although the specifics of these structures can be idiosyncratic, based on the author's and intended audience's intellectual emphasis and expertise, the broad contours of these organizational structures can become emblematic of a field. In political communication, the origin story is typically constructed in terms of three phases of media effects—hypodermic (media effects are powerful and direct), limited (media effects are rare and contingent), and subtle/moderated (whereas direct persuasion via the media may not be all that common, other types of media effects such as agenda-setting, priming, and framing can be consequential, especially under certain conditions and for certain types of people). For example, in their chapter for the second edition of this volume, Valentino and Nardis (2013) begin with a brief review of the three phases, then provide a comprehensive review of recent research, organizing their chapter in terms of four domains of influence: attention, learning, attitude change, and action. Other recent treatments are similarly structured and comprehensive (e.g., Iyengar, 2017; Jamieson, 2017; and Pooley, 2006). In this section, we briefly describe the history of the three phases (we point readers to the references cited above for more detailed treatments) to set the stage for our reimagining of the political psychology of political communication.

The birth of the formal study of media effects dates to the explosion of mass media offerings in the first half of the 20th century. First newspapers and magazines, then film and broadcast radio, followed by television, all garnered the interest—and concern—of sociologists and psychologists. Scholars feared that such far-reaching media with such vast audiences might have powerful "hypodermic" effects on the public's political attitudes and behaviors (Lasswell, 1927, 1930, 1935). "In the early days of communication study, the audience was considered relatively passive and defenseless, and communication could shoot something into them" (Schramm, 1971, p. 9). This perspective was rooted in post-war (both WWI and WWII) fears about propaganda, apocryphal (and exaggerated) accounts of the "mass hysteria" caused by H. G. Wells' *War of the Worlds* radio broadcast (Cantril et al., 1940), studies of the impact of WWII war bond drives (Merton et al., 1946), as well as the dominant social science theories of the day—mass society theory in sociology (Blumer, 1951; Durkheim, 1897; Kornhauser, 1959; Mills, 1956) and stimulus-response theory in psychology (e.g., Guthrie, 1935; Hull, 1943; Thorndike, 1898; see Bineham, 1988, for a critical review of the received wisdom about this first phase of media effects).

However, early media effects studies were not bearing out the fears of a passive and defenseless audience. The People's Choice Study (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948) and the American Soldier Studies (Merton & Lazarsfeld, 1950) pointed to limited direct effects of media messages on attitudes and behaviors, instead pointing to processes like selective exposure, selective attention, and individual differences in media effects (Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Schramm & Carter, 1959; Sears & Freedman, 1967). People sought out media content that supported their preexisting views, avoided content that contradicted those views, and varied in their responses to media based on factors like education and religion, all of which suggested that media were far better at reinforcement than persuasion (Lazarsfeld

& Merton, 1948; Klapper, 1960). As Valentino and Nardis (2013, p. 2) summarize, "citizens, it seemed, didn't pay much attention to politics, and when they did receive new information, it was primarily from friends and relatives they considered authorities on the subject" (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). This "Two-Step Flow" notion of media influence—where political media content is filtered through "opinion leaders" in a social network and then relayed to less interested members of the group—helped to explain why mass opinion change seemed so rare (see Druckman et al., 2018, for a recent review and empirical confirmation of the two-step communication flow theory).

The cognitive revolution in media effects research in the 1980s–1990s, with its focus on indirect effects of mediated messages on construct salience and judgment formation, meant that scholars could still assert that politically important media effects existed, even while acknowledging that strong, direct persuasion effects often did not. The agenda-setting effect of mass media (e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Miller, 2007; McCombs, 2004; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McCombs & Shaw, 1993) posited that mass media might not be influential in directly persuading audiences or telling them what to think, but were quite effective in telling the public what to think *about*. This increased the relevance of construct salience, mental models, and schema theory to the study of political communication and news effects. Soon the concepts of media priming (e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, Miller & Krosnick, 1997) and framing (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gross, 2008; Iyengar, 1991; Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Nelson et al., 1997; Scheufele, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), as well as the interconnections between agenda-setting, priming, and framing began to garner (and still receive) significant attention (e.g., McCombs & Ghanem, 2001; McCombs et al., 1997; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002). The cognitive revolution also highlighted the logical pairing between the fields of political communication and political psychology. Such work framed media effects in terms of schema theory and mental models, and brought with it a renewed focus on individual differences in media effects. As audience "needs," "traits," and "evaluative dispositions" were found to moderate the impact of media on individuals, and the very mechanisms underlying the effects (e.g., Domke & Wackman, 1998; Miller, 2007; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Oliver, 2002; Valentino & Nardis, 2013), human psychology became vital to the study of political media effects.

2. Phases of Media Effects and the Changing Media Landscape

This established history of the field of political communication, from hypodermic needle theory to limited effects to subtle/moderated effects (agenda-setting, priming, framing, and their nuances) is characterized by shifts in theoretical perspectives resulting from changes in the media context and methodological advances. Such advances often necessitated revisions of previous conventional wisdom. The field of propaganda studies (e.g., Lasswell 1927), from which the hypodermic needle theory was born, was defined by the logic of broadcast media, through which centralized, powerful sources of information could deliver homogenous content to disconnected masses. With few opportunities to "talk back" to powerful message senders, few options for diverse content, few incentives for media outlets to produce diverse content, and no media infrastructure connecting members of the mass to one another, scholars feared that media audiences would be susceptible to large-scale top-down propaganda campaigns.

With advances in survey and experimental methodologies and statistics, as well as new theories generated by the social-cognitive revolution in psychology (e.g. Barone et al., 1997), scholars found little empirical support for the hypodermic needle theory, concluding that the media had very limited effects (especially in the context of persuasion). Changes in the media landscape also played a role in the shift from phase one to phase two—greater media options (in both form and content) in the mid-20th century gave individuals more choice. For the most part, individuals chose content that did not challenge their pre-existing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. As media continued to fragment and diversify in the late 20th century, scholars pursued forms of media effects beyond direct persuasion, including subtle cognitive effects like agenda-setting, priming, and framing reviewed above. The field also started to respond to the diversification of politically relevant content in early 2000s, integrating these cognitive theories into the study of political entertainment including talk shows, late-night comedy programming, and satire. (Moy et al., 2006; Young, 2004, 2008). Expanding the study of media effects to sources not traditionally defined as "news" or "public affairs" has shown that just about *any* politically-adjacent content can provide information, set agendas, prime issues and traits, frame stories, and encourage political discussion and participation.

Starting with the earliest day of media effects research, scholars had defined "mass media communication" in terms of broadcast media such as newspapers, radio, and television—media that "enabled one or a few individuals to reach an audience of many" and through which "feedback [from message receiver to message sender] was minimal" (Reardon & Rogers, 1988). Such "linear and unidirectional" (Reardon & Rogers, 1988) conceptualizations of communication such as Lasswell's (1948) "who said what to whom with what effect" made sense given the largely top-down, unidirectional nature of media technologies at the time. And throughout most of the 20th century, mass media messages were produced and distributed by powerful message producers—who controlled the dissemination of messages to large, un-networked mass audiences. They were sustained either by the government, or (most notably in the US context) by media corporations selling access to a large mass audience to advertisers. But advances in digital technologies and social media have transformed both the experience of media users and the economics of media industries. Today's media users experience decentralized, interpersonal, horizontal, networked politically relevant communication every day (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). And they experience this socially-contextualized messaging within a system that relies on the economics and logics of micro-segmentation. Both of these changes make it necessary to position political psychology more centrally within the field of political communication.

In sum, shifts in the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of political communication throughout the 20th century were dictated, in part, by the changing media landscape. We submit that despite numerous theoretical and conceptual advances, the "third phase" of the field of political communication research is predicated on the existence of a mass media system that—by and large—no longer exists (Chaffee & Metzget, 2001). It is high time for a rethinking of the field of political communication. To be sure, we are not the first to argue that the qualitative differences between the media landscape of today and of yesterday necessitate such a rethinking. For example, Robison (2019) proposes an approach that centers on propaganda studies. And in their introduction to a special issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly* focusing on new approaches to political communication research in a changing media environment, Edgerly and Thorson (2020) highlight three themes

that emerge from the articles in the special issue, prompted by a recognition of the fundamental changes to the media environment: (1) motivations to create and share political content (self-expression), (2) a renewed focus on digital inequities, and (3) methodological innovations. In this chapter, we focus on how the shift away from traditional mass media models to networked, decentralized media systems through digital technologies has crucial implications for: (1) the scope of what constitutes political communication and (2) the integration of political psychology into the study of political communication.

3. Political Communication as Decentralized, Networked, and Interpersonal

Digital technologies have become decentralized by design, rendering information redundant across the network and empowering individual users to create, share, and publicly react to information (Abbate, 2000). This "network media logic" (Klinger & Svensson, 2015) means that individuals are both audience members and content producers; both recipients and participants (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010). In the early 2000s, when platforms like Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter reimagined the internet, they prioritized interactivity, user-generated content, and horizontal interpersonal networks (O'Reilly, 2009). Web 2.0 took the decentralized control of the internet and placed it within overlapping socially networked communities of friends, family members, colleagues, and neighbors. No longer was the audience a disconnected mass. No longer was the audience a mass at all (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). And as the lines between producer and receiver of information became increasingly blurred, no longer was the audience "an audience," but perhaps best described as "the people formerly known as the audience" (Rosen, 2008).

By embedding political communication within a social context, digital technologies and social media require that we increasingly think of all political communication in terms of interpersonal communication (Holbert & Geidner, 2009; Shah et al., 2017). Because of political communication's roots in rhetoric and top-down propaganda research, and because of the challenge of studying informal interpersonal communication, most historical considerations of political communication have not included examinations of discourse between and among regular people (McNair, 2011). And although political communication scholars have long studied interpersonal political discussion and deliberation (Eveland et al., 2011; Gastil et al., 2008; Stromer-Galley, 2003; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), these examinations have been considered separate from the study of strategic political communication, a distinction that is increasingly obsolete.

Recall that in the early days of media effects research, as strong persuasive effects of media messages were proving to be elusive, researchers *did* find *indirect* influence of media—in the form of communication between people, through social networks and trusted opinion leaders (Druckman et al., 2018; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). Today, with interpersonal communication embedded within digital media systems, constructs and processes relating to how people perceive, interact with, and respond to one another are increasingly relevant (Perloff, 2015). Cappella et al. (2015) describe, for example, the role of "impression and relationship-management" motives as increasingly important to the study of media effects in our socially networked media environment (Cappella et al., 2015, p. 11).

Characteristics and dispositional traits like conflict orientation (Sydnor, 2019), need for uniqueness (Lantian et al., 2017), empathy (Simas et al., 2020) and status-seeking (Petersen et al., 2021) all help bridge the gap between political psychology and the social context in which political communication is increasingly embedded. Walther (2017) recommends scholars make use of meta-constructs that bridge the media-interpersonal divide, including social meta-constructs like relationships, interactivity, mutual influence, and social goals. Such approaches necessitate conceptual shifts from "factors to actors" (Cappella, 2017) and require scholars to recognize the interdependency of individuals within a social system and to consider how individual-level variables interact with *explicitly social* media contexts in studies of processes and effects.

4. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AS FRAGMENTED AND MICRO-TARGETED

Accompanying these transformations that compel us to recenter interpersonal communication within the field of political communication, are changes in media logics (see Altheide & Snow, 1979) and economics that encourage micro-targeting (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). As the era of analog and broadcast gave way to cable and digital through the 1980s–1990s, media fragmentation—or the explosion in the number of media offerings—diffused audiences across hundreds of outlets, shrinking each individual audience and giving way to an era of media specialization and deliberate audience segmentation (Turow, 1997). Political communication scholars expressed concerns about the potential for media fragmentation to create "distinct issue publics" (Gurevitch et al., 2009, p. 170) and blur the lines of what constitutes professional journalism in ways that reduce public scrutiny and polarize the public (Mancini, 2013). The field produced empirical evidence of various forms of fragmentation-related polarization; ideological polarization stemming from exposure to like-minded content (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Stroud, 2011); and political interest polarization, whereby individuals who preferred entertainment over information could drop out of the political media ecosystem altogether (Prior, 2007).

Specialized cable channels and the Internet of the early 2000s were indeed fragmented, but the era of Web 2.0 born after 2004 (O'Reilly, 2009) transformed specialized media to "micro-targeted" media—communications that utilize user data to develop highly tailored media experiences driven by user socio-demographics, psychological characteristics, geographic data, and online consumer and social behaviors. Such connectivity data (Van Dijck, 2013) inform algorithms designed to maximize site visits and time on site in a hyper-competitive media environment. The economics of media competition have always encouraged the creation of public affairs content that is decontextualized, personalized, emotional, conflict-driven and dramatic (Bennett, 2016; Spencer & Spencer, 2007). Such norms lead to news content that contributes to various cognitive effects; from horse-race and strategy coverage that fuels political cynicism (Bennett, 2016; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993) to episodically framed personalized news (see Iyengar, 1991) that increases the audience's perceptions that individuals (rather than institutions or government) are responsible for their own political, social, or economic fate (Gross, 2008). Scholars warn that the increasing consolidation of news industries and reduced quality

of journalism, coupled with media fragmentation and polarization, will have detrimental effects on democracies around the globe (Van Aelst et al., 2017). Moreover, these dynamics are playing out in the midst of a vast sea of user data—data that increasingly inform the behaviors of media producers, regarding media content, argumentation, tone, aesthetics, and distribution (Deibert, 2019; Jamieson, 2013).

Whereas psychology used to enter the media effects conversation in the form of cognitive processing mechanisms and "individual difference variables" (see Oliver, 2002), today psychological processes and traits are *anticipated* by content producers and distributors. Audience psychology is "baked into" media products and media strategies from the start, to attract, arouse, and solidify connections with individual users and viewers. This is perhaps most obvious in the context of psychologically micro-targeted political advertising through social media platforms (Krotzek, 2019; Kruikmeier et al., 2016; Zarouali et al., 2022). But the splintering of the information ecosystem has also increased the ability (and need) of message producers across media forms to create emotionally evocative, psychologically compatible (to their intended audience) content—in terms of both substance and aesthetics. Psychological traits such as tolerance for ambiguity which correlate with political ideology (Jost et al., 2003) and aesthetic preferences (Cleridou & Furnham, 2014) may account for the distinct look and feel of genres preferred by liberals and conservatives (Young, 2019). In other words, media content is *strategically created* to attract specific audiences, based on their psychological make-up, preferences, and identities. Such "micro-segmentation" is dominating political media decisions and contributing to the production of content that will persuade connected individuals to watch, to use, to read, to engage, and to return. We assert that these drastic changes to the media landscape require *even greater* integration of political psychology into the study of political communication—especially the psychology of aesthetics (Jacobsen, 2006; Pels, 2003), political ideology (Jost et al., 2003), social/political identity (Huddy, 2001; Huddy et al., 2015), and emotion (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Webster, 2020; Young, 2019) in ways that eschew any vestiges of the notion that political communication consists of a distinct *non-strategic content creator*, on the one hand, and a *passive content receiver*, on the other.

Both transformations stemming from the digital media ecosystem—the decentralized, networked, interpersonal logic on the one hand and the fragmented, micro-segmented logics and economics on the other—are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In the following pages, we reflect on the implications of these transformations for various political communication theories and processes and discuss their significance for the role of political psychology within political communication. Harkening back to Lasswell's (1948) model of media communication, we first discuss the ways in which these media transformations have fundamentally revolutionized the production of political communication (the "who"). We then review research that reconceptualizes the audience as active participants in the political communication process (the "whom"). Next, we discuss some of the ways in which the decentralized/networked/interpersonal and micro-segmented media landscape affects media content (the "what"), focusing specifically on emotional content and the production and spread of misinformation. Finally, we discuss how these processes *affect* message processing, our shared (or not) "reality," and political polarization (the "with what effect" of Lasswell's framework).

Our choice to organize this reimagining of the field of political communication in terms of the who, the whom, the what, and the effects is not without its drawbacks. In making

this choice, we are conscious of the fact that we are adopting a framework borne out of a media context that no longer exists. After much deliberation, it seemed to us that Lasswell's (1948) framework actually spotlights, rather than obscures, the stark differences between the media landscape of yesterday and the media landscape of today.

5. The "*Who*"

We begin with the who. The conventional conceptualization of the sources of political communication focuses on elites—primarily news executives, professional journalists, politicians, and pundits—as the sole broadcasters of information, and of professional media organizations as the conduits of that information. In this section, we explore recent theoretical and empirical work that helps us reconceptualize and broaden our understanding of the "who."

5.1. From Gatekeepers to Curated Information Flows

With the advent of decentralized control over the flow of information and the shift from a vertical and disconnected to a horizontal and networked experience of media users, the role of information "gatekeepers" has fundamentally changed (Shoemaker et al., 2001). Whereas news executives and organizations used to have the unique power to "winnow, shape, and prod potential news messages . . . into those few that are actually transmitted by the news media" (Shoemaker et al., 2001, p. 233), that gatekeeping power has now been diffused across individuals, politicians, political organizations, social media platforms, and even rogue political actors.

Individual citizens, in the role of information producers and sharers, play the role of "citizen journalists" (Wall, 2015) or "participatory journalists" (Fröhlich et al., 2012), motivated by dissatisfaction with traditional news, a desire to engage/challenge dominant narratives, and to connect with others to acquire ideas and experiences (Fröhlich et al., 2012; Kim & Lowrey, 2015). On the recipient side, citizen journalism is viewed as most credible by those who are already cynical and skeptical about media in general (Carr et al., 2014). Videos of hostile encounters between citizens and government officials such as the military or police have complicated dominant elite narratives (Ali & Fahmy, 2013; Meraz, 2009), negatively affected viewers' perceptions of law enforcement (Boivin et al., 2017; Parry et al., 2019), and contributed to the growth in social justice movements (Anthony & Thomas, 2010). Recognizing the value—and appeal—of citizen journalism, some news organizations have integrated more user generated content (Thurman, 2008) and non-elite sources into their reporting (Hermida et al., 2014). Such shifts in the definitions of "journalism" and "objectivity" are illustrated in scholars' calls for professional journalists to reject objectivity, tap into their authentic moral voices, and draw upon their experiences, communities, and identities as they engage with events and issues (Carlson et al., 2021). While these changes are operating at the level of media production, they can affect how individuals select and process political information. Kelly (2019), for example, illustrates how perceptions of objectivity and credibility of news stories from unknown sources are driven by pre-existing

beliefs, leading to higher perceptions of bias when encountering balanced news than belief-disconfirming news.

The declining formal role of elite journalistic gatekeepers also means more opportunities for direct strategic communication from political elites to citizens, although empirical examinations reveal these instances of "direct-to-voter" social media communications are rare (Kleis Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013). In *The Rhetorical Presidency*, Tulis (1987) introduced the concept of "going public" to refer to presidents bypassing interactions with Congress by directly addressing the American people on matters of policy. Scacco and Coe (2021) expand on this with the concept of the "Ubiquitous Presidency" whereby digital technologies allow certain elites (namely, President Trump) to communicate directly with followers and avoid journalistic inquiry and accountability, while still relying on message amplification and legitimacy from news outlets. Direct communications from public officials to supporters increases opportunities for "para-social" interactions, through which individuals feel that they have intimate relationships with people they do not actually know in real life (Horton & Wohl, 1956). These perceptions can shape both cognitive and affective aspects of message processing (Lee & Shin, 2012), including increasing affinity for like-minded politicians through the para-social bond created through exposure to their Twitter feeds (Paravati et al., 2020).

Meanwhile, news organizations have become increasingly dependent on search engines and social media for the distribution and reach of their content (Kleis Nielsen & Ganter; 2018), leading some to call these "digital intermediaries" our new gatekeepers (Kleis Nielsen, 2016; Powers, 2017). Yet, digital intermediaries are not acting alone in curating the flow of information. User behavior and preferences inform the criteria that intermediaries use to shape information curation and distribution (Pariser, 2011). Wallace (2018) urges that we think about digital gatekeeping in terms of individual actors, algorithms, and platform incentives; or: "who is selecting which information according to what selection mechanism, and how is the news item framed before reaching the public?" (p. 288). Thorson and Wells (2016) conceptualize these processes not as gatekeeping, but as "curated information flows" through which journalists, strategic communicators, individual media users (personal curators), social contacts, and algorithmic filters all shape an individual's mediated experience.

5.2. Entertainment TV and Beyond as Conduits for Political Communication

Not only does today's qualitatively different media environment require scholars to redefine the "who" as being everyone, it also requires us to think more broadly about the channels of that communication. Media fragmentation and accompanying changes in the economics of media fueled an evolution in political media forms and genres through the 1990s to today. The distinction between news and entertainment that had been embedded into network television broke down as cable and the internet allowed—and encouraged—the creation of new hybrid genres of information (Baym, 2017; Chadwick, 2017; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011; Young & Gray, 2013). Political communication scholars began studying the political content and effects of late-night talk shows (Niven et al., 2003; Young, 2004), daytime talk

shows (Baum & Jamison, 2006; Glynn et al., 2007), historical reenactment films (LaMarre & Landreville, 2009), and narrative documentaries (Whiteman, 2004). Rather than remaining handcuffed to the false distinction between "political communication" and "entertainment," theory-driven analyses have revealed important political consequences of exposure to programming designed to entertain.

In the context of late-night comedy research alone, researchers have found evidence of political and public policy knowledge acquisition (Becker & Bode, 2018; Cao, 2008; Hardy et al., 2014), increased political discussion and participation among viewers (Feldman & Young, 2008; Landreville et al., 2010), increased attention to and awareness of politics and public policy (Brewer et al., 2018; Feldman et al., 2011), and increased information seeking from—and attention to—more traditional political content (Feldman & Young, 2008; Xenos & Becker, 2009). Importantly, many of these effects of exposure are conditional upon the individual characteristics of the audience—including political knowledge (Young, 2004), political interest (Xenos & Becker, 2009), age (Cao, 2008), and ideology (Lamarre et al., 2009).

Research has also begun to illuminate the ways in which campaign communications are affected by digital and social media affordances, described by Perloff (2015) as "the quintessential media features that facilitate actions or trigger psychological heuristics" (p. 549). According to Faraj and Azad (2012), media technologies shape the potential for users to engage in certain actions by virtue of their structures and internal logics. These "action-potentials"—or social media affordances—are especially implicated in political campaign communications (Bossetta, 2018), as evidenced by the fact that digital technology companies promote their platforms to candidates and work with campaigns to help them take advantage of platform characteristics to target likely voters (Kreiss & McGregor, 2018; see also Towner & Baumgartner, eds., 2021, for new research on how candidates and campaigns leveraged new media technology to reach potential voters during the 2020 elections).

Whereas political communication textbooks through the mid-1990s typically limited the concept of political communication to news, political advertising, and political debates, contemporary scholars explore the content, psychology, and effects of any mediated form of information that might have political implications. Recent work points to the relationship between videogame play reduced support for democratic and prosocial values (Bacovsky, 2021), increased postfeminist attitudes among viewers of YouTube makeup tutorials (Chae, 2021), the civic role of online meme culture (Penney, 2020), and the playful exploration of contentious issues related to gender and power on the social media platform, TikTok (Vijay & Gekker, 2021). Social scientists have also begun to explore complex phenomena such as "Black Twitter" as a place where people of color construct (Harlow & Benbrook, 2019) and perform (Florini, 2014) racial identity and advance counternarratives (Graham & Smith, 2016). Political scientists have also studied the intersection of sports, media, and politics, including how perceptions of NFL's Colin Kaepernick's public protests of police brutality are shaped by political and racial attitudes (Stepp & Castle, 2021; Towler et al., 2020).

6. The "Whom"

The reimagining of the "who" discussed above blurs the lines between who and whom to such a degree that we risk creating a distinction without a difference. Not only are

the traditional receivers of political communication now also producers of that content, but the new media landscape provides them with more opportunities to be active and effective *seekers* of information, while also incentivizing the strategic curation and packaging of content by producers (at both the elite and mass level) seeking to attract their intended audience. The notion of agency—who has it and what it even means—has been upended.

6.1. Uses and Gratifications

Uses and Gratifications (U&G) approaches to the study of media, popularized in the 1970s (Katz et al., 1973; Rubin, 1983), offer a valuable framework to consider both *why* people engage with media and *how they process and are shaped by* media experiences as a result. When originally developed, U&G's assumption of an active audience that "used media" to meet certain needs and gratifications contrasted sharply with that of the old passive-audience-centered media effects paradigm. When integrated with effects mechanisms, researchers found the impact of media exposure on outcomes like learning and message engagement was contingent on the needs and gratifications that guided media behaviors in the first place (Rubin, 1983).

In the digital media environment, the networked, interactive, and customizable "media affordances" (Sundar, 2008; Sundar & Limperos, 2013) ought to shape not only media effects mechanisms, but the very needs and gratifications users seek to satisfy through media use (see Perloff, 2015). Perloff (2015), for example, suggests that future U&G approaches integrate the affordances of digital technologies *with* unique psychological characteristics of the user to posit novel sets of uses and gratifications that individuals might seek to satisfy through media use. For instance, he points to Bergman et al.'s (2011) finding that although narcissism does not predict *time spent* using social media among millennials, it does predict the reasons *why* they use social media—to increase their number of friends, share their activities, and project a positive image. Since motivations for media use shape affective and cognitive processes associated with that usage, motivational distinctions ought to be factored into political media effects mechanisms. Perloff also urges the integration of neuroscientific approaches to better understand neuropsychological processes that correlate with individuals' media orientations and anticipated rewards. Consistent with the efficacy of such approaches, Sherry (2001) found significant correlations between television viewing motivations and various traits that share neural substrates, namely: mood, task orientation, and cognitive rigidity.

Early integrations of U&G approaches helped explicate how media user orientations and motivations shape cognition, attitude, and behavior effects (McLeod & McDonald, 1985). More recent applications have explored how motivations to use mobile messaging apps affect political discussion and efficacy (Pang, 2018), how audience motivations rooted in social utility shape political participation through social media use (Chen & Chan, 2017), how surveillance and escapism gratifications predict news consumption among college students (Diddi & LaRose, 2006), and how social media platform adoption is associated with motivations including hedonism, self-esteem, belonging, and reciprocity (Pai & Arnott, 2013). Illustrating the integration of interpersonal communication theory with U&G approaches in the context of political communication, Pennington and Winfrey (2021) find

that individuals who are more social and interpersonally-focused in their online behaviors are less likely to discuss politics on Facebook.

6.2. The Importance of Social Identity

There is increasing recognition in the field of political communication that the fragmented and interpersonally networked information landscape makes identity-driven motivations increasingly relevant to the processes outlined above (see, for example, Slater, 2007). Tajfel and Turner's Social Identity Theory (SIT; see Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Turner and Oakes' concept of self-categorization (1986) offer useful frameworks for considering the ways in which identity shapes media preferences and effects. Even before the birth of social media, Blumer & Kavanagh (1999) discussed the intersection of media fragmentation and identity, noting the "increased social differentiation and specialization, [and the] fragmenting [of] social organization, interests, and identities" through media. In his 1998 Ithiel De Sola Pool lecture, Bennett (1998) highlighted declining confidence in institutions and the rise in "lifestyle politics" resulting from economically driven social fragmentation. He also characterized the splintering of the media system as both a response—and contributor—to these trends. In 2008, Bennett and Iyengar revisited the concept of identity, arguing that among young people in particular, we see "shifting and far more flexible identity formations that require considerable self-reflexivity and identity management." (p. 716), including through their media behaviors.

But while political communication scholars were recognizing the increasing salience of identity-based motivations in political life, political psychologists were pointing to the limits of SIT in political contexts (Huddy, 2001). Yet, even while urging caution, Huddy (2001) acknowledged the capacity of "category salience" to shape identity in a given context with potentially important consequences. We propose that interpersonally networked and micro-segmented digital political media are tailor made (quite literally) to be just this: a context designed to activate and prime the salience of our identity categories. The microtargeting of symbols and texts through digital media, combined with the incentives to "perform identity" in an interpersonally networked social media context (Vaidhyanathan, 2018), speak not only to group "boundaries" but also to group "meaning" consistent with self-categorization and social identity theories (Haslam et al., 1992). Recent work points to the intersection of user psychology and social media logics in incentivizing fast, inattentive—and often identity-based—motivations, over accuracy-based motivations (see Fazio, 2020; Pennycook et al., 2021).

In the US context, socio-demographic, political, and psychological characteristics are increasingly enmeshed and overlapping (Mason, Chapter 24, this volume; Mason, 2018). This partisan separation along racial, religious, and geographic lines is accompanied by an epistemic separation on the left and the right (Oliver & Wood, 2018). This "social" and "epistemic" sorting, combined with the economics and logics of fragmented and digital media, means that identity categories are used, reinforced, and cultivated through the process of political communication itself, with implications for political polarization and affective polarization (see Iyengar et al., 2012; Young, 2023). These dynamics are the essence of Slater's (2007, 2015) Reinforcing Media Spirals (RMS), which proposes that identity motivates media behaviors in ways that reinforce that identity. Importantly, according to RMS, when

one's identity is perceived to be under threat, these patterns are exacerbated, such that media use not only reinforces identities, but can facilitate their polarization (see Long et al., 2019).

6.3. The Psychology of Media Selectivity: Beyond Political Attitudes

Whereas media fragmentation facilitates selective exposure and avoidance behaviors based on political ideology and political attitudes, it also invites people to make media selections based on content preferences and psychological traits. Sydnor (2019), for instance, illustrates that individuals who are conflict averse intentionally avoid uncivil political media, hence contributing to gaps in political engagement based on gender and race. Gerber et al. (2011) find that individuals high in openness, extraversion, and emotional stability are most likely to consume political media and that these traits shape preferences for specific genres of political information as well. People who prefer entertainment over information can selectively avoid political content altogether, leading to a decline in political knowledge and voter turnout among those least politically inclined (Prior, 2007; Toff & Kalogeropoulos, 2020). But just as social media might allow incidental exposure to ideologically diverse political information through friends and family, so too might social networks diversify media experiences in general, encouraging, for example, news consumption among younger and less politically interested users (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018).

Integrating the study of aesthetic preferences—style or taste—into political communication research presents a rich opportunity for political psychologists studying media selectivity patterns and effects. Pels (2003) explains that "political style or taste refers to the fact that judgments of persons . . . normally have a holistic and unarticulated character . . ." and proposes that bringing aesthetics and "style" into the study of politics "usefully bridges the divide between form and content, detail and essence, presentation and principle, sentiment and reason, and hence relativises a one-sided cerebral or rationalist approach to political behavior" (p. 48). Integrating the concepts of media "style," "packaging," or "aesthetics" allows us to move beyond classic message features (like political topics, argument quality, message source, or medium), to consideration of look, feel, tone, and style of political symbols and texts. Understanding how such characteristics resonate with user psychology may help explicate selective exposure, selective processing, and even selective production (see Cui et al., 2020). This is especially true in a socially and epistemically sorted and yet networked political media ecosystem in which media organizations are economically incentivized to tailor their content to the presumed psychological characteristics, identities, and aesthetic preferences of their intended audience.

One example of the integration of aesthetics into political psychological approaches to communication is found in the study of political entertainment. As reviewed above, the boundaries between entertainment and news have eroded (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011; Young & Gray, 2013), resulting in media content and genres that are increasingly hybrid; unruly combinations of forms, categories, and structures (Baym, 2017; Chadwick, 2017). These combinations, part entertainment and part news—part serious and part play—create fertile ground for political psychologists studying political communication, as individuals' tolerance for ambiguity likely affects their comfort with such blendings (Young, 2019).

Work on the psychology of aesthetic preferences indicates that tolerance for ambiguity and need for cognition are correlated with preferences for artistic (Wiersema et al., 2012) and musical styles (Rawlings et al., 2000). Young (2019) thus proposes that ambiguous ironic satire is compatible with the psychological correlates of social and cultural liberals—high in tolerance for ambiguity and need for cognition (see Jost et al., 2003), hence accounting for the left-leaning "bias" of much political satire, as well as the right leaning "bias" in didactic, literal, morally serious "outrage programming" (see Berry & Sobieraj, 2013). Such considerations are important as scholars study how individuals engage with politically relevant hybrid media forms including historical reenactment films (LaMarre & Landreville, 2009), political talk shows (Roth et al., 2014), and even journalists' Twitter profile pages (Ottovordemgentschenfelde, 2017).

Another fruitful application of the concept of "political media as aesthetic" comes from recent work on the psychology and appeal of populism. Its thin ideology, appeal to "traditional popular values," and antagonistic divide between "the people" and "elites" (see Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008) have led political communication scholars to describe populism itself as a "communication style" rather than a political ideology (Bracciale et al., 2017; De Vreese et al., 2018; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populism as an aesthetic is thus emotionally evocative, intimate anti-establishment messaging focused on regular people that draws a contrast between the monolith of good people and corrupt elites (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). Such aesthetics are likely to interact with audience psychology in ways that appeal to and mobilize certain kinds of individuals more than others, such as those who score lower in agreeableness (Bakker et al., 2021), higher in need for closure and certainty (Kruglanski, Molinario & Sensales, 2021), and higher in narcissism and psychopathy (Nai & Martinez i Coma, 2019; for a review of the literature on political language, see Hopkins, Chapter 9, this volume).

6.4. Echo Chambers

Another implication of the increasingly interpersonal nature of media experiences and the micro-segmentation of audiences is the potential formation of echo chambers and filter bubbles. As media choice increases, individuals can increasingly "opt in" or "out" of media experiences, facilitating selective exposure to and avoidance of ideologically consonant—or even politically relevant (Prior, 2007)—media content. In their paradigm-challenging essay, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) suggested that selectivity behaviors would be so great in this new media landscape, that media persuasion effects would all but disappear, even as other effects like agenda-setting or priming might continue. "As media audiences devolve into smaller, like-minded subsets of the electorate," they wrote, "it becomes less likely that media messages will do anything other than reinforce prior predispositions. Most media users will rarely find themselves in the path of attitude-discrepant information" (p. 724).

Such "echo chambers" or "filter bubbles" became a growing concern among political scientists and political communication scholars from 2000 to the 2010s (Sunstein, 2001), as empirical examinations pointed to a public engaging in selective exposure and avoidance of politically dissonant mediated information in ways that could fuel political polarization (Stroud, 2011; see below). Yet, while echo chambers and filter bubbles are certainly made possible through media fragmentation, research has failed to produce substantial evidence to support the notion that *most* people restrict themselves to only like-minded

media content (see Guess et al., 2018; Guess, 2021). Although selective exposure to like-minded content does occur, and moral-emotional content from elites spreads efficiently within their ideological social networks (especially on the right) (Brady et al., 2019), evidence of selective-avoidance of belief-disconfirming information is scarce (Garrett, 2009). Barbera et al. (2015) conclude that "homophilic tendencies in online interaction do not imply that information about current events is necessarily constrained by the walls of an echo chamber" (p. 1539).

Users tend to have diverse media diets and vary in the extent to which they pay attention to political or current events information (Guess, 2018), and those users who do pay attention to like-minded political content pay *more*, not *less*, attention to belief-dissonant programming (Garrett et al., 2011, Nelson & Webster, 2017). Even on social media, where algorithms and users themselves increase the ideological homogeneity of their newsfeeds (Bakshy et al., 2015), users are still exposed to some belief-disconfirming information. In fact, in the most fragmented context of all—the internet—selective exposure and avoidance are complicated by social networks, where social media posts of friends and family can serve as heuristics that guide ideologically diverse information consumption (Masip et al., 2018; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Flaxman et al., 2016; Zuiderveen et al., 2016), even trumping partisan selective exposure (Anspach, 2017). These results are supported by Dylko et al. (2018), who find that although customized media experiences increase selective exposure dynamics in ways that increase political polarization, this effect is limited to customization processes that are a*utomatically embedded* within a technology. When users have the ability to customize media experiences, these relationships shrink, again highlighting how user agency often diversifies—rather than homogenizes—media diets. Such findings certainly call into question Bennett and Iyengar's (2008) pronouncement of the "demise of the inadvertent audience" (p. 717). Whereas media fragmentation facilitates selective exposure and avoidance, the interpersonal networked nature of the social media experience does not.

Yet attending to and being receptive to belief-disconfirming content are two different things that may be motivated by different goals. Knobloch-Westerwick and Klienman (2012), for example, find that people engage in less selective avoidance of belief-disconfirming information when they expect their side is going to lose, pointing to anticipated "informational utility" as individuals anticipate that exposure to belief-disconfirming content "can aid individuals in making future decisions" (p. 171). Valentino et al.'s (2009) work is consistent with this explanatory mechanism, with individuals seeking out belief-disconfirming content as a way of monitoring their information environments. In this work, *anxiety* was found to fuel information seeking behaviors, thereby increasing exposure to belief-disconfirming content, illustrating that these consumption behaviors are shaped by emotional needs of the audience.

Finally, calls to relax the fears of echo chambers and filter bubbles are focused on the modal cases—the most likely outcomes for most people. This raises questions about whether we should be more concerned about the outcomes of users at the margins—culturally and politically. Boutyline and Willer (2017) for example, found that social networks (on Twitter) were most homogenous among those users with the most extreme political views. Evidence about the moderating role of political engagement is mixed; Guess (2021) finds a positive relationship between political engagement and media diet homogeneity, whereas Dubois and Blank (2018) find the reverse (see also Eady et al., 2019). Emotions such as anger may

fuel the kind of dynamics that lead to concerning echo-chambers, while fear and anxiety may mitigate them (Wollebaek et al., 2019). Recent work by Stier et al. (2020b) indicates that populist attitudes interact with contextual factors to fuel selective exposure patterns, with populist attitudes contributing to lower (but not zero) exposure to traditional news and greater exposure to hyper-partisan outlets.

The intersection of misinformation and echo-chambers has given rise to renewed interest in how misinformation may thrive and spread through online networks (Törnberg, 2018). This has led some to consider how mere *exposure* to belief-discordant information within a vocal and ideologically homogeneous social networks might still facilitate anti-democratic and polarizing outcomes. In Garrett's (2017) condemnation of "the echo chamber distraction," he highlights the potential dangers of "engagement echo chambers" or networks that have the capacity to promote falsehoods merely by "consistently affirming one view" (p. 371).

7. The "*What*"

Both the networked/interpersonal nature of the media landscape today, as well as the expansion of media outlets and corresponding economic incentives to create micro-targeted content that will garner the largest audience possible, have had profound effects on the content of political communication—the "what." A comprehensive review of the myriad ways in which the new media landscape has reshaped content production is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, we briefly review scholarship that highlights two such transformations—hyper-emotional content and the spread of falsehoods and conspiracy theories.

7.1. Emotional Content

Since the early 2000s there has been a growing recognition of the importance of emotions in political communication (e.g., Brader and Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume; Marcus et al., 2000; Neuman et al. 2007). For many years, this research was primarily focused on the effects of political ads—most notably, the impact of negative ads on candidate evaluations and voter turnout (Brader, 2006; Chang, 2001; Geer, 2006; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Mattes & Redlawsk, 2014; Tedesco, 2002, Valentino et al., 2011). The questions guiding this fruitful line of research center around the role of emotions in the political persuasion process (e.g. Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). The decentralized, fragmented, and networked nature of today's media environment has opened the door for a new set of questions about the ways in which media organizations and algorithms strategically push emotional content aimed at attracting clicks, likes, and shares, as well as the effects of such content. These new lines of research have documented differences in the positive versus negative emotionality of news content in traditional media outlets and on social media (e.g., Soroka et al. 2018), as well as whether information that is positive or negative in tone is more likely to be shared. Evidence on this second point is mixed, with some scholars finding that negative information is more likely to be shared than positive information (Godes et al., 2005; Hasell & Weeks, 2016), and others finding that positive information is more likely to be shared (Berger & Milkman

2012; Kraft et al. 2020). Aaroe and Peterson's (2020) work suggests that episodically framed news stories that resonate with our pre-existing cognitive biases are more likely to be shared and to shape our attitudes when they are experienced and processed through interpersonal networks. Meanwhile, Brady et al. (2017) find that content that includes moral-emotional language is more likely to be shared than less emotional content.

In her book, *Disrespectful Democracy: The Psychology of Political Incivility*, Sydnor (2019) demonstrates the central role that the psychological construct of conflict orientation plays in our understanding of the effects of emotionally arousing media content. Through experimental and survey research, she demonstrates how people who are more "conflict avoidant" are more likely to experience negative emotions (anxiety, disgust, and anger) in response to televised incivility, whereas those who are "conflict approaching" are more likely to experience positive emotions (like being entertained and amused) in response to that same content. Those who are conflict averse are then turned off by political media and more likely to opt out of political content altogether. Building on the work of Mutz and Reeves (2005), which explored how televised incivility can increase attention while disrupting other forms of cognitive processing, Kosmides and Theocaris (2020) find that social media incivility can actually induce positive emotions (enthusiasm), especially among those for whom the content is attitude-consistent. Borah (2013) points to the anonymity afforded by social media as one of the drivers of incivility and finds that uncivil news frames are a double-edged sword, increasing the credibility of a news article, on the one hand, while also decreasing political trust and efficacy, on the other.

7.2. Misinformation and Conspiracy Theories

In 1944, former head of "Rumor Control" for the Massachusetts Committee of Public Safety Robert Knapp defined "rumor" in *Public Opinion Quarterly* as "a proposition for belief of topical reference disseminated without official verification" (p. 22). He described rumors as providing detailed "information" spread by word of mouth that satisfy some emotional or psychological need of a community. It is the "spread by word of mouth" element that imbues the decades-old concept of "rumors" with increasing relevance in today's social media ecosystem. In their prescient 2000 article, Kuklinski et al. argue that the conventional "informed vs. uninformed" dichotomy conflates two very different kinds of uninformed people—those who do not know the facts, on the one hand, and those who believe false information (the "misinformed"), on the other. They called for more research on the causes and consequences of misinformation ("information that is false, but the person who is disseminating it believes that it is true"; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2018, p. 44), pointing to the potential deleterious effects of a misinformed public that is likely to resist facts that contradict their misinformed beliefs. Vraga and Bode (2020) call for a differentiation between information that is *false* and information that is merely *unsubstantiated*, such as operationalizing misinformation as "*information considered incorrect based on the best available evidence from relevant experts at the time*" (p. 138) for example. Such distinctions would take into account the fluid nature of expert consensus, especially from such domains as science and law.

Disinformation, in contrast, is "information that is false, and the person who is disseminating it knows it is false" (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2018). Efforts to spread

information that is knowingly false violate the free will and transparency assumptions at the heart of persuasion theory (see Perloff, 2020). Disinformation is thus more akin to propaganda and deception. Propaganda and persuasion scholars have long recognized that mass media propaganda, absent supplementary interpersonal messaging, was unlikely to persuade audiences (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1948). Because decentralized social media embed media messaging and user-generated content *within* interpersonal networks, disinformation and other forms of propaganda that are spread through these channels may be at a persuasive advantage (Young & McGregor, 2020). Jamieson (2020) chronicles how Russian propaganda operatives—especially online "trolls"—capitalized on the decentralized and networked logics of Facebook to exploit preexisting cultural cleavages during the 2016 US presidential election. She also illustrates how news organizations, driven by biases toward personalized, conflict-oriented news, legitimized and amplified these disinformation efforts. Munger (2020) argues that economic incentives that drive clickbait media lead to "credibility cascades" that enable misinformation to flourish. Meanwhile Garrett (2017) argues that the threat posed by deliberate politically strategic disinformation campaigns is far greater than the threat posed by the logics of the technologies themselves. He also explores how citizens might use the affordances of social media platforms to increase information accuracy, accountability, and civility.

Yet research on how elite-driven disinformation interacts with media affordances, logics, and economics paints a far clearer picture of democratic harm than of democratic health. Rhetoric scholars have detailed how political elites such as Donald Trump (Mercieca 2018) make strategic use of the affordances of the new media environment to spread falsehoods directly to the public. Using the metaphor of a polluted landscape, Philips and Milner (2021) explore how polluted information such as White supremacist ideology and conspiracy theories have permeated the media landscape and point to the interconnected, intertwined, and deeply networked nature of mis- and disinformation as being particularly pernicious and difficult to combat. Rosenblum and Muirhead (2020) identify a new form of conspiracism borne out of the new media landscape, which they define as conspiracy *without* a theory. "There is no punctilious demand for proofs, no exhaustive amassing of evidence, no dots revealed to form a pattern, no close examination of the operators plotting in the shadows. The new conspiracism dispenses with the burden of explanation. Instead, we have innuendo and verbal gesture . . . What validates the new conspiracism is not evidence but repetition . . . The effect of conspiracist thinking once it ceases to function as any sort of explanation is delegitimation" (p. 3).

Domestic propaganda efforts abound in the new media landscape (Shin et al., 2018), sometimes originating with inaccurate online rumors that resurface repeatedly to an extent that accurate rumors do not. On Twitter, such misinformation is often repackaged and brought back to life strategically by partisan news organizations, hence transforming *misinformation* into *disinformation* (Shin et al., 2018). Moreover, misinformation can spread "farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth" (Vosoughi et al., 2018, p. 1146; but see Guess et al., 2019 for work that shows that the sharing of misinformation during the 2016 election was rare). Recognition of the potential negative consequences of belief in misinformation and conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2019; Kuklinski et al., 2000) has also spurred research that explores the effectiveness of content aimed at combating misinformation, through either inoculation or "prebunking" (Lewandowsky & van der Linden, 2021), refutations from unlikely sources (Berinsky, 2015), or through correcting misinformation

once it has taken hold (e.g., Chan et al., 2017; Garrett et al., 2013; Nyhan et al., 2020; Ophir et al., 2020; Trujillo et al., 2021; Walter et al., 2020; Young et al., 2018)

8. The "*Effects*"

Lastly, we review scholarship that demonstrates how the changing media landscape necessitates a reimagining of the effects of political communication, focusing on message processing, cognitive theories of media effects (specifically, agenda-setting), and political polarization.

8.1. Message Processing

Dual-process models of information processing like the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo,1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980) continue to dominate cognitive psychological approaches to political communication processing and effects (for a review of this literature see Jerit & Kam, Chapter 17, this volume). Both models conceptualize individual motivation (see Chen et al., 1999) and ability as the factors that determine whether individuals are thoughtful and analytical as they process information, or if they are guided by heuristic cues, like source credibility (Sundar, 2008), attractiveness, or aesthetic features of the message. The notion that information processing is contingent on an individual's motivation and ability to engage thoughtfully with a message is crucial when considering the effects of political messages embedded within decentralized networked ecosystems that are *also* fragmented and micro-segmented.

Writing in 1995, Negroponte introduced the concepts of "push" and "pull" media to capture the distinction between old broadcast media that were "pushed" out to people versus digital media that people can select and "pull" toward themselves. "Being digital will change the nature of mass media from a process of pushing bits at people to one of allowing people (or their computers) to pull at them," he wrote(1995, p. 84). Building on the concepts of "push" and "pull" media, Holbert et al. (2010) explicate the implications of digital "pull" media for cognitive processing. They propose that the logics of old mass "push" media were likely to be met by audience members comparatively lower in motivation to process media content (because there was less opportunity for content selection), hence resulting in a greater likelihood of peripheral and heuristic message processing. But with fragmentation, choice, and interpersonally contextualized media experiences, users are guided by a motivation and ability to "pull" relevant, interesting, socially beneficial content toward them. Holbert et al. (2010) argue that this means media content is likely to be engaged with thoughtfully, or centrally, hence resulting in attitudes that are resistant and longer-lasting, or—if scrutiny results in counterargumentaion—less attitude change and more message resistance. These dynamics also complicate the historical distinction between media exposure and media attention (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Semetko et al., 1992), as the decision to select and "pull" content toward oneself in a high choice media environment might itself be indicative of interest in and attention to that content.

Since political messaging and news are now embedded within social networks, interpersonal dynamics ought to shape motivation and ability to thoughtfully engage with information content as well. In the context of public opinion toward an unfamiliar issue (nanotechnologies), Ho, Scheufele, and Corley (2013) found that people are mainly guided by heuristic cues when processing news, yet interpersonal communication changes these dynamics. The link between cognitive elaboration and public opinion toward nanotechnologies was contingent on interpersonal communication on the topic. In an examination of how people process and learn from information obtained through news versus through social contacts, Carlson (2019) found people learned more through news—except when the social contact was like-minded and knowledgeable, in which case individuals learned as much through the social contact as they did through news.

Looking at the effects of online comments on news story processing and engagement, message relevance (related to processing motivation) matters. User comments focused on a specific dimension (regionalism) of a news story shape audience recall and persuasion, especially for individuals for whom that dimension (regionalism) is especially salient (e.g., those highest in regional self-identity; Lee et al., 2017). Users' perceptions of the credibility of news stories are also affected by the valence of user comments, especially for users to whom the content is relevant (Winter et al., 2015). Yet, while social media users consider their friends more credible than news organizations in general, they still rate specific news articles as more credible when shared by a news organization than by a friend (Tandoc, 2019).

When it comes to political expression and information sharing decisions in online contexts, experimental work indicates that motivation to thoughtfully process a message might be overshadowed by reputational and social motivations (Winter, 2020). Winter (2020) found that users who anticipated writing on social media about a given news article were more likely to be motivated by impression management than by the quality of the arguments in the article itself. Whereas people express themselves politically online for social and persuasion-related reasons (see Eveland et al., 2011), the effects of political expression on cognitive elaboration and subsequent political participation is contingent on which motivations are guiding them, with persuasion motivations a bigger driver of elaboration and participation (compared to social motivations), mediated by news-seeking behaviors (Yoo et al., 2017).

Finally, the notion that exposure to "pull" media might reflect increased motivation to engage in cognitive elaboration and argument scrutiny may itself be complicated by factors related to the physical technologies themselves. Many users, especially younger users, engage in "second-screen" or "dual-screen" behaviors (see Gil de Zuniga & Liu, 2017), typically involving the use of a smartphone or tablet while (or immediately following) consuming other media, such as television or streaming content (see Nee & Barker, 2020). Such dual-screen activities during news or political debate viewing can increase cognitive load and reduce news processing, recall, and comprehension (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2014). However, research also points to emotional and social benefits of second-screen behaviors, including building feelings of community and learning the opinions of others (Nee & Barker, 2020), as well as political benefits, including seeking additional information, sharing information, and expanding knowledge in ways that fuel further political engagement (Chadwick et al., 2017; Vaccari et al., 2015).

Increased reliance on smartphones, tablets, and computers for news (see Shearer, 2021) has spurred scholars to study the impact of screen size and mobile news features on

cognitive processing, attention, and learning, with disappointing results. Dunaway et al. (2018) demonstrate that although shifts in news norms and production routines for mobile devices might increase access to news, they may also erode regular in-depth engagement with news stories. Their eye-tracking studies illustrate that even when users perceive that they are paying attention to news content on mobile devices, that attention is lower than it is on computers. Additional lab studies reveal that video news, when consumed on mobile devices, elicits lower psychophysiological responses than when consumed on larger screens, hence indicating less cognitive engagement with—and arousal to—news programming on mobile (Dunaway & Soroka, 2021).

8.2. Agenda-Setting Revisited. Again. And Again and Again

The decentralized control of political media, networked logics of digital spaces, and reduced gatekeeping authority of traditional news organizations all change the context within which cognitive theories of media effects occur. Take agenda-setting, for instance. Although we still see evidence of legacy news outlets shaping the agendas of the public (Tran, 2013), agenda-setting effects are far smaller among those who rely on alternative and online information sources (Shehata & Stromback, 2013). Feezell (2018) found that people had their agendas shaped by "incidentally encountered" stories on social media, with the strongest agenda-setting effects found among those lowest in political interest.

Meanwhile, the story-selection decisions of journalists and editors are themselves influenced by online and alternative content as well, as news organizations include stories and events that have circulated through social media and niche outlets (Jacobson, 2013). Gilardi et al. (2022) found that the news' agenda was set by the social media agenda of politicians and political organizations, and their agendas were, in turn, shaped by the news and by each other. This "intermedia agenda-setting" research (McCombs, 2004), exploring who is setting whose agenda, illustrates that although traditional news is still a dominant setter of the public's agenda (Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2017), Twitter—especially media-related Twitter—helps to set the agenda of mainstream news (Harder et al., 2017; Valenzuela et al., 2017), especially in the context of breaking news stories (Su & Borah, 2019). Additionally, partisan news outlets are driving the agendas of some traditional legacy news outlets (Vargo & Guo, 2017); by covering stories that serve their ideological perspective, they indirectly pressure mainstream outlets to cover those stories as well. These complex reciprocal agenda-setting dynamics have significant consequences, especially if the online content shaping the agenda of a news organization is *false*, something that is particularly likely for partisan news organizations (Guo & Vargo, 2020; Vargo et al., 2018).

Networked and intermedia dynamics permit bottom-up agenda-setting processes that may empower issue publics and activists (Luo, 2014; Su & Hu, 2020). With the public's agenda constructed through these complex relationships, the nature of Downs (1972) "issue attention cycle" has changed. The "alarmed-discovery" phase that used to catapult the public into action is no longer driven by the media's agenda alone, but also through interpersonal discussion and mobilization through social media (Zhang et al., 2017). Issue publics mobilized through "hashtag activism" help shape media and policy agendas, framing issues from racial justice (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015; Yang, 2016) to gendered terrorism attacks (Carter Olson, 2016) to sexual harassment (Xiong et al., 2019).

In the largely homogeneous, mass-audience-oriented media system of the 1970s, articulating a distinction between signaling to people what issues to pay attention to versus persuading people to think a certain way made sense. But by 2005, as that distinction was becoming obsolete, McCombs circled back again. "The media not only can be successful in telling us what to think about," he wrote, "they also can be successful in telling us *how to think about it*" (McCombs, 2004, p. 546). So-called attribute agenda-setting or second-level agenda-setting is similar to framing in that it involves elements of a news story being made more salient in ways that influence how audiences think about the issue (Entman, 1993). With fragmented partisan media outlets reporting on stories in ways that complement their networks' ideological leanings, attribute agenda-setting (Muddiman et al., 2014) and framing have become an essential part of contemporary media effects research. Recent studies illustrate how partisan news frames shape viewer perceptions of issues ranging from immigration (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2012) to climate change (Feldman et al. 2012), to COVID vaccines (Jamieson & Albarracin, 2020; but see also Trujillo & Motta, 2021 for data from 144 countries indicating that mere internet access itself is related to vaccine hesitancy) to election integrity and voter ID laws (Wilson & Brewer, 2013).

8.3. Political Polarization

The new media landscape is both interpersonal and identity-reinforcing by design. As discussed above, media and political elites and non-elites alike have incentives to create emotion-laden content (whether it be information, misinformation, or disinformation) that taps into the intended audience's increasingly aligned (Mason 2018) social and political identities. And audiences have a greater ability than ever before to selectively expose themselves to content that meets their informational, entertainment, identity-reinforcing, and/or attitude-reinforcing needs. This perfect storm of content production and content selection is what Slater (2007, 2015) calls a reinforcing media spiral—social identity drives media behaviors in ways that reinforce those identities. The "spiral" aspect of these relationships stems from the recursive dynamics between exposure and polarization that numerous scholars have highlighted (Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2010). Such studies point both to media contributing to polarization, and to polarization-fueling exposure to like-minded media. Given the central role that identity plays in political polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012), recent research has explored the impact of political communication in this new media environment on both attitude and affective polarization (see Tucker et al., 2018, for a comprehensive review of the role that misinformation plays in this process).

With regard to attitude polarization, Song and Boomgaarten (2017) use an agent-based modeling approach to demonstrate the role of interpersonal (dis)agreement in the reinforcing media spiral process, concluding that, "reciprocal dynamics between attitude polarization and attitudinally congruent partisan media exposure over time critically hinge on the attitudinal composition of one's discussion network and contextual variations in which such media exposure occurs" (p. 18). Feldman et al. (2014) use a two-wave panel study to test the reinforcing spirals model in the context of attitudes about global warming, finding evidence for an "ongoing, reinforcing cycle in which media use influences beliefs, and these beliefs then affect subsequent media use, which, in turn, reinforces beliefs" (p. 603). And Lee et al. (2014) find that the positive relationship between social network homogeneity

and attitude polarization is strongest among people who engage in political discussions more often than those who do not. These polarization effects are also moderated by the variation in affordances of different social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp; Yarachi et al., 2020). In her book, *Niche News*, Stroud (2011) demonstrates how partisan selective exposure, exacerbated by the proliferation of partisan media outlets, can simultaneously increase (not necessarily equitable) political participation *and* contribute to attitude polarization and fragmented interests. Pointing to the potential deleterious effects of this process for democracy, Stroud (2011, p. 10) argues that: "the onslaught of diverse partisan media outlets may undercut the development of common goals . . . Without a shared issue agenda, allocation of limited resources, such as time and money, become more difficult." Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) argue that some of the polarizing effects demonstrated in this literature are a methodological artifact—experiments that force exposure to pro- or anti-attitudinal content. In a series of innovative experiments, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) demonstrate that the polarizing effects of exposure to partisan media sources are limited by audience characteristics and the available content choices (i.e., whether people can opt out of news/political content altogether). Prior's (2013) work indicates that attitude polarization from selective media exposure is limited to those individuals who are highly politically interested and engaged, a subpopulation that is arguably more likely to wield political influence.

Recent research also points to the role of digital algorithms and curated information flows in exacerbating political divisions (Cho et al. 2020). In contrast, Munger and Phillips' (2022) analysis of right-wing political content on YouTube challenges the notion that algorithms themselves *cause* polarization and/or radicalization. They propose a supply-and-demand framework for analyzing the impact of political content on YouTube. Rather than the supply of right-wing YouTube content turning moderates into radicals (in a top-down, "hypodermic" way), the authors argue for the central role of content demand in this process: "the true threat posed by some right-wing content on YouTube is the capacity for creators to draw communities of committed viewers that mutually create and reinforce radical political canons, including some that promote hatred. There is a cap on how much news media a person can consume in a given day; YouTube has dramatically increased the number of distinct political communities which are able to hit that content cap" (p. 3). Although more research is needed to pin down the precise nature of the causal impact of algorithms, it is clear that dominance of algorithms and curated flows of information in the new media environment necessitate methodological advances that can distinguish the effects of *selective* exposure (demand), on the one hand, and *selected* (e.g., by algorithms) exposure (supply), on the other (Thorson et al., 2019; Thorson & Wells, 2016).

While attitude polarization concerns the shifting of policy positions toward partisan extremes, affective polarization refers to the rise in negative attitudes toward the opposing political party. In the latter context, emerging evidence highlights the role of media exposure, with subtle and contingent effects of media as a function of audience and content characteristics. For example, Druckman et al. (2019) find that the relationship between exposure to partisan incivility and positive affect toward, and trust in, the party of the source of the incivility is moderated by whether the content is pro- or counter-attitudinal; such exposure is depolarizing for in-party members, but polarizing for out-party members Work by Hasell and Weeks (2016) illustrates the implications of affective polarization beyond mere attitudes, finding that exposure to pro-attitudinal content increases anger toward the opposing party,

which, in turn, increases the likelihood of *sharing* the content. Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar (2017) find that access to broadband internet increases negative affect toward out-partisans, likely due to the increased exposure to partisan media that broadband affords. In her book, *Frenemies*, Settle (2018) proposes the END framework of social media interaction to conceptualize the political psychological process that exacerbates polarization in this new media landscape. "END refers to the characteristics of a subset of content that circulates in a social media ecosystem: a personalized, quantified blend of politically informative *expression*, *news*, and *discussion* seamlessly interwoven into a wider variety of socially informative content" (p. 50). Using this framework, Settle (2018) illuminates the ways in which even incidental exposure to and interaction with political (and, importantly, *nonpolitical*) content increases identity salience *and* has downstream effects on social inferences and affective polarization. All told, media are implicated in both attitudinal and affective polarization, in complex ways that are contingent on audience psychology and platform characteristics.

9. Advances in Political Communication Research Methods

The changing media landscape has also led to innovations in research methods from ones focused primarily on studying the unidirectional impact of "the"(singular) media on individuals (as individuals) to ones that enable researchers to study the networked, bidirectional, interpersonal, and fragmented nature of political communication causes and effects."

9.1. New Sampling Platforms

In recent years, scholars have increasingly relied on cheap online participant samples, including Amazon's Mturk and Prolific, often for experiments, panels, and real-time online experiments (Christenson & Glick, 2013). But reliance on these samples often presents problems related to sample representativeness that pose unique problems for political communication researchers. Mturk samples, for example, tend to lack older participants (see Brewer et al., 2016), and the few older participants they do include are far higher in "digital literacy" (Hargittai, 2002, 2005) than older non-Mturkers. Such self-selection presents generalizability problems when looking at political and communication dynamics that vary with age or digital literacy (Munger et al., 2021) , like the susceptibility to—or willingness to share—mis- and disinformation (Guess & Munger, 2020).

9.2. Digital Trace Data

Whereas new technologies gave rise to cheap sampling platforms like Mturk, they also ushered in an era of "big data" and "computational social science" in the field of political communication (Stroud & McGregor, 2018). Digital trace data from social media and other online behaviors has been used to study social networks and political behavior (Zuckerman,

2005), agenda-setting effects (Conway et al., 2015; Neuman et al., 2014), and information flows (Wells & Thorson, 2017). While the potential to study previously unmeasurable phenomena (Watts, 2011) is revolutionary for the field of political communication (Bode, 2018), scholars urge that the temptation to fetishize data over theory should be resisted (Gonzalez-Bailon, 2013). Gonzalez-Bailon reminds us, "Social science has the theoretical tradition to build a context for these data, point to the right mechanisms of the dynamics analyzed, and build credible interpretations—which is as important as having access to vast amounts of information and cutting-edge methods" (p. 159). Combinations of survey research with digital trace data can help center theory within such big data approaches (Choi, 2020; Stier et al., 2020a).

And although social media data accurately predict election outcomes and the results of empirical public opinion surveys (Ceron et al., 2014), recent studies of the users of various tech platforms suggest we should use caution as we consider who these people are and who they are not (Auxier & Anderson, 2021). For example, Pew reports that while 71% of 18–29-year-olds use Instagram and 42% use Twitter, among adults 65 and older, these numbers drop to 13% and 7%, respectively. There are also important racial and ethnic differences, with 46% of Hispanics reporting using What'sApp, compared to 23% of Black respondents, and 16% of White respondents. Twitter, in particular, is unique in ways that have implications for political communication research, as its users make less money, are less educated, and less likely to live in rural areas compared to non-users (Auxier & Anderson, 2021). Freelon urges scholars to take into account the technical design, terms of service, social context, and potential for misrepresentation introduced by particular platforms as they select digital trace data sources (Freelon, 2018). Through a nuanced understanding of the "patterns and dynamics" underlying trace data (Jungherr, 2015), scholars can contextualize findings in a transparent and meaningful way.

9.3. Automatic Coding Techniques

Advances in computational methods have also opened the doors for large-scale studies of the content of—and trends in—political information and media content (see Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). These include large-scale sentiment analysis to capture the extent of affect in news (Young & Soroka, 2012), the extent of news content on Twitter (Malik & Pfeffer, 2016), the misinformation ecosystem (Vargo et al., 2018), and the content of comments sections on news websites (Muddiman, 2018). As automated big-data approaches to the study of political information increase in number, we again find warnings from those seeking to keep theory at the center of political communication research. Reliance on automated techniques might lack a nuanced understanding of language and cultural symbols. They may also incentivize a "data-mining" approach, where trends are identified first, and post hoc explanations to account for those trends are concocted later. Such warnings include recommendations for the integration of crowd-coding (Haselmayer & Jenny, 2017) and manual coding into computer automated coding techniques (Lewis et al., 2013; Zamith & Lewis, 2015). Whereas some (Pal & Gonawela, 2017) make the case for "a return to small data" in content analysis with the integration of qualitative and interpretive approaches, others implore scholars to return to interpretive, mixed-methods approaches to the study of political communication as a whole to "build theory and analyze social life" (Karpf et al., 2015).

9.4. Measuring Exposure to Political Communication

The most important construct in the field of political communication research is also the most hotly contested: exposure to media content (see de Vreese & Neijens, 2016; Fishbein & Hornik, 2008). People are unreliable reporters of their own media use (see Parry et al., 2021; Prior, 2009b) and tend to overestimate their exposure to programming that they do, indeed, consume (Jurgens et al., 2020; Prior, 2009a). But, the validity of self-reported exposure measures also varies with question wording (see Smith & Neijens, 2011, for a review), with self-reported exposure to specific sources more reliable than general exposure measures (Scharkow, 2019). Self-reported measures are also complicated by the fact that users multitask with media (Foehr, 2006), including engaging in "second-screen" viewing (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2014).

Such issues raise the question of measuring exposure through more "passive" approaches through recording technologies, or digital trace data, as discussed above (de Vreese & Neijens, 2016). Yet, media exposure obtained through tracking devices that users agree to install on their devices is not unbiased either (Jurgens et al., 2020), both in terms of the kind of people who would allow themselves to be tracked in this way, and in the behavioral changes people might make because their media behaviors are being tracked. When comparing self-reported and logged smartphone use in their effects on aspects of social behavior and well-being, Jones-Jang et al. (2020) found that the self-reported measures underestimated the strength of these relationships, hence suggesting that the size of media effects *in reality* might be much larger than self-reports would suggest. Jerit et al. (2016) propose a hybrid "benchmark" approach to compare experimentally manipulated exposure to self-reported exposure, and then examine question-wording options to understand which produces the most "accurate" self-reported measure of exposure.

Media fragmentation increases individuals' opportunities to selectively choose—or avoid—exposure to media content. But on social media platforms like Facebook, exposure to politically relevant content—just incidentally through our newsfeeds—is shaped by our own behaviors, our friends' behaviors, and behaviors of news organizations, advertisers, and platform algorithms (Thorson & Wells, 2016). Our exposure behaviors, therefore, are more akin to "exposure opportunities" that are constrained by media context. Thorson et al. (2019) use survey data combined with respondents' individually downloaded Facebook data archives to mimic Facebook's understanding of users' political interest and to capture how Facebook had labeled individuals for advertisers (politically interested or not). Their results show that individuals "algorithmic identity, as categorized by Facebook, has an independent relationship to content exposure above and beyond user-reported levels of topical interest" (p. 193). If Facebook decides you are politically interested, you get more political content in your feed. If not, you do not. Such constraints in media choice must be factored into conceptualizations of "media exposure" and into theoretical models of effects.

10. Conclusion

We argue in this chapter that the conventional theories and processes at the core of the field of political communication are rooted in assumptions that no longer hold and contexts that

no longer exist. Today's media are decentralized, interpersonal, horizontal, and networked, a combination that has sweeping implications for the ways that individuals use, interact with, and are used *by* media. We focused here on two main changes in media experiences that upend assumptions of the field: (1) individuals today encounter socially and interpersonally contextualized messaging, and (2) this is occurring within a system predicated on the economics and logics of micro-segmentation. We assert that these are *qualitative* shifts. In other words, this is not simply a story about more outlets, a blurring of entertainment and information, or more partisan media content. Instead, this is a story about how shifts in fundamental aspects of message production, dissemination, consumption, and selection change the essence of the theoretical mechanisms at play within the field of political communication. And these new mechanisms are highly social, interpersonal, psychologically contingent, and mediated. They will require creative integration of political psychology— from the study of the drivers of message development and dissemination, to research on the nature of message selection, processing, and effects.

We use Lassewll's (1948) "who said what to whom, with what effect" model to illuminate the ways in which changes in the logics and economics of media and digital technologies disrupt traditional political communication theory. Political communication is no longer unidirectional and vertical. The *who* is now virtually everyone (and, with algorithms, perhaps even "everything"), upending the notion of "gatekeepers" and broadening our conceptualization of the channels of political communication. The *who* is also acting in a socially networked, group-identity-driven context in which the traditional message receivers (the *whom*) are interconnected with others who might also be message producers and message sharers (the old *who*). Meanwhile, the social media landscape provides these individuals with more opportunities to be active and effective *seekers* of messaging. Yet these seemingly empowering characteristics of digital technologies also facilitate and incentivize the strategic curation and packaging of content by message producers (at both the elite and mass level); message producers seeking to attract, engage, persuade, and mobilize their intended audience. Hence, today's *whom* has both *more choice* to select content that suits their needs and goals and, counterintuitively, *less agency* (due to strategic message development, algorithms, and curated information flows), leading to concerns about echo chambers and polarization, most notably on the margins where the effects of extremism are the most devastating.

Because the economics of media systems have adapted to the changing *who* and *whom*, the content of political communication (the *what*) has also changed in its composition, including the proliferation of hyper-emotional and uncivil content, increasing not only misinformation and disinformation, but also interpersonal political communication and socially networked political communication experiences. With these evolving *whos*, *whats*, and *whoms* come advances in our understanding of the complex mechanisms at play within and between our communication experiences (like the Reinforcing Media Spirals Model, or Curated Information Flows), which allow us to rethink the types of politically relevant *effects* we might find (e.g., message processing, agenda-setting, or political polarization).

Today's media ecosystem creates new and expanded opportunities for the role of political psychology within the field of political communication: in media selection behaviors, in the moderation and mediation of effects processes, and in the anticipation of individual psychology by message producers and disseminators. As these processes become known

to—and anticipated by—message producers, they inform the deliberate construction and curation of the very media content people encounter. This is what we mean when we say audience psychology is now "baked into" media products and messaging strategies. As such, the political communication of tomorrow must tackle thorny questions about what these changes in the information environment mean for the role that political psychology plays in the study of political communication. What are the effects of the fact that psychology is now baked into message construction and dissemination to attract audiences by exploiting socio-political identities and emotions? And how, and under what conditions, does the interpersonally networked media environment increase identity salience (e.g., through selective or incidental exposure), incentivize the production and sharing of mis- and disinformation, and further fragment and polarizes society, on the one hand, or (and) open up new avenues for political consciousness-raising, political participation, and collective action, on the other?

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CHAPTER 17

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS

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CHRISTOPHER M. FEDERICO AND ARIEL MALKA

1. IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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THE concept of ideology plays a central role in both normative and empirical understandings of political life. The importance of ideology derives in large part from the inherent complexity of politics, which invariably involves disputes about issues, values, and even understandings of reality in a variety of domains. Ideologies offer one way of managing this complexity. By providing leaders and citizens alike with comprehensive, organized frameworks for making sense of politics, ideologies supply political actors with ready-made judgments about the state of the world and many issues at once, while also furnishing an overarching narrative about *why* various political concerns fit together (Converse, 1964; Feldman, 2013; Lipset, 1960). Ideologies also explain and justify political reality. They provide rationales for why, and in what ways, the *status quo* should be preserved or changed (Bobbio, 1996; Jost et al., 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In short, ideologies confer structure, meaning, and cohesive rationales for action in a domain that would otherwise be intractably complicated.

Not surprisingly, ideologies especially animate the outlook of those most deeply invested in the business of politics. For example, ideologies have often received their most articulate and systematic expression in the work of political philosophers, pundits, and intellectuals, who have offered competing analyses of how and why societies function and how they should ideally be organized (Heywood, 2007; Laponce, 1981; Noel, 2014). Closer to the day-to-day conduct of political affairs, political parties and their leaders ("elites" in the argot of political science) rely on ideological abstractions to organize their platforms and structure political competition (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Lijphart, 1990; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004). Though the ideological work of party officials may not be as ornate as that of philosophers, it plays an essential role in lending coherence to party programs that span what would otherwise be hard-to-connect issue domains (Federico, 2021). Ideologies, in the practical partisan sense, allow a simpler choice between

a manageable number of—oftentimes, two—"crowning postures," rather than leaving citizens to make a multitude of judgments about specific issues (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; see also Downs, 1957).

Though the normative significance of ideology and its importance to elite political discourse is clear, social scientists have disagreed about whether ideology plays a meaningful role in organizing the preferences of citizens in the mass public. Much of this disagreement stems from differences in opinion about what, precisely, it means to make use of ideology in one's political reasoning and behavior. For example, abundant evidence suggests that the average citizen does not consistently apply ideological principles in everyday political judgments or behavior, and in many cases citizens do not hold the kind of stable political preferences that ideology would imply (Converse, 1964, 2000; Federico, 2020; Kalmoe, 2020; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). But this characterization of the mass public as "innocent of ideology" has not gone uncontested. Other scholars, for example, argue that the apparent absence of ideological sophistication among everyday citizens is an artifact of poor measurement (e.g., Achen, 1975). Others note that diverse attitudes may be functionally interconnected not by consistent application of abstract principles, but by service to a common set of underlying psychological motives (e.g., Jost, 2006). Still others emphasize identity processes as the mechanism that provides structural coherence to ideological outlooks among ordinary people (e.g., Federico & Malka, 2018).

Though thinkers from a variety of disciplines have contributed useful analyses of ideology as a phenomenon (Heywood, 2007; Laponce, 1981), political psychology offers a unique, important perspective on the foundations, functions, and sweep of ideologies. In particular, political psychology provides crucial insights about how political preferences are ideologically organized and what processes give rise to the kinds of ideological belief systems we observe in various political contexts. Moreover, research on the psychological bases of ideology has shed light on the psychological needs, traits, and motives that attract individuals to one ideology or another—and how the relationships between psychological variables and political preferences vary across issue domains, persons, and situations.

In this chapter, we provide a broad overview of research on the political psychology of ideological belief systems. In the first section, we review work on the nature, structure, and psychological foundations of ideology. We begin by addressing basic questions of how to define and conceptualize ideology, and how it might be differentiated from other kinds of political orientations. We then discuss the most important ideological construct examined by political psychologists: the left-right continuum (Jost et al., 2009, 2013). While noting the significance of the left-right dimension, we discuss ways in which its role in shaping preferences in mass publics is conditional and review a growing body of evidence that ideology may be multidimensional rather than unidimensional in its psychological structure. Next, we cover research on the dispositional predictors of ideology, focusing on the core finding that individuals who score high (versus low) on measures of psychological rigidity and threat sensitivity tend to hold right-wing (versus left-wing) preferences within important political domains. We also discuss the boundary conditions of the dispositional model, noting that the relationship between psychological variables and political preferences is moderated to a substantial extent, and in theoretically coherent ways, by factors such as issue domain, political engagement, and national context. We then review research suggesting that individuals on both the left and right may rigidly defend their convictions,

despite the tendency for conservative identifiers to score higher on dispositional indices of psychological rigidity.

In the second section of the chapter, we review theory and evidence regarding the social nature of ideology, with a particular focus on the social mechanisms that hold various elements of ideological belief systems together. We discuss various core social motives that lead people to adopt and act in accordance with different ideological identities and belief systems, including motives for bonding and intimacy with close others, motives to act in accordance with politically relevant social identities, and motives to defer to cues provided by trusted leaders. We also describe how the force provided by these social motives may encourage polarization and the sorting of electorates into ideologically disparate partisan camps. In turn, in the third section of the chapter, we discuss how ideological polarization and sorting may have feedback effects on other social divides and on psychological dispositions themselves. This is followed by the fifth section, in which we describe the implications of the ideological phenomena reviewed in this chapter for contemporary efforts to understand challenges to the integrity of democratic institutions.

In the final section, we conclude by summarizing and highlighting two key take-home messages of our review. The first is that links between psychological attributes and subsets of ideological attitudes sometimes appear to be organic and directly functional but other times appear to be conditional on how the relevant attitudes are packaged with other attitudes into socially constructed ideologies (Federico & Malka, 2018). Attention to this matter is important for understanding the psychological organization and societal implications of ideology. Second, we conclude that the social motives that give ideology its "absorptive" power—its ability to draw substantively diverse attitudes into ideological alignment—are also likely, within polarized contexts, to induce people to adopt non-political identities and self-perceptions that are congruent with ideological stereotypes (Bakker et al., 2021; Boston et al., 2018; Egan, 2020; Margolis, 2018a). How this phenomenon might perpetuate and aggravate polarization, and ultimately threaten democratic stability, is an important matter for researchers to attend to.

2. The Nature, Structure, and Motivational Underpinnings of Ideology

2.1. What Is Ideology?

We begin with a simple definitional question: what is ideology? Social scientists have pondered this question extensively, and in some ways there are as many definitions as there are scholars. However, a few key definitions cover the most important points (see Jost et al., 2009, p. 309). For example, political scientists Robert Erikson and Kent Tedin (2003) define ideology as a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (p. 64). More elaborately, Denzau and North (1994/2000) describe ideologies as "mental models" that "provide an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured" (p. 24). In an effort at synthesis, Federico (2020)

identifies three crucial defining features that are common to most definitions of ideology that political psychologists rely on: (1) ideologies are *belief systems* that tie an ideological identity together with specific attitudes, beliefs, and values in a functionally interdependent way across multiple domains (e.g., Brandt & Sleegers, 2021); (2) ideologies are *socially shared* among members of a group and reflect the life circumstances of people living in a specific social context; and (3) ideologies are *both descriptive and prescriptive*, in that they explain why society *is the way it is* and make normative statements about what society *should* ideally be like.

Though most conceptualizations of ideology share these basic features, they sometimes differ in the extent to which they approach ideology from a more functional perspective versus a "critical" one (Jost et al., 2009, 2013). The functional perspective usually takes a "value-neutral" tone, focusing on the organizational and interpretive role of political belief systems (e.g., Converse, 1964; Knight, 1999; see also Brandt & Sleegers, 2021). This approach derives variously from sociological functionalism and from formal treatments of ideology in political science that emphasize the role of ideology in simplifying political choices and systems of party competition (e.g., Downs, 1957; Hinich & Munger, 1994; see also Lipset, 1960; Lijphart, 1990; Benoit & Laver, 2006; Lipset & Rokken, 1967). In contrast, the critical perspective focuses more on the "system-justifying" role of ideologies—that is, on how ideologies may hide, excuse, or legitimize oppressive social arrangements. This approach descends in part from the classical Marxist view of ideology, which observed "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (Marx & Engels, 1846/1970). Continuing in this vein, later theorists spoke similarly of ideology as a kind of "cultural hegemony" (Gramsci, 1971) or as "systematically distorted communication" (Habermas, 1989). In contemporary political psychology, the critical perspective is incorporated most strongly into system justification theory (Jost, 2020) and social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which argue that members of subordinate social groups will be less likely to challenge systems of stratification or pursue the interest of their own group if they endorse beliefs suggesting that the unequal status quo is "fair" or morally justified. Often, the ideologies described by these models are narrower in nature than the broad worldviews that the belief systems perspective focuses on (e.g., the Protestant work ethic as a justification for economic inequality, as opposed to a broader conservative ideology covering both economics and other domains).

The core claims of these two perspectives on ideology do not mutually exclude each other; ideologies can be both belief systems *and* tools for justifying existing states of affairs. Though we touch on both treatments of ideology in this chapter, we focus on ideologies as generalized, interlinked belief systems (e.g., Converse, 1964, 2000; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). We do so in part to differentiate ideologies from other attitudes, values, and beliefs that may justify the status quo in a specific fashion but do not tie together positions across multiple issue domains in an interlocking way. But more importantly, we do so in order to clearly differentiate belief systems per se from the underlying psychological motives or institutional or group-interest functions that belief systems might sometimes serve. In other words, we do not make any restrictive assumption that a belief system only counts as "ideology" if it serves a system- or group-interest-justifying purpose.

Ideologies, then, are broad overarching structures comprised of multiple idea-elements that are socially shared and anchored in identity. Political psychologists have in turn identified several core components of these structures, ranging from issue positions at

the most concrete level to higher-order values and principles at the most abstract level (Feldman, 2013; Goren, 2012; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985). A few key distinctions are especially important here. First, public-opinion research frequently distinguishes between ideology in the "symbolic" or "philosophical" sense and ideology in the "operational" sense (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Free & Cantril, 1967; Stimson, 2004). Symbolic ideology refers to identification with a particular ideological category (e.g., conservative or liberal; Ellis & Stimson, 2012), whereas philosophical ideology refers to an abstract posture regarding social life (e.g., a libertarian preference for smaller government or a conservative preference for a more cautious orientation toward social change; Free & Cantril, 1967). In contrast, operational ideology refers to the general tilt of one's issue preferences, averaging across specific policy choices (e.g., whether one prefers more or less government intervention in the economy across various issues; Stimson, 2004). Importantly, these facets of ideology do not always hang together. For example, in the aggregate, Americans are simultaneously more likely to identify symbolically as "conservatives" but operationally prefer the "liberal" option of greater government spending across issues; indeed, a large proportion of individual citizens who identify as conservatives also favor greater spending (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; see also Gidron, 2022). Moreover, not all of these facets are equally central to individuals' belief systems. In this respect, the symbolic components of ideology (e.g., ideological identifications) are more strongly linked than operational issue positions with a larger number of belief-system elements and with actual voting behavior (e.g., Brandt et al., 2019; Brandt & Sleegers, 2021).

Second, researchers have distinguished between the *discursive superstructure* and *motivational substructure* of ideologies (Jost et al., 2009; see also Federico, 2021; Federico & Malka, 2018). The discursive superstructure of an ideology is its ideational content, consisting of the specific issue attitudes, values, and beliefs that go along with an ideological identity in a particular political context; it is the symbolic and positional content of an ideology. The motivational substructure of an ideology is the set of psychological motives and characteristics that attract people to one ideological posture or another (e.g., to the political left versus the political right). These include traits that reliably incline people to the left or right in particular domains; for instance, as we note in more detail below, strong needs for security and certainty tend to predict conservative positions in several (but not all) issue domains and contexts (e.g., Jost et al., 2009). In general, discursive superstructures are socially constructed networks of commitments, forged most strongly by the creative work of intellectuals and political elites (Converse, 1964; Noel, 2014). As such, they vary from one context to the next. The psychological variables that comprise the motivational substructure are more universal. For example, they include personality traits that are relatively similar across human populations (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014; Mondak, 2010). That said, the dispositions that make up the motivational substructure vary in their relationship with ideological preferences as a function of issue domain, political engagement, and contextual factors, as we shall see. For example, while those high (versus low) in needs for certainty are more attracted to conservative (versus liberal) positions on several issues, this relationship breaks down when the certainty-providing meaning of these conservative positions is not clear (e.g., Johnston et al., 2017).

2.2. A Core Ideological Construct: The Left-Right Dimension

One of the most important questions addressed by political psychologists interested in belief systems is how best to characterize individual differences in ideology. Though the nature of ideological variation is a topic of much debate (see Carmines & D'Amico, 2015; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Lewis, 2019), the most common assumption among researchers is that ideology varies on a unidimensional, left-right basis (Jost, 2006; see also Federico, 2020). Substantively, this schema is thought by many to contrast belief systems characterized by openness to social change and a preference for greater equality on the left and by preferences for stability and hierarchy on the right (Jost et al., 2009, 2013; Lipset, 1960). This characterization of ideology has its roots in the specifics of European history: indeed, the terms "left" and "right" refer back to the seating locations of radicals and conservatives in the French National Assembly in the late 18th century (Bobbio, 1996).

The left-right division plays a dominant role in the organization of political debate in many cultures (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Knight, 1999; McCarty et al., 2006), and it has also been the focus of most behavioral and psychological research on the nature and foundations of ideological affinity (Federico, 2020). The left-right distinction is especially relevant to how governing elites and other opinion leaders organize and explain their preferences and decisions (Campbell et al., 1960; McCarty et al., 2006; Noel, 2014). Similarly, the most engaged segments of the mass public are more likely to rely on the left-right schema to organize their preferences and perceptions (Converse, 1964; Kalmoe, 2020; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). The practical importance of the left-right dimension is not surprising. A venerable line of formal analysis in political science has consistently noted that reliance on a single ideological dimension has the salutary property of simplifying political choices and making communication and understanding of politics more manageable in the face of coordination problems and human cognitive limitations (Downs, 1957; Hinich & Munger, 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991). By collapsing multiple dimensions of political conflict (spread across a potentially large number of issues) into a single axis of disagreement, left-right competition should be especially helpful to those most involved in the operational work of politics. In other words, it may be institutionally adaptive.

Though functional, the left-right distinction is contingent and fluid (Federico & Malka, 2018). Indeed, there is substantial debate about the relative importance of a durable substantive core versus alterable coalition-justifying elements to left-right ideology (Jost, 2006; Federico & Malka, 2018; Lewis, 2019; Morgan & Wisneski, 2017; Noel, 2014). Some work emphasizes the seemingly durable aspects of left-versus right ideology. In particular, the familiar divide between a preference for equality and an inclination to seek change (on the left) versus favoring hierarchy and the status quo (on the right) is arguably the most consistent symbolic axis of left-right competition—a pattern rooted in the fact that hierarchical social arrangements (whether aristocratic or capitalistic) have historically anchored the status quo in many societies (Bobbio, 1996; Federico, 2020; Jost, 2009; Jost et al., 2009; Lipset, 1960; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). In contrast, other symbolic and programmatic differences between the left and right show greater variance across societies and time periods, making it unwise to assume that the content of the left-right divide is a fact of nature (see Lewis, 2019; see also Federico & Malka, 2018). Policy positions, value emphases, and ideological rhetoric change over time as a function of elite coalition-building and new challenges (Noel, 2014).

For example, in debates over health care policy in the United States, support for an individual mandate to purchase health insurance shifted from being a "conservative" position to a "liberal" one, as conservatives adjusted their stance on the basis of challenges offered to the status quo by political actors on the left (Johnston et al., 2017). Similarly, center-right parties in advanced democracies have strategically shifted in their attitudes toward democracy, regulation of the free market, and other matters over time in order to best protect the interests of elite groups amid changing circumstances (Gidron & Ziblatt, 2019). Within the United States, the adjustment of "conservatism" to the rise of Donald Trump is an object lesson in the flexibility with which core ideological constructs are popularly defined (Hopkins & Noel, 2022; Lewis, 2019).

With both its durable and its malleable components, the left-right dimension has clearly been central to the way elite ideological differences have been structured in many places and times. However, its role in belief-system structure within mass publics is more complicated and contested (Converse, 1964; Kalmoe, 2020; Kinder, 2006; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; see also Federico & Malka, 2018). As studies of public opinion from a variety of advanced democracies over multiple decades suggest, many citizens (1) do not fully understand the conceptual distinction between left and right, (2) do not spontaneously use the left-right schema to describe political actors and events, and (3) do not hold ideologically-constrained positions across issues (Baldassari & Gelman, 2008; Converse, 1964; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). Moreover, as Philip Converse (1964) famously found, many citizens in the 1950s showed low levels of attitude stability on specific issues, suggesting that their opinions were effectively "non-attitudes" that lack a broader ideological anchor. Of course, the extent and kind of ideological structuring varies across contexts and time periods (Baldassari & Goldberg, 2014; Levendusky, 2009; Malka et al., 2019). Moreover, researchers have argued that mass publics may show greater evidence of stable, ideologically structured attitudes once random error in survey measures is statistically accounted for (Achen, 1975; Ansolabehere et al., 2008; Erikson, 1979; Hill & Kriesi, 2001; Judd & Milburn, 1980). Regardless, it is clear that left-right belief system structure in mass publics is found primarily among the stratum of citizens who are most knowledgeable of and interested in political affairs (Converse, 1964; Federico, 2021; Kalmoe, 2020; Sniderman et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992). Compared to their less-engaged compatriots, these individuals are more likely to have received and accepted elite ideological signals about "what goes with what" (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; see also Freeder et al., 2019; Groenendyk et al., 2020). Moreover, the traditional left-right system of belief organization is relatively uncommon globally, especially outside "WEIRD" (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) nations (Malka et al., 2019; Marks et al., 2006; see also Federico, 2021). For example, using World Values Survey data collected in 90 nations, Malka and his colleagues find that the modal societal pattern is for conservative cultural preferences to be associated with left-leaning (rather than right-leaning market-oriented) economic preferences (Malka et al., 2019).

Taken together, these findings suggest that the left-right schema is an important basis for ideological variation, but also one whose reach is limited in significant ways (Morgan & Wisneski, 2017). In this respect, the division between left and right, while common, is not a fact of nature. It is not fixed—and neither are its relationships with other attitudes, identities, and psychological traits, a point we will return to below. The set of ideological packages available in a given society are social constructions. In large part, they reflect the discursive work of parties and their leaders, who assemble different issue positions and values into

the competing ideological frameworks that citizens choose from (Federico & Malka, 2018; Malka & Soto, 2015; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004); and intellectuals and pundits, who provide philosophical justifications for the ideological commitments that unify various political coalitions (Noel, 2014). As Converse (1964) noted long ago, ideologies most commonly derive their coherence from social cues provided by opinion leaders, rather than emerging solely on the basis of formal logic or bottom-up psychological motivations. This appears to be the case for the left-right schema as well, whose organization reflects the ways in which political elites have structured political competition in modern Western democracies (Federico & Malka, 2018; Jost, 2006).

2.3. Beyond the Left-Right Dimension: Multidimensional Conceptions of Ideology

Noting limits to the left-right dimension's explanatory reach, other perspectives on ideological variation suggest the existence of multiple dimensions of ideology (Federico, 2021; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Malka et al., 2019). Though there are analyses that suggest higher numbers of ideological dimensions (Carmines et al., 2012; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Park, 2018), the most common multidimensional approach to ideology posits the existence of two ideological dimensions, which emerge in a bottom-up fashion in factor-analytic examinations of the structure of sociopolitical attitudes. The way these dimensions are defined and interpreted varies across disciplines. Within psychology, the first dimension has tended to broadly correspond with preferences for more versus less equality, whereas the second has corresponded with preferences for cultural openness and autonomy versus tradition, order, and uniformity (Duckitt, 2001; Federico, 2021; Schwartz, 1992). In a sense, this bidimensional model disaggregates the two facets of ideological difference that the unidimensional model joins together (i.e., orientations toward equality and openness to change versus hierarchy and tradition; Jost, 2009) and argues that they vary in the extent to which they consistently overlap (Federico & Malka, 2018). Evidence for this bidimensional structure can be found across a variety of domains, most notably in the organization of value preferences and worldviews (e.g., Braithwaite, 1997; Duckitt, 2001; Schwartz, 1992; Stangor & Leary, 2006).

Within political science, these dimensions often deal with variation in the types of policy preferences queried in public opinion surveys. In particular, factor analyses of such survey data find that economic preferences (i.e., over government intervention in the economy and support for social welfare) and sociocultural preferences (i.e., over religion, multiculturalism, and traditional values) reliably fall on different factors (e.g., Carmines et al., 2012; Evans et al., 1996; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Fleishman, 1988; Knoke, 1979; Shafer & Claggett, 1995; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). Consistent with the idea that these two-dimensional models are, to a degree, parallel, research suggests that attitudes toward economic issues relate more strongly to the egalitarianism value dimension, while attitudes toward sociocultural issues relate more strongly to the openness versus tradition value dimension (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; see also Federico, 2021, Johnston et al., 2017, for reviews).[1]

Duckitt and colleagues' dual-process model of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) provides perhaps the most systematic account of how and why

attitudes and beliefs can be characterized using two dimensions. The dual-process model argues that the equality-inequality and openness-tradition dimensions can be captured respectively by *social dominance orientation* (SDO, a general preference for group-based hierarchy; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and *right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA, an inclination toward deference to ingroup authorities, conventionalism, and hostility toward outsiders and norm-violators; Altemeyer, 1998). In turn, the model suggests that these two "ideological attitude systems" are rooted in distinct worldviews and traits. Whereas the SDO/equality dimension rests on a view of the world as competitive and ruthless and on toughminded personality traits, the RWA/tradition dimension rests on a view of the world as dangerous and conformity-related traits (Duckitt, 2001). Put another way, the dual-process approach suggests that the SDO dimension reflects competitive, dominance-oriented motives, and that the RWA dimension reflects needs for security, safety, and certainty.

Though distinct, these two dimensions do overlap somewhat—albeit to a varying extent across political environments and individuals (Federico, 2020, 2021; Petersen, 2015; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). In some cases, the two dimensions are constrained in the usual "left-right" way, such that preferences for equality are aligned with cultural openness and preferences for hierarchy are aligned with support for tradition and the status quo. In other cases, they are not. As Federico and Malka (2018) note, the packaging of the two dimensions depends in large part on a polity's history and on how its elites tie together concerns from different political domains. The standard, "matched" left-right alignment of the two dimensions prevails in nations that are more economically developed, secularized, and culturally liberal, and in nations that were not part of the former communist bloc (Malka et al., 2014, 2019). In these countries, elites have tended to pair egalitarian economic positions with more culturally liberal social positions. However, outside of this set of nations, it is actually more common for egalitarianism and left-wing economic views to be slightly positively correlated with traditionalism and conservative cultural views (or vice versa)—a pattern Malka, Lelkes, and Soto (2019) refer to as the "protection versus freedom" belief-system organization.

However, even within nations where egalitarianism is aligned with cultural openness and left-wing (versus right-wing) economic positions are aligned with left-wing (versus right-wing) cultural positions, left-right consistency is not found to the same extent among all citizens. Though left-right packaging predominates among political elites and activists in these countries (Converse, 1964; Jennings, 1992), only those segments of the mass public that are attentive to signals from political elites about what goes with what show clear left-right alignment across dimensions and issue domains (Federico, 2021; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Malka et al., 2019). In sum, social and historical context—and elite opinion leadership in particular—play a key role in determining how the two core dimensions of ideological variation align with one another.

2.4. The Dispositional Bases of Ideology

Besides examining the nature of ideological differences, political psychologists have also taken a perennial interest in the dispositional bases of ideological affinity—that is, the psychological motives and characteristics that predict ideological orientations (Jost et al., 2003, 2009, 2013; see also Federico & Malka, 2018). Though the precursors of this approach go

back as far as classical sociology in the modern era (e.g., Weber, 1948; see also Gerth & Mills, 1953; Lasswell, 1948), the key impetus for work in this area goes back to post-war efforts to identify the antecedents of support for fascist ideology—most notably, early work on the authoritarian personality (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik; Levinson & Sanford, 1950; see also Allport, 1954). Subsequently, this approach was extended in order to make sense of the dispositional antecedents of extremism in general (Eysenck, 1954; Lipset, 1960; Rokeach, 1960) and "normal" left-right variation of the non-totalitarian sort (McClosky, 1958; Tomkins, 1963; Wilson, 1973).

Though work on the dispositional roots of ideology went out of style for some time, it was revived shortly after the turn of the century due in no small part to the work of social psychologist John Jost and his colleagues (Jost, 2009; Jost et al., 2003, 2009). The main conclusion that has been drawn from this contemporary body of work is that variables reflecting high (versus low) levels of psychological rigidity and threat sensitivity predict right-wing (versus left-wing) ideological preferences (Federico, 2021; Jost et al., 2009). This conclusion is sometimes characterized as the "rigidity of the right" perspective (Federico, 2021; Malka et al., 2017). An exhaustive review of the relevant literature would require a chapter in and of itself, so we refer the reader to canonical reviews of research on this topic (e.g., Federico & Malka, 2018; Jost et al., 2003, 2009, 2013; Jost, 2017) and provide only a brief summary of evidence and ongoing debates here.

First of all, one of the most examined dispositional predictors of political ideology is *authoritarianism* or the *authoritarian predisposition*, which reflects individual differences in deference to group authority and ingroup norms (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Stenner, 2005). Individuals high in authoritarianism have stronger needs for security and are more sensitive to threat (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et al., 1999; Lavine et al., 2002). As such, those high (versus low) in authoritarianism tend to prefer conservative (versus liberal) positions on cultural matters and tend to identify as politically conservative, perhaps to avoid the risks associated with deviation from the status quo (Federico et al., 2011; Federico et al., 2009; Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Jost et al., 2009). Feldman and Weber (Chapter 20, this volume) review this literature.

Another variable commonly linked to ideological differences is the *need for cognitive closure* (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2006), a tendency to avoid uncertainty by "seizing" more on available information as quickly as possible to draw conclusions and by "freezing" on those conclusions even in the face of a changed information environment. Research consistently suggests that individuals high (versus low) in need for closure are more likely to hold conservative political identities and cultural issue preferences (Federico et al., 2012; Federico & Goren, 2009; Jost et al., 2003, 2009; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Van Hiel et al., 2004; Van Hiel et al., 2010; see also Ruisch & Stern, 2021). Related findings suggest links between cognitive flexibility and analytic and exploratory thinking styles, on one hand, and liberal political identity and (mostly cultural) stances, on the other (e.g., Jost et al., 2017a; Pennycook et al., 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2021; see also Ruisch et al., 2020; Shook & Fazio, 2009).

Similar patterns arise in studies of personality, values, and morality. With respect to personality, studies using the five-factor model of personality (McCrae, 1996) consistently find that individuals high in openness to experience are more likely to hold liberal identifications and liberal preferences on many issues, whereas those high in conscientiousness are more

likely to hold conservative identifications and issue preferences (e.g., Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume; Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2010, 2011; McCrae, 1996; Mondak, 2010; for analogous results using measures of open-minded thinking, see Pennycook et al., 2020). Given the conceptual content of these traits, these patterns are consistent with the assumptions of the rigidity-of-the-right model: openness implies stronger tolerance of uncertainty and risk, whereas conscientiousness implies an emphasis on duty and restraint (McCrae & Costa, 2003).

With respect to values, work using Schwartz's (1992) model of human values finds that a preference for security-providing *conservation values* (i.e., tradition, conformity, and security) over exploration-oriented *openness values* is reliably associated with right-wing (versus) left-wing political identifications and cultural preferences (i.e., stimulation and self-direction; Caprara et al., 2006; Goren, 2012; Malka et al., 2014; Schwartz, 1992, 2007; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Finally, with respect to morality, research relying on moral foundations theory finds that individuals who place greater importance on *binding* moral concerns linked to group loyalty, deference to authority, and moral purity—concerns linked to shoring up communal social ties in the face of insecurity and danger—are more likely to hold conservative political identities and cultural attitudes (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Koleva et al., 2012; see also Federico et al., 2013; Weber & Federico, 2013).

Large-scale meta-analytic studies conducted in recent years provide evidence consistent with these basic patterns, with some caveats that we will return to below. For example, Jost, Stern, Rule, and Sterling (2017b) examined data from 134 studies and found "small-to-moderate" relationships between variables linked to the salience of fear and threat and support for several right-wing policies, parties, and leaders. Similarly, Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2017a) aggregated results from 181 samples including 133,796 participants and observed significant relationships (1) between measures of needs for structure and order, need for closure, intolerance of ambiguity, rigidity, and dogmatism and several right-wing preferences, and (2) between measures of integrative complexity, analytic thinking, need for cognition, and uncertainty tolerance and several liberal preferences.

Recent research using methods other than meta-analysis finds roughly similar patterns. For instance, Zmigrod and her colleagues (2021) used a data-driven approach based on Bayesian and drift-diffusion modeling techniques to map relationships between cognitive and personality dimensions and ideology.[2] In addition to finding that cognitive and personality variables consistently had stronger relationships with ideology than demographics did, they also found that conservative attitudes were associated with greater caution in perceptual decision-making and that cultural conservatism was linked with information-processing styles that were less flexible, complex, and reliant on working memory and with lower levels of risk-taking and greater risk perception.

When evaluating evidence for the rigidity-of-the-right model, there are nevertheless some recurring methodological and interpretive issues whose implications must be considered. Malka, Lelkes, and Holzer (2017) documented three of these: content overlap between psychological and political measures, insufficient attention to differences in the psychological correlates of cultural and economic political attitudes, and lack of attention to the role of political information environment in conditioning links between psychological variables and political attitudes. Occurrences of these issues are too numerous to document comprehensively here (see Malka et al., 2017), but it will suffice to provide a few examples. Research on the salience of fear and threat frequently uses measures of these constructs

that are overtly politicized, such as threat of terrorism and loss of white majority status (Jost et al., 2017b). When attention is paid to the specifically politicized nature of different threats, results do not show a directionally consistent relationship between threats and political orientation (see Brandt et al., 2021; Crawford, 2017; Hatemi & McDermott, 2020). In addition, the rigidity-of-the-right model often fails to account for why psychological variables that supposedly predict a broad-based conservative orientation often fail to predict right-wing positions in the economic domain, which is recognized by political scientists as central to left-right-differences in most advanced democracies (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Johnston et al., 2017; Malka et al., 2014). Finally, the strength and even direction of relationships between psychological attributes and political attitudes vary considerably across factors that serve as proxies for exposure to different political information environments (Federico & Malka, 2018). Below we discuss research on moderators of disposition-politics links that is attuned to these issues.

2.5. Moderators of the Relationship Between Dispositions and Ideological Preferences

Though the relationship between high (versus low) psychological rigidity and threat sensitivity and many right-leaning (versus left-leaning) preferences is well established at this point, evidence also increasingly suggests that these relationships are moderated by a number of individual and contextual factors, in predictable and theoretically coherent ways. Like the literature on dispositional variables and ideology itself, this body of work is extensive (see Federico, 2021; and Federico & Malka, 2018, for more exhaustive reviews). Below, we cover the key types of moderators that have been examined.

Issue domain. Perhaps the most important moderator is the type of political issue measured in a given analysis. As noted previously, political preferences are usefully described in terms of a two-dimensional structure corresponding in the policy realm to economic issues and sociocultural issues (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). In general, variables indicative of psychological rigidity and threat sensitivity more strongly predict ideological conservatism in the sociocultural domain than the economic domain; relationships between these dispositions and economic preferences are weak and inconsistently signed (Federico et al., 2014; Federico & Malka, 2018; Johnston et al., 2017; Malka & Soto, 2015; see also Costello & Lilienfeld, 2020). This pattern is found for authoritarianism (Cizmar et al. 2014; Feldman & Johnston, 2014), need for closure (Chirumbolo et al., 2004; et al.; Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003; Van Hiel et al., 2004; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016), and endorsement of conservation versus openness values (Duckitt, 2001; Duriez et al., 2005; Malka et al., 2014). It also shows up for Conscientiousness and Openness from the Big Five, though less consistently (Carney et al., 2008; Mondak, 2010; but see Clifford et al., 2015).[3]

The asymmetry likely reflects the "harder" nature of economic issues, which are not as easy to symbolically connect with dispositional preferences for security, certainty, and structure as issues like abortion, LGBT rights, and immigration (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Johnston et al., 2017; Johnston & Wronski, 2015; Malka & Soto, 2015). It may also reflect the unique dynamics of opinion formation in the economic sphere, where indices of psychological rigidity and threat sensitivity relate to right-wing economic preferences in

opposite directions among those low and high in political engagement (leading the effects to cancel out at the full-sample level; Federico & Malka, 2018). Finally, other research suggests motives other than those related to needs for security and certainty may matter in the economic domain. For example, Duckitt's (2001) dual-process model of ideology suggests that traits associated with competitiveness, ruthlessness, and tough-mindedness predict right-wing economic preferences (see also Bakker, 2017; Bardeen & Michel, 2019; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Gerber et al., 2010; Kettle & Salerno, 2017).

Exposure to elite discourse. Factors governing citizen exposure to elite political discussion also moderate the relationship between psychological variables and ideological preferences. As we have argued, ideologies are socially constructed, and different packages of political positions acquire their symbolic meaning largely through the creative work of political elites operating within the constraints imposed by the history and conditions of a particular society (Noel, 2014; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004; Federico & Malka, 2018). Consistent with the idea that society-level discursive and historical factors condition the relationship between dispositions and ideological affinity, research suggests that variables like a preference for conservation over openness values (Malka et al., 2014, 2019; Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2014; Thorisdottir et al. 2007), need for closure (Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003), and low Openness to Experience (Roets et al., 2014) are either unrelated to ideology or associated with stronger preferences for the left in former communist nations, where the left is associated with authoritarianism and perceived as representing an orderly past. Moreover, dispositional needs for security and certainty are more strongly related to ideological conservatism in nations at higher levels of development, where social liberalization has occurred and sociocultural divides over traditional values have emerged and become part of the broader left-right divide (Federico & Malka, 2018; Malka et al., 2014, 2019; see also Benoit & Laver, 2006; Lefkoridi et al., 2014). As noted above, indices of rigidity and threat sensitivity are more strongly related to social attitudes than economic ones, so the grafting of a sociocultural divide onto pre-existing left-right disagreement over economics makes it easier for citizens to sort into different ideological preferences (Johnston et al., 2017; Malka & Soto, 2015) and partisan identities and voting patterns (Cizmar et al., 2014; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) as a function of their basic psychological dispositions.

At the individual level, political engagement also consistently moderates the relationship between psychological dispositions and ideological preferences. All other things being equal, individuals high in political engagement are more likely to attend to elite signals about what different ideological labels mean and what goes with what ideologically (Converse, 1964; Kalmoe, 2020; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). In addition to having a better understanding of what different ideologies mean, those high in political engagement are also more concerned about using their issue stances to signal their broader political allegiances (Kahan, 2015a). As a result, they should find it easier to sort into the ideological identities and positions that best match their psychological motives and characteristics (Federico, 2021; Federico & Malka, 2018). Consistent with this expectation, variables like authoritarianism (Federico et al., 2009, 2011; Johnston et al., 2017), need for closure (Federico & Goren, 2009; Johnston et al., 2017; see also Federico & Ekstrom, 2018), low Openness to Experience and high Conscientiousness (Johnston et al., 2017; Osborne & Sibley, 2012, 2015), and a preference for conservation over openness values (Johnston et al., 2017; Malka et al., 2014, 2019) are all more strongly correlated with ideological conservatism among the highly engaged. Similar patterns are found for the relationship between variables like

authoritarianism and need for closure and political identifications that are linked to ideology, such as Republican partisanship in the United States (Federico & Reifen-Tagar, 2014; Johnston et al., 2017).

Interestingly, engagement *reverses* the relationship between needs for security and certainty and the left-right tilt of one's preferences in the economic realm (as noted briefly above). Among those high in engagement, individuals who prefer certainty, security, and structure tend to adopt more right-wing economic attitudes, favoring the free market and less redistribution. Among those low in engagement, the pattern reverses: individuals who prefer certainty, security, and structure tend to adopt more left-wing positions, favoring greater government intervention and redistribution (Johnston et al., 2017; Malka et al., 2014). This pattern has been found for authoritarianism, need for closure, dispositional risk aversion, conservation versus openness values, and the Openness and Conscientiousness dimensions of the Big Five (Federico & Malka, 2018; Malka & Soto, 2015).

This reversal reflects different processes of economic-preference formation among those low and high in engagement (Johnston et al., 2017). Among those low in engagement, there is a direct instrumental impact of dispositions, such that those with more rigid, threat-sensitive dispositions favor left-wing economic policies as a form of insurance against the risks and dangers of a market economy. Among those in high in engagement, the impact of "rigid" preferences for certainty, security, and structure are indirect and more heavily shaped by the abstract ideological meanings that political elites attach to market-oriented versus redistributionist economic positions. Individuals who are more attentive to politics are more likely to gravitate toward the ideological and partisan identities that best match their dispositions and adopt the economic positions that go along with those identities. Thus, engaged citizens who are more psychologically rigid or sensitive to threat sort themselves into right-wing ideological and partisan identities due to a symbolic preference for established ways of doing things and adopt the market-oriented economic positions associated with those identities. In contrast, engaged citizens who are more psychologically flexible and less threat-sensitive sort themselves into left-wing ideological and partisan identities due to their greater openness to change and adopt the interventionist positions implied by those identities.

Thus, the reversal found among those high in engagement reflects the meanings that have been typically assigned to different economic doctrines by political elites in many societies, in which support for the free market is seen as shoring up the status quo and support for redistribution and regulation of business is seen as progressive social change (Federico & Malka, 2018). Consistent with the argument that the symbolic meaning of economic positions in various social contexts is crucial to this process, the reversal effect dissipates in the nations of the former communist bloc (where left-wing positions represent an older, more traditional way of doing things; Malka et al., 2014), in nations where left-wing economic positions are not consistently tied to socially liberal positions that individuals high in needs for security and certainty are especially averse to (Malka et al., 2019), and in nations where high levels of redistributive and social welfare spending are seen as morally normative by much of the population (e.g., Nordic and eastern European nations; Czarnek & Kossowska, 2019).

Race and ethnicity. Several studies suggest that the typical relationship between dispositional preferences for certainty, security, and structure breaks down among members of racial and ethnic groups that have historically been subject to subordination

and oppression. Among members of these groups, the usual tendency for those who score higher on indices of rigidity and threat sensitivity to favor the status quo and adopt conservative positions comes into conflict with a motivation to protect the ingroup's interests (Federico et al., 2021). If one belongs to a racial or ethnic group that is disadvantaged by the status quo, political conservatism may not be as security- and-certainty-enhancing as it is for members of groups that enjoy a dominant position under existing arrangements (though some members of subordinate groups resolve this conflict in favor of system support; see Jost, 2020). Consistent with this expectation, research in the United States finds that authoritarianism (e.g., Dusso, 2017; MacWilliams, 2016), low Openness and high Conscientiousness (Gerber et al., 2011), and numerous other variables indicative of high needs for security and certainty more weakly relate to conservative identities and preferences among Black Americans and Latinos (Johnston et al., 2017). Pérez and Vicuña (Chapter 25, this volume) discuss the political psychology of minority status.

Type of dispositional measure. Though research suggests that psychological motives and characteristics relate to ideological preferences, this relationship is generally stronger when psychological dispositions are measured using self-reports rather than behavioral measures of psychological functioning. For example, several meta-analyses indicate that self-report personality measures of needs for certainty, security, and structure correlate more strongly with cultural conservatism than behavioral measures of how inflexibly or aversively individuals respond to complex, changing, or threatening stimuli (Van Hiel et al., 2016; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Similarly, while earlier studies suggested that behavioral and physiological measures of threat sensitivity were associated with social conservatism, subsequent studies using larger sample sizes have failed to replicate this result (Bakker et al., 2020; Fournier et al., 2020; Osmundsen et al., 2021; Smith & Warren, 2020). This asymmetry could reflect the limitations of self-reports as objective measures of how well individuals manage uncertainty, threat, and complex cognitive operations (Bakker et al., 2020). For example, self-report measures related to needs for security and certainty do not correlate with behavioral displays of politically biased reasoning (Guay & Johnston, 2022) and might be biased, themselves, by political orientation (Bakker et al., 2020; Ludeke et al., 2016). In some instances, self-report measures of this sort contain overtly political content, which exaggerates their correlation with ideology (Conway et al., 2016; Malka et al., 2017). However, the asymmetry may also be due to the lower reliability of behavioral measures (Dang et al., 2020) or the stronger match between the task demands of explicit political attitude measures and self-reports of personality compared to behavioral measures that do not require introspective, conscious judgments (Federico, 2021).

2.6. Is the Right Always More "Rigid"?

As noted previously, research on the relationship between psychological variables and political ideology is often interpreted as supporting a rigidity-of-the-right model (Malka et al., 2017). With respect to the relationship between cultural conservatism and many *dispositional measures* of rigidity and threat sensitivity, this pattern seems to be well supported (see Jost, 2009, 2017). At the same time, other research suggests that *situational manifestations* of rigidity may be more symmetric in their distribution across the ideological spectrum (Harper, 2020; see also Conway et al., 2018; Costello et al., 2021). Specifically,

despite well-established ideological asymmetries in dispositions, individuals on both the right and the left may become defensive, rigid, and intolerant when the validity of established political identities or attitudes are threatened or challenged.

This tendency manifests itself in several ways. For example, individuals on both the right and left exhibit motivated reasoning in defense of their worldviews when challenged (Ditto et al., 2019; Guay & Johnston, 2022; see also Cohen, 2003; Washburn & Skitka, 2017)—a pattern that often becomes stronger as political knowledge increases (Kahan, 2015b). Similarly, individuals at both ends of the left-right dimension avoid perspectives that diverge from their own (Collins et al., 2017; Frimer et al., 2017), though some evidence suggests that this tendency is somewhat stronger on the right (Nam et al., 2013; Rodriguez et al., 2017). Recent efforts to develop self-report measures of authoritarianism on the left also find subsets of individuals on both the left and right poles of the ideological spectrum that exhibit moral absolutism and intolerance of political opponents (Conway et al., 2018; Costello et al., 2021).[4] Finally, as noted above, relations between feelings of fear and threat and ideology vary considerably depending on the types of threats assessed (Brandt et al., 2021; Hatemi & McDermott, 2021; Malka et al., 2017).

Evidence of symmetry is also found with respect to cognitive manifestations of rigidity. Compared to centrists, those with extreme views are more likely to overestimate how much knowledge they possess (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). They also prefer to solve problems in relatively simple ways and experience a greater sense of certainty about the solutions they reach (van Prooijen et al., 2018). Individuals whose views are further away from the political center are also more likely to cognitively represent politics in a less complex fashion (Lammers et al., 2017; Tetlock, 1984), though other lines of research suggest that it is centrists who show lower levels of political knowledge and complexity in their representations of the political world (e.g., Sidanius, 1988; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). Finally, individuals on the left and right may be more rigid or flexible in different contexts. For example, though initial evidence suggested that those identified with the right are more cautious and focused on avoiding negative outcomes in exploration tasks (Shook & Fazio, 2009), this may reverse in contexts that those on the political right are more positively oriented toward (e.g., stock markets; Fiagbenu et al., 2019; Ruisch et al. 2020).

Though these results may appear to be at odds with work on left-right differences in dispositional rigidity, symmetry in situational rigidity makes sense in terms of theory and research on the consequences of commitments that are central to a person's identity (Federico, 2021). Politics is largely about important social identities (such as symbolic ideology and partisanship), and human beings are motivated to defend the worth of their identities—regardless of whether that identity has left-wing or right-wing content (Huddy, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002; Kahan, 2015a; Mason, 2018; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Other political preferences beyond broad identities like ideology and partisanship (e.g., attitudes toward specific political issues) can also become central to the self, and when they do they will also be defended "rigidly" in the face of attack (Krosnick, 1988; Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 2013).[5]

Thus, dispositional and situational forms of rigidity may relate to ideological variation in different ways. In this context, it is important to avoid the "jingle-jangle" fallacies, in which constructs with similar names are erroneously assumed to be the same and constructs with different names are incorrectly assumed to be distinct (Block, 1995). Though the dispositional and situational measures we review implicate some form of "rigidity," they

reflect different processes with respect to ideological preferences. On one hand, variables related to dispositional rigidity (or unobserved antecedents of those variables; Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015) may govern sorting into different ideological camps, with those higher (versus lower) in dispositional rigidity sorting into the right (versus the left). On the other hand, variables related to situational rigidity may reflect efforts to defend political commitments that are important to a person's identity, regardless of what end of the left-right spectrum they are on (Brandt & Crawford, 2020; Federico, 2021).[6] A critical goal for future work is to explore the exact interplay between these dispositional and situational processes, with an eye to determining whether observed left-right differences in defensiveness and rigidity are directly attributable to underlying dispositional differences or reflect other processes (Eichmeier & Stenhouse, 2019).

2.7. Is Ideology Genetically Transmissible?

Finally, a substantial volume of research has now addressed the possibility that political preferences—like the personality traits that have been found to predict those preferences—have a heritable, genetic component (for a more detailed review, see Ksiaszkiewicz & Friesen, 2017; Settle & Detert, Chapter 8, in this volume). As we will discuss below when we turn to the social bases of belief-system structure, research in political science has traditionally assumed that ideological orientations are transmitted from one generation to the next via socialization within the family and other social relationships and groups (e.g., Sears & Brown, 2013). Research on the biological heritability of political preferences challenges this assumption.

Most of this research uses the classic twin design developed by behavioral geneticists, which compares the attitudes of monozygotic twins (who are genetically identical) and dizygotic twins (who share approximately 50% of their genetic makeup). Given the assumption that twins within both kinds of pairs receive similar environmental influences, this design can be used to obtain estimates of trait variance due to genes and environment (Alford et al., 2005; Hibbing et al., 2014). Studies using this method suggest 40% to 50% of the left-right variance in individuals' attitudes can be attributed to additive genetic influences (see Gonzales et al., in press). Importantly, estimates of attitude heritability pertain to populations, not individuals, and heritability may thus vary across populations subject to different influences (Ksiaszkiewicz & Friesen, 2017). Consistent with this principle, the proportion of variance attributable to genetic effects is larger among those high in political engagement, in recent behavior-genetic studies (Kalmoe & Johnson, 2022). This suggests that genetic influences on ideological affinity are most likely to actually impact preferences in populations that better understand politics (and the ideological meaning of different political preferences) due to their greater exposure to elite political discourse and other aspects of the political information environment in a particular society.

Though this approach has generated much-needed attention to the possibility that political preferences may be subject to biological as well social influences, aspects of the twin methodology have been criticized, including its assumptions that monozygotic and dizygotic twins experience comparable environments and that genes do not interact with each other or lead individuals to sort into environments with different influences on attitudes (Charney, 2008; Shultziner, 2013). Given that many of the dispositional correlates

of ideology reviewed above also appear to be heritable, it is quite possible that observed relationships between personality and ideology may be due to common genetic influences (a pattern referred to as "pleiotropy" in the genetic literature) rather than a direct causal effect of personality on ideology (Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015; Osborne & Sibley, 2020; for a review, see Ksiaszkiewicz & Friesen, 2017). Further research will be needed to clarify this issue.

3. A Closer Look at the Social Nature of Ideology

As our review above suggests, ideological belief systems emerge from the interplay of (1) underlying psychological needs and (2) features of an individual's social and political context. The contextual features that would appear to be most important in this regard are those that provide information about how attitudes and beliefs should be packaged together—information that ultimately emanates from elite messages (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). In many cases, people receive this information and use it when forming or adjusting their political attitudes and beliefs.

This section addresses *why* they do so; in other words, the nature of the psychological processes that energize and direct people toward adoption of attitudes and beliefs that are deemed congruent with their ideological commitments. Belief system congruence has often been framed in terms of purely intrapsychic processes having to do with needs for dissonance reduction and cognitive consistency (Heider, 1958; Shafer, 1981). But a key point we wish to make is that the psychological processes underlying ideological coherence are inherently *social* (Coppock & Green, 2022; Jost et al., 2008; Rossignac-Milon & Higgins, 2018; Kahan, 2015a; Kruglanski et al., 2006). Below, we review theory and evidence for relationships with close others, social identifications with salient political groups, and rational deference to trusted elites as sources of belief-system structure.

3.1. Relationships with Close Others as a Source of Belief-System Structure

One important way that the psychological processes underlying belief system coherence are inherently social has to do with motives for bonding, intimacy, and approval from close others. For example, classic research on the inter-generational transmission of political attitudes demonstrated that ideological positions are likely to be transmitted from parents to children, especially to the extent that both parents have similar political beliefs and the family discusses politics frequently (Jennings & Niemi, 1968).[7] Meanwhile, there are long-established research traditions addressing the importance of political communication networks and deliberation for political attitudes and beliefs (Berelson et al., 1954; Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2006). A review of these literatures is beyond the scope of this chapter, but here we summarize some key insights about the roles of motives for interpersonal bonding and closeness in holding together ideological belief systems.

Evidence suggests that desire for closeness with important others can motivate people to align their own social and political opinions more closely with the perceived views of those other individuals (Jost et al., 2008; Stern & Ondish, 2018). According to shared reality theory (Hardin & Higgins, 1996), this is done to maintain and solidify important social relationships by establishing a sense of shared reality. Indeed, the long-acknowledged role of consistency motivation in belief system structure seems to have a lot more to do with inter-personal processes than early formulations suggested (Rossignac-Milon & Higgins, 2018). Specifically, the intensity of dissonance-reduction motives seems to depend on whether or not a shared reality with liked others is at stake (e.g., Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Cooper et al., 1974; Echterhoff et al., 2005). Indeed, the enforcement of conformity in views is central to intra-group processes in general, and the construction of realities (including the beliefs representing political reality) are likely "conducted interactively with fellow members of groups to which we belong and that we deem important" (Kruglanski et al., 2006, p. 84).

In fact, if one fully acknowledges the importance of primary social relationships to human flourishing, the potential rationality of seemingly irrational political positions comes into focus. Kahan (2015a) notes that for many people there is "expressive rationality" in the adoption of ideologically congruent views that are inaccurate or seemingly contrary to the individual's material self-interest. If the political positions associated with one ideo-logical posture seem to favor policies that would realistically improve one's material situa-tion but the positions of the opposing ideological posture are fervently held by one's close friends and family, which positions is it rational for the individual to adopt? Given that the individual's political behavior will have no detectable impact on policy outcomes (e.g., Downs, 1957 but might well have consequences for their relationships with close others, it could be "rational" to adopt the latter.

When considering how motives to be close to others can facilitate ideological cohesion, social media may play an important role in contemporary contexts. Specifically, much po-litical discussion takes place on social media, and some evidence suggests that this may go hand-in-hand with ideological polarization (Lee, 2016; Lee et al., 2014; though see Boxell et al., 2017). Bond and Messing (2015) found that people were more likely to be in ideolog-ical agreement with those Facebook friends with whom they share close social ties. Barbera et al. (2015) found that Twitter users generally interact with ideologically similar others, and this is especially true of users on the political right. Findings such as these are likely to in part reflect selection of close others and frequent interaction partners on the basis of polit-ical homophily. But the desire to reinforce social bonds may lead individuals to develop or amplify ideological agreement with close others on social media (Tufekci, 2018). And even if people interact with politically dissimilar others on social media, there is reason to expect that this would not lead to moderation of political attitudes and could sometimes yield a "backfire effect" resulting in more extreme attitudes (Bail et al., 2018).

The rising polarization in societies such as the United States may also increase the power of bonding and intimacy motives to promote ideological coherence among citizens. As the United States has become affectively polarized, Americans' marriage and dating preferences may be increasingly based on political homophily (Alford et al., 2011; Huber & Malhotra, 2017; Iyengar et al., 2018). There is also some evidence that Americans find those with opposed ideological and partisan views less attractive (Mallinas et al., 2018; Nicholson et al., 2016) or at least that they are motivated to claim that they do (Yair & Huber, 2020). Even when individuals do not select partners on the basis of ideological similarity per se, they

may do so on the basis of other characteristics that are correlated with politics, leading to more highly correlated ideological views between partners (Klofstad et al., 2013). Thus, if fewer Americans are romantically involved with ideologically dissimilar others, there is less opportunity for bonding motives to propel departures from ideologically constrained belief systems.

The likelihood of close others reinforcing existing political predispositions also increases to the extent that Americans have sorted into politically congenial areas. How much Americans are geographically segregating on the basis of political preferences is currently a matter of debate, though (Bishop & Cushing, 2008; Mummolo & Nall, 2017). Recently, Martin, and Webster (2020) reported evidence that Americans are sorting based on non-political lifestyle factors (e.g., population density) that happen to correlate with political preferences, but only to a small extent. In fact, as the authors note, one would expect *far less* geographical polarization than what is present in the United States, given the frequency with which Americans move and the modest extent to which politics and related lifestyle preferences influence their moving decisions. Martin and Webster (2020) contend that the most likely explanation for this is that citizens come to adopt the political preferences that are represented in their area, consistent with the general view that geography has a strong influence on political cognition (Enos, 2017).

Even for Americans who do have politically diverse social networks, there are forces that work against any tendency these networks might have to promote ideologically cross-cutting belief systems. For example, motives for harmonious interpersonal interaction often inhibit people from expressing political disagreement (Gerber et al., 2012; Noelle-Neumann, 1974), which can have the consequence of enhancing the homogeneity of political discussion networks (Cowan & Baldassari, 2018). In this regard, Mutz (2006) noted an intrinsic tension between promoting a politically active citizenry and one that is interpersonally exposed to attitude-challenging communication. To the extent that people have politically diverse discussion networks, she found, they were *less* likely to engage actively with politics; rather, politically homogenous discussion networks nurtured more political activism.

3.2. Social Identification with Political Groups as a Source of Belief-System Structure

Social identity refers to emotionally important self-categorization as a member of a so-cial group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It is probably the most frequently invoked concept for integrating societal and individual psychological levels of analysis in the social sciences (Brewer, 2001; Hogg et al., 1995). Because the study of ideological belief systems inherently involves such integration, the importance of social identity for such belief systems is often recognized, either directly or indirectly (Haas et al., 2019; Huddy & Bankert, 2017; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Malka & Lelkes, 2010).

The prior section addressed the roles of interpersonal bonds in holding ideological be-lief systems together, and in many cases these bonds are held with others with whom one shares a larger group-based identity. But there is an important distinction between groups that are mainly based on interpersonal bonds and those that are mainly based on a common social identification (Prentice, Miller & Lightdale, 1994). The nature of the larger groups

people socially identify with vary a great deal, and they include ethnic groups, social classes, genders, nationalities, and religions. Many are explicitly political, including ideological groups (e.g., conservatives), groups defined by position on a salient issue (e.g., Remainers in the context of the Brexit debate in the UK), social movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter), and, perhaps most prominently, political parties. These types of social identities structure political thinking and motivate people to form and represent themselves as possessing attitudes and beliefs that are consistent with the social identity (Federico & Malka, 2018; Johnston et al., 2017; Kahan, 2015a).

