

**ANCIENT & MEDIEVAL
ECONOMIC THEORY
(400 BCE - 1400 CE)**

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ECONOMIST
XENOPHON
(360 BCE)

Chapter I

Xenophon/Narrator: I once heard [Socrates] discuss the topic of economy after the following manner. Addressing Critobulus, he said: Tell me, Critobulus, is "economy," like the words "medicine," "carpentry," "building," "smithying," "metal-working," and so forth, the name of a particular kind of knowledge or science?

Crit. Yes, I think so.

Soc. And as, in the case of the arts just named, we can state the proper work or function of each, can we (similarly) state the proper work and function of economy?

Crit. It must, I should think, be the business of the good economist at any rate to manage his own house or estate well.

Soc. And supposing another man's house to be entrusted to him, he would be able, if he chose, to manage it as skilfully as his own, would he not? since a man who is skilled in carpentry can work as well for another as for himself: and this ought to be equally true of the good economist?

Crit. Yes, I think so, Socrates.

Soc. Then there is no reason why a proficient in this art, even if he does not happen to possess wealth of his own, should not be paid a salary for managing a house, just as he might be paid for building one?

Crit. None at all: and a large salary he would be entitled to earn if, after paying the necessary expenses of the estate entrusted to him, he can create a surplus and improve the property.

Soc. Well! and this word "house," what are we to understand by it? the domicile merely? or are we to include all a man's possessions outside the actual dwelling-place?

Crit. Certainly, in my opinion at any rate, everything which a man has got, even though some portion of it may lie in another part of the world from that in which he lives, forms part of his estate.

Soc. "Has got"? but he may have got enemies?

Crit. Yes, I am afraid some people have got a great many.

Soc. Then shall we say that a man's enemies form part of his possessions?

Crit. A comic notion indeed! that some one should be good enough to add to my stock of enemies, and that in addition he should be paid for his kind services.

Soc. Because, you know, we agreed that a man's estate was identical with his possessions?

Crit. Yes, certainly! the good part of his possessions; but the evil portion! no, I thank you, that I do not call part of a man's possessions.

Soc. As I understand, you would limit the term to what we may call a man's useful or advantageous possessions?

Crit. Precisely; if he has things that injure him, I should regard these rather as a loss than as wealth.

Soc. It follows apparently that if a man purchases a horse and does not know how to handle him, but each time he mounts he is thrown and sustains injuries, the horse is not part of his wealth?

Crit. Not, if wealth implies weal, certainly.

Soc. And by the same token land itself is no wealth to a man who so works it that his tillage only brings him loss?

Crit. True; mother earth herself is not a source of wealth to us if, instead of helping us to live, she helps us to starve.

Soc. And by a parity of reasoning, sheep and cattle may fail of being wealth if, through want of knowledge how to treat them, their owner loses by them; to him at any rate the sheep and the cattle are not wealth?

Crit. That is the conclusion I draw.

Soc. It appears, you hold to the position that wealth consists of things which benefit, while things which injure are not wealth?

Crit. Just so.

Soc. The same things, in fact, are wealth or not wealth, according as a man knows or does not know the use to make of them? To take an instance, a flute may be wealth to him who is sufficiently skilled to play upon it, but the same instrument is no better than the stones we tread under our feet to him who is not so skilled . . . unless indeed he chose to sell it?

Crit. That is precisely the conclusion we should come to. To persons ignorant of their use flutes are wealth as saleable, but as possessions not for sale they are no wealth at all; and see, Socrates, how smoothly and consistently the argument proceeds, since it is admitted that

things which benefit are wealth. The flutes in question unsold are not wealth, being good for nothing: to become wealth they must be sold.

Soc. Yes! Presuming the owner knows how to sell them; since, supposing again he were to sell them for something which he does not know how to use, the mere selling will not transform them into wealth, according to your argument.

Crit. You seem to say, Socrates, that money itself in the pockets of a man who does not know how to use it is not wealth?

Soc. And I understand you to concur in the truth of our proposition so far: wealth is that, and that only, whereby a man may be benefited. Obviously, if a man used his money to buy himself a mistress, to the grave detriment of his body and soul and whole estate, how is that particular money going to benefit him now? What good will he extract from it?

Crit. None whatever, unless we are prepared to admit that hyoscyamus, as they call it, is wealth, a poison the property of which is to drive those who take it mad.

Soc. Let money then, Critobulus, if a man does not know how to use it aright--let money, I say, be banished to the remote corners of the earth rather than be reckoned as wealth. But now, what shall we say of friends? If a man knows how to use his friends so as to be benefited by them, what of these?

Crit. They are wealth indisputably, and in a deeper sense than cattle are, if, as may be supposed, they are likely to prove of more benefit to a man than wealth of cattle.

Soc. It would seem, according to your argument, that the foes of a man's own household after all may be wealth to him, if he knows how to turn them to good account?

Crit. That is my opinion, at any rate.

Soc. It would seem, it is the part of a good economist to know how to deal with his own or his employer's foes so as to get profit out of them?

Crit. Most emphatically so.

Soc. In fact, you need but use your eyes to see how many private persons, not to say crowned heads, do owe the increase of their estates to war.

Crit. Well, Socrates, I do not think, so far, the argument could be improved on; but now comes a puzzle. What of people who have got the knowledge and the capital required to enhance their fortunes, if only they will put their shoulders to the wheel; and yet, if we are to believe our senses, that is just the one thing they will not do, and so their knowledge and accomplishments are of no profit to them? Surely in their case also there is but one

conclusion to be drawn, which is, that neither their knowledge nor their possessions are wealth.

Soc. Ah! I see, Critobulus, you wish to direct the discussion to the topic of slaves?

Crit. No indeed, I have no such intention--quite the reverse. I want to talk about persons of high degree, of right noble family some of them, to do them justice. These are the people I have in my mind's eye, gifted with, it may be, martial or, it may be, civil accomplishments, which, however, they refuse to exercise, for the very reason, as I take it, that they have no masters over them.

Soc. No masters over them! but how can that be if, in spite of their prayers for prosperity and their desire to do what will bring them good, they are still so sorely hindered in the exercise of their wills by those that lord it over them?

Crit. And who, pray, are these lords that rule them and yet remain unseen?

Soc. Nay, not unseen; on the contrary, they are very visible. And what is more, they are the basest of the base, as you can hardly fail to note, if at least you believe idleness and effeminacy and reckless negligence to be baseness. Then, too, there are other treacherous beldames giving themselves out to be innocent pleasures, to wit, dicings and profitless associations among men. These in the fulness of time appear in all their nakedness even to them that are deceived, showing themselves that they are after all but pains tricked out and decked with pleasures. These are they who have the dominion over those you speak of and quite hinder them from every good and useful work.

Crit. But there are others, Socrates, who are not hindered by these indulgences--on the contrary, they have the most ardent disposition to exert themselves, and by every means to increase their revenues; but in spite of all, they wear out their substance and are involved in endless difficulties.

Soc. Yes, for they too are slaves, and harsh enough are their taskmasters; slaves are they to luxury and lechery, intemperance and the wine-cup along with many a fond and ruinous ambition. These passions so cruelly belord it over the poor soul whom they have got under their thrall, that so long as he is in the heyday of health and strong to labour, they compel him to fetch and carry and lay at their feet the fruit of his toils, and to spend it on their own heart's lusts; but as soon as he is seen to be incapable of further labour through old age, they leave him to his gray hairs and misery, and turn to seize on other victims. Ah! Critobulus, against these must we wage ceaseless war, for very freedom's sake, no less than if they were armed warriors endeavouring to make us their slaves. Nay, foemen in war, it must be granted, especially when of fair and noble type, have many times ere now proved benefactors to those they have enslaved. By dint of chastening, they have forced the vanquished to become better men and to lead more tranquil lives in future. But these despotic queens never cease to plague and torment their victims in body and soul and substance until their sway is ended.

Chapter II

Crit. I think I take your meaning fully, Socrates, about these matters; and for myself, examining my heart, I am further satisfied, I have sufficient continence and self-command in those respects. So that if you will only advise me on what I am to do to improve my estate, I flatter myself I shall not be hindered by those despotic dames, as you call them. Come, do not hesitate; only tender me what good advice you can, and trust me I will follow it. But perhaps, Socrates, you have already passed sentence on us--we are rich enough already, and not in need of any further wealth?

Soc. It is to myself rather, if I may be included in your plural "we," that I should apply the remark. I am not in need of any further wealth, if you like. I am rich enough already, to be sure. But you, Critobulus, I look upon as singularly poor, and at times, upon my soul, I feel a downright compassion for you.

Crit. (laughing) And pray, Socrates, what in the name of fortune do you suppose our respective properties would fetch in the market, yours and mine?

Soc. If I could find a good purchaser, I suppose the whole of my effects, including the house in which I live, might very fairly realise five minae (say twenty guineas). Yours, I am positively certain, would fetch at the lowest more than a hundred times that sum.

Crit. And with this estimate of our respective fortunes, can you still maintain that you have no need of further wealth, but it is I who am to be pitied for my poverty?

Soc. Yes, for my property is amply sufficient to meet my wants, whereas you, considering the parade you are fenced about with, and the reputation you must needs live up to, would be barely well off, I take it, if what you have already were multiplied by three.

Crit. Pray, how may that be?

Soc. Why, first and foremost see you are called upon to offer many costly sacrifices, failing which, I take it, neither gods nor men would tolerate you; and, in the next place, you are bound to welcome numerous foreigners as guests, and to entertain them handsomely; thirdly, you must feast your fellow-citizens and ply them with all sorts of kindness, or else be cut adrift from your supporters. Furthermore, I perceive that even at present the state enjoins upon you various large contributions, such as the rearing of studs, the training of choruses, the superintendence of gymnastic schools, or consular duties, as patron of resident aliens, and so forth; while in the event of war you will, I am aware, have further obligations laid upon you in the shape of pay to carry on the triarchy, ship money, and war taxes so onerous, you will find difficulty in supporting them. Remissness in respect of any of these charges will be visited upon you by the good citizens of Athens no less strictly than if they caught you stealing their own property. But worse than all, I see you fondling the notion that you are rich.

Without a thought or care how to increase your revenue, your fancy lightly turns to thoughts of love, as if you had some special license to amuse yourself. . . . That is why I pity and compassionate you, fearing lest some irremediable mischief overtake you, and you find yourself in desperate straits. As for me, if I ever stood in need of anything, I am sure you know I have friends who would assist me. They would make some trifling contribution - trifling to themselves, I mean - and deluge my humble living with a flood of plenty. But your friends, albeit far better off than yourself, considering your respective styles of living, persist in looking to you for assistance.

Crit. I cannot gainsay what you have spoken, Socrates, it is indeed high time that you were constituted my patronus, or I shall become in very truth a pitiable object.

Soc. Why, you yourself must surely be astonished at the part you are now playing. Just now, when I said that I was rich, you laughed at me as if I had no idea what riches were, and you were not happy till you had cross-examined me and forced me to confess that I do not possess the hundredth part of what you have; and now you are imploring me to be your patron, and to stint no pains to save you from becoming absolutely and in very truth a pauper.

Crit. Yes, Socrates, for I see that you are skilled in one lucrative operation at all events--the art of creating a surplus. I hope, therefore, that a man who can make so much out of so little will not have the slightest difficulty in creating an ample surplus out of an abundance.

Soc. But do not you recollect how just now in the discussion you would hardly let me utter a syllable while you laid down the law: if a man did not know how to handle horses, horses were not wealth to him at any rate; nor land, nor sheep, nor money, nor anything else, if he did not know how to use them? And yet these are the very sources of revenue from which incomes are derived; and how do you expect me to know the use of any of them who never possessed a single one of them since I was born?

Crit. Yes, but we agreed that, however little a man may be blest with wealth himself, a science of economy exists; and that being so, what hinders you from being its professor?

Soc. Nothing, to be sure, except what would hinder a man from knowing how to play the flute, supposing he had never had a flute of his own and no one had supplied the defect by lending him one to practise on: which is just my case with regard to economy, seeing I never myself possessed the instrument of the science which is wealth, so as to go through the pupil stage, nor hitherto has any one proposed to hand me over his to manage. You, in fact, are the first person to make so generous an offer. You will bear in mind, I hope, that a learner of the harp is apt to break and spoil the instrument; it is therefore probable, if I take in hand to learn the art of economy on your estate, I shall ruin it outright.

Crit. I see, Socrates, you are doing your very best to escape an irksome task: you would rather not, if you can help it, stretch out so much as your little finger to help me to bear my necessary burthens more easily.

Soc. No, upon my word, I am not trying to escape: on the contrary, I shall be ready, as far as I can, to expound the matter to you . . . Still it strikes me, if you had come to me for fire, and I had none in my house, you would not blame me for sending you where you might get it; or if you had asked me for water, and I, having none to give, had led you elsewhere to the object of your search, you would not, I am sure, have disapproved; or did you desire to be taught music by me, and I were to point out to you a far more skilful teacher than myself, who would perhaps be grateful to you moreover for becoming his pupil, what kind of exception could you take to my behaviour?

Crit. None, with any show of justice, Socrates.

Soc. Well, then, my business now is, Critobulus, to point out to you some others cleverer than myself about those matters which you are so anxious to be taught by me. I do confess to you, I have made it long my study to discover who among our fellow-citizens in this city are the greatest adepts in the various branches of knowledge. I had been struck with amazement, I remember, to observe on some occasion that where a set of people are engaged in identical operations, half of them are in absolute indigence and the other half roll in wealth. I bethought me, the history of the matter was worth investigation. Accordingly I set to work investigating, and I found that it all happened very naturally. Those who carried on their affairs in a haphazard manner I saw were punished by their losses; whilst those who kept their wits upon the stretch and paid attention I soon perceived to be rewarded by the greater ease and profit of their undertakings. It is to these I would recommend you to betake yourself. What say you? Learn of them: and unless the will of God oppose, I venture to say you will become as clever a man of business as one might hope to see.

Chapter III

Crit. Be sure, Socrates, I will not let you go now until you give the proofs which, in the presence of our friends, you undertook just now to give me.

Soc. Well then, what if I begin by showing you two sorts of people, the one expending large sums on money in building useless houses, the other at far less cost erecting dwellings replete with all they need; will you admit that I have laid my finger here on one of the essentials of economy?

Crit. An essential point most certainly.

Soc. And suppose in connection with the same, I next point out to you two other sets of persons: - The first possessors of furniture of various kinds, which they cannot, however, lay their hands on when the need arises; indeed they hardly know if they have got all safe and sound or not: whereby they put themselves and their domestics to much mental torture. The others are perhaps less amply, or at any rate not more amply supplied, but they have everything ready at the instant for immediate use.

Crit. Yes, Socrates, and is not the reason simply that in the first case everything is thrown down where it chanced, whereas those others have everything arranged, each in its appointed place?

Soc. Quite right, and the phrase implies that everything is orderly arranged, not in the first chance place, but in that to which it naturally belongs.

Crit. Yes, the case is to the point, I think, and does involve another economic principle.

Soc. What, then, if I exhibit to you a third contrast, which bears on the condition of domestic slaves? On the one side you shall see them fettered hard and fast, as I may say, and yet for ever breaking their chains and running away. On the other side the slaves are loosed, and free to move, but for all that, they choose to work, it seems; they are constant to their masters. I think you will admit that I here point out another function of economy worth noting.

Crit. I do indeed - a feature most noteworthy.

Soc. Or take, again, the instance of two farmers engaged in cultivating farms as like as possible. The one had never done asserting that agriculture has been his ruin, and is in the depth of despair; the other has all he needs in abundance and of the best, and how acquired? - by this same agriculture.

Crit. Yes, to be sure; perhaps the former spends both toil and money not simply on what he needs, but on things which cause an injury to house alike and owner.

Soc. That is a possible case, no doubt, but it is not the one that I refer to; I mean people pretending they are farmers, and yet they have not a penny to expend on the real needs of their business.

Crit. And pray, what may be the reason of that, Socrates?

Soc. You shall come with me, and see these people also; and as you contemplate the scene, I presume you will lay to heart the lesson.

Crit. I will, if possibly I can, I promise you.

Soc. Yes, and while you contemplate, you must make trial of yourself and see if you have wit to understand. At present, I will bear you witness that if it is to go and see a party of players performing in a comedy, you will get up at cock-crow, and come trudging a long way, and ply me volubly with reasons why I should accompany you to see the play. But you have never once invited me to come and witness such an incident as those we were speaking of just now.

Crit. And so I seem to you ridiculous?

Soc. Far more ridiculous to yourself, I warrant. But now let me point out to you another contrast: between certain people whose dealing with horses has brought them to the brink of poverty, and certain others who have found in the same pursuit the road to affluence, and have a right besides to plume themselves upon their gains.

Crit. Well, then, I may tell you, I see and know both characters as well as you do; but I do not find myself a whit the more included among those who gain.

Soc. Because you look at them just as you might at the actors in a tragedy or comedy, and with the same intent - your object being to delight the ear and charm the eye, but not, I take it, to become yourself a poet. And there you are right enough, no doubt, since you have no desire to become a playwright. But, when circumstances compel you to concern yourself with horsemanship, does it not seem to you a little foolish not to consider how you are to escape being a mere amateur in the matter, especially as the same creatures which are good for use are profitable for sale?

Crit. So you wish me to set up as a breeder of young horses, do you, Socrates?

Soc. Not so, no more than I would recommend you to purchase lads and train them up from boyhood as farm-labourers. But in my opinion there is a certain happy moment of growth which must be seized, alike in man and horse, rich in present service and in future promise. In further illustration, I can show you how some men treat their wedded wives in such a way that they find in them true helpmates to the joint increase of their estate, while others treat them in a way to bring upon themselves wholesale disaster.

Crit. Ought the husband or the wife to bear the blame of that?

Soc. If it goes ill with the sheep we blame the shepherd, as a rule, or if a horse shows vice we throw the blame in general upon the rider. But in the case of women, supposing the wife to have received instruction from her husband and yet she delights in wrong-doing, it may be that the wife is justly held to blame; but supposing he has never tried to teach her the first principles of "fair and noble" conduct, and finds her quite an ignoramus in these matters, surely the husband will be justly held to blame. But come now (he added), we are all friends here; make a clean breast of it, and tell us, Critobulus, the plain unvarnished truth: Is there an one to whom you are more in the habit of entrusting matters of importance than to your wife?

Crit. There is no one.

Soc. And is there any one with whom you are less in the habit of conversing than with your wife?

Crit. Not many, I am forced to admit.

Soc. And when you married her she was quite young, a mere girl - at an age when, as far as seeing and hearing go, she had the smallest acquaintance with the outer world?

Crit. Certainly.

Soc. Then would it not be more astonishing that she should have real knowledge how to speak and act than that she should go altogether astray?

Crit. But let me ask you a question, Socrates: have those happy husbands, you tell us of, who are blessed with good wives educated them themselves?

Soc. There is nothing like investigation. I will introduce you to Aspasia, who will explain these matters to you in a far more scientific way than I can. My belief is that a good wife, being as she is the partner in a common estate, must needs be her husband's counterpoise and counterpart for good; since, if it is through the transactions of the husband, as a rule, that goods of all sorts find their way into the house, yet it is by means of the wife's economy and thrift that the greater part of the expenditure is checked, and on the successful issue or the mishandling of the same depends the increase or impoverishment of a whole estate. And so with regard to the remaining arts and sciences, I think I can point out to you the ablest performers in each case, if you feel you have any further need of help.

Chapter IV

Crit. But why need you illustrate all the sciences, Socrates? It would not be very easy to discover efficient craftsmen of all the arts, and quite impossible to become skilled in all one's self. So, please, confine yourself to the nobler branches of knowledge as men regard them, such as it will best befit me to pursue with devotion; be so good as to point me out these and their performers, and, above all, contribute as far as in you lies the aid of your own personal instruction.

Soc. A good suggestion, Critobulus, for the base mechanic arts, so called, have got a bad name; and what is more, are held in ill repute by civilised communities, and not unreasonably; seeing they are the ruin of the bodies of all concerned in them, workers and overseers alike, who are forced to remain in sitting postures and to hug the loom, or else to crouch whole days confronting a furnace. Hand in hand with physical enervation follows apace enfeeblement of soul: while the demand which these base mechanic arts makes on the time of those employed in them leaves them no leisure to devote to the claims of friendship and the state. How can such folk be other than sorry friends and ill defenders of the fatherland? So much so that in some states, especially those reputed to be warlike, no citizen is allowed to exercise any mechanical craft at all.

Crit. Then which are the arts you would counsel us to engage in?

Soc. Well, we shall not be ashamed, I hope, to imitate the kings of Persia? That monarch, it is said, regards amongst the noblest and most necessary pursuits two in particular, which are the arts of husbandry and war, and in these two he takes the strongest interest.

Crit. What! Do you, Socrates, really believe that the king of Persia pays a personal regard to husbandry, along with all his other cares?

Soc. We have only to investigate the matter, Critobulus, and I daresay we shall discover whether this is so or not. We are agreed that he takes strong interest in military matters; since, however numerous the tributary nations, there is a governor to each, and every governor has orders from the king what number of cavalry, archers, slingers and targeteers it is his business to support, as adequate to control the subject population, or in case of hostile attack to defend the country. Apart from these the king keeps garrisons in all the citadels. The actual support of these devolves upon the governor, to whom the duty is assigned. The king himself meanwhile conducts the annual inspection and review of troops, both mercenary and other, that have orders to be under arms. These all are simultaneously assembled (with the exception of the garrisons of citadels) at the mustering ground, so named. That portion of the army within access of the royal residence the king reviews in person; the remainder, living in remoter districts of the empire, he inspects by proxy, sending certain trusty representatives. Wherever the commandants of garrisons, the captains of thousands, and the satraps are seen to have their appointed members complete, and at the same time shall present their troops

equipped with horse and arms in thorough efficiency, these officers the king delights to honour, and showers gifts upon them largely. But as to those officers whom he finds either to have neglected their garrisons, or to have made private gain of their position, these he heavily chastises, deposing them from office, and appointing other superintendents in their stead. Such conduct, I think we may say, indisputably proves the interest which he takes in matters military. [...] Further than this, by means of a royal progress through the country, he has an opportunity of inspecting personally some portion of his territory, and again of visiting the remainder in proxy as above by trusty representatives; and wheresoever he perceives that any of his governors can present to him a district thickly populated, and the soil in a state of active cultivation, full of trees and fruits, its natural products, to such officers he adds other territory, adorning them with gifts and distinguishing them by seats of honour. But those officers whose land he sees lying idle and with but few inhabitants, owing either to the harshness of their government, their insolence, or their neglect, he punishes, and making them to cease from their office he appoints other rulers in their place. . . . Does not this conduct indicate at least as great an anxiety to promote the active cultivation of the land by its inhabitants as to provide for its defence by military occupation? [...] Moreover, the governors appointed to preside over these two departments of state are not one and the same. But one class governs the inhabitants proper including the workers of the soil, and collects the tribute from them, another is in command of the armed garrisons. If the commandant protects the country insufficiently, the civil governor of the population, who is in charge also of the productive works, lodges accusation against the commandant to the effect that the inhabitants are prevented working through deficiency of protection. Or if again, in spite of peace being secured to the works of the land by the military governor, the civil authority still presents a territory sparse in population and untilled, it is the commandant's turn to accuse the civil ruler. For you may take it as a rule, a population tilling their territory badly will fail to support their garrisons and be quite unequal to paying their tribute. Where a satrap is appointed he has charge of both departments.

Crit. Well, Socrates, if such is his conduct, I admit that the great king does pay attention to agriculture no less than to military affairs.

Soc. And besides all this, nowhere among the various countries which he inhabits or visits does he fail to make it his first care that there shall be orchards and gardens, parks and "paradises," as they are called, full of all fair and noble products which the earth brings forth; and within these chiefly he spends his days, when the season of the year permits.

Crit. To be sure, Socrates, it is a natural and necessary conclusion that when the king himself spends so large a portion of his time there, his paradises should be furnished to perfection with trees and all else beautiful that earth brings forth.

Soc. And some say, Critobulus, that when the king gives gifts, he summons in the first place those who have shown themselves brave warriors, since all the ploughing in the world were but small gain in the absence of those who should protect the fields; and next to these he summons those who have stocked their countries best and rendered them productive, on the

principle that but for the tillers of the soil the warriors themselves could scarcely live. And there is a tale told of Cyrus, the most famous prince, I need not tell you, who ever wore a crown, how on one occasion he said to those who had been called to receive the gifts, "it were no injustice, if he himself received the gifts due to warriors and tillers of the soil alike," for "did he not carry off the palm in stocking the country and also in protecting the goods with which it had been stocked?"

Crit. Which clearly shows, Socrates, if the tale be true, that this same Cyrus took as great a pride in fostering the productive energies of his country and stocking it with good things, as in his reputation as a warrior.

Soc. Why, yes indeed, had Cyrus lived, I have no doubt he would have proved the best of rulers, and in support of this belief, apart from other testimony amply furnished by his life, witness what happened when he marched to do battle for the sovereignty of Persia with his brother. Not one man, it is said, deserted from Cyrus to the king, but from the king to Cyrus tens of thousands. And this also I deem a great testimony to a ruler's worth, that his followers follow him of their own free will, and when the moment of danger comes refuse to part from him. Now this was the case with Cyrus. His friends not only fought their battles side by side with him while he lived, but when he died they too died battling around his dead body, one and all, excepting only Ariaeus, who was absent at his post on the left wing of the army. But there is another tale of this same Cyrus in connection with Lysander, who himself narrated it on one occasion to a friend of his in Megara. [...] Lysander, it seems, had gone with presents sent by the Allies to Cyrus, who entertained him, and amongst other marks of courtesy showed him his "paradise" at Sardis. Lysander was astonished at the beauty of the trees within, all planted at equal intervals, the long straight rows of waving branches, the perfect regularity, the rectangular symmetry of the whole, and the many sweet scents which hung about them as they paced the park. In admiration he exclaimed to Cyrus: "All this beauty is marvellous enough, but what astonishes me still more is the talent of the artificer who mapped out and arranged for you the several parts of this fair scene." Cyrus was pleased by the remark, and said: "Know then, Lysander, it is I who measured and arranged it all. Some of the trees," he added, "I planted with my own hands." Then Lysander, regarding earnestly the speaker, when he saw the beauty of his apparel and perceived its fragrance, the splendour also of the necklaces and armlets, and other ornaments which he wore, exclaimed: "What say you, Cyrus? did you with your own hands plant some of these trees?" whereat the other: "Does that surprise you, Lysander? I swear to you by Mithres, when in ordinary health I never dream of sitting down to supper without first practising some exercise of war or husbandry in the sweat of my brow, or venturing some strife of honour, as suits my mood." "On hearing this," said Lysander to his friend, "I could not help seizing him by the hand and exclaiming, 'Cyrus, you have indeed good right to be a happy man, since you are happy in being a good man.'"

Chapter V

Soc. [...] All this I relate to you to show you that quite high and mighty people find it hard to hold aloof from agriculture, devotion to which art would seem to be thrice blest, combining as it does a certain sense of luxury with the satisfaction of an improved estate, and such a training of physical energies as shall fit a man to play a free man's part. Earth, in the first place, freely offers to those that labour all things necessary to the life of man; and, as if that were not enough, makes further contribution of a thousand luxuries. It is she who supplies with sweetest scent and fairest show all things wherewith to adorn the altars and statues of the gods, or deck man's person. It is to her we owe our many delicacies of flesh or fowl or vegetable growth; since with the tillage of the soil is closely linked the art of breeding sheep and cattle, whereby we mortals may offer sacrifices well pleasing to the gods, and satisfy our personal needs withal. [...] And albeit she, good cateress, pours out her blessings upon us in abundance, yet she suffers not her gifts to be received effeminately, but inures her pensioners to suffer gladly summer's heat and winter's cold. Those that labour with their hands, the actual delvers of the soil, she trains in a wrestling school of her own, adding strength to strength; whilst those others whose devotion is confined to the overseeing eye and to studious thought, she makes more manly, rousing them with cock-crow, and compelling them to be up and doing in many a long day's march. Since, whether in city or afield, with the shifting seasons each necessary labour has its hour of performance. [...] Or to turn to another side. Suppose it to be a man's ambition to aid his city as a trooper mounted on a charger of his own: why not combine the rearing of horses with other stock? it is the farmer's chance. Or would your citizen serve on foot? It is husbandry that shall give him robustness of body. Or if we turn to the toil-loving fascination of the chase, here once more earth adds incitement, as well as furnishing facility of sustenance for the dogs as by nurturing a foster brood of wild animals. And if horses and dogs derive benefit from this art of husbandry, they in turn requite the boon through service rendered to the farm. The horse carries his best of friends, the careful master, betimes to the scene of labour and devotion, and enables him to leave it late. The dog keeps off the depredations of wild animals from fruits and flocks, and creates security in the solitary place. [...] Earth, too, adds stimulus in war-time to earth's tillers; she pricks them on to aid the country under arms, and this she does by fostering her fruits in open field, the prize of valour for the mightiest. For this also is the art athletic, this of husbandry; as thereby men are fitted to run, and hurl the spear, and leap with the best. [...] This, too, is that kindest of arts which makes requital tenfold in kind for every work of the labourer. She is the sweet mistress who, with smile of welcome and outstretched hand, greets the approach of her devoted one, seeming to say, Take from me all thy heart's desire. She is the generous hostess; she keeps open house for the stranger. For where else, save in some happy rural seat of her devising, shall a man more cheerily cherish content in winter, with bubbling bath and blazing fire? or where, save afield, in summer rest more sweetly, lulled by babbling streams, soft airs, and tender shades? [...] Her high prerogative it is to offer fitting first-fruits to high heaven, hers to furnish forth the overflowing festal board. Hers is a kindly presence in the household. She is the good wife's favourite, the children long for her, she waves her hand winningly to the master's friends. [...] For myself, I marvel greatly if it has ever fallen to the lot of freeborn

man to own a choicer possession, or to discover an occupation more seductive, or of wider usefulness in life than this. But, furthermore, earth of her own will gives lessons in justice and uprightness to all who can understand her meaning, since the nobler the service of devotion rendered, the ampler the riches of her recompense. One day, perchance, these pupils of hers, whose conversation in past times was in husbandry, shall, by reason of the multitude of invading armies, be ousted from their labours. The work of their hands may indeed be snatched from them, but they were brought up in stout and manly fashion. They stand, each one of them, in body and soul equipped; and, save God himself shall hinder them, they will march into the territory of those their human hinderers, and take from them the wherewithal to support their lives. Since often enough in war it is surer and safer to quest for food with sword and buckler than with all the instruments of husbandry. [...] But there is yet another lesson to be learnt in the public school of husbandry - the lesson of mutual assistance. "Shoulder to shoulder" must we march to meet the invader; "shoulder to shoulder" stand to compass the tillage of the soil. Therefore it is that the husbandman, who means to win in his avocation, must see that he creates enthusiasm in his workpeople and a spirit of ready obedience; which is just what a general attacking an enemy will scheme to bring about, when he deals out gifts to the brave and castigation to those who are disorderly. [...] Nor will there be lacking seasons of exhortation, the general haranguing his troops and the husbandman his labourers; nor because they are slaves do they less than free men need the lure of hope and happy expectation, that they may willingly stand to their posts. [...] It was an excellent saying of his who named husbandry "the mother and nurse of all the arts," for while agriculture prospers all other arts like are vigorous and strong, but where the land is forced to remain desert, the spring that feeds the other arts is dried up; they dwindle, I had almost said, one and all, by land and sea.

Crit. Socrates, for my part I agree with all you say; only, one must face the fact that in agriculture nine matters out of ten are beyond man's calculation. Since at one time hailstones and another frost, at another drought or a deluge of rain, or mildew, or other pest, will obliterate all the fair creations and designs of men; or behold, his fleecy flocks most fairly nurtured, then comes murrain, and the end most foul destruction.

Soc. Nay, I thought, Critobulus, you full surely were aware that the operations of husbandry, no less than those of war, lie in the hands of the gods. I am sure you will have noted the behaviour of men engaged in war; how on the verge of military operations they strive to win the acceptance of the divine powers; how eagerly they assail the ears of heaven, and by dint of sacrifices and omens seek to discover what they should and what they should not do. So likewise as regards the processes of husbandry, think you the propitiation of heaven is less needed here? Be well assured (he added) the wise and prudent will pay service to the gods on behalf of moist fruits and dry, on behalf of cattle and horses, sheep and goats; nay, on behalf of all their possessions, great and small, without exception.

Chapter VI

Crit. Your words command my entire sympathy, when you bid us endeavour to begin each work with heaven's help, seeing that the gods hold in their hands the issues alike of peace and war. So at any rate will we endeavour to act at all times; but will you now endeavour on your side to continue the discussion of economy from the point at which you broke off, and bring it point by point to its conclusion? What you have said so far has not been thrown away on me. I seem to discern already more clearly, what sort of behaviour is necessary to anything like real living.

Soc. What say you then? Shall we first survey the ground already traversed, and retrace the steps on which we were agreed, so that, if possible we may conduct the remaining portion of the argument to its issue with like unanimity?

Crit. Why, yes! If it is agreeable for two partners in a business to run through their accounts without dispute, so now as partners in an argument it will be no less agreeable to sum up the points under discussion, as you say, with unanimity.

Soc. Well, then, we agreed that economy was the proper title of a branch of knowledge, and this branch of knowledge appeared to be that whereby men are enabled to enhance the value of their houses or estates; and by this word "house or estate" we understood the whole of a man's possessions; and "possessions" again we defined to include those things which the possessor should find advantageous for the purposes of his life; and things advantageous finally were discovered to mean all that a man knows how to use and turn to good account. Further, for a man to learn all branches of knowledge not only seemed to us an impossibility, but we thought we might well follow the example of civil communities in rejecting the base mechanic arts so called, on the ground that they destroy the bodies of the artisans, as far as we can see, and crush their spirits. [...] The clearest proof of this, we said, could be discovered if, on the occasion of a hostile inroad, one were to seat the husbandmen and the artisans apart in two divisions, and then proceed to put this question to each group in turn: "Do you think it better to defend our country districts or to retire from the fields and guard the walls?" And we anticipated that those concerned with the soil would vote to defend the soil; while the artisans would vote not to fight, but, in docile obedience to their training, to sit with folded hands, neither expending toil nor venturing their lives. [...] Next we held it as proved that there was no better employment for a gentleman--we described him as a man beautiful and good--than this of husbandry, by which human beings procure to themselves the necessaries of life. This same employment, moreover, was, as we agreed, at once the easiest to learn and the pleasantest to follow, since it gives to the limbs beauty and hardihood, whilst permitting to the soul leisure to satisfy the claims of friendship and of civic duty. [...] Again it seemed to us that husbandry acts as a spur to bravery in the hearts of those that till the fields, inasmuch as the necessaries of life, vegetable and animal, under her auspices spring up and are reared outside the fortified defences of the city. For which reason also this way of life

stood in the highest repute in the eyes of statesmen and commonwealths, as furnishing the best citizens and those best disposed to the common weal.

Crit. I think I am fully persuaded as to the propriety of making agriculture the basis of life. I see it is altogether noblest, best, and pleasantest to do so. But I should like to revert to your remark that you understood the reason why the tillage of one man brings him in an abundance of all he needs, while the operations of another fail to make husbandry a profitable employment. I would gladly hear from you an explanation of both these points, so that I may adopt the right and avoid the harmful course.

Soc. Well, Critobulus, suppose I narrate to you from the beginning how I came in contact with a man who of all men I ever met seemed to me to deserve the appellation of a gentleman. He was indeed a "beautiful and good" man.

Crit. There is nothing I should better like to hear, since of all titles this is the one I covet most the right to bear.

Soc. Well, then, I will tell you how I came to subject him to my inquiry. It did not take me long to go the round of various good carpenters, good bronze-workers, painters, sculptors, and so forth. A brief period was sufficient for the contemplation of themselves and of their most admired works of art. But when it came to examining those who bore the high-sounding title "beautiful and good," in order to find out what conduct on their part justified their adoption of this title, I found my soul eager with desire for intercourse with one of them; and first of all, seeing that the epithet "beautiful" was conjoined with that of "good," every beautiful person I saw, I must needs approach in my endeavour to discover, if haply I might somewhere see the quality of good adhering to the quality of beauty. But, after all, it was otherwise ordained. I soon enough seemed to discover that some of those who in their outward form were beautiful were in their inmost selves the veriest knaves. Accordingly I made up my mind to let go beauty which appeals to the eye, and address myself to one of those "beautiful and good" people so entitled. And since I heard of Ischomachus as one who was so called by all the world, both men and women, strangers and citizens alike, I set myself to make acquaintance with him.

Chapter VII

Soc. It chanced, one day I saw him seated in the portico of Zeus Eleutherios, and as he appeared to be at leisure, I went up to him and, sitting down by his side, accosted him: How is this, Ischomachus? you seated here, you who are so little wont to be at leisure? As a rule, when I see you, you are doing something, or at any rate not sitting idle in the market-place. Nor would you see me now so sitting, Socrates (he answered), but that I promised to meet some strangers, friends of mine, at this place. And when you have no such business on hand (I said) where in heaven's name do you spend your time and how do you employ yourself? I will not conceal from you how anxious I am to learn from your lips by what conduct you have earned for yourself the title "beautiful and good." It is not by spending your days indoors at home, I am sure; the whole habit of your body bears witness to a different sort of life. [...] Then Ischomachus, smiling at my question, but also, as it seemed to me, a little pleased to be asked what he had done to earn the title "beautiful and good," made answer:

Isch. Whether that is the title by which folk call me when they talk to you about me, I cannot say; all I know is, when they challenge me to exchange properties, or else to perform some service to the state instead of them, the fitting out of a trireme, or the training of a chorus, nobody thinks of asking for the beautiful and good gentleman, but it is plain Ischomachus, the son of So-and-so, on whom the summons is served. But to answer your question, Socrates, I certainly do not spend my days indoors, if for no other reason, because my wife is quite capable of managing our domestic affairs without my aid.

Soc. Ah! Ischomachus, that is just what I should like particularly to learn from you. Did you yourself educate your wife to be all that a wife should be, or when you received her from her father and mother was she already a proficient well skilled to discharge the duties appropriate to a wife?

Isch. Well skilled! What proficiency was she likely to bring with her, when she was not quite fifteen at the time she wedded me, and during the whole prior period of her life had been most carefully brought up to see and hear as little as possible, and to ask the fewest questions? Or do you not think one should be satisfied, if at marriage her whole experience consisted in knowing how to take the wool and make a dress, and seeing how her mother's handmaidens had their daily spinning-tasks assigned them? For, as regards control of appetite and self-indulgence, she had received the soundest education, and that I take to be the most important matter in the bringing-up of man or woman.

Soc. Then all else, you taught your wife yourself, Ischomachus, until you had made her capable of attending carefully to her appointed duties?

Isch. That did I not until I had offered sacrifice, and prayed that I might teach and she might learn all that could conduce to the happiness of us twain.

Soc. And did your wife join in sacrifice and prayer to that effect?

Isch. Most certainly, with many a vow registered to heaven to become all she ought to be; and her whole manner showed that she would not be neglectful of what was taught her.

Soc. Pray narrate to me, Ischomachus, I beg of you, what you first essayed to teach her. To hear that story would please me more than any description of the most splendid gymnastic contest or horse-race you could give me.

Isch. Why, Socrates, when after a time she had become accustomed to my hand, that is, was tamed sufficiently to play her part in a discussion, I put to her this question: "Did it ever strike you to consider, dear wife, what led me to choose you as my wife among all women, and your parents to entrust you to me of all men? It was certainly not from any difficulty that might beset either of us to find another bedfellow. That I am sure is evident to you. No! it was with deliberate intent to discover, I for myself and your parents in behalf of you, the best partner of house and children we could find, that I sought you out, and your parents, acting to the best of their ability, made choice of me. If at some future time God grant us to have children born to us, we will take counsel together how best to bring them up, for that too will be a common interest, and a common blessing if haply they shall live to fight our battles and we find in them hereafter support and succour when ourselves are old. But at present there is our house here, which belongs like to both. It is common property, for all that I possess goes by my will into the common fund, and in the same way all that you deposited was placed by you to the common fund. We need not stop to calculate in figures which of us contributed most, but rather let us lay to heart this fact that whichever of us proves the better partner, he or she at once contributes what is most worth having." [...] Thus I addressed her, Socrates, and thus my wife made answer: "But how can I assist you? What is my ability? Nay, everything depends on you. My business, my mother told me, was to be sober-minded!" [...] "Most true, my wife," I replied, "and that is what my father said to me. But what is the proof of sober-mindedness in man or woman? Is it not so to behave that what they have of good may ever be at its best, and that new treasures from the same source of beauty and righteousness may be most amply added?" [...] "But what is there that I can do," my wife inquired, "which will help to increase our joint estate?" [...] "Assuredly," I answered, "you may strive to do as well as possible what Heaven has given you a natural gift for and which the law approves." [...] "And what may these things be?" she asked. [...] "To my mind they are not the things of least importance," I replied, "unless the things which the queen bee in her hive presides over are of slight importance to the bee community; for the gods", "the gods, my wife, would seem to have exercised much care and judgment in compacting that twin system which goes by the name of male and female, so as to secure the greatest possible advantage[18] to the pair. Since no doubt the underlying principle of the bond is first and foremost to perpetuate through procreation the races of living creatures; and next, as the outcome of this bond, for human beings at any rate, a provision is made by which they may have sons and daughters to support them in old age. [...] "And again, the way of life of human beings, not being maintained like that of cattle in the open air, obviously demands roofed homesteads. But if these same human beings are to have anything to bring in under cover,

some one to carry out these labours of the field under high heaven must be found them, since such operations as the breaking up of fallow with the plough, the sowing of seed, the planting of trees, the pasturing and herding of flocks, are one and all open-air employments on which the supply of products necessary to life depends. [...] As soon as these products of the field are safely housed and under cover, new needs arise. There must be some one to guard the store and some one to perform such necessary operations as imply the need of shelter. Shelter, for instance, is needed for the rearing of infant children; shelter is needed for the various processes of converting the fruits of earth into food, and in like manner for the fabrication of clothing out of wool. [...] But whereas both of these, the indoor and the outdoor occupations alike, demand new toil and new attention, to meet the case," I added, "God made provision from the first by shaping, as it seems to me, the woman's nature for indoor and the man's for outdoor occupations. Man's body and soul He furnished with a greater capacity for enduring heat and cold, wayfaring and military marches; or, to repeat, He laid upon his shoulders the outdoor works. [...] While in creating the body of woman with less capacity for these things," I continued, "God would seem to have imposed on her the indoor works; and knowing that He had implanted in the woman and imposed upon her the nurture of new-born babies, He endowed her with a larger share of affection for the new-born child than He bestowed upon man. And since He imposed on woman the guardianship of the things imported from without, God, in His wisdom, perceiving that a fearful spirit was no detriment to guardianship, endowed the woman with a larger measure of timidity than He bestowed on man. Knowing further that he to whom the outdoor works belonged would need to defend them against malign attack, He endowed the man in turn with a larger share of courage. [...] And seeing that both alike feel the need of giving and receiving, He set down memory and carefulness between them for their common use, so that you would find it hard to determine which of the two, the male or the female, has the larger share of these. So, too, God set down between them for their common use the gift of self-control, where needed, adding only to that one of the twain, whether man or woman, which should prove the better, the power to be rewarded with a larger share of this perfection. And for the very reason that their natures are not alike adapted to like ends, they stand in greater need of one another; and the married couple is made more useful to itself, the one fulfilling what the other lacks. [...] Now, being well aware of this, my wife," I added, "and knowing well what things are laid upon us twain by God Himself, must we not strive to perform, each in the best way possible, our respective duties? Law, too, gives her consent - law and the usage of mankind, by sanctioning the wedlock of man and wife; and just as God ordained them to be partners in their children, so the law establishes their common ownership of house and estate. Custom, moreover, proclaims as beautiful those excellences of man and woman with which God gifted them at birth. Thus for a woman to bide tranquilly at home rather than roam abroad is no dishonour; but for a man to remain indoors, instead of devoting himself to outdoor pursuits, is a thing discreditable. But if a man does things contrary to the nature given him by God, the chances are, such insubordination escapes not the eye of Heaven: he pays the penalty, whether of neglecting his own works, or of performing those appropriate to woman." [...] I added: "Just such works, if I mistake not, that same queen-bee we spoke of labours hard to perform, like yours, my wife, enjoined upon her by God Himself." [...] "And what sort of works are these?" she asked; "what has the queen-bee to do that she seems so like myself, or I like her in what I have to

do?" [...] "Why," I answered, "she too stays in the hive and suffers not the other bees to idle. Those whose duty it is to work outside she sends forth to their labours; and all that each of them brings in, she notes and receives and stores against the day of need; but when the season for use has come, she distributes a just share to each. Again, it is she who presides over the fabric of choicely-woven cells within. She looks to it that warp and woof are wrought with speed and beauty. Under her guardian eye the brood of young is nursed and reared; but when the days of rearing are past and the young bees are ripe for work, she sends them out as colonists with one of the seed royal to be their leader." [...] "Shall I then have to do these things?" asked my wife. [...] "Yes," I answered, "you will need in the same way to stay indoors, despatching to their toils without those of your domestics whose work lies there. Over those whose appointed tasks are wrought indoors, it will be your duty to preside; yours to receive the stuffs brought in; yours to apportion part for daily use, and yours to make provision for the rest, to guard and garner it so that the outgoings destined for a year may not be expended in a month. It will be your duty, when the wools are introduced, to see that clothing is made for those who need; your duty also to see that the dried corn is rendered fit and serviceable for food. [...] "There is just one of all these occupations which devolve upon you," I added, "you may not find so altogether pleasing. Should any one of our household fall sick, it will be your care to see and tend them to the recovery of their health." [...] "Nay," she answered, "that will be my pleasantest of tasks, if careful nursing may touch the springs of gratitude and leave them friendlier than before." [...] And I (continued Ischomachus) was struck with admiration at her answer, and replied: "Think you, my wife, it is through some such traits of forethought seen in their mistress-leader that the hearts of bees are won, and they are so loyally affectioned towards her that, if ever she abandon her hive, not one of them will dream of being left behind; but one and all must follow her." [...] And my wife made answer to me: "It would much astonish me (said she) did not these leader's works, you speak of, point to you rather than myself. Methinks mine would be a pretty guardianship and distribution of things indoors without your provident care to see that the importations from without were duly made." [...] "Just so," I answered, "and mine would be a pretty importation if there were no one to guard what I imported. Do you not see," I added, "how pitiful is the case of those unfortunates who pour water in their sieves for ever, as the story goes,[36] and labour but in vain? Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve, And hope without an object cannot live." [...] "Pitiful enough, poor souls," she answered, "if that is what they do." [...] "But there are other cares, you know, and occupations," I answered, "which are yours by right, and these you will find agreeable. This, for instance, to take some maiden who knows naught of carding wool and to make her proficient in the art, doubling her usefulness; or to receive another quite ignorant of housekeeping or of service, and to render her skilful, loyal, serviceable, till she is worth her weight in gold; or again, when occasion serves, you have it in your power to requite by kindness the well-behaved whose presence is a blessing to your house; or maybe to chasten the bad character, should such an one appear. But the greatest joy of all will be to prove yourself my better; to make me your faithful follower; knowing no dread lest as the years advance you should decline in honour in your household, but rather trusting that, though your hair turn gray, yet, in proportion as you come to be a better helpmate to myself and to the children, a better guardian of our home, so will your honour increase throughout the household as mistress, wife, and mother, daily more dearly prized.

Since," I added, "it is not through excellence of outward form, but by reason of the lustre of virtues shed forth upon the life of man, that increase is given to things beautiful and good." [...] That, Socrates, or something like that, as far as I may trust my memory, records the earliest conversation which I held with her.

Chapter VIII

Soc. And did you happen to observe, Ischomachus, whether, as the result of what was said, your wife was stirred at all to greater carefulness?

Isch. Yes, certainly, and I remember how piqued she was at one time and how deeply she blushed, when I chanced to ask her for something which had been brought into the house, and she could not give it me. So I, when I saw her annoyance, fell to consoling her. "Do not be at all disheartened, my wife, that you cannot give me what I ask for. It is plain poverty, no doubt, to need a thing and not to have the use of it. But as wants go, to look for something which I cannot lay my hands upon is a less painful form of indigence than never to dream of looking because I know full well that the thing exists not. Anyhow, you are not to blame for this," I added; "mine the fault was who handed over to your care the things without assigning them their places. Had I done so, you would have known not only where to put but where to find them. After all, my wife, there is nothing in human life so serviceable, nought so beautiful as order. [...]" "For instance, what is a chorus? - a band composed of human beings, who dance and sing; but suppose the company proceed to act as each may chance--confusion follows; the spectacle has lost its charm. How different when each and all together act and recite with orderly precision, the limbs and voices keeping time and tune. Then, indeed, these same performers are worth seeing and worth hearing. [...]" "So, too, an army," I said, "my wife, an army destitute of order is confusion worse confounded: to enemies an easy prey, courting attack; to friends a bitter spectacle of wasted power; a mingled mob of asses, heavy infantry, and baggage-bearers, light infantry, cavalry, and waggons. Now, suppose they are on the march; how are they to get along? In this condition everybody will be a hindrance to everybody: 'slow march' side by side with 'double quick,' 'quick march' at cross purposes with 'stand at ease'; waggons blocking cavalry and asses fouling waggons; baggage-bearers and hoplites jostling together: the whole a hopeless jumble. And when it comes to fighting, such an army is not precisely in condition to deliver battle. The troops who are compelled to retreat before the enemy's advance are fully capable of trampling down the heavy infantry detachments in reserve. [...] How different is an army well organised in battle order: a splendid sight for friendly eyes to gaze at, albeit an eyesore to the enemy. For who, being of their party, but will feel a thrill of satisfaction as he watches the serried masses of heavy infantry moving onwards in unbroken order? who but will gaze with wonderment as the squadrons of the cavalry dash past him at the gallop? And what of the foeman? will not his heart sink within him to see the orderly arrangements of the different arms: here heavy infantry and cavalry, and there again light infantry, there archers and there slingers, following each their leaders, with orderly precision. As they tramp onwards thus in order, though they number many myriads, yet even so they move on and on in quiet progress, stepping like one man, and the place just vacated in front is filled up on the instant from the rear. [...] Or picture a trireme, crammed choke-full of mariners; for what reason is she so terror-striking an object to her enemies, and a sight so gladsome to the eyes of friends? is it not that the gallant ship sails so swiftly? And why is it that, for all their crowding, the ship's company cause each other no distress? Simply that there, as you may see them, they sit in order; in order bend to

the oar; in order recover the stroke; in order step on board; in order disembark. But disorder is, it seems to me, precisely as though a man who is a husbandman should stow away together in one place wheat and barley and pulse, and by and by when he has need of barley meal, or wheaten flour, or some condiment of pulse, then he must pick and choose instead of laying his hand on each thing separately sorted for use. [...] And so with you too, my wife, if you would avoid this confusion, if you would fain know how to administer our goods, so as to lay your finger readily on this or that as you may need, or if I ask you for anything, graciously to give it me: let us, I say, select and assign the appropriate place for each set of things. This shall be the place where we will put the things; and we will instruct the housekeeper that she is to take them out thence, and mind to put them back again there; and in this way we shall know whether they are safe or not. If anything is gone, the gaping space will cry out as if it asked for something back. The mere look and aspect of things will argue what wants mending; and the fact of knowing where each thing is will be like having it put into one's hand at once to use without further trouble or debate." [...] I must tell you, Socrates, what strikes me as the finest and most accurate arrangement of goods and furniture it was ever my fortune to set eyes on; when I went as a sightseer on board the great Phoenician merchantman, and beheld an endless quantity of goods and gear of all sorts, all separately packed and stowed away within the smallest compass. I need scarce remind you what a vast amount of wooden spars and cables a ship depends on in order to get to moorings; or again, in putting out to sea; you know the host of sails and cordage, rigging as they call it, she requires for sailing; the quantity of engines and machinery of all sorts she is armed with in case she should encounter any hostile craft; the infinitude of arms she carries, with her crew of fighting men aboard. Then all the vessels and utensils, such as people use at home on land, required for the different messes, form a portion of the freight; and besides all this, the hold is heavy laden with a mass of merchandise, the cargo proper, which the master carries with him for the sake of traffic. [...] Well, all these different things that I have named lay packed there in a space but little larger than a fair-sized dining-room. The several sorts, moreover, as I noticed, lay so well arranged, there could be no entanglement of one with other, nor were searchers needed; and if all were snugly stowed, all were alike get-at-able, much to the avoidance of delay if anything were wanted on the instant. [...] Then the pilot's mate - "the look-out man at the prow," to give him his proper title--was, I found, so well acquainted with the place for everything that, even off the ship, he could tell you where each set of things was laid and how many there were of each, just as well as any one who knows his alphabet could tell you how many letters there are in Socrates and the order in which they stand. [...] I saw this same man examining at leisure everything which could possibly be needful for the service of the ship. His inspection caused me such surprise, I asked him what he was doing, whereupon he answered, "I am inspecting, stranger," - "just considering," says he, "the way the things are lying aboard the ship; in case of accidents, you know, to see if anything is missing, or not lying snug and shipshape. There is no time left, you know," he added, "when God makes a tempest in the great deep, to set about searching for what you want, or to be giving out anything which is not snug and shipshape in its place. God threatens and chastises sluggards. If only He destroy not innocent with guilty, a man may be content; or if He turn and save all hands aboard that render right good service, thanks be to Heaven." [...] So spoke the pilot's mate; and I, with this carefulness of stowage still before my eyes, proceeded to

enforce my thesis: "Stupid in all conscience would it be on our parts, my wife, if those who sail the sea in ships, that are but small things, can discover space and place for everything; can, moreover, in spite of violent tossings up and down, keep order, and, even while their hearts are failing them for fear, find everything they need to hand; whilst we, with all our ample storerooms diversely disposed for divers objects in our mansion, an edifice firmly based on solid ground, fail to discover fair and fitting places, easy of access for our several goods! Would not that argue great lack of understanding in our two selves? Well then! how good a thing it is to have a fixed and orderly arrangement of all furniture and gear; how easy also in a dwelling-house to find a place for every sort of goods, in which to stow them as shall suit each best--needs no further comment. Rather let me harp upon the string of beauty--image a fair scene: the boots and shoes and sandals, and so forth, all laid in order row upon row; the cloaks, the mantles, and the rest of the apparel stowed in their own places; the coverlets and bedding; the copper cauldrons; and all the articles for table use! Nay, though it well may raise a smile of ridicule (not on the lips of a grave man perhaps, but of some facetious witling) to hear me say it, a beauty like the cadence of sweet music dwells even in pots and pans set out in neat array: and so, in general, fair things ever show more fair when orderly bestowed. The separate atoms shape themselves to form a choir, and all the space between gains beauty by their banishment. Even so some sacred chorus, dancing a roundelay in honour of Dionysus, not only is a thing of beauty in itself, but the whole interspace swept clean of dancers owns a separate charm. [...] The truth of what I say, we easily can test, my wife," I added, "by direct experiment, and that too without cost at all or even serious trouble. Nor need you now distress yourself, my wife, to think how hard it will be to discover some one who has wit enough to learn the places for the several things and memory to take and place them there. We know, I fancy, that the goods of various sorts contained in the whole city far outnumber ours many thousand times; and yet you have only to bid any one of your domestics go buy this, or that, and bring it you from market, and not one of them will hesitate. The whole world knows both where to go and where to find each thing. [...] And why is this?" I asked. "Merely because they lie in an appointed place. But now, if you are seeking for a human being, and that too at times when he is seeking you on his side also, often and often shall you give up the search in sheer despair: and of this again the reason? Nothing else save that no appointed place was fixed where one was to await the other." Such, so far as I can now recall it, was the conversation which we held together touching the arrangement of our various chattels and their uses."

Chapter IX

Soc. Well, and did your wife appear, Ischomachus, to lend a willing ear to what you tried thus earnestly to teach her?

Isch. Most certainly she did, with promise to pay all attention. Her delight was evident, like some one's who at length has found a pathway out of difficulties; in proof of which she begged me to lose no time in making the orderly arrangement I had spoken of.

Soc. And how did you introduce the order she demanded, Ischomachus?

Isch. Well, first of all I thought I ought to show her the capacities of our house. Since you must know, it is not decked with ornaments and fretted ceilings, Socrates; but the rooms were built expressly with a view to forming the most apt receptacles for whatever was intended to be put in them, so that the very look of them proclaimed what suited each particular chamber best. Thus our own bedroom, secure in its position like a stronghold, claimed possession of our choicest carpets, coverlets, and other furniture. Thus, too, the warm dry rooms would seem to ask for our stock of bread-stuffs; the chill cellar for our wine; the bright and well-lit chambers for whatever works or furniture required light, and so forth. [...] Next I proceeded to point out to her the several dwelling-rooms, all beautifully fitted up for cool in summer and for warmth in winter. I showed her how the house enjoyed a southern aspect, whence it was plain, in winter it would catch the sunlight and in summer lie in shade. Then I showed her the women's apartments, separated from the men's apartments by a bolted door, whereby nothing from within could be conveyed without clandestinely, nor children born and bred by our domestics without our knowledge and consent - no unimportant matter, since, if the act of rearing children tends to make good servants still more loyally disposed, cohabiting but sharpens ingenuity for mischief in the bad. [...] When we had gone over all the rooms, we at once set about distribution our furniture in classes; and we began by collecting everything we use in offering sacrifice. After this we proceeded to set apart the ornaments and holiday attire of the wife, and the husband's clothing both for festivals and war; then the bedding used in the women's apartments, and the bedding used in the men's apartments; then the women's shoes and sandals, and the shoes and sandals of the men. There was one division devoted to arms and armour; another to instruments used for carding wood; another to implements for making bread; another to utensils for cooking condiments; another to utensils for the bath; another connected with the kneading trough; another with the service of the table. All these we assigned to separate places, distinguishing one portion for daily and recurrent use and the rest for high days and holidays. Next we selected and set aside the supplies required for the month's expenditure; and, under a separate head, we stored away what we computed would be needed for the year. For in this way there is less chance of failing to note how the supplies are likely to last to the end. [...] And so having arranged the different articles of furniture in classes, we proceeded to convey them to their appropriate places. That done, we directed our attention to the various articles needed by our domestics for daily use, such as implements or utensils for making bread, cooking relishes, spinning wool, and anything else of the same

sort. These we consigned to the care of those who would have to use them, first pointing out where they must stow them, and enjoining on them to return them safe and sound when done with. [...] As to the other things which we should only use on feast-days, or for the entertainment of guests, or on other like occasions at long intervals, we delivered them one and all to our housekeeper. Having pointed out to her their proper places, and having numbered and registered the several sets of articles, we explained that it was her business to give out each thing as required; to recollect to whom she gave them; and when she got them back, to restore them severally to the places from which she took them. In appointing our housekeeper, we had taken every pains to discover some one on whose self-restraint we might depend, not only in the matters of food and wine and sleep, but also in her intercourse with men. She must besides, to please us, be gifted with no ordinary memory. She must have sufficient forethought not to incur displeasure through neglect of our interests. It must be her object to gratify us in this or that, and in return to win esteem and honour at our hands. We set ourselves to teach and train her to feel a kindly disposition towards us, by allowing her to share our joys in the day of gladness, or, if aught unkind befell us, by inviting her to sympathise in our sorrow. We sought to rouse in her a zeal for our interests, an eagerness to promote the increase of our estate, by making her intelligent of its affairs, and by giving her a share in our successes. We instilled in her a sense of justice and uprightness, by holding the just in higher honour than the unjust, and by pointing out that the lives of the righteous are richer and less servile than those of the unrighteous; and this was the position in which she found herself installed in our household. [...] And now, on the strength of all that we had done, Socrates, I addressed my wife, explaining that all these things would fail of use unless she took in charge herself to see that the order of each several part was kept. Thereupon I taught her that in every well-constituted city the citizens are not content merely to pass good laws, but they further choose them guardians of the laws, whose function as inspectors is to praise the man whose acts are law-abiding, or to mulct some other who offends against the law. Accordingly, I bade her believe that she, the mistress, was herself to play the part of guardian of the laws to her whole household, examining whenever it seemed good to her, and passing in review the several chattels, just as the officer in command of a garrison musters and reviews his men. She must apply her scrutiny and see that everything was well, even as the Senate tests the condition of the Knights and of their horses. Like a queen, she must bestow, according to the power vested in her, praise and honour on the well-deserving, but blame and chastisement on him who stood in need thereof. [...] Nor did my lessons end here; I taught her that she must not be annoyed should I seem to be enjoining upon her more trouble than upon any of our domestics with regard to our possessions; pointing out to her that these domestics have only so far a share in their master's chattels that they must fetch and carry, tend and guard them; nor have they the right to use a single one of them except the master grant it. But to the master himself all things pertain to use as he thinks best. And so I pointed the conclusion: he to whom the greater gain attaches in the preservation of the property or loss in its destruction, is surely he to whom by right belongs the larger measure of attention. [...] Bless you, Socrates, what did she do but forth with answer me, I formed a wrong opinion if I fancied that, in teaching her the need of minding our property, I was imposing a painful task upon her. A painful task it might have been (she added), had I bade her neglect her personal concerns! But to be obliged to fulfil the duty of attending to her own

domestic happiness, that was easy. After all it would seem to be but natural (added me); just as any honest woman finds it easier to care for her own offspring than to neglect them, so, too, he could well believe, an honest woman might find it pleasanter to care for than to neglect possessions, the very charm of which is that they are one's very own.

Chapter X

Soc. So, when I heard his wife had made this answer, I exclaimed: By Hera, Ischomachus, a brave and masculine intelligence the lady has, as you describe her.

Isch. Yes, Socrates, and I would feign narrate some other instances of like large-mindedness on her part: shown in the readiness with which she listened to my words and carried out my wishes.

Soc. What sort of thing? Do, pray, tell me, since I would far more gladly learn about a living woman's virtues than that Zeuxis should show me the portrait of the loveliest woman he has painted.

