City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects | CUNY Graduate Center

2-2023

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare—Lessons from History

Nicholas K. Petaludis
CUNY Graduate Center

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!

More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5157
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu

This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH: THE POWER OF WEAKNESS IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE—LESSONS FROM HISTORY

by

NICHOLAS K. PETALUDIS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2023

© 2023

Nicholas K. Petaludis

All Rights Reserved

APPROVAL

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare—Lessons from History

by

Nicholas K. Petaludis

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Approved: December 2022

Stanley Renshon, Chair of Examining Committee

Jack Jacobs, Executive Officer

Supervisory committee:

Peter Romaniuk, Advisor

Thomas Halper, First Reader

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ABSTRACT

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare—Lessons from History

by

Nicholas K. Petaludis

Advisor: Stanley Renshon

Under what conditions do violent nonstate actors (VNA) succeed against states? Why does David sometimes beat Goliath? Since at least the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian Wars, the realist narrative in international relations measures power primarily in relative, coercive, and deterrent terms. Strong states should accordingly face fewer constraints and enjoy more options while pursuing their national interests. Unconventional warfare, and its subsets of terrorism and insurgency, should—given these circumstances, end in VNA failure. Sometimes, however, VNAs find success. By comparing the literature on historical and current case studies, I propose that a set of preconditions and two mechanisms help explain "the power of weakness." After it decides to abandon peaceful conflict resolution, the weak side must cultivate the cause that inspires its members to kill and die, to torture and suffer. Next, it requires safe havens. If the VNA cannot avoid the state's reach, its initial wave of attacks may likely constitute its final wave of attacks. Inspiration and sanctuary thus provide the weak side enough space and time for a stalemate. The state's daunting power advantages, however, make space and time necessary but not sufficient conditions for weak side success. The first mechanism that can begin to transform the existing power balance combines state miscalculation and VNA competitive adaptation. The strong side's blunders must border on the spectacular. For the weak side to survive the state's initial onslaught, it must harden its organization, coerce and cajole its community, eliminate rivals, and generate a range of goals. Although the VNA may grow and even evolve into a proto-state, it may still not achieve its political goals until external pressures intervene. My second mechanism accordingly examines how other states, international institutions, diasporas, and international norms finalize VNA success. The paradox that power does not necessarily translate to success may help clarify why states that lose unconventional conflicts often retain vast reserves of soldiers and resources. The power of weakness implies that terrorism and insurgency are forms of politics, and hence not to be understood strictly, or even primarily in military terms. Finally, the potential power of weakness can explain asymmetric warfare's persistence throughout history. Why do groups with guns and grievances, across successive generations, make the seemingly "futile" decision to fight states? A general theory of VNA success can inform analysis of when, and under what circumstances weak sides may, or may not prevail.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my parents Nick and Crista: I hope this gives you a tiny fraction of the joy and comfort you've given me.

To my wife Asmaa, daughter Rania, and son Elias: compared to the first day that each of you came into my life, today ranks a distant fourth.

To my brothers Greg and Andrew: thanks for being my brothers.

To my families in New York, Cephalonia, Casablanca, and further abroad: neither time nor distance dims my affection.

To my committee Stanley Renshon, Peter Romaniuk, and Tom Halper: your guidance was only surpassed by your collective wisdom. I chose well.

To my CUNY colleagues: Jim O'Neill, your help proved indispensable, while our dinners were a much-welcomed relief. Thanks Francois Pierre-Louis for your encouragement and Alyson Cole for your patience. My appreciation extends to the QC Library staff and the ILL folks that can apparently acquire anything.

To my SUNY-Albany graduate friends: loved coming back to my second home. The apartment with Timmy Mac and our stint at the Long Branch was great.

To my service buddies from San Antonio, Monterey, San Angelo, and Augsburg: winning the Cold War at times seemed more doable than finishing this essay.

To my SUNY-Albany undergraduate friends: The years at Stuyvesant Tower and Hamilton House prepared me for any challenge.

To my childhood friends in Jamaica, NY: growing up there was good.

To my formative years in Hell's Kitchen, NY: It wasn't as tough as it sounds…. I'm smiling in every old picture.

CONTENTS

PAGE

List of Maps……....vii

Chapter 1: Introduction …….1

Chapter 2: Theory and Method……....27

Chapter 3: Literature Review ..……53

Chapter 4: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962…….……93

Chapter 5: The EOKA in CYPRUS, 1955-1960……...…….……135

Chapter 6: The LTTE in Sri Lanka, 1983-2009……..…193

Chapter 7: The TPLF in Ethiopia, 2020-2022.……..……..……234

Chapter 8: Conclusions and Predictions……..……...……267

9. References …….…….284

MAPS

Page

4.1: Algeria……..……94

4.2: FLN Organization of Algeria……..……....112

5.1: Cyprus …….……..……136

6.1: Sri Lanka……..……...…194

7.1: Ethiopia……..…….235

7.2: Tigray……..……244

7.3: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ...……...……...…263

Chapter 1: Introduction

Under what conditions can violent nonstate actors (VNA)[1] succeed against states?[2] Why does David sometimes beat Goliath? These are the major theoretical questions of this analysis. Aristotle considered politics as a peaceful or violent competition for power.[3] The realist narrative in international relations, prevailing since at least the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian Wars, measures power primarily in relative, coercive, and deterrent terms.[4] Relative considerations compare capabilities.[5] Coercive power connotes a "do this or else!" logic, while deterrent power signals "don't do this or else!" Strong states should accordingly face fewer constraints and enjoy more options while pursuing their national interests.[6] Asymmetric warfare, and its subsets of terrorism and insurgency, should—given these circumstances, usually end in VNA failure.[7]

---

[1] A violent nonstate actor (VNA) is a nongovernmental group with political goals that for various reasons has lost faith in peaceful conflict resolution and then decided to use armed military force against the state. In this research, VNAs are groups of insurgents and terrorists. The term "irregulars" is also a synonym.

[2] A state is defined as "an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory" in Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (Sep. 2001), 643. See also Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (New York: Bedminster, 1968), 54; Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985); Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1978), 1-15; and Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1994).

[3] Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University, 1980), Bk. I.2.1094^{a}19, 2.

[4] Paul D'Anieri, *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010), 61-71; Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley and ed. Robert Strassler (New York: Free, 1996).

[5] Jack Nagel, "Some Questions about the Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* 13, no. 2 (Mar. 1968), 129; Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1957), 201-215.

[6] Although the practice of quantifying power is not precise, I will consider actors "strong" when their material power exceeds the adversary's power by a minimum of ten to one. Material power reflects a state's "population and armed forces" in Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win War," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Sum. 2001), 94. For quantifying relative power, see John Nutter, "Unpacking Threat: A Conceptual and Formal Analysis," in *Seeking Security and Development: The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers*, ed. Norman Graham (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1994), 29-49.

[7] The symmetric-asymmetric," "regular-irregular," "traditional-nontraditional," "and "conventional-unconventional," warfare dichotomies are used interchangeably.

Sometimes, VNAs defy expectations. They find a grievance powerful enough to inspire members to kill and die, to torture and suffer. They next access safe havens that prohibit the state from smothering their nascent movement. While the government falters and miscalculates for a host of reasons, the weak side survives by adapting to its highly competitive and hostile environment; it learns, restructures its organization, and eliminates rivals. The group cajoles, coopts, coerces, or kills for popular support. A military stalemate ensues.[8]

Emboldened irregulars must henceforth address four distinct audiences.[9] The government must realize that there is no "light at the end of the tunnel."[10] Justice and time are not on its side. Explosions, assassinations, and public funerals will plague the cruel and obstinate regime without mercy. Second, the weak side must appeal to or unsettle the state's civilians, business interests, farmers, students, factory workers, intellectuals, and media. They either ignored or facilitated the aggrieved side's suffering. In their name, the government murders and tortures our women and children. Rivers of tears and waves of blood are thus due—the state cannot protect everyone all the time. The future, however, can bring peace and prosperity—if your government accepts our demands.

The VNA must also fortify its own community's resolve. It presents itself more as a government-in-waiting and encourages its beleaguered compatriots to act as a nation-in-waiting. Without us, the irregulars assure, injustice and oppression will persist. While we gladly embrace the burdens and sacrifices attached to this awesome struggle, we need help. The weak side thus expects its people's money, shelter, food, information, obedience, loyalty, and participation.

---

[8] Stalemate in war means that "neither side can change the front lines dramatically no matter how hard it tries." Frederick Kagan, "What Stalemate Means in Ukraine and Why It Matters," *Institute for the Study of War*, May 22, 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-stalemate-means-ukraine-and-why-it-matters. No specific period constitutes a stalemate.

[9] VNAs do not necessarily address their various audiences in sequential or mutually distinct phases.

[10] Although this expression dates back to the 1800s, the JFK and LBJ administrations popularized it in the mid-1960s in reference to the Vietnam War.

Finally, the irregulars message external audiences. We are the virtuous underdog that simply ran out of peaceful options. Our opponent is a serial human rights violator. We deserve to govern ourselves in a secure territory that we can call home. As time passes, roiling conflicts invariably raise regional and international concerns. Amnesty International and the UN send observers and issue reports. Neighboring states get involved. If an active diaspora is assisting the VNA, the expatriates' host nations can affect the conflict. International pressure may therefore be crucial for determining irregular warfare's outcome.

The paradox that power does not necessarily translate to success may help clarify why states that lose unconventional violent conflicts often retain vast reserves of soldiers and resources. The power of weakness implies that terrorism and insurgency are forms of politics, and hence not to be understood strictly, or even primarily in military terms.[11] Finally, the potential power of weakness can explain asymmetric warfare's persistence throughout history. Why do some groups with guns and grievances, across successive generations, make the seemingly "futile" decision to fight states? A general theory of VNA success can inform analysis of when, and under what circumstances weak sides may, or may not prevail.

This research draws from and synthesizes, as well as contributes to scholarship on asymmetric warfare, terrorism, insurgency, coercion, rational choice, and organizational theories. These topics are timely and important. Historically, regular armies have fought in orderly formations that advance, in lock-step, elbow to elbow. More recently, conventional conflict involves states, delineated battlefields, and usually culminates with direct attacks against the enemy's strength—its army or territory. The priority is to weaken the opposition's *military* capacity. As both sides generally know where the enemy troops are located, have probably

[11] The power of weakness appears in various forms throughout my research: a VNA's resolve, its willingness to absorb losses, or its capacity to coerce, hurt, or subvert.

undergone similar training, and brought similar weapons to the field, conventional warfare's axiom is that the enemy uniformed soldier is easy for the state to find, but hard to kill.

The historical record of unconventional conflict differs substantially. The Persians, Greeks, Macedonians, and Romans encountered it in antiquity, as did the Spanish, French, and British during the Middle Ages. Napoleon's Iberian experiences coined the term "guerrilla warfare."[12] Irregular warfare evolved in America during its Revolution, Civil War, and Indian Wars; Filipinos and Mexicans used it against America just before the First World War.

A British officer used the term "small war" to encompass "all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops."[13] Battlefields materialize where and when the weak side chooses to fight.[14] Sanctuaries are indispensable. A state may have a great capacity "to attack what it sees but a limited ability to see what it wishes to attack."[15] It can probably destroy the ill-equipped, inexperienced irregulars easily, if and when it finds them; without the anonymity of cities, the shelter of jungles, swamps, forests, mountains, deserts, or aid from sympathetic locals, diaspora communities, or international allies, terrorists and insurgents stand little chance of survival, let alone success. Unconventional warriors accordingly aim primarily to subvert the strong side's will, or *political* capacity to fight. While the state struggles to find VNAs, once located, they are easy to kill.

The Modern Era

[12] Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: William Morrow, 1994b).
[13] Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London: His Majesty's Stationary, 1906), 21; Colin Gray, "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (2007): 42.
[14] Mao Tse-Tung, "Preserving Oneself and Destroying the Enemy," in *Classical Readings of International Relations*, ed. Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein, and Jay Shafritz (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), 416.
[15] Gordon McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," *Annual Review of Political Science* 6, no. 1 (2003): 484.

The post-World War I era that is represented by my cases reflects key breaks from the past. It is characterized by industry, mechanization, rapid travel, and mass communication. The infantry and cavalry of prewar militaries that bivouacked in and traversed heavily populated areas interacted intimately with locals. Soldiers had to become familiar with the native ethnic, social, political, and economic realities.

Modern armies no longer forage, requisition, loot, or buy their supplies locally. Civil-military relations now differ because armies that deploy by motorized vehicles and aircraft set up supply depots far from populated areas. By avoiding civilians, they consequently lose the community-based intelligence that they could later deploy against VNAs. Armies thus confront intelligence deficits, whereby they can neither negotiate local complexities well nor easily differentiate civilian from combatant. In this new era, states may perform worse in irregular warfare.[16] Since the Cold War's end in 1989, the frequency of conventional, interstate war has decreased.[17] Asymmetric warfare is becoming more the rule, not the exception.

The availability of powerful and inexpensive low-tech weapons further encourages VNAs. America, China, Israel, and ex-communist bloc states export the hardware that appeals to angry groups: portable anti-aircraft missiles, grenade launchers, assault rifles, handguns, explosives, and ammunition.[18] The US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate how

[16] Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63 (Win. 2009): 67-68; Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89-91.
[17] Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816–2007* (Washington DC: CQ, 2010); Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict," 629-644.
[18] Nan Tian et al., "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, last modified Apr. 2018, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2018; Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot, *The International Arms Trade* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2009); and Michael Picard, Paul Holtom, and Fiona Mangan, "Trade Update 2019: Transfers, Transparency, and South-east Asia Spotlight," *Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva/Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*, last modified Dec. 2019, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2019.pdf.

costly, sophisticated, and cutting-edge military technologies are still vulnerable to crude and improvised explosive devices.[19] The tools for asymmetric warfare will remain, at least for the foreseeable future, plentiful and accessible; and they can be effective in spite of a state's technological or other edge.

Asymmetric warfare is one of globalization's ironic "success" stories.[20] Since the early 1990s, individuals and groups have been empowered vis-à-vis the state; borders have become more porous in the global village. This village, however, is not always tranquil and hospitable. While globalization integrates regional economies, it likewise enables transnational terrorism and insurgency. Mobile and adaptable networks of irregulars can routinely outmaneuver rigid governmental bureaucracies.[21] Via the use of social media, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attracted and motivated thousands of adherents whom it had never actually met.[22] As the freer movement of people, money, ideas, and goods across borders benefits some societies, it may simultaneously expose them to the challenges of asymmetric warfare.[23]

---

[19] Jim Golby and Peter Feaver, "It Matters If Americans Call Afghanistan a Defeat," *Atlantic*, last modified Aug. 17, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/will-americans-call-afghanistan-victory/596188/; Dominic Tierney, "Why Has America Stopped Winning Wars?" *Atlantic*, last modified June 2, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/america-win-loss-iraq-afghanistan/394559/; and Tom O'Connor, "US Army Says it did Not Win Iraq War, Iran Appears to Be the Only Victor," *Newsweek*, last modified Jan. 22, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/army-not-win-iraq-iran-victor-1301050.

[20] Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine, 1996).

[21] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), and *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

[22] Patrick Tucker and Defense One, "Why Join ISIS? How Fighters Respond When You Ask Them," *Atlantic* (Dec. 9, 2015); J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter," *Brookings* (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-the-population-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter/; and Harleen Gambhir, *The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS's Information Warfare* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2016), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20The%20Virtual%20Caliphate%20Gambhir%202016.pdf.

[23] Steven Weber, "How Globalization Went Bad," *Foreign Policy*, last modified Oct. 13, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/how-globalization-went-bad/; Niall Ferguson, "A World without Power," *Foreign Policy*, last modified Oct. 27, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/a-world-without-power/.

Democratic states' respect for civil liberties further ensures, counter intuitively, that asymmetric warfare will persist.[24] Government countermeasures hinge on identifying, isolating, and killing or capturing VNAs. These efforts, though, have historically proven difficult. Irregulars rarely wear uniforms or mass in fixed formations; states hence struggle to distinguish between them and noncombatants. They routinely incur accusations of privacy invasion, racial profiling, human rights violations, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.[25]

Finally, the probability that VNAs could acquire some elements of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) makes asymmetric warfare an important topic for study. The 9/11/2001 attacks showed every aggrieved group not only how to transform commuter airliners into guided missiles, but also how to inflict mass casualties quickly, cheaply, and spectacularly. To what

---

[24] Donald and Frederick Kagan argue that democracies are not prepared to fight VNA in *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 307. Democracy's challenges relate to conscription, war costs, inflation, and asking the public and military to sacrifice for a limited, elective war. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (Jan. 1975): 185-186; Theodore Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James Rosenau (New York, Free Press, 1967); and William Zimmerman, "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory," *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 4 (Dec. 1973): 1204-1212.

[25] For "democratic defeatism," see Thucydides' study of the Athenian invasion of Sicily in *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1954), Bk. 7. JFK believed that democracies were not built for war in Melvin Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on US Foreign Policy, 1789-1994* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1996), xiii; many of Kennedy's contemporaries agreed in Michael Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *International Security* 27, no. 2 (Fall, 2002): 5; Jean-François Revel, *How Democracies Perish* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 3. Edmund Ions asserts that while the American right to demonstrate was a strength of free society during the Vietnam War, it simultaneously undermined power politics in *Dissent in America: The Constraints on Foreign Policy, Conflict Studies, no. 18* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1971). See also Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964); William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6, no. 4 (1994): 417-443; Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Sum. 2006): 49-80; Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005): 278-297; James Piazza, "Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 6 (2007): 521-539; Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet," in *Western Responses to Terrorism*, ed. Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 307-340; Gaga Gvineria, "How Does Terrorism End?" in *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 266; David Charters, *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994); and Joe Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems," *International Interactions* 24, no. 2 (1998): 151-170.

degree will WMD close the gap between VNAs and states in the future and redefine the power of weakness? The possible link of unconventional warfare and WMD has already prompted a reevaluation of concepts and assumptions in international relations.[26]

Politics

The Greek general and historian Thucydides posited that "fear, honor, and interest" motivate all political behavior, including war.[27] Aristotle's "politics" derived from those activities related to running the *polis* (city-state) and prioritized community safety and happiness.[28] The application of scientific rigor elevated politics into the "master science of

[26] Richard Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1998): 26-41; Reuven Paz, "Yes to WMD: The First Islamic *Fatwah* on the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad* 1, no. 1 (May 2003), and "Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction," *Hudson Institute*, Sep. 12, 2005b; Russell Howard, "The New Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Russell Howard and James Forest, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008); Thomas Homer-Dixon, "The Rise of Complex Terrorism," in Russell Howard and James Forest, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008); Andrew O'Neil, "Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How Serious is the Threat?" in Russell Howard and James Forest, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008); Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" in Russell Howard and James Forest, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008); and Joshua Goldstein, The Real Price of War: How You Pay for the War on Terror (New York: New York University, 2004), 128, 132. Some authors alternatively argue that the potential linkage between irregular warfare and WMD has been exaggerated. See John Mueller, *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them* (New York: Free Press, 2006), and "Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, (2005): 488-490; Gregg Easterbrook, "Term Limits: The Meaninglessness of 'WMD,'" *New Republic*, Oct. 7, 2002. For the challenges VNAs could face trying to deploy chemical and biological weapons, see Matthew Meselson, "The Myth of Chemical Superweapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Apr. 1991): 13; United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-559* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 48-49, 54. Regarding the use of nuclear weapons by VNAs, see Norman Rabkin, "Combating Terrorism," GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145 (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2000), 4, 12; Charles Duelfer, "Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Washington, DC," Oct. 6, 2004, and Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorists: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2004), 97.

[27] Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 43.

[28] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. I.2.1094^{a}19, 2. *Eudaimonia* (happiness) was the human pursuit of excellence and virtue for the good of the greater community in Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Ernest Baker (Oxford: Oxford University, 1995), xii-xiii.

practice because it establishes the framework within which all individual action takes place."[29] Public officials can promote the community's interests via domestic management (economics), public speaking and debating (law and oratory), ethics and virtue (philosophy and morality), and security from internal and external threats (police and military affairs).[30]

Politics accordingly imply a competition for power that characterize both violent and peaceful conflict. Power confers the capability to influence another side to do "what it would not otherwise have done (or not to do what it would have done)."[31] Conflict indicates "an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their goals."[32] Peaceful conflict resolution may entail an egalitarian distribution of scarce resources or the constraints on power embodied by popular sovereignty, free and fair elections, judicial review, and checks and balances.

When peaceful conflict resolution fails, for any host of reasons, politics can turn into an "act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[33] War as violent conflict resolution nonetheless retains its political nature.[34] German strategist Carl von Clausewitz asserts that war neither supersedes politics nor does it impose a new logic on them; it remains, rather, "a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means," whereby each side attempts to render the other "incapable of further resistance."[35] This logic further echoes

[29] Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), 19.
[30] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. I.2.1094ª19, 2.
[31] Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse, *International Relations, Tenth Edition* (New York: Longman, 2012), 45. Some elements of state power include military capacity, GDP, population, natural resources, geography, levels of patriotism and education, and credibility, 47.
[32] William Wilmot and Joyce Hocker, *Interpersonal Conflict* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 41.
[33] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976), 75; Alex Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 69-70.
[34] Christopher Bassford, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: a Polemic," *War in History* 1, no. 3 (1994): 329.
[35] Clausewitz, *On War*, 1976, 87.

classical realist notions of power, anarchy and self-help.[36] It also incorporates the rational actor model's supposition that leaders in similar circumstances make similar decisions while pursuing the national interest: "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can."[37] Finally, since war is an extension of politics, politicians should trump generals and policy should subordinate military strategy.[38]

Politics as War and Warfare

Although the political nature of war remains unchanged, "warfare"—its strategy and tactics—evolves. Strategy links "political aims and the use of force, or its threat"[39] to future grand plans.[40] British Field-Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery described strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means, such as soldiers and supplies, to fulfil the ends of policy." Tactics constitute the immediate tasks for accomplishing policy; they comprise "the dispositions for, and control of, military forces and techniques in actual fighting." Hence "strategy is the art of the conduct of war, [while] tactics [are] the art of fighting."[41]

Warfare changed when chemistry and metallurgy created gunpowder, cannons, and firearms. Vast military operations associated with industry followed; machine tooling and scaling generated precise weapons with greater range and lethality. Technology introduced gas,

[36] D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 59-69.
[37] Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 354; D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 157.
[38] Bassford, "John Keegan," 326-327. Policy is defined here as rational action "undertaken by an individual or group which already has power in order to use, maintain and extend that power."
[39] Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.
[40] Gray, "Irregular Warfare," 40.
[41] Bernard Montgomery, *A History of Warfare* (Cleveland, OH: World, 1968), 14; B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 335.

missiles, nuclear, and germ weaponry.[42] Although evolving warfare can "dissolve states,"[43] occur within states,[44] seem "primitive"[45] or "neoarchaic,"[46] cause nuclear fallout,[47] be outsourced to private companies,[48] start off as a civil war and become transnationalized,[49] incorporate the information revolution[50] and robotics,[51] "war" nonetheless remains an act of political coercion. No "old" versus "new" war dichotomy exists.[52] The day after the first bow shot an arrow in combat, the first gunpowder cannon blasted a city wall, the nuclear bomb fell on Hiroshima, or hijacked jetliners targeted New York office buildings, the nature of warfare changed. War as a political endeavor, however, remains a rational instrument of policy.[53]

Types of Warfare

[42] Derek Leebart, *To Dare and Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda* (New York: Little, Brown, 2006), 583.
[43] Mary Kaldor, "New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era Manifesto Challenge: Advancing Global Citizenship" (presentation, Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, London, UK, October 23, 2006), and *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1999): 1-12.
[44] Donald Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1996); Wallensteen and Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict," 629-644.
[45] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage, 1994), 58; John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,"' *International Security* 25 (2000): 42-70.
[46] Bjørn Møller, "The Faces of War," in *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*, ed. Håkan Wiberg and Christian Scherrer (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), 15.
[47] Paul Ehrlich et al., *The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984).
[48] David Shearer, "Private Armies and Military Intervention: Adelphi Papers no. 316 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Robert Mandel, *Armies without States: The Privatization of Security* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2002).
[49] Manus Midlarsky, *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (London: Routledge, 1992); James Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1997).
[50] Arquilla and Ronenfeldt, *In Athena's Camp*; Oliver Roy, "Islam, Iran and the New Terrorism," *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Sum. 2000): 89-106.
[51] P. W. Singer, *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Penguin, 2009).
[52] Gray, "Irregular Warfare," 35-57.
[53] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984), 87-88, 606.

Violent conflict subdivides into "symmetric warfare" and "asymmetric warfare." The former has historically been described as legal violence between opposing states with massed, uniformed armies on battlefields. The 1923 US *Field Service Regulations*, for example, described American conventional warfighting as the "destruction of the enemy's armed force and with it the complete overthrow of the enemy."[54] The myriad of explanations for this sort of violent political behavior cite human nature,[55] anarchy,[56] private property,[57] imperialist capitalism,[58] free trade,[59] domestic crises,[60] the global distribution of power,[61] the balance of power,[62] the offense-defense calculus,[63] the balance of threat,[64] hegemonic cycles,[65] regime

[54] Brian Linn, "The American Way of War Revisited," *Journal of Military History* 66, no. 2 (2002): 502.
[55] Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides*; Thomas Hobbes, "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind," in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, ed. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 108-110; Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, (New Haven: Yale University, 2006), 6-8; Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998); Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1966); and Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" in *International War: An Anthology*, ed. Melvin Small and J. David Singer (Chicago: Dorsey, 1989), 176-181.
[56] Randall Schweller, "Realism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1995-1996).
[57] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G. D. Cole (Rutland, VT: C. E. Tuttle, 1993).
[58] John Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1965); Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline* (New York: International, 1939); and Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review, 1969).
[59] Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free, 1988), chap 2.
[60] David Walder, *The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Alistair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (Mar. 1996).
[61] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979); Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University, 1998).
[62] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Random, 1972).
[63] Steven Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (Spr. 1998).
[64] Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spr. 1985).
[65] Robert Gilpin, *Change and War in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics & the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 2 (Apr. 1978).

type,[66] nationalism,[67] human cognition,[68] rational choice,[69] preemption,[70] small group dynamics,[71] and clashing civilizations.[72]

For asymmetric warfare to flourish, a weak side with grievances must first lose its faith in peaceful conflict resolution, and then it must access safe havens.[73] The breakdown of peaceful politics can be prompted by "the inability or unwillingness of the government to handle grievances to the satisfaction of the aggrieved."[74] This sort of political conflict is hence a "weapon of the weak,"[75] whereby "a relatively materially resource-rich regular force is pitted against a resource-challenged foe."[76]

As a result of the long and bloody stalemate fostered by trench warfare during World War One, more military theoreticians began focusing on how "indirect approaches"[77] could

---

[66] Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Sum. 1995): 5-38.
[67] Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* 24, no. 3 (Apr. 1972): 319-355.
[68] John Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go To War* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011); Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Presidio, 2004); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (Mar. 1979): 263-292; and Richard Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1981).
[69] James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Sum. 1995): 379-414.
[70] George W. Bush, "Beyond Containment and Deterrence to Preemptive Action (2002)," in *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, ed. Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar (New York: Grove, 2003), 251-253.
[71] Irving Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).
[72] Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49; Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Easily Be Mollified," *Atlantic* 266, no. 3 (Sept. 1990): 47-60.
[73] David Carter, Andrew Shaver, and Austin Wright, "Places to Hide: Terrain, Ethnicity, and Civil Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 81, no. 4 (2019): 1446-1465.
[74] William Zartman, "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts," in *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Conflicts*, ed. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), 5.
[75] Bryan Crozier applies the phrase to terrorism in *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections* (Boston: Beacon, 1960), 159. See also Nicholas Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 7, no. 1 (Win. 1987): 7-20; Alex Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories Data Bases and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1984), 41. James Scott uses this term more as a "cold" war in which the weak side approaches but does not cross the threshold of all out violence and relies more on "words, feints, and counterfeints, threats, a skirmish or two, and, above all, propaganda." *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University, 1985), 22.
[76] Colin Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 224.
[77] B. H. Liddell Hart posits that while direct approaches did not necessarily fail, the absence of psychological dislocation and shock value let the besieged enemy regroup quicker in *Strategy*, 25-26; F. Lee Campbell IV, "A Modest Suggestion," National Defense University, National War College, 2006.

target the enemy state's "soft underbelly," impose "a moral effect," prompt it to "lose its mental balance," and ultimately "compel its government to accept the hostile policy."[78] More irregulars saw that indirect attacks could hurt the state's civilians, noncombatants, or unsuspecting troops. The state's strength may thus lie "far less in its numbers or resources than in its stability or equilibrium—of control, morale and supply;" by using surprise, time, and sanctuaries to avoid the enemy's "line of natural expectation," a daring VNA could demonstrate that "the longest way round [a state's defenses] is often the shortest way home [to victory]."[79]

VNAs do not intentionally set out to wage regular or irregular conflict; "Rather, the mode, or more likely the mix of modes, is dictated by strategic circumstances."[80] Warfare accordingly assumes "the spirit of the age." It further reflects, but is not always determined by, the relative power of each adversary and "moves on its own goal with varying speed." [81]

If the state believes that it can eradicate the VNA, negotiations are useless.[82] Sometimes however, warring sides acknowledge a mutual dependence. Via their resolve and power to hurt, coerce, subvert, or absorb losses, irregulars convince states that they are really in a bargaining situation; the opponents accordingly share "a powerful common interest in reaching an outcome that is not enormously destructive of values to both sides." VNAs thus harness the power of weakness by converting political violence, or its threat, into coercive bargaining strength.[83]

"Unconventionality" in warfare implies strategies and tactics that lie outside the mainstream. One potential challenge to my research is that states and international institutions

[78] Strategists began exploring how "small, highly mobile elites" could exploit maneuver, speed, and surprise; others looked at how genocide and targeting civilians could break the enemy's will to resist. Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, 184-193; J. F. C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War* (London: Hutchinson, 1923), 30.
[79] Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), and *Strategy*, 25. He viewed WWI's staggering casualty rates from both sides' repeated direct attacks as predictable and driven by strategically bankrupt thinking.
[80] Gray, "Irregular Warfare," 40.
[81] Clausewitz, *On War*, 76, 87, 580-581; Bassford, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition," 328.
[82] D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 226.
[83] Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1960), 5-6.

set the prevailing norms. State-centric values and biases, which are embedded in the subjective laws of war, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism may hence taint academic research.[84] I acknowledge therefore that a state's "terrorist" or "insurgent" may be a VNA's "freedom fighter."[85] In the end, the crucial determinant may be who wins the conflict. My research, moreover, will not assume that any type of political behavior, regardless of the perpetrator or target, is necessarily more or less desirable. Weak-strong and state-nonstate considerations will likewise be devoid of any moral implications. These sorts of ethical prejudgments will be avoided wherever possible so as not to predetermine my conclusions.

Because irregular warfare invariably involves human suffering, VNAs, governments, news media, legal analysts, scholars, and international institutions could be inclined to exonerate or exaggerate certain actions by certain sides.[86] I will make all possible efforts to avoid these pitfalls and admit that all political acts, including violence, are open to debate. I do however, agree with Ted Gurr's assessment that while some political violence can generate positive results

[84] Walter Cunningham, Jr., "Terrorism Definitions and Typologies" in *Terrorism: Concepts, Causes, and Conflict Resolution*, ed. R. Moore (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2003), 23. Critical theorists contend that all social science is inherently political: "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective" that reflects a specific "time and space." Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (Jun. 1981): 128; Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University, 1986).

[85] For how "terrorism" evolved into "a pejorative political term of stigmatization," see Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook*, 40; Reuven Young, "Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 29, no. 1 (Dec. 1, 2006): 30; Philip Herbst, *Talking Terrorism: A Dictionary of the Loaded Language of Political Violence* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003), 163-164; William Connelly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1993), 10; and Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University, 1998), 28-40.

[86] Brigitte Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (New York: Pearson, 2010). The United Nations cannot settle on a single, comprehensive definition of terrorism because many of its members refuse to condemn some national liberation movements that target civilians. It has instead adopted numerous protocols and conventions that outlaw specific acts of terrorism; Michael Jordan, "Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats," *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 4, 2002), 7.

(the American Revolution produced the American Republic), sustained and intensifying warfare is ultimately destructive and worsens the human condition.[87]

Defining Insurgency and Terrorism

Unconventional warfare's subcategories of insurgency[88] and terrorism will be treated as "collective attacks [by a VNA] within a political community against the political regime, its actors—including competing political groups as well as incumbents—or its policies."[89] Insurgencies involve more people than terrorism.[90] One study contends that insurgency exists when "more than 1,000 have died over the course of the war, and more than 100 have died on each side."[91] Any specific threshold may be problematic. Sometimes the line separating insurgency and terrorism blurs. Insurgents may use terrorism as a tactic that is part of a broader strategy;[92] other times, insurgency includes party activism.[93]

[87] Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1970), 4.
[88] The various guises of insurgency include, but are not limited to civil war, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, wars of national liberation, anti-colonial wars, rebel movements, resistance groups, and revolutionary organizations. For a classification of insurgency based on the group's motivations, see Jeroen de Zeeuw, "Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements" in *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements after Civil War*, ed. Jeroen De Zeeuw (Boulder, CO: Reiner, 2007), 6-7; US Central Intelligence Agency, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012," *Homeland Security Digital Library*, last modified July 11, 2012, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=713599.
[89] Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 3-4.
[90] They occur between "the government and national army of an internationally recognized state" and "one or more armed opposition groups able to mount effective resistance against the state." Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 31-32.
[91] Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 9. Some civil war literature relies on similar definitions. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 779-801; Karl de Rouen, Jr., and David Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 308-309; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 5; and James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (Feb. 2003): 75-90.
[92] Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, Monograph/Reports, MR-1405 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2007), 5.
[93] Jeroen de Zeeuw, "Understanding the Political Transformation," 4; Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

The initial power imbalance between the competing sides helps determine the basic insurgency stages.[94] The "preinsurgency" sees the emerging leadership of an aggrieved group responding to failed attempts at peaceful conflict resolution.[95] During the "organization phase," a weak side relies on its safe havens to establish the group's infrastructure, recruit supporters, and train its operatives. During the third stage's "popular campaign of violence," the weak side proclaims "clear political objectives" that contest "a government's authority and legitimate monopoly on violence." "Success" means that the insurgents ultimately "reform, overthrow, or secede from an existing state regime or control a specific geographical area."[96]

By pursuing "tactical offensives within the strategic defensive," the VNA prefers quick battles within a protracted war.[97] After attacking unsuspecting government troops in remote outposts, on isolated trails, or while sleeping in their barracks, the irregulars melt away before the state can organize a response. When the balance of power shifts over time to favor the weak side, the conflict's final stage can assume a more conventional nature. As a result, insurgency outcomes are, to a much greater degree than terrorism, determined militarily on the battlefield, by the irregulars themselves.[98] Since insurgents ultimately seek to govern a constituency, popular support is crucial for their success. Unlike terrorists, they are consequently *less* inclined

[94] The stages are derived from the Maoist-Leninist literature and summarized by the US CIA's *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (No place or date of publication, approved for release on Jan. 5, 2009), accessed Jul. 31, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf.
[95] While most VNAs emerge from social movements and political parties that once pursued a peaceful resolution, a small percentage resort to violence at the start of the conflict. Erica Chenoweth and Pauline Moore, *The Politics of Terror* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018), 58; Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spr. 2008): 78-105.
[96] Zeeuw, "Understanding the Political Transformation, 4; Gray, "Irregular Warfare," 42; US CIA, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, 2009, 2; and Zartman, "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations," 5.
[97] Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 2000; Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (Pattern/Radical Reprint, 2001), accessed on Jan. 17, 2022, https://libcom.org/library/minimanual-urban-guerrilla; and Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Monthly Review, 1961).
[98] Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," 7; Schmid, *Political Terrorism*, 92.

to kill civilians and noncombatants indiscriminately.[99] They may instead assail the state's collaborators, intelligence apparatus, and political elites.

Terrorist groups are smaller than insurgencies and want collateral damage.[100] They often harbor vaguer notions of how to replace the existing regime. This more vulnerable type of VNA avoids targets that can fight back and primarily attacks civilians, noncombatants, and a society's "structural supports."[101] Although terrorist groups may grow into an insurgency over time, they are much less likely to achieve significant *military* victories on their own.[102] Since a few dozen irregulars will probably not collapse a state, their successes are likelier to appear as *political* victories, determined more by the decisions of the state.[103]

[99] Sometimes civilians do become "collateral damage" during insurgencies. Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1999), 281-296; T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," Praetorian, 2011, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/CSI/CSIPubs/lawrence.pdf, and *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky's, 1951). The Lenin-Maoist literature portrays insurgency as a popular movement for mass agitation and justice. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove 2004), and *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove, 1967); Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*; Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, and *For the Liberation of Brazil*, trans. John Butt and Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1971); and Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*.

[100] Terrorism is the work of clandestine networks, groups, or individuals. The West German Red Army Faction operated with a core membership of two to three dozen while the Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered in Italy with probably double that membership for two decades. Tens of thousands of British troops were needed to deal with less than 400 IRA operatives in Northern Ireland. According to Jones and Libicki, nearly two-thirds of terror groups since 1968 had fewer than 100 members in *How Terrorist Groups End*; Leebart, *To Dare and Conquer*, 579.

[101] Thomas Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 74; David Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century," *Dialogue–IO* 1, no. 1 (Spr. 2002): 17.

[102] This assessment could change dramatically if a VNA acquires WMD. Otherwise, even when terrorists "succeed" and coerce policy changes from the state, the relative *military* balance between the opponents remains virtually unchanged. Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2001).

[103] Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," 7; Schmid, *Political Terrorism*, 92; and Michael Findley and Joseph Young, "Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 285-305.

Copious research exists on terrorism's definition and causation.[104] Root causes range from the individual level,[105] the organizational level,[106] to the systemic level.[107] Various explanations cite generational waves,[108] cycles,[109] globalization,[110] the copycat effect,[111] the loss

[104] No "distinct, coherent class of actors" characterizes terrorists—any nonstate actor can use the tactic. Charles Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists," *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (2004): 5; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University, 2006); Walter Reich, *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998); Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, and *A Research Guide to Concepts*; and Omar Malik, *Enough of the Definition of Terrorism!* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001).

[105] Jerrold Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jerrold Post, Keven Ruby, and Eric Shaw, "The Radical Group in Context: 2. Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 25 (2002); Sun-Ki Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 1 (Oct. 1993); and Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the Twenty-first Century," *Political Psychology*, 21, no. 2 (June 2000): 405-420.

[106] David Rapoport, *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001); Irene Fiala, "Anything New? The Racial Profiling of Terrorists," *Criminal Justice Studies*, 16, no. 1 (Mar. 2003): 53-58; Rex Hudson, *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists* (Guilford, CT: Lyons, 2002); Paul Pillar, "Counterterrorism after al-Qaeda," *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Sum. 2004): 105; and Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 156-176.

[107] Thomas Volgy, Lawrence Imwalle, and Jeff Corntassel, "Structural Determinants of International Terrorism: The Effects of Hegemony and Polarity on Terrorist Activity," *International Interactions* 23, no. 2 (1997): 207-231; Alex Braithwaite and David Sobek, "Victim of Success: American Dominance and Terrorism," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 2 (2005): 135-148; Axel Dreher and Martin Gassebner, "Does Political Proximity to the US Cause Terror? *Economics Letters* 99, no. 1 (2008); Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (Jul. 1981): 379-399; and Edward Newman, "Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 no. 8 (2006): 749-772.

[108] David Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History* 100 (Dec. 2001): 419-425.

[109] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism, 1968–2000: Thresholds, Persistence, and Forecasts," *Southern Economic Journal* 71, no. 3 (Jan. 2004): 467-482; Todd Sandler, Walter Enders, and Harvey Lapan, "Economic Analysis Can Help Fight International Terrorism," *Challenge* (Jan.–Feb. 1991): 10-17; and Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?: A Time-Series Investigation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 3 (2000): 307-332.

[110] Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*; Audrey Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Win. 2002/03): 30-58; Vendana Shiva, "Economic Problems Cause Terrorism," in *Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints*, ed. Laura Egendorf (Farmington Hills, Ml: Greenhaven, 2004); and Michael Mousseau, "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Win. 2002/03): 5-29.

[111] Mark Sedgwick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (2004): 795-814; Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University, 2005).

of traditional values[112] or privileges,[113] youth bulges,[114] demographics,[115] state repression,[116] regime illegitimacy,[117] state capacity,[118] economics,[119] selective outrage,[120] leftist ideologies,[121] rightist ideologies,[122] splinter groups,[123] nationalist-separatism,[124] lone wolves,[125] and

[112] Todd Helmus, "Why and How Some People Become Terrorists," in *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).
[113] Mousseau, "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," 20.
[114] Henrik Urdal, "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006): 607-629.
[115] James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159-177.
[116] Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*; Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1995); and Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1995).
[117] Ehud Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 65-85; Weinberg and Pedahzur, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*.
[118] Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (2004): 230-258; Erica Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity," *Journal of Politics* 71, no. 1 (2010): 16-30; and James Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (Sep. 2008): 469-488.
[119] Samuel Huntington, "The Age of Muslim Wars," *Newsweek*, Dec. 17, 2001, 42-48; Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" *National Interest*, 21(Win. 2001/2002); Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 119-144; and Claude Berrebi, "The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful?" in *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).
[120] Thomas Friedman, "The Core of Muslim Rage," *New York Times*, Mar. 6, 2002, p. A21.
[121] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2006; Michael Dartnell, "France's Action Directe: Terrorists in Search of a Revolution," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2, no. 4 (Win. 1990): 457-488; George Kassimeris, *Inside Greek Terrorism* (London: Hurst, 2013); Alberto Bolivar, "Peru," in *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, ed. Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2002), 84-115; and GRAPO, "Communiqué on the Assassination of Dr José Ramón in Zaragoza on 27 March 1990," in *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, ed. Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky (London: Frank Cass, 1992).
[122] Allison Gough, "Ku Klux Klan Terror," in *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, ed. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Jeffrey Kaplan, "Right Wing Violence in North America," *Terrorism and Political* Violence 7, no. 1 (1995): 44-95.
[123] John Voll, "Bin Laden and the New Age of Global Terrorism," *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 4 (Dec. 2001): 1-5; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intra-movement Framing Contests and al-Qaida's Struggle for Sacred Authority," *International Review of Social History* 49, Supp. 12 (Dec. 2004): 159-177.
[124] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*; Walter Laqueur, *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Terrorists from around the World and Throughout the Ages* (New York: Reed, 2004), 153; and Berch Berberoglu, *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University, 2009).
[125] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2001); Lars Berntzen and Sveinung Sandberg, "The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014): 759-779.

education.[126] Some authors see democracy instigating terrorism,[127] while others consider it a mitigator.[128] Studies focus on religion in general,[129] on Islam,[130] Wahhabism,[131] the mixture of religion and politics,[132] and on the proliferation of religious minorities in democracies.[133]

Terrorism emphasizes a psychological component meant to intimidate a state's population.[134] It adheres to a simple logic: "Kill one; frighten ten thousand."[135] This sort of

---

[126] Christina Paxson, "Comment on Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, 'Education Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?'" (Princeton University, *Research Program in Development Studies Working Paper No. 207*, 2002); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Scapegoat," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spr. 2006): 117-125.

[127] Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random, 2005), and "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (Aug. 2003): 343-361; William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 1 (2001): 155-164; and Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States." .

[128] After the Cold War ended in 1989, various "triumphalists" extolled democracy's war-fighting advantages. Democracies supposedly excel at picking winnable wars—Scott Gartner and Randolph Siverson, "War Expansion and War Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (1996): 4-15; at selecting profitable wars—Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (1999): 794; at bandwagoning when attacked—Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (Dec. 1986): 1151-1169; Randolph Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1991): 285-306; William Reed, "Alliance Duration and Democracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 1072-1078; at entering wars with bigger economies—Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random, 1987); Allan Stam, III, *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1996); at generating higher public support—David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (Mar. 1992): 24-25; at fielding more enthusiastic soldiers—William Reed and David Clark, "War Initiation and War Winners," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 3 (June 2000): 378-395; and at making better foreign policy decisions—Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," 24-37; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1977), and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. (1995): 841-855.

[129] Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*; Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 94-95, and "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 19-20.

[130] Thomas Friedman, "An Islamic Reformation," *New York Times* (Dec. 4, 2002); Richard Connerney, "Islam Promotes Terrorism and Violence," in *Islam: Opposing Viewpoints*, ed. William Dudley (Farmington Hills, Ml: Greenhaven, 2004); and James Gelvin, "Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 4 (2008): 597-600.

[131] Patrick Lang, "The Wahhabist Strain of Islamic Fundamentalism Supports Terrorism," in *Islam: Opposing Viewpoints*, ed. William Dudley (Farmington Hills, Ml: Greenhaven, 2004).

[132] Eric Davis, "Reflections on the Study of Religion and Politics in Post Ba'thist Iraq," *Newsletter of the American Academic Research Institute in Iraq* (TAARII: Spr. 2008): 13-15.

[133] Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*; Sara Wade and Dan Reiter, "Does Democracy Matter: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 329-348.

[134] The Latin *terror* means to be extremely frightened or to have an intense fear or dread. See "terror, n." in the Oxford English Dictionary Online. June 2016. Oxford University. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/199606.

[135] Waltraud Morales, "Guerrilla War," in *Encyclopedia of the Developing World: Volume 2: F–N Index*, ed. Thomas Leonard (New York: Routledge, 2006), 728. For the psychological impact of terrorism on civilians and

indiscriminate political behavior spreads fear: "if no one in particular is a target, no one can be safe."[136] The 2004 Madrid train bombings showed that terrorism might prevail via a single, spectacular attack.[137] Most other times, however, successful terrorism resembles a sustained and organized campaign. "Strategic terrorists" seek to undermine "the psychological bond which binds the population to the regime"[138] and then render the state incapable of preventing chaos in peoples' everyday lives.[139] "Revolutionary terrorism" similarly seeks to isolate the individual

noncombatants, see Barry Levy and Victor Sidel, "Challenges that Terrorism Poses to Public Health," in *Terrorism and Public Health*, ed. Barry Levy and Victor Sidel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 4-18; D. W. Smith et al., "Population Effects of the Bombing of Oklahoma City," *The Journal of the Oklahoma State Medical Association* 92, no. 4 (Apr. 1999): 193-198; Sandro Galea et al., "Trends of Probable Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in New York City after the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 158, no. 6 (2003): 514-524; Roxane Silver et al., "Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological Responses to September 11," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 288, no. 10 (2002): 1235-1244; Robin Gurwitch et al., "The Impact of Terrorism on Children: Considerations for a New Era," *Journal of Trauma Practice* 1, no. 3–4 (2002): 101-124; Mark Schuster et al., "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks," *New England Journal of Medicine* 345 (2001): 1507-1512; and Gerard Chaliand, *Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle* (London: Saqi, 1987), 107-112.

[136] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Fox (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 170.

[137] Jose Rodriguez, *The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength*, Working Papers EPP-LEA:03 (Barcelona, Spain: Department of Sociology and Analysis of Organizations, Dec. 2005); Reuven Paz, *From Madrid to London: Al-Qaeda Exports the War in Iraq to Europe*, Occasional Papers 3, no. 3 (Herzliya, Israel: Global Research in International Affairs Center/Project for the Research of Islamist Movements, 2005), 4-6; Fernando Reinares, "The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 52, no. 2 (2010): 83-104; Rogelio Alonso, "The Madrid Attacks on March 11: an Analysis of the Jihadist Threat in Spain and Main Counterterrorist Measures," in *Countering Terrorism in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*, ed. James Forest (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 202-221; Narciso Michavila, *War, Terrorism and Elections Electoral Impact of the Islamist Terror Attacks on Madrid*, Working Paper no. 13/2005 (Spain: Real Instituto Elcano, June 4, 2005); Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh, "Politics vs Terrorism: The Madrid Case," in *Playing Politics with Terrorism*, ed. George Kassimeris (London: Hurst, 2007), 203-219; Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27 (2004): 355-375; and Robin Niblett, "Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, United States Senate: The Terrorist Attacks in Madrid: Implications for Transatlantic Relations and Cooperation in the War on Terrorism" (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 31, 2004). For arguments that the terrorist attacks did not successfully coerce the Spanish government, see William Rose et al., "Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings," *International Security* 32, no. 1 (Sum. 2007): 185-192.

[138] Peter Neumann and M. L. R. Smith, "Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and its Fallacies," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (Aug. 2005): 577; Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, 74.

[139] See Peter Knauss and D. A. Strickland's scenario: "The streets are completely empty. No one dares venture out. Except for occasional distant explosions, an uncanny silence prevails. Everywhere there is the odor of garbage, sewage, rotting corpses," in "Political Disintegration and Latent Terror," in *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed. Michael Stohl (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), 77.

from the regime; the "solidarity, cooperation, and interdependence on which social functioning is based" succumbs to "insecurity and distrust."[140]

Open societies in an increasingly interconnected world may be perpetually susceptible to this brand of political coercion, as shown by the attacks on shopping malls in Nairobi, Kenya,[141] at the Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, France,[142] and on a holiday party in San Bernardino, California.[143] Terrorists use bombings, assassinations, hijackings, or kidnappings.[144] They may hope that, "the use of symbolic violence alone will be sufficient to achieve their desired political goals."[145] Even those groups that sacrifice their members' lives treat suicide terrorism as a tactic to achieve their political goals;[146] they are thus not delusional, but instead "crazy like a fox."[147]

Unless a terror group grows into an insurgency, it may forego the mass participation and conventional military showdown phases. The need for secrecy means that the VNA requires less active support; more people involved with an organization's inner workings can jeopardize its

[140] Martha Crenshaw, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16, no. 3 (Sep. 1972): 387-388.
[141] Christopher Anzalone, "The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy," *CTC Sentinel* 10, no. 6 (Oct. 2013): 1-6; "Al-Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya," Background Report, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (Sep. 2013), 1; and "Analysis of Al-Shabaab's Attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya," *New York City Police Department* (Nov. 2013), accessed Aug. 5, 2016, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/894158/westgate-report-for-shield-website.pdf.
[142] Alissa Rubin et al., "France Says Truck Attacker Was Tunisia Native With Record of Petty Crime," *New York Times*, Jul. 15, 2016; Sophie Sassard et al., "With 84 Dead, France Investigates Whether Truck Attacker Acted Alone," *Reuters*, Jul. 17, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-crash-idUSKCN0ZU2K7.
[143] Erik Ortiz, "San Bernardino Shooting: Timeline of How the Rampage Unfolded," *NBC News*, Dec. 3, 2016, accessed Aug. 4, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-shooting/san-bernardino-shooting-timeline-how-rampage-unfolded-n473501.
[144] Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 21-27.
[145] Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 576.
[146] Pape, *Dying to Win*; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*; Christoph Reuter, *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2002).
[147] Christopher Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 201. For studies on terrorism's rationality, see Gary Sick, "The Political Underpinnings of Terrorism," in *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles Kegley (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 51; Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 10-11; Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation," 78; and Pape, *Dying to Win*.

security.[148] Unlike insurgents, terrorists may consequently not obsess over broad popular backing.[149] Longevity is instead associated with funding. Terrorists need money for their personal and political activities; they must blend into their community, reconnoiter, plan, and ultimately execute attacks. Various studies examine terrorism's links to state support,[150] diasporas,[151] charities,[152] crime,[153] hawala,[154] humanitarian aid,[155] and digital currencies.[156]

The Seeming Futility of Asymmetric Warfare

State power should usually prohibit VNA success. When unconventional warfare begins, states possess what initially seem to be insurmountable advantages. Major states forge empires,

[148] Peter Mascini, "Can the Violent *Jihad* Do Without Sympathizers?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 343-357.
[149] Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, *Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993–2000*, FFI Rapport-2001/03789 (Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2001); Rodriguez, *The March 11th Terrorist Network*; Maksim Tsvetovat and Kathleen Carley, "Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity: The Downside of Structural Equivalence," *Journal of Social Structure* 6 (2005); Daniel Byman, *Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism*, Analysis Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution/Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2005); James Forrest et al., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Annotated Bibliography, Vol. 2* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).
[150] Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God," *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense and Security/Naval Postgraduate School, 2007); Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjolberg, *Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature* FFI/Rapport (Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004).
[151] Paul Smith, "Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail," in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Volume 2: Combating the Sources and Facilitators*, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 142-162; Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random, 2006).
[152] Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27, no. 3 (May 2004): 169-185.
[153] Lia and Skjolberg, *Causes of Terrorism*; Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute/US Army War College, 2004).
[154] Patrick Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, "The Hawala Alternative: Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering," *Interpol* (Dec. 16, 2006).
[155] Peter Romaniuk, "The State of the Art on the Financing of Terrorism," *RUSI Journal* 159 no. 2 (Apr. 2014): 6-17.
[156] Aaron Brantly, "Financing Terror Bit by Bit," *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 10 (Oct. 2014): 1-5.

reorder international relations, and ultimately determine human history.[157] Every state has a military—even the Vatican; some can pursue irregulars with navies, marines, air forces, and space-based technology. They can apply rational-legal principles to organize their bureaucracies.[158] Multiple police agencies at various levels of society can acquire and disseminate actionable intelligence both nationally and globally.

States can declare martial law, suspend constitutions, and tax and conscript to expand their reach. They can subvert their civil society into a tool for political suppression;[159] state media can portray terrorists and insurgents not as freedom fighters, but as traitors, criminals, rapists, or baby-killers. Governments that derive their budgets from export earnings (oil, gas, or diamonds), or foreign aid may perfect an authoritarian statecraft that keeps the leadership in power and unaccountable.[160]

Rentier states fund sophisticated, pervasive, and unrestrained police and intelligence agencies that they can unleash on VNAs.[161] By leveraging their economy's commanding heights in technology, construction, banking, and agriculture, they can deprive weak sides of popular support; they can further dissuade people from joining the opposition by controlling housing, education, and health care. Through patronage and corruption, rentier states manipulate the mass media, political parties, and unions.[162]

---

[157] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; and Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[158] Weber, *Economy and Society*; Tilly, "War Making and State Making."
[159] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control State: Power in Jordan," *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 1 (Oct. 2000): 43-61.
[160] Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11, no. 3 (May 1982): 265-283; Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (Apr. 2001): 325-361; and Larry Diamond, "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?" *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1, (Jan. 2010): 93-112.
[161] Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley: University of California, 1990).
[162] F. Gregory Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994).

Apprehensive publics "rally around the flag" and support even unpopular regimes during crises.[163] If a state opts to pursue its irregulars, optimism and enthusiasm may at first buoy a populace that has yet to feel the brutal drudgery of unconventional war. In the early phases of the conflict, the government will probably enjoy its broadest and deepest levels of support, and have at its disposal the widest array of political, legal, diplomatic, economic, and military countermeasures. VNAs can often expect popular apathy, or, at best, lukewarm support. They may lack not just numbers and weapons, but also the critical skills and experience in operational security and evasion.

The Power of Weakness

Despite these daunting challenges, weak sides sometime find success. David beats Goliath. The power of weakness pits a state's force, resolve, and negotiating flexibility against a VNA's subversion, resiliency, and goal flexibility; "it should never be forgotten that the strength of this [state] force rests on the will of the government which employs it, and that, in its turn…rests on the will of the nation which this government represents."[164] VNAs can consequently undermine the strong side's will and legitimacy: "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being outadministered."[165] Weak sides may therefore not actually win asymmetric conflicts, but rather, their adversaries lose them.[166]

[163] D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 122-123.
[164] Fuller, *The Reformation of War*, 30.
[165] Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Naval War College Review* 17, no. 8 (Apr. 1965): 34.
[166] Charles Thayer, *Guerrilla* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 1.

Chapter 2: Theory and Method

This research seeks to draw from, synthesize, and contribute to scholarship on asymmetric warfare, terrorism, insurgency, coercion, rational choice, learning, and organizational theories. These topics are timely and important because unconventional warfare is increasingly becoming the norm; it is likely to remain an important political weapon of the truly aggrieved. The power of weakness prevails in unconventional warfare when VNAs engage in collective action that coerces policy changes from a state. The consensus in the literature is that after a weak side loses faith in peaceful conflict resolution, it must be able to access sanctuaries. As the state falters and miscalculates, the irregulars simultaneously organize, acquire support, and exploit external opportunities.

The Comparative Method and Learning from History

Historical case studies can generate lessons of broader applicability and improve our understanding of contemporary situations that bear certain resemblances. By combining several approaches, I intend to produce empirical knowledge from theory and history and capture the complexity of asymmetric warfare. I will fashion an explanatory research model that can develop and test a theory, and then identify the causal factors that account for VNA success.

The "potentially generalizable relations between aspects" of different phenomena do not "just turn up," but rather must be "deliberately sought out."[1] Established theories and existing causal mechanisms may help interpret new cases; they may incorporate new variables to identify

[1] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Strategies of Inquiry: Handbook of Political Science, Volume VII*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 104-108.

similarities among different cases.[2] My goal also is to pursue a "building block" approach to stronger theory. While the first case establishes a "preliminary theoretical construct," successive cases may uncover ways to improve and amend the original design.[3]

My analytical model features a qualitative, "focused-structured approach" that uses comparative cases to harness history to political science.[4] "Focusing" lets me to deal with only certain aspects of my unconventional warfare cases—varying outcomes. "Structuring" asks the same general questions of each case. By using a standardized set of questions, I aim to first acquire comparable data from each case, and then categorize these data for systematic comparison and empirical testing. At the same time, I want to prevent the idiosyncratic aspects of each case from distorting my results and hindering cumulative social science.[5]

Case Studies

I test my model's validity by applying it to three historic examples and one ongoing case of modern unconventional warfare. I chose my cases for several reasons. First, they are well documented with rich historical details and multiple sources. Second, they are amenable to

[2] Sidney Verba, "Review: Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics* 20, no. 1 (Oct. 1967): 114.
[3] Howard Becker, "Social Observation and Case Studies," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 11 (1968): 232-238; Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory," 104-107.
[4] I will use a small (*n*), comparative approach that is based on process tracing and seeks to identify "verifiable causal stories." Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005), ch. 10. According to Charles Tilly, this approach helps identify "differing chains of cause-effects relations" and uncovers "regularities through juxtaposition of historical cases" in "Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology," *Comparative Social Research* 16 (1997): 43-53. See also David Laitin, "Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline," in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Helen Milner and Ira Katznelson (New York: Norton, 2002), 2-5.
[5] Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Lauren (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 61.

theory development and testing, and provide control and variance to my research. Finally, the cases can help uncover an actor's motives and decision-making process.[6]

While displaying some similarity, my cases simultaneously exhibit distinct dissimilarities by occurring in societies that are separate from each other in time and space. As a result, similar phenomena that may be observed in these societies cannot be explained by mutual influences or a common origin.[7] I selected cases that end in total success, partial success, and failure so that I may be able to identify the conditions and variables that explain these different outcomes.[8]

My cases are instances of the same subclass of politics—asymmetric warfare. The FLN's terrorism and insurgency in Algeria (1954–62) is an iconic case of total success that helped shape the postwar environment and the future of the Middle East. The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters' (EOKA) terror campaign in Cyprus (1955–59) demonstrates how smaller VNAs with limited objectives can prevail. While the Tamil Tigers' terrorism and insurgency in Sri Lanka (1983–2009) resembles the Algerian and Cypriot cases in several important respects, it nonetheless fails. The ongoing study of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia will function as a test of the model developed for prediction and refinement. Based on the insights and analysis derived from the general theory, how likely is it that the VNA will succeed?

My conclusions will address whether the cases adhere to all, most, some, or none of my general theoretical elements. How does the level of theoretical validation influence the outcomes of VNA success or failure? Under what conditions do distinctive causal patterns emerge? How

[6] Alexander George and Timothy McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations: A Research Annual*, Vol. 2. (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1986).
[7] Marc Bloch, "Toward a Comparative History of European Societies," in *Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History*, ed. Frederic Lane and Jelle Riemersma (Homewood, IL: Richard Irwin, 1953), 496.
[8] George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 44.

can the variance in my independent and dependent variables assist in developing theory that helps identify these causal patterns?

Hypotheses and Variables (L 2: not bold & centered)

The balance of power should usually preclude VNA success in unconventional warfare. States possess what seem insurmountable advantages. VNAs can often expect popular apathy or lukewarm support; most of their founding members will likely die. Notwithstanding these glaring disparities, some weak sides conclude that the government is either unwilling or unable to resolve their grievances peacefully.

Having decided to fight, the VNA needs sanctuaries. It must organize away from the state's reach, find arms, maintain secrecy, and ambush its target. The stunned government may initially deny that a grievance even exists. After the shock wears off, however, and the VNA persists or even escalates, the state usually adopts a dual strategy. While the army and police pursue the irregulars, proposed political, social, and economic reforms try to simultaneously isolate the radical minority and assuage the moderate majority. The strong side expects the irregulars to promptly submit, quit, suffer in jail, or die.

Sometimes, time and space let the VNA rewrite the state's script. The military stalemate that ensues provides the opportunity for state miscalculation to combine with weak side competitive adaptation.[9] While the government's countermeasures either prove indecisive or actually exacerbate its challenges, the irregulars adjust to their hostile and changing environment. Even if, however, the VNA learns, restructures its organization, eliminates rivals, and cajoles,

[9] Stalemate in war means that "neither side can change the front lines dramatically no matter how hard it tries." Kagan, "What Stalemate Means in Ukraine."

coopts, coerces, or kills for popular support, it may still require external support. VNA success in unconventional warfare is thus usually a process.[10]

I draw the following preconditions and hypotheses from my review of the literatures in order to explain VNA success in unconventional warfare.

Preconditions: Most unconventional warfare ends with state victory. Those few cases that avoid this outcome first require VNAs to find a cause that inspires its members to kill and die, to torture and suffer. They must next access the safe havens that prevent the state from smothering the weak side in its infancy.

Hypothesis 1: The space and time that the preconditions afford are not sufficient for success and only preclude the VNA's quick and sudden demise. The more state miscalculation and weak side competitive adaptation combine to force a stalemate, the greater the chances for VNA success.[11]

Hypothesis 2: Even if the VNA evolves into a proto-state, it may still not be able to change government policy until external pressures intrude. The greater the role of foreign states,

[10] In some instances, such as 1983 Beirut, a single act of terrorism by Hezbollah caused America and France to change their policies and leave Lebanon prematurely. These types of lone incident outcomes, however, are extremely rare. I will focus on unconventional warfare that occurs as sustained campaigns.

[11] George Modelski notes that "stalemate is the most propitious condition for a settlement" in "International Settlement of Internal War," in *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, ed. James Rosenau (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1964), 143. Not all conflict is "ripe" for settlement. Ripeness reflects the opposing sides' perceptions of a mutually harmful stalemate. They will seek a way out after they realize that a quick victory is unlikely. William Zartman, *The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983); Saadia Touval and William Zartman, *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985); Michael Burton and John Higley, "Elite Settlements," *American Sociological Review* (June 1987): 295-307; Amartya Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science & Technology, 1984); Kenneth Arrow and Eric Maskin. *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2012); Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971); and Steven Brams, *Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration* (New York: Routledge, 1990). Prospect theory argues that sunk costs push opponents into costly deadlocks. Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect Theory," 263-292; Janice Stein and Louis Pauly, *Choosing to Cooperate: How States Avoid Loss* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1993); and Christopher Mitchell, "Cutting Losses: Working Paper 9, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution" (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 1995).

international institutions, diasporas, and human rights advocates in the conflict, the greater the chances for weak side success.

Preconditions: Achieving the Improbable Stalemate

The weak side needs a cause for which it can die and kill. Without proper motivation, the weak side's community will not continue to inflict and suffer the type of human depravity necessary to prevail in unconventional warfare. VNAs thus require festering complaints that affect their people disproportionately. These problems may stretch back decades, centuries, or even millennia; they must be powerful enough to imbue the weak side with an "us versus them"

mindset.[12] A winner-takes-all electoral system that produces out-groups may exacerbate issues that involve ethnic politics,[13] nationalism,[14] culture,[15] and religion.[16]

Sanctuaries are then indispensable if irregulars want to recruit, indoctrinate, attack, dictate the pace of operations, retreat, and regroup.[17] Irregulars, irrespective of their ideology, size, or goals, need refuge to prevent a state from converting its power into military victory.[18]

---

[12] Constructivism examines how norms, identities, and relationships generate an "us versus them" mentality in international relations. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory* (Boston: Longman, 2012b), 277-290. For how identity construction produces ethnic violence, see Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998); Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic, 2000); Nicholas Sambanis and Moses Shayo, "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2 (2013): 294-325; and Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."

[13] The minority group may feel that it is under siege and on the verge of extinction. Manning Nash, *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989); Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, ed. Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University, 1999), 261-302; Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia* (New York: Berghahn, 2011); Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995); Stuart Kaufman, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 45-86, and *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001).

[14] Nationalism is a political movement in which "individual members give their primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national community." It prompts these communities to desire an independent state. Stephen van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spr. 1994): 6; Michael Brown, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001); Louis Snyder, *German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1969); Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Win. 1993/ 94): 113-133; and Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992), 12-14, 123.

[15] Cultural differences over slavery, religion, gender rights, or abortion inspire domestic and international violence. William Kornblum and Carolyn Smith, *Sociology in a Changing World* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011), 191-192, 195, 197, 205; Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 22-49; Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," 47-60; and Jack Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999).

[16] Religious dogma and beliefs can lead to inflexibility, intolerance, and violence. David Little, "Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1, no. 2 (1995): 284-301; Roger Williamson, "Why is Religion Still a Factor in Armed Conflict?" *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21, no. 3 (1990): 243-253; Jeffrey Seul, "Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1999): 553-569; Steve Clarke, Russell Powell, and Julian Savulescu, *Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict: A Scientific and Conceptual Investigation* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2013); and Jonathan Fox, "The Ethnic-religious Nexus: The Impact of Religion on Ethnic Conflict," *Civil Wars* 3, no. 3 (2000): 1-22.

[17] Clausewitz predicted that general uprisings could succeed if the battlefield was "rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, marshes, of the local methods of cultivation." *On War*, 480. Successful VNAs may have multiple safe havens. US Department of State: Bureau of Counterterrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013: Chapter 3: Terrorist Safe Havens," last modified Apr. 2014; and Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 65.

[18] Robert Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens," (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, 2008), 15, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA479805.pdf; US Department of State, "Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report), Bureau of Counterterrorism and

Groups with sanctuaries are more effective at forging alliances and extending their reach and lethality.[19] They must accordingly exploit anonymity in densely populated areas, or relocate to vast mountain ranges, thick forests, sprawling deserts, impenetrable jungles, murky swamps, remote areas with multiple international boundaries, or failed states.[20]

Independent Variable 1: The Marriage of Miscalculation and Adaptation

In some sense, the onset of irregular conflict implies that the strong side is already succeeding. Regardless of regime type, states enjoy huge power advantages and a wide array of potential countermeasures. The government can set the tone early and quickly dissuade potential fence sitters. The local population, neighboring states, and international institutions may hesitate to oppose even the most contemptible regime if the authorities seem competent and in control.

The Stumbling State

Countering Violent Extremism: Country Reports on Terrorism 2015," last modified Jan. 20, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257522.htm; Elizabeth Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, "Eliminating Terrorist Safe Havens: One Size Does not Fit All, *Brookings*, Apr. 6, 2015b, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/04/06/eliminating-terrorist-safe-havens-one-size-does-not-fit-all/; Rem Korteweg, "Black Holes: On Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness," *Civil Wars* 10, no. 1 (Mar. 2008): 60; and Cristiana Kittner, "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 3 (2007): 308.

[19] Tricia Bacon, "Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 4 (Aug. 2014): 13.

[20] US CIA, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012," 6. For links between safe haves and failing states, see Liana Wyler, "CRS Report for Congress: Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy, RL34253, Aug. 28, 2008," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress, 2008), 4, 25-27; Robert Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 1-20; Phil Williams, "Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security," in *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*, ed. Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University, 2010), 41; Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas," 18; and Elizabeth Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, "Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38, no. 2 (2015): 85-112.

When unconventional conflict begins, the state has, in another sense, already failed to appreciate a VNA's values and resolve.[21] The government could not deter, coerce, cajole, or crush a group that probably totals no more than a few dozen members.[22] It could not neutralize the weak side's leadership; nor could it anticipate its next move.[23] The strong side's strategy may be inappropriate from the start.[24] The "politics of atrocity" or massive intimidation can generate sympathy for the weak side;[25] repressing moderates or appeasing radicals may likewise improve VNA odds dramatically.[26]

The state may realize too late that a VNA's support "derives not from its popularity, but from the unpopularity of the [state's] ensuing repression."[27] Asymmetric war may accordingly

---

[21] Arreguin-Toft notes that US strategy in Vietnam wrongly assumed that the communist government would quit after it sustained high casualties and hit its breaking point. "How the Weak Wins Wars," 99; Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), 167-168; and John Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam: The Statistics of a Deadly Quarrel," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Dec. 1980): 497-519.

[22] For why states squander quick and decisive outcomes, see my "Literature Review;" Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, and *Evolution of a Revolt*; Tom Bowden, "The Irish Underground and the War of Independence 1919-21," *Journal of Contemporary History* 8, no. 2 (Apr. 1973): 3-23; Yoshihiro Kuriyama, "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a "New Left" Group in Japan," *Asian Survey* 13, no. 3 (Mar. 1973): 336-346; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*; Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect Theory," 263-292; Lebow, *Between Peace and War*; Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies*; Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War," 379-414; Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," 5-38; Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas," and "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," 5-43; George Kassimeris, "Europe's Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975–2000," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 2 (Sum. 2001): 67-84; Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*; Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002); and Tuchman, *The Guns of August*.

[23] Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism;" Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 580; Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*; Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions," 487-505; and Martha Crenshaw, "Special Report: How Terrorism Ends," *US Institute for Peace* (Washington, DC: USIP, May 25, 1999), 2.

[24] Years before the Vietnam War ended, Kissinger lamented that America "fought a military war" while the opposition "fought a political one." As US generals pursued the enemy's "physical attrition," the other side "aimed for our psychological exhaustion." "The Viet Nam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs* 47, no. 2 (Jan. 1969): 214.

[25] David Rapoport, "Terrorism," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, Vol. 2, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge, 1992), 1064.

[26] Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," 10; Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 580; Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*; and Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism."

[27] Nathan Leites, "Understanding the Next Act," *Terrorism* 3, no. 1–2 (1979): 22; Edward Price, "The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terrorism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, no. 1 (1977): 52-66; William Waugh, Jr., "The Values in Violence: Organizational and Political Objectives of Terrorist Groups," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 3, no. 4 (1983): 5-19; Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation," 65-85; Ted Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 1990), 86-102; and Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," 7-20.

compel a government to demonstrate how well it can perform.[28] Since all regime types are vulnerable to the power of subversion, terrorism and insurgency can thus perversely offer a constituency the opportunity to decide whether its leadership is worth supporting. [29]

The Adaptive VNA

Even the most inept government will probably learn from its mistakes. Although security forces may be unable to locate a VNA, they will certainly know where to find its community. The state will seek to reassure domestic and external audiences that its setbacks are temporary. Military offensives, police raids, and detentions will unfold alongside flurries of legislation and constitutional reforms. During this "incipient stage," the irregulars must balance the need to attack, publicize the cause, rally supporters, and provoke state overreaction with limiting their exposure.[30] Four factors constitute the VNA's ability to compete, adapt, and prevail: organization, rival elimination, community support, and a range of goals.

---

[28] Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency."

[29] According to Paul Blackstock, "Subversion is the undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the victimized state, and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor." It assumes that public morale and "the will to resist intervention" emanate from socio-political and class loyalties rooted in "national symbols, such as the flag, constitution, crown, or…the chief of state." *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), 56. The US Department of Defense defines subversion as actions "designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority." "US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," *Joint Chiefs of Staff*, last modified July 2019, accessed Aug. 8, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. Charles Townsend views subversion as "the vulnerability of modern systems to all kinds of covert assaults." *Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1993), 116. See also William Rosenau, "Subversion and Insurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study– Paper 2, Occasional Papers (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 5; and R. J. Spjut, "Defining Subversion," *British Journal of Law and Society*, 6, no. 2 (Win. 1979): 254-261.

[30] US CIA, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012."

Organization. While the 19th century Russian anarchist Michael Bakunin belonged to a wave of VNAs that glorified acts of political violence as "propaganda by deed,"[31] he realized that success requires "a secret organization which has scattered its members in small groups over the whole territory… [is] inspired by a common ideal … [and acts] everywhere according to a common plan."[32] Although individual group members come and go, institutional memories persist.[33]

The VNA has already demonstrated some organizational competency by fighting the state to a standstill. Circumstances, however, change. The element of surprise is gone, and the state will likely escalate. The weak side must therefore improve its organization's structure, decision-making, and learning.[34] It may have to reevaluate its recruitment, membership qualifications, and hierarchy. Multiple and shifting intra-group rivalries and inter-group alliances may challenge its legitimacy.

Organizational flexibility weeds out weak VNAs. Sometimes, centralized bureaucracies with rigid chains of command foster success; by operating under a single unified leadership, the

---

[31] David Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004), 50.
[32] Michael Confino, *Daughter of a Revolutionary: Natalie Herzen and the Bakunin-Nechayev Circle*, trans. Hilary Sternberg and Lydia Bott (London: Alcove, 1974), 260.
[33] Comparative foreign policy examines how organizational variables influence decision-making. Richard Snyder, H. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3 (Princeton, NJ: Organizational Behavior Section, 1954), 68-117; Chris Argyris and Donald Schön, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Georges Romme and Ron Dillen, "Mapping the Landscape of Organizational Learning," *European Management Journal* 15, no. 1 (1997): 68-78; Mark Easterby-Smith, Mary Crossan and Davide Nicolini, "Organizational Learning: Debates Past, Present and Future," *Journal of Management Studies* 37, no. 6 (Sep. 2000): 783-796; and Michael Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2008).
[34] For how and why organizations adjust to changing conditions, see Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine, *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); Confino, *Daughter of a Revolutionary*; Argyris and Schön, *Organizational Learning*; Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane Russak, 1984); Katleen Carley, "Organizational Learning and Personnel Turnover," *Organization Science* 3, no. 1 (Feb. 1992): 20-46; Danny Miller, "A Preliminary Typology of Organizational Learning: Synthesizing the Literature," *Journal of Management* 22 (1996) no. 3, 486-505; Romme and Dillen, "Mapping the Landscape," 68-78; and Rapoport, "The Four Waves," 50.

group can enforce discipline and implement orders efficiently.[35] Other times, hierarchical VNAs are more vulnerable to decapitation.[36] The loss of a few experienced leaders can disrupt their ideology, strategy, or competency.[37]

Decentralized groups and horizontal networks may be nimbler and more efficient at exploiting new intelligence. They can compartmentalize into separate cells that preserve the group's operational security.[38] The challenge is that the VNA may strain to behave as a unitary actor and develop competing centers of decision-making. The group can then become susceptible to individual whims, splintering, or insubordination.[39]

Decision-making in underground groups can become homogenized, rigid, over-simplified, detached from reality, subject to groupthink, or impervious to constructive

[35] Kent Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism* 12 (1989): 139-152; McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 473-506; Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," *Orbis* 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985b): 465-489, and "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed., David Rapoport (London: Frank Cass 2001), 13-31; and Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama*.
[36] Bryan Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," *International Security* 36, no. 4 (Spr. 2012): 14.
[37] Gvineria, "How Does Terrorism End?" 268-269; Audrey Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006): 7-48; and Michael Eisenstadt, "'Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings' as a Counter-Terror Tool: An Assessment of Israel's Approach," *Peacewatch*, no. 342 (Aug. 28, 2001).
[38] Ian Lesser et al., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999); Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, "Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 94-117; and Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 2 (2013): 99-115.
[39] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 73.

criticism.[40] VNAs may thus have to learn through formal instruction or on-the-job training;[41] they may be obliged to follow the news, access court cases and law enforcement testimony, and peruse government hearings.[42] They may emulate other successful VNAs or go to camps and seminars run by friendly states.[43]

Rival Elimination. If the VNA wants to prevail on its terms, it will have to eliminate rivals. Competing groups can trigger the "rebel's dilemma" and undermine "extensive collective dissent" against the state;[44] they can support different goals, represent different parts of the same

[40] George Simmel, "The Secret and the Secret Societies," in *The Sociology of George Simmel*, trans. and ed. Kurt Wolff, (New York: Free, 1964), 345-376; Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic;" Donatella Della Porta, "Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political Organizations," in *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations*, vol. 4, ed. Donatella della Porta (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1992), 19; Franco Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 1990), 61; Barry Rubin, *Revolution until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1994); John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: an Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1989); Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies*, and *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Michael Elmes and Gary Gemmill, "The Psychodynamics of Mindlessness and Dissent in Small Groups," *Small Group Research* 21, no. 1 (Feb. 1990): 41; Donald Marquis, "Individual Responsibility and Group Decisions Involving Risk," *Industrial Management Review* 3, no. 2 (1962): 8-23; Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation;" J. K. Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of Violence," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 1, nos. 3 & 4 (1978): 277-285; and McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 489.
[41] Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama*, 140-147, 205-206; Romme and Dillen, "Mapping the Landscape," 71-73; and Horacio Trujillo and Brian Jackson, "Chap. 7: Theory: Organizational Learning as a Four-Component Process," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, ed. Brian Jackson et al., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 181-187.
[42] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1998, 178-179.
[43] Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network* (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1981), 10, 26; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2006, 78-79; Charles Russell, Leon Banker, Jr. and Bowman Miller, "Out-Inventing the Terrorist," in *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 3-42; Manus Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw and Fumihiko Yoshida, "Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1980): 262-298; Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus, "Observations on Why Violence Spreads," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1980): 299-305; Rohan Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism," *Frontline* 17, no. 3 (Feb. 5–8): 2000; Joyce Davis, *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 67-84; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 121-129; Pape, *Dying to Win*, 73; United States Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Research Study: International Terrorism in 1976: Diagnosis and Prognosis* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1976), 20; Cline and Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, 34, 44-46, 57, 60, 67-72; Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); and Maurice Tugwell, "Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA," in *British Perspectives on Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 23.
[44] The dilemma for irregulars' collective action is that while many may sympathize with their cause, rational sympathizers are incentivized to free ride and thereby not contribute to the public good of coercing or capturing the

community, or appeal to different communities. Rivals increase opportunities for betrayal and defection.[45] Newcomers may try to differentiate their brand by intensifying the violence, becoming more ideologically extreme, or attracting hard-core recruits.[46] Internal rivalries may rupture the VNA or leave it vulnerable to a government's divide-and-conquer tactics.[47]

Although rival elimination can be bloody and exhausting, the last group standing gains instant credibility as the state-in-waiting. Its longevity increases.[48] The survivors can access a wider audience through unchallenged media coverage, snuff out future threats, and derail unwanted peace deals.[49]

---

state. Mark Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1995), 16; Kanchan Chandra, "What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2006): 397-424.

[45] Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach," 483; Kristin Bakke, Kathleen Cunningham, and Lee Seymour, "A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 265-283; Kathleen Cunningham, Kristin Bakke, and Lee Seymour, "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-determination Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1: (2012): 67-93; and Fernando Reinares and Rogelio Alonso, "Confronting Ethnonationalist Terrorism in Spain: Political and Coercive Measures against ETA," in *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, ed. Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 125.

[46] Michael Boyle, "Bargaining, Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence against Civilians in Iraq 2004-2007," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (2009): 261-287; Stephen Nemeth, "The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 336-362; David Jaeger et al., "Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 3 (2015): 528-549; Barbara Walter, "The New New Civil Wars," *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2014) 469-486; and Sara Polo and Kristian Gleditsch, "Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 6 (2016): 815-829.

[47] States can help one or multiple VNAs. Paddy Woodworth, *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2002); Mia Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 61-88; Michael Findley and Joseph Young, "More Combatant Groups, More Terror? Empirical Tests of an Outbidding Logic," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 5 (2012): 706-721; Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalries* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2000); Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-state Paramilitaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 16-40; and Kenneth Bush, *The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read Between the Lines* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[48] Brian Phillips, "Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Longevity," *Journal of Peace* 52, no. 1 (Jan. 2015): 62-75; Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach," 483; Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma*, 208-210; and Khusrav Gaibulloev, Dongfang Hou, and Todd Sandler, "How do the Factors Determining Terrorist Groups' Longevity Differ from those Affecting Their Success?" *European Journal of Political Economy* 65 (Dec. 2020).

[49] Efe Tokdemir et al., "Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65, no. 4 (2021): 731; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*; and Justin Conrad and Kevin Greene. "Competition, Differentiation, and the Severity of Terrorist Attacks," *Journal of Politics* 77, no. 2 (2015): 546-561; Mary Crossan, Henry Lane, and Roderick White, "An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution," *Academy of Management Review* 24, no. 3 (1999): 522-537; Wendy Pearlman, "Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process," *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2009): 79-

Impress and Coerce the Community. VNAs can attract support by implementing social welfare programs, and building schools, roads and community centers. They disseminate their message via television and radio stations or web sites.[50] Irregulars burnish their reputations by bloodying the state's army and police, seizing its land, exploding its facilities, murdering its bureaucrats, and cowing its citizenry. Loyalty results from exposing the authorities' corruption or protecting the community's sacred shrines and historic monuments. VNAs may bestow glory, fame, or aid to members' families;[51] they promise a new or ideal community based on scripture or past paragons.[52] Weak sides can also replenish the ranks via kidnapping and extortion, crime, bank robbery, or the drug trade.[53]

109; Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53; Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Apr. 2002): 263-296; G. Kalah et al., "Networks of Cooperation: Rebel Alliances in Fragmented Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 9 (2019): 2071-2097; Barak Mendelsohn, "The Battle for Algeria: Explaining Fratricide among Armed Nonstate Actors," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 44, no. 9 (2021): 776-798; and Constantino Pischedda, "Wars within Wars: Why Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability Cause Inter-rebel Fighting in Internal Conflicts," *International Security* 43, no. 1 (2018): 138-176.

[50] After 9/11, al Qaeda relied on web sites, online discussion boards, chat rooms, and DVDs to spread its message. It posted suicide attack videos to attract new followers. Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," *Foreign Affairs 86*, (2007): 26-31; Gabriel Weimann, "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet," *Journal of International Security Affairs* 8 (2005); Brigitte Nacos, "Communication and Recruitment of Terrorists," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes: Vol. 2. Training*, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 41-52; and Madeleine Gruen, "Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes: Vol. 2. Training*, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 11-22.

[51] Jessica Darden, "Tackling Terrorists' Exploitation of Youth," *American Enterprise Institute*, May 2019, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/report/tackling-terrorists-exploitation-of-youth/Tackling-Terrorists-Exploitation-of-Youth.pdf.

[52] Halim Rane, "Reformulating Jihad in the Context of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: A Theoretical Framework," *Global Change, Peace and Security* 19, no. 2 (2007): 127-147; John Venhaus, "Why Youth Join al-Qaeda," *US Institute of Peace*, May 2010, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf; Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State: Analysis Paper No. 19," (Washington, DC: The Brooking Project on US Relations With the Islamic World, 2015); and Egor Fedorov, "The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham: the Group's Nation-Building Project through the Instrumental Use of Violence," *McGill Journal of Political Studies* 7 (2016): 34-35.

[53] US CIA, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012."

Ranging Goals. The quest for support can pose a dilemma for the weak side. VNAs must grow strong enough to subvert and coerce the state to achieve their political goals. The more they evolve into states-in-waiting, however, the more vulnerable they become to countermeasures. While staying on the offensive, the irregulars must simultaneously protect their existing assets while incorporating newly seized areas and caring for influxes of refugees. Smaller insurgencies and terrorist groups may be nimbler and more elusive, but they may not be imposing enough to influence state policy.

A weak side can ultimately resolve this power paradox by prevailing with its "victory or death" agenda. It wins when the state collapses, leaves, or cedes territory. This maximalist outcome, however, is rare—most attempted revolutions fail, declining empires may hold on to their colonies for decades, and states resist surrendering their land and people.[54] Limited goals may accordingly bring both large and small VNAs other types of success.

In politics, goals define outcomes.[55] If a state anticipates greater costs in complying with the weak side's grand demands than with attacking it, it will fight longer.[56] Pragmatic goals

[54] Maximalist outcomes may be too rare to inspire future generations of violent nonstate actors. Many of the Marxist VNAs failed in the 1960s-1970s because they rejected goals that fell short of governmental overthrow. Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, 82-83; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism;" Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1966), 3; Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1; Marvin Ott, "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution, Two Cases," *International Organization* 26, no. 4 (Aut. 1972): 613; John Vasquez, "The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau's Issue Area Typology," *Journal of Peace Research* 20, no. 2 (Sum. 1983): 179; and Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 53.

[55] The transition to democracy literature examines how different types of political goals affect a group's chances for success. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Model," *Comparative Politic*s 2 (Apr. 1970): 337-363; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1986); and Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1991).

[56] Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2003); Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (Sum. 1997): 335-364; Max Abrahms, "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 660; and Benjamin Acosta, "From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties," *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (Jul. 2014): 667.

present different opportunities and challenges.[57] Via their power to hurt, VNAs can transform the relative balance of power just enough to generate "a range of bargains that would not otherwise exist."[58] Limited goals can convince a state that the group is a trustworthy negotiating partner who can control its base's proclivity for violence;[59] they can assuage the weak side's battered, war weary community. Victory may result when the weak side calculates how far to coerce the target.[60] Pragmatism may alternately open the weak side to accusations of betrayal or selling out, especially if it has not managed to eliminate all its rivals.[61]

---

[57] A study of over 600 terror groups from 1968-2008 concludes that 43% of terrorists ultimately joined the political process. The implication is that some VNA goals are palatable to both their respective communities and target governments. Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*.

[58] Lisa Hultman, "The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of RENAMO Violence," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no. 4 (2009): 823; Jakana Thomas, "Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014): 807; Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49-80; Lake, "Rational Extremism," 15-29; and Reed Wood and Jacob Kathman, "Too Much of a Bad Thing? Civilian Victimization and Bargaining in Civil War," *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (July 2014): 685-706.

[59] Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*; Max Abrahms, "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited," *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 3 (2012): 366-393; Jean-Paul Azam, "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians," *Economics of Governance* 7, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 53-57; Laia Balcells, "Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 3 (June 2011): 397-422; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism;" Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace," 263-296; David Mason, "Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant," *Public Choice* 86 (1996): 63-83; Richard Rubinstein, *Alchemist of Revolution* (New York: Basic, 1987); Sick, "The Political Underpinnings," 51; Richard Shultz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism," in *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles Kegley (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 45; and Reed Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (Sep. 2010): 601-614.

[60] Rational choice theories posit that decision-making should reflect self-interest, cost-benefit analysis, and profit optimization. D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 157; Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," 86-102; Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 5-6; Michael Useem, "Ideological and Interpersonal Change in the Radical Protest Movement," *Social Problems* 19, no. 4 (Spr. 1972): 451-469; Clark McCauley and Mary Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," in *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: The Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, v. 9, ed. Clyde Hendrick (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), 231-256; Clausewitz, *On War*, 1984, 75-80; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism;" Walter, "The Critical Barrier," 335-364; Abrahms, "The Credibility Paradox," 660; McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 488; Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2004): 246; Zeeuw, "Understanding the Political Transformation," 1-32; Audrey Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2009); and Acosta, "From Bombs to Ballots," 667.

[61] Pragmatism may thus trigger in fighting, defections, or attacks from more radical groups. If a VNA's base originally coalesced around the prospect of creating mayhem, the organization may have subsequently institutionalized this violent preference. Militant bases can thus view their leadership's moderation as a sellout and insist on total victory. Hoffman and McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," 246; Acosta, "From Bombs to Ballots," 668, and "Palestinian Precedents: The Origins of Al-Qaeda's Use of Suicide Terrorism and *Istishhad*," in *Political Islam from Muhammad to Ahmadinejad: Defenders, Detractors, and Definitions*, ed. Joseph

This independent variable will measure state miscalculation and VNA competitive adaptation by examining the answers to the following questions:

- How did the VNA's organization affect the outcome?
- What did the VNA learn from its mistakes?
- Could the weak side anticipate and predict state actions?
- Did the VNA effectively eliminate its rivals?
- Did the VNA monopolize negotiations with the state?
- How much of the outcome reflects the VNA's agenda?
- Did the VNA adopt pragmatic goals alongside its "victory or death" maximalist agenda?
- How did the adoption/rejection of limited goals affect the outcome?
- Did the state use deploy all its military, political, economic, and diplomatic resources against the VNA?
- Did the initial government announcements reflect an accurate appreciation of the threat?
- How did government statements and policies evolve as the VNA persisted?
- How long did it take the state to realize that it had a VNA challenge?
- What was the state's level of interest?
- What constraints did the state face when responding to the political violence?

Independent Variable 2: External Pressures

Even after the VNA adapts to the post-stalemate environment, it may still have to summon external pressures to prevail in unconventional warfare. International institutions, other states, diaspora communities, and global norms can amplify the power of weakness. Various literatures examine the relationship between domestic and external politics.[62] According to a comparative study of the revolutions in France, Russia, and China, the old regimes' failure to institute economic reforms rendered them unable "to weather the particular intensity of military

Skelly (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010), 193-206; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*; Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases" 86-102; Zeeuw, "Understanding the Political Transformation," 1-32; and Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*.

[62] Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1983), 210-243; Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1983), 115-140; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984); Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," *International Organization* 47 (1993): 565-598; Alexander Wendt, "The Agent Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335-370; Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2012); and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (1986): 763-769.

threats from abroad."[63] Works in international relations note that foreign institutions can influence a state's economic policies,[64] gender relations,[65] human rights,[66] and decision-making.[67] Government officials and subnational actors may invoke international rules to win domestic policy debates, justify unpopular decisions, or evade constitutional restrictions.[68] External aid enhances a VNA's legitimacy and makes it harder for the state to portray it as a criminal organization.[69]

---

[63] Theda Skocpol, "State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia, and China," *Theory and Society*, 7, no. 1-2 (Jan.-Mar. 1979b): 19; Katherine Chorley, *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (Boston: Beacon, 1973); and Diana Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa* (New York: Academic, 1974). For how external pressures undermined 1789 France, see Walter Dorn, *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), chaps. 6-8; for their effect on 1917 Russia, see Nikolai Golovin, *The Russian Army in the World War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1931), 32, 39, 126, 160; for China, Frederic Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China* (New York: Free, 1975), chaps. 7-9; Frances Moulder, *Japan, China and the Modern World Economy : Toward a Reinterpretation of East Asian Development ca 1600 to ca 1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), chap. 4.

[64] International institutions and trade deals promote domestic liberal economic reform. Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen, "International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders Promote Economic Reform?" *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (Jan. 2014): 195-214; Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, "The Domestic Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements in Hard Times," *World Trade Review* 17, no. 3 (2018): 371-403; and Allison Carnegie and Cyrus Samii, "International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program," *British Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (2019): 1357-1379.

[65] Olga Avdeyeva, "States' Compliance with International Requirements: Gender Equality in EU Enlargement Countries," *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2010): 203-217; Kelly Kollman, "European Institutions, Transnational Networks and National Same-Sex Unions Policy: When Soft Law Hits Harder," *Contemporary Politics* 15, no. 1 (2009): 37-53.

[66] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2012); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2013); Brian Greenhill, "The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 1 (2010): 127-145; Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018); and Rodger Payne, "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction," *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2001): 37-61.

[67] Robert McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2014), 42-43; Joseph Nye, "Nuclear Learning and US–Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 400; Ethan Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (1990): 524; and Andrew Cortell and James Davis, Jr., "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996): 451-476.

[68] Charles Lipson, "The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 417-455; David Strang and Patricia Chang, "The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State: Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960–80," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993): 243.

[69] US CIA, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012," 15.

Support from foreign countries may be the "common enabler" for VNA success.[70] The American rebels, for example, benefitted greatly from France.[71] Vietnam may not have beaten the US in the 1970s if not for assistance from Moscow and Beijing.[72] The Afghan mujahadin may not have evicted the Soviets in 1989 without multiple sources of outside aid.[73] Besides providing sanctuary, neighbor states provide arms, intelligence, political support, military advice, and recruits. In the name of global peace and security, they may submit the conflict to the UN.

Diasporas can extend a VNA's safe havens, increase its longevity, and prevent it from moderating.[74] In the late nineteenth century, anti-tsarist VNAs established close ties to Russian immigrant communities in the US and Western Europe. The Irish Republic Army enjoyed cozy relations with Irish-Americans throughout the twentieth century.[75] Expatriate communities

[70] The inability to obtain external support may help explain the defeats of the US Confederacy, the Boers, and the Malayan VNA. Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2007), 133.
[71] America's alliance with Paris in 1778 brought credits, arms, and a superpower's navy. French assistance proved critical at the 1781 Battle of Yorktown. About 8,500 British troops faced 9,000 American troops that were supported by 38 French ships, 15,000 French sailors, and 7,800 French troops. Larry Addington, *The Patterns of War since the 18th Century* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1994), 18, quoted in Record, *Beating Goliath*, 25.
[72] Both the Soviet Union and China provided arms, ammunition and intelligence. Soviet technicians developed Hanoi's sophisticated air defense, while Chinese troops repaired its rail system. Record, *Beating Goliath*, 23-24.
[73] The US, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United Kingdom helped the Afghans at various stages of the conflict. Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, "The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union," *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 693-708; Bruce Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–89* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2014); John Prados, "US Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified," *National Security Archive*, last updated Oct. 9, 2001, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html.
[74] Diasporas are "ethnic or sectarian communities that permanently reside outside of their homeland" and remain engaged in their homeland's current affairs. VNAs with diaspora support are 40% less likely to succumb to military and police pressure and 34% less likely to accept limited goals. Gabriel Sheffer notes that 27 of the 50 most active terror groups after 1945 were closely linked to diasporas. *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), quoted in James Piazza, "How Diaspora Communities Influence Terrorist Groups," *Lawfare*, Mar. 3, 2019.
[75] About 70% of the weapons that British police and soldiers seized in Ireland were American. Pro-IRA groups in the US blocked the sale of arms to London. Bruce Hoffman et al., "The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 1-2.

around the globe thus constitute pools of potential volunteers while supplying funds, lobbying their hosts, and organizing consciousness-raising events.[76]

Global norms set the context for how the international community views the VNA, the target state, and the conflict.[77] They can become institutionalized in the state's systems or reinforce preexisting domestic assumptions.[78] If prevailing norms reflect the neomarxist narrative of imperialist exploitation, outsiders may be likelier to laud a VNA.[79] International norms can induce diaspora host nations to look the other way, actively support the cause, or unleash their police and intelligence services.

This independent variable will measure how external forces influence unconventional warfare's outcomes by researching the answers to the following questions:

- Did the VNA use international institutions to promote its agenda?
- Did the VNA rely on neighboring or distant states to resist the target government?
- Could the VNA access a global diaspora?
- How did the prevailing international norms affect the outcome?

Dependent Variable: Understanding VNA Success

---

[76] Modern communications, coupled with multiculturalism policies in host countries enhance diasporas' ethnic pride and political effectiveness. Steven Vertovec, "The Political Importance of Diasporas," *Migration Policy Institute*, June 1, 2005, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/political-importance-diasporas.

[77] Constructivism examines how changing norms and ideas influence states' foreign policies. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2003); Helen Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1997); Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (1992): 245-270; and Robert Keohane and Judith Goldstein, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993).

[78] Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 4-5; Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Legal and Practical Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1989), 61-63; and Jeffrey Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 83-114.

[79] For the neomarxist narrative of international relations, see Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, "Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism," in *International Relations Theory*, ed. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi (New York: Pearson/Longman 2012), 189-197; Immanuel Wallerstein, "A World-system Perspective on the Social Sciences," *British Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 3 (1976): 343-352, and *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1979); Joseph Buttigieg, "The Prison Notebooks: Antonio Gramsci's Work in Progress," *Rethinking Marxism* 18, no. 1 (2006): 37-42; Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1979); and Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review* 60, no. 2 (1970): 231-236.

My dependent variable constitutes the success that violent nonstate actors achieve in coercing substantial policy changes from a state that it would not have implemented voluntarily.[80] Recognizing that terrorists and insurgents sometimes succeed neither legitimizes nor delegitimizes their tactics or goals. Denying their effectiveness can moreover appear as "wishful thinking" and serve as "an impediment to objective analysis."[81] Finally, relegating VNAs to the category of politically illegitimate behavior may justify states' tendencies to reflexively respond with coercion and repression.[82]

I will not examine how often VNAs succeed in unconventional warfare. The literature offers a broad range of estimates: "almost never;"[83] "very rarely;"[84] "rarely;"[85] "seldom;"[86] "in a minority of cases;"[87] less than 5%;[88] 7%;[89] 10%;[90] 17%;[91] "generally;"[92] 36%;[93] "often;"[94]

[80] See "Chap 3: Literature Review" for definitions of success.
[81] Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 73.
[82] Lawrence Freedman, "Terrorism as a Strategy," *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314-339; James Cockayne, *Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7.
[83] Thomas Schelling, "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. Raymond Frey and Christopher Morris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20; Loren Lomasky, "The Political Significance of Terrorism," in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. Raymond Frey and Christopher Morris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 89; and Walter Laqueur, "The Futility of Terrorism," *Harper's* 252, no. 1510 (Mar. 1976).
[84] Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, 8.
[85] Chai, "An Organizational Economics Theory," 99; Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 43.
[86] Bonnie Cordes et al., *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983, R-3183-SL* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1984); Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: New York University, 1986); and Virginia Held, "Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals," in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. Raymond Frey and Christopher Morris (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1991).
[87] Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 25.
[88] Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*.
[89] United States Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)," Oct. 11, 2005; Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 43.
[90] Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 19.
[91] Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 48-51.
[92] Scott Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2004): 68.
[93] Yet another 28% of the resolutions featured "mixed outcomes" with political compromises and concessions by both sides. US CIA, "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012," 17.
[94] Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy* 120 (Sep.-Oct. 2000); Lake, "Rational Extremism;" and Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49.

"significantly" less than 50%;[95] and 50%.[96] Terrorism can "work"[97] and be "surprisingly successful"[98] or "gruesomely" effective.[99] My analysis, drawn on history, suggests that VNAs coerce states often enough to satisfy their bases and inspire future VNAs.

My working hypothesis, which is derived from the literature, is that successful VNAs are rational actors with multiple goals that are a function of the political environment.[100] These goals are discernable via the actions and statements of both the VNA and its community.[101] They reflect rational thinking, cost benefit analyses, profit maximization, and expected utility.[102] VNAs ultimately practice unconventional warfare because they have seen it succeed before and believe that it will work for them.[103]

---

[95] Assaf Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of *Dying to Win*," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 8 (2006): 709.
[96] Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," and *Dying to Win*, 61, 64-65. The author revised his estimate downward in a book he coauthored with James Feldman: *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2010).
[97] Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University, 2002), 321; Alan Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2002).
[98] Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace," 264.
[99] Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," 68.
[100] Kydd and Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace," 263-296; Rubinstein, *Alchemist of Revolution*; Sick, "The Political Underpinnings," 51; Shultz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism," 45; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," and "Theories of Terrorism;" Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation," 10-11; Harmon, *Terrorism Today*; and Pape, "The Strategic Logic," and *Dying to Win*.
[101] David Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (Sep. 1984); Stephen Dale, "Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anti-Colonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Philippines," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 1 (Mar. 1988); GRAPO, "Communiqué on the Assassination," 127-29; West German Red Army Faction, "Communiqué on the Attempted Assassination of Hans Neusel, State Secretary in the German Ministry of the Interior in Cologne on 27 July 1990," in *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, ed. Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 70-74; Della Porta, *Social Movements*, 150; Peter Taylor, *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (New York: TV, 1997), 127; Osama Bin Laden, "Transcript of Osama bin Laden Videotape," *CNN.com* (Dec. 13, 2001), accessed on Mar. 8, 2019 at: http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript/; Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works*; Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 21, 50-54; Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, "The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle East Terrorists," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 1 (Spr. 2003); Anne Oliver and Paul Steinberg, *The Road to Martyrs' Square* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2005), 48; Diego Gambetta, *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2005), 44, 82; and Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, chap. 4.
[102] D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 157.
[103] If irregular warfare consistently failed to generate even moderate benefits for VNAs over time, then it should be occurring less, not more frequently, as is the case. See Pape, "The Strategic Logic," 343.