A comprehensive account of how social identity (in all its various forms) relates to ideology is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we narrow our focus in two ways. First, we zero in specifically on the role of social identity in holding different political idea-elements together. Second, because many forms of social identity (see Brewer, 2001; Deaux, 1996; Thoits & Virshup, 1997) are likely to exert their influence on political attitudes via their incorporation into *explicitly political* social identities, we focus only on the latter (also see Mason, Chapter 24, this volume). In short, we focus on the role of explicitly political identities in pulling various political beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions into ideological alignment. This story, of course, starts with party identification.

Partisan identity. It makes sense to regard party identity as the key attribute that pulls diverse political idea elements into ideological packages. Parties are indispensable to democratic functioning, as they are the coalitions that channel individual preferences into organized collective action aimed at gaining power and realizing policy outcomes. When a citizen identifies with a party, they are psychologically aligning themself with a coalition whose purpose is to harness the energy and desires of various groups to the goal of gaining political power. Indeed, many other social identities (such as those based on class or ethnic group) can exert their influence on political attitudes via identification with a party that is viewed as representing the interests and values of these social groups.

Partisan identity has, and still does, function as a "perceptual screen" that guides political thinking and underlies attitude constraint (Campbell et al., 1960). For example, panel data suggest that people adjust their political attitudes to match their party identities in the United States (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Carsey & Layman, 2006) and elsewhere (Harteveld et al., 2017; Slothuus, 2015; Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021). Partisan identity also motivates individuals to rationalize their party's stances by adopting beliefs that justify those stances (Bisgaard, 2019; Lauderdale, 2016; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). Moreover, experimental data are consistent with citizens adopting the attitudes that political messaging cues indicate to be party-consistent (Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Bisgaard & Slothus, 2018; Brader & Tucker, 2012; Druckman et al., 2013; Merolla et al., 2016). Thus, to the extent that opposed parties in a given political context offer ideologically distinct programs, all of these social motives associated with partisanship should promote more ideologically cohesive views among partisans (Abramowitz, 2010; Levendusky, 2009).

The most common explanations for the power of partisanship to structure political thinking invoke partisan motivated reasoning, or reasoning that is biased toward reaching party-congenial conclusions (Bakker et al., 2020; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014; Peterson et al., 2013). This brings up a key distinction between two explanations for how partisan identity functions: *instrumental partisanship* and *expressive partisanship* (Huddy, Mason & Aaroe, 2015; Huddy et al., 2018; see Fiorina, 1976; Hamlin & Jennings, 2018). According to the instrumental explanation, party identity reflects a running tally of the relative merits of the

parties, which is updated as individuals acquire new information. This view emphasizes motives for accuracy in the processing of political information. According to the expressive explanation, party identity is a social identity that varies in strength across individuals. To the degree that it is strong, it motivates people to engage in party-consistent political cognition, attitude formation, and activity. This view emphasizes "consistency" or identity-expressive motivation.

Huddy and colleagues have demonstrated the utility of the expressive view of partisanship in the United States (Huddy et al., 2015) and in multi-party European democracies (Huddy et al., 2018). This perspective suggests that party identification leads people to adopt party-aligned attitudes because they gain expressive satisfaction from doing so. In this way, expressive motivation to adopt party-consistent attitudes may be one source of ideological constraint in systems where competing parties offer ideologically distinct programs (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964). Others, however, note that people might gain expressive utility merely from reporting party-aligned views in a survey, while not actually holding these views with sincerity or acting on them in the real-world (Bullock et al., 2015; Bullock & Lenz, 2019). However, Malka and Adelman (2022) show that evidence for insincere responding on matters of strong partisan valence is quite limited, and that when expressive motivation is strong enough to make people misrepresent their views in surveys it is also likely to be strong enough to influence their real-world political behavior.[8]

Other types of political social identity. It is for good reason that party identity is the main focus in explanations of how political identities structure political thinking and guide political behavior. A major part of partisan identity's power comes from the fact that it can subsume other identities that influence political attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions (e.g., Mason, 2018). Because parties are coalitions of groups, other social identities get baked into the partisan cake. Nonetheless, recent work underscores how shifting political contexts can change the independent importance of other types of political identities. Here we briefly discuss three other political identities that have potential to shape the content and structure of belief systems. These are identification with a revered leader, identification with salient and branded issue stances, and identification with an ideological label.

When people talk about partisan influences on political behavior, the term "partisan" is sometimes used broadly to reflect allegiance to something that is not the party per se but is strongly associated with it. A key example here is a revered leader who belongs to a particular party. Much research has addressed the importance of relationships between political leaders and citizens (Blondel, 1987; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Kunst et al., 2019). Social identifications with groups, such as political parties, can result in strong feelings of relational identification with key leaders (Steffens et al., 2014). Moreover, according to "transformational" approaches to leadership (Weber, 1948), when leaders possess sufficient charisma they "not only direct, but actively transform, their followers' attitudes and behavior" (Reicher, Haslam, and Hopkins, 2005). To Reicher et al. (2005), those who become influential leaders within a group organized around a social identity are those who "are in a position to supply information about the category definition." In this way, identification with a political leader that offers a clear ideological package of positions, above and beyond identification with an associated party, has the potential to pull attitudes and beliefs into ideological alignment.

Space limitations preclude a widely inclusive review of this literature. But it will serve our purpose to briefly describe one example: in the United States, at the time of this writing,

many Republicans identified more with Donald Trump than with the Republican Party itself (Page & Elbeshbishi, 2021; Rummler, 2021). This mattered, as it impacted elite incentives for whom to align with in a conflict between the revered leader and other elements of the party establishment. The electoral incentives were quite clear, as the party adjusted by aligning further with Trump and weeding out anti-Trump elements. But Trump and his followers' identification with him, we would argue, altered the definition and content of conservative ideology itself (Drutman, 2020; Hopkins & Noel, 2022; Lewis, 2019). That is, social identification with Trump seemed to be quite important for pulling idea-elements into an ideology and binding them together with this identity so that they would be difficult to change. Kunst et al. (2019), for example, found that, among white Republicans, "identity fusion"—defined as a deep-seated feeling of oneness with a group or individual—with Trump was a far stronger and more reliable predictor of support for persecution of disfavored ethnic groups and political violence than identity fusion with the Republican Party was. Because of identification with Trump, these attitudes might come to figure more prominently in the American "conservative" package while (for example) support of democracy-promoting wars overseas might become less central to that package. Thus, identification with a revered leader can structure ideological belief systems independently of party identity.

Other "partisan" influences on political behavior have more to do with a salient, branded issue stance or a movement. Consider the "Leave" versus "Remain" divide over Brexit that began to consume British politics in 2015. Hobolt and her colleagues note the traditional view of affective polarization as pertaining to animosity directed at members of the opposing party, but showed that identification with a stance on Brexit, which cut across party lines, generated affective polarization and outgroup prejudice that were at least as strong as those associated with partisanship (Hobolt et al., 2021; Sorace & Hobolt, 2021). A similar phenomenon occurred with the Tea Party movement in American politics in 2010. Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin (2011) noted how this movement provided a new source of identity for many Republicans that was "untethered from recent GOP baggage and policy specifics" and was built around a belief package focused on racially infused grievance against government assistance to "undeserving" elements in American society. This identity, while associated with the Republican Party, went beyond party in the broad sense and helped shift the ideological content of American conservatism. In fact, it served to distinguish a subset of Republican voters from the party establishment, energized the defeat of Republican establishment candidates, and presaged Trump's hostile takeover of the Republican Party (e.g., Parker & Barreto, 2013). Thus, identification with a salient issue stance or an associated movement can impact belief systems independently of party identity.

A third example pertains to symbolic identification with an ideological label. Right versus left, or conservative versus liberal, is a common way of discussing and interpreting political differences in many parts of the world (as noted above). Within the United States, ideological self-labeling—or symbolic ideology, to use the term discussed earlier (Ellis & Stimson, 2012)—does seem to promote adoption of identity-consistent attitudes (Devine, 2015; Malka and Lelkes, 2010; Mason, 2018). Knutson (1995) demonstrated the "absorptive power" of left versus right identification in western European countries, showing that this identification had retained its stable core meaning in the economic domain while absorbing wider cultural meanings over time. Knutsen's (1995) analysis suggests that ideological identification can be a force that pulls idea-elements into an ideology in a shifting political information environment, as "new meanings of left and right are added to the old

meanings." Of course, as we have seen, symbolic identification with an ideological label is not all-powerful: many individuals who identify with a specific ideological category do not adopt the issue positions that follow from it (especially with regard to right-wing economic positions among self-identified conservatives; see Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Thus, identification with an ideological label can to some extent structure broader belief systems independently of partisan identity.

Finally, in a polarized environment where different social and political identities increasingly align along a single dimension of political conflict, it might make the most sense to speak in terms of "mega-identities" that structure ideological belief systems (Finkel et al., 2020; Mason, 2018). As we discuss later, many scholars express concern that the tendency to interpret all societal tensions and divisions in terms of conflict between overarching political identities is a danger to democracy in the United States (Drutman, 2020; McCoy, Simonovits, & Littvay, 2020) and other countries (McCoy et al., 2018; Slovik, 2019). Although these mega-identities encompass more than partisanship—they also incorporate ideological labels, reverence for prominent leaders, salient identity-conferring issue stances, and identification with social movements—the nature of parties is that they come to represent sides in these overlapping societal divisions, thus absorbing other sources of societal conflict into partisan conflict. Mason and Wronski (2018), for example, show that party identity in the United States, especially among Republicans, now represents a more broadly aligned set of social group memberships, which enhances its power to structure political thinking and define the content of liberalism and conservatism.

3.3. Deference to Trusted Elites as a Source of Ideological Constraint

In the previous section we noted how the desire to express a valued political identity—most often partisanship—can lead people to adopt attitudes and beliefs that match that identity, resulting in greater ideological cohesion when competing identities are ideologically differentiated. But while it is clear that many people adjust their attitudes to match those of their political "side" (e.g., their party, a revered leader), discerning the motives for doing so is a complicated matter. The desire to express one's identity may not be the only operative factor. In this vein, a venerable tradition within political science depicts partisan cue-taking about issues as a form of effort-saving political rationality rooted in social trust (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991). The key idea here is that if one trusts a set of political elites to hold reasonable or moral political stances (and distrusts the opposing set of elites), then it is rational to defer to these elites (or avoid the positions of the opposing elites) when forming attitudes and making political choices.

Tappin, Pennycook, and Rand (2020) recently addressed this issue. The type of design most often used to examine expressive, identity-based influences on belief systems is the "party cues" design, where participants are provided with information that a particular issue position is endorsed by their party or an out-party. Considering this design, Tappin and his colleagues (2020) note the following:

> . . . party cues signify endorsement by a source that is either perceived as trustworthy and aligned with one's interests (same party cue), or as untrustworthy and opposed to one's

interests (opposition party cue). Thus, the information treatment alters perceived source trustworthiness. (p. 84)

Manipulations that provide party cues about an issue in an effort to causally identify the effect of expressive motives often violate the *excludability assumption*—that is, that the manipulation only alters the expressive reward associated with adopting one stance or another. Rather, they also alter whether one stance or another is thought to be most consistent with prior beliefs. That said, it is important to note these prior beliefs still pertain to social identity, as they are about trust or distrust of particular groups of elites on the basis of identity match versus mismatch. Thus, the effect demonstrated in cue experiments is social in nature regardless of whether expressive motives or rational reliance on trusted elites is at work.[9] Either path can socially facilitate the formation of ideologically consistent preferences to the extent that parties and their leaders offer ideologically distinct sets of policy options.

To the degree that ideological constraint is rooted in deference to knowledgeable elites that one trusts on the basis of prior opinions, this suggests a normatively welcome role of accuracy motivation in the formation of ideological belief systems, even if reliance on trusted elites is heuristic in nature (Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012). In truth, it is likely that accuracy motives (i.e., those aimed at holding correct opinions) and consistency motives (i.e., those aimed at reaching identity-consistent conclusions) both impact political reasoning to some degree (Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume; Lavine et al., 2012; Groenendkyk, 2013; Groenendyk & Krupnikov, 2021). Groenendyk (2018), for example, has argued that the present context of American polarization has heightened both the motive to adopt and justify identity-consistent attitudes *and* the motive to be open-minded and rational in the adoption of political attitudes. These motives conflict when one is presented with unfavorable information about one's own party, in which case accuracy motivation would favor accepting this information while consistency motivation would favor rejecting it. The solution, according to Groenendyk (2018), is to accept the unfavorable information about one's own party and to then further derogate the opposing party in one's mind in a "lesser-of-two-evils" political justification strategy. In the context of parties that are ideologically sorted at the elite level, this suggests that out-party elites might be more of a guide to what is ideologically inappropriate than same-party elites are to what is ideologically appropriate (e.g., Nicholson, 2012).

4. Reversing the Causal Arrow: Political Commitments as Influences on Non-political Identities

Traditionally, studies of traits, social identities, and political attitudes have modelled the latter as the dependent variable and traits and social identities as independent variables. This approach implies a clean delineation between individual differences in non-political constructs and individual differences in political constructs—and it assumes uni-directional causal influence of the former on the latter. Although this approach simplifies theorizing about ideology, it may fail to capture the nature of political worldviews in all circumstances.

In this section, we have emphasized that interpersonal experiences, social identities, and orientations toward the social world are what promote the binding of idea-elements into ideological belief systems. The power of social motives to do this comes from the fact that *political beliefs and attitudes are viewed as compatible with or inherently part of non-political identities and self-perceptions*. However, this logic implies that non-political identities and self-perceptions may themselves be adopted as a result of prior political commitments. In other words, it might make sense to conceptualize and operationalize ideological belief systems in a more encompassing way that includes both political and ostensibly non-political elements that are drawn together into alignment. Emerging work—which we review in this section—highlights the potential advantages of this approach.

For example, consider religiosity. The usual approach in political psychology is to assume that individual differences in religiosity exert a constraining influence on ideological affinity and other political preferences (Layman, 2001; Malka, 2013). Correlations between religiosity and conservative political attitudes are therefore assumed to reflect a unidirectional causal influence of the former on the latter. Patrikios (2008), however, used panel data from the United States to demonstrate that political commitments (party identification in particular) influence religiosity. Republican identity was associated with increased religiosity over time while Democratic identification was associated with the opposite. Margolis (2018a, 2018b) expanded on this by demonstrating that partisans with young children at home, who face a decision about whether and how religion should factor into their child-rearing, are particularly likely to adjust their level of religiosity on the basis of their partisanship. She concluded that "the strong association between religiosity and partisanship comes about, in part, because partisans adopt their party's religious stances as their own" (Margolis, 2018b, p. 30).

What about other demographic identities? American partisan coalitions are to an important degree sorted on the basis of identities having to do with ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and class. Furthermore, many politically engaged people have an exaggerated view of how sorted the parties are with respect to these identities (Ahler & Sood, 2018). Because demographic identities correspond with group memberships that are costly or difficult to change, it is usually assumed that they are fixed attributes whose relationships with political attitudes exclusively reflect their causal influence on the latter. However, Egan (2020) recently noted that demographic identities can shift over time, both because they represent a subjective attachment to a group (as distinct from an objective group membership) and because people's personal attributes sometimes position them at the boundaries of the group memberships that correspond with an identity. This raises the possibility that political commitments—including ideological ones—exert causal influence on the claiming of demographic identities. Indeed, using panel data from the United States, Egan (2020) found that small but significant segments of the American public change their ethnic, class, religious, and sexual identities to better match the prototypes of their partisan and ideological groups.

Finally, similar processes may be at work with respect to self-reported personality traits and self-perceptions. Due to their relatively strong rank-order stability in adulthood and their substantial heritable component, traits are often assumed to be causes, not consequences, of political commitments (cf. Hatemi & Verhulst, 2015). But it is possible that political commitments exert some causal influence on self-reported personality traits (Bakker et al., 2021). This might in part be because these commitments lead people to adopt

behavioral and experiential patterns that are stereotypical of their ideological or partisan in-group, or because they lead people to perceive themselves as similar personality-wise to the prototypical member of their political in-group. For example, Ludeke and his colleagues (2016) found evidence that people "overclaim" traits that characterize their ideological groups relative to the trait levels that would be expected on the basis of non-self-report indicators (e.g., peer reports). Similarly, some longitudinal evidence suggests that ideological and other preferences exert causal influence on personality traits, although these effects are small (Bakker et al., 2021; Boston et al., 2018; Luttig, 2021; cf. Osborne & Sibley, 2020). Finally, Bakker et al. (2021) found that individuals report personality traits that are slightly more congruent with their previously assessed political attitudes when politics is primed. All of this suggests that people are at least motivated to perceive their personalities as consistent with the prototypes of their ideological groups.

In sum, recent evidence suggests that the nature of the causal relationship between background characteristics and ideological affinity may be more complex than researchers have sometimes assumed. Ideology and other political identities may influence demographic identities and self-reported psychological dispositions, as well as being influenced by them. To be sure, the more complicated picture painted by this new evidence does not (in our opinion) imply that researchers should abandon the effort to identify causal antecedents of ideology. However, it does suggest that researchers may need to better contextualize relationships between demographics and personality, on the one hand, and ideology, on the other, as part of a broader, multidirectional network of causal effects.

5. Implications for Polarization and Democratic Functioning

Scholars have long debated the precise importance of public opinion for democracy (Claassen, 2020; Dahl, 2008; Fails & Pierce, 2010; Lipset, 1959; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). But public opinion influences the incentives of political elites to degrade or preserve democratic institutions and communicates the extent to which there exists support for mass action to degrade democracy (Malka & Costello, 2023; Graham & Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2019; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus, 1983). Many of the insights about the nature of ideology that we have described in this chapter have implications for attitudes towards democracy and actions that degrade democracy. In this final substantive section of our chapter, we review them.

First, some of these insights bear on the long-running question of whether certain ideological groups are more likely than others to support democracy-eroding efforts. A classic view from psychology is that individuals oriented toward the right are the most anti-democratic (Adorno et al., 1950; Nilsson & Jost, 2020). However, many classical measures tapping anti-democratic sentiment are optimized for detecting right-wing forms of illiberalism (Malka et al., 2017), and changes in measurement strategies can be undertaken to assess individual differences in authoritarianism-related constructs that apply specifically to the left (Costello et al., 2021; Conway et al., 2016). Furthermore, intolerance might have more to do with rigid ideological commitment in general than with a broad-based right-wing or left-wing orientation (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Brandt et al., 2014; Zmigrod, 2020).

That being said, recent work has addressed whether right- versus left-wing preferences relate to preferences for authoritarian governance. In this work, support for authoritarian governance is measured in a narrow way that focuses strictly on lack of commitment to democracy and support for degrading democratic institutions and norms. Malka, Lelkes, Bakker, and Spivack (2022) addressed this question using data from 14 consolidated Western democracies and two distinct survey projects. Cultural conservatism consistently predicted openness to authoritarian governance, across all countries and with effect sizes typically exceeding those for college education, political engagement, and other oft-noted predictors of democracy attitudes. This finding was replicated in a pre-registered study with a large demographically representative American internet sample in September of 2020 (Malka & Costello, 2023). This is consistent with theoretical perspectives linking ethnic antipathy (Miller & Davis, 2021) and opposition to societal liberalization (e.g., Welzel, 2007) to anti-democratic views. It is also consistent with the possibility that underlying genetic factors and/or needs for security and certainty may bind together cultural traditionalism and authoritarianism (e.g., Ludeke et al., 2013).

However, desires for certainty and security relate to left-wing attitudes in some domains for substantial subsets of citizens, as noted previously (Johnston et al., 2017; Malka et al., 2014), and needs for security and certainty often give rise to a "protection-based" attitude configuration representing a combination of cultural traditionalism and redistributive economics (Malka et al., 2019). This suggests that a combination of right-wing cultural preferences and left-wing economic preferences might be uniquely associated with a high level of anti-democratic sentiment. Indeed, Drutman et al. (2018) found this in American data, and this finding replicated in all of the English-speaking countries (Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) in the aforementioned study using World Values Survey and Latin American Public Opinion Project data (Malka et al., 2022) as well as the aforementioned pre-registered replication in 2020 (Malka & Costello, 2023). Increasingly, evidence suggests that within the United States and other English-speaking countries, there is a something about the protection-based belief-system configuration that coheres with anti-democratic sentiment (e.g., Carmines et al., 2016; Lefkofridi & Michel, 2017; Lipset, 1959).

A second way in which insights about ideology relate to public opinion regarding democracy has to do with the social aspects of ideological constraint. As we have argued, the extent to which ideological conformity is enforced in social and interpersonal contexts is often underappreciated. The interpersonal importance of toeing the ideological line may combine with the fact that an individual's political behavior usually has no meaningful instrumental consequences in the broader world to make political behavior mainly about relationship maintenance and identity expression (Hamlin & Jennings, 2011; Kahan, 2015a; Robbett & Matthews, 2018). If shared reality with close others is at stake, then there are serious obstacles to ideologically committed people defying anti-democratic actions undertaken by ideologically aligned elites and peers.

In the United States, surveys reveal worrying growth in anti-democratic sentiment (Drutman et al., 2018; Malka & Lelkes, 2017). These concerns are intimately tied to mounting affective polarization and the growth of social networks that are increasingly homogenous in political terms (Drutman et al., 2019; Drutman, 2020; Graham & Slovik, 2020; Malka & Costello, 2023; McCoy et al., 2020). A common explanation for this increase in anti-democratic sentiment is that viewing the other side as existentially threatening can lead

citizens to prioritize keeping opponents out of power over a commitment to the democratic process (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2019). But, as Malka and Costello (2023) note, it is also important to recognize how the absorptive power of ideologically-relevant identities can lead people to incorporate and justify elite-cued messages, including rationales that justify anti-democratic actions as pro-democratic. In this vein, research indicates that a considerable number of citizens simultaneously support democracy in the abstract and favor authoritarian actions under-taken by their side (Drutman et al., 2019; Inglehart, 2003). This asymmetry suggests that the beliefs incorporated into ideologically-relevant identities may allow individuals to believe that effectively authoritarian actions by one's side actually serve to "protect" democracy (Malka & Costello, 2023).

Acknowledgment of the social and interpersonal factors behind the coherence of ideological belief systems highlights the challenges faced by efforts to reduce partisan animosity and potential threats to democracy via messages and interventions (e.g., Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Lees & Cikara, 2020; Levendusky, 2018). First, if adoption of identity-consistent beliefs serves the goal of fitting in and getting along in one's social surroundings, then the effects of a countervailing message are unlikely to survive the recipient's return to their normal social surroundings and its associated messages and incentives. Rather, the attitude or belief promoted by the message would have to be continually socially reinforced, and this would require a change in incentives, and therefore messaging, from trusted political elites. Second, if people are motivated to identify with attributes that are prototypical of their ideological group, this should over time enhance perceptions that political opponents are fundamentally different, alien, and threatening (Bakker et al., 2021; Margolis, 2018a; Mason & Wronski, 2018). Third, if trusted elites present self-serving authoritarian actions as actually serving to protect democracy, then this belief will likely be absorbed into broader ideological postures, particularly for culturally conservative groups (Malka & Costello, 2023). As long as trusted ideological and partisan elites have political incentives to be divisive and to rationalize anti-democratic actions, counter-vailing efforts to reduce polarization and anti-democratic sentiment through messaging face an uphill battle.

6. Conclusion

In his chapter on ideology from the previous edition of this Handbook, Feldman (2013) emphasized the complexity involved in drawing connections between the character of ideology at the elite level and that at the mass level. Any notion of what "ideology" is at the mass level, Feldman observed, must be reconciled with findings suggesting multiple attitude dimensions that are not ideologically aligned for many people, low levels of attitude constraint, and largely unstable issue preferences. Indeed, if one defines ideology as a consistent, stable network of related beliefs and attitudes about the social and political world, Converse's (1964) conclusion that most of the public is "innocent of ideology" (while extreme in tone) would appear to remain more accurate than inaccurate (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017).

That being said, among the most reliable findings in political psychology is that those segments of the population who are politically engaged are more likely to hold temporally stable political attitudes that are consistently aligned along the left-right dimension

(Baldassari & Gelman, 2008; Malka et al., 2019; Zaller, 1992). Moreover, these individuals are more likely to display traits, values, and identities that are aligned with these political attitudes. If ideology represents a system of interconnected political attitudes and beliefs—even if they are not necessarily connected as a result of consistent application of abstract ideological principles—then an important, highly active segment of the population is in fact functionally ideological.

In this chapter we have reviewed findings about the nature and origins of ideology among ordinary citizens and the social nature of the motives underlying the coherence of ideological belief systems. We leave the reader with two key take-home points that we believe can be helpful in guiding research on ideology. The first, which we emphasized in a previous review (Federico & Malka, 2018), is that links between underlying psychological attributes and ideological preferences are usefully viewed as varying along a continuum (Johnston et al., 2017; Malka & Soto, 2015). At one end of this continuum are "menu-independent" relationships that are organic and functional, meaning the political preference *directly* helps satisfy the underlying psychological needs represented by the attribute. At the other end of this continuum are "menu-dependent" relationships that are *indirectly* present only because the relevant political attitudes happen to be discursively packaged with other attitudes that organically relate to the psychological attribute. Distinguishing such menu-independent and menu-dependent relationships between psychological attributes and political attitudes is important for gaining a realistic understanding of how basic psychological orientations and processes attract people to specific political coalitions and their associated ideologies. It is also important for integrating perspectives that emphasize the durable, psychologically rooted features of ideology (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost et al., 2003, 2009) with perspectives emphasizing the flexible, socially constructed aspects of ideology (e.g., Hopkins & Noel, 2022; Lewis, 2019; Noel, 2014).

Our second take-home point is that the social motives that facilitate the coherence of ideological belief systems have an under-appreciated implication. The ideologically congruent attitudes, beliefs, and self-perceptions that people are motivated to adopt need not be limited to the political realm. Indeed, many attributes thought to exert unidirectional causal influence on political attitudes—such as religiosity, demographically rooted social identities, and personality traits—might also be pulled into alignment with a political orientation (Bakker et al., 2021; Egan, 2020; Ludeke et al., 2016; Margolis, 2018a; Patrikios, 2008; Sidanius, Kteily, Sheehy-Skeffington et al., 2013). In other words, the social and psychological forces that bind political attitudes into ideological belief systems might simultaneously pull non-political identities, self-perceptions, and even behavioral propensities into their event horizon when those ostensibly non-political characteristics are deemed ideologically congruent in a polarized context. This matters because it can infuse political conflict with greater cultural and personal meaning and increase animosity against political outgroups. The clean delineation of psychological attributes as causes and ideological belief systems as effects may thus be unwarranted.

Notes

1. Qualifying this somewhat, it is important to note that valuing of equality applies to both the cultural and economic policy domains (Federico & Malka, 2018; Malka et al., 2017) and

that a reliable link between a general and consistently applied orientation toward change and substantive aspects of left-right ideology is questionable (Proch et al., 2019).

2. Drift-diffusion modeling uses accuracy and reaction-time data from cognitive tasks as input and derives latent variables reflecting different aspects of cognitive performance, including average rate of evidence accumulation, how individuals balance speed versus accuracy, and speed of stimulus processing and response execution (Zmigrod et al., 2021, p. 3).

3. For contrasting perspectives on this asymmetry, see Jost et al. (2017b), Azevedo et al. (2019), and Hennes, Nam, Stern, and Jost (2012).

4. As a caveat, however, some recent measures of left-wing authoritarianism correlate more weakly with left-right self-placement than parallel (and older) measures of right-wing authoritarianism (Costello et al., 2021), suggesting that symmetry in authoritarian hostility is not perfect.

5. Indeed, Zmigrod (2020) argues that rigid, defensive adherence to doctrine and a strong tendency to differentiate between political friends and foes may be constitutive of ideological thinking in general.

6. Dispositional and situational forms of rigidity may also work together in complex ways. For example, while trait rigidity predicts conservative identifications, it also appears strengthen political identifications on both the right and the left (given that there is residual variance in rigidity among both left and right identifiers; Luttig, 2018; Zmigrod et al., 2020).

7. Of course these classic findings about putative social transmission must now be considered in the context of evidence that political attitudes have substantial genetically heritable components (e.g., Smith et al., 2012), especially among individuals high in political sophistication (Kalmoe & Johnson, 2021).

8. Other work, described later, focuses on the roles of accuracy motives and rational updating in partisan cue receptivity.

9. Guay and Johnston (2020) designed experiments to overcome this confound and still found a substantial amount of politically motivated reasoning, and approximately equal levels of this among conservative and liberal identifiers (see also Ditto et al., 2019).

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MORALITY AS THE ENDURING BASIS OF PUBLIC OPINION

PAZIT BEN-NUN BLOOM

1. THE MORAL COMPASS

"A few crowning postures serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole"

(Converse, 1964, 211)

WHILE seminal works in political psychology have shown that voters are often politically ignorant and ideologically unsophisticated (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), there is also evidence that individual-level political attitudes are reasonably predictable, and that public opinion is overall stable and intelligible (e.g., Page & Shapiro, 1992). Consequently, a great volume of work in political psychology is aimed at discovering what guides people in constructing intelligible political attitudes.

One potential answer is the thesis of the moral public, which contends that in forming opinions on political matters, we are guided by moral values (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010, 2013). Individuals hold enduring moral beliefs, in the sense of value-based systems pertaining to right and wrong; and these fundamental core beliefs can account in part for their positions toward more transient issues. This chapter reviews morality as the enduring basis of public opinion.

For many years, political psychologists have neglected morality as an enduring source of political attitudes and political behaviors. This is partly because the moral psychology literature was traditionally dominated by a view of moral judgment as governed by a cognitive reasoning process organized as a series of hierarchical stages (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). To study moral judgments, cognitive moral developmentalist theorists examined how individuals justify their responses to stylized moral dilemmas, such as Kohlberg's

famous Heinz dilemma.[1] To argue that moral judgments underlie the formation of political attitudes seemed to demand the assumption that citizens have the cognitive abilities and intrinsic motivation to scrutinize politics through the abstract and complex prism of moral principles.

Moreover, unlike stylized moral dilemmas in philosophy and developmental psychology, such as Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma and the trolley problem (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976),[2] many everyday moral dilemmas—and most if not all political debates—are multidimensional and complex, involving uncertainty, a dynamic informational environment, and multiple competing values that must be prioritized. Researchers traditionally believed that to empirically study the extent to which the public relies on morals when forming political attitudes, they must identify the array of specific moral rules that people may apply to a particular political issue. And this is not an easy task. In the absence of comprehensible moral principles, and the presence of contrasting theories of ethics, firm moral stances on specific political issues are extremely hard to derive (Hampshire, 1983; MacIntyre, 1988; Sartre, 1977; Williams, 1985).

Moral decision making may be less complex than imagined, however. In contrast to the traditional view that moral judgment is governed by an effortful cognitive reasoning process, recent empirical evidence supports a simpler view. This new approach is inspired by Hume's (1960) classic view of moral judgment as rapid, emotional, and intuitive (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007). This framework facilitated a renewed focus on morality as a basis for political reasoning within political psychology. A moral compass guided by moral sentiment and intuition suggests a consistent and stable basis for public opinion even in the absence of political information, as many political issues can be reduced to questions of right and wrong. This novel conceptualization yielded renewed scholarly interest: an empirical analysis of social psychology journals shows a massive increase in the number and impact of publications on morality published from 2005 onward (Ellemers et al., 2019).

Still, rather than converging on particular perspectives and operationalizations, the morality literature seems to add new concepts and measures by the day. This review will help readers navigate through the abundance of definitions in this multidisciplinary literature, offering a guidebook to the moral compass. The chapter thus starts by reviewing the plethora of theoretical definitions for morality and "moral issues" in politics (section 2). The next sections discuss some of the complexities of the morality–politics nexus and reviews the main findings in this burgeoning literature. It describes the moral mindset as a primary explanation for key political behaviors, such as political mobilization, and for the political polarization and culture wars seen in contemporary democracies. In that vein, section 3 reviews central characteristics of moral attitudes, including their endurance and resistance to change, and their utility as issue frames. Section 4 further examines the links between moral attitudes and ideology, and in particular, possible ideological asymmetry in moral thinking. Section 5 discusses morality as a central mobilizing force: an important source of elite rhetoric, a vehicle for political activism, and a key dimension in voter evaluations of politicians. This is followed by a discussion of measurement (section 6). The chapter concludes (section 7) with some thoughts about the future of the field.

Table 18.1 Key terminology

Concept	Definition	Key measure
Moral dilemmas	Situations that encompass conflicting moral rules for individuals (Broeders et al., 2011).	E.g., the trolley problem and Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976)
Moral judgment	"The evaluation of an act as morally wrong or right" (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014, p. 496).	E.g., How morally permissible or morally impermissible is [act]? (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014)
Moralization	A process that "involves the acquisition of moral qualities by objects or activities that previously were morally neutral" (Rozin, 1999).	See Rhee et al. (2019) for cross-sectional experimental and longitudinal approaches to moral change
Moral issues	Issues under debate that are regarded by at least one side as concerning or threatening its core values (Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Mooney, 2001).	Measures examine whether morality was applied to the dilemma according to a certain theoretical perspective (e.g., harm appraisal, moral intuitions, moral principles, moral conviction, moral emotions).
Moral domain	Principles within the moral domain have an intrinsic effect on the well-being of others; violating them causes harm and is thus inherently wrong. The intrinsic "harmfulness" makes moral principles universal, unalterable, and authority-independent. In contrast, the conventional domain pertains to arbitrary social rules (Turiel, 1983).	Tailored questions regarding allowing/prohibiting practices independent of rules and authority (see Turiel et al., 1991; Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013, 2014; Smetana, 2006)
Moral intuitions	Unconscious, sudden, and rapid emergence of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (Haidt, 2001).	Measured via dumbfounding moral dilemmas (e.g., Haidt, 2001) or more typically with the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) (Haidt, 2003; see also Lefebvre & Krettenauer, 2019)
Moral emotions	"Emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent" (Haidt, 2003, p. 853).	
Moral foundations	Innate psychological mechanisms that dictate moral judgments on what constitutes right and wrong. These mechanisms differ among people, and include five moral systems: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity.	MFQ30; MFQ20 (Graham et al., 2009, 2011)
Moral conviction	"The belief that a given attitude is a reflection of one's core feelings or beliefs about fundamental issues of right and wrong" (Skitka et al., 2021, p. 348).	2-item self-reported moral conviction measure (Skitka et al., 2005)
Core values	"Transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or group" (Cieciuch et al., 2015).	SVS-57 items (Schwartz, 1992); PVQ-21 items (Schwartz, 2003)

2. What Makes a Political Issue a Moral Question? Theoretical Perspectives on Morality in Politics

The first step in exploring the role of morals in public opinion is to identify what political issues are understood in moral terms. However, scholars employ vastly different theoretical frameworks to study moral issues, suggesting a plethora of definitions (and consequent measures; see section 6). This section organizes the main approaches to the study of morality in politics by clarifying the most essential terminology: morality policies, domain theory, sentimentalism, moral foundations, and moral convictions (see also Table 18.1).

2.1. Morality Policies: Moral Issues as "Hot-Button" Social Problems

Classic political science literature suggests that certain "moral" issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage, display signature patterns of political decision-making and public responses that render them inherently different from other, "non-moral" (e.g., economic) issues. Scholars working within this approach typically identify a moral issue in a top-down manner, by examining "how an issue is framed, rather than its intrinsic content" (Mooney & Schuldt, 2008). A moral issue within this framework is one where "at least one advocacy coalition involved has portrayed the issue as one of morality or sin," and "used moral arguments in its policy advocacy" by exposing its embodied fundamental value conflict (Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Mooney, 2001). Such "politics of sin" is characterized by a refusal to compromise or to settle for a mere decline in sinful behavior, instead battling for total abolition (Meier, 1999). These "morality policies," as they are known, are therefore effectively viewed through the lens of religion (Engeli et al., 2012).

This typology is helpful in explaining the role of moral issues in politics. It explains why morally framed issues are at the heart of voter mobilization, candidate preferences, and party alignment (Adams, 1997; Hillygus & Shields, 2005; Layman et al., 2006). It also allows us to derive typical characteristics of moral issues: controversial, publicly salient, simple to grasp, and revolving around social conflicts rather than disagreement on material interests (Heichel et al., 2013; Hillygus & Shields, 2005; Mooney, 2001).

Looking for elite moral discourse as a way to classify issues as moral is particularly useful when comparing sets of political issues (e.g., social vs. economic issues), election cycles (e.g., the moralization of environmental politics), political parties (e.g., to see which employs more elite moral rhetoric on a given issue), and countries and times (when and where issue are moralized and how this translates into partisan cleavages). Still, this approach has significant limitations. For instance, the definition is somewhat endogenous, lacking *a priori* criteria for political issues likely to generate such value-based conflicts (Heichel et al., 2013). Further, moral framing may fluctuate in keeping with elite strategic and contextual considerations (Mucciaroni, 2011), and the public may not be tuned in to these changes. At the individual level, research works suggest that morals can be potentially applied to any

issue, whether complex or mundane, and not excluding economic issues (Kertzer et al., 2014; Ryan, 2014).

Most importantly for political psychologists, despite the centrality of the top-down approach within the political science literature, this perspective is less useful when seeking to analyze individual-level moralization, as opposed to the societal or group level. Consider, for instance, the issue of pornography regulation. A top-down examination will clearly identify this as a moral issue. In countries that have attempted to pass legislation limiting access to online pornography—including the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Ireland, and Poland, to name but a few—moral arguments are certainly employed by elites in policy advocacy, often with visible "politics of sin" dynamics. However, do all citizens uniformly view regulation of online porn as a moral issue?[3] What does it mean to view this issue morally? Does it entail employing a certain kind of logic or particular principles when reasoning about porn regulation? Does it mean viewing pornography as harmful, or revolting, or "just wrong," making regulation morally imperative? The various perspectives on morality in political psychology, described below, each offer a different idea of what it means to view a political issue through a moral lens (also see Table 18.1).

2.2. Domain Theory: Moral Rules Concern Harm, and Are Thus Universal, Authority-Independent, and Unalterable

The influential social-cognitive moral domain theory (hereinafter: "domain theory") developed by Elliot Turiel (1983) builds on the pioneering stage theories of Kohlberg (1969) and Piaget (1965) (for an overview of political socialization research see Sears & Brown, Chapter 3, this volume). Global stage theories within the structural-cognitivist Kohlbergian heritage view moral reasoning as a series of hierarchical cognitive stages acquired in a fixed order starting at a young age, indicating moral development. Like stage theories, moral domain theory views morality as a constructivist process in which morality is acquired by children in their daily social interactions. Yet, unlike global stage theories, morality is not viewed as hierarchical, and types of social knowledge are not thought to be acquired in succession, making some judgments more "morally developed" than others. Rather, beginning in early childhood, children distinguish between types (i.e., domains) of social knowledge, and particularly between societal norms, psychological preferences, and morals (Helwig & Turiel, 2002; Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1998).

What differentiates the moral domain from the domains of social conventions and personal preferences? Following the Rawlsian approach, actions within the moral domain are seen to have intrinsic effects on others' well-being, rendering violations—that is, harm to the physical or psychological welfare of others—inherently wrong (Dworkin, 1978; Rawls, 1971). As such, the moral domain encompasses rules and actions involving harm, justice, and rights (e.g., "never engage in unprovoked hitting," or "women should be allowed to vote"), which are "categorical in that what persons ought to do sets requirements for them that they cannot rightly evade by consulting their own self-interested desires or variable opinions, ideals, or institutional practices" (Gewirth, 1978, p. 24). The domain of convention contains rules of right and wrong as well, but as derived from social norms, authority, and tradition (e.g., stopping at a stop sign). Thus, social conventions are arbitrary: they hold

force through the social organization they define, and can be changed at will (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1983). While the existence of a social regulation is necessary for an act to be regarded as a conventional transgression, social regulation is unnecessary for an act entailing intrinsic harm to be regarded as a moral transgression.[4]

This non-arbitrary nature of moral rules, which distinguishes them from arbitrary social-personal conventions, is defined by at least three formal criteria: (1) universality, (2) authority-independence, and (3) unalterability. Consider the rule "children should not be tortured." The attribute of *universality* or *generalizability* (versus *relativity*) suggests that transgressions in the moral domain are judged to be wrong and impermissible across social contexts. If you think that intentionally inflicting severe pain on children to obtain information is always wrong, in any place or time, then for you this rule is universal. *Authority-independence* suggests that transgressions are wrong even in the absence of a specific law against such behavior, or even if the governing authority is unaware of the violation or chooses not to prosecute it. *Unalterability* suggests that moral obligations should not be alterable by means of any political or social mechanism—that is, torturing children is morally wrong even if allowed by referendum (see Smetana, 2006). If all three criteria hold for this rule in your eyes, than you categorize it as wholly in the moral domain.

Applying domain theory to politics, the extent to which political issues are judged as moral issues varies at the individual level with assumptions about the extent to which transgression is perceived to entail harm to others' welfare (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010; Turiel et al., 1991). For instance, pornography consumption may be classified in the moral domain for some, given assumptions about harm (e.g., the potential exploitation of performers), but in the conventional domain for others (who consider performers to be consenting adults). Nonetheless, as suggested by the morality-policies framework, political issues are expected to differ in their likelihood of being considered a matter of morals, with some political issues more likely to be categorized in the moral domain. For example, the intentional harm to an individual that characterizes capital punishment makes it more likely to be judged as universal, authority-independent, and unalterable than issues such as agriculture funding.

A large body of literature supports the moral domain perspective by confirming that people distinguish moral obligations from social conventions and personal issues above and beyond stimuli, settings, and cultures (for reviews, see Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1998). What is more, this robust distinction emerges at a very young age. For instance, Smetana (1981) reports that children as young as three years old recognize moral transgressions such as shoving and hitting as generalizably wrong and rule-independent, as compared to conventional transgressions such as not sitting in a designated spot or not returning toys to their places.

2.3. Sentimentalism and Intuitionism: Moral Issues Activate Moral Emotions

Critics of domain theory dispute its Rawlsian postulate that the moral domain universally concerns matters of others' welfare: harm, justice, and rights. Haidt et al. (1993) suggest that if the moral domain uniquely involves matters of harm and rights, then reassuring a person that an action was clearly harmless to others (and not related to violations of rights or injustice) should lead them to unambiguously classify it in the conventional-personal domain.

To test this, they craftily invented and presented taboo violations—that is, masturbating into a dead chicken before cooking and serving it for dinner, or a one-time consensual and secretive incest event with no long-term psychological costs—to samples of American and Brazilian children and adults. They then showed that despite persistent reassurance that no one was harmed in these scenarios, participants (with the notable exception of upper-class American adults) still insist on judging such taboo violations as immoral. The fact that people stick with their moral judgments despite their inability to reason through their judgment by attributing harm to the transgression is termed "moral dumbfounding" (Haidt, 2001).

Haidt's moral dumbfounding results notwithstanding, domain theory's premise that people of all ages across cultures distinguish between morals and conventions based on certain formal properties is backed up by persuasive and robust evidence. What is it, then, if not overt harm to others, that allows toddlers of three to distinguish between moral and conventional rules, such that the former are judged as more serious, generalizably wrong, and rule-independent? Emotion is an excellent candidate.

Indeed, Haidt observed strong emotional responses of participants to taboo violations. Accordingly, his Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) de-emphasized the role of moral reasoning implied by stage and domain theories. Following the primacy of affect research tradition (Zajonc, 1980), the SIM model suggests that more often than not, an automatic intuitive reaction emerges in response to moral transgressions, and it is this affective response that shapes our moral judgment; when cognitive moral reasoning occurs at all, it is a post hoc process destined to justify a preceding intuition (Haidt, 2001, 2003, 2012; for an overview of political emotions research see Brader and Gadarian, chapter 6, this volume).[5]

Surely not all emotion-generating acts are regarded as moral in nature, however. Sorrow at missing a loved one or anger at discovering a parking ticket on the windshield do not indicate that broken hearts and parking inspectors are regarded as immoral. For sentiment to explain classification into the moral domain, moral emotions must be distinguished from conventional ones. Haidt (2003) defined moral emotions as "those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent," with prototypical moral emotions including disgust, anger, contempt, guilt, and shame.

Yet while the criterion of domain attribution may be too restrictive, excluding acts that do not entail harm (e.g., the taboo-violating sexual habits studied by Haidt et al., 1993), a criterion based on prototypical moral emotions (disgust, anger, contempt, and so on) may not be restrictive enough. Many acts elicit prototypical moral emotions, but only a subset of them are immoral (recall your anger at the parking inspector). A more restrictive conceptualization of moral emotions in politics suggests that what differentiates moral from conventional rules is not just the type of emotion (anger vs. sadness), but also whether the act holds potential to evoke both other-directed and self-directed emotions (Prinz, 2008). Both criteria are necessary to ensure the generalizability of the moral norm: if you are angry with a parking officer who issues you a ticket, yet would not feel ashamed, in his position, to issue such tickets to others, then for you issuing a parking ticket is not a moral transgression (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013, 2014).

The sentimentalist view of morality is corroborated by empirical evidence. Moral cognition has been amply demonstrated to be tied to core affect, and specifically to emotions such as revulsion, anger, contempt, guilt, and compassion (Cameron et al., 2015; Haidt, 2012; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999). Neuroscience research, including work using imaging technology, has shown that moral cognition is linked to brain regions responsible

for processing emotion (Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2015; Horberg et al., 2011). Similar findings have come from studies with patients suffering from brain damage in areas related to emotions (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010), and with psychopaths, who are characterized by affective deficits (Blair et al., 1997).

Some adherents of the sentimentalist perspective, including the SIM model, have argued that people are hard-wired through evolution to respond with certain emotions to certain moral transgressions (Haidt, 2012). Notably, Rozin et al. (1999) found empirical evidence for what they termed the CAD triad hypothesis (also see Cheng et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012; Horberg et al., 2011; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Building on work by Shweder et al. (1987), they showed that transgressions in each of three moral domains—community (relating to communal values), autonomy (individual rights), and divinity (sanctity and purity)—give rise to a basic moral emotion: contempt for community, anger for autonomy, and revulsion for divinity.[6] However, more recent reviews of the evidence on morality and emotions suggest no systematic evidence for a link between discrete emotions and moral content (Cameron et al., 2015).

Overall, current evidence suggests that the SIM model may underestimate the role of reasoning in moral judgment. The fact that it is difficult for people to identify immediate harms in certain taboo acts—incest between consenting adults, unusual self-pleasing, or eating your recently deceased pet dog—does not mean that they do not conceive of these acts as causing harm, whether to social institutions, to tradition, or to the agents in their afterlife (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010). Further, there is evidence that participants perceive moral dumbfounding scenarios as carrying the *potential* to bring about harm, even if no harm was caused in the particular case (Stanley et al., 2019; but see McHugh et al., 2020). It has also been found that when asked to justify moral transgressions, people spontaneously use deontological (rule-based) appeals to a much greater extent than emotive justifications (65% vs. 22%; Wheeler & Laham, 2016). Finally, even if moral deliberation drives moral judgments less frequently than emotion, it still plays a key role in politics: it is moral debate rather than moral emotions that underlies changes in public opinion over time.

Accordingly, some literature in political behavior combines domain theory and sentimentalism perspectives by showing that both reasoning and emotions underpin moral domain categorization in political settings. This integrative position follows the literature on dual processes in psychology, suggesting that moral judgments can be guided by an immediate intuitive or affective automatic process, or by a more controlled, effortful, and reasoned appraisal (Greene, 2013; for a review of dual process theory, see Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume). In particular, studies demonstrate that moral convictions and moral judgments in politics are causally affected both by harm associations, as domain theory would argue, and by moral emotions (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013; 2014; Schein et al., 2016; Wisneski et al., 2020).

2.4. Moral Foundations Theory

While Haidt's results and SIM theory suggest that the moral domain does not universally entail harm to others and rights violations, this line of work leaves open the question of what content constitutes the moral domain. Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) was developed to fill this gap.

MFT draws heavily on Shweder et al.'s (1987) "three ethics" of autonomy, community, and divinity. Richard Shweder, a cultural anthropologist and Haidt's former teacher, had set out to disprove Elliot Turiel's universalist domain theory, arguing instead for a pluralist and "moderately relativist" approach toward morality, based on the belief that moral values fall into different, sometimes competing domains (e.g., justice vs. care; Shweder & Haidt, 1993). Together with colleagues, Shweder has argued that moral domain theory can be disproven by showing systematic cross-cultural differences in how people identify and respond to moral issues (Shweder et al., 1987). If the matters included in the moral domain vary systematically between cultures, then by definition they fail the tests of both universality and authority-independence, but instead are contingent upon social institutions.

Examining what practices are thought to be moral (i.e., perceived as universal, unalterable, etc.) among Americans and Indians, Shweder and his colleagues found that many of the issues classified by domain theory in the realm of social-personal conventions—such as questions relating to appropriate food, clothing, and sex roles—were in fact classified by Indians as matters of morality. This led the researchers to the conclusion that the content of the moral domain is variable across cultures.[7] Accordingly, they suggested that human moral phenomena fall into three domains, rather than one. The "ethics of autonomy" concerns rights, freedom, and individual welfare; as such, it is most like the universalistic moral domain posited by domain theory. The "ethics of community" concerns one's obligations to the larger community, such as loyalty, duty, respectfulness, modesty, respect for hierarchy, and self-restraint. Finally, the "ethics of divinity" is concerned with the maintenance of moral purity and sanctity.

Paralleling the debate in virtue ethics about which character traits constitute virtues, moral foundations theory sought to augment this list of potential moral domains. MFT suggests that human systems of morality evolved through the ages in response to fundamental social challenges. MFT then takes an inductive approach to define the main categories governing the moral domain. In this vein, Haidt and colleagues reviewed the anthropology and evolutionary psychology literature to identify the "top candidates for being the psychological 'foundations' upon which cultures construct their moralities" (Graham et al., 2011, p. 6). They proposed five sets of intuitions underlying moral judgments (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2007):

1) Harm/care. This moral foundation evolved to motivate caring for the vulnerable and allowing for kin altruism. It is related to the virtue of kindness and the emotion of compassion.

2) Fairness/reciprocity evolved to allow cooperation with individuals who are not kin. It is related to the virtues of justice and trustworthiness and the emotions of anger, gratitude, and guilt.

3) Ingroup favoritism/loyalty evolved to allow group cooperation in the presence of competition for resources. It is related to the virtue of patriotism and the emotions of group pride, belongingness, and hostility toward traitors.

4) Authority/respect evolved to allow the emergence of hierarchies, wherein superiors maintain order and protect subordinates, who in turn show deference and respect. It is related to the virtue of obedience and the emotions of respect and fear.

5) Purity/sanctity evolved to facilitate the avoidance of parasites and bacteria. It is related to the virtues of temperance, chastity, piety, and cleanliness, and the emotion of revulsion.

After proposing this list, Haidt and his colleagues posted a challenge on their website offering a prize of \$1000 "to anyone who could show that additional foundations were needed or that the current foundations should be rearranged." This led to various candidates being proposed, among them liberty/oppression, pertaining to the virtue of autonomy and focusing on libertarian objections to governmental coercion, which was added as a sixth foundation (Iyer et al., 2012). This additional foundation, however, has received less attention in the political psychology literature.

Based on empirical results, MFT suggests that the five main moral foundations can be grouped into two dimensions: the *individualizing* moral foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, which focus on the individual and correspond to Shweder et al.'s (1987) ethics of autonomy; and the group-focused *binding* moral foundations, including ingroup favoritism/loyalty, authority/respect (both corresponding to the ethics of community), and purity/sanctity (corresponding to the ethics of divinity). As is the case with possessing a virtue, adhering to a given moral foundation is a matter of degree. For instance, a person may adhere strongly to the binding moral foundations, prioritizing such values as patriotism, group pride, and respect for group leaders, while treating the individualizing foundations as secondary (though still valuing them to a certain extent) (for discussion on the link between moral foundations and political ideology see Federico & Malka, Chapter 17, this volume).

As will be evident throughout this chapter, a burgeoning literature has adopted MFT's assumption that morality extends beyond concerns with harm and fairness, using its typology and measurement system to study a wide range of political behaviors—including political attitudes (see section 3), ideology (section 4), and elite rhetoric (section 5). At the same time, MFT has been criticized for its ad-hoc nature (e.g., Hatemi et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2017), over-inclusiveness (Schein & Gray, 2015), relatively weak generalizability across cultures and groups (e.g., Davis et al., 2016; Iurino & Saucier, 2018), and particularly the validity of its measurements, as will be elaborated in section 6. Still, a review by Ellemers and colleagues (2019) shows that MFT has become the dominant approach to morality in psychology, producing by far the most cited works. In fact, there are some empirical indications that Jonathan Haidt has almost singlehandedly revived the interest of political and social psychologists in moral judgment and its relationship with politics.

2.5. Morality as an Attitude Attribute: Moral Conviction

A final perspective sees morality as an attitude attribute. This approach contrasts with those reviewed above, which seek to standardize the boundaries of the moral domain by pre-defining what qualifies as moral—whether via domain characteristics, particularly harm (Schein & Gray, 2015; Turiel, 1998), or through a broader conceptualization which views the moral domain as categorized into five or six foundations (Graham et al., 2009). Rather, this approach relies on people's own perceptions of their cognition as morally charged (Lovett & Jordan, 2005). Central to this paradigm is the concept of moral conviction, "the belief that a given attitude is a reflection of one's core feelings or beliefs about fundamental issues of right and wrong" (Skitka et al., 2021, p. 348), as measured by self-reports. For instance, studies may ask respondents whether or not their judgment on an issue, such as abortion, is "a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions" and "connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong."

A moral conviction is viewed as an individual attribute of an attitude, which one may hold to varying degrees, alongside (i.e., controlling for) other attitude dimensions such as certainty, extremity, and importance (Skitka et al., 2005; but see Philipp-Muller et al., 2020). The assumption is that individuals can access their psyches to apply their idiosyncratic conceptualization of what is moral in order to report the level of morality that they assign to a given position (Skitka et al., 2021); and that these self-reports capture their moral judgment in a way that enables meaningful comparisons between people and groups. Ample studies within this perspective show that people may potentially view any political issue through the lens of morality, including economic issues that other perspectives may view as inherently non-moral in nature (Ryan, 2014).

What does self-reported moral conviction capture? First, moral convictions have been found to be correlated with emotions—not with moral emotions in particular, but rather with scaled positive/negative emotions or a host of discrete emotions such as pride and regret (e.g., Skitka et al., 2016; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011). Moral convictions are also linked with skin conductance, indicating emotional arousal (Garrett, 2019). Additionally, moral conviction has been correlated with theory-driven elements of domain theory, such as universalism and perceived objectivity (Skitka et al., 2021). However, emotions are viewed within this perspective as better predictors of moral convictions than are domain theory appraisals or harm perceptions (Brandt et al., 2016; Clifford, 2019; Feinberg et al., 2019; Skitka et al., 2017).

To conclude, this section presented the dominant perspectives on morality in the contemporary political psychology literature, focusing on the conceptualization of moral issues in politics. Clearly, conceptualizing the moral domain in politics is complex. I propose to view each of the perspectives as capturing different elements of moral judgments, and thus as suitable to study different research questions. This approach treats the various perspectives as complementing each other rather than competing. To better decide which of these approaches may fit well with your own research question, you may want to carefully examine their operationalization of moral judgments. In that vein, section 6 is devoted to the different approaches to measuring morality in the context of public opinion.

The next three sections review how the various approaches are used to explain key political behaviors: political attitudes and attitude change (section 3), ideological asymmetry in moral judgments (section 4), and political mobilization, including elite rhetoric and candidate evaluations (section 5).

3. Morality and Attitudes: Attitude Strength, Attitudinal Change, and Morality as a Source of Psychological Constraint

While some attitudes serve an instrumental function, stemming from a motivation to gain rewards and avoid punishment, attitudes based in morality serve a value-expressive function, fulfilling people's need to establish and express their own self-definition (Katz, 1960; Rokeach, 1968). Attitudes rooted in moral values tend to be stronger than conventional or utilitarian attitudes. This makes such attitudes more resistant to political persuasion, while also making moral framing a good vehicle for political persuasion under certain circumstances. Finally, morality can also serve as a psychological constraint holding

together a meaningful belief system, and thereby weakening the Conversian view of the public as dysfunctional and ideologically unconstrained. This section begins to probe how morality might serve as the basis of public opinion by examining how moral convictions translate into political attitudes.

3.1. Morality and Attitude Strength

Attitudes vary in persistence and resistance (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Literature from multiple perspectives converges in associating morality with attitude strength, showing that a moralized attitude is held with greater certainty (and less ambivalence), is cherished as more important, and is more extreme (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013; Brandt et al., 2016; Philipp-Muller et al. 2020; Skitka et al., 2005).

There are several reasons why moralized attitudes are experienced as more certain. Tying a political object to the harm schema implies viewing it as intrinsically wrong under all circumstances. This increases the tendency to generalize this stance when assessing new information, thus reinforcing the existing attitude. When activated, moral emotions contribute to attitude certainty as well. They color all aspects of the situation (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), rendering us relatively insensitive to the situation's particulars (Bartels & Medin, 2007), and augmenting the existing standpoint as the experience is revisited. People thus become predictably biased in their decision-making (Taber & Lodge, 2006).

A sense that one's attitude is important is another symptom of a moralized attitude. Attitudes that are based upon closely held moral values establish one's self-concept and identity (e.g., Rokeach, 1968) and are sometimes called *ego-involving attitudes* (Ostrom & Brock, 1968). Since an attitude derived from a moral position exerts an involvement of the self that is less likely to arise in the case of conventional attitudes, it increases the perceived importance of a successful outcome in any debate.

Attitudes rooted in morality are also likely to be more extreme. This is because a moral stance is not amenable to compromise (Hunter, 1991; Meier, 1999; Mooney & Schuldt, 2008; White, 2002), and moral debates cannot easily be resolved by reference to new facts (Engeli et al., 2012). Evidence also shows that people express more extreme and rigid moral judgments when emotion is induced (Greene et al., 2001; Trafimow et al., 2005). Moreover, attitudes also become more extreme the more they are reinforced through repeated expression, whether in one's mind or verbally (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). People are more likely to repeat and reinforce attitudes as they grow in perceived importance and certainty, resulting in a further increase in extremity.

It should be noted that while moral convictions are conceptually and empirically associated with attitude strength, a moral conviction regarding a political object is typically described as a distinct attitude attribute. For instance, self-reported moral convictions still hold explanatory power even with the effect of attitude strength partialled out (Skitka et al., 2005). Another study showed that both moral conviction and attitude strength have independent effects on political attitudes, holding each other constant (Ryan, 2017). It has also been suggested and demonstrated, using a two-stage-least-squares model building on experimental instruments, that attitude moralization affects the strength with which one holds the attitude, rather than the other way around (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010, 2013). Likewise, moral conviction loaded on a dimension of attitude embeddedness in core values

together with additional attitude properties such as importance and certainty (Philipp-Muller et al., 2020).

3.2. Morality and Attitude Change

"Disputes with men pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irksome," writes David Hume in his *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. People with moralized attitudes are expected to have "blind adherence to their own arguments . . . contempt of their antagonists . . . and . . . passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood" (1960, p. 7). Indeed, a moral mindset amplifies the resilience of individuals facing situations that promote attitude change, such as those wherein there is sweeping support for the other view (Aramovich et al., 2012; Conover & Miller, 2018). Overbearing efforts to promote change in an audience fortified with a moral mindset may even backfire and direct the target audience away from the recommended attitude change (Ben-Nun Bloom & Levitan, 2011; Täuber & van Zomeren, 2013). Still, studies also find that moral messages can facilitate attitude change in the persuasion-suggested direction compared to non-moral messages on a host of issues, from same-sex marriage to universal health care and torture (e.g., Arceneaux, 2012; Clifford & Jerit, 2013; Day et al., 2014; Feinberg & Willer, 2015). The extent to which attitude change is boosted or attenuated under a moral mindset is intimately related with the way morality enters into political considerations.

Morality can enter the thought process to ultimately affect political attitude change through the preexisting mindset of the message recipient—whether the recipient sees the object of the discussion in a moral light or not[8]—and through the characteristics of the persuasive appeal. Moral appeals are messages or persuasion attempts that are imbued with moral cues. Morality can be imbued in the message through moral framing—that is, integrating moral argumentation or language. Morality can also be imbued in persuasive appeals through the message being conveyed by a moralized source (messenger) or within a moralized setting (both typically regarded as moral priming), holding the content constant.[9] Importantly, there is an interaction between the two—the mindset of the target audience and the characteristics of the message—in affecting attitude change.

Let us consider the moral mindset first. As discussed above, attitudes rooted in personal morals tend to be highly unbending, meaning that attempts at persuasion may be hard to press. Indeed, even labeling an attitude as moral can make people more resistant to changing their view (Luttrell et al., 2016; Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Again, this is partly because moral convictions exert an involvement of the self that is less likely to arise in relation to conventional attitudes (Ostrom & Brock, 1968, p. 375). The morally motivated individual may thus perceive a moral counterargument as posing a threat not only to her moral attitude, but also to her self-concept and sense of identity (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Ostrom & Brock, 1968). A moral mindset also renders people relatively impervious even to the persuasive effect of their own social network (Ben-Nun Bloom & Levitan, 2011).

Still, persuasion can be more successful when it considers the extent to which the target audience moralizes the issue in question. The classic functional matching hypothesis (Katz, 1960) suggests that a persuasion attempt will be more successful to the extent that it directly addresses the psychological function underlying a given attitude. That is, by addressing the individual's underlying motivation, the message generates interest, facilitates processing,

and directs attention toward the attitude's relevant attributes. A number of studies support this "moral matching" hypothesis, according to which moral appeals are particularly persuasive for target audiences that moralize the discussed political issue.

In support of this view, Lavine and Snyder (1999) showed that value-expressive messages increase recommended attitude change (e.g., encouraging people to vote). More recently, Bayes et al. (2020) showed that a message framing climate change in terms of conservative moral values was effective in changing beliefs and intentions concerning climate change among Republicans experimentally induced with a threat to their moral values. Similarly, moral appeals about antirecycling and marijuana legalization were more persuasive than non-moral appeals to the extent that initial attitudes were based on moral rather than practical concerns (Luttrell et al., 2019).

People are also motivated to protect their pre-existing attitudes. Thus, a political message can be framed in terms of a moral appeal designed to match the specific prior attitudes, for instance by reframing a moral argument in terms of binding moral foundations for conservatives (Wolsko et al., 2016) or drawing on religious language for a religious audience. Research using the MFT framework to examine support for pro-environmental legislation found that appeals framed in terms of purity (vs. harm) were more persuasive to conservatives (Feinberg & Willer, 2012) and increased recycling among conservatives (Kidwell et al., 2013). Such effects may be mediated by the belief that the matched moral frame is being expressed by a member of the ingroup (Wolsko et al., 2016).

In addition to matching the message to the function (moral or practical) and content (type of value) of the audience's preexisting attitude, other techniques can reduce the persuasion-resistance of morally convinced recipients. Particularly, it was found that two-sided messages acknowledging the recipient's moral position have a persuasive advantage when recipients base their attitudes on their morality compared to counter-attitudinal one-sided messages (Xu and Petty, 2021).

Moral framing can be used not just to shift people's attitudes, but also to reinforce existing behaviors. Here, the realm of social media offers useful lessons, with potentially far-reaching implications for the public discourse. For example, one study of Twitter messages concerning polarizing issues found increased diffusion of tweets containing moral-emotional language, such that sharing increased by roughly 20% on average for every additional moral-emotional word. However, importantly, the effect on retweet rates was larger within political ingroup (rather than outgroup) networks, suggesting that "communications about morality are more likely to resemble echo chambers and may exacerbate ideological polarization" (Brady et al., 2017). Likewise, moral framing was found to increase the sharing of news stories on Facebook and Twitter in Chile (Valenzuela et al., 2017), and was related to the probability of social movement messages being retweeted and favorited at the time of the 2019 Hong Kong protests—though again, the direction of the effect was contingent on the moral dimension used in the tweets and on support for the movement (Wang & Liu, 2021;). Still, current research warns against placing too much trust in the correlations revealed in large social media datasets (Burton et al., 2021). To demonstrate the need for caution, it shows that a moral contagion model, which posits that the use of moral-emotional language will increase the spread of messages, does not yield significant improvement over an implausible XYZ contagion model. Finally, one interesting question is how moral framing—that is, imbuing a message with moral cues—works at the cognitive level. There are reasons to believe that moral persuasion affects cognitive processing. Certainly,

it appears that moral framing, when effective, transforms how the target conceives of and reasons about the morally imbued information. For instance, in one study, moral appeals—employing value-based rather than pragmatic rhetoric—increased the likelihood of the target later employing moral argumentation in justifying their political decision (Colombo, 2021). The literature suggests three different routes by which moral framing or priming may affect the target's cognition. First, the origin of the message (e.g., a religious figure, trusted authority, friend, or political candidate) may influence the target's perception of whether the messenger is being honest (or, conversely, manipulative), and the degree to which the message may be biased (Ben-Nun Bloom & Levitan, 2011; Wallace et al., 2019). This may affect meta-evaluative processes, independently of the specific content of the persuasive message. Second is whether the target processes the message through a central-effortful or peripheral-intuitive cognitive route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Targets who employ central-effortful processing apply a high level of metacognitive scrutiny to the message. This may lead them either to further validate the message, or to "correct" the potential influence of the appeal (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2009). Finally, certain moral emotions, such as disgust, may impede learning and thereby reduce engagement with the message (Clifford & Jerit, 2018).

3.3. Moral Attitudes and Psychological Constraint

Moral attitudes can also be viewed as those political attitudes wherein a moral belief system serves as a psychological constraint. According to Converse (1964), belief systems are dynamically constrained if a change in one's attitude toward one issue is necessarily accompanied by a change in attitude toward a related issue. These horizontal constraints, wherein attitudes on related political issues are connected to each other, derive from a vertical constraint, wherein both are connected to some abstract superordinate belief or ideology (see Converse, 1964, p. 211; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985, p. 872). Thus, support for women's rights should be correlated with support for legalizing abortion, and both attitudes should in turn make one more likely to defend the rights of other marginalized groups (horizontal). In turn, support for women's rights, legalizing abortion, and marginalized populations may all be derived from a higher guiding principle, such as social equality and egalitarianism (vertical).

Converse postulated that constraint is learned from political and social agents, who regularly communicate the shared structures of liberal and conservative ideology. For this reason, this approach is often referred to as *sociological* constraint. Building on this assumption, he found little evidence for constraint among ordinary citizens, whose attitudes are less organized by a "proper" ideological view as communicated by ideological elites. However, others have advanced a *psychological* view of constraint, according to which constraint in political attitudes can stem from within the individual's psyche, and thus is likely to differ between individuals. When conceptualized in this more idiosyncratic manner, coherence in political attitudes should not be measured by how well they mirror elite ideology, but rather by how consistently they follow a certain set of inner concepts, which vary between people. If this is the case, then Converse's famous gloomy view of the non-ideological citizenry—or rather, public *non*-opinion—is at least partially a consequence of his search for the wrong type of constraint.

While the literature discusses several sources of psychological constraint, particularly personality traits (Jost et al., 2003), moral values are a good candidate to serve as a key source of individual-level constraint in how people derive their political attitudes. More

often than not, values and morals are proposed to underlie ideology rather than the other way around (Feldman, 1988; Lakoff, 2002; Schwartz, 1992). A sense of morality is readily available to us from a very young age (Smetana, 1981), potentially from infanthood (Wynn & Bloom, 2014), whereas abstract political attitudes emerge at a later developmental stage. This is because formulating such abstract attitudes requires a comprehension of core political concepts—for example, war, state, nationality, institutions, norms, and laws—that only develops during adolescence (Piaget & Weil, 1951; Torney-Purta, 1990). Given the moral nature of many political debates, and their rootedness in questions not of empirical facts but of right versus wrong, visceral moral reactions—feelings of disgust, guilt, or anger, or a strong sense of wrongness and harm—may lead people to respond consistently to groups of political issues, as well as promoting stability in people's political attitudes.

Thus, for researchers and practitioners, moral judgments are not just a meaningful and significant predictor of public opinion on specific issues. Rather, an inquiry based on moral judgments can also reveal the key sources of constraint within the political belief system of a particular individual (or group) about a particular political object, and thereby weaken the Conversian view of the dysfunctional, "ideologically innocent" public. Finally, this discussion can also go some way toward explaining why moral framing and persuasion, however well a position is argued, may face an uphill battle in changing people's attitudes in a climate of political moralization.

4. Ideological Asymmetry in Morality

While providing normative relief by weakening the Conversian view of the dysfunctional public, the idea of psychological constraint complicates systematic study of the ideology-moral judgment nexus. A range of abstract concepts can potentially guide us in politics, and there is no guarantee that different groups are guided by the same concepts (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981). Thus, an issue may be moral—meaning that transgressions typically lead to a sense of harm or feelings of revulsion—for conservatives but not liberals, or the other way around. Equally, individuals and groups may derive their attitudes from moral judgments for some issues, sociological constraints for others, and personality traits for still others. Moreover, people may view different issues through different prisms at different times. For instance, consider recent concerns over government surveillance and threats to individual privacy. One may view such questions through the lens of preventing harm to the individual ("the individual right to privacy is sacrosanct")—until the emergence of a terrorist threat, when one may adopt an authoritarianism prism.

Given the dynamic and complex nature of psychological constraints, systematic analysis of the ideology-moral judgment nexus may be guided by three competing hypotheses. First is the possibility that different ideological groups (i.e., liberals and conservatives) differ in their respective tendencies to perceive core political issues as moral (the "moralizing conservatives" hypothesis). Second is the possibility that liberals and conservatives are equally likely to view political issues through a moral perspective, but perceive politics through differing moral lenses ("conservatives are from moral Mars, liberals from moral Venus"). Finally, the "morality for all" hypothesis suggests that all individuals generally rely on similar moral criteria regardless of their ideology—although conservatives and liberals may apply a moral lens to differing political objects. Each of these hypotheses is supported by evidence, though not all studies conceptualize morality the same way.

4.1. The "Moralizing Conservatives" Hypothesis

The theory behind the "moralizing conservatives" hypothesis contends that American conservatism since the 1990s has been strongly associated with support for traditional moral and religious values (Miller, 1994). Accordingly, Republicans have successfully claimed moral standing for their positions on many issues and have generally done a better job communicating their messages in moral terminology (e.g., Lakoff, 2002). This may imply that conservatives today are more concerned with moral issues, and hold stronger moral convictions, than do liberals.

Some scholars ground the "moralizing conservatives" hypothesis not in such top-down moralizing, but in individual attributes. This explanation argues that individual propensities drive a conservative tendency to moralize and a liberal tendency to "conventionalize." Indeed, conservatism has been found to be related to dogmatism and to intolerance of ambiguity, avoidance of uncertainty, and the need for cognitive closure (Jost et al., 2003), all of which underlie a need for a rigid categorization of the world—something that is achieved by looking at the world in terms of right and wrong (Bakker reviews this literature in Chapter 2, this volume; see also Federico & Malka, Chapter 17, this volume). Rigid morality is also viewed as a conservative response to an uncertain world (Jost et al., 2003, p. 347). Liberals, on the other hand, are often viewed as more reluctant to judge based on right and wrong.

Regardless of which mechanism prevails, some studies based on exit polls have found that moral values are the main reason for voting among conservatives (e.g., 80% among Bush voters; see Media Matters, 2004). Consistent with these results, Lovett and Jordan (2005) showed that Bush voters in the 2004 presidential election scored higher in measures of moralism—that is, the "tendency to perceive everyday life as imbued with a moral dimension" (Lovett & Jordan, 2005, p. 167)—than did Kerry voters. If this view is correct, it has implications for campaigns, persuasion, participation, and electoral success, based on the fact that morality serves the motivational role of increasing action tendencies (Wren, 1991). Specifically, it implies that conservatives are easier to mobilize and more willing to participate and vote, giving an inherent electoral advantage to conservative candidates.

4.2. "Conservatives Are from Moral Mars, Liberals from Moral Venus"

The second hypothesis holds that while conservatives may not by definition rely on morals to a greater extent than do liberals, they may apply morals in a qualitatively different manner, perceiving politics through different moral lenses. Accordingly, it has been proposed that liberals and conservatives differ in their moral language. Theorizing on the image of the "nation as family," Lakoff (2002) suggests that liberal elites moralize about politics by evoking a nurturing family, while conservative elites evoke the metaphor of a strict father figure. The differing moral concepts behind these metaphors—care on the one hand, authority on the other—then guide their respective constituencies in political matters. Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013, 2016) critiqued the prediction of the "moralizing conservatives" hypothesis that only conservatives engage with moral concerns at the group level, suggesting that while conservatives are concerned with social *order*, liberals focus on social *justice*.

Similar reasoning can be applied using moral foundations theory. Here, the argument is that liberals and conservatives care most deeply about differing moral foundations: liberals

are most concerned with the individualizing foundations of care (avoiding harm to others) and fairness (justice and equality), while conservatives are concerned with the three binding foundations—loyalty (being loyal to the ingroup), authority (respecting authority, hierarchy, and tradition), and purity (respecting sanctity or wholesomeness)—alongside care and fairness (Graham et al., 2009, 2011; Haidt, 2012). According to MFT, while all five foundations are available at birth, a child's moral mind is socialized to view the world through either an atomistic and optimistic lens, or one that is community-oriented and pessimistic. The former is reflected mainly in the individualizing foundations, while the latter cannot be expressed without the binding foundations (Graham et al., 2009, 2011; Joseph et al., 2009).

This prediction of MFT has found at least partial evidence. Different levels of concern with individualizing versus binding moral foundations (for liberals and conservatives respectively) have been tied to political attitudes on a host of issues, from abortion to pornography (Koleva et al., 2012), candidate selection (Clifford, 2018; Franks & Scherr, 2015), and intentions to participate politically (Johnson et al., 2014). For instance, sermons in liberal versus conservative church congregations were found to employ more themes relying on the harm and fairness moral foundations and on binding foundations, respectively (Graham et al., 2009).

4.3. "Morality for All"

Some studies examining MFT's prediction of ideological asymmetry suggest that while some political differences between liberals and conservatives in moral judgments may exist, they generally rely on similar moral criteria. Recently, Frimer (2020) examined religious contexts as well as political, media, and organizational settings in an attempt to replicate Graham et al.'s (2009) results, according to which liberal and conservative sermons differed in their use of moral language. They found only weak support for increased use of purity and authority words among conservatives, suggesting that "it would probably be more accurate to conclude that liberals and conservatives use similar moral languages than that they use different languages" (Frimer, 2020, p. 13).

Further challenging the "moral Mars vs. moral Venus" hypothesis, Hatemi et al. (2019) suggest that moral foundations seem more likely to be situational assessments made to justify preexisting ideological beliefs, rather than a robust explanatory framework of political orientations. In contrast to the argument discussed earlier that values and morals underlie ideology rather than the other way around (Feldman, 1988; Lakoff, 2002; Schwartz, 1992; see section 3.3), they argue that ideology is more stable than moral foundations assessments, and is more likely to predict Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) responses than to be predicted by them. Still others suggest that when ideological differences in moral concerns are found to be present, they can be attributed to personality differences, particularly to systematic ideological variance in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and a social dominance orientation (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014; Milojev et al., 2014). For instance, Kugler et al. (2014) suggested that RWA fully accounts for the ideological differences in authority, in-group loyalty, and purity as predicted by MFT.

Other studies also depart from the "moral Mars vs. moral Venus" approach in that they argue that liberals and conservatives generally rely on similar moral criteria—but with an interest in differing political objects. For instance, conservatives and liberals alike were

found to employ sacred language from the domain of purity: conservatives when justifying social attitudes (e.g., on same-sex marriage), and liberals when justifying environmental protections (Frimer et al., 2017).

If indeed, as argued by the "morality for all" hypothesis, conservatives and liberals rely on a similar moral structure but apply it to different political issues, the question arises: what types of issues are moralized by liberals vs. conservatives? Frimer (2020) suggests that liberals tend to moralize issues pertaining to social justice and the environment, while conservatives do the same for religious and military issues. By another account, differences in how liberals and conservatives moralize issues are mediated by evaluations of the harm-fulness of the practice (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010). Specifically, liberals almost exclusively moralize issues that entail harm to people, whereas conservatives also moralize issues where they perceive harm to the social order (i.e., through violations of norms, traditions, and institutions). As such, it was found that the two issues on which liberals held the greatest moral convictions at the time were torture and capital punishment, where people's physical well-being is intentionally compromised, while the two most important moral issues for conservatives were gay adoption and abortion, where core family and religious values are at stake (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010). Future studies can examine social issues that have gained prominence more recently, such as the Black Lives Matter movement, critical race theory, and rights for transgender individuals.

As a final note, the relationship between morality and ideology may depend on the conceptualization of ideology and on the political context. A recent meta-analysis focusing on the relationship between moral foundations and ideology supports the expected pattern by which the binding and individualizing foundations are related to right- and left-wing ideologies, respectively, but suggests that this pattern is more typical of social rather than economic issues, and is moderated by political culture (Kivikangas et al., 2021). More work is needed to assess the morality-ideology link in different contexts. First, the issues moralized, the level of moralization, and the creed associated with "left" versus "right" are all contingent on the particular point in time and on the examined culture. Second, most studies on morality and ideology are conducted in the United States, where ideology typically reflects a unidimensional left-right contrast. In other countries, however, ideology includes an economic as well as a social vector, and these may relate to morality in different ways. Relatedly, most studies apply a self-reported single-item measure of ideology, which may conceal complexity in the morality-ideology link.

5. Morality and Mobilization: Elite Moral Rhetoric, Candidate Evaluations, Political Participation, and Intolerance

Elite moral rhetoric portrays the political debate in terms of right and wrong, often with the hope of mobilizing voters. This section will first examine the levels and types of elite moral rhetoric and will then consider the effect of moralization of politics on three key political processes: political participation, political polarization, and candidate evaluations.

Although normatively inverse in nature, both political participation and political intolerance have morality as a common denominator, with strong moral emotions such as anger, disgust, and contempt as the main underlying micro-mechanisms. Finally, when elites employ morality as a key evaluative criterion in politics, it will inevitably be used by voters to evaluate them as well. This section will thus conclude with the use of morality in candidate evaluations.

5.1. Elite Moral Rhetoric

At a time when political dialogue in the United States and Europe increasingly frames issues in moral terms, several theories propose that the weight placed on moral matters is what underpins current political divisions (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013; Cahn & Carbone, 2010; Callahan, 2007; Frank, 2004; Hunter, 1991). In particular, it is often argued that polarization dynamics are driven by party conflicts over what constitutes desirable moral values (Evans, 1997; Hetherington, 2009; Layman et al., 2006). As elites align on moral issues and adopt polarized positions, constituents soon follow suit (Adams, 1997). Put differently, when political discourse boils down to "right" and "wrong," and elites use different kinds of moral language in appealing to different constituencies, voters become more set in their opinions, and impossible to persuade. This in turn leads to political deadlock and even further polarization.

Evaluating patterns in elites' use of moral language is typically done through content analysis, relying on moral language lexicons developed based on one of the theories of morality, usually MFT (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Neiman et al., 2016). Results from these analyses with regard to ideologically asymmetrical use of moral language are mixed, and highly sensitive to the time and issue examined (Frimer, 2020).

For instance, using the MFT dictionary, Clifford and colleagues (Clifford et al., 2015; Clifford & Jerit, 2013) examined the use of language reflecting the harm and purity moral foundations in national media content on the debate over stem-cell research. Their findings suggest that purity rhetoric is employed to a greater extent in content reflecting the anti–stem cell position, and harm rhetoric in content reflecting the pro-stem-cell position. Similarly, newspaper ads discussing environmental issues were found to engage the harm foundation in particular (Feinberg & Willer, 2012). However, an analysis of speeches and television interviews by Republican and Democratic politicians did not support MFT's expectation of differential moral language (Neiman et al., 2016). Studies testing Lakoff's expectation of a differential breakdown in "strict father"/"nurturing parent" rhetoric in presidential election television spots also yielded mixed results (see Moses & Gonzales, 2015; Neiman et al., 2016; Ohl et al., 2013).

Likewise, an extensive analysis of Democrats' and Republicans' use of moral language in tweets and speeches found that conservative elites in the United States do not necessarily reference the binding foundations more than their liberal counterparts. In fact, in tweets posted from 2016 to 2018, Democrats used more moral language than Republicans across all moral foundations. Importantly, however, an analysis of speeches along a much longer period (1981–2017) shows that the difference in moral language use systematically changed over time based on party control, such that minority-party members used more moral language (Wang & Inbar, 2020). Interestingly, a study

analyzing English language books from 1900 to 2007 documents vast historical shifts in the cultural salience of the various moral foundations (Wheeler et al., 2019). It is thus currently unclear whether the same psychological mechanisms underlie moralization at the elite and public level.

Regardless of whether theoretical expectations of ideological asymmetry in the use of moral language are ultimately found to hold, it is clear from another group of studies that the use of elite moral language is effective in increasing mobilization, particularly public engagement within social media. For example, studies have found that the use of a moral-emotional frame increases the diffusion of messages by federal politicians (e.g., presidential candidates, members of the Senate and House) on Twitter (e.g., Brady et al., 2017; Valenzuela et al., 2017). Further, this "moral contagion" effect was stronger for conservative elites (Brady et al., 2019; but see Burton et al., 2021).

5.2. Political Participation

Morals are often viewed as intrinsically action-guiding and as motivations in and of themselves (see Wren, 1991). One mechanism behind morality's action-oriented role may relate to its association with affect. Evidence in the psychology literature points to the primacy of affect in motivating behavior, and the key role of emotions in increasing the probability of a decision to act (Zajonc, 1984). In fact, some scholars classify an emotion as moral based, inter alia, on their motivation induction and action tendencies (Haidt, 2003). Certainly, it makes sense that people who hold an emotionally laden moral conviction on a given issue should be more motivated to take action to promote their view—that is, to engage in political life.

The role of morality as a motivating force for political participation can also be attributed to the value-expressive function of moral convictions, and the overwhelming drive to protect one's ego in the face of challenge. Finally, there is the sheer ease of applying morals to politics. Moral issues are typically highly salient, and studies on morality policies suggest that people are willing to act on such issues based on very little information, leading to greater citizen mobilization and individual-level participation (Haider-Markel & Meier, 2003).

Empirically, the relationship between a moral state of mind and participation intentions, such as voting and activism, is well established in the literature. For example, in the context of the refugee crisis in Hungary, moral convictions were related both to volunteering to help refugees and to formal political engagement (Kende et al., 2017). Moral concerns also underlie participation in boycott and buycott efforts—that is., efforts to change corporate or national policies by, respectively, eschewing or deliberately seeking out particular products or suppliers (Fernandes, 2020). In addition, moral language was found to be associated with more indirect behavioral measures of political engagement, such as sharing news stories on Facebook and Twitter (Brady et al., 2017; Valenzuela et al., 2017; Wang & Liu, 2021).

A moralized attitude may be weighted more heavily when appraising a candidate's or a party's appeal and may even be the only dimension evaluated in making voting decisions, a phenomenon known as "issue voting" (Congleton, 1991). In issue voting, voters focus solely or primarily on issues about which they both care the most, and feel the greatest understanding and certainty. Indeed, both emotional indicators of attitude moralization and

reasoned indicators based on domain-theory characteristics have been found to increase issue-based political participation, as well as a tendency toward issue voting (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013).

One interesting question is the degree to which moral concerns underlie political participation in an ideologically asymmetrical manner. Based on a meta-analysis, Skitka et al. (2015) proposed that the relationship between moral convictions and participation intentions (e.g., voting and activism) is robust and characterizes both the left and the right. However, the motivational values underpinning political behavior may differ for different ideological camps. In keeping with the expectation that liberals and conservatives are concerned with different sets of moral foundations, Fernandes (2020) found that liberals boycott and buycott to protect the individualizing moral foundations of harm and fairness, whereas conservatives do so to protect the binding foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity.

5.3. Intolerance and Polarization

The past two decades have seen a shift in the political atmosphere, characterized by increasing ideological extremism and polarization. The emotional nature of moral convictions may explain these processes. Experimental evidence shows that people become more intolerant of moral transgressions and tend to express more extreme and more severe moral judgments when emotion is induced (e.g., Trafimow et al., 2005; van Stekelenburg & Gaidytė, Chapter 26, this volume). It has been found that partisan moral conviction—wherein our attitudes about political parties, party leaders, and party members are connected to our fundamental sense of right and wrong—has led to an increase in affective polarization in the United States. Individuals who tend to moralize politics exhibit more partisan bias, distance, and hostility, irrespective of their partisan strength and ideology (Garrett & Bankert, 2018). In fact, the "culture war" is often defined by its portrayal of emotional morality, as a "political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding" (Hunter, 1991, p. 42).

Indeed, there is empirical evidence that a moral mindset is related to several indicators of intolerance. Self-reported moral conviction is associated with social distance, such that some individuals are decreasingly willing to maintain social, private, and economic relationships—or even to sit next to—individuals who do not share their self-defined moral convictions (Skitka et al., 2005, 2012; Zaal et al., 2015). Moral emotions, such as disgust, are similarly related to social intolerance and aversive feelings toward outgroups, such as religious minorities and gay men (Ben-Nun Bloom & Courtemanche, 2015; Kiss et al., 2020). There is more limited evidence for the effect of self-reported moral conviction in predicting political intolerance, defined as support for depriving individuals holding the opposing view of civil and political rights; Skitka et al. (2012) found evidence for such intolerance in China, but not the United States. Another study, using both sentimental and domain-theory indicators of morality, reported that moral emotions but not perceived harm decreased political tolerance, but this effect was not mediated by self-reported moral conviction (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010). Both induced disgust and disgust sensitivity were found related to support for restrictions on LGBTQ, such as bathroom restrictions for transgenders, with harm assessments showing a weaker predictive power (Vanaman & Chapman, 2020; also

see Kiss et al., 2020). Those findings imply that moral emotions translate more easily into intolerance than moral reasoning.

All of these findings point to a link between morality and ingroup favoritism, where the ingroup may be organic (i.e., based on ethnicity, religion, or partisanship) or defined by adherence to a specific set of moral values. This link has both an evolutionary (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010) and neurological (Berns et al., 2012) basis. An individual who expresses a moral judgment signals to fellow group members which side she supports in a conflict. This information, in turn, enables a third party to express solidarity and punish violators of a norm. Thus, expressing moral judgments reduces the price of uncertainty in conflict and increases coordination within the group (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). The same argument applies to the evolution of religion as a mechanism for regulating social interaction and enforcing norms (Norenzayan, 2013), which explains why morality and religiosity are both associated with an increased tendency to punish "sinners."

Indeed, we tend to recoil at compromise with others when values viewed as sacred are at stake (Ginges et al., 2007; Tetlock, 2003). For instance, Ryan (2017) showed that moral conviction leads to the rejection of material incentives and reduced support for compromise, with the effect of moral conviction being comparable to the effect of holding extreme attitudes. In studies based on bargaining games, individuals who perceived an issue in moral terms were found to engage in more aggressive bargaining behavior when their opponents were perceived as holding opposing views (Delton et al., 2020). Such hostile moralized stances and behaviors only amplify the distance between political camps (Garrett & Bankert, 2018). Finally, a moral mindset amplifies not only opposition to compromise, but also opposition to politicians who are perceived as compromisers, or as willing to conduct negotiations on moral matters (Clifford, 2019; Ryan, 2017, 2019).

Still, studies have examined ways in which the polarizing role of morality can be attenuated. For instance, it was found that political arguments framed to appeal to the moral values of one's political opponents have the potential of reducing the attitudinal gap and tension between the two sides (Feinberg & Willer, 2015). In a similar vein, acknowledging the recipient's moral values by designing a two-sided message was found to encourage openness to the counter-attitudinal message among people with a strong moral basis for their attitudes (Xu and Petty, 2021). Sadly, however, when asked to craft an argument to convince one's political opponents, participants' arguments are significantly more likely to reflect their own moral values, rather than the moral values of the target of the message (Feinberg & Willer, 2015).

5.4. Voter Evaluations of Politicians

When morality is employed as a key evaluative criterion for political objects, it will inevitably be used for the evaluation of politicians as well. Classic models of impression formation in the field of social psychology did not examine morality as a separate dimension of social judgment, but rather suggested competence ("perceived ability") and warmth ("perceived intent") as the universal dimensions of social judgment (Abele et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007), with warmth being the more important of the two (Cuddy et al., 2011). In these classic models, moral traits were treated as simply one facet of warmth (Wojciszke et al., 1998).

However, an emerging newer model suggests that it is in fact the moral facet of warmth that drives its primacy in interpersonal evaluations (Brambilla et al., 2011; Brambilla et al., 2013; Leach et al., 2007). Findings pointing to the primacy of morality in impression formation lead us to expect that morality will be foremost in political evaluations as well, and that moral transgressions will damage politicians' images and consequently their chances for (re)election. This expectation is bolstered by the fact that individuals are motivated to perceive themselves as moral (Aronson, 1992)—a self-image that would be threatened by voting for a morally transgressing politician.

Indeed, voters value morality in political candidates. Classic studies examining the structure of candidate evaluations uniformly identify morality—often termed integrity, and sometimes honesty or trustworthiness—as an evaluative criterion (Kinder, 1986; Markus, 1982; Miller et al., 1986). Unsurprisingly, voters prefer candidates who espouse moral values closer to their own (e.g., Clifford, 2018). In a similar manner, evaluations of political servants often derive from partisan stereotypes. A cross-nation study suggests that liberal politicians are perceived to be more moral, specifically caring, and compassionate, whereas conservative politicians are considered to be more competent and "tough" (Bittner, 2015), although these stereotypes are at least partly context-dependent.

Nonetheless, findings pointing to the primacy of morality in impression formation in the social psychological literature do not necessarily translate well to the political realm. The political psychology literature suggests that overall, competence, rather than morality, tends to govern evaluations of political candidates (Castelli et al., 2009; Elkayam-Shalem & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2022; Funk, 1996; Mondak, 1995). For instance, in one classic study (Funk, 1996), hypothetical candidates in the United States presented as competent following a scandal were more positively perceived than candidates presented as warm. This is likely because, unlike in other social interactions, voters' primary concern when evaluating political figures is whether their representatives can "bring home the bacon." Thus, voters are willing to overlook moral transgressions in politicians perceived as highly competent. This result was replicated outside the United States (Elkayam-Shalem & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2022).

That morality may be an important, but not the single most important, evaluative criterion for politicians is supported by studies into the electoral consequences of moral misconduct. Ample studies have found a negative effect of exposure to information about scandals on voters' evaluations of politicians (e.g., Bhatti et al., 2013; Doherty et al., 2011; Maier, 2010). Still, empirical evidence supports the notion that while moral scandals in politicians may have a cost in reduced vote shares (Basinger, 2018), they do not necessarily end careers (Welch & Hibbing, 1997). Reactions to politicians' moral transgressions may be contingent on different factors. This include both the nature of the behavior (for instance, illegal vs. morally dubious yet legal behavior) and audience characteristics, such as a voter's moral identity and partisanship (Elkayam-Shalem & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2022; Mölders et al., 2017) or voter's gender (Eggers et al., 2018). For example, in the context of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, voters who had previously supported Clinton were less confident about the impropriety of his behavior and viewed it as less relevant to his political performance compared to non-supporters (Fischle, 2000). Walter and Redlawsk (2019) also found that voters' responses to moral violations by politicians are conditioned by partisanship, displaying a motivated-reasoning pattern. Finally, female voters in the United Kingdom were found to be more likely than men to punish politicians for moral misconduct, particularly female politicians (Eggers et al., 2018).

A multidisciplinary body of work suggests that even where political figures find their images tarnished by moral transgressions, they can effectively improve their image by shifting voters' focus to any dimension undamaged by scandal, including competence, warmth, and even morality in undamaged moral foundations. For instance, scandal-hit politicians who had violated the moral foundation of fairness were able to improve their overall image as well as moral image using loyalty appeals (an undamaged moral subdimension), but not fairness appeals (a damaged moral subdimension) (Elkayam-Shalem & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2022). This stream of work shows that voters rely on a multi-dimensional model of moral image in appraising politicians, joining other studies that suggest that the moral dimension of character may itself be divided into subdimensions (Clifford, 2018; Elkayam-Shalem & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2022; Goodwin et al., 2015). This view of moral character as multidimensional, together with voters' tendency for partisan motivated reasoning on behalf of one's ingroup politician, may help explain how scandal-hit politicians can nonetheless not only be reelected but also evaluated by voters as moral.

6. Measuring Morality

There are two main ways of quantifying individual-level morality in public opinion. The first is through top-down theory-driven measures. These define the contents of the moral domain according to a certain theoretical perspective—be it moral foundations, domain-theory criteria, harm, or sentiments—and directly test for individual-level variance in these contents. The second is through bottom-up measures, primarily moral conviction, which ask respondents whether something reflects their moral beliefs. Finally, a moral mindset is often experimentally manipulated rather than measured. The right-hand side of Table 18.1 refers the interested reader to key measures for each of the perspectives discussed in Section 2. Below I discuss the most commonly used top-down and bottom-up measures, and briefly discuss experimental morality induction.

6.1. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ)

By far the most frequently used theory-driven measure is Graham et al.'s (2009) Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) (see Ellemers et al., 2019, for a content analysis of morality measures). The MFQ is a 32-item measure (MFQ30, Graham et al. 2009; also available in a shorter form, MFQ20) designed to measure each of the five moral foundations. It does so by explicitly asking respondents for their (1) judgments on the relevance of considerations related to each of the five foundations (three items per foundation), and (2) endorsement of foundation-related values (three items per foundation; two additional items test attention to the task).

Notwithstanding its innovation and enormous popularity among political psychologists, the MFQ has been widely criticized, particularly for its validity. The main criticisms stem from the fact that the MFQ is a particularly inclusive paradigm that may confound related concepts. First, it is often argued that some of the measures for the binding foundations capture authoritarian personality (RWA) traits and social dominance orientation (SDO) rather

than distinct moral concepts (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014; Milojev et al., 2014). RWA is in fact strongly and positively correlated with the binding foundations, and SDO is strongly and negatively correlated with the individualizing foundations. Indeed, some MFQ items are heavily inspired by these measures (e.g., "Respect for authority is something all children need to learn"). In addition to suggesting that the moral measure confounds personality, this criticism reduces the MFT model to bi-dimensional.

Other scholars have noted the overlap between the MFQ and the second-most-often-used measure of endorsement of abstract moral rules (according to Ellemers et al.'s 2019 review)—namely, Schwartz's Value Survey (SVS) (Feldman, 2020; Graham et al., 2011; Sverdlik et al., 2012; Zapko-Willmes et al., 2021). Values are intimately related to morality, as both are used to evaluate and express worth.[10] The 57-item SVS[11] asks respondents to rate the importance of each of ten motivationally distinct types of values as a life-guiding principle.[12] This arrangement reflects the fact that all values are positive in valence, yet their rankings differ vastly between individuals.

Notably, a recent paper co-authored by Shalom Schwartz used a twin family study and self- and informant ratings with multi-rater data to examine the structural and genetic links between the MFQ and SVS. They found that the two are distinct psychological constructs, but associated in important ways. Thus, they show "partial convergence across different rater perspectives and a substantial genetic overlap" for conservation (versus openness to change) values and the binding foundations, which may reflect a common latent worldview—potentially security motives, sensitivity to threat, and the "dangerous world" belief (Zapko-Willmes et al., 2021, p. 1). Self-transcendence (versus self-enhancement) and the individualizing foundations were found to be "structurally divergent, but genetically linked," such that "the entire genetic variance in Individualizing foundations fully overlapped with the genetic variance in Self-transcendence, but not vice versa." They suggest that this association potentially reflects variance in the tradeoff between the core tendencies toward accomplishment of individual life goals and the pursue of social harmony (Zapko-Willmes et al., 2021, p. 11).

Other concerns have also arisen about the validity of the MFQ. While there is evidence for the model's higher-order binding versus individualizing elements, the full five-factor model is not necessarily validated cross-culturally (e.g., Iurino & Saucier, 2018) and in specific sub-groups within the United States (Davis et al., 2016). Further, contrary to MFT's narrative, the five foundations structure may not be heritable, as it was not found to be stable over time (Smith et al., 2017). Relatedly, it is often claimed that MFT—which is admittedly inductive rather than a-priori—may not be well grounded in either neuroscience or any other such systematic theory, and may be unfalsifiable.

Finally, the MFQ (and many other morality measures, including the SVS) capture rankings of abstract moral views rather than application of morality to a particular political issue. This has advantages, as it makes the measures generalizable to all issues and allows them to tap into a psychological essence detached from particular details. Nonetheless, declared abstract values may not directly capture the complexity of concrete political scenarios. This is because, holding constant a person's abstract belief in a certain moral foundation, its specific application to a political outcome depends on idiosyncratic "informational assumptions" (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010, 2013; Turiel et al., 1991) that may vary between contexts—as "all is fair in love and war." These assumptions reflect the intensity and target of harm, intentionality, and the group identity of the perpetrator and victim, as well

as the setting (e.g., Crimston et al., 2016; Watkins, 2020). Indeed, in certain cases the MFQ is unable to predict moral behaviors that can be predicted by more concrete contextualized measures, which capture the rich details of the moral dilemma. For instance, the abstract loyalty subscale of the MFQ did not predict variance in intent of whistleblowing, whereas more contextualized measures of loyalty capturing concerns that an individual has regarding a negative impact of whistleblowing on their organization and relationship with coworkers did systematically decrease the odds of blowing the whistle within an organization (see Weidman et al., 2020 vs. Dungan et al., 2019; Schein, 2020).

While MFT has so far almost exclusively been measured using the MFQ, other measures have been proposed. Most notably, the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS)[13] presents three specific moral violations within each of the moral foundations (e.g., "Stick a pin into the palm of a child you do not know"), asking the respondent how much money they would take to commit this action. The scale ranges from "I'd do it for free" to "Never for any amount of money," capturing the sacredness of the value. Thus, the MFSS has the advantage over the MFQ of capturing decisions in specific scenarios rather than rating abstract principles.

Other measures response to specific moral dumbfounding vignettes such as the secretive incest story, eating a dead pet dog, and other foundation-related scenarios (e.g., Clifford et al., 2015; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Frimer et al., 2013). While such measures have the advantage of examining responses to specific dilemmas rather than rankings of abstract principles, their focus on peculiar taboo violations does not necessarily capture the often-subtle trade-offs characterizing moral appraisal in complex real-world political decisions.

6.2. Domain Theory and Harm Measures

The intrinsic notion of harm underlying moral transgressions in domain theory yields some important distinctions between moral principles and social conventions, as defined by domain theory's formal characteristics, which specify that moral regularities are universal, authority-independent, and unalterable. Thus, the standard domain theory measure of categorization to the moral domain in political issues captures the non-arbitrary nature of moral rules, differentiating them from social–personal conventions. Other works measure perceived harm more directly, for instance by asking respondents how threatening, dangerous, and harmful a particular object is perceived to be (e.g., Schein et al., 2016). I focus here on the standard measure and its offshoots.

The standard measure of belonging to the moral domain was developed by Turiel et al. (1991). Participants are first presented with a brief scenario or statement and are asked to categorize it: "Is [this act] all right or not all right? Why or why not?" Answers may be negative, positive, or "depends." Then, respondents are presented with six items tailored to their responses, of which three concern the respondent's country (e.g., the United States) and three some (unnamed) other country or countries. These items probe respondents' views as to the legal status of the act (whether the act should be legal or illegal, and why), the legal contingency of their initial response (would the person change their judgment if the act was legal/illegal), and contingency on common practice (would the person change their judgment if the act was/ was not a common practice). In these questions, participants

answering that a certain political practice is all right are asked about their response to a situation where it is generally unaccepted or legally prohibited, while participants viewing the practice as not all right are asked about a situation where it is commonly accepted or legally allowed. The measure then examines whether the respondent's initial judgment is indeed universal, authority-independent, and unalterable, or whether it is affected by circumstances (e.g., by whether the act is a common practice). In addition, respondents' justifications for each criterion judgment are content-analyzed to examine whether they pertain to welfare, justice, and rights (issues associated with the moral domain), or to matters associated with the conventional or private domain (for the full measure, see Turiel et al., 1991).

Other works have adjusted this measure to suit political behavior surveys and experiments, eliminating the open-ended justifications, changing the binary responses to categorical scales, and developing a scaling method (for example, see measures in Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013, 2014). Findings from such studies show that people may range widely in the extent to which they categorize particular issues as being in the moral domain. At one extreme, people may regard a given issue as strictly conventional. Individuals may see the issue as wholly context-dependent, with issue-related behavior judged right or wrong based on the norms and legalities in a specific environment. At the other extreme, an issue may be regarded as belonging strictly to the moral domain, with related acts judged as right or wrong independent of laws, norms, and common practice.

The standard domain theory measure and its offshoots have several important advantages. Specifically, they are driven by a deductive theory of morality, concern real political issues rather than stylized scenarios, and contextualize the scales by tailoring items to the level of the political object rather than asking about an abstract principle. Still, they yield a continuous rather than a binary categorization to the moral domain (which may require using arbitrary cut-offs), may be too restrictive in regarding as conventional certain emotional and intuitive responses (such as to dumbfounding taboo violations), and may be cumbersome to use in a public opinion poll.

6.3. Moral Conviction

The respondent-driven instrument used most frequently by political psychologists (though it is not listed in Ellemers et al.'s review of measures) is the two-item self-reported moral conviction measure (Skitka et al., 2005). It directly asks respondents the extent to which their judgment about a certain political practice is "a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions" and is "connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong." As such, this measure does not carry theoretical assumptions about the nature of the moral domain, but rather taps whether a participant believes that their moral values, as the participant conceives them, apply to a specific object.

While parsimonious, contextualized, and flexible, this measure confounds actual differences in levels of moral appraisal with differences in how respondents conceptualize and delineate morality. Moreover, an important assumption of this measure is that people have access to their own cognition, and are able to extract and report information concerning whether or not they employ a moral lens when thinking about a particular political issue. However, there is much evidence that people are often incapable of reporting their

attitudes and experiences in a representative manner (e.g., Wilson et al., 1995; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).

Further, a self-reported conviction measure may be biased in predictable ways. First, it may measure knowledge that a certain political issue is related to morals in the general political discourse, whether or not one has actually employed these concepts in her own belief system (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2010, for some indication that the moral conviction measure is associated with political knowledge). This is because exposure to moral rhetoric increases the likelihood of connecting political issues with morality and of relying on moral considerations when discussing political positions (Kraft, 2018). Self-serving bias may play a role too, as people may assign moral drivers to the attitudes they find most indicative of their own self-concept.[14] Finally, people may also systematically differ in their willingness to relate to their personal preferences as "values" or "moral principles" (vs., for instance, preferences or positions), for instance based on whether they see value in analytical thinking or as a reflection of social desirability bias.

6.4. Manipulating Morality

This section has so far reviewed measures of morality. However, a moral mindset can also be manipulated or induced in an experiment. The main advantage of experimental manipulation of morality is that it can show a *causal* effect (as opposed to a statistical correlation) of a moral state of mind (vs. control) on political appraisal.

Moral manipulation may involve priming (altering *what* information is presented, by adding a cue that brings morality to mind), framing (altering *how* the information is presented, by adding a moral narrative which moralizes the message), or both. For instance, an experiment examining the persuasiveness of a moral frame embedded in an anti-abortion message may introduce disgust framing by conveying the message in disgust-driven terms such as "abhorrent," "gruesome," and "so horrible" as to evoke "a shudder of revulsion."[15] In an experiment using disgust priming, participants may be asked to start by reading a seemingly unrelated disgust-inducing essay, for instance on food or practices that are repulsive to most Westerners, accompanied by vivid pictures. In both experiments, respondents can be randomly assigned to a disgust exposure condition or a control condition, and will then respond to questions about their abortion attitudes.

Note that while framing offers valuable insights into important real-world moralization techniques, it has a pitfall, in that it often alters the information presented about the political message in a way that may offer an alternative explanation for the effect of induced morality. Accordingly, moral framing experiments require careful pretesting to ensure that the different treatments do not significantly differ in important dimensions such as message strength, negative valence, or arousal. Priming, by contrast, can make morality more accessible without altering the message, by inducing either object-relevant (e.g., unconscious feelings of abortion-related disgust) or incidental (e.g., feelings of disgust unrelated to abortion) moral cues. This enables the researcher to compare respondents' political judgments in the presence and absence of the induced moral cue, while holding constant the information about the political act appraised. Yet the effect of some of the imaginative sensory disgust primes employed in the literature (such as exposure to repulsive odors, tastes, and

sounds) may be weak or unstable and sometimes difficult to replicate (Ghelfi et al., 2020; Landy & Goodwin, 2015).

How exactly morality is induced depends on the experimenter's definition of morality—that is, whether morality is seen as wholly or partially emotion-laden, foundation-based, and so on—and on the micro-mechanisms hypothesized to underlie the specific outcome variable. Many experiments focusing on sentimentalism use techniques such as those described above, which link moral emotions, such as disgust or empathy, to a political message or scenario (but see Cameron et al., 2015; Landy & Goodwin, 2015). For researchers relying on other perspectives, thoughts of harm or moral foundations such as fairness or loyalty can be induced using vignettes containing harmful scenarios or moral violations, either incidental or content-related (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; Clifford et al., 2015; Dungan et al., 2019; Monroe et al., 2021). Messages can be framed using various types of moral language (e.g., Feinberg & Willer, 2012; Kidwell et al., 2013). Finally, while this chapter focuses on moral judgment and moral reasoning, a moral mindset can also be induced by presenting participants with reminders of moral character or moral conduct, such as an honor code or the Ten Commandments (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; but see Verschuere et al., 2018).

7. Conclusions

Moral thinking is a uniquely human cognition. Computer scientists at the cutting edge of their field are hard at work applying deep-learning artificial-intelligence paradigms in an effort to teach computers how to make moral judgments—with only partial success at best (see Jiang et al., 2021). Yet this process, which even the most sophisticated machine-learning algorithm is unable to imitate to a satisfying level, is one of the simplest and least effortful for people to engage in. Unlike a computer, a person can often decide almost instantaneously that "helping your political candidate" is noble and "helping your political candidate spread misinformation about vaccines" is not. This chapter shows the immense progress made in the last decade in the study of morality and public opinion, suggesting that intuitive and emotional moral judgments have a considerable influence on political attitude formation and political behavior. As people can be easily informed by their readily available and easy-to-use inner moral compass, public opinion may still be coherent even in the absence of detailed political information. Thus, emotional and intuitive moral judgments may explain why individual-level political attitudes are reasonably predictable, and why public opinion is overall stable and intelligible (Page & Shapiro, 1992), despite the robust evidence that the public is "innocent of ideology" (Converse, 1964).

As I have reviewed in this chapter, progress in the field is tightly related to different conceptual and methodological paradigms of morality. While there is striking convergence in these perspective on the importance of morality in a host of political outcomes, their overall conclusions with regard to its effect on specific political outcomes are often governed by the concrete conceptualization used. Indeed, the fact that the various perspectives cannot be easily integrated may point to the complexity of human morality. It is thus fair to conclude that the various perspectives complement each other by capturing different elements of morality in public opinion, and that they may be suited to studying different research questions.

Moreover, results from studies in the field are highly sensitive both to measures of moral state of mind and to measures of moral-political outputs. For instance, a study using moral conviction measures found that emotion, but not harm, moralized people's attitudes toward political issues and candidates—for example, leading a person to view a political issue such as a health care reform in a moral light (Skitka et al., 2017). Conversely, using a similar measurement framework but looking at within-person change in moral conviction from time 1 to time 2, it was found that harm, but not emotion, drives an increase in attitude moralization over time (Wisneski et al., 2020). Yet, applying a different set of measures and manipulations of harm (drawn from domain theory) and moral emotions (including disgust), other studies have found that *both* emotions and harm can affect attitude moralization—that is, viewing a range of political issues in a moral light (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013, 2014).

Future studies in the field should work toward improving the interconnections between theories and findings, first and foremost by triangulating the various operationalizations. Further, the nature of the measures and definitions used should be taken into consideration when comparing findings or choosing between different operationalizations for a certain research design. Operatively, the MFQ is vastly more inclusive in gathering the various concerns semantically relevant to morality, but its discriminant validity from related social issues is admittedly low and it is detached from particular political details. Moral conviction items capture what respondents report as falling within their moral domain as they perceive it, but these are idiosyncratically understood. Domain theory directly measures moralization of concrete political objects via the characteristics it sees as unique to the moral domain, but it may leave out more transient, less reasoned conceptions of morality. Sentimental measures, in turn, suffer the reverse limitations. The SVS cites ten motivationally distinct types of values, of which only some directly relate to motivations for moral conduct (particularly benevolence, universalism, and tradition). Finally, stage theory measures capture differences in how people think about moral dilemmas, but are purely focused on reasoning and rely on substantial normative assumptions.

Generally, contextualized approaches can be more useful in predicting concrete political attitudes and behaviors than abstract or stylized measures. This is because moral judgments are highly sensitive to the specific circumstances: questions like whether incest involves consenting adults, whether pornography excludes child pornography, and whether a medically elective abortion takes place during or after the first trimester are all essential considerations in appraising their morality. Contextualized measures refer to such details when examining perceived harm or sentiments, and are thus better able to predict consequent attitudes and behaviors[16]. The challenge of generalizability in the field transcends differences in conceptualization and operationalization. The lion's share of research is US-based or is otherwise based largely on WEIRD (white, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) samples. In addition, with the exception of certain inquiries (e.g., work on the ideological asymmetry of morality), most research findings are scattered, even anecdotal, and are often examined within a certain research group, measure, and setting. This is particularly worrisome as studies have shown that the effect of morality is sensitive to the particular political issue examined, the political and cultural context, and the time frame of the analysis (e.g., Wang & Inbar, 2020; Wheeler et al., 2019), and as sources of uncertainty are often not reported. It is thus advisable for future studies to cast a wide analytic net whenever possible, to potentially apply more than a single framework, to improve scientific reporting,

and to be careful when attempting to generalize not just from particular measures or experimental stimuli but also from one-shot, single-issue, single-context studies.

Next, taking a historical perspective, as the field moved from normative stage theories to the inclusive moral foundations theory, it saw an erosion in its sensitivity to the tension between moral evaluation (what is perceived as moral) and moral value (what is in fact right in a certain context). Applying moral psychology to study public opinion naturally focuses on individual-level perceptions of morality. Yet the fact that an opinion is perceived as moral does not make it moral: people can perceive as morally justified (or not perceive as morally wrong) even the most heinous of ideologies. Future studies can examine the link between moralization of political objects and moral conduct, moral character, and ethical policies. For instance, perceptions of morality based on empathy do not guarantee fair policies, as they systematically privilege certain agents—for example, children, animals, the visibly appealing, and a single victim over many (Decety, 2021). Policy making based on feelings of disgust, too, may systematically disadvantage certain groups, such as religious minorities and LGBTQ (Ben-Nun Bloom & Courtemanche, 2015; Vanaman & Chapman, 2020)—in a way that may bias public opinion and downstream policy. Arguments from within the foundations of loyalty and authority may lead to unethical behavior—such as protecting a corrupt ingroup member—that are less likely under the foundation of fairness.

Finally, the field has moved from viewing reasoned principles and conscious deliberation as the major sources of morality to stressing sentiments, intuitions, and self-reported convictions (but see integrative and dual process models of morality, e.g., Greene, 2013; Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013; 2014; Schein et al., 2016). Moral reasoning is currently often viewed as rare, and as a post hoc process designed to justify a preceding intuition. Still, moral arguments, not sentiments, can vary with time in response to changes in the information environment. For instance, it was not disgust at the taste or odor of smoking, but rather new knowledge about the harmful effects of passive exposure to cigarette smoke, that was responsible for the moralization of discourse on this topic. Moral reasoning is thus essential in understanding political changes both in individual-level attitudes and on a societal scale. I have argued in this chapter that one of the most important contributions of the new science of moral psychology to political science is to stress the power of simple moral intuitions as potent heuristics in politics, which may help explain the stability of public opinion. Yet, to be able to study both stability and change in public opinion, and to explain differences both cross-culturally and over time, it may be useful to let the pendulum swing back to the middle, where both reasoning and sentiments are examined.

Notes

1. The Heinz dilemma is a measure of moral development designed by Kohlberg. In this story, a woman is near death, and there is one highly expensive and overpriced drug that doctors think might save her. After her husband, Heinz, is unable to either raise the needed sum or persuade the druggist to lower his price, he considers stealing it. Should he? Participants' reasoning was coded into one of six stages, using a standard list of answers.

2. The trolley problem, introduced by Foot (1967), presents a situation in which an out-of-control trolley will inevitably kill five people working on the track—unless a switch is

pulled which will divert the trolley onto a side track, where it will hit and kill one person. Is it morally acceptable to pull the switch?

3. Apparently not (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014).

4. The personal domain concerns matters of personal preference, choice, and boundaries (privacy and control), distinguishing a particular individual from others. Issues in this domain pertain only to private aspects of an individual's autonomic life and thus are outside the realm of conventions and morals (Nucci, 2001).

5. While domain (and stage) theorists traditionally acknowledge that people experience emotions when thinking about morality, and that emotions facilitate the learning process about harm assumptions, they argue that emotions are not necessary or sufficient for the moral/conventional distinction to emerge (see Smetana, 2006).

6. We will return to Shweder et al. and their three moral domains in more detail below, when discussing Haidt's moral foundations theory.

7. It should be noted that domain theory does not require zero cross-cultural variance. Rather, it suggests that different contexts may lend themselves to different informational assumptions (i.e., what one accurately or mistakenly believes to be true) regarding the harmfulness of events.

8. It has been found that holding an attitude with moral conviction and viewing the attitude as reflecting one's values are intimately related (Philipp-Muller et al., 2020). Hence, in this section I draw on some of the literature on values in persuasion, under the assumption that morality may play a similar role.

9. For more on the difference between moral framing and moral priming, see section 6.4.

10. Having value or worth by itself is not a sufficient criterion for belonging to the moral domain. For example, handsomeness has value, but pertains to the domain of personal preferences. Schwartz's model refers to values as distinct motivational goals, not as measures of merit.

11. The Portrait Values Questionnaire—PVQ—is a shorter 21-item version.

12. The first axis contrasts openness to change—encompassing the values of autonomy (self-direction) and excitement (stimulation)—with conservation, which advocates for preservation of the status quo (tradition), norm compliance (conformity), and safety (security). The second axis contrasts self-enhancement—emphasizing the pursuit of self-interest by seeking to control people and resources (power) or by seeking success (achievement)—with self-transcendence, which emphasizes concern for the well-being of others (benevolence) and acceptance and tolerance (universalism) (Schwartz, 1992, 2016).

13. As reflected in the scoring system of the SVS but not the MFQ, values are all positive in valence, yet their rankings may differ vastly. Accordingly, the MFSS models moral foundations as trade-offs between concerns (e.g., testing a person's willingness to violate a moral concern for monetary payment; Tetlock, 2003), which potentially better captures the richness of moral appraisals in complex political decisions.

14. There is some evidence that self-reported moral convictions point to self-relevance of the issue, with attitude dimensions indicating self-relevance of the attitude—importance and certainty—being the best predictors of moral conviction within participants and over time (see Brandt et al., 2016).

15. Terms borrowed from the court's discussion in *Stenberg v. Carhart.*

16. Another factor to consider is whether motivated moral cognition is at play, and particularly whether an individual's moral self is threatened upon appraisal of the moral dilemma. In such cases, it may be important to consider examining ethical dissonance (Barkan, Ayal, & Ariely, 2015), moral coping strategies (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2019), or moral hypocrisy (O'Connor, Effron, & Lucas, 2020).

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CHAPTER 19

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THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER

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MONICA C. SCHNEIDER AND ANGELA L. BOS

1. GENDER/SEX IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW

GENDER/SEX[1]—"AN umbrella term for both gender (socialization) and sex (biology/evolution) . . . where gender and sex cannot be easily or at all disentangled" (van Anders, 2015, p. 1181)—affects the way people live with, work with, interact with, and perceive each other. Layered on top of the reproductive, chromosomal, genital, and hormonal differences between females and males (sex) and the socialization of masculine and feminine qualities (gender), cultures afford power and status to male bodies and men more than to female bodies and women. In politics, where seeking, gaining, and wielding power are core activities, women's inferior status persists across time and country. Even as women have tried to assert themselves as actors in the political sphere, people cling to the familiar actions of gendered prejudice and oppression. Though women have made many gains in social, political, and economic capital, gender/sex perseveres to shape political life.

As we write this chapter, we take stock of gains and challenges for political psychologists to investigate and explain. We note that, despite many women around the world rising to hold political leadership roles, such as former Chancellor Merkel in Germany and Vice-President Harris in the United States, women's representation, at all levels of political office, lags worldwide. We observe women organizing to challenge the power of and oppression by men through the #MeToo movement and the worldwide Women's March—and how women of color in particular have demonstrated leadership in these efforts as well as in the #BlackLivesMatter protests of police violence. We recognize the intersectional dynamics whereby Black women, Indigenous women, women of color, disabled women, and transgender women often struggle within social movements to have their voices heard and to have their unique group interests met. Worldwide, we witness hostility toward women political leaders. We behold a new generation of young people who are more open to gay rights and transgender identities, but continue to privilege traditional sexual and gender identities.

Each of these observations prompts questions about the ongoing and changing relationship between gender/sex, power, and stereotypes with political behavior and attitudes.

After decades of research that focused on binary sex differences, researchers still seem to feel compelled to look for such differences, despite evidence suggesting significant overlap between females and males (Hyde, 2005; Sapiro, 2003). We argue that research must push forward from a traditional "add women and stir" (Beckwith, 2005, p. 128) approach. Political psychology is uniquely situated to differentiate sex (biology) from gender (the "psychological features frequently associated with these biological states") (Deaux, 1985, p. 51) and to shift our focus from sex to gender and its many complexities, including its intersection with race and other identities (see Pérez & Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume). Through this shift, research can best specify how people create their gendered selves, in part as a collective response to norms, institutions, and policies that are themselves gendered (Diekman & Schmader, 2021), as well as the mechanisms through which gender affects behavior (Wood & Eagly, 2015).

This chapter reviews research to illustrate when political psychology provides particularly excellent insights regarding gender/sex and politics, especially when scholars carefully ground their work in psychological theories of gender. Wood and Eagly (2009, p. 111) warn readers to pay attention to of the *principle of compatibility:* Measures of gender/sex will only predict behavior when researchers align the appropriate aspect of gender with the behavior of interest. To this end, we draw attention to studies that exemplify a tight relationship between theory, expectations, measures, and outcomes, and underscore the continued promise of political psychology lenses to studying how gender, as a social construction tied to power, influences how people understand and experience politics.

We provide a roadmap for new and advanced readers to extant theory and research from the psychology of gender and how it gives insight into the effects of gender/sex in the political domain. We begin in Section 2 by defining key terms and presenting core theories that explain how and why gender develops. We review commonly used measures and highlight the need for careful measurement. Subsequently, we present empirical studies focused on explaining and understanding the powerful ways that gender/sex affect the political experiences of citizens' political attitudes and behavior (Section 3) and elite behavior (Section 4). In Section 5 we shift to understanding how gender/sex affects leader evaluations. We give an overview of psychological theories and empirical findings related to why and how people judge others based on their gender. We conclude with insights regarding promising next steps for the field.

2. A Psychological Approach to Gender/Sex

Psychology tells us about what gender is, theories of how and why gender develops, and how it is measured. We encourage researchers less familiar with the psychological literature to use this as an introductory guide to their journey to proper conceptualization of gender and better theorization of its effects. Our focus on gender over sex reflects our view that gender, not the biology of sex, is more likely to predict political variables of interest.

2.1. Defining Gender

Gender broadly refers to aspects of the self in relation to society typically associated with men (masculine) or women (feminine).[2] Tate et al. (2014) argue in favor of conceptualizing gender as a "bundle" of constructs, making it crucial for researchers to choose and properly define the appropriate aspect of gender relevant for their research. The bundle of gender constructs includes birth-assigned gender, current gender identity, gender roles and expectations, gender social presentation, and gender evaluations. Gender incorporates feeling a sense of collective identity with like-group members (Wood & Eagly, 2009, 2015) that precedes politicized identity or feelings that the political fate of one's gender is linked (Conover, 1988; Gurin, 1985). Finally, gender not only includes individual-level cognitions about how people define and express themselves, but also characterizes how people view each other and interact within a gendered social structure and gendered institutions (Diekman & Schmader, 2021; Wood & Eagly, 2012).[3]

Gender identity often falls neatly on a binary and matches birth-assigned sex, but variation between and among people warrants additional attention. While many people self-report gendered personality characteristics consistent with the gender that matches their sex, some people express a cross-sex-typed personality (high on a feminine or masculine dimension but not in the other), one that is androgynous (high on both feminine and masculine dimensions), or one that is undifferentiated (low on both feminine and masculine dimensions). Nonbinary people experience the two dimensions of gender simultaneously or even not at all (Hyde et al., 2019). For transgender people, their sense of their own gender identity differs from their biological, birth-assigned category and might also differ from how others label and assign gender to them (Tate et al., 2014). Moreover, the self-assignment of gendered personality traits demonstrates variability and nuance over time, situation, and the life course (Wood & Eagly, 2015). Such change might be particularly pronounced for people who are transgender, who often delay public expression or admission of their gender identity, due to strong social norms to match gender identity with birth-assigned sex (Tate et al., 2014).

2.2. Theories of Gender

Why does gender/sex emerge as the basis for many human behaviors and cognitions? We present several theories from psychology that explain gender. These theories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they without debate. We privilege social role theory as our preferred lens through which to best explain gender (Schneider & Bos, 2019)—that is, the adaptation of men and women into different social roles bears responsibility for gendered behaviors. Thus, we give an overview of social role theory before offering alternative explanations for the causes of gender: biology, evolutionary theory, power-based theories, and group-based explanations. We view promise in other theories as well, arguing that insight into gender can come from many different directions, provided that the researchers are explicit in identifying their theoretical bent.

2.2.1. *Social Role Theory*

Social role theory implicates a societal sex-based division of labor, stemming from the adoption of different roles by males and females because of their biological strengths, to

explain gender (Eagly et al., 2000; Wood & Eagly, 2012). Men's superior physical power facilitated their success at tasks involving manual labor and farming, which eventually led to their entrance into the paid labor force and allowed them to acquire resources and power (Wood & Eagly, 2002). Women's ability to bear children—and the pre- and post-natal physical limitations—meant that they spent more time in pre-industrial societies performing labor inside the home. Through occupying these roles, men and women developed the traits necessary for successful performance in them. For men, this meant adopting agentic traits (e.g., aggressive, ambitious) to assist their success as hunters, farmers, workers, and eventually, leaders, whereas women acquired the communal traits (e.g., empathetic, caring, kind) essential for caring for others. The tendency of men and women to exhibit agentic and communal traits and behaviors, respectively, results not from biological differences, but rather from learning the traits necessary to perform in their assigned roles and from social pressure to continue conforming to those roles (Eagly et al., 2000).

Conforming to gender roles means more than just adopting particular traits; part of the gender socialization process consists of teaching people to prefer goals consistent with the gender stereotypical dimensions of communion and agency (Diekman et al., 2017; see Sears & Brown, Chapter 3, this volume). The powerful reinforcement of binary gender norms results in boys learning to prioritize goals related to agency (seeking power, achievement, and new experiences) while girls adopt goals related to communion (seeking working with or helping others) (Diekman & Schmader, 2021). Over time, men and women's preferences for a subset of agentic goals related to achievement have converged, but women still have a stronger preference for communal goals and for rejecting power-related goals relative to men (Diekman et al., 2017; Schneider et al., 2016).

In sum, social role theory suggests that gender is a social construct derived from an ongoing gendered division of labor; gender roles perpetuate themselves because gender norms encourage conformity to these roles. Many scholars have found links between social roles and political attitudes and behavior (see work reviewed by Diekman & Schneider, 2010; Schneider & Bos, 2019).

2.2.2. *Biological Explanations*

A biological perspective suggests that divergence in male and female brains and hormones might explain behavioral differences; yet, recent studies challenge both the existence of these differences and, where they exist, their effects. Brain studies demonstrate more similarities than differences between the brain structure of men and women (Hyde et al., 2019; Joel et al., 2015). While people believe that the hormone testosterone bears responsibility for the masculine or aggressive behavior of men, a review of studies demonstrate similar testosterone levels in both men and women (Hyde et al., 2019). High testosterone links to competition and low testosterone to nurturance, constructs that are not synonymous with masculinity and femininity (van Anders, 2013). Crucially, even when scientists find sex-based brain differences (Ruigrok et al., 2014), they do not always find a clear relationship between those differences and behavioral sex dissimilarities (Wallentin, 2009).