Isch. I must tell you, Socrates, I one day noticed she was much enamelled with white lead, no doubt to enhance the natural whiteness of her skin; she had rouged herself with alkanet profusely, doubtless to give more colour to her cheeks than truth would warrant; she was wearing high-heeled shoes, in order to seem taller than she was by nature. [...] Accordingly I put to her this question: "Tell me, my wife, would you esteem me a less lovable co-partner in our wealth, were I to show you how our fortune stands exactly, without boasting of unreal possessions or concealing what we really have? Or would you prefer that I should try to cheat you with exaggeration, exhibiting false money to you, or sham necklaces, or flaunting purples which will lose their colour, stating they are genuine the while?" [...] She caught me up at once: "Hush, hush!" she said, "talk not such talk. May heaven forbend that you should ever be like that. I could not love you with my whole heart were you really of that sort. [...] And are we two not come together," I continued, "for a closer partnership, being each a sharer in the other's body?" [...] "That, at any rate, is what folk say," she answered. [...] "Then as regards this bodily relation," I proceeded, "should you regard me as more lovable or less did I present myself, my one endeavour and my sole care being that my body should be hale and strong and thereby well complexioned, or would you have me first anoint myself with pigments, smear my eyes with patches of 'true flesh colour,' and so seek your embrace, like a cheating consort presenting to his mistress's sight and touch vermilion paste instead of his own flesh?" [...] "Frankly," she answered, "it would not please me better to touch paste than your true self. Rather would I see your own 'true flesh colour' than any pigment of that name; would I rather look into your eyes and see them radiant with health than washed with any wash, or dyed with any ointment there may be." [...] "Believe the same, my wife, of me then, believe that I too am not better pleased with white enamel or with alkanet than with your own natural hue; but as the gods have fashioned horses to delight in horses, cattle in cattle, sheep in their fellow sheep, so to human beings the human body pure and undefiled is sweetest; and as to these deceits, though they may serve to cheat the outside world without detection, yet if intimates try to deceive each other, they must one day be caught; in rising from their beds, before they make their toilet; by a drop of sweat they stand convicted; tears are an ordeal they cannot pass; the bath reveals them as they truly are."

Soc. What answer did she make, in Heaven's name, to what you said?

Isch. What, indeed, save only, that thenceforward she never once indulged in any practice of the sort, but has striven to display the natural beauty of her person in its purity. She did, however, put to me a question: Could I advise her how she might become not in false show but really fair to look upon? This, then, was the counsel which I gave her, Socrates: Not to be for ever seated like a slave; but, with Heaven's help, to assume the attitude of a true mistress standing before the loom, and where her knowledge gave her the superiority, bravely to give the aid of her instruction; where her knowledge failed, as bravely try to learn. I counselled her to oversee the baking woman as she made the bread; to stand beside the housekeeper as she measured out her stores; to go tours of inspection to see if all things were in order as they should be. For, as it seemed to me, this would at once be walking exercise and supervision. And, as an excellent gymnastic, I recommended her to knead the dough and roll the paste; to shake the coverlets and make the beds; adding, if she trained herself in exercise of this sort she would enjoy her food, grow vigorous in health, and her complexion would in very truth be lovelier. The very look and aspect of the wife, the mistress, seen in rivalry with that of her attendants, being as she is at once more fair and more beautifully adorned, has an attractive charm, and not the less because her acts are acts of grace, not services enforced. Whereas your ordinary fine lady, seated in solemn state, would seem to court comparison with painted counterfeits of womanhood. [...] And, Socrates, I would have you know that still to-day, my wife is living in a style as simple as that I taught her then, and now recount to you.

Chapter XI

Soc. The conversation was resumed as follows: Thanking Ischomachus for what he had told me about the occupations of his wife; on that side I have heard enough perhaps for a beginning; the facts you mention reflect the greatest credit on both wife and husband; but would you now in turn describe to me your work and business? In doing so you will have the pleasure of narrating the reason of your fame. And I, for my part, when I have heard from end to end the story of a beautiful and good man's works, if only my wits suffice and I have understood it, shall be much indebted.

Isch. Indeed, it will give me the greatest pleasure to recount to you my daily occupations, and in return I beg you to reform me, where you find some flaw or other in my conduct.

Soc. The idea of my reforming you! How could I with any show of justice hope to reform you, the perfect model of a beautiful, good man--I, who am but an empty babbler, and measurer of the air, who have to bear besides that most senseless imputation of being poor - an imputation which, I assure you, Ischomachus, would have reduced me to the veriest despair, except that the other day I chanced to come across the horse of Nicias, the foreigner? I saw a crowd of people in attendance staring, and I listened to a story which some one had to tell about the animal. So then I stepped up boldly to the groom and asked him, "Has the horse much wealth?" The fellow looked at me as if I were hardly in my right mind to put the question, and retorted, "How can a horse have wealth?" Thereat I dared to lift my eyes from earth, on learning that after all it is permitted a poor penniless horse to be a noble animal, if nature only have endowed him with good spirit. If, therefore, it is permitted even to me to be a good man, please recount to me your works from first to last, I promise, I will listen, all I can, and try to understand, and so far as in me lies to imitate you from tomorrow. Tomorrow is a good day to commence a course of virtue, is it not?

Isch. You are pleased to jest, Socrates, in spite of which I will recount to you those habits and pursuits by aid of which I seek to traverse life's course. If I have read aright life's lesson, it has taught me that, unless a man first discover what he needs to do, and seriously study to bring the same to good effect, the gods have placed prosperity beyond his reach; and even to the wise and careful they give or they withhold good fortune as seemeth to them best. Such being my creed, I begin with service rendered to the gods; and strive to regulate my conduct so that grace may be given me, in answer to my prayers, to attain to health, and strength of body, honour in my own city, goodwill among my friends, safety with renown in war, and of riches increase, won without reproach.

Soc. And are you then indeed so careful to grow rich, Ischomachus? Amassing wealth but to gain endless trouble in its management?

Isch. Most certainly, and most careful must I needs be of the things you speak of. So sweet I find it, Socrates, to honour God magnificently, to lend assistance to my friends in answer to

their wants, and, so far as lies within my power, not to leave my city unadorned with anything which riches can bestow.

Soc. Nay, beautiful indeed the works you speak of, and powerful the man must be who would essay them. How can it be otherwise, seeing so many human beings need the help of others merely to carry on existence, and so many are content if they can win enough to satisfy their wants. What of those therefore who are able, not only to administer their own estates, but even to create a surplus sufficient to adorn their city and relieve the burthen of their friends? Well may we regard such people as men of substance and capacity. But stay (I added), most of us are competent to sing the praises of such heroes. What I desire is to hear from you, Ischomachus, in your own order, first how you study to preserve your health and strength of body; and next, how it is granted to you to escape from the perils of war with honour untarnished. And after that, it will much content me to learn from your own lips about your money-making.

Isch. Yes, and the fact is, Socrates, if I mistake not, all these matters are in close connection, each depending on the other. Given that a man have a good meal to eat, he has only to work off the effect by toil directed rightly; and in the process, if I mistake not, his health will be confirmed, his strength added to. Let him but practise the arts of war and in the day of battle he will preserve his life with honour. He needs only to expend his care aright, sealing his ears to weak and soft seductions, and his house shall surely be increased.

Soc. So far I follow you, Ischomachus. You tell me that by labouring to his full strength, by expending care, by practice and training, a man may hope more fully to secure life's blessings. So I take your meaning. But now I fain would learn of you some details. What particular toil do you impose on yourself in order to secure good health and strength? After what particular manner do you practise the arts of war? How do you take pains to create a surplus which will enable you to benefit your friends and to gratify the state?

Isch. Why then, my habit is to rise from bed betimes, when I may still expect to find at home this, that, or the other friend, whom I may wish to see. Then, if anything has to be done in town, I set off to transact the business and make that my walk; or, if there is no business to do in town, my serving-boy leads my horse to the farm; I follow, and so make the country-road my walk, which suits my purpose quite as well, or better, Socrates, perhaps, than pacing up and down the colonade. Then when I have reached the farm, where mayhap some of my men are planting trees, or breaking fallow, sowing or getting in the crops, I inspect their various labours with an eye to every detail, and, whenever I can improve upon the present system, I introduce reform. After this, as a rule, I mount my horse and take a canter. I put him through his paces, suiting these, as far as possible, to those inevitable in war - in other words, I avoid neither steep slope nor sheer incline, neither trench nor runnel, only giving my utmost heed the while so as not to lame my horse while exercising him. When that is over, the boy gives the horse a roll, and leads him homewards, taking at the same time from the country to town whatever we may chance to need. Meanwhile I am off for home, partly walking, partly running, and having reached home I take a bath and give myself a rub; and then I breakfast -

a repast which leaves me neither empty nor replete, and will suffice to last me through the day.

Soc. By Hera, Ischomachus, I cannot say how much your doings take my fancy. How you have contrived, to pack up portably for use - together at the same time - appliances for health and recipes for strength, exercises for war, and pains to promote your wealth! My admiration is raised at every point. That you do study each of these pursuits in the right way, you are yourself a standing proof. Your look of heaven - sent health and general robustness we note with our eyes, while our ears have heard your reputation as a first-rate horseman and the wealthiest of men.

Isch. Yes, Socrates, such is my conduct, in return for which I am rewarded with - the calumnies of half the world. You thought, I dare say, I was going to end my sentence different, and say that a host of people have given me the enviable title "beautiful and good."

Soc. I was indeed myself about to ask, Ischomachus, whether you take pains also to acquire skill in argumentative debate, the cut and thrust and parry of discussion, should occasion call?

Isch. Does it not strike you rather, Socrates, that I am engaged in one long practice of this very skill, now pleading as defendant that, as far as I am able, I do good to many and hurt nobody? And then, again, you must admit, I play the part of prosecutor when accusing people whom I recognise to be offenders, as a rule in private life, or possibly against the state, the good-for-nothing fellows?

Soc. But please explain one other thing, Ischomachus. Do you put defence and accusation into formal language?

Isch. "Formal language," say you, Socrates? The fact is, I never cease to practise speaking; and on this wise: Some member of my household has some charge to bring, or some defence to make, against some other. I have to listen and examine. I must try to sift the truth. Or there is some one whom I have to blame or praise before my friends, or I must arbitrate between some close connections and endeavour to enforce the lesson that it is to their own interests to be friends not foes. . . . We are present to assist a general in court; we are called upon to censure some one; or defend some other charged unjustly; or to prosecute a third who has received an honour which he ill deserves. It frequently occurs in our debates that there is some course which we strongly favour: naturally we sound its praises; or some other, which we disapprove of: no less naturally we point out its defects. [...] Things have indeed now got so far, Socrates, that several times I have had to stand my trial and have judgment passed upon me in set terms, what I must pay or what requital I must make.

Soc. And at whose bar is the sentence given? That point I failed to catch.

Isch. Whose but my own wife's?

Soc. And, pray, how do you conduct your own case?

Isch. Not so ill, when truth and interest correspond, but when they are opposed, Socrates, I have no skill to make the worse appear the better argument.

Soc. Perhaps you have no skill, Ischomachus, to make black white or falsehood truth

Chapter XII

Soc. But, perhaps I am preventing you from going, as you long have wished to do, Ischomachus?

Isch. By no means, Socrates. I should not think of going away until the gathering in the market is dispersed.

Soc. Of course, of course, you are naturally most careful not to forfeit the title they have given you of "honest gentleman"; and yet, I daresay, fifty things at home are asking your attention at this moment; only you undertook to meet your foreign friends, and rather than play them false you go on waiting.

Isch. Let me so far correct you, Socrates; in no case will the things you speak of be neglected, since I have stewards and bailiffs on the farms.

Soc. And, pray, what is your system when you need a bailiff? Do you search about, until you light on some one with a natural turn for stewardship; and then try to purchase him? - as, I feel certain, happens when you want a carpenter: first, you discover some one with a turn for carpentry, and then do all you can to get possession of him. Or do you educate your bailiffs yourself?

Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place and manage my affairs when I am absent, my "alter ego," needs but to have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my knowledge.

Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which your bailiff may possess?

Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.

Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?

Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow abundance of good things upon us.

Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?

Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to be the best.

Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which they fain would have.

Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application.

Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues.

Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might number off his fingers.

Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege? Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?

Isch. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making intemperate people diligent - I speak of intemperance with regard to wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to be done.

Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in like case?

Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that others do what is right.

Soc. What then? Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a like condition?

Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection. Your woeful lover is incapable of being taught attention to anything beyond one single object. No light task, I take it, to discover any hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes, will it be easy to invent worse punishment than that he now endures in separation from the object of his passion. Accordingly, I am in no great hurry to appoint a person of this sort to manage my affairs; the very attempt to do so I regard as futile.

Soc. Well, and what of those addicted to another passion, that of gain? Are they, too, incapable of being trained to give attention to field and farming operations?

Isch. On the contrary, there are no people easier to train, none so susceptible of carefulness in these same matters. One needs only to point out to them that the pursuit is gainful, and their interest is aroused.

Soc. But for ordinary people? Given they are self-controlled to suit your bidding, given they possess a wholesome appetite for gain, how will you lesson them in carefulness? how teach them growth in diligence to meet your wishes?

Isch. By a simple method, Socrates. When I see a man intent on carefulness, I praise and do my best to honour him. When, on the other hand, I see a man neglectful of his duties, I do not spare him: I try in every way, by word and deed, to wound him.

Soc. Come now, Ischomachus, kindly permit a turn in the discussion, which has hitherto concerned the persons being trained to carefulness themselves, and explain a point in reference to the training process. Is it possible for a man devoid of carefulness himself to render others more careful?

Isch. No more possible than for a man who knows no music to make others musical. If the teacher sets but an ill example, the pupil can hardly learn to do the thing aright. And if the master's conduct is suggestive of laxity, how hardly shall his followers attain to carefulness! Or to put the matter concisely, "like master like man." I do not think I ever knew or heard tell of a bad master blessed with good servants. The converse I certainly have seen ere now, a good master and bad servants; but they were the sufferers, not he. No, he who would create a spirit of carefulness in others must have the skill himself to supervise the field of labour; to test, examine, scrutinise. He must be ready to requite where due the favour of a service well performed, nor hesitate to visit the penalty of their deserts upon those neglectful of their duty. Indeed, the answer of the barbarian to the king seems aposite. You know the story, how the king had met with a good horse, but wished to give the creature flesh and that without delay, and so asked some one reputed to be clever about horses: "What will give him flesh most quickly?" To which the other: "The master's eye." So, too, it strikes me, Socrates, there is nothing like "the master's eye" to call forth latent qualities, and turn the same to beautiful and good effect.

Chapter XIII

Soc. But now, suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of some one the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?

Isch. Most certainly there is: it still remains for him to learn particulars - to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains he knows not.

Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute?

Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.

Soc. What! you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?

Isch. At any rate I try to do so.

Soc. And how, in Heaven's name, do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?

Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I dare say, you will simply laugh at me.

Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being. Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.

Isch. Thus, then, I reason, Socrates: The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs, however far inferior to man in thought and language, can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults, and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this

same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason; only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they happen to be slaves, the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them. But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise, since some natures hunger after praise no less than others crave for meats and drinks. My practice then is to instruct those whom I desire to appoint as my bailiffs in the various methods which I have found myself to be successful in gaining the obedience of my fellows. To take an instance: There are clothes and shows and so forth, with which I must provide my workfolk. Well, then, I see to it that these are not all alike in make; but some will be of better, some of less good quality: my object being that these articles for use shall vary with the service of the wearer; the worse man will receive the worse things as a gift, the better man the better as a mark of honour. For I ask you, Socrates, how can the good avoid despondency seeing that the work is wrought by their own hands alone, in spite of which these villains who will neither labour nor face danger when occasion calls are to receive an equal guerdon with themselves? And just as I cannot bring myself in any sort of way to look upon the better sort as worthy to receive no greater honour than the baser, so, too, I praise my bailiffs when I know they have apportioned the best things among the most deserving. And if I see that some one is receiving preference by dint of flatteries or like unworthy means, I do not let the matter pass; I reprimand my bailiff roundly, and so teach him that such conduct is not even to his interest.

Chapter XIV

Soc. Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule that he can compel obedience, is he, I ask once more, your bailiff absolute? Or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have named, does he still lack something?

Isch. Most certainly. One thing is still required of him, and that is to hold aloof from property and goods which are his master's; he must not steal. Consider, this is the very person through whose hands the fruits and produce pass, and he has the audacity to make away with them! perhaps he does not leave enough to cover the expenses of the farming operations! Where would be the use of farming the land by help of such an overseer?

Soc. What, can I believe my ears? You actually undertake to teach them virtue! What really, justice!

Isch. To be sure, I do. but it does not follow therefore that I find all equally apt to lend an ear to my instruction. However, what I do is this. I take a leaf now out of the laws of Draco and again another out of the laws of Solon, and so essay to start my household on the path of uprightness. And indeed, if I mistake not (he proceeded), both those legislators enacted many of their laws expressly with a view to teaching this branch of justice. It is written, "Let a man be punished for a deed of theft"; "Let whosoever is detected in the act be bound and thrown in prison"; "If he offer violence, let him be put to death." It is clear that the intention of the lawgivers in framing these enactments was to render the sordid love of gain devoid of profit to the unjust person. What I do, therefore, is to cull a sample of their precepts, which I supplement with others from the royal code where applicable; and so I do my best to shape the members of my household into the likeness of just men concerning that which passes through their hands. And now observe--the laws first mentioned act as penalties, deterrent to transgressors only; whereas the royal code aims higher: by it not only is the malefactor punished, but the righteous and just person is rewarded. The result is, that many a man, beholding how the just grow ever wealthier than the unjust, albeit harbouring in his heart some covetous desires, is constant still to virtue. To abstain from unjust dealing is engrained in him. [...] Those of my household (he proceeded) whom, in spite of kindly treatment, I perceive to be persistently bent on evil-doing, in the end I treat as desperate cases. Incurable self-seekers, plain enough to see, whose aspiration lifts them from earth, so eager are they to be reckoned just men, not by reason only of the gain derivable from justice, but through passionate desire to deserve my praise-- these in the end I treat as free-born men. I make them wealthy, and not with riches only, but in honour, as befits their gentle manliness. For if, Socrates, there be one point in which the man who thirsts for honour differs from him who thirsts for gain, it is, I think, in willingness to toil, face danger, and abstain from shameful gains - for the sake of honour only and fair fame.

Chapter XV

Soc. But now, suppose, Ischomachus, you have created in the soul of some one a desire for your welfare; have inspired in him not a mere passive interest, but a deep concern to help you to achieve prosperity; further, you have obtained for him a knowledge of the methods needed to give the operations of the field some measure of success; you have, moreover, made him capable of ruling; and, as the crowning point of all your efforts, this same trusty person shows no less delight, than you might take yourself, in laying at your feet earth's products, each in due season richly harvested--I need hardly ask concerning such an one, whether aught else is lacking to him. It is clear to me an overseer of this sort would be worth his weight in gold. But now, Ischomachus, I would have you not omit a topic somewhat lightly handled by us in the previous argument.

Isch. What topic, pray, was that?

Soc. You said, if I mistake not, that it was most important to learn the methods of conducting the several processes of husbandry; for, you added, unless a man knows what things he has to do and how to do them, all the care and diligence in the world will stand him in no stead.

Isch. So what you now command me is to teach the art itself of tillage, Socrates?

Soc. Yes, for now it looks as if this art were one which made the wise and skilled possessor of it wealthy, whilst the unskilled, in spite of all the pains he takes, must live in indigence.

Isch. Now shall you hear, then, Socrates, the generous nature of this human art. For is it not a proof of something noble in it, that being of supreme utility, so sweet a craft to exercise, so rich in beauty, so acceptable alike to gods and men, the art of husbandry may further fairly claim to be the easiest of all the arts to learn? Noble I name it! this, at any rate, the epithet we give to animals which, being beautiful and large and useful, are also gentle towards the race of man.

Soc. Allow me to explain, Ischomachus. Up to a certain point I fully followed what you said. I understand, according to your theory, how a bailiff must be taught. In other words, I follow your descriptions both as to how you make him kindly disposed towards yourself; and how, again, you make him careful, capable of rule, and upright. But at that point you made the statement that, in order to apply this diligence to tillage rightly, the careful husbandman must further learn what are the different things he has to do, and not alone what things he has to do, but how and when to do them. These are the topics which, in my opinion, have hitherto been somewhat lightly handled in the argument. Let me make my meaning clearer by an instance: it is as if you were to tell me that, in order to be able to take down a speech in writing, or to read a written statement, a man must know his letters. Of course, if not stone deaf, I must have garnered that for a certain object knowledge of letters was important to me, but the bare recognition of the fact, I fear, would not enable me in any deeper sense to know

my letters. So, too, at present I am easily persuaded that if I am to direct my care aright in tillage I must have a knowledge of the art of tillage. But the bare recognition of the fact does not one whit provide me with the knowledge how I ought to till. And if I resolved without ado to set about the work of tilling, I imagine, I should soon resemble your physician going on his rounds and visiting his patients without knowing what to prescribe or what to do to ease their sufferings. To save me from the like predicaments, please teach me the actual work and processes of tillage.

Isch. But truly, Socrates, it is not with tillage as with the other arts, where the learner must be well-nigh crushed beneath a load of study before his prentice-hand can turn out work of worth sufficient merely to support him. The art of husbandry, I say, is not so ill to learn and cross-grained; but by watching labourers in the field, by listening to what they say, you will have straightway knowledge enough to teach another, should the humour take you. I imagine, Socrates (he added), that you yourself, albeit quite unconscious of the fact, already know a vast amount about the subject. The fact is, other craftsmen (the race, I mean, in general of artists) are each and all disposed to keep the most important features of their several arts concealed: with husbandry it is different. Here the man who has the most skill in planting will take most pleasure in being watched by others; and so too the most skilful sower. Ask any question you may choose about results thus beautifully wrought, and not one feature in the whole performance will the doer of it seek to keep concealed. To such height of nobleness (he added), Socrats, does husbandry appear, like some fair mistress, to conform the soul and disposition of those concerned with it.

Soc. The proem to the speech is beautiful at any rate, but hardly calculated to divert the hearer from the previous question. A thing so easy to be learnt, you say? then, if so, do you be all the readier for that reason to explain its details to me. No shame on you who teach, to teach these easy matters; but for me to lack the knowledge of them, and most of all if highly useful to the learner, worse than shame, a scandal.

Chapter XVI

Isch. First then, Socrates, I wish to demonstrate to you that what is called "the intricate variety in husbandry" presents no difficulty. I use a phrase of those who, whatever the nicety with which they treat the art in theory, have but the faintest practical experience of tillage. What they assert is, that "he who would rightly till the soil must first be made acquainted with the nature of the earth."

Soc. And they are surely right in their assertion; for he who does not know what the soil is capable of bearing, can hardly know, I fancy, what he has to plant or what to sow.

Isch. But he has only to look at his neighbour's land, at his crops and trees, in order to learn what the soil can bear and what it cannot. After which discovery, it is ill work fighting against heaven. Certainly not by dint of sowing and planting what he himself desires will he meet the needs of life more fully than by planting and sowing what the earth herself rejoices to bear and nourish on her bosom. Or if, as well may be the case, through the idleness of those who occupy it, the land itself cannot display its native faculty, it is often possible to derive a truer notion from some neighbouring district than ever you will learn about it from your neighbour's lips. Nay, even though the earth lie waste and barren, it may still declare its nature; since a soil productive of beautiful wild fruits can by careful tending be made to yield fruits of the cultivated kind as beautiful. And on this wise, he who has the barest knowledge of the art of tillage can still discern the nature of the soil.

Soc. Thank you, Ischomachus, my courage needs no further fanning upon that score. I am bold enough now to believe that no one need abstain from agriculture for fear he will not recognise the nature of the soil. Indeed, I now recall to mind a fact concerning fishermen, how as they ply their business on the seas, not crawling lazily along, nor bringing to, for prospect's sake, but in the act of scudding past the flying farmsteads, these brave mariners have only to set eyes upon crops on land, and they will boldly pronounce opinion on the nature of the soil itself, whether good or bad: this they blame and that they praise. And these opinions for the most part coincide, I notice, with the verdict of the skilful farmer as to quality of soil.

Isch. At what point shall I begin then, Socrates, to revive your recollection of the art of husbandry? since to explain to you the processes employed in husbandry means the statement of a hundred details which you know yourself full well already.

Soc. Yes, I am aware of that.

Isch. Well then, supposing we begin to plough our land in winter?

Soc. It would not do. There would be too much mud.

Isch. Well then, what would you say to summer?

Soc. The soil will be too hard in summer for a plough and a pair of oxen to break up.

Isch. It looks as if spring-time were the season to begin this work, then? What do you say?

Soc. I say, one may expect the soil broken up at that season of the year to crumble best.

Isch. Yes, and grasses turned over at that season, Socrates, serve to supply the soil already with manure; while as they have not shed their seed as yet, they cannot vegetate. I am supposing that you recognise a further fact: to form good land, a fallow must be clean and clear of undergrowth and weeds, and baked as much as possible by exposure to the sun.

Soc. Yes, that is quite a proper state of things, I should imagine.

Isch. And to bring about this proper state of things, do you maintain there can be any other better system than that of turning the soil over as many times as possible in summer?

Soc. On the contrary, I know precisely that for either object, whether to bring the weeds and quitch grass to the surface and to wither them by scorching heat, or to expose the earth itself to the sun's baking rays, there can be nothing better than to plough the soil up with a pair of oxen during mid-day in midsummer.

Isch. And if a gang of men set to, to break and make this fallow with the mattock, it is transparent that their business is to separate the quitch grass from the soil and keep them parted?

Soc. Just so! - To throw the quitch grass down to wither on the surface, and to turn the soil up, so that the crude earth may have its turn of baking.

Chapter XVII

Isch. You see, Socrates, we hold the same opinion, both of us, concerning fallow.

Soc. Why, so it seems - the same opinion.

Isch. But when it comes to sowing, what is your opinion? Can you suggest a better time for sowing than that which the long experience of former generations, combined with that of men now living, recognises as the best? See, so soon as autumn time has come, the faces of all men everywhere turn with a wistful gaze towards high heaven. "When will God moisten the earth," they ask, "and suffer men to sow their seed?"

Soc. Yes, Ischomachus, for all mankind must recognise the precept: "Sow not on dry soil" (if it can be avoided), being taught wisdom doubtless by the heavy losses they must struggle with who sow before God's bidding.

Isch. It seems, then, you and I and all mankind hold one opinion on these matters?

Soc. Why, yes; where God himself is teacher, such accord is apt to follow; for instance, all men are agreed, it is better to wear thick clothes in winter, if so be they can. We light fires by general consent, provided we have logs to burn.

Isch. Yet as regards this very period of seed-time, Socrates, we find at once the widest difference of opinion upon one point; as to which is better, the early, or the later, or the middle sowing?

Soc. Just so, for neither does God guide the year in one set fashion, but irregularly, now suiting it to early sowing best, and now to middle, and again to later.

Isch. But what, Socrates, is your opinion? Were it better for a man to choose and turn to sole account a single sowing season, be it much he has to sow or be it little? or would you have him begin his sowing with the earliest season, and sow right on continuously until the latest?

Soc. I should think it best, Ischomachus, to use indifferently the whole sowing season. Far better to have enough of corn and meal at any moment and from year to year, than first a superfluity and then perhaps a scant supply.

Isch. Then, on this point also, Socrates, you hold a like opinion with myself - the pupil to the teacher; and what is more, the pupil was the first to give it utterance.

Soc. So far, so good! Is there a subtle art in scattering the seed?

Isch. Let us by all means investigate that point. That the seed must be cast by hand, I presume you know yourself?

Soc. Yes, by the testimony of my eyes.

Isch. But as to actual scattering, some can scatter evenly, others cannot.

Soc. Does it not come to this, the hand needs practice (like the fingers of a harp-player) to obey the will?

Isch. Precisely so, but now suppose the soil is light in one part and heavy in another?

Soc. I do not follow; by "light" do you mean weak? and by "heavy" strong?

Isch. Yes, that is what I mean. And the question which I put to you is this: Would you allow both sorts of soil an equal share of seed? or which the larger?

Soc. The stronger the wine the larger the dose of water to be added, I believe. The stronger, too, the man the heavier the weight we will lay upon his back to carry: or if it is not portage, but people to support, there still my tenet holds: the broader and more powerful the great man's shoulders, the more mouths I should assign to him to feed. But perhaps a weak soil, like a lean pack-horse, grows stronger the more corn you pour into it. This I look to you to teach me.

Isch. Once more you are pleased to jest. Yet rest assured of one thing, Socrates: if after you have put seed into the ground, you will await the instant when, while earth is being richly fed from heaven, the fresh green from the hidden seed first springs, and take and turn it back again, this sprouting germ will serve as food for earth: as from manure an inborn strength will presently be added to the soil. But if you suffer earth to feed the seed of corn within it and to bring forth fruit in an endless round, at last it will be hard for the weakened soil to yield large corn crops, even as a weak sow can hardly rear a large litter of fat pigs.

Soc. I understand you to say, Ischomachus, that the weaker soil must receive a scantier dose of seed?

Isch. Most decidedly I do, and you on your side, Socrates, I understand, give your consent to this opinion in stating your belief that the weaker the shoulders the lighter the burdens to be laid on them.

Soc. But those hoers with their hoes, Ischomachus, tell me for what reason you let them loose upon the corn.

Isch. You know, I daresay, that in winter there are heavy rains?

Soc. To be sure, I do.

Isch. We may suppose, then, that a portion of the corn is buried by these floods beneath a coat of mud and slime, or else that the roots are laid quite bare in places by the torrent. By reason of this same drench, I take it, oftentimes an undergrowth of weeds springs up with the corn and chokes it.

Soc. Yes, all these ills are likely enough to happen.

Isch. Are you not agreed the corn-fields sorely need relief at such a season?

Soc. Assuredly.

Isch. Then what is to be done, in your opinion? How shall we aid the stricken portion lying mud-bedabbled?

Soc. How better than by lifting up and lightening the soil?

Isch. Yes! and that other portion lying naked to the roots and defenceless, how aid it?

Soc. Possibly by mounding up fresh earth about it.

Isch. And what when the weeds spring up together with the corn and choke it? or when they rob and ruthlessly devour the corn's proper sustenance, like unserviceable drones that rob the working bees of honey, pilfering the good food which they have made and stored away with labour: what must we do?

Soc. In good sooth, there can be nothing for it save to cut out the noisome weed, even as drones are cleared out from the hive.

Isch. You agree there is some show of reason for letting in these gangs of hoers?

Soc. Most true. And now I am turning over in my mind, Ischomachus, how grand a thing it is to introduce a simile or such like figure well and aptly. No sooner had you mentioned the word "drones" than I was filled with rage against those miserable weeds, far more than when you merely spoke of weeds and undergrowth.

Chapter XVIII

Soc. But, not to interrupt you further, after sowing, naturally we hope to come to reaping. If, therefore, you have anything to say on that head also, pray proceed to teach me.

Isch. Yes, by all means, unless indeed you prove on this head also to know as much yourself already as your teacher. To begin then: You know that corn needs cutting?

Soc. To be sure, I know that much at any rate.

Isch. Well, then, the next point: in the act of cutting corn how will you choose to stand? facing the way the wind blows, or against the wind?

Soc. Not against the wind, for my part. Eyes and hands must suffer, I imagine, if one stood reaping face to face with husks and particles of straw.

Isch. And should you merely sever the ears at top, or reap close to the ground?

Soc. If the stalk of corn were short, I should cut down close, to secure a sufficient length of straw to be of use. But if the stalk be tall, you would do right, I hold, to cut it half-way down, whereby the thresher and the winnower will be saved some extra labour (which both may well be spared). The stalk left standing in the field, when burnt down (as burnt it will be, I presume), will help to benefit the soil; and laid on as manure, will serve to swell the volume of manure.

Isch. There, Socrates, you are detected "in the very act"; you know as much about reaping as I do myself.

Soc. It looks a little like it. But I would fain discover whether I have sound knowledge also about threshing.

Isch. Well, I suppose you are aware of this much: corn is threshed by beasts of burthen?

Soc. Yes, I am aware of that much, and beast of burthen is a general name including oxen, horses, mules, and so forth.

Isch. Is it your opinion that these animals know more than merely how to tread the corn while driven with the goad?

Soc. What more can they know, being beasts of burthen?

Isch. Some one must see, then, that the beasts tread out only what requires threshing and no more, and that the threshing is done evenly itself: to whom do you assign that duty, Socrates?

Soc. Clearly it is the duty of the threshers who are in charge. It is theirs to turn the sheaves, and ever and again to push the untrodden corn under the creatures' feet; and thus, of course, to keep the threshing-floor as smooth, and finish off the work as fast, as possible.

Isch. Your comprehension of the facts thus far, it seems, keeps pace with mine.

Soc. Well, after that, Ischomachus, we will proceed to cleanse the corn by winnowing.

Isch. Yes, but tell me, Socrates; do you know that if you begin the process from the windward portion (of the threshing-floor), you will find your chaff is carried over the whole area.

Soc. It must be so.

Isch. Then it is more than likely the chaff will fall upon the corn.

Soc. Yes, considering the distance, the chaff will hardly be carried across the corn into the empty portion of the threshing-floor.

Isch. But now, suppose you begin winnowing on the "lee" side of the threshing-floor?

Soc. It is clear the chaff will at once fall into the chaff-receiver.

Isch. And when you have cleansed the corn over half the floor, will you proceed at once, with the corn thus strewn in front of you, to winnow the remainder, or will you first pack the clean grain into the narrowest space against the central pillar?

Soc. Yes, upon my word! first pack together the clean grain, and proceed. My chaff will now be carried into the empty portion of the floor, and I shall escape the need of winnowing twice over.

Isch. Really, Socrates, you are fully competent yourself, it seems, to teach an ignorant world the speediest mode of winnowing.

Soc. It seems, then, as you say, I must have known about these matters, though unconsciously; and here I stand and beat my brains, reflecting whether or not I may not know some other things - how to refine gold and play the flute and paint pictures - without being conscious of the fact. Certainly, as far as teaching goes, no one ever taught me these, no more than husbandry; while, as to using my own eyes, I have watched men working at the other arts no less than I have watched them till the soil.

Isch. Did I not tell you long ago that of all arts husbandry was the noblest, the most generous, just because it is the easiest to learn?

Soc. That it is without a doubt, Ischomachus. It seems I must have known the processes of sowing, without being conscious of my knowledge.

Chapter XIX

Soc. But may I ask, is the planting of trees a department in the art of husbandry?

Isch. Certainly it is.

Soc. How is it, then, that I can know about the processes of sowing and at the same time have no knowledge about planting?

Isch. Is it so certain that you have no knowledge?

Soc. How can you ask me? when I neither know the sort of soil in which to plant, nor yet the depth of hole the plant requires, nor the breadth, or length of ground in which it needs to be embedded; nor lastly, how to lay the plant in earth, with any hope of fostering its growth.

Isch. Come, then, to lessons, pupil, and be taught whatever you do not know already! You have seen, I know, the sort of trenches which are dug for plants?

Soc. Hundreds of times.

Isch. Did you ever see one more than three feet deep?

Soc. No, I do not think I ever saw one more than two and a half feet deep.

Isch. Well, as to the breadth now. Did you ever see a trench more than three feet broad?

Soc. No, upon my word, not even more than two feet broad.

Isch. Good! now answer me this question: Did you ever see a trench less than one foot deep?

Soc. No, indeed! nor even less than one foot and a half. Why, the plants would be no sooner buried than dug out again, if planted so extremely near the surface.

Isch. Here, then, is one matter, Socrates, which you know as well as any one. The trench is not to be sunk deeper than two feet and a half, or shallower than one foot and a half.

Soc. Obviously, a thing so plain appeals to the eye at once.

Isch. Can you by eyesight recognise the difference between a dry soil and a moist?

Soc. I should certainly select as dry the soil round Lycabettus, and any that resembles it; and as moist, the soil in the marsh meadows of Phalerum, or the like.

Isch. In planting, would you dig (what I may call) deep trenches in a dry soil or a moist?

Soc. In a dry soil certainly; at any rate, if you set about to dig deep trenches in the moist you will come to water, and there and then an end to further planting.

Isch. You could not put it better. We will suppose, then, the trenches have been dug. Does your eyesight take you further? Have you noticed at what season in either case the plants must be embedded?

Soc. Certainly.

Isch. Supposing, then, you wish the plants to grow as fast as possible: how will the cutting strike and sprout, do you suppose, most readily? After you have laid a layer of soil already worked beneath it, and it merely has to penetrate soft mould? or when it has to force its way through unbroken soil into the solid ground?

Soc. Clearly it will shoot through soil which has been worked more quickly than through unworked soil.

Isch. Well then, a bed of earth must be laid beneath the plant?

Soc. I quite agree; so let it be.

Isch. And how do you expect your cutting to root best? If set straight up from end to end, pointing to the sky? Or if you set it slantwise under its earthy covering, so as to lie like an inverted gamma?

Soc. Like an inverted gamma, to be sure, for so the plant must needs have more eyes under ground. Now it is from these same eyes of theirs, if I may trust my own, that plants put forth their shoots above ground. I imagine, therefore, the eyes still underground will do the same precisely, and with so many buds all springing under earth, the plant itself, I argue, as a whole will sprout and shoot and push its way with speed and vigour.

Isch. I may tell you that on these points, too, your judgment tallies with my own. But now, should you content yourself with merely heaping up the earth, or will you press it firmly round your plant?

Soc. I should certainly press down the earth; for if the earth is not pressed down, I know full well that at one time under the influence of rain the unpressed soil will turn to clay or mud; at another, under the influence of the sun, it will turn to sand or dust to the very bottom: so that the poor plant runs a risk of being first rotted with moisture by the rain, and next of being shrivelled up with drought through overheating of the roots.

Isch. So far as the planting of vines is concerned, it appears, Socrates, that you and I again hold views precisely similar.

Soc. And does this method of planting apply also to the fig-tree?

Isch. Surely, and not to the fig-tree alone, but to all the rest of fruit-trees. What reason indeed would there be for rejecting in the case of other plant-growths what is found to answer so well with the vine?

Soc. How shall we plant the olive, pray, Ischomachus?

Isch. I see your purpose. You ask that question with a view to put me to the test, when you know the answer yourself as well as possible. You can see with your own eyes that the olive has a deeper trench dug, planted as it is so commonly by the side of roads. You can see that all the young plants in the nursery adhere to stumps. And lastly, you can see that a lump of clay is placed on the head of every plant, and the portion of the plant above the soil is protected by a wrapping.

Soc. Yes, all these things I see.

Isch. Granted, you see: what is there in the matter that you do not understand? Perhaps you are ignorant how you are to lay the potsherd on the clay at top?

Soc. No, in very sooth, not ignorant of that Ischomachus, or anything you mentioned. That is just the puzzle, and again I beat my brains to discover why, when you put to me that question a while back: "Had I, in brief, the knowledge how to plant?" I answered, "No." Till then it never would have struck me that I could say at all how planting must be done. But no sooner do you begin to question me on each particular point than I can answer you; and what is more, my answers are, you tell me, accordant with the views of an authority at once so skilful and so celebrated as yourself. Really, Ischomachus, I am disposed to ask: "Does teaching consist in putting questions?" Indeed, the secret of your system has just this instant dawned upon me. I seem to see the principle in which you put your questions. You lead me through the field of my own knowledge, and then by pointing out analogies to what I know, persuade me that I really know some things which hitherto, as I believed, I had no knowledge of.

Isch. Do you suppose if I began to question you concerning money and its quality, I could possibly persuade you that you know the method to distinguish good from false coin? Or could I, by a string of questions about flute-players, painters, and the like, induce you to believe that you yourself know how to play the flute, or paint, and so forth?

Soc. Perhaps you might; for have you not persuaded me I am possessed of perfect knowledge of this art of husbandry, albeit I know that no one ever taught this art to me?

Isch. Ah! that is not the explanation, Socrates. The truth is what I told you long ago and kept on telling you. Husbandry is an art so gentle, so humane, that mistress-like she makes all those who look on her or listen to her voice intelligent of herself at once. Many a lesson does she herself impart how best to try conclusions with her. See, for instance, how the vine, making a ladder of the nearest tree whereon to climb, informs us that it needs support. Anon it spreads its leaves when, as it seems to say, "My grapes are young, my clusters tender," and so teaches us, during that season, to screen and shade the parts exposed to the sun's rays; but when the appointed moment comes, when now it is time for the swelling clusters to be sweetened by the sun, behold, it drops a leaf and then a leaf, so teaching us to strip it bare itself and let the vintage ripen. With plenty teeming, see the fertile mother shows her mellow clusters, and the while is nursing a new brood in primal crudeness. So the vine plant teaches us how best to gather in the vintage, even as men gather figs, the juiciest first.

Chapter XX

Soc. Tell me, Ischomachus, if the details of the art of husbandry are thus easy to learn, and all alike know what needs to be done, how does it happen that all farmers do not fare like, but some live in affluence owning more than they can possibly enjoy, while others of them fail to obtain the barest necessities and actually run into debt?

Isch. I will tell you, Socrates. It is neither knowledge nor lack of knowledge in these husbandmen which causes some to be well off, while others are in difficulties; nor will you ever hear such tales afloat as that this or that estate has gone to ruin because the sower failed to sow evenly, or that the planter failed to plant straight rows of plants, or that such an one, being ignorant what soil was best suited to bear vines, had set his plants in sterile ground, or that another was in ignorance that fallow must be broken up for purposes of sowing, or that a third was not aware that it is good to mix manure in with the soil. No, you are much more likely to hear said of So-and-so: No wonder the man gets in no wheat from his farm, when he takes no pains to have it sown or properly manured. Or of some other that he grows no wine: Of course not, when he takes no pains either to plant new vines or to make those he has bear fruit. A third has neither figs nor olives; and again the self-same reason: He too is careless, and takes no steps whatever to succeed in growing either one or other. These are the distinctions which make all the difference to prosperity in farming, far more than the reputed discovery of any clever agricultural method or machine. [...] You will find the principle applies elsewhere. There are points of strategic conduct in which generals differ from each other for the better or the worse, not because they differ in respect of wit or judgment, but of carefulness undoubtedly. I speak of things within the cognisance of every general, and indeed of almost every private soldier, which some commanders are careful to perform and others not. Who does not know, for instance, that in marching through a hostile territory an army ought to march in the order best adapted to deliver battle with effect should need arise? - a golden rule which, punctually obeyed by some, is disobeyed by others. Again, as all the world knows, it is better to place day and night pickets in front of an encampment. Yet even that is a procedure which, carefully observed at times, is at times as carelessly neglected. Once more: not one man in ten thousand, I suppose, but knows that when a force is marching through a narrow defile, the safer method is to occupy beforehand certain points of vantage. Yet this precaution also has been known to be neglected. [...] Similarly, every one will tell you that manure is the best thing in the world for agriculture, and every one can see how naturally it is produced. Still, though the method of production is accurately known, though there is every facility to get it in abundance, the fact remains that, while one man takes pains to have manure collected, another is entirely neglectful. And yet God sends us rain from heaven, and every hollow place becomes a standing pool, while earth supplies materials of every kind; the sower, too, about to sow must cleanse the soil, and what he takes as refuse from it needs only to be thrown into water and time itself will do the rest, shaping all to gladden earth. For matter in every shape, nay earth itself, in stagnant water turns to fine manure. [...] So, again, as touching the various ways in which the earth itself needs treatment, either as being too moist for sowing, or too salt for planting, these and the processes of cure

are known to all men: how in one case the superfluous water is drawn off by trenches, and in the other the salt corrected by being mixed with various non-salt bodies, moist or dry. Yet here again, in spite of knowledge, some are careful of these matters, others negligent. [...] But even if a man were altogether ignorant what earth can yield, were he debarred from seeing any fruit or plant, prevented hearing from the lips of any one the truth about this earth: even so, I put it to you, it would be easier far for any living soul to make experiments on a piece of land, than on a horse, for instance, or on his fellow-man. For there is nought which earth displays with intent to deceive, but in clear and simple language stamped with the seal of truth she informs us what she can and cannot do. Thus it has ever seemed to me that earth is the best discoverer of true honesty, in that she offers all her stores of knowledge in a shape accessible to the learner, so that he who runs may read. Here it is not open to the sluggard, as in other arts, to put forward the plea of ignorance or lack of knowledge, for all men know that earth, if kindly treated, will repay in kind. No! there is no witness against a coward soul so clear as that of husbandry; since no man ever yet persuaded himself that he could live without the staff of life. He therefore that is unskilled in other money-making arts and will not dig, shows plainly he is minded to make his living by picking and stealing, or by begging alms, or else he writes himself down a very fool. [...] Presently, Ischomachus proceeded: Now it is of prime importance, in reference to the profitableness or unprofitableness of agriculture, even on a large estate where there are numerous workfolk, whether a man takes any pains at all to see that his labourers are devoted to the work on hand during the appointed time, or whether he neglects that duty. Since one man will fairly distance ten simply by working at the time, and another may as easily fall short by leaving off before the hour. In fact, to let the fellows take things easily the whole day through will make a difference easily of half in the whole work. [...] As, on a walking-expedition, it may happen, of two wayfarers, the one will gain in pace upon the other half the distance say in every five- and-twenty miles, though both alike are young and hale of body. The one, in fact, is bent on compassing the work on which he started, he steps out gaily and unflinchingly; the other, more slack in spirit, stops to recruit himself and contemplate the view by fountain side and shady nook, as though his object were to court each gentle zephyr. So in farm work; there is a vast difference as regards performance between those who do it not, but seek excuse for idleness and are suffered to be listless. Thus, between good honest work and base neglect there is as great a difference as there is between--what shall I say? Why, work and idleness. The gardeners, look, are hoeing vines to keep them clean and free of weeds; but they hoe so sorrily that the loose stuff grows ranker and more plentiful. Can you call that anything but idleness? [...] Such, Socrates, are the ills which cause a house to crumble far more than lack of scientific knowledge, however rude it be. For if you will consider; on the one hand, there is a steady outflow of expenses from the house, and, on the other, a lack of profitable works outside to meet expenses; need you longer wonder if the field-works create a deficit and not a surplus? In proof, however, that the man who can give the requisite heed, while straining every nerve in the pursuit of agriculture, has speedy and effective means of making money, I may cite the instance of my father, who had practised what he preached. [...] Now, my father would never suffer me to purchase an estate already under cultivation, but if he chanced upon a plot of land which, owing to the neglect or incapacity of the owner, was neither tilled nor planted, nothing would satisfy him but I must purchase it. He had a saying that estates already under cultivation cost

a deal of money and allowed of no improvement; and where there is no prospect of improvement, more than half the pleasure to be got from the possession vanishes. The height of happiness was, he maintained, to see your purchase, be it dead chattel or live animal, go on improving daily under your own eyes. Now, nothing shows a larger increase than a piece of land reclaimed from barren waste and bearing fruit a hundredfold. I can assure you, Socrates, many is the farm which my father and I made worth I do not know how many times more than its original value. And then, Socrates, this valuable invention is so easy to learn that you who have but heard it know and understand it as well as I myself do, and can go away and teach it to another if you choose. Yet my father did not learn it of another, nor did he discover it by a painful mental process; but, as he has often told me, through pure love of husbandry and fondness of toil, he would become enamoured of such a spot as I describe, and then nothing would content him but he must own it, in order to have something to do, and at the same time, to derive pleasure along with profit from the purchase. For you must know, Socrates, of all Athenians I have ever heard of, my father, as it seems to me, had the greatest love for agricultural pursuits.

Soc. Ischomachus, did your father retain possession of all the farms he put under cultivation, or did he part with them whenever he was offered a good price?

Isch. He parted with them, without a doubt, but then at once he bought another in the place of what he sold, and in every case an untilled farm, in order to gratify his love for work.

Soc. As you describe him, your father must truly have been formed by nature with a passion for husbandry, not unlike that corn-hunger which merchants suffer from. You know their habits: by reason of this craving after corn, whenever they hear that corn is to be got, they go sailing off to find it, even if they must cross the Aegean, or the Euxine, or the Sicilian seas. And when they have got as much as ever they can get, they will not let it out of their sight, but store it in the vessel on which they sail themselves, and off they go across the seas again. Whenever they stand in need of money, they will not discharge their precious cargo, at least not in haphazard fashion, wherever they may chance to be; but first they find out where corn is at the highest value, and where the inhabitants will set the greatest store by it, and there they take and deliver the dear article. Your father's fondness for agriculture seems to bear a certain family resemblance to this passion.

Isch. You jest, Socrates; but still I hold to my belief: that man is fond of bricks and mortar who no sooner has built one house than he must needs sell it and proceed to build another.

To be sure, and for my part I assure you, upon oath, I, Socrates, do verily and indeed believe you that all men by nature love (or hold they ought to love) those things whereby soever they believe they will be benefited.

Chapter XXI

Soc. I am turning over in my mind how cleverly you have presented the whole argument to support your thesis: which was, that of all arts the art of husbandry is the easiest to learn. And now, as the result of all that has been stated, I am entirely persuaded that this is so.

Isch. Yes, Socrates, indeed it is. But I, on my side, must in turn admit that as regards that faculty which is common alike to every kind of conduct (tillage, or politics, the art of managing a house, or of conducting war), the power, namely, of command - I do subscribe to your opinion, that on this score one set of people differ largely from another both in point of wit and judgement. On a ship of war, for instance, the ship is on the high seas, and the crew must row whole days together to reach moorings. Now note the difference. Here you may find a captain able by dint of speech and conduct to whet the souls of those he leads, and sharpen them to voluntary toils; and there another so dull of wit and destitute of feeling that it will take his crew just twice the time to finish the same voyage. See them step on shore. The first ship's company are drenched in sweat; but listen, they are loud in praise of one another, the captain and his merry men alike. And the others? They are come at last; they have not turned a hair, the lazy fellows, but for all that they hate their officer and by him are hated. [...] Generals, too, will differ (he proceeded), the one sort from the other, in this very quality. Here you have a leader who, incapable of kindling a zest for toil and love of hairbreadth 'scapes, is apt to engender in his followers that base spirit which neither deigns nor chooses to obey, except under compulsion. They even pride and plume themselves, the cowards, on their opposition to their leader; this same leader who, in the end, will make his men insensible to shame even in presence of most foul mishap. On the other hand, put at their head another stamp of general: one who is by right divine a leader, good and brave, a man of scientific knowledge. Let him take over to his charge those malcontents, or others even of worse character, and he will have them presently ashamed of doing a disgraceful deed. "It is nobler to obey" will be their maxim. They will exult in personal obedience and in common toil, where toil is needed, cheerily performed. For just as an unurged zeal for voluntary service may at times invade, we know, the breasts of private soldiers, so may like love of toil with emulous longing to achieve great deeds of valour under the eyes of their commander, be implanted in whole armies by good officers. [...] Happy must that leader be whose followers are thus attached to him: beyond all others he will prove a stout and strong commander. And by strong, I mean, not one so hale of body as to tower above the stoutest of the soldiery themselves; no, nor him whose skill to hurl a javelin or shoot an arrow will outshine the skilfullest; nor yet that mounted on the fleetest charger it shall be his to bear the brunt of danger foremost amid the knightliest horsemen, the nimblest of light infantry. No, not these, but who is able to implant a firm persuasion in the minds of all his soldiers: follow him they must and will through fire, if need be, or into the jaws of death. [...] Lofty of soul and large of judgment may he be designated justly, at whose back there steps a multitude stirred by his sole sentiment; not unreasonably may he be said to march "with a mighty arm," to whose will a thousand willing hands are prompt to minister; a great man in every deed he is who can achieve great ends by resolution rather than brute force. [...] So, too, within the field of

private industry, the person in authority, be it the bailiff, be it the overseer, provided he is able to produce unflinching energy, intense and eager, for the work, belongs to those who haste to overtake good things and reap great plenty. Should the master, being a man possessed of so much power, Socrates, to injure the bad workman and reward the zealous --should he suddenly appear, and should his appearance in the labour field produce no visible effect upon his workpeople, I cannot say I envy or admire him. But if the sight of him is followed by a stir of movement, if there come upon each labourer fresh spirit, with mutual rivalry and keen ambition, drawing out the finest qualities of each, of him I should say, Behold a man of kingly disposition. And this, if I mistake not, is the quality of greatest import in every operation which needs the instrumentality of man; but most of all, perhaps, in agriculture. Not that I would maintain that it is a thing to be lightly learnt by a glance of the eye, or hearsay fashion, as a tale that is told. Far from it, I assert that he who is to have this power has need of education; he must have at bottom a good natural disposition; and, what is greatest of all, he must be himself a god-like being. For if I rightly understand this blessed gift, this faculty of command over willing followers, by no means is it, in its entirety, a merely human quality, but it is in part divine. It is a gift plainly given to those truly initiated in the mystery of self-command. Whereas despotism over unwilling slaves, the heavenly ones give, as it seems to me, to those whom they deem worthy to live the life of Tantalus in Hades, of whom it is written "he consumes unending days in apprehension of a second death."

REVENUES
XENOPHON
(355 BCE)

Chapter I

For myself I hold to the opinion that the qualities of the leading statesmen in a state, whatever they be, are reproduced in the character of the constitution itself. As, however, it has been maintained by certain leading statesmen in Athens that the recognised standard of right and wrong is as high at Athens as elsewhere, but that, owing to the pressure of poverty on the masses, a certain measure of injustice in their dealing with the allied states could not be avoided; I set myself to discover whether by any manner of means it were possible for the citizens of Athens to be supported solely from the soil of Attica itself, which was obviously the most equitable solution. For if so, herein lay, as I believed, the antidote at once to their own poverty and to the feeling of suspicion with which they are regarded by the rest of Hellas. I had no sooner begun my investigation than one fact presented itself clearly to my mind, which is that the country itself is made by nature to provide the amplest resources. And with a view to establishing the truth of this initial proposition I will describe the physical features of Attica.

In the first place, the extraordinary mildness of the climate is proved by the actual products of the soil. Numerous plants which in many parts of the world appear as stunted leafless growths are here fruit-bearing. And as with the soil so with the sea indenting our coasts, the varied productivity of which is exceptionally great. Again with regard to those kindly fruits of earth which Providence bestows on man season by season, one and all they commence earlier and end later in this land. Nor is the supremacy of Attica shown only in those products which year after year flourish and grow old, but the land contains treasures of a more perennial kind. Within its folds lies imbedded by nature an unstinted store of marble, out of which are chiselled temples and altars of rarest beauty and the glittering splendour of images sacred to the gods. This marble, moreover, is an object of desire to many foreigners, Hellenes and barbarians alike. Then there is land which, although it yields no fruit to the sower, needs only to be quarried in order to feed many times more mouths than it could as corn-land. Doubtless we owe it to a divine dispensation that our land is veined with silver; if we consider how many neighbouring states lie round us by land and sea and yet into none of them does a single thinnest vein of silver penetrate.

Indeed it would be scarcely irrational to maintain that the city of Athens lies at the navel, not of Hellas merely, but of the habitable world. So true is it, that the farther we remove from Athens the greater the extreme of heat or cold to be encountered; or to use another illustration, the traveller who desires to traverse the confines of Hellas from end to end will find that, whether he voyages by sea or by land, he is describing a circle, the centre of which is Athens.

Once more, this land though not literally sea-girt has all the advantages of an island, being accessible to every wind that blows, and can invite to its bosom or waft from its shore all products, since it is peninsular; whilst by land it is the emporium of many markets, as being a portion of the continent.

Lastly, while the majority of states have barbarian neighbours, the source of many troubles, Athens has as her next-door neighbours civilised states which are themselves far remote from the barbarians.

Chapter II

All these advantages, to repeat what I have said, may, I believe, be traced primarily to the soil and position of Attica itself. But these natural blessings may be added to: in the first place, by a careful handling of our resident alien population. And, for my part, I can hardly conceive of a more splendid source of revenue than lies open in this direction. Here you have a self-supporting class of residents conferring large benefits upon the state, and instead of receiving payment themselves, contributing on the contrary to the gain of the exchequer by the sojourners' tax. Nor, under the term careful handling, do I demand more than the removal of obligations which, whilst they confer no benefit on the state, have an air of inflicting various disabilities on the resident aliens. And I would further relieve them from the obligation of serving as hoplites side by side with the citizen proper; since, beside the personal risk, which is great, the trouble of quitting trades and homesteads is no trifle. Incidentally the state itself would benefit by this exemption, if the citizens were more in the habit of campaigning with one another, rather than shoulder to shoulder with Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians from all quarters of the world, who form the staple of our resident alien class. Besides the advantage (of so weeding the ranks), it would add a positive lustre to our city, were it admitted that the men of Athens, her sons, have reliance on themselves rather than on foreigners to fight her battles. And further, supposing we offered our resident aliens a share in various other honourable duties, including the cavalry service, I shall be surprised if we do not increase the goodwill of the aliens themselves, whilst at the same time we add distinctly to the strength and grandeur of our city.

In the next place, seeing that there are at present numerous building sites within the city walls as yet devoid of houses, supposing the state were to make free grants of such land to foreigners for building purposes in cases where there could be no doubt as to the respectability of the applicant, if I am not mistaken, the result of such a measure will be that a larger number of persons, and of a better class, will be attracted to Athens as a place of residence.

Lastly, if we could bring ourselves to appoint, as a new government office, a board of guardians of foreign residents like our Guardians of Orphans, with special privileges assigned to those guardians who should show on their books the greatest number of resident aliens — such a measure would tend to improve the goodwill of the class in question, and in all probability all people without a city of their own would aspire to the status of foreign residents in Athens, and so further increase the revenues of the city.

Chapter III

At this point I propose to offer some remarks in proof of the attractions and advantages of Athens as a centre of commercial enterprise. In the first place, it will hardly be denied that we possess the finest and safest harbourage for shipping, where vessels of all sorts can come to moorings and be laid up in absolute security as far as stress of weather is concerned. But further than that, in most states the trader is under the necessity of lading his vessel with some merchandise or other in exchange for his cargo, since the current coin has no circulation beyond the frontier. But at Athens he has a choice: he can either in return for his wares export a variety of goods, such as human beings seek after, or, if he does not desire to take goods in exchange for goods, he has simply to export silver, and he cannot have a more excellent freight to export, since wherever he likes to sell it he may look to realise a large percentage on his capital.

Or again, supposing prizes were offered to the magistrates in charge of the market for equitable and speedy settlements of points in dispute to enable any one so wishing to proceed on his voyage without hindrance, the result would be that far more traders would trade with us and with greater satisfaction.

It would indeed be a good and noble institution to pay special marks of honour, such as the privilege of the front seat, to merchants and shipowners, and on occasion to invite to hospitable entertainment those who, through something notable in the quality of ship or merchandise, may claim to have done the state a service. The recipients of these honours will rush into our arms as friends, not only under the incentive of gain, but of distinction also.

Now the greater the number of people attracted to Athens either as visitors or as residents, clearly the greater the development of imports and exports. More goods will be sent out of the country, there will be more buying and selling, with a consequent influx of money in the shape of rents to individuals and dues and customs to the state exchequer. And to secure this augmentation of the revenues, mind you, not the outlay of one single penny; nothing needed beyond one or two philanthropic measures and certain details of supervision.

With regard to the other sources of revenue which I contemplate, I admit, it is different. For these I recognise the necessity of a capital to begin with. I am not, however, without good hope that the citizens of this state will contribute heartily to such an object, when I reflect on the large sums subscribed by the state on various late occasions, as, for instance, when reinforcements were sent to the Arcadians under the command of Lysistratus, and again at the date of the generalship of Hegesileos. I am well aware that ships of war are frequently despatched and that too although it is uncertain whether the venture will be for the better or for the worse, and the only certainty is that the contributor will not recover the sum subscribed nor have any further share in the object for which he gave his contribution.

But for a sound investment I know of nothing comparable with the initial outlay to form this fund. Any one whose contribution amounts to ten minae may look forward to a return as high as he would get on bottomry, of nearly one-fifth, as the recipient of three obols a day. The contributor of five minae will on the same principle get more than a third, while the majority of Athenians will get more than cent per cent on their contribution. That is to say, a subscription of one mina will put the subscriber in possession of nearly double that sum, and that, moreover, without setting foot outside Athens, which, as far as human affairs go, is as sound and durable a security as possible.

Moreover, I am of opinion that if the names of contributors were to be inscribed as benefactors for all time, many foreigners would be induced to contribute, and possibly not a few states, in their desire to obtain the right of inscription; indeed I anticipate that some kings, tyrants, and satraps will display a keen desire to share in such a favour.

To come to the point. Were such a capital once furnished, it would be a magnificent plan to build lodging-houses for the benefit of shipmasters in the neighbourhood of the harbours, in addition to those which exist; and again, on the same principle, suitable places of meeting for merchants, for the purposes of buying and selling; and thirdly, public lodging-houses for persons visiting the city. Again, supposing dwelling-houses and stores for vending goods were fitted up for retail dealers in Piraeus and the city, they would at once be an ornament to the state and a fertile source of revenue. Also it seems to me it would be a good thing to try and see if, on the principle on which at present the state possesses public warships, it would not be possible to secure public merchant vessels, to be let out on the security of guarantors just like any other public property. If the plan were found feasible this public merchant navy would be a large source of extra revenue.

