# WARFARE IN INNER ASIAN HISTORY (500-1800)

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## WARFARE IN INNER ASIAN HISTORY (500-1800)

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EDITED BY

NICOLA DI COSMO

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*Illustration on the cover*: Chinese ink drawing of the Mongol general Sübötei Ba'atur (1176-1248).

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# INTRODUCTION: INNER ASIAN WAYS OF WARFARE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Nicola Di Cosmo

The military side of the "expansion of Europe" has been closely associated, especially in the writings of historians such as Geoffrey Parker, with the technological and tactical transformation of the European battlefields and fortifications known as the "military revolution." Mastery of sophisticated weapons gave Europe's armies a distinct advantage that allowed them to prevail—by and large—in military confrontations against extra-European societies, perhaps slowly and accidentally at first, but rather effectively and purposefully from at least the late eighteenth century onward. Only certain areas of the world were not penetrated or dominated quite as effectively, and these are the areas identified by Halford J. Mackinder, the influential geographer, politician, and military theoretician, as the "heartland" of Eurasia, defined as the "pivot of history."[1] The heartland was inaccessible to sea-power, and yet could be easily crossed, in antiquity, by horsemen and camelmen, and later on by the railways. Mackinder recognized the historical role played by the steppes of Central Asia in military terms, and regarded Russia as the successor to the Mongols, that is, a power endowed with the same advantages and limitations as the great Eurasian empires created by the Inner Asian nomads. If, according to "pivot" theory, the larger currents of world history—especially military history—have revolved for ages around the heartland of Eurasia (or Central Eurasia, or even Inner Eurasia),[2] one can also say that the geopolitical rationale of this theory is not negated

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[1] An abridged version of Mackinder's theory has been recently reprinted in a voluminous anthology of military history: Gérard Chaliand, *The Art of War in World History*, pp. 821–25 (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1994).

[2] The first term is closely associated with the life and work of Owen Lattimore. The second has been defined by Denis Sinor in "Central Eurasia," in *Orientalism and History* ed. Denis Sinor, pp. 93–119 (Bloomington, Ind., 1970; rpt. Denis Sinor, *Inner Asia and its Contacts with Medieval Europe*, I [London: Variorum Reprints, 1970]). The latter term is used by David Christian and explained in the Introduction to his valuable book, *A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia: Volume I: Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire* (Oxford, 1998).

but rather complemented by the seaborne "expansion of Europe."

If the extent of the relevance of Inner Asia to modern world history can be debated, its centrality to the military history of Eurasia till pre-modern times would be hard to dispute.[3] Steppe nomads have been acknowledged as historical agents in their own right largely (but surely not uniquely) because of their military feats. At the same time, as we know, the chronicles and histories that reported such feats were written by people often placed at the receiving end of the violence the Inner Asian warriors did or could unleash. Or they were written by the nomads' literate subjects. While one might argue that such external observations are intrinsically suspect, their study across time, space, and different historiographical traditions, has yielded remarkable results. The comparative analysis of Chinese, Greek, Arabic and other sources has provided a body of elements that Inner Asian nomads shared—ranging from individual military skills to specific questions of armament, tactics and logistics—that has made ancient and modern scholars marvel at what, from the Danube to the Amur and from the Yenisei to the Amu Darya, seemed to be a single historical phenomenon that survived for millennia. The possibility of generalizing the "Eurasian steppe nomad" military paradigm across times and places has surely been the greatest impulse, together with an interest in the dynamics of frontier societies, behind a truly Inner Asian military history, that is, a holistic history of the nomadic "war machine" that did not assume the exclusive perspective of any one of the cultural spheres surrounding the heartland.

A scholarly tradition of which the best-known examples probably are René Grousset's *L'Empire des steppes* and William McGovern's *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, sought to identify what we might call the Inner Asian "military complex" as a unique and integrated historical phenomenon that, on a cyclical basis, produced overawing juggernauts able to dominate politically large expanses of Eurasia. We owe to the aforementioned study by Denis Sinor the distillation of the specific traits of the "Inner Asian warriors" through a compelling analysis of a wealth of sources from Rome to China. Among these,

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[3] As Denis Sinor has remarked, Inner Asia exerted influence in human history "through the excellence of its armed forces." See his "The Inner Asian Warriors," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 101.2 (1981): 133.

the most glaring feature shared by steppe nomadic warriors, from the Scythians to the Huns and Mongols, is their acquisition of individual military skills as a result of a specific lifestyle established in Inner Asia with the rise of pastoral nomadism around the beginning of the first millennium B.C., and remained unchanged (basically) until the modern age. It is surely the weight of this tradition that accounts for the resiliency of the *topos* of the steppe nomad as a "natural warrior." For instance, a recently published book that purports "to examine the nomads of Asia from a purely military perspective," attributes the superiority of the Eurasian nomads exclusively to their being "'naturally' expert in war," and invokes the wisdom of Clausewitz and Napoleon to confirm that good soldiers have to be able to endure extreme physical exertion and suffering.[4] Of course neither Clausewitz nor Napoleon would have claimed that having good soldiers was per se a condition sufficient to winning wars. Yet the scholarly thesis of the Inner Asian "natural" warriors has the solid backing of numerous and reliable sources. Indeed, the view that the steppe nomads have historically enjoyed an advantage vis-à-vis many of their sedentary enemies in virtue of their customs and way of life is unimpeachable. As John King Fairbank aptly stated: "the nomads were by necessity horsemen and hunters specialized in mounted archery, the most natural warriors ever produced by ecological circumstances".[5]

What exactly are these ecologically-derived advantages? Since they have been eloquently exposed by Denis Sinor, I will only touch on this issue briefly. The natural military skills of the nomads came from their contact from birth with a specially forbidding environment, which visitors from more temperate zones found inhospitable. Ancient theories associated physical and psychological traits with characteristics of the environment, especially in relation to temperature, available food, and vulnerability to the elements. Peoples living in the steppes, exposed to a harsher climate and a less varied diet, were regarded as braver than the people from warmer climates, afflicted by a softer temperament. From the earliest accounts of nomadic societies, it was the barren, arid, prohibitively cold steppe environment

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[4] Erik Hildinger, *Warriors of the steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.*, pp. 1–3. (New York, 1997).

[5] *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, "Introduction", p. 13. (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

that was responsible for making a special sort of individual. Their peculiar nomadic wandering was another molding feature. The consuming attention required by the animals, the lack of fixed abode, and the constant threat of enemy attacks, made the nomad's life, in the eyes of the Europeans, Chinese, and other chroniclers, poor, dangerous, and uninspiring. At the same time, the precocious ability to ride horses, the early training in shooting arrows, their intimate knowledge of the animals, the courage and ruthlessness instilled by hunting and fighting, the stamina developed through singular privations, were the ingredients that made the nomadic warrior so superior to the aristocratic and peasant armies of the sedentary states. Finally, a central role was played by the horse (or pony) of the steppe: hardy, small, Spartan in its demands, and of legendary endurance. Horses were plentiful in the steppe, and horse and warrior, shaped by the same environment, were uniquely suited to each other.

As a military type with a long and distinguished pedigree, the "natural warriors" of the Inner Asian steppes are more than just a curiosity in military history, but their characteristics have been so deeply set in the furrow plowed by the traditional sources, that their success seems to require no further explanation.[6] Focussing on these natural characteristics surely sheds light on some aspects of the military excellence of the steppe nomads, but other questions remain unanswered, especially with regard to the relationships between nomads and sedentary people, between war and environment, and between those nomads who attained high levels of military cohesion and those who did not. Issues concerning the introduction of new technology (for example the stirrup) or the military use of resources not limited to those available within the nomads' ecological confines, are also worthy of investigation. More important still, a study of Inner Asian warfare should also consider how specific historical events relate to a more generic paradigm of nomadic warfare. As a prologue to the presentation of the studies comprised in this volume, a

[6] With regard to the sturdy pony of the Asiatic steppe, Denis Sinor has cautioned against attributing to it alone phenomena such as the creation of large nomad empires. See "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," *Oriens Extremus* 19 (1972): 172. In the same article (p. 180) Sinor also stated that "a number of ill-explained facts pertaining to Inner Asian history become more understandable if consideration is given to the logistic limitations imposed upon Inner Asian cavalry by nature itself." My argument on the environmental limitations of nomadic armies is built on this fundamental insight.

few observations on the relative value of the "natural warrior" thesis are necessary. I should haste to add that these observations do not come unaided. Of crucial importance are the studies by Denis Sinor, John Masson Smith and others who have investigated the ecological limitations of nomadic steppe warfare.

As a first and admittedly self-evident point, we should remind ourselves that the legendary endurance of the nomad is a relative value. It depends on the terrain and on the foodstuffs available to both soldiers and animals. While every army in pre-modern times depended almost exclusively on the carrying capacity of the country in which it fought or was stationed, the need to feed large herds of animals is surely one aspect in which the steppe advantage could and did easily turn into a liability. But ecology posed further limitations. Inner Asian armies, not unlike European colonial armies, when fighting in alien territories were vulnerable to diseases against which they had no inherited or acquired immunity. In particular, malaria and dysentery apparently decimated the Mongol troops that crossed into the subtropical areas where these infections existed. Large concentrations of humans, as in cities, also constituted a problem for the Mongols, as these were often cesspools of potentially lethal illnesses. The Manchu-Mongol army fighting in the 1670s in southwest China against the rebellious general Wu Sangui was plagued by an unidentified disease, probably malaria. While the spread of the plague across Eurasia has been attributed, rightly, to the activities of the Mongols, they themselves were by no means immune from unwitting forms of bacteriological warfare.

Another obvious but nevertheless important environmental limit to nomads' expansion was that they could not easily fight naval battles. The few instances of naval warfare in which the nomads have engaged, such as the doomed Mongol invasion of Japan, have been unsuccessful. When the Mongols managed to overpower the enemy on water, as in the case of the battles fought on rivers by Qubilai's army against the Song, this was accomplished by non-Mongol soldiers recruited under Mongol banners. Only a "nomadic" army that had access to such specialist marine forces could attempt to fight on water.

Finally, no amount of horseback hunting and fighting could provide the skills required to mount a successful siege, and in particular the engineering knowledge that served sedentary armies since antiquity. While the nomads were at times aided in their attempts to storm a city by the ineptitude of the city commanders, or by the

fear they managed to instill in the defenders' hearts, their sieges usually needed to be completed quickly, as the attackers were in all probability pressed by the need to feed the army. The city of Riazan took only six days to fall (1237). The notion (so often proved wrong) that the Mongol horse-powered military machine could be resisted by seeking protection behind city walls was openly stated by the Caliph of Baghdad. When the Mongol armies appeared in sight of the city and requested that the fortifications be torn down, the Caliph replied: "When you remove all your horses' hooves, we shall destroy our fortifications."[7]

The natural strengths of the nomads also suffered from limitations other than environmental ones. In particular, the degree of organization, cohesion, and coordination attained by nomadic armies varied substantially from case to case. A number of sources point out how well disciplined the nomadic armies were, while usually remarking that such a degree of discipline was attained by fear rather than by consensus. It was the Mongols who were more often noted for their ability to create disciplined, strongly hierarchical armies, with clear lines of command and orders enforced through blind obedience. But was this typical of Inner Asian warriors? Other sources note that as soon as the battle is over, and even during the battle itself, the esprit de corps and discipline of the combatants could easily waver as each pursued one's own interest in looting, as was the case with the Xiongnu, who, according to the Chinese historian Sima Qian, were only moved by the desire for personal gain.[8] The military handbook by the Byzantine Emperor Maurice, *Strategikon*, differentiates clearly between the level of cohesion displayed by the Scythians and that achieved by Türks and Avars. The first appeared to be divided into uncoordinated (or loosely coordinated) groups, while the latter were able to fight in an orderly formation, thus being able to execute more complex tactical maneuvers.[9] As some of the articles in this book indicate, there are many documented instances of isolated, tribal-strength raiding along the Inner Asian frontiers by

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[7] Peter Jackson and David Morgan, eds. *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, p. 247 (London, 1990).

[8] Sima Qian, *Records of the Grand Historian*. Trans. Burton Watson, Vol. 2, p. 137 (New York, 1993 [Revised Edition]).

[9] Georg T. Dennis and Ernst Gamillscheg, *Das Strategikon des Maurikios*, pp. 360–61 (Wien, 1981).

bands, rather than proper armies, of Cumans and Pechenegs, Kazakhs and Tatars, Kirghiz and Uzbeks. Various Turkic and Mongolian peoples have been more commonly divided into a fragmented series of tribal groupings than anything resembling a centralized state, and their military organization reflected this state of affairs. Their raids were fairly serious threats to the security of the frontier, to trade, and to settlement in peripheral areas—and could swell to critical proportions in the case of mass migrations—but a strict discipline and a high level of internal cohesion could only rarely be imposed by what Joseph Fletcher Jr. called the "supra-tribal leader."[10] While all nomads through their life experience acquired certain skills that could be easily put to military use should the need arise, only some of them, at certain points in time, were able to attain the level of strategic organization and discipline that gained the grudging admiration of their enemies.

A third area that shows the relative value of the natural warrior paradigm concerns the all-important phenomenon of inter-nomadic warfare. The extra-Inner Asian perspective of many sources often excludes (with some exceptions) the issue of inter-nomadic warfare. No "empire of the steppes" came into being without having been preceded by a vicious and prolonged struggle amidst nomadic tribal formations. Indeed, no such empire survived without having to fight against nomadic foes. It is an established historical phenomenon that new nomadic "supra-tribal" polities emerged, at least in Mongolia and the Eastern side of the Eurasian steppes, after a protracted period of inter-nomadic warfare, yet this is a much neglected aspect of their military history. What made a given nomadic army more successful than the next? Were we to consider the relative strengths of two hostile European armies, one could point to a number of possible areas of investigation, according to time and place: from technology to resources, from leadership to social organization, from political structures to cultural traditions. Ever since Clausewitz it has been an accepted truth that war transcends the purely military.[11] Likewise, the essence of the military successes of Mongols and other Inner Asian warriors cannot be sought solely in the military qualities that

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[10] Joseph Fletcher, Jr. "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4, part I (1979–80): 237.

[11] This point is made in Peter Paret, "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth century", in *The Theory and Practice of War*, ed. Michael Howard, p. 32 (Bloomington, 1965).

have characterized the steppe nomads for three millennia because the fact in itself would not explain why certain armies were more successful than others. Surely there is an element of "fate and fortune" in every military confrontation, but in the end it is other aspects, such as the availability and use of the resources at the disposal of a given army, that make the difference. The analysis of a number of instances of the military ascent of Inner Asian military leaders shows that the winning party had indeed given great attention to the accumulation of economic and other resources, either by engaging successfully in trade, or by extracting "tribute," or by enhancing one's own productive basis. All three of these conditions can be observed for instance in the build-up of the Manchu "Banner army" in the early 1600s. In the study of inter-Inner Asian warfare we are forced to seek answers that transcend what is, in essence, an ethnographic approach, and consider the specific questions that military historians ask: how did the army work? What resources could it rely upon? How united (or divided) was its command? And then down to more specialized questions of logistics, technology, tactics, and strategy. While the basics of nomadic military skills, armament, and mobilization may have been comparable from the Danube to the Sungari, their effectiveness could and did vary.

Fourth, given that the nomadic steppe economy did not change appreciably in its basic characteristics, did the nomads' ability to wage war change over time? In his contribution to this volume Peter Golden establishes this continuity for the period embraced by his essay, that is, for at least a thousand years, but this could be stretched even further on both ends. Undoubtedly the degree of continuity is impressive, and can be found in other regions of Inner Asia as well. However, the sources also remark often that the nomads could lose their military might as a consequence of changes in their lifestyle. Indeed, the *topos* of the moral and physical decline of nomadic states as a result of the slackening effect of "post-conquest relaxation" is one that goes hand-in-hand with the "ecological warrior" notion. The sources are quick to point to the moral and physical decline of the once-hardy nomads as soon as they abandon the rigors of their nomadic life and become accustomed to more urbane comforts. Even more interestingly, the pernicious effects of idling amidst soft silks and fragrant foods is denounced also by autochthonous Inner Asian sources. The Türk leader Bilgä Qaγan thundered against those among

his people tempted by Chinese luxuries.[12] From the "outside," Arab travellers explained the decline of the once mighty Uighur empire with their conversion to a foreign religion and evident loss of interest in a martial lifestyle.[13] This type of explanation has followed the downfall of almost every Inner Asian empire according to a recognizable pattern. After the conquest, easy access to luxuries, interest in local religions and cultures, and mixing with the conquered sedentary population led the nomadic elites and many soldiers to forsake the hard life of the steppe, thus weakening their martial spirit, and leading to their being overthrown either by the local populace of by some other undiluted nomadic force. For instance, one can be surprised to read, in the military reports of an American secret agent in post-World War I Mongolia, that the Mongols are regarded as a unwarlike people under conditions of life that probably did not differ substantially from those of their ancestors of the thirteenth century.[14] What had changed? Quite simply, the Khalkha Mongols had not fought a serious war for almost two hundred years. While it is possible that the influence of Buddhism may have adversely affected the martial spirit of the Mongols, it is also probable that the reduction of the endemic inter-tribal violence was due to the "pacifying" effects of Qing rule in Mongolia. As society became less intensely militarized, the nomads became possibly less prone to engage in war. Although this argument may appear to be a tautology, it does place the notion of the natural warrior in a different light, and once again conveys the necessity to contextualize the issue of nomadic warfare according to place and time.

The "low tide" of nomadic power, alternating with the "high tide" of rise and conquest, is not the only but surely a very important aspect of the cycles of Inner Asian power that Lattimore among others identified as the true "pulse" of Inner Asian history.[15] Even among the nomads who never conquered empires one can see periods of

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[12] René Giraud, *L'Empire des Turcs Celestes: les règnes d'Elterich, Qapghan et Bilgä (680–734)*, pp. 158–59 (Paris, 1960).

[13] Colin Mackerras, "The Uighurs," in *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, ed. Denis Sinor, pp. 340–41 (Cambridge, 1990).

[14] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Mongolian Topics in the U.S. Military Intelligence Reports." *Mongolian Studies* 10 (1986): 96–107.

[15] Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, pp. 519–52 (Boston, 1962 [New York, 1940]).

greater integration alternating with periods in which the tribes appear to be more fragmented and their military cohesion much looser. While this is admittedly a different sort of cycle, it is also true that the nomads' ability to carry out offensive and defensive operations varied according to the size of the armies they could put in the field, and therefore according to the degree of integration achieved among the tribes.

The cyclical rises and falls of nomadic polities' power and cohesion occur at different qualitative levels and under historical circumstances that can be consolidated into a single model only through the cruellest Procrustean exercise.[16] The difference between the waning of the Xiongnu and the crepuscule of the Mongol khanates is just as great as (and possibly even greater than) the difference between the fall of Rome and the decline of Byzantium. While the basic tactical principles of nomadic armies may not have changed dramatically over time, the way in which resources were obtained and turned into military supplies did change considerably. The relative dearth of case studies on the foraging and distribution of supplies within a nomadic army prevents me from going too deeply into this question, but it is an acceptable generalization that a nomadic army with access to greater resources (such as those that could be provided by a neighboring sedentary state) was able to sustain longer and more distant campaigns.

While steppe warfare did not change much for long periods of time, especially if we consider the phenomenon on a regionally or ethnically-defined basis, once we take into consideration all the variants of the Inner Asian warrior model across the whole historical spectrum, then it becomes evident that the ways in which armies fought cannot be assumed to have been mere copies of some archetypical model. The similarities derive, in my view, from the basic rationale that all fighting forces tend to rely primarily on their strengths. Given that all nomads had a natural advantage in the speed afforded by the horses, their mobility is indeed a universal characteristic of nomadic warfare. Weaponry did not change much because whatever weapons they had worked rather well, and there were no pressures to dispose of the available technology as long as it proved viable. At the same time, one should also recognize that at least some Inner

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[16] I make this point elsewhere, see Nicola Di Cosmo, "State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History," *Journal of World History*, 10.1 (1999): 1–40.

Asian armies were able to introduce technological innovations when they saw fit. But such variables as the number of soldiers they were able to put in the field, how these were coordinated, what objectives they had, how they behaved towards the conquered people, and how they exploited the resources of the land, are matters that require special attention as they determine the difference between one army (and one society) and the next. For instance, there is likely to be a substantial disparity between an army that relies on trade and exchange to provide itself with weapons, and an army that can supply itself through indigenous production. The existence of such a range, limited by certain environmental and cultural factors to be sure, but all the same open to rather dramatic internal variations, prohibits the reduction of the "Inner Asian way of warfare" to a single phenomenon.

Fifth, the relative value of the Inner Asian warrior model must be measured against the impact that different nomads had on different civilizations. Assuming a world-history perspective, Inner Asian military history is especially relevant in two areas: the transmission of technology from, to, and across various parts of Eurasia, and the institutional and social changes that sedentary societies underwent as a direct result of nomadic contact, threat, or domination. Naturally, the longer and the wider the conquest was, the deeper the traces left behind. The Mongol conquest is a classic example. The demands placed by the Mongol elites on China, Persia, and Russia, created institutions that, altered the existing relationship between military and society.[17] A number of these institutions remained as part of the local system of government long after the Mongols had been overthrown.

On a different level, the nomads' way of fighting influenced the way in which sedentary armies organized their defences and supplied their armies. On the eastern side of the steppe, the Chinese not only adopted cavalry from the nomads, but also tried repeatedly to establish horse breeding stations that could supply military mounts. Such attempts placed a considerable burden on the empire's finances, and rarely brought satisfactory results. A similar point can be argued with regard to the construction of the Great Wall of China during the Ming dynasty. On the western side of the steppes, the introduction of the stirrup to the Mediterranean world is usually

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[17] Donald Ostrowsky, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589*, p. 44. (Cambridge, 1998).

attributed to westbound nomadic migration occurring around the middle of the first millennium A.D.

In a nebulous and often untraceable way, the nomads have been historically responsible for a number of "cultural transactions" across the landmass of Central Eurasia, which, historically, depended on war, as this was certainly, if unfortunately, one of the ways in which contacts with other societies were established. It is therefore not surprising that military equipment appears frequently, ever since the transmission of the war chariot from West Asia to East Asia in the second millennium B.C., among the items that sedentary societies acquired from the nomads. As Thomas Allsen shows in his contribution to the volume, the Mongol conquest functioned not only as a vector of deadly bacilli and bacteria, but also as a carrier of a military technology that was going to transform European and other societies: gunpowder. Thus, we need to distinguish between the nomads who had a definite and clearly identifiable impact on sedentary societies and those whose contacts did not generate specially dramatic developments.

Sixth, and last, did war, or the absence of it, in any ways changed a given nomadic society? This is a fair question, since it cannot be assumed that all societies were changed equally by phenomena such as mass militarization and territorial expansion. Answering this question depends on the magnitude of the engagement, and on the type of social organization of any nomadic group. However, it can be conjectured that, on a general level, the greater the level of militarization, the deeper the changes that may occur at every social level.[18] The rise, for instance, of a military aristocracy centered around the military leader and his clan tends to change dramatically the relationship among the tribes and lineages that constitute the society in question. As war takes its course, some groups reduce other groups to the rank of retainers or slaves, and a relationship that may have been egalitarian and horizontal tends to become hierarchical and vertical. Moreover, as a large part of the male population is separated from the direct production process to serve on prolonged campaigns or as permanent bodyguard at the service of the leader, economic pressures builds up towards the acquisition of war prisoners, slaves, and surrendered people that could take charge of traditional as well as new economic activities, such as the manufacturing or weapons.

[18] See Stanislav Andreski (Andrzejewski), *Military Organization and Society* (London 1964).

### *The essays*

The span of time of this book, approximately 500 to 1800, embraces a period in which the nomads of Inner Asia played a central role in the military history of Eurasia. The esssay are arranged into three chronologically discrete parts. This is not meant to emphasize any particular periodization of Inner Asian history, except for the commonly-held view that the Mongol conquest acted as a watershed in Inner Asian history. Thus a pre-Mongol, Mongol, and post-Mongol subdivision of the essays appeared to be appropriate.

One of the characteristics of the articles is to recognize the centrality of the original sources, while at the same time placing their often totalizing assumptions in their proper historical context. As mentioned above, the conceptual definitions of the warlike nomads and their modes of combat, while often similar through the width and breadth of Inner Asia from antiquity to near-modernity, do not reflect the same historical circumstances. The *adaequatio rei et intellectus* necessary to achieve a historically accurate vision of Inner Asian warfare has been sought through the collation of several essays bridging the western and the eastern steppes of Eurasia over a thousand years. Generally speaking, and somewhat regrettably, the eastern end of the steppe prevails over the western with six essays centered around China and only four on western and central Asia. The article by Thomas Allsen is the only one that embraces both ends of Inner Asia. While the articles presented here are written by scholars trained in different historical disciplines, their essays are not simply "case studies." An effort has been made, by and large, to keep in mind the social and political questions underlying the military context. An effort to address "patterns" of sedentary-nomadic interaction can be found not too deeply beneath the surface of several articles, since this has been a most prolific area of scholarly work. At an even broader level, some of the essays are underpinned by an explicit concern with the possible correlations between the history of the steppe nomads and world history.

David Graff's essay explains how the Tang emperor succeeded in vanquishing the Türk empire without renouncing the assumption that the steppe lifestyle made the nomad a "natural warrior." The other side of the same lifestyle, however, was an economy extremely vulnerable to environmental crises. Scarcity of pasture due to droughts or to unusually frigid winters could threaten the very subsistence base

of the nomads. The combination of, first, the creation of a light cavalry that could match tactically the distinct advantages of the Türks' "rapid deployment, speed of manoeuver, and surprise," and, second, a ruthless willingness to violate agreements and attack the enemy when weakened by an economic and political crisis gave the Tang the final victory. Notably, Graff points to the existence of a frontier force of Chinese cavalrymen that had long been trained to fight the nomads with the nomads' own methods. The Tang emperors Li Yuan (r. 618–626) and Li Shimin (r. 627–649) relied on a type of elite soldier modelled in every respect after their Türk counterpart. It was probably this type of soldier, who had already proven his valor for decades, and had been trained specifically in "steppe warfare," that was sent to raid the camp of the Türk *qaghan* Xieli, precipitating the Tang victory and subjugation of the Türks. Graff perceptively notes that while the nomadic way of life gave the Türk several advantages—among which the most conspicuous were their deftness with weapons (especially bow and arrow discharged from horseback), their tactical mobility, and their ability to subsist on the animals they brought along as long as pasture was available (therefore requiring scarcely any logistical supply)—the same way of life and environment produced serious liabilities, such as the vulnerability of their economy to climatic variations, which were compounded by the brittleness of the internal political structure. Imitating the Türks' way of warfare, not only in terms of martial skills and equipment, but also operationally and strategically, the Tang produced a force that could fight on enemy ground while it was not limited by the same weaknesses that impaired the Türks' army. The motif of the natural warrior is not denied here, but rather contextualized in relation to the strategic choices and tactical abilities of both parties. If the Türks lost, this was because the Tang emperor could rely on troops and commanders expert in steppe warfare, and because he himself was well acquainted with the nomads' *forma mentis*, when it came to military and political subtleties. Indeed, the sharp distinction sometimes drawn between nomadic and sedentary armies is much less marked. Recent publications have argued a similar point. For instance, Jonathan Skaff correctly argues that the opposition between Chinese and barbarians has not been a significant issue in possibly the most significant military event of the whole Tang history: the An Lushan rebellion, which saw the involvement of vari-

ous Central Asian military powers.[19] The reality of war blurred any *a priori* division between two camps, one Inner Asian and the other Chinese. From the viewpoint of Chinese military history, the Tang effort to match and overcome the military strength of the steppe goes to show that the "sedentary army" of China could and did learn from their northern neighbors, once the leadership understood the mechanics of steppe warfare. The defeat of the nomads, on the other hand, is not sought in a supposed laxity leading to the deterioration of martial spirit among the Türks, but rather in limitations that are inherent to steppe politics and economy.

A story of nomadic defeat is also told by Michael Drompp, whose article focuses on the military events related to the confrontation between the Tang and the Uighurs at the end of the Uighur empire (840–848). This confrontation provides an illuminating example of how relations along the steppe frontier really worked. Groups of Uighurs, no longer mighty and powerful, decimated by internecine warfare and Kirghiz attacks, migrated toward the border of their erstwhile ally, the Tang, after 840. As Drompp's article makes clear, these Uighurs were still nomadic warriors—rather than sedentarized and "mollified" versions of their martial ancestors—but the situation in their homeland north of the Gobi had become so desperate that they began a mass migration towards China seeking economic subsidies and political asylum. The presence of hundreds of thousands of Uighur refugees (albeit internally divided and sometimes simply scattered in bands without any precise affiliation) along a frontier that was both unequipped and unprepared, posed a distinct threat to China's security. The different strategies adopted by the two main Uighur leaders, Ögä Qaghan and Ormïzt, together with the countermeasures adopted by the Tang to deal with this crisis, illustrate the range of options that frontier conflicts with steppe nomads may generate.

The *casus belli*, as Drompp rightly notes, was desperation and the belief that diplomatic or military means could be applied to increase the various contendants' chances of survival. To be sure, this downward cycle of nomadic power appears to be more the result of the political break-up of the Uighur empire and the ascent of a new steppe power than the waning of martial spirit among the Uighurs.

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[19] "Barbarians at the Gates? The Tang Frontier Military and the An Lushan Rebellion,"in *War and Society*, 18.2 (2000): 23–35.

More importantly, to draw a sharp distinction on the battlefield between a nomadic and a sedentary army would badly miss the point. The Tang recruited a variety of nomads to serve under their standards against the belligerent Ögä, some of whom, by the way, were massacred once their services were no longer essential and their loyalty seemed to be dithering. We can also note how assertions of a Chinese ideological approach to frontier defence, if taken in the abstract would be misleading. The Uighur-Chinese confrontation described by Drompp shows that the Tang officials' approach to the crisis was characterized by a lucid, if cynical, *realpolitik*, as they tried to assuage the desperate refugees with gifts, and resorted to traditional "divide and rule" policies while proceeding to complete a program of military readiness. The narrative of this war, then, aptly contextualizes the military dimension of the waning of the once-powerful nomadic empire.

Turning to the other end of the Eurasian steppe in pre-Mongol times, Peter Golden's essay presents a broad-ranging analysis of warfare among the traditional nomads of Western Inner Asia, a tour de force that is unique for range and comprehensiveness. Spanning over a thousand years of the history of the western steppes of Eurasia, and based on the painstaking analysis of scores of historical sources, this essay yields convincing evidence related to the nature of warfare in the region, down to specific matters of training and armament, battle formations, and tactics. Not surprisingly, the image of the nomad in the European sources of the period is primarily identified with his warlike skills. But Golden makes an important point by differentiating between warfare among nomads and warfare between nomads and sedentary peoples, typically more destructive. While the armament and tactics of the nomads did not change appreciably over time (with the important exception of the adoption of the stirrup), the nomads were influential in transmitting military "know-how" to their sedentary neighbors, in particular the Byzantine army, whose equipment included several items "in the Avar style." Because relations between nomads and sedentary states were very often violent, or otherwise strained and ridden with mutual mistrust, the image of the nomad was often colored with less than complimentary descriptions, no doubt sometimes fully justified. Through booty and conquest, war produced wealth for the nomad, although the benefits of wealth seem to have been ephemeral. At the same time, the nomad had to defend himself against the expansion of other nomads or

against the expeditions of sedentary states. Wars of desperation (as the one described by Drompp) were fought by nomads displaced by the very instability of the political and natural environment of the steppe. Another key issue addressed in Golden's essay is that the vast majority of the nomads of the western steppes did not progress, for the thousand-odd years under consideration, to a level of socio-political organization that went beyond the "supra-tribal" confederation, itself a rather unstable edifice. These confederations oscillated between looser and more compact tribal associations never quite reaching the more complex state-like military and civil bureaucracies that we find in Western Inner Asia with the Türk and Türko-Khazar states, or in Eastern Inner Asia with the Mongolia and Manchuria-based empires, where the list of "imperial nomads" begins in the third century B.C. with the Xiongnu. This important reflection by Golden adds to the argument that, while nomads across Inner Asia did share a number of features, one should also (and especially) register a diversity of experiences that is reflected, historically, in the ways in which nomads organized themselves politically and militarily. Naturally, the issue of the range and continuity of the political experiences of different types of Inner Asian nomads is closely related to the equally crucial question of the range of ways in which nomads and sedentary peoples across Eurasia negotiated their co-existence.

The Mongol conquest is the part of Inner Asian military history that has received closest scholarly attention. Yet while the dimensions of the conquest and the impact it had on Europe and Asia vastly exceed any other Inner Asian military feat, and indeed place them in an altogether different league, there are also elements of continuity that should not be lost. The four chapters that focus on this period explore issues that are not usually discussed in the more classic accounts of the "Mongol storm."

Golden's detailed description of various features of the art of war as it was practised in the western Eurasian steppes reverberates in Michal Biran's study of the battle of Herat. The armies that clashed at Herat in 1270 were mainly light cavalry and the weapons the traditional Inner Asian ones: "arrows, bows, and lances." Biran's remark on the destruction caused by the armies to the cultivated fields as both purposefully and accidental reminds us that Inner Asian armies could and did behave differently towards sedentary peoples. The Chagadaid army of Baraq trampled the fields as an act of war, but in the case of Abaqa's Ilkhanid army, the crops were damaged

despite contrary orders issued by the commanders. It is easy to imagine that the nomadic soldiers did not "tiptoe" if they had to cross a cultivated area: when a nomadic army was on the move, out of the sheer number of animals, the damage to agricultural lands was often inevitable but not necessarily deliberate. Scouting is another feature of the Inner Asian art of war that is mentioned in Biran's account. Scouts could be actual scouts, the vanguard of the army, or a decoy army charged with luring the enemy into a trap. This vanguard group numbered, in the case of Abaqa's army, as many as 5,000 men.

Biran carefully analyzes the negotiations and diplomatic offers that preceded the battle, and the use made by both rivals of espionage and stratagems to manipulate their adversary or gather information. Once battle was joined, the two armies appeared to be in possession of roughly the same technology, with bow and arrow as the principal offensive weapon, and a number of other arms for close-quarter combat. The difference between them was that the Chagadaid side had fewer weapons and other supplies. On the Ilkhanid side, the soldiers had no body armor, and were thus exposed to the shock charges of the armored and heavier Chagadaid cavalry, which however was not very large. The Ilkhans seem (but not unequivocally) to have had a larger army, and to have been better equipped. The internal cohesion of the army was also important, with the Chaghadai side being less united than the Ilkhanid. But both armies used traditional nomadic warfare tactics: speedy maneuvers, ruses, and ambushes. Neither retreated behind city walls, and the presence of the leaders was important, though they appeared on the battlefield relatively late, possibly because revealing their presence too soon may have led to an early disintegration of the army in case the commander had been killed. Another advantage on the Ilkhan's side (also typical of nomadic warfare) was the better knowledge of the topography, though both armies seem to have scouted the terrain carefully. In Biran's eloquent argument, then, it appears that when two nomadic armies fought one another factors such as available resources, quality of leadership, and relative skills in the use of traditional tactics were essential.

A minute attention to the details of the military encounter, complemented by a search for larger answers, is also evident in Reuven Amitai's essay on the Ilkhan-Mamluk war on the occasion of Ghazan's campaign in Syria (1299–1300). A larger question is whether the

Mongol army underwent a change in the nearly half century between the conquest of Persia and this campaign. Amitai's answer is that the process of acculturation of the Mongols in Iran, particularly with respect to their conversion to Islam, did not have a noticeable impact in the military sphere, where the *modus operandi* and armament of the Mongols remained substantially the same as their grandfathers'.

The issues more closely related to the Mongol clash with Mamluk forces in Syria involve the reasons for the Mongol military success. The Mamluk army suffered from several disadvantages, such as low morale, a sense of complacency, and a command structure divided between two leaders, and was also much smaller than the Mongol one, possibly by a factor of two or even three. On the other hand, the Mamluks knew the terrain better than the Mongols. The Mongols' advantage, besides morale and the larger numbers, seems to lie chiefly in the person of Ghazan, as the talented and undisputed leader of the army. Amitai draws attention also to the logistics of the campaign in relation to the carrying capacity of the territory. The Mongol army may have included 350,000 horses or more, depending on the estimate of the troops involved, with each soldier keeping on average five horses. Based also on the research of other scholars, Amitai attributes the loss of Mongol horses during the campaign to the scarcity of pasture and water sufficient to support such a large mass of horses. If the Mongol troops were distributed along a very wide front, and exposed to the concentrated attack of the Mamluk on their right flank, this may well be because the territory did not permit a higher density of horses and troops. The same limitation would also explain why the horses were emaciated and unfit for action, and why the Mongols seem to have been caught unprepared. Amitai's attention to this question is all the more important because, while several scholars have debated the issue of the effects of the carrying capacity of the territory upon Turco-Mongol tactics, the particular incidence on this problem on the outcome of major battles has yet to be fully investigated. One could imagine, for instance, that with more determination and better leadership the Mamluks, who relied more than the Mongols on shock cavalry charges, could have routed the Mongols by attacking their spread-out troops in different sections of their formation. This is what they may have actually attempted to do, but, as it were, after the loss of the right flank the Mongols stood their ground, repelled the Mamluk charge with intense volleys of arrows, and counterattacked on horseback, without however being

drawn in a lengthy pursuit of the fleeing soldiers, possibly fearing an ambush. The Mongols, themselves second to none in the technique of horseback archery, preferred to meet the Mamluk cavalry charge dismounted, for a ground position allowed greater accuracy in shooting.[20]

In amicable disagreement with Professor John Masson Smith, Amitai concludes that the Mongol army was not inferior to the Mamluk, either in armament or fighting spirit, although there is evidence that the Mamluks used shock tactics while the Mongols did not. Amitai's conclusions explicitly encourage a holistic analysis of the conditions under which a given army operated, and reject approaches that tend to isolate one factor—be it armament, logistics, or the relative value of men and horses—to explain the outcome of military events.

John Herman's essay illustrates the behavior of an Inner Asian army in unfamiliar territory and unsuitable to its traditional methods of combat. Whereas the Mongol invasion of Central Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe conjures up images of unstoppable waves of mounted warriors, in the Southwest of China, a rugged land where rice paddies are nested among mountains and forests, the Mongols were treading far more carefully. In their larger effort to conquer the Southern Song the campaign against the Dali kingdom, resulting in its submission to the Mongols in 1253, may appear as yet another instance of Mongol military genius. But the reality was different. This Mongol victory was attained by an ethnically composite force, where local soldiers were relied upon more than Mongol warriors, at the cost of intricate negotiations with local leaders that undermined Mongol authority in the area. The "conquest" was never really completed and large swaths of the southwest remained under very limited Yuan sovereignty, while anti-Mongol resistance continued for the following thirty years.

The campaign was planned and executed according to classic Mongol strategy: the army was divided into three columns, led by

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[20] Incidentally, one may wonder whether the efficacy of a sustained discharge of arrows with high penetrating power against a close-rank cavalry charge might have been learned by the East Asian nomads centuries before from fighting against Chinese crossbow formations. I have no evidence to suggest this, except that, as early as the second century B.C., relatively small Chinese bodies of infantry troops armed with crossbows seemed to have been able to resist at length larger nomadic cavalry forces. See for instance the episode of Li Ling's fated expedition against the Xiongnu, in Sima Qian, *Records of the Grand Historian.* Trans. Burton Watson, Vol. 2, pp. 127–28.

Qubilai and two experienced field commanders, the veteran Mongol general Uriyanqadai and the Chinese Wang Dezhen. While the early part of the campaign went according to plan, and the Mongol troops were able to outmaneuver the Dali forces and occupy the capital of the kingdom, retaining the area proved more difficult as the Mongols were bogged down in a guerrilla war against Dali resistance led by the king himself. The following occupation of the area, under Uriyanqadai's command, shows that the Mongols relied to a large extent on local troops to fill the lower officer ranks. In a style reminiscent of the Anglo-French wars in North America, Mongols and Song fought each other through the indigenous peoples. Local armed resistance proved extremely costly to the Mongols, whose very presence in the area was under constant threat. Herman's study exposes the weaknesses of an army ill-suited to guerrilla warfare in unfamiliar territory, and probably overstretched, as the main Mongol forces were concentrating in the north to attack the Song. The pacification of the area in the end had to rely more on diplomacy and bureaucratic craft than on force. The draconian demands imposed by the Mongols on the conquered population had to give way to flexibility once the force of arms proved ineffective, and the need for experienced administrators and commanders from Central Asia, China, and elsewhere—most prominently the Central Asian governor Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din—negotiated their presence in the area both administratively and militarily. The steppe-warrior army had become, by then, an international and multiethnic force not dissimilar to a colonial army: this process of change is one of fascinating features of the Mongol experience in world military history.

As a viaduct linking disparate parts of Eurasia, the effects of the Mongol conquest easily transcend the purely military aspects, and the Mongol influence on the institutions, ideology, and cultures of the conquered countries has been the subject of several studies. It is in this broader context that Thomas Allsen situates his essay on the transmission of military technology, thus stressing the cultural aspect of the conquest in an area crucial to the world dimension of Inner Asian military history.

Having gained access to the most advanced centers of production of weapons, the Mongols actively involved themselves in the acquisition of military technology. Artisans and technicians skilled in the production and use of weapons circulated widely across the Mongol empire and transformed the map of military exchanges between East

and West. Allsen in particular explores the transmission of the trebuchets from the West to China and of gunpowder on the opposite route. The essay's detailed argument presents the Mongols not as mere facilitators and conveyors of exchanges between distant civilizations, but rather as active agents in the process. In world-historical perspective, this argument supports Abu-Lughod's thirteenth-century world system theory while stressing the pivotal position of the Inner Asian circuit within it (at least with regard to the spread of technology).[21] The multiethnic characteristic of the composition of the Mongol army was a functional necessity that depended on two variables: the extent of military technology available to them, and the type of war to be waged. Allsen's conclusion impinges on another most important point: the question of transmission. In weighing the relative importance of "priority" versus "receptivity"—the faculty of making use of a given invention—Allsen stresses the importance of the second, or, in other words, of the "process" of transmission over the "chronology" of invention. The long, intricate, piecemeal process that led to the spread of technology requires the ability and willingness, on the recipient's side, to make use of a given invention or innovation. The steppe nomads, Allsen argues, were limited in this respect because of their "ecological" commitment to mounted combat, which did not allow the adoption and development of firearms without posing a broader question of social and economic change. Steppe nomads of later eras continued to rely essentially on the traditional mode of combat also because of the absence of any "internal social and political challenge to cavalry warfare" that could stimulate innovations in the use of artillery. States that for a long period of time were exposed to the challenge of the steppe nomads, like Russia, were equally reluctant to switch to new forms of combat, once they had learned to defend themselves. Allsen's reflection is of major import to the broader question of the interaction between steppe and sown beyond the Mongol period per se, and the working hypothesis offered in the latter part of the essay can surely be explored by military historians in reference to military changes, especially in Russia and Western Asia, in the early modern period.

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[21] See the map of the eight circuits of the thirteenth-century world system in Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*, p. 34 (New York, 1989).

Di Cosmo's contribution to the volume addresses the general theme of inter-Inner Asian warfare, and focusses on the Manchu war against the Mongol Ñaqar leader Ligdan Khan, which took place in the 1620s and early 1630s. The significance of the war consisted in the Manchu ability to achieve political hegemony over the Mongol tribes of southern Mongolia, and in the subsequent elimination of a serious threat to their regional expansion. From the viewpoint of military history, the wars led to a closer incorporation of several Mongol tribes within the Manchu army and political establishment.

The essay focuses on several aspects of military interests. For instance, although the Manchus had an army similar to the Mongols', mostly based on light cavalry, they relied on static defences (forts and fortified cities) far more than the Mongols, and pressured their Mongol allies to build towns. The introduction of fortifications in steppes warfare may not be unprecedented, but it is clear that this was perceived as a new development at least by some Mongols. Other matters gleaned from the documents refer to the regulations the army had to observe during a campaign, with relative punishments in case of breach. Since much of the war was fought in the guise of raids and counter raids, the main difficulty consisted, on the Manchu side, in organizing and coordinating either "punitive expeditions" or rescue missions for their Mongol allies. When a certain military action was decided, the accurate coordination of troops from different tribes was crucial, and in the correspondence between the Manchu ruler and his Mongol allies we can detect a high degree of anxiety emerging from the preparation of a campaign. Failure to appear at a rendezvous was a crime of the highest order. Other crimes in relation to the conduct of war were announced to the troops, with special reference to the behavior of the soldiers vis-à-vis the enemy. Other matters of military interest discussed in this essay are the description of the conduct of a raid in the steppes, from its rationale and organization of its completion, and the treatment of prisoners of war. Some of the documents also shed light on the conduct of soldiers towards civilians.

From several episodes we see that the decision to participate in a military campaign was often not a matter of choice for several Mongol chiefs. They were either forced into war by the need to defend themselves or by the need to maintain their allegiance to a stronger party. The choice between the two formidable rivals was not easy and sev-

eral chieftains (and their people) did not survive a "wrong" decision. The diplomatic moves that went hand-in-hand with the military operations were central to this war, and several documents shed light on what we might regard as a Manchu doctrine of the "just war." The correspondence between the Manchu ruler Hong Taiji (r. 1627–1643) and Mongol chieftains supports the interpretation that Ligdan appeared to many as a bloodthirsty leader, a point artfully used by the Manchus for political capital. The focus on the diplomatic aspect of this war illustrates also how steppe warfare included extensive and on-going negotiations among the various parties involved, which contributed to shaping the outcome of the war no less than actual military clashes. In the end, Ligdan's failure to win either the diplomatic or the military side of the war opened the way to the Manchus' hegemony in southern Mongolia and led to a much closer integration between Manchus and Mongols—accomplished through treaties, marriage arrangements, and voluntary of forced submission—and eventually to the formation of the Mongol banners.

The Manchu-Mongol rivalry, albeit in a wholly different guise, is central to Peter Perdue's study of the Qing rulers' struggle against steppe nomads in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The main focus of this essay is on the particular combination of the choice of tools (in terms of logistics, diplomatic alliances and battlefield tactics) made by the two opposite camps. Through the reconstruction of historical contingencies, inclusive of economic, ecological, and personal features, Perdue's essay traces the main phases of a confrontation among three major powers—Russia, China, and the Zunghars—that lasted the better part of a century (c. 1680–1760). Perdue's argument, situated at the macroscopic level, combines the analysis of grand strategy and personal traits of governance with objective environmental and economic constraints. It also investigates qualitative changes in the way the three most celebrated Qing rulers approached the issue of frontier defence, and the variables that determined the range of options at their disposal. The overall impression is that the Qing military effort became ever more dependent for success upon the strengths of a sedentary empire. On the other hand, the Zunghars made several efforts to go beyond the limitations of their resource base: for instance, by attempting to develop their own backyard firearms industry, with the help of Russian and Swedish gunsmiths. Yet the Zunghars obtained their more persuasive victories when they relied on traditional nomadic tactics of highly mobile cavalry war-

fare. Yet the attempts by two Zunghar leaders to establish their own firearm production presents an interesting question in terms of the actual ability of nomads to integrate some of the available technology even when not directly applicable to their traditional mode of combat. One might also speculate that artillery became especially useful to the nomads when they made an effort to develop an agrarian base—either through the sedentarization of a portion of the nomadic population, or by conquering sedentary areas—as a more efficient way to defend settlements. The role of firearms as "prestige weapons" should also not be excluded, as access to them could have might have enhanced the authority of a given chief in a notoriously volatile political environment. On balance, it was the Qing ability to pour resources into the military effort and to sustain long-range campaigns with an unprecedented logistic preparation that eventually accounts for the success of Qianlong, as it provided the material basis that allowed to emperor to make his strategic choices. Interestingly, the Qing scholar Wei Yuan's (1794–1856) estimation that more than half of the Zunghars died of smallpox hints at a crisis within the nomadic camp strongly reminiscent of the one that hit the Türks on the eve of the Tang triumph, or the Uighurs before being wiped out, as we have seen in Graff's and Drompp's articles. Perdue's essay, by concentrating on the broader picture, reminds us that military history is a matter in which "fate and fortune" have their place alongside the more specialized aspects of battlefield tactics. It also reminds us that the Qing conquests, eventually encased in an official narrative of "manifest destiny," in reality consisted of a piecemeal process whose ebb and flow resulted from ad hoc choices and turns of fate, rather than from a grand strategy of imperial expansion.

The issue of Qianlong's personality, which has been of late the subject of considerable interest,[22] is central also to Joanna Waley-Cohen's article on military rituals. While he was, as Perdue defines him, a "desk general" with no inclination for the harsh life of the field commander, Qianlong was not immune to the grandeur of military honors, and especially proud of an heritage that celebrated

[22] The personality and historical role(s) of the Qianlong emperor are investigated at length in Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley, 1999) and Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley, 1998).

them and was in turn implicitly celebrated by the homage rendered to military exploits. Waley-Cohen's exacting examination of military rituals in the Qianlong period illustrates goes well beyond the emperor's personal predilection for glamorous events and genius for self-aggrandizement. Waley-Cohen's rich essay presents a thesis with the widest ramifications. Qianlong's relentless efforts to celebrate war and military exploits were meant to recast the traditional balance between the civil and the military (*wen* and *wu*) in such a way that the traditionally subordinated *wu* would gain equal dignity with *wen*. Waley-Cohen's essay focuses on the types of military rituals and on their dissemination, including audience performance and "broadcasting". The general effect of Qianlong's promotion of these rituals was to enhance the profile of the military ethos (closely associated with the Inner Asian heritage of the Manchus) within mainstream Chinese culture. The rituals discussed in this essay include the Grand Inspections (*da yue*), the rituals for dispatching generals (*ming jiang*) and for welcoming a victorious army (*jiaolao*), and finally the rituals that regulated the presentation and reception of captives (*xianfu* and *shoufu*) and the Autumn hunts at the imperial preserve of Mulan. According to Waley-Cohen's study, some of these rituals had Manchu precedents that, under Qianlong, were incorporated and fused with the Chinese ones into a single "martial" tradition. Moreover, military ritual was not just for the benefit of the participants, mainly soldiers and the emperor's entourage, but were disseminated, together with war paintings and illustrations of battles, throughout the empire in one celebration and glorification of Qing martiality. This essay's important contribution, then, is to assess the impact of the Inner Asian military tradition on a system of intellectual conventions and a culture that, like the Chinese, appeared to have shunned or at least muted its military "voice" for almost a thousand years.[23] Examples of attempts to raise the prestige of martial values include the Mongols in China, who established the primacy of the military on a racial and ethnic basis, and Turco-Mongol rule in other parts of Eurasia, where the "nomadic" side of society retained control of the military

[23] David Graff identifies in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion the conscious affirmation of a progressive divarication between *wen* and *wu*. See his "The Sword and the Brush: Military Specialisation and Career Patterns in Tang China, 618–907," in *War and Society* 18.2 (2000): 9–22.

in contrast to the civil administration managed by an urban, ethnically different (Iranian, "Sart," or other) population.

The Qing, however, were able to achieve a more complex operation, one that, here as in other spheres of politics and society, managed to retain certain values imported through the conquest and the Inner Asian heritage, and even raise them to a higher status, while effectively "disembodying" them from an exclusive racial and ethnic identity. Under Qianlong, the melding of Manchu "martiality" with a preexistent Chinese military tradition (which of course could not be ignored), and its resulting ritual performance, representation, and diffusion did not deny the Chinese their own military heritage but succeeded in emphasizing its new character, and in raising its prestige. It is not surprising then that Qianlong, the master manipulator of Chinese historiographical precedent, was so keen a student of the early Tang dynasty, and of Tang Taizong's reign in particular (627–649), a time when *wen* and *wu* where still complementary and had equal dignity in a gentleman's formation.

The essays included in this book broach numerous concerns of interest to military historians. Issues of frontier relations are grappled more directly in the essays by Drompp, Graff, and Golden, which enlighten us on the complexities of this area of research, and alert us that assumptions related to the existence of sharp and well-demarcated divides between "steppe and sown" can be misleading. Attention to inter-Inner Asian warfare, as studied in the essays by Biran, Amitai, and Di Cosmo, adds new insights into the mode of combat of historical nomads. Important points in support of a holistic approach to Inner Asian warfare are made in Perdue's essay. The encounter of nomadic armies with local societies, as scrutinized by Herman, invites closer studies of the behavior of Inner Asian soldiers in occupied territory. Allsen's examination of exchange of military technology is the closest to a fully-fledged analysis of Inner Asia within a "world-historical" approach to military history. Finally, the relevance of Inner Asian military values to issues of cultural change is argued in Waley-Cohen's essay. While these essays do not deny per se the paradigm of the Eurasian nomadic warrior, they problematize and contextualize it, thus proposing new directions of investigation.

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PART ONE

# THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD (500–1200)

# STRATEGY AND CONTINGENCY IN THE TANG DEFEAT OF THE EASTERN TURKS, 629–630

David A. Graff

For some two centuries following their sudden rise in the middle of the sixth century, the Turks (*Tujue*) were the dominant power among the pastoral peoples of the steppe zone to the north of China. During that period, the Turkish rulers (or *qaghans*) often competed with Chinese emperors for supremacy in Northeast Asia. At times the Turks had the upper hand, and at other times they were subordinated to the authority of the Chinese emperor. Armed conflict was a frequent occurrence, especially during those periods when neither side was strong enough to dominate the other. The 620s was one such period of conflict, and the year 630 marked a dramatic reversal of fortunes as the Turks, who had been able to project their power into a divided China only a few years before, suffered a decisive military defeat at the hands of the newly-established Tang dynasty. The Eastern Turks fell under the authority of the Tang emperors and would succeed in reasserting their independence only after the passage of fifty years. How were the Chinese able to win such a convincing victory over this formidable nomadic adversary?

One possible answer is that this outcome was an all but inevitable consequence of the unity that had been imposed on China by the Tang founders: once a strong hand was able to mobilize the vast human and material resources of the reunified empire, the badly outnumbered nomads had no hope of holding their own. But this answer does not take into account the many failures that even a unified China experienced in its military efforts against the steppe peoples, from Wang Mang's abortive war against the Xiongnu to Northern Song conflicts with the Khitan and the capture of a fifteenth-century Ming emperor by the Mongols. Chinese victory was never a foregone conclusion, but required careful strategic planning, significant tactical adjustments, and opportune circumstances that could be ruthlessly exploited. These elements were all present in the campaign of 629–30. Although we do not have an account of these events from the Turkish perspective, a study of the choices made by Tang commanders on

their way to overcoming the Turks may serve to illuminate the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish mode of warfare and the fundamental flaws in the Turks' political structure.

The relative strength of the Turk and Chinese states during the late sixth and early seventh centuries was to a large extent a function of the degree of internal unity each of them was able to achieve. From the time of its founding in 552 up until the late 570s, the unified Turk empire was able to extract numerous concessions from the rival Xianbei dynasts of Northern Zhou (557–581) and Northern Qi (550–577). The unification of North China in 577 under Zhou, followed closely by the division of the Turk empire into eastern and western halves and then the unification of all of China in 589 by Zhou's successor Sui (581–618), produced a complete reversal of this situation. By playing rival Turk leaders against one another and nurturing a string of anti-*qaghans* to challenge any *qaghan* who threatened to become too powerful, the Sui emperors were able to keep the Turks subordinated—if not subjugated—until Emperor Yang's realm began to dissolve in rebellion. Taking advantage of Sui weakness, the Shibi *qaghan* of the Eastern Turks proclaimed his independence in dramatic fashion by besieging Emperor Yang himself in the border town of Yanmen in 615. From that time on, he worked assiduously to promote the disintegration of the Sui empire, offering encouragement and armed support to a large number of separatist local magnates and rival contenders for the imperial throne.

When the Tang founder Li Yuan was preparing to launch his expedition against the Sui capital, he found it necessary to reach an understanding with his powerful northern neighbor in order to ensure the security of his base at Taiyuan. He deliberately adopted a respectful tone in his correspondence with Shibi, and even went so far as to promise the *qaghan* all of the booty—"boys and girls, jade and silk"—that would be acquired during the course of the proposed expedition. After the capture of Chang'an, the new Tang emperor continued to treat the Eastern Turks with the utmost circumspection, tolerating written communications from the *qaghan* that were "perverse and insulting" by Chinese standards, and opening his treasury to meet the nomads' seemingly insatiable demands for the material products of Chinese civilization.[1]

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[1] For Li Yuan's dealings with the Shibi *qaghan* in 617, see Wen Daya, *Da Tang chuangye qi ju zhu* (Shanghai, 1983), p. 19. It was once widely believed that Li Yuan

Despite the various concessions made by Li Yuan, his understanding with the Eastern Turks began to come apart very soon after he had occupied the Sui capital and announced the establishment of the Tang dynasty. The Turks' policy of keeping China divided and weak by extending their support to a large number of rival contenders for power, which had worked to Li Yuan's advantage when he launched his initial rising against the Sui government, put him at cross purposes with his erstwhile allies now that his goal was to reunify the empire under his own rule. The devastating offensive launched against the Tang positions in Taiyuan and Hedong by the regional leader Liu Wuzhou in 619, for example, was facilitated by an infusion of Turkish cavalry, and the Turks also made efforts to send assistance to Wang Shichong, a Sui general turned imperial pretender, when he was besieged in Luoyang by Tang forces. In the summer of 622, another regional leader, Liu Heita, was able to overrun all of Hebei because the Turkish *qaghan* had lent him ten thousand horsemen.[2] The Turks also challenged the legitimacy of the new regime by setting up a sort of Sui government in exile. Shibi's brother and successor, the Chuluo *qaghan*, installed Yang Zhengdao, a grandson of the late Emperor Yang, in the walled border town of Dingxiang in the spring of 620. With all of the Chinese at Chuluo's court (some ten thousand persons) placed under his authority, the pretender assumed the title of "King of Sui," observed the Sui calendar, and appointed his own officials.[3]

Before long, the Turks began to make direct raids against Tang territory, often in concert with the forces of their Chinese clients. In the spring of 621 the new *qaghan* Xieli (younger brother of Shibi and Chuluo, who had died the year before) led 10,000 Turks and 6,000 followers of the Chinese rebel leader Yuan Junzhang to attack

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had gone so far as to declare himself a vassal of the Turks. This view has been convincingly refuted by Li Shutong in "San bian Tang Gaozu cheng chen yu Tujue shi," *Tang shi suo yin* (Taibei, 1988), pp. 1–31, and several other articles.

[2] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu* (Beijing, 1975) [hereafter *JTS*], ch. 1, p. 13; ch. 55, p. 2253; and ch. 194A, p. 5156; Ouyang Xiu and Song Qi, *Xin Tang shu* (Beijing, 1975) [hereafter *XTS*], ch. 1, p. 14; Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian* (Beijing, 1956; rpt. Beijing, 1987) [hereafter *ZZTJ*], ch. 188, p. 5885.

[3] Du You, *Tong dian* (Beijing, 1988) [hereafter *TD*], ch. 197, p. 5407; *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5154. Chuluo's consort, the Yicheng Princess, was also a member of the Sui imperial house. Before Chuluo took her as his wife in accordance with the Turkish practice of levirate, she had been the wife of his brother Shibi (and of their father Qimin before that). After Chuluo's death she passed to his successor Xieli. See Lin Enxian, *Tujue yanjiu* (Taibei, 1988), p. 194.

Yanmen in northern Shanxi. In the autumn of the next year, Xieli came again to ravage the territories around Yanmen and Mayi. Large scale incursions continued in 623, 624, and 625. In September 624, an army led by Xieli and his nephew Shibobi, the Tuli *qaghan*, penetrated as far as Binzhou on the edge of the Tang heartland of Guanzhong; the following year, a Turkish army said to number no less than 100,000 drove past Yanmen and Mayi to irrupt into the lands around Taiyuan.[4] Each year the Turks came south in the early autumn, with subsidiary forces raiding the exposed border prefectures from Youzhou west to Liangzhou while their main army took either the Fen River valley or the northwestern approach to the Guanzhong region from the Ordos as its axis of advance. After a few weeks of plundering punctuated by clashes with the Tang defenders, the invaders would withdraw northward with their captives and booty. They would then "sue for peace"—a truce that would last only until the beginning of the next year's raiding season. The relentlessness and the large scale of the Xieli *qaghan*'s raiding can be understood as a consequence of the failure of the Turks' policy of seeking to dominate a divided China. Once the Tang founder had eliminated all of his major rivals, the Turkish *qaghan* was driven to take the field himself in a series of increasingly desperate attempts to prevent the new dynasty from consolidating its power.[5]

Without serious challenge in China proper after 623, Li Yuan began to plan a more vigorous response to the Turkish threat. On 25 August 624, the emperor told his attendant ministers that there would be a change in policy. "Formerly, because the Central Plain had not yet been settled and the Turks were just then strong, and I feared that they would disturb the border, so in ritual I treated them the same as an equal state. Now, since they have the faces of men and the hearts of beasts, and do not abide by their oaths and covenants, I am making a plan to attack and destroy them. . . ."[6] Not long after this he began to designate his written communica-

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[4] *JTS*, ch. 194A, pp. 5155–57; *XTS*, ch. 215A, pp. 6030–32. A list of Turkish raids and incursions between March–April 624 and June 626 can be found in Li Shutong, "Tang dai jieyong waibing zhi yanjiu," *Tang shi suo yin*, pp. 198–200.

[5] Andrew Eisenberg, "Warfare and Political Stability in Medieval North Asian Regimes," *T'oung Pao* 83 (1997), pp. 320–21. Also see Li, "Tang dai jieyong waibing zhi yanjiu," pp. 195–200, and Lin, *Tujue yanjiu*, pp. 242, 273.

[6] Wang Qinruo et al., *Cefu yuangui* (1642; photographic rpt. Beijing, 1960) [hereafter *CFYG*], ch. 990, p. 23b. A very similar speech appears in *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6032, where it is assigned to 625.

tions to the *qaghan* as "edicts" (*zhao*) and "commands" (*chi*) rather than as letters to an equal. He also began to carry out a series of practical measures to bolster his defenses, sending officers to fortify the border and build a flotilla of warships to ply the Yellow River, and reestablishing the twelve military zones in Guanzhong in order to train more troops and gather cavalry.[7] When Tong Yabghu, the powerful *qaghan* of the Western Turks, sent an embassy to the Tang court seeking a marriage alliance in May or June of 625, Li Yuan agreed to send him a princess of the blood as a step toward "allying with the distant in order to attack the near."[8]

Li Yuan never had the opportunity to carry out his designs against the Turks. On 3 September 626, he was forced to abdicate in favor of his second son, Li Shimin (Tang Taizong), who had ambushed and murdered the heir apparent at the Xuanwu Gate a few weeks earlier. The new emperor was almost immediately faced with a crisis as the Turk *qaghan* Xieli and his nephew Tuli came south through Jingzhou with a very large army (reported in most Chinese sources as 100,000 men) and reached Wugong near the Wei River on 17 September. Eight days later the Turks arrived at the north side of the Bian bridge, only twelve miles west-northwest of Chang'an. Refusing to take refuge behind the walls of the city, Li Shimin rode out with only a handful of followers to parley with the Turkish *qaghan*. The Tang official histories tell us that this bold and heroic gesture, coupled with the timely arrival of Tang reinforcements, persuaded Xieli to beat a hasty retreat.[9] However, there is good reason to believe that in reality the meeting at the Bian bridge was far from a triumph for the young emperor. When he explained his strategy to his ministers, his tone was defensive:

> If I had joined battle with the caitiffs, the losses would certainly have been many. Having formed a deep resentment toward us, they would be frightened and would make military preparations so that we would be unable to attain our goal. Hence we rolled up our armor and sheathed our weapons, and enticed them with gold and silk. Having

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[7] *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6032. For the military zones, see Swee Fo Lai, "The Military and Defense System Under the Tang Dynasty" (diss., Princeton University, 1986), pp. 9–11.

[8] Wang Pu, *Tang hui yao* (Beijing, 1955) [hereafter *THY*], ch. 94, p. 1693; *CFYG*, ch. 978, p. 20a. The alliance discussed in 625 failed to materialize since Xieli's raids cut off contact between the Tang court and the Western Turks.

[9] *ZZTJ*, ch. 191, pp. 6018–20; *CTS*, ch. 194A, pp. 157–58; *XTS*, ch. 215A, pp. 6032–34; *CFYG*, ch. 991, pp. 1a–3a.

> obtained what they desired, it was natural that they should withdraw of themselves. Their intentions will become both arrogant and careless, and they will no longer make military preparations. After this, we can cultivate our awesomeness, watch for a rift [within their camp], and eliminate them at single blow. 'If I wish to take something from them, I must certainly first give them something.' This speaks of our situation.[10]

It seems that the Turks received a substantial bribe as the price for their withdrawal, and Li Shimin would later speak of his "humiliation" at the Wei River.[11] His subsequent policies toward the Eastern qaghanate may well have been influenced by a desire for retribution.

The emperor was clearly not satisfied with the performance of his soldiers during the crisis. On 17 October 626, he brought the cavalry officers of the imperial guard into the courtyard of the Xiande Hall, where he told them that earlier dynasties' victories over the steppe peoples had been due to skill at arms. In more recent times, however, the troops had not been made to practice with their weapons, with the result that no one was able to resist the Turks. Henceforth, he declared, soldiers would be expected to devote themselves to practicing archery and horsemanship. Each day the emperor brought several hundred men to be instructed in archery in front of the Xiande Hall. He viewed the trials himself, and those who hit the target were rewarded with bows and swords, cloth and silk. These exercises continued despite the remonstrances of ministers who feared that the emperor might easily fall victim to a stray arrow.[12]

In the days and weeks that followed, Li Shimin took other measures to strengthen the defenses of his realm and enhance its military power. In November, he issued an edict calling for military training, maneuvers, and reviews in the agricultural slack season after the autumn harvest, and he announced that he would go in person to inspect the troops.[13] Then, in January 627, he supported a pro-

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[10] *ZZTJ*, ch. 191, p. 6020. Variants can be found in *CTS* 194A, p. 5158; *XTS*, ch. 215A, pp. 6033–34; *CFYG*, ch. 991, pp. 2b–3a; and *TD*, ch. 197, p. 5140.

[11] *XTS*, ch. 93, p. 3814. Li Shutong presents the case for Li Shimin's humiliation at the hands of the Turks in "Tang Taizong Wei shui zhi chi de yanjiu," *Tang shi suo yin*, pp. 51–68. While Li focuses on the weakness of the Chinese side, Eisenberg argues that the Turks were also in a difficult spot. He suggests that the purpose of Xieli's drive to Chang'an was to encourage anti-Tang risings; when these failed to materialize, the *qaghan* had no choice but to withdraw ("Warfare and Political Stability in Medieval North Asian Regimes," pp. 321–24).

[12] *JTS*, ch. 2, pp. 30–31.

[13] Song Minqiu (comp.), *Tang da zhaoling ji* (Beijing, 1959), ch. 107, p. 552.

posal to increase the size of the army by expanding the pool for troop selection to include able-bodied males who had not yet reached the statutory age for military service (though this particular plan was soon dropped on account of the adamant opposition of the remonstrating counselor Wei Zheng, who argued that it would greatly reduce the tax base and the quantity of manpower available for corvée labor).[14]

In spite of these various measures, the balance of power did not necessarily favor the Tang empire at the end of 626. It had been only three years since the Li family had brought the whole of the empire under their rule after a long and bloody series of internecine conflicts from which the country had not yet fully recovered. Although nominal unity had been restored, the real authority that the court was able to exercise at the local level was in fact severely limited in many areas; the Tang victory in the civil wars had been greatly facilitated by a liberal policy of allowing local strongmen who submitted to the Tang to remain in place as prefects and county magistrates. These local powerholders continued to enjoy considerable autonomy under Taizong and were apparently able to prevent the central government from fully mobilizing the financial and manpower resources of the territories under their control.[15] The number of registered households from which the government could extract taxes and labor service was much smaller during Taizong's reign than under Emperor Yang of Sui, and most of the men who served in the early Tang military were drawn from the Guanzhong region, where the court's authority penetrated to the local level.[16] Although the population and material resources of the Tang empire were many times greater than those of the Eastern Turk qaghanate, only a small fraction of the assets that were theoretically available could actually be brought to bear against the enemy.

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[14] *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, pp. 6026–27; and Wu Jing, *Zhenguan zhengyao* (Shanghai, 1978), pp. 66–67. The episode is discussed in Howard Wechsler, *Mirror to the Son of Heaven: Wei Cheng at the Court of T'ang T'ai-tsung* (New Haven and London, 1974), pp. 107–108.

[15] This problem is explored in Robert M. Somers, "Time, Space, and Structure in the Consolidation of the T'ang Dynasty (A.D. 617–700)," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 45, No. 5 (November 1986), pp. 971–94.

[16] See Edwin G. Pulleyblank, "Registration of Population in China in the Sui and T'ang Periods," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 4 (1961), p. 290, and Gu Jiguang, "Xi Wei Bei Zhou he Sui Tang jian de fubing," *Zhongguo shehui jingji shi jikan*, 5, No. 1 (March 1937), p. 92.