A more likely theory of the biology of gender/sex is that social factors and behavior determine hormones and brain differences, rather than the other way around (Hyde et al., 2019; Wood & Eagly, 2010, 2012). For instance, levels of testosterone are not fixed by biological sex, but instead respond to social stimuli like a baby crying (van Anders, 2013). In

short, scientists find little evidence that the biology of sex directly correlates to gendered behaviors, making its use in political psychology tenuous.

2.2.3. *Evolutionary Theory*

Evolutionary theorists argue that human psychological mechanisms and behavior developed to promote survival and reproduction (Tooby & Cosmides, 2015; Bang Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume). Gender differences, in particular, result from men's and women's physical differences in combination with their responses to unique challenges throughout evolutionary history. The exertion that pregnancy and breastfeeding requires shapes how women behave; for example, women tend to be more selective in their choice of mate and seek men who have physical characteristics that make them fit for reproduction (Buss & Schmitt, 2011). Because men have a low cost to procreation, they adopt sexual strategies appropriate to achieving a variety of sexual partners in short-term relationships.

Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) theory of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) posits that people have a tendency to want to maintain group hierarchies and establish dominance over outgroups; such desire for power is evolutionary-based and organizes societies across cultures. Women's careful decision-making in choosing an appropriate mate for child bearing and rearing means that men must compete to attract women. This competition encourages men to desire power and resources, to seek domination over other groups (particularly men of other groups), and to create and maintain the patriarchy in order to preserve women as a reproductive resource. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have amassed considerable evidence to show that men score higher than women on SDO, underlying broader political gender differences.

2.2.4. *Power Structure*

Theories focusing on power seek to understand how a group's placement in the larger hierarchical system conditions the behavior and attitudes of dominant and subordinate group members (Craig & Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume). Men, who enjoy a high social status, behave like members of other dominant groups by acting to support the social hierarchy and solidify their place in it (Jost et al., 2004). Subordinate group members, including women, counterintuitively, also often uphold the system to make sense of their subordinate status. Although people vary in their motivation to justify and support the system, both men and women tend to privilege men and male-stereotypical traits and behaviors as superior to those of women (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003).

2.2.5. *Group Identity*

Humans develop emotional attachments to groups in order to feel a sense of belonging and distinctiveness from others, perhaps as an evolutionary adaptation to solve challenges related to survival (e.g., Brewer, 2007). The predisposition for group identity combined with the power of gender as an enduring social and political category (Diekman & Schmader, 2021; Sapiro, 1981b) result in varied forms of gender identity. Gender identity includes the way people define themselves personally with respect to gender (Wood & Eagly, 2015), the

way that they attach to their gender group socially, and, most importantly, the way that they view their gender group as having political importance (e.g., Gurin, 1985). People might be particularly likely to adopt gender-based self-categorization when gender is salient and/or situationally relevant (Huddy, 2013).

Crucial for political psychologists, gender identity can evolve in political importance and be used to "consciously engage in a power struggle on behalf of the group" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, pp. 323–324). According to this model, as women (or any group) perceive injustice to their group, women's identification with other women as a politically important group emerges as a powerful predictor of collective action. The subjective group identification that women feel toward each other, combined with shared grievances that they attribute to a bad system, constitute a set of feminist beliefs (Gurin, 1985; Huddy, 2013; Simon & Klandermans, 2001), where feminist identity can be defined as "the politicized version of a female identity" (Huddy & Willmann, 2021, p. 6). The #MeToo movement provides an example of the politicization of gender identity.

Intersectional approaches to identity recognize how multiply constituted marginalized identities affect how people experience the world (Crenshaw, 1991). Other identities, such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, status, and ability (to name a few), are experienced in conjunction with gender/sex. Rogers et al. (2015) used a narrative approach to uncover that Black high school students reported the centrality of both race and gender to their identity, but that the importance of these identities changed over time to both "support and compete with each other" (2015, p. 419). Intersectional scholars have amassed considerable evidence in favor of understanding how multiple identities develop in tandem (e.g., Ghavami et al., 2016).

2.2.6. *Gender Socialization Theories*

Children's early gender socialization is a process through which they internalize gender concepts and stereotypes (Liben et al., 2002). Numerous theories have emerged regarding gender socialization and how people, starting in childhood, are socialized to gendered expectations and roles. Here, we briefly describe the major theories including theories social learning, cognitive development, gender schemas, and cognitive learning—biological, psychoanalytic, and intersectional (see Stockard, 2006, for a review).

Based on Social Learning Theory, sex-typed behaviors develop due to (1) modeling where children develop sex-typed behaviors because they model the behavior of other males or females and (2) reinforcement from others when they conform to expectations of their sex group (and lack of reinforcement when they do not conform) (Maccoby, 1992). Based on social role theory, through observing men and women holding sex-differentiated roles (e.g., men in roles such as leaders who are agentic and women in caretaking roles who are communal), children infer that sex-differentiated traits are needed to succeed in those roles. In addition, news coverage, children's literature, and popular culture convey gender-appropriate roles for girls and boys; together, these media encourage girls to adopt communal traits and goals and encourage boys to develop agentic traits and goals (Diekman & Murnen, 2004).

Multiple theoretical traditions emphasize the cognitive dynamics of gender socialization. In cognitive developmental theory, which builds on the work of Jean Piaget, children develop stereotypic conceptions of gender from what they see and hear around them, and

demonstrate increasing flexibility and complexity in understanding gender roles as they age (Kohlberg, 1966) and the capability for complex thought increases. According to gender schemas and cognitive learning theories, gender schemas are complex, multi-dimensional cognitive schemas that people use to keep information related to gender categories organized (Levy & Fivush, 1993). Through observing their culture, children develop gender schema and acquire sex-defined characteristics (e.g., traits, behaviors, preferences) that align with gender (Bem, 1981). In this model, children's gender schemas become more elaborate as they develop understanding of gender roles and their gender identity.

Psychoanalytic theory offers an alternative way to explain how gender becomes embedded in personality structures very early in our development (Stockard, 2006). In this theory, a child tends to first adopt a feminine identification, based on their main relationship often being with a mother or a female caretaker; they then embark on a process of embracing or rejecting this identification. This theory holds that boys' development of gender identity is challenging because they must work to repress their feminine identification developed through this first relationship (Chodorow, 1989). A sociology-oriented version of psychoanalytic theory holds that children first learn their role as a child; as they loosen ties with their mother and their fathers become more involved, they begin to adopt roles related to their gender identity (Stockard & Johnson, 1979).

2.3. Measurement of Gender/Sex

Having presented theories of why gender emerges, we turn to measures of gender that cut across these theoretical traditions. Before we begin, we note that the considerable complexity in conceptualizing and measuring sex and gender warrants several important considerations. First, neither gender nor sex should be measured as binary concepts (Hyde et al., 2019). Second, gender/sex should be measured via self-report to avoid inaccurate interviewer assessments (Albaugh, 2021; Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015). Third, gender should be treated as dynamic rather than static (Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015). Fourth, gender and sex questions should occur at the end of the survey to avoid priming respondents to think differently about subsequent questions (Cassino & Besen-Cassino, 2021). Fifth, language, culture, race, and ethnicity need to inform creating gender measures and adapting English-language questions for different contexts. Finally, researchers should carefully consider whether sex or gender—as well as which aspect of gender—will best predict the behavior of interest. Aligning "the content of the behavioral measure to the content of the dispositional measure" at the same "level of generality" (Wood & Eagly, 2009, p. 111) will ensure the compatibility of the measures to best predict behavior. For example, identifying with the interests of women as a group might predict gender-based political activity better than, say, a measure of preferences in interpersonal relationships, though both are valid measures of aspects of gender identity.

2.3.1. *Sex*

Multiple questions about gender/sex allow researchers to separate sex from gender (Albaugh, 2021; Saperstein & Westbrook, 2021; Tate et al., 2013). An appropriate question

about sex would ask for birth-assigned sex—since researchers and participants often cannot access information about chromosomal or other biological measures—and would include "male," "female," and "intersex" as response options. Transgender identity could be inferred from determining if a follow-up measure of gender identity differs from birth-assigned sex. Alternatively, a separate question simply asking if the respondent is transgender or not might avoid triggering transgender respondents, some of whom take offense to a question asking birth assigned sex (Albaugh, 2021), though reliability may be lower for such questions (Saperstein & Westbrook, 2021).

Before choosing any measure of sex, researchers should consider whether such a measurement is necessary for the outcomes of interest. Asking birth-assigned sex may be more relevant in medical research or for scholars studying the biological underpinnings of gender/sex through measuring hormones, brain activity, or genetic variation (Tate et al., 2013). For scholars studying the outcomes typically of interest to most political scientists, birth-assigned sex, on its face, has less predictive validity than gender identity (Albaugh, 2021).

2.3.2. *Gender*

While gender encompasses a number of constructs, a broad measure asking respondents their "current gender identity" (e.g., Albaugh, 2021) captures how people label themselves in the moment, since gender identity might change over time (Saperstein & Westbrook, 2021; Tate et al., 2013). The appropriate binary terms for response options in such a question would be "man" and "woman," since male and female refer to sex, not gender. To capture people who do not identify as either men or women, researchers might use open-ended options, which allow respondents to use their own language to describe their identity. A free response option, such as "another gender, please specify," avoids othering respondents who fall outside the gender binary (Albaugh, 2021), though one concern about asking open-ended questions is getting nonsense or confused responses. While this can occur, making it harder to decipher results (Saperstein & Westbrook, 2021), researchers must balance this possibility in their specific population with the need to create reliable and valid questions for those who fall outside the binary. Using a straightforward question about gender with three options (man, woman, free-response) should satisfy the goals of most political psychology research, though researchers with unique populations may need to consider additional options.

2.3.3. *Personality Traits*

Personality trait measures complement categorical gender/sex questions (Albaugh, 2021) by allowing respondents flexibility to self-report as having gradations of masculine and feminine attributes as two separate dimensions (Saperstein & Westbrook, 2021) or even to describe themselves as high or low on both dimensions (Wood & Eagly, 2015). The two most common personality trait measures include the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 1974) and the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) (Spence et al., 1974), which were developed from questionnaires about the stereotypical and desirable characteristics of men and women. For example, the BSRI measures a person's gendered personality traits on feminine (e.g., affectionate, compassionate, gentle, warm), masculine (e.g., competitive, assertive,

dominant, independent), and neutral (e.g., adaptable, helpful, reliable) dimensions (Bem, 1974, 1981). Participants are characterized as masculine, feminine, androgynous, or non-typed based on their responses and the level of difference between the scales.

One criticism of the BSRI/PAQ is that the measures define masculinity and femininity on behalf of respondents and, more broadly, may lack construct validity (Gidengil & Stolle, 2021). Self-placement on a single bipolar scale (Bittner & Goodyear-Grant, 2017) or two bidimensional scales (Gidengil & Stolle, 2021) of how feminine and masculine the respondent feels allows respondents to define the meaning of masculinity and femininity more generally than specific personality traits. Bidimensional scales performed better in predicting issue positions for people with atypical gender identities (Gidengil & Stolle, 2021). Response options ranged from a 7-point scale to a 0–100 feeling thermometer (Albaugh, 2021; Bittner & Goodyear-Grant, 2017). Political psychologists have begun utilizing personality measures of gender to great effect in predicting public opinion and political behavior (e.g., McDermott, 2016).

2.3.4. *Roles and Goals*

A facet of gender for researchers to consider is the gendered roles that people occupy as well as how people vary in identifying certain roles and goals as having personal relevance. Social role theory suggests that roles powerfully affect behavior. The gender segregation in occupational roles and in household labor means that men primarily work in leadership roles and perform wage labor, whereas women primarily occupy roles involving helping and working with others and perform the majority of the household and child-rearing tasks. Notwithstanding this gender segregation, people who occupy the same role will behave similarly, regardless of gender (Eagly et al., 2000). For example, teachers of any gender/sex will be more likely to share the same goals, interests, and traits than are a teacher and a CEO who have the same gender/sex. Crucially, people vary in the extent to which they identify these roles as being central to the self; a role may have a greater effect on behavior when it is personally significant or involving (Diekman & Schneider, 2010). Gender also manifests itself in the goals that people value, identifying that communal-related goals (such as helping others, serving humanity, and working with people) or agentic goals (such as seeking power, recognition, achievement, and success) are of personal importance (Diekman et al., 2010). Motivation to pursue these goals underlies choices to approach or avoid certain behaviors and roles; for example, women, who tend to prefer communal goals and eschew agentic goals, opt out of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) pursuits because they do not see them as avenues to achieving their preferred and valued outcomes (Diekman et al., 2017).

As a measure of gender, researchers might ask about occupational and other social roles (e.g., parenthood) and how important gender-related roles and goals are to respondents personally on scales ranging from not at all important to extremely important (Diekman et al., 2010). Political psychologists have already begun to understand how women's distaste for power-related goals negatively affect their ambition for elective office (Schneider et al., 2016) and how parenting roles of motherhood and fatherhood affect their opinions and participation (e.g., Sharrow et al., 2018).

2.3.5. *Group Identity*

There are several options for conceptualizing and measuring how people relate to their gender group. For some, gender might be a significant part of who they are, indicated by

how highly they place their gender on a list of characteristics describing themselves (Wood & Eagly, 2009, 2015) or how easily they implicitly connect themselves to gendered terms in an Implicit Association Test (IAT) (van Well et al., 2007). Scholars measure a general sense of group identity through asking closed-ended questions about the group's importance, pride in the group, feelings of commonality with the group, and general closeness with the group (for example, see Conover, 1984).

More relevant to political psychologists, however, are the ways that people identify with groups in political terms, or group consciousness. One measure of group consciousness draws from work studying Black political identity and measures linked fate, or whether or not respondents feel their individual outcomes depend upon what happens to their group (Dawson, 1994; Gay et al., 2016). Other aspects of group consciousness include awareness of shared grievances, blame for the system for causing disparities, and belief that collective action can solve group inequities (e.g., Gurin, 1985; Huddy & Willmann, 2021). As one feminist identity measure, the American National Election Studies (ANES) consistently includes a feeling thermometer toward feminists or the women's liberation movement from 0 to 100 where higher numbers indicate warmer evaluations (Huddy et al., 2000; Huddy & Willmann, 2021). The ANES occasionally includes additional feminist identity measures, such as applying the term feminist to the self and identification as a feminist, as well as measures of perceived gender discrimination and gender resentment (Huddy & Willmann, 2021). Measures of gender consciousness predict both political participation (e.g., Duncan & Stewart, 2007), such as in the #MeToo movement (Jenkins et al., 2021), as well as political attitudes and partisanship (Conover, 1988; Huddy & Willmann, 2021).

Because people's multiple group identities shape the lens through which they view the political world, gender group consciousness might conflict with or enhance feelings of linked fate with other groups. For example, while Gay and Tate (1998) found that Black women mainly viewed politics through a racial lens, feeling connected to their gender identity conditioned their response to certain Black male political figures, such as Clarence Thomas and O. J. Simpson. Similarly, Brown's (2014) work demonstrates how gender and race together shape the identity of Black women politicians.

There is very little consistency in measurement of group consciousness across studies, which is further complicated by attempts to measure gender consciousness separately from feminism. Compounding this problem, researchers use a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative methods (see Abdelal et al., 2009). While we regret that we do not end this section with a clear set of recommendations, we urge a renewed interest in measuring gender consciousness, linked fate, and feminist identity and linking these measures to political participation and political attitudes, particularly since scholars have not found consistency in the relationship between gender consciousness, specifically measured as linked fate, with political outcomes (Gay et al., 2016). We also advocate for considering gender consciousness in conjunction with consciousness related to other identities, particularly gender-adjacent identities like LGBTQ or other politically significant identities, such as race.

2.4. Conclusions and Future Directions

We urge scholars to proceed cautiously when using sex since the biology of sex is rarely theoretically motivated in political research. Instead, we encourage measuring gender as a "bundle" of constructs. There is no single aspect of gender/sex universally appropriate for all theory and research in political psychology. Thus, we shared general principles for best

conceptualizing gender/sex with examples of scholarship that has successfully employed the measures. We elaborate even further on more such studies in the next section, but we anticipate that the best work will be yet to come as scholars feel confident that they can branch out in their theorizing as to how different aspects of gender might apply in a political context. We recognize that some of the measurement recommendations may seem overly complex and burdensome, particularly to those accustomed to measuring gender/sex as a binary, but we anticipate that these new measures will not only improve validity and reliability, but will also inspire research into marginalized populations.

3. How Gender/Sex Affects Political Attitudes and Behavior

To emphasize the utility and predictive power of strong theoretical conceptions of gender/sex for research in the political realm, we review select findings that draw on the psychological theories and measures of gender from the previous section. We start with how children are first introduced to the gendered aspects of politics via gendered political socialization. We move on to exploring the gendered dynamics of adult public opinion and citizens' engagement and participation in politics. This review underscores that the effects of gender on political behavior are complex and conditional. We conclude the section with major points gleaned from our review and some ideas for future directions in these research areas.

3.1. Gendered Political Socialization

Children are exposed to and learn about politics and its gendered nature from a young age. But while research on both political socialization and gender socialization are plentiful, the combined effects of the two processes have not often been examined. Recent efforts by scholars in Europe (e.g., van Deth et al., 2011) and in the United States (Bos et al., 2021; Bos et al., 2019) are paving the way to understand the ways that gendered political socialization sets the foundation for later gender gaps in politics such as gaps in attitudes, participation, vote choice, knowledge, and ambition. This subsection draws upon the theory of gender socialization laid out earlier to introduce concepts in and research on political socialization and highlights research that aims to connect gender and political socialization processes.

Beginning in childhood, political socialization is the lifelong process of learning about and developing a set of beliefs and values related to politics (Sapiro, 2004) through a wide range of agents of socialization including family, school, media, and peers. Of these, family is often cited as the most powerful agent of socialization (Filler & Jennings, 2015; Oxley, 2017). Children develop more complex understandings of politics with age (Carter & Teten, 2002; Oxley et al., 2020), exhibiting "consistent, structured political orientations" regarding knowledge about politics, ideas about good citizenship, and familiarity with political issues by the first year of primary school (van Deth et al., 2011, p. 147), and demonstrating the development interest in politics by ages 8–14 (Haug, 2017).

When these processes of gender socialization (described above) and political socialization occur together, they combine to create gendered political socialization (Bos et al., 2021), which leads to two results. First, children learn that political leaders are predominantly men, who are perceived to engage in power-seeking behaviors more than cooperative and collaborative ones (Schneider et al., 2016), and that media (Lay et al., 2021) and school curricula (Cassese et al., 2014) emphasize the contributions of men in politics and more often highlight male stereotypical traits of political leaders. Based on these messages, when asked to draw a political leader, the vast majority of boys and girls ages 6–12 draw a man. Second, as a result of gendered messages about politics, gender differences in political outlooks emerge in childhood and adolescence (Bos et al., 2021; Fridkin & Kenney, 2007). Elementary school girls increasingly report less interest in politics and political careers than boys (Bos et al., 2019), and by age 15 there is a substantial gender gap in political interest among British children (Fraile & Sánchez-Vítores, 2020).

While gendered political socialization indicates negative effects on girls' political engagement, several findings point to positive effects of messages and role models on adolescent girls. Viable, novel women candidates inspire political discussion among young women (Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2017). When media covered prominent women politicians, the resultant increase in families' political discussion led adolescent girls to report greater intentions to be politically active (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006). Observing protests for women's rights motivates support for gender equality and engagement in politics: cross-nationally, adolescents who are exposed to media coverage of women's movement protests report increased support for equal gender roles (Banaszak et al., 2021). And a survey of adolescents and parents after the 2016 US presidential election revealed that Democratic girls, particularly those who felt disillusioned with the political system and those who had a parent participate in protests, indicated more interest in engaging in political protest (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2020).

3.2. Gender Gaps in Public Opinion and Partisanship

Previously documented gaps between men and women in their political attitudes and their voting behavior warrant explanations based in political psychology. For example, men are more likely than women to support the use of military force and women are more likely than men to support social welfare issues. In the United States, women typically vote Democrat and men vote Republican (see Lizotte, 2020, for a review; Ondercin, 2017). These gender patterns in partisanship hold cross-nationally with women being more likely than men to identify with liberal political parties (Inglehart & Norris, 2000), and in European elections, women are more likely to vote for left-leaning political parties (Immerzeel et al., 2015). In this section we discuss what we see as three promising streams of inquiry into gender differences in political attitudes, including studies that focus on better measures of gender, those that apply social role theory to understanding gender gaps, and those that examine power dimensions related to gender.

First, efforts to better conceptualize and measure gender are advancing our knowledge of attitude gaps. In a nationally representative sample in the United States, McDermott (2016) found that identifying with male- and female-typical personality traits predicted

party, ideology, and political attitudes more than sex alone. People with masculine personality traits or those who feel masculine were more likely to identify as Republicans and support conservatism, while those with feminine personality traits or those who feel feminine were more likely to support healthcare and government involvement, and identify as a Democrat and a liberal (Bittner & Goodyear-Grant, 2017; McDermott, 2016). Traditional attitudes and beliefs accompany those who are gender-conforming: a study in Sweden found men who identified with many masculine traits and women who identified with many feminine traits were more right, traditionalist, and nationalist than those who were less gender conforming, while sex only weakly predicted political attitudes (Solevid et al., 2021). And, men in the United States who reported their gender identity as "completely masculine" and for whom that identity was "extremely important" to their overall identity were much less likely to support COVID-19 mask requirements (Cassino & Besen-Cassino, 2020).

Second, social role theory is a useful lens through which to understand gender gaps in public opinion (see Schneider & Bos, 2019, for a review). Social role theorists argue that women will adopt a diffuse gender role, and embrace communality (kind, caring) over agency (independent, aggressive), making them more likely to support policies that relate to compassion and care for vulnerable groups like increased public funding for education and to caring for the elderly. Similarly, women's attraction to egalitarian and pro-social values, including tolerance, equality, social justice, and securing the well-being of others, mediates the relationship between sex and political attitudes, including attitudes toward use of force, environmentalism, equal rights, and social welfare issues (Lizotte, 2020). In contrast, men's increased support for increased military conflict and greater opposition to government assistance programs relates to their greater individualism and aggression (e.g., Huddy et al., 2008).

Finally, using power as a theoretical lens to understand gender reveals how men's greater power and status affects political attitudes. Men's socialization to support the status quo from which they benefit contributes to their opposition toward redistributive policies (Bullock & Reppond, 2017; Schmitt & Wirth, 2009). In their pivotal work around Social Dominance Orientation, which combines both power-related dynamics with evolutionary theory, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) found that men's greater orientation toward dominating other groups predicted their opposition to welfare state policies; the finding that SDO mediated the relationship between sex and political attitudes held up using cross-national data. In contrast, women's lower power status and their experiences with discrimination leads them to be more sympathetic to transgender rights and the rights of other minority groups (Becker & Jones, 2020).

Power dynamics further inform how race interacts with gender to affect policy attitudes and party affiliation. The benefits that White women receive from being a part of the white heteropatriarchy help explain why they have been consistent supporters of a Republican and conservative agenda (including that of Donald Trump), while bBlack women, Latinas, and Asian women have been more consistent supporters of social welfare policies, larger government, and candidates from the Democratic party (e.g., Strolovitch et al., 2017). In contrast to white women, women of color's greater sensitivity to these power inequities may explain why they demonstrate higher support for Democratic candidates in the United States than other identity groups (Bejarano, 2014) and why, even compared to Black men, Black women indicate higher support of progressive gender role attitudes and policies (J. S. Carter et al., 2009).

3.3. Political Knowledge, Participation, and Ambition

Similar to attitudinal divides, men and women differ in their political knowledge, interest, and behaviors ranging from discussing politics to running for political office. There is a consistent gender gap in political knowledge (Dolan, 2011), where men score 20–35% higher than women on a traditional five-point political knowledge battery (McGlone et al., 2006). Men engage in all forms of political participation—except voting—at higher rates than women (Burns et al., 2001). The size of the gender gap for various political acts ranges from 7 (e.g., in making financial contributions to political campaigns) to 15 points (e.g., paying attention to national politics). There are persistent differences between men and women in political ambition, or the desire to run for office, where women report less political ambition than men (Lawless & Fox, 2010). Identifying the root causes using theories of gender give insight into these behaviors.

3.3.1. *Knowledge*

Consideration of the gendered socialization of girls and women away from masculinized institutions and pursuits helps explain women's depressed political interest and knowledge as effects of gender and not sex. Women may not pursue information about politics as often as men or even in the same way. As evidence of the importance of gender on these outcomes, identification with masculine traits positively predicted political knowledge scores more than sex alone (McDermott, 2016). Women's scores on knowledge items equal or outperform men when the questions focused on topics more relevant to women's interests, such as government services or programs (Stolle & Gidengil, 2010) or women's representation at the national level (Dolan, 2011). Women experience larger knowledge gains from learning during political campaigns than men, which significantly reduces sex gaps in knowledge (Ondercin et al., 2011), and exposure to information can reduce or eliminate knowledge gaps (Jerit & Barabas, 2017). In short, socialization of women to be less interested in politics as well as to be only interested in certain areas of politics explains gaps in knowledge.

Interestingly, closer investigation into why men seem to have greater political knowledge reveals that the gap reflects differences in men and women's confidence in how they approach the survey. Approximately half of the gender gap is attributed to men being more likely to guess and their willingness to take risks on surveys in the United States (McGlone et al., 2006; Mondak & Anderson, 2004) and cross-nationally (Fortin-Rittberger, 2020). Discouraging "don't know" responses reduces women's uncertainty and reduces the gap (Mondak & Anderson, 2004). Stereotype threat, an effect by which reminding groups about negative group stereotypes depresses their performance on tasks and tests, applies here: when women college students were reminded of their group's stereotypical deficiencies in politics, they scored lower than men students (McGlone et al., 2006). Men's higher status teaches them to exhibit confidence and agency, whereas women's lower status leads them to internalize the stereotype that they are not equipped for politics; such power differences as the result of socialization help us think about these differences, in part, as artifacts of measurement.

3.3.2. *Political Participation*

To account for gender divides in a wide range of political participation, separating sex from gender-as-personality again proves to be effective. As part of her book on the

value of using female- and male-typical personality traits in the BSRI, regardless of sex, McDermott (2016) found a relationship between gendered personality and political engagement (including on items such as discussing politics and paying attention to political news). The findings demonstrate that masculinity motivates engagement in politics because it is a masculine domain: citizens with higher levels of masculinity are more likely to be politically engaged, whereas those reporting higher femininity are not (McDermott, 2016).

As with political knowledge, understanding the power dynamics with respect to gender can explain how women's lower status in the hierarchy depresses their participation in political life. The everyday experiences of women that objectify them (such as interpersonal encounters that focus on women's bodies, sexualized imagery of women in the media) reinforce women's inferior status and compliance with traditional gender roles. In experimental work, Calogero shows that such experiences discourage political activity and ultimately reduce women's likelihood of political participation and gender-based activism by increasing their ideological support for the status quo (Calogero, 2013, 2017). Ironically, then, women's everyday experiences cause them to defend, rationalize, and bolster, rather than dismantle, the status quo (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012) as they "align their self-concept and pursuits with their (unequal) status in the gender social hierarchy" (Calogero, 2017, p. 99).

Conceptualizing gender in terms of group membership and identity also improves insight into political participation and activism (Huddy, 2013; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Feminists and women who feel personally connected to political events were more likely to participate politically (Duncan, 1999; Duncan & Stewart, 2007). Moreover, women might be more likely to engage in politics through their social networks. Black women, for example, create more social capital and engage with community groups more than Black men or white women, which partially explains their participation (Farris & Holman, 2014). And disabled women, who are more likely to participate in community groups than disabled men, participate politically as a result (Schur, 2003).

3.3.3. *Ambition*

Explanations of political ambition that link the psychology and socialization of gendered roles to the masculinized domain of political life add particular value to understanding gender dynamics in political ambition. For example, earlier we reviewed a goal congruity theory of gender, which suggests that gender socialization affects the goals that people have and the roles that they pursue. Applying this theory to political ambition, Schneider et al. (2016) found that both men and women perceived political careers as a way to pursue agentic goals of power and recognition. However, the authors hypothesized that such perceptions would affect men and women differently: because women, relative to men, are socialized to avoid conflict and reject power-related goals (such as pursuing power and recognition), they should therefore avoid political roles. Across two observational studies, the authors found that interest in conflict, a male-typical trait, and interest in power-related goals mediated the relationship between gender/sex and political ambition. Similarly, in interviews with graduate students well positioned to pursue careers as public servants and elected officials, women more than men reported that political careers would not help them achieve their goals for effecting change (Shames, 2017).

Experimental and applied work further demonstrates the value in examining political ambition through the lens of gender roles and goals. Women's engagement in politics seems to increase when communal goals, such as helping people or working with others, are at stake or when power-related goals are de-emphasized. In an observational study, women elected to office described that they decided to run for office because close friends and family encouraged it (Carroll & Sanbonmatsu, 2013). An experimental study showed that the gender ambition gap was reduced when political careers were framed as affording the opportunity to meet communal—over power-related—goals (Schneider et al., 2016, figure 4). Comparing participants' responses before and after a campaign training for women revealed that, on average, participants decreased their estimates of how much time politicians spend on power-related goals; those who changed their minds about the content of a political career increased in positivity toward one (Schneider & Sweet-Cushman, 2020). Of course, not all interventions affect women uniformly or positively: framing women's political underrepresentation as a demand issue (i.e., citing the ways in which the political system limit's women's political opportunities) boosted white and Asian women's political ambition but depressed Black women's ambition compared to when framing as a supply issue (i.e., citing aspects of women's lives that make them less likely to run or to devalue their qualifications) (Holman & Schneider, 2018). Latinas' ambition was unaffected by either frame.

Role models have proven to be influential in encouraging women to seek STEM careers (e.g., Clark et al., 2016), particularly when the role model is seen as similar, inspirational, and attainable. While some studies in politics have found broad effects of women role models (e.g., Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006), other studies have found null results (e.g., Foos & Gilardi, 2020); thus, testing the psychological mechanisms through which such change might occur has been under-explored in the political realm. An observational study of women in one campaign program showed that having women role models as presenters in the training only enhanced ambition when the participant identified with the role model (Sweet-Cushman, 2019). Experimental manipulations of role model gender and framing of the goals of the political career did not directly affect ambition, but women respondents did feel an increased identification and similarity when the role model was a woman or when the role model highlighted communal aspects of the career (Schneider & Holman, 2020).

3.4. Conclusions and Future Directions

This section demonstrates that gender, not sex, contributes to differences between men and women on a wide range of political experiences that span a lifetime—from early socialization through to the choice to run for political office. Thinking about gender as a bundle of constructs proves effective: personality traits, goals and roles, and identity with women as a group affect political attitudes, participation in politics, and ambition to seek political office. Scholars should continue to broaden their application of different aspects of the gender bundle to political questions. For example, the effects of many roles, such as parenthood, remain under-explored. Quantitative and qualitative work on how people experience gender identity and its politicization might also provide insight into political phenomena.

This section has highlighted how carefully applying the different theories of gender from psychology can advance our understanding of politics. We demonstrated that the effects

of the socialization of gender, such that men are taught to embrace agentic traits and roles whereas women are taught to embrace communal traits and roles, are powerful and far-reaching across many phenomena. Yet, we also displayed how thinking of gender as a power relationship between men and women complements this socialization focus. Moreover, this body of work shows that gender is not a monolith: research that challenges essentialism by uncovering how intersectional identities combine with gender to affect attitudes and outcomes crucially move the field forward. While these contributions are apparent, it is also clear that the future direction of political psychology work needs to deepen focus on stronger theorizing, consistently incorporate better measures of gender, and to emphasize intersectional frameworks and methodologies to understand political gaps.

4. Gendered Behavior of Political Leaders

The effects of gender on behavior do not end when men and women are elected to political office. Understanding the psychology of elite political actors represents a promising research direction. Here, we share evidence that demonstrates how gender conditions leader behavior in ways similar to citizen behavior: elites act consistently with their gender identity by taking positions on and prioritizing issues that relate to gender-related goals and that are consistent with their gendered personality traits. Gender also reveals itself through interpersonal interactions and how political leaders approach their work; elite behavior often mirrors gendered expectations and socialization. And, as with the mass public, the intersection of gender with other identities, including race, affect elite behavior. To demonstrate the insightful research on elite behavior, we review three important books that use innovative methods to push the field forward.

Through extensive interviews with women members of the US Congress, Dittmar et al. (2018) contribute to our understanding of how women legislators engage their gender identity. The women reported identifying not just as a legislator, but as a woman legislator. The women convey how they are connected to each other through shared experiences, such as sexual harassment and violence. They also report how the challenges of facing stereotypes during a campaign and entering a male-dominated space—and facing harassment within that space—bonds them to each other. Through this shared sense of gender identity, women legislators are keenly aware of how their presence is symbolically important in empowering women. They detail the substantive ways they have advocated for women through addressing pressing issues of importance to women, such as sexual assault and harassment. Their comments make a compelling case that the way they approach governing is both distinctive and necessary during a time of intense partisan polarization and gridlock. Specifically, they detail how women legislators are more bipartisan and cooperative, value policy and productivity over power, and offer unique perspectives that contribute to legislative debates. And finally, the interviews underscore how the perspectives women of color legislators are shaped by their intersectional identities, which often means that they diverge from white women legislators . In short, this valuable book provides persuasive evidence that many facets of gender identity affect how women approach the position of legislator.

Nadia Brown's (2014) book *Sisters in the Statehouse* provides an exemplary intersectional work examining how gender and race affect the attitudes and behaviors of Black women

state legislators in Maryland. Using narrative methodology and one-on-one interviews, Brown traces how Black women legislators' identities are formed by their race, gender, and class as well as their experiences with discrimination. Brown analyzes the complexity with which these identities shape views on public policy, explaining how sometimes the women converge on issues, but other times diverge in their policy positions. In one example, Brown found that legislators united to argue for an alternative to a business program that specified a proportion of contracts for either minority-owned businesses or women-owned businesses. By establishing only two alternatives, the program required Black women business owners to choose a category instead of presenting their intersectional identity. Black women legislators were able to speak from personal experience on other issues disproportionally affecting Black women, such as domestic violence legislation in Maryland (N. E. Brown, 2014) and discrimination based on hair style and texture in New Jersey (N. E. Brown & Lemi, 2021). Overall, Brown reveals the unique ways that these legislators view themselves as Black women and applies this understanding to their electoral and lawmaking behavior.

Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) contribute to the body of knowledge through experiments replicating conditions experienced by women lawmakers to show that women's voices are largely silenced in group deliberations and that group rules and patterns work to inhibit their contributions. By varying deliberation rules and the gender composition of the group, the authors found that women spoke less often than men, experienced more interruptions, and had less influence on the overall decision of how to allocate societal resources, particularly when they constituted a minority of voices and when they were working within an environment with majoritarian versus unanimous rules for decision-making. Consistent with women's political socialization, their greater silence was explained by women in the study reporting less confidence than men. Because women took account of minority perspectives, showed concern for inequality, and exhibited a less competitive deliberation style more often than men, the implications of silencing women were stark. The absence of women's voices matters both for the substance of the outcome as well as the way in which decisions are reached. Through this innovative design replicating conditions experienced by women lawmakers, this work provides insight into how context interacts with gender socialization to affect the lawmaking process.

4.1. Conclusions and Future Directions

This section underscores recent attempts to expand our understanding of how gender shapes the experiences and behaviors of political leaders, efforts we hope will continue. Because of the difficulty in obtaining quantitative data on, say, the personality traits of men and women legislators, researchers must be creative in their approach. Here, we present a few examples of researchers who have done just that: Dittmar (2015) and Brown's (2014) interviews reveal a lot about the many aspects of gender identity and its intersection with race to condition the thoughts, behaviors, and voting preferences of women lawmakers. Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) use the power of the experimental method to give insight into gendered effects. We expect that future work will build on these studies and expand upon ways to use gender as a bundle of constructs in predicting elite behavior.

5. How Gender/Sex Affects Political Leader Evaluations

Over the past several decades, political psychologists have sought to understand whether and how gender/sex influences the way the public evaluates men and women political leaders, asking: do gendered cognitions limit women's representation in politics by affecting voters' choices? This section describes psychological theories of how people use gender to form inferences which scholars then apply to comprehend whether, how, and why voters view men and women political leaders differently. We review extant findings that provide evidence of role congruity theory—which explains prejudice against women leaders by the discrepancy between expectations for women and desirable qualities in leaders. Our review underscores that the effect of gender varies based on factors that alter women's fit with the political role and individual differences in support for the gender hierarchy. We conclude with suggestions for future research.

5.1. Psychological Theories of Gendered Evaluations

5.1.1. *Gender Stereotypes*

Gender stereotypes are attributions made to individuals based on outward appearance of gender. They are descriptive (defining what men or women are like), prescriptive (defining what men or women ought to be like), and proscriptive (what men or women should not be like) (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Stereotypes occur both consciously and subconsciously (Greeenwald & Banaji, 1995). Social role theory provides one explanation for gender stereotypes, arguing that they originate from gender roles. As described earlier, this theory posits that the roles women have held throughout history—care-taking and private-sphere roles—means that not only do they often develop communal traits to succeed in those roles, but also that people assume that they possess these traits. Likewise, since men have held leader and bread-winning roles, people conclude that men have agentic traits necessary for male-dominated roles (Eagly et al., 2000). Because people tend to endorse gender stereotypes and gender roles, they believe that women and men ought to behave in ways congruent with their gender role and ought not behave in ways incongruent with their gender. That is, women not only *are* kind and caring, but they *ought* to be, and they should *not* behave aggressively.

An alternative to social role theory's explanation for stereotype origins, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) argues that two key dimensions of stereotypes stem not from roles, but from a group's potential for threat and power (Fiske, 2012; Fiske et al., 2002). A warmth dimension characterizes groups based on perceptions of competitiveness—groups that are not competitive have high warmth—while a competence dimension differentiates groups based on high or low status. People perceive women as a group to have low competitiveness and low status, and, therefore, they are seen as high in warmth and low in competence.

5.1.2. *Models of Stereotype Effects*

Classic stereotype models argue that negative group stereotypes produce prejudice, but only under certain conditions. Stereotype activation or making the stereotype "accessible in one's

mind" must occur prior to stereotype application or the "extent to which one uses a group stereotype to judge a member of a stereotyped group" (Kunda & Spencer, 2003, p. 522). And, while stereotypes are often activated automatically to affect judgments, individual variation in goals, motivation, and the availability of information can disrupt the process and serve to "individuate" a member of a stereotyped group from a group stereotype (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). A negative group stereotype, such as a negative racial stereotype, that has been activated and applied would cause prejudice against a target.

Eagly and Karau (2002) argue that this model of prejudice will not apply to gender discrimination for two main reasons: (1) because stereotypes about women are largely positive, and (2) because the classic model does not account for the variation in prejudice across social roles that women experience. How, then, do gender stereotypes relate to prejudice toward women politicians? Role congruity theory (RCT) extends social role theory to explain that prejudice results when a group member seeks a counter-stereotypic role that challenges their prescribed social roles. To apply this to politics, women political leaders experience prejudice because women's prescribed communality is incongruent with the agentic expectations for leadership roles (Bos et al., 2017; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig et al., 2011; Schneider & Bos, 2019). Because of the association of men and masculine traits with leadership roles, when women political leaders behave communally and in accordance with stereotypical prescriptions, they will not meet the agentic expectations of leadership; conversely, if women behave as leaders, they will be judged negatively for lacking the communal qualities deemed appropriate for women and acting in ways proscriptive for women (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Schneider et al., 2021). In short, RCT scholars argue that prejudice results both from perceptions of women and from how these perceptions deviate from the qualities necessary for the leadership role.

From the perspective of the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), women, who are in a low-status, high-warmth quadrant, will experience paternalistic prejudice accompanied by emotions of pity and sympathy. Such prejudice can be conceptualized as benevolent sexism, which is "a subjectively positive orientation of protection, idealization, and affection directed toward women" (Glick et al., 2000, p. 763). Women professionals and feminists, however, are stereotyped as competent based on their high status, but also seen as lacking warmth (Fiske, 2012; Fiske et al., 2002). SCM predicts that groups in the high-status, low-warmth quadrant will elicit negative emotions, such as envy and jealousy. Women politicians fall under this category and would therefore experience prejudice, particularly because people are motivated to defend the gender hierarchy and women leaders violate that hierarchy by eschewing the prescribed status of women (Rudman et al., 2012). Hostile sexism measures individual-level variation in anger toward women who are perceived to be challenging men's power. Ambivalent sexism, comprised of both hostile and benevolent sexism, refers to a set of individual beliefs that reflect preferences for upholding existing power structures (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and serve "to justify women's subordinate status to men" (Glick et al., 2000, p. 763).

5.2. Measures of Gendered Evaluations

Many scholars of political psychology have adopted and tested a classic model that stereotypes of women applied to women leaders will cause prejudice in vote decisions and have, therefore, developed explicit and implicit measures of stereotypes. We

give an overview of these measures here, highlighting the variability in how political psychologists operationalize stereotypes and the strengths and weaknesses in their choices. Measures of gender stereotypes also take the first step toward testing RCT since RCT suggests that stereotypes of women must differ from expectations of the leadership role. We also include alternative measures that try to address role congruity more directly and measures that address individual-level beliefs in upholding the gender power structure.

Gender stereotypes of candidates are often measured by asking respondents "how well each of the following adjectives describe him/her" and to report their response on a scale from "not well at all" to "very well." For example, Huddy and Terklidsen (1993) measured the traits stereotypical of women, such as warm, gentle, sensitive, emotional, talkative, and cautious, as well as traits stereotypical of men, such as assertive, coarse, tough, stern, masculine, active, rational, self-confident, and aggressive. As an additional measure of gender stereotypes, the authors analyzed how participants viewed men and women candidates with regard to the political issues they could handle well, focusing on military (e.g., military or police crisis), compassion (e.g., the poor, childcare), and economic (e.g., budget deficit) issues.

Studies have been inconsistent with regard to which traits stereotypical of men and women (see Schneider & Bos, 2014, Table 1, p. 247) and issue competencies they utilize. Recent efforts use traditional "ground up" psychological methods to help identify the stereotypes of politicians and how this content varies by gender (Schneider & Bos, 2014) and partisanship (Schneider & Bos, 2016). This work concludes that women politicians constitute a stereotypical subtype of women and politicians, sharing little overlap in stereotype content with these larger groups (Schneider & Bos, 2014; Sweet-Cushman, 2021). Scholars might therefore measure stereotypes of women politicians, including both positive and negative items, rather than measuring stereotypes of women alone.

In using any of these stereotype measures, social desirability presents a challenge since people perceive it to be socially unacceptable to report that they hold stereotypes about groups. Even while stereotypes about women are not negative, people might feel hesitant to differentiate based on sex, given clear social cues toward gender equality. A variety of measurement and methodological strategies have been developed to address this issue. One strategy is to ask about not what the respondent thinks, but what the respondent thinks *others* think (Schneider & Bos, 2014). In comparing a common explicit measure of bias toward women leaders to one that offers respondents a way to "save face," Setzler (2019) shows that explicit measures underestimate bias, particularly for people belonging to groups in favor of gender equity.

Implicit measures, list experiments, and other methods that alleviate social desirability have been used successfully to measure gender stereotypes in politics. One implicit option is to use semantic differential measures where a respondent places a candidate on scales ranging, for example, from hard to soft or weak to strong (Bauer, 2015, 2020a; Krupnikov & Bauer, 2014). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is the most common implicit measure (Greenwald et al., 1998) where participants are exposed to stimuli from two stereotyped groups and two stereotypical concepts. IAT measures reaction time to linking stereotype concept to groups; for example, in one study, participants who had more difficulty in classifying a woman candidate as a leader were less likely to vote for a woman (Mo, 2015). In

this study, both explicit and implicit bias toward female candidates significantly predicted vote choice. Using a list experiment, Streb et al. (2008) showed that social desirability pressures people to hide their reluctance to support a woman for the role. In this study, 26% of respondents were upset about the idea of a woman president. Krupnikov et al. (2016) showed that when asking study participants about a sensitive subject related to gender and race, simply giving respondents a chance to explain their decisions lessened social desirability pressures.

Multiple measures reflect individual differences in how people view women vis-à-vis the traditional gender hierarchy as such views might affect support for women candidates. For example, hostile sexism is measured through a respondent's agreement with ideas such as "women seek power by gaining control over men," whereas benevolent sexism is gauged through agreement items such as "women should be cherished and protected by men." Another related measure includes modern sexism (including items like "over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual experiences").[4] In an attempt to directly test RCT, Schneider, Bos, and DiFilippo (2021) measured both proscriptive gender stereotypes (how women ought not behave) and expectations of the ideal inhabitant of the political role to study the effects of the disparity between the two. Finally, a respondent's evaluations of feminists, a group strongly associated with egalitarian gender relations, reflect ideas about gender relations (Huddy et al., 2000).

5.3. Empirical Findings on Gendered Evaluations

Early research from political psychologists experimentally varied the gender of a target candidate, uncovering clear differences in how voters perceive an otherwise identical woman versus man candidate with regard to beliefs (more liberal), traits (possessing women-typical traits), and issue competencies (women-typical issues like childcare) (e.g., Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Sapiro, 1981a; see a comprehensive list of traits in Table 1 in Schneider & Bos, 2014). Connecting these stereotypes to vote choice, however, proved more difficult: many scholars, using different explicit and implicit stereotype measures, established a relationship between gender stereotypes and voters' preferences (Mo, 2015; Sanbonmatsu, 2002), though many observational studies (e.g., Darcy & Schramm, 1977; Dolan, 2014) and some experimental studies (e.g., Sapiro, 1981a; Schneider, 2014) found a much weaker relationship.

We draw on a RCT perspective, which, rather than predicting a direct effect of stereotypes on vote choice, generates a set of hypotheses about when and how stereotypes about women—together with expectations about the politician role—might affect evaluations. In this section, we highlight how extant findings on the effects of gender cognitions are consistent with this theory and show the nuanced effects of gender stereotypes based on a candidate's congruity with the political leader role. In particular, role congruity depends on the campaign context, gendered campaign strategies, a candidate's political party identification, and intersectional identities. Finally, we underscore how individual differences in support of the gender hierarchy affect leader evaluations.

5.3.1. *Tests of Role Congruity Theory*

A growing body of research directly tests the primary premise of role congruity theory (RCT): bias against women leaders stems from the incongruity between the communal stereotypes attributed to women and agentic expectations for leadership roles (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Eagly & Karau, 2002). For example, Schneider, Bos and DiFillipo (2021) measured both expectations of the leadership role and stereotypes of women to show that people who believed that certain traits are necessary for the leadership role, but who also believe that those same traits are ones women ought not portray, were significantly less likely to support a woman candidate. Women politicians faced an agentic penalty where voters punished them for violating their proscriptive gender role because the leader role demands dominant, agentic traits. The authors also found that the incongruity between women and leaders—and the resultant penalty—was stronger when the electoral context emphasized male stereotypic strengths (national security focus) as opposed to female stereotypic strengths (care for vulnerable populations). Voters in an experimental study in the United States similarly penalized female politicians—that is, they were less likely to vote for them—for seeking power and thus violating prescribed communal expectations for them as women (Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010). And an observational test of RCT found that when viewing debates, voters reacted positively to German Chancellor Angela Merkel relative to her male opponent when she demonstrated happiness, an emotion congruent with both her gender and leadership. Voters further reacted negatively when Merkel displayed anger, an emotion incongruent with her gender but congruent with leadership, whereas her male opponents had more leeway to express such an emotion without penalty (Boussalis et al., 2021).

Also drawing directly on RCT, studies show that information introduced throughout the campaign can activate stereotypes and highlight women candidates' incongruity with leader roles or their deviation from gender roles. Conjoint and vignette experiments in Tunisia tested the effects on voter support of candidates presenting political platforms that were either gender-congruent or leadership-congruent (Blackman & Jackson, 2021). Women candidates whose platforms reflected women's issues, highlighting their incongruity with the political leader role, were less preferred. A conjoint experiment in Japan showed that when women candidates deviated from gender-based expectations—in traits and issue competencies–voters never rewarded them and in some cases punished them (Ono & Yamada, 2020). Bauer (2015) found that support for a woman candidate was only weakened in an experimental condition when feminine stereotypes such as "nurturing" and "compassionate" were activated. Activating stereotypes visually produces similar effects (Ditonto & Mattes, 2018). For example, Bauer and Carpinella (2018) found that masculine visuals (images of soldiers and of people in a business meeting) decreased evaluations of a female candidate's competence and electability by highlighting her lack of fit with the political role.

In low information settings or in the absence of party affiliation cues (Bos, 2011), voters are more likely to rely on broader stereotypes of women's lack of fit with the political leader role whereas in information-rich settings, voters can utilize other heuristics and information for their decisions (Andersen & Ditonto, 2018). And, because voters perceive women candidates as incongruent with leadership roles, they hold women candidates to a higher qualification standards (Bauer, 2020b, 2020c) and seek to assess a woman candidate's fit

with the role in their information search; for example, one study found that participants looked for more information about a woman candidate's competence and about "compassion issues" than they did for a man candidate (Ditonto et al., 2014).

5.3.2. *Election Context Affects Role Congruity*

Electoral contexts can highlight a woman candidate's congruity or incongruity with the role she seeks; we feature studies that ably test this key conjecture from RCT. Incongruity for women is particularly salient during military, terrorism, or economic crises, because men are seen as better at handling those issues. Survey data illustrated that during times of security threat, the public prefers male Republican leaders most and Democratic women leaders least (Holman et al., 2016). An experiment showed that a candidate's experience matters in conjunction with gender and context: the negative effects of a masculine context were lessened for former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who had experience in national security, as compared to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who does not (Holman et al., 2017). On the male-stereotypical issue of the economy, reading about economic volatility versus stability led participants to devalue the female, but not the male, candidate (Lei & Bodenhausen, 2018).

While war, terrorism, and poor economic conditions underscore women politicians' incongruity with politics, other contexts can benefit women candidates by highlighting how women's stereotypical strengths can be congruent with the leadership role. For instance, contexts of corruption may increase women's fit with the desired political leader role due to women being stereotyped as ethical, honest, or trustworthy. Barnes and Beaulieu (2014) used a survey experiment to show how the presence of a woman candidate reduced voters' suspicion of election fraud. Certain elections underscore women's issues such as in the 1992 US elections, dubbed "the year of the woman." Here, the context focused on candidate sex and gender issues, thereby underscoring women candidates' "fit" with political leadership, and encouraged voting for women candidates (Dolan, 2001). A woman candidate can also be seen as an "agent of change," as opposed to men candidates, who are seen as leadership status quo; this stereotype was particularly important to support for women candidates in the context of system threat (Brown et al., 2011). More recently, as the world was overturned by the global COVID-19 pandemic, studies indicated that this context allowed women leaders to successfully draw on and leverage women's traditional private sphere roles in their lives as political leaders (Johnson & Williams, 2020).

5.3.3. *Gender Stereotypes in Campaigns*

Scholars have long held that the effects of stereotypes on women's candidacies and electoral success are attenuated due to their anticipation of, strategic choices related to, and successful minimization of voter stereotypes in their campaigns (Huddy & Capelos, 2002). Candidates consider voter stereotypes in their campaign strategies to navigate "gendered terrain," as advised by campaign consultants who believe and advise that female candidates are being judged on masculinity and femininity (Dittmar, 2015). The strategies considered include decisions such as whether to "run as a man" versus "run as a women" (Bauer, 2015), whether they should "go negative" (Krupnikov & Bauer, 2014) or display emotion (Boussalis et al.,

2021), and whether they can successfully achieve stereotype trespassing (Bauer, 2019) or overturn voter stereotypes (Schneider, 2014) to better align themselves with voters' expectations of the political role. Women candidates must balance a need to present themselves as agentic to portray competence in the leadership role without violating prescriptions of their gender role.

Evidence suggests considerable nuance in how these strategies help or hurt women in the delicate balance of conforming to gender and leader roles. For example, an observational study of the 2016 Irish general election showed that women candidates gained from strategically conforming to caregiver expectations, but also emphasizing their occupational credentials so as to not limit them to a caregiving role (Kusche, 2019). Voters reacted negatively to women candidates "going negative" because they saw these women as violating strong prescriptive gender stereotypes and acting in a proscriptive way (Krupnikov & Bauer, 2014). Finally, while women and men candidates were both able to persuade voters to overturn stereotypical expectations through their rhetoric, men candidates with gender-incongruent rhetoric still did better overall because voters saw him as fitting better with many different aspects of the leader role (Schneider, 2014).

5.3.4. *Partisan and Gender Stereotypes*

Because party affiliation is a primary lens by which politicians are evaluated in American politics, this identity presents important intersections with a candidate's gender that can affect evaluations. Many scholars theorize that party simply matters so much that it erases the effects of gendered cognitions (e.g., Dolan, 2014). However, psychological theory suggests that voters might process these two stereotypes together; indeed, Schneider and Bos (2016) found evidence that party and gender had both main effects and interactive effects on trait and issue stereotypes. An examination of feminine stereotype activation showed that both feminine stereotypes and partisanship influence how female candidates are perceived (Bauer, 2018). Very little research to date has addressed directly how the combination of gender and party identity would affect role incongruity and prejudice. Future studies might also focus on whether members of the Republican and Democrat parties have disparate expectations of proscriptive and prescriptive behavior for men and women to further understand role incongruity and political party expectations. Of course, party expectations will vary by country as well.

5.3.5. *Intersectional Stereotyping*

Candidates seeking office hold important identities beyond gender, such as those related to race, parenthood, religion, and ethnicity. Testing RCT—or other theories of prejudice—becomes more complex when considering these other identities, upon which voters are likely to draw to form their impressions and make vote decisions. Leadership role stereotypes are not only tied to men (Koenig et al., 2011) but also have pro-white biases (Gündemir et al., 2014). Yet, to add to this complex picture, as with stereotypes of women, intersectional stereotypes are often positive and do not automatically lend themselves to prejudice. Political psychologists have made considerable progress in understanding how different identities intertwine with gender to form impressions; future research could focus

on testing additional identity combinations and continue to understanding their effects vis-à-vis psychological theories of prejudice such as RCT.

Stereotypes of women vary considerably by race and ethnicity (Rosette et al., 2016). Mounting research shows that Black women and Latina candidates are uniquely positioned to capitalize on positive aspects of both gender and ethnic/racial stereotypes to win office (Bejarano, 2014; N. E. Brown & Gershon, 2016). Stereotypes of Black women candidates combine the strengths of stereotypes based on both gender and race, such that voters see them as more compassionate than other combined identity politician groups (Carew, 2016) and as more capable to handle civil rights issues (Gordon & Miller, 2005). Voters give Black women more leeway to display dominance as compared to white women (Livingston et al., 2012), which can make them more congruent with political leader roles. Intersectional stereotypes for Latina candidates similarly combine their group stereotypes. Latinas are seen as more capable to handle stereotypically feminine issues (education, assisting the poor, reproductive health, and healthcare), and minority issues (racial discrimination and immigration) (Cargile, 2016). Together, these studies underscore how stereotype content and effects are more complicated to unpack for candidates with intersecting identities and for multiracial candidates (Lemi, 2020).

As another example, stereotypes based on a candidate's sexual orientation and gender identity also intersect with gender/sex to affect candidate evaluations. Consistent with RCT, voters punish lesbian female candidates more so than gay men in their evaluations (Bailey & Nawara, 2017) because these women violate their gender roles both by seeking office and by not conforming to traditional female heterosexual gender roles. Sexuality changes the effect of gender: gay men are viewed as less competent on masculine issues, while lesbian women are seen as more competent on masculine issues than heterosexual women candidates (Doan & Haider-Markel, 2010). Transgender candidates might experience additional layers of prejudice since respondents reported lower likelihood to vote for transgender candidates, who they saw as more liberal and less able to represent them (Jones & Brewer, 2019).

Finally, parenthood could produce consequential intersections with gender as voters evaluate candidates. Motherhood, in particular, is a role highly connected with feminine traits and could underscore a women candidate's incongruence with the political leader role. Yet, it is not mothers, but rather women without children, who face a penalty from voters when they seek public office (Deason et al., 2015). This is likely due to their violating prescriptive stereotype expectations for what a woman should do. Though they are not being penalized for being mothers, women candidates who use maternal campaign appeals do lose voter support (Deason, 2011).

5.3.6. *Prejudice Stemming from Individual Differences in Gender Hierarchy Support*

Prejudice toward women seeking political leadership roles can stem from individual differences among citizens in their underlying sexist views and their support for the gender hierarchy. Ambivalent sexism has been tied to affective responses to the 2016 campaigns in the United States, which affected mobilization rates (Valentino et al., 2018). Hostile sexism in particular has been shown to affect evaluations of candidates (Utych, 2021) and vote

choice (e.g., Schaffner, 2020). Cassese and Barnes (2019) show that white women, especially those with lower incomes and without a college degree, who reported greater endorsement of hostile sexism and weaker perceptions of systemic discrimination, were more likely to vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election.

Similarly, modern sexism broadly influences how voters seek information about female candidates in a campaign—and negatively affects their evaluations of and support for female candidates (Ditonto, 2019). In this study, using a Dynamic Process Tracing Environment methodology, voters who scored high on modern sexism sought less information about women candidates, were less likely to vote for a woman candidate in general, were less likely to vote for a woman candidate even when she was the candidate most aligned with their preferences, and rated women candidates more negatively than their male counterparts. Tesler and Sears (2010) showed that modern sexism was a strong predictor of Hillary Clinton's (un)favorability ratings in her first run for president. In short, these individual-level measures of sexism, though they come from a tradition other than RCT, help explain voters' choices.

5.4. Conclusions and Future Directions

In this section, we privileged RCT as a promising theoretical framework to study how gender/sex affects evaluations of women political leaders. Examples of tests of this theory using a variety of different methods illustrate the value of a RCT approach to revealing the conditions under which voters penalize women politicians; that is, when the campaign context, campaign strategies, or the candidate's or other intersectional group stereotypes highlight women's incongruity with political leader roles. As with studying the effects of gender/sex on political behavior, we believe strongly in the need for work to draw carefully from theories of gendered cognitions and to generate more direct tests of the role congruity framework in particular.

We also call on researchers to think creatively about a variety of expanded dependent measures to examine. This is, in part, because Krook (2020) identifies the monumental, worldwide problem of violence against women in politics and suggests that future research should go beyond vote choice to explain other behaviors toward women leaders. Explaining the effects of gender/sex on evaluations of elected officials are equally important. For example, preliminary evidence suggests that as respondents' sexism increases, male legislators were more likely to be rewarded for being friendly, but female legislators do not enjoy the same advantage due to gender stereotypes and expectations regarding women's behavior (Costa, 2020). Explaining evaluations of women and men once they are in office can be equally consequential to understanding women's underrepresentation and prejudice against women in politics worldwide.

6. Final Thoughts

We cannot overstate the significance of gender in every aspect of people's lives. For decades, psychologists have studied the ways in which gender is a fundamental organizing construct

that frames people's entire trajectory. A child's gender/sex is declared at birth, setting the expectation for their behavior and personality. Children learn their own gender, how to detect gender in others, and how deviation from birth-assigned gender can be met with resistance. In addition, gender combines and interacts with other identities. As children mature into adults, gender narrows the roles that they choose, from their occupation to roles within their family. Gender pervasively conditions how others see them and how much power they are afforded in society because cultures and institutions create and perpetuate gendered power structures.

Thus, it is no surprise that gender is a lens through which people understand politics and that gender structures citizen participation in politics. To best understand these dynamics, we argue that gender/sex must be carefully theorized before being applied to political variables. How do different aspects of the gender bundle affect public opinion and political participation? Future scholars can build upon the exemplary work highlighted in this chapter to further our understanding. For example, scholars might dig deeper into gender identity to give insight into how people's relationship to their gender identity and their gender roles affects political attitudes and behaviors. Research has only scratched the surface of understanding how people experience gender in combination with other identities to shape political views. While we promoted social role theory as the best framework for understanding gender and its effects, we also recognize that theories of gender socialization, power, and identity may work in tandem to provide the best insight.

Particularly given the gender inequalities in the political system and the problem this presents for democracy, there is a pressing, worldwide need to expand representation for gender-based interests in politics. Electing more women to office—and understanding how gendered cognitions limit women's access to seeking political office—may be one way to achieve this goal. Political psychologists who study gender are well positioned to generate further insights regarding how gender stereotypes can affect not only the election of women and their ongoing support from voters once in office, but also the increase in violence directed against them. In this review, we promoted the use of role congruity theory to understand discrimination and prejudice toward women leaders. We encourage future work to add direct tests of RCT and other theories of gender stereotypes in order to better understand the conditions under which gender does and does not matter for cognitions and behaviors toward political leaders.

We began this chapter with many examples of gender-based phenomenon in search of explanation; indeed, there is no shortage of ways that gender clearly affects political life. We expect future scholarship in this area to continue to leverage political psychology theories and the field's myriad methodologies to provide new understandings that improve gender equality and political representation.

Notes

1. We use the term gender/sex throughout when gender and sex cannot be differentiated. See also Hyde et al. (2019) for discussion of this term.
2. Many psychologists refer to the "meanings attached to men and women" (Wood & Eagly, 2015, p. 1) as masculine and feminine, respectively. Scholars also use different terms to describe these constructs: agency (self-assertion and competitiveness) and instrumentality

are other names for masculinity, while communion (warmth and concern with others) and expressiveness describe the meaning attached to women (Wood & Eagly, 2015). Scholars using these terms should also take note that the constructs can include desirable traits (e.g, warm for femininity, assertive for masculinity) and undesirable traits (e.g., domineering for masculinity, whiny for femininity) (for a review, see Bos, Madonia, & Schneider, 2018).

3. Sexual orientation or sexual attraction obviously relates to gender/sex, identity, and political outcomes. Addressing this topic thoroughly and with proper attention goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but we recommend resources that introduce a psychological treatment of sexual desires as related to both sex and gender, such as van Anders' Sexual Configuration Theory (2015).

4. A subset of ambivalent sexism and modern sexism items can be found in secondary data sources such as the American National Election Studies (ANES).

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AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

STANLEY FELDMAN AND CHRISTOPHER WEBER

1. AUTHORITARIANISM AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES

SOCIAL scientists in the 1930s and 1940s observing the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, the ascendency of fascist leaders like Mussolini, and the horrors of the Holocaust struggled to develop a way of understanding why people would support fascist parties and leaders and the atrocities they engaged in. One of the major contributions that emerged from this search was the concept of the authoritarian personality. This work was driven primarily by a small group of influential researchers at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany (Jay 1996). Among these, "Frankfurt School" scholars—Erich Fromm (1941) and later Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford (1950)—developed the first detailed empirical account of what authoritarianism is and how it operates. Soon thereafter, research on the political psychology of authoritarianism grew, generating an expansive literature that has made major contributions to our understanding of the origins of prejudice, intolerance, ethnocentrism, and support for right-wing parties and politicians.

Eight decades later, studies drawing on the construct of authoritarianism continue to focus on many of the same phenomena that motivated the original researchers even as new political and social concerns present themselves. With increased movements of people around the world, ethnocentrism and prejudice that were directed at national minorities in the 20th century now often appear as opposition to immigration and demands for border control. Those impulses along with the mobilization of nationalism have been a feature of the growth of right-wing populist causes and leaders around the world (Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Examples include Britain's exit from the European Union, Donald Trump's ascendancy in the United States, the rise of the Jaroslaw Kaczynski and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, Viktor Orban's Fidesz Party in Hungary, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Narendra Modi's Hindu nationalism in India. Norris and Inglehart (2019) describe support for these parties and leaders

as *authoritarian populism*, thus highlighting the connections between many contemporary political movements and aspects of psychological authoritarianism. While the world has gone through much change over the better part of a century, many of the issues that led to the start of research on authoritarianism continue to be relevant to politics today.

There is an expansive literature on authoritarianism within the social sciences that allows us to answer important questions about the nature of authoritarianism. First, *what is authoritarianism?* Despite its apparent simplicity, research on authoritarianism has been roiled by debates regarding the breadth and depth of the construct—what it should and should not entail—as well as how best to operationalize the construct in social analysis. It may seem surprising, but after decades of research, questions persist concerning the conceptual status of authoritarianism. Is it intertwined with conservatism? Is it an aspect of personality? A set of social attitudes? An orientation toward authorities and rules? Second, *what are the origins of authoritarianism?* Empirical research has put forth both biological and environmental explanations, with some demonstrating that authoritarianism is partially explained by genetics and evolution; other studies highlight how it is affected by socialization and life experiences. Authoritarianism is also shaped by environmental factors: education, friendships and social networks, societal levels of threat, and personality. How strong is the evidence that these factors are causal influences on authoritarianism?

Many of these questions will be addressed in the first half of our review. In the second half, we will move toward a more thorough description of how authoritarianism intersects and interacts with politics. Our third question is: *what is the relationship between authoritarianism and political ideology?* In its original formulation, authoritarianism was directly linked to right-wing political preferences (for a lengthier discussion of political ideology see Federico & Malka, Chapter 17, this volume). This continues to be the understanding that dominates much of the literature. Among the fiercest critiques of authoritarianism research is that the focus on *right-wing authoritarianism* misses an important question: Are authoritarian tendencies found on the political left? For instance, both Stalinism and Maoism practiced an authoritarian form of communist ideology. Fourth, *how is authoritarianism best measured*? Many of the debates that persist vis a vis measurement reflect the simple fact that authoritarianism and conservative preferences—in practice—are correlated. Self-report measures of authoritarianism—agreement with a series of attitudinal statements—were introduced by Adorno et al. (1950) and continue to persist in similar form. But the items that measure authoritarianism also reflect aspects of political ideology and attitudes toward social and political groups. Should we be measuring authoritarianism with statements occasionally veering close to the outcomes we expect authoritarianism to predict?

Finally, we will discuss how authoritarianism becomes aligned with electoral processes. *What are the conditions under which authoritarianism becomes associated with policy preferences and vote choice?* For most of its history, research on authoritarianism focused on estimating simple, direct effects. However, subsequent work has shown that authoritarianism exerts an effect under particular conditions—that is, political and social factors will moderate the effects of authoritarianism, increasing or decreasing its role as the social and political environment changes. Likewise, in a polarized party landscape, such as the United States, we also observe that authoritarianism tends to operate through partisanship, suggesting a mediated role. Recent research has begun to examine more carefully the political effects of authoritarianism as well as the circumstances under which it becomes politically consequential.

Our goal in this chapter is to review the literature on authoritarianism with a careful focus on these core questions. We will show how a thorough reading of the authoritarian literature, with an eye toward these questions, attests to the richness of this construct, in both its breadth and depth. Authoritarianism provides important insights into key aspects of contemporary politics—from intergroup attitudes, to support for national security measures, to voting behavior. We will highlight what is and what is not yet known about the dynamics of authoritarianism, as well as why it is a particularly useful construct for understanding a variety of political outcomes.

2. Back to the Beginning: A Brief History of Authoritarianism Research

Authoritarianism has a storied history within the social sciences. It emerged as a construct central to political and social thought in the 1930s, due largely to the pioneering work of the *Frankfurt School of Critical Theory*—a group of researchers led by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm, who were affiliated with the Weimar-era Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany (Jay, 1973). The Frankfurt School's work extended Marx and Engels' theorizing that economies move through societal arrangements that advance or lessen economic and political inequality. The Frankfurt School was neo-Marxist, by expanding Marx and Engels' insight to better understand how human psychology intersects with social, political, and economic arrangements. The Frankfurt School was quite critical of the central planning found in Marxism-Leninism.

The concept of psychological alienation was central to the Frankfurt School. According to orthodox Marxism, capitalism unleashed widespread innovation and human advancement; at the same time laissez-faire capitalism of the mid- to late 19th century devalued work and separated the worker from any inherent satisfaction in their labor. In Marxist doctrine, *such alienation* is typically understood to serve as a catalyst for a proletarian revolution. Workers will unite, demanding alternative, more egalitarian economic and political arrangements. The Frankfurt School advanced an altogether different narrative regarding alienation. They argued that free individuals might—in certain circumstances—abandon their freedoms for the security offered in authoritarian governing arrangements. In traditional Marxism, capitalist-led alienation ushers in a communist revolution; to the Frankfurt School, alienation may promote democratic backsliding toward autocracy, as individuals place trust in autocratic leaders. For instance, in *Escape from Freedom*, Erich Fromm (1941) elaborates on authoritarian submission, as it "help[s] the individual to escape from the unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness" (p. 150) with the goal "*to get rid of the individual self, to lose oneself;* in other words, *to get rid of the burden of freedom*" (p. 151).

In interwar Germany, *Frankfurt School* scholars were uniquely and tragically situated to witness their predictions come to fruition with the rise of National Socialism in their home country of Germany (Bottomore, 1983/2010). Fromm (1929/1984), for instance, collected detailed qualitative and quantitative interviews of working-class Germans, and elaborated on the psychological characteristics giving rise to autocracy:

> The authoritarian attitude affirms, seeks out and enjoys the subjugation of men under a high external power, whether this power is the state or leader, natural law, the past or God. The strong and powerful are simply admired and loved for these qualities, the weak and helpless hated and despised. (Fromm, 1984, 209–210)

Yet, it was not until the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality (TAP)* by Theodor Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) that an exhaustive individual treatment of the "authoritarian syndrome" was presented (see Brown, 1965/2004; Jay 1973). Through survey analysis, in-depth interviews, and projection-based techniques, such as the Thematic Apperception Test, clinical interviews, and interviews with parents and children, Adorno and colleagues (1950) advanced the notion that authoritarianism can be understood as a constellation of attitudes and beliefs, revolving around *anti-Semitism*, *prejudice and ethnocentrism*, *fascistic tendencies*, and *political and economic conservatism.* At the heart of the authoritarian character is a preference for autocratic rule and an endorsement of anti-democratic attitudes. It is perhaps for this reason that Adorno and colleagues named their self-report measure of the authoritarian personality the *F-scale* (Fascism Scale). The F-scale consists of nine interrelated facets forming the psychological basis for the authoritarian personality, based on the Freudian psychodynamic theory popular at that time (Adorno et al. 1950, 248):

1. Conventionalism and adherence to middle-class values.
2. Submission to perceived-to-be-legitimate authority figures.
3. Aggression those who violate conventional values and norms.
4. Anti-intraception, or "opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender minded."
5. Superstition and classification of the world into rigid categories
6. A preoccupation with power and toughness.
7. A cynical, oftentimes destructive, worldview.
8. Projection through the belief that the world is a dangerous and threatening place.
9. An exaggerated concern with sexual goings-on.

The Authoritarian Personality represented the first large-scale empirical assessment of authoritarian tendencies. The F-scale was found to positively correlate with anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and conservatism. Yet, within a few years of publication, *TAP* was roundly criticized by eminent social scientists in Richard Christie's and Marie Jahoda's edited volume "Studies in the Scope and Method of The Authoritarian Personality" (1954) (see also, Brown, 1965/2004; Stone, 1980; Duckitt 2001; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Federico et al., 2022). The *Studies and Scope* critiques were both methodological and substantively focused. Scholars noted that *TAP* samples were not based in probabilistic sampling, coders for open-ended responses were not completely blind to the researchers' intentions, and survey items in the F-scale were worded in the same direction, confounding authoritarianism with acquiescence bias.

Among the fiercest critiques—and one that persists—is whether authoritarianism is an exclusively right-wing phenomenon. While Adorno et al (1950) understood the "authoritarian syndrome" to align with political and economic conservatism, later scholars would underscore the similarities between *authoritarian-fascists* and *authoritarian-communist*s.

In particular, the authoritarian tendencies that gave rise to fascism appear closely resemble the authoritarian tendencies found in the writings and actions of Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin, and Vladimir Lenin, for instance. Evidence for and against the existence of left-wing authoritarianism has been advanced in the years since the publication of TAP. We will return to this issue later in this chapter.

Due in part to the substantive and methodological criticisms of *TAP*, research on authoritarianism slowed in the 1960s and 1970s. However, some significant contributions were made in these years. For example, Milton Rokeach (1960) introduced the concept of *dogmatism*, a construct reflecting the tendency to approach the social world with an open versus closed mind. *Dogmatism* advances elements that originated in *The Authoritarian Personality*, such as the notion that humans vary in their propensity to view the world in black-and-white terms. Dogmatism, however, was intended to be apolitical in nature thus addressing concerns about the exclusive right-wing focus of authoritarianism in *TAP*. Something similar is found in Eysenck's (1954) research, where social and political attitudes are arrayed on a *radicalism* versus *conservatism* dimension and *tender-* versus *tough*-mindedness dimension. Eysenck's tender- versus tough-minded dimension was located orthogonally to the radicalism-conservatism dimension, suggesting that tough-minded (authoritarian) attitudes can be found on the left and right.

3. Bob Altemeyer and the Renewal of Interest in Authoritarianism

Bob Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996) pioneering work on *Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)* prompted a resurgence of authoritarianism research in the social sciences (Duckitt 2001; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Federico, Feldman & Weber, 2022). Altemeyer simplified *TAP* by reducing the nine F-scale dimensions to three interrelated components: submission to authority, adherence to conventional social and moral standards, and aggression against those who violate traditional norms and convention (Altemeyer, 1981/1988/1996). Moreover, Altemeyer side-stepped concerns about the ideological tenor of the construct, acknowledging quite directly that his focus is on a right-leaning authoritarian's tendency to endorse traditionalism and conservative social arrangements.

Altemeyer's (1981/1988) RWA scale substantially simplified the measurement of authoritarianism by including attitudinal statements reflective of the three core components of right-wing authoritarianism that he identified. The scale also addressed measurement concerns surrounding the *F-scale*. In practice, the scale typically exhibits high levels of reliability, and the survey items are presented in both a *pro-* and a *con-* trait direction, minimizing the influence of acquiescence bias. Indeed, Altemeyer's apparent success in providing a methodologically justified measure is largely responsible for the resurgence of authoritarianism-based research in the late 20th century. The RWA measure is not free from criticism, however, and we will discuss issues related to the measurement of authoritarianism shortly.

Another important point of divergence was that Altemeyer conceived of authoritarianism as a *social attitude*, rather than a stable personality attribute (for a discussion of

personality and politics see Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume; see also, Duckitt, 2001). The three authoritarianism facets serve as "attitudinal clusters" and are largely the consequence of socially learned experiences. People high in authoritarianism, according to Altemeyer, tend to grow up in conservative, authoritarian families and their social networks are homogeneous, often devoid of social and ethnic diversity.

In Altemeyer's conceptualization, authoritarianism is a learned attitude, rather than a stable personality characteristic. This distinction is important, as Altemeyer's theorizing on RWA advanced a far more parsimonious understanding of the factors that produce authoritarian tendencies. In *TAP*, Freudian psychodynamic theory provided the explanatory framework for understanding authoritarianism. Yet, in the latter half of the twentieth century, Freudian theory largely fell out of favor in the social sciences in general and academic psychology more specifically. The waning influence of Freudian thought in the social sciences produced further uncertainty about the empirical value of authoritarianism in the social sciences. What are the causes of authoritarianism, if the entire theoretical apparatus used to understand its emergence are brought into question? Altemeyer's (1981/1988/1996) work partially filled this void, showing little evidence to support the Freudian notion that cold and inconsistent childrearing are core components of authoritarianism. Instead, Altemeyer shifted the focus to how authoritarianism is learned through the social interactions young people have with friends and parents, and in schools.

Altemeyer (1988) also presented the findings from numerous studies he designed to explore what he termed "authoritarian aggression"—the willingness of those high in authoritarianism to support punitive measures advocated by government authorities targeting people and groups who deviate from social norms or are members of minority groups. These studies refined and extended some of the central claims in *TAP* that authoritarianism is a major predictor of political intolerance and prejudice.

Altemeyer's extensive research program grew out of the development of his RWA scale. Ultimately, in his studies authoritarianism is what the RWA scale measures: conventionalism, submission, and aggression. Why do these three factors cohere among authoritarians? While Altemeyer's social learning account sidesteps the absence of evidence for the Freudian theory in *TAP*, it is not clear that social learning, by itself, provides an adequate explanation for the phenomenon of authoritarianism. We thus turn to research that attempts to develop a deeper understanding of the nature and origins of authoritarianism.

4. THEORIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM: SOCIAL COHESION, VALUES, AND THREAT

John Duckitt's (2001) Dual Process Model (DPM) of ideology and prejudice offers a conceptually rich approach to authoritarianism.[1] Duckitt's model has its origins in studies that compared the effects of RWA and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; for a discussion of SDO see Craig & Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume) on generalized prejudice and intolerance (Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland 2010; McFarland & Adelson, 1996). These studies converged on several important conclusions that distinguished the two. First, RWA and SDO were only weakly correlated. Second,

in models including these scales, both substantially predicted measures of prejudice and intolerance.

Third, and perhaps most important, RWA and SDO have distinctive correlations with other psychological variables. For example, Altemeyer (1998) found that these two scales relate to different set of social values as measured by Schwartz's (1992; also see Feldman, 2003) model. RWA is most related to a dimension that has conservation values (security, conformity, and tradition) at one end and openness values (self-direction and stimulation) at the other. In contrast, SDO is correlated with a dimension that contrasts self-enhancement values (achievement, power, and hedonism) with self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence). All of this suggests that RWA and SDO tap different constructs. Duckitt's dual process model attempts to develop a deeper understanding of the nature and origins of RWA and SDO in the context of a general model of prejudice and ideology. Given the focus of this chapter, we will discuss only that part of Duckitt's framework that relates to authoritarianism.

As did Altemeyer, Duckitt begins by conceptualizing authoritarianism—as measured by the RWA scale—as a set of social or ideological attitudes. For Altemeyer, the authoritarianism attitudes that are tapped by the RWA scale are simply expressions of the three components of right-wing authoritarianism. It is not clear what, if anything, is the glue that holds these three factors together. In contrast, Duckitt sees authoritarianism as a reflection of what he terms motivational goals or values: "high RWA expresses the value or motivational goal of establishing and maintaining collective or societal security, order, cohesion, and stability (as opposed to individual freedom, autonomy, and self-expression), which is made chronically salient for individuals by the socialized worldview belief that the social world is an inherently dangerous, unpredictable, and threatening (as opposed to safe, stable, and secure) place" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010, p. 1867). In this framework, authoritarianism (RWA) is assumed to be a direct function of a worldview that portrays the world as dangerous and unpredictable and that is jointly shaped by personality factors and socialization. The effects of authoritarianism (prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalism, right-wing ideology) are, in turn, a result of perceptions of threat to collective security—the motivational basis of authoritarianism.

The dangerous worldview at the heart of this model is assumed to be a function, in part, of a core personality dimension that reflects a desire for social conformity versus autonomy (Saucier 1994). In terms of the Big Five personality model, social conformity is a function of low openness to experience and, to a lesser extent, high conscientiousness. The desire for social conformity motivates people to protect the existing social order and, therefore, these individuals may be particularly sensitive to threats to that social order. Being chronically primed to view the world as threatening and unpredictable ultimately leads to the adoption of authoritarian beliefs. For Duckitt, personality has an indirect effect on authoritarianism through its influence on people's beliefs that the world is perceived as dangerous and threatening.

A significant feature of the conceptualization of authoritarianism in Duckitt's dual process model provides a more precise specification of the effects of authoritarianism on negative outgroup attitudes. Previous research comparing the influence of RWA and SDO on prejudice had typically employed measures of generalized prejudice—summary measures that combine antipathy toward several outgroups. But those groups may vary in important ways that alter the way in which such antipathies are influenced by authoritarianism and SDO.

Following up that idea, Duckitt and colleagues (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Asbrock et al., 2010; Asbrock et al., 2012) distinguished between groups that they labelled as dangerous (socially threatening but not subordinate), derogated (socially subordinate but not threatening), and dissident (those competing with the ingroup). Using cross-sectional and panel data, they found that RWA had significant effects on attitudes toward dissident and dangerous groups but no effect on derogated groups. This is consistent with the major thrust of the dual process model that authoritarianism should motivate prejudice against groups that are threats to the social order. Attitudes toward groups that do not pose such a threat—like derogated groups that are not threatening—are not related to authoritarianism (but are significantly predicted by SDO).

Other approaches to the conceptualization of authoritarianism share elements with Duckitt's model although they identify somewhat different attributes that form the core of authoritarianism. In Duckitt's model, RWA (what is measured by the RWA scale) is still considered to be the construct of authoritarianism. Dangerous worldview, personality, and socialization are assumed to be precursors to RWA. Is RWA really measuring authoritarianism or the attitudinal consequences of it? For example, Stenner (2005, 14) argues that "authoritarianism is an individual predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other." This is similar to Norris and Inglehart (2019, 8) who define authoritarianism as "a cluster of values prioritizing collective security for the tribe at the expense of individual autonomy." They see collective security encompassing three components: security from instability and disorder, conformity to traditions, and obedience to leaders who protect the group. The second two components closely resemble Altemeyer's conventionalism and conformity factors.

Where does this concern with collective security come from? Feldman (2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005/2009) argues that the core of authoritarianism is a dimension that reflects the tradeoff between the values of social conformity and personal autonomy. Although it is likely that most people will at times view both values positively (see Gray & Durrheim 2013), there is an inherent tension between these values—the pursuit of social conformity is ultimately at odds with personal autonomy and vice versa. There will be situations in which individuals prioritize one of these values over the others. Therefore, these two values can be placed on a continuum, with one end anchored by social conformity, the other with personal autonomy. Those who place roughly equal weight on the two values would be located near the midpoint of the dimension. On the other hand, at the extremes are those who consistently favor the pursuit of one of these two values over. From this perspective, authoritarianism emerges from individuals who prioritize social conformity over personal autonomy. The value of social conformity in this conceptualization reflects the desire to maintain social cohesion.

In these conceptualizations, the dimension of social conformity versus personal autonomy is the primary factor used to identify one's authoritarian beliefs (or lack thereof). For Feldman (2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997) and Stenner (2005/2009), the social and political attitudes characteristic of authoritarians—prejudice, intolerance, punitiveness—are behavioral consequences of the desire to maintain social conformity and cohesion. The attitudes captured by RWA-type measures are thus seen as *consequences* of authoritarian predispositions and not the construct itself. Social threat in these models plays a critical role: "People who value social conformity are predisposed to be intolerant but may not

be intolerant without the required threat, whether it is a particular group that is threatening or a perception that social cohesion is in danger more generally" (Feldman 2003, 52). From this perspective, high scores on RWA-type measures should be a function of the value placed on social conformity/cohesion in combination with high levels of social threat.

5. Threat and Authoritarianism

Throughout much of its history, authoritarianism research has examined simple, direct effects of authoritarianism measures on social and political attitudes. But why do we appear to see authoritarianism impacting political attitudes and behavior only in some places at some times? The responsiveness of authoritarianism to threat provides a mechanism that can account for over-time variation in the political effects of authoritarianism.

Researchers since Fromm (1941) have discussed and studied the relationship between threat and authoritarianism though the hypothesized causal mechanisms vary. Doty, Peterson, and Winter (1991; Peterson et al., 1993), extending earlier work by Sales (1973), examined how social threat, measured in terms of overall social and economic stability, contributed to increases in authoritarian behavior. In the United States, the period from 1978 to 1982 can be considered *high threat*; it was marked by economic uncertainty defined by high unemployment and inflation, an energy crisis, and the Iran-Hostage crisis. During these years, Doty and colleagues observe more authoritarian behavior relative to a *lower* threat period from 1982 to 1987—a period in which the White middle class in the United States enjoyed comparatively more economic security. Thus, a common way to view the threat and authoritarianism relationship is within a causal structure—salient threat motivates the adoption of authoritarian values (Duckitt, 2001); one *escapes from freedom* and sacrifices individuality because of a worldview in which the social world is seen as a dangerous and threatening place.

From a different perspective, threat plays a more interactive, dynamic role. It alters the manner and degree in which authoritarianism is expressed. The interaction between threat and authoritarianism has been the subject of much discussion and research (see Duckitt, 2013, and Feldman, 2013, for discussions of this). A major issue has been whether people high in authoritarianism are generally sensitive to a wide range of threats or are responsive only to certain types of threats. The conceptualizations just discussed predict that people high in authoritarianism should be uniquely responsive to threats to the social order and social cohesion while these same threats should have little or no effect on those low in authoritarianism. This prediction has been tested in several ways. Duckitt (2006) presented subjects with a range of different groups and followed that with a battery of questions to measure the extent to which the group was seen as a social threat or a competitive threat. The distinction between social and competitive threats is important here as competitive (economic) threats do not directly impact social cohesion. He found that effects of authoritarianism on negative responses to the groups were mediated by perceptions of social threat but not by competitiveness.

Other studies have directly tested the prediction that social threat should lead to the greatest outgroup animosity among those with authoritarian values. As a result, we tend to observe substantial variations in the simple marginal effect of authoritarianism on

prejudice and intolerance. Some studies have experimentally manipulated social threat. For example, Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) and Cohrs and Ibler (2009) examined the threat-authoritarianism interaction hypothesis by comparing the effects of authoritarianism on outgroup attitudes in conditions where threat from immigration was explicitly present or absent. Both studies found that threat increased hostility toward outgroups only among people high in authoritarianism. In addition, Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) found that outgroup hostility among authoritarians was higher when immigrants were portrayed as socially (culturally) threatening than when they were economically competitive.

Velez and Lavine (2017) tested the hypothesis that racial and ethnic diversity could act as threats to social cohesion among authoritarians. They examined the effects of authoritarianism among White Americans on racial prejudice, intolerance, and attitudes toward immigration as residential diversity varied. In areas with limited diversity, they found virtually no effect of authoritarianism. As residential diversity increased, however, the effect of authoritarianism on negative outgroup attitudes grew substantially larger, consistent with the idea that mere residential diversity functions as a threat. Similar dynamics of residential diversity were found in the Netherlands by Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, and Van Hiel (2014). Diversity was negatively related to attitudes toward immigrants only among those high in authoritarianism. Interestingly, they also found that diversity was related to *favorable* attitudes toward immigrants among low authoritarians. These studies show that ethnic and racial diversity is threatening to those high in authoritarianism and increases their hostility toward outgroups.

An alternative prediction concerning the interaction of threat and authoritarianism has been offered by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). In their approach, individuals high in authoritarianism have habitually elevated perceptions of threat. As a result, social and political events should have little impact on them since additional threats provide decreasing marginal returns. Instead, Hetherington and colleagues argue, it is those *low* in authoritarianism who should respond to threatening events by supporting more aggressive government actions and policies that restrict civil liberties since they are otherwise unlikely to experience social threat. This leads to the prediction that an increase in threat should *reduce* the apparent effects of authoritarianism on political attitudes since it will make low authoritarians endorse the sort of security and punitive policies typical of high authoritarians. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) tested this experimentally by making the threat of terrorism salient. They then estimated the effects of authoritarianism on questions tapping a willingness to restrict civil liberties to protect against terrorism and use force against international threats. Consistent with their prediction, they found that it is those low in authoritarianism that are most affected by the experimental manipulation of terrorist threat (for a broader discussion on the psychological effects of terror threat see Snider et al., Chapter 14, this volume).

So, some studies find threat-induced xenophobia only among high authoritarians, and others only among lows. Several recent studies help to resolve this puzzle. Claassen and McLaren (2021) examined responses in 19 European countries in the 2014 European Social Survey in which some respondents were exposed to an experimental manipulation of "immigration threat"—by raising the specter of non-European immigration. This study design helps to sort out whether immigration threat increases opposition to immigration across levels of authoritarianism or just for those high or just those who are low. Although the magnitude of the immigration threat/authoritarianism interaction varied across countries

(from non-significant to substantively large), the evidence supported the high authoritarian activation prediction: the threat of non-European immigration increased opposition to immigration among those high in authoritarian, but there was no support for an increase in opposition to immigration among those low in authoritarianism when threat was experimentally manipulated. Importantly, consistent with the findings of Cohrs and Asbrock (2009), Claassen and McLaren found that it was cultural threat from immigration that increased opposition among high authoritarians. Economic threat (from the skill level of immigrants) did not change levels of opposition to immigrants for people high or low in authoritarianism.

The divergence of the Hetherington and Suhay study, finding the strongest effects of threatened terrorism among low authoritarians, raises the possibility that the sorts of threat evoked by terrorism may moderate the effects of authoritarianism differently than the social conformity and diversity threats that many other studies have examined (see Feldman, 2013). Following this line of reasoning, Arikan (2022) designed a study to determine whether those high and low in authoritarianism respond to different types of threat. She did this by experimentally varying whether the threat to society or the personal threat of COVID-19 was made salient to respondents in several US samples. Although the results varied to some extent across the samples, support for tough policies to punish those not following COVID protocols increased among those high in authoritarianism in the societal threat condition while it increased among those low in the personal threat condition.

Stevens and Banducci (2022) use panel data in United Kingdom spanning two terrorist events to directly compare the effects of personal threat of terrorism and social (normative) threat on those high and low in authoritarianism. They measured normative threat as perceptions of ideological dissensus and personal threat as the identification of terrorism as the most important issue facing the nation. They broadly measured the effects of terrorist threat on support for right-wing leaders, opposition to immigration, and favoring greater military strength. They first found that both types of threat went up more among those high in authoritarianism than among low authoritarians. Importantly, they found effects of normative threat only among high authoritarians while personal threat influenced the dependent variables among low authoritarians.

Threat may not have a uniform effect across the authoritarian spectrum; instead, different types of threats resonate with authoritarians and non-authoritarians. While the majority of studies find support for the hypothesis that those high in authoritarianism will respond to threats to social cohesion and conformity, the Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Arikan (2022), and Stevens and Banducci (2022) studies suggest that low authoritarians are also sensitive to threat, in this case to existential or personal threat.

6. Authoritarianism as a Group-Level Phenomenon

The focus on social cohesion and conformity in these models raises an issue that has not been extensively addressed in the authoritarianism literature: social cohesion is only meaningful with respect to one's social groups. For instance, consider an individual who values

social conformity over personal autonomy. Adhering to group norms depends upon identification with a specific group. So, if an individual is embedded in a relatively liberal social network, social cohesion might map onto a liberal worldview. On the other hand, if this person were embedded in a relatively conservative social network, social cohesion might map onto a conservative worldview. Consistent with this prediction, Gorska et al. 2021 found that the perception of positive and negative social norms toward minority groups moderated the effects of authoritarianism on outgroup animosity. And Roets, Au, and Van Hiel (2015) reported that in Singapore, a country that has made multiculturalism a strong social norm, authoritarianism is *positively* related to support for multiculturalism and attitudes toward outgroups, which is opposite what is almost always found in other research. Authoritarianism, as a general preference for social cohesion, is animated by our social identities and the norms of the groups we identify with.

While not fully appreciated, conceptualizations of authoritarianism that are based on social conformity and cohesion are inherently group-centric models. This perspective was first developed by John Duckitt (1989), in a paper that that preceded his dual process model. Authoritarianism, as developed in this paper, involves a core tension reflecting the relationship between the group and individual: "At one extreme would be the belief that the purely personal needs, inclinations, and values of group members should be subordinated as completely as possible to the cohesion of the group and its requirements. At the other extreme would be the belief that the requirements of group cohesion should be subordinated as completely as possible to the autonomy and self-regulation of the individual member" (Duckitt, 1989, 71).

Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) built on Duckitt's conceptualization by making explicit the specific group context within which authoritarian predispositions are activated. Their conceptualization, which they call *group authoritarianism*, predicts that those high in authoritarianism will react only to threats that involve their salient social identities. In this model, it is a threat to *ingroup identification* that produces responses typical of authoritarianism. Stellmacher and Petzel assume that people have—as Duckitt suggested—relatively stable beliefs about the relationship between the demands of group cohesion and the individual. What they call an "authoritarian reaction"—conformity to group norms, obedience to leaders, and intolerance of deviance—results when those with these generalized authoritarian predispositions experience threats to a strong ingroup identity.

Kreindler (2005) arrives at a similar conceptualization of authoritarianism starting from basic principles of social identity theory. She argues that "authoritarianism reflects a desire to uphold ingroup norms and to ensure that these norms are preserved. Authoritarianism is preceded by two necessary conditions: group identification (which engenders support for group norms) and the perception that existing norms are under threat (which engenders concern for their preservation)" (Kreindler, 2005, 97). She argues that social identity theory can account for the three core components of authoritarianism identified by Altemeyer: conventionalism (the adoption of group norms), authoritarian submission (respect for authorities who embody group values), and authoritarian aggression (punishing ingroup members who violate group norms) (for greater discussion of social identity theory see Hopkins, Chapter 9, Mason, Chapter 24, and Pérez &Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume).

By a somewhat different route, Kessler and Cohrs (2008) arrived at a group-centric, *evolutionary* theory of authoritarianism. They suggest that authoritarianism could have been selected for—by evolutionary processes—as a mechanism to foster coordination and

cooperation in social groups. Common markers of group membership (conventionalism), ingroup loyalty (submission), and punishment of norm-violators (aggression) all help to maintain cohesion and cooperation among small groups (Bang Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume). Anthropology offers further insight into the importance of cohesive small groups. According to anthropologist Richard Lee (1979, Lee et al., 1999), several 20th-century hunter-gatherer societies were observed to be largely egalitarian in nature, where survival required human cooperation and coordination.

Drawing on Kessler and Cohrs (2008), it follows that a disposition toward conformity would have provided broad social value. In early human societies, authoritarianism might have provided the necessary glue to maintain security-providing, cohesive small groups. In small local communities, authoritarianism may have been selected to maintain intra- and inter-familial social bonds. Kessler and Cohrs (2008) suggest that authoritarianism—an individual's tendency to adhere to traditional group arrangements—increases sensitivity to local norms and customs, the desire to preserve traditional social arrangements, and the motivation to punish those who violate these arrangements. Authoritarianism may have been evolutionarily advantageous in maintaining small groups and punishing norm violation and may have emerged as a socio-cognitive mechanism to preserve local social arrangements. A certain number of individuals willing to prioritize the group over oneself will benefit the group. The social group offers security, thus enhancing survival and reproduction. Since humans invariably benefit from being in cooperative groups, Kessler and Cohrs argue that "reliance on conventions, submission to norm systems and the authorities embodying them, and aggression against norm violators has an adaptive value in increasing rates of cooperation in group and, in turn, enhancing group performance" (Kessler & Cohrs, 2008, 75). Groups that evolved with members who practiced authoritarian tendencies may therefore have been more likely to survive over time.

However, a problem with an evolutionary model such as this one, as the authors note, is that it is not easy to account for individual differences in a trait. If authoritarianism is adaptive, why are all people not highly authoritarian? Kessler and Cohrs speculate that overtime variations in environmental conditions could have altered the relative advantages of social conformity and autonomy. Some environments may have favored autonomy, others conformity. Those changing conditions could then have led to the maintenance of variation in authoritarianism in human populations.

Such group-based theories describe authoritarianism in non-ideological terms. A preference for social conformity over personal autonomy is animated by one's social groups. When cast in these terms, authoritarianism is not directly conflated with ideology. *The Authoritarian Personality* and *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* are concerned with authoritarians on the political right. While scholars have and continue to identify cases of authoritarianism on the left, in practice, the "left-wing-authoritarianism" has proven to be a somewhat elusive construct (Brown, 1965/2004; Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1960)—a topic we shall explore later in this chapter. Whether there are left- and right-wing authoritarians (and what that entails) is a question that can be cast in different terms: how does the fundamental human tendency to submit to authority morph into a belief structure, a preference for a party, or ideologies that take on a particular ideological flavor?

As we have suggested, the way in which authoritarianism is *politically* and *ideologically expressed* depends upon one's group, who is considered a legitimate authority figure within that group, and that group's position relative to the dominant group—does one's group

hold a disproportionate share of social, political and/or economic power? Consider, for example, the work on authoritarianism in Russia shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union by McFarland and associates (McFarland et al., 1992/1993; McFarland et al., 1996). They found that RWA scores correlated *positively* with support for the Soviet Union and the value of equality and negatively with laissez-faire individualism. Among people for whom communism remained a core of their group identity, authoritarianism was associated with ideologically left-wing attitudes and values like equality and social justice.

In another example of the importance of group identity and social norms, authoritarianism has different consequences for White relative to Black Americans. Dusso (2017) examined the effects of authoritarianism among African-American voters in the 2012 American presidential election. Among White voters in the United States, there is a strong relationship between authoritarianism and support for Republican candidates (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Among Blacks, Dusso found that authoritarianism was *positively* associated with voting for Democratic candidate Barack Obama. This may be a function, in part, of the activation of group norms for authoritarians. Since Democratic identification is normative among African-Americans (White & Laird, 2020), the tendency for authoritarians to defend ingroup norms should lead to the observed positive association between authoritarianism and Democratic voting.

The group-centric model of authoritarianism puts forward questions that have not been adequately dealt with in research on authoritarianism: What is the "group" that people want to protect? An implicit assumption in much of the literature is that people are thinking about their national group—the nation. That is probably a reasonable assumption for members of national majority groups who see their group as prototypical of the nation (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume). What are the consequences of authoritarianism among minority group members? There is no reason why authoritarianism should not vary among minority group members to the same degree as majority group members (but see Henry, 2011, who argues that authoritarianism may be higher among members of minority groups). While majority and minority group members should experience some threats to social cohesion similarly, the growth and influence of minority groups and increasing social diversity should be threats to authoritarian members of majority groups but not minority groups. That should lead to divergences in the effects of authoritarianism across groups.

7. The Origins of Authoritarianism

7.1. Evolutionary Approaches

Research suggests that authoritarian tendencies have both genetic and environmental foundations. As we just discussed, Kessler and Cohrs (2008) argue that authoritarianism may have emerged in human evolution to foster cooperation and preserve group structures. In evolutionary psychology, a literature has emerged around understanding how general-purpose cognitive modules emerged in human evolution. Human psychology includes an architecture informed by reactions to environmental conditions (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). These adaptive cognitive modules are "content neutral"; the expression of these evolutionarily informed cognitions can be practiced and expressed in any number of ways (Barkow

et al., 1992; Bang Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume; Buss, 2008). Group submission, and a general concern with social cohesion, may have evolved as adaptive mechanisms to navigate the demands of group living.

A related literature on the so-called *moral emotions* addresses psychological structures oriented around authority and group cohesion (Buss, 2008; Haidt, 2012). Humans' cognitive apparatus consists of quick, automatic reactions to environmental stimuli. *Reaction* is more common than *reflection.* Humans typically navigate the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of everyday life on autopilot, relying on cognitive shortcuts, heuristics, and general rules-of-thumb (Jerit and Kam, Chapter 15, this volume). Emotions are an evolved part of humans' cognitive architecture, some of which are oriented to protect and preserve group arrangements. Evolved group-oriented emotions—such as shame, guilt, and embarrassment—are often prompted by actions that threaten social groups (Brader & Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). These group-centric emotions serve as "commitment devices" preserving social cohesion, order, and in some cases submission to authority (Buss, 2008, 402).

Haidt extends this reasoning to *moral foundations theory*, which also addresses the advantages that an evolved, group-centric orientation could provide, particularly applied to moral judgment (Ben-Nun Bloom, Chapter 18, this volume; Graham et al., 2009, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Haidt et al., 2009; Haidt 2012). According to this approach, two broad clusters underpin moral judgment. On one hand, the two *individualizing foundations* curb exploitation from groups. These foundations represent concern about harm/care and concern about fairness/justice. On the other hand, the *binding foundations* exist to protect and preserve social groups. There are three binding foundations: a concern about purity, a loyalty to groups, and respect for authority. According to moral foundations theory, the individualizing and binding foundations emerged in human evolution as cognitive mechanisms to navigate threat and maximize survival. Research has demonstrated that the *binding* foundations are strongly intertwined with authoritarianism. Federico et al. (2013) showed that right-wing authoritarianism is related to the binding foundations, with the correlation between authoritarianism and the authority/loyalty foundation exhibiting the most prominent relationship. These evolutionary accounts suggest that authoritarianism may be, to some extent, a part of human psychological architecture (see also Sinn & Hayes, 2018).

7.2. Heritability

In addition to authoritarianism's possible evolutionary basis, scholars have identified a genetic foundation for the trait (for a discussion of genetics and politics see Settle & Detert, Chapter 8, this volume). McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, and Keyes (1999) used the classical twin design to explore whether authoritarianism is partially heritable. By collecting data from monozygotic and dizygotic twins reared together as well as twin pairs separated when young, McCourt et al. estimated the proportion of variation in authoritarianism scores attributable to genetics, common environment, and unique environmental causes. In their data, roughly one-half the variation in authoritarianism scores were attributable to genes. Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard (2013) similarly document the heritability of authoritarianism, finding that authoritarianism is a component of a partially heritable *traditionalism* worldview. Using two sets of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, Lewis and Bates

(2014) estimated that 61% of the variation in RWA was genetic. They also found that measures of ingroup favoritism, authoritarianism, and concern for norm maintenance shared the same genetic underpinnings. Their data also suggests that ingroup favoritism and authoritarianism may share a common environmental basis as well.

It is important to note that estimates of heritability from twin designs do not tell us anything about what the pathway from genes to authoritarian attitudes may be. There could be yet-unknown biological or neurological factors that predispose people toward authoritarianism. Alternatively, heritability could be a function of a *gene-environment correlation*: genes may influence the environments that people select into, and it is those environments that influence the development of authoritarianism.

Evolutionary and genetic explanations suggest that authoritarianism has deep roots in human cognition and biology. However, a notable limitation of this work is that the mechanisms by which authoritarianism is expressed are not specified. If authoritarianism is an evolved, adaptive orientation, surely it must be practiced in various ways, such as emotional reactions. We have reviewed authoritarianism research that argues that authoritarianism is influenced or activated by certain types of threat. There is some evidence of biological differences in how authoritarians versus non-authoritarians respond to threat. LePage et al. (2020) show that authoritarianism correlates with two measures of parasympathetic nervous system activation: tonic heat rate and heart rate variability. These indicators correlate with self-regulation, coping with threat, recovery, and aggression. This suggests that there may be biological differences in how authoritarians cope with environmental stress and threat.

7.3. Personality and Authoritarianism

Many studies have provided evidence of a relationship between authoritarianism and personality. An early account of this came from Adorno et al. (1950), who argued that intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive rigidity were closely related to authoritarianism (see also Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). Rokeach (1956/1960), developed the concept of dogmatism—a closed organization of beliefs—as a less ideologically oriented alternative to authoritarianism in *TAP*. He argued that dogmatism, unlike authoritarianism, could be found on the political left and right. However, studies consistently found that dogmatism is positively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism (Duckitt, 2009). More recently, Altemeyer (1996) developed a balanced, reliable, and non-ideological measure of dogmatism and found correlations of approximately .5 with his RWA measure.

There have also been many studies that have examined the relationships between the Big Five personality dimensions and authoritarianism. From a variety of samples across nations, authoritarianism is most consistently related to openness to experience and, to a lesser extent, conscientiousness (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).[2] Authoritarianism is largely uncorrelated with neuroticism, agreeableness, and extraversion. The relationship between authoritarianism and openness is consistent with the earlier findings on intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism as these constructs are facets of the broad dimension of openness or closely related to it. The relationships with openness to experience and intolerance of ambiguity suggest that authoritarianism may be based, to some extent, on discomfort with novelty or social complexity—as would be aroused by diversity and social change.

7.4. The Social Environment and Learning

Authoritarianism may have genetic and evolutionary foundations. Yet, these causes do not preclude a pervasive impact of one's social environment, which research shows also exerts a well-documented role. *The Authoritarian Personality* offered one of the earliest explanations for the emergence of authoritarian tendencies, citing the role of childrearing experiences. The focus in *TAP* was Freudian in nature, seeking to understand how childrearing patterns contribute to the authoritarian syndrome. High authoritarians were more likely to recall a "*distant, stern* father, with a bad temper, and a barrier between family and son, as opposed to the picture of a *warm, demonstrative father*." The mother, on the other hand, was generally "*sacrificing, kind, submissive* person" (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 366). In *TAP*, authoritarians view the family in competitive terms, often stressing the role of heredity and an "aristocratic superiority" (p. 358). Authoritarians were more concerned with familial images of status, power, and dominance. Ultimately, the "stern and dominant" father and "sacrificing, kind, and submissive" mother would create an environment in which the child will repress hostility, perhaps then projecting upon threatening outgroups (Adorno et al. 1950).

Such Freudian explanations fell out of favor in the latter half of the 20th century, due in part to researchers' inability to empirically replicate many of the key developmental tenets found in Freudian theory (Westen, 1998). It was not until Bob Altemeyer's *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (1981) that an alternative, more empirically based argument was advanced. As indicated earlier, the "social learning" approach Altemeyer developed conceives of RWA as an *attitude*, not a personality syndrome deeply rooted in early life. Authoritarian attitudes emerge in development through direct experience with the social world. Altemeyer (1981) found little evidence to suggest that authoritarianism emerges in development in response to childrearing patterns, as suggested in *TAP*; rather, authoritarianism represents the learned accumulation of life experiences. Parents provide a large share of the input, as does one's community, educational experiences, news, and entertainment. With respect to the role of the early family environment, Altemeyer's (1981) insight suggests that parenting content, not parenting style, shapes authoritarian beliefs. Children are likely to become authoritarian because their parent(s) is perhaps authoritarian, not because of a unique childrearing style. However, it is also important to recognize that correlations between parent's and children's levels of authoritarianism could be a result of shared genes as well as socialization.

Duckitt (2001) extends these ideas, by exploring the attitudes, values, and beliefs that contribute to RWA. In his model, a person's socialization will inform beliefs and values, which influence worldviews, then ideologies and political beliefs. Duckitt (2001) shows that adults who report growing up in a punitive environment are then more likely to place value in social conformity (over personal freedom). This tendency toward conformity may lead one to adopt a worldview in which world is seen as a dangerous and threatening place, which in turn leads to authoritarianism.

Weber and Federico (2007) shed further light on the effects of parental socialization by developing an *attachment* theory of authoritarianism (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2009; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Through socialization, children form a set of social expectations—known as *attachment patterns*—rooted in the extent to which the primary caregiver meets the child's psychological and physical needs. *Insecurely* attached individuals

are generally more preoccupied with abandonment and experience heightened degrees of interpersonal distrust and fear. Weber and Federico (2007) found that anxious attachment predicted RWA scores, and, as Duckitt's model suggests, it is mediated by dangerous world beliefs.The

Among the most consistent correlates of authoritarianism is educational attainment. Increasing levels of education are virtually always associated with lower authoritarianism (Simpson, 1972; Stubager, 2008). It is not clear, however, exactly how the correlation comes about, or even if education reduces authoritarianism. In a summary of relevant literature, Stubager (2008) finds three possible causal mechanism that could produce this relationship. Education could foster psychological security, thus reducing the extent to which people are personally threatened by social change and diversity. An alternative way in which education could reduce perceptions of threat is via knowledge and cognitive sophistication. Greater knowledge and sophistication may increase an understanding of the diversity of people and values in the world which should make diversity appear less unusual and unfamiliar. Finally, education may directly instill values that oppose authoritarianism. Educational institutions in many countries teach about toleration and democratic norms. And education exposes students to teachers and, potentially, other students who value diversity and tolerance. It is also possible that some of the association of education and authoritarianism may be non-causal. For example, those low in openness to experience may be less inclined to pursue higher levels of education at the same time it independently leads to greater authoritarianism, thus leading to a spurious correlation between the two.

Education also has informal effects that may affect levels of authoritarianism. Schools immerse students in social networks—groups of friends who are influences on each other's beliefs and values (Jennings & Niemi, 1968). In several studies, Altemeyer (1988) asked students to report on experiences they had, both those that should make them more comfortable with nonconformists and alternative lifestyles and those that should make them less comfortable. In each study, responses to his "experiences" scale were highly correlated with RWA scores (r > .7). Of course, as Altemeyer recognized, this association could be a consequence both of social experiences conditioning levels of authoritarianism and pre-existing levels of authoritarianism influencing the choices people make about the types of people they associate with. This uncertainty about causality is, unfortunately, characteristic of much of the existing research on the determinants of authoritarianism. Long-term socialization studies are expensive and difficult to undertake but they probably represent the best way to make progress in this area.

8. The Measurement of Authoritarianism

Since the publication of Adorno et al. (1950), the predominant method for measuring authoritarianism has been multiple item scales made up of attitude statements asked on an agree-disagree scale. The first version of this was the F-scale developed in Adorno et al. As we noted earlier, the F-scale was designed to tap into the fascistic tendencies inherent to the authoritarian syndrome. Since their conceptualization of authoritarianism was based on nine interrelated syndromes, the questions making up the F-scale were quite heterogeneous. For example, two questions were "Nowadays more and more people are prying into

matters that should remain personal and private" and "Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question."

Methodological investigations of the F-scale revealed two major problems. First, all the questions were worded in the same direction, so that an agree response corresponds with the authoritarian response. However, research has demonstrated that some individuals have a tendency to agree with statements they are presented with. This is known as acquiescence bias. Acquiescence bias is a potential confound when using the F-scale. Some amount of the variance in the scale may reflect acquiescence tendencies rather than authoritarianism, per se. If acquiescence bias confounds the measurement of authoritarianism, that bias may also contaminate the estimated relationship of authoritarianism with other variables. Second, analyses of the F-scale indicated that it was not unidimensional; the nine syndromes that the measure was designed to tap did not, in practice, sufficiently cohere to produce a reliable, single scale (see Altemeyer, 1981).

Altemeyer's (1981/1988) *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* scale was largely born out of the critiques of *The Authoritarian Personality*. From numerous questionnaires administered to his students, Altemeyer developed attitudinal statements that balance for acquiescence bias: for half of the questions, agreement indicated authoritarianism and for the other half, disagreement was the authoritarian response. Altemeyer also found that it was possible to create a more reliable, homogeneous measure by limiting the focus to just three of the components proposed by Adorno et al.: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. The RWA scale was originally 17 items in length, though Altemeyer eventually expanded it to 30 questions (Altemeyer, 1988). It has been translated into several other languages and shortened to various lengths to make it easier to include on non-student-based studies. Since its development in the 1980s, the RWA scale has been, by far, the most widely used measure of authoritarianism.

Despite its use in a very large number of studies, there are potential problems with the RWA scale that are not widely recognized. While Altemeyer's goal was to produce an authoritarianism scale that is unidimensional, several recent papers have shown that the three components of the scale are, in fact, empirically distinguishable (Funke, 2005; Duckitt et al., 2010; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Dunwoody & Funke, 2016). When questions are written to cleanly measure just one of these three components, factor analyses on multiple samples in several countries show that a three-factor model fits much better than a one-factor model. While the three factors are positively correlated in all of the national samples that have been reported in these studies, some of the inter-factor correlations are weak to moderate in some cases. In general, the smallest correlations are between the conventionalism and aggression factors (labeled as traditionalism and authoritarianism by Duckitt et al., 2010, and Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). In a Romanian sample included in Duckitt et al., the only significant correlation among the factors was between submission and aggression (r = .44). Duckitt and Bizumic present results from a Serbian sample with inter-factor correlations that range from .17 to .25.

Importantly, there is also evidence from these and other studies that the three factors have different associations with variables like prejudice and intolerance that authoritarianism should predict. For example, in a New Zealand sample, Duckitt and Bizumic find that the aggression (authoritarianism) factor predicts prejudice toward "dangerous groups," submission (conservatism) predicts prejudice toward "dissident groups," while conventionalism (traditionalism) has no additional significant effect on prejudice toward these

groups. In another study, Ludeke, Klitgaard, and Vitriol (2018) found that the authoritarian aggression factor was the key predictor of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 American presidential election with all three components included in the analysis. Neither of the other two factors were significant predictors.

Evidence that measures of RWA are multi-dimensional raises concerns about the measurement and conceptualization of authoritarianism. A general requirement for scale development is that the measure is unidimensional—the common variance in the items is a function of a single latent construct. It is possible to combine questions that measure the three authoritarianism factors into a single measure. But what is that measure tapping if items in the scale are measuring somewhat different underlying constructs? And, as studies of the dimensionality of RWA have shown, the three factors frequently have different relationships to other social and political variables. Is a single RWA measure therefore obscuring relationships that would be observed using three separate measures?

The dimensionality of RWA also has implications for our understanding of the construct of authoritarianism. If conventionalism, submission, and aggression are somewhat distinct factors, how do we understand exactly what authoritarianism is? For Altemeyer, (right-wing) authoritarianism is the conjunction of the three components. This assumes that high levels of authoritarianism are always manifested by high scores on all three of the factors. As the recent studies of the multi-dimensionality of RWA show, however, it is not uncommon to find people who are high on one of the factors but not on the other two. What identifies people high in authoritarianism if the three factors are not highly inter-correlated?

The attitudinal statements in the RWA scale also raise concerns about the use of the scale in statistical models to predict political policy preferences and support for political parties and candidates for office. One problem is that many questions in the RWA scale ask people's attitudes toward groups and issues that are often the target of debates over government policies. Consider the following RWA items:

> Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.
>   God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
>   You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. (reverse worded)
>   Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy "traditional family values." (reverse worded)

What do we learn if responses to these questions are correlated with people's policy preferences on issues like gay marriage, abortion, and women's equality? Relationships like this are virtually tautological—attitudes toward social groups "predict" preferences on policies affecting these groups. The inclusion of statements like these also raises concerns about the relationship between authoritarianism and ideology. Is someone who agrees with the first two of these statements and disagrees with the second two authoritarian or do they just hold conservative beliefs? The relationship between authoritarianism and conservatism should be subject to empirical analysis, not built into a measure of authoritarianism.

A second potential problem with the RWA scale in models of party and candidate support is that the language in some of the items increasingly resembles rhetoric used by right-wing politicians and media figures. Here are three examples from the RWA scale (all answered on an agree-disagree scale):

> Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
>
> The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.
>
> Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.

A large body of research in political science shows that citizens often adopt positions advocated by political leaders that they support (Lenz, 2013)—leaders provide policy cues to voters. If political leaders adopt rhetoric similar to what is found in the RWA scale, it stands to reason that some voters may show support for items on the RWA scale, not because they are necessarily authoritarian, but rather, these voters are absorbing policy cues from trusted political leaders.

There are two issues that need to be distinguished. First, is authoritarianism itself endogenous to political rhetoric? We will return to this question when we discuss other authoritarianism measures. Second, is a measure of authoritarianism endogenous? This is a measurement problem that would hinder studies of the political effects of authoritarianism. If authoritarianism is then used to predict support for political leaders, this leads to an inherent confound: one is predicting support for right-wing politicians from items that resemble the rhetoric of the same right-wing politicians. It is a well-established principle in empirical social science that a correctly specified regression models requires all predictor variables be unaffected by changes in the dependent variable in the model. The exogeneity assumption is problematic in political applications of right-wing authoritarianism. Two recent analyses of panel data in the United Kingdom (Van Assche et al. 2019) and New Zealand (Satherly et al. 2021) demonstrate this. Both studies find that changes in RWA over time are predicted by prior political partisanship. Therefore, contemporaneous correlations of RWA and party support are potentially confounded by the fact that RWA is endogenous to partisanship.

In the early 1990s, Stanley Feldman (see Feldman & Stenner, 1997) implemented an altogether different approach to the measurement of authoritarianism. He developed a four-item childrearing scale, asking respondents to choose between pairs of childrearing values:

> Although there are a number of qualities that people think children should have, every person thinks that some are *more important* than others. Although you may feel that both qualities are important, please tell me which one of each pair you think is *more important* for a child to have.
>
> Would you say it is *more important* for a child to be INDEPENDENT or RESPECTFUL OF THEIR ELDERS?
>
> Would you say it is *more important* for a child to be OBEDIENT or SELF-RELIANT?
>
> Would you say it is *more important* for a child to be WELL BEHAVED or CONSIDERATE?
>
> Would you say it is *more important* for a child to be CURIOUS or GOOD MANNERED?

This measure is grounded in the social cohesion/conformity models of authoritarianism previously discussed. If people want members of society to conform to societal norms and respect political leaders who enforce those norms, they should want to socialize children (and thus adults) to be respectful, obedient, well behaved, and good mannered. Responses to these (dichotomous) questions yield a scale with categories ranging from 0 to 4 based on the number of the conformity values that people choose out of the four value pairs.

This measure has now been included in a number of national surveys (every American National Election Study presidential year survey since 1992 except for 1996, several waves of the most recent online British Election Study, a French panel study spanning the 2017 national elections, recent national election studies in Germany and Switzerland, and others). Englehardt, Feldman, and Hetherington (2021) show that this measure is highly correlated with a short RWA-type measure. It predicts a wide range of policy preferences and measures of prejudice that authoritarianism is expected to be associated with (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009/2018; Velez & Lavine, 2017). And it is strongly correlated with support Donald Trump in 2016 (Weber et al., 2017), and right-wing parties in France and Germany (Hetherington & Weiler, 2018; Vasilopoulos & Lachat, 2018).

A major advantage of this measure in analyses like these is that questions do not have obvious political content—political debate rarely centers around childrearing practices. So, if this measure correlates with political outcomes, it is unlikely that it suffers from the endogeneity problem cited above; responses to the four value pairs probably do not strongly reflect contemporary political discourse. Using two American national panel studies, Englehardt et al. (2021) find no evidence that a range of political attitudes, candidate attitudes, and partisanship are associated with changes in the childrearing measure over time.

A limitation of the measure is that it is based on dichotomous responses to just four questions. This creates two methodological problems. First, the reliability of the measure is less than desirable (typically in the range of .6 to .65). Second, the distribution of responses to the measure yields too many people with scores of 0 and 4. This makes it difficult to distinguish those who are very high and very low in authoritarianism. Englehardt et al. (2021) have identified four additional value pairs that increase the reliability of the (eight-item) measure and increase its variance. They show that the estimated effects of the new eight item measure on a range of political variables are, on average, 50% larger than those obtained from the original four-item scale.

Another measure that is conceptually similar to the childrearing scale uses items from the Schwartz (1992) value inventory. One of the two dimensions that Schwartz derives to describe the configuration of values is anchored at one end by social conformity values (conformity, tradition, and security) and, at the opposing side, personal autonomy values (self-direction and stimulation). Subtracting a summed score of the personal autonomy values from the sum of the social conformity values produces a measure of the social conformity-autonomy dimension. Feldman (2003) showed that this value measure is highly correlated with RWA. This measure has been successfully used in studies of authoritarianism (see for example, Cohrs et al., 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Claassen & McLaren, 2020). The inclusion of the Schwartz value inventory on the European Social Surveys allows researchers to investigate effects of authoritarianism in these rich data sets.

9. A Return to Left-Wing Authoritarianism

As we have noted, one of the earliest critiques of *The Authoritarian Personality* was that it ignored authoritarianism on the political left (Eysenck, 1954; Shils, 1954). Shils argued that the basic characteristics of authoritarianism could be observed in the communist leadership

of the Soviet Union and the submission of Russians to Stalin's rule just as clearly as in Nazi Germany. In the decades since this issue arose, the specter of left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) has refused to die. In the last few years, new studies have appeared that attempt to develop valid, reliable measures of LWA, provide evidence that it can be found in Western societies, and identify correlates of LWA that show that it has foundations similar to RWA.

An early attempt to address concerns about the ideological character of authoritarianism came from the work of Rokeach (1956/1960) on dogmatism. Rather than focusing on authoritarianism on the political right, he argued that it was more fruitful to approach the study of authoritarianism by developing a nonideological conceptualization and measure of authoritarian tendencies. Rokeach hypothesized that the core of authoritarianism—whether on the political right or left—was a fixed, closed-minded belief system. In addition, Rokeach developed a self-report measure of dogmatism that he used in numerous studies on different samples. Unfortunately, the dogmatism scale included heterogeneous attitude statements with low inter-item correlations and featured the same acquiescence biases that plagued the F-scale. Even though Rokeach constructed the scale to tap authoritarianism across the political spectrum, studies consistently found that it was correlated with authoritarianism on the right (Stone, 1980; Altemeyer, 1996). In his 1980 review of research (largely based on Rokeach's dogmatism scale) that attempted to find authoritarianism on the left, Stone (1980, 13) concluded that "The present review of theoretical and empirical treatments of left-wing authoritarianism suggests that the concept may have no foundation in fact."

More recently, Altemeyer (1996, p. 201) narrowed the conceptualization of dogmatism to a "relatively unchangeable, unjustified certainty." Importantly, he also created a new self-report dogmatism scale that is much more reliable than Rokeach's measures and has items that are balanced for agreement response set. Despite using statements with no obvious ideological content, Altemeyer found correlations between his dogmatism measure and RWA of approximately .5. Consistent with studies that used Rokeach's measure, closed-mindedness—as tapped by Altemeyer's dogmatism scale—is strongly correlated with *right-wing authoritarianism.*

In addition to his studies using the dogmatism measure, Altemeyer (1996) attempted to develop a direct measure of left-wing authoritarianism. His strategy was to take statements included in his RWA measure and re-word them so that they would reflect left-wing versions of the three components of his RWA scale: submission ("a high degree of submission to authorities who are dedicated to *overthrowing* the established authorities in one's society"), aggression (a general aggressiveness directed against the established authorities, or against persons who are perceived to support those authorities"), and conventionalism ("a high degree of adherence to the norms of behavior perceived to be endorsed by revolutionary authorities") (Altemeyer, 1996, 219). Examples of statements in the LWA measure are:

> A leftist revolutionary movement is quite justified in attacking the Establishment, and in demanding obedience and conformity from its members.
> Even a revolutionary left-wing movement dedicated to overthrowing the present, totally unjust right-wing system does NOT have the right to tell its members how to act, dress, think, etc. (reverse worded)

LWA, for Altemeyer, is thus an uncritical willingness to submit to a revolutionary, left-wing movement that desires nothing short of overthrowing established governments.

Perhaps not surprisingly given the extreme ideological character of many of the items in the scale, Altemeyer found vanishingly few of his students (or their parents, in one sample) who scored high on the LWA measure. Similar results were found by Van Hiel, Duriez, and Kossowska (2006) in two non-random samples of adults in Belgium. Van Hiel et al. modified Altemeyer's LWA scale by dropping the conventionalism questions. They argued that "conventionalism is a belief system that essentially opposes ideologies that promote social change" (Van Hiel et al., 2006, 774). Their modifications of Altemeyer's scale did not help them find evidence of LWA in their two samples. Van Hiel et al. went further by recruiting people who were members of extreme left-wing organizations: Belgian communist and Stalinist groups. While the sample size was small (20 in the extreme left-wing groups), 13 of those group members scored above the midpoint of the LWA scale with two scoring at the scale maximum. This provides some validation for their LWA measure. Based on these findings, the authors concluded: "However, these results also make it clear that the presence of LWA in Western societies seems to be limited to very specific political movements that do not elicit much support in the mass public. As such, LWA is a marginal phenomenon in political life that is not easily found in convenience samples" (Van Hiel et al., 2006, 787).

Conway et al. (2018) adopt a qualitatively different strategy to measure left-wing authoritarianism. Rather than developing an altogether different scale, Conway et al. reworded items from the RWA scale "to direct the focus of the item on supporting authoritarian leaders that liberals would be more likely to agree with" (Conway et al., 2018, 1055). Like the RWA scale, several statements merely reflect left/right political views and have no obvious authoritarian tendency (e.g., "Progressive ways and liberal values show the best way of life"). However, some of these modified items do capture the flavor of authoritarian aggression (e.g., "Our country desperately needs a mighty and liberal leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical traditional ways of doing things that are ruining us." And "What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush the evil of pushy Christian religious people, and take us forward to our true path."). Their rewording of RWA items to reflect "left-wing authoritarian leaders" raises the question of who those leaders are. Consider the following statement from the RWA scale and its LWA counterpart:

> RWA: It's always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubts in people's minds.

> LWA: It's always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in science with respect to issues like global warming and evolution than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubts in people's minds.

Is casting doubt on scientists with respect to issues like global warming a reflection of authoritarian submission? More generally, with the exception of scientists, it is not clear from the items in this LWA scale who the left-wing authority figures are that left-wing authoritarians are submissive to.

Do left-wing authoritarians exhibit the same characteristics as authoritarians on the right? Conway et al. randomly assigned subjects to answer either the RWA or LWA scale. Those in the RWA condition also answered the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) or a reworded version targeting environmental groups. They also answered either the Rokeach dogmatism scale or a reworded version focusing on religion. Those in the LWA condition

were presented with a version of the Modern Racism Scale focusing on religious groups and a reworded dogmatism scale that deals with environmental issues. There was thus no invariant content across the two conditions to compare the psychological characteristics of high scorers on the LWA and RWA measures. In two samples, Conway et al. found that the correlations of LWA and RWA with their respective, targeted versions of the Modern Racism Scale were large and equivalent in size. In both samples, the correlation of RWA with the conservative version of the dogmatism scale was almost twice as large as the (significant) correlation of LWA with the liberal version. And, in both samples, self-identified liberals were *higher* in LWA than were conservatives on the RWA measure.