Weak sides must ultimately subvert a government.[104] They have to coerce the target state into paying a price and reexamining its national interest.[105] The "asset to liability shift" theory, for example, contends that when the political costs substantially "outweigh the benefits," the state recalculates its original "determination to preserve what was considered to be an asset."[106] Outcomes will thus reflect the degree to which the target state modifies its behavior in accordance with the coercer's political preferences.[107] I will use three categories to measure these outcomes: "complete/total success," "partial/limited success," and "failure."[108]

The FLN's accession to power and self-determination represents total success. In late 1954, before the violent conflict began, France rejected substantial social, economic, and political reforms in Algeria. In 1962, the VNA became the Algerian government and ended more than 130 years of French occupation. As the relative balance of power shifted, the strong side lost the political will to fight on. Limited success that results from a VNA's power to hurt,

---

[104] See footnote # 29.

[105] Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*; Abrahms, "The Political Effectiveness," 366-393; Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1950), 76-77, 83-84; David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (Jan. 1979): 170; and J. Bowyer Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971), 55.

[106] Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 576.

[107] Schelling, "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1996), and "The Strategic Logic;" Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy;" Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; Abrahms, "The Political Effectiveness," 371; and Tugwell, "Politics and Propaganda," 17.

[108] Similar categories appear in various studies. Crenshaw creates categories that include "success" and "preliminary success" in "Special Report," 2-3. Lake differentiates among "low-range," "medium-range," and "extremist" goals in "Rational Extremism," 18-19; see also James Denardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellio*n (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1985); McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making;" United States Institute for Peace, "How Terrorism Ends: Special Report," no. 48 (Washington, DC: USIP, May 25, 1999); and Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*. Partial objectives in unconventional warfare may concern territory, resources, or inclusion into a coalition government. Maximalist objectives may refer to ideology, values, religion, and political control. The latter are usually harder to negotiate and concede. See Kalevi Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on Procedure," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10, no. 3 (Sep. 1966): 272; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 101; Daniel Druckman and Benjamin Broome, "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Facilitation or Delinking?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 3 (Sep. 1988): 489-510; and Jacob Bercovitch, Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette Willie, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (Jun. 1991): 7-17.

coerce, or subvert appears in many forms. In 1959, for example, Britain reversed eighty years of imperial control in Cyprus.[109] While retaining its bases, London conceded the island's independence, but not its union with Greece.

Success will not include hostage taking or hijacking for money. If, however, those hostages or airliners were exchanged for political prisoners jailed by the target state or its allies, then this outcome could constitute partial success.[110] Terrorism that primarily brings publicity to the group's cause will also be omitted.[111] Palestinian political violence at the 1972 Munich Olympics transfixed the international media; it also and boosted the PLO's recruiting and income. There was however, no direct political payoff from the target states.[112]

VNA failure means that the group did not coerce or subvert the state into any substantial policy change. At some point, the government lost its incentive to bargain and opted instead to kill, capture, or expel the weak side.[113] After 2006, the Sri Lankan government summarily abandoned negotiation in favor of all out military violence. Thirty years of LTTE terrorism and insurgency culminated into "arguably the most significant military annihilation of an armed rebel movement in modern times."[114] The VNA's defeat left its community shattered and a quarter million Tamils detained in government camps.

---

[109] London established it control over the island via the 1878 Congress of Berlin. Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966), 67-71.
[110] Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works*.
[111] I disagree with Crenshaw's definition with "preliminary success" as achieving public recognition for the group in "Special Report," 3. I agree instead with Schelling's decision to treat the publicity and attention that VNAs achieve as "ends in themselves" in "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" 20.
[112] Had Germany or Israel acceded to VNA demands and released the 236 pro-Palestinian prisoners in their jails, then this result could have become a terrorist success story. Although PLO terror led to multiple United Nations Resolutions supporting Palestinian nationhood, invitations to speak abroad, diplomatic status in Greece, and an audience in 1982 with Pope John Paul II, these outcomes do not constitute the successful coercion of a target state.
[113] Daniel Metraux, "Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo," *Asian* Survey 35, no. 12. (Dec. 1995): 1140-1154; Kassimeris, *Inside Greek Terrorism*, and "Europe's Last Red Terrorists," 67-84; and Bolivar, "Peru."
[114] S. D. Selvadurai and Mike Smith, "Black Tigers, Bronze Lotus: The Evolution and Dynamics of Sri Lanka's Strategies of Dirty War," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36 (2013): 547.

The dependent variable will measure a VNA's effectiveness and success at coercing substantial policy changes from the state by researching the answers to the following questions:

- What are the VNA's stated goals?
- Does the group communicate narrower and limited goals to the state?
- Does the group itself see the outcome as successful and will it continue to use terror?
- Would other potential VNAs interpret the outcome positively and resort to political violence?
- How many of the group's original goals were achieved?

Chapter 3: Literature Review

Scholars offer various theories for why David beats Goliath. Two schools of thought, in particular, warrant closer analysis: the power and pragmatic models. In this Literature Review, I survey how previous authors define and conceptualize VNA success. I will look at competing explanations and examine how the scholarship addresses VNA failure. After summarizing the two major schools of thought, I will highlight and categorize their main arguments, agreements, and authors. What is essential to each paradigm, and what are their respective strengths and weaknesses? Based on an assessment of the competing models' logic and explanatory power, I will clarify which is most convincing and best suited for the purposes of this analysis.

Success and Failure

The research generally focuses more on the causes of political violence and less on its consequences.[1] Few studies treat terrorism and insurgency as coequal and comparable subcategories of asymmetric warfare; some contend that they do not belong in the same analytical rubric.[2] Those works that do address outcomes in unconventional warfare define success differently. Governments also tend to classify their related information in ways that are

[1] Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," in *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, ed. Clark McCauley (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1991), 69-70.
[2] Cathal Nolan, *Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), 669; Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 55; Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research* 3 (2002): 296; and Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism," 710.

congenial to their own narratives.[3] The information required for developing cumulative social science theory and analysis in this area is thus often difficult to acquire.[4]

9/11/2001: What Is Success?

After more than twenty years, no consensus exists on whether al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks succeeded or failed. Their unprecedented size and scope required "impressive coordination" and "the unswerving dedication" of nineteen jihadis.[5] Nearly three thousand people perished in the deadliest assault on US soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941.[6] US immigration policy changed as Washington quickly restricted visits by foreign scientists, tourists, and business people.[7] Commercial aviation first came to a halt and then changed forever.[8] The numerous intrusive and

[3] Ted Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," in *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research*, ed. Ted Gurr (New York: Free, 1980), 238-298.
[4] Tara Copp, "Pentagon Strips Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria Troop numbers from Web," *Military Times*, April 9, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/04/09/dod-strips-iraq-afghanistan-syriatroop-numbers-from-web/; Loren Schulman and Alice Friend, "The Pentagon's Transparency Problem: Why Accurate Troop Levels Are So Hard to Find," *Foreign Affairs*, May 2, 2018; Steven Aftergood, "The Costs of War: Obstacles to Public Understanding," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Nov. 14, 2018, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Costs%20of%20War%20-%20Aftergood%20paper_FINAL.pdf; and Alex Horton, "The Pentagon Struggles to Provide Accurate Numbers for Deployed Troops," *Washington Post*, Nov. 27, 2017.
[5] Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 303-304. According to the German news magazine *Der Speigel*, three times more Americans died on that one day from terrorism than in the previous thirty-three years in *Inside 9-11: What Really Happened: The Reporters, Writers, and Editors of Der Spiegel Magazine* (New York: St. Martin's, 2002), 261-262.
[6] Although 2,997 people died on Sep. 11, 2001 during the actual attacks, 21,000 more people have since gotten sick or died and received compensation. Aaron Katersky, "The 9/11 Toll still Grows: More than 16,000 Ground Zero Responders who GotSick were Found Eligible for Awards," *ABC News*, last modified Sep. 18, 2018, accessed June 24, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/US/911-toll-growsl-16000-ground-responders-sick-found/story?id=57669657. Post-9/11 airline cancellations prompted more people to travel by the more dangerous mode of automobiles and may have caused close to another 1,000 more deaths in road accidents. Michael Sivak and Michael Flanagan, "Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2002," *Transportation Research Part F 7: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour* 7, no. 4-5 (2004): 301-305.
[7] Kenneth Rogoff, "The Cost of Living Dangerously," *Foreign Policy* 145 (Nov.-Dec. 2004): 70-71.
[8] David Koenig, "How 9/11 Changed Air Travel: More Security, Less Privacy," *AP News*, last modified Sep. 6, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/how-sept-11-changed-flying-1ce4dc4282fb47a34c0b61ae09a024f4; Alison Sider, "9/11 Changed Flying for Good—to Some Travelers' Chagrin," *Wall Street Journal*, last modified Sep. 7, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/9-11-changed-flying-for-goodto-some-travelers-chagrin-11631019601; and Roger Congleton, "Terrorism, Interest-Group Politics, and Public Policy," *Independent Review* 7, no. 1 (Sum. 2002): 62.

costly governmental policies that followed influenced nearly every sector of American society and the global community.[9]

The "terrorism industry" that emerged after 9/11 incentivizes politicians, the media, and private contractors to stoke fears and exaggerate threats.[10] It promotes the "myth of the all-knowing, all-seeing terrorists"[11] while churning out endless worst-case scenarios.[12] The proliferation of governmental bureaucracies simultaneously demands increasing popular acquiescence and funding.[13] In many respects that include alarmism, hyper-secrecy, and an unwarranted influence into the "councils of government," the terrorism industry has come to embody President Eisenhower's "military industrial complex."[14]

---

[9] Dana Priest and William Arkin, introduction to *Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State* (New York: Back Bay, 2011), xix-xxi; Matthew Green, "How 9/11 Changed America: Four Major Lasting Impacts," *KQED*, last modified Sep. 8, 2017, https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/14066/13-years-later-four-major-lasting-impacts-of-911; Dave Roos, "5 Ways September 11 Changed America," *History.com*, last modified Mar. 10, 2021, https://www.history.com/news/september-11-changes-america; Dana Garfin, "How the Pain of 9/11 Still Stays with a Generation," *The Conversation*, last modified Sep. 11, 2017, https://theconversation.com/how-the-pain-of-9-11-still-stays-with-a-generation-64725; and "The 9/11 Effect and the Transformation of Global Security," *Council of Foreign Relations*, last modified Sep. 1, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/911-effect-and-transformation-global-security.

[10] Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions," 492-493. For the terrorism industry's tendency to conjure up the image of the omnipotent terrorist, see US Office of Homeland Security," The National Strategy for Homeland Security," (July 2002), accessed June 16, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf.; and Jeffrey Rosen, *The Naked Crowd* (New York: Random House, 2004), 79, 222.

[11] Benjamin Friedman, "Leap before You Look: The Failure of Homeland Security," *Breakthroughs* 13, no. 1 (2004): 33-36.

[12] Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security* 2, no. 4 (1978): 68; Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism," 311-312; John Mueller, "Why Isn't There More Violence?" *Security Studies* 13 (2004): 191-203; David Seed, *US Narratives of Nuclear Terrorism Since 9/11: Worst-Case Scenarios* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, "Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking 'What If?" *Security Dialogue* 39, nos. 2/3 (2008): 221-242; and Keith Spence, "World Risk Society and War Against Terror," *Political Studies* 53, no. 2 (2005): 284-302.

[13] In its review of the 9/11 attacks, Congress partly faulted the US intelligence community's "cold war legacy." It created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to end the foreign–domestic divide and integrate sixteen previously competitive and semi-independent intelligence bureaucracies. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York: Norton, 2004), 399-428; *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, "Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress," 2009, accessed June 20, 2019, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=231870. For the post-9/11 reforms' cost and effectiveness, see Priest and Arkin, introduction to *Top Secret America*, xxii; *Frontline: Top Secret America – 9/11 to the Boston Bombings*, directed by Michael Kirk (Boston, MA: Frontline Production with Kirk Documentary Group, 2011), accessed June 20, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-top-secret-america-911-boston/; and Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions," 487-505.

[14] Dwight Eisenhower, "The Presidency: President Dwight Eisenhower Farewell Address, Jan. 17, 1961," *C-Span*, accessed Sep. 20, 2021, https://www.c-span.org/video/?15026-1/president-dwight-eisenhower-farewell-address.

The operation cost al Qaeda an estimated $500,000. Osama bin Laden believed in 2004 that US countermeasures would approach $500 billion.[15] According to US Congressional budget estimates for Fiscal Year 2022, America spent over $2.3 trillion on its war in Afghanistan since 2001;[16] it spent $8 trillion on its global campaign on terror;[17] during this same period, the US Defense Department spent a staggering $14 trillion.[18] For almost a generation, resources that could fund education, infrastructure, or research have instead pursued "unachievable but politically popular levels of domestic security."[19]

[15] Osama bin Laden, "Full Transcript of bin Laden's Speech," last modified Nov. 1, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html, accessed June 17, 2019. According to Priest and Arkin in *Top Secret America*, 4-5, just after the attack, Congress immediately approved $40 billion as a down payment on the global war on terror. Three weeks later, Congress added the same amount to the preexisting multi-billion dollar authorizations. By 2005, the new Department of Homeland Security had an annual budget of $50 billion, while the state and local governments spent billions more. See also Friedman, "Leap before You Look," 35; Dean Calbreath, "Attacks to Cost 1.6 Million Jobs," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, Jan. 12, 2002; and Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions," 491-492.

[16] This estimate excludes anticipated spending for long-term care of disabled veterans and future interest payments on the money borrowed to fund the war. "U.S. Costs to Date for the War in Afghanistan, in $ Billions FY2001-FY2022," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Aug. 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022.

[17] This estimate covers expenditures for the US Defense Department's Overseas Contingency Operations and Basing budget, Homeland Security's Counterterrorism, for veteran care and disability, and for future interest payments on the money borrowed to fund these programs. "Estimate of U.S. Post-9/11 War Spending, in $ Billions FY2001-FY2022," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Sep. 1, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/BudgetaryCosts; Linda Qiu, "Did U.S. spend $6 trillion in Middle East Wars?" *Politifact*, last modified October 27, 2016, accessed June 26, 2019, https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/27/donald-trump/did-us-spend-6-trillion-middle-east-wars/; Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, RL33110," *Congressional Research Service*, Dec. 8, 2014, accessed June 26, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf; and Linda Bilmes, "The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets: Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP13-006," *Harvard Kennedy School*, Mar. 2013, accessed June 26, 2019, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/financial-legacy-iraq-and-afghanistan-how-wartime-spending-decisions-will-constrain.

[18] About one-third to one-half of the $14 trillion went to defense contractors. William Hartung, "Profits of War: Corporate Beneficiaries of the Post-9/11 Pentagon Spending Surge," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Sep. 13, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/ProfitsOfWar.

[19] David Banks, "Statistics for Homeland Defense," *Chance* 15, no. 1 (2002): 10; Clark Chapman and Alan Harris, "A Skeptical Look at September 11th: How We Can Defeat Terrorism by Reacting to It More Rationally," *Skeptical Inquirer* 26, no. 5 (2002): 30.

In a television interview on September 16, 2001,[20] Vice President Richard Cheney foreshadowed the Bush Doctrine and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).[21] American strategies to prevent future VNA attacks reflected contentious international relations theories and assumptions related to democratic peace[22] and collective security.[23] Since the US-led global operations would have "no end date," the GWOT licensed perpetual conflict.[24] These activities,

[20] "Text: Vice President Cheney on NBC's *Meet the Press*: transcript of an interview with Vice President Cheney conducted by Tim Russert, host of NBC's *Meet the Press*," *Washington Post Online*, last modified Sept. 16, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/cheney091601.html?noredirect=on.
[21] For a detailed analysis of the Bush Doctrine, see Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld, *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2007); George W. Bush, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," *White House*, September 11, 2001, accessed June 27, 2019, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html, and "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," White House, June 1, 2002, accessed June 27, 2019, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html; US White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States," Sept. 17, 2002, accessed June 27, 2019, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/; and US White House, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," Dec. 2002, accessed June 27, 2019, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf.
[22] Democratic peace theories posit that since liberal democracies do not fight one another, the spread of democracy pacifies international relations. See Immanuel Kant's "liberal internationalism" in Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," 1157-1162; John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 87-125; Marvin Zonis, "The 'Democracy Doctrine' of President George W. Bush," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, ed. Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New York: Routledge, 2007), 231-233; David Kinsella, "No Rest for Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (Aug. 2005): 453-458; Peter Baker, "The Realities of Exporting Democracy," *Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 2006; Alex Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 no. 4 (1992): 14-25; Ted Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails," in *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles Kegley (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 202-215; and Li, "Does Democracy Promote," 278-297. For democratic peace critiques, see Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (Nov. 2003): 585-602; Michael Mousseau, "An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation," *International Interactions* 28, no. 2 (Apr.-June 2002): 137-164; Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States," 151-170; F. Gregory Gause, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (2005): 62-76; Pape, *Dying to Win*, and "The Strategic Logic," 343-361; and Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 155-164.
[23] The Bush Doctrine called for numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties and institutions to combat VNAs in US White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002;" Renshon and Suedfeld, *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*. For arguments that collective security works, see Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Sum. 1995): 52-61. For critiques of collective security, see John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Win. 1994-1995): 5-49, and *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (Yale University, 2018); and Stephen Walt, *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).
[24] "Congresswoman Lee Fights to Stop Endless War in Appropriations Committee," last modified June 2, 2015, accessed June 21, 2019, https://lee.house.gov/news/press-releases/congresswoman-lee-fights-to-stop-endless-war-in-appropriations-committee; see also Christopher Woody, "Congress May Repeal the post-9/11 act the US Military Used to Justify the Fight against ISIS," *Business Insider*, last modified June 29, 2017, accessed June 21, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/a-bill-to-repeal-the-aumf-just-passed-2017-6.

moreover, that would take place "in the dark side, without any discussions," could eventually rot the foundations of democracy: governmental accountability, due process, checks and balances, separation of powers, and the media acting as public watchdogs.[25] The "unsavory characters" that Washington expected to cooperate with—Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, among others—were ruthless dictatorships inclined to use counterterrorism as a pretext to violate human rights and repress legitimate political dissent.[26] The Bush administration would further show "no reluctance" to go after Iraq, if it could prove that Saddam Hussain harbored terrorists.[27]

Two days after Cheney's interview, the US Congress enacted the GWOT's legal foundation—the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).[28] The AUMF empowered successive US administrations to engage VNAs globally and on the high seas, to try them in military commissions, and to detain them indefinitely in military prisons at Guantanamo Bay.[29] The Defense Department could henceforth change regimes abroad via covert military

[25] Thomas Bruneau, "Introduction: Challenges to Effectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for Transparency and Accountability in Democracy," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 3 (May 2007); Amy Zegart, "The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight," *Political Science Quarterly* 126 (Spr. 2011): 1-27; and *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 419-423.

[26] The literature on "rentier states" indicates that when the West confers aid, alliances, and legitimacy on authoritarian regimes, their motivation to liberalize and democratize suffers. See Diamond's "authoritarian statecraft" in "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?" 93-112; Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" 325-361; Beblawi, "The Rentier State;" and Gause, *Oil Monarchies*.

[27] "Text: Vice President Cheney."

[28] Senate Joint Resolution 23, 115 Stat. 224. Public Law 107–40—Sept. 18, 2001, 107th Congress, accessed June 20, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. The AUMF authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Woody, "Congress May Repeal."

[29] The AUMF was amended in 2002 to authorize military action in perpetuity against Iraq in "Congresswoman Lee Fights." It was still in effect as of Aug. 2021, and was used by Presidents George W. Bush, Barrack Obama, and Donald Trump to justify counterterrorism operations in eighty-five countries. These operations included air and drone strikes, training foreign police and military, direct combat and raids by US personnel, and advise and assist missions. Stephanie Savell et al., "United States Counterterrorism Operations 2018–2020," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Feb. 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/US%20Counterterrorism%20Operations%202018-2020%2C%20Costs%20of%20War.pdf; Jeremy Herb and Deirdre Walsh, "House Panel Votes to Repeal War Authorization for Fight against ISIS and al Qaeda," *CNN Politics*, last modified June 29, 2017, accessed June 21, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/house-panel-repeal-war-authorization-isis-al-qaeda/index.html; Jeremy Herb, "As White House Defers to Pentagon, Congress Mulls New Checks on Military Power," *CNN*

operations; while similar CIA activities obligated the executive branch to notify Congress, the DOD could classify its operations as "traditional military activities" and bypass the legislative branch's need to know.[30] The CIA used "enhanced interrogation techniques"[31] and "extraordinary rendition"[32] on suspects held in its international network of secret prisons.[33] By November 2002, it targeted foreigners with drones in Yemen;[34] in 2011, it killed untried US citizens abroad.[35]

By characterizing their countermeasures as "a war," bureaucracies in Washington could withhold information in the guise of national security.[36] In its haste to prevent any more 9/11s,

---

Politics, last modified June 21, 2017, accessed June 21, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/21/politics/congress-trump-war-limits/index.html; and Matthew Weed, "Memorandum to Honorable Barbara Lee: The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Background in Brief, *Congressional Research Service*, July 10, 2013, accessed June 21, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/aumf-071013.pdf.

[30] Jennifer Kibbe, "The Rise of Shadow Warriors," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (Mar. -Apr. 2004): 102-115.

[31] After 9/11, the CIA converted existing Clinton administration measures into what became "enhanced interrogation techniques." Priest and Arkin, *Top Secret America*, 16. For arguments that enhanced interrogation either blurs or crosses the torture threshold, see Jane Mayer, "Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' Program," *New Yorker*, Feb. 6, 2005, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/02/14/outsourcing-torture; Scott Shane, "Soviet-Style 'Torture' Becomes 'Interrogation,'" *New York Times*, June 3, 2007; and Michael Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 128. For USG documents authorizing enhanced interrogation, see "The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S. Policy and Methods," *National Security Archive*, last modified July 13, 2004, accessed July 8, 2019, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/.

[32] In rendition, the US sends detainees to their countries of origin for legal proceedings. "Extraordinary Rendition in US Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, Serial No. 110–28, April 17, 2007," *Homeland Security Digital Library*, accessed June 19, 2019, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=475954.

[33] Priest and Arkin, *Top Secret America*, 12-15, 19-20; Glenn Greenwald, "Committing War Crimes for the 'Right Reasons,'" *Salon.com*, last modified Dec. 18, 2008, accessed Mar. 7, 2019, https://www.salon.com/2008/12/17/douthat/. During a Sep. 26, 2002 joint hearing of the House and Senate intelligence committees, Cofer Black, the chief of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, spoke cryptically about his agency's new forms of "operational flexibility" in "Joint Investigation into September 11th: Fifth Public Hearing, Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing: Testimony of Cofer Black, September 26, 2002," *Federation of American Scientists: Intelligence Research Program*, accessed June 24, 2019, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/092602black.html.

[34] Priest and Arkin, *Top Secret America*, 14-16.

[35] Charles Savage, "Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen," *New York Times*, Oct. 8, 2011. For a debate on the pros and cons of targeted killings, see Daniel Byman, "Why Drones Work," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 4 (July-Aug. 2013): 32-43; Audrey Cronin, "Why Drones Fail," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2013): 44-54; and Jonathan Masters, "Targeted Killings," *Council on Foreign Relations*, last modified May 23, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/targeted-killings.

[36] Aftergood, "The Costs of War."

the government may have consequently made it easier to condemn whistle-blowers as traitors and shield bureaucratic waste, fraud, and abuse.[37] The Terrorist Surveillance Program let the National Security Agency conduct millions of warrantless wiretaps in order to monitor suspected al Qaeda communications.[38] The USA Patriot Act later authorized "sneak and peak" warrants on Americans, the monitoring of their phone and email communications, and the collection of their financial and library records, all without judicial oversight.[39]

The 9/11 attacks also changed global politics. International laws and institutions changed in order to deal with VNAs.[40] For the Bush administration, the capturing and killing of nebulous transnational groups and networks replaced the containment of communist states armed with nuclear weapons.[41] In the new age of American "vulnerability," long-standing deterrence

[37] Priest and Arkin, *Top Secret America*, xxiv; "Congresswoman Lee Fights;" "Testimony of David Norquist before the Senate Budget Committee, March 7, 2018," https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NORQUIST.FINAL%202018-03-07%20SBC%20Norquist%20Statement.pdf; and "Update on the Amount of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Uncovered through SIGAR's Oversight Work between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2019," *Office of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction*, SIGAR 21-05-SP, last modified Oct. 15, 2020, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2040663/SIGAR-21-05-SP.pdf.

[38] The program began shortly after 9/11/2001. For abuses, see James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, "Bush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courts," *New York Times*, Dec. 16, 2005; Leslie Cauley, "NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls," *USA Today*, May 11, 2006; Jane Mayer, "The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?" *New Yorker*, May 23, 2011. For the USG narrative, see United States Department of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, "The NSA Program to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks, Myth v. Reality," Jan. 7, 2006, accessed June 24, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf.

[39] It was enacted in Oct. 2001 as 115 Stat. 272 Public Law 107–56—Oct. 26, 2001: The USA Patriot Act of 2001. "Surveillance under the Patriot Act," *ACLU*, accessed June 24, 2019, https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act; Susan Jo Keller, "Judge Rules Provisions in Patriot Act to Be Illegal," *New York Times*, Sep. 27, 2007; Heather Phillips, "Libraries and National Security Law: An Examination of the USA Patriot Act," *Progressive Librarian* 25 (Sum. 2005): 28-42, accessed June 24, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901266. Rich Lowry counters that the alleged abuses by the 2001 Patriot Act are exaggerated in "Patriot Hysteria: The Zacarias Moussaoui Protection Act," *National Review Online*, Aug. 28, 2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20030829062753/http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry082803.asp, accessed June 24, 2019.

[40] Daniel O'Donnell, "International Treaties against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism during Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces," *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 864 (Dec. 2006): 853-880; Thomas Franck, "Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror," *American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 4 (Oct. 2004): 686-688.

[41] US White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002."

policies yielded to preemption and prevention; at the same time, the US simultaneously set off on nation-building and democracy exportation, if need be, at the point of a gun.[42]

The GWOT and AUMF probably motivated Iran and North Korea to accelerate their respective nuclear programs.[43] They embroiled America in deadly,[44] unpopular,[45]

[42] Since the First Gulf War in 1991, the US government has failed its pledge to democratize Kuwait. After 9/11/2001, it made similar dubious promises in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the challenges associated with imposing democracy abroad, see Benjamin Barber, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy* (New York: Norton, 2003), 170.

[43] Washington ironically demonstrated deterrence's continued relevance by consigning Iran and North Korea to the "axis of evil" and then invading Iraq. Teheran and Pyongyang could logically avoid Baghdad's fate via their own nuclear deterrent. Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address." For arguments linking the GWOT and nuclear proliferation, see Alex Wagner, "Bush Labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an 'Axis of Evil,'" *Arms Control Association*, accessed June 27, 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/print/995; John Deutch, "A Nuclear Posture for Today," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2005): 49-60; Jacques Hymans, "North Korea's Nuclear Neurosis," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 63, no. 3 (May 2007): 44-74; and Ray Takeyh, "Iran's Nuclear Calculations," *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 2 (Sum. 2003): 21-28.

[44] As of June 2021, 7,052 US soldiers died in post-9/11 military operations; another 30,177 veterans committed suicide. Thomas Suitt, "High Suicide Rates among United States Service Members and Veterans of the Post9/11 Wars," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified June 21, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/Suicides. Eighteen months after the Mar. 2003 invasion of Iraq, 100,000 civilians died—more than all the domestic and international terrorism casualties for the last century. Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions," 492. Figures put the total number of people killed in the post-9/11 wars at 900,000; this includes US soldiers, contractors and civilians, foreign civilians, military and police, irregulars, journalists, and humanitarian workers. Neta Crawford and Catherine Lutz, "Human Cost of Post-9/11 Wars: Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones, Afghanistan & Pakistan (Oct. 2001-Aug. 2021); Iraq (Mar. 2003-Aug. 2021); Syria (Sept. 2014-May 2021); Yemen (Oct. 2002-Aug. 2021) and Other Post-9/11 War Zones," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Sep. 1, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20War_Direct%20War%20Deaths_9.1.21.pdf. Post-9/11 wars also caused 38 million people to become refugees and seek shelter abroad or become internally displaced. David Vine et al., "Creating Refugees: Displacement Caused by the United States' Post-9/11 Wars," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified Aug. 19, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20War_Vine%20et%20al_Displacement%20Update%20August%202021.pdf.

[45] "People abroad are more likely to believe that the U.S.-led war on terror has been about controlling Mideast oil and dominating the world than they are to take at face value America's stated objectives of self-defense and global democratization." See "Global Opinion: The Spread of Anti-Americanism," *Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes and Trends*, Jan. 24, 2005, accessed June 24, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2005/01/24/global-opinion-the-spread-of-anti-americanism/.

unnecessary,[46] and unwinnable wars in Afghanistan[47] and Iraq.[48] The US naively expected its nation building to promote modernization,[49] strengthen democratization,[50] and empower the new regime in Kabul to better resist radical ideologies.[51] In Iraq, where no concrete links to al Qaeda

[46] For arguments that Bush picked an unnecessary fight with Saddam Hussein, and Iraq's leadership was deterrable, and posed no imminent threat, see John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes," Occasional Paper (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs/International Security Program, Nov. 2002; Patrick Buchanan, "Whose War?" *The American Conservative* (March 24, 2003); Brent Scowcroft, "Don't Attack Saddam (2002)," in *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, ed. Marvin Gettleman, and Stuart Schaar (New York: Grove, 2003), 334-336; and Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 321-335.
[47] Hartung, "Failure in Afghanistan;" Andrea Mazzarino, "Who Authorized America's Wars? And Why They Never End," *TomDispatch.com*, last modified July 15, 2021, https://tomdispatch.com/who-authorized-americas-wars/. For how attempts to democratize Afghanistan soured after a decade, see Scott Worden, "Afghanistan: An Election Gone Awry," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (July 2010): 11-25, and Martine van Biljert, "Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections: Briefing Paper 03/2009," *Afghan Analysts Network*, last modified Sep. 9, 2009, accessed July 11, 2019, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/polling-day-fraud-in-the-afghan-elections/.
[48] Because of the secrecy surrounding the AUMF, governmental bureaucracies compartmentalized and restricted their intelligence. Only a few people saw the big picture before the Second Gulf War in early 2003. The Bush administration could consequently make grandiose and unverified claims about Iraqi WMD while simultaneously dismissing skeptics. Priest and Arkin, *Top Secret America*, 20-24; and Richard Falk, "Global Patriotism (2002)," in *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, ed. Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar (New York: Grove, 2003), 337-344.
[49] Modernization theories emerged during the Cold War to contain communism and export American values globally. Liberalism, capitalism, and democracy were thus universal, mutually reinforcing, and transplantable abroad, regardless of culture, timing, or geography. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free, 1958), 43-65; Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 337-363; and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free, 1992).
[50] Although numerous theories address how democracy emerges and why it survives, few advocate its imposition militarily. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1997), 175; Gary Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis Series, No. 429 (Washington, DC: Cato, March 21, 2002). David Edelstein notes that the conditions which facilitated America's post-World War II occupations in Germany and Japan were absent in Iraq in *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2010). Studies link democratization to economic development—Seymour Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy," in *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, ed. Patrick O'Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 316-327; to civil society—Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78; Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (July 2011): 35-48; to ruling elite rifts—Ali Afshari and H. Underwood, "The Green Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 (Oct. 2009): 6-10; to good governance—Larry Diamond, "Why Democracies Survive," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 1 (Jan. 2011): 17-29; to culture—Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. and updated Stephen Kalberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); to individual leadership—Seymour Lipset, "George Washington and the Founding of Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 4 (Oct. 1998): 24-38, and Richard Brookhiser, *Founding Father: Rediscovering George Washington* (New York: Free, 1996), 103; to preexisting institutions—Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 55-69; and to colonial legacy—Ashutosh Varshney, "Why Democracy Survives," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 36-50.
[51] White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002."

existed,[52] the Bush Doctrine nonetheless pursued unilateralism,[53] regime change,[54] and the military imposition of democracy.[55] As the administration wrote itself a blank check to preempt anyone suspected of being or aiding al Qaeda,[56] international discontent with the US grew.[57]

The Power Explanations for State Success and VNA Failure

Despite 9/11's lasting consequences, the power school that includes the realist and leftist models maintains that the VNA failed. The weak side did not reverse the existing balance of power and switch sides with the state. According to the maximalist notions of success that

[52] The *9/11 Commission Report* found that the US government had "no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States" in "The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Overview of the Enemy: Staff Statement No. 15," accessed Aug. 8, 2019, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_15.pdf.

[53] Although the US government acknowledged a responsibility to pursue the GWOT through the United Nations and regional organizations, it simultaneously declared that America "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country." See White House, "The National Security Strategy, 2002," p. v.

[54] After 9/11, the US assumed that the confluence of rogue regimes, VNAs, and WMD henceforth constituted an "axis of evil" that reformulated the traditional balance of power calculus. Suicide terrorists were irrational and therefore undeterrable; unlike the Soviet Union, they had no fixed territory to defend. Time considerations for decision-making had furthermore shortened dramatically, so intelligence agencies would find it increasingly harder to detect nascent threats. A proactive America would thus change regimes if necessary. "Interview with Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29, no. 1 (Win. 2005): 5-12. Daniel Whiteneck argues that al Qaeda can be deterred in "Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework," *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (Sum 2005): 187-199.

[55] Andrew Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War," *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (Apr.–June 2006): 310-352. Ironically, candidate George W. Bush had not even mentioned democratization in his 2000 presidential campaign; after he became president, the subject first arose nine months after 9/11/2001. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point;" Stanley Renshon, "The Bush Doctrine Reconsidered," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, ed. Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New York: Routledge), 5.

[56] Barbara Lee, "No Blank Check to President Bush (2001)," in *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, ed. Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar (New York: Grove, 2003), 329-331.

[57] For negative reactions to post-9/11 US policies by NATO, developing countries, and the Middle East, see "What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, the World, America," *Pew Research Center/Global Attitudes & Trends*, last modified Dec. 4, 2002, accessed July 17, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2002/12/04/what-the-world-thinks-in-2002/; Jason Davidson, "The Costs of War to United States Allies Since 9/11," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, last modified May 12, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf.

parallel core assumptions in the revolution,[58] civil war,[59] and regime transition[60] literatures, the strong side offered no major concessions and ceded no territory. Its government remained intact.

The Realist Narrative

Realist notions of success appreciate how British intelligence officer T. E Lawrence helped Arab insurgents expel the Ottomans from the Middle East during the First World War. Lawrence of Arabia's strategy of attrition, popular support, and regime change secured desert safe havens, used "tip and run" strokes that avoided "the one process battle," and engineered a long "war of detachment."[61] Terrorism ended colonial rule abruptly in 1946 Palestine when the

---

[58] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and "Rentier State;" Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1965); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1966); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1982); Jack Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 139-187; James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (Feb. 1962): 5-19; James de Fronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2014); and Lucan Way, "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (July 2008): 55-69.

[59] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*; Rouen, and Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War," 303-320; Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 75-90; David Fearon "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 275-301; David Mason and Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996): 546-568; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253-273; and Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding," 779-801.

[60] Rudolf Heberle, *From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1945); Lisa Anderson, *Transitions to Democracy* (New York: Columbia University, 1999); Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115-144; Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2013); Guillermo O'Donnell et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1986b); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1996); and Thomas Caruthers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 5-21.

[61] Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, and *Evolution of a Revolt*; George Gawrychl, "T. E. Lawrence and the Art of War in the Twenty-First Century," *Command Posts: A Focus on Military History, Policy, and Fiction*, July 13, 2011, accessed on Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.commandposts.com/2011/07/t-e-lawrence-and-the-art-of-war-in-the-twenty-first-century/. After the Ottomans evacuated, the Arabs achieved self-sovereignty and set up a ruling council in Damascus; France later expelled them and instituted a colonial regime. William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004), 149-170.

Irgun's bombs triggered the British withdrawal from Palestine.[62] The FLN's accession to power in 1962, after the French left Algeria, also represents total success for irregulars. Terrorism likewise helped collapse South Africa's apartheid regime. Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress's (ANC) jailed leader, became the country's president in 1990.[63]

Realism should simultaneously assume that these dramatic results are rare because relative power generally determines political outcomes.[64] Since states usually enter unconventional conflicts with huge advantages, they should defeat irregulars. Terrorist groups that are smaller and weaker than insurgencies should be even less successful.[65] A government's "overwhelming material superiority" should thus not only "compensate for bad strategy," but ultimately "render strategy irrelevant."[66] Even though Greece and Peru committed numerous missteps against their respective VNAs, the states' power nonetheless prevailed.[67] Although France's decision to pardon members of *Action Directe* saw many of the irregulars return to terrorism, within a few years the state had broken the group.[68]

---

[62] The Irgun was founded in 1931 to promote an independent Jewish homeland, After its 1946 bombing of the British military headquarters in Jerusalem killed ninety-two people, London withdrew from Palestine; the Irgun disbanded and many of its members joined the government of the new state of Israel. Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ends," 19, 24-25; Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 118; Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 33; Martha Crenshaw, "Why Violence Is Rejected or Renounced: A Case Study of Oppositional Terrorism," in *A Natural History of Peace*, ed. Thomas Gregor (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 1996), 260-261; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 48-56.
[63] The ANC emerged in 1912 to end apartheid. The South African government imprisoned Mandela for twenty-six years before he was elected President in 1990. The ANC became a political party and headed the new democratic regime. Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ends," 19, 24; Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 33; and Nelson Mandela, "An Ideal for Which I Am Prepared to Die: Nelson Mandela," April 20 1964," *Guardian*, April 23, 2007.
[64] D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 61-71; Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides*; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; and Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*.
[65] Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," 97; John Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," *International Security* 13, no. 4 (Spr. 1989): 54-89.
[66] Record, *Beating Goliath*, x.
[67] Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ends," 30. For Greece, see Kassimeris, *Inside Greek Terrorism*, and "Europe's Last Red Terrorists," 67-84. For Peru, see Bolivar, "Peru," 84-115, and "Intelligence and Subversion."
[68] French President Francois Mitterrand's attempt at conciliation in the 1980s with the *Action Directe* VNA saw 20% of the amnestied prisoners return to terrorism. By 1987, the state had neutralized the group. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 83.

Realist counterinsurgency theories separate into the "hearts and minds" and "attrition-deterrence" approaches.[69] In the former, the government uses soft power to persuade and cajole locals into rejecting the VNA.[70] When British General Gerald Templer devised of the "hearts and minds" strategy in 1952 Malaya, he asked London for fewer troops and more welfare programs.[71] Throughout the various phases of the Vietnam War, the US tried to win over the locals' hearts and minds.[72] Italy's Red Brigades faded by the early 1990s after Rome offered financial aid to its supporters and leniency to repented members.[73]

Governments can use their hard power to punish or deter a weak side by intimidating its supporters, passing new antiterrorist legislation, signing extradition treaties, and imposing

---

[69] Paul Dixon, *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: Palgrave 2012); United States Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2007); Andrew Bacevich, *The New American Militarism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2005); Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, "Thinking Anew About Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-15; Neta Crawford, "Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 15, no. 2 (2007): 187-212; and Fred Kaplan, "CT or COIN," *Slate* (Mar. 24, 2009).

[70] Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ends," 28; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2006, 169; Callwell, *Small Wars*; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Alexander Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Civil Wars* 9, no.4 (Dec. 2007): 420-444; and Michael Findley and Joseph Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency," *Civil Wars* 9, no.4 (Dec. 2007): 378-401.

[71] The Malayan "Emergency" involved Britain and the communist-led Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). It lasted from 1948 to 1960 and ended with state victory. While Templer provided medical supplies and food to Malays and local tribes, he simultaneously hounded the MNLA with jungle patrols. When the VNA lost local aid, intelligence and support, it began extorting the locals and lost more popularity. Christopher Paul et al., "Malaya, 1948–1955: Case Outcome: COIN Win," in *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 60, accessed Oct. 20, 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.14; Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966* (London: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2008), 10; Karl Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1968* (Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2001), 113; Joel Hamby, "Civil-Military Operations Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Aut. 2002): 54-61, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483714.pdf; and Richard Clutterbuck, *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945–1983* (New York: Routledge, 1985).

[72] Richard Hunt, *Pacification* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 19-30, 39-40, 70-71; John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: Chicago University, 2005). LBJ referenced the term twenty-eight times from 1964-68 and warned that, "ultimate victory will depend upon the hearts and the minds of the people who actually live there." Gary Hess, *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015), 112.

[73] Rome stripped away the Red Brigades' anonymity with new laws that required apartment renters and sellers to reveal the names of their clients to the authorities. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 81-82; Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ends," 28; Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," 94-95; and Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance," 59-64.

harsher jail terms.[74] They can reinforce potential targets and thereby force a VNA to incur more risks.[75] States can learn from each other as they share intelligence, isolate the group from its audience, and restrict civil liberties.[76] Uruguay's mass arrests and selected disappearances of the Tupamaros in the 1960s-70s severely weakened that VNA.[77] Canada's War Measures Act in 1970 empowered the state to detain Quebec Liberation Front suspects without charges.[78]

Realism expects a state to identify, surveil, and assail its weaker adversary.[79] Repression can take the form of air strikes, drone attacks, or police raids.[80] Military operations can kill or capture the irregulars' leaders and supporters.[81] Moscow treated the Chechens brutally.[82]

---

[74] Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1992); Mason, "Insurgency, Counterinsurgency," 63-83; Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority* (Chicago, IL: Markham, 1970); Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency," 75-90; Edward Luttwak, "Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice," *Harper*'s 314 (2007): 33-42; and Lindsay Clutterbuck, "Law Enforcement," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004), 157.

[75] Jeffrey Ross and Ted Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 4 (Jul. 1989): 408.

[76] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 76-77, 127-128; Joao Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," *Security Studies*, 5, no. 3 (Spr. 1996): 193-260; and Gvineria, "How Does Terrorism End?" 291.

[77] Shirley Christian, "Tupamaros of Uruguay: The Mystique Survives," *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1986, https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/03/world/tupamaros-of-urugray-the-mystique-survives.html.

[78] The measure simultaneously deterred potential supporters from aiding the FLQ. Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 413.

[79] Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001), 97-110; Timothy Hoyt, "Military Force," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004), 162-185.

[80] Hoyt, "Military Force," 162-185; Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 55; Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Win. 2005-2006): 118-120; Rapoport, "The Four Waves," 60; Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 69-87; and Peter Sederberg "Responses to Dissident Terrorism: From Myth to Maturity," in *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles Kegley, Jr. (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 262-280.

[81] Cronin maintains that military force "hastened the decline or ended" numerous VNAs in "How al-Qaida Ends," 30. See also Barry Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Win. 2001-2002): 39-55. Although the Bush Doctrine called for a multi-faceted approach to counterterrorism, it nonetheless prioritized the military component in Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union." Repression can be a double-edged sword. The Tsarist Russian government may have triggered the first wave of modern terrorism by abusing political prisoners in jail. America's treatment of detainees and prisoners in the GWOT has been a source of international contention. Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War in the War on Terror," in *International Law and the War on Terrorism: US Naval War College, International Law Studies, vol. 79*, ed. Paul Wilson (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003), 175-230; Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1987), 33; and Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave," 419-425.

[82] Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya," *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Win. 2004-05): 563, and "Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The

Turkey broke the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), while Peru shattered the Shining Path.[83] Even a state's threat to use force can dissuade a VNA's sponsors.[84]

When irregulars operate abroad, state power in the guise of diplomacy and foreign aid can influence neighbors and international organizations.[85] America offered policing[86] assistance during the Cold War to countries resisting Soviet-supported VNAs.[87] States can also sanction collaborating governments' trade, investment, foreign companies, and IMF or World Bank loans.[88] Since 1947, Israel has hurt Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia for assisting Palestinian VNAs. States have punished Iran for supporting Palestinian and Bahraini VNAs; Teheran attacked Iraq in 1995 for helping the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).[89] The Reagan

---

Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 2 (Mar. 2005): 209-290; and Carol Williams, "A History of Terrorism Out of Chechnya," *Los Angeles Times*, Apr. 19, 2013.

[83] Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ends," 30.

[84] Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism," 39-55; John Alterman, "Special Report: How Terrorism Ends," *United States Institute for Peace* (May 1999): 2, https://www.usip.org/publications/1999/05/how-terrorism-ends.

[85] Haris Pesto, "The Role of Diplomacy in the Fight Against Terrorism," *Connections* 10, no. 1 (Win. 2010): 64-81; Peter Peterson, "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 2002): 74-94; J. Cofer Black, "Diplomacy and the War Against Terrorism: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 18, 2003," *US Department of State*, last modified Mar. 18, 2003, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2003/18795.htm; Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone, "Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: More Liberty, Less Terror?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 8 (Sep. 2018): 1607-1635; and Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, "Aid and the Delegated Fight against Terrorism," *Review of Development Economics* 10, no. 2 (2006): 330-344.

[86] Some theorists maintain that police are better at acquiring the intelligence needed in counterinsurgency. Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 43; Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 31; Clutterbuck, "Law Enforcement," 40-161; Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 408; Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*; and Michael Sheehan, "Diplomacy," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004), 104-105.

[87] John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). These programs may have empowered the recipients to repress peaceful political opposition. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection* (London: Zed, 1985); Martha Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1998).

[88] The US state sponsor of terror list "names and shames" supporters of VNAs. Among the states that America has diplomatically pressured to stop helping VNAs are Afghanistan, Sudan, and Pakistan. Byman, *Deadly Connections:* 278-280, 286; Adam Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective," *Survival* 47, no. 2 (Sum. 2005): 115-121; United States Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000: Briefing Upon the Release of the Report," last modified Apr. 30, 2001, accessed Aug. 8, 2019, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/2571.htm; David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1985); Jonathan Kirshner, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," *Security Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spr. 1997): 32-64; and Elizabeth Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts," *Security Studies* 5, no. 4 (Sum. 1996): 43-72.

[89] Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 50, 276, 286. Leftist students in Iran originally created the MEK in 1965. After the group helped overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, it eventually broke with the new theocracy; by 1986 it was trying to overthrow the Khomeini regime. Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: The People's Mojahedin

administration bombed Libya in 1986 for aiding VNAs. The Clinton administration bombed Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 for supposedly abetting al Qaeda's attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 because the government assisted al Qaeda.[90]

The Leftist Narrative

The Marxist-Moist-Leninist assumptions related to VNA victory generally parallel realism. They too tend to dismiss terrorism and prioritize insurgency; because popular support is indispensable to weak side success, irregulars should not systematically target civilians.[91] VNAs should prevail instead via mass agitation, revolution, the proletariat's empowerment, and the establishment of a utopian society.[92]

Che Guevara predicted failure for VNAs that confronted democracies.[93] Groups that waited for favorable revolutionary conditions likewise forfeited success. He exhorted aggrieved weak sides to attack the state, provoke its overreaction, and ultimately manufacture these

---

Organization of Iran," in *Iran: Outlaw, Outcast or Normal Country?* ed. Albert Benliot (Huntington, New York: Nova Science, 2001); and Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven: Yale University, 1989).

[90] Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave," 421.

[91] The history of unconventional warfare has shown however, that insurgencies do not always spare civilians. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, 281-296; Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*; and Begin, *The Revolt*.

[92] In Marx's narrative, human history culminates in the communist free state. The dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism mark stages of a process that ends private property and class exploitation. When the state is no longer an organ of bourgeois domination, it ultimately withers. The ensuing people's free state embodies freedom and democracy—people in classless society contribute what they can and take what they need. Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (New York: Penguin, 2010); Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New Haven: Yale University, 2012); Vladimir Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International, 1932); Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*; Edward Katzenbach and Gene Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung," *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (Sep. 1955): 321-340; Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*; Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*, trans. Bobbye Ortiz (New York: MR, 1967); Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, and *A Dying Colonialism*; Marighella, *Minimanual*, and *For the Liberation of Brazi*; Abraham Guillen, *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen* (New York: Morrow, 1973); and Ian Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 7.

[93] He believed that democracies were better at mitigating VNA grievances. Guevara, *Guerilla Warfare*.

conditions. Guevara advised insurgents to organize in the countryside, away from the state's reach. China's irregulars, he believed, initially failed because they focused on urban workers; Mao found success only after the Long March brought safe havens and rural support. Ho Chi Minh also prevailed against France after he mobilized Indochina's peasants in the countryside.

Mao represents more the "democratic defeatism" paradigm, whereby liberal states struggle with wars of attrition.[94] Success happens when the weak side effectively substitutes "political mobilization" for "industrial mobilization." Tactical offensives, fought within a strategic defensive, "bleed" the state "white" and "change the relative position" of the adversaries. VNAs win militarily when they organize space "so that it could be made to yield time;" they win politically when they organize time to yield resolve. As the conflict evolved "from asymmetrical to symmetrical," Mao expected a conventional counteroffensive to bring the "coup de grace," topple the state, and usher in communism.[95]

VNAs that steal, abuse locals, or mistreat enemy captives hurt their cause. The failure of its leaders to share the burdens of the rank-and-file can likewise weaken the group. When, moreover, weak sides fight modern states "on the latter's terms," "defeat is the invariable outcome." Learning from Ethiopia's futile resistance against Italy in the mid-1930s, Mao surmised that the weak side's plan to fight Rome in conventional terms was essentially a decision "to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain."[96]

---

[94] See Chap. 1: Introduction, footnote # 25.
[95] E. L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-tung," in *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him*—FMFRP 12-25, ed. T. N. Greene (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1962), 5-7, 13, 18, accessed Aug. 13, 2019, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-25%20%20The%20Guerrilla%20and%20How%20to%20Fight%20Him.pdf; Tse-Tung, "Preserving Oneself," 415-417. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese unconventional conflicts were decided "by massive conventional military operations." Record, *Beating Goliath*, ix-x; Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages, 1967), 210-219; Donald Hodges, *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen* (New York: William Morrow, 1973); and Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla*, 57.
[96] Tse-Tung, "Preserving Oneself," 415-417.

The US quit in Vietnam after losing 2% of its entire pool of soldiers that served during the ten-year conflict. In military terms, these 58,000 deaths represented only a tiny percentage of America's 1965 population of 194 million; in political terms, they were serious enough to sap American resolve by 1973. The Vietnamese Communists convinced Washington that it could not "punish the enemy beyond a certain point."[97] Although they lost over one million soldiers and two million civilians—about 5% of all the Communist-controlled population in Vietnam, they were nonetheless prepared to continue fighting in 1973.[98] US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger apparently came to appreciate VNA resolve during the peace talks in 1969: the irregular "wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win."[99]

Assessing "Power as Victory"

For the realist and leftist power schools, David beats Goliath when safe havens, time, popularity, organization, state miscalculation, and external pressures conspire to reverse the balance of power. As VNAs switch their relative position and become the new state, old regimes collapse or leave. While these narratives generally agree on process, the leftist school

[97] Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (New York: Cambridge University, 2003); Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1983), 59; Lyall and Wilson, "Rage Against the Machines," 67-106; Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 364-381; Stathis Kalyvas, "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War," *Journal of Ethics* 8, no. 1 (2004): 97-138; and Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher, "How 'Free' is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem," *World Politics* 59, no. 2 (2007): 177-216.
[98] Spencer Tucker, *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 64; Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam."
[99] Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," 214.

specifically characterizes success as the birth of a people's free-state: "Miraculously, a small band of men…goes on decisively to achieve an ideal, to establish a new society."[100]

The grand success narrative generates several problems. It tends to prioritize insurgency and dismiss terrorism.[101] The Marxist literature that treats victory in zero-sum terms views any political compromise as unacceptable collaboration with capitalism. This may help explain why studies often do not treat terrorism and insurgency as coequal and comparable subcategories of asymmetric warfare. The power models also seem to over-predict the frequency of revolutions and regime change. With so much endemic poverty and oppression globally, aggrieved groups should be defeating states often enough to justify asymmetric warfare's persistence throughout history. While studies support the growth of VNAs after the Cold War's end, they do not indicate a corresponding increase in regime changes and revolutions.[102] Since these types of political events remain rare, some other types of outcomes, beyond the dim prospects for the grand success, should be inspiring irregulars.[103]

The Marxist models are additionally prone to perpetuate "political myths" that portend success via immediate action;[104] Che Guevara and Regis Debray repeatedly tried in vain to

---

[100] Guevara, *Guerilla Warfare*.

[101] Arreguín-Toft, for example, ignores cases that relate to my research—VNAs that start unconventional warfare and win in "How the Weak Wins Wars." The insurgency-based database ignores partial success and assumes that a VNA can only win if it supported by "the majority of the population." It consequently treats the Cypriot outcome against Britain not as a limited VNA victory, but as an act conciliation that did not "require armed forces to implement." The author also concludes that when the state uses an indirect strategy of barbarism, the VNA can prevail only via a "direct defense." The problem is that direct defenses entail attacking focused enemy forces across an international border, destroying or seizing territory or bridges, or implementing static, forward, or mobile defenses. These strategies are available primarily to insurgencies, not to terrorist groups with a few dozen members.

[102] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*; Wallensteen, and Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000," 629-644; for an overview of the current emerging global conflicts, see International Crisis Group, "Watch List 2021," last updated Jan. 29, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/watch-list-202.

[103] While the revolution literature generates many explanations for why they happen, there is general agreement that they are rare. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin, 1977); Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*; Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 5-19; Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation," 139-187; and Jeff Goodwin, "Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements," in *The Handbook of Political Sociology*, ed. Thomas Janoski et al., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[104] The Cuban model reflects this need for immediate action. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, trans. T. Hulme and J. Roth (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1961).

replicate Fidel Castro's "faith in Utopia and the cult of violent action" throughout Latin America.[105] Since leftist revolutionaries naturally expect social justice to follow capitalism's demise, they moreover treat all irregular conflict as a national liberation struggle. As a result, they dismiss its unique political, economic, geographical, and international contexts.

Mao's general theories on weak side victory could consequently reflect anecdotal observations drawn from China's experience with Japan in the 1930-40s. In this rare case, Japan was militarily superior and demographically inferior; an attrition strategy may have therefore been applicable. Other times, however, particularly when smaller VNAs are involved, time may work against the weak side. Mao's final counteroffensive may never materialize.

Leftist VNAs not only transform triumph into "an act of faith," they usually fail to institutionalize virtually any of their utopian ideals.[106] They expect new state structures to emerge organically as the existing ones disappear.[107] Despite producing volumes of writings, Marx devoted only a few sentences to his actual workers' paradise: when "nobody has an exclusive sphere of activity," anyone "can become accomplished in any branch he wishes."[108] When a reporter asked Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman about his vision for Peru's future, the VNA leader admitted that," We have not studied this question sufficiently, because it involves problems that will pose themselves in the future."[109]

The Pragmatic-Limited School

[105] Richard Lowenthal, "Unreason and Revolution: Reflections on the Dissociation of Revolutionary Practice from Marxist Theory," RAND P-4119 (June 1969), 3, accessed Aug. 13, 2019, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dda4/d9d43100f6ad72298547323cc7f073f5f35c.pdf.
[106] Joseph Kraemer claims that Che Guevara died from this faith in "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare and the Decolonization Movement," *Polity* 4, no. 2 (1971): 138.
[107] Lowenthal, "Unreason and Revolution," 1-3.
[108] Robert Tucker, *The Marx–Engels Reader* (New York: Norton, 1972), 160.
[109] "Interview with Chairman Gonzalo," *El Diario* (Peru), Jul. 1988, http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/dawson/data/Interview_with_Chairman_Gonzalo.pdf.

Despite their obvious and overwhelming advantages, sometimes states cannot convert their relative power into military victory. In the 1990s, for example, American power proved ineffective against Somali militants, Serbian nationalists, and Iraqi dictators.[110] While Clausewitz believed that "superiority of numbers is the most common element of victory [in warfare]," he simultaneously recognized that this superiority, "depending on the circumstances," may sometimes contribute "very little."[111]

Government policies can produce unanticipated or self-defeating consequences: "no human endeavor has had all the effects and only the effects that were expected and intended."[112] State barbarism may trigger a "moral opposition to the war" and prompt its troops to "become defensive on the battlefield."[113] States that overreact to an insignificant threat or unnecessarily prolong a conflict may unwittingly dispel the "capability conception;"[114] they eventually "pass a tipping point and begin to decay at an accelerated rate." Governments may thus forfeit their

[110] Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 1.
[111] Clausewitz, *On War*, 194, 204. Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practise* (New York: Stuart, 1965); Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*; David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Joint Information Operations Center* (Sum. 2006): 29-35, accessed Mar. 2, 2016, http://www.au.af.mil/infoops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf; John McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (London: Faber, 1966); Richard Clutterbuck, *Guerrillas and Terrorists* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977); Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup*; Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*; Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2006; Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990); Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies*; Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*; and Anthony Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2004).
[112] Robert Jervis, "Systems Effects," in *Strategy and Choice*, ed. Richard Zeckhauser (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991), 108.
[113] Merom, *How Democracies Lose*, 24, 26, 230-231.
[114] A state may mistakenly believe that a peripheral conflict risks its survival. George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 170, 222; Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking, 1983), 169-170, 377-378; and Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 68, 122. Anders Boserup and Andrew observe that over time, the Vietnam War extended the battlefield into America's polity and social institutions in *War without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defense* (New York: Schocken, 1975); Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose," 177.

capacity to "mobilize, transform and employ a diverse array of human and material resources against the other for a strategic purpose."[115]

VNAs that fall short of revolution and regime change can nonetheless score various types of "partial success" via their power to hurt, coerce, and subvert.[116] By communicating other goals that the state and their own base find acceptable, they can avoid the "victory or death" predicament. According to various interpretations, Al Qaeda sought to reconstitute an Islamic Caliphate,[117] impose its radical beliefs globally,[118] "rid the world of religious and political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women,"[119] and roll back western culture.[120] If the 9/11 attacks are viewed via this maximalist standard, then this instance of unconventional warfare indeed failed; but what if al Qaeda simultaneously harbored other more limited goals as well? Maybe *some* of its aims on 9/11/2001 were more pragmatic—to end or reduce America's

[115] Gordon McCormick, Steven Horton, and Lauren Harrison, "Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars" (paper presented to the RAND Corporation Insurgency Board, Aug. 29, 2006), 5-6. Although the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 only destroyed about 3% of the French forces in Indochina, the political and psychological effects of the loss shattered the state's will to fight. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose," 177-178; Trinquier, "Modern Warfare;" Ian Beckett, *Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute/US Army War College, 2005); and Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles," 29-35.
[116] Alterman, "Special Report," 1-11; Gvineria, "How Does Terrorism End?" 257-291; Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, 32-34; and Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 118-119.
[117] Rubin and Rubin, *Anti-American Terrorism*; Osama bin Laden, "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders: The 1998 Fatwa," in *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, ed. Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar (New York: Grove, 2003), 325-327.
[118] Richard Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks and Q & A at Rossi Luncheon," *White House*, Jul. 26, 2004, accessed Sep. 17, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=81173.
[119] "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: Overview of the Enemy," 15.
[120] Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address;" Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor, 2000), 312.

presence in Saudi Arabia.[121] If causal links exist between the weak side's attacks and the subsequent US troop reductions in the desert kingdom, then al Qaeda succeeded.[122]

The Power of Weakness and the Weakness of States

Various literatures can address why relative power does not prevail and how VNAs achieve limited goals. Coercion studies criticize the power paradigms' binary codes of "success" or "failure" for generating arbitrary and misleading results.[123] Since "coercers generally have multiple goals as they pursue coercive strategies," a single version of success is unlikely.[124]

Both the international mediation[125] and regime transition[126] literatures posit that not all political objectives are equally amenable to resolution. Comparative foreign policy studies look at how domestic factors influence a state's ability to negotiate effectively.[127] Geography,[128]

[121] Numerous authors argue that the attacks meant to cause a US withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, a place where America had been escalating its military presence steadily since the First Gulf War in 1991. Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004), 242 and *Through Our Enemies Eyes*, xviii; Daniel Byman, "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?" *World Politics* 56, no. 1 (Oct. 2003): 142; Pape, *Dying to Win*; Jonathan Schanzer, *Al-Qaeda's Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004); and Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free, 2004), 244.
[122] Lake, "Rational Extremism," 19; Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49-80. Don van Natta, Jr., reported that by September 2003, only 500 American advisers remained at Saudi Arabia's Prince Sultan Air Base in "The Struggle for Iraq: Last American Combat Troops Quit Saudi Arabia," *New York Times*, Sep. 22, 2003.
[123] Barry Watts, "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies," *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (1997): 136; Walter Peterson, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom," *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 269-294.
[124] Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 34.
[125] Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts," 272; Druckman and Broome, "Value Differences," 489-510; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Willie, "Some Conceptual Issues," 7-17, Ott, "Mediation as a Method," 613; Vasquez, "The Tangibility of Issues," 179; and Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 53.
[126] Caruthers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," 5-21; Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 337-363; O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*; and di Palma, *To Craft Democracies*.
[127] Richard Snyder, "The Nature of Foreign Policy," *Social Science* 27 (Apr. 1952): 61-69.
[128] Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1956).

resources,[129] public opinion,[130] mass media,[131] elites and interest groups,[132] and bureaucracies[133] affect governmental decision-making. Power can become a potential detriment in asymmetric warfare if it makes the state overconfident.[134]

Rational Choice

Rational choice theories seem useful for clarifying the power of weakness. They treat irregulars not as an assembly of disparate individuals with competing views, but an organization that prioritizes goals, uses cost-benefit analysis, and seeks to optimize its profits.[135] Groups thus act according to a collective, unitary pursuit of a stable set of preferences.[136] Unconventional warfare becomes a contest that involves multiple players and unfolds in a continuously changing

[129] James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in *Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free, 1971), 95-151; Klaus Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1956).
[130] Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1950); Douglas Mendel, Jr., *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1961).
[131] Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1963).
[132] James Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1963); John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby," *London Review of Books* 28 no. 6 (Mar. 23, 2006): 3-12; and Buchanan, "Whose War?"
[133] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); James Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1962); and Burton Sapin and Richard Snyder, *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954).
[134] Desch, "Democracy and Victory," 14; Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 4. Some analysts observe that Israel fought effectively when its survival was at stake in 1948 and 1967. When it engaged in subsequent conflicts that did not imperil its national survival, it fought less effectively. Martin van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 296, 344; and Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History* (New York: William Morrow, 1998), 504, 526.
[135] D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 157; Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," 86-102; and Matthew Shugart, "Guerrillas and Elections: An Institutionalist Perspective on the Costs of Conflict and Competition," *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1992): 121-151.
[136] Mesquita and Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed," 364-381; Lake, "Rational Extremism," 15-29; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism;" Harvey Waterman, "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective," *World Politics* 33, no. 4 (July 1981): 554-589; McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 481-482; and Herbert Simon "Rationality in Psychology and Economics," in *Models of Bounded Rationality: Vol. 3, Empirically Grounded Economic Reason*, ed. Herbert Simon (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997).

environment; reciprocal operational relationships mean that one side's actions depend on the previous and anticipated actions of its friends and enemies.[137] Terrorism and insurgency represent a group's best means to an end.[138]

The strategic interaction theory notes that VNAs suffer when they fight on the state's terms.[139] They should rather devise an "opposite counterstrategy" that buys time, avoids a direct confrontation, and prevents a quick outcome.[140] The theory of inflated expectations argues that when powerful states fail to rout an enemy, their leadership loses legitimacy.[141] Resolve theories examine how advantageous power imbalances caused disadvantageous interest imbalances for states during the post-1945 wars of decolonization. Although VNAs rarely won in the field, they nonetheless manipulated "military stalemates, or *even defeat*," into political victories.[142] Strong

---

[137] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 3, and *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: Norton, 2006); Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (1993): 828-844; Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 405-426; David Gutmann, "Killers and Consumers: The Terrorist and His Audience," *Social Research* 46 (1979): 516-526; Ralph Dowling, "Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre," *Journal of Communication* 36, no. 1 (Mar. 1986): 12-24; and Konrad Kellen, "Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 43-58.

[138] Strategic or rational decision-making is informed by the availability of options and their anticipated outcomes. James March, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York, Free, 2009); Gordon Tullock, *The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution* (Blacksburg, VA: University Publications, 1974); Frederick Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time* (New York: Norton, 1976); Jerome Corsi, "Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 1 (Mar. 1981): 47-85; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism;" and Harvey Lapan and Todd Sandler, "Terrorism and Signalling," *European Journal of Political Economy* 9, no. 3 (Aug. 1993): 383-397.

[139] Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Wins Wars," 99-104. Weak sides lose when they choose the same type of strategy as the state. If states target a VNA "directly" with military force, the VNA must respond indirectly with terrorism and insurgency. If the state pursues an indirect approach of barbarism, the weak side should deploy a "direct defense" against the attacking state. State barbarism includes rape, murder, torture, the bombing of civilians, or concentration camps. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic, 1992), 151; Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Classic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Persia to the Present* (New York: Little, Brown, 1994), 108; Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 97-99; and Donald Hamilton, *The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 59.

[140] Campbell, "A Modest Suggestion;" Abrahms, "The Political Effectiveness," 366-393; and Downes, "Draining the Sea," 420-444.

[141] Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 53; Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose," 181-182.

[142] When a state believes that it is fighting "a limited war," against a "weak" opponent, "the prosecution of the war does not take automatic primacy over other goals pursued by factions within the government." Mack "Why Big Nations Lose Small," 184.

sides with low resolve and high politically exposure saw their people demand outcomes that fell short of total victory. Irregulars ultimately won a contest of wills, whereby their superior interest compensated for their inferior resources.[143]

Via their power to coerce, weak sides cause states to change extradition policies,[144] reform prisons,[145] or release prisoners.[146] Irregulars attack before elections[147] or force a state's troop withdrawal from overseas deployments;[148] after a Filipino was taken hostage in Iraq, Manila ignored rebukes from the US, Australia, and Iraq and withdrew fifty-one security personnel from Baghdad in July 2004.[149]

VNAs can goad a government into hasty counter-measures that make it appear malevolent, incompetent, or impotent.[150] They may attract sympathy and supporters when they

[143] Clausewitz, *On War*, 1976, 194, 204. While Vietnamese Communists "were fighting for their country as well as their principles," Americans "had only their principles at stake." As the antiwar movements "became more persuasive" and discredited even these principles, US resolve dissipated. Richard Betts, "Interests, Burdens, and Persistence: Asymmetries between Washington and Hanoi," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Dec. 1980): 523.
[144] Cockayne, *Hidden Power*.
[145] John Bailey and Matthew Taylor, "Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil and Mexico," *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1, no. 1 (2009).
[146] Palestinian terrorism has coerced Israel and a host of West European governments into releasing jailed political prisoners on numerous occasions in Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works*.
[147] Terrorist bombings in Spain likely influenced the 2004 elections. Rodriguez, *The March 11th Terrorist Network*; William Rose et al., "Does Terrorism Ever Work? 185-192; and Javier Gardeazabal, "Terrorism, Economic Downturns and Elections," *European Security Economics*, Policy Briefing 4 (Sep. 2011). Not all VNA shocks to electoral politics, however, signify success. See Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 59; Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 3 (2008): 279-301.
[148] Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," 66-73; Pape, "The Strategic Logic," 343-361. After losing 241 soldiers in "the most violent non-nuclear explosion since World War II," Washington abruptly ended its seventeen-month mission and abandoned Beirut to the Shi'ite militias. President Ronald Regan's justification for leaving Lebanon reflects the classic logic of coercion: "We couldn't stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the marines." Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 465; Thomas Friedman, "Marines Complete Beirut Pullback: Moslems Move In," *New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1984; and Reuter, *My Life is a Weapon*, 53.
[149] James Glanz, "Hostage is Freed after Philippine Troops are Withdrawn from Iraq," *New York Times*, July 21, 2004.
[150] Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy," 7-20; Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 580; Marighella, *Minimanual*; Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions;" Mesquita and Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed," 364-381; Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49-80; and Claire Metelits, *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians and Revolutionary Group Behavior* (New York: New York University, 2010).

manipulate a state into killing innocent civilians.[151] Bystanders can take sides if their leadership bypasses peaceful debate and transforms a "political situation to a military one."[152] Curfews, house searches, detainment without trial, and death squads could further alienate the citizenry.[153] If the government's counterterrorism is too "ostentatious," it may "magnify" the irregulars' political stature; by appeasing the moderates, the government can alienate the old order and inspire "reactionary pro-state terrorists."[154]

Rational Choice and Limits to the Power of Weakness

Rational choice theories can explain VNA failure. If suicide terrorists seem immune to deterrence, the government may collectively punish their communities and families.[155] Suicide terrorists hoping to instigate overreaction may instead prompt the government to reject large-scale military operations in favor of targeted assassinations and drone strikes.[156] If one VNA wants to outbid a competitor and escalates its violence, the state may reward the moderates and deny concessions to the radicals.[157]

---

[151] Kalyvas and Kocher, "How 'Free' is Free Riding," 190; Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (1989): 493; Mesquita and Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed," 364-381; Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49-80; Lake, "Rational Extremism," 15-29. For a counter example in which the government's indiscriminate use of force against civilians suppressed the VNA, see the case of Chechnya in Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (2009): 331-362.
[152] Marighella, *For the Liberation*, 35.
[153] Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 580-581; Marighella, *Minimanual*; Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy," 12; Eubank and Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism? 417-443.
[154] Berry, "Theories on the Efficacy," 14-16; Neumann and Smith, "Strategic Terrorism," 581-582; and Steve Bruce, "The Problem of Pro-State Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 1 (1992): 67-88.
[155] After the Palestinians launched the second intifada in 2000, Israel demolished the homes of the suicide terrorists' families. Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban Klor, "Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism, NBER Working Paper No. 16320," *National Bureau of Economic Research*, last modified August 2010, https://www.nber.org/papers/w16320.
[156] Lake, "Rational Extremism," 15-29.
[157] Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 49-80, and "Sabotaging the Peace," 263-296; Yelena Biberman and Farhan Zahid, "Why Terrorists Target Children: Outbidding, Desperation, and Extremism in the Peshawar and

Irregulars may misjudge how their various audiences receive their choices of attrition, coercion, and provocation.[158] Popular backlashes elicit sympathy for a VNA's victims and animus for its cause.[159] Italy's Red Brigade did not foresee that its kidnapping and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 would force "the Italian population to choose sides" and simultaneously compel "a divided government to mobilize."[160] Spain's Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) alienated its own Basque community with its choice of targets.[161] After the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped a British and a Canadian official in 1970, Canada declared martial law. While the group exchanged the Brit for safe conduct to Cuba, it murdered the Canadian. Canada's labor unions rallied against the FLQ. The public welcomed the army into Quebec.[162] The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in the US[163] and the Real IRA in Ireland[164] suffered similar losses in popular support.

Beslan School Massacres," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 2 (2019): 169-184; Victor Asal and R. Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks," *Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008): 437-449; Michael Horowitz and Philip Potter, "Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 199-225; and Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 92.

[158] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 44-48.

[159] Cockayne, *Hidden Power*, 287.

[160] The Italian public's prioritization of security and support for law enforcement intensified the VNA's internal divisions and made the group "schizophrenic" in Albert Legault, "La dynamique du terrorisme: le cas des Brigades Rouges," *Revue Etudes Internationales* 14 (1983): 639-681, quoted in Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 82-83.

[161] ETA sought to establish a separate homeland. Goldie Shabad and Francisco José Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 455-462.

[162] James Stewart, *The FLQ: Seven Years of Terrorism* (Montreal: Montreal Star and Simon and Schuster, 1970); Louis Fornier, *FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement* (Toronto: NC Press, 1984), 281.

[163] The SLA lost popularity after murdering Oakland's black school superintendent Marcus Foster in 1973; it later kidnapped Patricia Hearst in 1974 and had a wild shootout with police in Los Angeles. The journal of the New Left, *Ramparts*, condemned the SLA's actions as "morally unjustifiable" and "politically incomprehensible in "The Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism and the Left," *Ramparts* 12 (May 1974): 21, accessed Aug. 18, 2019, http://www.unz.com/print/Ramparts-1974may-00021/. See also Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," 96.

[164] RIRA's car bombing in Omagh in Aug. 1998 killed 29 people, including a woman pregnant with twins; it injured 220 others. Sean Boyne, "The Real IRA: After Omagh, What Now?" *Jane's Intelligence Review*, last modified Aug. 24, 1998, accessed Aug. 5, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20071025035213/http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir980824_1_n.shtml.

Irregulars that trigger more state repression, intensify social polarization, and worsen living standards can alienate the public.[165] Portuguese terrorism in the early 1920s undermined democracy and helped usher in dictatorship; VNAs during the Spanish Civil War enabled the rise of Francisco Franco. While the Tupamaros' "strategy of provocation" attracted global media attention after 1945, they ultimately destroyed freedom in Latin America's first welfare state and became "the gravediggers of liberal Uruguay."[166]

Weak sides can fail when the next generation rejects the cause.[167] Far-right organizations often articulate vague or grandiose goals.[168] During the 1970s, leftist VNAs produced no coherent model "that could be handed down to successors after the first generation of radical leaders departed or were eliminated." Japan's Red Army, Italy's Red Brigades, America's Weather Underground, and the West German Red Army Faction all experienced cross-generational failures that saw them lose popular favor.[169]

Assessing Rational Choice

Not all political groups are rational. A VNA may introduce violence not as a last resort, but rather from the onset of a dispute.[170] Rational choice theories seem irrelevant when

---

[165] Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 117.
[166] The term was coined by French revolutionary Regis Debray. Charles Townshend, "People's War," in *The Oxford History of Modern War*, ed. Charles Townshend, New Updated Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 194; Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 117-118.
[167] A group's goal and motivation may weaken its support base. Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 39-42; Gvineria, "How Does Terrorism End?" 271-272.
[168] Steven Chermak, Joshua Freilich, and Michael Suttmoeller, "The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States: Comparing Violent to Non-Violent Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 3 (2013): 193-218; and Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 39-42.
[169] Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 23; Donatella Della Porta, "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Penn State University, 1995a), 105-159, and "Introduction;" Peter Merkl, "West German Left-Wing Terrorism," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Penn State University, 1995), 160-210; and Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 405-426.
[170] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 58; Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want."

irregulars forsake political goals and resort to violence for violence's sake. The weak side's goals can likewise change over time.[171] Without a stable and ordered set of preferences, it may be more difficult to determine whether a group scored a successful outcome.

A VNA may not be an isolated and self-contained group, but belong to larger networks and political parties with their own priorities.[172] The IRA was attached to Sinn Fein in Ireland;[173] more recently, numerous Islamic jihadi groups pledged their allegiance to ISIS. If VNAs are not unitary actors with stable goals, then these models may not explain outcomes that feature organizational power struggles, succession challenges, and managerial disputes.[174]

Organizational Theory and Limited Success

The organizational literature can help explain outcomes in asymmetrical warfare by examining hierarchy, decision-making, membership, learning, intra-group rivalries, and inter-group alliances.[175] Related work in social psychology looks at how groups and the environment combine to influence personal behaviors.[176] The competitive adaptation theory posits that differences in organizational flexibility weed out the weakest VNAs. In some instances,

---

[171] Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want."
[172] Shawn Flanigan, "Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 6 (2008): 499-519.
[173] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 58.
[174] Mesquita and Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed;" Pearlman, "Spoiling Inside and Out."
[175] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 70; Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 94; Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 4 (2005): 275-293; Jacob Shapiro, *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2013); and Alterman, "Special Report," 2.
[176] Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (2010): 479; Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo, "Social Psychology, Terrorism, and Identity: A Preliminary Re-examination of Theory, Culture, Self, and Society," *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 23, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2005): 485-506; McCauley and Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," 231-256; David Webber and Arie Kruglanski, "The Social Psychological Makings of a Terrorist," *Current Opinion in Psychology* 19 (Feb. 2018): 131-134; and Jerrold Post et al., "The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism," *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes* 72, no 1 (Apr. 2009): 13-31.

centralized groups with rigid chains of command gain certain advantages.[177] A VNA based on a single, unified leadership can adjust to changing conditions, enforce discipline, issue orders quickly, and streamline its policy implementation. It can set the strategy and coordinate all the organization's levels.

In other instances, centralized groups succumb to state decapitation strategies.[178] Israeli targeted killings, for example, drastically damaged several Palestinian VNAs.[179] Peru's Shining Path pushed the country towards anarchy in the early 1990s; after the government captured its charismatic leader Abimael Guzman in September 1992, membership dropped from 10,000 to 500.[180] When the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) lost its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, it quickly transitioned to peaceful politics.[181] The Real Irish Republican Army splintered off in 1997 after the Provisional IRA negotiated peace with London; when its leader Michael McKevitt was captured in 2001, the group declined dramatically. Aum Shinrikyo's membership plummeted from 45,000 to 1,000 in Japan after the 1995 arrest of its leader, Shoko Asahara.[182]

---

[177] For the advantages of centralized bureaucracies, see Weber, *Economy and Society;* Mansoor Khan, "Do the Advantages of the Weberian Bureaucracy Outweigh Its Disadvantages?" *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 66, no. 4 (Dec. 2020): 592-595.

[178] Jenna Jordan, "Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, March 17, 2004); Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, "Rethinking Decapitation as a Strategy against Terrorism" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, Feb. 28, 2017); Stephen Hosmer, *Operations against Enemy Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and Alterman, "Special Report," 3.

[179] Steven David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, Mideast Security and Policy Studies no. 51 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, Sep. 2002); Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2006): 95-111, and "Why Drones Work," 32-43; Shlomo Gazit, "Israel," in *Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, ed. Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2002); Eisenstadt, "Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings;" and Jordan, "Leadership Decapitation."

[180] United States Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003," last modified June 22, 2004, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/.

[181] Peter Humi, Richard Blystone, and Nic Robertson, "Irate Kurds Protest across Europe over Ocalan's Arrest," *CNN.com*, last modified Feb. 16, 1999, accessed Aug. 8, 2019, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9902/16/ocalan.protest.01/; Audrey Cronin et al., *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, CRS Report for Congress, RL32223 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2004), 103-105, accessed Aug. 8, 2019, https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

[182] Cronin et al., *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, 103-105.

Decentralized VNAs that mimic horizontal networks with flexible chains of command may avoid decapitation attacks. They can assign the same tasks to multiple groups and stay ahead of ponderous state bureaucracies.[183] Nimble VNAs can better exploit information technology, remain elusive, and compartmentalize activities into semi-autonomous cells.[184] On the down side, they may behave less as unitary actors and more as fragmented institutions of multiple individuals with varying preferences.[185] Irregulars may then fail because of competing leadership, splintering,[186] insubordination,[187] or misjudging their opposition.[188]

Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck looked to history as a teacher when he remarked that, "Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others' experience."[189] No consensus, however, exists on how to learn from history. George Santayana's maxim about repeating the past includes no practical instructions. Weak sides can learn and prevail when they self-evaluate[190] or emulate other VNAs.[191] The demonstration effect maintains that actors copy other successful actors and replace ineffective tactics via the substitution effect.[192] When the PLO's aviation hijacking proved effective, other groups quickly followed.[193] Iranian innovations

[183] Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama*, 152-153, 203-207.
[184] Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*; Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Sum. 2002): 97-108; and Matthew Levitt, "Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover between Terrorist Groups," *SAIS Review* 24, no. 1 (Win.-Spr. 2004): 33-48.
[185] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 73.
[186] Asal, Brown, and Dalton, "Why Split?" 94-117.
[187] Shapiro, *The Terrorist's Dilemma*; Fernando Reinares, "Exit from Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization among Members of ETA," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 5 (2011): 780-803; and Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Promoting Exit," 99-115.
[188] Della Porta, "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy," 105-159, and "Introduction," 3-28.
[189] Hart, *Strategy*, 23.
[190] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 53; Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas."
[191] Enders and Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies," 828-844; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 121-122, 126, 129.
[192] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*.
[193] Sterling, *The Terror Network*, 10, 26; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2006, 78-79.

in suicide terrorism went global after 1979.[194] Hezbollah used the tactic in the 1980s against Israel, France, and America; the LTTE incorporated it in its conflict against Sri Lanka.[195]

VNAs can learn via news reports, legal indictments, court evidence, trial transcripts, and testimony from law enforcement officials.[196] Groups can query newly arrested colleagues about the state's tactics.[197] For decades, Moscow, the PLO, and Libya tutored multitudes of irregulars.[198] Al Qaeda produced numerous terrorism handbooks and manuals and used on-the-job training for counterfeiting, forgery, and espionage.[199]

Dumb and Inflexible Organizations

Groups that fail to learn and adapt will almost certainly fail as terrorists or insurgents. Their profoundly disadvantageous balance of power vis-à-vis the state means that their first defeat will probably be their last defeat. Incompetent VNAs are likely to face short-term challenges from limited information and time pressures, especially after the state escalates its activities.[200] They can misuse history and draw invalid parallels to their current situation;[201] or

---

[194] Russell, Banker, and Miller, "Out-Inventing the Terrorist," 3-42; Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida, "Why Violence Spreads," 262-298; and Heyman and Mickolus, "Observations on Why Violence Spreads," 299-305.
[195] Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism;" Davis, *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance,* 67-84; and Pape, *Dying to Win*, 73.
[196] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1998, 178-179.
[197] Sean O'Callaghan, *The Informer* (London: Corgi, 1999), 144-145, 243; Brian Jackson et al., *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 61; and Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama*, 156.
[198] Sterling, *The Terror Network*, 10, 26; Cline and Alexander, *Terrorism*, 34, 44-46, 57, 60, 67-72; and Tugwell, "Politics and Propaganda," 23.
[199] Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama*, 140-147, 206-207.
[200] Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning," *International Social Movements Research* 4 (1992): 29-42.
[201] During the US Senate hearings for President Jimmy Carter's cabinet nominations, Secretary of State candidate Cyrus Vance used Vietnam to "learn" how to avoid propping up unpopular foreign regimes; Secretary of Defense nominee Harold Brown relied on the same event to "learn" the dangers of US isolationism. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, "The Meaning of Vietnam: Belief Systems of American Leaders," *International Journal* 32, no. 3 (Sum. 1977): 453, 455-456.

they may apply valid theories to inappropriate circumstances and remember the past only to make the opposite mistake.[202]

An organization may reflexively resist change and negotiation when it faces little competition or has initially coalesced around violence.[203] Information overload can rush groups to adopt simplifying rules[204] that subject decisionmaking to cognitive distortions[205] narcissism,[206] paranoia,[207] or frustration.[208] Inter-organizational competition may cause a VNA to prioritize media attention over political gains;[209] if a weak side targets more civilians or adopts more extreme goals, the state may refuse to negotiate.[210] To outdo its rivals, a group may pursue

[202] Stephen van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1997), 20. Leaders reflexively avoid policies that recently failed. They put little effort into determining whether these alternative policies would have worked better in the past, or how much the current situation actually resembles the previous event. The adage that "Those who remember the past are condemned to make the opposite mistake" may be just as relevant. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 275.
[203] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 76; Michael Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism," *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (2010): 33-64. After Hamas expelled Fatah from the Gaza Strip in 2007, it continued firing rockets into Israel that caused little damage. This ritual became part of the Palestinian VNA's organizational routine even though Tel Aviv developed effective countermeasures. Michael Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip Potter, "Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence," *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (Win 2018): 139-171.
[204] Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, *Human Problem Solving* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1972).
[205] These distortions hinder the ability to perceive reality. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 490; Richard Cyert and James March, *Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Business, 1992).
[206] Gustav Morf, *Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ* (Toronto: Clarke & Irwin, 1970); Jerrold Post, "Notes on a Pscychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 7, no. 3 (1984): 241-256. Damage to self-image and esteem transforms political violence into an auto defense mechanism. Richard Pearlstein, *The Mind of the Political Terrorist* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1991), 7.
[207] Post, "Terrorist Psycho–Logic," 25-42.
[208] J. Margolin, "Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism," in *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Yonah Alexander and Seymour Finger (New York: John Jay, 1977); Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 5-19; Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Polities: A Cross National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10, no. 3 (Sep. 1966): 249-271; and Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1969): 1104-1124.
[209] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 71; Brian Jenkins, "The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems," in *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, ed. Yonah Alexander and John Gleason (New York: Pergamon, 1981), 3-10; Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach," 465-489; Denardo, *Power in Numbers*; Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*; and McCauley and Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," 231-256. For VNAs' attraction to the media, see McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 488; Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 61-88; and Biberman and Zahid, "Why Terrorists Target Children," 169-184.
[210] Ryan Bakker, Daniel Hill, Jr., and Will Moore, "How Much Terror? Dissidents, Governments, Institutions, and the Cross-National Study of Terror Attacks," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (Sep. 2016): 711-726; Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition," 16-30; Michael Findley and Joseph Young, "Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars," *Journal of Politics* 77, no. 4 (2015): 1115-1128; Useem, "Ideological and Interpersonal Change," 451-469; McCauley and Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," 231-256; McCormick, "Terrorist

needless risks.[211] Peru's Shining Path squandered power and popularity by routinely attacking other leftist irregulars.[212] A VNA may burn out if members lose faith in its goals.[213] Preexisting schisms, ethnic differences, ideological disputes, generational power struggles, or personality clashes can further dampen prospects for a VNA's success.[214]

Underground organizations that detach themselves from society can see their decision-making can become incoherent[215] or irrational.[216] Desires to "escape the words" through action, coupled with increasing state pressure, can convince a weak side that its "only language is action."[217] The group may struggle to adapt to new circumstances and accept more distorted views of the enemy, itself, and the costs of an action.[218]

VNA leadership can inherit "a tradition of historical action" and pursue obsolete notions of victory.[219] It may not tailor a strategy for its specific circumstances and then act uncritically

---

Decision Making," 488; Walter, "The Critical Barrier," 335-364; Abrahms, "The Credibility Paradox," 660; Acosta, "From Bombs to Ballots," 667; Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 61-88; and Biberman and Zahid, "Why Terrorists Target Children," 169-184.

[211] Useem, "Ideological and Interpersonal Change," 451-469; Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach," 465-489.

[212] Bolivar, "Peru," 84-115.

[213] Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sep. 1987); Gvineria, "How Does Terrorism End?" 267; and Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," 405-426.

[214] Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends;" Alterman, "Special Report," 1-11.

[215] Simmel, "The Secret and the Secret Societies," 345-376; Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic;" McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 486; Bonnie Erickson, "Secret Societies and Social Structures," *Social Forces* 60, no. 1 (Sep. 1981): 188-210; and Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen, "Security and Coordination in a Clandestine Organization," *Mathematical and Computer Modelling* 31, nos. 6-7 (Mar.-Apr. 2000): 175-192.

[216] Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), and "Rationality in Psychology;" Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 104; and Martha Crenshaw, "The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism," in *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*, ed. Robert Slater and Michael Stohl (New York: St. Martin's, 1988.), 12.

[217] Michael Seufert, "Dissension among the Terrorists: Killing People is Wrong," *Encounter* 51, no. 3 (Sep. 1978): 84; Leites, "Understanding the Next Act," 1-46; Konrad Kellen, *Terrorists—What are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions*, N-1300-SL (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1979); Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach," 465-489; Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*; and Post, "Terrorist Psycho–Logic, 25-42.

[218] Cyert and March, *Behavioral Theory of the Firm*; McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 486.

[219] Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*; Chalmers Johnson, *Autopsy on People's War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1973).

to imitate its predecessors.[220] Weak sides may engage in fantasy wars and consider themselves soldiers in a defensive war.[221] They substitute a nuanced reality with a "dichotomous confrontation" against the state,[222] and adhere to black and white notions of good versus evil.[223]

Secretive groups operating in hostile environments may prioritize organizational solidarity[224] and suppress internal dissent.[225] Out of deference to the leaders, the rank-and-file may reflexively equate debate to disloyalty.[226] Cognition and attribution theories address how people perpetuate false beliefs, suppress contradictory information, and promote self-censorship.[227] Groups may thus rush to a consensus without critically evaluating their

---

[220] Amy Redlick, "The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism," in *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, ed. Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 73-95; Edward Heyman, "The Diffusion of Transnational Terrorism," in *Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management*," ed. Richard Shulz and Stephen Sloan (New York: Pergamon, 1980), 190-244; Heyman and Mickolus, "Observations on Why Violence Spreads," 299-305; Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, "Why Violence Spreads," 262-298; Lawrence Hamilton and James Hamilton, "Dynamics of Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (Mar. 1983): 39-54; Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities," in *Technology and Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson (London, Frank Cass, 1993), 1-11; Oots, "An Individual-level Model," 109-125; and McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 488.

[221] Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," 90; Konrad Kellen, *On Terrorists and Terrorism*, N-1942-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1982); Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance," 59-64; Rubin, *Revolution until Victory?*; Bonnie Cordes, "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David Rapoport (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 150-173; and David Rapoport, "The Politics of Atrocity," in *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. David Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (New York: Pergamon), 127-216.

[222] Gerlach and Hine, *People, Power, Change*; Post, "Notes on a Pscychodynamic Theory," 241-256, and "Terrorist Psycho–Logic;" and Crenshaw, "The Subjective Reality," 12-48.

[223] Della Porta, "Introduction," 3-28; McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 487.

[224] Howard Becker, "Notes on the Concept of Commitment," *American Journal of Sociology* 66, no. 1 (July 1960): 32-40; Irving Janis, "Group Identification under Conditions of External Danger," in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 80-90.

[225] In order to preserve group cohesion, the Japanese Red Army ultimately turned on itself. Patricia Steinhoff, "Hijackers, Bombers, and Bank Robbers: Managerial Style in the Japanese Red Army," *Journal of Asian Studies* 48, no. 4. (Nov. 1989): 724-740; William Farrell, *Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army* (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1990); Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1961); Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); and Jerrold Post, "Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics," *Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (1987): 23-35.

[226] Post, "Terrorist Psycho–Logic," 25-42; Irving Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free, 1977).

[227] Chris Stout, *The Psychology of Terrorism: Programs and Practices in Response and Prevention*, Vol. 4 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems," 277-285; and McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 489.

alternatives.[228] The small group dynamics literature examines how insulated organizations succumb to groupthink, lose their strategic effectiveness, and reject partial successes. VNAs can embrace "an illusion of invulnerability," ignore reasonable warnings, and adopt an "unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality." [229]

Assessing the Organizational School

The organizational literature that addresses the inter-group rivalries, internal challenges, alliance formations, and personality clashes that plague VNAs also seems relevant for explaining outcomes in asymmetric warfare.[230] It can situate seemingly individualistic or irrational behavior into political and group contexts. If people commit violence on behalf of a political VNA, then they are terrorists or insurgents.

The closely related social identity and psychology literatures, however, may be problematic for analyzing politics.[231] They tend to posit that individuals are attracted more to a group's solidarity, and less to its policies.[232] These studies attribute group membership to self-

[228] See the case of the Weather Underground in Eteri Tsintsadze-Maass and Richard Maass, "Groupthink and Terrorist Radicalization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014): 735-758; Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation," 65-85; and Marvin Shaw, *Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).
[229] Janis, *Victims of Groupthink*; Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 130; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1982); Joseph McGrath, *Groups: Interaction and Performance* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984); Glen Whyte, "Groupthink Reconsidered," *Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 1 (1989): 40-56; Marquis, "Individual Responsibility," 8-23; Elmes and Gemmill, "The Psychodynamics of Mindlessness," 41; and McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 489.
[230] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 71; Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation," 65-85.
[231] Psychology models may address why only a few of the aggrieved millions of people globally resort to violence. Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism;" Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (2005): 3-42; and Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization," 479.
[232] Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 101-102.

esteem, charismatic leadership, identity cleansing, or identifying a villain. [233] They examine how certain personality types that are predisposed to mayhem join VNAs because of friendship,[234] peer pressures,[235] social networks,[236] hyper-stimulation,[237] adventure,[238] risk,[239] or revenge.[240] Arrogance, narcissism, or paranoia can also drive anti-social behavior. [241]

Conclusion

Much of the existing research can underwrite a comprehensive theory that bridges the existing gaps and explains why *both* terrorists and insurgents prove effective against states. While the realist and revolutionary paradigms address VNA total success, they ignore limited outcomes. The Marxist school is furthermore too optimistic and rejects the possibility that social

[233] Jeanne Knutson, "Toward a United States Policy on Terrorism," *Political Psychology* 5, no. 2 (1984): 287; Arie Kruglanski and Edward Orehek, "The Role of the Quest for Personal Significance in Motivating Terrorism," in *The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression*, ed. J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski, and K. Williams (New York: Psychology Press, 2011), 153-166; Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist;" Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*; Begin, *The Revolt*; and Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415-433.
[234] Della Porta, *Social Movements*, 168; Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists," in *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, ed. Peter Merkel (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1986), 204.
[235] Karen McVeigh, "Peer Pressure Lures more Britons to Syria than ISIS Videos, Study Finds," *Guardian*, Nov. 6, 2014.
[236] McCauley and Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization," 415-433.
[237] Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, "Terrorist (E)Motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34, no. 12 (2011): 967.
[238] Jean-Pierre Katrib, "Understanding Jihadists in their Own Words," accessed Sep. 1, 2019, http://www.maisondufutur.org/documents/pdf_manager/Jean-Pierre-Katrib.pdf.
[239] Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist," 28.
[240] The Black Widow female suicide terrorists in Chechnya either experienced personal trauma or witnessed Russian brutalities against family members. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, "Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists," in *Female Suicide Terrorists*, ed. Yoram Schweitzer (Tel Aviv, Israel: Jaffe Center, 2006a). A member of the Red Army Faction in West Germany sought revenge "on the corrupt old men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima." Jerrold Post, "When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism," *Political Psychology* 26, no. 4 (2005): 618.
[241] Chenoweth and Moore, *The Politics of Terror*, 98; Post, "Terrorist Psycho–Logic," 25-42; Heinz Kohut, *The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut, 1950-1978* (New York: International Universities, 1978), and "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 27, no. 1 (1972): 360-400; and Robert Robins and Jerrold Post, *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1997).

injustice is the historical norm. The rational choice and organizational approaches address limited success and explore when VNAs and states should negotiate. Various aspects of these different models can join to explain how David beats Goliath.

Chapter 4: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962

> "Although governments throughout history and all over the world always claim that terrorism is ineffective as an instrument of political change ... Algeria … provide[s] convincing evidence to the contrary."[1]

Prelude to Grievance

Located in North Africa, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria borders the Mediterranean Sea, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara.[2] Roman invasions during the second century BCE pushed the native Berber tribes southward from their coastal settlements into the mountains.[3] Most Berbers became Christians by the end of the fourth century CE; Arab invasions from the seventh century onward eventually converted them to Islam.[4] Although the Ottomans nominally controlled the land by the sixteenth century, pirates based in Algiers raided merchant shipping throughout the Mediterranean.[5] The French navy pursued the Barbary Coast pirates in the late 1700s; fleets from Western Europe and America sporadically assisted France over the next fifty years.[6]

On July 5, 1830, King Charles X invaded what eventually became the state of Algeria as

---

[1] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2006, 61.
[2] "Algeria," *CIA World Factbook*, accessed on Nov. 3, 2015, http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/africa/algeria.html.
[3] For an overview of the region from prehistory to the Roman and Byzantine periods, see Library of Congress, "Algeria: A Country Study," in *Collection: Country Studies*, ed. Helen Metz (Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1993), 5-10, accessed Feb. 13, 2020, https://www.loc.gov/collections/country-studies/?fa=location:Algeria.
[4] Philippe Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View," *Military Review* (Sep.-Oct. 2008): 57-58.
[5] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 11-22.
[6] The Barbary Coast was named after the indigenous Berbers. The US signed a treaty with the Dey of Algiers in 1797. In exchange for $10 million, Washington received a promise that Algerian privateers would avoid American ships for the next twelve years. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 21; Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954–62* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1967), 20.



Map 4.1: Algeria[7]

[7] "Algeria Maps," *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: University of Texas at Austin*, https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/algeria_pol-2001.pdf.

a diversion from his waning popularity.[8] The French invaders encountered independent city-states, coastal trading communities, pirate enclaves, and tribal areas.[9] Although Charles lost power in July, his forces would remain for generations to transform Algeria not into just another colony, but part of France itself.

The French overcame Arab resistance by 1848.[10] They dismissed the local leadership and classified the Arabs not as French citizens, but as "nationals."[11] The three newly created civil territories (*départements*) in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine allowed the European settlers to elect their representatives. Muslims could not serve as mayors or hold more than one-third of the council seats. One-hundred thousand colonists (*colons*) were now living in Algeria.[12]

France's military loss to Prussia in 1870 accelerated the colonization process.[13] After Prussia captured Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, 5,000 French citizens that did not want to live under German rule immigrated to Algeria.[14] Paris embarked on plans "to completely assimilate

[8] The pretext was a trade dispute between the French government and Algerian merchants. Geoffrey Adams, *The Call of Conscience: French Protestant Responses to the Algerian War, 1954-1962* (Ontario: Canada, Wilfrid Laurier, 1998), 11; John Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 23.
[9] France's three-week rout of Algeria culminated in mass rapes and the desecration of mosques and cemeteries. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 23; Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 56-58.
[10] Abdel Kader declared a holy war and initiated unconventional warfare in 1834. He scored some victories until surrendering in 1842. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 11; Ahmed Bouyerdene, *Emir Abd el-Kader: Hero and Saint of Islam*, trans. Gustavo Polit (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2012); and Benjamin Brower, "The Amir Abd Al-Qadir and the 'Good War' in Algeria, 1832-1847," *Studia Islamica* 106, no. 2 (Jan. 2011): 169-195.
[11] Algerian Jews received French citizenship in the 1850s and in 1870. While Napoleon III held out the prospect of citizenship for the Muslims in 1865, the catch was that they had to renounce Islamic law. Few Arabs accepted the offer, and it was not until 1958 that France finally offered them citizenship with no strings attached. Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 61; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 30-31.
[12] About 5,000 Europeans lived in Algeria in 1832. The settlers were also known as *pieds-noirs* (black feet). Both the wealthy business elite and landowners—*grands colons*, and the lower-class *petits blancs* (little whites) were intensely hostile to the indigenous Arabs; they further resented that French military rule prevented them from acquiring more land. Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution*,27-28; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 29.
[13] Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. France consequently sought to expand its empire southward into North Africa as a counterbalance to Germany's growing dominance in central Europe. A. J. P. Taylor, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman* (New York: Knopf, 1955).
[14] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 11.

