

WE DREAM TOGETHER

DOMINICAN INDEPENDENCE, HAITI, AND THE

FIGHT FOR CARIBBEAN FREEDOM **ANNE ELLER**



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We Dream Together

*Dominican Independence, Haiti, and the
Fight for Caribbean Freedom*

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FOR KEVIN LEE
WHO KNOWS ALL OF THIS
ALREADY

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Map 0.1 Map of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. By Annelieke Vries.

Timeline

c. 1474	Anacaona born in Yaguana, chiefdom of Xaragua, Ayiti
1500	Spanish authorities declare the island a Crown colony, Santo Domingo
1502	First Africans brought in slavery to Santo Domingo
1508	Indigenous rebellion in Higüey
1545	Maroon communities reach about seven thousand
1585–86	Siege of Santo Domingo by Sir Francis Drake
1605–6	Spanish authorities forcibly resettle colonists toward the southeast
1664	France names a governor in the west of the island, Saint-Domingue
1697	Treaty of Ryswick recognizes Saint-Domingue (west) and Santo Domingo (east)
1721	Revolt in Santo Domingo's Cibao valley against trade prohibitions with Saint-Domingue
1777	Treaty of Aranjuez fixes borders and authorizes trade
1791	Revolutionary fighting begins in Saint-Domingue
1793	Abolition won in Saint-Domingue
1795	Spain cedes Santo Domingo to France, midfighting
1796	Major rebellion at Boca Nigua sugar mill in Dominican territory

1801	General Toussaint Louverture reaches Santo Domingo; 1801 constitution affirms abolition
1802	Arriving French forces pursue Louverture, reestablish slavery in Santo Domingo
1804	Haiti proclaims independence
1805	Haitian emperor Jean-Jacques Dessalines invades Santo Domingo after direct threats from the French governor in the east
1806	Haiti fractures into a northern republic (kingdom, 1811) and southern republic
1808–9	Dominican rebels and allies expel French administration, reinstate Spanish flag
1810s	Multiple rebellions and conspiracies in Santo Domingo
1820	President Jean-Pierre Boyer reunifies Haiti
1821	Dominican independentists proclaim the Independent State of Spanish Haiti
1822	Unification of the whole island begins; Boyer abolishes slavery in the east for a second time
1825	France demands an “indemnity” to cease its aggression toward the island
1838	Haiti and France renegotiate payments; abolition in British Caribbean islands
1842	Major earthquake devastates Cap-Haïtien and other towns
1843	Reform movements threaten Boyer; Dominican politicians ponder French annexation; Boyer flees
1844	Unification ends, Dominican Republic proclaimed; antislavery rebellion and repression in Cuba
1840s	Restrictive labor codes passed in Danish West Indies, other nearby islands
1854	Dominican treaty with United States fails over popular opposition

1856	Haitian emperor Faustin Soulouque rebuffed from an invasion attempt on the east, his last
1857	Cibao politicians rebel against the administration in the Dominican capital
1859	President Fabre Nicholas Geffrard restores republican government to Haiti
1861	Spain annexes Dominican territory as the province of “Santo Domingo” once more



Figs. 0.1 and 0.2 Monuments to guerrilla fighters, Santiago de los Caballeros. Photos by author, 2008.



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Introduction

ROOTS AND BRANCHES OF THE TREE OF LIBERTY

Listen, then: there is an Antille
in the middle of the Caribbean sea
that gets light and life
from the sun of Liberty

—MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ OBJÍO, “Mi patria” (1868)

After dark on a late spring night in 1864, an anonymous group toppled a towering palm tree, the Tree of Liberty, in the town square of Santo Domingo. Planted by officials from Jean-Pierre Boyer’s administration four decades earlier, the tree represented a celebration of Dominican emancipation, independence, and the unification of the former Spanish colony with the revolutionary Haitian state.¹ Those who won abolition in 1822 called themselves “freedmen of the Palm.” The tree grew just meters from the plaza’s whipping post.² The unification of Santo Domingo and Haiti lasted for more than two decades before it dissolved, and a mobilization in the east created a separate republic. The night the palm fell, however, independence had vanished. A colonial slave power ruled Dominican territory again, warships threatened Port-au-Prince, and fighting raged throughout the east. Spanish troops, who controlled the Dominican capital, moved into free black neighborhoods and other parts of the city to prevent protests over the tree’s destruction.³ “*The tree of our glories is toppled to the ground,*” a Dominican poet decried, imploring, “Brave Dominicans, why do you suffer so much insult?”⁴

We Dream Together considers anticolonial struggle in an island at the heart of Caribbean emancipation and independence, Hispaniola, Quisqueya,

or Ayiti.⁵ Spanish Santo Domingo was the oldest site of indigenous decimation and European colonial settlement in the Americas, as well as the first nucleus of sugar slavery and marronage. The French colony of Saint-Domingue, established in the west of the island, gave the world nearly one-third of its sugar, at a staggering human cost. Tremendous upheaval from 1791 to 1804—a collection of struggles that became known as the Haitian Revolution—swept the whole island and region into pitched battles for freedom. One might easily extend the dates of emancipation and independence fighting to include the military campaign of Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1805, when a French governor, poised in the east of the island, threatened to capture and enslave Haitian children across the mountains. The dates of revolutionary struggle might include the 1810s, when French warships arrived repeatedly and the northern Haitian empire braced for war, as whole cities emptied at the threat of battle. They might even extend into the 1820s, as so-called indemnity payments to France for recognition and independence rocked the Haitian administration, then extended to the whole island. They might extend into the 1850s, the first time both states on the island, now separated, had anything like regular international recognition. In 1861, however, an eastern leader gave the Dominican Republic back to Spain, a slave power. Fighting was not over.

We Dream Together recounts the immense opposition to self-rule directed toward the island and a popular Dominican and Haitian mobilization, when the Dominican Republic was annexed back to Spain, to defend that autonomy at any cost. The Dominican Republic and Haiti, two countries with important postslavery peasantries born of marronage and revolution, grappled with state making as anti-emancipation voices grew the loudest, as slavers continued to ferry tens of thousands of people past their shores, and as new imperial projects deepened.⁶ Atlantic empires were in a moment of profound transition. Power shifted in the Gulf of Mexico, where plantation regimes faltered but indenture expanded, large swaths of Central America changed hands, steam power and canal projects loomed, and U.S. interests grew. In domestic contests and imperial expansion, the hemisphere was an uneven geography of slavery and precarious sites of refuge. Although Spanish authorities promised they would protect free labor in Dominican territory, administrators dreamed of new projects of agricultural production, settler colonization, and labor control. Dominican elites shared the same hopes. Rural residents, who organized their lives with their own authority networks, confronted both these domestic and occupying authorities simultaneously.

In response to Spanish reoccupation in 1861, whole communities left their homes, made new alliances, burned down their own towns, and risked their lives. They did so collectively, despite divisive elite narratives and with barely any resources. Their commitment was unrelenting, even as Spanish authorities sent a host of warships to defeat them. Over a two-year period, more than fifty thousand troops arrived from Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico to crush the rebels, as Spain poured millions into military offense.⁷ Not even prominent military men had control over the insurgents, who grew more radical in the course of the fighting. Residents of the island, fully immersed in Civilization's assault, forged lucid, alternative solidarities. They defended self-government and community, confronting opposition from both domestic and imperial authorities. They fought, explicitly, against the reestablishment of slavery, and they understood the stakes of their battles to reach far beyond the island. In their victory, guerrilla fighting spread from the island to the rest of Spain's Caribbean empire. Many demands and solidarities of the rebellion, however, like rural freedom in Santo Domingo, quickly became obscure to record and memory beyond the island. They were written in battle, even at home.

Severing Colonial Bonds

A common refrain in the present-day Dominican Republic reminds listeners that the country was "the only one in the hemisphere" to become independent from another American state, when politicians of the territory proclaimed separation from Haiti in 1844. This aphorism is not true, of course, as Panamanians, Ecuadorians, Belizeans, Uruguayans, or others could affirm. Extrication from formal European colonialism, the settling of borders, the forming and re-forming of federations, and lasting regional divides bedeviled new national projects. In cases like Paraguay's border conflicts with Brazil and Argentina in the 1860s, nationalist mobilizations and the settling of borders caused tremendous bloodshed. Although leaders compared vociferously, Santo Domingo's conflicts were minor in comparison.⁸ Regional fissures nagged, however, even grew. Economic and political divisions caused powerful residents of León to tangle with Granada, Córdoba with Buenos Aires, Les Cayes with Port-au-Prince, Santiago with Santo Domingo, Quetzaltenango with Guatemala City. Proponents of federalism tangled with centralists, regional leaders competed for power, and divisions proliferated. Leaders vied, variously and alongside their constituents and clients, for local authority or centralized government. One constitution followed another. These fissures brought Venezuela to bloody civil war in 1858, for example, in

battles that often drew on questions of racism, land tenure, political rights, and the very idea of autonomy itself. Limited economic integration and independent peasantries made leaders' wishful centralization more difficult. The only way to avoid tyranny was for rule by "cumaneses in Cumaná; apureños in Apure," combatants earnestly argued.⁹ Where growing U.S. aggression in the Gulf of Mexico disrupted sovereignty and divided elites, state consolidation became all the more difficult.¹⁰