Costello et al. (2022) also approach the question of left-wing authoritarianism by first constructing their own LWA measure but in a manner quite different from that proposed by Conway et al (2018). Their LWA scale consists of attitudinal statements believed to tap left-wing authoritarianism. Factor analyses yielded three sub-factors that were labeled anti-hierarchical aggression, anti-conventionalism, and top-down censorship. Like Altemeyer's LWA scale, many of their statements are fairly extreme, especially those in their anti-hierarchical aggression factor. For instance, consider these items:

> When the table are turned on the oppressors at the top of society, I will enjoy watching them suffer the violence they have inflicted on so many others.
> Most rich Wall Street executives deserve to be thrown in prison.
> If a few of the worst Republican politicians were assassinated, it wouldn't be the end of the world.

To measure anti-conventionalism, Costello et al. use these (among others):

> Deep down, just about all conservatives are racist, sexist, and homophobic.
> It is important that we destroy the West's nationalist, imperialist values.

In contrast, many of the statements in the top-down censorship factor reflect contemporary attitudes concerning offensive and racist speech:

> University authorities are right to ban hateful speech from campus.
> I should have the right not to be exposed to offensive views.

Costello et al. report the results of analyses from multiple samples that included a wide range of measures of personality, cognitive rigidity, and psychopathology. Diverging from much recent research that shows that there are substantial differences between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (following Duckitt's 2001 Dual Process Model), Costello et al. compare associations with their LWA scale to patterns of relationships with both RWA and SDO. While there are some similarities between their LWA scale and the RWA scale in terms of their relationships with the psychological measures in their samples, in some cases the pattern of relationships makes LWA look more like the counterpart to SDO than RWA—particularly for anti-hierarchical aggression. Their decision to contrast their LWA measure with a combination of RWA and SDO makes it more difficult to determine what, if anything, are the common underlying features of left-wing and right-wing authoritarianism, as measured by the RWA scale.

Costello et al. provide some evidence that those who score high on their LWA measure share some psychological characteristics with high scorers on RWA. In many of their

analyses they present partial correlations of LWA (and RWA) with a range of variables, controlling for left-right political orientation (LWA is highly correlated with measures of political ideology). There are some notable divergences, however. As Altemeyer found, dogmatism is strongly correlated with RWA; it is weakly correlated with Costello et al.'s LWA scale. Like the Altemeyer and Van Hiel et al. LWA measures, it is unclear how many people in Western societies would score high on this measure, especially for the anti-hierarchical aggression and anti-conventionalism factors.

What the Conway et al. and Costello et al. approaches have in common is that they begin their studies of left-wing authoritarianism by constructing scales (which are quite different from each other) that are designed to measure authoritarianism on the left, to compare to right-wing authoritarianism. Both argue that it is not possible at this point—or potentially in the future—to develop a measure of authoritarianism that is ideologically neutral. This approach has some major implications, not only for measuring authoritarianism, but also for its conceptualization.

In terms of measurement, the clear left-wing content in these LWA scales creates the same endogeneity problems for researchers that we noted for Altemeyer's RWA scale. What does it mean for our understanding of the nature of authoritarianism if it is inextricably bound up with ideology? It is then possible that the motivational basis of right-wing and left-wing authoritarianism are different? In the Costello et al. formulation, left-wing authoritarianism reflect a desire to overthrow the current political and economic system in the United States. Is this, motivationally, equivalent to the desire of those high in right-wing authoritarianism to defend ingroup norms and enforce social conformity?

This raises the question of whether authoritarianism is a deep psychological phenomenon or just a series of attitudinal and behavioral characteristics that can be observed in some people on the left and right. And are those characteristics necessarily reflections of authoritarianism? For example, it is well known that people on the political left and right can be intolerant of groups that they see as a threat (Sullivan et al., 1982; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). Any conceptualization of authoritarianism should go beyond just finding that some people on the left and right can be intolerant of those who hold divergent beliefs.

10. The Political Effects of Authoritarianism

As we have shown, a consistent finding to emerge in authoritarianism research is that a non-trivial portion of citizens in democratic societies may voluntarily abandon their personal liberties for collective security. Also, as we have suggested, authoritarianism is not inherently right- or left-wing. Instead, how authoritarianism is practiced largely depends upon one's group, and the position of that group within the broader society. However, in practice, authoritarianism does consistently relate to support for right-wing populist parties, anti-democratic attitudes, support for autocratic leaders, and a fierce defense of conventionalism and the status quo. Though authoritarianism may not be an exclusively right-wing phenomena, the preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that those with right-leaning tendencies tend to also be more authoritarian (Eysenck, 1954; Brown, 1965/

2004; Rokeach, 1960; Altemeyer, 1998). The prioritization of collective security over personal autonomy explains, in part, the rise of authoritarian parties across the globe (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

It is important to recognize that there is an important distinction between *authoritarian* leaders and *authoritarians* in the mass public. While our focus has primarily been on the latter—this chapter is situated to understand the human tendency to submit—here we consider the former as well. In particular, *how does authoritarianism in the mass public produce authoritarian leaders*, and *in what ways do authoritarian leaders package policies that resonate with authoritarian voters?* In this section, we take up the *politicization* of authoritarianism, exploring the myriad ways that authoritarianism is politically expressed.

10.1. Authoritarianism Submission and Political Party Support

Empirically, authoritarianism tends to align with support for right-wing political parties. In their book, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*, Norris and Inglehart (2019) situate political parties according to their authoritarian and populist orientation. Here, it is useful to think of *populism* as a generally anti-establishment and anti-elitist orientation. Throughout Western history, populist parties have been both *left* and *right* in their ideological orientation. And, while populism continues to be expressed among liberal and conservative parties, from 2010 to 2020 the world witnessed substantial increases in electoral success for *right-wing, authoritarian populism* (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In the United States, the Republican Party under Donald Trump similarly exhibited characteristics of authoritarian populism.

Research has demonstrated that authoritarians gravitate toward authoritarian populist parties, and their oftentimes charismatic leaders. Vasilopulous et al. (2019), for instance, show that after the 2015 Paris attacks, authoritarians were more likely to support the far-right National Front. Similarly, Bakker, Schumacher, and Rooduijn (2021) found that authoritarianism is related to support for the Britain's far-right UKIP. Schmidt, Darowska, and Gloris (2017) similarly find that support for conformity predicts support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), also a far-right party (see also Hetherington & Weiler, 2018).

Cognitive linguist George Lakoff (2008) suggests that two dominant metaphors dominate ideological thinking and partisan politics in the United States. Lakoff argues that preferences regarding the size, scope, and function of government are extensions of citizens' views toward child socialization, with the political-left-viewing child, and by extension governing, arrangements in a "nurturant," egalitarian manner. The political right in the United States, on the other hand, has advanced a more "disciplinarian" vision, focusing on traditionalism and decidedly more authoritarian parenting preferences. Using the childrearing values, which we have discussed as a measure of authoritarianism, Barker and Tinnick (2006) draw on the American National Election Studies (ANES) to provide empirical evidence for Lakoff's expectations. They showed that the childrearing measure predicts a wide range of conservative political values and issue preferences, even in models with extensive controls for attitudinal and demographic variables that the childrearing measure is

correlated with. The conservative issue preferences associated with authoritarianism should then incline people to support right-wing parties and leaders.

Why are authoritarians attracted to "strong man" political parties? Norris and Inglehart (2019) show that authoritarian populists parties draw on themes and metaphors that advance an "us" versus "them"—and by extension "strong" versus "weak"—narrative. The authoritarian populist often scapegoats, highlighting the aggrieved status of their political or social group. The authoritarian populist's "group" is cast as victimized, perhaps affected adversely by changing social norms, demographic diversity, and a threat to traditional values. Consider Donald Trump's presidential announcement speech, where he notes, "Our country is in serious trouble. We don't have victories anymore," and "the U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems." He goes on declaring, "when Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people."[3] Federico, Feldman, and Weber (2022) show that the ascendance of Donald Trump was due primarily to a punctuated multi-decade process. From 1992 to 2004, authoritarians sorted into the Republican Party (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), a process that expanded greatly during the Trump presidency (Federico et al., 2022), likely due in part to the explicit authoritarian rhetoric that Trump frequently employed. Scholarly work has established a strong connection between authoritarianism and support for Donald Trump in the 2016 American presidential election (Bakker et al., 2021; MacWilliams, 2016; Feldman, 2020; Womick et al., 2019; Ludeke et al., 2018).

10.2. Social Cohesion, Group Aggression, and the Preservation of Law and Order

Authoritarianism is often predictive of law-and-order policies that preserve the status quo. For instance, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) examine citizen response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. They find that authoritarianism generally predicts civil liberties restrictions, such as warrantless wiretapping, torture, and opposition to criticizing the president. Feldman (2020) similarly finds that authoritarianism predicts support for carrying national ID cards, wiretapping, and profiling of airport security. Recall that a central tenet to much authoritarianism research is the notion that authoritarians actively defend the (conventional) status quo and aggress against those that threaten or challenge the status quo. Dunwoody and Plane (2019) find that authoritarianism predicts support for removal of unregistered Muslim or Mexican immigrants, and this support persisted even when authoritarian respondents were told the action is unconstitutional.

In addition, authoritarians typically hold negative attitudes toward those who challenge conventional Judeo-Christian norms (Altemeyer, 1981). Authoritarians, for instance, often express aversion to homosexuality (Stenner, 2005; Cohen & Smith, 2016; Malka et al., 2014), as well as abortion, immigration, and criminal leniency (Malka et al., 2014). Authoritarianism is linked to opposition to immigration, LGBTQIA+ rights, and affirmative action (Cizmar et al., 2014). It is diagnostic of negative out-group attitudes in non-US contexts. Authoritarianism has been linked to prejudice in Netherlands (Van Assche et al., 2014), Poland (Bilewicz et al., 2017), Germany (Asbrock et al., 2012), and Italy (Passini,

2017), as well as Australia and New Zealand (Duckitt, 2001; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018; Duckitt, 2006).The combination of outgroup animosity and socially conservative attitudes helps to explain the attraction of right-wing populist parties and leaders to those high in authoritarianism. Some of these studies that show pronounced effects of authoritarianism on political attitudes and party support used RWA-type measures that we have argued are potentially endogenous to those outcomes. However, many of these studies employed the childrearing measure and they find substantial effects of authoritarianism on support for authoritarian populist parties, conservative social attitudes, and opposition to immigration. The overall conclusions of this section thus seem robust to variation in the measurement of authoritarianism.

11. Concluding Thoughts

The study of authoritarianism was initially motivated by social scientists' desire to understand mass support for the Nazi Party in Germany, and the horrors of the Holocaust. A large body of research quickly found relationships between authoritarianism and prejudice, intolerance, punitiveness, and right-of-center political views. As we have shown in this chapter, even with significant changes in the conceptualization and measurement of authoritarianism over the decades since its introduction, recent research continues to document the importance of authoritarianism for understanding animosity toward outgroups as well as social and religious nonconformists, and support for anti-democratic actions and policies. As the world has seen greater migrations of people, authoritarianism has become an important factor in our understanding of why people oppose or support immigration and, as well, often vote for right-wing populist parties and politicians who take strong anti-immigration stands.

While there is a great deal of continuity in studies that document the effects of authoritarianism, we have shown that the conceptualization and theoretical framework underlying the construct has changed substantially over time. Altemeyer's substitution of social learning theory for the Freudian theory of Adorno et al. that had fallen out of favor provided researchers with a more straightforward way of understanding authoritarianism as a cluster of learned social attitudes. However, the "thin" social learning account ultimately lead many researchers (Duckitt, 1989, 2001; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Feldman, 2003; Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005; Stenner, 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) to a conceptualization that views authoritarianism as a desire for ingroup cohesion and conformity to group norms. As we have discussed, this conceptualization provides a richer framework for studying authoritarianism and, importantly, identifies social and cultural threat as factors that moderate the political effects of authoritarianism. The interaction of authoritarian predispositions and social/political conditions helps to answer a central question: why are the effects of authoritarianism in politics much more pronounced in some places and at certain times and not others?

Despite the rapidly growing body of research on authoritarianism, questions about the nature, consequences, and measurement of the construct remain. If authoritarianism is bound up with a desire the maintain ingroup cohesion, a key question becomes how people identify their ingroup. A person could see their ingroup as the nation, their racial/ethnic group, their religion, or some combination of such groups (see Huddy, 2013). We have

examined some evidence that the effects of authoritarianism are different in minority and majority groups. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are vastly more studies of authoritarianism among majority group members and relatively few studies that examine its dynamics in minority groups. The group cohesion perspective suggests that we can learn more about the dynamics of authoritarianism by broadening the focus of research by comparing its effects in majority and minority groups.

Another question that comes out of the group cohesion models is the identification of the group norms that those high in authoritarianism seek to defend. An implicit assumption in virtually all research on majority group member is that there is a common set of ingroup norms that invoke "traditional" moral values, the privileged status of the majority group, and the value of social, political, and religious institutions. Most obviously, ingroup norms for members of minority groups may be very different. More importantly, this assumes that group norms are fixed and consensual. But this is almost certainly not true. If those high in authoritarianism are motivated to defend group norms, we need to know more about how those norms are perceived. And what is the role of elites in shaping group norms in ways that increase or decrease the deleterious effects of authoritarianism?

There remain deep divisions in how to best measure authoritarianism. Despite the concerns we discussed with its potential endogeneity, many researchers continue to use Altemeyer's RWA scale or some variant of it. A growing number of large-scale studies are instead employing the childrearing measure. We need to know more about the consequences of these alternative measures for conclusions about effects of authoritarianism in the political domain.

Finally, at this point we think that it is premature to draw firm conclusions about the status of left-wing authoritarianism. A resurgence of research on this topic is just beginning to make its way into peer-reviewed journals. At least two new and quite different measures have been introduced that purport to measure left-wing authoritarianism. And challenges to this new research have not yet been published. Closer attention to left-wing versus right-wing authoritarianism is important, not only for exploring the possibility of anti-democratic attitudes on the political left, but also for our deeper understanding of the nature and origins of the construct of authoritarianism.

Notes

1. The Dual Process Model name for Duckitt's model has no relationship with the dual process models of cognition and information processing (see Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume).
2. Sibley and Duckitt's (2008) meta-analysis estimated a mean correlation of -.36 between openness to experience and authoritarianism.
3. https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY, PATRIOTISM, AND NATIONALISM

....

LEONIE HUDDY

CITIZENS form strong psychological attachments to the nation-state which has proven to be a robust and enduring political entity. At certain historical times, national attachments are seen as politically dormant, whereas at other times they are regarded as ascendent (Hobsbawm 1990). In truth, the political power and relevance of citizens' national attachments wax and wane with ongoing events. There has been a resurgence of nationalism in recent times as a diverse array of leaders including Donald Trump (United States), Narendra Modi (India), Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), and Victor Orban (Hungary) rose to political prominence. Other recent political events reinforce the rising importance of national attachments. The Brexit vote brought home the power of national attachments to fracture supra national alliances and entities. The coronavirus pandemic has fostered exclusionary travel policies, inhibited global movement, and generated talk of vaccine nationalism as wealthy countries hoard vaccines for the use of their citizens. All in all, this is a good time to take stock of research on national attachments and evaluate their political effects.

There are few areas in political psychology as contentious as the study of national attachments, however, which can have positive and negative normative political consequences. This field of research is dominated by perennial questions concerning whether loyalty to a nation fosters pernicious ethnocentrism or serves as a laudatory form of national glue that promotes multi-ethnic and racial cooperation. National attachments clearly have chauvinistic aspects that undercut or dissolve national unity by creating internal divisions and stoking suspicion of outsiders. This chauvinism can manifest as a restriction on welfare assistance to internal ethnic and racial minorities, the denial of assistant to foreigners and immigrant newcomers, or the development of exclusionary national norms that dictate nativist religious, cultural, or linguistic practices (Kymlicka, 2015; Theiss-Morse, 2009).

It is also clear that national attachments foster national solidarity. Miller and Ali (2014) hold this positive view, regarding national attachments as an essential ingredient of modern, Western societies. In their words, residents of multicultural, market-driven nations "will

only be willing to support socially just institutions and policies - particularly those that together make up the welfare state - if they share a common identity with those who are likely to be net beneficiaries" (p. 239). There is a growing body of empirical evidence demonstrating that a shared national identity fosters trust and assistance to co-nationals, promotes cooperative health behavior, and enhances civic engagement (van Bavel et al., 2020; Theiss-Morse 1996; Huddy and Khatib 2007).

The divergent consequences of national attachments are confusing and beg resolution. Why do national attachments sometimes promote and at other times undercut national cohesion? In this chapter, I dig more deeply into the nature and psychology of national attachments to better understand their political consequences. The first order of business is to provide clear and distinct definitions of different kinds of national attachments. The inconsistent use of terminology and measures makes it difficult for researchers working in this area to communicate clearly with one another. We do not need a vast number of concepts to bring clarity to the study of national attachments. I begin with the concept of national identity, a subjective attachment and identification with the nation and co-nationals.

A strong national identity is linked to patriotism which conveys a love of country and adherence to specific national norms, including the behaviors and beliefs expected of a loyal member of the nation. In that sense, patriotism captures specific types of ingroup loyalty. But the exact manifestation and consequences of patriotism depend heavily on national context and the nature of shared national norms. National identity is also related to nationalism, an attachment to the nation that spills over into chauvinism and a dislike of outsiders. A common link to national identity helps to explain why patriotism and nationalism are closely aligned in empirical data. Nonetheless, despite sharing a common national identity, patriots and nationalists can differ sharply in terms of their political beliefs.

The distinction between patriotism and nationalism has been commonplace in political psychology for some time (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Osborne et al. 2017). It can be traced back to *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1950)*, a seminal work in which the authors differentiated simple love of country, labeled as patriotism, from *pseudopatriotism*, a "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups." When defined in this way, pseudopatriotism is not identical to nationalism, but shares a common animosity toward foreigners.

These three concepts—national identity, patriotism, and nationalism—provide a parsimonious and effective way to understand the political consequences of national attachments. They also serve as a useful simplification of the myriad concepts developed under the rubric of national attachments, many of which can be folded into or associated with the three basic concepts, as I discuss below.

There are additional theoretical and empirical reasons to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism. First, from an evolutionary perspective, positive ingroup attachments such as patriotism provide a foundation for human cooperation and help to explain the ease with which humans adopt social identities (Brewer 2004; Brewer and Caporeal 2006; see also Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume). In contrast, negative outgroup animosity is a more variable outcome of group life. From an evolutionary perspective, outgroup animosity depends on the presence of intergroup threat and is not a necessary consequence of an ingroup attachment (Brewer 1979). Second, there are empirical grounds on which to divide measures of national attachments into patriotism and nationalism. The two measures are empirically related but also distinct, and their political effects can be classified into two

broad classes of outcomes as discussed below. In simple terms, patriotism is far more likely to unite citizens of a nation whereas nationalism has greater potential to divide them, especially in ethnically diverse societies. Nationalism also generates ethnocentric reactions to foreigners more consistently than patriotism.

Before delving further into the psychology of national attachments, it is important to note that patriotism and nationalism refer to attachments to nation-states. A nation is defined as a group of connected people, specifically those who share common ancestry, history, or culture. In contrast, a state has distinct institutions, territory, and government. The nation-state refers to a state that controls its borders, has distinct institutions, and is also made up of a group of people with a common background, culture, or history. Patriotism and nationalism involve a link to both the national population and respect for state institutions and thus forge subjective ties to a nation and a state. As evidence, both forms of national attachment are undergirded by national identity, by an identification with other members of the nation, and in that sense are aspects of a nation. Patriotism and nationalism are also linked to support for state institutions. Patriotism promotes state-linked behavior such as voting and tax compliance. Nationalism is associated with support for state institutions such as the military and homeland security that protect state borders and engage in conflict with threatening neighboring states. To keep things simple, I use nation as a short-hand term for nation-state throughout this chapter.

1. Defining National Attachments

1.1. National Identity, Patriotism, and Ingroup Attachments

1.1.1. *National Identity and Ingroup Bias*

According to Tajfel, a social identity (or in this case a national identity) involves an individual's "knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (Tajfel 1981, p. 255). From this vantage point, national identity involves a cognitive awareness of belonging, and an emotional attachment, to a nation (see Mason, Chapter 24, this volume). Consistent with this definition, *national identity* is defined as a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation that is measured by questions concerning the subjective importance of being a national and a sense of connection to co-nationals (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy 2013). National identity is typically associated with a mild positive bias for one's own country over others, and a preference for co-nationals but does not imply any necessary hatred of outsiders. It creates the foundation for other forms of national attachments and provides the substrate for adherence to national norms. Strong national identifiers are very likely to conform to consensual national norms such as voting (Huddy and Khatib 2007).

1.1.2. *Patriotism and National Pride*

Patriotism is strongly aligned with national identity and has similar consequences, including adherence to national norms. It is commonly defined as "a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation" (Conover and Feldman et al. 1987, p. 1), or the "degree of love for and pride

in one's nation" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, p. 271). It involves an inclusive sense of national belonging regardless of citizens' ethnic and religious background (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, p. 175). It can fuel positive attitudes toward immigrants and generate trust in a country's institutions (Gross et al. 2009; Huddy and Del Ponte 2019; Satherley et al. 2019). According to Habermas (1996) patriots are bound together in liberal democracies by a political culture, in which citizens "patriotically identify" with civic practices and participatory self-rule. At its essence patriotism is an ingroup attitude that conveys positive feelings about one's own nation and co-nationals but does not necessarily lead to outgroup derogation (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Patriotism also heightens adherence to group norms and generates trust in a country's institutions (Gross et al. 2009). Patriotism is thus most commonly measured by pride in the nation and various aspects of national achievement (Huddy et al. 2021).

National identity and patriotism both involve positive feelings for the nation and generate national solidarity and a liking for co-nationals (Theiss-Morse 2009; Miller and Ali 2014). Patriotism is a more complex concept than national identity, however, because the positive emotions and pride with which it is associated can become tied to specific and not fully consensual forms of patriotic behavior. Reverence for the national flag, standing for the national anthem, serving in the military, or refusing to criticize national leaders have been seen at different times and by varying political subgroups as foundational forms of patriotic behavior. These more specific meanings of patriotism can also generate political conflict to a far greater degree than an internalized national identity. In the United States, those on the political left and right have differed at times on whether support for national symbols such as the flag and anthem, military service, and uncritical allegiance to national authorities constitute proud, patriotic behavior (Hurwitz and Peffley 1999).

1.1.3. *Civic Patriotism, Constructive Patriotism, and Civic Norms*

In addition to identifying with or feeling proud of the nation, researchers have also investigated the specific behaviors or practices deemed normative for good or ideal citizens of a nation. I refer to these as injunctive national norms which are equated with the common meaning and expectations linked to membership of a specific nation. Norms vary across nations, helping to explain why national identity and patriotism can generate different political outcomes in different national contexts. National norms can also vary among subgroups and subcultures within a nation. Researchers have focused on two key understandings of national belonging, developed initially to distinguish among differing national political cultures: (1) civic patriotism and (2) ethnocultural conceptions of the nation (Citrin et al.1990; Shulman 2002; Wright et al. 2012).

Civic patriotism defines a good citizen as one who obeys the nation's laws, votes in its elections, and adequately fulfills other national obligations and responsibilities such as paying taxes. In the United States, this view of American identity is widely accepted (Citrin et al. 1990). Schatz, Staub, and colleagues develop the related concept of *constructive patriotism*, which is defined as "an attachment to country characterized by critical loyalty" and "questioning and criticism" driven by "a desire for positive change" (Schatz et al. 1999, p. 153). Constructive patriotism is linked to political engagement, and in that sense tied to the concept of civic patriotism and its attendant civic responsibilities. In nations with strong

civic national norms, civic patriotism, general patriotism, and national identity will be related, heightening levels of patriotic civic behavior. In contrast, ethnocultural conceptions of the nation are more divisive and less normative, having far more in common with nationalism than patriotism.

Patriotism can take other forms as well. Symbolic patriotism is linked to reverence for the national flag and anthem (Hurwitz and Peffley 1999). Suhay, Calfano, and Dawe (2016) demonstrate that making symbolic patriotic norms salient increases the prevalence of patriotic behavior. In their study, reinforcing patriotic American norms such as flag flying on the Fourth of July increased Muslim Americans' intention to enact such behavior. In sum, patriotic behavior is defined by national norms, resulting in different patriotic behaviors across countries. Patriotic behavior can include expectations of military service, reverence for the national anthem, a willingness to pay taxes to support a strong social welfare state, or support for overseas humanitarian intervention. Making a patriotic norm salient will increase the relevant patriotic behavior, even as that behavior differs across national contexts.

1.1.4. *Diverse Patriotisms*

The ability of subgroups and subcultures to shape and diversify the meaning of national identity helps to explain the proliferation of various forms of patriotism. Some scholars have identified different and potentially contested meanings of the nation grounded in its founding, history, and culture. The search for more fine-grained meanings of patriotism can be nationally idiosyncratic, resulting in typologies of patriotisms that are more difficult to compare across nations. There has been considerable effort to identify different meanings of American identity and patriotism, for example. Smith (1997) identifies a liberal tradition within American political culture that emphasizes individualism, a civic republican tradition that focuses on community self-governance, and an ethnocultural tradition that reflects the white population's desire for dominance discussed below. Schildkraut (2002) confirms Smith's tripartite conception of national ideology and adds incorporationism as a fourth element that reflects a view of the United States as an immigrant nation.

The diverse meanings of national identity and the proliferation of patriotisms can be observed in other nations. For example, Breidahl et al. (2018) identify a conservative and liberal meaning of Danish identity. A conservative understanding of Danish identity involves adherence to Danish traditions and the view that Danish history and Christianity should be advanced in schools. In contrast a liberal understanding of Denmark entails knowing about Danish culture, participating in civic society, and advocating freedom of religion and speech. Presumably, there are different and potentially idiosyncratic meanings of patriotism and national belonging in every nation, linked to a nation's origins, history, and values.

1.2. Nationalism and an Outgroup Focus

In contrast to patriotism, *nationalism* is defined in political psychology as a sense of "national superiority and dominance" that includes an attachment to the nation (as does patriotism) but spills over into animosity toward outsiders (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, p. 175). Not everyone uses the term nationalism in this way. Some refer to all national

attachments as nationalism. I follow convention within political psychology and define nationalism as national chauvinism (Dekker et al. 2003). Nationalism is typically assessed by asking for agreement or disagreement with statements such as "other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible" or "the world would be a better place if other countries were more like ours" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989).

A dislike or sense of superiority over other nations also colors views of immigrants within a nation. Nationalism is far more likely than patriotism to fracture national consensus because it is more divisive, leading to heightened xenophobia, negative views of immigrants, anti-Semitism, the derogation of foreigners, and classic racism (Ariely 2012; Blank and Schmidt 2003). Nationalism often surfaces as ethno-religious nationalism that is directed at both foreign nationals and internal ethnic and religious minorities. It narrowly construes who rightfully belongs to the nation, drawing restrictive national boundaries that exclude those who do not belong to the majority ethnic or religious group. It is associated with opposition to immigration policy and enhances perceived foreign threats. Far more so than patriotism, the effects of nationalism are consistent across national contexts. As I discuss below, nationalism may take similar form in different nations because it is grounded to some extent in stable personality characteristics such as authoritarianism (see also Feldman and Weber, Chapter 20, this volume). In contrast, the meaning of patriotism is more variable in part because it is an outcome of national norms that are linked in turn to a country's particular culture and history.

1.2.1. *Ethnocultural Conceptions of the Nation; Christian Nationalism*

As noted earlier, researchers have identified ethnocultural nationalism as a specific form of nationalism (Citrin et al. 1990). Ethnocultural aspects of American identity include the need to believe in God, have American ancestry, or be Christian to be considered a "true American." Such beliefs are less common than a civic understanding of American identity underscoring the divisive nature of such views (Citrin et al. 1990; Citrin et al. 2001; Citrin and Wright 2009). Ethnocultural nationalism can lead to exclusionary and hierarchical ethnic and racial distinctions in which non-White Americans (in the United States), Indian Muslims (in India), and Chinese Uighurs (in China) are regarded as of lower status than those of a nation's dominant ethnic/racial or religious group (Bonikowski & Zhang 2020). As for other forms of nationalism, ethnocultural nationalism is linked to opposition to immigration and welfare assistance, especially in countries experiencing high levels of immigration (Wright et al., ; Wright and Reeskens 2013). In western Europe and in the United States, traditional measures of nationalism and ethnocultural nationalism measure the same concept (Huddy et al. 2021; Huddy and del Ponte 2021).

Other researchers have developed a related measure of Christian nationalism in the United States (Perry et al. 2021) that involves a perceived fusion of Christianity and the United States involving questions such as "The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation."

1.2.2. *Related Concepts: Blind Patriotism, Collective Narcissism, and Populism*

Schatz, Staub, and colleagues differentiate between two forms of patriotism: constructive and blind patriotism. *Blind patriotism* is defined as "an unwillingness both to criticize and

accept criticism" of the nation and is indexed by items such as "my country right or wrong" and the view that the country's policies are morally correct (Schatz and Staub 1997, p. 231; Schatz et al. 1999). On the surface, blind patriotism captures an uncritical view of the nation not a sense of national superiority. Nonetheless, it is empirically linked to nationalism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism and is far closer to nationalism than patriotism in its political effects (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Schatz et al. 1999).

Golec de Zavala and colleagues' (2009) concept of collective narcissism has similar ingredients (and consequences) to nationalism. Collective narcissism captures the view that other nations fail to recognize the uniqueness and greatness of one's nation. This is tightly related to beliefs about national superiority, the hostile intentions of other nations, and a sensitivity to national threats that translate into negativity towards other nations. In that sense, the concept is closely aligned with that of nationalism because it is more focused on other nations than one's own and linked to negative views of foreigners (Federico and Golec de Zavala 2018).

Some researchers regard populism as closely aligned with nationalism. Populism typically upholds the primacy of "the people" over the establishment and pits the good people against a corrupt and malevolent elite (Brubaker 2020; Mudde 2013; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018). Populism and nationalism are often related empirically and can have similar political effects, especially when populism is aimed at immigrants, ethnic and cultural minorities, and foreigners. Some political parties and leaders classified as populist are also nationalist in outlook. As Bonikowski (2017) notes, however, populism is less an ideology than a style of governing, a political strategy, or a form of political rhetoric that champions ordinary people at the expense of cultural and political elites. In that sense, populism falls short as a fully blown ideology or belief system. Nationalism represents a more consistent belief system centered on national superiority and the minimization of foreign influence in national affairs (Bieber 2018; BruBaker 2020). It is thus important to distinguish a populist style of leadership from a leader's pursuit of a nationalist ideology. From that standpoint, nationalism is a more clearly defined and readily measured concept than populism.

2. Key Theories

2.1. Social Identity Theory

The psychology of national attachments can be analyzed through the lens of social identity theory, an extremely well-developed approach to the study of social identities (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). One of the theory's major insights is that identities form readily, promote group cohesion, and are pervasive among members of any group, including a nation. From this perspective, national identities are essential to the smooth functioning of a nation. This conclusion is complicated, however, by two factors: (1) subgroup contestation over the meaning of patriotism and the specific beliefs and behaviors associated with a given national identity, and (2) variation in the degree to which national as opposed to potentially divisive partisan, ethnic, or other subnational identities are politically salient (Pérez and Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume).

Social identity theory emphasizes the importance of symbolic concerns such as a group's social standing as central to the development of group cohesion. There are two distinct

branches of social identity theory (SIT): the version developed by Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) known as social identity theory, and self-categorization theory (SCT), a cognitive elaboration of SIT (Turner et al. 1987). Both theories acknowledge the origins of social identity in cognitive and motivational factors, although SCT places greater emphasis on cognitive factors (Hogg, 1996, p. 67). Tajfel concluded that cognitive factors such as an awareness of belonging to a group could not solely explain intergroup relations and believed that motivational factors linked to the protection of group status were central to the emergence of intergroup bias. Both SIT and SCT place key emphasis on the need among group members "to differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 42).

The need for positive group differentiation leads to a mild form of ingroup bias, in which group identifiers exhibit a weak preference for ingroup over out-group members (Jackson and Smith 1999; Mummendey et al. 2001; Simon et al. 1995). In terms of national identity this means that individuals will prefer co-nationals to foreigners, although it does not automatically generate a dislike of outsiders. National identity is an attachment to the co-nationals with no necessary implication for how one feels toward outsiders (Huddy 2013; Mummendey et al. 2001; Sniderman et al. 2004). A liking for co-nationals among strong national identifiers means by implication that they will be more willing to help co-nationals than foreigners, more likely to conform to national norms, and more driven to defend the nation when it is threatened (Terry and Hogg 1996; Theiss-Morse 2009).

In addition, within social identity theory group solidarity rests on the development of a strong group identity (Huddy 2001). But not everyone identifies equally strongly with the nation (Pérez and Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume). It is therefore imperative to measure gradations in the strength of national identity to fully understand its effects. It is well documented that strong group identifiers are more likely to conform to group norms (Terry and Hogg 1996). In the case of national identity, this means that strong national identifiers will be most likely to conform to prescriptive norms, such as voting in the United States or egalitarian behavior in Denmark and Sweden, and experience more positive emotions after conforming to them (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Christensen et al. 2004). For example, in several western European countries, a greater sense of national pride increases tax compliance, an indicator of national cooperation (Torgler and Schneider 2007).

Most citizens hold a subjective attachment to the nation in the form of an internalized national identify. Billig's (1995) concept of banal nationalism helps to explain its ubiquity. From Billig's perspective, references to the nation and its symbols, interests, and positive attributes underlie national discourse in ways that go unexamined but that powerfully shape citizens' worldview. A national identity is associated with positive views of the nation but does not imply any specific meaning. It can be completely unrelated to a specific ideological outlook, for example (Citrin et al. 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007), although national subgroups often compete for ownership over the national label and its symbols. When a consensual patriotic norm, such as voting or paying taxes, is made salient, strong national identifiers should be most inclined to enact the behavior.

2.2. Individual Differences: Personality Predispositions

From an individual difference perspective, holding a strongly patriotic or nationalistic outlook is linked to one's underlying traits and personality (see Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume).

Authoritarianism has been seen as one of the most important precursors to the development of national attachments and is linked empirically to both patriotism and nationalism (Feldman and Weber, Chapter 20, this volume). Authoritarianism is defined as a preference for ingroup cohesion, social stability, and a heightened sensitivity to violations of group norms, and is associated with strong ingroup identification and conformity (Duckitt 2001; Feldman 2003). Osborne and colleagues (2017) delve into the personality-based origins of both patriotism and nationalism in a New Zealand panel study conducted over a three-year period. They found that authoritarianism measured at a prior point in time was linked to subsequent patriotism and nationalism. But they found far stronger effects of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) on nationalism than patriotism over time. This is consistent with evidence from other studies of a sizeable association between authoritarianism and nationalism but not between authoritarianism and patriotism (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy and Del Ponte 2021; Schatz and Staub 1997).

Osborne and colleagues (2017) also examine the effects of social dominance orientation (SDO) on national attachments. SDO is a predisposition tied to a belief in social hierarchy and a tough worldview (Duckitt 2001; Craig and Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume). SDO is linked to nationalism in their data but has no effect on patriotism. Osborne and colleagues ground their research in Duckitt's (2001) dual process model of ideology in which authoritarianism increases adherence to norms as a form of protection against threats to social cohesion, whereas SDO is associated with support for social hierarchies and a tough approach to the world. From Duckitt's perspective, these orientations are linked to early socialization and thus suggest that nationalism is at least to some degree a product of stable individual differences that vary little over time.

There is suggestive evidence that nationalism is constant over time at least in the aggregate. Huddy and Del Ponte (2019) examined levels of nationalism in 10 eastern and western European countries included in all three national identity modules of the ISSP (conducted between 1996 and 2014). There was no change over time in levels of nationalism across the ten countries. Nationalism is also linked in these data to educational attainment, another stable individual attribute. Better educated individuals tend to eschew nationalism contributing further to its stability (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy et al. 2021). In contrast, education levels are less strongly associated with patriotism.

Researchers have examined the link between national attachments and other motivational and cognitive psychological predispositions. Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2019) view collective narcissism (equated here with nationalism) as a form of compensation for low personal self-esteem. In their research, high self-esteem is linked to patriotism, whereas low self-esteem is linked to collective narcissism, after controlling for the positive link between self-esteem and patriotism. From this perspective, someone who experiences low self-esteem adopts a sense of collective narcissism to bolster their sense of self. Collective narcissism fosters a sense of national superiority, increases the perceived hostility of other nations, and enhances a sensitivity to national threats all of which translates into negativity toward other nations. Golec de Zavala and colleagues argue that this process is distinct from authoritarian hostility toward foreign nations predicated on a desire for social cohesion and the protection of cultural values. Instead, collective narcissism arises as a response to foreign threats to the national image and status (Federico and Golec de Zavala 2018).

Finally, national attachments have also been traced to cognitive predispositions. Zmigrod et al. (2019) found that cognitive inflexibility (assessed objectively) predicts extremist attitudes, including a willingness to harm others, and sacrifice one's life for the group.

Across two samples (N = 1,047) drawn from the United Kingdom and the United States, cognitive inflexibility predicted endorsement of violent action undertaken to protect the national ingroup, which in turn predicted a willingness to sacrifice one's life for the nation.

In sum, nationalism but not patriotism appears to be an outgrowth of stable personality traits and abilities such as authoritarianism, SDO, low self-esteem, and levels of educational attainment.

2.3. Realistic and Cultural Threat

Many researchers view socio-economic threat and deprivation as precursors of nationalism. A common argument is that globalization and the presence of ethnically diverse immigrants threatens less skilled and less well-educated workers, leading them to endorse a more chauvinistic and exclusionary form of nationalism. Alternatively, some researchers point to threats emanating from immigrants who adopt different religious and cultural practices or hold differing values that threaten the majority's values and worldview. This position has been developed by Inglehart and Norris (Norris and Inglehart 2019). According to their cultural backlash hypothesis, publics have taken a nationalistic, populist turn because elite support of LGBTQ rights and racial justice has alienated those who view it as repudiation of their more "traditional" values.

Some researchers have combined the two approaches to argue that economic factors can act as antecedents to perceived cultural threats which then drive support for populism (linked to nationalism) (Rhodes-Purdy et al. 2021). From this perspective, economic crises generate negative emotions such as anxiety and anger which foster cultural resentment in turn. The cultural discontent generated by economic crises increases support for nationalist political figures and parties which place blame for economic woes on the increased influence of ethnic, minority, immigrant, and foreign forces.

2.4. Social Construction

There is widespread consensus that the nation is an "imagined community" (Anderson 1983) with an "invented tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). As noted by Mylonas and Tudor (2021) "States today are self-conscious actors in the process of nation building, often systematically attempting to make national attachments primary" (p. 117). From this constructivist perspective, national leaders work to create cohesion among people who may not share the same ancestral ethnicity, customs, or heritage. Nations come to take on meaning through the reinforcement of specific practices, the creation and amplification of national myths, reinforcement of a common religion, enforcement of a national language, and a selective historical narrative (Hopkins, Chapter 9, this volume). Such views of the nation are transmitted via education, social norms, laws and institutions, and everyday discourse (Billig 1995).

The constructivist approach is central to an understanding of national norms that dictate beliefs about a country's founding, its patriotic practices such as civic behaviors, and the kinds of beliefs and behaviors adopted by a typical citizen. Social constructivism—the notion that concepts derive their meaning through social processes—is implicit within

social identity and self-categorization theory, which stresses the ease with which social groups and social identities form and develop meaning for members of arbitrarily designated groups (Huddy 2001; Reicher 2004). From a social constructivist perspective, it is difficult to understand the consequences of group identification without understanding its subjective meaning to group members (Billig 1995). This is especially important for national identities, which often have contested meaning. Members of diverse subgroups can attach a different meaning to national identity, depending on their race or ethnicity or the region of the country in which they live (Reicher and Hopkins 2000; Schildkraut 2011).

The meaning of national identity is also likely to have its most profound effect among the strongest national identifiers, helping to explain the link between national identity and patriotism. In Sindic and Reicher's (2009) research, strongly identified Scots who viewed Scotland as dominated by the English, felt their identity was undermined by a union with Britain, and saw the two identities as incompatible were far more likely than others to support Scottish nationalism and political independence from Britain. But in the absence of a strong Scottish national identity, these beliefs had far less political impact. Political parties can also shape the meaning of national identity. In the 1992 Scottish elections, the Scottish National Party, which favored independent statehood emphasized that Scottish identity, was incompatible with English identity (Reicher and Hopkins 2001). In contrast, the conservatives, who supported continued ties with Britain, emphasized Britishness and the commonalities between the Scots and English while downplaying Scottish distinctiveness.

2.5. Framing, Rhetoric, and Elite Influence Theory

Unlike the other approaches discussed here, framing theories are focused more on the activation of national attachments than on their origins or nature. In that sense, the approach is compatible with the personality approach to nationalism, discussed earlier. Scholars working within this framing perspective take as a given the existence of stable levels of national attachments and study the factors that heighten their political salience (Beiber 2018). Within this approach, exogenous factors such as massive economic, cultural, or political change, and/or subjectively perceived social marginalization and status threat fuel the rise of nationalist rhetoric (Bieber 2018; Bonikowski 2017). This in turn fosters the emergence of nationalistic political parties and candidates that attract those predisposed to support nationalism (Huddy et al. 2021). As Bonikowski (2017) notes, nationalistic attitudes have remained stable even as support for nationalistic political parties has increased. Party success is thus more a function of growing support from nationalistic citizens than rising levels of nationalism. This leaves unclear, however, why nationalistic political parties have emerged at roughly the same point in time across diverse countries to attract citizens with pre-existing nationalistic leanings. It is possible that nationalistic political parties emerge as a reaction to common international trends such as a global recession or migration precipitated by climate change.

Elite influence theory provides the foundation for predictions concerning framing effects. From this perspective, public opinion is a top-down phenomenon driven largely by powerful partisan messages that have their greatest effect among the most politically attentive and knowledgeable (Kalmoe 2020). Zaller (1992, 2012) posits three factors as necessary for successful elite influence. First, the news media needs to cover an argument or

message with some frequency (*supply*); second, a person needs to be exposed to this information (*exposure*); third, a message to which someone is exposed needs to have resonance for them leading to its acceptance or rejection (*acceptance*). A nationalistic party or political leader who promotes a nationalistic agenda can increase the link between nationalism and opposition to free trade, immigration, and involvement in supranational entities such as the EU among members of the public. This rhetoric has special resonance among the most highly nationalistic residents who are the first to shift their political views in tandem with agreeable frames (Lenz 2013; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992). If a message conveying nationalistic opposition to the EU is absent from the news it is unlikely to influence public opinion, but if a nationalistic message is ubiquitous and meets with broad acceptance it will be persuasive. Within this model, elites do not increase levels of nationalism—they increase its political salience and relevance.

3. The Measurement of National Attachments

In analyzing the link between globalization and national identity, Ariely (2012) notes that "little agreement exists among scholars regarding the measurement of national identity" (p. 467). That is an understatement. The International Social Science Programme's (ISSP) national identity modules provide one of the richest sources of data on national attachments. The module has been included in three distinct ISSP surveys (conducted in numerous countries in 1996, 2004, and 2014). The data set is widely used in political science and sociology, but items are not used consistently to define key concepts. Some researchers pick one, some several, and still others all relevant items to measure a specific concept. Worse, some researchers combine items measuring different concepts in a single scale. This lack of measurement consistency poses an obvious hurdle to the accumulation of knowledge on the determinants, nature, and political consequences of national attachments.

3.1. National Identity

In psychology, social identities are measured with multi-item scales that reflect a mix of cognitive factors, such as the acknowledgment that one belongs to a nation or use of the term "we" for co-nationals, and affective factors, such as the subjective importance of national belonging (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Mummendey et al. 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997). Citrin et al. (2001) draw on similar items to tap the strength of American identity among respondents in the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS). The following are common items: "How important is being American to you" and "how close do you feel to [COUNTRY]" (see also Sniderman et al.'s 2004 use of Crocker and Luhtanen's collective self-esteem scale). These items do not touch on the meaning of national identity and avoid contentious behaviors, such as standing for the national anthem, or divisive beliefs such as a dislike of foreigners. Some researchers take another tack and attempt to measure the primacy of national versus an international or supranational identity (Hooghe and Marks 2004). In the ISSP data,

national identity is measured with a single item asking how close the respondent feels to their country (Huddy and del Ponte 2019; see Table 21.1).

3.2. Patriotism

Group identity is typically accompanied by a sense of ingroup bias, defined as somewhat more positive ratings of one's own than other nations and nationals. This ingroup bias is often defined as patriotism, a positive feeling or a sense of pride in a country and its achievements. In the ISSP national identity module data (Table 21.1), nationals are asked

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Table 21.1 National Identity, Nationalism, and Patriotism Items (ISSP National Identity Module)

NATIONAL IDENTITY
How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]
NATIONALISM
Ethnocultural (. . . to be a TRUE COUNTRY NATIONAL)
How important is it to have been born in [COUNTRY]?
How important is it to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship?
How important is it to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life?
How important is it to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]?
How important is it to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry?
How important is it to be a [religion]?
Nationalism
I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world.
There are some things about [COUNTRY] that make me feel ashamed of [COUNTRY].*
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY]
Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries.
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
PATRIOTISM
Civic Patriotism (. . . . to be a TRUE COUNTRY NATIONAL)
How important is it to respect [COUNTRY]'s political institutions?
How important is it to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?
National Pride
When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].
How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in the way democracy works?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s political influence in the world?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY's] economic achievements?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s social security system?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s scientific and technological achievements?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s achievements in sports?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s achievements in the arts and literature?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY's] armed forces?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s history?
How proud are you of [COUNTRY]'s fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?
How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?

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how proud they feel as a national of their country and of a long list of aspects of their nation's history, culture, and institutions. The ISSP pride items are not always fully exploited to measure patriotism. Some researchers pick a single item to measure national pride (Ariely 2012), others combine several (Davidov 2009), and still others use all pride measures (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Other patriotism scales tap positive feelings about specific patriotic symbols such as the national anthem and flag (Peffley and Hurwitz). Some researchers combine national identity and pride items into a single measure. This latter strategy was used by Johnston et al. (2010) to measure Canadian identity, combining the rated importance of being Canadian, a sense of belonging to the Canadian community, pride in being Canadian, and positive feelings for the country.

3.2.1. *Civic Patriotism*

As noted above, there is a widely discussed distinction across and increasingly within nations between an *ethnocultural* view of national belonging (e.g., based on a common ethnic heritage) and *civic patriotism,* linked to a common national purpose and shared goals (Citrin et al. 1990; Li and Brewer 2004; Smith 1988). To assess these views, survey respondents are asked to rate various attributes as indicative of a true or good citizen. Civic patriotism is measured with items that equate good citizenship with following the laws, respecting the country's institutions, voting, and feeling like a national (see Table 21.1). In the United States, civic patriotism is more common than an ethnocultural understanding of the nation. When asked why they rate themselves as a "particularly good," "good," "ordinary," or "not so good citizen" and what they could do to become a better citizen, most Americans mention voting (Conover et al. 2004; see also Devos and Banaji 2005).

One of the difficulties in developing distinct measures of ethnic and civic understandings of American identity has been respondents' tendency to rate all aspects of national identity as equally important. Some researchers working outside the United States document distinct ethnocultural national and civic factors in analyses of questions concerning what constitutes a good citizen (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Helbling et al. 2016). But the strong empirical link among all items has made it difficult to create two competing scales in some national contexts, a problem that has bedeviled research in this area for some time. Miller and Ali (2014) get around this problem by subtracting scores on the civic and ethnic conception measures to obtain a difference score. Wright and Citrin (2012) solve this problem by switching from questions that ask people to rate the importance of various attributes to ranking them. This solution leads to a clearer distinction between those who prefer nativist ethnocultural characteristics and those who prefer civic attributes, revealing the association between ethnocultural aspects of identity and increased opposition to immigration.

3.2.2. *Constructive Patriotism*

Constructive patriotism was initially measured by Schatz and Staub (1997) by items such as "I oppose some U. S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it" and "I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change" (Schatz and Staub 1997). Others have measured constructive patriotism differently using three items from the ISSP: pride in the country's democracy, pride in its social security system, and the fair and

equal treatment of all groups in society, although this blurs the distinction between civic and constructive patriotism (Davidov 2009; Meitinger 2017). There is a potential confound between love of country and political engagement in the original constructive patriotism scale and it is not surprising that Schatz and colleagues find a clear link between political involvement and constructive patriotism (Schatz et al. 1999; Rothi et al. 2005). But it also raises questions about the nature of the scale. Is constructive patriotism primarily a measure of patriotism? Or of political interest and involvement?

3.3.   Nationalism

Nationalism has traditionally been measured with scale items tapping its chauvinistic side such as agreement with the statement that "other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). The ISSP nationalism battery includes five-scale items that tap a sense of national superiority, including items such as "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]. And Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries" (Table 21.1). As for patriotism, there is a lack of consistency in how these items are used, however. Researchers often choose a subset of the 5 items to assess nationalism (Ariely 2012; Davidov 2009; Sumino 2021). Other national elections surveys, such as the 2016 and 2020 American National Election Survey (ANES), include just one item to measure nationalism: "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans."

3.3.1. *Ethnocultural Nationalism*

As noted, an ethnocultural conception of the nation is assessed by asking respondents about the desired attitudes and behaviors of "true" or "good" citizens (Bonikowski 2017). In the United States, Citrin and colleagues have measured ethnocultural nationalism in the United States as the view that a true American is Christian and born in the country (Citrin et al. 1990, 2001; Citrin and Wright 2009; Smith 1997). The ISSP series includes questions about majority ethnic ancestry, majority religion, speaking the majority language, having been born in the country, having lived most of one's life there, and holding citizenship. These constitute aspects of an ethnocultural understanding of the nation.

3.3.2. *Combined Nationalism Scale*

Huddy and colleagues (2021; Huddy and del Ponte 2021) analyzed the structure of the ISSP national attachment measures in western Europe and the United States and identify two factors—nationalism and patriotism—that capture the measurement structure of national attachment items. The nationalism factor is comprised of items tapping an ethnonationalism conception of the nation plus standard nationalism scale items (see Table 21.1). This single factor indicates that nationalism is a unitary concept. The two-factor structure shows measurement invariance across western European nations and between Blacks and Whites in the United States (Huddy et al. 2021; Huddy and del Ponte 2021). Moreover, ethnonationalism

and traditional scale measures of national chauvinism have very similar effects reinforcing their conceptual overlap (Citrin et al. 1990; Citrin et al. 2001; Hochman et al. 2016; Lindstam et al. 2019; Schildkraut 2011; Wong 2010).

3.3.3. *Alternative Measures of Nationalism*

The collective narcissism scale captures a slightly different aspect of nationalism, emphasizing the failure of other nations to recognize the uniqueness and greatness of one's nation. Sample items include "Not many seem to fully understand the importance of the United States" (Federico and Golec de Zavala 2018). But the collective narcissism scale also includes items that overlap with that of traditional nationalism measures such as "If my nation had a major say in the world, the world would be a better place" (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). The original scale has nine items, although shorter versions also exist (Federico and Golec de Zavala 2018).

3.4. Scales vs Typology

Rather than array people on multiple, correlated scales, some researchers have developed typologies of national attachments that sort people into distinct groups. Bonikowski and Di Maggio (2016) divide Americans into four latent classes based on their responses to items assessing patriotism, nationalism, and national identity in the 2004 ISSP/GSS national identity module. The four groups are (1) ardent nationalists who feel close to America, endorse numerous attributes as central to being a true American, are very proud of the nation, and are high on chauvinism; (2) restrictive nationalists who hold an exclusive view of what it means to be Americans but are not high in national pride; (3) creedal Americans who feel proud of the national but place few restrictions on what it means to be a true American; and (4) the disengaged who express low levels of pride and a weak sense of national identity. This typology complements the distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Some Americans are high in both patriotism and nationalism (ardent), and some are low on both scales (disengaged), consistent with a moderately high positive correlation between the two scales in survey data. Other Americans are higher on one than the other (restrictive and creedal). Stronger endorsement of the nationalism items (among the ardent and restrictive) is linked to isolationism and a negative view of immigrants. This finding underscores the political value of the nationalism scale; it also challenges the need for a typology that fails to draw a clean distinction between patriotism and nationalism.

Bonikowski and de Maggio's (2016) typology has been replicated in a much larger numbers of countries (Soehl and Karim 2021). It also has some parallel in Satherley and colleagues' (2019) latent class analysis in which New Zealanders are divided into two distinct groups: a subgroup of people who endorse patriotism but not nationalism (11%) and those who are both highly nationalistic and patriotic (33%). The researchers identify other classes, but they are less clear-cut because they reflect middling or lower levels of both patriotism and nationalism. Once again, groups that endorse nationalism have less-positive ratings of immigrants, underscoring the distinct political relevance of a nationalism scale. On average, there is greater political benefit to the identification of nationalism than the

sorting of people into distinct typologies that reflect some mix of high and low scores on nationalism and patriotism, although both the scale and typology approaches have merit.

Other researchers have employed a Q-sort methodology to place Americans into various typologies. Sullivan and colleagues (1992) divide Americans into a group of nationalists and four types of patriots. Patriots included Americans who embrace national symbols, those who reject them in favor of patriotic political activism (akin to constructive patriotism), those who ground patriotism in protection of the environment, and those who equate patriotism with capitalism. Hanson and O'Dwyer (2019) conducted a Q-sort that divided Americans into two distinct groups: political liberals who prioritized an active and critical form of political involvement in the nation, and conservatives who prioritized equality of opportunity, national symbols, and national pride. Part of the difficulty with the Q-sort technique, however, is that typologies are often based on small samples and depend heavily on the items included in the sort.

3.5. Next Steps

The measurement of national attachments remains confusing and fragmented. A more systematic approach is needed to bring coherence to this area of research. There is promise in approaches that measure concepts with multi-item scales that have higher predictive validity than a single item (Huddy et al. 2021). There is also virtue in using standard concepts and measures, perhaps even including multiple such measures in a single study, to allow for a better assessment of the validity of existing scales. Data contained in the ISSP national identity modules provide this kind of rich measurement resource and deserve to be used more widely than now by political psychologists. All in all, research on national attachments begs for more systematic attention to issues of measurement. Despite measurement inconsistency, however, patriotism and nationalism have distinct political effects, as I discuss below.

4. The Political Consequences of Patriotism and Nationalism

4.1. National Identity, Patriotism, and Social Cohesion

4.1.1. *Social Trust and Assistance*

There is empirical support for the claim that national identity works as national glue. Several studies find an increased link between national identity, trust of co-nationals, increased compliance with national norms, and decreased ethnic and partisan divisiveness, although not all studies arrive at this conclusion. Supportive evidence comes from several different strands of research.

First consider evidence that priming national identity increases trust and social cohesion. Blouin and Mukand (2019) found that exposure to government propaganda

emphasizing national unity decreased the salience of ethnicity, increased interethnic trust, and strengthened the willingness to interact face-to-face with non-co-ethnics in Rwanda. Depetris-Chauvin and colleagues (2020) report that a national football team's victory boosted trust in other ethnicities and reduced intrastate violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Robinson (2016) reports that a strong national identity in Malawi led to increased trust of co-nationals in a trust game regardless of shared ethnicity. In this research, priming the national flag also increased trust in co-nationals among those who were less strongly identified with the nation. A strong national identity is associated with enhanced assistance to co-nationals in need (Johnston et al. 2010; Theiss-Morse 2009). Maki et al. (2019) found that those with a stronger national identity were more likely to assist co-nationals affected by a major earthquake in Chile in 2010. In addition, a strong national identity fuels the adoption of protective public health behaviors in a broad range of countries (van Bavel et al., 2022; Cárdenas et al. 2021; Chan et al. 2021).

In a similar vein, several experimental and non-experimental studies document a link between strong national identity and support for policies that benefit immigrants and co-nationals of diverse racial backgrounds (Ariely 2012; Collingwood et al. 2018; Huddy and del Ponte 2019; Osborne et al. 2019; Satherley et al. 2019; Soroka et al. 2017). For example, White Americans are more supportive of spending on minority education when their national identity is made salient but are less supportive of the same program when their racial identity is salient (Transue 2007). Charnysh et al. (2015) found that priming the nation among Hindus by exposing them to a map of the country colored by the national flag increased support for co-nationals across divisive religious lines. In this study, Hindus gave more to Hindu than Muslim fire victims without a national prime but gave equally when the map and flag were made salient. The 9/11 terrorist attacks may have had a similar effect on White Americans. In one study, experimental exposure to information about the events of 9/11 heightened American identity and increased support for multiculturalism policies (Davies, Steele, and Markus, 2008).

Civic patriotism has similar effects. Those who rank highly the civic aspects of American identity are more supportive of increased immigration and less supportive of policies that favor English-speaking immigrants (Citrin and Wright 2009). They are also more inclined than others to think that volunteering, donating money to charity, and serving in the military is an obligation they owe to other Americans (Schildkraut 2011).

4.1.2. *Civic Engagement*

In the United States, American identity is associated with civic behaviors such as voting, greater political attention, and higher levels of political knowledge (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Social identity theory predicts greater adherence to group norms among strong group identifiers, translating in the case of American identity into greater civic involvement among strong national identifiers. Those high in civic patriotism are more inclined to think that volunteering, donating money to charity, and serving in the military is an obligation they owe to other Americans (Citrin and Wright 2009; Lindstam et al. 2019; Schildkraut 2011).

The overlap between national and ethnic or racial identities among members of minority groups has particular importance for political engagement and citizenship. Simon and

colleagues report that a dual identity as a Russian-German or Turkish-German, indicated by statements such as "Sometimes I feel more as a German and sometimes more as a Turk," enhances political activity and support of group-related political issues among immigrants in Germany (Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008). These dual identities exhibit attributes of Brewer and Roccas' complex identities in which no one of the two identities dominates. In the absence of a dual identity, ethnic identity does not foster electoral engagement on behalf of the minority group. This points to the essential role of national identity in fostering civic engagement.

4.1.3. *Limits to Patriotic National Cohesion*

The cohesion effected by strong national identity and patriotism is readily fractured, however, placing clear limits on national unity. In democracies, co-nationals are often divided along partisan and ideological lines. Kam and Ramos (2008) underscore the tension between partisan conflict and national unity, demonstrating the degree to which such outcomes are conditioned by the relative salience of one or another identity. In their research, national identity shapes presidential approval in periods of national threat but partisan identity has greater effect on presidential approval in "normal" political times. In a similar vein, Levendusky (2018) conducted an experimental study in which he primed American identity, increasing the sense that outpartisans were fellow Americans. This modestly reduced partisan affective polarization and improved positive ratings and trait judgments of opposing partisans. In a politically polarized nation, there are obvious limits on the ability of national identity to effect national solidarity and cohesion. Chan (2021) found that national identity predicted the enactment of protective public health behaviors during the COVID pandemic in both China and the United States. But this link was complicated in the United States among conservatives who strongly identified with the Trump administration and were slower to adopt preventive behaviors of benefit to co-nationals.

Johnston and colleagues (2010) note other limits to the cohesive effects of national identity. They argue that national identity will increase support for policies seen as foundational or tightly linked to the nation, such as Social Security or Medicare in the United States. They demonstrate the link between national identity and support for national health care in Canada, a point of pride within the country, but found less support for the old-age pension and anti-poverty programs, which are not regarded as foundational aspects of the Canadian welfare system. The authors speculate on the importance of the historical development of a country's welfare state to explain why some policies are tightly tied to national identity and others are not. In countries such as Sweden, national identity is likely to be tightly linked to support for the entire welfare state whereas that is far less likely to be true in the United States or Canada.

Internal threats may also undermine the cohesive effects of national identity. Indeed, strong national identifiers may experience threats from members of a minority group as more of a national affront and consequently draw more exclusive national boundaries in the face of such threats. For example, Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) found that a strong national Dutch identity was associated with greater perceived threats to Dutch culture and that priming national identity increased opposition to immigration, especially among those with low prior levels of perceived cultural threat. Other studies

report similar findings in which cultural threat interacts with national identity to increase discrimination toward co-nationals of different racial or ethnic backgrounds (Falomir-Pichastor et al. 2009). These findings might reflect the political arousal of chauvinistic nationalism but could also underscore the conditions under which patriotic national unity can be fractured.

In sum, the cohesive effects of national identity and patriotism are fragile. They are eroded by divisive partisan conflicts. They are limited to specific aspects of social welfare policy linked to a country's history, complicating any automatic link between national identity and support for a specific national policy (Miller and Ali 2014). As Theiss-Morse (2009) finds, strong American identifiers will extend assistance to other Americans, but this assistance does not extend to the beneficiaries of social welfare programs. Collingwood and colleagues (2018) provide an interesting descriptive example of the conditions under which national identity drives policy support. They argue that President Trump's travel ban against Muslims in early 2016 was portrayed by the news media as anti-American, resulting in increased opposition to the ban among strong American identifiers. In the presence of political divisions or in the absence of strong political norms linking a policy to the nation, however, national identity does not automatically drive support for policies that benefit co-nationals.

4.1.4. *National Identity, Patriotism, and International Cooperation*

National identity and patriotism also foster support for international cooperation and supranational entities. In western Europe, a strong national identity is associated with greater trust in national institutions that are, in turn, embedded within the EU. In such countries, a strong national identity increases EU support (Anderson 1998; Hobolt and deVries 2016; although for contrary findings see Carey 2002). But this, too, is a contingent process. Strong national identifiers are more reactive than others to national threats, shifting support or neutrality toward a threatening nation into opposition, anger, and aggression.

Researchers studying a range of different groups find that strong group identifiers react more angrily than others to group threat (Mason, Chapter 24, this volume; Musgrove and McGarty 2008; Rydell et al. 2008; van Zomeren et al. 2008). When it comes to national identity, strong American patriots reacted with greater anger toward terrorists in the lead up to the Iraq war, heightening their support for war (Feldman et al. 2015; Huddy et al. 2007). Strong American identifiers also responded with greater anger to an insulting message about the United States and Americans written by a foreigner (Rydell et al. 2008). Fischer et al. (2010) made salient British subjects' national or gender identity and then exposed them to photos of the July 7, 2005, London bombings. Subjects whose British identity was made salient were more likely to report feeling aggression and expressed greater support for the war on terror than those for whom gender identity was made salient.

4.2. Nationalism and National Divisions

National identity and patriotism can enhance national solidarity, increase trust, and promote support for national policies. But their effects vary with context, circumstances, and

the meaning of national identity. In contrast, the political effects of nationalism are far more uniform and predictable.

4.2.1. *Nationalism Undermines International Cooperation*

Nationalism typically has ethnocentric effects that undermine international cooperation. It diminishes support for supranational political entities, promotes opposition to global trade, and fosters opposition to immigration. Indeed, highly nationalistic Americans will only support free trade if it yields outsized monetary gains to their nation (Mutz 2021). In the ISSP European data, nationalism consistently boosts support for protectionism and anti-immigration policies across countries (Huddy and Del Ponte 2019). Holding an exclusive national identity distinct from Europe diminishes support for the EU, and, while this is not a measure of nationalism, the two have very similar effects (Marks and Hooghe 2003). Both an exclusive national identity and nationalism increase support for nationalist policies and political parties (Dunn 2015; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017; Mayda and Rodrik 2005).[1] Scotto and colleagues (2018) show greater support for the Leave side in the UK Brexit vote among nationalists and greater support for Remain among those classified as globalists. Domm (2004) finds that nationalism has negative effects on the belief that one's nation benefits from EU membership.

4.2.2. *Nationalism, Exclusionary Domestic Policies*

Nationalism also influences domestic policy views. Individuals who endorse an ethnocultural view of American identity, equated here with nationalism, are more likely to oppose policies designed to benefit new immigrants, view negatively the impact of immigration, support English-only vote ballots, endorse ethnic profiling of Arab Americans, and generally support restrictions on civil liberties for non-citizens (Citrin et al. 1990; Citrin et al. 2001; Huynh et al. 2015; Schildkraut 2011; Sengupta et al. 2019; Wong 2010). In general, nationalism is linked to heightened xenophobia, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, the derogation of foreigners, classic racism, and a higher social dominance orientation (Ariely 2012; Blank and Schmidt 2003; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Pehrson et al. 2009; Sidanius et al. 1997; Wagner et al. 2012).

Theiss-Morse (2009) demonstrates that ethnocultural nationalism places clear boundaries on who qualifies as an American. This in turn limits support for government policies that benefit members of diverse ethnic and racial minority groups. In that sense, nationalism places clear limits on support for spending on policies that benefit members of minority groups, including social welfare, education, and the improvement of urban areas. In this way, ethnocultural nationalism defines who constitutes "we" and places boundaries on ingroup cooperation.

4.2.3. *Political Disengagement*

One of the puzzling aspects of nationalism is its link to political disengagement. Unlike national identity or civic patriotism which are associated with higher levels of political engagement, strong nationalists tend to voter at lower levels than others and express less

interest in politics (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Consider uncritical patriotism. Schatz and colleagues (1999) find *lower* not higher levels of political involvement and interest among uncritical patriots. They do not provide a clear theoretical basis for this observed relationship, but they demonstrate a link between authoritarianism and uncritical patriotism which provides a plausible explanation. Authoritarians typically exhibit lower levels of political information, interest, and involvement that can be traced to their reduced scores on openness to experience and lesser interest in exposure to new information (Altmeyer 1996; Feather et al. 2001; Lavine et al. 2005). Moreover, a general political passivity among authoritarians is consistent with one of their defining attributes—a greater deference to authority figures (Altmeyer 1998). This helps to explain lower levels of political involvement and interest among strong nationalists due, in part, to their greater authoritarianism. This trend may be upended, however, when strongly nationalistic politicians, such as Donald Trump, or nationalistic policies, such as Brexit, are on the ballot. Nationalistic political figures and policies can attract voters high in nationalism, overturning their habitual disinclination to participate in democratic politics. This is an important area for future research investigation.

4.3.   Support for Nationalist Political Parties and Leaders

There has been an obvious rise in nationalistic political parties and leaders in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in recent years. Prime examples of nationalistic political parties and their leaders in Europe include the National Rally in France (Marine Le Pen), the Italian Northern League (Matteo Salvini), Law and Justice in Poland (Andrzej Duda), and Fidesz in Hungary (Viktor Orban). The US Republican Party took a nationalistic turn that was most obvious following the election of Donald Trump in 2016, but had been present since the terror attacks of September 11, in tandem with growing Republican opposition to immigration (Bartels 2018). Nationalistic parties and leaders have arisen elsewhere in the world including Turkey (Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party), India (Narendra Modi and the BJP), the Philippines (Rodrigo Duterte and PDP-Laban), and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro). Leaders of such parties combine an overt love of country with support for nationalistic economic and social policies including skepticism of supranational forces such as the EU and the UN.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, support for nationalistic leaders and political parties is grounded in nationalism not patriotism. Donald Trump attracted support from White Americans holding anti-immigration and nationalistic views in the 2016 presidential election (Reny et al. 2020; Mutz 2018), continuing a decade-long trend in nationalistic White support for Republican candidates (Huddy and del Ponte 2021). Other forms of nationalism have also been tied to support for nationalist parties. Chichoka and Cislak (2020) show that collective narcissism is linked to support for populist parties. There is also evidence that collective narcissism had powerful influence on positive ratings and electoral support for Trump in the 2106 election (Federico and Golec de Zavala 2016). Dunn (2015) documents strong nationalist support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe.

4.3.1.   *The Political Activation of Nationalism*

If nationalism is linked to stable underlying aspects of personality and early socialization, how can we explain variation over time in the political potency of nationalism? The existence

of a nationalist political party and broad dissemination of its agenda help to explain this dynamic. Even at low levels of electoral success nationalist political parties receive considerable media attention (Bischof and Senniger 2018). A neo-nationalist party with a larger vote share typically receives even greater media attention than one with weaker electoral outcomes (Vliegenthart et al. 2012). This points to the critical role of media exposure in disseminating the ideas and policy platform of a nationalistic party and thus increasing awareness of its agenda, consistent with the dynamics of an elite influence theory of public opinion.

According to Hooghe and Marks (2004), the divisive political rhetoric found among the leaders of Euroskeptic political parties can enhance the negative effects of an exclusive national identity on EU support. More broadly, the mere presence of a neo-nationalist party in a country can create a megaphone for nationalistic citizens and foster a climate of intolerance toward outgroups. A study by Van Assche and colleagues (2017) provides an example of this process. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the World Values Survey (WVS), the authors found that a right-wing climate in a country or a sub-national region was associated with more negative outgroup attitudes among citizens regardless of their personal ideology. The authors did not test whether this effect was confined to nationalistic citizens but that is a distinct possibility. Using Eurobarometer data from twelve European countries, Semyonov et al. (2006) found that anti-immigrant attitudes were more pronounced across the general population precisely in countries where extreme right-wing parties enjoy greatest support.

Huddy and colleagues (2021) find additional support for elite influence theory in analysis of ISSP data from western Europe. In their data, nationalistic opposition to the EU is more common in countries with a neo-nationalist party and far less common in countries that lack such a political party. In their research, levels of nationalism do not map in any obvious way onto countries that did and did not have a neo-nationalist party, ruling out the notion that countries with high levels of nationalism are more likely to have a nationalist political party. Denmark had one of the lowest levels of nationalism in the ISSP data yet had a nationalist party, whereas Ireland had one of the highest levels of nationalism and lacked a party. Moreover, in Huddy et al.'s research (2021), the best-educated nationalists were most opposed to the EU. This may seem counterintuitive but is consistent with the expectation that elite influence has its greatest influence on those exposed to a message, something that is more common among better-educated citizens who are more politically attentive than those with lower levels of education (Zaller 1992).

There is also evidence that the effects of a nationalist party are further enhanced by the actions of mainstream political parties which may weaken their support for immigration when facing nationalist opposition (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020). In sum, the supply of nationalist rhetoric can enhance the political effects of nationalism. This finding is consistent with other research showing that political rhetoric is needed to translate societal trends, such as an increase in the immigrant population, into policy attitudes (Bruter 2003; Hopkins 2011).

4.4. Sharply Contrasting Effects of Patriotism and Nationalism

Patriotism and nationalism can have sharply contrasting political effects, especially on matters linked to immigration, the treatment of foreigners, and views of internal ethnic

minorities. When it comes to immigration, patriotism promotes national unity and increases support for immigration and globalization whereas nationalism fosters divisive opposition to foreigners and domestic immigrants in the United States and western Europe (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy et al. 2021). Carter and Perez (2016) find unifying effects of pride and fracturing effects of national chauvinism in a survey of Black and White Americans. Among White and Black Americans, nationalism decreased positive ratings of African, Asian, and Latino immigrants; it also decreased Black ratings of White immigrants. In contrast, national pride boosted Blacks' ratings of African, Asian, Latino, and White immigrants although had more limited effects among Whites (confined to more positive ratings of Asian immigrants). In Ariely's (2012) analysis of 2003 ISSP data, pride in the country's democracy, social security, and treatment of groups similarly led to more positive views of immigration whereas national chauvinism led to more negative assessments. Domm (2004) also shows that nationalism has negative and patriotism positive effects on the belief that one's nation benefits from EU membership.

The contrasting effects of nationalism and patriotism on immigration and related matters raises two critical considerations. First, it is important to note that nationalism and patriotism are typically positively correlated. This means that the inclusion of one measure without the other could mask evidence of their complex positive and negative effects on political attitudes such as support for increased immigration. Second, the positive correlation between patriotism and nationalism but their contrasting political effects underscores the importance of each national attachment's salience within national politics. If national leaders are unified in their support of a particular policy, strong national identifiers and patriots are likely to fall in line, reducing the salience of nationalistic opposition. Conversely, politicians who oppose a policy on nationalistic grounds will increase policy opposition among strong nationalists.

Finally, I need to underscore the differing political effects of distinct forms of national attachments in the United States and elsewhere. Despite their positive association, nationalism and patriotism have opposing political effects. In the United States, nationalism promotes opposition to immigration, increases support for trade protectionism, and boosts White support for the Republican Party over time, whereas patriotism promotes support for immigration and increases opposition to trade protectionism across racial lines. We find similar trends in western Europe, where strong nationalism fuels opposition to immigration, free trade policies, and the EU, and promotes electoral support for populist parties whereas patriotism strengthens support for the same policies and the EU (Huddy et al. 2021).

5. Majority and Minority Status

5.1. Levels of National Attachment and Political Effects

Nation states are often formed by core ethnic groups, whose language and culture come to dominate state practices. This results in somewhat higher levels of national attachment among members of founding majority than minority ethnic groups within a nation, although this also varies by nation (Elkins and Sides 2007; Devos and Banaji 2005; Sidanius

et al. 1997; Theiss-Morse 2009). Staerkle and colleagues (2010) analyze the cross-national ISSP national identity data from 33 countries to understand factors that enhance or minimize differences in levels of national attachment among members of minority and majority ethnic groups. They find modestly weaker identification with the nation among members of minority groups, with substantially lower levels of attachment in roughly half the countries included in their data. This suggests a slight average difference in levels of national attachment by ethnic groups but also considerable cross-national variability. They also find consistently stronger ties between ethnic and national identity for members of the majority than minority groups. In the United States, Huddy and Khatib (2007) find that Blacks expressed lower levels of national pride but not national identity in the 2004 GSS-ISSP identity module, although this difference disappeared once items referring to equal treatment of groups and the country's history are removed from the scale.

It is less clear, however, that levels of nationalism differ by majority and minority ethnic group status. In research by Huddy and del Ponte (2021) Black Americans were less patriotic but more nationalistic than Whites after controlling for the other type of national attachment and demographic factors. In New Zealand, minority ethnic status was not associated with level of patriotism but was associated with higher levels of nationalism (Osborne et al. 2017). Higher levels of nationalism among members of minority groups is puzzling, especially in analyses that include controls for other factors with which nationalism is often associated such as education. More work is needed to better understand this relationship. Nonetheless, minorities are not less nationalistic than majority groups.

Apart from differences in levels of national attachment by majority-minority status, there are also important questions concerning the political effects of national attachments. Do they have the same meaning and effect among members of majority and minority groups? Carter and Perez (2016) find that national pride increases anti-immigration attitudes among White Americans but has the opposite effect, promoting support for immigration, among Blacks.

Nationalism has more uniform effects among majority and minority groups. Huddy and del Ponte (2021) report that strongly nationalistic Whites and Blacks oppose immigration and support protectionist economic policies to the same degree. But the effects of nationalism can also differ by majority-minority status. In the United States, nationalistic Whites have been increasingly attracted to the Republican Party over the last two decades and vote for Republican presidential candidates whereas Blacks have not. This occurred despite slightly higher levels of nationalism among Black than White Americans in all three ISSP/GSS national identity modules collected in 1996, 2004, and 2014. Obviously, other factors such as group interest and group alliances come into play in translating national attachments into political attitudes.

5.2. Explaining Different Levels of National Attachments

Researchers have attempted to understand factors that enhance and diminish differences in national attachments among members of minority and majority ethnic groups. There is some evidence that levels of patriotism differ across geographic contexts among members of minority groups. Wolak and Dawkins (2017) find higher levels of patriotism among members of minority groups living in states with greater racial and ethnic diversity. In

the least diverse states, non-Whites were less patriotic than Whites whereas there was no difference between Whites and non-Whites in states with higher levels of diversity. Some point to economic factors such as the provision of welfare benefits that may sharpen ethnic boundaries and weaken national attachments among members of minority groups. In support of this supposition, Staerkle and colleagues (2010) found that national attachments were weaker among members of minority than majority groups in highly developed, ethnically homogeneous, welfare-based state economies such as Sweden.

The distribution of political power may also influence the degree to which members of minority groups feel attached to the nation. Green (2020) noted that ethnic and national identity align when an ethnic group holds political power in sub-Saharan Africa but that national identity may wane among members of ethnic groups when they are out of power and ethnic identity is stronger than national identity. Ray (2018) demonstrates that ethnic groups who lack access to power report lower levels of national pride than ethnic groups who experience economic inequality. Drawing on data from World Values Survey from 59 countries conducted between 2010 and 2012, Ray finds lower levels of national pride among members of ethnic groups who lack political power or had been subjected to political discrimination.

6. Future Directions

One of the challenges confronting researchers interested in the political effects of national attachments is to achieve greater consensus on their definition and measurement. It is difficult to understand when national attachments will bring about greater national cohesion or generate internal divisions when studies differ in how they measure a given concept or use the same measure to tap different concepts. The rich data contained in the ISSP national identity modules provides an excellent starting point for the analysis of national attachments, their structure, measurement, conception as scales or typologies, and the assessment of measurement invariance across nations. The data also has its limits. Panel data would provide a very welcome addition to research on national attachments, allowing political psychologists to better understand the underlying stability of different types of national attachments, and compare the relative stability of measures over time. This would help to answer important questions such as whether someone's level of nationalism changes in response to ongoing events such as an influx of immigrants or economic challenges, or whether political parties capitalize on such changes to increase the political salience of nationalism.

The conditions under which national unity can be enhanced or undermined among those who identity strongly with the nation and express strong patriotic feelings is also worthy of greater research attention. It is clear from recent events in the United States that partisan divisiveness can readily fracture national unity. But what are the limits to this process? Social identity theory sheds some light on this process, by emphasizing the conditions under which national identity is salient, such as in the presence of an external enemy. The theory helps to explain why national identity and pride generate national trust and solidarity. But social identity theory sheds less light on the existence of nationalism and its divisive effects on support for immigration, diversity, and political tolerance.

As noted, the recent rise in support for nationalist parties and political leaders cannot be traced to rising levels of nationalism. Aggregate levels of nationalism have remained relatively constant in the United States and western European countries in recent years. Instead of increasing levels of nationalism, nationalist parties increase the political relevance of nationalism. If nationalist parties make nationalism more salient but do not increase levels of nationalism, we need to better understand the conditions that foster their emergence. Is it increased cultural and ethnic diversity within a nation that allow such parties to gain traction? An economic crisis? Threats to a nation's dominance? Testing the conditions under which nationalistic rhetoric is deemed more and less acceptable, or a nationalistic candidate gains more and less support, may provide a good starting point for this line of research.

Lower levels of patriotism but comparable levels of nationalism among members of majority and minority ethnic groups deserves future attention. What are the political consequences, if any, of such differences? Black Americans may score lower than Whites on standard measures of patriotism, but they vote at higher rates once racial differences in educational attainment are controlled (Bowler and Segura 2012). In the United States, nationalism has increasingly driven White but not Black support for the Republican Party, creating clear racial limits to the success of nationalistic rhetoric in ethnically diverse nations. More research is needed to understand the meaning of patriotism, nationalism, and their political effects for members of diverse racial and ethnic minority groups across nations. It is heartening to see an emerging line of recent research on the factors that promote a sense of national belonging among diverse citizens. This is an important area of future research.

I hope this chapter has made clear the value of a psychological approach to the study of national attachments. Past research on pride and national chauvinism has spawned a variety of scales and concepts, drawn differing normative conclusions, and has been characterized by conflicting and contradictory terminology and measurement. It is not uncommon to find the same survey question being labeled quite differently by different researchers. Better measurement, clearer concepts, and a stronger theoretical focus will help to advance research within this area. National attachments are essential to the smooth functioning of the modern nation-state. Patriotism fosters tax compliance, civic engagement, pride in national culture, history, and achievements, and a willingness to help co-nationals. National cohesion can be fractured, however, by resurgent nationalism, which restricts national belonging, generates hostility toward foreigners, and places limits on international cooperation. As the world confronts problems that are beyond the control of any single nation, an understanding of the dynamics that propel a nation toward cohesion and international cooperation or toward chauvinism and nation-first policies could not be more pressing.

Note

1. Schlipphak (2013) and Teney et al. (2014) find that support for the EU, immigration, and free trade are related and pertain to attitudes toward supranationalism and international cooperation more generally.

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THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

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1. Theorizing Leadership

Why do some individuals emerge as effective political leaders while others do not? Why are some politicians able to mobilize people to produce transformative societal change? Why do ordinary citizens at times become enthralled with authoritarian leaders? These are some of the questions that have preoccupied social scientists—particularly political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and management theorists—for many decades (for more on leadership research in political science and international relations see Levy, Chapter 10, Stein, Chapter 11, and Casler and Yarhi-Milo, Chapter 12, this volume). However, scholarly interest in leadership began much earlier and can be traced back to the writings of philosophers who sought to provide answers to *normative* questions about good (ethical and effective) leadership. For example, in the *Analects*, written in the period 475–221 BCE, Confucius reflected on the question of "what makes a good ruler?" and answered that "moral cultivation" is the key to what we would nowadays refer to as "good, ethical governance" (Adair, 2013). Likewise, in *The Republic*, written around 375 BCE, Aristotle outlined his views about "good" (virtuous) leadership. Leadership roles, he argued, should be reserved for educated *philosopher kings*, who are "in love with wisdom and truth seeking," who have attained certain virtues, such as prudence, fairness, courage, restraint, and who have the ability to set aside personal self-interest (Bauman, 2018; Takala,1998).

In the 16th century a radically different view about what constitutes good and virtuous leadership was advanced by the Florentine diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli. In his 1532 book *The Prince*—a "how-to" guide for rulers eager to retain power—Machiavelli argued that leaders and citizens have a shared interest in protecting state authority, and that all means (ethical or unethical) can be justified to secure this end, including murder, betrayal, and

stoking division (Skinner, 1978). Likewise, Thomas Hobbes advanced a pragmatic approach to leadership in his 1651 treatise *Leviathan*. Hobbes too believed that in a dangerous world marked by constant violent conflict (which he described as humanity's "natural state"), leaders should be realistic and decisive. However, rather than focusing on leader *self*-preservation, Hobbes was preoccupied with ways to secure peace and stability, and the solution he proposed was a social contract in which citizens submitted themselves to government in exchange for protection. Without a social contract of this kind, Hobbes argued, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes 1651; cited in Riley, 2009: 25).

During the Enlightenment, interest in identifying normative or prescriptive ideals about "good governance" resurfaced, spurred on by dissatisfaction with absolutist monarchs claiming to have been granted the "divine right" to rule. It was during this era that leadership came to be viewed as anchored in popular consent. For example, in his 1689 book *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, John Locke contemplated ways to prevent the abuse of power and argued that this could only be achieved by governing with the consent of the general population (Hoff, 2015). Locke saw effective leadership as involving a partnership between rulers and the ruled in which each citizen "seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates" (Locke, 1689: 70–71). Along related lines, in *De l'Esprit des Lois*, written in 1748, Charles Montesquieu compared the virtues of different systems of government and made the case for the strict "separation of powers" as a means of preventing power abuse and protecting citizens' rights (Kingston, 2008). Power abuse, he contended, would erode the public's trust in leaders, and in turn render society unstable.

As can be seen from this short list of examples, early thinking about leadership was primarily concerned with the psychology and behavior of leaders but, over time, increasingly recognised that it hinged on a leader's ability to form a successful partnership with followers. This realization paved the way for the study of *followership* to become a central concern in contemporary leadership research (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). A question of particular interest among contemporary researchers is why certain leaders have a remarkable capacity to inspire and mobilize followers while others seem to falter or fail at this endeavour. Indeed, followership has become a hot topic in contemporary election studies, with political scientists focusing on the relationship between partisan identification (partisanship) and political behavior.

In what follows, we seek to explain how psychological theorizing can be used to enrich our understanding of leadership by exploring its links to followership and partisanship. However, it is useful to first clarify how we define leadership. In line with standard definitions, we define this as "the process through which one or more people influence other group members in a way that motivates them to contribute to the achievement of group goals" (Haslam et al., 2015: 648). It is also worth clarifying that we view leadership not as the capacity to exert power *over* people (as per Machiavelli and Hobbes), but as capacity to exert power *through* people (as per Locke, Montesquieu, and Weber; see Turner, 2005). Moreover, while political theorists such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Weber viewed followership through the prism of power through rather than power over, the group *processes* that bind followers to leaders were largely unexplored in their, and other more recent, analyses. Instead, there has been a tendency in leadership research to conceive of followership as the outcome of particular leadership styles (e.g., charismatic leadership,

authentic leadership, transformative leadership), rather than as a resource that would-be leaders build up over time through a process of mutual social influence.

Our aim in this chapter is to provide a forensic examination of the way in which this resource is created and mobilized. We do this by arguing that effective leadership works primarily through a process in which leaders contribute to building a sense of shared identity with other group members (a sense of "us-ness"), and subsequently tap into that shared identity to garner followership and capacity to secure social change (Haslam et al., 2011). In this way, it is the *coordinated* endeavor of leaders and followers, framed by a sense of shared psychological group membership that allows them to work together to advance the interests of the group.

In advancing this argument, the chapter is organized into three sections. First, we review different phases in contemporary leadership research in social and organizational psychology, paying particular attention to the tendency to overlook group dynamics and instead rely on explanations couched in terms of individual differences. In this section we discuss and unpack core concepts, offer a critique of popular theories and methodological approaches, discuss key empirical findings, and identify the primary problems that prevailing models encounter and fail to resolve. After this, we introduce the social identity approach to (political) leadership. This argues that for leaders to be accepted and gain power through others, they have (a) to be perceived as representative of a group membership that they share with followers ("being one of us"), (b) to be seen as championing group goals ("doing it for us"), (c) to actively cultivate and harness shared social identity ("crafting a sense of us"), and (d) to initiate structures that enable group members to enact their shared social identity ("making us matter"). We then conclude this chapter with a section that argues for the need to step up efforts to draw on social identity theorizing to interrogate group processes in ways that will enable us to better understand the group processes driving *partisanship* (Campbell et al., 1980; Huddy, Mason & Aarøe, 2015; West & Iyengar, 2020), *elite influence* (Feldman et al., 2012; Zaller, 1992), and *affective polarization* (Huddy & Yair, 2021; Druckman & Levendusky, 2019).

2. Contemporary Leadership Research

Contemporary leadership research developed in three partly overlapping phases (Haslam & Reicher, 2016). The first phase was associated with research into *charismatic leadership*, and focused (in a gendered way) on "great men" and the source of their charisma. This was followed by a wave of research that sought to do greater justice to contextual variables and motivational factors, with researchers seeing leadership as involving person—situation fit, rational choice, and social construction. Finally, in recent decades, researchers have once again returned to seeing leaders' capacity to secure compliance and followership as flowing from particular leadership styles (e.g., in the form of inspirational, transformative, or authentic leadership).

2.1. Phase 1: "Great Men" and Their Charisma

As Lindholm observed in his 1990 book *Charisma*, the idea of the exceptional heroic leader has been around for a long time. It features in Plato's *Republic* (375 BCE), Aristotle's

Nicomachean Ethics (340 BCE), Comte's *Calendar of Great Men* (1849), Mill's (1859) description of leaders as individual geniuses, Carlyle's *Great Man Theory of History* (1840), Nietzsche's depiction of an *Übermensch* ("superman") as an ideal-type leader (1885), Le Bon's writings on the hypnotic crowd leader (1900), and Weber's work on "charismatic leadership" (1922) (for overviews, see Lindholm, 1990; Potts, 2009). What these authors shared was a belief, articulated by Francis Galton in his 1869 book *Hereditary Genius*, that human progress is the creation of "great men" who are "born special" and "made of the right stuff." As the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus put it: "the many are worthless, good men are few; one man is worth ten thousand if he is the best" (Kahn, 1981: 57), a view echoed by Thomas Carlyle when he declared that "universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here" (Carlyle, 1840: 3).

Such observations speak to a long history of leadership scholars glorifying "great men" (to the exclusion of "great women") and perpetuating the idea of charisma as a special gift that only some people possess, in line with the original meaning of the ancient Greek word *khárisma* as a "special gift." This "heroic" view continues to inform lay understandings of the topic. For example, it is seen in the popular biographies of politicians, CEOs and sports coaches which glorify leaders by portraying them as capable of achieving remarkable things as a consequence of their unique personalities. In other words, the key premise of this approach is that people are great leaders by dint of what sets them apart from the masses. According to such accounts, leaders who achieved great things did so more or less singlehandedly by virtue of their remarkable personality and charisma (e.g., "Churchill defeated Nazi Germany," "Gandhi secured India's independence," "Lincoln ended slavery").

There are fundamental problems with this heroic view. For example, while some leaders are clearly more effective than others, it is also clear that rather than being "born to lead," leaders' propensity for leadership is shaped by their life experiences. In the mid-20th century this point was explored extensively by Frankfurt School sociologists in their efforts to explain the remarkable appeal of authoritarian leaders and regimes (see Feldman & Weber, Chapter 20, this volume). In particular, they grappled with the fact that the Great Depression of the 1930s had failed to trigger a global working-class uprising as traditional Marxist social theory predicted, and struggled to explain why the deprived working classes put their faith instead in authoritarian leaders who reinforced rather than challenged the unequal status quo (Eyerman, 1981). Inspired by Freudian psychology, these scholars began to study the life stories of totalitarian leaders, paying particular attention to such things as early childhood trauma, repressed aggression, and sexuality (Jay, 2019). In the process, they became early adopters of a *biographical approach*, which involved retrospective inquiry to discover early signs of greatness, depravity, and adversity in the personal histories and life stories of (in)famous leaders (see also Bennis & Thomas, 2002).

Frankfurt School scholars also invoked early childhood experiences to explain how an entire generation of ordinary Germans could become enthralled by Hitler's authoritarian leadership. Hitler was able to gain a mass following, they reasoned, because ordinary Germans growing up during the Great Depression had been subjected to harsh child-rearing styles which manifested in later life in a collective "authoritarian syndrome" (Adorno et al., 1950). Although early Frankfurt School scholars viewed personality not as fixed but as structured by social relations and social experiences, and hence potentially changeable[1] (Fromm et al., 1989), this nuance was missing from later analyses in which researchers proposed there are measurable individual differences in the extent to which individuals would be drawn to authoritarian leaders—differences that could be captured by relevant measures (notably,

the F-Scale and the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988). Alongside this, Frankfurt School researchers also extended leadership research by introducing considerations of *followership* into their analysis of leadership. And while they embraced an individualistic conception of followers (as individuals with particular personality traits unwittingly gravitating towards particular kinds of leaders) they nevertheless recognized that followership is an indispensable part of the leadership jigsaw.

Importantly too, Frankfurt School scholars were also interested in group processes and collective meaning making. However, this process was viewed in a top-down manner, as a process through which powerful elites control the means of cultural production (e.g., through art, movies, television) to further their vested interests, and are thus able to manipulate the masses into a state of "false consciousness." What remained underexamined was the (bottom-up) transformative influence that followers exert over leaders, and the dynamic processes through which leaders and followers cue each other (Feldman et al, 2012). Moreover, scholars in this tradition failed to take on board Weber's insight that charisma is *conferred* on leaders by followers (Weber, 1946), and that leaders earn but can also lose their reputation as charismatic leader (Milosevic & Bass, 2014). Indeed, recognizing this point makes the broader debate about whether or not leaders are "born to lead" redundant, since it is clear that leadership can never be achieved without the participation of followers.

However, Weber himself was ambivalent on this point. At times he emphasized the subjectivity of perceived charisma, but elsewhere he portrayed charisma as a leader characteristic—for example, when arguing that charismatic leadership would be required to save the masses from themselves. Thus in his 1922 essay *The Sociology of Charismatic Leadership*, he outlined the extraordinary characteristics that he believed charismatic leaders would need to possess in order to be able to inspire others with their vision and mission (Weber, 1946). In this way, his work paved the way for interest in those traits that mark out charismatic leaders, as well as in the quest to identify effective leadership styles (e.g., House & Howell, 1992). Ultimately, though, these efforts were unsuccessful. In particular, influential reviews that were conducted around the middle of the century concluded that none of the traits that the literature identified as important for leadership (e.g., intelligence, extraversion, dominance) reliably predicted its success (e.g., Mann, 1959). Instead, the usefulness of these variables was observed to always depend on a further factor, namely the *social situation* (Stogdill, 1948). Moreover, while findings of more recent meta-analyses suggest that individual traits (such as the Big Five personality traits) are associated with indicators of leader *role* performance (Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume; for reviews, see Do & Minbashian, 2020; Lord et al., 1986 Derue et al., 2011), these findings do not help us understand the process through which aspiring leaders are able to build a following (Haslam et al., 2020).

In summary, then, early 20th-century leadership research described ideal-type leaders in ways that relied heavily on individualistic "heroic" leadership models, with researchers either assuming that charismatic leaders are innately special and therefore destined to succeed, or that they can acquire traits and skills that enable them to succeed at all times and under all circumstances. This heroic view continues to inform lay understanding of leaders' abilities to achieve remarkable things. Moreover, although more leadership research now pays more attention to contextual factors and group dynamics (e.g., Hollander, 2012), on the whole psychological research into leadership and followership has continued to rely heavily on personality and trait-based explanations (e.g., Barber, 1992; Deinert et al.,

2015; DeRue et al., 2011; Hargrove, 1966; Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Tucker, 1977; Renshon, 1994). Nevertheless, over time, there has been increasing recognition that (political) leadership success is subjective (Weber, 1946), context-dependent (Stogdill, 1948) and bound up with shared values and beliefs (George, 1968), and hence not reducible to personality alone (Winter, 2005). No leader is an island, and to understand their leadership properly we need to understand their relationship with the followers who make it possible.

2.2. Phase 2: The Contingent Nature of Leadership and Followership

As Mintzberg notes (2004), the "great man" approach to leadership continues to wield considerable influence in society at large and is reflected in popular conceptions of the topic. However, in the field of leadership studies, confidence in the approach has gradually waned—in both psychological and political science. As we intimated above, two bodies of evidence have led researchers to abandon the heroic view of leadership. One centres on growing evidence that leadership success is the contingent product of personal and situational factors; the other on the observation that leadership success is necessarily dependent on a leader's acquired capacity to garner followership.

Together, these two insights led to a second phase of research in which researchers sought to account for the context-dependent nature of leadership success. For example, historians and sociologists advanced what became known as the *situational approach*, arguing that particular contexts (e.g., an economic crisis) will provide fertile soil for certain kinds of leaders (Cooper & McGaugh, 1963). According to this perspective, particular conditions "produce" particular kinds of leaders (as per the aphorism "cometh the hour, cometh the man"), with the implication that any leader who happens to rise to prominence might easily have been someone else *like* them. For example, proponents of this approach would argue that if it had not been Hitler who seized the moment and capitalized in on ordinary Germans' frustration with the Weimar Republic, it would have been someone else with a similar leadership style.

As an extension of this point, organizational psychologists advanced a *contingency approach* (e.g., Fiedler, 1964; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987), which viewed leadership success as dependent on the quality of the match between individual leaders and the situations they confront (Gibb, 1958). There are a range of ways in which this approach has been realized theoretically and practically. At heart, though, it argues that leadership can be understood (and assessed) with reference to three core elements: first, the character of leaders (e.g., their relationship- or task-focus); second, relevant features of the leadership context (e.g., the need to build relationships or complete tasks); and third, the optimal fit between these two elements.

Situational and contingency approaches have both helped to increase awareness of the context-dependent nature of leadership success. However, both are informed by an assumption that leaders have an immutable personality that helps them to succeed, and that manifests itself in the same way over time and across a broad range of contexts (Haslam et al., 2020). Yet in recent years this assumption has been increasingly called into question, not least because evidence suggests that leadership effectiveness rests on a

leader's capacity to *adapt* to the context in which they find themselves. Indeed, what contingency approaches fail to account for is the *dynamic interactionism* whereby leaders (e.g., politicians) and followers (e.g., voters) cue and change *each other* (Feldman et al., 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007). Among other things, this means that leaders need to tailor their style according to the context in which they and their group find themselves (Reynolds et al., 2010). Related to this observation, a further failing of contingency approaches is that only the leader is ever subjected to serious psychological analysis. However, as we have noted, a large part of the context that confronts any leader is constituted by followers who are necessarily bound up with the success of leadership (Bennis, 1999; Platow et al., 2015). As with heroic approaches, a core problem with contingency formulations is thus that they position rank-and-file group members as passive onlookers to the leadership process rather than active participants in it (Reicher et al., 2005; Shamir, 2007).

Mindful of this point, researchers advanced new approaches that attempted to take stock of followers' perceptions and motivations. However, these approaches continued to conceive of the leader-follower relationship in a mechanistic way, as one entailing a match between leaders' style and followers' expectations. For example, this is a feature of *transactional approaches* that zero in on the nature of the leader-follower *relationship.* In particular, early work by Hollander (1965, 1985) viewed this relationship as a mercantile exchange that is shaped by rational cost-benefit evaluations in which leaders and followers are motivated to scratch each others' backs, providing the terms of the exchange are fair. In particular, the leaders' contributions to the group are argued to give them (idiosyncracy) credit to then be able to innovate and deviate from the group's path. Such insights paved the way for the emergence of *leader-member exchange (LMX) theory*, which called for more attention to be paid to the quality of the interpersonal relations bwtween leaders and followers, and argued that high-quality exchange relationships are intragroup partnerships (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Scandura & Graen, 1984) characterized by a "high degree of mutual trust, respect, and obligation" (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995, p. 227). This idea that leadership centres on successful interpersonal transactions accords with principles of *equity theory* (Adams, 1965), which conceive of humans as rational utility maximizers (*homo economicus)*, and which see followership as contingent on leaders' ability to ensure followers are satisfied with their ratio of outcomes relative to input and relative to the contributions and rewards of others. A central idea here is that a leader's job revolves around combatting (actual and perceived) freeriding.

Conceptualizing leadership in these terms has intuitive appeal, not least because it is consistent with theories of economic exchange that have widespread currency in the social sciences (Fine & Milonakis, 2009). Nevertheless, a key limitation of these approaches is that the concepts of "cost" and "benefit" are elastic, such that almost anything can be interpreted retrospectively as aligned with "rational" self-interest (Bruins et al., 1995). What is more, it is often unclear whether *self*-interest refers to the individual's interests, or to shared "sociotropic" self-interests. In line with this point, evidence suggests that perceptions of transactional "utility" are highly fluid, and shaped by prevailing values and norms (Selznick, 1957; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2018). Indeed, in these terms, much of what leaders actually do involves (re)defining followers' values in ways that fundamentally *recalibrate* transactional algebra—as when John F. Kennedy's invited Americans to "ask not what your country can do for you . . ." (MacArthur, 1996: 486) or when Donald Trump told his followers that they

would pay the price of legal action against him, observing "they're going after me without any protection of my rights [but] in reality they're not after me, they're after you" (January 29, 2022). In other words, leaders do not just give followers what they value; they also tell them *what* to value.

Speaking to the importance of followers' expectations, research informed by a *perceptual approach* has argued that followers have preconceived ideas about what good leadership looks like and that leaders need to live up to these in order to succeed. In particular, proponents of *leader categorization theory* (LCT) have argued that effective leaders need to behave in ways that conform to established leadership stereotypes (Lord et al., 1982; Lord & Maher, 1990, 1991). Consistent with this analysis, research shows that male political candidates continue to benefit from a baseline association between leadership and being male (Sanbonmatsu, 2002), even though the effect has weakened over time (Eagly, 2007). Similarly, racial ideology was a predictor of people voting for a white candidate in the 2008 US presidential elections (Greenwald et al., 2009). This suggests that non-caucasian candidates continue to face a comparative disadvantage, since a significant segment of the electorate will vote on the basis of race rather than proposed policy.

Again, though, it is apparent that rather than being fixed and immutable, leader stereotypes are labile and responsive to context—and that leadership involves shaping rather than simply pandering to followers' expectations. This, for example, explains why Barack Obama was able to defeat John McCain, despite 77% of US voters being White (Pew Research Centre, April 30, 2009), and despite Obama's candidacy triggering a surge in racist sentiments (Tesler, 2013). To explain why many white voters became enthusiastic supporters of an African-American presidential candidate, we thus need to go beyond an approach which sees the terms and expectations of leadership as set in stone, and leaders as powerless to change them. In particular, as we outline further below, to explain the groundswell in support for Obama we need to understand the transformative power of his "Yes we can" campaign, and of the group processes that this mobilized and tapped into.

Importantly too, we need to come to terms with the point that while it centres on issues of power, leadership is more about gaining power *through* followers than it is about having power *over* them. Nevertheless, the *power approach* to leadership has generally focused on the material and psychological resources that leaders have at their disposal (Kerr & Jermier, 1978; French et al., 1959), and studied the conditions under which different kinds of resources are more or less effective in securing others' compliance (e.g., Kahn et al., 1964; Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). This is problematic because evidence suggests that when leadership is seen as a matter of resources (e.g., as a question of having the means to coerce others), this is generally inimical to influence and often a source of resistance and reactance (Brehm, 1966; Turner, 1991, 2005). To be sure, control over resources can matter, especially if the resources in question are scarce and of valued to others (Reynolds & Platow, 2003). But nonetheless, a concern to wield power *over* people will at best engender superficial, extrinsically motivated compliance (i.e., where followers follow because they feel they *have* to). If one is interested in securing deeper intrinsically motivated compliance (i.e., where followers follow because they *want* to), one therefore needs to focus on achieving this through the "soft" process of social influence rather than the wielding of "hard" material force (Nye, 1990; Gallarotti, 2011; Haslam et al., 2014).

2.3. Phase 3: Transformational Leadership

As Gerstner and Day (1997) note, traditional leadership theories attributed leadership effectiveness to fixed personal characteristics of the leader, to features of the situation, or to an interaction between the two. The downside of treating the leader–follower relationship in this mechanistic way is that it remains unclear what might motivate (potential) followers to follow a particular leader, and why (political) leaders often have very different relations with different (groups of) followers. The third phase in leadership research emerged around efforts to reveal the psychological processes bound up with these dynamics of followership. For example, *path-goal theory* acknowledged that team members have different motivations and viewed leadership challenges as revolving around the need to align the goals of leaders and followers (Evans, 1970, 1996; House, 1971). Likewise, proponents of *vertical dyad linkage theory* argued that in all groups there is typically a highly motivated central ingroup, consisting of team members with close ties to the leader, and peripheral outgroups comprised of team members who are not so committed to the leader's vision and hence only "go along" with their instructions under duress and with little enthusiasm (Dansereau et al., 1975; see also Reynolds & Platow, 2003).

At first glance, the arguments put forward by these two approaches seem sound. However, both are based on a rather static understanding of groups which fails to appreciate how group goals, boundaries, and commitment can change as a function of social context. Both approaches also fail to acknowledge the capacity for particular forms of leadership to transform relatively disengaged bystanders into actively engaged and intrinsically motivated followers. This is a serious oversight as, after all, a key challenge facing leaders is precisely to persuade potential followers to "come on board" by converting them into enthusiastic ingroup members.

This idea that leadership centers on the process of transforming passive spectators into active followers was central to the writing of political scientist James M. Burns. In particular, he contrasted *transformational leaders* with *transactional leaders* and argued that only the former are able to elevate and capitalize upon the motivations and morals of prospective followers (Burns, 1978). Moreover, Burns argued that by conceiving of leaders and followers as "set apart" in an uneven transactional power relationship, traditional approaches fail to recognize the capacity for leaders and followers to influence and empower each other. At the same time, though, there is some conceptual ambivalence in Burns' writing because this drew heavily on individualistic psychological theorizing (e.g., Maslow's hierarchy of needs) while at the same time calling for greater attention to *collective*-level dynamics. Nevertheless, his work laid the foundations for what has probably been the most influential strand of leadership thought and practice in recent decades—*transformational leadership theory* (Bass & Riggio, 2006).

As it has evolved, transformational leadership research has had two key foci—namely the *perceptual approach* and *behavioral approach.* Researchers who have adopted a perceptual approach have generally looked to develop scales to measure and assess the transformative impact of different leadership styles on followers. In this vein, advocates of *multifactor leadership* have sought to capture the nuances of transformational leadership via tools such as the multilevel leadership questionnaire (MLQ; Bass & Avolio, 1997). These recognize the importance of group dynamics and, to this end, typically seek to

capture multiple stakeholders' perceptions of leaders (e.g., through *360-degree feedback*). However, when push comes to shove, the collective dimensions of leadership tend to recede into the empirical shadows—with data from such exercises routinely being used simply to make an assessment of the extent to which a given individual is (or is not) a transformational leader.

Aware of these issues, researchers pursuing a behavioral approach have tried to uncover and understand the dynamics of transformational leadership, typically grounding their understanding of these in the charismatic character of the individual leader. The roots of this approach hark back to Weber's writings that we have already discussed and to research conducted in the 1950s by Fleishman and colleagues (Fleishman, 1953; Fleishman & Peters, 1962). The latter identified approximately 2,000 characteristics of successful leaders and ultimately distilled these down to two that appeared to be particularly predictive of leadership success—namely "consideration" and "structure initiation." Likewise, in their influential 1982 book *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies*, Waterman and Peters argued that the twin hallmarks of leader success were "bias for action" and ability to achieve "productivity through people."

These analyses are often descriptively very rich (as they were in Burns' writing). For example, Yammarino (1994) observes that:

> The transformational leader arouses heightened awareness and interests in the group or organization, increases confidence, and moves followers gradually from concerns for existence to concerns for achievement and growth . . . in short, transformational leaders develop their followers to the point where followers are able to take on leadership roles and perform beyond established standards and goals. (p. 28)

More recently too the idea that particular leaders are equipped with extraordinary capacity to transform and engender followership has been a focus for research into processes of *authentic leadership*. Authentic leaders, it is argued, have above-average capacity to foster trust, motivation, and followership, largely because they are equipped with above-average levels of self-awareness, capacity to self-reflect, responsiveness to feedback, and ability to resolve conflict in non-manipulative ways (Avolio et al, 2004; Gardner et al, 2011; Luthans & Avolio, 2003).

It is clear from this literature that leaders who are perceived by followers as transformational and authentic (constructs that have significant conceptual overlap; Banks et al., 2016) do indeed have greater capacity to engender followership. Nevertheless, a number of key questions remain unanswered in the "black box" of transformational theory. In particular, what are the actual *processes* that lead to a given leader coming to be perceived by followers as stimulating and inspirational (van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013)? What is it that transformational leaders actually transform? And what actually determines whether followers perceive their leadership as transformational?

In addressing such questions, one point that becomes clear is that rather than being transformational or authentic in the abstract (in ways that the perceptional approach would suggest), these characteristics are always subjective and in the eye of the beholder (Nye & Simonetta, 1996). In particular, followers are more likely to perceive a leader as transformational and authentic when the leader in question is perceived to be an ingroup member (Steffens et al., 2016). By way of example, Democrats generally saw the lewd comments made by Donald Trump in the lead up to the 2016 presidential election as evidence of toxic

masculinity, while Trump supporters saw them as harmless locker room banter that was evidence of Trump's authenticity (Reicher & Haslam, 2017b). Similarly, leaders' perceived authenticity fluctuates as a function of their capacity to deliver things that matter for group members (Steffens et al., 2016). For example, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson's popularity surged (to 66% in July 2020) when he successfully portrayed himself as the only leader able to "get Brexit done," but his approval rating plummeted (to 22% in January 2022) after news broke that he had hosted a series of parties during a period of strict COVID-19 lockdown (YouGov, 2022)—behavior that communicated a sense that he was not interested in following the same rules as everyone else. Again, then, we see that leadership success cannot be explained with reference to leader characteristics alone but that it needs to be understood as grounded in the relationship between the leader and their group (Funk; 1996; Kinder et al., 1980; Laustsen & Bor, 2017).

In summary, then, it is apparent that while treatments of transformational and authentic leadership have homed in on some of the important realities of the leadership experience, they nevertheless neglect the interactive dynamics that bind leaders and followers together as members of a group with a shared mission, purpose and identity. Indeed, by focusing on awe-inspiring leaders and leadership styles but leaving group processes and persuasion out of the equation, leadership research has arguably come full circle. As Conger put it, "the heroic leader has returned [. . .] and the literature is reminiscent of the 'great men' theories, but with a twist given the transformational leaders' strong orientation towards the development of others" (1999: 149). A similar problem plagues election studies, where voters are commonly construed as passive consumers of different leadership styles, and viewed as responding differentially to particular kinds of cues only as a function individual-level differences (e.g., in personality, anxiety, need). However, here too there is growing awareness that politicians read and shape public sentiments (Mols & Jetten, 2020), and that politicians and voters *influence each other* as a function of group memberships that they share to a greater or lesser extent (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Feldman et al., 2012). To fully appreciate these dynamics, we therefore need a framework which takes the collective group-level dimensions of leadership seriously. This is ultimately what the social identity approach provides, and it is to this that we now turn.

3. WHY WE NEED A NEW APPROACH

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that leadership research has come a long way over the course of the last century. In particular, we now know that it is important not only to consider context-dependence and situational fit when explaining leadership success, but also to understand followers' motivations when trying to explain leaders' capacity to inspire and mobilize. Related to this point, another literature that has generated important insights into leadership and followership is the burgeoning literature on *partisanship* (Abramson, 1979; Campbell et al., 1980; Huddy & Bankert, 2017; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Mason, Chapter 24, this volume). Thanks to this, we now know that followers of political leaders and parties are motivated by a mixture of positive ingroup feelings (positive partisan identity, PPID) and negative outgroup feelings (negative partisan identity, NPID;

Rathje et al., 2021), and that these sentiments often reinforce each other in ways that lead to affective polarization (Huddy & Yair, 2021).

This literature makes it clear that followership is a process of subjective meaning-making that is heavily structured by group dynamics. This is seen, for example, in reactions to politicians who are often simultaneously loved and loathed by different groups of people (e.g., former US President Donald Trump, the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and British Brexit campaigner Nigel Farage; Steffens et al., 2018). However, polarization of this kind will only occur once relevant social identities have been made salient, and once voters begin to self-identify as supporters of a particular party or leader (Oakes et al., 1994). Once this happens, voters are at risk of ending up in separate echo-chambers where different groups appraise leaders' actions in radically different ways (Finkel et al., 2020; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). What is more, politicians often actively encourage "othering" of outgroups, as they stand to gain electorally from whipping up resentment toward the opposing party (through negative partisanship). Importantly too, as can be seen from debate about anthropogenic climate change, leaders will invoke evidence, and present this evidence as irrefutable, even though relevant stakeholder groups typically have different views about *which* evidence should count as policy-relevant (Head, 2008).

In short, both what is perceived as "good leadership" and as valid "evidence" supporting government action are subjective and in the eye of the beholder. This point is made by Deborah Stone in her 1988 book "*Policy Paradox*," which urged evidence-based policy researchers to avoid having naïve faith in "objective evidence" and the enlightened "rationality project" (Stone, 1988). In particular, she argued that the emerging evidence-based policy literature has misplaced confidence because it fails to appreciate the fact that evidence itself is often the product of partisan group interests (Wang et al., 2021). The same is true of the leadership literature, where the valorising of leaders' authenticity and transformational potential neglects the fact that appreciation of these qualities is grounded in perceivers' group memberships (Steffens et al., 2016, 2021a).

More generally, consideration of group psychology is often conspicuously absent from traditional leadership research. This is especially true in organizational psychology, where leaders and followers are typically viewed as interacting individuals rather than as members of groups. This is less true in political psychology where there has been long-standing interest in the group, not least via research into (positive and negative) partisanship (Abramson, 1979) and affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012). Nonetheless, political psychologists still grapple with the same conceptual challenges as their organizational counterparts. Like followers of the Frankfurt School before them, many continue to ignore social context and to present individualistic accounts of partisan followership which see this as the coming together of voters who share personality traits which lead them to be attracted to particular kinds of messages or rhetoric (e.g., Luttig, 2018). And rather than examine how politicians actively shape voters' perceptions about societal issues, studies typically explain (positive and negative) partisanship and affective polarization with reference to individual differences and hard-wired propensities that voters are believed to enact unthinkingly (for a more nuanced view of leader-follower influence on foreign policy, see Kertzer, Chapter 13, this volume).

As Durkheim (1912 [1995]) observed in his work on "collective effervescence," what these individual-difference explanations overlook is the fact that followers' behavior is often

guided by a distinct "group mindset." As Gestalt psychologists observed, here the group is *more* than the sum of its parts, and hence group attitudes cannot be understood as the mere aggregation of personal motivations or propensities (Asch, 1952; Turner, 1991). The neglect of group-level dynamics is also an important reason why research is often observed to have limited ecological validity (e.g., Agassi, 1960, Mols & 't Hart, 2017).

Given the ongoing appeal of individualistic metatheory (e.g., as noted by Lynch & Kalaitazake, 2020; Steiner, 1974), the need to advance an alternative perspective that recognizes the unique psychological dimensions of collective behavior remains a pressing challenge for leadership research and for political psychology more generally. At a general level this is a challenge that has been met by social identity approach in social psychology (SIT, Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1979; Turner & Oakes, 1986; Turner, 1991) as well new-institutionalism theorizing in political science (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Olsen, 1983). Accordingly, in what follows, we seek to show how insights from a social identity approach can be used to develop a non-reductionist, integrative theory of political leadership.

4. The Social Identity Approach to Political Leadership

As the forgoing reviews makes clear, previous leadership research has generated a wealth of perspectives both about what effective leadership entails and what it "looks like." What remains poorly understood, though, are the psychological *processes* that enable leaders to exert transformational influence over the groups they lead (Burns, 1978), and the *conditions under which* transformation can occur. In this regard, a distinctive feature of social identity theorizing is its emphasis on the importance of social groups for people's sense of self, and hence for both social perception and social influence (Turner, 1991). In particular, self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987, 1994) argues that the influence process that is central to leadership is grounded in perceivers' sense that they share social identity (a sense of "us-ness") with the leader. Rather than viewing groups as distorting individual group members' perceptions of themselves and the world or as a basis for individuals to lose their identity and morality (Le Bon, 1896; Zimbardo et al, 1971), the social identity approach instead views groups as strengthening individuals' sense of connectedness, and as helping them to make sense of the social world *collectively* and to develop *shared* group goals (Turner et al., 1987). Moreover, from a social identity perspective, leaders are able to exert influence through followers precisely as a function of their capacity to transform followers' self-understanding so that this is informed by a sense of shared social identity— so that leaders and followers define themselves not as "me" but as "us," and then strive to advance that sense of "us-ness" in the world.

Accordingly, transformation is seen in the social identity tradition as arising from the internalization of new norms, attitudes, and values into group members' shared self-understanding, such that these new norms, attitudes, and values come to be internalized into followers' self-concept, and seen as "what we are about" and "what we want to do." In these terms, political leadership (and social influence more generally) is seen as centering

on power *through* people, and as contingent on a leader's capacity to transform followers' shared self-understanding through processes of *identity leadership* (Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014; van Dick et al., 2018). However, the capacity for a leader to transform followers' shared self-understanding in this way depends on the leader in question being seen by followers as someone who is representative of the group as a whole, who is acting in its interests (i.e., as "one of us" rather than "one of them"), and who is effective in bringing group interests to fruition (i.e., "making us matter").

Seeing political leadership in this way alerts us to two important facets of the leadership process. First, we can see that "trust in fellow group members" is both the reason why individuals gravitate to certain groups and the *consequence* of perceiving shared group membership (Reicher et al., 2005; Platow et al., 2012). Second, we see that groups are eager to develop a *shared understanding* of "who we are" and "what we are about," and that leaders play an important role in reaching consensus about how to answer these questions. Critically, it is this social identity-based sense of shared self-understanding that is absent from traditional understandings of groups that see them only as clusters of individuals attracted to each other through an exchange relationship or as clusters of individuals under the hypnotic spell of a charismatic leader (Hogg, 1992; for a discussion of related elite influence models of public opinion, see Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume).

That said, there are without doubt clusters of individuals that cooperate in a purely transactional way, without developing a shared social identity (Reynolds & Platow, 2003). However, as social identity researchers have shown in experiments which pit alternative explanations against each other, shared social identification proves to be a more powerful predictor of group cohesion and cooperation between group members than attraction or resource exchange (Haslam et al., 1997; Hogg, 1992). Other studies that have examined the role of shared social identity in social and organizational life also confirm that those who perceive themselves as sharing group membership in a given context are more likely to respect (Platow et al., 2013), trust (Platow et al., 2012), believe (Wang et al., 2021), and help (Platow et al., 1999) one another (Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Reicher & Levine, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2009). Indeed, as Van Bavel and Pereira (2018) explain, this is why enthusiastic followers of political parties and their leaders are often immune to countervailing evidence presented by non-ingroup sources.

As noted above, the social identity approach to (political) leadership centers on the observation that social influence is grounded in shared social identification and associated sense of "we-ness" (Turner, 1991). This means that people are influenced by others to the extent that they are perceived to be members of a psychological ingroup ("us"). This, indeed, is why politicians go to great lengths to try to convince perceivers that they are representative of the group they are seeking to lead—whether it be their constituency, party, or country.

In line with this point, there is now a large body of research evidence that shows that shared identity is the key that unlocks social influence. For example, experimental studies show that messages are more persuasive when they are perceived as emanating from an ingroup rather than an outgroup member (e.g., Cruwys et al., 2012; Grace et al., 2008; Haslam et al., 1999; Mackie et al., 1990; McGarty et al., 1994; Oldmeadow et al., 2003; Platow et al., 2005, 2007). Likewise, analysis of speeches by Prime Ministerial candidates in Australian Federal elections found that successful candidates used the pronouns "*we*" and "*us*" much more frequently in their speeches than their unsuccessful counterparts (once every 79 words vs. once every 136 words; Steffens & Haslam, 2013). The conclusion that leaders" success arises

from their capacity to speak (and be perceived to speak) on behalf of the group whose members they are seeking to influence and mobilize has also been corroborated in experimental research with the power to address issues of causality (e.g., Steffens et al., 2014). Among other things, these studies provide empirical affirmation of Adair's (2011) observation that the most useful word in a political leader's vocabulary is "we," and the least useful word is "I." At the same time too, other research shows that leaders who *lack* shared social identification with followers are more likely to resort to "sticks and carrots" techniques to secure power *over* them (Reynolds & Platow, 2003; Steffens et al., 2018).

Two important lessons emerge from this growing body of leadership research. First, it is clear that for aspiring leaders to be accepted they have to be perceived by followers not only as a fellow ingroup-member (i.e., "one of us"), but also as a model group member. That is, they need to be seen as *prototypical* of the group so that they are understood to embody what "we" are about (Hogg, 2001; Steffens et al., 2021b; Turner & Haslam, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2011; after Rosch, 1978). In other words, it is not enough to be perceived as typical, but necessary to be viewed as extraordinarily typical (i.e., prototypical). Second, it is clear that rather than prototypicality being a given, influential leaders are creative *identity entrepreneurs* who (re)define followers' shared self-understanding in terms of shared social identity and who are able to portray their political project(s) as epitomizing "what we are all about" (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000).

These are arguments that we unpack in more detail in the sections that follow. We do this by zeroing in on four key ways in which social identity is critical to political leadership. As we will see, these involve not only identity prototypicality and identity entrepreneurship but also *identity advancement* and *identity impresarioship*. A critical point here is that ultimately leadership is about "walking the walk" of identity leadership not just "talking the talk." So as well as representing and creating a sense of "us," this involves advancing group interests and creating identity-embedding structures.

5. Identity Prototypicality: Being "One of Us"

As we intimated above, a key ingredient of effective leadership is perceived prototypicality. This means that an aspiring leader will have more potential for influence the more representative they are seen to be of the group they are seeking to lead. This principle is derived from self-categorization theory's argument (a) that social identity provides a basis for social influence by providing a platform for a sense of shared understanding of the world, but (b) that people differ in the degree to which they are seen to exemplify a given social identity (Turner, 1991).

This insight runs counter to earlier research which argued that leaders' influence derives from fixed abstract leader characteristics, such as intelligence (Judge et al., 2004; Lord et al., 1986), fairness (Michener & Lawler, 1975), and charisma (Bono & Judge, 2004), or even height (Judge & Cable, 2004). As noted above, leader characteristics such as these can matter for leader *role* performance. However, we contend that such characteristics are generally perceived through the lens of group membership. In line with this point, there is

evidence that in-group prototypicality affects how followers evaluate would-be leaders on these various dimensions—such that the more a leader is perceived to be "one of us," the more intelligent, fair, charismatic, and even tall, they are seen to be (for a review, see Haslam et al., 2020). Such findings suggest that rather than being *inputs* into the leadership process, these various qualities are often *outputs*, and the outcome of shared psychological group membership (Platow et al., 2015).

The claim that perceived prototypicality takes precedence over abstract leader characteristics is supported by a growing body of empirical evidence. In particular, evidence shows that leaders' capacity for influence derives in large measure from their status as ingroup-prototypes (McGarty et al., 1992; Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003), and that perceived prototypicality predicts followership more reliably than perceived leader characteristics (Steffens et al., 2015), particularly as the group becomes more important to respondents (Hains et al., 1997). Evidence also confirms that perceived prototypicality enhances trust in leaders (Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008), perceived leader fairness (van Dijke & de Cremer, 2008), and perceived leader charisma (Platow et al., 2006).

A number of additional points are important to bear in mind in relation to perceived prototypicality. First, we noted earlier that a central feature of the leadership process is leaders' ability to lead their group in new directions. Here, though, leaders need to be careful not to go out on a limb. Before they can drive change (and secure what Hollander, 1958, referred to as "idiosyncrasy credit"), they first have to earn followers' trust by showing how their proposals align with existing group norms (Abrams et al., 2008). In the context of seeking to innovate, leaders will therefore often (need to) go to great lengths to highlight their ingroup prototypicality. For example, in the context of pursuing a radical right-wing agenda, the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, was careful to hide his Indonesian heritage (e.g., by bleaching his hair; Van Leeuwen, 2009).

Yet by the same logic, politicians can also undermine their ability to secure followership and compliance with their directives if they act in ways that communicate their departure from group norms. For example, in 2021 the British Health Secretary Matt Hancock was forced to resign after he was found to have broken his own COVID-19 rules during a strict lockdown while pursuing an extra-marital affair. Likewise, as we have already observed, Prime Minister Johnson's popularity plummeted when he was discovered to have attended a number of parties in his Downing Street office in clear violation of COVID-19 health directives (for a review, see Haslam et al., 2021). Such examples speak to the point that leaders' influence will typically dissipate if they are seen to behave in a way that sets them apart from their group (e.g., so that there appears to be different rules for "them" and for "us"). Social identity theorists have also confirmed this effect empirically, with results of experiments showing that perceived prototypicality affects not only followers' willingness to support leaders' proposals for change, but also the extent to which a leader is able to pursue a change agenda without losing support (Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001).

Would-be leaders can also gain or lose prototypicality inadvertently as a result of changing circumstances. For example, before the 2003 US-led war on Iraq, US newspapers described the hawkish US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as an extinguished volcano, but once war had been declared he emerged as one of the most prominent leaders in President Bush's administration. This speaks to the fact that intergroup conflict typically serves to bolster the prototypicality of leaders who seek to define themselves in opposition to relevant outgroups (e.g., by supporting war; Rabbie & Bekkers, 1978). Such examples also make the point that

changes in context (e.g., from peace to war) often change the relative salience of a particular categories and particular category exemplars (e.g., so that in the case of a war, party affiliation will become less salient than national affiliation), and this will often change perceivers' appraisal of which leader is best able to represent and protect the group's interests (Turner & Haslam, 2001). Importantly, such changes cannot be explained with recourse to personality, but instead require an analysis that accounts for political leaders' capacity to benefit from enemyship (Engels, 2010).

But in this context it is important too to acknowledge that leaders generally do not just sit around and wait for their prototypicality to become apparent to followers. Rather, they go to considerable lengths to *make* this apparent. For example, former Polish President Lech Wałęsa—who began his working life as shipping yard electrician before becoming Poland's most famous trade union leader—was always careful to ensure voters remembered he was a working-class hero (e.g., stating in 1970 that "I worked here [in the shipyard] for ten years and I still feel I'm a shipyard worker"; Stokes, 1993: 35). In very different ways, former US President Donald Trump was also able to persuade a large number of voters that he was "one of us" through his advocacy for "ordinary Americans" (e.g., when shouting "I am your voice" during mass rallies; Reicher & Haslam, 2017b). Thus he pronounced:

> My Dad, Fred Trump, was the smartest and hardest working man I ever knew. [. . .] It's because of him that I learned, from my youngest age, to respect the dignity of work and the dignity of working people. He was a guy most comfortable in the company of bricklayers, carpenters, and electricians and I have a lot of that in me also. (RNC, July 21, 2016)

Critically too, Trump also sought to make a case for his own prototypicality (and thus leadership) by seeking to undermine the perceived prototypicality (for ordinary American working families) of his Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton. This was something he did by casting her as representative of the country's corrupt elite (Maskor et al., 2020):

> Big business, elite media and major donors are lining up behind the campaign of my opponent because they know she will keep our rigged system in place. They are throwing money at her because they have total control over everything she does. She is their puppet, and they pull the strings. That's why Hillary Clinton's message is that things will never change.