Algeria into France."[15] The three territories would vote in Paris' National Assembly;[16] an Algerian Governor General would report directly to the French Interior Ministry.[17] New immigration policies attracted more *colons*;[18] Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Cypriots, and Maltese joined successive waves of European settlement in Algeria.[19] The 1881 Native Code restricted Arab free speech and travel.[20] The 1889 law that made the children of French immigrants full French citizens "helped shape a sense of ethnic solidarity and of shared superiority to the Muslim masses" at a time when racism permeated Europe.[21] The *colons* eventually controlled the prime farmland;[22] private European companies encouraged more immigration. Wine and cereal cultivation enabled the settlers to prosper.

The *colons* exerted control via local Arab collaborators, religious leaders, and tribal authorities known derisively as "yes-men" (*Beni Oui Ouis*).[23] They constituted an active political lobby in Paris that steadfastly resisted Arab empowerment.[24] By 1915, only about 50,000 Muslims could vote.[25] Although more than 150,000 Muslims served France during

---

[15] Jonathan Githens-Mazer, "The Blowback of Repression and the Dynamics of North African Radicalization," *International Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2009): 1018; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 30.
[16] Each *département* sent six deputies and three senators to the National Assembly.
[17] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 31.
[18] Paris also used Algeria as a dumping ground for its unemployed and political undesirables. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 21-22; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 12.
[19] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 22; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 11; and Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (New York: Oxford University, 2012), 25-27.
[20] In many respects, the *Code de l'Indigénat* that remained in effect until the mid-1940s was a precursor to South Africa's apartheid system. The Muslims needed French permission to take in stray animals, become school teachers, shelter strangers, and travel inside their own country. Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 32-33.
[21] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 12. Social Darwinists maintained that people and cultures were in competition, just like plants and animals. The more successful competitors in the ongoing "survival of the fittest" belonged at the top of the natural, political, social, and economic orders.
[22] About 3% of the land is arable. See "Algeria," *CIA World Factbook*; Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 23-24.
[23] The highest honor any Arab could earn was French citizenship.O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 26-27; Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 33.
[24] The European settlers resisted efforts to empower the Arabs politically, economically, and socially until Algerian independence in 1962.
[25] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 32.

World War I, and several hundred thousand others had worked in French factories, the *colons* still denied them full voting rights.[26]

The interwar period consequently spawned Algerian nationalism.[27] Muslims became aware of European living standards, democratic principles, and the pan-Arabism emerging in the Middle East. Numerous nationalist parties and social movements attracted French-educated intellectuals, workers in France, clerics, and communists.[28] Messali Hadj's North African Star (*Étoile Norde-Africaine*—ENA) became the first Arab group to call for independence in 1926. Religious groups joined the ENA to demand Arabic as the official language.[29]

Weak leadership in Paris exacerbated the Algerian situation. Liberals and Communists generally supported Arab demands; the Conservatives and business elite opposed them. In 1936, Prime Minister Leon Blum's Popular Front promoted Arab suffrage for 20,000 soldiers, civil servants, college graduates, politicians, and workers. While these reforms would not threaten the 200,000 voting *colons*' dominance, Algeria's European politicians killed them anyway.[30]

Although significant numbers of Arab Algerians initially rallied to France in 1940, their enthusiasm ebbed after the Vichy regime stripped Jews of their citizenship and jailed Muslim

---

[26] About 25,000 Algerian Muslims died serving France. Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 33. Some French politicians, including Prime Minister George Clemenceau recognized the Muslim contributions to the war effort and pressed for reforms in Algeria. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 17-19; and Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 20.

[27] Githens-Mazer, "The Blowback of Repression," 1018.

[28] The irony is that France educated these Arab nationalists during its late nineteenth century "civilizing mission" to immerse a select group of Muslims in French language and culture; the students were supposed to "evolve" into Algeria's "native intellectual elite." Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 33; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 26-27; and Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001).

[29] Hadj created the ENA in France and was arrested often for his political activism. Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962* (Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1978), 3; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 36; and Paul Jureidni, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954–1962* (Washington, DC: American University, 1963), 5.

[30] Algeria's French mayors resigned to prevent a debate on the plan in the National Assembly. Jureidni, *Case Studies in Insurgency*, 5; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 29-30; and Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 18.

nationalists.[31] The *colons* generally sympathized with the Vichy government and viewed the Allied landings in Algiers with apprehension in November 1942.[32] The Free French Provisional Government headquartered in Algeria during the war.[33]

The leading Arab parties, most of which had recently favored assimilation, responded to Governor General Georges Catroux's[34] call for volunteers with the Algerian Manifesto in March 1943—a document that reflected America's anti-colonial attitudes, France's military humiliation, and the *colons*' inflexibility.[35] Free French vague promises only united more Arab moderates and radicals.[36] The prospect of 50,000-60,000 "meritorious" Muslims possibly receiving voting rights in 1944 meant that even in the best circumstances, the *colons*' overwhelming majorities in the local assemblies would remain unchallenged. Muslim agitation throughout the Middle East intensified after Washington and London pressured the Free French into leaving Lebanon and

[31] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 40; Jureidni, *Case Studies in Insurgency*, 5.
[32] US President Franklin Roosevelt warned the previous year that Allied war aims included the dismantling of Europe's empires. He and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter on Aug. 14, 1941 to help coordinate US and British war aims. It envisioned a postwar world characterized by free trade, collective security, and self-determination; the charter became a foundation of the United Nations. United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "The Atlantic Conference and Charter, 1941," https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf.
[33] The Free France government-in-exile was established in London in June 1940. The Free French Provisional Government was created in Algeria in 1944 and ruled until 1946. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 18-19.
[34] Catroux served as Algeria's Governor General from 1943 to 1944.
[35] The manifesto prioritized self-determination and agrarian reforms in Jureidni, *Case Studies in Insurgency*, 5; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 31-32.
[36] The prominent moderate activist Ferhat Abbas had served in the French military's medical corps and previously supported assimilation. He joined the radical Messali Hadj in the Friends of the Algerian Manifesto (*Amis de Manifeste Algérien*—AMA) in March 1944. The group fused socialist and Islamic values and attracted a half million workers, students, and intellectuals. After they split in 1946, Abbas founded the pro-labor Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (*Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien*—UDMA). Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 19; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 32-34.

Syria in 1943.[37] After Algeria's Vichy regime fell in September 1944, banned Arab political parties formed underground cells and paramilitary groups.[38]

French "conciliation" and Arab radicalization continued for a decade. Paris made empty promises to appease Algeria's Muslims while simultaneously reassuring *colons* the status quo would remain. As a result, "The absolute opposition of the Europeans to all liberalization and to any diminution of their superiority meant that any reforms voted in Paris were futile, since their implementation depended on the European-dominated Algerian Assembly."[39]

The Emergence of Politics as Violence

Violence erupted on May 8, 1945, just as Nazi Germany fell. Eight thousand Arab protestors turned a French victory parade in Setif into an independence demonstration.[40] Police and protestors exchanged gunfire amid looting and arson. The violence spread to the countryside, where Arabs attacked European settlements and government buildings. After five

[37] France acquired Syria and Lebanon in 1923 via the League of Nations Mandate system that was supposed to first partition the defeated Ottoman Empire and then prepare the local populace for self-rule. As Charles de Gaulle's High Commissioner to the Levant, Gen. Catroux oversaw the French withdrawal from Syria in 1943. Martin Thomas, "France and its Colonial Civil Wars, 1940–1945," in *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Part III - Occupation, Collaboration, Resistance and Liberation*, ed. Richard Bosworth and Joseph Maiolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2015), 581-604; David Cutler, "Timeline: French-Lebanese Relations," *Reuters*, last modified Nov. 18, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-france-relations/timeline-french-lebanese-relations-idUSL1842546320071118; Denys Myers, "The Mandate System of the League of Nations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 96 (Jan. 1921): 74-77; Norman Bentwich, *The Mandates System* (New York: Longman's and Green, 1930); John Morrison and Adam Woog, *Syria* (New York: Chelsea, 2009); and Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987), 583-618.

[38] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 40-41.

[39] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 5.

[40] Setif is in eastern Algeria. The *colons* were celebrating the Allied victory in Europe. Messali Hadj's and Ferhat Abbas' "The Friends of the Algerian Manifesto" promised the French authorities that they would join the parade and not display nationalist flags. See footnote # 36; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 42; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 19; and Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: Viking, 1977), 23.

days, around 100 Europeans died.[41] *Colon* militias joined the French army in indiscriminate raids (*ratissage*).[42] French aircraft and warships simultaneously bombed Muslim population centers. The government banned political organizations and arrested thousands of Arabs.[43]

After the violence subsided, Paris, which was focusing on the new Fourth Republic's constitution, expected Algeria's return to normalcy.[44] These expectations, in retrospect were naïve. After May 1945, Muslim hopes for assimilation increasingly yielded to demands for liberation. Algerian nationalism was transforming from an elitist idea to a popular political movement. Messali Hadj formed the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (*Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*—MTLD) in June 1946. The VNA advocated autonomy, universal suffrage, and France's violent expulsion.[45]

The French dithered while more Arabs edged toward violence. The 1947 Organic Statute created a bicameral Algerian Assembly to represent the two separate communities in a French union.[46] For the Arabs, it meant that *colons* would still monopolize political power while

---

[41] Many of the dead had been mutilated. Another 100 were wounded, while scores of women had been raped. William Shughart, "An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000," *Public Choice* 128 (2006): 7-8.
[42] The literal translation of *ratissage* is a "raking over." Many of the soldiers were from Senegal and other sub-Saharan French colonies. Miquel Calcada, "Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence: Les Evenments, a Lost Opportunity for Peace," *Journal of Conflictology* 3, no. 2 (2012): 52-61.
[43] While the numbers vary, the sources generally agree that about 100 Europeans died. As for Muslim casualties, the French government claimed 1,500, the French army estimated 6,000-8,000, American sources argued 7,000-40,000, and Algerian Muslims sources claimed 45,000. William Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1969), 50; Githens-Mazer estimates between 15,000 and 45,000 in "The Blowback of Repression," 1019; Francois puts the number at "15,000 native Muslim activists" in "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 58. See also Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 5; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 32-33; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 19; John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2004), 149; Richard Brace and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1960), 55; and Jureidni, *Case Studies in Insurgency*, 6.
[44] The Fourth Republic was born in Oct. 1946 and collapsed in Oct. 1958.
[45] Jureidni, *Case Studies in Insurgency*, 6; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 20; and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 51-52.
[46] While one house would represent Europeans and "meritorious" Muslims, the second represented the remaining millions of Muslims. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 43; Joan Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 27.

retaining 90% of industry and 40% of prime farmland.[47] Additional promises to teach Arabic in schools and liberate Muslim women floundered. The *colons* rejected the statute because it went too far; they fixed local elections in 1948, 1951, and 1953 to seal its fate.[48] The Europeans' "inborn sense of superiority towards the Muslim," was being increasingly tempered by their growing fear "of being heavily outnumbered by the Muslim masses."[49]

Had it not been so preoccupied with occupation, liberation, reconstruction, and a new constitution, France may have realized that assimilation failed. Algerian Arab living standards steadily worsened.[50] One-hundred and fifty thousand Muslims had to relocate to France; the millions that remained faced high illiteracy rates and obsolete farming techniques. Although their disparate political parties bickered, most Muslims could see that the status quo "doomed [them] to permanent inferiority."[51]

The postwar discovery of iron, zinc, lead, and phosphates spurred the French leadership to reconsolidate its Algerian administration. In the meantime, Arab nationalist groups organized, squabbled, splintered, and reorganized. As Messali Hadj's MTLD fractured in March 1947, one group, led by Ahmed Ben Bella and Hocine Ait Ahmed, became the Special Organization (*Organisation Secréte*—OS).[52] When French authorities broke up the OS in March 1950 and

---

[47] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 24-25. Only 500 Muslims had substantial landholdings. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 2, 5; and Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 20.
[48] Alarmed by the MTLD's municipal election victories in 1947, the *colons* rigged the Algerian Assembly's inaugural election the next year to allot only nine seats to the MTLD and fifty-five seats to government-approved groups. A MTLD delegate was arrested during the Assembly's first session. Algerian Governor Generals Edouard Naegelen and Roger Leonard rigged the June 1951 elections. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 43; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 21.
[49] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 25.
[50] Birth rates routinely outpaced agricultural output. Famines and epidemics plagued the Arabs. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 2; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 24-25.
[51] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 2, 6.
[52] Ben Bella became the first President of an independent Algeria in 1963. The MTLD had nearly 14,000 members. The OS assembled a secret army of 1,800 irregulars. Charles Shrader, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954–1962* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 135-136; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 42-43.

arrested Ben Bella, the survivors, along with the remnants of the MTLD, scattered to Switzerland, France, and the Middle East.[53]

After Ben Bella escaped French custody in 1952 and fled to Cairo, he assembled a group of former OS colleagues, MTLD dissidents, and Muslim veterans.[54] In early 1954, he contacted another MTLD faction inside Algeria.[55] This internal faction sent a war council of six members to meet with the three externals in Berne, Switzerland in mid-1954.[56] The "Club of Nine" created the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (*Comité Révolutionnaire Pour L'Unité et L'Action*—CRUA) and became the Algerian revolution's "historical chiefs."[57]

The CRUA covertly set up its political-military infrastructure and divided the country into five provinces (*wilayat*).[58] While the group considered Mohammed Boudiaf the nominal leader, commanders set their own military tactics and strategy. They agreed to start operations on November 1. On that date, the CRUA renamed itself the National Liberation Front (*Front de*

[53] Ben Bella was convicted in 1950 for robbing a post office. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Ahmed Ben Bella: President of Algeria," by Robert Merle, accessed Dec. 16, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmed-Ben-Bella; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 35; and Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 135.

[54] They became the VNA's External Delegation. Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, and Mohammed Khider oversaw political planning, arms acquisitions, foreign aid, and liaising with President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 91; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 44; and Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 135.

[55] This group become the core of the VNA's Internal Delegation.

[56] Disagreement exists on when the Club of Nine first met. Shrader writes that it was May 8, 1954 in *The First Helicopter War*, 135. Quandt argues that it was sometime in July in *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 91-92.

[57] The Club of Nine included Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Boudiaf, Belkacem Krim, Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Khider, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mourad Didouche, and Moustafa Ben Boulaid. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 135; Rabah Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War: The Conflict between the Mouvement national algérien (MNA) and the Front de libération nationale (FLN) in France during the Algerian War (1954–1962)," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 2 (Aug. 2012): 227; and Paul Jureidni et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume I: 1933-1962*, revised edition, ed. Paul Tompkins, Jr. (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 294.

[58] *Wilayat* were commanded by a colonel. The Sahara Desert was a separate province until Aug. 1956. Ben Boulaid headed the Aurès province; Mourad Didouche commanded North Constintine, Kabylia went to Belkacem Krim, Algerois to Rabah Bitat, and the Oranie was under Ben M'Hidi. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 41-42; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 44; and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 92.

Libération—FLN);[59] its military operatives became the Army of National Liberation (*Armée de Libération Nationale*—ALN).[60]

Preconditions for VNA Success

The Arab grievance went back 124 years. After crushing the local resistance by 1848, France made the Muslims second-class citizens in their own country.[61] A virtual apartheid regime systematically enabled the European settlers to dominate Algeria socially, politically, and economically.[62] The 1881 Native Code subjected Algeria's "nationals" to permanent inferiority. They could neither travel nor speak freely. The First World War changed little despite 150,000 Algerian Arabs having served in the French army. While Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points helped birth new nations in Europe, they ignored the Arabs in North Africa. Even when governments in Paris tried to accommodate the Muslim majority, they were too weak to follow

[59] Alf Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1972), 107-129; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 37-38; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 21; and Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 9-12.

[60] The ALN eventually divided into guerrilla and uniformed units. While both relied almost exclusively on light weapons, the latter units used conventional tactics and were based in Morocco and Tunisia. Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 60. William Lewis estimates the ALN at "500 commandos" in "The Decline of Algeria's FLN," *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 2 (Spr. 1966): 164; another account guesses "300 fighters" in Angel Rabasa et al., *Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 17.

[61] French colonial policies featured mass rapes, massacres and genocide. Of the three million Arabs living in the country in 1830, one-half to one million were dead by 1860. Asafa Jalata, *Phases of Terrorism in the Age of Globalization: From Christopher Columbus to Osama Bin Laden* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 92-93; Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, "Torture in Algeria: Past Acts That Haunt France: Liberty, Equality and Colony," *Le Monde diplomatique* (June 2021), https://mondediplo.com/2001/06; Dominik Schaller, "Genocide and Mass Violence in the 'Heart of Darkness: Africa in the Colonial Period," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and Donald Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 356; and Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2007), 364.

[62] For the hardships and humiliations the Muslims endured under French colonialism, see Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, and *A Dying Colonialism*.

through. The powerful c*olon* lobby ensured that free elections and a more egalitarian distribution of scarce resources did not happen.

The Second World War brought the beginnings of change. While France could live with the losses of Syria in Lebanon in 1943, it resolved to keep Algeria. Now the Atlantic Charter's call to end empires excluded the Arabs.[63] The best that the French could muster were vague promises that everyone knew would die at the altar of *colon* intransigence.

The colonial authorities should have realized that May 8, 1945 marked not only the symbolic end of the Nazi empire, but also the French empire. The Arabs' violence at Setif brought instead "raking over" operations that were accompanied by air force and naval barrages. The grievance festered. As the weak side lost faith in political negotiations, the prevailing power imbalance made irregular warfare inevitable.

Safe havens are indispensable if irregulars want to target the state's soft underbelly, impose a moral effect, and compel the government to accept a hostile policy. France could easily kill a VNA if it found it; its challenge was finding it. Algeria was the world's tenth largest country and the largest in Africa. It bordered the Mediterranean on north, Morocco on its northwest, and Tunisia on its northeast; Libya sat south of Tunisia and abutted Algeria's entire eastern frontier. Vast deserts and mountain ranges punctuated nearly a million square miles of potential sanctuary.[64] The FLN could retreat deep into the mountains and acquire arms from nomads and smugglers through the Sahara Desert and Libya.[65] Morocco's King Mohammed V made Oudjda an FLN sanctuary in September 1955;[66] after Morocco and Tunisia became

[63] See footnote # 32; US Department of State, "The Atlantic Conference and Charter, 1941."
[64] "Algeria," *CIA World Factbook*.
[65] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 44.
[66] Oudjda is located in northeastern Morocco, close to the border with Algeria. Mohammed al-Khamis bin Yusef bin Hassan al-Alawi was Morocco's Sultan from 1927 to 1953, was exiled 1953-1955, returned as sultan 1955-1957, and was king from 1957-1961.

independent in March 1956, the FLN opened offices in Rabat and Tunis. Algerian VNAs thereafter enjoyed unrestricted havens for training, storing weapons, and launching incursions.[67]

Faltering France

France's postwar recovery progressed well by 1954. The Marshall Plan stimulated Western Europe's industrial production.[68] French exports outpaced imports. GNP grew steadily since 1950; the unemployment rate was 2.2%.[69] As a founding member of the United Nations, France sat on the prestigious Security Council. The state was developing nuclear weapons by 1948[70] while pursuing a rapprochement with its perennial adversary—Germany.[71]

The Empire seemed relatively secure in the early 1950s. In Africa, France retained Dahomey (future Benin), the Ivory Coast, French Sudan (future Mali), French Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, French Upper Volta (future Burkina Faso), Chad, the French Congo, French Cameroon, and Madagascar; it controlled numerous Pacific islands.[72] Although France

[67] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 48; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 169.
[68] Officially called the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan lasted from Apr. 1948-June 1952 and transferred about $13 billion from America to Western Europe. By removing trade barriers and modernizing industry, the program increased European prosperity and contained communism. Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1987); William Cromwell, "The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 8 no. 4 (1982): 233-249; John Agnew and Nicholas Entrikin, *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor* (Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2004); Charles Kindleberger, *Historical Economics: Art or Science?* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1990), 166-198; and John Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," *Journal of Modern History* 64, no. 3 (1992): 500-524.
[69] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "World Economic Report 1953-54," E/2729 and ST/ECA/30, Apr. 15, 1955, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/searchable_archive/1954_WESS_Full.pdf, 31-34.
[70] "French Nuclear Program," *American Heritage Foundation*, last modified Feb. 14, 2017, https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/french-nuclear-program; Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1998).
[71] These negotiations helped found the European Union. D'Anieri, *International Politics*, 346-348.
[72] Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur, *French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front: Hope and Disillusion* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); Barnett Singer and John Langdon, *Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 2004).

ceded Syria and Lebanon in 1943, it kept both its Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates.[73] Five generations of settlement and investment convinced the French that Algeria melded with the mainland. The stunning loss of Indochina in May 1954, moreover, made many French view Algeria as their line in the sand. Embittered soldiers returning from Vietnam vowed not to tolerate another lost colony.[74]

In the bipolar world of 1954 dominated by the American and Soviet superpowers,[75] France was a great power.[76] When it engaged the FLN, the state already had 70,000 soldiers, gendarmerie, and auxiliaries in country.[77] Forty percent of its air force personnel was in Algeria,

[73] The 1881 Treaty of Bardo and 1883 Convention of Marsa gave France control of Tunisian internal affairs and foreign policy; ultimate authority rested with the French Resident-General. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "The Protectorate (1881–1956)," by Nevill Barbour, L. Brown, and Emma Murphy, accessed Dec. 24, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia/Unity-government. France imposed similar conditions on its Moroccan protectorate via the Treaty of Fez in March 1912. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Decline of Traditional Government (1830-1912)," by Nevill Brown, L. Miller, and Susan Miller, accessed Dec. 24, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia/Unity-government; and Susan Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2013), 88-92.

[74] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 59; Roger Vaurs, "The Role of France and the French in North Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 306 (Jul. 1956): 17-25; Tony Smith, "The French Economic Stake in Colonial Algeria," *French Historical Studies* 9, no. 1 (Spr. 1975): 184-189; Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War: Indochina, 1954* (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1967).

[75] For the different types of state power, see A. J. P Taylor, T*he Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1954), xxiv; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*; A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958); Aron, *Peace and War*; George Modelski, *Principles of World Politics* (New York: Free,1972), 149; Richard Stoll, "State Power, World Views, and the Major Powers," in *Power in World Politics*, ed. Richard Stoll and Michael Ward (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 136; A. F. K Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980); and Daniel Geller and J. David Singer, *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998), 177.

[76] France was reestablishing its standing in Europe and the international order; a healthy economy and a modern military could protect its imperial markets and raw materials. The French already possessed the strongest army in Western Europe—Germany was demilitarized, and both the US and Great Britain were withdrawing from the continent. As Paris was concerned with deterring a Soviet invasion and a future German threat, it decided in 1948 to develop a nuclear arsenal. It also began modernizing its conventional forces in order to deal with the emerging national liberation movements in Africa and Asia. Robert Aldrich, *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Tyler Stovall, *France since the Second World War* (London: Pearson, 2002), 54; and David Thompson, "Delusions of *Grandeur*: French Global Ambitions and the Problem of the Revival of Military Power, 1950-1954," PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2007).

[77] This number included 8,000 airmen, 1,500 sailors, two parachute battalions, five infantry battalions, and ten squadrons. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 1, 39, 42.

and another 19% was training to support operations there.[78] Paris could call up another 200,000 indigenous security forces, *colon* reservists, and temporary recruits.[79]

Algeria's proximity gave France short lines of communication and easy access to troops and supplies; the absence of jungles (as in Vietnam) meant that its aircraft could observe vast distances. The state had a preexisting political administration and modern military command, control, and logistics systems.[80] The military had served in North Africa for generations, appeared familiar with the social, economic, and political complexities, and could summon help from coastal shipping, cargo planes, fighter and bomber jets, and helicopters.[81]

How a VNA Just Survives

Militarily, the weak side was not prepared to fight a modern state. It had no armor, air force, or navy. Irregulars carried hunting rifles, shot guns, and outdated light weapons.[82] No arms had yet arrived from abroad. The FLN had to create political, military, administrative, and logistical systems from scratch while fighting a great power.[83]

---

[78] About 20% of French air assets were in Algeria—600 fixed wing aircraft and 100 helicopters. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 41.
[79] A. Peterson, G. Reinhardt, and E. Conger, *Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Algerian War, Memorandum RM-3653-PR, July 1963* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1963), 7.
[80] The civil administration in Algeria was organized similarly as the French mainland. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 27.
[81] Ibid, 1, 2, 27.
[82] While the accounts vary, virtually none put the FLN at above 3,000 members. Adams counts "3,000 nationalists" in *The Call of Conscience*, 25; Jureidni, estimates 2,000-3,000 "militant nationalists" in *Case Studies in Insurgency*, 6; Entelis figures about 1,000-3,000 disorganized "moudjahidines" (fighters of the faith) in *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 51; the Arab local councils that met in Batna (a city in northeast Algeria) on November 6 estimated the "rebels" at 2,000, and surmised that half of these were forced conscripts. Michael Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion* (New York: Praeger, 1959), 122. The FLN's own estimates range from 900 to 3,000. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 93.
[83] FLN logistics ultimately relied mostly on mules and foot. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 2, 131.

No central directorate coordinated the VNA's military, political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. The FLN thus started a war first, without a coherent strategy, and hoped to organize for the military campaign and statehood later on.[84] It tried appealing to Islamic fanaticism, Algerian nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Berber ethnic pride.[85] Fears of domination by a single leader produced decentralized decision-making. Disputes between the Externals and Internal triggered Soviet-style purges until late 1956; poor communications and logistics prevented supplies from reaching the fighters.[86] Rival VNAs challenged the FLN's legitimacy.[87]

The historical chiefs were agitators and clandestine operators, not organizers, theoreticians, or administrators.[88] They imagined themselves the repository of Algerian nationalism and deeply distrusted their Arab political contemporaries.[89] As long as they carried the prestige of being an original freedom fighter, the chiefs figured that they could eventually ally with suitable politicians.

The FLN went into the fight with wildly optimistic expectations. France had obviously degenerated into a "military paper tiger" after its humiliations in the world war and Indochina. Generations of oppression and poverty had moreover irrevocably separated Algerian Muslims

[84] Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 96.
[85] Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 132, 136.
[86] Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 96; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 2, 162.
[87] Ferhat Abbas' UDMA did not join the FLN in April 1956. The Algerian Communist Party (PCA) rejected open rebellion until Sep. 1955; it provided the FLN with explosives and bomb-making tutorials. After his release from prison in late 1954, Messali Hadj rejected the FLN and reformed the MTLD into the Algeria National Movement (*Mouvement National Algérien*—MNA). The MNA declared war on both France and the FLN; during the Café Wars from 1955 to 1957, FLN and MNA supporters in Europe targeted each other with bombings and assassinations. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 136; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 54-56; Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 94-97; Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 114-115; Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War," 227-240; and Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 56.
[88] Ahmed Ben Bella, Amar Ouamrane, and Belkacem Krim had served in the French army. Ben Bella and Hacine Ait Ahmed achieved little success in the OS. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 96; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 7-8.
[89] Since the FLN had not shared its plans with the clerics, unions, students groups, communists, and MTLD, it began the fight with virtually no support from these larger and more established organizations. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 95-97; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 54-56.

and *colons*.[90] Since no "strong middle ground of political compromise" existed, the Arabs were poised to revolt—"a single spark could set a prairie fire."[91] The disillusioned Arab veterans who fought the Nazis and Vietnamese were now ready to fight France.[92]

Hoping for Stalemate

The VNA's best hopes for success hinged on the French leadership's obliviousness and the nation's war fatigue. The prospect of losing Algeria was inconceivable to France: "The relatively quiet years since 1945, especially in the face of active nationalist agitation in neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia, had lulled the French authorities into complacent smugness, and possible disloyalty of the Muslim population in Algeria had not occurred to them."[93] Interior Minister Francois Mitterrand[94] voiced these assumptions in the National Assembly on November 5, 1954: while the Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates constituted legally separate states, Algeria was part of France.[95] Although its nationalists were technically criminals, France would nonetheless be sympathetic if they repudiated the rebellion.[96] Prime Minister Pierre

[90] Rabasa et al., *Money in the Bank*, 22.
[91] Mao argued that the VNA need not "win over the masses first and then hold a national armed insurrection to seize power." The exploited masses merely needed some organization and education to drive the revolution. Che Guevara and the Weather Underground espoused similar ideas. Mao Tse-Tung, "Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire, Jan. 5, 1930," *Marxists.org*, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_6.htm; Guevara, *Guerilla Warfare*; and Bernardine Dohrn et al., *Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism* (City Unknown: Communications, 1974), https://www.sds-1960s.org/PrairieFire-reprint.pdf.
[92] Despite suffering harsh losses in Italy against the Nazis during the 1944 winter campaigns, the Arabs received only medals, military pensions, and government jobs, but not French citizenship nor equality with the *colons*. Martin Gilles, "War in Algeria: The French Experience," *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2005): 52.
[93] Morocco and Tunisia were also demanding their independence from France by 1952. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 39-40.
[94] Mitterrand was Interior Minister 1954-1955 and President 1981-1995. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "François Mitterrand: President of France," by William Saffran, accessed Dec. 24, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Socialist-Party-France.
[95] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 118.
[96] Regarding talks with the FLN, Mitterrand declared, "I will not agree to negotiate with the enemies of the homeland. The only negotiation is war!" Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah* (New York: Enigma, 2006), 1;

Mendès-France echoed Mitterrand's sentiments a week later.[97] While the irregulars represented "the criminal purpose of a few men," the premier was certain that "the overwhelming majority of our Moslem fellow countrymen" harbored "faultless civic sense and unequivocal loyalty."[98]

While France seemed ready to tolerate more violence in late 1954, that toleration, the FLN surmised, was not open-ended.[99] The national trauma of the Nazi occupation was still fresh.[100] The conflict had to consequently end quickly and decisively. The *colons* were all in, but the French people seemed increasingly indifferent to Algeria, especially after Indochina. Sending more young men to another futile colonial war was problematic. The general disfavor for imperialism that emerged globally after the war also encouraged the FLN.[101]

The Stalemate Comes

Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 118.

[97] Mendès-France served from June 1954 to Feb. 1955 and recently oversaw France's pullout from Indochina.

[98] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 119. After rejecting compromise with the FLN, Mendès-France assured the National Assembly that "there can be no conceivable secession." Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993), 111; and Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 21.

[99] For the shifting French public opinion on Algeria, see Merom, "A 'Grand Design'?" 273.

[100] The defeat to Germany in 1940 shattered the nation's morale. French defense spending tripled since 1938; by mid-1939, 76% of a confident public supported war if Germany attacked Poland. When the war started in Sep., France could mobilize five million well-armed and trained soldiers in ninety-four divisions. Twenty-four of these divisions comprised African colonial troops; another two million were available in the empire. Paris could deploy motorized infantry, cavalry, and heavy armor. Its 3,000 tanks rivaled the German inventory; at 10,000 artillery pieces, France had 3,000 more than Germany. France also had the fourth largest navy in the world. Germany's six-week rout thus shocked France in June 1940. The nation endured four years of occupation, forfeited prime industrial regions, and capped its army at 100,000 soldiers. Swastikas adorned government buildings; Nazis patrolled the country's main thoroughfares and looted its artwork. Paris' Gestapo deported 75,000 French Jews to death camps in the east. Thousands had collaborated. About 580,000 French men, women, and children perished by the war's end. Sixty thousand died in Allied raids alone; another 120,000 were either conscripted by the Nazis, held as prisoners of war, or forced to work in Germany. Ian Dear and Michael Foot, *The Oxford Companion to World War II* (Oxford: UK, Oxford University, 1995), 391-414; Allan Mitchell, *Nazi Paris: The History of an Occupation, 1940-1944* (New York: Berghahn, 2010); Philippe Burrin, *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New, 1996); Thomas Christofferson, *France during World War II* (New York: Fordham University, 2006); Martin Dean, "Where Did All the Collaborators Go?" *Slavic Review* 64, no. 4 (2005): 791-798; Michael Foot, *Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977); and "France," *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/france.

[101] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 59.

The unconventional warfare that erupted on November 1, 1954 featured terrorism—ambushes, bombings, shootings, and arson attacks. FLN irregulars targeted police stations, military garrisons, communications centers, commercial warehouses, and public utilities.[102] The operations that unfolded mostly in Province I shocked both Paris and the *colons*.[103] Since the FLN had not confided in the clerics, communists, or unions, the Muslim masses were just as stunned; many French leaders refused to believe that the Algerians acted alone and suspected Tunisian and Moroccan bandits (*fellaga*).[104] The military had not been expecting violence and disbanded its intelligence unit.[105] It blamed rural tribes and began deploying airborne troops, bombers, and helicopters to the suspected trouble spots. On November 20, the government started relocating 200,000 villagers from the Aurès region to "security zones." Despite distributing 50,000 flyers and promising amnesty, only 1,600 locals showed up—almost none of which were military age men.[106]

France next misjudged how its countermeasures, albeit misdirected, had nonetheless disbursed the irregulars into the mountains. The lack of intelligence prompted the state to settle into fixed outposts, adopt "cordon-and-search" tactics, and secure only the limited areas. The shortage of counterinsurgency troops meant that patrols remained in the villages for a short time before moving on. The FLN simply bypassed these areas, collected intelligence, set up

[102] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 41; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 44.
[103] The terrorism occurred in the Kabylie and Aurès regions. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 37-38; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 5; and Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 25.
[104] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 39-40.
[105] Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah*, 11; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 40.
[106] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 188, 123; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 40-41; and Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 25.



Map 4.2: FLN Organization of Algeria[107]

and cultivated local support.[108]

Despite these challenges, the government seemed ready to smother the uprising by spring 1955.[109] The FLN had inflicted minimal damage and already lost its Oran and Algiers cells.[110] The maximalist goals that it issued from Cairo on November 1, 1954 seemed pure bravado. The

[107] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, ix.
[108] Troop shortages plagued the French throughout the conflict. Even though the war in Indochina ended in May 1954, it would months to reassign those troops to Algeria. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 50-52.
[109] The military was using mostly conventional tactics. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 13.
[110] The November 1 attacks claimed seven victims—six Arabs and a French teacher. Ibid, 42.

VNA lectured the Europeans who planned to remain in the new Arab state that they could either be "considered as foreigners in the eyes of the law" or "opt for Algerian nationality."[111] The group's "Proclamation to the Algerian People" went on to demand "the restoration of the Algerian state…within the framework of the principles of Islam," and "the preservation of all political freedoms, without distinction of race or religion."[112] "Every vestige of corruption and reformism" in Algeria, the FLN promised, would end, while "the internationalization of the Algerian problem" would herald the "realization of North African unity within its national Arabo-Islamic framework."[113]

To the VNA's utter dismay, the Arab masses seemed indifferent.[114] The Arab veterans did not rise up. The National Assembly's state of emergency on March 31, 1955 let Algeria's Governor General Jacques Soustelle establish security zones and restrict Arab movements.[115] The authorities detained suspects at will.[116] Most original leaders and their deputies were soon killed or captured.[117] The FLN had to recruit common criminals and brutalize its own people.[118] As the Muslim masses stood by, the moderates and elites balked at the FLN's extremism. They could not yet imagine France losing to a VNA and leaving Algeria.

The stalemate came in mid-1955. The authorities had to compensate for the absence of counterinsurgency troops by forming local *colon* units.[119] The politicians had also gone to work.

---

[111] "Algeria 1954: Front de Liberation Nationale Proclamation, November 1, 1954, To the Algerian People," *Marxists.Org*, https://www.marxists.org/history/algeria/1954/proclamation.htm; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 115.
[112] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 44.
[113] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 112; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 113.
[114] Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, 51; Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 93-94.
[115] Soustelle was Governor General Jan. 1955-Jan. 1956. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 28.
[116] The head (prefect) of each department could regulate internal movement and depopulate entire villages. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 52; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 37.
[117] Of the original interior leadership, only Belkacem Krim and Ben M'Hidi were free and alive in late 1955. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 94-95.
[118] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 59.
[119] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 53.

Notwithstanding his bluster at the National Assembly in late 1954, Mendès-France was part of a bloc of liberal politicians that wanted a negotiated settlement. While Interior Minister Mitterrand had initially promised "war," he too backed reforms for Algeria's police, civil service, and elections.[120] Governor General Soustelle introduced grand plans for Algeria's integration with France, and tasked ethnologists to negotiate with moderate Arabs.[121]

Soustelle's Algerian tour in early 1955 convinced him that Paris misunderstood the local situation. The "frightened" Arabs cared less about the FLN and more about poverty. He observed firsthand how the recent military operations failed to solve political, economic, and social problems. The governor general realized further that because the state had too few troops in country to protect the locals, Arab villagers were naturally turning to the FLN.[122]

Soustelle assured Muslim nationalists on March 28 that martial law would not end legitimate political discourse.[123] He budgeted money for construction projects and implored his officials to forswear their "European superiority complex" and "condescension."[124] Proportional representation for Arabs in the National Assembly would replace the *colon*-dominated Algerian Assembly; more schools and teachers would make all students bilingual. Algeria's three provinces would become a single French province with French living standards.[125]

---

[120] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 45; Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 156-157.
[121] Soustelle trained as an anthropologist and spent time in Mexico. His Algerian policies reflected Mexico's programs to integrate native Indians while allowing them to retain their traditional culture. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 28; Geoffrey Bocca, *The Secret Army* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 12.
[122] The "Violette" and "Véronique" operations unfolded in the Aurès region in Jan.-Feb. 1955. Both the French air force's napalm bombing and the army's artillery barrages had little effect on the FLN's terrorism. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 130-133.
[123] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 36.
[124] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 157-158; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 13.
[125] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 38-39.

The Governor General released imprisoned MTLD "moderates."[126] He sought to redistribute private and public lands to the Arabs that held only 8% of the total private investment. His six-year plan called for raising Arab living standards 6% annually. Training centers would prepare more Arabs for the civil service, while the government would cede control of the mosques to local clerics.[127]

Reforms that ostensibly appeared as radical, far-reaching, and noble efforts to democratize and modernize Algeria were doomed from the start. New laws had to pass an Algerian Assembly still controlled by angry, frightened, and vengeful *colons*. Even in peaceful times, they had shown no intention of voluntarily relinquishing the status quo; the settlers condemned Soustelle for even negotiating with Arabs. The Governor General should have anticipated these reactions and further realized that without the full backing of the French military, police, media, and civil society, his program would die.[128]

The integration schemes also required stability and security. Terrorism and a burgeoning insurgency were already embroiling Algeria by mid-1955. The authorities were punishing villages collectively for FLN actions and formed brutal Muslim VNAs.[129] The French reformers consequently pushed "integration" onto a deeply distrustful Arab majority that equated

[126] Messali Hadj went on to create a rival of the FLN—the *Mouvement national algérien* (MNA). See footnote # 87. Both Benyoucef Benkhedda and Saad Dahlab joined the FLN shortly after their release, and all three went on to play prominent roles in the conflict. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 98.
[127] While 26,000 European companies employed 300,000 mostly European workers, 7,000 Arab companies employed about 23,000 Arab workers. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 159-162.
[128] The press in Algiers portrayed the Protestant Soustelle as a Jewish agitator in order to capitalize on Arab antisemitism. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 28-29, 37.
[129] Ibid, 37. France's Special Administration Section (*Section Administrative Specialiseé*—SAS) assembled what essentially became a Muslim Algerian VNA—the *harkis*. While they eventually numbered 150,000, many collaborated with the FLN and were subsequently reassigned to France. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 50.

"pacification" to state torture and murder.[130] Peaceful conflict resolution understandably stalled as the colonials brutalized the people they sought to civilize.

Finally, time killed the reforms. Generations of occupation had soured Muslims on the appeal of becoming French men and women. A growing Arab unity made them less inclined to compromise.[131] Even under the best of circumstances, years would pass before Algeria's Muslims reaped tangible benefits. During this intervening period, FLN political violence could derail any ongoing negotiations.

The liberals' outreaches succeeded in one important respect—they delayed the full imposition of martial law for five critical months.[132] This respite, however, would end. After Prime Minister Edgar Faure reconstituted the army's Algerian intelligence unit, the FLN faced collapse by summer 1955.[133] While its internal leadership was being guillotined, its externals did nothing. The irregulars faced severe shortages of arms, food, and intelligence.

The FLN strikes against the symbols of colonial rule—government buildings, police stations, and military facilities—brought few tangible results.[134] Province II's new command therefore resorted to the politics of atrocity.[135] The strategy of collective punishment would

[130] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 30, 37. For France's use of torture in Algeria, see Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah*; Adam Shatz, "The Torture of Algiers," *New York Review of Books* 49, no. 18 (Nov. 21, 2002).
[131] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 42.
[132] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 13.
[133] Faure succeeded Mendès-France in Feb. 1955 and served until Feb. 1956. General Paul Aussaresses' intelligence unit quickly confined the FLN to *Wilaya* II. He later admitted to torturing and murdering suspects. Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah*; Shatz, "The Torture of Algiers;"; James Gannon, *Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination: The History Neocons Neglected* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 48; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 50; and Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 140.
[134] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1998, 62.
[135] Deputy commander Youssef Zighou succeeded Commander Mourad Didouche, who died on Jan. 18 at the Battle of Douar Souadek.

henceforth consider European military and civilians "all responsible for the crimes committed against our people."[136] Philippeville became the VNA's test case on August 20, 1955.[137]

Four hundred FLN irregulars infiltrated the city weeks earlier. The thousands of local Arabs they organized would brandish sticks, pitchforks, knives, and axes. To embolden the Muslims, the FLN lied about a fictitious Egyptian flotilla landing in the city's port.[138] The opening salvo in Philippeville saw Arabs slaughter *colon* women and children. They moved on to Arab collaborators, local politicians, and soldiers.[139]

The mobs next murdered European women, children, and babies at Ain Abid, Saint Charles, and El Arrouch; Arab youths carried the FLN's bombs.[140] Eighty irregulars led 560 locals into el Halia. Armed with farm tools, dynamite, gasoline bombs, and guns, they raped and mutilated the women while the *colon* men were at work; infants had their throats cut.[141] By the time its operations ended on August 21, the VNA had assaulted thirty-six different locations.[142]

In the short-term, Philippeville appeared yet another FLN failure. The VNA overran no military garrisons or police stations stocked with weapons.[143] The *colons*' fury engulfed their

---

[136] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 50.
[137] Philippeville is in northeastern Algeria. The FLN commander chose it because of recent simmering tensions and the fact that many Arabs here had also lost family members in the May 1945 Setif violence. Githens-Mazer, "The Blowback of Repression," 1019; Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 140; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 50; and Shatz, "The Torture of Algiers."
[138] Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah*, 35; James Le Sueur, *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2006), 31; and Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 140-141.
[139] The literature generally puts the FLN victims at 123 dead and 200 wounded. James Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2009), 89-90; *Le Monde* reported similar numbers on September 2, 1955. See also Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 158; Gannon, *Military Occupations*, 48; Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*; Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (New York: Routledge, 2013) 118; and Shatz, "The Torture of Algiers."
[140] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 174.
[141] Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 141; Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 174; and Library of Congress, "Algeria," 46.
[142] It targeted the French military garrison at el Khroub, moderate Arab politicians in Constantine, security personnel on the street, police stations, movie theaters, restaurants, and the Jewish community at Ramdane Djamel. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 173; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 50-51; and Library of Congress, "Algeria," 46.
[143] Tom Parker, *Avoiding the Terrorist Trap: Why Respect for Human Rights is the Key to Defeating Terrorism* (NJ: World Scientific, 2019), 124; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 162.

Arab neighbors. After three days, the government claimed that it "neutralized" 1,273 irregulars; the FLN countered that indiscriminate army, police, and vigilante reprisals murdered 12,000 Muslims.[144] The city's sports arena became a giant detention center for interrogating, torturing, and executing untried suspects.

The state ignored due process and let settler families spectate the revenge massacres.[145] Vigilantes lynched random Muslims after *colon* funerals.[146] Philippeville's mayor armed militias and stood by as they lashed out.[147] Within hours, France's 41st Parachute Brigade detained and shot 150 Arabs at el Halia; it summarily shot another sixty FLN suspects at el Khroub. The air force levelled villages suspected of aiding the FLN.[148] After the terrorism and reprisals subsided, a stalemate ensued.

State Miscalculation Marries VNA Competitive Adaptation

France had too few troops in country to pursue the FLN in such a vast and inaccessible territory. Governor General Soustelle complained that while he needed 60,000 troops for the Constantine department alone, Paris had only provided 21,000;[149] the porous borders with Tunisia and Morocco left whole regions exposed.[150] General Jean-Jules-Alexis Callies believed

[144] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 122; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 46; and Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 51.
[145] *L'Humanité* newspaper published a gruesome photo of dead Arabs on the front page of its August 25, 1955 edition. See "Algeria 1955: a Photo and its Caption," *Histoire colonial*, last modified Sep. 28, 2019, https://histoirecoloniale.net/Algerie-1955-une-photo-et-sa.html; Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 90; and Githens-Mazer, "The Blowback of Repression," 1020.
[146] Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 141.
[147] Paul-Dominique Benquet-Crevaux served as mayor from May 1953 to Feb. 1957. Robert Zaretsky, *Albert Camus: Elements of a Life* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2010), 127.
[148] Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 141; Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 121.
[149] Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 170.
[150] Soustelle and his top general asked Paris for thirty infantry battalions, eighteen squadrons of mechanized cavalry, and more helicopters. Ibid, 170-171.

that France required 650,000 troops for its responsibilities in NATO, North Africa, the empire, and the homeland; Algeria alone needed 400,000.[151] Paris budgeted for 450,000 in total. Only 150,000 of those soldiers were slotted for all of French North Africa.[152]

Redeploying assets from France, NATO, and Indochina took time. Troop levels reached 180,000 in January 1956;[153] 260,000 in mid-1956; and 370,000 in April 1957.[154] They did not hit the requisite 400,000 level until late 1958.[155] The grid (*quadrillage*) system exacerbated these nagging shortages by dividing the country into sectors that required a permanent troop presence. France could not consequently launch major offensives until early 1959.[156]

The state's challenges only worsened after Philippeville. It was "impossible [for the Europeans] to distinguish rebels from the general population."[157] The inability to protect Muslim collaborators pushed more locals to the FLN.[158] Thousands of terrified Arabs that fled into the mountains to escape *colon* revenge became irregulars. To the millions of Arabs that stayed, the FLN and France offered a clear choice—honorable resistance or shameful cowardice.

European paranoia henceforth transformed all Muslims into potential terrorists.[159] As *colons* worried that once loyal Arab servants and coworkers were plotting to slit their throats in the night, their militias became unrestrained counter-terrorist squads.[160] That the government

---

[151] Callies sat on France's Supreme War Council and was Inspector-General of Armed Forces in North Africa.
[152] Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 38-40, 49-50.
[153] These redeployments came from the French Foreign Legion infantry and paratroopers, motorized infantry divisions, armored and light mechanized divisions. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 40.
[154] Ibid. This number included 233 infantry battalions, twenty-six armor regiments, twenty-nine artillery groups, and fifty police squadrons.
[155] Ibid. 350,000 of these were army, 40,000 air force, and 8,000 navy. Another 176,000 men were serving in the police and auxiliaries.
[156] Ibid, 39.
[157] Githens-Mazer, "The Blowback of Repression," 1020; Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 90; Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 158; Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 141; and Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 87.
[158] Terrorism supposes that a government cannot protect all it citizens all the time.
[159] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 120-121.
[160] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 42.

refused to stop, or even condemn the indiscriminate revenge violence after August 1955 convinced yet more Muslims "that the French system of justice was never going to be applied equally to them, whatever their citizenship, and that their allegiance would get them nothing socially, politically, or economically."[161] The current regime was but the latest in a long line of racist European hypocrites who offered help with one hand while clutching a gun in the other.

The FLN adapted to the post-Philippeville environment by reaffirming its "victory or death" strategy.[162] It "made itself heir to the Algeria which existed before 1830" and rejected all negotiations whose end game was not independence.[163] When Marshal Tito[164] hosted the FLN and France for talks in July 1956, the VNA demanded "the restoration of Algerian sovereignty," without "conditions or reserves."[165] The two sides met five more times in Italy, and the talks went nowhere.[166] In 1959, new Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle pursued battlefield victories as a means to improve France's bargaining position.[167] Although the "Challe Plan" inflicted severe losses, the FLN again dismissed all offers for cease-fires and elections.[168] A new wave of

[161] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 63.
[162] At the Club of Nine's first meeting in Switzerland in mid-1954, the members unanimously agreed that war could expel France and achieve a free Algeria; when it reassembled in July near Algiers, the group decide that it would neither limit its violence nor accept limited French "concessions." Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 135.
[163] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 112; Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 30; and Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 59.
[164] Josip Broz Tito played a prominent role in resisting the Italo-German occupation of Yugoslavia and was the country's president 1953-1980. He was the first communist leader to defy Moscow and gained an international reputation for his nonalignment policy in the Cold War. *Encyclopaedia Britannica online*, s. v. "Josip Broz Tito: President of Yugoslavia," by Ivo Banac, accessed Jan. 23, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Josip-Broz-Tito; Richard West, *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1995).
[165] Tito had just finished meeting with the leaders of India and Egypt in Yugoslavia. Elie Abel, "Nehru Joins Tito, Nasser; Limits Conference Hopes; Nehru Opens Talk with Tito, Nasser," *NY Times*, July 19, 1956.
[166] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 143.
[167] After leading the Free French during the war and the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946, de Gaulle retired from politics. The May 1958 military coup in Algeria that helped collapse the French Fourth Republic brought him out of retirement. De Gaulle was prime minister June 1958-Jan. 1959 and president Jan. 1959-Apr. 1969.
[168] De Gaulle informed Commander in Chief Gen. Maurice Challe that he "expected operations to take a dynamic turn which would result in our undisputed mastery of the field." Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 331. Speed, mobility, and force concentration kept the FLN irregulars in constant retreat and disorder. François-Marie Gougeon, "The Challe Plan: Vain yet Indispensable Victory," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 16, no. 3 (Aug. 2006): 293-316.

terrorism promptly ended the French entreaties.[169] As a result, the VNA's opening demands in 1954 mirrored the state's final concessions in 1962.

The FLN targeted Arab moderates, collaborators, and rivals relentlessly.[170] The first two groups, it believed, would cave to either greed or fear and barter away Algeria's freedom; too many "Muslim tribal chiefs and elitist judges, clerics, and bureaucrats" were still benefitting by France's presence.[171] Competing VNAs could challenge the FLN's legitimacy and weaken its leverage with Paris.[172] Ben Bella dealt with these "problematic" Arabs from his Cairo base.[173] An FLN squad first warned its intended victims; if their bad behavior continued, mutilation or murder followed.[174]

The FLN attacks at Philippeville joined the state's overreaction to rupture relations between Algeria's two communities. Former moderates in either camp had to take sides.[175] Although the FLN may not have initially been the Arabs' ideal option, it was now their only

[169] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 15.
[170] Five hundred thousand Algerians worked in France, Germany, and Belgium. Messali Hadj's MNA adopted a similar platform as the FLN and fostered strong union support from these workers. The two VNAs engaged in the "café wars" that killed about 5,000 Arab Algerians. Cafés in France played a vital role for the Algerian immigrant communities; the owners taxed the salaries of their respective VNA members and remitted the money back to Algeria. The FLN ultimately prevailed by mid-1956 and Messali Hadj passed into political obscurity. Lewis, "The Decline of Algeria's FLN," 164; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 45-46; and Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 45.
[171] Rabasa et al., *Money in the Bank*, 22.
[172] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 45. When the FLN initiated the conflict in November 1954, numerous other nationalist groups were already operating. Ferhat Abbas' *Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto* and the Algerian Communist Party initially kept a friendly neutrality towards the FLN. Only the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama supported the FLN from the start.
[173] Ibid, 46.
[174] The FLN cut off the lips and noses of noncompliant Muslims in O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 45.
[175] Sueur, *Uncivil War*, 31; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 162; Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 91; Michael Brett, "Anglo-Saxon Attitudes: The Algerian War of Independence in Retrospect," *Journal of African History* 35, no. 2 (1995): 218; Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World, 1992), iii; and Githens-Mazer, "The Blowback of Repression," 1020.

option.[176] The group henceforth presented itself as a unifier under which disparate patriotic organizations could fight colonialism. Its agenda became the national agenda.

The VNA's organization proved a mixed blessing. The absence of an overarching structure meant that the FLN functioned like a network—each group commander oversaw an independent fiefdom. This lack of coordination presented challenges: "The degree of success varied from Wilaya to Wilaya, and as liaison and co-operation between Wilayas were virtually non-existent, they sank or swam by their own efforts alone."[177] On the positive side, this horizontal organization deprived France of a clear enemy chain of command; no centralized leadership existed for the strong side to kill or capture.

The fact that the group survived until mid-1955 demonstrates that it understood the nature of unconventional warfare, the legacy of imperialism in Algeria, and the role of public opinion in France.[178] The VNA learned from France's recent experiences in Indochina and Britain's failure in Palestine.[179] Terrorism could provoke the state to "intensify its repression," break into homes, arrest innocent, and transform Algeria's political problems into military operations.[180] More Arabs suffering at the hands of Europeans would invariably translate into more support for the FLN.[181] Finally, the FLN understood that as long as it operated with

[176] Three weeks after Philippeville, sixty-one prominent "moderate" Muslim politicians publicly rejected the notion that Arabs could become French only by learning the language. Most joined the FLN. Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 142; Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 122; and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 99.
[177] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 42.
[178] By mid-1956, the French public was already favoring negotiations over force and rejected tax increases in order to reestablish peace in Algeria. A year later, "a relative majority of the French had already been alienated from the core ideas of the French Algeria policy: no-recognition, no-negotiations, and no-compromise with the FLN." Merom, "A 'Grand Design'?" 271-272.
[179] 150,000 Arab Algerians had served France bravely in Tunisia, Italy, France, and later Vietnam. Gilles, "War in Algeria," 52.
[180] Marighella, *Minimanual*, 80-81.
[181] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 30.

impunity in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, it could survive indefinitely. Time would strengthen Arab resolve, subvert French resolve, and ultimately reverse the balance of power.

External Influences

Even if the VNA becomes a proto-state, it may still not coerce or subvert the government until external pressures intrude. Unlike the distant war in Indochina, the French people monitored events in Algeria closely. The media published graphic photographs of both sides' atrocities. In October 1955, hundreds of French protestors in Lyon blocked a transport train carrying troops to Algeria. Leftist intellectuals urged troops not to commit atrocities;[182] the French Communist Party challenged the war's legitimacy.[183] As public opinion soured, the generals and politicians struggled to prosecute the war.[184] On December 8, Prime Minister Mollet, former Prime Minister Mendès-France, Interior Minister Mitterrand, and future Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas[185] united in the Republican Front to call for peace and withdrawal from Algeria.[186]

The FLN used international institutions to spotlight France's atrocities and present itself as Algeria's true representative.[187] With the VNA's prompting, the 1955 Bandung Conference

[182] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 44.
[183] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 62.
[184] The French public's confidence in the government declined steadily and hastened the Fourth Republic's collapse in 1958. The overwhelming support for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in September reflected less an approval of the document itself and more a hope that General de Gaulle would settle the Algerian conflict. United States Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Vol. VII, Part 2, Document 201," Intelligence Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Problems and Prospects of the Fifth Republic, No. 8374, Dec. 6, 1960," *US Department of State: Office of the Historian*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v07p2/d201.
[185] He served from June 1969 to July 1972.
[186] Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 47.
[187] Arthur Asseraf, 'Between the World and Algeria: International Histories of the Algerian War of Independence," Arab Studies Journal 25, no. 1 (2017): 198-209; Jennifer Johnson, *The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Health Care, and Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2015).

in Indonesia addressed the Algerian crisis.[188] Arab, Asian, and African countries cooperated to put Algeria on the UN General Assembly's agenda on September 30, 1955;[189] by mid-1956, the FLN convinced them to refer the issue to the UN Security Council.[190] In 1957, Tunisia and Morocco requested help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding the hundreds of thousands of Algerian refugees flooding into their respective countries.[191] Washington increasingly pushed Paris to liberalize its colonial policies.[192] NATO pressured France against redeploying its West German divisions to Algeria.[193]

---

[188] Twenty-nine Asian and African nations met in Apr. to discuss decolonization and development. They declared support for "the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay." "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)," *CVCE.eu*, last modified April 24, 1955, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html; "Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955," *US Department of State: Office of the Historian*, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf.

[189] Although the General Assembly removed Algeria from its agenda two months later, the UN had nonetheless characterized the conflict as a human rights and self-determination issue that superseded claims of French sovereignty. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 213-214; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 60-61; and Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 42.

[190] The Security Council did not address Algeria officially but acknowledged "the international character of the Algerian problem." Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 131.

[191] The League of Red Cross Societies also got involved. Malika Rahal and Benjamin White, "UNHCR and the Algerian War of Independence: Postcolonial Sovereignty and the Globalization of the International Refugee Regime, 1954–63," *Journal of Global History* 17, no. 2 (2022): 331.

[192] Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2001). The US hedged between supporting France and losing the moderate Arabs to communism and provoking France's withdrawal from NATO. The FLN believed that the US government only "reluctantly" supported France in Algeria, and took note of how American media were "pitilessly condemning [French] war crimes," the "genocide of the aged," the "torture of political prisoners," and the "multiplication of concentration camps" in Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 140. The US State Department concluded that de Gaulle's political fortunes rested on settling the Algerian conflict quickly and thereby preventing a takeover by the extremist right. United States Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States." Communists accused Washington of helping oppress the Third World by arming and enabling its NATO ally. Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 62.

[193] France's NATO partner Great Britain, in the midst of its exit from Cyprus, complained that Algeria was weakening the military alliance by draining French human and material resources. Christopher Goldsmith, "The British Embassy in Paris and the Algerian War: An Uncomfortable Partner?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 2 (June 2002): 159-171. US General Lauris Norstad, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe characterized France's naval forces in the western Mediterranean as "little more than a fleet of fishing smacks." Martin Alexander and J. Keiger, *France and the Algerian War 1954-1962*: *Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 186. De Gaulle resented the lack of US-UK support in Algeria and the special Anglo-American relationship since the war. After Washington rejected his plan for a NATO tripartite directorate, de Gaulle withdrew France's Mediterranean fleet from NATO command, banned foreign nuclear weapons on French soil, and began to build an independent defense. France tested its first nuclear weapon in Feb. 1960, in Algeria. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 49; *New World Encyclopedia*, s. v. "NATO," accessed July 5, 2022, https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=NATO&oldid=1069940.

Middle Eastern politics foisted more challenges on the colonials. Nasser's meddling in Algeria prompted Paris to join the British-Israeli Suez invasion in November 1956.[194] The debacle left France isolated; Paris and London would henceforth play secondary roles in the region to Washington and Moscow.[195] Moroccan and Tunisian independence in March 1956 guaranteed the FLN unrestricted safe havens.[196] Mounting external pressure was consigning the beacon of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" to rule Algeria as a Soviet-style police state.

1955-56: The Power Balance Shifts

The balance of power began shifting in Algeria by early 1956. As the FLN's status steadily grew, France would pursue total annihilation and recreate the parts of Nazi Germany. The VNA hence confronted the popularity dilemma. If it became too big and conventional, the state would find and destroy it on the battlefield. If it remained small, many would view the FLN as a glorified group of terrorists.

Governor General Soustelle went from reformer to hardliner.[197] He ignored Prime Minister Edgar Faure's termination of Algeria's state of emergency and detained FLN suspects arbitrarily.[198] When new Prime Minister Guy Mollet visited Algeria in February 1956, angry

---

[194] France used Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal as a pretext to join the invasion, topple Nasser, and stem Egypt's brazen aid to the FLN. Stewart Ross, *Causes and Consequences of the Arab–Israeli Conflict* (Austin, TX: Raintree Steck-Vaughn, 1996); Jonathan Isacoff, *Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006), 79; and Library of Congress, "Algeria," 48.

[195] G. C. Peden, "Suez and Britain's Decline as a World Power," *Historical Journal*, 55, no. 4 (Dec. 2012): 1073-1096; Zach Levey, "French–Israeli Relations, 1950–1956: The Strategic Dimension," in *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, ed. Simon Smith (NY: Routledge, 2016), 87-106.

[196] France conceded Tunisia and Morocco in the hope of keeping Algeria. Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 135; Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, 125.

[197] After visiting the *colon* victims at el Halia, he declared that no negotiations were possible with terrorists. Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes*, 90; Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 158.

[198] Faure served in early 1952 and again Feb. 1955-Feb. 1956. He ended the state of emergency on Dec. 2, 1955. Adams, *The Call of Conscience*, 44.

colon mobs pelted him with tomatoes; Mollet promptly replaced his moderate nominee for governor general with Robert Lacoste.[199] Lacoste shut down the Algerian Assembly, granted the army virtually unlimited police powers, and ruled by decree. He simultaneously resurrected Soustelle's half measures, now in the guise of semi-autonomy.[200] As the war spread across northern Algeria, French troop levels escalated.[201]

As Muslim public opinion sided with the FLN, the VNA steadily transitioned into "a state within a state."[202] Student groups organized strikes that strained the national economy. The externals were finally smuggling arms into the interior. The group collected taxes from the areas it controlled. More and better recruits followed. Since the VNA no longer needed threats to keep troops in the field, it received better intelligence; it was protecting friendly villages and building clinics and schools. By the end of Soustelle's term ended in February 1956, the FLN comprised 15,000-20,000 irregulars and resembled the type of national liberation movement that freed France from the Nazis and Vietnam from France. [203]

Marxist Delusions Yield to Pragmatic Terrorism in 1956

[199] Mollet served Feb. 1956-May 1957. His original plan was to bring back Gen. Georges Catroux. The Governor General now became the Resident Minister. Lacoste served Feb. 1956-May 1958. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 13; "The Algerian War of Independence," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* online, https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/The-Algerian-War-of-Independence.
[200] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 47; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 13. *Colons* delayed Lacoste's program in the National Assembly until 1958.
[201] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 49-53.
[202] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 129-130. The clerics (*ulema*) joined; Ferhat Abbas dissolved the UDMA and formally joined the External Delegation in Cairo. The FLN's General Union of Algerian Workers attracted over 100,000 members. It developed national institutions for health care and humanitarian aid that cared for millions of war victims. It used the Algerian Red Crescent to interact with foreign states on behalf of refugees. Rahal and White, "UNHCR and the Algerian War," 333.
[203] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 63-64.

Flush with optimism, the FLN shifted strategy to usher in the "period of protracted insurgency." Asymmetric warfare would "evolve" into symmetrical warfare. Mao's grand conventional counteroffensive would supposedly bury the old state and birth the new Algeria. Reality quickly proved otherwise. The FLN's larger and less-mobile units made easy prey for French aircraft and artillery.[204] No Arab national authority yet existed to make rapid adjustments.[205] Commanders along the Moroccan and Tunisian borders hoarded weapons.[206] The Internal Delegation held bloody purges while accusing the External Delegation of treason.[207] The VNA lost about one-third of its irregulars between April and May 1956.[208] Total defeat seemed imminent.

The FLN met secretly in a cottage in Algeria's Soummam Valley on August 20, 1956.[209] All the internal provinces attended; Ben Bella and the External Delegation waited in Italy and Libya for a signal that never came.[210] The group convened for twenty days and produced a forty-page document that codified three principles: politics superseded military affairs, the Internal Delegation would handle the overall course of the conflict, and collective decision-making.[211]

---

[204] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 53. France finally integrated the army, police, and civil administration; new *colon* Territorial Units helped the police administer the cities and towns. French soldiers were living in remote villages while civil administrators implemented agrarian reforms, built new village hospitals, and set up mass education programs.
[205] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 131.
[206] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 73. Interior units complained that they had still had no automatic weapons.
[207] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 141-143; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 9.
[208] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 64-65.
[209] The French army just declared the Soummam Valley "pacified." Province II commander Youssef Zighout, the Philippeville mastermind, convinced the group that he host a secret meeting. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 141, 143; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 132; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 71, 74; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 9; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 47; and Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 137.
[210] It is not certain if the internals intentionally planned the meetings knowing that the externals would be unable to attend. The only prominent external member present was Ben M'Hidi. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 143; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 132; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 137; and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 99.
[211] Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 137.

The conferees still worried that a single leader would become too powerful, so they commissioned no generals.[212] Arab units were standardized according to French companies and battalions.[213] The group established categories of soldiers and introduced a pay scale.[214] The National Council for the Algerian Revolution (*Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne*—CNRA) became the FLN's new central committee.[215] The CNRA formed the Committee of Coordination and Implementation (*Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution*—CCE).[216]

The attendees affirmed that their essential political goal was to achieve national independence by making "the colonialist fiction of 'French Algeria disappear.'" The FLN anointed itself the "sole truly national organization" and resolved to act like a "recognizable political authority," respect the "laws of war," apply "normal administration," and establish elected assemblies, taxation, and courts; it would not tolerate foreign influences from Cairo, Washington, or Moscow. The VNA reaffirmed that all "negotiation [with Paris] follows the all out struggle against the pitiless enemy, it never precedes it."[217]

---

[212] Colonels led each military province. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 144-145; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 132-133; and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 100.

[213] Each colonel had three assistants—for political, military, and intelligence affairs. The political assistant headed finance, propaganda, and the Organization for Political Administration (*Organisation Politico-Administrative—OPA*). The OPA became the FLN's shadow government at the city or village. The conferees also subdivided *wilayas* into zones (*mintaka*) that were led by a captain; zones were further divided into regions (*nahia*) under a second-lieutenant; and regions were then divided into sections under a warrant officer. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 10; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 73.

[214] The *moujahidines* were the uniformed, paid full-timers that comprised the majority of the irregulars in Algeria and the conventional units in Morocco and Tunisia; the unpaid, part-time paramilitary auxiliaries (*moussebilines*) had no uniforms, underwent minimal training, and served as guides, guards, messengers, saboteurs, and spies; at the bottom were the unpaid, poorly trained part-time helpers (*fidayines*). O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 74-75; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 149-151.

[215] The CNRA expanded from 17 to 34 people and included members from across Algeria's political spectrum. It served as the FLN's highest representative governing body until 1962. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 9; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 132; and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 103.

[216] Only internal military leaders served in the CCE. The five-person group became the de facto government when the CNRA was not in session. The Ferhat Abbas-led Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (*Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne—GPRA*) replaced the CCE in September 1958. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 9; Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 132; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 72; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 47; and Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 138.

[217] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 133-137; Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 101.

The conference ended the rift between the internals and externals. Ben Bella's group in Egypt yielded to the CNRA.[218] New weapons networks bypassed the Exterior Delegation.[219] Any doubt as to the interiors' ascendancy vanished when the French arrested the exterior leadership while it was flying from Rabat to Tunisia.[220] The CCE began appointing military officers and implementing the FLN's strategy.[221]

Agitators and revolutionaries no longer monopolized the FLN. Politicians and organizers from academia, labor unions, and the MTLD joined the CNRA.[222] They brought years of experience in coalition building and administration. The new leadership ultimately defended Algerian nationalism and transformed a VNA into a united front.[223] Amazingly, the conference reaffirmed the earlier deranged decision to hasten the conflict into a general insurrection. Despite the FLN's massive spring 1956 losses, it stuck to its strategy to "organize and direct 'millions of men in a gigantic combat.'"[224]

Delusions in Late 1956-58: Both Sides Court Disaster

[218] Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 137.
[219] Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 101.
[220] On October 22, the military ordered the French pilot of the Moroccan-owned plane to land the group in Algiers. Four of the six historic chiefs that were still alive and not in prison were thus incarcerated for the next five years. The irony for France was that by taking Ben Bella, Mohammed Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed, and Mohammed Khider out of commission, it actually eliminated an ongoing source of tension for FLN decision-making. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 104-105; Latifa Babas, "22 October 1956: Ben Bella, King Mohammed V and the Story of the Re-routed Plane," *Yabiladi*, last modified Oct. 22, 2018, https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/70157/october-1956-bella-king-mohammed.html.
[221] Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 103-104; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 72-73; and Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 138.
[222] Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 97, 102. Of the CRUA's twenty-seven original leaders, seventeen made it to the CNRA; the other ten had been killed, arrested or fired.
[223] Ibid, 98, 124.
[224] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 138.

The first phase of the grand counteroffensive opened in September 1956. The "Battle of Algiers" featured mass bombings and assassinations of prominent Arabs and Europeans.[225] Over the next half year, 800 terror attacks hit the capital monthly. An eight-day general strike in January 1957 coincided with a UN debate on Algeria.[226] General Jacques Massu's 10th Paratroop Division instituted a military dictatorship that perfected torture, population control, and exploiting FLN defectors; checkpoints and raids eradicated the VNA's infrastructure. The French claim to have suffered seven casualties and neutralized 1,827 irregulars.[227] By February, the CCE fled to Morocco and Tunisia and launched another internal search for "traitors."[228]

France sensed victory. The colonial administration's previous demands for 400,000 soldiers in country now seemed alarmist. Paris actually planned to withdraw troops and shorten military service from 27 to 24 months.[229] While its military prowess in Algiers was generating dramatic headlines, it had still not achieved victory. To France's utter dismay, the FLN quickly reconstituted itself in the "pacified" capital. The army had to expel the VNA from the city again.[230] As French casualties mounted, public opinion soured.[231] Stalemate again ensued.

Despite having just been routed from Algiers, the FLN decided that it too sensed victory by fall 1957. The steady stream of Arab volunteers allowed it to weed out the "freebooters and

---

[225] *The Battle of Algiers*, DVD, directed by Gillo Pontecorvo (Criterion, 2004); Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 10, 14.
[226] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 66.
[227] The government believed that it had to date killed 30,000 ALN members and captured 13,000. Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 66.
[228] The FLN executed CCE member Ramdane Abane in Dec. 1957 for prioritizing an individual cult over collective leadership. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 14; Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, 105-106.
[229] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 92-93.
[230] The Second Battle of Algiers was more of a police action run by a single airborne regiment. Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 66.
[231] In late 1957, the French estimated that they had 3,700 dead, 6,000 wounded, and 650 missing These figures include French Muslim troops. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 91; Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 61-62.

adventurers" and field 130,000 troops.[232] The VNA was transitioning to insurgency. It would accordingly impress its international supporters by standing toe-to-toe with a great power.[233] In anticipation of the great spring 1958 offensive, FLN members went to Egypt for commando courses and to East Germany and Iraq for jet pilot training.[234]

This strategy brought no success before the Soummam conference. Its second salvo in Algiers found more failure. The decision to go big reflected not facts on the ground, but Maoist-Leninist revolutionary fantasy.[235] The FLN opted to fight a modern state on the latter's terms; it chose to ignore how French speed and mobility delivered sudden, comprehensive, and lethal outcomes.[236] Finally, the VNA chose to overlook how France's newly built Morice Line was blocking the group's previously unfettered safe havens in Morocco and Tunisia.[237] When conventional battle came, the FLN's "big" platoons surrendered without a fight.[238] In conventional military terms, the state won.

Victory after This?

[232] The Soummam conference expanded battalions to 20 officers and 350 men; plans were made to balloon them to 600. Battalions had three companies; each company had three platoons, and each platoon had three groups. The 600-man battalion would fight conventionally with machine guns and mortars. Volunteers now went through a grueling two-month boot camp. The FLN's 40,000 uniformed full-timers (*moujahidines*) were supported by 90,000 unpaid *moussebilines* and *fidayine*; 25,000 *moujahidine* were stationed in Tunisia and Morocco. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 149-151, 155; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 74-75, 88; and Library of Congress, "Algeria," 48.
[233] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 88-89.
[234] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 108; O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 89.
[235] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 89; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 146.
[236] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 89; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 147. While the French used motorized armor, artillery, and aircraft, the VNA relied on foot messengers and did not acquire radios until 1959.
[237] The Morice Line was completed in Sep. 1957 and deployed electric fences, barbed wire, minefields, and searchlights that ran along most of Algeria's 700 miles of borders with Morocco and Tunisia. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 263-264; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 146; and O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 92.
[238] These figures include French Muslim troops. O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection*, 91.

As noted previously, unconventional warfare should be understood primarily in political, not military terms. The FLN was thus able to exploit the power of weakness after it made one final competitive adaptation—abandoning insurgency and reverting to terrorism.[239] The VNA learned from its mistakes and perfected the small-scale ambush; it attacked only when it was certain of victory and then vanished. Night operations targeted isolated detachments, command posts, officer barracks, mess halls, and individuals.[240] The new approach nullified French air power and artillery. The FLN convinced the strong side that the best it could hope for was perpetual stalemate and festering violence. French public opinion was lost.

The Denouement: It Takes a Great Man to Quit

French media reported in May 1958 that the army took out 12,000 irregulars over the last four months and captured 80% of their arms shipments.[241] The hardliners understandably blamed the liberal politicians for squandering the military wins in anticipation of another Indochina; political expedience would again sacrifice French honor. A national consensus emerged that only Charles de Gaulle could solve Algeria.[242]

The May 13, 1958 revolt in Algiers by the *colons* and army collapsed the Fourth Republic and brought de Gaulle to power.[243] General Raoul Salan[244] formed the Committee of

[239] Peterson, Reinhardt, and Conger, *Symposium on the Role of Airpower*, 14; Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 145, 155-156. The FLN disbanded its big battalions into companies and smaller independent units of 10 to 15 members. It simultaneously built its conventional forces in Morocco and Tunisia for a showdown that never came. The troops stationed abroad fixed French resources on the borders and reduced pressure on the interiors. FLN Minister of the Armed Forces Belkacim Krim expected the regular army to bring prestige during the war and security during statehood.
[240] Ibid, 147.
[241] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 156.
[242] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 51.
[243] Ibid, 52. General Massu led the military's seizure of power in Algeria.
[244] He was commander-in-chief of French Algerian forces and believed that de Gaulle would save the colony.

Public Safety in Paris and demanded that President René Coty[245] appoint the retired general the head of a new government. Charles de Gaulle's tenure as Prime Minister began in June with a free hand in Algeria.[246] No one knew his true intentions. His emotional proclamation "Long Live French Algeria!" during his June visit to Algeria raised right-wing hopes; but his committee's preliminary draft of the Fifth Republic's constitution excluded Algeria. A September 1958 referendum would decide the matter.[247]

De Gaulle's popularity alarmed the FLN into establishing a Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (*Gouvernement Provisionel de la République Algérienne*—GPRA) in Cairo.[248] The GPRA's first proclamation on September 18, 1958 called for "freedom, justice and social liberation;"[249] it banned other parties from negotiating with France and rejected all invitations for a cease-fire and elections.[250] Morocco, Tunisia, the Soviet Union, and Arab, East European, Asian, and African states recognized the GPRA as Algeria's official government.[251]

Eighty percent of Algeria's Muslim electorate approved the new constitution.[252] France's entreaties for a "partnership" with Algeria went nowhere. Although the Challe offensives finally brought military victory in late 1959, the French nation reached it breaking point.[253] De Gaulle publicly broached self-determination in September. His reversal spurred the infuriated *colons*

[245] He was President from Jan. 1954-Jan. 1959.
[246] De Gaulle became the first president of the Fifth Republic in Feb. 1959.
[247] Bryan Muller, "'I Understood You!': May 1958, the Return of De Gaulle and the Fall of France's Fourth Republic," *Conversation*, last modified May 16, 2018, https://theconversation.com/i-understood-you-may-1958-the-return-of-de-gaulle-and-the-fall-of-frances-fourth-republic-93510.
[248] The GPRA was created on Sep. 18, 1958 and was headed by Ferhat Abbas. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 53.
[249] "First Declaration of the Algerian Provisional Government," *Archive Today*, last modified Jan. 3, 2014, https://archive.ph/20070823113037/http://www.algerian-history.info/proclagpra.htm#selection-257.0-257.56.
[250] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 15.
[251] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 53.
[252] Ibid; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 15. FLN violence did not dissuade the Arabs from voting.
[253] The Challe plan went into operation March 1959. Although he never admitted it outright, de Gaulle probably saw the renewed military effort as a way to gain leverage for a final political settlement. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 15. Families of French soldiers serving in Algeria began speaking out against the war. The stories of French torture simultaneously produced national indignation. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 53.

and army into two failed coup attempts in January 1960 and April 1961. The hardliners formed their own VNAs in France and Algeria.[254] This new violence finally convinced the French nation to abandon Algeria and convinced de Gaulle to abandon the *colons*.[255]

Truce talks between the government and the FLN began at Évian in May 1961.[256] The cease-fire went into effect on March 19, 1962. On July 1, six million Algerian men and women voted for independence.[257] While de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria independent on July 3, the new Algerian government waited until July 5—the 132nd anniversary of France's invasion. Ahmed Ben Bella became Algeria's first president on September 15, 1963.[258]

The Cost of Victory

Of the 1.7 million French soldiers that served in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, about 30,000 died, and 65,000 were wounded. The *colons* took 10,000 casualties—3,000 of which were fatal. The French authorities claimed they killed 141,000 irregulars; the FLN initially estimated that 300,000 Arabs died; later studies revised this number upward to 1.5 million.[259] Another 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges. The "café wars" in France between the FLN and MNA took another 5,000 victims. One million European settlers chose to leave Algeria after 1963.[260]

---

[254] The *colons* created the Secret Armed Organization (*Organisation Armée Secrète*—OAS) in 1961. It used bombs and assassinations in France and Algeria to prevent the colony's independence. The group targeted Muslims, the French army, police, hospitals and schools. OAS activities caused 2,000 deaths from 1961 to 1962. Alexander Harrison, *Challenging De Gaulle: The O.A.S and the Counter-Revolution in Algeria, 1954–1962* (New York: Praeger, 1989).
[255] Library of Congress, "Algeria,"53-54; Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 62.
[256] Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 16.
[257] The total electorate was 6.5 million voters. Library of Congress, "Algeria," 55.
[258] Ibid; Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, 17.
[259] Library of Congress, "Algeria," 55; Adam Shatz, "The Battle of Algiers," *Nation*, last modified May 31, 2001, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/france-torture-algeria-colonialism/.
[260] Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 56; Library of Congress, "Algeria," 55.

Chapter 5: The EOKA in Cyprus, 1955-1960

> "First there was no Cyprus Problem. Then a few bangs followed and you agreed there was a problem, but it couldn't be solved ever. More bangs followed. Then you agreed to try and solve it, but in fact only bedevil it further. Meanwhile however EOKA has seen that a few bombs could change your inflexible 'Never' to 'Sometime'; now they feel they have a right to provoke an answer to the question 'When?'"[1]

Prelude to Grievance

Located in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Republic of Cyprus sits 240 miles north of Egypt, forty miles south of Turkey, and 480 miles southeast of Greece.[2] The island is 140 miles long, sixty miles wide (at its broadest point), features 400 miles of coastline, and covers 3,572 square miles. Cyprus contains 670 square miles of forest; the Kyrenia Mountains are in the north and Troodos Range is in the southwest.[3] The island has figured prominently in regional and international politics because of its strategic location near Africa, Europe, and Asia.

Timber and minerals attracted pirates, traders, and conquerors since 1,500 BCE. Successive waves of settlement by Minoans, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Mycenaeans, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans followed.[4] The Cypriots adopted Christianity under Roman rule

---

[1] Lawrence Durrell, *Bitter Lemons* (New York: Dutton, 1957), 223-224.
[2] The capital is Nicosia.
[3] Library of Congress, "Cyprus: A Country Study," in *Collection: Country Studies,* ed. Eric Solsten (Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1993), xiv, 50-53; "Cyprus," *Nations Online*, last modified 2022, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/cyprus.htm; "Cyprus," *CIA World Factbook*, last modified Jan. 25, 2022, accessed on Feb. 3, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cyprus/#geography; and *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus," accessed Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/print/article/148573.
[4] Greek migration to the island coincided with the Mycenaean collapse around 1,200 BC. Cyprus henceforth developed a predominantly Hellenic culture. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus;" Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 3, 5-10; "Cyprus," *Nations Online*; and Eugene Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus* (Washington, DC: American University, 1971), 9-22.

Map 5.1: Cyprus[5]

in the first century.[6] Byzantine rule began in the fourth century and lasted nearly 800 years.[7]

The Crusader era[8] that lasted from the late twelfth to the late thirteenth century saw Cyprus ruled

[5] "Map of Cyprus, Mediterranean Sea," *Nations Online Project*, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cyprus_map2.htm.

[6] The apostles Paul, Mark, and Barnabas visited the island. According to Christian tradition, Barnabas founded the Cypriot Orthodox Church and was later martyred at Salamis, Cyprus. *Jewish Encyclopedia*, s. v. "Barnabas, Joses," by Crawford Toy and Kaufmann Kohler, accessed. Feb. 4, 2002, https://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2533-barnabas-joses; "Saint Barnabas," *Franciscan Media*, last modified June 11, 2020, https://www.franciscanmedia.org/saint-of-the-day/saint-barnabas.

[7] The Byzantine era started in 364 and established Cyprus' Greco-Christian culture. Arab Islamic invasions began in the mid-seventh century and lasted 300 years. Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus Phocas ultimately secured Cyprus and expelled the Arabs from Crete in 965. Warren Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1997), 948; John Norwich, *Byzantium: The Apogee* (New York: Knopf, 1992); Anthony Kaldellis, *Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium, 955 A.D. to the First Crusade* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2017); and "Cyprus," *Nations Online*.

[8] Crusader rule initiates nearly 400 years of Catholic administration that ends with the Ottomans in 1571.

by a Byzantine usurper,[9] England's King Richard the Lionheart,[10] and the Knights Templar.[11] The Knights tired of the constant uprisings and sold the island to Guy de Lusignan, the Catholic King of Jerusalem in 1192.[12] Venice supplanted the Lusignan dynasty in 1468.[13] The Venetians competed for dominance with the ascending Ottoman Empire. For the next century, the Ottomans raided Cyprus for slaves and wealth.

The Ottoman Era

The Ottomans went from raiding to conquest in September 1570—60,000 troops captured Cyprus and massacred 20,000 inhabitants.[14] The arrival of people with a different religion, language, and culture changed the island's demographics.[15] The conquering soldiers

[9] Governor Isaac Komnenos declared himself the island's emperor and ruled 1184-1191. Ian Heath, *Byzantine Armies AD 1118–1461* (Oxford, UK: Osprey 2000), 24.
[10] While traveling to the Holy Land during the Third Crusade, Richard's fiancé, Berengaria of Navarre, was shipwrecked on Cyprus and robbed by Komnenos' men. Richard deposed Isaac in 1191 and installed his administration before he left for Jerusalem. While he fought his historic battles with Saladin, the Cypriots revolted against the crusaders' oppressive taxation. Jean Flori, *Richard the Lionheart: Knight and King* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Kenneth Setton, Robert Wolff, and Harry Hazard, *A History of the Crusades: Volume Two, The Later Crusades 1187-1311* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1969); John Hosler, *Siege of Acre, 1189-1191: Saladin, Richard the Lionheart, and the Battle That Decided the Third Crusade* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2018); and Thomas Asbridge, *The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land* (New York: Ecco, 2010).
[11] The Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon was a Catholic military order formed in 1119 to protect Christians on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1994); Frank Sanello, *The Knights Templars: God's Warriors, the Devil's Bankers* (Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade, 2003).
[12] Guy de Lusignan was a French crusader and king of Jerusalem 1186-1192. He made Cyprus an independent kingdom that his successors ruled for the next 300 years. Sidney Painter, "The Lords of Lusignan in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," *Speculum*, 32, no. 1 (Jan. 1957): 27-47.
[13] Benjamin Arbel, "Greek Magnates in Venetian Cyprus: The Case of the Synglitico Family," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 325-337, and *Cypriot Population under Venetian Rule (1473-1571): A Demographic Study* (Nicosia: Idryma Archiepiskópou Makariou, 1984); and Eugene Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus*, 22.
[14] "Cyprus," *Nations Online*; Stephen Turnbull, *The Ottoman Empire 1326–1699* (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2003), 58; T. C. Hopkins, *Confrontation at Lepanto: Christendom vs. Islam* (New York: Forge, 2006), 82; and Thomas Madden, *Venice: A New History* (New York: Viking, 2012).
[15] Selim II ruled from 1566-1574 and facilitated Turkish migration to Cyprus.

became its first permanent Turkish inhabitants; along with the Anatolian peasants, nomads, and miners that followed, they formed the nucleus of Cyprus' Turkish community.[16]

The Ottoman Empire treated its Christians as a revenue source. Islamic requirements for religious toleration, coupled with the need to rule many non-Muslims, produced the millet system.[17] The Greek Cypriots became a religious community governed by clerics (ethnarchs).[18] The ethnarchy exercised civil and religious responsibilities that included tax collection, education, and justice; so long as they obeyed the sultan, the Greeks retained some autonomy. The Ottomans, in return, received revenues without the burdens of administration.

The millet system abolished serfdom and allowed the Ottomans to tax the Cypriot farmers who now owned their land.[19] It also prevented the integration of the island's two main communities.[20] The locals experienced some intermarriage and little ethnic violence.[21] They

[16] This first generation of settlers received land grants (*timars*). Kemal Karpat, "The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. William Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968); Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus," *Comparative Politics* 5, no. 4 (July 1973): 582; George Hill, *A History of Cyprus: The Ottoman Province; the British Colony, 1571-1948, vol. 4* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1952), 18-20; and Van Coufadakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies—The Cyprus Case," in *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, ed. Van Coufadakis (New York: Pella, 1967), 30.

[17] The millet system managed the millions of non-Muslims that came under Ottoman control in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Christos Doumas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," *Social Science* 43, no. 3 (June 1968): 149; William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2009), 48-49; Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam, *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001); Anver Emon, *Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2012); Van Coufadakis, "The Cyprus Question—A Continuing Dialogue," in *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, ed. Van Coufadakis, (New York: Pella, 1967), 3-4; and John Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus from the Coming of the Apostles Paul and Barnabas to the Commencement of the British Occupation (AD 45-AD 1878) Together with Some Account of the Latin and Other Churches Existing in the Island* (London: Methuen, 1901), 198.

[18] The Greek translation is the ruler of a tribe or nation. *Merriam-Webster OnLine*, s. v. "ethnarch," accessed Feb. 7, 2022, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethnarch.

[19] The 150,000 Greeks became the principal landowners by virtue of outnumbering the 30,000 Turks. Doumas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," 148; Philip Newman, *A Short History of Cyprus* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1953), 10, 12.

[20] Doumas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," 148.

[21] Laws regulated the marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men. Achilles Emilianides, "Effect of Marriage on Nationality in Cyprus," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1953): 621-627; Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy," 583.

sometimes united against heavy taxation and developed a common dialect.[22] By recognizing the Orthodox Church, the Ottomans enabled the Greeks to retain their cultural identity and assert their political and economic dominance.[23] Cyprus' Catholics, on the other hand, saw their priests exiled; their churches become mosques.[24]

As long as the Ottoman Empire fared well, Cyprus was relatively stable. Misrule and changing geopolitics eventually hurt living standards.[25] The Atlantic trade replaced the Mediterranean routes for lucrative commerce. Earthquakes, insect infestations, and famines ravaged all Cypriots.[26] The sultans in Istanbul became detached and corrupt.[27] Throughout the nineteenth century, uprisings became common in the Empire. The "sick man of Europe" lost wars and failed on multiple attempts to modernize.[28]

---

[22] They united in 1764 to murder Chil Osman—the newly appointed governor who doubled taxes. Doros Alastos, *Cyprus in History: A Survey of 5,000 Years* (London: Zeno, 1955), 321; Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy," 582-587; and Coufadakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition," 31-32. Early on in the Ottoman administration, the island's main cleavages reflected economic disparities, not cultural differences. The two communities used each other's places of worship during holidays. Samuel Baker, *Cyprus, as I Saw It in 1879* (London: Macmillan, 1879).

[23] The Ottomans reinstituted the office of the archbishop and reversed Catholic policies that subordinated the Cypriot Church to Rome. Keith Kyle, *Cyprus* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1984), 4.

[24] Many Catholics that did not flee converted to Orthodoxy or Islam. Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus*, 116.

[25] Doumas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," 149. The Ottomans sold the office of tax collector to the highest bidder. The winner paid the government in advance and then proceeded to tax the people as heavily as possible.

[26] Ibid. By 1760, only 7,500 adults lived on Cyprus.

[27] The Ottoman practice of hereditary rule produced inept sultans. The Grand Vizier, whose residence was the Sublime Porte, eventually supplanted the sultan; the term "Sublime Porte" became synonymous with Ottoman power. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Sublime Porte: Ottoman Government," accessed Feb. 7, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sublime-Porte; Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge University, 2005).

[28] Russian Tsar Nicholas I characterized the Ottoman Empire as the "Sick Man of Europe" in 1833. Karl Vitzthum von Eckstädt, Henry Reeve, and Edward Taylor, *St. Petersburg and London in the Years 1852-64: Reminiscences of Count Charles Frederick Vitzthum von Eckstaedt* (London: Longmans & Green, 1887), 29-30; Miroslav Šedivý, "From Adrianople to Münchengrätz: Metternich, Russia, and the Eastern Question 1829–33," *International History Review* 33, no. 2 (2011): 205-233; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, chaps. 5, 8-9; and Roderick Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1962), chap. 4.

Greece's revolution against the Ottomans in 1821 affected Cyprus harshly.[29] The island's authorities executed hundreds of Orthodox clerics in July.[30] Greek nationalism thrived regardless. Over time, it would transform the dream of a small elite into a popular movement coalescing around *enosis*—union with the motherland. The new Kingdom of Greece likewise viewed independence as the beginning of a struggle to recapture its former territories.[31] Europeans (particularly Britain) were simultaneously paying more attention to the "sick man's" holdings. Although they defeated the Ottomans in a series of wars, Britain, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary preferred to dismantle the empire gradually and methodically.[32] Greece stood to profit because London, Paris, and St. Petersburg had brokered its independence.[33]

Cyprus' *enosis* gained momentum after London gifted Greek King George I the Ionian Islands in 1864.[34] Russia defeated the Ottomans in the Balkans in 1878 and pursued Turkish

---

[29] The mainland Greeks were the first Ottoman subjects to gain independence. The 1830 London Protocol declared Greece an independent monarchy under European protection. The sultan acknowledged this outcome in the 1832 Treaty of Constantinople. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "War of Greek Independence," accessed Feb. 25, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-Greek-Independence.

[30] Archbishop Kyprianos and 486 priests were hanged or beheaded on July 9, 1821 for fomenting revolution. Theo Panayides, "Cyprus' Archbishop Kyprianos–martyr, victim, fighter," *Cyprus Mail*, last modified July 4, 2021, https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/07/04/cyprus-archbishop-kyprianos-martyr-victim-fighter/; Matthew Namee, "The 1821 Massacre of Greeks in Cyprus," *Orthodox History*, last modified Mar. 30, 2021, https://orthodoxhistory.org/2021/03/30/the-1821-massacre-of-greeks-in-cyprus/.

[31] When Greece became independent in 1830, millions of ethnic Greeks remained under foreign control in Thessaly, Epirus, the Ionian and Aegean Islands, Crete, Asia Minor, and Cyprus. The new government's policy thus became the "Grand Idea (*Megali Idea*)." The quest for Greater Greece sought to reunite "within Greek borders all the lands in Turkish hands where Greek Orthodox were living." Nicholas Petaludis, "The Megali Idea: The Quest for Greater Greece and the Balkan Wars," (Master's thesis, State University of New York at Albany, 1994), 1; Basil Kondis, *Greece and Albania, 1908-1914* (Thessaloniki, GR: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), 12; and Theodore Geshkoff, *Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe* (New York, Columbia University, 1940), 20-21.

[32] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*; Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; and Edward Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1965).

[33] The sultan's Egyptian mercenaries under Mehmet Ali defeated the Greek nationalists in 1826 and captured Athens. Greek fortunes changed the following year after Britain's navy routed Ali at the Battle of Navarino. From this point onward, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg supported Greek independence. David Howarth, *Greek Adventure: Lord Byron and other Eccentrics in the War of Independence* (New York: Atheneum, 1976); Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece: 1770-1923* (New York: St. Martin's, 1972); and Edward Forster, *A Short History of Modern Greece: 1821–1956* (London: Methuen, 1958).

[34] The Ionian, or Seven Islands (*heptanese*) of Corfu, Paxos, Kefalonia, Lefkada, Ithaca, Zakinthos, and Kythira were Greek for more than three millennia. Britain acquired them from France during the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Newly crowned King George I had relatives in the Russian, British, Norwegian, and Danish royal families. Forster,

territory via the Treaty of San Stefano.[35] Vienna and London checked St. Petersburg's aspirations in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin;[36] Athens got Thessaly and part of Epirus.[37] Union could have followed when Britain acquired Cyprus in June.[38]

The British Era

Greek Cyprus' grievance against Britain began in 1878.[39] London did not replay its Ionian Island charity, so no quick union awaited.[40] The new occupation instead brought unpleasant surprises. The Cyprus Convention obligated London to transfer the leftover funds

---

A Short History of Modern Greece; John Van der Kiste, *Kings of the Hellenes: The Greek Kings, 1863-1974* (Dover, NH: Alan Sutton, 1994); and *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Ionian Islands," by Jeff Wallenfeldt, accessed Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ionian-Islands.

[35] Russia sought to terminate the Turkish presence in the Balkans. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Treaty of San Stefano," accessed Feb. 11, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-San-Stefano.

[36] Nicholas van der Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency: The Divided Island, 1955–1974* (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2010), 15; William Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement, 1878-1880* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1963); Robert Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question* (London: Cass, 1962); and Dwight Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1934).

[37] During the "Great Eastern Crisis," Bosnia-Herzegovina's Orthodox Slavs rebelled against Ottoman rule in 1875. The next year Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Turks. Russia joined the war in 1877. The Berlin Conference gave Bosnia-Herzegovina to Vienna, granted Serbian and Romanian independence, and prevented Russia from establishing a warm water port at the Dardanelle Straits. Thessaly and Epirus sit near the coastal region between northwestern Greece and southern Albania. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*; Fred Jane, *Imperial Russian Navy: Its Past, Present, and Future* (London: Thacker, 1904); and "The Treaty of Berlin, 1878: Excerpts on the Balkans," *Fordham University*, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1878berlin.asp.

[38] Secret Anglo-Ottoman talks at the Berlin Conference led to the Cyprus Convention on June 4, 1878. While Istanbul officially retained sovereignty over the island, it ceded administrative control to London; the latter promised in return to protect the Ottoman Empire against further Russian incursions. J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, trans. J. C. Hurewitz (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1975; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 4, 19; and Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention*.

[39] The 1881 British census indicated that 74% of the people were Orthodox Christians, 24% were Muslim Turks, and about 2% were Catholics, Maronites, and Protestants. Nikos Christofis and Thekla Kyritsi, "Introduction: Cypriot Nationalism(s) in Context," in *Cypriot Nationalisms in Context*, ed. Thekla Kyritsi and Nikos Christofis (Cham: Switz., Palgrave/Macmillan, 2018), 7-8.

[40] Sir Garnet Wolseley, Britain's first High Commissioner to Cyprus, dismissed calls for union. He served from July 1878 to June 1879. London wanted the island to safeguard its Indian trade routes and establish a commanding presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus, however, lacked a deep-water harbor. Britain remedied this problem four years later when it acquired Egypt's port at Alexandria. David French, "British Intelligence and the Origins of the EOKA Insurgency," *British Journal for Military History* 1, no. 2 (2015): 85; Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850–1960* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 2006), 162-165.

from its administration costs to Istanbul.[41] This "Cyprus Tribute" was £93,000. The colonial authorities decided, however, that the money was better spent paying off the Ottomans' Crimean War loans. Not only would the impoverished Cypriots shoulder the financial burdens of British colonialism—they became responsible also for the tribute.[42]

The Grand Idea during the Great War

The next three and a half decades of British administration affected the island's two communities differently. The Turkish minority generally embraced a system that favored it politically and prevented *enosis*. It opposed London's creation of a Cypriot constitution with a legislative assembly in 1882. The Turks essentially acted as Britain's junior ally and resisted the Greek community's efforts for democratization.[43] The majority's discontent on Cyprus only grew after Greece reunited with another long lost island—Crete—in 1913.[44]

Britain annexed Cyprus in November 1914, just after Istanbul sided with Berlin in the First World War.[45] London then asked Athens to honor its Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

[41] See footnote # 38.
[42] G. S. Georghallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985), 5-9, 38-40, 45-57; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 20-21; and "The Cyprus Tribute Volume 4: debated on Thursday 19 May 1892," *Hansard: UK Parliament*, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1892-05-19/debates/18f5d8e8-8573-4bb7-8a66-2245d89b642d/TheCyprusTribute.
[43] Diana Markides and G. S. Georghallides, "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931," *Cyprus Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 13, no. 1 (May 1995): 64.
[44] The 1913 Treaty of Bucharest ended the Balkan Wars and authorized Greater Greece's reunion with Crete. Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, 199; Frank Anderson and Amos Hershey, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870-1914* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), 439.
[45] Cyprus became sovereign British territory. Kevin Fewster, Hatice Hürmüz Başarin, and Vecihi Başarin, *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story* (Crow's Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003); Edward Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001); and Mustafa Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany'? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad," *War in History* 18, no. 2 (Apr. 2011): 184-199.

Mutual Protection with Serbia and declare war on Bulgaria;[46] it offered Cyprus in 1915 to entice Greece into the war.[47] Greek King Constantine I instead declared neutrality and deposed his pro-war Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos in October.[48] British, French, and Russian troops occupied Greece until a coup returned Venizelos to power in October 1916. By the time Greece declared war on the Central Powers in June 1917, London rescinded the Cyprus offer.[49]

Greater Greece both prospered and suffered right after the First World War.[50] The Allies took Western Thrace from the beaten Bulgaria via the November 1919 Treaty of Neuilly-sur-

[46] The 1913 treaty obliged Greece to defend Serbia against Bulgaria. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus," accessed Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/print/article/148573; "Diplomatic Documents, 1913-1917, Issued by the Greek Government Concerning the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance and the Germano-Bulgarian Invasion in Macedonia: Part First," *American Journal of International Law* 12, no. 2, Supplement: Official Documents (Apr. 1918): 86-139; and "Greek White Book, Supplementary Diplomatic Documents, 1913-1917, Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Greek Government; Dealing with the Greco-Serbian Treaty and the Germano-Bulgarian Invasion of Macedonia, and Containing Telegrams Exchanged," trans. Theodore Ion and Carroll Brown (New York: American Hellenic Society/Oxford University Press, 1919).

[47] *Enosis* supporters consider the offer British acknowledgement of Cyprus' Greek ties. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, 339-344; Wilfrid Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story of EOKA* (London: Hale, 1959), 18-19; Kemal Melek, "The Cyprus Question: A Study in Ethnic Relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, 1955-1967," *Istanbul University Faculty of Communication Journal* 1-2 (1992): 300; and Doumas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," 151.

[48] Constantine did his military training in Germany and married Sophia—Kaiser Wilhelm II's sister. Kiste, *Kings of the Hellenes*. Venizelos was prime minister seven times from 1910 to 1933. Paschalis Kitromilides, *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2008).

[49] King Constantine abdicated in June 1917. His son Alexander was king until Oct. 1920. Greece raised ten divisions and contributed the Royal Hellenic Navy. Its troops fought in Bulgaria and Serbia under French and British command. Kiste, *Kings of the Hellenes*; John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 253; Coufadakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition, 33; and Alexander Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After: A Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor, 1915-1922* (London: Methuen, 1937), 8-11, 37.