Old colonial divides carved up and united Hispaniola. After Columbus initiated a violent process of Spanish attacks and settlement, European powers recognized the island as juridically Spanish for more than one hundred years. French adventurers reached the western part of the island in the seventeenth century; after a series of battles, Spain recognized French Saint-Domingue in 1697. In the intense colonial milieu of Caribbean empire—as imperial powers tacked back and forth for way stations, plantations, geopolitical influence, and brutally gleaned profits—division of the island had ample precedent. The Dutch and the French had divided Saint Martin (Soualiga) in two, just decades before. Many more Caribbean sites, including nearby Jamaica, had simply changed hands at the muzzle of a cannon. Symbiotically, Santo Domingo and Saint-Domingue grew together. Just as the Middle Colonies formed part of a greater slave system that connected to the U.S. South, so were the cattle, hides, and foodstuffs of Santo Domingo directly essential to the functioning of the deadly, and growing, plantations in Saint-Domingue. Dominican colonists fought to break mercantilist restrictions across the island. Like many other Caribbean plantation landscapes, the two colonies were nodes of an interdependent system.¹¹ By the late eighteenth century, Dominican elites sought to parlay profits into more slavery of their own. Their hopes were similar to those of the elites in Cuba, whose plantation aspirations were rising simultaneously.¹² As elite supplicants vied for state attention, ranchers and a flourishing peasantry continued to trade. The population quadrupled.¹³ And then, in 1791, revolutionary fighting exploded.


Dominicans' independence unfolded over decades, propelled by this fighting. Revolution in French Saint-Domingue engulfed the whole island. Spanish authorities, after abetting western rebels for a time, hastily ceded Dominican territory to France. Toussaint Louverture, claiming a French mandate, reached Santo Domingo. Four Dominicans signed Louverture's 1801 constitution, which abolished slavery on Dominican soil for the first time.¹⁴ After Louverture's defeat, however, two successive French generals

occupied the Dominican capital, threatening newly independent Haiti. Both generals were pro-slavery, and the latter introduced unpopular new taxes.¹⁵ In this light, one can see the 1808–9 Dominican effort to expel them and to restore a Spanish flag—even as other territories in Latin America were beginning to mobilize for independence—as a devolution of authority back to the island, a battle against French domination on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁶ A party of Dominicans and Puerto Rican allies, aided by British ships and Haitian munitions, expelled the French occupation. A Dominican stepped in as a Spanish figurehead. He ruled by verbal edict, and he made significant diplomatic entreaties to the independent Haitian states, now split into a northern kingdom and a southern republic.¹⁷ For more than a decade, as Spanish authorities practically ignored the territory, colonial sovereignty eroded. Dominican conspirators regularly appealed to Haitian rulers for arms and support for the many revolts and conspiracies that ensued, and pro-unification plans emerged.¹⁸ Dominican residents of center-island towns held ceremonies that celebrated Haitian independence.¹⁹ Authors of a brief independence conspiracy in 1821 sought to link the territory, to be called “Spanish Haiti,” to Gran Colombia, in a scheme that would have maintained slavery. Within two months, however, a wave of Dominican support ushered in Haiti’s president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, into the eastern capital.²⁰ Boyer was a republican who had defeated the northern monarch, King Henry I. Boyer proclaimed Dominican emancipation for a second time on 9 February 1822, as the colony became part of Haiti. Officials planted the Tree of Liberty less than two weeks later.²¹ The whole island was now Haiti, the only independent nation in the Caribbean. One man later remembered Dominicans everywhere expressed solidarity with their “new fellow co-citizens,” independent at last.²²

For the next twenty-two years of political unification, stability reigned. Emancipation proceeded smoothly. In the former Dominican capital, many freedmen joined the ranks of the African Battalion, two regiments of freedmen in the city who also regularly welcomed escapees from neighboring islands. Outside of the capital, where sugar plantations had endured, families reclaimed the land. Small, local, unprocessed sugar production continued. In eastern cattle country, little changed.²³ New communities of regional migrants fleeing slavery formed on the northern coast. In urban settings, it is likely that proponents of “vernacular citizenship” demanded, fundamentally, new recognition and stature.²⁴ Dominican elites grudgingly admitted, “Boyer’s measures [were] very just,” even as they complained about his policies of “spreading

employment and official recognition indistinctly among people of this and that color.”²⁵ Coffee, tobacco, and wood selling thrived, with direct encouragement from Port-au-Prince.²⁶ The reach of the government into rural areas all over the island, however, was minimal. As if by some miracle, the regime endured for two decades, despite the fragility of its infrastructure. Residents in most areas lived within networks that were centripetal to Port-au-Prince or Santo Domingo. Small ships traveled along the coast, because overland travel was prohibitively difficult. Travelers and migrants connected, sometimes furtively, port-town residents to islands and coasts near and far. They articulated “public rights,” positive claims to authority, belonging, and legal personhood, rooted in their own autonomy and in the independence of the island itself.²⁷

Years passed, and a whole new Dominican generation was born into Haiti’s autocratic, but defiant, republicanism. Residents of the unified island grew up with independence and emancipation while in close contact with migrants, sailors, travelers, and traders from islands where slavery was steadfast. The freedmen regiments guarded the pacific Dominican capital the whole time, led by veteran officers of the Haitian Revolution. Haiti’s constitution broadcast a welcome for people of color everywhere.²⁸ Groups of enslaved men and women from Jamaica arrived to the north coast in circuitous routes by small craft, hiding “under the lee of the Caicos reeds.”²⁹ Others from Puerto Rico and the United States chose the Dominican capital and other towns, as they had done even in decades before Dominican emancipation. Purposefully eluding official notice, they left few traces.³⁰ Dominicans lived free and independent for sixteen years before hundreds of thousands of their neighbors won full emancipation in the British West Indies. The unified administration, meanwhile, survived despite French threats and the ominous burden of Haiti’s so-called indemnity debt to France, which brought warships to Haitian shores. A veritable discursive defense industry sprang up in Haiti, defending black nationhood.³¹ Dominican writers defended the administration, too.³² Those arriving from the United States brought their own elegies about, and ideas of, Haitian freedom, as they joined and shaped various north coast communities.³³ Regionally, however, the island was entirely alone in political independence. All the islands in Dominicans’ immediate political and commercial sphere—Saint Thomas, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Jamaica, Curaçao, Puerto Rico, Cuba—remained colonized, and the waters percolated with illegal human traffic. No other Caribbean territory inched toward self-rule.



Map I.1 Map of settlement and rural spaces, ca. 1830. By Heather Rosenfeld. Adapted from Jean-Marie Dulix Théodat, *Haïti et la République dominicaine: Une île pour deux* (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 140, with the consultation of Neici Zeller and Raymundo González.

In early 1844, a small movement changed Dominican flags again, as dissidents in the east seceded and proclaimed a new state. Opponents, reform movements, and peasant opposition proliferated all over the island, from Les Cayes to Santo Domingo, fed up with Boyer's monopoly on the administration. Participants marveled at the pan-island catharsis from 1843 to 1844, during which "democracy flowed full to the brim."³⁴ Boyer fled the island, and the east seceded, all within a matter of months. At the time, the processes of early spring 1844 were commonly known as Separation. There was a fair amount of continuity, again, as the process unfolded. Dominican legislators merely adopted most of the articles of an 1843 joint reform constitution that almost ruled.³⁵ Moving forward in trying economic and political circumstances, politicians of Haiti and the Dominican Republic remained at once vulnerable and hopeful for greater integration. The nineteenth century, a journalist reported, was "the century of lights," and island elites expected it to shine on their own endeavors. "The world has taken on a new character . . . the fogs have disappeared and ignorance has taken refuge," another writer proclaimed.³⁶ Politicians praised Giuseppe Garibaldi, dreamed of participation in the rise of nations, and contemplated cash crop expansion. As in other states, debt, political and regional divisions, and frequent armed movements, driven by opponents with conscripted armies, challenged both administrations.³⁷ They warily took stock of the imperial climate, which

seemed only to be worsening. “Every nation is free, as small as it might be, and has the right to make its own laws,” the Dominican foreign minister proclaimed.³⁸

Emancipation, Empire, and Caribbean Freedom

Caribbean independence faced more menacing scrutiny than Latin America’s movements did. The liberation struggles of the Haitian Revolution unleashed an unrelenting torrent of international attention. Hemispheric master classes invoked Haiti’s existence as a specter of black rebellion, and they used the moment to shore up and expand their own plantation regimes.³⁹ As a direct response to Haiti’s independence, imperial authorities ruled surrounding islands in a state of exception.⁴⁰ After abolition in British and French islands, elites judged abolition to be a failure, compounding old discourses about the supposed dysfunction of sugar-island spaces with new layers of racist disappointment.⁴¹ Authorities paid indemnity to slaveholders, tidily celebrated their own beneficence, restricted the rights of the emancipated, capaciously expanded indenture, and resented, judged, and excoriated the tenacious efforts of individuals and communities to carve out spaces of autonomy, even where land was scarce.⁴² The fiction of experimentation, of “hopefulness,” Diana Paton observes, was “itself profoundly connected to coercion and to ideas of white superiority.”⁴³ Precisely through Caribbean emancipation, scientific racism enshrouded the putatively raceless liberal subject.⁴⁴ As plantation production declined—and postslavery peasantries grew—Britain opened up its islands to free trade, depressing prices further. Politicians began to recast the Caribbean sugar islands as an imperial burden, dependencies that a magnanimous, white empire would only have to bear as it expanded further.⁴⁵ British abolitionists envisaged Sierra Leone to be a refuge precisely in its capacity as an “anti-Caribbean” space where free labor would actually prevail.⁴⁶