More generally, Trump's success in the 2016 election speaks to the fact that leadership is never about the possession of some set pre-defined leadership qualities. Indeed, exit polls suggested that on every measure of character and suitability for the presidency, Clinton had a clear lead over Trump. She was seen as better qualified (53 vs. 37%), as having the right personality and temperament (56 vs. 34%), as being less dishonest (59 vs. 65 percent), and as being less unpopular (54 vs. 61%; Reicher & Haslam, 2017a). The fact that Clinton received a majority of all votes suggests that these evaluations matter. However, ultimately the bid for the White House was won, not by the leader who was perceived to possess the right traits, but by the leader with the most enthusiastic following, who was capable of swaying the vote in their favor in key swing states. In this way, leadership rests not on a leader being "good" in the abstract but on them being seen to be mobilizing their qualities in the service of an ingroup. As one Trump supporter (Republican Duncan L. Hunter) put it: "He may be an asshole, but he's *our* asshole" (cited in Reicher & Haslam, 2017b; see also Steffens et al., 2021a).

6. Identity Advancement: Doing It for "Us"

Yet while it is important for leaders to be seen as "one of us," this alone is not sufficient for them to secure the support of followers. In particular, this is because they also have to champion ingroup goals. In other words, they also have to be seen to be "doing it for us." Early leadership research informed by the perceptual approach argued that humans have implicit views about what good leaders look like (e.g., confident, self-aware, considerate), and hence that a leader who fits this preconceived image will have greater capacity to engender followership (Kenny et al., 1994; Lord et al., 2020). As we noted earlier, one of the leader characteristics that has been a particular focus for research attention is fairness. But what does fairness look like—especially for followers? As we will see, answering this question proves complex, but the key point is that this is a quality that followers always appraise through the lens of a salient group membership.

One point to note is that perceptions of leader fairness vary depending on which criteria these are evaluated against. One important distinction here is between distributive justice (i.e., a belief that resources have been allocated fairly) and procedural justice (i.e., belief that a decision-making process is fair and transparent). Research by Tyler and colleagues supports the general claim that when these two variables are pitted against each other, it is perceived *procedural* justice that most reliably predicts leader endorsement, followership, and norm compliance (Tyler et al., 1985). Moreover, this work moves beyond the general claim that perceived leader fairness is essential for maintaining group cohesion (Cartwright & Zander, 1960), by showing that a leader can "win over" followers by acknowledging and respecting *group*-level preferences and concerns. In particular, it appears that followers are more likely to forego short-term gains for the benefit of the community as a whole if they feel their views are acknowledged and respected (Platow et al., 1998; Platow, Brewer & Eggins, 2008; Platow et al., 2013; Tyler & Degoey, 1995).

Tyler and colleagues' work also underlines the point that conceptions of fairness are always bound up with moral communities and that members of these communities (who tend to view the world in us–them terms; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) will often apply different fairness standards, depending on whether the situation involves in- or outgroup members. For example, people are often quick to condemn an outgroup leader who trespasses, but remarkably forgiving when it is "our leader" who is in the wrong (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). At times, followers will even change their moral stance when it transpires that their leader has behaved in a way that they had condemned previously. This can be seen, for example, when one looks at responses to NPPR/Brookings polls which ask survey participants in the United States whether an elected official who commits an immoral act in their private life can still behave ethically and fulfil their duties in their public and professional life. In 2011 30% of White Evangelical Protestants believed this to be possible, but by 2016—when the scandal-prone Donald Trump was running for office (Graham, 2017)—this number had risen to 72%. Examples like these show that values and moral commandments are not set in stone but negotiated to suit identity-based interests.

Theory-based experimental studies also provide more specific insight into the *conditions under which* followers endorse fair or unfair leaders (e.g., Platow et al., 1997). In an early study of this form, participants in New Zealand were asked to evaluate a fictitious CEO of a

local health authority responsible for allocating a scarce resource (time on a kidney dialysis machine) to two patients. In one condition the two patients were described as two life-long New Zealanders, and in a second condition one patient was said to be a life-long New Zealander and the other a recent immigrant. The results showed that participants valued fairness (even-handedness) when dealing with two ingroup members, but ingroup-favoring *unfairness* when resources had to be split between the ingroup and outgroup member. Here, then, people's appetite for fairness was clearly bounded by concern for the ingroup.

In an extension of this research, Haslam and Platow (2001, Experiment 2) introduced participants to a student leader who, in the past, had either been even-handed in their support for an ingroup and an outgroup or identity-affirming in favoring the ingroup over an outgroup. They were then and asked to write down arguments to support of this leader's proposal to install new billboard sites around campus. Participants who were told the proposal had emanated from the identity-affirming leader generated more than twice as many arguments as participants who thought that it was the argument of an even-handed leader. Again, then, while in the abstract people will generally profess to have an appetite for fairness, their willingness to put their shoulders to the wheel in order to enact a leader's vision will be tempered by their confidence in that leader's willingness to be *unfair* in ways that advance the interests of the group.

In sum, then, it is neither fairness or unfairness per se that enhance a leader's appeal and their capacity to bring about societal change. Rather, what matters is whether the leader is perceived as having group interests at heart. In the Netherlands, for example, former Prime Minister Wim Kok benefitted from his track record as an outspoken Union leader who stood up for workers' rights in his successful bid to become leader of the Labour Party (PvdA). This was also the case during his time as prime minister, when his credentials helped him to persuade Dutch workers and Trade Unions that it was in their best interest to accept wage restraint (as outlined in the, 1982, *Akkoord van Wassenaar*). Likewise, in Israel support for Ariel Sharon's pursuit of the 2005 peace process which led to the withdrawal of troops from Gaza was predicated on his history as a former military leader (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008).

Yet while leaders' pursuit of group interests is an essential feature of their appeal, as these examples illustrate, there is nevertheless considerable variation in precisely how they do this. This is because much depends on the nature of the group in question and, in particular, the norms of the group and what it is that defines group interest (e.g., material vs. moral advance). Among other things, this means that leaders *can* advance group interests by being even-handed in their dealings with outgroups—but this is most likely to appeal to their followers when they have come to value even-handedness and to see it a source of positive distinctive-ness for the group (see Haslam et al., 2011). Accordingly, if a leader wants to be fair, one of their first challenges is to help create a community that will appreciate this (Platow et al., 2008).

7. Identity Entrepreneurship: Crafting a Sense of "Us"

Thus far we have argued that for leaders to gain influence, they need to be perceived as representative of a shared ingroup identity ("being one of us") and as champions of group goals ("doing it for us"). In this section, we take a closer look at the ways in which leaders

actually harness social identities for their political causes in practice. Here we propose that leaders gain influence through people (Turner, 2005) by redefining followers' collective self-understanding in such a way that the leaders' political projects come to be viewed as concrete manifestations of the group's beliefs and values. Rather than viewing leaders simply as social identity *interpreters*, we argue that influential leaders also need to be *identity entrepreneurs*, whose influence derives from their creative ability to redefine followers' shared self-understanding, to portray themselves as quintessential group members, and to frame their projects as epitomizing what the group is all about (Haslam et al., 2020; Reicher & Hopkins, 2000; Reicher et al., 2005).

A good example of this process is Lincoln's Gettysburg address, in which he presented his emancipation policy as nothing more than an expression of the values on which America was founded. Another good example is Martin Luther-King's "I have a dream" speech, in which he appealed to the spirit of the Gettysburg Address and argued in a similar vein that the Civil Rights movement was nothing but the realization of American values and identity. As these examples illustrate, politicians who succeed in bringing about landmark societal change generally understand that transforming society goes hand in hand with a transformation in citizens' collective self-understanding (i.e., their shared social identity).

Identity entrepreneurship is a craft which leaders can acquire and hone. Leaders who master this skill will find it easier to navigate what can be understood as a core leadership paradox—that followers want their leaders to be exceptional, yet they also want their leaders to be of them, like them, and not to stand above them (i.e., they want them to be prototypical not just typical). The way in which effective identity entrepreneurs satisfy both needs simultaneously (and resolve the apparent paradox) is by being exceptional in their representativeness of the group (Steffens et al., 2013). In other words, it is by becoming viewed as exceptionally prototypical that leaders gain influence *through* followers (see also Sewell et al., 2021). What is more, identity entrepreneurship involves a double labor. On the one hand, considerable effort is taken to craft a new narrative and a new self-definition, but on the other hand, these efforts have to be hidden so that the leader's account of identity becomes viewed as obvious, natural, and effortless, rather than as artificially constructed and cultivated (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000).

As the following extract from a speech by Belgian radical right-wing politician Filip Dewinter illustrates, leaders of nativist anti-immigration movements are often skillful identity entrepreneurs, who create and tap into a sense of threatened social identity by portraying the group they seek to lead (e.g., the nation) as under attack, and requiring a strong leader to restore order (Reicher et al., 2008; Crimston et al, 2021):

> We are experiencing a third Islam invasion. The first one occurred in 8th Century Spain and the second came from the East. Each time brave Europeans stopped the invasion, first in Poitiers in 732, then in Vienna in 1683. Islam is a religion that wants to conquer the entire globe, and historically, Europe has always been its enemy. [. . .] Multiculturalism is the Trojan horse Islam uses to conquer Europe. Comrades, the time has come to show character. We have to end this immigration invasion, defend the superiority of our civilization, stop the Islamization of Europe, and give back Europe to the Europeans. (cited in Mols & Jetten, 2014)

Speaking to the generality of such rhetorical constructions, a similar apparent was seen in Donald Trump's address to the crowd on January 6th 2021 in Washington DC, which set the scene for their subsequent assault on the Capitol building (Haslam et al., 2022):

> Our fight against the big donors, big media, big tech, and others is just getting started. This is the greatest in history. There's never been a movement like that. . . . We must stop the steal and then we must ensure that such outrageous election fraud never happens again, can never be allowed to happen again. But we're going forward. We'll take care of going forward. (Naylor, 2021)

However, leaders do not have infinite room to reinterpret social identities and social reality. Rather, they have limited degrees of freedom to reinterpret social identities, and skillful identity entrepreneurs need to be sensitive to how far they can stretch reality and reinterpret the group's shared self-understanding. Successful attempts to redefine followers' shared self-understanding will typically result in norm change (a rethinking of "what we *really* are about"), and hence identity entrepreneurship is as much about redefining "who we are" ("being") as it is about articulating "where we are heading" ("becoming"). What also matters is the degree of contestation in any given context, and whether there are other identity entrepreneurs offering competing versions of "who we are" and "what we are about" (Haslam et al., 2020). For example, in the lead-up to the 2016 US presidential elections, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton both tried to gain the upper hand by destabilizing opponents' claims to represent and advance group interests. Whereas Clinton sought to turn female voters against Trump by drawing attention to his derogatory comments about women, Trump's strategy was to turn voters against Clinton by portraying her as representative of a self-serving elite (Maskor et al., 2021).

In this context, it is also clear that politicians can sometimes underestimate the importance of social identity management—or at least be caught off guard. For example, the former Labour leader Michael Foot struggled to win popular support with UK voters after being falsely accused by right-wing commentators of wearing informal attire (a donkey jacket) at a Remembrance Day ceremony—something they characterized as disrespectful to the war dead and their families (Haslam et al., 2011). At the same time, there are also many leaders who have fully understood, and fully capitalized on, the importance of representing "us." For example, former US President George W. Bush became renowned for his incoherent language and expressions (so-called *Bushisms*), wearing jeans and cowboy hats, and his taste for steaks and Budweiser beer, and, while in various ways these may all have been "unpresidential," they nevertheless helped him to be widely regarded as an "all-American guy" (Weisburg, 2004). And while a range of factors had a negative impact on his approval ratings (notably the prolonged war in Iraq and questions around his evasion of the draft for service in the Vietnam war; Lardner & Romano, 1999), this cultivated image served him well with the electorate. By way of a more recent example, the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been suspected of deliberately messing up his hair before interviews, in an effort to come across as an atypical politician, and to conceal his privileged upbringing (Flinders, 2020). Likewise, former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison routinely played up his image as an "ordinary bloke from the shire" by attending rugby games and by showcasing his barbeque skills (Gauja et al., 2020).

Examples like these make the point that identity entrepreneurship involves not just rhetoric, but a wide range of performances that a leader can engage in—including their speech, dress, hairstyle, and leisure activity. What is more, identity entrepreneurs are often able to turn apparent disadvantages into advantages. For example, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt was unable to stand up for long periods of time (after suffering from what at the time was believed to be polio), but he used this to his advantage by drawing parallels

between his *personal* ability to overcome adversity and his ability to lead the nation through the Great Depression (DiNunzio, 2014: 82).

Speaking to the fact that these various acts of identity entrepreneurship are rarely accidental, there is plenty of evidence that politicians are explicitly instructed by campaign advisors to play up their prototypicality. For example, in a 1984 memo, Assistant White House Chief of Staff Richard Darman outlined Ronald Reagan's rhetorical strategy, stating:

> Paint Ronald Reagan as the personification of all that is right with or heroized by America. Leave Mondale in a position where an attack on Reagan is an attack on America's idealized image of itself. (cited in Erickson, 1985: 100)

Likewise, in a memo outlining Hillary Clinton's strategy to beat her rival Barack Obama in the 2008 Democratic Primaries, Chief Strategist Mark Penn underscored the importance not only of playing-up Clinton's prototypicality but also of undermining Obama's:

> His roots to basic American values and culture are at best limited . . . Let's explicitly own "American" in our programs, the speeches and the values. He doesn't. (McVeigh, Dinsman, Choi-Fitzpatrick & Trivedi, 2011: 52)

What such examples show is that seasoned politicians and campaign advisors understand very well that elections are in many ways a contest about creating alignment between the self and the group, and that in order to secure voter support leaders must find a way to persuade them that they are a quintessential member of the group they seek to represent. For example, on his path to the White House, Donald Trump regularly portrayed "winning" as quintessentially American, but as something that his opponents had lost the ability to do, and in this way his personal achievements could be seen as epitomizing the fulfilment of the American Dream:

> Folks, we don't win anymore. Right? We don't win anymore. We don't win! We don't win on anything. We don't win on trade. We don't win with the military. (cited in Shabad, 2016)

> I have made billions of dollars in business making deals—now I'm going to make our country rich again. . . . Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it. . . . I am your voice. (cited in Plumer, 2016)

These various examples speak too to the fact that leaders are generally skillful storytellers (Gardner, 1996)—who tell stories about themselves in relation to the group not just with their words, but with their dress, their appearance, their choice of food, and much else besides. In this way, the stories they tell help to signal the social identity they share with their audience and follow a distinct pattern. For a start, leaders appeal strategically to social identities that seem make sense and are fitting in the context at hand—notably in being defined at an appropriate level of abstraction (Turner et al., 1987). For example, politicians looking to secure support for international development aid will often appeal to shared humanity, while those opposing such aid will typically appeal more narrowly to national interests and people's sense of belonging to the nation. At the same time, identity entrepreneurs typically also look to (re)define the *meaning* of relevant social identities (e.g., what it means to be Scottish, British, Québécois, Canadian), and do this in such a way that the new self-understanding can be leveraged in pursuit of their political projects (e.g., by framing their policy proposals

as naturally aligned with the nation's spirit, values, and aspirations; Reicher & Hopkins, 2000). Thus when President Obama signed his health care act into legislation, he made the case for this by observing that:

> The [Affordable Health Care] bill I'm signing will set in motion reforms that generations of Americans have fought for and marched for and hungered to see. [. . .] That our generation is able to succeed in passing this reform is a testament to the persistence and the character of the American people, who championed this cause, who mobilized, who organized, who believed that people who love this country can change it. (Harris & Bailey, 2014: 253)

Importantly too, identity entrepreneurship often takes the form of efforts to redraw category boundaries so as either to expand the ingroup circle (by including previously excluded groups), or by reducing it (by excluding previously included groups). Indeed, in the world at large there is often competition between leaders with opposing views about whether to expand or contract the ingroup circle. An extreme example is seen in Hitler's redefinition of German nationhood ("Volk") as anchored in an ethnic bond so as to exclude Jews from the category "fellow Germans" and thereby pave the way for the Holocaust (Reicher et al., 2008). Yet at the same time Bulgarian leaders explicitly rejected the characterization of Jews as "other" (seeing Bulgarian Jews primarily as Bulgarians) in ways that protected them from harm (Reicher et al., 2006). This example underscores the broader point that identity entrepreneurs create constituencies by making the case for categorizing society in particular ways, and that those constituencies are then the platform not only for mobilization and collective action but also for their own leadership (Haslam et al., 2020).

8. Identity Impresarioship: Making "Us" Matter

Leaders may succeed in becoming viewed as "one of us" and "doing it for us," and draw on skills of identity entrepreneurship to encourage followers to view them as providing leadership that helps the group in the pursuit of becoming who we are meant to become. However, to have *enduring* impact on society and the way it is organized, they have to work hard to ensure that the norms, values, and beliefs associated with shared self-understandings become concretized and embedded within societal institutions and social practice. Without this, a leader risks being seen as "all talk but no action," and their vision is likely to be viewed as little more than pie in the sky.

History provides many examples of leaders who understood the importance of concretizing and embedding shared social identity in structures and institutions. The Apostle Paul, for example, succeeded in building the Christian community through his vigorous promotion of rituals and practices that brought diverse communities together and allowed them to live out a shared religion. As theologians have argued, the major practical feat of Paul's leadership was to establish congregations within which he institutionalized a number of key rites, ceremonies, and practices (notably baptism and the Lord's supper, "the two main rituals of early Christianity"; Horrell, 2005: 129–130; see also Esler, 2003). As Horrell (2005: 110) observes:

> The key social achievement of these community-forming actions [consisted] in the bringing together of many people into one body, the construction of a new form of corporate solidarity. Both rituals, baptism and the Lord's supper . . . communicate and reinforce a world-view in which the death and resurrection of Christ are the central event in a cosmic story—these events give meaning to the world, providing a fundamental hermeneutical orientation by which it is to be understood—and at the same time convey as the central theme of the Christian ethos the notion of a solidarity in Christ that transcends former distinctions.

More generally, this is the function of such things as political rallies, conferences and demonstrations that serve to bring people together and *enact* valued identities (see Haslam et al., 2020).

Importantly, identity impresarioship can be used to advance both benign and pernicious projects. Hitler, for example, understood that for Germans to embrace the shared self-understanding that he and his fellow fascists were looking to promote, it was necessary to engineer systems that enabled Germans to become active participants in the newly crafted national spirit. This was seen most potently in his appropriation of the Olympic movement in the staging of the 1936 "Nazi Olympics" in Berlin (Mandell, 2000; Reicher, 2020). On the one hand, these were an instantiation of Goebbels' idea that "German sport has only one task: to strengthen the character of the German people, imbuing it with the fighting spirit and steadfast camaraderie necessary in the struggle for its existence" (cited in Rippon, 2006: 17). On the other hand, they were embraced as a global marketing exercise for the Nazi project, intended to bear testimony to the toughness of the German Volk and the vaunted superiority of Aryan ideals of racial purity that culminated in a crescendo of "emotional-patriotic impact" (Mandell, 2000: 199). Likewise, elsewhere Hitler not only promoted the production of movies that celebrated the Nazi cause (notably in Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*, which portrayed him as descending from the heavens to lead a unified German nation), but also orchestrated massive rallies (notably in Nuremberg) that were choreographed so as to equate Hitler, the individual, with Germany, the category (Kershaw, 2001).

More generally, politicians are well aware of the importance of putting in place systems and structures that help to embed new shared self-understandings. In the United States, for example, considerable thought is put into the decoration of the Oval Office at the start of a new presidency (Brooks, 2011). Which previous presidents' portraits should hang on the walls? Which symbols should be on display? What should be on the presidents' desk? Similarly, the backdrop to leaders' press conferences is often finely tuned to create precisely the right impression—with thought given to the composition of the audience, the flags, the slogans, the entrance music (Allegretti, 2021; Mandell & Martin, 2016).

On a larger scale the same identity-embedding objectives are achieved by erecting new monuments, initiating new commemorations, and inventing new rituals. Here, though, rather than engineering new self-understandings from scratch, leaders often treat existing understandings as "raw materials" that they can appropriate for new shared self-understandings. Indeed, leaders typically know their vision of "where we as a group are heading to" will be more persuasive if it is presented as aligned with, and seen to be a natural expression of, "where we as a group came from." For example, Obama alluded to the motto "E pluribus unum" (out of many, one) written on all US currency, to invite Americans had unite under his leadership, thus appropriating America's past for his vision of its future (Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012). Indeed, this is a key reason why commemorations and

FIGURE 22.1 The four components of identity leadership that are integrated within the social identity approach to (political) leadership (after Haslam et al., 2020)

celebrations of history (e.g., on Remembrance Day, on Labor Day) are often a critical site for leaders to engineer new visions of "our future"—visions of which they are prototypical.

A case in point here are museum displays and celebratory events and texts designed to immerse observers in history and give them a particular experience of it. It is telling, for example, that on the road to high office, presidents and prime ministers typically set out their vision in a heavily-marketed book that seeks to establish their identity credentials (e.g., Nelson Mandela's *Long Road to Freedom*; Barack Obama's *Dreams from my Father*; Donald Trump's *Art of the Deal*; Boris Johnson's *The Churchill Factor*). Critically, such activities inform prospective followers about "who we are," what we should learn from the past, and accordingly what vision of the future we should endorse (e.g., one of peaceful cooperation or aggressive competition) (Figure 22.1). However, in the process they also set up the leader as the person who can deliver against that agenda by providing *identity continuity* between who we have been in the past, who we are now, and who we will be in the future (Haslam et al., 2021; Reicher, 2004).

9. CONCLUSION

We began this chapter with a critique of the heroic approach to leadership which conceives of leaders as exceptional individuals who are understood to possess an exceptional personality

and character that sets them apart from ordinary mortals. We then reviewed more contemporary leadership approaches that have been developed in social and organizational psychology and that seek to account for the context-dependence of leadership success and the subjectivity of perceived charisma. Significantly, these approaches generally recognize the importance of followership as a necessary accompaniment to leadership. Nevertheless, by construing this as the natural consequence of exposure to leaders with particular traits and styles, and hence seeing leaders' individual differences as the key reason why followers support them, these approaches sidestep the question of how leaders change in response to group circumstances, how people (voters) are *converted* into actively engaged followers (partisans), and hence how leaders and followers *co-produce* social and political change. Some of these ideas are captured in descriptions of transformational leadership, but the extant theory around this is mute as to how exactly this process works.

Another issue consistently sidestepped is that of *identity-based* subjectivity. For example, in research on authentic leadership (Avolio et al., 2004; Avolio & Gardner, 2005), followership is viewed as the product of leaders' capacity to be truthful to their inner self, but this neglects the fact that leader authenticity is perceived subjectively through the lens of shared (or non-shared) social identity (Steffens et al., 2016). Critically, then, as we have seen, it is social identity that ultimately binds leaders and followers together and that structures followers' experience of authenticity and other aspects of the leadership process (e.g., intelligence, morality, vision, fairness; Haslam et al., 2020).

Research into partisanship and affective polarization grapples with exactly the same issues. As authors commenting on the methodological individualism that pervades this literature have noted (Agassi, 1960; Mols & 't Hart, 2017), what is lost through a focus on individual differences are the *group processes* that shape group members' perceptions (Huici et al., 1997; Mols et al., 2009; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). In our view, then, the importance of social identity for all aspects of the leadership process is hard to overstate.

Although it has been a long time coming, there is evidence that this point is increasingly being recognized in various branches of political science. First, there is widespread consensus (a) that partisan polarization is an increasing relevant feature of Western democracies (McCarty et al., 2006), (b) that voters can be motivated by positive and negative partisanship (Caruana et al., 2015; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016), and, more importantly, (c) that this partisanship revolves around social identity rather than rational policy preferences (Campbell et al., 1980; Greene, 1999; Huddy et al., 2015; West & Iyengar, 2020). Second, there is growing recognition that elites and mass publics influence ("cue") each other (Feldman et al., 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Mols & Jetten, 2020), and that it is important to take group identities and their influence into account when seeking to understand the effects of framing messages and cultivated public sentiments (Mols, 2012). In practical terms, this means that political psychologists gauging voter attitudes have to come to grips not only with issues of geographical multilevel modelling (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002), but also with the fact that humans have multiple nested social identities to which politicians appeal. These, though, can easily be overlooked if research design is not attuned to these dimensions of the political process (Huici et al., 1997; Mols et al., 2009).

The new psychology of political leadership that is advanced in this chapter differs fundamentally from individualist approaches that have dominated and dogged the field to date in seeing the psychology of effective leadership as grounded in the social identity that a leader builds and advances with followers, rather than in his or her identity as an individual.

Moving beyond the idea that it is leaders' or followers' personality that is the key driver of effective leadership and group advancement, this approach helps us to appreciate that these things are always a matter of effective social identity management (Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014). In these terms, while the political scientist Harold Lasswell may have been correct to assert that politics is about "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell, 1958), we would argue that when it comes to political leadership these things all hinge on the social identities that define the "who" of this formulation. Ultimately, then, it is typically the political leader with the most persuasive social identity narrative about "who we are" who wins the hearts and minds of voters, and who thereby gains control over who gets what, when, and how.

Note

1. As Adorno noted, "Personality is not to be hypostatized as an ultimate determinant. Far from being something which is given in the beginning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surrounding world, personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated from the social totality within which it occurs. [. . .] The conception of personality structure is the best safeguard against the inclination to attribute persistent trends in the individual to something 'innate' or 'basic' or 'racial' within him" (Adorno et al., 1950, 5).

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PART IV

INTERGROUP
RELATIONS

GROUP-BASED HIERARCHIES OF POWER AND STATUS

MAUREEN A. CRAIG AND L. TAYLOR PHILLIPS

GROUP-BASED identities, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, and many more, continue to shape people's life chances and outcomes and in many cases form the basis for group-based inequality. Indeed, group-based inequality has been increasing over the last decades in many countries worldwide (United Nations, 2020). Where inequality or disparity exist, so does hierarchy—the rank-ordering of individuals or groups based on some valued dimension(s) within human structures (e.g., organizations, societies; Magee & Galinsky, 2008, p. 5). Hierarchies are often structured around disparities in resources such as power (i.e., possessing more or less control over other people and resources), authority (i.e., legitimacy, right, or formal claim to control), status (i.e., esteem, respect, and admiration), or even cultural values (i.e., collective values and meaning systems; see Stephan et al., 2009; Zou & Cheryan, 2017). Given the ubiquity of group-based hierarchies and their intransigence, despite worldwide efforts to mitigate them in recent decades (United Nations, 2020), it is imperative to understand how individuals exist within and respond to group-based hierarchy.

This chapter examines the interaction between individuals and complex societal and political systems that generate group-based hierarchies of prestige, power, and privilege. Hierarchy is essential reading for political psychologists: merely existing within social hierarchies affects people's psychology and consequently, their propensity to engage in political action. Indeed, how people interact with hierarchical systems can inform not only whether, but also what kinds of actions members of different groups may take to alter or maintain existing hierarchies. How do people interact with existing group-based hierarchies? How do group-level motives impact action intended to alter or maintain hierarchy? What downstream consequences does this have for political action? The present chapter reviews and integrates contemporary and classic social scientific research to understand the political implications of individuals' position and experiences within group-based hierarchies, as well as their attempts to change or maintain such systems.

1. LEVEL OF ANALYSIS: GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS

Status and power are theoretically separable and distinct bases of hierarchical differentiation. Power indicates control over valued resources and the ability to influence others,

whereas status indicates perceived respect and esteem, both of which can lead to greater influence over others (see Blader & Chen, 2012; Cheng et al., 2013; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; see also Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner et al., 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Some theoretical traditions focus more on the precursors and consequences of social status (e.g., social identity theory; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), some focus more on power (e.g., social dominance theory, SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and some view power as the source of status, explaining why at the group level these constructs are often highly conflated (status characteristics theory; Berger et al., 1972).

While there are literatures across several social scientific fields examining processes underlying and associated with individuals' experiences of *personal* power and status, we focus on how belonging to socio-demographic *groups* that vary in their level of influence over society (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender) affects individuals' experiences of and responses to hierarchy itself. The present chapter focuses on understanding how individuals respond to and are impacted by existing group-based hierarchies, in which power and status are not easily separated. Given that there is often a conflation at the group-level between power and status such that high-status groups tend to be powerful as well (and *vice versa*), this chapter focuses on individuals' membership in groups that are socially dominant (groups that are high in status and/or power in society) or socially marginalized (groups that are low in status and/or power in society; Magee & Galinksy, 2008). If a distinction between power and status is essential to understand a finding, we will use the terms high-status and low-status or high-power and low-power groups to clarify.

Of course, group membership is not the only driver of individuals' experiences with and response to group-based hierarchy. Ample variation exists within groups, as well as between groups. For instance, individual differences such as personality (e.g., Altemeyer, 1988; Bakker, Chapter 2, this volume; McFarland, 2010; Perry & Sibley, 2012), ideology and attitudes (e.g., Federico and Malka, Chapter 17, this volume; Jost et al., 2009; Tesler, 2016; Tesler & Sears, 2010), and core values (Ben-Num Bloom, Chapter 18, this volume; Sagiv & Roccas, 2021; Schwartz, 1994) also affect individuals' experiences of and responses to group-based hierarchies, as described in existing reviews. Here, we focus in particular on research cataloging the ways in which individuals' group membership—in relatively socially dominant versus socially marginalized groups—impacts individuals' experience of group-based hierarchy, and the political implications of such experiences. However, where relevant, we also highlight when individual differences might moderate the effects of group membership or even overwhelm group-based effects.

2. Theoretical Explanations

Given the pervasiveness of group-based hierarchical systems, it is perhaps unsurprising that several theories have emerged seeking to explain why hierarchies exist (e.g., social dominance theory; Sidanius et al., 2017; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and persist (e.g., social justification theory; Jost, 2020; Jost & Banaji, 1994). The emergence of group-based hierarchies has been extensively covered in prior reviews, so we do not rehash this discussion (for recent reviews about the theoretical explanations for why hierarchies exist and the impact of group-based dominance, see Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng, 2020;

Mahadevan et al., 2016), but we provide a brief overview of several predominant social scientific theories.

Decades of theorizing and research have highlighted the role of group interests as one instigator of intergroup conflict (e.g., Duckitt, 1994, 2001; Esses et al., 1998, 2001; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1967; Sherif et al., 1961). This work suggests that a motive to advance one's group's interests (e.g., by attaining resources) can lead to competition between different social groups and from this competition, hierarchy may emerge and perpetuate. Notably, realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1967; Sherif et al., 1961), a classic theory about the origins of intergroup conflict and prejudice, suggests that prejudice and conflict stem from competition over scarce resources and group interests. Specifically, this work (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1967) suggests that if members of one social group experience or perceive threat from another social group to which they do not belong (i.e., an outgroup), this tends to heighten prejudice toward this outgroup. The instrumental model of group conflict (Esses et al., 1998, 2001), also highlights the role of perceived scarcity in group conflict and hierarchy maintenance. This model posits that perceptions of resource scarcity and salience of a potentially competitive outgroup together guide intergroup competition. Further, this model suggests that hierarchy itself (i.e., the unequal distribution of resources among societal groups) may facilitate the perception of limited or scarce resources, which then perpetuates group conflict and group hierarchy.

While research examining realistic group conflict theory most frequently considered competition between groups of equal status (see Sherif et al., 1961), the dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice (Duckitt, 1994, 2001) extended this theorizing to consider different forms of intergroups relations within hierarchical systems. For example, Duckitt (1994) posited that prejudice and intergroup conflict can result from both a threat-driven group defense motivation and a competitive motive to attain dominance, power, and superiority. These dual motivations highlight that a higher-status group's expression of prejudice toward a lower-status group need not necessarily be driven by perceived threats to one's group interests and resources, but could simply stem from motives to attain dominance.

This motive to attain group dominance is paramount to another predominate theory within political psychology, social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2006), which suggests that hierarchies emerge due to evolutionary pressures and distinguishes three types of hierarchical systems: age-based (in which adults have greater power than children), sex-based (in which men have greater power than women), and arbitrary-set-based (which encompasses the remainder of group-based hierarchies, including those based on race, ethnicity, or religion, for example). This term "arbitrary-set" is meant to highlight the social construction and non-universality of these hierarchies that are based on the most salient social distinctions within a given society. Classic SDT (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2006) suggests that individuals interact with hierarchy in one of two opposing ways: hierarchy-enhancing versus hierarchy-attenuating behavior. Hierarchy-enhancing behavior constitutes actions that serve to enhance or maintain the existing hierarchical arrangement, for example, expressing racial bias, supporting policies such as that serve dominant group interests (e.g., lowering the taxes of wealthy individuals), or opposing policies that would benefit marginalized group interests (e.g., affirmative action). Hierarchy-attenuating behavior, on the other hand, includes actions that serve to attenuate the existing hierarchical arrangement, for example, expressing egalitarianism, supporting

policies that serve marginalized group interests, or opposing policies that would benefit dominant group interests.

Social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) is understood as a fundamental motive underlying hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating behavior. SDO indicates an orientation toward or preference for group-based dominance and inequality (Ho et al., 2012), irrespective of the position of one's own group (ingroup) in that hierarchy (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius et al., 1994, 2017). People who score higher on SDO tend to support hierarchy-enhancing action, while those who score lower tend to support hierarchy-attenuation. The origins of the SDO motive itself are relatively understudied, but it has been theorized as a relatively stable, individual trait, passed down either biologically or environmentally by parents to children (Duriez & Soenens, 2009; Kandler et al., 2016; Kleppestø et al., 2019). However, predictable tendencies in which members of dominant groups in hierarchies (e.g., men, White Americans) on average score higher on SDO than do members of marginalized groups in group-based hierarchies (e.g., women, Black Americans) suggests that the social structure and group interests and motives also play a role in contributing to this individual difference orientation (Sidanius et al., 2017).

In addition to work considering the emergence of hierarchy, there is also research examining the question of how and why hierarchies sustain themselves. System justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) provides one such explanation for why hierarchies are preserved, once established. This theoretical framework distinguishes three forms of justification that people may be motivated to engage in. Specifically, this work delineates ego-justification (driven by a motive to view oneself positively), group-justification (driven by a motive to view one's group positively), and system-justification (driven by people's desire to view the system or status quo in a favorable light, for example, as legitimate and fair). Given these proposed motives, among members of socially-dominant groups, all three of the motives should be often congruent with one another. In contrast, among marginalized groups, the group-justification motive may often conflict with the system-justification motive. For example, a desire to bolster and justify the status quo of persistent gender inequality in which women, on average, tend to earn less than men (Barroso & Brown, 2021) would require viewing such gender disparities as justified. Justifying the system and status quo in this way would be consistent with a motive to enhance or maintain men's high-standing, but would be counterproductive for a woman viewing her gender group (women) in a positive light. One intriguing aspect of system justification theory is that it seeks to explain when and why people who are socially-marginalized may sometimes act in ways that sustain their own subjugation (Jost, 2020; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004).

Complementing the psychological theories detailed above, status characteristics theory (SCT; Berger et al., 1972) stems from a sociological tradition and seeks to describe the process through which group memberships (e.g., race, gender, and education level) become associated with differential resource and performance expectations, and thus, how these memberships come to provide status and create stable hierarchies (Berger et al., 1972; Ridgeway, 1991; see also expectation states theory, Wagner & Berger, 1993 for a historical review). Expectations serve as a key mechanism for hierarchy stability in this theory. To the extent that individuals learn to expect more (versus less) valuable contributions from individuals of different groups, they then will pay more (versus less) attention, deference, and respect to those individuals. In turn, targets from whom more is expected are given more opportunity to confirm these expectations, while those from whom less is expected

are given little opportunity to disconfirm these low expectations. Considered in tandem with the psychological phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecies (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968), in which someone's expectations about another person lead that person to act in ways that confirm preconceived notions, it is little mystery why this process could entrench hierarchies and the status quo.

Critically, expectations about others' value are generated not simply from idiosyncratic initial experiences with specific individuals, but also draw from pre-existing associations and stereotypes based on basic social categories (so-called diffuse status characteristics such as gender or race; Berger et al., 1972). Thus, before an individual-level interaction even occurs, a priori expectations due to group stereotypes can direct the likely pattern of power and prestige hierarchy that will emerge within an organization. Given these dynamics, the rank-order of groups within a hierarchy tend to remain stable over time. Indeed, this proposition has been demonstrated not only empirically and theoretically, but with mathematical modeling (e.g., Berger et al., 1977; Fisek, 1974; Foschi & Foschi, 1979).

3. OVERVIEW

The ways in which people can interact with hierarchical systems will provide the organization of this chapter. We begin by outlining when and why people may take action to influence an existing group-based hierarchy. First, people may seek to *maintain* the existing hierarchy, protecting the position of dominant groups and maintaining the distance between those at the bottom and top. Second, people may also seek to *enhance* the existing hierarchy, improving the position of dominant groups and increasing the gap between those at the bottom and top. Third, people may seek to *mitigate* group-based hierarchies, improving the position of marginalized groups, reducing the position of dominant groups, and decreasing the distance between the bottom and top. And fourth, people may seek to *rearrange* group-based hierarchies, changing the positions of various groups without necessarily affecting the amount of hierarchy or the distance between the bottom- and top-ranked groups. After detailing this work examining when people seek to influence hierarchical systems in these different ways, next we will discuss research on how people *react* when the hierarchy is perceived to be under these different states (e.g., maintained and stable, enhanced, mitigated, or rearranged). Finally, we end by considering open questions and opportunities for future work.

4. MAINTAINING OR ENHANCING GROUP-BASED HIERARCHIES

People may act in ways that serve to maintain or even enhance hierarchical systems. We begin with the broad literature that examines the circumstances in which individuals may seek to maintain hierarchy and the status quo, before considering the less empirically examined question of when people may seek to make hierarchies more extreme.

4.1. Maintenance of Group-Based Hierarchies

One of the core areas of investigation in system justification theory (see Jost, 2020, for an overview) is in understanding how and why people may seek to maintain the often inequitable and hierarchical social, economic, and political status quos. Research examining system justification motivation has found that it can manifest in a number of different ways (e.g., in terms of stereotyping, ideology, attributions) and occur implicitly (e.g., nonconsciously) as well as explicitly (e.g., Jost et al., 2002; Kay & Jost, 2003). Further, this work has found that perceiving that the existing system or one's worldview is under threat can increase system justification. As an example, perceived threats to the system (e.g., manipulated via a passage that directs criticism toward the current social system or not) can lead individuals to come to its defense and express system bolstering attitudes (Kay et al., 2005).

Other recent work has tested whether feelings of powerlessness can activate a system justification motive and lead to perceiving the existing social system as legitimate. Across several experiments (van der Toorn et al., 2015), undergraduates were randomly assigned to complete an essay task in which they were asked to detail an event in their lives in which either they had power over someone else (high power condition) or someone else had power over them (low power condition; a common perceived power manipulation, see Galinsky et al., 2003) and then completed items assessing system justification and perceptions that several social inequalities are legitimate. Results revealed that in contrast to what a self-interest perspective might predict—but consistent with system justification theory—participants who were induced to feel powerless (versus powerful) were more likely to report that the existing societal status quo was fair and legitimate (van der Toorn et al., 2015). Furthermore, induced feelings of powerlessness (versus powerfulness) led to reports that the unequal distribution of wealth, the gender pay gap, and disproportionate incarceration rates of Black Americans were more legitimate (van der Toorn et al., 2015). Overall, work within the system justification theoretical tradition suggests that the maintenance of an inequitable status quo can be contributed to by people's motives to see the system as just and fair, including among those who may be marginalized by the current system.

Turning to sociology, while the original work on status characteristics theory was formulated to understand bounded interactions within dyadic or small team settings, later research expanded to consider how the emerging hierarchies in these organizational contexts might affect future interactions in other teams and as a result, serve to maintain group-based hierarchies (Berger et al., 1989). For instance, Ridgeway and colleagues (e.g., Ridgeway, 1988; Ridgeway & Berger, 1986) demonstrated how societal-level hierarchies create a priori expectations regarding characteristics like race and gender, and, in turn, these expectations can create a self-fulfilling pattern during interpersonal interactions, which ultimately reinforce the original societal-level hierarchy. Moreover, Ridgeway (1991) argues that these original status expectations themselves come into existence via association with differentiated resources. That is, if an inequality exists and people have differential access to resources, depending on group membership, this in turn leads perceivers to associate members of those groups with more or less resources (see also, "social role theory"; Koenig & Eagly, 2014).

Indeed, recent empirical evidence supports this point and finds evidence of race-status associations in which White Americans are mentally linked with the concept of high

status and Black Americans with the concept of low status (Dupree et al., 2021); consistent with Ridgeway's (1991) theorizing, the authors (Dupree et al., 2021) suggest that these associations may occur due to observation of racially distributed jobs, among other potential explanations. Given this, economic, political, and other social structures that generate resource hierarchies (i.e., differential group access to material and symbolic resources) can become legitimated and reinforced via expectations. As an example, a policy that leads men to receive higher wages than women may then generate an expectation that men have more resources than women, in turn granting status advantage to men, ultimately reinforcing the initial resource discrepancy.

A final theoretical tradition that speaks to hierarchy maintenance is social dominance theory (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 2017). Research seeking to understand how social dominance orientation (SDO) is linked to social attitudes reveals that individuals who are more supportive of hierarchy and anti-egalitarian (i.e., higher in SDO) express attitudes and act in ways that would serve to maintain the hierarchy (Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, high-SDO individuals express prejudice against marginalized groups and express exclusionary attitudes toward those who would threaten existing hierarchies (e.g., marginalized groups seeking to gain in status; see Craig & Richeson, 2014c; Thomsen et al., 2008).

This theory also highlights that people can be drawn to different institutions depending on their level of SDO, and playing a role within the institution can itself shape someone's levels of SDO (Sidanius et al., 2004). Specifically, those high in SDO are drawn to hierarchy-enhancing institutions whereas those low in SDO are drawn to hierarchy-attenuating institutions (Sidanius et al., 1996); as an example, among students, higher SDO scores predicted interest in careers like prosecutor or police officer, whereas lower SDO scores predicted interest in careers such as civil rights lawyer. Once in those settings, however, socialization into a hierarchy-enhancing institution can increase attitudes that serve to maintain the hierarchy. For example, White police officers developed more hostile attitudes toward Black Americans across their first 18 months of training, whereas Black officers developed *less* hostile attitudes towards Whites in that same time (Teahan, 1975). Furthermore, SDO can predict electoral behavior, as a nationally representative survey revealed that the extent to which voters' SDO increased from 2012 to 2016 predicted a shift away from the Democrat Hillary Clinton and toward the Republican Donald Trump, a candidate whose campaign rhetoric focused on a return to the status quo of the past (e.g., with the slogan "Make America Great Again"; Mutz, 2018).

While the above work suggests some people may have motivation to maintain the hierarchy and current status quo, people are also sensitive to others' opinions of them and strive to shape others' views of them and be viewed well (e.g., impression management; Goffman, 1959). Given cultural shifts in the United States over the last decades toward less acceptability of certain forms of prejudice (including racial prejudice; Crandall et al., 2013; although, see Crandall et al., 2018), those who support dominating outgroups (e.g., high-SDO individuals) may also attempt to do so in less overt ways. This shift toward less perceived acceptability of explicit, overt racial bias can also be seen in how the very ways in which social scientists attempt to measure racism have changed over time (see Kinder, Chapter 27, this volume).

Similarly, recent work finds that in addition to being predictive of the expression of explicit prejudice in the service of maintaining hierarchy, SDO is also related to less overt

expressions of hierarchy maintenance. For instance, while White Americans high in SDO *privately* support White political candidates who report that their racial identity is a central aspect to who they are, there was less *public* political support for these White candidates out of concern that they might provoke racial minorities (Jun et al., 2017). Furthermore, dominant group members who support hierarchy may attempt to appease marginalized groups by sacrificing small concessions in order to maintain the overall hierarchy (Chow et al., 2013). In particular, if the hierarchy is less stable or marginalized groups are seen as more angered, those high in SDO are *less* opposed to policies that would redistribute resources and opportunity (e.g., affirmative action). Indeed, this work (Chow et al., 2013) revealed that high-SDO White Americans only expressed strong opposition to redistributive policy if their concern about hierarchy stability was allayed, suggesting that those high in SDO may generally view hierarchy as stable, but that concerns over system stability can mute usual tendencies toward publicly expressing support for hierarchy maintenance.

4.2. Enhancement of Group-Based Hierarchies

Interestingly, whereas classic theorizing within the SDT tradition emphasizes hierarchy-*enhancing* motivations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), empirical work on SDO often focuses on hierarchy-*maintenance* outcomes. For example, opposition to a policy that seeks to reduce hierarchy, such as affirmative action, would serve to maintain, but not necessarily enhance hierarchy. That is, SDO tends to predict the support of the status quo (maintaining hierarchy) and opposition to reducing inequality, rather than strictly support for making the hierarchy more *extreme* (i.e., enhancing hierarchy). While much work referenced thus far, spanning disciplines and theoretical traditions, has considered the question of when people support maintaining hierarchies, one may also seek to make a hierarchical system *more unequal*, or be motivated toward hierarchy-enhancing action.

Work highlighting the motivational pull of maintaining positive group esteem suggests that one can protect positive views of the ingroup by vying for group status within the hierarchy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This process, known as social competition, is posited to be most likely to occur if group boundaries are impermeable and the hierarchy is viewed as unstable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Further, in unstable hierarchies, people desire not only stability, but a dominant position within a more stable hierarchy (Caricati, 2012). Given that individuals do indeed often actively seek to enhance their own personal status (Anderson et al., 2015) and attempt to maximize their personal gains (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; see Thielman et al., 2021, for a review), it is reasonable to suspect that similar processes may operate at the group level. Indeed, recent work has identified that desire for status is a fundamental human motive (Anderson et al., 2015; Kim & Pettit, 2019; Mahadevan et al., 2019), implying that humans are driven to seek increasing status.

Original formulations of SDT (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) emphasized hierarchy-enhancing motives, rather than hierarchy maintenance alone. Perhaps representing a return to this tradition, recent research on SDO has begun to explore the idea that high-SDO individuals (both those belonging to dominant and marginalized groups) can have motivation to dominate outgroups. Specifically, emerging work on SDO hints at desires among high-SDO people to achieve *more* hierarchy (Kteily et al., 2017, 2019; Lucas & Kteily, 2018).

Interestingly, this recent work demonstrates that SDO not only relates to preferences for the ideal amount of hierarchy, but even shapes how people *see* the existing hierarchy in the first place. SDO is predictive of people's processing and memory for hierarchy itself, which in turn can shape desires to enhance (or mitigate) hierarchical structures. In a series of creative experimental studies, Kteily and colleagues (2017) showed that, if presented with the same visual representation of a hierarchy (e.g., human stick figures arranged in a pyramid shape that varied in the steepness of the slope to manipulate level of hierarchy), individuals scoring higher in SDO misremembered the stimulus as having shown *less* hierarchy than was accurate, whereas those lower in SDO misremembered *more* hierarchy than was accurate. The authors (Kteily et al., 2017) posit a motivated information processing account (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2006) and suggest that this pattern of perception is driven by a desire to justify one's orientation toward hierarchy. That is, those motivated to enhance hierarchy (those high in SDO) perceived less hierarchy than was actually present, which should justify seeking more hierarchy. In contrast, those motivated to attenuate hierarchy (low-SDO individuals) perceived more hierarchy than was accurate, which presents the justification for aims of reducing hierarchy. Thus, this work suggests one's preference for hierarchy can shape perception and memory for hierarchies themselves. These perceptual differences can impact downstream political preferences: the more people supported group-based hierarchy, the less they perceived a novel unequal society as hierarchical, which predicted less support for redistributive policies intended to reduce the inequality and hierarchy (Kteily et al., 2017).

In addition to basic perceptual biases, there are biases in the degree to which individuals with varying levels of SDO attribute harm, depending on whether an action affects dominant or marginalized targets (Lucas & Kteily, 2018; Waldfogel et al., 2021). For example, Waldfogel et al. (2021) demonstrated that support of SDO relates to individuals' attention to hierarchy: whereas people more supportive of egalitarianism (lower-SDO) are more likely to notice and accurately remember social inequality that negatively impacts marginalized groups, more anti-egalitarian (higher-SDO) individuals are more likely to notice when inequality disadvantages dominant groups (e.g., men; see also Lucas & Kteily, 2018). Goudarzi and colleagues (2020) also find that people's ideology regarding whether the economic system is fair (i.e., economic system-justification) predicted both self-report and physiological responses to economic inequality. Particularly, this work revealed that exposure to suffering stemming from economic inequality (e.g., video clips depicting people experiencing homelessness) triggered *less* negative emotion, as indexed by facial muscle activity and skin conductance patterns signifying negative affect (e.g., furrowed brows) and arousal (e.g., sweatiness), among those who highly (vs. lowly) justified the current economic system. Taken together, this work demonstrates that people's experiences of and perceptual processes regarding inequality differ depending on ideology (e.g., preference for hierarchy, support for egalitarianism, and justification of the status quo). To the extent that individuals perceive and experience hierarchy differently, they may reach different conclusions regarding which reparative actions are warranted. For example, to reach one's preferred state of hierarchy, if one is low in SDO and tends to perceive the presence of more hierarchy (particularly hierarchy that affects marginalized groups), they may prefer hierarchy-mitigating action, but if one is high in SDO and tends to perceive less hierarchy (unless the hierarchy harms socially-dominant groups), they may prefer hierarchy-enhancing action.

New research (Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2022) with largely White samples has revealed that participants' SDO levels predicted their liking of and support for hiring a job candidate who had explicitly discriminated against Black Americans or instituted policies that decreased the number of Black hires (hierarchy-enhancing behavior). Other recent work (Kachanoff et al., 2020) that has examined when hierarchy enhancement may occur reveals that perceptions that other groups are trying to control White Americans (termed *collective autonomy restriction*) predicts White Americans' support for working together with others of their racial group to further racial group interests. If enacted, these types of behaviors would, at minimum, serve to maintain the racial hierarchy and further could easily serve to enhance and accentuate the hierarchy.

While this new research is intriguing, much more work is necessary to separate the circumstances that may elicit hierarchy maintenance (e.g., opposition to policies such as affirmative action that would reduce hierarchy) versus hierarchy enhancement (e.g., support for policies such as reducing tax rates of the wealthy that would exacerbate hierarchy). Overall, whereas ample empirical research has considered individual efforts to protect and maintain the current hierarchy, less work has considered when individuals seek to *increase* inequality and stretch the group-based hierarchy itself.

5. Mitigating or Rearranging Group-Based Hierarchies

Research has also considered the different motivations that may drive marginalized and dominant groups to reduce group-based hierarchy. First, we consider the perspective of members of marginalized groups and when they may seek to take action to mitigate existing group-based hierarchy. Then, we consider the perspective of members of dominant groups and the circumstances in which they may seek to mitigate group-based hierarchy, even at the expense of their group's dominant position. Finally, we turn to a related, but understudied, form of interacting with hierarchy: rearranging the order in which the groups are positioned.

5.1. Hierarchy Mitigation Enacted by Marginalized Groups

Much of the literature examining when people seek to reduce intergroup hierarchy focuses on understanding when members of marginalized groups work to improve their own group's position through a variety of methods—from voting and engaging with electoral politics, to protest and collective action. Collective action is often defined as behaviors enacted by individuals as "psychological group members" with the goal of improving their group's conditions (van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wright et al., 1990; see also van Stekelenburg & Gaidyte, Chapter 26, this volume). While most frequently examined in the context of social protest, this definition of collective action is inclusive of traditional social protest actions such as petition signing and actively protesting, but also electoral participation such as voting (van Zomeren et al., 2018). Given the focus of this

literature on predicting when people who psychologically identify with a group act on be-half of it, collective action research typically includes samples of people who are members of the group seen as detrimentally impacted by a form of inequality (e.g., Black Americans' efforts to reduce anti-Black racism).

As noted above, acting to pursue group interests could take the form of acting within existing political systems to seek to improve one's group position. For example, scholars have argued that to leverage their political strength as a numerical demographic minority group in a two-party political system, Black Americans prioritize group solidarity in party politics to form a stronger voting bloc (White & Laird, 2020). While ideologically diverse, over 80% of Black Americans self-identify as Democrats and this engagement with party politics serves racial group interests by increasing the likelihood of the party responsiveness and prioritization of racial group issues (White & Laird, 2020). Thus, one common form of action that marginalized group members may take to attempt to mitigate hierarchy is by working through the political system and institutions as they currently exist (e.g., voting in elections).

Another form of hierarchy-mitigating action that marginalized groups could pursue is to seek to change the very systems viewed as unjust. Research on collective action highlights that members of marginalized groups may pursue social change to improve their group's po-sition within a hierarchy. Collective action has been investigated by political psychologists across multiple countries (e.g., within the United States: Chong, 1991; Selvanathan et al., 2018; Northern Ireland: Noor et al., 2008; Israel/Palestine: Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020) and domains (e.g., racial inequality: Selvanathan et al., 2018; gender inequality: Duncan, 1999; sexuality-based inequality: Techakesari et al., 2017). Across these varied social contexts, there is broad consistency in terms of the psychological processes that spur action towards social change. Particularly, this work highlights that identification with the affected group is a crucial precursor to feeling a sense of group-based injustice, which predicts support for acting collectively on behalf of that group (Stürmer & Simon, 2004, 2009; Wright et al., 1990, van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Generally, individuals are more likely to support or engage in social change action, if the intergroup hierarchy is perceived as unjust, if they identify with the marginalized group, and perceive that social action may be effective (see Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2012). In addition to these precursors to action, perceived personal benefits may contribute to engaging in collective action. Specifically, acting as an activist can afford reputational benefits (Chong, 1991) and engaging in collective action can enhance one's status within one's own group (in addition to the possibility of enhancing one's ingroup's status in the hierarchy; Willer, 2009). As such, multiple psychological and relational processes contribute to individuals' decisions to engage in social change action.

While the above work considers when people act to improve their own group's position in a hierarchy, research has also examined the question of when people seek to improve the social position of a group to which they do not belong. This may take the form of soli-darity, in which members of one marginalized group view their own group's experiences as aligned with those of another marginalized group (e.g., Black and Hispanic Americans may perceive that the two groups' discrimination experiences are similar, perhaps due to shared status as "racial minorities") and act to increase that outgroup's status (Craig & Richeson, 2012, 2016; Vollhardt et al., 2016). Specifically, solidarity represents advocacy on behalf of others perceived to share common cause, similar experiences, or broader inclusive group membership (Cortland et al., 2017; Craig & Richeson, 2016; Louis et al., 2019; Sirin et al.,

2016; Subašić et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2009). As an example of solidarity in action, "The Coalition for Harmony in Monterey Park" movement in the 1980s brought Asian Americans and Hispanics together to fight a resolution that was perceived as discriminating against both Asian and Hispanic immigrants (e.g., the resolution would make English the official language and require English-only business signs; Horton, 1992).

Prior research suggests that political solidarity is more readily activated in contexts where different groups' experiences and interests are seen as shared or similar (e.g., Cortland et al., 2017; Craig & Richeson, 2012, 2016). For example, a series of laboratory experiments with Hispanic and Asian American participants revealed that reading about the discrimination faced by one's own racial group (anti-Hispanic and anti-Asian racism, respectively) led to the expression of more positive automatically-activated and self-reported attitudes toward Black Americans and that this increased positivity was statistically mediated through increased perceived similarity (Craig & Richeson, 2012). Similarly, in a national survey experiment (Sirin et al., 2016), Black and Hispanic Americans were more likely than White Americans to support pro–civil rights policies and actions regarding minority detainees and this effect appeared driven by greater group empathy. Overall, members of marginalized groups may support and seek to reduce hierarchy by improving their own group's marginalized position (i.e., ingroup collective action) or the position of another marginalized group (i.e., solidarity; for further discussion, see Pérez & Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume).

5.2. Hierarchy Mitigation Enacted by Dominant Groups

Of course, it is not only members of marginalized groups who might seek to mitigate a group-based hierarchy. For example, in research utilizing largely White samples, exposure to a job candidate who had a history of enacting policies that *increased* Black representation (a hierarchy mitigating action) led to more support for the candidate among those who scored lower (rather than higher) in SDO (Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2022). Similar to marginalized groups, perceiving that the current hierarchy is inequitable and unjust predicts dominant group members' support for mitigating it as well (Leach et al., 2002; Phillips & Lowey, 2018; Radke et al., 2020; Tropp & Barlow, 2018). While this may run counter to group interests, a recent Pew Research Center poll found that, on average, 56% of White Americans report that being White helps in getting ahead in the United States (Menasce Horowitz et al., 2019). These beliefs about ingroup privileges are moderated by partisanship. For example, if that same Pew poll is broken down by political party, 78% of White Democrats reported beliefs about White racial advantages whereas only 38% of White Republicans reported similarly.

The literature on allyship focuses on understanding the circumstances in which members of a socially dominant group support action to reduce social-disparities that benefit their own social group (e.g., Whites' support of reducing racial inequality). Specifically, allyship refers to the context in which members of a group that is socially dominant in a domain support action to reduce the disparities that relatively benefit their own group in this domain (see Craig et al., 2020; Louis et al., 2019). This context is particularly interesting from a group interest perspective, as members of the dominant group who seek to reduce hierarchy that benefits their ingroup are acting counter to group interests. This allyship literature suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, that certain forms of identification with one's

dominant group identity can predict political engagement in support of improving the outcomes of a marginalized outgroup (Curtin et al., 2015; Iyer & Ryan, 2009).

Importantly, on average, reporting that one's dominant group identity is central or important to one's sense of self (common ways of measuring "identification") tends to predict support for maintaining or accentuating one's high-status place in the hierarchy (e.g., Jardina, 2019; Lowery et al., 2006). However, the perceived centrality or importance of one's identity (often called being "lowly identified" or "highly identified") is just one element of the multifaceted construct of social identification (see Ashmore et al., 2004). Recent work examining the different ways in which dominant group identification can manifest have revealed a more nuanced picture with intriguing implications for how dominant group identity may both facilitate or hinder hierarchy-mitigating action, depending on the lens through which one views the hierarchy. Specifically, this work (e.g., Croll, 2007; Goren & Plaut, 2012; Knowles et al., 2014) suggests that highly identifying with a dominant social group could either predict hierarchy-mitigating action *or* hierarchy-maintaining action, depending on how one views the hierarchical system itself and one's position within it.

For example, an analysis of a nationally representative data set found that the subgroup of White Americans who reported that their racial identity was "very important" to them expressed polarized responses on social issues (Croll, 2007). Highly identified White Americans were more likely to indicate *both* hierarchy-challenging and hierarchy-maintaining explanations for racial disparities, compared with White Americans who identified less strongly with their racial group (Croll, 2007). In another study (Goren & Plaut, 2012), White participants were asked to write about their racial identity and the research team coded the essays on whether participants (a) did not strongly identify with their ethnicity ("weakly identified"), (b) viewed their ingroup as a source of pride ("prideful" identification), or (c) acknowledged racial privileges ("power-cognizant" identification). White Americans rated as "prideful" or "power-cognizant" reported that their race was important to them at statistically equivalently high levels, but "power-cognizant" White Americans reported more positive attitudes toward diversity than those with a "prideful" identity (Goren & Plaut, 2012). This work highlights that viewing one's identity as central and important to one's life and experiences is distinguishable from the regard one feels towards one's group (see also Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Sellers et al., 1997) and that these different aspects of identity may interact to guide responses to group hierarchy.

Taken together, this work on White racial identity suggests that dominant group members who seek to mitigate the hierarchy may identify with their socially dominant ingroup but, importantly, identify in a way in which they critique the existing power structure and perceive their group to possess unearned societal privileges and power (Curtin et al., 2015, 2016; Goren & Plaut, 2012; Ostrove & Brown, 2018). The combination of these identity processes can facilitate support for dismantling hierarchical systems perceived as unjust (Knowles et al., 2014). With this form of "power-cognizant" dominant group identification, perceptions that their group has privileges in society as well as criticism, rather than legitimization, of the status quo and hierarchy are essential components that lead allies to pursue hierarchy-mitigating action (Knowles et al., 2014; Ostrove & Brown, 2018). It is notable that the existence of allies and egalitarian dominant group members challenges strong group interest theoretical accounts; however, in a later section we will introduce another route through which people who belong to a socially dominant group may support

hierarchy-mitigating action that does not require such explicit focus on relinquishment of group advantages.

Critiques of allyship. Whereas emerging work in psychology on allyship has emphasized the motivations that may spur dominant groups to "relinquish their privileges" (Brown & Ostrove, 2013), other work critiques that this perspective overemphasizes altruism among the dominant group. Recent scholars have theorized that dominant group allies also may be motivated to enact allyship due to ulterior goals focused on supporting oneself or one's ingroup (Radke et al., 2020) or only if their own interests converge with marginalized groups (Bell, 1980; see also Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). A strong interest-convergence account posits that any actions taken by the dominant group, even those that may superficially appear morally driven, are actually designed to serve the dominant group's interest (Bell, 1980; Chow et al., 2013).

This perspective and self-focused motives are consistent with the appeasement motives highlighted in work examining circumstances in which dominant group members may show superficial support for redistributive policy in order to prevent the hierarchy from being destabilized (Chow et al., 2013). Similarly, Radke and colleagues (2020) posit that dominant group members who are more highly identified and hold social action goals that focus on the ingroup are more likely to engage in dependency-oriented help as well as enacting public, rather than private, action. A dominant group ally offering dependency-oriented help takes agency away from the marginalized group, which serves to reify the intergroup hierarchy (Nadler, 2002, Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Nadler et al., 2009). In contrast, an ally offering autonomy-oriented help (i.e., help that supports the marginalized group's agency and independence) challenges the hierarchy and empowers the targeted group. From this perspective, what at first blush might seem to be hierarchy mitigation or the relinquishing of group-based dominance may yet serve to bolster the current hierarchy, depending on what form the aid takes.

Superordinate or "common ingroup" identity (e.g., as "Americans"; Gaertner et al., 1996) could also spur interest alignment, leading dominant groups to feel more positively and support improvements for the marginalized group in the interest of the whole, under certain conditions. For example, Transue (2007) experimentally manipulated whether White Americans were asked about how close they feel toward their racial group (subgroup identity prime) or toward Americans (superordinate identity prime) and found interesting effects particularly among those who reported feeling close to the primed identity. Whereas White Americans who felt close to their ethnic group expressed more support for tax increases to improving public schools than support for educational opportunities for minorities, this difference in policy support was statistically indistinguishable among those who felt close to other Americans (among those primed with a superordinate identity).

The fact that it was only those feeling close (versus not close) with a superordinate identity who expressed support for hierarchy-mitigating policy is an important caveat. Attempts to garner hierarchy mitigation and social change through superordinate identification alone are likely to fail, given the substantial amount of research finding that focusing on commonalities with outgroup members can elicit feelings of positivity and intergroup harmony, but can ironically *reduce* the likelihood that people see group-based inequality and, in turn, support social change (Saguy, 2018; Saguy et al., 2009, 2016; see also Dixon et al., 2010, 2012).

Regardless, even if dominant group members perceive interest convergence, this account would suggest that they would be less likely to support hierarchy mitigation if their interests begin to diverge from those of marginalized groups. Moreover, dominant groups may also attempt to reclaim superordinate identities by re-excluding marginalized groups from this identity (e.g., Danbold & Huo, 2021). Together, these patterns suggest that, at times, dominant groups' hierarchy mitigation action may serve to support their own interests, which align with marginalized group interests at the moment, but may be unlikely to be long-lasting.

Dominant group members and solidarity. While it is often studied as such, allyship is not the only pathway that may lead people who belong to a socially dominant group to support hierarchy-mitigating action (Craig et al., 2020). Indeed, just as is often discussed with members of groups who are marginalized in similar domains (e.g., Black and Hispanic Americans), members of the dominant group in a domain can connect their own experiences with inequality in another arena with the experiences of a marginalized outgroup. For example, a White American woman may seek to take action to mitigate the racial hierarchy by enacting allyship (driven by perceiving her racial privileges) as well as through solidarity (driven by perceived connections between sexism and racism). A key distinction between allyship and solidarity is whether individuals engage in social change through the lens of identifying with a socially marginalized identity (solidarity) or with a socially dominant group identity (allyship; Craig et al., 2020). Perceptions of shared discrimination experiences can spark solidarity (feelings of similarity and common cause) toward an outgroup perceived to face injustice among people who are marginalized within the same domain as the outgroup or from members of the group that is socially dominant in the domain. For example, both White and Hispanic Americans may express solidarity with Black Americans due to a perception of having shared discrimination experiences, but these perceived shared experiences could be along different dimensions of identity.

Recent theoretical work has begun to consider this question of how belonging to different social groups may influence motivations and support for different forms of social action to achieve hierarchy change (e.g., see Craig et al., 2020; Radke et al., 2020; Selvanathan et al., 2020). There is limited relevant empirical examination, however, particularly for understanding how the possession of multiple social identities influences support for hierarchy change. Given that individuals hold multiple, intersecting social identities (Cole, 2009; Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015; Remedios & Snyder, 2015), belonging to a socially dominant group in one dimension does not preclude facing discrimination along another dimension (e.g., Black men are members of a socially dominant gender group, but a marginalized racial group).

Recent experimental work finds that if people consider social disparities that advantage one of their group identities, they report facing greater discrimination due to their other identities as well as greater support for working with oppressed outgroups to pursue common cause (Brown & Craig, 2020). For example, among racial minority undergraduates from upper-income family backgrounds, considering class-based inequality led to greater reports that they experience discrimination due to their other social identities (e.g., reporting higher levels of racial discrimination). In another study conducted with heterosexual Americans, reading an article about discrimination faced by gay Americans led to reports that the social groups participants belonged to (ingroups) faced more discrimination and,

further, expressed greater support for the notion that different oppressed groups should work together (Brown & Craig, 2020).

This research suggests that considering a form of inequality in which one is a member of the socially dominant group (e.g., racial inequality for White women, class inequality for upper-income racial minorities, or sexuality-based inequality for heterosexuals) can heighten perceptions of discrimination faced due to one's other identities. This greater salience of ingroup discrimination in response to information about an outgroup's inequality could reasonably either spark solidarity (due to perceived shared experiences) or drive a wedge between members of different social groups (due to competitive victimhood processes; see Young & Sullivan, 2016; Vollhardt, 2020). Current research has not yet determined the circumstances in which each of these different downstream consequences may occur.

Research also finds that perceiving that one has faced discrimination in one domain can sensitize people to perceiving their group-based *privileges* along another domain (see Rosette & Tost, 2013). In samples of full-time working professionals, White women and racial minority men were more inclined than White men to report that their organization advantages White people and men, respectively, and this was particularly the case if they felt they were not able to thrive and be successful in their current job (Rosette & Tost, 2013). For example, White women were more likely than White men to report personal experiences with gender-based discrimination, which predicted perceptions that men have group-based privileges and, subsequently, perceptions that Whites have racial privilege (again, particularly among women who reported that they were moderately, but not highly, successful; Rosette & Tost, 2013). Taken together with the above work, this research finds that people can, at times, perceive connection among the different forms of social inequality and group-based hierarchies and that perceiving discrimination along one dimension can facilitate awareness or perception of group-based advantages and disadvantages in other domains.

As another example, research has found that presenting information about racism to heterosexual racial minorities can evoke a derogation effect, with less positive attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and less support for policies that would benefit sexual minorities (Craig & Richeson, 2014a). Yet recent research reveals that highlighting similarities in discrimination experiences can lead to an opposite pattern. Specifically, highlighting connections between past racial discrimination and recent forms of discrimination against sexual minorities (e.g., in terms of marriage laws that have historically targeted both groups) increases heterosexual racial minority group members' support for political positions that would benefit sexual minorities (e.g., support for legalizing same-sex marriage or adoption rights; Cortland et al., 2017). That is, despite being members of the socially-advantaged sexuality-based group, perceptions of shared discrimination due to one's racial minority group membership spurred empathy and solidarity (see also Sirin et al., 2016).

Overall, this work suggests that it may be useful to disentangle the type of psychological process underlying hierarchy mitigation (e.g., allyship, solidarity, ingroup collective action) from individuals' social group membership and, instead, focus on how people view their identities in relation to a form of inequality to determine which underlying process leads to social change action (see Craig et al., 2020). While social change may be jointly sought both by members of socially dominant and marginalized groups, the lenses through which members of these groups identify and perceive injustice may shape how they act in efforts to

enact change. For example, a dominant group member may engage in social change action either via a process of (a) ingroup collective action, (b) solidarity, or (c) allyship depending on whether the impetus for action spurs from identifying with the affected group itself (e.g., Kunst et al., 2018), from perceived common stigmatization experiences along different forms of inequality (e.g., Cortland et al., 2017), or from perceiving one's ingroup as unjustly privileged (e.g., Leach et al., 2002; Phillips & Lowery, 2020). Future research would benefit from understanding ingroup collective action, solidarity, and allyship as complementary (yet distinct) psychological processes that may lead people to engage in social change to mitigate group-based hierarchy.

5.3. When Do People Seek to Rearrange Group-Based Hierarchies?

Whereas hierarchy maintenance and mitigation have each received ample attention in the political psychology literature, and hierarchy enhancement has received much theoretical (but less empirical) attention, efforts to *reorder* group-based hierarchies have received very limited examination. Thus, it is an intriguing, but relatively open question as to whether marginalized groups may seek to maintain group-based hierarchy, but reorder it such that their group becomes positioned on top. This way in which individuals may seek to influence the hierarchy requires separating some often-conflated elements of group-based hierarchy—specifically, system stability and positional stability. This separation implies that, to the extent that motives underlying hierarchy maintenance action emphasize predictability, stability, and legitimacy (Leach et al., 2002; Jost, 2020), then the current overall system could be maintained even while the position of groups within that hierarchical system are rearranged. For example, individuals may support the idea of a meritocratic system in which rewards should be distributed based on relevant, controllable, individual factors, and individuals can both want to protect this system while rearranging their groups' relative standing within the hierarchy.

When only two groups in a hierarchy are studied at a time (e.g., men vs. women, White Americans vs. Black Americans), then group position and system stability are often confounded in the research design. However, given that actual hierarchies exist in many diverse contexts that include the presence of multiple well-represented groups in society, this diversity implies that the overarching hierarchical system can be maintained while a group's relative position within that system is shifted. For example, Black Americans may seek to shift their group's relative position within the hierarchy, but maintain a hierarchical system in which their racial group dominates over others.

Fitting this perspective, emerging work on SDO suggests that this individual difference orientation may not simply be related to preference for more versus less equality, but rather preference for certain *kinds* of arrangements (Lucas & Kteily, 2018; see also Waldfogel et al., 2021). Whereas those high in SDO generally want to maintain or even exacerbate existing inequalities, this work also finds that some of those *lower* in SDO want to support the advancement of those currently at the bottom of the hierarchy (for example, see Ponce de Leon & Kay, 2021). When given the chance to help if the *dominant* group is harmed, those lower in SDO may decline to do so (e.g., Lee et al., 2011; Lucas & Kteily, 2018).

For example, in an online convenience sample (Study 6, Lucas & Kteily, 2018), the relationships between SDO and empathy differed, depending on if participants were

randomly assigned to consider a student that had qualified for either a school's legacy admission policy that was ending or the school's affirmative action policy that was ending. Specifically, if considering a student who would qualify for a school's affirmative action policy that was ending, SDO predicted less empathy for the marginalized-group student and less opposition to the policy change (Lucas & Kteily, 2018). In contrast, if considering a student who would qualify for a school's legacy admission policy that was ending, SDO predicted *greater* empathy for the dominant-group student and *more* opposition to the policy change.

Overall, this work suggests that rather than only seeking to boost the status of marginalized groups, those lower in SDO are also (albeit, to a weaker extent) supportive of policy changes that are seen as harming a dominant group member. If both types of policies occur (those that boost marginalized groups and reduce advantages of dominant groups), this theoretically could yield rearrangement of the rank order, although more empirical research is needed to make strong claims.

Recent theorizing on triadic social stratification theory (TSST; Caricati, 2018) has considered the position of "intermediate-status" groups—groups positioned between at least two outgroups in a hierarchy. This work suggests that intermediate-status groups could conceivably coalesce with either lower-rank or higher-rank groups to form alliances in pursuit of hierarchy change or hierarchy maintenance, respectively (see Caricati, 2012, 2018; Sollami & Caricati, 2015). Often tested within occupational groups or national group contexts, a central tenet of TSST is that the perceived stability of the hierarchy is an important determinant of the intergroup behavior of intermediate-status group members. For example, across several studies (Studies 1 and 2 of Caricati et al., 2020), Italian participants were provided with information about the hierarchy of several countries: Germany was positioned as the highest status and most powerful, Italy (the ingroup) as intermediate status, and Greece as low-status. Importantly, participants were randomly assigned to read that either the international hierarchy was stable or not (i.e., whether Greece's GDP was increasing or remaining low). Results revealed that participants generally reported greater favorability of an alliance with the alleged high-status group (Germany; Study 1), however, participants' support of an alliance with the lower-status group (Greece; Study 2) was heightened if the hierarchy was positioned as unstable (vs. stable; Caricati et al., 2020). Overall, this work provides intriguing initial evidence that intermediate status groups' coalitional inclinations may differ in strategic ways, depending on their perception of the hierarchy itself (e.g., whether it is perceived as stable) and that some of these inclinations imply hierarchy rearrangement.

Recent work also reveals circumstances in which members of the dominant group anticipate forming a coalition with an intermediate-status group. In this work (Craig & Lee, 2022), the prospect of societal change due to the increasing status and power of Hispanic Americans activated perceptions that both White and Asian Americans will lose social status, which facilitated Whites' perceptions of Asian Americans as a potential ally in maintaining the current racial hierarchy. However, without a catalyst like perceptions of status threat from a growing third group, people's expectations of typical interracial coalitions are quite different. Indeed, among diverse sets of Americans (both White and racial minority group members), the predominate assumption appears to be that specific racial minorities will work together (against the interests of White Americans) for racialized political issues due to perceived interest convergence stemming from racial

stereotypes (Craig et al., 2022). For example, in a racially diverse sample, nine times out of ten, participants reported that Black and Hispanic Americans would coalesce on status-relevant issues such as low-income housing and welfare funding and further that these group's positions would be in opposition to participants' assumptions of Whites' positions on the issues (Craig et al., 2022).

A longitudinal study (Knowles et al., 2022) with a nationally representative sample of White Americans revealed that these types of beliefs about minority collusion may vary based on partisanship. Specifically, compared to White Democrats, White Republicans more strongly endorsed beliefs that minority groups collude and work together and that White people should act as a political bloc to defend their group's interests; these partisan differences occurred at the beginning of the study in 2015 and these beliefs increased over the three-year study duration (Knowles et al., 2022). Despite growing beliefs about minority group collusion among a subset of the White population, it is important to note that members of different marginalized groups do not automatically view one another as prospective coalition partners (see Craig et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2016, 2018a; Kaufmann, 2003). Overall, research has just begun to understand the psychological intricacies of coalition-building—both real or assumed—and the conditions in which groups seek hierarchy rearrangement in diverse societies, leaving an exciting avenue for future research to uncover.

6. Responses to Maintenance or Change of Group-Based Hierarchy

As reviewed above, individuals may interact with group-based hierarchies by working to maintain them, enhance them, mitigate them, or rearrange them. Next, we consider how individuals may, in turn, *react* when the hierarchy is maintained or changes in each of these ways.

6.1. Reactions to Hierarchy Maintenance

Research suggests that several psychological processes work to reduce the extent to which people (and particularly people whose group is dominant in the hierarchy) notice that hierarchy is being maintained (e.g., perceived legitimacy, system justifying ideologies, and legitimizing myths; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Pratto et al., 2006). Predictable differences emerge between the members of dominant and marginalized groups in terms of views of the group-based hierarchy and inequality itself. For example, on average, White Americans tend to perceive that greater progress toward racial equality has been made, compared with the perceptions of members of racial minority groups (although both groups indicated that at least some progress has been made; Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Eibach & Keegan, 2006). Follow-up experiments that manipulated participants' frame of reference for comparison revealed that this group-based difference in perceptions of progress is explained, in part, by the use of different reference points—White Americans compared racial progress against

the poor race relations of the past, whereas racial minority participants compared progress against ideal standards (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006).

As another example, an ethnographic field study within a dozen high schools in the US Midwest demonstrated that Black History Month commemorations tended to differ, depending on the student body demographics (Salter & Adams, 2016). In the schools in which the majority of students were White, the Black History Month displays (e.g., posters and imagery) tended to focus on less negative and painful aspects of Black history (e.g., slavery and racism) and more on celebratory and positive aspects of Black history (e.g., famous Black inventors), compared with the displays in schools with majority-minority student bodies. A separate sample of White Americans then rated the different Black History Month displays and these results revealed that on average, White Americans reported more positive affect and liking for the displays derived from majority-White schools (than those from majority-minority schools) and that this preference was strongest among participants who rated their White identity as important to their sense of self (Salter & Adams, 2016).

While the above studies provide evidence of a general tendency toward perceiving increasing progress (particularly among members of the dominant group in the hierarchy), there was no objective measure of racial progress with which to compare participants' ratings to determine if participants were over- or under-estimating the amount of hierarchy. More recent research utilizes a more objective measure to assess tendencies toward viewing the hierarchy as more or less equal than is accurate. That is, recent work (Kraus et al., 2019) has revealed vast underestimates in the average American's estimates of the magnitude of the racial wealth gap. While it is well known that humans tend to be quite poor at making these kinds of estimates (e.g., see Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Hauser & Norton, 2017; Phillips et al., 2021), participants' inaccuracies in this work tend to follow a reliable pattern in which the degree of racial hierarchy is consistently underestimated. Specifically, nationally representative samples of Americans were asked to report their perceptions of the wealth of a typical Black, Hispanic, and Asian family on a scale of $0–$200, assuming the wealth of a typical White family was $100 (Kraus et al., 2019). These estimates were then compared against data on racial groups' actual median wealth derived from the US Census Survey of Income and Program Participation. Although it is possible that the respondents have different conceptions than the Census Bureau of what constitutes wealth, the comparison between these numbers suggests that respondents perceived the wealth of Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans to be much closer to White Americans' wealth than may be accurate (89.3% of respondents overestimated equality by 20 or more percentage points and 61.5% overestimated equality by 50 or more percentage points).

Providing further empirical evidence to this point, recent work suggests that even if presented with information about persisting racial disparities in economic outcomes (highlighting an ongoing hierarchical system), people update their perceptions of past (1963), but not current (2016) wealth gaps, in a way that maintains perceptions of the current status quo as more equal than is accurate (Onyeador et al., 2021). Specifically, rather than adjusting their overestimates of contemporary racial economic equality, individuals who read information about economic disparities reported that the past was more equitable, compared with those who read about a topic unrelated to race (left-handedness). This finding suggests that one way people may make sense of ongoing racial disparities and maintain one's view of society as fair and progressing is to view the past as not so bad.

The predictable tendencies and misperceptions outlined above may be one example of a broader "myth of racial progress" narrative (Richeson, 2020). Social dominance theory may consider this type of narrative an example of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths—cultural ideologies widely known within a society that serve to maintain or enhance group-based inequality and hierarchy—as perceiving society to invariably move towards justice without outside intervention could legitimize the status quo and serve to stifle support for social change (why act, if things will always get better?).

This work adds to an emerging research area focused on understanding dominant group reactions to evidence of group inequity (i.e., unfair group hierarchies; Knowles et al., 2014; Phillips & Lowery, 2018). Some research has considered the invisibility hypothesis, or the idea that dominant groups, in particular, are less likely to notice advantages and unfairness that benefit them (e.g., McIntosh, 1989; Pratto & Stewart, 2012). For instance, it is possible that such social advantages are inherently less visible than are social disadvantages (Davidai & Gilovich, 2016; Phillips & Jun, 2022; Sawaoka et al., 2015; Wu & Dunning, 2020), due to cognitive mechanisms that prioritize potential threats and loss. However, other work has emphasized motivated factors at play, including basic needs for self-esteem, group-esteem, and preference for meritocracy (Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Knowles et al., 2014; Phillips & Lowery, 2015, 2020; Lowery et al., 2007).

Motivation may also play a role in shaping attention itself: for instance, those higher in SDO (Waldfogel et al., 2021; see also Kteily et al., 2017) or higher in social class (Dietze & Knowles, 2016; Kraus et al., 2010; see also Magee & Smith, 2013) are less likely to attend to inequality, in part due to an emphasis on their own instrumental goals. Attempting to integrate these perspectives, Phillips and Lowery (2018) propose "herd invisibility," in which both the cognitive and motivational factors that lead individual dominant group members to deny the existence of inequality in turn shape *social constructions* of inequality, which may minimize perceptions of unfair advantages (see also, Jun et al., 2022). Overall, this research suggests that the ongoing maintenance of the hierarchy may be contributed to, in part, by general tendencies of "not seeing" inequality or perceiving an inexorable trend toward social progress.

6.2. Reactions to Hierarchy Enhancement

To our knowledge, little research within psychology has considered reactions to the *enhancement* of group-based hierarchies (but see Eibach & Keegan, 2006). However, given that hierarchies can and regularly do become more extreme (e.g., Alvaredo et al., 2013; Gates, 2020), this represents an area that will likely benefit from future work. Here, we briefly consider related phenomena: how people react to hierarchy enhancement in small team contexts and how people understand growing economic inequality.

In smaller team contexts, individuals tend to react more strongly to the experience of status loss than to status gain (Pettit et al., 2010; Pettit & Lount, 2010; Neely & Dumas, 2016). For instance, when faced with a growing hierarchy, people are more willing to cheat to avoid falling behind than they are to cheat to get ahead (Pettit et al., 2016). This fits with prospect theory perspectives, which suggest that humans are generally more sensitive to losses than to gains. In turn, this work suggests that when group-hierarchy is enhanced, people ought to react in part based on their own group position: if their position is reduced (even

symbolically), reactions ought to be more negative, as compared to the degree of positivity when their position is improved.

In societal-level economic contexts, people tend to be motivated toward increased collective action and support more redistribution when they perceive rising inequality (Cruces et al., 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015). However, both cognitive and motivational forces often prevent people from perceiving the existence of exacerbated inequality (Hauser & Norton, 2017; Phillips et al., 2021). This work shows that beliefs about one's ability to climb the hierarchy (e.g., beliefs in meritocracy) can lead members of marginalized groups to justify existing inequality more and perceive less discrimination and social inequality (McCoy & Major, 2007; see also Davidai & Gilovich, 2015). Those who are slipping behind may not always notice this change, but when they do, they ought to be especially driven to act. In both cases, perceptions of mobility may also mitigate reactions to hierarchy enhancement, such that growing inequality is more tolerated to the extent individual mobility is still perceived to be possible (Day & Fiske, 2017).

6.3. Reactions to Hierarchy Mitigation

What happens when people perceive others actively engaging to attempt to mitigate an existing hierarchy (e.g., individuals engaging in collective action)? Recent work suggests that it may depend on the form of action being enacted. For example, dominant group members—particularly, those generally resistant to social change (more so than those open to social change)—are more likely to support making concessions to enact social change, if those collectively acting engage in non-normative nonviolent action (e.g., civil disobedience; Shuman et al., 2021). Fewer concessions were supported if individuals engaged in normative nonviolent action (e.g., peaceful demonstrations) or violent action (e.g., riots), or did not act at all. The authors suggest that this tactic is particularly effective because nonnormative nonviolent action reflects the best balance of disruption and perceived constructive intentions (i.e., constructive disruption; Shuman et al., 2021). That is, those engaging in non-normative nonviolent action are perceived to have positive intentions while still being disruptive enough to draw attention with the non-normativity of the action.

In addition to understanding how people respond to those collectively acting, a growing body of work suggests that people are quite sensitive to potential threats to the hierarchy and their status within it. For example, work examining responses to social progress highlights that making salient the progress that marginalized groups have made can lead to backlash among certain segments of the dominant group (e.g., Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014; Wilkins et al., 2017). Specifically, this work finds that among members of dominant groups (e.g., White Americans, men) who hold more status legitimizing beliefs, information that marginalized groups are making social gains (e.g., racial minorities, women) tends to lead to greater perceptions that their own dominant group is discriminated against (see Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014; Wilkins et al., 2017, 2018).

Furthermore, recent research suggests that people view population shifts within social hierarchies as potentially threatening to their ingroup's status, if one's ingroup is not alleged to be the one growing in size (for recent reviews, see Craig et al., 2018a, 2018b). This research is consistent with classic theorizing on group threat theory, which highlights the links between concerns about one's position in the hierarchy and intergroup attitudes

("group threat theory," Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958). Specifically, this perspective (Blumer, 1958) posits that prejudice toward minority groups stems from majority group members' feelings of concern regarding their dominant position, a proposition that is consistent with other work suggesting that anti-immigrant attitudes are a result of concerns about one's economic interests (Bobo, 1999). Blalock (1967) further considered group position concerns and linked it to prejudice—particularly, suggesting that perceptions of group size often serve as a proxy for perceived group power and that larger minority groups are seen as economic and political threats to members of the dominant group. This work is consistent with classic political science work (Key, 1949) in which White southern politics were driven by an effort to maintain White rule in so-called Black belts (areas with large proportions of Black residents). Particularly, this perspective suggested that Whites living in areas with larger percentages of Black residents maintained one-party (Democratic) rule to (1) prevent partisan competition for Black people's vote and (2) unify to strengthen opposition to any federal attempts to interfere in racial policy.

A growing body of social scientific research (Burrow et al., 2014; Craig & Richeson, 2014b, 2014d, 2017, 2018a, 2018b; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Major et al., 2018; Outten et al., 2012; Skinner & Cheadle, 2016; Willer et al., 2016) considers how demographic changes toward increasing racial diversity tend to be viewed as a potential evidence of hierarchy mitigation (and possibly rearrangement; for recent reviews, see Craig et al., 2018a, 2018b). This work typically experimentally manipulates the content of news articles and reveals that making salient the increasingly diverse national racial demographics elicits a host of intergroup and ideological outcomes among members of the current majority group (i.e., non-Hispanic White Americans). For example, presenting information about the changing national racial demographics (vs. control information) leads White Americans to express greater anxiety (Burrow et al., 2014), more anger and fear toward minority groups (Outten et al., 2012), and more explicit and automatically activated racial bias (Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Skinner & Cheadle, 2016), as well as endorse assimilation more strongly (Danbold & Huo, 2015), endorse conservative policy positions and political groups more strongly (Craig & Richeson, 2014d, Willer et al., 2016), and express greater concerns about facing anti-White discrimination (Craig & Richeson, 2017, 2018b). Indeed, in this work, presenting White Americans with information about trends toward greater racial diversity in the United States elicits greater perceptions that White Americans will face discrimination (particularly, in the future; Craig & Richeson, 2017), and one study finds that this also elicits support for policies that would require employers to make special training programs for White workers and to make special efforts to recruit White workers (Craig & Richeson, 2018b). Such policies, if prophylactically enacted, could serve to enhance the existing racial hierarchy.

This body of research implicates concerns about Whites' diminished societal status (in terms of group status, access to resources, and cultural prominence) as driving forces underlying these effects (see Craig & Richeson, 2014b, 2014d, 2017; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Major et al., 2018; Outten et al., 2012). Group status threat is often assessed in the literature as concern for the ingroup's status and influence in society and is often assessed relatively (e.g., perceptions that White Americans will have more or less status and influence than minority groups). There is also work identifying prototypicality threat (concern that one's group will no longer be seen as the cultural prototype, e.g., Danbold & Huo, 2015, 2021), symbolic threat (concern for unmarked benefits related to belonging; Stephan et al., 2009), and realistic threat (concern for group access to resources; Stephan et al., 2009).

Additionally, research suggests that existential concerns that one's racial group is disappearing may also be activated by salient information about White population decline (e.g., Bai & Federico, 2020). That is, information about the ingroup declining in population can elicit existential threat: concern for the continuing existence of one's group (Bai & Federico, 2020; Wohl et al., 2020). Overall, this work reveals that anticipating increasing diversity can activate a number of different forms of intergroup threat (e.g., group status, realistic, symbolic, existential) and is frequently examined among White Americans.

6.4. Reactions to Hierarchy Rearrangement

The prospect of a rearranged hierarchy is likely threatening among groups not portrayed as gaining in status or power in this prospective new hierarchy. Considering that the hierarchy might be rearranged could also elicit concerns regarding system stability and predictability. For members of the dominant group, hierarchy rearrangement implies loss of relative status, at minimum, and even the potential for hierarchy inversion. For example, White Americans' perceptions of how minorities will use power, if gained, greatly shifts their openness to relinquish group dominance (Kteily et al., 2021). Recent work on this idea suggests that some White Americans perceive that Black Americans would use any gains they make in power to dominate other groups and these perceptions uniquely predict opposition to policies that would empower Black Americans (e.g., affirmative action) as well as predict support for efforts that would maintain a hierarchy in which Whites are dominant (Kteily et al., 2021). As noted earlier, in a large, nationally representative panel of White Americans, Republicans and Independents showed increasing belief over time that minorities are working together against Whites' interests ("minority collusion"). Such perceptions predict support for the alt-right movement and opposition to Black Lives Matter (Knowles et al., 2022). Overall, the extent to which dominant group members assume that marginalized groups want to rearrange the hierarchy and are even colluding to do so predicts threat and efforts to stymie this perceived rearrangement. This implies that if a rearrangement actually occurred, dominant group members would perceive shifts in status and power that would trigger all of the threats discussed in the hierarchy mitigation section.

One's position in the hierarchy can also shape the degree to which rearrangement is perceived as threatening. Specifically, work on last-place aversion (Kuziemko et al., 2014) finds that people in the penultimate position are particularly sensitive to the possibility of moving to last place in a hierarchy. For example, people who were randomly assigned to second-to-last place were more likely to give money to the person one rank above rather than the person one rank below (Kuziemko et al., 2014). Taken to a policy level, last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them and has been used to explain why individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase (Kuziemko et al., 2014).

Relevant to this idea, one paper has examined how other racial minority groups (e.g., Black Americans and Asian Americans) react to information about demographic change that is driven by another minority group (i.e., Hispanic population growth). Given that Hispanic growth represents the growth of an outgroup to non-Hispanic Black or Asian Americans, one may expect that such information would also elicit threat reactions, similar to what has been observed among White Americans. Indeed, consistent with this possibility,

Black and Asian American participants who read an article highlighting Hispanic population growth (vs. control information) reported greater preference for conservative positions (or less support for liberal positions) on a variety of political issues (Craig & Richeson, 2018a). Taken together with the prior work on White Americans' reactions to racial shifts, this body of work suggests that anticipating demographic change and potential for hierarchy rearrangement can elicit threat responses and support for policies that would maintain the status quo among groups not portrayed as driving the population growth.

7. Opportunities for Future Research

Ample previous research has tried to answer the question of why group-based hierarchies exist and are sustained. Still more work has also considered the circumstances in which people seek to reduce hierarchy via increasing marginalized groups' rank in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, a number of unanswered questions call for future research. We summarize these below.

7.1. Understudied Interactions with Group-Based Hierarchy

As our review above reveals, research has just begun to consider when groups may seek to rearrange (rather than reduce) the hierarchy and what other groups' responses are to the prospect of hierarchy inversion (Kteily et al., 2021). Some of the prior work examining when people seek to engage in political action to improve the position of marginalized groups or how dominant groups respond to hierarchy threats may actually be tapping into these hierarchy-rearrangement concerns, but most studies do not use methods that allow for this to be distinguished from hierarchy-mitigation concerns. Relatedly, almost no empirical psychological research considers hierarchy enhancement or exacerbation—when groups may seek to make the hierarchy steeper. Whereas hierarchy maintenance and mitigation efforts have received much empirical attention, groups may attempt to manage hierarchy in other ways. Future work should explore these possibilities.

Another area in need of further clarification is when and why evidence of inequality and hierarchy is, at times, accepted and when it is misperceived (see McCall et al., 2017; Hauser & Norton, 2017; Phillips et al., 2021). For example, while evidence of inequality and existing hierarchies can spur people towards hierarchy-mitigating policy support and social action (e.g., Dietze & Craig, 2021; McCall et al., 2017), such evidence can also lead to psychological processes that serve to maintain the legitimacy of hierarchy, thus, thwarting the likelihood of engaging in reparative action (e.g., Onyeador et al., 2021). Understanding which process is likely to occur in response to evidence of inequality is essential for predicting political behavior.

7.2. Unpacking "Threat"

An area for future clarification is in explaining how to predict which *types* of threats are elicited by expected challenges to the hierarchy. Theoretical traditions often vary in their focus on different forms of threat. For example, Blalock (1967) delineates two forms

of threat: (a) economic (e.g., concerns about loss of jobs), and (b) political threat (e.g., concerns about losing political control and power). One could also distinguish (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Kinder, 1985; Stephan et al. 2009) between realistic threats (threats to the physical welfare or resources of the ingroup, see also "realistic group conflict theory"; Sherif et al., 1961; Campbell, 1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and symbolic threats (threats to the ingroup's system of meaning and values; see also Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sanders 1996; Meertens & Pettigrew 1997; Sears & Henry 2003).

Yet many times it is not obvious which forms of threat may be elicited in different forms of hierarchy-challenging contexts. For example, while group status threat (i.e., concerns that one's group will lose status) has been found to account for why information about changing demographics influences policy preferences (Craig & Richeson, 2014d), reducing concerns about Whites' racial status *did not* reduce concerns about facing anti-White discrimination following the same article prime (Craig & Richeson, 2017). Instead, assuaging concerns about no longer being the cultural prototype alleviated Whites' perceptions that anti-White discrimination will rise in a racially diverse future United States (Craig & Richeson, 2017). Thus, our understanding of which different forms of intergroup threat (e.g., group status, realistic, symbolic, existential) are elicited and drive different outcomes following information that the hierarchy may be changed is currently incomplete.

An additional consideration in need of further attention is that threats can be experienced at the group level (e.g., group-esteem threat; Branscombe et al., 1999; group-dominance threat; Chow et al., 2013; fraternalistic relative deprivation; Runciman, 1966) or at the personal level (e.g., threats to one's personal sense of self-esteem or morality; Phillips & Lowery, 2020; Brown & Craig, 2020; inequity in interpersonal relationships; Adams, 1965). Perceptions that one is threatened at the group level and the personal level may, at times, coincide, but this is not always the case. For example, past work suggests that changing demographics information leads Whites to report that they are personally-anxious (Burrow et al., 2014) as well as to report that the status of White people (as a group) is under threat (e.g., Outten et al., 2012). In contrast, information about group privileges (e.g., Phillips & Lowery, 2015; see also Wright et al., 1990) can lead dominant group members to agree that their group is privileged, while still disagreeing with the idea that they are *personally* privileged. In attempts to prove this point, dominant group members even work harder to bolster the view of oneself as not personally privileged (Phillips & Lowery, 2020). Taken together, the sheer variety of different forms of group-relevant threats and the lack of clarity in the circumstances under which one will experience different forms of threat will likely hamper any intervention efforts and thus, is in need of further research.

7.3. Complex Hierarchies: Multiple Groups and Individuals

With notable exceptions (e.g., Benjamin, 2017; Collingwood, 2020; Cikara, 2020; Craig & Lee, 2022; Dixon et al., 2020) and despite more complex theorizing (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), much empirical research focuses on dynamics between two groups at a time, even within diverse hierarchies, which limits our understanding of how groups relate to one another and to hierarchical systems in diverse societies. When do people reach out to members of other groups to either change or maintain the hierarchy? How do intermediate-ranked groups interact with the hierarchy and how do marginalized and dominant groups

respond towards intermediate-status groups? Social scientific research is just beginning to understand these complex dynamics, but such work is essential for a more complete understanding of politics in diverse societies.

Another tension in the current literature regards who exactly is being theorized about when group behavior is evoked: elites or citizens? For example, some theories especially emphasize the elite and powerful members within a dominant group (e.g., interest convergence theory, Bell, 1980; see also Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chow et al., 2013; Jun et al., 2017). The norms and socialization processes set by these powerful group members may in turn shape the experience of the masses. From this perspective, altruism or genuine intergroup helping motivations become less feasible and proclamations of such motivations will elicit suspicion (Konrath et al., 2016; Kristofferson et al., 2014).

Other work theorizing about group behavior may instead emphasize average citizens, including those who may deviate from the group norm. This focus on individual group members, rather than the group as a whole (i.e., as led by elites), presents new potential motives: alternate sources of esteem (e.g., moral or political identities; Brown & Craig, 2020; Phillips & Lowery, 2020) or the desire for justice (Lowery et al., 2009). From this view, genuine allyship from dominant group members appears more feasible. Indeed, individual-esteem and justice motives, including egalitarianism and fairness, are also powerful in guiding action. These may represent an opening in which the dominant position of advantaged group members becomes psychologically untenable ("poisoning the consciences of the fortunate," Leach et al., 2002), leading people to give up group material interests to satisfy alternate motives. It is possible that genuine coalitional action across social groups primarily endures as long as a sense of shared interest occurs (e.g., Cortland et al., 2017). The burgeoning research examining underlying motives of dominant group allies (e.g., Selvanathan et al., 2020; Radke et al., 2020) will help elucidate this puzzle, but further research comparing motives of both citizens and elites is warranted.

8. Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of group-based hierarchy, including theories about what creates and sustains hierarchy, how individuals may interact with group-based hierarchy—acting to maintain it or change it—as well how people react when the hierarchy is maintained or in flux. Some ways in which people take action to influence an existing group-based hierarchy were well-examined within the literature (e.g., when people may seek to maintain the existing hierarchy or mitigate it), whereas other forms of interaction have more nascent empirical evidence (e.g., conditions in which people seek hierarchy enhancement or rearrangement). Then, discussing the literature on how people respond when the hierarchy is in these different states, we again found that some research areas were well trodden (e.g., how people respond to the notion that group-based hierarchy may be mitigated), while others are still developing (e.g., how people respond when hierarchy is exacerbated). We identified how certain forms of interaction with the hierarchy have been empirically conflated (e.g., distinguishing hierarchy-enhancement from hierarchy-maintenance and hierarchy-mitigation from rearrangement). We ended by considering several areas that currently lack clarity, which we believe present opportunities for

valuable future contributions. These open questions and more await further investigation into how people exist within and interact with group-based hierarchical systems. In an unprecedented time of social engagement, sociocultural change, and contact (e.g., increasing diversity and globalization), understanding how individuals experience and respond to hierarchy is imperative.

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CHAPTER 24

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POLITICAL IDENTITIES

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LILLIANA MASON

THE very nature of political identities—in particular partisan and ideological identities—sits uncomfortably with normative ideals of democratic behavior. Though politics has long been understood as rooted in identity-motivated behavior (i.e., Campbell et al. 1960), these motivations do not necessarily match an idealistic view of voters as rational, objective, and informed (Achen and Bartels 2016). Nonetheless, social identification with political groups is a crucial element driving political behavior and must inform any study of citizens' participation, organization, and judgment. The field of political psychology allows us to combine long-studied theories of partisan identity with social-psychological literature that explains social identity and intergroup conflict. By using psychological theories to understand political identities, recent research has been able to explain how voters process information, take political action, respond emotionally, and even exhibit prejudice against their political opponents. While these behaviors are often not "rational" from an individual economic perspective, they are certainly in line with perfectly normal and predictable psychological motivations (Huddy 2018).

The study of identity in political science has changed across time. The "Michigan School" approach made it clear that social identities influenced political behavior, and that partisanship itself could be thought of as a social identity, capable of skewing partisans' understanding of the political world (Campbell et al. 1960). This view was challenged in later decades, as a more instrumental view of partisanship took hold (i.e., Fiorina 1981). The instrumental argument suggested that voters made rational political choices, based on an objective observation of political events and figures, and in their individual economic interest. The biasing effects of partisan identities were re-examined in the early 2000s (i.e., Bartels 2002), leading to a new body of research that took advantage of social identity theory and other psychological theories to better inform political science's understanding of the role of identity in politics. In particular, more recent research considers partisan and ideological identities as social identities, distinct from a policy-oriented understanding of these concepts (i.e., Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Ellis and Stimson 2009). By examining the "issue-based" and "identity-based" elements of partisanship and ideology separately, this work allows researchers to be more precise in our measurement of and predictions about political behavior.

Recent research has also begun to examine the way that partisan identities operate alongside other important social identities (Mason 2018b). Indeed, an alignment between political and other social identities such as race, religion, and even "place" can provide additional energy to political or partisan conflicts (Cramer 2016; Jacobs and Munis 2019; Margolis 2018; Tesler and Sears 2010a; M. Levendusky 2009). The increasing alignment between social identities, or "social sorting," can be used to explain another identity-based political phenomenon—what is generally known as "affective polarization" (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). This refers to a view of polarization that centers on how partisans feel about each other rather than what they believe government should do. The process of social sorting has been documented in American politics, and its effects are also documented in international contexts, under the terminology of "cleavage structures" (Selway 2011b). By thinking of polarization in an identity-based manner, political psychology has been able to better inform scholarship on political polarization—improving measurement and operationalization of the concept.

Through understanding the identity-based motivations underlying political behavior, it becomes easier to explain seemingly irrational behavior of voters, emotional responses to political events, increasing polarization, and the confluence of prejudice and partisanship.

Politics is essentially formalized intergroup conflict. Without a firm understanding of the group dynamics underlying political behavior, it is difficult to fully understand politics as a whole. In the interest of space, this chapter will mainly examine social identities as they are related to partisanship and ideology. Other chapters will directly address additional social identities and their direct relationships with political behavior and politics (see Perez and Vicuna, Chapter 25, this volume; Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume).

1. Major Theoretical Approaches to Identity Formation

To understand the formation and activation of political identities, we must first understand how individuals form groups in the first place, and what those group attachments mean for behavior and judgment. Individuals can be organized into groups in multiple ways, for multiple reasons, and can feel attached to these groups to differing degrees. I focus here on four major approaches to the study of social group formation. Each of these can provide a different perspective on the underlying dynamics and psychological motivations for social group or identity formation and functioning.

1.1. Evolutionary Perspective

At face value, an evolutionary perspective on group formation is quite simple to conceptualize. Humans have always formed social groups in order to survive and reproduce (Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume). Families, communities, even civilizations would be impossible to imagine without a natural human inclination to unite with other individuals in pursuit of cooperation and group preservation. Caporael and Baron (1997) write that social

groups are "the mind's natural environment" (pg. 317). We can see and experience that human psychology is deeply rooted in social relationships. Van Bavel and Pereira (2018) note that social groups (like political parties) fulfill basic social needs, like "belonging, distinctiveness, epistemic closure, access to power and resources, and provide a framework for the endorsement of (moral) values" (pg. 5).

From this perspective, basic activities such as childrearing, food gathering, tool development, food production, and group defense are all reliant upon a social group working together. Human survival requires cooperation between group members, trust in the loyalty of other group members, defense of the group from outsiders, and the reliability and enforcement of group norms. All of these requirements can be observed in modern political intergroup relations.

Cikara, Botvinick, and Fiske (2011) even identify group-formation patterns in neural activity, suggesting a deep human inclination toward identifying, forming, and maintaining group boundaries. These are generally most identifiable in the case of ingroup formation—not outgroup derogation (a finding consistent with Marilynn Brewer's 1999 findings).

In particular, McDermott and Hatemi (2018) consider the use of an evolutionary perspective essential to understanding contemporary populist and identity-based politics. They argue that the basic human needs for group cohesion across time have typically devolved to concerns over "resource allocation, in-group defense and out-group discrimination, and attempt to regulate sex and reproduction" (pg. 2). They find clear parallels between these types of long-standing group-based motivations in contemporary political conflicts over "access to health care, the status of transgender individuals and a woman's right to choose, how to view out-groups such as immigrants, and how we defend ourselves in the war against terrorism" (pg. 2). These may be contemporary examples of political debates, but they can be seen as enduring examples of deeply-rooted human needs for status, security, and resources.

1.2. Categorization and Group Salience

Self-categorization theory (SCT) attributes group cohesion to cognitive factors such as the situational salience of group identity. In this perspective, individuals hold multiple concepts of self, and the function of the social self is situation-specific. A person will consider themselves to be part of a social group if the situational context brings the group to mind. A particular group identity often becomes salient in the clear presence or reminder of a relevant outgroup. As the contrast between the two groups grows more prominent, a person "depersonalizes" their own individual view of themselves, and feels more similar to other members of the group they belong to (Turner et al. 1987). The shift from personal to collective identity is accompanied by increased adherence to group norms and heightened self-stereotyping, factors that can lead to political cohesion and cooperation (Turner et al. 1987; Terry and Hogg 1996).

Much of this process of depersonalization relies on a strong ingroup "prototype." The prototype can take the form of a leader whose ideas and suggestions group members comply with. This compliance confers status onto the leader, creating a status-based differentiation between leaders and followers (Hogg 2001). Alternately, group members may generate a group prototype by examining the social makeup of the group. Egan (2020) finds that some

partisans will alter their professed ethnic and religious identities to conform with the party's social prototype.

1.3. Realistic Group Interest

Realistic group interest theories focus on the role of perceived or real inequalities between groups as drivers of group-based behavior. These theories include realistic group conflict, relative deprivation, social dominance theory, and Blumer's theory of group position (Blumer 1958; Kteily, Sidanius, and Levin 2011; Sidanius et al. 2007; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Together, these theories suggest that group membership is politically important to the extent that tangible group gains and losses drive group members' political decisions.

According to *realistic group conflict theory*, group members are motivated to take action and stereotype outgroup members when two or more groups are competing over limited resources (Sherif and Sherif 1953). *Relative deprivation theory* predicts political participation and angry and resentful emotions as a result of the judgment that one's group is unfairly disadvantaged in relation to another group (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015). *Social dominance theory* predicts political behavior rooted in a "preference for inequality among social groups" (Pratto et al. 1994). In particular, it predicts opposition to political policies that reduce inequality. Finally, *Blumer's theory of group position* locates the source of racial group prejudice in the importance of the dominant racial group's superiority over the subordinate racial group. Blumer writes, "the dominant group is not concerned with the subordinate group as such but it is deeply concerned with its position vis-a-vis the subordinate group" (Blumer 1958, pg. 4). In general, these theories are concerned with which groups get power and which have the most power (see Craig and Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume).

Group interests are generally more effective than individual self-interest at motivating political behavior—although the two can often be intertwined (Bobo 1983). In the case that they are conflicting, however, we can observe seemingly "irrational" political behavior, in which individuals ignore their self-interest in pursuit of group interests. For example, racial group interests motivated some uninsured white Americans to oppose the 2010 Affordable Care Act, which would have provided them with health insurance, but would have also provided care to Black Americans and offered a political victory to the first Black American president (Tesler 2012). In fact, much of the work on the topic of realistic group interest is rooted in racial intergroup conflict.

1.4. Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory (SIT) is a precursor to self-categorization theory described above. The main difference between the theories is that SCT is mainly cognitive in nature, while SIT includes other motivations linked to the protection of group status and esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The earliest versions of social identity theory developed by Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) placed key emphasis on the need among group members "to differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity" (Turner et al. 1987, pg. 42). Social identity theory was originally demonstrated via "minimal group paradigm" experiments, in which relatively meaningless group labels were

randomly assigned to experimental subjects who nonetheless proceeded to privilege their own assigned group over the other (for a summary, see Brewer 1979). Some subjects were willing to accept a loss for their own group as long as the outgroup lost even more (Billig and Tajfel 1973). This theory helps to explain why group members might forego the "greater good" for all groups in order to achieve higher status for their own group.

Social identity theory is primarily related to positive feelings about one's ingroup, and only secondarily related to negative or derogatory feelings about a relevant outgroup (Brewer 1999). According to this theory, outgroup hatred or prejudice arises only when a group's status is threatened by an outgroup.

Social identities can also vary in the strength of a person's attachment to the group, and that strength of attachment can alter reactions to status threats. Those who are strongly attached to a group are more likely to respond to group status threats with anger—according to a related theory known as *intergroup emotions theory* (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; E. R. Smith and Mackie 2015; Eliot R. Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007). This theory combines social identity theory with *appraisal theory* (Brader and Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume) to demonstrate that when a group member is strongly attached to the group and can identify the source of the status threat, they are likely to respond to the threat with anger—an emotion that generally encourages action. If a group member is either weakly attached to the group or does not know the source of the status threat, they are more likely to respond with anxiety—an emotion that is related to avoidance (Brader and Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). Importantly, this theory argues that individual group members can feel emotions on behalf of the group—unrelated to their own individual circumstances.

Another theory that emerges from SIT is *uncertainty-identity theory* (i.e., Hogg 2000, 2014; Hogg et al. 2007). This theory identifies uncertainty about oneself as a motivator for forming group identities. Self-uncertainty can emerge from widespread social conditions such as war or disaster—or it can emerge from individual conditions such as unemployment or divorce. Groups provide distinctive attributes that group members can use to prescribe their own attitudes, feelings, and behavior—providing individuals with a sense of who they are and what they should think and do. Under conditions of extreme uncertainty, individuals may be motivated to join extremist groups—whose rigid structure of strict boundaries and uniform beliefs and behaviors can provide relief from extreme or enduring uncertainty.

2. Partisanship and Ideology: Issues and Identities

With this understanding of how identities form and how they can affect behavior, I move to the topics of partisanship and ideology. The theories of social identity and group cohesion are crucial for informing a complete understanding of the role of partisanship and ideology—two concepts that have not always been understood as identities.

2.1. Traditional Views of Partisanship and Ideology

Early studies of American political behavior cited partisan identity as a central predictor of vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Berelson 1962; Lazarsfeld 1944). Campbell et al. (1960)

considered partisanship to be a "perceptual screen" through which voters perceived politics and political figures in a way that was more generous to their own party than to their outparty. This view—often referred to as the "Michigan School" approach—was consistent with many of the theories of group identity discussed above. Partisanship was considered to be a group identity, and also to be informed by other group identities. Campbell et al. (1960) noted that racial, religious, and other identities could influence which party a person voted for. But further, partisanship itself operated like an identity—it was learned during childhood from parents and friends and continued to be enforced by social environments and contexts throughout adulthood. A person's vote was only partially motivated by their preferred policies. It was also an act of group-based solidarity and a decision that did not require much deliberation for partisans.

Over the next twenty years, views on partisanship evolved, with Fiorina (1981) writing that, instead of an identity, partisanship was more like a reasoned decision that voters made based on a "running tally" of their evaluations of a party and its leaders. In this view, voters were choosing candidates because they believed the candidate and their party was more in line with the voter's own preferences for governing. This was consistent with the rational choice perspective of Downs (1957). Rather than being about identity, voting in this theory was related to assessments of issues and policies. Normatively, this approach was reassuring. Voters that make decisions based on impartial thought and evaluations are participating in democracy in a reasonable and responsible manner.

Another 20 years later, though, American political science returned to the idea of partisanship as a biasing factor in partisans' understanding and evaluation of politics. Bartels (2002) urged political scientists to go "Beyond the Running Tally," revealing evidence that partisans were, in fact, biased toward their own party in their assessments of political reality. Their evaluations of the American economy, policy beliefs, presidential traits, performance, approval, and factual questions about the level of unemployment or inflation were consistently related to partisanship. This study was one of many that pushed the study of American political behavior back toward an identity-focused view of partisanship, where it stands now.

Similarly, ideology has traditionally been understood as a somewhat rational coherent set of policy preferences or values—a "system of beliefs" (Converse 1964). But in more recent research, the labels "liberal" and "conservative" have come to be understood as both a description of policy attitudes and a group label—two concepts that are not always perfectly correlated (Ellis and Stimson 2009).

Overall, the extent to which partisanship and ideology behave like a social identity or like an issue-based decision likely depends on the political context—including the positions and behavior of the two parties as well as the degree of partisan polarization. Here, I present evidence supporting the identity-based nature of partisanship and ideology. Social identities can warp political evaluation and decision-making, and are therefore an important phenomenon central to the normative underpinnings of democracy (Achen and Bartels 2016).

2.2. Measuring Partisanship and Ideology as Social Identities

2.2.1. *American Partisanship*

Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2004) and Greene (2004) reintroduced the concept of American partisanship as a social identity in the early 2000s. Green et al (2004) explicitly

rejected the construct of social identity theory, but nonetheless likened partisanship to a religion (see also Finkel et al. 2020). Greene (2004, 2002) explicitly argued for a measure of partisanship rooted firmly in social identity theory—using the 10-item *Identification with a Psychological Group* (IDPG) scale (Mael and Tetrick 1992). He found this identity-based scale to be a better predictor of partisan attitudes and behavior than the traditional 7-point scale of partisanship commonly used by the American National Election Studies. Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015) also found that a reduced, 4-item version of the IDPG scale was a more powerful predictor of partisan anger, enthusiasm, and activism than either the traditional 7-point scale or a measure of issue extremity. Partisan identity could even be detected on an implicit level, with partisans responding to party cues faster than they can cognitively process them Theodoridis (2017). According to these empirical metrics, partisanship does function as a social identity for many Americans—with the ingroup preference and biased political judgment that implies.

2.2.2. *American Ideology*

Although the traditional (and common) understanding of ideology is directly related to political issues and values, recent scholarship has begun to examine the potential for an identity-based element of ideology—considering the groups "liberals" and "conservatives" as social entities theoretically independent of policy attitudes. Ellis and Stimson (2009, 2012) identified a difference between what they termed "symbolic" and "operational" ideology. Symbolic ideology acts more like an identity, while operational ideology is related to policy attitudes. They identified a large number of "symbolic" conservatives who were "operationally" liberal ("conflicted conservatives"). In other words, many self-identified conservatives held generally liberal policy attitudes. The same was not the case among self-identified liberals, whose symbolic and operational ideology was more consistent.

Claassen, Tucker, and Smith (2014), however, were able to identify conflicted liberals as well, finding that around 30% of Americans are conflicted conservatives and 20% are conflicted liberals. Importantly, conflicted conservatism is related to Republican and conservative identities, low political knowledge, religiosity, and Fox News exposure. Conflicted liberalism is related to Democratic and liberal identities, low political knowledge, and Black or Hispanic ethnic identities.

Further research explicitly measured ideology as a social identity, using items similar to the partisan social identity measure—assessing individuals' social attachment to their ideological group labels (Malka and Lelkes 2010; Mason 2018a; Devine 2015). This work demonstrated that many self-identified liberals and conservatives do consider themselves to be socially attached to other people who share their ideological group label, and that the strength of this identity affected their feelings toward and evaluations of their ideological outgroup, independently of their policy preferences.

2.2.3. *Comparative Partisanship*

The study of partisanship as a social identity has also been conducted in non-American contexts. Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017) use a similar partisan social identity scale as that used in the United States to measure the strength of partisan social identity in European

multi-party systems. They find that in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom this identity-based scale is useful for measuring partisan social attachments and is better than a measure of ideological intensity (both identity and issue-based) at predicting inparty voting and political participation. In newer southern European democracies, partisanship is generally less strongly related to social identity and more to evaluation of party performance—a more instrumental outcome (Lisi 2014).

However, in a non-European context, Conroy-Krutz, Moehler, and Aguilar (2016) find evidence of partisan influence on voter decision-making in Uganda, a new multiparty system, while Carlson (2016) identifies strong partisan social identity and partisan motivated reasoning in the same nation. In Brazil, Samuels and Zucco (2014) find evidence that party identification can influence policy positions (counter to the assumptions of normative democratic theory), even in a relatively new democracy with a fragmented party system.

2.3. The Limits on Impartial Partisan Reasoning

One important implication of the identity-based nature of partisanship and ideology is that identities tend to alter assessments of reality and decision-making in a way that benefits the ingroup at all costs. This biased reasoning can generate seemingly "irrational" political behavior—in which voters privilege the status of the party over their own well-being.

2.3.1. *Motivated Reasoning and Inaccurate Beliefs*

Partisan motivated reasoning is a process by which partisans seek out information that is beneficial to their party, and disregard or counter-argue information that harms their party or lowers its status (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006; Petersen et al. 2013; Lodge and Taber 2013; Leeper and Slothuus 2014). Importantly, these effects are most common among those who are the *most* informed about politics and scientifically literate (Kahan et al. 2012; Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2016). Attempts to provide correct information to partisans can sometimes generate a boomerang effect—whereby strongly identified partisans react to party-inconsistent information with increased commitment to the party line (Redlawsk 2002; Hart and Nisbet 2012; Zhou 2016). Partisans may also, when confronted with undeniable evidence of bad news for their party (like an economic collapse or a terrorist attack), shift the blame for the bad news away from their party toward some other cause (Bisgaard 2015; Healy, Kuo, and Malhotra 2014). Even evaluations of objective economic conditions can be biased by partisanship (Rogers 2016; Enns and McAvoy 2012). Furthermore, these biased and mistaken beliefs are not attributable to "partisan cheerleading"—individuals seem to sincerely believe these motivated beliefs (Peterson and Iyengar 2021).

It is possible to counteract these motivations. By prompting partisans to consider civic duty or accuracy over partisanship, some partisans can overcome some of these biases (E. Groenendyk 2013; Bullock 2009; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014). Removing a discussion from the political sphere and encouraging open-mindedness can also reduce motivated reasoning (E. Groenendyk and Krupnikov 2021).

However, many partisans do not know the accurate story of who makes up the other party. Americans tend to overestimate the number of partisans who are members of politically salient groups (Ahler and Sood 2018). People substantially overestimate the percentage of Democrats who are union members, LGBT, Black, and atheist, and also overestimate the percentage of Republicans who are Southerners, over 65, Evangelical, and earn more than $250,000 per year. These misperceptions are significantly greater when a partisan is estimating these numbers for their opposing party. According to Ahler and Sood (2018), these beliefs are associated with allegiance to the inparty and animosity toward the outparty. When people are told the correct percentages, however, they see members of the other party as less extreme and feel less socially distant from them. There are similar effects on policy attitudes—partisans believe their opponents to hold much more extreme policy attitudes than they do in reality—and that belief increases the attitude extremity of those who believe it (Ahler 2014; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016). These inaccurate beliefs about the characteristics of the outparty have real consequences for partisan conflict. For more information on partisan misinformation see Miller and Young (Chapter 16, this volume).

2.3.2. *Partisan Bias in Non-Political Realms*

Partisan identities do not only bias partisans in their evaluations of political reality, but they can also have effects on individuals' decision-making outside of the realm of politics. Bias against outgroup partisans has been observed in the sale of football tickets (Engelhardt and Utych 2020), distribution of college scholarships (Iyengar and Westwood 2015), ratings of personal interactions (Healy and Malhotra 2014), a prisoners' dilemma game (Balliet et al. 2018), college admissions decisions (Munro, Lasane, and Leary 2010), choosing romantic partners (Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2013), hiring (Gift and Gift 2015), choosing teammates (Lelkes and Westwood 2016), ratings of physical attractiveness (Nicholson et al. 2016), and neighborhood preferences (Hui 2013).

Recent research has even found dehumanizing effects of partisanship and ideology—with strongly identified partisans and ideologues believing that those in the outparty or opposing ideology are less than human to some degree (Crawford, Modri, and Motyl 2013; Cassese 2021; Martherus et al. 2021; Pacilli et al. 2016; Kalmoe and Mason 2022). Dehumanization is a significant risk factor for intergroup violence and conflict (Bandura 1999; Kalmoe and Mason 2022). This type of partisan bias goes beyond what the "Michigan School" conception of partisanship outlined. While a partisan identity can be a useful heuristic or an organizing tool for political behavior, it can also, under the wrong conditions, become a far more extreme influence on political behavior—even extending to political conflict.

By thinking about partisanship and ideology from an identity-based perspective, it becomes easier to explain more extreme political behavior.

3. MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

Having examined the potential biasing effects of partisan and ideological identities individually, it is important to take into account that any individual can and does hold multiple

social identities at any given time, and that the relationship between these identities can increase or decrease the biasing power of these social attachments (Roccas and Brewer 2002). This idea has appeared independently in political science and social psychological research. I will explain each independently and then synthesize the implications for politics.

3.1. Cross-cuttingness in Political Behavior

In the study of American political behavior, social identities can reduce the biasing effects of partisanship and political activity if they are "cross-cutting" or act as "cross-pressures" (Lazarsfeld 1944; Berelson 1962; Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset 1981). Robert A. Dahl (1967) wrote,

> A society offers a number of different lines along which cleavages in a conflict can take place; differences in geography, ethnic identification, religion, and economic position, for example, all present potential lines of cleavages in conflicts. If all the cleavages occur along the same lines, if the same people hold opposing positions in one dispute after another, then the severity of conflicts is likely to increase. (pg. 277)

When, for instance, partisanship and ideology grow increasingly aligned, as they did in American politics in the later 20th century (Levendusky 2009), the conflict between the parties is likely to grow increasingly intense (Mason 2015). As other social identities such as race and religion also divide by party, partisanship grows even stronger (Mason 2018b; Powell 1976).

When, however, partisans are exposed to cross-cutting social networks, they tend to grow more politically tolerant (Mutz 2002; Mutz and Mondak 2006), engage in less partisan-motivated reasoning (Klar 2014), engage in higher quality political thinking (Erisen and Erisen 2012), consume less partisan media (Scacco and Peacock 2014), and think of themselves in more non-partisan terms (Lupton, Singh, and Thornton 2015). They also tend to participate less in politics (Nir 2005; 2011; Brader, Tucker, and Therriault 2014). Here we have something of a normative conundrum. Cross-pressured partisans are less hostile to their partisan opponents, but they are also less active in politics altogether.

3.2. Identity Complexity in Social Psychology

Psychological theory supports the findings from political science on cross-cutting identities and cross-pressures at the individual level. Roccas and Brewer (2002) identified the concept of *identity complexity*, which goes beyond the study of a single social identity and instead looks at the relationship between multiple identities—and its implications for outgroup tolerance. In this work, high-complexity identities are those in which a single individual is a member of two (or more) groups and perceives the membership of the two groups to be relatively distinct. In other words, most of the members of one group are not perceived to also be members of the other group. Low-complexity identities are those in which a single individual is a member of two (or more) groups whose membership they perceive to be largely overlapping—most of the members of one group are also perceived to be members of the other group. In contrast with the political science work, this theory depends on subjective

perceptions of alignment between groups rather than the objective assessment of inter-group affiliations.

High-complexity identities tend to encourage tolerance of outgroup members, as the individual identifies with people who are like them, but also unlike them in some way. Low-complexity identities decrease tolerance of outgroup members because the individual does not consider themselves to be similar to people unlike them and has more constrained boundaries around their own identity. Brewer and Pierce (2005) measured the complexity of national, religious, occupational, political, and recreational social identities—finding that individual differences in the perception of the complexity of these identities significantly predicted tolerance of ethnic outgroups. Miller, Brewer, and Arbuckle (2009) found low identity complexity to be correlated with implicit and explicit racial attitudes, closedmindedness, low need for cognition, conservatism, and nationalism.

3.2.1. *Cleavage Structures in Comparative Perspective*

The comparative perspective on multiple identities tends to rely on a more macro view of the effects of "cross-cutting cleavages." At a societal level, scholarship demonstrates a significant relationship between the alignment of social and political identities and broad intergroup conflict (though for a critique, see Franklin 2010). In a study of 102 countries, Selway (2011a) finds that cross-cutting ethnic and religious identities decrease the likelihood of civil war. Gubler and Selway (2012) find that civil war onset is nearly twelve times less likely in societies where ethnicity is crosscut by class, geographic region, and religion. Scarcelli (2014) specifies that civil war is most likely in the presence of overlapping social cleavages in addition to catalysts such as economic decline and adverse regime change. From a macro-level perspective, the individual dynamics of social group attachment are played out on a global scale.

Altogether, considering the relationships between multiple identities can provide considerable insight into how individuals behave politically and how entire societies can be affected by the convergence or divergence of identities on a mass scale.

4. POLARIZATION

Much like partisanship and ideology, polarization as a concept has long been defined in policy-based terms. The traditional view of polarization in the United States meant that Democrats were becoming more extremely liberal in their policy attitudes and Republicans were becoming more extremely conservative in their policy attitudes. However, it is possible to think of polarization in identity-based terms. Rather than policy attitudes moving further to the ideological extremes (issue-based polarization), polarization can be thought of as group-based conflict (affective polarization). In this view, Democrats and Republicans hate each other not entirely because they disagree on policy, but also because of identity-based conflicts. This section will look at the rise of "affective polarization" in the study of political behavior.