Chapter IV

I come to a new topic. I am persuaded that the establishment of the silver mines on a proper footing would be followed by a large increase in wealth apart from the other sources of revenue. And I would like, for the benefit of those who may be ignorant, to point out what the capacity of these mines really is. You will then be in a position to decide how to turn them to better account. It is clear, I presume, to every one that these mines have for a very long time been in active operation; at any rate no one will venture to fix the date at which they first began to be worked. Now in spite of the fact that the silver ore has been dug and carried out for so long a time, I would ask you to note that the mounds of rubbish so shovelled out are but a fractional portion of the series of hillocks containing veins of silver, and as yet unquarried. Nor is the silver-bearing region gradually becoming circumscribed. On the contrary it is evidently extending in wider area from year to year. That is to say, during the period in which thousands of workers have been employed within the mines no hand was ever stopped for want of work to do. Rather, at any given moment, the work to be done was more than enough for the hands employed. And so it is today with the owners of slaves working in the mines; no one dreams of reducing the number of his hands. On the contrary, the object is perpetually to acquire as many additional hands as the owner possibly can. The fact is that with few hands to dig and search, the find of treasure will be small, but with an increase in labour the discovery of the ore itself is more than proportionally increased. So much so, that of all operations with which I am acquainted, this is the only one in which no sort of jealousy is felt at a further development of the industry. I may go a step farther; every proprietor of a farm will be able to tell you exactly how many yoke of oxen are sufficient for the estate, and how many farm hands. To send into the field more than the exact number requisite every farmer would consider a dead loss. But in silver mining (operations) the universal complaint is the want of hands. Indeed there is no analogy between this and other industries. With an increase in the number of bronze-workers articles of bronze may become so cheap that the bronze-worker has to retire from the field. And so again with ironfounders. Or again, in a plethoric condition of the corn and wine market these fruits of the soil will be so depreciated in value that the particular husbandries cease to be remunerative, and many a farmer will give up his tillage of the soil and betake himself to the business of a merchant, or of a shopkeeper, to banking or money-lending. But the converse is the case in the working of silver; there the larger the quantity of ore discovered and the greater the amount of silver extracted, the greater the number of persons ready to engage in the operation. One more illustration: take the case of movable property. No one when he has got sufficient furniture for his house dreams of making further purchases on this head, but of silver no one ever yet possessed so much that he was forced to cry "enough." On the contrary, if ever anybody does become possessed of an immoderate amount he finds as much pleasure in digging a hole in the ground and hoarding it as in the actual employment of it. And from a wider point of view: when a state is prosperous there is nothing which people so much desire as silver. The men want money to expend on beautiful armour and fine horses, and houses, and sumptuous paraphernalia of all sorts. The women betake themselves to expensive apparel and ornaments of gold. Or when states are sick, either through barrenness of corn and other fruits, or through

war, the demand for current coin is even more imperative (whilst the ground lies unproductive), to pay for necessaries or military aid.

And if it be asserted that gold is after all just as useful as silver, without gainsaying the proposition I may note this fact about gold, that, with a sudden influx of this metal, it is the gold itself which is depreciated whilst causing at the same time a rise in the value of silver.

The above facts are, I think, conclusive. They encourage us not only to introduce as much human labour as possible into the mines, but to extend the scale of operations within, by increase of plant, etc., in full assurance that there is no danger either of the ore itself being exhausted or of silver becoming depreciated. And in advancing these views I am merely following a precedent set me by the state herself. So it seems to me, since the state permits any foreigner who desires it to undertake mining operations on a footing of equality with her own citizens.

But, to make my meaning clearer on the question of maintenance, I will at this point explain in detail how the silver mines may be furnished and extended so as to render them much more useful to the state. Only I would premise that I claim no sort of admiration for anything which I am about to say, as though I had hit upon some recondite discovery. Since half of what I have to say is at the present moment still patent to the eyes of all of us, and as to what belongs to past history, if we are to believe the testimony of our fathers, things were then much of a piece with what is going on now. No, what is really marvellous is that the state, with the fact of so many private persons growing wealthy at her expense, and under her very eyes, should have failed to imitate them. It is an old story, trite enough to those of us who have cared to attend to it, how once on a time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, owned a thousand men in the silver mines, whom he let out to Sosias, a Thracian, on the following terms. Sosias was to pay him a net obol a day, without charge or deduction, for every slave of the thousand, and be responsible for keeping up the number perpetually at that figure. So again Hipponicus had six hundred slaves let out on the same principle, which brought him in a net mina a day without charge or deduction. Then there was Philemonides, with three hundred, bringing him in half a mina, and others, I make no doubt there were, making profits in proportion to their respective resources and capital. But there is no need to revert to ancient history. At the present moment there are hundreds of human beings in the mines let out on the same principle. And given that my proposal were carried into effect, the only novelty in it is that, just as the individual in acquiring the ownership of a gang of slaves finds himself at once provided with a permanent source of income, so the state, in like fashion, should possess herself of a body of public slaves, to the number, say, of three for every Athenian citizen. As to the feasibility of our proposals, I challenge any one whom it may concern to test the scheme point by point, and to give his verdict.

With regard to the price then of the men themselves, it is obvious that the public treasury is in a better position to provide funds than any private individuals. What can be easier than for the Council to invite by public proclamation all whom it may concern to bring their slaves, and to buy up those produced? Assuming the purchase to be effected, is it credible that people will

hesitate to hire from the state rather than from the private owner, and actually on the same terms? People have at all events no hesitation at present in hiring consecrated grounds, sacred victims, houses, etc., or in purchasing the right of farming taxes from the state. To ensure the preservation of the purchased property, the treasury can take the same securities precisely from the lessee as it does from those who purchase the right of farming its taxes. Indeed, fraudulent dealing is easier on the part of the man who has purchased such a right than of the man who hires slaves. Since it is not easy to see how the exportation of public money is to be detected, when it differs in no way from private money. Whereas it will take a clever thief to make off with these slaves, marked as they will be with the public stamp, and in face of a heavy penalty attached at once to the sale and exportation of them. Up to this point then it would appear feasible enough for the state to acquire property in men and to keep a safe watch over them.

But with reference to an opposite objection which may present itself to the mind of some one: what guarantee is there that, along with the increase in the supply of labourers, there will be a corresponding demand for their services on the part of contractors? It may be reassuring to note, first of all, that many of those who have already embarked on mining operations will be anxious to increase their staff of labourers by hiring some of these public slaves (remember, they have a large capital at stake; and again, many of the actual labourers now engaged are growing old); and secondly, there are many others, Athenians and foreigners alike, who, though unwilling and indeed incapable of working physically in the mines, will be glad enough to earn a livelihood by their wits as superintendents.

Let it be granted, however, that at first a nucleus of twelve hundred slaves is formed. It is hardly too sanguine a supposition that out of the profits alone, within five or six years this number may be increased to at least six thousand. Again, out of that number of six thousand — supposing each slave to bring in an obol a day clear of all expenses — we get a revenue of sixty talents a year. And supposing twenty talents out of this sum laid out on the purchase of more slaves, there will be forty talents left for the state to apply to any other purpose it may find advisable. By the time the round number of ten thousand is reached the yearly income will amount to a hundred talents.

As a matter of fact, the state will receive much more than these figures represent, as any one here will bear me witness who can remember what the dues derived from slaves realised before the troubles at Decelea. Testimony to the same effect is borne by the fact, that in spite of the countless number of human beings employed in the silver mines within the whole period, the mines present exactly the same appearance today as they did within the recollection of our forefathers. And once more everything that is taking place today tends to prove that, whatever the number of slaves employed, you will never have more than the works can easily absorb. The miners find no limit of depth in sinking shafts or laterally in piercing galleries. To open cuttings in new directions today is just as possible as it was in former times. In fact no one can take on himself to say whether there is more ore in the regions already cut into, or in those where the pick has not yet struck. Well then, it may be asked, why is it that there is not the same rush to make new cuttings now as in former times?

The answer is, because the people concerned with the mines are poorer nowadays. The attempt to restart operations, renew plant, etc., is of recent date, and any one who ventures to open up a new area runs a considerable risk. Supposing he hits upon a productive field, he becomes a rich man, but supposing he draws a blank, he loses the whole of his outlay; and that is a danger which people of the present time are shy of facing.

The citizens of Athens are divided, as we all know, into ten tribes. Let the state then assign to each of these ten tribes an equal number of slaves, and let the tribes agree to associate their fortunes and proceed to open new cuttings. What will happen? Any single tribe hitting upon a productive lode will be the means of discovering what is advantageous to all. Or, supposing two or three, or possibly the half of them, hit upon a lode, clearly these several operations will proportionally be more remunerative still. That the whole ten will fail is not at all in accordance with what we should expect from the history of the past. It is possible, of course, for private persons to combine in the same way, and share their fortunes and minimise their risks. Nor need you apprehend, sirs, that a state mining company, established on this principle, will prove a thorn in the side of the private owner, or the private owner prove injurious to the state. But rather like allies who render each other stronger the more they combine, so in these silver mines, the greater number of companies at work the larger the riches they will discover and disinter.

This then is a statement, as far as I can make it clear, of the method by which, with the proper state organisation, every Athenian may be supplied with ample maintenance at the public expense. Possibly some of you may be calculating that the capital requisite will be enormous. They may doubt if a sufficient sum will ever be subscribed to meet all the needs. All I can say is, even so, do not despond. It is not as if it were necessary that every feature of the scheme should be carried out at once, or else there is to be no advantage in it at all. On the contrary, whatever number of houses are erected, or ships are built, or slaves purchased, etc., these portions will begin to pay at once. In fact, the bit-by-bit method of proceeding will be more advantageous than a simultaneous carrying into effect of the whole plan, to this extent: if we set about erecting buildings wholesale we shall make a more expensive and worse job of it than if we finish them off gradually. Again, if we set about bidding for hundreds of slaves at once we shall be forced to purchase an inferior type at a higher cost. Whereas, if we proceed tentatively, as we find ourselves able, we can complete any well-devised attempt at our leisure, and, in case of any obvious failure, take warning and not repeat it. Again, if everything were to be carried out at once, it is we, sirs, who must make the whole provision at our expense. Whereas, if part were proceeded with and part stood over, the portion of revenue in hand will help to furnish what is necessary to go on with. But to come now to what every one probably will regard as a really grave danger, lest the state may become possessed of an over large number of slaves, with the result that the works will be overstocked. That again is an apprehension which we may escape if we are careful not to put into the works more hands from year to year than the works themselves demand. Thus I am persuaded that the easiest method of carrying out this scheme, as a whole, is also the best. If, however, you are persuaded that, owing to the extraordinary property taxes to which you have been subjected during the present war, you will not be equal to any further contributions

at present, what you should do is this: during the current year resolve to carry on the financial administration of the state within the limits of a sum equivalent to that which your dues realised before the peace. That done, you are at liberty to take any surplus sum, whether directly traceable to the peace itself, or to the more courteous treatment of our resident aliens and traders, or to the growth of the imports and exports, coincident with the collecting together of larger masses of human beings, or to an augmentation of harbour and market dues: this surplus, I say, however derived, you should take and invest so as to bring in the greatest revenue.

Again, if there is an apprehension on the part of any that the whole scheme will crumble into nothing on the first outbreak of war, I would only beg these alarmists to note that, under the condition of things which we propose to bring about, war will have more terrors for the attacking party than for this state. Since what possession I should like to know can be more serviceable for war than that of men? Think of the many ships which they will be capable of manning on public service. Think of the number who will serve on land as infantry (in the public service) and will bear hard upon the enemy. Only we must treat them with courtesy. For myself, my calculation is, that even in the event of war we shall be quite able to keep a firm hold of the silver mines. I may take it, we have in the neighbourhood of the mines certain fortresses — one on the southern slope in Anaphlystus; and we have another fort on the northern side in Thoricus, the two being about seven and a half miles apart. Suppose then a third breastwork were to be placed between these, on the highest point of Besa, that would enable the operatives to collect into one out of all the fortresses, and at the first perception of a hostile movement it would only be a short distance for each to retire into safety. In the event of an enemy advancing in large numbers they might certainly make off with whatever corn or wine or cattle they found outside. But even if they did get hold of the silver ore, it would be little better to them than a heap of stones. But how is an enemy ever to march upon the mines in force? The nearest state, Megara, is distant, I take it, a good deal over sixty miles; and the next closest, Thebes, a good deal nearer seventy. Supposing then an enemy to advance from some such point to attack the mines, he cannot avoid passing Athens; and presuming his force to be small, we may expect him to be annihilated by our cavalry and frontier police. I say, presuming his force to be small, since to march with anything like a large force, and thereby leave his own territory denuded of troops, would be a startling achievement. Why, the fortified city of Athens will be much closer the states of the attacking parties than they themselves will be by the time they have got to the mines. But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose an enemy to have arrived in the neighbourhood of Laurium; how is he going to stop there without provisions? To go out in search of supplies with a detachment of his force would imply risk, both for the foraging party and for those who have to do the fighting; whilst, if they are driven to do so in force each time, they may call themselves besiegers, but they will be practically in a state of siege themselves.

But it is not the income derived from the slaves alone to which we look to help the state towards the effective maintenance of her citizens, but with the growth and concentration of a thick population in the mining district various sources of revenue will accrue, whether from the market at Sounion, or from the various state buildings in connection with the silver mines,

from furnaces and all the rest. Since we must expect a thickly populated city to spring up here, if organised in the way proposed, and plots of land will become as valuable to owners out there as they are to those who possess them in the neighbourhood of the capital.

If, at this point, I may assume my proposals to have been carried into effect, I think I can promise, not only that our city shall be relieved from a financial strain, but that she shall make a great stride in orderliness and in tactical organisation, she shall grow in martial spirit and readiness for war. I anticipate that those who are under orders to go through gymnastic training will devote themselves with a new zeal to the details of the training school, now that they will receive a larger maintenance whilst under the orders of the trainer in the torch race. So again those on garrison duty in the various fortresses, those enrolled as peltasts, or again as frontier police to protect the rural districts, one and all will carry out their respective duties more ardently when the maintenance appropriate to these several functions is duly forthcoming.

Chapter V

But now, if it is evident that, in order to get the full benefit of all these sources of revenue, peace is an indispensable condition — if that is plain, I say, the question suggests itself, would it not be worth while to appoint a board to act as guardians of peace? Since no doubt the election of such a magistracy would enhance the charm of this city in the eyes of the whole world, and add largely to the number of our visitors. But if any one is disposed to take the view, that by adopting a persistent peace policy, this city will be shorn of her power, that her glory will dwindle and her good name be forgotten throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, the view so taken by our friends here is in my poor judgment somewhat unreasonable. For they are surely the happy states, they, in popular language, are most fortune-favoured, which endure in peace the longest season. And of all states Athens is pre-eminently adapted by nature to flourish and wax strong in peace. The while she abides in peace she cannot fail to exercise an attractive force on all. From the mariner and the merchant upwards, all seek her, flocking they come; the wealthy dealers in corn and wine and oil, the owner of many cattle. And not these only, but the man who depends upon his wits, whose skill it is to do business and make gain out of money and its employment. And here another crowd, artificers of all sorts, artists and artisans, professors of wisdom, philosophers, and poets, with those who exhibit and popularise their works. And next a new train of pleasure-seekers, eager to feast on everything sacred or secular, which may captivate and charm eye and ear. Or once again, where are all those who seek to effect a rapid sale or purchase of a thousand commodities, to find what they want, if not at Athens?

But if there is no desire to gainsay these views — only that certain people, in their wish to recover that headship which was once the pride of our city, are persuaded that the accomplishment of their hopes is to be found, not in peace but in war, I beg them to reflect on some matters of history, and to begin at the beginning, the Median war. Was it by high-handed violence, or as benefactors of the Hellenes, that we obtained the headship of the naval forces, and the trusteeship of the treasury of Hellas? Again, when through the too cruel exercise of her presidency, as men thought, Athens was deprived of her empire, is it not the case that even in those days, as soon as we held aloof from injustice we were once more reinstated by the islanders, of their own free will, as presidents of the naval force? Nay, did not the very Thebans, in return for certain benefits, grant to us Athenians to exercise leadership over them? And at another date the Lacedemonians suffered us Athenians to arrange the terms of hegemony at our discretion, not as driven to such submission, but in requital of kindly treatment. And today, owing to the chaos which reigns in Hellas, if I mistake not, an opportunity has fallen to this city of winning back our fellow-Hellenes without pain or peril or expense of any sort. It is given to us to try and harmonise states which are at war with one another: it is given to us to reconcile the differences of rival factions within those states themselves, wherever existing.

Make it but evident that we are minded to preserve the independence of the Delphic shrine in its primitive integrity, not by joining in any war but by the moral force of embassies

throughout the length and breadth of Hellas — and I for one shall not be astonished if you find our brother Hellenes of one sentiment and eager under seal of solemn oaths to proceed against those, whoever they may be, who shall seek to step into the place vacated by the Phocians and to occupy the sacred shrine. Make it but evident that you intend to establish a general peace by land and sea, and, if I mistake not, your efforts will find a response in the hearts of all. There is no man but will pray for the salvation of Athens next to that of his own fatherland.

Again, is any one persuaded that, looking solely to riches and money-making, the state may find war more profitable than peace? If so, I cannot conceive a better method to decide that question than to allow the mind to revert to the past history of the state and to note well the sequence of events. He will discover that in times long gone by during a period of peace vast wealth was stored up in the Acropolis, the whole of which was lavishly expended during a subsequent period of war. He will perceive, if he examines closely, that even at the present time we are suffering from its ill effects. Countless sources of revenue have failed, or if they have still flowed in, been lavishly expended on a multiplicity of things. Whereas, now that peace is established by sea, our revenues have expanded and the citizens of Athens have it in their power to turn these to account as they like best.

But if you turn on me with the question, "Do you really mean that even in the event of unjust attacks upon our city on the part of any, we are still resolutely to observe peace towards that offender?" I answer distinctly, No! But, on the contrary, I maintain that we shall all the more promptly retaliate on such aggression in proportion as we have done no wrong to any one ourselves. Since that will be to rob the aggressor of his allies.

Chapter VI

But now, if none of these proposals be impracticable or even difficult of execution; if rather by giving them effect we may conciliate further the friendship of Hellas, whilst we strengthen our own administration and increase our fame; if by the same means the people shall be provided with the necessaries of life, and our rich men be relieved of expenditure on war; if with the large surplus to be counted on, we are in a position to conduct our festivals on an even grander scale than heretofore, to restore our temples, to rebuild our forts and docks, and to reinstate in their ancient privileges our priests, our senators, our magistrates, and our knights — surely it were but reasonable to enter upon this project speedily, so that we too, even in our own day, may witness the unclouded dawn of prosperity in store for our city.

But if you are agreed to carry out this plan, there is one further counsel which I would urge upon you. Send to Dodona and to Delphi, I would beg you, and consult the will of Heaven whether such a provision and such a policy on our part be truly to the interest of Athens both for the present and for the time to come. If the consent of Heaven be thus obtained, we ought then, I say, to put a further question: whose special favour among the gods shall we seek to secure with a view to the happier execution of these measures?

And in accordance with that answer, let us offer a sacrifice of happy omen to the deities so named, and commence the work; since if these transactions be so carried out with the will of God, have we not the right to prognosticate some further advance in the path of political progress for this whole state?

RHETORIC
BOOK I, CHAPTERS VI-VII
ARISTOTLE
(350 BCE)

Chapter VI

It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former. Now the political or deliberative orator's aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general.

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites. One thing may entail another in either of two ways: (1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does-i.e. it does so usually. All this being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently. The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil. The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people. Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things. Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honor and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action; since all such

qualities are productive of what is good. Further-good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life: since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself. And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:-That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen. And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning: "Surely would Priam exult."

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that 'evils draw men together'; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.

Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labor or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end - an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning: "And for Priam (and Troy-town's folk) should "they leave behind them a boast;" and "Oh, it were shame "To have tarried so long and return empty-handed as erst we came;" and there is also the proverb about 'breaking the pitcher at the door'.

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and 'most people' is taken to be equivalent to 'everybody'. That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good. So, again, that which is praised by our enemies [or by the worthless] for when even those who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. (For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote: "Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.")

Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favor of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are 'practicable' in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done 'easily' when they are done either without pain or quickly: the 'difficulty' of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes. Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at an or at least a balance of good over evil.

This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight. Good, too, are things that are a man's very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them. So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack—such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one's equals, or one's inferiors have succeeded. Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies; and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience, since we think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise: and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but also better. Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honor for honor, money-loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility.

Chapter VII

Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.

A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now to call a thing 'greater' or 'more' always implies a comparison of it with one that is 'smaller' or 'less', while 'great' and 'small', 'much' and 'little', are terms used in comparison with normal magnitude. The 'great' is that which surpasses the normal, the 'small' is that which is surpassed by the normal; and so with 'many' and 'few'.

Now we are applying the term 'good' to what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which all things aim; to what they would choose if they could acquire understanding and practical wisdom; and to that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them. Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger.

Again, if the largest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women, then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens.

Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially. Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating. Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other two. A thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of itself a greater good than that other. For this conception of 'productive of a greater' has been implied in our argument. Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the

latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is chosen for the sake of physical well-being. And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing. (That which stands 'less' in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better. That which does not need something else is more self-sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not; the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into existence. Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences. Now it is plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to be more important than another from two opposite points of view: it may appear the more important (1) because it is a beginning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not a beginning and the other thing is-on the ground that the end is more important and is not a beginning. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not have been done if he had not planned it. On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it out.

Further, what is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful. Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful: it is harder to get, and therefore better worth getting. Reversely, it may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we can make more use of it. For what is often useful surpasses what is seldom useful, whence the saying: "The best of things is water."

More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy, because it is rarer: and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard, for it is as we wish it to be. That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, and whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness: for positive goodness and badness are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be. Further, in proportion as the functions of things are noble or base, the things themselves are good or bad: conversely, in proportion as the things themselves are good or bad, their functions also are good or bad; for the nature of results corresponds with that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely the nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of their results. Moreover, those things are greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or more honorable. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell generally; and similarly, unusually great love of friends being more honorable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honorable

than ordinary love of money. Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than an unusual degree of the other. Again, one thing is more honorable or better than another if it is more honorable or better to desire it; the importance of the object of a given instinct corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same reason, if one thing is more honorable or better than another, it is more honorable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more honorable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals is also more honorable and valuable; as is the science, so is the reality that is its object, each science being authoritative in its own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honorable the object of a science, the more valuable and honorable the science itself is-in consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be so; either without qualification, or in so far as they use their understanding to form their judgement.

This is indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness, since one definition of 'good' was 'what beings that acquire understanding will choose in any given case': from which it clearly follows that that thing is better which understanding declares to be so. That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better men, either absolutely, or in virtue of their being better; as courage is better than strength. And that is a greater good which would be chosen by a better man, either absolutely, or in virtue of his being better: for instance, to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would be the choice of the juster man. Again, the pleasanter of two things is the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these are two of the characteristics by which the 'good' and the 'end' have been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or what is desirable in itself. And those things also are greater goods which men desire more earnestly to bring about for themselves or for their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring about are greater evils. And those things which are more lasting are better than those which are more fleeting, and the more secure than the less; the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our wishes, being there for us whenever we like. Further, in accordance with the rule of co-ordinate terms and inflexions of the same stem, what is true of one such related word is true of all. Thus if the action qualified by the term 'brave' is more noble and desirable than the action qualified by the term 'temperate', then 'bravery' is more desirable than 'temperance' and 'being brave' than 'being temperate'. That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which is not, and that chosen by the majority than that chosen by the minority. For that which all desire is good, as we have said; and so, the more a thing is desired, the better it is. Further, that is the better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies, or, again, by authorized judges or those whom they select to represent them. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that of every one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. And

sometimes it may be argued that what all share is the better thing, since it is a dishonor not to share in it; at other times, that what none or few share is better, since it is rarer. The more praiseworthy things are, the nobler and therefore the better they are. So with the things that earn greater honors than others-honor is, as it were, a measure of value; and the things whose absence involves comparatively heavy penalties; and the things that are better than others admitted or believed to be good. Moreover, things look better merely by being divided into their parts, since they then seem to surpass a greater number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was roused to battle by the thought of “All horrors that light on a folk whose city is taken of their foes, when they slaughter the men, when the burg is wasted with ravening flame, when strangers are haling young children to thralldom, (ffair women to shame.) “

The same effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax after the manner of Epicharmus. The reason is partly the same as in the case of division (for combination too makes the impression of great superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the cause and origin of important results. And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one's natural powers. When a man accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of their opposites. Hence the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games: “In time past, hearing a Yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, I carried my loads of fish from, Argos to Tegea town”. So Iphicrates used to extol himself by describing the low estate from which he had risen. Again, what is natural is better than what is acquired, since it is harder to come by. Hence the words of Homer: “I have learnt from none but myself.”

And the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as when Pericles in his funeral oration said that the country's loss of its young men in battle was 'as if the spring were taken out of the year'. So with those things which are of service when the need is pressing; for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in a greater degree which are nearer the end. What aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more desirable than to confer them, since a man will choose the former even if nobody is to know of it, but it is not the general view that he will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value, since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with health it is not so. That is better than other things which is more useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example, that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the highest value, as possessing all these advantages.

Again, that is better than other things which is accompanied both with less pain and with actual pleasure; for here there is more than one advantage; and so here we have the good of feeling pleasure and also the good of not feeling pain. And of two good things that is the better whose addition to a third thing makes a better whole than the addition of the other to the same thing will make. Again, those things which we are seen to possess are better than those which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the air of reality. Hence wealth may be regarded as a greater good if its existence is known to others. That which is dearly prized is better than what is not-the sort of thing that some people have only one of, though others have more like it. Accordingly, blinding a one-eyed man inflicts worse injury than half-blinding a man with two eyes; for the one-eyed man has been robbed of what he dearly prized.

The grounds on which we must base our arguments, when we are speaking for or against a proposal, have now been set forth more or less completely.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
BOOK V, CHAPTER V
ARISTOTLE
(340 BCE)

Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the Pythagoreans said; for they defined justice without qualification as reciprocity. Now 'reciprocity' fits neither distributive nor rectificatory justice—yet people want even the justice of Rhadamanthus to mean this: Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done—for in many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in accord; e.g., (1) if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in return, and if some one has wounded an official, he ought not to be wounded only but punished in addition. Further (2) there is a great difference between a voluntary and an involuntary act. But in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together—reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal return. For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together. Men seek to return either evil for evil—and if they cannot do so, think their position mere slavery—or good for good—and if they cannot do so there is no exchange, but it is by exchange that they hold together. This is why they give a prominent place to the temple of the Graces—to promote the requital of services; for this is characteristic of grace—we should serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and should another time take the initiative in showing it.

Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself give him in return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other; they must therefore be equated. (And this is true of the other arts also; for they would have been destroyed if what the patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of the same amount and kind.) For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore the excess and the defect—how many shoes are equal to a house or to a given amount of food. The number of shoes exchanged for a house (or for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond to the ratio of builder to shoemaker. For if this be not so, there will be no exchange and no intercourse. And this proportion will not be effected unless the goods are somehow equal. All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before. Now this unit is in truth demand, which holds all things together (for if men did not need one another's goods at all, or did not need them equally, there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange); but money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the name 'money' (*nomisma*)—because it exists not by nature but by law (*nomos*) and it is in our power to change it and make it useless. There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker's work is to that of the farmer's work for which it exchanges. But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when they have already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both excesses), but when they still have their own goods. Thus they are equals and associates just because this equality can be effected in their case.

Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his product equated to C. If it had not been possible for reciprocity to be thus effected, there would have been no association of the parties. That demand holds things together as a single unit is shown by the fact that when men do not need one another, i.e., when neither needs the other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange, as we do when some one wants what one has oneself, e.g., when people permit the exportation of corn in exchange for wine. This equation therefore must be established. And for the future exchange—that if we do not need a thing now we shall have it if ever we do need it—money is as it were our surety; for it must be possible for us to get what we want by bringing the money. Now the same thing happens to money itself as to goods—it is not always worth the same; yet it tends to be steadier. This is why all goods must have a price set on them; for then there will always be exchange, and if so, association of man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz., five. That exchange took place thus before there was money is plain; for it makes no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value of five beds.

We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been marked off from each other, it is plain that just action is intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for the one is to have too much and the other to have too little. Justice is a kind of mean, but not in the same way as the other virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, while injustice relates to the extremes. And justice is that in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute either between himself and another or between two others not so as to give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbour (and conversely with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with proportion; and similarly in distributing between two other persons. Injustice on the other hand is similarly related to the unjust, which is excess and defect, contrary to proportion, of the useful or hurtful. For which reason injustice is excess and defect, viz. because it is productive of excess and defect—in one's own case excess of what is in its own nature useful and defect of what is hurtful, while in the case of others it is as a whole like what it is in one's own case, but proportion may be violated in either direction. In the unjust act to have too little is to be unjustly treated; to have too much is to act unjustly.

Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and injustice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.

POLITICS
BOOK I
ARISTOTLE
(330 BCE)

Chapter I

Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.

Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.

Chapter II

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say, "It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;" as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First house and wife and an ox for the plough," for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says: "Each one gives law to his children and to his wives."

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a

man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the “Tribeless, lawless, heartless one,” whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

Chapter III

Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen.

Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be: I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the master-ship of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.

Chapter IV

Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other instruments.

For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, “of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;” if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action.

Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another’s man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

Chapter V

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects—for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.

Chapter VI

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature.

The law of which I speak is a sort of convention—the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force; and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave.

Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says: "Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods?"

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.

We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to

both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.

Chapter VII

The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and science for the slave. The science of the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more necessary, others of the more honorable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before slave, master before master.' But all such branches of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute.

Hence those who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war. Enough of the distinction between master and slave.

Chapter VIII

Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be no other than the art of household management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household management or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property and riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general, parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their food have made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain with greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among themselves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference.

The laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up of itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade—there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in

themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that “No bound to riches has been fixed for man.”

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.

Chapter IX

There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called an art of wealth-getting [‘Chematistics’], and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art.

Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations: Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men’s natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.

When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not

natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?

Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; in their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth getting. As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the un-limited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth increase their hoard of coin without limit. The source of the confusion is the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art; but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute.

Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.

Chapter X

And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether the art of getting wealth is the business of the manager of a household and of the statesman or not their business? viz., that wealth is presupposed by them. For as political science does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with earth or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know, too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of getting wealth is a part of the management of a household and the art of medicine not; for surely the members of a household must have health just as they must have life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from one point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another way the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always what remains over of that from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.

There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.

Chapter XI

Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now proceed to the practical part. The discussion of such matters is not un-worthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal and irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are, first, the knowledge of livestock—which are most profitable, and where, and how—as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of these pay better than others, and which pay best in particular places, for some do better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. These are the divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds—the provision of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for sale—these again differing as they are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third, service for hire—of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a third sort of wealth getting intermediate between this and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit from the earth, and from things growing from the earth which, although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now.

Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of excellence. Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of other branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer to their writings. It would be well also to collect the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him.

When the harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world

that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by cities when they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.

There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought up an the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests. He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.

Chapter XII

Of household management we have seen that there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule.

For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his footpan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus ‘father of Gods and men,’ because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

Chapter XIII

Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities—whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not? So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in any of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty.

Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like

Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, "Silence is a woman's glory," but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self control? But is there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his duties.

Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

ECONOMICS
BOOKS I-II
PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE
(320 BCE)

BOOK I

Chapter I

The sciences of politics and economics differ not only as widely as a household and a city (the subject-matter with which they severally deal), but also in the fact that the science of politics involves a number of rulers, whereas the sphere of economics is a monarchy.

Now certain of the arts fall into sub-divisions, and it does not pertain to the same art to manufacture and to use the article manufactured, for instance, a lyre or pipes; but the function of political science is both to constitute a city in the beginning and also when it has come into being to make a right use of it. It is clear, therefore, that it must be the function of economic science too both to found a household and also to make use of it.

Now a city is an aggregate made up of households and land and property, self-sufficient with regard to a good life. This is clear from the fact that, if men cannot attain this end, the community is dissolved. Further, it is for this end that they associate together; and that for the sake of which any particular thing exists and has come into being is its substance. It is evident, therefore, that economics is prior in origin to politics; for its function is prior, since a household is part of a city. We must therefore examine economics and see what its function is.

Chapter II

The parts of a household are man and property. But since the nature of any given thing is most quickly seen by taking its smallest parts, this would apply also to a household. So, according to Hesiod, it would be necessary that there should be “First and foremost a house, a woman, and an ox for the plough...” for the first point concerns subsistence, the second free men. We should have, therefore, to organize properly the association of husband and wife; and this involves providing what sort of a woman she ought to be.

In regard to property the first care is that which comes naturally. Now in the course of nature the art of agriculture is prior, and next come those arts which extract the products of the earth, mining and the like. Agriculture ranks first because of its justice; for it does not take anything away from men, either with their consent, as do retail trading and the mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the warlike arts. Further, agriculture is natural; for by nature all derive their sustenance from their mother, and so men derive it from the earth. In addition to this it also conduces greatly to bravery; for it does not make men’s bodies unserviceable, as do the illiberal arts, but it renders them able to lead an open-air life and work hard; furthermore it makes them adventurous against the foe, for husbandmen are the only citizens whose property lies outside the fortifications.

Chapter III

As regards the human part of the household, the first care is concerning a wife; for a common life is above all things natural to the female and to the male. For we have elsewhere laid down the principle that nature aims at producing many such forms of association, just as also it produces the various kinds of animals. But it is impossible for the female to accomplish this without the male or the male without the female, so that their common life has necessarily arisen. Now in the other animals this intercourse is not based on reason, but depends on the amount of natural instinct which they possess and is entirely for the purpose of procreation. But in the civilized and more intelligent animals the bond of unity is more complex (for in them we see more mutual help and goodwill and co-operation), above all in the case of man, because the female and the male co-operate to ensure not merely existence but a good life. And the production of children is not only a way of serving nature but also of securing advantage; for the trouble which parents bestow upon their helpless children when they are themselves vigorous is repaid to them in old age when they are helpless by their children, who are then in their full vigour. At the same time also nature thus periodically provides for the perpetuation of mankind as a species, since she cannot do so individually.

Thus the nature both of the man and of the woman has been preordained by the will of heaven to live a common life. For they are distinguished in that the powers which they possess are not applicable to purposes in all cases identical, but in some respects their functions are opposed to one another though they all tend to the same end. For nature has made the one sex stronger, the other weaker, that the latter through fear may be the more cautious, while the former by its courage is better able to ward off attacks; and that the one may acquire possessions outside the house, the other preserve those within. In the performance of work, she made one sex able to lead a sedentary life and not strong enough to endure exposure, the other less adapted for quiet pursuits but well constituted for outdoor activities; and in relation to offspring she has made both share in the procreation of children, but each render its peculiar service towards them, the woman by nurturing, the man by educating them.

Chapter IV

First, then, he must not do her any wrong; for thus a man is less likely himself to be wronged. This is inculcated by the general law, as the Pythagoreans say, that one least of all should injure a wife as being ‘a suppliant and taken from her hearth’. Now wrong inflicted by a husband is the formation of connexions outside his own house. As regards association, she ought not to need him when he is present or be incapacitated in his absence, but should be accustomed to be competent whether he is present or not. The saying of Hesiod is a good one: “A man should marry a maiden, that habits discreet he may teach her.”

For dissimilarity of habits tends more than anything to destroy affection. As regards adornment, husband and wife ought not to approach one another with false affectation in their person any more than in their manners; for if the society of husband and wife requires such embellishment, it is no better than play-acting on the tragic stage.

Chapter V

Of possessions, that which is the best and the worthiest subject of economics comes first and is most essential—I mean, man. It is necessary therefore first to provide oneself with good slaves. Now slaves are of two kinds, the overseer and the worker. And since we see that methods of education produce a certain character in the young, it is necessary when one has procured slaves to bring up carefully those to whom the higher duties are to be entrusted. The intercourse of a master with his slaves should be such as to allow them to be neither insolent nor uncontrolled. To the higher class of slaves he ought to give some share of honour, and to the workers abundance of nourishment. And since the drinking of wine makes even freemen insolent, and many nations even of freemen abstain therefrom (the Carthaginians, for instance, when they are on military service), it is clear that wine ought never to be given to slaves, or at any rate very seldom.

Three things make up the life of a slave, work, punishment, and food. To give them food but no punishment and no work makes them insolent; and that they should have work and punishment but no food is tyrannical and destroys their efficiency. It remains therefore to give them work and sufficient food; for it is impossible to rule without offering rewards, and a slave's reward is his food. And just as all other men become worse when they get no advantage by being better and there are no rewards for virtue and vice, so also is it with servants. Therefore we must take careful notice and bestow or withhold everything, whether food or clothing or leisure or punishments, according to merit, in word and deed following the practice adopted by physicians in the matter of medicine, remembering at the same time that food is not medicine because it must be given continually.

The slave who is best suited for his work is the kind that is neither too cowardly nor too courageous. Slaves who have either of these characteristics are injurious to their owners; those who are too cowardly lack endurance, while the high-spirited are not easy to control. All ought to have a definite end in view; for it is just and beneficial to offer slaves their freedom as a prize, for they are willing to work when a prize is set before them and a limit of time is defined. One ought to bind slaves to one's service by letting them have children, and not to have many persons of the same race in a household, any more than in a state. One ought to provide sacrifices and pleasures more for the sake of slaves than for freemen; for in the case of the former there are present more of the reasons why such things have been instituted.

Chapter VI

The householder has four roles in relation to wealth. He ought to be able to acquire it, and to guard it; otherwise there is no advantage in acquiring it, but it is a case of drawing water with a sieve, or the proverbial jar with a hole in it. Further, he ought to be able to order his possessions aright and make a proper use of them; for it is for these purposes that we require wealth. The various kinds of property ought to be distinguished, and those which are productive ought to be more numerous than the unproductive, and the sources of income ought to be so distributed that they may not run a risk with all their possessions at the same time. For the preservation of wealth it is best to follow both the Persian and the Laconian methods. The Attic system of economy is also useful; for they sell their produce and buy what they want, and thus there is not the need of a storehouse in the smaller establishments. The Persian system was that everything should be organized and that the master should superintend everything personally, as Dio said of Dionysius; for no one looks after the property of others as well as he looks after his own, so that, as far as possible, a man ought to attend to everything himself. The sayings of the Persian and the Libyan may not come amiss; the former of whom, when asked what was the best thing to fatten a horse, replied, 'His master's eye' while the Libyan, when asked what was the best manure, answered, 'The master's foot-prints'. Some things should be attended to by the master others by his wife, according to the sphere allotted to each in the economy of the household. Inspections need only be made occasionally in small establishments, but should be frequent where overseers are employed.

For good imitation is impossible unless a good example is set, especially when trust is delegated to others; for unless the master is careful, it is impossible for his overseers to be careful. And since it is good for the formation of character and useful in the interests of economy, masters ought to rise earlier than their slaves and retire to rest later, and a house should never be left unguarded any more than a city, and when anything needs doing it ought not to be left undone, whether it be day or night. There are occasions when a master should rise while it is still night; for this helps to make a man healthy and wealthy and wise. On small estates the Attic system of disposing of the produce is a useful one; but on large estates, where a distinction is made between yearly and monthly expenditure and likewise between the daily and the occasional use of household appliances, such matters must be entrusted to overseers. Furthermore, a periodical inspection should be made, in order to ascertain what is still existing and what is lacking.

The house must be arranged both with a view to one's possessions and for the health and well-being of its inhabitants. By possessions I mean the consideration of what is suitable for produce and clothing, and in the case of produce what is suitable for dry and what for moist produce, and amongst other possessions what is suitable for property whether animate or inanimate, for slaves and freemen, women and men, strangers and citizens. With a view to well-being and health, the house ought to be airy in summer and sunny in winter. This would be best secured if it faces north and is not as wide as it is long. In large establishments a man

who is no use for other purposes seems to be usefully employed as a doorkeeper to safeguard what is brought into and out of the house. For the ready use of household appliances the Laconian method is a good one; for everything ought to have its own proper place and so be ready for use and not require to be searched for.

BOOK II

Chapter I

He who intends to practise economy aright ought to be fully acquainted with the places in which his labour lies and to be naturally endowed with good parts and by choice industrious and upright; for if he is lacking in any of these respects, he will make many mistakes in the business which he takes in hand.

Now there are four kinds of economy, that of the king, that of the provincial governor, that of the city, and that of the individual. This is a broad method of division; and we shall find that the other forms of economy fall within it.

Of these that of the king is the most important and the simplest, that of the city is the most varied and the easiest, that of the individual the least important and the most varied. They must necessarily have most of their characteristics in common; but it is the points which are peculiar to each kind that we must consider. Let us therefore examine royal economy first. It is universal in its scope, but has four special departments—the coinage, exports, imports, and expenditure. To take each of these separately: in regard to the coinage, I mean the question as to what coin should be struck and when; in the matter of exports and imports, what commodities it will be advantageous to receive from the satraps in tax and dispose of and when; in regard to expenditure, what expenses ought to be curtailed and when, and whether one should pay what is expended in coin or in commodities which have an equivalent value.

Let us next take satrapic economy. Here we find six kinds of revenue—[from land, from the peculiar products of the district, from merchandise, from taxes, from cattle, and from all other sources]. Of these the first and most important is that which comes from land (which some call tax on land-produce, others tithe); next in importance is the revenue from peculiar products, from gold, or silver, or copper, or anything else which is found in a particular locality; thirdly comes that derived from merchandise; fourthly, the revenue from the cultivation of the soil and from market-dues; fifthly, that which comes from cattle, which is called tax on animal produce or tithe; and sixthly, that which is derived from men, which is called the poll-tax or tax on artisans.

Thirdly, let us examine the economy of the city. Here the most important source of revenue is from the peculiar products of the country, next comes that derived from merchandise and customs, and lastly that which comes from the ordinary taxes.

Fourthly and lastly, let us take individual economy. Here we find wide divergences, because economy is not necessarily always practised with one aim in view. It is the least important kind of economy, because the incomings and expenses are small. Here the main source of revenue is the land, next other kinds of regular activity, and thirdly investments of money. Further, there is a consideration which is common to all branches of economy and which calls for the most careful attention, especially in individual economy, namely, that the expenditure must not exceed the income.

Now that we have mentioned the divisions of the subject, we must next consider whether the satrapy or city with which we are dealing can produce all, or the most important revenues which we have just distinguished; if it can, it should use them. Next we must consider which sources of revenue do not exist at all but can be introduced, or are at present small but can be augmented; and which of the expenses at present incurred, and to what amount, can be dispensed with without doing any harm to the whole.

We have now mentioned the various kinds of economy and their constituent parts. We have further made a collection of all the methods that we conceived to be worth mentioning, which men of former days have employed or cunningly devised in order to provide themselves with money.

For we conceived that this information also might be useful; for a man will be able to apply some of these instances to such business as he himself takes in hand.

Chapter II

Cypselus, the Corinthian, having vowed to Zeus that, if he made himself master of the city, he would dedicate to him all the property of the Corinthians, ordered them to draw up a list of their possessions. When they had done so, he took a tenth part from each citizen and told them to trade with the remainder. As each year came round, he did the same thing again, with the result that in ten years he had all that he had consecrated to the god, while the Corinthians had acquired other property.

Lygdamis, the Naxian, having driven certain men into exile, when no one was willing to buy their possessions except at a low price, sold them to the exiles themselves. And offerings belonging to them which were lying half finished in certain workshops he sold to the exiles and any one else who wished to buy them, allowing the name of the purchaser to be inscribed upon them.

The Byzantines being in need of money sold the sacred enclosures belonging to the state. Those which were fertile they sold on lease, and those which were unproductive in perpetuity. They treated in the same way the enclosures which belonged to associations and clans and all which were situated on private estates; for the owners of the rest of the property bought them at a high price. To the associations they sold other lands, viz.

the public lands round the gymnasium, or the market-place, or the harbour; and they sold the places where markets were held at which various commodities were sold, and the rights over the sea-fisheries and the sale of salt, and . . . of jugglers, and soothsayers, and druggists, and other such persons plied their trades; but they ordered them to pay over a third of their profits. And they sold the right of changing money to a single bank, and no one else might either give money in exchange to anyone, or receive it in exchange from anyone, under penalty of forfeiting the money. And whereas there was a law amongst them that no one should have political rights who was not born of parents who were both citizens, being in want of money they passed a decree that a man who was sprung from a citizen on one side only should become a citizen if he paid down thirty minae. And as they were suffering from want of food and lack of money, they made the ships from the Black Sea put in; but, as time went on, the merchants protested and so they paid them interest at ten per cent, and ordered those who purchased anything to pay the ten per cent, in addition to the price. And whereas certain resident aliens had lent money on security of property, because these had not the right to hold property, they passed a decree that any one who wished could obtain a title to the property by paying a third of the loan to the state.

Hippias, the Athenian, put up for sale the parts of the upper rooms which projected into the public streets, and the steps and fences in front of the houses, and the doors which opened outwards. The owners of the property therefore bought them, and a large sum was thus collected. He also declared the coinage then current in Athens to be base, and fixing a price

for it ordered it to be brought to him; but when they met to consider the striking of a new type of coin, he gave them back the same money again.

And if anyone was about to equip a trireme or a division of cavalry or to provide a tragic chorus or incur expense on any other such state-service, he fixed a moderate fine and allowed him, if he liked, to pay this and be enrolled amongst those who had performed state services. He also ordered that a measure of barley, and another of wheat, and an obol should be brought to the priestess of Athena-on-the-Acropolis on behalf of anyone who died, and that the same offering should be made by anyone to whom a child was born.

The Athenians who dwell in Potidaea, being in need of money to carry on war, ordered all the citizens to draw up a list of their property, each man enrolling not his whole property collectively in his own deme, but each piece of property separately in the place where it was situated, in order that the poor might give in an assessment; anyone who possessed no property was to assess his own person at two minae. On the basis of this assessment they each contributed the amount enjoined.

Sosipolis of Antissa, when the city was in want of money, since the citizens were wont to celebrate the feast of Dionysus with great splendour and every year went to great expense in providing, amongst other things, very costly victims, persuaded them, when the festival was near at hand, to vow to Dionysus that they would give double offerings the next year and collect and sell the dedications for the current year. Thus a substantial sum was collected for the needs of the moment.

The people of Lampsacus, expecting a large fleet of triremes to come against them, ordered the dealers to sell a medimnus of barley-meal, of which the market price was four drachmae, at six drachmae, and a chous of oil, the price of which was three drachmae, at four drachmae and a half, and likewise wine and the other commodities. The individual seller thus received the old price, while the city gained the surplus and so was well provided with money.

The people of Heraclea, when they were sending forty ships against the tyrants on the Bosphorus, not being well provided with money, bought up from the merchants all their corn and oil and wine and the rest of their stores, fixing a date in the future at which they were to make the payment. Now it suited the merchants better to sell their cargoes wholesale rather than retail. So the people of Heraclea, giving the soldiers two months' pay, took the provisions with them on board merchant-vessels and put an official in charge of each of the ships. When they reached the enemies' territory, the soldiers bought up all the provisions from them. Thus money was collected before the generals had to pay the soldiers again, and so the same money was distributed time after time until they returned home.

When the Samians begged for money for their return home, the Lacedaemonians passed a decree that they would fast for one day, themselves and their domestics and their beasts of burden, and would give to the Samians the amount that each of them usually expended.

The Chalcedonians, having a large number of foreign mercenaries in their city, owed them pay which they could not give them. They therefore proclaimed that if any citizen or resident alien had any right of seizure against any state or individual and wished to exercise it, they should give in their names. When many did so, they seized the ships which sailed into the Black Sea on a plausible pretext, and appointed a time at which they promised to give an account of their captures. When a large sum of money had been collected they dismissed the soldiers and submitted themselves to trial for their reprisals, and the state out of its revenues made restitution to those who had been unjustly plundered. When the people of Cyzicus were at variance and the popular party had gained the upper hand and the wealthy citizens had been imprisoned, they passed a decree, since they owed money to their soldiers, that they would not put their prisoners to death, but would exact money from them and send them into exile.

The Chians, who have a law that a public register of debts should be kept, being in want of money decreed that debtors should pay their debts to the state and that the state should disburse the interest from its revenues to the creditors until they should be able to restore the principal.

Mausolus, tyrant of Caria, when the king of Persia sent and ordered him to pay his tribute, collected together the richest men in the country and told them that the king was demanding the tribute, but he himself could not provide it. And certain men, who had been suborned to do so, immediately promised to contribute and named the amount that each would give. Upon this the wealthier men, partly through shame and partly from fear, promised and actually contributed far larger sums.

On another occasion when he was in need of money, he called together the Mylassians and told them that this city of his, though it was their mother-city, was unfortified and that the king of Persia was marching against him. He therefore ordered the Mylassians each to contribute as much money as possible, saying that by what they paid now they would save the rest of their possessions. When a large contribution had been made, he kept the money and told them that at the moment the god would not allow them to build the wall.

Condalus, a governor under Mausolus, whenever during his passage through the country anyone brought him a sheep or a pig or a calf, used to make a record of the donor and the date and order him to take it back home and keep it until he returned. When he thought that sufficient time had elapsed, he used to ask for the animal which was being kept for him, and reckoned up and demanded the produce-tax on it as well. And any trees which projected over or fell into the royal roads he used to sell . . . the produce-taxes. And if any soldier died, he demanded a drachma as a toll for the corpse passing the gates; and so he not only received money from this source, but also the officers could not deceive him as to the date of the soldier's death. Also, noticing that the Lycians were fond of wearing their hair long, he said that a dispatch had come from the king of Persia ordering him to send hair to make false fringes and that he was therefore commanded by Mausolus to cut off their hair. He therefore said that, if they would pay him a fixed poll-tax, he would have hair sent from Greece. They

gladly gave him what he asked, and a large sum of money was collected from a great number of them.

Aristotle, the Rhodian, who was governor of Phocaea, was in want of money. Perceiving therefore that there were two parties amongst the Phocaeans, he made secret overtures to one party saying that the other faction was offering him money on condition that he would turn the scale in their favour, but that for his own part he would rather receive money from them and give the direction of affairs into their hands.

When they heard this, those who were present immediately gave him the money, supplying him with all he asked for. He then went to the other party and showed them what he had received from their opponents; whereupon they also professed their willingness to give him an equal sum. So he took the money from both parties and reconciled them one with another. Also, noticing that there was much litigation among the citizens and that there were grievances of long standing among them owing to war, he established a court of law and proclaimed that unless they submitted their cases to judgement within a period which he appointed, there would be no further settlement of their former claims. Then getting control of a number of suits and of the cases which were subject to appeal with damages, and receiving money from both parties by other means, he collected a large sum.

The Clazomenians, when they were suffering from famine and were in want of money, decreed that private individuals who had any olive oil should lend it to the state, which would pay them interest. Now olives are abundant in this country. When the owners had lent them the oil, they hired ships and sent it to the marts from which their corn came, giving the value of the oil as a pledge. And when they owed pay to their soldiers to the amount of twenty talents and could not provide it, they paid the generals four talents a year as interest. But finding that they did not reduce the principal and that they were continually spending money to no purpose, they struck an iron coinage to represent a sum of twenty talents of silver, and then distributing it among the richest citizens in proportion to their wealth they received in exchange an equivalent sum in silver. Thus the individual citizens had money to disburse for their daily needs and the state was freed from debt. They then paid them interest out of their revenues and continually divided it up and distributed it in proper proportions, and called in the iron coinage.

The Selymbrians were once in need of money: they had a law which forbade the export of corn; when a famine occurred and they had a supply of last season's corn, they passed a decree that private persons should hand over their corn to the state at a fixed price, each reserving a year's supply; they then allowed anyone who wished to export his supply, fixing a price which they thought would give them a profit.

The people of Abydos, when their land was untilled owing to political dissensions and the resident aliens were paying them nothing because they still owed them money, passed a decree that anyone who was willing should lend money to the farmers in order that they

might till the soil, providing that they should enjoy the first-fruits of the crop and that the others should have what remained.

The Ephesians, being in need of money, made a law that their women should not wear gold ornaments, but should lend to the state what they already possessed; and fixing the amount which was to be paid they allowed the name of any one who presented that sum to be inscribed as that of the dedicator on certain of the pillars in the temple.

Dionysius of Syracuse, wishing to collect money, called together an assembly and declared that Demeter had appeared to him and bade him bring the ornaments of the women to her temple. He had therefore, he said, done so with the ornaments of the women of his own household; and he demanded that everyone else should do the same, lest vengeance from the goddess should fall upon them. Anyone who refused would, he said, be guilty of sacrilege. When all had brought what they possessed through fear of the goddess and dread of Dionysius, after dedicating the ornaments to the goddess he then appropriated them, saying that they were lent to him by her. And when some time had elapsed and the women began wearing ornaments again, he ordered that any women who wished to wear jewellery of gold should dedicate a fixed sum in the temple.

And when he was intending to build triremes, he knew that he would be in want of money. He therefore called together an assembly and said that a certain city was to be betrayed to him and that he needed money for this purpose. He therefore asked the citizens to contribute two staters each; and they did so. He then let two or three days elapse, and pretending that he had failed in his attempt, after commending their generosity he gave every man his contribution back again. By this action he won the hearts of the citizens. And so they again contributed, thinking that they would receive their money back again; but he took the money and kept it for building his ships.

And when he was in need of money he struck a coinage of tin, and calling an assembly together he spoke at great length in favour of the money which had been coined; and they, even against their will, decreed that everyone should regard any of it that he accepted as silver and not as tin.

On another occasion, being in want of money, he asked the citizens to give him contributions; but they declared that they had nothing to give. Accordingly he brought out his own household goods and offered them for sale, as though compelled to do so by poverty. When the Syracusans bought them, he kept a record of what each had bought, and when they had paid the price, he ordered each of them to bring back the articles which he had bought.

And when the citizens owing to the taxes could not keep cattle, he said that he had enough up to the present; those therefore who acquired cattle should now be free from a tax on them. But since many soon acquired a large number of cattle, thinking that they could keep them without paying a tax on them, when he thought that a fitting moment had come he gave orders that they should assess their value and then imposed a tax.

Accordingly the citizens, angry at having been deceived, slew their cattle and sold them. And when, to prevent this, he ordered them to kill only as many as were needed for daily use, they next devoted them for sacrifice to the gods. Dionysius then forbade them to sacrifice any female beast.

On another occasion when he was in need of money, he ordered all families of orphans to enrol themselves; and when they had done so, he enjoyed their property until each came of age.

And after he had captured Rhegium he called an assembly of the inhabitants together and informed them that he would be quite justified in enslaving them, but under the circumstances he would let them go free if he received the amount which he had spent on the war and three minae a head from all of them. The Rhegians then brought to light the wealth which before had been hidden, and the poor borrowed from the richer citizens and from foreigners and provided the sum which he demanded. When he had received it from them he nevertheless sold them all as slaves, and seized all the treasures which had before been hidden and were now brought to light.

Also having borrowed money from the citizens under promise of repayment, when they demanded it back he ordered them to bring him whatever money any of them possessed, threatening them with death as the penalty if they failed to do so. When the money had been brought, he issued it again after stamping it afresh so that each drachma had the value of two drachmae, and paid back the original debt and the money which they brought him on this occasion. And when he sailed against Tyrrhenia with a hundred ships he took much gold and silver and a considerable quantity of other ornaments of all kinds from the temple of Leucothea. And knowing that the sailors too were keeping many things for themselves, he made a proclamation that everyone should bring him the half of what he had and might retain the other half; and he threatened with death anyone who failed to deliver up the half. The sailors, supposing that if they gave up the half they would be allowed undisturbed possession of the rest, did so; but Dionysius, when he had received it, ordered them to go back and bring him the other half. The Mendaeans used the proceeds of their harbour customs and their other dues for the administration of their city, but did not exact the taxes on land and houses; but they kept a register of property-owners, and whenever they needed money, they paid as though they owed taxes. They thus profited during the time which elapsed by having full use of the money without paying interest.

When they were at war with the Olynthians and needed money, seeing that they had slaves they decreed that a female and a male slave should be left to each citizen and the rest sold, so that private individuals might lend money to the state. Callistratus the Athenian, when the harbour-dues in Macedonia were usually sold at twenty talents, made them fetch double that price. For, noticing that the richer men always bought them because it was necessary that the sureties provided for the twenty talents should be possessed of one talent, he proclaimed that

anyone who liked could purchase them and that sureties should be provided for only a third or any other proportion which each could guarantee.

Timotheus, the Athenian, when he was at war with the Olynthians, and in need of money, struck a bronze coinage and distributed it to the soldiers. When they protested, he told them that the merchants and retailers would all sell their goods on the same terms as before. He then told the merchants, if they received any bronze money, to use it again to buy the commodities sent in for sale from the country and anything which was brought in as plunder, and said that, if they brought him any bronze money which they had left over, they should receive silver for it.

When he was making war in the neighbourhood of Corcyra and was in difficulties, and the soldiers were demanding their pay and refusing to obey him and threatening to go over to the enemy, he called together an assembly and told them that no money could reach him owing to the stormy weather—though he had, he declared, such an abundance of supplies that he offered them as a free gift the three months' rations which they had already received. They, supposing that Timotheus would never have made such a valuable concession unless he really expected the money, kept silence about the pay; and he meanwhile achieved the objects which he had in view.

When he was besieging Samos he actually sold to the inhabitants the fruits and the produce of their lands, and so had abundance of money to pay his soldiers. And when there was a shortage of provisions in the camp owing to the arrival of newcomers, he forbade the sale of corn ready ground, and of any smaller measure than a medimnus, and of any liquid in a smaller quantity than a metreta. Accordingly the commanders of divisions and companies bought up provisions wholesale and distributed them to the soldiers, while the newcomers brought their own provisions with them and, when they departed, sold anything that they had left. The result was that the soldiers had an abundance of provisions. Datames, the Persian, having soldiers under his command, could supply their daily needs from the enemy's country, but having no money to give them, and being requested to pay them, when the time came at which it was due he devised the following plan. He called together an assembly and told them that he had no lack of money, but that it was in a certain place which he named. He therefore moved his camp and started to march thither. Then when he was near the place, he went in advance to it and took from the temples there all the embossed silver plate which they contained.

He then loaded his mules so that the silver plate was visible and they looked as though they were carrying silver, and continued the march. The soldiers, when they saw it, thought that the loads were all solid silver and were encouraged, thinking that they would receive their pay. But Datames told them that he must go to Amisus and have the silver minted. Now the journey to Amisus was one of many days and exposed to the weather. So all this time he made use of the army, merely giving them their rations. He kept in his personal service all the skilled artificers in the army and the retailers who carried on traffic in any commodity; and no one else was permitted to do any of these things.

Chabrias, the Athenian, advised Taus, king of Egypt, when he was starting on an expedition and was in need of money, to say to the priests that owing to the expense some of the temples and the majority of the priests must be dispensed with. When the priests heard this, each wishing to retain his own temple and to remain a priest himself, they offered him money. And when Taus had accepted money from all of them, Chabrias advised him to order them to expend a tenth part of the amount which they formerly spent on their temple and themselves, and to lend the rest to him until the war against the king of Persia should come to an end. And he advised him to fix the necessary amount and demand a contribution from each household and likewise from each individual; and that, when corn was sold, the buyer and the seller should give an obol for each artabe over and above the price; and that he should demand the payment of a tenth part of the profits derived from shipping and manufactures and any other form of industry. And he advised him, when he was leaving the country on an expedition, to order that any unminted silver or gold which anyone possessed should be brought to him: and when most people brought it, he advised him to make use of it and to commend the lenders to the provincial governors so that they might repay them out of the taxes.

Iphicrates, the Athenian, when Cotys had collected an army, provided him with money in the following way. He advised him to order the men under his command to sow land for him with three medimni of corn. The result of this was that a great quantity of corn was collected. Accordingly he brought it down to the markets and sold it, and thus gained an abundance of money.

Cotys, the Thracian, tried to borrow money from the Peirinthians so that he might pay his soldiers; but the Peirinthians refused to give him any. He therefore begged them at any rate to grant him some men from among their citizens to act as a garrison for certain strongholds, in order that he might make full use of the soldiers who were at present on duty there. To this request they promptly acceded, thinking that they would thus obtain possession of these strongholds. But Cotys threw into prison those who were sent and ordered the Peirinthians to recover them by sending him the money which he wished to borrow from them.

Mentor, the Rhodian, having arrested Hermeias and seized his estates, allowed the overseers whom Hermeias had appointed to retain their positions. But when they all felt secure and took steps to recover anything which had been hidden or deposited for safety elsewhere, he arrested them and deprived them of all they had.

Memnon, the Rhodian, after making himself master of Lampsacus, was in need of money. He therefore exacted a heavy tribute from the richest citizens, telling them that they could collect it from the rest of the citizens. But when the latter had contributed, he ordered them to lend him this sum as well, fixing a period within which he would pay them back.

On another occasion when he was in need of money, he demanded contributions from them, saying that they should be repaid out of the revenues. They therefore contributed, thinking that they would soon receive their money back. But when the time was at hand for the

payment of the revenues, he told them that he needed these revenues as well, but would repay them later with interest. He also excused himself from paying the rations and wages of those who were serving under him for six days in the year, declaring that on these days they had no watch to keep, no marching and no expenses, meaning the 'omitted' days. As he was already giving the soldiers their rations on the second day of the new month, he thus passed over three days in the first month and five by the following month, and so on till he reached a total of thirty days.

Charidemus of Orus, who held certain places in Aeolia, when Artabazus was marching against him needed money to pay his soldiers. At first, then, the citizens gave him contributions, but afterwards they declared that they had nothing left to give. Charidemus then ordered the inhabitants of the place which he thought was richest to send away to another place any coin or other valuable treasure which they possessed, and he promised to give them an escort; at the same time it was clear that he himself was also removing his valuables. When they had obeyed him, he led them a little way outside the city and, after examining what they had, took all that he needed and sent them back again. He also made a proclamation in the cities over which he ruled that no one was to keep any arms in his house, the penalty for so doing being a fine which he specified. He then took no further action and paid no attention to the matter. The citizens, thinking that he had not meant the proclamation to be taken seriously, continued to keep the arms which they happened to possess. But Charidemus suddenly instituted a house to house search and exacted the fine from those in whose houses he found any arms.

A certain Philoxenus, a Macedonian who was satrap of Caria, being in need of money, said that he intended to celebrate the Dionysia, and he nominated the richest of the Carians to defray the cost of the choruses and gave directions as to what they had to supply. But seeing that they were annoyed, he sent to them secretly and asked them what they were willing to give to be released from serving. They declared their readiness to give considerably more than they thought it would cost them, in order to be freed from the trouble and the neglect of their private affairs which it would entail. Philoxenus accepted what they offered and put others on the list, until he had received even more than he had wanted . . .