Opposition to Caribbean self-rule fed on these anti-emancipation narratives, racist pseudoscience, and an increasingly voracious imperial appetite. Scholars described neat hierarchies of race cultures and fantasized about permanent subordination. White travelers journeyed from island to island and told the same story: that the freed communities of color they encountered (or rather imagined) were “lazy,” and their “wants . . . but few,” their religious practice “witchcraft,” their resolutions for self-governing, ultimately absurd.⁴⁷ Only force could compel these subjects to labor, imperial proponents argued. Maybe they would cease to exist entirely.⁴⁸ In the islands, political practice followed this useful pessimism. French authorities eliminated vot-

ing rights almost as soon as they were extended.⁴⁹ In Jamaica and other British possessions, white colonists deepened their commitment to empire and actively abnegated the island's self-rule. Independence, from the perspective of a white minority, was out of the question.⁵⁰ Caribbean indenture and new projects of Asian and African imperialism represented a global imperial promise that weathered, and even took strength from Caribbean abolition: unfree labor had an expanding territory, a brown or black face, and a lucrative future. As one U.S. southerner remarked, confidently, the increased interlinking of the world markets and imperial reach meant that the "civilized Nations of the Temperate Zone" would continue to profit from "tropical regions" after emancipation.⁵¹ Powerful English figures, relentless, argued that slavery should not have been abolished at all.⁵²

In the Spanish Caribbean forced labor and colonialism ruled. Sugar slavery dominated western Cuba, as planters reorganized, centralized, and expanded their holdings. Cuban planters, like their peers in the U.S. South and Brazil, had doubled down against emancipation, adopted technological innovation, expanded infrastructure, committed to the illegal slave trade, and profitably integrated brutal plantation regimes into growing international markets.⁵³ Colonial officials relied on elite loyalty in exchange for official undergirding of slavery.⁵⁴ Authorities made extensive inquiries into the reform and expansion of vagrancy laws, trying to draw rural and urban residents into state control.⁵⁵ In Puerto Rico, sugar and coffee production doubled from an amalgam of slave and free labor.⁵⁶ "Force could domesticate them externally, but they would continue internally to be bad citizens, disgruntled [*infelices*], and traitors, invisible enemies," one Puerto Rican official insisted.⁵⁷ Skepticism easily turned to persecution.⁵⁸ Nearly one in every four Cubans was enslaved, and the trade, though illegal, was massive. In Spain, abolitionist proponents amounted to "a voice in the wilderness."⁵⁹ Indenture complemented chattel trade. Spanish senator Argudín boasted that he planned the importation of forty thousand African "apprentices"; observers claimed he had struck a deal with the British to maintain slavery in Cuba until 1900.⁶⁰ Like pro-slavery advocates and imperial abolitionists alike, these authorities invoked the emancipated Caribbean as a specter. When the governor of Puerto Rico claimed that abolition led to "indolence and ruin," he directed his condemnation squarely at Haiti.⁶¹

Dominican separation from Haiti emerged at this precise midcentury moment of retrenchment and contest, in which Haiti faced a veritable "pro-slavery clamor," and pro-slavery entrenchment in the United States only grew louder.⁶² Mapmakers and politicians of nearby Latin American nations,

in their first decades of independence, increasingly distanced themselves from their own Caribbean shores, insisting that autonomy existed elsewhere. Intelligentsia in new nations like Costa Rica and Colombia invented normative Atlantic geographies, through which they drafted themselves outside of the Caribbean. Rather, they chose the “Atlantic” to bind them.⁶³ When representatives from Costa Rica, Mexico, New Granada, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela met to draft an emergency treaty meant to forestall U.S. incursion in the Caribbean and Central America in 1856, they did not invite either Haiti or the Dominican Republic, not only because they preferred not to but because neither had the formal recognition of the United States at all.⁶⁴ One African American author assessed Santo Domingo to be a dysfunctional, if fertile, space. He prescribed “Anglo-African empire” to better it.⁶⁵ Island politicians, keenly aware of the content and scope of discursive hostility, meticulously embraced Civilization’s precepts. Referring to his invitation to African Americans to settle in Haiti in 1824, President Boyer wrote that he was saving them from “the alternative of going to the barbarous shores of Africa.”⁶⁶ “Civilization is a fact in our days, a semiuniversal doctrine,” a Dominican politician opined, agreeing—but pessimism, violence, and anxiety pursued them.⁶⁷

The pact made by some Dominican elites in dialogue with hemispheric white supremacist and imperial pressures is infamous: effusive anti-Haitian intellectual production and racism. A vocal portion of Dominican elites blamed Haiti for their territory’s ills, and they did so, from the earliest years, in explicitly racist terms.⁶⁸ Like other hemispheric elites, writers in the capital embraced dichotomous language: of progress versus backwardness, civilization versus barbarism, order versus atavism, Christianity versus fetishism, and Providence versus disorder; in the absolute weakness of their administration, they externalized the entire narrative.⁶⁹ To Dominican writers’ distinct advantage, however, they conjured an external vector for their anxieties that outsiders readily embraced. A minority literate group in the Dominican capital and other towns, eager to cement distance between their national project and the west, began a furious anti-Haitian writing campaign. They excoriated Haiti’s black citizenship as exclusionary; they reassured international imperial audiences of Dominican eagerness for outside (white) investment and capital. Several Haitian military mobilizations—but, overwhelmingly, the relentless poverty and precarity of the Dominican Republic itself—inflamed their sentiments. White travelers, journalists, and politicians from slaveholding societies wholeheartedly agreed with, and amplified, these Dominican elites’ narrative of a race war on the island and

agreed that protections against capital were backward, if not monstrous.⁷⁰ Accordingly, they demonstrated a preoccupation with the whiteness of the Dominican Republic—as a calculus for its annexionability as well as victimhood—that bordered on obsessive.⁷¹ “The entire universe will judge between the haitians [sic] and the Dominicans,” a Dominican writer unctuously agreed, and these accounts dominated new national narratives.⁷²

Annexation, Belonging, and Sovereignty

Although scholars sometimes characterize Dominican annexationists as a uniquely conservative minority, politicians’ recourse to outside aid and territorial cession was quite common throughout the hemisphere.⁷³ Annexationism embodied the crux of elite, lettered anxiety over “race,” autonomy, and citizenship vis-à-vis a rural and nonwhite majority, regional divisions, a fractured partisan scene, economic difficulties, and imperial incursion. Especially in moments of economic necessity, politicians throughout the hemisphere toyed with outside intervention and territorial cession. Usually, these were short-term bargains to keep their own power against political opponents, but the projects sprang from a durable distrust of popular politics.⁷⁴ Annexation was an enduring psychological refuge and a political tactic. This experimentation was everywhere, but it was particularly enduring in the crucible of the Gulf of Mexico, where European powers, U.S. interests, and international pressures converged. Foreign reparations demands and outright aggression were common. Cuba’s annexationists knew they had willing U.S. ears. Some Mexican elites, in turn, looked eagerly to the island.⁷⁵ As political turmoil and poverty plagued them, many Dominican elites decided nationhood was uncertain, even undesirable. Foreign interest in the poor territory, which began slowly, quickly grew more pronounced. Dominican annexationists were markedly omnivorous in response, offering their struggling administration every which way: to Britain, Spain, the Low Countries, the United States, Sardinia, and especially France.⁷⁶ “They know perfectly well that their republic, without any other resource than the port taxes of a few boats and the printing of continually depreciating paper money, isn’t viable,” one visitor to Santo Domingo asserted smugly.⁷⁷

Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic in 1861 tested an Atlantic empire in transition. As other scholars have observed, facile narratives of Spanish imperial decline after the 1820s preempt discussion of the political contests that followed.⁷⁸ As U.S. expansion, antislavery resistance, and the threat of Caribbean independence movements loomed, Spanish reformers realized administrative restructuring that had been debated

since the independence movements several decades before, centralizing overseas administration. Constitutional representation remained in limbo, but Spain shared these debates with Britain, France, and other imperial powers that had not yet neatly codified distinctions between imperial and national subjects.⁷⁹ In settler projects on multiple continents, debates over incorporation and autonomy accelerated, vacillating between assimilation, association, and other models, as legislators circumscribed political inclusion along boundaries of lineage, “race,” and culture.⁸⁰ Many Spanish liberals supported federalism, popular in new Latin American states as well, as a means to politically integrate, and save, Spain’s Caribbean empire.⁸¹ Cuban political elites looked to U.S. annexation and to the models of semi-autonomous government in the British Caribbean and Canada with pointed cupidity.⁸² Simultaneously, Spanish authorities also quietly grappled with the idea of abolition in future decades. Puerto Rican plantation owners, without the capital to compete, tangled with the idea more immediately.⁸³ The Cuban governor, a driving force for annexation, proposed to incorporate the Dominican territory as a province without slavery, purposely to call the question of legislative unity and labor modes into debate. Once more, political impetus in the Caribbean catalyzed imperial debates.⁸⁴