4.1. Affective versus Issue-Based Polarization

A description of affective polarization begins in the United States, where the concept was developed and has been widely researched. However, emerging research has looked at this phenomenon in other countries, and that will be described after the US case. In short, affective polarization describes a scenario in which partisans of two parties dislike each other, in a way not rooted in policy-based disagreements.

Prior to the study of "affective polarization," political scientists in the United States were engaged in a debate over whether American citizens were polarized at all—using the issue-based definition of polarization. On one side of the debate, the argument was that polarization is only really occurring among our elected representatives and other elite party leaders (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004, 2008). According to this perspective, most of the electorate was out of sync with elite polarization, and the average American still held moderate issue positions. They argued that much of the increased partisan voting and an increasing correlation between party and ideology that had been observed in recent years was not an indication of polarization, but instead a symptom of partisan-ideological sorting.

One the other side of the debate, a number of political scientists argued that Americans were, in fact, growing steadily and increasingly polarized on issue positions, particularly among politically engaged citizens (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Jacobson 2012; Garner and Palmer 2011). According to Abramowitz (2011), among the most engaged voters—those who arguably have the largest effect on national politics, and whose number was steadily increasing, issue polarization was strong and growing.

One of the omissions of this debate was that it did not account for the role of identities in driving partisan animosity. By focusing entirely on whether partisans were polarized in their policy attitudes, the debate missed the fact that many American partisans were very clearly and visibly engaged in intergroup conflict.

What effectively ended the debate was a shift to a focus on the animosity between partisans rather than on whether or not they disagreed. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) published findings that Democrats and Republicans increasingly disliked each other on a personal level, to an extent approximating hatred—a phenomenon that they labeled "affective polarization," indicating an approach based in partisan feelings. Importantly, they found these effects not only in engaged partisans, but also in non-activists. According to their results, half of Republicans and one third of Democrats in 2010 would feel unhappy if their son or daughter chose to marry a member of the opposing party. Members of both parties negatively stereotyped members of the opposing party, and the extent of this partisan stereotyping had increased by fifty percent between 1960 and 2010. This personal dislike and prejudice, Iyengar et al (2012a) suggested, was only inconsistently founded in policy attitudes, leading them to advocate for a separate measure of polarization, one that is based in the concept of social distance, or group-level animosity, rather than issue position extremity.

4.2. Affective Polarization in the United States

The concept of affective polarization centers identity rather than issues in partisan conflict. Though measures vary, it generally assesses the degree to which partisans dislike opposing

partisans and prefer people in their own party. This theory implies that rather than policy informing partisanship, it is possible—particularly in a contentious environment—for partisanship to inform policy attitudes (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Cohen 2003; Barber and Pope 2019; Highton and Kam 2011). This reversal of the traditional democratic theory gives partisan identities more power to directly influence politics. When group identities become the central drivers of political decision-making, group status can influence political decisions to an outsized degree (Achen and Bartels 2016). In the extreme case, partisans may prefer group victory (in elections or legislation) over the greater good of the nation or even the quality of life of party identifiers. This biased reasoning is consistent with warnings from American founders James Madison and George Washington against the "mischiefs of faction" delivered in Federalist Paper No. 10 and Washington's 1976 Farewell Address. They warned that if America were to be divided into political factions, citizens would begin to care more about defeating each other and lose sight of the security of the nation and the American project altogether. This type of polarization can drive powerful wedges between Americans.

Indeed, affective polarization has been steadily increasing in America. While feelings toward partisans' inparty have remained relatively steady, the warmth of feelings toward the outparty has dropped precipitously (Abramowitz and Webster 2016). So why has this "affective" type of polarization increased in America? Part of the explanation can be found in the changing relationship between multiple social identities in American politics. The Democratic and Republican parties have moved into strong alignment with other powerful social identities such as race, religion, ideological identity, and rural consciousness (Cramer 2016; Mason 2018b). As discussed in Section 3 of this chapter, this "social sorting" has created the opportunity for partisanship to become a powerful driver of political action, intolerance, ethnic resentment, and even violence (Mason 2015, 2018b; Kalmoe and Mason 2022). Instead of voting in order to earn the success of your political party alone, that vote is now connected to the status of a number of deeply rooted identities. The stakes of failure are multiplied.

Group identities can inform or strengthen partisanship, but group feelings in general have an influence on partisanship—not only feelings about the inparty but also feelings about the outparty. Partisans who dislike the social groups associated with the opposing party tend to be more affectively polarized and more strongly partisan (Robison and Moskowitz 2019; Kane, Mason, and Wronski 2021). In the other direction, some scholarship has even identified the effects that partisanship can have on individual social identities. Partisanship can influence religiosity (Margolis 2018) and expressed ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class (Egan 2020). Partisan identities are not only informed by group feelings but also powerful enough to change other social identities.

The racial divide in particular has allowed American partisans to structure their partisan conflicts along pre-established lines of highly charged conflict between White and Black Americans (Valentino and Sears 2005; Tesler and Sears 2010b; Outten et al. 2012; Schickler 2016; Christopher Sebastian Parker and Towler 2019; Christopher S. Parker and Barreto 2013; Westwood and Peterson 2022; Hetherington, Long, and Rudolph 2016). The process of social sorting allowed the Republican Party to represent the interests of White, Christian America, while the Democratic Party was increasingly representing those who wanted to overturn centuries of social inequality. Support for Republican Donald Trump in the 2016 election and Trump administration has been repeatedly linked to racial resentment

(Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Luttig, Federico, and Lavine 2017; Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2018; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta 2018; Mason, Wronski, and Kane 2021). Kalmoe and Mason (2022) found that the most "radical" partisans (those who vilify and dehumanize outgroup partisans) are Republicans who are high in racial resentment and hostile sexism, and Democrats who are low in racial resentment. This pattern suggests that most extreme partisan animosity is rooted in disagreements over the traditional social hierarchy. This type of divide is not easily corrected—Democrats and Republicans have opposite and incompatible visions of who holds power in American society.

Evidence of affective polarization in the United States is rapidly accumulating (for an overview see Iyengar et al. 2019). Miller and Conover (2015) demonstrated that those with strong partisan identities held the most hostile and uncivil political attitudes and were the most active in politics. As explained in Section 2 of this chapter, partisans are increasingly discriminating against outgroup partisans, even in non-political realms, and to a degree that rivals racial discrimination (Iyengar and Westwood 2015), though see Westwood and Peterson (2022) for evidence that race and partisanship are not independent identities.

However, some work has pointed to the weaknesses of some of the assumptions underlying the concept of affective polarization. Druckman and Levendusky (2019) note that observed levels of affective polarization depend on the measure chosen. Common measures include the difference between party feeling thermometers (Lelkes and Westwood 2016), party trait descriptions (Garrett et al. 2014), party trust (Levendusky 2013), and a set of "social distance" measures indicating a person's comfort having friends or neighbors in the opposing party, or having a person's child marry someone from the opposing party (Levendusky and Malhotra 2015). Here, the social distance measures seem to be assessing a more behavioral element of affective polarization and do not correlate well with the other measures. The social distance measure (at least the marriage item) also conflates dislike of outgroup partisans with dislike of partisanship in general. Many Americans do not want their child to marry anyone who identifies as any kind of partisan and discusses politics (Klar, Krupnikov, and Ryan 2018).

Furthermore, Druckman and Levendusky (2019) find that when subjects are asked questions about the opposing party in general, they tend to think mainly about the party's elite actors—prominent political figures (consistent with the "prototype" focus of self-categorization theory). This undercuts the idea that these measures are mainly assessing animosity between citizens. In fact, (Klar and Krupnikov 2016) identify a substantial portion of Americans who are embarrassed to admit their partisan identities and are turned away from politics due to the intense disagreement and animosity on display in public political conflicts.

A related theory is "negative partisanship"—the idea that American voting is driven by negative feelings toward the opposing party, rather than the divergence between inparty and outparty feelings (Abramowitz and Webster 2016). In this perspective, outgroup dislike leads to ingroup loyalty—rather than ingroup affection leading to outgroup dislike (as social identity theory would predict). However, Zhong et al. (2008) note that it may be possible to generate a "negational identity"—in opposition to another group—under conditions that maximize individual need for distinctiveness. Bankert (2021) empirically separated negative and "positive" partisanship (the latter being equivalent to partisan social identity), to examine their independent effects on political behavior. She found positive partisanship

to uniquely predict political participation, while negative partisanship uniquely predicted opposition to bipartisanship.

4.3.   Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective

Evidence of affective partisan polarization has emerged far outside of the American context. Of particular interest is whether partisan affective polarization can behave the same way in a multi-party system as it does in America's zero-sum two-party system. Overall, it seems that affective polarization is not a uniquely American phenomenon. Defining affective polarization as "resentment toward political opponents," Gidron, Adams, and Horne (2020) look at 19 Western countries over 25 years and find that American affective polarization is not more extreme than in other countries, but it has increased more quickly than what was observed in other Western countries since the 1990s.

Reiljan (2020) finds evidence of affective polarization in 22 European democracies—most intensely in central eastern and southern Europe, where the degree of affective polarization exceeds that of the United States. Northwestern European countries, in contrast, are found to have lower levels of affective polarization than the United States. Interestingly, Reiljan (2020) also finds evidence that high levels of affective polarization can be present in countries with ideologically centrist party structures and can be weak in ideologically polarized political systems—reinforcing the independence of issue-based and affective polarization.

Consistent with a theory that group identities can form around divisive political opinions (McGarty et al. 2009), Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley (2021) identify affective polarization in the United Kingdom around "Brexit" opinion groups. They do not observe affective polarization between parties, but instead between those who voted for the United Kingdom to remain a part of the European Union, and those who voted to leave.

The effects of affective polarization include rising partisan social distance in Spain (Viciana, Hannikainen, and Torres 2019), the perception of politics as a high-stakes competition in 34 countries (Ward and Tavits 2019), and gridlock and democratic erosion in 11 countries (McCoy and Somer 2019).

In terms of mechanisms that drive polarization, political identity centrality was shown to increase affective polarization in New Zealand (Satherley, Sibley, and Osborne 2020). In Turkey, partisan identity drives the perception that the opposing party is a threat (Laebens and Öztürk 2021). A lack of cross-cutting identities is also related to affective polarization in 11 countries—but only when it is encouraged by "political entrepreneurs" who benefit from national division (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; Somer and McCoy 2019). Finally, affective polarization in 19 Western countries is linked to unemployment and inequality, elite conflict over cultural issues like immigration or national identity, and majoritarian electoral institutions (Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020).

Due to the novelty of the study of affective polarization outside the American context, nearly all of the studies mentioned above used unique methods of measuring affective polarization. The standard American measures do not perfectly fit a multi-party system. Rather than seeing this as an empirical problem, I interpret this diversity of measures—and their similar conclusions—as a strong validation that affective polarization is an important phenomenon outside of the United States. The only methodological caveat is that in Norway, affective polarization toward parties is lower than in the United States, but affective

polarization toward partisans is indistinguishable from the United States (Knudsen 2021). This suggests, consistent with Druckman and Levendusky's (2019) research, that much of the observed partisan animosity in comparative perspective may be driven by feelings toward elites more than feelings toward regular outgroup partisans.

4.4. Effects of Identities on Emotions and Action

Strong and polarized political identities can powerfully influence political behavior. Brader and Gadarian (Chapter 6, this volume) go into detail on the relationship between emotions and political behavior. Here, I look more closely at the role of identities in guiding emotions and behaviors. One of the main links between identity and emotions or behavior is a threat to the status of the group. When a group's status is threatened (even if only in relation to another group) group members respond emotionally and are motivated to take action to combat the threat (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000).

In Section 1 of this chapter, I explained intergroup emotions theory—which specifies that group members can feel emotions on behalf of their group, and that the degree of identification with the group can affect the type of emotion they feel (E. R. Smith and Mackie 2015; Eliot R. Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007). Strong identifiers respond to group threats with anger, while weak identifiers respond to group threats with anxiety. Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015) applied this theory to partisan social identities—finding that the most strongly socially identified partisans tended to respond with anger to party status threats, but not to issue-based threats. These strong partisans also reacted with more enthusiasm to party status victories, and not to issue-based victories. Anger and enthusiasm are important emotions because they tend to promote action (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).

It is important to note that these emotional reactions are similar for Democrats and Republicans in American politics. When it comes to threats to partisan status, partisans of both parties are equally reactive to status threat. Despite prior findings that conservatives are more responsive to threat (Oxley et al. 2008), more recent research has found that liberals and conservatives likely respond to status threats in similar ways (Crawford 2017; Bakker et al. 2020).

The relationship *between* identities can also affect emotional reactions to threats. Partisans with few cross-cutting identities are more likely to react to threats with anger and to victories with enthusiasm (Mason 2016). Those with many cross-cutting identities, however, do not react with any emotion to these same messages.

Anger and enthusiasm brought on by identity-based engagement in politics can motivate political action including talking to others about politics, wearing a campaign button or putting up a political yard sign, attending political events, and donating money to a candidate or party (E. W. Groenendyk and Banks 2014). Angry partisans are also more likely to engage in partisan motivated reasoning, while anxious partisans are less inclined to do so (Weeks 2015; E. Groenendyk 2016).

Strong partisan identity is also a direct predictor of political action (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015), but under certain conditions it can be more likely to lead to political participation. For low-status groups, political participation is most likely if they understand their group to be in a subordinate social stratum, think of their group as lacking in social influence compared to another group, and also believe that this subordinate condition is due

to unfair social barriers (Miller et al. 1981). According to Klandermans (2014), collective political action including protest behavior is more likely if the group identity is explicitly politicized. This process occurs when group members are aware of shared grievances, an external enemy is blamed for the group's grievance, and the group seeks to win support from authorities or the general public in their struggle (Simon and Klandermans 2001; van Stekelenberg and Gaidytė, Chapter 26, this volume). The effect of partisan identity strength on election turnout can also be moderated by other politicized identities—such as racial and ethnic identities (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016). In the presence of multiple politicized identities, the effect on turnout is dependent on the strength of all of the politicized identities.

In a more dangerous direction, if strong identities are severely threatened, they can motivate dehumanizing and even violent behavior. As I discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, when group members grow morally disengaged from a particular outgroup, the chance of intergroup violence increases (Bandura 1999). Moral disengagement removes the self-regulatory mechanisms governing moral (non-harmful, compassionate) conduct by dehumanizing and vilifying outgroup members (Bandura 1996). Kalmoe and Mason (2022) identified trends of increasing moral disengagement among American partisans between 2017 and 2021. They found a significant relationship between moral disengagement and support for political violence among American partisans—particularly among those who tend to be aggressive in their non-political lives. They also found that a strong partisan social identity is a consistent predictor of both moral disengagement and approval of partisan violence—the latter of which is prevalent in between 10 and 30% of Americans, depending on the level of partisan threat in the political context. Reducing the likelihood of intergroup conflict is necessary for a stable democracy.

5. Promoting and Inhibiting Partisan Animosity

One of the major concerns raised by new research on the identity-based roots of affective polarization is how to combat it. Political scientists are increasingly looking to theories about intergroup conflict in order to attempt to reduce the increasing animosity on display in the United States and across Western democracies. Though Tropp (Chapter 30, this volume) will cover many of these approaches, they are worth a brief mention here as well.

5.1. Contact Theory

One of the oldest approaches to reducing intergroup conflict and prejudice is as simple as spending social time with members of the outgroup (see Tropp and Dehrone, Chapter 29, this volume). Allport's (1954) landmark research on prejudice identified certain types of social contact that were most likely to reduce intergroup prejudice and conflict. This contact should place members of both groups in equal status and in pursuit of common goals; should be sanctioned by institutional supports; and should lead to the perception of

common interests and common humanity (pg. 281). Pettigrew et al (2011) further refined this theory to specify that all Allport's conditions do not necessarily need to be met in order to reduce prejudice, and that contact can also reduce prejudice "vicariously," via mass media exposure or friends-of-friends. In the case of intractable conflicts, contact can backfire, increasing prejudice, but Goldenberg et al. (2017 have found that changing perceptions of outgroup malleability can increase intergroup cooperation even in these intractable conflict scenarios. Cross-cutting political discussions can also reduce affective polarization (Amsalem, Merkley, and Loewen 2022). Unfortunately, contact between Democrats and Republicans in the United States has become increasingly rare, as partisans have grown geographically segregated (Cramer 2016; Jacobs and Munis 2019; Brown and Enos 2021).

5.2. Superordinate Identity

Another classic approach to reducing intergroup conflict is to emphasize a superordinate group identity (Sherif and Sherif 1953). In the context of politics, a national identity is superordinate to partisan identities. When a nation is under threat from outsiders, it can generate a "rally-around-the-flag" effect, reducing partisan animosity and unifying citizens in defense of the nation and in support of their leader (Mueller 1973). Increasing the salience of a shared superordinate identity can increase communication across groups (Greenaway et al. 2015), and has been shown to reduce affective polarization in the United States between Democrats and Republicans (Levendusky 2017). In western Europe, for example, the global COVID-19 pandemic (a threat to all of humanity) increased trust in government and support for leaders (Bol et al. 2021). A similar effect was observed in Haiti (Lupu and Zechmeister 2021).

However, a threat to a superordinate identity cannot always improve intergroup relations—at times it can worsen conflict. In particular, when there is little trust between groups, and contempt or fear between them, group members may respond to a common threat by scapegoating and blaming the outgroup rather than cooperating (Brewer 1999). In fact, the rally effect from the COVID pandemic was blunted by partisanship in the United States, where interparty tensions were already high and the pandemic response was politicized (Shino and Binder 2020).

5.3. Elite Rhetoric

Political elites have a powerful role to play in reducing or enflaming partisan animosity. Partisans in the public respond to elite polarization by expressing higher levels of affective polarization (Banda and Cluverius 2018) and relying more strongly on partisan cues to form opinions about policy (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Partisan leaders' willingness to compromise can affect mass partisans' willingness to compromise on political matters (McLaughlin et al. 2017). Elite incivility can incite anger in the mass public (Gervais 2017) and a combative form of partisanship (Gervais 2019). Political leaders even have the power to reduce approval of political violence among partisans (Kalmoe and Mason 2022). One reason political elites have such influence on voters is that they can shape what voters understand as the prototypical group member. By observing leaders, partisans are taught

which norms and values are most important to the group. The public enforcement (or lack thereof) of those norms can shape the behavior of loyal partisans.

5.4. Social Norms

Social norms are generally defined and enforced via social sanctions (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Conformity with group norms attracts peer approval and feelings of pride, while deviance from group norms leads to disapproval and feelings of shame (Suhay 2014). To the extent that groups enforce norms of tolerance and cooperation, interparty animosity can be restrained. However, the opposite is also true—norms of extremism and intolerance will evoke a political environment full of conflict. Social reform can indeed occur when new injunctive social norms ("what should be") work together with identity to amass support for new movements. (L. G. E. Smith, Thomas, and McGarty 2015). To the extent that parties and partisans enforce pro-democratic and anti-extremist norms, hot political tempers could be cooled.

6. Conclusion and Future Directions

The role of identity in political behavior often helps to explain voter behavior that may appear to be irrational or normatively problematic. In this chapter, I introduced some of the more common theories of social group formation and cohesion. Most of the work on political behavior relies on social identity theory or one of its offshoots. In general, we think about political behavior as maximizing the status (overall or relative) of our social groups. Crucially, many strongly identified partisans are motivated to sacrifice their own well-being in order to increase or defend the status of their social groups.

By applying this reasoning to partisan and ideological identities, it becomes easier to explain seemingly irrational and normatively problematic behavior from partisans. Strongly identified partisans and ideologues are not necessarily driven by their policy preferences—in fact their policy preferences can be affected by their group identities. In the presence of status threat—which is nearly constant for parties in any democracy—partisans look for status-based victory. Every election is a referendum on the relative status of the parties—and the more biased a person's political perception is, the more they will believe that victory is essential.

These effects of identity are only compounded when other identities become involved in political conflict. Whether from an objective individual perspective, a subjective individual perspective, or a macro-level society-wide perspective, identities aligned along the same political divide tend to increase animosity, intolerance, political action, and even violence. These types of alignments can generate intractable conflicts within a nation—generating opposing visions for the meaning of national identity.

As the intensity of political conflict increases, partisans can grow more socially distant from each other. Instead of simple disagreements over issues, the involvement of multiple identities can generate a polarization rooted in feelings rather than rational policy considerations. This "affective polarization" has increased rapidly in the United States but

can also be found to varying degrees in many nations across the world. Democracy is not only about choosing legislators to enact policy—it also relies on much more primal feelings of "us versus them." Although this is contrary to normative democratic theory, it is also important to understand and assess. Without an identity-based understanding of democratic politics, many of the normative assumptions underlying political predictions and expectations will be incorrect.

Redefining the role of identity-defensive political behavior as predictable and common is a project that is only beginning. Future avenues of research may include an examination of the potential benefits of social sorting and partisan animosity—including the possibility of increased political power for under-represented social groups. More research is needed on the potential for democratic partisanship to drive extremism and political violence—in both the American and comparative perspective. Identity-centered interventions should be made more apparent in projects aiming to preserve and maintain democracy. The structural issues of racial, ethnic, and gender-based inequalities only preserve and maintain long-entrenched status hierarchies that will respond to political attempts to equalize with aggressive defensiveness. Democracies should approach reform with that threat in mind. Identity-based politics presents a challenge to normative theories of democracy—but any attempts to ensure a fully-representative multi-ethnic democracy will not be successful until these motivations are taken into account and explicitly addressed.

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THE GAZE FROM BELOW
Toward a Political Psychology of Minority Status

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EFRÉN O. PÉREZ AND BIANCA V. VICUÑA

"What about groups on the bottom rungs of society's ladder?. . . What will they then do, given that they, too, are presumed to prefer a positive . . . self-concept?"

—Rupert Brown, Social Identity Theorist

IN 1971, the famed social psychologist Henri Tajfel and his collaborators published an imaginative platform of studies now known as the *minimal group experiments*. Their goal was to uncover the basic cognitive principles behind intergroup conflicts. To nab these mechanisms, Tajfel and his team reasoned they had to start backwards: by eliminating the disorderliness of the world and begin introducing, one by one, the complicating factors that would ultimately produce intergroup conflict. This feature is what made their experiments so *minimal*.

It would turn out to be a misnomer of sorts, for the parsimonious mechanisms that Tajfel and his colleagues landed on would prove seminally instructive. We will soon get to these basic "moving parts" of social identity theory (SIT)—the name given to Henri Tajfel's lifework. But we highlight here one tenet that would prove especially revealing for subordinated groups, or minorities: our chapter's focus. This is the notion that all humans, regardless of race, gender, sexuality, or other stigmatized attributes, are driven to uphold a *positive self-concept*. This means that in our quests to validate ourselves, group identity is but one channel to cement our self-images.

In principle, this idea makes sense: we identify with others who make us feel and look good. But in practice, complications quickly arise, with most arising from the tension underlined by the opening epigraph: how *do* minorities, who must contend with their subordination, attain a positive identity? The real answer is that SIT's original formulation was unequipped to directly address this query. In early renditions, what mattered most was the division between ingroups and outgroups, not whether these groups were equals.

A political psychology of minority status, then, must start from the premise that intergroup inequities exist (Craig and Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume). This underscores one way that minorities feel and think differently than dominant groups: they are highly attuned to their subordination, to the point that it can be cognitively and emotionally taxing for many of them (Crocker and Major 1989)—a core insight that applies to minorities who are racial (e.g., Branscombe et al. 1999; Brown et al. 2000; Garcia Bedolla 2005; Pérez 2015a, b), sexual (e.g., Remedios and Snyder 2015; Flores et al. 2018; Goh et al. 2019), religious (e.g., Malliepaard and Verkuyten 2018; Verkuyten et al. 2019; Verkuyten et al. 2019), linguistic (e.g., Laitin 1977; Tavits and Pérez 2019), and others. This laser-focus on one's unequal rank means minorities are quite sensitive to questions about their subordination and threats of old and new forms of oppression (Major and O'Brien 2005). The rest of this chapter explains what this implies for a *political* psychology of minority groups, especially in terms of their attention to civic issues, their opinions and perspectives about public affairs, and their willingness to mobilize toward collective political ends through protest and voting.

To this end, we first expose the systemic roots of minorities' subordination and the psychological motivations these unleash among group members, answering why minorities are, in fact, minorities? We then turn to a robust discussion of key affective and cognitive processes known to govern inter- and intra-group relations. We draw heavily on social identity theory (SIT) and its offshoots (for additional discussion of social identity theory see Mols et al., chapter 22; Mason, Chapter 24, this volume). Although not the only theoretical "game in town," SIT is one of the more well-developed psychological frameworks to study groups (Huddy 2013)—and, also poorly understood by many political scientists (Huddy 2001). Our contribution here is to better align psychology's generic understanding of groups with political scientists' deeper knowledge of specific minorities (Pérez 2021; Pérez and Kuo 2021). We accomplish this by first discussing key psychological threats that all groups experience and how these can propel minorities to express more (less) unified political opinions and greater (weaker) collective action, including group-led protests and bloc voting. We then apply these insights to three (3) literatures we think can benefit from greater attention to the political psychology of minority status: *intersectional identities*, *interminority solidarity*, and the *boundaries between minority-majority groups*.

Although we can spend entire volumes discussing the unique experiences of sundry minority groups, we believe there is much to be gained—conceptually and theoretically— by taking a panoramic view of minorities and identifying those mechanisms that likely cut across specific groups (Pérez and Kuo 2021). Thus, our essay places less weight on group differences and leans heavier toward integrating conceptual insights that can apply *throughout* many minority communities. In doing so, we seek to clarify some core concepts and processes that should allow scholars to better grasp *when*, *why*, and *which* minorities becomes politically engaged in terms of the opinions they express and the actions they undertake.

1. What Makes Minorities, Minorities?

It is tempting to think that minorities' station in any society is driven by their relative size, with smaller groups qualifying as minorities. Yet the correspondence between

numbers and status is looser than many presume. Consider how women are treated as minorities, *despite* demographic parity with men (Prewitt-Freilino et al. 2012; see also Bos and Schneider, Chapter 19, this volume). Moreover, in the United States, people of color are labeled minorities, *in spite* of growing demographic, economic, and political clout (Pérez 2021). In contrast, sexual minorities are a small proportion of most populations, yet are aggressively relegated to second-class citizenship (Lewis et al. 2017). These and other complex realities belie an impoverished conceptual vocabulary to explain minority status.

We stipulate that minority status stems from a group's subordination, which is produced by *stigmatization* and *marginalization*. While often used synonymously, we use these terms to underscore two distinct features that yield subordination. This subordination, we hasten to add, is not innate to minorities. It is driven by hierarchies between groups (Craig and Phillips, chapter 23, this volume). Accordingly, to say that minorities are *stigmatized* is to say that they are deemed socially inferior. As Major and O'Brien (2005: 395) explain, the "stigmatized have . . . an attribute that marks them as different and leads them to be devalued in the eyes of others." These stigmas can be (in)visible (*sexual orientation*), (un) controllable (*stuttering*), appearance-based (*weight*), or ascribed (*race*) (e.g., Goh et al. 2019; Garcia Bedolla 2005; Steele et al. 2002). Because stigmas assign minorities a lower social value, it corrupts their positive self-concept.

Minority status is also produced via *marginalization*, or an experienced power deficit. By power, we mean a person's control over their own outcomes (cf. Brehm 1993; Fiske 1993; Goodwin et al. 2000; Richeson and Ambady 2003). Although marginalized group members have personal agency, their complete influence over social and economic outcomes is hindered by systemic forces that emanate from a dominant group's hostility or indifference toward them (e.g., Brewer 1999; Jackman 1994). With less power in hand, *marginalization* further undermines minorities' ability to attain a positive self-concept.

In our view, attainment of a positive self-concept is harder to produce when one is *stigmatized* (i.e., socially devalued) and *marginalized* (i.e., relatively powerless). This is another key difference between dominant and subordinate groups. Dominant group members are driven to *preserve* their relative cachet and power, yet minorities are motivated to *repair* the deficits they face on these fronts. Here, minorities will sometimes use political means to clear a smoother path to a positive self-concept. But we say *sometimes* because political engagement is personally costly (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). It requires mental energy (Gailliot et al. 2007). And, it often demands extensive resources (e.g., time, money) (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Hersh 2020). Hence, there is nothing automatic about minorities' political mobilization, especially given that *stigmatization* and *marginalization* are psychologically painful for minorities—so painful, in fact, that disengagement is a plausible response (cf. Crocker and Major 1989; Vignoles et al. 2006; Verkuyten et al. 2019). Thus, predicting when collective action is more likely starts with a deeper understanding of the psychological motivations that compel any group to mobilize, while clarifying why those efforts manifest *politically* (Olson 1965; van Zomeren et al. 2004; Fowler and Kam 2007). Let us demonstrate this next.

2. Fundamental Group Processes for Minorities

As two scholars who study minorities, each of us has been privy to the complaint by some colleagues that they find political psychology too highly abstracted. Yet this complaint entirely misses the goal of robust psychological theory, which is to isolate and validate the core mechanism(s) responsible for individual behavior across varied settings and protagonists. Abstraction *is* the aim—and virtue. To make this abstraction more palatable, we now draw on social identity theory (SIT) to explain four key mechanisms that are highly relevant to a deeper understanding of minority politics: *categorization*, *distinctiveness*, *identification*, and *ingroup favoritism*.

SIT recognizes that all individuals, even minorities, belong to multiple groups. That is, we have a repertoire of identities where we store memberships in many nominal categories like *race*, *ethnicity*, *gender*, *religion*, and *sexual orientation* (Margolis 2018a; Verkuyten et al. 2019; Pérez et al. 2019; Remedios et al. 2020; Pérez 2020). SIT insists, however, that people do not generally have the mental bandwidth to think of themselves, simultaneously, as members of all their groups. Rather, people manage their complex self-concepts based on contextual cues. "Who" we are at any one time depends on "who else" is around. This is where *categorization* matters.

People's environments structure the classification of individuals into ingroup(s) and outgroup(s). This categorization can happen through meaningful criteria or arbitrary distinctions (Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig and Tajfel 1973). Indeed, in Tajfel's minimal group studies, individuals were categorized on the basis of over-/under-counting dots and preferences for abstract art, leading to the creation of an "us" and "them." The lesson here is that out of the many idiosyncratic traits that individuals possess, systemic forces—for example, institutions, political elites, researchers—*categorize* people using a closed-set of attributes (Horowitz 1985; Chandra 2012; Mora 2014).

In light of *categorization*, individuals become psychologically invested in their ingroup's *distinctiveness*. Distinctiveness is what makes an ingroup unique and special (Brewer 1991; Branscombe et al. 1999; Malliepaard and Verkuyten 2018; Pérez et al. 2019). It consists of the many attributes and norms that define who "we" are and how "we" should behave. And, since we all seek a positive self-image, individuals strive to ensure this distinctiveness is infused with cachet. *Distinctiveness* is a byproduct of an intergroup setting, not an innate ingroup quality. Consider how in Mexico, the category *Mexicans* is a badge of pride. But if we shift north to the United States, *Mexicans* are drenched in stigmas (Pérez 2015a; Garcia Bedolla 2005). The category is unchanged, yet the frame of reference affects the valence of attributes that comprise it (Chandra 2012).

With *distinctiveness* intact, several doubts are dissipated for individuals. Who belongs in the group? Which group members better reflect the category and which members have a tenuous foothold in it? How are group members expected to behave and what are they supposed to believe (e.g., Ellemers et al. 1999; Schmitt and Branscombe 2001; Reid and Hogg 2005; Danbold and Huo 2015; Margolis 2018a, b; Malliepaard and Verkuyten 2018; Margolis

2018a, b; Verkuyten 2018; Verkuyten et al. 2019)? In a complex world where buzzing streams of information outstrip our cognitive capacities, the *distinctiveness* of an ingroup provides its members with meaning, security, and direction. By clarifying an ingroup's boundaries and essence, *distinctiveness* minimizes the perceived variance between ingroup members, increases the perceptual distance between ingroup members and the outgroup(s), and thus cements ingroup identification (Turner et al. 1987; McGarty et al. 1992). Although the distinctiveness of ingroups can emerge organically, at least in politics, it is often structured by institutions and individual actors, as exemplified by the racial and ethnic categories that national censuses highlight (Nobles 2001; Mora 2014; Rodriguez-Muñiz 2021), as well as the political actions and rhetoric expressed by political leaders through anti-immigrant discourse and initiatives across the globe (e.g., Pérez 2015a, b; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Santa Ana 2002; Chavez 2001). This point is especially important for minorities. Some scholars lament how the creation of groups (e.g., *Latinos* in the United States) obliterates nuances between its members (e.g., *Mexicans*, *Cubans*, *Puerto Ricans*) (Beltrán 2010). Normatively, we cannot disagree with this. In this particular case, individuals arrive to the United States as *Mexican*, *Cuban*, and *Puerto Rican*, but become *Latino* partly because the US census and other institutions privilege this pan-ethnic category at the expense of other national-origin options—and in contradistinction to other groups (e.g., *White*, *Black*, *Asian American*). Empirically, however, this is precisely what SIT would predict when disparate individuals coalesce into a larger group: identification perceptually homogenizes an ingroup, while increasing its psychological distance from an outgroup (Turner et al. 1987).

Ingroup *identification* can be more precisely thought of as the cognitive and emotional significance that a person attaches to a category (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979; for a related discussion on political identities see Mason, Chapter 24, this volume). This significance has several components (Leach et al. 2008), but a core element is a category's *centrality* or *importance* to a person: that is, to what degree does a category reflect my sense of self? This is an individual difference, not a type. It is not the case that individuals either identify with a group or not, but rather, they identify with a group to a measurable degree. These individual differences determine which individuals are sensitive to intergroup stimuli and events (Ellemers et al. 1997; Ellemers et al. 2002; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Leach et al. 2010; Pérez 2015a, b; Margolis 2018a, b; Cvetkovska et al. 2020). Thus, to grasp an identity's impact on individual behavior, we must grapple with the differences separating high- from low-identifiers.

In fact, ignoring these nuances comes at the risk of misunderstanding SIT's fourth process, *ingroup favoritism*. This is the inclination to cognitively and affectively privilege one's ingroup with respect to an outgroup(s), including deeper and more detailed processing of information related to an ingroup (Van Bavel et al. 2008) and greater willingness to help ingroup members (Dovdio et al. 1997). In the minimal group studies, ingroup favoritism manifested itself in patterns of reward allotments between the ingroup and outgroup, with ingroup members maximizing the difference in amounts awarded between groups. But ingroup favoritism can also manifest as ingroup members expressing more positive feelings toward one's ingroup (relative to the outgroup) (Branscombe et al. 1999; Pérez 2015a, b; Cvetkovska et al. 2020), endorsing more positive stereotypes about one's ingroup (relative to the outgroup) (Kinder and Kam 2009; Malliepaard and Verkuyten 2018), or supporting public policies or ideologies that privilege one's ingroup (relative to the outgroup) (Block 2011; Margolis 2018a, b; Verkuyten 2018). Yet the bigger insight about *ingroup favoritism*

is not the spread of ways it expresses itself, but rather, its unerring focus. Ingroup favoritism privileges "us," which is often divorced from any antipathy toward "them" (Brewer 1999). This is critical, because it suggests that being pro-minority does not entail automatic rejection or hostility toward outgroups. One can be pro-Black, without being anti-White (Herring et al. 1999). One can be pro-Latino *and* pro-American (Pérez et al. 2019). And, one can be pro-Muslim, without being anti-European (Verkuyten et al. 2019).

3. Identity Threats in Light of Stigmatization and Marginalization

We have stressed, so far, that minorities' *stigmatization* (devaluation) and *marginalization* (powerlessness) compromise their attainment of a positive self-concept. Consequently, we believe minorities are motivated to recognize and seize opportunities that improve on these dimensions. Some of these opportunities arise from identity threats that minorities encounter. Sometimes, minorities will resolve these threats politically. We illustrate this by discussing four common threats at the intergroup (*value* and *distinctiveness* threat) and intragroup (*categorization* and *prototypicality* threat) levels.

3.1. Value Threat

Value threats impugn an ingroup's cachet. Any stimulus here that undermines this cachet jeopardizes an ingroup's *value* for members. Because minorities are subordinated, they are exposed to *value* threats more regularly than are members of dominant groups. This means minorities will be, on average, more sensitive to denigrating stimuli and ready to contend with them. Consider, here, how people of color (Aronson et al. 1998; Steele et al. 2002), females (Shih et al. 1999; Major et al. 2003), LGBTQ individuals (Flores et al. 2018; Goh et al. 2019), and other minorities must manage discrimination against them and their group (Oskooii 2016, 2020).

Although dominant group members may devalue and discriminate against subordinated communities, minorities highly value their ingroup because it provides them with certainty, security, and belonging (Brewer 1991; Branscombe et al. 1999; Pérez et al. 2019; Brannon and Linn 2021). Thus, in light of *value* threat, the generic response is to reinvigorate the ingroup's cachet through available means, with those more strongly identifying with an ingroup engaging in more vigorous action (since they stand to lose the most, cognitively speaking). For example, in a set of papers on US Latinos, Pérez (2015a,b) demonstrates how *value* threat (operationalized through elite rhetoric highlighting "illegal" immigration) spurs high-identifying Latinos to repair their ingroup by expressing more intense support for pro-Latino policies and greater pro-Latino sentiment. Additional research also traces *value* threat to increases in civic engagement and voter turnout among Latinos (e.g., Gutierrez et al. 2019; White 2016), while other scholarship has reported young Latinas protesting SB4—a Texas anti-immigrant law—by wearing their *quinceañera* dresses, thus signaling ethnic pride as a response to devaluation of their co-ethnics (González-Martin

2020). This is a broad pattern that generally replicates among other "real world" minorities, including ethnic, religious, tribal, and racial ones across the globe (Horowitz 1985; Leach et al. 2010; Verkuyten 2018; Verkuyten et al. 2019; Cvetkovska et al. 2020).

Beyond the specific instances just discussed, this "hunkering down" effect has other effects on minority politics. For example, when a minority identity is impugned, a motivation to defend it is triggered (Kunda 1990; Taber 2003; Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber and Young 2013; Bolsen and Palm 2019), which sidelines other motives, including a drive toward accuracy in judgment. This means ingroup members who sense a *value* threat will engage in reasoning that reaffirms their group's worth, even at high costs. In western Europe, for example, chronic *value* threats to Muslim minorities (e.g., "Islam is a *backward* religion") leads them to turn so intensely inward that they dis-identify with their host nation—that is, they actively *reject* a host nation identity, which reduces the amount of common ground that underpins national cohesion (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Malliepaard and Verkuyten 2018; see also Huo et al. 2010; Dovidio et al. 2016). Additional studies suggest this broad effect can have negative downstream consequences for minority political behavior, depending on how *value* threat is transmitted. For example, Oskooii (2020) reports evidence that peer-to-peer discrimination (a form of *value* threat) is associated with reductions in voter turnout among ethnic minorities in Britain. In a similar vein, Komisarchik, Sen, and Velez (2020) find that Japanese individuals who were interned in US relocation camps during World War II expressed less interest in politics two decades after that experience. Thus, while responses to *value* threat are palliative for minorities, they can be detrimental for *inter-* and *intra*-group relations.

3.2. Distinctiveness Threat

Part of how a group retains its cachet is by standing for something positively unique or distinctive. This enables an ingroup to fully differentiate itself from an outgroup(s), which allows ingroup members to bolster their self-image by seizing on the clarity and certainty about what they stand for and what makes them so great. When this distinctiveness is compromised, ingroup members become insecure about who they are. This leads high-identifying members to engage in affective and cognitive efforts to restore that distinctiveness (Ellemers et al. 1999; Danbold and Huo 2015). For example, Pérez et al. (2019) reason that part of what makes US Latinos unique is their balancing of ethnic and national identity—they are *Mexican* and *American*, *Cuban* and *American*, *Dominican* and *American*, and so on. Consequently, political rhetoric that acknowledges this duality affirms Latinos' distinctiveness. This affirmation motivates Latinos to express greater allegiance to the nation, which they exhibit through attitudes (e.g., *US patriotism*) and preferences (*English as US official language*) that engender greater national unity and cohesiveness.

Distinctiveness threat also provides a window to better understand when racial political coalitions are formed. For instance, ignoring the unique experiences of minority women as racial minorities inhibits the stability of coalitions to address gender inequality (e.g., Cole 2008; Collins 1996). In addition, individuals who possess a dual identity (e.g., *Mexican American*), but perceive discrimination against the stigmatized category in this pair (i.e., *Mexican*), are more inclined to be politicized as a way to improve the disadvantaged position of their minority group (Simon and Grabow 2010; Simon and Ruhs 2008; see also

Pérez et al. 2019). This is further exemplified by Black women's historical position as political organizers across both racial and gender movements (See Michener et al. 2012). On the contrary, respecting a group's *distinctiveness* and sources of pride leads to a greater sense of belonging and cooperation across groups (Brannon et al. 2021). A major lesson here for smoldering debates about multiculturalism and related ideologies is that stable, diverse polities can be sustained through political discourse that acknowledges and respects the distinct identities reflected in a mass public, especially those held by minorities (Huo and Binning 2008; Citrin and Sears 2014).

The principal implication from *distinctiveness* threat is a triggering of intragroup concern over the boundaries and content of the ingroup. This can lead ingroup members to more aggressively police their boundaries, with the goal of reinvigorating the purity of the ingroup (Huo and Molina 2006; Dovidio et al. 2016), which often produces a harsh stance toward ingroup deviants—affiliates who contravene the unique attributes and standards of the ingroup (Marques et al. 1988; Marques and Paez 1994; Pinto et al. 2010). This recoiling from "black sheep" in one's ingroup will generate stronger political cohesiveness among high-identifying group members, as seen in African Americans' sidelining of Black conservatives from their ingroup (White and Laird 2020), the marginalization of later-generation Latinos from their ethnic group's immigrant peers (Jiménez 2010; Garcia Bedolla 2005), and the shaming of Asian Americans who contradict stereotypes about high academic competence (Jiménez 2017).

When an ingroup's distinctiveness is intact, there is more certainty about the ingroup's nature (Reid and Hogg 2005), which yields less variance in the opinions and values expressed by affiliates: two features that facilitate an ingroup's political cohesion (e.g., Block 2011; Hogg et al. 2010; Liss et al. 2001). For example, African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, and other minoritized groups are more willing to close ranks, politically, when they sense that their unique histories and struggles are acknowledged and respected (Flores and Huo 2013). In this instance, a shared identity as *people of color* leads these individuals to support policies that do not directly benefit or implicate their own unique ingroup (e.g., Black support for unauthorized immigrants) (Pérez 2021; Pérez, Vicuña, Ramos, et al. 2021). But when these individuals believe the uniqueness of their own ingroup is drowned out for the sake of *people of color*, Asian, Black, and Latino adults are less inclined to support policies that do not implicate their own ingroup (e.g., weaker Latino support for the Black Lives Matter movement).

3.3. Prototypicality Threat

Threats can also emanate from within an ingroup. For example, John Turner and his students (1987, 1994) have taught us that part of what cements an individuals' identification with an ingroup is the sense that one embodies the average, or *prototypical* member. When a minority individual lays claim to being *African American*, *Female*, *Catholic*, *LGBTQ*, and so on, they are professing themselves to be *the* model reflection of their ingroup. If this *prototypicality* is threatened, individuals will mobilize to repair this situation (Schmitt and Branscombe 2001; Wenzel et al. 2007; Danbold and Huo 2015; Danbold and Huo 2017).

One illuminating political example of *prototypicality* threat in action involves White and Laird's (2020) *Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Political Behavior*. In this book

the authors contend that African Americans' enduring experiences with racial discrim-ination have taught them that collective political action is one avenue to improve their social status. Yet such action requires unity in light of political diversity among African Americans, with some leaning ideologically to the left, some leaning ideologically to the right, and plenty of others in between (Dawson 2001). To speak with a more unified voice, Black Americans close ranks by enshrining racial progressives as their ingroup's *prototype*, while shunning explicitly conservative members of their racial group, thus transforming themselves into a steadfast segment of the Democrats' electoral coalition.

In another, now classic, book—*Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics*—Cathy Cohen (1999) describes Black Americans' tepid response to the AIDS crisis evolving within their communities. Despite the concentration of AIDS cases in African American neighborhoods, Black individuals have politically responded to victims of this disease (some of them homosexuals, some of them drug addicts) with unusual restraint. One way to read this "breakdown" in Black politics, as Cohen describes it, is through the *prototypicality* pressures that ingroups experience. Insofar as Black individuals with AIDS are marginalized and pushed to the periphery of the Black community, it implies that African Americans have defined their prototypical member as male, heterosexual, and "well-to-do," which underwrites the indifference that Cohen reports (cf. Marques et al. 1988; Marques and Yzerbyt 1988; Marques and Paez 1994).

3.4. Categorization Threat

The last threat we discuss occurs when there is a mismatch between how a person views themselves and how others construe them in a situation. For instance, a female engi-neer interviewing for a high-tech job might sense *categorization threat* if the interviewer attends more to their gender attributes rather than professional qualifications (Morgenroth et al. 2020). This will lead the threatened female to minimize her gender attributes while amplifying her professional characteristics, even though she may strongly identify as female. Indeed, as Branscombe et al. (1999: 38) explain, "[s]uch resistance to being categorized is likely to be particularly strong when the membership category seems irrelevant or illegiti-mate given the situation at hand." In this specific setting, *categorization threat* will prompt female professionals to stress their differences from other female colleagues (Ellemers et al. 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

One example of *categorization* threat in politics is provided by Jiménez (2010), who reports the pressures that some Mexican Americans experience to act "ethnically" in the wake of sustained Mexican immigration into their communities. This influx of new co-ethnics heightens the salience of shared ethnic identity. But for co-ethnics who have been born in the United States and are temporally distant from the immigrant experience, their ethnic identity is often lower in priority, which means some co-ethnics will work to differ-entiate themselves from their immigrant kin by signaling membership in alternate, higher-status groups (e.g., *Americans*). Consistent with this, Hickel and colleagues (2020) find that some Latinos prioritize their national identity over their ethnic identity, which leads them to express greater supportive of restrictive immigration policies and hard-right politicians.

Categorization threat also has implications for Republican women in the United States. When a female is mis-classified as a Democrat (or liberal) on the basis of their gender,

it may lead some women to express more conservative opinions about gender inequality in response. Consider the "puzzling" number of White females who voted for Donald Trump—the 2016 Republican nominee for president who publicly espoused sexist views (Junn 2017; Junn and Masuoka 2020). White women breaking for a misogynist candidate is only surprising if we presume that the relevant identity driving these individuals is a *feminist* one—that is, a *politicized* gender identity that only some women hold (Simon and Klandermans 2001; Huddy and Willmann 2016). But identifying as a *woman* does not entail identification as a *feminist*. Alas, women have other political identities that they value more, such as their *partisanship*. Consistent with this reasoning, published research shows that modern sexism played a significant role in women's support for Donald Trump (Setzler and Yanus, 2018; Valentino et al., 2018), suggesting that the relevant identity driving these individuals was *partisan*, rather than *feminist* (see also Huddy and Willmann 2016).

Beyond this specific case, categorization threat also holds implications for how we might understand the gender composition of elected officials within US political parties. For instance, why do some female elected officials choose to operate as Republicans, rather than Democrats, if the latter is arguably friendlier toward "women's issues"? Because, our discussion here implies, they may believe that their gender identity is less germane to the type of political work they wish to undertake, suggesting there is more room for maneuver within the Republican Party.

4. Grappling with Subordination Through *Politics*

So far, we have tried to give readers a deeper appreciation for some of the basic mechanisms behind a political psychology of minority status. We now use this blueprint to inform—conceptually, theoretically, and methodologically—a trifecta of political science literatures focused on better understanding how minorities deal, politically, with their subordination in intergroup settings: (1) intersectional identities, (2) interminority solidarity, and (3) redefining minority/majority relations.

4.1. Intersectional Identities

Intersectionality, as an analytical framework, calls for a closer examination of the interactive effects of social identities (Al-Faham, Davis, and Ernst 2019; Bos and Schneider, Chapter 19, this volume; Collins 2015; Garcia Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007; McCall 2005; Nash 2008). Its most notable insight contends that multiply-marginalized individuals experience unique forms of oppression that are fundamentally different from those experienced by their singly-marginalized counterparts. Women of color, for instance, not only experience both racism *and* sexism, but also experience them differently than men of color and White women (Crenshaw 1989, 1991). Many political scientists draw on *intersectionality* to grasp the political behavior of multiply-marginalized communities (e.g., Gershon et al. 2019; Frasure-Yokley 2018; Junn 2017; Labelle 2019; Sampaio 2014). The thrust of this

research is that the unique experiences of multiply-marginalized individuals complicates their ability to prioritize any single identity they hold (Hancock 2007), which suggests that intersectional identities consist of a confluence of categories (King 1988; Settles 2006; see also Wilcox 1996). One implication that follows from this view is that *women of color* might encounter difficulties in cooperating politically with *white women* and *men* if their *distinctiveness* is not acknowledged and respected (Vicuña 2021; Huo and Binning 2008). For instance, scholars of *intersectional* identities have engaged in a long-running debate about whether *Black women* fail to strongly support *feminist* movements because of the latter's *White*-centered image: a highly plausible claim with thin empirical evidence behind it (so far) (e.g., Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte 2008).

We see standard intersectional approaches to politics as displaying two blind spots: weak conceptualization and loose operationalization of *intersectionality* in political studies (Remedios and Snyder 2015). Both aspects, we think, can be improved through greater attention to the political psychology of minority status. Consider, first, what it means to hold an *intersectional* identity. Does it mean that multiple marginalized categories are simultaneously co-activated in a person (e.g., *female* and *African American* and *homosexual* are synchronously relevant)? Does it mean that multiple stigmatized categories (e.g., *female, Latinx, homosexual*) are fused together and stored as a single unit in memory (e.g., *homosexual-Latinx-woman*)? The answer to this conceptual point matters for how we understand the nature of *intersectional* identities. For example, if *intersectional* identities are a confluence of chronically activated categories, then this implies a substantial demand for cognitive and emotional resources as one attends to the many ingroups and outgroups in play (Remedios and Snyder 2015; Roccas and Brewer 2002). The risk here is one of being mentally taxed to the point of paralysis. Yet by most accounts, political scientists aspire to use *intersectionality* to better understand political involvement, not *disengagement*. So, what gives?

Part of what has to give are the exceedingly strict assumptions implied by this generic rendition of *intersectionality*. This starts, we believe, with closer attention to how identities are stored in long-term memory (LTM) (Lodge and Taber 2013; Pérez 2016). Psychologists long ago taught us that mental content, like identities, are stored in close proximity to each other in LTM (Collins and Loftus 1975). This means categories like *female*, *African American*, *progressive* are stored near each other in memory, but not so close that they are the same thing. Hence, the categories comprising an *intersectional* identity are correlated, but empirically separable. Indeed, you will recall from our previous discussion on *categorization* that people's information environments relatively privilege one category over many possible others, which suggests that even in studies of *intersectionality*, there is a predominant category that captivates people's attention and directs their behavior, depending on the frame of reference (i.e., who is the outgroup?).

Consistent with this formulation, Remedios et al. (2020) demonstrate that women of color attribute rejection by others to sexism when the outgroup is *males*, but to racism when the outgroup is *Whites*. This pattern suggests that *intersectional* identities adapt to cues in intergroup settings, with the frame of reference being key. Rather than activating a fused *women of color* identity, it appears that several correlated identities are stimulated, with one being relatively more privileged than others in a setting. Similarly, when the frame of reference is doubly an outgroup, like *White men,* women of color anticipate a dual threat to their racial and gender identities (Chaney et al. 2020). This occurs because individuals who

are multiply marginalized are highly attuned to situational cues. They understand the "big picture" about the systemic nature of intolerance.

Conceptually, we think a political psychology of minority status also demands greater specificity about who the frame of reference is for individuals with a heightened *intersectional* identity. This will facilitate efforts to grasp the nature of a politicized *intersectional* identity. Consider the possible differences of opinion among *women of color* if the frame of reference is *White women* versus *White men*. If *White women* serve as the group of comparison, then we might expect stronger political attitudes that improve women of color's racial disadvantage. If *White men* are the frame of reference, then we might anticipate stronger political opinions that defend *women of color*'s position vis-à-vis *White men*. To gain even further clarity on the nature of responses here, specifying the content of a *woman of color* identity would be valuable (cf. White and Laird 2020; Anoll 2021; Pérez 2021). For example, what does it mean to be a *woman of color* in terms of a prototype and its political values and beliefs (Schmitt and Branscombe 2001; Danbold and Huo 2015)?

Methodologically, a more psychologically informed sense of *intersectionality* entails measuring individual differences in multiple identities and the possible interface between them. This would enable researchers to better assess the reality of various differentiated identities—that is, to what degree is each category in an intersectional identity crucial to the self-definition of a person (Leach et al. 2008)? In an observational context (e.g., opinion survey), appraising identities that "go together" in memory will enable analysts to assess whether they all are associated with outcomes of interest (as an *intersectional* perspective implies), while verifying that one identity has a more "privileged" impact on these dependent measures, consistent with our discussion so far. Insofar as this type of pattern emerges, it would strongly suggest that an *intersectional* identity derives its political power from a convergence of highly valued group attachments, akin to how US partisanship draws force from the confluence and reinforcement of distinct identities (e.g., racial, class, religious, occupational) (cf. Mason 2018; Huddy, Mason, and Norwitz, 2016). In turn, by gauging individual differences in the strength of these identities, researchers can distinguish those individuals for whom various categories are central to their sense of who they are from those for whom these categories are less crucial to their self-image. Those nuances are key to pinpointing who is most likely to "pitch in" to political efforts that prop *intersectional* groups (Ellemers et al. 1997; Leach et al. 2008; Pérez 2015a, b). In particular, it would allow researchers to better appraise whether the political influence of an *intersectional* identity depends on the interaction between relevant categories. For instance, among some *women of color*, their identification as *females* and as *people of color* might simultaneously drive their political views and actions, while for others, the political influence of their *female* identity depends on how strongly or weakly they identify as a *person of color* (or vice versa).

More generally, we believe greater attention to the psychology of *intersectional* identities can break new conceptual and empirical ground. This iterative process begins by distilling one's reasoning about *intersectional* identities into more concrete, testable, and observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Consider, for example, issues of police brutality or LGBTQ rights. Each of these domains, in principle, broadly implicates multiple nominal categories, such as *race*, *gender*, *class*, and *sexual orientation*. Yet who is energized politically by these issues depends, in no small part, on how they are framed (Druckman 2001; Winter 2008).

By one account, these issues can be framed with a prototypical community member in mind, which, for the purposes of this example, would entail *heterosexual Black men* (police brutality). Per a *galvanization* hypothesis (cf. Sniderman et al. 2004), a subset of potentially relevant categories is politically activated based on key attributes. If this reasoning is correct, then one observable pattern might be an engagement gap, with prototypical members (e.g., *heterosexual Black men*) being more politically aware and knowledgeable than members on the edges of the activated group (e.g., *LGBTQ + Black women*). We might also expect an enthusiasm gap, where prototypical members engage in costlier action on behalf of "their" group than peripheral members. These patterns imply a narrowly politicized core of individuals who are disposed toward collective action, but less inclined toward broad perspective-taking (Adida et al. 2018; Cortland et al. 2017).

By another account, the issues of police brutality can also be framed in a way that allows more variance around a group's prototype. Per a *mobilization* hypothesis (Sniderman et al. 2004), a wider number of categories is activated based on shared attributes. In the case of police brutality, this entails a focus on race (*Black people*) with less attention to gender (i.e., *Black (fe)males*) or class (i.e., *poorer Black people*). By collapsing across characteristics, more individual group members stand to feel a sense of identification with the activated group. Thus, in terms of engagement and enthusiasm, we might predict smaller or null differences between relevant subsets of ingroup members. And if true, this would suggest a broader, politically energized ingroup that is more uniformly predisposed toward political action. This will matter tremendously in political systems like the United States, where public affairs are conducted on the basis of "large numbers" or coalitions. Furthermore, an ingroup that is more broadly defined inclines members toward greater perspective-taking, since many potential outgroups (e.g., *richer Black people*, *Black females*) are better reflected in the ingroup's prototype (Adida et al. 2018; Cortland et al. 2017).

In a third account, the issues of police brutality can also be framed with the explicit inclusion of marginalized subgroups (e.g., Black women and Black queer people). Per an *identity respect* hypothesis (Barreto and Ellemers 2002; Dovidio et al. 2016; Huo et al. 2010; Vicuña n.d.), a multiple-identity frame makes non-prototypical members who are committed to other subgroups feel that they are valued, promoting ingroup identification and making them more likely to work on behalf of the larger shared group. In fact, these individuals tend to dislike common ingroup frames because they restrict the ability to resolve intragroup inequalities and tensions, which can fragment the larger group. Black men, for instance, are often perceived as the prototypical victims of racial discrimination, including police brutality (Crenshaw 1989; Jackson 2016; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). And yet, Black women have played and continue to play a critical role as political organizers to address racial inequality (e.g., three Black women founded Black Lives Matter) (Michener et al. 2012; Jackson 2016). Black women's continued involvement in these social movements tells us that, despite not being the perceived prototypical victims of racial discrimination, they have not been discouraged from being politically active (as suggested by the *galvanization* hypothesis). Additionally, the fact that Black women have created more explicitly inclusive movements, like #SayHerName, suggests that their needs are not met by movements with common ingroup frames (as suggested by the *mobilization* hypothesis). Consequently, the political behavior of multiply-marginalized individuals might be better explained by the *identity respect* work, with multiple-identity frames more effectively promoting their political engagement. Future research, then, might find it beneficial to further investigate the

cognitive nature of intersectional identities, especially whether discrete identities interact to form unique political outcomes by reinforcing (or undermining) each other.

4.2. Interminority Solidarity

In a world where many polities are becoming more diverse and unequal, understanding when and how individuals develop solidarity across race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, language, and the like is becoming normatively and scientifically pressing (Jackman 1994; Staerklé et al. 2010; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Flores et al. 2015; Flores, Hatzenbuehler, and Gates 2018; Hasenbush, Flores, and Herman 2019; Michelson and Harrison 2020; Harrison and Michelson *forthcoming*). On the face of it, one might imagine that diversity in the face of inequality is a recipe for the development of solidarity-based movements. Yet one would be wrong, for there is nothing automatic or natural about the emergence of alliances between subordinated groups (McClain and Johnson Carew 2017; Benjamin 2017; Wilkinson 2015). Rather, as the psychology of minority status teaches us, these coalitions take active psychological effort (Pérez 2021; Craig and Richeson 2018). They emerge under specific conditions (Pérez 2020). And, they succeed when minorities are placed in a specific frame of mind (Cortland et al. 2017; Pérez and Kuo 2021).

Take the example of interracial solidarity between various people of color in the United States. Impressions notwithstanding, these subordinated communities vary wildly in terms of their arrival to the United States, their treatment at the hands of US authorities, their experiences with discrimination, and their political aspirations and goals. So how is solidarity stitched together in these contexts? Part of the answer starts with greater attention to the content of identities—especially broad-based identities that can sustain solidarity across disparate groups. For example, research into a *people of color* identity, or PoC ID, suggests this broad-based attachment is characterized by two overarching attributes that unify diverse group members. Through a series of in-depth interviews, Pérez (2021) reports that African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos who identify as *people of color* share a common view that their communities are linked because they are structurally disadvantaged with respect to Whites. In other words, official policies—in law enforcement, immigrant admissions, higher education—serve to collectively keep *people of color* "in their place." Second, these interviews also reveal that *bona fide* PoC view highly progressive, left-of-center politics as *the* key to remedying racial disparities, which implies robust support for an active government hand in nudging citizens toward more equitable race relations.

Both insights align with the experimental insights of Clarissa Cortland and her colleagues (2017). Across five experiments, these authors demonstrate that when groups do not share an identity (e.g., people who identify as *African American* versus *gay*) they will still express solidarity if they recognize common marginalizing experiences (i.e., being discriminated on the count of *race* or *sexual orientation*). Indeed, these findings are consistent with those of Pérez (2021), who shows, experimentally, that PoC ID retains its political influence so long as the various subordinated groups nested under this category feel and think their own minority group's trials and tribulations are recognized and not "drowned out" by the needs of the larger group.

Achieving solidarity between subordinated groups is therefore quite challenging. Part of the difficulty relates to how inequalities are produced between subordinated groups. The

varied configuration of minority groups means they experience different vulnerabilities. Consider the case of racial hierarchy in the United States. The latest theorizing in social psychology (Zou and Cheryan 2017) contends that Whites are still the most valorized group in America's racial hierarchy. However, major shifts in rankings come from people of color and their respective stations in relation to Whites and each other, as reflected in Figure 25.1. Accordingly, non-Whites are construed as falling along two major axes of subordination. The first of these is the familiar *superior-inferior* dimension that has shaped many political scientists' thinking (Sidanius et al. 1997; Carter and Pérez 2016). Here, Whites are construed as the most *superior* group—that is, the group with the most prestige. Punching right below Whites are Asian Americans: a racial group considered to be higher-status than Blacks and Latinos, but not as socially esteemed as Whites. This liminal station recognizes Asians' more complicated status within America's racial order (Kim 2003; Xu and Lee 2013).

The second axis of subordination, in turn, involves the ranking of groups in terms of how *American* or *foreign* they are considered. Again, Whites occupy the most advantaged position along this corridor (cf. Danbold and Huo 2015; Pérez et al. 2019). Yet among people of color, the jockeying for position along this axis reflects the complex ways in which different racial minority groups experience their subordination. For example, Black people are positioned here as relatively more *American* than Asians and Latinos, who contain many immigrants in their ranks. Thus, in comparison to Asian Americans and Latinos—two groups regularly construed as "foreign intruders"—Black individuals are considered *relatively more American* (Carter 2019).

Notice that in Figure 25.1, each group's position is relative to the other. It is very nearly impossible to understand, say, the position of Asian Americans without also appreciating where African Americans, Latinos, and Whites are located on this plane. In fact, if you look closely, you can better appreciate that each non-White group holds a relatively more privileged rank in comparison to other groups. For example, although many scholars are well aware of the types of advantages that Whites enjoy relative to non-Whites, what has been less clear is how each non-White group enjoys a modicum of advantage with respect

FIGURE 25.1 Two axes of subordination

to other people of color. Although all non-White groups are marginalized, Blacks are stereotyped as a relatively more *American* group than other people of color. Similarly, inasmuch as Asians are stereotyped as a more *foreign* group than Black and White individuals, they are also stereotyped as relatively *superior* to their Latino and Black counterparts. Alas, these small but invidious comparisons can fuel a "narcissism of small differences," such that any advantage within this hierarchical arrangement, no matter how small or seemingly petty, will trigger the types of intergroup comparisons that often produce ingroup favoritism (Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig and Tajfel 1973).

Consistent with this view, Pérez and Kuo (2021) reveal that threats to minorities' unique position in the racial order leads them to embrace a defensive posture toward other people of color. In a series of experiments, these authors show that African and Asian Americans will react defensively toward Latinos if they sense this outgroup undermines their group's more favorable position within the racial hierarchy. For example, Black adults who read about Latinos' demographic growth perceive changes to what it means to be *American*. Black individuals repair this threat and assert their relative station in the hierarchy by expressing less favorability toward Latinos and other people of color, perceiving less room for cooperation with racial minorities, and indicating greater support for policies that curtail Latinos' influence (e.g., English-only, immigration restrictions). Asian Americans express a similar defensive posture, but on the basis of a different vulnerability. Specifically, Asian Americans who read about the implications of Latinos' demographic growth perceive changes to what it means to be a "respectable" immigrant, that is, a foreigner who comes to the United States legally and with higher levels of education and skills. In light of these unsettled perceptions, Asian Americans repair this threat by reporting less favorability toward Latinos and other people of color, expressing a less cooperative spirit with other minorities, and voicing stronger endorsement of policies that curb Latinos' influence.

Of course, just like the varied social positions of minoritized groups can clarify when two or more communities of color might be less likely to cooperate politically, racial hierarchies also present a variety of psychological opportunities for these groups to also express more unified behaviors and opinions. As Linda Zou and Sapna Cheryan (2017: 698) observe, "Solidarity may be easier to achieve between groups that . . . have similar resulting experiences with prejudice." Consistent with that view, Pérez, Vicuña, Ramos, and colleagues (2021) reason that people of color who experience a shared source of marginalization will feel a heightened sense of solidarity with people of color, which should then produce more unified political views. For example, although Asian Americans are stereotyped as a *model minority* and Latinos as *low status*, both are viewed as *perpetual foreigners*. In two parallel experiments with Asian and Latino adults, these authors show that reading about another racial group who is marginalized as *foreign* increases Asians' *and* Latinos' solidarity with PoC. This shift, in turn, substantially boosts Asian support for flexible policies toward undocumented immigrants (which implicates Latinos) and Latino support for policies that facilitate admissions for high-skill immigrants (which implicates Asians).

4.3. Redefining Minority-Majority Relations

With so much of our discussion emphasizing hierarchies between groups, it is easy to walk away with the impression that these orders between groups hardly change. But

transformations do occur. And one relevant way this happens is through a re-definition of minority (e.g., *Latinos*, *females*, *Homosexuals*, *Muslims*) and majority relations (e.g., *Whites*, *males*, *Heterosexuals*, *Christians*). We illustrate this point with an analysis of the relationship between *Whites* and *people of color* in the United States.

In the annals of US race relations, observers have grown accustomed to underscoring the durability in unequal relations between (non-)Whites. Yet such persistence does not entail a complete absence of variance. Consider, for example, the previous remaking of *Whites* in light of ongoing demographic pressures that Southern and Eastern European immigrants once presented. Although *Irish*, *Italian*, *Jewish*, and others are considered *White* today, during the early 1900s these groups were considered anything but. Alas, they held a distinct liminal status between "real" *White* and *Black Americans*. The sparseness of survey and experimental data on these liminal groups limits our understanding about the psychological factors that pushed and pulled them toward Whiteness. But historical and sociological accounts suggest at least two parallel explanations. The first is that some members of these immigrant minorities, particularly those in later generations, signaled their worthiness as *Whites* by mimicking the racist attitudes toward *Blacks* that "real" *Whites* used to keep the racial order intact. The second is that prototypical *Whites* (in that era, Anglo-Saxon *Whites*) acquiesced to the claims of some of these *liminal* groups as a way to preserve *White* hegemony. The end result was a sharper hierarchy between *Blacks* and *Whites* that emerged from the incorporation of southern and eastern Europeans into the White majority (Wilkerson 2010; King 2000), but as peripheral members—that is, as White "light" (Jacobson 1999).

How can scholars draw on these to further our grasp of the psychology of minority status? One way is use surveys and experiments to study contemporary immigrant minorities, such as *Latinos* and *Asians*, and their disposition toward *Whites* and *African Americans*. If transformations in a hierarchy occur when some outgroup members signal their worthiness to ascend into a dominant ingroup, then scholars can seize this insight to explain how some minorities become marginal members of a majority. Part of this stems from recognizing the preservationist logic that drives a dominant group, such as *Whites*: while the contours and content of *Whites* can change, such accommodations seek to retain *Whites*' perch at the hierarchy's apex. Remember, although *Whites* may find people of color threatening to their ingroup, this sense of threat from them is not uniform (see Figure 25.1; Zou and Cheryan 2017). Thus, Whites might be inclined to give up some *distinctiveness* (by incorporating some people of color, like *Asians* and *Latinos*), while still preserving their dominance (by increasing their distance from *Blacks*). This would imply opportunities for some liminal minorities to exploit for their own interests and goals (see Bonilla-Silva 2004).

To bring some light to these questions, we (Pérez, Vicuña, and Robertson 2023) have argued that Latinos are acutely sensitive to social opportunities that let them join a higher status group (e.g., *American*), which provides an avenue to improve their lower rank in America's hierarchy (Noel et al. 1995; Ellemers and Jetten 2013). In light of these prospects, Latinos strive to "prove their worth" as members of the higher ranked group by adhering to its norms and values, which leads them to express political views that bolster the hierarchy's oppressive efforts. Across five studies composed of surveys and experiments, Pérez et al. (2023) find that Latino adults who deem themselves more *American*—a highly esteemed group—express greater prejudice against Black people, particularly when Latinos feel that their position as *Americans* is jeopardized. In turn, this heightened racism fuels stronger

Latino opposition to affirmative action for Blacks, greater aversion to federal aid to Blacks, and a stronger distaste for monitoring employment-related discrimination against Blacks, among other policies.

5. Coda

If a political psychology of minority status is a scientific goal, then political scientists must start by acknowledging that subordinate groups are mired in inequities. This has been our central proposition. Indeed, despite minorities' stigmatization and marginalization, individuals identify with these ingroups because they reduce the uncertainty of the world by telling members who they are and how they should behave, all while infusing them with a deep sense of belonging. Given that group identities are but one avenue to achieve and maintain a positive self-image, minorities will take advantage of opportunities that allow them to improve the position of their group. This, however, does not always happen in a straightforward fashion. We therefore invite scholars of minority politics to incorporate psychological motivations and processes to more crisply explain and predict minorities' political behavior.

If we have strongly privileged the role of psychology to better understand minorities' political behavior, it is because we think that minorities are complex beings. They recognize the social and structural obstacles that limit their opportunities. They belong to multiple social groups. And, they often possess manifold political interests. Because of this, we cannot summarize their behavior by simply assuming that they invariably act on behalf of only one of their ingroups. We must therefore consider the complexities behind their chosen identities, the content of those identities, and the effects that individual-level characteristics—such as identity strength and prototypicality—have on those identities, all in order to fully understand minorities' political responses. Above all, we must understand that while contextual factors make some identities more salient than others, minorities still have wide discretion and agency to choose the groups they identify with. Indeed, if there is one lesson that you take away from this essay, it is that members of minority groups prefer for their distinctive identities to be recognized and respected, rather than be ignored.

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

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This chapter is an update of the 2013 chapter *Social movements and the dynamics of collective action* (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2013). In that chapter we described fundamental social psychological processes—social identity, social cognition, emotions, and motivation—as they were employed in the context of social movement participation and as, we argued, engaging in social movements most of the time implies taking part in some form of collective action. However, the world of protest has changed profoundly since 2013. Virtualization gave the world a new "virtual look," and we observe as much protest now as in the roaring '60s, a decade characterized by high levels of protest activity. It is therefore not surprising that research on the social and political psychology of protest has expanded since 2013, both theoretically and empirically. This chapter is an attempt to synthesize these recent efforts and revise the assessment of where we are. To do so, we refreshed the whole chapter. Therewith the main section of this chapter focuses on social and political psychological approaches to movement participation. The central question is: *Why do some individuals participate in collective action while others don't?*

This chapter focuses on individuals, addressing central questions concerning their fears, hopes, and concerns. How do people perceive political contexts in ways that drive them to participate or abstain from collective action? What are the choices they make, why do they make them, and what are their motives? These questions center on the individual and therefore belong to the realm of political and social psychology. Obviously, other disciplines like sociology and political science also study social movements and collective action; in this chapter we will adopt a political psychological approach and point to literature from sociology and political science where applicable. Our general assumption is that people respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it. This is what a political psychology of social movements and collective action is about—trying to understand how people respond to perceived sociopolitical configurations. Political psychology explores the causes of people's thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and actions—and, primarily, how these are influenced

by sociopolitical context. It thus has a lot to offer to the study of protest participation, underscoring the importance of context (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). This raises additional questions that we also address: How are citizens embedded in their social environment? How do they perceive their political context? How does that influence their political orientation and behavior?

In this chapter, we propose a framework to study the political psychology of collective action participation. We first introduce the dynamics of collective action, which are decomposed into the dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization (Klandermans, 2004). The dynamics of demand are about people and their motives. The dynamics of supply are about organizations and their appeals. The dynamics of mobilization concern the convergence of demand and supply. In the mobilization section, we specifically consider how classic social capital factors such as social trust and embeddedness in organizations influence who does or does not participate in protest activity. Subsequently we discuss how the social and political psychological processes of politicization, polarization, and radicalization hinder or spur participation in collective action. Finally, we show how perceptions of the political context influence the decision to protest or not, focusing on socio-economic, political, and cultural contextual factors. In doing so, we provide an overview of what social and political psychology, combined with other disciplines, has to offer to the study of social movements and collective action, where we stand, and where we think the lacunas are. We end with a discussion of the challenges by those who study social movement participation.

1. Defining Social Movements and Collective Action

"Social movements are collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites and authorities" (Klandermans, 1997, p. 2; Tarrow, 1998, p. 4). This definition includes three key elements that deserve elaboration. First, social movements are *collective challenges*. They concern disruptive collective direct action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes. There is an obvious reason why this is the case. Social movements typically though not always encompass people who lack access to politics (see Craig & Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume). Had they had access, there would have been no need for a social movement. Disruptive collective action forces authorities to pay attention to the claims brought forward. Second, it concerns people with a *common purpose and solidarity*. Social movement participants rally behind common claims; they want authorities to do something, to change a state of affair or to undo changes. Such common claims are rooted in feelings of collective identity and solidarity. Third, isolated incidents of collective action are not social movements. Only *sustained collective action* turns contention into a social movement.

Although movement participants are a minority, several authors have observed that movement types of action have become more frequent over the last 40 years (e.g. Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998; Rucht & Neidhardt, 2002; Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). Others have argued that social movements have become a regular phenomenon in democratic societies (e.g. Goldstone, 2003). Some of these authors have

labeled this trend "movimentization of politics" (Rucht & Neidhardt, 2002), while others coined the term "movement society" (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998), and more recently Miriam Smith (2018) edited a special issue on the promises of the social movement society. This increase in social movement activity is also observed at the individual level, in terms of both protest participation (Dalton et al., 2010), as well as the public acceptance of protest (Park & Einwohner, 2019).

Engaging in social movements most of the time implies taking part in some form of collective action. In the words of Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990), an individual takes part in collective action "any time that [s/he] is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group." Wright (2001) proposes a simple taxonomy of possible forms of political action. In response to some political issue, people can choose to stay inactive; if they get into action, they can engage in individual or collective action; and collective action can be noncontentious or contentious. Participation can further be distinguished in terms of duration (ad hoc versus sustained) and effort (weak versus strong) (Figure 26.1).

Some activities require little effort, others a lot, and some are limited in time, while others are unlimited. Activities in the low-effort/limited-duration square typically require large numbers to make any impression on policymakers. It does not make much sense to have a petition with only 10 signatures; you need thousands if not hundreds of thousands. People know this, and thus for them to be motivated, it is important to know that some threshold level will be reached. Therefore, an important element of the persuasion strategy must be how to convince people that enough other people will participate. Activities in the high-effort/unlimited duration square, on the other hand, must solve the free-rider dilemma (see Chong, Chapter 4, this volume). For high-effort/long-duration activities, it usually suffices to have only a few participants who are willing to make an effort. As a consequence, many people can afford to take a free ride. Willingness to participate in this type of activity thus implies readiness to give 90% or more of the supporters that free ride. The social and political psychological dynamics vary, as the story of thresholds and free riders illustrate.

FIGURE 26.1 The process of participation (Klandermans, 1997)

Attempts to explain (non)participation must thus take into account the kind of activity we are talking about.

2. WHY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS EMERGE

In this chapter we concentrate on why individuals participate in movement activities. The question of why social movements come into being, why they become successful or not, or why they have become common practice is not our focal question. There is a rich literature available on that matter (for instance Buechler, 1993; Della Porta & Diani, 2020; McAdam et al., 1996; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). For our purpose, it suffices to summarize the global answers that have been forwarded, in brief: because people are aggrieved, because people have the resources to mobilize and seize the political opportunity to protest, and because their collective identities politicize. These answers parallel the history of theoretical approaches to collective action.

Research began in the 1950s and 1960s with classical theories such as symbolic interactionism, structural functionalism, and relative deprivation theory. Buechler (1993) classified these theories as classical collective behavior theories, a category that he characterizes as theories that understand social movements as a reaction to social stress, strain, or breakdown. The direct causes of collective behavior are seen as rooted in individuals who are experiencing various forms of discontent or anxiety. Basically, discontent is viewed as the origin of protest. In social movement literature these theories have also been labeled "breakdown theories," which alludes to the fact that researchers conceived of social movements as indicators of the existence of major cleavages in a society and of societal tension or even breakdown as a consequence.

Resource mobilization theorists saw social movements as normal, rational, institutionally rooted political challenges by aggrieved people. Differential availability of resources explains in their eyes why some aggrieved people become involved in social movements while others do not. It was argued that people need individual and collective resources—money, labor, time, education—to develop efficacy and stage a collective political action. Next to it, there should also be mobilizing agents—organizations and recruiting networks—that facilitate protest participation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). One of the prominent examples is the US civil rights movement, where the strong indiginous organizations like Black churches provided resources and played a crucial role in the development of Black insurgency (McAdam, 1982).

Resources could be both material and non-material, like connections and social capital one possesses. Within the resource mobilization framework, participation in collective action was analyzed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with it. Rational choice models of behavior (Klandermans, 1984; Opp, 1988) and Olson's theory of collective action (1965) were employed as models to explain individuals' participation and nonparticipation in collective action. When the potential benefits outweigh the anticipated costs, people opt to participate. Paradoxically, the same deprivation that might motivate people to stage collective action might deprive them of the resources needed for such action.

Soon a variant of resource mobilization theory developed within political science: the political process approach, which proposed that collective action was driven by

the political opportunities available to aggrieved groups with the resources needed to take action (McAdam, 1982). Political opportunities are "those consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success and failure" (Tarrow, 1998, p. 85). The key recognition, according to Meyer (2004, p. 125), in the political opportunity perspective is that "activists' prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent. Analysts therefore appropriately direct much of their attention to the world outside a social movement, on the premise that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit a social movement's prospects for (*a*) mobilizing, (*b*) advancing particular claims rather than others, (*c*) cultivating some alliances rather than others, (*d*) employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and (*e*) affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy." Among the many aspects of the political environment that have been referred to as factors influencing success expectations are the strength of the state, the level of repression, the party system, the degree of access to policy, and the degree to which elites are divided (Meyer, 2004). Kriesi and his colleagues (1995) study these political opportunities by comparing the emergence of new social movements across France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Opportunity structures include the nature of political cleavages, institutional structures, alliance structures (here, the openness and political position of the organized left), and prevailing strategies of social movements. By focusing on the effects of two factors, the configuration of power on the left and its presence or absence in government, they offer a fuller picture of citizen mobilization as it responds to political opportunity. Their study serves to "remind the reader that the state can invite action by facilitating access, but it can also provoke action by producing unwanted policies and political threats, thereby raising the costs of inaction" so Meyer (2004, p. 131).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an interest began to develop in the cognitive and affective origins of social movements. In response to the structuralist approach of the then dominant paradigms—resource mobilization and political process theories—social movement scholars from various angles began to highlight the processes of interaction, the symbolic definition and negotiation among participants, opponents, and bystanders of collective action. Grievances, resources, and opportunities are all needed for social movements to develop, but the scholars hold that these factors are also the result of the presence of social movements. They are in the eyes of the beholder and thus socially constructed. Moreover, researchers working from this perspective argued that aggrieved people might have the resources and opportunities to protest, but they still need to construct a politicized collective identity to engage in collective political action.

Over the last three decades, this new approach to collective action has been elaborated in studies of framing, collective identity, and emotions in the context of social movements. Together they have been labeled social constructionist approaches to protest. Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) were among the first to elaborate on the role of cognitive processes in their treatment of frame alignment—that is, attempts by movement organizers to persuade people to adopt the movement's reading of the situation. The more recent social constructionist studies concern the role of emotions in collective action (Goodwin et al., 2001; Van Troost et al., 2013). At this point, social constructionism has carved out its own niche as a legitimate approach to the analysis of social movements (Buechler, 2000, p. 54).

In sum, breakdown theories, resource mobilization, political process theories, and social constructionist theories all tried to account for the emergence of social movements in our societies. All agree that somehow grievances are at the root of social movements and contention, but they diverge in their explanations of what makes aggrieved people protest. While breakdown theories offer little in terms of mobilization processes beyond high levels of discontent, resource mobilization and political process theory point to resources and political opportunities as factors in the environment that impact on the formation and fate of social movements. Social constructionists, on the other hand, focus more on processes of interaction and sense-making among the aggrieved as internal factors stimulating the emergence of social movements. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the mechanisms of engagement in collective action as they are currently conceived in social and political psychology, but we will also draw on the approaches used in political science and sociology literature.

3. THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

The dynamics of collective action can be decomposed into the dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization (Klandermans, 2004). The *demand side* of collective action concerns characteristics of a social movement's mobilization potential. What is its demographic and political composition? Which collective identities does it comprise? What are the shared grievances and emotions? What is the composition of its organizational field; and to what extent are individuals socially and virtually embedded? The *supply side* of collective action concerns the characteristics of the movement. Is it strong; is it effective? Is it likely to achieve its goals at affordable costs? Does it have charismatic leaders? Is it an organization people can identify with? What does its action repertoire look like? Does it stage activities that are appealing to people? Which ideology does the movement stand for, and what constituents of identification does it offer? Demand and supply do not automatically come together. In a market economy, marketing is employed to make sure that the public is aware of a supply that might meet its demand. *Mobilization* is—so to speak—the marketing mechanism of the movement domain. The study of mobilization concerns such matters as the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication, the influence of social networks, and the role of new media such as the Internet, (smart)phones, and social media.

Studies of participation tend to concentrate on mobilization and to neglect the development of demand and supply factors. Yet there is no reason to take either for granted. To be sure, grievances abound in a society, but that does not mean that there is no reason to explain how grievances develop and how they are transformed into a demand for protest. Nor does the presence of social movement organizations in a society mean that there is no need to understand their formation and to investigate how they stage opportunities to protest and how these opportunities are seized by aggrieved people.

Resource mobilization and political process theorists typically study supply factors, social constructionists study demand factors, and all researchers study mobilization regardless of their approach. We focus in this chapter on the study of collective action in social and political psychology and thus place an emphasis on the demand side of mobilization.

3.1. Dynamics of Demand

Little is known about how exactly demand is formed. A few decades ago Klandermans introduced the distinction between *consensus mobilization* and *consensus formation* (1984, 1988). While consensus mobilization concerns "deliberate attempts to spread the view of a social actor among parts of the population," consensus formation concerns "the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures" (Klandermans, 1988, p. 175). Gamson (1992) in his book, *Talking Politics*, shows that people use diverse sources of information as they talk with their friends about politics. Employing time-series analysis, scholars such as Vliegenthart (2007) and Muis (2012) demonstrated for the issues of immigration and integration that in a complex interplay between real-life events, media attention, debates in the parliament, and debates between politicians, public opinion is formed and converted into anti-immigrant party support in the Netherlands. Van Stekelenburg and colleagues (2013) investigate how, in a newly built neighborhood, demand for protest develops as a function of the development of formal, informal, and virtual networks. They argue that a collective is needed for consensus to emerge. In fact, only new residents who formed relations with other residents in the new suburb participated in typical not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) protests. The internet and social media play a pivotal role in creating networks that facilitate consensus formation and the formation of a collective identity, a topic we discuss later in the chapter (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Van Stekelenburg, Anikina, et al., 2013; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b).

Indeed, the formation of demand is a process that takes place in social interaction and a perceived social and political context. Individuals are embedded in formal, informal, and virtual networks, which in turn are embedded in multiorganizational fields be it at local, national, or international levels. Understanding the formation of demand in a society requires insight in these processes of consensus mobilization and formation, a subject to which we return in the section on mobilization. Here we will elaborate on grievances, efficacy, identity, and emotions as antecedents of protest participation.

3.1.1. *Grievances*

Grievances concern "outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem" (Klandermans, 1997, p. 38). In *The Social Psychology of Protest*, Klandermans expands on this definition to distinguish among illegitimate inequality, suddenly imposed grievances, and violated principles. The notion of suddenly imposed grievances and violated principles originates in the sociological social movement literature. Walsh and Warland (1983) coined the first term and Kriesi (2006) the second. Suddenly imposed grievances—such as the establishment of a waste incinerator or a highway trajectory—are powerful mobilizers, as are violated principles. Illegitimate inequality is dealt with in the literatures on relative deprivation and social justice. Relative deprivation theory holds that feelings of relative deprivation result from a comparison of one's situation with a certain standard—one's past, someone else's situation, or an ideological standard such as equity or justice (Folger, 1986). If a comparison results in the conclusion that one is not receiving what one deserves, a person experiences relative deprivation. The literature further distinguishes between relative deprivation based on personal comparisons (i.e., individual deprivation) and relative

deprivation based on group comparisons (i.e., group deprivation; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). Research demonstrates that relative group deprivation is particularly important for engagement in collective action (Major, 1994), but work by Foster and Matheson (1999) suggests that so-called double deprivation, that is, a combination of group and individual deprivation, is even more effective. Based on a meta-analysis, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) conclude that the cognitive component of relative deprivation (i.e., the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison) has less influence on protest participation than does the affective component (i.e., such feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation, and discontent about outcomes).

Social psychologists have applied social justice theory to the study of social movements (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The social justice literature distinguishes between two classes of justice judgments: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice is related to the fairness of outcome distributions. Procedural justice, on the other hand, refers to the fairness of decision-making procedures and the relational aspects of the social process, that is, whether authorities treat people with respect and can be trusted to act in a beneficial and unbiased manner (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Research has found that people care more about how they are treated than about outcomes. Based on these findings, Tyler and Smith (1998) propose that procedural justice might be a more powerful predictor of social movement participation than distributive justice. We can observe these struggles in the Black Lives Matter protests, for instance (Williamson et al., 2018), and that is also what we found both in our research in South Africa (Klandermans et al., 1998) and among migrants in the Netherlands and New York (Klandermans et al., 2008).

Political trust and political cynicism further influence the formation of grievances. There is a lively academic debate regarding the relationship between political trust and protest activity. The debate boils down to the question of whether trust in politics is *positively* or *negatively* related to protest activity. We argued that the question to be answered was not so much whether people who engage in protest activity trust or distrust their political elites, but rather who the trusting and distrusting protesters are and why they protest (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018). We exploited a dataset encompassing data on about 9,000 demonstrators whose trust in their parliaments varied widely, ranging from trustworthy capable, to corrupt incapable. It revealed that distrusting disenchanted citizens turn their back on institutionalized politics, for them demonstrating *substitutes* for the party politics they distrust. Among those high in trust, demonstrating *supplements* party politics. John Jost's research on system justification might be relevant here. Jost and colleagues show that system justification can undermine willingness to protest, even among political activists (Jost et al., 2012). For instance, May Day protestors in Greece primed with a system-justifying stereotype exhibited less anger and willingness to protest compared to a control group of protestors. Future research might dig into the fascinating relation between trust in parliament and justification of the system.

3.1.2. *Efficacy*

It would be hard to deny that people who can be potentially mobilized by a movement are aggrieved, but as we know grievances do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in collective action. Therefore, the key question to be addressed by any grievance theory

is: why do some aggrieved people protest, while others do not? In a later section on the contextual factors that influence protest participation, we delve much more deeply into the role of efficacy, trust, and embeddedness. For the moment, we can simply state that grievances are weak predictors of protest (Dalton et al., 2010). Rather than aggrieved people, it is those who possess political skills and resources who are more likely to protest, independent of their level of grievances. The underlying political psychological concept is efficacy. In political science, individual efficacy (internal and external) and group efficacy (linked to the perceived success of a movement) are distinguished. People are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to redress their grievances at an affordable cost (Klandermans, 1984). The more effective an individual believes collective action participation to be, the more likely the person is to participate. Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004) propose efficacy as the core of what they call problem-focused coping—one of the two pathways to collective action they define, the other being emotion-focused coping, with group-based anger at its core (see below on emotions).

3.1.3. *Identity*

Next to efficacy, identity, specifically collective identity, became one of the most important concepts in the social movement literature over the past 40 years. Melucci was among the first to emphasize the significance of collective identity (Melucci, 1989). In the years to follow the concept began to gain prominence in the social movement literature (see for instance Stets & Serpe, 2019; Stryker et al., 2000). Meanwhile, social psychologists began to explore the role of group identification in movement participation (de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000; Klandermans et al., 2002; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer et al., 2003) and concluded that the more one identifies with a group involved in a protest activity, the more likely one is to take part in that activity.

A complicating matter in this respect is the fact that people simultaneously hold multiple identities, while movements tend to emphasize a single identity and refer to a single place in society. As a consequence, people may experience being steered in different directions by conflicting identities (cf. Kurtz, 2002). Individuals might find themselves under cross-pressure when two groups they identify with are on opposite sides of a controversy (e.g., union members faced with the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being disloyal to the company or the country. This problem is especially relevant in the case of protest participation by immigrants, specifically Muslim immigrants, which can easily be (mis)interpreted as disloyalty to their new country of residence. González and Brown (2003) coined the term "dual identity" to point to the concurrent workings of super- and subordinate identities. They argue that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g., ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a superordinate entity (e.g., national identity). In fact, they claim that dual identity is a healthy configuration, as it implies sufficient identification with one's subgroup to experience basic security *and* sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude divisiveness.

There is evidence that indeed people who hold a dual identity are more satisfied with their situation than people who do not (González & Brown, 2003; Simon & Grabow, 2010). Furthermore, studies of Spanish and Dutch farmers, South African citizens, and immigrants

in the Netherlands and New York suggest that individuals who report holding a dual identity are more satisfied with their social and political situation than those who do not hold a dual identity (Klandermans, 2001; Klandermans et al., 2004; Klandermans et al., 2008). However, if they are dissatisfied, individuals who hold a dual identity are more likely to participate in collective action.

Most studies investigate how identification fosters mobilization and participation, but the opposite direction—how mobilization and participation strengthen identity formation—is no less interesting (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2019). To do so, we distinguished between deductive and inductive identity formation (inspired by Postmes et al., 2005). Identification with the organizers is formed in a deductive top-down manner via mobilization strategies. The participants bring this existing identity to the protest event. Eventually and inductively, a new activist identity emerges while participants are taking part in the demonstration themselves while sharing grievances with other participants.

Thomas and colleagues (2009) study emerging norms related to ongoing commitment. Drawing on recent developments in the collective action, identity formation, and social-norm literatures, they advance a model to understand sustainable commitment to action. This so-called normative alignment model suggests that one solution to promoting ongoing commitment to collective action lies in crafting a social identity with a relevant pattern of norms for emotion, efficacy, and action. Rather than viewing group emotion, collective efficacy, and action as group products, the authors conceptualize *norms* about these as contributing to a dynamic system of meaning, which can shape ongoing commitment to a cause. These emerging group norms and the previously discussed deductive and inductive identity formation might well play a large role in helping us to understand mobilization and participation in contemporary connective actions organized via social media with minimal organization (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). We will come back to these types of actions below.

3.1.4. *Emotions*

Relatively recent work in sociology and social and political psychology has brought emotions to the study of social movements (Goodwin et al., 2001; Van Stekelenburg, 2006; van Zomeren et al., 2019; van Zomeren et al., 2004; see also Brader & Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). For those of us who have been part of protest events or watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of protest detached from emotions. Emotions can be avoidance or approach oriented. Fear, which makes people refrain from taking action, is an example of an avoidance-oriented emotion. Anger is an approach-oriented emotion and is known to be an antecedent of protest participation (van Zomeren et al., 2004). There appears to be a relation between emotions and efficacy. When people do not feel efficacious, they are more likely to experience fear; feeling efficacious, on the other hand, is associated with experiencing anger (Mackie et al., 2000). Findings from the study among migrants confirm this: feelings of efficacy reinforced anger and reduced fear, while in their turn anger fostered collective action participation, while fear undermined it (Klandermans et al., 2008).

Van Zomeren et al. (2004) show that anger is an important motivator of protest participation of *disadvantaged* groups. Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2006) examined readiness

for political action among *advantaged* Australians to oppose government plans to re-dress disadvantaged Aborigines. They found that symbolic racism and relative depriva-tion evoked group-based anger, which in turn promoted willingness for political action. But advantaged group members can also perceive the ingroup advantage as unfair and feel guilt and anger about it. Anger related to in-group advantage, and to a lesser degree guilt, appears to be a potent predictor of protest of advantaged group members (Leach et al., 2006).

In nonnormative violent actions, contempt and hatred appear to be more relevant emotions than anger (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Becker et al., 2011; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch & Becker, 2013; Tausch et al., 2008; Van Stekelenburg, 2017). They are a direct re-action to protracted harm perceived as deliberate, unjust, and stemming from an inner evil character of the hated individual or group (see Halperin & Cohen-Chen, Chapter 30, this volume). Shared hate delegitimizes the outgroup and facilitates a clear distinction be-tween the outgroup and ingroup. If feelings of superiority are threatened, fear can undergo a terrible transformation into hatred and violence (Sternberg, 2008). Thus, in sum, we can define two emotional routes to protest (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017a): an anger route based on efficacy leading to normative action, and a contempt/hate route when legitimate channels are closed (Wright et al., 1990) and the situation is seen as hopeless, invoking a "nothing to lose" strategy leading to nonnormative protest (Kamans et al., 2011; Matsumoto et al., 2015).

Whereas the importance of anger, hate, contempt, and other negative emotions spurring action are indisputable, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of positive emotions, such as hope, in collective action research (Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014; Tausch & Becker, 2013; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017). Sabucedo and Vilas maintain that positive emotions, such us hope and pride, can facilitate protest. Hope, in their words "is related to the expec-tation that desirable phenomena will happen" (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). The antici-pation that the objectives established will be attainable activates hope, and this encourages involvement in the protest. Thus, an emotional climate of hope may provide support for prolonged, targeted group activity in the future" (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). Pride appears to be associated with taking—actions that are social and highly valued by individuals in a specific setting (Tangey et al., 2007), such as acting in line with the values of the ingroup. In this sense, it is linked to the act of participating itself.

3.1.5. *An Integrating Framework*

Strikingly, a comprehensive framework integrating identities, grievances, and emotions into a single model was lacking for a long time. Recently, however, Simon et al. (1998), van Zomeren et al. (2008), van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007, 2017) , and van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk (2011) have each attempted to build such models. The three models identify different pathways to collective action. Simon et al. distinguish between an instrumental and identity pathway; van Zomeren et al. distinguish between an emotion- and a problem-focused pathway; and van Stekelenburg and Klandermans distin-guish among pathways to collective action associated with instrumentality, identity, ide-ology, and anger. All three models emphasize the central role of identification; in order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions that characterizes a demand of protest,

FIGURE 26.2 Motivational dynamics of collective action participation

a shared identity is needed. Similarly, all three models include an instrumentality component with efficacy as a key aspect.

Figure 26.2 depicts our summary of the various models to explain the strength of the motivation to participate in collective action. Motivational strength results from group-based anger, and instrumental and/or ideological motivation. Instrumental and ideological motivation each result from grievances and feelings of efficacy shared with a group that the individual participants identify with. Grievances may originate from interests and/or principles that are felt to be threatened. The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they are and the more they are prepared to take part in collective action to protect their interests and/or to express their indignation. However, this motivational constellation might differ across contexts; grievances are also socially constructed and organizers play an important role here, they do their utmost to frame the cause in terms that resonate with their constituency (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). Hence, turning the mobilizing potential into actual participation depends also on the supply of opportunities to act.

3.2. Dynamics of Supply

Social movement organizations are more or less successful in satisfying demands for collective political participation, and we may assume that movements that successfully supply what potential participants demand gain more support than the movements that fail to do so. Movements and movement organizations can be compared in terms of their effectiveness in this regard. This is not to say that this is easy to assess (Giugni et al., 1999; Giugni, 1998). Measures of movement effectiveness differ and include the movement's impact on and access to polity, impact on public opinion, mass media attention, and its ability to provide selective incentives (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oliver, 1980). Nonetheless, movement organizations try to convey the image of an effective political force. They can do so by pointing to the impact they have had in the past, or to the powerful allies they have. Of course, they may lack all this, but then, they might be able to show other signs of strength. A movement may command a large constituency, as witnessed by turnout at demonstrations, large or increasing membership figures, or large donations. It may comprise strong organizations with strong charismatic leaders who have gained respect, and so on.

An important element of the supply side of participation is the provision of information about the behavior of others. Social networks—real and virtual—are of strategic importance in this respect because it is through these networks that people are informed about the behavior or intentions of others (Kim & Bearman, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994; Passy, 2001, 2003). In his paper on the Chinese student movement of 1989, Zhao (1998) gives a striking illustration of this mechanism. He describes how the ecological circumstance that most students in Beijing live in the same part of town made the success of the movement in terms of mobilization visible in the streets in front of the dormitories. It goes without saying that these days the virtual world, and social media such as Facebook, do the same (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). We will discuss social networks as a part of a social capital in the section on mobilization below.

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one's group. This is most attractive to people who identify strongly with their group (de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Interestingly, these studies show that identification with the more exclusive group of movement participants is far more influential than identification with the more inclusive category. Indeed, in addition to the opportunity to act on behalf of the group, collective action participation offers further constituents of identification: for instance, a charismatic leader of the movement; the movement's cause; the other people in the movement, the movement organization itself, can all function as the source of identification. Not all these sources of identification are always equally appealing. Movement leaders can be more or less charismatic, or the people in the movement can be more or less attractive. Moreover, movements and movement organizations may be, and in fact often are, controversial. As a consequence, movement participants are frequently stigmatized (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006). Within the movement's network, this is, of course, completely different, as Stuart and colleagues (2013) show in their study on members of the Sea Shepherds. There militants have the internal status denied to them by society. Indeed, it is not uncommon for militants to refer to the movement organization as a second family, a substitute for the social and associative life society is no longer offering them (Orfali, 1990; Tristan, 1987). Movement organizations not only supply a source of identification, they also offer all kinds of opportunities, such as marches, rituals, songs, meetings, signs, symbols, and common codes, to enjoy and celebrate the collective identity (see Stryker et al., 2000, and Stets & Serpe, 2019, for an overview).

Moreover, social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between "critical communities," where new ideas and values are developed, and "social movements" which are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. "In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames" (Rochon, 1998, p. 31). Through processes such as consensus mobilization (Klandermans, 1988), framing (Snow et al., 1986), or dialogue (Steinberg, 1999) movements seek to disseminate their definition of the situation to the public at large. Such definitions of the situation have been labeled "collective action frames" (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Collective action frames can be defined in terms of injustice (that is, some definition of what is wrong in the world), identity (that is, some definition of who is affected and who is responsible), and agency (that is, some beliefs about the possibilities of changing society). We may

assume that people who join a movement come to share some part of the movement's ideas and values.

Social movements do not invent ideas from scratch; they build on an ideological heritage as they relate their claims to broader themes and values in society. In so doing they relate to societal debates that have a history of their own, and that history is usually much longer than that of the movement itself. Gamson (1992), for example, refers to the "themes" and "counterthemes" that in his view exist in every society. One such paired theme and countertheme he mentions is "self-reliance" versus "mutuality," that is, the belief that individuals must take care of themselves versus the belief that society is responsible for its less fortunate members. In a study of the protests about disability payments in the Netherlands, we demonstrated how in the Netherlands these two beliefs became the icons that galvanized the debates (Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996). While "self-reliance" became the theme of those favoring restrictions on disability payments, "mutuality" was the theme of those who defended the existing system. Another example is what Tarrow (1998) calls "rights frames": human rights, civil rights, women's rights, animal rights, and so on—in other words, collective action frames that relate a movement's aims to some fundamental rights frame. For decades, Marxism has provided this kind of ideological frame for social movements.

To sum up, the supply side of collective action is not static or a constant. In fact, it has to be constructed again in every mobilization campaign. McAdam et al. (1996) have defined this phenomenon as *mobilizing structures*, which are "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 3). Mobilizing structures are the connecting tissue between organizers and participants.

3.3. Mobilization

Mobilization is the process that gets the action going; demand and supply would remain potential ingredients of action if the process of mobilization did not bring the two together. As mentioned above, social networks, social trust, and communication channels are indispensable to the mobilization process. They are crucial for the emergence of shared grievances, enhanced social connectedness, and the development of perceived collective efficacy.

3.3.1. *The Role of Embeddedness: Social Trust and Social Capital*

The concept of social capital has important implications for advancing our understanding of the role of social embeddedness and social trust in protest participation. In his study *Making Democracy Work* Putnam defines social capital as a possession that does not contain material assets, but connections among individuals: it consists of "features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of the society by facilitating coordinated actions" (1993, p. 167). From the civic culture perspective, social trust belongs to a broader set of values that characterize "good citizenship," according to which community-oriented citizens are expected to be politically active, to advance both their own interests and the interests of the community.

Social trust is particularly important for facilitating mobilization processes because it suppresses fear, on the one hand, and enhances political efficacy, on the other. As Benson and Rochon (2004) notice, the costs of taking part in a demonstration may be relatively small, but can result in arrest and prosecution, depending on the democratization of the regime and the atmosphere of the demonstration. Thus, participants need to make a leap of faith to perceive participation in a collective action as worthwhile and effective. Social trust leads to optimistic estimates about the likelihood of success of a protest because it increases the expectation that others will act (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988). In this way, social trust helps to overcome the free-rider problem because individuals trust others to act. In Rothstein's (2013) terms, they develop positive reciprocity. Some studies show that social trust translates into political efficacy, which, in turn, leads to protest participation (Gaidytė, 2015; Gaidytė & Muis, 2019). The reasoning, according to Kerr and Harris (1996), is that people with more cooperative social motives attach greater weight to others' outcomes. Putnam (1993) observed that in a more trusting community ordinary citizens have a greater sense of political efficacy because they feel empowered to influence political issues. In contrast, in distrustful societies people perceive themselves as being exploited, submissive, and dependent, constraining their sense of political efficacy. Similar results were obtained in a study by Bäck and Christensen (2016), who found that social trust enhances the propensity to participate in demonstrations in European countries, and even more so in contexts characterized by higher levels of social trust.

In line with the social capital concept, active membership in organizations and involvement in voluntary associations is considered crucial to the transformation of trust from an individual characteristic to a collective resource. Being embedded in a network ensures that collective material and cognitive/psychological resources are accessed equally by citizens. The emphasis here is on voluntary organizations (within an institutional setting), rather than private circles of friends or family (Klandermans et al., 2008). Formal social networks are thought to function as "schools of democracy" where "citizens learn to participate by participating" (Pateman, 1970, p. 105). Hence, when citizens participate in small-scale civic associations, they are taught habits of cooperation and thus able to socialize into larger political entities actions (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Newton, 1997; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016).

3.3.2. *The Role of Communication Networks*

The effect of network interaction on protest activity is contingent on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people gather about politics as a result (McClurg, 2003). Klandermans et al. (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms: immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in a protest provided they were embedded in social networks that offered an opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. Being integrated into a network increases the chances that one will be targeted with a mobilizing message and that any promise to participate is monitored and socially enforced.

Indeed, part of the infrastructure of a movement's mobilization potential is the communication networks that connect individuals. Walgrave and Klandermans (2010) demonstrate how open and closed communication channels and weak and strong ties weave a web

of connections that influence how easy or difficult it is to reach a movement's mobilization potential. Polletta, Chen, Gardner, and Motes suggest that the Internet plays an important role in grievance formation (2013). This corroborates van Stekelenburg and Klandermans' (2017b) observation that technologies such as mobile phones, the Internet, Facebook, and so on, played a crucial role in the mobilization of high school students in the Netherlands in a protest campaign against educational policy.

Roggeband and Duyvendak (2013) raise the question of whether traditional networks and organizations such as parties, unions, or churches have lost their mobilizing force and are being replaced by light communities such as Facebook groups and highly fluid mobilizing structures. They suggest that more and more people avoid "heavy" long-term engagements and replace more formal institutions for looser engagements in informal, sometimes temporary, or issue-specific networks. As they also see a change from "identity politics" to "issue politics," these authors suggest that the emergence of "light" communities will be accompanied by a process of individualization resulting in a shift from collective to individual action.

3.3.3. *The Process of Mobilization*

Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several conceptually distinct steps. As mentioned previously, Klandermans (1988) distinguished between consensus and action mobilization. The more successful consensus mobilization is, the larger the pool of sympathizers a mobilizing movement organization can draw from. In their frame alignment approach to mobilization, Snow and Benford and their colleagues further elaborated on consensus mobilization (see Benford, 1997, for a critical review; and Snow, 2004, for an overview). Klandermans and Oegema (1987) broke the process of action mobilization down further into four separate steps: people (1) need to *sympathize* with the cause, (2) need to *know* about the upcoming event, (3) must *want* to participate, and (4) must be *able* to participate (see Figure 26.3).

Each step brings the supply and demand of protest closer together until an individual eventually takes the final step to participate in an instance of political protest. The first step accounts for the results of consensus mobilization. It divides the general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. A large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons many a sympathizer never turns into a participant. The second step is equally crucial; it divides the sympathizers into those who have been the target of mobilization attempts and those who have not. The third step concerns the social psychological core of the process. It divides sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who are not. Finally, the fourth step differentiates among people who are motivated, dividing them into those who participate and those who do not.

In their research on the mobilization campaign for a peace demonstration Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found that three-quarters of the population of a community south of Amsterdam felt sympathy for the movement's cause. Of these sympathizers, three-quarters were somehow targeted by mobilization attempts. Of those targeted, one-sixth were motivated to participate in the demonstration. And finally, of those motivated, one-third ended up participating. The net result of these different steps is some (usually small)

FIGURE 26.3 The process of action mobilization (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987)

proportion of the general public that participates in protest. With each step smaller or larger numbers drop out, but the better the fit between demand and supply, the smaller the number of dropouts.

3.3.4. *Mobilization with Minimal Organization*

Sometimes the demand for protest can be so overwhelming that very little is needed to bring large numbers of people onto the streets. In Belgium in 1996, Dutroux was arrested on suspicion of having kidnapped, tortured, and sexually abused six girls aged between 8 and 19, four of whom died. A number of shortcomings in the Dutroux investigation caused widespread discontent in Belgium with the country's criminal justice system. In the context of the massive indignation regarding the kidnapping and serial killing of children by Dutroux and judicial errors in Belgium in dealing with it, television and newspapers sufficed as mobilizing actors (Walgrave & Manssens, 2000). Yet the mobilizing power of the media should not be overestimated (Kingdon, 1984). They only have the power to mobilize in the case of so-called consensual issues (Verhulst, 2011), that is, issues that are grounded in suddenly imposed grievances that evoke a communal sense of repulsion and indignation. Examples include the death of a child caused by drunken driving (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996) or senseless violence (Lodewijkx et al., 2008). The salience and the consensual character of the issues compensate for the lack of organization, making mobilization via the mass media possible.

It is helpful to consider an example of protests staged in the absence of any form of organization (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). In November 2007, 20,000 Dutch secondary school pupils took to the streets protesting the deteriorating quality of their education. The movement took the shape of protests by several groups geographically scattered and occurred over time. The protests were impromptu and short-lived. They were initiated by the stereotypical guy next door, Kevin, whose call for action was "virally" spread via face-to-face personal and virtual networks (e.g., MSN,

social network sites). Via mobile phones, videos of unrest were uploaded on YouTube, and the YouTube videos facilitated frame-alignment. Hence, in real-time, *would-be* protesters came to share grievances and emotions with *actual* protesters, and they shared information on actual turnout.

These secondary school protests are examples of so-called connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Mobilization for connective action moves from one person to another—individually, as part of a larger email list, or a social network such as Facebook, Instagram, or TikTok. In a process that continues to reproduce itself, the message is copied and redistributed. An original sender cannot know where or when the message stops traveling, stops being copied and redistributed, stops being translated. Messages with higher degrees of resonance will be dispersed in greater densities. The Arabian revolutions from Tunisia to Syria, the earlier Green Protests in Iran, and the more recent Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and storming of the Capitol are all examples of the power of connective action.

Mobilization with minimal organization has become more effective with the appearance of virtual networks and social media. This changing form of connectivity affects dynamics of contention dramatically (e.g. Enjolras et al., 2012; Enjolras et al., 2014; Harlow, 2011; Velasquez & LaRose, 2014). Various social media such as LinkedIn, Instagram, and Facebook make it easy to connect to others in a network. Previously this was time consuming, effortful, and thus costly. This implies that anyone can be an organizer nowadays, as exemplified by the young climate change protesters who organized the international Friday For Future movement (Wahlström et al., 2019). Social media have given people a set of tools that allow them to create and find these groups. They reduce the costs of participation by lowering communication and coordination costs and facilitate group formation, recruitment, and retention. As such, they make organizing without organizations feasible (cf. Earl & Kimport, 2011). They can also foster collective identity across a dispersed population; they encourage the perception among individuals that they are members of a larger community by virtue of the emotions, grievances, and the feelings of efficacy they share. And finally, they create networks. These sites—which have attracted millions of users worldwide since their introduction—make it possible to connect to hundreds of people who share interests and activities across political and geographic borders. What makes them unique is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers virtually or in-person, but rather that they enable users to publicly display their connections and make visible their social networks (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). The internet and social media created a new virtual stratum; individuals move around in *virtual* networks in addition to (in)formal *physical* networks.

Social media thus make self-organized action feasible, by on the one hand lowering information, communication, and coordination costs, and on the other hand offering a space and tool to produce, express, and perform political dissent. They help to steer loosely coupled structures (Lacquer, 1999) and make grievances, ideas, and ideologies travel rapidly from one context to the other. The term "CNN effect" has been coined to describe the influence of satellite news on intergroup conflicts in other parts of the world: "The idea is that a global conscience comes into being through the global mass media" (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 128). Through satellite television and the Internet, people are more informed about the struggles of their brothers and sisters worldwide with which they feel emotionally connected. Social media spur intergroup conflict because "explosive import products" such as fights between activists and the police, storming of the Capitol, or Israeli attacks against

Palestinians are vividly transmitted and facilitate the creation of global activist identities such as Black Lives Matter, or Muslims.

The internet and social media also augment activists' tactical repertoire, be it offline actions that are supported and facilitated by the Internet, or online actions that are Internet-based (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010). Internet-supported actions involve the Internet as a device that reinforces the traditional tools of organizers by making it easier to organize and coordinate. Smartphones make it possible to continuously document activists "on the spot" about actions and interaction with the police and thereby change the tactics of groups like the "Black Bloc" (McPhail & McCarthy, 2005) and Extinction Rebellion (Shah, 2019). Internet-based action, on the other hand, involves the Internet's function of creating new and modified tactics as for instance online petitions, email bombings, and hacktivism, expanding the action toolkit of social movement organizations.

4. Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization

Today's societies are increasingly described in terms of uncertainties and threat (Moghaddam, 2008), fears (Bauman, 2006), and risk (Beck, 1992). Such collective fear enhances politicization, polarization, and radicalization (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). Perceived threat and social exclusion are said to fuel such political participation especially if citizens do not trust their government to solve their problems (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018). However, fear can also reduce polarization under some circumstances—for example, through avoidance of confrontation (e.g. Mackie et al., 2000). The kind of threat that stokes polarization is probably linked to anger (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Globalization and migration create dynamics that serve to include some and exclude others in a connected but polarized global context. It results in salient identities and ensuing clashes of ideologies (Moghaddam, 2005, 2008). In societies where "threat is in the air" (Moghaddam, 2008), prejudice and hate toward other groups are high (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010), which provides an opening for political actors to politicize prejudice in order to mobilize for (radical) conflict behavior (Kinnval & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010).

When do people go beyond moderate collective action to choose more extreme, radical forms of action? Research on both conventional collective action and political violence suggests that radical forms of action are usually preceded by more moderate forms of support. In the section on Mobilization, we discussed Klandermans & Oegema's (1987) four stages model of social movement engagement, from being a sympathizer, to becoming an active participant. Similarly, in the political violence literature, scholars have emphasized the incremental nature of engagement in radical action, utilizing a staircase metaphor (e.g. Moghaddam, 2005). Indeed, in both the social movement and political violence literatures there has been a well-articulated need to understand a commitment to collective efforts to bring about social change *as a process* (Horgan, 2008). There are two transformations relevant to understanding the process of becoming a (radical) activist, more specifically: (1) the shift between sympathy and active support (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987), and (2) the shift between support for moderate collective action and more extreme strategies (Stuart

et al., 2013). Three processes are particularly useful for describing these shifts, respectively *politicization*, *polarization*, and *radicalization*. We will discuss these three processes. We argue that politicization and polarization are interrelated but different processes both nested in the process of radicalization.

4.1. Politicization

Awareness of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identity must politicize to become the engine of collective action. Politicization of a collective implies that people "intentionally engage, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). Politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment. Typically, this process begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group's predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If, in the course of this struggle, the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government, or political parties as we could observe when Black Lives Matter aligned with the Democrats in the United States) or the general public, collective identity fully politicizes (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

What distinguishes politicized collective identity from collective identity? The first distinction is raised consciousness: "the growing awareness of shared grievances and a clearer idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances reflect a distinct cognitive elaboration of one's worldview providing group members with a meaningful perspective on the social world and their place in it" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 327). The second distinction is about the relation with other groups. A politicized identity provides antagonistic lenses through which the social world is interpreted. This intergroup polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as "pro" or "con," thus as allies or opponents. The third distinction concerns the unique behavioral consequences of politicized collective identity, namely, politicized group members should be likely to engage in collective action directed at the government or the public to force them to intervene or to take sides. This is facilitated by social movement organizers who skillfully design collective action frames that emphasize, who we are, what we are angry about, and whom we hold responsible.

Simon and his students (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008) have argued that a politicized collective identity is inherently a dual identity. Some sense of identification with the superordinate political entity seems to be a basic requirement of social and political mobilization in that it ensures that this entity is acknowledged as *one's own* social or political habitat or arena. More specifically, to the extent that one identifies with the superordinate entity, one should feel entitled to make political claims, because identity confers rights. Similarly, one should feel motivated to get actively involved in the political game, because it becomes one's own game, and one should feel encouraged to approach third parties as potential allies, because they can be viewed as in-group members at the superordinate level (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2017).

Little is known about the dynamic processes of politicization of the collective identity and how this may change the content of social identities. Felicity Turner (2017) recently wrote a dissertation on this topic and developed an innovative measure to assess changes in identity content due to politicization. In one of her studies, she examines politicized identities among (un) politicized Americans in the 2012 US presidential elections. In a longitudinal sample of US citizens (N = 760), they tracked personal (i.e., unique) and politicized (i.e., party activist) identity content: before, during, and after the election. They compared identity content of individuals who self-labeled as politicized (i.e., active party promoters) or unpoliticized (i.e., passive party supporters). Their results show that politicized identities are moralized identities that have a self-evaluative, but not strongly action motivation, function. Methodologically this work is innovative and useful and we are confident that her research will yield results that will move the field forward, especially in understanding the dynamic interplay of individual and context over time.

4.2. Polarization

We live in polarized times. Take Trump, Brexit, or Black Lives Matter protesters clashing with the police. Intergroup conflict occurs in a wider, more inclusive societal context. We conceive of polarization as an instance of movement/counter-movement dynamics in which the ingroup and outgroup "keep each other alive" (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Ingroup and outgroup mutually reinforce each other, identifying themselves in opposition to each other and regarding the other as the main target of their collective actions. When groups polarize, a strict distinction between "us" and "them" evolves. Both groups assert that what "we" stand for is threatened by "them," tribute is paid to the in-group's symbols and values, and the outgroup is derogated. It is a *cyclical process* that evolves over time fueled by intergroup incidents. Each incident—like a terrorist attack—generates a push for intragroup similarity and intergroup distinctiveness through which groups drift apart and intergroup conflicts intensifies (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). This cyclical process intensifies by exposure to intergroup violence, which increases intolerance, hatred, and feelings of revenge (e.g., Halperin, 2008; see also Halperin & Cohen-Chen, Chapter 30, this volume). The more intense the polarization, the more—and more violent—the associated intergroup conflicts. Polarization—in the sense of opposing opinions—belongs to a democratic society. It gives voice to interests and emotions, and facilitates group formation. However, the balance may tilt, sharpened oppositions lead then to conflict and polarization is threatening rather than enriching. There are compelling reasons to worry about polarization. Indeed, the latest Global Risks Report (2017) ranked "increasing polarization" as third most important risk-trend for the decade to come.

The social sciences approach polarization from different vantage points. As a consequence, what constitutes polarization remains unclear (Esteban & Schneider, 2008). Political scientists primarily investigate the political arena and focus on *political polarization* at the level of political parties. "For parties to be polarized, they must be far apart on policy issues, and the party members must be tightly clustered around the party mean" (Poole & Rosenthal, 2001, p. 105) or at the level of citizens (e.g., DiMaggio et al., 1996; Mason, 2015) In political science much of the emphasis is on affective party polarization not ideological (see Iyengar et al. 2019, for an overview article; see also Mason, Chapter 24, this

volume). Sociologists, conversely, focus on the social and conceive of it as *social polarization*. They focus on structural segregation along ethnic, religious, and class lines in global cities like New York (Sassen, 2016), Amsterdam, and Rotterdam (Burgers & Van der Waal, 2008; Hamnett, 2001). Social sorting is one of the main bases for polarization according to Mason (2016), who focuses on sorting grounded in race, religion, and left-right identification. So it is fair to say that social or group polarization has heavily shaped this research in political science. Social psychologists, finally, study polarization as a phenomenon "in people's mind." They describe it as *group polarization* and emphasize the sharpening of group-based attitudes, ideas, norms and group identification (e.g., McGarty et al., 1992). Obviously, in reality these arenas are intertwined. Indeed, political polarization extends to social arenas, erodes social trust (Martini & Torcal, 2016), and takes on the same processes of exclusion, rigidity, and confrontation present in the political struggle (McCoy et al., 2018). Hence, one cannot study the one form of polarization and neglect the other.

The continuation of conflict is facilitated by sustained mistrust (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2009). This makes *trust* a core concept in polarization (see also Iyengar et al., 2019). This is indeed what we found in a pilot study conducted among citizens of Rotterdam (van Stekelenburg, 2018); the more polarized a neighborhood, the greater the number of reported conflicts (recorded by Police Central Control Room). But neighborhoods with high levels of trust in local politicians, police, and each other reported *less* conflict despite similar levels of societal polarization. This suggests that interpersonal and institutional trust enhance resilience to the effects of polarization, and their vital role in curbing polarization.

4.3. Radicalization

When a movement declines, many activists quit (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2015). But becoming inactive is not the only response to movement decline. Indeed, radicalization appears as an alternative response to movement decline (della Porta, 1995). Although violence tends to be present from the very beginning of a protest cycle, the more dramatic forms of violence occur when the mass phase of the protest cycle is over (della Porta, 1995). Violence as mobilization declines is attributed to people's dissatisfaction with protest outcomes and their attempts to compensate for the "reduction in numbers" (della Porta, 1995). At the same time the repression apparatus becomes more effective toward the end of a cycle. Against that background, sustained participation can take the form of radicalization, making radical, sustained participation and disengagement different sides of the same coin.

Following social psychologists such as Moghaddam (2005) and Doosje et al. (2016), we consider radicalization to be a *process*. Both scholars depict the process of radicalization as a staircase. Thought and action on each floor are characterized by particular psychological processes. People are located on different floors of the building, but everyone begins on the ground floor. The ground floor starts with subjective interpretations of material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and trust in politics. Individuals try to move up to the first floor, in search of ways to improve their life conditions. These individuals attempt to improve their own situation and that of their group. On this floor, they are particularly influenced by options for individual mobility and voice. When people feel their voice is listened to, they "buy into" the system. Hence, people feel politically efficacious and might participate in lawful protests to voice their grievances. However, when they feel they are voiceless,

they become more dissatisfied and detached. They may then climb up to the second floor, where they come under the influence of persuasive messages telling them that external enemies cause their problems. From this stage on, social movement organizers become important in the process of radicalization. Some individuals keep climbing up to reach the third floor, where they adopt a morality supportive of radicalization. Gradually, those who have reached the third floor become separated from the mainstream norms and values of their society, which generally condemn radical activism. Those individuals who continue to climb up to the fourth floor adopt a more rigid style of categorical "us versus them," "good against evil" thinking; it is seen as legitimate to attack "the forces of evil" in every way feasible. They take on a view supportive of an "ends justify the means" approach. The group's isolation is an important factor in explaining its deviation from the "normal" perception of reality and strengthens this tendency toward violence (e.g., della Porta, 1995). Eventually, some of these individuals move up to the fifth floor and take part in and directly support violent actions. The higher people move up the staircase to radicalization, the lower the degrees of freedom. After people have become part of a radical political group, the only options left open to them are to kill, be killed, or be captured.

Social movements are carriers of meaning and organizers and leaders do their utmost to create moral outrage and to provide a target against which this can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package of attitudes. Organizers appeal to "attack emotions" such as anger to create "fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). However, just being angry is not enough, as Martin Luther King (1968) aptly stated: "It is not enough for people to be angry—the supreme task is to organize and unite people so that their anger becomes a transforming force." This is what organizers do—use their power, resources, and creativity to turn individual grievances and emotions into collective claims and to stage opportunities to act upon these claims. In other words, organizers create collective actions frames that turn individual grievances into political claims (van Stekelenburg, 2014). They use discourse and identity as resources to emotionally prime members for social movement recruitment. This "emotion work" has always been key to the organization of protest (Schrock et al., 2004), especially in the context of dangerous or risky protest. Fear, for example, may inhibit collective action, and so organizers attempt to frame situations such that fear will be suppressed or at least mitigated (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001). Moreover, and important in the context of our "emotional work by organizers" argument, Matsumoto and colleagues show, by analyzing leaders' speeches in different stages, how organizers mobilize different violent emotions at different stages. Through the careful use of language and nonverbal behaviors, leaders motivate, escalate, or defuse situations and incite action through emotion transformation (Matsumoto et al., 2015; Mols et al., Chapter 22, this volume).

5. How Context Matters?

Individuals cannot be seen as independent from context, thus many of the approaches and analytical levels of collective action discussed in this chapter point directly or indirectly to the influential role of external social and political factors. Why are people in some countries more politically active than people in other countries? This question draws our attention to

contextual factors and how they shape the relationship between important individual characteristics and political engagement.

Several studies have already suggested that contextual characteristics—such as perceived corruption (Olsson, 2014), type of political regime (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014), institutional effectiveness, inequality, economic growth (Christensen, 2011; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Van Deth & Elff, 2004), and other institutional conditions, such as the level of political (de)centralization and form of government (for instance, Van der Meer et al., 2009; Vráblíková, 2014)—matter for individuals' decision to engage in a collective action. In short, people experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting which translates into specific grievances. The context also provides an array of possible collective response to a grievance. We elaborate next on socio-economic, political, and cultural factors as the most prominent contextual factors shaping an individual's decisions to protest.

5.1. Socio-economic Factors

There are two major pathways by which socio-economic factors could foster protest participation; the first is related to resources and the second to grievances. A dominant perspective of political participation argues that a country's economic growth and prosperity gives people "the luxury" to participate, because, on the one hand, it reduces material insecurities and, on the other hand, enables people to invest more of their time in political issues—this is also what the post-materialist thesis suggests (Van Deth, 1983; Inglehart, 1997). It is argued that the process of economic development leads to social change that also alters the political culture of a nation and that is associated with the rise of new forms of political participation (Nie et al., 1969; Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2004). Empirical studies suggest that an increase in the supply of material resources leads to an increased level of protest participation, even among the relatively poor (for instance, Inglehart, 1997). One argument for this is that rich countries generally implement extensive social welfare systems that not only facilitate the development of civic engagement, but also make citizens feel safer (because the system guarantees basic socio-economic needs) and consequently make them more willing to take political action (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005; Lancee & Van de Werfhorst, 2012).

Inequality is another contextual socio-economic indicator that affects protest participation (Alesina & La Ferrara; 2000; Uslaner & Brown, 2005; Van Deth et al., 2007). In more equal societies, a greater number of people are enabled to embark on collective action. As Lancee and Van de Werfhorst (2011) notice, in more unequal societies people tend to abstain from participation because they feel greater disadvantage and are more anxious than they would have been in more egalitarian societies. In their empirical study, they find evidence that independent of individual resources, higher inequality diminishes social participation. Uslaner and Brown (2005) support the argument by saying that in unequal societies people think that they are not represented; they feel powerless and therefore they engage in less collective action.