The Tang emperor's Turkish opponents had much less to work with, but they enjoyed certain distinct advantages. While the majority of Taizong's soldiers were infantrymen, all of Xieli's warriors campaigned on horseback and normally fought as cavalry.[17] This gave the Turks a tremendous edge in both strategic and tactical mobility. And while relatively few Chinese had been brought up to shoot a bow from horseback, this valuable military skill was all but universal among the Turks. To Chinese eyes, mounted archery was the most outstanding characteristic of the Turkish fighting man and the essence of the Turkish mode of warfare; as one Chinese observer put it, "the Turks make bow and arrows their teeth and claws."[18] In addition to their bows, however, the Turks also carried sabers and lances, and some of them, at least, had helmets and armor.[19] The accounts of combat found in Turkish runic inscriptions of the early eighth century make it clear that their battles were more than just archery contests, and were often decided at very close quarters: "Prince Kül mounted the yellowish white [horse] and attacked suddenly. He stabbed six men with a lance. In hand-to-hand fighting he cut down a seventh man with a sword."[20] The lance, presented as the hero's weapon par excellence, actually occupies a much more prominent place in the Turks' military self-portrait than does the bow.

The gap between real and potential military power was not nearly so wide for the Turks as it was for the Chinese. This situation had much to do with their steppe environment and pastoral way of life. Until the early years of the twentieth century, the population of the Mongolian steppe is believed to have numbered no more than about a million persons, a number which was probably limited by the eco-

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[17] For general overviews of Turkish warfare, see Cai Hongsheng, "Tujue hanguo de junshi zuzhi he junshi jishu," *Tujue yu Huihe lishi lunwen xuanji*, ed. Lin Gan (Beijing, 1987), pp. 257–76; and Xue Zongzheng, *Tujue shi* (Beijing, 1992), pp. 744–51.

[18] Wen, *Da Tang chuangye qi ju zhu*, p. 2; the speaker is Li Yuan. The chapter on the Turks in the Sui dynastic history (completed in early Tang) points out that they are "adept at mounted archery, and cruel by nature"; Wei Zheng et al., *Sui shu* (Beijing, 1973), ch. 84, p. 1864.

[19] Chen Qinglong, "Tujue xizu de bingqi," *Dalu zazhi*, 68, No. 5 (May 15, 1984), pp. 234–38. Armor was most likely of the lamellar type. I use "saber" to translate the Chinese *dao*, denoting a blade with only one cutting edge that was well-suited to hacking and slashing from horseback.

[20] This is taken from the 732 "Kül Tigin" inscription, translated in Talat Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1968), p. 270, and is a fairly typical description of combat. A Chinese translation of the same inscription can be found in Lin, *Tujue yu Huihe lishi lunwen xuanji*, pp. 479–87.

logical carrying capacity of the grasslands under conditions of extensive pastoralism.[21] However, the same environment that kept population small also ensured that practically every able-bodied adult male possessed rudimentary military skills. Horsemanship and archery, the mainstays of warfare as practiced by the steppe peoples, were also essential skills of everyday life in a pastoral economy where the main business of stock herding was frequently supplemented by hunting. As a result, all the men of a tribe could, and did, serve as soldiers when the need arose.[22] The close congruence between the normal lifestyle of the nomads and the needs of warfare was also reflected in their relative freedom from the logistical problems that bedeviled China's mass infantry armies, especially when they attempted to campaign on the steppe. As long as the nomads brought their herds with them and chose routes through grasslands with adequate pasture, they were logistically self-sufficient and had no need for supply trains.[23] Given these conditions the Eastern Turk qaghanate should have been able to field large armies in spite of the limited population of the steppe, though the Chinese sources which credit Xieli with campaign armies of one hundred thousand men surely include an element of exaggeration.

The size of the Turks' military force was a function not only of their basic way of life, but also of the structure of their empire, which incorporated all of the nomads from Yiwu (Hami) east to the river valleys of Manchuria. Within this empire the Turks themselves were no doubt a minority, but as the pre-eminent military power of Inner Asia since the mid-sixth century they had been able to dominate many other steppe peoples, including both Turkic and non-Turkic groups.[24] At the center of the Turk state was the Ashina clan, from which the *qaghans* were invariably chosen, and the Ashide clan with whom the Ashina intermarried. Close relatives of the *qaghan*, usually given the title of *shad*, were sent out to govern the peoples

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[21] Rhoads Murphey, "An Ecological History of Central Asian Nomadism," *Ecology and Empire: Nomads in the Cultural Evolution of the Old World*, ed. Gary Seaman (Los Angeles, 1989), p. 43.

[22] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), p. 221; David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), p. 84; Denis Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 101, No. 2 (April-June 1981), pp. 134–35; Cai, "Tujue hanguo de junshi zuzhi he junshi jishu," pp. 262–63.

[23] John Masson Smith, Jr., "Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44, No. 2 (December 1984), pp. 332–35 and passim. The nomads had no need to carry large supplies of grain because they could eat their livestock, including extra horses.

[24] Lin, *Tujue yanjiu*, pp. 78–79.

subordinate to the Turks, while indigenous leaders of the vassal groups were given lesser titles (such as *irkin* and *eltäbär*). Occasionally, one or more of the *qaghan*'s relatives who were serving as governors might receive the title of "subordinate *qaghan*," and it seems that this was often done to placate the offspring of previous *qaghans* who had been passed over for the succession.[25]

In 626 there was at least one important subordinate *qaghan* in the Eastern Turk empire. This was the Tuli *qaghan*, a son of the Shibi *qaghan* and nephew of Xieli, who had his headquarters somewhere north of the Chinese border town of Youzhou and ruled over the "eastern wing" (*dongpian*) of the empire. The vassal peoples under his authority included the Khitan and the Xi, who inhabited what is now northeastern Hebei and southwestern Liaoning. Another important regional governor was Shaboluo *shad*, an uncle or possibly a cousin of Xieli, who supervised a following of fifty thousand family groups from a headquarters northwest of Lingzhou. Shaboluo, who held sway over the western part of the Turk empire, was later raised by Xieli to the status of subordinate *qaghan*.[26] In the territory north of the Gobi desert, Tuo *shad* (Ashina She'er, a son of Chuluo *qaghan*) and Xieli's son Yugu *shad* divided control of the various Tiele tribes between them.[27]

The Tiele were a loosely related group of Turkish clans and tribes whose various components were scattered across the territory of both the Eastern and Western Turk empires. In the eastern qaghanate they occupied the lands between the Gobi desert and southern end of Lake Baikal, including the valleys of the Orkhon and Selenga rivers.[28] Spanning the boundary of the two qaghanates, the Tiele

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[25] For the Turk state structure, ranks and offices, see Lin, *Tujue yanjiu*, pp. 78–80, and 88. The institution of the subordinate *qaghan* is examined in Michael R. Drompp, "Supernumerary Sovereigns: Superfluity and Mutability in the Elite Power Structure of the Early Türks," *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery*, ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 92–115.

[26] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6073–74; *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5159; *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6036.

[27] *XTS*, ch. 110, p. 4114.

[28] Wei, *Sui shu*, ch. 84, p. 1879; *XTS*, ch. 217A, p. 6111; *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, pp. 6044–45. Also see Edwin G. Pulleyblank, "Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, 28 (1956), pp. 35–42. Here and elsewhere in this chapter, the rather problematic word "tribe" is used to denote a mutable political structure rather than a real kinship group; see Hilda (Ildikó) Ecsedy, "Tribe and Tribal Society in the 6th Century Turk Empire," *Acta Orientalia*, 25 (1972), pp. 255–56, and Rudi Lindner, "What Was a Nomadic Tribe?" *Comparative Studies in History and Sociology*, 24 (1982), pp. 696–701.

were an unstable element in both states, and sudden changes of allegiance were not uncommon.

Xieli himself seems to have made his home south of the Gobi in the vicinity of Dingxiang, where he continued to support the rump Sui court of Yang Zhengdao.[29] In addition to underwriting this "king of Sui" (*Sui wang*) the *qaghan* also gave his backing to two local Chinese strongmen, Yuan Junzhang of Heng'an and Liang Shidu of Xiazhou, who continued to hold important border towns in defiance of Tang authority. With the connivance of Liang Shidu, Yushe *shad*, a son of Chuluo *qaghan* and the elder brother of Tuo *shad*, was able to move south of the Yellow River with a following of ten thousand tents and nomadize in the Ordos region.[30] Xieli *qaghan*'s own personal following included not only his fellow Turks, but also large numbers of Sogdians and Chinese (the latter having defected or been carried off by the nomads during the disorder at the end of Sui). According to Edwin G. Pulleyblank, the Sogdian community in the Eastern Turk qaghanate was organized as a separate "tribe" under the authority of a *shad*, and the *qaghan* had a body of elite Sogdian soldiery at his disposal.[31]

The various regional governors (*shad* and subordinate *qaghans*) were in theory subject to the authority of the supreme *qaghan*, and were expected to furnish taxes (livestock) and troop levies at his command.[32] In actuality, however, powerful centrifugal tendencies were inherent in the Turks' state structure, which was of necessity based on decentralized and indirect rule. The regional governors enjoyed considerable autonomy, and their followers were more loyal to them than to the supreme *qaghan*. Subordinate *qaghans* in particular seem to have controlled sufficient resources and manpower to resist or challenge the supreme *qaghan* if they so desired, and as members of the ruling Ashina clan and close relatives of the ruler they usually had strong claims to the throne themselves under the notoriously ambiguous succession system that prevailed among the early Turks. Lateral succession from brother to brother was the norm, but it was

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[29] Li Fang et al., *Taiping yulan*, ch. 316, p. 6b, in *Guoxue jiben congshu* (Taibei, 1959) [hereafter *TPYL*].

[30] *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6029.

[31] Edwin G. Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," *T'oung Pao*, 41 (1952), pp. 318, 322–23, 347–49. Also see Cai, "Tujue hanguo de junshi zuzhi he junshi jishu," pp. 261–62.

[32] Cai, "Tujue hanguo de junshi zuzhi he junshi jishu," p. 266.

difficult to exclude potential heirs when the throne was passed to the next generation; "the Turks did not have a clear hierarchy of ranks that determined who was in line for the throne once a set of brothers was exhausted."[33] As the son of Xieli's elder brother and predecessor, Tuli had a strong claim to the throne as "the representative of the genealogically senior line who was now of age."[34] At a lower level in the Turks' political structure, the many vassal tribes supervised by the *shad* retained their own separate names and identities, their own indigenous leaderships, and the memory of their former autonomous existence. Some of these vassals, such as the Xueyantuo, the Uighur, and the Khitan, were quite large and powerful groups, and if the Turks' power should weaken, they might be expected to reassert their autonomy by force of arms. Moreover, the same pastoral way of life that gave the steppe peoples their peculiar military advantages also held out the possibility that the Turks (or whoever else happened to be the dominant steppe power) might eventually weaken enough to become vulnerable.

By the early autumn of 627, reports had reached the Tang court that Xieli's empire had been stricken by both natural disaster and politico-military crisis. Unusually heavy snowfalls had covered the ground to a depth of several feet, preventing the nomads' livestock from grazing and thus precipitating a heavy die-off among the herds upon which the steppe peoples were dependent for their subsistence. The immediate result of this calamity was a famine among the peoples of the Eastern Turk qaghanate. At roughly the same time, revolts broke out among some of the Turks' subject tribes. The accounts of these events given in Chinese sources are vague and in some cases contradictory, making it impossible to determine whether the snowstorms contributed to touching off the revolts or merely served to aggravate them. Nor is it at all clear whether the severe weather occurred in the winter of 626–27, the spring of 627, or even the early autumn. According to one Chinese source, the natural disaster came first and was fanned into a political crisis by Xieli's misguided policies. Finding that his revenues in the wake of the disaster were no longer adequate to meet his needs, the *qaghan* imposed additional exactions—presumably to be paid in livestock—upon the subject tribes. Already hard-hit by the loss of animals, many of the

[33] Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier*, p. 133.
[34] Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier*, p. 143.

hungry tribesman now rose in rebellion, leading to a significant weakening of Xieli's military power.[35]

The news of hardship and unrest on the steppe touched off a debate at the Tang court in late August or early September 627. Many of the young emperor's advisors urged him to seize the opportunity to launch an immediate attack on the Eastern Turks. Xiao Yu, the Left Vice-Director of the Department of State Affairs (*shangshu zuo puye*), asserted that "To annex the weak and attack those who are in confusion is what was considered skillful in antiquity." The emperor himself, however, was uncertain as to whether he should avail himself of the chance to destroy the Turks or abide by the non-aggression agreement he had made with Xieli the previous year. When asked for his opinion, the emperor's brother-in-law and close friend Zhangsun Wuji, the Right Vice-Director of the Department of State Affairs (*shangshu you puye*), counseled patience. In his view, the Tang should make no offensive moves but merely wait until the Turks raided the borders before launching an attack. He was very much opposed to a long-range expedition to seek out the nomads and attack them in their own territory, which he considered impossible—at least for the time being. "For the moment," he concluded, "we should restrain ourselves and keep our word." Li Shimin accepted this advice, with the result that the Tang took no overt military action against the Turks in 627.[36]

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[35] The source for this is *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, p. 6037, an entry placed under the seventh month of the first year of the Zhenguan period. Two other passages (*JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5158, and *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, pp. 6045–46) seem to suggest that the rebellions *preceded* the snowstorms and famine. My reasons for preferring the first passage in *ZZTJ* are laid out in some detail in David A. Graff, "Early T'ang Generalship and the Textual Tradition" (diss., Princeton University, 1995), p. 472, n. 48. For a different interpretation of the timing of these events, see Xue, *Tujue shi*, pp. 252–53. Eisenberg ("Warfare and Political Stability in Medieval North Asian Regimes," pp. 323–24) suggests that Xieli's failure to bring about a Tang collapse in his 626 invasion may have been enough to encourage some of the subject tribes to part company with the Turks. For a general discussion of the effects of severe winter weather on the pastoral economy, see Owen Lattimore, *Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited* (New York, 1962), pp. 32–33. The resulting weakness invited aggression. In 72 B.C.E. the Xiongnu had suffered from the attacks of hostile tribes which occurred in close conjunction with abnormally heavy snowfalls, and a freezing of the pastures in 839 opened the way for the destruction of the Uighur state by the Kirghiz in 840.

[36] This reconstruction of the court discussion in late August or early September 627 follows *CFYG*, ch. 991, pp. 4a–b. Other versions of the debate can be found in *XTS*, ch. 105, p. 4018, and *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, p. 6037. The same event may also be described in *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5158, and *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, p. 6046, but the

The main threat to the Eastern Turk qaghanate in that year came not from China but from the vassal tribes north of the Gobi desert. Led by the Xueyantuo—who had submitted to Xieli only a short time before—the Uighurs, Bayegu, and other tribes rebelled and defeated successive armies sent against them under Yugu *shad*, Tuo *shad*, and Tuli *qaghan*. According to the Chinese sources, a force of only 5,000 Uighurs defeated Yugu *shad*'s 100,000 cavalry at Malieshan and then pursued the survivors all the way to the Tianshan.[37] When Tuli also returned in defeat, Xieli imprisoned him for more than ten days and also had him flogged. After this experience Tuli is reported to have harbored a deep resentment against his uncle. When Xieli tried to levy troops from his following, Tuli refused to furnish them. Xieli then attacked Tuli, who sent to the Tang court to ask for military assistance in May of 628.[38]

Once again, Li Shimin hesitated. Should he go to the aid of Tuli, with whom he had once sworn an oath of brotherhood, or should he honor his agreement with Xieli? The Minister of War (*bingbu shangshu*) Du Ruhui offered the following speech: "The Yi and Di [barbarians] are faithless. Thus has it been since time immemorial. Even though our state tries to keep faith, they will certainly break their promises. It would be better to destroy them by exploiting their disorder. This is what is called the way of destroying the disorderly and insulting the perishing."[39] Persuaded by Du's argument, the emperor ordered his general Zhou Fan to garrison Taiyuan and make preparations for an offensive to destroy the Turks. Another frontier commander was instructed to give direct military assistance to Tuli.[40]

On the other side of the Yellow River, in the Ordos region, the Tang forces also adopted a more aggressive stance. For some time, two Tang officers, Liu Lancheng and Liu Min, had been harassing

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opinions of Xiao Yu and Zhangsun Wuji are not mentioned; the decision not to attack the Turks is attributed solely to Li Shimin himself, and to his determination not to break his word to Xieli. Li Shutong ("Tang Taizong Weishui zhi chi de yanjiu," p. 56) argues that Xieli and the Tang emperor had agreed to refrain from attacking one another again.

[37] *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, pp. 6045–46; *XTS*, ch. 110, p. 4114.

[38] *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, p. 6049. Also see *THY*, ch. 94, p. 1689; *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5158; *XTS*, ch. 215A, pp. 6034, 6038; and *TD*, ch. 197, pp. 5411–12.

[39] *CFYG*, ch. 991, pp. 4b–5a, incorporating the emendations suggested by Cen Zhongmian in *Tujue jishi* (Beijing, 1958), p. 176.

[40] *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5158.

the local strongman Liang Shidu, who still held Xiazhou with the support of the Turks. About the same time that Tuli sent his appeal to the court in the late spring of 628, the two Lius persuaded the emperor to launch a major offensive to eliminate Liang Shidu. As the main Tang army, led by the emperor's brother-in-law, Chai Shao, drew near the prefectural seat of Xiazhou, it was assailed by a Turkish army sent to rescue Liang. A daring charge led by two of Chai's subordinates brought about the defeat and withdrawal of the Turks, and the Tang army advanced to camp beneath the walls of the town. Shortly afterwards, Liang was killed by his followers, who immediately opened the gates and offered their submission.[41]

Perhaps in retaliation for the attack on Liang Shidu, the Turks once again raided the Tang borders in the autumn of 628.[42] After the raid was reported at court in October, some of the ministers proposed restoring the long walls (*chang cheng*) that had been built by Sui. But the emperor would have none of it. Pointing to a number of signs of Xieli's weakness, such as the death of his herds, his falling out with Tuli, and the appearance of unnatural portents in the territory of the Eastern Turks, Taizong announced that Xieli's downfall could not be far away. There was no need to trouble the people with repairing the frontier defenses.[43]

In addition to these portents and his recent military successes, Taizong's increased confidence may also have owed something to the continuing disintegration of the Eastern Turk state, an unraveling which seems to have gathered momentum in the course of 628. In March the faraway Malgal made their submission to Tang, and they were followed by the Khitan in May.[44] North of the Gobi, all or most of the remaining Tiele tribes had adhered to the Xueyantuo by December. Near the end of the year, the Tang emperor surreptitiously sent a mission through Turk territory to invest the Xueyantuo leader Yi'nan with the title of the Zhenzhupijia *qaghan*. Yi'nan established his headquarters at the foot of the Ötükän mountains—traditionally the seat of Turk rulers—and sent his brother at the head of a tribute mission that arrived at the Tang court at the end of

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[41] *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, p. 6050; *JTS*, ch. 56, p. 2281, ch. 69, p. 2517, 2523; *XTS*, ch. 87, p. 3731.
[42] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6057.
[43] *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6034; *CFYG*, ch. 125, pp. 13b–14a; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6057.
[44] *JTS*, ch. 2, p. 33; *ZZTJ*, ch. 192, p. 6050; *XTS*, ch. 219, pp. 6167–68.

August 629.[45] These activities frightened Xieli into sending a mission of his own to Chang'an. Through his emissary, the *qaghan* declared himself a vassal of the Chinese emperor and asked for the hand of an imperial princess, so that he might "behave as a son-in-law according to the rites."[46]

By this time, however, the Chinese side had already decided on war. Zhang Gongqin, the area commander (*dudu*) of Daizhou in northern Shanxi since 627, had submitted a memorial on the vulnerable situation of the Eastern Turks in which he pointed to (1) Xieli's poor leadership style and moral failings, (2) the revolt of the Xueyantuo and other subject tribes, (3) the defeat and disgrace of leading members of the Ashina clan such as Tuli *qaghan*, Tuo *shad*, and Yugu *shad*, (4) the famine conditions north of the border, (5) the disaffection of the Turks themselves on account of the favor shown to Xieli's unpopular Sogdian administrators, and (6) the possibility that many Chinese who had been abducted by the Turks might rise up and act as a fifth column if the Tang armies were to attack. Taizong was deeply impressed by Zhang's arguments.[47] On 11 September 629, the emperor appointed his minister of war, Li Jing, to serve as commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army for the Dingxiang route, with Zhang Gongqin as his deputy. The two were ordered to make preparations for a campaign against the Turks.[48] A month later, Chai Shao, the conqueror of Liang Shidu, was made commander of the expeditionary army for the Shengzhou route.[49] At the same time several other forces must have been put in readiness elsewhere along the border, for in December Taizong would order his armies to advance to attack the Eastern Turks in six separate columns, along a front of 720 miles from Yingzhou (today's Liaoning) in the east to Lingzhou (today's Ningxia) in the west.

When Taizong finally abrograted his treaty with Xieli and ordered this large-scale offensive against the Eastern Turks, he sought to justify his decision by pointing to the assistance that the *qaghan* had

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[45] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6061, 6065; *JTS*, ch. 2, p. 37, and ch. 199B, p. 5344; *THY*, ch. 94, p. 1689; and *CFYG*, ch. 964, p. 1b, and ch. 970, pp. 6a–b.

[46] *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5159; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6065.

[47] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6065; *CFYG*, ch. 366, pp. 1a–b, ch. 428, pp. 26a–b; *JTS*, ch. 68, p. 2507; *XTS*, ch. 89, p. 3756.

[48] *XTS*, ch. 2, p. 30; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6065–66; Cen, *Tujue jishi*, p. 179.

[49] *XTS*, ch. 2, p. 30. Shengzhou was the Tang name for Sui's Yulin commandery, at the northeastern corner of the great bend of the Yellow River.

given to Liang Shidu in 628.[50] As a *casus belli*, this rings rather hollow, since the ostensibly intolerable offense had occurred no less than sixteen months before the emperor's decision to attack. There is good reason to believe that Taizong's timing was governed by considerations of military expediency rather than by any of Xieli's activities.

As the Eastern Turk qaghanate unraveled, the emperor had rejected the urgings of ministers who wished to take advantage of the situation to launch an immediate attack. At the same time, he had been anything but a good neighbor to Xieli, sending agents to the steppe to encourage revolts among the *qaghan*'s subject tribes, readily accepting the allegiance of groups defecting from the Turkish polity, and even extending protection to the rebel *qaghan* Tuli.[51] His stance was one of cautious watching and waiting. It can be argued that ever since the encounter at the Wei River his goal had been to encompass Xieli's destruction, but he would not commit himself to the risk of a major foray beyond the northern border until the enemy had weakened to the point that success was assured.[52] His final decision to move against the Turks may have been triggered by Zhang Gongqin's eloquent summary of their distress, by the cementing of an anti-Turk alliance with the Xueyantuo, or even by the evidence of fear and weakness manifest in Xieli's decision to send a tribute mission to the Tang court. It also seems likely that Taizong's decision was influenced by the growing strength of his own state and army. In 627 Zhangsun Wuji had advised against an expedition into the steppe because it was "not yet possible." By 629, however, the logistical situation of the Tang troops on the frontier had been ameliorated by the establishment of military agricultural colonies (*tuntian*) in Bingzhou (Taiyuan), Daizhou, and Shuozhou, and in 630 Fang Xuanling, then Left Vice-Director of the Department of State Affairs (*shangshu zuo puye*), reported to the throne that "our military arsenals and armaments are now vastly superior to those of the Sui dynasty."[53]

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[50] *THY*, ch. 94, p. 1689; *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5159; *TD*, ch. 197, p. 5411; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6065–66.

[51] *CFYG*, ch. 426, p. 25a; *JTS*, ch. 69, p. 2523—accepting Cen Zhongmian's argument (in *Tujue jishi*, p. 178) that the latter passage refers to 628 rather than 637.

[52] Li, "Tang Taizong Weishui zhi chi de yanjiu," pp. 58–59.

[53] Wu, *Zhenguan zhengyao*, p. 149; the translation follows that of George Winston Lewis, "The Cheng-kuan cheng-yao: A Source for the Study of Early Tang Government" (M.A. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1962), p. 328. For the *tuntian*, see *JTS*, ch. 61, p. 2369, ch. 83, p. 2775, and *XTS*, ch. 89, p. 3756.

In accordance with Taizong's orders issued on 13 December 629, Li Jing and Zhang Gongqin advanced northwestward from their base at Mayi toward the town of Dingxiang, where Xieli's puppet "king of Sui" still held court. A short distance to their northeast, Li Shiji, commander of the expeditionary army for the Tongmo route, marched on Dingxiang by way of Yunzhong (today's Datong, Shanxi). To the west, Chai Shao's army was ordered to march from Shengzhou and cross to the north side of the Yellow River, and Li Daozong led another force north from Lingzhou. At the eastern end of the border, meanwhile, the Youzhou area commander Wei Xiaojie and the Yingzhou area commander Xue Wanshu were also ordered to lead expeditionary armies against the Turks. The routes assigned to the columns led by Li Jing, Li Shiji, and Chai Shao were clearly designed to converge on Xieli's headquarters in the vicinity of Dingxiang. A total of 100,000 soldiers were committed to the campaign, divided among the six expeditionary armies. The expeditionary army for the Dingxiang route, cooperating closely with Li Shiji's column, represented the main effort, while the more distant thrusts were presumably aimed at distracting outlying Turkish leaders such as Shaboluo and preventing them from sending aid to Xieli. All six columns were subject to the overall authority of Li Jing.[54]

On 18 December 629, Li Daozong attacked a Turkish force near Lingzhou, capturing several hundred men and women and more than ten thousand head of livestock.[55] To the east, Li Jing selected three thousand light cavalry and advanced to occupy the Eyang ridge south of Dingxiang. According to the Chinese sources, the Turks had not anticipated this move and interpreted Li's bold advance with such a small force as an indication that his men were no more than the vanguard of a much larger Tang army. Unnerved by this unexpected development, the men in Xieli's camp were disturbed by a number of false alarms. When Li Jing carried out a night attack on Dingxiang and penetrated the outer wall, Xieli evacuated the town and retreated northward to a place called Tieshan (Iron Mountain).

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[54] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6066; *JTS*, ch. 194A, pp. 5159; *XTS*, ch. 2, p. 30. Some texts, such as the edition of the *Zizhi tongjian* issued by Guji chubanshe (Beijing, 1956) say that the overall command belonged to Li Shiji. Here I follow *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5159, and *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6035 in assigning the top command to Li Jing, who was very much the senior of the two. See Huang Yongnian, "Lun Li Ji," *Shaanxi shida xuebao*, 1981, No. 1, pp. 70–78.

[55] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6067.

At some point during the course of the retreat he was deserted by some of his followers, including a Sogdian advisor who surrendered to Tang bringing the pretender Yang Zhengdao and the Sui Empress Xiao along with him.[56] These last representatives of the Sui imperial house were sent on to Chang'an, where they arrived on 26 February 630.[57]

Although his following was greatly diminished as a result of these setbacks, the Chinese histories report that Xieli's army at Tieshan was still much larger than the small column with which Li Jing had forced the evacuation of Dingxiang.[58] Given this disparity in numbers, the ease with which the Tang general won this initial victory is difficult to explain. It is possible that the Chinese sources greatly overestimate the size of the *qaghan*'s following, said to number several tens of thousands of warriors even after the retreat to Tieshan. It is also possible that Li Jing's army was reinforced after the initial occupation of Eyang ridge. Another factor that may have helped persuade Xieli that discretion was the better part of valor was the advance of Li Shiji's column. After clashing with a Turkish force in the neighborhood of Yunzhong, these troops moved northwest to encounter and defeat another enemy force at Baidao, north of Dingxiang.[59] It is not clear whether the battle at Baidao occurred before, during, or after the withdrawal from Dingxiang, but the exact chronology is not of critical importance since the *qaghan*'s scouts presumably kept him apprised of the danger that the approach of Li Shiji's column posed to his line of retreat toward Yinshan and the trails across the Gobi, and this news alone could have been enough to precipitate his retreat. At some point after Xieli's withdrawal—probably in late February or early March of 630—Li Jing marched north to Baidao and joined forces with Li Shiji.[60]

About the same time that Empress Xiao and Yang Zhengdao reached Chang'an, an envoy from Xieli also arrived at the Tang court. The envoy, Zhishi Sili, came to beg forgiveness on behalf of

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[56] This tentative reconstruction of events follows *TPYL*, ch. 289, p. 5b, and *CFYG*, ch. 411, p. 21b, rather than *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6070–71.

[57] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6071. If this date is correct, Dingxiang must have fallen early in the intercalary twelfth month, corresponding to January–February 630. More than 600 miles of road lay between this sector of the frontier and Chang'an.

[58] *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5159.

[59] *XTS*, ch. 93, p. 3818; *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2485; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6071; *CFYG*, ch. 357, p. 14b.

[60] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6072.

his master and convey his request not only to bring the whole of his nation to submit, but also to come to court in person to pay homage to the Chinese emperor.[61] Having already pronounced himself content with the capture of Dingxiang as repayment for the humiliation he had suffered at Xieli's hands, and perhaps also wary of the risks involved in pursuing the fugitive Turks deeper into their own element, Taizong apparently decided to accept the offer and sent one of his master diplomats, Tang Jian, the chief minister of the Court of State Ceremonial (*honglu qing*), to the *qaghan*'s camp to negotiate the terms of his submission.[62] Once the imperial envoy had arrived among them and an agreement was being worked out, the Turks not unnaturally assumed that they would not be attacked again and began to relax their guard.[63]

While Tang Jian was parleying with the Turks at Tieshan, probably just a few days after March 20, the Tang generals at Baidao conferred with one another. Li Jing, the senior commander on the scene, had received an order from the emperor to go and meet Xieli, presumably to receive the *qaghan*'s surrender and escort him to the capital after Tang Jian had done his work.[64] Sensing a military opportunity in the peace negotiations, Li Shiji put the following proposal to Li Jing: "Although Xieli has been defeated, his people are still many. If he flees across the desert and defends himself among the Nine Surnames [i.e., the Tiele], the road is long and the obstacles serious. If we pursue, it will be hard to reach him. At present the edict-bearing ambassador has arrived among them. They will certainly relax their defenses, and then we will make a surprise attack on them. This is how to pacify the bandits without fighting." Recognizing a parallel between this plan and a stratagem that had once been employed in Han times, Li Jing was delighted, and the two generals resolved to make an immediate attack on Xieli's camp.[65]

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[61] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6072.

[62] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 5072. According to *TD*, ch. 156, p. 4005, the *qaghan* had no intention of putting himself in Taizong's power by coming to court, but simply intended to drag his heels until the horses had fattened on the spring grass and he could take refuge north of the desert.

[63] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479, ch. 194A, p. 5159.

[64] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479.

[65] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2485; *XTS*, ch. 93, p. 3818. For the Han precedent, see Sima Qian, *Shi ji* (Beijing, 1959), ch. 92, p. 2620. The biography of Li Jing (*JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479, and *XTS*, ch. 98, p. 3814) gives credit to Li Jing and makes no mention of Li Shiji. My reasons for preferring the account in the biography of Li Shiji are given in Graff, "Early T'ang Generalship and the Textual Tradition," pp. 495–97.

The senior Tang commander led a cavalry strike force out from the camp at Baidao on the evening of the same day on which the conference was held, while a separate force under Li Shiji departed soon afterward.[66] Li Jing's biographies indicate that his column consisted of ten thousand elite horsemen carrying twenty days' rations.[67] The main column crossed the Baidao River and approached Xieli's camp by a roundabout route through the Yinshan massif. Somewhere in the uplands, Li Jing's troops surprised and captured a Turkish outpost of one thousand tents; these Turks were made to accompany the column as it continued its stealthy approach toward the *qaghan*'s main encampment at Tieshan.[68] Meanwhile, the force under Li Shiji proceeded by the most direct route toward Qikou, a location north of Tieshan and the beginning of a major track across the Gobi, in order to cut off Xieli's escape.

By 27 March 630, Li Jing had reached a position from which he could strike directly at the Turkish camp. The vanguard of the Tang army consisted of two hundred mounted archers led by an officer named Su Dingfang.[69] As they moved toward the enemy, their advance was cloaked by mist until they were within a short distance of Xieli's camp. Then, we are told, the mist suddenly lifted to reveal the *qaghan*'s headquarters tent directly in front of them. Thanks to the weather conditions and their own complacency with Tang Jian in their midst, it was only at this point that the Turks became aware of the approach of the Tang troopers—and by this time it was already too late for them to muster their own warriors and deploy for battle.[70] Su Dingfang and his followers charged directly toward

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[66] My account of the battle generally follows that in *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6072–73. Divergences will be identified and explained in subsequent notes.

[67] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479. It is also possible that this figure really represents the combined forces of Li Jing and Li Shiji.

[68] *TD*, ch. 156, p. 4005; *CFYG*, ch. 432, p. 8b.

[69] For Su's biographies, see, *JTS*, ch. 83, pp. 2777–80, and *XTS*, ch. 111, p. 4137. Su was the commander of the Kuangdao regiment, a *fubing* unit based inside the city of Chang'an. See Lao Jingyuan, *Tang zhechongfu kao*, in *Ershiwu shi bu bian* (rpt. Beijing, 1956), vol. 6, p. 7606, and Gu Jiguang, *Tang zhechongfu kao jiaobu*, in *Ershiwu shi bu bian*, vol. 6, pp. 7544 and 7655.

[70] There is some disagreement in the Chinese sources as to the point that the Tang cavalry were able to reach before the Turks became aware of their approach. Sima Guang follows the no longer extant *Tang li* in placing the Tang troopers seven *li* (or about two miles) from Xieli's headquarters tent (*ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6072–73), while the biographies of Su Dingfang (*JTS*, ch. 83, p. 2777, and *XTS*, ch. 111, p. 4137) have them penetrating to within one *li* of the *qaghan*. The rather less dramatic account in the biography of Li Jing (*JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479) says that the Turks were alerted when the attackers reached a point fifteen *li* (or about five

the *qaghan*'s tent, cutting down dozens of Turks and throwing the entire camp into confusion. Rather than attempting to organize some sort of resistance, Xieli availed himself of an especially fine horse and fled for his life with only a portion of his following.

With the *qaghan* went all hope of coordinated resistance. When the main body of the Tang attackers, who had been following at an unspecified interval behind Su Dingfang's vanguard, reached the Turks' campsite, it seems that there was little for them to do except slaughter some more of the hapless nomads, receive the submission of others, and—in what was reported as a serious breach of military discipline—dissolve into a wild mob of looters to lay hands on whatever treasures could be found in the tents of the Turkish leaders.[71] According to most of the accounts of this "battle," some ten thousand of the Turks were killed and more than one hundred thousand Turkish men and women submitted to the victors.[72] These figures should be treated with caution since they may be inflated and they almost certainly confuse what happened on the day of the battle with submissions which did not occur until some time afterward.[73] A large number of Turks must have fled the camp at Tieshan rather than staying to fight a losing battle or taking the risk of throwing themselves upon the mercy of the victors. According to the biography of Li Shiji, Xieli led ten thousand of his people to Qikou in the hope of escaping across the desert but found his path blocked by the army of Li Shiji, who had gotten there first. The *qaghan* turned around and fled westward, while fifty thousand of the fugitive Turks, led by their chiefs, eventually surrendered to Li Shiji.

Carried by the relay riders of the imperial post system, Li Jing's victory announcement had covered the two thousand *li* to Chang'an by 6 April 630, when Taizong proclaimed a general amnesty to celebrate the triumph of Chinese arms over the barbarian.[74] As the

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miles) from the headquarters tent. All sources agree that Xieli promptly decamped and the Turks were unable to organize an effective defense.

[71] Li Jing was impeached by the Censor-in-Chief (*yushi dafu*) on 8 July 630, for allowing his troops to get out of hand. See *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6078; *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2480; and *XTS*, ch. 93, p. 3814.

[72] *ZZTJ*, ch. 93, p. 6073 and *CFYG*, ch. 1000, p. 21b note that the spoils also included several hundred thousand horses and camels.

[73] The wording of *XTS*, ch. 215A, p. 6037 seems to indicate that the *total* number of Xieli's followers who surrendered both during and after the raid was more than 100,000.

[74] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6073; for the text of Taizong's edict proclaiming the amnesty, see Song, *Tang da zhaoling ji*, ch. 83, p. 477.

edict issued by the emperor on this occasion acknowledged, the victory was still incomplete insofar as Xieli *qaghan* was still at large and had fled to "no one knows where." In fact, the fugitive *qaghan* had gone with a handful of followers to take refuge with the tribe of his uncle, the subordinate *qaghan* Shaboluo, who had his headquarters northwest of Lingzhou. As a Tang force approached Shaboluo's camp, Xieli, apparently realizing that his uncle's loyalty had finally reached its limit, escaped from the camp and tried to hide in the desolate valleys, but was overtaken, led back, and handed over to the Tang officers on 2 May.[75] The *qaghan* was sent to Chang'an, and on 19 May he was brought to the Shuntian Gate to be reprimanded by the emperor.[76]

The defeat of Xieli at Tieshan was followed by the surrender of most of the remaining elements of the Eastern Turk empire. In late April, the *irkin* of the Sijie, one of the Tiele tribes, led his people to submit to Tang, and in the early autumn Yugu *shad*, who had fled with his following to Gaochang, came in to surrender.[77] Shaboluo *qaghan* had gone over to the Tang at the same time that he surrendered Xieli, and the Turk leader in the Ordos region, Yushe *shad*, had surrendered in January of 630, even before Xieli's defeat.[78] And the Tuli *qaghan*, of course, had been counted as a client of the Tang since 628. With the defeat and capture of Xieli and the surrender of his kinsmen and vassals, the Eastern Turk qaghanate had ceased to exist. Scattered groups of Turks continued to hold out in some areas north and west of the Gobi, but the dominant power north of the desert was now Taizong's ally Yi'nan, the *qaghan* of the Xueyantuo, who had made the Uighurs and most of the other Tiele tribes his vassals. After a heated debate at court, the Turks who had surrendered to Tang were eventually allowed to dwell in the marginal lands along the Chinese border from Lingzhou in the west to Youzhou in the east, with the greatest number of them apparently residing in the Ordos region south of the Yellow River.[79] The ascendancy of the Chinese emperor over the peoples of the steppe was symbolized

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[75] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6074.

[76] *JTS*, ch. 3, p. 39; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6074–75 places the presentation of Xieli on the following day. Taizong's remarks on the occasion can be found in *CFYG*, ch. 985, p. 4a–b.

[77] *XTS*, ch. 215A, pp. 6036–37; *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6073, 6082.

[78] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6067.

[79] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6075–77; also see Pan Yihong, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and Its Neighbors* (Bellingham, Washington, 1997), pp. 183–87.

by his assumption of the title of "Heavenly *Qaghan*" (*Tian kehan*) for use in his correspondence with his new nomadic vassals.[80]

The defeat of Xieli and its aftermath marked a major reversal in the relationship between China and the steppe. However, the ascendancy that had been gained over the steppe peoples was not without limits, for the Chinese emperor could not and did not treat them in the same fashion as he did his sedentary subjects. The resolution of the problem of the Chinese who had been taken captive by the Turks, one of the longstanding grievances of the Tang government, is emblematic of the new relationship between China and the nomads. In June of 631, the officials who had been charged with recovering the captives were able to report that eighty thousand Chinese who had been abducted by the Turks had been returned to their homes. This accomplishment would not have been possible without the defeat of Xieli. At the same time, however, it is worth noting that these results were obtained not by the issuance of commands predicated on the threat of force, but by the expenditure of substantial sums in gold and silk in order to redeem the captives.[81] Even after their crushing defeat, the Turks were treated with care and respect. Although nominally reorganized into prefectures and protectorates in the Chinese administrative system, the tribesmen remained effectively under the authority of their own chiefs, who received honors, titles, and appointments from the emperor.[82] "Those of their chieftains and leaders who came [to submit] were all appointed to be generals, generals of the palace gentlemen, and other officers. More than one hundred of them were arrayed at court as officials above the fifth rank, and as a result several thousand families [of Turks] came to dwell in Chang'an."[83] One of the most important of the Turkish leaders, Ashina She'er (the former Tuo *shad*, who did not surrender until 635) was even given one of the emperor's sisters as a wife.[84]

The Tang court felt obliged to treat the surrendered Turks with great care because the victory at Tieshan had destroyed the Eastern Turk state but had not enabled China to extend its control over the

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[80] *JTS*, ch. 3, p. 39; *XTS*, ch. 2, p. 31.
[81] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, p. 6087; *JTS*, ch. 3, p. 41; *XTS*, ch. 2, p. 32.
[82] *ZZTJ*, ch. 193, pp. 6073, 6077, 6079; *CFYG*, ch. 964, pp. 1b–2a.
[83] *JTS*, ch. 194A, p. 5163.
[84] This was the Hengyang Princess, the fourteenth daughter of Li Yuan; see *XTS*, ch. 83, p. 3644, and Lin, *Tujue yanjiu*, p. 222.

whole of the steppe. Although carefully observing the formal niceties of a tributary relationship with the Tang, the Xueyantuo retained their *de facto* independence north of the desert, while the Western Turks, too, remained free of Chinese control in the Tarim basin, Dzungaria, and Western Turkestan. If the Eastern Turks should find Chinese rule intolerable, they were not without potential allies and places of refuge. The Tang had capitalized on natural calamities and divisions within the Turk polity when they moved against Xieli, and thus were able to achieve their decisive victories with relatively small forces of cavalry. If they wished to project power and extend their authority farther to the north and west of China—and to do so at a reasonable cost—they would have to rely heavily on the large cavalry forces that could be raised from among their Turkish vassals.[85] For all of these reasons, it was very much in the interest of the Tang government to make sure that the Eastern Turks remained contented clients and loyal auxiliaries.

From first to last, Tang Taizong exercised great caution in his dealings with the Eastern Turks. They were clearly not an enemy that could be taken lightly, and he chose not to join battle with them until their strength had declined to the point that a Tang victory was all but certain. When Xieli marched on Chang'an in 626, the Chinese emperor bribed him to withdraw. In the aftermath of Xieli's raid, Taizong contented himself with measures to build up the defensive strength of his empire. Even after the Turk *qaghan*ate began to disintegrate in 627, he was not eager to initiate offensive action immediately. He did not authorize limited, local military action against the Turks (in the form of support for Tuli and the campaign against Liang Shidu) until the summer of 628, and it was not until late in 629, after forming an alliance with the rising power of the Xueyantuo, that he felt strong enough to launch a large-scale offensive capable of breaking Xieli's power once and for all. His decision to accept Xieli's offer of submission and send Tang Jian to the *qaghan*'s camp after the fall of Dingxiang fits into the same pattern of caution, and suggests that even at that late date the emperor was willing to settle for something less than a complete military victory in order to avoid the risk of a costly defeat. As we have seen, it was Li Jing

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[85] For examples of the use of Turk and other steppe auxiliaries by Tang, see Kang Le, *Tang dai qian qi de bianfang* (Taibei, 1979), pp. 38, 47, 52.

and Li Shiji who sensed the opportunity and undertook the final, devastating assault against the Turkish camp on their own initiative.

The Tang victory over Xieli's Eastern Turks owed much to favorable circumstances and a ruthless willingness to exploit them. Taizong evidently understood the structural weaknesses in the Turkish polity, took steps to encourage the revolts of both the subordinate tribes and discontented junior members of the ruling family (particularly the Tuli *qaghan*), and took full advantage of the resulting chaos and disunity. In addition to this, however, the Tang victory also required operational and tactical adjustments to enable Chinese forces to overcome the nomads in their own element.

The total number of Tang troops sent against Xieli, 100,000 men, represented only a fraction of the manpower resources that were potentially at Taizong's disposal.[86] Moreover, these soldiers were distributed among six different armies deployed at widely separated points along the northern frontier. Each of the individual armies could not have been very large, perhaps no more than 30,000 men even in the case of the central columns led by Li Jing and Li Shiji. Although most Chinese armies of this period were composed primarily of foot soldiers,[87] the participation of infantrymen is not mentioned in any of the Chinese accounts of the campaign against Xieli. Foot soldiers were surely present in supporting roles, holding fortified positions and escorting supplies, but the sources state that the decisive offensive moves were made by relatively small flying columns composed entirely of cavalry, such as the 3,000 that Li Jing led against Dingxiang and the 10,000 who rode into Xieli's camp. Rather than mobilizing vast numbers of Chinese infantrymen who could not have caught up with the highly mobile Turks and could have been supplied only with the greatest difficulty, Taizong and his generals evidently opted for a symmetrical response to the military challenge posed by the nomads, placing their main reliance on light cavalry forces that mimicked those of their opponents.

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[86] The registered population of the Tang empire at this time was approximately three million households, with an average of between five and six persons per household. See Hans Bielenstein, "The Census of China during the Period 2–742 A.D." *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities*, 19 (1947), p. 126, and Pulleyblank, "Registration of Population in China in the Sui and T'ang Periods," pp. 290, 293. The actual population was much larger.

[87] The composition of Sui and Tang armies is discussed in Graff, "Early T'ang Generalship and the Textual Tradition," pp. 170–75.

The operations of these Tang cavalry forces emphasized speed and surprise. Li Jing caught the Turks off guard with his sudden, rapid advance to the vicinity of Dingxiang, then took advantage of the cover of darkness to force his way inside the walls of the town. When he marched against the Turkish encampment at Tieshan, he set out on the same day that he made the decision to act. Not only did he exploit the unwariness of the Turks with a Tang ambassador in their midst, but he also traveled by a roundabout route and then launched his attack just when the weather conditions made for especially poor visibility. These efforts to improve the odds in his favor were very much in keeping with the style of warfare practiced by the Turks and other steppe peoples. In the view of one authority, their strategy was "based not on brute strength, but on an ingeniously conceived plan. The fundamental principle was to cause the greatest possible loss to the enemy all the while sparing one's own forces. It was for this reason they would always seek to initiate battle under conditions unfavorable to the enemy, and to attack him on his weakest side. They would not engage in a decisive battle except when, in the first engagements preparing the decisive action, they had already assured themselves of the conditions and advantages necessary to carry off the victory."[88]

In addition to improving the odds in his favor, the Tang general's emphasis on speed and surprise may also have been intended to prevent Xieli's Turks from slipping out of reach. One of the major considerations in Li Jing's decision to surprise the camp at Tieshan was his fear that the *qaghan* was simply playing for time in his negotiations with Tang Jian and would withdraw to the north of the Gobi desert once his horses had fattened on the spring grass.[89] Since the Turks carried their provisions with them on the hoof, slaughtering animals from their herds as necessary, they were not bound by cumbersome supply lines and creeping baggage trains but could travel wherever there was sufficient water and pasture.[90] And since there was seldom any need to defend fixed points such as cities and towns, the nomads could withdraw before a superior enemy force and avoid battle almost indefinitely. Even when configured as relatively small

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[88] Eugène Darkó, "Influences touraniennes sur l'évolution de l'art militaire des Grecs, des Romains et des Byzantins," *Byzantion*, 10 (1935), p. 450.

[89] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2485; *XTS*, ch. 93, p. 3818; *TD*, ch. 156, p. 4005.

[90] Smith, "Ayn Jalut," pp. 331–39.

columns of light cavalry, the Tang forces would have had difficulty matching the strategic mobility of the Turks. One sign of this is that the Tang cavalry packed twenty days' grain rations for their march on Xieli's camp.[91] We may infer that they did not have enough extra horses to provide themselves with fresh meat, and that their striking range was limited by the amount of grain they could carry with them. The Tang forces' relative logistical weakness and lack of strategic mobility helps to explain their leaders' emphasis on speed and surprise. And it also helps to explain their efforts to trap the Turks and cut off their escape routes, as when Li Shiji was sent to Qikou to prevent the Turks at Tieshan from retreating northward into the desert. This sort of move was not in keeping with the Chinese military tradition, which warned against completely encircling a desperate enemy or impeding his escape, but it made good sense under the conditions of steppe warfare where it was possible for an enemy to retreat over vast distances, recoup his strength, and return to fight again another day.[92]

There is good reason to believe that the cavalry forces of the nascent Tang dynasty were better prepared and equipped for this sort of mission than their Sui predecessors. The typical Sui cavalryman not only had a full suit of armor for himself but was also mounted on an armored horse. The horse's armor, made of small rectangular plaques (lamellae) of iron or leather like that of the rider, covered almost the whole of its body with the exception of the lower legs.[93] Iconographic evidence (such as tomb figurines) indicates that the riders were normally armed with lance and saber, and often carried a shield for additional protection. Almost certainly encouraged by the introduction of the stirrup, this type of heavily-armored cav-

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[91] *JTS*, ch. 67, p. 2479.

[92] The contrast between Chinese and steppe strategy has been remarked by Thomas Barfield: "Nomadic tradition demanded that a defeated enemy always be run to ground, while traditional Chinese strategy cautioned against pushing a defeated army too far, lest in desperation it inflict a defeat on its pursuers." (*The Perilous Frontier*, pp. 151–52.) For early Chinese statements on the subject, see *Sunzi jiaoshi*, ed. Wu Jiulong (Beijing, 1990), p. 126; Liu Yin, *Liu tao zhijie*, ch. 2, p. 46, in vol. 13 of *Kambun taikei*, comp. Hatori Unokichi (Tokyo, 1912; rpt. Taibei, 1978); and Liu Yin, *Sima fa zhijie*, p. 30, also in vol. 13 of *Kambun taikei*. Translations can be found in Ralph D. Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Boulder, Colorado, 1993), pp. 87, 142, 171.

[93] Yang Hong, *Zhongguo gu bingqi luncong*, 2nd ed. (Beijing, 1985), p. 48; the components of the barding are described in detail in Albert E. Dien, "A Study of Early Chinese Armor," *Artibus Asiae*, 43 (1982), p. 38.

alry made its debut during the fourth century C.E. and soon came to occupy the most prominent place in the military establishments of both northern and southern regimes during China's several centuries of disunity.[94]

Heavy cavalry continued to serve as the core element of Chinese armies after the reunification of North and South by the Sui dynasty in 589. It played an important role in the Sui conquest of the southern Chen state in 588–89, and four thousand armored soldiers on armored horses formed the nucleus of each of the thirty "armies" that Emperor Yang led against the northern Korean state of Koguryŏ in 612.[95] The tactical employment of the Sui cavalry seems to have been extremely rigid. When campaigning against the steppe nomads, most Sui generals, fearing that they would be surprised by their more nimble opponents, deployed their forces in square-shaped defensive formations. Infantry, cavalry, and carts were positioned for mutual support, with the cavalry held in reserve at the center of the formation. It was considered a noteworthy innovation when a Sui general campaigning against the Turks in 598 created separate formations composed entirely of cavalry to facilitate offensive action on the battlefield.[96]

During the rebellions and civil wars that followed Emperor Yang's Korean debacle, the armored horse seems to have disappeared entirely from Chinese battlefields. The sources begin to speak of "light cavalry" (*qing ji*) as the characteristic mounted force of the newly established Tang dynasty. The chief way in which this new type differed from the earlier heavy cavalry was that, while the rider might still be armored, the horse was not.[97] It was light cavalry of this sort that Li Shimin and other Tang generals of the civil wars are reported to have led into battle, and some sources specify that Li Jing used not just three thousand cavalry but three thousand "light cavalry" to take Dingxiang from the Turks at the end of 629.[98] Various explanations

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[94] Albert E. Dien, "The Stirrup and Its Effect on Chinese Military History," *Ars Orientalis*, 16 (1986), pp. 36–38; Dien, "A Study of Early Chinese Armor," pp. 5, 40; Yang Hong, *Gudai bingqi shihua* (Shanghai, 1988), pp. 122, 140.

[95] Yang, *Zhongguo gu bingqi luncong*, p. 50. For the use of armored cavalry against Chen, see *ZZTJ*, ch. 176, p. 5499; for descriptions of Emperor Yang's army in 612, see *ZZTJ*, ch. 181, p. 5660; Wei, *Sui shu*, ch. 8, p. 160; and Asami Naoichirō, "Yōdai no dai ichi ji Kōkuri enseigun: sono kibo to heishu," *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, 44, No. 1 (June 1985), p. 28 and passim.

[96] Wei, *Sui shu*, ch. 48, pp. 1285–86. The general was Yang Su.

[97] Yang, *Zhongguo gu bingqi luncong*, pp. 51–52; Yang, *Gudai bingqi shihua*, pp. 144–45, 153–55.

[98] See *TPYL*, ch. 289, p. 5b, and *CFYG*, ch. 411, p. 21b.

have been offered for this change. Yang Hong attributes the shift to the social upheaval that brought down the Sui dynasty, when unarmored peasant rebels were able to outmaneuver and defeat the cumbersome heavy cavalry.[99] Albert Dien, on the other hand, has pointed out that the Sui unification of China put an end to the longstanding conflict between North and South and left the lightly-armored steppe peoples as the principal military challenge to the Chinese state; "perhaps," he suggests, "decreased emphasis on heavy cavalry in the artistic representations reflected a tendency toward lighter armor to better face the mounted nomads on the frontiers."[100] A recent article by Wang Yuanchao takes a similar position, pointing in particular to evidence of Turkish influence on the early Tang armies.[101]

The explanations offered by Dien and Wang resonate much better with the origin of the Tang army as a frontier force that was engaged in fighting the Turks before its leaders plunged into the vortex of China's internal conflict. The future founder of the Tang dynasty, Li Yuan, was appointed a general of the imperial guard and sent by Emperor Yang to Taiyuan in 615 to serve as the regional pacification commissioner (*anfu dashi*) and later viceroy (*liu shou*).[102] This assignment put him athwart one of the major invasion routes favored by the Turks, and required him to give serious thought to the nomads' way of war and the best means of dealing with it. Later, when facing a Turkish incursion in the vicinity of Mayi in 616, he shared his assessment of the Turks with the local prefect:

> The strength of the Turks is that they rely solely on mounted archers. When they see an advantage they advance; when they know they will encounter difficulties they retreat. They gallop like the wind and turn like lightning; they have no permanent formations. They make bows and arrows their teeth and claws; they make armor and helmet their normal attire. Their units do not deploy in ranks and files; their camps have no fixed locations. They follow the grass and water to make their living quarters, and use sheep and horses as the army's provisions. When they are victorious they stop to search for booty; when defeated they are not ashamed [to flee]. They do not have the burden of keeping watch at night and patrolling in the daytime; they do not have

[99] Yang, *Zhongguo gu bingqi luncong*, pp. 50–52.

[100] Dien, "A Study of Early Chinese Armor," p. 41.

[101] Wang Yuanchao, "Tang chu jiaji juzhuang shuailuo yu qing qibing xingqi zhi yuanyin," *Lishi yanjiu*, 1996, No. 4, especially pp. 56–57.

[102] For a discussion of Li Yuan's appointment, responsibilities, and regional authority, see Nunome Chōfū, *Zui Tō shi kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1968), pp. 108–112.

> the expense of constructing fortifications and transporting supplies. When Chinese troops go on campaign, everything is the opposite of this. When [Chinese commanders] engage them in combat, only very rarely are they able to establish merit. Now, if we were to do what they do and imitate their strong points, they would know there was no advantage to be gained and would of themselves stop coming [to attack us].[103]

He soon acted upon this analysis by selecting two thousand of his Chinese cavalrymen who were able to shoot from horseback and training them to fight in the Turkish manner:

> Their food, drink, and lodgings were the same as those of the Turks. They followed the grass and water, and placed outposts at a distance. Whenever they encountered Turkish scouts, they behaved as if no one was watching and galloped around shooting and hunting, so as to flaunt their awesome martiality. . . . When they encountered the Turks suddenly, the bravest and keenest were organized as a separate unit and ordered to maintain their integrity (*chi man*) in order to watch for their opportunity. Whenever the Turks saw [Li Yuan's] troops, they always said that on account of their behavior they suspected that they belonged to their own tribe. On those occasions when they drew [Li Yuan] into battle, they never dared to face him but fled in all directions.[104]

This account from Wen Daya's *Court Diary of the Founding of Great Tang* (*Da Tang chuangye qi ju zhu*) greatly exaggerates the degree of success that Li Yuan achieved against the Turks, but the assertion that the Tang leader deliberately set out to emulate what he perceived as the strong points of the Turks is entirely plausible. There are a few tantalizing hints that Li Yuan and his son and successor Li Shimin continued to promote a Turkish tactical style among their forces in later years. Whereas the Sui horsemen who participated in Emperor Yang's Korean expedition seem to have been divided between heavy cavalry units equipped only for "shock" action and a much smaller contingent of mounted archers, Li Shimin and certain of his followers later demonstrated equal skill at both archery and close combat. During an engagement outside Luoyang in the spring of 621, a warrior named Qiu Xinggong was one of the group of riders who followed Li Shimin in cutting his way through the enemy line. Once they had emerged on the other side, he used

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[103] Wen, *Da Tang chuangye qi ju zhu*, p. 2.

[104] Wen, *Da Tang chuangye qi ju zhu*, p. 2. A much less detailed version can be found in *ZZTJ*, ch. 183, p. 5717, where it is placed at the end of 616.

his bow to shoot down several of the enemy's horsemen.[105] In another engagement a few weeks later, Li Shimin provoked the opposing force with his mounted archery in order to lure them into a cavalry ambush.[106] To these episodes should be added the riding and archery practice that Li Shimin demanded of his guardsmen in 626, and the report that Li Jing's assault on Xieli's camp in 630 was spearheaded by two hundred mounted archers.[107] Sparse as it is, this evidence suggests the possibility that many of the Tang troopers sent against Xieli in 629–30 were already well versed in steppe tactics and weapon skills.

The Tang conquest of the Eastern Turk qaghanate highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of the Turk polity and the steppe mode of warfare. The Turks' military strengths, intimately connected with their nomadic way of life, included their skill at archery and horsemanship and their ability to mobilize a relatively large percentage of their population for participation in war. Of especially great importance was the tactical mobility enjoyed by Turkish forces composed entirely of cavalry, together with the long-range strategic mobility of cavalry able to subsist on pasture and therefore unconstrained by conventional supply lines. On the debit side, the same natural environment that contributed to the Turks' strength could be a limiting factor. Harsh weather might kill off the herds upon which the nomads depended, while normal seasonal variations vitiated the military usefulness of plants and animals and imposed temporary limits on mobility (as when Xieli would not risk the crossing of the Gobi until his horses had fattened on the spring grass). Another major weakness was that the Turks' political structure was ever prone to instability along two dimensions: rivalry between members of the ruling family could easily lead to internecine conflicts, and today's subject tribes were potentially tomorrow's enemies.

The decisions made by the Tang leaders reflected a keen understanding of both the nature of their adversary and the essentials of warfare as it was practiced by the nomads. Tang Taizong ruthlessly exploited the weaknesses of the Turks (which were at least in part

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[105] For the organization of Emperor Yang's army, see Wei, *Sui shu*, ch. 8, pp. 160–61; for Qiu Xinggong, see *ZZTJ*, ch. 188, pp. 5902–3.

[106] *ZZTJ*, ch. 189, p. 5910. Ambushes and feigned flights were prominent in the repertoire of steppe tactics, but they were also well known in China during this period and used quite often by many different commanders.

[107] *XTS*, ch. 111, p. 4137.

dependent upon contingent, fortuitous climatic events), and largely negated their military advantages by sending against them forces which had been configured to resemble those of the nomads themselves. The rapid offensive operations undertaken by Li Jing and Li Shiji, designed to take Xieli's people by surprise and prevent their escape, also served to counter the enemy's advantages and were entirely in keeping with steppe traditions of warfare.[108] Tang emulation of the steppe warriors was not simply a matter of horses, bows, and other equipment but extended to operational behavior and strategic choice. One of the reasons that Taizong's China was able to gain such a complete victory over the Eastern Turks was because both its elite cavalry forces and the thinking of its military leaders were already well suited to demands of steppe warfare.

[108] In the Orkhon inscriptions dating from the early eighth century and describing political and military events of the second Eastern Turk qaghanate (682–734), there is much mention of surprising the enemy and avoiding being surprised oneself. See Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, pp. 269, 287.

## Glossary

anfu dashi (pacification commissioner) 安撫大使
Ashide 阿史德
Ashina 阿史那
Ashina She'er 阿史那社爾
Baidao 白道
Bayegu 拔野古
Bian bridge 便橋
bingbu shangshu (minister of war) 兵部尚書
Bingzhou 并州
Binzhou 豳州
Chai Shao 柴紹
Chang'an 長安
chang cheng (long walls) 長成
Chen 陳
chi (command) 敕
chi man (maintain integrity) 持滿
Chuluo 處羅
Daizhou 代州
dao (saber) 刀
Datong 大同
Di 狄
Dingxiang 定襄
dongpian (Eastern Wing) 東偏
Du Ruhui 杜如晦
dudu (area commander) 都督
eltäbär (chieftain of vassal group under Turk qaghanate) 頡利發
Eyang ridge 惡陽嶺
Fang Xuanling 房玄齡
Fen river 汾水
fubing (territorial militia) 府兵
Gaochang 高昌
Guanzhong 關中
Han 漢
Hebei 河北
Hedong 河東
Heng'an 恒安
Hengyang 衡陽
honglu qing (chief minister of the court of state ceremonial) 鴻臚卿
irkin (chieftain of vassal group in Turk qaghanate) 俟斤
Jingzhou 涇州
Khitan (Qidan) 契丹
Kuangdao 匡道
li (unit of distance equal to approx. 1/3 mile) 里
Li Daozong 李道宗
Li Jing 李靖

Li Shiji 李世勣
Li Shimin 李世民
Li Yuan 李淵
Liang Shidu 梁師都
Liangzhou 涼州
Liaoning 遼寧
Lingzhou 靈州
Liu Heita 劉黑闥
Liu Lancheng 劉蘭成
Liu Min 劉旻
liu shou (viceroy) 留守
Liu Wuzhou 劉武周
Malieshan 馬鬣山
Mayi 馬邑
Ningxia 寧夏
Northern Qi 北齊
Northern Zhou 北周
qaghan 可汗
Qikou 磧口
Qimin 啓民
qing ji (light cavalry) 輕騎
Qiu Xinggong 丘行恭
Shaboluo 沙鉢羅
shad (Turk governor ruling over subject peoples) 設
shangshu you puye (right vice-director of the department of state affairs) 尚書右僕射
shangshu zuo puye (left vice-director of the department of state affairs) 尚書左僕射
Shanxi 山西
Shengzhou 勝州
Shibi 始畢
Shibobi 什鉢苾
Shuntian gate 順天門
Shuozhou 朔州
Sijie 思結
Su Dingfang 蘇定方
Sui 隋
Sui wang (king of Sui) 隋王
Taiyuan 太原
Tang 唐
Tang Jian 唐儉
*Tang li* 唐曆
Tang Taizong 唐太宗
tian kehan (Heavenly Qaghan) 天可汗
Tianshan 天山
Tiele 鐵勒
Tieshan 鐵山

Tong Yabghu 統葉護
Tongmo 通漠
Tujue (Turks) 突厥
Tuli 突利
tuntian (military agricultural colony) 屯田
Tuo shad 拓設
Uighurs 回紇
Wang Mang 王莽
Wang Shichong 王世充
Wei river 渭水
Wei Xiaojie 衛孝節
Wei Zheng 魏徵
Wugong 武功
Xi 奚
Xianbei 鮮卑
Xiande hall 顯德殿
Xiao, Empress 蕭后
Xiao Yu 蕭瑀
Xiazhou 夏州
Xieli 頡利
Xiongnu 匈奴
Xuanwu gate 玄武門
Xue Wanshu 薛萬淑
Xueyantuo 薛延陀
Yang, Emperor 煬帝
Yang Su 楊素
Yang Zhengdao 楊政道
Yanmen 鴈門
Yi 夷
Yicheng 義成
Yi'nan 夷男
Yingzhou 營州
Yinshan 陰山
Yiwu 伊吾
Youzhou 幽州
Yuan Junzhang 苑君璋
Yugu shad 欲谷設
Yulin 榆林
Yunzhong 雲中
Yushe shad 郁射設
yushi dafu (censor-in-chief) 御史大夫
Zhang Gongqin 張公勤
Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌
zhao (edict) 詔
Zhenzhupijia 眞珠毗伽
Zhishi Sili 執失思力
Zhou Fan 周範

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# THE UIGHUR-CHINESE CONFLICT OF 840–848

Michael R. Drompp

A long history of the frequent—and often overwhelming—military victories of Inner Asian peoples in their wars of conquest has perhaps obscured the fact that at times the nomads of the Inner Asian steppe battled without success. Such conflicts could include failed efforts at expansion of power or defensive wars; they could even include warfare provoked by desperation. This article considers an example of the latter, a case in which large bands of Inner Asian refugees, fleeing from the destruction of their state, were forced into a series of difficult negotiations and sometimes violent confrontations with China that ultimately led to their disappearance.

The Turkic-speaking Uighurs (Chinese Huihe, Huihu) began their domination of the Mongolian Plateau and its environs in 744, when they were part of a coalition that overthrew the imperium of their ethnic cousins, the Türks (Chinese Tujue). The Uighurs replaced the Türks as the supreme power on the eastern steppe, and used their strength to overawe and exploit their neighbors, both nomadic and sedentary, when possible. Uighur relations with China—of paramount importance to both states—were unusual. This was primarily due to the fact that shortly after the rise of the Uighurs, China's Tang dynasty (618–907) was nearly toppled by a rebellion that originated within its own military. The rebellion of An Lushan, which began in 755, unleashed such violence on the Tang government that the Tang court was forced to seek foreign assistance for its very survival. Such assistance came from the Uighurs, who sent cavalry to China and aided in quashing the rebellion.

After this, the Uighurs enjoyed both a military and a moral advantage in regard to China. Tang weakness had been revealed in the An Lushan Rebellion; although the dynasty survived the rebellion, it never regained the grandeur it had enjoyed in earlier years. Once a dynamic and expansionist power, the Tang dynasty after the mid-eighth century was diminished and fragmented. Although still a large and formidable nation, Tang China was less confident in its dealings with foreign powers than it had been prior to the rebellion, and

less interested in attempting to extend its power. In addition, the Uighurs had performed a great service to the Chinese emperor. As a result, the Tang court felt obliged to offer them privileges not normally accorded to a foreign state, particularly a system of trade (Uighur horses for Chinese silk) that was particularly advantageous to the nomads, as well as a number of marriages between Uighur rulers and princesses of the Tang imperial house of Li.[1]

As a result of their special situation, the Uighurs were able to exploit Chinese wealth while maintaining relatively friendly relations with the Tang government, despite some periods of tension. They also took advantage of their privileged position to act as patrons and protectors of the Manichaean religion—the faith transmitted by Sogdians and other Central Asians that had been adopted by many Uighur elites—within China.[2] The Chinese deeply resented Uighur religious interference and economic exploitation, but found it difficult to refuse Uighur demands. As for the Uighurs, the large amount of Chinese silk that entered their land resulted in an accumulation of wealth that had been unparalleled in earlier nomadic empires. While the Chinese regarded the Uighurs as unwelcome parasites (even though China seems to have needed horses from them as well as other suppliers), the Uighurs themselves enjoyed their relationship with China, as it benefited them enormously. Chinese silk augmented the Uighur economy; Chinese princesses and imperial appointments increased Uighur political prestige.

Despite these extraordinary advantages, Uighur power eventually began to wane. An important subject people, the Turkic-speaking Kirghiz (Chinese Xiajiasi, etc.), had rebelled against Uighur rule around 820, and this rebellion developed into a protracted war. In the 830s, vicious internecine strife among the Uighur ruling elite fur-

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[1] On this trade, see Christopher I. Beckwith, "The Impact of the Horse and Silk Trade on the Economies of T'ang China and the Uighur Empire: On the Importance of International Commerce in the Early Middle Ages," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 34 (1991), pp. 183–198. On Tang-Uighur marriage politics, see Pan Yihong, "Marriage Alliances and Chinese Princesses in International Politics from Han through T'ang," *Asia Major*, 3rd Series, Vol. 10, Parts 1–2 (1997), pp. 118–122. For an overview of Tang-Uighur relations, see Colin Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire According to the T'ang Dynastic Histories: A Study in Sino-Uighur Relations, 744–840* (Columbia, 1973), pp. 14–50.

[2] On Manichaeism in the Uighur empire and Tang China, see Samuel N.C. Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China: A Historical Survey* (Manchester, 1985), pp. 189–198.

ther enfeebled the court. In 840, after a very harsh winter, famine and pestilence weakened the Uighur government to the point that the Kirghiz, aided by a disgruntled Uighur general, attacked the Uighur capital on the Orkhon River, assassinated the Uighur ruler (*qaghan*), and brought the Uighur steppe empire to an end. Many Uighurs were unwilling to come under the rule of the victorious Kirghiz, and fled from the rout.[3] While groups of Uighurs migrated in several different directions away from their former realm, it is those Uighurs who fled south to the Tang border that will claim our attention here.

As has been noted, Tang China in the mid-ninth century was no longer the robust empire that its founders had created and expanded. After having survived the An Lushan Rebellion, the Tang dynasty had maintained its rule and even flourished, but never recaptured the position of overweening power in East and Central Asia that it had enjoyed under earlier emperors. By 840, Tang China found itself still important but seriously weakened—and with many neighbors, including the Uighurs, ready to take advantage of that weakness. Tang power was further compromised by the post-An Lushan autonomy of many regions which had been part of the Tang empire. Not only had some territory (such as the Tarim Basin) been completely lost, but other regions within China proper had asserted a degree of independence that deprived the Tang central government of their tax revenues and, at times, of their political and military cooperation.[4]

When the presence of the Uighur refugees at the northern border was first made known, the Tang court at Chang'an certainly was aware of its own weakness in that region. The northern tier of provinces included three under direct Tang control; going from west to east, these were Fengzhou (to the west of which was territory controlled by the Tibetans), Zhenwu, and Hedong. East of Hedong was

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[3] On the collapse of the Uighur steppe empire, see Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian* (Beijing, 1956), ch. 246, pp. 7942 and 7946–7947; see also Liu Xiu et al., *Jiu Tang shu* (Beijing, 1975), ch. 195, pp. 5213–5214 and Ouyang Xiu et al., *Xin Tang shu* (Beijing, 1975), ch. 217b, pp. 6130–6131 and 6149–6150. Some of this material has been translated in Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, pp. 122–125.