Annexationists exulted, at the same time, in a heterodox diffusion of racialist thinking, nationalist rhetoric, and imperial force. Massive territorial grabs, armed filibusters, trade imbalances, and conspiracies facilitated the urgent fraternal language on which Spanish and Dominican annexationists traded. Expansion by the United States, piratic and powerful, catalyzed urgent debates over race and political destiny among Latin American politicians, who began to identify collectively as such.⁸⁵ The language of the rights of nations, self-determination, and federalism saturated both American and Spanish political discourse.⁸⁶ Dominican and Spanish annexationists considered that a shared *raza*—a racial collective of language, religion, culture, and “blood”—offered a workable paradigm for Dominican integration, a “language of affiliation.”⁸⁷ Dominican emissaries deployed fraternal narratives of Spanishness tactically in recognition missives, even as they made myriad appeals to other powers simultaneously. Just as in Central American contexts, their fraternity was a whitened one.⁸⁸ They asserted the existence of a “permanent war” with Haiti to an audience that was immediately receptive to a race-war paradigm. In response, Spanish annexationists traded on old revenge fantasies toward Haiti and lofty egalitarian promises in breezy tandem. Romantic language of racial destiny and voluntarism abetted utopian thinking and masked the violence of territorial gain. As other scholars

have observed, proponents of these utopias usually indulged in free-soil claims that belied explicit plans for racial hierarchy.⁸⁹ A U.S. filibuster, meanwhile, suggested that the Dominican Republic could become “another California.”⁹⁰ So the French consul dreamed of establishing a massive “immigrant empire” in Samaná.⁹¹ Unaware of the territory’s tiny and inconsistent electoral history, the Cuban governor enthusiastically swore not a single Spanish soldier would arrive until approved by universal suffrage.⁹²

As with other imperial projects, discursive justifications were window dressing for economic and strategic interests that drove Spanish policy. Keen enthusiasm for renewed colonial expansion, or at least the preservation of Spanish Caribbean power, outweighed discourse about prestige, the reclamation of Columbus’s island, and other florid narratives.⁹³ The territory’s potential value in staving off U.S. interests was paramount. The Samaná peninsula was perfectly located to establish a coaling station. “Samaná is to the Gulf of Mexico what Mayotta is to the Indian Ocean,” a British consul agreed. “It is not only the military, but also the commercial key of the Gulf.”⁹⁴ Around the new administration, the coterie of Dominican elites gathered who ascribed to proposed projects of labor control and indenture schemes, distanced from the Dominican rural majority.⁹⁵ “I give you a people without journalists and devoid of lawyers,” the Dominican president reportedly bragged.⁹⁶ Industrialists proposed a railroad “like the French have done from Puebla to Veracruz,” canals and communication infrastructure “like the English have done in India,” an import scheme “like Java or Mauritius,” and a naval station to “block the mouth of the Mississippi.”⁹⁷ Annexation was fundamentally experimental, but the Spanish officers felt confident that the moment demanded innovation. “Annexation of Santo Domingo is an event as rare as it is new . . . and it is beyond our normal rules,” the Cuban governor urged. “Many of the measures we ought to adopt must also be of a most special and very extraordinary character.”⁹⁸

International imperial powers, meanwhile, ignored Dominican elites’ pronouncements of Spanishness or, in fact, any narrative of Dominican agency. It was easy to imagine, in 1861, that an independent Caribbean nation might disappear. Massive territorial loss to the United States threw Mexican politics into a tailspin after 1848, Nicaraguans confronted armed conspiracies, and European groups launched a joint intervention in Mexico. These same countries deepened networks in Africa, moralized about so-called legitimate commerce, and mounted new plantation experiments. Commentators deployed toward the island the same benevolence narratives honed in other imperial sites. “The Christian and the Philanthropist must hail the event

which will put Hayti under any influence or dominion,” one pamphleteer declared.⁹⁹ “Dominicana has a government—so poets have empires,” a U.S. man concluded, predicting their demise.¹⁰⁰ A French columnist urged Spanish authorities to discard the voluntary pretext. “[Spain] would do better just simply to say that she is retaking Santo Domingo because she wants to,” he remarked dispassionately.¹⁰¹ Finally, other European powers looked with equanimity and even approval on Dominican annexation not only because they naturalized its absorption but because, at a crucial moment of U.S. weakness, Spanish annexation might forestall several decades of U.S. expansion in the Gulf. The timing was incredibly propitious. Just months before annexation began, states in the U.S. South began to secede, one by one.

The Living Nightmare of Slavery

Beyond the capital, confronting the critical test of annexation, were the people. A small canon of early national writing, from a tiny group of elites, obscures them relentlessly. As Raymundo González observes, elites’ “anti-peasant, racist mindset” sprang from their disdain for the very formation of the Dominican peasantry itself, which was born, in many areas, from an independent rural maroon population who worked on the margins of cattle society or entirely for their own subsistence.¹⁰² Elites were studiously silent on race not only out of putative republicanism but precisely in defiance of Haiti’s privileging of black citizenship. The relentless invective directed toward Haiti for its defense of black sovereignty compounded their silence further; Dominican elites defined the nation as the purposeful absence of these discussions.¹⁰³ As Haitian heads of state issued periodic invitations for African American migrants, Dominican ministers secretly wrote to agents in New York demurring any new schemes of black migration.¹⁰⁴ Rumors of black migrants’ arrival spurred alarm among officials, who wanted migrants from the Canary Islands, Spain, or another European country.¹⁰⁵ A submerged wave of popular politics burgeoned in the rural areas and towns, which elites minimized and denied as they gambled with foreign powers and renarrated Dominican identity. Politicians regularly ignored popular antiracism and anti-imperialism, even when it led to public protests, as they toyed with slave powers on a razor’s edge. Writers admitted that popular warnings about enslavement, for example, were an “eternal ghost . . . the nightmare of slavery,” but insisted they were a ridiculous relic, “from the time of Boyer.”¹⁰⁶

Most Dominicans left no written response. There was no planter class fastidiously observing them, no logbook, no epistolary archive. There was no

archivist even of the Dominican government for the first fifteen years of separation.¹⁰⁷ Rural residents lived outside of documentation regimes as they made lives from woodcutting, hunting, livestock, honey and wax, and limited coffee production.¹⁰⁸ Contraband, slow and small-scale migration, and the lived geographic linkages to nearby island towns and coasts produced little record. Transportation between any of the regions was difficult, usually undertaken by horse or mule. Carts, even small ones, were largely limited to the towns, further impeding trade.¹⁰⁹ Communities relied more on orality than the written word, personal distribution of justice rather than bureaucratic dissemination, local networks more than state ambit and resources, interpersonal obligations more than contracts, usufruct rights versus titled ownership, subsistence rhythms more than other parameters of time, and so on. As for labor, their governing logic was more the moral economy of a day's manual labor than "labor discipline" in any industrial iteration, slow or seasonal production and storage more than accumulation or capitalization, and a relative nonspecialization of labor, except perhaps along gendered lines. Like other peasantries with limited market production, there was little tying them to administrative centers.¹¹⁰ Their dispersal was a purposeful, centuries-old marronage.¹¹¹ As a contemporary observed from one central valley town, they were the children of slavery.¹¹²

We Dream Together explores a political consensus shared by this rural majority, and also by many in towns: vigilance over emancipation outside of plantation spaces, anticolonial commitment, keen understanding of the racism that surrounded them, and discourses of community and pride they articulated in response. Although they left no writing, seeking "collective biographies and community studies" reveals the many intersecting frames of a precarious entente.¹¹³ Dominican autonomy emerged out of decades of revolutionary fighting and struggle, of small-scale regional migration, interchange, and constant domestic conversations, vigilance, and esteem. Throughout the territory, Dominicans' commonsense assumptions differed gravely from the small group who held power in the capital. Understanding of emancipation and independence was grounded in generations of conversation and interchange, at the heart of popular sentiment, and directed to defense of the whole island against outside hostility, which many understood to be constant.¹¹⁴ Scholars of annexation often analyze it in nationalist terms. These interpretations tend to downplay domestic discussions about racism, which elites refused to record, as well as Dominicans' engagement with the ongoing battles over emancipation throughout the Caribbean.¹¹⁵ As with many rural would-be citizens throughout the hemisphere, Dominicans

shared a commitment to relative egalitarianism, general rights to political decision-making in one's community (a personhood more expansive than bourgeois citizenship), and a hybrid assemblage of positive rights, including that of military belonging.¹¹⁶ The most important of these rights was probably the right to the means of subsistence (that is, independence and land), and for many it also included a certain degree of autonomy from the reaches of a formal state. With annexation, their articulation became clear.¹¹⁷