In a second explanation linked to grievances, the opposite logic seems more applicable. Increasing socio-economic inequality and economic crisis in general could lead to more perceived grievances and heightened motivation to demonstrate, as seen in the anti-austerity protests and Occupy movement that followed the 2008 global recession

(Van Stekelenburg & Gaidytė, 2021). The worsening economic situation of a country and perceived deprivation can bring people to the streets (Grasso & Giugni, 2016). Della Porta (2015) distinguishes movements of crisis, driven primarily by the victims of the crisis and often more spontaneous and violent, from movements of affluence, primarily composed of conscience participants, better organized, and less violent. She points out that a new social class, the "precariat," made of unemployed or part-time employed educated youths with no or few social protections, was the main actor in the movements against inequality and corruption (Della Porta, 2015, p. 4). In each context, protesters possess a different set of resources—individual or provided by social movement organizations—that affect their efficacy of participation. Using the demand and supply metaphor of Klandermans (2004), we may assume that grievances and mobilization potential (social networks) become more relevant for motivation to protest than the supply side and shift the protest demand curve upward. In other words, aggrieved individuals are more likely to protest regardless of the participation cost (e.g., risk).

5.2. Political Factors

Political institutions and people's perceptions of the political context greatly influence individual's willingness to protest (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Christensen, 2011; Marien and Christensen, 2012; Vráblíková, 2014; Gaidytė, 2015). Following Lijphart (1999), a basic distinction is frequently drawn between power sharing and power concentrating democratic systems (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, p. 991). The power-sharing democracies value inclusion and the representativeness of the political powers and therefore aim to generate governments that are representative of a wide array of interests. Power-concentrating democracies prioritize accountability and the rule of the majority and therefore aim to produce efficient majority governments with clear responsibility for decision-making. The extent of power sharing or institutional openness plays an important role in determining how easy it is for citizens to influence the political decision-making between elections (Christensen, 2011, pp. 59–61). In line with this reasoning, Vráblíková (2014) demonstrates that states with more veto points—more "checks and balances" on political leaders—have more individual protest participation. In a system with more checks and balances, decision-making is less decisive and slower, and protest activists can hope to be successful with their demands.

From the contextual perspective, perceived political corruption is known for two-sided repercussions for collective action. On the one hand, some claim that corruption is a counter-motivator of political participation, including protest, because high levels of corruption decrease perceived political efficacy, making people believe that their actions will not bring about change (Uslaner, 2002; Rothstein, 2013). According to Kostadinova (2012), the negative effect of corruption on protest behavior is strongest in countries that are less or not at all democratic. This moderation effect implies that in less democratic countries, high levels of corruption would deter protest activity whereas higher levels of perceived political corruption mobilize people and bring them to the streets in advanced democracies (still, the former countries would score high on corruption level, while the latter would score lower). However, more recent examples in Belarus and Russia show that aggrieved individuals will still protest, instead of relying on electoral routes to affect politics,

even against corrupt regimes. Nevertheless, these protest activities are not long lasting, and mobilize relatively small numbers of protesters.

Finally, the democratization of a country is also an important determinant of collective action. Drawing from Western countries' experience, participation in social movements increases rather than decreases when societies democratize and governments become more responsive to citizens' claims (Goldstone, 2004). This is congruent with Inglehart's thesis: in democracies citizens develop awareness and criticism against hierarchical institutions and thus are more likely to engage in elite-challenging activities. The opposite is observed in non-democratic countries. Repressive political environments may increase the costs of participation considerably: people may lose friends, they may risk their jobs or otherwise jeopardize their sources of income, they may be jailed, and they may even lose their lives (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Davenport et al., 2005; Honari, 2018; Honari & Muis, 2021).

5.3. Cultural Factors

Cultural environment and specific values constitute the third set of contextual effects that drive participation in elite-challenging activities (for instance, Schwartz, 2006; della Porta & Diani, 2020). The cultural context could be defined as the shared beliefs, and meanings commonly found at a place and time. It could be perceived as a cognitive apparatus that people need to orient themselves in the world, and that, in turn, constraints or fosters collective action. Activists' interpretation of their situation, their perceptions of what is worthy and unworthy, and their guiding principles of life are all important to define individuals' capacity to act and their tactics of collective behavior (della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 64).

From this perspective, certain value orientations and resources, such as social trust, are a property of contexts, not only of individuals; on the aggregate level they create a contextual climate (Kawachi et al., 2008). Almond and Verba in their study *The Civic Culture* (1963) claim that political culture influences whether and in what way individuals will engage in politics. Their study concludes that even those who possess a lower socio-economic status are inclined to actively participate when a democratic civic culture is prevalent. In environments dominated by participatory attitudes, people feel more efficacious about political participation.

In a similar vein, Putnam argued that social trust serves as a "public good" with positive spill-over effects on collective action (Putnam, 1993, 2000). His study of the Italian regions pointed out that democratic engagement works better in an environment characterized by high levels of social capital: "Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibrium with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement" (Putnam, 1993, pp. 111, 177). That said, even poorly connected individuals benefit from a well-connected community (Putnam, 2000, p. 20). The reverse is also true: societies can also be locked in a self-producing process of distrust that inhibits participatory motives.

In advanced industrial societies, people participate in new social movements to express post-materialist values of the new middle class. The cultural shift in these societies places an emphasis on such values as self-actualization, quality of life, and expression of collective action (Melucci, 1980). By protesting, individuals engage in so-called new politics, which demands democratization of everyday life, equal rights, recognition and acceptance of

difference (Martin, 2015). Concerns related to climate change and rising inequality create a new demand, mobilizing potential, for social movements in Western democracies. In sum, the economic, political-institutional, and cultural context adds to our understanding of why some individuals engage in collective action while others do not. Context should be part of the explanation because it shapes the way in which social and political processes occur (Tilly & Goodin, 2006, p. 6). However, context should not be overestimated in models predicting protest, because it would carry a risk of misunderstanding the essence of political phenomena, in this case—collective action—located in it. The context should be treated as a surrounding, an affecting condition, rather than a direct cause and the phenomenon of interest itself (Collier & Mazzuca, 2006; Ancelovici, 2021).

6. Conclusion

In the chapter, we have reviewed the state of research on collective action, through the lens of political psychology and other disciplines.

We hope it provided useful insights into the study of social movements and collective action. We applied a dynamic theoretical approach which linked the mechanisms of supply and demand sides of collective action. From the demand side, we analyzed the prerequisites of political participation, such as grievances, identification, efficacy, emotions, and a need for social embeddedness. We integrated these concepts to account for the motivation to participate in social movements. From the supply side, we underscored the characteristics of social movements itself, such as the effectiveness of social movements, the ability of organizations to appeal to individual grievances, and the ideals and values on which movements are based. Much attention was paid to virtual, formal, and informal networks, generating participatory motives, and social media, which decreases the cost of participation. We also touched upon the processes of politicization, polarization, and radicalization that stem from (socially constructed) collective fear. Finally, we have contextualized the individual inclination to protest, by discussing socio-economic, political, and cultural factors influencing collective action. We concluded that protests are shaped by context, although we agree that individual action itself and the psychological mechanisms behind it should not be underestimated.

Where do we stand now and what should we expect regarding the development of the study of collective action in the years to come?

First, in terms of formation of demand and supply, the Internet and social media have become increasingly central to the emergence of collective action. Social media obviously facilitates cooperation and helps to overcome the start-up problems of collective action by forming small groups and coalitions that share similar attitudes (Centola, 2013). Pervasive social media thus raises new questions about how it reduces the costs of information acquisition and information processing. Take for instance the traditional information-processing approach focused on the individual. There is growing recognition that cognition forms within social groups rather than within an individual (e.g. Gamson, 1992; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Taber, 2003). Via social media people more readily acquire "shared cognitions." How do people come to share information? Who do they trust as a source of information? And who do they mistrust? Why would people adopt certain frames while

neglecting or paying less attention to others? We suggest that socially structured cognition is a new and inviting field in relation to collective action. Information search behavior has changed significantly, as have the available amount of information and the algorithms that "steer" the information to one's screen. Take, for instance, the much-debated "alternative facts" and "fake news" in the 2016 and 2020 American presidential elections (see Jerit & Kam, Chapter 15, this volume). If social media have changed one thing profoundly, it is our perception of reality, in ways that fuel politicization, polarization and radicalization (e.g., Alberici & Milesi, 2015; Enjolras et al., 2014; Hong & Kim, 2016; Johnson et al., 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2017).

Social media functions not only as an informational tool, but also as a tool of expression, the latter being, arguably, more important for protest participation. Providing an expressive mechanism, social media reduces the psychological distance between individual and collective action, as the cost increased from doing nothing to expressing something on social media is very low. Thus, future research could more thoroughly investigate how social media expression boosts levels of identification, positive incentives, and individual efficacy, and how they in turn lead to protest participation. Furthermore, the question remains how access to social media moderates the intentions not only to attend, but also actually to organize the protests. In other words, what are the long-term effects of social media on broadening the pool of collective action sympathizers?

Second, the discussion of social media raises another focal question: Does internet usage inspire offline political participation? What is the relationship between offline versus online participation? Some authors claim that increased online political discussion indirectly affects offline political participation through the influence of political information sharing (Lane et al., 2017). For instance, Greijdanus et al. (2020) conclude that social media facilitate online activism, particularly by collating individual experiences, community building, and the development of shared realities. They suggest that online and offline activism are positively related because social media posts can mobilize others for offline protest, although the visibility of activism could become risky in the repressive contexts.

On the other hand, future research could investigate whether online activism *hinders* offline protests. Virtual interaction in its essence is at odds with traditional models of predicting protest participation. These models assume that social movements are generated through direct participation in activities within an organizational context that explicitly expresses pro-societal stances and norms. Indeed, some studies show that online and offline civic participation have different attitudinal predictions, so these types of participation do not necessarily grow from each other. For instance, we have discussed studies in this chapter that show that social trust and civic responsibility lead to more (peaceful) collective action offline, while the same pattern is not found for online collective action (Oser, Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Machackova & Šerek, 2017). The fact that we observe two different patterns stems from the specific character of online participation, as it is typically performed at a relative distance from other people, rather than demanding direct personal interactions.

Virtual communication also has dubious effects on political efficacy as it provides only limited opportunities to feel a sense of accomplishment. Even if it enhances critical thinking and deliberation (Dahlgren, 2009), empirical data suggest that this kind of participation is not related to a desire to work towards common societal good (Machackova & Šerek, 2017). Thus, the concern remains that online participation may, in fact, boost greater acceptance

of radical attitudes and create a fragmented public sphere (Benkler et al., 2018; Klein & Muis, 2019). We could investigate the differences and similarities between people that participate online and offline (or both) to better understand whether traditional explanatory models of collective action adequately explain online participation, or whether we need to expand our models of collective action. For instance, the psychological inclination to participate offline and online could be investigated—do people restrict their actions to one domain? (c.f. Greijdanus et al., 2020). What are the goals of the activists and what are the mechanisms that convert online (dis)agreement to the actual protest in the streets? What are the potential dangers of online participation, to both participants on the individual level and political society as such?

Third, our chapter advocates for an integrated methodological framework that spans the disciplines of political psychology, sociology, political science, and communication science to enable a more holistic understanding of collective action. Future research could try to integrate different levels of development of collective action, by combining micro, meso, and macro perspectives. Combining different levels of analysis would provide a more comprehensive perspective on the origins of individual-level protest behavior. As Klandermans (2014) argues, we need an interdisciplinary approach to answer the following questions: What are key motives for action? To what extent do movement organizations appeal to these motives; and what are the opportunities and constraints imposed by a regime? Dynamics of demand represent factors at the micro level and are featured prominently in the political/social psychology literature (taking the individual as unit of analysis). The dynamics of supply and mobilization refer to the factors at the meso level and are mainly reflected in the discipline of sociology. The macro-level predictors—contextual dynamics—are most apparent in political science. Furthermore, we need more research on protest information, and how information leads to consensus, and how calls for action find their ways through current ecosystems of individuals, networks, and organizations. Thus, how information mediates action and is mediated relates to micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis and could be integrated in the findings of the disciplines mentioned. In sum, the field would benefit if scholars working in different disciplines talked more with each other, employing a cross-cutting approach to the dynamics of collective action (Christopher 2021).

Fourth, not only should different disciplines talk to each other, but so should scholars from different geographic regions. So far, social movement studies are predominantly Western-biased, except for a few notable exceptions (e.g., della Porta, 2015; Jacobsson & Saxonberg, 2016; Honari & Muis, 2021). The motivation to protest varies across contexts. There are differences in the dynamics of supply and demand. Context constrains perceived grievances, political efficacy, and the general motivation and willingness to protest. Some argue that social activism is constrained geographically (Piotrowski, 2015). Accordingly, theoretical and analytical approaches should be adjusted to take into account historical legacies, societal access to different levels of material, social and psychological resources, and the presence of a repressive regime. In the current context, pro-democracy protests and movements, such as those in Hong Kong and Eastern Europe, increase in scale and frequency across continents and countries, and are particularly worthy of our attention. Studying geographically diverse movements not only enhances scientific knowledge but also generates information that can help improve the world and enhance the future of democracy. Will these movements achieve meaningful political change and what role does

individual agency play in their success? Can politics from below bring humanity closer to a more equal and democratic world? And will social media facilitate these goals or conversely place greater stress on existing political and socio-economic cleavages? Answers to these questions will emerge in future years from the ever-expanding social movement society.

Note

Although the failed revolutions in Azerbaijan and Syria also reveal what happens when the right ingredients are not in place.

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PREJUDICE AND POLITICS

DONALD R. KINDER

My purpose in this chapter is to review the literature on the intersection between prejudice and politics. I confine my attention to research on prejudice and politics in the United States (a necessary restriction, because there is so much of it) and I concentrate on what we have learned about this subject since the previous edition of the *Handbook* (Kinder 2013)—quite a bit, in my estimation.

To discuss prejudice and politics in a serious way presupposes that we know both what race is and what prejudice is—and neither concept is straightforward. Accordingly, the first two sections of the chapter spell out the meaning of these two central ideas: first "race" and then "prejudice." The next section acknowledges that, in practice, prejudice is understood in different ways and expressed in different forms. With this in mind, I review what we have learned recently about the decline of biological racism, the meaning and measurement of modern racism, and the growing interest in the political relevance of implicit racism. The next section, and the heart of the chapter, summarizes evidence on the part played by prejudice in shaping the political lives of Americans on consequential matters. The final section considers, in light of recent events in the United States (and elsewhere in the developed world), the prospects for democracy in a society divided by race.

1. THE IDEA OF RACE

Throughout the 19th century, biologists employed the term "race" to refer to fundamentally different kinds, and their empirical research was devoted to establishing a racial hierarchy, with white people ("Caucasian") at the top and black people ("African" or "Ethiopian") at the bottom.[1] Well into the 20th century, race retained respectability and widespread use as a scientific category. Differences between races—assumed to be inherent and immutable—continued to be regarded as established matters of fact, and "the inferiority of certain races was no more to be contested than the law of gravity to be regarded as immoral" (Barkan 1992, p. 3).

We now know was a mistake. Genetic diversity in human groups is overwhelmingly a matter of individual variation within populations. History in the long run is a recurrent story

of migration and conquest, of the relentless intermingling of human groups. Americans classified as black have variable amounts of European ancestry, and many Americans classified as white have some African ancestry. The notion that all of human diversity can be reduced to a small number of distinct races, once taken for granted in the scientific community, has been abandoned (Lewontin 1995; Futuyma 2005).

That race has largely disappeared from biology is important, but it does not settle anything for us here. Our interest is in race as understood by everyday people, and in this sense, race is very much alive. Most of us rarely think twice about assigning people we meet to racial categories; indeed, this is such an automatic habit, it could be said that we do not think about classifying people by race at all (e.g., Bruner 1957; Fazio and Dunton 1997).

Seen this way, racial categories are psychological entities. They are concepts: "mental representations of a world outside the mind" (Gelman 2019, p. 314). Concepts are indispensable; without them, mental life would be chaotic, language would be staggeringly complex, and communication virtually impossible (Smith and Medin 1981). "Life is so short," Gordon Allport once wrote, "and the demands upon us for practical adjustments so great, that we cannot let our ignorance detain us in our daily transactions. We have to decide whether objects are good or bad by classes. We cannot weigh each object in the world by itself. Rough and ready rubrics, however coarse and broad, have to suffice" (1954, p. 9).

Racial categories are understood to be "natural kinds" (Rothbart and Taylor 1992). Unlike human artifacts, natural kinds are taken to be part of the biological world (Gelman 2003, 2019; Hirschfelt 1996). Members of natural kind concepts share not only observable features but also a deeper reality; that there exists an inherent, immutable substance or property—blood, genes, some mystical force—that generates the characteristics that members share. The understanding of racial groups as natural kinds emerges early in life. By the time American children enter elementary school, they believe that racial groups exist, that persons belong to such groups on the basis of observable characteristics, that race is transmitted and fixed at birth, and that differences between races arise from something basic and fundamental (Hirschfelt 1996).

Whatever biological science says, race remains real in American life. Real and consequential: race is inscribed in American law, entrenched in social experience, imprinted on economic life, and, as we will soon see, influential, still today, in our politics.[2]

2. THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE

Prejudice—or racism (I will use the two terms interchangeably)—is a species of attitude. And by attitude, I mean, following Gordon Allport, a "mental and neural state of readiness" (Allport 1935, p. 810). Attitudes represent "a tendency to act in favor of, opposed to, in behalf of, or in contradiction to, the object with which it is related" (Allport 1935, p. 837). Attitudes are predispositional and, as such, fundamental to the human enterprise, both in the immediate present and in the evolutionary past (e.g., Kahneman 2003; Zajonc 1980).[3]

In the United States, race prejudice represents a tendency on the part of white Americans to act in opposition to the interests and aspirations of black Americans.[4] The core of prejudice is enmity, expressed through both negative emotions and denigrating beliefs (Fredrickson 2002; Pettigrew 1982; Wilson 1973). Prejudice is categorical, in that racial groups in general,

and "blacks" in particular, are understood to be natural kinds. Prejudice takes natural kinds for granted: that human populations can be partitioned into distinct types on the basis of their physical differences. Prejudice is also dimensional, in that prejudice varies continuously from one person to the next. For some white Americans, race is a largely incidental and inconsequential feature of social life. For others, like active members of the Ku Klux Klan, race is the main thing. Most fall somewhere in between these extremes. It would be a mistake to assume that people either are racist, or they are not. Prejudice is a quantity, not a kind.

There are as many attitudes as there are objects in the world. We are interested in prejudice in particular because of its connection to inequality, discrimination, and segregation. Prejudice, as Herbert Blumer reminds us, "reflects, justifies, and promotes the social exclusion of the subordinate racial group" (1958, p. 4; Wilson 1973).

Blumer's point raises an important question. Does prejudice *necessarily* include opposition to policies and practices designed to reduce discrimination and to advance the interests and aspirations of black Americans? I do not think so. Voting against a black candidate, or opposing affirmative action, cannot by itself be taken as evidence of prejudice. The heart of this chapter is devoted to assessing the extent to which prejudice motivates the choices white Americans make about parties, candidates, and policies. I take this is to be an empirical question, not something to be settled by definition. For the purpose of this essay, it is perhaps *the* empirical question.

3. Varieties of Prejudice

As a practical matter, prejudice—or racism—is not one thing. Prejudice (racism) comes in more than a single variety. In the previous edition of this chapter (Kinder 2013), I suggested that it was useful to classify types of racism according to three sets of binary distinctions: biological (old-fashioned) versus cultural (modern), cognitive (stereotype) versus affective (visceral), and implicit (unconscious) versus explicit (conscious). Combinations of these features capture differences in how prejudice is conceived and assessed. In this section of the chapter, guided by these distinctions, I take up the apparent decline of biological racism; the continuing discussion over the meaning and measurement of modern racism; and the growing interest in the political consequences of implicit racism.

3.1. Decline of Biological Racism

By the latter stages of the 17th century, slavery was established throughout the Southern colonies. At the time of the first US Census in 1790, African Americans—nearly all enslaved—made up roughly 20% of the national population and more than one-third of the population of the South (Farley and Allen 1987).

Slavery was justified on the ground that the African was fit for slavery and for slavery alone. That was racist, but it was not until slavery came under direct attack by the abolitionists in the early decades of the 19th century that the presumption of black inferiority developed into a full-blown theory. Prior to the abolitionist challenge, slaveholders defended their

practice—insofar as they were called upon to do so—merely by referring to the fact that slavery was a legally sanctioned economic arrangement. They did not need to make the argument that blacks were inferior; that was simply taken for granted.

In the early decades of the 19th century, however, slavery began to be debated. Northern abolitionists argued that slaveholding was evil. Southern slavers, intellectuals, and statesmen rose—if that is the right way to put it—to the challenge. The debate over slavery eventually transformed what had been a mostly unthinking assumption of racial superiority into a self-conscious theory of racism, "a rationalized ideology grounded in what were thought to be the facts of nature" (Fredrickson 1971, p. 2).

And what were these so-called facts of nature? The Negro and the white comprised separate and fundamentally distinct races. Differences between them in intellectual capacity and moral character were obvious, inborn, and permanent. Sexual liaisons between black men and white women were an abomination. A racially integrated society was impossible; more than that, it was unimaginable.

The Civil War brought an end to slavery, but other forms of racial oppression survived, and still more were invented. After Reconstruction, African Americans were excluded from politics, ostracized from social life, and confined to the meanest work. For all of this, biological racism, as I will call it, provided justification and, insofar as it was needed, moral consolation. This form of race prejudice persisted well into the 20th century—endorsed not just by ordinary citizens (as far as we can tell), but by scientists, intellectuals, church leaders, and statesmen alike (Fredrickson 1971; Myrdal 1944).

This is no longer the case. Elite expressions of biological racism are today much harder to find in books, journals, sermons and speeches (Myrdal 1944; Kinder and Sanders 1996), and perhaps at least partly for this reason, biological racism is much harder to find in the American public. From World War II to the present, biological racism has undergone slow, gradual, and steady erosion. Support for the idea that black Americans suffer inborn and immutable inferiority has not disappeared, but it has substantially diminished. The notion of biological impairment, of permanent disadvantage, is much less prominent now than it once was (Apostle et al. 1983; Kinder 2023; Kinder and Chudy 2016; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997).

It turns out that decline in white support for biological prejudice is due preponderantly to generational replacement. Elderly cohorts of whites, in possession of old-fashioned beliefs about race, have been gradually replaced by younger (and better-educated) cohorts, more likely than their elders to reject the claim of innate, biological, categorical superiority (Kinder and Chudy 2016; Kinder 2023). Generational replacement has sometimes been referred to as "social progress through death." The decline in white support for biological racism appears to be an excellent case in point.[5]

3.2. Meaning and Measurement of Modern Racism

Even if biological racism were to disappear entirely, it would not mean the end of racism. Much as biological racism emerged in fully articulated form out of the debate over slavery, a new, modern variety of racism arose out of the racial crisis of the 20th century. Or so it is argued. The new racism travels under various names: "symbolic racism" (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988), "modern racism" (McConahay 1986), "racial

resentment" (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and "laissez faire racism" (Bobo and Smith 1998). There are differences among these, but all share the view that biological racism has largely faded away, and that a new form of racism ("modern racism," I'm going to call it here) has largely taken its place.

The two forms of racism are alike in several important respects. Both emerged out of a national crisis. Both offer an account of racial differences in wealth, status, and power that is flattering to whites and denigrating to blacks. Both provide justification for exclusion and neglect—but they do so in different ways. Biological racism understands differences between blacks and whites to be profound and unalterable, rooted in nature. On the account offered by the new racism, racial inferiority is more cultural than biological, seen in the customs and folkways of black life: idleness, violence, drug abuse, abandoned children—the whole "tangle of pathology" that many whites see as characteristic of life in black families and neighborhoods.

Modern racism has come to occupy a prominent position in scholarship on race and American politics—prominent, but not unchallenged. In their chapter in the 2009 *Annual Review of Political Science*, Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman conclude: "To a very considerable extent, the debate over the continued political effects of racial prejudice hinges on an ongoing dispute over the nature and measurement of racial prejudice" (p. 425). By this they are referring to the ongoing and, in their judgment, unresolved dispute over the nature and measurement of modern racism in particular.

It is fair to say that this discussion is still ongoing—as it should be. Social science is bristling with disagreements over what things mean and how they should be measured. Such disagreements are perhaps inevitable, given the complexity of concepts, the imprecision of language, and the technical vexations of assessment. It should not surprise us that the new racism thesis has given rise to spirited and energetic debate.

One important line of criticism contends that modern racism, as typically measured, is not racism at all. Standard measures of modern racism get at something else: white Americans' commitment to individualism (Sniderman and Hagen 1985), or their intuitive sense of justice (Sniderman and Carmines 1997), or their embrace of conservatism (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018; Feldman and Huddy 2005), or their ignorance of history (Huddy and Feldman 2009).[6]

A second critique begins by acknowledging that modern racism has played a significant role in American politics in the past, but that its importance is waning. Christopher DeSante and Candis Watts Smith (2020) point out that the events that gave rise to the new racism are fading into history. They suggest that recent events have given rise to a new form of racism (post-modern racism?), centering on the denial of systemic racism.

Other work in this line is more technical. Are standard measures of modern racism equivalent across groups (DeSante and Smith 2020; Pietryka in press)? Is modern racism one thing or two (Tarman and Sears 2005)? How could standard measures be improved (Wilson and Davis 2011)? Which indicators should be replaced (Huddy, Feldman, and Pen in press)? What is being measured when standard measures of racism are asked of African Americans (Kam and Burge 2018; Tesler and Sears 2010)? Work of this kind is exactly what one hopes to see in a discipline with scientific aspirations.

A final point worth noting here concerns trajectory. As we saw in the preceding section, biological racism appears to be on a long, steady decline. The story for modern racism is different. Over the past half century, modern racism is essentially stationary: no evidence of

progress, but no evidence of retrogression, either (Kinder and Chudy 2016). Until the spring of 2016, that is, when modern racism suddenly and significantly declines. This change seems to be real: it shows up on all measures, across several surveys, and in interviews carried out in person and over the internet. The change is substantial among Democrats and it is negligible among Republicans (Hopkins and Washington 2020; Hout and Maggio 2021; Kinder 2023). What is responsible for this change? Is the decline in racism temporary or the beginning of a trend? Good questions.

3.3. Political Relevance of Implicit Racism

In a society overrun by polls and surveys, it is easy to take for granted that attitudes are measurable. We might disagree over the best method for doing so but not over the possibility of the enterprise itself. It was not always so. In the early decades of the 20th century, psychology was dominated by behaviorism. The idea that aspects of mentality could be assessed, or even that it was desirable to try, ran against convention. In 1928, the experimental psychologist L. L. Thurstone announced, to a skeptical audience, his discovery that attitudes could be measured (Thurstone 1928). His pioneering venture was followed in short order by projects led by Likert, Guttman, Coombs, Osgood, and others. These "measurement men," as Banaji and Heiphetz (2010) called them, "achieved the previously unthinkable; for the first time ever, they took the ephemeral mental quality of *favoring* and *disfavoring* and rendered it the subject of scientific study" (p. 349). The rest, as they say, is history. Attitude became the "keystone in the edifice of American social psychology" (Allport 1935, p. 798).

The methods developed by Thurstone and his colleagues varied in important ways, but all shared one feature in common: each relied on introspection. In one way or another, people were asked to reflect on some subject (immigration, say, or the New Deal), to retrieve their thoughts and feelings relevant to the subject, and then to report what it was that they thought and felt. Attitudes were measured directly. For nearly one hundred years, attitudes, including prejudice, have been assessed overwhelmingly in this fashion.

Meanwhile, in recent decades, psychology has been generating experimental results demonstrating that not all attitudes are accessible to introspection. Implicit attitudes, as they are called, evade the conscious mind; they are "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience" (Greenwald and Banaji 1995, p. 8). Implicit attitudes are activated automatically and influence judgment and behavior outside awareness (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998; Gawronski and Payne 2010).

Implicit attitudes require new and subtle methods of measurement. Most rely on experimental procedures adapted from cognitive psychology (Gawronski, De Houwer, and Sherman 2020; Wittenbrink and Schwarz 2007). Such methods would seem to offer a way to get at those attitudes—like prejudice—that people might not care to acknowledge even to themselves. What have we learned about prejudice, conceived of as an implicit attitude?

First of all, implicit prejudice can be measured reliably (e.g., Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Second, racial bias in implicit form is extremely robust. Implicit prejudice against black Americans shows up in study after study, and not only among white Americans, but also among Asian, Latino, and Native Americans. Only African Americans come off as free of racial bias (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2006; Nosek et al. 2007). And third, although

implicit and explicit measures of prejudice are positively correlated with each other, the correlations run small: implicit and explicit prejudice are far from interchangeable (Greenwald et al. 2009; Kinder and Ryan 2017).

This last result is important, in that it suggests that implicit and explicit measures of prejudice could have separate and distinct consequences for politics. The evidence bearing on this possibility is thin and mixed. A number of well-conceived studies show that implicit attitudes influence the decisions people make in politics, over and above the effects due to explicit attitudes (e.g., Mo 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Ryan 2017; Perez 2016). None of these studies concerns racial prejudice, however. And research that does take up prejudice generally finds that once direct measures of explicit prejudice are taken into account, implicit prejudice has no independent effect (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Kalmoe and Piston 2013; Kinder and Ryan 2017; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne et al. 2010).[7]

At this relatively early stage, it would be premature, to put it mildly, to conclude that the effect of racial prejudice on the decisions citizens make in the domain of politics is confined to explicit prejudice. More evidence is surely needed. And even if further studies continued to return negligible results, it would be a mistake to write off implicit prejudice altogether. The psychology literature is running over with demonstrations showing that implicit prejudice predicts judgment and action in many consequential social settings (e.g., Greenwald et al. 2009; Green et al. 2007; Gawronski and Payne 2010; Greenwald and Banaji 2017).[8]

4. Political Consequences of Prejudice

To what extent and under what conditions does prejudice spill into politics? In this section of the chapter, I review evidence on the part played by prejudice in shaping the political lives of Americans in three important ways: the political party they identify with, the candidates they support, and the policies they favor. This research relies primarily on one measure or another of modern racism. My review assumes that such measures are imperfect but serviceable, adequate to the task at hand. Readers who think, to the contrary, that current measures are deeply and irretrievably flawed can stop reading at this point (actually, all of you are free to stop whenever you like).

In trying to bring order to this literature, I have found two ideas especially useful: "priming" and "racialization." Priming refers to the idea that judgment depends in part on what comes immediately to mind at the moment judgment is rendered—on considerations that are, for whatever reason and however briefly, accessible (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Priming is implicated in politics (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). In their role as citizens, Americans are called upon to make judgments of various alternatives: they decide whether to support or reject candidates for public office, they find policy proposals wise or terrible, they conclude that a political party is for them or not, they take the results of government action to be successful or disastrous, they judge the president's performance to be inspiring or deplorable, and so on. These various alternatives are always complex, and such complexity makes it difficult to know what standards should be applied in any single case. The intuition behind priming is that these standards are supplied or at least encouraged by the preoccupations of mass communications. How political alternatives are judged depends in part on which stories media choose to cover, and, consequently, which standards are made

salient. The more attention media pay to a particular aspect of political life—the more frequently that aspect is *primed*—the more citizens will incorporate what they know and feel about it into their political judgments. Defined this way, priming has received strong and consistent support, in both experimental and observational studies (for a review, see Kinder 1998), and I will make use of it here.

The complement to priming is racialization. Priming is a psychological mechanism. Racialization refers to the external environment of politics—more specifically, to how parties and candidates and policies are framed. Parties, candidates, and polices are racialized insofar as they are framed in such a way as to encourage citizens to understand them as having racial implications. Together, priming and racialization provide a measure of how far race has become insinuated into politics.

The literature I am about to review includes laboratory, field, and natural experiments. But to a large extent, the conclusions I draw rest primarily on correlations. Well, there are correlations and then there are correlations. The evidence I rely on comes from strong designs and careful analysis. Alternative explanations—based in partisanship, political principles, ideological identification, white identity (Jardina 2019), racial sympathy (Chudy 2021), and more—are taken into account. To be reported here, the estimated effects of prejudice must be substantial (not merely statistically significant) and must stand up across multiple tests.

4.1. Prejudice and Partisanship

At the center of politics in the United States are the political parties, enduring coalitions among politicians, interest groups, activists, and donors. Parties nominate candidates, wage campaigns, set agendas, propose policies, and pass legislation. One might say—E. E. Schattschneider has said it—that modern democratic government is "unthinkable save in terms of parties" (1942, p. 1).

Just as political parties are indispensable to the work of politics, partisanship is indispensable, or nearly so, to the political work of citizens (e.g., Bartels 2000; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy et al. 2015), and is implicated in what I take to be the two most important developments in American politics since World War II: realignment, the sharp reversal of party fortunes in the American South beginning in the 1960s; and polarization, the growing distemper in recent decades between Democrats and Republicans in the nation as a whole. These two developments turn out to be connected, and both, as we are about to see, are connected to prejudice.

4.1.1. *Realignment*

From the end of Reconstruction to the New Deal, no section of the country was more solidly Democratic than the South. As late as 1950, Southern whites were some 40 percentage points more likely to be Democrats than were whites living outside the South. Today, the South is decisively Republican (Black and Black 2013; Lublin 2021).

Several explanations have been offered for this staggering change. According to Shafer and Johnston (2006), the "engine of partisan change in the postwar South was, first and

foremost, economic development" (p. 94). Similar in spirit, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2016) argue that as Southern whites got richer, they naturally (in the economist's telling) moved away from the party of redistribution. A second line of argument proposes that white Southerners were drawn to the Republican Party primarily by the promise of lower taxes, limited government, reduced regulation, and restored patriotism—and not by the Democratic Party's backing of civil rights initiatives (Black and Black 1987). Lynn Sanders and I (Kinder and Sanders 1996) argued to the contrary, that the precipitating event for partisan change in the South was the sudden shift in the position of party elites on civil rights, made dramatically visible in the 1964 presidential election (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Valentino and Sears 2005).

In the previous installment of this chapter, I concluded that the evidence available at the time was insufficient to adjudicate decisively among the alternative explanations. This is no longer so. Ilyana Kuziemko and Ebonya Washington (2018) provide a convincing analysis of the movement of Southern whites out of the Democratic Party. Kuziemko and Washington establish two key points. First, the decline of the Democratic South began in the spring of 1963, as President Kennedy engaged in a series of high-profile confrontations with Governor Wallace over desegregation of the University of Alabama. This moment marked the beginning of an historic reversal: the Democratic Party, the party of white supremacy, was becoming the party of racial liberalism; the Republican Party, the party of Lincoln and emancipation, was becoming the party of racial conservatism (Carmines and Stimson 1989).[9] And second, the decline in Democratic partisanship took place almost entirely among white Southerners who reported they would not vote for a qualified presidential candidate from their own party who happened to be black. Kuziemko and Washington conclude that "defection among racially conservative whites just after the Democrats introduce sweeping Civil Rights legislation explains virtually all of the losses in the region" (p. 2865). The realignment of party and power in the American South was driven not by economic interests, nor by conservative principles, but by racialization.

4.1.2. *Polarization*

Animosity between partisans is rising. For thirty years and perhaps longer, Democrats have been expressing increasing hostility toward Republicans. Over the same period, Republicans have been returning the favor, expressing increasing hostility toward Democrats. Republicans and Democrats also disagree more sharply with each other than they used to—over domestic policy, international affairs, presidential performance, and more (Brown and Enos 2021; Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky and Malhotra 2019; Levendusky 2009). Polarization threatens social cohesion, impairs communication, increases enmity, and can turn ordinary disagreements into implacable conflicts (Coser 1956).

Does prejudice have a part to play in polarization? Probably, though the evidence is circumstantial. As Southern whites began moving out of the Democratic Party in the 1960s, blacks were moving in. Thanks to Supreme Court decisions, voter registration drives, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, blacks in the South (where most lived) began to vote in large numbers, and when they did, they voted overwhelmingly for Democrats. Today, the racial divide in partisanship is enormous. In 2016, 81% of blacks identified as Democrats, compared to just 38% of whites.[10]

The racial divide is even greater than these percentages imply. This is because among white Americans, the association between partisanship and prejudice has increased sharply over the last several decades. Thirty years ago, Democrats and Republicans were indistinguishable from one another on measures of modern racism. Today, they differ markedly. This sorting appears to be due at least in part to white Americans bringing their partisanship into conformity with their views on race (Engelhardt 2019, 2021; Kinder and Chudy 2016; Tesler 2016).

In three experiments, Westwood and Peterson (2022) show how close the connection between race and partisanship has become. They find that treatments that induce mildly unpleasant experiences between blacks and whites lead to increased animosity toward members of the opposite party. The reverse holds as well: treatments that induce mildly unpleasant experiences between Democrats and Republicans lead to increased animosity toward members of the opposite race. Westwood and Peterson conclude that in American politics today, race and partisanship are "enmeshed."

4.2. Prejudice and the Vote

Prejudice, as we have seen, has become part of partisanship. Insofar as partisanship influences voting, then prejudice also influences the vote. My interest in this section goes beyond the indirect role of prejudice on voting. Here I wish to convey what we know about the impact of prejudice on the vote over and above the effects due to partisanship or ideology or principles or economic interests—prejudice as an independent electoral force.

At the outset, I presume that prejudice will be more or less potent in this role depending on the prominence and clarity of cues signaling that the candidates differ substantially in the racial groups they favor and oppose. The magnitude of the difference, the clarity of the difference, and the prominence of the difference: together, these three constitute the preconditions for racialization. In the presence of these conditions, voters will be more likely to be asking themselves: is this candidate *for us*, or is this candidate *for them*, where "us" and "them" are defined in racial terms.

A notable case in point is provided by Barack Obama's run for the presidency in 2008. Apart from partisanship, nothing predicted the 2008 vote more effectively than prejudice (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2011; Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau 2010; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne et al. 2010; Piston 2010; Stephens-Davidowitz 2014; Tesler and Sears 2010). Racially resentful whites voted against Obama more than they otherwise would have had Obama been white; racially sympathetic whites voted for Obama more than they otherwise would. On balance, Obama lost more votes among whites than he gained. If prejudice as a short-term force could somehow have been erased in 2008, Obama would have won in a landslide (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2011; Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau 2010; Stephens-Davidowitz 2014).[11]

That Obama won is evidence that blackness is no longer automatically and categorically disqualifying for the highest office in the land—a welcome if long-delayed achievement. Obama won, but did so in spite of his race. He won because conditions could hardly have been worse for the opposition: the ongoing and dispiriting war in Iraq, the collapse of financial institutions, the beginnings of a terrifying recession, all presided over by an increasingly unpopular Republican president. In the absence of all the terrible news, it is unlikely

that Obama would have won at all (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2011; Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau 2010).

Obama ran again in 2012, and as we all know, he won again. After a full term of Obama as president, was race receding from politics? One reason to think this could be so arises from the shortfall between Obama's performance as president and what white Americans might have expected of him before he assumed office. Zoltan Hajnal (2006) argues that when a black person runs for mayor for the first time, whites fear the worst. What actually transpires is much less than whites fear. Once in power, black mayors do not turn the tables, pursuing policies that punish whites. As a consequence, when black mayors stand for re-election, whites are less agitated; their fears are diminished; their attitudes toward blacks improved. Unhappily, this does not seem to apply to Obama. Prejudice appears to have been just as present and just as important in Obama's re-election as it was four years before (Kinder and Chudy 2016; Petrow et al. 2018; Stephens-Davidowitz 2014; Tesler 2016). Obama, evidently, was still black.

Obama was racialized, and so, it appears, were other aspects of politics during his presidency. Prior to Obama's election, prejudice had little to do with Congressional voting.[12] In the 2010, 2012, and 2014 House elections, however, prejudice played a significant role (Tesler 2016). Another example concerns the Tea Party, a politically significant movement which arose shortly after Obama's inauguration, ostensibly as a protest against big government, burdensome taxes, and budget deficits. It was partly that, but it was also a reaction against the idea of a black man moving into the White House (Parker and Barreto 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2016; Tesler 2016).

Obama's influence seems to extend even to the construction of reality. Politics is a complicated business, and it takes place, for the most part, far away. The average person pays attention intermittently and casually. Under these circumstances, many citizens may feel free to construct a picture of the political world that reinforces their predispositions—in effect, and to a degree, to make up their own facts. So it seems when it comes to America's first black president. Where was Obama born? What religion does he practice? Is his skin light or dark? Is his economy improving or deteriorating? Are his policies on race more or less generous to black Americans than those advanced by Democratic presidents before him? These questions ask not for preferences but for, to use an old-fashioned term, the truth. Nevertheless, the answers white Americans provided to all these questions were significantly and substantially shaped by their attitudes on race (Hutchings, Cruz, Gause, and Piston 2021; Jardina and Traugott 2019; Kemmelmeier and Chavez 2014; Tesler 2016).

The far-reaching racialization of politics during the Obama administration led Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2018) to declare the end of racial priming. Prior to Obama's appearance on the national stage, it seemed easy enough to demonstrate priming effects through subtle racialization treatments (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and Whites 2002). Afterward, not so. Valentino and his colleagues (2018) argued that the Obama presidency made race and prejudice chronically accessible, and as a consequence, experimental treatments highlighting race that once primed prejudice no longer did so.

Obama may be a special case (all cases are of course special in some aspect), but like Obama, black candidates running for office are generally penalized for their race. Substantial racial bias shows up in Senate and gubernatorial races (Tokeshi 2020), in House elections (e.g., Lublin 2021), in voting for delegates in presidential primary contests (Broockman and

Soltas 2020), and in school board elections (Flavin and Hartney 2017). Black candidates are damaged more than their white counterparts by allegations of sexual impropriety (Berinsky et al. 2011), they are damaged more than white candidates by taking ambiguous positions on policy (Piston, Krupnikov, Ryan, and Milita 2018), and they face serious obstacles when trying to counter racist appeals by their opponents (Banks and Hicks 2019). The race penalty and its complexities are investigated in a continuing series of experiments that manipulate the racial identity of fictitious candidates (e.g., Kirkland and Coppock 2018; Kripnikov et al. 2016), and in a new series of experiments that manipulate candidate skin color, finding that whites are inclined to favor black candidates with lighter complexions (Messing et al. 2016; Weaver 2012).[13]

A candidate's racial identity and color are just two of many possible cues signaling alignment or opposition to racial groups. Others include taking positions on policy, drawing attention to problems while ignoring others, associating with certain kinds of people, and more. This implies black candidates can be rewarded by racially conservative whites and punished by racially liberal whites insofar as they are seen to stand against the interests of "their people" (Hood and McKee 2015; Karpowitz et al. 2021; LaFleur Stephens-Dougan 2021). The same applies to white candidates, who can choose to make race more or less central to their campaigns (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

This last point brings us to Donald Trump. It is not hard to show that, among other things, the Trump's successful campaign for the presidency was appealing to racism (e.g., Smith and King 2021). But it is a separate matter to establish that voters were responding on this ground. Trump was selling racism: were voters buying it? The evidence is abundant that they were. Racism was as important to the white vote in 2016 as it was in the Obama elections, if not more so (Green and McElwee 2019; Hopkins 2021; Jardina 2020; Reny et al. 2019; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2017; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Smith and Hanley 2018).[14]

Trump's success is troubling on another front. In her award-winning book, Tali Mendelberg (2001) argued that in the aftermath of the civil rights movement, candidates and parties could no longer rely on explicitly racist appeals. In a political system that frowned upon racist speech, such appeals would backfire. Appeals to prejudice continued, but to be effective, they had to be careful, subtle, euphemistic.

This is not the campaign that Donald Trump presented to the American public. Here's what the Trump campaign looked like to Robert Kagan, writing in the *Washington Post* in May of 2016: "What he [Trump] offers is an attitude, an aura of crude strength and machismo, a boasting of disrespect for the niceties of the democratic culture that he claims, and his followers believe, has produced national weakness and incompetence. His incoherent and contradictory utterances have one thing in common: They provoke and play upon feelings of resentment and disdain, intermingled with bits of fear, hatred, and anger. His public discourse consists of attacking or ridiculing a wide range of 'others'—Muslims, Hispanics, women, Chinese, Mexicans, Europeans, Arabs, immigrants, refugees—whom he depicts either as threats or as objects of derision. His program, such as it is, consists chiefly of promises to get tough with foreigners and people of nonwhite complexion. He will deport them, bar them, get them to knuckle under, make them pay up or make them shut up."[15]

Careful? Subtle? Euphemistic? Not in the least. And yet, Trump's campaign certainly seemed to be effective. He was nominated over a host of more qualified candidates, he was

elected president in 2016, and despite a severe recession and a murderous pandemic on his watch, Trump was very nearly re-elected in 2020. It is not at all clear that delicacy is required for prejudice to be primed (Huber and Lapinsky 2006, 2008; Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010; Mendelberg 2008a, 2008b; Stephens-Dougan 2016).

A final point: the prominence of prejudice in voting is not just a matter of who the candidates are and how they present themselves. It depends also on voters' surroundings. In *Southern Politics*, V. O. Key (1949) showed in meticulous detail that politics in the South through the first half of the 20th century was most reactionary in the so-called Black Belt: an arc that ran from the Chesapeake Bay in the northeast, through the eastern shore of the Carolinas, round the midlands of Georgia and Alabama, along the rivers of Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana, and into east Texas. It was within the Black Belt where slavery had flourished, where African Americans in large numbers still lived, and where, as Key put it, whites possessed "the deepest and most immediate concern with the maintenance of white supremacy" (p. 5).

Key's observations have been corroborated in scores of subsequent studies, recently and most notably by Ryan Enos (2016, 2017). In an ingenious design, Enos made good social science use of the city of Chicago's decision to demolish large public housing projects. The projects amounted to high-rise ghettos, populated overwhelmingly by black Chicagoans. From the point of view of whites, they were, as Enos put it, "places where the other lived, places where white people didn't go—a hulking mass of the outgroup, visible from across the freeway" (2017, p. 146). Enos found, consistent with the racial threat hypothesis, that after the projects were demolished, white Chicagoans living close to project sites were less likely to vote and, when they did vote, were less likely to support racially conservative candidates.[16]

4.3. Prejudice and Opinion on Policy

Democracy means government responsive to its people. In a true democracy, what the people want—on immigration or Social Security or affirmative action—shapes what the government actually does. This is the way things are supposed to work. Insofar as they actually do work this way, opinion on policy becomes, as James Stimson once put it, the "drive wheel" of politics.[17]

This sounds good, and it is good, as far as it goes. But often overlooked in this simple view of representation is the degree to which opinion on policy arises from anti-democratic sentiments. If the public gets what it wants, but what it wants is shaped by racism, then the representation of public opinion in policy works against the democratic project. With this in mind, in this section of the chapter, I review evidence on the relationship between prejudice and opinion on policy.

It should come as no surprise, this far in, to learn that the effect of prejudice on opinion is pronounced on policies where the racial consequences are explicit, where racialization is built in. On fair housing, school desegregation, affirmative action in college admissions, and more, prejudice plays a major role (e.g., Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). More interesting, and more troubling, is that prejudice also has effects on opinion on issues where race is present only by implication.

One well-researched example is welfare. Welfare programs such as Food Stamps are unpopular among white Americans, and they are especially unpopular among whites who

score high on standard measures of prejudice. This finding is robust, across time and context, models, experimental and observational studies, different measures of racial attitudes, and with stringent controls on alternative explanations (e.g., DeSante 2013; Gilens 1999; Mendelberg 2001; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder 2023; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Winter 2006).

Why does prejudice figure so prominently in how white Americans think about welfare policy? Let us count the ways. Media overrepresent blacks among the poor. Racially stereotyped representations of welfare recipients are common. Elite discussions of welfare policy traffic routinely in racial code. On top of all this, there is the close fit between the racialized language surrounding debates over welfare reform, on the one hand, and central themes of modern racism, emphasizing self-reliance and discipline, on the other (Gilens 1999; Quadagno 1994; Patterson 2000).

Another clear case of racialization is provided by policy in the domain of crime. By a substantial margin, the United States imprisons a larger fraction of its population than any other country in the world. Mass incarceration falls disproportionately on African Americans. Blacks are more likely than whites to be arrested and much more likely to be imprisoned (Travis, Western, and Redburn2014). In media coverage of crime, black perpetrators are over-represented and portrayed in stereotyped ways (e.g., Entman and Rojecki 2010; Gilliam, Iyengar, Simon, and Wright 1996; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). White Americans associate crime with blacks (Schaller et al. 2003), and blacks with crime and danger (Payne 2001).

It is no surprise, then, that the effects of prejudice on policy within the domain of crime and punishment are pervasive. Building prisons, abolishing furlough programs, executing convicted murderers, siding with police, defending the right to bear arms: on all these subjects, prejudice plays an important role (Carter and Corra 2016; Filindra and Kaplan 2016; Filandra, Kaplan, and Buyuker 2021; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Peffley and Hurwitz 2002, 2010; Strickler and Lawson 2022).

The dramatic rise in incarceration in the United States since 1970 seems to have followed public demand. Americans wanted a more punitive criminal justice system—and they got it (Enns 2014). From one point of view, mass incarceration is a democratic result, a fine example of giving the public what it wanted. What the public wanted and why it wanted what it did, is another matter.

A third case of racialization returns us to the Obama presidency. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama promised to fix the American health care system if he were elected. In March of 2010, Congress passed and the president signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The policy extended coverage to some 30 million uninsured Americans, reorganized and expanded Medicaid for the poor, imposed stricter regulation on private health care insurance, and created new insurance purchasing organizations ("exchanges") in an effort to curtail rising costs.

The ACA became law, but only after overcoming ferocious opposition. As the vote approached, thousands of protestors descended on the Capitol. Congressman John Lewis, making his way through the Longworth House office building, was singled out for abuse. Some in the crowd screamed "nigger." Others spat upon his companion, Representative Emanuel Cleaver, a Democrat from Missouri and, more to the point, African American. In the meantime, Rush Limbaugh, the king of talk radio, began to argue that health care

reform—"Obamacare" as opponents came to call it—represented the president's attempt to deliver reparations to black Americans for slavery.

The repeated association between the nation's first black president and his signature legislation racialized the role of government in health care. Michael Tesler (2012, 2016) makes this point convincingly. Cross-sectional, panel, and experimental evidence all converge on the same point: after Obama but not before, opposition to the expansion of government health care was driven in an important way by modern racism (Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Kinder and Chudy 2016). Health care illustrates how a policy, on its face neutral with respect to race, can become racialized, depending on how the policy is framed and how it comes to be understood by the public.

The first three cases of racialization—welfare, crime, and Obamacare—may seem straightforward enough. The last case I will discuss is much less so.

Social Security was established by FDR as part of the New Deal. It is financed largely by payroll taxes and, in sharp contrast to welfare programs, is popular among the American public. Social Security is particularly popular among white Americans who score *high* on measures of prejudice. Nicholas Winter (2008) shows that when it comes to pensions for the elderly, prejudice turns into a force for liberalism, for a more generous welfare state.

According to Winter, the racialization of Social Security has to do with the way the program is presented: as social insurance in return for work; as benefits earned by a lifetime of effort. In the American context, work, effort, determination, and the avoidance of idleness are all linked to whiteness: "Work—and the independent ownership of the fruits of that labor—has historically been at the center of what it has meant to be white in America" (Winter 2006, p. 402).

* * *

What the public thinks about policy is accorded a privileged position in democratic theory. Such preferences are taken to be instructions for what government should and should not do. It is an unfortunate feature of American politics today that in many important domains, the majority group's policy preferences are shaped by prejudice.[18]

Prejudice's reach is impressive, but it does not intrude on every political question.[19] Various aspects of environmental policy, including climate change, are untouched by prejudice. The same can be said for LGBT politics. Prejudice also has little to say about abortion, childcare, or sexual harassment. The effects of prejudice on the general trade-off between cutting government spending and expanding government programs appear to be small or negligible; small or negligible on the federal government's responsibility to provide jobs and a decent standard of living; and small or negligible on government health insurance—until, that is, the nation's first black president made reform of the health care system his top priority (Burns and Kinder 2023; Kinder 2023).

All in all, research on prejudice and policy has generated an impressive set of results, identifying both where prejudice matters and where it does not. Crisp empirical regularities of this kind are invitations to theoretical invention, and there has been quite a bit of it here: to account for the features that make a policy more or less likely to be understood in racial terms (e.g., Filindra and Kaplan 2016); to comprehend the nature of correspondence between how a policy is framed and presented, on the one side, and how prejudice is represented in the mind, on the other (e.g., Winter 2008); and to identify the psychological

mechanism or mechanisms responsible for the priming of prejudice (e.g., Tesler 2016; Valenzuela and Reny 2020).

5. RACE AND DEMOCRACY

Political psychology no doubt means different things to different people. To me it means this: the application of concepts, theories, methods, and sensibilities developed in the field of psychology to problems and puzzles of political importance. From this point of view, it would be hard to find a better object of study for political psychology than prejudice.

The study of prejudice and politics is important on theoretical grounds because it informs how we should understand democratic politics in general. Under democracy, citizens are asked to make consequential—consequential in the aggregate—decisions about parties, candidates, and policies. They do so *not*, for the most part, to advance their interests (Sears and Funk 1991; Green 1992) or to promote an ideological program (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). Rather, for most of us most of the time, politics is about groups. The decisions citizens make about parties, candidates, and policies arise primarily from the attachments and animosities of group life (Achen and Bartels 2017; Huddy 2013; Kinder and Kam 2009; Mason 2018). In this sense, prejudice presents a rich case for the investigation of a group centered analysis of democratic politics.

On the more practical side, the study of prejudice and politics reveals important aspects of the American political system—what it is, and what it could be. If prejudice could be removed, the polarization and ill-feeling that divides the parties would likely be reduced. In the absence of prejudice, racial differences over policy would narrow, and government would be more generous to the poor, the incarcerated, and the underserved (Alesina, Glaeser, and Glaeser 2004; Piketty 2020; Roemer, Lee, and Yi 2007). If prejudice could be erased, Americans would be more satisfied with their form of government (March 2021) and less likely to reject basic democratic norms (Bartels 2020). Racial division is a threat to democracy itself (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Runciman 2018).

None of this is to deny that the United States has come a long way on matters of race. Discrimination is illegal. Voting rights, taken away during Jim Crow, have been returned. The legal foundations of segregation have been dismantled. Black participation in political life towers over what it was a generation or two ago. By almost every measure, the quality of life experienced by black Americans has notably improved. In 2008, American voters chose Barack Obama, the son of a Kenyan immigrant, as their president.

All true. But it is also true that the United States continues to be marked by deep racial differences. Black children are more than twice as likely than white children to die in their first year. Those who survive face poorer health, more illness—asthma, diabetes, heart disease, and cancer—and, on average, a shorter life. Black adults are twice as likely to be unemployed as whites, and when they are employed, they earn less. On average, black households command about *one-tenth* the financial assets of the average White household.[20] For young black men, imprisonment has become more common than military service or a college education (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). In poor black neighborhoods, "law enforcement and discipline are now part of the architecture of community life" (Weaver and

Lerman 2010, p. 1). In such places, black citizens contact government primarily in police stations, courtrooms, and prisons (Soss and Weaver 2017).[21]

Inequality is maintained and strengthened by segregation (Anderson 2010; Massey and Denton 1993; Trounstine 2018), and segregation remains a feature of American social life. In 2010, in a typical major American city, one-half or more of the black population would need to re-settle in new neighborhoods in order to achieve racial balance in the city as a whole (Massey and Tannen 2015). If neighborhoods remain segregated, then so do other important institutions: where Americans worship, where they shop, whom they marry, and notably, where American children go to school. In major metropolitan areas in the United States, segregation of schools is increasing (Clotfelter 2004).

African Americans make up roughly 13% of the voting age population in the United States, but they comprise less than 2% of elected officials (Burns and Kinder 2023). Congress re-authorized and strengthened the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006, but in 2013, in *Shelby County v Holder*, the Supreme Court weakened two key provisions, arguing that voting rights were no longer threatened by racial discrimination. More recently, in the name of ensuring election integrity, state legislatures under Republican control have passed scores of statues to make voting more difficult (Berman 2015; Hajnal *et al.* 2017). And after American voters placed Obama in the White House, they turned to Trump.

All of this is a reminder of why the study of prejudice and politics in America remains vital today, some 400 years after the first enslaved people were brought ashore in Virginia. In *Deep Roots*, Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2018) show the lingering effect of slavery on Southern whites' racial attitudes today, some 150 years after emancipation. "History," as James Baldwin once wrote, "is not the past. It is the present. We carry our history with us. We are our history."[22] So it seems.

Notes

1. Going against current practice, I do not capitalize "white" or "black." Capitalization encourages the idea that the terms refer to distinct biological races, an idea we should give up.
2. On the mutability and tenacity of racial categories, see Bobo (2011); Davenport (2020); and Liebler, Porter, Fernandez, Noon, and Ennis (2017).
3. I do distinguish racism (or prejudice) considered as an individual attitude from systemic or institutional racism. The latter is enormously important, but racism as attitude is also important, especially in the domain of democratic politics, which is my subject here.
4. Throughout, "white" means non-Hispanic white.
5. For an argument and some evidence that the election of the nation's first black president might be generating a revival of biological racism, see Tesler (2013) and Knuckey and Kim (2015)
6. That I am a protagonist in these discussions places me, given the purpose of this essay, in an awkward position. Here I will just cite several replies to the critics: Kinder (2023); Kinder and Mendelberg (2000); Sears and Henry (2005); Simmons and Bobo (2018); and Tarman and Sears (2005).
7. Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2018) report a small effect of implicit prejudice on opposition to Obamacare; their analysis does not include an explicit measure of

prejudice. Banks and Hicks (2016) find that a measure of implicit prejudice predicts white support for stiffer restrictions on voting, but only after administration of a fear induction, and without controlling on explicit prejudice.

8. Where measures of modern racism, measured directly, may prove to be less relevant (e.g., Peyton and Huber 2021).

9. Outside the South, the movement toward racial liberalism among Democratic Party elites started earlier, beginning in the mid-1940s and continuing on gradually and more or less continuously through the racial crisis of the 1960s (Schickler 2016).

10. According to the American National Election Study.

11. Obama is bi-racial: his father was black (and dark); his mother was white (and pale). Following convention, most Americans looked at Obama and saw a black man.

12. Except when Congressional elections feature a black candidate. Then, with partisanship taken into account, black candidates generally run stronger among African American voters—by 4 or 5 percentage points—and weaker among white voters—by roughly 10 percentage points—than they would in the absence of racial considerations (e.g., Bullock and Dunn 1999; Grofman, Handley and Lublin 2001; Lublin 1997; Sass and Pittman 2000; Sass and Mehay 1995).

13. On the political significance of skin color within the black community, see Ostfeld and Yadon (2022).

14. One popular alternative interpretation of the 2016 election emphasizes populism, Trump's supposed capacity to speak for the dispossessed, to give voice to those Americans displaced economically and ignored politically. Researchers who have looked for populism as a basis for the Trump vote have found very little evidence for it (e.g., Mutz 2018; Reny et al. 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). An exception is Baccini and Weymouth (2021), who find that Trump did better among whites living in counties suffering sharp losses in manufacturing jobs. A second alternative account emphasizes Trump's history of misogyny. The evidence here is stronger. Voters committed to the traditional view of women's place tended to vote for Trump, and so did those who expressed resentment over what they took to be women claiming special rights. These effects showed up in the 2016 election, but not before, and appear to be traceable more to Trump than to Clinton (Kinder, Reynolds, and Burns 2019; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2017; Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno 2018).

15. Robert Kagan, *Washington Post*, May 20, 2016, A21.

16. Another aspect of what Enos calls "social geography" is proximity to protest. Omar Wasow (2020) found that in presidential elections between 1964 and 1972, whites living in counties close to nonviolent black protests (which often provoked violent counter measures from white authorities) tended to vote more Democratic than comparable whites living far from such protests. Proximity to *violent* black protest appears to be another matter. According to Wasow, violent protest pushed whites to vote more conservatively. In a close analysis of the violence in Los Angeles set off by the Rodney King verdict, Enos, Kaufman, and Sands (2019) report the opposite.

17. On the responsiveness of national policy to public opinion, see, among others, Miller and Stokes (1963); Bartels (1991, 2016); Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995); Gilens (2012); and Lenz (2013).

18. In all these cases and more: aid to Africa (Baker 2015); the Confederate flag (Strother, Piston, and Ogorzalek 2017); trade policy (Mutz et al. 2021); paying college athletes (Wallsten et al. 2020); support for the Iraq War (White 2007); restricting voting (Banks

and Hicks 2016; Wilson and Brewer (2013); on how Americans think of themselves ideologically (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017); pocketbook voting (Crowder-Hersh and Nall 2020); and tax reform (Burns and Kinder 2021).

19. At least not directly. As argued earlier, prejudice is implicated in partisanship. To the extent partisanship shapes opinion on the matters mentioned in the text, to that extent so does prejudice.

20. The literature on racial differences in economic status is enormous. See, among many others, Blank (2001) and Farley and Allen (1987). On race and health, see Williams (2001) and Xu, Murphy, Kochanek, and Tejada-Vera (2021).

21. Nearly everyone who is sent to prison eventually gets out. Mass incarceration means a corresponding huge population of the formerly imprisoned are "at large." They are at large but with impaired prospects, including forfeiture of voting rights. Following felony convictions, offenders are typically stripped of the right to vote. Many of the statutes governing disenfranchisement were passed in the late 1860s and 1870s, at a time when the question of voting rights for black Americans took on special urgency, and are most common in states with large nonwhite prison populations (Behrens, Uggen and Manza 2003; Uggen and Manza 2002). Because black Americans are much more likely to be arrested, convicted, and incarcerated than whites are, blacks are also much more likely to have their voting rights revoked on this ground (Weaver and Lerman 2010).

22. From *Remember This House*, notes for Baldwin's unfinished book on the intertwined lives of three murdered friends: Medgar Evers, Martin Luther King, Jr, and Malcolm X.

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CHAPTER 28

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MIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM

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EVA G. T. GREEN AND CHRISTIAN STAERKLÉ

UPON its publication in news outlets around the world, the picture of the body of Alan Kurdi—a three-year-old Syrian refugee boy washed up on a Greek beach in September 2015—instantly led to a global upturn in concern and awareness of the risks and misery of migration. Despite the controversies around the circumstances of the picture and the reactions to it, migration was now on everyone's mind. This is but one tragic event among uncountable others around the world through which migration and multiculturalism forced their way into global consciousness over the last decade. There were terror attacks against migrant minorities, racist incidents, hate speech against immigrant groups, and electoral successes of radical right parties. But there were also powerful reactions against such exclusionary tendencies. In many countries, people mobilized to show solidarity with refugees and organized into collectives to defend the rights and dignity of the ever-growing masses of migrants (de Haas et al., 2019).

Migration and multiculturalism have become key issues over which contemporary societies are increasingly polarized. The negative reactions to migratory flows have become more radical, but supporting movements have also made their voices increasingly heard (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Indeed, virtually all countries in the world need to deal with the steady flow of people crossing international borders that have made societies in our globalized world more and more diverse. Despite its contested nature as a normative model for organizing diversity in receiving societies, demographic multiculturalism has become a reality to which countries need to adapt.

This chapter focuses on two major questions concerning migration and multiculturalism. First, it looks at the social and psychological processes at work in the migrant experience. Second, it deals with how members of receiving societies react to the increased and diversified immigrant presence in their societies.[1] Our review draws mainly upon research and theory in political and social psychology. Reflecting the diversity of classic and recent empirical work on migration and multiculturalism, we present research covering a wide range of methodological approaches, including survey, experimental, and qualitative studies. The chapter emphasizes how historical and political contexts affect the nature of intergroup relations between migrant groups and receiving societies. It furthermore

highlights the role of widely shared social representations in processes of migration and multiculturalism, expressed in ideological belief systems, political discourse, and everyday cultural repertoires. We argue that a political psychology perspective to migration and multiculturalism will gain from taking an interdisciplinary approach in which different levels of analysis—including individual, group and societal factors—are combined and articulated (de Haas et al., 2019; Chryssochoou, 2004; Deaux, 2006; Verkuyten, 2018).

The chapter is organized in four parts. The first part outlines some historical benchmarks of modern migration and briefly presents two key notions of a psychological approach to migration—assimilation and multiculturalism—in their historical context. In a second part, we summarize empirical research that focuses on the psychological dynamics involved in the migrant experience, in particular the interactionist and complex nature of migrant identities, acculturation in receiving societies, and intergroup approaches to acculturation and multiculturalism. The third part analyzes the role of threat regarding immigrants and immigration in the reactions of majority populations in receiving societies. The fourth part presents multilevel research on the effects of contextual factors on attitudes toward immigration held by national majority groups.

Since other chapters in this volume are directly concerned with processes related to historical ethnic minorities within countries (Kinder, Chapter 27, this volume), this chapter specifically analyzes diversity and multiculturalism as the outcome of international migration. Moreover, although migration is a global phenomenon, we focus our discussion mainly on those migration flows which end up in Western countries, since it is mostly in these contexts that empirical research has studied the psychological processes involved in the migrant experience and the public reactions to immigration.

1. Assimilation and Multiculturalism in Context

Early works on acculturation and incorporation of immigrants (e.g., Park & Burgess, 1921; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918) reflected questions arising from voluntary and permanent forms of migration, especially to the United States. Incorporation of immigrants in the host society was seen as a one-way street toward the hegemonic White Anglo-Saxon Protestant "WASP" norm in which immigrants gradually lose their ties with their country of origin while picking up the values of the receiving society. In this model of migrant *assimilation*, the identity of origin was to be replaced with the host identity, and ethnic distinctions as well as the cultural and social practices that express it were bound to disappear (see Alba & Nee, 2003, for a more contemporary analysis of assimilation). Assimilation therefore relies on the principle of *similarity* between migrant groups and the receiving society: Such intergroup similarity is deemed to foster successful integration into mainstream society and to promote harmonious intergroup relations within receiving societies. Largely taken for granted in the early times of immigration, it was the sole conceivable form of migrant incorporation. Metaphors such as *melting pot*, *soup*, *stew*, and *salad bowl* have been put forward to figuratively describe variants of assimilation. Their relevance, however, is contested, as their use depends on the (perceived) degree of dissolution of the original ethnic and

national identities and their absorption in mainstream society as well on the (perceived) emergence of new cultural identities.

European diversity, in contrast, is historically due to migration from former colonial countries and the presence of different cultural and linguistic groups on national territories, for example Wallonian and Flemish populations in Belgium, or Finnish- and Swedish-speaking and native Sami populations in Finland. In "multi-nation" states where cultural diversity arises from the incorporation of territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state, the political debate has been more concerned with political rights of resident cultures than with their assimilation into receiving societies (Kymlicka, 1995). In these contexts, minority cultures typically claim self-government rights that demand some form of political autonomy (e.g., the province of Quebec in Canada or Catalonia in Spain) or special representation rights in order for the groups' views and interests to be effectively represented in the political process, for example by allocating a predefined number of seats in the legislature for members of minority groups (Azzi, 1992).

After WWII, the nature of international migration gradually changed. Migration volume increased drastically, due to armed conflicts and large-scale natural disasters, growing global inequalities pushing people to search for a better life, or new international agreements liberalizing person movements (de Haas et al., 2019). The United States was confronted with new waves of mass immigration from Latin America (especially Mexico), Asia, and the Caribbean after the Immigration Act of 1965. Part of this migration was characterized by large numbers of undocumented "illegal" immigrants, by religious identities different from those of American mainstream society, by a tendency to maintain closer ties with their countries of origin, and often by a reluctance or incapacity to learn the English language. Thus, in the 21st century, migrants originate from increasingly diverse economic, social, and cultural backgrounds, giving rise to differentiated forms of migration in receiving countries, including voluntary and involuntary migration, temporary and permanent labor migration, as well as refugee, asylum seeker, and family reunion migration. Migration has also become increasingly politicized, in particular with respect to domestic politics which are ever more marked by public debates about immigration (in particular Muslim immigrants), by the tendency of political parties in the Western world to define their identity through tough stances toward migration and multiculturalism, and by hostile, racist, and xenophobic attitudes of large segments of national majority populations in receiving societies (de Haas et al., 2019; Staerklé & Green, 2018). The classical understanding of assimilation as a general settlement policy has therefore become ever more questioned. In this context of "new immigration," immigrants can no longer be seen as definitely leaving their country of origin or permanently taking residence in the receiving society, the receiving society cultures have become too heterogeneous to provide a single cultural model toward which immigrants should strive, and in light of the difficult experiences of increasing numbers of immigrants, the notion of inevitable assimilationist progress has become untenable (Bornstein, 2017; Deaux, 2006; Vertovec, 2007).

Analyzing policy responses to such criticism, Brubaker (2001), for example, observes the rise of new forms of assimilation policies that no longer expect immigrants to be completely absorbed in the receiving society. These civic integration policies place a stronger emphasis on the progressive process rather than on the desired end-state of becoming similar to the receiving society, for example in the form of proposed or encouraged language courses for immigrants, the acquisition of work-related skills, or the easing of strict naturalization rules

(Joppke, 2017; Lesinska, 2014). These policies focus on individual rights and responsibilities, placing little emphasis on multicultural principles such as cultural recognition and measures to address group-based inequality such as affirmative action. As a result, many countries that formerly had a strong policy emphasis on multiculturalism such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia have shifted to policies that require more "adaptation" and "integration" from immigrants, often under pressure of rising right-wing populist parties (Joppke, 2007; for a related discussion on nationalism see Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume).

The more encompassing response to the limitations of an assimilationist view of migrant incorporation was the gradual development of "difference"-based conceptions of citizenship, based on the formal recognition of migrant and other minority identities and legal accommodation of their difference (Isin & Wood, 1999; Taylor, 1992). One of the major models of this differentialist turn (Brubaker, 2001) was *multiculturalism*, a term that covers multiple realities and presents a number of ambiguities (see Berry, 2013; Glazer, 1997; Kymlicka, 2012).

Multiculturalism has three components (e.g., Ward et al., 2018). First, in a descriptive, demographic, sense, multiculturalism refers to the diverse ethnic composition of contemporary societies, be they the product of existing ethno-cultural groups within countries or the outcome of international migration. In this sense, virtually all countries in the world are multicultural. Second, in a normative and prescriptive sense, multiculturalism is a desirable way of organizing diversity within a country. Offering a positive view of cultural identity maintenance, it considers that cultural diversity *as such* has positive effects on a society, by contributing fresh perspectives, promoting openness toward others, and preventing discrimination (Kymlicka, 1995). Third, multiculturalism is implemented with specific policies that accommodate claims for the recognition of group-specific identities, for example, rights for political representation, legal protection of cultural practices, or language and educational rights. Such group-differentiated policies formally recognize the legitimacy of differences between ethnic and cultural groups residing in a country and aim at promoting equal treatment and equal rights of these groups (Kymlicka, 1995). The passionate debates about the legitimacy of civil, social, or political rights of specific migrant groups, for example affirmative action policies or group-specific clothing regulations (e.g., concerning headscarves and veils of Muslim women, Joppke, 2009) reveal that the question of group rights is one of the most pressing issues in contemporary societies struggling with multicultural demands (Bloemraad, 2015; 2018; Koopmans et al., 2005).

Much like assimilation, the normative model of multiculturalism has come under increasing pressure (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Lesinska, 2014; Joppke, 2014; Kymlicka, 2012). Multiculturalism is accused of undermining national cohesion, exacerbating intergroup divisions rather than overcoming them, essentializing and reifying group boundaries, and ultimately compartmentalizing ethnic groups into segregated urban ghettos (Barry, 2001). As a result, multiculturalism might fuel negative attitudes toward migrant groups rather than alleviate them, as implied by the sweeping declarations from several heads of government over the last 15 years who announced that "multiculturalism has failed" and even suggested that it represents a danger for Western liberal democracies (see Bloemraad, 2015).

Negative effects of ethnic diversity on social relations have also been put forward by Putnam (2007) in the context of his developing the advantages of "social capital." His "constrict hypothesis" states that ethnic diversity within a given context results in fewer social relations in general, that is, independently of ingroup and outgroup membership, and thus

in weakened social cohesion (for a related discussion on diversity and authoritarianism, see Feldman & Weber, Chapter 20, this volume). Yet, empirical evidence for the "constrict hypothesis" is far from consistent. In a meta-analysis on the alleged detrimental effects of ethnic diversity on social cohesion, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) found support for the constrict claim for aspects of social cohesion at the level of neighborhoods only, but no consistent evidence for the hypothesis that ethnic diversity would be related to less interethnic social cohesion at more inclusive levels of categorization. Bloemraad (2015) praises the advantages of multiculturalism, arguing that *"countries with more multicultural policies and a stronger discourse of pluralism and recognition are places where immigrants are more likely to become citizens, more trusting of political institutions, and more attached to a national identity,"* thereby giving them the opportunity *"to shape political discourse and policy to be more inclusive of diversity"* (p. 593).

Nevertheless, there is broad consensus that multiculturalism is "on the retreat" (Kymlicka, 2010). However, the exact forms and reasons behind this development are disputed as are the alternatives to multiculturalism. For Joppke (2014), " . . . *[M]ulticulturalism is under attack today for condoning, even reinforcing a stance in which one's primordial group attachment [. . .] ranks above one's civic attachment to the political community"* (p. 293). Multiculturalism's retreat is generally linked to the growing presence of Muslims and Islam in contemporary immigrant integration debates, and the stigma attached to them among more traditional Europeans and North Americans. Putting this development into perspective, Brubaker (2013) argues that *"religion has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation over the political accommodation of cultural difference—a striking reversal of the longer-term historical process through which language had previously displaced religion as the primary focus of contention"* (p. 16). This shift from linguistic to religious lines of demarcation has been accompanied by the increasing securitization of state-minority relations whereby immigrants are primarily perceived as a threat to the security and cultural integrity of destination societies (de Haas et al., 2019, p.11). This process has been most evident with immigrants of Muslim origin.

There is, however, debate as to whether the ensuing retreat from multiculturalism is a rhetorical "perception" problem or whether there is actual incompatibility and thus real conflict between Islamic and liberal democratic principles (Joppke, 2014; see also Bloemraad, 2018; Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Malik, 2015). These concerns are to some extent addressed by the concept of *interculturalism* that has recently been advocated as an ideological and policy alternative to multiculturalism (Yogeeswaran et al., 2021). Interculturalism underscores the importance of dialogue and interactions between people of different origins, recognizes mixed and flexible identities, and focuses on similarities rather than on differences between groups (see also Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2020).

The emergence of *transnationalism* and diaspora communities is another key feature of contemporary migration (Faist et al., 2013; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Owing to modes of online communication and decreasing travel costs, migrants now can more easily maintain relationships with their societies of origin across national borders. Transnational social spaces are expressed in political engagement of migrants in their country of origin, as financial support for homeland networks, or as regular travel between the receiving society and the country of origin. Transnationalism thereby de-emphasizes the importance of physical location of migrants in the receiving society and extends multiculturalism and ethnic loyalties across the national borders of the receiving society.

In sum, the two major paradigms of migrant incorporation—assimilation and multiculturalism—are both questioned for a variety of reasons. In the following section we will unpack the implications and responses to this development. Focusing on the migrant perspective, we first discuss the formation of contemporary ethnic and cultural identities as well as the strategies deployed to construe migrant identities. We then provide an overview of classical and recent research on acculturation, and finish with a section on contrasting attitudes between minorities and majorities toward cultural diversity and multiculturalism.

2. The Migrant Experience

2.1. Contemporary Migrant Identities

The concept of *ethnic identity* captures the dynamics that are involved in the negotiation of cultural and ethnic boundaries in receiving societies (see Verkuyten, 2018). Ethnic identities involve beliefs in commonality, or shared kinship or ancestry; they are historically defined and involve a sense of temporality and continuity that sets them apart from other social identities (see Sani, 2008; for more on the development of ethnic identities see Sears and Brown, Chapter 3, this volume). Yet, in contemporary research, ethnic groups are not bounded cultural entities to which people naturally belong but are rather *social constructions* that emerge from continuous social interactions *between* the migrant and the majority group and *within* migrant groups themselves (Barth, 1969). Migrant identities are therefore the product of both "other-definition" and "self-definition." *"Other-definition means ascription of undesirable characteristics and assignment of inferior social positions by dominant groups. Self-definition refers to the consciousness of group members of belonging together on the basis of shared cultural, religious and social characteristics. The relative strength of these processes varies. Some minorities are mainly constructed through processes of marginalization (which may be referred to as racism or xenophobia) by the majority or dominant group. Others are mainly constituted on the basis of cultural and historical consciousness (or ethnic identity) among their members"* (de Haas et al., 2019, pp. 76–77). As a consequence of this interactionist view, ethnic group boundaries may be legitimized and maintained (as in multicultural discourses) or on the contrary challenged and eventually dissolved (as in assimilationist and interculturalist discourses).

Reconfigurations of migrant identities are for example contingent upon normative pressures to conform to ingroup obligations (such as the maintenance of cultural traditions) and to outgroup expectations (such as labor market integration). These negotiations may take place between first- and second-generation immigrants, between parents and children, or between high- and low-status group members (Bornstein, 2017). As a result, any characteristics, beliefs, or practices associated with ethnic groups may change over time, for example when longstanding traditions are replaced with modern customs.

Discrimination and stigmatization by the majority group has been shown to be one of the key drivers of more and less inclusive ethnic boundaries (Wimmer, 2013). Research on ethnic identification has indeed shown that the subjective importance of membership in an ethnic group is particularly strong for migrant groups in receiving societies in which the legitimacy of their norms and values—and even their mere presence on national

soil—is questioned. In a study on religious identification by Muslim (Sunni) migrants in the Netherlands, Verkuyten (2007) found that over half of the participants had the highest possible score on scales of religious identification. For these "total" identifiers, identification with the receiving Dutch society was lower than for those Muslims with lower levels of religious identification. These findings suggest that Muslim migrants are prone to stress their ethnic identity in a context of increasing tensions with the receiving society. Hence, the degree and nature of ethnic identification by migrant groups is flexible and is moderated by the intergroup context in receiving societies.

As a result of this dynamic and interactionist view of the formation of ethnic identities, migrant identities are often "messy" and group boundaries "blurry" (Alba, 2005), especially those of second-generation immigrants (see Lamont & Molnar, 2002). The variety of migration contexts, in terms of countries of origin and receiving societies, of migration history, and of duration of residence and political grievances, gives rise to a wide range of possible migrant identity configurations and forms of interdependence between migrant groups and receiving societies (Bornstein, 2017). Contemporary migrant identities combine cultural origins in different ways and thus give rise to new and complex identities, described as multiple, mixed, hybrid, or hyphenated identities (Deaux, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Phinney, 1990; Verkuyten; 2018). Increased ethnic mixing and the prevalence of multiethnic identities are also reasons why the rigid split between a White majority and Non-White minorities in the United States is a politically motivated and misleading narrative that aims to mobilize support for the far-right myth that non-White minorities would soon outnumber the White majority (Alba et al., 2021).

This emphasis on intergroup mingling and blending stands in stark contrast to classical intergroup research in social psychology that treats social categories as unproblematic and defines them with unambiguous boundaries, possibly reflecting the extensive intergroup research on American race relations where the group boundaries of African Americans are unusually impermeable and fixed. Research on "black exceptionalism" has indeed shown that immigrant groups such as Latinos assimilate more easily into the broader society compared to African Americans (Sears & Savalei, 2006; Citrin & Sears, 2014). More generally, these findings suggest that perceptions of fixed "color lines" of immigrant groups may contribute to maintain minority distinctiveness and to restrict their possibilities for greater assimilation in the receiving society.

The issue of category labeling illustrates the often-difficult task of using appropriate names for migrant categories whose status in the receiving society is changing. Category labels are malleable and strategic constructs, they can make a statement about the norms, values, and cultural history of the group, and they can convey a sense of position of the group in the larger society (Pérez and Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Examples include the continuous debate about the use of "Latino" (or "Latinx"), "Hispanic," or hyphenated category labels (e.g., "Mexican-American") to describe immigrant groups of Spanish and Portuguese descent in the United States (Deaux, 2006; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006), or the shift in usage from "Negroes" to "Blacks" to "African-Americans" (Philogène, 1999).

2.2. Identity Work and Identity Negotiation

One of the striking features of migrant identities is the typically large gap between the way migrant groups are categorized by national majorities and by migrant groups themselves.

National majority discourse appeals to inclusive and generalizing categories with often negative connotations such as "foreigners" or "immigrants" (Kosic & Phalet, 2006), while migrants themselves use more fine-grained and less inclusive categories, distinguishing for example between different religious orientations, national and regional origins, or first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants (e.g., Sears et al., 2003).

Discursive research examines such identity constructions through the analysis of language and discourse related to the migrant experience (see Hopkins, Chapter 9, this volume). It thereby explores the multiple meanings social actors attempt to convey when talking about their own and other groups. In this approach, migrant experiences are contextualized within particular social settings and migrant identities are analyzed as flexible and dynamic resources that change as a function of the intergroup context and the historical and political conditions of receiving societies. The analysis of situated discursive practices thus enables a nuanced analysis of the subjective understanding of the migrant experience, such as a low-status position within the receiving society or the suffering of discrimination (Deaux, 2006; Verkuyten, 2018).

In a study based on a discursive approach to social identity theory, Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004) illustrate how widespread majority representations of a homogeneous and unified Muslim category are challenged by Muslim activists in Britain: some activists put forward a political understanding of Muslim identity and restrict the boundaries of Muslim identity to those members who conform to central Muslim practices such as the Hajj (the Mecca pilgrimage) or the daily prayers. Others, in contrast, promote a more inclusive and spiritual view of Muslim identity and feel affiliated with "people [throughout the world] who are struggling to have their voices heard" (p. 53, see also Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013 on identity performance). The formation of ethnic minority identities as a function of an ongoing negotiation and opposition to stereotypical understandings on behalf of the majority group has been demonstrated by a study on British mixed-heritage children and adults who flexibly construe their identities in the context of inherent tensions of a multicultural community (Howarth et al., 2014). A study on ethnic category label use before and after migration further illustrates the dynamic and strategic formation of ethnic identities as a function of a changing intergroup context. Ethnic Finnish migrants emigrating from Russia to Finland mostly presented themselves as "Finns" in the (Russian) pre-migration context, whereas after their arrival in Finland, their Finnish identity was problematized as they were often viewed by the receiving Finnish society as the "Russians" (Varjonen et al., 2013).

2.3. Acculturation and Multiculturalism

Acculturation research focuses on the determinants and consequences of different strategies migrants employ to adapt to new cultural milieus (see Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Ward & Geeraert, 2016). It has its roots in cross-cultural psychology and studies the individual- and group-level changes resulting from intercultural contact. The classical definition states that acculturation refers to *"those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups"* (Redfield et al., 1936, p. 149).

The most influential model of acculturation has been proposed by Berry (1990). His model emphasizes the bi-dimensional nature of acculturation processes where the maintenance of relationships with one's country of origin and the development of new ties

with the receiving society are independent of each other and may therefore combine in different ways. Four basic types of acculturation strategies result from crossing these two dimensions: *integration* reflects a desire to simultaneously maintain ties with the country of origin and establish strong contacts with members of the receiving society, whereas *separation* denotes the wish to maintain one's migrant identity while minimizing contacts with the receiving society. *Assimilation* refers to the abandonment of one's original cultural identity and the pursuit of contacts with the receiving society, whereas *marginalization* describes the rejection of both the original culture and the receiving society.

Due to its important heuristic value, Berry's highly successful model became the starting point of a burgeoning literature on acculturation (see Sam & Berry, 2016). At the same time, various limitations of this initial model have been pointed out over the years, for example that it obscures the wide array of possible forms of interdependence between migrant groups and the receiving society, or that it is not sufficiently sensitive to issues of measurement and operationalization of acculturation orientations (see Bornstein, 2017). Varying operationalizations indeed reflect different degrees of closeness and different levels of involvement with the receiving society, thereby highlighting the difficulty of defining unambiguous criteria of intergroup similarity, an issue already recognized by Gordon (1964) in his classical theory of assimilation. There he differentiated multiple (e.g., cultural, linguistic, behavioral, attitudinal, and identity) dimensions of assimilation. Not surprisingly, then, the rather general measures of endorsement of different acculturation strategies are controversial (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2006).

Flourishing research over the last three decades has amply demonstrated that acculturation is a highly context-dependent, longitudinal, and differentiated process. Based on an extensive overview of the acculturation literature, Bornstein (2017) summarizes these developments of Berry's initial model by developing a "specificity" principle of acculturation science that urges researchers to study the "where, whom, how and when" dimensions of acculturation, that is, to take into account the multiple moderating factors of actual acculturation processes and experiences of migrants. Five moderating terms are identified, *setting* conditions (reasons to migrate, conditions in the cultures of origin and destination, migrants' experience and status), *personal attributes* (gender, individual differences), *time* (age, historical conditions), *process* (socialization, opportunities, participation), and *domain* (multidimensionality of acculturation process). Taken together, the analysis of these factors offers a useful blueprint for a more pluralistic, realistic, and comprehensive perspective than the one-size-fits-all principle of the universalistic taxonomy of individual acculturation choices underlying Berry's initial model.

Much of more recent acculturation research has developed and extended the initial acculturation model to give rise to new theoretical models that are sensitive to the varying experiences of contemporary migrant groups. A first major extension of Berry's model was the *Interactive acculturation model* (IAM, Bourhis et al., 1997; Bourhis et al., 2010). This model adds to the acculturation *orientations* adopted by migrant groups the acculturation *expectations* held by members of the receiving society toward specific groups of immigrants. At one extreme, members of the receiving society may for example expect immigrants to fully abandon their original culture and follow an assimilation strategy. The IAM further adds *individualism* as an alternative strategy to marginalization, denoting an orientation that stresses personal characteristics rather than group membership in both migrant and receiving society acculturation orientations.

The IAM is but one of many acculturation models highlighting the intergroup nature of acculturative processes through *"which majorities and minorities, immigrants and nationals, are engaged in continuous mutual contact and interaction, affecting each other's acculturative choices and acculturative expectations"* (Horenczyk et al., 2013, p. 205). As already implied in the original definition of acculturation by Redfield and colleagues in 1936, these models recognize that not only the immigrants, but also the receiving society undergo transformations as a result of the arrival of immigrants, thereby emphasizing mutuality in attitudes, perceptions, and expectations (for overviews, see Horenczyk et al., 2013; Brown & Zagefka, 2011). That mutuality is the essential insight behind the familiar "melting pot" metaphor.

Following the mutuality principle, a large body of research has investigated the individual and social factors that determine the preferences for acculturation strategies by (migrant) minorities and majorities (see Ward & Geeraert, 2016, for the ecological context of acculturation). Early studies have found that integration and separation are the preferred modes of acculturation among minorities, whereas majorities expect migrants to endorse either integration or assimilation strategies, though context-dependent exceptions to these patterns are common (see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). A number of factors have been shown to account for the endorsement of acculturation expectations by majorities, including strength of ethnic and national identification, ethnocentrism, social dominance orientation (henceforth, "SDO"), political orientation, feelings of threat from the presence of migrant groups, individual networks of ethnic contacts, or perceptions of immigrant discrimination (e.g., Bourhis et al., 2009; Montreuil et al., 2004). Furthermore, acculturation expectations adopted by majorities depend on the type of migrant groups: integration is likely to be the preferred strategy for "valued" minorities (in terms of favorable stereotypes associated with them), while assimilation, segregation, and marginalization are more likely to be endorsed for negatively evaluated minorities (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001).

Other research adopting an intergroup perspective has examined the effects of match and mismatch between acculturation orientations held by migrant groups and receiving societies (van Oudenhoven et al., 2006; Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2014). Minority and majority attitudes toward acculturation can either be concordant and give rise to consensual relations between majorities and minorities (especially when both groups agree on integration or assimilation as preferred modes of acculturation), or discordant, evidenced by a mismatch between minority preferences and majority expectations, leading to problematic or even conflictual relationships (Bourhis et al., 1997). The relational outcomes of a mismatch of intergroup definitions of acculturation orientations include, for migrants, heightened acculturative stress, and, for members of the receiving society, stereotyping and discriminatory behaviors, for example in educational or health care institutions, at the workplace, in housing decisions, or in encounters with the police.

Such mismatch was evidenced in the Netherlands, where Moroccan and Turkish immigrants have been shown to prefer integration, while Dutch nationals believed that separation, their least liked orientation, was mainly chosen by these migrant groups (van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). In Germany, research has similarly shown that whereas migrant groups preferred strategies implying contact with the receiving society, majorities thought they endorsed strategies implying culture maintenance (Zagefka & Brown, 2002). More importantly, this study revealed that greater perceived mismatch between migrant and majority acculturation orientations at the individual level deteriorated the perceived quality of

intergroup relations (in terms of ingroup favoritism and perceived discrimination) for both minorities and majorities.

The intergroup nature of migrant incorporation in receiving societies is also evidenced at the level of public opinion about multiculturalism and the policies destined to implement its principles. One of the key findings of this strand of research is that ingroup identification by minority groups is associated with identity affirmation and the support for multicultural, group-differentiated policies, whereas ingroup identification with majority groups strengthens perceptions of the threatening aspects of multiculturalism and thus opposition to group-based claims and policies (see Verkuyten, 2018). This pattern of findings has become known as the "multiculturalism hypothesis." It has received experimental support in studies where multicultural vs. colorblind ideologies have been manipulated (Wolsko et al., 2006; for a general review of cognitive effects of multiculturalism, see Crisp & Turner, 2011).

The common finding that support for multicultural policies is higher among migrant groups than among national majorities further suggests that minorities and majorities endorse different justice conceptions. Following early work on minority rights and procedural justice in South Africa by Azzi (1992), recent research has indeed demonstrated that membership in subordinate minority groups generally increases perceived compatibility between individual and collective forms of justice (Gale & Staerklé, 2019). In other words, majority natives are likely to reject multicultural policies when they view society as a space of individual competition, but less so when they question the primacy of individual justice principles. For immigrants, in turn, attitudes toward inequality-reducing multicultural policies do not depend on beliefs in individual responsibility. Indeed, their subordinate position leads them to consider that their successful integration in society requires endorsement of both individual and collective justice principles (Simon, 2011).

2.4. Successful and Unsuccessful Acculturation

Much work on acculturation has been concerned with the factors that determine whether acculturation is successful or not, that is, whether migrants are able to appropriately negotiate the demands of the receiving society and adapt to a new cultural context (see Nguyen & Benet-Martìnez, 2013). Successful long-term adaptation is multidimensional and evidenced with migrants' sociocultural and political integration, labor market integration, psychological well-being, and physical health. Cultural learning approaches highlight the necessity to learn culture-specific skills in order to successfully adapt to a new cultural milieu, in particular communication competence such as proficiency in the language of the receiving society (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2008) and effective social interaction skills (Masgoret & Ward, 2006). Extensive social support further increases migrant well-being and adjustment (Safdar et al., 2009), in particular social networks that include members of the receiving society (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2006; Repke & Benet-Martìnez, 2018). Illustrating the importance of transnational social spaces as determinants of successful adaptation, ethnic networks *abroad* have also been shown to increase migrant well-being (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2006).

Acculturation is a gendered process, since girls and boys, and women and men, acculturate differently. Notably, women tend to be more distressed by interpersonal difficulties common after migration, but men are more concerned by discrimination, financial worries,

and work-related adversities (see Bornstein, 2017). Exposure to majority norms and expectations also has gender-specific implications (Bos and Schneider, Chapter 19, this volume). For example, the confrontation with gender equality norms of Western societies affects girls and boys differently, especially those immigrant children from traditionally gendered societies (Suárez-Orozco & Qin, 2006). Under such circumstances, sons may experience greater achievement and cultural conformity pressures than daughters. Gender further shapes majority responses to immigrants, for example Dutch girls have been found to be less concerned with ethnic group differences and more likely to consider immigrant children as Dutch than are their male counterparts (Verkuyten et al., 2013).

Acculturative stress, in turn, may result from unsuccessfully negotiated cultural contact and manifest itself as depressive symptoms, feelings of anxiety, and psychosomatic disorders (Berry, 2006). Following Berry's initial framework, research has generally shown that integration is the most, and marginalization the least, adaptive strategy to deal with acculturative stress. That is, the integration strategy leads to the most positive outcomes in terms of coping, psychological health, and well-being (Berry & Sabatier, 2010; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). Yet, processes of adaptation develop over time, with acculturative stress increasing soon after the arrival of the migrant in the receiving society, followed later by a decrease over time (Berry, 2006).

A key factor underlying successful adaptation is the experience and perception of *discrimination* among migrants. There is ample empirical evidence showing that perceiving oneself as a target or victim of majority discrimination is a major acculturative stressor, increasing depressive symptoms, distress, and anxiety, as well as decreasing life satisfaction, well-being, and self-esteem (Cassidy et al., 2004; Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000; for a meta-analysis, see Schmitt et al., 2014). In a study on the impact of discrimination on the acculturation strategies of international students in the United Kingdom for example, perceived discrimination has been shown to lead to a perceived a lack of permeability of group boundaries, and thus to avoidance of the receiving society and endorsement of one's own cultural background (Ramos et al., 2016). A study examining both pre- and post-migration factors underlying psychological adaptation of ethnic migrants in the receiving society found that pre-acculturative stress and anticipated discrimination (before migration) are associated with subsequent greater stress and discrimination (after migration), which in turn decrease post-migration well-being (Mähönen & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2012). These findings suggest that migration expectations predict at least to some extent actual psychological and behavioral adaptation in the receiving society. They thus plead in favor of pre-migration interventions to create positive, though realistic, expectations regarding the intergroup context of the receiving society.

Many if not most migrants have to find ways to deal with discrimination in receiving societies, though most often against other members of their group than against them personally. In line with the common finding that threats to the ingroup encourage group identification, perceived discrimination has thus been shown to increase ingroup identification (Jetten et al., 2001; Craig & Phillps, Chapter 23, this volume; Perez & Vicuna, Chapter 25, this volume). The deleterious effects of perceived discrimination may therefore to some extent be buffered through identification with minority groups (see Schmitt et al., 2014).

Subsequently, a more general model of "social cure" has been developed that demonstrates how social identities (and related factors such as social support and a sense of community) are capable of promoting adjustment, coping, and well-being for individuals dealing with

migratory stressors such as discrimination, particularly among vulnerable populations such as migrants (Jetten et al., 2012). In a study on Syrian refugees in Turkey, for example, higher perceived ethnic discrimination was associated with poorer physical and mental health, but these effects were weaker or non-existent for refugees who derived a sense of efficacy and meaningfulness from their Syrian identity, thereby also underscoring the importance of differentiating identity needs for understanding the effects of perceived discrimination (Çelebi et al., 2017).

The positive effects of social identities on well-being are far from consistent, and critically depend on identity content and the social status of the group. In a study on immigrant detention in the United Kingdom, for example, shared identities were a source of burden and distress, because detainees carried guilt, and interactions with other ingroup members were painful (Kellezi et al., 2019). Another study demonstrating the limits of the social cure paradigm found that while Syrian refugees' poor health conditions after their arrival in the United Kingdom was fully explained by emotional distress, social support did not play any role in accounting for longitudinal health conditions (James et al., 2019). Thus, when identities are threatened and stigmatized, and when individual circumstances cause harm to other ingroup members and lead to ostracism, social cure can become a social curse.

Under conditions of successful adaptation, however, individuals may develop dual or bi-cultural identities that represent comfort and proficiency in both the culture of origin and the culture of the receiving society. In an extensive meta-analysis, Nguyen and Benet-Martìnez (2013) have found a strong and positive association between bi-culturalism and both psychological and sociocultural adjustment, suggesting that complex identities have generally clear advantages over single identities. These psychological benefits were however contingent upon the countries of origin, with positive associations for Latin American, Asian, and European immigrants, whereas no or negligible associations were found for African immigrants.

Dual identities also have implications for the political integration of migrants into liberal democratic societies. In a longitudinal survey study on Turkish migrants in Germany, Simon and Ruhs (2008) showed that dual identification with the Turkish migrant group and the superordinate German national group uniquely predicted political involvement in the form of support for political claims in favor of Turks living in Germany, while no relation was found between dual identification and radical or violent politicization. These findings suggest that while identification with the aggrieved ingroup is necessary to foster involvement on behalf of the ingroup (Spears et al., 2001), identification with the super-ordinate group is also required to foster normative collective action, since it reflects the acknowledgement that political action needs to be taken within the limits of general acceptance of the larger polity (see Azzi et al., 2011; Van Stekelenburg & Gaidytė, Chapter 26, this volume, for dynamics of collective action and political mobilization by migrant groups).

Political and legal integration of migrants through the granting of national citizenship represents the final phase of the migration process. Demonstrating the benefits of a multicultural approach to diversity, research has shown that in countries with multicultural policies and pluralistic discourse, migrants are more likely to become national citizens, participate in political decision-making, and identify with the country (Bloemraad, 2015; Politi et al., 2022). Yet, for naturalized immigrants this transition from national outsiders to national insiders may paradoxically lead to more negative attitudes toward other, more recent immigrants. Research has indeed demonstrated that recently naturalized citizens in

Switzerland who expressed belongingness motives to justify their desire to become national citizens were more likely to support restrictive immigration policies compared to those who wished to naturalize for instrumental motives (Politi et al., 2020).

Finally, the socioeconomic position of the migrant is recognized as a key determinant of adaptation as well. "Segmented assimilation" refers to outcomes where migrants are assimilated into different segments of society as a function of social class (Portes & Rumbaut, 2014). For low-status migrants this process may lead to "downward assimilation" whereby young migrants join the most disadvantaged minorities at the bottom of society, an outcome squarely at odds with early assimilationist expectations of upward mobility and integration into mainstream society. Migrants in low social positions have also been shown to experience greater acculturative stress and to be prone to unsuccessful adjustment (Jasinskaja et al., 2006). An important driver of unsuccessful and precarious adjustment concerns low educational achievement of children of immigrants. Research has evidenced large achievement gaps between native and immigrant children and adolescents, often associated with school disengagement and feelings of lack of belonging of immigrant youth (Motti-Stefanidi & Masten, 2013). Recent research shows that a contextual multilevel approach that examines the interplay between identity threat, identity protection, and educational achievement at different levels of analysis is required to account for this achievement gap. Minority educational attainment has thus not only been associated with positive interpersonal relations with peers and teachers, but crucially also with schools that explicitly promote and enact identity-protective institutional values and ideologies such as multiculturalism. Educational acculturation is thus contingent upon identity protection and threat at the interpersonal, intergroup, and institutional level (Phalet & Baysu, 2020).

3. MAJORITY ATTITUDES toward IMMIGRATION: THREAT PERSPECTIVES

The large migratory flows to Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world over the last decades have impacted receiving societies in many ways. Even though the world has witnessed many heartfelt and welcoming reactions to the arrival of immigrants and refugees (as in Germany following the Syrian refugee "crisis" in 2015, see Bloemraad & Voss, 2020), the public debate in receiving societies has been aligned with the securitization turn in migration policy and migration law (de Haas et al., 2020), dominated by anti-immigrant rhetoric that sees migrants and refugees as a "problem," as a "threat," or as a "danger." Immigrants are thus depicted as "flooding" the country, "taking away" the jobs of citizens, abusing the welfare system, or undermining national values (e.g., Every & Augoustinos, 2007). Such allegations imply that the arrival and presence of immigrants yields various negative consequences for citizens of receiving countries. The alleged threats are subsequently used as arguments to oppose rights of immigrants and restrict their entry into receiving societies. Oddly, the voices of those perceiving immigrants as solving labor shortages due to low birth rates in more developed countries have usually been more muted. In this section, we present research that examines the role of perceived threat in explaining the psychological processes underlying attitudes toward immigrants by members of receiving societies.

The notion of threat is present in a plethora of social psychological theories concerned with understanding the underpinnings of anti-immigration attitudes (see Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2016). Threat is an umbrella term with multiple meanings (Stein, Chapter 11, this volume). Broadly defined, threat appraisals refer to the anticipation of negative consequences related to the arrival and presence of immigrants in a receiving society. Threat research generally differentiates two main routes through which threat relates to anti-immigration attitudes: material or realistic threats on the one hand, and value or symbolic threats on the other (e.g., Riek et al., 2006; Sears & Funk, 1991; Stephan et al., 2016). Material threats anticipate negative consequences with respect to the distribution of valued and usually scarce tangible resources in the receiving society, including economic assets, political power, and physical well-being of national ingroup members. Value-based threats, in turn, foresee perceived non-tangible negative consequences of immigrant presence and are derived from the assimilationist idea that all members of the national ingroup should share the same values and conform to common norms. Threat has also been assessed with intergroup anxiety, involving feelings of uneasiness and awkwardness related to intergroup interactions (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). The psychological nature of threat thus varies, since threat may refer to the perceived likelihood of negative immigration consequences or to an emotional anticipation involving fear and anxiety (Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 2016).

3.1. Material Threats

Some theoretical models focus on locating the causes of anti-immigrant attitudes in the competitive intergroup *structure* of the relationships between the national ingroup and immigrant outgroups. Based on *realistic conflict theory* (Sherif, 1967), these models assume that competition over scarce resources between social groups leads to intergroup conflict and, consequently, to negative attitudes toward immigrant outgroups. As a result, individuals who perceive competition with an immigrant outgroup are most likely to experience material threat and develop negative attitudes toward members of the group. *Group position theory* (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999) and *social dominance theory* (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) take a similar approach, underscoring that societies are structured as group-based hierarchies in which dominant (usually majority) groups have many advantages over subordinate (immigrant minority) groups (see also Esses et al., 2005). Dominant national ingroups propagate "legitimizing myths" that portray the majority-immigrant relationship as competitive in order to justify their higher status, resources, and power.

Perceived economic threat has been shown to relate to discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants in Europe (McLaren, 2003; Pereira et al., 2010) and North America (e.g., Citrin et al.,1997; Esses et al., 1998), as well as in Asia (e.g., Singapore Ramsay & Pang, 2017) and Africa (e.g., South Africa; Harris et al., 2018). The perceived share of immigrants of the overall population and the anticipation of demographic shifts toward a decreasing proportion of native citizens are variants of perceived realistic threat that drive anti-immigration attitudes and support for restrictive migration policies (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2020; Major et al., 2018; Shepherd et al., 2018; see also Craig et al., 2018; Danbold & Huo, 2015, for similar effects related to the perceived declining share of Whites in the United States). Security threats such as anticipated terrorist attacks are also understood as a form of

realistic threat, mainly fuelling threat perceptions regarding Muslim immigrants (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; see Snider et al, Chapter 14, this volume).

3.2. Value Threats

In current-day Western societies, the worldviews of Muslim immigrants are often represented as threatening the core values of receiving societies. In March 2021, for example, a slight majority of the Swiss electorate voted in favor of banning face coverings in public, including the burka and the niqab worn by Muslim women, thereby illustrating the political consequences of such perceptions of value threat. Perceived value threat originates in presumed differences in belief systems, worldviews, and morality between immigrant groups and national majorities (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1991). Purportedly incompatible values of immigrant communities are portrayed as a menace to an idealized, homogeneous national ingroup whose members share common values (Biernat & Vescio, 2005; Esses et al., 2005). Different lines of value threat research converge in the argument that values and norms of the national majority are used as the frame of reference for judging immigrant outgroups (see Joffe & Staerklé, 2007).

Importantly, negative immigration attitudes are often triggered by *perceptions* or *beliefs* about profound value differences rather than by any objective difference. Huntington (2004), for example, argued that the continuing immigration from Latin America threatens the linguistic and Anglo-Protestant cultural identity of the United States, but this culturalist argument is inconsistent with data showing that by the third generation, most Hispanic immigrants identify as Americans and are monolingual in English, and that therefore alleged value differences soon become minimal (Citrin et al., 2007). Yet, exposure to xenophobic threat rhetoric can backfire and make Hispanic immigrants and Latinos in the United States more ethnocentric and less politically trusting, thereby in turn confirming majority threat perceptions (Pérez, 2015).

The origins of immigration attitude research on value threat can be found in theories initially developed to understand the continuing racism against Blacks in the United States. This research has demonstrated that the old-fashioned bigotry from the Jim Crow era has been replaced with a more subtle type of prejudice that is socially more acceptable because it is anchored in Blacks' purported lack of conformity with key American values (see Sears & Henry, 2005; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2004; McConahay, 1986). In symbolic racism theory, for example, Blacks are perceived to violate, more than Whites, traditional American values such as self-reliance, the work ethic, and respect for authority (Sears & Henry, 2005). Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) conceptualized similar ideas in the European context, leading them to distinguish between blatant and subtle forms of prejudice against immigrants. Perceived value violation by immigrants is a central component of subtle prejudice against immigrants, in addition to exaggeration of cultural differences and the denial of positive emotions toward immigrants.

Both symbolic racism and subtle prejudice have been shown to underlie support for various restrictive policies such as expulsion of value-violating immigrants in Europe (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and Whites' opposition to immigration and multilingualism in the United States (Sears et al., 1999; see also Huddy & Sears, 1995). Drawing on this seminal work, value-based threats have been shown to be associated with anti-immigrant

prejudice (McLaren, 2003; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Davidov et al., 2020). For example, a study conducted in the Netherlands showed that perceived symbolic, but not material, threat predicted prejudice against Muslim immigrants (Velasco González et al., 2008; see also Sniderman et al., 2004). Moreover, perceived cultural threats are a stronger predictor of far-right support than are perceived economic ethnic threats (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012).

3.3. Beyond Material and Value Threats

Although value and material threat are often conceived of as rival explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes, some research suggests that they coexist and are complementary, providing different, but not mutually exclusive, motivational explanations of immigration attitudes (e.g., Riek et al., 2006; Sniderman et al., 2004; Stephan et al., 2016). Empirically, re-alistic and symbolic threat perceptions are generally strongly correlated (Staerklé & Green, 2018; Stephan et al., 2016) and frequently difficult to disentangle.

A case can be made that both the perception of material and value-based threat relate to the fundamental processes of dealing with intergroup similarity and difference, respectively. Material threat implies that *similarity* with immigrants is threatening since "they" are motivated to acquire the same resources "we" want, too. Value threat, in turn, implies that *difference* with immigrants is threatening, since "they" are too different to be integrated into "our" society. This hypothesis is supported by a study that revealed more negative attitudes toward Mexican immigrants in the United States when participants focused either on intergroup *difference* in positive interpersonal traits such as "generous" and "friendly" (supporting value threat predictions) or on intergroup *similarity* on work-related traits such as "competent" and "hardworking" (supporting material threat predictions; Zárate et al., 2004). These "similar" immigrants may thus evoke material threat, related to the job market (e.g., highly qualified Germans in the German-speaking side of Switzerland), in line with the reactive distinctiveness hypothesis based on social identity theory (e.g., Jetten et al., 2004). Across European countries, symbolic threat was also found to relate to preferences for immigrants similar to oneself, whereas material threat was related to preferences for different immigrants who would not compete for the same resources (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015).

Ideological orientations have been shown to account for some of these different threat effects by shaping the threat experience that subsequently drives anti-immigration stances (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Duckitt, 2006; Guimond et al., 2003). Research in the United States and Switzerland demonstrated that when immigrants were portrayed as adapting to the values of the receiving society (i.e., becoming similar to the national majority), anti-egalitarian (high-SDO) nationals motivated to enforce status boundaries were more willing than low-SDO nationals to persecute immigrants than when they did not make such integrative efforts (Thomsen et al., 2008). In contrast, right-wing authoritarian (RWA) nationals concerned with the enforcement of ingroup norms were more willing than nationals low on RWA to persecute immigrants when they did *not* make integrative efforts.

The way perceived threat affects intergroup attitudes thus depends on the specific immigrant group under consideration. Indeed, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) have outlined a sociofunctional approach to prejudice arguing that prejudice toward specific outgroups arises from specific forms of intergroup threat. For example, security fears have been

shown to shape attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, but material threat generates views toward eastern Europeans (Hellwig & Sinno, 2017). "Culturally distant" and stigmatized immigrant groups whose members wear visible signs of cultural or religious affiliation, or differ in physical appearance, are the most likely targets of value-based threat rhetoric. This is the case for example for low-skilled Hispanic laborers in the United States or Muslim immigrants, refugees, and Roma people in Europe. Accordingly, immigrants deemed to be "culturally similar" and often originating from wealthier countries are less likely targets of value-based threat rhetoric.

Disease threat, in turn, appears to combine both realistic and symbolic threat dimensions. From an evolutionary point of view, protection from disease through the avoidance of potential pathogens and parasites is a functional and adaptive strategy (Schaller, 2006; Petersen, Chapter 7, this volume). Throughout history, however, diseases have been associated with supposedly inferior or "dirty" outgroups and foreign populations (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007), which explains why perceptions of disease threat are related to anti-immigration attitudes (Faulkner et al., 2004; Green et al., 2010). The recent closing of national borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic raised concerns that the fear of the pandemic would fuel restrictive immigration attitudes; in the United States, for example, perceived COVID-19 threat has been found to relate to anti-Asian prejudice (Huo, 2020). In Turkey, perceived COVID-19 threat was simultaneously associated with negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees (through threat perceptions), and to pro-immigrant attitudes and helping intentions (through common ingroup identification) (Adam-Troian & Bagci, 2021; see van Bavel et al., 2020).

3.4. Individual or Collective Threat?

Negative outcomes of immigrant presence can be anticipated at the individual or the collective level, reflecting motivations of individual vs. collective self-interest (e.g., Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Citrin et al., 1997; Sears & Kinder, 1985; Stephan et al., 2016; Valentino et al., 2019). Individual threat perceptions describe situations where members of the receiving society are concerned that their individual interests are menaced by immigration. Collective threat perceptions refer to conditions where the ingroup as a whole—be it national, ethnic, or regional—is seen as threatened by immigration.

As immigrants often occupy low-status positions, low-status majority members are more likely to be confronted with immigrants than high-status members. Low-status members are therefore also more likely to view themselves in competition for similar resources such as affordable housing and jobs, and thus to perceive material threat. Indeed, the relationship between low social positions and negative immigration and cultural diversity attitudes has been amply demonstrated (Carvacho et al., 2013; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Scheepers et al., 2002; for an overview, Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Similarly, low-status ethnic minorities such as Blacks and Hispanics in the United States are more likely to view themselves in competition with immigrants and thus to be more opposed to immigration (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; see however Citrin & Sears, 2014).

However, competition is not the sole explanation for the links between social status, threat perceptions, and anti-immigrant prejudice. Alternative explanations of status differences in the expression of anti-immigration prejudice highlight high-status groups'

greater awareness of anti-discrimination norms and more subtle expressions of prejudice (Jackman & Muha, 1984; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Yet another explanation is that the effects of social status are due to differential political socialization experiences at home and at school rather than status per se (see Cavaille & Marshall, 2019; Sears & Funk, 1991; Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015, for selection effects).

With respect to collective self-interest, Citrin and colleagues (2001) have shown that although personal economic circumstances played little role in support for reducing immigration, pessimism about the national economy and beliefs about negative labor market consequences of immigration predicted anti-immigration attitudes (see also Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Stephan et al., 2016). While people who see their national ingroup as relatively *disadvantaged* in comparison with immigrant outgroups have been shown to display stronger anti-immigrant attitudes (Pettigrew et al., 2008), somewhat paradoxically, this was also the case for those who see their ingroup as relatively *advantaged* in relation to immigrant outgroups (Guimond & Dambrun, 2002). In this latter case, anti-immigrant prejudice is interpreted as a strategy to maintain the privileges of the high-status ingroup and status quo (see Jetten, 2019). Yet, in general, highly skilled immigrants are preferred over lower-skilled immigrants (Valentino et al., 2019), especially by national majority groups (Gale & Staerklé, 2021).

3.5. Threat Rhetoric

Many studies have used fictitious newspaper articles, editorials, and research findings as well as policy framings to induce threat perceptions, thereby simulating dissemination of threat-based arguments in the media and the public sphere (Esses et al., 1998; see Rios et al. 2018, for an overview). The differential impact of threat rhetoric as a function of the targeted immigrant group is demonstrated in a study showing that news reports on Latino immigrants emphasizing the costs of immigration (i.e., material threat) instead of its benefits led White US citizens to support reduction of immigration, to prefer English-only laws, and to request information from anti-immigration groups. This was far less the case when European immigrants were featured in the reports (Brader et al., 2008). Similarly, fictitious editorials depicting a highly skilled immigrant group (rather than a vaguely described immigrant group) arriving in a context where jobs are scarce evoked perceptions of competition and resulted in generalized negative attitudes toward immigrants in Canada (Esses et al., 1998). In actual political discourse, arguments put forward by British political leaders regarding Brexit leveraged both on supposed realistic (e.g., terrorism, crime, competition for jobs) and symbolic threats (e.g., value differences; Portice & Reicher, 2018). Content analyses of television news in Flanders (the northern part of Belgium) over a period of 11 years revealed that cultural and safety threats were prevalent in TV news stories regarding North African immigrants (Van der Linden & Jacobs, 2017). An Austrian study examining the effects of populist advertising found that both value (*"Respect for our culture instead of false tolerance"*) and material threat appeals (*"Protection for our jobs instead of competition and loss of workplaces"*), combined with anti-immigrant visuals (print ads for the right-wing Austrian Freedom Party depicting Muslim immigrants crossing the Austrian borders), increased feelings of symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes, and ultimately led to stronger anti-immigration attitudes (Schmuck & Matthes, 2017).

3.6. Group Identification and Threat

Because immigrants are often perceived and constructed as threatening historically developed *national* values, national identification plays an important role in anti-immigrant attitudes. Research has shown that ethnic majorities within countries are more likely to see themselves as legitimate representatives of the nation and are therefore more likely to identify with the nation (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Staerklé et al., 2010). This ingroup identification makes members sensitive to matters that may harm the group; therefore, individuals who identify strongly with their country are likely to be more concerned about the national interest than less identified individuals. Accordingly, national identification has been shown to be an antecedent of more intense feelings of threat (e.g., Riek et al., 2006). Threat triggers a motivation to defend the identity of the nation that may lead more strongly identified individuals to hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Esses et al., 2005; Mummendey et al., 2001; see Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume). Examining attitudes of Dutch adolescents, Velasco González and colleagues (2008) showed that national identification increased anti-Muslim prejudice, but this relationship was fully mediated by perceived symbolic threat (see also Bilali et al., 2018, for a similar pattern with national identification of Turks predicting negative attitudes toward Kurds through threat perceptions).

Religious identification has also been related to negative outgroup attitudes. While the research focus is generally on national majorities in Western countries, Obaidi and colleagues (2018) showed that high identification as Christians as well as Muslims in Europe, Afghanistan, and Turkey was related to greater perceived symbolic threat, and consequently to stronger outgroup hostility. National, religious, and ethnic identification may also influence the way individuals react to threat, by strengthening the link between perceived threats and hostile outgroup attitudes (Stephan et al., 2016). For example, in the US presidential campaign in 2016, exposure to messages anticipating a racial shift increased Whites' support for anti-immigrant policies and for Donald Trump, and decreased support for Bernie Sanders through heightened group status threat (Major et al., 2018). However, this pattern was only found among Whites highest in identification with Whites as a group.

Not only the degree of group attachment determines increase of anti-immigration attitudes, but also its form and content. While an uncritical and idealizing attachment to the nation based on a sense of national superiority positively relates to anti-immigration attitudes, the relationship may be negative when attachment implies pride in the nation without intergroup comparisons (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Green et al., 2011; Grigoryan & Ponizovskiy, 2018; Mummendey et al., 2001; see also Yoogeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Falomir-Pichastor and Frederic (2013), in turn, showed that heterogenous conceptions of national identity were related to perceived threat and anti-immigrant prejudice, but only among high national identifiers. Thus, it may not be identification per se that drives anti-immigration stances, but rather the meaning individuals and groups attribute to identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For example, some research has shown that national identification was related to prejudice toward asylum seekers in England only to the extent that people endorsed an ethnic conception of the nation, based on ancestry and blood ties (Pehrson et al., 2009a; see also Meeus et al., 2010). In a study highlighting the importance of representations of national history, the experimentally emphasized Christian roots of

Dutch nationhood led low national identifiers to oppose rights of Muslim immigrants to the same extent as did high identifiers (Smeekes et al., 2011).

3.7. Conclusion

In this section, we have reviewed the notion of threat and its links to immigration-related attitudes. A potentially confusing issue is the varying use of threat as an explanatory variable in immigration attitude research. Threat has been conceived as a component of prejudice and as an antecedent, as a mediator and as a moderator of the psychological processes underlying anti-immigration stances. In survey research, for example, threat perceptions are typically assessed by explicitly asking respondents the extent to which they feel immigrants threaten values or job opportunities of the national majority. These threat measures are subsequently used to predict anti-immigrant prejudice. Strong semantic overlap between threat and prejudice measures, however, could imply that threat is simply a variant of prejudice (e.g., Sniderman et al., 2004). If reverse causality cannot be excluded, such cross-sectional survey research is therefore at risk of being tautological.

The variety of methods used to study the role of threat in anti-immigration attitudes makes it indeed difficult to establish an unequivocal causal order between threat and prejudice. While experimental research (simulating threat via fictitious newspaper articles, editorials, research findings, or policy framings) addresses these critiques by manipulating threat perceptions in various ways (see see Rios et al., 2018, for an overview), controlled experiments remain artificial—frequently using student populations—and thus cannot conclusively show the conditions under which threat shapes immigration policy attitudes among the general population in the real world.

Hence, the links between threat and an anti-immigrant stance may be circular. For example, people expressing anti-immigration prejudice might subsequently appeal to threat as a means to justify their prejudices (Bahns, 2017). Similarly, overestimating the size of an immigrant group in a country may be a consequence, rather than a cause, of attitudes toward those groups (Hopkins et al., 2019). The threat—prejudice circularity is also revealed in a study where immigration anxiety was related to seeking out, recalling, and agreeing with news reporting conveying threatening information regarding immigration (Gadarian & Albertson, 2014). Finally, given the widespread presence of threat rhetoric in the public sphere, perceived threat may also reflect endorsement of threat-based political discourse.

While any one method alone does not permit unequivocal causal interpretation of the threat-prejudice nexus, the increase of survey experiments embedded in large-scale social surveys can make the best of both worlds (Ford & Mellon, 2020). Yet, despite their differences in the underlying assumptions and the forms of threats they investigate, the various theories converge in viewing threat as closely related to anti-immigration attitudes.

4. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSES OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

In this fourth part, we overview research examining the multiple impacts of contextual (e.g., national, regional, local) determinants on attitudes related to immigration and

multiculturalism. This more recent body of research demonstrates that the wider socio-cultural and political environment shapes individual immigration attitudes, and that these processes vary over time and across geographic and institutional contexts. The development of high quality international social surveys, such as the *European Social Survey* (ESS; see Heath et al., 2020), the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP), and the *World Values Survey* (WVS) has fostered comparative cross-national and cross-regional research that relates contextual factors to individual-level processes and outcomes. The basic rationale for such investigations is that individuals' attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism are contingent upon the surrounding social contexts in which they develop, over and above individual-level determinants such as threat perceptions, intergroup contact, and ideological orientations (Christ et al., 2017; Pettigrew, 2018). Though the call for integration of different levels of analysis is far from new (Doise, 1986), the necessary multi-level research designs to do so have become common only over the last two decades, as they can now be readily implemented with a number of software packages. Multilevel approaches allow the simultaneous examination of different levels of analysis by combining individual-level predictors with national- or regional-level factors in a single explanatory model (e.g., Hox, 2010). In statistical terminology, the data is hierarchically organized in a multilevel data structure where individuals are nested within one or more higher-level contextual units. Thus, psychological explanations of public opinion toward immigration and immigrants can be complemented with structural, political, historical, and institutional explanations.

The contextual units can be *distal*, such as nations or regions, or more *proximal*, such as districts, neighborhoods, schools, or even classrooms. In early multilevel research, the conceptualization of contextual units has mainly relied on intergroup competition and intergroup contact (see Christ et al., 2022, for an overview). The two most commonly studied context-level characteristics relate to national economic conditions (e.g., GDP, unemployment rate) and to national immigration and ethnic diversity patterns (e.g., proportion of immigrants, change in immigrant proportion, ethnic fractionalization) that provide information on the structural and compositional dimensions of the contexts in which individuals develop their attitudes toward immigration and cultural diversity. More recent research has furthermore examined the impact of ideological and normative contexts (e.g., policies, surrounding public opinion) on citizens' views regarding immigration (Guimond et al., 2014). This research has offered innovative approaches to further our understanding of the processes underlying the context–attitude relationship (mediating processes) and demonstrated key boundary conditions of such processes (moderating processes). In the following, we overview and discuss these different bodies of research.

4.1. Extending Threat and Contact Approaches to a Contextual Level

Drawing on both realistic conflict theory and social identity theory, Scheepers and colleagues (2002) were among the first to theorize and empirically assess threat as a context-level factor in a multi-level perspective, formalized in *ethnic competition theory* (see also Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; see Section 3 of this chapter). On the individual level, ethnic competition theory defines competition in terms of the social conditions (e.g., professional category, income) of members of the receiving society: low-status conditions may elicit perceptions of a competitive relationship with immigrants that in turn may give rise to

anti-immigration sentiments. Competition on the contextual level, in turn, is assessed with the economic conditions of a country or a region, assumed to affect competition between members of the receiving society and immigrants. The reasoning is that in a disadvantaged context—indexed by high unemployment rates for example—competition for scarce resources such as jobs is likely to be greater than in an advantaged context (see also Green, 2009; Kunovich, 2004; Kunst et al., 2017; Quillian, 1995).

Group (or "fraternal," Runciman, 1966) relative deprivation—understood as a perceived group-level disadvantage in relation to other groups resulting in a sense of ingroup entitlement—is known as a powerful driver of anti-immigrant prejudice (see Smith et al., 2012). Recently, Meuleman et al. (2020) found across 20 European countries that national-level long-term unemployment was not directly related to perceived threat, but that group relative deprivation was higher in high-unemployment countries. Group relative deprivation, in turn, was related to perceived threat. This finding suggests that group relative deprivation explains (i.e., mediates) how disadvantageous labor market conditions translate into anti-immigration attitudes.

One of the key recent debates has been whether ethnic diversity resulting from a growing number of immigrants erodes social cohesion and triggers anti-immigrant sentiments (the constrict hypothesis, as discussed in section one, Putnam, 2007), or alternatively fosters more inclusive immigration attitudes. Two contrasting rationales—one extending competition frameworks and the other one intergroup contact theory—have been put forward to examine how migration patterns shape immigration attitudes and political behavior (see Christ et al., 2022). In the following, we overview evidence for both rationales and conclude by discussing potential explanations for contradictory and mixed evidence.

Threatening diversity. The threat approach suggests that a high or growing proportion of immigrants elicits both perceived material and value threats. In this view, greater exposure to immigrants increases perceived economic competition (material threat) and reinforces sentiments of alleged challenges to national values and lifestyle (value threat). Across 15 European countries, Scheepers and colleagues (2002) showed that individuals living in similar conditions as immigrants were more likely to endorse threat perceptions, and that a strong presence of non-EU citizens within a country was directly related to ethnic exclusionism (assessed with opposition to the granting of civil and social rights to immigrants). Comparing measures of immigrant presence, another study showed that while the percentage of low-status immigrants in European countries did not affect individual threat perceptions, a higher percentage of non-Western immigrants was associated with greater country average levels of perceived immigration threat (Schneider, 2008; see Green et al., 2010). Rink et al. (2009), in turn, found, over time across three electoral surveys, that the proportion of immigrants in a municipality was positively related to voting for the Vlaams Belang (a nationalist, right-wing populist party) in Flanders, Belgium.

Contextual diversity can also interact with other factors. In an early multilevel study, Quillian (1995) showed that while higher proportions of immigrants from non-European countries was associated with greater racial prejudice, this relationship was more likely to occur in countries with poor economic conditions (see also Green et al., 2018). Individual-level factors such as ideological orientations further moderate the effects of context-level diversity. For example, Van Assche and colleagues (2014, 2016) found that a higher proportion of ethnic minorities was most closely associated with greater prejudice and outgroup

distrust among individuals high in RWA (see also Sibley et al., 2013, for the moderating effect of dangerous world beliefs).

The threat approach has also been applied to examine the impact of temporal contexts, demonstrating that *changes* in immigration and economic conditions may affect perceived competition. Pooling Dutch surveys over 1979–2002, Coenders and colleagues (2008, study 1) showed that ethnic discrimination was more widespread in times of high levels of immigration and increased unemployment. Moreover, birth cohorts having experienced high immigration and unemployment levels in their formative pre-adult years expressed greater ethnic discrimination. Similar patterns were found across European countries in an examination of a narrower time frame from 2002 to 2007 (Meuleman et al., 2009). This study showed that countries with weaker inflows of immigrants had more tolerant immigration attitudes than those with higher levels of immigration, and that attitudes toward immigration became more tolerant particularly in countries where unemployment rates did not increase. In a natural experiment in the Greek islands, Hangartner and colleagues (2019) recently revealed that large and sudden direct exposure to refugees increased natives' hostility toward refugees and support for restrictive immigration and asylum policies.