[4] See Edwin G. Pulleyblank, "The An Lu-shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in Late T'ang China,"*Essays on T'ang Society: The Interplay of Social, Political and Economic Forces*, ed. John Curtis Perry and Bardwell L. Smith (Leiden, 1976), pp. 32–60; see also C.A. Peterson, "Court and Province in Mid- and Late T'ang," *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 3: Sui and T'ang China, 589–906, Part I*, ed. Denis Twitchett (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 464–560.

Youzhou, an essentially autonomous province under the control of a military governor. To the east, Youzhou bordered on Korea and the ocean, and on its northern marches were important nomadic peoples such as the Khitans (Chinese Qidan), Tatabï (Chinese Xi), and Shiwei—all of whom had been vassals of the once-powerful Uighur empire.

The Chinese, long inattentive to events within the Uighur empire, were thus caught unawares when, in the autumn of 840, Uighur refugees suddenly arrived at the northern border near the city of Tiande, on the north bank of the great bend of the Yellow River in northern Fengzhou. The first of two major refugee groups to arrive was a band led by several Uighur aristocrats, the most important of whom was Ormïzt (Chinese Womosi), a prince (*tegin*) who reportedly was the brother of the murdered Uighur ruler.[5] The number of Uighurs in this group is not given in any source, but evidence given below would suggest that it contained significantly more than 30,000 people.

Although Tang border officials were agitated by the sudden appearance of these Uighurs, no serious hostilities erupted. Indeed, Ormïzt Tegin and his followers requested asylum from the Chinese. Their submissiveness was of course due to their difficult position. Not only had their state been uprooted, but the Uighurs were now fragmented, with no recognized leadership. Groups of Uighurs had gone east and west as well as south; some may have remained on the Mongolian Plateau. The danger of Kirghiz pursuit of these refugees could not have been discounted, and might indeed have been expected. Further, the factionalism that had plagued the Uighur court had resulted in enmities within that nation, so that Ormïzt also feared rival leaders. His submissiveness in regard to China is therefore not surprising; entering China would mean escape from other, apparently more dangerous, enemies, as well as the opportunity to obtain needed provisions.

Despite the apparent peaceableness of the Uighur arrivals, the Tang court began to prepare for the eventuality of hostilities. Although they by no means comprised the bulk of the Uighur nation, Ormïzt and his followers nonetheless represented a significant threat to the Tang border defenses, which were generally weak and unprepared

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[5] See Michael R. Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü as Sources for the History of T'ang-Inner Asian Relations" (diss., Indiana University, 1986), p. 13. See also Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7947.

for a major conflict. Emperor Wuzong (r. 840–846), who had recently ascended the throne, ordered Liu Mian (782–846), military governor of Zhenwu and a seasoned border general, to advance his troops northward and make ready for a possible Uighur attack, but no such attack came. Instead, the Uighurs withdrew slightly from the border, and Liu Mian was ordered to return to his garrison.[6] The border situation remained uncertain for several months.

In the spring of 841, the Chinese court issued a letter of imperial decree to the "rebellious" Uighurs who had appeared at their border, chastising them for disturbing the frontier and accusing them of ruining the amicable relationship that had existed between the two peoples. It then urged them to hurry back to their homeland and help to bring about its recovery. Nevertheless, the letter also announced that despite some skirmishes that had occurred at the border (clearly identified as having been caused by Uighur raids to obtain provisions), the Tang government had ordered all its border garrisons not to engage in battle with the Uighurs—that is, not to initiate conflict.[7] This may have been more out of fear than compassion, for China had long neglected its border defences due to the great expenses involved and the relatively good relations with the Uighurs. The general unpreparedness of the northern defences was clear to Wuzong's chief minister Li Deyu (787–850), the man who oversaw the handling of the entire Uighur crisis.

The Uighurs responded with a letter, no longer extant, informing the Chinese of the circumstances surrounding their flight to the Tang border and formally requesting asylum. Although the Chinese response was sympathetic, it nevertheless continued to urge the Uighurs to return home. The court asked for clarification of the Uighurs' desires and plans, and hinted briefly but darkly of Chinese border officials who might not act in accordance with the Tang court's wishes.[8] Indeed, many Tang officials, both at the court and at the border, urged an attack on the refugees, but Li Deyu denounced such suggestions. Citing their previous merit during the An Lushan Rebellion, their current distress, and the restraint they had shown thus far at the border, he encouraged the emperor to send envoys to pacify

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[6] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, pp. 7947–7948.

[7] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji* (Shanghai, 1936), ch. 5, p. 33. An English translation of this and all other documents from this source mentioned herein may be found in Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü."

[8] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 5, pp. 33–34.

the Uighurs and transport provisions to them. "Now, a poor bird has flown into our bosom," he said, "and we must still be compassionate."[9] Li also pointed out that the troops at many border posts were currently inadequate for resisting an Uighur attack, and urged the emperor to strengthen defences there. Still, Li made it clear that he preferred peace to war, compassion to belligerence.[10]

On the other hand, Li Deyu continued to resist the demands for asylum that were made by the Uighurs under Ormïzt Tegin. Li wanted the Uighurs to leave the border and return to their homeland if at all possible. This could reflect both his understanding that large non-Chinese populations could cause trouble when settled within China (as, for example, the Türks had done earlier in the dynasty's history) and his desire not to give refuge to someone who might be fleeing from a much stronger power—a power that might be willing to raid China to recover the refugees. The Tang government had no intelligence concerning Kirghiz numbers or movements at this time.

The Tang court's next edict to the Uighurs stated that Chinese assistance was limited, and would not continue beyond what had already been allocated (the extent of which is not known); furthermore, it refused the Uighurs' request for armor and weapons, and again urged them to leave the border and return to the steppe.[11] This request for armor and weapons is interesting; the Uighur refugees surely did not make it in the hopes of using them to recover their old realm from the Kirghiz, but rather in an effort to protect themselves from hostile tribes at the border—tribes such as Tanguts (Chinese Dangxiang), Tuyuhun, and Shatuo which resided at the Chinese northern border under Tang "loose-rein" (*jimi*) control[12]—or even rival Uighur groups or raiding Kirghiz.

With the approach of winter, the Tang court eventually relented and sent a large quantity of grain to the Uighur refugees. Li Deyu encouraged this generosity, as much from concern about possible Uighur raids precipitated by hunger as from Confucian concern for

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[9] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 13, p. 101.

[10] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, pp. 7952–7953; Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 13, pp. 101–102.

[11] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 5, pp. 34–35.

[12] On the Tang *jimi* system, see Pan Yihong, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and Its Neighbors* (Bellingham, 1997), pp. 197–203.

virtuous behavior. The border was still unprepared for war; Tiande was still weak, and the Uighurs were hungry. Li convinced the emperor that giving the Uighurs provisions was far preferable to the loss of a border garrison. At the same time, he encouraged the emperor to transfer troops to the north and to restore the combat readiness of the garrisons there in case a conflict should arise.[13]

In January 842 the situation was further complicated by the arrival in China of an envoy representing a man who claimed the rulership of the Uighur nation and led his own group of Uighur refugees. This new claimant to the Uighur throne, Ögä (Chinese Wujie) Qaghan, also had with him the Taihe Princess—Emperor Wuzong's paternal aunt, who had been sent to the Uighur capital in 821 to wed the ruler, and had remained as *qatun* (queen) under successive Uighur rulers. Ögä made several requests: to be officially recognized as the legitimate Uighur *qaghan*, to be given guarantees for the security of Manichaean churches within China, to be granted provisions as well as troops to aid him in the recovery of the Uighur realm, and finally to be given the Chinese garrison town of Tiande, near his encampment, as a temporary residence. The Chinese agreed to the request for grain—possibly the same grain that had been earmarked for Ormïzt's group—and to the assurances regarding Manichaeans in China. The Tang court also attempted an imperial appointment for Ögä, but this proved unfeasible due to the instability of the border situation. The court refused the other requests. In an effort to reduce the new *qaghan*'s leverage, the court also made a rather transparent (and unsuccessful) effort to get Ögä to send the Taihe Princess to Chang'an.[14]

Ögä Qaghan did not, however, see himself as a suppliant in the same way that Ormïzt Tegin did. Indeed, he seems to have regarded his position as one from which he could make demands—some of which, such as the request for a border town, were unprecedented. It was this belief in his own position of strength, or perhaps the political necessity of acting as if he were in a position of strength, that ultimately led Ögä into conflict with the Tang government.

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[13] Sima Kuang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, pp. 7954–7955; Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 13, pp. 102–103. Note that Li Deyu also feared the possibility of a Tibetan attack on Fengzhou.

[14] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 3, pp. 13–14 and ch. 5, pp. 29–30. See also the information in Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü," pp. 37–56.

Further, Ögä and Ormïzt were rivals—not for position, since Ormïzt never claimed the throne, but as leaders of rival factions in the Uighur court struggles.[15]

It would seem that the *qaghan* was following an aggressive strategy of bluster. His stance was not entirely unsupported, since he had with him the Chinese emperor's aunt as hostage as well as troops which far outnumbered those in any garrison in northern Fengzhou, Zhenwu, or Hedong; Chinese sources estimate his followers at this time at approximately 100,000 persons—a far from insignificant presence.[16] Ögä's purpose in pursuing this strategy seems to have been to maintain his autonomy in order to see what kind of arrangements he could work out with the Chinese and with other nomadic groups in the area. He may have been hoping to assemble enough troops and supplies to repulse the Kirghiz and reestablish Uighur rule on the Mongolian Plateau, although his request for Chinese troops to assist him in this enterprise seems both bold and ambitious. Before he could do anything in this regard, he needed time to recover and regroup. Tang imperial recognition of his position as *qaghan* would bolster his legitimacy. Provisions were crucial to his immediate survival. As for the city of Tiande, it must be recalled that many among the Uighur elite had become sedentarized to a significant degree.[17] Ögä would have been accustomed to city life, and may well have felt that such an arrangement would offer him much-needed protection should the Kirghiz be in pursuit. Unlike Ormïzt, however, he did not wish to submit to Chinese rule. He wanted to be regarded by the Chinese as a sovereign ruler.

There were now two major groups of Uighurs near the Chinese border, as well as smaller bands and splinters from the larger groups, creating a confusing and potentially volatile situation. Ormïzt Tegin continued to press his case for asylum, and this was finally granted. On 2 June 842, he and his followers submitted formally at Tiande. Ormïzt and his most important followers were granted titles and positions. Although we do not know the exact number of Uighurs in this group, it must have been significant, as the number of officers

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[15] On the relationship and rivalry between Ögä Qaghan and Ormïzt Tegin, see Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü," pp. 12–13.

[16] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7962. The original number of Ögä's followers at the Chinese border may have been larger, since Sima Guang referred to that group as "diminished and weakened" when he gave their number as 100,000.

[17] See Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, pp. 12–14.

alone was given as more than 2,600. The emperor then granted the submitted Uighur leaders grain, silks, and silver implements. More important, the submitted Uighurs were now designated as the "Return to Righteousness" (*Guiyi*) Army, and thereby incorporated into the Tang military structure. Ormïzt, who was granted the imperial surname of Li and the name Sizhong ("Loyal Thoughts"), was settled with his followers at the frontier, their families supported by government funds.[18]

Ögä's response to these events is unrecorded, but he must have been displeased at the Tang decision to grant asylum to Ormïzt and his followers—people who should have been the *qaghan*'s subjects. He soon requested that Ormïzt be turned over to him, as well as asking for more grain, livestock (cattle and sheep), and more guarantees for Manichaeans in China. All these requests were refused, although the Tang court ungenerously suggested that he could purchase grain at Zhenwu, using Chinese silk obtained from the horse-silk trade. As for the Manichaeans, the emperor asserted that the Manichaean temples in South China, at least, had lost support due to the fall of the Uighur empire, and so had been temporarily closed.[19]

All this could only have further alienated Ögä from China, adding to his pique at having been refused the garrison town he had requested as a residence. But Ögä still was in a difficult situation. Unable to recapture his homeland due to the weakness of his troops, he nevertheless was not prepared to submit to Tang authority. Perhaps he hoped to intimidate the Chinese into better terms. Whatever the *qaghan*'s motives, his ambiguous position was a dangerous one, and the Tang court was becoming increasingly unwilling to accommodate his demands, as well as continually discomfited by his presence as a threat at the northern frontier, where Chinese officers were becoming more and more skittish. As the likelihood of conflict increased, the "loose-rein" tribes at the border were becoming eager for the spoils that a battle with Ögä Qaghan would likely yield: domestic animals, slaves, and goods of various sorts. Furthermore, Ögä indicated to the Tang court his fear that independent tribes to the east that had once been subordinate to the Uighurs, such as the

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[18] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 2, pp. 10–11; ch. 8, pp. 59–61; and ch. 13, pp. 107–108. See also Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, pp. 7961–7965 and Ouyang Xiu et al., *Xin Tang shu*, ch. 217b, p. 6132.

[19] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 5, pp. 30–31.

Khitans, Tatabï, and Shiwei, could prove hostile, or even join forces with rival Uighur groups to attack him.

Although he still hoped that the *qaghan* would leave the border of his own accord, Li Deyu continued preparations for battle and encouraged the emperor to restrain his northern officials from making a premature assault on the Uighurs, since the border was still not sufficiently strengthened. He called for additional officers to be appointed and a regiment of 700 crossbow archers to be sent to the northern border; these archers were to be used to prepare an ambush in the event that the Uighurs kept to the forests for protection, as they often did. Li Deyu also urged the emperor to encourage and welcome defections from among the *qaghan*'s followers. In his opinion, the suffering of the Uighur refugees would make them willing to submit, and generous rewards would make their submission even more likely.[20]

Ögä, of course, was busy trying to improve his own situation, but his efforts were continually thwarted by the Chinese. He had sent an official to China in order to claim silk owed to the Uighurs for horses that had been provided prior to the Uighur empire's collapse, but this man had been detained at Zhenwu. This silk would have been important to allow Ögä to purchase provisions, as seen above. The Tang court had already granted silk to Ormïzt, and the latter now urged the court to take it back and give it to Ögä, possibly in the hope that this would ease tensions as a sort of ransom for those Uighurs who had been granted asylum in China.[21] As Chinese officials sought to understand the *qaghan*'s desires and motives, they became more and more convinced that it was more a need for currency (i.e., silk to purchase provisions) than a fear of other tribes that kept him at the border.[22] The silk was eventually sent to him, but only after irksome delays, in part caused by a Tang demand that he send an escort for the silk convoy. This measure, however, did not yield the desired effect, since the *qaghan* and his followers remained near the border.[23]

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[20] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 13, pp. 106–107. In this source (and others), this document, "A Memorial Enumerating What Should Be Done to Attend to Tiande's Attacking and Expelling the Uighurs," has erroneously been appended as part of another document; see Cen Zhongmian, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," *Shixue Zhuankan*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1937), p. 142, n. 1.

[21] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 13, p. 109.

[22] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7963.

[23] See Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü," pp. 131–133 and 142–144.

The Tang court now became concerned that Ögä would use the silk that he finally had obtained to purchase animals, particularly horses and camels, and war materiel from the "loose-rein" tribes at the border. Li Deyu asked the emperor to order the border officials to prohibit such sales.[24] Furthermore, in the autumn of 842, the Uighurs began moving southeast toward Batoufeng, on the north bank of the great bend of the Yellow River, about midway between Tiande and Zhenwu. Li Deyu began to consider the possibility of a surprise attack, and his memorial to the emperor contains some interesting observations.

> I have received successive imperial edicts regarding the Uighurs' gradual approach to Batoufeng, the necessity to attack them as soon as possible, and the question of how we can obtain the Taihe Princess. I have long contemplated [these problems], examining [circumstances] with great precision. The Uighurs are all cavalry and good at fighting in the wilderness. If [the attack should take place on] desert land, we would have difficulties fighting them. Even though our generals are excellent and our troops are strong, we would not be victorious. I have recently heard that the barbarians (*ronglu*) do not understand siege warfare. Consequently, except for knowing how to rush to and fro on horseback, they are quite unaccomplished in other [ways of warfare]. I suspect that they do not have scouts along the roads, since we have not made any sudden attack on their camp. If we order Shi Xiong to go with 1000 cavalry of the Yiwu horse army and also select 1000 Tuihun [i.e., Tuyuhun] cavalry, carefully choose infantry to serve as flanks, and gag [them] for a night attack, it will certainly be easy to achieve success. . . .[25]

But shortly thereafter, Li Deyu changed his mind and requested that the planned assault be called off, since the Uighurs had not engaged in any hostile activities.[26] Matters quickly became tense again, however, when the Uighurs bypassed Batoufeng and entered the region of Yunzhou (also known as Datong), in the province of Hedong, where they stole large numbers of cattle and horses from "loose-rein" tribes there. The Tuyuhun and Tanguts in the region pulled up their tents and fled to the mountains for safety, since they could not rely on the Tang government for protection. The Uighurs then withdrew, presumably northward.[27]

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[24] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 13, p. 109.
[25] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 17, pp. 141–142.
[26] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 111.
[27] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 111.

The Tang court began to debate the appropriate course of action; Li Deyu now called for a strike, although other officials urged a more defensive posture.[28] Li urged the emperor to send more reinforcements to the northern frontier, to be drawn from regions east and southeast of Chang'an. He claimed to fear Uighur collusion with the Tibetans, which would only compound the difficult situation at the border, and also was worried about the coming of winter, when the rivers would freeze and facilitate movement across them.[29] The Tang court's deliberations were further complicated by two factors. One was the presence of various groups of Uighurs at the border that did not appear to be under a single command, and were acting independently of the *qaghan*, thus causing Chinese uncertainty as to which groups were subordinate to Ögä Qaghan and which were not. Another was the continued general weakness of the Tang border garrisons, which Li Deyu feared would not be able to withstand an Uighur assault.

In September 842, the Tang court prepared letters for both the Uighur *qaghan* and the Taihe Princess. The former was stern and censorious, but still held out the possibility for a peaceful solution to the crisis, preferably to be achieved by the Uighurs' departure from the border. The latter was both sympathetic and critical, urging the princess to use her influence for peace.[30] Although these letters may have never been sent, they do indicate the Tang court's efforts to maintain the peace at the border—and possibly to buy time to prepare for a conflict, should one break out.[31]

A third letter from that same month, addressed to a high-ranking Uighur minister at Ögä's court and carried by Liu Mian, continued to exhort the Uighurs, in a rather exasperated tone, to behave correctly as vassals of the Tang emperor, while expressing dismay at their violent actions and immoderate requests. This letter contains information of interest, as it clearly was written in response to a letter from that same Uighur minister. Although the Uighur letter does not survive, it must have contained at least hints of a threat, as the Chinese letter says, "Your letter also stated that foreigners [i.e.,

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[28] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7963; Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 18a, pp. 591–592.

[29] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 111.

[30] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 5, pp. 31–33.

[31] See Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü," pp. 161–163.

Uighurs] are easy to rouse to action but difficult to pacify. After they have been made wrathful, one cannot restrain them."[32] The Tang letter then encouraged the Uighurs to direct their anger toward their true enemies, the Kirghiz, and not toward the blameless Chinese.[33] From this we can see that the Uighurs were attempting to justify their actions in regard to China and thus warn the Chinese of the dangers of continuing to resist Uighur demands. Despite their weakness as refugees, Ögä Qaghan and his followers seem to have been determined to try to take advantage of their large numbers and relative mobility as well as Chinese unpreparedness. The Chinese response was equally unambiguous in revealing the Tang court's determination to resist the Uighurs' demands, and for the first time stressed the idea of Ögä's Uighurs submitting to China rather than returning north of the Gobi. Previous letters had urged them to submit to Tang rule, but this letter was the first in which there was virtually no mention of the Uighurs returning to their homeland. It may be that the Chinese were beginning to realize the hopelessness of getting the remaining Uighurs to move northward.

At about this same time, indeed, the Uighurs were moving further south, and Ögä continued his pressure to compel the Tang court to turn Ormïzt over to him. He also made further use of his hostage, the Taihe Princess, who sent a letter to the Chinese emperor requesting cattle and sheep.[34] Neither of these requests—regarding Ormïzt and provisions—was acted upon by the Tang court. Meanwhile, the Chinese continued to reinforce their border defenses. Li Deyu urged the emperor to reestablish abandoned courier stations to improve communications with the border garrisons and to stockpile grain for the supply of the northern troops. It is worth noting that Li also expressed concerns that "villainous persons" in the northern border region might assist the Uighurs in their designs.[35]

The gradual movement eastward of Ögä Qaghan and his followers, from near Tiande in Fengzhou to the region around Yunzhou in Hedong, caused the Chinese to fear the possibility of an Uighur attack, particularly since it was now autumn (late September–early October), the traditional season for nomadic raids.[36] For reasons that

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[32] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 8, p. 62.
[33] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 8, pp. 61–62.
[34] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 18a, p. 592.
[35] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, pp. 112–113.
[36] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 112.

are not completely clear, Li Deyu had decided by 4 October 842, on which date he submitted a memorial on this subject to the emperor, that a peaceful conclusion of the Uighur crisis was no longer possible. He suggested two possibilities: either to attack immediately, or to delay the attack until spring. Court officials found the spring plan appealing, since in spring the Uighurs' men and horses would be lean and weak, having endured the hardships of winter, while the Tang troops would be refreshed, having been able to avoid the difficulties of a winter campaign. But there was always the chance that the Uighurs would attack in the autumn, not allowing the Chinese the luxury of waiting until spring.

The Tang court was still vexed by the problem of obtaining sufficient manpower for the defense of the northern frontier, as recruitment of soldiers had proved quite difficult. Furthermore, the "loose-rein" peoples under Tang control were not strong enough to resist the Uighurs unaided. According to Li Deyu, the largest such groups comprised only 1,000 to 2,000 tents. He pointed out that these peoples had their own self-interest in mind, and had fled when a contingent of Uighurs had approached Yunzhou.[37] To the "loose-rein" peoples, however, the matter certainly must have appeared as a case in which the Tang government could not adequately defend them from a vastly superior force.

In a memorial submitted to the throne on 14 October, Li Deyu set forth a strategy that focused on Uighur weaknesses in order to promote a spring attack on Ögä Qaghan and his followers. In particular, he pointed to the fact that the Uighurs were encumbered by their families and baggage, quite unlike a typical nomadic raiding army.[38] He had earlier expressed concern that the Uighurs would leave their families and baggage farther from the Chinese border, in a position of safety, but this had not occurred. The Uighurs' reduced mobility would make their camp vulnerable to a Chinese spring attack. Thus the Tang court chose the path of building defenses throughout the remaining autumn and winter, and postponing an attack on the Uighurs until the spring of 843.

For that purpose, in the first half of October 842, Liu Mian was named Uighur pacification commissioner (*zhaofu Huihu shi*), while

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[37] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, pp. 113–114; Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7966.

[38] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 115.

Zhang Zhongwu, the semi-autonomous governor of Youzhou in the northeast, was named eastern Uighur pacification commissioner (*dongmian zhaofu Huihu shi*). Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) was made group commander of the Tanguts of Hexi (*Hexi Dangxiang dujiang*) and southwest Uighur chastisement commissioner (*Huihu xinan zhaotao shi*).[39] The Tang court thus established a tripartite military structure with Liu Mian in the north-central region, Zhang Zhongwu in the northeast, and Ormïzt in the northwest.[40] The court immediately began the procurement of necessary war materiel, particularly horses, which were to be purchased from the "loose-rein" peoples in the north. This would serve to supply the Tang armies as well as to keep these horses out of Uighur hands.[41]

By 19 October 842, the court at Chang'an had learned that the Uighurs had shifted their camp southward about 40 *li* (20 kilometers),[42] apparently out of fear of a Khitan attack from the north. Meanwhile, Zhang Zhongwu had conspired with the Khitan, Tatabï, and Shiwei rulers to murder the Uighur overseers, who had apparently attempted to maintain Uighur control over those peoples despite their current difficulties. Here we can see the semi-independent region of Youzhou working together with nomadic leaders to weaken the Uighurs; according to Chinese records, more than 800 Uighurs were put to death as a result of this plot.[43] All this was done on Zhang's own initiative, and not because of any directive from the Tang court. Although we have little information regarding Zhang Zhongwu's deliberations and actions, it seems clear that the Uighur crisis was a threat to him as well, and that he would want to work in concert with Chang'an to bring about a rapid settlement of the problem; he was able to take advantage of Khitan, Tatabï, and Shiwei enmity toward their former masters to weaken the Uighur presence in his sector.

Liu Mian also carried out surreptitious activities in an effort to bring the Uighurs within striking range so that he could achieve the

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[39] Sima Kuang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7966; see also Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 3, pp. 18–19.

[40] It should be noted that Liu Mian had been transfered to serve as military governor of Hedong in May 842, a position he continued to hold; his replacement in Zhenwu was Li Zhongshun. See Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7959.

[41] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 116.

[42] One *li* is approximately one-third of an English mile.

[43] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, pp. 115–116; Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7967.

merit of their defeat and the rescue of the Taihe Princess. To that end, he twice sent a spy, a soldier named Cai Xi, to the encampment of Ögä Qaghan. On his first mission, in the winter of 842–843, Cai Xi pretended to be pursuing an escaped Chinese convict. On his second mission, Cai appeared to be in an official ambassadorial capacity, bearing ten camel-loads of provisions. At the Uighur camp he met with the Taihe Princess as well as with several high-ranking Uighur officials, but did not meet with Ögä since, according to the Uighur officials, this would not be appropriate due to the *qaghan*'s unusual circumstance of being in exile from his homeland. Despite the gifts he brought, Cai Xi was mistrusted by the Uighurs until he took a blood-oath with them. The Uighurs then followed his counsel and shifted their camp closer to Yunzhou (see above), some 60 *li* (30 kilometers) distant from Liu Mian's army.[44]

The Tang court continued its buildup with both Chinese and non-Chinese troops, particularly Shiwei, Shatuo, and Tuyuhun, in addition to Tanguts already placed under the control of Ormïzt—and Ormïzt's own Uighur followers. It is clear from Chinese records that Ormïzt had requested an active role in the attack on Ögä Qaghan; therefore, the Tang court placed two non-Chinese generals, He Qingchao and Qibi Tong, along with their 6,000 troops, under his command. The intent of the Tang government was to have many of its non-Chinese troops placed under loyal non-Chinese command, on the presumption that such leaders were "well-acquainted with barbarian matters," and so could easily command such troops. But Ormïzt was cautioned to work in close accord with the Chinese generals. We should also note that many Chinese generals, such as Liu Mian and Shi Xiong, had sizeable contingents of non-Chinese troops placed under their commands.[45]

On 3 November 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial asking that Tuyuhun troops *not* be placed under Ormïzt's command, as he had learned that the Uighurs and Tuyuhun had long been enemies. The situation was to be investigated, and "doubtful" Tuyuhun troops dismissed. To compensate for the lost Tuyuhun troops, Li Deyu, fear-

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[44] Michael R. Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia," *T'ang Studies*, Vol. 6 (1988), pp. 1–23.

[45] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 116; ch. 5, p. 35; and ch. 8, p. 61. See also Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 18a, p. 593 and Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 247, p. 7967.

ing problems of communication, thought it best not to place Chinese troops under Ormïzt's leadership, choosing instead to transfer some of Liu Mian's Shatuo troops.[46] The Shatuo themselves were speakers of a Turkic language, and so would have found communication with Ormïzt and his Uighurs a reasonably simple matter. We should note that Li's memorial also made clear that non-Chinese troops in this campaign were to retain their own native leaders, who were then placed under the command of the higher-ranking Tang generals, both Chinese and non-Chinese.

Liu Mian apparently needed to keep at least some of his Shatuo troops. Another memorial from Li Deyu's brush indicates the importance of non-Chinese troops to all Chinese armies at that time. It states, in part:

> . . . in an advancing army facing north, in every important military undertaking [there should be] one or two hundred foreign cavalry to lead the way. If we order all [foreign troops] to be taken out and withdrawn [from the various armies to be handed over to Ormïzt], the [other] armies would not be able to advance.[47]

It seems clear that non-Chinese troops were crucial to Tang armies of this period for use as guides and cavalry units, at least in northern border zones.

Late in 842, the first envoy to China from the Kirghiz arrived at Tiande. The Tang court attempted to use the latter's desire for friendly relations in an effort to rid itself of the Uighur problem. Although this remains a tangential aspect of our story, it should be kept in mind that the Chinese continued to urge the Kirghiz to attack Ögä Qaghan. Furthermore, they warned the Uighurs—in another letter to an Uighur minister carried by Liu Mian—of this contact and its potentially dire consequences for the Uighurs. This letter warned the Uighurs that the Kirghiz had sent out 40,000 troops to find the Taihe Princess (who had briefly been in their custody before being recaptured by the Uighurs) and return her to China. It then urged the Uighurs to return the princess and either hide themselves in nearby mountains and valleys or, to be preferred, come to China in submission. The letter also indicates that by this

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[46] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huchchang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 117. Note that there is evidence that some Chinese troops were indeed put under Ormïzt's command; see Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 15, p. 121.

[47] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 117.

time the Uighurs had come to depend on the Heichezi ("Black Carts"), a group of the Shiwei people, for protection.[48]

Meanwhile, forces of the autonomous military governor of Youzhou, Zhang Zhongwu, had defeated a group of Uighurs who had broken away from Ormïzt before his submission. Some 30,000 Uighurs then surrendered to Zhang Zhongwu at the border of Youzhou. This contingent, which included two princes, a princess, and other high-ranking officials, was then dispersed within the Tang realm.[49] Again, we can see here the effects of the fragmentation and frustration that plagued the Uighur refugees (of both major groups) in their predicament at the Tang border.

In late November 842, the Chinese court gave Liu Mian, whom Li Deyu described as prone to prudence, *carte blanche* in his handling of the Uighur pacification project, in the hopes that this would embolden him to act quickly and decisively.[50] This decision by the Tang government was to have serious consequences, as we shall see below.

While Liu Mian and other Chinese generals hoped to wait for a spring campaign, Ormïzt was now quite eager to advance and attack Ögä Qaghan. He received permission to do so,[51] but the subsequent confrontation was not a major one; Chinese sources, which are not clear as to the date of this clash, claim that Ormïzt was victorious.[52] Meanwhile, the Tang court became increasingly concerned about Ögä's actions. In response to a secret court decree of late January 843, in which the Uighurs were now likened to vipers and scorpions rather than "a poor bird,"[53] Liu Mian prepared for battle, shifting his troops closer to Yunzhou. A skirmish between the Chinese general Li Zhongshun and the Uighurs under Ögä was also said to have resulted in an Uighur defeat, but again the result was inconclusive.[54]

The situation was becoming dire for the Uighur refugees. The two attacks by Ormïzt and Li Zhongshun should have signaled increasing Tang hostility. Dissension among Ögä's followers was a problem, however, as Chinese records indicate that at about this

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[48] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 8, pp. 63–64.
[49] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 195, p. 5214.
[50] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 118.
[51] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 14, p. 118; Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7969.
[52] Ouyang Xiu, *Xin Tang shu*, ch. 217b, p. 6132.
[53] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 6, p. 44.
[54] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 246, p. 7969.

same time (probably about January 843), a high-ranking Uighur official went to Youzhou and offered to deliver the Taihe Princess to Zhang Zhongwu. At this time, Ögä was no more than 80 *li* (40 kilometers) from the border of Youzhou. The sources also inform us that some Uighurs defected from Ögä's camp to Tang officials at Zhenwu.[55] All of this information suggests that Ögä and his followers must have been quite dispirited in the winter of 842–843, just prior to the final Tang attack.

Nevertheless—or perhaps because of his desperate situation—the *qaghan* chose to go on the offensive. In the first month of the lunar year (3 February–4 March 843), Ögä moved westward, attacked Zhenwu, and then remained camped nearby. This move may have been because Ögä was retreating from Liu Mian's advance northward, and the raid on Zhenwu would provide him with supplies. It may also be that Ögä wanted to punish the Tang officials at Zhenwu for taking in Uighur defectors. Whatever the cause for the Uighurs' movement, Liu Mian now made his final plans. He ordered his adjutant Shi Xiong to lead non-Chinese (Shatuo, Qibi, and Tuoba) troops and make a surprise attack on the *qaghan*'s camp. His hope was that in the panic that ensued, the Uighurs would flee and abandon the Taihe Princess, who could then be recovered by Tang forces. Liu Mian would follow with a large army.[56]

Shi Xiong led his troops from Yunzhou southwest to Mayi; they then advanced northward to Zhenwu under cover of night "when the moon was darkened." Looking out from the battlements of Zhenwu in an attempt to estimate the Uighurs' numbers, Shi Xiong saw felt-covered carts attended by persons dressed in red and green clothing in the Chinese style; he was informed by spies—possibly defected Uighurs or Liu Mian's spy, Cai Xi, who was with Shi at this time—that these were the carts of the Taihe Princess and her entourage. Shi Xiong then sent out a spy to inform the princess of the impending attack on the Uighur camp; she was told to stay in her cart and not to move.[57]

Shi Xiong's attack was indeed calculated to create panic among the Uighurs. He brought together a large number of cattle, horses,

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[55] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 195, pp. 5214–5215.

[56] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 247, p. 7971.

[57] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 247, p. 7971; Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 161, p. 4235. On Cai Xi's involvement, see Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia," pp. 10–11.

and other domestic animals, as well as drummers, from within Zhenwu. During the night he had more than ten openings made in the city's walls; at dawn, flags and torches were put on the walls, and then the animals were released from the city to the pounding of drums, followed by Shi's troops. As Shi's biography states, "Torches lit the sky, and the hubbub shook the earth. The *qaghan*, terrified beyond measure, led [some of his] cavalry and fled."[58]

The attack was successful; the Uighurs were defeated and the Taihe Princess recovered. Soon after, on 13 February 843, Shi Xiong again engaged the Uighurs in battle at Shahu ("Kill the Barbarians") Mountain, and severely defeated them. A large number were killed, and many (estimates range from 5,000 to 20,000) were taken prisoner. Large numbers of livestock were also captured. Ögä Qaghan, wounded in the battle, escaped with several hundred cavalry and fled to the protection of the Heichezi.[59] The Tang court celebrated this victory and the princess' return, and publicly blamed the Uighurs' deceit and pride for their own downfall. It also took advantage of the Uighurs' destruction to begin the government takeover of the Manichaean temples in China.[60]

Still, there were remnants of the Uighurs north of the Chinese border, and the Tang government sought ways to eliminate them. Recent intelligence had informed them that Ögä was hoping to seek support from the Heichezi, and Li Deyu hoped to prevent him from doing so. Rewards were offered for the capture of the *qaghan* and his high officials,[61] but no Chinese army was able to pursue or capture Ögä, who did find his way to the protection of the Heichezi. Many of his dispersed troops apparently fled east to Youzhou and surrendered to Zhang Zhongwu.[62]

The Tang generals who had participated in the campaign were rewarded, including the Uighur prince Ormïzt. He was provided with a living and a house in Chang'an, but his "Return to Righteousness" Army was ordered to be disbanded. Many of this army's officers and soldiers were to be placed under the command of other

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[58] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 161, p. 4236.
[59] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 247, pp. 7972–7973; Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 161, p. 4236.
[60] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 3, pp. 14–15.
[61] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 15, pp. 121–122.
[62] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 247, p. 7973.

Tang armies.[63] It would seem that the Chinese did not wish to leave intact an army that was made up primarily of non-Chinese troops but, given the importance of such troops as scouts and cavalry units, it is not surprising that the Tang government would not want to lose their military services. Ormïzt's troops thus were to be divided and employed as garrison guards, a decision that was to have tragic consequences. The Uighurs under Ormïzt's command, numbering more than 3,000, refused to comply with the Chinese order to be dispersed. Liu Mian took advantage of the court's earlier command to act decisively without waiting for orders, and had all these Uighurs massacred.[64] He was not punished for this deed.

After the defeat of the Uighurs at Shahu Mountain, the Chinese continued to urge the Kirghiz, sometimes in extremely strong language, to carry out the final mopping up operations.[65] But the Kirghiz, despite some brief campaigning on the Mongolian Plateau, did not establish a permanent politico-military presence there,[66] and so the problem of Ögä and his small band of followers—which hardly seems to have been a serious threat to the Chinese—remained unresolved for a few years, and apparently resulted in some more raids on the Chinese border aimed at obtaining provisions.[67] The Kirghiz appear to have been more interested in extending their power into the Tarim Basin, something they hoped to do with Chinese help. This, of course, would bring them into conflict with those Uighurs who had fled westward after the collapse of their empire. But the Chinese ultimately chose not to get involved in this distant scheme,[68] and there is no evidence that the Kirghiz actually campaigned to control the Tarim Basin region.[69]

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[63] Ouyang Xiu et al., *Xin Tang shu*, ch. 217b, p. 6133; Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 7, p. 56.

[64] Cen Zhongmian, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," p. 221, n. 1.

[65] See the extant letters to the Kirghiz ruler in Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 6, pp. 37–42 and supplement, pp. 285–286.

[66] On this subject, see Michael R. Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition: Kirghiz Adherence to the Yenisei Region after A.D. 840," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 119, No. 3 (1999), pp. 390–403.

[67] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 7, pp. 56–57.

[68] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 174, pp. 4522–4523.

[69] Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition," pp. 394 (see especially n. 23) and 396.

Possibly aware that the Kirghiz could not be forced to do their bidding, the Tang court also urged Zhang Zhongwu, military governor of Youzhou, to destroy the remnants of the Uighurs. From an imperial edict dated sometime between 5 March and 2 May 843, we learn that Zhang had been able to gain some information regarding Ögä's whereabouts. The Tang government urged Zhang to send an army beyond the frontier to eliminate the remaining Uighurs.[70] The Chinese court's own disinclination to act could be related to internal difficulties—i.e., a military revolt in Zhaoyi, followed by Tangut disturbances in the north—that had begun to demand its attention. When Zhang Zhongwu showed no initiative in this regard, Li Deyu urged the emperor on 6 June 843 to send Liu Mian out to attack the Uighurs,[71] but nothing came of this.

Late in 844, the court once again received news of the Uighurs through Zhang Zhongwu. According to this information, Ögä wished to move westward to the Tarim Basin and join the Uighurs there, while some of his followers preferred to submit to China. Li Deyu used this intelligence to urge the emperor to press Zhang Zhongwu once again to attack the Uighurs or bring about their submission by any means necessary, even promising favorable treatment for Ögä.[72] All this was done while still encouraging the Kirghiz to attack the Uighurs. Indeed, a Kirghiz envoy had suggested coordinated action against the Uighurs, but the Tang court argued that the distance involved—more than 1,000 *li* (500 kilometers) northward to the Heichezi territory—was too great. The Chinese did offer, however, to prepare border troops to kill or capture any Uighurs fleeing from a Kirghiz assault.[73] Again, no agreement was reached. It should be pointed out that the difficulties of communication between the Chinese and Kirghiz rulers were significant, due primarily to the distance between them.[74]

The Tang court—and Ormïzt—continued to worry about the Uighurs. At one point Ögä Qaghan was reported to be 300 *li* (150 kilometers) or less north of Tiande. Ormïzt suggested that he was waiting to ambush a Tang envoy on a projected visit to the Kirghiz, which had been planned in order to transport the emblems of Chinese

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[70] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 6, pp. 44–45.
[71] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 15, pp. 122–123.
[72] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 17, pp. 147–148.
[73] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 6, pp. 40–42.
[74] See Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition."

official appointment—something the Kirghiz *qaghan* very much desired—to Kirghiz territory. Further intelligence from a captured Uighur indicated that Ögä had only about 1,500 troops, was sorely lacking in armor and other equipment, and was forced to obtain provisions by raiding other nomadic peoples.[75]

When the Tang Emperor Wuzong died on 22 April 846, still nothing had been done about the Uighurs north of China. The new ruler, Xuanzong (r. 846–859), disliked Li Deyu and so rejected him and his policy of friendship toward the Kirghiz, although he did ultimately approve an embassy to the Kirghiz with emblems of Chinese imperial appointment for the Kirghiz ruler.[76]

Ögä Qaghan was assassinated in 846, possibly by an Uighur minister, or possibly by the Heichezi, who are said in at least one source to have been bribed to do so by one of Ormïzt's high officials.[77] A new *qaghan*, Ögä's younger brother Enie, was able to muster about 5,000 followers, and they dwelt among the Tatabï, protected by the latter's ruler Shishelang. In June or July 847, Zhang Zhongwu inflicted a severe defeat on the Tatabï. The Uighurs, now reduced to some 500 people, fled to the Shiwei. When Zhang Zhongwu attempted to capture the new *qaghan*, the latter fled westward with his wife, son, and nine cavalry; the remaining Uighurs were parcelled out among the Shiwei tribes.[78]

Not long after that, apparently some time in March 848, a Kirghiz force said to number 70,000 suddenly attacked and defeated the Shiwei, and then took the Uighurs with them back to Kirghiz territory. However, some Uighurs appear to have escaped by hiding in mountain forests, and later plundered other tribes in order to survive. Those few Uighurs who escaped the Kirghiz were said to have gradually made their way westward to Gansu and the Uighur state that had been established there.[79] As for Enie, his fate is unknown.

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[75] Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, ch. 17, p. 148.

[76] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 248, p. 8030; Ouyang Xiu, *Xin Tang shu*, ch. 217b, p. 6150.

[77] Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 195, p. 5215; Ouyang Xiu et al., *Xin Tang shu*, ch. 217b, pp. 6132–6133.

[78] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 248, pp. 8028 and 8032; Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*, ch. 195, p. 5215.

[79] Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, ch. 248, p. 8032; Ouyang Xiu et al., *Xin Tang shu*, ch. 217b, p. 6133.

## *Conclusion*

In examining this particular incident, we can learn much about Inner Asian ways of warfare when war was not a planned act of conquest, but indeed an act of desperation. First, we must note that the Uighurs' situation was from the outset disadvantageous to them. The struggles and problems that had led to their empire's collapse, as well as the ensuing chaos, meant that the survivors had no common leadership and no common strategy; it also meant that their normal economy was disrupted, making the need for provisions a serious and constant source of worry. Furthermore, the Uighur troops were in the difficult position of having with them their families and possessions—a rare condition for nomadic armies facing China.

Why did these refugees choose to go to China? In the case of Ormïzt Tegin, the answer seems relatively simple. China and the Uighurs had enjoyed relatively peaceful relations for decades, although the Chinese found the horse-silk trade onerous and expensive, to the point of being seriously in arrears in regard to payment. Still, the Tang court never attempted to use force to stop or even modify the trade, and this could have signalled to Ormïzt (and Ögä) that China was unable or unwilling to employ force against the nomads. Faced with the double threat of a political rival (Ögä) and the possibility of Kirghiz pursuit, it is no surprise that Ormïzt would see the advantage of entering the relative safety of China, even if it meant doing so as a suppliant. At the Chinese border he had behaved impeccably, even revealing to Chinese officials a plot by other Uighur leaders within his group to attack Tang territory, and then luring the conspirators to his camp and killing them.[80] By coming to China before Ögä's elevation to the throne, Ormïzt had avoided the stigma of rebellion. By not allowing his followers to attack China's border garrisons, he had displayed his powers of restraint. And by revealing another Uighur leader's plot to attack the Chinese border and then thwarting that plot by murdering his own compatriots, he had shown his sincerity and trustworthiness. As a reward, he was accepted into China and made a part of the Tang establishment.

As for Ögä Qaghan, the question of why he chose to deal with China in the manner that he did is less easily settled. As a sover-

[80] Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü," pp. 56–57.

eign ruler, he would not wish to become subservient to China. On the other hand, there were many historical examples of Chinese assistance being given to a weakened Inner Asian leader who then used this help to re-establish his power on the steppe, and Ögä may have been aware of them. Indeed, in its communications with the Uighur refugees the Tang court frequently mentioned one of the most well-known precedents for this: the submission of the Xiongnu ruler Huhanye (r. 58–31 B.C.E.) to China's Han dynasty, formalized by a visit to the Han court in 51 B.C.E. In his struggle for the leadership of the Xiongnu empire, Huhanye finally requested and used Chinese assistance (including gold, silk, and provisions, all of which he received through his act of submission) to defeat his half-brother Zhizhi and reestablish his power on the Mongolian Plateau.[81] Chinese relations with the Xiongnu remained friendly for more than half a century, in part because the Han court continued to provide goods to the Xiongnu each time one of their rulers visited China.[82]

This important foreign policy coup, which has been called "the most important single event in the history of foreign relations of the Han period,"[83] had a significant impact on later international relations in the region. The situation in which a weakened Inner Asian ruler sought assistance from China in an effort to reestablish his power is what Thomas J. Barfield has called the "inner frontier strategy" employed by nomadic peoples in times of civil war. In this strategy, one of the combatants would seek aid from China to destroy his rival. Such a strategy was employed in the direst circumstances, when a steppe empire had broken (or was in danger of breaking) apart, but still required that the suppliant maintain his autonomy and not come under direct Chinese control.[84] Barfield contrasts this to an "outer frontier strategy," in which a strong and united nomadic state would employ violence and the threat of violence to extract wealth from China.[85]

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[81] See Michael R. Drompp, "The Hsiung-nu *Topos* in the T'ang Response to the Collapse of the Uighur Steppe Empire," *Central and Inner Asian Studies*, Vol. 1 (1987), pp. 1–46. Note that this article cannot be used effectively without the list of errata and corrigenda provided in *Central and Inner Asian Studies*, Vol. 4 (1990), p. 82.

[82] Ying-shih Yü, *Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 45–49.

[83] Yü, *Trade and Expansion in Han China*, p. 45.

[84] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), p. 63.

[85] Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier*, pp. 49–50.

Examined in those terms, it would seem that Ögä Qaghan was following Barfield's "inner frontier strategy" in an attempt to win Chinese aid to recover his homeland. However, we have seen that Ögä's dealings with the Tang court were generally belligerent, which was not in keeping with the pattern established by the Xiongnu ruler Huhanye. Still, it may be that Ögä Qaghan felt that a degree of aggressiveness was necessary for him to maintain his autonomy and not come under the direct control of the Tang government as Ormïzt eventually did. It is also conceivable that Ögä was attempting to block Chinese trade with the Kirghiz, even though such trade was never really established, since he relied on the possibility of Chinese wealth for his own survival and recovery.

There is more to consider in this question. The "inner frontier strategy" model is complicated by the fact that during the Tang dynasty, China had relied on nomadic power when it was in a state of civil war. Early in the seventh century, when the Sui dynasty was collapsing, there were many contenders for the throne of China. The victor, Li Yuan (566–635, r. 618–626), who established the Tang dynasty in 618, succeeded in part because he had been able to obtain assistance from the Türks, whose cavalry strengthened his forces.[86] Further, we have already seen that the Uighurs aided China during the An Lushan Rebellion, and thus helped save the Tang dynasty from destruction. Therefore, we can see both China and Inner Asian peoples pursuing a policy of seeking assistance from the other in times of extreme political instability. Ögä's actions at the Tang border may be seen as part of this larger historical pattern, and hence a strategy that had been pursued by many other rulers—on both sides of the Gobi—when they found themselves in danger of losing their thrones.

Historically aware or not, Ögä Qaghan may have felt that by holding the Taihe Princess as hostage, and by virtue of the recent amicable relations between China and the Uighurs, he was entitled to some help from the Tang court. It may have been his hope that such assistance would buy him both protection and time so that he could make plans either to regain his homeland or establish a power base elsewhere. But the Chinese were willing to provide only limited aid to the new *qaghan*, and some of his demands were considered excessive. Granting provisions, as well as the silk payments

[86] See Woodbridge Bingham, *The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty: The Fall of Sui and Rise of T'ang—A Preliminary Survey* (Baltimore, 1941), pp. 99–100 and 122–123.

already owed to the Uighurs, was expensive but manageable. The bestowal of territory, however, even if limited to a single garrison city, was symbolically powerful and therefore unpalatable to the Tang government. The empire had been bequeathed to Emperor Wuzong by his ancestors; to give away even a small piece of its territory would be at the very least unfilial, and at worst a symbolic surrender to Uighur power. Furthermore, Ögä's demands regarding the return of Ormïzt and the protection of Manichaean temples were seen as interference in China's internal affairs—something that would not have been regarded in a positive light by the court at Chang'an.

Because neither he nor the Tang government was willing to make all the concessions required by the other, Ögä Qaghan was forced into dangerous maneuvers at the border which ultimately led to the debacle at Shahu Mountain. Drawn southward by the possibility of Chinese protection and the lure of Chinese wealth, Ögä carried out sporadic raids which, although clearly intended to obtain supplies, may also have been calculated to warn the Tang court of his power. He constantly sought to obtain assistance from China, but with only moderate success. It is interesting to note that the Kirghiz also requested Tang cooperation for two projected actions: the elimination of the Uighurs and an attack on the Tarim Basin. The Chinese refused, and the Kirghiz eventually pursued only the first of these actions—and then only after the Uighurs had been so seriously weakened that seizing them proved to be not much of a challenge.

The Chinese had worked steadily to weaken the Uighurs' position by preparing their own border defenses, adding reinforcements, and sowing dissension among the Uighurs through the use of spies. Uighur weakness provided the Chinese with sufficient time to allow this policy to take shape and be implemented. Chinese success was favored by the Tang court's willingness to make effective use (as scouts and cavalry units) of "loose-rein" Inner Asian peoples who had been settled within China's borders. Furthermore, the Tang government also was able to take advantage of Uighur rivalries, as even Uighur troops were used in the efforts to destroy Ögä Qaghan. The fact that Uighur personal or familial loyalties took precedence over tribal or "national" loyalties is not unexpected in Inner Asia, particularly since those "larger" loyalties had been diminished by long years of internal strife. Ormïzt, in a weak position, managed to survive by valuing self-preservation above all else. Ögä, seeking to retain some measure of power and dignity, was unable to achieve his goals; his defeat and death spelled the end of Uighur power on the Mongolian Plateau.

## Glossary

An Lushan 安錄山
Batoufeng 把頭烽
Cai Xi 蔡襲
Chang'an 長安
Dangxiang 党項
Datong 大同
dongmian zhaofu Huihu shi 東面招撫回鶻使
Enie 遏捻
Fengzhou 豐州
Gansu 甘肅
Guiyi 歸義
Han 漢
Hedong 河東
Heichezi 黑車子
He Qingchao 何清朝
Hexi Dangxiang dujiang 河西党項都將
Huhanye 呼韓邪
Huihe 回紇
Huihu 回鶻
Huihu xinan zhaotao shi 回鶻西南招討使
jimi 羈縻
li 里
Li Deyu 李德裕
Li Sizhong 李思忠
Li Yuan 李淵
Li Zhongshun 李忠順
Liu Mian 劉沔
Mayi 馬邑
Qibi 契苾
Qibi Tong 契苾通
Qidan 契丹
ronglu 戎虜
Shahu 殺胡
Shatuo 沙陀
Shi Xiong 石雄
Shishelang 石舍朗
Shiwei 室韋
Sui 隋
Taihe 太和
Tang 唐
Tiande 天德
Tuihun 退渾
Tujue 突厥
Tuoba 拓跋
Tuyuhun 吐谷渾

Womosi 嗢沒斯
Wujie 烏介
Wuzong 武宗
Xi 奚
Xiajiasi 黠戛斯
Xiongnu 匈奴
Xuanzong 宣宗
Yiwu 義武
Yunzhou 雲州
Youzhou 幽州
Zhang Zhongwu 張仲武
zhaofu Huihu shi 招撫回鶻使
Zhaoyi 昭義
Zhenwu 振武
Zhizhi 郅支

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# WAR AND WARFARE IN THE PRE-ČINGGISID WESTERN STEPPES OF EURASIA[1]

Peter B. Golden

Russian and Ukrainian scholars, whose national histories have been so closely intertwined with the movements of steppe peoples, saw the struggle of Rus', their common progenitor, with the Steppe as one of the key themes of not only their own histories, but by extension that of Europe as a whole. Rus', they averred, was the shield that heroically held off the hordes of Asia. This was the struggle of Forest and Steppe, Steppe and Sown.[2] Nomadic depredations culminating in the Mongol conquest, were seen as the source of many if not all of the modern problems that beset that region. Thus, V.V. Kargalov wrote that the "the eternally billowing nomadic storm cut off Rus' from the centers of trade . . . Rus's war with the steppes lasted for centuries; it was an unbroken and exhausting one."[3] These conceptualizations of the nomad-sedentary encounter were often

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[1] There is some ambiguity in the geographical nomenclature. "Eurasia" can denote the whole of the European-Asian landmass or the meeting ground of "Asia" and "Europe" traditionally placed around the Ural mountains. "Western Eurasia," thus, can designate the western zone of the Euro-Asian continent (in effect Europe) or the western zone of the region of contact. By the term "Western Steppes of Eurasia" I mean the regions bounded by the Hungarian plains in the West and the Trans-Volgan steppes in the East extending to the borders of Western Uzbekistan. This corresponds, *grosso modo*, to the Pontic-Caspian steppes of the Classical authors. The southern rim of this zone is the Crimea and the North Caucasian mountains.

[2] See the writings of the leading figures of nineteenth century Russian history, Sergej M. Solov'ëv (1820–1879), *Istorija Rossii s drevnejšix vremën* (Moskva, 1988–1966), I/1–2, pp. 352, 357, 383, 647–648 and Vasilij O. Ključevskij (1841–1911), *Kurs russkoj istorii* (Moskva, 1987–1990), I, pp. 282ff. For a fuller discussion of the historiography of this theme, see Ruslana M. Mavrodina, *Kievskaja Rus' i kočevniki (Pečenegi, Torki, Polovcy)* (Leningrad, 1983) and her "Rus' i kočevniki," *Sovetskaja istoriografija Kievskoj Rusi*, ed. Vladimir V. Mavrodin et al., (Leningrad, 1973), pp. 210–221. See also the leading Ukrainian scholar, Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj (1866–1934), *Istorija Ukraïny-Rusy* (L'viv, 1904–1922, reprint: Kyïv, 1992–1996), I, pp. 203ff., II, pp. 505–506, 530, 533. A brief survey of this literature may also be found in my "Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus'," *Ukrainian Economic History. Interpretive Essays*, ed. Ivan S. Koropeckyj. (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 58–62.

[3] VadimV. Kargalov, "Poloveckie nabegi na Rus'" *Voprosy Istorii* (1965), No. 3, p. 68, see also his larger study, *Vnešnepolitičeskie faktory razvitija feodal'noj Rusi* (Moskva, 1967).

adopted, uncritically, by Western scholars. Jerome Blum attributed the problems of the twelfth-century Rus' economy to the "unprecedented frequency and violence" of the nomadic (Cuman) raids. Richard Pipes, who appears to have considered the Pontic steppes as the birthright of the Eastern Slavs, writes that the latter "had to abandon the steppe and withdraw to the safety of the forest" because nomad incursions had made life "unbearable."[4] Few scholars were prepared to see anything positive in the encounter with the steppe. Most recently, however, a more nuanced appraisal of the steppe-sedentary interaction in Eurasia has begun.[5] In the pre-Činggisid era, the nomads never attempted to conquer Rus'.[6] Indeed, one can demonstrate that in the period from ca. 350 (the advent of the Huns into the region) and until the Mongol conquests, it was the nomads who were either driven off or forced to make accommodations.[7] The nomads were, occasionally, a nuisance, especially in frontier steppe regions where they considered the Slavic colonists the interlopers. But, trade and the productive forces of the Kievan Rus' economy were not adversely affected, nor did the population suffer any decline.[8]

Although there are a good number of brief studies of different aspects of Byzantium's interaction with the steppe, thus far there has been no attempt to view this history as a whole.[9] The Byzantines

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[4] Jerome Blum, *Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, 1961, reprint: New York, 1964), p. 57; Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), p. 37.

[5] See the broader canvas of Anatoly M. Khazanov, Andre Wink (eds.), *Nomads in the Sedentary World* (Richmond, 2001).

[6] Omeljan Pritsak, "The Polovcians and Rus'" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 2 (1982), p. 380 who concluded that there was no Cumans "danger" and that the Cumans "never aimed to occupy even a part of a frontier Rus' principality."

[7] See Peter B. Golden, "Nomads and Their Sedentary Neighbors in Pre-Činggisid Eurasia" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 7 (1987–1991), pp. 41–81.

[8] Golden, "Aspects of the Nomadic Factor," pp. 99–101; Thomas S. Noonan, "The Flourishing of Kiev's International and Domestic Trade, ca. 1100–ca. 1240" in *Ukrainian Economic History*, ed. Koropeckyj, pp. 102–146. David B. Miller, "The Kievan Principality in the Century before the Mongol Invasions: An Inquiry into Recent Research and Interpretation" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, X/1–2 (1986), p. 223.

[9] Gyula (Julius) Moravcsik's monumental *Byzantinoturcica* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1958) is an excellent collection of onomastic, textological, historiographical and bibliographical material, but makes no attempt to present a full picture of the 1100 year Byzantine encounter with the steppe. His *Bizánc és a magyarság* (Budapest, 1953), rev. Eng. trans. *Byzantium and the Magyars*, trans. M. Szegedy-Maszák et al. (Amsterdam, 1970) is a thorough survey of the interaction of one steppe people with Byzantium. Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500–1453* (London, 1971) is sensitive to these issues, but concerned with a broader range of themes.

had very practical reasons for an interest in the steppe. Movements of peoples often had direct consequences for the Byzantine borderlands and occasionally core territories. These are discussed in the remarkable *De Administrando Imperio* of the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (r. 949–959).[10] Byzantine historiographical traditions, with their frequently archaicizing inclinations, often provide unique data. The Byzantines, of course, had Herodotos, whose description of Scythia and the Scythians provided numerous *topoi* for later authors. The latter, as any perusal of sources such as Anna Komnena or Niketas Khoniates will show, often preferred the more "classical" sounding "Scythian" to some barbarous contemporary ethnonym.

A complete study of the relations between Iran and the Turko-Mongolian steppe has yet to be written. In the Sāsānid era (ca. 226–651), the nomads were a constant factor in Iranian history. Beginning in the latter half of the eleventh century, some centuries after the Arabo-Islamic conquest of Iran (651), the region came to be dominated by nomadic peoples who had come in from Central and Inner Asia. Thereafter, with some exceptions, the military-political leadership of this region has remained largely in the hands of steppe nomad invaders or their descendants.

The historiography of Medieval Transcaucasia, another "frontline" region of sedentary states, is similarly lacking in studies that look for broader patterns of relations with the steppe world.

We are now much better informed about the workings of nomadic society and its need to interact with the sedentary world.[11] Our purpose here is to examine one aspect of the steppe-sedentary encounter, the military dimension, in the period extending from ca. 350 to ca. 1200. It is this theme that lies at the heart of the larger question of nomad-sedentary interaction. We will begin with a brief overview of the nomads and their military political encounters from the Huns to the Cuman-Qıpčaqs. We will then engage in a closer examination of a number of specific themes dealing with the art of war in the steppes.

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[10] Henceforth noted as *DAI*, ed. Julius (Gyula) Moravcsik, trans. Romilly Jenkins (Washington, D.C., 1967). Constantine Porphyrogenitus's name has become so well known in this form that I have used it instead of Konstantinos Porphyrogennētos which is the form more in keeping with the transcriptions used elsewhere in this paper.

[11] See Anatoly M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, trans. J. Crookenden (2nd ed., Ann Arbor, 1994) and Sechin Jagchid, Van Jay Symons, *Peace, War, and Trade along the Great Wall* (Bloomington, 1989).

*The Western Steppes: Migrations and Military Encounters*

In the first centuries C.E., Roman and Parthian military encounters with the then largely Iranian steppe peoples, were not unknown. The Romans fought against and occasionally were able to use the Alans, who, by the first century C.E., were the dominant force in the Pontic steppes. They periodically troubled Roman interests (especially the Bosphoran statelet) in the Crimea, with which they also traded, and were an ever-present invasion threat into Transcaucasia, Anatolia, and Iran through the Caucasian passes.[12] The Roman general Arrian (95–175), the famous historian of the conquests of Alexander the Great, also composed the *Contra Alanos* in which he sketched the means of dealing militarily with them. Here we already see the familiar nomadic strategies of feigned retreats, flanking maneuvers etc.[13]

The East Roman/Byzantine state inherited these geopolitical and strategic concerns which were a source of anxiety given the relative propinquity of the imperial capital, Constantinople, to the uneasy northern frontiers. It was the entrance, ca. 350, of the Huns into the Caspian-Pontic steppe zone, however, that produced far greater concern for the northern frontiers. This was the beginning of a series of waves of migration of Turkic peoples from their South Siberian-Mongolian homeland to the West. Nomadic movements in Eurasia almost always went from East to West.

The origins of the European Huns remain the subject of some considerable debate, in particular the question of their relationship, if any, to the Huns of Asia (the Xiongnu of the Chinese sources).[14]

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[12] See Julian Kulakovskij, *Alany po svedenijam klassičeskix i vizantijskix pisatelej* (Kiev, 1899); Michael Rostovtzeff, "The Sarmatae and Parthians," *The Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. S.A. Cook et al., (Cambridge, 1936, reprint: 1954), XI, pp. 95–97; Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (Cleveland-New York, 1963), pp. 155–156.

[13] See also the convenient summary of Roman information about the Alans prior to the arrival of the Huns in Bernard Bacharach, *A History of the Alans in the West* (Minneapolis, 1973), pp. 3–25 and pp. 126–132 which provides an English translation of the fragment of Arrian's work that survives.

[14] See the cautionary comments of Denis Sinor, "The Hun Period," *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, ed. D. Sinor (Cambridge, 1900), pp. 177–179 who suggests that it may have become a generic term for Inner Asian nomads. Arguments for a more direct relationship are presented in Károly Czeglédy, "From East to West: The Age of Nomadic Migrations in Eurasia" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 3 (1983), pp. 25–125. The standard works on the European Huns are E.A. Thompson, *The Huns* (1948), rev. ed., by Peter Heather, (Oxford, 1996); Otto Maenchen-Helfen, *The World of the Huns*, ed. M. Knight (Berkeley, 1973). See also *Attila és Hunjai*, ed. Gyula Németh (Budapest, 1940). Németh, in his "A Hunok nyelve" in the latter

The Hunnic union in Europe that eventually created one of its centers in Pannonia (= Hungary) contained a variety of peoples, including Iranian nomads, Germanic and Slavic subjects, together with an Inner Asian, most probably Altaic, core. The series of migrations that had brought them westward also caused the movement into the region of a number of other tribal groupings, some of which were, possibly, Turkic in speech.[15] By 375, the Alans and Goths had been hit, as well as other lesser known Iranian and Germanic peoples, and were pressed or fled westward to the hoped for safety of the Roman territories. In 395, spurred on by famine in the steppe, the Huns came through the Caucasus and raided Anatolia and Iran. They quickly established a pattern of raiding alternating with military service in both the Roman and the Persian empires, exploiting as best they could the ongoing Roman-Sāsānid rivalry. In 434, Attila (d. 453) and his brother, Bleda (whom he murdered in 444), became the dominant chieftains of a substantial union of Huns with their center in Pannonia. Attila, for a time, embarked on a series of expeditions against the Roman realm, east and west, that caused some anxiety. His goal, however, was not conquest, but extortion or at least the regularization of the "subsidies" that Roman authorities were paying him not to do precisely what he was doing. As Maenchen-Helfen noted, he was "more than a nuisance to the Romans, though at no time a real danger."[16] Although they caused some damage, most of these campaigns were not successful. Indeed, given his base in Pannonia, it is likely that Attila was unable to command the requisite number of horses needed for true nomadic raiding.[17]

Attila's union quickly collapsed in internecine turmoil following his death in 453. His eldest son, Ellac, perished in 454 in a struggle with subject tribes that had revolted. Sensing weakness, Constantinople, at first, was no longer willing to negotiate subsidies with the "barbarians" (a perennial theme of nomad relations with Byzantium),

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work, while aware of the ethnic complexity of the Hunnic union, stressed (pp. 217–226) the Turkic elements. Recent scholarship is more cautious, see András Róna-Tas, *Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages* (Budapest, 1999), p. 208.

[15] On the ethno-linguistic questions, see Peter B. Golden, *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples* (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 57–67 (on the Xiongnu), pp. 87–88.

[16] Manechen-Helfen, *World of the Huns*, pp. 125–126. See also Denis Sinor, "The Historical Attila," *Attila. The Man and his Image*, ed. F.H. Bäuml and M.D. Birnbaum (Budapest, 1993), pp. 1–29.

[17] Rudi Lindner, "Nomadism, Horses and Huns" *Past and Present*, 92 (1981), pp. 3–19.

but subsequently relented after gaining more favorable terms.[18] The inability to obtain "gifts" and "tribute" (often not clearly distinguished), an important source of domestic authority for nomadic leadership, undoubtedly weakened the Attilids.

A decade later, ca. 463, Priskos (d. sometime after 472), to whom we are indebted for much of our information about Attila, reported the arrival of another grouping of Inner Asian and in this instance undoubtedly Turkic tribes: the Šarağurs (Σαράγουροι), Oğurs (Οὖρωγοι = Ὦγουροι) and Onoğurs (Ὀνόγουροι). They had been driven westward, probably from present day Kazakhstan, by the Sabirs (Σαβίροι), who in turn had been pushed westward by the Avars of Inner Asia. The latter had been set into motion by "the tribes who lived by the shore of the Ocean." The Šarağurs (**Šara Oğur* "White/Yellow Oğurs"), having defeated the Akatir Huns (Ἀκατίροις Οὐννοις) after "many battles," then "approached the Romans, wishing to win their friendship." Apparently, some sort of arrangement was worked out for within a few years we find them attacking Sāsānid Transcaucasia.[19] In 480, we have the first clear mention of the Bulğars, another Oğuric union, which the Emperor Zeno (r. 474–491) used against the Ostrogoths in 482. But within a few years they were allied, for a time (488–489), with the Gepids (again against the Ostrogoths) and then are reported troubling Byzantine possessions as well.[20] They were soon—perhaps by the late fifth century, but certainly by the early sixth century—followed into the region by the Sabirs. Although the Šarağurs quickly faded from view, these Oğuric tribes, speaking a distinct form of Turkic (representing an earlier form of or a form diverging from Common Turkic) were now one of a welter of "Scythian" or "Hunnic" nomadic groupings reported in the Late Roman sources.[21]

The Byzantines took most note of those who posed some threat to them. Attempts were made to convert one or another grouping thereby bringing them into the Christian Commonwealth of which the Byzantine emperor considered himself the head. The Byzantines, like their imperial neighbor and rival, Sāsānid Iran and distant China,

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[18] See Priskos's account in *The Fragmentary Classicizing Historians of the Later Roman Empire. Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus*, ed. trans. R.C. Blockley (henceforth: Priskos/Blockley, Liverpool, 1981, 1983), II, pp. 352/353–354/355.

[19] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 344/345, 353/353–354/355.

[20] Veselin Beševliev, *Die Protobulgarische Periode der Bulgarischen Geschichte* (Amsterdam, 1980), pp. 76ff.

[21] See Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 92–106.

practiced an elaborate policy of subsidies or divide and conquer. It was, on the whole, cheaper and certainly less dangerous to buy the nomads off. Outfitting and sending costly expeditions into the steppe with no guarantee of even finding the elusive nomads, much less defeating them, was at best a risky business. Ideally, one group could be supported and encouraged to check the others. This policy was graphically illustrated in the mid-sixth century when the Byzantines, responding to danger from the Kutrigurs (*Quturoğur from **Toqur Oğur* "Nine Oğurs"), were able to seduce their kinsmen, the Utrigurs (*Uturğur = *Otur Oğur* "Thirty Oğurs"),[22] to destroy the former (see below). Once bought, however, the nomads frequently did not stay bought. Prokopios noted that some Sabir chieftains had alliances with Rome, others with Persia. Both empires periodically paid them fixed amounts of gold, adding more as the need arose,[23] but the nomads often proved to be fickle allies. Thus, the Sabirs, on occasion, carried out devastating raids into Transcaucasia and Byzantine Asia Minor.[24] This situation was difficult to manage as Constantinople had to deal with often rapidly shifting or largely diffused power groupings. Empires prefer to have a single tribal entity through which they can manage the forces in the "tribal zone" on their borders and therefore the imperial governments often sought to identify individuals or groups among the "barbarians" that could serve this purpose. In some areas, anthropologists have found that expansive states will even create tribes or tribal structures and become involved in ethnogenetic processes with a view towards creating stable forces on the frontier with which they can deal.[25]

In 552, Bumın of the Ašina clan[26] of the Türks overthrew the Jou-jan in Mongolia, founding the First Türk Empire (552–630 in

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[22] On these names, see Golden, *Introduction*, p. 99 and the literature noted there.

[23] Prokopios, *De Bello Gothico: History of the Wars*, ed. trans. H.B. Dewing (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.—London, 1919), II, pp. 536/537, VIII, pp. 154/155.

[24] Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. De Boor (Leipzig, 1883, reprint: Hildesheim, 1963), I, p. 161, *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor*, ed. Eng. trans. Cyril Mango and R. Scott (Oxford, 1997), p. 245.

[25] R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, "The Violent Edge of Empire" *War in the Tribal Zone*, ed. R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead (Santa Fe, 1992), p. 13.