Evaeses, the Syrian, being satrap of Egypt, discovering that the provincial governors were on the point of revolting from him, summoned them to the palace and hanged them all, and ordered that their relatives should be told that they were in prison. Their relatives therefore severally began to negotiate on their behalf and tried to buy the release of the captives. Evaeses made an agreement in each case and, after receiving the sums for which he had stipulated, restored them to their relatives—dead.

Cleomenes, an Alexandrian who was satrap of Egypt, when there was a severe famine everywhere else while Egypt was less seriously affected, forbade the export of corn, and when the provincial governors declared that they would not be able to pay the tribute because corn could not be exported, he cancelled the prohibition, but put a heavy tax on the corn. The

result was that, if he did not . . . he received a large tax at the cost of a small exportation and the provincial governors lost their excuse.

As he was sailing through the district in which the crocodile is regarded as a deity, one of his slaves was carried off. He therefore summoned the priests and told them that since he had been injured without provocation he intended to take vengeance on the crocodiles, and gave orders to hunt them. The priests, in order that their god might not be held in contempt, collected all the gold that they possessed and presented it to him, with the result that he desisted.

When king Alexander commanded him to found a city near the Pharos and to establish there the mart which was formerly held at Canopus, he sailed to Canopus and told the priests and the owners of property there that he had come to transfer them. The priests and inhabitants collected and gave him a sum of money to induce him to leave their mart undisturbed. This he accepted and for the moment left them alone, but afterwards, when he had the material for building ready, he sailed to Canopus and demanded an excessive amount of money from them, which he said represented the difference to him between having the mart near the Pharos and at Canopus. And when they said that they would not be able to give him the money he made them move their city.

And when he had sent someone to make a purchase and discovered that his messenger had got what he wanted cheaply but intended to charge him an excessive price, he told the friends of the purchaser that he had heard that he had made his purchases at an excessive price and therefore he would go there himself; at the same time with assumed wrath he railed against his stupidity. When they heard this they told Cleomenes that he ought not to believe those who spoke against the messenger until he came himself and rendered his account. When the purchaser arrived they told him what Cleomenes had said; and he, wishing to make a good impression on them and on Cleomenes, submitted the prices at which he had actually bought the goods.

When corn was being sold in the country at ten drachmae, he summoned the dealers and asked them at what price they would do business with him. They named a lower price than that at which they were selling to the merchants. However, he ordered them to hand over their corn at the same price as they were selling to everyone else; and fixing the price of corn at thirty-two drachmae he then sold it himself.

He also called the priests together and told them that the expenditure on the temples in the country was excessive; consequently some of the temples and the majority of the priests must be abolished. The priests individually and collectively gave him the sacred treasures, thinking that he really intended to carry out his threat and because each wished that his own temple should be undisturbed and himself continue to be priest.

When Alexander was in the region of Babylon, Antimenes the Rhodian hēmiolios raised money in the following way. An ancient law existed in Babylonia that anything which was

brought into the country should pay a duty of ten per cent., but no one ever enforced it. Antimenes, waiting till all the satraps and soldiers were expected and no small number of ambassadors and craftsmen . . . and persons travelling on their own private affairs, and many gifts were being brought up, exacted the ten per cent, duty according to the existing law.

On another occasion, when providing the slaves who were to look after the camp, he commanded that any owner who wished should register the value which he put upon them, and they were to pay eight drachmae a year; if the slave ran away the owner was to receive the price which he had registered. Many slaves being registered, he amassed a considerable sum of money. And whenever any slave ran away he ordered the satrap of the country in which the camp was situated to recover the runaway or else to pay the price to the owner.

Ophelas, the Olynthian, having appointed a superintendent over the province of Athribis, when the provincial governors of that district came to him and expressed their willingness to pay of their own accord a much larger sum and begged him to dismiss the superintendent whom he had just appointed, asked them if they would be able to pay what they promised; when they answered in the affirmative he left the superintendent at his post and bade him exact the amount of tribute which they themselves had assessed. Thus he did not think it right either to degrade the official whom he had appointed or to impose a heavier tribute upon them than they themselves had fixed, but at the same time he himself received a far larger amount of money.

Pythocles, the Athenian, recommended to the Athenians that the state should take the lead from the mines at Laurium out of private hands at the market price of two drachmae and that they should then themselves fix the price at six drachmae and so sell it.

Chabrias, when crews had been enrolled for a hundred and twenty ships and Taus only needed sixty, ordered the crews of the sixty ships which remained behind to supply those who sailed with two months' provisions, or else to sail themselves. They, wishing to attend to their own affairs, complied with his demand.

Antimenes ordered the satraps to keep the storehouses along the royal roads filled according to the custom of the country; but whenever an army or any other body of men unaccompanied by the king passed along, he used to send one of his own men and sell the contents of the storehouses.

Cleomenes, when the first day of the month was approaching and he had to give his soldiers their rations, purposely put back into harbour, and as the new month advanced he put out again and distributed the rations; he then left an interval until the first day of the next month.

The soldiers, therefore, because they had recently received their rations, kept quiet; and Cleomenes by passing over a month each year . . . Stabelbius, the Mysian, when he owed his soldiers pay, called the officers together and told them that he had no need of private soldiers but only of officers, and that, when he did need soldiers, he would give each officer a sum of

money and send him out to collect mercenaries, and that he would rather give the officers the pay which ought to go to the soldiers. He therefore ordered them each to send away their own levies out of the country. The officers, thinking that it would be an opportunity to make money, dismissed the soldiers in accordance with his commands. But after a short interval he collected the officers together and told them that just as a flute player was no use without a chorus, so too officers were useless without private soldiers; he therefore ordered them to leave the country.

Dionysius, when he was making a round of the temples, whenever he saw a gold or silver table displayed, ordered that a libation should be poured out 'to good luck' and that the table should be carried off; and whenever he saw amongst the statues one which held out a wine cup, he would say, 'I accept your pledge', and order the statue to be carried away. And he used to strip the gold from the statues, saying that he would give them others lighter and more fragrant; he then clad them with white garments and crowns of white poplar.

CITY OF GOD
BOOK XI, CHAPTER XVI
AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO
(426 CE)

Of the Ranks and Differences of the Creatures, Estimated by Their Utility, or According to the Natural Gradations of Being

For, among those beings which exist, and which are not of God the Creator's essence, those which have life are ranked above those which have none; those that have the power of generation, or even of desiring, above those which want this faculty. And, among things that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation, as animals are ranked above trees. And, among the sentient, the intelligent are above those that have not intelligence,— men, e.g., above cattle. And, among the intelligent, the immortal such as the angels, above the mortal, such as men. These are the gradations according to the order of nature; but according to the utility each man finds in a thing, there are various standards of value, so that it comes to pass that we prefer some things that have no sensation to some sentient beings. And so strong is this preference, that, had we the power, we would abolish the latter from nature altogether, whether in ignorance of the place they hold in nature, or, though we know it, sacrificing them to our own convenience. Who, e.g., would not rather have bread in his house than mice, gold than fleas? But there is little to wonder at in this, seeing that even when valued by men themselves (whose nature is certainly of the highest dignity), more is often given for a horse than for a slave, for a jewel than for a maid. Thus the reason of one contemplating nature prompts very different judgments from those dictated by the necessity of the needy, or the desire of the voluptuous; for the former considers what value a thing in itself has in the scale of creation, while necessity considers how it meets its need; reason looks for what the mental light will judge to be true, while pleasure looks for what pleasantly titillates the bodily sense. But of such consequence in rational natures is the weight, so to speak, of will and of love, that though in the order of nature angels rank above men, yet, by the scale of justice, good men are of greater value than bad angels.

**A LETTER
ON CREDIT SALES AND USURY
THOMAS AQUINAS
(1262 CE)**

Chapter I

I received your letter containing some cases concerning which you requested the opinion of the Archbishop Elect of Capua and myself. After a discussion thereon with the aforesaid Archbishop Elect and afterwards with Cardinal Hugh, I decided that the following reply should be made to the first case.

Assuming that the custom of deferring payment for three months, as is set forth in the case, has been introduced for the common good of merchants, that is, for facilitating commerce, and not for fraudulent usury: then a distinction must be made. For the vendor, while granting credit for the aforesaid interval, sells his goods either (1) for an amount exceeding the just price on account of his waiting for payment, or (2) for an amount equal to the just price.

In the first alternative there is no doubt that contract is usurious, inasmuch as the waiting for a certain time is included in the price. And this is not excused by the fact that the second vendor may be employed by the first, since for no cause whatever may the price be increased on account of the interval for which payment is deferred.

In the second alternative, there is no usury. Nor does the fact that he would sell for less were payment made immediately make any difference. This can be seen by comparison with other debts. If an amount due to a person is payable after a certain date, even though he might remit a portion of the debt if it were paid him sooner, still in this case it is clear that the creditor is entirely immune from usury. For though it smacks of usury to take more than is due on account of delay in payment, to take less than one may be paid sooner does not smack of usury, especially on the part of him who gets less, though on the part of him who gives less on paying sooner, there seems to be some kind of usury since he sells an interval of time. Hence also in the case proposed there is no more fear of usury in connection with the buyer who, when he pays before three months, buys the cloth for less than the just value, than in connection with the seller who takes less than he may be sooner paid.

Chapter II

From this it is also clear what should be said concerning the second case. For if the merchants of Tuscany, bringing cloth from the Fair of Lagny to wait until Easter [for payment], sell the cloth for more than it is worth in the general market, here is no doubt that this is usury. But if they sell it, not at more than its worth but at its worth, yet at more than they would take for it if payment were made immediately to them, there is no usury.

Chapter III

In the third case a similar reply should be made. For if those who accept money with usury wish to recover that usury by selling the cloth at more than its worth on account of the aforesaid delay, there is no doubt that this is usury since time is clearly sold. Nor are they excused by the fact that they wish to indemnify themselves, for no one should indemnify himself by committing mortal sin. And although they can in selling the cloth lawfully recover other expenses lawfully contracted, for example, the cost of transporting the cloth, still they cannot recover the usury they paid, for this was an unjust payment; especially since by paying usury they sinned in giving the usurers an occasion for sinning, since the necessary which is urged—namely that they may live more respectably and do a bigger trade—is not such a necessity as suffices to excuse the aforesaid sin. This is clear by comparison; for a man could not in selling cloth recover expenses which he might have incurred carelessly and imprudently.

Chapter IV

From what has been said the query in the fourth case is also clear. For if he who owes money payable on a certain date pays before this date that a portion of the debt may be remitted to him, he seems to commit usury, inasmuch as he sells time for paying the money. Hence he is bound to restitution. Nor is he excused by the fact that he is inconvenienced by paying before the date or that he is induced to do this by someone, for all usurers could be excused on the same ground.

This is the firm and definite decision of myself and the aforesaid, namely, the Archbishop Elect of Capua and Cardinal Hugh, concerning the aforesaid cases. Farewell.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

II-II, Q.77-78

Thomas Aquinas

(1274 CE)

QUESTION 77
OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?**
- (2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;**
- (3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?**
- (4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it?**

Article I

Whether It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing for More Than Its Worth?

Objection I: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 8, 15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth.

Objection II: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural and not sinful.

Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth.

Objection III: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than its worth.

On the Contrary, It is written (Matt. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.

I Answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that bids against him." But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the equality

of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.

Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing, while another man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.

On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.

Reply to Objection I: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xlv, De Rescind. Vend. 2, 8].

On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice.

Reply to Objection II: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.

Reply to Objection III: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought.

Article II

Whether a Sale Is Rendered Unlawful Through a Fault in the Thing Sold?

Objection I: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels and the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the thing be defective in other ways.

Objection II: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity, would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality. Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic. v, 7*). Therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being defective.

Objection III: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).

On the Contrary, Ambrose says (*De Offic. iii, 11*): "It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with fraud."

I Answer that, A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find it written against certain people (*Isa. 1:22*), "Thy silver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is mixed is defective in its substance.

Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is written (*Deut. 25:13, 14*): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a less," and further on (*Deut. 25:16*): "For the Lord . . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all injustice."

A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in consequence, is illicit.

In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed unjust, as shown above (Q. 59, A. 2). Nevertheless he is bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in quantity as to a defect in quality.

Reply to Objection I: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the property of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the art of the demons.

Reply to Objection II: The measures of salable commodities must needs be different in different places, on account of the difference of supply: because where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state must determine the just measures of things salable, with due consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it is not lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public authority or custom.

Reply to Objection III: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the seller and buyer can easily discover.

Article III

Whether the Seller Is Bound to State the Defects of the Thing Sold?

Objection I: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its condition.

Objection II: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (*De Offic.* iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer this unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold.

Objection III: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.

Objection IV: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him the faults of the goods he is selling.

On the Contrary, Ambrose says (*De Offic.* iii, 10): "In all contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action."

I Answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the buyer—loss, if, by reason

of this defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the price on that account—danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.

On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.

Reply to Objection I: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest: for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made known to him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest.

Reply to Objection II: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad: for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being useful in many others.

Reply to Objection III: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.

Reply to Objection IV: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice.

Article IV

Whether, in Trading, It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing at a Higher Price Than What Was Paid for It?

Objection I: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matt. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that he may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is cast out of God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of retailing at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen whom Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.

Objection II: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as shown above (A. 1). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be done without sin.

Objection III: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you would the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who, from being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness. Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at a higher price.

On the Contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning," [*Cf. Obj. 1] says: "The greedy tradesman blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be exercised without these vices." Therefore trading is not in itself unlawful.

I Answer that, A tradesman is one whose business consists in the exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), exchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to provide the household or the state with the necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards tradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need: but the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and tends to

infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment for his labor.

Reply to Objection I: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change. For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor. Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last end, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or virtuous, as stated above.

Reply to Objection II: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession, and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to another, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust.

Reply to Objection III: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of evil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so many vices, since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips" [*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): "No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses." Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.

QUESTION 78
OF THE SIN OF USURY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury?**

- (2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of consideration, by way of payment for the loan?**

- (3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money taken in usury?**

- (4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?**

Article I

Whether it is a Sin to Take Usury for Money Lent?

Objection I: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But Our Lord said of Himself (Lk. 19:23): "At My coming I might have exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for lending money.

Objection II: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine law, according to Dt. 23:19,20: "Thou shalt not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: "Thou shalt fenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one." [*'Faeneraberis'---'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word 'faeneraberis': hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Objection III: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.

Objection IV: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among other counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Objection V: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.

Objection VI: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.

Objection VII: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.

On the Contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries."

I Answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.

On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house.

Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury.

Reply to Objection I: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our own profit not for His.

Reply to Objection II: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he is just.']." They were permitted, however, to take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone according to Is. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God. Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read:

"Many have refused to fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they would be able to lend to others.

Reply to Objection III: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural."

Reply to Objection IV: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of counsel.

Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain, but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.

Reply to Objection V: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.

Reply to Objection VI: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.

Reply to Objection VII: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.

Article II

Whether it is Lawful to Ask for any Other Kind of Consideration for Money Lent?

Objection I: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact some-thing else besides the money lent.

Objection II: Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound by a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of compensation as condition of the loan.

Objection III: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on Is. 33:15, "Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes [*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of remuneration.

Objection IV: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given. Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan granted.

Objection V: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum of money re-moves the money further from himself than he who entrusts it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also lawful to receive interest for money lent.

Objection VI: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive interest for money lent.

Objection VII: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low figure; or raises his price through delay

in being paid, and lowers his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact some consideration for money lent.

On the Contrary, Among other conditions requisite in a just man it is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase."

I Answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money." Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity: since, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a worse condition through lending. On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money, for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.

Reply to Objection I: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways from having.

Reply to Objection II: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he received in loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a repayment.

Reply to Objection III: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other

hand the remuneration by service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to take, exact, and expect it.

Reply to Objection IV: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at some future time.

Reply to Objection V: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, part of the profits derived from his money.

Reply to Objection VI: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for the use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury, unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book.

Reply to Objection VII: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again this anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.

Article III

Whether a Man is Bound to Restore Whatever Profits he has Made out of Money Gotten by Usury?

Objection I: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy, so are the branches." Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.

Objection II: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: 'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold, and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from usurious money must be restored.

Objection III: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is also bound to restore what he acquired with it.

On the Contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.

I Answer that, As stated above (A[1]), there are certain things whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received (since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss.

On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him.

Reply to Objection I: The root has not only the character of matter, as money made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection II: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not pre-scribed that such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to the amount taken in usury.

Reply to Objection III: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to the usurious money itself.

Article IV

Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?

Objection I: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.

Objection II: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal, which is always sinful, as stated above (Q[43], A[2]). Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.

Objection III: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a usurer.

On the Contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin.

I Answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even God uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods, he would sin.

Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a good

end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save his life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field."

Reply to Objection I: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.

Reply to Objection II: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need, since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but from malice.

Reply to Objection III: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts one's money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a good purpose.

DE USURIS
GILES OF LESSINUS
(1278 CE)

Prologue

Every man who is not degenerate by nature loves the truth, and desires to know it above all things. Which if anyone desires with a true heart, and seeks it in the simplicity of his heart, it will manifest itself; and God who promises this is true, and gives it to those who love him, as it is written in Sap. 6: He anticipates those who desire themselves, that he may show himself to them first: Eccl. 1: My son, desire wisdom, approach her, and the Lord will give her to you. I call upon her therefore, that she may not allow me to err to the danger of my soul, and into the snare of others; but may she deign to enlighten my darkened eyes with her own light, without which no one is able to reach the light of truth at all. Amen.

Since, however, in doubts whose truth, when acknowledged, is salutary, and whose ignorance poses a danger to human salvation, it is very useful to investigate the truth, and in our times we have heard many controversies among doctors, not only in natural questions, but also in morals, in which there is a danger of different opinions and opinions, and especially in that part of justice which is called commutative by philosophers, and in that part of it which restrains the vice of usury; therefore, to declare the truth about this matter and to elucidate the doubts, as far as God has granted and our labor, with the effort of our poor investigation, can reach, is our purpose in this work. First, therefore, we must inquire what is signified by the name of usury in general, and in how many ways it is understood by doctors. Second, about its proper matter, and its different ways and species. Third, about human acts, about whom and through whom it occurs. Fourth, whether it is always evil per se, and whence evil is in it. Fifth, about the transfer of usury, namely, whether ownership is transferred in them. Sixth, whether the reason for doubt or danger is capable of excusing the vice of usury in those contracts in which, according to some, there is usury. Seventh, when personal and real conditions are capable of excusing usury. Next, we must inquire about the vice of usury. And first, how and when it occurs, not only in loans, but also in general, in contracts of sale and purchase. Second, whether the vice of usury occurs in the purchase of annuities for life. Third, about rich people who sell forests for a term, more expensive than they are worth at the time of sale. Fourth, about those who entrust their money and other goods to other merchants, so that they may profit from them for a third or half of the profit. Fifth, about the goods of orphans which are entrusted to guardians, or parents, or communities of villages for profit, without prejudice to their lot. Sixth, about peasants, and the exchange of peasants, whether there is the vice of usury in it. Seventh, about merchants who promise to pay at the fair for their remaining partners, because they had received ready money from them of a different kind, which was only valid at the fair. After this, we will inquire about the restitutions of usury. And first, why should they be made. Second, to whom or by whom. Third, by whom. Fourth, how, namely, whether publicly or privately. Fifth, whether the same things in number, or only equivalent ones. Sixth, whether the fruits and proceeds of them are to be restitution. Seventh, whether they should be enforced, and how.

Chapter I

But since human science proceeds from signs to things, and from sensible things to intelligible things, as experience teaches and philosophical authority confirms; and a slight error in the principles, or ignorance of them, generates the greatest error in the pursuit to the end; therefore, wishing to know the truth about usury, we must first understand what is signified by the authors under the name of usury. For since names are signs of things, and we cannot carry the things themselves with us in the discussion of the truth of them; therefore, using the names themselves for things, we must know what the names themselves signify. According to grammarians, the name of usury is derived from use: and it signifies in its first sense a thing which is acquired by the use of some thing, just as shaving is derived from the act of shaving, and shearing from the act of shearing. But since the grammarian is principally concerned with signs, not because of the things which are signified, but because of the mode of signification which they denote in themselves, for example, that sometimes by the mode of substance, sometimes by the mode of accident of substance, sometimes by the mode of act, sometimes by the mode of accident, a sign is attributed to an act; Therefore, the words themselves are referred by physical authors more to designating certain things in a specific way, these or those in some kind of things: for which reason, since the physicist or the logician frequently does not establish words signifying according to the number of things, because art does not equal nature, it happens that the physicist or logician designates several things with one word; and thus an equivocation of words occurs. Sometimes, however, the very word which, by the property of its word, signifies something generally and universally, the physicist himself determines to designate some special thing: and this is sometimes by some simile, sometimes by the contrary: for example, the name of apostle is generally said from the act of sending; and yet the theologian determines this name to the special sent ones of Christ, and still more singularly to the person of Paul, when it is said without objection. We call a physicist or philosopher, however, one who philosophizes about things, whether naturally, mathematically, or theologically. And we call a logician, one who considers about words and signs in any way. And in this way the name usury is taken by natural or moral philosophers and by divine authors to designate a determinate thing resulting from the use of things, according to a certain singular reason for the use of the thing. But since by natural law every thing that comes into the use of man, by nature the use diminishes rather than produces an increase, and this is most apparent in the matter of air: therefore usury according to its proper reason is called a thing which is acquired from the use of air; for which reason philosophers say that usury is called, as if acquired by the use of air: hence also that Psalm. 14: He did not give his money to usury. But theologians, considering the reasons for the just and unjust, and explaining these terms more subtly, broadly extend the meaning of this name to the increases that come from the use of all things by a similar use and reason, and not only of money. And therefore the doctors call usury every excess of any thing that use produces, similar to that from which usury is first called: as is found in Ezek. 22: You have taken usury and excess, and you have slandered your neighbors greedily, and you have forgotten me, says

the Lord God. And so it takes usury there, and the excess of any thing that has the nature of usury. Therefore, the name usury first signifies the increase that money produces from its use.

But secondarily it also signifies the excess that any thing produces from its use together with the use of money. And therefore, because such excess sometimes arises from use against the law, and sometimes from use legally; therefore the name usury is understood in the Holy Scriptures in many ways. For sometimes it is understood in evil, as when it is done from use against the law; sometimes in good, as when it is done legally from use. In good it is also found to be accepted in three ways. In one way when it is according to the law of divine charity, as in Matt. 25: You ought to have put my money in the bankers' hands, so that at my coming I might have received what was mine with usury. In another way when it is according to the law of brotherly charity, as in Prov. 28: He who gathers wealth at usury and at a liberal interest gathers it among the poor: and in Prov. 19: Let him lend to the Lord, who has mercy on the poor. In a third way when it is according to the law of justice and equity, as in Ps. 71: He will redeem their souls from usury and iniquity, and they drew near even to the gates of death. In the first way the term usury designates the superabundance of rewards in the future life, with respect to the merits of the present life. In the second way it designates the superabundance of merits in the present life with respect to the grace given. In the third way it designates the superabundance of punishments justly due with respect to the present sin: and in these three ways it is called spiritual usury rather than corporal. In another way, usury is called the excess of corporeal and temporal things, etc., according to which the word usury signifies a certain vice of the kind of avarice, which is produced by greed, which is the root of all evils. And according to this way of understanding the word usury, usury is commonly condemned by the doctors. From these things, then, it is clear what is signified by the word usury, and in how many ways the word usury is understood by the sacred doctors.

Chapter II

Now, turning our investigation to that meaning of usury, by which we signify the superabundance or increase of corporeal or temporal things, let us say first what its proper matter is, and what species, and what modes. But according to the authors we find its proper matter determined by three conditions: because everything that comes into the use of man, determinable by number, weight, and measure, is properly and per se the matter of usury. And this is thus declared. For it has already been declared that the name of usury, as used by the doctors of sacred doctrine in condemnation, signifies superabundance or increase resulting from the use of some thing. Therefore, since superabundance is the extreme with respect to something just and just said in morals, it is necessary that what is just and just in morals be determined in the things from which superabundance arises, which is called usury. For if the very things from the use of which the damnable superabundance is said to arise, they would not be determined in the sense of just and equitable, nor could superabundance itself be determined in the sense of unjust and unjust. But things that come into the use of man can only be determined in the sense of justice and equity according to the three aforesaid: namely, according to number, by which equal and unequal are determined generally in all things that are distinguished by a discrete number: and according to measure by which equal and unequal are commonly determined in continuous things, according as they come into the use of man, such as wheat, wine, oil, and the like: thirdly, according to weight, by which equal and unequal are determined specially in other things, which cannot be equalized and divided so readily neither by number nor by measure, as are especially metals and brass. Nor can things that come into the use of men be determined in terms of equity in other ways, neither in more nor in fewer ways: because every such thing is either distinct and discrete from one another, or not.

If it is discrete, since the first reason for the distinction of all discrete things is number, then necessarily according to equity, which is demonstrated by numbers, the things themselves, insofar as they are discrete, must be determined by equity. For example, if we wish to determine equity between a house and a bed, which are distinct and discrete things, we must place the estimate of both in some number: and if there are five houses and one bed, then there will be equity if five beds are added to five houses: for five with five are equal; and so it is in all things distinct and divided from one another. But if things are indistinct, they cannot be distinguished and determined to equality except in two ways: namely, either by some determinate measure, as when a thing has a quantity divisible and manageable by itself, such as fields, cloth, and the fruits of the earth: or by equal weight, as when a thing is not easily divisible and its whole goodness is considered in proportion to its weight, as are brass, iron, tin, gold, and silver. And therefore because excess, which the authors call usury, signifies the extreme with respect to equity in things that come to the use of man, it is necessary that the matter of usury be known and determined by these three aforesaid, because the extremes communicate in matter with the means. And from this it is clear that not only money or coins

are called the matter of usury, but also all things that can be determined by number, weight and measure, and come to the use of man: for which reason the Scripture says in Deut. 23: You shall not lend your brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, at interest. Now there are two species of corporeal usury according to the laws in common: one which is commonly called usury of lot, which is when some increase is sought only from a borrowed lot; another which is called usury of usury, which is properly called *improbum fœnus*, which also renders a man infamous. Of which third question. 7: infamous in the end of weight, distinction question. 7: three. And this is called the usury of usury, because even the usury itself which is incidental to the lot, gives rise to other usury according to the proportion to the birth of the lot. There are also two kinds of usury, some of which are condemned by law, namely usury which was called *centesima*, which was equal to the lot only per year. But another was called *emiola*, from *emi*, which is medium or bad, and *olon*, which is a whole year, because it gave rise to only half the lot per year. Of these there is 47 dist. cap.: *quoniam multa*. From these therefore it is clear in what matter usury occurs, and what and how many are its species or modes according to the authors.

Chapter III

But since we see particular superabundances from many things which have neither the name nor the vice of usury, such as those which are multiplied from seeds, and also which some gain by human labors and just contracts, it is now necessary to declare the acts by which and in which the superabundance of things acquires for itself the name and vice of usury. But that superabundance has the name of usury principally from and through the act of commutative justice, which is said to give or receive a thing on loan, is first proved by the doctors of Holy Scripture. For we read in Exod. 22, thus: If you lend money to a poor man of my people who dwells with you, you shall not press him as an exactor: and it follows: Neither shall you oppress him with usury. Likewise Deut. 23: But you shall lend to your brother that which he needs without usury. It is thus declared by reason. For since we are speaking of usury, according as it says the increase elicited from the use of any thing; It should be noted that each thing possessed by man can have a twofold use, as stated in 1 Polit. One is the proper use of the thing itself, by which the thing itself is referred to the necessity of human life; for example, the putting on of shoes. Another is the use not proper to the thing, although it is inherent in itself; but by which another thing is acquired commutatively through the thing itself. For example, the exchange of shoes by sale or exchange; as when money or another thing is acquired through it. Since, therefore, the use said in the first way is determined by an end suitable to the end, because all things that can be possessed were made and created for the benefit and life of man; it follows that every increase in things, generated from the use of such things, has the character of good and not of evil in itself: for which reason usury, which is an increase having the character of evil, does not arise from such use per se. It therefore follows that from the use of a thing there is a use said in the second way, which is from the exchange of a thing for another. But this mode still occurs in two ways: because it is either for an end suitable, or apart from an end suitable. If in the first way, then the exchange can still be made in a way that is due and suitable to the end. And this is in two ways. The first and first way is, by way of liberality alone, as in gratuitous giving: and this way of itself does not produce any increase, because the possession of a thing and its use are liberally transferred to another. Another and due way is by way of equity and justice; as when some thing and its use are exchanged and transferred by just equalization of another thing or use, whether it be for money, or for another thing, or for physical labor. And it should be noted that sometimes a thing is transferred justly together with its use, as in sale and purchase and exchange; but sometimes only the use of the thing, and not the possession of the thing, as in things accommodated and leased. Therefore in those things which are transferred justly liberally, if they are transferred for an end that is suitable to them, nothing reprehensible is naturally found. But we call a suitable end useful and necessary for human life.

From these it is concluded that all excess, innate from the use of things in the aforementioned ways, in relation to a suitable end, lacks the nature of usury. But if it is outside the suitable end or due manner, then it is usury. Therefore, it is necessary that the nature of usury be

found first and per se in some act of the aforementioned, insofar as it lacks the due manner, or the suitable end, or both. However, it is clear that the proper use of a thing is per se in relation to a suitable end. Therefore, since in relation to a suitable end every use acquires the nature of good simply, it will follow that in abstraction from a suitable end it acquires the nature of evil generally, not this or that specifically. Therefore, the special nature of usury, as it is condemned as a vice, will not be from the relation of the use of a thing to the end: for someone can seek usury, just as he can steal, in order to have the necessities of human life. But he is not excused from the vice of usury or theft. Therefore, from an undue manner concerning some use of things, the nature of usury occurs. Furthermore, through the excess that occurs from a loan by reason of a loan, usury corrupts both due modes at the same time; because that, namely the excess which occurs from a gratuitous contribution, has no vice, because it does not corrupt liberality: for if it corrupted liberality, it would no longer be a gratuitous contribution. Similarly, that excess which occurs from a just exchange or sale does not have the vice of inequality: for otherwise there would be no just sale or exchange; but that excess alone which proceeds from a loan by reason of a loan corrupts liberality and justice: liberality indeed, because a loan must be made gratuitous by nature of a loan: for this is signified in Luke 6: Lend, expecting nothing in return. Likewise, this is signified by reason of the name, because a loan is given when mine or yours is given to me or to you. Likewise, it corrupts justice, because it is designated in the return of what was given in a loan. And therefore where more is given, inequality is born. From these things it is clear that in the act of loan alone, concerning the exchange of things, there is first and per se the idea of usury, according as it is properly understood by the doctors, as an excess from the use of things condemnable. But a similarity to this vice is found in other contracts as well, through a certain assimilation of superabundances to this vice, as will be said below.

Chapter IV

From what has been said, it can now be seen why the reason for the vice in usury is of this kind. For in every act of man evil occurs, either by nature or by law. Nature, when an act done contrary to nature is not referred to an end that is appropriate to nature: for the reason for good from an appropriate end is in all things; but by law, evil occurs when the contrary is done to a written or infused law. And in both of the aforementioned ways evil is found in usury: for if the proper use of things to an appropriate end is determined by their nature, even the exchange of them which is invented for the sake of their proper use must be referred to the same end by their nature. Therefore, if it is done contrary to an appropriate end and is not referred to the end for which it is done, it will be of its own nature having the character of evil. But wherever an exchange of things is done for the sake of their increase and multiplication, it is already done contrary to an appropriate end; because where increase and multiplication are intended, there cannot be an appropriate end. We can easily see this in a greedy and usurious man, who always desires something to increase and multiply his wealth, and yet is never satisfied: for the richer he is, the more he thirsts for money; and if we believe the writings of the philosopher, he lacks both what he has and what he does not have; and therefore no suitable end can be found in accumulating wealth through usury. And in usury it is extended to infinity: because the more it is acquired, the more it is extended, and the more it has the nature of infinity, as the philosopher also determines in 1 Polit., chap. 5. For whatever is for some end is finite. Therefore, since usury denotes the superabundance and increase produced by the use of a thing, by the intention and reason of the name itself, it will necessarily mean that which is beyond the end of natural exchange, which is only for the necessity of human life, which is of itself finite in its needs. And the philosopher puts this reason not only in usury properly so called, which they call thokon, that is, the creation of coinage; but also in every commutative, in which only profit and the multiplication of things are intended for the sake of the necessities of life. Of which the Philosopher speaks in 1 Polit., chap. 5, in the end, where he says thus: since there are indeed two kinds of profit, which he calls chismatic, this one indeed kalipic, that is, the increase of money for the sake of the money itself; this one economic, that is, that which serves for the government of the house and the city, or for the common good; and this one indeed national, that is, that which is acquired in order to economically preserve, praised because it is finite and is ordered to a due end according to nature; but the transferative one justly censured. He calls the other commutative one translative, by which a thing is transferred from one to another, not for the proper use of things and the necessities of life, but only for the sake of profit, so that riches may always be multiplied. And because for the sake of this transfer the coin was made, as the Philosopher says *ibid.*, therefore this kind of vice appears more in the transfer of coins, for their multiplication. And therefore it follows that a transfer of this kind, which is for the purpose of accumulating money, by the transfer of money is not according to nature: and this is what follows: but it is reciprocal: because, namely, the transfer is made of money for money, and not for another thing necessary to human life: and therefore such an exchange,

which is called oboletic, that is, where an obolus, that is, a small and definite weight, is given for another of the same kind for the increase, is most reasonably hated.

And this is hated, because by it comes the possession of the coin and its use for something else for which it was not made by nature, because it was made for the sake of transfer, that is, so that through it the transfer of other things might be made insofar as they are necessary for life, and not insofar as they are for the gathering and affection of avarice. And immediately the philosopher descends to this kind of gain, insofar as it is made specifically by usury properly so called, which they call thokon in Greek, that is, birth in Latin, because the coin begets itself in usury, that is, because it multiplies and increases because of its transfer. In a loan, however, the coin is transferred for its own sake only, and not because of the necessary end of life, by reason of the loan. Hence the philosopher *ibid.* says: thokos but the coin is also made by the coin. Therefore and most contrary to nature and reason is this acquisition of money, namely that which is by thokos, that is, in the loan of money for the increase of money. And therefore he says especially with respect to that acquisition which is made in other contracts, solely because of greed, which is evil and against nature, even worse is that which is made through the exercise of bodily filth; but this is especially against nature, because it obliges the defendant to restitution of what was received, which the first two ways do not do. Thus, therefore, it is clear how evil is inherent in usury by nature, and because of the matter, according to the Philosopher. In another way we can show that evil occurs in usury specifically because of the nature of the proper act from which it occurs, which is to lend. For since lending is a proper act, from the corruption of which the vice of usury is generated, as was declared in the preceding chapter, and since this kind of act is an act of liberality and grace, as we will show, necessarily whatever happens to the act that takes away liberality, diverts the act itself from its nature, and consequently corrupts the virtue of universal justice. Wherefore it has the nature of an injury; and thus the nature of a fault. But that lending one's thing to another is a proper act of liberality and grace, is clear first from the genus of the act, which is giving itself, because it designates the liberality of the giver. But that which takes away liberality, either the violence of an external agent, or the necessity of an internal nature, or the debt of equity implies: for whatever is transferred from one to another by violence is not given, but taken away. But that which is similarly transferred by the necessity of nature, as in the successions of heirs, is not given, but left behind. Likewise, that which is transferred by the debt of equity, as in just sales and exchanges of things, and the remuneration of labor, is more returned than given. Therefore, in that transfer in which the act of giving properly ought to be attended to, liberality ought in no way to be corrupted. But this kind of act, namely, of giving, is truly attended to in the act of lending, as the authorities of both laws prove. Therefore, if any circumstance is added to this kind of act which corrupts the liberality of giving, such an act will be evil and vicious and a sin. Such a circumstance is added whenever the lending is done for some gain, whether in hope or in reality; because that which is done for gain is not done for pure liberality. From which it follows that there is always evil and sin there, not only from the nature of its end and matter, but also from the nature of the proper act, about which it has to be done. A third reason is also assigned by others, namely from the unjust possession of usury: for whatever is acquired in order to be possessed, and is not worthy of being justly possessed, is ill-acquired and

ill-possessed, and generates sin in the acquirer and in the possessor. But this is the case in usury, as will be explained. Why is usury a sin: for whatever is made one's own from something that is not one's, without just title and by fraud of something that is not one's, is unjustly acquired and unjustly possessed. But in usury a thing is made one's own from something that is not one's, without just title and by fraud of something that is not one's, as will be immediately clear. Why is it unjustly acquired and unjustly possessed. But the demonstration of this is: because the transfer of a thing from owner to owner cannot be done by just title, except in three ways: namely, either by the right of nature, namely, when the thing is devolved from fathers or parents to sons and heirs by death; which way is not in the transfer of usury. Or by the right of grace and liberality, namely, when the owner of the thing gives gratuitously to another what was his. In this way, however, usury seems to be somewhat excusable, because the owner is said to voluntarily give the increase of usury to the usurer. But this is not sufficient to excuse it; because we call a usurer one who does not lend gratuitously, but in the hope of some increase, which he then receives, or hopes to receive.

And although the borrower may willingly give him some increase, or may wish to give it; nevertheless, on the part of the borrower or one hoping for such an increase, the reason for grace and liberality is removed, as regards him from whom the act of this kind is made: and therefore what he receives does not become his by right of liberality, as regards the part of the borrower himself: and therefore the right of grace is not preserved as regards him. Or it can become his of what is not his, by right of equity: that is, when, according to the equity of the law, compensation is made for some thing, as in the sales and purchases of things; or for labor, as when wages for labor are paid to laborers. It is clear, however, that even in this way usury cannot be found in the sense of just possession and acquisition. First, because this kind of contract has no reason for sale and purchase, nor for exchange, as appears from the form of the words, and from the transfer of money, or of the thing loaned; which of its nature is given or determined by number, weight, and measure. And it does not depend on the will of the transferor: for if more is demanded than is given, the commensurability is unjust: for nothing in a thing given is equal to the increase that is received beyond that, not gratuitously, nor by law of nature. Secondly, injustice also appears in the acquisition of usury, because by fraud it is made of what is not one's own. Therefore in usury there is a vice or evil by way of fictitious equity. Which is clear as follows. For the usurer, transferring a thing or money, in order to receive something more by transfer than he gave, always pretends some equity in the acceptance of the surplus: which cannot be anything but the time in which he does such a favor, and expects the reception of the lot. And this is clear; because according to the prolongation or shortening of time, the surplus of usury is increased or diminished. Therefore the usurer intends to repay from time that which he receives more than he gave. Now time is common, nor is it the proper possession of any one, but is given equally by God. Wherefore this kind of usurer, intending to equalize and compensate for the thing received, commits fraud both on his neighbor whose time it is, whom he sells to himself, and on God whose thing he has given freely, under a price. It is clear, however, that compensation is not made by any labor in the contract or acquisition of usury; because the usurer gains as much while sleeping as while awake, and on solemn days as on common holidays. Wherefore it follows from all these that an excess of usury is not acquired or possessed by any right or just title.

Wherefore it is both evil by its nature and reprehensible, because it is made by human will. From the foregoing it is also clear why certain usury is conceded in Sacred Scripture and also in human laws as lawful; because whenever usury can be taken as one's own thing by some just title, it will be an unscrupulous acceptance. And this is when things are forcibly withheld, and are in truth the property of others, and are acquired or withheld by usury. But that usury is a reprehensible evil, and why, has already been said. But how much and what kind it is, will have to be declared. For according to theology, usury is condemned as a mortal and grave sin. Hence Ezekiel. 18: Whoever does all these things that are detestable, shall die by death: and usury is enumerated in the above. Therefore the vice of usury is to be detested, and worthy of eternal death. Furthermore, Ambrose in Book. On the good of death, and it is found 17, question. 4: If anyone accepts usury, and commits robbery, he shall not live. But it must be noted that usury differs from theft and robbery: because theft and robbery have no appearance of equity, because they are committed by hidden and open violence: nor do they pretend to any utility in the republic, but rather the subversion of the peace of the republic: usury, however, pretends to some appearance of equity: because it seems fair and just that some benefit should be returned for a benefit shown, although in truth, nothing is due to such a benefit from justice, but only from grace, which is benevolence and thanksgiving. Similarly, in usury some utility seems to be sought for the republic, because through it many inheritances are retained and a great many losses are avoided; for which reason also human laws permit it and do not punish it, just as they punish and prohibit theft and robbery. From these things, therefore, it is clear that usury is a reprehensible evil according to the law of nature, and a mortal sin according to the divine law; and that it is a certain species or mode of the genus of robbery and theft.

Chapter V

Since it has been said that usury is included in the genus of theft and robbery as a special mode, and cannot be considered as such except because of the detention of some thing belonging to another against the owner's will, it is not without reason that experts ask whether usury is a true thing belonging to another, and not a true possession of the recipient. And from this it is commonly asked by doctors whether ownership is transferred in usury. And because there is a twofold determination of this question among doctors: because some of those who proceed more theologically simply affirm that ownership is not transferred in usury; but others who pay attention to written laws and human laws say that ownership is simply transferred. But so that the truth may appear according to our intention, we subjoin this chapter. But what can move theologians to assert that ownership is not transferred are certain authorities, and the reasons that follow from them. For blessed Augustine says to Macedonius, and it is found in 14 questions. chapter 5: What shall I say about usury, which even the laws and judges themselves command to be paid? Is he who takes or robs something from a rich man more cruel than he who murders a poor man with usury? In these and similar things, therefore, they are certainly ill-possessed. Behold how blessed Augustine says, that just as theft and robbery are ill-possessed, so also usury: and he adds *ibid.*: and I would that they were restored. But only what is to be restored is to be restored which is another's and not one's own; therefore usury is not in the possession of the possessor: for what is another's and what is one's own are contrary, and do not fall into the same thing at the same time. Likewise Augustine in *Lib. de Verb. Dom.*, Tract. 30: do not wish to give alms from usury and usury. But it is clear that anyone can give alms from his own. Therefore it seems that usury is not in the property and power of the possessor. Furthermore. No thing is to be restored to anyone except to him who is its true owner. Therefore since one thing cannot have two owners at the same time, different and equal from each other, and all usury is to be restored according to the divine law to the one from whom it was received as to the true owner, it follows that the one who restores it does not have true ownership of it; and thus it was not transferred to the usurer. On the contrary, it moves certain jurists and experts, namely that according to every law, another's thing whose ownership is not transferred must always be restored to its true owner in the same amount, by whomever it is possessed. But in usury, even according to divine law, this is not judged. For if someone has received a horse or money or any other thing on usury from another, he is not bound to restore the same thing in the amount according to the laws, but it is sufficient only if he restores the value of the thing.

Furthermore. If the usurer sells or gives a horse received on usury to another, it is clear from the laws that ownership is transferred, and that the recovery of the same horse is not due to the person who had given the horse to the usurer for usury. But if ownership had not been transferred to the usurer, the usurer could not give or sell to another by transferring ownership that he did not have. Wherefore it seems that ownership is transferred in usury. And by another natural reason it seems the same: because the borrower asks for a loan with one and the same will, and promises profit or increase on his own. Since, then, the will by which one

asks for a loan is completely free and not compelled, the will by which one promises an increase will be likewise free. But the promise must be repaid with the same will by which it is promised. Wherefore, such an increase will be freely repaid by the one who is the true owner of the thing. But if the true owner of the thing transfers ownership to any possessor, he truly transfers ownership. Wherefore, it seems that ownership is truly transferred in usury even by natural law. And so by divine law, which does not compel the restitution of the same thing numerically, and by human laws which do not compel the restitution of usury, and do not punish those who receive usury as if they were receiving other people's things, and by the law of nature, those who are of this opinion attempt to show that ownership is transferred in usury. Why, then, should they be restitution, if they are not other people's things? And if they are other people's things, how can they be sold or given as one's own?

From these, therefore, arises a doubt, not without reason. To clarify this, it is necessary to know in advance that the divine law judges something else as alien, and the human law differently. For the divine law says that whatever is possessed against the law of God, who alone is truly the master, is alien. And therefore all things that are possessed by another, if they are possessed against the will of God, are possessed unjustly, and are possessed against the will of the master as if they were alien things: and this is expressly said by blessed Augustine to Macedonius: and it is found in 14 questions. chap. 5: What shall I say? Do we not convince all who seem to themselves to rejoice in what they have acquired, and do not know how to use it, that they possess something else? For that is certainly not alien which is possessed by right. But that which is possessed by right is possessed by right; and that which is possessed by right is possessed by right. Therefore, everything that is possessed by wrong is possessed by wrong; but he who uses it wrongly possesses wrongly. Thus it is clear that the usurer is not the true owner of usury, just as neither is the robber of plunder, because both possess ill: and therefore he possesses another's, and not his own: but the true lord possesses as his own that which he possesses as lord. From which it is clear that according to the law of God, ownership is not transferred in usury: and therefore divine law commands that restitution be made for usury as well as for plunder. And I call divine law that which is contained in the canon of Sacred Scripture and in the decrees of the holy fathers and councils. But human law judges as alien only that which is taken or withheld according to human laws, contrary to the will of the man who is the lord of things. Therefore, when in theft or plunder the taking or withholding of things appears to be against the will of that man who is supposed to be lord by all men, human law justly punishes it, and compels it to be restored as truly alien. But that which is taken or withheld in usury does not seem to be against the will of the giver, because it is neither given through ignorance nor taken by violence. Why does human law not judge usury as belonging to another? But there is still a doubt from what has been said. If divine law judges usury as belonging to another, why does it not compel the restitution of the same thing numerically? To which we reply that, as far as it is from divine law, the usurer must be compelled to make the same restitution numerically, if the thing itself remains in the power of the usurer, unless it is released by the assent of the claimant; otherwise he is bound to restore the value for it. But if the thing does not remain in the power of the usurer, but has been consumed, or transferred into the possession of another, who is the possessor of true faith; then the usurer must be compelled to make the restitution of an

equivalent. But a doubt still arises as to how the usurer can transfer another's thing to the possession of another. I answer that he cannot do so in accordance with what is judged to be his own; but in accordance with what is his own. But because by divine law it is judged to be another's, it must also be judged by the same law that it cannot justly be transferred to another without the consent of the true owner. How then can anyone retain things given or bought from a moneylender, which he knows were things of usury? Or why should he not be compelled to make restitution, as one who retains robbery or theft of any kind given or bought without the consent of the true owner? To which it must be said that divine law principally considers what is just for any person, or what is just insofar as it is thereby ordered to the end, which is eternal life. But human law considers this insofar as men are ordered among themselves to civil well-being, which is to live in honesty and common peace.

But divine law uses human law as an instrument, wherever by civil works man can be ordered or disordered from the end of eternal life: just as also all nature is an instrument of divine power, and not because of need, but because of the excellence of divine power, which operates some by itself, and some by nature. Therefore, because things acquired by usury corrupt just ownership only in the person acquiring and holding it, but do not properly corrupt the civil good of man, that is, peace, because they are not simply received against the will of the giver; therefore it is sufficient for a judge who judges according to the law of God that the usurer only satisfy as to God, namely, that he restore as much as he receives against the law of God. But because the thing received is not made unjust on the part of the giver in human law, nor even in the law of God, except for reason alone on the part of the usurer; therefore the judge is not compelled by any law to restore the same thing, nor is it necessary for the reason stated. Therefore, because of what has been said, we believe that ownership is not transferred in usury according to divine law, but we judge only as transferred by human law.

Chapter VI

But because certain words of law are found in which the reason for doubt and the dangers of events seem to completely excuse the vice of usury in certain exchanges and contracts; therefore it is necessary to consider when and in which contracts and how they are valid to excuse; and when and in which they are not valid. It must therefore be known first of all that it is a general rule among all doctors, and it must be firm, that no condition or circumstance can excuse any vicious act or habit, except insofar as it can remove the reason for viciousness from it. For when the Hebrews are excused from stealing the spoils of the Egyptians, this is only because by the command of a superior master things that were not theirs became theirs. Therefore, if they are able to excuse doubt or danger, this will not be unless they have the power to remove the reason for truly called usury. And because in loans the vice of usury is attached from the fact that they are made in the hope of gain, which is against the nature of the loan; therefore because doubt and danger by their nature do not remove this viciousness from the loan when it is made in the hope of gain, neither doubt nor danger can excuse the vice of usury. And this is proven by that decretal, to a sailor. For if someone has entrusted money to a sailor for loan because of the hope of some profit, although he has also accepted the risk of the lot upon himself, he is nevertheless judged a usurer, even if he has lost it all. And similarly if someone has lent some money to someone, for example one hundred pounds for ten years, so that if within this time he dies, one of them is freed from the debt, and from the loan who took it; but if they both survive, after ten years the one who took the loan will give two hundred and fifty pounds to the one who had given the loan, he is not excused because of doubt and risk from usury. But wherever they can remove the reason for the vice of usury, there they can excuse it: and this is in certain contracts. And to know specifically how and in what cases this can happen, we must consider those contracts or exchanges of things in which something is taken more than is given, which if this exchange is made for the sake of time, already commits a form of vicious usury, because this kind of excess cannot be reduced to the equality of justice either from lawful labor, or from the use of one's own thing, or by the compensation of another substance. But if this excess is not taken or intended for the sake of time, at least the reason for doubt or danger can supplement the equity of justice. For example, if someone buys something for a price less than it is worth at the time of purchase, or for an equal price, yet he will receive the thing at a time when he hopes it will be worth more: or even if someone sells something for a price greater than it is worth at the time of sale, hoping, however, that it will be worth only that much at the time of payment; if it is likely to be doubted whether it can be worth more or less for the time for which the thing is sold or bought, in such cases the reason for doubt can excuse it, and make justice equitable, although more is taken than given; Because the reason for this doubt posits that the estimation of value in things is based on the very nature of things, which can be more or less valuable at a given time. Hence, more is expected there not only because of time, but because of the very nature of the thing, which is sometimes more valuable at one time than at another, and sometimes less.

And in this way the reason for doubt and even local danger can excuse some contracts that would otherwise be judged usurious. And this is proven by that chapter, to the sailor. The explanation of the above will also be clearer by examples. Let us suppose, therefore, that someone after Augustus has a lot of grain or wine for sale, and at that time a measure of grain is worth only three solidi, and a modicum of wine ten, and sells the grain for four solidi, and the wine for twelve, and is yet to receive the money on the feast of St. John, because he did not want to give it for a lower price even if he received it immediately, because he estimated that his thing would probably be worth only that much at the aforesaid time of payment; I say that he does not commit usury, although he receives more in hope than he gives at the time of sale, because he does not receive it because of the time, but because of the nature of the thing, which can probably and verisimilitude be doubted to be worth only that much at the time for which he sold, even if it was not worth so much at the time for which he sold. And this reason can be applied to some other contracts, even when a thing is bought for less than it is worth at the time of purchase, but is to be received at another time, at which it is likely to be doubted whether it will be worth more or less than it was bought. But as was said about the reason for doubt in a loan and in other contracts, so must be said about the reason for risk: because the reason for risk does not remove the reason for usury in a loan, even in the case of a lot, as is proven in the chapter on the seafarer. And the reason for this is clear from the above. But in other contracts in which the received seems to be in excess of the given; it can excuse, namely, when the reason for risk itself can compensate for such excess. For things of the same species which are possessed outside of danger are valued more than the same things which are in danger: and therefore compensation is turned to the nature of the thing, which is valued more or less because of the danger.

Chapter VII

But since we see certain conditions which according to the law seem to excuse usurious contracts simply, as is seen first by that Deuteronomy 23: You shall not lend to your brother at usury; and it follows, but to a stranger. Wherefore it seems that usury which is received from a stranger, and especially from one of unequal worship, does not have the nature of a fault: and thus it seems that the condition of the person by whom he is in unequal worship, excuses usury. Similarly according to blessed Ambrose 14, question 4: Execute usury from him whom you justly desire to harm: to whom arms are rightly brought, usury is rightly taken away. From which it is clear that the condition which makes an enemy worthy of death excuses the vice of usury. A third condition is also taken and found in the law by reason of dowry, or paternal promise: as when someone receives with his wife as dowry some inheritance or land or annual rents, for some certain sum of money in pledge, he can receive such fruits without diminution of the dowry, as long as the reason for the pledge remains. And this is found in Extra. de usuris, chap. salubriter. The fourth condition can be taken from the nature of the thing: namely, when the thing which is received in pledge, belongs to the one who receives in pledge de jure, but is de facto forcibly withheld by another, then he can receive the fruits of the pledge beyond the lot, because he receives it as his own, and not as another's. And this is found in the first Decr. de usuris, chap. pluris. The fifth condition can also excuse, which is called interest, or compensation for damage, and not hope of profit, as if someone lends money gratis, up to some specified term, in which he needs his money for some necessity, and the loan has not been returned at the aforesaid term, the borrower can recover beyond the lot whatever damage he incurs, because of the default of payment. And in this way the surety can recover the interest from the debtor, which he pays to the creditor, because of the default of the debtor. And this is confirmed in Extra. de Fidejuss. in Duab. decretalibus. Sixthly, usury is also excused when something is offered gratuitously beyond the lot; because according to Gregory in the Register, and is found in 1, question 5: An offering does not incur any stain of guilt on anyone that does not proceed from the request of the one who is around. But the reason why such conditions excuse usury and when, is sufficiently clear and evident, if one considers what was said in the preceding chapter, namely, because no circumstance can change a person's character from good to evil, or vice versa, unless it removes from its nature the reason for goodness or malice. Now usury as a vice can occur first and per se in loans, and secondarily in other contracts. Now usury in loans is a vice. First, because it corrupts liberality, which is to give a loan gratuitously: and this reason for vice is removed by the last condition, namely when something is given or received gratuitously beyond the lot. Usury also corrupts the due end in loans, because it is accepted with the hope of gain, and without just recompense; and this malice is also removed by the first, second, and fifth conditions. For the first is that by which it is shown that God alone is the Lord of all things, and that all things are given to promote the worship of God: and therefore by the virtue of faith the evil of usury is removed in that case: because then it is not done with the hope of gain. Similarly in the second it is done with the zeal of justice and charity, which, as far as it can, tries to destroy the enemies of the faith, namely tyrants and heretics, even by the same right, when it cannot otherwise require their property than by

usury. But in the fifth the reason for justice is clear, because it is not taken with the hope of gain, but for compensation for damage: and therefore that superabundance is justly acquired. It also sometimes happens that usury is taken in other contracts, in which something is asked for more than is given without cause. And this can also be excused in all the ways aforesaid, and in two others as well. And this can happen when that which is received beyond the lot becomes its own by the right of nature; as the fruit of pledges for the dowry of a wife, or for the provision of children. Or it can become its own by the right of equity, as the thing itself which is pledged, when according to equity it belonged to the one who receives the fruit. These words suffice concerning the conditions excusing usury: how many there are, and when they are capable of excusing usury, and when they are not.

Chapter VIII

But since the ancient enemy, having sown the weeds of greed and avarice in human nature, has produced the vice of usury, not only in loans, which is clearly condemned in the light of divine truth in Holy Scripture and eradicated, but also in other contracts, in which, under the appearance of human equity and justice, as it were, interest is hidden, therefore in this part, seeking to uncover this evil, we will speak about those contracts in which it lies hidden. First, however, we say what was said at the beginning, that usury is whatever happens besides the lot, without just title, whether in loans or in other contracts. But what only happens because of time in contracts, as in loans, happens to the lot without just title; because he makes it his own by fraud, namely by selling time, which is God's and given in common to all. And he cannot have the title of natural succession, or of gratuitous gift, or of just gain through the merit of lawful and proper labor, or by the compensation of his own thing. And hence it is that every contract in which something more is received than is given, whether in hope or in reality, and this only for the sake of time, is called a usurious contract: and this is what is said in those decretals Extra. on usury: in the city. And he consulted. But it is to be noted what is properly called lot here, and what is an accident of lot: for lot is understood in Holy Scripture in two ways. In one way as a given sign, by which confused things are distinguished from one another, according to that Prov. 18 chap. lot compresses contradictions: and again Prov. 16: lots are cast into the lap, but are tempered by the lord: and that Acts 1: the lot fell upon Matthias. In another way lot is understood for an office, or a thing justly possessed, or due in the division of some persons or possessions: as the lots of the children of Israel are called, just portions distinct to each tribe or person assigned. And in this way it is also understood here for a thing justly possessed or due to some person. But this is said to happen to the lot, which does not pertain to the property of the lot. From which it is clear that the proper use of a thing and the fruits of the same thing do not happen to the lot: because he who has property in another thing or possession, has both the use and fruit of it by right: and therefore he who buys a field or a horse in order to receive more in fruits by reason of the fruits, and by reason of the use of the horse which he buys, receives nothing more than happens to the lot, because it is all about the lot, namely the fruits and the use. It is also to be noted secondly that the fruits and the uses of things can increase and decrease in value according to the diversity of times. And this can happen to the things themselves in three ways, without time being the cause per se. In one way, when there is no reason for such an increase in the use of the thing. In another way, because of the scarcity and abundance of the things themselves: for things which are diminished by their use are naturally consumed according to time, and are fewer: because they are further removed from their origin: just as wheat is naturally more abundant in autumn than in spring. In another way this happens from the nature of the things themselves, which receive an increase in value according to time, as is evident in land, forests and animals. In a third way from the nature of the thing related to the condition of the place. It is therefore to be held generally that in all contracts in which more is received from the seller or buyer than he gave, and there was no reason for such an increase in the use of the thing or in the nature of the thing itself, nor was it produced by time by any condition existing in the things themselves, as is evident in the three aforementioned ways, but the increase

happens from the extension of time granted by the seller or buyer, so that by this he may receive more; then such a surplus received over and above what was given is called usury, and it has the defect of usury, because it is generated without just reason in such contracts and loans: and this is called among jurists, and also commonly, selling or buying on credit.

But if more is received than is given simply because the seller or buyer's valuation is greater at one time than at another, because of any of the three aforementioned causes, or even because of the delay of the thing at one time than at another, then it can be done without the fault of usury, because such excess is compensated by the greater value of the thing in itself for the time for which such excess is received, and is not received for the delay of time. However, it should be noted that in these contracts, although they can be excused from the fault of usury according to the reason stated, they are not excused at all from the fault of greed: for which reason it is called in the canon a disgraceful gain, as is found in 14th question, chapter 4: if any cleric, and chapter 4: whatever the harvest times. And it is called a disgraceful gain, because by reason of time it happens like usury, although differently. Or it is called filthy lucre by reason of the end, because such contracts are not made, as in most cases, for the necessity or utility of human life, but rather for the increase of wealth, which is done by greed, which has no end, because the greedy person is not satisfied with money: and therefore they have the nature of a vice. However, if such contracts are ordered to the use of human life, they are excused from all turpitude, as is stated in the cited chapters, 14, question 4. And by this it is also shown that there is no usury in such a case, because usury is not excused even to the extent that it is ordered to the necessity of life. From these it can also be seen that usury can occur not only from the dilation of time, but from the nature of the thing related to the condition of time. And similarly from the nature of the thing related to the condition of place: namely, when some things are given on loan, whether money, to be returned equal in kind and number, weight and measure. And yet because the borrower hopes that the same thing will be worth more numerically at a specified time or place when it must be returned, and for this reason he himself borrowed it to be returned at such a time or such a place, that it may be returned to him at a specified time or in a specified place, I say that there is clearly a fault of usury there: because more is hoped for from the loan, or for the sake of the loan, than is given. And for the same reason the fault of usury can occur in other contracts in which more is received than is given for a similar reason, as for example, if someone sells or buys grain or wine at one time in order to receive more at another time than he gave merely by reason of time or place, although the things are also worth only that much at that time, then the fault of usury becomes due to the usurious intention. Which, however, could well be done if only the nature of the thing were taken into account, and not the reason of time or place, which in no way are anything to do with the thing: and therefore they do not make things worthless or charitable in themselves. Hence it is clear that in the same contract, according to species, the fault of usury from corrupt intention and the fault of avarice without the fault of usury from the ugliness of gain. And sometimes it can also be done without any fault, when it is done for the necessity of life. From what has been said, the doubt raised by some is also resolved: whether the fault of usury can be generated by anticipation of time, as by delay or prolongation: for example: someone owes another one hundred solidi to be paid after years, or annually in two or three terms, and the creditor wants to remit to the debtor a

third or fourth or fifth part, if he pays him at the beginning of the year, or before the set terms, when he asks. But it is clear that in this case more is taken than is given by reason of time. For example, the debtor justly owed one hundred solidi, and by reason of anticipation of time he pays only eighty. Therefore he receives twenty beyond what he gives, namely beyond eighty: because those twenty belonged to the creditor, and they became the debtor's by reason of anticipation of time. Therefore, by reason of the rule given about the cause of the fault in usury, which is when more is taken than is given by reason of time, it seems that this kind of case is usurious. But here the excuse of usury can fall in two ways.