Diversity as an opportunity. Predictions derived from extensions of intergroup contact theory (Tropp and Dehrone, Chapter 29, this volume), however, are at odds with those derived from threat and competition perspectives: contact theorists have established that living in culturally diverse societal contexts (i.e., with a high proportion of immigrants) provides more contact opportunities, notably through intergroup friendships that decrease rather than increase perceived threat and antagonistic attitudes toward immigrants (Hewstone, 2015; Wagner et al., 2006). The proportion of immigrants within German districts (intermediate administrative levels between states and municipalities), for example, has been shown to be negatively related to immigrant prejudice, and this relationship was mediated by contact at the workplace and in neighborhoods (Wagner et al., 2006). In another study focusing on both the White British majority and ethnic minorities in the United Kingdom, Schmid and colleagues (2014) found that *neighborhood* ethnic diversity was associated with greater intergroup contact. This intergroup contact was related to lower threat perceptions that in turn resulted in higher outgroup, ingroup, and neighborhood trust, respectively, as well as in more positive intergroup attitudes. Across European countries, Schlueter and colleagues (2020) similarly found that higher proportions of Muslims in a country were associated with more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. These results are at odds with Putnam's (2007) "constrict claim" according to which neighborhood diversity erodes social cohesion, especially because these positive effects have been found to hold also for the presence of stigmatized immigrants in neighborhoods.

Reconciling contact and threat rationales. Although diversity-based threat and intergroup contact processes appear to contradict each other, it is likely they operate *simultaneously* in explaining the relationship between diversity and immigration-related attitudes and political behavior. For example, Schlueter and Wagner (2008) demonstrated that a greater regional proportion of immigrant populations in Europe increased both intergroup contact *and* perceived threat. Subsequently, Pettigrew and colleagues (2010) showed that the effect of contact is based on direct *experience* with immigrants and is thus affected by

the actual size of immigrant populations within German regions, whereas perceived threat is triggered by the *perception* of immigrant presence (see also Hooghe & Vroome, 2015a; van Assche et al., 2016). Green and colleagues (2010) in turn found that the presence of western European migrants was related to increased intergroup contact in Swiss municipalities, which in turn was linked to reduced threat perceptions. The presence of stigmatized migrants (mainly from Turkey, Albania, and countries of former Yugoslavia), however, was related to both increased intergroup contact and threat perceptions. Extending this study to political behavior in Switzerland, Green and colleagues (2016) showed that the presence of stigmatized immigrants at the district level was related to threat perceptions, but not to intergroup contact. District-level perceived threat, in turn, was related to actual radical right-wing voting through an increased willingness to vote for right-wing parties. Positive intergroup contact, however, was associated with less radical right-wing voting through lower willingness to vote for right-wing parties and reduced threat. Finally, Laurence and colleagues (2018) showed that neighborhood and workplace ethnic diversity were related to both positive and negative intergroup contact experiences that further relate to positive and negative intergroup attitudes, respectively.

Other studies have also shown the *interplay* between threat and intergroup contact processes. In a study across 17 European countries, McLaren (2003) revealed that while a high proportion of foreigners in a country increases perceived threat, immigrant friendships buffer this effect, suggesting that individuals with immigrant friends living in highly diverse contexts feel less threatened by diversity than those without such friendships. Similarly, the proportion of foreign-born in US regions had less impact on Whites' immigration attitudes when their interpersonal networks included non-White members (Berg, 2009; see also Laurence, 2014, for a similar pattern in the United Kingdom). Moreover, the proportion of immigrants in European countries has been shown to moderate the relationship between intergroup contact and anti-immigrant prejudice (Semyonov & Glickman, 2009). Positive contact was related to less negative attitudes toward immigrants to a greater degree in countries with a large number of non-Europeans, compared to countries with a smaller number of non-Europeans. Extended, indirect contact (knowing ingroup members who have immigrant friends), however, has been shown to be more effective in reducing prejudice for individuals living in segregated neighborhoods with few direct contact experiences with immigrants, compared to individuals from mixed neighborhoods with more opportunities for direct contact (Christ et al., 2010).

Navigating mixed evidence. Although predictions based on threat and contact approaches have both received much empirical support, some studies found no evidence for the role of context-level factors in explaining immigration attitudes. In a study across 20 European countries, for example, no effects were found of the economic situation and of the proportion of immigrant populations on hostile attitudes toward immigration (Sides & Citrin, 2007). In another study, no effect was found of the proportion of Muslim populations on anti-Muslim attitudes across European countries (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). In yet another cross-European study, the proportion of Muslims in a country was positively related to perceived material threat and negatively to perceived symbolic threat, but unrelated to right-wing voting intentions (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Moreover, comparing attitudes toward foreigners across different regions of Germany, Semyonov and colleagues (2004) revealed that the *actual* proportion of the immigrant populations within regions had no effects on such attitudes, whereas a high *perceived* size of immigrant

populations was associated with perceived threat and discriminatory attitudes toward foreigners (see also Craig et al., 2018). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis examining the links between diversity and prejudice conducted by Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes (2017) also revealed either positive or negative relationships, and in over half of the studies no relationship was found.

The territorial size of the contextual unit of analysis and the degree of ethnic segregation within those units may explain some of the apparent contradictions between the predictions derived from threat and contact approaches. The positive effects of intergroup contact have been shown to occur predominantly at a proximal and local level (e.g., municipality, neighborhood, or district), where daily interactions between immigrants and members of the receiving society are plausible (see Wagner et al. 2006; Schmid et al., 2008; see also Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015). A large presence of immigrants at a distal, national level, however, may be more likely to enhance threat perceptions due to an increased political concern with immigration, reflected in widespread anti-immigrant discourse in the media. In line with this argument, a US study examining attitudes of Asian Americans, Blacks, Latinos and Whites found that interethnic diversity reduced perceived threat and prejudice at the neighborhood level but increased it at the city ("metropolitan") level (Oliver & Wong, 2003). Similarly, Biggs and Knauss (2012) showed that in UK *neighborhoods* with greater proportions of non-Whites (South Asians and Muslims in particular), the probability of being a British National Party (BNP) member was lower among white British adults. However, this probability was higher in *cities* (a larger unit of analysis compared to neighborhoods) with a greater proportion of non-Whites, and even more so when minorities were clearly segregated (see also Ford & Goodwin, 2010). In the same vein, Laurence and colleagues (2019) showed that a high proportion of non-whites in UK neighborhoods was associated with reduced prejudice in diverse areas with low levels of segregation, whereas prejudice was heightened in segregated areas. A study across European countries also revealed that living in mixed—as opposed to homogeneous or highly ethnic—neighborhoods was linked to reduced threat perceptions and social distance toward immigrants, whereas the immigrant ratio in the country was related to increased threat perceptions (Semyonov & Glickman, 2009). Finally, a recent meta-analysis demonstrated that social trust (as an indicator for social cohesion) was reduced in ethnically diverse local, proximal levels (i.e., neighborhoods), but this effect was less marked or even reversed at a more distal level (e.g., districts) (Dinesen et al., 2020). The ideological climate reigning in a given context, which we turn to next, may be another way to shine a light on some of the contradictory and mixed effects of diversity.

4.2. Ideological Climates and Immigration Attitudes

Up to now, we have discussed how individual opinions are affected by structural and compositional features of contexts. We finish this section by examining how ideological characteristics of contexts may provide normative guidance regarding socially acceptable and desirable ways to think about and deal with immigration and cultural diversity (e.g., Guimond et al., 2014; Pettigrew, 2006, 2018). Three types of ideological climates are described: (a) *top-down* ideological climates, institutionalized through legislation and

integration policies; (b) ideological climates based on political and media discourse; and (c) *bottom-up* ideological climates based on aggregated individual-level data.

4.2.1. *Integration Policies as Ideological Climates*

Several studies have used national integration policies as indicators of positive institutionalized norms that may signal to both immigrants and natives that cultural diversity is valued and that immigrants are treated in fair and welcoming ways. In a study across four countries, Guimond and colleagues (2013) showed that national integration *policies* were linked to perceived integration *norms* of citizens of these countries, which in turn predicted their *attitudes* toward immigrants. In a cross-European study, Schlueter and colleagues (2013) found that inclusive integration policies (as measured by the *Migrant Integration Policy Index*, Niessen, 2009) were related to reduced threat perceptions (see also Callens & Meuleman, 2016; Hooghe & Vroome, 2015b). Likewise, Green and colleagues (2020) showed that inclusive integration policies, at the national level, were related to lower levels of symbolic threat perceptions and to more extensive intergroup contact. Inclusive integration policies further reinforced the negative relationship between contact and threat perceptions (see also Kende et al., 2018, for a similar pattern for countries endorsing egalitarian as opposed to hierarchical values). In yet another cross-European study, Schlueter and colleagues (2020) found that inclusive immigrant integration policies, and to some degree stronger state support for religious practices, were associated with less negativity toward Muslim immigrants. These studies thus suggest that citizens are at least to some extent aware of and influenced by the surrounding policy contexts that guide citizens' views on immigration.

Recent research further revealed that the mixed effects of diversity may also be due to the interaction between immigrant integration policies and immigrant presence. Kende and colleagues (2022) found that across national, regional, and institutional (i.e., school) levels of governance, anti-immigrant prejudice was lower when immigrant presence was coupled with inclusive policies that render immigrants more equal to natives. National policy contexts have also been found to moderate the relationship between ideological beliefs and immigration attitudes. In a cross-European study, Kauff and colleagues (2013) found that the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and negative diversity beliefs was stronger in more inclusive countries, suggesting that a multicultural ideology and inclusive policies may pose a threat to authoritarian individuals.

4.2.2. *Political and Media Discourse as Ideological Climates*

The positions of political parties on cultural diversity and immigration are other normative reference points that shape citizens' opinions. Accordingly, the relative strength of political parties within a given context is another indicator of the ideological climate of countries. A strong presence of right-wing parties, for example, has been shown to increase anti-foreigner sentiment across European countries, over and above individuals' political orientation (Semyonov et al., 2006; see also Lahav, 2004). Yet, the picture is more complex as specific ideological emphases in political party discourse moderate their impact on individuals' attitudes: the presence of extremist parties promoting blatant racism

(based on *biological* intergroup differences) did not affect public opinion as a whole, since such views have become increasingly socially unacceptable. Instead, the national prevalence of right-wing parties with a culturalist racist agenda (based on essential *cultural* differences) was shown to relate to anti-immigrant attitudes (Wilkes et al., 2007). Examining the role of media reports as contextual sources of perceived threat, Schlueter and Davidov (2013) showed that negative immigration news reporting shapes national majorities' threat perceptions regarding immigration. Linking repeated cross-sectional survey data from Spain with regional statistics on immigrant presence and a longitudinal content analysis of news reports, they found that negative immigration reporting was related to increased threat perceptions, but this relationship was weaker in regions where the presence of immigrants was higher. These findings suggest that opportunities for contact can buffer the pernicious consequences of negative media portrayals regarding immigration.

4.2.3. *Bottom-Up Ideological Climates*

Shared ideological beliefs and values as well as aggregated individual expressions regarding immigration within a given context may be seen as *bottom-up* normative climates (Green & Sarrasin, 2019). Much like policies, these shared ideological beliefs are also broadly situated on a continuum from exclusionary to inclusive. For example, a study using Swiss national referenda results at the level of municipalities provided an indicator of local ideological climates based on actual voting behavior of citizens on a wide range of social issues (Sarrasin et al., 2012). This study evidenced stronger opposition to liberal anti-racism laws in municipalities with conservative, exclusionary ideological climates, after accounting for individual-level ideological orientations. Right-wing ideological climates across countries and regions have further been shown to moderate the relationship between individual right-wing ideologies and negative immigrant attitudes (as well as other outgroup attitudes; see van Assche et al., 2016): in strong right-wing oriented climates, individual outgroup attitudes converge toward prejudice, regardless of personal ideology.

Ethnic and civic conceptions of national citizenship, finally, make up ideological climates at both the top-down policy level and the bottom-up individual level of shared values in national populations. Across 15 European countries, Weldon (2006) showed that residents in countries with *ethnic* citizenship regimes—requiring shared ethnicity and ancestry for citizenship—were less willing to grant political rights to ethnic minorities compared to residents in countries with *civic* citizenship regimes (i.e., assimilationist and pluralistic regimes). Individuals in assimilationist regimes, in turn, were less tolerant than individuals in pluralistic regimes. Another study revealed lower levels of anti-immigrant prejudice in countries with a collective representation of *civic* nationhood. Moreover, the relationship between national identification and anti-immigrant prejudice was weaker in these countries, suggesting that national identification defined by shared civic citizenship is less related to the desire to exclude immigrants (Pehrson et al., 2009b).

This brief overview suggests that ideological climates—be they defined by top-down institutional factors or by bottom-up shared representations—may offer citizens a normative framework of reference on which they rely when making up their minds on immigration and cultural diversity.

4.3. Future Avenues for Contextual Research

Contextual-level analyses in political psychology have contributed to the understanding of how local, regional, national, and also temporal contexts affect individual opinions regarding immigration. Though in recent years the processes that account for the relationship between context and attitude have been thoroughly examined, there is still a need for more systematic and more nuanced theorizing of these mechanisms occurring at different contextual levels, for example by using varying indicators of ideological climates and multiple outcome variables.

An important issue to consider in analyzing the impact of proximal contexts (such as neighborhoods) is the role of self-selection. Indeed, it is possible that a link between immigrant ratio in a given context and more positive immigrant attitudes results from tolerant individuals self-selecting into diverse areas and, conversely, less tolerant individuals leaving these areas. For example, Maxwell (2019) found with Swiss panel data evidence that individuals holding pro-immigrant attitudes moved into urban, typically more ethnically diverse areas, but that individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes were not moving out of such urban areas. Using longitudinal data from England and Wales, Kauffmann and Harris (2015), however, found no evidence for the role of self-selection in explaining the more positive immigration attitudes among British Whites in more diverse local contexts.

One must also acknowledge that the bulk of this strand of research examines majority attitudes in receiving countries in the Global North. Indeed, immigrant minorities are under- or misrepresented in national surveys (e.g., Feskens et al., 2006). As a result, multilevel research focusing on the immigrant minority perspective remain scarce (for exceptions, see Schmid et al., 2014; Staerklé et al., 2010). For example, Kauff and colleagues (2016) revealed that national minority members were more likely to support anti-discrimination laws and immigrant rights in social contexts in which majority members had experienced positive intergroup contact. This finding counters the concern that positive intergroup contact may demobilize minorities (Tropp and Dehrone, Chapter 29, this volume). Politi and colleagues (2022), in turn, showed that inclusive integration policies were related to migrants' naturalisation intentions and to the endorsement of integration as an acculturation strategy.

Examining how contextual factors shape immigrant minority experiences and attitudes as well as the interplay between majority and minority perspectives is essential for bringing the field forward. The omission of research on the Global South, in turn, is mainly due to the lower coverage of such countries in large-scale social surveys. Insofar as contextual factors driving attitudes toward migration may differ drastically between the Global North and South, sampling of countries in international social surveys should be extended, and scientific and structural collaborations between regional social surveys should be promoted.

5. Conclusion

This chapter proposed an overview of research on migration and multiculturalism from the perspective of political psychology. We started our discussion with a historical framing of the two major modes of migrant incorporation: assimilation and multiculturalism. In the

second section, we presented research studying the perspective of migrant groups, showing the interactionist nature and the complexity of contemporary migrant identities as well as the pros and cons of various acculturation strategies employed by migrants. We also highlighted the intergroup nature of attitudes toward multiculturalism and of acculturation strategies between national majorities and ethnic migrant minorities. In the third section, we focused on research investigating the role of various forms of perceived threat associated with migrant groups by national majorities. The final section featured recent multilevel research on majority attitudes toward migration across national and regional contexts.

An important goal of the chapter was to relate the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism to the dialectic processes of intergroup similarity and differentiation, respectively. The research reviewed clearly indicates that migrant experiences, and reactions to immigration by receiving societies, express the complex and dynamic interplay of similarity and difference, at the level of motivations, perceptions, and normative expectations. For migrant groups, qualified and selective *similarity* with the receiving society's majority is an asset for a successful migrant experience, for example through language acquisition and awareness of dominant social norms. At the same time, intergroup *difference* and concomitant identification with their ethnic group is likely to help many migrants to construct positive social identities rooted in the everyday experiences and practices associated with their ethnic group. Importantly, research has also emphasized that such differentiation processes do not only operate *between* migrant groups and receiving majorities, but also *within* migrant categories, in particular between early and recent migrants; between first-, second-, and third generation migrants; between migrant organizations defending contrasting visions of incorporation; and between different ethnic groups.

Yet, the demands and practical implications derived from the principle of intergroup similarity may be contradictory: majorities may expect migrants to "adapt" and respect "their values," but when they do so, they may become threatening competitors for jobs and other material resources of the majority group. Intergroup difference can be equally paradoxical: migrants who are portrayed as (too) different from the majority culture allegedly threaten social cohesion and national values. At the same time, majorities may prefer that migrant groups, especially those they dislike, remain apart from them in order to safeguard an imaginary homogeneity of their ingroup. Intergroup difference is furthermore enhanced through majority practices that make integration more difficult, such as unequal treatment by authorities, lack of institutional support for integration, widespread discrimination, or segregated housing. Research therefore needs to carefully spell out the specific meaning and practical implications of intergroup similarity and difference that is implied by political rhetoric and hidden in general attitudes toward immigrants. Research should also more clearly differentiate attitude formation toward contrasting types of immigrants, for example by comparing attitudes toward high- versus low-status immigrants, or toward immigrants from culturally similar versus distant countries. Currently, to maximize cross-national comparability, large international surveys mainly refer to generic immigrants in their item wording. However, additionally assessing attitudes toward immigrants of specific national origin—that may vary from country to country—would allow to paint a more accurate picture of the psychological processes involved in immigration attitude construction.

During the last two decades, migration and multiculturalism have become one of the most heavily debated issues in contemporary receiving societies, both at the level of political discourse and in everyday conversations. As illustrated in studies on migrant identity

construction and ideological climates reviewed in this chapter, this societal communication is likely to affect the way citizens think about immigrants. Politicians, migrant group leaders, members of the civil society and other "identity entrepreneurs" (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) participate in the societal immigration debate by strategically communicating specific understandings of assimilation and multiculturalism. In this view, for example, "threat perceptions" are the outcome of social influence processes that deliberately portray certain migrant groups as "different" or "dangerous." These discourses participate in the construction and diffusion of positive and negative meanings of migration, thereby creating socially acceptable, and often simplified, ways of thinking and talking about immigrants and immigration. In future research, political psychology could gain from placing a stronger emphasis on the implications of this ongoing communicative process on how migrants construct their ethnic identities and how majorities ascribe characteristics on migrant groups.

Finally, the variety of methodological and theoretical approaches through which political psychology has studied phenomena of migration and multiculturalism is an important asset for making our research relevant to policy makers and practitioners (see Esses et al., 2017; Wills, 2010). Discursive, experimental, and survey research have different stories to tell about migration and immigration. Yet, despite their often conflicting theoretical assumptions, we hope and assume they share the normative goal of making our multicultural societies more inclusive and a better place to live for all citizens. Researchers in political psychology should therefore highlight the implications of their studies on migration and immigration policies. As we have shown in this chapter, political psychology has a great deal to offer to promote the chances for successful migrant experiences as well as positive, enriching, and constructive relationships between migrant groups and national majorities.

Note

1. Throughout the chapter we use the term "receiving society" instead of "host society" in order to avoid connotations of migrants being passively "hosted" by national majorities. The term "migrant" is used when migration is analyzed from the perspective of those who move into new contexts, while the term "immigrant" is employed to describe the perspective of the receiving society into which migrants immigrate.

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CHAPTER 29

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PREJUDICE REDUCTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Dual Goals to Be Pursued in Tandem

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LINDA R. TROPP AND TRISHA A. DEHRONE

RECENT theorizing in social and political psychology suggests that intergroup relations may be construed either in terms of efforts to achieve prejudice reduction and intergroup harmony, or to achieve social change to promote intergroup equality, with the expectation that these goals are inherently in opposition to each other (e.g., Dixon et al., 2012; Cikara & Paluck, 2013). In this chapter, we contend that promoting prejudice reduction at the relational level, and social change toward equality at the societal level, may be conceived of as dual goals to be pursued in tandem, rather than necessarily being framed as goals in conflict. With this lens, we review a number of theoretical perspectives on prejudice reduction and social change, including literature on intergroup contact, common group identities, and social norms. Throughout the chapter, we stress how a dual focus on prejudice reduction and social change can inform our understanding of relational and structural challenges in intergroup relations, with special attention to the integral role that group status plays in shaping people's perspectives and experiences in relation to other groups (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2009; Jones & Dovidio, 2018; Tropp, 2006). We conclude the chapter with suggestions for integrative research that may be pursued to fill gaps in the existing literature, along with discussing implications of such work for interventions that seek to reduce prejudice and promote social equality.

1. PREJUDICE REDUCTION

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Long-standing pursuits in the intergroup research literature have been to specify the nature of prejudice (Allport, 1954; Dovidio et al., 2005), along with identifying the individual and societal factors that contribute to and maintain prejudice (Duckitt, 1992; Kinder, Chapter 27, this volume; Zanna & Olson, 1994), and possible strategies through which prejudice between groups might be reduced (Paluck et al., 2021; Tropp & Molina, 2019). Since its early origins, scholarly writings on prejudice have emphasized ways in which people

harbor distinctions between members of their own group and other groups (e.g., Sumner, 1906; Tajfel, 1981), and how they typically reserve more positive attitudes, more generous attributions and associations, and greater resources for members of their own group relative to those granted to members of other groups (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Cikara et al., 2014; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Along with this historical emphasis, the focus of scholarship on prejudice and prejudice reduction has shifted considerably over the last several decades, both in terms of the perspectives of people studied, and in terms of how this social problem can and should be addressed. Early studies of prejudice and prejudice reduction typically centered on the perspectives of dominant groups (see Shelton, 2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005b), highlighting the prejudices of those who held more privileged positions in society toward groups who were disadvantaged or marginalized, in order to consider strategies by which their prejudices might be reduced (see, e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Kinder, Chapter 27, this volume). One outgrowth of this tendency was for members of disadvantaged groups to be seen as little more than "objects" of others' attitudes (Amir, 1969; Jones et al., 1984; Shelton, 2000), an unfortunate tendency that persisted even as researchers began to investigate prejudice from the perspectives of members of disadvantaged and marginalized groups toward the end of the 20th century. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, a proliferation of research focused on the perspectives of "targets" of prejudice (see, e.g., Jones et al., 1984; Swim & Stangor, 1998), with a particular emphasis on understanding the effects of being targeted by prejudice and discrimination for psychological well-being (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989), thereby inadvertently relegating the experiences of disadvantaged groups to being "nothing more than reactions to oppression" (Jones et al., 1984, p. 180). Only since the dawning of the new millennium—and with fresh insights afforded by the greater racial and ethnic diversity of scholars in the field—has research begun to incorporate more fully the perspectives and experiences of minoritized groups into studies that examine the foundations of intergroup prejudice (e.g., Monteith & Spicer, 2000) and how members of dominant and minoritized groups relate to and form attitudes toward each other (e.g., Devine & Vasquez, 1998; Perez & Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume; Shelton, 2003; Shelton et al., 2006; Tropp, 2006).

2. Prejudice Reduction through Intergroup Contact

Among the strategies proposed to reduce prejudice and improve relations between groups, one of the oldest and most widely studied approaches involves intergroup contact (see Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Green & Staerkle, Chapter 28, this volume; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). In the psychology research literature, intergroup contact refers specifically to face-to-face interaction between members of distinguishable social groups; this contact may be reported by participants themselves, or observed directly in research studies (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In either case, this definition of contact would not include studies that rely on proximity between groups or proportional indices reflecting local

diversity to infer that some degree of interaction between groups has occurred (see, e.g., Enos, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014).

Whereas studies using indicators of group proportions or proximity tend to show that greater outgroup representation corresponds with greater expressions of intergroup prejudice and threat (e.g., Craig et al., 2018; Enos, 2017; Quillian, 1995), intergroup contact research typically reveals that greater contact between groups corresponds with lower levels of intergroup prejudice and threat (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011, for a review). Nonetheless, it has long been recognized that contact between groups may still carry the potential to heighten intergroup hostility and prejudice (Allport, 1954; Hewstone, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Williams, 1947); hence, early scholarship on intergroup contact sought to specify conditions that could be instituted within the spaces where members of different groups interact to maximize the likelihood of achieving salutary outcomes from their contact. These optimal conditions—which were originally generated by Allport (1954) and Williams (1947), and later refined and consolidated by Pettigrew (1971; 2021)—include establishing equal status between groups within the contact situation, promoting cooperation between groups as they work toward common goals, and ensuring that this type of equal status, cooperative contact is supported by institutional authorities, policies, laws, and customs. Numerous research studies spanning many decades indicate that, while these conditions are not essential to achieve positive outcomes from intergroup contact, greater reductions in prejudice are likely to result when contact between groups is structured in accordance with these optimal conditions (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

More recent generations of scholarship on intergroup contact have focused on analyzing the psychological processes and mechanisms through which contact contributes to prejudice reduction (see Paolini et al., 2021, for a review). Research conducted in countries around the globe indicate that more intimate forms of intergroup contact, and contact that involves positive interactions across group lines, have greater capacity to reduce prejudice, as compared to other, more distant forms of contact, or contact experienced as negative in valence (Paolini et al., 2021; Tropp et al., 2017). Longitudinal, experimental, and meta-analytic studies converge in showing that positive, close contact between groups—such as that typified by cross-group friendships—is especially likely to reduce intergroup prejudice and improve intergroup attitudes, relative to other forms of contact (Binder et al., 2009; Davies et al., 2011; Page-Gould et al., 2008; Pettigrew, 1998; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005a). Related work reveals how pathways involving reduced feelings of intergroup threat and anxiety, and greater experiences of intergroup empathy, help to explain why intergroup contact typically contributes to prejudice reduction (Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Levin et al., 2003; Paolini et al., 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Swart et al., 2011).

Although research in the intergroup contact literature has tended to focus on relations between racial, ethnic, religious, and national groups (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), a growing body of research has begun to consider the effects of contact between political groups. In light of increasing polarization and overt hostility between political partisans, particularly in the United States (see Ahler & Sood, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2012; Moore-Berg et al., 2020), a number of studies now show that greater engagement across political group lines can ease affective polarization and lessen partisan animosity (Amsalem et al., 2021; Levendusky & Stecula, 2021; Wojcieszak & Warner, 2020). Similar trends have also been observed among opinion-based groups, where sharing personal narratives and experiences relevant to one's political opinions may not only foster greater perceptions

of similarity across group lines (Wojcieszak & Warner, 2020), but may also contribute to shifting political attitudes and behavioral intentions related to social issues and policies (see, e.g., Hoskin et al., 2019; Kalla & Broockman, 2020; Römpke et al., 2019).

3. Prejudice Reduction through Common Group Identities

An alternate prejudice reduction strategy involves the introduction of a new common group identity, or enhancing the salience of an existing common group identity, that can include members of the different groups who are present in the intergroup context (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, for a review). Research on this approach is informed by the legacy of scholarship on principles of social categorization, and the role that salient group memberships play in intergroup relations. Generally, this body of work would suggest the more that distinctions between groups are made salient and emphasized in the intergroup context, the more likely it is that members of distinct groups will accentuate group differences and harbor prejudices toward each other, while demonstrating more favorable evaluations and attitudes toward members of their own groups (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2012).

Growing from these original insights, intergroup researchers have long debated the role of group membership salience in prejudice reduction strategies. Some scholars have proposed that the salience of group membership should be minimized in intergroup contexts, to reduce a focus on group differences and facilitate the ability for members of distinct groups to recognize and come to know each other as differentiated individuals (i.e., *decategorization*; see Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller, 2002). At the same time, other scholars stressed that it is necessary for group membership to be salient in intergroup contexts, so that any positive encounters or associations people have with individual members of another group will be more likely to generalize and extend to reduced prejudice toward that other group as a whole (i.e., *categorization*; see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986).

In light of these ongoing debates regarding the role of group membership salience, Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues proposed *recategorization* as a novel prejudice reduction strategy. According to their Common Ingroup Identity Model, members of distinct groups can be encouraged to recognize their shared membership in a larger, superordinate category that can include each group—thereby creating a common group identity (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2016). Due to the same processes of social categorization that govern other forms of intergroup bias, attitudes toward former outgroup members would become then more positive, because they are now recognized as part of a common ingroup and afforded the kinds of positive evaluations and attitudes that are typically reserved for fellow ingroup members (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues have conducted numerous studies in laboratory and field settings showing the benefits of recategorization for reducing intergroup prejudice and improving intergroup attitudes (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1989; Gaertner et al., 1994; Nier et al., 2001; Riek et al., 2010).

Like the broader intergroup contact literature, research on common group identities has recently been extended to examine its role in regard to political polarization and ideological division. Complementing the earlier work summarized above, recent survey and experimental studies show that inter-party hostility and polarization are weakened when greater emphasis is placed on a common national group identity that can include partisans from different sides of the American political spectrum (see Iyengar et al., 2019; Levendusky, 2018; Warner et al., 2020). Likewise, related studies from Chile and Northern Ireland also suggest that a common national group identity can foster greater empathy and forgiveness between opposing political groups with histories of violent conflict (Noor et al., 2008; González et al., 2011).

4. Prejudice Reduction Strategies: Challenges and Shortcomings

Though prejudice reduction strategies such as intergroup contact and creating common group identities have yielded many positive outcomes, they are not without challenges and shortcomings. One set of challenges involves the tendency for people to prefer surrounding themselves with similar others (McPherson et al., 2001), and to avoid diverse settings or interactions with diverse others that are often associated with feelings of discomfort, threat, or anxiety (Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton & Richeson, 2005). Indeed, people often self-select into communities where they share relevant commonalities with others, thereby distancing themselves from people and groups who have largely different perspectives and experiences in society (Iyengar et al., 2019; Krysan et al., 2009; Kye, 2018; Turner et al., 2021; Van der Laan Bouma-Doff, 2007). Compounding these individual choices, entrenched patterns of societal inequality and racial and economic segregation further divide social groups in terms of the degree to which they can relate to each other's lived experiences (Massey, 2016; Rothstein, 2017). Together, these relational and structural factors both create considerable obstacles to the prospect of achieving reductions in prejudice and more positive attitudes and relations between groups.

In light of deeply rooted social divisions due to segregation and inequality, several scholars have also questioned whether prejudice reduction should ultimately be our primary goal; instead, they suggest that greater emphasis needs to be placed on achieving broader social change toward intergroup equality (see, e.g., Cikara & Paluck, 2013; Dixon et al., 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Importantly, as noted by McConahay (1978), "amicable relations among racial and ethnic groups can exist alongside grossly unjust inequalities" (p. 77). Moreover, with its stated goal of prejudice reduction, this literature has tended to focus on shifting prejudiced attitudes among members of dominant and historically advantaged groups—an approach that is likely to focus research efforts on attitudes and social relations between members of different groups, rather than on the structural inequalities that shape the nature and contours of intergroup relations (Dixon et al., 2017). Moreover, given their relatively privileged position in the status hierarchy, members of dominant groups are less likely to see or experience the structural disadvantages that exist in society relative to members of minoritized groups, who are more directly affected by them (Eibach &

Ehrlinger, 2006; Knowles et al., 2014; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In turn, members of dominant groups may be inclined to see societal inequalities as being rooted mostly in social attitudes and relations, rather than in terms of institutional structures and systems that perpetuate intergroup disparities (Rucker et al., 2019; Salter et al. 2018).

Paralleling these views, Wright and Lubensky (2009) argue that "when efforts to reduce prejudice focus exclusively on getting dominant group members to think nicer thoughts and feel positive emotions about the disadvantaged group, they may not necessarily increase support for broader structural and institutional changes" (p. 18). At the same time as they acknowledge that "efforts to reduce rampant antipathy, overt expressions of hostility, and active denigration of other groups would need to be part of a scheme to improve many intergroup relations," Wright and Baray (2012) also add that it "appears reasonable to consider the limitations of a focus on prejudice reduction, and recognize that it may actually directly conflict with another important means by which positive social change occurs" (p. 242). And as stated particularly forcefully by Dixon et al. (2012), "we need to ask ourselves if prejudice reduction deserves its status as the preeminent framework through which we approach the problem of 'improving' relations between groups within historically unequal societies" (p. 425). In the paragraphs that follow, we discuss in more depth how these concerns associated with the prejudice reduction approach relate to the specific strategies of intergroup contact and common group identities.

Intergroup contact. Given the central role that group status plays in shaping relations between groups (Bobo, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), intergroup contact research over the last twenty-five years has identified a number of asymmetries in experiences of intergroup contact among members of dominant and minoritized groups. While both are likely to feel anxious and apprehensive about engaging in intergroup contact (Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton et al., 2006), their anxieties are likely to be based in different concerns: members of dominant groups are likely to experience anxiety about being perceived as prejudiced, whereas members of minoritized groups are more likely to be anxious about being targeted by prejudice (Devine & Vasquez, 1998). Correspondingly, members of dominant groups typically seek reassurance of their moral integrity (e.g., that they are "liked" and seen as "good people"), while members of minoritized groups instead tend to seek respect and desire to feel empowered (Bergsieker et al., 2010; Shnabel et al., 2009). Members of dominant groups also prefer to avoid discussions of group differences during contact, whereas members of minoritized groups typically prefer to address structural inequalities directly and discuss differences in status and power relations between the groups (Kteily et al., 2013; Saguy & Dovidio, 2013).

Newer generations of contact research have also uncovered notable asymmetries in the effects of intergroup contact among members of dominant and minoritized groups. On average, the beneficial effects of contact on prejudice reduction tend to be weaker among members of minoritized groups, relative to the effects typically observed among members of dominant groups (Binder et al., 2009; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005b)—a finding due in part to the pervasiveness of discrimination faced by minoritized groups in their relations with the dominant group (Tropp, 2007). At the same time, growing evidence suggests that while greater intergroup contact typically corresponds with greater awareness of inequality, greater support for social change, and greater participation in efforts to promote social change toward equality among members of dominant groups, greater intergroup contact tends to be associated with lower perceptions of discrimination, less support for social change, and lower levels of participation in efforts to promote social change toward equality

among members of minoritized groups (e.g., Cakal et al., 2011; Dixon et al., 2010a; 2010b; Hässler et al., 2020; Reimer et al., 2017; Selvanathan et al., 2018).

Common group identities. Some parallel asymmetries in preferences and perspectives of members of dominant and minoritized groups have been observed in relation to common group identities. Due to status differences in the larger society, members of dominant racial groups (e.g., White Americans) tend to be viewed as more representative and prototypical of the common group as a whole (e.g., "Americans") as compared to minoritized racial groups in the same society (e.g., Asian Americans, Black Americans; see Devos & Banaji, 2005). The norms, values, and standards of the dominant group are also more likely to be projected onto the common group as a whole, relative to those of minoritized groups (see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel et al., 2003). As a consequence, members of minoritized groups are more likely to feel their distinct subgroup identity is merely being subsumed within the larger superordinate category, while wanting to ensure their distinct subgroup identity is valued and acknowledged, in spaces where diverse groups are brought together as part of a larger whole (Crisp et al., 2006; Eggins et al., 2002; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Indeed, considerable work now suggests that dominant groups tend to prefer singular representations of common group identities, where all parties are merely regarded as part of a single, shared superordinate category (i.e., one group representations); by contrast, members of minoritized groups prefer representations that highlight both their distinct subgroup identities and their inclusion in the superordinate category (i.e., dual group representations; Dovidio et al., 2000, 2008).

Relatedly, these preferences for group representations within common group identities correspond with group members' ideological orientations and conceptions of diversity (see Berry, 2001; Dovidio et al., 2009; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Paralleling their preferences for one group representations, members of dominant groups typically favor colorblind ideologies that align with assimilationist perspectives, in that they downplay group differences and focus on commonalities across all within the larger whole. Instead, and in line with their preferences for dual group representations, members of minoritized groups tend to favor multicultural ideologies that align with perspectives highlighting diversity, by emphasizing and valuing group differences that exist within the larger whole (Dovidio et al., 2016; Plaut et al., 2009; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Ryan et al. 2010). Importantly, these asymmetries in ideological orientations also carry broader societal implications: one group representations of common group identities may help to maintain the group status hierarchy by deflecting attention from group-based disparities and masking inequalities that exist between the groups included therein (Dovidio et al., 2016; Neville et al., 2013); moreover, presenting one group representations of common group identities may in turn lead people to perceive less inequality between groups, and therefore less of a need for social change to promote equality (Dovidio et al., 2016; Ufkes et al., 2016).

5. Addressing Structural Inequalities in Prejudice Reduction Strategies

Many of the key shortcomings of prejudice reduction approaches summarized above may be aided through addressing structural inequalities directly when groups are brought together

to interact or as part of a common group identity. Emerging research on intergroup contact and common group identities has purposely pursued these precise issues, to identify pathways and mechanisms through which these prejudice reduction approaches can serve both to improve attitudes and relations between groups and to promote ever-greater levels of societal equality.

A growing body of evidence demonstrates that intergroup contact need not undermine minoritized group members' support for social change toward equality when the contact includes explicit acknowledgment of group differences in status or power—such as communicating respect for the minoritized group (Glasford & Johnston, 2018) and empowering the minoritized group (Hässler et al., 2021), as well as having minoritized group members receive confirmation from dominant group members that status inequalities are illegitimate (Becker et al., 2013), and/or that they support efforts to promote intergroup equality (Droogendyk et al., 2016; see also Louis et al., 2019). Among both dominant and minoritized groups, greater intergroup contact is also associated with greater willingness to work in solidarity across group lines to promote social change toward equality (Hässler et al., 2020). These tendencies are likely to be strengthened further the more members of these groups communicate about group differences in status and power during their contact (Tropp et al., 2021; Hassler et al., 2021). Conversations about structural inequalities with minoritized groups can also afford dominant groups with greater insights into and awareness of their own relative privilege (Nagda & Gurin, 2007; Nordstrom, 2015), which in turn can foster their greater motivation to take action for social equality (Tropp et al., 2021). Along with the efforts of minoritized groups, support and motivation for social equality among dominant groups has often been regarded as integral for creating successful social movements and sustainable social change to promote equality, because of their greater access to societal resources and their lesser potential to encounter resistance from others in the dominant group as they work to achieve more equitable societal outcomes (Dovidio et al., 2016; Glasford & Johnston, 2018; Hässler et al., 2021; Subašić et al., 2008; see also Craig and Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume).

Parallel trends have also been observed with respect to how common group identities are framed and represented. Recent studies show that dual identity representations—where group members identify strongly with both the common group (e.g., national group) and their distinct subgroup (e.g., ethnic group)—encourage members of minoritized groups to sustain commitment to social change to promote equality (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Ufkes et al., 2016; van Stekelenburg and Gaidyte, Chapter 26, this volume), even after experiencing positive contact with the dominant group (Pereira et al., 2017). At the same time, we recognize that members of dominant groups tend to prefer one group representations to dual group representations of common identities (Dovidio et al., 2000), likely because "recognizing both difference and commonality may be less comfortable than emphasizing only common identity, colorblindness, and assimilation" (Dovidio et al., 2016, p. 133). Yet recognizing both differences and commonalities through dual group representations could potentially yield benefits for dominant and minoritized groups alike (see Banfield & Dovidio, 2013), and particularly when dominant group members feel that their own subgroup identities are recognized and valued as part of a larger multicultural entity (see Plaut et al., 2011).

6. Addressing Methodological Issues in Prejudice Reduction Research

Beyond conceptual critiques of prejudice reduction strategies, there have also been a number of methodological critiques leveled at the research literature on prejudice reduction. Particularly in reference to research on intergroup contact, some critiques have focused on the preponderance of cross-sectional survey studies that only examine patterns of associations among relevant variables and provide little interpretive insight regarding possible causal effects in prejudice reduction (see Christ & Wagner, 2013; O'Donnell et al., 2021). Newer generations of contact research have responded directly to these concerns by conducting long-term, and often multi-year, longitudinal studies that allow for assessments of how changes in contact correspond with changes in intergroup attitudes over time (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Levin et al., 2003; see also Christ et al., 2012). Focused mostly on racial and ethnic relations, such studies suggest that both causal paths are in operation: greater contact with other racial and ethnic groups typically reduces prejudice over time, and people who are initially more prejudiced tend to avoid contact with other racial and ethnic groups.

Longitudinal studies in this area have continued to grow more methodologically rigorous and sophisticated in recent years. By incorporating latent change models and social network models into longitudinal designs, researchers can examine within-individual variability in contact and prejudice scores and the degree to which changes in individuals' levels of intergroup contact are associated with changes in their levels of prejudice over time (see, e.g., Bracegirdle et al., 2022; Christ & Wagner, 2013; O'Donnell et al., 2021; Wölfer et al,. 2016). This work has revealed considerable within-individual variability in the degree to which associations between contact and prejudice change over time (Dhont et al., 2012), as well as showing that greater contact may also shift individuals' propensities to be prejudiced over time, as indicated by change in their social dominance scores (Dhont et al., 2014).

Combining elements of longitudinal and cross-sectional research designs, cross-sequential studies have also begun to clarify how associations between contact and prejudice may vary due to both processes of human development and the psychological processes through which attitudes are formed and transformed over time. As one notable example, Wölfer et al. (2016) recruited four cohorts of Swedish youth (aged 13, 16, 20, and 22 years at the start of the study, $N = 3815$) for a four-wave, multi-year longitudinal study of changes in intergroup contact and intergroup attitudes. In line with earlier research, these authors observed that greater contact was associated with more positive intergroup attitudes across all cohorts. Latent growth curve models also showed that contact yielded particularly strong effects in shaping intergroup attitudes among the younger cohorts of adolescents, as compared to the effects of contact observed among the older cohorts of young adults whose intergroup attitudes had begun to crystallize. Thus, the authors conclude that early contact experiences may not only be important drivers of youth's developing intergroup attitudes, but these early experiences may also increase their willingness to engage in future intergroup contact as they enter into adulthood (see also Sears & Brown, Chapter 3, this volume).

Other methodological critiques specify that experimental research designs in field settings should be favored (e.g., Paluck et al., 2021), due to their ability "to assess causal relationships" and "whether an intervention's effects emerge and endure among the cacophony of real-world influences including larger political and economic changes and proximal social pressures and distractions" (Paluck & Green, 2009, p. 357). We agree that more experimental studies conducted in field settings—with diverse populations of participants from different societal contexts around the world (see, e.g., Littman et al., 2021; Mousa, 2020)—have unique strengths that can contribute meaningfully to the prejudice reduction research literature. Still, we believe that valuable information may be gained through a variety of research methods, and their synthesis (see Brewer & Hunter, 2006), such that many approaches should be harnessed to study a phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as prejudice reduction. As stated by Paluck et al. (2021), it would be fruitful "to pull from all corners of behavioral science to develop feasible, transportable, and sustainable ways to end prejudice" (p. 555).

We also wish to highlight that outcomes may vary not only in relation to the prejudice reduction strategies used (e.g., contact, common group identity), how they are implemented (e.g., dosage, time scale), and how studies are designed to evaluate them (e.g., experimental, longitudinal), but also in relation to the nature of the intergroup context and how relevant outcomes are assessed. On the whole, greater degrees of societal inequality, instability, and/or violence should naturally present greater challenges to detecting prejudice-reducing effects, as such features of the context typically provoke and sustain heightened levels of intergroup threat (Kende et al., 2018; Tropp, 2015; Wagner & Hewstone, 2012), which can reinforce long-standing narratives of conflict between groups (Bar Tal, 2007). At the same time, although prejudice reduction is often conceptualized as a single process, it may actually involve several related psychological processes, such that it may involve reducing initial feelings of intergroup threat or anxiety in order to allow space for the possibility of having positive intergroup attitudes eventually emerge (see, e.g., Page-Gould et al., 2008; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Reimer et al., 2021; Swart et al., 2011). Thus, depending on levels of pre-existing intergroup hostility or conflict in a given context, it is possible that prejudice reduction efforts may yield less overt hostility between groups without full intergroup trust or inclusion (e.g., Dehrone et al., 2021; Tropp & Mallett, 2011), or more positive feelings toward individual members of other groups without broader generalization of intergroup attitudes (e.g., Mousa, 2020). We therefore advise researchers and practitioners to attend closely not only to the prejudice reduction strategies and methodologies they intend to use, but also to consider what types of prejudice reduction outcomes are realistic in light of the social and political contexts in which prejudice reduction strategies are being implemented and evaluated (see also Pettigrew, 2021; Tropp, 2015; Wagner & Hewstone, 2012).

7. Social Change

Rather than pursuing the goal of prejudice reduction, other scholars would instead encourage greater emphasis on promoting social change (e.g., Cikara & Paluck, 2013; Dixon et al., 2012); yet, somewhat disparate literatures on social change currently exist in social and political psychology. A considerable amount of research has considered factors that

motivate people to become involved in collective efforts to promote social change toward equality (see, e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Originally, research in this area focused on the perspectives and motivations of historically disadvantaged and minoritized groups who sought to improve their position, or the position of their group, with the existing status hierarchy. This work has stressed the importance of identification with the disadvantaged group and recognition of the group's disadvantaged position as motivating forces for collective action in response to social inequality (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright & Tropp, 2002; Pérez and Vicuña, Chapter 25, this volume). Other driving factors include group members' perceptions of the permeability, legitimacy, and stability of the status hierarchy (Shuman et al., 2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), as well as their moral convictions and beliefs about the likelihood of the group's success in effecting change (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; 2012). More recently, the scope of research in this area has also been extended to consider factors that might motivate dominant groups to support change toward greater equality. Although dominant groups are generally motivated to maintain and support the status quo from which they benefit (Bobo, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), emerging research suggests that members of dominant groups can become activated to promote social equality due to their moral convictions (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2011), as well as through meaningful contact experiences with members of minoritized groups (e.g., Cakal et al., 2021; Craig and Phillips, Chapter 23, this volume; Hässler et al., 2020; Selvanathan et al., 2018; Tropp & Uluğ, 2019).

While these perspectives have shed great light on the motivating factors that propel people to support social change at the individual level, they do not yet specify strategies through which broad-scale social change might be achieved. Other branches of the social science research literature have instead examined factors that contribute to changes in public opinion and behaviors in civic life, including indicators of equality and inclusion as established through broad social policies (*institutional context*; see, e.g., Sullivan et al., 1985; Weldon, 2006), as well as perceived norms for intergroup relations in particular communities or social contexts (*social norms*; see, e.g., Blinder et al., 2013; Sechrist & Stangor, 2005).

8. Social Change through Institutional Context

Scholarship on institutional context highlights ways in which societal and political institutions—and particularly those established through relevant laws and government policies—contribute to shaping public attitudes toward various groups (Weldon, 2006). Within a given institutional context, societal and political institutions, and the influential actors within them, define rules, policies, and standards for conduct that shape the nature of public discourse and narratives regarding how groups are to be treated (Weldon, 2006), as well as how people from different groups are expected to relate to each other (Pettigrew, 1991). These policies and standards may be framed in relatively exclusionary or inclusionary terms, such that they deny or provide certain opportunities or resources to designated constituents, and in turn serve as cues regarding whether certain groups should be excluded or included (Jiménez et al., 2021; see also Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume).

Recent studies from across Europe and North America indicate how the institutional context of a given society can shape public attitudes toward minoritized groups in that society (see de la Sablonnière et al., 2020; Huo et al., 2018; Ofosu et al., 2019; Schlueter et al., 2013). As one illustrative example, Schlueter et al. (2013) linked ratings of immigrant integration policies at the national level from the 2016 Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, see Huddleston et al., 2017) to individual-level survey data gathered through the Eurobarometer (2009, 25 countries) and the European Value Study (2008–2009). In both cases, multi-level models revealed that more inclusionary immigrant integration policies corresponded with lower reported perceptions of threat posed by immigrants among members of the host societies. Similar associations were observed between MIPEX ratings of national immigrant integration policies and public attitudes toward Muslims assessed through the European Social Survey (2014–2015); more inclusionary integration policies were associated with less negative attitudes toward Muslims, an effect that persisted even when statistically controlling for the proportion of Muslim residents in the national context (Schlueter et al., 2020).

In another line of research examining how institutional context can shape individuals' attitudes, Ofosu and colleagues (2019) gathered responses to implicit and explicit measures of anti-gay prejudice from approximately 1 million individuals who completed these measures via Project Implicit over a 12-year period (https://implicit.harvard.edu/). By geo-locating these individuals and tracking the dates of their responses, the authors were able to examine scores on measures of anti-gay prejudice before and after legislation passed legalizing same-sex marriage in each state. Overall, the authors observed that both implicit and explicit forms of anti-gay prejudice tended to decrease in recent years. However, their results also showed steeper decreases in anti-gay prejudice following legalization of same-sex marriage at the state level—a finding the authors replicated using a nationally representative sample from the United States (based on data from the American National Election Studies, www.electionstudies.org).

9. Social Change through Social Norms

Alongside policies established by the institutional context, considerable research suggests that people's expressed attitudes and behaviors toward other social groups may also be shaped through social norms (see Crandall et al., 2002; Pettigrew, 1991; Sherif, 1936). Norms involve socially shared perceptions of the ways in which people typically behave or should behave (see Miller et al., 2000; Paluck, 2009). Whereas a person may be subject to legal reprimands if they fail to follow established policies, the repercussions of a person's failure to follow social norms are more likely to be based in forms of social disapproval than formal censure (Young, 2008).

Social norms pertaining to intergroup relations can be communicated and absorbed through a variety of means. Intergroup norms relevant to public opinion may be inferred in response to established social policies (e.g., de la Sablonnière et al., 2020; Schlueter et al., 2013; Tankard & Paluck, 2017). Normative messages about intergroup relations can also be transmitted through media sources (e.g., Bilali et al., 2017; Hameiri et al., 2016; Paluck, 2009), and people may perceive norms of approval or disapproval regarding intergroup

relations in their immediate social environments, based upon the expressed attitudes and observed behaviors of others (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994; Stangor et al., 2001, Tankard & Paluck, 2016).

Complementing the research on institutional context described above, an experimental study by Huo et al. (2018) suggests how perceived norms regarding state-level policies may shape individuals' attitudes toward particular groups. Ostensibly as part of a study on news reporting (Study 1), White US citizens were asked to read and rate several headlines, including one that was varied randomly across experimental conditions to suggest that residents of their state supported proposed legislation that would either encourage local immigration (welcoming condition) or discourage local immigration (unwelcoming condition). After reading the news headlines, participants indicated their attitudes toward a variety of social groups, including Whites, Americans, Latinos, and legal immigrants, among others. While no significant differences in attitudes toward Whites or Americans were observed across experimental conditions, White American participants who were exposed to a headline indicating that legislators and residents of their state would welcome local immigration reported more positive attitudes toward legal immigrants and Latinos, as compared to those exposed to a headline indicating that legislators and residents of their state would not welcome local immigration. Thus, the authors conclude that perceived support for immigration from state legislators and local residents can shape White Americans' inclinations to be more or less favorable toward groups associated with immigration in their home communities.

Research by Murrar et al. (2020) provides another notable research example. These authors developed professional-quality posters representing data they had gathered previously to convey the norm that most students at their university value diversity. In one study (Study 2), university classrooms were randomly assigned to have several of these posters present (social norms condition) or not present (control condition) during the first 5 weeks of the academic semester. Near the end of the semester (weeks 10–12), students enrolled in courses that took place in these classrooms were then asked to complete measures concerning their own attitudes toward diversity. Results showed that students in classrooms with posters representing pro-diversity social norms early on in the semester reported significantly more supportive attitudes toward diversity toward the end of the semester, as compared to students in classrooms where no such posters were present. Thus, the presence of normative messages demonstrating support for diversity among others within the institution contributed to shaping students' own attitudes toward diversity.

By learning and subscribing to norms that are operating in one's local environment, people can gain a greater sense of belonging and avoid social rejection or disapproval (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). People are also especially likely to attend to normative information from influential others (Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). In intergroup contexts, people will attend closely to the norms enacted or espoused by members of their own groups, whose expressed attitudes and behaviors serve as influential guides for their own attitudes toward and social relations with members of other groups (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Thus, people's willingness to express intergroup prejudice closely tracks the social norms they perceive from fellow group members, and the extent to which they deem prejudice against certain groups to be socially acceptable (Crandall et al., 2002; Durrheim et al., 2016). Additional research in diverse intergroup contexts also shows that people may attend to cues from both

members of their own group and other groups, as both can serve as useful sources of information for guiding intergroup relations (e.g., Gómez et al., 2011; Wout et al., 2014; Tropp & Bianchi, 2006).

10. Social Change Strategies: Challenges and Shortcomings

While institutional and normative approaches to promoting social change can be quite influential, there are also some challenges and limitations associated with their use. One set of challenges pertains to the fact that social norms are constantly in the process of changing (Crandall et al., 2002). Particularly when nations and communities are in the midst of major transformations, such as those involving rapid demographic shifts (Craig et al., 2018), emergent social movements (Crutchfield, 2018), or political polarization (Kingzette et al., 2021), there may not be widespread consensus regarding what prevailing norms are or should be, and attempts to establish one clear, standard set of norms is likely to be contested (Pettigrew, 1991). In the words of Sherif (1936), "such a delicate, unstable situation is the fertile soil for the rise of doubts concerning the existing norms, and a challenge to their authority" (p. 86).

In the absence of normative consensus, urging people to comply with norms to which they do not subscribe can also incite backlash (Legault et al., 2011), and may even provoke feelings of anger and resentment (Pettigrew, 1991; Plant & Devine, 2001). As one illustrative example, Legault et al. (2011) presented non-Black participants with one of three versions of a brochure that were randomly assigned across experimental conditions; one version encouraged compliance with non-prejudiced norms (norm compliance condition), one version described the importance and value of being non-prejudiced (prejudice reduction condition), and one version simply provided participants with a definition of prejudice (control condition). After reading through the brochure, each participant then completed measures tapping their reported prejudice toward Black people and their motivation to be non-prejudiced. Results showed that participants in the norm compliance condition reported significantly greater prejudice toward Black people than participants in either the control condition or the prejudice reduction condition, along with showing motivations to be non-prejudiced comparable to participants in the control condition. Together with other work (e.g., Devine et al., 2002), these findings suggest that norms encouraging people to be non-prejudiced can unintentionally reinforce some people's willingness to express prejudice, to maintain a sense of autonomy or personal control (see also Legault et al., 2007).

Furthermore, if and when any consensus emerges regarding norms and standards for conduct concerning relations between groups, there may still not be broad agreement or shared understandings about whether and how those norms and standards are being followed or enacted. Members of dominant and minoritized groups often have quite divergent views regarding what "equality" looks like, or what it might ultimately take to be achieved (Lewis, 2021). Relatedly, groups in conflict tend to differ in their views about what realizing peace should entail, and their perceptions can vary depending on their relative positions of power: groups high in power are typically more inclined to conceptualize peace in terms of intergroup harmony, whereas groups low in power are more inclined

to conceptualize peace in terms of achieving justice or receiving fair treatment (Leshem & Halperin, 2020; Saguy et al., 2013). Corresponding to their power and status positions, groups may also vary in how they see and evaluate progress toward social change, such that dominant groups with greater power typically perceive greater progress toward social equality than groups with less power who have been minoritized in society (Kteily & McClanahan, 2020; Richeson, 2020).

11. PREJUDICE REDUCTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: POINTS OF CONNECTION AND INTEGRATION

Given that strengths and challenges are associated with common strategies used to foster both prejudice reduction and social change, we seek to highlight ways in which merits of these approaches can complement and bolster each other. Like other scholars (e.g., Jones & Dovidio, 2018; Hässler et al., 2021), rather than framing prejudice reduction and social change as incompatible goals, we subscribe to a "both-and" approach that incorporates contributions afforded by these (and other) frameworks, toward the dual goals of improving attitudes and relations between groups and achieving ever-greater levels of social equality and justice. Working toward these joint goals will necessarily involve multiple dimensions of social life and multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the attitudes and motivations held by individuals, to their interactions with others as members of social groups, to social norms and structures that shape the spaces in which diverse groups live and engage with each other (see Jones & Dovidio, 2018; Pettigrew, 2021). In turn, the strategies and interventions we devise to address these challenges will necessarily require efforts at both individual and societal levels (Lewis, 2021; Richeson 2018), such that we must begin to envision how approaches typically used to promote prejudice reduction and social change relate to and can inform each other.

At the interface of these approaches, some scholars suggest that a great deal of work has focused on how social norms shape individuals' attitudes and behaviors, yet more attention should be granted to understanding how individual-level attitudes help to create and sustain norms that can foster social change (Durrheim et al., 2016). Others propose that these processes may occur on varying time scales, such that implementing changes in the normative climate can serve as an effective and efficient way to shift individuals' attitudes and behaviors in the short term, and that such changes at the individual level carry the potential of changing ways in which people will be socialized in the longer term (Crandall et al., 2002). More broadly, these efforts suggest that the fields of social psychology and political psychology are ripe for greater empirical and theoretical integration of scholarship on prejudice reduction and social change.

A number of researchers have embarked on such integrative investigations in recent years, linking normative processes and policies to individuals' contact experiences and intergroup attitudes (see, e.g., Christ et al., 2014; Green et al., 2020; Kende et al., 2018; Pettigrew, 2021; Rosenfield, 2017). Some of this work has specified a "contextual effect" of intergroup contact.

Through multilevel analyses across seven large-scale surveys (five cross-sectional and two longitudinal), Christ and colleagues (2014) have shown that greater positive intergroup contact not only predicts lower levels of prejudice at the individual level, but also uniquely contributes to predicting more tolerant norms at the context level. As described by the authors, "prejudice is a function not only of whom you interact with, but also of where you live" in that "contact also affects prejudice on a macro-level, whereby people are influenced by the behavior of others in their social context" (Christ et al., 2014, p. 3999).

Other studies point to ways in which societal norms and institutional contexts might moderate prejudice reduction effects (Green & Staerkle, Chapter 28, this volume). For instance, Kende et al. (2018) linked country-level scores on measures of egalitarianism and support for hierarchy (Schwartz, 1992) to effect sizes reported in a large-scale meta-analysis of associations between intergroup contact and prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). With data from 660 samples in 36 cultural contexts, the authors observed that studies in contexts that scored higher in egalitarianism typically revealed stronger contact-prejudice associations, whereas studies in contexts that scored higher on support for hierarchy tended to show weaker contact-prejudice associations. Relatedly, Green et al. (2020) examined how the inclusiveness of country-level migrant integration policies (as determined by the Migrant Integration Policy Index, https://www.mipex.eu/) shape associations between everyday contact experiences and perceptions of intergroup threat as observed in the European Social Survey (Round 7). Based on responses from 32,093 citizens in 20 European countries, Green et al. (2020) found that everyday contact with people from other racial and ethnic backgrounds was generally associated with lower perceptions of intergroup threat; moreover, the links between everyday contact and reduced threat were stronger in countries with more tolerant migration policies (high MIPEX scores) as compared to the contact-threat links observed in countries with less tolerant migration policies (low MIPEX scores).

Some quasi-experimental studies have also examined boundary conditions for contact effects, by testing whether and how contact-based interventions might reduce prejudice in contexts where prejudice toward minoritized groups is normative, blatant, and commonplace—such as anti-Roma prejudice in Hungary (see Kende et al., 2017a; Orosz et al., 2018). In collaboration with the Living Library program sponsored by European Youth Center Budapest (Council of Europe), Orosz et al. (2016) studied Hungarian participants' responses to facilitated conversations with members of minoritized groups who were willing to share their experiences with prejudice, discrimination, and social exclusion. In some cases, program participants engaged with a member of the Roma community, and in other cases, program participants engaged with members of other minoritized groups (e.g., LGBT). Surveys administered before and after participation in the program assessed Hungarian participants' own attitudes toward Roma people, and how much they believed their friends would be willing to accept and engage in contact with Roma people, as an indicator of perceived peer norms. Results showed that pre-program attitudes toward Roma people were comparable among Hungarians who did or did not engage with a member of the Roma community; however, Hungarians who engaged with a Roma person reported significantly less prejudice toward Roma people after participating in the program, as compared to Hungarians who did not engage with a Roma person during the program. Moreover, these patterns of effects were consistent irrespective of whether participants perceived their friends to be more or less accepting of Roma people.

In another quasi-experiment, and given the extreme underrepresentation of Roma students at their university, Kende et al. (2017b) gave Hungarian students an opportunity to meet with a Roma student at their university outside of regular academic hours. Recruited from randomly selected sections of undergraduate psychology courses, 64% of the Hungarian students enrolled agreed to participate, and their initial attitudes toward Roma people did not significantly differ from those who chose not to participate (means scores of 2.49 and 2.54 on a 5-point scale). Students who elected to participate were then paired with a Roma student for a 60-minute conversation, during which they took turns asking and responding to questions designed to foster closeness and mutual self-disclosure (see Aron et al., 1997). Both participating and non-participating students were once again asked to report their own attitudes toward Roma people, as well as their perceptions of institutional support for minimizing anti-Roma prejudice (at the classroom, university, and state levels). Results indicated that students who engaged in conversation with a Roma partner reported significantly more positive attitudes toward Roma people in general after this experience, while there was no significant difference in attitudes toward Roma people among students who did not engage in conversation with a Roma partner. Perceived institutional support also moderated effects of this contact intervention, such that the prejudice-reducing effect was especially pronounced among participants who perceived stronger institutional norms countering anti-Roma prejudice.

These contact-based interventions were short in duration, and little is known regarding whether their effects would persist over time. However, multi-level analyses of panel data from nearly 900 Hungarian adolescents provides further insight regarding these trends (Váradi et al., 2021). Váradi and colleagues observe that greater contact with Roma people is generally associated with less anti-Roma prejudice. At the same time, Hungarian adolescents also perceive that anti-Roma prejudice is normative among their classmates and teachers, and over time, many students adjust their attitudes to what they perceive to be the classroom norm.

Taken together, findings from this emerging body of work highlight many points of connection between processes associated with prejudice reduction and social change. As suggested by Durrheim et al. (2016), the "space" between individuals' prejudices and social norms "is a site of genuine interaction . . . between people who define and contest the nature of prejudice" and "where expressions and definitions of prejudice can help to make or break norms" (p. 21). Viewed in this light, it becomes more natural to envision ways in which insights from the literatures on prejudice reduction and social norms can function in tandem to maximize our potential for fostering social inclusion and realizing social change toward greater equality.

12. Prejudice Reduction and Social Change: Bridging Differences in Perspective

Nonetheless, and despite the great potential for further conceptual and empirical integration in research on prejudice reduction and social change, there have been some differences

in perspective and emphasis in these literatures that should not be overlooked. One point of divergence involves what is determined to be the goal of any given strategy or intervention to be implemented. Scholars focused on social norms tend to emphasize changing people's perceptions of others' attitudes and behaviors, so that they may be motivated to engage in behaviors that correspond with those perceived norms (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Paluck et al., 2021; Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Scholars in the prejudice reduction tradition have instead tended to focus on how people experience and respond to relations with different others, so that they may be motivated to change how they think about, feel, and behave toward members of other groups (e.g., Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005a). In this sense, from the perspective of many prejudice reduction researchers, the goal is not simply to change people's evaluations of another group, but rather to reconfigure their construals and understandings of relations between groups *in relationship with each other* (Frey & Tropp, 2006; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). As such, rather than thinking about prejudice reduction merely as an instance of attitude change toward any given attitude object (e.g., recycling; see Tankard & Paluck, 2016), prejudice reduction strategies are inherently relational in nature, such that they may not only spark change in how people relate to and feel toward other groups, but they may also transform how people see themselves and their own groups in relation to other groups (see Brewer, 2008; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Pettigrew, 1997; Tropp & Barlow, 2018).

This difference in perspective points to another potential point of divergence between the literatures on prejudice reduction and social change as they currently exist—namely, how they regard adherence to, versus internalization of, prevailing social norms (see Crandall et al., 2002; Kelman, 1958). Among many researchers who study norms, observing adherence to without private acceptance or internalization of prevailing social norms is not inherently problematic, provided that this adherence to norms produces the desired behavior. However, this presumed lack of internalization may not sit well with many researchers who study prejudice and prejudice reduction, who often desire to foster "an internalized, personal commitment to egalitarianism" (Kunstman et al., 2013, p. 443; see also Plant & Devine, 1998), and who acknowledge that people's motivations may be questioned, or their behaviors may be regarded merely as performative, without some evidence of sustained commitment or internalization (see, e.g., Morris, 2020).

What, then, might help to make further integration of perspectives on prejudice reduction and social change as useful and generative as possible? At the very least, we must articulate the goals and intended outcomes of our research and interventions clearly (are we seeking only to reduce prejudice? only to produce behavior change? or might other outcomes also be relevant?), while specifying the level(s) of analysis at which we seek to effect change. Rather than conflating discussions of strategies and levels—such as presuming that prejudice reduction studies are only relevant to individual-level processes, and social change studies are only relevant to societal-level processes—we should remain open to and explore the possibility that these approaches may involve multiple social and psychological processes and have impacts at multiple levels (see also Jones & Dovidio, 2018; Pettigrew, 2021).

Here, it might be particularly useful for researchers to consider the time scales within which intended effects are expected to occur. As stated by Jones and Dovidio (2018), "in order for both-and solutions to be found, the time frame may need to be expanded . . . taking a long view may open up possibilities that a short view is unable to envision" (p. 33).

Researchers in the prejudice reduction and social change traditions have both suggested ways in which the processes they study may be shaped or influenced by the passage of time. For instance, what initially emerges through compliance to social norms may eventually become internalized due to repeated feedback and continued socialization from fellow group members in response to one's expressed attitudes and behaviors (Crandall et al., 2002; Sherif, 1936). Interactions between strangers from different groups may initially be threatening and stress-provoking (MacInnis & Page-Gould, 2015), but these tendencies can attenuate over time as people gain greater experience, familiarity, and comfort engaging with others across group lines (Page-Gould et al., 2008; Tropp, 2021). Highlighting group differences can also enhance perceptions of threat and competition between groups—thus, reducing the salience of group differences during the early stages of contact may help to curb the escalation of intergroup competition and conflict, with an understanding that group differences must be addressed at later points of the intergroup relationship to address structural inequalities that exist between groups (see, e.g., Dovidio et al., 2016; Hässler et al., 2021; Pettigrew, 1998). Considering issues of timing and sequence may help us to gain purchase on the nature and roles of social and psychological processes in our ongoing efforts to dismantle prejudice and promote social change.

Along with considering temporal dimensions of the processes we study, we must also attend closely to the social and political contexts in which we study prospects for prejudice reduction and social change. Rather than being inclined to make wholesale claims about the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of varied strategies, such an approach may help to ensure that we learn how these social and psychological processes may manifest and function similarly or differently across contexts (see Pettigrew, 2021). For example, people may be more or less willing to engage in intergroup contact, or to exhibit long-lasting attitude change as a result of intergroup contact, depending on the intensity and/or severity of conflict, violence, segregation, and inequality between groups in their communities (e.g., Kende et al., 2018; Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Mousa, 2020; Wagner & Hewstone, 2012). Alternatively, people may be more or less inclined to endorse or promote social change depending on normative expectations, opportunity structures, and repressive systems in their local environments (e.g., Corcoran et al., 2011; Uluğ et al., 2021). As stated eloquently by Dixon et al. (2017), framing prejudice reduction and social change merely as in opposition to each other could be "potentially as limiting as the presumption that the two models of change are simply compatible . . . the deeper challenge will be to explore how the relationship between these two models of change plays out within particular social contexts and to specify the conditions under which interventions based on these models are effective, ineffective, or even counterproductive in creating a more just society" (p. 495).

13. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have endeavored to review the vast, and often disparate, research literatures on prejudice reduction and social change, while highlighting how scholarship in these areas might bolster each other and become more interconnected in future work. Rather than framing prejudice reduction and social change as goals that are inherently incompatible or in opposition to each other, we firmly believe that it could prove useful—both

for new empirical and theoretical developments, and for the interventions informed by our work—to envision ways in which the goals of prejudice reduction and social change may be pursued in tandem. We hope the reflections provided here encourage new collaborations and generative research directions that support joint efforts toward realizing greater social equality while improving attitudes and relations between social groups.

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CHAPTER 30

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EMOTIONAL PROCESSES IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

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SMADAR COHEN-CHEN AND ERAN HALPERIN

1. INTRODUCTION

INTRACTABLE intergroup conflicts are extreme, prolonged, and violent forms of intergroup conflict, which involve unique socio-psychological dynamics (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). As such, they offer challenges in using widely established and successful approaches to intergroup relations and harmony. One approach which has gained growing attention in this context addresses the role of emotions as an avenue to changing attitudes, behaviors, and even support for policies in intergroup intractable conflicts (Brader & Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume). The role of emotional processes in conflicts can be studied from two very different perspectives. The first is a more descriptive one, in which scholars examine the role played by individuals' and groups' emotional experience in conflict situations. The second perspective, which has gained increasing attention in the recent decades, is a more interventionist one, focusing on the way emotional change (or regulation) can promote conciliatory attitudes and behaviors among the conflict's involved parties. The following chapter offers for the first time an integrative model, bringing together both the descriptive and the interventionist approaches. Put differently, this model encapsulates both the role of emotional experiences in preserving and perpetuating conflicts, and the potential role of emotion regulation in contributing to conflict resolution.

We begin by defining and discussing intractable conflicts, and their unique characteristics and dynamics. We then introduce the role of emotions in conflict, portraying first the descriptive approach, which elucidates how conflicts elicit emotions, and how emotions shape behaviors and policies in conflict in two ways. First, how emotions shape different stages of the conflict cycle, and second, the way emotions are experienced versus the types of intergroup outcomes they induce. Next, we add the interventionist approach, providing an overview of approaches to conflict resolution, and their limitations in addressing intractable conflicts specifically. We then incorporate the emotion-based interventionist approach into our model and demonstrate how two different approaches to emotion regulation (direct and indirect) come into play during the emotion generative process. Finally,

we discuss the main challenges and opportunities in studying emotional processes in intractable conflicts and offer some avenues for developing the field further.

2. Intractable Intergroup Conflicts

Intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007) are characterized by extreme, prolonged violence and involve unique socio-psychological dynamics that influence their nature and longevity. Coleman (2011) estimated that about 5% of conflicts in the world become intractable. The conflicts in the Middle East, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, and Cyprus constitute prototypical examples of intractable conflicts. While intractable conflicts evolve around very tangible and real issues (such as territory, security, and natural resources), which must be addressed in the resolution process, they are not merely severe forms of intergroup conflict. These conflicts are situations so extreme that although those involved understand that peace is in their best interest, they seem unwilling, and perhaps unable, to take the necessary steps toward conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2011; Fitzduff & Stout, 2006; Tropp, 2012).

2.1. Defining and Conceptualizing Intractable Conflict

In what ways are intractable conflicts unique? First, intractable conflicts are *protracted* and last at least one generation, creating a situation in which large parts of society have been born into a state of conflict, and are not acquainted with peaceful life conditions (Kriesberg, 1998). In addition to affecting the collective memory of the conflict, being unfamiliar with peace may make it hard for people in conflict to desire, and therefore act in order to promote, conflict resolution. Second, intractable conflicts cause widespread destruction and devastation. Although many intergroup conflicts may involve various forms of violent actions between the groups, intractable conflicts involve an ongoing cycle of wide-scale and extreme *violence* (such as war, occupation, terrorism, and limited military engagement), which escalates and de-escalates over time (Kriesberg, 1993, 1998; see also Snider et al., Chapter 14, this volume). This leads to another unique characteristic of intractable conflicts. The scope and sheer intensity of intractable conflict leads to *extensive investment* made by the parties involved. These investments are both physical (financial and military) and psychological (Kriesberg, 1993, 1998), which enable the group to withhold the difficult conflict situation (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Two further phenomena characterizing intractable conflicts involve the conflict's *centrality* and *totality* in the eyes of society members. While all intergroup conflicts exist in people's awareness and may be present in the collective narrative, intractable conflicts are highly predominant and play a central role in individuals' lives and decisions, as well as those of society as a whole. The conflict becomes so prevalent that it penetrates into almost all spheres in societal, cultural, educational, and political life and institutions, all of which become involved in the conflict and highly politicized. In essence, it is impossible for those involved in the conflict to ignore the situation or to stay neutral, since the conflict is forced upon them throughout their lives and in multiple domains (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007).

Lastly, and perhaps most pertinent to this chapter, in addition to material factors, societies involved in intractable conflicts are characterized by a number of unique perceptions and attitudes. Parties in intractable conflicts hold an inherently *zero-sum perception* of the conflict. The fact that the conflict is highly multifaceted and complex, together with the continuous threats to security, lead to a perception of the issues in question not only as important but as existential to the group's very survival. And because both groups understand that winning is not a possibility, but equally will not compromise, intractable conflicts involve a perception that the *conflict is irresolvable*. Since both sides cannot win and are locked in a stalemate, both sides expect the conflict to continue forever, and they adjust accordingly both materially and psychologically to withstand the conflict far into the future (Kriesberg, 1993; Bar-Tal, 2007).

2.2. The Psychological Infrastructure of Intractable Conflicts

Contemporary literature on intractable conflicts describes a self-perpetuating cycle that when complete leads to conflict intractability (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). As a result of the exposure to the extreme conditions of a long-lasting violent conflict, societies in such conflicts develop specific needs in their struggle for survival. Two of the most basic needs in this regard are maintaining a sense of normality in light of the abnormal situation that conflicts bring about, and the need to mobilize society for the collective conflict effort. Once these needs arise, psychological mechanisms develop in order to address them. For example, perceptions of ingroup righteousness or outgroup delegitimization can provide a sense of purpose and reason in the face of the doubt and helplessness that intractable conflicts often evoke. In other words, such psychological mechanisms are what people use in the attempt to try to live a normal life in abnormal conflict circumstances. Similarly, psychological mechanisms enable mobilization of group members without doubt or delay, which is crucial in an intractable conflict scenario.

These mechanisms are sustained and passed along between group members and taught across generations until they become a collective norm or standard. Over time, they establish into a complex sociopsychological infrastructure that both encompasses these elements and provides continuous psychological support and social mobilization. This infrastructure has been termed the culture of conflict or the psychological infrastructure of the conflict, and it consists of three main aspects: the *collective memory*, *ethos of conflict*, and *collective emotions* (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013; Bar-Tal et al., 2012). The developed infrastructure underlies the evolved culture of conflict and lays the groundwork for the reconstruction of a collective identity with characteristics reflecting the conflict context.

Collective memory is defined, according to Kansteiner (2002), as representations of the group's past, remembered by society members as their history and providing the epistemic foundation for the group's existence and continuity. Collective memory constructs the narratives, the symbols, and the myths related to the past that mold the culture of the group. Beliefs underlying collective memory, as a narrative, in the case of intractable conflict, evolve over time and become the history of the conflict to society members. Because collective memory is constructed to provide the epistemic basis and justification for the current goals and beliefs regarding the conflict, it provides an over-simplified, one-sided

historic narrative, which is inherently biased and distortive (Bar-Tal et al., 2012; Baumeister & Hastings, 1997). It revolves around four major themes: (1) The justification of the conflict, and its eruption and ensuing developments; relatedly, (2) the presentation of the ingroup as positive and (3) delegitimization of the outgroup; and lastly, (4) the victimization of the ingroup by the rival group. Past events that are unrelated to the conflict are often adapted and reinvented to serve the needs and goals associated with the conflict (Hammack, 2011; Hopkins, Chapter 9, this volume; Volkan, 1997). Importantly, the collective memory becomes, during times of escalation in which external parties become involved, an additional battleground over which the sides of the conflict fight to justify their actions (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013).

Ethos of conflict is defined as "the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide dominant characterization to the society and [give] it a particular orientation" (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. xiv). It is a relatively stable worldview, described as a conflict-specific ideology (Bar-Tal et al., 2012; Cohrs, 2012; Jost et al., 2009), which creates a conceptual framework that allows human beings to organize and comprehend the prolonged context of conflict in which they live and act toward its preservation or alteration in accordance with this standpoint. It provides the shared basis for societal membership, binds the members of society together, gives meaning to societal life, and imparts legitimacy to social order. The ethos of conflict is comprised of eight interrelated themes of societal beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

Societal beliefs about the justness of the ingroup's goals outline, justify, and rationalize the ingroup's goals, presenting them as existential and delegitimizing the justness of the outgroup's goals. *Societal beliefs about security* delineate the threats and dangers posed by the outgroup and conflict, functioning as a strong societal mobilizer to address said dangers when required. *Societal beliefs of positive collective self-image* refer to the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive characteristics (e.g., courage, morality), to the ingroup as a way to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup and establishing a sense of superiority and moral endurance (Sande et al., 1989). S*ocietal beliefs of the ingroup's victimization* refer to the presentation of the ingroup as the ultimate (and often only) victim, both generally but with a specific focus on the harm perpetrated by the outgroup (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Schori-Eyal et al., 2014). These provide moral incentive to seek justice and oppose the outgroup, as well as to seek support from the international community. *Societal beliefs delegitimizing the opponent* place the outgroup and its members outside the boundaries of commonly accepted norms and groups, therefore justifying aggressive and inhumane treatment of the rival (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Haslam, 2006). *Societal beliefs of patriotism* create attachment and loyalty to the country and society, subsequently propagating sacrifice (including of members' own life) and encouraging willingness to endure hardships for the group (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Huddy, Chapter 21, this volume). *Societal beliefs of unity* emphasize the importance of unity and social cohesion in the face of threat. These beliefs forge a sense of belonging and solidarity (Moscovici & Doise, 1994). Lastly, *societal beliefs of peace* shape peace as the group's ultimate wish and present the ingroup and peace-loving and pacifist. These beliefs bolster positive self-perceptions and external presentation of the group (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). Together, these themes enable an understanding of society's present and past concerns as well as its future aspirations in the context of the conflict.

2.3. Intergroup Emotions

The unique psychological infrastructure involved in intractable conflicts, coupled with the one-sided perceptions and beliefs, turn intractable conflicts into fertile ground for the evolvement and perpetuation of intense group-based and collective emotions (Halperin, 2015). Emotions occur when an individual or a group appraises a situation as offering either important challenges or opportunities deemed to be relevant (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984). This relevance can be based on individual goals and priorities, but also pertains to important social identities as well as symbolic and group-based goals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore conflicts, which arise when two or more parties perceive their goals as directly contradictory and decide to act upon this basis (Kriesberg, 1993), are a quintessential breeding ground for a range of emotions. Collective or group-based emotions form the third and final layer of intractable conflicts' psychological infrastructure, because the emotions themselves are derived and created based on the ethos of the conflict and collective memory. Collective memory forms the historical and epistemic basis for the conflict-based ideology, and this in turn influences how events related to the conflict are interpreted (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). Such appraisals underlie the generation and regulation of emotions (Frijda, 1986), which subsequently lead to action tendencies and attitudes supporting or rejecting efforts for conflict resolution.

Consequently, emotions have been described as arguably the psychological fuel driving and escalating intractable conflicts (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015), since they guide attention to events, shape how events are then interpreted (Dukes et al., 2021), and determine attitudinal and behavioral responses. Research on emotions in the context of conflicts has indicated that they pervade both the antecedents and outcomes associated with conflicts (Lindner, 2006). Specifically, for intergroup conflict, group identification adds a layer of complexity to the role of emotions in conflicts and their resolution. Thus, the most relevant types of emotions to such contexts are group-based emotions and collective emotions.

In recent years, a combination of growing research regarding affective processes in psychology in general (Dukes et al., 2021; Ekman, 1999; Fredrickson, 1998; Frijda, 1986; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001), and the acknowledgment of the importance in understanding emotions in political processes (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Mackie & Smith, 2015; Marcus et al., 2000), has led to a substantial increase in the study of emotions in intergroup, political conflicts (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020; Halperin, 2014, 2016; Halperin et al., 2011).

2.3.1. *Group-Based Emotional Phenomena*

Group-based emotions result from an individual's self-categorization as a member of a social group and occur in response to situations that have perceived relevance for that group (Goldenberg et al., 2016; Smith & Mackie, 2016). These emotions differ from the more classic individual emotions in that they are experienced by individuals merely as a result of their group membership. As such, people can experience group-based emotions "in the name" of their group, without even experiencing the emotion inducing event directly or personally. Importantly, group-based emotions are emotions that are experienced at the individual level. For example, an individual sitting on the couch may experience pride at the

sight of a representative of their country winning a medal in the Olympic Games, although they do not know the athlete personally, and have played no part in their success. The only thing they have in common is that they belong and identify with the same group (national, gender, or religious).

On the other hand, collective emotions (see Bar-Tal et al., 2007) are defined as macrolevel phenomena that emerge from emotional dynamics among individuals who are responding to the same situation (Goldenberg et al., 2020). As such, they represent emotional phenomena on the collective or group level, rather than on the individual one. Another example, again the context of the Olympics, is a widescale celebration in light of a substantial victory such as winning a gold medal. Here, a large number of people are experiencing pride or joy in light of the national achievement, and the emotion can therefore be considered a collective emotional experience.

3. Research Approaches to Emotions in Conflict

Scrutinizing the recent developments in the study of emotions in conflicts in recent years, one can categorize that work into two very different, yet closely related categories. These two perspectives feed and inform one another mutually. The first perspective is descriptive and is characterized by scholars examining the role played by group-based and collective **emotional experience** in conflict situations. More specifically, most of the work in this area focuses on the way that discrete emotions, as well as other affective processes (e.g., emotional sentiments, clusters of emotions; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994), shape policy preferences and other individual or group-based motivations in the context of intractable conflicts.

The second perspective is inspired by the Lewinian tradition (Lewin, 1943), according to which in order to really understand a phenomenon, one should attempt to change it. This approach, when applied to the study of emotions in conflict, can be described as interventionist due to its focus on ways **emotional change (or regulation)** can promote conciliatory attitudes and behaviors among parties involved in conflict. By deliberately inducing emotional change processes in conflicts, mostly using lab and field-based experimental designs, scholars contribute to the understanding of conflict resolution processes on the one hand, and to the more basic understanding regarding the nature, role, and implications of emotions in intractable conflicts on the other hand. Our chapter presents, for the first time, an integrative model bringing together both the descriptive and the interventionist approaches. This integrative model encapsulates both the role of emotional experiences in preserving and perpetuating conflicts, and the role of emotion regulation in potentially contributing to conflict resolution efforts and processes.

3.1. The Descriptive Approach—Emotional Experiences in Conflicts

The descriptive approach aims to understand and observe the role of emotions in conflicts, without seeking to intervene or change the emotional experiences themselves. Early work

on emotions in politics utilized a broad perspective based mainly on valence (the extent to which an emotion is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant) and its role in political behavior, or on the role of two distinct systems of clusters of emotions in these processes (Marcus, 2003). Over the years, scholars of emotions in conflict have found it more functional to refer to discrete emotions, which enables a more precise and specific examination of emotions and their corresponding behavioral tendencies. This approach draws upon appraisal theory of emotions (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986; see also Brader & Gadarian, Chapter 6, this volume), which delineates emotional processes as rooted in appraisals of meaningful events, leading to emotional goals and subsequently action tendencies. One major reason for this shift were consistent findings showing that emotions of the same valence and even the same intensity or arousal can lead to two very different, and sometimes even opposite political implications (e.g., Halperin et al., 2011; Lerner et al., 2003), which raised the need to develop a more precise scope of examination.

Accordingly, a conflict-related event relevant to an individual and associated group leads to an appraisal regarding the self or the ingroup, which elicits an emotional response, and subsequently a relevant attitude or behavioral tendency (Halperin, 2015). As Lindner (2006) outlines, emotions can (and should) be viewed simultaneously as both antecedents and outcomes of conflict, exacerbating the downward spiral so often described as the cycle of violence associated with intractable conflict (Coleman et al., 2007). In the current chapter, we refer to emotions in conflict using this integrative, cyclical approach, which sees emotional phenomena as both meaningful outcomes and powerful antecedents of political processes in conflict (Figure 30.1).

3.1.1. *Emotions as Outcomes*

Using this model to examine the role of emotional experiences in conflicts, two relationships have dominated the field (Lindner, 2006). The first examines ways in which conflict situations and events affect and influence emotions and emotional experiences (See Figure 30.1). The assumption is that conflict-related situations are meaningful enough to group members to draw their attention, influencing their appraisals of events or new information, and subsequently eliciting adaptive or maladaptive emotional reactions (Mackie & Smith, 2015) relevant to the conflict situation itself. The lion's share of research within the context of intractable conflicts has focused, understandably, on negative emotions.

As stated, the psychological infrastructure and culture of conflict shape how events are interpreted and therefore the emotional response to such events. Thus, the conflict ideology effectively constructs group based emotional reactions to the conflict. For instance, the perpetual threat posed by conflict situations, and the prevalence of these threats in the collective experience manifested in societal beliefs about security and victimhood within the ethos of conflict can lead to long term fear (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, 2011; Jarymowicz

FIGURE 30.1 The descriptive approach

& Bar-Tal, 2006). Relatedly, threat content has been found to induce either fear or anger in low-power groups (Kamans et al., 2010). The unique existential characteristics of intractable conflicts have been found to elicit a feeling that the future of the group is in question, an appraisal underlying collective angst (Wohl et al., 2012). Similarly, intergroup anxiety stems from deep-rooted psychological and physical segregation between groups involved in such conflicts (Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). However, threat has been found to elicit additional emotions, also related to the ingroup and its responses to events within the context of intractable conflict. Experiencing the inability to respond to an aggressive and unfair event or behavior perpetrated by the outgroup induces the emotion of humiliation (Fernandez et al.; Lindner, 2006, 2002; McCauley, 2017). On the other hand, guilt derives from feeling regret over the ingroup's harmful actions, coupled with appraised responsibility for the unfair or immoral misconduct toward an outgroup (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998).

Although not as prevalent, conflict-related events or new information may also elicit emotions that are experienced as positive for the individual. Events advancing the (imagined or real) possibility for peace in the future, as well as information increasing expectations of conflict resolution have been found to elicit the emotion of hope (Halperin et al., 2008; Leshem & Halperin, 2020; for a review see Cohen-Chen et al., 2017a). Another example is pride, experienced when an individual holds a positive group image, either in general or in a specific domain (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Schori-Eyal et al., 2015). These perceptions are also exhibited within the ethos of conflict, specifically societal beliefs about the ingroup's positive self-image as well as beliefs about peace (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013).

3.1.2. *Emotions as Antecedents*

The second relationship within the descriptive approach corresponds to the latter stage of the model (refer to Figure 1). Subsequent to the way in which conflict and conflict-related events induce emotional responses, a myriad of work examines the role that emotions play in eliciting conflict-related attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 2007; de Rivera & Paez, 2007). Each intergroup emotion has a unique story, stemming from its distinctive appraisal, emotional goals, and action tendencies. Previous research has examined the effect of similarly valanced or related emotions that may differ on a specific appraisal aspect. This difference may lead to differential attitudinal or behavioral tendencies in conflict. A notable example is anger and hatred, which are both negatively- emotions associated with aggression. However, while anger stems from an appraisal that the situation or group can be changed and efforts should be made to promote such change (Mackie et al., 2000), hatred is based in a perception of the outgroup as inherently evil and unchanging (Halperin, 2008). Importantly, although these two emotions often go hand in hand, this key difference between them has important implications and results in very different outcomes. For instance, anger in the absence of hatred was found to induce concessions in conflict (Halperin et al., 2011), and while anger motivated engagement in normative action, hatred induced violent action intentions (Shuman et al., 2016).

Moreover, each emotion has a discrete influence on attitudes and behavioral tendencies. This can be on individual level behaviors, such as engagement in collective action (*Hope*: Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020; *Anger*: Van Zomeren et al., 2000; *Anger/Hatred*: Shuman

et al., 2017; *Contempt*: Tausch et al., 2011), as well as support for policies or collective-level decision-making related to resolving intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Halperin et al., 2011, 2012). These unique effects of discrete group-level emotions on conflict related outcomes take place in different phases of intractable conflicts, as will be elaborated in the following pages.

3.2. Different Emotions Are Dominant during Different Phases

Group-level emotions play a significant role in all phases of intractable conflicts, yet, research in recent decades suggest that different emotions play different roles in different phases, although some emotions are dominant in more than one phase. For the sake of simplicity, we now focus on the most dominant emotional processes, characterizing each phase.

Conflict eruption, as the starting phase of any intractable conflict, a process in which the parties' conflicting goals rise above the surface and spark the potential for violent intergroup confrontation. Intractable conflicts erupt over goals that are perceived to be of existential importance and often are related to core beliefs associated with group identity. They are based on severe grievances and contentions that are accompanied by strong emotional feelings (Coutant et al., 2011; Kriesberg, 2007). Azar (1990) suggested that the basic conditions for eruption of protracted conflicts are deprivation of basic needs related to collective identity (see also Brewer, 2011; Kelman, 1997; Korostelina, 2006; Reicher, 2004; Staub, 2011). The eruption process is driven by intra as well as inter-group processes that stimulate and motivate the destructive transformation of the disagreements into overt and active conflict. The challenge of mobilizing society members to actively participate in the intractable conflict is of crucial importance. Many of the ideas related to the psychological processes that underlie collective action (see: van Zomeren et al., 2008) can be applied to mobilization for conflict.

The emotion that has been most frequently studied with respect to this stage of the conflict is anger. *Anger* is evoked by events in which the individual perceives the actions of others as unjust, unfair or as deviating from acceptable societal norms (Averill, 1983). In addition, it involves appraisals of relative strength and high coping potential (Mackie et al., 2000). The integration of these two characteristics often creates a tendency to confront (Berkowitz, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000), strike, kill, or attack the anger-eliciting target.

In line with its characteristics, previous studies conducted in the context of real-world conflicts have consistently found a clear and direct association between anger and the attribution of blame to the outgroup (Halperin, 2008; Small et al., 2006). Other studies have found that individuals who feel angry appraise future military attacks as less risky (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and anticipate more positive consequences for such attacks (Huddy et al., 2007). Accordingly, studies conducted in the United States following the September 11 attacks found that angry individuals were highly supportive of an American military response in Iraq and elsewhere (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2006). Finally, the central role of group-based anger in motivating conflict eruption and aggression yielded further support in a recent study conducted in Serbia and Republika Srpska (Spanovic et al., 2010).

Humiliation is another important emotion that appears in the early phase of conflict eruption. It is a particularly strong aversive self-conscious emotion that arises when a person or a group see themselves as unfairly demeaned, degraded, or put down (Elshout et al., 2017; Fernández et al., 2015; Lindner, 2006; McCauley, 2017). The experience of humiliation has been associated with particularly negative outcomes for the psychological well-being of the victims, such as major depression, severe anxiety, or suicidal tendencies (Hartling & Lindner, 2016; Klein, 1991; Torres & Bergner, 2012). Not in vain, humiliation has been labeled the "nuclear bomb of emotions" (Lindner, 2006, p. xiii) to emphasize its extreme destructive outcomes. It creates rifts between groups and breaks relationships (Lindner, 2001). This feeling arises in many of the conflict situations in which societies experience deprivation as a result of discrimination, oppression, and/or exploitation. Humiliation often creates a motivation to retaliate, as the humiliated group sees it as the only way to regain positive group identity and image.

Conflict escalation and management entail strategies to contend with conflict while it is expected to continue, including choices about how to respond to violence, as well as how to treat civilians and civilian causes among the adversary. Escalation indicates that the grievances, objections, and contentions raised are not met with understanding and compliance, but rather with dismay, rejection, and even stronger counter-actions. Consequently, the party that raised the grievances or objections resorts to harsher steps, in order to make the conflict more salient and more costly to the rival. These steps are met with severe reactions, and both sides thus raise the level of confrontation, entering into cycles of reactions and counter reactions (Horowitz, 1985; Kriesberg, 2007). From a psychological perspective, our assumption is that conflict escalate due to a destructive feedback loop between the actual context and events on the one hand, and the psychological repertoire, held by society members, on the other hand. The psychological repertoire leads to actions that escalate the conflict, in turn the escalation reinforces the repertoire that perpetuates the conflict, due to the dominance of the culture of conflict and its baring on collective identity.

Two dominant emotions that have received much attention in the current literature as impacting policy preferences in this context are fear and anger. Fear is associated with the appraisal that one is under threat and lacks sufficient strength or control to overcome the threat—and is characterized by the motivation to defend and protect oneself (Roseman et al., 1994; see Stein for a discussion of fear and perceived threat, Chapter 11, this volume). These lead to action tendencies focused on minimizing risk, which may take the form of either "fight" or "flight" depending on what seems most effective for threat reduction. Indeed, while in some violent conflicts fear has been found to decrease support for military action (e.g. Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2006), in more intractable conflict, where "flight' seems less possible, fear leads to defensive aggression increasing support for aggression toward the outgroup (e.g. Spanovic et al., 2010; Stein, Chapter 11, this volume).

Anger, as mentioned above, is associated with appraising the outgroup's behavior as unjust and the ingroup as strong and able to successfully contend with risk and confrontation with the other (Smith et al., 2007). Anger is further associated with the motivational goal of taking action and setting right the outgroup's perceived wrongdoing (e.g., Roseman et al., 1994). Correspondingly, in the context of conflict management and escalation, anger most often leads to justification of and support for confrontation and use of violence against the outgroup (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Pliskin et al., 2014; Halperin et al., , 2013; Skitka et al., 2006).

De-escalation and peacemaking: Although de-escalation of intractable conflicts is a highly difficult challenge, almost every society engaged in such conflict contains societal forces (even that they are a small minority) that propagate and press for embarking on a different road—the road of peacemaking. Once these forces grow and become influential, it is possible to say that the process of peace-building has gained momentum. In some societies, this process even ends with a peaceful settlement following negotiations that may extend over many years (see Fisher et al., 2013). People living under long-term conflict often acknowledge that dramatic compromises are necessary for the promotion of peace yet often do not endorse them. Emotions modulate such support, with some emotions presenting a barrier and others facilitating it.

One of the most powerful emotional barriers to de-escalation and peacemaking is that of hate. Hatred is driven by the appraisal that the outgroup is inherently and unchangeably evil, thus people who are dominated by hate unequivocally reject any compromise toward changing relations between the groups because it is deemed futile (Halperin, 2008, 2011). The impact of anger and fear for conflict resolution is more complex in that they may drive either opposition or support for political compromise depending on how such compromise is construed. The appraisals of anger, namely, seeing the outgroup as unjust and the ingroup as strong and able to successfully contend with risk (Smith et al., 2007), often leads to opposition to compromise (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2006; Spanovic et al., 2010). However, when correction of outgroup wrongdoing is deemed possible through conciliatory action (for example, if education and mass media campaigns are perceived effective in inducing change in outgroup behavior), anger can increase support for compromise (Halperin et al., 2011; Reifen-Tagar et al., 2011).

Fear (and by extension, anxiety or angst), on the other hand—given that it is shaped by the appraisal that the magnitude of threat is greater than one's ability to overcome it, and characterized by the motivation to avoid risk and restore security—often presents a meaningful barrier to support for conciliatory policies (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Sabucedo et al., 2011), as they are perceived as potentially risky, or at the very least as uncertainty inducers. However, to the extent that compromise can be construed as the path to establish security, fear is likely to increase willingness to compromise (Halperin et al., 2013; Spanovic et al., 2010).

Finally, hope, an emotion characterized by positive affect coupled with an expectation for further positive outcomes, is a meaningful facilitator of conflict resolution. Hope increases openness to and active search for new information (Bar-Tal, 2013; Cohen-Chen et al., 2014), and increases creative thinking about solutions, and support for compromises (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Cohen-Chen et al., 2014a; Leshem et al., 2016).

A further important force relevant for de-escalation and peacemaking is engagement in collective action, such as participation in demonstrations or signing petitions, to advocate for or oppose conciliation or compromise (van Stekelenberg & Gaidyte, Chapter 26, this volume). Anger has been identified as the most relevant emotion motivating collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2012). To a lesser degree, guilt also motivates participation in collective action in support specifically of reparations to the outgroup for harm caused by the ingroup (Mallett et al., 2008; Solak et al., 2017). Hope has also been proposed as a meaningful predictor of collective action, stemming from its goal-driven action-orientation and the belief in the possibility of a brighter reality (Cohen-Chen et al.; Greenaway et al., 2016).

Reconciliation goes beyond the formal resolution of the conflict by focusing on steps to address the psychological needs of the sides and to transform their relationship—such as acknowledgment of and support for compensation of past outgroup suffering, willingness to extend apologies, and to accept them and forgive. A dominant emotion shaping people's willingness to acknowledge and compensate outgroup suffering is guilt. Group-based guilt stems from appraisals of ingroup responsibility for illegitimate harm to the outgroup (Doosje et al., 1998; Ferguson & Branscombe, 2014) and is associated with the motivation to correct the wrongdoing, and to be forgiven by the outgroup. Group-based guilt has been found to increase support for compensation across different conflicts (e.g., Allpress et al., 2010; Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011; Lickel et al., 2011), and is also associated with support for the extension of official apologies to the outgroup for past moral transgressions (Leonard et al., 2015; McGarty et al., 2005).

Another relevant self-targeted emotion stemming from the appraisal of responsibility for harm inflicted on others is shame. However, unlike guilt, it is coupled with the appraisal that the wrongdoing is indicative of the perpetrator's defective nature (Tangney, 1991). Correspondingly, shame is characterized by the motivational goal of validating the ingroup's image (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2008). Hence, in the context of reconciliation, shame has been found to increase both support for reparations and defensive avoidance (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Lickel et al., 2005), likely depending on the extent to which the damaged group-image is deemed reparable (Leach & Cidam, 2015).

Finally, empathy—the experience of a congruent emotion to that of another—plays an important role in reconciliation, especially in how recipients of intergroup apologies respond to it. Consistent with empathy's motivational goal of alleviating the discomfort or suffering of the other (Cikara et al., 2011), several studies have found that empathy is associated with willingness to forgive the opponent for past transgressions (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008; Tam et al., 2008).

3.3. "Feel Good"/"Do Good": An Alternative Perspective to the Role of Emotions in Conflicts

One way to look at the role played by group-level emotions in conflict, as presented above, is to examine emotional impact in each and every phase of the conflict. A more nuanced way to look at the very same phenomenon was recently offered by Cohen-Chen and colleagues (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020), who introduced a framework categorizing emotions according to two separate dimensions: valence (the extent to which emotions are experienced as pleasant or unpleasant) and function (the extent to which emotions lead to outcomes supporting or hindering conflict resolution). This differentiation is particularly important in intractable conflicts, in which clashes between how good an emotion feels and the good that it does in terms of the conflict more broadly are very prevalent. Importantly, the position of each emotion in a specific quadrant is dynamic and subject to change, dependent on contextual factors such as power or (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). For example, anger may be experienced as pleasant when feelings of empowerment are emphasized (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), while hope for intergroup harmony may diminish motivation to change power

asymmetries when induced in a low-power group (Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020). However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Feel bad/do bad emotions are emotions that involve negative affect for the individual, and simultaneously induce conflict-escalating attitudes and behaviors. This definition encompasses within it the largest number of emotions, due to the very nature of conflict as harmful and destructive. For example, hatred (Fischer et al., 2018; Opotow & McClelland, 2007; Sternberg, 2005) is a negatively valanced emotion stemming from an appraisal of the outgroup as holding a stable and evil nature (Halperin, 2008). Subsequently, hatred has been found to lead to aspirations of annihilation of the outgroup as a whole, triggering extreme intergroup aggression (Halperin, 2008). Similarly, humiliation, an emotion based on an internalization of aggressive external message that is perceived to be hostile but unjust (Fernandez et al., 2015; Lindner, 2006, McCauley, 2017), has been suggested to predict reactive violence and aggression (Lindner, 2006; Motyl et al., 2009), as well as diminishing support for opportunities to achieve peace (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Lastly, emotions elicited by a sense of threat to the ingroup, such as intergroup anxiety (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Halperin et al., 2012) and fear (Halperin et al., 2008; Pliskin et al., 2015) have been found to increase avoidant behaviors, diminishing willingness to engage with the outgroup to promote conflict resolution. Fear in conflict has been found to induce cognitive freezing (Kruglanski, 2004), leading to a focus on threatening information (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014) and preventing openness to new ideas (Clore et al., 1994; LeDoux, 1995).

Feel bad/do good emotions are those which are experienced as negative or unpleasant, but induce peace-supporting attitudes or behaviors. An example that has gained much interest and evidence is guilt, which is experienced as negative based on an appraisal of being personally accountable or seeing the ingroup as responsible for negative and unjust acts aimed at the outgroup (Branscombe et al., 2004). Despite the negative experience associated with the emotion, guilt has been shown to encourage support for reparations or apologies for past wrongdoing (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005), promoting intergroup conciliation. Another emotion that may feel unpleasant but has been found to promote positive intergroup attitudes is sadness, associated with an appraisal of significant loss (Camras & Allison, 1989). Gur, Ayal, and Halperin (2021) recently showed that experiencing sadness can reduce political polarization and promote peace-supporting attitudes. Lastly, collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) is a negative emotion experienced when group members appraise their group as under existential threat. However, collective angst has been found to induce attempts to prevent the negative outcome, which can at times manifest in promoting conciliatory attitudes (Wohl et al., 2016; Halperin et al., 2013).

Although not considered a discrete emotion, empathy (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cikara et al., 2011; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Zaki, 2019) is characterized by feelings of sympathy and compassion toward a suffering or misfortunate (member of the) outgroup (Hasson et al., 2018) and therefore is categorized as negatively valanced. Empathy is linked to cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup attitudes (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), and in the context of intractable conflicts has been found to induce support for humanitarian policies to help the outgroup (Balmas & Halperin, 2021; Pliskin et al., 2014; Rosler et al., 2017). Due to both its valence and its behavioral outcomes, members of group are motivated not to experience empathy, which makes it uncommon in the context of intractable and violent conflicts.

As previously mentioned, positively valenced emotions are significantly less prevalent in the context of violent and extreme conflicts. However, they too can have opposite effects on conflict-related attitudes (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). Emotions that are experienced as pleasant, or the contextual conditions that may change the emotional valence (such as sadness enhancing a feeling of togetherness; Porat et al., 2016; Porat et al., 2016), emphasize the importance of emotional preferences and the motivation individuals have to experience certain emotions (Tamir, 2016).

Feel good/do bad emotions are emotions experienced as positive or pleasant, but induce conflict-exacerbating attitudes. A notable example is pride. Despite being experienced as elevated and positive due to the achievements or nature of the ingroup (Sullivan, 2007), pride has been found to be associated with increased aggression (Baumeister, 2001), prejudice against outgroup members (Pettigrew, 1997), and hostility toward outgroup members via increased nationalism (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003).

Lastly, *feel good/do good* emotions are those which both feel pleasant and promote intergroup harmony. The most notable example is the emotion of hope, which, as previously mentioned, is a positively valenced emotion elicited in light of imagining a positive and desired goal in the future (Lazarus, 1999; Cohen-Chen et al., 2017b; Leshem & Halperin, 2020). Long-term hope has been found to have positive associations with a myriad of peace-supporting attitudes, such as favorable information processing (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014), support for humanitarian aid to the outgroup (Halperin & Gross, 2011), support for conciliatory attitudes (Halperin et al., 2008; Cohen-Chen et al., 2019), and openness to engaging with the outgroup (Saguy & Halperin, 2014). Notably, and has previously stated, hope can, under some conditions, elicit outcomes detrimental to conflict facilitation (Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020). However, this is beyond the purview of this chapter.

As aforementioned, we refer to the interplay between the conflict and the emotional experiences in the conflict as a cyclical process (see Figure 1). One example of such a process might begin with an initial conflict related event (Lindner, 2006), which violates the ingroup's sense of justice, the underlying appraisal associated with the emotion of anger (Averill, 1983). As stated, anger has been found to increase aggressive attitudes (Skitka et al., 2006), which in intractable conflict contexts is translated into support for aggressive policies against the outgroup. As this process progresses and repeats itself, this continuous cycle may expand and become ingrained in collective memory and narrative (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). As parties involved continue to act and react, leading perceptions of the outgroup as inherently evil (underlying the emotion of hatred and further inducing extreme violence and aspirations to annihilate the outgroup; Halperin, 2008), and the conflict as fundamentally irresolvable, feeding into the hopelessness (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006) that perpetuates the conflict. As the cycle intensifies, different perceptions come into play, triggering new appraisals and therefore a variety of emotions.

3.4. The Interventionist Approach—Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict

For many years, social scientists have endeavored to understand the creation, preservation, escalation, and resolution of intergroup conflicts with the aim to develop interventions for promoting peace and intergroup harmony (Lewin, 1943). This includes a myriad of

approaches from many fields and schools of thought, which have proven efficacious, as presented below. Nonetheless, these approaches' success has been found to be limited in extreme, protracted conflict situations. Recently, and as mentioned above, emotions have captured the attention of social psychologists as a key mechanism underlying political attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in contexts characterized by extreme animosity. Subsequently, this approach has become a central avenue in creating and developing interventions aimed at engendering reconciliation.

3.4.1. *Classic Interventions Promoting Intergroup Harmony*

Arguably the most famous and well-researched contribution to reducing intergroup conflict has been *Contact Theory* (Allport, 1954; Barlow et al., 2012; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Graf et al., 2014; Hayward et al., 2017; Pettigrew, 2008; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tropp, 2021; Tropp & Dehrone, Chapter 29, this volume). Contact theory posits that, under certain conditions, contact between members of different social groups can reduce intergroup bias (Allport, 1954). Members of opposing or different groups should be of equal status to one another and should cooperate to achieve common goals. Moreover, integration and contact should be supported by authorities and group norms, or attitude change will be difficult to achieve (for a meta-analysis see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

These conditions are often impossible to achieve in highly charged, extremely segregated contexts such as intractable conflicts. Counter-productive consequences have been said to be caused by defensive reactions to meeting and "fraternizing" with the enemy (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bekerman & Maoz, 2005), leading to deterioration of intergroup relations. Within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, contact theory, in certain forms, has been shown to be ineffectual. At times contact theory has even been described as immoral by preserving the status quo (Maoz, 2011; Maoz et al., 2007). In the case of asymmetrical relations between groups, contact-based interventions that do produce positive perceptions of the outgroup lessen perceptions of existing power differences (Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012; Saguy et al., 2009).

Over time, contact-based interventions were developed in order to overcome physical, language-based, and cultural segregation (Crisp & Turner, 2009; Pettigrew, 2008), as well as low motivation to engage in actual contact due to anxiety, discomfort, or bias (Crisp & Turner, 2009; Dixon et al., 2005; Wright et al., 1997). Based on this, interventions began to move away from direct interactions between outgroup members, while maintaining a focus upon the specific outgroup in question. *Extended Contact* (Wright et al., 1997; Turner et al., 2008), demonstrating that knowledge of a close relationship between an ingroup member and an outgroup member can improve intergroup attitudes. Later on, *Imagined Contact* (Crisp et al., 2008; Crisp & Turner, 2009) used mental simulations to change attitudes toward an outgroup, by providing a "safe" way for people to engage in contact with the outgroup, and reducing intergroup anxiety (Birtel & Crisp, 2012; Stathi et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2007).

Another approach, based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), is the *Common Ingroup Identity Model* (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This approach focuses on creating a common identity, shared by members of different groups, to reduce bias and stereotyping. *Decategorization* highlights individual identity over group identity (Bettencourt et al., 1992), *recategorization* highlights a superordinate or shared identity of outgroup members

(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Relatedly, *crossed categorization* (Crisp & Hewstone, 2000) blurs intergroup boundaries by highlighting shared social categories.

Although traditional interventions for promoting intergroup relations have proven successful in a large number of contexts, the understanding has gradually emerged that in intractable conflicts, one of the major fuels of the conflict, emotions, has been overlooked by classic approaches in working to instill peace and intergroup harmony. Zero-sum perceptions make common goals nearly impossible (Brewer, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). A collective narrative and socio-psyhcological infrastructure endorses and sustains the conflict, rather than supporting prejudice-reducing activities and interventions (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). Consequently, attempts to change these mutually and deeply engrained norms come up against reactance, as they are interpreted as a threat to the group's identity and existence (Bar-Tal, 2007). Emotions, as flexible mechanisms associated with cognitions, identity, and motivations, are a key psychological mechanism in reconciliation processes, playing a pivotal role for intergroup relations characterized by rigid attitudes and perceptions. Thus, without addressing the emotional aspect underlying political attitudes and motivations, change, and particularly consistent and long-term change, is extremely difficult to achieve (Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2016).

3.4.2. *Emotional Interventions—The Age of Affectivism*

In recent decades, following similar trends in other domains within psychological sciences, political psychologists have shown an increasing shift from a descriptive to a more interventionist approach. This shift is manifested in work focusing on offering evidence-based interventions to reduce intergroup prejudice and promote intergroup reconciliation (see: Hameiri et al., 2014; Paluck et al., 2020). Specifically, regarding the study of emotions in conflict, while the descriptive approach serves the initial purpose of furthering knowledge regarding the role of emotions in conflict, it stops short of expounding how this information can be used to change this harmful spiral of conflict.

Accordingly, emerging research has aimed to understand how this knowledge can be used to *change* emotions in order to promote attitudes for conflict resolution (Halperin, 2015; Halperin et al., 2014; Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). This line of work utilizes knowledge regarding the role of emotions in conflict, as well as extant research on emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2007), which refers to the process of influencing emotional responses by the self or others. In the context of intractable conflict, work on emotion regulation investigates ways in which emotions elicited by conflict-related events can be changed, leading to subsequent attitudinal and behavioral changes (for recent reviews see: Gross et al., 2013; Halperin & Riefen-Tagar, 2017).

3.4.2.1. Emotion Regulation The idea that even powerful emotions can be modified is the cornerstone of a rapidly developing field of research in affective science that is concerned with emotion regulation, defined as the processes that influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them (Gross, 2014). Because emotions are multi-componential processes that unfold over time, emotion regulation may involve changes in various components of the emotional process, including the latency, rise time, magnitude, duration, or offset of responses in behavioral, experiential, or physiological domains (Gross & Thompson, 2006). Emotion regulation may increase or decrease the

intensity and/or duration of either negative or positive emotions, and the defining feature of emotion regulation is the activation of a goal to modify emotion generation (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). Most of the research on emotion regulation has thus far focused on individuals or dyads. However, many of the insights from such research are applicable to intergroup conflicts (Goldenberg et al., 2016, 2020).

Emotion regulation pertains both to situations in which people regulate their own emotions as well as to processes through which individuals or groups regulate others' emotions. In terms of the change strategy itself, one way to categorize emotion regulation processes is to examine not the target (the individual whose emotion is changing) but the process of the regulation. This results in two different approaches to emotion regulation—a direct approach (people are directly asked or trained to regulate their emotions) and an indirect approach (messages are conveyed to indirectly regulate other's emotions). These two approaches and the differentiation between them are particularly relevant in the context of intractable conflicts, in which emotions should be regulated in masses, people are not always motivated to down-regulate their negative emotions, and the source of the individual or group that aspire to stimulate the emotion regulation process is critical in determining its effectiveness.

3.4.2.2. *Direct Emotion Regulation* Emotion regulation in its direct meaning refers to self-driven, intentional efforts to change the intensity, valence, or type of experienced emotion (Gross, 1998, 2007). People can regulate their own emotions and attempt to regulate the emotions of others. This may be targeted toward positive, as well as negative, emotions, assuming the form of upward (increasing levels of arousal) or downward (decreasing levels of arousal) regulation. In what now is already considered as the classic model of emotion regulation, James Gross (1998) offered five main strategies of direct emotion regulation that follow the process and sequence of the way emotions evolve—situation selection, situation modification, attention deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation.

All these direct emotion regulation strategies can be applied, with some necessary adjustments, to the realm of intergroup conflicts and to the regulation of group-level emotions (Goldenberg et al., 2016). The required adjustments are mostly impacted by the collectivistic nature of the emotional experience, by the central role played by social identities in these contexts, as well as from the fact that the actual experience of the emotion often takes place in a crowded or at least subjectively "groupy" environment. Also, the question of what is actually needed to regulate the emotions of a group, and in what way is it different from simultaneous regulation of many individual emotions, is still unresolved.

In terms of empirical support for the effectiveness of direct emotion regulation strategies within the context of intractable conflict, one strategy that has received substantial attention is cognitive reappraisal—the modification of meaning-giving to different situations aimed at shifting one's emotional reactions to them. In one example (Halperin et al., 2013) researchers trained participants in the skills of cognitive reappraisal (unrelated to the context of conflict), and compared those participants' emotional and political reactions to those of a control group. Equipped with the skills of cognitive reappraisal, participants reacted with less anger to a real political anger-inducing event, leading them to demonstrate greater support for conciliatory policies, both one week and five months after training. Same pattern of results was received in another study in which the ultimate political outcome of

the emotion regulation intervention has been reduced political intolerance toward conflict related outgroups (Halperin et al., 2013). A similar pattern of results was obtained recently in a less intense intergroup conflict, when two direct emotion regulation strategies, cognitive reappraisal and suppression, led to increased intergroup openness among a sample of Finish participants (Westerlund et al., 2020). Finally, in a recent study, results regarding the constructive implications of reappraisal were observed also using reappraisal training through smartphone application, rather than through in-lab, face-to-face training (Porat et al.., 2020). Clearly, training in emotion regulation skills can enhance peace-oriented reaction to political events. The challenge with training in direct emotion regulation, however, is that it hinges on people's motivation to regulate their emotions in a direction conducive to peace promotion, which, especially in the context of intractable conflict, is often not the case.

Therefore, another configuration of direct emotion regulation in the context of intergroup conflicts focuses on deliberative attempts to change people's motivation to experience or not to experience certain emotions, rather than on the emotion-regulation skills required in order to do that (Porat, Tamir & Halperin, 2020). Change in motivation to experience certain emotions can be done by highlighting either hedonic or instrumental considerations or benefits, or some integration of both. Recent attempts to regulate conflict-related emotion through altering motivation were successful, when across four studies, Porat and colleagues (Porat et al., 2016) were able to alter group-based emotional experiences, and even political reactions, simply by changing what people wanted to feel. Specifically, Jewish-Israelis actively down-regulated anger or fear when they were led to believe that the experience of these emotions toward Palestinians might impair their political decision making (Porat et al., 2016).

3.4.2.3. Indirect Emotion Regulation Despite the success garnered by the direct approach to emotion regulation, the context of intractable conflict poses a unique challenge in the application and widespread utilization of direct emotion regulation. The notion that people involved in deeply entrenched conflicts are motivated to down-regulate negative emotions or up-regulate positive emotions has been described as widely misplaced (Tamir, 2009). On the contrary, many of the beliefs that form the underlying appraisals of such emotions are exacerbated by the collective narrative (Bar-Tal, 2001; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009), which serves as a survival mechanism for groups involved in intractable conflicts. Relatedly, recent work has pointed to a misalignment between the valence and functionality of emotions in conflicts (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). As aforementioned, this work suggests that in conflicts, and particularly intractable conflicts, emotions that are experienced as positive for the individual (such as ingroup pride; Averill, 1983; Baumeister, 2001; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003) are often detrimental to the resolution of conflict, while emotions experienced as negatively valanced (such as guilt or empathy; Wohl et al., 2006) can be functional to resolution efforts.

This disaccord further upholds the need for indirect interventions in promoting peace-making attitudes through emotions, manifested as indirect emotion regulation (for a review see Halperin et al., 2014). One notable advantage of the indirect approach is the fact that it bypasses the necessity for individuals to be motivated to regulate their emotions (Halperin et al., 2014). The process begins with associating between a target conflict-related action tendency and the connected discrete emotion. Next, core appraisal themes underlying

the emotions (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984) are identified, and various strategies and interventions are employed to change those appraisals without necessarily mentioning the outgroup or the context of the conflict. While we present a number of examples, this by no means is an exhaustive review, as more examples of indirect emotion regulation can be found in the literature.

One such strategy addresses general beliefs or perceptions, which individuals then apply deductively to the specific context subconsciously. A substantial amount of work employing this approach has utilized the well-established implicit theories (Chiu et al., 1997; Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995) according to which people hold beliefs regarding the malleability of various constructs, such as individuals (Plaks et al., 2001), and groups (Rydell et al., 2007). Research within the interventionist approach has utilized strategies based on implicit theories for two reasons. First, malleability beliefs are relatively simple to change (Blackwell et al., 2007; Heslin et al., 2005). Second, malleability is associated with a number of emotions' core appraisal themes. One example is hatred, which is based on the appraisal of the outgroup as inherently and unchangeably evil (Halperin, 2008). Interventionist research that sought to regulate hatred indirectly imparted the belief that groups in general are malleable, without referring to the outgroup in question. This relatively simple, applicable, and indirect intervention successfully reduced intergroup hatred and increased support for concessions within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Halperin et al., 2011). A related design addressed hopelessness, which is rooted in the appraisal of the conflict as irresolvable (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). Applying a similar approach further led to interventions that instilled general malleability of groups (Goldenberg et al., 2018), conflicts (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014), and the world (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015). Although the specific conflict and outgroup were never mentioned directly, these interventions successfully induced hope for peace and subsequently support for conciliatory policies in intractable conflict.

A further indirect strategy does not depend on deductive reasoning (all groups are malleable therefore the outgroup is malleable) but addresses an unrelated psychological need that would enable acceptance of an idea or message underlying an emotion functional for conflict resolution (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). One such example is group-based guilt (Branscombe et al., 2004), which induces support for reparations or apologies (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005). Guilt is elicited by an appraisal of an unjust or immoral act perpetrated by an individual's ingroup toward an outgroup. The acceptance of ingroup responsibility is however in stark contrast to the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001), which asserts ingroup righteousness and poses a threat to the need for a positive ingroup image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One line of work (Čehajić et al., 2011) addressed this need by administering a self-affirmation intervention, which enables group members to tolerate a threat to a specific aspect of their identity, in the form of responsibility acceptance, if they are able to affirm other aspects of their ingroup image. Results showed that without referring to the conflict, the self-affirmation intervention successfully led to increased guilt, subsequently leading to support for reparations to the outgroup in conflict. Across these examples, by addressing a seemingly unrelated belief or psychological need, the context-specific appraisal was influenced when the event or new information is introduced, which subsequently up-regulated or down-regulated the relevant emotion.

3.5. The Integrative Model: Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Conflict

Integrating the descriptive and the interventionist approaches, we contend that each type of intervention corresponds to a different stage in the emotion-elicitation process, creating a comprehensive model of emotions and emotion regulation in conflict (Figure 30.2).

The *indirect approach* corresponds to the stage in which conflict-related events elicit emotions in conflict. This is because such interventions transform the way events, behaviors, and relationships are appraised, changing the way emotions are experienced. Indeed, this approach essentially targets the appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) rather than an already formed appraisal, which lead to the formulation of the appraisal itself (Halperin et al., 2014). The fact that the indirect approach does not tackle specific conflict-related content or attitudes means that changes in general or unrelated perceptions could potentially be applied to other contexts entirely (or not at all) and is therefore not content-specific to the conflict.

Advantageously, the fact that the indirect approach focuses on the relationship between a conflict-related event and the emotional experience means that the regulation process comes into play before the appraisal and destructive emotion are even formed. Gross (2008) refers to this stage as taking place when the event in the emotion generative process cannot be modified by the individual, but before the event is imbued with a specific meaning. At this point, the individual (or an external party) may take specific actions (attentional deployment; Gross, 2008) to affect how this event is interpreted and becomes the appraisal in question. Applied to the context of conflict, rather than the individual choosing to change appraisal tendencies affecting how an appraisal is formed, the intervention itself (externally administered) changes how conflict-related events are interpreted and therefore how appraisals are formed.

This is meaningful because previous work has established that over time recurring (negative) experiences become entrenched in psychological schema and grow more automatic, persistent, and stable (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Frijda et al., 1991). Such long-term sentiments in conflict then exacerbate corresponding emotional responses by biasing the cognitive

FIGURE 30.2 An integrative model of emotions and emotion regulation in conflict

appraisals of an event (Halperin & Gross, 2010). Based on this logic, changing the process by which an event is appraised negatively before it is actually formed would alleviate and weaken this inevitable and destructive association. Previous research has shown that the frequent application of such interventions creates the effect's endurance over time (Yeager & Walton, 2011). It therefore stands to reason that this approach could change *the way* in which events or new information are interpreted and processed in the first place, leading to long-term change in intergroup attitudes through intergroup emotions.

On the other hand, the direct approach corresponds to the second stage, in which emotions are antecedents of political outcomes. This is because direct emotion regulation, and particularly the most common form of it, cognitive reappraisal (Gross, 2007), operates mostly after the emotion has already appeared. Here, the assumption is that the appraisal has already been formed (based on previous experience and long-term emotions), and the emotion is already being experienced by the individual. In that case, the reappraisal process intervenes at the point in which the action tendencies associated with the discrete group-level emotion are just about to transform into a concrete conflict related motivation, behavioral tendencies, or policy preferences. Naturally, changing emotions after they have already been formed is a challenging task, but research have demonstrated that emotion regulation strategies can be effective, even at that point of the emotional process. Moreover, regulating emotions after they have emerged can be even more important when it comes to group-level emotions and to intractable conflicts. This is especially true in these cases because emotional reactions in groups might have a diffused and amplifying nature (see Goldenberg et al., 2016, 2020), so down-regulation negative emotions among some members of the group can be effective in preventing escalation of the emotional experience among the group in general.

4. Conclusions and Future Directions

A recent consensus paper, written by dozens of leading scholars of emotions and affective sciences, has recently raised the question of whether social sciences are now moving into the era of what they defined as "Affectivism" (See Dukes et al., 2021). In the final paragraph of that paper, the authors state that "the conceptual, methodological and technical advances made within the last few decades have demonstrated that affective processes are unquestionably enlightening when it comes to understanding both behavior and cognition. While it will ultimately be the responsibility of historians of science to determine whether or not a new era has begun, given the undeniable impact of affective sciences on our models of brain, mind, and behavior, it seems relevant to ask today whether we are now in the era of 'affectivism'" (Dukes et al., 2021, p. 5).

We argue that although the scientific work on the role of emotions and emotion regulation processes in intergroup conflicts has developed rapidly in the last two decades, it is still in its early stages. The dominance of affective processes in this area of research is not yet close to the description in the previous paragraph regarding social and behavioral sciences more broadly. On the one hand, most political psychologists agree today that emotions play a key role in driving individuals and groups toward violent conflict, but also toward de-escalation processes. At the same time, both from a conceptual and a methodological

perspective, there is still a long way to go before we can achieve at least part of the potential embedded in studying emotional processes in conflict situations.

We have suggested in the current chapter that to address that gap, an integrative approach should be adopted, one that brings together a descriptive view on the role of emotions in conflicts, with a more interventionist approach on the ways through which emotional change can promote support for peaceful resolution of such conflicts. The current chapter reviewed several steps made in recent years to promote such an integrative approach. For example, as we reviewed in the current chapter, scholars in the field have managed to develop a much more nuanced view of the nature and implications of discrete group-level emotions on conflict related policies and behaviors. After more than two decades on intensive research, empirical work from various contexts on prolonged conflicts have allowed us to more deeply understand which situations would give rise to which group-level emotions and among which individuals. These studies also enabled us to pinpoint the discrete emotions that constitute catalysts or barriers to various conflict related processes (e.g., support for compromises for peace, humanitarian aid, intergroup interaction and negotiation). We illustrate that what seem to be considered positive emotions might be at times destructive to conflict resolution, and vice versa regarding negative emotions that at times may be constructive. Finally, in the last decade, there is some work showing quite promising indications regarding the impact of effective emotion regulation processes as tools for conflict transformation.

However, as we suggested, more work is needed and, as we see it, political psychologists should utilize progress made in other domains of research and society to deepen our understanding of emotional processes in conflicts. For example, social media provides a fertile ground to the study of emotional processes in groups in general and in conflicts more specifically (Goldenberg & Gross, 2020). Also, big data science, coupled with social media targeting, enables a more personalized approach to the way individuals are driven by emotions in conflict situations, as well as to the way different emotion regulation efforts can differently influence different individuals according to their backgrounds, personality characteristics, or ideologies (Halperin & Schori-Eyal, 2020).

Future work should also go beyond the emotional "immediate suspects," taking into account other group-based emotions, such as (but not limited to) schadenfreude, admiration, and contempt. It should also study other emotion regulation strategies besides cognitive reappraisal, while taking into account more seriously the aspects unique to intergroup conflicts such as power relations, traumatic experiences, and identity complexity. Finally, from a methodological point of view, the integration of neurophysiological studies, on the one hand with large scale field experiments, on the other hand, seem like the next step in the study of emotions in conflict.

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