[50] The Greek military lost 5,000 soldiers. Martin Gilbert, *First World War: A Complete History* (New York: Rosetta, 2014), 551.

Seine;[51] they gave it to Greece at the San Remo Conference in April 1920.[52] San Remo led to the Treaty of Sèvres in August; Athens could establish a "presence" in Eastern Thrace, administer the Smyrna Greeks along the Anatolian coast, and control the Aegean islands of Tenedos and Imbros.[53]

While Britain was intent on keeping Cyprus, it also looked to make Greece its surrogate in the Balkans against Russia and Italy.[54] Prime Minister David Lloyd George ordered his delegation at the Paris Peace Conference to promote Athenian claims in Eastern Thrace and Anatolia; he then schemed with Prime Minister Venizelos for French and American[55] backing

[51] Bulgaria lost its outlet to the Aegean Sea. Thrace was part of Greece for millennia and contained a large Greek majority. The treaty also included a population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria. US Congress, Senate, "Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria and Protocol, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine at November 27, 1919," *Peace Treaties, Various Treaties and Agreements between the Allied and Associated Powers and Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey, together with some other agreements signed by the Peace Conference at Paris and Saint-Germain-En-Laye, presented by Mr. Lodge, April 25, 1921*, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 7, 1921, 47-162, https://archive.org/details/peacetreaties00alli/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater; "Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal," *American Journal of International Law* 14, no. 4 (1920): 356-360, https://doi.org/10.2307/2212906.

[52] The conference met in Italy on April 19-26 to divide the Ottoman Empire. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Conference of San Remo," accessed Feb. 10, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Conference-of-San-Remo.

[53] The Sèvres Treaty abolished the Ottoman Empire, gave Armenia independence, and made Kurdistan autonomous. Greece's new borders extended twenty-five miles from Istanbul. Tenedos and Imbros sit by the Dardanelles Straits. Smyrna and the surrounding areas along the Anatolian coast had been part of Greece since antiquity; they contained millions of Greek and Armenian Christians in 1920. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Treaty of Sèvres," accessed Feb. 10, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Sevres; Renee Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York: Berghahn, 2003); and Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 151-153, 163.

[54] London believed that the new Bolshevik regime would renew Russian efforts to control the Straits. Italy demanded portions of the former Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires at the peace conferences based on the 1915 Treaty of London; Rome had agreed to join the Allies only after being promised these territories that included islands in the Adriatic and Albania's port at Vlore. By 1919, France and Britain believed that Italy had reneged on its treaty obligations; they were also annoyed that Rome initiated operations to occupy Smyrna. Margaret MacMillan and Richard Holbrooke, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002), ch. 22; H. James Burgwyn, *The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1993).

[55] US President Woodrow Wilson supported Greece's occupation of western Anatolia. The region had a large Greek population, and Wilson's postwar plans envisioned self-determination for minorities. United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918," https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/fourteen-points; "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points: 8 January, 1918," *Yale Law School: The Avalon Project*, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp; and Godfrey Hodgson, *Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House* (New Haven: Yale University, 2006), 160-163.

during Italy's absence from Paris.[56] After their bogus report put Anatolian Christians in imminent danger of Turkish violence, an Anglo-Greek flotilla landed 13,000 troops at Smyrna on May 15, 1920.[57] The Greek army brutalized Turkish prisoners and locals; the Turks retaliated against Christians outside the occupation zone. The Greeks were clashing with organized Turkish military units by late May.[58] General Mustafa Kemal emerged as leader of Turkish nationalism.[59]

Greece's "allies" turned their backs. The British Empire, having just sustained three million casualties, was in no mood for more war, now on behalf of the Greek Empire.[60] France obsessed over German reparations while US President Woodrow focused on his Fourteen Points and the League of Nations; Italy assisted the Turkish resistance. An official Allied inquiry that included a British commissioner was already blaming Greece.[61]

---

[56] Rome temporarily left the Paris Conference over a land dispute with Yugoslavia. Burgwyn, *The Legend of the Mutilated Victory*. By Feb. 1919, London planned for Greek administration of Smyrna. A. E. Montgomery, "The Making of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920," *Historical Journal* 15, no. 4 (Dec. 1972): 775-787; and Peter Jensen, "The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 4 (Nov. 1979): 553-565.

[57] Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), 88-92; Victoria Solomonidis, "Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919–1922," (PhD Dissertation, King's College, University of London 1984), 43-52.

[58] Greek troops bayoneted Turkish war prisoners, arbitrarily detained thousands of civilians, and looted Jewish-owned shops. Smith, *Ionian Vision*, 88-92; Solomonidis, "Greece in Asia Minor," 43; and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Oxford University, 1968), 241-243.

[59] General Mustafa Kemal led former Ottoman officers in a rebellion against the sultan and organized the resistance. He became the Republic of Turkey's first president in 1923. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Kemal Atatürk: President of Turkey," accessed Feb. 11, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kemal-Ataturk; Paul Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1974).

[60] *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "World War I: Killed, Wounded, and Missing," accessed Feb. 11, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I/Killed-wounded-and-missing.

[61] According to the official investigation, the Greek army suffered two dead and six wounded; one hundred Greek civilians died while 300-500 Turkish civilians were dead or wounded. Çağrı Erhan, "Greek Occupation of Izmir and Adjoining Territories: Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry, May-September 1919," (Ankara: SAM, 1999); Mark Lewis, "International Legal Movements Against War Crimes, Terrorism, and Genocide, 1919-1948," (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 2008); and Stavros Stavridis, *Greek-Turkish War, 1918-23: An Australian Press Perspective* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2008).

The Battle of Sakarya became the Greco-Turkish War's turning point in September 1921.[62] The Greek front collapsed a year later when Mustafa Kemal captured Smyrna. Turkish mobs murdered Archbishop Chrysostomos and burned the city's Greek and Armenian quarters.[63] The Great Fire's casualties range from 10,000 to 100,000; thousands more fled.[64] The Treaty of Sèvres passed into history as Athens evacuated Eastern Thrace and Anatolia. Many of the refugees, already resentful of the Turks and British, settled in Cyprus and swelled the Greek community there with staunch supporters of *enosis*.[65]

The July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne created modern Turkey.[66] A population exchange forced 1.5 million Greeks to leave former Ottoman lands; 500,000 Muslims left Greece.[67] Except for Istanbul, the Greek presence in Asia ended.[68] Lausanne recognized Italy's possession

[62] The conflict is also called the Anatolian War. Sakarya took place Aug. 23-Sep. 13 outside Ankara. William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Christopher Chant, *Warfare of the 20th Century: Armed Conflict Outside the Two World Wars* (Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell, 1988), 22; and Smith, *Ionian Vision*, 227-233.

[63] Archbishop Chrysostomos Kalafatis was murdered on Sep. 19, 1922. The Eastern Orthodox Church declared him a martyr and a saint on Nov. 4, 1992. George Horton, *The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953); Giles Milton, *Paradise Lost: Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of a Christian City in the Islamic World* (New York: Basic, 2008).

[64] Tessa Hofmann, Matthias Bjørnlund, and Vasileios. Meichanetsidis, *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912-1922 and Its Aftermath : History, Law, Memory* (New York: Caratzas, 2011); Mark Biondich, *The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence Since 1878* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2011), 92; Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2002), 52; Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece* (Paris: Mouton, 1962); Meir Zamir, "Population Statistics of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and 1919," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 1 (Jan.1981): 85-106; Jensen, "The Greco-Turkish War," 553-565; and Smith, *Ionian Vision*, 92.

[65] Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 16.

[66] Turkey retained sovereignty over Anatolia, Istanbul, and Eastern Thrace while renouncing claims to its former Arab provinces. Autonomy for Kurdistan and independence for Armenia disappeared. Turkey could run its finances and organize its armed forces as it saw fit. The Straits were open to all shipping. Article 59 obligated Greece to pay Turkey reparations. "Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923," *World War I Document Archive*, accessed Feb. 10, 2022, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.

[67] Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006); Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 47; and Dinah Shelton, *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity* (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference, 2005), 303.

[68] Turkey granted the Greeks minority rights in Istanbul.

of the Dodecanese Islands[69] and made Britain the undisputed lord of Cyprus.[70] The island became a crown colony in 1925.[71]

Many Greeks, including George Grivas, felt betrayed by Britain. The future VNA leader was born in Cyprus in 1897 and moved to Greece in 1915. He graduated from the Hellenic Military Academy in 1919.[72] The second lieutenant served with the Greek 10th Division in Anatolia and participated in the advance from Smyrna to Ankara. Grivas was wounded at the Battle of Sakarya, cited for bravery, and promoted to first lieutenant;[73] he recognized "the possibilities" of unconventional warfare after observing "the ease with which a band of [Turkish] irregulars armed only with rifles" delayed an entire division for a full day.[74]

How a Grievance Grows

The interwar period saw Greek nationalism on Cyprus intensify and Turkish nationalism coalesce. The island's Turks were inspired by Kemalism.[75] They withdrew their unqualified

[69] The Dodecanese, or Twelve Islands that include Rhodes, Karpathos, and Patmos lie about fifty miles off Turkey's southwestern coast and 250 miles from Athens. They were part of Greece until the sixteenth century Ottoman conquest. Rome took control after the 1911 Italo-Turkish War. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Dodecanese: Islands, Greece," accessed Feb. 11, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Dodecanese.
[70] Turkey formally accepted the loss of Cyprus in Article 20. "Treaty of Lausanne: Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923," *BYU World War I Document Archive*, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.
[71] Cyprus was a British protectorate 1878-1914, a military occupation 1914-1925, and a crown colony 1925-1960. "Cyprus," *Nations Online*. Crown colonies lack substantial political autonomy and are administered by a London-appointed executive governor. Edward Jenks, *The Government of the British Empire* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918); James Olson and Robert Shadle, *Historical Dictionary of the British Empire* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996).
[72] George Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, trans. Charles Foley (New York: Praeger, 1965), 3-4.
[73] Andreas Varnavas, *Brief History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA, 1955-1959* (Nicosia: EOKA Liberation Struggle 1955-59 Foundation, 2001); George Grivas, *General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Alexander Pallis (New York: Praeger, 1965); and Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 27.
[74] Grivas returned to Athens in 1923, was promoted to captain, and studied military science in France. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 4; Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 17.
[75] Kemalism is the ideology of the Turkish Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). It sought to move the new state beyond its Ottoman legacy by embracing Turkish nationalism, secularization, and modernization. Eric Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 181; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern*

support for the administration and formally asked for more autonomy in 1930.[76] The global depression brought mass poverty and discontent. The two-year drought that destroyed crops and livestock pushed Cyprus to the verge of famine. These hardships saddled even more debt on a people still roiling over colonial taxation policies.[77]

London decided to raise Cypriot customs and excise taxes in 1931. The Greek and Turkish members of the legislative council united to reject Governor Ronald Storrs' bill. Storrs ignored the council and dismissed the non-compliant Turks as bribe takers.[78] Starting on October 21, five thousand Cypriots engaged in ten days of mass protests.[79] The Greek-led riots culminated with the torching of the British Government House in Nicosia.[80] A third of the island's 600 villages participated in the violence. The Bishop of Kition publicly called for the administration's violent overthrow.[81]

Middle East, 167; and Donald Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (New York: AMS, 1973), 245.

[76] The original 1882 constitution created an eighteen member Legislative Council. Of the twelve elected members, three had to be Muslim. The high commissioner appointed the remaining six members. The three Muslims consistently voted with the commissioner's six appointees and deadlocked the council. The high commissioner then cast the deciding vote. After the Turks broke from the authorities in the Legislative Council and upset the power balance, the governor had to impose new laws unilaterally. Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 21; Alexios Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability: British Constitutional Proposals in Post-war Cyprus," J*ournal of Human Rights in the Commonwealth* (Feb. 2016): 51.

[77] Although London took over the sultan's tribute in 1927, it then charged £10,000 for "imperial defense." Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 21-22; Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus*, 33.

[78] Storrs was governor Nov. 1926-Oct. 1932. Markides and Georghallides, "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making," 65; Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 51; Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus*, 33; and Georghallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship*, 578.

[79] Henry Frendo, "The Naughty European Twins of Empire: The Constitutional Breakdown in Malta and Cyprus 1930–1933," *The European Legacy* 3, no. 1 (1998): 50; Stella Soulioti, *Fettered Independence: Cyprus, 1878-1964. Vol. I: The Narrative* (Minneapolis, MN: Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota, 2006), 17.

[80] After the priest of Nicosia's Phaneromeni Church proclaimed *enosis*, the crowd moved on to burn the British Government House. David Carter, "The 1931 Rebellion: A Week that Shook Cyprus," *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*, last modified Oct. 22, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20121024032328/http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Davidcarter/31rebellion/31rebellion.html; Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus*, 33; and *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus," accessed Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/print/article/148573.

[81] Carter, "The 1931 Rebellion."

Britain sent Royal Marines and dispatched infantry and aircraft from Malta and Egypt.[82] It suspended the constitution and banned elections, freedom of the press, and political parties.[83] The authorities arrested 2,000 people and exiled the bishops of Kition and Kyrenia.[84] Martial law turned Governor Richmond Palmer into a military dictator from 1933 to 1938;[85] he appointed all municipal officials and could reject new archbishops.[86] What little Greek opposition took place during this period involved clerics and communists.

Britain had thus far failed to stabilize its Eastern Mediterranean colony. By trying to westernize Cyprus, it "inadvertently introduced the concept of a people's right to self-determination." By stimulating trade and commerce, Britain enabled the Greeks to accumulate the wealth that they would later use to promote *enosis*. By stripping the ethnarchy of its tax collecting duties, Britain allowed Greek nationalists to paint it as anti-church.[87]

For two generations, London intentionally accentuated the two communities' cultural differences. It downplayed their numerous commonalities and never promoted a history that was distinct from Greece.[88] Although the colonials built more public schools after 1918, they instituted two separate boards of education. The textbooks provided by the respective

[82] Ibid; Frendo, "The Naughty European Twins," 50.
[83] Elections did not resume until 1943.
[84] Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1978,), 27.
[85] Palmer served Nov. 1933-July 1938.
[86] The absence of the bishops from Kition and Kyrenia left only two senior clerics—Archbishop Cyril III in Nicosia and Bishop Leontios in Paphos. When Cyril died in 1933, the British refused to allow the two exiled priests to return for an election. The office remained vacant until Leontios' election in June 1947. Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 22-23; Christopher Sutton, "Britain, the Cold War, and 'the Importance of Influencing the Young': A Comparison of Cyprus and Hong Kong," *Britain and the World* 7, no.1 (2014): 89.
[87] Doumas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," 150.
[88] Van Coufoudakis, "Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis (review)," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 4, no. 2 (1986): 175-177; Georghallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship*. The legislative institutions exploited racial cleavages and "destroyed any possibility of a common citizenship." Yiannos Katsourides, "The Rise of Greek Cypriot Nationalism to Hegemony: Agency, Particularities, and Polarization," in *Cypriot Nationalisms in Context*, ed. Thekla Kyritsi and Nikos Christofis (Cham: Switz., Palgrave/Macmillan, 2018), 30.

motherlands ignored the distinct Cypriot dialect that had evolved since the sixteenth century.[89] London let Athens and Ankara transform their communities into each other's enemy.[90]

The push for *enosis* moved to London, where Greek Cypriot expatriates lobbied Parliament for home rule.[91] With the prospects of another war looming in the late 1930s, Britain pacified the island with increased trade and banks loans to small farmers. It built more hospitals. New roads connected the isolated villages to the cities; barren hills and mountains were reforested.[92] The Cyprus question would linger until after the next war.

The War's Respite

Thirty thousand Greek Cypriots enlisted in the British army after Italy and then Germany invaded Greece.[93] Governor Sir Charles Woolley formed the Cyprus Regiment and the Cyprus Volunteer Force;[94] Cypriot transport units joined the British Expeditionary Force in France.[95] The island became an Allied supply depot and training base. London hinted that it would resolve the Cyprus problem after the war.[96] While the governor did not restore the constitution, he allowed political parties to operate.

---

[89] Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict," 589-590; William Weir, *Education in Cyprus: Some Theories and Practices in Education in the Island of Cyprus since 1878* (Nicosia, Cyprus: Cosmos, 1952), 54-56, 113-116.
[90] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," xxv.
[91] They formed the Committee for Cyprus Autonomy in 1937.
[92] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 23.
[93] Fascist Italy attacked Greece on Oct. 28, 1940 and was repelled in March 1941. Hitler's invasion, codenamed Operation Marita, took place a month later. German, Italian, and Bulgarian troops occupied Greece by May. Jack Greene, "Greece Campaign," in *Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History*, ed. David Zabecki (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2015); John Hondros, *Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-44* (New York: Pella, 1983); Christopher Buckley, *Greece and Crete, 1941* (London, HMSO: 1977); and Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 23-24.
[94] He served Oct. 1941-Oct. 1946.
[95] George Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990), 23.
[96] Both British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Prime Minister Winston Churchill fueled these assumptions but made no specific guarantees. Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 24.

Among the first groups to organize, to the consternation of the church and right wing, was the Progressive Party of the Working People (*Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú*—AKEL).[97] The communists won the March 1943 municipal elections in Limassol and Famagusta. The Greek Right responded with the Cyprus Enosis Front (*Kypriakon Enotikon Metapon*—KEM). The Turks created their own political parties and labor unions.[98]

The Greek Government-in-exile pursued *enosis* diplomatically, even while it was under British protection. King George II explained the *Megali Idea* to President Franklin Roosevelt in June 1941.[99] In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Grivas busied himself with Italian fascists, German Nazis, and Greek communists. He fought Italy well after October 1940—his Second Army Division helped push the Italians back into Albania.[100] The newly promoted colonel was working in the War Office when Germany invaded in April 1941.[101] After the Greek Army demobilized, he eventually settled in Athens in 1943 to fight Nazis.[102] When the Germans issued his arrest warrant in March, Grivas went underground and formed a VNA called "X."[103]

---

[97] The Anglo-American alliance with the Soviet Union in Jan. 1942 destigmatized communism in the west. William Johnsen, *The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 2016). The Cypriot Communist Party emerged in 1926 and reformed as AKEL in 1941. Although the British suppressed potential sources of nationalism after 1931, they left the trade unions relatively unscathed. These organizations became a political base for the communists. T. W. Adams, *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus* (Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1971); Yiannos Katsourides, "The National Question in Cyprus and the Cypriot Communist Left in the Era of British Colonialism (1922-59)," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern studies* 16, no. 4 (2014): 474-501.

[98] Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 51; Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 16.

[99] George became king in 1922 and left Greece after the Nazi invasion in April 1941 He led the Greek governments-in-exile in Crete, Egypt, and London. George returned to Greece after the war and died in 1947. Kiste, *Kings of the Hellenes*, 136-137; Julia Gelardi, *Born to Rule: Five Reigning Consorts, Granddaughters of Queen Victoria* (New York: St. Martin's, 2005); and Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 45.

[100] He transferred from the General Staff in Athens to the mountain front in Epirus. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 4-5; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 27.

[101] Grivas earned a reputation for his meticulous staff work. Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 17.

[102] Ibid, 16; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 5; Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story*, 22-23. For arguments questioning Grivas' role in resisting the Nazis, see Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 91.

[103] "X" symbolized the unknown. Grivas recruited colleagues from the 2nd Army Division. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 5; Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 26; and Andreas Varnavas, *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA, 1955-1959* (Nicosia: Foundation of the EOKA Liberation Struggle 1955-1959, 2004) 33-34.

The group received little British support until autumn 1944.[104] London opted instead to work with the Greek Left; but when the government returned to Athens in October 1944, the British occupation triggered a communist uprising by the Hellenic People's Liberation Army (*Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós*—ELAS).[105] Fighting erupted between X and ELAS.[106] With the Nazis gone, London and Grivas united in the Greek civil war.[107] Although the communists lost Athens in February 1945, the war continued until 1949.[108]

Enosis in the Cold War

The Cold War complicated *enosis*. Turkey was no longer Europe's sick man, and it did not want a hostile Greek Cyprus looming off its borders.[109] Turkish Cypriots did not want to live as a minority under Athens. One side's demand for partition (*taksim*) consequently grew commensurately with the other's demand for union.[110] The Greek state's shattered economy

[104] Grivas writes that his 300 irregulars collected intelligence on German movements. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 5.
[105] ELAS was the military arm of the National Liberation Front (*Ethnikó Apeleftherotikó Métopo*—EAM). Both organizations were closely related to the Greek Communist Party (*Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas*—KKE). Grivas claims that the communists were not interested in fighting Nazis, but rather schemed to seize power after Germany left. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 6-7; David Brewer, *Greece, the Decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War* (London: Tauris, 2016); and Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949* (London: NLB, 1972).
[106] Conflict between Left and Right Greek VNAs already began in 1943. George Alexander, *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982); George Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom; Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953* (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1953), 200.
[107] The British had arranged for a truce between the Left and Right in order to focus on the Germans. After the Nazis left, London realized that ELAS would not submit its army of 40,000 to British command. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 8; Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story*, 29, 37.
[108] Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 19.
[109] Greater Greece reincorporated the Dodecanese Islands via the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties that ended Italy's empire in Africa, Greece, and Albania. See footnote # 69. "Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, and Finland," (Washington, DC: GPO, 1947), accessed on Feb. 16, 2022, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435066406612&view=1up&seq=8&skin=2021.
[110] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," xxiv-xxv.

compelled it to rely on London—union's main obstacle—to underwrite its civil war.[111] Athens' anticommunism prompted it to oppose the Cypriot Left and split the Greek community politically.[112] British Prime Minister Clement Atlee doubted whether the Greek government would even survive.[113] His advisers argued in 1946 that, "[Britain still] occupying Cyprus meant the Soviets could not;" the Foreign Office warned that given Greece's daunting financial and military challenges, ceding it the island was folly.[114]

Atlee's Labour Party was intent on preserving the Empire.[115] Britain's withdrawal from India in 1947 hardened its resolve in Cyprus.[116] London had to secure its new oil transport routes from the Middle East. Palestine was rebelling and continued control of the Suez Canal was uncertain; Britain also had to relinquish bases in Iraq.[117] At the same time, anticolonial sentiment was growing in the US and UN; British relations with both Ankara and Athens would affect NATO. London thus realized that it could no longer "embark on a policy of repression in Cyprus in the hope that no one would notice."[118]

---

[111] The Greek Civil War lasted from 1943 to 1949. The government defeated the communists in Oct. 1949 with help from Great Britain and America. Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou, "The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941–2002," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 2 (2004): 223-231; Robert Service, *Comrades!: A History of World Communism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2007); and John Iatrides, *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover: University of New England, 1981).
[112] AKEL's resounding wins in the May 1946 municipal elections alarmed Athens, the Cypriot Right, and the church. Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 52.
[113] Atlee succeeded Winston Churchill in July 1945 and served until Oct. 1951.
[114] A communist Greece would transform Cyprus into a Soviet outpost and imperil the British Empire in the Mediterranean and Middle East. John Kent, *Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East* (London: HMSO, 1998), 147; David Fieldhouse, "The Labour Government and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945-51," in *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951*, ed. Ritchie Ovendale (Leicester: Leicester University, 1984), 104-105.
[115] William Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 222-224; Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 51; and Fabian Colonial Bureau, *Strategic Colonies and Their Future: Papers Prepared for the Fabian Colonial Bureau* (Fabian Publications and V. Gollancz Limited, 1945), 35.
[116] The British Raj lasted from 1858 to July 1947. Burton Stein and David Arnold, *A History of India* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); John Riddick, *History of British India: A Chronology* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).
[117] Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 79.
[118] Sutton, "Britain, the Cold War," 85-108; David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," *International Affairs* 62, no. 1 (1985): 1-20; and Louis, *The British Empire*.

The Winster Plan: Imperial Concerns & Local Politics

Governor Baron Winster's reforms in mid-1947 mark the state's first postwar efforts to fix Cyprus.[119] Britain's violent and humiliating expulsion from Palestine meant that it would consolidate its imperial assets on the island.[120] The plan began promisingly enough by allowing the return of the Greek agitators exiled after 1931 and repealing the 1937 religious laws.[121] The situation digressed after that. The Consultative Assembly of eighteen representatives that convened for a new constitution in July included seven Turks, two unaffiliated Cypriots, one Maronite Christian,[122] eight Leftist Greeks, and no one from the church or the Right.[123] Britain was killing communists in Greece while negotiating with them in Cyprus.

The Winster plan merely repackaged colonialism as proportional representation.[124] Although a Greek majority would control a "new" Executive Council, the governor could set the council's agenda and veto its decisions.[125] Even this scheme, however, proved too generous for

[119] Reginald Fletcher, the first Baron Winster, served Oct. 1946-Aug. 1949.
[120] Jewish nationalists initiated terrorism in late 1945. Their irregular warfare culminated with the spectacular bombing of Britain's military headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on July 22, 1946. London relinquished its Palestine Mandate in May 1948 and began redeploying its troops to Cyprus. "The British Army in Palestine," *National Army Museum*, accessed Feb. 22, 2002, https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/conflict-Palestine#:~:text=Withdrawal,in%20the%20war%20that%20followed; "Palestine; Termination of the Mandate 15th May, 1948," (London: HMSO, 1948), accessed on Feb. 22, 2022, https://archive.org/details/PalestineTerminationOfTheMandate15thMay1948.
[121] See footnote # 86.
[122] The Maronite Cypriots emigrated from Lebanon during the Middle Ages and saw their numbers decline under Ottoman administration; less than 2,000 remained by the 1930s. Farid Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2010), 109.
[123] Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 52.
[124] President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus Edward Jackson struck all other options from the assembly's agenda. He also headed the Consultative Assembly 1943-1951. Christopher Sutton, *Britain's Cold War in Cyprus and Hong Kong: A Conflict of Empires* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2016), 110; Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 54.
[125] The colonial administration monopolized defense, finance, foreign affairs, and minority issues. Alexios Alecou, *Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945-1955: Politics and Ideologies under British Rule* (New York: Nature America, 2016), 64, and "Safeguarding through Stability," 54; and Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 26.

Labour Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Imperial Staff in London. Months of revisions produced a draft constitution that empowered the colonial authorities even more than the 1882 version.[126]

The Cypriot Left rejected the plan. It initially embraced *enosis* in a political platform that brought electoral victories in 1946. The communists now decided that since union was unlikely, they would settle for self-government. The Church and the Right denounced them as traitors; their opposition to the assembly, communism, and Britain hardened.[127] Athens killed the governor's plans by misinforming Greek Cypriots that its own *enosis* plan was already being debated in London.[128]

Early 1950's: Grivas, Makarios, Athens: The Approach of Violence

An emboldened Athens made *enosis* national policy after the Greek Civil War ended in 1949.[129] A January 1950 plebiscite showed that the Cypriot Greek community supported union.[130] Makarios II's sudden death in June brought Makarios III in October.[131] The new archbishop promised that Britain would not rest until Cyprus united with "Mother Greece;" he further assured that, "no offer of a constitution or any other compromise will be accepted by the

[126] Alecou, "Safeguarding through Stability," 55-56.
[127] Ibid, 52. Communist wins in the May 1946 elections alarmed the Right, who lost most municipalities except Paphos and Kyrenia. The church opposed communism because of the oppression that its Orthodox brethren endured in the Eastern bloc. The USSR sought to establish state atheism. Arto Luukkanen, *The Religious Policy of the Stalinist State: A Case Study—The Central Standing Commission on Religious Questions, 1929-1938* (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1997); Geoffrey Blainey, *A Short History of Christianity* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); N. S. Timasheff, *Religion in Soviet Russia 1917-1942* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942); and Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 25.
[128] In reality, Athens was so concerned with its civil war that it dared not antagonize its British benefactors. Its immediate goal on Cyprus was to undermine AKEL. Alecou, *Communism and Nationalism*, 62-63, and "Safeguarding through Stability," 56.
[129] Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 302; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 27.
[130] Makarios II organized the vote. Ninety-six percent of the Greek electorate voted for union. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6; Doros Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British* (London: Heinemann, 1960), 34-35.
[131] Michael Christodoulou Mouskos was born in 1913 and became bishop of Kition in 1948.

people of Cyprus."[132] Makarios denounced Britain before the UN Secretary General in February 1951 and urged Athens to do the same at the General Assembly;[133] he contemplated how political violence could raise the issue's profile.[134] A ring met secretly in Athens to recruit retired Colonel George Grivas in May.[135]

Grivas had converted X into a Greek political party—National Agrarian Party X—during his failed bids for public office in 1946 and 1950.[136] Now free to pursue *enosis* full-time, he concluded that only unconventional warfare could end British colonialism and prevent communist dominance on the island. The colonel started organizing a Cypriot VNA and advocated immediate action.[137] When he conferred with Makarios in July 1951, the cautious cleric preferred diplomacy and sabotage.[138]

The issue simmered until mid-1952. When Makarios refused to meet with Grivas in Cyprus in June, the colonel turned to Archbishop Spyridon in Athens. Privately, Spyridon conspired with the Athens Ring; publicly, he berated the Greek government for not liberating "the enslaved areas."[139] Makarios joined the ring in Athens and agreed to lead its Liberation

---

[132] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 27; Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6.
[133] He presented the 1950 plebiscite results and requested that the UN apply self-determination to Cyprus. Andrew Novo, "The God Dilemma: Faith, the Church, and Political Violence in Cyprus," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 31, no. 2 (Oct. 2013): 197.
[134] Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*, trans. Timothy Cullen and Susan Kyriakidis, (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1986), 21-44; Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 28-54.
[135] The Archbishop of Athens Spyridon helped form the Athens Ring that included a Cypriot bishop, Savvas and Socrates Loizidis, former Greek Minister of War George Stratos, and law professor Dimitrios Vezanis. Ioannis Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* (New York: New York University, 1999), 244; Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 20.
[136] Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 92.
[137] Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 17.
[138] They first met in Athens in 1942 and eventually became bitter enemies. Grivas considered himself the true leader of Cypriot nationalism. Makarios believed that America would act as mediator because it was inducting Greece and Turkey into NATO. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6; David Binder, "Greece, Turkey, and NATO," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2012): 95-106; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Front Line State, 1952-1967* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 28; and Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story*, 40, 43-45.
[139] Makarios still hoped to avoid violence and persuade Greece to submit Cyprus to the United Nations. Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 119. Spyridon, on the other hand, had recently organized mass demonstrations in Athens to

Committee; Grivas became the military chief.[140] They swore in March 1953 to support *enosis* until death and agreed to initiate political violence. Besides issuing idle threats, Greek Prime Minister Field Marshal Alexander Papagos did not impede the cabal.[141] Queen Elizabeth II's coronation on June 2, 1953 hinted at things to come. On Makarios' orders, the Pancyprian Youth Movement (PEON) organized riots in Paphos and sabotaged power stations.[142] On the diplomatic front, the cleric repetitioned the UN in August and publicly welcomed all assistance—even from the Eastern bloc.[143]

Peaceful Conflict Resolution's Demise

British intransigence continued. During his visit to Athens on September 22, 1953, Prime Mister Anthony Eden informed Papagos tersely that there was "no Cyprus Question at the time, nor could there be one in the future."[144] Eden chastised the Greek leader for the "over-cordial reception" given to Archbishop Makarios—a "disaffected British subject." He mocked that although there was "a considerable Greek population in Alexandria and in New York," he "did not suppose that the Greek Government was claiming Enosis for them."[145] Eden was equally

protest the visit of the British Supreme NATO Commander Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 65; Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 20.

[140] The group was also called the "Struggle Committee." Makarios warned Grivas that, "Not fifty men will be found to follow you." Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 65; Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, 244; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 17-18; and French, "British Intelligence," 86.

[141] Papagos was prime minister Nov. 1952-Oct. 1955. His cabinet member Gen. George Kosmas dealt with the Athens Ring directly. Papagos did not want armed insurrection to start before the UN General Assembly debated Cyprus in fall 1954. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 97; Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, 245; and Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 20.

[142] Grivas was still in Athens. After his return to Cyprus, he recruited heavily from PEON and the church-controlled Christian Youth Movement (OHEN). John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 93-94; Sutton, "Britain, the Cold War," 89, 95.

[143] Makarios officially petitioned the UN Secretary General on Aug. 10, 1953. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, 245.

[144] Soulioti, *Fettered Independence*, 23.

[145] Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 129.

brusque with the Greek ambassador in London in December; he reiterated his unchanged attitude to the House of Commons on March 15, 1954.[146]

More "concessions" worsened the situation. Minister of State for the Colonies Henry Hopkinson resurrected Winster's plan in mid-1954 as a pathway to "a wide measure of internal self-government." While "no change of sovereignty was contemplated," the offer, he assured, represented "the opportunity for economic, social and constitutional development." Hopkinson consulted no Greeks, but "hoped that men of goodwill and moderation would come forward in sufficient numbers."[147] He admitted at the House of Commons that "certain territories in the Commonwealth" were subject to "peculiar circumstances" and should "never expect to be fully independent;" the minister concluded that "nothing less than full sovereignty over Cyprus could enable Britain to carry out her strategic commitments in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East."[148] Greek riots ensued in August.

In October, George Grivas entered Cyprus in disguise and recruited the All-Farmers Union of Cyprus (*Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou*—PEK) for his intelligence network.[149] The Bishop of Kyrenia publicly praised the anti-colonial movements in Egypt and India and exhorted "all youths to be ready to shed their blood." When the colonials made sedition a five-year offense, Greek Cypriots called general strikes.[150] Makarios shortened his UN mission and returned to Nicosia on January 10, 1955.[151] He met Grivas the next day and approved the

---

[146] Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1967) 9; Soulioti, *Fettered Independence*, 24.
[147] Hopkinson served 1952-1955. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 75-77.
[148] Library of Congress, "Cyprus;" "Cyprus (Constitutional Arrangements): HC Deb," *Hansard: UK Parliament* 531 (July 28, 1954): 504-514, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1954/jul/28/cyprus-constitutional-arrangements; Christopher Price, "Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence: Written Evidence Submitted by Christopher Price," *Parliament.UK*, last modified July 31, 2004, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/113/113we11.htm; 28; and Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6.
[149] Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story*, 47; Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6; and Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, 246.
[150] Sutton, "Britain, the Cold War," 95.
[151] Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, 246.

formation of the National Organization of Cypriot Struggle *(Ethnikí Orgánosis Kypriakoú Agónos*—EOKA).[152]

Preconditions for VNA Success

Peaceful conflict resolution failed in Cyprus. For seventy-seven years, the authorities in London and Nicosia proved unable or unwilling to settle the issue. Free elections, independence, or *enosis* did not happen.[153] Greek Cypriots wanted to determine their own future. They resented being singled out for discrimination while other colonies advanced.

Britain sought desperately to avoid the recent outcomes in Palestine, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon;[154] its sovereign colony of Cyprus would not break away. The sides polarized after Athens and Ankara became more assertive in 1950; the Turkish Cypriots fixated on partition. EOKA accordingly chose an indirect route for it political agenda that the FLN adopted months earlier in Algeria as a weapon of the weak.

As in Algeria, Cypriot irregulars needed safe havens before they could exploit the state's potential weaknesses and compel it to accept a hostile policy. Britain could kill a VNA if it found it; EOKA accordingly hid in the island's forests, mountains, caves, and foothills; the group operated in the anonymity of the Greek cities and villages that comprised 80% of the population. Grivas noted during his July 1951 reconnaissance on Cyprus that although the island was too

[152] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 30. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus," accessed Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/print/article/148573.
[153] The colonial authorities banned elections and political parties on numerous occasions and consistently empowered the Turkish minority to stalemate Greek aspirations.
[154] Britain would soon also grant independence also to Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria, and Kenya.

small to serve an ideal sanctuary for unconventional warfare, the local commitment to *enosis* was strong; the Orthodox Church, trade unions, and youth groups would support the cause.

While the British traversed the island via a network of good roads that connected the capital Nicosia to the main towns, EOKA could alternate its activities between the cities and mountains.[155] Unlike in Algeria, however, there were no sympathetic neighbor states with porous borders and a common anti-colonial grudge; Egypt and Israel, Cyprus' natural allies, were fighting each other.[156] The only friendly state was 500 miles away in Greece, sitting across a Mediterranean Sea patrolled by the Royal Navy.

Fight a State?

Britain seemed ready to deal with a Cypriot VNA in 1955. Like France, its postwar recovery hinged on the Marshall Plan.[157] Washington provided London another $4 billion loan in December 1945 and canceled its Lend Lease debt.[158] Canada donated billions in supplies and

[155] Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 20.
[156] The First Arab-Israeli War took place in May 1948. Israel and Egypt fought again in Nov. 1956 and remained in a state of constant hostility until they signed the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978. Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 247-251, 287-291, 374-375; Ross, *Causes and Consequences of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*; Isacoff, *Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict*; and Peden, "Suez and Britain's Decline," 1073-1096.
[157] See "Chap. 4: Case Study 1: The FLN," footnote # 68. Six years of war decimated its merchant shipping and two-thirds of its export trade. Air attacks alone inflicted 30,000 deaths and 50,000 injuries in London. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Reconstruction after World War II," by Blake Ehrlich and Hugh Clout, accessed Mar. 24, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/London/Reconstruction-after-World-War-II; Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London: Abacus, 1998), 520.
[158] FDR's Lend-Lease Program lasted Mar. 1941-Sep. 1945 and supplied Britain, Free France, China, and the USSR with food, oil, ships, and planes. In return for the aid, the US sometimes acquired leases on army and naval bases. Britain received more than 60% of the US aid that in 2020 terms equates to $400 billion. US supplies that arrived after the war were sold to Britain at a discount and funded by long-term US loans. "Lend-Lease Act (1941)," *National Archives*, last modified Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act; Warren Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2019); "Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II," *US Department of State: Office of the Historian*, accessed Mar. 8, 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease; Finlo Rohrer, "What's a Little Debt between Friends?" *BBC News Magazine*, last modified May10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4757181.stm; and Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 161.

services.[159] Britain instituted universal health care in 1948 and devoted 4.9% of GDP to social security programs in the early 1950s.[160] The economic comeback lagged, however, particularly in comparison to Western Europe, because successive Labour and Conservative governments fixated on empire.[161] Domestic economic priorities thus did not hurt the state's imperial policies in Cyprus. The state's imperial policies, rather, hurt domestic development.

In the bipolar world of 1955, Britain was a great power. Its army had nearly half a million troops and a budget of £600 million.[162] Britain was a founding member of the United Nations, sat on the prestigious Security Council, and was a key US ally and NATO member;[163] it became a nuclear power by 1952.[164] British troops, police, and administrators had already been on Cyprus for three generations. They could impose roadblocks, conduct unannounced searches,

[159] J. L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975).
[160] After 1950, Britain experienced a decade and a half of economic growth that funded its generous welfare state. Kevin Jefferys, *Labour Forces: from Ernie Bevin to Gordon Brown* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002); Nicholas Crafts, "Rebuilding after the Second World War: What Lessons for Today?" *Warwick: Economics, Cage Research Centre*, last modified June 27, 2020, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/01-07-20-rebuilding_after_the_second_world_war_what_lessons_for_today/.
[161] Britain's high imperial expenditures caused five years of domestic austerity punctuated by rationing and shortages in food and housing. David Dutton, *British Politics since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997); Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, *Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939-1955* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000). Britain was spending 7.7% of GNP on defense in the early 1950s, while West Germany and Japan were spending virtually nothing. Unlike Bonn, which directed its $1.7 billion from the Marshall Plan to industrial modernization, London spent much of its $2.7 billion on imperial retention. Britain consequently relied on steam engines and other antiquated technologies until the 1960s. Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Marshall Plan* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988); Correlli Barnett, "The Wasting of Britain's Marshall Aid," *BBC*, last updated Mar. 3, 2011, https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/marshall_01.shtml.
[162] "Army Estimates, 1954–55," *Hansard: UK Parliament*, 524 (Mar. 11, 1954), https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1954-03-11/debates/05277dde-2331-49f0-b243-08c068e58994/ArmyEstimates1954%E2%80%9355; Barnett, "The Wasting of Britain's Marshall Aid."
[163] United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "The Formation of the United Nations, 1945," https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un; Robert Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2001); and Len Scott and Stephen Twigge, *Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964* (London: Harwood, 2000).
[164] Tom de Castella, "Five Years that Shaped the British Military," *BBC News Magazine*, last modified Mar. 15, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31750929; Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "The British Nuclear Stockpile, 1953–2013," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, last modified July 1, 2013, https://thebulletin.org/2013/07/the-british-nuclear-stockpile-1953-2013/.

detain entire villages, and interrogate anyone over twelve. The colonial authorities could deploy dogs and commando units to find arms stashed in mountain caves.[165]

The state's military buildup on Cyprus had already begun with its August 1954 pullout from Egypt, nearly nine months before the unconventional warfare began on the island.[166] After the fighting started in April 1955, colonial authorities could deploy infantry brigades, tanks, and parachute and artillery regiments that had seen action in Sudan, Egypt, Aden, Malta, Kenya, Kuwait, and Jordan.[167] The Royal Air Force (RAF) helped defeat the Nazis a decade earlier.[168] Its Cypriot assets included modern fighter, bomber, and transport squadrons versed in ground attack, observation, communications, sea operations, anti-submarine operations, and search and rescue.[169] The state could call in RAF detachments from Egypt and Malta and use helicopters to support field forces.[170]

Whereas EOKA could summon dozens of irregulars, Britain's security forces tallied 10,000 by mid-1955. Troop levels grew to 13,000 soldiers and 2,000 police in November. June

---

[165] NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," *The World Today* 12, no. 4 (Apr. 1956): 148.
[166] James Paul and Martin Spirit, "War and Politics," *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*, last modified 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20121027010356/http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/war.html.
[167] James Paul and Martin Spirit, "British Units Serving in Cyprus 1955-1959," *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*, last modified 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20121123130140/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/cyprusunits.html.
[168] During the Battle of Britain that lasted July-Oct. 1940, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy squadrons repelled large-scale attacks by the Nazi Luftwaffe. They gave Germany its first major defeat and participated in the strategic bombing campaign that helped end the war in 1945. Richard Overy, *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe 1940-1945* (New York: Viking, 2013); Winston Churchill, "Their Finest Hour: Speech to House of Commons, June 18, 1940," *International Churchill Society*, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/their-finest-hour/; Stephen Bungay, *Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain* (Minneapolis: Zenith, 2010); and John Terraine, *A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1985).
[169] James Paul and Martin Spirit, "Aircraft Deployed in Cyprus," *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*, last modified 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20130721174203/http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Aircraft.html.
[170] By 1958, for example, the 284th RAF Squadron had flown 16,000 sorties and transported 13,000 troops to critical parts of the battlefield. It evacuated 200 wounded soldiers, dropped 113 tons of ammunition, and pioneered night flying and fast-roping techniques. James Paul and Martin Spirit, "The Helicopter in Cyprus," *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*, last modified 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20130605095755/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/helo.html; Paul and Spirit, "British Units Serving in Cyprus."

1956 saw an increase to 22,500; by December, the number was 31,000.[171] Arguments that other imperial commitments in Kenya, Malaya, and Egypt restricted British efforts in Cyprus thus sound hollow.[172]

Britain had incentive to stabilize Cyprus quickly and to transform the island into its principal Middle Eastern base. Both London and Nicosia knew about George Grivas and X since the Nazi occupation. They issued him multiple visas for Cyprus from 1951 to 1953 and routinely spied on him.[173] Britain conducted covert intelligence operations in Greece.[174] The Security Service's (MI5) Liaison Officer hunted evidence "which might imply control of indigenous [Cypriot] organizations from the outside;" the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) ran agents out of Athens, broke codes, and read Greek government diplomatic cables about

[171] Andrew Novo, "Friend or Foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA Insurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 3 (2012): 417; Fausto Scarinzi, "Force Structure and Counterinsurgency Outcome: The Case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)," *Defence Studies* 21, no. 2 (2021): 208-209; and David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2015), 119.

[172] During the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952-1960, the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) rose up against the British Kenya Colony. Although the KFLA lost militarily in 1956, it survived until Britain left in 1963. Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (New York: Routledge, 2009); J'Bayo Adekson, "The Algerian and Mau Mau Revolts: A Comparative Study in Revolutionary Warfare," *Comparative Strategy* 3, no. 1 (1981): 69-92; Daniel Branch, "The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War against Mau Mau in Kenya," *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 291:315, and *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). The Malayan conflict lasted from 1948-1960. British colonial authorities fought the communist Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). Britain called the conflict an "emergency" because London-based insurance companies had to pay out claims in instances of "wars." Michael Burleigh, *Small Wars Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World 1945–1965* (New York: Viking, 2013), 163-164. Britain prevailed in 1960 after using mass detentions and deforestation herbicides. Phillip Deery, "Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 1 (2007): 29-54; Karl Hack, "Everyone Lived in Fear: Malaya and the British Way of Counterinsurgency," Small Wars and Insurgencies 23, nos. 4-5 (Sep. 2012): 672; and Alastair Hay, *The Chemical Scythe: Lessons of 2, 4, 5-T, and Dioxin* (New York: Plenum, 1982), 149-150. Since Cyprus housed no major munitions manufacturing facilities, the authorities, bolstered by the Royal Navy and RAF, should have—at least in theory—prevented EOKA from acquiring arms. French, "British Intelligence," 84-85; Bilj, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 32; and Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 111-112.

[173] Grivas traveled under his own name and promised to abstain from politics during his stay on the island. French, "British Intelligence," 88.

[174] Chikara Hashimoto, *The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2017), 20, 24.

Cyprus.[175] MI6 and the American CIA recruited "senior members of the Greek administration and Greek Army officers."[176] MI5 and MI6 eventually merged their Cypriot operations and disseminated their findings to the appropriate officials in London and Nicosia.[177]

Unless the decision-makers in London and Nicosia seriously miscalculated early on, their advantages should have crushed a VNA that never exceeded more than a few hundred irregulars. The state's initial response should convinced the British nation, the Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, and the international community that it was ready and able to convert state power into military, political, economic, or diplomatic solutions. Britain had generations of experience running the island. It was a modern state in 1955 with a cutting edge military that included a nuclear arsenal. The Royal Navy could blockade the island and inspect any vessel. That its economy lagged in Western Europe testified to Britain's willingness to sacrifice domestic living standards for imperial pretensions.

Despite these glaring advantages, Britain faced two daunting obstacles. First, it coveted the company of superpowers after 1945. Second, it believed that it stood a better chance to join this exclusive club by going nuclear and retaining its empire.[178] London's grand strategy,

---

[175] The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) oversaw codebreaking. Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2001), 551; Keith Jeffery, *The Secret History of MI6* (New York: Penguin, 2010), 674-675; and French, "British Intelligence," 90.

[176] Bilj, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 22.

[177] MI6 was briefing Governor Sir Robert Armitage about gun smuggling operations and a nebulous Liberation Committee in Athens by early 1954; he was governor 1954-Sep. 1955. Foreign Secretary Eden and Prime Minister Macmillan saw regular updates on George Grivas, weapons shipments, and a secret organization in "the hilly country in the west of Cyprus." French, "British Intelligence," 88, 90-91. MI6 later uncovered a plot to ship arms to Cyprus in November. Its intelligence led to a successful joint army, police, navy and RAF operation. Charles Foley and W. I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus* (Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1975), 28.

[178] Numerous studies address the pitfalls of empire. Paul Kennedy notes that in order to avoid "overstretch," states maintaining a "far-flung empire" need a strong economy that is not "undermined by onerous military preparations." *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945: Eight Studies* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983), chap. 8, and *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (New York: Vintage, 1989). Jack Snyder examines how industrialists, financiers, business interests, and colonialists form domestic blocs that promote expansionist foreign policies. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2013). See also Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas;" Organski, *World Politics*; and Kindleberger, *Historical Economics.*

accordingly, sought to align the nation's economic, military, psychological, domestic, and international assets to its haughty political goals.[179]

One obvious problem was that if not for American largesse, Britain was bankrupt and could barely feed its people. Second, it was entering a new postwar world flush with demands for decolonization, nationalism, sovereignty, and self-determination. Minorities and former subject peoples wanted to control their own fates. Yet London chose to believe that a win in Cyprus would redeem its recent string of humiliating imperial setbacks in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[180] Britain had to convince itself further that the island was essential not just to the empire, but also to NATO's mission of deterring communism.

London obligingly fantasized that most Cypriots appreciated being royal subjects and second-class citizens;[181] Greek "nationalism" on the island was merely the concoction of malcontent clerics, right and left wing agitators, and Athenian conspirators. Britain's delusions further convinced it that nominal political reforms would beguile the Greek community into accepting repackaged colonial subservience. For sure, the Cypriots would not and could not organize and sustain premeditated and prolonged warfare against their colonial benefactors.

How a Stalemate Happens

EOKA's unconventional warfare began on April 1, 1955 by bombing the newly refurbished Cyprus Broadcasting Station. Sixteen more government buildings and military bases

[179] Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1993), 4.
[180] Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus, 1958-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 7-8. The Conservative government faced an internal rebellion in 1954 in the House of Commons that it quelled via repeated assurances that it would never cede Cyprus.
[181] Ibid, 9. This meant willfully ignoring the 1950 plebiscite and every other public opinion poll that indicated Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly favored *enosis*.

suffered explosions in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol.[182] A corresponding leaflet campaign explained the group's goals; it cast the Turks as anti-British compatriots and "advised" them not to help the enemy.[183] Over the next two months, the VNA proclaimed that nothing short of *enosis* would quell the violence. The authorities were befuddled. While some pamphlets bore the moniker "EOKA," others carried the equally mystifying mark of "Digenis.[184]

Governor Sir Robert Armitage drew London's ire for having left government installations unguarded.[185] The governor later admitted that he expected spontaneous riots, not the "cool, premeditated terrorism" that unfolded in Palestine.[186] His administration assumed that Cypriot nationalists lacked the "guts" and "true leadership" to rebel.[187] Cyprus' Police Commissioner J. H. Ashmore had opposed the formation of a separate Special Branch for nationalist threats because the real danger, he was certain, stemmed from impulsive outbursts.[188] Anticommunist

[182] French, "British Intelligence," 84.
[183] Chares Demetriou, "Political Violence and Legitimation: The Episode of Colonial Cyprus," *Qualitative Sociology* 30, no. 2 (2007): 179; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 30.
[184] Grivas adopted the name from the Medieval Greek hero—Digenis Akritas, who defended the Byzantine Empire from invaders. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s. v. "Digenis Akritas: Byzantine Epic Hero," https://www.britannica.com/topic/Digenis-Akritas-Byzantine-epic-hero; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 55.
[185] He was governor 1954-Sep. 1955. Armitage's security forces had already captured the *St. George* smuggling vessel on January 25, 1955 near Paphos and arrested its crew of Greek nationalists. British officials in London were questioning why the island's authorities failed to detect and neutralize EOKA. Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (New York: Allen Lane, 2009), 472; Panagiotis Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to the Middle East Crisis* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 74-77. Grivas noted in his diary on Jan. 11, 1955 that "the British have taken no precautionary measures against action on our part since all Government offices are completely unguarded and unprotected and even military establishments are badly guarded and we are easily able to approach these during the night." Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 96.
[186] Previous violence corresponded to Greek holidays and anniversaries. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 55.
[187] These suppositions, in retrospect, appear understandable. MI6's litany of warnings included little actionable intelligence. French, "British Intelligence," 89. Actionable intelligence constitutes "the necessary information immediately available in order to deal with the situation at hand," and "can be acted upon within a 12 to 72 hour period of time." Stephen Pearson and Richard Watson, *Digital Triage Forensics: Processing the Digital Crime Scene* (New York: Syngress, 2010), 1-11; *Collins Dictionary*, s. v. "actionable intelligence," accessed Mar. 28, 2022, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/actionable-intelligence.
[188] Ashmore's force suffered from low wages and high turnover. His police superintendents collected, analyzed, and disseminated their own intelligence. French, "British Intelligence," 91-92; Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University, 2006); David Anderson, "Policing and Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954–60," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 21, no. 3 (1993): 177-207; and Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 414-431.

ideology likewise had London occupied with potential leftist VNAs.[189] Colonial Secretary John-Fletcher Cooke summarily dismissed MI6 reports on arms trafficking, a nefarious retired colonel, and "some organization preparing for sabotage." The spy organization, he concluded, had exaggerated incidents of cigarette smuggling into looming revolt.[190]

Mixing Imperial Arrogance and Ignorance

Prime Minister Anthony Eden assumed office four days after the conflict began.[191] He and Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan determined to preserve the Empire and tasked General Gerald Templer to assess Cyprus;[192] they continued to include Turkey in the negotiations.[193] EOKA's second round of terrorism hit police stations in Nicosia and Kyrenia in June 1955.[194] The VNA penetrated the Special Branch and assassinated Greek collaborators. While the governor finally secured government buildings and deployed police on mobile patrols, Armitage simultaneously strove to avoid "the impression that these subversive activities have disrupted

[189] Britain had recently engaged communists in Greece and was currently fighting them in Malaya. It had amassed dossiers on Cypriot 5,500 leftists and only 1,500 nationalists. French, "British Intelligence," 94; Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence*, 49-60, 66-68.
[190] The capture of the *St. George* and the arrest of 13 operatives on Jan. 25, 1955 reinforced the administration's beliefs. No suspect mentioned George Grivas. The authorities concluded that Socrates Lozides, a thirty-year-old lawyer, was the ringleader. MI5 interrogators concentrated on implicating Athens so that London could discredit Greece's UN petition. French, "British Intelligence," 96-98.
[191] Eden's Labour Party replaced Winston Churchill's Conservatives on April 5, 1955.
[192] Templer devised Britain's "hearts and minds" countermeasures in Malaya. See "Chapter 3: Literature Review, footnote # 71. During his tour, Templer professed to being shocked that the governor, confronted by a nationalist VNA and an established communist party, prioritized propaganda and agricultural reforms. Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 418-419; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 56.
[193] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 59; Coufadakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition," 35.
[194] EOKA murdered its first Greek police officer on June 21 in Nicosia; the second died the next day in Limassol. Grivas sought to coerce the underpaid, unpopular, and scared Greek police to resign, stop investigations, and become informers. Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 210; Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 421-422; Keith Slack, "EOKA Intelligence and Counterintelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 32, no. 1 (2019): 97-99; and Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics;" Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 60.

normal life."[195] In July, the VNA attacked more Greek collaborators, colonial police, and soldiers.[196]

Officially, the Tripartite Conference invited Ankara and Athens to London in August 1955 and requested they appoint advisors for Cyprus' governor.[197] Macmillan proposed removing self-determination from the agenda temporarily.[198] Self-government would instead happen in phases; the colonial authorities would control foreign affairs, defense, and public security. All three states would guarantee minority rights. Macmillan rejected Greek arguments that a base lease could satisfy Britain's security needs.[199]

Unofficially, London hoped to subdue Athens with false hopes and long talks. Maybe the Greeks would forego the onerous process of resubmitting Cyprus to the UN.[200] Britain also schemed to split the Greek Cypriot Left and Right; while the former embraced non-union solutions, the latter did not. The state also welcomed the possibility that "a few [anti-Greek] riots in Ankara" would temper the push for *enosis* and set London up as neutral arbitrator.[201]

The Tripartite Conference instead spawned more mistrust.[202] London was risking civil war on Cyprus and bad relations between its two NATO allies for the sake of empire. Athens

---

[195] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 55.
[196] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 30; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 52; and Demetriou, "Political Violence," 182.
[197] The conference lasted Aug. 29-Sep. 6 and was also called the London Conference, the Eastern Mediterranean Conference, and "Tridominium." Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 64-65; Stephen Xydis, "The UN General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 1954-58," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 2 (1968): 144.
[198] "Self-determination" henceforth became a euphemism for *enosis* because it was understood that if given the vote, the 80% Greek majority on the island would vote for union.
[199] Macmillan insisted that, "the United Kingdom should possess not so much a base in the old sense of the word as a whole complex of interrelated facilities, which ramified over the whole island." Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 130.
[200] London intentionally pushed the conference back until late August in order to upset Greek diplomacy in the UN. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 64-65; Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 666.
[201] Anti-Greek riots occurred in Istanbul, not Ankara in September 1955. Turkish mobs destroyed twenty-nine Greek churches, 4,000 shops and 2,000 homes. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6-7.
[202] US Assistant Under-Secretary H. T. Bourdillon observed that tridominium was causing "Pan-demonium" and killing "any chance of the Cypriots making up their own minds about their future." He was serving in the US Embassy in London. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 65.

saw through Macmillan's delay schemes; it bemoaned the exclusion of the Greek Cypriots and *enosis'* absence from the agenda. Ankara resented that union was not forbidden.[203] Trust in the colonial administration eroded further after sixteen EOKA suspects escaped from Kyrenia Castle in September 1955. The VNA then torched the British Institute in Nicosia.

Harding's Folly

New Cypriot Governor Field Marshal Sir John Harding assured London that EOKA had no popular support.[204] Victory, he predicted, would soon appear as a political situation "which will ensure that when self-determination is applied the outcome will be a decision to remain within the Commonwealth." Harding really believed that most Cypriot Greeks would voluntarily forego *enosis*;[205] pressure from EOKA and the church, he surmised, hindered them from supporting the administration.[206]

Harding explained to the Greeks that NATO requirements superseded their self-determination. The situation, he suggested, could change after self-government proved "capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the [Cypriot] community."[207] When the governor

[203] Ankara maintained that Cyprus was strictly a Turco-British affair since 1878. See footnote # 38. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 124-125, 130-131; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 65; Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6-7; and "Menderes on the London Conference," *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*, last modified May 27, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20121113125728/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/menderes-%20london_conf.html.
[204] He was governor Sep. 1955-Oct. 1957.
[205] Diana Markides, "Britain's 'New Look' Policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding Talks, January 1955-March 1956," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23, no. 3 (1995): 479-502; Andrew Novo, "An Insoluble Problem: The Harding-Makarios Negotiations, Turkey, and the Cause of Cypriot Enosis," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 24, no. 1 (2015): 87-103; and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus Question, March-December 1956," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 19, no. 2 (1991): 247-263.
[206] French, *Fighting EOKA*, 93.
[207] Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7.

sweetened the deal with an offer of financial aid, Makarios agreed to conditional talks.[208] To appease the Right, the authorities arrested communists en masse.

Another round of EOKA terrorism promptly derailed the talks in November 1955. The radical Right was not placated; the embittered Left became less willing to negotiate. The VNA organized strikes in forty-six schools. Harding ordered the government to run the schools and caught blame for depriving children of education.[209] After EOKA killed soldiers at Kykko, the governor declared a state of emergency on November 26—eight months after the violence began.[210] Public assemblies and strikes were banned; carrying weapons and using bombs became capital offenses.[211] Censorship and collective punishment followed.[212] Fines on the Greek community aimed to recoup the state's losses; suspected EOKA supporters were evicted and had their homes destroyed.[213] A stalemate ensued.

The Weak Side's Competitive Adaptation

The stalemate should prompt the state to modify its strategy with escalating military offensives and politico-economic outreaches. The more that the VNA implements competitive adaptation to eliminate its rivals, harden its organization, and coerce and cajole its community,

[208] The loans were contingent on the Greeks postponing self-determination. Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 31. The archbishop's conditions were that: the governor would not control internal security; Turkish minority rights would pertain only to religion and education; and a general amnesty for all jailed Cypriot nationalists. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7.
[209] Only 81 of the island's 500 elementary schools were open by spring 1956. Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 210; Demetriou, "Political Violence," 181; and Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."
[210] EOKA killed seven soldiers on November 9. NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 149-150; AAP-Reuter, "State Of Emergency Declared in Cyprus," *Central Queensland Herald* (Rockhampton, Australia), Dec. 1, 1955, p. 13, https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/79257336.
[211] Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."
[212] NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 150.
[213] Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 210-211.

the greater its chances for success. In many ways, EOKA would prove one of the best-led and most efficiently organized VNAs in the postwar era.

George Grivas began serious preparations five years before he launched his unconventional warfare. His failed bid for Greek public office in 1950 made him a full time irregular warrior. Posing as a tourist, he reconnoitered his birth land multiple times. His 1951 assessment of the terrain, population centers, and coastlines identified two daunting challenges. First, well-established communication lines linked the small island's urban, rural, and mountainous areas. Only small-scale operations that did not capture and hold territory could succeed.[214] Second, since the Greek community had no experience running its own affairs, Grivas' organization would have to provide strong leadership and military training.[215]

The five-month reconnaissance that began in October 1952 ultimately underwrote VNA success. He contemplated how to combine urban terrorism and mountain insurgency while influencing international opinion.[216] The colonel contacted future commanders who helped him collect intelligence on mountain bases, safe houses, local police, military units, and collaborators.[217] The group measured harbor depths and recorded tidal times to know when to unload cargo; it reconnoitered the two Government Houses, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, colonial officials, and identified Khlorakas Beach near Paphos as an ideal

[214] While EOKA eventually grew to 300 members, it contained about 100 irregulars when the violence began in spring 1955. Demetriou, "Political Violence," 175.
[215] Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 16.
[216] Xydis, "The UN General Assembly," 144.
[217] Grivas delegated many of these duties to Andreas Azinas. Andreas Azinas, *50 Years of Silence—Cyprus' Struggle for Freedom: My EOKA Secret File, Volume B* (Nicosia: Airwaves, 2002), 365; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 22-23.

smuggling location.[218] The VNA-in-waiting made trial runs with ships carrying pottery to expose the Royal Navy's procedures.[219] Grivas was importing arms by March 1954.[220]

The detailed strategy that Grivas presented the Liberation Committee in February 1953 evolved into EOKA's 1954 "Preliminary General Plan of Insurrectionary Action in Cyprus."[221] It proved prescient. A VNA, he surmised, would not defeat Britain on the battlefield; it could, however, subvert and ultimately sap the state's political will to fight.[222] Since Cyprus lacked the massive mountain ranges for ideal havens, and was located far from mainland Greece and other islands, the weak side could accordingly not exceed 200-300 full-time members.[223] It would live in the mountains and operate primarily in the villages. Hit and run attacks on government installations, public buildings, and military bases would draw the colonials into the cities.[224]

A Popularity Contest

Grivas expected his group to generate mass local support and receive aid from the ethnarchy.[225] EOKA's tight budget of about £1,540 monthly came mainly from Athens, the Cypriot Church, and the American diaspora community; its popularity rose steadily because it did not have to loot local homes and businesses and paid fair market prices for food and

[218] Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 188-194; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 16-17.
[219] Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*, 9.
[220] Another arms shipment made in through in October. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 18-19.
[221] Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, 12-15; George Grivas, *Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle* (London: Longmans, Green, 1964), 38-47, 91.
[222] Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 204-207.
[223] The VNA operated in the Troodos and Kyrenia Mountains and eventually comprised 750 associates. Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 209; Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 92-93; Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 157; French, *Fighting EOKA*, 56-57, 64; and Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."
[224] Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 209-210.
[225] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 84.

supplies.[226] He terrorized the Greek contingent of Cypriot police officers—the best source of local intelligence. The besieged authorities would either enlist more Turkish officers or import British Bobbies. Either way, the administration would confront the strong side's most daunting challenge in unconventional warfare—isolating the enemy.[227]

The state's misdirected reprisals would consequently escalate. While EOKA was hiding, the Cypriot Orthodox clerics were not. Renewed British attacks on the Greeks' most venerated institution—the church—coupled with mounting apprehension caused by the increasingly Turkified police force, would convince the community that it was under siege.[228] Since Athens was too far and too weak, the island's Greeks would naturally turn to EOKA.

Anarchy and virtual civil war would loom. EOKA's attacks on Turkish police would inflame intercommunal hostilities. Terrorism against the families of the British authorities would provoke more governmental overreaction.[229] Collective punishment, torture, and state murder would engender more Greek fear and animosity. Mounting international criticism would further isolate Britain and turn the VNA into the noble underdog.

Eliminating Rivals

The FLN and EOKA differed dramatically concerning their respective rivals. The former coopted or eliminated competing VNAs and evolved into a parallel government that could

[226] This figure represents the group's 1956 budget. About 30% went to the irregulars, 20% to EOKA families, 16% to war material, 17% to smuggling, 5% to propaganda, 2.5% to medical expenses, and 10% to legal fees. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955–1959," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21, no. 2 (2008): 386.
[227] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 84.
[228] Britain had previously attacked the Cypriot Church after the 1931 Greek riots. For the composition of the Cypriot Police Force, see Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 403.
[229] For instances of when government countermeasures instigate severe and unintended consequences, see Mueller, *Overblown*, and "Six Rather Unusual Propositions," 487-505.

negotiate with France as a rational, unitary actor; it became the sole and legitimate repository of Arab Algerian nationalism. By the end, only the FLN's decision to pursue total or limited victory mattered. No alternate power center remained to contest its authority.

EOKA never enjoyed such luxuries on Cyprus. Decades before its formation in 1955, the Greek Left had established itself on the island; the communists were organized, well-funded, and had won numerous municipal elections. While the VNA dominated the Right, it did not monopolize the use of violence there as well: more than twenty Greek Cypriot groups that participated in the conflict.[230] The Church represented the island's Greek community since the fourth century; EOKA was around since January 1955. The prestigious ethnarch could petition the UN General Secretary directly; George Grivas—the right-wing fanatic, could not. While they cooperated for *enosis*, the archbishop could eventually pull rank and accept something less.

The Turkish minority presented EOKA challenges that never bedeviled the FLN. It existed on Cyprus four centuries and determined after 1947 to reject the *Megali Idea*.[231] The British decision to give the community's benefactor—Ankara—a seat in the negotiations further sabotaged EOKA's vision of success. Turkey would not be bullied by Greece; it henceforth promoted partition. The Turkish VNAs that battled both the Greeks and then the British could furthermore ensure that Ankara and its Cypriot protégés influenced the outcome.

EOKA was also beholden to its Athenian benefactors. Greek politicians and soldiers played a key role in creating and funding the group. Although Greece had been steadily defying London's Cyprus policy since its civil war ended in 1949, it could not as easily defy Washington.

---

[230] Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*; "List of Greek Cypriot Organizations which Promoted ENOSIS—Union of Cyprus with Greece—through Armed Assaults, Killings, and Terrorism all over the Island," accessed Mar. 25, 2022, https://www.turkishnews.com/cyprus/enosis_organizations.html; Euripides Antoniades, "The Liberation Struggle in Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Press: The Position of the Leading Greek Cypriot Press Eleftheria, O Phileleftheros and Haravgi in 1957–1960," *Media History* 24, no. 3-4 (2018): 514-527; and Şevki Kıralp, *A History of Resentment and Violence: The Fight for Status and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University, 2016).
[231] See footnote # 31.

The US was a key source of aid to Britain, Greece and Turkey and wanted to present NATO as a unified alliance again communism. Hence, Greece and America could also affect Cyprus' fate.

Learning

EOKA learned from the past and embraced competitive adaptation. The group transformed a potentially lethal challenge—size—into its greatest asset—operational security.[232] Grivas recognized the power of weakness in 1922, when a few Turkish riflemen hidden in the hills stopped an entire Greek unit for a full day. He learned the importance of secrecy and organization during his days living underground and resisting the Nazi occupation.

The VNA's strategy informed its small size, unified command, and flexible tactics.[233] It primarily recruited teenagers from the Union of Orthodox Christian Youth (*Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon*—OHEN), the Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus (*Panagrotiki Enosis Kypro*—PEK), the Pancyprian National Organization of Youth (*Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neolaias*—PEON), and the Young Stalwarts (*Alkimos Neolaia Tis EOKA*—ANE).[234] The Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle (*Politiki Epiropi Kypriakou Agonos*—PEKA) became EOKA's propaganda wing.[235] Greek Cypriots studying at Athens University received

[232] Most accounts put EOKA's maximum membership at 300. Andrew Novo maintains that in April 1955, the VNA had "no more than 80 armed men," and that only Grivas and his number two, Gregory Afxentiou, had any military experience. "Friend or Foe?" 417. Operational security examines how "friendly actions attendant to military operations" can be exploited by an adversary. "Army Regulation 530–1: Operations and Signal Security: Operations Security," *Federation of American Scientists*, 1, last modified Sep. 26, 2014, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/ar530-1.pdf.
[233] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 90.
[234] Seventy-seven percent of the put on "wanted" lists by the authorities during the conflict were between 15 and 25; 87% of those tried for anti-government activities were under twenty-five. Many were high school students or trade workers. Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 96; NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 146; and Alzada Comstock, "Uneasy Cyprus," *Current History* 34, no. 202 (June 1958): 354.
[235] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 84; Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 242.

paramilitary training from former resistance officers. All members took a religious oath to sacrifice their lives, follow orders, and keep all organizational secrets, even under torture.[236]

As was the case with the FLN, each member from one compartmentalized cell knew only the details "that concerned him personally."[237] Couriers only recognized some colleagues. Combat groups only knew each other; group commanders could only contact the sector commander. Before each attack, experienced EOKA operatives reconnoitered the location and identified the best terrain, cover, concealment, and escape route. No operation proceeded without George Grivas' approval.[238]

Grivas' constantly shifting target profile and operational zones compelled the angry and mystified authorities to lash out. When they closed in on his mountain units, he unleased waves of urban violence. At different junctures, government buildings, military installations, colonial troops, bureaucrats, politicians, Greek police and civilian collaborators, Turkish police and VNAs, and soldiers' wives and children all felt EOKA's wrath. The group used guns, bombs, landmines, and arson. Grivas mobilized the Greek masses into civil disobedience, general strikes, riots, pamphleteering, and boycotts of British goods.[239]

The VNA's tactics also responded to international events. The third round of terrorism corresponded with Britain's tripartite conference in August 1955.[240] Violence likewise escalated

---

[236] For the actual oath, see Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 402; NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 147; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 18-19; and French, "British Intelligence," 88.
[237] Grivas, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 29.
[238] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 90, 102; Elenitsa Seraphim-Loizou, *The Liberation Struggle of Cyprus 1955–1959: Through the Eyes of a Woman EOKA Area Commander* (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1983), 138.
[239] Andreas Karyos, "The Armed Struggle against British Colonial Rule in Cyprus, 1955-1959: EOKA's Strategic Mentality and Tactics," in *The Creation of New States and the Collapse of Old Empires in the XX Century: 70 years of Israel as an independent State 1948 – 2018, Jerusalem, September 2-7, 2018*, ed. Dani Asher and Benny Michelsohn (Israeli Commission of Military History/MDD, 2021), 269, https://www.academia.edu/40362966/The_Armed_Struggle_against_British_Colonial_Rule_in_Cyprus_1955_1959_EOKA_s_Strategic_Mentality_and_Tactics, 269.
[240] The VNA escalated its violence during the talks to provoke more British reprisals. London complied by appointing Field Marshal Sir John Harding as governor. Harding's declaration of a state of emergency on Nov. 26, 1955 further antagonized the locals. Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 210.

during UN debates and NATO peace proposals. Grivas realized that disabling the airfields at Akrotiri, Episkopi, and Dhekelia would disrupt Britain's Suez operations. The August 1956 attacks delayed a scheduled Anglo-French airborne operation until November.[241] When imperial obligations in Kenya, Egypt, and Malaysia caused troop shortages on the island, EOKA targeted the depleted security force; after the overseas deployments began returning to Cyprus in December 1956, Grivas adjusted by going after Greek Cypriot collaborators.[242]

EOKA's superior intelligence apparatus fueled its learning and adaptation. Grivas knew that low standards, poor pay, and lack of arms compromised the security services' capacity to conduct raids; many village police stations did not even have a telephone.[243] The VNA established "special centers" in early 1955 to collect and disseminate information to "fixed transmission centers" in coffee shops, gas stations, and pharmacies. Bus and taxi drivers who traveled the country in their daily routines operated a courier system replete with secret urban postal boxes and rural dead letter boxes.[244]

Allies in the post office intercepted mail for military, political, or intelligence offices. Operatives in the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority monitored calls between the government, suspected informers, and British sympathizers. Hospital staff secretly treated wounded EOKA members; complicit prison wardens relayed messages and helped detainees

---

[241] EOKA assaulted the airbases sixty three times from Sep. 19 to late Oct. Akrotiri was still unusable when Britain launched on Nov. 5. The head of the Egyptian operation, Gen. Sir Charles Keightley, lamented that the operation failed partly due to the unusable Cypriot airfields. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 85-87, 101; Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1999), 40-44; and Phillip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968* (London: Oxford University, 1973), 112.

[242] Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."

[243] The British estimated that by 1958, nearly a quarter of its 932 Cypriot national security personnel worked for EOKA. Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 420; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 31; and John Gentry, "Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars," *Intelligence and National Security* 25, no. 1 (2010): 57.

[244] The VNA concealed messages in infants' diapers. Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 85-87; Grivas, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 81, 95, and *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 28, 30; Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 383; and Seraphim-Loizou, *The Liberation Struggle of Cyprus*, 139.

escape. Forestry Department officials provided food, shelter, and information on military movements. Greek Customs officials were especially valuable for smuggling arms.[245]

Grivas obsessed over counterintelligence.[246] He understood the British capability to intercept signal intelligence[247] and never used a telephone, radio, "or any scientific means of communication which might give our positions away."[248] He screened all potential candidates, gave them loyalty tests, and assigned codenames for people, locations, operations, and equipment. The colonel instructed members on how to handle interrogations and create plausible explanations in case of arrest.[249] By battering the Greek police, EOKA wrecked the authorities' ability to generate human intelligence;[250] sympathetic officers informed on the state's plans, security measures, and impending attacks.[251] The VNA generated enough actionable intelligence to target Governor Armitage, Governor Harding, and General Keightley.[252]

---

[245] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 100.

[246] Counterintelligence involves efforts "to protect one's own intelligence operations from penetration and disruption." Defensive counterintelligence "seeks to thwart hostile intelligence from penetrating one's own intelligence service." Offensive counterintelligence "tries to manipulate or disrupt penetrations of one's own intelligence by turning an opponent's agent into a double agent." Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ, 2009), 151; Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 101. The organization assiduously surveilled its own members and incorporated operational redundancies. When, for example, the British uncovered a communications network in Nicosia, the VNA simply brought in reserve couriers and changed its methods. Peter Wright, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (New York: Viking, 1987), 156.

[247] Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is information "derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems that provides a vital window…into foreign adversaries' capabilities, actions, and intentions. "Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Overview," *National Security Agency/Central Security Service*, https://www.nsa.gov/Signals-Intelligence/Overview/.

[248] Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 28.

[249] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 101.

[250] By the end of the conflict, the Cypriot Police Force sustained fifty-one dead and 185 wounded. The British then viewed those Greek officers who remained at their posts with suspicion. Seraphim-Loizou, *The Liberation Struggle*, 136; Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 380; and Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 423, 427-428.

[251] At least twenty Greek Cypriot police cooperated with EOKA as part of a network of informants that infiltrated all levels of the administration. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 92-93, 120-121; Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 89; Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies*, 154; and Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 375-394.

[252] EOKA not only knew when Armitage was attending a movie, it also knew his exact seat. The bomb that it placed near this seat detonated after the governor left. The group later placed a bomb under Harding's bed at the *Ledra Palace Hotel*, and only a last minute scheduling change prevented his demise. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 37-38, 53-54, 68-69; Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 174-175.

While EOKA reconnaissance groups located British targets, separate execution squads then killed them. The colonel personally instructed irregulars how to identify suitable targets and discern their habits. His simple but effective method for reconnoitering British army patrols stressed patterns and predictability. An EOKA unit that repeatedly surveilled British soldiers playing soccer saw that they always drank from the same water fountain after the game. Later on, another EOKA unit detonated a bomb hidden by that fountain.[253]

Pragmatism versus Maximalism

EOKA, just like the FLN, presented the colonial government with "victory or death" maximalist goals. Both VNAs confronted strong sides whose opening position was "never." Whereas "self-determination" for the FLN meant the sovereignty over Algeria's affairs, to EOKA it signified *enosis* with the Greek motherland. EOKA was ruthless and uncompromising regarding nationalist agenda. It provoked the state into brutal reprisals, polarized the competing sides, and diminished chances for peaceful resolution. Terrorism derailed Anglo-Ethnarch peace talks in 1955 and repeatedly rebuffed British entreaties. By decimating the local police, the group ensured that soldiers would resort to brutality. By targeting military families, ambulances, and hospitalized women, it undercut chances of any negotiated settlement.[254]

EOKA's endgame included no limited options. Fear, anarchy, inflamed ethnic tensions, and unqualified popular support would saddle the state with prolonged frustration. The

[253] Grivas observed that, "After a raid, troops would be sent out to patrol the countryside." He noted that the patrol "followed the same route, at the same speed, and at the same hour, simply offering itself as a target." Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 97; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, and *Guerrilla Warfare*, 32; and Seraphim-Loizou, *The Liberation Struggle*, 117.

[254] The authorities also resorted to an all Turkish Mobile Reserve Unit and Auxiliary Police Force that had no trust in the Greek community. Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 420, 422; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 31; Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 210; and NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 145.

authorities in London and Nicosia would heed EOKA's demands and leave; self-determination would culminate in *enosis*. Those minorities who wanted to live as Greek minorities would stay, but the most would go to Turkey.

External Influences

Grivas anticipated that international pressures would discomfort the state years before the conflict began. He likewise expected imperial pressures to cloud its decision-making. The recent ignominious retreats from Palestine, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon would prompt London to double down on Cyprus.[255] Athens' pastime became appealing to international institutions.[256] Makarios III was denouncing Britain to the UN Secretary General in 1951 and eventually convinced Athens to follow suit at the General Assembly.[257] The Greek state complied in late 1954, just as the Cypriot archbishop petitioned the Secretary General a third time.[258] The weak side framed the conflict in terms that resonated with the prevailing international norms: world peace, sovereignty, self-determination, and anti-imperialism.[259]

[255] Britain soon also granted independence to Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria, and Kenya.
[256] Greece asked the UN General Assembly five times from 1954 to 1958 to consider Cyprus' equal rights and self-determination. Xydis, "The UN General Assembly," 141; Coufadakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition," 37-38; and Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 305.
[257] He presented the pro-*enosis* plebiscite to Secretary General Trygve Lie in February.
[258] "Self-determination" became code for *enosis*: the 80% Greek majority on the island would vote for union. Antonis Klapsis, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt," *Modern Greek Studies* Yearbook 24/25 (2008-2009): 127-140, and "The Strategic Importance of Cyprus and the Prospect of Union with Greece," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 5 (2013): 765-782; and Andreas Karyos, "The Acceleration of History and Decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus, 1945–1959," in *Acceleration of History: War, Conflicts and Politics*, ed. Alexios Alecou (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2016), 113-132. The UN decided not to consider Cyprus on Dec. 17, 1954 "for the time being." United Nations General Assembly, "Application, under the Auspices of the United Nations, of the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples in the Case of the Population of the Island of Cyprus, 9th Session: 814: IX, 514th Plenary Meeting," Dec. 17, 1954, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209535?ln=en; Soulioti, *Fettered Independence*, 24.
[259] Makarios petitioned the Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in Aug. 1953.

Britain had heretofore escaped the criticisms levelled against the Dutch over the East Indies and France over Indochina and North Africa; its colonial policies, London assured, were liberal. Cyprus refuted this argument and attracted growing external scrutiny.[260] Britain's ongoing withdrawal from Egypt, meanwhile, meant that it had to designate Cyprus as its new Middle East Land and Air Forces headquarters.[261] London thus chose to counter Greece's diplomatic pressure by bringing in Turkey.[262]

Ankara dutifully reciprocated by declaring that the island was never a part of Greece. If Britain ever withdrew, Cyprus had to revert to Turkey.[263] The conflict henceforth became a convoluted trilateral affair; as London tempted civil war in its Mediterranean colony, it fielded inquiries from the European Court of Human Rights.[264] The Suez War's aftermath in late 1956 that damaged Anglo-American relations and led to a more active Soviet Union in the Middle East brought more unwanted outside attention.[265]

Cyprus attracted Washington's attention for several reasons. Turkey was crucial for US containment policies.[266] The conflict then helped collapse the Balkan Pact, NATO's main link to

---

[260] While Britain supported the Netherlands at the UN, the Dutch did not reciprocate and supported Cyprus' *enosis*. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 41-42.

[261] Britain took over Egypt from the Ottomans in 1882; it began withdrawing its troops shortly after Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in 1952. Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 287-291; Panayiotis Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1991).

[262] Britain previously treated Cyprus both as an internal matter and as a bilateral issue with Greece. After Athens went to the UN, London ignored that the staunchly anti-*enosis* Ankara had already renounced all rights to Cyprus via Article 20 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. See footnotes # 66 and 70. Antonis Klapsis, "EOKA and Anglo-Greek Relations: The View from Athens," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 48, no. 3 (2020): 548.

[263] Ankara maintained that the 1878 Cyprus Convention and 1923 Treaty of Lausanne concerned only Turkey and Britain. Any revisions made by Greek nationalists or Athens would abrogate the treaties and cause the island to return to Turkey. Coufadakis, "The Cyprus Question," 1-2; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 28; and Kyle, *Cyprus*, 6.

[264] Susan Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and Colonial Counter-insurgency, 1944-1960* (London: Leicester University, 1995), 239-244.

[265] Harold Macmillan took office after Anthony Eden presided over "one of the great British military fiascos." Scott Lucas, "Suez, the Americans and the Overthrow of Anthony Eden," *LSE Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1987): 227-54. After the war ended in Nov., the US and USSR forced the French, British, and Israelis to withdraw from Egypt. Cold War politics henceforth dominated the Middle East. Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 290.

[266] The Eisenhower administration wanted to use bases in Turkey to deter the Soviets while avoiding the appearance of imperialism. John Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (New York: Harper &

Yugoslavia.[267] In 1956, it put the US in the awkward situation of condemning the Soviet occupation of Hungary while at the same time defending Britain's occupation of Cyprus.[268] London again upset its US relations by drawing Washington into a failed Cypriot tripartite scheme in 1957.[269] By 1958, the British were fending off NATO peace initiatives.[270] The Berlin Crisis in November intensified American pressure on London, Athens, and Ankara to resolve Cyprus and allow NATO to focus on the Soviet threat.[271]

Council on Foreign Relations, 1960), 196-199; Behcet Yesilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). Turkey was also a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In 1955, the US-sponsored military alliance united Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the UK in a collation to contain communism in the Middle East and Asia. CENTO dissolved in 1979. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "The Value to CENTO of UK Bases on Cyprus," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 4 (July 2009): 611-624.

[267] The 1953 Balkan Pact united Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia against Soviet expansion into the Balkans. Tito tried in vain to mediate between Athens and Ankara. David Stone, "The Balkan Pact and American Policy, 1950-1955," *East European Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (Sep. 1994): 393-407; Ehrlich, *Cyprus*, 34; Margaret Ball, *NATO and the European Union Movement* (New York: Praeger, 1959), 142; and Milan Terzic, "Yugoslavia and the Balkan Pact 1953/1954," *Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia: Strategic Research Institute*, http://www.isi.mod.gov.rs/abstrakt.php?lang=en&id=6; and "Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact), August 9, 1954," *Yale Law School: Avalon Project*, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eu002.asp.

[268] In Oct. 1956, 200,000 Hungarians demanded economic reforms and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Moscow sent in an invasion force of 60,000 soldiers and 5,000 tanks on Nov. 3. Robert Byrnes, "East Europe in Crisis," *Current History* 32, no. 186 (1957): 74; Paul Zinner, "Revolution in Hungary: Reflections on the Vicissitudes of a Totalitarian System," *Journal of Politics* 21, no. 1 (1959): 3-36; and Brian McCauley, "Hungary and Suez, 1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power," *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, no. 4 (Oct. 1981): 777-800.

[269] London pushed the enclave plan on the US 1956-1957. Britain would retaining sovereignty over numerous areas while Greece and Turkey administered the rest of Cyprus, London would convert the island into a virtual aircraft carrier that could deliver "a heavy counter-blow with nuclear weapons." By now, the US wanted independence for Cyprus. Andreas Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy, 1957-1960," *Cyprus Review* 22, no. 1 (Spr. 2010): 88-89; Simon Ball, "Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958," *Historical Journal* 38, no. 2 (1995): 439-454.

[270] Because of Cyprus, Greece withdrew from the alliance's maneuvers in Sep. 1955. After Archbishop Makarios' Mar. 1956 deportation, it shut its military bases to British and Turkish troops; Athens recalled its soldiers from the Turkey's NATO base at Izmir and then barred NATO nuclear weapons on its territory. Greece resumed its NATO activities only after Makarios' return in Mar. 1957. Ehrlich, *Cyprus*, 34.

[271] The Soviets cut off the West's land access to West Berlin in 1948. The US responded with a yearlong airlift. The city's subsequent population growth meant that it could not be sustained by another airlift. Washington was also trumpeting West Berlin's economic recovery and political freedom as a capitalist success story. For Moscow, the city spotlighted the contrast between the two Germanies. Many Germans were leaving Soviet Berlin and heading westward. Vladislav Zubok, *Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)*, Vol. 6 (Cold War International History Project: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993). Angered by America's recent deployment of nuclear weapons to West Germany, in Nov. 1958 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave the US, Britain, and France a six month ultimatum to withdraw from West Berlin. American President Dwight Eisenhower mobilized NATO. Moscow built the Berlin Wall in 1961.United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961," https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/berlin-crises; William Taubman,

The Island Mirage: Military Success and Political Reforms

The stalemate in late 1955 produced the expected military and political strategic reassessment by the state. Governor Harding decided that Makarios was actively financing the VNA. The authorities accordingly deported the archbishop, the bishop of Kyrenia, and two priests to the Seychelles Islands on March 9.[272] This move later proved self-defeating.[273] Six days after the deportations, EOKA murdered eight and wounded twenty-seven Greek police officers.[274] Its unsuccessful attempt on Governor Harding in late March 1956 nonetheless killed five more soldiers.[275] The VNA soon graduated to attacking the troops' houses and families.[276]

Britain initiated a series of military countermeasures in April. The infantry set off to destroy EOKA "beyond all hope of recovery."[277] Eradicating the VNA's mountain units would supposedly unshackle the villagers' pro-British sentiments. Seventeen thousand troops, supported by three cavalry squadrons, motorized scout vehicles, helicopters, and observation

Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: Norton, 2004); and William Tompson, *Khrushchev: A Political Life* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

[272] The Seychelles are in the Indian Ocean, off eastern Africa's coast. They became a British crown colony in 1903. Xydis, "The UN General Assembly," 144; Comstock, "Uneasy Cyprus," 354; and Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."

[273] During Makarios' yearlong absence, George Grivas became the undisputed military and political leader; his maximalist agenda consequently became the Greek community's agenda. Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 31; *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus," accessed Feb. 8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/print/article/148573.

[274] NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 145-146.

[275] Ibid. EOKA's weapons of choice were handguns and grenades. Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."

[276] NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 146; Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 209-210.

[277] Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 210-211.

planes cordoned off large sections of the Troodos Mountains;[278] they seized arms, supporters, a trove of documents that disclosed members' identities, and Grivas' personal diary.[279]

The state then underwrote Turkish VNAs. The Cypriot Turks that met with the British Ambassador in Ankara in June 1956 formed Volcano (*Volkan*); the group became the Turkish Resistance Organization (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâti*—TMT) and received arms from Turkey. TMT proved its worth to London when it replaced the British as EOKA's favorite target.[280]

The corresponding political reforms, designed to capitalize on the military successes, came in mid-1956. British hopes rose when Grivas unilaterally called a two-week summer truce.[281] Commissioner Cyril Radcliffe seized the opportunity to abandon phased self-government—the "adult people" of Cyprus deserved "maximum self-government at once." He proposed "the widest possible measure of autonomy" in the guise of a new legislature, minority safeguards related to religion, education, and language, and an option for self-determination in the indefinite future.[282] The Turks accepted. The Greeks did not. With Makarios in exile, Colonel Grivas rejected anything short of *enosis*. EOKA unleashed urban terrorism in September.[283] Parliament then alienated the Turks in late 1956 by debating self-determination.[284]

---

[278] The state could further deploy twenty squadrons of Canberra and Valiant bombers, eight infantry battalions, the Third Brigade Commandos, and three paratrooper battalions. O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 41.
[279] The British conducted 12 major offensives Apr. 1956-Feb. 1957. *Terrorism in Cyprus: The Captured Documents*, (London, HMSO, 1956); Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics;" French, *Fighting EOKA*, 135-136; Simon Robbins, "The British Counter-insurgency in Cyprus," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 4-5 (2012): 720-743; Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 383; and Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 102.
[280] Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 305. London's satisfaction was short-lived—TMT eventually turned on the British. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 303.
[281] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 154.
[282] He was the commissioner for constitutional reforms. Self-government would leave foreign policy, defense, and internal security to Britain. It guaranteed the Turkish Cypriots a minister and six members in the legislature. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7; Lord Cyril John Radcliffe, "Cyprus, Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Debate," *Hansard: UK Parliament* 562 (Dec. 1956): 1267-1268, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals; and Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 31.
[283] Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 154.
[284] Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7.

As Grivas' strategy predicted, the Greek community and the police drifted further apart. Since the government could not press its own bureaucrats into service, it eventually imported three hundred British Bobbies.[285] In the meantime, it recruited Muslims into an all Turkish Auxiliary Police Force. While this organization generated little useful intelligence, it inflamed ethnic tensions. Whereas the Greeks viewed attacks on any police as an attack on Britain, the Turks saw an attack on their official as an attack on their community.[286]

No Light in the Tunnel

Despite their escalating countermeasures throughout 1956, the colonials could not kill, capture, or deter Grivas. EOKA's multiple temporary truces proved illusory.[287] The Empire's soldiers, "angered by cowardly and cold-blooded attacks against their comrades, and their wives and children, [were] inevitably tempted to forego restraint in their attitude towards the local population." The hatred of the British, "previously limited to certain sectors of the people," spread "island-wide."[288] As Grivas predicted, the state would lose the battle of public opinion.

Distrust between the intelligence services in London and Nicosia further undermined state strategy.[289] The dearth of actionable intelligence prompted the island's authorities to downplay warnings from MI5 and MI6. Even after they obtained Grivas' diary, seized EOKA

[285] Gen. Templer's recommendations stressed the strengthening of the island's police force. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 60-61.
[286] When, for example, a Turkish police auxiliary was killed guarding a power station, Turkish mobs retaliated against Greek shops in January 1957. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 59-60.
[287] Britain's 1956 military campaigns ultimately proved ineffective. Grivas' March 1957 cease-fire merely allowed EOKA the respite to reconstitute itself in the mountains. French, *Fighting EOKA*, 149-150, 182; Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 211.
[288] NC, "Restoring Order in Cyprus," 146; Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 209-210.
[289] The *St. George* seizure in Jan. 1955 duped the authorities into thinking that they neutralized the nationalist threat. British intelligence could not implicate Grivas or EOKA.

documents, and interrogated captured irregulars, the authorities generated few solid leads.[290] Tactics that evolved from big sweeps with large units to the "Brains and not Brawn" approach with small, mobile units proved no more useful for deterring, capturing, or killing the VNA.[291]

The ensuing government repression came as curfews, collective fines, mass arrests, detention centers, and mistreatment of suspects.[292] Governor Harding presided over hangings of nine youths and confronted the European Court of Human Rights' allegations of torture; his administration convicted 894 Greek Cypriots of crimes ranging from weapons possession to murder. [293] Anglo-Cypriot relations degenerated to the point that by 1958 the army was reporting that 70% of the Greek community supported EOKA.[294]

1957: The Power of Weakness Appears

The cascade of British political reforms that followed the failed 1947 Winster Plan all proved ineffective for the same basic reason—they kept ultimate power in British hands. Prime Minister Macmillan understood that time was working against the Empire by early 1957.[295] Domestic discontent simmered as newspapers covered the Cypriot carnage in graphic detail.[296]

---

[290] British intelligence officers generally lacked Greek language skills and resorted to pursuing hints and rumors. Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 213. The British bought the diary from an EOKA member who found it after one of Grivas' escapes; information from the diary and other sources led to the killing of Markos Drakos, EOKA's third in command, during the Black Mac Operation in January 1957. Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 376-385.
[291] French, "British Intelligence," 84; Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, 472; Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence*, 74-77; Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 213; and Karyos, "The Armed Struggle," 269-270.
[292] British officers were court-martialed in April 1956 for abusing prisoners. A. W. B. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire—Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001), 884-1055.
[293] Demetriou, "Political Violence," 175.
[294] Ibid; Kyriacos Markides, "Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus," *American Ethnologist* 1, no. 2 (May 1974): 320; and Karyos, "The Armed Struggle," 269-270.
[295] The government announced in April 1957 that National Service was ending in 1960. The end of conscription meant impending military cuts in Cyprus.
[296] The Daily Mirror published a picture of a British photographer lying dead on Nicosia's Ledar Street on Nov. 16, 1956. Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 91.

The state now reassessed its national priorities: complete control over Cyprus was unnecessary after all. British imperial and NATO requirements needed just "an airfield on long lease or in sovereignty." Once that was secured, the two communities could afterward "divide the rest of the island between them."[297]

The first iteration of Macmillan Plan brought no surprise— battlefield success would improve the state's bargaining position. Major General Douglas Kendrew obliged. He whittled EOKA's sixteen units down to five by importing tracking dogs from Kenya and Malaya and deploying "Q patrols" with small mobile units.[298] Informants betrayed Gregory Afxentiou—EOKA's second in command—and sixty-nine irregulars hiding in the Kyrenia Mountains. The olive branch followed in March 1957. The government rescinded martial law and recalled Makarios from his Seychelles exile in exchange for a temporary truce.[299] Two hundred foreign reporters and military honors awaited the archbishop's mid-April arrival in Athens.[300]

Grivas complied with a cease-fire.[301] Macmillan tried to entangle the US in another tripartite conference. To his annoyance, new NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak proposed an independent Cyprus modeled on Belgium. Greece declined and looked again to the UN;[302] London's newest overtures convinced the Turks that *enosis* loomed.[303]

---

[297] Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7; Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 150-156.
[298] Kendrew was General Officer Commanding and Director of Operations, Cyprus District Oct. 1956- Oct.1958. Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics." The Q patrols that included British and Turkish security personnel and EOKA informers were separate units with their own transport and equipment. Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 105, 109, 111-113; French, *Fighting EOKA*, 145-149.
[299] EOKA promptly resorted to targeting Greek and Turkish police in the cities. Since the British barred Makarios from returning to Cyprus, he settled in Athens. French, *Fighting EOKA*, 258; Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."
[300] Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 237-238.
[301] EOKA honored the truce for about four months, until the summer; in the meantime, it rearmed and recruited.
[302] Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 260.
[303] Sir Hugh Foot's appointment as governor, moreover, bothered Ankara. Foot was a liberal bureaucrat while Harding was a soldier. Foot served Dec. 1957 to Aug. 1960 as Cyprus' last colonial governor. Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 150-156; *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus;" Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 206-208; and Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 211.

EOKA terrorism resumed in fall 1957. British aircraft at Akrotiri airbase smoldered. The authorities found themselves fighting both Greek and Turkish VNAs in January 1958.[304] Macmillan's plans fizzled as Turkey demanded its own base on Cyprus, veto power on any new constitution, and affirmation that partition was the only long term-solution.[305] In preparation for yet another political deal, Governor Foot released 100 EOKA detainees and went on a month long listening tour.[306] London had just squandered six months "sabotaging NATO efforts while trying to trap Athens and Washington into accepting a plan neither desired."[307]

1958: The Tunnel's Light Starts to Shine

EOKA launched another series of attacks in March 1958 despite the presence of 30,000 colonial soldiers and 3,000 police.[308] Governor Foot proposed that Cyprus' status be determined after five years of internal self-rule.[309] London, Athens, and Ankara would manage foreign policy, defense, and internal security. Ankara rejected the scheme as communal self-determination; anti-Greek riots in Nicosia raged by February.[310]

The May 1958 Partnership Plan continued British sovereignty unless a trilateral was accepted. Athens and Ankara would appoint representatives to the Cypriot government; each

[304] TMT leader Rauf Denktash replicated EOKA's organization and obtained training and weapons from Turkey. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7; Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 150-156; and Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics."
[305] Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 94.
[306] Hugh Foot (Baron Caradon), *A Start in Freedom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 166-167.
[307] Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 90.
[308] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 84; Novo, "Friend or Foe?" 427.
[309] Each community would have its own House of Representatives; a governor's council would include representatives from Athens and Ankara, four Greek Cypriots, and two Turkish Cypriots. Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, 159-163.
[310] John Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), 105-107; Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, 169.

community would have separate legislatures.[311] Majority rule vanished; the Turkish minority would have equal power to the Greek majority. Prime Minister Macmillan characterized his reforms as "metaphysical partition;" the Colonial Office called it "pre-partition." Athens rejected the plan as a prequel to partition. Ankara dismissed it as a bridge to *enosis*.[312]

A Turkish VNA sealed the plan's fate by bombing the Turkish Consulate in Nicosia on June 7, 1958 and blaming EOKA.[313] Turkish Cypriots looted Greek properties; they killed five EOKA suspects near Geunyeli a week later and expelled Greek Cypriots from mixed districts. Once peaceful neighboring villages clashed with knives, stones, and sticks.[314] EOKA suspended its anti-British attacks to kill Turks. Turkish mobs threatened the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul.[315]

Tens of thousands British soldiers failed to capture Grivas or suppress the violence in August 1958. EOKA was murdering off-duty soldiers and army wives in front of their children.

[311] Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 92-93.
[312] Stephens, *Cyprus, A Place of Arms*, 150-156; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 32.
[313] The British immediately suspected EOKA and discovered in 1984 that TMT exploded the bomb. Successive Conservative governments had allowed the TMT free reign. *Cyprus: Britain's Grim Legacy*, directed by Bruce MacDonald (London: Granada Television; 1984), last accessed Apr. 9, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAtDhb47yJo; Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (New York: Noonday, 1989), 45.
[314] Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7.
[315] Ibid; Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 288-294. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople headquartered various branches of the Eastern Orthodox Church since Byzantine times. Mary Fairchild, "Eastern Orthodox Denomination: Eastern Orthodoxy is a United Family of 13 Self-Governing Churches," *Learn Religions*, last updated Apr. 27, 2019, https://www.learnreligions.com/eastern-orthodox-church-denomination-700624; Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2001); and Halil Inalcik, "The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23/24 (1969-1970): 229-249.

Nicosia streets became the "Murder Mile."[316] The state jailed thousands of Greeks, imposed house detentions, curfews, and murdered detainees.[317]

The revamped Partnership Plan saw the state officially retract its "never" policy and then threaten to proceed over Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot objections.[318] Macmillan took the lead and visited Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Greece warned that his unilateralism could jeopardize its membership in NATO;[319] EOKA committed 430 acts of terrorism between September and December to show that it was still stuck on enosis.[320] Archbishop Makarios, however, told reporters in Athens that he was amenable to independence and British bases.[321]

Independence as Limited Victory

As the Cyprus question again loomed before the UN in November 1958, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu and his Greek counterpart Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza began secret

[316] Nicosia's Ledra Street proved especially lethal for British authorities. Kosta Pavlowitch, "Nicos Sampson: The 'Executioner of Murder Mile' who Twice Escaped the British Death Sentence," *The Guardian*, May 20, 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/may/21/guardianobituaries1; Michael Buchanan-Dunne, "Where Is the Real Murder Mile?" *Murder Mile Tours*, last updated June 22, 2016, https://www.murdermiletours.com/blog/where-is-the-real-murder-mile.