[26] Chin. A-shih-na most recently etymologized as deriving from Iranian, cf. Soġd. *'xš'n'k* (*ɔxšânêk*) "blue," Khotanese Saka *āššeina—aśna* "blue," Tokharian A *āśna* "blue, dark" = *Kök Türk*, see Sergej G. Klyashtorny, "The Royal Clan of the Turks and the Problem of Early Turkic-Iranian Contacts" *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, XLVII/3 (1994), pp. 445–447.

the East, 552–659 in the West, see below). The Jou-jan (*Abar/Avar* may have been their self-designation) ruling house was massacred and those that were not brought under direct Türk control ultimately fled westward sometime after 555. In 558, a people calling themselves the Abars or Avars,[27] having recently arrived in and taken control over the tribes of the Pontic steppe zone, dispatched an embassy to Constantinople. As was typical of Eurasian nomads, they sought "gifts" which hopefully would become regular subsidies, offered their military services, and implied, of course, that these same services could be turned against Byzantium. Before they could fully consolidate their position, the Türks, under İštemi, Bumın's brother, were on the scene (their first embassy to Constantinople was in 568, although earlier contact in 562 may also have taken place).[28]

The Türks had established an empire that stretched across Eurasia, from the Crimea to Manchuria.[29] It was organized along a bipartite, East-West principle : the Eastern Qağan was superior while the *Yabğu Qağan* governed the western zone. The Western Türks, as the new, clearly dominant force in the western steppe zone, were brought into alliance with Byzantium. But the Avars, who had taken refuge in Pannonia (ca. 567–568), Attila's old habitat, did not disappear, and Constantinople felt the need to have diplomatic relations with them as they, too, demanded their payments. This infuriated the Türks. Thus, in 572 a Byzantine ambassador was upbraided by the Türk ruler of the western part of the empire for having diplomatic dealings with the Avars, "our slaves who have fled their masters."[30]

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[27] On the much debated problem of the relationship of the European Avars to the Jou-jan and Hephthalites and the Uar-Hun question, see Czeglédy, "From East to West," *AEMAe*, 3 (1983), pp. 38, 67ff. See also Arnulf Kollautz and Hiyasuki Miyakawa, *Geschichte und Kultur eines völkerwanderungszeitlichen Nomadenvolkes* (Klagenfurt, 1970), 2 vols.

[28] Theophanes Byzantios in *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ed. Karl Müller, 4 (Paris, 1885), p. 270, see also Walter Pohl, *Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa 567–882 n. Chr.* (München, 1988), pp. 40–41.

[29] A useful outline of Türk history can be found in Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 131–150. See also Wolfgang E. Scharlipp, *Die Frühen Türken in Zentralasien* (Darmstadt, 1992). A more detailed study is that of Ahmet Taşağıl, *Gök-Türkler* (Ankara, 1995) based largely on the Chinese sources. These are also collected in the classic study by Edouard Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux* (1900) published with his *Notes Additionnelles* (1903, Paris, 1941) and Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (Tu-küe)* (Wiesbaden, 1958), 2 vols. Lev N. Gumilëv's *Drevnie tjurki* (Moskva, 1967) has many interesting suggestions, but is not always reliable.

[30] Menander Protector: *The History of Menander the Guardsman*, ed. trans. R.C. Blockley (Liverpool, 1985), pp. 174/175.

Subject peoples such as the Alans and Onoğurs, who had resisted the "invincible might of the Türks," another Byzantine envoy was informed in 576, were now also "numbered amongst our slaves."[31]

While Constantinople wavered between a policy of appeasement of the Avars and meeting their treaty obligations with the Türks, the Avars were establishing the contours of their new domain. The Gepids of Pannonia had been driven out and the Lombards who had made common cause with the Avars against the former now also left for hopefully happier prospects in Italy. Joined by other tribal groupings seeking shelter from the Türks, the Avars by the 580s were raiding Byzantine holdings in the Balkans. The raids were often joined with Slavic campaigns that had begun several decades earlier. While the latter ultimately culminated in wide-scale migration and settlement, the military activities of the Avars who, on occasion, in the past also fought the Slavs on behalf of Byzantium,[32] were limited to the raiding typical of the nomads of that era. In 626, however, the Avars and their Slav allies attempted an attack on Constantinople coordinated with Sāsānid Iran. The attack failed. In its aftermath (or perhaps even before this unsuccessful bid), Avar might appears to have weakened.[33] Slav and Bulğar elements were breaking away.

The Türko-Byzantine relationship also underwent periods of strain, especially with regard to joint actions against Iran. In 589, the Türks had been soundly defeated near Herat by the Sāsānids. Moreover, their own state was torn by internecine strife due, in part, to the complexities of the succession system in which sovereignty rested in a charismatic clan. Unless carefully regulated, over time a number of claimants to the Qağanal dignity invariably appeared with attendant domestic strife. In 603, a major revolt of the subject Tiele[34] grouping (which included many of the Oğuric tribes in the West) took place. Although weakened, the Türks were still able to join the Byzantines (ca. 625/626) in Herakleios's counteroffensive against

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[31] Menander/Blockley, 174/175. The Byzantine embassy of 576 also brought with it some 106 Türks who had come to Constantinople at different times; some had been there a "long time," others had come with earlier embassies (Menander/Blockley, 170/171). This would seem to indicate that there was already some history of contact.

[32] Menander/Blockley, pp. 192/193–193/194 discussing events of 578.

[33] On these wars, see Pohl, *Die Awaren*, pp. 58ff.; J. Kovačević, *Avarski kaganat* (Beograd, 1977), pp. 41–81.

[34] Chin. *Tiele* presumably rendered some Turkic term. On the various theories, see Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 93–94.

Sāsānid Iran in Transcaucasia, where they assisted in the taking of T'bilisi in 628.[35] But, by 659, the Western Türk Qağanate had succumbed to Tang China as the Eastern Qağanate had earlier in 630.

Although the Türk Qağanate (second empire: 687–742) revived in the East and once again extended its power to Central Asia, the mantle of qağanal authority in the westernmost steppes had by then passed to the Khazars. Comprised of a variety of Turkic peoples speaking Common Turkic and Oğuric languages as well as Iranian, Finno-Ugric, Slavic, and Palaeo-Caucasian elements, the ruling house was most probably of Ašina origin.[36] Türks and Byzantines bound by shared geopolitical concerns continued the *entente*.[37] Both states were faced with the rapidly expanding Arabian Caliphate.

Following the conquest of Iran (651), the Arabs quickly moved northwards on two fronts, into the Caucasus and Central Asia. Here, they faced the Khazar Qağanate, which was centered in the North Caucasian steppelands and adjoining regions of the Pontic steppes and the lower Volga, and the Western Türk Qağanate, also known as the On Oq ("ten arrows"), centered in Turkistan, which was already riven by internal disputes and divided into two subconfederations. In 737, the Muslim forces, in what may have been a coordinated effort, had administered a serious defeat to the On Oq, had captured the Khazar Qağan in the lower Volga and had forced him to convert to Islam. This marked the culminating point of the Arabo-Khazar struggle for domination of the Caucasus. The Khazar ruler

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[35] The chronology of these events is not entirely clear. See Movsēs Dasxuranci, *The History of the Caucasian Albanians*, trans. Charles Dowsett (London, 1961), pp. 81–88; *K'art'lis C'xovreba*, ed. Simon Qauxč'išvili (T'bilisi, 1955), I, pp. 225, 374–375. According to Nikephoros (d. 828, writing in late 770's–780's), the alliance was arranged in 626 when Herakleios was in Lazica. The assault on Iran proper was put off because of the Avaro-Persian attempt on Constantinople in that year, see *Nikephoros, Patriarch of Constantinople, Short History*, ed. trans. Cyril Mango (Washington, D.C., 1990), pp. 54/55–58/59. The Türk-Khazars netted considerable booty from these and subsequent campaigns, see Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia, the Near East, and the Steppe in the Early Medieval Period: An Examination of the Sassanian and Byzantine Finds from the Kama-Urals Area" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, II (1982), pp. 275ff.

[36] For narratives of Khazars history, see Douglas M. Dunlop, *The History of the Jewish Khazars* (Princeton, 1954); Mixail I. Artamonov, *Istorija Xazar* (Leningrad, 1962); Peter B. Golden, *Khazar Studies* (Budapest, 1980), 2 vols.; Anatolij P. Novosel'cev, *Xazarskoe gosudarstvo i ego rol' v istorii Vostočnoj Evropy i Kavkaza* (Moskva, 1990).

[37] A less positive view of this relationship is taken by Thomas S. Noonan, "Byzantium and the Khazars: A Special Relationship?" *Byzantine Diplomacy*, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 109–132.

soon abjured Islam, but major Khazar-Arab wars were now, with some exceptions, largely a thing of the past. The boundaries between the two empires were established in the North Caucasus, with Bāb al-Abwāb/Darband serving as the principal Arab outpost on the always dangerous steppe.

The Khazars, in turn, shifted their center to the lower Volga, establishing in that region their capital city Atıl/İtil (still undiscovered). Seeking further integration into the larger, monotheistic Mediterranean world with which it now had extensive trade relations, the Khazar leadership and core clans by the late eighth and into the ninth century converted to Judaism, wary perhaps of the political baggage that conversion to either Islam or Christianity would have brought. The Khazar state, one of the largest of its era, extended from an often uneasy border in the Crimea to the Middle Volga, and from Kiev to the steppe approaches to Khwārazm. For a time, it dominated the North-South trade. By the tenth century, faced with the influx of new steppe peoples in particular the Pečenegs who occupied the Pontic steppes and the Oğuz who were sometimes allies and sometimes troublesome neighbors in the East, the growing power of the Rus' state and the loss of its paramountcy in trade to its own vassal state of Volga Bulğaria, Khazaria began to fade. In 965, it fell to the combined attacks of the Rus' and the Oğuz.

In neighboring Central Asia, events were taking place that would transform that region, over the centuries, into a distinct Islamo-Irano-Turkic cultural zone and have an impact on the western steppes.[38] With the collapse of the Türk empire in 742 and the flight ca. 745 of the Ašina-led Qarluqs, an important constituent tribal confederation of the Eastern Türk state, to the Western Türk lands, the stage was set for the meeting of the Tang army and the once again surging Arabs at the Battle of the Talas (751) in present day Kazakhstan. The Arabs won in part due to the defection of the Qarluqs to the Muslim side. By 766, the Qarluqs had brought much of the On Oq territory under their control.[39] The defection, however, did not mean immediate Islamization. Indeed, the Ṭāhirids (821–873) and the

[38] See *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert L. Canfield (Cambridge, 1991).

[39] The political and military history of this region and era are discussed in Hamilton A.R. Gibb, *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia* (New York, 1923, reprint: New York, 1970) and Christopher. I. Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia. A History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese during the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1987).

Sāmānids (819–1005), Eastern Iranian dynasties that came to represent Caliphal interests in Transoxiana and Eastern Iran, in the early ninth century launched a number of campaigns against the pagan Qarluqs whose number also included Christianized elements undoubtedly stemming from the Soġdian urban populations with which they were in contact. The beginning of the use of Turkic military slaves by the ʿAbbāsids was closely connected with gifts to the caliphs of Turkic warriors taken in these campaigns.[40]

The Qarluqs were soon joined, in the 770s, by the restless and explosive Oğuz tribal union who nomadized to their West, along the Syr Darya and up to the Volga. The Oğuz ultimately dislodged the Pečenegs and sent them westward into the Pontic steppes which they came to dominate by the end of the ninth century.[41] The Oğuz union also faced pressure from the Kimek Qağanate located in Western Siberia.[42] All of these were offshoots, to varying degrees, of the Türk state. The Oğuz and Qarluqs were frontline nomadic polities facing the Irano-Islamic forces of the Caliphate in the Transoxanian marches. The latter were the Islamized heirs of the earlier Soġdian statelets and Khwārazm and retained their mercantile traditions. The slave trade, in particular, was a major source of wealth and the Sāmānids even established training schools for their human harvests. According to the *Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam*, Farġāna, the "Gate of Turkistān," was one of the portals through which "great numbers of Turkish slaves" were brought.[43] The campaign of the Sāmānid Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad, in 893, that was directed to the Zaravšan valley and the city of Ṭarāz, netted some 10–15,000 prisoners (including the wife of the Qarluq ruler) and killed 10,000 others.[44]

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[40] See Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 189–201.

[41] Peter B. Golden, "The Migrations of the Oğuz" *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 4 (1972), pp. 45–84. The most thorough summary of Oğuz tribal history is that of Faruk Sümer, *Oğuzlar* (3rd ed., İstanbul, 1980). For the history of the Pečenegs, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Peçenek Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1937); Petre Diaconu, *Les Petchénègues au Bas Danube* (Bucharest, 1970); Omeljan Pritsak, "The Pečenegs: A Case of Social and Economic Transformation" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 1 (1975), pp. 211–235 and a brief overview in Lajos Ligeti, *A magyar nyelv török kapcsolatai a honfoglalás előtt és az Árpád-korban* (Budapest, 1986), pp. 362–364, 382–385, 506–511; Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 264–270.

[42] Kimek history is still little studied. See Bulat E. Kumekov, *Gosudarstvo kimakov IX–XI vv. po arabskim istočnikam* (Alma-Ata, 1972) and Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 202–205.

[43] *Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam*, ed. M. Sutoodeh (Sutūdah) (Tehran, 1340/1962), p. 112, *Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam. The Regions of the World*, trans. Vladimir F. Minorsky (London, 1937, reprint with additions, 1971), pp. 115–116.

[44] Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīḫ aṭ-Ṭabarī. Taʾrīḫ ar-Rasūl*

The whole of the Irano-Muslim city-state world was bounded by forts facing the steppe to fight the "Infidel Turks."[45] Over time, some of the tribes, or elements of them, were drawn to and embraced Islam, usually through the activities of Muslim merchants and Ṣūfī orders. They then became the new champions of Islam, a role that increasingly became associated with Turkic peoples and was soon realized in the early Islamic Turkic states, the Qarakhanids (992–1212) in Central Asia and the Seljuks (1040–1194) in the Near East, but these issues lie beyond the purview of this essay. Qarakhanid military practices, however, about which we have some information, are helpful in understanding those of other, contemporary steppe peoples, and are noted for comparative purposes.

The Oğuz union was unstable and generated pressures that could be felt from the Pontic steppes and the Rus' lands to the Near East. The Qarluqs were one of the tribal groupings that came to constitute the Qarakhanid core. Relations between the tribes were often uneasy, even in the absence of religious differences. Maḥmūd al-Kāšġarī, a scion of the Qarakhanid royal house, writing in the 1070s after the Seljuks had made themselves masters of the core Islamic lands, noted that the Oğuz and the Čigil (a subconfederation of the Qarluqs) fought constantly and that the "enmity between the two peoples persists to the present."[46]

Events in Central Asia, as we have already noted, often spilled over into the Pontic steppes. The Oğuz, pressured by the Kimek state, pushed out the Pečenegs who became a powerful presence in the Black Sea region. Byzantine policy, as we learn from the emperor-historian, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (r. 945–959), was largely predicated on using the Pečenegs to control the steppe access to the Crimea (the Byzantine listening post in the steppe) and to Byzantium's northern frontiers, a role previously held by the Khazars before they weakened.[47] Prefaced by several failed attempts in 909 and 910 (and

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*wa'l-Mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abu'l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Cairo, 1967–1969), X, p. 34; Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj aḏ-Ḏahab wa Maʿādin al-Ǧawhar*, ed. Charles Pellat (Beirut, 1966), V, p. 150.

[45] See descriptions in the *Ḥudūd*, ed. Sutoodeh, pp. 113–118, trans. Minorsky, pp. 116–119.

[46] Maḥmūd al-Kāšġarī, *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects (Dīwān Luġāt at-Turk)*, ed. trans. Robert Dankoff in collaboration with James Kelly (Cambridge, Mass., 19882–1985), I, p. 301.

[47] In addition to his *DAI*, J. Moravcsik, trans. Jenkins, see also Frank Wozniak, "Byzantium, the Pečenegs, and the Khazars in the Tenth Century" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 4 (1984), pp. 299–316 and Jonathan Shepard, "Constantine VII's Doctrine

very likely some decades earlier) a major Rus' raid down the Volga into the Caspian Islamic lands was carried out in 912–913. The Khazar ruler is depicted as remarkably passive during these incursions through the heart of his territory. He allowed the Rus' to pass through unobstructed and then permitted his Muslim subjects to butcher them in retaliation for the damage inflicted on their coreligionists along the southern Caspian coast. The details and dating are uncertain.[48] The local chronicle, the *Ta'rīḫ al-Bāb*, reports that hostilities between the Khazars and local Muslims had been going on since 901[49] which may explain the Khazars' behavior. Another major Rus' raid in 943–944 brought the city of Barḏa'a under their control for a time, but also ended badly for them.[50] Although the Rus' had been thwarted, the Khazar hold was clearly loosening. The Khazar Hebrew documents of the mid-tenth century depict a beleaguered empire, facing hostility from Byzantium, the Rus' and their subject peoples and neighbors. The Khazar ruler, Joseph writes that Rus' forays down the Volga were no longer tolerated, adding, "I war with them. If I left them in peace for one hour, they would destroy the entire land of the Ishmaelites up to Baghdad."[51] Several years later (965), Khazaria, as we have previously noted, was mortally wounded.

We find the first mention of the Pečenegs in the Rus' sources s.a. 915. They had been driven westward by pressure from the Oğuz and others. The final impetus westward may have been touched off by the Sāmānid attacks on the Qarluqs in the 890s. The Pečenegs were allowed to cross Rus' lands, after reaching an accord with the Rus' grandprince Igor', to get to the Danube whither they had been summoned by Byzantium anxious to exert pressure on Balkan Bulgaria.

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of 'Containment' of the Rus," *ΓΕΝΝΑΔΙΟΣ k 70-letiju akademika G.G. Litavrina*, ed. B.N. Florja (Moskva, 1999), pp. 264–283.

[48] See account of al-Mas'ūdī, ed. Pellat, I, pp. 218–221 (for events of the raid sometime after 300/912–913). For a full discussion, see Vladimir F. Minorsky, *A History of Sharvân and Darband* (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 111–112; Golden, *Khazar Studies*, I, pp. 80–81.

[49] Minorsky, *History*, pp. Arabic, pp. 4, 17/26, 42.

[50] Reported in Dasxuranci, trans. Dowsett, p. 224 and Abū 'Alī b. Muḥammad Ibn Miskawaih, *Tajārub al-Umam*, ed. H.F. Amedroz, trans. D.S. Margoliouth (Oxford, 1920–1921), II, pp. 62–67/V, pp. 67–73.

[51] Pavel K. Kovkovcov, *Evrejsko-xazarskaja perepiska v X veke* (Leningrad, (1932), Hebrew text, p. 32/Russ. trans. p. 102. On Khazar difficulties with their neighbors, see the "Schechter Document" in Norman Golb and Omeljan Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, 1982), pp. 106–121.

How Byzantium established contact with the Pečenegs is unclear. The Crimea, long a Byzantine intelligence center for the steppe, is the most likely candidate. The Pečenegs had occupied the previously Hungarian-held section of the Pontic steppe termed *Etelköz* ("the land between the rivers," possibly the Don-Danube region or the Dnepr-Danube mesopotamia).[52] Pečeneg involvement in the Danubian borderlands of Byzantium became an oft-repeated pattern. In 920, however, we learn of the first hostile Pečeneg-Rus' encounters when Igor' attacked them. Nonetheless, Pečeneg forces served along with Varangians and Slavs in Igor's assault on Constantinople in 944.[53] Byzantium, however, was a much more adept player in building coalitions, and was every bit the equal of China in using "barbarians" to fight "barbarians."[54] Having invited the Rus' to invade Bulgaria, Constantinople soon found itself with an unwanted guest in that region and turned to the Pečenegs to pressure the Rus' prince Svjatoslav by attacking Kiev in 968. Svjatoslav's continuing interest in the region was ended in 972 when the Pečenegs, probably at Constantinople's behest, ambushed and killed him after the Byzantines had forced him to leave Bulgaria.[55]

Far more serious and prolonged warfare between the Rus' and the Pečenegs broke out during the rule of Vladimir I (r. 978–1015), beginning in 988 and lasting until ca. 1006–1007. This may have been touched off by Vladimir's alliance with the Oğuz, the traditional enemy of the Pečenegs, which was manifested in a joint raid on Volga Bulgharia in 985 and by the Rus' ruler's aggressive posture toward the steppe. The Pečenegs became enmeshed, on the losing side, in the Rus' throne struggle following Vladimir's death that brought Jaroslav (r. 1019–1054) to power.[56] Very likely under Rus' and Oğuz pressure, the Pečenegs now began to direct their attention

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[52] *Polnoe sobranie russkix letopisej* (henceforth *PSRL*, Moskva-St. Peterburg/Petrograd/Leningrad, 1841–1995), I, c. 42; Obolensky, *Byzantine Commonwealth*, p. 106; György Györffy, "Sur la question de l'établissement des Petchénègues en Europe" *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, XXV/1–3, (1972) pp. 283–292. For the Dnepr-Danube location, see Róna-Tas, *Hungarians and Europe*, pp. 325ff., 413.

[53] *PSRL*, I, cc. 42, 45.

[54] On the Chinese policy, see Lien-sheng Yang, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order" in John K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 33.

[55] *PSRL*, I, cc. 72, 73.

[56] *PSRL*, I, cc. 121–124,127–129, 141–142; Ivan M. Šekera, *Kyïvs'ka Rus' XI st. u mižnarodnyx vidnosynax* (Kyïv, 1967), 79–80, 99–108.

to the potentially vulnerable Byzantine Danubian frontier. When their raids into Byzantine territory ended unsuccessfully in 1036, the Pečenegs once again sought to establish a threatening presence on the Rus' frontiers where they were soundly defeated by Jaroslav.[57]

Once again, the Pečenegs found themselves on Byzantium's Danubian frontiers.[58] Here, Constantinople was able to play on internal disputes, giving sanctuary and favor to the loser in an internal power struggle. Continuing pressure from their steppe enemies brought even more Pečenegs into Byzantine service which proved to be a mixed blessing. By 1053, unable to control them as they had hoped, Constantinople was compelled, by treaty, to recognize their self-governing status within the imperial borders. This did not solve the problem. Moreover, Byzantium was under serious attack in the East as the Oğuz tribesmen unleashed by the Seljuk conquests began to make themselves felt. While many Oğuz moved into the Near East, another grouping, called *Tork* (pl. *Torci*) in the Rus' sources and Οὔζοι by the Byzantines, occupied the Pečeneg's former territory in the Pontic steppe. By 1054, they were at war with Rus', and in 1064 were also driven to the Danubian frontiers of the empire where they were defeated by the Byzantines (1064) and Hungarians (1068). Fragments of the Oğuz, Pečenegs, and other smaller nomadic groupings that had remained in the Pontic steppes were now organized into the "People of the Black Hats" (Rus'. *Černii klobuci*), a nomadic borderguard grouping in service to the princes of Kiev.[59]

In 1071, the Seljuks defeated the Byzantines at Mantzikert and Anatolia was opened to Turkish conquest. Pečeneg attacks and other nomadic troubles in the Balkans, which drew Constantinople's attention, may have been a contributing factor[60] in the Oğuz takeover of considerable Anatolian territory. Now determined to rid themselves of this threat, the Byzantines once again turned to the steppe. Their new partners were the Qıpčaqs, a complex tribal union of Turkic and very probably Mongolic elements of diverse origins. Their core derived from the Kimek union which had collapsed in the early

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[57] *PSRL*, I, cc. 150–151; Diaconu, *Les Petchénègues*, pp. 39–49.

[58] The classic account (although in need of some updating) of Byzantine-Pečeneg relations remains V.G. Vasil'evskij, *Vizantija i Pechenegi* in his *Trudy* (SPb., 1908), I.

[59] Peter B. Golden, "The *Černii Klobouci*", *Symbolae Turcologicae. Studies in Honour of Lars Johanson*, eds. Arpád Berta, Bernt Brendemoen, and Claus. Schönig, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Transactions, 6 (Uppsala, 1996), pp. 97–107.

[60] Kurat, *Peçenek Tarihi*, p. 165.

eleventh century under the impact of a migration touched off in Inner Asia by the Qun,[61] pursued in turn by the Qay. The Qun/Qumans and the Qıpčaqs (who nomadized in the western lands of the Kimek union) now came together to form a new union (which other elements coming from Inner Asia would later join) known generally as the *Qıpčaq*s, while its westernmost subgrouping was also called *Quman* [Cuman] and its eastern subgrouping was also known as *Qangli*.[62] Their arrival touched off a series of migrations that spilled over into the Pecheneg and Türkmen (Oğuz) lands.[63] The neighboring Khwārazmšāh state (in present-day Western Uzbekistan) felt their presence by the early 1030's.

In 1055, the Cumans make their first appearance in the Rus' chronicles and in 1061 the first Cuman raid on Rus' is recorded.[64] Their territories, in time, extended from the Danube to the borderlands of Khwārazm and from Western Siberia to the Crimea and North Caucasian steppes. The period 1055–1120 was marked by considerable aggression as the Cumans explored the boundaries of their new habitat and tested the defenses of the Rus' settlements that bordered on the steppe. Initially, they were allies of Byzantium, helping Constantinople to defeat and fatally weaken the Pečeneg union in 1091, although they refused to participate in the bloodbath that followed.[65] The last gasp of Pečeneg bellicosity took place in 1121/1122

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[61] The ethnonym *Quman* (Cuman or Coman) is believed to derive from *Qun*, cf., Gyula Németh, "A kunok neve és eredete" *Századok*, 76 (1942), pp. 166–178. The still unresolved question of Qun/Cuman origins is far too complex a question to be dealt with here, see Josef Marquart (Markwart), *Über das Volkstum der Komanen* in Willi Bang, Josef Marquart, *Osttürkische Dialektstudien* in the *Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, phil. hist. Klasse, N.F., XIII/1 (Berlin, 1914), pp. 25–238; Pritsak, "The Polovcians and Rus'," *AEMAe*, 2 (1982), pp. 321–339; Seržan M. Axinžanov, *Kypčaki v istorii srednevekovogo Kazaxstana* (Alma-Ata, 1989), pp. 39ff. The name Quman was loan-translated into Rus' as *Polovci* "the pale, pale-yellow ones," Lat. *Pallidi* etc.

[62] See the literature noted in Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 270–273.

[63] The migration is recorded in the *Ṭabā'i al-Ḥayawān* by al-Marwazī writing ca. 1120: *Sharâf al-Zamân Tahir Marvazī on China, the Turks and India*, ed. trans. Vladimir F. Minorsky (London, 1942), Arabic, p. 18/trans. pp. 29–30.

[64] *PSRL*, I, 162, 163.

[65] Vasil'evskij, *Vizantija i Pečenegi*, pp. 96ff. Anna Komnena [Comnena], *Alexiada*, ed. L. Schopen, A. Reiferscheid, (Bonn, 1839, 1878), I, pp. 396–409, deflects the blame for the slaughter of Pečeneg prisoners from her father. In addition, I have made reference to the English translation, *The Alexiad*, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Baltimore, 1969), pp. 253–260 and the recent Russian translation which has a full and useful commentary: *Aleksiada*, Russ. trans. Ja. N. Ljubarskij (SPb., 1996), pp. 233–239.

(or 1122/1123) and was soundly defeated.[66] In time, however, the Cumans would also take to raiding the Byzantine borderlands (e.g. 1148, 1152 [or 1155], 1160, 1190s).

Interspersed with accounts of these raids are notices of Cuman units serving as allies in the Byzantine military forces.[67] In the late 1180s, they played an important role in the establishment of the Second Bulgarian Empire of the Asenids (1185–1279)[68] and produced their successor dynasties, the Terterids (1280–1323) and Šišmanids (1323–1393). They were equally important in the Khwārazmšāh state in the East which by the late twelfth-early thirteenth century had become a major force in the Middle East as well. In Khwārazm, elements of the sometimes turbulent Qıpčaqs (our data is sparse here) established marital ties with the Khwārazmšāhs, thus becoming one of the forces behind the throne—not always to the benefit of the state.[69] Meanwhile, in Rus', by 1118–1120 the Cumans had been soundly trounced by Vladimir Monomax (d. 1125) and one of their tribal groupings had even taken refuge in Georgia, whither they had been invited by the Georgian king Davit' Aġmašenebeli (1089–1125) with whom there were marital ties. Here, these Cumans played an important role in freeing the kingdom of the Seljuk threat and establishing Georgia as the premier regional power. Although many of these Qıpčaqs returned to their steppe homeland after the death of their nemesis, Vladimir Monomax, the Georgian crown continued to rely on Qıpčaq forces, in addition to their feudal army, up to the Mongol conquest.[70]

By the 1130's, as the unity of Rus' faded, the Cumans played an increasingly central role in the internecine strife of the Rjurikids (the ruling house of the Rus' state), as different Cuman subgroupings took

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[66] Mixail V. Bibikov, *Vizantijskie istočniki po istorii Drevnej Rusi i Kakvaza* (SPb., 1999), pp. 199–228.

[67] See Bibikov, *Vizantijskie istočniki*, pp. 244ff.

[68] D.A. Rasovskij, "Rol' polovcev v vojnax Asenej s vizantijskoj i latinskoj imperijami v 1186–1207gg." *Spisanie na Bŭlgarskata Akademija na naukite*, 58 (1939), pp. 203–211 considers their role crucial. See also the remarks of Bibikov, *Vizantijskie istočniki*, pp. 250–257. For a brief overview of the complicated origins of the Second Bulgarian Empire, see John V.A. Fine, Jr., *The Late Medieval Balkans* (Ann Arbor, 1987), pp. 10–17.

[69] See Axinžanov, *Kypčaki*, pp. 191–216 and İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Harezmşahlar Devleti Tarihi* (Ankara, 1956); Zija M. Bunijatov, *Gosudarstvo xorezmšaxov-anuštiginidov 1097–1231* (Moskva, 1986).

[70] Peter B. Golden, "Cumanica I: The Qïpčaqs in Georgia" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 4 (1984), pp. 45–87.

service and formed alliances (and sometimes marital ties) with the warring Rus' factions.[71] Thus, in the twelfth-thirteenth century, as Gumilëv suggests, the "Cuman land and Kievan Rus' constituted one polycentric state."[72] The Cumans, stateless like the Pečenegs and Western Oğuz, their predecessors in the Pontic Steppes, were saved from the fate of the latter by integrating themselves into the regional politico-military system (Rus', Byzantium and the Balkans, Transcaucasia, Khwārazm).

In the Ponto-Caspian and trans-Volgan steppes, the Pre-Činggisid nomads raided the sedentary world to gain access to its goods, served in it as mercenaries and "allies," but they never attempted to conquer it. Turkic soldiers were much in demand well beyond the confines of the Eurasian steppe as can be seen from the prominent military role played by the Qıpčaqs in particular in the *ġulām/mamlūk* system in the Islamic world. Indeed, after the advent of the Seljuks, Turks of one or another grouping (though predominantly Oğuz or Qıpčaq) tended to make up the military and political elites in the Islamic heartlands. Western and eastern sources underscore the martial nature of Turkic nomadic society.

### *The Marital Image of the Eurasian Nomads in Contemporaryu Sources*

Sima Qian, writing of the Xiongnu, says that "they herd their flocks in times of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crisis they take up arms and go off on plundering and marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature . . . The Xiongnu make it clear that warfare is their business."[73] In distant Byzantium centuries later, these views were echoed: Agathias (d. 580), in his relation of the attack on Constantinople by the Kutrigur Zabergan, comments that the "cause of the attack was, in the truest sense, the iniquity of the barbarian and the longing for gain."[74] The Turkic

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[71] For various periodizations of Cuman-Rus' relations, see D. Rasovskij, "Polovcy. IV. Voennaja istorija polovcev" *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, 11 (1940), pp. 95–127; Svetlana A. Pletnëva, "Poloveckaja zemlja" *Drevnerusskie knjažestva X–XIII vv.* ed. L.G. Beskrovnyj (Moskva, 1975), pp. 260–300; Mavrodina, *Kievskaja Rus' i kochevniki*, pp. 61–62.

[72] Lev N. Gumilëv, *Drevnjaja Rus' i velikaja step'* (1989, reprinted in his *Sočinenija*, Moskva, 1997), I, p. 365.

[73] Sima Qian, trans. Watson, II, pp. 129, 143.

[74] *Agathiae Myrinaei Historiarum libri quinque*, red. Rudolf Keydell (Berlin, 1967),

nomads' desire for the spoils of war is underscored by the ninth-century Arab essayist al-Jāḥiẓ who reports the comments of Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd to the effect that the Turks do not fight for the sake of religion, sect, overlordship, group solidarity, etc. but "solely for booty."[75] Anna Komnena recounts the incident in 1087 when the Pečenegs called on the Cumans to join them in a raid on Byzantine lands. By the time the Cumans arrived, the Pečenegs had already acquired considerable booty. The Cumans, who had not participated in the fighting nonetheless demanded a share of the booty. When this was denied them, they attacked and defeated the Pečenegs.[76]

These themes run through the historical traditions of all the peoples with whom the nomads came in contact. Many of them are summed up in the *Strategikon* attributed to the Byzantine Emperor Maurice (582–602). It has an important notice on the Türks and Avars and it is worth quoting in full:

> The Scythian peoples are, as they say, of one way of life and organization; they are without a single government (πολυαρχά) and free from the business of politics (ἀπράγμονα). Only the [nations] of the Turks and Avars give thought to military organization. The [nation] of the Turks is numerous and free, set free from the variety and severity of the great number of human affairs. They are trained in nothing but to be ready to attack the enemy courageously. The [nation] of the Avars is the most maleficent, changeable and experienced in warfare. These [peoples], then, as they are governed by a single ruler, are subjected to cruel punishments from their commanders for their mistakes. Governed not by love but by fear, they bravely bear the toils of battle and hardship. They suffer heat and cold and the remaining lack of necessities, being nomads. Being superstitious, secretive [κρυψίβουλα or "treacherous"], friendless, faithless and governed by the greed for things, they are contemptuous of oaths, they neither observe compacts nor are they satisfied with gifts, but even before they accept a gift they are setting schemes and subversion of what has been agreed upon. Skilfully calculating the suitable times, they immediately make use of them, endeavoring to prevail against their enemies not so much by hand as by deceit and by sudden attacks and by the closing off of military necessities . . .[77]

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p. 178, Agathias, *The Histories*, trans. J.D. Frendo (Berlin-New York, 1975), p. 147 renders it "Though his real motive was the innate violence and rapacity that characterizes the behaviour of barbarians . . ."

[75] Al-Jāḥiẓ, *Manāqib Jund al-ḫilāfa wa Faḍā'il al-Atrāk: Hilâfet Ordusunun Menkıbeleri ve Türkler'in Fazîletleri*, Turk. trans. Ramazan Şeşen (Ankara, 1967), p. 70

[76] Ed. Schopen, I, pp. 352–353, trans. Sewter, pp. 228–229, trans. Ljubarskij, p. 213.

[77] Mauricius, *Strategicon*, ed. Rumanian trans., H. Mihăescu (Bucharest, 1970), p. 268.

The theme of the nomad as naturally warlike is a constant topos in Byzantine literature. Theodore Synkellos, in his homily on the Avar attack on Constantinople of 626 says that the Avar were "a wild people whose life is war."[78] Anna Komnena remarks of the Pečenegs that "they possess an innate talent for war."[79] The emphasis on martial valor can be seen in the custom of the Türks, recorded in the *Zhou shu*, of placing stones on the grave of their dead "according to the number of people he had killed during his life."[80] Some of the epitaphs listed the number of enemies captured and slain.[81]

Ibn al-Faqīh (10th century) gives the following account of how the Turks reared their children for the warrior's life: "if a son is born to one of them, he raises him, feeds him, and carries out his wishes until he becomes an adult. When [the child] reaches maturity, he extends to him a bow and arrow and takes him from his domicile and says to him 'look out for yourself!' After that, the son becomes to him [the father] like a stranger whom he does not know. Thus their custom demands that they act with their children, both young men and girls."[82]

To the Byzantines, it appeared that war produced wealth for the nomads. Priskos, who spent some time in Attila's camp as ambassador, recounts his conversation with a Greek who had turned "Scythian." The latter said that "after a war, men amongst the Scythians live at ease, each enjoying his own possessions and troubling others or being troubled not at all or very little."[83] The threat of war was an even more efficacious method of extracting wealth. Dengizikh, Attila's son (whose head was later brought to Constan-tinople), in the 460's threatened war unless the empire gave him and his army "land and money." The Emperor Leo I (r. 457–474), who was largely under the control of the Alan Aspar and other "barbarian" elements running the East Roman military at that time, having earlier rejected the Attilids' request, was now quite agreeable and indeed "was well-disposed to those of the foreign peoples who came into alliance

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[78] See Pohl, *Die Awaren*, p. 168; Denis Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors" *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 101 (1981), p. 134.

[79] Ed. Schopen, I, pp. 344–345; Ljubarskij, p. 209, Sewter, p. 224 renders this as "war is in their blood."

[80] Liu, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, I, p. 10.

[81] Igor' V. Kormušin, *Tjurkskie enisejskie épitafii* (Moskva, 1997), pp. 37–38, 172.

[82] Ibn al-Faqīh, Mašhad ms., f. 169 b, cited in F.M. Asadov, *Arabskie istočniki o tjurkax v rannee srednevekov'e* (Baku, 1993), p. 46.

[83] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 268/269.

with him."[84] Theophylaktos Simokattes (d. mid-seventh century?), who continues the work of Menander, states that the Türks had grown very rich from the tribute they extorted from Iran.[85] Gardīzī (writing ca. 1040, but based on earlier sources) reports that the Pečenegs possessed great quantities of horses, sheep, weapons and many gold and silver vessels, the latter not the products of a pastoral economy.[86]

Another common theme is the barbarism and perfidy of the Eurasian nomads. The dealings of the Byzantine Emperor Justin I (r. 518–527), a rough-hewn soldier whose policies were probably guided by his gifted nephew and successor Justinian I (527–565), with the "Huns" (most probably the Sabirs are meant here) in 521/522 provide a graphic illustration of the difficulties with nomadic "alliances." Justin sent "envoys and gifts" to Zilgibis (Ζιλγιβίς) with whom a treaty against Iran had been concluded. The Persian ruler, Kavad (r. 488–531), however, also sent an embassy to Zilgibis, concluding a treaty with him as well. Ultimately, Zilgibis opted to bring his 20,000 warriors over to Sāsānid service. Justin then informed Kavad that Zilgibis had sworn an oath to be his ally, and added that "it is necessary that we, as brothers, become friends and not made the sport of these dogs." Kavad concurred and had Zilgibis killed along with his troops.[87] Justin II (r. 565–578), Justinian's nephew who became mentally unbalanced in the latter part of his reign, is reported to have told an Avar ambassador that "it is more painful to be the friends of the Avars—nomads and foreigners—than their enemies, since their friendship is treacherous."[88] The emperor Tiberios

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[84] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 354/355. We will discuss treaty and tribute below.

[85] Theophylaktos Simokattes, *Historia*, ed. C. De Boor, rev. P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1972), p. 121, *The History of Theophylact Simocatta*, Eng. trans. Michael Whitby and Mary Whitby (Oxford, 1986), pp. 80–81. After their defeat in 589 at the hands of Bahrām, the Türks, according to Theophanes, ed. De Boor, I, p. 262/Mango, p. 385, were now forced to pay the Persians the 40,000 gold coins that had previously been the tribute paid to them by Iran.

[86] Abū Sa'īd 'Abd al-Ḥayy b. Ḍaḥḥak al-Gardīzī, *Ta'rīḫ-i Gardīzī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (Tehran, 1363/1984), p. 579, see also Arsenio P. Martinez, "Gardīzī's Two Chapters on the Turks" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 2 (1982), p. 152.

[87] Accounts are found in Theophanes, ed. De Boor, I, pp. 167–168/trans. Mango, 254–56; *Chronicon Paschale*, ed. L. Dindorf (Bonn, 1832), p. 615, *Chronicon Paschale 284–628 A.D.*, trans. Michael Whitby and Mary Whitby (Liverpool, 1989), pp. 106–107; Io. Malalas, *Chronographia*, ed. L. Dindorf (Bonn, 1831), pp. 414–415; *The Chronicle of John Malalas*, trans. Elizabeth Jeffreys et al., (Melbourne, 1986), pp. 234–235.

[88] Menander/Blockley, pp. 140/141.

I (r. 578–582), who had been Justin's co-ruler, in a campaign into Caucasian Albania ca. 575 took hostages from the Sabirs and Alans. He then made a proposition to a Sabir and Alan delegation that he would pay double whatever the Persians were paying them to serve as his allies. The envoys duly agreed. Later, however, they "revolted" and "taking no account of their hostages, joined the Persians." Once again large sums were offered to those who would come over "willingly."[89] "Alliances," even after they were cemented with cash payments (or the promises of such), were rarely permanent.

Al-Qazwīnī (d. 1283) in his *Āṯār al-Bilād* (composed ca. 1275) says of the Turks of "Turkistān," that "they are distinguished from the rest of the peoples by their numbers, extreme bravery, endurance, their likeness to predatory animals (*ṣūrat al-sibā'*) . . ." He then goes on to tell the story of a Khwārazmian merchant caravan whose own military slave guards turned on them, saying "we want to kill you and take your goods. We will sell them and buy with them horses and weapons. We will go (to join) the service of the Sulṭān." The merchants were able to trick them with a plan of cooperation and they were subsequently arrested by the Khwārazmian ruler and crucified.[90] Whether the story is true or not is inconsequential; what is most telling is that al-Qazwīnī, a popular author, found it entirely plausible. The clerical authors and annalists of the Eastern Slavic chronicles, often simply term the nomads *poganye*, the "pagans" or the "accursed pagans." The memory of Avar cruelties to the Duleby Slavs was preserved in the Rus' chronicles. With some satisfaction, the *Povest' vremjannyx let* recalled the destruction of the Avar state (late 790's) commenting that it gave rise to a saying in Rus' that continued in use during the centuries up to the time of the compilation of the Rus' primary chronicle (twelfth century) "they perished like the Avars" (*pogiboša aki Obre*).[91]

Duplicity in politics was hardly the monopoly of the nomads. Menander reports the speech made by the Western Türk ruler, who appears under his title *Türk-šad* (Τούρξανθος), to the Byzantine envoy Valentinos in 576 when the latter asked the Türks to fulfill their treaty obligations and come to Constantinople's support against Iran: "Are

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[89] Menander/Blockley, pp. 162/263.

[90] Zakarīya b. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Qazwīnī, *Āṯār al-Bilād wa Aḫbār al-'Ibād* (Beirut, 1389/1969), p. 514.

[91] *PSRL*, I, cc. 11–12.

you not those very Romans who use ten tongues and lie with all of them?" Placing ten fingers in his mouth, he added "as now there are ten fingers in my mouth, so you Romans have used many tongues. Sometimes you deceive me, sometimes my slaves the Uarkhonitai . . ."[92] The reference here is to Byzantium's continuing diplomatic contacts with the Avars (Uarkhonitai). Menander, in his account of the Avar designs on the Balkan city of Sirmium, in 579, records the fears of the Avar Qağan regarding Byzantine intentions and inducements. "Many of the peoples," the Qağan says, "who had beforetimes come to this land had first been enticed with such gifts by the Romans, who in the end had attracted and destroyed them utterly."[93] The words uncannily mirror those of the Kül Tegin inscription (S5–6) warning the Türks to be wary of the enticements of China: "(China) gives without care (*bunsuz*) gold, silver, embroidered silk brocade (*išgüti*). The word of the Chinese people (*Tabğač bodun*) is sweet, its brocades (*ağısı*) are soft. Deceiving with sweet words and soft brocades, it draws near a distant people and after having them settle nearby, they begin to think evil thoughts about them. They do not permit good, wise or brave people to move . . . Being deceived by the sweet words and soft brocades, O Türk people, . . . many died . . ."[94]

## *The Art of War in the Steppes*

The sources are unanimous in their portrait of the steppe peoples as being the most skilled in warfare. According to Arab ethnic stereotyping, the Chinese were the masters of crafts and manufacture, the Greeks excelled in philosophy and wisdom, the Sāsānids in politics and the Turks in warfare.[95] What was the Eurasian nomads' art of war? First, we should note that, on the whole, war *in* the steppe for the nomads was usually not as destructive in its consequences as it was for the sedentary world.[96] Unless caught by surprise (which did happen), the nomads usually could quickly move out of harm's

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[92] Menander/Blockley, pp. 172/173–174/175.
[93] Menander/Blockley, pp. 226/227.
[94] *Orhon Yazıtları*, ed. Talât Tekin (Ankara, 1988), pp. 2/3–4/5.
[95] Cf. the comments of al-Jāḥiẓ/Şeşen, p. 80.
[96] Joseph Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives" *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 46 (1986), p. 14.

way.[97] This was not so of the sedentary, agrarian population of those states immediately bordering on the steppes. In 1103, Vladimir Monomax, the Rus' ruler, in response to the advice from the *družina* (comitatus) of Svjatopolk, another prince with whom he was conferring, not to embark on a Spring campaign for fear of ruining the peasants and their ploughed lands, replied "I am surprised that you are sorry for the horse with which one ploughs but do not take into consideration that when the peasant (*smerd*) begins to plough, the Cuman will come and strike him with an arrow, he will take his mare and riding into his village he will take his wife and children and all his property . . ."[98]

Although often giving the impression of loosely flowing forces, seeming to extemporize tactics as they went along, the Eurasian nomad armies were highly organized and disciplined. By the era of the Türk empire, the nomads across Eurasia were facing powerful, sedentary states and empires which they could not threaten with impunity. Responding to this, the nomads developed more structured armies, adopted new military technologies and created a heavily armed cavalry.[99] Organized according to the decimal principle (clearly articulated in the Činggisid armies about which we are much better informed), the armies were ordered according to cosmological concepts, geographical directions, colors and numbers. There was also a hierarchy of rank, observed in drinking and feasting ceremonies, that in states such as the Türks and Khazars, could be hereditary.[100] Tribal confederations were often built on a process of

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[97] The Rus', especially under Vladimir Monomax in the early twelfth century, carried out a number of attacks into Cuman lands, overrunning the Cuman "towns" and returning with many prisoners and booty, e.g. the campaign of 1103 and those that followed, see *PSRL*, I, cc. 277–279, II, cc. 252–256, VII, pp. 19–20.

[98] *PSRL*, II, cc. 252–253.

[99] Julij S. Xudjakov, *Vooruženie srednevekovyx kočevnikov Južnoj Sibiri i Central'noj Azii* (Novosibirsk, 1986), pp. 136–137.

[100] See the comments of Pohl, *Die Awaren*, p. 164; İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Türk Bozkır Kültürü* (Ankara, 1987), p. 71. See there also (p. 32) for the hierarchy of rank as well as Abdüllkadir İnan, "Orun ve "Ülüş Meselesi" in his *Makaleler ve İncelemeler* (Ankara, 1968), pp. 241–254. Epigraphic evidence for the decimal system can be seen in the Uyğur Moyun Čur inscription (N6): *bınga baši* "head of a military unit of 1000," see Gubajdulla Ajdarov, *Jazyk orxonskix pamjatnikov drevnetjurkskoj pis'mennosti VIII veka* (Alma-Ata, 1971), p. 344. The Crimean Tatars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century still maintained these organizational principles, see L.J.D. Collins, "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars 16th–17th centuries" in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, eds. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (Oxford, 1975), p. 258.

superstratification as other steppe peoples were brought into the union and often placed in the front ranks of fighting units.[101] Mobilization was all-inclusive. In preparing for a campaign against Sāsānid holdings in Transcaucasia in 626, the Türk-Khazar ruler "ordered all those who were under his command—divers nations and tribes, mountain-folk and plain-dwellers, men who lived under roofs and others who slept beneath the stars, seamen and landsmen . . . to come when he gave the signal, well prepared and ready-armed."[102]

This was, as Denis Sinor has phrased it, a "people's army;" there being no native Turkic or Mongol term specifically for "soldier."[103] Turkic designated a "warrior" with the term *er* "human male, man" and hence "fighting man, husband," etc.[104] Derived from this was *eren* "men" (based on a plural form) which came to mean "real man, fighting man."[105] The Turkic inscriptions of the Orxon and Yenisei make note of the *er at* "warrior-name" that a youth acquired at maturity and the completion of a rite of initiation involving hunting or military activity. Such customs were not unknown to later Turkic societies.[106] The Mongol term, *čerig* "warrior, soldier, army, military," derives from the Turkic *čerig* "troops drawn up in battle order" and then "army, troops."[107] Other terms we encounter are: *alp* "brave" (also "tough, resistant, hard to overcome") > *alpağut* "warrior" and *tonga* "hero, outstanding warrior"[108]

Women were included in the ranks of this fully mobilized society. Prokopios, aware, of course, of the legends of the Amazons whose origins he traces to the region of the Sabirs, reports that in the aftermath of "Hunnic" (i.e. Sabir) raids into Byzantine territory, the bod-

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[101] Gyula Németh, *A honfoglaló magyarság kialakulása* (Budapest, 1930, 2nd rev. ed., 1991), p. 45; György Györffy, "A csatlakozott népek" *Századok*, 92 (1958), pp. 44–76 reprinted in his *A magyarság keleti elemei* (Budapest, 1990), pp. 43–79; Artamonov, *Istorija xazar*, p. 345.

[102] Dasxurançi/Dowsett, pp. 82–83.

[103] Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors," *JAOS*, 101 (1981), p. 134.

[104] Sir Gerard Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish* (Oxford, 1972), p. 192.

[105] Clauson, *ED*, p. 232.

[106] Kül Tegin, E31: *inim kül tegin er at bulti* "my younger brother Kül Tegin received his warrior-name," see Tekin, *Orhon Yazıtları* (Ankara, 1988), p. 16; Kormušin, *Tjurkskie enisejskie épitafii*, pp. 128, 146, 172, 258–259; Sergej G. Kljaštornyj, Dmitrij G. Savinov, *Stepnye imperii Evrazii* (SPb., 1994), pp. 70–71.

[107] *Mongolian-English Dictionary*, ed. Ferdinand D. Lessing et al. (3rd reprinting, Bloomington, 1995), p. 173; Clauson, *ED*, pp. 428–429.

[108] Clauson, *ED*, pp. 127, 128, 515.

ies of women warriors were found among the enemy dead.[109] East Roman or Byzantine sources also knew of women rulers among the nomads. Malalas, among others, mentions the Sabir Queen Bōa/Bōarēz/Bōarēks (Βώα, Βωαρήζ, Βωαρήξ) who ruled some 100,000 people and could field an army of 20,000.[110] In 576 a Byzantine embassy to the Türks went through the territory of Ἀκκάγας "which is the name of the woman who rules the Scythians there, having been appointed at that time by Anagai, chief of the tribe of the Utigurs."[111] The involvement of women in governance (and hence in military affairs) was quite old in the steppe and was remarked on by the Classical Greek accounts of the Iranian Sarmatians.[112] It was also much in evidence in the Činggisid empire. These traditions undoubtedly stemmed from the necessities of nomadic life in which the whole of society was mobilized.

Ibn al-Faqīh, embellishing on tales that probably went back to the Amazons of Herodotos, says of one of the Turkic towns that their "women fight well together with them," adding that the women were very dissolute and even raped the men.[113] Less fanciful evidence is found in the *Jiu Tangshu* which, s.a. 835, reports that the Uyğur Qağan presented the Tang emperor with "seven women archers skillful on horseback."[114] Anna Komnena tells of a Byzantine soldier who was unhorsed with an iron grapple and captured by one of the women defenders as he charged the circled wagons of the Pečenegs.[115] Women warriors were known among the already Islamized Türkmen tribes of fifteenth century Anatolia and quite possibly among the Ottoman ġāzīs (cf. the *Bacıyân-ı Rûm* "sisters of Rūm").[116]

As contemporary and modern authors have noted, the nomadic life-style "promoted martial qualities, the equestrian archer, the coordinated hunt in times of peace, the tactical army in times of war."[117]

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[109] Prokopios, Loeb ed., V, pp. 74–79.

[110] Malalas, ed. Dindorf, pp. 430–431; Theophanes, ed. De Boor, I, p. 175, see also Golden, *Khazar Studies*, I, p. 258.

[111] Menander/Blockley, pp. 172–173.

[112] Anatolij M. Khazanov, *Social'naja istorija skifov* (Moskva, 1975), pp. 85–86.

[113] See Mašhad ms. 174a in Asadov, *Arabskie istočniki*, p. 55.

[114] Colin Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire according to the T'ang Dynastic Histories* (Canberra, 1972), p. 122

[115] Anna Komnena, ed. Schopen, I, p. 358, trans. Sewter, p. 231, trans. Ljubarskij, p. 216.

[116] See discussion in Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu* (2nd ed. Ankara, 1972), pp. 159–161.

[117] Fletcher, "The Mongols," *HJAS*, 46 91986), p. 14.

Indeed, herding, hunting and raiding formed a seamless web, one easily leading into the other. The importance of the hunt for military training was not lost on the Byzantines. The *Strategikon* of Maurice discusses this at length, noting that the "Scythian" method has greater risks involved.[118] Of the European Huns Jordanes noted that "they know nothing but hunting" and having formed into a tribe, attacked their neighbors. They were "most adept in horseriding" (*ad equitandum promptissimi*) and "very well versed in bows and arrows" (*et ad arcos sagittasque parati*).[119] Contemporaries were also impressed with the speed with which these forces moved. The Činggisid Mongols, it has been estimated, could cover about 200 kilometers per day.[120]

*Training*

The fluidity of movement, so typical of the nomadic art of war, derived not only from a life spent constantly in the saddle. These were well-schooled and disciplined armies. Theophylaktos Simokattes says that the Oğur people was one of the strongest nations "on account of its large population and its armed training for war."[121] The Western Türk Qağans, according to aṭ-Ṭabarī had a special protected zone consisting of a meadow and a mountain in which hunting was forbidden. This was perhaps the private preserve (Turk. *qoruğ*) of the Qağan. There were three days of training in the mountain and three days in the meadow. Weapons (bows and arrows) were also stockpiled here.[122] As was noted earlier in the *Strategikon* (see above), the Türks "are trained in nothing but being ready to attack the enemy courageously." Discipline was strict. The *Strategikon* also remarks that the Türks, "governed not by love but by fear, . . . bravely bear the toils of battle and hardship." The Khazar general, Bluč'an, was cruelly executed when he failed to bring the Georgian

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[118] Maurice, *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, p. 380.

[119] Jordanes, *Getica*: *Iordan, O proisxoždenii i dejanijax getov*, ed. Russ. trans. Elena Č. Skržinskaja (Moskva, 1960), Latin, p. 151/Russ. 123, 125–6, 128, cited by Priskos/Blockley, II, 222/223.

[120] According to the estimate of Krzysztof Dąbrowski, Teresa Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk and Edward Tryjarski, *Hunowie europejscy, Protobułgarzy, Chazarowie, Pieczyngowie* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk, 1975), p. 109.

[121] Theoph. Sim., ed. De Boor, pp. 257–258, trans. Whitby and Whitby, p. 189.

[122] aṭ-Ṭabarī, ed. Ibrāhīm, VII, p. 113.

princess Šušan alive (she committed suicide) to the Qağan who wanted to marry her.[123]

Ibn Faḍlān who in 921–922 journeyed to the Volga Bulğars, vassals of the Khazars, reports that when the Khazar qaghan sent out a military force:

> it cannot retreat for any reason in any way. If it is put to rout, they kill all who turned away. As for the commander and his deputy, if they are put to rout they are confined and their children are confined. They [the children] are [then] given, in their presence, to others. They view this in the same way as if they were criminals. Their utensils (*matāʿ*) and their weapons and homes [are also given away to others]. Sometimes, [the Qağan] cuts each one of them into two pieces and crucifies them and sometimes he hangs them by the neck from trees. Sometimes, he reduces them to a lowly rank, if he feels kindly towards them.[124]

Armies based on tribal unions, especially those containing unwilling members, were not easy to hold together, hence the harsh discipline. Byzantine sources report that the Avars were much concerned about this. In the campaign of 601, the Qağan "became greatly terrified" over the large number of defections and made great efforts to win back the defectors. The *Strategikon* attributed the desertions to the instability of the nomads, their greed and the lack of kinship among the tribes.[125]

### *Battle Order, Offense and Tactics*

The term for troops in a battle order or battle-line in Turkic was *čerig* (see above), which eventually replaced Old Turkic *sü* to denote "army."[126] One who was able to break the battle-line was called *sökmen*,[127] which was also a military title and later, in Anatolia, a dynastic name. According to Jordanes, Attila, at the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields, held the center with his best forces (*cum suis fortissimis*), placing

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[123] *K'art'lis C'xovreba*, ed. Qauxč'išvili, I, pp. 249–250. He was strangled by two horsemen pulling on ropes about his neck in opposite directions.

[124] Aḥmad ibn Faḍlān, *Risāla*: *Ibn Faḍlān's Reisebericht*, ed. Germ. trans. and commentary by Ahmet Zeki Validi Togan in *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 24/3 (1939), Arabic text, p. 45/Germ. p. 101.

[125] Theoph. Sim., ed. De Boor, p. 293, trans. Whitby and Whitby, p. 217; *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, p. 272.

[126] Clauson, *ED*, pp. 428–429, 781.

[127] From *sök-* "to tear apart, pull down, break through," Clauson, *ED*, p. 819.

the subject peoples on the wings.[128] Such, perhaps, was the preferred arrangement in unions that were composed of highly diverse ethnic elements.

The *Strategikon* has a lengthy section on this.[129] It begins by noting that the Türks and Avars do not set up a proper military camp, but "are scattered about according to tribe and clan," although sentries are sent out and posted at a distance to prevent a surprise attack. They begin to draw up their battle order (παρατάξις) at night. Unlike the Byzantines and Persians who form three units [or divisions], the Türks and Avars are divided into different groupings (μοίραις), "compactly joining together the divisions in order to appear as one battle line." They also hold a force outside of the battle line,[130] which they use for ambushes and to help those who are in difficulty. Spare horses are held behind the lines and the baggage train is one or two miles from the troops in the battle line and kept off to the right or left. The ranks are somewhat uneven, but the front (τὸ μέτωπον) "is both even and thickly packed."[131] They prefer to fight "from afar, with ambushes and encirclement of the enemy, false retreats and [unexpected] wheeling around, counterattacks, and lines that are wedge-shaped, that is, are scattered." Once the opponents are defeated, they run them down and completely destroy them. If they take refuge in a fort, they wear them down and force them to surrender. The large number of horses that they have with them requires considerable pasturage. This can work to their disadvantage. They do not fight well on foot and prefer to deal with tightly formed opposing infantry from horseback. If they are defeated, the author of the *Strategikon* warns, they should be pursued with caution, because they do not recognize defeat, but will stage counterattacks and "will make it their business, through many ways, to attack the enemy."

The nomads' tactics were carefully observed by the Byzantine military and adopted in their own training. In his discussion of the

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[128] Jordanes/Skržinskaja, Lat. p. 162, Russ. p. 105.

[129] *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, pp. 270–274.

[130] This is most probably the reserve force, *yetüt* noted by Maḥmūd al-Kāšġarī/Dankoff, II, p. 106 "reserves in an army. It is taken from the phrase *yetüt sač* "hair that is left loose after being tied." Clauson, *ED*, p. 886, reads this as *yatut* < *yat-* "lie down," i.e. "lying down, waiting."

[131] The *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, notes elsewhere (p. 74) that the arrangement of forces in units of varying sizes is typical of the Türks and Avars.

"Scythian drill," this same author says that no distinction is made between attackers and defenders, they form one battle line, divided into two halves and practice an encirclement maneuver (κύκλωσιν). In the "Alan drill" the feigned retreat and counterattack was practiced.[132] The nomads shooting arrows in retreat were every bit as effective as when attacking.[133] The feigned retreat, associated with the nomads for a millennium, nonetheless continued to fool their enemies. In the 629/630 Türk-Khazar campaign in Transcaucasia, the Khazars met the Sāsānid troops and "immediately took flight, but only to appear later on both flanks to challenge" the Persians. They then surrounded and destroyed the Persian army.[134] In the Qarakhanid army, as described by Maḥmūd al-Kāšġarī, there was the tactic called the "Pleiades battle order" (*ülker čerig*) in which the troops retreated in squadrons and then following the lead of one, would turn around and attack. "Using this stratagem they are seldom routed." The attack on the flanks was called *bögürle-: ol yağını bögürledi* "he broke into the enemy ranks from right or left so that he routed him without meeting him head on."[135] The Cumans were great masters of the feigned retreat and counterattack as they demonstrated in campaigns in the Balkans in 1187 and 1205.[136]

The arrangements of troops could vary according to topography and other strategic factors. Thus, Theophylaktos Simokattes in his descriptions of a number of Avar engagements has them divided into fifteen companies in one, a single division in another and twelve companies in yet another battle.[137] In the eleventh century, Michael Psellos saw only disorder, remarking of the Pečenegs, that "they are not divided up by battalions and when they go to war they have no strategic plan to guide them." They attack, he writes, "in one mass, close-packed and pell-mell" and "when they break away there is no order in their retreat." Nonetheless, he notes, they remarkably

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[132] *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, p. 158.

[133] al-Jāḥiẓ/Şeşen, p. 67.

[134] Dasxuranci/Dowsett, pp. 104–105.

[135] From *bögür* "kidney"> *bögürle-* "to hit on the kidneys," see Kāšġarī/Dankoff, I, p. 128, II, p. 319; Clauson, *ED*, pp. 328–329.

[136] Niketas Choniatēs, *Historia*, ed., H.-L. van Dieten (Berlin, 1975), pp. 397, 616–617, Eng. trans. *O City of Byzantium. Annals of Niketas Choniatēs*, trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1984), pp. 218, 337.

[137] Theoph. Sim., ed. De Boor, pp. 286, 287, 288, trans. Whitby and Whitby, pp. 212, 213.

all re-group.[138] Anna Komnena, however, who was a far better observer of military affairs, recounts that in the 1087 campaign, the Pečenegs "know how to arrange a phalanx. So, after placing ambuscades, binding together their ranks in close formation, making a sort of rampart from their covered wagons (on this see below), they advance en masse . . .," shooting arrows from a distance.[139]

Not all forces of Eurasian nomadic origin were mounted, although the overwhelming majority of our references to them would appear to indicate that most were. For example, Agathias mentions a Sabir mercenary force in Byzantine service who were heavy infantry (ὁπλιτών).[140]

Battles were sometimes prefaced by "scare tactics." According to Menander, the Avars at the beginning of a battle raised "a wild cacophony," howling and beating their drums and "raising such a noise as to stress and terrify the Romans." Having experienced this on a number of occasions, the Byzantine commanders used to forewarn their troops, thereby lessening the impact.[141]

The ambush was a favorite tactic and is commented on by virtually all the sources. The *Strategikon* devotes a section to the feigned retreat and "Scythian ambush." Two famous incidents involving rulers may be noted. The Hephthalites killed the Sāsānid ruler Pērōz (r. 459–484) leading him into a trap that consisted of "a series of carefully camouflaged pits and trenches that stretched over the plain for a very great distance."[142] Sometime ca. 619, the Avars attempted to abduct by ambush the Byzantine Emperor Herakleios. The latter barely escaped, fleeing back to Constantinople with his foes in hot pursuit.[143] The Khazars in their wars with the Arabs in the North Caucasus (e.g., s.a. 652/653) are also reported to have set ambushes, hiding behind the thickets and shooting arrows at the Arabs.[144]

Campaigns were planned and often coordinated with other groups or peoples favorable to them. During the Türk-Khazar invasion of

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[138] Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*: Michel Psellos, *Chronographie*, ed., trans. E. Renauld (Paris, 1926, 1928), II, pp. 124–127, Eng. Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 318–319.

[139] Anna Komnena, ed. Schopen, I, pp. 344–345, trans. Ljubarskij, 209–210, trans. Sewter, p. 224.

[140] Agathias, ed. Keydell, p. 106, trans. Frendo, p. 87.

[141] Menander/Blockley, pp. 130/131.

[142] Agathias, ed. Keydell, pp. 157–158, trans. Frendo, p. 130.

[143] Nikephoros/Mango, pp. 50/51–52/53.

[144] aṭ-Ṭabarī, ed. Ibrāhīm, IV, pp. 304–305.

Caucasian Albania in 628, the invaders had "planned it all in advance," the various groups being given different military targets. Dasxuranc'i reports that they "all attacked as one man and swallowed up our country at the time appointed."[145] During the Arab siege of the Khazar North Caucasian city of Balanjar in 652/653, the Khazars outside the city coordinated a joint attack with the defenders against the Arabs that broke the siege and killed the Arab commander.[146]

Probably the most ambitious undertaking was the failed joint Avar-Persian attack on Constantinople in 626. However, this was not the first such coordinated Avar land and sea attack. In his attempt on Sirmium in 579, the Avar Qağan had boats built on the spot to transport part of his forces and sent them off, rowed by oarsmen who were obviously inexperienced in this. Meanwhile, his larger land force marched off as well. He deceived the Byzantines, saying that he was intending to attack the Slavs who had not paid him their annual tribute. The Avars built a bridge and cut the city off. In the meantime, the Byzantines, who were busy fighting the Persians as well, tried to scare them off with intimations that the Türks might attack them. The Avars were aware that Constantinople was bluffing and suggested that the city, which the Qağan considered strategically important as a Byzantine staging area for attacks against the Avars, be evacuated. Byzantine attempts at averting the attack by sending "gifts" to buy off the enemy also failed. The Byzantines remained determined to retain the city but despite these efforts lost it, finally, in 582.[147]

### *Defense*

The *Strategikon* faults the Türks and Avars for not establishing a proper bivouac, and being instead scattered about "according to clan and tribe."[148] The most common nomadic tactic of defense was the circling of the wagons on which the nomads moved their families and possessions. Thus, Anna Komnena reports that as the Pečenegs prepared for battle, "they fenced off their army with covered wagons, like towers, and then moved by units against the emperor and

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[145] Dasxuranci/Dowsett, p. 97.
[146] aṭ-Ṭabarī, ed. Ibrāhīm, IV, p. 304.
[147] Menander/Blockley, pp. 216/217–226/227; Pohl, *Die Awaren*, pp. 70–76; Kovačević, *Avarski kaganat*, pp. 46–51.
[148] *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, p. 270.

began to shoot their arrows from a distance."[149] In a campaign of 1121–22 (or 1123), the Pecheneg response to a Byzantine attempt to surprise them with a dawn attack was to deploy their wagons in a circle. They, then, "positioned a goodly number of their troops on them and fashioned a palisade. They cut many oblique passage ways through the wagons, enabling them to take refuge behind them as though they were walls whenever hard pressed . . . When rested they sallied out through the gates . . . This tactic devised by the Patzinaks, which, in effect, was the same as fighting from walls, frustrated the Roman assault."[150]

The nomads also brought defense materials with them, a kind of portable fort. Gardīzī reports that the Khazars had each of their horsemen bring with him a "peg sharpened at [one] end (that is) the length of three cubits . . . These pegs are implanted [in a circle] around the army. [Then,] a shield is hung from each peg" forming a palisade.[151] Perhaps something similar can be seen in Jordanes's account of the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields. At one point, Attila, hard-pressed by the Visigoths, retreated to the cover of the "fences of his camps" (*septa castrorum*).[152] Menander tells us that the Byzantine embassy of 569 as it made its way through the Türk-controlled territory of the Χοαλιτῶν or Χολιατῶν, "travelled through fortresses.[153]

Ibn Rusta (writing ca. 903, but based on earlier sources from the mid- to late ninth century)[154] says that the Khazars dug trenches

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[149] Anna Komnena, ed. Schopen, I, pp. 344–345, trans. Ljubarkskij, pp. 209–210, trans. Sewter, p. 224.

[150] Nik. Choniates, ed. van Dieten, pp. 14–15, trans. Magoulias, pp. 10–11. See the detailed account in John Kinnamos, *Ioannis Cinnami Epitome*, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn, 1836), pp. 7–8, Eng. trans.: *The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus*, trans. Charles M. Brand (New York, 1976), pp. 15–16.

[151] Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 582, Martinez, pp. 154–155; Marwazī/Minorsky, Arabic, p. 21/33 has a similar account, adding "in this way in less than an hour round the encampment a wall is made which cannot be pierced."

[152] Jordanes/Skržinskaja, Russ. p. 107, Lat., p. 164. Elsewhere, Jordanes/Skržinskaja, Russ. p. 101, Lat., p. 159, mentions a "village" (*vicum*)—or more likely a camp or *ordu*, which was "like an immense city" (*instar civitatis amplissimae*) with stout walls. Attila preferred these camps to cities. Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 264/265 also mentions a village in which Attila had a residence which was surrounded by "a wooden wall which was built with an eye not to security but to elegance." The walls also had towers.

[153] Menander/Blockley, 120/121–122/123. Some are inclined to see various Turkic names here, cf.Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II, p. 345 and the literature cited there.