The middle chapters of this book detail the immediate conflicts that Dominicans confronted in the new occupation, as the colonial project immediately betrayed Spain's fraternal promises. In the face of material scarcity and subsistence labor, administrators constantly produced colonial difference in narrative and practice. Their registers were marvel, classification, and disdain.¹¹⁸ Officials passed a series of reforms that were abrasive and alien, and the frank racism of everyday officials betrayed their explicitly race-blind mandates. Both parties felt they had preexisting knowledge of each other, and neither was pleased. The occupation was intimately linked to plantation slavery. The captain general of Cuba planned it, Spanish troops who had recently been stationed in Cuba guarded it, Cuban coffers funded expansion, and secret slaving missions buzzed the island's north coast as the Cuban governor celebrated the inauguration of Jefferson Davis.¹¹⁹ Even when the project was only a rumor, widespread rejection and anticolonial sentiment were evident in Dominican territory. One early small uprising over enslavement, quickly crushed, ought to have warned authorities of the conflicts to come. Legend grew around the man who had led the small revolt in the next two years after his trial and execution; residents said that he was very old, blind, heroic.¹²⁰ Within weeks of the first renewed rebellion, fighting exploded across the territory. Popular anticolonialism, republicanism, citizenship language, and ties of solidarity with Haiti flooded public discourse against the Spanish, which became known as the War of Restoration.

The rebellion gave voice to rural politics, trenchant critiques of colonial despotism, and republican and democratic ideas that outpaced feasible implementation. As in many rural uprisings, including the Haitian Revolution, authorities had little inkling of the scale of the battle before them.¹²¹ Everyone commented, in awe, on the popular nature of the war. "The current revolution was the masses rising up, dragging the rest with them," a town resident marveled.¹²² The Dominican former president supposed that the mobilization was a military one, that he could simply neutralize the uprising by going after prominent opponents. He was wrong; the rebellion was more massive and more total than anything that had come before in his lifetime.¹²³

Fear of reenslavement, particularly, electrified the whole territory. These slavery discussions, which Spanish authorities characterized as “rumor,” were rather a precise window into the living discussions of autonomy, an unwritten assessment of Caribbean emancipation as news of other contests reached Dominican shores, and only lastly a response to the precipitously arrived new state.¹²⁴ They were ubiquitous, and the fighting spread like a whirlwind. Whole families left towns and refused to return. Rebels barely had munitions, but they were willing to burn their own towns to destroy Spanish advantage. The Spanish were exasperated. “In Santo Domingo one fights against invisible enemies,” one lamented, “chasing ghosts.”¹²⁵

Rebels had heterogeneous tactics, allegiances, and goals. The war had no front line. As in other Caribbean contests, Dominicans and their allies resisted the Spanish troops in local networks that were constantly shifting, with very little outside help.¹²⁶ They called on decades of experience. Mobilization—even the very language of it—called on the island’s shared military history.¹²⁷ Average soldiers who had previously fought for separation came to call for reunification.¹²⁸ Prominent generals espoused a range of ideologies. Like other midcentury leaders, their language was capacious, often contradictory, with ample space for pragmatism.¹²⁹ As with the loyalists, there was a portion of the rebel leadership who clung to an absolute silence on race, who insisted any mention of it was “unprincipled,” that their fight was one of raceless national liberation.¹³⁰ All these leaders made overtures to the Haitian president, however, calling on his republicanism. Members of the newly formed Provisional Government extolled, “Liberty! Liberty! Poetry in every language!”¹³¹ As the fighting continued, a more radical leadership grew to share popular irreverence toward civilizationist claims, and their anticolonial vocabulary became more explicit. Their overtures to Haiti, especially, reflected a “black recognitionist” discourse.¹³² They praised the real democracy of Restoration ranks, called for direct suffrage, and moved to forge lasting alliances with other anticolonial activists. Other leaders, in horror, sought to topple them.

Dominicans and their Haitian allies defeated the Spanish in 1865, with the rapt attention of regional neighbors and increasing anticolonial ties. One Spanish senator invoked the Haitian Revolution and recent rebellions in India when he called, in vain, for a massive troop surge to crush them.¹³³ News of Spanish defeat spread even faster than in earlier decades, as prisoners, travelers, missives, elegies, newspapers, sailors, and returning troops circulated descriptions of Hispaniola’s triumph. Dominican rebel leaders traveled, too, reaching Curaçao, Saint Thomas, Venezuela, New York, Grand

Turk, Haiti, Mayagüez, and numerous other ports. Together with other anticolonial activists from other islands, they acted with a keen sense of a heroic and historic present. The fighting inaugurated a period, much like Latin American independence that preceded it, that was “improvised and reactive . . . [a] time of macrosocial change.”¹³⁴ Plans for an independent Caribbean federation bloomed. The fraternity that bound them was hybrid and multiple.¹³⁵ Rulers came and went; some stayed long past their welcome. Rebels often found themselves in outright antistate alliances. But new anticolonial alliances formed; imperial pressure constantly renewed them. Coastal towns served as vital regional outposts centuries after their outsize importance in the construction of Caribbean empire.

The Dominican War of Restoration coincided with, and contributed to, a renewal of emancipation energy, won through tenacious, constant fighting. As independence and antislavery fighting began in Cuba, Hispaniola provided concrete and ideological refuge in a deeply transcolonial space.¹³⁶ Intra-Caribbean migration accelerated, as thousands left for seasonal work, and steam travel, for some residents, made the Caribbean smaller by increments.¹³⁷ Even those who were not supporters of pan-Caribbean federation readily admitted its feasibility. “The idea of the ‘Antillean League’ can be realized one day, the day that Great Britain gives its permission . . . , so the Spanish Government should open its eyes,” predicted one prominent Dominican liberal.¹³⁸ Idealists rallied for political “regeneration” and fraternal, voluntary alliances that could bridge political divides, defeat logistical difficulties, and overturn absolutism. Technological changes like the telegraph abetted their sense of the possible. “This is quite an era in [the] West Indian story,” a visiting Jamaican man remarked.¹³⁹ In a hard won moment, optimists felt like all tides might rise, that Providence and progress might uplift everyone.¹⁴⁰

Independence and Sacrifice

Independence came at a high cost. Imperial threats and state fragility kindled the new political experiments. As with other new states, on Hispaniola there were “a number of competing utopias,” political frames that ranged from regional autonomy, to larger federations, to projects of sheer personal ambition.¹⁴¹ Coalitions of guerrilla fighters trickled apart as the fighting ended, as individuals and families returned to their homes in a devastated landscape. In the division and exhaustion on Dominican soil, a wealthy, prominent political figure, a familiar face, handily reclaimed power. Once again there was a widening of the distance between popular visions and

the praxis of those at the helm. Foreign attention, and loan offers, loomed. There existed a “mercantile oligarchy, that has never been Dominican, and has always used any means to realize its traitorous plans,” one veteran protested, in exasperation.¹⁴² After Restoration fighting, opponents of annexation still felt the danger acutely. The scope of their imagination sprang not just from optimism but also from the relative insecurity of the two nations themselves, and possibility took root not only from a hostile international climate but also from internal regionalism, separatism, fracture, and repression. Many idealists lived lives of almost constant fighting. In “stable . . . instability,” life went on.¹⁴³

Popular solidarities, forged by Dominicans, Haitians, and their neighbors, faced concrete and discursive opposition. Dominican elites renarrated the fighting even as it was happening. Within forty years, an unrecognizable narrative expunged all of the uncertainty, all plural visions, and all of the contests of the period. A small group of writers supplanted them with tales of the heroism of a single blond-haired, blue-eyed man who was barely in Dominican territory at all during these decades, Juan Pablo Duarte.¹⁴⁴ They re-remembered separation from Haiti as cataclysmic and the devotion of the Dominican public to nation as unwavering and inevitable.¹⁴⁵ In the gendered memory production of military glory, authors redrafted women’s signal contribution to Restoration fighting into larger narratives of abnegation.¹⁴⁶ Through the eyes of an exile narrative, in fact, the nation became a morality tale of tragedy, sacrifice, and obedience for most Dominicans.¹⁴⁷ Outsiders minimized and marginalized the guerrilla war, too, in decades that followed. With independence and pan-Caribbean organizing famously described as “Cuba and Puerto Rico, two wings of the same bird,” the geographic body, in the form of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, sustains the wings without mention.¹⁴⁸ In the wake of these willful counternarratives, authors work hard to recover the neglected historiographical space for Haitian political thought in the east, when elites sought to silence it most avidly.¹⁴⁹ Popular memories eluded this erasure, refused silencing, and frustrated the discipline of these unitary narratives. So Dominican authorities must have worried, when they arrested a group of men and women for commemorating the War of Restoration with vodou rites during Trujillo’s dictatorship sixty years later, in the heart of the capital.¹⁵⁰