In one way, when the creditor freely and liberally grants such a surplus to the debtor, and the debtor does not accept it for the sake of time. In another way, when the debtor compensates for such a surplus by the loss of his own property: as when he cannot have money without alienation and loss of some property of his own, from which to pay the creditor what he demands before the term of payment: otherwise, it is a case of usury. But a special difficulty seems to be in those contracts in which things are bought or sold, which receive an increase in value or cheapness from the process of time; such as crops, the fruits of animals, the fruits of trees, the spoils of forests: for because such things are sold and bought frequently before the time of their usefulness or use, and are bought for less than they will be worth at the time of their reception and use, the question is not unjustly raised, whether receiving more for them or expecting for the time of their reception constitutes a usurious contract. Which indeed the determiners distinguish: because either the buyer, having already had the ownership of such a thing at the time of purchase, accepts the risk upon himself, or the risk remains with the seller. If in the first way, they want the contract to be permissible because of the risk: just as a lessor of his own thing and receiving something beyond that is excused on this account, because the risk of the thing remains with the lessor, as is stated distinctly. 88: buyer. But if in the second way, then they condemn the contract. But if the truth of the thing is considered, this kind of distinction has no place here: for if the lessor receives something beyond the thing leased, this has the nature of equity, because it is compensated for by the use of the thing leased which is the property of the lessor, and pertains to his lot, that is to say to the thing leased, the property of which simply remains with the lessor; and therefore the risk of it also remains with the lessor. But when someone sells a thing, not only the use of it, but its ownership; it is clear that the risk of the thing is transferred by law to the buyer. When therefore, when a person sells a thing of this kind thus, he retains the risk with himself, ownership is no longer transferred in this way, and therefore there is no exchange of just sale. But it is clear that the buyer has already transferred the ownership of the money he gave: wherefore it has more the nature of a loan: and if more is hoped for because of a future time determined than is given, it follows that there is a vice of usury. And therefore, without prejudice, it seems to me that a different distinction should be made in the aforesaid contracts: and especially because we see that the danger of the thing is not easily imminent in the sale of spoils or woods, as in others. For things of this kind can be bought, either as necessary for the use of the life of the buyers, or for the sake of profit only. If in the first way, there is no vice, although they will probably be worth more at the time of their reception: provided, however, that a just valuation has been made at the time of the contract, which is according to the law of nature, and also human custom, in that a thing of human life can only

be justly valued insofar as its use is necessary: and this either simply, or for some definite time. And because simply, with wise men, a perfect thing is valued more than an imperfect one, and for a definite time a thing is valued insofar as it can be sold among men; and therefore, although such things are sold less imperfectly than they would be worth when perfect, it does not seem to me that anyone should receive more than the lot, because the lot is sold to the buyer, with an increase in its value and utility. But if such contracts are made in the second way, that is, for the sake of profit, they can still be judged to be merely a base gain on account of greed, which arises from the condition of time, as was said above about the others. And again, a vice can occur in them: and this when such a gain is sought only from time, and the risk is removed, or there can probably be no doubt about the risk, whether the things can be worth more or less by reason of time. So far, these things have been said universally concerning the nature of contracts, in which it seems that the vice of usury can occur in some way.

Chapter IX

But since in the previous chapter the equity and justice of contracts were discussed simply according to our purpose, now after this it seems right to discuss contracts made for a time and not simply. And concerning this the investigation is twofold useful. First, whether it is permissible to buy some goods, such as income or possessions for life, which is an indefinite time. Second, whether it is permissible to buy some of the aforementioned for a definite time, for example, for ten years or for twenty: which two things are frequently done among the men of our time. Regarding the first, the sayings of some, and their reasons, should be noted, who condemn this kind of contract as usurious. First, however, we confess that we have nowhere read or heard an authority, either in the canon or in extravagant epistles, or in the body of law, that supports this opinion. But we have seen in the writings of certain masters what we will subjoin: and concerning this we will try to confirm the sayings by reason, as far as we can. Geoffrey, who is a great authority in canon law, making a summary on the titles of the decretals, says thus in the title on usury, chap. he who to the sailor: there he expressly says that giving a certain amount of money or a sum of money to some Church in exchange for some possessions to be held for the life of the giver and after the death of the holder to be returned to the Church itself, is a usurious contract. And he gives the reason for this, saying that the giver has the hope of living beyond the time in which he has received from the proceeds the whole lot that he had given and beyond. But hope alone makes usurious. This is the reason of the said Master and his opinion. This is also the opinion of another theologian, asserting this, adding reasons: first, showing that this kind of contract cannot be excused by reason of doubt or danger, because there is no other kind of contract in which someone gives a hundred pounds to receive ten annually as long as he lives, and hopes that he will live to eleven years and beyond: or that in the eleventh year he will receive one hundred and ten pounds together; with the added condition also that if he dies before, he will receive nothing of the whole sum. Now it is clear that in this second contract there is a defect of usury; nor is it removed by reason of doubt or danger, as is proven by that chapter. to the sailor. Wherefore likewise in the first contract there will be the vice of usury: nor is it removed by reason of doubt, since there is always there the hope of receiving more. By this reason the same doctor wishes that both the seller and the buyer sin with the vice of usury; because according to this reason, just as the buyer receives in hope more than he had given, so also the seller, because he hopes, or at least wishes, a speedy end to the things bought. And if it happens that he dies in the first year, or in the second, it is clear that he received more than he gave. But this vice in the seller, indeed, no one whom I have heard in word, or seen in writing, extends to usury. The same doctor theologian also seems to confirm the opinion of this kind as a sentence from the sayings of the philosopher, who in two places, namely, 10 Ethic. and in 1 Polit., he speaks of the nature of coins, showing that the invention of coins was made for the sake of transfer, that is, so that through them other things which are necessary for the life of man may be transferred: and therefore when coins are transferred to another so that he may increase and multiply himself, there is thokos, that is, the vice of usury, as appears from the sayings of the philosopher. Therefore, since in the purchase of income for life the transfer of money is made for the purpose of multiplying itself, it seems always and naturally to be the vice of usury.

Furthermore, this sentence seems to be given from the divine law, Leviticus 24, where it is said: When you sell anything to your fellow citizen, or buy from him, you shall not defraud your neighbor; but according to the number of the years of the jubilee you shall buy from him, which he shall sell to you according to the taking of the fruits. But explaining this, the Gloss *ibid.* speaks thus, when you sell, etc. Here, according to the letter, it is morally instructive, that in contracts between neighbors we should have compassion, lest anyone be too troublesome in dealing with the needs of the poor, lest he should strive to acquire the possessions of others, but lend to the needy, and gradually receive what is lent from the fruits of the fields. From this authority and the Gloss it seems that when someone buys the possessions of his neighbor, having received a share from the proceeds of the fruits, it is not lawful for the buyer to receive anything beyond that. But everyone who buys possessions or income for life hopes to receive something beyond the share given, and receives it if he lives beyond that according to his hopes. Therefore the contract is unlawful, even according to the divine law. The same is seen from what has been said about the cause of usury: because in such contracts something is always hoped for or received beyond what is given, for the sole reason of time; but this reason makes the contract usurious. But not daring to assert that the opinion of these and so many men is false, since the contrary opinion is held by the dissimulation of so many and many ancients and moderns, it seems fitting also to discuss the truth about this question by reason, as much as God has given to our smallness. But it should be known first of all that we have seen the opinion of a certain famous doctor in law, who condemned this kind of contract not as usurious, but as vicious because of the circumstance of sin attached, namely in the seller; because the seller wished for the death of the buyer. But even if this is evil, it is not by the nature of the contract, but happens from without; and therefore the contract should not be condemned for this reason: whence, according to the aforesaid doctor, if such contracts were made for the life of the sellers, they would not be evil. Inquiring, therefore, what injustice can be contained in such contracts, and whether they can be made lawfully, and how, the arguments of the contradictors are resolved. We say first, that whoever is the owner of a thing is also the owner of the use of the same thing. We also say secondly, that the true owner of a thing can transfer it to another free of charge, or even for a price and in exchange for another thing. We also say thirdly, that the owner can transfer the use and fruit of his own thing. We also say fourthly, that the true owner of a thing, just as he can give or sell the ownership of a thing, or the use, or the fruit of any possession simply as to all time, so he can give or sell as to a determined or particular time. All these are proved by the true reason for ownership. It is also to be observed that in a loan, only the substance of the thing and its value should be considered according to the reason of the substance, and not according to the reason of the use of the thing or the fruit; because it should be done gratuitously according to the reason of the loan; and therefore the borrower should expect nothing more than the value of the thing from the use of the thing borrowed, because the loan is transferred by reason of the substance, and not by reason of the use. But there is another in things adapted to use. For the substance of a thing does not admit of more and less in itself: but in a contract of sale and purchase, not only the substance of the thing is considered, but also its fruit and use. But from the fruit and use of things themselves it happens that the value of them naturally increases and decreases among men: wherefore from the nature of this kind

of contract one can hope beyond what is given, or even fear lest he receive less than he has given: and therefore merchants can hope for profit from trade, which they cannot when lending. It should also be noted that, as the Philosopher says, and treats of it in his Politics in 1, all exchange of things between men takes place because of the necessity of human life: and therefore it is required that a commensuration of them should be made in having more and less in value, according as they have more and less of utility and necessity for human life.

But this kind of utility varies in many ways, more or less: in one way from time; in another way from place; in another way from the condition of the things themselves; in another way from the nature of the things themselves. Therefore, in a sale the substance of a thing is transferred with its use either simply or for a time. And when simply, it is clear that the buyer will receive more without fault, because the utility of the thing and its fruits are transferred for all time with the substance of the thing. But when in a sale only the substance of the thing is transferred with its utility for some time, and not simply, it is not just according to the nature of the thing, that a thing whose substance is possessed for a time should be valued as much as one which is always possessed; because there does not follow from it so much utility to the owner of human life: even if more is received or is hoped to be received than was given, no injustice follows: and especially when the buyer has the intention of buying for the necessity and utility of life, and not for profit or increase of money; which also in other purchases is a sin, according to the Philosopher. But sellers, as in most cases, always look to some utility, either of their house, or of the Church, or of the city; and they do not do this for the sake of profit, which is why they are more excused. We also say fifthly, that by the right by which someone receives something more than he gave in possessions purchased simply, by the right he receives something more than he gave in possessions purchased, or income for life: because everything is a matter of fate, whatever he receives more; because he buys the substance of the thing with its use and fruit, just as he who buys for all time. But it is still doubtful according to this opinion, whether the seller can retain the substance he received, when he has bought nothing or little and survived after the purchase. The determination of which is, why by reason of doubt and danger, which was of the nature of this kind of contract, it becomes his. And this reason sometimes excuses in contracts from their nature: which it does not do in loans, because there it happens from something other than from the reason of the loan. For when by the nature of the contract there is a risk or doubt equally on the part of the seller and the buyer, then the thing bought or sold would also justly be valued less than if the risk or doubt did not arise by the nature of the contract: and therefore the contract is just by its nature, since there is equally doubt on both sides whether they will receive or will receive less or more. For if a man buys a horse and pays a hundred pounds for it; it is clear that if the horse dies within the same hour after payment, the sellers nevertheless justly retain the hundred pounds, although the buyer has obtained no benefit, because he has justly transferred his thing to the buyer. Similarly, he who sells possessions for an indefinite period, the determination of which depends on nature, and not on man, and the time is determined apart from the man's intention, insofar as he has legally transferred his thing, and the transfer already returns to him by the nature of the contract. Furthermore, it must be considered that in such sales and purchases for life, the free will of the seller and the buyer is found equally by

the nature of the contract: and especially when the rich sell and the poor buy: which is more frequently by the nature of the contract, because each does such things for his own benefit: for neither is the rich compelled to sell, nor the poor to buy, nor is the poor bound to give anything gratuitously to the rich or to borrow, nor is the rich bound to give anything of his own to such a poor man. Wherefore every transfer made by the free will of the owners is made justly. From these things it follows that whatever the buyer or seller receives more than they gave, they receive justly, and as their own, by the free will of the owners; but in loans this justice cannot be found, when more is received in profit from the loan: for the borrower receives of his own free will, as does the lender; But the borrower does not promise or give more of his own free will, but is as if compelled by the perversity of the lender, who does not want to do what he is bound to do without hope of gain: and therefore that more cannot be made his by the same right as the loan, which is returned to him, nor by any just title. From the foregoing it is inferred that both because of the just valuation of things at the time of the contract, because the thing is valued justly only insofar as it is related to the owner's benefit, and is worth justly only as much as it can be sold without fraud; and also because of the risk equally attached to the contract itself by its nature on the part of both owners, and also because of the free will of the owners transferring the things with their proceeds, this kind of contract is by its nature free from the vice of usury. But we have spoken of its nature; because by accident the vice of dishonest gain can occur in the contract itself, and sometimes also the vice of usury.

But the vice of filthy lucre without the reason of usury occurs in it when someone rich enough for his life, both according to the nature of the thing and the person, and according to the state of the person, buys such income in order to become richer, and to acquire more wealth without just and pious necessity: and therefore it is called filthy lucre then, because it is exercised not for the due end of human life, but for the sake of avarice, which has no end. But the vice of usury can occur from this kind of contract when a man weakened by poverty sells such income unwillingly, or his possessions out of compelling necessity: and this because of the lack of loan, which he does not find among the rich. And then usury also occurs when the rich, considering this need of their neighbors, give a less just estimate for the possessions of the poor to acquire for themselves, whose needs, if they can without loss, they are bound out of brotherly charity to relieve by loan: and in this case the law of Moses says in Leviticus. 25, as appears from the text, and the Gloss cited, which says: one must sympathize with the needs of one's neighbors, and let no one bargain with the needs of the poor, but lend to the needy, and gradually receive the fruits of the fields on loan. From these things it is clear that in such a case the sale is due to the default of the loan, and the purchase is made as it were in place of a loan; and also that the valuation to the buyer is less just because of the necessity of the seller: and therefore that which the buyer receives more than he has given, does not have a just title of possession. Hence in this consideration the vice of usury can occur not only in purchases for life, but also in purchases simply, as regards all time. It is therefore to be universally observed that whenever someone buys any possession, whether for a time or simply for the sake of profit, which is only expected from the very reason of time, and not from the nature of the thing possessed; there is a vice in such a contract; and this kind of profit is called disgraceful in law. If, however, such possession is purchased for the sake of

gain, and it is just out of brotherly charity to lend to a poor neighbor, lest he fall into extreme poverty, as the ancient law commanded, then such profit from purchase has the defect of usury by the equivalence of loan; because there more is taken than is given without a just title to possessing the thing. If, however, someone buys another's thing not for the sake of gain, but because of the necessity or utility of his life, even if he receives more over time than he gave at the time of the contract; since he receives this by the nature of the contract per se, and accidentally by reason of time, I believe there would be no defect. But how we can satisfy the words and arguments of the adversaries, let us now explain, saying first that Godfrey's statement is not confirmed by any authority of the canon: secondly, that his example is said to have truth when the Church, impelled by some necessity, is forced to pledge its possessions, which it cannot and does not wish to simply alienate: for then it is not a sale properly, but a pledge; because he who cannot sell a thing or possession simply, cannot sell it by right for a time. For it is clear that although some churches possess many things, they cannot alienate the right of possession without the authority and consent of a superior prelate, either simply or temporarily. And therefore such sales of churches are mortgages, because according to this way such a contract is usurious, because it is not permissible to receive the fruits of mortgages beyond the lot, because they are not of the nature of a lot.

But to the reason given by the said Master concerning the hope of living only by receiving more than he has given, it must be said that this kind of hope or reception of more does not constitute a vice of usury, except when that which is hoped for or received is more incidental to the lot, and is not the nature of the lot: for otherwise every one who buys fields or animals in order to receive more in the proceeds in the course of time, or in the things themselves sold at another time, would be a usurer. But in just sales, when some owner transfers the ownership of his thing with its use and fruit simply or for a time, it is clear that all the proceeds of the thing sold are of the nature of the lot, and not an accident of the lot: wherefore such a hope or a larger acceptance does not constitute a usurious contract: and I say this with all due respect to the great Master. But to that which is adduced by another theologian, it seems to us that the answer is that there is a twofold doubt: namely, excusing and not excusing doubt: for doubt excuses when it removes inequality and makes a just assessment of the given and received as to the nature and use of the things exchanged; For example, when someone buys ten annually for a hundred, which he immediately pays, for his own life or for the life of another. And considering the utility of each with respect to the possessor, it is likely that there is doubt as to which is greater or lesser, because of the indeterminacy of time: and therefore an equivalent estimate is made because of the doubt. From these things it is clear that the reason for doubt makes the valuation just: and therefore whatever is given or received beyond that, whether by the buyer or the seller, is received as if from one's own lot. But the doubt which can only occur with respect to profit or loss from a determined time, cannot be estimated, because no just estimate arises from its doubt: because something more is hoped for by virtue of a determined time only, which is not capable of making a just compensation: and therefore it is clear how, when put outside, they are not of the same reason: for in him who hopes to receive a hundred and ten together in the eleventh year, by virtue of a determined time only, compensation for inequality is made, and thus he makes a usurious contract; But in another who does not expect to receive more except in an

indefinite time, and from a thing bought justly according to its nature, then, as has been shown, nothing is taken beyond the lot, but the whole is hoped for as his own, and from his lot it is not made his own because of the reason for time, but because of the nature of the contract. That which is also secondly adduced in confirmation of this opinion about the words of the philosopher, must be dissolved in this way. First, that the intention of the philosopher, as is apparent from his words, is that the coin was invented for the purpose of transferring other things, the use of which is necessary for human life: and therefore whenever someone uses the transfer of a coin in order to multiply them by other coins of the same kind, it is an abuse of the coin and a dishonest contract, and is called thokos, that is, parent of the thing. Hence it is clear to me that this kind of contract, of which there is talk, is not thokos. First, because even if the rents are bought for life with money, nevertheless by the nature of the contract it is not held that they are bought for the purpose of adding money to money, but that things necessary for human life purchased with the money itself are purchased. And this end contradicts the end for which thokos is made. Thokos is also purged from the vice by another reason, because as in most cases in this contract, not money paid, but the things themselves are bought, which are either referred to the use of man by their fruits, such as land and other possessions, or by themselves, such as wheat, wine, oil, and the like. Now thokos is, as the Philosopher says, a coin of coins. The third reason why thokos is not in this kind of contract is also taken from this, because according to the Philosopher, it is thokos when money is acquired by money in the likeness of those who generate similar things. Now it is clear that when similar things are generated from similar things for multiplication, that the generating things are preserved, and are not corrupted in their generations. But he who gives a hundred pounds, that he may have ten annually as long as he lives, it is clear that there is no reason for generation there, because the hundred pounds do not remain, either in the power or dominion of the giver with its generation, but are entirely transferred by him: nor do they remain in the right of return as is done in thokos: wherefore this kind of contract should rather be called the transmutation of thing for thing, than the generation of some thing from thing. From these it is clear that the reason for thokos is of no use in this kind of contract. But to that which was proposed against this kind of contract concerning the divine law, it must be said first, that that law understood according to the letter is said to be divine, but nevertheless it is temporal, as are many other laws which were given to that people only according to the literal sense in a figure; and therefore just as the observance of the jubilee does not remain among the Christian people, so also do the laws which were given for the sake of the jubilee, one of which was the law adduced, as appears from the text.

And again, if we consider what is moral in this law, which the Gloss quoted explains, we find that it does nothing against the nature of these contracts; but only against the perverse intentions of rich buyers, who, as the Gloss says, are troublesome, trading on the necessities of the poor, and are eager to acquire the possessions of others, when they are bound out of brotherly charity to accommodate them to those in need, and to receive gradually the accommodated goods from the fruits of the fields. And thus it is evident that this happens in contracts of this kind, and it is not of the nature of the contract, in which they frequently do not sell without need, but buy. And neither the law nor the Gloss of itself infects this kind of contract with the vice of usury by nature, but only by accident. As for what is said about the

nature of time, the truth is clear if the above is recalled to memory: because time can be referred to some exchanges of things, as conferring something of just value, or taking it away. And in this way, if for the sake of time more or less is sold, this kind of contract will not be usurious: for the measure of wheat in summer is valued more and justly than in autumn, all other things being equal, that is, as much as is due to the nature of time; and therefore if someone receives more of the grain sold for the time of summer than he gave in the autumn when he buys the grain, he is not judged usurious, provided, however, that he wishes to sell the grain for that time only, and not for any other. In this way it is also clear that ten pounds are valued more and justly at all times annually than at any particular time: or more and justly for the same reason at the time of a young horse than at an old one; and this from the nature of time. And yet usury is not judged if someone buys ten pounds at all times, that which he receives or hopes to receive more than he has given, although from time it happens to him more and with certainty. Therefore, similarly, he who receives more of what he buys for any particular time should not be judged usurious. And this is one reason, because by the nature of time a thing has become its own with its own proceeds: and therefore it is entirely of its own lot. Time can also be considered in contracts as conferring or detracting nothing from the value of a thing by the nature of time, but is only considered as an extrinsic measure of duration. When, therefore, by reason of the time thus received, something more is received or expected than is given, the fault of usury or injustice is already evident: because that more which is received beyond what is given is neither compensated by the nature of the thing, nor is it given or received gratuitously: and therefore it cannot be made one's own by any just title, but is always someone else's. So much has been said by us about the purchase and sale of income and possessions for life. We ask all who may happen to see this work to comply, if through ignorance we have spoken wrongly, and to correct them, because without prejudice both here and elsewhere we always intend to affirm what we write and say. After this, however, we must investigate the second part of this chapter, namely, about contracts in which certain incomes or possessions are purchased for a fixed time. For example, someone has certain income, such as from a parish or a prebend, or from a patrimony, or from another source, and he wants to sell such income for six years or for ten, or for some fixed period, so that he may have ready money at the same time. And the question is whether these can be lawfully bought for a lower price than they are worth in so many years received. And it seems that so: because, as has already been said in the preceding, a present and collected thing is valued at more value than a future and divided thing. And again, by selling such income, as much or frequently greater benefit is derived from such a sale as from the holding of the things. Furthermore, the Church indulges clerics who have been marked with the cross, that they may sell the fruits of their benefices for three years: but this would not be the case if there were a defect in such contracts. But against this is clearly what has been said about usury: that in such a contract more is received, or at least is certainly expected from the buyer than is given: neither danger nor doubt now occurs in this contract by its nature: wherefore he is simply seen as a usurer on the part of the buyer. We feel, however, without prejudice, that in contracts of this kind there is no fault on the part of the seller, as far as the nature of the contract itself is concerned.

But as far as the nature of time is concerned, it may seem to some that on the part of the buyer it is a usurious contract, because he is to receive more, not only in hope, but also in reality, than he has given, and this only by reason of time. But when what is less in a given respect with respect to the received, is compensated to him with respect to the excess received from time alone, then we judge the contract to be usurious, because this kind of excess is transferred without just title. But it seems to me that a contract can also be made just on the part of the buyer, and that it is just as far as the nature of the contract is concerned. But it can be made unjust by accident in two ways. In one way, when he corrupts the charity due to his brother: namely, when the buyer sees his brother in need for the salvation of his body or for the salvation of his soul, for which necessity he must sell his income or possessions, then the buyer, if he is rich, is able to help his neighbor without harm, I mean without prejudice, which he is bound to lend him, and to accept the aforesaid income or possessions in place of pledges, until he has received what he had accommodated. And this is proved by that law, Leviticus 24, and its Gloss. In another way, an unjust contract can be made on the part of the buyer because of the corruption of the end of the debt, which is for the benefit of human life. Hence, when it is made for the sole purpose of gain and the increase of wealth, then it is a base gain: but in the first way it is reduced to the vice of usury. But by its nature a contract has three things in it which show that it is just. One is the very liberality of the seller, by which he can give his thing for free, or exchange it for something of less value than his own thing: and according to this no vice occurs in the buyer, because what is received is entirely of the free will of the owner. Another is the very equity of the exchange of things: because when a thing is sold for as much as is justly valued, either by the seller and the buyer, or by those who are of positive law, then there is justice in the exchange. But it is clear that the seller cannot have more for the time for which he sold, and also things that will come over time are not of such value as those collected at once, nor do they bring so much benefit to the possessors: for which reason they must be of less value according to justice. The third is the reason for the lot itself: because what is taken more than is given is of the nature of the lot, because the buyer buys all that was to come at a fixed time, and therefore does not receive more than his own lot, just as neither does he who buys income for all time. These are the reasons for the justice of this kind of contract: by which the contrary reason is also dissolved, which seemed to show a usurious contract: because even if more is taken than is given, this is due to the nature of the thing exchanged, and that more is not an accident of the lot, but is of the lot of the buyers themselves: just as more is taken than is given in those possessions that are bought hereditary as regards all time: and this is said only of those that are sold and bought for a time.

Chapter X

Because we have already said that in contracts the vice of usury occurs when things are sold more expensive because of the mere delay of time than they are estimated at the time of sale, and we see this reason in almost all sales of bundles of wood, which are generally sold by the hundredth and thousandth year; therefore it is not without reason that we should investigate about contracts of this kind, whether justice can be found in such contracts, or whether they are simply usurious. And it seems that they are simply usurious: because they are sold more expensive because of the mere delay of time, or for the time in which they are sold; for example, in summer or spring they are of less utility, and therefore of less value: wherefore if then part of them is given for ready money for a lower price, which seems to be frequently done, than if there were no ready money, then only because of the delay of time the remaining part is sold more expensive. But this makes a usurious contract. Therefore and so on. Likewise this doubt is doubled, because it is found in principal owners who sell forests and groves by the measures of land. And it is also found in merchants who buy woods from the owners themselves by measure, and from them make bundles, which they then sell by number. Both therefore, because of the credit which they make up to a time, sell wood more dearly than it is worth at the time of sale. If therefore the things which are sold, whether then or at harvest time by merchants, are at the time of sale of a lower value according to the equity of justice than they are sold for, and beyond the just valuation something is unjustly taken for credit for a future time, it seems without any excuse to be a usurious contract: which can be proved by *Extra. eod., chap. consulit*: where a usurious contract is expressly called when someone takes away his goods at a much higher price, if the delay for payment of a long time is extended, than if the price were paid in the continent; and that those which have been thus received are to be compelled to be restitution. But against this is the general custom, which is seen and tolerated by the Church. Furthermore, according to justice, each thing should be of greater value and appreciation both at the time and for the time of its use than at another time in which its use is not so convenient and necessary. But those who sell woods and bundles and the like, sell to be paid at a time when their use is more convenient than at the time of their sale. Wherefore they can be valued and sold more dearly than they are worth at the time of sale. And by this reason I believe without prejudice that contracts of this kind can be excused from the fault of usury: and when there is probably a doubt whether things of this kind will be worth more or less at the time of payment. And this is proven *Extra. eod., chap. in the city*. Therefore, it is not because of the delay of payment in a long time that such things are sold more dearly, but because of the just valuation of things, which in the future time when payment is determined, will probably be worth more than they are sold more dearly at the time of sale; and thus more is not taken than is given on account of time alone, as arguments to the contrary pretended; but the equity of justice between the given and the received is preserved for the time for which the sale is made. Hence it should be noted that the belief of the price to be paid at a future time after some contract can occur in contracts without fault, for three reasons. In one way through the grace and liberality of the seller: namely, when the thing is sold according to a fair valuation for the time of the sale and exchange of the thing itself, and the seller himself expects payment liberally over a long

period, because of the grace he has towards the buyer. And in this way the belief is free from all fault, and does not make the contract defective. In another way, the belief can occur in a contract without fault according to the merit and justice of the contract itself, and not through the grace of the seller; For example, if a thing is sold at a time when it does not have as much utility and necessity for human life as it will have at some future time according to the nature of time, and the seller intends to sell his thing for that time when it has a greater necessity or utility, and in which it will be worth more than it is worth at the time it is sold, it is just from the nature of the contract that the seller should at least wait for that time for which he makes a greater estimate of the value: and therefore such a belief still generates no defect in the contract, nor in the contracting parties.

And this is proven *extra eod.*, chap. *naviganti*. In a third way, credit can occur accidentally, namely from the malice or poverty or impotence of the buyer. And in this way selling his thing more dearly than it is worth at the time of sale, or even than it will probably be worth in the future, which is the only way it is determined, can be excused from the defect, by the intention of the seller, although the contract itself is defective in itself. For if the seller intends to sell his thing more dearly, not because of time alone, but only because of the loss which he sees threatening him from the delay in recovering payment, or because of the annoyance which he probably fears will come to him in the repetition of his debt, because of the malice or impotence of the debtor, then he is excused from the defect, and equity of assessment is made in contracts of this kind, by compensation for the loss, or when these things are probably feared to happen in credit: and then the rectitude of this kind of intention appears, when the seller would rather not sell to such people than sell on credit; and when he would rather give to others for a lower price in payment than sell on credit to such others for a higher price. But in one way credit makes a contract usurious: namely, when because of the credit itself a thing is sold more dearly than it is simply worth or would probably be worth at the time of payment; or even if it is worth so much as it probably would be worth, yet the seller himself would not sell his other things unless he received more because of the credit itself. And from this it is clear when the aforesaid contracts by measures of forests, and by bundles of wood, can be lawfully made, and when and how they are usurious. But there seems to be a doubt about the second part of this chapter: namely, whether contracts are lawful when some things are bought for a lower price in payment; for example, wheat in the ground in winter and woods that will still grow for three years or more, before the suitable time for cutting, than they will be worth just at the time of their collection and reception; For example, corn in the ground in winter is given for a lower price than it will be worth at the right time of August when it is gathered: and so of forests and groves. And it seems a usurious contract on the part of the buyer; because for the delay of time he will receive more than he gave, as is clear from the examples given. And this reason makes usurious contracts, as has often been predicted. Furthermore, contracts of this kind cannot be excused on the grounds of doubt or danger, because it is not doubted that such things will be worth more at the time of their reception than the price that was given for them at the time of purchase. But against this is that the just valuation of each thing depends on the utility or necessity of the thing itself. But it is clear that the utility or necessity of any imperfect thing is not so great as that of the same perfect thing: wherefore it is not rightly to be valued at so great a price when

it is still imperfect, and far from its perfection, as when it is already perfect. But such things are bought at the time of their imperfection, and therefore they should be valued at a lower value than they will be at the time of their perfection. Furthermore, that which by the nature of time increases to a thing, justly belongs to the one to whom the thing itself belongs: as if someone buys fruitful lands or trees, or fruitful animals, whatever comes to pass by the nature of time, and not only by the exercise of labor, justly belongs to the one to whom such lands belong, etc. Therefore, since by the nature of time crops sown in the land come to a greater value, and so do forests; it follows that whatever comes beyond the price given, justly belongs to the one who buys it, and it falls into his own lot: therefore he receives nothing beyond the lot, although the buyer receives more than he gave. And we believe this without prejudice to a better opinion. But we say this with regard to the nature of the contract; although nevertheless by accident, by intention it could be a disgraceful gain for the buyer, namely when the buyer only intends that the increase of profit and wealth, coming from the nature of time, without the exercise of labor and without doubt of danger, probably be possible to happen. And there can also be another way in which a contract can be usurious: namely, when someone is forced to sell such things before the appropriate time out of necessity, because of which the buyer is bound by brotherly charity to lend the seller money, if he needs and wishes; but if the nature of the contract itself is considered, more is not received from the buyer for the delay of time, but for the nature and utility of the thing made or derived from the nature of time.

Chapter XI

Now there is a question about things that are entrusted to the good faith of others for profit. And this question is twofold: because either the question is about the commissioning of coins, or about the commissioning of other things that come into the use of man by themselves, such as fields, animals and gardens. As for the first question, it seems to some that the vice of usury falls upon them. First, because there seems to be no difference in the nature of the thing between entrusting the money of another in good faith and borrowing the same. But he who lends money for the sake of some profit, even if he takes the risk of his own fortune upon himself, commits the vice of usury, as is stated in *Extra. ibid., chap. naviganti*. Wherefore similarly he who entrusts his money to the good faith of another in the hope of profit, commits usury. This also seems to be the second; because what is thus hoped for or received from profit beyond the lot, he receives which he cannot possess by any just title; because it is neither given gratuitously, nor is it returned by one's own labor, nor is it compensated by another thing: therefore it seems to be possessed or hoped for simply unjustly. Furthermore, even if in the commissioning of other things that bear fruit of themselves, an excuse may be valid; However, since money of itself does not produce any utility beyond itself, it seems that at least in the commission of money for the sake of profit, there is always *thokos*, which is the vice of usury according to the Philosopher, that is, the production of six coins from a coin, which is against its nature. To this it seems to me that the answer is that either the commission is made of money, in such a way that the ownership of the whole or part of the entrusted thing is transferred into the power of the person to whom it is entrusted; or the commission is made in such a way that the ownership does not pass, but the entire entrusted thing remains in the possession of the entruster. In the first way, it is a vice of usury, in that he hopes for profit from a thing that is not his own, because it had already been transferred by commission into the ownership of another; and in this it is likened to a loan, as the first reason approves. But in the second way, profit can be hoped for without the vice of usury, because then money or other things are entrusted like servants and servants who trade with the master's property for the benefit of their master; and therefore the entruster can hope for profit, as from his own property and thus it does not happen by lot, nor is it possessed without a just title; because as he receives a part of his own thing, yet not the creation of the coin from the coinage immediately, but the creation of the things themselves, which were acquired by just exchange with his coins. But because it was said above in whole or in part, it was said that if someone entrusts a hundred to someone, so that he lends half to him and retains the other half for his own possession, yet so that the one to whom it is entrusted must trade for profit from those hundred; I say that this profit already has the vice of usury, because it is hoped not only from the entrusted thing, but also from the thing borrowed and entrusted equally. For just as in logic, a statement is judged false because of the subject of falsehood, although it directly signifies truth; as if it were said, A flying man is an animal; so in morals an action is judged to be vicious when it is mixed with vice, as in the present case. From what has been said the truth of the second question is now clear, namely when fruitful things are entrusted for profit. It should be noted, however, that in these matters entrusted for profit, permutative justice is more or less clear: because when a field or lands are entrusted to be

cultivated for profit, justice is sufficiently apparent, because there is no transfer of ownership, and nothing more is received from the fruit of the thing itself. But in animals, as when sheep or oxen or pigs are entrusted to be nurtured for profit, justice is not so clear: because sometimes usurious fraud is usually mixed into such commissions, as when the risk of the principal being entrusted is excluded by the entruster. For example, someone gives a hundred sheep to nurture for profit, but in such a way that the hundred sheep always remain safe for him, whatever happens. In this case, usurious fraud can occur; and this is when the entruster himself taxes a portion of the profit beyond a just estimate, because of which the labor and solicitude of the nurturer are not compensated according to a just estimate. Another fraud is also commonly committed in such cases, when a rich man lends a hundred pounds to a poor man, so that he may buy sheep or oxen to feed with them for the profit of the one who gave the loan, and for the profit of his students: I say that there the fraud is mixed with usury, because the root of this kind of profit already arises from the loan: and therefore this kind of commission is accused of the vice of usury. Then, therefore, such commissions can be lawfully made, when the loan or the likeness of a loan is not mixed in such cases, but the ownership is retained with the risk that can commonly occur: or when the ownership of the thing entrusted is also communicated to the one who undertakes it for the profit of feeding, and a similar risk is communicated to both. And when the profit is assessed according to a just estimate, by which the labor and solicitude of the students are justly compensated. And let these words on the subject suffice for the present.

Chapter XII

Because certain laws, once established in custom, are considered just laws, which ought rather to be called corruptions than approved customs, and we see this in this matter of usury, which varies according to regions and cities as regards the protection of orphans and children: and therefore we do not think it unworthy to investigate whether orphans can be excused from the vice of usury when they have reached full age, in which they are actually masters of their own property, and are freed according to the laws from their guardians, and then receive their own inheritances and goods in which they had succeeded, increased by the act of usury and the exercise of guardians, or at least intact and not diminished, preserved by such exercise. Sometimes such guardians also make a profit from the goods of orphans, and such also give something above their lot for the maintenance of the little ones, or even for an increased lot: some villages, cities, or towns are also accustomed to receive the goods of orphans, even excluding the relatives of the orphans from their guardianship; and for the goods of orphans they are accustomed to give a certain surplus to the guardians of the children annually, always preserving the lot of the orphans. But in such cases orphans seem to be excused from the vice of usury in two ways. First, because it is not their action, for they have not given their goods or money to usury: therefore whatever comes to them in this way beyond their lot, they receive not from a loan, nor from a gift given by them in the hope of profit, but as if given gratuitously, and thus they can retain it by just title: hence Gregory, and is found in 1, question 2: so no offering brings a stain of guilt upon the receiver, which does not proceed from the petition of the receiver, etc. Second, because since he is a child, he differs in no way from a slave, according to the apostle Galatians 4; and therefore the just use or abuse of the child's things resides in the guardians, wherefore it seems that the fault of usury should not be imputed to children: but where there is no fault in the possession, restitution is not due to be made by him. But against this is that what is acquired unjustly by a slave, as belonging to another, cannot justly become the property of his master because of his ignorance, without always being bound to restitution, whenever he knows the truth. Therefore orphans, when they know the truth, cannot retain for themselves the surpluses of their things acquired by usury. To determine this, a distinction must be made. First, concerning the cause and origin of this kind of surplus: because either it is acquired by the fruits of the things themselves which are the orphans', such as fields, animals and the like; or it is acquired by the mere transfer of things, and for the sake of the transfer itself; and because money was instituted solely for the purpose of transfer, as the Philosopher says, therefore this kind of cause appears chiefly in the use of money, the use of which is in the transfer of the fruits of things. And if in the first way some surpluses are acquired by orphans, they have no vice of usury in themselves: both because in this there is no profit hoped for or received from a loan; and also because nothing is accidental to fate, because the fruit born from such things naturally accompanies the things themselves, and is of the nature of fate, and not an accident of fate. But in the second way, a distinction must still be made: because this kind of surplus, which arises from the transfer of things or money, is either given or arises to the wards as a profit arising from the detention of their things, and in this way it is not permissible for them to retain it, because the detention of things does not give rise to the idea of any profit insofar

as they are detained, except insofar as they have utility and bring fruit. But if this kind of surplus is not given as a profit, but as a favor or as a gift, then it is permissible for them to retain it: and in this way the first two reasons proceed. And by that reason the custom excuses the vice of usurers in many cities: and the sign of this, that it is given gratuitously, is taken from the fact that, against the will of the wards, they determine for themselves the surplus which they give them, and that they never demand or demand anything from the wards. From these things it is clear that if the guardians of wards knowingly give the wards' money to usury by themselves or through others, that such an excess of property is alien, and is unjustly possessed even by the wards, whenever they know it: and if the wards do not want to restore it, the guardians are to be compelled to do so.

Chapter XIII

Now among the exchanges of men there is a certain kind of exchange in things, which is called barter; which has neither the character of a loan, because in such an exchange no profit is expected from the delay of time, nor is the same lot returned to the barterer in kind or in number or in weight. For he gives Parisians, and receives sterling, or money of another kind. Similarly, it has not the character of exchange, which is called sale and purchase, properly speaking; because this kind is done in valuable things, the prices of which are determined and measured by coinage: but this kind is only in the exchange of coins of different kinds: for which reason it follows that the art of bartering, which is a species of exchange, is simply called barter. But barter is said generally when something is taken in place of another given, and thus it includes all exchange. It is also said barter when a thing determined for the benefit of men is exchanged for another thing that similarly has another benefit by its nature. And thus it is treated of exchanges in civil and canon law: and as if someone wishes to exchange a parish for a prebend, or a prebend for a prebend, and the like. In a third way, exchange can be said more specifically to the matter of coins, the exchange of coins themselves. And in this way we say that exchange is the exchange of coins, which is commonly practiced for the sake of profit. But the question in this chapter is about this profit, whether it is acquired justly or unjustly. And it seems to be unjust in three ways by nature. First, because it proceeds from the improper use of the thing, because, according to the Philosopher, a coin does not beget a coin, but the exchanger uses the coin for the sake of profit. Second, because the exchange act seems to be for the benefit of the recipient from the exchanger, if he is just, or that it should be done gratuitously. Third, because according to the Gospel, the Lord cast such out of the temple. Therefore, it must be said that the exchange art is of itself just. Hence, it must be said to the first that the exchange art uses the coin for a suitable use. And the reason is, that the excess which is received by the moneylenders in such an exchange of money is not received on account of money which is in itself unsellable, but on account of danger or interest, so that it may be subsidized with the salaries of pensions, houses, servants, and labors and expenses in the necessary and lawful art, lest they put their effort and sweat in vain in a lawful thing for the benefit of others. To the second, it must be said that the art of the moneylender is just in two ways. First, because it signifies an act of justice and liberality through the greater benefit of the gift given to the recipient by the moneylender than that received by him. And secondly, because the moneylender act should not be done gratuitously by its nature, like the act of a loan: therefore that which seems to be received in excess passes into the possession of the recipient by the simple will of the giver. To the third point which is persuaded by the Gospel, it must be said that the Lord cast such people out of the temple on account of the place, which was appointed only for spiritual things: and therefore they carried on their trades contrary to the reverence due to the place, and the ugliness of their greed was apparent in such people. Or it should be said that such people should be thrown out of the temple, because it is not permitted for the ministers of the temple, that is, ecclesiastical men, to engage in such mercantile activities.

Chapter XIV

There is therefore a question again about merchants. First, whether it is lawful for someone to entrust his money to another who is going to the market for profit without the fault of usury. And a distinction must be made about this: because either it is simply a commission, which is made of the good faith of another, and thus the fault of usury would not occur, as we showed above in chapter 11: or it is a commission *secundum quid*, but simply a transfer, as in a loan: but I say commission *secundum quid*, insofar as the commissioner does not retain the risk of the thing entrusted to him. And in this way, because of the nature of the transfer, which should have been done gratuitously without hope of profit, the fault of usury occurs: and in this case the decretal speaks to the sailor. For this reason, if we ask further about those who lend some determined money to other merchants, on such an agreement that they pay similar and equal in number and weight to the creditors of those from whom they receive in certain fairs determined according to place and time: for example, Baldwin borrows from Walter one hundred pounds sterling in France in the month of August, so that Baldwin pays one hundred pounds sterling for Walter in the following January, in which Walter was held to his creditors: or if not to the creditors, to the lender himself at such a place and time; about this we must distinguish: because either the borrower at the time of transfer estimates that the said currency will be more valuable in the place or at the time to which it is to be paid; for example, sterling is worth more in England than in France: and then there is nothing to blame there. Or he probably fears a decrease in the value of sterling before a determined time. And then it must be said that the borrower commits usury, because he hopes for profit from the loan. Or the borrower does not intend any profit in lending, either from time or from place, but only because of the favor and grace of his neighbor, and then he incurs no blame from this. There is also another thing that can be doubted about this kind of matter. For it has been said that the hope of profit in lending makes usury a vice. Therefore it seems that if someone having some special money, which he fears will decrease in its value in the future according to the statutes of positive law, and for this reason lends such money to be returned to him at the same price as it was at the time of the loan, with respect to the common valuation of the land money; it seems that since such a loan is made with the hope of profit, that there is a vice of usury in it. For example, someone having sterling worth four Tournesols, fears that in the future, by the authority of positive law, they will be worth only a third Tournesol, for which reason he lends sterling, and after their value has decreased, he does not want to receive as many sterlings in number and weight as he had lent, but according to the price in Tours, whose value they were at the time of the loan. To this it must be said that it is one thing to avoid loss, and another to hope for gain: for whoever hopes for gain from a loan sins with the vice of usury, according to the authority of the Gospel of Luke 6: "Give loans, expecting nothing in return." But not so he who avoids loss from a loan. For the first cannot be done without injury to God, who forbade this to be done; nor without injury to his neighbor, to whom that from which profit is hoped should have been done gratuitously, which is against grace; but the second can be done justly, because by this no injury is done to God, because it is not forbidden by any law: nor even to his neighbor, because he receives nothing less for the time of the loan than he is bound to repay, because at the time he borrows, it was

worth as much as he is bound to repay. Nor would it be vitiated for this reason if the time were determined by the lender, in which it is probable that the money borrowed would be worth less than it was worth at the time of the loan; because vitiation does not occur from the mere extension of time, but rather either from the will of the positive law, or from the nature of money. Nor is the borrower harmed in this: because he does not borrow it in order to keep it until the time when it would probably be less valuable; but that it might use it for that time for which it might preserve its value, which it had when it borrowed it. A similar question is also asked about the one who lends grain or wine or oil, in certain measures, and this at a time when they are less valuable, so that it may be returned to him in equal measures and weights and species at another time when it is likely that the aforesaid things will be more valuable. And it seems from what we have already said that it is lawful to lend in this way; because there nothing more is taken than is given, because such things are really returned by number, weight and measure. Moreover, in this the lender seems only to avoid loss and not to hope for profit: because if such things were sold at a time when they are worth less, the owner of them would be harmed by this. Hence he can also lawfully sell them for that time in which they are likely to be worth more, and it is not usury, as is stated in Extra. chap. naviganti. Wherefore it seems likewise that he can lawfully lend those things to be returned to him at a time in which they are likely to be worth more. To which we say that in this case conscience either excuses or accuses, because a loan should be made gratuitously and without hope of profit, whenever the hope of profit is intended in and from a loan, then it is not without the vice of usury; but thus it is not in buying and selling. But the hope of profit can be excluded from the intention of the lender in the aforementioned way, in two ways. In one way, when the lender is ready to accept the borrowed thing at any time, even before that determined time when the things should probably be more expensive: in this way the hope of profit, and if it is intended accidentally, not by itself, because it does not remove the reason for gratuitousness from the loan. In another way, when the lender has also determined the time when they would probably be more valuable, for the sole purpose of avoiding loss: for then he avoids loss when, taking care of his own needs, he intends to preserve his things that are more necessary for the use of life, which if he did not have them at that time, he would have to buy them elsewhere, and thus he would suffer loss from the favor of the loan made to his neighbor: and thus intending in lending is excused from all vice of usury.

Chapter XV

Now, however, approaching what we have proposed to declare in the third place in this work, let us proceed by inquiring about the restitutions of usury. But that the laws oblige us to restitution of usury is sufficiently clear from the nature of them. For since above in the first part of this work, chapter 4, it was declared that the excess of usury is possessed by no just title, therefore it cannot be justly retained and is possessed unjustly. But as blessed Augustine says, 74, q. 4, that which is unjustly possessed and is alien to one, must be the property of another. Therefore, since every excess of usury is as it were a thing alien to the usurer himself who unjustly possesses it, it follows that it is the property of another who is deprived of it. But this is just according to all laws, that every thing deprived contrary to justice be restored: for restitution always regards deprivation. Wherefore, according to all natural justice, usury must be restored. But perhaps it will be said that such things are not deprived by anyone contrary to all justice: especially because the deprivation seems to have been done voluntarily. And also because human laws do not punish, which nevertheless ought to punish injuries: therefore it does not seem to be against human justice. To which it should be noted that the will of man sometimes regards the thing willed for its own sake, sometimes for the sake of something else. But when for its own sake, then if that willed thing is simply just and good, then the will is good, and the work proceeding from them is good and just; but if it is unjust and evil, then likewise the will is evil. But if he regards the willed thing not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else: for example, someone wants to throw a cargo into the sea, so as to escape danger: that again for the sake of which something is said to be willed, either has the character of just, or unjust, or indifferently. And in this first way the will is still judged to be comparatively just and good, but still it can be simply unjust, as if someone wants to steal in order to give to the poor. But in the second way the will can be judged to be absolutely just and free, when that willed thing is by its nature just and good; but it is comparatively unjust and not free, when that willed thing has an evil end. Hence, that which someone wishes to give in excess of his own is not in itself evil or unjust: and therefore in this respect the will is absolute and free; but when he wishes to give this for the sake of a loan, which he cannot have otherwise, then such a will, compared to the end, which is in itself unjust, contracts the nature of injustice, and falls from the nature of freedom. And because this kind of injustice is incurred by suffering rather than by doing, therefore the punishment lies in the giver himself and not in guilt. But laws sometimes consider this justice, insofar as it is the preservation of external peace between men: and therefore such laws do not punish, except insofar as they destroy this peace. Sometimes also, as they are more enlightened by the light of faith and divine right, they also consider true and internal justice: and thus canonical laws also prohibit and punish usury. For thus it is written in Isa. 32: The work of justice is peace: and therefore such peace as they seek who make laws, such justice they claim for themselves. We say, therefore, that by divine law the restitution of usury must be made principally, because in Sacred Scripture, as far as the Old Law is concerned, those who lend money at usury are condemned: and therefore usury is accepted against the divine law. But the New Law forbids hoping for anything from a loan: wherefore accepting it will be all the more contrary to the evangelical law. But that which is against the

divine law, according to no other law can be true or just; because the divine law is the first and universal origin of all just laws, just as God is the origin of all beings. Nevertheless, it is also against the law of nature, because in this the end that is suitable according to the nature of the act of human life is corrupted. For to this act, which is to lend, the end that is suitable is naturally shown, namely, common society and fraternal charity in providing for the needs of one's neighbors: and therefore it must be done naturally gratuitously. Wherefore, whenever this act is done for the hope of some advantage or gain, then the end that naturally belongs to it is taken away from it, and it is done against nature, wherefore it is repugnant to the law of nature: therefore it is not only unjust against the divine law, but also against natural law.

Chapter XVI

But since usury is to be restituted, it is now necessary to investigate to whom restitutions are to be made. And it seems that restitution is to be made only to God and to the ministers of God. Because according to what was said in the first part of chapter 5, ownership is not transferred in usury by divine right, but only by human right: but according to reason, restitution of that which is unjustly withheld is to be made in law. Therefore it seems that restitution is to be made only to God and the Church. But against this is that the land and its fullness belong to the lord, by whomever it is possessed justly or unjustly: therefore no thing can be deprived in truth. From which also is gathered the general rule, that any thing is to be restitution only to him who is unjustly deprived of the thing itself or of its equivalent. For just as restitution is to be made only to that thing which was unjustly possessed, so also to no one; or to some it is to be restitution except to him or to those who were unjustly deprived of it. And from this it is concluded first, that restitution is to be made only to those who were justly the masters of those things which are to be restitution, before the unjust deprivation. From which it is further concluded that, when those who had been robbed have died, restitution must now be made to their children and successors, who rightfully succeed to the property of the robbed deceased. But if perhaps the deceased has bequeathed all his goods to the poor or to the Churches or to other persons, then, as by virtue of the will, a right is acquired in the present and ready goods of the deceased himself, the poor or to others to whom they were bequeathed, and so they have an acquired right in those things which are rightfully due to him by any right whatsoever: and therefore in this case, the executors of the aforesaid deceased, or to those places or persons to whom he bequeathed all his goods, should make the restitution which should have been made to him while he was alive. But if perhaps the successors are unknown, and it is not known to whom restitution is likely to be made, or perhaps they are known to be in distant places and regions, and without hope of return, and without the ability to send or approach them, then in the first case the advice and authority of the Church must be sought: because by reason of divine law the restitution which was due to a man who was a member and son of the Church belongs to the Church itself: but each person's own Church is called his own bishop. In the second, it is also to be done by the advice of the Church: however, this is added, that the Church must promise to make restitution to him, if it should be necessary at some future time through the unexpected return of those to whom it was due by law. From the foregoing, therefore, it is concluded that if usury of such goods has been accepted by a slave or maid, or by a son or daughter, or by a kidnapper or thief, or by another usurer, or by a Christian or Jew, of which it is clear to the one who wishes to make restitution that they were not the true owners of those things; that restitution of such things is not to be made to those from whom they were accepted, but to their true owners themselves and their successors, if they can be had. However, such restitution should be made with caution, lest it be scandalous to the aforementioned persons. However, if it is believed with probability that the aforementioned, namely, a son on the conscience of his father, and a slave on the will of his master, and a monk also on his abbot, and a kidnapper and usurer of goods justly possessed, then restitution can also be made to the injured persons themselves: and the same must be said of a wife while her husband is alive.

Chapter XVII

Now by whom restitutions of usury should be made, our consideration is necessary. That indeed every owner who withholds a thing unjustly deprived of by another, whether justly or unjustly, is bound to restore the thing itself or an equivalent, is manifest from both divine and natural law. First, because sin is not forgiven by divine law unless what was taken away is restored, if it can be restored. Therefore, restitution of the offering should be made by the one to whom such a sin is imputed. But sin is not imputed except to the one who has taken away or withheld another's thing, which is not his by some just title. Therefore, restitution must be made by him. Likewise, from the precept of natural law we have that whatever you wish that men should do to you, you should do the same to them. But with a just will, the one who has been robbed of his own thing wishes that the robber restore to him. Wherefore likewise the robber must justly restore to the one robbed. But who can be called a robber of another's thing, or a detainer in the matter of usury, so that he is bound to make restitution, is not so clear in some cases. For this reason, the first question is asked about the wife of a usurer, whether she is bound to make restitution for her deceased usurer husband. The second is asked about the restitution of what is given to her for her life in her husband's house. The third is asked about whether she can do this lawfully when her husband is unaware and still alive. And the fourth is asked about sons and daughters. The same question is asked about the servants and hirelings of usurers. In the same way, the fifth is asked about laborers, workers, and merchants who give their labors, their works, and their goods to usurers for profit, whether they are bound to make restitution of what they have received from them. The sixth is asked about those who receive offerings, alms, or gifts from them, whether they are bound to make restitution. The seventh is also asked about supporters who encourage and defend them in the practice of usury, just as some cities and some princes encourage and defend those who are called *Caursini*, who otherwise would not dare to practice this act of usury. To this last point, it should first be known that just as companions of thieves, and those who are said to run with thieves, are condemned by the judgment of theft in Holy Scripture; Thus all the aforesaid, insofar as they act in any way towards the vice of usury, either as movers, or as authors, or as sharers in profit, or as supporters and defenders of such, are to be condemned for the vice of usury. And just as God is not satisfied for an injury inflicted on him except by penance, so neither is his neighbor for a thing unjustly robbed except by just restitution. But to each according to the degree of his offense is the restitution of what was taken due. For example, another person sins in this only as a mover, wherefore he is also bound to move the plaintiff to make restitution: but if he is not sufficient to induce him to do so, he must invoke the aid of his superior: but if he is not sufficient, or perhaps neglects to do so, I think without prejudice that in this case he who was the mover is bound to make restitution of what was taken by his motion. And if the plaintiff is either as principal or as assistant, both are bound to make restitution of all the things taken in *solidum*: yet so that if one restores, the other is absolved as to the injury to his neighbor. But if he has only shared in the profit, either knowingly or unknowingly. If knowingly, then again it can be done justly, or for bodily necessity, when otherwise no convenient remedy can be found, as happens to poor beggars.

And thus sometimes sons and daughters in the house of usurers' parents can be excused by this, who otherwise cannot find the necessary sustenance for themselves: and similarly a wife can be excused by the same necessity. Or this is done for spiritual benefit, as the lord ate with the publicans for their conversion. And this is done again justly, or because of the compensation already made, or at least to be made in the hope of being made: and in the first way artisans and laborers and servants can sometimes justly receive from the goods of usurers, which they acquire from usurers: because as much as they receive from usurers, they return to them as compensation for work or labor or craft, so that the usurers are not thereby rendered powerless to make restitution. Nevertheless, if such artisans believe that usurers have nothing of value and can profit from others with the same ease, they sin by knowingly sharing their work with usurers for profit, which they know is someone else's, and especially because of scandal.

But in the second way, sons and daughters and the wife can also participate in the hope of restitution at some future time, when they hope that they will probably have the ability, although they do not have it at the time when they participate. But whoever has been a participant knowingly outside of any of the three aforementioned causes, or even ignorantly, and who has sometimes had such knowledge, such persons are bound to restitution for that part in which they are participants of another's property. Thus, therefore, by this general document, the questions can be answered. To the first and second about the wife, it must be said that the wife of the usurer is bound to restitution for her deceased husband, insofar as the ill-gotten goods were devolved to her, or insofar as she, while her husband was alive, used such goods. But if nothing of such goods is devolved to her, or if perhaps from the goods she had brought into the marriage, the profit was sufficient for her needs, and for all that she spent during her husband's life; then she is not bound to make any restitution, unless she has used the husband's property in the hope of restitution, or unless she has retained something belonging to another after the husband's death: but nothing is to be restitution except that belonging to another. To the third question it must be said that since the wife is not the mistress of things, but only of the husband, she is nevertheless joined to the husband for help and for the use of things: therefore, just as she cannot alienate the husband's things against his will, so she cannot restore the husband's things against his will. But just as she is given to the husband as a help for procreation, so for the preservation and honest and useful multiplication of things, and above all for the promotion of the husband's salvation: whence the apostle 1 Cor. 7: The unbelieving husband will be saved by a believing wife. Therefore, just as a usurious man can make moderate alms from his own things, without the husband knowing and not forbidding him, because in this way she is acting for the husband's cause, which he is bound to do for the promotion of his own salvation, and also for the preservation and multiplication of his goods: so I think without prejudice that she can make restitutions from other people's things, without the husband knowing and not forbidding him, because in this way she is acting for the husband's cause. But if she does it with the husband knowing but disguising it, she can act all the more securely, because there is now an argument that the husband approves, from which he does not disapprove. But if the husband forbids it, or punishes it before or afterwards, the woman does so, or wishes to do so, it is no longer lawful for her: because as things are under the power of the husband, so is the wife: wherefore,

being thus subject, she must obey her husband in all things, according to the apostle. And if not in doing evil, yet she must obey in omitting good, because it is not necessary for her own salvation: wherefore if the wife does not do what seems good to her, it is not imputed to her as a sin, but to him who forbids her. The answer to the things adduced in the fourth and fifth is clear from what has been said before about the participants. But to what is asked in the sixth about those who receive alms and offerings and gifts, it must be said that such as receive from them either know them to be usurers, or do not know them either then when they receive them, or afterwards: and if they do not know them, they do not sin by receiving them, nor are they bound to make restitution. But if they know them then or afterwards; either by necessity they are compelled to receive them, or not: if by necessity, they do not sin, nor are they bound to make restitution. If there is no necessity, there are still either notorious or not notorious usurers: if notorious, then everyone who receives from them sins because of scandal, and because they are excommunicated by law: and therefore restitution must always be made, but not always to them. But if they are not notorious, either they are believed to have something of their own good besides usury, or nothing: if nothing, then restitution must be made by those who received something; but if something, then gifts and the like can also be received from them without sin, and they are not obligated to restitution. To the last question, it must be said that only he is bound to restitution who receives or withholds another's property unjustly: hence also if a usurer who lends with the sole hope of profit, has received nothing more, although he has exceeded, even if he is guilty of the vice of usury, he is still not obligated to make any restitution. Hence only he is bound to restitution who withholds or receives something from another unjustly. Hence the supporters and defenders of usurers, insofar as they are of this kind only, are not obligated to restitution of anyone, except insofar as they share in the profit; namely, because for this reason they are supporters, that they may receive some portion from usurers: yet in this they sin against God, even however much they may intend the benefit of the region or the city, because they encourage sinners in their sins. Nor is it the same with those by whose authority something is done, and with those who encourage, defend, and receive the actors: because the former are the cause of the evil act per se; but the latter are not the cause of the act itself, but of accidents to the act itself for its preservation and greater fruit.

Chapter XVIII

But since there must be a measure in every matter, now the manner in which the restitution of usury is to be made remains to be inquired into. And first, whether publicly or privately. Then, whether before or after the payment of debts or legacies. Third, whether restitution is to be made to one person before another. And whether it can be made equally according to the proportion of those taken, or unequally because of the conditions and needs of the persons. Regarding the first, it should be known that one thing is necessary when speaking of the necessity of satisfaction, and another when speaking of its perfection. But for the necessity of satisfaction, two things suffice: one as to God, namely the humility of true penitence against contempt of God; and another as to neighbor, namely the full restitution of what was unjustly taken against the injury of neighbor. But of the perfection of satisfaction, the last signs are required: namely, both the testimonies of the aforementioned, in which there is the merit of perfect humility as to God, and the restitution of personal reputation against scandal from innate sin as to the Church. And in this respect, it is not only a matter of perfection, but also of necessity, for a notorious usurer to promise and confirm, at least publicly and in the hands of the Church, the restitutions to be made; because otherwise he would be deprived of the sacrament of salvation and Christian burial by law. And for this reason the apostle also says, 1 Timothy 5: Rebuke the sinner before all. But as to the second point which was proposed concerning order, it should be known that the custom is almost universally among us that debts which are clear are first paid, and afterwards restitutions are made, and lastly legacies are paid. And the reason for this custom may be: because legacies are given in a certain sense, and not simply given. For the reason for a legacy implies two things: namely, that a thing is not given simply, except by the death of the legatee, whence it can always be revoked while the legatee is still alive; and that they are bequeathed for some benefit of the legatee after death. And from these it may be clear that legacies, insofar as they are of this kind, do not oblige according to the necessity of justice, but according to the devotion and benefit of the legatee. Wherefore, since the things necessary for salvation precede those of devotion and supererogation, debts are justly paid before legacies. But with greater justice are things taken away to be restored than debts to be paid, since in this justice is fulfilled, removing the injury done to God and neighbor: but in the payment of debts no injury is removed, but only justice is paid: wherefore according to this it seems that things taken away should be restored before debts are paid.

But the opposite happens as in most cases: which, however, can have two reasons. In one way, namely, when the debts are clear and manifest, but the restitutions are not so, but must be sought; and the clear always precedes the obscure in human law. In another way, when the thing that is owed is determined, namely a hundred or ten, but is not to be restitution in this way. But the determined by law precedes the indeterminate, insofar as it is of this kind. And from this it is concluded that when the restitutions are to be made clear and open and determined by the open confession of the restitutioner, all the debts must by law precede: which, however, is rarely observed, because what is of law is observed by few. And according to what has been said, it is clear when restitution can be made to one person before

another: namely, when the restitution of one is clear and definite, and of the other not so, all other things being equal. But again, if one is rich and the other poor, and more in need of those things for which restitution is to be made, and it is equally clear in both, restitution can still be justly made to the poor before the rich, because he has been more injured in the taking of his belongings, and because he has more need. However, if both are of equal condition, namely in poverty or wealth, and are equally clear about both: if an injury was done to one before the other, still the first to be restitution must be made in accordance with the order of natural law to the one to whom the injury was done first. Likewise, if restitution is to be made in parts, each must be restitution proportionately according to the amount of what was taken: so that if only a third part of what was taken, or half, or any other part, all other things being equal, restitution of a third part of all that is to be restitution must be made to all. The reason for this is that a good will to restore everything is shown to all, if the ability were present: and thus each becomes more prone to forgive the injury done to him, when he sees the will to amend ready.