[154] Tadeusz Lewicki, *Źródła arabskie do dziejów Słowiańszczyzny* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk, 1956, 1969, 1977), II/2, pp. 7–17; Ignatij Ju. Kračkovskii, *Arabskaja geografičeskaja literatura* in his *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Moskva-Leningrad, 1955–1969), IV,

(*ḫandaqat*) "about themselves" to serve as protection from the Majġhariyya (Magyars) and other neighboring peoples.[155] They also constructed (or had constructed for them) forts situated at strategic points. Thus, in 838, the Byzantines built the fort of Sarkel (noted as Sharkil, Sarqil or Sarqil, cf. Σάρκελ, שרכיל, שרקל, סרקל etc.) on the Don, as a protection, it would appear, against the Pečenegs. Three hundred Khazar guards were posted there.[156] There were also riparian Khazar defense units on the lower Volga and lower Don aimed at checking the Oğuz and Rus' amongst others. Of them, our source, al-Mas'ūdī, only says that they are in a "state of armed readiness" but gives no description of their fortifications—if any.[157] There was a Khazar fort at the Straits of Kerč (usually identified with Ταμάταρχα of the Byzantine sources and the later Rus' city of Tmurtorokan'[158]), which the Byzantines tried to destroy using the Rus'.[159] Whether this fort was actually constructed by the Khazars or taken over by them is unclear. Constantine Porphyrogenitus mentions a series of "deserted cities" to the west of the Dnestr facing Balkan Bulgaria. These may have been forts built to protect the river crossings. Although the names given by our source may be Pečeneg, they appear to antedate Pečeneg control of that region. They may go back to Khazar times or even earlier. The traces of churches and crosses found there suggested to Constantine that these were earlier Byzantine settlements. Perhaps, like Sarkel, they had been built for the Khazars by the Byzantines. In any event, in his day, they were no longer serving any military function.[160]

The Volga Bulğars, whose ruler, a vassal of the Khazar Qağan, converted to Islam in the early tenth century, requested in his letter

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pp. 131–133, 159–160; Mihály Kmoskó, *Mohamedán írók a steppe népeiről* (Budapest, 1997), I/1, pp. 66–69.

[155] Abū 'Alī b. 'Umar Ibn Rusta, *Kitāb al-A'lāq an-Nafīsa*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1892), p. 143.

[156] Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, ed. Moravcsik, trans. Jenkins, pp. 182/183–184/185; Theophanes Continuatus, *Historiae*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1838), pp. 122–124. See also Golden, *Khazar Studies*, I, pp. 239–243 for the forms of this toponym. For the most recent description of Sarkel, see Svetlana A. Pletnëva, *Sarkel i "šëlkovyj put'"* (Voronež, 1996).

[157] al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, ed. Pellat, I, p. 218.

[158] See discussions in Golb and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents*, pp. 36, 104–105, 128, 137.

[159] Shepard, "Constantine VII's Doctrine," *ΓΕΝΝΑΔΙΟΣ*, p. 266.

[160] Constante Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, ed. Moravcsik, trans. Jenkins, pp. 168/169; Golden, *Khazar Studies*, I, pp. 249–250.

to the Caliphate that resulted in the dispatch of the mission of 921–922 that was to aid him in creating a Muslim infrastructure for his state that a fort be built by the Arabs for him "out of his fear of the king of the Khazars."[161] The Balkan Bulğars had fortifications to which they retreated from the attacks of Constantine IV (r. 668–685).[162] The existence of fortifications was, obviously, a necessity dictated by terrain and foes. The Kimek, a Qağan-led state centered in Western Siberia, had no fortified or walled settlements,[163] since the surrounding Uralic forest peoples with whom they had extensive trade relations simply did not pose that kind of threat.

Of the various Eurasian nomads in the Western Steppes, only the Türks and the Khazars who derived in part from the latter, constituted actual states. Not surprisingly, we are somewhat better informed about their military structure. We shall focus on the Türk-Khazar and Khazar forces. Archaeological evidence indicates that at least some portion of the Türk army consisted of heavy cavalry alongside the light cavalry bowmen so typical of the Eurasian steppe armies.[164] The North Caucasian Huns, a vassal people of the Khazars ruled by Alp *İlteber* included among his forces Hunnic and other "vigorous peoples of the land of Gog . . . bearing halberds, and archers and cataphracti, armoured and helmeted."[165] This, perhaps, indicated a force that had both heavy cavalry and archer-light cavalry. Ibn Saʿīd, a thirteenth century author from Muslim Spain, says that the Khazars had unusually large horses,[166] indicative, perhaps, of heavy cavalry. Archaeological evidence would appear to indicate the presence of heavy and light cavalry among the Khazars,[167] the Pečenegs, Western Oğuz (Torks) and Cumans.[168]

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[161] Ibn Faḍlān/Togan, Arabic, p. 35/Germ. pp. 80–81.

[162] Nikephoros/Mango, pp. 90/91.

[163] Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 553, Martinez, p. 122.

[164] Gumilëv, *Drevnie tjurki*, pp. 68–70, suggests that the light cavalry was drawn from subject populations and that it was their heavy cavalry that gave the Türks their advantage. See also Xudjakov, *Vooruženie*, pp. 137, 166 who views the light cavalry as being the basic military core of the Türks.

[165] Dasxuranci/Dowsett, p. 150; Dieter Ludwig, *Struktur und Gesellschaft des Chazaren-Reiches im Licht der schriftlichen Quellen* (Münster, 1982), pp. 228–289.

[166] See (Oxford) Bodleian, ms. I, 874, f. 71 cited in Dunlop, *History*, p. 225.

[167] Svetlana A. Pletnëva, *Očerki xazarskoj arxeologii* (Moskva-Ierusalim, 1999), pp. 207–208 and illustration 122.

[168] Svetlana A. Pletnëva, "Pečenegi, torki i polovcy v južnorusskix stepjax'," *Trudy Volgo-Donskoj arxeologičeskoj ékspedicii*, I, in *Materialy i Issledovanija po Arxeologii SSSR*, 62 (Moskva-Leningrad, 1958), p. 197. Some of the literary sources (e.g. Psellos, ed. Renauld, II, pp. 124–127, trans. Sewter, pp. 317–319), however, portray the Pečenegs as an undisciplined mass without helmets, shields etc. i.e. light cavalry.

In the early Türk-Khazar or Proto-Khazar period (up to ca. 650), when the Khazars were not yet clearly distinguished from the Türk Qağanate, we have some evidence, hardly surprising, for the existence of an elite force, perhaps a royal *comitatus* like the *Böri* of the Türks.[169] In the Transcaucasian campaign of 626, Herakleios was given a "strong, elite force of cavalry and skilled archers, about a thousand in number" which may refer to such a grouping.[170] It is interesting that Dasxuranc'i distinguishes between the cavalry (probably heavy cavalry) and the archers (most probably the light cavalry). The number of troops probably points to the decimal system typical of the Eurasian nomads.

Ibn Aʿṯam al-Kūfī, in his account of the warfare in the North Caucasus between the Arabs and Khazars that took place in 731, notes the presence of "one thousand men from the *ṭarḫāns* of the Khazars whom the king of the Khazars had organized there," a reference, perhaps, to a special unit or *comitatus* of the ruler. In that same author's account of Marwān's successful foray into Khazaria in 737, mention is made of a Khazar commander, named Hazār Ṭarḫān, and the "40,000 sons of *ṭarḫāns*" serving with him.[171] While the number is almost certainly unrealistic, and this could hardly be the same unit mentioned more than a century previously in connection with Herakleios, it might, nonetheless, again point to a special, elite force or royal *comitatus* drawn from the ranks of those who held the dignity of *tarqan*. The latter is an ancient, Inner Asian title (possibly of Xiongnu origin) that by this time denoted important administrative responsibilities.[172] These "40,000 sons of ṭarḫāns" are, perhaps, the "retinue" (*ḥāšiya*) of 4000 that the Qağan had, according to al-Iṣṭaḫrī.[173] The title *tudun*, a high Türk title often associated

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[169] Liu, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, I, pp. 9, 181: "all the guard officers [of the Türks, pbg] are called *fu-li*" (= *böri* "wolf," the Türk ancestral totem).

[170] Dasxurançi/Dowsett, p. 87. Ludwig, *Gesellschaft*, pp. 286–287, quite properly, wonders whether this was an already existing force or one specially selected for the occasion. Theophanes, ed. de Boor, I p. 316, trans. Mango, p. 447 says it numbered 40,000; see also Dionysius of Tel Maḥrē in *The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles*, ed. trans. A. Palmer et al. (Liverpool, 1993), p. 137. The chronology of these events is confused, Theophanes dating it to 624/625.

[171] Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Ibn Aʿṯam al-Kūfī, *Kitāb al-Futūḥ*, ed. ʿAbdu'l-Muʿīd Ḫān Bukhārī (Hyderabad, 1969–1975), VIII, pp. 61, 72.

[172] Golden, *Khazar Studies*, I, p. 181; Ludwig, *Gesellschaft*, pp. 151–153, 289 would also see in the entourage (*aṭrāf*) of the son of the Qağan, noted by Ibn Aʿṯam al-Kūfī, VIII, pp. 52–53, another reference to a grouping of his "closest dependents and nobles." On *tarqan*, see Clauson, *ED*, pp. 539–540.

[173] Abū Isḥāq Fārisī al-Iṣṭaḫrī, *Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1870), p. 220.

with tax collection, noted among the Khazars, may also have involved some military police functions.[174]

The command of the army was always in the hands of the *Yabğu Qağan* (Jebu Xak'an of the Armenian sources) or of his son who bore the title *Šad*. The latter had a council of advisors as well as a "trusted governor and tutor."[175] By the mid-ninth century, when the Khazars come fully into the view of the Muslim sources, we begin to see the outline of the dual system of rule that is fully in evidence in the tenth century and later authors. By this time, the Qağan had become a sacral ruler and the day to day administration of governmental affairs, including the military, was in the hands of the *Qağan-Beg* (variously given in our sources as *Qağan Beg, Beg, Šad, Yillig*). Indeed, his mere presence was enough to halt bloodshed. As al-Iṣṭaḫrī notes, "they do not fight with him because of their veneration of him."[176]

We have several relatively detailed reports on the Khazar army. Ibn Rusta (whose sources date to the mid- to late ninth century) says that the *Šad* calls up a levy of horsemen from the powerful and wealthy "commensurate with their possessions."[177] He conducts annual raids on the Pečenegs, personally leading the army. His soldiers "have a handsome appearance," going out "in full armament, having banners, spears and strong coats of mail. His mounted retinue (*rakābuhu*) [number] 10,000 horsemen, among whom [are those] who are bound by wages paid to them and among them [also] are those who are levied on the rich."[178] When he is out on campaign, he is preceded

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[174] Pronounced **toḏun* according to Clauson, *ED*, p. 457; Golden, *Khazar Studies*, I, pp. 215–216; Ludwig, *Gesellschaft*, 287.

[175] Dasxurançi/Dowsett, pp. 95, 98; Ludwig, *Gesellschaft*, p. 287. Here we see an example of the *atabeg* system, known under a variety of names among the Turkic peoples, on Seljuk *atabeg*, see Osman Turan, *Selçuklular Tarihi ve Türk-Islâm Medeniyeti* (Ankara, 1965), pp. 221–222; on the *ataliq* of the Uzbeks, see Robert D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia* (Princeton, 1991), p. 58.

[176] Al-Iṣṭaḫrī, ed. de Goeje, p. 224; see also al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, ed. Pellat, I, p. 214. On the Khazar sacral rulership, see P.B. Golden, "Gosudarstvo i gosudarstvennost' u xazar: vlast' xazarskix kaganov, "(ed.), *Fenomen vostochnogo despotizma. Struktura upravlenija i vlasti*, ed. N.A. Ivanov (Moskva, 1993), pp. 211–233.

[177] This and the account that follows is found in Ibn Rusta, ed. de Goeje, p. 140. The *Šad* is noted as *īšā* in this author.

[178] This, perhaps, hints at some kind of feudal structure in which wealthy families were required to produce certain numbers of soldiers (according to the size of their holdings?), a foreshadowing of later Mamlūk and Mughal practices, see John Critchley, *Feudalism* (London, 1978), pp. 24–27, 40, 59–60; Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages. The Early Mamlūk Sultanate 1250–1382* (Carbondale- Edwardsville, 1986), p. 40.

by "a drum-like contraption shaped like the sun which a horseman who rides in front of him carries. He goes forth and his army follows him and they see the light of that sun-like (drum)." War booty is brought to the Šad who takes what he likes and then gives the rest to be distributed. Gardīzī, clearly based on the same sources, has a similar account, adding that the annual raids on the Pečenegs netted animals (*māl*) and captives. He also remarks that the Šad (text *išād*) "himself takes the land/agricultural tax (*ḫarāj*) and dispenses it to the army."[179] Of the 10,000 horsemen,[180] "some of these receive a salary and some are from the military following (*waḍīʿat*) of the wealthy who accompany the king in their own armor and equipment." Here, we are probably dealing with the *comitatus* or military retinue of the tribal or clan chiefs. Even when this army goes out, "they still leave a large army at home to protect their families and wealth." In Gardīzī, the sun-like drum contraption is replaced by the scouts carrying candles who go before the king providing light so that the army may advance.

Al-Iṣṭaḫrī (writing in the mid-tenth century but drawing on earlier sources)[181] says, as we have previously noted, that the Khazar king has a retinue/entourage of 4000. He adds further that the king has a constant army of 12,000 men (when one dies he is replaced). "They do not receive a regular salary (*jirāya dārra*) except for whatever trifle reaches them after a long period." This army assembles around the ruler when war or some other calamity occurs. The army together with the king and his retinue and the so-called "pure Khazars" (*al-ḫazar al-ḫullaṣ*, perhaps a corruption of some term for the Qalis/Ḫalis/Khwārazmians)[182] lived in the western part of the capital city, Atıl/İtil.[183] Al-Masʿūdī, writing in the 930's, has an important notice on the *Ors* (الارسيه: *al-Ursiyya*),[184] the name of the

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[179] This and the account that follows is found in Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, pp. 580–582, Martinez, pp. 154–155. My translation occasionally differs slightly from that of Martinez.

[180] The same figure is repeated by al-Marwazī/Minorsky, Arabic, pp. 21/33.

[181] Kračkovskij, *Arabskaja geografičeskaja literatura* in his *Izbrannye sočinenija*, IV, pp. 196–198; Mihály Kmoskó, "Die Quellen Iṣṭachrī's in seinem Berichte über die Chasaren," *Körösi Csoma Archivum*, I (1921–1925), pp. 141–148.

[182] See Dunlop's discussion of this question, *History*, pp. 94–95, esp. n. 21.

[183] Al-Iṣṭaḫrī, ed. de Goeje, pp. 220–222. Ibn Ḥawqal, *Kītāb Ṣūrat al-Arḍ* (Beirut, 1992), pp. 330ff., his contemporary closely follows this account.

[184] On the proper reading, see Tadeusz Lewicki, "Un peuple iranien peu connu: les *Arsiya ou *Orsiyya" in Gy. Káldy-Nagy (ed.), *Studies in Honour of Julius Németh* (Budapest, 1976), pp. 31–33 and Peter B. Golden, "Cumanica III: Urusoba," *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III*, ed. Denis Sinor (Bloomington, 1990), pp. 33–46.

Khwārazmian guard that constituted the standing army (*jund*) of the king and in whom the king placed his "complete trust." They were permitted the free and public practice of their Islamic faith and the chief minister (*wazīr*) of the king was, in al-Masʿūdī's time, selected from their number. They were not required to participate in Khazar wars against Muslims. "Of them, there rides with the king 7000 archers in cuirass, helmets, and coats of mail. They also have lancers who have weapons and arms in the Muslim manner."[185] These were, perhaps, heavy cavalry in the Iranian tradition. Our source adds that "among the kings of the East in this region, no one except for the king of the Khazars has armed forces of mercenaries (*junūd murtaziqa*)."[186] It is unclear if this statement refers to the *Ors* guard or the salaried soldiers noted in our other sources—if they are not one and the same.

The Khazar Qağans could also draw on the manpower of their subject peoples, the North Caucasian "Huns," the Iranian Alans, the Oğur Turkic Bulğaric peoples of the Ponto-Caspian steppes and Middle Volga region, the Burtas of the Volga region and others. Of the Burtas (*Burṭās, Burdās* Russ. *Brutas*), whose ethnicity is uncertain,[187] we have sparse and contradictory notices. In part, this may stem from their complex ethnic antecedents. Two groups appear to be present, one nomadic or semi-nomadic, the other settled. They lacked a central political authority and had different burial customs, a clear indication of two distinct populations. Ibn Rusta and Gardīzī say that they have 10,000 mounted warriors. They are armed with bows, javelins and battle axes and fight constantly with the Volga Bulğars and Pečenegs.[188]

The Volga Bulğar confederation,[189] composed of three tribal groupings, was ruled by a "king" who had the title of *yılṭawar*.[190] His

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[185] Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, ed. Pellat, I, p. 213.

[186] Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, ed. Pellat, I, p. 214.

[187] Omeljan Pritsak, "The Khazar Kingdom's Conversion to Judaism" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, II (1978), p. 264, suggests: **Furtas* the "River As." The As or Alano-As were an Iranian people of thesteppe zone and North Caucasus.

[188] Ibn Rusta, ed. de Goeje, pp. 140–141; Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, pp. 582–583, Martinez, pp. 155–157; Marwazī/Minorsky, Arabic, pp. 21/33. Gardīzī elsewhere says only the well to do have horses.

[189] For a general overview, see Tryjarski, "Protobułgarzy" in Dąbrowski et al., *Hunowie*, 181ff.

[190] *Yılṭawar* = Common Turkic *il-teber* "a title for a tribal ruler subordinate to a superior ruler," on *il-teber* see Clauson, *ED*, p. 134.

authority was not always accepted by the different elements in the Bulghar union, as Ibn Faḍlān notes. The only taxes due him were one sable pelt per household (*fī kull bait*),[191] but if the king sent out a raiding party, he was entitled to a share in the booty along with the rest.[192] The *Ḥudūd* says that they could put forth 20,000 horsemen.[193] Ibn Rusta and Gardīzī allow them only 10,000 horsemen, Ibn Rusta noting that their warriors, had armor and sharp weapons. Gardīzī says simply that they have good weapons and riding stock.[194]

Our sources on the details of the military forces of the later nomads are remarkably meager. Gardīzī reports that the Pečenegs were engaged in slaving expeditions against their neighbors (and were raided in return) and had many weapons and "banners and pennants which they raise up in battle [as well as] bugles made from the horns of oxen which they sound in battle."[195] Both the Pečenegs and the Cuman-Qıpčaqs lacked central leadership, a circumstance that their opponents tried to exploit.[196]

### *Numbers*

It is almost impossible to gauge with any degree of accuracy the number of troops that any of these groups could field. The numbers given in our sources are, most probably, inflated. They frequently refer to their "great multitudes."[197] The Rus' chronicles compare their numbers to "great forests" (*jako borove velicii*).[198] An

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[191] Ibn Rusta, ed. de Goeje, p. 141, however, says that they paid their ruler a tribute of one "riding animal." The same tax was levied on marriages.

[192] Ibn Faḍlān/Togan, Arabic, pp. 27, 33/Germ. pp. 60, 74–75. The Burtas were frequent targets of their raids.

[193] *Ḥudūd*, ed. Sotoodeh, p. 195, trans. Minorsky, p. 163.

[194] Ibn Rusta, ed. de Goeje, pp. 140–141; Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, pp. 582, 585, Martinez, pp. 155, 158.

[195] Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 579, Martinez, pp. 151–152.

[196] Golden, *Introduction*, pp. 266–267, 279–280. Cf. the incident, in 1121/1122 or 1122/1123, reported by Niketas Choniatēs, ed. van Dieten, pp. 13–16, trans. Magoulias, pp. 10–11 in which the Emperor John Komnenos sent Pečeneg-speaking envoys to the different field camps of the Pečenegs in an attempt to persuade at least some of them to withdraw.

[197] Cf. Anna Komnena, trans. Ljubarskij, p. 202, Sewter, p. 214, who refers to their "enormous resources of manpower."

[198] *PSRL*, II, cc. 254, 267, e.g. "the Cuman forces came like forests and one could not see them all." The seventeenth century French traveller Beauplan (G. de Levasseur) observed the density of the Crimean Tatar forces on the move, commenting that "the trees in the forest are not more thickly packed," cited in Collins, "Crimean Tatars" in Parry and Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society*, p. 265.

Avar general, having defeated the Byzantines, sent the Byzantine commander the message "why, I ask you, when you are weakened by your small numbers compared with the Avars and the Scythians, did you dare to give battle ?"[199] The nomads, with their much fuller mobilization may have, indeed, outnumbered their opponents. The nomads also gave the appearance of being very numerous and this may have accounted for their large numbers in the eyes of their contemporaries. The *Strategikon*, with its sharp and experienced soldier's eye, simply states that it is hard to estimate their numbers because the nomadic armies "have so many horses."[200] Warriors returning again and again on fresh mounts would certainly give the impression of seemingly inexhaustible forces.

Let us briefly examine some of the numbers given in our sources. At the Battle of Nedao (454) which pitted the sons of Attila against their subject peoples, the Hunnic forces were said to have suffered 30,000 casualties.[201] The "Hunnic" chieftain Zilgibis, ca. 522, had 20,000 troops.[202] The Sabir "Queen" Boarēks, in 527/528, who was reported to have had "100,000 people" under her command, defeated a "Hunnic" rival who had a military force of 20,000.[203] Prokopios mentions a Sabir force of 12,000.[204] The Kutrigur Zabergan, in his attack on Constantinople in March 559, split up his forces, one unit of which is noted as consisting of 7,000 horsemen.[205] In his interview of the first Türk embassy to Constantinople, the Emperor Justin II learned that 20,000 Avars had fled from the Türks while others remained as subjects.[206] The Tarniakh, Kotzagēr and Zabender who joined the Avars in Pannonia were 10,000 in number.[207] The Avar Qağan sent a force of 10,000 Kutrigurs to raid the Byzantine lands,

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[199] Menander/Blockley, pp. 148/149–150/151.

[200] *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, p. 242.

[201] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 320/321; Jordanes/Skržinskaja, Latin, p. 173/Russ., p. 119. The latter (Latin, p. 165/Russ. 109) gives 165,000 as the number of slain on both sides at the Catalaunian Fields.

[202] Theophanes, ed. de Boor, I, p. 167, trans. Mango, p. 254 and other sources.

[203] Malalas, ed. Dindorf, p. 430, trans. Jeffreys et al., p. 249; Theophanes, ed. de Boor, I, p. 167, trans. Mango, p. 254. Agathias, ed. Keydell, p. 139, trans. Frendo, p. 115 calls the Sabirs "a large and populous nation also extremely warlike." The 100,000 of Boarēks, most probably not to be taken literally, may have referred to the total population of her tribal union.

[204] Prokopios, *De Bello Gothico* (Loeb ed.), V, 154/155.

[205] Agathias, ed. Keydell, p. 178, trans. Frendo, p. 147.

[206] Menander/Blockley, pp. 114/115–116/117.

[207] Theoph. Sim., ed. de Boor, p. 260, trans. Whitby and Whitby, p. 191.

commenting that if they should be destroyed, it "shall cause me no pain."[208] In 578, the Byzantines brought in a force of 60,000 Avar heavy cavalry (ἱππέων θωρακοφόρων) to fight the Slavs who were plundering the Balkans.[209] In 599, in a series of clashes with the Byzantines, the Avars lost 4,000 in one engagement, 9000 the next day and 15,000 in a following battle. A Byzantine surprise attack produced 30,000 casualties among the Avar forces including their allies and subjects. In yet another battle 3,000 were captured.[210] The Türk-Khazars could afford to give Herakleios, as we have seen, a force of 40,000 for his Caucasian campaigns.[211] More realistic numbers are noted by the later Arab geographers, e.g.: 7,000 in al-Masʿūdī, 10,000 in Ibn Rusta, 12,000 in al-Iṣṭaḫrī (see above). The Burtas, as we have seen, were credited with the substantial force of 10,000 (see above). Before their migration to Pannonia, the Hungarian tribal union (*Majgharī*), had 20,000 horsemen who fought, usually successfully, with many of their neighbors and conducted slave raids against the Ṣaqāliba.[212] Al-Masʿūdī says that the Alans in the Caucasus region could field 30,000 horsemen.[213] Further to the east, Ibn al-Faqīh in his discussion of Sāmānid campaigns against the pagan Turks of Central Asia, notes that 20,000 Muslims led by Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad (r. 892–907) faced 60,000 Turks. Al-Masʿūdī remarks that Ismāʿīl, in his campaign of 280/893–4, took 15,000 Turks captive and killed 10,000.[214]

Occasionally, we get more regionally defined figures. The *Ḥudūd* mentions the village "Bīglīlīgh" in the Tuxs country of the Turks that can field 3000 men.[215] The Kimek who had an important state in western Siberia had 20,000 mounted warriors.[216] The powerful

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[208] Menander/Blockley, pp. 136/137.

[209] Menander/Blockley, pp. 192/193.

[210] Theoph. Sim., ed. de Boor, pp. 287–289, trans. Whitby and Whitby, pp. 212–213.

[211] Theophanes, ed. de Boor, I, p. 316, trans. Mango, p. 447 s.a. 624/625; see also Dionysius of Tel-Maḥrē, *The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles*, ed. trans., A. Palmer et al., p. 137.

[212] *Ḥudūd*, ed. Sotoodeh, pp. 87–88, trans. Minorsky, p. 101. See also al-Marwazī/Minorsky, Arabic, p. 22/35.

[213] Al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, ed. Pellat, I, p. 230.

[214] See the Mashhad Ms., f. 172a–b, cited in Asadov, *Arabskie istočniki*, pp. 51–52; al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, V, p. 150.

[215] *Ḥudūd*, ed. Sotoodeh, p. 84, trans. Minorsky, p. 99.

[216] Vladimir F. Minorsky, "Tamīm b Baḥr's Journey to the Uighurs" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 10 (1948), pp. 282, 284; Asadov, p. 48 (Ibn al-Faqīh).

Uyğur empire is reported to have had 30,000 (Gardīzī), 20,000 (Ibn al-Faqīh) or 12,000 (Tamīm b. Baḥr) mounted warriors.[217] Pečeneg forces deployed against Byzantium in 1087 are noted as 80,000 (including Hungarian and other allies) and 36,000.[218] Omeljan Pritsak, on the basis of John Skylitzes's statement that in 1048 the eleven districts of the western part of the Pečeneg realm had a population of some 800,000 people, estimated that each "district" had about 72,727 people, thus concluding that the forty districts mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus in his *De Administrando Imperio*[219] in the mid-tenth century would have yielded a total population of 2.8 to 3 million people. Since each district, he claims, would support a force of 10,000 (*tümen*), the Pecheneg army must have equalled 400,000. But, Pritsak termed this a "tentative estimation" and we should view it in that spirit.[220]

### *The Accoutrements of War*

Flags, banners or standards,[221] the horsehair or horse tail standard,[222] as well as various markings,[223] are all well documented. Flags used for military purposes may have been adopted from China where they appear quite early.[224] The Türks used flags with a golden wolf's

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[217] Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 570, trans. Martinez, p. 135; Minorsky, "Tamīm b. Bahr" *BSOAS*, 10 (1948), pp. 279–284, 303; Asadov, *Arabskie istočniki*, pp. 47–48 (Ibn al-Faqīh, Mashhad ms., ff. 170a–b.

[218] Anna Komnena, trans. Ljubarskij, pp. 203, 210, trans. Sewter, pp. 217, 225.

[219] Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *DAI*, ed. Moravcsik, trans. Jenkins, pp. 166/167. We are not sure what Constantine meant by "districts" (μέρη). These were most probably clan groupings whose numbers could change over time.

[220] Pritsak, "The Pečenegs" *AEMAe*, I (1975), p. 227.

[221] The terms are Old Turk. *badraq* > *baḏraq* > *baḥraq* > *bayraq, urunu, urğu, urğa, sanjaq*, see Clauson, *ED*, pp. 236, 307; Recep Toparlı, *Kıpçak Türkçesi Sözlüğü* (henceforth, *KTS*, Erzerum, 1993), p. 168; *The King's Dictionary. The Rasūlid Hexaglot: Fourteenth Century Vocabularies in Arabic, Persian, Turkic, Greek, Armenian and Mongol*, ed. Peter B. Golden, trans. T. Halasi-Kun, Peter B. Golden, Louis Ligeti and Edmund Schütz (Leiden, 2000), p. 204C19. *Sanjaq* is related to: *sančïš* "battle, struggle, war," *sančïš-* "to stab one another" < *sanč-* "to stab," *sančïq-* "to be routed," see Clauson, *ED*, pp. 835, 836.

[222] Turk. *tuğ* which could also denote a kind of "drum," see Clauson, *ED*, p. 464.

[223] E..g. *bečkem*, Oğuz. *berčem* a kind of badge made of "silk or the tail of a wild ox that warriors wear on the day of battle," *taṷuq* " a "piece of silk fastened to the heads of lances and standards in war time," see Clauson, *ED*, pp. 295, 519.

[224] Robin D.S. Yates, "Early China," *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds*, Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), p. 13.

head. The Pečenegs and Cumans are also depicted as having flags and banners. Representations of them can be seen in the illustrations of some of the Rus' chronicles.[225]

Armor was widespread, but armor (Turk. *yarıq*) made of metal (e.g. a metal breast plate,)[226] appears to have been rather more limited to the wealthy. Some types of armor mixed metallic and non-metallic substances. Horses were also armored, some lightly, others more heavily.[227] With regard to the armaments of the Türks, the *Zhou shu* says "they have bows, arrows, whistling arrowheads,[228] coats of armor/mail, long cavalry spears and swords. They also carry daggers as a belt adornment."[229] Archaeologically, these items are all attested. Bows were of the compound type, with a variety of arrows. Arrow-heads were made of iron or bone in a variety of shapes, including armor-piercing types. There were several types of swords, sabers, daggers, lances, battle-axes and shields.[230]

The *Strategikon* paints a similar picture, noting that the Türks, Avars, and other "Hunnic" peoples wear armor and have "swords, bows and lances, most of them in battle make use of two sets of arms. They mount up the lances on their shoulders and hold the bows in their hands, using both as need requires. Not only do they wear armor, but the horses of their notable ones are also covered with iron and felt in the front areas. They train diligently, especially for equestrian archery (ἐφίππον τοξείαν)."[231] Elsewhere, this source makes mention of "cavalry lances (κοντάρια καβαλλαρικὰ) with leather straps across the middle, in the Avar style," protective neckpieces (περιτραχήλια) "in the Avar style," as well as other types of clothing and protective coverings "in the Avar style."[232] Clearly, the Byzantines were willing to learn from their nomadic foes. In the mid-twelfth century, the Cumans were still relying on the same

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[225] Liu, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, I, p. 9; Gardīzī, ed. Ḥabībī, p. 579, Martinez, p. 152; Xudjakov, *Vooruženie*, p. 166; Pletnëva, "Pečenegi, torki i polovcy," pp. 197–198.

[226] Cf. Qarakhanid *sāy yarıq*, or chain mail, e.g. Qarakhanid *küpe yarıq* "coat of mail" Clauson, *ED*, p. 687 (*küpe* "a small metal ring"), 858, 962.

[227] A.I. Peršic, I. Ju. Semënov and V.A. Šnirel'man, *Vojna i mir v rannej istorii čelovečestva*, (Moskva, 1994), II, pp. 157–158.

[228] This type of arrow goes back to the Xiongnu, see Sima Qian/Burton, II, p. 134, see also Xudjakov, *Vooruženie*, p. 150.

[229] Liu, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, I, p. 9.

[230] See also Xudjakov, *Vooruženie*, pp. 137–163 for detailed descriptions.

[231] *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, pp. 268, 270.

[232] *Strategikon*, ed. Mihăescu, pp. 50, 52.

weapons: "[they carry] curved bows and arrows, in battle they wheel about with spears."[233]

As for production, the nomads made some of their own arms. The Türks in the Altai were, originally, metal workers, presumably weapon-makers, for the Joujan.[234] This coincided with the spread of the stirrup and, deriving from that, more heavily armed men and armored cavalry.[235] Indeed, it has been claimed that the Türks invented the hard saddle with two stirrups so well suited for warfare.[236] Iron is not readily available to the steppe peoples. The Türks took pains to put on a show for a Byzantine embassy travelling through Soġdia, offering them iron for sale. Menander thought that their real purpose "was to demonstrate that they had iron mines. For it is said that amongst them iron is not easily obtained."[237] Muslim sources state that the Turks have little iron and make their arrowheads and spearheads from bone.[238] Sinor surmises that the nomads acquired weapons from trade with the sedentary world, the use of specialized craftsmen taken captive, and through the taxation of conquered, sedentary populations.[239] This often led to very circumspect trading policies on the part of the sedentary world. However, he neglects another source: war booty.[240] As a consequence, other types of weapons became known to them. The Avars appear to have borrowed some Frankish-style weapons such as spears with winged points.[241]

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[233] Niketas Choniatēs, ed. van Dieten, p. 94, trans. Magoulias, p. 54.

[234] Liu, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten*, I, pp. 5, 40. The tale in the *Sui-shu* says the the Altay mountains (Chin. Chin-shan "Golden Mountain = Altay > Altañ, cf. Mongol *altan*, Turk. *altun* "gold") where the Ašina Türk first come into the view of the Chinese sources means "helmet" and that they took their name from this. The etymology is incorrect, but it undoubtedly points to what kind of metal-working the pre-imperial Türks were doing.

[235] Pohl, *Die Awaren*, p. 164.

[236] Pershic et al., *Vojna i mir*, II, p. 154.

[237] Menander/Blockley, pp. 116/117–118/119.

[238] Aḥmad ibn abī Ya'qūb b. Ja'far al-Ya'qūbī, *Kitāb al-Buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1892), p. 295, see also the anonymous Köprülü Library Ms. 1623 (*Risāla fī'l-Aqālīm*), ff. 209b–210a in Şeşen, *Hilāfet*, p. 35.

[239] Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors" *JAOS*, 101 (1981), p. 142. E.g., the Khazars, according to the *PSRL*, I, cc. 16–17, took a tribute from the Poljane Slavs of the Kiev region of one sword per hearth. The Khazars had locally produced sabers (with one cutting edge) whereas the Poljane produced swords that were double-edged.

[240] After destroying a Persian army in Armenia, ca. 629/630, Movsēs Dasxurançi/ Dowsett, p. 106, reports that the Khazars plundered the corpses and took their weapons.

[241] W. Szymański. E. Dąbrowska. *Awarzy, Węgrzy* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk, 1979), p. 84.

The nomads were most famous for their prodigious skills in archery, the form of combat that was most closely associated with them.[242] Al-Jāḥiẓ comments that if 1,000 Turkic mounted archers drew their bows and shot at the same time, 1,000 of their foes would be hit.[243] Poisoned arrows were not unknown.[244] Another important weapon was the lasso, especially as the capture of the enemy for ransom or sale into slavery, was an important goal of the nomads. The long experience with herd management made them particularly proficient. Al-Jāḥiẓ remarks of the Turks that "no one can feel himself safe from their lasso."[245]

Although engineering and siege machinery are not usually associated with the nomads, our source indicates that they could be quite ingenious in these areas, often making use of the talent locally available or imported from elsewhere. According to Priskos, the "Scythians" besieging Naissus (Niš) first constructed bridges to cross the river and then "brought up beams mounted on wheels" on which they massed fire power that cleared the walls of their defenders. In addition, rams and scaling ladders were used.[246] The Sabirs, Prokopios tells us, "fashioned some kind of device" (μηχανήν τινα ἐπετεχνήσαντο) that was totally new to the Byzantines: a type of battering ram propelled by forty men who were inside it and protected while others with long poles and hooks pulled down the stones that were dislodged from the wall.[247] The Avars were said to have acquired the siege technology from a Byzantine captive. In the 626 siege of Constantinople, they "constructed siege engines, namely wooden towers and tortoise

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[242] At the Battle of Nedao, all the "national" weapons were on display: ". . . a remarkable spectacle took place, where the Goth fought with his pike, the Gepid with his sword, the Rugian broke the weapons in his own wound, the Suavian was on foot, the Hun fought with his arrows, the Alan formed his heavy-armed battle line, the Herul his light-armed one (*Alanum gravi, Herulum levi armatus aciem strui*), Jordanes/Skržinskaja, Latin p. 173/Russ. pp. 118–11. Cf. also Olympiodorus/Blockley, II, pp. 182.183, on the "natural talent" of the Hunnic kings for archery."

[243] Al-Jāḥiẓ/Şeşen, pp. 66–67.

[244] Ibn al-Faqīh, Mašhad ms. f.173b cited in Asadov, *Arabskie istočniki*, p. 54. Pečenegs in Hungarian service were also said to use poisoned arrows (*toxicatis sagittis*), see Tryjarski, *Pieczyngowie*, p. 559; György Györffy, *Besenyők és magyarok* in *Körösi Csoma Archivum*, I (1939), reprinted in his *A magyarság keleti elemei*, p. 113.

[245] Al-Jāḥiẓ/Şeşen, p. 79. The commanders of a Byzantine force defeated by "Huns" in 528 were lassoed as they fled, see Malalas, ed. Dindorf, pp. 432–3, trans. Jeffreys et al., p. 254.

[246] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 230/231–232/233.

[247] Prokopios, *De Bello Gothico* (Loeb ed.), V, pp. 156/157–158/159. Malalas, ed. Dindorf, pp. 430–431 also remarks that they had excellent siege machinery.

shells."[248] Regarding the Arabo-Khazar warfare in the North Caucasus in the 650s, there are a number of notices telling of Arabs being hit or killed by stones hurled from *mangonels*.[249] In 1184, the Cumans under Könček besieging Kiev brought in a Muslim (*besurmenin*, most probably from Khwārazm) who was an expert in "living fire" (apparently some kind of naphtha compound) "and they had tight catapult bows (*luci tuzii samostrelnii*) which fifty men could barely pull."[250]

*Water Transport*[251]

The nomads had others, more knowledgeable than themselves in this area, build watercraft for them. Thus, on occasion, the Avars brought in Slavic or even Lombard shipwrights.[252] But, they also constructed water-crossing devices of their own. In the siege of Thracian Chersonese in 559, the Sabirs fashioned small boats from "enormous quantities of very long reeds of exceptional thickness and toughness" and then "devised improvised rowlocks and outriggers on either side."[253] Shovels were used for oars. Niketas Khoniatēs describes another Cuman device: a skin filled with straw and "stitched so tightly that not a drop of water could penetrate within." After tying them to the horses tails, the Cumans and their goods would get on them and navigate them "as if it were a boat and the horse a sail."[254]

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[248] Theoph. Sim., ed. de Boor, pp. 102–103, trans. Whitby and Whitby, p. 66; Nikephoros/Mango, pp. 58/59. The "tortoise shells" (χελῶναι) = the Roman *testudo* "a pent-house formed of shields overlapping each other like scales on a tortoise's back," see Henry G. Liddell, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon* (7th ed., Oxford, 1889), p. 886 or Henry G. Liddell, Robert Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, rev. ed. H.S. Jones (9th ed., Oxford, 1940, reprinted 1968), p. 1987 χελώνη "tortoise, tortoise-shell, pent-house or shed for protecting besiegers, = Lat. *testudo* "overlapping shields."

[249] E.g. aṭ-Ṭabarī, ed. Ibrāhīm, IV, p. 306.

[250] *PSRL*, II, cc. 634–635.

[251] See extensive discussion in Denis Sinor, "Water-Transport in Central Eurasia" *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, XXXIII (1961), pp. 156–179.

[252] Theoph. Sim. ed. de Boor, p. 226, trans. Whitby and Whitby, pp. 162–163; Paulus Diaconus, *Pauli Historia Langobardorum*, ed. G. Waitz in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, 48 (Hannover, 1878), p. 154.

[253] Agathias, ed. Keydell, pp. 191–192, trans. Frendo, pp. 157–158.

[254] Nik. Choniates, ed. van Dieten, p. 94, trans. Magoulias, pp. 54–55.

## *Treaty and Tribute*

A full analysis of nomad-sedentary diplomatic relations and the oftimes tortured political dealings between the steppe and settled worlds is too large a theme to be dealt with in any detail here. We may, however, simply sketch some general patterns. The nomads were often seen as fickle and untrustworthy, bellicose and rapacious. "They are always eager," Agathias notes, "to raid strange lands and the lure of pay and the hope of plunder are sufficient incentive for them to fight now for one people, now for another, changing sides with bewildering rapidity."[255] An example of their mercurial conduct (as viewed from the perspective of the sedentary world) can be seen in a notice in Ibn al-Aṯīr. In 517/1123–24, the people of Darband and Širvān in the North Caucasus were spared serious problems when a dispute broke out between the Georgians and their Qıpčaq allies that ended up with the departure of the besiegers "as if they were defeated."[256] Even well-established relationships, cemented by marital ties, could suddenly turn sour.

How could sedentary states manage these relationships? They were aware that the nomads wanted and needed the manufactures and foodstuffs of the settled world. The threat of cutting off that access (if it could, indeed, be carried out) was one possible, albeit often uncertain means of controlling the nomads' behavior. Thus, in the aftermath of Attila's death, his sons sent an embassy to Constantinople asking for a peace treaty and the establishment of border markets on the Danube "in the old manner" so that they could "exchange whatever they requested." The Emperor Leo I at first refused saying that access to Roman trade should be denied them because they had already caused too much damage, but later agreed.[257] The Chinese sources have very similar accounts.[258] Merchants from the sedentary world sometimes played a role in guiding the nomads' policy. Thus, the Huns who were attacking Iran in 484 were said to be guided by "Eustace, a merchant of Apamea."[259] The manipulation of trade, however, was premised on the ability to withstand an attack.

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[255] Agathias, ed. Keydell, p. 139, trans. Frendo, p. 115.

[256] ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn al-Aṯīr, *Al-Kāmil fī'-t-Taʾrīḫ*, ed. C.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851–1876, reprint: Beirut, 1965–1966 with different pagination), X, p. 615.

[257] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 252/253.

[258] See Jagchid and Hyer, *Peace, War and Trade, passim.*

[259] *The Syriac Chronicle Known as that of Zachariah of Mitylene*, trans. F.J. Hamilton,

Occasionally, Byzantium and Iran cooperated in maintaining a strong defense on the Caucasian passes, the usual invasion routes of the nomads into Anatolia and Iran.[260] Subsequently, after the Muslim takeover of these key strategic posts, Byzantine help was no longer given, but the same concern and vigilance remained. The walls of Darband/Bāb al-Abwāb were manned, Ibn Rusta tells us, by 1,000 men day and night.[261] Offensive strategies were risky, but not unknown. The nomads could be attacked, especially in winter, when, as the *Strategikon* tells us, "their horses are suffering misery" from the weather. Herakleios's Türk-Khazar allies faded away in the course of a winter campaign in Transcaucasia.[262] Rus' campaigns were also sometimes undertaken in winter or early spring.[263]

In addition to stout defenses and a strong military posture, there were several other strategies employed to stem nomadic incursions. The most common were: alliance and conversion, the sending of gifts and payment of tribute (which sometimes meant outbidding one's rivals or giving in to ever-escalating demands), divide and conquer. Negotiations were often hazardous (for both sides) and were sometimes used (by both sides) to mask offensives.[264] When the Pečenegs crossed the Danube and were raiding Byzantine lands in 1122, John Komnenos (r. 1118–1143) sent out Pečeneg-speaking envoys to the different chieftains to negotiate while he secretly prepared an attack.[265] In 1118, the Volga Bulğars simply poisoned the Cuman princes who had come, most probably, to extract something from them.[266] Alliances and the treaties by which they were formalized rarely lasted long. Even the Khazar *entente* with Byzantium, which found expression in the marriage of a Khazar "princess" to the future Emperor Constantine V (r. 741–775) in 732, a most

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E.W. Brooks (London, 1899), pp. 151–152. Omeljan Pritsak, *Origin of Rus'* (Cambridge, 1980), I, pp. 15–17, sees nomadic empires as deriving from the impact of international trade and the activities of "professional empire builders rooted in urban civilizations".

[260] Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 346/347, 353/353–354–355.

[261] Ibn Rusta, ed. de Goeje, p. 148. In Central Asia as well, the old defense systems dating to the pre-Islamic Soġdian rulers were maintained "as a protection against the raids of the tribes of the Turks," see Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Masʿūdī, *Kītāb at-Tanbīh wa'l-Ishrāf*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1894), p. 65.

[262] Theophanes, ed. de Boor, I, p. 317, trans. Mango, p. 448.

[263] Cf. *PSRL*, II, c. 260, VII, p. 21. The nomads also occasionally ventured a winter campaign, cf. *PSRL*, II, c. 257.

[264] See Menander/Blockley, pp. 52/53.

[265] Nik. Choniates, ed. van Dieten, pp. 13–16, trans. Magoulias, pp. 10–11.

[266] *PSRL*, II, cc. 284–285, VII, p. 24.

unusual act for the Byzantines whose royal house rarely married outside of the Byzantine realm, and in the building by Byzantium of forts for the Khazars in the ninth century, had, as I have already noted, its fair share of strains. By the mid-tenth century, the earlier amity had turned to open hostility, as we know from a Khazar Hebrew letter (the "Cambridge" or "Schechter" document)[267] and from Constantine Porphyrogenitus (see above).

Treaty negotiations invariably focused on tribute, access to markets, and fugitives. It was often less costly and less dangerous to pay tribute. On occasion, the nomads were even allowed to purchase weapons in Constantinople with the money they had received as gifts or tribute.[268] Tribute payments to favored allies were sometimes done with pomp and ceremony. An eighth-century Byzantine chronicle mentions a golden-roofed basilica in which tribute payments (πάκτα) were made to the Khazar Qağan and the Balkan Bulğar ruler.[269]

When the nomads conquered an area, the terms of surrender could be harsh. According to Movsēs Dasxuranc'i, when the Türk-Khazars attacked Caucasian Albania in 628 as allies of Byzantium, the Qağan allowed those "nobles and leaders" who surrendered "to live and serve me." As for the others, all males over fifteen years of age were to be killed and the women and children enslaved.[270]

The sedentary states and empires also attempted to convert the nomads to their respective faiths as one means of influencing and perhaps controlling them. This is too large a theme to be dealt with in this essay. We may merely note that the Armenian and Byzantine churches in the sixth and seventh century sent missionaries to one or another "Hunnic" people with only minimal and largely ephemeral success.[271] The same may be said of later attempts to Christianize

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[267] See new edition by Golb and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents*, pp. 101ff.

[268] Cf. Priskos/Blockley, II, pp. 226/227, 236/237, 242/243, 254/255–256/257, the Huns constantly insisted on the return of "fugitives;" Menander/Blockley, pp. 42/43. In 565, the Avars pledged that they would provide Byzantium with "efficient protection. But, they would only be well-disposed to the Roman state in exchange for the most valuable gifts, yearly payments and very fertile land to inhabit," Menander/Blockley, pp. 48/49–52/53.

[269] *Constantinople in the Early Eighth Century: The Parastaseis syntomoi chronikai*, ed. trans. A. Cameron, H. Herrin (Leiden, 1984), pp. 98/99.

[270] Dasxurançi/Dowsett, p. 95.

[271] Cf. Malalas, ed. Dindorf, p. 431, trans. Jeffreys et al., p. 250; Zachariah of Mitylene/Hamilton, Brook, pp. 329–330, Dasxurançi/Dowsett, pp. 153–166; Aleksandr V. Gadlo, *Étničeskaja istorija Severnogo Kavkaza IV–Xvv.* (Moskva, 1979), pp. 80–82, 107ff.; Peter B. Golden, "Religion Among the Qıpčaqs of Medieval Eurasia" *Central Asiatic Journal*, 42/2 (1998), esp. pp. 226–237.

the Cumans. Islam, brought to the Turkic nomads by merchants and Ṣūfīs in Central Asia ultimately had greater success.

Divide and conquer, as we have seen, was a policy often employed by the sedentary states at all ends of the steppe, occasionally with devastating results for the nomads. The use of one nomadic group against another was the cornerstone of Byzantine policy. The nomads, however, were also often able to exploit the internal divisions of the settled states. This was done, almost invariably, for short term gains. They were not, with few exceptions, interested in large-scale conquests or the take over of sedentary states. Byzantine rebels or claimants to the throne could often find support from nomadic troops. Thus, in 515, when Vitalian made his bid for power, he did so with a "large army of Huns and Bulgars."[272] The Sāsānid Kavad I (r. 488–531) had close ties with the Hephthalites, to whom he paid tribute. They helped him to recover his throne in 499 after he had been deposed in 496 for his support of the Mazdakite movement.[273] Zachariah of Mitylene, in discussing events of 531–532, remarks that the Persians "hire large numbers of Huns and bring them to their assistance."[274] The nomadic presence was also used by the peoples of Transcaucasia whose often troubled relationships with their Sāsānid overlords ebbed and flowed depending on the degree of nomadic pressure on Iran.[275] Khazars and Central Asians served in the Byzantine Imperial Guard,[276] mirroring in some respects the *ġulām* (military slave) institution of the Caliphate. The Rjurikid Vasil'ko Rostislavič (d. 1124 or 1125? a great grandson of Jaroslav I and prince of Terebovl'), who in 1092 had raided Poland with a force of Cumans, in 1097, planned to make use of the nomadic Berendei, Pečenegs, and Torks, who were often in Rus' service, for a joint campaign against Poland and Danubian Bulgaria; he would then turn on the Cumans.[277] Perfidy was not the exclusive possession of the nomad. The domestic political history of Kievan Rus' from the middle of the twelfth century cannot be understood without reference to the

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[272] Malalas, ed. Dindorf, pp. 402–405, trans. Jeffreys et al., pp. 226–227.

[273] Theoph. Sim., ed. de Boor, pp. 160–161, trans. Whitby and Whitby, pp. 111–112, see also Richard N. Frye, *The History of Ancient Iran* (München, 1984), pp. 322–323.

[274] Zachariah of Mitylene, trans. Hamilton and Brooks, p. 228.

[275] Peter B. Golden, "The Turkic Peoples and Caucasia," *Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change*, ed. R.G. Suny (rev. 2nd ed., Ann Arbor, 1996), pp. 46–47.

[276] Warren Treadgold, *Byzantium and its Army 284–1081* (Stanford, 1995), p. 110, 115; Mark Whittow, *The Making of Byzantium 600–1025* (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 169–170.

[277] *PSRL*, I, c. 266, II, c. 240.

nomadic forces brought in by the competing Rjurikid factions in their throne struggles. There is no evidence to indicate that the nomads actively manipulated these internecine struggles, but they were able to capitalize on them on occasion. The sedentary states, however, as we have seen, were able to play a deadly game of divide and conquer. In the Mediterranean world there was widespread use of mercenary bands drawn from the Eurasian steppe (and elsewhere). The Mongol conquests, and later the breakup of the Činggisid realms saw Cuman-Qıpčaq soldiers in Egypt-Syria (the Mamlūk state), Hungary (as servitors of the crown), Balkan Bulgaria (the Terterid and Šišmanid dynasties), and Byzantine Anatolia (as border guards against the Turks).[278] All the major and minor states on the periphery of the steppe had military forces of Eurasian nomadic origin.

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Are we justified in comparing Eurasian nomadic armies and tactics over a nearly thousand year period? The sources would indicate so. Tactics used throughout this period, such as the feigned retreat, go back to the earliest notices on the nomadic peoples. Moreover, with the exception of the invention and spread of the stirrup, the technology of war, in the pre-gunpowder age, had undergone only relatively modest changes. Nomadic society in the western Eurasian steppes was conservative in many respects. With the exception of the Türk and Türk-Khazar states, advanced polities that were brought into this region from outside, these were stateless tribal polities. The tribes were, above all, political organizations based on kinship, real or fictitious. Kinship was the basis for political integration. More often than not, power within them was diffused, not centralized.[279] Tribes, it has been suggested, developed in response to states and even were, in some instances, created or manipulated by them.[280]

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[278] Halil Inalcık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State" *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, II/2 (1981–82), pp. 77–78.

[279] Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, pp. 148–152; Patricia Crone, "The Tribe and the State," *States in History*, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford, 1986), pp. 48–49, 55.

[280] Morton Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society* (New York, 1967), pp. 168–170 and his *The Notion of Tribe* (Menlo Park, Calif., 1965), pp. 10, 30, 49, 52. Crone, "The Tribe and the State," pp. 68–71, takes a somewhat different view concluding that states cause tribes to disappear. Nomads, however, she views as an "exception to the rule." Among the nomads, the interference of states could "trigger the

Nomads succeeded in conquering sedentary states when they had social cohesion and a common purpose. This allowed them to fully exploit their military resources and take maximum advantage of their mobility, the key to their success.[281] The nomads went to war to secure access to the goods produced by sedentary society. Sometimes, this resulted in the actual conquest of a sedentary state and the emergence of a nomadic state now grafted onto the pre-existing sedentary state. It often also meant a move out of the steppe (e.g. the Seljuks). Those that remained in the steppe, such as the Türks and the Türk-Khazars, created a vassal-tribute or trade-tribute system, usually allowing the conquered lands to retain their own internal political systems with only limited integration of nomad and sedentary.[282] The nomads first expanded to incorporate other nomads and those elements of the forest world and neighboring sedentary society whose products they wanted. The precursor to statehood was a "supra-tribal polity" or "imperial confederacy . . . autocratic and state-like in foreign affairs, but consultative and federally structured internally."[283] In the western steppes, the Oğuric tribes, the Pečenegs, Western Oğuz (Torks) and Cumans never reached even that stage. They remained loosely structured tribal unions. The Cuman-Qıpčaqs had a less complex political organization than the Kimek Qağanate from which they, in part, derived. There was no unilinear movement "upward." Rather, the nomads oscillated between loosely or more tightly structured unions depending to some degree on external pressures. The Rus' defeats of the Pečenegs and Western Oğuz did not result in the appearance of statehood among the latter. Rather, it resulted in their migration and ultimate incorporation into other polities, both nomadic and sedentary. The Cuman-Qıpčaqs

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formation of higher political units, including embryonic states." See also R. Brian Ferguson, "A Paradigm for the Study of War and Society," *War and Society*, ed. Raaflaub and Rosenstein p. 419, who writes "tribes can evolve without states, but states make a lot of tribes and most named tribes in the ethnographic record exist under the spell of states." Cf. also Bernard Bacharach, "Early Medieval Europe" in that same volume, p. 286, who notes that the Salian Franks "would seem to have had their ethnogenesis as Roman allies."

[281] Crone, "The Tribe and the State," Hall (ed.), *States in History*, pp. 70–71.

[282] Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, pp. 228–233, 255; and the important study of Nicola Di Cosmo, "State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History" *Journal of World History*, 10/1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 30–32 on trade-tribute empires.

[283] Fletcher, "The Mongols" *HJAS*, 46 (1986), p. 15; Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier*, p. 8.

survived until the Mongol conquest, as we have noted, by taking advantage of Rus' divisions and integrating themselves into the Rus' power structure. In the western steppes, statehood came from without.

Warfare here, unlike many other aspects of politics, was also largely divorced from religion. The Arabs fought the Khazars in the name of Islam. The Khazars, although a state, had no ideological counterpoise other than the defense of their turf. Raids into Muslim-dominated Transcaucasia were solely for booty and strategic advantage, never for conquest or faith. After the Judaization of the Khazar ruling clans and core tribes, there is only one notice reporting actions taken on the basis of religion: Khazar retaliation for the destruction of a Jewish synagogue in the Islamic world.[284] In Central Asia, however, warfare based on religion, e.g. Muslim vs. Non-Muslim Turks, was more widespread. The Ottoman *ġāzī* tradition certainly had, at least in part, Central Asian *alp eren* ("brave warrior") antecedents.[285]

Finally, we may note that Abram I. Pershic has concluded that the predatory raiding by the nomads often tended to retard economic development in the affected regions of the sedentary world while "the nomadic formations themselves, growing wealthy from their war booty, did not have the stimuli to develop productive forces. They remained stagnant, extensive, pastoral societies." He further adds that western Europe was not exhausted by constant warfare with the nomads, whereas frontline states, such as Rus', were.[286] This is a restatement of an old theme in Russian historiography.[287] The most recent research, however, has shown that, at least in the case of Rus', the example best known to Peršic's Russian-speaking audience, there is no evidence for such a sweeping conclusion. Nomadic depredations did cause damage to some of the frontier regions of Rus',[288] which were disputed territories in any event, but Rus's great

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[284] Ibn Faḍlān/Togan, Arabic, p. 45/Germ. pp. 102–104.

[285] Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar* (2nd ed., Ankara, 1966), pp. 208–217 and his *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu*, pp. 146ff.; Vladimir A. Gordlevskij, *Gosudarstvo sel'džukidov Maloj Azii* in his *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Moskva, 1960), I, pp. 74–75.

[286] Peršic, *Vojna i mir*, II, pp. 230–231.

[287] Cf. Aleksandr E. Presnjakov, *Lekcii po istorii Russkoj Istorii. Kievskaja Rus'* (Moskva, 1938, reprinted in his *Knjažoe pravo v drevnej Rusi. Lekcii po russkoj istorii* (Moskva, 1993), pp. 336–338: Rus' absorbed the blows from the steppe and paid for it by its exhaustion in the struggle with the nomads.

[288] P.A. Rappaport, "Iz istorii Južnoj Rusi XI–XII vv." *Istorija SSSR*, 5 (1966), pp. 113–116.

problems of the twelfth century stemmed from the disunity and constant internecine warfare of the Rjurikids. When the nomads conquered sedentary states, the latter were usually already in a weakened state resulting from domestic problems. This the Mongols graphically illustrated in the thirteenth century across Eurasia.

## Appendix: Terminology of Weaponry

*Terminology of general weaponry: tulum* ("weapons, military equipment"), *yaraq* ("arms, military equipment)[289]

*Armor and body defenses*

*bütülük* "cuirass,"[290] *demür kömlek/temür kömlek* "armor" (lit. "iron shirt"),[291] *yarıq* "body armor, chain mail, plate armor, breastplate, coat of mail," *küpe*[292] *yarıq* ("coat of mail"), *sāy yarıq* "a breast plate, plate armor,"[293] *yošuq, yašıq, yıšıq, ošuq* "helmet,"[294] *sağıt* "Gerät, Instrument, Ausrüstung in allgemeinem, besonders Pferedegeschirr . . . Waffen" < Pers. *sāxt* "stirrup leather, horse armour, saddle and bridle . . .,"[295] *tuma* "cuirass of war,"[296] *tura* "shield," *qalqan* "shield,"[297] *yağır* "small iron shield."[298] There was considerable variation in size, shape and material. Leather armor was common.[299]

*Bow and Arrow*

*yā, yay* "the bow," *yatan* "wooden bow,"[300] *oq* "arrow," *üčleč* "featherless arrow used to shoot at rabbits and made of sticks joined at the tip by a

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[289] Qarakhanid, see Clauson, *ED*, pp. 500, 962; Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 236. Much of the terminology from the pre-Činggisid era is recorded only in the Qarakhanid sources. His terminology, however, is fairly uniform in Turkic.

[290] Qıpčaq, Kaare Grønbech, *Komanisches Wörterbuch* (Copenhagen, 1942), p. 71; Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 52.

[291] Qıpčaq, Toparlı, *KTS*, pp. 67, 200.

[292] *Kübe, küpe* "one of the rings making up chain-mail," Qıpčaq "coat of mail, military equipment," Clauson, *ED*, p. 687, Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 142; Grønbech, *KWb.*, p. 157.

[293] Türk, Uyğur, Qarakhanid, Khwārazmian, Qıpčaq, Clauson, *ED*, pp. 858962; *Hexaglot*, ed. Golden, pp. 196B9, 204C22.

[294] Clauson, *ED*, p. 977; *Hexaglot*, ed. Golden, p. 204C23. The Cuman *tovulğa* "helmet" < Mong. *doġulġa* (Grønbech, *KWb.*, p. 250, Lessing, p. 271; Hasan Eren, *Türk Dilinin Etimolojik Sözlüghü* (Ankara, 1999), p. 410) is borrowing that probably stems from the period after 1200.

[295] In Qıpčaq in this and other meanings, Khwārazmian Turkic *sağutlığ* "armoured," Čağatay *sawut* "coat of mail," see Clauson, *ED*, 806; Grønbech, *KWb.*, p. 212; Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 166."

[296] Qıpčaq, Abū Ḥayyān, *Kitāb al-İdrāk li-Lisān al-Atrāk*, ed. Ahmet Caferoğlu (Istanbul, 1931), Arabic, p. 66/Turk. trans. p. 107.

[297] Uyğur, Qarakhanid, Khwārazmian, Qıpčaq et al., Clauson, *ED*, pp. 531, 621.

[298] Qıpčaq, Clauson, *ED*, p. 905; *İdrāk*, ed. Caferoğlu, pp. Arabic. 95/Turk. trans. p. 117.

[299] E.g. among the early Hungarians, see Csanád Bálint, *Die Archäeologie der Steppe* (Wien-Köln, 1989), pp. 213–217. The Pečenegs and Cumans had very similar weapons and armor, with leather helmets with iron points, leather shields etc., see Akdes Nimet Kurat, *IV–XVIII Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri* (Ankara, 1972), p. 106.

[300] Clauson, *ED*, pp. 869, 892.

piece of iron,"[301] *qalwa/qalva* "blunt hunting arrow,"[302] *čiğılwār/čiğılvār oqı* "short arrow for cross-bow,"[303] *qatutluğ oq* "poisoned arrow,"[304] *bašaq* "arrow-head, iron head of an arrow,"[305] *temürgen/temren/timren/demren, demiren, oq temiri* "iron tip of an arrow, iron arrow-head,"[306] *kesme* "a broad arrow-head," *yasıč* "a broad arrow-head,"[307] *suqım* "the whistle for the arrow,"[308] *ilgü, ülkü* "archery target."[309]

*Swords, Spears, Cudgels etc.*

*balta* "ax, battle-ax," *bögde/bügde*, "dagger," *qılıč* "sword,"[310] *šebšebi* "a sword drawn from its sheath,"[311] *čomaq, čoqmar/čoqmaq/čoqman* "cudgel, mace"[312] *tumar* "arrow of a cudgel,"[313] *süngü* "lance, spear."[314] The length, material and construction of the latter varied with time and place.[315] The Khazars, according to Ibn al-Faqīh, made spear-heads of very good quality.[316]

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[301] Clauson, *ED*, p. 26; Kāshgharī/Dankoff, I, p. 127.

[302] Qarakhanid, Clauson, *ED*, p. 617.

[303] Qarakhanid, < Iran. "crossbow" conjectured by Clauson, *ED*, 408; Kāšġarī/Dankoff, I, p. 367.

[304] Qarakhanid, Clauson, *ED*, p. 596.

[305] Qarakhanid, Khwārazmian, Qıpčaq, Čağatay, Clauson, *ED*, p. 378; Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 34.

[306] Middle Oğuz, Qıpčaq, Qarakhanid, Clauson, *ED*, p. 509; Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 200; *Hexaglot*, ed. Golden, pp. 198A18, 205A1.

[307] Qarakhanid, Qıpčaq, Clauson, *ED*, pp. 751, 974.

[308] Clauson, *ED*, p. 811.

[309] Toparlı, *KTS*, pp. 92, 225.

[310] Clauson, *ED*, pp. 325, 333, 618; Toparlı, *KTS*, pp. 33, 118. On the sword cult among the nomads, see Maenchen-Helfen, *Wordl of the Huns*, pp. 278–280.

[311] *Idrāk*, ed. Caferoğlu, Arabic, p. 54/Turk., p. 96; Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 189.

[312] *Čomaq* is attested in the Pre-Mongol era and in Middle Qıpčaq, the other forms are found in fifteenth century Ottoman, both are probably loan-words, see Clauson, *ED*, pp. 422–423.

[313] Toparlı, *KTS*, p. 213.

[314] Türk, Uyğur, Qarakhanid, Qıpčaq etc. <*sung* "a battle," *süngüš* "battle," *süngüš-* "to fight one another," *süngüglüg* "lancer" etc., Clauson, *ED*, pp. 834–835, 839.

[315] Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors" *JAOS*, 101 (1981), p. 141.

[316] Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Isḥāq Ibn al-Faqīh, *Kitāb al-Buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1885), p. 50; Ludwig, *Gesellschaft*, p. 295.

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PART TWO

# THE MONGOL AGE (1200–1400)

# THE BATTLE OF HERAT (1240): A CASE OF INTER-MONGOL WARFARE*

Michal Biran

While Mongol campaigns of conquest in Asia and Europe have long caught the imagination of military historians, far less attention has been given to the inter-Mongol rivalries after the dissolution of the Mongol empire. This is not only because those conflicts seemed less engaging, but also because most of the inter-Mongol conflicts were merely raids or skirmishes which received only short notices in contemporary sources. In this context, the battle of Herat is an important exception.[1]

When the armies of the Ilkhan Abaqa (r. 1265–1282) met the troops of the Chaghadaid Khan Baraq (r. 1266–1271) in 1270 at Herat in present-day Afghanistan, it was for a full-scale and decisive combat. Abaqa's victory secured Ilkhanid rule in Khurāsān and precluded any real threat to the Ilkhanate's eastern frontier for several decades. Baraq's defeat resulted in the loss of the independence of the Chaghadaids, who were obliged to submit to Qaidu (1236–1301), Ögödei's grandson. Considering the role of the Golden Horde behind the scenes, the battle thus involved the four Chingissid *uluses*, and was influential in shaping the borders of the independent Mongol khanates.

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[1] Other major inter-Mongol battles include the wars between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate mainly in 1262 and 1265, about which see, e.g., Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 86–91; and the battle between the Central Asian Mongols under Qaidu and the Yuan forces in 1301, about which see Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997), pp. 52–4. The description of the battle of Herat in contemporary sources is, however, far more detailed than the descriptions of the abovementioned battles.

This unique battle left its mark in historical records, both medieval and modern.[2] Yet, the military aspects of the battle have not yet been studied on the basis of the whole range of available sources. The works of the main Ilkhanid historians, Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 1318) and Waṣṣāf (d. circa 1328), whose descriptions serve as the basis for most of modern scholarship, devoted most of their attention to the Central Asian Mongols, who initiated the battle. Only through their works can one get the full political framework in which the battle took place.[3] For the military aspects, however, the local chronicles and the Mamluk sources are no less useful. The most important local chronicle is Harawī's *History of Herat*, written c. 1330, which makes use of Rashīd al-Dīn's work but adds many details.[4] Also valuable are the two chronicles of Kirmān, whose Sultan fought side by side with Abaqa,[5] the more apocryphal Georgian chronicle,[6] and the Arabic-Mamluk chronicles. As rivals of the Ilkhans, the Mamluks

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[2] For the research literature see: Constantine A.M. D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols* (The Hague, 1834, rpt. Tientsin, 1940), vol. 3, pp. 428–54; Henry H. Howorth, *The History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century* (London, 1888, rpt. New York, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 228–40; John A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Ilkhans," in *The Saljuq and the Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle, Vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 357–60; Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Leiden, 1985), pp. 61–4; A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Il-Xanid Army," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, vol. 6 (1988), pp. 152–7; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 31–2.

[3] For Rashīd al-Dīn see David O. Morgan, "Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb," *Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed.*, vol. 8 (1995), pp. 458–9 and the references there; David O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 13–14. For Waṣṣāf see *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15; Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge, 1951), vol. 3, pp. 67–8. Shorter descriptions of the battle appear in other Ilkhanid sources: Ḥamdallāh Qazwīnī, *Ta'rīkh-i Guzīda* (Leiden, 1913), pp. 577, 582; and the Arabic chronicle ascribed to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *al-Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a* (Baghdad, 1932–3), p. 357). I have also made use of the later Persian chronicle of Mīrkhwānd (d. 1498). Mīrkhwānd, who wrote in Timurid Herat, used Rashīd al-Dīn, Waṣṣāf and Harawī or his sources (see below). Yet he also preserved details about the Central Asian Mongols which are not to be found in earlier works (W.W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (4th edition, London, 1977), p. 58).

[4] Sayf b. Muḥammad Harawī, *Ta'rīkh nāmah-i Harāt*, ed. M. Ṣiddiqī (Calcuta, 1944), pp. 303–30. On Harawī see Ṣiddiqī's introduction to this edition, pp. 10–15. Martinez extensively used Harawī's work, though I am not in accord with his conclusions (see below, esp. pp. 202ff.).

[5] *Simṭ al 'ulā*, written c. 1317, and especially the *Ta'rīkh-i shāhī*, written c. 1317 or earlier. About those works see Bāstanī-Parīzī's introduction to: Anonymous, *Ta'rīkh-i shāhī-i Qara Khitā'iyyān*, ed. M.I. Bāstanī-Parīzī (Tehran, 1966–7), pp. 1–19, 30–32.

[6] *Histoire de la Georgie*, trans. M. Brosset (St. Peterburg, 1850), Part 1, pp. 573–86 (hereafter, *The Georgian Chronicle*). This source is used by Howorth, Spuler and Martinez.

showed interest in Abaqa's struggles in the east—struggles that kept him away from Syria—and their independent version of the conflict is therefore of interest. The most detailed Mamluk description of the battle of Herat appears in the work of the Syrian historian al-Yūnīnī (d. 1326), which is repeated, with several changes, in the later works of Ibn al-Dawādārī (d. after 1335) and Mufaḍḍal (d. after 1358).[7] Another set of Mamluk sources provides many details about the Tegüder incident that preceded the battle, though not all of them connect it to the battle of Herat.[8] One should bear in mind, however, that apart from Marco Polo's blurred version of this battle,[9] all the sources originated in Herat or westward. The Chaghadaid version of the events therefore did not come down to us.[10]

On the basis of a close comparison between Arabic and Persian sources, this essay aims to reconstruct the background and course of the battle of Herat. This is followed, after a short discussion of the battle's results, by an analysis of the military aspects of the battle, in which I have tried to explain the reasons for Abaqa's victory, as well as to compare this battle to Mongol wars against "foreign" (i.e., non-Mongol) rivals.