Being alive on Hispaniola in those decades, on either side of the island, kindled a constant and vigilant defense of autonomy itself. President Boyer’s Tree of Liberty on Dominican soil—adopted, embraced, toppled, mourned, forgotten—exemplifies the vibrant faith in autonomous citizenship, born of

the revolution, that emerged on both sides of the island and endured across generations, but that always faced incredible contest. In a critical moment in a fight for self-rule, many Dominican rebels overwhelmingly rejected divisive narratives that had brought about annexation itself. In their solidarity, enduring and obvious, Haitian citizens helped them frankly, repeatedly, generously, and simply because their own survival was also at stake. It was a collection of battles that escaped the control of the leaders for a time. In the political and military contests that followed, these active negotiations continued. Investment, capitalization, and industrialization loomed, but neither the rate, nor the authors, nor the impact was predetermined. One writer described the pitched struggle that persisted: “Tyranny and liberty fight each other tenaciously and fiercely: the first are all the forces of hate and desperation, the second, love for the homeland and hope for the future.”¹⁵¹

Notes

Abbreviations

AGI	Archivo General de Indias (Spain)
AGN-RD	Archivo General de la Nación–República Dominicana
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
AMAE	Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Madrid
ANC	Archivo Nacional de Cuba
Anexión	Fondo Anexión
AP	Asuntos Políticos
<i>BAGN</i>	<i>Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación</i>
BNE	Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid
BNJM	Biblioteca Nacional José Martí (Cuba)
CH	Colección Herrera
Clío	<i>Revista Clío, Órgano de la Academia Dominicana de la Historia</i>
CO	Colonial Office
Copiador	Índice General de Libros Copiadores de la Sección RREE, AGN-RD
Cuba	Papeles de Cuba
FO	Foreign Office
NARA	National Archives (U.S.)
RREE	Relaciones Exteriores
SD	Santo Domingo
s/f	sin fecha
SHM	Servicio Histórico Militar, Madrid
TNA	The National Archives, Kew (U.K.)

Introduction

1. Vicioso, *El freno hatero*, 144; Mella, *Los espejos de Duarte*, 198. Some Dominican scholars refer to the period of Unification (1822–44) as “occupation” (e.g., Núñez Grullón, *Evolución constitucional dominicana*, 17). More recent studies limit “occupation” to the first weeks of unification between the two territories during which—despite obvious support from citizens in a number of Dominican towns and a pacific reception of the transition generally—a large number of Haitian troops were present to realize the change in flag (Lora Hugi, *Transición*, 47).
2. Mella, *Los espejos de Duarte*, 197–98.
3. Castro Ventura, *La Guerra Restauradora*, 236. Spanish troops occupied San Lorenzo de los Mina and built new guard posts in Pajarito (Villa Duarte) and San Carlos.
4. José Francisco Pichardo, “A la palma de la libertad: Indignamente derribada en la noche del 9 de mayo de 1864,” in Rodríguez Demorizi, *Santana y los poetas*, 342 (emphasis in original).
5. “Hispaniola” comes from the moniker that Columbus gave the island, “La Española.” The etymology of “Quisqueya,” reportedly an Arawak word for “mother of all lands,” is more controversial, first reported by Italian historian Peter Martyr d’Anghiera, who had never traveled to the island; some emphasize that its popularity is a result of an aversion to using “Haiti” (San Miguel, *Crónicas de un embrujo*, 76). Haiti or Ayiti, conversely, was widely recorded as an Arawak name for the island meaning “mountainous land.” Furthermore, it had a vibrant place in the nineteenth-century island political lexicon after its deliberate adoption by statemakers in the west in 1804 (Geggus, “Naming of Haiti”). Dominican independentists of late 1821 hoped to create “Spanish Haiti” in the east; the whole island was Haiti for a time, from 1822 to 1844. After Dominican separation, Dominican use of “Haiti” to refer to the whole island subsided, but rebels revived it during anti-Spanish fighting. Poet Manuel Rodríguez Objío pointedly gestured to a breadth of invocations, imagining, “Your former inhabitants, in patriotic cry, sometimes they called it Quisqueya, sometimes they called it Haiti” (qtd. in Vicioso, *El freno hatero*, 291–92). I will use “Hispaniola,” as it is the most commonly used name for the island in English. Although it lends particular credence to the imperial record, invoking that aggression is perhaps appropriate to recount the events that transpired. Where its interlocutors invoked it, I will also use “Haiti.”
6. Mintz, *Caribbean Transformations*, 132–33; Casimir, *La culture opprimée*; González, *De esclavos a campesinos*; González, “War on Sugar.” Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, interprets the early 1800s as an accelerating imperial transition, rather than a lull.

7. Castro Ventura, *La Guerra Restauradora*, 160.
8. Narratives of conflict with Haiti had multiple uses. As in Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, willful print propagandists hoped to foment popular mobilization and national allegiance, in addition to making appeals to outside powers simultaneously (Huner, "Toikove Ñane Retã!").
9. Plaza, "God and Federation," 140.
10. In the case of Nicaragua, for example, see Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream*; Wolfe, *Everyday Nation-State*; in Mexico, see, e.g., Paní, *El segundo imperio*; Ibsen, *Maximilian, Mexico, and the Invention of Empire*.
11. Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery*; Giusti-Cordero, "Beyond Sugar Revolutions," 58–83; Cromwell, "More Than Slaves and Sugar," 770–83.
12. Ferrer, *Freedom's Mirror*; Schneider, *Occupation of Havana*.
13. González, *De esclavos a campesinos*; Moya Pons, *Historia colonial de Santo Domingo*.
14. Dubois and Garrigus, *Slave Revolution in the Caribbean*, 36; Ferrer, *Freedom's Mirror*; Cordero Michel, *La revolucion haitiana y Santo Domingo*; Nessler, *Island-Wide Struggle for Freedom*; Yingling, "Colonialism Unraveling"; Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti*.
15. Nessler, "The Shame of the Nation."
16. Adelman, "Age of Imperial Revolution," 336.
17. Sánchez Ramírez, *Diario de la Reconquista*.
18. Paredes Vera, "La Constitución de 1812," 110; Lora Hugi, "El sonido de la libertad," 127; Eller, "All Would Be Equal in the Effort," 128, 132.
19. Pierrot and McIntosh, "Henry/Nehri."
20. Dajabón, Monte Cristi, Santiago de los Caballeros, Las Caobas, Las Matas de Farfán, San Juan, Neiba, Azua, La Vega, Bánica, Hinch, and the northern port city of Puerto Plata all issued proclamations in support of the pending unification (Lora Hugi, *Transición*, 46–49; Paredes Vera, "La Constitución de 1812," 136; Janvier, *Haïti et ses visiteurs*, 601). In fact residents raised the Haitian flag in Monte Cristi, Dajabón, and Beler in November 1821, two weeks before the Colombian one was (briefly) raised in the south (Mackenzie, *Notes on Haïti*, 235).
21. Alemar, *Escritos*, 185. As a successor to Pétion, Boyer was a known entity to political observers in the Dominican capital. Fledgling periodical *El Duende* looked admiringly on Boyer's leadership skills (*El Duende*, no. 1, 15 April 1821, 1; no. 8, 3 June 1821, 1).
22. Lora Hugi, *Transición*, 46.
23. Lora Hugi, *Transición*, 73.
24. McGraw, *Work of Recognition*, 6–7.
25. Francisco Brenes qtd. in Castro Ventura, *Duarte en la proa*, 48.
26. Lora Hugi, *Transición*, 46; Jimenes Grullón, *La República Dominicana*, 132. Tobacco production nearly quadrupled in the Cibao, although farming

technology remained fairly primitive; wood exports increased significantly as well (Betances, “Agrarian Transformation,” 61). Contemporary observers attested that the east-to-west cattle trade increased and that commerce from Cap, Gonaïves, Saint Marc, Port-au-Prince, and Jacmel spread to some centers of the east (“American Intrigues in St. Domingo, II,” *The Anti-slavery Reporter* 7, no. 2 [1859]: 29–31).