Chapter XIX

But from what has been said a question arises about the matter and quantity of what must be restitution. Whether, namely, if someone has taken a sheep or an ox, or any other thing beyond his lot, he is bound to restore the same thing, or is it sufficient to restore the price of the thing received. From which it can be seen that he is bound to restore the same thing, and not only alone, but doubled, because of that precept of the law of Moses, Exod. 22; where it is said that a thief is bound to restore the same thing double, and a sheep fourfold, and an ox fivefold. To which it must be said that one must judge differently about theft and robbery, and differently about usury: because in usury the ownership is transferred in some way by the law of the court, although not by the law of the Pole; but in no way in others. Hence a horse stolen, no matter into whose hands it passes, must always be restored, even by the law of the court. Secondly, however, not so, if the horse is taken by usury. Wherefore one must judge differently about usury: and it must be said that it is sufficient if the restitution of the price is made. The reason for this is twofold. One has already been said: because what is taken beyond the lot is not taken away by any violence inflicted on the owner, as in theft and robbery: and therefore it is not properly said to be taken away, but rather taken against natural and divine justice by the will of the giver: but what has been taken away, the same must be restored in number, even if it is improved. Another cause and reason also comes from the nature of exchange, in which what is taken beyond the lot is taken, which is the nature of a loan. For just as in loans it is not necessary that the same be returned in number, but only an equal in price; so neither is it necessary to restore the same for an excess received by reason of a loan, but an equivalent in price suffices. But what is written in the law about double, quadruple, and quintuple has no place in usury, but only in theft or robbery, because this kind of usury does not destroy the good of the republic by its very nature, as theft and robbery do; but only corrupts personal good, or the good of the brother; and this not by inflicting evil, but only by not making what is due be done well. And we have written about these elsewhere in more detail in the seventh commandment of the Decalogue: and therefore these things will suffice for the present.

Chapter XX

But since, as the Lord says, a bad tree cannot bear good fruit, and whatever grows from a bad root seems to draw its nature from the root, it has been seen by many that not only must things taken away or unjustly received be restored, but also that all proceeds and all profits derived from them must be restored, because what comes to someone from another, the other person takes responsibility for by law. These seem to be expressed in *Extra. de Rest. Spol. cap. gravis*: where it seems that things must be returned with the fruits received, and what the robbed would have received if they had possessed them: and this is also expressly stated in the law *Extra. de rei venditione, cap. majus*: where it is said that such a person is bound to all profits received and to be received. But against the above seems to be the reason for usury. First, because there is simply no reason for violent or furtive plunder, of which the above laws speak. Second, because in usury the very excess of wealth is first and foremost in money, which does not have fruit as far as its nature is concerned, because it has become the cause only of the transfer of other things. Thirdly, also in general, in making restitution, only the damage that has been inflicted must be restored: but only the damage has been inflicted, as in most cases, to the extent that the thief gains from the stolen and plundered thing, because the thief has multiplied the stolen thing by his own labor and skill, which the true owner would not have done. But what seems to me to be said about these? I say without prejudice, that one should judge differently about restitutions of usury, and differently about restitutions of theft and robbery. For that must be restored which by no right becomes one's, either divine or human. And therefore it is an injury not only with God to retain the things thus taken away, and the fruits and uses of things; but it is also unjust with man, both by the law of the common court and by the law of personal conscience. But it is not so with usury, because although they are against divine law, and against the natural law of a spiritual nature, which regards only the debt of grace and charity; yet it is not directly against human law, which regards the utility and justice of the republic in general; and therefore in this respect the ownership is transferred to them, nor do they have the character of those who have been taken away. It is clear, however, that the rights alleged speak of things taken by violence, in which no root of just possession is found. However, this must be generally observed, that in every restitution to be made, all fruits and all gains, from the fact that they come from the thing to be restitution insofar as such fruits and gains are unjustly possessed, and from the fact that they come from a thing wrongly held according to divine justice, have the character of another, according to the reason of blessed Augustine. Therefore, according to God, they cannot be retained, except by divine authority. Again, it must be observed secondly, that only that which is to be restored to the man in whom the injury was done to him concerning his thing.

But there are certain things which by their nature have fruit and utility in possession; either because they multiply and increase by the nature of time, or because they are cultivated by the skill of human ingenuity and labor, such as lands and fields: and such things must be restored to man with their proceeds: because in this a man to whom an injury has been done in his thing taken away is damaged not only as to the substance of the thing, but also as to the

use of the thing and the fruit arising from the use: and thus the rights alleged can and must be understood. Thirdly, it must also be noted that restitution must always be made to him who has suffered the injury and loss. Therefore, if someone has suffered an injury and not loss, real restitution is not to be made to him *de jure*, but only according to the kind of injury, an amendment must be made by similar satisfaction. Hence he who beats his neighbor in no way damaging him is not bound to any real restitution: because every real restitution to be made to someone must be commensurate with the quantity of the damage inflicted. Hence it is that the law of Moses generally condemned every thief of any thing that has use and utility to a double restitution: one, namely, for the substance of the thing, and another for the use of the thing taken. From which it is concluded that in every restitution to be made to a man, the loss of both the thing and the use that comes from the thing by the nature of the thing must be considered. Therefore, if any profit comes to the usurer beyond the thing and the natural use of the thing from his own operation and skill, in which no other person is harmed, I say without prejudice that he is not bound to restore such profit to the man. For example, a usurer had one hundred marks of silver from the interest from which he made an image which he sold for one hundred and ten marks: I believe without prejudice that he is not bound to restore those ten marks in excess to the one from whom he had the aforesaid one hundred marks: nevertheless he cannot retain them according to God, because he acquired them against God from another's property. And therefore the authority of the Church alone is to be sought to restore or distribute such things. But from these arises a question. If anyone sells any stolen thing immediately after the theft, or converts it to his own use, consuming it in its entirety, and does not immediately restore it, but wishes to restore it after a while, whether he is bound to all the fruits of the use which the true owner would have received during that delay. For example, someone stole a foal or a calf, which the true owner was to keep until the years of perfect value, but the thief immediately sold it, and freed himself from the future. The question is whether the thief is bound to restore only the value of the foal, or also the value of the perfect horse. This seems to be according to the rights alleged. Furthermore, he is bound to restore the profits according to the law, therefore much more the damages inflicted. In line with this, the question is also asked about money taken away, or even unjustly possessed: why it may happen that the person from whom it was taken away or unjustly received, increased it by trading it, or perhaps because of its defect, sold his possession, and thereby suffered a great loss. Whether the detainer and receiver of such money without just title is liable for all the profits which the true owner would have made from it, or for all the losses which the true owner incurs from it, for full restitution. To these two we say without prejudice, that in making restitution of any thing, two things are to be considered principally: namely, the value of the thing which was principally taken or received unjustly, and the damage which was inflicted on the wronged person. For the first reason I say that the same thing which had been taken must be restored, or an equivalent and similar thing in species and value.

But as to the second, it should be noted that sometimes damage is said to have been inflicted properly and *per se*, and sometimes only accidentally and not *per se*: and if in the first way, then the defendant is bound to make restitution for the damage, whatever it may be; in the second way, he is not bound to the person who suffered the damage. And to understand the

above, let us take the following case as an example. If someone suffered damage for money taken from him in that he wanted to buy from it the necessaries of life, or to pay for purchases or debts, for the despoiling of which he incurs damage, because because of its defect he had to sell his possessions that were useful to him, or borrow money at interest, or would have incurred some other inconvenience, I say that this kind of damage occurs per se from theft or robbery, and therefore it must be restored to the person who suffered it. In addition to these, accidental damage can occur there: namely, when from the stolen money he did not acquire the profit he intended, and he suffered no other loss: I say without prejudice, that such profit is not to be restored to the person who is said to have suffered such damage. But if there are things that have been taken away, which by their nature can increase and grow in value according to the nature of time, then the plunderer is bound to restore the value of the things themselves, which they would have been worth according to the nature of both the thing and the time, at the time when he wishes to restore them. And this is clear from the answer to the aforesaid questions. And this must always be observed in usury, as regards things that are received for usury.

Chapter XXI

But since we have said above how and by whom and from whom and how restitutions of usury are to be made, in this last chapter we wish to declare how they are to be enforced by the laws and by the canon. And first it must be supposed that the fault insofar as it is against the charity of God is not removed or expiated by coercion, but only voluntary penance, and is capable of being amended: but the fault which is directly committed against the charity of one's neighbor, must also be enforced by laws both divine and human. Therefore, since the vice of usury is directly against the charity of God, who prohibits and condemns it in his law, and also against the charity of one's neighbor; let us see by what penalties it is to be enforced. To understand which it must be known that in general public penalties are to be inflicted only for public vices; and therefore public usurers are to be enforced by the penalty of law: and sometimes, because of the accompanying contumacy, the penalty of the judge is also to be added. They are indeed restrained by a threefold penalty of law: namely, that they are forbidden to be received into holy communion, and that their offerings are likewise not received into the altar, and that they are not received into the burial of Christians; and these three are held Extra. chap.: why in almost all. And in addition, a penalty is added to those who have done the contrary, namely, suspension, unless by the judgment of their bishop they have first satisfied, and in addition also by accident such a note of infamy follows. Hence also public usurers, when they recover money from another for usury which they had given, can be repelled by exception, until they themselves have first satisfied the usury, Extra. same chap.: because in vain of the law. But especially on these penalties clerics can be suspended by law from their offices, if they were usurers, Extra. same chap. most clerics. But the contumacious who are not corrected even because of the aforementioned penalties, the judge must and can restrain by a sentence of suspension and deposition: but laymen he can restrain by a sentence of excommunication, as is stated Extra. same chap. aforesaid. Likewise, if ecclesiastical justice is not sufficient, secular justice should be invoked for help: Extra. deinde. Cum vero ab homine, distinct. 17: nec licuit. But in the penitential forum, where the correction of sin is at issue, especially insofar as it is against the law of God, usurers are to be compelled to make restitution in such a way that the benefit of absolution is denied them, unless they make restitution in full as much as they can, or ask for a delay from those to whom they are bound to make restitution.

Or if they are poor and powerless to make restitution, let them promise God and their confessor that if they ever come to the fruit of prosperity, they will make restitution according to their ability. Or they will certainly demand forgiveness from those to whom they are bound to make restitution: otherwise they should not be absolved in the forum of penance. And all this is proven by the authority of blessed Augustine, who says that sin is not forgiven unless what was taken away is restored. Just as therefore the confessor shows that he is absolved by God whom he absolves by word, so he should not absolve by word unless he sees signs of restitution to be made in the confessor: which signs are determined in those things which we have said before according to the different states of the restitutioner. These are said concerning the vice of usury as regards usury itself in general, and usurious contracts, and the

restitution of usury, as far as God has deigned to grant to my littleness. But if anything has been said badly, or less well, I ask forgiveness, I bear correction: for I know that I am a weak man, less able to understand just judgment, and surrounded and enveloped in the darkness of laws and ignorance. Therefore, I always implore the very light of life, which shines in darkness, that by illuminating my heart, it may cleanse the darkness of sins and errors in me, and may deign to lead me to the perfection of eternal life. Who lives and reigns with the Father of lights, eternally connected and consubstantial with the Holy Spirit in love, one God forever and ever.

Amen.

DE MONETA

Nicholas Oresme

(1360 CE)

Chapter I

Why Was Money Invented?

When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when He separated the sons of Adam, He set the bounds of the people. Next, men were multiplied on the earth, and possessions were divided to the best advantage. The result of this was that one man had more than he needed of one commodity, while another had little or none of it, and of another commodity the converse was true: the shepherd had abundance of sheep and wanted bread, the farmer the contrary. One country abounded in one thing and lacked another. Men therefore began to trade by barter: one man gave another a sheep for some corn, another gave his labour for bread or wool, and so with other things. And this practice persisted in some states, as Justin tells us, till long afterwards. But as this exchange and transport of commodities gave rise to many inconveniences, men were subtle enough to devise the use of money to be the instrument for exchanging the natural riches which of themselves minister to human need.

For money is called 'artificial riches' seeing that a man who abounds in it may die of hunger; as appears from Aristotle's example of the greedy king, who prayed that everything he touched should turn to gold, which the gods granted, and he perished of hunger, as the poets tell. For money does not directly relieve the necessities of life, but is an instrument artificially invented for the easier exchange of natural riches. And it is clear without further proof that coin is very useful to the civil community, and convenient, or rather necessary, to the business of the state, as Aristotle proves in the fifth book of the Ethics, although Ovid says:

***“From earth we mine a source of future ill,
First iron and then gold, more deadly still.”***

For that is caused by the perverse greed of wicked men, not by money itself; which is a convenience for human intercourse, and whose use is essentially good. Whence Cassiodorus says: “However common money seems to us from our constant use of it, we should consider how good reason our forefathers had to amass it.’ And he says in another place that, “It is certain that moneyers were established for the particular use of the public.”

Chapter II

The Material of Money

Now, since money is an instrument for the exchange of natural riches, as appears from the preceding chapter, it follows that it must be a fit tool for the work. This implies that it must be easy to handle and to feel with the hands, light to carry and that a small portion of it should purchase a larger quantity of natural riches, with other conditions which will appear later. Coin must therefore be made of a precious and rare material, such as gold. But there must be enough of such material.

Wherefore, if there is not enough gold, money is also made of silver; and where these two metals do not exist or are insufficient, they must be alloyed, or a simple money be made of another metal, without alloy, as was formerly the case with copper, as Ovid tells in the first book of the *Fasti*, saying:

***“Men paid in copper once: they're now for gold,
And the new money elbows out the old.”***

A like change the Lord promised by the mouth of Isaiah:

“For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver.”

For these metals are the fittest for coining. And, as Cassiodorus says: “Aeacus and Indus, king of Scythia, are said to have been the first to discover, one gold and the other silver, and to be praised for delivering them to man's use.” And therefore so much of them ought not to be allowed to be applied to other uses that there should not be enough left for money.

It was this consideration that led Theodoric, king of Italy, to order the gold and silver deposited according to pagan custom in the tombs, to be removed and used for coining for the public profit, saying: “It was a crime to leave hidden among the dead and useless, what would keep the living alive.” On the other hand it is inexpedient that the material of money should be too plentiful; for that, as Ovid says, was the reason for the disuse of copper. That may be the reason why Providence has ordained that man should not easily obtain gold and silver, the most suitable metals, in quantity, and that they cannot well be made by alchemy, as some try to do; being, if I may say so, justly prevented by nature, whose works they vainly try to outdo.

Chapter III

Of the Variery of Materials and of Alloy

Money, as was said in Chapter I, is the instrument of trade. And since both for communities or individuals, trade must sometimes be large, or in bulk, sometimes smaller, and more generally petty, or retail, it has been convenient to have precious money, made of gold, easy to carry and to count, and suitable for large transactions.

It was also proper to have silver money, less precious, suitable for giving change and for adjustments of price, and for buying goods of lower value. And since a particular country is not always furnished with silver in proportion to its natural riches, besides which, the portion of silver which would be justly due for a pound of bread or the like, would be too small to hold in the hand, money came to be coined of a cheaper metal together with the silver, and that is the origin of our 'black' money, which is suitable for petty dealings. And thus, where silver is not abundant, the best plan is to have three materials for money, gold, silver and the 'black' alloy. But it should be observed and laid down as a general rule that no alloy should be permitted except in the least precious metal used for small change. For instance, where the money consists of gold and silver, the gold should never be alloyed if it can be coined pure.

The reason is that all such mixture is naturally suspect because the proportion of pure gold in it cannot readily be determined. Consequently coins should not be alloyed except for the necessity above-mentioned. And this should only be done where the suspicion is least, or the fraud is of least importance, that is in the less precious metal. Again, no such mixture should be made except for the common good, on account of which money was invented and by which it is regulated as is shown above. But there is no necessity nor common advantage in alloying gold money where silver is also in use; nor can it honestly be done, nor has it been done in any well governed community.

Chapter IV

Of the Form or Shape of Money

When men first began to trade, or to purchase goods with money, the money had no stamp or image, but a quantity of silver or bronze was exchanged for meat and drink and was measured by weight. And since it was tiresome constantly to resort to the scales and difficult to determine the exact equivalent by weighing, and since the seller could not be certain of the metal offered or of its degree of purity, it was wisely ordained by the sages of that time that pieces of money should be made of a given metal and of definite weight and that they should be stamped with a design, known to everybody, to indicate the quality and true weight of the coin, so that suspicion should be averted and the value readily recognised. And that the stamp on coins was instituted as a guarantee of fineness and weight, is clearly proved by the ancient names of coins distinguishable by their stamp or design, such as pound, shilling, penny, half-penny, as, sextula, and the like, which are names of weights applied to coins, as Cassiodorus says. Shekel, likewise, is the name of a coin, as appears in Genesis I and also of a weight as appears in the same book. The other names of coins are not 'proper' (i.e. derived from the essence), but accidental, or denominative from a place, a design or an authority, or in some other way.

But the pieces of money which are called coin (*nummisma*) should be of a shape and quantity suitable for handling and counting, and of a material capable of being coined, malleable and fit to receive and retain an impression. Hence not all precious substances are fit for coins: gems, lapis lazuli, pepper and the like are not naturally fit, but gold and silver eminently are so, as we said before.

Chapter V

Who has the Duty of Coining?

Furthermore, it was ordained of old, with good reason, and to prevent fraud, that nobody may coin money or impress an image or design on his own gold and silver, but that the money, or rather the impression of its characteristic design, should be made by one or more public persons deputed by the community to that duty, since, as we have said, money is essentially established and devised for the good of the community. And since the prince is the most public person and of the highest authority, it follows that he should make the money for the community and stamp it with a suitable design. This stamp should be finely wrought and difficult to engrave or counterfeit. It should also be penal for a foreign prince or any other to coin money of like design but of lower weight, so that common people could not distinguish one from the other. This should be a crime; nor can anyone have such a privilege, for it is forgery; and it is a just cause for war.

Chapter VI

Who Owns the Money?

Although it is the duty of the prince to put his stamp on the money for the common good, he is not the lord or owner of the money current in his principality. For money is a balancing instrument for the exchange of natural wealth, as appears in Chapter I. It is therefore the property of those who possess such wealth. For if a man gives bread or bodily labour in exchange for money, the money he receives is as much his as the bread or bodily labour of which he (unless he were a slave) was free to dispose. For it was not to princes alone that God gave freedom to possess property, but to our first parents and all their offspring, as it is in Genesis 1. Money, therefore, does not belong to the prince alone. But if anyone object that our Saviour, when a penny was shown Him, asked: "Whose is this image and inscription?" and when it was answered, "Caesar's", gave judgment: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (as though He meant "The coin is Caesar's because Caesar's image is stamped upon it"), it is clear to anyone who reads the context that He does not say that the money was due to Caesar because it bore Caesar's image, but because it was 'tribute'. For, as the apostle says: "Tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom". Christ therefore showed that the stamp was the means of knowing to whom the tribute was due, namely the person who fought the battles of the state, and by reason of his dominion had the right to coin money. Thus, money belongs to the community and to individuals. And so say Aristotle in the seventh book of the Politics and Cicero about the end of the old Rhetoric.

Chapter VII

Who Bears the Expense of Coining?

As money belongs to the community, it should be coined at the expense of the community. The most appropriate way of doing this is to distribute the expense over the whole coinage by causing the material, such as gold, when it is brought to be coined or sold for coined money, to be bought for less money than it could be coined into and at a certain fixed rate; e.g. if a mark of silver can be coined into sixty-two shillings, and two shillings are needed for labour and other necessaries in minting, the mark of silver will be worth sixty shillings and the other two will be paid for the minting. But the rate should be fixed high enough to cover the cost of coining at all times. And if the money can be made at a lower price, it is reasonable that the balance should go to the distributor or ordainer, to wit, the prince or the master of the mint, as a sort of pension. But this rate should be a moderate one, and need only be quite small if money is adequately plentiful, as shall be said later. And if such a rate or pension were excessive it would be to the damage and prejudice of the whole community, as any man may easily see.

Chapter VIII

On Alterations in Coinage in General

First of all we must know that the existing laws, statutes, customs or ordinances affecting the community, of whatever kind, must never be altered without evident necessity. Indeed, as Aristotle says in the second book of the Politics, an ancient positive law is not to be abrogated in favour of a better new law, unless there is a notable difference in their excellence, because changes of this kind lessen the authority of the laws and the respect paid them, and all the more if they are frequent.

For hence arise scandal and murmuring among the people and the risk of disobedience. Especially if such changes should be for the worse, for then they would be intolerable and unjust. Now it is the case, that the course and value of money in the realm should be, as it were, a law and a fixed ordinance. This is indicated by the fact that pensions and yearly rents are reckoned according to the value of money, i.e. in a certain number of pounds or shillings.

From which it is clear that a change in money should never be made, unless perhaps under eminent necessity or for the obvious advantage of the whole community. Wherefore Aristotle, in the fifth book of the Ethics speaking of coin, says: "It aims remaining of the same value." But alteration in money (considering the matter generally) may be regarded as being made in various ways: first, to put it shortly, in form or shape; then, in bimetallic ratio; in value and denomination; again, in quantity or weight, and lastly, in material substance. For money may be altered in any one or more of these five ways. We had better then, discuss these ways, and reasonably inquire whether money can justly be altered in any of them, and, if so, when, by whom, how and for what reason.

Chapter IX

Change of Form

The impressed form or stamp of the money can be altered in two ways. One is, without demonetising the old money, as if a prince should inscribe his own name on the money issued during his reign, allowing the old money to pass current. This is not strictly an alteration, nor is it a great matter if it is done, unless another alteration is involved.

The form may be changed in another way, by making new money and demonetising the old. That is definitely an alteration and can justly be made for one of two reasons. One is, if a foreign prince or false coiners maliciously copy or counterfeit the moulds or dies of the money and there is found in the realm a forged, false money, like the good in colour and form. Then, if no other remedy could be applied, it would be well to change the moulds and the form of the stamp.

Another reason might be if perchance the old money was too much injured by age or reduced in weight. Its currency should then be forbidden and the new and better money should be given a different stamp, so that the common people should be able to know one from the other.

But I do not think that the prince should be able to demonetise the old money except for one of these reasons, for such a change would otherwise be unnecessary, scandalous and to the damage of the community. Nor does it appear that the prince could be induced to make such a change but for one of two reasons: either because he wishes to have no other name than his own inscribed on the coins, which is a slight to his predecessors, and empty ambition; or because he wants to get a larger profit by coining more money, as was mentioned in Chapter VII, and that is covetousness and to the prejudice and loss of the whole community.

Chapter X

Change of Ratio

Ratio is the comparison or habitual relation of one thing to another, just as in the proportion of gold money to silver money there ought to be a definite relation in value and price. For as gold is naturally more precious and scarcer than silver, and more difficult to find and to get, gold of the same weight ought to excel silver in value by a definite proportion. The ratio, for instance, might be twenty to one, and thus one pound of gold would be worth twenty pounds of silver, one mark twenty marks, one ounce twenty ounces, and so forth.

And another proportion is possible, such as twenty-five to three, or any other. But this proportion ought to follow the natural relation in value of gold to silver, and a ratio should be fixed, not to be arbitrarily changed, nor justly varied except for a reasonable cause and an alteration arising from the material, a thing which rarely happens. Thus, if it were notorious that less gold was being found than before, it would have to be dearer as compared with silver, and would change in price and value. But if there were little or no material change, the prince would not be free to make such a change in price. For if he were to alter the ratio arbitrarily, he might unfairly draw to himself his subjects' money, for instance, by fixing a low price for gold and buying it for silver, and then raising the price when he sold his gold or gold money, or by doing the same with silver.

It would be like fixing a price for all the corn in his kingdom, buying it and selling again at a higher price. Everyone can clearly see that this would be an unjust exaction and actually tyranny. Indeed, it would appear outrageous and worse than that which Pharaoh did in Egypt, of which Cassiodorus says:

“We read that Joseph gave leave to buy corn, to meet the deadly famine, but set such a price that the people, hungry for relief, sold themselves into slavery to him to buy themselves food. What a miserable life it must have been for those to whom the bitter bread of relief seemed to take away their freedom, where the freed man groaned no less than the captive wept. I believe the holy man to have been compelled by the necessity both of satisfying a greedy prince and of helping a perishing people.”

So Cassiodorus.

But the monopoly of coinage of which we spoke would be even more tyrannous, being more involuntary and not for the need of the community, but literally to its harm. But if anyone should say that corn is not a fair parallel, because certain commodities are the private property of the prince for which he may set his own prices, as some say is the case with salt and a fortiori with money, we answer that a monopoly or gabelle of salt, or any public necessity, is unjust. And that princes who have made laws to give themselves this privilege are the men of whom the Lord says, in the words of the prophet Isaiah:

“Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and write grievousness which they have prescribed.”

Again, it is clear from our first and sixth chapters, that money is the property of the commonwealth. Therefore, and lest the prince should unfairly put forward the reason given in this chapter for altering the ratio, the community alone has the right to decide if, when, how, and to what extent this ratio is to be altered, and the prince may not in any way usurp it.

Chapter XI

Change of Name

As was said in Chapter IV, there are certain names or non-essential denominations of money which indicate the author or the place of coinage, and these have little or nothing to do with our subject. But others are essential or proper to coin, e.g. penny, shilling, pound and the like, which denote the value or weight and were given by our forefathers after deep thought and with great mystery. Of which Cassiodorus says:

“It is remarkable on how rational a plan money was brought together by the ancients. They would have six thousand pence to be a shilling (solidus), in order that the round shape of radiant metal, like a golden sun, might correspond numerically with the age of the world. But the number six (senarius; which learned antiquity defined not undeservedly as perfect) it signified by the name of ounce (uncia), the first degree of measurement, and multiplying it by twelve to match the months, brought it up to a pound to correspond with the year. What a wise invention! How far-seeing were our elders! It was most ingenious to devise measures for human use and at the same time symbolises many of the secrets of nature. That, therefore, is deservedly called a pound which has been so weightily considered.”

So far Cassiodorus.

But although we now apply these names differently to our coins, they must not be changed to no purpose. Suppose, for example, that there are three kinds of coins, the first worth a penny, the second a shilling and the third a pound. Then if the description of one is altered but not that of any other, that will change their proportionate value. So, if anyone were to call or fix the value of the first kind at two pence without altering the others to match, the proportionate value would be changed, a thing which is not lawful (as appears in the preceding chapter), except in very rare cases with which I am not concerned at present. It is necessary, then, that if the proportion is to remain unchanged, and one coin changes its denomination, the others should be changed in proportion, so that if the first coin is called two pence, the second shall be two shillings and the third two pounds. And if no other change were made, it would be necessary for goods to be bought or priced at proportionately higher rates. But such a change would be to no purpose, and must not be made, because it would be scandalous and a false denomination. For that would be called a pound which really was not a pound, which is, as we have said, improper. But no other impropriety would ensue, except where pensions or rents were appointed in terms of money. For in that case it is immediately apparent that besides the impropriety which we have named, such rents by this change would either be reduced or would increase unreasonably and unjustly and to the damage of many people. For where some people's pensions or rents were inadequate, they should be augmented by another special measure, and not this prejudicial and hurtful one. Therefore this change of denomination should never be made; least of all should the prince attempt to make it.

Chapter XII

Change of Weight

If the weight of a coin be changed and its value proportionately altered and also its denomination and its form, a new variety of money is created, as if a penny were made into two halfpence, involving neither loss nor gain. This may lawfully sometimes be done by reason of a real change in the value of the material, a thing which very rarely happens, as was said in Chapter X, speaking of another kind of change. But I am now speaking of a definite alteration of the weight or quantity of money without any change of name or value. And it seems to me that such a change is plainly unlawful, especially in a Prince, who cannot do it without disgraceful injustice. Because, in the first place, the prince's image or superscription is placed by him on the coin to guarantee the weight and standard of the material, as was proved above in Chapter IV. Consequently, if the weight is not true, this is at once seen to be a foul lie and a fraudulent cheat.

For measures of corn and wine and other measures are frequently stamped with the king's public mark, and any man tampering with these is held to be a forger. In exactly the same way, the inscription on a coin indicates its weight and the purity of its material. Can any words be too strong to express how unjust, how detestable it is, especially in a prince, to reduce the weight without altering the mark? Cassiodorus says on this point, in the fifth book of his 'Variae':

“For what is so criminal as to permit oppressors to sin against the very nature of the balance, so that the very symbol of justice is notoriously destroyed by fraud?”

Secondly, the prince can in this way get possession of other people's money, nor can there be any other reason why he should make such a change. For he would receive money of good weight, recoin it and pay out coins of short weight. And this is the very thing which God forbids in sundry places of Holy Scripture. Of this Solomon says: “Divers weights and divers measures, both of them are alike abomination to the Lord.” And in Deuteronomy it is said that: “All that do such things . . . are an abomination unto the Lord.” Therefore riches thus gathered to their lord's hurt are soon consumed, because, as Cicero says:

“Ill-gotten goods never prosper.”

Chapter XIII

Change of Material

The material of money is either simple or mixed, as appeared in Chapter III. If simple, it may be abandoned as insufficient; for instance if little or no gold could be found, it must needs cease to be coined: and if it again were found in sufficient plenty, money would again begin to be coined of it, as has sometimes happened. Again, a particular material might have to cease to be coined because it was too abundant. It was for the treason that copper money formerly went out of use, as was said in Chapter III. But such causes occur rarely, and in no other way is a material for money, pure or mixed, to be abandoned or newly adopted. But if the material be mixed, it should be so only in the less precious of the metals which are coined pure (as was proved in Chapter III), and in black money, that the pure may be distinguished from the mixed. And the mixture (or alloy) must be made in a fixed proportion, such as ten parts of silver to one, or to three, of some other metal, as is convenient, as we said in Chapter III.

And this proportion may be altered on account of a real or corresponding proportion or variation in the nature of the material, and in two ways. Either owing to the lack of material, like having no silver, or conspicuously less than before, in which case the proportion of silver to the other metal in the black money may be diminished; or, if silver were much more abundant than before, the quantity of silver in the mixture should be raised. But, as has been said, such causes are very rare and, if the case occurs, such a change in proportion should be made by the community, for greater safety and to prevent fraud, as was said in Chapter X of the change in the (bimetallic) ratio. But in no other case should the mixture, or its proportion, be changed, least of all by the prince, for the reasons given in the last chapter, which are directly applicable to the present question since the stamp on the coin denotes the genuineness of the material and its proportions, and so to change these is to falsify the coinage. Besides, some coins are inscribed with the name of God or of some saint and with the sign of the cross, which was devised and appointed of old as a witness of the genuineness of the money in material and weight. If the prince, then, despite this inscription, should change the material or the weight, he would seem to be silently lying and for swearing himself and bearing false witness, and also transgressing that commandment which says: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Also he misuses the word 'money', for Uguccio says: "*Moneta* is so called from *moneo* (to warn)", because it warns us against fraud in metal or weight. Again, a prince by this means could wrongfully draw to himself the wealth of his people, as was said in the last chapter on change of weight, and many other anomalies would result. This fraud indeed would surely be worse than that of change of weight, because it is more cunning and less apparent and does more harm and injury to the community. And for this reason, where such alloy or black money exists, the community ought to keep in some public place or places a sample of this proportion or quality of alloy, to prevent the prince (which God forbid) or the moneyers secretly committing this fraud in the alloy, just as examples of other measures are frequently kept in charge of the community.

Chapter XIV

Compound Change of Money

There is a compound change of money when more simple changes than one are combined, as by changing at the same time the (bimetallic) ratio or the mixture of materials and possibly the weight as well. There would thus be a number of possible combinations of the five simple changes already described. And since no simple change ought to be made except for the real and natural causes mentioned which very rarely occur, it is obvious that the occasion for a compound change will even more rarely, or perhaps never, happen. And if it should, a fortiori such a compound change must never be made by the prince, because of the dangers and disadvantages already named, but only by the community. For if so many abuses result from simple changes wrongly made, as we have said, much greater and worse would follow from a compound change.

For money ought to be true and just in substance and in weight, as is shown us in the Holy Scriptures, where it is said of Abraham that he bought a field for which he gave 400 shekels of silver of approved public money. If then the money were good and were not unnecessarily altered, since it would last a long time, there would not be any need to make a great deal of it nor to have many moneyers at the public expense. And this would be to the public advantage, as was suggested in Chapter VII.

On the whole then, we must conclude from the premisses that no change of the money, simple or compound, is to be made on the sole authority of the prince, especially where he wishes to do it for the sake of the profit and gain to be got from the change.

Chapter XV

That the Profit Accruing to the Prince from Alteration of the Coinage is Unjust

I am of opinion that the main and final cause why the prince pretends to the power of altering the coinage is the profit or gain which he can get from it; it would otherwise be vain to make so many and so great changes.

I propose therefore to give fuller proof that such gain is unjust. For every change of money, except in the very rare cases which I have mentioned, involves forgery and deceit, and cannot be the right of the prince, as has previously been shown. Therefore, from the moment when the prince unjustly usurps this essentially unjust privilege, it is impossible that he can justly take profit from it. Besides, the amount of the prince's profit is necessarily that of the community's loss. But whatever loss the prince inflicts on the community is injustice and the act of a tyrant and not of a king, as Aristotle says.

And if he should tell the tyrant's usual lie, that he applies that profit to the public advantage, he must not be believed, because he might as well take my coat and say he needed it for the public service. And Saint Paul says that we are not to do evil that good may come. Nothing therefore should be extorted on the pretence that it will be used for good purposes afterwards. Again, if the prince has the right to make a simple alteration in the coinage and draw some profit from it, he must also have the right to make a greater alteration and draw more profit, and to do this more than once and make still more, and also to make one or more compound alterations, constantly making more profit in the ways already described. And it is probable that he or his successors would go on doing this either of their own motion or by the advice of their council as soon as this was permitted, because human nature is inclined and prone to heap up riches when it can do so with ease.

And so the prince would be at length able to draw to himself almost all the money or riches of his subjects and reduce them to slavery. And this would be tyrannical, indeed true and absolute tyranny, as it is represented by philosophers and in ancient history.

Chapter XVI

That Such Profit is Unnatural

Although all injustice is in a way contrary to nature, yet to make a profit from altering the coinage is specifically an unnatural act of injustice. For it is natural for certain natural riches to multiply, like grains of corn, ‘which,’ as Ovid says, ‘when sown, the field with ample interest repays.’ But it is monstrous and unnatural that an unfruitful thing should bear, that a thing specifically sterile, such as money, should bear fruit and multiply of itself. Therefore when profit is made from money, not by laying it out in the purchase of natural wealth, its proper and natural use, but by changing it into itself, as changing one form of it for another, or giving one form for another, such profit is vile and unnatural. It is by this reasoning that Aristotle proves, in the first book of the Politics, that usury is against nature, because the natural use of money is as an instrument for the exchange of natural wealth, as has frequently been said. Anyone therefore who uses it otherwise, misuses it against the natural institution of money, for he causes money to beget money, which, as Aristotle says, is against nature. And, besides, in these changes by which profit accrues it is necessary to call something which in truth is not a penny, a penny, and which is not a pound, a pound, as has already been said in another connexion. But it is clear that this is no less than to disturb the order of nature and of reason, of which Cassiodorus says:

“Pay your shilling, and keep something back if you are strong enough; deliver a pound, and make it less if you can. In all such cases, as the names themselves show, you pay in full, or you are not giving what you say you give. You cannot by any means use the names of whole units and yet make fraudulent deductions. Is not such a violation of nature's secrets, such an attempt to obscure the greatest certainties, plainly a cruel and disgraceful wound to truth itself? Weight and measure are the first things to prove, for all is chaos where there is deceit in the unit of measurement.”

Again, it is said in the book of Wisdom that God ordered all things by measure, weight and number; but in changing of money there is no profit unless fraud is committed in these most certain things, as I have declared before. Therefore he who seeks to profit from such changes of money sins against God and against nature.

Chapter XVII

That Profit from the Change of Money is Worse than Usury

It seems to me that there are three ways in which profit may be made from money, without laying it out for its natural purpose; one is the art of the moneychanger, banking or exchange, another is usury, a third alteration of the coinage. The first way is contemptible, the second bad and the third worse. Aristotle mentioned the first two, but not the third, because in his times such wickedness had not yet been invented. That the first is contemptible and disreputable, Aristotle proves by the reasons given in the last chapter, for this is as it were to make money beget money. He also calls exchange 'obolostatic', what we commonly call Poitevinage. It was for that reason that Saint Matthew, the apostle who had been a moneychanger, did not return to his former calling after our Lord's resurrection, as Saint Peter, who had been a fisherman, did. And in giving this reason, the Blessed Gregory says: "It is one thing to earn a living by fishing, and another to amass money from the profits of receipt of custom. For there are many trades which can scarcely if ever be practised without sin, etc." For there are certain vulgar crafts which defile the body, such as cleaning the sewers, and others which, like this, defile the soul. As to usury, it is certainly bad, detestable and unjust, and Holy Scripture says so. But it remains to show that gaining money by altering the coinage is even worse than usury.

The usurer has lent his money to one who takes it of his own free will, and can then enjoy the use of it and relieve his own necessity with it, and what he repays in excess of the principal is determined by free contract between the parties. But a prince, by unnecessary change in the coinage, plainly takes the money of his subjects against their will, because he forbids the older money to pass current, though it is better, and anyone would prefer it to the bad; and then unnecessarily and without any possible advantage to his subjects, he will give them back worse money. And even if he makes better money than before, it is only with a view to a future debasement, and that he may give them (meanwhile) less of the good money than the corresponding value of the old. In either case he keeps back part for himself. In so far then as he receives more money than he gives, against and beyond the natural use of money, such gain is equivalent to usury; but is worse than usury because it is less voluntary and more against the will of his subjects, incapable of profiting them, and utterly unnecessary. And since the usurer's interest is not so excessive, or so generally injurious to the many, as this impost, levied tyrannically and fraudulently, against the interest and against the will of the whole community, I doubt whether it should not rather be termed robbery with violence or fraudulent extortion.

Chapter XVIII

That Such Alterations of Money are Essentially not Permissible

Sometimes, lest worse befall and to avoid scandal, dishonourable and bad things such as public brothels are allowed in a community. Sometimes also, from necessity or for convenience, some contemptible business like money-changing is permitted, or some evil one, like usury. But there seems to be no earthly cause why so much gain should be allowed from alteration of the coinage for profit. It does not avoid scandal, but begets it, as appears in Chapter VIII, and it has many awkward consequences, some of which have already been mentioned, while others will appear later, nor is there any necessity or convenience in doing it, nor can it advantage the commonwealth. A clear sign of this is that such alterations are a modern invention, as was mentioned in the last chapter. For such a thing was never done in cities or kingdoms formerly or now well governed. Nor have I found any mention of it in history except that in a letter of Cassiodorus written in the name of Theodoric, king of Italy, a slight change of weight, which a certain treasurer had made in paying some soldiers, is severely blamed and thoroughly censured. Writing of this to Boetius, the king says: "Wherefore let your prudence, learned in philosophic doctrines, expel wicked lying from the company of truth, lest anyone should be tempted to diminish its integrity." And, a little later, he continues: "The wages of labourers must not be docked, but payment must be made in full to him of whom faithful service is required." If the Italians or Romans did in the end make such alterations, as appears from ancient bad money sometimes to be found in the country, this was probably the reason why their noble empire came to nothing. It appears therefore that these changes are so bad that they are essentially impermissible.

Chapter XIX

Of Certain Disadvantages to the Prince from Alterations of the Coinage

Many great disadvantages arise from such alterations in the coinage, some of which specially affect the prince, others the whole community, and others particular parts of the community. Many of these have lately been seen to occur in the realm of France, and some have already been named, which must nevertheless be recapitulated.

First, it is exceedingly detestable and disgraceful in a prince to commit fraud, to debase his money, to call what is not gold, gold, and what is not a pound, a pound, and so forth as in Chapters XII and XIII. Besides, it is his duty to condemn false coiners. How can he blush deep enough, if that be found in him which in another he ought to punish by a disgraceful death?

Again, it is a great scandal, as was said in Chapter VIII, and contemptible in a prince, that the money of his kingdom never remains the same, but changes from day to day, and is sometimes worth on the same day more in one place than in another. Also, as time goes on and changes proceed, it often happens that nobody knows what a particular coin is worth, and money has to be dealt in, bought and sold, or changed from its value, a thing which is against its nature.

And so there is no certainty in a thing in which certainty is of the highest importance, but rather uncertain and disordered confusion, to the prince's reproach. Also it is absurd and repugnant to the royal dignity to prohibit the currency of the true and good money of the realm, and from motives of greed to command, or rather compel, subjects to useless good money; which amounts to saying that good is evil and vice versa, whereas it was said to such from the Lord, by his prophet:

“Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil.”

And again, it is a disgrace to a prince to dishonour his predecessors, for we are all bound by the Lord's commandment to honour our parents. But he seems to detract from the honour of his ancestors when he cries down their good money, and has it, and with it their image, cut up and in place of the gold money which they coined makes money which is partly brass. This seems to be foreshadowed in the first book of Kings where we read that King Rehoboam took away the golden shields which his father Solomon had made, in exchange for which he made brazen shields. That same Rehoboam lost five-sixths of his people because he tried at the beginning of his reign to overtax his subjects. Furthermore, the king ought exceedingly to abhor tyrannical acts, of which as we have said before alteration of the coinage is one. And that is prejudicial and dangerous to all the king's posterity, as shall be shown more at length later.

Chapter XX

Of Other Disadvantages to the Community as a Whole

Among the many disadvantages arising from alteration of the coinage which affect the whole community, is one which was the main subject of Chapter XV, namely that the prince could thus draw to himself almost all the money of the community and unduly impoverish his subjects. And as some chronic sicknesses are more dangerous than others because they are less perceptible, so such an exaction is the more dangerous the less obvious it is, because its oppression is less quickly felt by the people than it would be in any other form of contribution. And yet not all age can be heavier, more general or more severe. Again, such alterations and debasements diminish the amount of gold and silver in the realm, since these metals, despite any embargo, are carried abroad, where they command a higher value. For men try to take their money to the places where they believe it to be worth most. And this reduces the material for money in the realm.

Again, foreigners frequently coin similar counterfeit money and bring it to the country where the debased coin is current and thus rob the king of the profit which he thinks he is making. It may be, too, that some of the material is consumed in the constant melting and re-melting which goes on where such alterations are made. There are thus three ways in which the material of money is lessened by these alterations. They cannot therefore last long unless the material is abundant in mines or otherwise, and so the prince would at last be unable to coin enough good money. Again, because of these alterations, good merchandise or natural riches cease to be brought into a kingdom in which money is so changed, since merchants, other things being equal, prefer to pass over to those places in which they receive sound and good money. Furthermore, in such a kingdom internal trade is disturbed and hindered in many ways by such changes, and while they last, money rents, yearly pensions, rates of hire, cesses and the like, cannot be well and justly taxed or valued, as is well known. Neither can money safely be lent or credit given. Indeed many refuse to give that charitable help on account of such alterations. And yet a sufficiency of metal for coin, merchants and all these other things mentioned are either necessary or highly useful to humanity, and their opposites are prejudicial and hurtful to the whole civil community.

Chapter XXI

Of Disadvantages to Part of the Community

Some sections of the community are occupied in affairs honourable or profitable to the whole state, as in the growing of natural wealth or negotiating on behalf of the community. Such are churchmen, judges, soldiers, husbandmen, merchants, craftsmen and the like. But another section augments its own wealth by unworthy business, as do money-changers, bankers or dealers in bullion: a disgraceful trade as was said in Chapter XVIII. These men, then, who are as it were unwanted by the state, and some others such as receivers and financial agents, etc., take a great part of the profit or gain arising from changes in coinage and by guile or by good luck, draw wealth from them, against God and Justice, since they are undeserving of such riches and unworthy of such wealth.

But others, who are the best sections of the community, are impoverished by it; so that the prince in this way damages and overburdens the larger and better part of his subjects and yet does not receive the whole of the profit; but the persons above-mentioned, whose business is contemptible and largely fraudulent, get a large part of it. Again, when the prince does not announce before hand the date and the scheme of the alteration which he means to make, some persons, by their own cunning or through their friends, secretly foreknow it, and buy up merchandise with the weak money to sell again for the sound, get rich quickly, and make an excessive and undue profit against the lawful course of normal trade. And this seems to be a kind of monopoly to the prejudice and damage of all the rest of the community. Furthermore, by such changes rents assessed in terms of money are necessarily unjustly lessened or unjustly raised, as was said before in Chapter XI on change of name. The prince, also, by such variations and sophistications of coin gives scoundrels an opportunity to coin false money, either because they consider that the prince has already done so and it is thus less against their conscience, or because the forgery is less quickly found out and they can more easily commit more crimes in these conditions than if good money were constantly current. Besides, in these circumstances, what innumerable perplexities, obscurities, errors and insuperable difficulties occur in accounts of expenditure and receipts! Hence also arise matters for lawsuits and various issues, insufficient payments of debts, frauds, disorders, manifold abuses and sundry disadvantages more than I can describe and possibly worse and greater than some that have been mentioned. And no wonder, for as Aristotle says: "One error has many consequences" as may easily be seen.

Chapter XXII

Whether the Community Can Make Such Alterations

Since the coinage is the property of the community as was shown in Chapter VI, it appears that the community can dispose of it as it pleases. It can therefore alter it after any fashion, make what gain it will from it and treat it as its own, especially if it needs a large sum of money for war or for the ransom of its prince from captivity or some accident of the kind. For in that case it might raise the sum by an alteration of the coinage nor would this be unnatural or like usury, because it would not be done by the prince but by the community to which the money belonged. For in this way many of the objections to the alteration of the coinage already made would drop and have no place. And it appears not only that the community might do this, but also that it ought, assuming that the contribution is necessary, for such an alteration seems to unite almost all the good conditions required by any tallage or contribution. For it brings in much profit in little time, is very easy to collect and assess or share without employing a large staff or risking fraud in collection, and is cheap to collect. Nothing, either, can be devised more fair or proportional, since he who can afford most pays most.

And it is, for its amount, less seen or felt and more endurable without danger of rebellion or popular discontent. For it is universal: neither clerk nor noble can escape it by privilege or otherwise, as many try to escape other contributions, causing envyings, dissensions, litigation, scandals and many other evils which do not arise from such an alteration of the coinage. Therefore, in the case presupposed, it can and should be done by the community.

But in this matter it seems to me now, with all respect for wiser heads, that it may be laid down that the money needed by the community should be exported to, or spent in distant lands and among people with whom there is no intercourse, and also be so much as to cause a notorious lack of the materials for money in the community for a long time. And if so, the sum may be raised by lightening or alloying the coin, because if this were not done, the alteration would have to be made later for the reason and in the way given in Chapter XIII.

But if the sum be not so great or be otherwise expended, or in any other way be such as not to cause a notable and long lack of material for money in the community, I maintain that besides the disadvantages hinted at in the present chapter, such an alteration of the coinage would involve more, and worse things than those above explained, than would any other contribution. And the worst danger would be lest the prince should at last assume the right to do this and then all the before-mentioned evils would come back again. Nor does it matter that, as we began by saying, the money belongs to the community, because neither the community nor anyone else has the right to misuse or unlawfully use his own property, as the community would be doing if it made such an alteration in the coinage. And if the community, rightly or wrongly, should make such a change, the money must with all speed be brought back to its due and permanent state, and all taking of profit from it must cease.

Chapter XXIII

An Argument that the Prince May Alter the Coinage

It is usually said, that in an emergency all things belong to the prince. Therefore in an imminent or instant emergency, he may take as much of the money of the realm as he chooses, in any way he likes, for the defence of the commonwealth or of his own position as prince. And alteration of the coinage is an appropriate and fitting way of doing this, as may be proved from what is said in the previous chapter. Again, supposing that the prince has no right at the common or ordinary law so to alter the coinage and take such a profit from it, it might be said that he can do so in virtue of a prerogative, for instance a special privilege from the Pope, or the Church, or the Roman Emperor, or even from the community, granted to him of old as a heritage for his services.

The money, also, is the property of the community, as appears from Chapter VI, and the community can change it as was said in the last chapter; therefore it can, or could, grant the authority to make such a change to the prince, renounce the right to ordain or change the coinage, and give part of the money to the prince to take in any way he pleased. Again, if by the common law it rests with the community, as has been said, to regulate the coinage, and it, owing to popular discord, has failed to agree on a plan, may it not compromise by leaving the regulation of the coinage hence forward and for ever to the will of the prince? It may surely do so, and allow him on this account to take a profit from the change or regulation of the coinage. It was said, too, in Chapter VII that a certain 'pension' ought to be fixed to cover the expense of coining and that the prince may have something out of or in excess of that 'pension' for himself: Therefore, by parity of reasoning, he may have or take more and more from this and consequently as much as he would get from an alteration in the coinage. He may, therefore, in the same way, raise that profit by such alterations. Besides, the prince ought to have a large settled revenue from the community with which to maintain a noble and honourable estate as becomes princely magnificence or royal majesty. These revenues, then, must be attached to the princely dominion or the prerogative of the royal crown. It is therefore possible that a considerable part of these revenues was formerly charged on the coinage, so that it would be lawful for the prince to make a profit by altering the coin. It is also possible that if this right were taken away the rest of the revenue would not be enough for a princely state. Consequently to propose to take from him the power of altering the coinage, is an attack on the honour of the king, a dishonour of the prince, it is indeed impoverishing him and robbing him of his magnificence, not only unjustly, but disgracefully to the whole community which cannot with decency have a prince unless he maintains his dignity.

Chapter XXIV

Reply to the Previous Chapter and Main Conclusion

Although there might possibly be many difficulties in meeting the first argument, I will pass over them briefly, as it occurs to me now that, lest the prince should pretend such an emergency when there is none, as Aristotle says tyrants do, it should be determined by the community or the better part of it, expressly or tacitly, when, what and how great an emergency threatens.

I mean by, 'expressly', that the community should be assembled, if there is the opportunity; 'tacitly,' if the emergency is so imminent that the people cannot be called together and so plain that it is subsequently notorious. For in such a case the prince may take some part of the property of his subjects, not by changing the coinage, but by way of a loan to be repaid in full later. On the second point, that the prince may have a privilege to change the money, first, I will not discuss the Pope's powers, but I think he never has made or would make such a grant since he would be giving a licence to do evil, which no possible good deeds could qualify a man to receive. As for the Roman Emperor, I say that he never had power to give any prince the privilege to do what he could not lawfully do himself, e.g. such a change in the money, as appears from what has been said.

As to the community, it has been said in Chapter XXII that it cannot change the money except in a particular case, and then, if it should entrust the task to the prince, within reasonable limits which are apparent from that chapter and from others, the prince would still not be doing it of his own authority but as the executor of a public ordinance. In answer to another argument, that the community which owns the money may divest itself of its right and transfer it to the prince, it seems, in the first place, that no well advised community would do such a thing; and secondly that it is unlawful even for itself to alter the coinage or to misuse its own property in any way, as was said in Chapter XXII.

Again, a community of citizens which is naturally free would never knowingly reduce itself to slavery or submit itself to the yoke of a tyranny. If, therefore, it were cheated or terrified and coerced into granting the prince such alterations without foreseeing the resulting evils, and that this would amount to slavery, it can immediately or otherwise revoke the grant. Again, anything belonging to anyone as of natural right cannot justly be transferred to another; but that is how money belongs to the free community, as is clear enough from Chapters I and VI. So, just as the community cannot grant to the prince authority to misuse the wives of any of its citizens he will, it cannot give him such a privilege over the coinage as he can only misuse, by exacting a profit from changing it, as appears from several earlier chapters.

The same argument applies to what was added about a disagreement in the community in the regulation of the coinage and its compromising in so far on the prince's decision. I admit it

can do so for some purposes and on some occasions; but not by giving him the power to take such undue profit from the said unnecessary alterations. To another argument, borrowed from Chapter VII, that the prince may have some profit from the coinage, the answer is easy, namely that this is a small and limited pension, which is not to be at all augmented by alteration of the coinage, but is independent of any change. In reply to another argument, that the prince may have revenues and ought to have a magnificent and honourable estate, such revenues can and should be appropriated and drawn from other sources than such undue alterations from which, as has previously been shown, such great evils and disadvantages arise.

And supposing that some part of such revenue is charged on the coinage, it must be fixed and limited in amount, say two shillings or soon every mark coined and so forth, which would not involve any alteration or unreasonable and enormous increase in profit arising from the detestable changes of which we have spoken.

The general conclusion from all this is that the prince cannot make these changes or receive profit in this way either by the regular common law or by privilege, gift, grant, bargain or any other authority or means whatever, nor can it be his right in virtue of his lordship or otherwise. Also that the denial of such a right is no disherison or infringement of his majesty as is falsely alleged by flatterers, intriguers and traitors to the commonwealth.

Again, since the prince is bound not to do this, he deserves no pension or gift for refraining from such an improper exaction, for this seems nothing less than a ransom from slavery, which no king or good prince ought to exact from his subjects. Also, supposing, but not admitting, that he may have the privilege of drawing a profit from the coinage as a return for coining good money and maintaining its standard, even so he must forfeit the privilege if he so abuses it as to change and debase the money for the greedy and disgraceful enhancement of his own profit.

Chapter XXV

That a Tyrant Cannot be Lasting

In this and the following chapter I propose to prove that raising money by such alterations of the coinage is dishonourable to the kingdom and to the damage of all the king's posterity. You must know, therefore, that the difference between kingdom and tyranny is that a tyrant loves and pursues his own good more than the common advantage of his subjects, and aims at keeping his people in slavery; a king, on the contrary, prefers the public good to his own and loves above all things, after God and his own soul, the good and public freedom of his subjects. And this is the true usefulness and nobility of the princely power, whose lordship is the nobler and the better, as Aristotle says, the more it is over freer and better men, and endures the longer for the king's steadfastness in following that principle. As Cassiodorus says: "The art of governing is to love the interests of the many." For whenever kingship approaches tyranny it is near its end, for by this it becomes ripe for division, change of dynasty or total destruction, especially in a temperate climate, far from a slavish barbarism, where men are habitually, morally and naturally free, not slaves, nor habituated to tyranny; to whom slavery would be unprofitable and unacceptable, and tyranny nothing less than unnatural and therefore short-lived, since as Aristotle says: "Things contrary to nature most quickly decay." So, too, Cicero says: "That no empire is strong enough to last if it is full of fear." And Seneca in his tragedies says: "No-one can prolong Enforced empires: moderate empires last."

Wherefore the Lord by his prophet reproached the deposed princes, saying: "With force and with cruelty have ye ruled them." And the same thing is said elsewhere, for Plutarch says to the emperor Trajan that "the state is a body, living as it were by a gift of the gods, actuated by the decision of the highest justice, and governed by the restraint of reason." The state or kingdom, then, is like a human body and so Aristotle will have it in Book V of the Politics. As, therefore, the body is disordered when the humours flow too freely into one member of it, so that that member is often thus inflamed and overgrown while the others are withered and shrunk and the body's due proportions are destroyed and its life shortened; so also is a commonwealth or a kingdom when riches are unduly attracted by one part of it. For a commonwealth or kingdom whose princes, as compared with their subjects, increase beyond measure in wealth, power and position, is as it were a monster, like a man whose head is so large and heavy that the rest of his body is too weak to support it.

And just as such a man has no pleasure in life and cannot live long; neither can a kingdom survive whose prince draws to himself riches in excess as is done by altering the coinage, as appeared in Chapter XX. Again, as in a chorus unison has no power to please and excessive or improper dissonance destroys and spoils the whole harmony, but a proportional and measured difference of tone is needed to produce the sweet melody of a joyous choir: so also, generally, equality of possessions or power in all sections of the community is inconvenient and inconsistent, but too great a disparity destroys and spoils the harmony of the state, as

appears from Aristotle in Politics, Book V. But especially if the prince, who is, as it were, the tenor and leading voice in singing, is too great and is out of tune with the rest of the commonwealth, the sweet melody of the kingdom's constitution will be disturbed. And this, as Aristotle says, is another difference between a king and a tyrant. For a tyrant wishes to be more powerful than the whole community over whom he rules by force: but a king's moderation is restrained by the fact that he is greater and more powerful than any of his subjects, but of less power or wealth than the whole community, and so stands in the middle.

But because the king's power commonly and easily tends to increase, the greatest care and constant watchfulness must be used, indeed extreme and supreme prudence is needed, to keep it from degenerating into tyranny, especially because of deceitful flatterers who have always, as Aristotle says, urged princes to be tyrants. For they cunningly deceive the simple ears of princes (as we read in the book of Esther), who judge other men's characters by their own, and by their suggestions kings' minds are turned to evil. But since it is hard to avoid them or to root them out, Aristotle gives another rule by which a kingdom may long survive. That is that the prince should not enlarge his dominion over his subjects, should not overtax them or seize their goods, should allow or grant them liberties and should not interfere with them or use his plenary powers but only a power regulated and limited by law and custom. For few things, as Aristotle says, should be left to the decision of a judge or a prince. For he adduces the example of Theopompus, king of the Lacedaemonians, who, after having given back to the people many powers and imposts, when his wife wept and reproached him, saying, "He should be ashamed to hand on to his sons a less profitable kingdom than he had received from his father," replied, "leave them a more permanent one." Surely an oracle of God! How weighty a saying, fit to be written in golden letters in kings' palaces! "I leave them a more permanent one": as he might have put it, "I have made the kingdom greater in duration than I have made it less by limiting its power." A greater man than Solomon is here.

For if Rehoboam, whom I mentioned above, had received from his father Solomon a kingdom so limited, he would never have lost ten of the twelve tribes of Israel, nor would he have been reproached thus in Ecclesiasticus: "Thou didst profane thy seed, to bring wrath upon thy children; and I was grieved for thy folly; so that the sovereignty was divided."

It has thus been proved that a dominion which is turned from a kingdom to a tyranny is bound to have a speedy end.

Chapter XXVI

That the Taking of Profit from Alteration of the Coinage injures the Whole Royal Succession

I propound the thesis that the alterations before-mentioned are dishonourable to the king and prejudicial to the royal house. To prove this I lay down three premisses:

First that that is a reproach to a king and to the prejudice of his successors by which a kingdom is exposed to destruction or to being given over to strangers. Nor could a king grieve or weep enough who should be so unhappy, so wretched as by his carelessness or mis-government to do anything that brought him or his heirs to lose a kingdom ennobled by so many great deeds and so long gloriously maintained. Nor would it be without danger to his glorious soul, if by his fault his people should suffer so many plagues, so many great misfortunes as usually accompany the fall or the conquest of kingdoms.

Secondly, I submit that tyranny exposes a kingdom to ruin, as was set forth in the last chapter and since, as it is written in Ecclesiasticus, "Sovereignty is transferred from nation to nation, because of iniquities and deeds of violence and greed of money," while tyranny is iniquitous and violent. Furthermore, to come to particulars, God forbid that the free hearts of Frenchmen should have so degenerated that they should willingly become slaves; and therefore a slavery thrust upon them cannot last. For, though the power of tyrants is great, it does violence to the free hearts of subjects and is of no avail against foreigners.

Whoever, therefore, should in any way induce the lords of France to such tyrannical government, would expose the realm to great danger and pave the way to its end. For neither has the noble offspring of the French kings learned to be tyrannous, nor the people of Gaul to be servile; therefore if the royal house decline from its ancient virtue, it will certainly lose the kingdom.

Thirdly, I submit, as a point already proved and often repeated, that to take or augment profit by alteration of the coinage is fraudulent, tyrannical and unjust, and moreover it cannot be persisted in without the kingdom being, in many other respects also, changed to a tyranny. Wherefore, it not only brings disadvantages of its own, but involves many other evils as either its conditions or its consequences. For this course can only be the advice of evil-minded men, ready to counsel any fraud or tyranny, if they see a prince inclined to it or willing to listen to it.

To sum up my argument, I say that a thing which tends to bring a realm to ruin is disgraceful and harmful to the king and his heirs, my first premiss; that it extends and changes to a tyranny, my second; and that it does so by alteration of the coinage, my third. Consequently a tax levied by means of such changes is against the king's honour and injures his posterity, which was to be proved.

All this, as I said before, is tentative and subject to correction by experts. For, as Aristotle says: "Civil matters are usually doubtful and uncertain." If anyone, therefore, in his love of truth, chooses to contradict or oppose what I have written, he will be doing well. And if I have spoken evil let him bear witness of the evil, but with reason, lest he be seen needlessly and wilfully to condemn what he is not able effectually to refute.

Here ends the treatise.

MUQADDIMMAH
CHAPTER V
IBN KHALDUN
(1377 CE)

**ON THE (VARIOUS) ASPECTS OF MAKING A LIVING, SUCH AS
PROFIT AND THE CRAFTS. THE CONDITIONS THAT OCCUR IN
THIS CONNECTION. A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS ARE CONNECTED
(WITH THIS SUBJECT).**

Section I

The Real Meaning and Explanation of Sustenance and Profit. Profit is the Value Realized from Human Labour

It should be known that man, by nature, needs something to feed him and to provide for him in all the conditions and stages of his life from the time of his (early) growth to his maturity and on to his old age. "God is rich, but you are poor." God created everything in the world for man and gave it to him, as indicated in several verses of the Qur'an. He said: "He created for you everything that is in the heavens and on earth. He subjected the sun and the moon to you. He subjected the sea to you. He subjected the firmament to you. He subjected the animals to you." (The same idea is indicated in) many (other) passages of (the Qur'an), Man's hand stretches out over the (whole) world and all that is in it, since God made man His representative on earth.

Every man tries to get things; in this all men are alike. Thus, whatever is obtained by one is denied to the other, unless he gives something in exchange (for it). When (man) has control of himself and is beyond the stage of (his original) weakness, he strives to make a profit, so that he may spend what God gives him to obtain his needs and necessities through barter. God said: "Thus, ask God for sustenance."