[317] The main difference from the previous version was that Ankara and Athens were now off the legislative council and had instead direct access to the governor. Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics;" Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 150-156.

[318] Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 93.

[319] Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle; Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 289.

[320] EOKA's audacious attacks on the Akrotiri and Nicosia airbases in Oct. damaged bombers and transports. It surveilled the locations for months and obtained the guards' schedules from Greek workers. Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 97; Grivas, *The Memoirs of George Grivas*, 51, 172; French, *Fighting EOKA*, 274-280; and Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 150-156.

[321] Dimitri Bitsios, C*yprus: The Vulnerable Republic* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975), 78; Barbara Castle, *Fighting All the Way* (London: Pan, 1994), 289-310; Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7; Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 305; and Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), 137-138.

bilateral talks at Zurich.[322] Britain's UN representative invited his Greek and Turkish colleagues to London; the three reached a deal on February 19, 1959.[323]

London reassessed its position after suffering 156 dead and 788 wounded soldiers and police; it lost thirty-five civilians. EOKA exploded 1,782 bombs, destroyed Britain's military bases, sabotaged its aircraft, burned its supply depots, and ultimately caused £10,000,000 in damage.[324] After four years of conflict, its position "had remarkably changed completely from one of never negotiating the status of Cyprus to a political settlement."[325] Makarios accepted a trilateral guarantee for Cyprus' sovereignty and ordered Grivas to cease hostilities.[326] Britain secured unfettered base rights for perpetuity. *Enosis* was off the table.[327]

Archbishop Makarios III became the island's first elected president in December 1959. Dr. Fazil Küçük was the first Turkish Vice-President.[328] George Grivas left Cyprus for a hero's

---

[322] Bitsios, C*yprus*, 92; Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 278-285, 295-298.
[323] Ehrlich, *Cyprus*, 8; Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 4; Paul and Spirit, "War and Politics;" and *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Cyprus."
[324] EOKA estimated that it killed 417 colonials and wounded 702. It attempted to assassinate 230 Greek Cypriots, and killed 148. Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency*; Markides, "Social Change," 309-330; Penelope Tremayne, *Below the Tide* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 79; and Karyos, "The Armed Struggle," 269-270.
[325] The state settled for a solution in 1959 that it could have had at the Tripartite Conference in Aug. 1955. Footnote # 199; Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 419; and Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 85. As early as June 1956, Labour politician Francis Noel-Baker floated the idea that British military installations could form "an enclave which would remain British territory indefinitely whatever the results of self-determination." Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 305; Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 157; and Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 87. Some scholars argue that when Macmillan came to power in Jan. 1957, he had already accepted the diminishing Empire and expected to cede Cyprus. Robert Holland, *European Decolonization 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Macmillan International, 1985); John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Macmillan International, 1988); and Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 657-701. Opponents argue that the undecided Macmillan waited two years to reach a settlement that ended British sovereignty. Had his forces killed or captured George Grivas, he would have tried to stay in Cyprus. Glafkos Clerides, "My Deposition, Vol. 4 (Nicosia: Alithia, 1992), 39; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 306.
[326] Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7; Scarinzi, "Force Structure," 212.
[327] Slack, "EOKA Intelligence," 85, 102; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, chap. 11.
[328] Library of Congress, "Cyprus," 32-33. The presidential regime made Greek and Turkish official languages. The President would be Greek and the Vice-President would be Turkish. The Council of Ministers had seven representatives chosen by the President, and three by the Vice-President. It adhered to majority rule, but the President or Vice-President could veto decisions related to foreign affairs, defense or internal security. The House of Representatives had thirty-five Greeks and fifteen Turks. The Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice each contained Greek and Turkish judges. Twelve hundred Greeks and 800 Turks comprised the Cypriot army; another 1400 Greeks and 600 Turks formed the police and gendarmerie.

welcome in Athens and an honorary rank of general. The Crown Colony of Cyprus became the Republic of Cyprus on August 16, 1960. The Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment formed the new state's constitution.[329] Cyprus joined the United Nations the next month.

[329] Ibid, xxi-xxii, 33. The Treaty of Establishment gave Britain sovereignty over the two enclaves at Akrotiri and Dhekelia that totaled 99 square miles. Britain controlled Nicosia Airport during emergencies. The Treaty of Guarantee obligated Britain, Greece, and Turkey to ensure Cypriot independence. The Treaty of Alliance established a tripartite headquarters. See also "The Zurich and London Agreements: Memorandum Setting Out the Agreed Foundation for the Final Settlement of The Problem of Cyprus," *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*, accessed Mar. 1, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20120414215511/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Treaties%20-1959-60.html.

Chapter 6: The LTTE in Sri Lanka, 1983-2009

> "One language, two countries; two languages, one country."[1]
>
> "Time and events transmogrified the LTTE into an ogreish outfit, but the thickets of ethnocentric policies that post-independence Sri Lankan governments instituted were what birthed and legitimated the Tamil quest for separatism."[2]

Prelude to Grievance

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka sits in the India Ocean, eighteen miles off India's southeastern coast. The name derives from the Sanskrit "resplendent island." Its commercial capital is Colombo and the administrative capital is Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte. Forests cover 40% its 25,000 square miles. The island has 833 miles of coastline and mountain ranges in the center and south.[3]

Sinhalese from northern India arrived in 500 BCE and established multiple Buddhist kingdoms from 200 BCE to 1200 CE.[4] State supported religion merged with politics and culture;[5] the Buddhist Sinhalese came to consider themselves the nation's true custodians.[6] The

[1] Statement by Sri Lanka politician Colvin de Silva, quoted in Neil DeVotta, "Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Pacific Affairs* 73, no. 1 (Spr. 2000): 58.
[2] Neil deVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 6 (2009): 1022.
[3] Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka: A Country Study," in *Collection: Country Studies,* ed. Russell Ross and Andrea Savada (Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1988), xv-xvi; "Sri Lanka," *CIA World Factbook*, last updated Apr. 19, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/.
[4] The Sinhalese national narrative is the "Great Geneology" (*Mahavamsa*), which purports that they descended from Aryans that invaded India from the central Russian steppes. Ahmed Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2013), 50.
[5] The Buddhist clergy located its temples close to the royal palaces in order to exert more influence over state institutions. Erin Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror,* ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), 224.
[6] The 74% Sinhalese majority is primarily Buddhist. Siddhartha Gautama (*Buddha* or awakened one) founded the religion in India in the 6th century BCE. Sri Lanka's King Devanampiya Tissa converted in the third century BC. The Buddha's oral teachings were written down for the first time on Sri Lanka. Over time, the island became the repository of sacred relics that included the Buddha's bones and personal possessions. Library of Congress, "Sri

Map 6.1: Sri Lanka[7]

Lanka," 3, 7; *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Buddha Summary: Discover the Life of Buddha, Founder of Buddhism," https://www.britannica.com/summary/Buddha-founder-of-Buddhism; "Buddhism," *History.com*, last modified Sep. 15, 2021, https://www.history.com/topics/religion/Buddhism. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Sri Lanka: Conversion to Buddhism," https://www.britannica.com/place/Sri-Lanka/Conversion-to-Buddhism.

[7] Geospatial Information Section, *Map of Sri Lanka*, Jan. 2007, No. 4172 Rev. 2, https://www.refworld.org/docid/460a6b9f2.html.

Hindu Tamils probably migrated from southern India two or three centuries later.[8] They moved into northern Sri Lanka, took over Jaffna's lucrative pearl industry, and pushed the Sinhalese southward.[9] The Pandya, Pallava, and Chola kingdoms rose and fell.[10] The vast jungle that separated the communities allowed the Tamils to develop a distinct culture in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Sinhalese came to view the close relations between the island Tamils and those in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu as a perpetual source of separatism.

European Colonization

Portuguese in the sixteenth century encountered an island divided among one Tamil and two Sinhalese kingdoms.[11] They took over the coastal areas and later annexed large swaths in the interior via puppet rulers; they discriminated against local religions, destroyed temples, and promoted the Catholic Church.[12] The Dutch used their base in Indonesia to take over the spice

[8] They eventually comprised about 18% of the population.
[9] Kings Sena and Guttika inaugurated Sri Lankan Tamil rule in 237 BCE. Sinhalese rule returned after they were murdered. The city of Kandy became the Sinhalese cultural center. Paul Schellinger and Robert Salkin, *International Dictionary of Historic Places, Volume V: Asia and Oceania* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 37; Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 224.
[10] The Chola dynasty adopted the tiger as its symbol. Patrick Peebles, *The History of Sri Lanka* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004); Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, *The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity* (Stuttgart, GE: Steiner, 1994), 56-57.
[11] Vasco da Gama helped make Portugal a maritime power by finding a water route from Europe to India in 1497. Don Lourenco de Almeida landed on "Cilao" in 1505 while chasing Moorish pirates. His trade mission became a fort. The Portuguese introduced Roman Catholicism and dominated the spice trade. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 17-21; Schellinger and Salkin, *International Dictionary of Historic Places*, 443.
[12] They destroyed both Buddhist and Hindu temples and gave Christian converts preferential trade deals. Their missionaries established Catholic schools that influenced the upper classes to adopt European languages and names. This legacy survives among the modern Sri Lankan families named Silva, Perrera, Costa, and Fernando. Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 224; Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 56.

trade from Lisbon in 1656 and promote Protestantism.[13] Preferential treatment for the Tamils allowed them to keep their slaves and indentured servants.[14]

London challenged Dutch dominance and seized the island's port city Trincomalee in 1796.[15] The British East India Company ruled until the 1802 Treaty of Amiens made Sri Lanka a crown colony.[16] London united the island, renamed it Ceylon, and promoted western liberal democracy and a laissez faire economy. It introduced coffee, tea, and rubber farming, suppressed religious persecution, and ended slavery, traditional land tenure, and the state cinnamon monopoly.[17]

The colonials perpetuated preferential treatment for local Tamils and imported Indian Tamils to work on the coffee, tea, and rubber plantations.[18] Their missionary schools produced

[13] The Dutch ruled via the East India Company and backed vassal kings in exchange for control of the cinnamon trade. They focused more on trade and less on proselytizing the natives. The descendants of the Dutch men who married local women are called Burghers. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 4, 22-23; Kingsley de Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka* (London: Hurst, 1981), 114; George Winius, *The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon: Transition to Dutch Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1971); and Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 56.
[14] Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 53.
[15] Britain needed a port in the area after it almost lost its Indian base at Madras to France in 1758. The Netherlands then sided with France during the US Revolution. Britain feared that the Dutch would deliver Ceylon to the French during the Napoleonic Wars and occupied the island's coastal areas. D. Ratnaweera et al., "Land Settlement Sri Lanka 1840-1975: A Review of the Major Writings on the Subject (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Agrarian Research and Training Institute, 1976), 16; David Chandler, *Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars* (Ware, UK: Wordsworth, 1999), 44; and Cyril Parkinson, *War in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1815* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), 74-77.
[16] For the definition of "crown colony," see "Chap. 5: Case Study 2: EOKA," footnote # 71. "Treaty of Amiens, March 25, 1802," *Napoleon and Empire: Official Text*, https://www.napoleon-empire.com/official-texts/treaty-of-amiens.php; Richard Boyle, "King Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe: Sri Lanka's Last Monarch," *Serendib*, last modified Aug. 2016, http://serendib.btoptions.lk/article.php?id=1858&issue=80; and John Rogers, "Caste as a Social Category and Identity in Colonial Lanka," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 41, no. 1 (2004): 51-77.
[17] This was the first time that a single power ruled since the 12th century. New railways, roads, schools, hospitals, power plants, and plantations improved living standards. The 1832 Colebrooke-Cameron Commission replaced mercantilism, state monopolies, and discriminatory regulations with a unified administration based on equal rights; the governor lost many autocratic powers while the Ceylon Civil Service modernized education and promoted local administration. British occupation saw the population boom from 800,000 to seven million by 1948. Niranjan Casinader, Roshan De Silva Wijeyarat, and Lee Godden, "From Sovereignty to Modernity: Revisiting the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms – Transforming the Buddhist and Colonial Imaginary in Nineteenth-century Ceylon," *Comparative Legal History* 6, no. 1 (2018): 34-64; *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Colebrook-Cameron Commission: British Commission," https://www.britannica.com/topic/Colebrook-Cameron-Commission; and Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 4, 27-29.
[18] Although the Tamils lost their slaves, they remained influential landowners. Indian Tamils played virtually no part in the unconventional warfare. Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 53-54.

the English-speaking Sri Lankans that filled the growing economy's clerical and administrative positions.[19] The new medical, engineering, and accounting schools that were disproportionately located in the north provided Tamils more opportunities to rise in the administration and private sector.[20]

Ceylon thrived over the next century as new trades emerged in landowning, planting, and commerce. British class divisions and social conventions regulated castes and created intra-elite rivalries.[21] Nationalist stirrings in the late nineteenth century came not as an elitist call for self-determination, but rather as a Buddhist backlash against western vice and missionaries.[22] The colonial policy to downgrade the Buddhist clergy, coupled with the expanding Tamil influence, instilled a minority complex in the Sinhalese majority.[23]

The First World War Sparks Nationalism

The First World War barely reached Ceylon in military terms. Allied propaganda extolling freedom and self-determination did, however revive its nationalism. Ethnic violence

[19] The British wanted more "educated Ceylonese" to qualify as voters. The 1924 election involved only 4% of the population. S. R. Ashton, "Ceylon," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century: Volume IV*, ed. Judith Brown and William Louis (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1999), 451-457.
[20] Forty percent of education expenditures went to 5% of the population that was overwhelmingly Tamil by the early twentieth century. Tamils comprised half the student bodies at Colombo's Medical College and Technical College. Robert Kearney, "Educational Expansion and Political Volatility in Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 9 (Sep. 1975): 728-729; Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 58-59.
[21] Ashton, "Ceylon," 451.
[22] Christian proselytizing alarmed the Buddhist clergy. Archaeological excavations in the 1880s revived Buddhist interest in ancient history. Indigenous temperance movements likewise assailed foreign vices and transformed Buddhism into a source for patriotism and national regeneration. Ashton, "Ceylon," 452-453; Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 34-35; and Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 224.
[23] 60 million Tamil Indians resided off the coast in Tamil Nadu state that habitually intervened in Sri Lanka's affairs. Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 60; John Rogers, "Social Mobility, Popular Ideology, and Collective Violence in Modern Sri Lanka," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 3 (Aug. 1987): 589; Mark Frost, "Wider Opportunities: Religious Revival, Nationalist Awakening and the Global Dimension in Colombo, 1870-1920," *Modern Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (Oct. 2002): 943; and Alfred Wilson and Joseph Chandrakanthan, "Tamil Identity and Aspirations," *Conciliation Resources* 4 (Aug. 1998), https://www.c-r.org/accord/sri-lanka/tamil-identity-and-aspirations.

flared between Sinhalese and Muslims in 1915.[24] The authorities encouraged Sinhalese and Tamils political cooperation in the 1919 Ceylon National Congress. The 1921 and 1924 constitutions that granted more self-government simultaneously empowered the locals to criticize the administration.

Democratization stirred communal discord. Governor Sir William Manning observed in the mid-1920s how Sinhalese "designs to dominate the whole political situation by sheer weight of numbers" generated Tamil hostility.[25] The Sinhalese resented the Tamils' reluctance "to account themselves merely a minority section of a united 'Ceylonese' nation."[26] The 1931 Donoughmore Constitution reinforced these trends. On the positive side, it brought universal suffrage and invested local politicians with "authority unimaginable in most of Britain's [other] colonial possessions."[27] On the negative side, it inspired Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism. Democracy meant that the island's largest community could soon exert its influence. For the Tamils, it meant being overwhelmed by a hostile majority.[28]

At a time when colonial subjects in Algeria and Cyprus craved self-rule, Ceylon's Tamils rejected it and boycotted free elections; they sought instead a federalist model that reserved half of all council seats for minorities. The Sinhalese, meanwhile, chafed at the large numbers of

[24] About 10% of the population is Muslim. Among the Sinhalese that the authorities detained was future prime minister Don Senanayake. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 36; Ashton, "Ceylon," 453.
[25] He served Sep. 1918-Apr. 1925.
[26] Ashton, "Ceylon," 457; Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 227.
[27] The constitution replaced communal electorates that safeguarded minority rights with territorial constituencies meant to foster a Ceylonese national identity. Charles Collins, "The Significance of the Donoughmore Constitution in the Political Development of Ceylon," *Parliamentary Affairs* 4, no 1 (1950): 101-110; James Jupp, "The Constitutional System in Ceylon," *Pacific Affairs* 43, no. 1 (Spr. 1970): 73-83; and Ashton, "Ceylon," 454, 456.
[28] Under Britain's Westminster parliamentary model, whichever party won the most votes formed the government. This meant that no Tamil party could gain political power without Sinhalese support. Before the introduction of universal suffrage in 1931, the Burgher, Muslim, Christian, India, and Tamil minorities were protected; the Sinhalese were accordingly underrepresented. The minorities realized that the abolition of communal suffrage would see them swamped by the newly-enfranchised Sinhalese. Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 225-226; Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 64-65.

Tamil Indian laborers influencing the island's elections.[29] Both sides coopted culture to bolster their respective claims to a privileged status. Solomon Bandaranaike's Great Sinhalese Union envisioned Ceylon as a Buddhist state by 1936.[30] The All Ceylon Tamil Congress claimed that Hindus inhabited the island first and then impressed their culture on the Sinhalese.[31]

The Second World War and Nationhood

The Second World War did reach Ceylon and transformed the island into a resource-laden strategic base. Ceylon provided 60% of the Allies' rubber after Malaysia fell and housed Britain's Southeast Asia Command by 1944.[32] The economy flourished as the Allies developed the island's infrastructure.[33] Board of Ministers' Director Don Senanayake secured more self-government from London in October 1945.[34]

The Cold War continued these liberalizing trends. After Britain granted Indian and Burmese freedom in 1947, the Ceylon Independence Act converted the island into a dominion.[35] Sananayake's umbrella group of disparate political parties—the United National Party (UNP)—

[29] About 225,000 Indian Tamils were on the electoral rolls in 1939. Ashton, "Ceylon," 457-458.
[30] He later served as prime minister 1956-1959.
[31] Ashton, "Ceylon," 459; Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 37.
[32] Japan occupied Malaysia in early 1942. Its subsequent loss of carriers and aircraft defending Ceylon ended its military supremacy in the Indian Ocean. "1942: Singapore Forced to Surrender," *BBC Home*, accessed May 3, 2022, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/15/newsid_3529000/3529447.stm; Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1970): 61-89; Yoji Akashi & Mako Yoshimura, *New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1945* (Singapore: NUS, 2008); and Ashton, "Ceylon," 460-46.
[33] Ceylon would host large numbers of Allied troops during the war.
[34] He was Ceylon's first prime minister 1947-1952.
[35] Dominion is "a self-governing nation of the Commonwealth … that acknowledges the British monarch as chief of state." *Miriam-Webster Online*, s. v. "dominion," accessed on Apr. 30, 2022, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dominion; Timothy Parsons, *The Second British Empire: In the Crucible of the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 128; "Ceylon Independence Act 1947," *Legislation.gov.uk*, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/7/enacted#:~:text=An%20Act%20to%20make%20provision,the%20British%20Commonwealth%20of%20Nations; and "Ceylon Independence Bill: HC Deb 21 November 1947, Vol. 444; cc 1477-524, *Hansard: UK Parliament*, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1947/nov/21/ceylon-independence-bill.

easily won the inaugural elections.[36] The new prime minister was charismatic, anticommunist, and had London's confidence; [37] he sincerely sought ethnic harmony via a pluralist, multiethnic state. The Soulbury Constitution that was modeled after the Westminster Parliament promoted "civic nationalism," ethnic neutrality, and anti-discrimination measures.[38] Sri Lankans would henceforth direct their political loyalties to the state, not to their ethno-cultural groups. Ceylon's leaders seemed poised to govern their island to peace and prosperity.[39]

Post-Colonial Optimism and Omens

Ceylon's independence, unlike in India, set off no civil wars.[40] Two issues, however, posed immediate challenges. The "Indian question" raised the political status of one million migrant Tamil Indian laborers. Three laws to disenfranchise them began to fracture Sinhalese-

[36] Concerns over future Indian bullying prompted him to sign military treaties that guaranteed Britain's air and sea base rights. This initially spared the state from maintaining an expensive army that could interfere in politics. Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 120-122; Ashton, "Ceylon," 461-462.

[37] Britain's fears that Ceylon's independence would inspire other anti-imperial nationalists prompted public declarations that the island was unique and its most politically advanced colony. Privately, the Colonial Office trusted Senanayake. After he fell off his horse in 1952, Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent neurosurgeon Sir Hugh Cairns to treat the injured Ceylonese leader. Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*, 122; Ronald Hyam and Roger Louis, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964: Economics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth, Series A, Volume IV* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office/Institute for Commonwealth Studies, 2000), 647-648; and Ashton, "Ceylon," 463.

[38] Many UNP leaders studied in Britain. The Soulbury Constitution combined parliamentarianism and bicameralism; Britain still controlled defense and foreign policy. Section 29(2)b barred discriminatory against minorities; 29(2)c prevented laws from conferring any privileges to people of any community or religion that is not conferred to people of other communities or religions. Ivor Jennings, *The Constitution of Ceylon* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1949), https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.275889/mode/2up; Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 65; David Brown, *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000), 124; and Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, 395.

[39] The population was six million: 4 million Sinhalese, 1.5 million Tamils, 380,000 Muslims, 30,000 Portuguese and Dutch descendants (Burghers), and 10,000 other Europeans. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxviii, 4; and S. R. Ashton, "Ceylon," 456.

[40] For India's civil war, see Shuja Nawaz, "The First Kashmir War Revisited," *India Review* 7, no. 2 (May 2008): 115-154; Peter Lyon, *Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 80; and Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Tamil relations.[41] Second, the "equality question" meant to redress Tamil overrepresentation and Sinhalese underrepresentation in the administrative, political, military, and education sectors.

Groups and parties formed, split, and reformed. The Tamil Federal Party broke away from the moderate Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1949 to spearhead the more radical anti-Sinhalese resistance. A leftist bloc under Solomon Bandaranaike splintered off from the ruling UNP and formed the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1951.[42] Prime Minister Senanayake's sudden death in 1952 deprived the nation of its founding father at a critical time. His son Dudley won the 1952 elections and resigned in 1953;[43] Dudley's cousin John Kotelawala became prime minister in October and promptly antagonized India.[44]

Bandaranaike's SLFP won the 1956 elections as the defender of Buddhist-Sinhalese culture.[45] Independence, he claimed, was a sham, until the nation severed relations with the Commonwealth. His platform recognized Sinhalese as the official language and treated Tamil

[41] The 1948 Ceylon Citizenship Act, the 1948 Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No. 3, and the 1949 Ceylon Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act No. 48 purged hundreds of thousands of Indian Tamils from electoral rolls. Their status had not been an issue prior to 1947 because both India and Ceylon were parts of the British Empire; people born or living in these two territories therefore had the identical status of British subjects. B. K. Jain, "The Problem of Citizenship Rights of Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon," *Indian Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1963): 65-66, 74; Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 41; and Kingsley de Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America), 155.

[42] It combined a domestic socialist agenda with a nonaligned foreign policy.

[43] Although Dudley was already seriously ill, he survived and returned to politics later on. His plan to cut rice subsidies sparked civil unrest and brought the transportation and communication sectors to a standstill. D. C. Ranatunga, "A Courageous, Frank and Lively Politician," *Daily FT*, Apr. 8, 2017, https://www.ft.lk/opinion/a-courageous-frank-and-lively-politician/14-608669.

[44] He served Oct. 1953-Apr. 1956. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru resented the UNP's treatment of the Tamil Indians and its decision to seek membership in the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Ceylon ultimately did not join the anticommunist military alliance. United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "Memorandum from the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State, Washington, December 23, 1955," https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d132; Nabarun Roy, "Assuaging Cold War Anxieties: India and the Failure of SEATO," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 26, no. 2 (2015): 322-340; Ang Cheng Guan, *Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation* (New York: Routledge, 2022); and Kevin Ruane, "SEATO, MEDO, and the Baghdad Pact: Anthony Eden, British Foreign Policy and the Collective Defense of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 1952–1955," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16, no. 1 (2005): 169-199.

[45] The election coincided with the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's death. Bandaranaike also ran on the nationalization of banks, plantations, and insurance companies. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxviii-xxix, 4-5, 43-46.

and English as foreign latecomers; demonstrations by Buddhist clerics ultimately shelved the SLFP's limited autonomy proposals.[46] Ceylon was dividing into two hostile groups. Less than a decade after independence, the island lurched toward civil war.

1956-1983: Forging a VNA

The next generation of Ceylonese politics was not preordained to produce unconventional warfare. Not every Sinhalese-dominated administration directed a steady stream of provocations towards the minority. In 1965, for example, the UNP-led government tried to elevate the Tamil language. Junius Jayewardene's UNP electoral rout in 1977 supposedly heralded a righteous society (*dharmishta*) that would reverse previous Sinhalese excesses. His 1978 constitution featured proportional representation and more Tamil power in Parliament.[47]

Despite these laudable outreaches, numerous policies and events isolated and antagonized the Tamils.[48] The Soulbury Constitution that decided elections on a first-past-the-post scheme severely disadvantaged minorities;[49] local demographics and the Tamils' spatial distributions ensured that Sinhala-majority areas decided general elections. The 1956 "Sinhala Only"

---

[46] Parliament's "Sinhala Only" Act—the Official Language Act No. 33, replaced English with Sinhala as the sole official language and excluded Tamil.

[47] Jayewardene served as prime minister 1977-1978 and president 1978-1989. The 1978 Constitution introduced a presidential system and recognized Tamil as a national language for public administration and legal proceedings. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxix-xxx, 52-54; Nira Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 298.

[48] Government policies 1956-1970 saw the army go from being 40% Tamil to 1%; Tamils in the administration dropped from 30% to 5%. Amita Shastri, "Government Policy and Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka" in *Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Michael Brown and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997), 146.

[49] The candidate with the plurality of votes wins the seat, and the losing party has no representation at all. For arguments on how regime type generates social discord and ethnic unrest, see O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*; Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994); and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (July 1997): 449-471.

platform demonstrated that the leading parties had no incentives to cater to minorities.[50] A May 1958 rumor regarding the murder of a Sinhalese caused hundreds of Tamil revenge deaths. The ensuing state of emergency saw the government forcibly relocate 25,000 Tamils from mostly-Sinhalese areas to Hindu areas in the north.[51]

Sirimavo Bandaranaike's SLFP electoral victory in July 1960 brought the Tamils still more grief.[52] Sinhalese VNAs undermined the UNP's pro-Tamil reforms in 1965. Sirimavo's return to power in 1970 led to yet fewer minority protections. The 1972 constitution that renamed the country Sri Lanka empowered the state to "protect and foster Buddhism."[53] Tamil university applicants faced quotas and higher entrance requirements; their percentages continued to plummet in medical, engineering, and agriculture schools.[54]

---

[50] As democracy usually produces governments that favor the majority, the two main Sinhalese political parties often outbid each other in inflammatory ethno-nationalist rhetoric. International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process: Asia Report No. 124, Nov. 28, 2006," https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-failure-peace-process; Alfred Wilson, *Electoral Politics in an Emergent State: The Ceylon General Elections* (London: Cambridge University, 1975); Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, *Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and Cultural Continuity* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 197; Michael Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland: Pape's Muddles on "Suicide Bombers" in Sri Lanka, Working Paper 32 Nov. 2007* (Heidelberg, GE: University of Heidelberg/South Asia Institute, 2007), 14; and Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 227.

[51] Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 46.

[52] A Buddhist monk assassinated Solomon Bandaranaike on Sep. 15, 1959. His widow Sirimavo became the first female prime minister and adopted his pro-Sinhalese platform. D. B. S. Jeyaraj, "The Incident that Rocked Ceylon 55 Years Ago: The Assassination of Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranai," *Daily Mirror Online*, last modified Sep. 16, 2014, https://www.dailymirror.lk/53002/the-incident-that-rocked-ceylon-55-years-ago-the-assassination-of-prime-minister-swrd-bandaranaike; "Assassination of SWRD Bandaranaike: How did Buddharakkitha Acquire the .45 Revolver?" *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), Jan. 18, 2019, http://www.dailynews.lk/2019/01/18/features/174680/how-did-buddharakkitha-acquire-45-revolver.

[53] Her new United Front allied with the communists, won a resounding victory, and dismissed former Tamil allies. The constitution reaffirmed Sinhala as the state language and concentrated decision-making in the cabinet, where Tamils had no representation. A prime minister headed the government and was accountable to a unicameral Parliament. Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 227; Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 80.

[54] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 291-292; Amita Shastri, "The Material Basis for Tamil Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka," in *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity*, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (New York: Routledge, 1994), 211-213; David Little, "Religion and Ethnicity," in *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 48-50; Chandra de Silva, "Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Rivalry: The Background," in *From Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*, ed. Robert Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), 126; Kingsley de Silva, "University Admissions and Ethnic Tensions in Sri Lanka, 1977-82," in *From Independence to Statehood*: *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*, ed. Robert Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), 98, and *Managing Ethnic Tensions*, 263; and Ambalavanar Sivarajah, "The Rise of Militancy in Tamil Politics," in *Security Dilemma*

Article 9 of Jayewardene's 1978 constitution reiterated the state's obligation to protect and foster Buddhist doctrine and institutions. It continued his predecessor's Tamil restrictions in the universities and administration.[55] His 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act drew international condemnation for human rights violations.[56] After VNAs coerced Tamils to boycott the 1982 elections, the government expelled sixteen minority legislators.[57] Their departure caused a power vacuum that irregular warriors gladly filled.

The Birth of the LTTE

The simmering turmoil caused VNAs to proliferate.[58] Both sides used them to promote their nationalistic agendas, bully moderates, subvert reforms, provoke the government, and kill their neighbors. Sinhalese groups that fanned rumors of murdered citizens and assassinated police officers caused states of emergency in 1958 and 1965. In 1971, the Sinhalese Maoist People's Liberation Front (*Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—JVP*) decried the SLFP's socialist programs as too tepid. The VNA tried to seize power in a single day by slaughtering dozens of Sri Lankan politicians, police, and dissenters.[59]

---

of a Small States: Internal Crisis and External Intervention in Sri Lanka, ed. P. V. J. Jayasekera (New Delhi: South Asian, 1995), 130-131.

[55] Sinhalese controlled 85% of the public sector by 1980. Shaheen Akhtar, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Domestic, Regional and International Linkages (1983-1993)," (PhD dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 2009), 84-85; Neelan Tiruchelvam, "Ethnicity and Resource Allocation," in *From Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*, ed. Robert Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), 186; Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 82.

[56] *Amnesty International* called the law incompatible with democracy. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," in 54; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 298.

[57] The legislators refused a loyalty oath. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 300.

[58] For a list of Sri Lankan VNAs, see Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 277-279.

[59] It melded Marxism and anti-Tamil venom into a "National Ethos" (*Jatika Chintanaya*) designed to purge non-Sinhalese legacies, purify the Sinhalese Aryan blood, restore Buddhism, and create a self-sufficient agrarian paradise. The government declared a state of emergency in April 1971 and jailed 16,000 JVP members. Government paramilitaries killed 10,000-20,000 JVP irregulars. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," 50; Mick Moore, "Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka," *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 3 (July 1993): 593-642; Fred

The Tamil Students Federation (TSF) formed in 1970 to fight discrimination in universities.[60] The moderate Tamil United Front (TUF) warned in 1972 that, "There will be a day for the Tamils also to use arms;"[61] its radical youth threw grenades at the moderates.[62] That same year, the TSF became the Tamil New Tigers; Velupillai Prabhakaran's Marxist group attracted young nationalists.[63] After the September bombing of a carnival brought the police to his family's house, Velupillai went underground for the next thirty-seven years. He established contacts in Tamil Nadu during his stay in India, returned to the island in mid-1974, and enhanced his reputation by assassinating Jaffna's mayor Alfred Duraiappah in 1975.[64]

Stalemate

The New Tigers trained at a jungle base near Vavuniya and started robbing banks in March 1976 to fund their activities.[65] After renaming his group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

---

Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection," *New Left Review* 69 (Oct. 1971): 55-91; and Gamini Samaranayak, "Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 99-119.

[60] The issue radicalized Tamil youth. Kingsley de Silva, "University Admissions," 102-103.

[61] The TUF became the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1975. Tamils met Sinhalese provocations in the mid-1950s with peaceful protest (*satygraha*), a tactic pioneered by Mahatma Gandhi in India. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Satyagraha: Philosophy," https://www.britannica.com/topic/satyagraha-philosophy; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 294.

[62] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 82.

[63] The seventeen year-old Prabhakaran created the group on May 22 and used the moniker Thamby (little brother.) "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," *South Asia Terrorism Portal* (SATP), accessed May 5, 2022. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/srilanka/liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-ltte; Rajan Hoole, *The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Inside Account* (Claremont, CA: Sri Lanka Studies Institute, 1990); Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind, Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the World's Most Ruthless Guerrilla Leader* (New Delhi: Konark), 2003; and Hellmann-Rajanayagam, *The Tamil Tigers*.

[64] The July 27 murder was revenge for the Jan. 1974 electrocution deaths of nine Tamils at the Fourth International Tamil Research Conference. A telegraph pole fell during a clash with police. Tamil Mayor Duraiappah supported Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Jerome Taylor, "Velupillai Prabhakaran: Leader of the Tamil Tigers," *Independent*, May 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/velupillai-prabhakaran-leader-of-the-tamil-tigers-1687239.html; "Obituary: Velupillai Prabhakaran," *BBC News*, modified May 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7885473.stm.

[65] He called his forty-acre base the Flower Garden (*Poonthoddam*). T. Sabaratnam, *Pirapaharan*, accessed May 5, 2022, https://www.sangam.org/Sabaratnam/PirapaharanChap9.htm.

Eelam (LTTE), Prabhakaran's five-person Central Governing Committee promulgated a constitution in May.[66] Armed revolution would achieve separatism and political independence "from the autocratic domination and oppression of the Sinhala chauvinist regime;" socialism and the end of the caste system would follow. Three departments focused on intelligence, subversion, and seizing army camps in Tamil territory. The VNA cast itself as "the authentic revolutionary vanguard of the struggling masses."[67] Its external activities would focus on propaganda, fundraising, and weapons procurement; its message was that the Tamils were victims of ethnic chauvinism, political discrimination, and police repression. Only a separate state, led by LTTE, could bring peace.[68]

About two dozen members constituted the LTTE in mid-1983.[69] The irregulars took oaths of allegiance both to liberation (*punita cutantiram*) and their leader. They promised to bite down on a cyanide capsule (*kuppi*) if captured.[70] Prabhakaran became Commander in Chief of the army, navy (Sea Tigers),[71] air force (Air Tigers),[72] the intelligence group, and the suicide unit

---

[66] He was the Central Governing Committee Chairman. The Committee oversaw the military wing, a political wing, and the International Secretariat; the Secretariat ran the global commercial network. The tiger was the symbol of the Tamil Chola dynasty. The VNA's slogan became "The thirst of the Tigers is the Tamil Eelam Motherland." Hellmann-Rajanayagam, *The Tamil Tigers*, 56-57; Sabaratnam, *Pirapaharan*, chap. 6; Peter Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations—A Preliminary Analysis, Commentary No. 77," (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Mar. 2000).

[67] Sabaratnam, *Pirapaharan*.

[68] Anthony Davis, "Tamil Tiger International," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (Oct. 1996): 469-473.

[69] State security forces hovered around 30,000. Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 16.

[70] All members carried a cyanide capsule around their neck and were forbidden by the leadership to drink alcohol, use drugs or engage in premarital sex. Peter Schalk, "Resistance and Martyrdom in the Process of State Formation of Tamililam," in *Martyrdom and Political Resistance Essays on Asia and Europe*, ed. Joyce Pettigrew (Amsterdam: VU University, 1997), 64; Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 7-8; and Mia Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda," *Washington Post*, May 24, 2009.

[71] The brown water navy deployed "ship killer" speedboats. Stealth vessels operated by the shore and inland waters. The group eventually assembled a fleet of eleven commercial freighters and built its own miniature submarines. Its freighters would station themselves 1,200 miles from the island, outside the navy's operating range. At the opportune time, they would speed to shore and transfer their cargo to trawlers. Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 27; "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE);" and Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."

[72] Tamil expatriates from the US and Switzerland assisted the LTTE air wing. The VNA bought two light aircraft from Australia in 1998 and had a Robinson R-44 helicopter and landing strips by 2002; it probably installed an air defense system around its runways by 2005. The air force's biggest success came on Mar. 26, 2007, when two propeller planes bombed the Katunayake airbase. Shanaka Jayasekara, "The Threats Posed by Aviation Assets in the

(Black Tigers).[73] Separate female units soon appeared (Birds of Freedom).[74] The irregulars would find safe havens in the island's jungles and in India. They eventually raised funds in fifty-four countries.[75]

The LTTE targeted post offices, police, politicians, Muslims, soldiers, bases, and other VNAs—both Sinhalese and Tamil. It terrorized the moderate TULF during the June 1981 local elections; voter intimidation in 1982 elicited the island's first ever charges of election fraud. Its terrorism spurred the government to impose censorship in 1983 and purge Tamil legislators.[76]

The group's prominence skyrocketed after it killed and mutilated thirteen soldiers outside Jaffna in 1983.[77] The Black July reprisals unfolded as two weeks of anti-Tamil riots, arson, and murder.[78] Sinhalese hit squads snatched Tamils from trains, beat them, and then burned them alive; they used government voter lists to identify Tamil homes.[79] President Jayewardene's slow reaction hinted at government complicity; the attacks that initially centered on Colombo engulfed

---

Possession of Terrorist Groups and Proto-States," in T*he Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in South Asia, Proceedings of the First Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) October 19-21, 2005, Denpensar, Bali, Indonesia, IDA Paper P-4096*, ed. John Hanley et al., (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2006), III64 - III66; Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 27.

[73] Recruits underwent a four-month training regime in weapons, tactics, communications, explosives, intelligence. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE);" Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 64.

[74] Arjuna Gunawardena, "Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat?" in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? ed. Yoram Schweitzer (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2006), 81-90; Dexter Filkins, "Asia: Tiger Women: Sri Lanka's Rebels Rely on Female Fighters," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 11, 2000; Audrey Cronin, "CRS Report for Congress: Terrorists and Suicide Attacks August 28, 2003," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress, 2000), 12-13, https://irp.fas.org/crs/RL32058.pdf; Dilip Ganguly, "Sri Lankan Bomber Identified as Female, Extremist," *Associated Press*, Jan. 6, 2000; and Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, chap. 4.

[75] Fundraising mostly took place in Tamil diaspora communities in Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Britain, America, and Scandinavia. Jagath Senaratne, *Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977-1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counter-insurgencies, Foreign Intervention* (Amsterdam: VU University, 1997), 68-74.

[76] The 6th Amendment banned public discourse on separatism. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 301.

[77] It ambushed army patrol Four-Four-Bravo with Indian mines at Tirunelveli on July 23. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 299; Stanley Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1996), 94-95.

[78] They began in Colombo July 24 and lasted until Aug. 5.

[79] Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds*, 96, 283; T. D. S. A. Dissanayaka, *The Agony of Sri Lanka: An in-depth Account of the Racial Riots of 1983* (Colombo: SL: Swastika, 1983), 80-81.

the island.[80] Tamil shops, markets, banks, and factories burned. State death estimates ranged from 300-400; unofficial sources claimed 3,000 dead Tamils. The 150,000-200,000 Tamil refugees that resettled throughout the globe would remain active in the island's politics.[81] Thousands of families lost everything, including trust in their own nation. Those Tamils that remained gravitated increasingly toward VNAs.[82]

Unconventional warfare came because the Buddhist majority felt obligated to institutionalize its version of the national culture. A besieged minority consequently came to believe that its survival was at risk. A generation of Sinhalese incitement precluded the government from regaining Tamil trust. By 1983, the weak side assumed that the state was unable or unwilling to resolve the matter peacefully. Politics henceforth became violent.[83]

President Jayewardene waited six months to debate autonomy at the All Party Conference in January 1984.[84] In the meantime, India and VNAs took liberties. New Delhi sponsored talks between the four prominent Tamil groups and Colombo in Bhutan. The irregulars' ranks swelled under the Eelam National Liberation Front's (ENLF) banner; emboldened after receiving Indian training and arms, the movement demanded self-determination and a merger of the Northern and

[80] Government vehicles transported the Sinhalese mobs. H. A. I. Goonetileke, "July 1983 and the National Question in Sri Lanka: A Bibliographical Guide," *Race and Class* 26, no. 1 (1984): 159-193; Pradeep Jeganathan, "'Violence' as an Analytical Problem: Sri Lankanist Anthropology after July '83," *Nethra: Journal of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies* 2, no. 4 (1998): 7-47; and Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds*, 96.
[81] Colombo alone saw 100,000 Tamils flee. This diaspora would support the LTTE for the next twenty-six years. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 300; Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds*, 94; and Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxxi, 55.
[82] Prabhakaran gloated that, "The '83 July holocaust has united all sections of the Tamil masses" in "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)."
[83] For a Sinhalese overview of the conflict's roots, see Kingsley de Silva, *Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka* (New York, Penguin, 1998). For the Tamil perspective, see Alfred Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Hurst, 2000). Adele Balasingham provides the LTTE's narrative in *The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance* (Mitcham: Fairmax, 2001).
[84] The talks between Jayewardene and the TULF offered all nine provinces autonomy in judicial, representative, executive, and land issues. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxxi.

Eastern provinces in March 1985.[85] India's limited devolution plan at the 1986 Bangalore Conference only convinced Prabhakaran step up his anti-government activities.[86]

Jayewardene concluded by early 1987, almost four years after the violence began, that the state had to neutralize the irregulars in order for a peace settlement to succeed.[87] The military comprised 48,000 troops and 5% of the national GDP.[88] Forty thousand served in an army that featured five infantry task forces, two reconnaissance regiments, and artillery, engineer, signals, and logistics units. The navy's 5,000 personnel that operated fifty-five vessels could interdict Tamil gun smuggling from India. The air force's 3,700 members could conduct ground operations, airlift, and medical evacuation. The Sri Lankan National Police had 28,000 officers and included a National Intelligence Bureau and Special Forces.[89]

Notwithstanding the shortcomings that it would exhibit in the future, the Sri Lankan government was poised for decisive victory in mid-1987. Operation "Liberation" began in the north on May 26. Eight thousand troops captured the strategic town Nelliady in two days; they held the northern zone by June, seized weapons, and narrowly missed the Sea Tigers commander. The retreating LTTE hid amongst the locals throughout the Jaffna Peninsula.[90]

---

[85] In addition to the LTTE, the ENLF included the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). Indian intelligence's Research and Analysis Wing oversaw Tamil aid. Shelton Kodikara, "The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka: The JVP, the Indian Troops, and Tamil Politics," *Asian Survey* 29, no. 7 (July 1989): 718.
[86] Nilova Roy, "Summit May Ease South Asia Tensions," *Washington Post*, Nov. 18, 1986, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/11/18/summit-may-ease-south-asia-tensions/d43ebf6f-ca85-4140-9ee8-3121f6c1662c/.
[87] The LTTE had just exploded car bombs in Trincomalee and Colombo that killed more than 100 civilians. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 303.
[88] The state increased defense spending from 1% GDP in early 1980s. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxii.
[89] Sri Lanka imported small arms, mortars, artillery, and ships from Britain, China, Singapore, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, Israel, and West Germany. Its counterinsurgency squadron used Italian trainers, and US and French helicopters. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxi-xxii.
[90] Cyril Ranatunga, *Adventurous Journey: From Peace to War, Insurgency to Terrorism* (Colombo, SL: Vijitha Yapa, 2010); Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 93; and Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 303.

India interceded. The world's second largest state accused Colombo of genocide. After Sri Lanka turned back an unauthorized Indian flotilla carrying humanitarian aid, New Delhi's aircraft violated the island's airspace on June 4, 1987.[91] Colombo relented, ceased its military offensives, and signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on July 29. Its devolution plan kept the island a unitary state while acknowledging its "multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society."[92] India's International Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) was supposed to disarm Tamil VNAs; its maritime forces would help Sri Lanka intercept illicit arms.[93] The LTTE accepted the truce and receded into the jungle. Food and garland welcomed the IPKF.

The Sinhalese bitterly resented the Hindu-Indian occupation. The JVP organized riots in the south, attacked army camps, and bombed a meeting attended by both President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Premadasa in August 1987.[94] Eastern Muslims and Sinhalese feared that a merger with the north would consign them to minority status. New Delhi realized too late that despite its enthusiastic welcome, it had little local support; harsh interrogations, torture, and

[91] Gandhi wanted to play regional peacekeeper. He accused Sri Lanka of starving its population and creating thousands of refugees; Indian cargo planes escorted by fighters violated Sri Lankan airspace to drop supplies. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxxii; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 304.
[92] Kumar Rupesinghe, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF)," *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 346; Kodikara, "The Continuing Crisis," 717-719; and Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 304.
[93] India occupied Jaffna, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Amparai and expected to disarm the VNAs with 6,000 police. Ironically, it had just trained and equipped these groups in Tamil Nadu. In return for New Delhi's assistance, Colombo canceled an agreement with the US to expand the *Voice of America*; it further gave India veto power over which foreign nations could use Trincomalee harbor. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxii, xxvi, xxxiii; Hellmann-Rajanayagam, *The Tamil Tigers*, 15; and Rupesinghe, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia," 349.
[94] Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxii-xxiii, xxxiv; Rohan Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-accord Report from Jaffna* (Colombo, SL: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), 46.

murder only hurt its cause. The LTTE wanted India out and encouraged local hunger strikes.[95] After the Tigers ditched the truce in October, the IPKF resorted to arming their rivals.[96]

Unconventional warfare resumed in October 1987, after more than a dozen detained Tigers committed suicide.[97] LTTE revenge fell on 200 Sinhala civilians. The VNA was fending off two states by mid-1988. Newly elected President Premadasa requested an Indian withdrawal and obtained truces from the LTTE and JVP.[98] New Delhi's subsequent pullout in March 1990 proved a weak side bonanza: the Tigers believed that they beat the world's second largest state and liked their chances against Sri Lanka.[99] A long stalemate ensued.

The tiny group of Tamil Marxist nationalists that attracted a few dozen operatives in 1983 entered the 1990s as "one of the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world."[100] The VNA just thwarted two states. Colombo's weakness and New Delhi's retreat inspired it to consolidate power and position itself as the Tamil nation's defender. The LTTE thus started to emulate Algeria's FLN as a government-in-waiting. It would eventually manage its own roads and become the first VNA to issue speeding tickets.[101]

---

[95] Colonel Tileepan fasted to death in Sep. 1987. Annai Pupati, a mother of ten, followed his example in Apr. 1988. Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 8-9.

[96] The IPKF expected to disarm the LTTE quickly and thus never prepared to engage the VNA in a prolonged conflict. It lacked contingency plans to protect civilians, quickly resorted to brutality, and then armed the LTTE's former ENLF allies. Footnote # 85; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 305.

[97] Sri Lanka's Navy arrested the Tigers for arms smuggling. Prabhakaran charged that state oppression forced the detainees into desperate measures. Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka," xxxiv.

[98] Sri Lankabhimanya Ranasinghe Premadasa served as president Jan. 1989-May 1993.

[99] India ultimately lost 1,200 soldiers and expanded the IPKF to 70,000. Kumar Rupesinghe, *Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures, and Lessons, Vol. 2* (Colombo, SL: Research & Documentation Centre/Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006), and "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia," 350.

[100] Tamil Nadu and India's Research and Analysis Wing provided shelter, money, arms, safe homes, and training camps in the 1970s and 1980s. New Delhi denied Colombo's request for joint naval operations to stop LTTE arms smuggling until 1987. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the U.S.," last modified Jan. 2008, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008; Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 221; and Chris Smith, "South Asia's Enduring War," in *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert Rotberg, (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 17-18.

[101] The LTTE was collecting large sums form highway tolls. Bloom, *Dying to Win*, 213.

It designed its own legal code, created a College of Law, and went into broadcasting, banking, sports, farming, and highway building.[102]

The *Brave Tiger* (*Viravankai*) newspaper and the *Voice of the Tigers* radio station disseminated its message, along with a host of pamphlets, books, plays, and poems. Web sites solicited donations and linked to respected humanitarian agencies.[103] Tax collection, propaganda, coercion, drugs and weapons trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, bribery, and murder would make it the de facto authority in the east and north.[104]

The nascent state hounded rivals.[105] The LTTE had already destroyed TELO by May 1986.[106] In July 1989, it murdered TULF leaders in their homes; commandos decimated the EPRLF's leadership at Chennai in June 1990. The Indian-backed Tamil National Army fell swiftly after the IPKF withdrew.[107] Anti-Muslim operations caused with mass expulsions from the north in October. Moderate Tamils routinely suffered Tiger attacks throughout the 1990s.[108]

Suicide Terrorism as Competitive Adaptation

[102] deVotta, "The Liberation Tigers," 1033.
[103] Tiger sites linked to the World Council of Churches and International Educational Development. They brought legitimacy, mobilized active supporters, swayed potential backers, and transmitted propaganda globally. Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 45-46.
[104] Senaratne, *Political Violence in Sri Lanka*, 74-87; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 306.
[105] Over thirty VNAs operated in the Jaffna Peninsula after 1983.
[106] It murdered the group's leader for being too close to India and then executed several hundred of its members. T. S. Subramanian, "Chronicle of Murders," *Frontline*, Aug. 14, 1999, https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article30257904.ece.
[107] President Premadasa helped the LTTE eliminate the Tamil National Army. Ketheshwaran Loganathan, *Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict* (Colombo: SL, CEPRA 1996); Purnaka de Silva, "The Growth of Tamil Paramilitary Nationalisms: Sinhala Chauvinism and Tamil Responses," in *Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka: 'Pearl of the East' or the 'Island of Tears'?* (London: Sage, 1999); and Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 302, 305-306.
[108] Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 18; Subramanian, "Chronicle of Murders."

The LTTE exploited the authorities' security lapses during holidays and late hours. Its repertoire featured selective assassination, indiscriminate terrorism, and conventional assaults.[109] Government ships and foreign commercial vessels suffered its wrath, as did commuter trains, buses, oil tanks, airports, and power stations.[110] Suicide terrorism, however would become its most gruesome and effective competitive adaptation.

The FBI credits the LTTE with inventing the suicide belt, pioneering female suicide terrorism, and murdering world leaders.[111] It loaded cars, trucks, boats, buses, tractors, and even bicycles with explosives and used children routinely.[112] Suicide first appeared in the early 1980s as a defensive measure for operational security—one bite on a cyanide capsule ensured that captured Tamils told the state no tales.[113] Improvisation in 1987 transformed suicide into an offensive weapon that could be delivered anywhere with human precision.[114] Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi succumbed in 1991.[115] A remote controlled car bomb took out

[109] The LTTE evolved to insurgency after the 1990 Indian withdrawal. It amassed a conventional army that scored battlefield victories at Pooneryn in Nov. 1993; Mullaitivu in July 1996; Puliyankulam and Kanakarayankulam in September 1999; Elephant Pass in April 2000, and Agni Kheela in April 2001; Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 27.
[110] United States Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997," *US Department of State Archive*, accessed May 17, 2022, https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html; Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 42.
[111] Female Tigers initially bypassed government profiling. They trained in martial arts, automatic weapons, and how to walk and sit like pregnant women. The explosive belts around their midsection gave the appearance of late-term pregnancy. Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda;" FBI, "Taming the Tamil Tigers."
[112] LTTE suicide terrorists were usually between fourteen to sixteen years old; 60% were girls. Charu Lata Joshi, "Ultimate Sacrifice," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 163, no. 22 (June 2000).
[113] Schalk, "Resistance and Martyrdom," 64; Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 7-8.
[114] Vallipuram Vasanthan (Captain Miller) drove an exploding truck into the Nelliyadi army base on July 5. The LTTE did not use the tactic again until after India withdrew in 1990. Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 7-8; Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism."
[115] A female Tiger named Dhanu murdered Gandhi in Tamil Nadu on May 21 in retaliation for his 1987 decision to deploy troops to Sri Lanka. The LTTE had intelligence that if reelected, Gandhi would seek revenge on Prabhakaran for reneging on the 1987 cease-fire and would reintroduce the IPKF to Sri Lanka. Fourteen onlookers also died in the blast, while another four dozen were seriously injured. Anand Vikatan, "Lady with the Poison Flowers: With Rajiv Gandhi's Gruesome Assassination, the Suicide Bomber Had Well and Truly Arrived," *Outlook India*, last modified Feb. 5, 2022, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/lady-with-the-poison-flowers/228400; "A Look Back at Rajiv Gandhi's Assassination," *New Indian Express*, last modified May 21, 2020, https://www.newindianexpress.com/galleries/nation/2018/may/21/a-look-back-at-rajiv-gandhis-assassination-101515--1.html; and Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism."

Foreign Minister Ranjan Wijeratne shortly afterward.[116] Ten top Sri Lankan military officers died by LTTE landmine in August 1992. Admiral Clancy Fernando fell victim in November to a suicide motorcyclist.[117] Sri Lankan President Premadasa perished in 1993.[118]

Truck bombs at the Central Bank in January 1996 and Colombo's World Trade Center in October 1997 targeted the economy and foreign investment.[119] Independence Day in 1998 nearly ushered in civil war after the Tigers attacked the most revered Buddhist temple in Kandy.[120] A suicide bomber wounded President Chandrika Kumaratunga and killed thirty-eight spectators during the 1999 elections.[121] By the mid-2000s, squadrons of suicide boat bombs operated in swarms that mingled with local fishing trawlers.[122]

The Tigers manipulated Hindu culture and a personality cult to justify suicide terrorism. By elevating the tactic to the ultimate act of nationalism, the LTTE sent its opponents an unmistakable message: "We will sacrifice ourselves at any time to hurt you anywhere."[123]

---

[116] He died Mar. 2, shortly after calling the LTTE a "baby brigade." A parked car with 220 lbs. of explosives destroyed his armored car. Subramanian, "Chronicle of Murders;" Rajan Hoole, "The 1990s: The Culture of Untruth and a Perilous Vacuum, Part 2," *Colombo Telegraph*," last modified Apr. 11, 2014, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-assassination-of-ranjan-wijeratne/; and Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism."

[117] The LTTE bomber crashed his explosives-laden motorbike into Clancy's car on Nov. 16. Ramesh Menon, "LTTE Assassinates Vice-admiral Clancy Fernando, Weakens Sri Lankan Army Offensive," *India Today*, last modified Aug. 13, 2013, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/story/19921215-ltte-assassinates-vice-admiral-clancy-fernando-weakens-army-offensive-767290-2012-12-21.

[118] A suicide bomber on a bicycle killed him and twenty-four others May 1. Edward Gargan, "Suicide Bomber Kills President of Sri Lanka," *New York Times*, May 2, 1993; Subramanian, "Chronicle of Murders."

[119] The attacks were retaliation for the state's massive military offensives that began in mid-1995. They killed nearly 100 civilians and injured 1,400. Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda."

[120] An exploding truck damaged the exterior of the temple believed to hold Buddha's tooth on Jan. 25. Had it reached the temple's inner sanctum, civil war would have likely erupted. DeVotta, "Control Democracy," 55.

[121] She was the daughter of Prime Ministers Solomon and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Chandrika became prime minister in Aug. and then became Sri Lanka's first female president in Nov. 1994. She appointed her mother Prime Minster. The LTTE wanted her UNP opposition candidate Ranil Wickremasinghe to win because he promised to implement a truce. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 309; Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism."

[122] The LTTE navy used fiberglass attack craft with machineguns and grenade launchers. It also had armored suicide boats with contact-fused explosives. Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."

[123] LTTE suicide bombers destroyed a third of Sri Lanka's navy and inspired numerous Islamic copycats. Al Qaeda's attack on the USS Cole at Yemen in 2000 was a carbon copy of a 1991 LTTE naval attack. Amy Waldman, "Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka," *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 2003.

Prabhakaran achieved fanatical devotion from his followers. The zenith of a Black Tiger's existence was not completing the mission or enjoying a divine afterlife, but rather sharing a pre-attack meal with the glorious leader.[124]

Black Tiger pictures of adorned Tamil orphanages.[125] Martyr's Hall in Batticaloa housed 2,500 portraits in a gold and red ambiance to simulate Hindu religious practices. Tamils learned their names and revered their exploits.[126] Kilinochchi stores sold videos with tribute songs; highway billboards instructed female Tigers how to play dead and draw in more enemies before exploding themselves. Dead body politics paraded the remains of suicide bombers through the streets to incite rage.[127] By 2000, twenty-one major cemeteries and holy grounds (*tuyilam illam*) held commemorative rituals every November 27—Great Heroes' Day.[128]

Derailing Negotiations

Suicide terrorism dovetailed neatly into the LTTE's other pastime—derailing negotiations. President Kumaratunga's People's Alliance offered to talk with no preconditions after 1994. Her "peace package" included unilateral devolution and autonomy. A new parliamentary system would underpin this "region of unions" and replace the existing presidential-parliamentary model that had so alienated the Tamils. The North and Eastern

[124] Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda."
[125] Black Tigers were LTTE operatives who died in suicide operations. Captain Millar and the twelve Tigers who swallowed cyanide in 1987 became favorites. Waldman, "Masters of Suicide Bombing."
[126] Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 64.
[127] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University, 1999), 107-126; Michael Roberts, "Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration," *Social Analysis* 50, no. 1 (2006): 84-86.
[128] The first Tamil Tiger died on this date in 1982. The celebrations include music, billboards, and a community lamentation at 6:06 p.m. Sara McDowell and Maire Braniff, *Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 87-88; Michael Roberts, "Saivite Symbolism, Sacrifice and Tamil Tiger Rites," *Social Analysis* 49, no. 1 (2005): 81-82, and *Blunders in Tigerland*, 29-37.

Provinces would unite; chief ministers and assemblies would control their own region's taxation, security, law, police, land, agriculture, industry, development, education, culture, and communications. Both Sinhala and Tamil would be the state's official languages.[129]

Its fixation to its maximalist agenda prompted the LTTE to dismiss the offer outright. The VNA's counteroffer included sinking a navy ship in September 1994. The next month, it probably assassinated UNP presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake.[130] During the 1995 cease-fire negotiations, it sank two navy ships at Trincomalee.[131] Truces became euphemisms for Tiger ploys to regroup and raid local schools for child warriors.[132]

The war economy incentivized the VNA to reject peace. Expatriate remittances would dry up if the conflict ended. When, for example, the Tigers captured the Elephant Pass in 2000 and verged on retaking the Jaffna Peninsula, major infusions of money poured in from Canada, Australia, and the UK.[133] The irregulars grew accustomed to livelihoods based on taxing goods and services, extortion, racketeering, trafficking, and theft; the international humanitarian aid designated for refugees simultaneously lined their pockets.[134] The generation of youth raised in

---

[129] Shastri, "Government Policy," 159; ira Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 310.

[130] Dissanayake rejected the government's pro-Tamil reforms and planned to ask for India's assistance against the LTTE. The LTTE was suspected of killing him on Oct. 24, but no decisive proof came out. His widow Srima became the UNP candidate and lost the election to Kumaratunga's People's Alliance. "Candidate among 50 Dead in Sri Lanka Bomb Attack: Terrorism: Opposition Leader Is Killed by a Suicide Assassin at an Election Rally. Tamil Guerrillas Suspected," *LA Times*, Oct. 24, 1994, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-10-24-mn-54198-story.html; *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga: President of Sri Lanka," by Alison Eldridge, accessed May 19, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chandrika-Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga; and Gunaratna, "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism."

[131] Shastri, "Government Policy," 159; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 307, 310; and Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 229.

[132] The government captured twenty-nine Tigers in 1998. Twenty-five were below eighteen, and one was thirteen. "US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - Sri Lanka," *Refworld*, last modified Feb. 26, 1999, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa7d14.html; Frances Harrison, "Journalists Failed to Tell the Story of War Crimes in Sri Lanka," *Journalism.co.uk*, last modified May17, 2012, https://www.journalism.co.uk/news-commentary/frances-harrison-sri-lanka-journalists-failed-to-tell-the-story-of-war-crimes/s6/a549285/, and "Tiger Rebels 'Dragoon Tamil Teenagers,'" *BBC News: South Asia*, last modified Feb. 1, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1795443.stm.

[133] Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 51.

[134] Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 229. For how the war economy incentivizes more conflict and undermines peace negotiations, see Edward Newman et al., Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during

violence and corruption did not want peace. Many irregulars had not been to school and lacked both the skills and mindset to join the normal labor market. The LTTE consequently reneged on its agreements, made unrealistic preconditions, and spoiled reasonable deals.[135]

The LTTE's organization surpassed its Algerian and Cypriot counterparts in many respects. The Sri Lankan VNA morphed from a terrorist group, to an insurgency, a powerful lobby, and then into a transnational corporation with legitimate and illicit subsidiaries and front organizations.[136] These lucrative ventures, coupled with aid from the Tamil diaspora, ensured the Tigers' survival.[137] Domestically, money came in from the granting of exit visas, bribes for avoiding military service, transport charges, legal fines, and smuggling human cargo.[138]

External Influences

Conflict Resolution (New York: United Nations University, 2006); Marie-Joëlle Zahar, "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes," in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, ed. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 159-177.

[135] Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, "The Dangers of Devolution: The Hidden Economies of Armed Conflict," in *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 60-61; Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 230.

[136] The Central Governing Committee and the International Secretariat oversaw the group's global undertakings. The LTTE successfully lobbied the South African government to stop selling arms to Sri Lanka. Hoffman et al., "The Radicalization of Diasporas," 2.

[137] The 200,000 Tamils that fled after 1983 formed expatriate communities in more than fifty counties and contributed to the Tigers' longevity. Anthony Davis, "Tiger International: How a Secret Global Network Keeps Sri Lanka's Tamil Guerrilla Organization Up and Killing," *Asiaweek*, July 26, 2000, http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/96/0726/cs1.html; Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 49-50.

[138] The LTTE smuggled refugees from Sri Lanka and India to the west. Its networks included passport and visa forging, bribery, safe houses, and transport. Thailand became a staging point for moving the refugees into the EU and Canada. Canada's large Tamil population and lax immigration laws allowed the illegal migrants to go underground, find low-paying jobs, and function as the LTTE's indentured servants, tax collectors, or henchmen. Roberts, *Blunders in Tigerland*, 28; Gerald Peiris, "Secessionist War and Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational Impulses," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material & Political Linkages*, ed. K. P. S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (Delhi: Roli/Bulwark/Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/peiris.htm; and Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 52.

Outside funding saw LTTE attacks become more frequent, complex, and lethal.[139] Protection rackets extorted foreign businesses and salaried employees.[140] Sri Lanka became a transit station for narcotics moving to and from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the West. The VNA's drug networks handled bulk deliveries, courier protection, distribution, and dealing.[141] Its fleet of freighters carried timber, opium, heroin, cement, and fertilizer.[142] In one audacious 1997 operation, the LTTE hijacked 32,000 mortars Colombo bought from Mozambique.[143]

The international arms market proved particularly rewarding for the Tigers. Until 1991, New Delhi and Tamil Nadu provided money, weapons, and training. The LTTE expanded its activities into Southeast Asia with offices in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. By the mid-1990s, its diverse list of business partners included munitions companies in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, North Korea, and Southeast Asia.[144]

The Faltering State in the 1990s

The state fared poorly in the 1990s. The early years brought foreign intervention into its internal affairs. India's departure and the LTTE's prowess with suicide terror turned Sri Lanka

[139] Davis, "Tamil Tiger International," 469-473. The VNA was receiving US$2 million monthly from Tamil supporters in Canada, Switzerland, the UK, and Germany.
[140] Ibid. Tamil businesses in Toronto remitted 20% of their profits to the LTTE while each Tamil family had to pay a Canadian dollar per day. Tamil families in France, Germany, and Switzerland gave about $US 50 monthly.
[141] Peiris, "Secessionist War and Terrorism."
[142] The LTTE was active in the Burmese, Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong drug markets and registered its ships with shell companies in Panama, Honduras, Liberia, and Southeast Asia. Raymond Bonner, "Tigers Sink Claws into Arms Trade," *South China Morning Post*, Mar. 11, 1998 (reprinted from the *New York Times*); Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE);" and Peiris, "Secessionist War and Terrorism."
[143] The LTTE bribed an Israeli subcontractor to arrange for a LTTE freighter that was registered in Greece—the Stillus Limassul—to pick up the US$ 3 million consignment. By June 1997, the LTTE was killing Sri Lankan soldiers with the mortars. Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE)."
[144] The group acquired weapons from Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Africa, Burma, Turkey, France, Italy and Ukraine. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE);" Bonner, "Tigers Sink Claws;" Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE);" and Davis, "Tamil Tiger International," 469-473.

into a failed state.[145] For President Kumaratunga's unilateral devolution plan to work, the LTTE had to be disarmed.[146] Otherwise, the group would rule the northeast while retaining its capacity to fight the state. To make the VNA more pliable and prevent it from converting the truce into a waystation for Tamil separatism, Kumaratunga needed military success.[147]

Operation "Leap Forward" thus began on the Jaffna Peninsula in July 1995. "Thunder Strike" followed in early October; by month's end, the "Sunshine" offensive (*Riviresa*) deployed thirty-five thousand army, navy, and air force troops. Three infantry divisions, backed by heavy armor and artillery hounded the LTTE. Although its insurgents inflicted heavy casualties, the VNA resorted to suicide terrorism.[148] Elite troops from the 53rd Division took Jaffna on December 5.[149] The Tigers again left their cities for jungle havens.

The forty-nine day battle left half a million people homeless.[150] Army officers predicted during their victory ceremony in Jaffna that, "Very soon we will totally defeat and annihilate separatist terrorists." The boast seemed reasonable as the state held most of the peninsula by May 1996.[151] Still, the weak side lingered; again, it dismissed the government's amnesty offer.

---

[145] Sri Lanka appeared healthy in the 1990s with 4.6% annual growth that supported food and public transportation subsidies and universal healthcare and education. Free and regular elections took place. It was nonetheless a fragmented state because it did not monopolize coercive control over large parts of its territory. Donald Snodgrass, "Economic Development of Sri Lanka," in *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 90; V. Nithiyanandam, "Ethnic Politics and Third World Development: Some Lessons from Sri Lanka's Experience," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (Apr. 2000): 283-284; and Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Routledge, 2009), 78.

[146] The plan eventually evolved into an even more liberal ethnic confederation.

[147] The "pro-peace" president thus pursued "war for peace." Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 231-232; DeVotta, "Control Democracy," 69; and ICG, "Sri Lanka," 4.

[148] It bombed two large oil storage facilities near Colombo in October. The next month, two suicide bombers killed eighteen and injured fifty. The group then sank a government supply ship in Trincomalee harbor with an underwater mine. Iqbal Athas, "Sri Lanka Launches Military Offensive," *UPI*, Oct. 17, 1995, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/10/17/Sri-Lanka-launches-military-offensive/5807813902400/.

[149] Iqbal Athas, "Sri Lankan Troops Enter Rebel Jaffna," *UPI*, Nov. 20, 1995, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/11/20/Sri-Lankan-troops-enter-rebel-Jaffna/7158816843600/.

[150] Ibid. Many of the refugees joined the Tamil diaspora.

[151] "1995: Jaffna Falls to Sri Lankan Army," *BBC: On This Day: 5 December*, accessed May 25, 2022, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/5/newsid_4618000/4618661.stm.

The waves of suicide terrorism followed achieved the desired outcome.[152] The state could not simultaneously maintain its territorial gains in the Jaffna Peninsula, seize the adjoining mainland, and protect its citizens throughout the island.[153] Operation *Seda Pahara* stalled in July 1996 after the VNA inflicted 1,200 casualties. *Amnesty International* issued scathing reports on the state's human rights abuses.[154] The subsequent *Edibala* and "Assured Victory" (*Jaya Sikurui*) offensives that began in 1997 did not secure Jaffna by spring 1998. In March, the LTTE introduced the exploding bus to the world.[155]

As the overstretched military retrenched, unrelenting suicide attacks disrupted elections and cowed moderates. Black Tigers partially blinded President Kumaratunga during her December 18, 1999 campaign; that same day, another bomb meant for opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe killed twelve and injured seventy.[156] Prabhakaran could declare with confidence that an independent Tamil Eelam was "the only and final solution to our national conflict."[157] The decade that started with India's uninvited intervention wound down with government pleas for foreign intervention from India, Pakistan, Norway,[158] and Israel.[159]

---

[152] Its attack on the Central Bank in Colombo killed 100 and injured 1,400. In July, it blew up a commuter train and caused 70 deaths and 500 injuries.

[153] Smith, "South Asia's Enduring War," 27; Rajan Hoole and Rajani Thiranagama, *Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power: Myths, Decadence and Murder* (Colombo, SL: University Teachers for Human Rights, 2001), 378-379; and Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 307.

[154] The NGO charged that the security forces arbitrarily detained thousands of Tamils and used torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. Amnesty International, *Wavering Commitment to Human Rights: ASA/37/08/96,* Aug. 1, 1996, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a98c13.html.

[155] The attack in Colombo killed thirty-eight and injured 250.

[156] "Kumaratunga Re-elected in Sri Lanka," *BBC News: World: South Asia*, Dec. 22, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/574780.stm.

[157] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 310.

[158] Colombo asked Norwegian diplomat Erik Solheim to formulate a peace deal. Rajat Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 5 (2004): 904; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 359.

[159] The government asked India, Pakistan, and Israel for ships and aircraft to help redeploy its retreating army to a new defensive line. Tel Aviv had supplied Sri Lanka with fighter jets, patrol boats, missiles, and training in the 1980s. Colombo broke diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in 1990 to protest Israel's Palestinian policies. "Sri Lanka to Suspend Relations with Israel," *UPI*, last modified Mar. 20, 1990, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/03/20/Sri-Lanka-to-suspend-relations-with-Israel/6077637909200/; Lakkana Nanayakkara, "How Israel Helped Sri Lanka Defeat the Tamil Tigers," *Algemeiner*, Jan. 31, 2012, http://www.algemeiner.com/2012/01/31/how-israel-helped-sri-

9/11/2001: The Darkness before the Dawn

At best, the new millennium forebode unremitting stalemate. At worst, it presaged state collapse. Sri Lanka's conventional approach proved ineffective in irregular warfare; low retention and high desertion devastated military morale. Thirty-five thousand soldiers withdrew from the Jaffna Peninsula in spring 2000;[160] tens of thousands of LTTE showed no sign of relenting.[161] They dispatched India, took Colombo's best shot, and now controlled nearly 6,000 square miles of sanctuary in the north and east.[162] The group reclaimed its cities while its suicide terrorists spread havoc.

A March 2000 attack on a minister's motorcade caused a hundred casualties. Around the time that Black Tigers murdered Minister of Industries Development C. V. Gooneratne in June, Canadian Members of Parliament attended public LTTE fundraisers in Toronto.[163] Four months later, Black Tigers killed a presidential candidate and twenty-three onlookers. Summer 2001 brought the state no respite. The spectacular attack at Bandaranaike International Airport and the adjoining Katunayake military airbase on July 24 shocked the nation. Fourteen irregulars destroyed twenty-six commercial and military aircraft; half of Air Lanka was disabled as

---

lanka-defeat-the-tamil-tigers/; Hoole and Thiranagama, *Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power*, 391-393, 399; Smith, "South Asia's Enduring War," 27, 30; and Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 308.

[160] Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 904; United Kingdom Home Office, "Sri Lanka: Country Report: Country Information and Policy Unit: Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Apr. 1, 2004," https://www.refworld.org/docid/40a887847.html.

[161] The Tigers topped out at about 30,000 members.

[162] Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 232, 235; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 310.

[163] Gooneratne's wife and 20 others also died. Pape, "The Strategic Logic," 358. A known LTTE-front hosted the Toronto party—the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils. The US government had designated the LTTE a terrorist group in 1997. Jim Karygiannis was in the Liberal Party and hoisted the Canadian flag alongside the Tamil Tiger flag. The Liberal Party, Ottawa, and Washington did nothing. Peiris, "Secessionist War and Terrorism."

horrified tourists looked on from departure lounges.[164] The President suspended Parliament from July to September 2001 amid a reeling economy and a motion of no confidence.[165] The state tottered. Then al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks changed the world.

9/11/01 and Changing Norms

During the Tigers' first decade, island Tamils joined sympathizers in New Delhi and Tamil Nadu to resist Sinhalese chauvinism. VNA support was a regional affair. The international community showed little interest in pursuing the Tamil "underdogs," particularly in light of Colombo's "appalling human rights record."[166] The effectiveness of LTTE propaganda persuaded western states to treat the Tigers "as a genuine national liberation movement engaged in a legitimate struggle for independence against an oppressive Sinhalese-dominated state."[167]

The 1983 anti-Tamil pogroms transformed the Tiger's support into a transnational affair. The expatriates' activities, and by extension the VNA's survival, would henceforth rely on their host nations' good will. As long as the conflict remained localized, Tamil diaspora activism drew little attention outside Sri Lanka; the same went for the LTTE's commercial ventures. While the international community could have hindered its money laundering or weapons, narcotics, and human smuggling, for the most part it did not. The Tigers consequently thrived.

---

[164] It was then the most destructive terrorism in aviation history. United States Department of State, "Sri Lanka: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2003," *US Department of State*, Feb. 25, 2004, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27951.htm; Rohan Gunaratna, "Intelligence Failure Exposed by Tamil Tiger Airport Attack," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 13, no. 9 (Sep. 2001): 14-17; and Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 310.

[165] Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 904.

[166] Davis, "Tiger International."

[167] This favorable press continued throughout the 1990s, despite the Tiger massacres of Muslims, Tamils, and Sinhalese, the murder of world leaders, and the scores of suicide attacks. The LTTE murdered Muslims in prayer and drove Jaffna's 75,000 Muslims out in Oct. 1990. It then tried to destroy the Bodi Tree in India under which the Buddha attained enlightenment. Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support*, 47; Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 69.

Rajiv Gandhi's shocking assassination by suicide bomber on May 21, 1991 changed the game.[168] Twenty countries branded the LTTE a terrorist organization.[169] With India's assistance gone, most of the VNA's resources henceforth came from abroad.[170] The post-1995 government offensives in the Jaffna Peninsula reinforced these trends. Although the military advances fizzled by the late 1990s, they had nonetheless expelled the irregulars from their major cities. The diaspora had accordingly become indispensable to the jungle-bound Tigers.[171]

Unconventional Warfare in the Post-9/11 World

The 9/11 attacks hardened the international community to VNAs and unconventional warfare.[172] A perceptible shift in the balance of power towards the state began in Sri Lanka.

---

[168] A local photographer named Haribabu recorded the gruesome event and died in the attack. Mark Fineman, "Photographer's Last Shots: Clues to Gandhi's Killers," *LA Times*, June 18, 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-18-mn-925-story.html.

[169] Colombo began a diplomatic campaign to subject the Tamil diaspora to international sanctions and to destroy LTTE assets. US Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997;" Rohan Gunaratna, "Internationalisation of the Tamil Conflict (and its Implications)," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 20 (1997): 119-152; and "Terrorism Act 2000: UK Public General Acts 2000 c. 11, Part I, Section 1," *Legislation.gov.uk*, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1.

[170] Both the Tamil Nadu state and the central government's Research and Analysis Wing immediately cracked down on LTTE assets. Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda;" Davis, "Tiger International."

[171] The Tamil diaspora had grown to half a million. Over 140,000 lived in Canada, primarily in Toronto. Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 228-229; Davis, "Tiger International."

[172] President Bush's global war on terror would focus on rogue states and VNAs acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Bush, "Beyond Containment and Deterrence," 351-352; Renshon, "The Bush Doctrine Reconsidered," 1-37. Washington and the EU subsequently restricted VNA fundraising. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, "Terrorist Financing Since 9/11: Assessing an Evolving Al-Qaeda and State Sponsors of Terrorism, 112th Cong., 2nd Second Sess., May 18, 2012, Serial No. 112-93"; Martin Weiss, Terrorist Financing: The 9/11 Commission Recommendation (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2005); Christian Kaunert and Marina Della Giovanna, "Post-9/11 EU Counter-Terrorist Financing Cooperation: Differentiating Supranational Policy Entrepreneurship by the Commission and the Council Secretariat," *European Security* 19, no. 2 (2010): 275-295; Raphael Perl, *Anti-Terror Strategy, the 9/11 Commission Report & Terrorism Financing: Implications for US Policymakers* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School/Center For Contemporary Conflict, 2005); 9/11 Public Discourse Project, *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, Dec. 5 2005*, https://www.911plus.org/pdf/2005_12_05_CommissionBriefingStatementSummary911.pdf; and John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille, "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," *Monograph on Terrorist Financing* (2004), http://bryantassociates.info/ba%20info/_fpclass/amlcft/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf.

Despite LTTE threats, 70% of the island's voters turned out for the December 2001 elections.[173] Kumaratunga's People Alliance retained the presidency; the UNP's Ranil Wickremasinghe became prime minister.[174] The new government reversed strategy to bait its Tiger trap. Military wins would not bring success versus the LTTE at the negotiating table. In the post-9/11 world, failure with the Tigers at the negotiating table would bring military success on the battlefield.

For the trap to work, the international community had to first see the state as a sincere peace-seeker. Norway's 2002 mediation let Colombo take the diplomatic initiative.[175] In moves that seemed to augur yet another Tiger renewal, the state unilaterally confined the army, police, and Special Task Force to their camps. It then acceded to Prabhakaran's demands and eased the embargo in the north; civilians moved freely in and out of Tiger strongholds. Sri Lankan Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle proposed integrating the LTTE into the armed forces.[176]

The second part of the trap entailed showing the post-9/11 world the Tigers' true nature. The democratic state was really the aggrieved party; the LTTE was al Qaeda's mentor. This rebranding would take time. At first, the VNA cooperated with the multinational Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and prepared to engage in peaceful politics; Sinhalese officials opened the Tiger's political office in the north.[177] Prabhakaran's cease-fire in February 2002 eased more travel restrictions. The government reciprocated by promptly returning irregulars that violated the truce to LTTE checkpoints. Commercial flights to Jaffna resumed after a six-

[173] US Department of State, "Sri Lanka: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices."
[174] Ranil was prime minister 2001-2004.
[175] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 359. The US, EU, and Japan oversaw the deal.
[176] UK Home Office, "Sri Lanka: Country Report."
[177] The SLMM stationed Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, and Icelandic peace monitors in Colombo and Tiger territories. It operated mobile patrol units and naval teams in Jaffna and Trincomalee. "Sri Lanka: Creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)," *Relief Web*, last modified May 24, 2005, https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-creation-sri-lanka-monitoring-mission-slmm; "Status of Mission Agreement on the Establishment and Management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Mar. 18, 2002," *University of Edinburgh: Peace Agreement Database*, https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/548.

year hiatus. Both sides endorsed the return of refugees. The Tigers publicly accepted autonomy in November and pledged to pursue independence only as a last resort.[178] Colombo responded in December with a power-sharing scheme for Tamil autonomy.

2003: Peace Loses its Luster

Still, the Tigers refused to disarm. Troubling reports had already begun to filter in by mid-2002. In direct violation of the truce, the LTTE boosted its standard 5% extortion tax on teachers and government officials to 12%. Forced recruitment of child soldiers rose, as did abductions for ransom;[179] Sea Tigers membership expanded dramatically. Human Rights Watch and the US State Department reported that the LTTE was violently silencing its opposition.[180] Even more disconcerting, these activities were spreading into the government-controlled Batticaloa district. Recently returned refugees were again fleeing.[181]

The Tigers took the bait and prepared for battle by early 2003. The government went on massive recruitment drives and initiated military modernization programs;[182] it requested arms

[178] In his first press conference in over a decade, Prabhakaran noted that the three immutable conditions for peace were a Tamil homeland, nationality, and self-determination. The Tamil people wanted the right to decide their own political destiny. Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 908; "Pirapaharan Commits to Peace, Self Determination," *Tamil Net*, last modified Apr. 11, 2002, https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6838.
[179] While the LTTE was working with UNICEF on a program to demobilize child soldiers, it continued to abduct children. "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010), Recently Ended Conflict," *Project Ploughshares*, last modified Jan. 2011, https://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/sri-lanka-1983-2010/.
[180] Human Rights Watch, "Sri Lanka: Political Killings During the Ceasefire," last modified Aug. 7, 2003, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/srilanka080603.htm; US Department of State, "Sri Lanka: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices."
[181] Harrison, "Tiger Rebels 'Dragoon Tamil Teenagers;'" Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," 230.
[182] In late 2001, the reconstituted military comprised 112,000 soldiers, 27,000 naval personnel, 20,000 air personnel, and 20,000 Home Guard auxiliaries. By 2002, it expanded to 250,000. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 362-377; Rajesh Venugopal, "The Politics of Market Reform at a Time of Civil War: Military Fiscalism in Sri Lanka," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46, no. 49 (2011): 67-75.

and training from India.[183] Prabhakaran suspended negotiations until Colombo withdrew troops from "security zones" in Jaffna; non-Tamil refugees could not return.[184] The LTTE leader next demanded a role in the reconstruction talks in Washington and Tokyo.[185]

Growing political rifts in Colombo made the government less inclined to bargain. President Kumaratunga resented Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's appeasement; the devolution proposal under a new federal constitution seemed like partition. The president withdrew her party's support for the government and declared a state of emergency on November 5. Her SLFP joined the JVP and Buddhist clergy in the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA).[186]

2004: The New Strategy

Mahinda Rajapakse rode the UPFA's hardline platform to victory in April 2004.[187] Colonel Karuna's defection from the Tigers later in the year emboldened the incoming administration.[188] The VNA lost six thousand irregulars overnight, many of which would collaborate with the state. They knew the LTTE's local sympathizers and networks; they could

[183] Skirmishes had continued between the state and VNA, at sea, against the LTTE opponents, and between the Tamils and Muslims in the east. "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010)."
[184] Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 911.
[185] The LTTE was on the State Department's terrorist list and could not attend talks in Washington. It boycotted the June reconstruction talks in Tokyo. Fifty-one states and twenty-two international organizations pledged $US 4.5 billion in aid to Sri Lanka.
[186] Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 911.
[187] He was prime minister 2004-2005 and president 2005-2015. Chandra de Silva, "Sri Lanka in 2005: Continuing Political Turmoil," *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2006): 114-119; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 355-356.
[188] Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (Col. Karuna) claimed that Northern Tamils subordinated eastern Tamils. His defection inspired future challengers to the LTTE. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 310-311; Rajat Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 913-914.

disrupt its extortion operations and rechannel vital funding to pro-government groups. The defectors provided actionable intelligence on Tiger strategy, recruitment, and organization.[189]

Government policies accordingly changed. Federalism yielded to a unitary state based on limited decentralization and devolution. The state would no longer treat the LTTE as the Tamils' sole representative.[190] General Sarath Fonseka assumed battlefield command, while the prime minister's brother Gotabaya Rajapakse became defense secretary.[191] Colombo's new approach took shape by December. Extra-judicial killings befell parliamentarians associated with the LTTE on Christmas Day in a Batticaloa church. Five Tamil students died the next month on a Trincomalee beach. While paramilitaries, soldiers in civilian garb, or state-recruited criminals were suspected, no official government investigations followed.[192]

The new strategy prioritized three objectives after 2005. First, it required more and better troops using a new type of warfare. Military spending skyrocketed. Colombo solicited annual grants and loans from China; it obtained multiple lines of credit for oil and arms.[193] Expenditures rose to $1.29 billion in 2007.[194] The army that before 2005 could barely recruit 3,000 annually was recruiting that amount monthly by 2008.[195] Weapons poured in from India,

[189] Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War;" Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 355-356; and ICG, "Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process," 9.
[190] Colombo negotiated with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), an umbrella group formed in 2001 by the Illanaki Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010);" Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 913, 915.
[191] Both were critics of the peace process and saw the army's previous restraint as a hindrance to victory.
[192] ICG, "Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process," 10; University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), Sri Lanka, "Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy, Special Report No. 20, Apr. 1, 2006," accessed June 2, 2022, https://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport20.htm.
[193] Iran, Libya, Russia, and Pakistan complied with Colombo's requests. Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[194] The defense budget nearly doubled to $1 billion in 2005. ICG, "Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process," 22.
[195] The army grew from 120,000 in 2005 to 200,000 in 2009. Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."

Pakistan, Israel,[196] Iran, China, the US,[197] Bulgaria, and Russia. Sri Lanka acquired Mig-27 fighters from Ukraine, British armored vehicles, and rockets from Slovakia.[198] Its special forces trained alongside counterparts from India, the US, and Britain.[199]

The new military went on the perpetual offensive to overstretch the Tigers and deny them sanctuary. It shunned large, conventional, slow-moving units for small, highly trained, and mobile groups that infiltrated the VNA's rear areas, called in air strikes and artillery attacks, eliminated high-value targets, provided intelligence, and disrupted supply and communications lines. The army and police joined a Civil Defense Force to smash Tiger urban cells. [200]

The new navy neutralized LTTE suicide swarms with counter-swarms of 60-70 vessels.[201] Intelligence from India and the US guided it to LTTE freighters and trawlers. The 10,000 Sri Lankan Special Forces that operated with 1,500 Special Infantry Operations troops harried the Tiger leadership; they overloaded the LTTE's inflexible and hierarchical chain of command.[202] By seizing the initiative, the state forced the VNA to protect its people and territory.[203] While the state was rejecting conventionality, the weak side was embracing it.[204]

---

[196] Tel Aviv provided military advisors and large amounts of weapons that included Kfir aircraft and Dvora and Shaldag naval craft. Colombo let Israeli submarines test fire missiles in its waters. Nanayakkara, "How Israel Helped Sri Lanka."
[197] "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010)." Closer relations with Washington began in 2002. The Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement allowed US vessels to refuel in Sri Lanka; in return, America bought food, fuel, and transportation.
[198] Ibid.
[199] Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 906.
[200] Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[201] Ibid. A US-built coastal defense system provided Colombo shored-based targeting information.
[202] The 1,500 SIOT troops in 2005 grew to 30,000 in 2009.
[203] Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[204] By 2005, The LTTE controlled 5,800 square miles in the north and east. It had become a proto-state with welfare institutions, a police force, a traditional army with heavy weaponry, some naval assets, a small air force, and the most sophisticated suicide terror squads in the world. David Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka: A Successful Model?" in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York: Routledge, 2012), 315.

Colombo next marshaled diplomatic and economic efforts to sanction the Tamil diaspora in the US, European Union, Canada, Australia, and India.[205] Thirty-two states that had once hosted the expatriates' fundraising triumphs designated the LTTE a terrorist organization; they unleashed their law enforcement, intelligence, and bank regulators on the Tigers. Sri Lanka likewise recognized the advantages of joining the US-led global war on terror.[206]

Finally, the government managed its critics. Less due process and more welfare spending countered domestic dissent.[207] Since the countermeasures blurred the civilian-combatant line, battlefields were sealed off from media scrutiny;[208] the administration stopped disclosing casualty rates to parliament until 2009.[209] Meddling countries and human rights organizations were told that Sri Lanka's struggle represented not just a struggle for a state's survival, but rather the war on terror's front line. South Asia's version of al Qaeda warranted not negotiation, but eradication. Colombo's rebranding of the LTTE from freedom-loving underdogs to sinister criminals resonated in Washington and New Delhi.[210]

2006-2009: A VNA's Unmitigated Defeat

[205] The LTTE was receiving 60% of its funding and 100% of its military equipment from abroad by 2004. Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," 906; Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[206] The US was instrumental for disrupting the LTTE's offshore weapons procurement. It shared intelligence, provided a Coast Guard vessel, and improved Sri Lanka's naval command and control capabilities. Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[207] Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[208] The government's new strategy and tactics supported arguments that democratic regimes face disadvantages in unconventional warfare: "democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory." Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15.
[209] "The Tigers' Last Stand; Sri Lanka," *Economist* 390, no. 8613 (Jan. 19, 2009): 48.
[210] The US and India gave "their tacit support for the all-out offensive against the LTTE." Anbarasan Ethirajan, "How Sri Lanka's Military Won," *BBC News: South Asia*, last modified May 22, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8063409.stm.

The state forced the VNA to show its hand by 2006: nothing short of an independent Tamil would suffice. The Tigers had cynically exploited yet another cease-fire. Prabhakaran determined to prevail via unconventional warfare in the post-9/11 world. The next three and a half years demonstrated how a VNA's fanatical adherence to "victory or death" caused spectacular disaster.[211] The Tigers found themselves on the constant defensive, resorting to ever more tactically gruesome but strategically ineffective measures.

Black Tigers failed to kill General Fonseka in April 2006; had they succeeded, the state would have appointed another army commander.[212] When the Tigers shut the Mavil Aru dam on July 21 to cut off water to 15,000 villagers, the government cast its offensive as a humanitarian mission.[213] Tiger suicide terrorism, mortar attacks, air strikes, and naval warfare spread throughout the east and north.[214] The EU declared the LTTE a terrorist organization and froze its accounts in mid-2006; more pressure on the Tigers' overseas commerce followed.[215] The Special Task Force seized the major coastal roads that linked east to north.[216] Col. Karuna's irregulars hounded Tiger sympathizers and siphoned off potential LTTE recruits.[217]

The VNA retreated deeper into the jungle. Its shelling of a delegation of western diplomats injured the American and Italian ambassadors.[218] The heart of LTTE territory in the north came under siege in March. The Tiger air strike on Katunayake air base brought no relief;

---

[211] The LTTE leadership accepted the narrative propounded by many military observers and journalists that it was "the A-team of terrorist groups" and the state would never prevail militarily. Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 34.
[212] A pregnant Bird of Freedom tried to take him out at army headquarters. Anoja Kugenthirarasah faked pregnancy and attended prenatal classes at a military hospital for three weeks before her failed attempt on Fonseka killed nine people. Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda;" Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 356; Alex Perry, "If This is Called Peace...," *Time Magazine*, Apr. 30, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070214084152/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501060508-1189385,00.html.
[213] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 355-356; Layton, "How Sri Lanka Won the War."
[214] "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010)."
[215] Ibid. The Tigers' legal and illicit global businesses were still generating $200-300 million annually.
[216] It had been trained and equipped by the US, UK, and India. Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 315.
[217] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 355-356.
[218] The LTTE claimed it was not aware of their presence. Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 355-356.

nor did the exploding tractor suicide attack on an army base.[219] The April attacks on an airbase and two oil facilities near Colombo caused a blackout during the World Cup cricket finals.[220]

The state controlled the east in July and pushed into the north by October. [221] Colombo had enough soldiers to hold the territory it captured while simultaneously supporting multiple offensives.[222] Tiger funding and recruiting evaporated, locally externally.[223] VNA leaders fell in succession as safe havens dwindled. Whatever heated chatter emanated from the international community warned of holding the state accountable *after* the conflict was over.

Colombo waited until January 2008 to withdraw officially from Norway's cease-fire.[224] It declared the LTTE a terrorist group and assured that post-conflict negotiations would only include the Tigers' rivals.[225] An April rout seemed imminent, as 10,000 irregulars confronted 200,000 soldiers. Still, LTTE prolonged the human suffering for another thirteen tragic months.

The End Game

The Tigers lost their key naval base at Viddattaltivu in June 2008. Their administrative center in Kilinochchi fell by September.[226] The Sri Lankan air force repeatedly targeted known hiding locations of Prabhakaran; the Black Tigers managed to murder retired General Janaka

[219] The initial shock of Tiger air strikes faded, and these attacks with homemade light aircraft caused little damage.
[220] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 357.
[221] Ibid, 358. The state instituted Special Economic Zones in the East to attract international humanitarian aid.
[222] Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 318. The army brought in 34,000 recruits in 2007 and grew to 150,000 by early 2008. The total military was 200,000. The resumption of the war killed the tourist trade, so many islanders enlisted out of economic need.
[223] Ibid, 316-318. The LTTE shrunk to 10,000. The irony is that the Tamil diaspora, which had grown to one million, was losing its ability to support the Tigers; DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," 1023.
[224] The official reason for the withdrawal was the LTTE attack on a civilian bus that killed twenty-four. By ending the truce, Sri Lanka triggered the SLMM's departure and assumed free reign of the information emanating from the battlefield. "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010);" Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 360.
[225] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 359.
[226] Ibid, 360-362. In what was either profound bravery or pure recklessness, the Tigers took staggering losses to hold Kilinochchi until Apr. 2009.

Perera on October 6.[227] The Tigers lost the strategic A-9 highway in January 2009. The state established "safe zones" for civilians as it moved up the coastline.[228]

The end came in May with the "Clearing the East" offensive. Since the state banned journalists, NGOs, and UN observers, only the combatants and 250,000 hapless civilians know what really happened.[229] Both sides mistreated civilians. The LTTE used them as human shields and murdered anyone trying to escape. While in its death throes, it still kidnapped children for soldiers. The group's final gamble entailed hiding amongst civilians and provoking the government to attack the mass of humanity indiscriminately; the resulting humanitarian catastrophe would surely generate international intervention and a cease-fire.[230]

The state obliged the LTTE. After the fighting penned the Tigers and beleaguered noncombatants into shrinking safe zones, the government launched massive artillery assaults and air strikes; Colombo repeatedly rejected calls for truce and civilian safe passage.[231] The Tamil Tigers confronted total defeat. Government troops killed Prabhakaran on May 18, 2009. Accounts of the final days vary. Some maintain an ambush took out his armored car and final 250 supporters. Others say that the last Tigers shot their surrendering leaders in back. Skeptics maintain that the army did not want prisoners and killed them all.[232] The government rejected

---

[227] Ibid, 360-361. The blast also killed his wife and twenty-five others.
[228] Once secure Tiger strongholds fell in Mullaitivu, Vishwamadu, Puthukkudiyiruppu, and Puttumatalan.
[229] Mysterious white vans kidnapped media employees. Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 321.
[230] Jayadeva Uyangoda, "Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties," *Asian Survey* 50, no. 1, (Jan.-Feb. 2010): 1104-1011.
[231] Anywhere from 7,000 to 40,000 people died in the final "safe zone." Michael Roberts, "The Tamil Death Toll in Early 2009: Challenging Rohan Gunaratna," *Thuppahi's Blog*, Dec. 1, 2011 (12:14 p.m.), https://thuppahis.com/2011/12/01/the-tamil-death-toll-in-early-2009-challenging-rohan-gunaratna/; Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 317; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 362-364; DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," 1043-1044; International Crisis Group, "War Crimes in Sri Lanka: Asia Report No. 191, May 17, 2010," 5, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/191-war-crimes-in-sri-lanka.pdf; Frances Harrison, Still Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka's Hidden War (London: Portobello, 2012b), 75; Jyoti Thottam, "Prabhakaran: The Life and Death of a Tiger," *Time*, May 19, 2009; and "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010)."
[232] Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age*, 362-363.

peace talks with surviving Tigers. The Tamil National Alliance became the sole Tamil representative and accepted a federal state that granted few political concessions.[233]

Three hundred thousand Tamils ended up in internal displacement camps in the north. The government deemed 10,000 of them LTTE and removed them to secure facilities. At least 70,000 islanders died in the unconventional conflict since 1983. President Rajapakse's January 2010 reelection signaled Sri Lanka's move toward authoritarianism.[234] He had his political opponent, the military hero General Fonseka, arrested.[235] A series of measures concentrated power in the executive while weakening the courts, the legislature, and opposition parties. His administration bullied parliament into lifting presidential term limits.[236] Patronage and the lingering emergency laws empowered the state to repress the media and manipulate elections.[237] Both the government and the opposition agreed that no political or military officials would face courts for war crimes.[238]

[233] See footnote # 190. The government dismissed Tamil grievances. "Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983-2010)."
[234] Rajapakse's United People's Freedom Alliance won 144 seats in the 225-seat National Assembly. Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, "One Year After Terrorism: Sri Lanka Needs to Demilitarise Reconstruction and Development for Sustainable Peace," *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 5 (2010): 690.
[235] Fonseka lost the presidential election, won a seat in parliament, and was then court-martialed and convicted for corrupt military supply deals. He served two years of a three-year sentence before receiving a full presidential pardon in 2015. He then became Sri Lanka's first field marshal. Somar Wijayadasa, "Prosecuting and Persecuting the War Hero – General Fonseka," *Sunday Times* (Sri Lanka), Sep. 19, 2010, https://www.sundaytimes.lk/100919/News/nws_16.html; Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 318.
[236] International Crisis Group, "Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, Asia Report No. 209, July 18, 2011," https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/209-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka-harder-than-ever.pdf.
[237] Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 322.
[238] Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, "Victory Celebration and the Unmaking of Diversity in Post-war Sri Lanka," in *In the Shadow of Transitional Justice: Cross-national Perspectives on the Transformative Potential of Remembrance*, ed. Guy Elcheroth and Neloufer de Mel (New York: Routledge, 2022), 52.

Chapter 7: The TPLF in Ethiopia, 2020-2022

> "They [the Tigray People's Liberation Front] are looking at the long term and trying to make Tigray a burial ground for [Ethiopian Prime Minster] Abiy's troops…. A lot of people will suffer."[1]

Prelude to Grievance

Located in the Horn of Africa, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia borders Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Sudan. The landlocked country of 113 million people covers 420,000 square miles and situates its capital in Addis Ababa; lowlands, steppes, and desert surround the imposing array of mountains and plateaus that run from southwest to northeast.[2] Ethiopia includes about 100 distinct ethnolinguistic groups; seventy languages constitute mother tongues.[3] About 32-36% of the population is ethnic Oromo, 24-30% is Amhara, 7% is Somali, 6% is Tigray, 4% is Guragie, and 3% is Wolaita.[4]

[1] Yohannes Woldemariam quoted in Jason Burke, "Rise and Fall of Ethiopia's TPLF – From Rebels to Rulers and Back," *Guardian*, Nov. 25, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/rise-and-fall-of-ethiopias-tplf-tigray-peoples-liberation-front.

[2] The landscape features "awe-inspiring mountains, isolated plateaus, and precipitous valleys." "Enormous gorges and canyons thousands of feet deep" punctuate the highlands and keep regions "completely isolated from each other." The topography poses "almost insurmountable obstacles to political leaders who have sought to unify the country." Saheed Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007), 4-5.

[3] Library of Congress, "Ethiopia: A Country Study," in *Collection: Country Studies*, ed. Thomas Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry (Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1991), xvi.

[4] Group size varies according to different sources. About 40% of the total population and 80% of the city dwellers speak Amharic as their first or second language. Three-quarters of the 6-7 million Tigrayans engage in agriculture. Tigray comprises 7 administrative zones, 52 districts, and 814 sub-districts. Mulugeta Gebregziabher et al., "Geographical Distribution of the Health Crisis of War in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia," *BMJ Global Health* 7 (2022): 1, https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/7/4/e008475.full.pdf; "Ethiopia," *CIA World Factbook*, last updated Sep. 12, 2022, accessed on Sep. 15, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia/; and Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 140.