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[7] On al-Yūnīnī and his sources see the introduction of Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography* (Leiden, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 6–21, 60–80. None of al-Yūnīnī's extant sources mentioned there (e.g., Ibn Khallikān) is identified as the source for his information on the battle of Herat. On the relationship between the three Mamluk writers (al-Yūnīnī, Ibn al-Dawādārī and al-Mufaḍḍal) see Donald P. Little, *Introduction to Mamluk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 10–11, 33–6, 53–61. Shorter notices on the battle appear in other Mamluk sources, e.g., Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 1325), *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rīkh al-hijra* (ed. D.S. Richards, Beirut, 1998), pp. 116, 121; MS BL Add 23325, fol. 77a, hence Badr al-Dīn al-'Aynī (d. 1451), *'Iqd al-jumān fī ta'rīkh ahl al-zamān*, MS Topkapi Sarayi, Ahmet III, 2912, fols. 100a, 104a; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), *Ta'rīkh al-islām* (Beirut, 1999), vol. 52, p. 51; Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya* (Cairo, 1939), vol. 13, p. 255.

[8] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra*, p. 141, fols. 81b–82a; hence al-'Aynī, *'Iqd*, fol. 106a; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-muluk* (Beirut, 1942), vol. 7, p. 9; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab* (Cairo, 1984), vol. 27, p. 396 (where Qaidu and not Baraq initiated the battle). Al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī mention the incident as the background of the battle of Herat; Baybars and al-'Aynī mention it also before the battle but describe it in detail only after it, in 1274, and this later date is followed by al-Nuwayrī and Ibn al-Furāt.

[9] Marco Polo, *The Book of Sir Marco Polo*, trans. Henry Yule (London, 1903), vol. 2, p. 66; Marco Polo, *The Description of the World*, trans. Arthur C. Moule and Paul Pelliot (London, 1935–1938), vol. 2, pp. 456–7. To the best of my knowledge, Chinese sources of the 13th–14th centuries do not mention this battle, being primarily preoccupied for those years with Qubilai's campaigns against the Song.

[10] The only Central Asian source of this period, Jamāl Qārshī, does not

### *The Background: The Coming of Baraq into Central Asia*

The battle of Herat was initiated by Baraq, the Chaghadaid khan who arrived in Central Asia only a few years before the battle took place. Yet the roots for Baraq's actions are to be sought not only in his immediate circumstances, but also in the two great Mongol succession struggles: the Toluid *coup d'etat* of 1251, which promoted Möngke to the throne of the Qa'an, the supreme leader of the Mongol empire, at the expense of his cousins the Ögödeids; and the inter-Toluid rivalry that followed Möngke's death (1259), when his two brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke contested the Qa'anate.[11]

Möngke's accession led to the dissolution of the Ögödeid *ulus*, and greatly harmed the Chaghadaids, who had been the Ögödeids' allies. The Jochids, khans of the Golden Horde, whose leader was instrumental in enthroning Möngke, quickly manipulated Chaghadaid weakness, taking over Transoxania and Western Turkestan, formerly under Chaghadaid control. The Chaghadaid share in the empire's revenues was also taken over by the Jochids and the Toluids.[12] The Toluids were naturally the great beneficiaries of Möngke's rise. After his accession Möngke placed his two brothers Qubilai and Hülegü, Abaqa's father, in charge of China and Iran respectively. The two brothers expanded the empire's borders each in his own direction, thereby creating the basis for two new regional khanates.[13]

The Qubilai-Arigh Böke struggle that followed Möngke's death gave the deprived *uluses* of Central Asia a chance to restore the for-

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mention the battle, yet he supplies the chronological framework for Qaidu and the Chaghadaid's succession. On him see Peter Jackson, "Djamāl Ḳarshī," *Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed.*, Supp. 3–4 (1981), p. 240.

[11] For these conflicts and their role in the dissolution of the Mongol Empire see Peter Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire,"*Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 22, no. 2 (1978), pp. 186–244; for a detailed discussion of Möngke's accession and its consequences see also Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 18–44; for the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke see Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 34–5; Zhou Liangxiao, *Hubilie* (Jilin, 1986), pp. 46–65.

[12] Peter Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220–1290," *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, ed. Reuven Amitai and David O. Morgan (Leiden, 1999), p. 29; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 16; Jackson, "Dissolution," p. 207; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 483–5.

[13] Thomas T. Allsen, "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China," *Alien Regimes and Border States 907–1368*, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, vol. 6 of *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 394; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 17; for more details on the conquests in Möngke's time, see, e.g., Allsen, "The Rise," pp. 403–7.




Map 1: The Mongol Empire after the Death of Möngke (1259) (After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 114).

tunes of their lineages. Taking advantage of the Golden Horde's preoccupation with the Ilkhanate in the early 1260s, the new Chaghadaid Khan Alghu (r. 1261–66) took over the former Chaghadaid territories and much more, and consolidated his authority in the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, formerly under the Qa'an. Switching his support from Arigh Böke to Qubilai, thereby largely facilitating the latter's victory, Alghu also gained Qubilai's confirmation to his rule over the territory stretching from the Altai to the Oxus.[14] Qubilai was also obliged to confirm Hülegü's rule over the territory "from the banks of the Oxus up to the gates of Egypt," in order to gain his support. This confirmation was a major factor in the outbreak of hostilities between, on one side, Hülegü and his descendants, the Ilkhans, and, on the other, the Golden Horde, which had its own claims on parts of Iran.[15]

The Qubilai-Arigh Böke conflict also prompted Ögödei's grandson, Qaidu, to restore the dissolved Ögödeid *ulus*, whose territories had become, after Qubilai's arrangements, part of Alghu's territory. Unable to cope alone with Alghu, Qaidu turned to the Golden Horde for help. The Golden Horde Khan, Berke (r. 1257–67) was willing to cooperate against their common enemy. With Berke's aid, Qaidu managed to vanquish Alghu once, but was badly defeated in his second attempt. Only Alghu's death in late 1265 or early 1266 prevented Qaidu from paying a heavier price for this defeat.[16]

Alghu's death set the stage for Baraq's activities. Starting his career in Qubilai's camp in China, where his father had been banished in 1251 due to his pro-Ögödeid tendencies, Baraq won Qubilai's favor by performing "praiseworthy services" for him.[17] Sometime

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[14] On Alghu see Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 488–92; Liu Yingsheng, "Ali Buge zhi luan yu Chahatai hanguo de fazhan," *Xinjiang daxue xuebao*, 1987, pp. 30–34.

[15] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh, vol. 2*, ed. E. Blochet (London and Leiden, 1911), p. 398 (hereafter: Rashīd/Blochet); Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, trans. J.A. Boyle (New York and London, 1971), pp. 255–6 (hereafter: Rashīd/Boyle); Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat al-ṣafā* (Tehran, 1961), vol. 5, p. 196; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 23; Jackson, "Dissolution," pp. 208–35.

[16] Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 201; W.W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (Leiden, 1956–1962), vol. 1, pp. 123–4; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 22.

[17] 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik Juwaynī, *Taʾrīkh-i jahān gushā*, ed. M.M. Qazwīnī (London, 1912–37), vol. 3, pp. 64–5; 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā'-malik Juwaynī, *History of World Conqueror*, trans. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 591–2; Rashīd/Blochet, pp. 7, 169, 188; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 23, 139, 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 125; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24.

after 1263 Baraq received Qubilai's permission to return to Central Asia.[18] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, after Alghu's death Baraq gained from Qubilai a *yarligh* ('command' or 'order') appointing him as a joint ruler over the Chaghadaid *ulus* together with Mubārak Shāh (r. 1265–66). Mubārak Shāh was the son of Alghu's widow, Orghina, from her first marriage. She had chosen him to succeed Alghu, apparently without getting the Qa'an's permission.[19] By sending Baraq, Qubilai hoped to secure his interests in the Chaghadaid *ulus*, and to have an ally against Qaidu, who refused to accept his authority.[20] When Baraq arrived in Central Asia, and found out that Orghina and Mubārak Shāh had firmly established their power, he kept the decree in his possession a secret, and presented himself as a refugee seeking to return to his original appanage. Mubārak Shāh allowed him to settle on his patrimonial appanage in the Chaghāniyān region, near Tirmidh, on the banks of the Oxus. Baraq gradually won the loyalty of the members of Mubārak Shāh's army, and eventually deposed him, degrading him to the rank of a hunting inspector.[21] Rashīd al-Dīn's description is, however, incompatible with Jamāl Qarshī's dates. According to Qarshī, the only Central Asian source for those events, Mubārak Shāh was enthroned in March 1266, and deposed by Baraq in September of the same year.[22] If those dates are correct, then Baraq must have arrived in Central Asia before Alghu's death, and indeed Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that he asked Qubilai for permission to leave after the surrender of Arigh Böke, in 1264.[23] It is hard to determine whether and when he received Qubilai's decree, which is not mentioned at all in the *Yuan shi*, the official history of the Yuan dynasty. Since Baraq turned against the

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[18] Song Lian, *Yuan shi* (Beijing, 1976), vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 91.

[19] Rashīd/Blochet, p. 188; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 125; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24.

[20] Rashīd/Blochet, p. 189; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151; Ibn Faḍlallāh al-'Umarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. and trans. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 2.

[21] Rashīd/Blochet, p. 169; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 139–40; 'Abdallāh b. Faḍlallāh Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1959–60), pp. 16, 67; 'Abd Âl Muḥammad Ayātī, *Tahrīr-i ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1967), pp. 5, 37; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 24. Mubārak Shāh's exact title was *muqaddam bārschiyān*, the inspector of those who hunt with cheetahs. See Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersichen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–74), vol. 2, p. 238.

[22] Jamāl Qarshī, *Mulkhaqāt al-Surāḥ* in V.V. Bartold, *Turkestan v epokhu 'mongol'skogo nashestiva* (St. Petersburg, 1900), vol. 1 (texts), p. 138.

[23] Rashīd/Blochet, p. 189; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 151.

Qa'an's troops immediately after Mubārak Shāh's banishment, it is unlikely that the decree played a decisive role in his attaining the Chaghadaid leadership.[24]

If Qubilai expected Baraq to represent his interests faithfully, he was to be disappointed: Baraq's first action as the Chaghadaid Khan was to defeat Qubilai's garrison in Khotan, in east Turkestan, and plunder the city. Yet in 1268 Baraq received a grant from Qubilai, who probably still hoped to secure his alliance against Qaidu.[25] Baraq, however, had his own reasons for confronting Qaidu. First, in trying to revive the dissolved territory of the Ögödeid *ulus*, Qaidu took over territories that were allocated by Qubilai to Alghu, i.e., the Chaghadaid lineage. More concretely, around 1268, after an abortive attempt to invade Besh Baliq, Qaidu was compelled to retreat westwards, evacuating Almaliq and withdrawing more than a thousand kilometers westwards. Having moved west of Talas, he was getting dangerously close to Baraq.[26] Fearing that Qaidu had set his sights on Samarkand and Bukhara, Baraq decided to attack him. Setting an ambush for Qaidu's forces, Baraq inflicted a crushing defeat on Qaidu on the banks of the Jaxartes. Again Qaidu turned for assistance to the Golden Horde, whose new ruler, Möngke Temür (r. 1267–80), perhaps fearing the rise of a second Alghu, sent his uncle, Berkecher, to Qaidu's help with allegedly 50,000 men. With their support Qaidu was able to defeat Baraq near Khojand, on the banks of the Jaxartes, and apparently overran Transoxania.[27]

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[24] Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 24–5.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 38; Song Lian, *Yuan shi*, Chap. 63, p. 1569. The Chinese text, translated in Emily V. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1988), vol. 2, p. 36, reads Beiting, which in Yuan times usually means Besh Baliq. Cf. Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yuan Dynasty and the Uighurs in Turfan in the 13th century," *China among Equals*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, 1983), p. 254, who, following Abe Takeo, understood Beiting as referring to Qara Qorum. Allsen himself, however, recounts that due to this attack of Qaidu the Uighurs evacuated Besh Baliq, a measure they had no reason to take if Qaidu indeed attacked the much more northerly Qara Qorum. It is true that in Yuan times the name Beiting was also attached to a place in Mongolia in the vicinity of Qara Qorum (see the detailed discussion and references in Michal Biran, "China, Nomads and Islam: The Qara Khitai [Western Liao] Dynasty 1124–1218," [Diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000], p. 52, n. 54), but this was quite an unusual use. See the very hesitant discussion of Abe Takeo on the location of Beiting in his *Xi Huigu guo shi de yanjiu* (Urumqi, 1986), pp. 359–61, in which he does not even mention Qara Qorum.

[27] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 107–8; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jami'u't-tawarikh [sic] Compendium*

The descriptions of this battle in the sources are extremely terse, but the desperate steps that Baraq took in its aftermath imply that he had suffered a serious reverse. Baraq fled to Samarkand and Bukhara, plundered the cities and employed their craftsmen around the clock to prepare new weapons, as he was trying to rebuild his army.[28] In the midst of his preparations, Qaidu's messenger, the Ögödeid prince Qipchaq, reached Baraq's camp with a peace proposal. The peace was offered in the name of the unity of the Chinggisid family, yet the sources stress that Qaidu's main motive for conciliation was his fear that the Chaghadaid Khan would trample Bukhara and Samarkand under the hooves of his horses.[29] Perhaps aware of his inability to defeat Qaidu on the battlefield, and with the encouragement of his governors among his sedentary subjects, Baraq accepted the proposal. The two princes decided to hold a *quriltai* (an assembly of princes) in the spring, and this took place either in Talas in the spring of 1269, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, or in Qatwān near Samarkand at an earlier date, around 1267, as implied by Waṣṣāf.[30] It was during this *quriltai* that Baraq presented his plan to invade Khurāsān.

At the *quriltai*, Qaidu appealed for unity in the name of the shared heritage of Chinggis Khan. Baraq claimed that, in the name of this same heritage, the Chaghadaids were also entitled to an appanage and pasture lands that others would not threaten. It was decided that two thirds of Transoxania (or its revenues) would be transferred to Baraq and one third to Qaidu and Möngke Temür, whose representative, Berkecher, also took part in the *quriltai*. The princes decided that henceforth they would dwell only in the mountains and plains and not in the cities; moreover, they would neither make exaggerated demands on their subjects nor graze their cattle in cultivated lands. The sedentary territories were entrusted to Mas'ūd Beg, the experienced administrator who served the Qa'an and afterwards the

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*of Chronicles*. Trans. Wheeler M. Thackston. Central Asian Sources IV (Cambridge, Mass, 1998–9), p. 521 (Hereafter: Rashid/Thackston).

[28] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 39; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 25.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 109–10; Rashid/Thackston, p. 521; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 39.

Chaghadaids, with the charge to restore Transoxania to prosperity.[31] Summer and winter pastures were assigned to Baraq's troops. Qaidu and Baraq divided the military "thousands" (units of one thousand men)[32] and the artisan workshops—including those devoted to the production of weapons—[33] of Samarkand and Bukhara between the two of them, and this was probably the reward Qaidu demanded for defeating Baraq. Qaidu also stationed forces in the region of Bukhara to prevent Baraq's army from encamping there.

Dissatisfied with his expulsion from Bukhara and with his lot in the agreement, Baraq, who could not advance eastward or northward into his new allies' territories, proposed to traverse the Oxus the following spring. With this move, he intended to take possession of some of Abaqa's lands, which he declared to be areas that had been seized by force and not by virtue of inheritance.[34] The Chaghadaids might have had some older grudges against the Toluid Ilkhans,[35] yet Khurāsān, with its rich pastures, was clearly the most convenient direction for Baraq's expansion. Qaidu accepted his plan, surmising that whatever the consequences of the battle, it would benefit him: If Abaqa were vanquished, Baraq would be occupied in Khurāsān and much less concerned about Transoxania; were Baraq to be vanquished, so much the better.[36] Similar calculations probably also guided Möngke Temür, who approved of the *quriltai*'s decisions, despite the fact that at that time he was apparently commited to

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[31] On Mas'ūd Beg see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mahmud Yalavach," *In the Service of the Khan*, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (Wiesbaden, 1993), pp. 128–30.

[32] The units mentioned are probably the forces which were stationed in those cities in Möngke's time and subordinated to the Qa'an or to other Mongol princes. See Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 51.

[33] For the workshops (*kārkhānah*) see I.P. Petrushevski, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Mongold," *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. John A. Boyle, vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 512–13.

[34] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 39; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 109–10, 113; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 521–2, 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 266–8. For the problems of Ilkhanid legitimacy see Thomas T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," *Rulers from the Steppes*, eds. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marx (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 223–41.

[35] Though this did not prevent Alghu from cooperating with Hülegü against the Golden Horde. Peter Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 5 (1992), p. 344.

[36] Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 289, 293; see also Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 113–14; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Rashīd/Blochet, pp. 173, 192; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 142, 150.

maintaining a "peace" or "truce" with the Ilkhanate.[37] The *quriltai* was concluded with the princes exchanging gold cups with one another and addressing each other as *anda* (blood brothers).[38]

Yet despite the solemn ceremonies, the *quriltai*'s decisions were disregarded soon after it was held. Möngke Temür's army moved towards Transoxania, probably to take possession of the part to which he was entitled by the agreement (if not more). Qaidu sent his troops against Möngke Temür, and thereupon evacuated Bukhara. Baraq, who "saw the arena of his desires empty," rushed to reoccupy Bukhara.[39] Determined to invade Iran, and disregarding the *quriltai*'s other decisions, Baraq resumed the oppression of his subjects. He confiscated the local cattle, prohibited his subjects to ride horses, and killed all the oxen in order to use their skins for shields. Feeding his horses wheat and barley from the sown fields, eight *mann* per horse daily, Baraq soon caused a major depletion of the city's stock of foodstuffs.[40] Only with great difficulty did Mas'ūd Beg manage to convince him not to plunder Samarkand and Bukhara, pointing out that he had to secure his rear in case the Iranian campaign failed.[41]

### *The Chaghadaid Invasion*

Yet Baraq had made preparations for his invasion of Iran even before entering Bukhara. Soon after the *quriltai*,[42] or perhaps earlier, in the

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[37] On this "peace" see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 89.

[38] For a detailed description of the Talas' *quriltai* see Liu Yingsheng, "Lun Talasi huiyi," *Yuanshi luncong*, vol. 4 (1992), pp. 256–65; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 26–30. See the later source also for a refutation of the claim that this *quriltai* was an anti-Toluid alliance that enthroned Qaidu.

[39] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69.

[40] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 39; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 289. See also Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523, according to which Baraq took over all the animals "from the provinces that belonged to Qubilai Khan and Abaqa khan" (east of the Oxus), not sparing even plow oxen. Unfortunately, *mann* is a unit of weight which has different values in different places (from 1/485 kg to 128 kg), and therefore the amount of fodder per horse cannot be determined. See Muhammad Mu'īn, *Farhang-i fārisī* (Tehran, 1963), vol. 4, p. 366 for a list of the different weights.

[41] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 39; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 113; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 289.

[42] Thus according to Waṣṣāf's description of the events (Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69). Rashīd al-Dīn dated Mas'ūd's visit to winter 665/1266–7, i.e. before the

summer of 1268, he sent Mas'ūd Beg to Abaqa, apparently to take care of matters relating to the appanages of Qaidu and Baraq in Iran, as well as to express friendship and loyalty.[43] Mas'ūd's real mission, however, was to spy out the land, especially the roads and the size of Abaqa's armies.[44] After a short stay at the Ilkhanid court, fearing that the real motive of his visit had been discovered, he asked permission to leave. Abaqa regretted this permission soon after he gave it, but Mas'ūd, who had taken the precaution of leaving two horses at each post station through which he had passed, managed to cross the Oxus before Abaqa's troops could reach him. After hearing his envoy's report, Baraq's eagerness to invade Iran grew considerably.[45]

Another step Baraq took in 1267–8 was to contact Tegüder—the Chaghadaid prince who had accompanied Hülegü when the latter went to Iran and had stayed in the Ilkhanate ever since—who was the commander of a *tümen*, a military unit of nominally 10,000 men. During the mission of Mas'ūd Beg or shortly afterwards, Baraq's envoys presented to Tegüder a special hollow arrow, in the middle of which a letter was hidden. In the letter, Baraq informed Tegüder of his intention to invade Iran and asked for his help, perhaps even proposing to reward Tegüder by appointing him over Khurāsān and Māzandarān after they had vanquished Abaqa.[46]

According to Harawī, during the same mission Baraq also informed Abaqa that he planned to arrive in Khurāsān, and promised to be

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*quriltai*, but he claimed that Mas'ūd came as an envoy of Baraq and Qaidu (Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 105; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 519). Since the cooperation between the two began only after the *quriltai*, it seems much probable that it took place after it. Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 289 gives 660/1261–2 as the date of Mas'ūd's visit, which is certainly too early.

[43] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 105; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 519. For the rights and appanages of Chinggisid princes in the different Mongol *uluses* see Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," pp. 12–38.

[44] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 69.

[45] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 105; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 519.

[46] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 111; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522 (who translated *tümen* as a division); Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 290; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 71–2; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 306. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, fol. 81b estimated Tegüder's forces as 30,000 men; *The Georgian chronicle*, p. 576 gives him 20,000 men; Grigor of Akanc' (should be Akner), "History of the Nation of Archers," trans. Richard N. Frye and Robert P. Blake, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2 (December, 1949), p. 375, speaks of 40,000 men and lots of wealth. Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar* (Freiburg-Cairo, 1971), vol. 8, p. 140, claims that Baraq asked Tegüder to join him in obeying Möngke Temür, the Khan of the Golden Horde.

his loyal vassal if Abaqa assigned him an appanage in Khurāsān.[47] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, after this mission Baraq contacted Tübshin, Abaqa's brother and his viceroy in Khurāsān, and demanded that he evacuate the region of Bādghīs up to Ghazna and the Indus River, which he defined as his forefathers' realm. Baraq had a point there: the region of Ghazna and Afghanistan as far as Sind was taken away from the Chaghadaids and annexed to Hülegü's realm only in Möngke's time.[48] Tübshin transmitted the message to Abaqa, who fiercely declined the offer, stating that he had inherited this territory from his father and was ready to defend it.[49] According to Harawī, Abaqa offered Ghazna to Baraq, on the conditions that he remitted half of its income to the Ilkhanate's treasury and that Abaqa still owned half of its artisans.[50] Whatever Abaqa replied, it did not satisfy Baraq, who was determined to fight.[51]

As for Tegüder, after reading Baraq's letter, he asked permission from Abaqa to return to his appanage in Georgia, intending to join Baraq via Darband, crossing through the Golden Horde's domains. He spent enough time there to outrage the Georgians and the Armenians by pillaging villages and caravans and especially by harassing the local Christian clergy.[52] Due to the Armenians' complaints, or to his discovery of Tegüder's correspondence with Baraq, or perhaps as a result of the reports about Baraq's deploying his armies near the Oxus, Abaqa summoned Tegüder to his court several times.[53] When Tegüder refused to comply, Abaqa decided to attack him first, despite Baraq's impending threat. He sent two of his senior commanders, Shiremün and Abatai, to pursue Tegüder with their armies.[54] According to the Mamluk sources, Abaqa also summoned his troops from Anatolia,[55] and both the Mamluk historian al-Yūnīnī and the

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[47] Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 307–8.

[48] J. Aubin, "L'ethnogenese des Qaraunas," *Turcica*, vol. 1 (1969), p. 79; see also Rashīd/Boyle, p. 139, recording the death of Baraq's grandfather in Bāmyān.

[49] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 112; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523.

[50] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 309; the artisans' main function was making weapons.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] Grigor of Akner, p. 375.

[53] *Ibid.* Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 140–41; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir'āt al-zamān* (Hyderabad, 1954–61), vol. 2, pp. 410–11; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 112; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 290–1.

[54] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 112; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 522; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 41; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 290–1; Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 410–11; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 140.

[55] Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 410–11; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8,

Armenian chronicler Grigor of Akner mention the participation of Georgian and Armenian units in the Ilkhanid force.[56] The incident was therefore a clash of a wider scale than can be gleaned from the Ilkhanid sources alone. After a bad start, the Ilkhanid troops had defeated Tegüder and blocked his way to Darband. Tegüder retreated into the mountains of Georgia, but got lost in the forest. He found a temporary refuge with the Georgian King David, but soon afterwards decided to beg for Abaqa's mercy.[57] Alternatively, Tegüder was brought to Abaqa by Shiremün, who defeated him in a second battle.[58] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Tegüder surrendered in April-May, 1270, but was brought to Abaqa only later,[59] after having been exiled to the Kibūdān isle in lake Urmīyah, west of Tabriz. After he defeated Baraq, Abaqa pardoned Tegüder but deprived him of any real power. Tegüder's commanders, who according to Tegüder had persuaded him to rebel, were executed, and his troops, divided into units of tens and hundreds, were incorporated in the Ilkhanid army. Tegüder was not allowed to hold a bow or to ride a mature horse, limitations he dutifully observed.[60]

This was not perhaps the help Baraq had anticipated from Tegüder, but certainly the engagement of part of Abaqa's troops in the west facilitated his next moves. Having declined Abaqa's proposals and being determined to fight, Baraq asked for Qaidu's assistance despite his blatant breaches of the *quriltai*'s decisions. Qaidu agreed to Baraq's request, hoping to push him into Abaqa's hands, as the sources clearly indicate.[61] He sent to his assistance two Ögödeid princes, the

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pp. 140–1; Bybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, fols. 81b–82a; al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd*, fol. 106a; Ibn al-Furāt, *Taʾrīkh*, vol. 7, p. 9.

[56] *Ibid.* Grigor of Akner, p. 377.

[57] *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 583; Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 42; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl, loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar, loc. cit.* This was either because he had found that the Georgians plotted to kill him, or because his remaining horses were poisoned in the Georgian woods.

[58] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 112–3; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 309 retained a different version, according to which Tegüder declined Baraq's offer to support him, and warned him against challenging Abaqa's numerous army.

[59] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 112–13, where he said Tegüder was brought to Abaqa in Rabīʿ al-awwal of that year, i.e., six months earlier. Rashīd must have been referring to Rabīʿ al-awwal of the following year (October–November, 1270), as indeed given in Thackston's translation (Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523).

[60] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda, loc. cit.*; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl, loc. cit.*; Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 113; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 291; Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 42.

[61] Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp.

aforementioned Qipchaq as well as Chabat, grandson of Güyüg Qa'an, with 2000 horsemen each, and possibly, according to Waṣṣāf, a few more princes. At the same time Qaidu ordered his men to find an excuse and return to him before the battle actually started.[62] Baraq placed Qaidu's troops in his vanguard[63] and crossed the Oxus in late 1269–early 1270 (according to Rashīd al-Dīn) or sometimes between September 1268 and August 1269 (according to Waṣṣāf, Harawī and the Mamluk sources). This was shortly after the *quriltai* took place, if Rashīd al-Dīn's chronology is reliable, and while Abaqa was still engaged with Tegüder.[64]

Baraq advanced to Marūchaq, between Balkh and Herat, where Tübshin and Arghun Aqa, the administrator of Khurāsān, were waiting for him. After a short battle, the Ilkhanid troops were defeated and chose to retreat to Māzandarān, informing Abaqa of Baraq's advance.[65] During this fight, a commander of thousand from Tübshin's army, named *Sechektu, whose family formerly served Qipchaq's house (i.e., the Ögödeids) defected to Baraq's ranks, and joined Qipchaq, presenting him with fine Arabian horses. Qipchaq's keeping most of those horses to himself instead of offering all of them to Baraq annoyed Jalayirtai, one of Baraq's senior commanders. This dispute gave Qipchaq the excuse he needed to return to Qaidu. Baraq sent first his brother and then Jalayirtai with 3000 horsemen to pursue him, but they were unable to catch him. Soon afterwards, Chabat also found a chance to withdraw, although he lost most of his troops when he ran into Baraq's son in Bukhara. Baraq protested to Qaidu at the desertion of his forces.[66] Qaidu ignored Baraq, but

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113–14; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Rashīd/Blochet, pp. 173, 192; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 142, 150; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 293.

[62] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 40; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 293; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 30.

[63] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 309.

[64] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 70; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 40; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 582. According to al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī, Baraq crossed the Oxus after he had heard that Abaqa caught Tegüder. They understood the whole battle of Herat as a by-product of the Tegüder affair. al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148.

[65] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 72; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 411. Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 309–10 claimed that Tübshin and Arghun Aqa retreated without taking the field.

[66] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 115–19; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 523–5; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 299; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 40.

he did send a message to Abaqa, informing him of Qipchaq's return. Subsequently, friendship existed between Qaidu and Abaqa, who called each other *ortaq* (friend, ally).[67]

Despite the defection of Qaidu's troops, Baraq managed to take over and devastate large parts of Khurāsān, overrunning Badakhshān, Shaburghān, Ṭāliqān and Merv up to the borders of Nishapur, which his forces plundered on May 19, 1270, evacuating it on the following day.[68] Baraq continued to oppress his subjects in his newly conquered territories,[69] and even planned to plunder Herat. He became convinced, however, that it would be more useful to gain the support of its ruler, Shams al-Dīn Kart, who could help him win the assistance of other Khurāsāni rulers and subjects. Shams al-Dīn Kart, up to then an Ilkhanid vassal, was obliged to arrive at Baraq's camp and accept Baraq's authority. Baraq promised to appoint him as the governor of Khurāsān when Baraq troops continued further westwards. In the meantime, Baraq appropriated money, weapons and cattle from the city, and appointed his tax collectors and inspectors in its markets, workshops and mints.[70] Unimpressed by Baraq's destructive policies, however, Shams al-Dīn Kart managed to return to Herat, allegedly to collect auxiliary troops and provisions for Baraq. Actually, what he did was to take refuge in his castle at Khaysār, south-east of Herat, and wait for the arrival of Abaqa.[71]

Meanwhile, Baraq allocated pasturelands to his commanders: Bādghīs, the pastureland north of Herat, originally allocated to Qipchaq, was given to either Yasaur or *Misu-Mengu. Margha'ul, Baraq's leading commander, received the western area of Ṭūs in the direction of Nishapur, along the Herat river and its tributaries, near the bridge of *Chaghchaghān. Since he knew the roads, Margha'ul was supposed to lead the vanguard troops in the invasion of Iran. Baraq himself stayed on the rear at Ṭāliqān. Although he boasted that after Khurāsān he intended to conquer Iraq and Azerbaijan[72]—

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[67] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 117; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 525; see Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 31.

[68] Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 119; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 294 (26th Ramaḍān, 668).

[69] Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 294.

[70] Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 314–16; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 98.

[71] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 119–20; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 296–7.

[72] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 119; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 304, 312, 313; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 288, 295, 296.

that is to take over the Ilkhanate—he was in no hurry to do so. In the meantime, he ordered his troops to let their horses graze in the meadows and to ride oxen and donkeys, so his army had been idle for a few weeks when the rumors about Abaqa's arrival began to spread.[73]

### *The Coming of Abaqa and the Battle*

Abaqa made serious preparations to deal with the Chaghadaid threat. He ordered his chief minister to prepare arrows, bows and lances,[74] and sent the commanders to assemble their troops and auxiliary forces.[75] Abaqa also ordered his brother, Yoshmut, who was stationed on the border with the Golden Horde, to join him with 10,000 soldiers.[76] According to Waṣṣāf, Yoshmut was sent earlier to the aid of Tübshin while Abaqa was engaged with Tegüder. After Baraq occupied Khurāsān, Yoshmut ran into him several times and suffered heavy losses.[77]

Abaqa left Azerbaijan on April 27, 1270.[78] According to Rashīd al-Dīn he ordered his army not to pluck a single stalk from the fields,[79] yet the Mamluk sources assert that his troops grazed their horses in the sown fields throughout their way.[80] Abaqa's troops went from Azerbaijan to Mūghān, Ardabīl, and Sharūyāz, the future site of Sulṭāniyya. There Abaqa met a messenger sent to the Ilkhanid court by Qubilai Qa'an. The messenger, who had just managed to escape from captivity in Baraq's hands, reported that Baraq's men were constantly drunk, and that their horses had become useless (*qadaq*). Hearing this, Abaqa passed on.[81] His troops reached Rayy,

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[73] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 119; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 288, 295, 296. See also Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71.

[74] Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 299.

[75] *Ta'rīkh-i shāhī*, p. 287.

[76] Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 299.

[77] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 72, 73; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, pp. 41, 42.

[78] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 120; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526 (The 4th of Ramaḍān, 668).

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 434, 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, ed. and trans. E. Blochet, Patrologia Orientalis, vols. 12, 14, 20 (Paris, 1919–28), p. 521.

[81] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 120; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 526–7; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*,

and then Qūmis, where they were accompanied by the troops of Tübshin and Arghun Aqa, whom Baraq had driven away from Khurāsān. They continued to Rādkān and Nishapur, where the Sultan of Kirmān, Ḥajjāj, as well as other auxiliaries (apparently from Yazd) joined them. Together they continued southwards to Bākharz,[82] and were joined near Herat by the Georgian contingents.[83] Throughout the march, Abaqa concealed his presence among the troops, and gave orders to kill whoever divulged it.[84] This policy seems to have worked well, since Baraq doubted the arrival of Abaqa almost until the beginning of the battle.[85]

After having traveled for fifty-five days from Mughān, Abaqa's troops were only at 5 days' distance from Baraq's. Abaqa and his commanders decided that the troops would carry their supplies for the five days' march already cooked in order not to light fire.[86] Then ten out of every hundred horsemen were ordered to move, half a day in advance of the main body, to collect information.[87] This vanguard, estimated at 5000 men, included also the Georgian troops of King David, and was headed by the Ilkhanid commanders Abatai and Shiktur.[88] Abaqa ordered them to kill every Chaghadaid soldier that they found on their way. They did so, until they closed in on Baraq's vanguard. Abaqa's advance troops caught the enemy contingent by surprise at dawn and annihilated it completely. They returned and reported to Abaqa that the distance between their

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vol. 5, p. 300, where the messenger reported only about Baraq's actions in Khurāsān, not about their being unprepared for battle. al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 521 for the road. For *qadaq* see Doerfer, *Neupersischen*, vol. 3, p. 420.

[82] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 120–1; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 527; *Tarikh-i shāhī*, p. 288; cf. Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 300.

[83] *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580.

[84] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 521.

[85] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 122; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 528.

[86] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 148; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 521. For the use of this means by earlier Mongol forces see Henry D. Martin, "The Mongol Army," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, no. 1 (1943), p. 50.

[87] Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 434; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, pp. 521–2.

[88] *Ibid.*; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580; This king David was not the one who gave refuge to Tegüder, but "The Big David" (David Ulugh), Abaqa's ally, who died soon after the battle. See W.E.D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People* (London, 1932), pp. 114–18.

troops and Baraq's was a day and a half's journey.[89] This perhaps corresponds to Rashīd al-Dīn's report that when Abaqa was at Bākharz, he sent a small group of 100 horsemen from Fāryāb, much further to the northeast, to check the enemy's movements. This group clashed with some of Baraq's troops, but managed to overcome them and to report back to Abaqa.[90]

Abaqa then divided his troops into the standard three divisions—right, left and center—and sent Tübshin to *Chaghchaghān, on the Herat river, against Baraq's vanguard commander Margha'ul, who headed 3000 men. Tübshin ran into Margha'ul's troops, defeated them, and took back the booty the Chaghadaid army had previously collected from Khurāsān. Margha'ul managed to escape and inform Baraq, who withdrew his forces.[91]

According to Harawī, Baraq heard from Margha'ul about the arrival of the Ilkhanid troops, rode towards them and the battle began.[92] Elsewhere, like Mīrkhwānd, Harawī also cites Rashīd al-Dīn's detailed and beautiful version. Margha'ul indeed reported to Baraq on the arrival of the Ilkhanid army, but (since it was headed by Tübshin), Baraq was not sure whether Abaqa himself had also arrived in Khurāsān. Baraq then received a messenger from Abaqa, who suggested that he take over the area of Ghazna as far as the Indus river, i.e., the area that Baraq had formerly demanded from Tübshin. Baraq considered the offer for a while, but after consulting his commanders finally declined it, and decided to fight, despite the contrary advice of his astrologer. He sent three spies (*jawāsis*) to find out whether Abaqa had indeed arrived in Khurāsān, as claimed in the message.[93]

Abaqa advanced to Herat and sent his commanders to choose the battlefield, which goes to show that he was less than confident that Baraq would accept his peace proposal. While there, they caught

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[89] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl, loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar, loc. cit.*; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd, loc. cit.*

[90] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 121; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 527.

[91] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 121; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 527; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 300. According to Harawī, *Herat*, p. 317, Margha'ul was stationed in Qarābāgh in Bādghīs; Abaqa's army was sent from Jām, north of Bākharz, and was apparently led by Abaqa. This is also implied by al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī (*loc. cit.*), according to whom Abaqa rode by night and suddenly found himself facing Margha'ul.

[92] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 317.

[93] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 122; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 527–8; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 300–301.

Baraq's spies and brought them back to Abaqa, who decided to manipulate them. After discussing the plot with a trusted Mongol soldier, he sat on his throne, feasting with his commanders, and made sure that the spies, bound to the tent's pillar, could hear him. After a few hours, the man with whom Abaqa conspired arrived, and reported that the Golden Horde had used Abaqa's absence from Azerbaijan to invade his domains in great numbers. "If you don't hasten to return," added the messenger, "you will not find your camps or people." Abaqa declared that he would withdraw immediately and suspend the fight with Baraq until after the Qipchaq threat had been eliminated. He ordered his people to return at once to Māzandarān, leaving their tents behind. He then ordered the three spies killed, but made sure that one of them was able to escape. Then he and his troops decamped and moved to the *Jina (or *Khanbeh) plain, which was chosen to be the battlefield.

The spy who had managed to escape rushed to report the good news to Baraq. Baraq was overjoyed and the next morning rode towards Abaqa's deserted camps. Even the refusal of the people of Herat, following Abaqa's commands, to open their gates to the Chaghadaid army did not change his good mood. Baraq and his troops crossed the Herat river, pillaged the deserted tents of Abaqa's troops and camped south of Herat. Only the next morning, after riding some twelve kilometres (two *farsakhs*) did they suddenly see the plain full of Abaqa's army, and understood they had been tricked. Baraq camped next to the Herat river, on the banks of one of its tributaries, the (unidentified) Qara Su (black water).[94]

Although the use of disinformation was not uncommon among the Ilkhans and their contemporaries,[95] this story is almost too convenient to be true. If one accepts it, however, it is worth noticing that to both Abaqa and Baraq a large-scale attack of the Golden Horde in spite of the "peace" between it and the Ilkhanate seemed quite plausible. Interestingly, the Mamluk sources also report that

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[94] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 124–5; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 528–9; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 320–23; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 303–5; Boyle, "Dynastic and Political," p. 359; for the Qara Su (Mongolian: Black water) see also Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 73 (Āb-i siyāh, Persian: black water); al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 523 (*al-nahr al-aswad*, Arabic: the black river).

[95] See Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 139–55; and see his article in this volume: Reuven Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid army? Ghazan's first campaign into Syria, 1299–1300," p. 238.

Baraq came to attack the Ilkhanid troops only after he was convinced that Abaqa had already withdrawn. This rumor, according to this version, was spread by a Chaghadaid turncoat, at Abaqa's request. The man, an expert in scapulomancy, escaped to Abaqa's ranks after his divinations revealed Abaqa's future victory. Abaqa was encouraged by this prospect, and promised to give the diviner a village if his prediction turned out to be true. He also asked him to spread the rumor that he (i.e., Abaqa) had retired, thereby encouraging Baraq to attack.[96]

When he found out that Abaqa's forces were still in Khurāsān, Baraq considered retreat, but was persuaded by his generals to resume fighting, despite his obvious disadvantages, namely Abaqa's choice of the battlefield, the poor condition of Baraq's horses, and the fact that the Ilkhanid army had cut the Chaghadaid access to water.[97] Despite all this, Abaqa's victory did not come easily. The battle began in the following day, July 22, 1270,[98] near the Qara Su river. Abaqa encouraged his troops, and again divided them into three divisions—left, right and center—whose composition, however, is far from clear.

Most sources agree that the right flank was held by Tübshin and Hindu Noyan,[99] who were accompanied also by Samaghar, the Ilkhanid commander of Anatolia.[100] According to the Georgian Chronicle, however, Shiktur, Arghun Aqa and Ias Bugha (the Christian 'Abdallāh of the Arabic and Persian sources) as well as the unidentified *Togha-Bogha Djini manned the right flank,[101] while Yoshmut held the left flank, whose composition is uncertain. According to Rashīd

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[96] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, pp. 522–3. For Mongol scapulomancy see William of Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, ed. and trans. P. Jackson, ed. D. Morgan (London, 1990), p. 193 and n. 2.

[97] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

[98] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 330; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 130; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531 (The first of Dhū al-Ḥijja, 668).

[99] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305.

[100] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Baraq indeed camped on the banks of the Qara Su, but the Ilkhanid troops to his west probably blocked his way to the main Herat river.

[101] *The Georgian Chronicle*, pp. 580–1. According to the Mamluk source "'Abdallāh the Christian" brought to the battlefield "churches and bells on strong camels." al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, *loc. cit.*; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, *loc. cit.*; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 524.

al-Dīn, the left flank was huge, as it comprised Arghun Aqa, to whom the armies of Kirmān under Sultan Ḥajjāj and of Yazd under the *atabeg* Yūsuf Shāh were subordinated, as well as Sonitai, Shiktur, Buriltai and ʿAbdallāh Aqa.[102] Harawī mentions only Yoshmut and Boriltai, Mīrkhwānd records Yosmut and Sonitai Noyan, and Waṣṣāf only reports the names of Shiktur and Arghun Aqa.[103] The Georgian Chronicle, according to which most of the aforementioned people were on the right, cites only Abatai and Shiremun on the left flank.[104] According to Harawī, Mīrkhwānd, and the *Taʾrīkh-i-shāhī*, Arghun Aqa and the Kirmānid forces were positioned in the center,[105] which, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, was held by Abatai Noyan and a group of commanders.[106] Abaqa himself was in the center, according to Mīrkhwānd and Harawī, but was persuaded to stand back, since he was supposed to be the target of the Chaghadaid attack.[107] For this same reason, according to the *Taʾrīkh-i shāhī*, Abaqa chose to be on the left flank.[108] It seems as if Baraq's forces were also divided, but there is no reference to the composition of the different Chaghadaid units.[109]

The different sources also differ with regard to the course of the battle, although all of them agree that at one point Baraq was close to winning. According to the *Taʾrikh-i shāhī*, Baraq started the battle with a dense barrage of arrows, which left many people wounded.[110] This might be identical with Margha'ul's attack, which most sources described as opening the battle. Margha'ul, leading a thousand men,

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[102] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 125, 127; Rashīd/Thackson, pp. 527, 530, where the translation is not accurate regarding the affiliation of the Kirmāni and Yazdi troops.

[103] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305; Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74.

[104] *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580.

[105] *Taʾrīkh-i shāhī*, p. 290; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305; Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī Kirmānī, *Simṭ al-ʿula* (Tehran, 1949), p. 47 says that Arghun Aqa was with the Kirmānid troops.

[106] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

[107] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305. He differentiates between the center's vanguard (*muqaddima-i* qūl), manned by Arghun Aqa and the Kirmāni forces, and the "regular" center.

[108] *Taʾrīkh-i shāhī*, p. 290.

[109] Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305. Yet all those references are rather general. It is still possible that the Chaghadaid force was not divided, as implied, for example, by describing Margha'ul attacking "from left and right" (e.g., Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 306).

[110] *Taʾrīkh-i shāhī*, p. 289.

galloped left and right, attacking and retreating and causing great havoc. With this force he managed to overcome 3000 Ilkhanid horsemen and even to attack some of the Ilkhanid commanders with his sword. Eventually, he was hit by an arrow and killed.[111] Margha'ul's death came as a major blow to the Chaghadaid army. Yet Jalayirtai offered to avenge his death, and Baraq, after warning him not to let Abaqa's troops ambush him, allowed him to go. With 4000 horsemen wearing mailcoats, who waged repeated attacks, Jalayirtai was able to defeat either Abaqa's powerful left flank[112] or his central division.[113] At this point, Abaqa considered retreat,[114] but was encouraged by Sonitai, his oldest commander, to continue fighting. Whether Sonitai simply told Abaqa that having 70,000 warriors at his disposal, he could spare 10,000 and still win the day,[115] or whether Sonitai stirred the troops, asking them to fight for the sake of Chinggis Khan[116]—a cliche not very well suited to the battle's circumstances—or for their patron, Abaqa,[117] in any case, Sonitai's intervation was crucial to embolden the Ilkhanid army.

Abaqa took the field himself, coordinating his left flank, which he sent Yoshmut to redeploy, and the other undamaged parts of his army. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, it took the Ilkhanid forces three assaults before they could defeat Baraq,[118] and Waṣṣāf also mentions repeated Ilkhanid attacks on the Chaghadaids.[119] According to Harawī,

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[111] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 127–8; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 327; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 306; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Ñahj al-sadīd*, pp. 523–4. Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 153 claims that Margha'ul was shot by a crossbow. The Persian text of both Rashīd and Harawī has *tīr-i charkh*. *Charkh* means crossbow, but also the celestial wheel, fortune and misfortune (F. Steingass, *Persian English Dictionary* (eighth ed., London and New York, 1988), p. 390), and indeed Thackston translated it as "an arrow of misfortune". According to Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 75, Margha'ul's death occurred at a later stage of the battle.

[112] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 128; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74.

[113] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 328; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 306; *Ta'rīkh-i shāhī*, p. 290.

[114] Rashīd al-Dīn is the only source who plays down Abaqa's desperate situation at this stage. Waṣṣāf, Harawī, Mīrkhwānd and the Mamluk source all suggest that Baraq's forces nearly won the battle.

[115] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 328; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 307.

[116] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 74; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 43.

[117] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 129; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 307.

[118] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 128; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

[119] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 75.

Abaqa attacked from left and right, but Jalayirtai managed to hold out, pursuing the Ilkhanid troops, killing and wounding them. When, however, he tried to return to Baraq, he could not make it, having been encircled by another division of Abaqa's troops. Due to this ambush, Jalayirtai's troops dispersed. When Baraq saw that the situation was desperate, he entered the battle himself, attacking and retreating for a while before he was hit and left horseless. His desperate position, as he was lying on the ground and crying "I am Baraq, give me a horse," was missed by neither Rashīd al-Dīn nor Harawī.[120] Eventually somebody recognized Baraq, and gave him a horse. "With eyes full of tears and a heart full of ire," Baraq rode all the way back to Bukhara.[121]

Thereupon, Abaqa's troops pursued the Chaghadaids for two days.[122] Some of them surrendered to Abaqa, some sought refuge in Herat and were killed by its population, and a few other were burned alive by Abaqa's troops.[123] The only Chaghadaid who was still fighting at this stage was Jalayirtai. He assembled the routed Chaghadaids, drove them eastwards towards the sands of Amuya, near the Oxus, and held his ground till the remnants of the Chaghadaids got away.[124] But while he was able to save some people, most of the Chaghadaids were in dire straits, and many of them drowned when they tried to cross a river, which may have been that of Herat or, more likely, the Oxus.[125] The Mamluk sources also claim that when the fleeing Chaghadaids dismounted, each of them hamstrung his horse with his sword, so that the enemy could not make use of it, unique behaviour which is neither known from other Mongol battles, nor corroborated by any other source.[126] Many or even most of Baraq's

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[120] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 129; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 530–1; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 330.

[121] *Ibid.*; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 75; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 307.

[122] *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 580.

[123] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 130–1; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 329.

[124] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 129–30; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531. Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155 describes Jalayirtai's actions as a second battle, in which the Chaghadaids won.

[125] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 435–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 149–50; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 525, according to whom there was a large-scale drowning; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 329–30.

[126] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 435–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 149–50; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 525. Hamstringing horses was, however, known in pre-Islamic Arabia and in the early Islamic period (see e.g. Muḥammad b. Jarīr

troops perished in the battle, while Abaqa's losses were smaller, but still significant.[127]

### *Results and Political Implications*

Baraq's defeat sealed his destiny. In addition to his crushing defeat, soon after he reached Bukhara he was struck by paralysis, and had to be carried in a litter. Some of his commanders chose to join Abaqa, while two princes decided to ride eastward. Baraq sent loyal princes after the deserters, and dispatched his brother, Basar, to ask for Qaidu's assistance, describing his desperate situation and attributing his defeat to the desertion of Qipchaq and Chabat. Qaidu imprisoned the messenger, but informed Baraq that he would send troops to his aid. He then led 20,000 men westward, hoping to take advantage of the Chaghadaid weakness, and to prevent Baraq from joining Qubilai. Baraq learnt about Qaidu's approach only after his

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al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-muluk*, ed. DeGoege (Leiden, 1879–1901), series 1, pp. 1476, 1614; M. Fishbein, trans, *The Victory of Islam*, vol. 8 of *The History of al-Ṭabarī* (New York, 1997), pp. 19, 156, relating to the years 626–7 and 629–30). A horse was hamstrung when its rider resolved not to attempt escape but to fight to the death, as is documented in a 9th century episode: During the struggle between the Caliph Harūn al-Rashīd's two sons, al-Amīn (r. 809–813) and al-Ma'mūn (r. 813–833), al-Amīn's governor of al-Ahwāz fought a losing battle against a strong contingent of al-Ma'mūn's army. When he realized that everything was lost, he offered the clients (*mawālī*) to run and save their life and let him fight alone till the bitter end. The loyal clients refused, pointing out that they owe him too much to abandon him at this stage. They therefore dismounted and hamstrung their horses so that they would not be able to change their mind (Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, series 3, p. 853; M. Fishbein, trans. *The War between Brothers* (New York, 1992), p. 117 quoted in David Ayalon, *Enuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study of Power Relations* (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 26. I am indebted to Prof. Reuven Amitai for this reference). However, already the late 10th century scholar, Khaṭṭābī (d. 998), commenting on the hamstringing of the horse of Ja'far b. 'Abd al-Ṭālib, the Prophet Muḥammad's cousin in the battle of Mu'ta (in 629–30, see the first reference from Ṭabarī above) explained the hamstringing as meant to prevent the enemy from making use of the horses of his defeated enemies. Khaṭṭābī also cited several Muslim legal opinions on the subject of hamstringing. Abū Sulaymān Khaṭṭābī, *Ma'ālim al-sunan* (Allepo, 1933), vol. 2, pp. 253–4; partially cited in 'Aẓīm Ābādī, *al-'Awn al-ma'būd* (Medina, 1968), vol. 8, p. 240; I am indebted to Prof. Michael Lecker and to Ms. Vardit Tokatli for those references.

[127] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, pp. 435–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 149–50; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 525, according to whom Baraq lost more than 40,000 men, and Abaqa either 370, 390 or just "many many troops", part of them due to a disease; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 329–30, where Abaqa lost 5000 men and Baraq most of his army.

princes had already caught the rebels. He tried to convince Qaidu to go back, to no avail. Qaidu's troops surrounded Baraq's camp, planning to attack him on the following day. In the morning, however, they discovered that Baraq had passed away during the night. Most of Baraq's troops, estimated as 30,000 men, chose to submit to Qaidu, who granted them pasturelands and shares of Baraq's wealth.[128] According to Waṣṣāf's alternative version, most of Baraq's troops chose to enter into Qaidu's service, while Baraq was still alive. Baraq was then obliged to seek refuge with Qaidu, who poisoned him.[129]

Baraq died in August 1271, and less than a month later Qaidu was enthroned as khan at Talas.[130] Apart from being the Ögödeid khan, Qaidu was also empowered to appoint the head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*. In Central Asia, the battle of Herat thus led to the accession of Qaidu and to the loss of independence of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, which became subordinate to Qaidu.[131] This did not happen without opposition: Baraq's and Alghu's sons rebelled against Qaidu, and so also did the newly appointed head of the Chaghadaids, Negübei. Yet after being defeated by Abaqa, and having their troops divided between Abaqa's and Qubilai's army, the Chaghadaids could not challenge Qaidu for long. Du'a, Baraq's son, acknowledged this fact and chose to ally himself with Qaidu. In 1282, Qaidu appointed him head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, and their cooperation, which lasted till Qaidu's death (1301), enabled Du'a to organize the Chaghadaid *ulus* and regain its independence after Qaidu's death.[132] Yet even before Du'a's accession, from the mid 1270s, Qaidu, thanks to the battle's outcome, was able to assert himself as the ruler of the independent Mongol khanate in Central Asia.[133] Another important advantage that Qaidu gained from Baraq's defeat was the alliance of Masʿūd Beg, who after the battle moved into Qaidu's service. The cooperation between the two lasted till Masʿūd's death (1289), after which his sons continued to serve Qaidu.

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[128] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 131–8; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 531–5; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 153; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 31–2.

[129] Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 76; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 44; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 309; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 32.

[130] Qarshī, *Mulkhaqāt*, p. 138; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 32.

[131] *Ibid.*; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 130.

[132] For the relationship between Du'a, Qaidu and Qaidu's sons see Biran, *Qaidu*, Chs. 2, 3.

[133] Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 33.

Together they presided over the gradual recovery of Qaidu's sedentary territories.[134]

Abaqa's victory confirmed Ilkhanid control over Khurāsān, and for the remaining years of his rule, his eastern frontier remained quiet. Later on the Ilkhanids had to cope with local raids by Qaidu, the Chaghadaids, and the Qara'unas against Khurāsān and Herat, but apart from the invasions during Oljeitü's reign, the eastern border of Iran remained safe until the rise of Temür Lang (1370–1405).[135] Abaqa also took several steps that were meant to secure his eastern border. He was dissuaded from his original intention of destroying the disloyal city of Herat, but its ruler, Shams al-Dīn Kart, who had flirted with Baraq, remained suspect in Abaqa's eyes. In 1275, after several delays, Shams al-Dīn Kart was persuaded to go to Tabriz, the Ilkhanid capital, where he was detained and finally poisoned in 1278.[136] Even before that, a Chaghadaid appointee, who coveted Bukhara, reported to Abaqa that Qaidu and the Chaghadaids were fighting in the city, and claimed, apparently from his own imagination, that they were planning to cross the Oxus again. Abaqa sent his troops to invade and destroy Bukhara, so that nobody would wish to fight for it again.[137] The Ilkhanid force, which allegedly came to avenge the harm inflicted by Baraq on Khurāsān, reached Bukhara on January 29, 1273. Although they did not find in the city any Chaghadaid or Ögödeid troops, Abaqa's troops burned and pillaged for a week, reducing the city to ashes.[138] After this week, however, Abaqa's troops evacuated Bukhara. Despite their victory, the Ilkhanids did not try to expand beyond the Oxus, which remained their eastern border.[139]

Another step that Abaqa took was to entrust the region of Ghazna to those Chaghadaids who joined his troops after the battle. This step was meant to curb the power of the Qara'unas,[140] who inhabited

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[134] Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 32.

[135] Boyle, "Dynastic and Political," p. 360.

[136] Peter Jackson, "Abaqa", *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 1 (1985), p. 62, and see Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 330ff. for a detailed description of those events.

[137] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 77; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 45; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 311–12.; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 140–2; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 536–7.

[138] Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 33. Sacked again in 1276 by Alghu's sons, Bukhara remained in ruins till 1282, when Qaidu sent Mas'ūd Beg to restore it.

[139] Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 152.

[140] For the Qara'unas, a group of Mongols who ruled over most of modern

this area, and to check further Chaghadaid pressure on Khurāsān. Abaqa, who had formerly offered this region to Baraq, after the battle appointed Mubārak Shāh, the former head of the Chaghadaids, to command the Qara'unid army of Ghazna. It is unclear to what extent the "Ilkhanid" Chaghadaids managed to rule the Qara'unas effectively. In the late 1290s, however, Du'a's troops took over the Qara'unas.[141]

Abaqa's victory cost him already, however, on his western front, against the Mamluks. Being busy in the north and east in 1268–70, Abaqa did not send troops to the help of Antioch, an Ilkhanid vassal state that in 1268 passed into the hands of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars. The Ilkhanid troops of Anatolia were by then busy with Tegüder in Georgia. For the same reason Abaqa also did not take steps to prevent Baybars's advance against the Crusaders in 1269.[142] Moreover, Abaqa's involvement in Herat, and his attention to the eastern front, probably contributed to his failure to implement a real joint campaign with the Franks against the Mamluks. When the crusade of Edward, shortly to become Edward I of England, reached Acre in spring 1271, Abaqa sent to his help only a small and ineffective force that raided north Syria in October 1270, only to withdraw at the first indications of a Mamluk approach.[143] Taking all this into account, it is clear why the Mamluk sources chose to describe the battle of Herat.

What was the reaction of the other Mongol khanates to the battle's result? Soon after the battle, Qubilai's emissaries arrived in Marāgha to enthrone Abaqa,[144] reconfirming his rule over Iran, and demonstrating at least the nominal authority of the Qa'an there. Although he was mostly preoccupied in 1268–73 with the siege of Xianyang, in Central China, Qubilai was also aware of Qaidu's

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Afghanistan and attempted to remain independent of both the Ilkhans and the Chaghadaids see Aubin, "Qara'unas," *passim*; Shimo, "The Qara'unas in the Historical Materials of the Ilkhanate," *Memoires of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, vol. 35 (1977), *Passim*; Jackson, "Dissolution," pp. 242ff.

[141] Aubin, "Qara'unas," pp. 83–4; Jackson, "Dissolution," p. 242; Peter Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. 5 (1992), p. 345.

[142] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 119–20.

[143] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 98–9; L. Lockhart, "The Relations between Edward I and Edward II of England and the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia," *Iran*, vol. 6 (1968), p. 24; John A. Boyle, "The Ilkhans of Persia and the Princes of Europe," *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1976), pp. 30–1.

[144] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 138–9; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 535.

strengthening and took precautions. Already in 1271 he sent a coalition of princes headed by his fourth son Nomuqan to Almaliq, in the uper Ili valley, to guard against Qaidu. The serious threat this coalition posed to Qaidu, however, collapsed in the middle of the 1270s, when the princes rebelled against Nomuqan and some of them even found their way into Qaidu's ranks.[145] Throughout his rule, Qubilai was unable to enforce his authority over the Central Asian Mongols.[146]

Möngke Temür's messengers also came to greet Abaqa's victory.[147] Although he approved of Baraq's plan to conquer Khurāsān, and despite his diplomatic efforts to forge an alliance with the far away Mamluks against Abaqa, when the latter was faced by a real threat, that of Baraq, Möngke Temür remained neutral, choosing only to congratulate Abaqa after his victory. This was not only because in 1270 much of Möngke Temür's attention was concentrated on the troubles in Novgorod, the northern outlet of the Golden Horde trade,[148] but also because Baraq was no less a threat to Möngke Temür than Abaqa himself. The war, resulting in the curbing of the Chaghadaid force and the temporarily weakening of the Ilkhans, certainly suited Möngke Temür's interests. Nor did he have a reason to be worried by Qaidu's accession. Despite the tension between them after the Talas *quriltai*, Qaidu remained Möngke Temür's protégé at least till the mid-1270s.[149] Soon after his greetings to Abaqa, however, Möngke Temür renewed his attempts to ally with the Mamluks against the Ilkhans, though these never materialized.[150]

The battle of Herat was therefore a major event that shaped the borders of the emerging independent Mongol Khanates and their international relations. Let us now turn to our analysis of the reasons for Abaqa's victory.

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[145] For Nomuqan and the princes' rebellion see Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 37–41.

[146] See Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 37–57.

[147] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 139; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 535; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 308.

[148] Bartold Spuler, *Die goldene Horde* (Wiesbaden, 1965), p. 59; George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 170–1.

[149] Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 63–4.

[150] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 89–91.

*The Military Implications: Why did Abaqa win?*

A.P. Martinez has claimed that "the battle of Herat was decided by the Ilkhanid heavy cavalry," and considers the Ilkhanids' better weaponry, lances mostly, that allegedly distinguished them from the Chaghadaid "light" archers, as the main reason for their victory.[151] This conclusion, however, can be disputed.[152]

The Mongol army had used lances already at the time of Chinggis Khan[153] and certainly in the early 1240s, when Carpini and Thomas of Spalato described it.[154] Therefore, being armed with lances does not necessarily justify the classification of its users as "heavy cavalry." Moreover, Baraq's troops also carried lances during the battle of Herat, and their use continued to be common later on among Central Asian Mongols.[155] However, Baraq's insistence on making weapons around the clock in Bukhara, his confiscation of cattle for their skins as well as plundering weapons before and during the battle[156] indeed suggest that his armament was inferior to that of Abaqa, at least in quantity. This makes sense: after all Abaqa had a much larger and better organized kingdom at his disposal than Baraq had during his short rule in Transoxania. Yet I doubt whether the difference in the armament of the two sides was that great, or whether it was this alone that decided the battle. A close reading of the different sources suggests that the two armies used a number of weapons besides bows and arrows. Abaqa's forces indeed had lances, knives, javelins, and swords,[157] but Baraq's troops were also equipped

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[151] Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155.

[152] In general, cf. Martinez's evaluations of the Ilkhanid army cited above with those of J.M. Smith (J.M. Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 44, no. 2 [December, 1984], pp. 307–345; J.M. Smith, "Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations," *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. Y. Lev [Leiden, 1997], pp. 249–266) and R. Amitai-Preiss (Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, esp. Ch. 10; Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid army," p. 253ff.).

[153] See e.g., Juwaynī, *Jahān gushā*, vol. 1, p. 107; Juwaynī, *World Conqueror*, vol. 1, p. 134 (Chinggis Khan's army using lances against Jalāl al-Dīn); Robert W. Reid, "Mongolian Weaponry in *The Secret History of the Mongols*," *Mongolian Studies*, vol. 15 (1992), pp. 88–9.

[154] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 216; Reid, "Weaponry," pp. 88–9.

[155] Kirmānī, *Simṭ al-ʿulā*, p. 47; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 287; Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 86–7.

[156] *Taʾrīkh-i shāhī*, p. 290; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 314; Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 68; Ayātī, *Taḥrīr*, p. 38.

[157] Waṣṣāf, *Taʾrīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 74, 75; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 326, 328, 329; Mīrkh-

with swords, lances, and daggers.[158] Four thousand of them also wore mailcoats (*jawshan-i pūsh*).[159] Martinez concluds that less than five percent of the Chaghadaid force used armor.[160] I do not think that the numbers given in the sources (see below) enable one to calculate percentages with any hope of accuracy. Yet it is no less significant that, to the best of our knowledge, none of Abaqa's troops wore armor. Indeed, the 4000 armored Chaghadaid warriors managed to break up an important Ilkhanid division.

Despite all that, however, it is clear that the main weapon was still bows and arrows, and this is true for both sides. The barrage of arrows from Baraq's troops is well attested, and the Chaghadaids repeated attacks (or attacks and retreats) also suggest the use of arrows and not of hand to hand combat. The Ilkhanid forces, however, also made good use of arrows, with which, for example, they managed to kill Margha'ul, and with which Tübshin and others damaged the Chaghadaids in the later stages of the battle.[161] Only at the end of the battle did the Ilkhanid army turn to hand to hand combat, slaying the Chaghdaids with swords, as had also been common among the Mongols at the time of Chinggis Khan.[162] During the battle, the

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wānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 299; *The Georgian Chronicle*, p. 582; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435.

[158] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, pp. 148–9; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Kirmānī, *Simṭ al-ʿulā*, p. 47; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 293. Amitai-Preiss (*Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 255) had questioned the reliability of Waṣṣāf's descriptions of arms, defining them as mainly poetical. There might be some truth in this accusation (though Waṣṣāf certainly demonstrates a rich collection of metaphors describing bows and arrows), but the mentioning of diverse weapons in the different sources suggests that at least some of them were real, not imaginative.

[159] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 328. For later examples of Chaghadaid forces using armor see Harawī, *Herat*, p. 630; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Voyages d'Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, ed. and trans. C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti (Paris, 1969), p. 49; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, trans. Hamilton A.R. Gibb (Cambridge, 1958–1994), vol. 3, p. 566.

[160] Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155.

[161] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 127, 131; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 530, 531; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 74, 75; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 307; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149 and see also the poetic description of the battles in which bows and arrows have a central position. Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 74, 75; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 305; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 328–9.

[162] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 524; for earlier examples from Chinggis Khan's time see, e.g., Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 44, 243; Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abū 'l-Faraj*, ed. and trans. E.A.W. Budge (London, 1932), vol. 1, p. 376; also Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 223.

Ilkhanids also conducted repeated attacks in order to break the Chaghadaids' force. More important, their final victory was achieved after they had managed to drag Jalayirtai into an ambush, and this testifies to their mobility, not to their "heavy" qualities.

Martinez claimed that the "heavier" quality of the Ilkhanid army caused Abaqa to chose as the battlefield "an agricultural area where irrigation channels restricted cavalry movements."[163] In fact, Harawī states (immediately after the lines cited by Martinez) that due to the multiple quantities of buildings and irrigation canals the "agricultural" area was found unsuitable by the Ilkhanid commanders, who therefore elected an open plain as the battlefield,[164] a fact which is clearly confirmed by Rashīd al-Dīn.[165] Apparently what is most striking about this battle of Herat, when compared to battles fought in the region in the pre-Mongol period—mainly among the Khwārazmians and the Ghūrids—or even to later Mongol clashes in the region, is the complete absence of siege warfare and hydraulic warfare (i.e. flooding the river in the face of the enemy).[166] This is not only because the issue at stake in 1270 was not the control of Herat but of Khurāsān, but also because none of the Mongol troops seemed to have mastered those techniques, and they therefore preferred to fight outside the city.

If not exclusively because of his army's better weaponry, why did Abaqa win? This was due to a combination of several factors, which I shall examine here.

*Size*: I certainly agree with Martinez that both forces struck contemporary observers as unusually large, and they probably were.[167] At least the lowest estimates of Abaqa's troops—50,000[168] 70,000[169]

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[163] Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," pp. 155–6.

[164] Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 319–20; Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 225.

[165] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 123, 125; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 528, 529; Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History," p. 360.

[166] See, e.g., Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-taʾrīkh* (Beirut, 1966), vol. 12, pp. 190, 393; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 406. Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 155, claimed that one unit of Abaqa's troops was equipped with arbalests, but I did not find any reference to that.

[167] Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 154; see, e.g., Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 309, 317, 325; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 293, 304. Most of those descriptions refer to Abaqa's troops.

[168] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 324.

[169] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326, cited in Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 154.

or 100,000[170]—correspond with contemporary assessments of the Ilkhanid troops sent against the Mamluks,[171] and are therefore quite plausible. It is much harder to accept the numbers given for Baraq's troops: 90,000,[172] 100,000[173] or even 150,000.[174] The Mamluk sources do not emphasize Baraq's numerical superiority, although they report 40,000 Chaghadaid dead.[175] According to the Kirmānid chronicle, however, Baraq crossed the Oxus with 20,000 horsemen, while Abaqa's troops (even without the Kirmānid auxiliaries) are estimated at 100,000.[176] One wonders how Baraq, ruling only in Transoxania, deserted by Qaidu's troops, and unsupported by any auxiliary troops,[177] could bring to the field more troops than Abaqa. Estimates of the whole Central Asian armies (i.e., not only of Transoxania) are usually much smaller in comparison to the estimates of the other Mongol khanates. Marco Polo, for example, attributed 100,000 horsemen to Qaidu's army (including the Chaghadaid troops) and 300,000 horsemen to the Ilkhanate.[178] One can also mention that except for Harawī's generous descriptions, the actual fighting forces mentioned in the sources do not exceed a few thousands.[179] Moreover, the desertion of Qipchaq and Chabat with their 4000 horsemen was taken as a great blow to the Chaghadaid troops.[180] The only group that might have fought side by side with Baraq was the Qara'unas, since Rashīd al-Dīn maintains that the man who eventually gave Baraq a horse after his fall was Sali, the Qara'unas.[181] Yet it is hard to

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[170] *Ta'rīkh-i shāhī*, p. 287.

[171] Amitai-Preiss, *Ilkanid and Mamluks*, pp. 228 (60,000); 189 (50,000); Amitai, "Whither the Ilkhanid army," pp. 234–5 (65,000; 70,000; 90,000; 100,000).

[172] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 329.

[173] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 71; Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 313, 321, 329; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 293.

[174] Harawī, *Herat*, p. 310.

[175] al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 436; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 150; Mufaḍḍal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, p. 525.

[176] *Ta'rīkh-i shāhī*, pp. 287–8.

[177] Shams al-Dīn Kart indeed went to Herat to enlist such troops, but he never came back. Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 120.

[178] Polo, *Marco Polo*, trans. Yule, vol. 2, pp. 457–8; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 85.

[179] See, e.g., Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 293; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 115; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 524; al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 329; cf. Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 310–11.

[180] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 131–2; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 532.

[181] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 131; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 532, though previously this Sali is defined as one of Baraq's bodyguards (*kejīktānān*), Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 129; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 330 also described him only as a

assert how many of the Qara'unas, if any, indeed came to fight for Baraq, and since they were not punished by Abaqa after the battle (unlike others among Baraq's collaborators, such as Shams al-Dīn Kart) their presence in Baraq's ranks was probably not massive.[182] The Ilkhanid troops, on the other hand, included most of Abaqa's senior commanders, whose troops arrived not only from Khurāsān but also from Azerbaijan, Darband and Anatolia and were reinforced by the auxiliary troops of Kirmān, Yazd and Georgia.[183] It is hard to determine the weight of these auxiliary troops, but Martinez certainly overemphasizes the role of the Georgian contingent, which the Ilkhanid sources do not even mention.[184] One should bear in mind that enlarging the numbers of the defeated enemy could be a device used by Ilkhanid chroniclers to magnify Abaqa's victory, and that we have no pro-Chaghadaid sources to balance this tendency. On the basis of our sources it is hard to claim unequivocally that Baraq's forces were numerically inferior, but this seems to have been likely.