(Man) obtains (some profit) through no efforts of his own, as, for instance, through rain that makes the fields thrive, and similar things. However, these things are only contributory. His own efforts must be combined with them, as will be mentioned. (His) profits will constitute his livelihood, if they correspond to his necessities and needs. They will be capital accumulation, if they are greater than (his needs). When the use of such accruing or acquired (gain) reverts to a particular human being and he enjoys its fruits by spending it upon his interests and needs, it is called "sustenance." The Prophet said: "The only thing you (really) possess of your property is what you ate, and have thus destroyed; or what you wore, and have thus worn out; or what you gave as charity, and have thus spent."

When (a person) does not use (his income) for any of his interests and needs, it is not called "sustenance." (The part of the income) that is obtained by a person through his own effort and strength is called "profit." For instance, the estate of a deceased person is called "profit" with reference to the deceased person. It is not called "sustenance," because the deceased person has no use for it: But with reference to the heirs, when they use it, it is called "sustenance."

This is the real meaning of "sustenance" among orthodox Muslims. The Mu'tazilah stipulated for the use of the term "sustenance" that it must be possessed rightfully. Whatever is not possessed (rightfully) is not called "sustenance" by them. Wrongfully acquired property or anything forbidden was not admitted by them as something that could be called "sustenance." Yet, God sustains him who acquires property wrongfully, and also the evildoer, the believer as well as the unbeliever. He singles out whomever He wishes for His mercy and guidance.

(The Mu'tazilah) have arguments for their theory of "sustenance." This is not the place to discuss them fully.

It should further be known that profit results from the effort to acquire (things) and the intention to obtain (them). Sustenance requires effort and work, even if one tries to get it and ask for it in the proper ways for getting it. God said: "Thus, ask God for sustenance." The effort to (obtain sustenance) depends on God's determination and inspiration. Everything comes from God. But human labor is necessary for every profit and capital accumulation. When (the source of profit) is work as such, as, for instance, (the exercise of) a craft, this is obvious. When the source of gain is animals, plants, or minerals, (this is not quite as obvious, but) human labor is still necessary, as one can see. Without (human labor), no gain will be obtained, and there will be no useful (result).

Furthermore, God created the two mineral "stones," gold and silver, as the (measure of) value for all capital accumulations. (Gold and silver are what) the inhabitants of the world, by preference, consider treasure and property (to consist of). Even if, under certain circumstances, other things are acquired, it is only for the purpose of ultimately obtaining (gold and silver). All other things are subject to market fluctuations, from which (gold and silver) are exempt. They are the basis of profit, property, and treasure.

If all this has been established, it should be further known that the capital a person earns and acquires, if resulting from a craft, is the value realized from his labor. This is the meaning of "acquired (capital)." There is nothing here (originally) except the labor, and (the labor) is not desired by itself as acquired (capital, but the value realized from it).

Some crafts are partly associated with other (crafts). Carpentry and weaving, for instance, are associated with wood and yarn (and the respective crafts needed for their production). However, in the two crafts (first mentioned), the labor (that goes into them) is more important, and its value is greater.

If the profit results from something other than a craft, the value of the resulting profit and acquired (capital) must (also) include the value of the labor by which it was obtained. Without labor, it would not have been acquired.

In most such cases, the share of labor (in the profit) is obvious. A portion of the value, whether large or small, comes from (the labor). The share of labor may be concealed. This is the case, for instance, with the prices of foodstuffs. The labor and expenditures that have gone into them show themselves in the price of grain, as we have stated before. But they are concealed (items) in regions where farming requires little care and few implements. Thus, only a few farmers are conscious of the (costs of labor and expenditures that have gone into their products).

It has thus become clear that gains and profits, in their entirety or for the most part, are value realized from human labor. The meaning of the word "sustenance" has become clear. It is (the

part of the profit) that is utilized. Thus, the meaning of the words "profit" and "sustenance" has become clear. The meaning of both words has been explained.

It should be known that when the (available) labor is all gone or decreases because of a decrease in civilization, God permits profits to be abolished. Cities with few inhabitants can be observed to offer little sustenance and profit, or none whatever, because little human labor (is available). Likewise, in cities with a larger (supply of) labor, the inhabitants enjoy more favorable conditions and have more luxuries, as we have stated before. This is why the common people say that, with the decrease of its civilization, the sustenance of a country disappears. This goes so far that even the flow of springs and rivers stops in waste areas. Springs flow only if they are dug out and the water drawn. This requires human labor. (The conditions) may be compared with the udders of animals. Springs that are not dug out and from which no water is drawn are absorbed and disappear in the ground completely. In the same way, udders dry up when they are not milked. This can be observed in countries where springs existed in the days of their civilization. Then, they fell into ruins, and the water of the springs disappeared completely in the ground, as if it had never existed.

God determines night and day.

Section II

The Various Ways, Means, and Methods of Making a Living

It should be known that "livelihood (making a living)" means the desire for sustenance and the effort to obtain it. "Livelihood" (ma'ash) is a maf'al formation from 'aysh', "life." The idea is that aysh "life" is obtained only through the things (that go into making a living), and they are therefore considered, with some exaggeration, "the place of life." Sustenance and profit may be obtained-through-having the power to take them away from others and to appropriate them according to a generally recognized norm. This is called imposts and taxation.

Or (profit may be obtained) from wild animals by killing or catching them whole on land or in the sea. This is called hunting (fishing).

Or (profit may be obtained) either from domesticated animals by extracting surplus products which are used by the people, such as milk from animals, silk from silk worms, and honey from bees; or from plants such as are planted in fields or grow as trees, through cultivating and preparing them for the production of their fruits. All this is called agriculture.

Or profit may be the result of human labor. (Such labor may be applied) to specific materials. Then it is called a craft, such as writing, carpentry, tailoring, weaving, horsemanship, and similar (crafts). Or it may be applied to nonspecific materials. This, then, includes all the (other) professions and activities.

Or profit may come from merchandise and its use in barter; (merchants can make such profit) either by traveling around with (the merchandise) in (various) countries, or by hoarding it and observing the market fluctuations which affect it. This is called commerce.

These are the different ways and means of making a living. Certain thorough men of letters and philosophers, such as al-Hariri and others, had this in mind when they said: "A living is made by (exercising) political power (imarah), through commerce, agriculture, or the crafts." (The exercise of) political power is not a natural way of making a living. We do not have to mention it here. Something was said before in the second chapter about governmental tax collection and the people in charge of it. Agriculture, the crafts, and commerce, on the other hand, are natural ways of making a living.

Agriculture is prior to all the other (ways of making a living) by its very nature, since it is something simple and innately natural. It needs no speculation or (theoretical) knowledge. Therefore, (invention) of it is ascribed to Adam, the father of mankind. He is said to have taught and practiced agriculture. This indicates that it is the oldest way of making a living and the one most closely related to nature.

The crafts are secondary and posterior to agriculture. They are composite and scientific. Thinking and speculation is applied to them. Therefore, as a rule, crafts exist only among sedentary peoples. (Sedentary culture) is posterior to Bedouin life, and secondary to it. In this sense, their (invention) was ascribed to Idris, the second father of mankind. He is said to have invented them with the help of divine revelation for the human beings to come after him.

Commerce is a natural way of making profits. However, most of its practices and methods are tricky and designed to obtain the (profit) margin between purchase prices and sales prices. This surplus makes it possible to earn a profit. Therefore, the law permits cunning in commerce, since (commerce) contains an element of gambling. It does not, however, mean taking away the property of others without giving anything in return. Therefore, it is legal. And God knows better.

Section IV

Trying to Make Money from Buried and Other Treasures is Not a Natural Way of Making a Living

It should be known that many weak-minded persons in cities hope to discover property under the surface of the earth and to make some profit from it. They believe that all the property of the nations of the past was stored underground and sealed with magic talismans. These seals, they believe, can be broken only by those who may chance upon the (necessary) knowledge and can offer the proper incense, prayers, and sacrifices to break them.

The inhabitants of the cities in Ifriqiyah believe that the European Christians who lived in Ifriqiyah before Islam, buried their property and entrusted its (hiding place) to written lists, until such time as they might find a way to dig it up again. The inhabitants of the cities in the East hold similar beliefs with regard to the nations of the Copts, the Romans (Byzantines), and the Persians. They circulate stories to this effect that sound like idle talk. Thus, a treasure hunter comes to dig where there was money buried, but does not know the talisman or the story connected with it. As a result, he finds the place empty or inhabited by worms. Or, he sees the money and jewels lying there, but guards stand over them with drawn swords. Or the earth shakes, so that he believes that he will be swallowed up, and similar nonsense.

In the Maghrib there are many Berber "students" who are unable to make a living by natural ways and means. They approach well-to-do people with papers that have torn margins and contain either non-Arab writing or what they claim to be the translation of a document written by the owner of buried treasures, giving the clue to the hiding place. In this way, they try to get their sustenance by (persuading well-to-do people) to send them out to dig and hunt for treasure. They fool them by saying that their only motive in asking for help is their wish to find influential protection against seizure and punishment by (local) authorities. Occasionally, one of these treasure hunters displays strange information or some remarkable trick of magic with which he fools people into believing his other claims, although, in fact, he knows nothing of magic and (magical) procedures.

Most weak-minded people wish to do their digging with others and to be protected by the darkness of night while they do it. They are afraid of watchers and government spies. When they do not turn anything up, they put the blame upon their ignorance of the talisman with which the (buried) money was sealed. Thus they deceive themselves as to the failure of their hopes.

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In addition to a weak mind, a (common) motive that leads people to hunt for treasure is their inability to make a living in one of the natural ways that lead to profit, such as commerce, agriculture, or the crafts. Therefore, they try to make a living in devious ways, such as (treasure hunting) and the like, not in one of the natural ways. For they are unable to make the effort necessary to earn something, and they trust that they can gain their sustenance without effort or trouble. They do not realize that by trying to make a living in an improper manner, they plunge themselves into much greater trouble, hardship, and expenditure of energy than otherwise. In addition, they expose themselves to (the risk of) punishment.

Occasionally, a principal motive leading people to hunt for treasure is the fact that they have become used to ever-increasing, limitless luxury and (luxury) customs. As a result, the various ways and means of earning money cannot keep pace with and do not pay for their (luxury) requirements. When such a person cannot earn enough in a natural way, his only way out is to wish that at one stroke, without any effort, he might find sufficient money to pay for the (luxury) habits in which he has become caught. Thus, he becomes eager to find (treasure) and concentrates all his effort upon that. Therefore, most of those who can be observed to be eager to (hunt for treasure) are people used to luxurious living. Among the people of the (various) dynasties and the inhabitants of cities such as Cairo (Egypt), where there is much luxury and (living) conditions are favorable, many are engrossed in the search for (treasure). They question travelers about extraordinary tales of (hidden treasure) with the same eagerness they show for the practice of alchemy. Thus, we hear that the inhabitants of Cairo (Egypt) consult the Maghribi "students" they meet, in hopes that, with their help, they may perhaps hit upon some buried or other treasure. They further investigate (the possibility of) making water disappear in the soil, because they believe that the majority of all buried treasures are to be found in the canals of the Nile and that the Nile largely covers the buried or hoarded treasures in those regions. Persons who possess the (afore-mentioned) forged records fool them with the excuse that the reason they cannot reach the treasures is because the Nile flows there. In this way they cover up their lies. First, they want to make a living. The person who hears their (stories) wants to make the water disappear in the ground by means of magical operations, so as to obtain what he wants. (People in Egypt) are fond of magic, (a trait) they have inherited from their early forebears in (Egypt). Their magical disciplines and monuments still remain in (Egypt) as the graves (of the ancient Egyptians) and other buildings attest. The story of Pharaoh's magicians testifies to their special (knowledge of magic).

The inhabitants of the Maghrib circulate a poem among themselves which they ascribe to the sages of the East. As one can see, it shows how to make water disappear in the ground by magical means. This is (the poem): "O you who are looking for the secret of how to make water disappear in the ground, Listen to the word of truth from an expert! Put aside all the false statements and deceptive remarks That people have written in books, And listen to my truthful word and advice, If you are one of those who do not believe in cheating [being cheated?]. If you seek to make a well disappear, and How to handle this well has always puzzled the mind, Make a picture resembling yourself standing, (but) The head should be that

of a young lion, (drawn) as a round shape. His hands (should) hold the rope that is Drawing a bucket up from the bottom of a well. On his breast, there (should be) an h, as you may have seen, (Written three times), the number of divorce. Be careful not to repeat it more often! It (should) step upon is without touching (them), Walking like someone who is courageous, clever, and skillful. He means that the is are in front of (the figure), and it looks as if it were walking upon them Around the whole, there is a line running, Which should rather be square than round. Slaughter a bird over it and smear its (blood) upon it, And immediately after the slaughtering, go and use incense, Sandarac, frankincense, storax, And costus root. And cover it with a silken garment, A red one or a yellow one, not a blue one. It should have no green or dark (colour) in it. It should be sewn with threads of white Or red wool of purest red coloring. The ascendant should be Leo, as has already been explained, And there should be no bright moonlight, And the [fall ?] moon should be connected with the lucky position of Mercury. A Saturday should be the hour of the operation."

My opinion is that this poem is one of the things with which swindlers fool (other people).

These (swindlers) create remarkable situations and employ astounding techniques. They go so far in their devious lies as to take up residence in famous mansions and houses known as (hiding places of treasures). They undertake excavations there and make underground cells and put signs there which they (then) incorporate in their forged lists. Then, they go to some weak-minded person with these lists. They urge him to rent the mansion and live there. They suggest to him that the mansion contains a buried treasure of indescribable magnitude. They ask for money to buy drugs and incense, in order to break the talismans. They condition him by producing the signs they themselves had placed there and that were of their own manufacture. He gets excited by the things he sees. He is deceived and taken in by them without knowing it. During these (operations), the (swindlers) use among themselves a (special) linguistic terminology with the help of which they inveigle (their victims), and keep them in ignorance of what they say concerning the digging, incense, slaughtering of animals, and the other such things that they do.

The things that have been said about (treasure hunting) have no scientific basis, nor are they based upon (factual) information. It should be realized that although treasures are (sometimes) found, this happens rarely and by chance, not by systematic 'search. (The hiding of treasures) is no matter of general concern, such that people would commonly store their money underground and seal it with talismans, either in ancient or in recent times. Buried treasures (rikaz), such as are mentioned in the Prophetic traditions and such as the jurists assume to exist - that is, buried in pre-Islamic times - are found by chance, not by systematic search.

Furthermore, why should anyone who hoards his money and seals it with magical operations, thus making extraordinary efforts to keep it concealed, set up hints and clues as to how it may be found by anyone who cares to? Why make a written list of it, so that the people of any period and region could find his treasure? This would contradict the intention of keeping it concealed.

Furthermore, intelligent people act with some definite, useful purpose in mind. A person who hoards his money does so because he wants his children, his relatives, or someone else to get it. No intelligent person tries to hide his money altogether, from everybody. To do so would merely bring about its destruction or loss, or its going to some member of a future nation unknown to him.

The question has been asked: Where is the property of the nations (that came) before us, and where are the abundant riches known to have existed among those nations? (In reply,) it should be known that treasures of gold, silver, precious stones, and utensils are no different from (other) minerals and acquired (capital), from iron, copper, lead, and any other real property or (ordinary) minerals. It is civilization that causes them to appear, with the help of human labor, and that makes them increase or decrease. All such things in people's possession may be transferred and passed on by inheritance. They have often been transferred from one region to another, and from one dynasty to another, in accordance with the purposes they were to serve and the particular civilization that required them. If money (at this time) is scarce in the Maghrib and Ifriqiyah, it is not scarce in the countries of the Slavs and the European Christians. If it is scarce in Egypt and Syria, it is not scarce in India and China. Such things are merely materials (alat) and acquired (capital). It is civilization that produces them in abundance or causes them to be in short supply. Moreover, minerals are affected by destruction like all other existent things. Pearls and jewels deteriorate more quickly than anything else. Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, and tin are also affected by destruction and complete annihilation, which destroy their substances in a very short time.

The occurrence of finds and treasures in Egypt is explained by the fact that Egypt was in the possession of the Copts for two thousand or more years. Their dead were buried with their possessions of gold, silver, precious stones, and pearls. This was the custom of the people of the old dynasties. When the dynasty of the Copts ended and the Persians ruled Egypt, they searched the graves for such objects and discovered them. They took an indescribably large amount of such objects from the graves, from the pyramids, for example, which were the royal graves, and from the other (types of graves). The same was done by the Greeks after them. Those graves afforded opportunities for treasure (hunting and have continued to do so) down to this time. One frequently comes upon buried treasure in them. This may either consist of money buried by the Copts, or (it may be) the specially prepared vessels and sarcophagi of gold and silver with which they honored their dead when they buried them. For thousands of years, the graves of the Copts have been likely to afford opportunities for finding (treasure). Because of the existence of (treasures in graves) the Egyptians have been concerned with the search for treasures and their discovery. When, in the later (years) of a dynasty, duties come to be levied upon various things, they are even levied upon treasure hunters, and a tax has to be paid by those stupid and deluded persons who occupy themselves with (treasure hunting). Greedy people (in the government) who try assiduously to (discover treasures think that they) have thus found the means to discover treasures (for their own benefit) and a promising way to get them out. But all their efforts remain entirely unsuccessful. God is our refuge from perdition.

Those who are deluded or afflicted by these things must take refuge in God from their inability to make a living and their laziness in this respect, just as the Messenger of God took refuge from it and turned away from the ways and delusions of Satan. They should not occupy themselves with absurdities and untrue stories; "God gives sustenance to whomever He wishes to give it, without accounting."

Section V

Ranks are Useful in Securing Property

This is as follows: We find that the person of rank who is highly esteemed is in every material aspect more fortunate and wealthier than a person who has no rank. The reason for this is that the person of rank is served by the labor (of others). They try to approach him with their labor, since they want to be close to (him) and are in need of (the protection) his rank affords. People help him with their labor in all his needs, whether these are necessities, conveniences, or luxuries. The value realized from all such labor becomes part of his profit. For tasks that usually require giving some compensation (to the persons who perform them), he always employs people without giving anything in return. He realizes a very high value from their labor. It is (the difference) between the value he realizes from the (free) labor (products) and the prices he must pay for things he needs. He thus makes a very great (profit). A person of rank receives much (free) labor which makes him rich in a very short time. With the passing of days, his fortune and wealth increase. It is in this sense that (the possession of) political power (imarah) is one of the ways of making a living, as we have stated before.

The person who has no rank whatever, even though he may have property, acquires a fortune only in proportion to the property he owns and in accordance with the efforts he himself makes. Most merchants are in this position. Therefore, (merchants) who have a rank are far better off (than other merchants).

Evidence for this is the fact that many jurists and religious scholars and pious persons acquire a good reputation. Then, the great mass believes that when they give them presents, they serve God. People, therefore, are willing to help them in their worldly affairs and to work for their interests. As a result, they quickly become wealthy and turn out to be very well off although they have acquired no property but have only the value realized from the labor with which the people have supported them. We have seen much of this in cities and towns as well as in the desert. People do farm work and business for these men, who sit at home and do not leave their places. But still their property grows and their profits increase. Without effort, they accumulate wealth, to the surprise of those who do not understand what the secret of their affluence is, what the reasons for their wealth and fortune are; "God gives sustenance to whomever He wishes to give it, without accounting."

Section VI

Happiness and Profit are Achieved Mostly by People Who are Obsequious and use Flattery. Such Character Disposition is One of the Reasons for Happiness.

We have stated before in a previous passage that the profit human beings make is the value realized from their labor. If someone could be assumed to have no (ability whatever to do any) labor, he would have no profit whatever. The value realized from one's labor corresponds to the value of one's labor and the value of (this labor) as compared to (the value of) other labor and the need of the people for it. The growth or decrease of one's profit, in turn, depends on that. We have also just now explained that ranks are useful in securing property. A person of rank has the people approach him with their labor and property. (They do that) in order to avoid harm and to obtain advantages. The labor and property through which they attempt to approach him is, in a way, given in exchange for the many good and bad things they may obtain (or avoid) with the aid of his rank. Such labor becomes part of the profit of (the man of rank), and the value realized from it means property and wealth for him. He thus gains wealth and a fortune in a very short time.

Ranks are widely distributed among people, and there are various levels of rank among them. At the top, they extend to the rulers above whom there is nobody. At the bottom, they extend to those who have nothing to gain or to lose among their fellow men. In between, there are numerous classes. This is God's wise plan with regard to His creation. It regulates their livelihood, takes care of their interests, and insures their permanency.

The existence and persistence of the human species can materialize only through the co-operation of all men in behalf of what is good for them. It has been established that a single human being could not fully exist by himself, and even if, hypothetically, it might happen as a rare exception, his existence would be precarious. Now, such co-operation is obtained by the use of force, since people are largely ignorant of the interests of the (human) species, and since they are given freedom of choice and their actions are the result of thinking and reflection, not of natural (instinct). They thus refrain from co-operating. Therefore, it is obligatory to make them (co-operate), and there must be some motive forcing human beings to take care of their interests, so that God's wise plan as to the preservation of mankind can materialize. This is what is meant by the verse of the Qur'an: "And we placed some of you over others in various grades, so that they might use the others for forced labor. The mercy of your Lord is better than whatever they gather."

It has, thus, become clear that rank means the power enabling human beings to be active among the fellow men under their control with permission and prohibition, and to have forceful superiority over them, in order to make them avoid things harmful to them and seize their advantages. (They may act) in justice and apply the laws of religion and politics, and (also) follow their own purposes in everything else.

However, the first thing (the just use of rank) was intended by the divine providence as something essential, whereas the second thing (self-seeking use of rank) enters into it as something accidental, as is the case with all evils decreed by God. Much good can fully exist only in conjunction with the existence of some little evil, which is the result of matter. The good does not disappear with the (admixture of evil), but attaches itself to the little evil that gathers around it. This is the meaning of the occurrence of injustice in the world. It should be understood.

Each class among the inhabitants of a town or zone of civilization has power over the classes lower than it. Each member of a lower class seeks the support of rank from members of the next higher class, and those who gain it become more active among the people under their control in proportion to the profit they get out of it. Thus, rank affects people in whatever way they make their living. Whether it is influential or restricted depends on the class and status of the person who has a particular rank. If the rank in question is influential, the profit accruing from it is correspondingly great. If it is restricted and unimportant, (the profit) is correspondingly (small). A person who has no rank, even though he may have money, acquires a fortune only in proportion to the labor he is able to produce, or the property he owns, and in accordance with the efforts he makes coming and going to increase it. This is the case with most merchants and, as a rule, with farmers. It also is the case with craftsmen. If they have no rank and are restricted to the profits of their crafts, they will mostly be reduced to poverty and indigence, and they do not quickly become wealthy. They make only a bare living, somehow fending off the distress of poverty.

If this has been established and if it further has become clear that rank is widely distributed and that one's happiness and welfare are intimately connected with the acquisition of (rank), it will be realized that it is a very great and important favor to give away or grant a rank to someone, and that the person who gives it away is a very great benefactor. He gives it only to people under his control. Thus, giving (rank) away (shows) influence and power. Consequently, a person who seeks and desires rank must be obsequious and use flattery, as powerful men and rulers require. Otherwise, it will be impossible for him to obtain any (rank). Therefore, we have stated that obsequiousness and flattery are the reasons why a person may be able to obtain a rank that produces happiness and profit, and that most wealthy and happy people have the quality (of obsequiousness and use flattery). Thus, too, many people who are proud and supercilious have no use for rank. Their earnings, consequently, are restricted to (the results of) their own labors, and they are reduced to poverty and indigence.

It should be known that such haughtiness and pride are blameworthy qualities. They result from the assumption (by an individual) that he is perfect, and that people need the scientific or technical skill he offers. Such an individual, for instance, is a scholar who is deeply versed in his science, or a scribe who writes well, or a poet who makes good poetry. Anyone who knows his craft assumes that people need what he has. Therefore, he develops a feeling of superiority to them. People of noble descent, whose forebears include a ruler or a famous scholar, or a person perfect in some position, also share this illusion. They are arrogant

because of the position their forebears held in their town. They have seen it themselves or have heard about it. They assume that they deserve a similar position because of their relationship to such men and the fact that they are their heirs. In fact, they cling to something that is a matter of the past, since perfection is not passed on by inheritance. The same is the case with people who are skillful, experienced, and versed in affairs. Some of them assume that they are perfect and needed on that account.

All these types (of people) are found to be proud. They are not obsequious and do not flatter people of a higher station. They belittle all others, because they believe that they are better than other people. One of them may even disdain to be obsequious to a ruler and consider such obsequiousness humiliating, abasing, and stupid. He expects people to treat him in accordance with what he thinks of himself, and he hates those who in any respect fail to treat him as he expects to be treated. He often gets to feel very anxious and sad, because they fail (to treat him according to his expectations). He always worries much, because people refuse to give him what he considers his due. People, (in turn,) come to hate him, because of the egoism of human nature. Rarely will (a human being) concede perfection and superiority to another, unless he is somehow forced to do so by superior strength. Such (forcefulness and superior strength) is implied - in rank. Thus, when a haughty person has no rank-and he cannot have any, as has been explained - people hate him for his haughtiness, and he receives no share of their kindness. He obtains no rank from members of the next higher class, because he is hated (by them), and, therefore, he cannot associate with them and frequent their homes. In consequence, his livelihood is destroyed. He remains in a state of indigence and poverty, or (in a state) that is only a little better. The acquisition of wealth is altogether out of the question for him.

In this (sense), it is widely said among the people that a person who is perfect in knowledge obtains no share (in worldly goods). The knowledge that is given to him is taken into account, and this is set apart as his share (in worldly goods). This is the meaning of it. Everyone is successful at the things for which he was created God decides. There is no Lord but Him.

In a dynasty, the character quality mentioned may cause disturbances among the ranks. Many people of the low classes come up to fill them, and many people of the higher classes have to step down on that account. The reason is that when a dynasty has reached its limit of superiority and power, the royal clan claims royal and governmental authority exclusively for itself. Everybody else despairs of (getting any share in) it. (All the other people can only) hold ranks below the rank of the ruler and under the control of the government. They are a sort of servant of his. Now, when the dynasty continues and royal authority flourishes, those who go into the service of the ruler, who try to approach him with advice, or who are accepted as followers by him because of their capability in many of his important affairs, will all be equal in rank in his eyes. Many common people will make efforts to approach the ruler with zealous counsel and come close to him through all kinds of services. For this purpose, such people make much use of obsequiousness and flattery toward the ruler, his entourage, and his family, so that eventually they will be firmly entrenched and the ruler will give them a

place in the total (picture) of his (administration). Thus, they obtain a large share of happiness and are accepted among the people of the dynasty.

At such a time, the new generation of the dynasty, the children of the people who had seen the dynasty through its difficulties and smoothed its path, are arrogant because of the noteworthy achievements of their forefathers. Because of them, they look down on the ruler. They rely on their influence (lasting) and become very presumptuous. This makes the ruler hate them and keep away from them. He now leans toward those of his followers who do not rely upon any (achievements of the past) and would not think of being presumptuous and proud. Their behavior is characterized by obsequiousness to (the ruler) and flattery (of him) and willingness to work for his purposes whenever he is ready for some undertaking. Their rank, consequently, becomes important. Their stations become high. The outstanding personalities and the elite turn to them, because they receive so many favors from the ruler and have great influence with him. The new generation of the dynasty, meanwhile, keeps its proud attitude and continues to rely upon the (achievements of the) past. They gain nothing from that. It merely alienates them from the ruler and makes him hate them and give preference to his (newly gained) supporters, until the dynasty is destroyed. This is natural in a dynasty, and this is usually at the origin of the importance of its followers. God does whatever He wishes.

Section VII

Persons Who are in Charge of Ices Dealing with Religious Matters, such as Judge, Mufti, Teacher, Prayer Leader, Preacher, Muezzin, and the Like, are Not as a Rule Very Wealthy

The reason for this is that, as we have stated before, profit is the value realized from labor (products). (This value) differs according to the (varying degrees of) need for (a particular kind of labor). Certain (types of) labor (products) may be necessary in civilization and be a matter of general concern. Then, the value realized from (these products) is greater and the need for them more urgent (than otherwise).

Now, the common people have no compelling need for the things that religious (officials) have to offer. They are needed only by those special people who take a particular interest in their religion. (Even) if the offices of mufti and judge are needed in case of disputes, it is not a compelling and general need. Mostly, they can be dispensed with. Only the ruler is concerned with (religious officials) and (religious) institutions, as part of his duty to look after the (public) interests. He assigns (the religious officials) a share of sustenance proportionate to the need that exists for them in the sense (just) mentioned. He does not place them on an equal footing with people who have power or with people who ply the necessary crafts, even if the things that (the religious officials) have to offer are nobler, as they deal with religion and the legal institutions. He gives them their share in accordance with the general need and the demand of the population (for them). Their portion, therefore, can only be small.

Furthermore, because the things (the religious officials) have to offer are so noble, they feel superior to the people and are proud of themselves. Therefore, they are not obsequious to persons of rank, in order to obtain something to improve their sustenance. In fact, they would not have time for that. They are occupied with those noble things they have to offer and which tax both the mind and the body. Indeed, the noble character of the things they have to offer does not permit them to prostitute themselves openly. They would not do such a thing. As a consequence, they do not, as a rule, become very wealthy.

I discussed this with an excellent man. He disagreed with me about it. But some stray leaves from the account books of the government offices in the palace of al-Ma'mun came into my hand. They gave a good deal of information about income and expenditures at that time. Among the things I noticed, were the salaries of judges, prayer leaders, and muezzins. I called the attention of (the person mentioned) to it, and he realized that what I had said was correct. He became a convert to (my opinion), and we were both astonished at the secret ways of God with regard to His creation and His wise (planning) concerning His worlds. God is the Creator, and He decides.

Section VIII

Agriculture is a Way of Making a Living for Weak People and Bedouins in Search of Subsistence

This is because agriculture is a natural and simple procedure. Therefore, as a rule, sedentary people, or people who live in luxury, do not practice it. Those who practice it are characterized by humility. When Muhammad saw a plowshare in one of the houses of the Ansar (in Medina), he said: "Such a thing never entered anyone's house save accompanied by humbleness." Al-Bukhari explained this (statement) as referring to too intense an occupation with (agriculture) and he entitled the chapter in which he dealt with the tradition in question: "Warning against the consequences of (too intensive an) occupation with agricultural implements or transgression of the stipulated limit." (However,) the reason for it might possibly be that imposts come to be (exactd from farmers) and lead to (their) domination and control (by others). The person who has to pay imposts is humble and poor, because a superior force takes (his possessions) away (from him). Muhammad said: "The Hour will not arise until the charity tax becomes an impost." This refers to the tyrannical ruler who uses force against the people, who is domineering and unjust, and who forgets the divine rights of (private) capital and considers all rights to be (subject to) imposts (to be paid) to rulers and dynasties. God has power to do what He wishes.

Section IX

The Meaning, Methods, and Different Kinds of Commerce

It should be known that commerce means the attempt to make a profit by increasing capital, through buying goods at a low price and selling them at a high price, whether these goods consist of slaves, grain, animals, weapons, or clothing material. The accrued (amount) is called "profit" (ribh).

The attempt to make such a profit may be undertaken by storing goods and holding them until the market has fluctuated from low prices to high prices. This will bring a large profit. Or, the merchant may transport his goods to another country where they are more in demand than in his own, where he bought them. This, (again,) will bring a large profit.

Therefore, an old merchant said to a person who wanted to find out the truth about commerce: "I shall give it to you in two words: Buy cheap and sell dear. There is commerce for you." By this, he meant the same thing that we have just established. God "gives sustenance. He is strong and solid."

Section X

The Transportation of Goods by Merchants

The merchant who knows his business will travel only with such goods as are generally needed by rich and poor, rulers and commoners alike. (General need) makes for a large demand for his goods. If he restricts his goods to those needed only by a few (people), it may be impossible for him to sell them, since these few may for some reason find it difficult to buy them. Then, his business would slump, and he would make no profit.

Also, a merchant who travels with needed goods should do so only with medium quality goods. The best quality of any type of goods is restricted to wealthy people and the entourage of the ruler. They are very few in number. As is well known, the medium quality of anything is what suits most people. This should by all means be kept in mind by the merchant, because it makes the difference between selling his goods and not selling them.

Likewise, it is more advantageous and more profitable for the merchant's enterprise, and a better guarantee (that he will be able to take advantage of) market fluctuations, if he brings goods from a country that is far away and where there is danger on the road. In such a case, the goods transported will be few and rare, because the place where they come from is far away or because the road over which they come is beset with perils, so that there are few who would bring them, and they are very rare. When goods are few and rare, their prices go up. On the other hand, when the country is near and the road safe for traveling, there will be many to transport the goods. Thus, they will be found in large quantities, and the prices will go down.

Therefore, the merchants who dare to enter the Sudan country are the most prosperous and wealthy of all people. The distance and the difficulty of the road they travel are great. They have to cross a difficult desert which is made (almost) inaccessible by fear (of danger) and beset by (the danger of) thirst. Water is found there only in a few wellknown spots to which caravan guides lead the way. The distance of this road is braved only by a very few people. Therefore, the goods of the Sudan country are found only in small quantities among us, and they are particularly expensive. The same applies to our goods among them.

Thus, merchandise becomes more valuable when merchants transport it from one country to another. (Merchants who do so) quickly get rich and wealthy. The same applies to merchants who travel from our country to the East, also because of the great distance to be traversed. On the other hand, those who travel back and forth between the cities and countries of one particular region earn little and make a very small profit, because their goods are available in large quantities and there is a great number of merchants who travel with them. God "gives sustenance. He is strong and solid."

Section XI

Hoarding

Intelligent and experienced people in the cities know that it is inauspicious to hoard grain and to wait for high prices, and that the profit (expected) may be spoiled or lost through (hoarding). The reason may perhaps lie in the facts that people need food, and that the money they spend on it, they are forced to spend. Therefore, their souls continue to cling to (their money). The fact that souls cling to what is theirs may be an important factor in bringing bad luck to the person who takes (someone's money) giving nothing in return. This, perhaps, is what the Lawgiver (Muhammad) meant when he speaks about taking people's property for nothing. In this particular case, it is not a question of (taking money) giving nothing in return. Still, people cling to (the money spent for food); they had to spend it and had no possible excuse, which is a sort of compulsion.

For things that are traded, other than foodstuffs and victuals, people have no compelling need. It is merely the diversification of desires that calls their attention to them. On such, they spend their money voluntarily and willingly, and they retain no hankering after (the money) they have paid. Thus, the person known to be a hoarder is persecuted by the combined psychic powers of the people whose money he takes away. Therefore, he loses his profit. And God knows better.

In this connection, I heard an interesting story about a shaykh of the Maghrib. Our teacher Abu 'Abdallah al-Abili told it to me as follows: "I was in the house of the (chief) judge of Fez, in the time of Sultan Abu Sa'id. He was the jurist Abu-Hasan al-Malili. He had just been offered, as his salary, the choice of one of the various sorts (of taxes) that were collected by the government." He said: "The judge reflected a while. Then he said: 'The customs duties on wine.' Those of his friends who were present were amused and astonished. They questioned him as to what was in his mind. He replied: 'All tax money is forbidden. Therefore, I choose the tax that is not haunted by the souls of those who had to pay it. Rarely would anybody spend his money on wine unless he were gay and happy with the experience of (drinking wine), and did not regret it. His soul, therefore, does not cling to the money he has had to spend.' " This is a remarkable observation. And God knows better.

Section XII

(Continued) Low Prices are Harmful to Merchants Who (have to) Trade at Low Prices

This is because, as we have stated before, profit and livelihood result from the crafts or from commerce. Commerce means the buying of merchandise and goods, storing them, and waiting until fluctuation of the market brings about an increase in the prices of (these goods). This is called profit (ribh). It provides a profit (kasb) and a livelihood for professional traders. When the prices of any type of goods, victuals, clothing material, or anything else (that may bring in) capital, remain low and the merchant cannot profit from any fluctuation of the market affecting these things, his profit and gain stop if the situation goes on for a long period. Business in this particular line (of goods) slumps, and the merchant has nothing but trouble. No (trading) will be done, and the merchants lose their capital.

This may be exemplified in the instance of grain. While it remains cheap, the condition of all farmers and grain producers who have to do with any of the various stages of grain production is adversely affected, the profit they make being small, insignificant, or non-existent. They cannot increase their capital, or they find (the increase) to be small. They have to spend their capital. Their condition is adversely affected, and they are reduced to poverty and indigence. This then, in turn, affects the condition of millers, bakers, and all the other occupations that are connected with grain from the time it is sown to the time it can be eaten. Likewise, the condition of soldiers is adversely affected. Their sustenance is provided by the ruler in the form of grain from farmers, through the grant of fiefs. Thus, (when the prices of agricultural products are low) the income from taxation is small, and soldiers are unable to render the military service for which they exist and for which they receive sustenance from the ruler. Thus, (the ruler) discontinues their sustenance, and their condition is adversely affected.

Likewise, while the prices of sugar and honey remain low, everything connected with (these commodities) is adversely affected, and the merchants who deal in it stop trading. The same is the case with clothing (material), while prices remain low. Thus, prices that are too low destroy the livelihood of the merchant who trades in any particular type of low-priced (merchandise). The same applies to prices that are too high. Occasionally and rarely, they may bring an increase in capital as a result of hoarding (some particular merchandise) and the large profit that goes with (hoarding), but it is medium prices and rapid fluctuations of the market that provide people with their livelihood and profit.

This insight has a bearing upon customs established among civilized people.

Low prices for grain, and of other things that are traded, are praised, because the need for grain is general and people, the rich as well as the poor, are compelled to buy food.

Dependent people constitute the majority of people in civilization. Therefore, (low prices for foodstuffs) are of general usefulness, and food, (at least) as far as this particular kind of food

(namely, grain) is concerned, weighs more heavily than commerce. God "gives sustenance. He is strong and solid."

Section XIII

The Kind of People Who Should Practice Commerce, and Those Who Should Not

We have stated before that commerce means increasing one's capital by buying merchandise and attempting to sell it for a price higher than its purchase price, either by waiting for market fluctuations or transporting the merchandise to a country where that particular merchandise is more in demand and brings higher prices, or by selling it for a high price to be paid at a future date. The profit is small in relation to the capital (invested). However, when the capital is large, the profit becomes great, because many times a little is much.

In the attempt to earn the increase (of capital) that constitutes profit, it is unavoidable that one's capital gets into the hands of traders, in the process of buying and selling and waiting for payment. Now, honest traders are few. It is unavoidable that there should be cheating, tampering with the merchandise which may ruin it, and delay in payment which may ruin the profit, since (such delay) while it lasts prevents any activity that could bring profit. There will also be non-acknowledgement or denial of obligations, which may prove destructive of one's capital unless (the obligation) has been stated in writing and properly witnessed. The judiciary is of little use in this connection, since the law requires clear evidence.

All this causes the merchant a great deal of trouble. He may make a small profit, but only with great trouble and difficulty, or he may make no profit at all, or his capital may be lost. If he is not afraid of quarrels, knows (how to settle) an account, and is always willing to enter into a dispute and go to court, he stands a better chance of being treated fairly by (traders), because he is not afraid and always ready to enter into a dispute. Otherwise, he must have the protection of rank. It will give him respect in the eyes of traders and cause the magistrates to uphold his rights against his debtors. In this way, he will obtain justice and recover his capital from them, voluntarily in the first case, forcibly in the second.

On the other hand, the person who is afraid or unaggressive, and who, in addition, lacks the influence (of rank) with the judiciary, must avoid commerce. He risks the loss of his capital. He will become the prey of traders, and he may not get his rights from them. People as a rule covet the possessions of other people. Without the restraining influence of the laws, nobody's property would be safe. This applies especially to traders and the low-class mob.

Section XIV

The Character Qualities of Merchants are Inferior to Those of Leading Personalities and Remote From Manliness

In the preceding section, we stated that a merchant must concern himself with buying and selling, earning money and making a profit. This requires cunning, willingness to enter into disputes, cleverness, constant quarreling, and great persistence. These are things that belong to commerce. They are qualities detrimental to and destructive of virtuousness and manliness, because it is unavoidable that actions influence the soul. Good actions influence it toward goodness and virtue. Evil and deceitful actions influence it in the opposite sense. If (evil and deceitful actions) come first and good qualities later, the former become firmly and deeply rooted and detract from the good qualities, since the blameworthy influence (of the evil actions) has left its imprint upon the soul, as is the case with all habits that originate from actions.

These influences differ according to the different types of merchants. Those who are of a very low type and associated closely with bad traders who cheat and defraud and perjure themselves, asserting and denying statements concerning transactions and prices, are much more strongly affected by these bad character qualities. Deceitfulness becomes their main characteristic. Manliness is completely alien to them, beyond their power to acquire. At any rate, it is unavoidable that their cunning and their willingness to enter into disputes affects their manliness (adversely). The complete absence of (any adverse effect) is very rare among them.

There exists a second kind of merchant, which we mentioned in the preceding section, namely, those who have the protection of rank and are thus spared (the onus) of having anything to do personally with such (business manipulations). They are most uncommon. For they are people who have all of a sudden come into the possession of a good deal of money in some unusual way, or have inherited money from a member of their family. Thus, they have obtained the wealth that helps them to associate with the people of the dynasty and to gain prominence and renown among their contemporaries. Therefore, they are too proud to have anything personally to do with such (business manipulations), and they leave them to the care of their agents and servants. It is easy for them to have the magistrates confirm their rights, because (the magistrates) are familiar with their beneficence and gifts. (These merchants) will thus be remote from such (bad) character qualities, since they have nothing to do with the actions that bring them about, as has just been mentioned. Their manliness, therefore, will be very firmly rooted and very remote from these destructive qualities, save for the influences of such evil actions as may slip in behind the scenes. For they are compelled to supervise their agents and to concur with or oppose the things they do and do not do. However, these (activities) are limited, and their influence is scarcely perceptible. "God created you and whatever you do."

The character qualities of merchants are inferior to those of noblemen and rulers, because: merchants are mostly occupied with buying and selling. This necessarily requires cunning. If a merchant always practices cunning, it becomes his dominant character quality. The quality of cunning is remote from that of manliness which is the characteristic quality of rulers and noblemen. If the character of (the merchant) then adopts the bad qualities that follow from (cunning) in low-class merchants, such as quarrelsomeness, cheating, defrauding, as well as (the inclination to) commit perjury in rejecting and accepting statements concerning prices, his character can be expected to be one of the lowest sort, for well-known reasons. It is because of the character that one acquires through the practice of commerce that political leaders avoid engaging in it. There are some merchants who are not affected by those character qualities and who are able to avoid them, because they have noble souls and are magnanimous, but they are very rare in this world. "God guides whomever He wants to guide" with His bounty and generosity. He is the Lord of the first ones and the last ones.

Section XV

The Crafts Require Teachers

It should be known that a craft is the habit of something concerned with action and thought. In as much as it is concerned with action, it is something corporeal and perceptible by the senses. Things that are corporeal and perceptible by the senses are transmitted through direct practice more comprehensively and more perfectly (than otherwise), because direct practice is more useful with regard to them.

A habit is a firmly rooted quality acquired by doing a certain action and repeating it time after time, until the form of (that action) is firmly fixed. A habit corresponds to the original (action after which it was formed). The transmission of things one has observed with one's own eyes is something more comprehensive and complete than the transmission of information and things one has learned about. A habit that is the result of (personal observation) is more perfect and more firmly rooted than a habit that is the result of information. The skill a student acquires in a craft, and the habit he attains, correspond to the quality of instruction and the habit of the teacher.

Furthermore, some crafts are simple, and others are composite. The simple ones concern the necessities. The composite ones belong to the luxuries. The simple crafts are the ones to be taught first, firstly because they are simple, and (then) because they concern the necessities and there is a large demand for having them transmitted. Therefore, they take precedence in instruction. (But) the instruction in them, as a consequence, is something inferior.

The mind, (however,) does not cease transforming all kinds of (crafts), including the composite ones, from potentiality into actuality through the gradual discovery of one thing after the other, until they are perfect. This is not achieved all at one stroke. It is achieved in the course of time and of generations. Things are not transformed from potentiality into actuality all at one stroke, especially not technical matters. Consequently, a certain amount of time is unavoidable. Therefore, the crafts are found to be inferior in small cities, and only the simple (crafts) are found there. When sedentary civilization in (those cities) increases, and luxury conditions there cause the use of the crafts, they are transformed from potentiality into actuality.

Section XVI

The Crafts are Perfected Only if There Exists a Large and Perfect Sedentary Civilization

The reason for this is that, as long as sedentary civilization is not complete and the city not fully organized, people are concerned only with the necessities of life, that is, with the obtaining of food, such as wheat and other things. Then, when the city is organized and the (available) labor increases and pays for the necessities and is more than enough (for the inhabitants), the surplus is spent on luxuries.

The crafts and sciences are the result of man's ability to think, through which he is distinguished from the animals. (His desire for) food, on the other hand, is the result of his animal and nutritive power. It is prior to sciences and crafts because of its necessary character. (The sciences and crafts) come after the necessities. The (susceptibility) of the crafts to refinement, and the quality of (the purposes) they are to serve in view of the demands made by luxury and wealth, then correspond to the civilization of a given country.

A small or Bedouin civilization needs only the simple crafts, especially those used for the necessities, such as (the crafts of) the carpenter, the smith, the tailor, the butcher, or the weaver. They exist there. Still, they are neither perfect nor well developed. They exist only in as much as they are needed, since all of them are means to an end and are not intended for their own sake.

When civilization flourishes and the luxuries are in demand, it includes the refinement and development of the crafts. Consequently, (these crafts) are perfected with every finesse, and a number of other crafts, in addition to them, is added, as luxury-customs and conditions demand. Among (such crafts are) those of the cobbler, the tanner, the silk weaver, the goldsmith, and others. When the civilization is fully developed, these different kinds (of crafts are perfected and refined to the limit. In the cities, they become ways of making a living for those who practice them. In fact, they become the most lucrative activities there are, because urban luxury demands them. Other such crafts are those of the perfumer, the coppersmith, the bath attendant, the cook, the biscuit baker, the harisah baker, the teacher of singing, dancing, and rhythmical drum beating. There are also the book producers who ply the craft of copying, binding, and correcting books. This (last mentioned) craft is demanded by the urban luxury of occupation with intellectual matters. There are other similar (crafts). They become excessive when civilization develops excessively. Thus, we learn that there are Egyptians who teach dumb creatures like birds and domestic donkeys who produce marvelous spectacles which give the illusion that objects are transformed, and who teach the use of the camel driver's chant, how to dance and walk on ropes stretched in the air, how to lift heavy animals and stones, and other things. These crafts do not exist among us in the Maghrib, because the civilization of (Maghribi) cities does not compare with the civilization of Egypt and Cairo. God is wise and knowing.

Section XVII

The Crafts are Firmly Rooted in a City (only) When Sedentary Culture is Firmly Rooted and of Long Duration

The reason for this is obvious. All crafts are customs and colors of civilization. Customs become firmly rooted only through much repetition and long duration. Then, their coloring becomes firmly established and rooted in (successive) generations. Once such coloring is firmly established, it is difficult to remove it. Therefore, we find that cities with a highly developed sedentary culture, the civilization (population) of which has receded and decreased, retain traces of crafts that do not exist in other more recently civilized cities, even though they may have reached the greatest abundance (of population). This is only because conditions in those (cities) with the old civilization had become well established and firmly rooted through their long duration and constant repetition, whereas the (other recently civilized cities) have not yet reached the limit.

This is the situation, for instance, in contemporary Spain. There we find the crafts and their institutions still in existence. They are well established and firmly rooted, as far as the things required by the customs of (Spanish) cities are concerned. (They include,) for instance, building, cooking, the various kinds of singing and entertainment, such as instrumental music, string instruments and dancing, the use of carpets in palaces, the construction of well-planned, well-constructed houses, the production of metal and pottery vessels, all kinds of utensils, the giving of banquets and weddings, and all the other crafts required by luxury and luxury customs. One finds that they practice and understand these things better (than any other nation) and that they know well the crafts that belong to them. They have an abundant share of these things and have distinctly more of them than any other city, even though civilization in (Spain) has receded and most of it does not equal that which exists in the other countries of the (Mediterranean) shore. This is only because, as we have mentioned before, sedentary culture had become deeply rooted in Spain through the stability given it by the Umayyad dynasty, the preceding Gothic dynasty, and the reyes de taifas, successors to (the Umayyads), and so on. Therefore, sedentary culture had reached in (Spain) a stage that had not been reached in any other region except, reportedly, in the 'Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. There, too, the reason was the long duration of the respective dynasties. Thus, the crafts became well established there. All the various kinds of crafts were developed and refined to perfection. Their coloring remained in that civilization and did not leave it, until it was totally destroyed. Like a garment's fast color, (the colour held fast until the garment was destroyed).

This was also the case in Tunis. A sedentary culture had been established there by the Sinhajah (Zirid) dynasty and its successors, the Almohads. The crafts were developed to perfection in every respect, though less so than in Spain. However, sedentary culture in Tunis has been greatly enriched by sedentary institutions imported from Egypt. The distance between the two countries is short, and travelers from Tunis visit Egypt every year. Also, (Tunisians) often live in (Egypt) for some time, and then bring back the (Egyptian) luxury

customs and technical knowledge they like. Thus, the situation with regard to (sedentary culture in Tunis) has become similar to that of Egypt, for the reasons mentioned, and also to that of Spain, because many people from eastern Spain who were exiled in the seventh [thirteenth] century settled in Tunis. Thus, certain aspects of (sedentary culture) have become firmly rooted there, even though the civilization (population) of (Tunis) at this time is not adequate to them. However, a fast coloring rarely changes, except when its basis ceases to exist. Thus, we also find in al-Qayrawan, in Marrakech, and in Qal'at Ibn Hammad some remnants of such (sedentary culture). All these places, it is true, are nowadays in ruins or destined soon to fall into ruins, and only people who know are able to discern these remnants. They will find, however, traces of the crafts (there) showing what once existed there, like faded writing in a book. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XVIII

Crafts Can Improve and Increase only When Many People Demand Them

The reason for this is that man cannot afford to give away his labor for nothing, because it is his (source of) profit and livelihood. Throughout his life, he has no advantage from anything else. Therefore, he must employ his labor only on whatever has value in his city, if it is to be profitable to him.

If a particular craft is in demand and there are buyers for it, (that) craft, then, corresponds to a type of goods that is in great demand and imported for sale. People in the towns, therefore, are eager to learn (that particular) craft, in order to make a living through it. On the other hand, if a particular craft is not in demand, there are no buyers for it, and no one is interested in learning it. As a result, (the craft) is destined to be left alone and disappears because of neglect.

Therefore, it has been said on the authority of Ali: "Every man's value consists in what he knows well." This means that the craft he knows constitutes his value, that is, the value realized from his labor, which is his livelihood.

There is another secret to be understood in this connection. That is, that it is the ruling dynasty that demands crafts and their improvement. It causes the demand for them and makes them desirable. Crafts not in demand with the dynasty may be in demand with the other inhabitants of a city. However, that would not be the same thing, for the dynasty is the biggest market. There, everything can be marketed. It does not make any difference whether it is little or much. Whatever is in demand with the dynasty is of necessity a major article. On the other hand, the demand of the common people for a particular craft is not general, nor is the business that the common people can provide of large volume. God has power to do what He wishes.

Section XIX

The Crafts Recede from Cities that are Close to Ruin

This is because of what we have explained. The crafts can improve only when they are needed and when they are in demand with many people. When the condition of a city weakens and senility sets in as the result of a decrease of its civilization and the small number of its inhabitants, luxury in the city decreases and (its inhabitants) revert to restricting themselves to the necessities. The crafts belonging to luxury conditions and which depend on (luxury) become few. The master of (a particular craft) is no longer assured of making a living from it.

Therefore, he deserts (his craft) for another, or he dies and leaves no successor. As a result, the institutions of the crafts disappear altogether. Thus, for instance, painters, goldsmiths, calligraphers, copyists, and similar artisans who cater to luxury needs disappear. The crafts continue to decrease, as long as the city continues to decrease, until they no longer exist. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XX

The Arabs, of All People, are Least Familiar With Crafts

The reason for this is that the Arabs are more firmly rooted in desert life and more remote from sedentary civilization, the crafts, and the other things which sedentary civilization calls for, (than anybody else). (On the other hand,) the non-Arabs in the East and the Christian nations along the shores of the Mediterranean are very well versed in (the crafts), because they are more deeply rooted in sedentary civilization and more remote from the desert and desert civilization (than others). They do not even have camels, which make it possible for the Arabs to retreat far into the wilderness of the desert, nor do they have pastures for (camels) or sand suitable for their breeding.

Therefore, we find that the homelands of the Arabs and the places they took possession of in Islam had few crafts altogether, so that (crafts) had to be imported from other regions. One may observe the great number of crafts in non-Arab countries such as China, India, the lands of the Turks, and the Christian nations, and the fact that other nations imported (their own crafts) from them.

The non-Arabs in the West, the Berbers, are like the Arabs in this respect, because for a very long period they remained firmly rooted in desert life. This is attested by the small number of cities in the (Berber) region, as we have stated before. The crafts in the Maghrib, therefore, are few in number and are not well established. Exceptions are the weaving of wool and the tanning and stitching of leather. For, when they settled down, they developed these (crafts) greatly, because they were matters of general concern and (the wool and leather) needed for them were the most common raw materials in their region, on account of the Bedouin conditions prevailing among them.

On the other hand, the crafts had been firmly rooted in the East for a very long period, ever since the rule of the ancient nations, the Persians, the Nabataeans, the Copts, the Israelites, the Greeks, and the Romans (Rum). Thus, the conditions of sedentary culture became firmly rooted among them. It included the crafts, as we have stated before. Their traces have not been wiped out.

The Yemen, al-Bahrayn, Oman, and the Jazirah have long been in Arab possession, but for thousands of years, the rule of these areas has belonged to different (Arab) nations in succession. They also founded cities and towns (there) and promoted the development of sedentary culture and luxury to the highest degree. Among such nations were the 'Ad and the Thamud, the Amalekites and the Himyar after them, the Tubbas, and the other South Arabian rulers (Adhwa) . There was a long period of royal authority and sedentary culture. The coloring of (sedentary culture) established itself firmly. The crafts became abundant and firmly rooted. They were not wiped out simultaneously with (each ruling) dynasty, as we have stated. They have remained and have always renewed themselves down to this time, and

they have become the specialty of that area. Such (special Yemenite) crafts are embroidered fabrics, striped cloth, and finely woven garments and silks. God inherits the earth and whomever is upon it.

Section XXI

The Person Who has Gained the Habit of a Particular Craft is Rarely Able Afterwards to Master Another

A tailor, for instance, who has acquired the habit of tailoring and knows it well and has that habit firmly rooted in his soul, will not afterwards master the habit of carpentry or construction, unless the first habit was not yet firmly established and its coloring not yet firmly rooted.

The reason for this is that habits are qualities and colors of the soul. They do not come all at once. A person who is still in his natural state has (an) easier (time) acquiring certain habits and is better prepared to gain them. When the soul has been colored by a habit, it is no longer in its natural state, and it is less prepared (to master another habit), because it has taken on a certain coloring from that habit. As a result, it is less disposed to accept (another) habit.

This is clear and attested by (the facts of) existence. One rarely finds a craftsman who, knowing his craft well, afterwards acquires a good knowledge of another craft and masters both equally well. This extends even to scholars whose habit has to do with thinking. (The scholar) who has acquired the habit of one particular science and masters it completely will rarely achieve the same mastery of the habit of another science, and if he were to study (another science), he would, except under very rare circumstances, be deficient in it. The reason lies in the significance attaching, as we have mentioned, to preparedness and the fact that he becomes colored by the color that the soul receives from the habit it acquires. And God knows better.

Section XXII

A Brief Enumeration of the Basic Crafts

It should be known that the crafts practiced by the human species are numerous, because so much labor is continually available in civilization. They are so numerous as to defy complete enumeration. However, some of them are necessary in civilization or occupy a noble (position) because of (their) object. We shall single these two kinds out for mention and leave all others.

Necessary (crafts) are agriculture, architecture, tailoring, carpentry, and weaving. Crafts noble because of (their) object are midwifery, the art of writing, book production, singing, and medicine.

Midwifery is something necessary in civilization and a matter of general concern, because it assures, as a rule, the life of the new-born child. The object of (midwifery) is newborn children and their mothers.

Medicine preserves the health of man and repels disease. It is a branch of physics. Its object is the human body.

The art of writing, and book production, which depends on it, preserve the things that are of concern to man and keep them from being forgotten. It enables the innermost thoughts of the soul to reach those who are far and absent. It perpetuates in books the results of thinking and scholarship. It makes four out of the (three) orders of existence (as it constitutes a special order of existence) for ideas.

Singing is the harmony of sounds and the manifestation of their beauty to the ears.

All these three crafts call for contact with great rulers in their privacy and at their intimate parties. Thus, they have nobility that other (crafts) do not have. The other crafts are, as a rule, secondary and subordinate. (The attitude toward them, however,) differs according to the different purposes and requirements. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XXIII

The Craft of Agriculture

The fruit of this craft is the obtainment of foodstuffs and grains. People must undertake to stir the earth, sow, cultivate the plants, see to it that they are watered and that they grow until they reach their full growth, then, harvest the ears, and get the grain out of the husks. They also must understand all the related activities, and procure all the things required in this connection.

Agriculture is the oldest of all crafts, in as much as it provides the food that is the main factor in perfecting human life, since man can exist without anything else but not without food. Therefore, this craft has existed especially in the desert, since, as we have stated before, it is prior to and older than sedentary life. Thus, it became a Bedouin craft which is not practiced or known by sedentary people, because all their conditions are secondary to those of desert life and their crafts, thus, secondary and subsequent to (Bedouin) crafts. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XIV

The Waft of Architecture

This is the first and oldest craft of sedentary civilization. It is the knowledge of how to go about using houses and mansions for cover and shelter. This is because man has the natural disposition to reflect upon the outcome of things. Thus, it is unavoidable that he must reflect upon how to avert the harm arising from heat and cold by using houses which have walls, and roofs to intervene between him and those things on all sides. This natural disposition to think, which is the real meaning of humanity, exists among (men) in different degrees. Some men are more or less temperate in this respect. They use (housing) with moderation, as, for instance, the inhabitants of the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth zones. The inhabitants of the first and seventh zones, on the other hand, are unfamiliar with the use of (housing), because they are intemperate and their thinking does not go far enough to enable them to practice human crafts. Therefore, they take shelter in caverns and caves, just as they (also) eat unprepared and uncooked food.

Now, the temperate people who use houses for shelter become very numerous and have many houses in one area. They become strangers to each other and no longer know each other. They fear surprise attacks at night. Therefore, they must protect their community by surrounding it with a wall to guard them. The whole thing thus becomes a single town or city in which they are guarded by authorities which keep them apart. They (also) need protection against the enemy. Thus, they use fortresses and castles for themselves and for the people under their control. These men (who control fortresses and castles) are like rulers or amirs or tribal chieftains of a corresponding position.

Also, building conditions are different in the (various) towns. Each city follows in this respect the procedure known to and within the technical (competence) of (its inhabitants) and corresponding to the climate and the different conditions of (the inhabitants) with regard to wealth and poverty. The situation of the inhabitants within each individual city also (differs). Some use castles and far-flung constructions comprising a number of dwellings and houses and rooms, because they have a great number of children, servants, dependents, and followers. They make their walls of stones, which they join together with quicklime. They cover them with paint and plaster, and do the utmost to furnish and decorate everything. (They do so) in order to show how greatly they are concerned for their shelter. In addition, they prepare cellars and underground rooms for the storage of their food, and also stables for tying up their horses, if they are army people and have many followers and guests, such as amirs and people of a corresponding position.

Others build a small dwelling or house for themselves and for their children to live in. Their desire goes no farther, because their situation permits them no more. Thus, they restrict

themselves to a mere shelter, which is natural to human beings. Between the two (extremes), there are innumerable degrees.

Architecture is also needed when rulers and people of a dynasty build large towns and high monuments (hayakil). They try their utmost to make good plans and build tall structures with technical perfection, so that (architecture) can reach its highest development. Architecture is the craft that satisfies requirements in all these respects. It is found most (widely represented) in the temperate zones, that is, in the fourth zone and the adjacent area. In the intemperate zones, there is no building activity. The people there use enclosures of reeds and clay as houses, or take shelter in caverns and caves.

The architects who exercise the craft differ. Some are intelligent and skillful. Others are inferior.

Furthermore, (architecture) has many subdivisions. Thus, the building material may be smoothed stones or bricks. The walls made of (such material) are joined and firmly held together by clay and quicklime. They thus hold together as fast as if they were of one piece.

Another (material) is simply earth. One builds walls with it by using 116 two wooden boards, the measurements of which vary according to (local) custom. The average measurements are four cubits by two. They are set upon a foundation. The distance between them depends on the width of the foundation the builder considers appropriate. They are joined together with pieces of wood fastened with ropes or twine. The two remaining sides of the empty space between the two boards are joined by two other small boards. Then, one puts earth mixed with quicklime into (this frame). The earth and quicklime are pounded with special mixers used only for this purpose, until everything is well mixed throughout. Earth is then added a second and third time, until the space between the two boards is filled. The earth and quicklime have combined and become one substance. Then, two other boards are set up in the same fashion, and (the earth) is treated in the same manner, until it is ready. (All) the boards are then properly set up piece upon piece, until the whole wall is set up and joined together as tightly as if it were of one piece. This construction is called tabiyah, and the builder of it is called tawwab.

Another technique of construction is the covering of walls with quicklime.

The quicklime is first diluted with water and let soak for a week or two depending on how long is required for it to become well-balanced in its temper and to lose any excess igneousness detrimental to its adhesiveness. When this process is completed to the satisfaction of (the builder), he puts it on the wall beginning at the top and rubs it in until it sticks.

Another technique of construction is roofing. Pieces of wood (beams), either carefully smoothed by a carpenter or left rough, are placed over two walls of the house, and more boards are placed on top of them. They are joined together with nails. Upon that, earth and

quicklime are poured. They are pounded with mixers until they combine and hold together. The roof is thus covered with quicklime (plaster), exactly as the walls were covered with it.