Map 7.1: Ethiopia[5]

Ethiopia emerged as the Aksumite Kingdom in the first century CE and eventually established close relations with the Byzantines, Egyptians, and Muslims.[6] It converted to Christianity in the fourth century.[7] Muslim Arabs took control of the Red Sea's commerce in the eighth century, settled the coast around the Horn of Africa, and gradually cut off Ethiopia from

[5] Lauren Blanchard, "Ethiopia's Transition and the Tigray Conflict: R46905," *Congressional Research Service*, updated Sep. 9, 2021, 3, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R46905.
[6] The earliest settlers arrived from Southwest Arabia in the first millennium BCE. For a history of the Aksumite Kingdom, see Stuart Munro-Hay, *Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiquity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1991).
[7] Aksum came under Hellenic cultural influence. Egypt's Coptic Church later appointed its bishops. Dale Moore, "Christianity in Ethiopia," *Church History* 5, no. 3 (1936): 271-284; John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39.

Europe and the Middle East; [8] the growing rivalry between Muslims and Christians exacerbated preexisting highlander-lowlander and farmer-animal herder schisms.[9]

The Zagwe kingdom that succeeded the Aksumites at the end of the first millennium controlled the modern areas of Tigray and Eritrea.[10] King Yekuno Amlak's accession in 1270 ushered in the Ethiopian Empire and the Solomonic dynasty that lasted until 1974.[11] Ethiopia may have receded into history had Portugal not interceded in its war with the Islamic Adal Sultanate in 1529-1543.[12] The state survived, but the conflict weakened it severely. Relations with neighboring Somalia were henceforth strained;[13] the Oromo people saw an opportunity to move in from the southwest and establish their own political institutions. Over time, their influence grew throughout the army, nobility, and government.[14]

Persistent religious, ethnic, and political rivalries in the sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries relegated the empire to an assembly of quarrelling fiefdoms.[15] As Portuguese influence

[8] Jon Abbink, "An Historical-Anthropological Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: Issues of Identity and Politics," *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, 11, no. 2 (1998): 109-124.
[9]About half the people consider themselves Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and 10% identify as Catholic or Protestant. Muslims comprise a third of the population. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 140.
[10] Marie-Laure Derat, "The Zagwe Dynasty (11-13th Centuries) and King Yemreḥanna Krestos," *Annales d'Ethiopie* 25 (2010): 157-196; David Buxton, *The Abyssinians* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 44.
[11] This dynasty claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba via their son Menelik I. 1 Kings 10:1-10; Acts 8:26-40; Charles Rey, *In the Country of the Blue Nile* (London: Duckworth, 1927), 266; and Richard Pankhurst, "Fear God, Honor the King: The Use of Biblical Allusions in Ethiopian Historical Literature, Part I," *Northeast African Studies* 8, no. 1: (1986): 11-30.
[12] Lisbon supported the Christian Ethiopian coalition of Amhara and Tigray against an Islamic force of Somalis, Turks, and Arabs. Richard Pankhurst, *The Ethiopian Borderlands: Essays in Regional History, from Ancient Times to the end of the Eighteenth Century* (Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea, 1997); Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991* (Athens, OH: Ohio University, 2001), 9.
[13] David Laitin and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987).
[14] The Oromo live primarily in central Ethiopia; about 44% are Muslims, 41% are Orthodox Christians, and 9% are Protestants. "Ethiopian Government Portal: Oromia Regional State," *Wayback Machine: Internet Archive*, http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/oromia-regional-state; Donald Levine, *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2014), 35-41.
[15] Solomonic emperors became figureheads isolated in the capital Gondar. Richard Pankhurst, *The Ethiopian Royal Chronicles* (Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1967); Shiferaw Bekele, "Reflections on the Power Elite of the Wärä Seh Mäsfenate (1786-1853)," *Annales d'Ethiopie* 15 (1990): 157-179; and Hiroki Ishikawa, "Changes in the Military System during the Gondar Period (1632-1769): Their Influence on the Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty," *Annales d'Éthiopie* 18, no. 1 (2002): 215-229.

waned, Ethiopia reconsolidated its control in the north while steadily expanding southward. Tewodros II's reign (1855-68) incorporated the Shewan nation into the reviving empire and suppressed simmering revolts.[16] Yohannes IV continued his predecessor's centralization program and staved off foreign encroachment. He pacified the Tigray region with the new arms he acquired from Europe and then defeated Egypt in 1875.[17]

King Menelik II doubled the state's territory after taking power in 1889.[18] He made Addis Ababa the capital and recognized Italy's sovereignty over Eritrea in the Treaty of Wichale.[19] He dealt Italian imperial aspirations a resounding defeat at the 1896 Battle of Adwa.[20] Menelik abolished slave markets, built bridges, railways, and telegraph and telephone systems; he introduced vaccination programs, a national currency, and the first modern schools. By the end of his reign in 1913, Ethiopia had become Africa's strongest indigenous power.[21]

---

[16] Shewa was an autonomous kingdom that included Addis Ababa. By the mid-19th century, it was populated by Christian Amhara, Oromo, and Muslims. Tewodros was an ethnic Amara who joined the various kingdoms into one state while ending feudalism and creating a national army. R. H. K. Darkwah, *Shewa, Menilek, and the Ethiopian Empire, 1813-1889* (London: Heinemann, 1975); Harold Marcus, "Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900," in *Colonialism in Africa 1870 - 1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870 - 1914, Volume 1*, ed. Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan (London: Cambridge University, 1969); and Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 10, 23, 25-27.

[17] Yohannes was from Tigray and ruled 1872-1889. The Suez Canal's 1869 opening attracted more attention to the Red Sea from the Ottomans, Egyptians, British, and Italians. London's 1882 occupation of Egypt set off the European scramble to partition Africa. Rome seized parts of Ethiopia and established a colonial presence in Eritrea and Somalia. Britain expanded into east Africa and took Ethiopian territory. French control of Djibouti took away Ethiopia's main port. Czeslaw Jesman, "Egyptian Invasion of Ethiopia," *African Affairs* 58, no. 230 (1959): 75-81; Edward Ullendorff, *The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People* (London: Oxford University, 1973), 90; and Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 27-28, 44-45.

[18] He had been the King of Shewa, 1866-1889.

[19] One hundred years later, Eritrean nationalists would successfully characterize this treaty as proof that Ethiopia did not believe that it had a legitimate claim to Eritrea. Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 45.

[20] Menelik's 100,000 Ethiopians defeated 25,000 Italians and thereby spared the country the catastrophic colonial wars that ravaged Africa. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 29-30; Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia, *Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory Against European Colonialism* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005); Yirga Woldeyes, "The Battle of Adwa: an Ethiopian Victory that Ran against the Current of Colonialism," *The Conversation*, Feb. 29, 2020, https://theconversation.com/the-battle-of-adwa-an-ethiopian-victory-that-ran-against-the-current-of-colonialism-132360; and Donald Levine, "The Battle of Adwa as a "Historic" Event," *Ethiopian Review*, Mar. 3, 2009, http://ethiopianreview.com/content/2006.

[21] Menelik's royal court drew heavily from the Tigray and Amhara groups. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 32-34; Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*.

Menelik's daughter Zauditu became empress after his unpopular grandson Lij Yasu was deposed in September 1916. Since neither the Ethiopian Church nor the State Council fully trusted her, Zauditu had to accept her cousin Ras Tafari Makonnen as regent and heir.[22] He was the de facto ruler that continued Menelik's modernization policies and became His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I in 1930.[23] While the 1931 constitution centralized power, the military incorporated Russian officers, Ethiopians from the King's African Rifles, British, French and Belgian advisors, and a tiny air force comprised of French and African American pilots.[24]

Although Haile Selassie prized technology and development, his autocratic rule neglected the types of social, political, and economic reforms that could have substantially improved national living standards. The 1935 war with and subsequent occupation by Fascist Italy forced him into exile in Britain until 1941.[25] Rome united Ethiopia with its Eritrean and Somaliland colonies and brutally suppressed local VNAs; in order to exploit its new conquest, Italy constructed roads, bridges, and hospitals. A failed 1937 attempt by irregulars to assassinate Marshal Rodolfo Graziani caused the execution of 30,000 Ethiopians.[26] Tenacious resistance by VNAs transformed Italy's occupation into a permanent state of emergency.

---

[22] Tafari descended from the Shewan King Sahle Selassie and claimed direct lineage to Israel's King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 32-34; Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, 52, 135; Bridgette Kasuka, *Prominent African Leaders since Independence* (Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2013), 19; and Paul Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 189.

[23] Numerous international journalists and dignitaries attended his Nov. 2 coronation. Gifts from the US Special Ambassador included refrigerators, typewriters, phonographs, records, rose bushes, and American motion pictures. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 32-34; Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, 54.

[24] Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 32-34; Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, 57-58.

[25] Rome considered the Horn of Africa its untapped mineral reserve and used bases in Somaliland and Eritrea to invade Ethiopia. Selassie's formal complaint to the League of Nations went nowhere, as Europe's colonial powers had agreed to resolve their African territorial disputes via bilateral partition treaties. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 71-74; Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945* (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 120-124; and Alberto Sbacchi, *Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1997).

[26] Graziani was Viceroy of Ethiopia and Governor-General of Italian East Africa June 1936- Dec.1937. The fascists destroyed Ethiopian churches and executed hundreds of clergy. Richard Pankhurst, "Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia: A History of their Discussion, from the League of Nations to the United Nations (1936-1949)," *Northeast African Studies* 6, nos. 1-2 (1999): 83-140; Ian Campbell, *The Addis Ababa Massacre: Italy's National Shame* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); and Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 79.

Ethiopia after the Second World War

Rome's decision to fight alongside Berlin during the Second World War prompted a British-led Allied effort to recruit African soldiers. An Anglo-Ethiopian army under Colonel Orde Wingate proceeded to dislodge Italy from Africa in early 1941.[27] Haile Selassie was liberating his country by January; he entered Addis Ababa in May and signed a 1942 agreement giving London broad control over Ethiopian finances, administration, and foreign policy.[28]

The Cold War and economic challenges shortened Britain's stay in Ethiopia.[29] The US asserted itself in Africa to countervail Soviet influence. Addis Ababa signed a mutual defense pact with Washington in 1953.[30] Selassie renewed efforts to simultaneously modernize the country and consolidate his rule. His failure to redress the daunting economic and ethnic problems left him vulnerable to a coup in December 1960.[31]

Although Selassie survived, recurring crises underwrote his downfall fourteen years later. The national economy that increasingly relied on coffee production favored the landowning Oromo and increasingly relegated Tigray and Amhara to tenant farming. Unconventional

---

[27] W. E. D Allen, "Wingate of the Gideonites," *Palestine Post*, Apr. 9 1944, https://www.nli.org.il/en/newspapers/?a=d&d=pls19440409-01.1.4&e=-------en-20--1--img-txIN%7ctxTI----------1.

[28] Fantahun Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: from Victory to Collapse 1977-1991* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 2014); John Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Sellassie Years* (Algonac, MI: Reference, 1984).

[29] See "Chapter 5: The EOKA in Cyprus, 1955-1960," footnotes # 161-164.

[30] Selassie nonetheless tried to play off the US against the USSR, flirted with the postwar nonaligned movement, established close relations with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and declared his support for state socialism. "History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement," *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India*, last updated Aug. 22, 2012, https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement.

[31] Minorities wanted more representation in the national government and resented Amhara control of social services. The failed coup unfolded on Dec. 13 while Selassie was in Brazil; it included the emperor's son, his imperial bodyguard, the police chief and state officials. The military and church remained loyal to the emperor. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 95, 102; Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, 211; and Henze, *Layers of Time*, 254.

warfare as a result wracked Ethiopia throughout the 1960's.[32] Marxist student groups that extolled the Russian and Chinese revolutions formed, radicalized, and reformed. The government bullied labor unions, repressed the opposition, and killed thousands of peasants.

The early 1970s staged Haile Selassie's demise. A 1972 drought in the northeast caused famine and starvation that took 200,000 lives.[33] The Wollo and Tigray regions that supplied 40% of the country's food lost a fifth of their population and most of their farm animals. When student protests in 1973 criticized government inaction, the state responded with mass arrests, deportations, and murders. As millions of his subjects wallowed in abject misery, Selassie staged elaborate imperial pageants. General strikes emboldened students, teachers, soldiers, and intellectuals to seek change.

The January 1974 military protests would terminate the 700-year Solomonic rule. The state faced insurgency by February. Labor strikes paralyzed the public sector and utilities. Police repression abruptly negated any optimism produced by the prime minister's resignation and the new cabinet's promise to reform. Haile Selassie lost his throne on September 12, 1974.[34]

Communist Ethiopia and Separatism during the Cold War

[32] Land privatization generated more dispossessed peasants. Mechanized farming further disrupted traditional social, cultural, political, and economic relationships. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 103-104.
[33] The government simultaneously faced rising global oil prices after the 1974 Arab embargo and the drop in global coffee prices. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 115.
[34] He was detained in his palace and was probably murdered on government orders in 1975. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Haile Selassie I: Emperor of Ethiopia," accessed Sep. 28, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Haile-Selassie-I; Christopher Clapham, "Four Decades after Haile Selassie's Death, Ethiopia is an African Success Story," *Conversation*, Aug. 27, 2015, https://theconversation.com/four-decades-after-haile-selassies-death-ethiopia-is-an-african-success-story-46690.

Junior officers instituted a military dictatorship.[35] The Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army—the Derg, elected Mengistu Haile Mariam the new leader.[36] The regime embarked on Soviet-style economic planning at all sectors of society; its quest for the socialist utopia included comprehensive land reform and the nationalization of banks and insurance companies.[37] The state monopolized development, promised social transformation, and mobilized 40,000 students and teachers to explain its revolution.

The Derg seemed to invite popular participation when it welcomed returning expatriates and encouraged its allies to form and reconstitute political organizations. The All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) were poised to help shepherd in a new progressive civil society.[38] The honeymoon, however, would not last long; nor would Ethiopian history end with the communist free state. Mengistu's unceasing campaigns to vanquish the ubiquitous reactionaries would instead recreate the worst aspects of the preceding regime.[39]

The state's radical policies generated more irregulars yearning for self-determination. All Ethiopia's regions experienced unconventional warfare in the latter half of the 1970s. The former EPRP ally became an urban VNA after the regime targeted its members and their families; the Derg then turned on the MEISON.[40] The Eritrean People's Liberation Force (EPLF) that formed

[35] The cabal consisted of disgruntled officers from the army, air force, navy, and police.
[36] "Derg" is Amharic for "council" or "committee."
[37] Marina Ottaway, "The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?" *Northeast African Studies* 2, no. 3 (1995): 67-84; Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 120-121.
[38] Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 122-123.
[39] Derg radicals purged moderates in Nov. 1974 and eliminated many former military allies by 1977. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 121, 124; John Harbeson, *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State* (Boulder: Westview, 1988); and Aregawi Berhe, "Ethiopia: Success Story or State of Chaos?" in *Post-Modern Insurgencies Political Violence, Identity Formation and Peacemaking in Comparative Perspective*," ed. Ronaldo Munck and Purnaka de Silva (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 99.
[40] Marina and David Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (New York: Africana, 1978), 187; Alexander de Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 104.

in 1975 bedeviled the state until 1991.[41] The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) initiated anti-government operations in the south.[42] The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) wanted part of Ethiopia to join Somalia.[43]

Tigrayan peasants with a long tradition of landholding feared that government reforms would relegate them to tenant farming,[44] subordinate them to the larger Amhara group,[45] and eradicate the last vestiges of their autonomy.[46] They further resented the state's mandatory conscription, onerous taxation, and repression of clergy.[47] Nationalism in Tigray coalesced amid the Derg's initial disorganization and preoccupation with Somalia and Eritrea.[48] A small group

[41] Eritrean nationalism simmered since the Second World War. London promised to support its autonomy in return for Eritrea's help against Italy. After the war, however, Ethiopia coveted Eritrea's access to the Red Sea. Rome's rule in Eritrea segued into British administration until 1950. Three years after the UN created the Eritrean-Ethiopian federation in 1959, Ethiopia declared Eritrea its fourteenth province. Tekeste Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: the Federal Experience* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997) and "Italy and its Relations with Eritrean Political Parties, 1948-1950," *Africa* (2004): 417-452; Bereket Selassie, *Eritrea and the United Nations and other Essays* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1989); and Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 124-125.

[42] The Oromo comprise the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. The OLF operated in the Bale, Arse, and Sidamo regions after 1973. Paul Baxter, Jan Hultin, and Alessandro Triulzi, *Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1996); "OLF Mission," *Oromo Liberation Front*, http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/OLFMission.htm; and Paul Baxter, "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo," *African Affairs* 77 (1978): 283-296.

[43] They facilitated Somalia's 1977 invasion of Ethiopia. See footnote # 53; "The Somali Abbo Liberation Front," *Garri Nation*, last updated Sep. 5, 2011, https://garagarri.wordpress.com/2011/09/05/bandera-garri/; Waal, *Evil Days*, 74-80; Michael Woldemariam, *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2018); and Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 125.

[44] The 1974 Land Proclamation Act nationalized land and ended the traditional rural power structure. Harbeson, *The Ethiopian Transformation*, 86; Kiflu Tadesse, *The Generation: The History of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party—Part I* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1993), 209.

[45] Although the Tigrayans and Amara were similar culturally and linguistically, the former believed that they alone represented pure Ethiopian culture. Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 28-29, 31, 46; John Markakis, *Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1974), 48.

[46] The Tigray population in the 1960s was about two million; another million lived outside the region. Three-quarters of the population spoke Tigrigna, even though the central government banned the language in schools and courts since the 1940s. John Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1987), 250; Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front," *African Affairs* 103, no. 413 (Oct. 2004): 582.

[47] The Derg rammed through its land reforms, bullied peasant associations, forced farmers to resettle on collective farms, and seized surplus agriculture at below-market prices. Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 16, 29, 31.

[48] Tigray then represented about 5-6% of Ethiopia's population. It was not industrialized and lacked valuable exports. Although the Aksumite kingdom had arisen there, the region suffered economic and political decline since medieval times. Menelik's recognition of Italian Eritrea in 1889 caused lasting resentment because it contained Tigrayan speakers. See footnote # 19. Many Tigrayans supported Italy's 1935 invasion of Ethiopia in order to weaken the central government; Rome combined Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Eritrea into the *African Orientale Italiana* and attached Tigray to Eritrea. Haile Selassie's efforts to reassert state control over the Tigray after 1941

of university teachers and students formed the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1975.[49] The Marxist-Leninist VNA decided that unconventional warfare would resolve its political grievances and allied with the bigger EPLF.[50] Its small groups of irregulars that targeted the state first sought more autonomy;[51] by 1976, the "Manifesto of the TPLF" demanded the creation of an "independent democratic republic of Tigray;" Amhara oppression, it claimed, had irrevocably compromised Tigray's autonomy.[52]

When Somalia attacked Ethiopia in 1977, Addis Ababa successfully appealed to the invader's benefactor in Moscow.[53] Ethiopia abandoned the US for the USSR; Soviet aid

---

sparked violence; 30,000 government troops, supported by British aerial bombing, could not fully subdue the Tigrayan resistance. Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 16, 45, 49; Paul Henze, *Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985), 18-25; and Richard Greenfield, *Ethiopia: A New Political History* (London: Pall Mall, 1965), 285.

[49] The TPLF's predecessor was the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO). It indoctrinated students, teachers, and civil servants in the rigors of insurgency by studying Algeria, China, Cuba, and Vietnam. It also established relations with Eritrean VNAs. From 1975-78, the successor TPLF formulated political goals and strengthened ties with Eritrean VNAs. The group's 170 members attended the "fighters' congress" in Feb. 1976 to elect Aregowi Berhe chairman, organize the Central Committee, and appoint their military commanders. Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front," 584; Markakis, *National and Class Conflict*, 253; and Theodros Dagne, "EPRDF's Rise to Political Dominance," *Ethiopian Review* (Dec. 1992), 17.

[50] Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 92.

[51] Although the irregulars lacked effective communications and carried sticks, they nonetheless freed detained comrades, robbed banks, and seized arms from police stations. Markakis, *National and Class Conflict*, 253; Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 97.

[52] The manifesto characterized a Tigrayan as anyone who spoke the language and delineated the region's geographic boundaries. It accused the Amhara nation of intentionally denying the group human and political rights. Bamlak Yideg and Peteti Premanandam, "The 1976 TPLF Manifesto and Political Instability in Amhara Region, Ethiopia," *Research Review: International Multidisciplinary Research Journal* 4, no. 1 (Jan. 2019).

[53] Mohammed Siad Barre's Somalia wanted to annex the Ogaden region. The Somalis seized large parts of Ethiopia while Mengistu's troops mutinied. Micheal Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2017), 556-557; Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 125; and United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, "Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden:" The Horn of Africa and SALT II, 1977–1979," accessed Oct. 4, 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/horn-of-africa#:~:text=In%20the%20summer%20of%201977,was%20populated%20by%20ethnic%20Somalis.



Map 7.2: Tigray[54]

[54] Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 66.

combined with seventeen thousand Cuban soldiers to help Mengistu repulse Somalia.[55] The "easy' victory convinced the Derg that another quick war in Eritrea would simultaneously pacify the Tigray and dissuade future VNAs. This decision consequently generated escalating cycles of violence. The 30,000 government troops that moved into Tigray in May 1978 committed a host of atrocities and drove the urban youth to the TPLF.[56] From its remote mountain sanctuaries, the VNA harassed the Derg's supply routes; additional help arrived from the EPLF. Two-thirds of Ethiopia's 245,000 soldiers were fighting Tigrayan and Eritrean irregulars by 1982.[57]

The famine that ravaged northern Ethiopia and Eritrea in the early 1980s prompted the warring sides to focus on relief.[58] During the stalemate, the TPLF reorganized for prolonged unconventional warfare.[59] When the fighting resumed, state offensives inflicted mass casualties and triggered severe refugee problems regionally; still, Ethiopia defeated neither the EPLF nor

[55] The Soviets deemed Ethiopia a better geostrategic ally and ended their ten-year alliance with socialist Somalia. Soviet military aid to Addis Ababa soon reached $1 billion—more than Washington provided over the previous twenty-five years. From 1977 to the collapse of the USSR, this number reached $13 billion. After the US and Ethiopia parted ways, Washington sought to contain communism in Africa by allying with Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Oman, and Somalia. Kenneth Pollack, *Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 90-91; Gebru Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000): 635-667.
[56] The CIA estimated the group at 2,000 members in 1978; it doubled by 1979. Burke, "Rise and Fall of Ethiopia's TPLF;" Dan Connell, *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1993), 157.
[57] The EPLF provided Russian advanced weapons that it captured from the government. The TPLF was attracting so many recruits by 1981 that it sent many to the EPLF for training. Dan Connell, "A Lesson of Hope from Eritrea," *New Statesman*, Nov. 7, 1980, 20; Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 123; and Girma Kebbede, *The State and Development in Ethiopia* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1992), 117-118.
[58] Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 118.
[59] While the TPLF opted for attrition, the Eritrean VNA transitioned to conventional war in 1982. The Tigrayans thus avoided losing large numbers of fighters and civilians because they did not attempt to hold land until after they expelled the Derg in 1989. Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 125.

TPLF.[60] Mikhail Gorbachev's accession in 1985 began the decline in Soviet aid to Ethiopia.[61] The Derg, meanwhile, stepped up its deeply unpopular peasant resettlement program.[62]

Support for the state plummeted. Living standards fell while its military offensives sputtered. VNAs controlled most of Eritrea and Tigray by 1987.[63] The defeat that the EPLF inflicted at Afabet in March 1988 would prove more than just another military setback—it portended the demise of Communist Ethiopia.[64] The TPLF summarily overran the strong side's bases and expelled it permanently from its region in early 1989.[65]

The Cold War's end signaled the Derg's demise. Ethiopia's security and economic policies contributed to two million deaths in the Horn of Africa since 1982. Millions more refugees destabilized the region. Despite mobilizing half a million soldiers, devoting half its budget to defense, and receiving massive Soviet aid, the state was losing to irregulars.[66] Mengistu's generals attempted a coup and proposed a truce with the VNAs during his May 1989 visit to East Germany.[67] The finale came in May 1991, just after he proclaimed Ethiopia's socialist experiment a failure and fled to Zimbabwe.

---

[60] Benjamin Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2013), 196.
[61] Gorbachev was General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mar. 1985-Aug. 1991 and President of the Soviet Union Mar. 1990-Dec. 1991. He advised Mengistu in 1988 to implement economic liberalization and political decentralization. Library of Congress, "Ethiopia," xxvi; Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 124.
[62] The relocations began in 1978 to ostensibly combat the drought and increase agricultural output. The disastrous plan to move thirty million Ethiopians over the next nine years was punctuated by human rights abuses, poor planning, and mass suffering. The squalid relocation camps lacked food, water, and sanitation. The resettlements did not happen in the Tigrayan and Eritrean regions because VNAs controlled the population. Kebbede, *The State and Development in Ethiopia*, 81; Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 146.
[63] Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 159. The TPLF achieved military parity with the Derg by 1987.
[64] Ibid, 160. The EPLF put 15,000 government troops and a mechanized division out of action while capturing heavy weapons and Soviet advisors.
[65] Ibid, 162.
[66] Government helicopters attacked villages with no military significance by 1988. Waal, *Evil Days*, 258, 263-264.
[67] The coup failed when enough of the military and police sided with the state. Andargachew Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1993), 355.

The TPLF Ascends

The ascending TPLF seized the initiative to govern in 1991.[68] It invited the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM),[69] the Oromo People's Democratic Party (ODPO),[70] and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (SEPDF) to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).[71] The EPRDF declared itself the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and assumed security and intelligence responsibilities from the demobilized the Ethiopian army on May 27.[72] The eighty-seven member Council of Representatives elected Meles Zenawi President of the TGE on July 1.[73] Optimism prevailed. The new regime adopted national reconciliation, promised to democratize and implement western economic policies, and genuinely seemed on the road to a viable central government.[74]

---

[68] Fikrejesus Amahazion, "Ethiopia and TPLF: A Precipitous Fall – OpEd," *Eurasia Review*, Nov. 18, 2020, https://www.eurasiareview.com/18112020-ethiopia-and-tplf-a-precipitous-fall-oped/.

[69] The group became the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP).

[70] The TPLF created this party to enhance its legitimacy in the Oromo region in the south. It combined defectors from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) with a small group of ethnic Oromo officers from the Derg. Sarah Vaughan, "Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia," (PhD Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2003), 168; Assefa Lemu, "The Rise and Fall of EPRDF, *Aiga Forum*, Dec. 8, 2018, http://www.aigaforum.com/article2018/The-Rise-and-Fall-of-EPRDF.htm#google_vignette.

[71] The EPRDF's constitution incorporated the 1976 TPLF manifesto's call to end feudalism and imperialism and establish a democracy. Paulos Milkias, "Ethiopia, the TPLF and Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor," *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 15; Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 133.

[72] "Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia," *Negarit Gazeta*, July 22, 1991, https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/the-transitional-period-charter-of-ethiopia.pdf.

[73] Meles left his university studies for the TPLF in the mid-1970s and became its leader in 1989. He led the transition government May 1991-Aug. 1995 and served as Ethiopia's Prime Minister Aug. 1995-Aug. 2012. Observers from the US, USSR, and UN oversaw the vote. Aaron Maasho, "Ethiopians Mourn Strongman Ruler Meles, Dead at 57," *Reuters*, Aug. 21, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-meles-idUSBRE87K04K20120821; Library of Congress, "Ethiopia," xix, xxvii.

[74] The TGE aspired to build a federal system that divided Ethiopia into ethnically based states and instituted inclusion via the offices of president, prime minister, and the seventeen-member Council of Ministers. It created twelve autonomous ethnic regions to appease the Amhara, Oromo, Somalis, and Tigray. While the regional leadership exercised executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the community, the central government controlled defense, foreign policy, economic policy, citizenship requirements, and currency. Library of Congress, "Ethiopia," xxvii-xxviii, xxix.

Eritrea Seeks Independence

The ascending Eritreans opted to leave Ethiopia.[75] The EPLF controlled North, West, and South Eritrea by May 1991. President Meles supported Eritrean independence even though it would land lock Ethiopia; he pledged to help rebuild Eritrea's economy.[76] On April 25, 1993, 98% of Eritrean voters favored independence from Ethiopia. The EPLF transformed into the Provisional Government of Eritrea under Issaias Afwerki on May 24.[77] The United Nations formally admitted the State of Eritrea four days later.[78]

Reckless Unilateralism & Old Fashioned Autocracy

The TPLF-led government in Addis Ababa, meanwhile, immediately confronted the perils of unchecked power. Since the EPRDF relied on the Tigrayan military to manage the transition period, it felt little pressure to build popular consensus.[79] Meles' regime consequently made a series of puzzling and potentially catastrophic decisions. It declared the ex-Soviet bloc's

[75] Tigrayan and Eritrean students forged close ties in the early 1970s at the University of Asmara. The EPLF agreed to help the TPLF on the condition that the latter recognize Eritrea's right to secede from Ethiopia. John Young, "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 1 (Mar. 1996): 106, and *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 98; and Haggai Erlikh, *The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962-1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Africa* (Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1983), 76.
[76] The TGE agreed to honor the results of a 1993 referendum on Eritrean independence. Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to share a common currency and the Assab oil refinery; 80% of the former's trade would pass through the latter's ports. Special arrangements addressed the nationals living in each other's jurisdiction. Library of Congress, "Ethiopia," xxix; Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 136.
[77] Fikrejesus Amhazion, "A Look Back on Eritrea's Historic 1993 Referendum," *Tesfa News*, Apr. 23, 2018, https://www.tesfanews.net/revisiting-eritrea-historic-1993-referendum/; Library of Congress, "Ethiopia," xix, xxvii.
[78] "Eritrea Becomes a Member of the United Nations," *South African History Online*, last updated Sep. 30, 2019, https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/eritrea-becomes-member-united-nations#:~:text=The%20UN%20approved%20an%20Observer,member%20on%2028%20May%201993.
[79] Terence Lyons, "Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34, no. 1 (1996): 121; Norwegian Observer Group, "Local and Regional Elections in Ethiopia 21 June 1992," Human Rights Report, no.1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1992), 12.

most repressive, backward, and isolated state—Enver Hoxha's Albania—its paragon.[80] In a particularly misguided attempt to garner support and legitimacy domestically and internationally, the EPRDF unilaterally passed a constitution that ostensibly granted every ethnic group in Ethiopia the right of secession.[81]

Multiple organizations consequently asserted that their distinct identity constituted the legal basis for their own statehood. Sixty political parties prepared to contest the 1992 regional elections. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)—the strongest party in the most populous region—began its violent quest for self-determination in June.[82] In order to prevent Ethiopia from sinking into a morass of ethnic violence or even civil war, the government violated its new constitution and resorted to violence and repression.

Both aspiring and established nationalist groups suffered when they repeated the TPLF's former revolutionary slogans for democracy, equality, civil rights, and the rule of law. These same activities, as they had during the times of Haile Selassie and then the Derg, served as probable cause for arrest, torture, or worse. The EPRDF thus embarked on a course that replicated the both Mengistu's and Hoxha's dictatorships. It arrested reporters and editors;[83]

---

[80] This statement was mystifying because the new regime quickly embraced western liberal economic policies and allied with the US, EU, and Israel. As Addis Ababa renewed its American alliance, Washington expected Ethiopia to act as its proxy against Islamist Sudan. Clapham, "Four Decades after Haile Selassie's Death;" Aregawi Berhe, "The EPRDF and the Crisis of the Ethiopian State, 8-2001," International Conference on African Development Archives, 2-5, https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive/5. For insights into communist Albania, see Idrit Idrizi, "Enver Hoxha's Last Purge: Inside the Ruling Circle of Communist Albania (1981–1983)," *East European Politics and Societies* 36, no. 4 (2022): 1091-1110; Bernd Fischer, "Albania and Enver Hoxha's Legacy," *Open Democracy*, last updated June 10, 2010, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/albania-and-enver-hoxhas-legacy/; and "Albania Domestic Repression under Hoxha and Alia," *Photius*, last updated Apr. 1992, https://photius.com/countries/albania/economy/albania_economy_domestic_repression_~57.html.

[81] Art. 39, No. 1 in Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution promised "Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession." Lyons, "Closing the Transition," 121-142; Berhe, "The EPRDF and the Crisis," 3, 11.

[82] Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 134-135.

[83] Amnesty International, "Ethiopia, Accountability Past and Present: Human Rights in Transition, AI Index: AFR/25/6/95 (London, Apr. 1995), 10.

thousands of political prisoners would languish in state jails.[84] The government brutalized former Oromo, Ogadeni, and Afar allies. Before too long, it would also be fighting Tigrayan separatists.[85]

1998-2000: Ethiopia and Eritrea Go to War

Ethiopia's relations with Eritrea likewise soured. After the former allies accused each other of territory theft in mid-1998, hundreds of thousands of soldiers swarmed the contested borders.[86] The war that began in 1999 would kill tens of thousands; air forces bombed each other's defenseless cities while the OLF sided with Eritrea.[87] As drought compounded the human suffering, 650,000 people became refugees. Vital infrastructure in both desperately poor countries turned to rubble.[88] A tentative peace came in December 2000.[89]

Toward Unconventional Warfare

Ethiopia's preoccupation with Eritrea enabled more VNAs to plot separatism. The OLF still operated in the south; the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) wanted southeast

[84] Ethiopian Human Rights Council, "The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia, 7th Report" (Addis Ababa, Aug. 1994).
[85] Berhe, "The EPRDF and the Crisis," 10.
[86] The process by which Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia in 1993 had not delineated their borders.
[87] See footnote # 82.
[88] Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, 137-138.
[89] After the loss of 80,000 lives, the US, OAU, and Rwanda mediated the Algiers Agreement that demarcated the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Year, "Identical Letters Dated 12 December 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council," A/55/686-S/2000/1183, Dec. 13, 2000, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ER%20ET_001212_AgreementEritreaEthiopia.pdf; Farouk Chauthia and Teklemariam Beckett, "Tigray Crisis: Hyenas Feast on Corpses as Ethiopian Forces Retreat," *BBC News*, Oct. 19, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-63263302.

Ethiopia to become Somalia. Factions within the TPLF became restive enough for Meles to ban them from Tigray by 2001.[90] After his March reelection, he purged the TPLF and courted non-Tigray supporters with money, jobs, and promises to democratize the 2005 elections.

After leading the overthrow of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,[91] the EPRDF dominated Ethiopian politics from 1991 to 2018. Despite decades of corruption and despotism, it enjoyed a steady stream of western aid, especially from Washington and London.[92] The 2005 elections marked the EPRDF's final effort to democratize Ethiopia.[93] The unfavorable vote hastened the unnerved regime's move to unvarnished autocracy and blatant patronage. The state rewarded loyalists with public funds, gave them jobs they did not deserve, let them embezzle money and sell public lands, and then extorted their complicity.[94]

Meles' sudden death in 2012 precipitated the EPRDF's demise. His handpicked successor Prime Minister Halemariam Desalegn would soon oversee the dissolution of the ruling coalition. Government land seizures and peasant evictions in 2015 triggered a ten-month state of emergency, replete with more mass detentions and murders.[95] Over the next three years, unrest in Amhara and Oromia verged on open rebellion. After Halemariam resigned in February

[90] At the TPLF's founding, "self-determination" meant self-rule inside a democratic, multi-ethnic Ethiopia. The radicals later reinterpreted it in the 1976 Manifesto as an independent Republic of Tigray. Ironically, the ELPF pressured them to drop statehood. Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front," 591, and "The EPRDF and the Crisis," 45.
[91] Mengistu adopted this name after 1987.
[92] Foreign aid comprised a third of the state's annual budget. Amahazion, "Ethiopia and TPLF."
[93] When PM Meles kept his 2001 promise to liberalize the electoral process, opposition parties went from 12 to 174 seats in parliament. "Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections: Final Report," (Atlanta, GA: Carter Center, Dec. 2009), 26, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/ethiopia-2005-finalrpt.pdf.
[94] Lemu, "The Rise and Fall of EPRDF."
[95] Amahazion, "Ethiopia and TPLF;" "Ethiopia PM Hailemariam Desalegn in Surprise Resignation, *BBC News*, last updated Feb. 15, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43073285. Halemariam had not been a fighter or an EPRDF founder and thus lacked the support of the TPLF leadership.

2018,[96] three coalition partners turned against the Tigrayan leadership. Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in April 2018.[97]

Ethiopia Confronts the TPLF

The EPRDF's collapse in November 2019 hastened the end of Tigray's thirty-year preeminence in Addis Ababa.[98] Having just enjoyed a generation of dominance, the TPLF refused the role of junior partner in the new Prosperity Party that emerged in December.[99] The group opted instead to retrace Eritrea's 1991 course toward separatism and statehood. It began to relocate to mountain sanctuaries and transform itself into a VNA; it defied state demands to turn over fugitives, stockpiled weapons, and organized its irregulars.[100]

The Prosperity Party nonetheless anticipated a long honeymoon followed by peace and prosperity. It pledged multi-party elections, offered to reconcile with critics, and welcomed back exiles. Abiy publicly renounced past government abuses, lifted bans on political parties, released political prisoners, ended media censorship, and privatized state enterprises; he received the

[96] He served 2012-2018 and was the first ruler to resign in modern Ethiopia.
[97] Abiy's father was a Muslim Oromo and his mother was Christian Amhara. Dawit Endeshaw, "The Rise of Abiy "Abiyot" Ahmed," *Reporter*, Mar. 3, 2018, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/rise-abiy-abiyot-ahmed; Zelalem Girma, "Ethiopia in Democratic, Transformational Leadership," *Ethiopian Herald*, Apr. 3, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180506104159/http://www.ethpress.gov.et/herald/index.php/society/item/11415-ethiopia-in-democratic-transformational-leadership; and Burke, "Rise and Fall of Ethiopia's TPLF."
[98] Daniel Berhane, "EPRDF's New Leadership (Executive & Council Members Lists)," *Horn Affairs*, Oct. 3, 2010, https://hornaffairs.com/2010/10/03/eprdfs-new-leadership/.
[99] The Prosperity Party reincorporated the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). It replaced the TPLF with the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambela People's Democratic Movement (GPDM), and the Harari National League (HNL). "The EPRDF Officially Ends; The Prosperity Party Begins," *Ezega News*, Dec. 26, 2019, https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/7599/The-EPRDF-Officially-Ends-The-Prosperity-Party-Begins; Yohannes Gedamu, "The New Political Party of Ethiopia's Abiy Holds Much Promise but Faces Significant Hurdles," *Quartz Africa*, Dec. 13, 2019, https://qz.com/africa/1767933/ethiopia-prime-minister-abiys-prosperity-party-faces-big-hurdles/.
[100] Luc Willis, "Highlight 17/2021 – The Fallout of Ethnic Federalism," *MEIG*, May 12, 2021, https://www.meig.ch/highlight-17-2021-the-fallout-of-ethnic-federalism/; Amahazion, "Ethiopia and TPLF."

Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating with Eritrea.[101] His decision, however, to cancel the June 2020 national elections instantly generated charges of illegitimacy from the already-stewing TPLF.[102] The organization defied the government in September and elected Debretsion Gebremichael President of the Tigray Region.[103] The state nullified the election and appointed Mulu Nega Chief Executive of the Tigray Regional State;[104] after issuing arrest warrants for Debretsion and his cohorts, Abiy fired Tigrayan officials and generals.[105] The irregulars concluded that the time for peaceful conflict resolution had passed.

Under Debretsion's leadership, the TPLF initiated unconventional warfare against Ethiopia for independence and statehood on November 4, 2020.[106] It targeted multiple Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) military installations throughout its territory; it blocked roads, cut government communications, and seized weapons.[107] The VNA had already perfected

[101] Ethiopia promised to accept the 2002 UN-sponsored boundary with Eritrea and thereby officially ended the 20-year stalemate that followed the 1998-2000 war. See footnote # 89; Jason Burke and Jon Henley, "Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Wins 2019 Nobel Peace Prize," *Guardian*, Oct. 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/11/abiy-ahmed-ethiopian-prime-minister-wins-2019-nobel-peace-prize; and Amahazion, "Ethiopia and TPLF."
[102] The government and the election board cited the pandemic and growing instability. Martina Schwikowski, "Crisis Looms in Ethiopia as Elections are Postponed," *DW*, June 16, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/crisis-looms-in-ethiopia-as-elections-are-postponed/a-53829389; Dawit Endeshaw, "Ethiopia Opposition See Dangers if 2020 Vote Delayed," *Reuters*, June 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-election-idUSKCN1TM23N; and "Ethiopia is Entering Constitutional Limbo," *Economist*, May 16, 2020, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/05/16/ethiopia-is-entering-constitutional-limbo.
[103] He worked in communications and propaganda. Burke and Henley, "Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia's Prime Minister."
[104] Brook Abdu, "Tigray Interim Gov't Plans Regional, Zonal Overhaul," *Reporter*, Nov. 21, 2020, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/10464/.
[105] Luc Willis, "Highlight 17/2021;" "Ethiopia Appoints New Tigray Leader, Amnesty Reports 'Massacre,'" *Al Jazeera*, Nov. 13, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/scores-of-civilians-massacred-in-ethiopias-tigray-amnesty.
[106] The TPLF claimed that it carried out a preemptive strike before the government could initiate its offensives. "Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: How a Soldier Survived an 11-hour Gun Battle," *BBC News*, Dec. 10, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55215431.
[107] The TPLF besieged 300 troops at Sero for 10 days with tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and mortars. Amahazion, "Ethiopia and TPLF;" "Inside a Military Base in Ethiopia's Tigray: Soldiers Decry Betrayal by Former Comrades," *Reuters*, Dec. 17, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-attack-idUSKBN28R1IE; and Jeremy Binnie, "Ethiopia Says Northern Command is Counterattacking Tigray Rebels," *Jane's*, Nov. 12, 2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ethiopia-says-northern-command-is-counterattacking-tigray-rebels.

irregular warfare against the Derg from 1975 to 1991. Its 2020 strategy reflected these lessons: the TPLF would again relinquish assets that sat within easy reach of the state.[108]

As happened in the previous three case studies, the irregulars retreated after their initial offensives, regrouped in their safe havens, and resorted to waves of ambushes and hit and run attacks. The VNA's military arm—the Tigray Defense Force (TDF)—consisted of about 250,000 well-armed irregulars amassed from local militias and the federal army.[109] The TPLF had until recently controlled the treasury, military, and main levers of national power. Unlike the FLN, EOKA, and LTTE, it did not have to create a political organization and army from scratch.

State Miscalculation

Nobel Peace Prize winner Prime Minister Abiy seemed poised for a quick and relatively painless military victory in late 2020. Ethiopia's ongoing privatization and transition toward a market economy had expanded the GDP, grown the budget, and boosted national living standards.[110] The ENDF's 150,000 troops featured ground forces, 3,000 air force personnel, the

[108] Before the hostilities, the TPLF army was a traditional force with heavy weapons. Michael Horton, "Tigray Defense Forces Resist Ethiopian Army Offensive as Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethnic Militias Enter the Fray," *Jamestown Foundation* 19, no. 10 (May 24, 2021); Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*; and Jenny Hammond, *Fire from the Ashes: A Chronicle of the Revolution in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1998).
[109] "Concern of Outright War in Ethiopia Grows as PM Presses Military Offensive," *Voice of America*, Nov. 9, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_concern-outright-war-ethiopia-grows-pm-presses-military-offensive/6198127.html.
[110] The country invested heavily in dams for hydroelectric power, roads, and a railway to connect the interior to the port in Djibouti. Ethiopia's 2021 GDP of $111.27B rose 3.36% from 2020. Its 2022 GDP expanded by 6.6% despite the conflict in Tigray and the pandemic's after-effects. Military spending will reach $475M by late 2022 and constitutes 14.9% of the state budget. Dana Sanchez, "Ethiopia Moves Toward Privatization. It's Not about Money. It's About Tech," *Moguldom Nation*, Jan 10, 2017, http://afkinsider.com/136888/ethiopia-moves-toward-privatization-its-not-about-money-its-about-tech-pm-says/; Aaron Maasho, "Ethiopia Sells off Seven State Firms, to Offer More," *Reuters*, Mar. 29, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-privatisation-idUSL6E8ET53G20120329; "Ethiopia GDP 1981-2022," *Macrotrends*, https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ETH/ethiopia/gdp-gross-domestic-product; "Govt: Ethiopia's GDP to Expand by 6.6% in 2022," *Ethiopian Monitor*, May 10, 2022, https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2022/05/10/govt-ethiopias-gdp-to-expand-by-6-6-in-2022/; "Ethiopia Military Expenditure," *Trading Economics*, https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/military-

Ministry of Peace, and Federal Police;[111] the navy was rebuilt in January 2020.[112] The regions could each deploy paramilitary forces to operate alongside federal troops and local militias.[113]

The six-month state of emergency in Tigray that took effect in late November suspended the constitution in order to "protect the country's peace and sovereignty, and to maintain public security, law and order."[114] The "law enforcement operation" saw the ENDF quickly take the regional capital of Mekelle.[115] Reinforcements arrived from the Afar and Amara regions; Eritrea sent soldiers to help Abiy capture the Tigrayans' major towns and heavy equipment.[116] The government applauded itself for avoiding "the large-scale civilian casualties and war crimes that so many in the international community confidently predicted."[117]

---

expenditure#:~:text=Military%20Expenditure%20in%20Ethiopia%20is,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models; "Ethiopia Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2022," *Macrotrends*, https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ETH/ethiopia/military-spending-defense-budget; and "Ethiopia's Top 10 Budget Expenditures in 2022-23 Fiscal Year," *Business Info Ethiopia*, July 20, 2022, https://businessinfoeth.com/ethiopias-top-10-budget-expenditures-in-2022-23-fiscal-year/.

[111] The ENDF has aging equipment from the Soviet era. It received modern arms from China, Russia, and Ukraine after 2010. Although there is no mandatory conscription, the government ordered military-age citizens to undergo military training after the Tigray conflict escalated in November 2021. Ethiopia," *CIA World Factbook.*

[112] Addis Ababa disbanded the navy in 1996 and then signed a 2019 deal to base its reconstituted fleet at Djibouti. "Ethiopia Navy to be Based in Djibouti, Command HQ in Bahir Dar (Report)," *Africa News*, Mar. 12, 2019, https://www.africanews.com/2019/12/03/ethiopia-navy-to-be-based-in-djibouti-command-hq-in-bahir-dar-report//; Martin Plaut, "Ethiopia's Navy is Reborn – in Djibouti: The Revival of Ethiopian Navy, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, Regional Power Dynamics," *Eritrea Hub*, Feb. 1, 2020, https://eritreahub.org/ethiopias-navy-is-reborn-in-djibouti.

[113] "Ethiopia," *CIA World Factbook.*

[114] Eoin McSweeney and Bethlehem Feleke, "Ethiopia's Nobel Laureate Leader Vows 'Military Confrontation' with Restive Region," *CNN*, Nov. 4, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/04/africa/ethiopia-military-tigray-region-intl/index.html.

[115] The offensive began on Nov. 8 and ended twenty days later. Mekelle contained 500,000 inhabitants. Binnie, "Ethiopia Says Northern Command."

[116] Abiy initially tried to keep the alliance with Eritrea secret and had Eritrean troops wear Ethiopian military uniforms. Giulia Paravicini, "In Escalation of Ethiopia War, Tigray Leader Says His Forces Fired Rockets at Eritrea," *Reuters*, Nov. 15, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN27V05M; "Ethiopia," *CIA World Factbook*; Burke, "Rise and Fall of Ethiopia's TPLF;" and Aditi Bhandari and David Lewis, "The Conflict in Ethiopia," *Reuters Graphics*, Dec. 18, 2020, https://graphics.reuters.com/ETHIOPIA-CONFLICT/xklpyjmndvg/.

[117] Abiy Ahmed, "Operations to Restore Law and Order in Ethiopia's Tigray Region: How Did We Get Here?" *Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: London*, Dec. 24, 2020, https://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/operations-to-restore-law-and-order-in-ethiopias-tigray-region-how-did-we-get-here/; "Tigray Forces Claim to Have Shot Down Ethiopian Plane, Taken Town," *Reuters*, Nov. 28, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict/ethiopia-says-military-operation-in-tigray-region-is-over-hunt-for-tigray-leaders-begins-idINKBN288098; "Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: PM Claims Capture of Regional Capital Mekelle," *BBC News*, Nov. 29, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55111061; and Cara Anna, "Ethiopia

The retreating VNA seemed broken.[118] Its former western supporters wanted and expected a decisive state victory to stabilize the country and the Horn of Africa. Ex-allies in Eritrea sided with Ethiopia and actively promoted the TPLF's extinction. The desperate Tigrayan irregulars fired missiles into Eritrea in a failed bid to force outside intervention.[119]

VNA Survival and the Stalemate

The VNA nonetheless survived. Its battle-hardened quarter million troops that outnumbered the ENDF possessed an intimate knowledge of the local geographic, social, political, and economic complexities.[120] The TPLF had already assembled huge weapons caches while it governed Ethiopia; the government offensive prompted it to readily abandon whatever it deemed useless for small, mobile, and lightly armed detachments of ten to eighty fighters. Professional Tigrayan officers and NCOs organized a formidable VNA that has since prioritized not holding territory, but rather winning popular support.[121]

Declares Victory as Military Takes Tigray Capital," *AP News*, Nov. 28, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-kenya-0fb8647516d9be83d45fee2f1e4d13ae.

[118] "Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: How a Soldier Survived."

[119] Three rockets landed close to the airport in Eritrea's capital of Asmara. The TPLF hoped that Eritrea's involvement would draw in Sudan and Egypt, who were already in a dispute with Ethiopia over the dam it was constructing on the Blue Nile. Cara Anna, "Diplomats: Rockets Fired at Eritrea amid Ethiopian Conflict," *Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 2020; Paravicini, "In Escalation of Ethiopia War."

[120] Unlike my previous three case studies, the VNA that initiated unconventional warfare against a state could field more troops. The also TPLF gained military experience from the 1998-2000 Eritrean War and the guerrilla war to oust Mengistu in 1991. Martin Plaut, "Eritrea in the Tigray War: What We Know and Why it Might Backfire," *African Arguments*, Jan. 8, 2021, https://africanarguments.org/2021/01/eritrea-in-the-tigray-war-what-we-know-and-why-it-might-backfire/.

[121] Much of the TPLF leadership defected from the federal army. Its command included former ENDF Chief of Staff General Tsadkan Gebretensae, Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede, and Ethiopia's former Ambassador to Israel Tsegaye Berhe. They studied Mao's writings and understood that success depended on local goodwill, food, safe havens, and actionable intelligence. Horton, "Tigray Defense Forces Resist;" "Tsadkan Gebretensae, General Tadesse Worede Reportedly under Siege," *Borkena*, Jan. 22, 2021, https://borkena.com/2021/01/22/tsadkan-gebretensae-general-tadesse-worede-reportedly-under-siege/.

The fighting that dragged on into 2021 displaced nearly a million people. Fifty-thousand Ethiopians have already fled to neighboring Sudan.[122] TPLF leader Debretsion vows to resist "as long as federal 'invaders' are on Tigrayan soil."[123] The irregulars recaptured Mekelle in June 2021. By July, they advanced into the Amhara and Afar regions;[124] by November, they allied with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)[125] to take the highway that linked Tigray with Addis Ababa.[126] After a yearlong fight, stalemate ensued.

Civilian and military casualties mount as the fighting spreads. When more government offensives proved indecisive in spring 2022, Addis Ababa declared a unilateral truce in

[122] Bhandari and Lewis, "The Conflict in Ethiopia."
[123] "Ethiopia: 'We Are in Our Homeland, the Invaders Are Attacking Us,' Says Tigray's Gebremichael," *France 24*, May 12, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201205-ethiopia-we-are-in-our-homeland-the-invaders-are-attacking-us-says-tigray-s-gebremichael; "In Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Has Won the Battle but not the War," *Economist*, Dec. 1, 2020, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/12/01/in-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-has-won-the-battle-but-not-the-war.
[124] "Tigrayan and Oromo Forces Say They Have Seized Towns on Ethiopian Highway," *Reuters*, Nov. 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigrayan-forces-say-they-have-seized-another-town-ethiopias-amhara-region-2021-10-31/.
[125] See footnote # 82. Parts of the OLF came to terms with Abiy in Aug. 2018. Other parts splintered from the group, became the OLA, and continued to fight the government. Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, "Ethiopia Govt Agrees Peace Deal with Eritrea-based 'Ex-terror' Group," *Africa News*, July 8, 2018, https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/07/ethiopia-govt-agrees-peace-deal-with-ex-terror-group-based-in-eritrea/; Zecharias Zelalem, "Worsening Violence in Western Ethiopia Forcing Civilians to Flee," *Al Jazeera*, last update Mar. 29, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/20/worsening-violence-western-ethiopia-forcing-civilians-to-flee; and Cara Anna, "Ethiopia Armed Group Says It Has Alliance with Tigray Forces," *AP*, Aug. 11, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/africa-only-on-ap-ethiopia-b280e6622d66b7e7f9b12cd1d0041ae8.
[126] The United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces (UFEFCF) emerged in Nov. 2021 as a coalition of the TPLF, OLA, and nine other VNAs. "Ethiopia's Tigray Forces Seek New Military Alliance," *Reuters*, Aug. 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/ethiopias-tigray-forces-seek-new-military-alliance-2021-08-11/; "Nine Anti-gov't Groups Team up as Ethiopia Recalls Ex-soldiers," *Al Jazeera*, Nov. 5, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/5/nine-anti-abiy-groups-team-up-as-ethiopia-recalls-ex-soldiers; Patrick Wintour, "Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency as Tigrayan Rebels Gain Ground," *Guardian*, Nov. 2, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/02/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-as-tigray-rebels-gain-ground; and Simon Rynn and Ahmed Hassen, "Ethiopia: What Next?" *RUSI*, Oct. 22, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ethiopia-what-next.

March.[127] The TPLF reciprocated. Prime Minister Abiy used the respite to engage Somali-based terrorists from al-Shabaab in May.[128] The conflict with the TPLF resumed in August.[129]

From the VNA's Vantage Point

By November 2020, the TPLF concluded that it no longer wanted Tigray to constitute just another state in Ethiopia. The grievance that hinges on its recently lost political preeminence now galvanizes the vast majority of its supporters. Most Tigrayans expect that their acquiescence to the new hostile regime will bring only worsening times. The VNA is further emboldened because it need not form a military and political organization from scratch.

After its creation in 1975, the TPLF adapted to its hostile and competitive environment effectively enough to topple the Derg and seize power by 1991. Since 2000, Prime Minister Meles habitually purged its dissidents. The VNA that entered the 2020 conflict against Ethiopia with few internal challengers hence expects continual access to Tigray's money, shelter, food, intelligence, loyalty, and participation. It retains remote mountainous safe havens and tries to balance its need to hide with its need to attack, publicize the cause, rally loyalists, and provoke

[127] The truce let aid enter the region. "Ethiopia Declares Unilateral Truce to Allow Aid into Tigray," *Al Jazeera*, Mar. 24, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/ethiopia-declares-truce-to-allow-aid-into-tigray.
[128] Ethiopian troops moved into Somalia's Gedo region to deter further al-Shabaab incursions. The Islamist VNA is affiliated with al Qaeda and is suspected of numerous fatal attacks throughout Africa. Abdullah Bozkurt, "UN Report Indicates al-Qaeda and ISIS Enjoy Safe Haven in Turkish-controlled Idlib," *Nordic Monitor*, Feb. 9, 2022, https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/02/the-un-report-indicates-al-qaeda-and-isis-enjoys-safe-haven-in-turkish-controlled-idlib/; Lorenzo Vidino, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann, "Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict," *African Security* 3, no. 4 (2010): 216-238; and "Ethiopia," *CIA World Factbook*.
[129] It continues until the time of the writing of this chapter in Oct. 2022. "Fighting in Northern Ethiopia Shatters Months-long Truce," *Guardian*, Aug. 24, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/24/fighting-in-northern-ethiopia-shatters-months-long-truce-tigray; "Ethiopia," *CIA World Factbook*.

the government's overreaction. The TPLF has thus far learned, reformed, and eliminated its rivals. It consequently shows no signs of going away.

The VNA however, is not poised for total success. Two million Tigrayans are refugees.[130] Those that remain cannot access banks, telephones, or the internet. The group conscripts old men and children while bombs fall on its cities. Wild animals eat the corpses of Tigrayan villagers;[131] the UN World Food Program estimates that half the people face severe food shortages.[132] Less than 4% of health facilities and 13.5% of hospitals in the region are functioning.[133] The military balance of power that reversed since 2020 now sees a half million Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers engage 200,000 TPLF irregulars.[134] While the VNA has no air force, the state, which can recruit a million new soldiers annually, deploys Turkish-made fighter jets and drones from China and Iran.[135]

The TPLF's justifications for statehood are questionable. Its original 1975 mandate called for increased autonomy within Ethiopia, not for separation. Unlike Eritrea, Tigray lacks a long tradition of independence.[136] Tigrayans have instead preferred for centuries to exist within

[130] From Nov. 2020 to mid-2022, 63,000 Tigrayan refugees have fled to desperately poor Sudan. "The Conflict in Tigray: Testimonies of Survivors of the Bombing of the Capital, Mekele," *BBC News*, Dec. 21, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-55386339.
[131] Chauthia and Beckett, "Tigray Crisis: Hyenas Feast."
[132] About 10% of its total population of six million relied on external food aid before the war started. Bhandari and Lewis, "The Conflict in Ethiopia;" UNICEF, "Situation Analysis of Children and Women: Tigray Region," 2020, https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/2351/file/Tigray%20region%20.pdf; and "Fighting in Northern Ethiopia."
[133] Gebregziabher et al., "Geographical Distribution," 1. The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports that the government has deliberately targeted Tigrayan health facilities, looted them, or used them as military installations. "People Left with Few Healthcare Options in Tigray as Facilities Looted, Destroyed," *Médecins Sans Frontières*, Mar. 15, 2021, https://www.msf.org/health-facilities-targeted-tigray-region-ethiopia.
[134] Chauthia and Beckett, "Tigray Crisis: Hyenas Feast."
[135] Chinese "Wing Loong II" drones have proven deadly against the TPLF. Farouk Chosia, "Conflict in Ethiopia: How Did Abiy Ahmed Stop the Advance of the Tigrayan Fighters?" *BBC News*, Dec. 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-59666290.
[136] Ras Mikael Sehul established a Tigrayan empire in 1769. During this Era of Princes (*Zamana Masafent*) that lasted until 1855, the central state fractured. As Shewa next emerged to dominate Ethiopia, poverty, anarchy, and factionalism exposed Tigray to Egyptian, Mahdist Sudan, and Italian invasions. The twenty major battles that unfolded there 1896 to 1935 saw the opposing armies routinely pillage the already beleaguered region. The failed Tigrayan revolt in 1943 that opposed Haile Selassie's return brought British aerial bombing and widespread devastation. Selassie nonetheless gave Tigray limited autonomy when he appointed Tigrayans, not Amhara, as

the Ethiopian empire and federal state. After the EPLF and TPLF coalition defeated the Derg in 1991, the latter, had it wanted, could have followed the former's example to secessionism and statehood. The Tigrayan VNA opted instead not for self-determination, but leadership of Ethiopia. Separatist aspirations materialized only after it lost political power in 2018.

The Faltering State?

Abiy's scorched earth strategy has so far alienated Tigray, guaranteed the TPLF a steady supply of committed fighters, and tarnished his reputation.[137] The respected Ethiopian Church publicly disputes his version of reality.[138] His law enforcement operation subjects the state to charges of torture, human rights violations, and the use of starvation as a war tactic.[139] The coalition of federal troops, ethnic militias, and Eritrean soldiers purportedly commit mass

regional administrators, revoked the despised land tax, and empowered the locals to implement their own tribute system. Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia*, 38-43, 52; Gebru Tareke, "Rural Protest in Ethiopia, 1941-1970: A Study of Three Rebellions," (PhD dissertation, Syracuse University, 1977), 132, 141; Robert Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernisation of Ethiopia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1970), 50; Richard Pankhurst, *Social History of Ethiopia: The Northern and Central Highlands from Early Medieval Times to the Rise of Emperor Téwodros II* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1992), 88; Mordechai Abir, *Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes, the Challenge of Islam and Re-unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855* (New York, Praeger, 1968), 160; Christopher Clapham, "The Structure of Regional Conflict in Northern Ethiopia," *Conflict* 15, no. 3 (1991): 251; Margery Perham, *The Government of Ethiopia* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1969), 253; Haggai Erlikh, "Tigrean Nationalism, British Involvement and Haile Selassie's Emerging Absolutism—Northern Ethiopia, 1941-1943," *Asian and African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1981), 195; and Caulk, "Armies as Predators," 457-493.

[137] The government deployed federal and Eritrean troops to Tigray while simultaneously recruiting Amhara and Afar militias. Horton, "Tigray Defense Forces Resist;" Yohannes Gedamu, "Opinion: What Ethiopia Needs is Less, not More, Ethno-nationalism," *Tadias*, May 10, 2021, http://www.tadias.com/05/10/2021/opinion-what-ethiopia-needs-is-less-not-more-ethno-nationalism/.

[138] Cara Anna, "'Horrible': Witnesses Recall Massacre in Ethiopian Holy City," *AP News*, Feb. 18, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/witnesses-recall-massacre-axum-ethiopia-fa1b531fea069aed6768409bd1d20bfa.

[139] "Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed: The Nobel Prize Winner who Went to War," *BBC News*, Oct. 11, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43567007.

rapes,[140] desecrate religious sites,[141] and intentionally destroy farms, schools, and hospitals.[142] Eritrea's involvement raised suspicions that Abiy's once lauded peace deal merely set the stage for war against their mutual enemy.[143] Ethiopia is also fighting irregulars in Oromia.[144] Abiy also realizes that as the war continues, his priority to centralize the state will fade.[145]

Ethiopia nonetheless shows no indications that it will treat Tigray in 2023 as it treated Eritrea in 1991. Its economy has done relatively well under the EPRDP and Abiy. The state currently spends a small percentage of GDP on military countermeasures. The prime minister's domestic allies, particularly the Amhara, see him avenging the past human rights abuses

[140] Reuters reports that Eritrean soldiers routinely kill civilians, gang-rape women, and loot households and crops. Michelle Nichols, "Men Forced to Rape Family Members in Ethiopia's Tigray, U.N. Says," *Reuters*, Mar. 25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/men-forced-rape-family-members-ethiopias-tigray-says-un-2021-03-25/.
[141] CNN documented in Nov. 2020 that Eritrean soldiers opened fire on worshippers at Maryam Dengelat church. Barbara Arvanitidis et al., "Massacre in the Mountains," *CNN*, Mar. 22, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/africa/ethiopia-tigray-dengelat-massacre-intl/index.html.
[142] Horton, "Tigray Defense Forces;" Fassil Hailu, "Reasons the International Community is Unable to End the War in Tigray," *Ethiopia Insight*, Apr. 21, 2021, https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/04/21/reasons-the-international-community-is-unable-to-end-the-war-in-tigray/; Katharine Houreld, "Health Official Alleges 'Sexual Slavery' in Tigray," *Reuters*, Apr. 15, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/special-report-health-official-alleges-sexual-slavery-tigray-women-blame-2021-04-15/; Amnesty International, "Ethiopia: Three Killed, 19 Injured in Tigray as Eritrean Troops Open Fire on Civilians," Apr. 14, 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/ethiopia-three-killed-19-injured-in-tigray-as-eritrean-troops-open-fire-on-civilians-2/; and Alex de Waal, "The Tigray Crisis: Is the Debate Over 'Genocide' in the Region a Distraction?" *BBC News*, May 29, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-57293207.
[143] After initially denying Eritrea's involvement in the conflict, Abiy then claimed that it had intervened without Ethiopia's consent. Arvanitidis et al., "Massacre in the Mountains;" Rodney Muhumuza, "Ethiopia's Leader Says Atrocities Reported in Tigray War," *AP News*, Mar. 23, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-atrocities-commited-tigray-war-3c4a7a322b1cafb687bd1a224e69ff78.
[144] Horton, "Tigray Defense Forces Resist."
[145] While the Ethiopian army is becoming weaker, the regional forces of Amhara, Oromo, and Afar have increasingly grown to fight the TPLF. Tobias Hagmann, "Ethiopia's Civil War: Five Reasons why History won't Repeat Itself," *Conversation*, Nov. 21, 2021, https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-civil-war-five-reasons-why-history-wont-repeat-itself-172158.

committed by his previous party—the EPRDF.[146] The regime has enabled Ethiopia's second largest ethnic group, the Amhara, to occupy large swaths of Tigrayan territory.[147]

International Pressure as Decider?

My model posits that two preconditions and two independent variables underwrite VNA success. After abandoning all hopes for a peaceful resolution in 2020, the group embraced a cause for which it could die and kill—independence. The grievance infused Tigrayan irregulars with an "us versus them" mentality. Indispensable safe havens ensure the group's longevity. As Ethiopian miscalculation coupled with the weak side's competitive adaptation, the once inevitable state victory degenerated into stalemate.

My model further asserts that even after the VNA adapts to its post-stalemate environment, it may still not manage to reverse the unfavorable power balance until states, international institutions, or changing norms intervene. Addis Ababa is currently at odds with Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.[148] The European Union has

[146] They Amhara lost significant territories to the TPLF-led EPRDF after 1991. Abiy's Prosperity Party also attracts broad support for the Oromo region, the major cities, and Ethiopia's diaspora community. Kjetil Tronvoll, "Ethiopia's Tigray War is Fueling Amhara Expansionism," *Foreign Policy* (Apr. 28, 2021); Hagmann, "Ethiopia's Civil War;" Fassil Hailu, "Hawks and Doves: The Great Divide over the War in Tigray," *Ethiopia Insight*, Jan. 11, 2021, https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/11/hawks-and-doves-the-great-divide-over-the-war-in-tigray/, and Hailu, "Reasons the International Community."

[147] Samuel Gebre, "Ethiopia's Amhara Seizes Disputed Territory amid Tigray War," Mar. 16, 2021, *Bloomberg*, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-16/ethiopia-s-amhara-seize-disputed-territory-amid-tigray-conflict?leadSource=uverify%20wall; Hailu, "Reasons the International Community is Unable."

[148] See "Map 7: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam," p. 30. Ethiopia is building a dam to produce electricity for domestic consumption and export. While the project is a source of Ethiopian national pride, Sudan and Egypt fear it will threaten their Nile access to drinking water and irrigation. The Trump administration, African Union, and Arab League have tried unsuccessfully to mediate. Blanchard, "Ethiopia's Transition and the Tigray Conflict," 20; Mohammed Alamin and Simon Marks, "Sudan Renews Warning on Nile Dam, Moves to Avert Water Shortages," *Bloomberg*, July 28, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-28/sudan-renews-warning-on-nile-dam-moves-to-avert-water-shortages#xj4y7vzkg; "Egypt Plans Dam-busting Diplomatic Offensive against Ethiopia," *UPI*, Feb. 27, 2014, https://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2014/02/27/Egypt-plans-dam-busting-diplomatic-offensive-against-Ethiopia/UPI-13631393533111/; "Egypt Stays Opposed to Ethiopia's Grand

accused Ethiopia of ethnic cleansing and withheld €88 million in aid.[149] The US reiterated the ethnic cleansing charge against its ally on March 10, 2021 and threatens visa restrictions.[150] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been warning of an impending humanitarian crisis since the government offensive began.[151] The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide urges Addis Ababa to investigate



Map 7.3: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam[152]

Millennium Dam Project," and *Ezega News*, Apr. 11, 2011, https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails?Page=heads&NewsID=2847.

[149] "EU Suspends Ethiopian Budget Support over Tigray Crisis," *Reuters*, Jan. 15, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-eu/eu-suspends-ethiopian-budget-support-over-tigray-crisis-idUSKBN29K1SS; Michelle Nichols, "Eritrea Admits Presence in Ethiopia's Tigray, Tells U.N. Withdrawing," *Reuters*, Apr. 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eritrea-admits-presence-ethiopias-tigray-tells-un-withdrawing-2021-04-16/; and Hailu, "Reasons the International Community is Unable."

[150] "Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed;" Sharmila Devi, "Tigray Atrocities Compounded by Lack of Health Care," *Lancet*, 397, no. 10282 (Apr. 10-16, 2021): 1336; Muhumuza, "Ethiopia's Leader Says Atrocities Reported;" and Jennifer Hansler, "Blinken: Acts of 'Ethnic Cleansing' Committed in Western Tigray," *CNN*, Mar. 10, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/10/politics/blinken-tigray-ethnic-cleansing/index.html.

[151] Thousands of refugees were fleeing the Tigray to eastern Sudan. Babar Baloch, "Pace of Ethiopian Refugee Arrivals in Sudan Unseen in the Last Two Decades," *UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency*, Nov. 17, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2020/11/5fb391214/pace-ethiopian-refugee-arrivals-sudan-unseen-decades.html.

[152] Blanchard, "Ethiopia's Transition and the Tigray Conflict," 20.

extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, property looting, mass executions, and impeded humanitarian access.[153] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report that Amhara forces commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.[154] The head of the World Health Organization (WHO) complains that he cannot not send money to his starving relatives.[155]

Common Ground and Limited Success

VNAs succeed when they coerce substantial policy changes that a state would not have implemented voluntarily. The FLN achieved total success in 1962. Its terrorism and insurgency fundamentally reversed the preexisting balance of power. The former weak side expelled the French colonial regime from Algeria and became the new government. EOKA earned partial success in 1959. Britain went from "no negotiations" to signing a political settlement. While the Cypriot VNA certainly helped forge an independent Cyprus, its maximalist goal for union with Greece did not happen; Britain also retained military bases on the island. The LTTE could have likewise scored partial success in 2002-03. After Sri Lanka implemented a unilateral truce, it

[153] United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, "United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, Urges All Parties to Prohibit the Use of Sexual Violence and Cease Hostilities in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia," Jan. 21, 2021, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/press-release/united-nations-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict-ms-pramila-patten-urges-all-parties-to-prohibit-the-use-of-sexual-violence-and-cease-hostilities-in-the/; Alice Wairimu Nderitu, "Statement by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, on the Situation in Ethiopia," *UN*, Feb. 5, 2021, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/Statement%20on%20Ethiopia%205%20Feb%2021.pdf; and Muhumuza, "Ethiopia's Leader Says Atrocities Reported."

[154] "The Conflict in Tigray: The Population of the Ethiopian Region was Subjected to 'Ethnic Cleansing by the Allies of the Abi Ahmed Government,'" *BBC News*, Apr. 7, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-61022338.

[155] Tedros Ghebreyesus is from Ethiopia and has been Director-General of WHO since 2017. "Conflict in Tigray: WHO Director Cannot Send Money to His 'Starving' Relatives in Ethiopia," *BBC News*, Aug. 26, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-62689948.

acceded to VNA demands for unfettered movement and free commerce, proposed incorporating the Tigers into the national army, and offered autonomy, but not independence.

Based on my understanding of these historical case studies, I predict that the TPLF will eventually achieve limited success, similar to the political settlement that the LTTE rejected. Neither side has established its dominance since 2020. Malnutrition runs rampant in Tigray and throughout Ethiopia; 700,000-800,000 people are already dead.[156] As the war spills over into the Afar and Amhara regions, it further taxes the over-stressed health, water, and food services.[157] Another conflict-induced failed harvest will exacerbate the famine.[158]

The international community simultaneously understands that pushing Ethiopia too hard may embolden other disgruntled groups. More conflict will certainly displace millions more people, promote anarchy, and create fertile grounds for more VNAs.[159] Prime Minister Abiy's western allies are not eager to undermine the African leader they recently extolled a political reformer, an economic liberalizer, and a Nobel Peace Prize winner;[160] they further realize that Ethiopia can again pivot eastward—this time toward China.[161] Given its recent debacles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, Washington is extremely unlikely to intervene into Ethiopia.

After a year and a half of military stalemate, both sides agreed to a truce in March 2022. Although the fighting resumed on August 24, they should understand that total victory is highly unlikely. Prime Minister Abiy acknowledges that his initial optimism was misplaced: "If you

[156] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Ethiopia: Situation Report," last updated Oct. 15, 2022, https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/Ethiopia; Chauthia and Beckett, "Tigray Crisis: Hyenas Feast."
[157] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Update Situation Report, 3 May 2021," Apr. 27, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-tigray-region-humanitarian-update-situation-report-3-may-2021.
[158] Devi, "Tigray Atrocities Compounded," 1336.
[159] "Amid Violence, Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency in Amhara," *Al Jazeera*, Apr. 19, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-in-amhara-amid-violence; Hailu, "Reasons the International Community is Unable."
[160] Hailu, "Reasons the International Community is Unable."
[161] Gebre, "Ethiopia's Amhara Seizes Disputed Territory;" Hailu, "Reasons the International Community is Unable."

can't win then you've got to sit down and talk.... My advice is … let's have enough of [this] war."[162] The TPLF realizes that Abiy's regime is not the Derg and entered into peace talks with the state in September 2022.[163]

I cannot say with certainty that this round of negotiations will end with the TPLF's partial success.[164] Based on my observations from the previous three case studies in Algeria, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka, I predict that the state will eventually offer a measure of autonomy that it was not prepared to grant in 2020. In the very near future, unconventional warfare in Ethiopia will again empower a weak side to claim success and inspire future VNAs.

[162] "Fighting in Northern Ethiopia;" Hagmann, "Ethiopia's Civil War."
[163] The TPLF wants negotiations to occur under the auspices of the African Union and the settlement overseen by international monitors. The government insists that the TPLF must first disarm before negotiations begin. "Conflict in Tigray: the Region's Rebels Say They are Ready for Peace Talks under the Auspices of the African Union," *BBC News*, Sep. 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-62873324; Farouk Chosia, "Conflict in Ethiopia: How Did the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front Fighters Outperform the Ethiopian Army?" *BBC News*, Nov. 19, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-59318886.
[164] The most recent negotiations began on Oct. 25, 2022 in South Africa. "Ethiopia Peace Talks Marred by Foreign Interference – PM," *Africa News*, Nov. 1, 2022, https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/01/ethiopia-peace-talks-marred-by-foreign-interference-pm/?dicbo=v2-a3ca07a7a1368cefded4c1ee6ab4db0b.

Chapter 8: Conclusions and Predictions

According to "Chapter 3: Theory and Method," my intention was to combine several comparative approaches in order to produce empirical knowledge from theory and history. I sought to build a research model that first developed a theory of and then identified the causal factors for VNA success. I asked whether established theories and existing causal mechanisms could help interpret my cases. Could they further incorporate new variables to identify similarities among my cases? My goal was to produce a building block approach to theory development. While the FLN case study was meant to establish a "preliminary theoretical construct," the subsequent EOKA, LTTE and TPLF cases would improve the original design.

My qualitative, focus-structured approach used comparative case studies to attach history onto political science. Focusing enabled me to address only certain aspects of irregular warfare linked to VNA success. Closely related queries could then examine why weak sides usually lost, and what constituted success and failure. Structuring let me create standardized sets of questions that facilitate the acquisition of comparable data from each case that is suitable for categorization and empirical testing.

My model proved both valid and amenable to improvement for several reasons. I believe that I demonstrated how terrorism and insurgency were comparable subcategories of unconventional warfare. The first case study on the FLN that featured both types of political violence served as more than an iconic example of total success. It also became the template for characterizing outcomes in terms of a process. Algeria alerted me to prolonged and festering grievances rooted in culture, religion, ethnicity, or identity politics. Not only were these

grievances unlikely to dissipate, but they would at some point motivate irregulars to suffer and torture, to kill and to die.

This case demonstrated the necessity for safe havens—unconventional wars end when the state finds the VNA. I learned how geography and topography advantaged the weak side vis-à-vis the government and fostered stalemates. I saw that sympathetic neighbors with contiguous borders offered the best sort of sanctuary. To pursue irregulars here, the target had to commit acts of war and violate state sovereignty. Barring that, it would have to sink money and personnel into static defenses.

Algeria showed how stalemates channeled unconventional conflicts into somewhat predictable pathways. They convinced the state that military offensives would isolate the VNA's radicals; political negotiations would simultaneously attract its moderates. The weak side had to consequently adapt to its hostile and changing environment or perish. This case next identified the independent variables that could prove critical for explaining outcomes: state miscalculation, VNA decision-making and learning, ranging goals, community support, rival elimination,[1] and the target nation's mood.

The FLN likewise spotlighted the importance of geopolitics and global norms. Arab Algerians that served France during World War I experienced firsthand European notions of democracy, independence, and self-determination. The returning soldiers that organized nationalist movements expected these same principles to forge a free Algeria.[2] The norms that

[1] The study not only alerted me to examine how the VNA treated its internal rivals, but also the competition within diasporas.
[2] They saw these principles underwrite the postwar states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

applied to Europeans, unfortunately, differed than those applied to Middle Easterners.[3] Algeria would thus wait until after the Second World War, when changing attitudes spurned imperialism.

The EOKA case refined and improved my model by reiterating that success required grievances based on thorny and intractable issues that could span centuries. It confirmed how terrorism was a subcategory of unconventional warfare that was capable of achieving policy change. Cyprus resembled Algeria in that the pre-1945 international norms did not promote decolonization and minorities' self-determination. The Cypriot VNA demonstrated how a small island's limited safe havens were more amenable to terrorism than insurgency. The group's size, in turn, hampered its ability to eliminate rivals; active rivals then prevented EOKA from dominating negotiations with the state. This instance of irregular warfare accordingly uncovered linkages among geography, organization, and limited success.

Cyprus emphasized how the intervention of multiple states—Greece and Turkey—combined to preclude VNA total success. It likewise transformed the concept of victory from independence and self-determination to union with a foreign country. Like its Algerian counterpart, EOKA emphasized the importance of VNA competitive adaption and state incompetence. Three hundred irregulars outlasted 30,000 soldiers on an isolated island patrolled by a great power's navy. Cyprus and Algeria both equated actionable intelligence to VNA longevity; they conversely illuminated how states with poor intelligence lashed out blindly, alienated numerous audiences, and sabotaged their chances for success.

My third case on the LTTE reiterated that specific types of grievances propel unconventional warfare into the depths of human depravity. It reemphasized the importance of

[3] While Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points helped liberate European minorities, the League of Nation's Mandate System told the Arabs to wait for more western tutelage. Paris insisted that Algeria was part of metropolitan France and thus exempt from even these expectations.

weak side competitive adaptation, now in the guise of suicide terrorism. Sri Lanka next accentuated the importance of changing international norms. Like the FLN and EOKA, the Tigers thrived as long as they could portray themselves as freedom-seeking underdogs bucking foreign subjugation.

Events that unfolded over a single September day in 2001 fundamentally changed the international community's attitudes toward unconventional warfare, terrorism, VNAs in general, and the LTTE in specific. The Tamil Tigers could have nonetheless replicated EOKA's partial success, had they accepted any of the government's political proposals in the early 2000s. By instead rejecting compromise in the form of increased autonomy, this VNA became the paragon for utter defeat.

A comparison of the Tigers and EOKA highlights linkages among organization, individual leadership, rival elimination, and outcomes. In both instances, single charismatic leaders dominated VNAs built on bureaucratic decision-making. EOKA had to tolerate rivals, remained subservient to the Cypriot Church, and could not fight Greece or Turkey in addition to the Brits; the group ultimately had to accept partial success. After the LTTE eradicated its domestic competition and expelled India, its leader could summarily reject every government political entreaty. Velupillai Prabhakaran saddled his community with disaster, died on the battlefield, and had his cremated remains tossed unceremoniously into the Indian Ocean. Living conditions for most Tamils worsened. George Grivas, on the other hand, left the soon to be independent island, returned to Greece a national hero, received the honorary rank of general, retired, and died peacefully.

An examination of the LTTE and FLN further addressed the changing dynamics associated with a VNA's transition from terrorism to insurgency. The FLN decision to go big

and conventional nearly terminated the entire enterprise; it only survived its reckless strategy by returning to terrorism and stationing its conventional troops in sovereign Morocco and Tunisia. The LTTE, meanwhile, could count on no sympathetic neighbors, especially after its 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi alienated India. The more it resembled a state-in-waiting, the more vulnerable it became to Sri Lanka's countermeasures. By the mid-2000s, the Tigers were trying to protect hundreds of thousands of civilians, numerous cities, army bases, and naval installations spread over 6,000 square miles. Geography teamed with a maximalist agenda to explain outcomes: once the state located the VNA, it killed it.

This case also uncovered the different challenges that weak states confront in irregular conflict. Unlike France and Great Britain, Sri Lanka was not a great power. It entered the conflict with limited resources and a small and inexperienced military. The government waited four years to start countermeasures that India abruptly interrupted. The state endured a decade and a half of devastating suicide terror attacks and humiliating conventional battlefield losses. Still, Colombo prevailed while Paris and London quit. This episode accordingly underscored the relationship between weak states with strong resolve and strong VNAs with inflexible goals.

The TPLF case fundamentally changed unconventional warfare's power calculus. The VNA did not initiate conflict while simultaneously having to create political and military structures from scratch. The "strong-weak side" dichotomy actually reversed. The Ethiopian "irregulars," which had already found total success in 1991 against the Derg, outnumbered the state's forces in 2020.

The TPLF leadership, which functioned as Ethiopia's government for the last generation, adopted the same winning attrition strategy in 2020. Thanks to Meles' periodic purges, the VNA now faces little domestic competition; it additionally retains unhindered access to unlimited safe

havens. The state, meanwhile, has already applauded itself for a victory that quickly proved illusory. It faces a host of other potential internal ethnic uprisings; the al-Shabaab terror group continues to threaten both Somalia and Ethiopia. Despite the seemingly substantial advantages that the VNA now enjoys, the best outcome that it can realistically expect is limited success in the guise of enhanced autonomy.

Ethiopia is relatively stable. Its move toward liberalization and privatization since the Cold War's end brought tangible financial benefits. Addis Ababa's countermeasures are thus not bankrupting the country. Eritrea's involvement in the conflict, coupled with the support coming from ethnic militias and regional paramilitaries, has recently enabled the government to surpass the TPLF's numbers in the field. Prime Minister Abiy's regime is hence not being out-administered by a VNA.

Global norms, neighboring states, and international institutions additionally do not seem supportive of an independent Tigray that fractures Ethiopia and destabilizes the Horn of Africa. Few outsiders consider Ethiopia the Tigrayans' imperial aggressor. The TPLF grievance, moreover, is less than two years old. For centuries, Tigray has been a vital part of first the Ethiopian Empire, and then the federal state. These conditions accordingly reinforce the likelihood for the VNA's partial success.

Concerns, Refinements, and Improvements

I sought to avoid a model whose key hypotheses rested on a disparate and ad-hoc set of independent variables. I furthermore wanted my approach to exhibit large explanatory power, be replicable, and ultimately contribute to social science. I relied on history to resolve this

challenge. First, I looked at the various literatures for recurring patterns that could inform my research.[4] I noted how the occurrence of "the stalemate" could prove useful for depicting terrorism and insurgency as ongoing processes. I hypothesized that after the preconditions for unconventional warfare generated a standoff, outcomes would hinge on state miscalculation, VNA competitive adaptation, and external pressures.

My case studies demonstrated how the process that characterized outcomes might not be as linear and sequential as I initially believed. While the various independent variables that I identify in my three case studies prove integral for understanding VNA success or failure, they also seem to characterize more of a haphazard and cumulative effect. At different times, and in varying orders, external and internal variables combine to help David beat Goliath.[5]

The fact that all four of my target states were democracies may limit my conclusions' broader applicability. As I noted in my research, illiberal regimes that by definition lack transparency, shun accountability, and restrict media hinder objective studies of their roles in unconventional conflicts.[6] Political officials and military personnel may likewise be uninclined to give interviews and elucidate their decision-making. If their countermeasures are successful, they may face war crimes tribunals and a host of international inquiries related to human rights violations, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. If they lose the conflict, they could be dead, imprisoned, or living abroad under aliases.

---

[4] I tried to discern patterns and explanations that transcended time, geography, or culture.

[5] Cyprus' geography and the Royal Navy severely curtailed direct foreign help, particularly from Greece. Athens' diplomatic maneuvers via the UN and NATO actually hurt EOKA by prompting London to include Ankara in the negotiations and underwrite Turkish VNAs. Foreign states likewise played a nuanced role in Sri Lanka. While New Delhi initially supported the island's Tamils, by 1987 its army of occupation was trying to disarm the Tigers. After 1991, India was outright hostile to the LTTE.

[6] Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005): 278-297.

Studies that show autocrats engage in fewer irregular conflicts can mitigate the negative effects of regime type on my conclusions.[7] The literature generally indicates that since undemocratic states suppress civil liberties and deny open debate, political groups find it difficult to organize, eliminate rivals, and graduate into VNAs.[8] The literature, however, is not unanimous that irregulars prefer democracies.[9]

Why David Beats Goliath: Explaining Varying Outcomes

Why does David beat Goliath? The power of weakness begins to manifest itself after the target government proves unwilling or unable to resolve the political impasse peacefully. In all four cases, VNAs deemed certain state policies intolerable. French imperialism instituted a two-tiered system that subordinated Arabs and empowered *colons*. For the weak side, the status quo was destined to bring neither equality nor prosperity; one-hundred and twenty four years of European rule had relegated it to poverty and second-class citizenship.

---

[7] Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition;" Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy;" and "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce?" Li and Schaub, "Economic Globalization;" Pape, "The Strategic Logic;" and Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, ''Democracy and Terrorism: What Recent Events Disclose,'' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 1 (1998): 108-118.

[8] Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States;" Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy."

[9] Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, "The Devil You Know but Are Afraid to Face: Underreporting Bias and its Distorting Effects on the Study of Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (2006): 714-735; Wade and Reiter, "Does Democracy Matter;" Thomas Pluemper and Eric Neumeyer, "The Friend of My Enemy is My Enemy: International Alliances and International Terrorism," *European Journal of Political Research* 49, no. 1 (2010): 75-96; Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jennifer Gandhi and Wonik Kim, "Coopting Workers under Dictatorship," *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (2010): 646-658; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279-1301; Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2006); Benjamin Smith, "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule," *World Politics* 57, no. 3 (2005): 421-451; and Joseph Wright, "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Impact Economic Growth and Investment," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2008): 322-343. Dictatorships differ from each other as much as they differ from democracies. Nearly three-quarters had elected legislatures 1946-2008; half had legal opposition parties; a third had opposition parties operating in elected legislatures. Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization;" and Jose Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland, "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," *Public Choice* 143, nos. 1-2 (2010): 67-101.

Greek Cypriots also experienced generations of European imperialism. Their version of freedom entailed joining Greece. Like its counterpart in North Africa, EOKA realized that great power imperial aspirations meant to subordinate its community while other former colonies became free and progressed politically.[10] After 1945, neither weak side wanted to live as the plaything of "a superpower-in-waiting."

European colonialism, on the hand, benefitted Sri Lanka's Tamils. Despite their small numbers, Dutch and British favoritism let them dominate the Sinhalese majority. The LTTE grievance appeared after independence transferred power to a Sinhalese-dominated government in 1947. State policies henceforth meant forced assimilation for the Tamils and the end of their unique culture on the island. The TPLF likewise chafed at losing power. The Ethiopian VNA had tasted total success in 1991, lost its power in 2018, and wanted to regain it violently by 2020.

In all four cases, unconventional warfare took the respective governments by surprise. After their shock and then anger dissipated, Paris, London, Colombo, and Addis Ababa dutifully

[10] Cyprus lacked deep harbors and could not accommodate modern aircraft carriers. Its limited strategic value as a naval base showed during the 1956 Suez crisis. The Royal Navy admitted numerous times that it did not need the facilities on Cyprus. Klearchos Kyriakides, "The Island of Cyprus and the Projection of Sea Power by the Royal Navy since 1878," in *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean: Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries)*, ed. Carmel Vassallo and Michela D'Angelo (Valletta: Malta University, 2007), 231-232; Michael Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 19-28, 62-69, and "From 'Cold' War to 'Hot' War: Allied Strategic and Military Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (2007): 725-748. London rejected *enosis* primarily for its superpower delusions: its nuclear bombers could use Cypriot airfields to attack the USSR. Britain produced the Canberra and V-bombers for this specific purpose. Michael Dockrill, *British Defence since 1945* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 29-30, 35-36; Ruane, "SEATO, MEDO, and the Baghdad Pact," 169-199; Varnavas, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy," 81; Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); and Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*. London also wanted Cyprus to house a radar base and listening post to protect its remaining Middle Eastern colonial assets. Palestine had broken away, Nasser became hostile, and Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadiq defied Britain in 1951. William Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 775; Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2008); and Ritchie Ovendale, *Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962* (London: Leicester University, 1996). Prime Minister Macmillan hay have delayed the negotiations until Aug. 1960 in order to increase the size of the British Sovereign Base Areas. Hubert Faustmann, *Divide and Quit?: British Colonial Policy in Cyprus 1878-1960. Including a Special Survey of the Transitional Period: February 1959-August 1960* (Mannheim: Mateo, 1999), 245.

proclaimed to all who would listen that the criminals and malcontents would face swift and harsh justice. Alongside the deployment of security forces, each government initiated its own version of the reform flurry; politics and violence would jointly reinstitute normalcy. Normalcy, however, did not return. The FLN, EOKA, LTTE, and TPLF instead achieved stalemate.

From Stalemate to Success

For the FLN, sanctuary became synonymous with organization, strategy, and foreign aid. Domestic topography and regional geography enabled the VNA's sea sawing from terrorism to insurgency, and back to terrorism. The international network of friendly states that featured Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia underwrote the weak side's longevity. Safe havens enabled a few thousand ill-trained, poorly armed, and quarrelsome irregulars to overcome shoddy organization, low popularity, habitual internal purges, and the tendency to brutalize their own community; remote refuges compensated for a group of historical chiefs that initially worried more about being dominated by one of their own than being discovered by the French. Safe havens later helped offset the foolish decision to fight the state conventionally.

France unintentionally empowered the weak side by never developing stable and clear definitions of success that could inform its strategy and tactics. The authorities in Algiers and Paris lacked a unity of purpose that could shape and align their logistical, administrative, and diplomatic efforts. Successive administrations lurched from assimilation, integration, federation, semi-autonomy, and self-determination. The ongoing conflict forced Paris to face unpleasant facts: French citizens and Arab nationals harbored irreconcilable differences in Algeria. Troop

shortages and poor intelligence hobbled the strong side's efforts. The corresponding delays, confusion, and discord gradually sapped the French nation's willingness to fight.

France's coercion against the Arabs proved a better recruitment tool for the FLN than the group's own coercion against the Arabs. The state's politics of brutality alienated moderates and encouraged the locals to consider the group as their only option. The FLN consequently attracted more and better recruits, eliminated its rivals, derailed unwanted negotiations, received more aid from its European diasporas, and transformed into the state-in-waiting.

Global norms that were against France from the start continued to extol decolonization and self-determination. The UN publicly scrutinized the conduct of one of its Security Council members. NATO and American concerns with containing communism and promoting liberalism, capitalism, and democracy seemed increasingly at odds with French actions in Algeria. The FLN, buttressed by Soviet propaganda, portrayed France, and by extension the West, as the face of neoimperialism.

At its peak, the FLN comprised 40,000 regulars, auxiliaries, and irregulars.[11] The French army deployed 500,000 in 1960 and never dropped below a ten to one advantage. Five times the number of Algerians fought alongside the French than the FLN.[12] The state used torture, collective punishment, and forced relocations. Elite paratrooper units crushed the FLN in Algiers by 1957.[13] Militarily, France prevailed by 1959; politically, the Fourth Republic died a

[11] The regulars stayed inside Tunisia. Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 100-101; Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), 295.
[12] Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 87; Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 179; and John Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945—1962 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1966), 156.
[13] General Jacques Massu broke a general strike in Algiers by threatening to destroy any closed shop. He fractured the FLN infrastructure with torture and mass arrests. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 183-207.

year earlier.[14] By September 1959, the national savior Charles de Gaulle concluded that France had to leave Algeria. The VNA prevailed with total success.

Sanctuaries and geography presented EOKA different challenges and opportunities that shaped the VNA's limited success. The little island's mountain ranges could mostly support terrorism. Cyprus had no immediate neighbors; Greece sat hundreds of miles away, separated by a Mediterranean Sea that Britain treated like its private lake. The VNA thus found aid and comfort in the anonymity of cities and the safety of the mountains and foothills.[15]

Since Cypriots had little experience with political violence, EOKA established a rigid-bureaucratic organization that revolved around George Grivas. Decision-making was direct; orders were implemented quickly.[16] The VNA's tiny operating budget saved it from having to coerce local support and jeopardize its popularity.[17] The group's broad popular appeal consequently prohibited Britain from forcibly relocating locals into safe zones. The authorities could never defend their collaborators and allies from weak side reprisals. Since EOKA did not depend on outsiders for supplies and munitions, the vaunted Royal Navy hardly bothered it.

About 300 hardcore members eventually comprised the VNA that hid in the mountains and unleashed waves of urban terror when the authorities got too close. Unlike the FLN, EOKA never had the option to go big and conventional; it had to tolerate numerous rivals.[18] While the

---

[14] It suffered from weak executives and fractious legislatures with a multiplicity of parties since its birth in 1948.
[15] Cyprus had a population of 556,000: 80% was Greek and 19% was Turkish. Kyle, *Cyprus*, 7.
[16] EOKA was always vulnerable to a decapitation attack. Had any one of Britain's 30,000 soldiers killed or captured Grivas, EOKA would almost certainly have dissolved.
[17] The British concluded that 25,000 locals directly supported EOKA while "an even wider part of the general population acquiesced." Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, 45; Demetriou, "Political Violence and Legitimation," 175-176; Markides, "Social Change," 321; Clement Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 38-39; Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence," 380-381; Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus* (New York: Tauris, 2004), 172; Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict," 575-599; and Peter Loizos, "The Progress of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1970," in *Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair*, ed. John Davis (London: Athlone, 1974), 114-133.
[18] EOKA existed less than a decade. The ethnarchy represented the community's interests for nearly two millennia. Most Greek Cypriots reflexively considered the archbishop their leader. Markides, "Social Change," 309-330; Bryant, *Imagining the Modern*.

group created its superb intelligence network from scratch, the rest of its support came courtesy of the most respected institution on the island—the Cypriot Orthodox Church.[19] Although EOKA derailed negotiations on several occasions, it never evolved into a state-in-waiting.[20]

External pressures featured prominently in EOKA's limited success. Greece's persistent lobbying at the UN General Assembly meant that Athens would shape the outcome.[21] London's decision to include Ankara and countenance Turkish VNAs complicated matters further for EOKA. The 1956 Suez debacle compelled Britain (and France) to accept a diminishing role in the Middle East. The US considered Turkey crucial for its containment strategy and simultaneously wanted access to Britain's Cypriot bases.

Turkey ultimately bought the pragmatic outcome because Greece dropped *enosis*. It faced economic crises at home. After the Iraqi coup fractured the Baghdad Pact in July 1958, Turkey found itself surrounded by neutral regimes.[22] The Berlin Crisis in November intensified American pressure on London, Athens, and Ankara to resolve Cyprus, unify NATO, and focus on the Soviets.[23]

Cyprus differed from Algeria in that successive waves of European settlers did not change local demographics. No huge *colon* lobby coalesced in London to threaten coups if the government withdrew. Britain was only bound to the island by its bases. Four years of

---

[19] Britain understood by 1958 that EOKA owed a large part of its "hold on the population very largely to the support of the Church." Jason Klocek, "Seek and You Shall Find Religious Intelligence in British Counter-Insurgency Operations," *St. Antony's International Review* 12, no. 1 (May 2016): 26.
[20] EOKA derailed talks between Britain and the archbishop in Nov. 1955. Karyos, "The Armed Struggle," 269-270.
[21] Athens tried five times during 1954-1958 to convince the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution on Cyprus. Xydis, "The UN General Assembly," 141; Coufadakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition," 37-38; and Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 305.
[22] The coup that overthrew the pro-British Iraqi regime alarmed both Britain and Turkey. General Abdul Karim Qasim withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, opened diplomatic relations with Soviet Union, and adopted a non-aligned foreign policy. The pact, minus Iraq, became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Richard Jasse, "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (Win. 1991): 140-156; Dimitrakis, "The Value to CENTO," 611-624; and Stephens, *Cyprus, A Place of Arms*, 158.
[23] Secretary-General of NATO Paul-Henri Spaak volunteered his services. The former Belgian prime minister was NATO's Secretary General May 1957-Apr. 1961. Melek, "The Cyprus Question," 305.

unconventional warfare could thus persuade London that if "its military requirements were met…by the retention of bases under British sovereignty…it could "consider the transfer of sovereignty by Her Majesty's Government over the rest of the island."[24] When unconventional warfare brought EOKA limited success, it mattered little that Grivas still clung to *enosis*.[25]

When founded in 1947, Sri Lanka had no external enemies. British officers retained the top command positions and blindly taught the army conventional British warfare.[26] In 1983, the island's colonial legacy meant that its military resembled more a ceremonial institution, not an actual instrument for warfighting. No doctrine existed for either large-scale operations or VNA countermeasures. Unlike the situations in Algeria and Cyprus, the weak side in Sri Lanka did not initiate a conflict with a great power.

For the LTTE, sanctuary became synonymous with organization, strategy, potential partial success, and total failure. Sri Lanka was seven times larger than Cyprus; the forests and jungles alone that covered 40% of the island were almost three times larger than all of Cyprus. Sympathetic Hindu India loomed just a few miles off its northwestern shore. New Delhi and Tamil Nadu had a history of helping their Hindu Tamil brethren.

In many respects, the LTTE's organization and competitive adaption surpassed its predecessors in Algeria and Cyprus. The group pioneered suicide terrorism and routinely

---

[24] "Cyprus (Agreement): HC Deb 19 February 1959, vol. 600 cc618-30," *Hansard: UK Parliament*, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/feb/19/cyprus-agreement#column_618.
[25] Klapsis, "EOKA and Anglo-Greek Relations," 547-564; Novo, "The God Dilemma," 193-215; and Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms*, 150-156.
[26] Concerns over future Indian bullying prompted the first prime minister to guarantee Britain's air and sea base rights. This initially spared the government from maintaining an expensive army. Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*, 120-122; Ashton, "Ceylon," 461-462; Raj Vijayasiri, "A Critical Analysis of the Sri Lankan Government's Counterinsurgency Campaign," (Master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999); Jagath Senaratne, "The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka: A Case for Reform," in *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, ed. Cavin Cawthra and Robin Luckman (London: Zed, 2003), 181-204; and Hashim, *When Insurgency Wins*, 41.

provoked the government to lash out indiscriminately. The Tigers managed a sophisticated infrastructure that included highways, school, courts, and temples; ruthless rival elimination transformed them into the Tamil nation's unchallenged representative. Propaganda campaigns extolled them as freedom-loving underdogs and cast the human rights violating state as the defender of Buddhist chauvinism.

As in Cyprus, the VNA's superb intelligence network and obsession with operational security initially kept the leadership out of the state's clutches. The Tigers perfected the truce ruse to rearm and regroup. They switched back and forth from terrorism, insurgency, and conventional warfare. LTTE irregulars demonstrated on numerous occasions and in gruesome detail that the state could not protect its allies and collaborators.