*Horses*: Rashīd as-Dīn stresses the unreadiness of Baraq's horses as a main reason for his defeat.[185] Baraq's continuous compalints about his shortage of pasture lands, his confiscatous of horses in Transoxania and Herat, his feeding the horses with grain at the expenses of the city dwellers, and his ordering his troops in Khurasan to ride donkeys and asses till the horse got fat,[186] all suggest that he had some difficulties with his supply and preparation of horses, though he certainly attempted to overcome it.

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Mongol, one of Baraq's intimates. See also Aubin, "Qara'unas," 82 (based on Harawī, *Herat*, pp. 311–12, but not very convincing).

[182] Cf. Shimo, "Qaraunas," 140, where he claimed that most of the Qaraunas fought with Abaqa.

[183] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 305, 306, 317; *The Georgian Chronicle*, pp. 580–81. Rashīd mentioned 10 commanders of Abaqa, while the Georgian chronicle mentions 8; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326 mentions 6; Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 73 mentions 7 princes, 3 commanders and 6 "commanders of Argun Aqa"; the Mamluk sources mention 5 commanders (Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vol. 8, p. 150).

[184] Martinez, "Il-Xanid Army," p. 156; see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 225.

[185] Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 122, 127; Rashīd/Thackston, pp. 377, 527, 530; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 326.

[186] Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, p. 298; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, p. 118; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 526.

Two deferences suggest that Abaqa's troops also used "local" Arabian horses, stronger than the regular Mongol ponies. Before the battle Baraq impudently asked Abaqa for *tafchaq* horses, a term usually referring to Arabian or Turkmenian horses;[187] and when *Sechektu defected to Qipchaq, he brought a present of fine Arabian horses, which became a bone of contention between Qipchaq and Jalayirtai.[188] It is however impossible to determine how widespread was the use of such horses among Abaqa's troops or how significant it was. My impression is that it was more a matter of prestige than a true military asset.

*Intelligence and knowledge of the terrain*: Throughout the battle the two sides ascribed great importance to acquiring information on the enemy and on the terrain, through spies, scouts or diplomatic messengers, while at the same time trying to keep this information from reaching the enemy through subterfuge and disinformation. Abaqa had a certain advantage in this respect, not only because he caught the three spies (if he did), but mostly because his troops knew the terrain much better than the Chaghadaids. This enabled them to choose the battlefield and to block the Chaghadaid access to water.[189]

*Leadership and discipline*: The importance of personal leadership is stressed throughout the descriptions of the battle: Abaqa's presence or absence was a major question for the Chaghadaids, and he himself was their chief target during the battle. Both Abaqa and Baraq took the field themselves rather late, when they were either winning (in Abaqa's case) or desperate (in the case of Baraq). Many reports stress the boldness of certain commanders on both sides: Abatai and Tübshin on the Ilkhanid side, Margha'ul and Jalayirtai on that of the Chaghadaids.[190] Indeed, the killing of Margha'ul greatly harmed the Chaghadaids both practically and in terms of morale, and Baraq described it as a major reason for his defeat.[191] Moreover, Abaqa's commanders seemed to have had firmer control over their troops: Yoshmut managed to redeploy his troops after the Chaghadaids

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[187] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, ed. B. Karīmī (Tehran, 1959), vol. 1, p. 49; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 38; Doerfer, *Neupersischen*, vol. 2, p. 601.

[188] See n. 66 above.

[189] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 127; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 530.

[190] See, e.g., al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl*, vol. 2, p. 435; *The Georgian Chronicle*, pp. 581–2; Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 129–30; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 531.

[191] Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, pp. 133–5.

harmed the Ilkhanid flank, while Jalayirtai was unable to rearrange his dissolving troops in a similar situation. The desertion of Qaidu's troops, of which Abaqa was informed in good time, also contributed to his victory, and in turn undermined Baraq's leadership.[192]

The Ilkhanids won the battle not because they employed heavy cavalry, but because their troops were light, mobile cavalry, just like the Chaghadaids. Yet they had a somewhat better supply of horses and weaponry, had better knowledge of the terrain of the battle and were better organized under a more capable leadership. In fact, it was exactly the Ilkhanid mobility that allowed the westernmost side to defeat its eastern rival, in contrast to former battles in the regions, such as the battle of Dandānqān (1040), the battle of Qatwān (1141), or the battle of Andkhūd (1204), in which the more mobile, eastern party won.[193]

How was the battle of Herat different from Mongol battles fought against non-Mongol troops? In terms of tactics and armament, the battle of Herat had a lot in common with former Mongol encounters with non-Mongol rivals.[194] The main difference, however, is that in the battle of Herat both sides used the same "Mongol" methods. They were therefore more or less evenly matched, and the fight was difficult for both of them.

Moreover, unlike most of the former Mongol battles, this battle did not end in conquest. Not only did Baraq not conquer Khurāsān, but Abaqa also evacuated Bukhara soon after his invasion, retreating back to the western side of the Oxus. The battle of Herat, like the battles between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde, was a battle fought in order to determine the borders of the separate Mongol khanates that gradually emerged after Qubilai's accession. The enormous size of the empire at the end of Möngke's reign, Qubilai's weakness due to his struggle with his brother, and his transferring the Mongol capital to north China—all these developments contributed to a situation in which the major Chinggisid lineages were trying to assert their local authority. This was done at the expense

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[192] E.g., Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 134–5.

[193] For Dandānqān see David O. Morgan, *Medieval Persia* (London, 1998), pp. 22, 26; for Qatwān and Andkhūd see Biran, "China, Nomads and Islam," Chs. 1, 3, 5.

[194] For general assessments of the Mongol armies see Martin, "The Mongol Army," *passim*; Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 89–95.

of the rights of the Qa'an in the sedentary territories, and of the rights of absentee princes in different places.[195]

Another tendency, already present in Möngke's time but reinforced when the dissolution of the empire hampered the Mongols' ability to recruit and mobilize troops throughout the empire, was the increase in the importance of the sedentary territories. Baraq and Qaidu fought mainly over Bukhara and Samarkand and their workshops and troops, and Abaqa chose to reduce Bukhara to ashes. In this respect Baraq, who declared he would take over Iraq and Azerbaijan, and was therefore willing to plunder Transoxania and Khurāsān, perhaps showed some remnant of the old Mongol spirit. His contemporaries understood that the name of the game was now the consolidation of rule in the existing territories, rather than conquering new ones.[196]

In contrast with their battles against non-Mongol troops, when fighting against each other the Mongols could not use their imperial ideology to legitimize their actions, and the general theme of the Chinggisid lineage was not sufficient to secure Mongol loyalty. In shaping the new borders of the khanates, the Mongols tried to find allies along lineage lines (as in the cases of Tegüder and *Sechektu). Yet *realpolitik*, which temporarily connected, for example, Qaidu and Abaqa, was no less useful as a basis for alliance.

The battle of Herat was thus an important stage in defining the borders of the independent khanates. The Central Asian Mongols, however, remained a thorn in the side of the other Mongol khanates. This is not only because they lost the battle, but because two imperial lineages, the Chaghadaids and the Ögödeids, were stuck together there, and their struggles stirred trouble even beyond their own territories.[197] Moreover, the relatively poor territory of Central Asia was squeezed between the other Mongol khanates, with no convenient scope for expansion other than at the expense of the neighboring khanates. Even as a way of keeping their troops busy, the Central Asian Mongols were likely to harass the other khanates. Yet they

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[195] See Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," *passim*; Biran, *Qaidu*, p. 27; Rashīd/ʿAlīzādah, p. 114; Rashīd/Thackston, p. 523.

[196] Rashīd al-Dīn stresses the apparent difference between Baraq's "oppressive" rule and Abaqa's benevolence. One should bear in mind however that in his dealing with Bukhara Abaqa was not less furious than Baraq was in Khurāsān.

[197] See, e.g., the struggles in Central Asia between 1270–82 and after Qaidu's death in the first two decades of the 13th century.

were unlikely to challenge them in large battles. The Central Asian Mongols, at least between Baraq and Temür Lang, probably realized they were unable to eliminate any of the other Mongol states. Nor were they necessarily interested in doing so. The rhetoric of the Chinggisid unity, so prevalent in the descriptions of the battle of Herat,[198] did not prevent the different Chinggisid lineages from fighting each other, but it proved that they all acknowledged the rights of the other Chinggisids to rule over parts of the empire. Besides, the other Mongol khanates did not prove easy rivals, as the Chaghadaids found out at Herat. It is therefore not surprising that the Central Asian Mongols chose raids, not battles, as their main form of future warfare,[199] thereby leaving the battle of Herat as a rather unique example of inter-Mongol warfare on the grand scale.

[198] See, e.g., Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, pp. 69, 74; Rashīd/'Alīzādah, pp. 109–10; Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat*, vol. 5, pp. 286–8; Harawī, *Herat*, p. 305.

[199] See, e.g., Biran, *Qaidu*, pp. 81–92.




Map 2: Greater Iran in the 13th Century
(After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 117).




Figure 1: The Main Chinggisid Branches and the Great Khans (After Biran, *Qaidu* [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997], 120).

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# WHITHER THE ILKHANID ARMY? GHAZAN'S FIRST CAMPAIGN INTO SYRIA (1299–1300)*

Reuven Amitai

## *Introduction*

The intention of this essay is not to discuss in depth the reasons for continued Mongol aggression towards Mamluk controlled Syria, or even the factors behind the specific decision of Ghazan (1295–1304) to launch his first offensive when he did. In general, it can be said that long-standing Ilkhanid antipathy towards the Mamluks mixed with traditional Mongol imperialism.[1] These, in turn, combined with Ghazan's anger at Mamluk support of the rebel Mongol general Sülemish in Anatolia in 1298,[2] and a Mamluk raid launched against Mardin in Mongol controlled territory earlier in 1299.[3] In addition, Mamluk renegades who recently had fled to the Ilkhanate, led by the former governor of Damascus, Sayf al-Dīn Qipchaq, played their

* This study was undertaken during the spring of 2000, whilst I was a fellow at Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank to the Director and staff of the IAS for their assistance during this time. Earlier versions of this paper were presented before the Mongolia Society at Indiana University in April 2000 and the Seminar "Turco-Mongolia Nomads and the Sedentary World" at the IAS in May 2000. I am grateful to various colleagues for their comments at these talks.

[1] On these, see Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "Mongol Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War against the Mamluks." *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, eds. Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan (Leiden, 1999), pp. 57–72.

[2] John A. Boyle, "The Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-Khāns," *The Cambridge History of Iran* [henceforth *CHIr*], vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 387; Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanenzeit, 1220–1350*, 4th edition (Leiden, 1985), p. 83.

[3] Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," pp. 386–7; Spuler, *Iran*, p. 83. The one Mamluk source to mention this raid, which evidently the Mamluks wanted to forget, is Abu 'l-Fidā' (al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad 'Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl b. 'Alī), *al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh al-bashar* (Istanbul, 1286/1869–70), p. 44. Ghazan, in his letter to Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in 701/1301, adduces this as one of the main reasons for the campaign which led to his victory at Wādi al-Khaznadār; Karl V. Zetterstéen, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlūkensultane* (Leiden, 1919), p. 98. The most complete account of this raid is found in Waṣṣāf ('Abd Allāh b. Faḍl Allāh), *Ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf (= Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-a'ṣār)* (Bombay, 1269 H./1852–3; facsimile rpt. Teheran, 1338 S./1959–60), pp. 372–3.

part in encouraging the Mongol ruler to exploit the confused state of Mamluk politics at the time.[4] Finally, it is possible that Ghazan also sought to take advantage of the civil wars fought in the Golden Horde between the Khan Toqta and prince Noghai, which effectively—albeit temporarily—neutralized the danger of invasion from that front. At the same time, the Chaghatayid Khanate—a sometime enemy—was preoccupied with an attack from the east.[5] Ghazan, then, was presented with a window of opportunity, during which he launched an offensive (the first of three) into Syria. The justification for this and successive campaigns, employing both Mongol and Islamic reasons, will be left to another study.[6]

The actual course of this campaign, particularly a detailed reconstruction and analysis of the Mongol victory in which it resulted, is the subject of the present study.[7] Having established the course of the battle in some detail, I will compare it to the battlefield performance of the Ilkhanid army in campaigns from a generation or two before. My intent, then, is to determine if the Mongol army present in greater Iran for much of the thirteenth century underwent a change over time, being as it was in a milieu somewhat different from Inner Asia. If in fact there was an alteration of some type, I will thereupon attempt to ascertain whether such a transformation was a result of a consciously adopted policy, as suggested by Dr. A.P. Martinez,[8] or whether it occurred unintentionally, as part of a larger process of cultural change which the Mongols apparently

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[4] Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1382)* (London, 1986), pp. 91, 99; Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," p. 386.

[5] This is suggested by John M. Smith, Jr., "Nomads on Ponies vs. Slaves on Horses," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 118 (1998), p. 60.

[6] For an analysis of the Muslim legitimization of Ghazan's campaigns, see H. Horst, "Eine Gesandschaft des Mamlūken al-Malik an-Nāṣir im Ilḫān-Hof in Persien," W. Hoenerbach (ed.), *Der Orient in der Forschung: Festschrift für Otto Spies* (Wiesbaden, 1967), pp. 348–70; see also my article, cited in note 1.

[7] For earlier discussions of the campaign, some of them very brief, see: A.C.M. D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols* (The Hague and Amsterdam, 1834–5; facsimile rpt., Tientsin, China, 1940), vol. 4, pp. 230–41; G. Weil, *Geschichte des Abbasidenchalifats in Egypten* (Stuttgart, 1860–2), vol. 1, pp. 225–9; Henry H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century* (London, 1876–1927; facsimile rpt., New York, [1965]), vol. 3, pp. 434–40; Spuler, *Iran*, pp. 84–5; Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," pp. 387–9; Irwin, *Middle East*, pp. 100–1. See also the important comments in John M. Smith, Jr., "'Ayn Jālūt: Mamlūk Success or Mongol Failure?", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44 (1984), pp. 329–30.

[8] A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Īl-Xānid Army," *Archivum Euraisiae Medii Aevi*, 6 (1986), pp. 129–242, esp. 138–88.

underwent. *A priori* it might be expected that indeed such a shift—deliberate or not—in the military sphere did occur, given the changes in the realm of religion, administrative and political culture, and perhaps even lifestyle among the Mongols of Iran, although the last mentioned area still needs a detailed study.[9]

In order to facilitate this comparison, I will summarize my conclusions regarding the Ilkhanid army as I suggested in my study of the early Mamluk-Mongol war:[10] The Mongols had originally moved into the Islamic world with an army based primarily on light mounted archers riding steppe ponies.[11] "The Ilkhanid army, of course, included from the beginning additional troops of various provenance, including "Chinese" siege engineers, Armenians and Georgians—which appear to have been both infantrymen and cavalrymen of different types—and local Muslim soldiers, such as those of the subjugated Seljuq sultanate of Rūm. Many, and perhaps most, of these last mentioned were mamluks—or slave soldiers—of sundry origin, who served various local rulers who in turn had no choice but to join the Ilkhanid war machine. Without disparaging these different contingents, or denying their occasional importance (such as the Georgian troops at the battle of Abulustayn in 1276), it appears that these forces played only a secondary role compared to troops of Inner Asian origin, be they Turks or Mongols.

I have found no evidence that the Mongols in Iran employed Mongol "heavy cavalry" in their early campaigns into southwestern Asia. By heavy cavalry I mean well-armored troops mounted on relatively large horses, and primarily intended for shock warfare: their primary purpose was to slam into their opponents armed with lance, sword, axe, etc. Some modern writers have suggested, often unequivocally, that Mongol armies in general, and in China in particular, contained a significant component of heavy cavalry, even at an early date. This I will leave for a separate discussion, although I might

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[9] Some of these topics are touched upon in David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 160–70; see also Jean Aubin, *Émirs mongols et vizirs persans dans les remous de l'acculturation* (Paris, 1995).

[10] Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Īlkhānid War, 1260–1281* (Cambridge, 1995), chapter 10, esp. pp. 214–25.

[11] See the discussion in Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 84–96; Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," pp. 313–321. I will be returning, to Smith's analysis below. The most important text for the early Mongol army remains John of Plano Carpini's, as brought in Christopher Dawson (ed.) ("Translated by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey"), *The Mission to Asia* [rpt. of *The Mongol Mission*] (London, 1980), pp. 32–8.

mention that in one case at least this assertion is based merely on the gratuitous assumption that the Mongol army resembled that of the Jurchids.[12]

It might be expected that the *bahāduriyya* troopers mentioned on occasion by the Muslim sources might be some type of heavy—or at least heavier—cavalry. The name, of course, derives from the Mongol term *baghatur* (plural *baghatud*), and apparently refers to the elite guard of the khan.[13] However, whether the *bahādurs* referred to in the Ilkhanid army were truly heavy cavalry remains to my mind an open question,[14] although they may well have been better equipped than the average Mongol trooper.

This model of early Mamluk-Mongol confrontations is based on an examination of four battles: ʿAyn Jālūt in 1260, the first battle of Homs later that same year, Abulustayn in 1276, and the second battle of Homs in 1281.[15] In three of these battles it is clear that the Mongols attacked first, seemingly taking the initiative before the Mamluks were fully arrayed for battle. In two of these battles (the first and second battles of Homs) there is evidence that the Mongols launched wave after wave of attacks, although it is not explicitly stated that they were firing arrows as they went. Based, however, on what John of Plano Carpini and others tell us, the widespread and effective use of archery is to be expected in these cases. Also at ʿAyn Jālūt it appears that the Mongols launched at least two successive attacks, the second after regrouping in the wake of a Mamluk counter-attack. The following; model can be suggested for Mongol behavior on the battlefield: "The Mongols sought to attack first. As the forward squadrons drew close, they let off as many arrows as possible. The Mongols were prepared to launch waves of archers, but if they caught the Mamluks in a state of relative disorganization, as at Abulastayn, then they plunged straight into the Mamluk lines."[16] Then they would

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[12] H.D. Martin, "The Mongol Army," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1943, p. 69.

[13] For the use of this term for the guard corps of the Great Khan, see Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia and the Islamic Lands* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 21–2 and note 14; Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA, 1978), pp. 36, 218, note 59. For mention of *bahādur* among Ilkhanid troops, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 52, 108, 225.

[14] "Martinez ("Il-Xānid Army," pp. 152–6) apparently thinks so, basing himself on Waṣṣāf's evidence for the battle of Herat in 1270. On this, see Michal Biran's article in this volume and Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 225.

[15] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 220–3.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

use lances, swords, clubs, maces and axes. From the beginning, it appears that the Mongols were capable of fighting at close quarters if the proper circumstances presented themselves.

The Mamluks, needless to say, did not just sit back and let the Mongols do whatever they wished. On the whole, it would seem that they were capable of absorbing initial Mongol attacks, certainly returning a heavy fire of arrows, and having the advantage of shooting while sitting on standing horses or dismounted, thus increasing their accuracy. At some point they would launch a counterattack, and it would appear that the larger size of their horses and better state of their equipment (let alone the numerical edge, at ʿAyn Jālūt and Abulustayn) gave them a certain advantage which contributed to their victory. I still have reservations, however, whether the "heavier" nature of the Mamluk cavalry, and its apparent greater "professionalism" was as decisive as suggested and reaffirmed by Prof. J.M. Smith, Jr.[17] I will return to this point towards the end of the essay.

Having established this starting line, so to speak, I will now turn to the first campaign of Ghazan into Syria, which culminated in the third battle of Horns in 1299, or Wādī al-Khaznadār—"Valley (or River) of the Treasurer"—as it is usually known.[18] As said before, a detailed description of this battle will be the basis for an analysis of the possible transformation of the Ilkhanid army after several decades of rule in a sedentary milieu.

## *The Campaign*

In the spring of 1299, a report reached Damascus from the Mamluk border fortress of al-Bīra that Ghazan had first hoped to launch a two-pronged attack on Syria. He had sent his general Sülemish to Rūm (Anatolia) with 25,000 horsemen. This commander was to gather the troops of Rūm, presumably both the Mongol garrison and the subject Seljuq soldiers, and to precede to Syria via Lesser

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[17] Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," *passim; idem*, "Nomads on Ponies *vs.* Slaves on Horses," pp. 54–62.

[18] I have opted for the vocalization of *khaznadār*, although generally *khazindār* is given in modern works. The Arabic word for treasury is *khazna*; there is no reason to assume that with the addition of *dār* ("holder" in Persian) the former component changes its vocalization, merely that the *tāʾ marbūta* or *hāʾ* disappear in the written version. A parallel case is *jāmadār*, composed *of jāmah* and *dār*, although the former element here is also from Persian.

Armenia, apparently collecting the army of that country also. Ghazan, with the majority of the army was to proceed to the Euphrates and to raid the environs of al-Bīra, al-Raḥba (another Mamluk border fortress), and Qal'at al-Rūm.[19] Thereupon the two forces were to join together at Aleppo. If either of the armies was to meet a Mamluk force, it was to stand and fight. Otherwise, the Mongols planned to move further south into Syria.[20] Ghazan's plans, however, were cut short by Sülemish's rebellion, mentioned above, as well as disorders by Bedouin in the region of Iraq.[21] He had no choice but to postpone his offensive to later in 1299.

In the summer of 1299, intelligence continued to arrive in Cairo reporting on Ghazan's hostile intentions *vis-à-vis* Syria, and the main Mamluk army set off from Cairo on 24 Dhu'l-Qa'da 698 (22 September 1299).[22] This army had been preceded by an advance force several days previously. In addition, a contingent of the Egyptian army had been dispatched to north Syria some time before.[23] Finally, it should not be forgotten that each provincial capital in Syria had its own force, the most important of these being in Damascus and Aleppo. It must be also mentioned that although the Sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalawun was at the head of this army (second reign: 1299–1309), he was only 15 years old at this time, and merely a titular ruler, real power being the hands of a coterie of senior officers, the most important being Salar the vice-sultan (*nā'ib al-salṭana*) and Baybars al-Jashnakīr, the high stewart or major-domo

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[19] Qal'at al-Rūm was an Armenian fort in eastern Anatolia which was captured by the Mamluks under the sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf Khalīl b. Qalawun in 1292; Irwin, *Middle East*, p. 78. For al-Bīra and al-Raḥba, and their role in the Mamluk border strategy, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 76–77.

[20] Li Guo, *Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography: al-Yūnīnī's Dhayl Mir'āt al-zamān* (Leiden, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 120–1 (translation); vol. 2, pp. 63–64 (Arabic text). Ibn al-Dawādārī, *al-Durar al-fākhir fī sīrat al-malik al-nāṣir*, ed. H.R. Roemer, vol. 9 of *Kanz al-durar wa'l-jāmi' al-ghurar* (Cairo, 1960), pp. 8–9. It seems to me that Li Guo is incorrect in rendering that "both of them [i.e., Sulemish and Ghazan—R.A.] would encamp at the Euphrates . . ." The plural *nazalū* refers to the Mongols under Ghazan. This is clearly understood for two reasons: 1) the two forces are ordered to rendezvous subsequently at Aleppo; 2) if Sülemish was to come via Lesser Armenia, it makes no sense to travel to northern Syria by-way of al-Bīra, etc.

[21] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk miṣr wa'l-qāhira* (Cairo, 1930–56; facsimile rpt., Cairo [n.d.]), vol. 8, p. 118.

[22] Baybars al-Manṣūrī al-Dawādār, *Zubdat al-fikra fī ta'rīkh al-hijra: History of the Early Mamluk Period*, ed. D.S. Richards (Beirut, 1998), p. 329. This author—a senior amir—was left in Cairo as governor with a small force, while virtually the entire Mamluk army and the military elite went off to campaign in Syria.

[23] Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8, p. 120; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 11.

(*ustādār*).[24] I would suggest that the lack of a single and undisputed leader was to have a disastrous effect on the outcome of the battle from the Mamluk point of view.

The Mamluk army's entrance into Palestine was soon marred by trouble. North of Gaza, Oirat tribesmen in the army revolted. These were Mongols who had fled to the Sultanate in 1296 during the reign of the sultan al-ʿĀdil Kitbugha (1294–6) and had been well received and integrated into the army. By now, however, they were dissatisfied, and desired to remove the leaders of the current *junta*, and to put Kitbugha—now governor of Sarhad—back on the throne. The mutiny was put down without too much trouble, but it certainly left a bad taste in everyone's mouth, and it was clear that the army was suffering from a lack of unity on the verge of a major campaign.[25]

The Sultan, together with the main army, remained in the area of Ascalon for several weeks, waiting for more concrete information regarding the Mongols. He then set off for Damascus, reaching it on 8 Rabīʿ I 699 (3 December 1299). News kept coming in on the Mongols' advance and then that they had finally crossed the Euphrates. After distributing money to the officers for the purchase of supplies, the Sultan and the Egyptian army set off on 17 Rabīʿ I (12 December), being preceded by the army of Damascus itself.[26]

The army moved north, taking up position in the plains to the north of Homs (map 1): the exact location of the battlefield will be discussed below. The troops were in full battle gear for three days, which wore out both the soldiers and their mounts. There also seems to have been a problem of supplies: the sources relate that prices for goods became quite expensive and that there was a lack of fodder, an interesting piece of evidence for the nature of Mamluk logistics.[27] A important comment is made by the Ayyūbid scion Abu

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[24] On al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's return to the throne for the second time, his lack of authority and the power of the two above-mentioned amirs, see Irwin, *Middle East*, pp. 85–104; Peter M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East From the Eleventh Century to 1517* (London, 1986), pp. 107–113.

[25] For this incident see, e.g., Baybars, *Zubda*, p. 330. For the arrival of the Oirats in the Sultanate, see: David Ayalon, "The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom," *Islamic Culture*, 25 (1951), pp. 99–101.

[26] Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 15; Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, p. 58.

[27] Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 16; Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, p. 58; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8, p. 121; cf. Baybars, *Zubda*, p. 331, who writes that the army rode in one day the equivalent of three days marching. In his other chronicle (*Kītāb al-tuhfa al-mulūkiyya fī 'l-dawla al-turkiyya*, ed. ʿA-R.S. Ḥamdān [Cairo, 1987], p. 157), Baybars al-Manṣūrī adds that the Mamluk horses were exhausted from the distance they had travelled and the burden they had carried.




Map 1: Homs and its environs, ca. A.D. 1940
(Courtesy of Cambridge University Press).

'l-Fidā' (d. 1331), a contemporary of these events, although it appears that he himself did not actually participate in the battle. He comments—albeit with the advantage of hindsight—that Salār and Baybars al-Jashnakīr were in charge, and that the army was in a bad state, due to the fact that "greed had overtaken the officers and they had not completed [the full compliment] of their units. The army had declined due to bad management, along with similar things of such corruption, which necessitated its defeat."[28] This was certainly not a good situation on the eve of a battle. Another contemporary, Ibn al-Dawādārī (fl. 1338–40), remarks that the Mamluks entered the battle with the wrong attitude, disdaining the Mongols and not taking them seriously,[29] an approach echoed later by this author when he relates how a Mamluk envoy rationalized before Ghazan the ignoble Mamluk defeat.[30] Although there is certainly some *post facto* justification going on here, there may also be a grain of truth: after 40 years of success on the battlefield, the Mamluk leadership and even soldiery were apparently no longer psychologically worked up by the Mongols as they should have been. This, combined with other factors, such as the lack of a single, undisputed commander, was to be calamitous for the Mamluks.

Up to now, we have been following the Mamluk sources. Although there are some differences between them, these are not of a significant nature. It is instructive to turn now to the pro-Mongol sources, written mostly in Persian, for the events leading up to the battle. The first and most important of these is Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 1318), one of Ghazan's two wazirs—and the future historian—who accompanied the Ilkhan's army on this campaign, and even plays a small role in the later Mongol occupation of Damascus, as recorded by Mamluk writers.[31] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Ghazan had left the area of Tabriz on the 19 Muḥarram 699 (16 October 1299). Wāṣṣāf (fl. 1299–1323)—a slightly later historian—says that each soldier was to

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[28] Abu 'l-Fidā', vol. 4, p. 43; cf. the translation in Peter M. Holt, *Memoirs of a Syrian Prince: Abu'l-Fidā', Sultan of Ḥamāh (672–732/1273–1331)* (Wiesbaden, 1983), p. 35.

[29] Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 15.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 73. This interview, much of which is of a jocular nature (at the Mongols' expense it might be added) is found also in Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, 102.

[31] On this, see Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "New Material from the Mamluk Sources for the Biography of Rashīd al-Dīn," *The Court of the Il-khans*, eds. Julian Raby and Teressa Fitzherbert, published as vol. 12 of *Oxford Journal of Islamic Art* (Oxford, 1996), p. 28.

bring five horses with him, and equipment and provisions (for himself) for six months. In addition, supposedly 50,000 camels transported fodder for the horses.[32] Quṭlugh-Shāh and Mulai were sent ahead with the vanguard, and the Ilkhan followed, crossing the Euphrates on a temporary bridge on 12 Rabīʿ I (7 December) at Qalʿat Jaʿbar (map 2). Soon afterwards, he received news that there had been disorder in the enemy camp. Perhaps these were reports of the rebellion of the Oirats, described above.[33] Five days later he was at Aleppo. Ghazan is said to have not permitted his soldiers to forage from the fields, but such accounts may just be an attempt to portray the Ilkhan as a just ruler. There may be, however, actually some truth in this, if indeed the supply train of camals about which Waṣṣāf informed us really existed. This author, at any rate, tells us that twice on the march into Syria, the Mongol army was refurbished with fodder.[34]

Rashīd al-Dīn continues that the Ilkhan did not waste time investing Aleppo (map 2); according to Waṣṣāf he did permit his troops and horses to rest there a bit and also carried out a general inspection.[35] Moving south, he passed Hama on 25 Rabīʿ I (20 December), and arrived in the neighborhood of Salamiyya not long afterward. Mamluk scouts, referred to as *yazak-i yāghī*, appeared. Waṣṣāf reports that a Mamluk scout had been captured on the march from Aleppo and had provided important intelligence, which was supplemented by the account of a pilgrim returning from the *ḥajj*, who had seen the Mamluk army in Damascus.[36] Seeing that his army was not yet ready (since they were probably resting and letting the horses pasture), Ghazan set out with a group of guardsmen (*ṭā'ifa-yi bahādurān*) to inspect the prospective battlefield and to collect intelligence. Word arrived that the Mamluks were approaching, and the army prepared

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[32] Waṣṣāf, p. 373, lines 20–22. This evidence is discussed by Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," 329. In general, the account given by Waṣṣāf, 373–4, of Ghazan's march into Syria parallels that of Rashīd al-Dīn, although it adds interesting details and variants, some of which I cite below. Mīrkhwānd and Khwāndamīr basically provide a short summary of Waṣṣāf's account of the campaign; the latter being much more terse. See Mīrkhwānd,' *Ta'rīkh rawḍat al-ṣafā* (Tehran, 1338–51S/1959–72), vol. 5, pp. 403–8; Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar* (Tehran, 1333S/1954), vol., p. 152 = Khwandamir [*sic*], *Habibu's-siyar, Tome 3: The Reign of the Mongol and the Turk*, Part One: *Genghis Khan-Amir Temür*, ed. and tr W.M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA, 1994), p. 85.

[33] This was suggested by Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," p. 387.

[34] Waṣṣāf, p. 374.

[35] Waṣṣāf, pp. 374–5.

[36] Waṣṣāf, p. 375.




Map 2: The Fertile Crescent, ca. 13th century A.D.
(Courtesy of Cambridge University Press).

itself accordingly. Then Chūpān, an important Mongol general, appeared on the scene, announcing that this was not true, but a means merely to test the army's readiness. Again the Ilkhan reconnoitred, and came to the conclusion that the Mamluks had adopted an array similar to that used in 1281 against Möngke Temür. It seems that Rashīd al-Dīn's is referring to the arrangement of the troops, and not the exact geographic position. If this is the case, this would probably refer to the strong wings, flanked by nomadic auxiliaries.[37]

The Ilkhan decided that the best method to counter the Mamluk plan was not to attempt a head on attack (*qaṣd barābār īshān na kunad*). Rather, he ordered a move to the left, which would be across from the enemy's right. The exact meaning of this sentence is not completely clear. It appears that Ghazan had hoped to shift to his left and thus to concentrate on the Mamluk right, while also outflanking them on the left. On Wednesday, 27 Rabīʿ I (22 December), the Ilkhan ordered an encampment next to an unspecified "narrow river" (*ab-i bārīk*),[38] some three *farsang*s from Homs. This would be some 18 km from that city, according to the figure of 6 kilometers/*farsang*.[39] The Mongol troops were ordered to take a water supply for three days. The plan was to enter the desert and thereupon to attack the Mamluks from the rear.[40] Before this plan could be executed, however, the Mamluks appeared, and Ghazan had to meet them while his army was in a state of relative disarray.[41] This information is confirmed in a general way by Waṣṣāf, who adds that initially Ghazan had

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[37] See the discussion in Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 190–3.

[38] Waṣṣāf, p. 377, uses this phrase, and then says that in Mongolian it is called *narin su* ("slender river"), which is actually a Mongolian-Turkish hybrid.

[39] See *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], s.v. "Marḥala," vol., pp. 556–9; W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte* (Leiden, 1955), p. 62. I have opted for the *farsang* rather than *farsakh*, since the former is used in the sources cited in this study.

[40] Waṣṣāf, p. 375, reports that Ghazan ordered Sulṭān Yasa'ul to lead a *tümen* and to take up position behind the Mamluks. This, together with the nearness of the Orentes (ʿĀṣī) River, would hem in the Mamuk army. It is doubtful, however, whether this plan was executed, and not just because of Rashīd al-Dīn's statement, cited above: there is no mention in the Mamluk sources of any such Mongol "ambush." See also note 67 below.

[41] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, in Karl Jahn, *Geschichte Ġāzān-Ḫān's aus dem Ta'rīḫ-i-mubārak-i-ġāzānī* (London, 1940), pp. 125–6; this is translated in W.M. Thackston (tr. and ann.), *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jamiʿu't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles. A History of the Mongols*, vol. 45 of *Sources of Oriental Languages and Literature* (Cambridge, MA, 1998–9), pp. 644–5.

only 9000 fighters with him,[42] and that the extreme left and right wings under Qurmishi and Mulai respectively had yet to come up.[43]

In his description of the situation before the battle, Waṣṣāf notes that due to the long march, many of the horses had died, and others had become emaciated and incapacitated. He also states that Ghazan thus ordered that all the army would fight on foot, for several reasons: 1) those who had no choice but to become infantrymen would be encouraged by having other troops acting as infantry; 2) this would trick the Mamluks into thinking that the Mongols thought their own horses inferior; and 3) this would improve the Mongol archery.[44] It will, indeed, be seen that much of the Mongol army fought on foot during part of the battle, but the all encompassing nature of this report is belied by the information in both Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf that the Mongol troops dismounted and remounted at different spots and different times during the fighting. The battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār was basically a confrontation between cavalry armies.

Before proceeding with the description of the actual battle, it is worth dealing with two important matters. First, the location of the battle; and, second, the size and composition of both armies. The first matter is complicated by the lack of any mention of Wādī al-Khaznadār on the relatively detailed maps from the French Mandate period which I have been able to consult (see map 3, a composite of three French maps).[45] Many of the Mamluk sources also refer to the scene of the battle as Majmaʿ al-Murūj, meaning "Assembly of the Plains"; I have also not succeeded in locating this name in modern maps. The "narrow stream" mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf is also not obviously identified. However, some Mamluk sources do mention that Wādī al-Khaznadār was near Salamiyya,[46] which is about 40 kilometers to the northwest of Homs; it can be remembered

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[42] Waṣṣāf, pp. 377–8.

[43] Waṣṣāf, p. 377.

[44] Waṣṣāf, p. 376; this evidence is discussed in Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army." pp. 176–7.

[45] See "Levant 1:200,000 Sheet Horns Nl–37–XIII," "Levant 1:200,000 Sheet Qarateine Nl–37–XIV" and "Levant 1:200,000 Sheet Selemiye Nl–37–XX"; for some of this area, see the more detailed "Levant—1:50000$^{e}$ F$^{LLE}$ Nl–37–XIII–4a."

[46] Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, p. 58; Yūnīnī, vol. 2, p. 97; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8, p. 121. Cf. Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab* (Cairo, 1923–97), vol. 27, p. 411, who writes that Majmaʿ al-Murūj was near Homs.


SELEMIYE
Tell Aamria
Tell Aads
Khurbet Faraj
Tell es Sayâde
Khodor
Qara
Arbid
Saffâoui
Marj
Tell Aamré
Aldoun
Khaniess
Séjar
Oumm el Aamad
Qoubbet el Hatâ
Souleime
Tell Hassane Pacha
Oumm Journ
Khourbet Aarâl
Osmâniye
Tell Jenah
Tell el Khazné
Tell Thaoûn
Ain Houssaine
El Rhasbiye
Mkharram ett Tahtani
Ett Taouile
Aïdet Selemiye
Ain Dâta
Naoua
MESHERFE
Jebel Habis
Hamidiyet Oummel Aamad
Khan Oummel Aamad
Badoû
Jâbriyat
Cheikh Hamid
Ouraïde
Tell Arhara
Oumm Jbâb
Abbara
Jnainâta
Hourraqi
Souain
BOUEIN
Ouszaiye
Soukkara
Tell el Ahmar
Abou Ali
Arfiye
ech Chnane
HOMS
Kaidal
Rhouze
Mesherfé
Tell Nefar
Tell es Seading
Tell Chemâ
Tell el Bellane
Tell Nreiming
Tell Abdeen Nasser
Tell el Hajar
Khourbet Naoufal
Khourbet Aabd
Khourbet el Merri
Khourbet Beida
Tell Bichara
Tell Daraïne
Tell Dahabiye
Zaafarane
Tell Mahoudé
Khourbet el Dâs
Tell Aïssé
Tell Aïssé Dine
Tell Kalakh
Tell Jabbeh
Tell Ahmar
Tell Sakhra

that Rashīd al-Dīn writes that Ghazan passed Salamiyya on his way south. It seems, then, that the battle was somewhere on the plains south of Salamiyya, in a general way towards Horns.[47] Some support for this is found in the modern place-name of Tall al-Khazna ("Hill of the Treasury"), some 30 kilometers northeast of Homs, which may be a remnant of *khaznadār*. The nearby Wādī Maydānī (Ouadi Meidani), which runs from the south into the Orontes (al-ʿĀṣī) in the north, could well be the "small river," and it is tempting to identify this with Wādī al-Khaznadār of the Mamluk sources. The contemporary Abu 'l-Fidā', who was also a distinguished geographer, refers to the battlefield as Wādī Majmaʿ al-Murūj.[48] I understand this as meaning that the Wādī (valley or riverbed) in question, i.e. Wādī al-Khaznadār, is in the midst of "the Meeting of the Plains." If this is acceptable, than the Majmaʿ al-Murūj could be the amalgam of plain-lands to the east and west of this Wādī. It may be remembered that Rashīd al-Dīn writes that "small river" was three *farsang*s (about 18 kilometers) from Homs. In reality, Wādī Maydānī (i.e. Wādī al-Khaznadār) is about 25 km from that city. I presume that our author, although a great administrator and historian, misjudged the distance between the river and the town during the short time he spent in the area, under conditions not suited for accurate surveying.

The contemporary Ibn al-Dawādārī adds that when the Mamluks approached the location of the battle, "they looked down upon the Mongol armies" (*fa-ashrafū ʿalā jumūʿ al-tatār*), information confirmed by Baybars al-Manṣūrī.[49] Since we are dealing with an area is which is basically flat (with an exception of the Wādī, which appears to descend 50 meters or so from the general lay of the land), this must mean one of the low hills in the area (perhaps that of Méshrefé; see map 3), or perhaps the slightly higher land to the south.

In short, I am suggesting that the battle took place over the large, generally flat area (see below) to the south of Salamiyya, perhaps even on both sides of the present day Wādī Maydānī. It may be, but this

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[47] Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il, *al-Nahj al-sadīd wa'l-durr al-farīd fīmā baʿda ibn al-ʿAmīd*, ed. and tr. E. Blochet as "Histoire des sultans mamlouks" in *Patrologia orientalis*, vols. 12, 14, 20 (Paris, 1919–28), p. 469 (of continuous pagination), says that Wādī al-Khaznadār is "between Hama and Homs," a not particularly helpful description.

[48] Abu 'l-Fidā', vol. 4, p. 43.

[49] Ibn al-Dawādārī p. 16; cf. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, p. 331: *ashrafū ʿalā majmaʿ al-murūj*.

is speculative, that the armies faced each other on a line running from the northwest (in the direction of Rastan) to the southwest.

We are also not on *terra firma* when it comes to the numbers of each army, but we do have a rough indication of their size, certainly in relative terms. As mentioned above, Waṣṣāf provides interesting evidence for the Mongols, stating that the order had been given for five out of every ten men to show up for the campaign. Professor Smith suggests that these were drawn from thirteen *tümens*—a division of theoretically 10,000 men—and thus Ghazan entered Syria with some 65,000 horsemen (and 325,000 horses). This number of *tümens* is apparently based on the count of Mongol commanders provided by Rashīd al-Dīn: twelve commanders who were found with Ghazan on the day of the battle, plus—I assume—the guard *tümen* under the Ilkhan's direct command.[50] I accept Prof. Smith's suggestion that when a Mongol source close to the ruler mentions officers in such a context these can be considered *tümen* commanders.[51] One wonders, however, whether the *tümens*, in question actually numbered 10,000. In fact, there is reason to think that they were in reality far from their nominal strength,[52] in which case the total figures must be somewhat smaller (i.e. if there were 13 *tümens*, and at the beginning they were not up to full strength, then half of the men would be less than 65,000). Yet in spite of this reservation, the figure of about sixty to sixty-five thousand Mongols may not be completely unreasonable: some Mamluk sources state that Ghazan had originally envisioned invading Syria with 70,000 horsemen before Sülemish's rebellion caused the postponement.[53] Waṣṣāf, however, provides another piece of evidence: the Mongol troops were counted whilst they were crossing the temporary bridge over the Euphrates, and the total came to 90,000.[54] This indeed a high figure, but the source does say that they were counted and the circumstances would have been appropriate for an orderly tally of the troops. The fact that al-Dhahabī (d. 1348) suggests that the

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[50] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 127; cf. the list in Waṣṣāf, p. 374.

[51] Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," p. 310.

[52] See Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 15, citing—ultimately—Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment*, pp. 170–1, n. 27. Smith, "Nomads on Ponies," p. 60, seems to accept now that *tümens* were not always (or usually) normally up to nominal strength.

[53] Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 8; Ibn Abī 'l-Faḍā'il, p. 458.

[54] Waṣṣāf, p. 374.

Mongols numbered 100,000 may give some credence to this figure, although he himself casts some doubt on it.[55]

With regards for the Mamluks, it is clear that virtually their entire army joined the battle; it may be remembered that the commander and future historian Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 1325) had been left in Cairo with only a small contingent, and it is certain that all of the various Syrian contingents were present at the battle.[56] Elsewhere I have suggested that the Mamluk army at the second battle of Homs (1281) numbered several tens of thousands,[57] and this too was almost the sum total of the Sultanate's military resources. Barring evidence to the contrary, this rough estimate is applicable to the latest conflagration. The early fourteenth century Syrian chronicler al-Dhahabī (d. 1348) reports that the Mamluks had some twenty thousand soldiers at the battle.[58] This may be a little low, but not outrageously so: if pushed to the wall, I would be wiling to estimate, that the total Mamluk army at this time in the neighborhood of thirty thousand troops.[59] It may be mentioned that the pro-Mongol Waṣṣāf reports that the Mamluks came to the battle with forty thousand men.[60] In short, although it is difficult to arrive at an exact quantification of the two armies, there are some indications that the Mongols enjoyed a numerical superiority over the Mamluks, perhaps as high as three to one. Initially, however, the Ilkhanid army was spread out, this numerical superiority did not come into play.

Returning to the course of the battle, some Mamluk sources mention that the Mamluks had left that morning—27 Rabīʿ I (22 December)—their positions north of Homs upon hearing that the Mongols were withdrawing from Syria. Reports had reached the

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[55] Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī *Taʾrīkh al-islām*, MS. British Library Or. 1540, fol. 123b. Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad M. Ziyāda and Saʿīd ʿA.-F. ʿĀshūr (Cairo, 1934–73), vol. 1, p. 886, also cites this number, but this figure may have been adopted so as to provide a *post facto* explanation for the embarrassing Mamluk defeat.

[56] The later claim of the Mamluk envoy Ḥusām al-Din Özdemür al-Mujīrī before Ghazan that the Mamluks only brought a quarter of their army to the battle, after so many Mamluk victories and the dangers on other fronts, is of course a blatant attempt to belittle the defeat; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 73; Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, p. 102.

[57] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 193–4.

[58] Dhahabī, fol. 123b.

[59] The theoretical size of the Mamluk army in Egypt in 715/1315–6, the time of the Nāṣirī *rawk* (cadastral survey), was 24,000; see David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army," *Bulletin of the School and Oriental and African Studies*, 16 (1954), pp. 70–71.

[60] Waṣṣāf, p. 377.

Mamluks that the Mongols had been discouraged by the size of the Mamluk forces. But actually, the sources continue, this was a Mongol trick,[61] evidently to get the Mamluks to break up their well-prepared formation. This information is confirmed to a degree by Rashīd al-Dīn: the Mamluks "thought that the Mongol army was moving aside before withdrawing," and thus the Mamluks moved forward their attack by a day.[62] No claim, however, is made for deliberate disinformation. Actually, had the Mongols been feeding the Mamluks disinformation, they certainly would not have been as ill-prepared as the Mamluks found them. Ibn al-Dawādārī writes that they came upon the Mongols while at camp, resting their animals,[63] while Baybars al-Manṣūrī reports that upon perceiving the approaching Mamluks, the Mongols mounted their horses, got organized in squadrons (*ṭallabū*), exerted themselves and headed for the Mamluks.[64] Again, this is confirmed by Rashīd al-Dīn: Ghazan, alerted to the approach of the Mamluks, prayed two *rakʿa*s with his army,[65] and together with his troops mounted and made ready for battle. As mentioned before, the Mongols were caught unprepared and Ghazan had to make due with those troops who were near at hand, 9,000 in the center according to Waṣṣāf.[66] There is no indication from Rashīd al-Dīn that the planned manoeuvre to the desert was executed even in part.[67] The battle finally began before noon.[68]

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[61] Yūnīnī, vol. 2, p. 97; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8, p. 121.

[62] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p." 126.

[63] Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 16.

[64] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Ẓubda*, p. 331.

[65] Waṣṣāf, p. 376, writes that the day before the battle, Ghazan had ordered the officers and troops to purify themselves and pray.

[66] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, pp. 126–7; Waṣṣāf, p. 378.

[67] Cf. Waṣṣāf, p. 377, who writes that the "left wing" under Sulṭān Yasa'ul was sent off to manoeuvre around the enemy, and the Mamluks thought that this was the main Mongol army withdrawing; this is what prompted the Mamluks to move up their attack. Since Rashīd al-Dīn mentions "Sulṭān" in the center (albeit in the left of the center), it seems that he probably did not lead this particular force, if indeed it did go off.

[68] The Mamluk sources state say that the Sultan and his army arrived at the battlefield at the fifth hour, i.e. 5 hours after sunrise, which would roughly mean eleven o'clock (6 hours would be noon: see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], vol. 5, p. 707): Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, p. 58; Yūnīnī, vol. 2, p. 97; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 16; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8. p. 123. It is clear that these works are all derived from a common source, probably a lost section of Jazarī's *Ḥawādath al-zamān*. Cf. Het'um [Hayton/Hethoum], "La Flor des estories de la Terre d'Orient," in *Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents armeniens* (Paris, 1869–1906), vol. 2, p. 193 (cited in Boyle, "Īl-Khān," p. 388), who reports the battle commencing at sunrise and ending by noon.

A remarkable piece of evidence is conveyed at this stage by two fifteenth century Mamluk historians, al-ʿAynī (d. 1451) and al-Maqrīzī (d. 1442): the Mamluk soldiers received orders to throw down their lances (*rimāḥ*) and "to depend upon the striking of the sword and mace."[69] The ultimate source of this information seems to be the lost work of the early fourteenth-century historian—and soldier in the *ḥalqa* formation (a non-Mamluk part of the Mamluk army)—Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, who participated in the battle.[70] Al-ʿAynī adds that this was a great mistake, not the least since the discarded lances were a tremendous nuisance to the Mamluk horses. The importance of this piece of evidence, besides its immediate implications for the battle is that it is the first real information that I have encountered in the Mamluk sources about the significance of these weapons in actual combat. Without denigrating the importance of the bow and arrow, and the ability of the Mamluks to use them in motion or standing, we now have some real indications of the ability of the Mamluk troopers to engage in hand-to-hand warfare, and perhaps even shock tactics, although most certainly not of the type developed by Frankish armies.

At this point, we can review the evidence regarding the order of battle of each side. The two above-cited fifteenth-century authors give us a good picture of the Mamluks' formation (fig. 1), apparently arranged only after coming within eyesight of the Mongols. On the extreme right wing (*maymana*) was the bedouin chief of Syria ʿĪsā b. Muhannā, leading the various tribes of north Syria (Āl Mirā, Āl ʿAlī and Āl Kalb, besides—so it would seem—his own Āl Faḍl). The right wing proper was formed by the armies of Aleppo and Hama under the governor of the former city, Balāban al-Ṭabbākhī. The Left wing (*maysara*) was composed of five amirs of 1000[71] who are named (Bektash al-Fakhrī *amīr silāḥ*, Aqqush Qattāl al-Sabuʿ,

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[69] Maqrīzī, vol., p. 886: *ʿalā ḍarb al-sayf wa'l-dabbūsh*; cf. al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd al-jumān fī ta'rikh ahl al-zamān*, ed. M.M. Amīn (Cairo, 1987–92), vol. 4, p. 11: *ʿalā ḍarb al-suyūf.*

[70] See Donald P. Little, "The Recovery of a Lost Source for Bahrī Mamlūk History: al-Yūsufī's *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*" *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94 (1974), pp. 42–54; *idem, An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 80–87. Yūsufī is subsequently mentioned by ʿAynī as a source for material about the battle; see below.

[71] Officially "amirs of 100, commanders of 1000," i.e. they commanded both a unit of 100 of their own mamluks, and (theoretically) 1000 soldiers of the *ḥalqa* formation. See David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 15 (1953), pp. 469–70.

500 Mamluk *naft* throwers

| Left Wing (*maysara*) | | Center (*qalb*) | | Right Wing (*maymana*) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bektash al-Fakhri *amir silah* | | Salar with "rest of army" | | 'Isa b. Muhanna with Syrian Beduoin (on extreme Right) |
| Aqqush Qattal al-Sabu' | | Burulghi | | |
| Sanjar al-Dawadari | Royal Mamluks | Qutlubek al-Hajib | Royal Mamluks | Balaban al-Tabbakhi, governor of Aleppo with armies of Aleppo and Hama |
| Toghril al-Ighani | | Aybeg al-Khaznadar | | |
| Hajj Kurt, governor of Tripoli with army of Tripoli | | A number of junior officers | | |
| "squadron" (tulb) of Lachin al-Ustadar with sundry junior commanders | | Sultan with small group of Mamluks, together with Lachin al-Ustadar (exact location unspecified) | | |

Figure 1: Battle of Wadi al-Khaznadar, December 1299 Mamluk order of battle.

ʿAlam al-Dīn Sanjar al-Dawadārī and Ṭoghril al-Īghānī), plus the governor of Tripoli Ḥājj Kurt (with his army), and the "squadron" (*ṭulb*) of Lachin al-Ustādār, including the amirs of 40 from the remnant of the Ẓāhiriyya (mamluks of al-Ẓāhir Baybars) and their entourages.[72] As will be seen, the last-named amir, Lachin al-Ustādār was himself behind the lines with the young Sultan. The center (*qalb*) was composed of the rest of the army, under Salar and Baybars al-Jashnakīr, together with Burulghi, Quṭlubek al-Hājib, Aybeg al-Khaznadār; all of these were accompanied by a number of lesser amirs. The royal Mamluks were on either side of the center. The Sultan himself, as mentioned above, was behind the lines, under the tutelage of Lachin al-Ustādār. The royal standard (*sanjaq al-sulṭān*) was placed away from the Sultan, to attract the enemy and keep them away from him. In the vanguard (*muqaddima*) were placed 500 mamluk *nafṭ*—or Greek-fire—throwers (*zarrāqūn*). At the last minute, Baybars al-Jashnakīr was taken ill with fever and diarrhoea, and was removed from the battlefield on a stretcher.[73] The sources leave it to our judgement whether this convenient illness was feigned or not.

A number of observation can be made on this order of battle. First, it does not seem to mention all of the important amirs, i.e. the regimental commanders known as "amirs of 100, commanders of 1000." The governor of Damascus, Aqqush al-Afram, is also conspicuously missing; although there is no reason to think that, having set off from Damascus just before the Sultan, he and the Damascene army were not at the battle. Second, notwithstanding the incomplete nature of the report, it would appear that the right wing was relatively weak, both compared to previous Mamluk practices, e.g. at the battle of Homs in 1281,[74] and compared to the opposing Mongol left wing (see below). The Mamluk commanders appear to have placed their weight in the center and left. Thirdly, it is clear that the Sultan, some 15 years old, was completely out of the picture. The duumvirate of Baybars al-Jashnakīr and Salar,

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[72] For *ṭulb*, a squadron of undefined size, see D. Ayalon, "Ḥarb, iii.—The Mamlūk Sultanate," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], vol. 3, p. 185; R. Amitai, "Ṭulb," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*[2], vol. 10, p. 608. For amirs of 40 or *ṭablkhāna* amirs as written here, see Ayalon, "Studies" (as in previous note), pp. 469–70. For the Ẓāhiriyya, personal mamluks of the late Sultan Baybars, see: Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 72, 179–81.

[73] Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 886; ʿAynī, vol. 4, pp. 11–13.

[74] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 191–3.

however, was no replacement for the command of a resolute *Heerkönig*[75] like Sultan Baybars (1260–77) or even Qalawun (1279–90).[76] The transport of Baybars al-Jashnakīr from the field in the minutes before the commencement of the battle did nothing to improve morale. The disadvantage of the Mamluks was not only one of numbers.

Following Rashīd al-Dīn's account,[77] we can reconstruct the Mongol order of battle without two much trouble (fig. 2). On the extreme right (*awwal-i maymana*) was Mulai—a name often rendered in the sources as Bulai.[78] After him was Amīrzādah Saṭalmish,[79] then Quṭlugh-Shāh, followed by two names which are unclear, Yaman and perhaps Merted (M-R-T-D). The former certainly does not sound Mongolian or Turkish, but is confirmed by Waṣṣāf;[80] and the latter remains obscure, but may be identified with Bortas who is mentioned later by Waṣṣāf together with Yaman.[81] Be this as it may, each of these commanders are said to have led a *tümen*. In the center (*qalb*) was Ghazan himself, "like a majestic mountain." In front of him was a strong vanguard (*muqaddima*) lead by Chūpān on the right and one Sulṭan on the left; the latter many be the Sulṭan Yasa'ul mentioned later by Waṣṣāf.[82] To the immediate right of Center (*yamīn-i qalb*) was Ṭoghrilche, the son of Aju Sokorchi, positioned there it would seem to provide additional cover for the Ilkhan in the center. Continuing on to the left wing[83] from the "Great

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[75] This apt expression is from Peter M. Holt, "The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 28 (1975), p. 246.

[76] For Qalawun's role at Homs in 1281, which can not be characterized as overly heroic, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, ch. 8; cf. Linda Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan* (Wiesbaden, 1998), pp. 108–12.

[77] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 127.

[78] On the identity of these two names, see the comments by Blochet in Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il, p. 583, note 4.

[79] He is called by Waṣṣāf, p. 374: Saṭilmish Mīrzādah.

[80] Waṣṣāf, p. 380: Yamān, but cf. *ibid.*, p. 374, in the list of officers who accompanied Ghazan into Syria: Namān.

[81] He is also one of the commanders of 1000 and 10,000 listed by Waṣṣāf on p. 374.

[82] Waṣṣāf, p. 377.

[83] Rashīd al-Dīn does not use the term *maysara*, but it is clear that he has generally been giving a rundown of the entire Mongol army from the extreme right wing onward. His exact words are *zīr-i qūl-i bozorg*, but this is not to be understood as "behind the great center" in the sense of "after" (as Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army," p. 167, takes it), but rather "afterwards in the line-up along the front." Otherwise we are to understand that Ghazan placed his household troops and three *tümens* behind the front line, beside the rear guard, and there was no Left wing at all.

| Left (*maysara*) | Center (*qalb or qol*) | | | (Right) (*maymana*) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ilbamish | Sultan (Yasa'ul?) | Chupan | | Mulai (extreme Right) |
| Chichak | household | | Toghrilche | Amirzadah Satalmish |
| Qurmishi | retainers (ev oghlanar) | Ghazan | | Qutlugh-Shah |
| | | | | Yaman (?) |
| | | | | Merted (? <M-R-T-D) |
| | Rearguard (*saqa*) | | | |
| | Korbuqa Bahadur | | | |

Figure 2: Battle of Wadi al-Khaznadar, December 1299 Mongol order of battle.

Center" (*qol-i buzurg*), were the royal retainers (*ev oghlanān*),[84] which appear to be distinct from the royal guard. The expression *qol-i buzurg* may be a calque of the Mongolian *yeke qol* ("large" or "imperial center") which was another term for the royal bodyguard or *baghaturs*.[85] In any event, the *ev oghlanān* provided extra protection to the Center to the left. The left wing proper was composed of Ilbasmish with his *tümen*, then Chichak, then Qurmishi the son of Alinaq.[86] The rearguard (*sāqa*) of the army was commanded by Korbuqa Bahādur.[87]

Although only some of the above-mentioned commanders are explicitly said to be with *tümens*, it seems—following Professor Smith—that they were all indeed divisional commanders. The *tümens* themselves, as said above were at half strength, i.e. 13 *tümens* perhaps equalled 65,000 men. But it appears that the center and wings were not yet up and ready for action when the battle commenced. Even so, according to Waṣṣāf, the front covered by the Mongol army stretched to four *farsangs*, i.e. 24 kilometers, and therefore—this authors continues—it was difficult to maintain control over the entire force.[88] This same situation, resulting from armies being composed of many tens of thousands of horsemen, had also been a problem at the second battle of Homs in 1281.[89]

Both Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf report that the Mamluks attacked before the Mongols could fully reassemble and prepare themselves.[90] If the Mongols had been readying a ruse, they were woefully unprepared. Even if not, it shows that their scouts, which Waṣṣāf calls *qarā'ulan*,[91] had not done a very credible job in giving the army ample warning. This delay is particularly striking, since the Mamluks

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[84] Thackston, *Compendium of Chronicles*, p. 646, translates this as a proper name, but cf. Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army," p. 167, who gets this right. On this expression, see Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente in Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–75), vol. 2, pp. 226–7 (no. 675). On the household retainers of the khan, see the comments in Thomas T. Allsen, "Guard and Government in the Reign of the Grand Qan Mongke, 1251–59," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 46 (1986), p. 514.

[85] Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion," *Mongolian Studies*, 6 (1980), p. 43.

[86] On Alinaq, a prominent general in the reign of Tegüder Amad (1282–4), see Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," pp. 365–7.

[87] This is mistranslated by Thackston, *Compendium of Chronicles*, p. 646, as "flank."

[88] Waṣṣāf, p. 377; see translation in Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army," p. 169.

[89] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 194.

[90] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 127; Waṣṣaf, p. 377.

[91] This term, from the Mongolian *qaraghul*, often refers to road patrols; see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 62, 142; Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, vol. 1, pp. 399–400 (no. 276).

did not attack immediately, but they themselves were arranging their army for battle, and even took the time to have Salar, the chamberlains (*ḥujjāb*), and perhaps other senior officers, along with religious dignitaries (*fuqahā'*) make the rounds and whip up enthusiasm for the *jihād*. These efforts, it is reported, resulted in an outbreak of weeping among the troops.[92] I might add, that the Mamluks sources give no indication that facing the Mamluks was an army that ostensibly was now also Muslim, led by a ruler who styled himself *pādshāh-i islām*.

The above mentioned wide front occupied by the armies may explain the confusion of the sources regarding the actual conduct of the battle. Not only are there disparities between the pro-Ilkhanid and pro-Mamluk authors, but even among the latter there are definite contradictions. Still it possible to reconstruct the course of the battle in its general lines, and here and there are bits of information that shed light on the details of the fighting. Unlike most of the previous encounters with the Mamluks, the Mongols did not attempt to preempt their enemy and attack first. This was apparently at Ghazan's orders, so as to wear out the Mamluk horses (who, it will be remembered, were already suffering from fatigue due to the morning's march and the state of readiness which had lasted three days), and also to improve the accuracy of the Mongol archers, who would shoot from a standing position, be it on horseback or on foot.[93] An additional reason may have been to conserve the strength of the remaining Mongol horses, many of whom had died on the march, as suggested by Waṣṣāf. A final advantage would be that the Mongols would be in a defensive position until more Mongol soldiers would show up. The Mamluk sources are almost unanimous that the Mamluks attacked first with their left, against the Mongol right. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Quṭlugh-shāh ordered that the drums (*kuhūrka*)[94] in his division be beaten; the "Egyptians" thinking that drums indicated the position of the Ilkhan, thus attacked in that

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[92] Maqrīzī vol. 1, pp. 886–7; 'Aynī, vol. 4, p. 13.

[93] This is the suggestion in Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887; 'Aynī, vol. 4, 13–4. On the basis of past experience, the Mamluks had expected a concurrent Mongol attack, which would have resulted in both armies "slamming" into each other (*fa-taqa'u al-ṣadma min al-ṭā'ifatayn*.

[94] From the Mongolian *kögerge*; Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army," p. 167; F. Lessing, *Mongolian-English Dictionary* (Berkeley, 1960), 488; Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, vol. 1, pp. 473–5 (no. 339). Waṣṣāf, p. 378, also mentions Quṭlugh-Shāh's war drums.

direction. Yet it is unlikely that the Mamluks had any doubts that he was anywhere but in the center. Rashīd al-Dīn is surely offering us a *post facto* explanation for the opening moves of the battle.[95]

Rashīd al-Dīn reports that at first the Mamluks (i.e., their left) attacked Quṭlugh-shāh's division, and apparently the Mongol right in general, "thousand after thousand, one after another." While this may be a literary device, it can also be an indication of a concerted attack of wave after wave of horsemen, perhaps even wielding bow and arrow in a traditional steppe fashion of wave shooting while advancing, retiring and being replaced by a fresh wave. In any event, the attack(s) proved successful: virtually all the Mamluk sources report the rout of the Mongols at this side (i.e., their right), even going as far to state that 5,000 Mongols were killed, a not improbable number perhaps, but not one which the Mamluks were in any position to ascertain.[96] Rashīd al-Dīn does not dispute this general assessment: The Mamluks reached as far as the Mongol ranks, tore into them, and threw down the "heros," as he calls them.[97] Many Mongols were killed or wounded, but Quṭlugh-shāh and some of his men managed to join Ghazan in the center.[98] The fate of the rest of the Mongol right is left unspecified by this author, but it may be mentioned that Mulai, who had been placed on the extreme right, is later found leading the Mongol advance forces into Palestine. Waṣṣāf describes the discomfiture of the Mongol right, which had also dismounted only to receive the order to remount. It was at this juncture that the Mamluks chose to attack, catching the Mongols unprepared, pushing them back.[99]

In the center, things were going better for the Mongols, although it will be remembered that Ghazan initially only had 9,000 horsemen with him, while facing an attack of 40,000 "Egyptians," surely an exaggerated figure.[100] The Mamluk *nafṭ* throwers had moved for-

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[95] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 127.

[96] Yūnīnī, vol. 2, p. 98; Ibn Ṭaghrī Birdī, vol. 8, pp. 121–2; Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, 58 (these three accounts are surely based on one source, apparently Jazarī); Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, p. 331; Nuwayrī, vol. 27, p. 411; vol. 31, p. 385 (clearly based on *Zubda*); ʿAynī, vol. 4, p. 15, but cf. Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887, who has the same account found in Yūnīnī et al. Ibn al-Dawādārī, pp. 16–17, who generally has an account parallel to Yūnīnī for the whole course of the battle, here mistakenly writes that it was the Mamluk *right* which defeated the Mongol *left*, a clear mix-up.

[97] Whether these *bahādurān* were really "guardsmen" seems unlikely.

[98] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 127.

[99] Waṣṣāf, p. 378.

[100] Waṣṣāf, p. 378.

ward and tossed their grenades, but since they were still too far away from the forward position of the Mongols, these burnt themselves out without inflicting any damage.[101] In the center Ghazan also held his troops back from attacking and had them dismount, so that they would thereby gain greater accuracy in their archery. Het'um writes that the Mongols took up a position behind their horses, but his evidence is unique.[102] A look at Figure 3, describing an earlier battle in which the Mongols took place, shows that another arrangement was possible when mounted archers dismounted.[103]

Not only do Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣaf[104] agree about the dismounting of much of the Mongol army, but this is confirmed also by Mamluk sources, who report that the steadfastness of the Mongols disconcerted the Mamluks galloping ahead at full speed.[105] At that point, the Mongols mounted and launched a concerted attack (*ḥamalat al-tatār ḥamlatan ṣādiqatan*) until they encircled the Mamluk center.[106] Rashīd al-Dīn uses a particularly apt expression to describe this stage: "[The Mongols] remounted and attacked them in the Turkish fashion" (*bar īshān turk tāz kardan*).[107] This is probably an allusion to the traditional tactic of using light cavalry attacking with bows and arrows in a united manner.[108]

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[101] 'Aynī, vol. 4, p. 14: Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887.

[102] Het'um, p. 193.

[103] On this illustration, and the battle it describes, see note 132 below.

[104] Waṣṣāf, p. 378, who writes that Ghazan ordered Yaman, Ṭoghrilche and Bortas to dismount. These would seem to be three division commanders directly to the right of the Mongol Center, parallel to the Ṭoghrilche, Yaman and Merted mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn mentioned above. It is logical then that Bortas and Merted are the same: the M-R-T-D of Rashīd al-Dīn being perhaps a corruption of Borṭas برطاس←مرتد

[105] 'Aynī, vol. 4, p. 14; cf. Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887, who has a much shorter rendition of this.

[106] 'Aynī, vol. 4, p. 14, who writes only that they "encircled the Muslims," but it seems that the intention is to the Mamluk Center at this stage. Abu 'l-Fidā', vol. 4, p. 42 (= p. 35 in Holt's translation) reports that the Mamluk center stood firm, after both the right and left wings had fled. The center was encircled, a great battle ensued and then the Sultan withdrew. The magnitude of the defeat is thus concealed in this terse account.

[107] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 128.

[108] But cf. Waṣṣāf, p. 378, who writes that the Mongols "let loose at [the enemy] an infliction of arrows in the Turkish manner," while they were still dismounted. This author's intention to "Turkish manner" must be to the accuracy of the archery and not the fact of it being executed on a galloping horse. The translation is from Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army," p. 169. For the Turkish manner of fighting and the use of archery, see R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 75–83; David Ayalon, "Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon: The Importance of the Mamlūk Institution," *Der Islam*, 53 (1976), 218–25.

Figure 3: Mongols fighting soldiers of Khwārazm-shāh; one side has dismounted to use their bows (MS. Bibliothèque nationale Suppl. persan 1113, fol. 72). Reproduced by kind permission of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.

The majority of Mamluk sources are not very precise at this point. Perhaps the embarrassment was so acute that it was decided that brevity was the soul of wisdom at this stage of the description. The contemporary Syrian writer al-Yūnīnī, for example, writes: "The [Mamluk] center also launched an attack. Exhaustion (*takhādhul*) afflicted them, brought on by God. The [Mamluk] right wing was defeated. So were those behind the royal standards" (*al-sanājaq al-sulṭāniyya*).[109] These standards were certainly in the center, and this must be an indirect way of saying that the center was routed. The exhaustion probably reflects the fatigue of the horses, who previous to the rapid assault had been on the march all day, as well as the discomfiture and rapidly declining moral of the Mamluk troopers and officers, brought on *inter alia* by the initial steadfastness of the Mongols, their accurate fire, and then their concerted attack. Consequently, the Mamluks, lacking proper leadership, and eventually encountering superior numbers had little choice but to withdraw.

There are some Mamluk sources, however, which provide us with some additional information, and act as a corrective to the panegyrics found in the Persian sources. According to these writers, who seem to be derived from the work of Baybars al-Manṣūrī, Ghazan had been initially nonplussed at the defeat of the Mongol right. He withdrew with a group of 30 horsemen, intending to retreat from the battlefield. But then those elements of the army which had not been in the first round of the battle came up, and Ghazan renewed the attack. Baybars al-Manṣūrī then writes: "[The Mongol] squadrons (*karādīsuhum*) assembled around the [Mamluk] center, and prevented them from striking with lance and sword, launching a barrage of arrows . . . and the [Mamluk] horses were hit."[110] From this passage we learn how the combination of fresh troops and effective archery contributed to a victory. The inability of the Mamluks to use whatever shock power they possessed was surely a factor in their defeat.

*A propos* Ghazan's short-lived desire to flee the battlefield, certain Mamluk sources report that he had been stopped by none other

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[109] Yūnīnī, vol. 2, p. 98; cf. the translation by Li Guo, in the first volume of his edition, pp. 133–4. Similar accounts are found in Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, p. 58; Ibn al-Dawādārī, pp. 16–17. Cf. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8, p. 122, who writes that the Mamluk right fled after it had almost won, surely wishful thinking.