27. Scott, “Public Rights and Private Commerce.”
28. Ferrer, “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery.”
29. Harris, “Summer on the Borders,” 152.
30. Lockward, *Documentos*, 222.
31. See, among many others, Pompée-Valentin baron de Vastey, *Colonial System Unveiled*; Bissette, *Réfutation du livre de M. V. Schoelcher*; Bongie, *Friends and Enemies*; Nicholls, “Work of Combat”; Daut, “‘Alpha and Omega’ of Haitian Literature.”
32. Prominent Dominican political figures explicitly condemned 1830s Spanish missions to reclaim the territory and dubbed Boyer “an angel of peace”; others penned poetry in praise of Boyer’s regime (Cassá, *Personajes dominicanos*, 167; de Granda, “Un caso de planeamiento lingüístico frustrado,” 209). Many pro-Boyer texts may have later been destroyed (Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed*, 181).
33. Puig Ortiz, *Emigración*; Hidalgo, “From North America to Hispaniola”; Hoetink, “Americans in Samaná”; Fleszar, “‘My Laborers in Haiti Are Not Slaves’”; Fanning, *Caribbean Crossing*.
34. Qtd. in Sheller, “Army of Sufferers,” 43–44.
35. Lockward, *La Constitución Haitiano-Dominicana*.
36. “La union constituye la fuerza,” *El Dominicano*, no. 1, 29 June 1855, 1; “La Historia de El Duende,” *El Progreso*, no. 17, 12 June 1853, 6.
37. Pani, *El segundo imperio*, 104; Soto, *La conspiración monárquica en México 1845–6*; Andrés, “Colonial Crisis and Spanish Diplomacy,” 328.
38. *Índice General de Libros Copiadores de la Sección RREE, AGN-RD* (hereafter cited as *Copiadador*), 13 June 1848.
39. A small sampling of the flourishing scholarship on the immediate impact of the Haitian Revolution includes James, *Black Jacobins*; Scott, “Common Wind”; Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*; Geggus, *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution*; Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens*; Garraway, *Tree of Liberty*; Ferrer, *Freedom’s Mirror*; Clavin, *Toussaint Louverture and the American Civil War*; White, *Encountering Revolution*; Johnson, *Slavery’s Metropolis*.
40. Spieler, “Legal Structure of Colonial Rule during the French Revolution.”
41. Brown, *Reaper’s Garden*; Schmidt-Nowara, *Slavery, Freedom, and Abolition*. Planters wrote of the necessity of slavery: “For proof, look to Jamaica, San Domingo, Hayti” (“Negro Slavery,” *Southern Cultivator* 20, nos. 5–6 [May–June 1862]: 110.
42. Lightfoot, *Troubling Freedom*; Besson, *Martha Brae’s Two Histories*.
43. Paton, “Revisiting No Bond but the Law.”

44. Among the very rich body of works, see these texts: Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*; Holt, “‘Empire over the Mind’ ” and *Problem of Freedom*; Hall, *Civilising Subjects*; Rugemer, *Problem of Emancipation*; Newton, *Children of Africa*; Kazanjian, *Brink of Freedom*.
45. Hall, “Nation Within and Without.”
46. Lambert, *Mastering the Niger*; for similar discourses about Liberia, see Kazanjian, *Brink of Freedom*.
47. Breen, *St. Lucia*, 240–59.
48. See, for example, Hall, *Civilising Subjects*; Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings*.
49. Peabody, “France’s Two Emancipations,” 34.
50. Holt, *Problem of Freedom*.
51. Karp, “The World the Slaveholders Craved,” 418. Pro-slavery voices praised the new cotton projects using indentured labor in Guiana, Trinidad, and other sites (Elliott, *Cotton Is King*, 144).
52. De Barros, *Reproducing the British Caribbean*, 28; Hall, *Civilising Subjects*, 22, 48; Rugemer, *Problem of Emancipation*, 263.
53. Ferrer, *Freedom’s Mirror*; Tomich, “Wealth of Empire,” 5–6.
54. Martínez-Fernández, *Torn between Empires*, 17–18.
55. Figueroa, *Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom*, 167; Picó, *Al filo del poder*, 52.
56. Laviña, “Puerto Rico,” 103.
57. Figueroa, *Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom*, 36.
58. Reid-Vazquez, *Year of the Lash*; Finch, *Rethinking Slave Rebellion*.
59. Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba*, 153; see also Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Anti-slavery*.
60. Philadelphia, “Friends’ Intelligencer,” no. 13, 13 September 1856, 408.
61. Puerto Rican governor Rafael Aristegui to Spanish minister of state, 15 November 1844, qtd. in Febres-Cordero Carrillo, “La anexión,” 80; Ruffin, *Diary of Edmund Ruffin*, 291.
62. Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti*, 121; Rugemer, *Problem of Emancipation*.
63. Putnam, “Ideología racial, práctica social y estado liberal en Costa Rica”; Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory*. Mainland Caribbean areas—coastal Venezuela and Colombia, for example—further erased Caribbean regional connections in favor of a continental Latin American identification (Gómez, “Entwining the Revolutions”).
64. Gobat, “Invention of Latin America,” 1363.
65. Harris, “Summer on the Borders.”
66. Dewey and Boyer, *Correspondence Relative to the Emigration to Hayti*, 11.
67. B. F. Rojas, “A los dominicanos,” 11 June 1865, qtd. in Rodríguez Demorizi, *Actos y doctrina*, 394.
68. Henríquez Ureña, *Panorama histórico de la literatura dominicana*, 69. On the durability of these narratives, see, for example, Torres-Saillant, “Blackness and Meaning in Studying Hispaniola.”

69. Wolfe, *Everyday Nation-State*, 171–72.
70. “Exclusivism . . . isolated from humanity,” Dominican president Báez inveighed in 1850 (Lockward, *Documentos*, 133). For a contextualizing of these isolation narratives in a slightly earlier period, see Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*.
71. Out of direct imperial interests and an irrepressible urge to excoriate Haiti, outside travelers and eager capital city elites argued for flagrant contrasts on the island along multiple tacks: that there was no racism in the republic, that Dominicans were white-identifying, and that good Dominican patriots hated Haiti (Candelario, *Black behind the Ears*, chap. 1; Martínez-Fernández, *Torn between Empires*, 41–42; Eller, “Awful Pirates and Hordes of Jackals”). Their preoccupation continued unabated for decades. One author pleaded that the United States remain neutral in any island conflict, for example, but only because the story of “130,000 white Dominicans” was a “pious fraud” (Clark, *Remarks upon United States Intervention in Hayti*).
72. “Al Público,” *El Dominicano*, no. 1, 19 September 1845, 1.
73. This literature often separates the annexationism of the small group in power (e.g., Álvarez López, *Dominación colonial*, 11, 33; Betances, “Social Classes,” 23) from another undercurrent in the Cibao valley, less systematically discussed (e.g., Marte, *Correspondencia*, 63), or even from pro-U.S. annexation sentiment in the far eastern province of Higüey (Mayes, *The Mulatto Republic*, 18). It also tends to exaggerate the differences between politicians of the south and the Cibao, discussed more in chapter 1 (Landolfi, *Evolución cultural dominicana*).
74. Larson, *Trials of Nation Making*, 6.
75. Rojas, *Cuba Mexicana*.
76. Martínez-Fernández, “Caudillos,” 574; Escolano Giménez, *La rivaldad internacional*, 68.
77. Dhormoys, *Une visite chez Soulouque*, 147.
78. Brown, “Global History of Latin America”; Sartorius, *Ever Faithful*; Schmidt-Nowara, “La España ultramarina”; Thomson, *Birth of Modern Politics in Spain*; Morillo-Alicea, “‘Aquel laberinto de oficinas.’”
79. Hall, “Nation Within and Without,” 181; Peabody, “France’s Two Emancipations,” 31.
80. Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies*, 275; Razack, *Race, Space and the Law*, 55.
81. E.g., Colombia’s 1863 Rionegro Constitution (Andrés, “Colonial Crisis,” 335).
82. Escolano Giménez, “La organización de la provincia de Santo Domingo,” 340; Castro Ventura, *La Guerra Restauradora*, 372.
83. Dorsey, “Seamy Sides of Abolition.”
84. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*; Dubois, *Avengers*.

85. McGuinness, "Searching for 'Latin America,'" 102; Luis-Brown, *Waves of Decolonization*, 247; Gobat, "Invention of Latin America," 1346.
86. Sanders, *Vanguard of the Atlantic World*, 4; Thomson, "Garibaldi and the Legacy of the Revolutions of 1848"; Peyrou, "Harmonic Utopia of Spanish Republicanism."
87. Coviello, *Intimacy in America*, 4.
88. McGuinness, "Searching for 'Latin America,'" 101.
89. Smith, *Freedom's Frontier*.
90. May, "Lobbyists for Commercial Empire," 408.
91. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Correspondencia*, 65; Hauch, "The Dominican Republic and Its Foreign Relations," 98.
92. R. Edwardes to Lord J. Russell, Madrid, 22 April 1861, AGN-RD: Anexión DE/000933, Expte. 6, p. 17.
93. Fontecha Pedraza and González Calleja, *Una cuestión de honor*, 5, 9, 51; Álvarez Junco, "Spanish National Identity," 321.
94. Schomburgk, "Peninsula and Bay of Samaná," 283.
95. Eusebio Soler to Gob. Superior Civil, SD, 4 July 1864, AGN-RD: Anexión 16, Expte. 1, doc. 3.
96. Qtd. in Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 224.
97. Eusebio Soler to Gob. Superior Civil, SD, 4 July 1864, AGN-RD: Anexión 16, Expte. 1, doc. 3.
98. Francisco Serrano to Min. de Guerra, Havana, 6 September 1861, AHN: Ultramar 3532, Expte. 2, doc 2.
99. *Hispaniola, Hayti*, 87.
100. Harris, "Summer on the Borders," 80.
101. Qtd. in "Nouvelles étrangères," *Le Moniteur Haïtien*, no. 27, 8 June 1861, 3.
102. González, "Ideología del progreso y campesinado," 34; González, "La figura social del montero," 79.
103. Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*; Lasso, *Myths of Harmony*; McGraw, *Work of Recognition*; Grandin, "Liberal Traditions in the Americas."
104. Min. de RREE to Cornelio G. Holff, RD Agente Comercial in NYC, Copiador, 4 March 1860.
105. Fr. Consul to Min. de RREE, Copiador, 4 February 1861.
106. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Relaciones dominicoespañolas*, 352; Marte, *Correspondencia*, 42.
107. Marte, "La oralidad sobre el pasado insular," 7.
108. Escolano Giménez, "La insurrección dominicana," 73. Ranches make notoriously difficult historiographical subjects, authors observe (Giusti-Cordero, "Beyond Sugar Revolutions," 67). Considering the issues of evidence about black ranching societies throughout the Atlantic World, see Sluyter, *Black Ranching Frontiers*.
109. Cross-Beras, *Sociedad y desarrollo en la República dominicana*, 54.