The group's impressive and lucrative transnational network of legitimate and illicit ventures helped offset the loss of India in 1991. By 2000, the LTTE had fended off the world's second largest state and humiliated Colombo on the battlefield. Norwegian diplomats and international monitors, backed by the US, treated the group as their legitimate negotiating partner. Less than a decade later, following tens of thousands of deaths, the Tamil Tigers suffered resounding defeat.

If Rajiv's Gandhi's 1991 assassination soured the LTTE's relations with India, the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks ruined the group's relations with the world. After 9/11, the Tigers' bureaucratic decision-making coupled with new global norms and growing state resolve to facilitate their demise. It blinded the leadership from interpreting the period from 2001 to 2004 as a window of opportunity for limited success.

The cult of personality that had emerged around Velupillai Prabhakaran eradicated internal dissent. The absence of rivals reinforced his authority; Prabhakaran and his cronies,

moreover, sat in the epicenter of numerous transnational businesses and smuggling ventures; they additionally accessed funds pouring in monthly from the diaspora. Sri Lanka's equivalent of the Cypriot ethnarch thus never engineered a pragmatic outcome. As the VNA grew bigger and more sophisticated, it consequently became harder for one person, surrounded by a small coterie, to generate rational decisions.

Nobody thus dissuaded the Tigers from murdering Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and drawing India's animus. No one warned them after 2001 that playing the Norwegians interlocutors as fools was a bad idea. The isolated VNA did not sense how the new global attitudes on terrorism would undermine its heroic narrative. It failed to see itself becoming an unreliable negotiating partner shackled to its victory or death zealotry.[27] Nor did the LTTE anticipate how new banking regulations would team with international maritime efforts to choke off its external incomes. The LTTE then chose to ignore how the state was adapting to its new conditions. Sri Lanka was acting different from Algeria and Cyprus: this government's resolve was hardening.

Colombo's new and prominent role in the global war on terror let it recast the Tigers from freedom-loving underdogs to al Qaeda's mentor. Sri Lanka's special forces trained alongside its US, UK and Indian counterparts; the state rebrandished its image by inviting Norway to mediate; it demonstrated good will and an openness to peaceful resolution. Had the Tigers publicly accepted any of its offers, Colombo could not have reneged.

VNA defeat came after the state ceased pursuing territory. Sri Lanka began acting more like a VNA. Its war of attrition prioritized the LTTE's physical eradication. Specially trained

[27] The new world that was less tolerant of VNAs was likelier to equate terrorism with criminality, not nationalism and self-determination. American journalist Barbara Crossette voiced these new attitudes: "the Tigers were a heavily armed movement that never deserved the ill-informed sympathy it got outside Sri Lanka." Barbara Crossette, "Sri Lanka Wins a War and Diminishes Democracy," *Nation*, Feb. 18, 2010.

infantry units adapted flexible, small team tactics that targeted the Tigers' rear lines. As the state went small and unconventional, the VNA encountered the perils of the state-in-waiting—it lacked both the size and resources to defend static positions.[28] Terrorism and insurgency could have nonetheless brought the Tamil Tigers limited success. By clinging to their maximalist agenda and trying to act like a state, they instead found total failure. Goliath beat David.

While David may taste revenge in Ethiopia, he will likely not relish total revenge. The TPLF will not reprise its 1991 grand victory against the government. Prime Minister Abiy's regime will survive in Addis Ababa. While Ethiopia will prevent the VNA from reclaiming its past preeminence, it will not impose the Tigers' fate in Tigray. Pragmatism and limited success will prevail.

[28] Israeli Kfir fighter jets and Pakistani technology supported the state's rocket and artillery attacks. President Pervez Musharraf was a US ally in the global war on terror and provided Sri Lanka tanks, mortars, hand grenades, military advisers, and intelligence sharing. "Pakistan Played Major Role in LTTE Defeat: Sources," *Business Standard*, last modified Jan. 19, 2013, https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/pakistan-played-major-role-in-ltte-defeat-sources-109052800127_1.html; Lewis, "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka," 319.

References

Variations and irregularities encountered when transliterating Arabic into English necessitate the use of a standardized form for text and quotations. The quoted text is transcribed exactly as in the original, except that some silent edits are made to names and locations in the quoted passage for consistency's sake. For example, the leader of al Qaeda appears in this essay as "Osama bin Laden," while his name in various sources showed up as "Usama bin Ladin."

AAP-Reuter. "State Of Emergency Declared In Cyprus." *Central Queensland Herald* (Rockhampton, Australia), Dec. 1, 1955, p. 13. Https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/79257336.

Abbink, Jon. "An Historical-Anthropological Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: Issues of Identity and Politics." *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, 11, no. 2 (1998): 109-124.

Abdu, Brook. "Tigray Interim Gov't Plans Regional, Zonal Overhaul," *Reporter*, Nov. 21, 2020. Https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/10464/.

Abel, Elie. "Nehru Joins Tito, Nasser; Limits Conference Hopes; Nehru Opens Talk with Tito, Nasser." *NY Times*, July 19, 1956.

Abir, Mordechai. *Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes, the Challenge of Islam and Re-unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855*. New York, Praeger, 1968.

Abrahamian, Ervand. *The Iranian Mojahedin*. New Haven: Yale University, 1989.

Abrahms, Max. "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 660-671.

———. "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited." *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 3 (2012): 366-393.

———. "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy." *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spr. 2008): 78-105.

———. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 42-78.

Acosta, Benjamin. "From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties." *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (Jul. 2014): 666-683.

———. "Palestinian Precedents: The Origins of Al-Qaeda's Use of Suicide Terrorism and *Istishhad*." In *Political Islam from Muhammad to Ahmadinejad: Defenders, Detractors, and Definitions*, edited by Joseph Skelly. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010. 193-206.

Adams, Geoffrey. *The Call of Conscience: French Protestant Responses to the Algerian War, 1954-1962*. Ontario: Canada, Wilfrid Laurier, 1998.

Adams, T. W. *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*. Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1971.

Addington, Larry. *The Patterns of War since the 18th Century*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1994.

Adejumobi, Saheed. *The History of Ethiopia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007.

Adekson, J'Bayo. "The Algerian and Mau Mau Revolts: A Comparative Study in Revolutionary Warfare." *Comparative Strategy* 3, no. 1 (1981): 69-92.

Afshari, Ali, and H. Graham Underwood. "The Green Wave." *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 (Oct. 2009): 6-10.

Aftergood, Steven. "The Costs of War: Obstacles to Public Understanding." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified Nov. 14, 2018. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Costs%20of%20War%20-%20Aftergood%20paper_FINAL.pdf.

Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World, 1992.

Agnew, John, and Nicholas Entrikin. *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor*. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2004.

Ahmed, Abiy. "Operations to Restore Law and Order in Ethiopia's Tigray Region: How Did We Get Here?" *Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: London*, Dec. 24, 2020. Https://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/operations-to-restore-law-and-order-in-ethiopias-tigray-region-how-did-we-get-here/.

Aissaoui, Rabah. "Fratricidal War: The Conflict between the Mouvement national algérien (MNA) and the Front de libération nationale (FLN) in France during the Algerian War (1954–1962)." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 2 (Aug. 2012): 227-240.

Akashi, Yoji. "Japanese Policy towards the Malayan Chinese 1941–1945." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1970): 61-89.

Akashi, Yoji, and Mako Yoshimura. *New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1945*. Singapore: NUS, 2008.

Akhtar, Shaheen. "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Domestic, Regional and International Linkages (1983-1993)." PhD dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 2009.

Aksakal, Mustafa. "'Holy War Made in Germany'? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad." *War in History* 18, no. 2 (Apr. 2011): 184-199.

Aksoy, Deniz, and David Carter. "Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups." *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2014): 181-204.

"Al-Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya." Background Report, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Sep. 2013.

Alamin, Mohammed, and Simon Marks. "Sudan Renews Warning on Nile Dam, Moves to Avert Water Shortages," *Bloomberg*, July 28, 2021. Https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-28/sudan-renews-warning-on-nile-dam-moves-to-avert-water-shortages#xj4y7vzkg.

Alastos, Doros. *Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British*. London: Heinemann, 1960.

———. *Cyprus in History: A Survey of 5,000 Years*. London: Zeno, 1955.

"Albania Domestic Repression under Hoxha and Alia," *Photius*. Last updated Apr. 1992. Https://photius.com/countries/albania/economy/albania_economy_domestic_repression_~57.html.

Aldrich, Robert. *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion*. New York: St. Martin's, 1996.

Alecou, Alexios. *Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945-1955: Politics and Ideologies under British Rule*. New York: Nature America, 2016.

———. "Safeguarding through Stability: British Constitutional Proposals in Post-war Cyprus." *Journal of Human Rights in the Commonwealth* (Feb. 2016): 50-56.

Alexander, George. *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1982.

Alexander, Martin, and J. Keiger. *France and the Algerian War 1954-1962*: *Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy.* London: Frank Cass, 2002.

"Algeria." *CIA World Factbook*. Accessed on Nov. 3, 2015. Http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/africa/algeria.html.

"Algeria Maps." *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: University of Texas at Austin*. Https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/algeria_pol-2001.pdf.

"Algeria 1955: A Photo and its Caption." *Histoire colonial*. Last modified Sep. 28, 2019. Https://histoirecoloniale.net/Algerie-1955-une-photo-et-sa.html.

"Algeria 1954: Front de Liberation Nationale Proclamation, November 1, 1954, To the Algerian People." *Marxists.Org*. Https://www.marxists.org/history/algeria/1954/proclamation.htm.

Allen, W. E. D. "Wingate of the Gideonites," *Palestine Post*, Apr. 9 1944. Https://www.nli.org.il/en/newspapers/?a=d&d=pls19440409-01.1.4&e=-------en-20--1--img-txIN%7ctxTI----------1.

Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

———. *Nuclear Terrorists: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York: Times, 2004.

Almond, Gabriel. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harcourt, 1950.

Alonso, Rogelio. "The Madrid Attacks on March 11: An Analysis of the Jihadist Threat in Spain and Main Counterterrorist Measures." In *Countering Terrorism in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*, edited by James Forest. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007. 202-221.

Alterman, John. "Special Report: How Terrorism Ends." *United States Institute for Peace*. May 1999: 1-11. Https://www.usip.org/publications/1999/05/how-terrorism-ends.

Amahazion, Fikrejesus. "Ethiopia and TPLF: A Precipitous Fall – OpEd," *Eurasia Review*, Nov. 18, 2020. Https://www.eurasiareview.com/18112020-ethiopia-and-tplf-a-precipitous-fall-oped/.

———. "A Look Back on Eritrea's Historic 1993 Referendum," *Tesfa News*, Apr. 23, 2018. Https://www.tesfanews.net/revisiting-eritrea-historic-1993-referendum/.

Ambler, John. *The French Army in Politics, 1945—1962*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1966.

"Amid Violence, Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency in Amhara," *Al Jazeera*, Apr. 19, 2021. Https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-in-amhara-amid-violence.

Amnesty International. "Ethiopia, Accountability Past and Present: Human Rights in Transition, AI Index: AFR/25/6/95." London, Apr. 1995.

———. "Ethiopia: Three Killed, 19 Injured in Tigray as Eritrean Troops Open Fire on Civilians," Apr. 14, 2021. Https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/ethiopia-three-killed-19-injured-in-tigray-as-eritrean-troops-open-fire-on-civilians-2/.

———. *Wavering Commitment to Human Rights: ASA/37/08/96*, Aug. 1, 1996. Https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a98c13.html.

"Analysis of Al-Shabaab's Attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya." New York City Police Department (Nov. 2013). Accessed Aug. 5, 2016. Https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/894158/westgate-report-for-shield-website.pdf.

Anderson, David. "Policing and Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954–60." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 21, no. 3 (1993): 177-207.

Anderson, Frank, and Amos Hershey. *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870-1914*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1918.

Anderson, Lisa. "The State in the Middle East and North Africa." *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (Oct. 1987): 1-18.

———. *Transitions to Democracy*. New York: Columbia University, 1999.

Anderson, Perry. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. New York: Verso, 1979.

Andrew, Christopher. *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*. New York: Allen Lane, 2009.

Anna, Cara. "Diplomats: Rockets Fired at Eritrea amid Ethiopian Conflict," *Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 2020.

———. "Ethiopia Armed Group Says It Has Alliance with Tigray Forces," *AP*, Aug. 11, 2021. Https://apnews.com/article/africa-only-on-ap-ethiopia-b280e6622d66b7e7f9b12cd1d0041ae8.

———. "Ethiopia Declares Victory as Military Takes Tigray Capital," *AP News*, Nov. 28, 2020. Https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-kenya-0fb8647516d9be83d45fee2f1e4d13ae.

———. "'Horrible': Witnesses Recall Massacre in Ethiopian Holy City," *AP News*, Feb. 18, 2021. Https://apnews.com/article/witnesses-recall-massacre-axum-ethiopia-fa1b531fea069aed6768409bd1d20bfa.

Antoniades, Euripides. "The Liberation Struggle in Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Press: The Position of the Leading Greek Cypriot Press Eleftheria, O Phileleftheros and Haravgi in 1957–1960." *Media History* 24, no. 3-4 (2018): 514-527.

Anzalone, Christopher. "The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy." *CTC Sentinel* 10, no. 6 (Oct. 2013): 1-6.

Arbel, Benjamin. *Cypriot Population under Venetian Rule (1473-1571): A Demographic Study*. Nicosia: Idryma Archiepiskópou Makariou, 1984.

———. "Greek Magnates in Venetian Cyprus: The Case of the Synglitico Family." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 325-337.

Arena, Michael, and Bruce Arrigo. "Social Psychology, Terrorism, and Identity: A Preliminary Re-examination of Theory, Culture, Self, and Society." *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 23, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2005): 485-506.

Arendt, Hannah. *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin, 1977.

Argyris, Chris, and Donald Schön. *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978.

Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by David Ross. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1980.

———. *The Politics*. Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984.

———. *The Politics*. Translated by Ernest Baker. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1995.

"Armed Conflicts: Sri Lanka (1983 - 2010), Recently Ended Conflict." *Project Ploughshares*. Last modified Jan. 2011. Https://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/sri-lanka-1983-2010/.

"Army Estimates, 1954–55." *Hansard: UK Parliament*, 524 (Mar. 11, 1954). Https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1954-03-11/debates/05277dde-2331-49f0-b243-08c068e58994/ArmyEstimates1954%E2%80%9355.

"Army Regulation 530–1: Operations and Signal Security: Operations Security." *Federation of American Scientists*. Last modified Sep. 26, 2014. Https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/ar530-1.pdf.

Arnold, James. *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2009.

Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. Translated by Richard Howard and Annette Fox. New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Arquilla, John, and David Ronenfeldt. *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997.

———. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Wins Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Sum. 2001): 93-128.

Arrow, Kenneth, and Eric Maskin. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2012.

Arsenault, Elizabeth, and Tricia Bacon. "Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38, no. 2 (2015): 85-112.

———. "Eliminating Terrorist Safe Havens: One Size Does not Fit All," *Brookings*, Apr. 6, 2015b. Https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/04/06/eliminating-terrorist-safe-havens-one-size-does-not-fit-all/.

Art, Robert, and Patrick Cronin. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2003.

Arvanitidis, Barbara, Nima Elbagir, Bethlehem Feleke, Eliza Mackintosh, Gianluca Mezzofiore and Katie Polglase. "Massacre in the Mountains," *CNN*, Mar. 22, 2021.

Asal, Victor, and R. Rethemeyer. "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks." *Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008): 437-449.

Asal, Victor, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton. "Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 94-117.

Asbridge, Thomas. *The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land*. New York: Ecco, 2010.

Ashley, Richard. "The Poverty of Neorealism." In *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert Keohane. New York: Columbia University, 1986.

Ashton, S. R. "Ceylon." In *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century: Volume IV*, edited by Judith Brown and William Louis. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1999.

Asprey, Robert. *War in the Shadows: The Classic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Persia to the Present*. New York: Little, Brown, 1994.

———. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*. New York: William Morrow, 1994b.

"Assassination of SWRD Bandaranaike: How did Buddharakkitha Acquire the .45 Revolver?" *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), Jan. 18, 2019. Http://www.dailynews.lk/2019/01/18/features/174680/how-did-buddharakkitha-acquire-45-revolver.

Asseraf, Arthur. "Between the World and Algeria: International Histories of the Algerian War of Independence." *Arab Studies Journal* 25, no. 1 (2017): 198-209.

Athas, Iqbal. "Sri Lanka Launches Military Offensive." *UPI*, Oct. 17, 1995. Https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/10/17/Sri-Lanka-launches-military-offensive/5807813902400/.

———. "Sri Lankan Troops Enter Rebel Jaffna." *UPI*, Nov. 20, 1995. Https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/11/20/Sri-Lankan-troops-enter-rebel-Jaffna/7158816843600/.

Atran, Scott. "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism." *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2004): 67-90.

Augustine. *The City of God against the Pagans*. Translated by R. W. Dyson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998.

Aussaresses, Paul. *The Battle of the Casbah*. New York: Enigma, 2006.

Avdeyeva, Olga. "States' Compliance with International Requirements: Gender Equality in EU Enlargement Countries." *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2010): 203-217.

Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*. Translated by Timothy Cullen and Susan Kyriakidis. New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1986.

Ayele, Fantahun. *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 2014.

Azam, Jean-Paul. "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians." *Economics of Governance* 7, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 53-73.

Azam, Jean-Paul, and Veronique Thelen. "Aid and the Delegated Fight against Terrorism." *Review of Development Economics* 10, no. 2 (2006): 330-344.

Azinas, Andreas. *50 Years of Silence—Cyprus' Struggle for Freedom: My EOKA Secret File, Volume B*. Nicosia: Airwaves, 2002.

Babas, Latifa. "22 October 1956: Ben Bella, King Mohammed V and the Story of the Re-routed Plane." *Yabiladi*. Last modified Oct. 22, 2018. Https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/70157/october-1956-bella-king-mohammed.html.

Baccini, Leonardo, and Johannes Urpelainen. "International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders Promote Economic Reform?" *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (Jan. 2014): 195-214.

Bacevich, Andrew. *The New American Militarism.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2005.

Bacon, Tricia. "Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8 no. 4 (Aug. 2014): 4-26.

Bailey, John, and Matthew Taylor. "Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil and Mexico." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1, no. 1 (2009): 3-29.

Baker, Peter. "The Realities of Exporting Democracy," *Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 2006.

Baker, Samuel. *Cyprus, as I Saw It in 1879*. London: Macmillan, 1879.

Bakke, Kristin, Kathleen Cunningham, and Lee Seymour. "A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars." *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 265-283.

Bakker, Ryan, Daniel Hill, Jr., and Will Moore. "How Much Terror? Dissidents, Governments, Institutions, and the Cross-National Study of Terror Attacks." *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (Sep. 2016): 711-726.

Balasingham, Adele. *The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance*. Mitcham: Fairmax, 2001.

Balcells, Laia. "Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 3 (June 2011): 397-422.

Baldwin, David. *Economic Statecraft.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1985.

———. "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies." *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (Jan. 1979): 161-194.

Ball, Margaret. *NATO and the European Union Movement*. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Ball, Simon. "Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and Great Britain under the terms of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958. *Historical Journal* 38, no. 2 (1995): 439-454.

Baloch, Babar. "Pace of Ethiopian Refugee Arrivals in Sudan Unseen in the Last Two Decades." *UNHCR: UN Refugee Agency*, Nov. 17, 2020. Https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2020/11/5fb391214/pace-ethiopian-refugee-arrivals-sudan-unseen-decades.html.

"Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955." *US Department of State: Office of the Historian*. Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf.

Banks, David. "Statistics for Homeland Defense." *Chance* 15, no. 1 (2002).

Barber, Benjamin. *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*. New York: Norton, 2003.

———. *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World.* New York: Ballantine, 1996.

Barber, Malcolm. *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1994.

Barnett, Correlli. "The Wasting of Britain's Marshall Aid," *BBC*. Last updated Mar. 3, 2011. Https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/marshall_01.shtml.

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2012.

Basile, Mark. "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 3 (May 2004): 169-185.

Bassford, Christopher, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: a Polemic." *War in History* 1, no. 3 (1994): 319-336.

Bates, Daniel, and Amal Rassam. *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001.

Baxter, Paul. "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo." *African Affairs* 77 (1978): 283-296.

Baxter, Paul, Jan Hultin, and Alessandro Triulzi. *Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1996.

Beblawi, Hazem. "The Rentier State in the Arab World." In *The Arab State*, edited by Giacomo Luciani. Berkeley: University of California, 1990.

Becker, Howard. "Notes on the Concept of Commitment." *American Journal of Sociology* 66, no. 1 (July 1960): 32-40.

———. "Social Observation and Case Studies." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 11 (1968): 232-238.

Beckett, Ian. *Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute/US Army War College, 2005.

———. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Begin, Menachem. *The Revolt*. Translated by Samuel Katz. Tel Aviv: Steimatzky's Agency, 1951.

Bekele, Shiferaw. "Reflections on the Power Elite of the Wärä Seh Mäsfenate (1786-1853)." *Annales d'Ethiopie* 15 (1990): 157-179.

Belasco, Amy. "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11, RL33110." *Congressional Research Service*, Dec. 8, 2014. Accessed June 26, 2019. Https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.

Bell, J. Bowyer. "The Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence: An Overview." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 17, no. 2 (1994): 115-155.

———. *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971.

Bellamy, Alex, and Paul Williams. "Thinking Anew About Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-15.

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945*. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.

Benmelech, Efraim, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban Klor. "Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism, NBER Working Paper No. 16320." *National Bureau of Economic Research*. Last modified August 2010. Https://www.nber.org/papers/w16320.

Bentwich, Norman. *The Mandates System*. New York: Longman's and Green, 1930.

Berberoglu, Berch. *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University, 2009.

Bercovitch, Jacob, Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette Willie. "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations." *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (Jun. 1991): 7-17.

Bergen, Peter and Swati Pandey. "The Madrassa Scapegoat." *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spr. 2006): 117-125.

Berger, J. M., and Jonathon Morgan. "The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter." *Brookings* (Mar. 5, 2015). Https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-the-population-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter/.

Berhane, Daniel. "EPRDF's New Leadership (Executive & Council Members Lists)," *Horn Affairs*, Oct. 3, 2010. Https://hornaffairs.com/2010/10/03/eprdfs-new-leadership/.

Berhe, Aregawi. "The EPRDF and the Crisis of the Ethiopian State, 8-2001." International Conference on African Development Archives. 5. Https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive/5.

———. "Ethiopia: Success Story or State of Chaos?" In *Post-Modern Insurgencies: Political Violence, Identity Formation and Peacemaking in Comparative Perspective*," edited by Ronaldo Munck and Purnaka de Silva. New York: St. Martin's, 2000.

———. "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front." *African Affairs* 103, no. 413 (Oct. 2004): 569-592.

Berntzen, Lars, and Sveinung Sandberg. "The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014): 759-779.

Berrebi, Claude. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful?" In *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, edited by Paul Davis and Kim Cragin. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009.

Berrebi, Claude, and Esteban Klor. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 3 (2008): 279-301.

Berry, Nicholas. "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 7, no. 1 (Win. 1987): 7-20.

Betts, Richard. "Interests, Burdens, and Persistence: Asymmetries between Washington and Hanoi." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Dec. 1980).

———. "The New Threat of Mass Destruction." *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1998): 26-41.

Bhandari, Aditi, and David Lewis. "The Conflict in Ethiopia," *Reuters Graphics*, Dec. 18, 2020. Https://graphics.reuters.com/ETHIOPIA-CONFLICT/xklpyjmndvg/.

Biberman, Yelena, and Farhan Zahid. "Why Terrorists Target Children: Outbidding, Desperation, and Extremism in the Peshawar and Beslan School Massacres." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 2 (2019): 169-184.

Bijl, Nicholas van der. *The Cyprus Emergency: The Divided Island, 1955–1974*. Barnsley UK: Pen & Sword, 2010.

Biljert, Martine van. "Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections: Briefing Paper 03/2009." *Afghan Analysts Network*. Last modified Sep. 9, 2009. Accessed July 11, 2019. Https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/polling-day-fraud-in-the-afghan-elections/.

Bilmes, Linda. "The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets: Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP13-006." *Harvard Kennedy School*, March 2013. Accessed June 26,

2019. Https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/financial-legacy-iraq-and-afghanistan-how-wartime-spending-decisions-will-constrain.

bin Laden, Osama. "Full Transcript of bin Laden's Speech." Last modified Nov. 1, 2004. Accessed June 17, 2019. Https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html.

———. "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: The 1998 Fatwa." In *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, edited by Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar. New York: Grove, 2003. 325-327.

———. "Transcript of Osama bin Laden Videotape." *CNN.com*, Dec. 13, 2001. Accessed Mar. 8, 2019. Http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript/.

Binder, David. "Greece, Turkey, and NATO." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2012): 95-106.

Binnie, Jeremy. "Ethiopia Says Northern Command is Counterattacking Tigray Rebels," *Jane's*, Nov. 12, 2020. Https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ethiopia-says-northern-command-is-counterattacking-tigray-rebels.

Biondich, Mark. *The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878*. Oxford , UK: Oxford University, 2011.

Bitsios, Dimitri. C*yprus: The Vulnerable Republic*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975.

Bjorgo, Tore. "Introduction." In *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, edited by Tore Bjorgo. London: Routledge, 2005.

Black, J. Cofer. "Diplomacy and the War against Terrorism: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, Mar. 18, 2003." *US Department of State*. Last modified Mar. 18, 2003. Https://2001 2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2003/18795.htm.

Blackstock, Paul. *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations*. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964.

Blainey, Geoffrey. *The Causes of War*. New York: Free, 1988.

———. *A Short History of Christianity*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

Blakeley, Ruth. *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: the North in the South*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Blanchard, Lauren. "Ethiopia's Transition and the Tigray Conflict: R46905," *Congressional Research Service*. Updated Sep. 9, 2021, 3. Https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R46905.

Bloch, Marc. "Toward a Comparative History of European Societies." In *Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History*, edited by Frederic Lane and Jelle Riemersma. Homewood, IL: Richard Irwin, 1953. 494-521.

Blomberg, Brock, Gregory Hess, and Akila Weerapana. "An Economic Model of Terrorism." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 17-28.

Bloom, Mia. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University, 2005.

———. "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding." *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 61-88.

———. "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda." *Washington Post*, May 24, 2009.

Bocca, Geoffrey. *The Secret Army*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

Boix, Carles, and Milan Svolik. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-sharing in Dictatorships." *Journal of Politics* 75, no. 2 (2013): 300-316.

Bolivar, Alberto. "Intelligence and Subversion in Peru." *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement Journal* 3, no. 3 (Win. 1994).

———. "Peru." In Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, edited by Yonah Alexander. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2002. 84-115.

Bonner, Raymond. "Tigers Sink Claws into Arms Trade." *South China Morning Post*, Mar. 11, 1998 (reprinted from the *New York Times*).

Boserup, Anders, and Andrew Mack. *War without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defense*. New York: Schocken, 1975.

Bouyerdene, Ahmed. *Emir Abd el-Kader: Hero and Saint of Islam*. Translated by Gustavo Polit, Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2012.

Bowden, Tom. "The Irish Underground and the War of Independence 1919-21." *Journal of Contemporary History* 8, no. 2 (Apr. 1973): 3-23.

Boyle, Michael. "Bargaining, Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence against Civilians in Iraq 2004-2007." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (2009): 261-287.

Boyle, Richard. "King Sri Wickrama Rajasinghe: Sri Lanka's Last Monarch." *Serendib*. Last modified Aug. 2016. Http://serendib.btoptions.lk/article.php?id=1858&issue=80.

Boyne, Sean. "The Real IRA: After Omagh, What Now?" *Jane's Intelligence Review*. Last modified Aug. 24, 1998. Accessed Aug. 5, 2019. Https://web.archive.org/web/20071025035213/http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir980824_1_n.shtml.

Bozkurt, Abdullah. "UN Report Indicates al-Qaeda and ISIS Enjoy Safe Haven in Turkish-controlled Idlib," *Nordic Monitor*, Feb. 9, 2022. Https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/02/the-un-report-indicates-al-qaeda-and-isis-enjoys-safe-haven-in-turkish-controlled-idlib/.

Brace, Richard, and Joan Brace. *Ordeal in Algeria*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1960.

Brams, Steven. *Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Braithwaite, Alex, and David Sobek. "Victim of Success: American Dominance and Terrorism." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 2 (2005): 135-148.

Branch, Daniel. *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

———. "The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War against Mau Mau in Kenya." *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 291-315.

Brantly, Aaron. "Financing Terror Bit by Bit." *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 10 (Oct. 2014): 1-5.

Brett, Michael. "Anglo-Saxon Attitudes: The Algerian War of Independence in Retrospect." *Journal of African History* 35, no. 2 (1995): 217-235.

Brewer, David. *Greece, the Decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War*. London: Tauris, 2016.

Brinton, Crane. *The Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: Vintage, 1965.

"The British Army in Palestine." *National Army Museum*. Accessed Feb. 22, 2002. Https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/conflict-Palestine#:~:text=Withdrawal,in%20the%20war%20that%20followed.

Brodie, Bernard. "The Development of Nuclear Strategy." *International Security* 2, no. 4 (1978).

Brookhiser, Richard. *Founding Father: Rediscovering George Washington*. New York: Free, 1996.

Brower, Benjamin. "The Amir Abd Al-Qadir and the 'Good War' in Algeria, 1832-1847." *Studia Islamica* 106, no. 2 (Jan. 2011): 169-195.

Brown, David. *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics*. London: Routledge. 2000.

Brown, Michael. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001.

Bruce, Steve. "The Problem of Pro-State Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 1 (1992): 67-88.

Bruneau, Thomas. "Introduction: Challenges to Effectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for Transparency and Accountability in Democracy." *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 3 (May 2007).

Bryant, Rebecca. *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*. New York: Tauris, 2004.

Buchanan, Patrick. "Whose War?" *The American Conservative* (Mar. 24, 2003).

Buchanan-Dunne, Michael. "Where Is the Real Murder Mile?" *Murder Mile Tours*. Last updated June 22, 2016. Https://www.murdermiletours.com/blog/where-is-the-real-murder-mile.

Buckley, Christopher. *Greece and Crete, 1941*. London, HMSO: 1977.

"Buddhism." *History.com*. Last modified Sep. 15, 2021. Https://www.history.com/topics/religion/Buddhism.

Bungay, Stephen. *Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain*. Minneapolis: Zenith, 2010.

Bunzel, Cole. "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State: Analysis Paper No. 19." The Brooking Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, Washington, DC, 2015.

Burgwyn, James. *The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1993.

Burke, Jason. "Rise and Fall of Ethiopia's TPLF – From Rebels to Rulers and Back," *Guardian*, Nov. 25, 2020. Https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/rise-and-fall-of-ethiopias-tplf-tigray-peoples-liberation-front.

Burke, Jason, and Jon Henley. "Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Wins 2019 Nobel Peace Prize," *Guardian*, Oct. 11, 2019. Https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/11/abiy-ahmed-ethiopian-prime-minister-wins-2019-nobel-peace-prize.

Burleigh, Michael. *Small Wars Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World 1945–1965*. New York: Viking, 2013.

Burrin, Philippe. *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise*. Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: New, 1996.

Burton, Michael, and John Higley. "Elite Settlements." *American Sociological Review* (June 1987): 295-307.

Bush, George W. "Beyond Containment and Deterrence to Preemptive Action (2002)." In *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, edited by Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar. New York: Grove, 2003. 351-352.

———. "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point." *White House*, June 1, 2002. Accessed June 27, 2019. Https://georgewbush whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

———. "President Delivers State of the Union Address." *White House*. Jan. 29, 2002. Accessed June 27, 2019. Https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

———. "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation." *White House*, Sep. 11, 2001. Accessed June 27, 2019. Https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.

Bush, Kenneth. *The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Buttigieg, Joseph. "The Prison Notebooks: Antonio Gramsci's Work in Progress." *Rethinking Marxism* 18, no. 1 (2006): 37-42.

Buxton, David. *The Abyssinians*. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Byford-Jones, Wilfrid. *Grivas and the Story of EOKA*. London: Hale, 1959.

Byman, Daniel. "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do we Understand Our Enemy?" *World Politics* 56, no. 1 (Oct. 2003): 139-163.

———. *Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism*. Analysis Paper No. 4. Washington, DC: Brookings/Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2005.

———. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

———. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2006): 95-111.

———. "Why Drones Work." *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2013): 32-43.

Byman, Daniel, and Matthew Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. New York: Cambridge University, 2002.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

Byrnes, Robert. "East Europe in Crisis." *Current History* 32, no. 186 (1957): 71-76.

Calbreath, Dean. "Attacks to Cost 1.6 Million Jobs." *San Diego Union-Tribune*, Jan. 12, 2002.

Calcada, Miquel. "Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence: Les Evenments, a Lost Opportunity for Peace." *Journal of Conflictology* 3, no. 2 (2012): 52-61.

Callwell, Charles. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1906. Accessed Mar. 17, 2014. Http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/small_wars.htm.

Campbell, F. Lee. "A Modest Suggestion." National Defense University, National War College, 2006. Accessed Oct. 15, 2019. Https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=465385.

Campbell, Ian. *The Addis Ababa Massacre: Italy's National Shame*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Campbell, John. *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy*. New York: Harper & Council on Foreign Relations, 1960.

"Candidate among 50 Dead in Sri Lanka Bomb Attack: Terrorism: Opposition Leader Is Killed by a Suicide Assassin at an Election Rally. Tamil guerrillas suspected." *LA Times*, Oct. 24, 1994. Https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-10-24-mn-54198-story.html.

Cardoso, Fernando, and Enzo Faletto. *Dependency and Development in Latin America* Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1979.

Carlsnaes, Walter. "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (1992): 245-270.

Carley, Kathleen. "Organizational Learning and Personnel Turnover." *Organization Science* 3, no. 1 (Feb. 1992): 20-46.

Carnegie, Allison, and Cyrus Samii. "International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program." *British Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (2019): 1357-1379.

Carruthers, Susan. *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and Colonial Counter-insurgency, 1944-1960*. London: Leicester University, 1995.

Carter, David. "The 1931 Rebellion: A Week that Shook Cyprus." *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*. Last modified Oct. 22, 2008. Https://web.archive.org/web/20121024032328/http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Davidcarter/31rebellion/31rebellion.html.

Carter, David, Andrew Shaver, and Austin Wright. "Places to Hide: Terrain, Ethnicity, and Civil Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 81, no. 4 (2019): 1446-1465.

Cartwright, Dorwin, and Alvin Zander. *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Caruthers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 5-21.

Casinader, Niranjan, Roshan De Silva Wijeyarat, and Lee Godden. "From Sovereignty to Modernity: Revisiting the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms – Transforming the Buddhist and Colonial Imaginary in Nineteenth-century Ceylon." *Comparative Legal History* 6, no. 1 (2018): 34-64.

Castella, Tom de. "Five Years that Shaped the British Military." *BBC News Magazine*. Last modified Mar. 15, 2015. Https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31750929.

Castle, Barbara. *Fighting All the Way*. London: Pan, 1994.

Cauley, Leslie. "NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls." *USA Today*, May 11, 2006.

Caulk, Richard. "Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 3 (1978): 457-493.

"Ceylon Independence Act 1947." *Legislation.gov.uk.* Https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/7/enacted#:~:text=An%20Act%20to%20make%20provision,the%20British%20Commonwealth%20of%20Nations.

"Ceylon Independence Bill: HC Deb 21 November 1947, Vol. 444; cc 1477-524." *Hansard: UK Parliament*, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1947/nov/21/ceylon-independence-bill.

Chafer, Tony, and Amanda Sackur. *French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front: Hope and Disillusion*. New York: St. Martin's, 1999.

Chai, Sun-Ki. "An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence." *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 1 (Oct. 1993).

Chaliand, Gerard. *Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle*. London: Saqi, 1987.

Chalk, Peter. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations—A Preliminary Analysis, Commentary No. 77." Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Mar. 2000.

Chandler, David. *Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars*. Ware, UK: Wordsworth, 1999.

Chandra, Kanchan. "What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2006): 397-424.

Chant, Christopher. *Warfare of the 20th Century: Armed Conflict outside the Two World Wars*. Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell, 1988.

Chapman, Clark, and Alan Harris. "A Skeptical Look at September 11th: How We Can Defeat Terrorism by Reacting to It More Rationally." *Skeptical Inquirer* 26, no. 5 (2002): 29-34.

Charters, David. *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994.

Chauthia, Farouk, and Teklemariam Beckett, "Tigray Crisis: Hyenas Feast on Corpses as Ethiopian Forces Retreat," *BBC News*, Oct. 19, 2022. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-63263302.

Checkel, Jeffrey. "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 83-114.

Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143, nos. 1-2 (2010): 67-101.

Cheney, Richard. "Vice President's Remarks and Q&A at Rossi Luncheon." *White House*, Jul. 26, 2004. Accessed Sep. 17, 2017. Http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=81173.

Chenoweth, Erica. "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity." *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 1 (2010): 16-30.

———. Is Terrorism still a Democratic Phenomenon?" *International Relations* 32, no. 8 (Win. 2012): 85-99.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Pauline Moore. *The Politics of Terror*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2018.

Chermak, Steven, Joshua Freilich, and Michael Suttmoeller. "The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States: Comparing Violent to Non-Violent Organizations." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 3 (2013): 193-218.

Chorley, Katherine. *Armies and the Art of Revolution*. Boston: Beacon, 1973.

Chosia, Farouk. "Conflict in Ethiopia: How Did Abiy Ahmed Stop the Advance of the Tigrayan Fighters" *BBC News*, Dec. 16, 2021. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-59666290.

———. "Conflict in Ethiopia: How Did the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front Fighters Outperform the Ethiopian Army," *BBC News*, Nov. 19, 2021. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-59318886.

Chourchoulis, Dionysios, and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas. "Greek Perceptions of NATO during the Cold War." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 497-514.

Christian, Shirley. "Tupamaros of Uruguay: The Mystique Survives." *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1986. Https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/03/world/tupamaros-of-urugray-the-mystique-survives.html.

Christofferson, Thomas. *France during World War II*. New York: Fordham University, 2006.

Christofis, Nikos, and Thekla Kyritsi. "Introduction: Cypriot Nationalism(s) in Context." In *Cypriot Nationalisms in Context*, edited by Thekla Kyritsi and Nikos Christofis. Cham: Switz., Palgrave/Macmillan, 2018. 1-22.

Churchill, Winston. "Their Finest Hour: Speech to House of Commons, June 18, 1940." *International Churchill Society*. Https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/their-finest-hour/.

Clark, Bruce. *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006.

Clark, Michael. *Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion*. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Clarke, Richard. *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free, 2004.

Clarke, Steve, Russell Powell, and Julian Savulescu. *Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict: A Scientific and Conceptual Investigation*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2013.

Clapham, Christopher. Four Decades after Haile Selassie's Death, Ethiopia is an African Success Story," *Conversation*, Aug. 27, 2015. Https://theconversation.com/four-decades-after-haile-selassies-death-ethiopia-is-an-african-success-story-46690.

———. "The Structure of Regional Conflict in Northern Ethiopia." *Conflict* 15, no. 3 (1991): 244-253.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976.

———. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984.

Clayton, Anthony. *The Wars of French Decolonization*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Clerides, Glafkos. *My Deposition, Vol. 4*. Nicosia: Alithia, 1992.

Cleveland, William. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004.

Cleveland, William, and Martin Bunton. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2009.

Cline, Ray, and Yonah Alexander. *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*. New York: Crane Russak, 1984.

Clodfelter, Micheal. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2017.

Clutterbuck, Lindsay. "Law Enforcement." In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, edited by Audrey Cronin and James Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004. 140-161.

Clutterbuck, Richard. *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945–1983*. New York: Routledge, 1985.

———. *Guerrillas and Terrorists*. London: Faber and Faber, 1977.

Cockayne, James. *Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime*. New York: Oxford University, 2016.

Cohen, Bernard. *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1963.

Cohen, Michael. *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954*. London: Frank Cass, 1997.

———. "From 'Cold' War to 'Hot' War: Allied Strategic and Military Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (2007): 725-748.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom. "On the Duration of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253-273.

Collins, Charles. "The Significance of the Donoughmore Constitution in the Political Development of Ceylon," *Parliamentary Affairs* 4, no 1 (1950): 101-110.

Comstock, Alzada. "Uneasy Cyprus." *Current History* 34, no. 202 (June 1958): 352-356.

"Concern of Outright War in Ethiopia Grows as PM Presses Military Offensive," *Voice of America*, Nov. 9, 2020. Https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_concern-outright-war-ethiopia-grows-pm-presses-military-offensive/6198127.html.

Confino, Michael. *Daughter of a Revolutionary: Natalie Herzen and the Bakunin-Nechayev Circle*. Translated by Hilary Sternberg and Lydia Bott. London: Alcove, 1974.

"The Conflict in Tigray: Testimonies of Survivors of the Bombing of the Capital, Mekele," *BBC News*, Dec. 21, 2020. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-55386339.

"The Conflict in Tigray: The Population of the Ethiopian Region Was Subjected to 'Ethnic Cleansing by the Allies of the Abi Ahmed Government,'" *BBC News*, Apr. 7, 2022. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-61022338.

"Conflict in Tigray: The Region's Rebels Say They Are Ready for Peace Talks under the Auspices of the African Union," *BBC News*, Sep. 11, 2022. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-62873324.

"Conflict in Tigray: WHO Director Cannot Send Money to His 'Starving' Relatives in Ethiopia, *BBC News*, Aug. 26, 2022. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-62689948.

Congleton, Roger. "Terrorism, Interest-Group Politics, and Public Policy." *Independent Review* 7, no. 1 (Sum. 2002): 47-67.

"Congresswoman Lee Fights to Stop Endless War in Appropriations Committee." *Congresswoman Barbara Lee*. Last modified June 2, 2015. Accessed June 21, 2019. Https://lee.house.gov/news/press-releases/congresswoman-lee-fights-to-stop-endless-war-in-appropriations-committee.

Connell, Dan. *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1993.

———. "A Lesson of Hope from Eritrea," *New Statesman*, Nov. 7, 1980.

Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Connelly, William. *The Terms of Political Discourse*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1993.

Connerney, Richard. "Islam Promotes Terrorism and Violence." In *Islam: Opposing Viewpoints*, edited by William Dudley. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven, 2004.

Connor, Walker. "Nation-Building of Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* 24, no. 3 (Apr. 1972): 319-355.

Conrad, Justin, and Kevin Greene. "Competition, Differentiation, and the Severity of Terrorist Attacks." *Journal of Politics* 77, no. 2 (2015): 546-561.

"Convention between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal." *American Journal of International Law* 14, no. 4 (1920): 356-360. https://doi.org/10.2307/2212906.

Copp, Tara. "Pentagon Strips Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria Troop Numbers from Web." *Military Times*, April 9, 2018. Https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/04/09/dod-strips-iraq-afghanistan-syriatroop-numbers-from-web/.

Cordes, Bonnie. "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature." In *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, edited by David Rapoport. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001. 150-173.

Cordes, Bonnie, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Sue Moran, and William Sater. *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983*. R-3183-SL. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1984.

Corsi, Jerome. "Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 1 (Mar. 1981): 47-85.

Cortell, Andrew, and James Davis, Jr. "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996): 451-476.

Cottee, Simon, and Keith Hayward. "Terrorist (E)Motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34, no. 12 (2011): 963-986.

Coufoudakis, Van. "Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis (review)." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 4, no. 2 (1986): 175-177.

———. "The Cyprus Question—A Continuing Dialogue." In *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, edited by Van Coufadakis. New York: Pella, 1967. 1-11.

———. "The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies—The Cyprus Case." In *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, edited by Van Coufadakis. New York: Pella, 1967. 27-49.

Cox, Robert. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1981): 126-155.

Crafts, Nicholas. "Rebuilding after the Second World War: What Lessons for Today?" *Warwick: Economics, Cage Research Centre*. Last modified June 27, 2020. Https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/01-07-20-rebuilding_after_the_second_world_war_what_lessons_for_today/.

Crawford, Neta. "Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 15, no. 2 (2007): 187-212.

Crawford, Neta, and Catherine Lutz. "Human Cost of Post-9/11 Wars: Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones, Afghanistan & Pakistan (Oct. 2001 – Aug. 2021); Iraq (March 2003 – Aug. 2021); Syria (Sept. 2014 – May 2021); Yemen (Oct. 2002-Aug. 2021) and Other Post-9/11 War Zones." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified Sep. 1, 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20War_Direct%20War%20Deaths_9.1.21.pdf.

Crawshaw, Nancy. *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1978.

Crelinsten, Ronald, and Alex Schmid. "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet." In *Western Responses to Terrorism*, edited by Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993. 307-340.

Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (Jul. 1981): 379-399.

———. "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16, no. 3 (Sep. 1972): 383-396.

———. "Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning." *International Social Movements Research* 4 (1992): 29-42.

———. "How Terrorism Declines." In *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, edited by Clark McCauley. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1991. 69-87.

———. "How Terrorism Ends." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL., Sep. 1987.

———. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." In *Origins of Terrorism*: *Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

———. "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism." *Orbis* 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985): 465-489.

———. "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the Twenty-first Century." *Political Psychology*, 21, no. 2 (June 2000): 405-420.

———. "Special Report: How Terrorism Ends." *United States Institute for Peace*. Washington, DC: USIP, May 25, 1999.

———. "The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism." In *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*, edited by Robert Slater and Michael Stohl. New York: St. Martin's, 1988. 12-48.

———. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." In *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, edited by David Rapoport. London: Frank Cass 2001. 13-31.

———. "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts." In *Terrorism in Context*, edited by Martha Crenshaw. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1995.

———. "Why Violence Is Rejected or Renounced: A Case Study of Oppositional Terrorism." In *A Natural History of Peace*, edited by Thomas Gregor. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 1996. 249-272.

Creveld, Martin van. *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force*. New York: Public Affairs, 1998.

Cromwell, William. "The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 8, no. 4 (1982): 233-249.

Cronin, Audrey. "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism." *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Win. 2002-2003): 30-58.

———. "CRS Report for Congress: Terrorists and Suicide Attacks August 28, 2003." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress, 2003. Https://irp.fas.org/crs/RL32058.pdf.

———. "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups." *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Sum. 2006): 7-48.

———. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2009.

———. "Why Drones Fail." *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2013): 44-54.

Cronin, Audrey, Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, CRS Report for Congress, RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Feb. 6, 2004. Accessed Aug. 8, 2019. Https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

Crossan, Mary, Henry Lane, and Roderick White. "An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution." *Academy of Management Review* 24, no. 3 (1999): 522-537.

Crossette, Barbara. "Sri Lanka Wins a War and Diminishes Democracy," *Nation*, Feb. 18, 2010.

Crozier, Brian. *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections*. Boston: Beacon, 1960.

Cunningham, Kathleen, Kristin Bakke, and Lee Seymour. "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-determination Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1: (2012): 67-93.

Cunningham, Jr., Walter. "Terrorism Definitions and Typologies." In *Terrorism: Concepts, Causes, and Conflict Resolution*, edited by R. Scott Moore. Fort Belvoir, VA: US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2003. 5-40.

Cutler, David. "Timeline: French-Lebanese Relations." *Reuters*. Last modified Nov. 18, 2007. Https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-france-relations/timeline-french-lebanese-relations-idUSL1842546320071118.

Cyert, Richard, and James March. *Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Business, 1992.

"Cyprus (Agreement). HC Deb 19 February 1959, vol. 600 cc618-30," *Hansard: UK Parliament*. Https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/feb/19/cyprus-agreement#column_618.

"Cyprus." *CIA World Factbook*. Last modified Jan. 25, 2022. Https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cyprus/#geography.

"Cyprus (Constitutional Arrangements) HC Deb. 28." *Hansard: UK Parliament* 531 (July 1954), 504-514. Https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1954/jul/28/cyprus-constitutional- arrangements#column_507.

"Cyprus." *Nations Online*. Last modified 2022. Https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/cyprus.htm.

"The Cyprus Tribute Volume 4: debated on Thursday 19 May 1892." *Hansard: UK Parliament*. Https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1892-05-19/debates/18f5d8e8-8573-4bb7-8a66-2245d89b642d/TheCyprusTribute.

Dagne, Theodros. "EPRDF's Rise to Political Dominance." *Ethiopian Review* (Dec. 1992).

Dahl, Robert. "The Concept of Power." *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1957): 201-215.

Dahl, Robert, and Bruce Stinebrickner. *Modern Political Analysis*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice, 2003.

Dakin, Douglas. *The Unification of Greece: 1770-1923*. New York: St. Martin's, 1972.

Dale, Stephen. "Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anti-Colonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Philippines." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 1 (Mar. 1988): 37-59.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. "Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 2 (2013): 99-115.

D'Anieri, Paul. *International Politics Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010.

Darby, Phillip. *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968*. London: Oxford University, 1973.

Darden, Jessica. "Tackling Terrorists' Exploitation of Youth," *American Enterprise Institute*, May 2019. Https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/report/tackling-terrorists-exploitation-of-youth/Tackling-Terrorists-Exploitation-of-Youth.pdf.

Darkwah, R. H. K. *Shewa, Menilek, and the Ethiopian Empire, 1813-1889*. London: Heinemann Educational, 1975.

Dartnell, Michael. "France's Action Directe: Terrorists in Search of a Revolution." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2, no. 4 (Win. 1990): 457-488.

Darwin, John. *Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Macmillan International, 1988.

David, Steven. *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, Mideast Security and Policy Studies no. 51. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, Sep. 2002.

Davidson, Jason. "The Costs of War to United States Allies Since 9/11." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified May 12, 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf.

Davies, James. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (Feb. 1962): 5-19.

Davis, Anthony. "Tamil Tiger International." *Jane's Intelligence Review* (Oct. 1996): 469-473.

———. "Tiger International: How a Secret Global Network Keeps Sri Lanka's Tamil Guerrilla Organization Up and Killing." *Asiaweek*, July 26, 2000. Http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/96/0726/cs1.html.

Davis, Eric. "Reflections on the Study of Religion and Politics in Post Ba'athist Iraq." *Newsletter of the American Academic Research Institute in Iraq* (TAARII). Spr. 2008: 13-15.

Davis, Joyce. *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Davison, Roderick. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1962.

Dean, Martin. "Where Did All the Collaborators Go?" *Slavic Review* 64 no. 4 (2005): 791-798.

Dear, Ian, and Michael Foot. *The Oxford Companion to World War II*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1995.

Debray, Regis. *Revolution in the Revolution?: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America*. Translated by Bobbye Ortiz. New York: MR, 1967.

Deery, Phillip. "Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 1 (2007): 29-54.

Della Porta, Donatella. "Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political Organizations." In *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations*, vol. 4, edited by Donatella Della Porta. Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1992, 3-28.

———. "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy." In *Terrorism in Context*, edited by Martha Crenshaw. University Park, PA: Penn State University, 1995. 105-159.

———. *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Demetriou, Chares. "Political Violence and Legitimation: The Episode of Colonial Cyprus." *Qualitative Sociology* 30, no. 2 (2007): 171-193.

Dempsey, Gary. "Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism." Policy Analysis Series, No. 429. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, Mar. 21, 2002.

Denardo, James. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellio*n. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1985.

Der Speigel. *Inside 9-11: What Really Happened: The Reporters, Writers, and Editors of Der Spiegel Magazine*. New York: St. Martin's, 2002.

Derat, Marie-Laure. "The Zagwe Dynasty (11-13th Centuries) and King Yemreḥanna Krestos." *Annales d'Ethiopie* 25 (2010): 157-196.

Dershowitz, Alan. *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2002.

Desai, Raj, and Harry Eckstein. "Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion." *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 1990): 441-465.

Desch, Michael. "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters." *International Security* 27, no. 2 (Fall, 2002): 5-47.

Deutch, John. "A Nuclear Posture for Today." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2005): 49-60.

Devi, Sharmila. "Tigray Atrocities Compounded by Lack of Health Care," *Lancet*, 397, no. 10282 (Apr. 10-16, 2021): 1336.

Devillers, Philippe, and Jean Lacouture. *End of a War: Indochina, 1954*. New York: Praeger, 1969.

DeVotta, Neil. "Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka." *Pacific Affairs* 73, no. 1 (Spr. 2000): 55-76.

———. "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka." *Asian Survey* 49, no. 6 (2009): 1021-1051.

Diamond, Larry. "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?" *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1, (Jan. 2010): 93-112.

———. "Why Democracies Survive." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 1 (Jan. 2011): 17-29.

Diehl, Paul, and Gary Goertz. *War and Peace in International Rivalries.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2000.

Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955–1959." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21, no. 2 (2008): 375-394.

———. *Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to the Middle East Crisis*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010.

———. "The Value to CENTO of UK Bases on Cyprus." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 4 (July 2009): 611-624.

"Diplomatic Documents, 1913-1917, Issued by the Greek Government Concerning the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance and the Germano-Bulgarian Invasion in Macedonia: Part First." *American Journal of International Law* 12, no. 2, Supplement: Official Documents (Apr. 1918): 86-139.

Dissanayaka, T. D. S. A. *The Agony of Sri Lanka: An in-depth Account of the Racial Riots of 1983*. Colombo: SL: Swastika, 1983.

Dixon, Paul. *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave, 2012.

Dockrill, Michael. *British Defence since 1945*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

Dodd, Clement. *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Dohrn, Bernardine, Billy Ayers, Jeff Jones, and Celia Sojourn. *Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism*. City Unknown: Communications, 1974. Https://www.sds-1960s.org/PrairieFire-reprint.pdf.

Dorn, Walter. *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Dorril, Stephen. *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations*. London: Fourth Estate, 2001.

Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1982.

Doumas, Christos. "History and the Cyprus Problem." *Social Science* 43, no. 3 (June 1968): 146-152.

Dowling, Ralph. "Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre." *Journal of Communication* 36, no. 1 (Mar. 1986): 12-24.

Downes, Alexander. "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy." *Civil Wars* 9, no.4 (Dec. 2007): 420-444.

Doyle, Michael. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (Dec. 1986): 1151-1169.

Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 779-801.

Drakos, Konstantinos, and Andreas Gofas. "The Devil You Know but Are Afraid to Face: Underreporting Bias and its Distorting Effects on the Study of Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (2006): 714-735.

Dreher, Axel, and Martin Gassebner. "Does Political Proximity to the US Cause Terror? *Economics Letters* 99, no. 1 (2008): 20-27.

Druckman, Daniel, and Benjamin Broome. "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Facilitation or Delinking?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 3 (Sep. 1988): 489-510.

Duelfer, Charles. "Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Washington, DC." Oct. 6, 2004.

Dunn John. *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1989.

Durrell, Lawrence. *Bitter Lemons.* New York: Dutton, 1957.

Dutton, David. *British Politics since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997.

Easterbrook, Gregg. "Term Limits: The Meaninglessness of 'WMD.'" *New Republic*, Oct. 7, 2002.

Easterby-Smith, Mark, Mary Crossan, and Davide Nicolini. "Organizational Learning: Debates Past, Present and Future." *Journal of Management Studies* 37, no. 6 (Sep. 2000): 783-796.

Eckstädt, Karl Vitzthum von, Henry Reeve, and Edward Taylor. *St. Petersburg and London in the Years 1852-64 : Reminiscences of Count Charles Frederick Vitzthum von Eckstaedt*. London: Longmans & Green, 1887.

Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In *Strategies of Inquiry: Handbook of Political Science, Volume VII*, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975. 79-138.

Edelstein, David. *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2010.

"Egypt Plans Dam-busting Diplomatic Offensive against Ethiopia," *UPI*, Feb. 27, 2014. Https://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2014/02/27/Egypt-plans-dam-busting-diplomatic-offensive-against-Ethiopia/UPI-13631393533111/.

"Egypt Stays Opposed to Ethiopia's Grand Millennium Dam Project," *Ezega News*, Apr. 11, 2011. Https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails?Page=heads&NewsID=2847.

Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy, and Walter Roberts. *The Cold and the Dark: The World after Nuclear War*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

Ehrlich, Thomas. *Cyprus, 1958-1967*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Eisenhower, Dwight. "The Presidency: President Dwight Eisenhower Farewell Address, Jan. 17, 1961." *C-Span*. Accessed Sep. 20, 2021. Https://www.c-span.org/video/?15026-1/president-dwight-eisenhower-farewell-address.

Eisenstadt, Michael. "'Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings' as a Counter-Terror Tool: An Assessment of Israel's Approach." *Peacewatch*, no. 342 (Aug. 28, 2001).

Eller, Jack. *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999.

Elmes Michael, and Gary Gemmill. "The Psychodynamics of Mindlessness and Dissent in Small Groups." *Small Group Research* 21, no. 1 (Feb. 1990): 28-44.

Emilianides, Achilles. "Effect of Marriage on Nationality in Cyprus." *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1953): 621-627.

Emon, Anver. *Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2012.

Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. "The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (1993): 828-844.

———. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?: A Time-Series Investigation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 3 (2000): 307-332.

———. "Transnational Terrorism, 1968–2000: Thresholds, Persistence, and Forecasts." *Southern Economic Journal* 71, no. 3 (Jan. 2004): 467-482.

Endeshaw, Dawit. "Ethiopia Opposition See Dangers if 2020 Vote Delayed," *Reuters*, June 21, 2019. Https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-election-idUSKCN1TM23N.

———. "The Rise of Abiy "Abiyot" Ahmed," *Reporter*, Mar. 32, 2018. Https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/rise-abiy-abiyot-ahmed.

Engels, Friedrich. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*. New York: Penguin, 2010.

Entelis, John. *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986.

"The EPRDF Officially Ends; The Prosperity Party Begins," *Ezega News*, Dec. 26, 2019. Https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/7599/The-EPRDF-Officially-Ends-The-Prosperity-Party-Begins.

Erhan, Çağrı. "Greek Occupation of Izmir and Adjoining Territories: Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry, May-September 1919." Ankara: SAM, 1999.

Erickson, Bonnie. "Secret Societies and Social Structures." *Social Forces* 60, no. 1 (Sep. 1981): 188-210.

Erickson, Edward. *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001.

"Eritrea Becomes a Member of the United Nations." *South African History Online*. Last updated Sep. 30, 2019. Https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/eritrea-becomes-member-united-nations#:~:text=The%20UN%20approved%20an%20Observer,member%20on%2028%20May%201993.

Erlikh, Haggai. *The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962-1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Africa*. Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1983.

———. "Tigrean Nationalism, British Involvement and Haile Selassie's Emerging Absolutism—Northern Ethiopia, 1941-1943." *Asian and African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1981): 191-227.

"Estimate of U.S. Post-9/11 War Spending, in $ Billions FY2001-FY2022." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified Sep. 1, 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/BudgetaryCosts.

"Ethiopia Appoints New Tigray Leader, Amnesty Reports 'Massacre,'" *Al Jazeera*, Nov. 13, 2020. Https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/scores-of-civilians-massacred-in-ethiopias-tigray-amnesty.

"Ethiopia." *CIA World Factbook*. Last updated Sep. 12, 2022. Accessed on Sep. 15, 2022. Https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia/.

"Ethiopia Declares Unilateral Truce to Allow Aid into Tigray," *Al Jazeera*, Mar. 24, 2022. Https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/ethiopia-declares-truce-to-allow-aid-into-tigray.

"Ethiopia GDP 1981-2022." *Macrotrends*. Https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ETH/ethiopia/gdp-gross-domestic-product.

"Ethiopia is Entering Constitutional Limbo," *Economist*, May 16, 2020. Https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/05/16/ethiopia-is-entering-constitutional-limbo.

"Ethiopia Military Expenditure." *Trading Economics*. Https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/military-expenditure#:~:text=Military%20Expenditure%20in%20Ethiopia%20is,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models.

"Ethiopia Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2022." *Macrotrends*, Https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ETH/ethiopia/military-spending-defense-budget.

"Ethiopia Navy to be Based in Djibouti, Command HQ in Bahir Dar (Report)," *Africa News*, Mar. 12, 2019. Https://www.africanews.com/2019/12/03/ethiopia-navy-to-be-based-in-djibouti-command-hq-in-bahir-dar-report//.

"Ethiopia Peace Talks Marred by Foreign Interference – PM," *Africa News*, Nov. 1, 2022. Https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/01/ethiopia-peace-talks-marred-by-foreign-interference-pm/?dicbo=v2-a3ca07a7a1368cefded4c1ee6ab4db0b.

"Ethiopia PM Hailemariam Desalegn in Surprise Resignation, *BBC News*. Last updated Feb. 15, 2018. Https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43073285.

"Ethiopia: 'We Are in Our Homeland, the Invaders Are Attacking Us,' Says Tigray's Gebremichael," *France 24*, May 12, 2020. Hhttps://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201205-ethiopia-we-are-in-our-homeland-the-invaders-are-attacking-us-says-tigray-s-gebremichael.

"Ethiopian Government Portal: Oromia Regional State." *Wayback Machine: Internet Archive*. Http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/oromia-regional-state.

Ethiopian Human Rights Council. "The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia, 7th Report." Addis Ababa, Aug. 1994.

"Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed: The Nobel Prize Winner who Went to War," *BBC News*, Oct. 11, 2021. Https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43567007.

"Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: How a Soldier Survived an 11-hour Gun Battle, *BBC News*, Dec. 10, 2020. Https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55215431.

"Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: PM Claims Capture of Regional Capital Mekelle," *BBC News*, Nov. 29, 2020. Https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55111061.

"Ethiopia's Tigray Forces Seek New Military Alliance," *Reuters*, Aug. 11, 2021. Https://www.reuters.com/world/ethiopias-tigray-forces-seek-new-military-alliance-2021-08-11/.

"Ethiopia's Top 10 Budget Expenditures in 2022-23 Fiscal Year," *Business Info Ethiopia*, July 20, 2022. Https://businessinfoeth.com/ethiopias-top-10-budget-expenditures-in-2022-23-fiscal-year/.

Ethirajan, Anbarasan. "How Sri Lanka's Military Won." *BBC News: South Asia*, last modified May 22, 2009. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8063409.stm.

"EU Suspends Ethiopian Budget Support over Tigray Crisis," *Reuters*, Jan. 15, 2021. Https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-eu/eu-suspends-ethiopian-budget-support-over-tigray-crisis-idUSKBN29K1SS.

Eubank, William, and Leonard Weinberg. "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6, no. 4 (1994): 417-443.

———. "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 1 (2001): 155-164.

Eudes, Dominique. *The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949*. London: NLB, 1972.

Evans, Martin. *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*. New York: Oxford University, 2012.

Evera, Stephen van. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1997.

———. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spr. 1994): 5-39.

———. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." *International Security* 22, no. 4 (Spr. 1998): 5-43.

———. "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by States and Societies, version 3.5." Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Political Science Department and Security Studies Program. Jan. 10, 2002.

"Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, Serial No. 110–28. April 17, 2007." *Homeland Security Digital Library*. Accessed June 19, 2019. Https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=475954.

Eyerman, Joe. "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems." *International Interactions* 24, no. 2 (1998): 151-170.

Fabian Colonial Bureau. *Strategic Colonies and Their Future: Papers Prepared for the Fabian Colonial Bureau*. Fabian Publications and V. Gollancz, 1945.

Fairchild, Mary. "Eastern Orthodox Denomination: Eastern Orthodoxy is a United Family of 13 Self-Governing Churches." *Learn Religions*. Last updated Apr. 27, 2019. Https://www.learnreligions.com/eastern-orthodox-church-denomination-700624.

Falk, Richard. "Global Patriotism (2002)." In *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, edited by Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar. New York: Grove, 2003. 337-344.

Fall, Bernard. *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu*. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1967.

———. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." *Naval War College Review* 17, no. 8 (Apr. 1965): 21-37.

Fanon, Frantz. *A Dying Colonialism*. Translated by Haakon Chevalier. New York: Grove, 1967.

———. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove, 2004.

Farrell, William. *Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army*. Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1990.

Faustmann, Hubert. *Divide and Quit?: British Colonial Policy in Cyprus 1878-1960. Including a Special Survey of the Transitional Period: February 1959-August 1960*. Mannheim: Mateo, 1999.

Fearon, James. "Rationalist Explanations of War." *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Sum. 1995): 379-414.

———. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 275-301.

Fearon, James, and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the U.S." Last modified Jan. 2008. Https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008.

Fedorov, Egor. "The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham: The Group's Nation-Building Project through the Instrumental Use of Violence." *McGill Journal of Political Studies* 7 (2016): 34-35.

Feierabend, Ivo, and Rosalind Feierabend. "Aggressive Behaviors within Polities: A Cross National Study." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10, no. 3 (Sep. 1966): 249-271.

Ferguson, Niall. "A World without Power." *Foreign Policy*. Last modified Oct. 27, 2009. Https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/a-world-without-power/.

Ferracuti, Franco. "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 1990, 59-64.

Fewster, Kevin, Hatice Hürmüz Başarin, and Vecihi Başarin. *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*. Crow's Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003.

Fiala, Irene. "Anything New? The Racial Profiling of Terrorists." *Criminal Justice Studies* 16, no. 1 (Mar. 2003): 53-58.

Fieldhouse, David. "The Labour Government and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945-51." In *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951*, edited by Ritchie Ovendale. Leicester: Leicester University, 1984.

"Fighting in Northern Ethiopia Shatters Months-long Truce," *Guardian*, Aug. 24, 2022. Https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/24/fighting-in-northern-ethiopia-shatters-months-long-truce-tigray.

Figueiredo, R. J. P. de, and Barry Weingast. "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict." In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, edited by B. F. Walter and J. Snyder. New York: Columbia University, 1999. 261-302.

Filkins, Dexter. "Asia: Tiger Women: Sri Lanka's Rebels Rely on Female Fighters." *Los Angeles Times*, Mar.11, 2000.

"Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)." *CVCE.eu*. Last modified April 24, 1955. Https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html.

Findley, Michael, and Joseph Young. "Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency." *Civil Wars* 9, no. 4 (Dec. 2007): 378-401.

———. "More Combatant Groups, More Terror? Empirical Tests of an Outbidding Logic." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 5 (2012): 706-721.

———. "Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem." *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012b): 285-305.

———. "Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars." *Journal of Politics* 77, no. 4 (2015): 1115-1128.

Fineman, Mark. "Photographer's Last Shots: Clues to Gandhi's Killers." *LA Times*, June 18, 1991. Https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-18-mn-925-story.html.

Finnemore, Martha. "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy." *International Organization* 47 (1993): 565-598.

———. *The Purpose of Intervention Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2003.

"First Declaration of the Algerian Provisional Government." *Archive Today*. Last modified Jan. 3, 2014. Https://archive.ph/20070823113037/http://www.algerian-history.info/proclagpra.htm#selection-257.0-257.56.

Fischer, Bernd. "Albania and Enver Hoxha's Legacy," *Open Democracy*. Last updated June 10, 2010. Https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/albania-and-enver-hoxhas-legacy/.

Flanigan, Shawn. "Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 6 (2008): 499-519.

Flibbert, Andrew. "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War." *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (Apr.-June 2006): 310-352.

Flori, Jean. *Richard the Lionheart: Knight and King*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.

Foley, Charles. *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War.* Baltimore: Penguin, 1964.

Foley, Charles, and W. I. Scobie. *The Struggle for Cyprus*. Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1975.

Foot, Hugh (Baron Caradon). *A Start in Freedom*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

Foot, Michael. *Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Fornier, Louis. *FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*. Toronto: NC Press, 1984.

Forrest, James, Thomas Bengtson, Jr., Hilada Martinez, Nathan Gonzalez, and Bridget Nee. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Annotated Bibliography, Vol. 2*. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006.

Forster, Edward. *A Short History of Modern Greece: 1821–1956*. London: Methuen, 1958.

Fox, Jonathan. "The Ethnic-religious Nexus: The Impact of Religion on Ethnic Conflict." *Civil Wars* 3, no. 3 (2000): 1-22.

"France." *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*. Https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/france.

Franck, Thomas. "Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror." *American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 4 (Oct. 2004): 686-688.

Francois, Philippe. "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View." *Military Review* (Sep.-Oct. 2008): 56-67.

Freedman, Lawrence. "Terrorism as a Strategy." *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314-339.

Freeman, Michael, and Gordon McCormick. "Rethinking Decapitation as a Strategy against Terrorism." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, Feb. 28, 2017.

French, David. "British Intelligence and the Origins of the EOKA Insurgency." *British Journal for Military History* 1, no. 2 (2015): 84-100.

———. *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2015.

"French Nuclear Program." *American Heritage Foundation*. Last modified Feb. 14, 2017. Https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/french-nuclear-program.

Frendo, Henry. "The Naughty European Twins of Empire: The Constitutional Breakdown in Malta and Cyprus 1930–1933." *The European Legacy* 3, no. 1 (1998): 45-52.

Freud, Sigmund. "Why War?" In *International War: An Anthology*, edited by Melvin Small and J. David Singer. Chicago: Dorsey, 1989.

Friedman, Benjamin. "Leap before You Look: The Failure of Homeland Security." *Breakthroughs* 13, no. 1 (2004).

Friedman, Thomas. "An Islamic Reformation." *New York Times*, Dec. 4, 2002.

———. "The Core of Muslim Rage." *New York Times*, Mar. 6, 2002, p. A21.

———. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.* New York: Anchor, 2000.

———. "Marines Complete Beirut Pullback: Moslems Move In." *New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1984.

Fronzo de, James. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2014.

Frost, Mark. "Wider Opportunities: Religious Revival, Nationalist Awakening and the Global Dimension in Colombo. 1870-1920." *Modern Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (Oct. 2002): 937-967.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free, 1992.

Fuller, J. F. C. *The Reformation of War*. London: Hutchinson, 1923.

Gaddis, John. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Dongfang Hou, and Todd Sandler. "How do the Factors Determining Terrorist Groups' Longevity Differ from those Affecting Their Success?" *European Journal of Political Economy* 65 (Dec. 2020).

Galea, Sandro, David Vlahov, Heidi Resnick, Jennifer Ahern, Ezra Susser, Joel Gold, Michael Bucuvalas, and Dean Kilpatrick. "Trends of Probable Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in New York City after the September 11 Terrorist Attacks." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 158, no. 6 (2003): 514-524.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Gambetta, Diego. *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2005.

Gambhir, Harleen. *The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS's Information Warfare.* Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2016. Accessed Jan. 3, 2020. Http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20The%20Virtual%20Caliphate%20Gambhir%202016.pdf.

Gandhi, Jennifer. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Wonik Kim. "Coopting Workers under Dictatorship." *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (2010): 646-658.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279-1301.

Ganguly, Dilip. "Sri Lankan Bomber Identified as Female, Extremist." *Associated Press*, Jan. 6, 2000.

Ganguly, Rajat. "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 5 (2004): 903-917.

Gannon, James. *Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination: The History Neocons Neglected*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.

Ganor, Boaz. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research* 3 (2002): 287-304.

Gardeazabal, Javier. "Terrorism, Economic Downturns and Elections." *European Security Economics*, Policy Briefing 4, September 2011.

Garfin, Dana. "How the Pain of 9/11 Still Stays with a Generation." *The Conversation*. Last modified Sep. 11, 2017. Https://theconversation.com/how-the-pain-of-9-11-still-stays-with-a-generation-64725.

Gargan, Edward. "Suicide Bomber Kills President of Sri Lanka." *New York Times*, May 2, 1993.

Gartner, Scott, and Randolph Siverson. "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (1996): 4-15.

Gause, F. Gregory. "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (2005): 62-76.

———. *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994.

Gawrychl, George. "T. E. Lawrence and the Art of War in the Twenty-First Century." *Command Posts: A Focus on Military History, Policy, and Fiction*. July 13, 2011. Accessed Apr. 7, 2014. Http://www.commandposts.com/2011/07/t-e-lawrence-and-the-art-of-war-in-the-twenty-first-century/.

Gazit, Shlomo. "Israel." In *Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, edited by Yonah Alexander. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2002.

Gebre, Samuel. "Ethiopia's Amhara Seizes Disputed Territory amid Tigray War," *Bloomberg*, Mar. 16, 2021. Https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-16/ethiopia-s-amhara-seize-disputed-territory-amid-tigray-conflict?leadSource=uverify%20wall.

Gebregziabher, Mulugeta, Fasika Amdeselassie, Reiye Esayas, Zerihun Abebe, Hannah Silvia, Abeba Teklehaimanot, Jeffrey Korte, John Pearce, and James Cochran. "Geographical Distribution of the Health Crisis of War in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia," *BMJ Global Health* 7 (2022): 1-11. Https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/7/4/e008475.full.pdf.

Gedamu, Yohannes. "The New Political Party of Ethiopia's Abiy Holds Much Promise but Faces Significant Hurdles," *Quartz Africa*, Dec. 13, 2019. Https://qz.com/africa/1767933/ethiopia-prime-minister-abiys-prosperity-party-faces-big-hurdles/.

———. "Opinion: What Ethiopia Needs is Less, not More, Ethno-nationalism," *Tadias*, May 10, 2021. Http://www.tadias.com/05/10/2021/opinion-what-ethiopia-needs-is-less-not-more-ethno-nationalism/.

Geddes, Barbara. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115-144.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic, 2000.

Gelardi, Julia. *Born to Rule: Five Reigning Consorts, Granddaughters of Queen Victoria*. New York: St. Martin's, 2005.

Geller, Daniel, and J. David Singer. *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998.

Gelvin, James. "Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 4 (2008): 597-600.

Gentry, John. "Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars." *Intelligence and National Security* 25, no. 1 (2010): 50-75.

George, Alexander. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison." In *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, edited by Paul Gordon Lauren. New York: Macmillan, 1979.

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005.

George, Alexander, and Timothy McKeown. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." In *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations: A Research Annual*, Vol. 2. Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1986.

Georghallides, G. S. *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985.

Geospatial Information Section. *Map of Sri Lanka*. Jan. 2007, No. 4172 Rev. 2. Https://www.refworld.org/docid/460a6b9f2.html.

Gerlach, Luther, and Virginia Hine. *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.

Geshkoff, Theodore. *Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe*. New York: Columbia University, 1940.

Gilbert, Martin. *First World War: A Complete History*. New York: Rosetta, 2014.

———. *Israel: A History*. New York: William Morrow, 1998.

Gilles, Martin. "War in Algeria: The French Experience." *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2005): 51-57.

Gillespie, Joan. *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*. New York: Praeger, 1960.

Gilpin, Robert. *Change and War in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Girma, Zelalem. "Ethiopia in Democratic, Transformational Leadership," *Ethiopian Herald*, Apr. 3, 2018. Https://web.archive.org/web/20180506104159/http://www.ethpress.gov.et/herald/index.php/society/item/11415-ethiopia-in-democratic-transformational-leadership.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan. "The Blowback of Repression and the Dynamics of North African Radicalization." *International Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2009): 1015-1029.

Glanz, James. "Hostage is Freed after Philippine Troops are Withdrawn from Iraq." *New York Times*, July 21, 2004.

———. "In Jordanian Case, Hints of Iraq Jihad Networks." *New York Times*, July 29, 2005.

Glenny, Misha. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*. London: Penguin, 1992.

"Global Opinion: The Spread of Anti-Americanism." *Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes and Trends*. Jan. 24, 2005. Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2005/01/24/global-opinion-the-spread-of-anti-americanism/.

Golby, Jim, and Peter Feaver. "It Matters If Americans Call Afghanistan a Defeat." *Atlantic*. Last modified Aug. 17, 2019. Https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/will-americans-call-afghanistan-victory/596188/.

Goldsmith, Christopher. "The British Embassy in Paris and the Algerian War: An Uncomfortable Partner?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 2 (June 2002): 159-171.

Goldstein, Joshua. *The Real Price of War: How You Pay for the War on Terror*. New York: New York University, 2004.

Goldstein, Joshua, and Jon Pevehouse. *International Relations*. Tenth ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2012.

Goldstone, Jack. "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 139-187.

Golovin, Nikolai. *The Russian Army in the World War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1931.

Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2013.

Goodwin, Jeff. "Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements." In *The Handbook of Political Sociology,* edited by Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks, and Mildred Schwartz. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Goodwin, Jeff, and Theda Skocpol. "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World." *Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (1989): 489-509.

Goonetileke, H. A. I. "July 1983 and the National Question in Sri Lanka: A Bibliographical Guide." *Race and Class* 26, no. 1 (1984): 159-193.

Gougeon, François-Marie. "The Challe Plan: Vain yet Indispensable Victor." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 16, no. 3 (Aug. 2006): 293-316.

Gough, Allison. "Ku Klux Klan Terror." In *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism,* edited by Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.

"Govt: Ethiopia's GDP to Expand by 6.6% in 2022," *Ethiopian Monitor*, May 10, 2022. Https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2022/05/10/govt-ethiopias-gdp-to-expand-by-6-6-in-2022/.

Granatstein, J. L. *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Grandmaison, Olivier Le Cour. "Torture in Algeria: Past Acts That Haunt France: Liberty, Equality and Colony." *Le Monde diplomatique* (June 2021). Https://mondediplo.com/2001/06.

GRAPO. "Communiqué on the Assassination of Dr José Ramón in Zaragoza on 27 March 1990." In *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, edited by Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky. London: Frank Cass, 1992.

Gray, Colin. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005.

———. "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Win. 2007): 35-57.

———. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1999.

"Greek White Book, Supplementary Diplomatic Documents, 1913-1917, Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Greek Government; Dealing with the Greco-Serbian Treaty and the Germano-Bulgarian Invasion of Macedonia, and Containing Telegrams Exchanged." Translated by Theodore Ion and Carroll Brown. New York: American Hellenic Society/Oxford University Press, 1919.

Green, Matthew. "How 9/11 Changed America: Four Major Lasting Impacts." *KQED*. Last modified Sep. 8, 2017. Https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/14066/13-years-later-four-major-lasting-impacts-of-911.

Greene, Jack. "Greece Campaign." In *Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History*, edited by David Zabecki. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2015.

Greenfield, Richard. *Ethiopia: A New Political History*. London: Pall Mall, 1965.

Greenhill, Brian. "The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 1 (2010): 127-145.

Greenwald, Glenn. "Committing War Crimes for the 'Right Reasons.'" *Salon.com*. Last modified Dec. 18, 2008. Accessed Mar. 7, 2019. Https://www.salon.com/2008/12/17/douthat/.

Grivas, George. *General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Alexander Pallis. New York: Praeger, 1965.

———. *Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle*. London: Longmans, Green, 1964.

———. *The Memoirs of George Grivas*. Translated by Charles Foley. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Gross, Michael. *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Gruen, Madeleine. "Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web." In *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes: Vol. 2. Training*, edited by James Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. 11-22.

Guan, Ang Cheng. *Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation*. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Guevara, Che. *Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Monthly Review, 1961.

Guillen, Abraham. *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen*. New York: Morrow, 1973.

Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Columbia University, 2002.

———. "Intelligence Failure Exposed by Tamil Tiger Airport Attack." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 13, no. 9 (Sep. 2001): 14-17.

———. "Internationalisation of the Tamil Conflict (and its Implications)." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 20 (1997): 119-152.

———. "The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism." *Frontline* 17, no. 3 (Feb. 5-8): 2000.

———. *War and Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-accord Report from Jaffna*. Colombo, SL: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987.

Gunawardena, Arjuna. "Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat?" In *Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?* Edited by Yoram Schweitzer. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2006. 81-90.

Gurr, Ted. "A Causal Model of Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices." *American Political Science Review* 62 (1969): 1104-1124.

———. "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict." In *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research*, edited by Ted Gurr. New York: Free, 1980. 238-298.

———. "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 1990. 86-102.

———. "Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails." In *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, edited by Charles Kegley. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. 202-215.

———. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1970.

Gurwitch, Robin, Betty Pfefferbaum, and Michael Leftwich. "The Impact of Terrorism on Children: Considerations for a New Era." *Journal of Trauma Practice* 1, nos. 3-4 (2002): 101-124.

Gutmann, David. "Killers and Consumers: The Terrorist and His Audience." *Social Research* 46 (1979): 516-526.

Gvineria, Gaga. "How Does Terrorism End?" In *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, edited by Paul Davis and Kim Cragin. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 257-291.

Hack, Karl. *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1968*. Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2001.

———. "Everyone Lived in Fear: Malaya and the British Way of Counter-insurgency." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, nos. 4-5 (2012): 671-699.

Hackett, John. *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus from the Coming of the Apostles Paul and Barnabas to the Commencement of the British Occupation (A.D. 45-A.D. 1878) Together with Some Account of the Latin and Other Churches Existing in the Island*. London: Methuen, 1901.

Hacker, Frederick. *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time*. New York: Norton, 1976.

Hagmann, Tobias. "Ethiopia's Civil War: Five Reasons why History won't Repeat Itself," *Conversation*, Nov. 21, 2021. Https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-civil-war-five-reasons-why-history-wont-repeat-itself-172158.

Hailu, Fassil. "Hawks and Doves: The Great Divide over the War in Tigray," *Ethiopia Insight*, Jan. 11, 2021. Https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/11/hawks-and-doves-the-great-divide-over-the-war-in-tigray/.

———. "Reasons the International Community is Unable to End the War in Tigray," *Ethiopia Insight*, Apr. 21, 2021. Https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/04/21/reasons-the-international-community-is-unable-to-end-the-war-in-tigray/.

Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Halliday, Fred. "The Ceylonese Insurrection." *New Left Review* 69 (Oct. 1971): 55-91.

Hamby, Joel. "Civil-Military Operations Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Aut. 2002): 54-61. Https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483714.pdf.

Hamilton, Donald. *The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

Hamilton, Lawrence, and James Hamilton. "Dynamics of Terrorism." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (Mar. 1983): 39-54.

Hammes, Thomas. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2006.

Hammond, Jenny. *Fire from the Ashes: A Chronicle of the Revolution in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1998.

Hansler, Jennifer. "Blinken: Acts of 'Ethnic Cleansing' Committed in Western Tigray," *CNN*, Mar. 10, 2021. Https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/10/politics/blinken-tigray-ethnic-cleansing/index.html.
Https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/africa/ethiopia-tigray-dengelat-massacre-intl/index.html.

Harbeson, John. *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988.

Harmon, Christopher. *Terrorism Today*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Harrison, Alexander. *Challenging De Gaulle: The O.A.S and the Counter-Revolution in Algeria, 1954–1962*. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Harrison, Frances. "Journalists Failed to Tell the Story of War Crimes in Sri Lanka." *Journalism.co.uk*. Last modified May17, 2012. Https://www.journalism.co.uk/news-commentary/frances-harrison-sri-lanka-journalists-failed-to-tell-the-story-of-war-crimes/s6/a549285/.

———. *Still Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka's Hidden War*. London: Portobello, 2012b.

———. "Tiger Rebels 'Dragoon Tamil Teenagers.'" *BBC News: South Asia*. Last modified Feb. 1, 2002. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1795443.stm.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. *Strategy*. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967.

———. *Thoughts on War*. London: Faber & Faber, 1944.

Hartung, William. "Failure in Afghanistan, Over 40 Years in the Making." *Forbes Online*. Last modified August 18, 2021. Https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2021/08/18/failure-in-afghanistan-over-40-years-in-the-making/?sh=65590a31c437.

———. "Profits of War: Corporate Beneficiaries of the Post-9/11 Pentagon Spending Surge." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified Sep. 13, 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/ProfitsOfWar.

Hashim, Ahmed. *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 2013.

Hashimoto, Chikara. *The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2017.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. "Blocking Enosis: Britain and the Cyprus Question, March-December 1956." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 19, no. 2 (1991): 247-263.

———. *Greece and the Cold War: Front Line State, 1952-1967*. New York: Routledge, 2006

Hay, Alastair. *The Chemical Scythe: Lessons of 2, 4, 5-T, and Dioxin*. New York: Plenum, 1982.

Heath, Ian. *Byzantine Armies AD 1118–1461*. Oxford, UK: Osprey 2000.

Heberle, Rudolf. *From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1945.

Hecht, Gabrielle. *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1998.

Hedström, Peter, and Richard Swedberg. *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998.

Heggoy, Alf. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1972.

Held, Virginia. "Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals." In *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, edited by Raymond Frey and Christopher Morris. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1991.

Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar. *The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity*. Stuttgart, GE: Steiner, 1994.

Helmreich, Paul. *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1974.

Helmus, Todd. "Why and How Some People Become Terrorists." In *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, edited by Paul Davis and Kim Cragin. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009.

Henze, Paul. *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

———. *Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985.

Herb, Jeremy. "As White House Defers to Pentagon, Congress Mulls New Checks on Military Power." *CNN Politics*. Last modified June 21, 2017. Accessed June 21, 2019. Https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/21/politics/congress-trump-war-limits/index.html.

Herb, Jeremy, and Deirdre Walsh. "House Panel Votes to Repeal War Authorization for Fight against ISIS and al Qaeda." *CNN Politics*. Last modified June 29, 2017. Accessed June 21, 2019. Https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/house-panel-repeal-war-authorization-isis-al-qaeda/index.html.

Herbst, Philip. *Talking Terrorism: A Dictionary of the Loaded Language of Political Violence*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003.

Herring, George. *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986.

Hess, Gary. *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015.

Hess, Robert. *Ethiopia: The Modernisation of Ethiopia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1970.

Heuser, Beatrice. *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Heyman, Edward. "The Diffusion of Transnational Terrorism." In *Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management*," edited by Richard Shulz and Stephen Sloan. New York: Pergamon, 1980. 190-244.

Heyman, Edward, and Edward Mickolus. "Observations on Why Violence Spreads." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1980): 299-305.

Hilderbrand, Robert. *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1990.

Hill, George. *A History of Cyprus: The Ottoman Province; the British Colony, 1571-1948, Volume 4.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1952.

Hill, John. "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan." *Journal of Modern History* 64, no. 3 (1992): 500-524.

Hirschon, Renee. *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*. New York: Berghahn, 2003.

"History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement." *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India*. Last updated Aug. 22, 2012. Https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement.

Hitchens, Christopher. *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*. New York: Noonday, 1989.

Hobbes, Thomas. "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind." In *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, edited by Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999.

Hobson, John. *Imperialism: A Study*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1965.

Hodges, Donald. *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen*. Edited by Abraham Guillen. New York: William Morrow, 1973.

Hodgson, Godfrey. *Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House*. New Haven: Yale University, 2006.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University, 1998.

———. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University, 2006.

———. "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 303-316.

———. "Terrorism Trends and Prospects." In *Countering the New Terrorism*, edited by Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

———. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities." In *Technology and Terrorism*, edited by Paul Wilkinson. London, Frank Cass, 1993. 1-11.

Hoffman, Bruce, and Gordon McCormick. "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 4 (Jul. -Aug. 2004): 243-281.

Hoffman, Bruce, William Rosenau, Andrew Curiel, and Doron Zimmermann. "The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich." Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.

Hofmann, Tessa, Matthias Bjørnlund, and Vasileios Meichanetsidis. *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912-1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*. New York: Aristide Caratzas, 2011.

Hogan, Michael. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1987.

Holland, Robert. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.

———. *European Decolonization 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Macmillan International, 1985.

Holland, Robert, and Diana Markides. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850–1960*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2006.

Holsti, Kalevi. "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Figures on Procedure." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10, no. 3 (Sep. 1966): 272-296.

Holsti, Ole, and James Rosenau. "The Meaning of Vietnam: Belief Systems of American Leaders." *International Journal* 32, no. 3, (Sum. 1977): 452-474.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. "The Rise of Complex Terrorism." In *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, edited by Russell Howard and James Forest. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Hondros, John. *Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-44*. New York: Pella, 1983.

Hoole, Rajan. *The Broken Palmyra: the Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Inside Account*. Claremont, CA: Sri Lanka Studies Institute, 1990.

———. "The 1990s: The Culture of Untruth and a Perilous Vacuum, Part 2." *Colombo Telegraph*." Last modified Apr. 11, 2014.

Hoole, Rajan, and Rajani Thiranagama. *Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power: Myths, Decadence and Murder*. Colombo, SL: University Teachers for Human Rights, 2001.

Hopkins, T. C. *Confrontation at Lepanto: Christendom vs. Islam*. New York: Forge, 2006.

Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York: Viking, 1977.

Horowitz, Michael. "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism." *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (2010): 33-64.

Horowitz, Michael, Evan Perkoski, and Philip Potter. "Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence." *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (Win. 2018): 139-171.

Horowitz, Michael, and Philip Potter. "Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 199-225.

Horton, Alex. "The Pentagon Struggles to Provide Accurate Numbers for Deployed Troops." *Washington Post*, Nov. 27, 2017.

Horton, George. *The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953.

Horton, Michael. "Tigray Defense Forces Resist Ethiopian Army Offensive as Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethnic Militias Enter the Fray." *Jamestown Foundation* 19, no. 10 (May 24, 2021).

Hosler, John. *Siege of Acre, 1189-1191: Saladin, Richard the Lionheart, and the Battle That Decided the Third Crusade*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2018.

Hosmer, Stephen. *Operations against Enemy Leaders.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

Houreld, Katharine. "Health Official Alleges 'Sexual Slavery' in Tigray," *Reuters*, Apr. 15, 2021. Https://www.reuters.com/world/special-report-health-official-alleges-sexual-slavery-tigray-women-blame-2021-04-15/.

Howard, Philip, and Muzammil Hussain. "The Role of Digital Media." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (July 2011): 35-48.

Howard, Russell. "The New Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction." In *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, edited by Russell Howard and James Forest. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Howarth, David. *Greek Adventure: Lord Byron and other Eccentrics in the War of Independence*. New York: Atheneum, 1976.

Hoyt, Timothy. "Military Force." In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, edited by Audrey Cronin and James Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004. 162-185.

Hudson, Rex. *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists.* Guilford, CT: Lyons, 2002.

Huggins, Martha. *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University, 1998.

Hultman, Lisa. "The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of RENAMO Violence." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no. 4 (2009): 821-834.

Human Rights Watch. "Sri Lanka: Political Killings during the Ceasefire." Last modified Aug. 7, 2003. Http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/srilanka080603.htm.

Humi, Peter, Richard Blystone, and Nic Robertson. "Irate Kurds Protest across Europe over Ocalan's Arrest." *CNN.com*. Last modified Feb. 16, 1999. Accessed Aug. 8, 2019, Http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9902/16/ocalan.protest.01/.

Hunt, Richard. *Pacification*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.

Huntington, Samuel. "The Age of Muslim Wars." *Newsweek*, Dec. 17, 2001, 42-48.

———. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Sum. 1993): 22-49.

Hurewitz, J. C. *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*. Translated by J. C. Hurewitz. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1975.

Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962*. Stanford, CA: Hoover, 1978.

Hyam, Ronald. *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Hyam, Ronald, and Roger Louis. *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964: Economics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth, Series A, Volume IV*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office/Institute for Commonwealth Studies, 2000.

Hymans, Jacques. "North Korea's Nuclear Neurosis." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 63, no. 3 (May 2007): 44-74.

Iatrides, John. *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*. Hanover: University of New England, 1981.

Idrizi, Idrit. "Enver Hoxha's Last Purge: Inside the Ruling Circle of Communist Albania (1981-1983)." *East European Politics and Societies* 36, no. 4 (2022): 1091-1110.

Ienaga, Saburo. "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education." *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Win. 1993-94): 113-133.

"In Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Has Won the Battle but not the War," *Economist*, Dec. 1, 2020. Https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/12/01/in-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-has-won-the-battle-but-not-the-war.

Inalcik, Halil. "The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23/24 (1969-1970): 229-249.

Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1997.

"Inside a Military Base in Ethiopia's Tigray: Soldiers Decry Betrayal by Former Comrades," *Reuters*, Dec. 17, 2020. Https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-attack-idUSKBN28R1IE.

International Crisis Group. "Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, Asia Report No. 209, July 18, 2011." Https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/209-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka-harder-than-ever.pdf.

———. "Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process: Asia Report No. 124, Nov. 28, 2006." Https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-failure-peace-process.

———. "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186," Feb. 23, 2010.

———. "War Crimes in Sri Lanka: Asia Report No. 191, May 17, 2010b." Https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/191-war-crimes-in-sri-lanka.pdf.

———. "Watch List 2021." Last updated Jan. 29, 2021. Https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/watch-list-2021.

"The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S. Policy and Methods." *National Security Archive*. Last modified July 13, 2004. Accessed July 8, 2019. Https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/.

"Interview with Chairman Gonzalo." *El Diario* (Peru), Jul. 1988. Http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/dawson/data/Interview_with_Chairman_Gonzalo.pdf.

"Interview with Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29, no. 1 (Win. 2005): 5-12.

Ions, Edmund. *Dissent in America: The Constraints on Foreign Policy, Conflict Studies, no. 18*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1971.

Isacoff, Jonathan. *Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry.* Lanham, MD : Lexington, 2006.

Ishikawa, Hiroki. "Changes in the Military System during the Gondar Period (1632-1769): Their Influence on the Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty." *Annales d'Éthiopie* 18, no. 1 (2002): 215-229.

Jackson, Brian, John Baker, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio Trujillo and Peter Chalk. *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005.

Jackson, Robert. *The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966*. London: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2008.

Jaeger, David, Esteban Klor, Sami Miaari, and M. Daniele Paserman. "Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 3 (2015): 528-549.

Jain, B. K. "The Problem of Citizenship Rights of Persons of Indian Origin in Ceylon." *Indian Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1963): 65-78.

Jalata, Asafa. *Phases of Terrorism in the Age of Globalization: From Christopher Columbus to Osama Bin Laden*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

James, Lawrence. *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*. London: Abacus, 1998.

Jane, Fred. *Imperial Russian Navy: Its Past, Present, and Future*. London: Thacker, 1904.

Janis, Irving. "Group Identification under Conditions of External Danger." In *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory,* edited by Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander. New York: Harper

and Row, 1968. 80-90.

———. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983.

———. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

Janis, Irving, and Leon Mann. *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*. New York: Free, 1977.

Jasse, Richard. "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism." *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (Win. 1991): 140-156.

Jayasekara, Shanaka. "The Threats Posed by Aviation Assets in the Possession of Terrorist Groups and Proto-States." In T*he Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in South Asia, Proceedings of the First Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) October 19-21, 2005, Denpensar, Bali, Indonesia, IDA Paper P-4096*, edited by John Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig, Satu Limaye, and Caroline Ziemke. Alexandia, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2006. III64 - III66.

Jeffery, Keith. ———. *The Secret History of MI6*. New York: Penguin, 2010.

Jefferys, Kevin. *Labour Forces: From Ernie Bevin to Gordon Brown*. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002.

Jeganathan, Pradeep. "'Violence' as an Analytical Problem: Sri Lankanist Anthropology after July'83." *Nethra: Journal of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies* 2, no. 4 (1998): 7-47.

Jenkins, Brian. "The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems." In *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, edited by Yonah Alexander and John Gleason. New York: Pergamon, 1981. 3-10.

Jenks, Edward. *The Government of the British Empire*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1918.

Jenne, Erin. "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State." In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003.

Jennings, Ivor. *The Constitution of Ceylon*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1949. Https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.275889/mode/2up.

Jensen, Peter. "The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 4 (Nov. 1979): 553-565.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976.

———. "Systems Effects." In *Strategy and Choice*, edited by Richard Zeckhauser. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991.

Jesman, Czeslaw. "Egyptian Invasion of Ethiopia." *African Affairs* 58, no. 230 (1959): 75-81.

Jeyaraj, D. B. S. "The Incident that Rocked Ceylon 55 Years Ago: The Assassination of Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranai." *Daily Mirror Online*. Last modified Sep. 16, 2014. Https://www.dailymirror.lk/53002/the-incident-that-rocked-ceylon-55-years-ago-the-assassination-of-prime-minister-swrd-bandaranaike.

Joes, Anthony. *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2004.

"Joint Investigation into September 11th: Fifth Public Hearing, Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing: Testimony of Cofer Black, September 26, 2002." *Federation of American Scientists: Intelligence Research Program.* Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/092602black.html.

Johnsen, William. *The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor*. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 2016.

Johnson, Chalmers. *Autopsy on People's War*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1973.

———. *Revolutionary Change*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1982.

Johnson, Jennifer. *The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Health Care, and Humanitarianism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2015.

Jones, Seth, and Martin Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008.

Jordán, Javier, and Nicola Horsburgh. "Politics vs Terrorism: The Madrid Case." In *Playing Politics with Terrorism*, edited by George Kassimeris. London: Hurst, 2007. 203-219.

Jordan, Jenna. "Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, Mar. 17, 2004.

Jordan, Michael. Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats." *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 4, 2002.

Joshi, Charu Lata. "Ultimate Sacrifice." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 163, no. 22 (June 2000).

Jost, Patrick, and Harjit Singh Sandhu. "The Hawala Alternative: Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering." *Interpol* (Dec. 16, 2006).

Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2001.

Jupp, James. "The Constitutional System in Ceylon." *Pacific Affairs* 43, no. 1 (Spr. 1970): 73-83.

Jureidni, Paul. *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954–1962*. Washington, DC: American University, 1963.

Jureidni, Paul, Norman La Charite, Bert Cooper, and William Lybrand. *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume I: 1933-1962*. Revised edition, edited by Paul Tompkins, Jr. Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013.

Kagan, Frederick. "What Stalemate Means in Ukraine and Why It Matters." *Institute for the Study of War*, May 22, 2022. Https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-stalemate-means-ukraine-and-why-it-matters.

Kagan, Donald, and Frederick Kagan. *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today*. New York: St. Martin's, 2000.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (Mar. 1979): 263-292.

Kalah, G., M. Gabbay, M. Hafez, and Z. Kelly. "Networks of Cooperation: Rebel Alliances in Fragmented Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 9 (2019): 2071-2097.

Kaldellis, Anthony. *Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium, 955 A.D. to the First Crusade*. NY: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1999.

———. "New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era Manifesto Challenge: Advancing Global Citizenship." Paper presented at the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, London, UK, Oct. 23, 2006.

Kalyvas, Stathis. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

———. "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War." *Journal of Ethics* 8, no. 1 (2004): 97-38.

Kalyvas, Stathis, and Matthew Kocher. "How 'Free' is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem." *World Politics* 59, no. 2 (2007): 177-216.

Kant, Immanuel. "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective." In *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld and translated by David Colclasure. New Haven: Yale University, 2006.

Kapferer, Bruce. *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia.* New York: Berghahn, 2011.

Kaplan, Jeffrey. "Right Wing Violence in North America." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7, no. 1 (1995): 44-95.

Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam: A History*. New York: Viking, 1983.

Karpat, Kemal. "The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire." In *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, edited by William Polk and Richard Chambers. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968.

Karyos, Andreas. "The Acceleration of History and Decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus, 1945–1959." In *Acceleration of History: War, Conflicts and Politics*, edited by Alexios Alecou. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2016. 113-132.

———. "The Armed Struggle against British Colonial Rule in Cyprus, 1955-1959: EOKA's Strategic Mentality and Tactics." In *The Creation of New States and the Collapse of Old Empires in the XX Century: 70 Years of Israel as an Independent State 1948 – 2018, Jerusalem, September 2-7, 2018*, edited by Dani Asher and Benny Michelsohn. Israeli Commission of Military History/MDD, 2021. 268-273. Https://www.academia.edu/40362966/The_Armed_Struggle_against_British_Colonial_Rule_in_Cyprus_1955_1959_EOKA_s_Strategic_Mentality_and_Tactics.