Another technique of construction is decoration and ornamentation. Thus, figures formed from gypsum are placed upon the walls. (The gypsum) is mixed with water, and then solidified again, with some humidity remaining in it. Symmetrical figures are chiseled out of it with iron drills, until it looks brilliant and pleasant. The walls are occasionally also covered with pieces of marble, brick, clay, shells (mother-of-pearl), or jet. (The material) may be divided either into identically shaped or differently shaped pieces. These pieces are arranged in whatever symmetrical figures and arrangements are being utilized by the (various artisans), and set into the quicklime (with which the walls have been covered). Thus, the walls come to look like colorful flower beds.

There are (other techniques of construction), such as the construction of wells and cisterns for running water. In the houses, large, well-cut marble basins are prepared. They have orifices in the middle to permit the water of the cistern to flow out. The water comes to the cistern from the outside through conduits bringing it into the houses.

There are other similar kinds of architectural activity. The workmen who do all these things differ in skill and intelligence. They grow in number when the civilization of a town increases and widens.

The authorities often have recourse to the opinions of these men, about construction matters which they understand better. For in towns with large populations, people live in very crowded conditions. Therefore, they compete with each other for space and air above and below and for the use of the outside of a building. The owner fears lest (any encroachment) cause damage to the walls, and, therefore, forbids it to his neighbor, except where the neighbor has a legal right to it. (People) also have differences over right-of-way and about outlets for running water and about refuse disposed of through subterranean conduits. Occasionally, someone claims somebody else's right to (use of) a wall, eaves, or a gutter, because the houses are so close to each other. Or someone may claim that his neighbor's wall is in bad condition and he fears that it will collapse. He needs a judgment against the other party from an expert to force the other party to tear the wall down and prevent damage to the neighbor(ing house). Or, a house or courtyard has to be divided between two parties, so that no damage to the house or curtailment of its usefulness is caused, and similar things.

All these matters are clear only to those who know architecture in all its details. They can judge these details by looking at the joints and ties and the wooden parts. (They can see whether) the walls are leaning over or are straight, (whether) dwellings are divided as required by their construction and (intended) use, and (whether) water can flow in and out the conduits without causing harm to the houses or walls it flows through, and other things. They know about them and have the experience that others do not have.

However, the quality of (architects) differs in the different groups. It depends on the (ruling) dynasties and their power. We have stated before that the perfection of the crafts depends on the perfection of sedentary culture and their extent (depends) on the number of those who demand them. At the beginning, the dynasty is a Bedouin one, and therefore needs for its construction activities (the help of) other regions. This was the case when al-Walid b. 'Abd-al-Malik decided to build the mosques of Medina and Jerusalem and his own mosque in Damascus. He sent to the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople for workmen skilled in construction work, and the Byzantine emperor sent him enough men to build these mosques as he had planned them.

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Architects also make some use of geometry (engineering). For instance, they use the plumb to make walls perpendicular, and they use devices for lifting water, to make it flow, and similar things. Thus, they must know something about the problems connected with (engineering). They also must know how to move heavy loads with the help of machines. Big blocks of large stones cannot be lifted into place on a wall by the unaided strength of workmen alone. Therefore, the architect must contrive to multiply the strength of the rope by passing it through holes, constructed according to geometrical proportions, of the attachments called mikhal "pulleys." They make the load easier to lift, so that the intended work can be completed without difficulty. This can be achieved only with the help of geometrical (engineering) principles which are commonly known among men. Such things made it possible to build the (ancient) monuments that are standing to this day. They are believed to have been built in pre-Islamic times and by persons whose bodies were (of a size) corresponding (to the) large (size of the monuments). This is not so. (The people who built them) used engineering devices, as we have mentioned. This should be understood. "God creates whatever He wishes."

Section XXV

The Craft of Carpentry

This craft is one of the necessities of civilization. Its material is wood. This is as follows: God made all created things useful for man, so as to supply his necessities and needs. Trees belong among these things. They have innumerable uses known to everybody. One of their uses is their use as wood when they are dry. The first use of wood is as wood for fires, which man needs to live; as sticks for support, protection (of flocks), and other necessities; and as supports for loads that one fears might topple over. After that, wood has other uses, for the inhabitants of the desert as well as for those of settled areas.

Bedouins use wood for tent poles and pegs, for camel litters for their women, and for the lances, bows, and arrows they use for weapons. Sedentary people use wood for the roofs of their houses, for the locks of their doors, and for chairs to sit on. Wood is the raw material for all these things. The particular form needed in each case is the result of craftsmanship. The craft concerned with that and which gives every wooden object its form is carpentry in all its different grades.

The master of (this craft) must first split the wood into smaller pieces or into boards. Then, he puts these pieces together in the required form. In this connection, he attempts with the aid of his craft to prepare these pieces by the proper arrangement for (their) becoming parts of the (desired) particular shape. The man in charge of this craft is the carpenter. He is necessary to civilization. Then, when sedentary culture increases and luxury makes its appearance and people want to use elegant types of roofs, doors, chairs, and furniture, these things come to be produced in a most elegant way through mastery of remarkable techniques which are luxuries and in no way necessities. Such (techniques) include, for instance, the use of carvings for doors and chairs. Or, one skillfully turns and shapes pieces of wood in a lathe, and then one puts these pieces together in certain symmetrical arrangements and nails them together, so that they appear to the eye to be of one piece. They consist of different shapes all symmetrically combined. This is done with all the (possible) shapes into which wood may be cut, which turn out to be very elegant things. The same applies to all wooden utensils (alat) of whatever kind. Carpentry is also needed for the construction of ships, which are made of boards and nails. Ships are bodies (constructed with the help) of geometry (engineering), fashioned after the form of a fish and the way a fish swims in the water with its fins and belly. The shape is intended to make it easier for the ship to brave the water. Instead of the animal motion that the fish has, the ship is moved by the winds. It is often supported by the movement of oars, as is the case in (naval) fleets.

In view of its origin, carpentry needs a good deal of geometry of all kinds. It requires either a general or a specialized knowledge of proportion and measurement, in order to bring the forms (of things) from potentiality into actuality in the proper manner, and for the knowledge of - proportions one must have recourse to the geometrician.

Therefore, the leading Greek geometricians were all master carpenters. Euclid, the author of the Book of the Principles, on geometry, was a carpenter and was known as such. The same was the case with Apollonius, the author of the book on Conic Sections, and Menelaus, and others.

It is said that Noah taught carpentry (first) in the world. With its help, he constructed the ship of salvation (the Ark) with which he performed his (prophetical) miracle during the Flood. This story may be possible, that is, (Noah) may have been a carpenter. However, there is no reliable proof that he was the first to practice (carpentry), because (the event) lies so far back in the past. (The story) serves to indicate the great age of carpentry. There is no sound information about its (existence) before the story of Noah. Therefore, he was, in a way, considered the first to learn it. The true secrets (significance) of the crafts in the world should be understood. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XXVI

The Craft of Weaving and Tailoring

It should be known that people who are temperate in their humanity cannot avoid giving some thought to keeping warm, as they do to shelter. One manages to keep warm by using woven material as protective cover against both heat and cold. This requires the interlacing of yarn, until it turns out to be a complete garment. This is spinning and weaving.

Desert people restrict themselves to this. But people who are inclined toward sedentary culture cut the woven material into pieces of the right size to cover the form of the body and all of its numerous limbs in their various locations. They then put the different pieces together with thread, until they turn out to be a complete garment that fits the body and can be worn by people. The craft that makes things fit is tailoring.

These two crafts are necessary in civilization, because human beings must keep warm.

The purpose of (weaving) is to weave wool and cotton yarn in warp and woof and do it well, so that the texture will be strong. Pieces of cloth of certain measurements are thus produced. Some are garments of wool for covering. Others are garments of cotton and linen for wear.

The purpose of tailoring is to give the woven material a certain form in accordance with the many different shapes and customs (that may occur in this connection). The material is first cut with scissors into pieces that fit the limbs of the body. The pieces are then joined together with the help of skillful tailoring according to 'the rules, either by the use of thread, or with bands, or (one) quilts (them), or cuts openings. This (craft) is restricted to sedentary culture, since the inhabitants of the desert can dispense with it. They merely cover themselves with cloth. The tailoring of clothes, the cutting, fitting, and sewing of the material, is one of the various methods and aspects of sedentary culture.

This should be understood, in order to understand the reason why the wearing of sewn garments is forbidden on the pilgrimage. According to the religious law, the pilgrimage requires, among other things, the discarding of all worldly attachments and the return to God as He created us in the beginning. Man should not set his heart upon any of his luxury customs, such as perfume, women, sewn garments, or boots. He should not go hunting or expose himself to any other of the customs with which his soul and character have become colored. When he dies, he will necessarily lose them (anyhow). He should come (to the pilgrimage) as if he were going to the Last Judgment, humble in his heart, sincerely devoted to his Lord. If he is completely sincere in this respect, his reward will be that he will shed his sins (and be) like he was on the day when his mother gave birth to him. Praised be You! How kind have You been with Your servants and how compassionate have You been with them in their search for guidance toward You!

These two crafts are very ancient in the world, because it is necessary for man in a temperate civilization to keep warm. The inhabitants of less temperate, hotter zones do not need to keep warm. Therefore, we hear that the Negro inhabitants of the first zone are mostly naked. Because of the great age of these crafts, they are attributed by the common people to Idris, the most ancient of the prophets. They are also often attributed to Hermes. Hermes is said to be identical with Idris. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XXVII

The Craft of Midwifery

Midwifery is a craft that shows how to proceed in bringing the new-born child gently out of the womb of his mother and how to prepare the things that go with that. It also shows what is good for (a new-born child), after it is born, as we shall mention. The craft is as a rule restricted to women, since they, as women, may see the pudenda of other women. The woman who exercises this craft is called midwife (qabilah, literally, "the woman who receives"). The word implies the meaning of giving and receiving. The woman in labor in a way gives the embryo to the midwife, and the latter receives it.

This is as follows: When the embryo has gone through all its stages and is completely and perfectly formed in the womb - the period God determined for its remaining in the womb is as a rule nine months - it seeks to come out, because God implanted such a desire in (unborn children). But the opening is too narrow for it, and it is difficult for (the embryo to come out). It often splits one of the walls of the vagina by its pressure, and often the close connection and attachment of (its) covering membranes with the uterus are ruptured. All this is painful and hurts very much. This is the meaning of labor pains. In this connection, the midwife may offer some succor by massaging the back, the buttocks, and the lower extremities adjacent to the uterus. She thus stimulates the activity of the (force) pushing the embryo out, and facilitates the difficulties encountered in this connection as much as she can. She uses as much strength as she thinks is required by the difficulty of (the process). When the embryo has come out, it remains connected with the uterus by the umbilical cord at its stomach, through which it was fed. That cord is a superfluous special limb for feeding the child. The midwife cuts it but so that she does not go beyond the place where (it starts to be) superfluous and does not harm the stomach of the child or the uterus of the mother. She then treats the place of the operation with cauterization or whatever other treatment she sees fit.

When the embryo comes out of that narrow opening with its humid bones that can easily be bent and curved, it may happen that its limbs and joints change their shape, because they were only recently formed and because the - substances (of which it consists) are humid. Therefore, the midwife undertakes to massage and correct (the new-born child), until every limb has resumed its natural shape and the position destined for it, and (the child) has again its normal form. After that, she goes back to the woman in labor and massages and kneads her, so that the membranes of the embryo may come out. They are sometimes somewhat late in coming out. On such an occasion, it is feared that the constricting power (muscle) might resume its natural position before all the membranes are brought out. They are superfluities. They might become putrid, and their putridity might enter the uterus, which could be fatal. The midwife takes precautions against that. She tries to stimulate the ejection, until the membranes which are late in coming out come out, too.

She then returns to the child. She anoints its limbs with oils and dusts it with astringent powders, to strengthen it and to dry up the fluids of the uterus. She smears something upon

the child's palate to lift its uvula. She puts something into its nose, in order to empty the cavities of its brain. She makes it gargle with (swallow) an electuary, in order to prevent its bowels from becoming obstructed and their walls from sticking together.

Then, she treats the woman in labor for the weakness caused by the labor pains and the pain that the separation causes her uterus. Although the child is no natural limb (of the mother), still, the way it is created in the uterus causes it to become attached (to the body of the mother) as if it were an inseparable limb (of her body). Therefore, its separation causes a pain similar to that caused by the amputation (of a limb). (The midwife) also treats the pain of the vagina that was torn and wounded by the pressure of (the child) coming out.

All these are ills with the treatment of which midwives are better acquainted (than anyone else). We likewise find them better acquainted than a skillful physician with the means of treating the ills affecting the bodies of little children from the time they are sucklings until they are weaned. This is simply because the human body, at this stage, is only potentially a human body. After (the child) is weaned, (its body) becomes actually a human one. Then, its need for a physician is greater (than its need for a midwife).

One can see that this craft is necessary to the human species in civilization.

Without it, the individuals of the species could not, as a rule, come into being. Some individuals of the species may be able to dispense with this craft. God may arrange it for them that way as a miracle and extraordinary wonder. This, for instance, may be done for the prophets. Or there may be some instinct and guidance given to the child through instinct and natural disposition. Thus, such children may come into existence without the help of midwives.

The miraculous kind (of births) has often occurred. It has, thus, been reported that the Prophet was born with the umbilical cord cut and circumcised, placing his hands upon the earth and turning his eyes toward heaven. The same applies to Jesus (who spoke) in the cradle, and other things.

The instinctive kind (of births) is not unknown. Since dumb animals, such as, for instance, bees and others have remarkable instincts, why should one not assume the same for man who is superior to them, and especially for those human beings who are singled out by acts of divine grace? Furthermore, the common instinct of new-born children that causes them to seek their mother's breast is a clear testimony to the existence of an instinct in them. The ways of divine foresight are too great to be grasped completely.

This explains the incorrectness of the opinion of alFarabi and the Spanish philosophers. They argue for the non-existence of (the possibility) of a destruction of the various species (of beings) and the impossibility of an end of created things, especially of the human species. They say that once there has been an end to (the existence of) individuals of (the human species), a later existence of them would be impossible. (Their existence) depends upon the existence of midwifery, without which man could not come into being, since even if we were

to assume that a child might (come into existence) without the help of this craft and without being taken care of by (this craft) until it was weaned, still, it could certainly not survive. (For not only midwifery but also other crafts are needed. However,) the crafts cannot possibly exist without the ability to think, because they are the fruit of thinking and depend on it.

Avicenna undertook the refutation of this opinion, because he was opposed to it and admitted the possibility of an end of the various species (of beings) and of the destruction of the world of creation and its subsequent re-establishment as a consequence of astronomical requirements and strange (astral) positions which, he thought, take place rarely over very long intervals of time. It requires the fermentation, with the help of appropriate heat, of a kind of clay that corresponds to the temper of (the being to be created). Thus, it comes to be a human being. Then, an animal is destined for that human being. In that animal, an instinctive (desire) is created (which is directed) toward bringing that human being up and being kind to him, until he exists fully and is weaned. Avicenna explained this lengthily in the treatise which he entitled the 'Treatise of Hayy b. Yaqzan.'

His argumentation is not correct. We agree with him in regard to the (possibility of the) end of the various species (of beings), but not on the basis of his arguments. His argumentation depends on relating actions to a cause that makes (them) necessary. The theory of the "voluntary agent" is a proof against him.

According to the theory of the "voluntary agent," there is no intermediary between the actions and the primeval power, and there is no need for such (a difficult) task. If we accepted (Avicenna's argumentation) for the sake of the argument, (we might say that) it is saying no more than that the continued existence of the individual is the consequence of the instinctive desire to bring him up which has been created in dumb animals. What, then, would be the necessity that might call for (such a procedure), and further, if such an instinctive desire can be created in a dumb animal, what would prevent its creation in the child itself, as we (for our part) assumed at the beginning? It is more likely that an instinct directed toward his own interests is created in an individual than that one directed toward the interests of someone else is created in (someone). Thus, both theories (that of al-Farabi and that of Avicenna) prove themselves wrong in their particular approach, as I have established. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XXVIII

The Craft of Medicine

The Craft of Medicine is Needed in Settled Areas and Cities But Not in the Desert

This craft is necessary in towns and cities because of its recognized usefulness. Its fruit is the preservation of health among those who are healthy, and the repulsion of illness among those who are ill, with the help of medical treatment, until they are cured of their illnesses.

It should be known that the origin of all illnesses is in food, as Muhammad said in the comprehensive tradition on medicine, that is reported among physicians but suspected by the religious scholars. He said: "The stomach is the home of disease. Dieting is the main medicine. The origin of every disease is indigestion." The statement "The stomach is the home of disease," is obvious. The statement: "Dieting is the main medicine," is to be understood in the sense that himyah "dieting" means "going hungry," since hunger means refraining (ihtima') from food. Thus, the meaning is that hunger is the greatest medicine, the origin of all medicines. The statement: "The origin of every disease is indigestion," is to be understood in the sense that baradah "indigestion" is the addition of new food to the food already in the stomach before it has been digested.

(The statement lends itself to) the following comment. God created man and preserves his life through nourishment. He gets it through eating, and he applies to it the digestive and nutritive powers, until it becomes blood fitting for the flesh and bone parts of the body. Then, the growing power takes it over, and it is turned into flesh and bones. Digestion means that the nourishment is boiled by natural heat, stage by stage, until it actually becomes a part of the body. This is to be explained as follows. The nourishment that enters the mouth and is chewed by the jaws undergoes the influence of the heat of the mouth, which boils it slightly. Thus, its composition is slightly altered. This can be observed in a bit of food that is taken and chewed well. Its composition then can be observed to be different from that of the (original) food.

The food then gets into the stomach, and the heat of the stomach boils it, until it becomes chyme, that is, the essence of the boiled (food). (The stomach) sends (the chyme) on into the liver, and ejects the part of the food that has become solid sediment in the bowels, through the two body openings. The heat of the liver then boils the chyme, until it becomes fresh blood. On it, there swims a kind of foam as the result of the boiling. (That foam) is yellow bile. Parts of it become dry and solid. They are black bile. The natural heat is not quite sufficient to boil the coarse parts. They are phlegm. The liver then sends all (these substances) into the veins and arteries. There, the natural heat starts to boil them. The pure blood thus generates a hot and humid vapor that sustains the animal spirit. The growing power acts upon the blood, and it becomes flesh. The thick part of it then becomes bones. Then, the body eliminates the (elements of the digested food) it does not need as the various superfluities, such as sweat, saliva, mucus, and tears. This is the process of nourishment, and the transformation of food from potential into actual flesh.

Now, illnesses originate from fevers, and most illnesses are fevers. The reason for fevers is that the natural heat is too weak to complete the process of boiling in each of those stages. The nourishment thus is not fully assimilated. The reason for that, as a rule, is either that there is a great amount of food in the stomach that becomes too much for the natural heat, or that food is put into the stomach before the first food has been completely boiled. In such a case, the natural heat either devotes itself exclusively to the new food, so that the first food is left in its (half-digested) state, or it divides itself between the old and the new food, and then is insufficient to boil and assimilate them completely. The stomach sends the (food) in that state into the liver, and the heat of the liver likewise is not strong enough to assimilate it. Often, an unassimilated superfluity, resulting from food that had been taken in earlier, has (also) remained in the liver. The liver sends all of it to the veins unassimilated, as it is. When the body has received what it properly needs, it eliminates the (unassimilated superfluity) together with the other superfluities such as sweat, tears, and saliva, if it can. Often, (the body) cannot cope with the greater part of the (unassimilated superfluity). Thus, it remains in the veins, the liver, and the stomach, and increases with time. Any composite humid (substance) that is not boiled and assimilated undergoes putrefaction. Consequently, the unassimilated nourishment - what is called khilt becomes putrefied. Anything in the process of putrefaction develops a strange heat. This heat is what, in the human body, is called fever.

This may be exemplified by food that is left over and eventually becomes putrefied, and by dung that has become putrefied. Heat develops in it and takes its course. This is what fevers in the human body mean. Fevers are the main cause and origin of illness, as was mentioned in the (Prophetic) tradition. Such fevers can be cured by not giving an ill person any nourishment for a certain number of weeks; then, he must take the proper nourishment until he is completely cured. In a state of health, the same procedure serves as a preventive treatment for this and other illnesses.

Putrefaction may be localized in a particular limb. Then, a disease will develop in that limb, or the body will be affected either in the principal limbs or in others, because (that particular) limb is ill and its illness produces an illness of its powers. This covers all illnesses. Their origin as a rule is in the nourishment.

All this is left to (the attention of) the physician.

The incidence of such illnesses is more frequent among the inhabitants of sedentary areas and cities (than elsewhere), because they live a life of plenty. They eat a great deal and rarely restrict themselves to one particular kind of food. They lack caution in taking food, and they prepare their food, when they cook it, with the admixture of a good many things, such as spices, herbs, and fruits, (both) fresh and dry. They do not restrict themselves in this respect to one or even a few kinds. We have on occasion counted forty different kinds of vegetables and meats in a single cooked dish. This gives the nourishment a strange temper and often does not agree with the body and its parts.

Furthermore, the air in cities becomes corrupt through admixture of putrid vapors because of the great number of superfluities (in cities). It is the air that gives energy to the spirit and thus strengthens the influence of the natural heat upon digestion.

Furthermore, the inhabitants of cities lack exercise. As a rule, they rest and remain quiet. Exercise has no part in their (life) and has no influence upon them. Thus, the incidence of illness is great in towns and cities, and the inhabitants' need for medicine is correspondingly great.

On the other hand, the inhabitants of the desert, as a rule; eat little. Hunger prevails among them, because they have little grain. (Hunger) eventually becomes a custom of theirs which is often thought to be something natural to them because it is so lasting. Of seasonings they have few or none, The preparation of food boiled with spices and fruits is caused by the luxury of sedentary culture with which they have nothing to do. Thus, they take their nourishment plain and without admixtures, and its temper comes close to being agreeable to the body. Their air has little putrescence, because there is little humidity and putrescence when they stay (anywhere), and the air is changing when they move around. Too, they take exercise, and there is a lot of movement when they race horses, or go hunting, or search for things they need, or occupy themselves with their needs. For all these reasons, their digestion is very good. There is no adding of new food when the old food (has not yet completely been digested). Thus, their temper is healthier and more remote from illness (than that of sedentary people). As a result, their need for medicine is small. Therefore, physicians are nowhere to be found in the desert. The only reason for this is the lack of need for them, because if physicians were needed in the desert they would be there. There would then be a livelihood for them to lead them to settle there. This is how God proceeds with His servants. "And verily, you will not be able to change God's way."

Section XXIX

Calligraphy, (The Art of) Writing, is One of the Human Crafts

(Writing) is the outlining and shaping of letters to indicate audible words which, in turn, indicate what is in the soul. It comes second after oral expression, It is a noble craft, since it is one of the special qualities of man by which he distinguishes himself from the animals. Furthermore, it reveals what is in (people's) minds. It enables the intention (of a person) to be carried to distant places, and, thus, the needs (of that person) may be executed without (him) personally taking care of them. It enables (people) to become acquainted with science, learning, with the books of the ancients, and with the sciences and information written down by them. Because of all these useful aspects, (writing) is a noble (craft).

The transformation of writing in man from potentiality into actuality takes place through instruction. The quality of writing in a town corresponds to the social organization, civilization, and competition for luxuries (among its inhabitants), and the demand for (all) that, since (writing) is a craft. We have stated before that (the crafts) are that way and that they depend on civilization. For this reason, we find that most Bedouins are illiterate. They are not able to read and write. Those of them who do read or write have an inferior handwriting or read haltingly. (On the other hand,) we find that instruction in handwriting in cities with an extraordinarily developed civilization is more proficient, easier, and methodically better (than elsewhere) because the coloring (of the craft of writing) is firmly established in them. Thus, we are told about contemporary Cairo (Egypt) that there are teachers there who are specialized in the teaching of calligraphy. They teach the pupil by norms and laws how to write each letter. In addition, they let him teach (others) how to write each letter. This strengthens his (respect for) the rank of knowledge and (for) perception as far as teaching is concerned. His habit becomes one of the most perfect kind. This comes from the perfection and abundance of crafts (there), the result of large civilization and the great amount of (available) labor.

Writing is not learned that way in Spain and the Maghrib. The letters are not learned individually according to norms the teacher gives to the pupil. Writing is learned by imitating complete words. The pupil repeats (these words), and the teacher examines him, until he knows well (how to write) and until the habit (of writing) is at his finger tips. Then, he is called a good (calligrapher).

Arabic writing had already reached its most developed, accurate, and excellent stage in the Tubba' dynasty, because (that dynasty) had achieved a great sedentary culture and luxury. The handwriting there was called the Himyarite script.

(Writing) was transplanted from (South Arabia) to al-Hirah, because the dynasty of the family of al-Mundhir was there. They were relatives of the Tubba's and shared their group feeling, and they were the founders of Arab rule in the 'Iraq. Their writing was not as good as that of the Tubba's, because (the time) between the two dynasties was short and, (therefore,)

sedentary culture and the crafts and other things depending on it were not developed enough for (calligraphy). From al-Hirah, the inhabitants of at-Ta'if and the Quraysh learned (writing), as has been said. The person who learned the art of writing from al-Hirah is said to have been Sufyan b. Umayyah, or Harb b. Umayyah. He learned it from Aslam b. Sidrah. This is a possible theory. It is a more likely theory than that of those who say that they learned it from the Iyad, the inhabitants of the 'Iraq, because of the verse of an [Iyadi] poet: "People to whom belongs the area of the 'Iraq when They travel together, as well as writing and pen."

This is an unlikely theory. Even though the Iyad settled in the area of the 'Iraq, they maintained their desert attitude, and handwriting is a sedentary craft. The meaning of the (verse of that) poet is that the Iyad were closer to handwriting and the pen than other Arabs, because they were closer to an urban environment. The theory that the inhabitants of the Hijaz learned (writing) from the inhabitants of al-Hirah, who, in turn, had learned it from the Tubba's and the Himyar, is the most plausible one.

In 165 the biography of one of Milik's companions, Ibn Farrukh-'Abdallah b. Farrukh-al-Qayrawani al-Firisi alAndalusi, in the Kitab at-Takmilah of Ibn al-Abbar, I have seen the following remark, reported by Ibn Farrukh on the authority of 'Abd-ar-Rahman b. Ziyid b. An'um, on the authority of his father, who said: "I said to 'Abdallah b. 'Abbas: 'You Qurashites, tell me about the Arabic script. Did you use it in the same way, before God sent Muhammad, with its connected and unconnected letters, such as ', l, m, n?' (Ibn 'Abbas) replied: 'Yes.' I continued: 'From whom did you learn it?' He replied: 'From Harb b. Umayyah.' I asked: 'From whom did Harb learn it?' He replied: 'From 'Abdallah b. Jud'in.' I asked: 'From whom did 'Abdallah b. Jud'in learn it?' He replied: 'From the inhabitants of al-Anbir.' I asked: 'From whom did they learn it?' He replied: 'From a Yemenite newcomer among them.' I asked: 'From whom did he learn it?' He replied: 'From al-Khullajin b. al-Qisim, who wrote down the revelation of the prophet Hid. He used to say: "Do you invent a new procedure every year, Or an opinion that is to be explained in a different way? Indeed, death is better than a life in which among those who abuse us, There are the Jurhum and the Himyar."

At the end of the passage, Ibn al-Abbir added: "I was told this by Abu Bakr b. Abi Jamrah, in his book, on the authority of Abu Bahr b. al-'Asi, on the authority of Abul-Walid al-Waqqashi, on the authority of Abu 'Umar at-Talamanki, on the authority of Abu 'Abdallah b. Mufarrij, who was my written source, on the authority of Abu Sa'id b. Yunus, on the authority of Muhammad b. Musa b. an-Nu'min, on the authority of Yahya b. Muhammad b. Khushaysh, on the authority of 'Uthmin b. Ayyilb al Ma'ifiri at-Tunisi, on the authority of Buhlul b. 'Ubaydah at Tujibi, on the authority of 'Abdallah b. Farrukh.

The Himyarites had a script called musnad. The letters were written separately. It could be studied only with their permission. The Mudar learned the Arabic script from the Himyar. However, they did not write it well, as is the case with crafts practiced in the desert. The crafts there have no firmly established methods and show no inclination toward accuracy and elegance. There is a wide gap between the desert attitude and craftsmanship, and Bedouins

can for the most part dispense with crafts. Thus, the writing of the Arabs was a Bedouin (script), exactly like, or similar to, the writing the Arab (Bedouins) use at this time. Or, we might say that the writing the Arab (Bedouins) use at this time shows a better technique, because (the Arab Bedouins today) are closer to sedentary culture and have more contact with cities and dynasties (than the Mudar of old). The Mudar were more firmly rooted in desert life and more remote from sedentary areas than the inhabitants of the Yemen, the 'Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Arabic writing at the beginning of Islam was, therefore, not of the best quality nor of the greatest accuracy and excellence. It was not (even) of medium quality, because the Arabs possessed the savage desert attitude and were not familiar with crafts.

One may compare what happened to the orthography of the Qur'an on account of this situation. The men around Muhammad wrote the Qur'an in their own script, which was not of a firmly established, good quality. Most of the letters were in contradiction to the orthography required by persons versed in the craft of writing. The Qur'anic script of (the men around Muhammad) was then imitated by the men of the second generation, because of the blessing inherent in the use of an orthography that had been used by the men around Muhammad, who were the best human beings after (Muhammad himself) and who had received his revelation from the book and word of God. At the present time, people similarly imitate the handwriting of saints or scholars because of the blessing (inherent in that), and they follow the orthography whether it be wrong or right. One could hardly compare these men to the men around Muhammad or the things they write down to (the divine revelation) they wrote down! Consequently, (the Qur'anic orthography of the men around Muhammad) was followed and became established, and the scholars acquainted with it have called attention to passages where (this is noticeable).

No attention should be paid in this connection to the assumption of certain incompetent (scholars) that (the men around Muhammad) knew well the art of writing and that the alleged discrepancies between their writing and the principles of orthography are not discrepancies, as has been alleged, but have a reason. For instance, they explain the addition of the alif in la-'adhbahannahu "I shall indeed slaughter him" as an indication that the slaughtering did not take place (la-adhbahannahu). The addition of the ya' in bi-ayyin "with hands (power)," they explain as an indication that the divine power is perfect. There are similar things based on nothing but purely arbitrary assumptions. The only reason that caused them to (assume such things) is their belief that (their explanations) would free the men around Muhammad from the suspicion of deficiency, in the sense that they were not able to write well. They think that good writing is perfection. Thus, they do not admit the fact that the men around Muhammad were deficient in (writing). They (want to) consider them as perfect by ascribing good writing to them, and they seek to explain (orthographic peculiarities) that are contrary to good orthographic usage.

This is not correct. It should be known that as far as (the men around Muhammad) are concerned, writing has nothing to do with perfection. Writing is an urban craft that serves to make a living, as has been shown above. Perfection in a craft is something relative. It is not absolute perfection. A deficiency from (perfection in the crafts) does not essentially affect

one's religion or personal qualities. It merely affects things that have to do with making a living, and (does so) in accordance with the (existing) civilization and co-operation for (civilization), since writing indicates what is in the souls. The Prophet was illiterate. That was perfection so far as he was concerned and it was in keeping with his station, because he was noble and had nothing to do with the practical crafts, all of which are matters connected with making a living and with civilization. (On the other hand,) as far as we are concerned, illiteracy is not a perfection. (Muhammad) was exclusively devoted to his Lord. We, however, must co-operate in order to make life in this world possible for us. The same applies to all the crafts, including even the theoretical sciences. As far as (Muhammad) is concerned, perfection means that he has nothing to do with any of them. The opposite is the case with us.

Later, royal authority came to the Arabs. They conquered cities and took possession of provinces. They settled in al-Basrah and al-Kufah, and the dynasty needed the art of writing. At that time, they (began) writing. They sought to practice and study it, and it came into common use. As a result, a high degree of excellence in (writing) was achieved. (Writing) became firmly established. In al-Kufah and al-Basrah, it reached a great degree of accuracy, but did not reach the limit (of perfection). The Kufic script is still known at this time.

The Arabs then spread over all the regions and provinces and conquered Ifriqiyah and Spain. The 'Abbasids founded Baghdad. There, the different kinds of writing reached the limit (of perfection), because civilization was highly developed in (Baghdad), since it had become the home of Islam and the center of the Arab dynasty.

The norms of writing used in Baghdad were different from those in al-Kufah, in that they inclined toward wellshaped letters, brilliancy, and splendor. This difference became established (and lasted) for a long time. The wazir (Aba) 'Ali b. Muglah became its protagonist in Baghdad. He was followed in this respect by the secretary, 'Ali b. Hilal, who is known as Ibn al-Bawwab. The tradition of instruction in the Baghdadi and Kufi writing ended with him in the fourth [tenth] century and afterwards. The forms and the norms of the Baghdadi script then departed still further from Kufic, and eventually, there was a complete break. Later on, the differences were accentuated by masters who always tried to find new forms and improved norms of writing, up to the time of such later calligraphers as Yaqut al-Musta'simi and al-Wall 'Ali al-'Ajami. The tradition of the teaching of writing stopped with them. This (type of calligraphy) was transferred to Egypt where (the script) was somewhat different from the 'Iraqi script. The non-Arabs learned the ('Iraqi script) there (in the 'Iraq). It turned out to be different or completely distinct from the writing of the Egyptians.

The Ifriqi script, the old form of which is (still) known at this time, was close to the forms of the eastern script. Spain became the domain of the Umayyads. Their situation as to sedentary culture, the crafts, and the various scripts was a special one. As a result, the Spanish script, as it is known at the present time, became special, (too).

Civilization and sedentary culture developed greatly everywhere in the (various) Muslim dynasties. Royal authority increased, and the sciences were cultivated. Books were copied,

and they were well written and bound. Castles and royal libraries were filled with them in an incomparable way. The inhabitants of the different regions vied with and rivaled each other in this respect.

Then, the Muslim empire became disorganized and shrank. With its shrinking, all these things shrank, too. With the disappearance of the caliphate, Baghdad lost its outstanding position. The position it had held with regard to calligraphy and (the art of) writing, and, indeed, with regard to scholarship (in general) was taken over by Egypt and Cairo. The art of writing continues to be cultivated there at this time. There are teachers of writing there who are employed (just) to teach the letters. For that, they have norms of how the letters are to be drawn and shaped. These norms are generally recognized among them. The student soon learns to draw and form the letters well, as he learns them by sensual perception, becomes skilled in them through practice in writing them, and learns them in the form of scientific norms. Therefore, his letters turn out to be as well formed as possible.

The inhabitants of Spain, on the other hand, were dispersed throughout the (various) regions when the rule of the Arabs in Spain and that of the Berbers who succeeded (the Arabs), were annihilated and the Christian nations gained the upper hand. From (the time of) the Lamtunah (Almoravid) dynasty down to this time, they have spread all over the coast of the Maghrib and Ifriqiyah. They permitted the people settled (there) to share in the crafts they possessed, and they attached themselves to the ruling dynasty (in Northwest Africa). In this way, their script replaced the Ifriqi script and wiped it out. The scripts of al-Qayrawan and al-Mahdiah were forgotten, once the customs and crafts of (the two cities) were forgotten. All the various scripts of the inhabitants of Ifriqiyah were assimilated to the Spanish script used in Tunis and adjacent regions, because there were so many Spaniards there after the exodus from eastern Spain. The (old script) has been preserved in the Jarid, where people had no contact with those who wrote the Spanish script and were not in close touch with them, because (the Spaniards who came to Northwest Africa) used to proceed to the capital city of Tunis. The script of the inhabitants of Ifriqiyah thus became a representative of the Spanish type of writing. Eventually, the shadow of the Almohad dynasty receded somewhat, and sedentary culture and luxury retrogressed with the retrogression of civilization.

At that time, writing also suffered a setback, and its forms deteriorated. The method of teaching writing was no longer known, in consequence of the (general) corruption of sedentary culture and the decrease in civilization. Traces of the Spanish script remain there. They attest to the (perfection in it) which the people had formerly possessed. The existence of such traces is explained by the fact that, as we have mentioned before, it is difficult to wipe out the crafts once they are firmly established in a sedentary culture.

In the later Merinid dynasty in Morocco, a kind of Spanish script established itself, because (the Spaniards) were close neighbors and the (Spaniards) who left (Spain) soon settled in Fez, and the Merinids employed them during all the days of their rule. (But) in regions far from the seat and capital of the realm, writing was not cared for, and it was forgotten as if it had never been known. The (various) types of script used in Ifriqiyah and the two Maghribs

inclined to be ugly and far from excellent. When books were copied, it was useless to look at them critically. (Study of them) merely caused pain and trouble, because the texts were very corrupt and full of clerical errors, and the letters were no longer well formed. Thus, they could be read only with some difficulty. In this way, writing was affected like all the other crafts by the decrease of sedentary culture and the corruption of the (ruling) dynasties. "God decides and no one can change His decision."

Professor Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Hilal al-Katib al-Baghdadi, who is known as Ibn al-Bawwab; wrote a poem in the basit meter with the rhyme on r, in which he mentions the craft of writing and the matters with which it has to do. The poem belongs among the best things ever written on (the subject). I considered it proper to insert it in this chapter, so that those who want to learn the craft of (writing) may profit from it. It begins: "O you who want to write a calligraphic hand And desire to write and draw (the letters) well: If you are truly desirous of mastering the art of writing, Pray that your Master make it easy (for you)! Prepare a calamus that is straight And strong, capable of fashioning elegant writing with craft. If you propose to nib the calamus, aim At applying to it the greatest symmetry. Look at both ends of it, and then nib it At the end where it is thin and narrow. Give the part of the calamus that is nibbed a moderate size, Neither too long nor too short, And make the split precisely in the middle of the calamus so that the space nibbed On both sides of it will be exactly equal. Eventually, when you have done all this as carefully As the careful craftsman who knows what is wanted, Then, turn all your attention toward cutting the point, For cutting the point is the crux of the procedure. Do not beg me to reveal its secret. I am chary of its secret, a thing concealed. But the sum total of what I want to say is that The (point) should be something between oblique and round. Stir the (ink in the) inkstand with soot that is treated With vinegar or verjuice. Add to it red pigment that has been diluted With orpiment and camphor. Eventually, when (the ink) has fermented, Go to the clean, pleasant, tested paper. After cutting it, press it with a press, so as To remove all trace of crumpling and soiling. Then, make patient imitation your habit. Only a patient person achieves what he desires. Begin by writing on a wooden slate, wearing it out With a resolution kept free from haste. Do not be ashamed of your bad writing When you begin to imitate (the letters) and draw lines. The matter is difficult (at the beginning), and then becomes easy. Many a thing that is difficult (at the beginning) turns out later on to be easy. Eventually, when you have achieved what you have hoped for, You will be filled with joy and gladness. Then, thank your God and do His pleasure! God loves all those who are grateful. Furthermore, pray that the fingers of your hand will write Only what is good for you to leave behind in the house of deception. Everything a man does, he will be confronted with on the morrow, When he is confronted with the written decree (on the Day of Resurrection)."

It should be known that writing shows the things that are spoken, just as the things that are spoken show the ideas that are in the soul and the mind. Both writing and speech must express clearly (what they want to express). God said: "He created man, taught him clarity." This includes clarity in all the things one expresses.

The perfection of good handwriting consists in the fact that it is clear. (This is achieved) by indicating clearly the conventional letters of (the script), arranging and drawing them well. Each letter by itself is distinct from the others, except where connection between the letters within a word is an accepted technicality. This does not apply to letters that have been accepted as letters that should remain unconnected, such as ' when it precedes (another letter) in the word, nor to r, z, d, dh, and others. It is different when (these letters) follow (another letter in a word). It is this way with all (letters).

Later scribes then agreed to connect words with each other and omit letters that were known to them but not to others who did not know the code, which, thus, remained unclear to others. These (scribes) are the officials who write government documents and keep court records. It seems that they use such a special code, from which others are excluded, because they have to write a great deal, and they are famous for their writing, and many people connected with them know their code. When they write to others who do not know their code, they cannot use it and have to try to write as clearly as possible. Otherwise, their writing would be like non-Arabic writing. It would be in the same category with it in as much as both (types of writing, the code and nonArabic writing) are not (generally) agreed upon (by conventional usage). There is no (real) excuse for (writing in code), except in the case of officials of the government's tax and army (bureaus). They are required to conceal (their affairs) from the people, since (these affairs) are government secrets that have to be kept secret. Therefore, they use a very special code among themselves, which is like a puzzle. It makes use of the names of perfumes, fruits, birds, or flowers to indicate the letters, or it makes use of forms different from the accepted forms of the letters. Such a code is agreed upon by the correspondents between themselves, in order to be able to convey their thoughts in writing.

Occasionally, skillful secretaries, though not the first to invent a certain code (and with no previous knowledge of it), nonetheless find rules (for deciphering it) through combinations which they evolve for the purpose with the help of their intelligence, and which they call "solving the puzzle (decoding)." Well-known writings on the subject are in the possession of the people. God is knowing and wise.

Section XXX

The Craft of Book Production

Formerly, (people) were concerned with scholarly writings and (official) records. These were copied, bound, and corrected with the help of a transmission technique and with accuracy. The reason for this was the importance of the (ruling) dynasty and the existence of the things that depend on sedentary culture. All that has disappeared at the present time as the result of the disappearance of the dynasties and the decrease of civilization. In Islam it had formerly reached tremendous proportions in the 'Iraq and in Spain. All of it depends on civilization, on the extent of the (ruling) dynasties, and on the demand existing in (the dynasties) for it. Thus, scholarly works and writings were (formerly) numerous. People were desirous of transmitting them everywhere and at any time. They were copied and bound. The craft of book producers, thus, made its appearance. (They are the craftsmen) concerned with copying, correcting, and binding books, and with all the other matters pertaining to books and writings. The craft of book production was restricted to cities of a large civilization.

Originally, copies of scholarly works, government correspondence, letters of enfeoffment, and diplomas were written on parchment especially prepared from animal skins by craftsmen, because there was great prosperity at the beginning of Islam and the works that were written were few, as we shall mention. In addition, government documents and diplomas were few in number. Therefore, (the early Muslims) restricted themselves to writing on parchment. This was an expression of respect for what was to be written down, and of desire that it should be correct and accurate. The production of books and writings then developed greatly. Government documents and diplomas increased in number. There was not enough parchment for all that. Therefore, alFadl b. Yahya suggested the manufacture of paper. Thus, paper was used for government documents and diplomas. Afterwards, people used paper in sheets for government and scholarly writings, and the manufacture of (paper) reached a considerable degree of excellence.

The concern of scholars and the interest of government people then concentrated on accuracy in scholarly writings and the establishment of their correctness with the help of a chain of transmitters leading back to their writers and authors, because that is the most important element in establishing a correct and accurate (text). Statements are thus led back to those who made them, and decisions (in legal questions, fatwa) are led back to the persons who decided in accordance with them and were able to pronounce them by means of independent judgment.

Wherever the correctness of a text is not established by a chain of transmitters going back to the person who wrote that particular text, the statement or decision in question cannot properly be ascribed to its (alleged author). This has been the procedure of scholars and experts in (all matters of religious knowledge) in all times, races, and regions, so much so that the usefulness of the craft connected with the transmission of traditions came to be restricted to this aspect (of the process of transmission). The main fruit of (the craft

concerned with the transmission of traditions) is the knowledge of which traditions are "sound," which are "good," which "go back in an uninterrupted chain of transmitters to the Prophet" (musnad), which have a chain of transmitters that "skips the first transmitter on the authority of Muhammad" (mursal), which have a chain that "stops with one of the men of the second generation" (magtu), and which have a chain that "stops with one of the men around Muhammad" (mawquf), in order to be able to distinguish (such traditions) from spurious ones. This is no longer (a subject of investigation). The cream of it has been churned in the principal collections (of traditions) that have found general acceptance by all Muslims. It would, thus, be a superfluous activity to attempt (to investigate the matter anew). Therefore, the only remaining result to be gained from the process of transmission and occupation with it is that it can serve to establish a correct text of the principal collections of traditions and other books on jurisprudence used for legal decisions, as well as for other writings and scholarly works. (It also serves) to establish uninterrupted connection with their respective authors, so that transmission on their authority or ascription to them is sound. Both in the East and in Spain, this method has been the tried and true path. We find that the copies made in (former) times in those regions are the most exact, well done, and correct. People everywhere at this time possess old copies attesting to the perfection previously reached in this respect. The inhabitants of the various regions have handed them down (and preserved) them to the present, and they do not like to part with them.

At the present time, this method has altogether disappeared in the Maghrib and among Maghribis, because the craft of writing, accuracy, and the transmission technique were cut off there as the result of the destruction of the civilization of (the Maghrib) and its basic desert attitude. The principal collections and writings were copied in Bedouin script. They were copied by Berber students in such a bad handwriting and with so much corruption and so many clerical errors that they cannot be understood. They remain incomprehensible to those who examine them critically. Only very rarely are they of any use.

Furthermore, this (situation) has caused disintegration in the field of legal decisions (fatwa). Most statements ascribed to the school authorities are not (orally) transmitted but are taken from the writings as they are found there. This has also affected the attempts of some religious leaders to write books. They know little of the technical side of (authorship) and lack the crafts necessary for realizing the purposes of (authorship). Some slight remnant of this institution has remained in Spain. It is about to disappear. (Religious) scholarship has almost completely stopped in the Maghrib. "God has the power to execute His commands."

We now hear that the craft of transmission (technique) still exists in the East. The sciences and crafts are in demand there, as we shall mention later on, and, therefore, those who want to, find it easy to establish the correct text of writings. However, the script for good copying surviving there is that of the non-Arabs, and found in their manuscripts. The copying (of books) has deteriorated in Egypt as it has in the Maghrib, and even more so. "God has the power to execute His commands."

Section XXXI

The Craft of Singing (and Music)

This craft is concerned with the setting of poems to music. (This is done) by scanning the sounds according to well-known fixed proportions, which causes any sound (complex) thus scanned to constitute a tune, a rhythmic mode. These modes are then combined with each other according to accepted proportions. The result is pleasant to listen to because of its harmony and the quality (that harmony) gives to the sounds. This is as follows: As explained in the science of music, sounds are in certain proportions (intervals) to each other. A sound may be one-half, one-quarter, one-fifth, or one-eleventh of another sound. The difference in interval between the sounds that reach the ear transforms them from simple (sounds) to combinations of (sounds). Not every combination is pleasant to listen to. There are special combinations (that are pleasant). They have been enumerated and discussed by musicologists, as is mentioned in the proper place.

The music produced by the rhythmic modes of singing may be supplemented by scanning other sounds that come from solids and are produced by either beating or blowing into instruments used for the purpose. Such (instrumental music) adds to the pleasure of listening. Various kinds of instruments are used in the contemporary Maghrib. There is the wood-wind instrument called shabbabah. It is a hollow reed with a number of holes on the sides. One blows into it, and it gives a sound.

The sound escapes from the hollow of (the reed) straight through these holes. It is scanned by placing the fingers of both hands upon these holes in conventionally accepted ways. This creates the proper intervals between the sounds and also combines them harmoniously. As a result, they are pleasant to listen to when one hears them, because of the harmony we have mentioned.

Another similar kind of instrument is the wood-wind instrument called zulami. It has the form of a reed, with two wooden parts carved (hollow), hollow but not round, because it is made of two pieces put together. It also has a number of holes. One blows into it through a small connected reed which directs the wind to (the holes). This produces a highpitched tone. The fingers are placed upon (the holes) and the sounds are thus scanned in the same way as on the shabbabah.

One of the best wind instruments at this time is the bug. This is a trumpet of copper (brass) which is hollow, one cubit long, widening toward the opening, the diameter of which is less than the palm of a hand in width. It has the form of a nibbed calamus. One blows into it through a small reed which conveys the wind from the mouth into it. The sound comes out compact and loud. It also has a number of holes, and (makes) a harmonious tune of pleasant effect, which is produced in the same way (as in the aforementioned instruments), by placing the fingers (on the holes).

Then, there are the string instruments. They are all hollow. They may have either the shape of a section of a sphere, as, for instance, the barbiton and the rebec, or a square shape, such as the ganun. The strings are placed upon the surface of (the instrument). They are tied at the head to pegs that can be turned, so that it is possible to (tighten or) loosen (the strings) as required, by turning them. The strings are either plucked with another piece of wood or (played) with a string fastened between the two ends of a bow that passes over (the strings of the instrument) after it had been waxed with wax or mastic (kundur). Sounds are scanned through lightening (the pressure of) the hand that guides (the bow) over the strings, or through transferring (the bow) from one string to another. Moreover, in all string instruments, the fingers of the left hand can be used to beat or pluck the ends of the strings. Thus, there originate harmonious, pleasant sounds. Moreover, brass kettles may be beaten with sticks, or pieces of wood may be beaten against each other in a harmonious rhythm. This creates a feeling of pleasure as the result of the music one hears.

Let us explain the reason for the pleasure resulting from music. This is as follows: As has been established in the proper place, pleasure is the attainment of something that is agreeable. (Such a thing,) in sensual perception, can only be a quality. If (such a quality) is proportionate and agreeable to the person who has the perception, it is pleasant. If it is repugnant to him or discordant, it is painful.

Agreeable foods are those whose quality corresponds to the temper of the sense of taste. The same applies to agreeable sensations of touch. Agreeable smells are those that correspond to the temper of the vaporous cordial spirit, because that spirit is what perceives and receives them through the (medium of the) sense (of smell). Thus, aromatic plants and flowers smell better and are more agreeable to the spirit, because heat, which is the temper of the cordial spirit, is preponderant in them. Agreeable sensations of vision and hearing are caused by harmonious arrangement in the forms and qualities of (the things seen or heard). This impresses the soul as harmonious and is more agreeable to it.

If an object of vision is harmonious in the forms and lines given to it in accordance with the matter from which it is made, so that the requirements of its particular matter as to perfect harmony and arrangement are not disregarded that being the meaning of beauty and loveliness whenever these terms are used for any object of sensual perception that (object of vision) is then in harmony with the soul that perceives (it), and the soul, thus, feels pleasure as the result of perceiving something that is agreeable to it. Therefore, lovers who are most deeply in love express their extreme infatuation by saying that their spirit is commingled with that of the beloved. In another sense, the meaning of it is that existence is shared by all existent things, as the philosophers say. Therefore, (existent things) love to commingle with something in which they observe perfection, in order to become one with it.

The object that is most suited to man and in which he is most likely to perceive perfect harmony, is the human form. Therefore, it is most congenial to him to perceive beauty and loveliness in the lines and sounds of the human form. Thus, every man desires beauty in the

objects of vision and hearing, as a requirement of his nature. Beauty in the objects of hearing is harmony and lack of discordance in the sounds.

This is as follows: Sounds have certain qualities. They may be whispered or loud, soft or strong, vibrant or constrained, and so on. Harmony between them is what gives them beauty. Firstly, the transition from one sound to a contrary or identical sound as well as the return to the first sound, is not made suddenly but gradually. There must be something to bridge the gap between the two sounds. This may be compared with the fact that linguists consider clusters of sounds of discordant or similar articulation ugly. This belongs to the same category. Secondly, the sounds must have harmonious intervals, as was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. The transition from a sound to a sound one-half, one-third, or some other fraction of it, must take place in a harmonious manner according to the rules established by musicologists. When the sounds are harmonious with regard to their qualities, as has been mentioned by musicologists, they are agreeable and pleasant.

Such harmony may be a simple one. Many people are gifted to achieve it by nature. They do not need any (special) instruction or (craft) for it, for we find people who are gifted by nature for the meters of poetry, the rhythms of the dance, and similar things. The common people call such an aptitude "musicalness" (midmar). Many Qur'an readers belong in this category. In reciting the Qur'an, they know well how to modulate their voices, as if they were flutes. They thus cause emotion through the beauty of their performance and the harmony of their modes.

Harmony may also result from composition. Not all human beings are alike in their knowledge of it, nor are they all equally able by nature to practice it, if they know it. This is the melodious music with which the science of music has to deal, as we shall explain later on among the sciences.

Malik disapproved of the use of melodies in reciting the Qur'an, and ash-Shafi'i permitted it. Here it is not a question of artistic musical melodies. There can be no difference of opinion as to the fact that they are forbidden. The art of singing is something entirely unconnected with the Qur'an. It is true, in the recitation and pronunciation (of the Qur'an), each letter (sound) requires a certain quantity of sound for its particular pronunciation, in as much as, for instance, the lengthening of vowels in the proper places is concerned, the longer or shorter pronunciation of long vowels, and similar things. Melodious music also requires a certain quantity of sound to materialize, because, as we have stated, its real meaning is harmony. However, considering the one (thing) ruins the other, since they are the opposite of each other. The recitation of the Qur'an must be given preference, in order to avoid any change in traditional transmission in connection with the Qur'an.

Thus, melodious music can, by no means, be combined with the pronunciation under consideration in connection with the Qur'an. As regards the difference of opinion (among authorities as to the permissibility of melodious music for the recitation of the Qur'an), the thing (the authorities) have in mind is the plain music to which nature guides the person who

is musical (midmar), as we have stated. Such a person arranges his sounds in certain harmonious cadences, which those who know about singing, as well as others, perceive (as music). This is the point about which the difference of opinion (revolves).

The obvious (fact) is that the Qur'an is (to be) kept free of it, (exactly) as the imam (Malik) thought. The Qur'an is something that causes awe, as it reminds (man) of death and what comes after it. It is not an occasion to give pleasure in the perception of beautiful sounds. It was (in this spirit) that the men around Muhammad recited the Qur'an, as is stated in their biographies.

The statement by Muhammad, "A flute of those belonging to the family of David was brought to him," does not refer to cadences and melodious music, but it refers to a beautiful voice, a clear pronunciation in reciting the Qur'an, and a clear distinction in the articulation and enunciation of the letters (sounds).

Since we have mentioned the meaning of singing, it should be known that singing originates in a civilization when it becomes abundant and (people) progress from the necessities to the conveniences, and then to the luxuries, and have a great diversity of (luxuries). Then, the craft of singing originates, because it is required only by those who are free from all the necessary and urgent needs of making a living and care for domestic and other needs. It is in demand only by those who are free from all other worries and seek various ways of having pleasure. In the non-Arab states before Islam, music was highly developed in cities and towns. The (non-Arab) rulers cultivated it eagerly. It went so far that the Persian rulers felt a great concern for musicians. Musicians had a place in their dynasty and attended their sessions and gatherings and sang for them. The same is (still) the case with the non-Arabs at this time in all their regions and provinces.

The Arabs originally had (only) poetry. They composed a kind of speech consisting of equal parts of harmonious proportions, as far as the number of consonants with and without vowels was concerned. Within these parts, they divided speech in such a way that each part made sense by itself and did not have to lean upon the other. Such (part of speech) they called verse. It is agreeable to nature first by its division into parts, then by the harmonious arrangements of its parts at the ends and beginnings, and then by the fact that it conveys the intended meaning and uses expressions conforming to (that meaning).

(The Arabs) appreciated (poetry) very highly. It was distinguished in their speech through a certain nobility, because it alone possessed harmony. They made poetry the archive of their history, their wisdom, and their nobility, and the touchstone of their natural gift for expressing themselves correctly, choosing the best methods (uslub, of expression). They have continued to do so.

The harmony resulting from (a division of speech into) parts, and (into an equal number of) consonants with and without vowels, is just one small drop in the ocean of sound harmony, as is well known from the literature on music. However, (the Arabs) did not know anything

except (poetry), because at that time, they practiced no science and knew no craft. The desert attitude was their dominant trait.

Now, camel drivers sang when they drove their camels, and young men sang when they were alone (with each other at times of leisure and recreation). They repeated sounds and hummed them. When such humming was applied to poetry, it was called singing. When it was applied to the praise of God or some kind of recitation (of the Qur'an), it was called taghbir. Abu Ishaq az-Zajjaj explained this word as (derived from al-ghdbir, that is, melodies) reminding one of al ghabir "that which remains," that is, the affairs of the other world.

When (the Arabs) sang, they often effected a simple harmony between the modes, as was mentioned by Ibn Rashiq at the end of the Kitab al-'Umdah, and by others. This was called sinad. Most (Arab music) was in the light rhythm (khafif) that is used for dancing and marching, accompanied by drums and flutes. It causes emotion and makes the seriousminded feel light. The Arabs called that hazaj. All these simple types of melodious music are primary ones. It is not unlikely to assume that they can be grasped by nature without any instruction, as is the case with all simple crafts.

The Arabs continued this way during their desert and pre-Islamic period. Then, Islam made its appearance. (The Arabs) took possession of (all) the realms of the world. They deprived the non-Arabs of their rule and took it over. They had their well-known desert attitude and low standard of living. In addition, they possessed the thriving religion (of Islam) and that (Muslim) religious severity which is directed against all activities of leisure and all the things that are of no utility in one's religion or livelihood. Therefore, (music) was avoided to some degree. In their opinion, only the cadenced recitation of the Qur'an and the humming of poetry which had always been their way and custom, were pleasurable things.

Then, luxury and prosperity came to them, because they obtained the spoils of the nations. They came to lead splendid and refined lives and to appreciate leisure. The singers (now) left the Persians and Byzantines. They descended upon the Hijaz and became clients of the Arabs. They all sang accompanied by lutes, pandores, lyres, and flutes. The Arabs heard their melodious use of sound, and they set their poems to music accordingly. In Medina, Nashit al-Farlsi, Tuways, and Sa'ib Khathir, a client of `Abdallah b. Jafar (b. Abt Talib), made their appearance. They heard the poems of the Arabs and set them to music. They did it well, and they became famous. Ma'bad and his class of singers, as well as Ibn Surayj and his ilk, learned from them. Continual and gradual progress was made in the craft of singing. Eventually, in the days of the `Abbasids, (the craft of singing) reached its perfection with Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi, Ibrahim al-Mawsili, (Ibrahim's) son Ishaq, and (Ishaq's) son Hammid. (The music) and the (musical) sessions of Baghdad during the ('Abbasid) dynasty have remained a topic of conversation down to the present time.

(People at that time) constantly had games and entertainments. Dancing equipment, consisting of robes and sticks, and poems to which melodies were hummed, were used. That was transformed into a special kind (of entertainment).

Other dancing equipment, called kurraj, was also used. (The kurraj) is a wooden figure (resembling) a saddled horse and is attached to robes such as women wear. (The dancers) thus give the appearance of having mounted horses. They attack and withdraw and compete in skill (with weapons). There were other such games intended for banquets, wedding parties, festivals, and (other) gatherings for leisure and entertainment. There was much of that sort in Baghdad and the cities of the 'Iraq. It spread from there to other regions.

The Mawsilis had a young (apprentice) servant, by name Ziryab, who had learned from them how to sing. He learned so well that they became jealous of him and sent him away to the West. He joined al-Hakam b. Hisham b. `Abd-ar-Rahman I, the amir of Spain. He (al-Hakam) honored him greatly. He rode out to welcome him. He showered him with gifts, fiefs, and allowances. He gave him a place in his dynasty as one of his boon companions. The musical heritage Ziryab left in Spain was transmitted down to the time of the reyes de taifas. In Sevilla, (the craft of singing) was highly developed. After (Sevilla) had lost its affluence, (the craft of singing) was transplanted from there to the coast of Ifriqiyah and the Maghrib. It spread over the cities there. A sprinkling of it is still left there, despite retrogression in the civilization of the region and the decreasing power of its dynasties.

The craft of singing is the last of the crafts attained in civilization, because it constitutes (the last development toward) luxury with regard to no occupation in particular save that of leisure and gaiety. It also is the first to disappear from a given civilization when it disintegrates and retrogresses. God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

Section XXXII

The Crafts, Especially Writing and Calculation, Give Intelligence to the Person who Practices Them

We have already mentioned in the book that the rational soul exists in man only potentially. Its transformation from potentially into actuality is effected first by new sciences and perception derived from the sensibilia, and then by the later acquisition (of knowledge) through the speculative power. Eventually, it comes to be actual perception and pure intellect. Thus, it becomes a spiritual essence, and its existence then reaches perfection.

Therefore it is necessary that each kind of learning and speculation should provide (the rational soul) with additional intelligence. Now, the crafts and the habit of (the crafts) always lead to the obtainment of scientific norms, which results from habit. Therefore, any experience provides intelligence. The habits of the crafts provide intelligence. Perfect sedentary culture provides intelligence, because it is a conglomerate of crafts characterized by concern for the (domestic) economy, contact with one's fellow men, attainment of education through mixing with (one's fellow men), and also administration of religious matters and understanding the ways and conditions governing them. All these (factors) are norms (of how to do things) which, properly arranged, constitute scientific disciplines. Thus, an increase in intelligence results from them.

In this respect, writing is the most useful craft because, in contrast to the (other) crafts, it deals with matters of theoretical, scientific interest. This is explained through (the circumstance) that writing involves a transition from the forms of the written letters to the verbal expressions in the imagination, and from the verbal expressions in the imagination to the concepts (underlying them), which are in the soul. The writer, thus, always goes from one indication to another, as long as he is wrapped up in writing, and the soul becomes used to the constant (repetition of the process). Thus, it acquires the habit of going over from the indications to the things meant by them. This is what is meant by intellectual speculation, by means of which the knowledge of (hitherto) unknown sciences is provided. As the result of being accustomed to the process of going (over from the indications to the things indicated by them) people acquire the habit of intellection, which constitutes an increase in intelligence and provides an additional insight into affairs and a shrewd understanding of them. This is why Khosraw remarked of his secretaries, when he noticed that they had that kind of insight and shrewd understanding: "Dewaneh," that is (they are) Satans (devils) and crazy. This is said to be the etymology of diwan (the ministry) of the secretaries.

Calculation is connected with (writing). Calculation entails a kind of working with numbers, "combining" and separating them, which requires much deductive reasoning and speculation, and this is what is meant by intelligence. "God brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers. You did not then know anything. And He gave you hearing and vision and hearts." "You are little grateful."