110. Turits, *Foundations of Despotism*.
111. González, *De esclavos a campesinos*.
112. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Papeles de Pedro F. Bonó*, 192.
113. Putnam, "To Study the Fragments/Whole," 619.
114. Vinson, "African (Black) Diaspora History, Latin American History."
115. There has been a profusion of valuable monographs about the Restoration War within this paradigm that focus, instead, on other aspects of the annexation and rebellion. One scholar writes that there was "no discrimination" during the First Republic (Castro Ventura, *La Guerra Restauradora*, 102); others disregard elite racism more obliquely, in the tendency to mystify annexationist tendencies as "backward," rather than interrogating the common goals (of indenture, of profit, or of self-preservation versus a rural majority) that an important sector of Dominican annexationists had in common with elites throughout the Caribbean (for an overview, see Febres-Cordero Carrillo, "La anexión," chap. 2). Scholars tend to mention the importance of fears of reenslavement to the rebels without further contextualization outside of the immediate antagonism of the occupation (i.e., the regional context or long-term domestic discussions of emancipation and racism). At different moments, authors have used the nationalist frame, furthermore, specifically as a vehicle of liberation. Professor, intellectual, and revolutionary Juan Bosch published his classic study of the popular rebellion, with an essay about U.S. intervention wreaking havoc on the territory, one hundred years later. "To reach the category of hero, men and women do not need to be *letrados*; what they need is the capacity to create acts," he urges, pointedly (Bosch, *La Guerra de la Restauración*, 125).
116. Mimi Sheller refers to this as a "peasant democratic ideology" (*Democracy after Slavery*, 5).
117. On the concept of articulation of solidarities in the African diaspora, see Patterson and Kelley, "Unfinished Migrations."
118. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*.
119. Carlos Helm to Francisco Serrano, 5 March 1862, ANC: AP 53, Expte. 16.
120. Luperón, *Notas autobiográficas*, 99; Ayuso, *Historia pendiente*, 9, 94.
121. Abreu Cardet and Sintés Gómez, *El alzamiento de Neiba*, 29.
122. Qtd. in Rodríguez Demorizi, *Actos y doctrina*, 77.
123. Marte, *Correspondencia*, 90.
124. On discussions of warnings of reenslavement in other contexts, see, e.g., Hahn, "'Extravagant Expectations' of Freedom."
125. Jimenes Grullón, *Sociología política dominicana*, 131.
126. Finch, *Rethinking Slave Rebellion*, 171.
127. De la Gándara, *Anexión y guerra de Santo Domingo*, 201–2; Rodríguez Demorizi, *Del vocabulario dominicano*, 20. The Haitian president, Fabre Nicholas Geffrard, predicted the struggle. "Dominicans and Haitians are the two most indomitable peoples of the new world, and . . . the most resolute,"

- he warned the Spanish. "Call Dominicans . . . , and ask each one what they have done for their country (*Le Moniteur Haïtien*, no. 12, 23 February 1861, 3).
128. Martínez, *Diccionario*, 514.
 129. Sanders, *Vanguard of the Atlantic World*, 26; Smith, *Roots of Conservatism*, 79.
 130. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Actos y doctrina*, 375.
 131. *Boletín Oficial*, 18 December 1864, qtd. in Rodríguez Demorizi, *Actos y doctrina*, 249.
 132. Fusté, "Possible Republics," 3.
 133. Bermúdez de Castro y O'Lawlor, *Cuestión de Santo Domingo*, 39, 47–49.
 134. Adelman, "Iberian Passages," 59.
 135. Amid a valuable body of works that consider how Caribbean activists confronted constant tension between the insistent "racelessness" of republican national projects and the immediate menace of racism at home and abroad, see Fusté, "Possible Republics"; Stephens, *Black Empire*; Reyes-Santos, *Our Caribbean Kin*; Mayes, *The Mulatto Republic*; Scott, "Public Rights"; Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*.
 136. Johnson, *Fear of French Negroes*, 2; Reyes-Santos, *Our Caribbean Kin*, 8; Chaar-Pérez, "'Revolution of Love.'"
 137. Sheller, *Citizenship*, 102.
 138. He continued, wryly: "In the great Confederation there will be the French of Guadeloupe and Martinique, whom I don't know; the Haitians, whom I know too well; the Cubans, whom I am getting to know, as I am seeing them in the work of destruction, which they will most probably continue after emancipation; the English of Jamaica and the rest of the British isles; and us. . . . Superb elements, of course, to construct a mixed society that ought to serve as a barrier to the aspirations and invasions of the Anglo-Saxon raza!" (*Espailat y Quiñones, Escritos*, 269).
 139. Hepburn, *Haïti as It Is*, 11.
 140. Kachun, "'Our Platform Is as Broad as Humanity,'" 2; Hepburn, *Haïti as It Is*, 16.
 141. Gómez, "Entwining the Revolutions."
 142. Rodríguez Objío, *Gregorio Luperón e historia de la Restauración*, 2:192; Haitian heads of state engaged in similar "salvation diplomacy" (Adam, *Une crise haïtienne 1867–1869*, 42).
 143. Dubois, *Haïti*, 169.
 144. Mella, *Los espejos de Duarte*. Duarte was in exile after the first six months of Separation. He wrote mournfully of the battles that raged from exile in near-total anonymity (Castro Ventura, *Duarte en la proa de historia*, 252).
 145. Mella, *Los espejos de Duarte*, 34, 38, 54.
 146. Hagemann and Rendall, "Introduction," 28. On archetypes of Dominican women in the nineteenth century, see Lora Hugí, "Las mujeres anónimas," 84.

147. Mella, *Los espejos de Duarte*, 301.
148. Rodríguez de Tió, *Mi libro de Cuba*, vii.
149. Among works that consider the nineteenth century specifically, see Cordero Michel, *La revolución haitiana*; Hernández Flores, *Luperón, héroe y alma*; Torres-Saillant, "Tribulations of Blackness"; Mayes, *The Mulatto Republic*; Nessler, *An Island-Wide Struggle for Freedom*; Martínez, "Not a Cockfight"; Franco, "Remanentes ideológicos."
150. Torres-Saillant, "Tribulations of Blackness," 132.
151. "Convulsiones de los pueblos," *La Regeneración*, no. 2, 3 September 1865, 3.

1. Life by Steam

1. "Haiti," *El Dominicano*, no. 21, 5 September 1846, 81.
2. "Continuación," *El Dominicano*, no. 7, 13 November 1845, 17–18.
3. "Clamor Público," *El Dominicano*, no. 21, 5 September 1846, 83.
4. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Correspondencia*, 1:164.
5. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Correspondencia*, 2:12, 17.
6. Rodríguez Demorizi, *Correspondencia*, 1:59; these caudillo-led troops or party militias were known elsewhere as *montoneras* (Holden, *Armies without Nations*, 38).
7. Aluma-Cazorla, "Caudillo as the Post-bandit."
8. Pérez Memén, *El Pensamiento dominicano*, 25; Campillo Pérez, *Historia electoral dominicana*; Franks, "Transforming Property," 90.
9. Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos*, 1, 398.
10. To propose to cross the island by land, "people seemed to think a man must either be crazy, or that he expected to derive some mysterious benefit from such a trip," one traveler remarked in 1870 (Hazard, *Santo Domingo, Past and Present*, 274).
11. François-Xavier Guerra qtd. in Knöbl, "State Building in Western Europe and the Americas," 72.
12. Marte, "La oralidad sobre el pasado insular," 41.
13. Marte, "La oralidad sobre el pasado insular," 34. "Spaniards" was also commonly used in Haiti at the popular level; Emperor Soulouque often simply referred to "the eastern part" (Pablo de Urrutia to Cap. Gen. of Cuba, 6 November 1858, ANC: AP 224, Expte. 13). Other scholars emphasize that leaders invoked terms of political consensus ("copatriots," *con-patriotas*) precisely because the idea of territorial unity was so weak (Mella, *Los espejos de Duarte*, 216).
14. Vicioso, *El freno hatero*, 333.
15. Lora Hugí, *Transición*, 130; San Miguel, *Los campesinos del Cibao*, 44.
16. After 1824, only state documents were in French, and French secretaries (*greffiers*) appeared only in the Dominican capital (de Granda, "Un caso de planeamiento lingüístico frustrado," 193, 199–201, 203; Lora Hugí, *Transición*,