Kassimeris, George. "Europe's Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975–2000." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 2 (Sum. 2001): 67-84.

———. *Inside Greek Terrorism*. London: Hurst, 2013.

Kasuka, Bridgette. *Prominent African Leaders since Independence*. Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2013.

Katersky, Aaron. "The 9/11 toll still grows: More than 16,000 Ground Zero responders who got sick found eligible for awards." *ABC News*. Last modified Sep. 18, 2018. Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://abcnews.go.com/US/911-toll-growsl-16000-ground-responders-sick-found/story?id=57669657.

Katrib, Jean-Pierre. "Understanding Jihadists in their Own Words." Accessed Sep. 1, 2019. Http://www.maisondufutur.org/documents/pdf_manager/Jean-Pierre-Katrib.pdf.

Katsourides, Yiannos. "The National Question in Cyprus and the Cypriot Communist Left in the Era of British Colonialism (1922-59)." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern studies* 16, no. 4 (2014): 474-501.

———. "The Rise of Greek Cypriot Nationalism to Hegemony: Agency, Particularities, and Polarization." In *Cypriot Nationalisms in Context*, edited by Thekla Kyritsi and Nikos Christofis. Cham, Switz.: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2018. 25-46.

Katzenbach, Edward. "Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-tung." In *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him*—FMFRP 12-25, edited by T. N. Greene. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1962. 11-21. Accessed Aug. 13, 2019. Https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-25%20%20The%20Guerrilla%20and%20How%20to%20Fight%20Him.pdf.

Katzenbach, Edward, and Gene Hanrahan. "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung." *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (Sep. 1955): 321-340.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran." In *Iran: Outlaw, Outcast or Normal Country?* edited by Albert Benliot. Huntington, New York: Nova Science, 2001.

Kaufman, Stuart. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001.

———. "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence." *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 45-86.

Kaunert, Christian, and Marina Della Giovanna. "Post-9/11 EU Counter-terrorist Financing Cooperation: Differentiating Supranational Policy Entrepreneurship by the Commission and the Council Secretariat." *European Security* 19, no. 2 (2010): 275-295.

Kearney, Robert. "Educational Expansion and Political Volatility in Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection." *Asian Survey* 15, no. 9 (Sep. 1975): 727-744.

Kebbede, Girma. *The State and Development in Ethiopia*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1992.

Keefe, Eugene, William Cover, William Giloane, James Moore, Suzanne Teleki, and Eston White. *Area Handbook for Cyprus*. Washington, DC: American University, 1971.

Keegan, John. *The First World War*. New York: Knopf, 1998.

———. *A History of Warfare*. New York: Vintage, 1994.

Kellen, Konrad. "Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 43-58.

———. *On Terrorists and Terrorism*. N-1942-RC. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1982.

———. *Terrorists—What are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions*, N-1300-SL. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1979.

Keller, Susan. "Judge Rules Provisions in Patriot Act to Be Illegal." *New York Times*, Sep. 27, 2007.

Kelling, George. *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990.

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000.* New York: Random, 1987.

———. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*. New York: Vintage, 1989.

———. *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945: Eight Studies*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983.

Kenney, Michael. *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2007.

Kent, John. *Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East*. London: HMSO, 1998.

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984.

———. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989.

Keohane, Robert, and Judith Goldstein. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993.

Khan, Mansoor. "Do the Advantages of the Weberian Bureaucracy Outweigh Its Disadvantages?" *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 66, no. 4 (Dec. 2020): 592-595.

Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1982.

Khoury, Philip. *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987.

Kibbe, Jennifer. "The Rise of Shadow Warriors." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (Mar. -Apr. 2004): 102-115.

Kiernan, Ben. *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2007.

Kilcullen, David. "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency." *Joint Information Operations Center* (Sum. 2006): 29-35. Accessed Mar. 2, 2016. Http://www.au.af.mil/info ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf.

Kimball, Warren. *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2019.

Kindleberger, Charles. *Historical Economics: Art or Science?* Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1990.

Kinsella, David. "No Rest for Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (Aug. 2005): 453-458.

Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2008.

Kıralp, Şevki. *A History of Resentment and Violence: The Fight for Status and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus*. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University, 2016.

Kiras, James. "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency." In *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, edited by John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin Gray. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 185-207.

Kirk, Michael, dir. *Frontline: Top Secret America – 9/11 to the Boston Bombings*. Boston, MA: Frontline Production with Kirk Documentary Group, 2011. Accessed June 20, 2019. Https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-top-secret-america-911-boston/.

Kirshner, Jonathan. "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions." *Security Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spr. 1997): 32-64.

Kissinger, Henry. "The Viet Nam Negotiations." *Foreign Affairs* 47, no. 2 (Jan. 1969): 211-234.

Kiste, John van der. *Kings of the Hellenes: The Greek Kings, 1863-1974.* Dover, NH: Alan Sutton, 1994.

Kitromilides, Paschalis. *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*. Edinburgh,

Kittner, Cristiana. "The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 3 (2007): 307-329.

Klapsis, Antonis. "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt." *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 24/25 (2008-2009): 127-140.

———. "EOKA and Anglo-Greek Relations: The View from Athens." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 48, no. 3 (2020): 547-564.

———. "The Strategic Importance of Cyprus and the Prospect of Union with Greece." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 5 (2013): 765-782.

Klocek, Jason. "Seek and You Shall Find Religious Intelligence in British Counter-Insurgency Operations." *St. Antony's International Review* 12, no. 1 (May 2016): 16-37.

Klotz, Audie. *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018.

Knauss, Peter, and D. A. Strickland. "Political Disintegration and Latent Terror." In *The Politics of Terrorism*, edited by Michael Stohl. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983.

Knorr, Klaus. *The War Potential of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1956.

Knutson, Jeanne. "Toward a United States Policy on Terrorism." *Political Psychology* 5, no. 2 (1984): 287-294.

Kodikara, Shelton. "The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka: The JVP, the Indian Troops, and Tamil Politics." *Asian Survey* 29, no. 7 (July 1989): 716-724.

Koenig, David. "How 9/11 Changed Air Travel: More Security, Less Privacy." *AP News*. Last modified Sep. 6, 2021. Https://apnews.com/article/how-sept-11-changed-flying-1ce4dc4282fb47a34c0b61ae09a024f4.

Kohut, Heinz. *The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut, 1950-1978*. New York: International Universities, 1978.

———. "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage." *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 27, no. 1 (1972): 360-400.

Kollman, Kelly. "European Institutions, Transnational Networks and National Same-sex Unions Policy: When Soft Law Hits Harder." *Contemporary Politics* 15, no. 1 (2009): 37-53.

Kondis, Basil. *Greece and Albania, 1908-1914*. Thessaloniki, GR: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976.

Kornblum, William, and Carolyn Smith. *Sociology in a Changing World*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage, 2011.

Korteweg, Rem. "Black Holes: On Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness." *Civil Wars* 10, no. 1 (Mar. 2008): 60-71.

Kousoulas, George. *The Price of Freedom; Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953.* Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1953.

Kraemer, Joseph. "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare and the Decolonization Movement." *Polity* 4, no. 2 (1971): 137-158.

Kramer, Mark. "Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict." *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 2 (Mar. 2005): 209-290.

———. "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya." *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Win. 2004-2005): 5-63.

Krasner, Stephen. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." In *International Regimes*, edited by Stephen Krasner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1983. 210-243.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Legal and Practical Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1989.

Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John Ruggie. "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State." *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (1986): 753-775.

Kriger, Norma. *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1992.

Krueger, Alan, and Jitka Maleckova. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 119-144.

Kruglanski, Arie, and Edward Orehek. "The Role of the Quest for Personal Significance in Motivating Terrorism." In *The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression*, edited by J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski, and K. Williams. New York: Psychology Press, 2011. 153-166.

"Kumaratunga Re-elected in Sri Lanka." *BBC News: World: South Asia*. Dec. 22, 1999. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/574780.stm.

Kupchan, Charles, and Clifford Kupchan. "The Promise of Collective Security." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Sum. 1995): 52-61.

Kuriyama, Yoshihiro. "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a "New Left" Group in Japan." *Asian Survey* 13, no. 3 (Mar. 1973): 336-346.

Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara Walter. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence." *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Apr. 2002): 263-296.

———. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Sum. 2006): 49-80.

Kyle, Keith. *Cyprus*. London: Minority Rights Group, 1984.

Kyriakides, Klearchos. "The Island of Cyprus and the Projection of Sea Power by the Royal Navy since 1878." In *Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean: Commerce, Politics and Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries)*, edited by Carmel Vassallo and Michela D'Angelo. Valletta: Malta University, 2007.

Laitin, David. "Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, edited by Helen Milner and Ira Katznelson. New York: Norton, 2002.

Laitin, David, and Said Samatar. *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987.

Lake, David. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (Mar. 1992): 24-37.

———. "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century." *Dialogue–IO* 1, no. 1 (Spr. 2002): 15-29.

Lamb, Robert. "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens." Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, 2008. Https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA479805.pdf.

Lang, Patrick. "The Wahhabist Strain of Islamic Fundamentalism Supports Terrorism." In *Islam: Opposing Viewpoints*, edited by William Dudley. Farmington Hills, Ml: Greenhaven, 2004.

Lapan, Harvey, and Todd Sandler. "Terrorism and Signalling." *European Journal of Political Economy* 9, no. 3 (Aug. 1993): 383-397.

Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987.

———. "The Futility of Terrorism." *Harper's* 252, no. 1510 (Mar. 1976): 99-105.

———. *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998.

———. *Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

———. *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Terrorists from around the World and Throughout the Ages*. New York: Reed, 2004.

Lasswell, Harold, and Abraham Kaplan. *Power and Society*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1950.

Lawrence, Thomas. *The Evolution of a Revolt*. Praetorian, 2011. Https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/CSI/CSIPubs/lawrence.pdf.

———. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Layton, Peter. "How Sri Lanka Won the War: Lessons in Strategy from an Overlooked Victory." *Diplomat*, last modified Apr. 9, 2015. Https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/.

Lebow, Richard. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 1981.

Lee, Barbara. "No Blank Check to President Bush (2001)." In *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, edited by Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar. New York: Grove, 2003. 329-331.

Lee, Dwight. *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1934.

Leebart, Derek. *To Dare and Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda*. New York: Little, Brown, 2006.

Legault, Albert. "La dynamique du terrorisme: le cas des Brigades Rouges." *Revue Etudes Internationales* 14 (1983): 639-681. Quoted in Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines." In *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, edited by Clark McCauley. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1991.

Leites, Nathan. "Understanding the Next Act." *Terrorism* 3, no. 1-2 (1979): 1-46.

Leites, Nathan, and Charles Wolf. *Rebellion and Authority*. Chicago, IL: Markham, 1970.

Lemu, Assefa. "The Rise and Fall of EPRDF, *Aiga Forum*, Dec. 8, 2018. Http://www.aigaforum.com/article2018/The-Rise-and-Fall-of-EPRDF.htm#google_vignette.

"Lend-Lease Act (1941)." *National Archives*. Last modified Feb. 8, 2022. Https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act.

"Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II." *US Department of State: Office of the Historian*. Accessed Mar. 8, 2022. Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease.

Lenin, Vladimir. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*. New York: International, 1939.

———. *State and Revolution*. New York: International, 1932.

Lerner, Daniel. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Free, 1958.

Lesser Ian, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. *Countering the New Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

Levey, Zach. "French–Israeli Relations, 1950-1956: The Strategic Dimension." In *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, edited by Simon Smith. NY: Routledge, 2016. 87-106.

Levine, Donald. "The Battle of Adwa as a "Historic" Event." *Ethiopian Review*, Mar. 3, 2009. Http://ethiopianreview.com/content/2006.

———. *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2014.

Levitt, Matthew. "Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God." In *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas. Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.

———. "Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover between Terrorist Groups." *SAIS Review* 24, no. 1 (Win.-Spr. 2004): 33-48.

Levy, Barry, and Victor Sidel. "Challenges that Terrorism Poses to Public Health." In *Terrorism and Public Health*, edited by Barry Levy and Victor Sidel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Oxford University, 1968.

———. "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Easily Be Mollified." *Atlantic* 266, no. 3 (Sep. 1990): 47-60.

Lewis, David. "Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka: A Successful Model?" In *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, edited by Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. New York: Routledge, 2012. 312-323.

Lewis, Mark. "International Legal Movements against War Crimes, Terrorism, and Genocide, 1919-1948." PhD Dissertation, University of California, 2008.

Lewis, William. "The Decline of Algeria's FLN." *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 2 (Spr. 1966): 161-172.

Li, Quan. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005): 278-297.

Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (2004): 230-258.

Lia, Brynjar, and Åshild Kjøk. *Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993–2000*, FFI Rapport-2001/03789. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2001.

Lia, Brynjar, and Katja Skjolberg. *Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature*, FFI/Rapport. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.

Lia, Brynjar, and Thomas Hegghammer. "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27 (2004): 355-375.

"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)." *South Asia Terrorism Portal* (SATP). Accessed May 5, 2022. Https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/srilanka/liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-ltte.

Library of Congress. "Algeria: A Country Study." In *Collection: Country Studies*, edited by Helen Metz. Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1993. Accessed Feb. 13, 2020. Https://www.loc.gov/collections/country-studies/?fa=location:Algeria.

———. "Cyprus: A Country Study." In *Collection: Country Studies*, edited by Eric Solsten. Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1993.

———. "Ethiopia: A Country Study." In *Collection: Country Studies*, edited by Thomas Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry. Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1991.

———. "Sri Lanka: A Country Study." In *Collection: Country Studies*, edited by Russell Ross and Andrea Savada. Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Federal Research Division, 1988.

Lichbach, Mark. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1995.

Linn, Brian. "The American Way of War Revisited." *Journal of Military History* 66, no. 2 (2002): 501-530.

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1996.

Linz, Juan, and Arturo Valenzuela. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994.

Lipset, Seymour. "Economic Development and Democracy." In *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, edited by Patrick O'Neil and Ronald Rogowski. New York: Norton, 2006. 316-327.

———. "George Washington and the Founding of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 4 (Oct. 1998): 24-38.

Lipson, Charles. "The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 417-455.

"List of Greek Cypriot Organizations which Promoted ENOSIS—Union of Cyprus with Greece—through Armed Assaults, Killings, and Terrorism all over the Island." Accessed Mar. 25, 2022. Https://www.turkishnews.com/cyprus/enosis_organizations.html.

Little, David. "Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1, no. 2 (1995): 284-301.

———. "Religion and Ethnicity." In *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999.

Loganathan, Ketheshwaran. *Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict*. Colombo: SL, CEPRA 1996.

Loizos, Peter. "The Progress of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1970." In *Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair*, edited by John Davis. London: Athlone, 1974. 114-133.

Lomasky, Loren. "The Political Significance of Terrorism." In *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, edited by R. Frey and Christopher Morris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

"A Look Back at Rajiv Gandhi's Assassination." *New Indian Express*. Last modified May 21, 2020. Https://www.newindianexpress.com/galleries/nation/2018/may/21/a-look-back-at-rajiv-gandhis-assassination-101515--1.html.

Lorenz, Konrad. *On Aggression*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1966.

Louis, William. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.

———. *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.

Lowenthal, Mark. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, DC: CQ, 2009.

Lowenthal, Richard. "Unreason and Revolution: Reflections on the Dissociation of Revolutionary Practice from Marxist Theory." RAND P-4119. June 1969. Accessed Aug. 13, 2019. Https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dda4/d9d43100f6ad72298547323cc7f073f5f35c.pdf.

Lowi, Theodore. "Making Democracy safe for the World: National Politics." In *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, edited by James Rosenau. New York: Free, 1967.

Lowry, Rich. "Patriot Hysteria: The Zacarias Moussaoui Protection Act." *National Review Online*. Aug. 28, 2003. Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://web.archive.org/web/20030829062753/http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry082803.asp.

Lucas, Scott. "Suez, the Americans and the Overthrow of Anthony Eden." *LSE Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1987): 227-254.

Lustick, Ian. *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993.

Luttwak, Edward. "Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice." *Harper's* 314 (2007): 33-42.

———. *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University, 2001.

Luukkanen, Arto. *The Religious Policy of the Stalinist State: A Case Study—The Central Standing Commission on Religious Questions, 1929-1938*. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1997.

Lyall, Jason. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (2009): 331-362.

Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson. "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." *International Organization* 63 (Win. 2009): 67-106.

Lyon, Peter. *Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008.

Lyons, Terrence. "Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 1 (Mar. 1996): 121-142.

Maasho, Aaron. "Ethiopia Sells off Seven State Firms, to Offer More," *Reuters*, Mar. 29, 2012. Https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-privatisation-idUSL6E8ET53G20120329.

———. "Ethiopians Mourn Strongman Ruler Meles, Dead at 57," *Reuters*, Aug. 21, 2012. Https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-meles-idUSBRE87K04K20120821.

MacDonald, Bruce, director. *Cyprus: Britain's Grim Legacy*. Granada Television: 1984. Last accessed Apr. 9, 2022. Https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAtDhb47yJo.

Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (Jan. 1975): 175-200.

Macmillan, Harold. *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971

———. *Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

MacMillan, Margaret, and Richard Holbrooke. *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Madden, Thomas. *Venice: A New History*. New York: Viking, 2012.

Magdoff, Harry. *The Age of Imperialism*. New York: Monthly Review, 1969.

Magnus, Ralph, and Eden Naby. *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Shugart. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal." *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (July 1997): 449-471.

Malik, Omar. *Enough of the Definition of Terrorism!* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

Mandel, Robert. *Armies without States: The Privatization of Security*. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2002.

Mandela, Nelson. "An Ideal for Which I Am Prepared to Die: Nelson Mandela April 20 1964." *Guardian*. Apr. 23, 2007.

Mansfield, Edward, and Helen Milner. "The Domestic Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements in Hard Times." *World Trade Review* 17, no. 3 (2018): 371-403.

Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Sum. 1995): 5-38.

"Map of Cyprus, Mediterranean Sea," *Nations Online Project*. Https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cyprus_map2.htm.

Marantzidis, Nikos, and Giorgos Antoniou. "The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941–2002." *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 2 (2004): 223-231.

March, James. *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen*. New York, Free, 2009.

Marcus, Harold. "Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900." In *Colonialism in Africa 1870 - 1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870 - 1914, Volume 1*, edited by Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan. London: Cambridge University, 1969.

Margolin, J. "Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism." In *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by Yonah Alexander and Seymour Finger. New York: John Jay, 1977.

Marighella, Carlos. *For the Liberation of Brazil*. Translated by John Butt and Rosemary Sheed. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1971.

———. *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.* Pattern/Radical Reprint, 2001. Accessed on Jan. 17, 2022. Https://libcom.org/library/minimanual-urban-guerrilla.

Markakis, John. *Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.

———. *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1987.

Markides, Diana. "Britain's 'New Look' Policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding Talks, January 1955-March 1956." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23, no. 3 (1995): 479-502.

Markides, Diana, and G. S. Georghallides. "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931. *Cyprus Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 13, no. 1 (May 1995): 63-81.

Markides, Kyriacos. "Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus." *American Ethnologist* 1, no. 2 (May 1974): 309-330.

Marquis, Donald. "Individual Responsibility and Group Decisions Involving Risk." *Industrial Management Review* 3, no. 2 (1962): 8-23.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. New Haven: Yale University, 2012.

Mascini, Peter. "Can the Violent *Jihad* Do Without Sympathizers?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 343-357.

Mason, David. "Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant." *Public Choice* 86 (1996): 63-83.

Mason, David, and Patrick Fett. "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996): 546-568.

Masters, Jonathan. "Targeted Killings." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Last modified May 23, 2013. Https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/targeted-killings.

Mayer, Jane. "Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' Program." *New Yorker*, Feb. 6, 2005.

———. "The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?" *New Yorker*, May 23, 2011.

Mazzarino, Andrea. "Who Authorized America's Wars? And Why They Never End." *TomDispatch.com*. Last modified July 15, 2021. Https://tomdispatch.com/who-authorized-americas-wars/.

McAdam, Doug. "'Initiator' and 'Spin-off' Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles." In *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, edited by Mark Traugott. Durham, NC: Duke University, 1994. 217-239.

McCauley, Brian. "Hungary and Suez, 1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power." *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, no. 4 (Oct. 1981): 777-800.

McCauley, Clark, and Mary Segal. "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups." In *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: The Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, v. 9, edited by Clyde Hendrick. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987. 231-256.

McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415-433.

McClintock, Michael. *The American Connection*. London: Zed, 1985.

McCormick, Gordon. "Terrorist Decision Making." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6, no. 1 (2003): 473-506.

McCormick, Gordon, and Guillermo Owen. "Security and Coordination in a Clandestine Organization." *Mathematical and Computer Modelling* 31, no. 6-7 (Mar.-Apr. 2000): 175-192.

McCormick, Gordon, Steven Horton, and Lauren Harrison. "Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars." Paper presented to the RAND Corporation Insurgency Board, Aug. 29, 2006.

McCuen, John. *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency*. London: Faber, 1966.

McDowell, Sara, and Maire Braniff. *Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

McElroy, Robert. *Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2014.

McGrath, Joseph. *Groups: Interaction and Performance*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984.

McSweeney, Eoin, and Bethlehem Feleke. "Ethiopia's Nobel Laureate Leader Vows 'Military Confrontation' with Restive Region," *CNN*, Nov. 4, 2020. Https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/04/africa/ethiopia-military-tigray-region-intl/index.html.

McVeigh, Karen. "Peer Pressure Lures more Britons to Syria than ISIS Videos, Study Finds." *Guardian*, Nov. 6, 2014.

Mearsheimer, John. "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics." *International Security* 13, no. 4 (Spr. 1989): 54-89.

———. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Win. 1994-1995): 5-49.

———. *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2018.

Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes." International Security Program Occasional Paper. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Nov. 2002.

———. "The Israel Lobby." *London Review of Books* 28 no. 6 (Mar. 23, 2006): 3-12.

Medlicott, William. *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement, 1878-1880*. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1963.

Melek, Kemal. "The Cyprus Question: A Study in Ethnic Relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, 1955-1967." *Istanbul University Faculty of Communication Journal* 1-2 (1992): 297-316.

Mendel, Jr., Douglas. *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan*. Berkeley, University of California, 1961.

Mendelsohn, Barak. "The Battle for Algeria: Explaining Fratricide among Armed Nonstate Actors." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 44, no. 9 (2021): 776-798.

"Menderes on the London Conference." *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*. Last modified May 27, 2013. Https://web.archive.org/web/20121113125728/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/menderes-%20london_conf.html.

Menon, Ramesh. "LTTE Assassinates Vice-admiral Clancy Fernando, Weakens Sri Lankan Army Offensive." *India Today*. Last modified Aug. 13, 2013. Https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/story/19921215-ltte-assassinates-vice-admiral-clancy-fernando-weakens-army-offensive-767290-2012-12-21.

Merkl, Peter. "West German Left-Wing Terrorism." In *Terrorism in Context*, edited by Martha Crenshaw. University Park, PA: Penn State University, 1995. 160-210.

Merom, Gil. "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War." *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 2 (Win. 1999): 267-288.

———. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. New York: Cambridge University, 2003.

Meselson, Matthew. "The Myth of Chemical Superweapons." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 3 (Apr. 1991): 12-15.

Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, and Randolph Siverson. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89, no. (1995): 841-855.

Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (1999): 791-807.

Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de, and Eric Dickson. "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 364-381.

Metelits, Claire. *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians and Revolutionary Group Behavior*. New York: New York University, 2010.

Metraux, Daniel. "Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo." *Asian Survey* 35, no. 12. (Dec. 1995): 1140-1154.

Metz, Steven, and Raymond Millen. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004.

Michavila, Narciso. "War, Terrorism and Elections: Electoral Impact of the Islamist Terror Attacks on Madrid." *Real Instituto Elcano*, Working Paper 13/2005, June 4, 2005.

Midlarsky, Manus. *The Internationalization of Communal Strife*. London: Routledge, 1992.

Midlarsky, Manus, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida. "Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1980): 262-298.

Milkias, Paulos. "Ethiopia, the TPLF and Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor." *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 13-66.

Milkias, Paulos, and Getachew Metaferia. *Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory against European Colonialism*. New York: Algora, 2005.

Miller, Danny. "A Preliminary Topology of Organizational Learning: Synthesizing the Literature." *Journal of Management* 22, no. 3 (1996): 486-505.

Miller, Susan. *A History of Modern Morocco*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2013.

Milner, Helen. *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1997.

Milton, Giles. *Paradise Lost: Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of a Christian City in the Islamic World*. New York: Basic, 2008.

Mirbagheri, Farid. *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2010.

Mishal, Shaul, and Maoz Rosenthal. "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 4 (2005): 275-293.

Mitchell, Allan. *Nazi Paris: The History of an Occupation, 1940-1944*. New York: Berghahn, 2010.

Mitchell, Christopher. "Cutting Losses: Working Paper 9, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution." Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 1995.

Modelski, George. "International Settlement of Internal War." In *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, edited by James Rosenau. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1964.

———. "The Long Cycle of Global Politics & the Nation-State." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 2 (Apr. 1978).

———. *Principles of World Politics*. New York: Free, 1972.

Moghadam, Assaf. "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of *Dying to Win*." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 8 (2006): 707-729.

Møller, Bjørn. "The Faces of War." In *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*, edited by Håkan Wiberg and Christian Scherrer. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999.

Montgomery, A. E. "The Making of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920." *Historical Journal* 15, no. 4 (Dec. 1972): 775-787.

Montgomery, Bernard. *A History of Warfare*. Cleveland, OH: World, 1968.

Moore, Barrington., Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon, 1966.

Moore, Dale. "Christianity in Ethiopia." *Church History* 5, no. 3 (1936): 271-284.

Moore, Mick. "Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka." *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 3 (July 1993): 593-642.

Morales, Waltraud. "Guerrilla War." In *Encyclopedia of the Developing World: Volume 2: F–N Index*, edited by Thomas Leonard. New York: Routledge, 2006. 728-731.

Morf, Gustav. *Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ*. Toronto: Clarke and Irwin, 1970.

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Random House, 1972.

Morrison, John, and Adam Woog. *Syria*. New York: Chelsea, 2009.

Moulder, Frances. *Japan, China and the Modern World Economy: Toward a Reinterpretation of East Asian Development ca 1600 to ca 1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Mousseau, Michael. "An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation." *International Interactions* 28, no. 2 (Apr.-June 2002): 137-164.

———. "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror." *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Win. 2002-2003): 5-29.

Mueller, John. "The Banality of 'Ethnic War."' *International Security*, 25 (2000): 42-70.

———. *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them*. New York: Free, 2006.

———. "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam: The Statistics of a Deadly Quarrel." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Dec. 1980): 497-519.

———. "Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005): 487-505.

———. "Why Isn't There More Violence?" *Security Studies* 13 (2004): 191-203.

Muhumuza, Rodney. "Ethiopia's Leader Says Atrocities Reported in Tigray War," *AP News*, Mar. 23, 2021. Https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-atrocities-commited-tigray-war-3c4a7a322b1cafb687bd1a224e69ff78.

Muller, Bryan. "'I Understood You!': May 1958, the Return of De Gaulle and the Fall of France's Fourth Republic." *Conversation*. Last modified May 16, 2018. Https://theconversation.com/i-understood-you-may-1958-the-return-of-de-gaulle-and-the-fall-of-frances-fourth-republic-93510.

Munro-Hay, Stuart. *Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiquity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1991.

Myers, Denys. "The Mandate System of the League of Nations." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 96 (Jan. 1921): 74-77.

Mythen, Gabe, and Sandra Walklate. "Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking 'What If?" *Security Dialogue* 39, nos. 2-3 (2008): 221-242.

Nacos, Brigitte. "Communication and Recruitment of Terrorists." In *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes: Vol. 2. Training*, edited by James Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. 41-52.

———. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. New York: Pearson, 2010.

Nadelmann, Ethan. "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society." *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (1990): 479-526.

Nagel, Jack. "Some Questions about the Concept of Power." *Behavioral Science* 13, no. 2 (Mar. 1968): 129-137.

Nagl, John. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: Chicago University, 2005.

Naimark, Norman. *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2002.

Namee, Matthew. "The 1821 Massacre of Greeks in Cyprus." *Orthodox History*. Last modified Mar. 30, 2021. Https://orthodoxhistory.org/2021/03/30/the-1821-massacre-of-greeks-in-cyprus/.

Nanayakkara, Lakkana. "How Israel Helped Sri Lanka Defeat the Tamil Tigers." *Algemeiner*, Jan. 31, 2012. Http://www.algemeiner.com/2012/01/31/how-israel-helped-sri-lanka-defeat-the-tamil-tigers/.

Nash, Manning. *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. New York: Norton, 2004.

"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Overview of the Enemy: Staff Statement No. 15." Accessed Aug. 8, 2019. Https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_15.pdf.

Natta, Jr., Don van. "The Struggle for Iraq: Last American Combat Troops Quit Saudi Arabia." *New York Times*, Sep. 22, 2003.

Nawaz, Shuja. "The First Kashmir War Revisited." *India Review* 7, no. 2 (May 2008): 115-154.

NC. "Restoring Order in Cyprus. *The World Today* 12, no. 4 (Apr. 1956): 144-152.

Nderitu, Alice. "Statement by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, on the Situation in Ethiopia." *UN*, Feb. 5, 2021, Https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/Statement%20on%20Ethiopia%205%20Feb%2021.pdf.

Negash, Tekeste. *Eritrea and Ethiopia: the Federal Experience*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997.

———. "Italy and its Relations with Eritrean Political Parties, 1948-1950." *Africa* (2004): 417-452.

Nemeth, Stephen. "The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 336-362.

Neumann, Peter, and M. L. R. Smith. "Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and its Fallacies." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (Aug. 2005): 571-595.

Newell, Allen, and Herbert Simon. *Human Problem Solving*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1972.

Newman, Edward. "Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 8 (2006): 749-772.

Newman, Edward, Oliver Richmond, Karin Aggestam, Marie-Joelle Zahar, Ekaterina Stepanova, Yossi Shain, R. Aryasinha. *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*. New York: United Nations University, 2006.

Newman, Philip. *A Short History of Cyprus*. New York: Longmans, Green, 1953.

Newsinger, John. *British Counterinsurgency: from Palestine to Northern Ireland*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Niblett, Robin. "Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, United States Senate: The Terrorist Attacks in Madrid: Implications for Transatlantic Relations and Cooperation in the War on Terrorism." Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mar. 31, 2004.

Nichols, Michelle. "Eritrea Admits Presence in Ethiopia's Tigray, Tells U.N. Withdrawing," *Reuters*, Apr. 16, 2021. Https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eritrea-admits-presence-ethiopias-tigray-tells-un-withdrawing-2021-04-16/.

———. "Men Forced to Rape Family Members in Ethiopia's Tigray, U.N. Says," *Reuters*, Mar. 25, 2021. Https://www.reuters.com/world/men-forced-rape-family-members-ethiopias-tigray-says-un-2021-03-25/.

"Nine Anti-gov't Groups Team up as Ethiopia Recalls Ex-soldiers," *Al Jazeera*, Nov. 5, 2021. Https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/5/nine-anti-abiy-groups-team-up-as-ethiopia-recalls-ex-soldiers.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004.

"The 9/11 Effect and the Transformation of Global Security." *Council of Foreign Relations*. Last modified Sep. 1, 2021. Https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/911-effect-and-transformation-global-security.

9/11 Public Discourse Project. *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations*. Https://www.911plus.org/pdf/2005_12_05_CommissionBriefingStatementSummary911.pdf.

"1995: Jaffna Falls to Sri Lankan Army." *BBC: On This Day: 5 December*. Accessed May 25, 2022. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/5/newsid_4618000/4618661.stm.

"1942: Singapore Forced to Surrender." *BBC Home*. Accessed May 3, 2022. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/15/newsid_3529000/3529447.stm.

Nithiyanandam, V. "Ethnic Politics and Third World Development: Some Lessons from Sri Lanka's Experience.' *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (Apr. 2000): 283-311.

Nolan, Cathal. *Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002.

Norris, Robert, and Hans Kristensen. "The British Nuclear Stockpile, 1953–2013." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Last modified July 1, 2013. Https://thebulletin.org/2013/07/the-british-nuclear-stockpile-1953-2013/.

Norwegian Observer Group. "Local and Regional Elections in Ethiopia 21 June 1992." Human Rights Report, no.1. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1992.

Norwich, John. *Byzantium: The Apogee*. New York: Knopf, 1992.

Novo, Andrew. "Friend or Foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA Insurgency." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 3 (2012): 414-431.

———. "The God Dilemma: Faith, the Church, and Political Violence in Cyprus." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 31, no. 2 (Oct. 2013): 193-215.

———. "An Insoluble Problem: The Harding-Makarios Negotiations, Turkey, and the Cause of Cypriot Enosis." *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 24, no. 1 (2015): 87-103.

Nutter, John. "Unpacking Threat: A Conceptual and Formal Analysis." In *Seeking Security and Development: The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers,* edited by Norman Graham. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1994. 29-49.

Nye, Joseph. "Nuclear Learning and US–Soviet Security Regimes." *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 371-402.

O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954–1962*. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1967.

"Obituary: Velupillai Prabhakaran." *BBC News*. Modified May 2009. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7885473.stm.

"Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections: Final Report." Atlanta, GA: Carter Center, Dec. 2009. Https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/ethiopia-2005-finalrpt.pdf.

O'Callaghan, Sean. *The Informer*. London: Corgi, 1999.

O'Connor, Tom. "US Army Says It Did Not Win Iraq War, 'Iran Appears To Be The Only Victor." *Newsweek*. Last modified Jan. 22, 2019. Https://www.newsweek.com/army-not-win-iraq-iran-victor-1301050.

O'Donnell, Daniel. "International Treaties against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism during Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces." *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 864 (Dec. 2006): 853-880.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 55-69.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1986.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1986.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress." 2009. Accessed June 20, 2019. Https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=231870.

"OLF Mission." *Oromo Liberation Front*. Http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/OLFMission.htm.

Oliver, Anne, and Paul Steinberg. *The Road to Martyrs' Square*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2005.

Olson, James, and Robert Shadle. *Historical Dictionary of the British Empire*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996.

Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.

O'Malley, Brendan, and Ian Craig. *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1999).

O'Neil, Andrew. "Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How Serious is the Threat?" In *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, edited by Russell Howard and James Forest. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

O'Neill, Bard. *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990.

Onuf, Nicholas. *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Oots, Kent. "An Individual-level Model of Terrorist Contagion." In *The 1986 Annual on Terrorism*, edited by Yonah Alexander. Dordrecht, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986. 109-125.

———. "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups." *Terrorism* 12 (1989): 139-152.

Organski, A. F. K. *World Politics*. New York: Knopf, 1958.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980.

Ortiz, Erik. "San Bernardino Shooting: Timeline of How the Rampage Unfolded." *NBC News*, Dec. 3, 2016. Accessed Aug. 4, 2016. Http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-shooting/san-bernardino-shooting-timeline-how-rampage-unfolded-n473501.

Ott, Marvin. "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution, Two Cases." *International Organization* 26, no. 4 (Aug. 1972): 595-618.

Ottaway, Marina. "The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?" *Northeast African Studies* 2, no. 3 (1995): 67-84.

Ottaway, Marina, and David Ottaway. *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution*. New York: Africana, 1978.

Ovendale, Ritchie. *Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962*. London: Leicester University, 1996.

Overy, Richard. *The Bombers and the Bombed : Allied Air War over Europe 1940-1945*. New York: Viking, 2013.

Owen, John. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *International Security* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 87-125.

Painter, Sidney. "The Lords of Lusignan in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries." *Speculum* 32, no. 1 (Jan. 1957): 27-47.

"Pakistan Played Major Role in LTTE Defeat: Sources." *Business Standard*. Last modified Jan. 19, 2013. Https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/pakistan-played-major-role-in-ltte-defeat-sources-109052800127_1.html.

"Palestine; Termination of the Mandate 15th May, 1948." London: HMSO, 1948. Accessed on Feb. 22, 2022. Https://archive.org/details/PalestineTerminationOfTheMandate15thMay1948.

Pallis, Alexander. *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After: A Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor, 1915-1922*. London: Methuen, 1937.

Palma, Giuseppe di. *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1991.

Panayides, Theo. "'Cyprus' Archbishop Kyprianos – Martyr, Victim, Fighter." *Cyprus Mail*. Last modified July 4, 2021. Https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/07/04/cyprus-archbishop-kyprianos-martyr-victim-fighter/.

Pankhurst, Richard. *The Ethiopian Borderlands: Essays in Regional History, from Ancient Times to the end of the Eighteenth Century*. Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea, 1997.

———. *The Ethiopian Royal Chronicles*. Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1967.

———. "Fear God, Honor the King: The Use of Biblical Allusions in Ethiopian Historical Literature, Part I." *Northeast African Studies* 8, no. 1: (1986): 11-30.

———. "Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia: A History of Their Discussion, from the League of Nations to the United Nations (1936-1949)." *Northeast African Studies* 6, nos. 1-2 (1999): 83-140.

———. *Social History of Ethiopia: The Northern and Central Highlands from Early Medieval Times to the Rise of Emperor Téwodros II*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1992.

Pape, Robert. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1996.

———. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2005.

———. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (Aug. 2003): 343-361.

Pape, Robert, and James Feldman. *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2010.

Parker, Tom. *Avoiding the Terrorist Trap: Why Respect for Human Rights is the Key to Defeating Terrorism*. NJ: World Scientific, 2019.

Paravicini, Giulia. "In Escalation of Ethiopia War, Tigray Leader Says His Forces Fired Rockets at Eritrea," *Reuters*, Nov. 15, 2020. Https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN27V05M.

Parkinson, Cyril. *War in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1815*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1954.

Parsons, Timothy. *The Second British Empire: In the Crucible of the Twentieth Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

Patrick, Stewart. "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" In *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*, edited by Russell Howard and James Forest. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Paul, Christopher, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. "Malaya, 1948–1955: Case Outcome: COIN Win." In *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 51-63. Accessed Oct. 10, 2019. Http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.14.

———. *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013.

Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "Aircraft Deployed in Cyprus." *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*. Last modified 2008. Https://web.archive.org/web/20130721174203/http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Aircraft.html.

———. "British Units Serving in Cyprus 1955-1959." *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*. Last modified 2008. Https://web.archive.org/web/20121123130140/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/cyprusunits.html.

———. "The Helicopter in Cyprus." *Internet Archive*: *Wayback Machine*. Last modified 2008. Https://web.archive.org/web/20130605095755/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/helo.html.

———. "War and Politics." *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*. Last modified 2008. Https://web.archive.org/web/20121027010356/http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/war.html.

Pavlowitch, Kosta. "Nicos Sampson: The 'Executioner of Murder Mile' who Twice Escaped the British Death Sentence." *The Guardian*, May 20, 2001. Https://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/may/21/guardianobituaries1.

Paxson, Christina. "Comment on Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, 'Education Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?'" Research Program in Development Studies Working Paper No. 207. Princeton University, 2002.

Payne, Rodger. "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction." *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2001): 37-61.

Paz, Reuven. *From Madrid to London: Al-Qaeda Exports the War in Iraq to Europe.* Herzliya, Israel: Global Research in International Affairs Center/The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements, Occasional Papers 3, no. 3, 2005.

———. "Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction." *Hudson Institute*, Sep. 12, 2005b.

———. "Yes to WMD: The First Islamic *Fatwah* on the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction." *PRISM Special Dispatches on Global Jihad* 1, no. 1 (May 2003).

"Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia," *Negarit Gazeta*, July 22, 1991. Https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/the-transitional-period-charter-of-ethiopia.pdf.

Pearlman, Wendy. "Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process." *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2009): 79-109.

Pearlstein, Richard. *The Mind of the Political Terrorist*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1991.

Pearson, Stephen, and Richard Watson. *Digital Triage Forensics: Processing the Digital Crime Scene*. New York: Syngress, 2010.

Peden, G. C. "Suez and Britain's Decline as a World Power." *Historical Journal*, 55, no. 4 (Dec. 2012): 1073-1096.

Peebles, Patrick. *The History of Sri Lanka*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004.

Peiris, Gerald. "Secessionist War and Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational Impulses." In *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material & Political Linkages*, edited by K. P. S. Gill and Ajai Sahni. Delhi: Roli/Bulwark/Institute for Conflict Management, 2002. Https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/peiris.htm.

Pelling, Henry. *Britain and the Marshall Plan*. New York: St. Martin's, 1988.

Pentzopoulos, Dimitri. *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact upon Greece*. Paris: Mouton, 1962.

"People Left with Few Healthcare Options in Tigray as Facilities Looted, Destroyed," *Médecins Sans Frontières*, Mar. 15, 2021. Https://www.msf.org/health-facilities-targeted-tigray-region-ethiopia.

Perham, Margery. *The Government of Ethiopia*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1969.

Perl, Raphel. *Anti-Terror Strategy, the 9/11 Commission Report & Terrorism Financing: Implications for US Policymakers*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2005.

Perry, Alex. "If This is Called Peace..." *Time Magazine*, Apr. 30, 2006. Https://web.archive.org/web/20070214084152/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501060508-1189385,00.html.

Pesto, Haris. "The Role of Diplomacy in the Fight against Terrorism." *Connections* 10, no. 1 (Win. 2010): 64-81.

Petaludis, Nicholas. "The Megali Idea: The Quest for Greater Greece and the Balkan Wars." Master's thesis, State University of New York at Albany, 1994.

Peterson, A., G. Reinhardt, and E. Conger. *Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Algerian War, Memorandum RM-3653-PR, July 1963*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1963.

Peterson, Peter. "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 2002): 74-94.

Peterson, Walter. "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom." *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 269-294.

Phillips, Brian. "Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Longevity." *Journal of Peace* 52, no. 1 (Jan. 2015): 62-75.

Phillips, Heather. "Libraries and National Security Law: An Examination of the USA Patriot Act." *Progressive Librarian* 25 (Sum. 2005): 28-42. Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901266.

Piazza, James. "Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 6 (2007): 521-539.

———. "How Diaspora Communities Influence Terrorist Groups." *Lawfare*, Mar. 3, 2019.

———. "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (Sep. 2008): 469-488.

———. "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159-177.

Picard, Michael, Paul Holtom, and Fiona Mangan. "Trade Update 2019: Transfers, Transparency, and South-east Asia Spotlight." *Small Arms Survey, Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies/Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*. Last modified Dec. 2019. Http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2019.pdf.

Pillar, Paul. "Counterterrorism after al-Qaeda." *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Sum. 2004).

———. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1983.

———. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001.

Pipes, Daniel. "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" *National Interest*, 21 (Win. 2001-2002).

"Pirapaharan Commits to Peace, Self Determination." *Tamil Net*. Last modified Apr. 11, 2002. Https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6838.

Pischedda, Costantino. "Wars within Wars: Why Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability Cause Inter-rebel Fighting in Internal Conflicts." *International Security* 43, no. 1 (2018): 138-176.

Plaut, Martin. "Eritrea in the Tigray War: What We Know and Why it Might Backfire," *African Arguments*, Jan. 8, 2021. Https://africanarguments.org/2021/01/eritrea-in-the-tigray-war-what-we-know-and-why-it-might-backfire.

———. "Ethiopia's Navy is Reborn – in Djibouti: The Revival of Ethiopian Navy, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, Regional Power Dynamics," *Eritrea Hub*, Feb. 1, 2020. Https://eritreahub.org/ethiopias-navy-is-reborn-in-djibouti.

Pluemper, Thomas, and Eric Neumeyer. "The Friend of My Enemy is My Enemy: International Alliances and International Terrorism.'' *European Journal of Political Research* 49, no. 1 (2010): 75-96.

Poggi, Gianfranco. *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1978.

Pollack, Kenneth. *Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness.* New York, Oxford University Press, 2019.

Pollis, Adamantia. "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus." *Comparative Politics* 5, no. 4 (July 1973): 575-599.

Polo, Sara, and Kristian Gleditsch. "Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 6 (2016): 815-829.

Pontecorvo, Gillo, director. *The Battle of Algiers*, DVD. Criterion, 2004.

Posen, Barry. "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics." *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Win. 2001-2002): 39-55.

Post, Jerrold. "Notes on a Pscychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior." *Terrorism: An International Journal* 7, no. 3 (1984): 241-256.

———. "Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics." *Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (1987): 23-35.

———. "Terrorist Psycho–Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 25-42.

———. "When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism." *Political Psychology* 26, no. 4 (2005): 615-636.

Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny. "The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle East Terrorists." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 1 (Spr. 2003): 171-184.

Post, Jerrold, Farhana Ali, Schuyler Henderson, Steven Shanfield, Jeff Victoroff, and Stevan Weine. "The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism." *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes* 72, no. 1 (Apr. 2009): 13-31.

Post, Jerrold, Keven Ruby, and Eric Shaw. "The Radical Group in Context: 2. Identification of Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 25 (2002): 101-126.

Prados, John. "US Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified." *National Security Archive*. Last updated Oct. 9, 2001. Https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html.

"President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points: 8 January, 1918." *Yale Law School: The Avalon Project*. Https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.

Price, Bryan. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism." *International Security* 36, no. 4 (Spr. 2012): 9-46.

Price, Christopher. "Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence: Written evidence submitted by Christopher Price." *Parliament.UK*. Last modified July 31, 2004. Https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/113/113we11.htm.

Price, Edward. "The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terrorism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, no. 1 (1977): 52-66.

Priest, Dana, and William Arkin. *Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State*. New York: Back Bay, 2011.

Putnam, Robert. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78.

Qiu, Linda. "Did U.S. Spend $6 Trillion in Middle East Wars?" *Politifact*. Last modified Oct. 27, 2016. Accessed June 26, 2019. Https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/27/donald-trump/did-us-spend-6-trillion-middle-east-wars/.

Quandt, William. *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1969.

Quataert, Donald. *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005.

Rabasa, Angel, Lesley Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shukla. *Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.

Rabkin, Norman. "Combating Terrorism." GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145. Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2000.

Radcliffe, Lord Cyril. "Cyprus, Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Debate." *Hansard: UK Parliament* 562 (Dec. 19, 1956): 1267-1279. Https://api.parliament.uk/historichansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals.

Raghavan, Srinath. *War and Peace in Modern India*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Rahal, Malika, and Benjamin White. "UNHCR and the Algerian War of Independence: Postcolonial Sovereignty and the Globalization of the International Refugee Regime, 1954–63." *Journal of Global History* 17, no. 2 (2022): 331-352.

Rajasingham-Senanayake, Darini. "The Dangers of Devolution: The Hidden Economies of Armed Conflict." In *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999.

Ranatunga, Cyril. *Adventurous Journey: From Peace to War, Insurgency to Terrorism*. Colombo, SL: Vijitha Yapa, 2010.

Ranatunga, D. C. "A Courageous, Frank and Lively Politician." *Daily FT*, Apr. 8, 2017. Https://www.ft.lk/opinion/a-courageous-frank-and-lively-politician/14-608669.

Rane, Halim. "Reformulating Jihad in the Context of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: A Theoretical Framework." *Global Change, Peace and Security* 19, no. 2 (2007): 127-147.

Rapoport, David. "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions." *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (Sep. 1984): 658-677.

———. "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism." In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, edited by Audrey Cronin and James Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004. 46-73.

———. "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism." *Current History* 100 (Dec. 2001): 419-425.

———. *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.

———. "The Politics of Atrocity." In *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by David Rapoport and Yonah Alexander. New York: Pergamon, 1977. 127-216.

———. "Terrorism." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, Vol. 2, edited by Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan. London: Routledge, 1992. 1061-1079.

Ratnaweera, D., G. Wickrmasinghe, A. Ellman, and K. T. Silva. "Land Settlement Sri Lanka 1840-1975: A Review of the Major Writings on the Subject." Colombo, Sri Lanka: Agrarian Research and Training Institute, 1976.

Reagan, Ronald. *An American Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

Record, Jeffrey. *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win*. Washington, DC: Potomac, 2007.

Reddaway, John. *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986.

Redlick, Amy. "The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism." In *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, edited by Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979. 73-95.

Reed, William. "Alliance Duration and Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 1072-1078.

Reed, William, and David Clark. "War Initiation and War Winners." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 3 (June 2000): 378-395.

Reich, Walter. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998.

Reinares, Fernando. "Exit from Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization among Members of ETA." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 5 (2011): 780-803.

———. "The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 52, no. 2 (2010): 83-104.

Reinares, Fernando, and Rogelio Alonso. "Confronting Ethnonationalist Terrorism in Spain: Political and Coercive Measures against ETA." In *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, edited by Robert Art and Louise Richardson. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 105-132.

Renshon, Stanley. "The Bush Doctrine Reconsidered." In *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism*, edited by Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld. New York: Routledge, 2008. 1-37.

Renshon, Stanley, and Peter Suedfeld. *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism*. Edited by Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Resende-Santos, Joao. "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914." *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spr. 1996): 193-260.

Reuter, Christoph. *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing*. Translated by Helena Ragg-Kirkby. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2004.

Reuveny, Rafael, and Aseem Prakash. "The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union." *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 693-708.

Revel, Jean-François. *How Democracies Perish*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.

Rey, Charles. *In the Country of the Blue Nile*. London: Duckworth, 1927.

Reynolds, David. "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War." *International Affairs* 62, no. 1 (1985): 1-20.

Richardson, Louise. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*. New York: Random House, 2006.

Riddick, John. *History of British India: A Chronology*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.

Riedel, Bruce. "Al Qaeda Strikes Back." *Foreign Affairs 86* (2007): 26-31.

———. *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–89*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2014.

Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts." *New York Times*, Dec. 16, 2005.

Robbins, Simon. "The British Counter-insurgency in Cyprus." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 4-5 (2012): 720-743.

Roberts, Adam. "The Laws of War in the War on Terror." In *International Law and the War on Terrorism: US Naval War College, International Law Studies, vol. 79*, edited by Paul Wilson. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 175-230.

———. "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective." *Survival* 47, no. 2 (Sum. 2005): 115-121.

Roberts, Michael. *Blunders in Tigerland: Pape's Muddles on "Suicide Bombers" in Sri Lanka, Working Paper 32 Nov. 2007*. Heidelberg, GE: University of Heidelberg/South Asia Institute, 2007.

———. "Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration." *Social Analysis* 50, no. 1 (2006): 84-86.

———. "Saivite Symbolism, Sacrifice and Tamil Tiger Rites." *Social Analysis* 49, no. 1 (2005): 67-93.

———. "The Tamil Death Toll in Early 2009: Challenging Rohan Gunaratna." *Thuppahi's Blog*, Dec. 1, 2011 (12:14 p.m.). Https://thuppahis.com/2011/12/01/the-tamil-death-toll-in-early-2009-challenging-rohan-gunaratna/.

Robins, Robert, and Jerrold Post. *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1997.

Robinson, James. *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1962.

Rodriguez, Jose. *The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength*. Barcelona, Spain: Department of Sociology and Analysis of Organizations, Working Papers EPP-LEA:03, Dec. 2005.

Rogers, Elizabeth. "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts." *Security Studies* 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 43-72.

Rogers, John. "Caste as a Social Category and Identity in Colonial Lanka." *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 41, no. 1 (2004): 51-77.

———. "Social Mobility, Popular Ideology, and Collective Violence in Modern Sri Lanka." *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 3 (Aug. 1987): 583-602.

Rogoff, Kenneth. "The Cost of Living Dangerously." *Foreign Policy* 145 (Nov.-Dec. 2004): 70-71.

Rohrer, Finlo. "What's a Little Debt between Friends?" *BBC News Magazine*. Last modified May10, 2006. Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4757181.stm.

Romaniuk, Peter. "The State of the Art on the Financing of Terrorism." *The RUSI Journal* 159 no. 2 (Apr. 2014): 6-17.

Romme, Georges, and Ron Dillen. "Mapping the Landscape of Organizational Learning." *European Management Journal* 15, no. 1 (1997): 68-78.

Roos, Dave. "5 Ways September 11 Changed America." *History.com*. Last modified Mar. 10, 2021. Https://www.history.com/news/september-11-changes-america.

Rosato, Sebastian. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (Nov. 2003): 585-602.

Rose, William, Rysia Murphy, and Max Abrahms. "Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings." *International Security* 32, no. 1 (Sum. 2007): 185-192.

Rosecrance, Richard, and Arthur Stein. "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy." In *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, edited by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1993. 3-21.

Rosen, Jeffrey. *The Naked Crowd*. New York: Random House, 2004.

Rosen, Steven. "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer." In *Peace, War, and Numbers*, edited by Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972.

Rosenau, James. *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1997.

———. *National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1963.

———. "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy." In *Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, edited by James Rosenau. New York: Free, 1971. 95-151.

Rosenau, William. "Subversion and Insurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study–Paper 2, Occasional Papers." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 2007.

Ross, Jeffrey, and Ted Gurr. "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States." *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 4 (Jul. 1989): 405-426.

Ross, Michael. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (Apr. 2001): 325-361.

Ross, Stewart. *Causes and Consequences of the Arab–Israeli Conflict*. Austin, TX: Raintree Steck-Vaughn, 1996.

Rostow, Walt. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Rotberg, Robert. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators." In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003. 1-20.

Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille. "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." *Monograph on Terrorist Financing* (2004). Http://bryantassociates.info/ba%20info/_fpclass/amlcft/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf.

Rouen, Jr., Karl de, and David Sobek. "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome." *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 303-320.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract and Discourses*. Translated by G. D. Cole. Rutland, VT: C. E. Tuttle, 1993.

Roy, Nabarun. "Assuaging Cold War Anxieties: India and the Failure of SEATO." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 26, no. 2 (2015): 322-340.

Roy, Nilova. "Summit May Ease South Asia Tensions." *Washington Post*, Nov. 18, 1986. Https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/11/18/summit-may-ease-south-asia-tensions/d43ebf6f-ca85-4140-9ee8-3121f6c1662c/.

Roy, Oliver. "Islam, Iran and the New Terrorism." *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Sum. 2000): 89-106.

Ruane, Kevin. "SEATO, MEDO, and the Baghdad Pact: Anthony Eden, British Foreign Policy and the Collective Defense of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 1952–1955." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16, no. 1 (2005): 169-199.

Rubin, Alissa, Lilia Blaise, Adam Nossiter, and Aurelien Breeden. "France Says Truck Attacker Was Tunisia Native With Record of Petty Crime." *New York Times*, Jul. 15, 2016.

Rubin, Barry. *Revolution until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO*. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1994.

Rubin, Barry, and Judith Rubin. *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader*. New York: Oxford University, 2002.

Rubenstein, Richard. *Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World*. New York: Basic, 1987.

Ruedy, John. *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2004.

Runciman, Steven. *The Fall of Constantinople 1453*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2001.

Rupesinghe, Kumar. "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF)." *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 337-350.

———. *Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures, and Lessons*. Vol. 2. Colombo, SL: Research & Documentation Centre/Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006.

Russell, Charles, Leon Banker Jr., and Bowman Miller. "Out-Inventing the Terrorist." In *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, edited by Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979, 3-42.

Russell, Diana. *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa*. New York: Academic, 1974.

Rustow, Dankwart. "Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Model." *Comparative Politic*s 2 (Apr. 1970): 337-363.

Rynn, Simon, and Ahmed Hassen, "Ethiopia: What Next?" *RUSI*, Oct. 22, 2021. Https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ethiopia-what-next.

Sabaratnam, Lakshmanan. *Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and Cultural Continuity*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Sabaratnam, T. *Pirapaharan.* Accessed May 5, 2022. Https://www.sangam.org/Sabaratnam/PirapaharanChap6.htm.

"Saint Barnabas." *Franciscan Media*. Last modified June 11, 2020. https://www.franciscanmedia.org/saint-of-the-day/saint-barnabas.

Samaranayak, Gamini. "Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 99-119.

Sambanis, Nicholas, and Moses Shayo. "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2 (2013): 294-325.

Sanchez, Dana. "Ethiopia Moves toward Privatization. It's Not about Money. It's About Tech." *Moguldom Nation*, Jan 10, 2017. Http://afkinsider.com/136888/ethiopia-moves-toward-privatization-its-not-about-money-its-about-tech-pm-says/.

Sandler, Todd, Walter Enders, and Harvey Lapan. "Economic Analysis Can Help Fight International Terrorism." *Challenge* (Jan.-Feb. 1991): 10-17.

Sanello, Frank. *The Knights Templars: God's Warriors, the Devil's Bankers*. Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade, 2003.

Santos, Theotonio dos. "The Structure of Dependence." *American Economic Review* 60, no. 2 (1970): 231-236.

Sapin, Burton, and Richard Snyder. *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954.

Saravanamuttu, Paikiasothy. "Victory Celebration and the Unmaking of Diversity in Post-war Sri Lanka." In *In the Shadow of Transitional Justice: Cross-national Perspectives on the Transformative Potential of Remembrance*, edited by Guy Elcheroth and Neloufer de Mel. New York: Routledge, 2022. 51-63.

Sarkees, Meredith, and Frank Wayman. *Resort to War: 1816–2007*. Washington DC: CQ, 2010.

Sassard, Sophie, Michel Bernouin and Tom Bergin. "With 84 Dead, France Investigates Whether Truck Attacker Acted Alone." *Reuters*, Jul. 17, 2016. Accessed Aug 5, 2016. Http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-crash-idUSKCN0ZU2K7.

Savage, Charles. "Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen." *New York Times*, Oct. 8, 2011.

Savell, Stephanie, Rachel McMahon, Emily Rockwell, and Yueshan Li. "United States Counterterrorism Operations 2018–2020," *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified Feb. 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/US%20Counterterrorism%20Operations%202018-2020%2C%20Costs%20of%20War.pdf.

Savun, Burcu, and Daniel Tirone. "Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: More Liberty, Less Terror?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 8 (Sep. 2018): 1607-1635.

Sbacchi, Alberto. *Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1997.

Scarinzi, Fausto. "Force Structure and Counterinsurgency Outcome: The Case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)." *Defence Studies* 21, no. 2 (2021): 204-221.

Schaffer, Ronald. *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Schalk, Peter. "Resistance and Martyrdom in the Process of State Formation of Tamililam." In *Martyrdom and Political Resistance Essays on Asia and Europe*, edited by Joyce Pettigrew. Amsterdam: VU University, 1997. 61-83.

Schaller, Dominik. "Genocide and Mass Violence in the 'Heart of Darkness: Africa in the Colonial Period." In *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, edited by Donald Bloxham and Donald Moses. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Schanzer, Jonathan. *Al-Qaeda's Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror*. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.

Schelling, Thomas. *Arms and Conflict*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1966.

———. *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*. New York: Norton, 2006.

———. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1960.

———. "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" In *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, edited by Raymond Frey and Christopher Morris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 18-32.

Schellinger, Paul, and Robert Salkin. *International Dictionary of Historic Places, Volume V: Asia and Oceania*. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Scheuer, Michael. *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004.

———. *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002.

Schmid, Alex. *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories Data Bases and Literature*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1984.

———. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

———. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 4 (1992): 14-25.

Schulman, Loren, and Alice Friend. "The Pentagon's Transparency Problem: Why Accurate Troop Levels Are So Hard to Find." *Foreign Affairs*, May 2, 2018.

Schuster, Mark, Bradley Stein, Lisa Jaycox, Rebecca Collins, Grant Marshall, Marc Elliott, Annie Zhou, David Kanouse, Janina Morrison, and Sandra Berry. "A National Survey

of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks." *New England Journal of Medicine* 345 (2001): 1507-1512.

Schweller, Randall. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*. New York: Columbia University, 1998.

———. "Realism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1995-1996): 90-121.

Schwikowski, Martina. "Crisis Looms in Ethiopia as Elections are Postponed," *DW*, June 16, 2020. Https://www.dw.com/en/crisis-looms-in-ethiopia-as-elections-are-postponed/a-53829389.

———. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1985.

Scott, Len, and Stephen Twigge. *Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964*. London: Harwood, 2000.

Scowcroft, Brent. "Don't Attack Saddam (2002)." In *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, edited by Marvin Gettleman, and Stuart Schaar. New York: Grove, 2003. 334-336.

Sederberg, Peter. "Responses to Dissident Terrorism: From Myth to Maturity." In *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes,Controls*, edited by Charles Kegley, Jr. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 262-280.

Sedgwick, Mark. "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (2004): 795-814.

———. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (2010): 479-494.

Šedivý, Miroslav. "From Adrianople to Münchengrätz: Metternich, Russia, and the Eastern Question 1829–33." *International History Review* 33, no. 2 (2011): 205-233.

Seed, David. *US Narratives of Nuclear Terrorism since 9/11: Worst-Case Scenarios*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Selassie, Bereket. *Eritrea and the United Nations and other Essays*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 1989.

Selvadurai, S. D., and Mike Smith. "Black Tigers, Bronze Lotus: The Evolution and Dynamics of Sri Lanka's Strategies of Dirty War." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36 (2013): 547-572.

Sen, Amartya. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science & Technology, 1984.

Senanayake, Darini Rajasingham. "One Year After Terrorism: Sri Lanka Needs to Demilitarise Reconstruction and Development for Sustainable Peace." *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 5 (2010): 690-696.

Senaratne, Jagath. *Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977-1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counter-insurgencies, Foreign Intervention*. Amsterdam: VU University, 1997.

———. "The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka: A Case for Reform." In *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, edited by Cavin Cawthra and Robin Luckman. London: Zed, 2003. 181-204.

Senate Joint Resolution 23. 115 Stat. 224. Public Law 107–40—Sept. 18, 2001, 107th Congress. Accessed June 20, 2019. Https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf.

Seraphim-Loizou, Elenitsa. *The Liberation Struggle of Cyprus 1955–1959: Through the Eyes of a Woman EOKA Area Commander*. Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1983.

Service, Robert. *Comrades!: A History of World Communism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2007.

Seton-Watson, Robert. *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question.* London: Cass, 1962.

Setton, Kenneth, Robert Wolff, and Harry Hazard. *A History of the Crusades: Volume Two, The Later Crusades 1187-1311*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1969.

Seufert, Michael. "Dissension among the Terrorists: Killing People is Wrong." *Encounter* 51, no. 3 (Sep. 1978): 84-85.

Seul, Jeffrey. "Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1999): 553-569.

Shabad, Goldie, and Francisco José Llera Ramo. "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain." In *Terrorism in Context,* edited by Martha Crenshaw. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1995). 455-462.

Shaban, Abdur Rahman Alfa. "Ethiopia Govt Agrees Peace Deal with Eritrea-based 'Ex-terror' Group," *Africa News*, July 8, 2018. Https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/07/ethiopia-govt-agrees-peace-deal-with-ex-terror-group-based-in-eritrea/.

Shane, Scott. "Soviet-Style 'Torture' Becomes 'Interrogation.'" *New York Times*, June 3, 2007.

Shapiro, Jacob. *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2013.

Shastri, Amita. "Government Policy and Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka." In *Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by Michael Brown and Sumit Ganguly. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997.

———. "The Material Basis for Tamil Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka." In *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity*, edited by Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger. New York: Routledge, 1994. 208-235.

Shatz, Adam. "The Battle of Algiers," *Nation*. Last modified May 31, 2001. Https://www.thenation.com/article/world/france-torture-algeria-colonialism/.

———. "The Torture of Algiers." *New York Review of Books* 49, no. 18 (Nov. 21, 2002).

Shaw, Marvin. *Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Shearer, David. "Private Armies and Military Intervention: Adelphi Papers no. 316." New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Sheehan, Michael. "Diplomacy." In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, edited by Audrey Cronin and James Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2004.

Sheffer, Gabriel. *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Shelton, Dinah. *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*. Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005.

Shiva, Vendana. "Economic Problems Cause Terrorism." In *Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints*, edited by Laura Egendorf. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven, 2004.

Shrader, Charles. *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962*. Praeger, 1999.

Shugart, Matthew. "Guerrillas and Elections: An Institutionalist Perspective on the Costs of Conflict and Competition." *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1992): 121-151.

Shughart, William. "An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000." *Public Choice* 128 (2006): 7-39.

Shultz, Richard. "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism." In *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, edited by Charles Kegley. New York: St. Martin, 1990.

Sick, Gary. "The Political Underpinnings of Terrorism." In *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, edited by Charles Kegley. New York: St. Martin, 1990.

Sider, Alison. "9/11 Changed Flying for Good—to Some Travelers' Chagrin." *Wall Street Journal*. Last modified Sep. 7, 2021. Https://www.wsj.com/articles/9-11-changed-flying-for-goodto-some-travelers-chagrin-11631019601.

"Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Overview." *National Security Agency/Central Security Service*. Https://www.nsa.gov/Signals-Intelligence/Overview/.

Silva, Chandra de. "Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Rivalry: The Background." In *From Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*, edited by Robert Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam. New York: St. Martin's, 1984.

———. "Sri Lanka in 2005: Continuing Political Turmoil." *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2006): 114-119.

Silva, Kingsley de. *A History of Sri Lanka*. London: Hurst, 1981.

———. *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986.

———. *Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*. New York, Penguin, 1998.

———. "University Admissions and Ethnic Tensions in Sri Lanka, 1977-82." In *From Independence to Statehood*: *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*, edited by Robert Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam. New York: St. Martin's, 1984.

Silva, Purnaka de. "The Growth of Tamil Paramilitary Nationalisms: Sinhala Chauvinism and Tamil Responses." In *Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka: 'Pearl of the East' or the 'Island of Tears'?* London: Sage, 1999.

Silver, Roxane, E. Holman, Daniel McIntosh, Michael Poulin, and Virginia Gil-Rivas. "Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological Responses to September 11." *The Journal of the American Medical Association* 288, no. 10 (2002): 1235-1244.

Simmel, George. "The Secret and the Secret Societies." In *The Sociology of George Simmel*, edited and translated by Kurt Wolff. New York: Free, 1964, 345-376.

Simon, Herbert. *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

———. "Rationality in Psychology and Economics." In *Models of Bounded Rationality: Vol. 3, Empirically Grounded Economic Reason,* edited by Herbert Simon. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997.

Simpson, A. W. B. *Human Rights and the End of Empire—Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention*. Oxford: Oxford University, 2001.

Sinclair, Georgina. *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University, 2006.

Singer, Barnett, and John Langdon. *Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 2004.

Singer, P. W. *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Penguin, 2009.

Sivak, Michael, and Michael Flanagan. "Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2002." *Transportation Research Part F 7: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour* 7, nos. 4-5 (2004): 301-305.

Sivarajah, Ambalavanar. "The Rise of Militancy in Tamil Politics." In *Security Dilemma of a Small States: Internal Crisis and External Intervention in Sri Lanka,* edited by P. V. J. Jayasekera. New Delhi: South Asian, 1995. 129-132.

Siverson, Randolph, and Juliann Emmons. "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1991): 285-306.

Skocpol, Theda. "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." *Theory and Society* 11, no. 3 (May 1982): 265-283.

———. "State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia, and China. *Theory and Society*, 7, no. 1-2 (Jan.-Mar. 1979b): 7-95.

———. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Slack, Keith. "EOKA Intelligence and Counterintelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 32, no. 1 (2019): 82-119.

Small, Melvin. *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on US Foreign Policy, 1789-1994*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1996.

Smith, Alistair. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (Mar. 1996): 133-153.

Smith, Benjamin. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule." *World Politics* 57, no. 3 (2005): 421-451.

Smith, Chris. "South Asia's Enduring War." In *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999.

Smith, D., E. Christiansen, R. Vincent, and N. E. Hann. "Population Effects of the Bombing of Oklahoma City." *The Journal of the Oklahoma State Medical Association* 92, no. 4 (Apr. 1999): 193-198.

Smith, Michael Llewellyn. *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*. New York: St. Martin's, 1973.

Smith, Paul. "Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail." In *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Volume 2: Combating the Sources and Facilitators*, edited by James Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. 142-162.

Smith, Tony. "The French Economic Stake in Colonial Algeria." *French Historical Studies* 9, no. 1 (Spr. 1975): 184-189.

Snodgrass, Donald. "Economic Development of Sri Lanka." In *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999.

Snow, Donald. *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War*. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1996.

Snyder, Glenn, and Paul Diesing. *Conflict among Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1977.

Snyder, Jack. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2013.

Snyder, Louis. *German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1969.

Snyder, Richard. "The Nature of Foreign Policy." *Social Science* 27 (Apr. 1952): 61-69.

Snyder, Richard, H. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3. Princeton, NJ: Organizational Behavior Section, 1954. 68-117.

Solomonidis, Victoria. "Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919–1922." PhD Dissertation, King's College, University of London 1984.

"The Somali Abbo Liberation Front." *Garri Nation*, last updated Sep. 5, 2011. Https://garagarri.wordpress.com/2011/09/05/bandera-garri/.

Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*. Translated by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1961.

Soulioti, Stella. *Fettered Independence: Cyprus, 1878-1964. Vol. I: The Narrative*. Minneapolis, MN: Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota, 2006.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

Speckhard, Anne, and Khapta Akhmedova. "Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists." In *Female Suicide Terrorists*, edited by Yoram Schweitzer. Tel Aviv, Israel: Jaffe Center, 2006a.

Spence, Keith. "World Risk Society and War against Terror." *Political Studies* 53, no. 2 (2005): 284-302.

Spencer, John. *Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Sellassie Years*. Algonac, MI: Reference, 1984.

Spjut, R. J. "Defining Subversion." *British Journal of Law and Society*, 6, no. 2 (Win. 1979): 254-261.

Sprinzak, Ehud. "The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 65-85.

———. "Rational Fanatics." *Foreign Policy* 120 (Sep.-Oct. 2000): 66-73.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1956.

Spruyt, Hendrik. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1994.

"Sri Lanka." *CIA World Factbook*. Last updated Apr. 19, 2022. Https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/.

"Sri Lanka: Creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)." *Relief Web*. Last modified May 24, 2005. Https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-creation-sri-lanka-monitoring-mission-slmm.

"Sri Lanka to Suspend Relations with Israel." *UPI*. Last modified Mar. 20, 1990. Https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/03/20/Sri-Lanka-to-suspend-relations-with-Israel/6077637909200/.

Stam, Allan, III. *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic politics and the Crucible of War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1996.

Staniland, Paul. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-state Paramilitaries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 16-40.

"Status of Mission Agreement on the Establishment and Management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Mar. 18, 2002." *University of Edinburgh: Peace Agreement Database*. Https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/548.

Stavridis, Stavros. *Greek-Turkish War, 1918-23: An Australian Press Perspective*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2008.

Stedman, Stephen. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53.

Stefanidis, Ioannis. *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*. New York: New York University, 1999.

Stein, Arthur. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World." In *International Regimes*, edited by Stephen Krasner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1983. 115-140.

Stein, Burton, and David Arnold. *A History of India*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Stein, Janice, and Louis Pauly. *Choosing to Cooperate: How States Avoid Loss*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1993.

Steinhoff, Patricia. "Hijackers, Bombers, and Bank Robbers: Managerial Style in the Japanese Red Army." *Journal of Asian Studies* 48, no. 4. (Nov. 1989): 724-740.

Stephens, Robert. *Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean*. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966.

Sterling, Claire. *The Terror Network*. New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1981.

Stern, Jessica. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: Harper Collins, 2003.

Stewart, James. *The FLQ: Seven Years of Terrorism*. Montreal: Montreal Star/Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Stoessinger, John. *Why Nations Go to War*. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011.

Stohl, Rachel, and Suzette Grillot. *The International Arms Trade*. Malden, MA: Polity, 2009.

Stoll, Richard. "State Power, World Views, and the Major Powers." *In Power in World Politics*, edited by Richard Stoll and Michael Ward. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989. 135-157.

Stone, David. "The Balkan Pact and American Policy, 1950-1955." *East European Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (Sep. 1994): 393-407.

Stoner, Kathryn, and Michael McFaul. *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2013.

Stora, Benjamin. *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001.

Stout, Chris. *The Psychology of Terrorism: Programs and Practices in Response and Prevention,* Vol. 4. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Stovall, Tyler. *France since the Second World War*. London: Pearson, 2002.

Strang, David, and Patricia Chang. "The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State: Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960–80." *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993): 235-262.

Subramanian, T. S. "Chronicle of Murders." *Frontline*, Aug. 14, 1999. Https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article30257904.ece.

Sueur, James le. *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2006.

Suitt, Thomas. "High Suicide Rates among United States Service Members and Veterans of the Post9/11 Wars." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified June 21, 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/Suicides.

"Surveillance under the Patriot Act." *ACLU*. Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act.

Sutton, Christopher. "Britain, the Cold War, and 'the Importance of Influencing the Young': A Comparison of Cyprus and Hong Kong." *Britain and the World* 7 no.1 (2014): 85-108.

———. *Britain's Cold War in Cyprus and Hong Kong: A Conflict of Empires*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2016.

Swamy, Narayan. *Inside an Elusive Mind, Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the World's Most Ruthless Guerrilla Leader*. New Delhi: Konark, 2003.

"The Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism and the Left." *Ramparts* 12 (May 1974): 21-27. Accessed Aug. 18, 2019. Http://www.unz.com/print/Ramparts-1974may-00021/.

Taber, Robert. *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*. New York: Stuart, 1965.

Tadesse, Kiflu. *The Generation: The History of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party—Part I*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1993.

Takeyh, Ray. "Iran's Nuclear Calculations." *World Policy Journal* 20, no. 2 (Sum. 2003): 21-28.

Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Sum. 2002): 97-108.

Tambiah, Stanley. *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1996.

Tareke, Gebru. "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000): 635-667.

———. "Rural Protest in Ethiopia, 1941-1970: A Study of Three Rebellions." PhD dissertation, Syracuse University, 1977.

Tarrow, Sidney. "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention." In *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, edited by Mark Traugott. Durham, NC: Duke University, 1995. 89-116.

Taubman, William. *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*. New York: Norton, 2004.

Taylor, A. J. P. *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman*. New York: Knopf, 1955.

———. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1954.

Taylor, Jerome. "Velupillai Prabhakaran: Leader of the Tamil Tigers," *Independent*, May 19 2009. Http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/velupillai-prabhakaran-leader-of-the-tamil-tigers-1687239.html.

Taylor, Peter. *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein*. New York: TV, 1997.

Terraine, John. *A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1985.

"Terrorism Act 2000: UK Public General Acts 2000 c. 11, Part I, Section 1." *Legislation.gov.uk*, Https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1.

Terrorism in Cyprus: The Captured Documents. London: HMSO, 1956.

Terzic, Milan. "Yugoslavia and the Balkan Pact 1953/1954." *Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia: Strategic Research Institute*. Http://www.isi.mod.gov.rs/abstrakt.php?lang=en&id=6.

"Testimony of David Norquist before the Senate Budget Committee, Mar. 7, 2018." Https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NORQUIST.FINAL%202018-03-07%20SBC%20Norquist%20Statement.pdf.

"Text: Vice President Cheney on NBC's *Meet the Press*: Transcript of an Interview with Vice President Cheney Conducted by Tim Russert, host of NBC's *Meet the Press*. *Washington Post Online*. Last modified Sept. 16, 2001. Https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/cheney091601.html?noredirect=on.

Thaden, Edward. *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1965.

Thayer, Charles. *Guerrilla*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Thomas, Jakana. "Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014): 804-818.

Thomas, Martin. "France and its Colonial Civil Wars, 1940–1945." In *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Part III - Occupation, Collaboration, Resistance and Liberation*, edited by Richard Bosworth and Joseph Maiolo. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2015. 581-604.

Thompson, David. "Delusions of *Grandeur*: French Global Ambitions and the Problem of the Revival of Military Power, 1950-1954." PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2007.

Thornton, Thomas. "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation." In *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

Thottam, Jyoti. "Prabhakaran: The Life and Death of a Tiger," *Time*, May 19, 2009. Http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1899590-1,00.html.

Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Richard Crawley and edited by Robert Strassler. New York: Free, 1996.

———. *The Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner. Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1954.

Tian, Nan, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter Wezeman, and Siemon Wezeman.

"Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Last modified Apr. 2018. Https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2018.

Tierney, Dominic. "Why Has America Stopped Winning Wars?"*Atlantic* (June 2, 2015). Https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/america-win-loss-iraq-afghanistan/394559/.

"The Tigers' Last Stand; Sri Lanka." *Economist* 390, no. 8613 (Jan. 19, 2009).

"Tigray Forces Claim to Have Shot Down Ethiopian Plane, Taken Town," *Reuters*, Nov. 28, 2020. Https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict/ethiopia-says-military-operation-in-tigray-region-is-over-hunt-for-tigray-leaders-begins-idINKBN288098.

"Tigrayan and Oromo Forces Say They Have Seized Towns on Ethiopian Highway," *Reuters*, Nov. 1, 2021. Https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigrayan-forces-say-they-have-seized-another-town-ethiopias-amhara-region-2021-10-31/.

Tilly, Charles. "Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology." *Comparative Social Research* 16 (1997): 43-53.

———. "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists." *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (2004): 5-13.

———. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1985.

Timasheff, N. S. *Religion in Soviet Russia 1917-1942*. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942.

Tiruchelvam, Neelan. "Ethnicity and Resource Allocation." In *From Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*, edited by Robert Goldmann and A. Jeyaratnam. New York: St. Martin's, 1984.

Tiruneh, Andargachew. *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1993.

Tokdemir, Efe, Evgeny Sedashov, Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu, Carlos Leon, Jeremy Berkowitz, and Seden Akcinaroglu. "Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65, no. 4 (2021): 729-758.

Tompson, William. *Khrushchev: A Political Life*. New York: St. Martin's, 1995.

Touval, Saadia, and William Zartman. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985.

Townshend, Charles. *Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain.* Oxford: Oxford University, 1993.

———. "People's War." In *The Oxford History of Modern War*. Edited by Charles Townshend. New Updated Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 177-200.

Trager, Robert, and Dessislava Zagorcheva. "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done." *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Win. 2005-2006): 87-123.

Treadgold, Warren. *A History of the Byzantine State and Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1997.

"Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, and Finland." Washington, DC: GPO, 1947. Accessed on Feb. 16, 2022. Https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435066406612&view=1up&seq=8&skin=2021.

"Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact), August 9, 1954." *Yale Law School: Avalon Project*. Https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eu002.asp.

"Treaty of Amiens, March 25, 1802." *Napoleon and Empire: Official Text*. Https://www.napoleon-empire.com/official-texts/treaty-of-amiens.php.

"The Treaty of Berlin, 1878: Excerpts on the Balkans." *Fordham University*. Https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1878berlin.asp.

"Treaty of Lausanne: Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923." *BYU World War I Document Archive*. Https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.

"Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923." *World War I Document Archive*. Accessed Feb. 10, 2022. https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.

Tremayne, Penelope. *Below the Tide.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.

Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Translated by Daniel Lee. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Tronvoll, Kjetil. "Ethiopia's Tigray War is Fueling Amhara Expansionism," *Foreign Policy* (Apr. 28, 2021).

Trujillo, Horacio, and Brian Jackson. "Chap. 7: Theory: Organizational Learning as a Four-Component Process." In *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, edited by Brian Jackson, John Baker,

Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio Trujillo and Peter Chalk. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 181-187.

Truman, Harry. *Memoirs Volume II: Years of Hope and Trial*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956.

"Tsadkan Gebretensae, General Tadesse Worede Reportedly under Siege," *Borkena*, Jan. 22, 2021. Https://borkena.com/2021/01/22/tsadkan-gebretensae-general-tadesse-worede-reportedly-under-siege/.

Tse-Tung, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel Griffith. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois, 2000.

———. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel Griffith. New York: Praeger, 1961.

———. "Preserving Oneself and Destroying the Enemy." In *Classical Readings of International Relations*, edited by Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein, and Jay Shafritz, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999.

———. *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*. Peking: Foreign Languages, 1967.

———. "Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire, Jan. 5, 1930." *Marxists.org*. Https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_6.htm.

Tsintsadze-Maass, Eteri, and Richard Maass. "Groupthink and Terrorist Radicalization." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 5 (2014): 735-758.

Tsvetovat, Maksim, and Kathleen Carley. "Structural Knowledge and Success of Anti-Terrorist Activity: The Downside of Structural Equivalence." *Journal of Social Structure* 6 (2005).

Tuchman, Barbara. *The Guns of August*. New York: Presidio, 2004.

Tucker, Patrick, and Defense One. "Why Join ISIS? How Fighters Respond When You Ask Them." *Atlantic* (Dec. 9, 2015).

Tucker, Robert. *The Marx–Engels Reader*. New York: Norton, 1972.

Tucker, Spencer. *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Tugwell, Maurice. "Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA." In *British Perspectives on Terrorism*, edited by Paul Wilkinson. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. 13-40.

Tullock, Gordon. *The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution*. Blacksburg, VA: University Publications, 1974.

Turnbull, Stephen. *The Ottoman Empire 1326–1699*. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2003.

Ullendorff, Edward. *The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People*. London: Oxford University, 1973.

UNICEF. "Situation Analysis of Children and Women: Tigray Region," 2020. Https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/2351/file/Tigray%20region%20.pdf.

United Kingdom Home Office. "Sri Lanka: Country Report: Country Information and Policy Unit: Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Apr. 1, 2004." Https://www.refworld.org/docid/40a887847.html.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "World Economic Report 1953-54," E/2729 and ST/ECA/30. Apr. 15, 1955. Https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/searchable_archive/1954_WESS_Full.pdf.

United Nations General Assembly. "Application, under the Auspices of the United Nations, of the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples in the Case of the Population of the Island of Cyprus, 9th Session: 814: IX, 514th Plenary Meeting." Dec. 17, 1954. Https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209535?ln=en.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Ethiopia: Situation Report." Last updated Oct. 15, 2022. Https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/Ethiopia.

———. "Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Update Situation Report, 3 May 2021," Apr. 27, 2021. Https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-tigray-region-humanitarian-update-situation-report-3-may-2021.

United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. "United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, Urges All Parties to Prohibit the Use of Sexual Violence and Cease Hostilities in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia," Jan. 21, 2021. Https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/press-release/united-nations-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict-ms-pramila-patten-urges-all-parties-to-prohibit-the-use-of-sexual-violence-and-cease-hostilities-in-the/.

United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Year. "Identical Letters Dated 12 December 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council." A/55/686-S/2000/1183, Dec. 13, 2000. Https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ER%20ET_001212_Agreement EritreaEthiopia.pdf.

United States Army and Marine Corps. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2007.

United States Central Intelligence Agency. "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency." No place or date of publication. Approved for release on Jan. 5, 2009. Accessed Jul. 31, 2016. Https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf.

———. "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012." *Homeland Security Digital Library*. Last modified July 11, 2012. Https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=713599.

United States Central Intelligence Agency: Directorate of Intelligence. *Research Study: International Terrorism in 1976: Diagnosis and Prognosis*. Washington, DC: CIA, 1976.

United States Congress: House of Representatives: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security. "Terrorist Financing Since 9/11: Assessing an Evolving Al-Qaeda and State Sponsors of Terrorism, 112th Cong., 2nd Second Sess., May 18, 2012, Serial No. 112-93.

United States Congress: Office of Technology Assessment. *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-559*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing, 1993.

United States Congress: Senate. "Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria and Protocol, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine at November 27, 1919," *Peace Treaties, Various Treaties and Agreements between the Allied and Associated Powers and Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey, together with some other agreements signed by the Peace Conference at Paris and Saint-Germain-En-Laye, presented by Mr. Lodge, April 25, 1921*. 67th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 7, 1921. 47-162. Https://archive.org/details/peacetreaties00alli/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater.

"United States Department of Defense: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms." *Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Last modified July 2019. Accessed Aug. 8, 2019. Https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.

United States Department of Justice: Office of Public Affairs. "The NSA Program to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks, Myth v. Reality." Jan 7, 2006. Accessed June 24, 2019. Https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf.

United States Department of State. "Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report), Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism: Country Reports on Terrorism 2015." Last modified Jan. 20, 2017. Https://2009 2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257522.htm.

———. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Vol. VII, Part 2, Document 201: Intelligence Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Problems and Prospects of the Fifth Republic, No. 8374, Dec. 6, 1960.” *US Department of State: Office of the Historian*. Https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v07p2/d201.

———. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs),” Oct. 11, 2005.

———. “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.” *US Department of State Archive*. Accessed May 17, 2022. Https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html.

———. “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000: Briefing upon the Release of the Report.” Last modified Apr. 30, 2001. Accessed Aug. 8, 2019. Https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/2571.htm.

———. “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003.” Last modified June 22, 2004. Https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/.

———. “Sri Lanka: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2003.” *US Department of State*, Feb. 25, 2004. Https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27951.htm.

United States Department of State: Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013: Chapter 6: Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Last modified Apr. 2014.

———. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013: Chapter 3: Terrorist Safe Havens.” Last modified Apr. 2014.

United States Department of State: Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report),” last modified Jan. 20, 2017. Https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257522.htm.

United States Department of State: Office of the Historian. “The Atlantic Conference and Charter, 1941.” Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf.

———. “The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961.” Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/berlin-crises.

———. “Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The Horn of Africa and SALT II, 1977–1979.” Accessed Oct. 4, 2022. Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/horn-of-africa#:~:text=In%20the%20summer%20of%201977,was%20populated%20by%20ethnic%20Somalis.

———. “The Formation of the United Nations, 1945.” Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un.

———. "Memorandum from the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State, Washington, Dec. 23, 1955." Https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d132.

———. "Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918." Https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/fourteen-points.

United States Institute for Peace. "Special Report: How Terrorism Ends." (May 1999): 1-11. Https://www.usip.org/publications/1999/05/how-terrorism-ends.

United States Office of Homeland Security. "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," July 2002. Accessed June 16, 2016. Https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf.

United States White House. "The National Security Strategy of the United States, Sept. 17, 2002. Accessed June 27, 2019. Https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.

———. "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction." Dec. 2002." Accessed June 27, 2019. Https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf.

University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), Sri Lanka. "Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Challenges to Human Rights Advocacy, Special Report No. 20, Apr. 1, 2006." Accessed June 2, 2022. Https://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport20.htm.

"Update on the Amount of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Uncovered through SIGAR's Oversight Work between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2019." Office of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR 21-05-SP. Last modified Oct. 15, 2020. Https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2040663/SIGAR-21-05-SP.pdf.

Urdal, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence." *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006): 607-629.

"US Costs to Date for the War in Afghanistan, in $ Billions FY2001-FY2022." *Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*. Last modified Aug. 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022.

"US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - Sri Lanka." *Refworld*. Last modified Feb. 26, 1999. Https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa7d14.html.

Useem, Michael. "Ideological and Interpersonal Change in the Radical Protest Movement." *Social Problems* 19, no. 4 (Spr. 1972): 451-469.

Uyangoda, Jayadeva. "Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties." *Asian Survey* 50, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2010): 1104-1011.

Valentino, Benjamin. *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2013.

Varnavas, Andreas. *Brief History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA, 1955-1959*. Nicosia: EOKA Liberation Struggle 1955-1959 Foundation, 2001.

———. *A History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA (1955-1959)*. Nicosia: EOKA Liberation Struggle 1955-1959 Foundation, 2004.

———. "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy, 1957-1960." *Cyprus Review* 22, no. 1 (Spr. 2010): 79-106.

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Why Democracy Survives." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 36-50.

Vasquez, John. "The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau's Issue Area Typology." *Journal of Peace Research* 20, no. 2 (Sum. 1983): 179-192.

Vatikiotis, Panayiotis. *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1991.

Vaughan, Sarah. "Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia." PhD Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2003).

Vaurs, Roger. "The Role of France and the French in North Africa." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 306 (Jul. 1956): 17-25.

Venhaus, John. "Why Youth Join al-Qaeda." *US Institute of Peace*, May 2010. Https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf.

Venugopal, Rajesh. "The Politics of Market Reform at a Time of Civil War: Military Fiscalism in Sri Lanka." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46 no. 49 (2011): 67-75.

Verba, Sidney. "Review: Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 20, no. 1 (Oct. 1967): 111-127.

———. *Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1961.

Verdery, Katherine. *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*. New York: Columbia University, 1999.

Vertovec, Steven. "The Political Importance of Diasporas." *Migration Policy Institute*, June 1, 2005. Https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/political-importance-diasporas.

Victoroff, Jeff. "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (2005): 3-42.

Vidino, Lorenzo, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann. "Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict." *African Security* 3, no. 4 (2010): 216-238.

Vijayasiri, Raj. "A Critical Analysis of the Sri Lankan Government's Counterinsurgency Campaign." Master's Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999.

Vikatan, Anand. "Lady with the Poison Flowers: With Rajiv Gandhi's Gruesome Assassination, the Suicide Bomber Had Well and Truly Arrived." *Outlook India*. Last modified Feb. 5, 2022. Https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/lady-with-the-poison-flowers/228400.

Vine, David, Cala Coffman, Katalina Khoury, Madison Lovasz, Helen Bush, Rachael Leduc, and Jennifer Walkup. "Creating Refugees: Displacement Caused by the United States' Post-9/11 Wars." Brown University: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. Last modified Aug. 19, 2021. Https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20War_Vine%20et%20al_Displacement%20Update%20August%202021.pdf.

Viotti, Paul, and Mark Kauppi. "Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism." In *International Relations Theory*, edited by Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. New York: Pearson/Longman 2012. 189-197.

———. *International Relations Theory*. Boston: Longman, 2012b.

Volgy, Thomas, Lawrence Imwalle, and Jeff Corntassel. "Structural Determinants of International Terrorism: The Effects of Hegemony and Polarity on Terrorist Activity." *International Interactions* 23, no. 2 (1997): 207-231.

Voll, John. "Bin Laden and the New Age of Global Terrorism." *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 4 (Dec. 2001): 1-5.

Waal, Alexander de. *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991.

———. "The Tigray Crisis: Is the Debate Over 'Genocide' in the Region a Distraction?" *BBC News*, May 29, 2021. Https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-57293207.

Wade, Sara, and Dan Reiter. "Does Democracy Matter: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 329-348.

Wagner, Alex. "Bush Labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an 'Axis of Evil.'" *Arms Control Association*. Accessed June 27, 2019. Https://www.armscontrol.org/print/995.

Wakeman, Frederic. *The Fall of Imperial China*. New York: Free, 1975.

Walder, David. *The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905*. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

Waldman, Amy. "Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka," *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 2003.

Wall, Irwin. *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2001.

Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (2001): 629-644.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1979.

———. "A World-system Perspective on the Social Sciences." *British Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 3 (1976): 343-352.

Walt, Stephen. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spr. 1985): 3-43.

———. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.

Walter, Barbara. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (Sum. 1997): 335-364.

———. "The New New Civil Wars." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2014): 469-486.

Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 1979.

Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.* New York: Basic, 1992.

Wasmund, Klaus. "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists." In *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, edited by Peter Merkel. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1986. 191-228.

Waterman, Harvey. "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective." *World Politics* 33, no. 4 (July 1981): 554-589.

Watts, Barry. "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies." *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (1997): 115-171.

Waugh, Jr., William. "The Values in Violence: Organizational and Political Objectives of Terrorist Groups." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 3, no. 4 (1983): 5-19.

Way, Lucan. "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3, (July 2008): 55-69.

Webber, David, and Arie Kruglanski. "The Social Psychological Makings of a Terrorist." *Current Opinion in Psychology* 19 (Feb. 2018): 131-134.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff. New York: Bedminster, 1968.

———. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Routledge, 2009.

———. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated and updated by Stephen Kalberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Weber, Steven. "How Globalization Went Bad." *Foreign Policy*. Last modified Oct. 13, 2009. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/how-globalization-went-bad/.

Webster, Donald. *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation.* New York: AMS, 1973.

Weed, Matthew. "Memorandum to Honorable Barbara Lee: The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Background in Brief." *Congressional Research Service*. July 10, 2013. Accessed June 21, 2019. Https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/aumf-071013.pdf.

Weeks, Jessica. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): 35-64.

Weimann, Gabriel. "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet." *Journal of International Security Affairs* 8 (2005).

Weinberg, Leonard, and Ami Pedahzur. *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Weinberg, Leonard, and William Eubank. ''Democracy and Terrorism: What Recent Events Disclose.'' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 1 (1998): 108-118.

———. “Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 156-176.

Weir, William. *Education in Cyprus: Some Theories and Practices in Education in the Island of Cyprus since 1878*. Nicosia, Cyprus: Cosmos, 1952.

Weiss, Martin. *Terrorist Financing: The 9/11 Commission Recommendation*. Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2005.

Wendt, Alexander. “The Agent Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335-370.

West German Red Army Faction. “Communiqué on the Attempted Assassination of Hans Neusel, State Secretary in the German Ministry of the Interior in Cologne on 27 July 1990.” In *Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, edited by Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky. London: Frank Cass, 1992.

West, Richard. *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*. New York: Carroll & Graf, 1995.

Wezeman, Siemon, Pieter Wezeman, and Alexandra Kuimova. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020.” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Last modified Mar. 2021. Https://www.sipri.org/publications/2021/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2020.

“What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America.” *Pew Research Center/Global Attitudes & Trends*. Last modified Dec. 4, 2002. Accessed July 17, 2019. Https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2002/12/04/what-the-world-thinks-in-2002/.

Whiteneck, Daniel. “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework.” *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (Sum. 2005): 187-199.

Whyte, Glen. “Groupthink Reconsidered.” *Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 1 (1989): 40-56.

Wickramasinghe, Nira. *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Wijayadasa, Somar. “Prosecuting and Persecuting the War Hero – General Fonseka.” *Sunday Times* (Sri Lanka), Sep. 19, 2010. Https://www.sundaytimes.lk/100919/News/nws_16.html.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Civil Society as Social Control State: Power in Jordan.” *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 1 (Oct. 2000): 43-61.

———. "Framing Jihad: Intra-movement Framing Contests and al-Qaida's Struggle for Sacred Authority." *International Review of Social History* 49, Supp. 12 (Dec. 2004): 159-177.

Wilkinson, Paul. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. New York: New York University, 1986.

———. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Williams, Carol. "A History of Terrorism Out of Chechnya." *Los Angeles Times*, Apr. 19, 2013.

Williams, Phil. "Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security." In *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*, edited by Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas. Stanford: Stanford University, 2010.

Williamson, Roger. "Why is Religion still a Factor in Armed Conflict?" *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21, no. 3 (1990): 243-253.

Willis, Luc. "Highlight 17/2021 – The Fallout of Ethnic Federalism," *MEIG*, May 12, 2021. Https://www.meig.ch/highlight-17-2021-the-fallout-of-ethnic-federalism/.

Wilmot, William, and Joyce Hocker. *Interpersonal Conflict*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.

Wilson, Alfred. *Electoral Politics in an Emergent State: The Ceylon General Elections*. London: Cambridge University, 1975.

———. *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. London: Hurst, 2000.

Wilson, Alfred, and Joseph Chandrakanthan. "Tamil Identity and Aspirations," *Conciliation Resources* 4 (Aug. 1998). Https://www.c-r.org/accord/sri-lanka/tamil-identity-and-aspirations.

Winius, George. *The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon: Transition to Dutch Rule*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.

Wintour, Patrick. "Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency as Tigrayan Rebels Gain Ground," *Guardian*, Nov. 2, 2021. Https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/02/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-as-tigray-rebels-gain-ground.

Wintrobe, Ronald. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Woldemariam, Michael. *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2018.

Woldeyes, Yirga. "The Battle of Adwa: an Ethiopian Victory that Ran against the Current of Colonialism." *The Conversation*, Feb. 29, 2020. Https://theconversation.com/the-battle-of-adwa-an-ethiopian-victory-that-ran-against-the-current-of-colonialism-132360.

Wood, Reed. "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (Sep. 2010): 601-614.

Wood, Reed, and Jacob Kathman. "Too Much of a Bad Thing? Civilian Victimization and Bargaining in Civil War." *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (July 2014): 685-706.

Woodward, Susan. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995.

Woodworth, Paddy. *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2002.

Woody, Christopher. "Congress may Repeal the Post-9/11 Act the US Military Used to Justify the Fight against ISIS. *Business Insider*. Last modified June 29, 2017. Accessed June 21, 2019. Https://www.businessinsider.com/a-bill-to-repeal-the-aumf-just-passed-2017-6.

Worden, Scott. "Afghanistan: An Election Gone Awry." *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (July 2010): 11-25.

Wright, Joseph. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Impact Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2008): 322-343.

Wright, Peter. *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer*. New York: Viking, 1987.

Wyler, Liana. "CRS Report for Congress: Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy, RL34253, Aug. 28, 2008." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress, 2008.

Xydis, Stephen. *Cyprus; Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1967.

———. *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*. The Hague: Mouton, 1973.

———. "The UN General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 1954-58." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 2 (1968): 141-158.

Yesilbursa, Behcet. *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59*. New York: Frank Cass, 2005.

Yideg, Bamlak, and Peteti Premanandam. "The 1976 TPLF Manifesto and Political Instability in Amhara Region, Ethiopia." *Research Review: International Multidisciplinary Research Journal* 4, no. 1 (Jan. 2019).

Young, John. *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

———. "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 1 (Mar. 1996): 105-120.

Young, Reuven. "Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation." *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 29, no. 1 (Dec. 1, 2006): 23-105.

Zahar, Marie-Joelle. "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes." In *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, edited by John Darby and Roger MacGinty. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 159-177.

Zamir, Meir. "Population Statistics of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and 1919," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 1 (Jan. 1981): 85-106.

Zawodny. J. K. "Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of Violence." *Terrorism: An International Journal* 1, nos. 3 & 4 (1978): 277-285.

Zaretsky, Robert. *Albert Camus: Elements of a Life*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2010.

Zartman, William. "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts." In *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Conflicts*, edited by William Zartman. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995.

———. *The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983.

Zeeuw, Jeroen de. "Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements." In *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements after Civil War*, edited by Jeroen DeZeeuw. Boulder, CO: Reiner, 2007. 1-32.

Zegart, Amy. "The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight." *Political Science Quarterly* 126 (Spr. 2011): 1-27.

Zelalem, Zecharias. "Worsening Violence in Western Ethiopia Forcing Civilians to Flee," *Al Jazeera*. Last update Mar. 29, 2021. Https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/20/worsening-violence-western-ethiopia-forcing-civilians-to-flee.

Zewde, Bahru. *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*. Athens, OH: Ohio University, 2001.

Zimmerman, William. "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory." *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 4 (Dec. 1973): 1204-1212.

Zinner, Paul. "Revolution in Hungary: Reflections on the Vicissitudes of a Totalitarian System." *Journal of Politics* 21, no. 1 (1959): 3-36.

Zonis, Marvin. "The 'Democracy Doctrine' of President George W. Bush." In *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, edited by Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld. New York: Routledge, 2007). 231-250.

Zubok, Vladislav. *Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)*. Vol. 6. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993.

Zürcher, Eric. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1993.

"The Zurich and London Agreements: Memorandum Setting Out the Agreed Foundation for the Final Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus." *Internet Archive: Wayback Machine*. Accessed Mar. 1, 2022. Https://web.archive.org/web/20120414215511/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Treaties%20-1959-60.html.

Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina. *Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939-1955*. Oxford: Oxford University, 2000.