[110] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, p. 331, from which: Nuwayrī, vol. 27. p. 411; vol. 31, p. 385; ʿAynī, vol. 4, p. 15 (who cites Baybars by name later that page); partial version in Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887.

than Qipchaq, the Mamluk deserter, who strengthened his resolve, leading to the eventual Mongol victory. After the battle, when Qipchaq had returned to the Mamluk fold, he explained his actions by claiming that he had hoped that keeping Ghazan on the scene would lead to his capture.[111] There is no reason to doubt that this represents some post-battle rationalizing on Qipchaq's part, wishing by this means to help rehabilitate himself in the eyes of his Mamluk comrades.

Rashīd al-Dīn reports that during the battle the Mamluks had prepared an ambush, using the Bedouins under their chief ʿĪsā b. Muhannā in the same way in which the Bedouins had acted during the previous battle at Homs in 1281.[112] Although the word *kamīn*—"ambush"—is used, it seems that the Bedouins were to attack from the rear, since this was what the Bedouin had reportedly done in the previous battle. The Mongol rearguard under Korbuqa was called upon to deal with this, which it did without too much ado.[113] The only problem with this report is that some Mamluk authors note that early on the Bedouin had fled the scene, as they and their horses were nonplussed by the barrage of arrows emanating from the Mongol left. This in turn had led to the hasty retreat of the Aleppan army, who gathered up the army of Hama with them as they went.[114] The supposed Bedouin attack may be nothing more than a *topos*, or perhaps the result of a chance encounter between fleeing nomads and Mongol forces either during the battle or its aftermath.

Whatever the exact order of events, it is clear that the Mamluk army had suffered a complete defeat, and abandoned the field in disarray.[115] And what of the young sultan, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad? Most Mamluk writers report that he merely withdrew making his way to Baʿlabakk and then on to Egypt. This terse account belies the embarrassing incident that in the rush of the retreat the Sultan had been abandoned on the hill with Lachin al-Ustādār and a small number of Mamluks. The Sultan wept and beseeched God to save him. We have this report on good authority: the historian al-Yūsufī,

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[111] Nuwayrī, vol. 31, p. 385; Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887.

[112] The author refers to this as *zamān-i mangū tīmūr* ("the time of Möngke Temür"), i.e. the name of Abagha's brother who commanded the Mongols at this battle. For this maneuver in 1281, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 197–8.

[113] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jalhn, p. 127.

[114] ʿAynī, vol. 4, pp. 14–15; Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887.

[115] Baybars al-Manṣūrī (*Zubda*, p. 331) presents this retreat as an orderly withdrawal necessitated by the difficult straits in which the army found itself. This, of course, is merely an attempt to put a good face on a very embarrassing situation.

who adds: "At this time there were twelve young mamluks with the Sultan, and I was the thirteenth.[116] To his credit, Lachin al-Ustādār took command of the situation, and was able to bring his young charge eventually back to Egypt.

The battle appears to have ended in the late afternoon.[117] It was in the immediate aftermath of the battle that another Mongol general Abishqa arrived on the scene together with the ruler of Lesser Armenia at the head of 5,000 men.[118] It can be noted that the Armenian historian Het'um, who renders a detailed report of the battle, does not actually state that the Armenian troops took part in the battle. In his account, the Armenian king only appears in the mopping-up operation after the victory.[119]

The Mamluk army fled the battle, abandoning armor, weapons and other baggage so as to reduce their loads and flee more quickly. No attempt was made to organize an orderly withdrawal, although certainly some commanders made an attempt to retreat with their own soldiers in something resembling a formation. Most troops headed south, eventually reaching Egypt. Some of the retreating soldiers suffered depredations from local mountain-dwellers, evidently Druze from the area of modern Lebanon, as well as local nomads. Ibn al-Dawādārī bitterly comments that the "mountain dwellers and Bedouin treated the [Mamluk] soldiers worse than the Mongols, as if they wanted to take revenge on Islam." Some Mamluk troops made their way to the various Mamluk fortresses in the area, where they were to wait out the period of Mongol occupation. It appears, *pace* Waṣṣāf,[120] that there was no immediate pursuit of the fleeing Mamluks. This is stated clearly by Rashīd al-Dīn,[121] as well as by most of the Mamluk authors, who add that this was heaven-sent mercy which prevented the complete destruction of the Mamluk army. Some sources report that Ghazan himself held back his troops fearing a Mamluk ambush, i.e., he was afraid that this was a feigned retreat designed to catch the pursuing Mongols off guard.[122] Again we have a report from

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[116] Cited in 'Aynī, vol. 4, p. 15; summarized, without attribution in Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 887.

[117] According to most of the Mamluk sources quoted above, the battle lasted until after the afternoon prayer (*al-'aṣr*) a somewhat imprecise term.

[118] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 128.

[119] Het'um, 191–4.

[120] Waṣṣāf, p. 378.

[121] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 128.

[122] Yūnīnī, pp. 98, 100; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 17; Nuwayrī, vol. 31, p. 386;

Qipchaq that the he had dissuaded the Ilkhan from going after the Mamluks, in order—so he will later claim—to prevent a complete Mamluk rout.[123]

Not surprisingly, the sources offer varying figures for the casualties on both sides. Baybars al-Manṣūrī and al-Nuwayrī give the names of eight Mamluk amirs who were killed and the figure of a thousand troopers among the Mamluks and *ḥalqa*. The latter author adds that 14,000 Mongols died in the battle.[124] Mention has been made (see note 96) that according to some Mamluk writers 5,000 Mongols had been killed in their right wing alone. It seems unlikely, however, that the Mamluks or those who served them would have known such figures. Waṣṣāf steers clear of mentioning the Mongol dead, but does report that 5,000 "Egyptians" perished in the battle. Probably the lower Mamluk figure is to be accepted, since the original source, Baybars al-Manṣūrī, was a high officer, and would have had access to such information. On other hand, the evidence in the Mamluk sources regarding the Mongol deaths is worthless. Mamluk deaths were relatively low, in spite of the total defeat, since they had not been subjected to an immediate pursuit, in which usually the lion's share of casualties would have occurred.

Ghazan began moving south, taking possession of the Sudan's treasure which he found in the abandoned Mamluk camp. Homs surrendered as did Damascus. Subsequently, Mongol forces under Mulai raided deep into Palestine, reaching as far as Gaza and Jerusalem, falling upon Mamluk stragglers and civilian refugees.[125] Ghazan's occupation of Damascus will be the subject of another, forthcoming study.[126] It may be mentioned, however, that although the notables

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Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, pp. 58–61; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, vol. 8. pp. 122–4. For the seeking of refuge by some of the amirs in the castles of Syria, see *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, ed. G. Raynaud (Geneva, 1887), pp. 300–1 (par. 605). I would like to thank Dr. Laura Minervini (Naples) for this last reference and a translation of this passage.

[123] Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fi aʿyān al-miʾa al-thāmina* (Ḥaydarābād, 1348–50/1929–32), vol. 3, p. 214.

[124] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, p. 332; Nuwayrī, vol. 31, p. 385; Maqrīzī, vol. 1, p. 888, follows Nuwayrī for the Mongol dead.

[125] See Reuven Amitai, "Mongol Raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260 and 1300)," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1987, pp. 243–7. For a colorful story of one straggler being caught, see ʿAynī, vol. 4, p. 18: an amir, Bilik al-Ṭayyār, and his entourage, including his family, were intercepted near Baysān; Bilik fought off the Mongols, was killed, but his family escaped.

[126] "The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk Loyalties," *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, eds. Amalia Levanoni and Michael Winter (Sussex Academic Press, forthcoming).

of the city surrendered, the citadel under the command of the Mamluk officer Sanjar Arjuwash held out for the entire period of Mongol occupation. After several weeks (5 February 1300), Ghazan left the city and returned to his kingdom for reasons which will be discussed below. He left Quṭlugh-Shāh in charge with a substantial force, but he too withdrew after about a month. Finally, Mulai, who was in the environs of the city after returning from the south, retired to the east.[127] At this juncture, Mamluk forces, who had already set out from Egypt, regained control of the city, and then proceeded to occupy all of Syria up to the Euphrates. In spite of the embarrassing outcome at Wādī al-Khaznadār, Mamluk authority in Syria was not disrupted in the long-run.[128]

### *Analysis of the fighting methods and the battle*

After this somewhat detailed reconstruction of the battle, it is appropriate to attempt to draw some conclusions, first by examining the salient fighting methods employed by the Mongols who fought at this battle. I might introduce these remarks by stating, contrary to what I expected when I first embarked on this study, that it appears that the Ilkhanid army of *circa* 1300 was remarkably similar to that of a generation or two before.

First, we have seen that the Mongol troopers set out on this campaign each with a string of five horses. This is in complete accordance with traditional Mongol (and steppe) military practice, necessitated by the use of steppe ponies. These were indeed sturdy and dependable mounts, but they could only carry a heavy burden for so long without being replaced from time to time. More importantly, they could not maintain a sustained gallop and thus on the battlefield had to be replaced after some time.[129] We have here a clear indication that the average Mongol trooper was still riding a steppe pony,

[127] Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," p. 389.

[128] For some of the wider implications of the Mognol victory, see Sylvia Schein, "*Gesta Dei per Mongolos 1300*. The Genesis of a Non-Event," *English Historical Review*, 84 (1979), pp. 805–819.

[129] On the steppe pony and the Mongol practice of each soldier setting out with several mounts, see David Morgan, "The Mongol Armies in Persia," *Der Islam*, 56 (1979), pp. 85–86; Smith, "Ayn Jālūt," p. 331; Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 214–5.

and thus there was a limit how much armor and additional equipment could be carried. This is sufficient evidence suggest that the Ilkhans still commanded an army based on light cavalry.

Second, both the Mamluk and Mongol authors make mention of the effective use of archery by the Mongols in this battle. The employment of masses of mounted archers was the hallmark of steppe warfare, and there is nothing in the descriptions presented above to suggest that the Mongols of the waning days of the thirteenth century were fighting any differently. Rashīd al-Dīn's remark that the Mongol center "attacked [the Mamluks] in the Turkish fashion" is a clear allusion to the continued use of steppe archery. Baybars al-Manṣūrī's describes the "barrage of arrows" launched by the same Mongols, a confirmation of the concerted manner of this tactic.

Third, the Mongols—at the Ilkhan's orders—dismounted to shoot the attacking Mamluks with greater accuracy. This may not have been the Mongol technique of choice, but it certainly had a honorable pedigree: the Mongols had already dismounted in one of their battles against the Khwārazm-Shāh Jalāl al-Dīn *circa* 628/1230–1,[130] and in Abulustayn in 1276.[131] There is an illustration in a Paris manuscript of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, reproduced here (fig. 3), which shows Khwārazmi troops fighting Mongols, where one side—unidentified to my mind—is firing dismounted.[132] At Wādī al-Khaznadār, having repulsed the Mamluks, the Mongols remounted and successfully counterattacked. There is nothing here that remotely suggests a change in Mongol tactics.

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[130] Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī, *Mirʾāt al-zamān fī taʾrīkh al-aʿyan*, vol. 8 (Ḥaydarābād, 1370/1951), p. 671; see also Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 223–4.

[131] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[132] "This is found in E.D. Phillips, *The Mongols* (New York and Washington, 1969), plate 7, taken from MS. Bibliothèque Nationale Suppl. Persan 1113, fol. 72r. On this picture, see Francis Richard, "Un des peintres du manuscrit Supplément Persan 1113 de l'Histoire des Mongols de Rašīd al-Dīn identifié," *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. Denis Aigle (Teheran, 1997), p. 315: "Pres de la forteresse de Vāliyān, combat des Mongols contre les soldats de Sultan Hʷārazmšāh Ǧalāl al-dīn, conduits par Sayf al-dīn (1221)." Cf. Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," p. 324, note 52. This picture, needless to say, is not contemporary to the events described. The manuscript, according to Richard, is from the first third of the fifteenth century, but is based on an earlier model, certainly no earlier than the beginning of the fourteenth century. As far as I can tell, the episode described in this picture is not in the text of *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, but rather is found in 'Alā' al-Dīn Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, *Taʾrīkh-i jahān gushā*, ed. M.M. Qazwīnī (London and Leiden, 1912–37), vol. 2, pp. 136–9 = Juvaini, *The History of the World Conqueror*, tr. John A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 405–7.

Taken altogether, we see a great degree of continuity in Mongol equipment, fighting techniques, and tactics. The evidence we have been able to adduce shows that the Mongol army under Ghazan was on the whole similar to the one led into the Middle East almost half a century earlier by his great-grandfather Hülegü (d. 1265), and even to that which preceded it thirty years before at the time of the first Mongol campaign to Iran led by Chinggis Khan (d. 1227). This does not mean that there were no changes whatsoever. We would expect some transformations, such as the increasing use of equipment produced by professional artisans, but evidence of such has yet to show up in the sources. In any event, it appears that acculturation by the Mongols in the Islamic world to the wider, sedentary culture, such as it occurred in the realms of religion, administrative practice and even language, did not necessarily lead to significant change in the military sphere.

There is then, in my opinion, little if any support for Dr. Martinez's claim that this battle represented a stage in the adoption of the Mongols to "the requirements of Levantine warfare." There is no evidence, literary or archeological, to state that there had been "an important increase in the quantity of armor and arms that [Ghazan] had available and, possibly, in their quality as well,"[133] and that this contributed in any way to Ghazan's victory. The reasons for Mongol success, or Mamluk failure, must be sought elsewhere.

Before moving on to an analysis of the outcome of the battle, a comment about Mamluk fighting methods is required. We have here clear evidence of two techniques used by the Mamluks on the battlefield: first, the use of swords, maces and even lances (the last mentioned appears not to have been utilized in this particular battle). In other words, it seems that the Mamluks could and did launch frontal attacks using shock tactics. At the same time, there is evidence, albeit not explicit, that the Mamluks launched attacks of wave after wave of mounted archers, even though it is not distinctly stated that the Mamluks were employing bows and arrows here. Yet it is known that the Mamluks trained intensely in archery, including shooting while riding a galloping horse.[134] The combination of this information with the evidence provided by Rashīd al-Dīn that the Mamluk waves of "thousands followed one after another," leads to

[133] Martinez, "Īl-Xānid Army," p. 176.
[134] See the comments in Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," pp. 317, 323–4.

the tentative conclusion that at Wādī al-Khaznadār the Mamluks also employed the tactic of massed charges by mounted archers, shooting barrages as they advanced.

We are now in a position to attempt an analysis of the Mongol victory. From the beginning the Mamluks, although fighting on home ground, were suffering from a number of disadvantages. First, on the way to the front, there had been a rebellion, that of the Oirats, which had revealed tensions in the ranks and did nothing to improve morale. Second, there was a certain complacency towards the Mongol danger, and this may have led many of the Mamluk commanders not to prepare themselves and their units fully. This is connected to the third reason: the lack of a strong or undisputed commander, be he the sultan or his representative. In the days of Baybars, for instance, frequent inspections had been conducted to make sure that the officers and soldiers were present and fully equipped, even at times between campaigns; soldiers had even been executed for not showing up at these inspections.[135] At the present battle, the Sultan, al-Nāsir Muhammad, was a mere youth, with absolutely no power whatsoever. In his stead was the duo of Salār and Baybars al-Jashnakīr, and the latter was not even on the battlefield when the fighting began. The lack of a charismatic and unchallenged leader was to be a decisive factor in the course of the battle. The exhausted state of the Mamluk horses, and perhaps of the Mamluks themselves, may also be mentioned.

The Mongols had two major advantages in this battle: first, significantly larger numbers, and two, a decisive and talented commander, in the person of Ghazan Ilkhan. In spite of being caught somewhat unprepared, the Ilkhan did not lose his cool, and continued to direct his troops until additional soldiers could come up and a counterattack could be launched. The numerical disadvantage of the Mamluks was not immediately felt, since much of the Mongol army was spread out at the commencement of fighting. Fresh Mongol units, however, began to appear, and in spite of the initial Mamluk successes on their left, the Mamluk attacks were stemmed and subsequently they left the battlefield in total confusion. I might add that various Mamluk authors comment on how effective the Mongol archery was at wreaking havoc in the Mamluk lines.

[135] See Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks,* pp. 73–74.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which, if any, of the above reasons was the decisive one. I cannot agree with Prof. Smith, who writes in his important article from 1986 on 'Ayn Jālūt—in fact, a comprehensive study of Mongol-Mamluk warfare—that "the battle in 1299 was eventually won by superior Mongol numbers rather than archery."[136] I, for one, cannot say with certitude that the "Mongols numbers" would have been so decisive had a more resolute and talented commander been leading the Mamluks. The outcome of the battle, to my mind, was decided by a combination of the aforementioned factors: to pick just one of them and to evaluate it in isolation from the others appears to be an overly simplified way of analyzing this battle.

This, of course, touches upon an ongoing debate between Professor Smith and myself on the relative merits of the two armies. Professor Smith, in his seminal 1986 article mentioned above, suggested that the Mongols were basically an extremely large bunch of amateurs using mediocre, home-made equipment, fighting highly trained and bettered equipped Mamluks, whose superior skills and armament made up for their smaller numbers. This highly detailed, technical article is a *tour deforce* of interdisciplinary research. I must say, however, that while recognizing that the whole nature of the discussion of both the Mongol and Mamluk armies has been raised since the publication of this article, I was not completely convinced by Prof. Smith's thesis. I expressed my reservations in my book *Mongols and Mamluks* in 1995, saying that the difference in quality between the average Mongol and Mamluk trooper was much less significant than it had been portrayed by Professor Smith.[137] It also seems that the fighting methods of the two armies were perhaps not as far apart as he suggested, In my book, I attempted to construct what I hope was a more nuanced model based on a detailed examination of four battles. My conclusions, as may be remembered, were summarized at the beginning of this essay.

Recently, Professor Smith has written a long review of my book, published in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*.[138] While conceding certain points and making some extremely positive and even flattering comments, Prof. Smith on the whole remains true to his-

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[136] Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," p. 325.
[137] See *Mongols and Mamluks*, chapter 10.
[138] See note 5 above.

previous position. In this present context, I am unable to engage in a long rejoinder. I will limit myself to pointing out that at the battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār, there are indications that both sides used attacks of massed mounted archers, although the Mamluks clearly employed shock tactics, which remains unstated for the Mongols. More importantly, for all of their "professionalism," the Mamluks abandoned the battlefield, and Syria for that matter, in a most shameful manner. This can be contrasted to the way a much outnumbered group of "amateur" Mongols fought to the death at the battle of Abulustayn in 1276.[139] Having said this, I can now await Professor Smith's "counterattack." I might add that this academic give and take, conducted in a friendly and respectful spirit, is surely much more pleasant that the "give and take" which was found on the Mongol-Mamluk battlefield.

I would like to discuss one more, related matter, that of logistics, and of the limitations it placed on an army of steppe origin. Professor Smith broached this subject first in the aforementioned 'Ayn Jālūt article. Around the same time, Professor David Morgan also discussed this issue in a short but important and thought-provoking piece called "The Mongols in Syria, 1260–1300."[140] The conclusions reached in both articles—but via different means—was that geographic and climatic conditions prevented the long-term presence of a large Mongol army in Syria. This was because the Mongols who brought with them an immense numbers of horses—say five per trooper—or more than 300,000 in the case of the campaign of 1299–1300, found neither the pasture land nor the water resources to sustain such a force. As summer approached, or rather already when winter drew to a close, much if not most of the army would have to withdraw from Syria for more adequate pasture land to the east, mainly in Azerbaijan and its environs. In the view of Professor Smith, this logistical problem was directly related to the previous discussion: since the Mongols were basically inferior soldiers compared to the Mamluks, they had to compensate by bringing larger armies (with their enormous trains of horses) to Syria. But the "holding capacity" of Syria for such an army was limited, and thus within a few months most of the army had to leave the country. Hence,

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[139] A comment to this effect is already made in Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p. 233. Smith, "Nomads on Ponies," does not relate to this comment.

[140] This appeared in *Crusades and Settlement*, ed. Peter Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 231–5.

the climatic and geographic conditions of Syria dictated to a great degree the outcome of the Ilkhanid-Mamluk war. These conclusions tallied with Prof. Morgan's paper mentioned above.

In *Mongols and Mamluks* I expressed some reservations to these conclusions, although I did not completely reject them: the long, dry summers of Syria was certainly a factor to be considered by the Mongols. Whether it was the only consideration and whether it necessitated the leaving of only a relatively small force, such as that left behind by Hülegü in 1260 (ca. 10,000 Mongols), remained, in my opinion, an open questions. Other grounds, such as political and military considerations, may have played no less as significant a role.[141]

This being said, I am now more inclined to accept the conclusion of Morgan and Smith, at least for the campaign under discussion here. Indeed, Rashīd al-Dīn provides indication that the Syrian climate was a factor behind Ghazan's decision to withdraw not long after the battle, after a short occupation of Damascus. He writes:

> Since the weather was turning hot, the Pādshāh paid no attention to the people of the Citadel [of Damascus] . . . On Saturday, the 13th of Jumādā I (February 5) he withdrew from Damascus . . .[142]

This is not an explicit statement on the problems of feeding and watering the Mongol horses, and thus it was misunderstood by Boyle and others.[143] There appears, however, to be no other way in which it can be properly understood, except that, with the coming of summer, much of the Mongol army had to vacate Syria or face the consequences of a dearth of water and pasture.

Logistics, however, were not the only reason behind Ghazan's early withdrawal. Het'um writes that the Ilkhan left the country because of an incursion of Chaghatayid troops.[144] This explanation need not be discounted as a mere rationalization for the Ilkhan's decision, which led him to throw away the results of his impressive victory. Quṭlu-Khwāja, the son of Duwa, the Chaghatayid Khan,

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[141] See Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 27–29, for a discussion of Hülegü's withdrawal from Syria, which paved the way for the Mamluk victory at 'Ayn Jālūt. One contributing factor was faulty intelligence on the Mongols' part regarding the strength and resolve of the Mamluk army in Egypt.

[142] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Jahn, p. 130; translation based on Thackston, *Compendium of Chronicles*, vol. 3, p. 647.

[143] Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," p. 389. See also the comments of Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, vol. 3, p. 446.

[144] Het'um, p. 196.

had carved out for himself an area of control in the environs of Ghazna and Ghūr (both in modern Afghanistan);[145] perhaps, on the other hand, these were Negüderi Mongols.[146] Ghazan could certainly not neglect this problem, and in any event, he could only sojourn for so long in a frontier area, neglecting affairs of state and not maintaining a presence in the center of his kingdom. Logistics may have played a significant role in his decision to leave Syria, but they were not the only considerations.

Be this as it may, Ghazan intended to return to Syria and continue on his offensive. In the *farmān* (royal proclamation or order) which he issued just prior to his leaving Damascus, he wrote: "We will return to [this] country in the autumn, and we intend to go to Egypt."[147] The analysis of his later two campaigns to Syria, culminating in the total Mongol defeat at Marj al-Ṣuffar in 1303, must be left to another essay.

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[145] Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, vol. 3, p. 446; Rene Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes*, tr. N. Walford (New Brunswick, 1970), p. 382.

[146] Boyle, "Īl-Khāns," p. 388.

[147] Zetterstéen, *Beiträge*, 75.

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# THE CIRCULATION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

Thomas T. Allsen

The Mongols' repertoire of weapons at the beginning of the thirteenth century did not differ appreciably from the pattern of armament that had predominated in the nomadic world since the first centuries of the Christian era.[1] As they expanded beyond the steppe, however, they began to appropriate the military technology of their enemies and subjects. A dramatic case in point is their rapid mobilization of Chinese and Korean maritime skills to create a navy that performed a crucial role in the defeat of the Southern Song (1127–1279), the major seapower of eastern Eurasia.[2]

This propensity is noticeable as well in their acquisition of West Asian defensive armor—chainmail, helmets, breastplates, and horse armor.[3] There is, for example, early eyewitness testimony that the Mongols coveted Alan-made breastplates. Equally revealing, the Mongolian word for "cuirass," *begder*, goes back to the Persian *bagtar*, "chainmail."[4] In the opinion of one scholar, the Mongolian army in the West, which arrived as light cavalry, was soon transformed into a medium or heavy armored cavalry under Persian influence.[5]

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[1] Catherine Uray-Köhalmi, "La périodisation de l'histoire des armaments des nomades des steppes," *Études mongoles*, 5 (1974), pp. 145–55. See also Denis Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 101 (1981), pp. 133–44.

[2] Xiao Qiqing [Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing], "Meng-Yuan shuijun zhi xingchi yu Meng-Song zhanzheng," *Hanxue yenjiu*, 8 (1990), pp. 177–200.

[3] On this subject, see M.V. Gorelik, "Rannii mongol'skii dospekh," *Arkheologiia, etnografiia i antropologiia Mongolii*, ed. A.P. Derevianko and Sh. Natsagdorzh (Novosibirsk, 1987), pp. 163–208 and particularly pp. 201–02.

[4] On Alan armor, see Christopher Dawson, ed., *Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York, 1955), p. 210; William of Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, trans. Peter Jackson, ed. David Morgan (London, 1990), p. 259; and Makhmud ibn Vali, *More tain otnositel'no doblestei blagorodnykh*, trans. B.A. Akhmedov (Tashkent, 1977), p. 16. On *begder*, see Bertold Laufer, *Sino-Iranica: Chinese Contributions to the History of Civilization in Ancient Iran*, rpt. (Taipei, 1967), p. 575.

[5] A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Il-Xanid Army," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 6 (1986–1988), pp. 129–242.

Such borrowings, moreover, were subsequently transmitted throughout Eurasia. It did not, for instance, take the princes of Rus long to emulate their Mongolian adversaries. In 1252 German envoys visiting Hungary were much impressed with the regiments of Daṇilo, ruler of Galicia, because they arrived in full battle array wearing "Tartar armor [*oruzh'iu Tatar'skomu*]" that protected both rider and horse.[6] These "glittering arms," it is safe to say, were not of "Tartar" manufacture. Almost certainly, the prototypes were fabricated in the Islamic East by local artisans drafted into service by their Mongolian overlords. Writing in the early fourteenth century, Rashīd al-Dīn states that in the early days of the empire individual artisans (*ūzān*)—bowyers, arrow-makers, quiver- and bow-case makers, swordsmiths and others—were attached to particular cities, while others were brought together in factories (*kārkhānah*) directly under the supervision of Mongolian courts. All, he adds, were paid, at least in principle, by drafts assigned on the provinces.[7] And, it must be remembered, the territories the Mongols brought under their dominion in the thirteenth century included most of the ancient centers of military technology. Iraq, the seat of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate which fell to the Mongols in 1258, produced chainmail, helmets, and swords, and Baghdad itself had a special quarter devoted to these crafts.[8]

Wherever the Mongols appeared they sought out artisans whose skills had direct or indirect military applications. In 1255, according to a local chronicle, a large number of saddle-, bow-, and quiver-makers, as well as various metalsmiths, fled Mongolian officials in central Rus for Kholm in Volynia.[9] Their flight was well advised, for had they fallen into Mongolian hands they would have been compelled to make arms on the conquerors' terms and quite likely transported to locales far from home. The Mongols regularly moved artisans of all types from one cultural zone of their vast empire to another.[10] Therefore, the mechanism of the diffusion of military tech-

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[6] *Ipat'evskaia letopis*, vol. 2 of *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, rpt. (Moscow, 1998), col. 814.

[7] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Ta'rīkh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī; Dāstān-i Ghāzān Khān*, ed. Karl Jahn (London, 1940), p. 336. For a full English translation, see A.P. Martinez, "The Third Portion of the Story of Ghāzān Xān in Rašīdu'd-Dīn's *Ta'rīx-e Mobārak-e Ghāzānī*," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 6 (1986–1988), pp. 120–22.

[8] Muhammad Rashid al-Feel, *The Historical Geography of Iraq between the Mongolian and Ottoman Conquests* (Nejef, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 248 and 284–86.

[9] *Ipat'evskaia letopis*, col. 843.

[10] For details and documentation on these policies, see Thomas T. Allsen, *Commodity*

nology not only operated through the capture of enemy weapons, but though the systematic identification, mobilization, and redistribution of military technicians. And it is these practices that best explain why the Mongolian era saw an extensive transcontinental exchange of military technology including the transmission of two important types of offensive armament, the trebuchet to China and gunpowder weaponry to the West.

Catapults for hurling stones come in several varieties, each based on differing mechanical principles. In the ancient Mediterranean area there was the "Onager," which operated on the basis of torsion. In China around the fourth century B.C. there developed the *pao*, which depended upon traction as its motive force. Finally, in the twelfth century A.D. there emerged the most powerful type, the counterweighted trebuchet. This new weapon originated either in Europe or in the Muslim West, and most likely developed in stages in consequence of frequent military interaction between these regions in the era of the Crusades.[11] What is certain is that by the beginning of the thirteenth century siege warfare was the decisive feature of the struggle for the Holy Land and that a new weapon, the trebuchet, was widely used by both Christians and Muslims.[12]

While the details of its construction and chronology of its diffusion remain somewhat uncertain, it is reasonable to assume that the counterweighted trebuchet had its origin in the Chinese traction catapult, or manned trebuchet, that the Arabs adopted in the course of the seventh century. This machine consisted of a beam on a fulcrum placed atop a tower. The fulcrum divides the beam into a long and a short arm in the ratio of 5:1 or 6:1. On the long arm was a "rest" for shot, while on the short arm ropes pulled by 50 to 250 men provided the energy to discharge the missile, usually a heavy stone.

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*and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 30–45.

[11] Joseph Needham, "China's Trebuchets, Manned and Counterweighted," *On Premodern Technology and Science: A Volume of Studies in Honor of Lynn White, Jr.*, ed. Bert S. Hall and Delno C. West (Malibu, Calif., 1976), vol. 1, pp. 107–110; Joseph Needham and Robin Yates, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge, 1994), vol. 5, pt. 6, pp. 203–18; and Lynn White, Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (New York, 1966), pp. 101–03.

[12] See the discussion of Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192–1291* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 210–56, particularly 211, 213, 223–24, 227–28, 231–33, 238–40.

The counterweighted version of this earlier weapon consisted of a beam on a fulcrum typically divided into a long and short arm in a ratio between 2:1 and 5:1 depending on the size of the machine. In this case, however, the motive force was provided by a massive counterweight of stone or metal attached to the short arm. On the long arm, in the most advanced models, was attached a long sling with shot whose initial movement was guided by a channel affixed beneath the tower supporting the fulcrum. With such a machine missiles weighing 100 kg could be hurled a distance of 275 meters or more.[13] Called *manjanīq* or *ʿarrādah* in the Islamic world, this powerful new weapon diffused rapidly throughout western Eurasia and soon attracted the attention of the Mongols.

From the earliest days of their campaigns in the West, the Mongols had reason to respect the artillery of the opposition. At Bukhara in 1221, while attacking the inner citadel, the Mongols experienced intense "counter battery" fire when the defenders discharged their catapults (*ʿarrādah-hā*) and missiles of naphtha (*qārūrat-i naft*).[14] By this time, it should be remembered, the Mongols were in a good position to make comparisons since they had already become familiar with and were utilizing Chinese siege equipment. Zhao Hong, the Song envoy who visited the Mongols in 1221, records that they made use of a variety of siege machines including mobile towers for attacking walls, covered moveable passageways for approaching fortifications, and catapults on mounts (*paozuo*).[15]

As the Mongols moved deeper into the sedentary world, and encountered elaborate fortifications and walled, moated cities, they were presented with a formidable challenge that they could not overcome by relying solely on their own military resources and skills. One response was to make heavy use of sedentary levies, "arrow fodder," as John Masson Smith calls them, to directly assault the walls.[16] This costly procedure, however, was only a partial solution;

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[13] Donald R. Hill, "Trebuchet," *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 4 (1973), pp. 99–116, and Donald R. Hill, "Mandjanik," *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1991), vol. 6, pp. 405–06.

[14] ʿAtā-Malik Juvaynī, *Taʾrīkh-i Jahāngushā*, 3 vols., ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazvīnī (London, 1912–37), vol. 1, p. 82, and ʿAtā-Malik Juvaynī, *The History of the World Conqueror*, 2 vols., trans. John A. Boyle (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), vol. 1, p. 106.

[15] Zhao Hong, *Mengda beilu* in *Menggu shiliao sizhong*, ed. Wang Guowei (Taipei, 1975), p. 445.

[16] John Masson Smith, "Demographic Considerations in Mongol Siege Warfare,"

efficient catapults, which the Mongols termed *orbu'ur*, became increasingly critical to their continued success.[17] And it is evident that by 1236 the fame of Muslim siege machines had already reached East Asia because Xu Ting, another Song envoy, in speaking of the Muslims (Huihui), states that their "instruments for attacking cities are particularly refined."[18] Naturally, by the time the Mongols reached Iran and Iraq in force in the 1250s their admiration for Muslim artillery was confirmed and consolidated. When, for example, they assaulted the city of Mayyafāriqīn in Upper Mesopotamia in 1259, the Mongols "brought from Mosul a famous catapult [*manjanīq*]."[19] This dependence on indigenous siege technology is well portrayed in the illustrations to the Edinburgh *Jamīʿ al-tavārīkh*, in which the catapult operators are depicted in Arab dress with semitic features, while the assaulting soldiers are Mongolian in facial features and armor. Moreover, the catapults shown are unquestionably of the counterweighted variety.[20]

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that when the campaigns of Mongolian armies in China were slowed by stubborn Song defensive works, Qubilai appealed to the Il-qans for "western" artillery to help neutralize these strong points. The resulting dispatch of specialists to China became a famous and much discussed episode in the history of East-West cultural exchange, but one that has been poorly understood at times. Thanks, however, to recent research several of the most controversial issues have been cleared up. First, the personnel involved were Muslims, not Christians, and Marco Polo, despite explicit claims put forth in the account of his travels, had nothing to do with the introduction of the trebuchet to China.[21]

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*Archivum Ottomanicum*, 13 (1993–1994), pp. 329–34. See also Frantz Grenet and Mohammedjan Isamiddinov, "La prise de Samarcande par Gengis-Khan," *L'Histoire*, 149 (1991), pp. 8–14, particularly 10–13.

[17] Antoine Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol du Houa i i iu de Houng-ou (1398)*, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz (Brussels, 1997), vol. 1, p. 81, equates *orbu'ur* with the Chinese *pao*.

[18] Peng Daya and Xu Ting, *Heida shilüe*, in *Menggu shiliao*, p. 503.

[19] Minhāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i naṣīrī*, ed. W. Nassau Lees (Calcutta, 1864), p. 436, and Minhāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i naṣīrī*, trans. H.G. Raverty, rpt. (New Delhi, 1970), vol. 2, p. 1270.

[20] David Talbot Rice, *The Illustrations to the World History of Rashīd al-Dīn*, (Edinburgh, 1976), pl. 54, p. 147, pl. 59, p. 157.

[21] Marco Polo, *The Description of the World*, trans. A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot (London, 1938), vol. 1, pp. 316–20; A.C. Moule, *Quinsai with other Notes on Marco Polo* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 70–78; and Needham and Yates, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, pt. 6, pp. 218–28.

Second, the weapons introduced were counterweighted catapults, not gunpowder weapons as some Chinese and western historians have asserted.[22]

While details remain sketchy, there is broad consensus on the major contours of this episode, as reconstructed from the *Yuanshi* and Rashīd al-Dīn. According to the Chinese account, Qubilai in 1271 sent emissaries to the Il-qan Abaqa (Abuge) to obtain catapult-makers (*paojiang*). The Il-qan duly sent to the capital ʿAlā al-Dīn (Alaowading) and Ismāʾīl (Yisimayin). ʿAlā al-Dīn was probably from Mayyāfariqīn (Mufali) and Ismāʾīl from Aleppo/Halab (Xulie). They traveled east with their families, sons and grandsons, and once in Dadu they successfully demonstrated their new weapons to the Yuan court.[23] In Rashīd al-Dīn's account of this same mission, a certain Talib (presumably another name of ʿAlā al-Dīn) comes with Ibrāhīm and Abū Bakr. The latter are probably the sons of Ismāʾīl, whom the Chinese sources call Yibulajin (Ibrāhīm) and Bu Bai (Abū Bakr). The Muḥammad mentioned in Rashīd al-Dīn's version has less plausibly been identified with Ismāʾīl's son Mahama Sha (Muḥammad Shāh). There is also some discrepancy in the two sources' accounts of their origins: Rashīd al-Dīn makes Talib a man of Baʿalbak and Damascus, both towns in Syria.[24] This association is interesting since Baʿalbak, a garrison city commanding one of the main routes to Damascus, enjoyed a long-time reputation for military innovation, including the invention of Greek fire.[25]

Despite these discrepancies, the Chinese and Persian accounts make it perfectly clear that at the behest of Qubilai, Muslims, very likely Arabs, recruited by Abaqa, were responsible for bringing to China knowledge of a new type of catapult, one that Rashīd al-Dīn in his account, cited above, calls "a large Frankish [Farangah] *manjanīq*."

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[22] This issue is carefully analyzed by S.A. Shkoliar, *Kitaiskaia doognestrel'naia artilleriia* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 210–28. See also Needham and Yates, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, pt. 6, pp. 219–26.

[23] *Yuanshi* (Beijing, 1978) ch. 203, pp. 4544–45, and Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 4–5.

[24] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʾ al-tavārīkh*, 2 vols., ed. B. Karīmī (Tehran, 1959), vol. 1, p. 651; Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Ghengis Khan*, trans. John A. Boyle (New York, 1971), pp. 290–91; and Moule, *Quinsai*, pp. 76–77.

[25] Theophanes, *The Chronicle of Theophanes*, trans. Harry Turtledove (Philadelphia, 1982), p. 53, and Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj*, trans. Ernest A. Wallis Budge, rpt. (Amsterdam, 1976), vol. 1, p. 101.

The *Yuanshi* contains several accounts of the catapult's technical characteristics and deployment. Most generally it says that the Muslim Ismā'īl "constructed a catapult for hurling large stones [*jushipao*] which operated with an economy of force and shot a great distance."[26] In another place it records that in 1272 Ismā'īl constructed a catapult for use against Xiangyang (Marco Polo's Saian-fu): "The weight [of its shot]," the passage reads, "was 150 *jin* [89.4 kg]; upon firing a tremendous noise tore heaven and earth and anything it struck was devastated, its shot penetrating seven *chi* [2.5 meters] into the earth."[27] Finally, the *Yuanshi* relates that when Ismā'īl arrived from the Western Region he described "the method of using the new catapult [*xinpaofa*]." During the bombardment of Xiangyang, this passage continues, "one shot made a direct hit on one of its gate towers making a sound like a clap of thunder and shaking the inside of the city."[28]

Taken together, these references confirm that the powerful and efficient machines in question were new to China and that they produced devastating results that greatly impressed the locals. Unmistakably, these "Frankish catapults" constructed by Muslims were the counterweighted trebuchet of the Mediterranean world. The Mongols, naturally, were pleased with their performance and used them throughout the campaign against the Southern Song. In 1279, as these operations ended, the Yuan court drafted South Chinese artisans, Mongols, North Chinese and Muslims "who were able to make Muslim catapults [Huihui *pao*]."[29] Here we have convincing evidence that the technology of the "new catapults" was transferred to the Chinese.

The Il-qans, it is important to note, not only transmitted Mediterranean military technology to China; they were also consumers. We know that in 1307 the Il-qan Öljeitü (r. 1304–16) sent several masters of artillery (*ustād-i manjanīqī*) of European origin (*az* Farangistān) to Herat, then in rebellion, where they built catapults (*manjanīq*) and other instruments of war.[30] While the affair was ended through negotiation, the episode points out again the Mongols' intense interest in

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[26] *Yuanshi*, ch. 7, p. 144.
[27] *Yuanshi*, ch. 203, p. 4544.
[28] *Yuanshi*, ch. 128, p. 3125.
[29] *Yuanshi*, ch. 98, p. 2517, and Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 85.
[30] Sayf ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Havarī, *Ta'rīkh-i nāmah-i Harāt*, ed. M. Ṣiddīqī (Calcutta, 1944), p. 504.

foreign weaponry and their ability to acquire technology *and technicians* from all corners of Eurasia.

Although the trebuchet represents the pinnacle in the development of medieval siege machinery, its days were already numbered owing to the development of gunpowder weapons. Still, it held its own against such weapons for a century or more, a matter that calls for an explanation. The trebuchet's survival so long after the appearance of cannon was in part due to its superior reliability and effectiveness in comparison with the new gunpowder weapons. But additionally, early bombards and cannon were very expensive and exceedingly heavy and difficult to move. In contrast, a trebuchet was largely made of wood (and a few metal fittings) and could therefore be assembled or even manufactured where needed. Stated differently, the technology of siege machines made use of the relatively "mobile" skills of the carpenter, while that of cannon required those of the far more stationary forger or founder. Thus, logistically and economically, siege machines remained a viable and attractive alternative to the early firearms for a long time. In the end, of course, it was finally surpassed and rendered obsolete by the new gunpowder weapons, and it is to the history and diffusion of this important innovation that we now turn our attention.

The origin of gunpowder and firearms has been the subject of intense study for several centuries. This is a complex topic with many unknowns, and consequently divergent and contradictory claims have been advanced over time in attempts to explain the development and diffusion of this technology, particularly as gunpowder has been viewed as a major engine of change in early modern history.

At one time it was widely believed in the West that gunpowder was invented in Europe, the handiwork of a fourteenth-century monk, Berthold the Black.[31] This mythology, in combination with the misunderstanding of Chinese texts dealing with gunpowder weapons, produced a climate in which western scholars denied Chinese priority in the development of this technology. Although some Europeans, particularly travelers, recognized early on that gunpowder diffused from East to West, it was only at the beginning of the last century

[31] J.R. Partington, *A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder* (Baltimore, 1999), pp. 91–97. See also Scott Schaefer, "The Invention of Gunpowder," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 44 (1981), pp. 209–11.

that these doubts and denials were effectively refuted by Gustave Schlegel in an article that adduced compelling evidence in favor of a Chinese origin.[32] Since Schlegel's day the Chinese priority in gunpowder and firearms has been established with certainty. The remaining issues are largely ones of refining chronology, elaborating the typology of the weapons and their technology, and tracing the introduction of these innovations into other parts of the world.[33]

The most recent synthesis of the sources and secondary literature is by Joseph Needham and his associates. Their basic findings can be summarized as follows. The first reference to gunpowder—a mixture of charcoal, saltpetre (nitrate) and sulphur—goes back to the ninth century in China. By 1000 there were "bombs" or "grenades" using gunpowder that were hurled by catapults. However, given the quality of the "gunpowder" then in use, the result was surely a deflagration or sudden combustion, rather than a true explosion. Thus, in its early phases, gunpowder was largely an incendiary weapon to which the Chinese regularly and justifiably attached the word *huo*, "fire." Sometime around 1100 the Chinese, according to Needham, experimented with the "fire lance" (*huoqiang*) or flamethrower. Again, the chemical process at work here was deflagration and the weapon itself was roughly analogous to the modern Roman candle. By the twelfth century, in consequence of the increased proportion of purified saltpetre in the formula, gunpowder at last produced real explosions. These took the form of bombs and grenades such as those encountered by the Mongols at the siege of Kaifeng in 1232. Finally, around 1280, there was the appearance of the metal-barreled gun or cannon, which used the explosive power of gunpowder to propel a projectile down a tube.[34] The Chinese also used gunpowder in fireworks,

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[32] Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Travels in India*, 2nd ed., ed. William Crooke (Oxford, 1925), vol. 2, p. 217, and Gustave Schlegel, "On the Invention and Use of Firearms and Gunpowder in China, prior to the Arrival of the Europeans," *T'oung-pao*, 3 (1902), pp. 1–11.

[33] L. Carrington Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng, "The Early Development of Firearms in China," *Isis*, 36 (1946), pp. 114–23 and 250–51; Wang Ling, "On the Invention and Use of Gun Powder and Firearms in China," *Isis*, 37 (1947), pp. 160–78; and Tenney L. Davis and James Ware, "Early Chinese Military Pyrotechnics," *Journal of Chemical Education*, 24 (1947), pp. 522–37.

[34] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge, 1986) vol. 5, pt. 7, pp. 94–358. For a more concise account, see Joseph Needham, "The Guns of Khaifeng-fu," *Historia scientiarum*, 19 (1980), pp. 11–30.

civil engineering projects, and to a limited extent in mining, and they did so centuries before its use elsewhere in the Old World.[35]

Knowledge of gunpowder manufacture seems to have been confined to East Asia until the Mongols launched their campaigns of conquest, in the wake of which it diffused throughout Eurasia. Gunpowder may have reached the Indian subcontinent as early as the middle decades of the thirteenth century, although Indian recipes do not appear until much later.[36] In the Muslim West, the first complete recipe in Arabic dates from 1291. Initially called *naft*, gunpowder over time acquired the name *bārūd*.[37] In Latin Europe, the first and quite summary formula dates to 1267, but it is not until the fourteenth century that full recipes are produced, possibly through Arab alchemical mediation.[38]

The dates at which firearms appear in the Old World, first in the form of cannons and later as hand weapons, is quite variable. For India the first authentic reference, despite frequent claims to the contrary, comes rather late, ca. 1442.[39] In the eastern Islamic world, Iran and Central Asia, firearms appeared somewhat earlier, the latter decades of the fourteenth century, which coincides with the rise of Temür. The data, however, are far from clear since the nomenclature of early firearms in this region is a tangle.[40] In the Muslim

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[35] Peter J. Golas, "Chinese Mining: Where Was the Gunpowder?" *Explorations in the History of Science and Technology in China*, ed. Li Guohao, et al. (Shanghai, 1982), pp. 452–58.

[36] Iqtidar Alam Khan, "Origin and Development of Gunpowder Technology in India: A.D. 1250–1500," *The Indian Historical Review*, 4 (1977), pp. 20–29 and particularly 22–24, and more recently, his "The Role of the Mongols in the Introduction of Gunpowder and Firearms in South Asia," *Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology*, ed. Brenda J. Buchanan, (Bath, 1996), pp. 33–44.

[37] G.S. Colin and D. Ayalon, "Bārūd," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 1055–61.

[38] White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, pp. 96–101; Kelly De Vries, *Medieval Military Technology* (Peterborough, Ontario, 1992), pp. 143–50; and Vernon Foley and Keith Perry, "In Defense of *Liber Igneum*: Arab Alchemy, Roger Bacon, and the Introduction of Gunpowder into the West," *Journal for the History of Arabic Science*, 3 (1979), pp. 200–18, and particularly 217–18.

[39] Iqtidar Alam Khan, "Early Use of Cannon and Musket in India: A.D. 1442–1526," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 24 (1981), pp. 146–64.

[40] V. Minorsky, *Persia in A.D. 1478–1490* (London, 1957), pp. 115–16, and more recently, A.S. Davidov, "K istorii ognestrel'nogo oruzhiia v Srednei Azii," *Istoriia i etnografiia narodov Srednei Azii: Sbornik statei*, ed. A.K. Pisarchik (Dushanbe, 1981), pp. 14–24.

West, the earliest reliable reference to cannon (*midfa'*) is from the 1360s–'70s, perhaps earlier in North Africa.[41]

Gunpowder weaponry in the form of grenades, cannon, and sidearms first appears in the Russian chronicles in the last decades of the fourteenth century, usually in connection with military confrontations with the successor states of the Golden Horde. Gunpowder artillery (*tiufiaki*) is first mentioned in 1382 and after 1399 references to gunpowder and hand weapons become regular features of these chronicles.[42] For the Balkans the chronology is somewhat earlier, the 1350s, and by 1380 gunpowder weaponry is fairly common. For the most part these weapons were produced in Venice and Dubrovnik.[43] And in the Latin West the first uncontestable evidence of firearms is from 1326, surprisingly somewhat earlier than in the lands that lie between China, the birthplace of gunpowder cannon, and western Europe.[44]

From this brief survey it is clear that the accumulated evidence compels the conclusion that the Mongols played a pivotal role in the dissemination of gunpowder and firearms throughout the Old World. Nonetheless, there remain major gaps in our knowledge, and all that can be done is to juxtapose the new data with the old in the hope of providing a new interpretive framework.

One of the major, and perennial, problems is that of terminology. In Arabic sources, for example, the early terms for gunpowder are very confused and misleading. *Naft*, originally meaning naphtha or Greek fire, becomes the word for gunpowder over time.[45] That is, gunpowder, a new phenomenon, was reidentified with naphtha, an established term and the closest cultural category into which gunpowder could be slotted. This, of course, applies to western sources

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[41] David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society* (London, 1956), pp. 1–4.

[42] *The Nikonian Chronicle*, trans. Serge A. Zenkovsky (Princeton, 1988), vol. 4, pp. 5, 6, 118; Thomas Esper, "Military Self-Sufficiency and Weapons Technology in Moscovite Russia," *Slavic Review*, 28 (1969), pp. 187–88; and I.S. Prochko, *Istoriia razvitiia artillerii: S drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XIX veka* (St. Petersburg, 1994), pp. 19–20, 44–45.

[43] Djurdjica Petrović, "Fire-arms in the Balkans on the Eve of and after the Ottoman Conquests of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London, 1975), pp. 165–74.

[44] William H. McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, 1982), pp. 80–95.

[45] Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms*, pp. 9–30.

as well. Thus, when Carpini, speaking of Mongolian siege techniques, notes their use of "Greek fire," it is not at all clear whether he is referring to naphtha or to some kind of gunpowder weaponry.[46]

The Chinese origin of gunpowder and firearms, despite these remaining ambiguities which have encouraged isolated claims to the contrary, is not open to serious doubt.[47] However, the exact channels and agents of transmission have yet to be established. Needham sees western travelers or individual Mongolian servitors as the principal agents of the transfer of this military technology to the West.[48] For some reason, he is reluctant to credit the Mongolian military machine with a substantial part in this transmission. To my mind, the Mongolian army is by far the most likely candidate; after all, within its ranks Chinese and Muslim catapult-operators were brought together for joint training at Dadu in 1279, perhaps in preparation for the forthcoming assault on Japan in 1281.[49] It is certainly possible that the resulting exchanges of technology, so likely under these circumstances, found their way back to West Asia.

Even more promising, of course, is the obvious proposition that the Mongolian forces in their campaigns in the West brought Chinese military technology to the Muslim lands. The best way to pursue this line of inquiry is to examine more carefully the Mongols' use of artillery (both catapult and gunpowder weaponry) during their major operations in western Eurasia. More specifically, based on the evidence presented in the Chinese and Persian sources, I will try to answer several interrelated questions: When did the Mongols form their first artillery units? What were the ethnic and occupational background of their artillerymen? Who commanded these units? And how were they deployed against the Mongols' Muslim foes?

The Mongols learned of the need for artillery in their many battles with the Jin (1115–1234). In their initial incursions into North China, starting in 1205, the Mongols encountered fortifications, walled cities, catapults, and gunpowder weapons for the first time. The result was the development of the Mongols' own artillery arm around 1214,

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[46] Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, p. 37.

[47] See, for example, A. Rahman Zaky, "Gunpowder and Arab Firearms in the Middle Ages," *Gladius*, 6 (1967), pp. 45–58 and particularly 46, where he asserts, without evidence, that the Arabs invented the cannon.

[48] Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, pt. 7, pp. 568–79.

[49] *Yuanshi*, ch. 10, p. 210, and Jacques Dars, *La marine chinoise du X^e siècle au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1992), p. 333.

an event that also signalled a fundamental change in Mongolian military objectives in the region, a shift from annual raiding to a program of conquest and permanent occupation of Jin territory.

The chief architect of the new artillery arm was a Mongolian general of the Barghutai clan named Ambughai (Anmuhai). The story of the creation of such a service is succinctly outlined in his biography in the *Yuanshi*:

> [Ambughai], together with his father Bohochu, served Chinggis Qan, went on campaign and had merit. [One day] the emperor asked [him]: "In attacking cities and seizing territory what goes in first, troops or weapons of war?" [Ambughai] replied saying: "In attacking cities first employ stone catapult shot because they are strong, heavy, and have great range." The emperor was pleased and then ordered the formation [of units of] catapult operators.
>
> In the year 1214 [when] the Grand Preceptor and Viceroy Muqali [Muhuali] campaigned south [against the Jin] the emperor proclaimed: "Ambughai says that in attacking cities it is most appropriate to employ catapult tactics; [if] you see fit to do this, how can the cities not be broken?"
>
> [The emperor] then bestowed a gold tally upon [Ambughai] and made him Imperial Agent [*Darughachi*] of Catapult Operators of all Circuits [*suilu paoshou daluhuachi*]. Ambughai selected 500 or so men and trained them. Afterwards he subdued many states, greatly relying on his powerful [weapons].[50]

While his title indicates he exercised command over Mongolian artillery forces at large, it is unlikely that Ambughai was a technician concerned with the design and construction of weapons. These matters, clearly, were in the hands of Chinese specialists, the most prominent of whom was Xue Taraqai (Dalahai), whom Chinggis Qan, around 1214 appointed Marshal of Catapult Operators and Riverine Forces (*paoshuishou yuanshuai*). A few years later, after he had distinguished himself in the field, he was made Grand Marshall of Catapult Operators, Riverine Forces and All Classes of Artisans [attached to] Military Households (*paoshuishou junmin zhu serenjiang tuyuanshuai*).[51] Xue died in 1233 and in the following year he was succeeded in office by another Chinese with a hybrid name, Zhang Bātur (Badu), who came over to the Mongols in 1211.[52]

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[50] *Yuanshi*, ch. 122, p. 3010.
[51] *Yuanshi*, ch. 151, p. 3563.
[52] *Yuanshi*, ch. 151, p. 3580.

Of more immediate interest, it can be demonstrated that these officers campaigned in the West. Xue accompanied Chinggis Qan in 1219 on the campaign against Khwārazm. And it is very likely that Ambughai also went west in 1219, although his Chinese biography only says he "subdued many states." In Jūzjānī's account of Mongolian operations in Afghanistan, he twice notes that the "personal catapult commander of Chinggis Qan" was sent against a fortress in Gharchistān. In one passage this officer's name is spelled Āīkah *nūyin* (Mongolian *noyan*, "commander") and in the other as Āīlah *nūyin*.[53] In both cases the text can be readily amended to Ābkah = Ābukah, a very fair rendering of the original, Ambughai.[54]

Artillerymen of east Asian origin also accompanied the Mongols on their next major thrust into the Muslim world, Hülegü's campaigns against the 'Abbāsid and Ismā'īls in the 1250s. According to Juvaynī, in 1252 Möngke, to support Hülegü's forces setting off for Iran, "sent messengers to China [Khitaī] to summon catapult [*manjanīq*] experts and naphtha-throwers [*naft-i andāzān*] and they brought from China 1,000 households [*khānah*] of Chinese catapultmen."[55] The term "1,000 households," sometimes misunderstood as "crews" or "teams," is in fact a Persian calque (loan translation) on the Chinese term *qianhu*, literally "1,000 households," which in turn is the Chinese equivalent of the Mongolian *mingghan*, "unit of 1,000."

For our immediate purposes, it is most helpful that we can identify the personnel pool from which this unit was recruited. This vital information comes from a passage in the chapter on military affairs in the *Yuanshi*, which relates the following about the acquisition of artillery personnel:

> In the beginning, when Chinggis Qan and Ögödei were on campaign, [catapult operators] were recruited in various circuits [*lu*], and, moreover, whenever a district [*zhou*] or county [*xian*] was subjugated, the artisans, such as smiths, carpenters, goldsmiths and gunpowder-

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[53] Jūzjānī, ed. Lees, pp. 356 and 371, and Jūzjānī, trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 1047–48, 1073–76.

[54] Boyle has suggested the reading, Īlah, which he identifies with Ile of the *Secret History*. The latter, however, was not Chinggis Qan's artillery commander. See John A. Boyle, "The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India according to the *Ṭabaqāt-i nāṣirī* of Jūzjānī," *Islamic Studies*, 2 (1963), pp. 236–37.

[55] Juvaynī, ed. Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 92–93, and Juvaynī, trans. Boyle, vol. 2, p. 608. This information is also found in Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 686, and Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, p. 419.

> makers [*huojiang*] were recruited as catapult operators [*paoshou*] and ordered to go on campaign. In 1251, all [these categories of artisans] were registered [in the census of that year] as catapult operators.[56]

Most certainly, then, Hülegü's forces in Iran contained a large contingent of Chinese artillerymen, some of whom knew how to make gunpowder.

If we now examine the Mongols' employment of artillery in their western campaigns, it is evident that they made use of all the siege weapons in the arsenal of their Chinese conscripts. At Jand, a city on the Syr Darya, the Mongols, according to Juvaynī, used "battering rams [*kharak*], catapults [*manjanīq*], and scaling ladders [*nardubān*]." The following year at Samarqand they again used catapults.[57] They also used various kinds of incendiary devices. In Juvaynī's account there are mentions of "casks of naphtha [*qavārīr-i naft*]" at Khwārazm, of "fire [*ātish*]" hurled into the citadel of Bukhara, and of "fire [*ātish*], naphtha [*naft*] and stones" employed at Khojand.[58]

The Chinese sources also provide relevant data on the use of such weapons in the course of this campaign. The biography of Guo Baoyu, a Chinese commander serving Chinggis Qan, relates the following episode from spring 1220:

> The advancing [Mongolian] troops subdued Samarqand [Xiansigan]. Arriving at the Amu Darya [Anmu He], they were opposed by ten or more forts of rammed earth and by boats deployed in the middle of the river. . . . [Guo] Baoyu ordered *huojian* [literally, "fire arrows"] directed against their ships. At once, all caught fire; seizing [the moment] they overcame [the opposition], advanced straight ahead and defeated 10,000 troops guarding [the opposite] bank.[59]

The term *huojian* used here originally denoted an incendiary arrow but by the twelfth century the term had come to mean a rocket, a true gunpowder weapon.[60]

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[56] *Yuanshi*, ch. 98, p. 2514, and Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 80.

[57] Juvaynī, ed. Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 69, 93, and Juvaynī, trans. Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 89, 118.

[58] Juvaynī, ed. Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 71, 82–83, 100, and Juvaynī, trans. Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 92, 106, 127. See also Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 356–57, 301, 373.

[59] *Yuanshi*, ch. 149, p. 3521.

[60] Jixing Pan, "On the Origin of Rockets," *T'oung-pao*, 73 (1987), pp. 2–15. See also his "The Origin of Rockets in China," *Gunpowder*, pp. 25–32.

Next we have several references to Chinese siege equipment in the campaigns of 1239–40 in the North Caucasus. In the first, a "cloud ladder [*yunti*]" is deployed against the walls of the Alan capital Maghas. This was a retractable ladder sometimes operated by counterweights and mounted on a wheeled platform.[61] Second, there is a notice regarding a *zhuanguan*, which has been identified by the Russian historian Shkoliar as a small catapult of the "whirlwind [*xuanfeng*]" type in which the throwing arm is attached to a cradle atop a single vertical pole.[62] Besides the advantage of its light weight, this type had the further advantage of being readily aimed since it could be swivelled, and was therefore well adapted to use in the mountainous terrain of the Alan lands.

During the campaigns of the 1250s we again see the full range of Chinese artillery deployed in Iran. At the siege of Maynūn Diz, an Ismā'īlī castle, the Mongols employed an "ox-bow [*kamān-i gāv*] that the Chinese masters [*āsātadh*] had built and which had a range of 2,500 paces."[63] This, apparently, was a huge crossbow, an arcuballista—very much a Chinese specialty—which shot large javelins.[64] Against Girdkūh, another Ismā'īlī castle, Guo Kan, the son of Guo Baoyu, used "cloud ladders" and catapults on mounts (*jiapao*) to assault its formidable walls.[65] Finally, in Rashīd al-Dīn's account of the assault on Baghdad in 1257–58 the troops under the command of Bugha Temür "rained catapult stones, arrows and casks of naphtha [*qavārīr-i naft*]" on the defenses.[66]

Admittedly, the terminology used in these sources is ambiguous and transitional, and all can be read as incendiary weapons, that is, as forms of Greek fire. On the other hand, the casks of naphtha might well be true bombs hurled by catapults and the fire arrows self-propelled rockets with explosive charges. The latter interpreta-

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[61] *Yuanshi*, ch. 122, p. 3011; Needham and Yates, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, pt. 6, pp. 446–54; and Herbert Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China," *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, ed. Frank A. Kierman and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), pp. 165–66, 170.

[62] Wang Yun, *Qiujian xiansheng daquan ji*, ca. 1304 (Sibu congkan ed.), ch. 51, p. 7a, and Shkoliar, *Kitaiskaia doognestrel'naia artilleriia*, pp. 375, 381.

[63] Juvaynī, ed. Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 128, and Juvaynī, trans. Boyle, vol. 2, p. 631.

[64] On the varieties of Chinese *arcuballistae*, some mounted on carriages, see Needham and Yates, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, pt. 6, pp. 187–200.

[65] *Yuanshi*, ch. 149, p. 3524, and E. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches from East Asiatic Sources* (London, 1967), vol. 1, p. 134.

[66] Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 711.

tion of these particular passages is supported by another body of evidence that confirms the argument that the Mongolian army brought Chinese gunpowder to the Muslim world in the middle decades of the thirteenth century.

First, there is the well known fact that around 1240 the Arabs began to call saltpetre, a critical ingredient in gunpowder, Chinese snow (*thalj ṣīnī*).[67] Less appreciated but equally helpful are two other words for gunpowder in West Asia, the Arabic *dawāʿ* and the Persian *dārū*. Unexpectedly, both terms have as their primary meaning "drug" or "medicine," understood in this context as "recipe." This usage is best explained with reference to the Chinese background of gunpowder. As Wang Ling has pointed out, the Chinese term *huoyao*, "fire drug," was an early name for fireworks and later became one of the terms for gunpowder, which, by the early thirteenth century, had been shortened to *yao*, "drug."[68] Indeed, in one of the earliest and most noted confrontations involving gunpowder, the siege of Kaifeng in 1232, the Jin forces used bombs and rockets filled with *yao* against the Mongols.[69] It seems, therefore, reasonable to conclude that *dawāʿ* and *dārū*, whatever their linguistic relationship to one another, are calques on the Chinese term *yao*, a further indication that Muslims learned of gunpowder and gunpowder weapons directly from Chinese artillerymen, who, we have seen, were a regular and integral part of the Mongolian armies operating in the West. This interpretation, moreover, would account for the possible Persian references to the Mongols' use of Chinese gunpowder weapons in West Asia in the mid-thirteenth century, particularly the *huoqiang* or "fire lance." Mention of such a weapon, Iqtidar Alam Khan argues, is found in some manuscripts of Rashīd al-Dīn and Juvaynī in the form *chang*, properly read *chīang*.[70]

But however one reads this evidence, it is clear that by the early fourteenth century gunpowder, if not guns, was commonplace in

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[67] Colin, "Bārūd," pp. 1056, 1057.

[68] Wang Ling, "On the Invention and Use of Gunpowder," p. 164.

[69] *Jinshi* (Beijing, 1975) ch. 113, p. 2496. For further reference to *yao* as "gunpowder" in the thirteenth century, see Jaroslav Prušek, "Quelques rémarques sur l'emploi de la poudre à canon en Chine," *Archiv Orientalni*, 20 (1952), pp. 257, 258, 263, 265, 267.

[70] Iqtidar Alam Khan, "The Coming of Gunpowder to the Islamic World and India: Spotlight on the Role of the Mongols," *Journal of Asian History*, 30 (1996), pp. 35–39.

West Asia. This is neatly demonstrated in an anecdote about Öljeitü's reign recorded by the contemporary court official and chronicler, Qāshānī. He notes that "one day [when] an exhibitor set up a fireworks display [*ātish-bāzī*] in his [majesty's] presence, an aerial rocket [*mushakī-i havā'ī*] fell before his august person." Qāshānī goes on to relate that Öljeitü's advisors wanted the man punished but the ruler said no, since it was a matter of chance, not design.[71] For the chronicler, the point of all this was the good nature and benevolence of Öljeitü. For us, the point is that someone writing in the early fourteenth century can invoke rockets without explanation. Obviously fireworks, rocketry, and gunpowder were now unexceptional features of Mongolian court life in Iran, a part of the military and cultural baggage the Mongols brought with them from China.

The diffusion of firearms, as distinct from that of gunpowder, is much more problematical. As already noted, the chronology of the appearance of true firearms in various parts of Eurasia seems quite random. Such weaponry appears first in China then in western Europe and only much later in lands between. In the absence of any discernible pattern it is difficult to make suggestions on the precise channels and agents of its diffusion. New data are needed, either from the literary sources, which have already been closely examined, or from archaeology and art history, which, in my judgment, hold out the best prospect for future progress.[72] The most recent discovery, a relief sculpture of an archaic firearm or bombard in the Buddhist Cave Temples of Dazu in Szechuan, dates to the early twelfth century, some 150 years before the next securely dated weapon in the 1280s.[73]

In the study of diffusion, and in the history of technology generally, great emphasis has been placed on the chronology of "invention," namely, the question of priority. In my view, more significant

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[71] Abū al-Qasīm al-Qāshānī, *Ta'rīkh-i Ūljaytū*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran, 1969), p. 238. The earliest literary reference to rockets in West Asia is in al-Hasan al-Rammāh, writing ca. 1280, who is fully aware of their Chinese origin. See Partington, *History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder*, pp. 200–03.

[72] See, for example, Ho Peng Yoke and Wang Ling, "On the *Karyūkyō* [*Huolung jing*], the Fire-Dragon Manual," *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 16 (1977), pp. 147–59, and L. Carrington Goodrich, "Early Cannon in China," *Isis*, 55 (1964), pp. 193–95.

[73] Lu Gwei-djen, Joseph Needham and Phan Chi-hsing, "The Oldest Representation of a Bombard," *Technology and Culture*, 29 (1988), pp. 594–605.

are the issues of agency and of acceptance and rejection, that is, the question of receptivity. The origin of gunpowder is now well established but the how and why of its spread remains to be explained. One thing is for certain; its diffusion, even within a given region, typically presents a complex and convoluted picture. This is well illustrated in the southeast Asian case. The first firearms in the region were likely Chinese bombards carried by the Yuan fleet that invaded Java in 1293. In succeeding centuries familiarity with gunpowder weapons grew, although the exact channels of diffusion are unclear since Chinese, Muslims, and later, Europeans, all played a role in demonstrating and popularizing this new technology. As was the case elsewhere, early firearms, including handguns, required special knowledge and training and therefore the fastest way for local rulers to gain access to this technology was to enlist foreign specialists.[74] Again, we need to recognize that one of the recurrent features of the history of gunpowder and firearms is the diffusion of the technologists, not just the technology.

But beyond the question of diffusion is the broader question of the social and political consequences of technological change. Did firearms create a new kind of state, the "gunpowder empire"? Stephen Morillo has convincingly argued that it was not cannon that produced strong centralized states; rather, well-ordered states were a prerequisite for the efficient utilization of gunpowder.[75] The central issue then, is not so much what gunpowder did to a particular people or polity but what a people or polity did *with* gunpowder.

In addressing this complex problem, it is well to remember Arnold Pacey's stricture that technology transfers always involve a dialogue in which the receiving cultures "interrogate" the new technique "on the basis of their own experience and knowledge of local conditions."[76] For Europe, this interrogation was a measured process, lasting for centuries. Among other things, this inquiry resulted in corning, the production of granular gunpowder of greater explosive power, and this in its turn led to changes in cannon, handguns and projectiles

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[74] Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce*, vol. 2, *Expansion and Crises* (New Haven, 1993), pp. 219–33.

[75] Stephen Morillo, "Guns and Governments: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan," *Journal of World History*, 6 (1995), pp. 75–106 and particularly 81.

[76] Arnold Pacey, *Technology in World Civilization: A Thousand Year History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. viii.

to accommodate and exploit the new powder. By the mid-fifteenth century cannon of various types were central to siege warfare. More slowly these weapons, including the smaller hand-held varieties, took their place in the field and on the high seas. This was nearly 200 years after the introduction of gunpowder and 125 years after the first mention of guns. Clearly, there was an extended period of demonstration of the new technology during which Europeans explored its possibilities.[77]

In the opinion of some scholars, the accumulation of discrete, incremental changes in European weapons technology, defensive works, tactics, discipline, training, and the growing size of armies constituted a "military revolution," one that explains western Europe's supremacy in early modern times.[78] This notion has been challenged but even critics acknowledge the West's technical and tactical supremacy while questioning the role and weight of this supremacy in Europe's global ascendency.[79]

The good order and discipline of European armies certainly impressed outsiders by the seventeenth century,[80] but it is both misleading and unproductive to make direct and mechanical comparisons between the military establishments of "world leaders" and those lagging behind. It must be remembered that a given state's military posture is influenced most by immediate needs to deal with hostile neighbors and rivals, not more distant models or "international" standards. Thus, Jonathan Grant argues that Ottoman military production and performance should not be measured against "first tier" innovators such as England or Holland but against "second tier" importers of the new technology such as Austria and Russia,

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[77] There is now a voluminous literature on this subject. Recent and high quality studies include Bert S. Hall, "The Corning of Gunpowder and the Development of Firearms in the Renaissance," *Gunpowder*, pp. 87–120; Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics* (Baltimore, 1997), pp. 41–66; and Kelly De Vries, "Gunpowder and Early Gunpowder Weapons," *Gunpowder*, pp. 21–35.

[78] Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 6–44.

[79] William R. Thompson, "The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendency of Western Eurasia in the World System," *Journal of World History*, 10 (1999), p. 148.

[80] See the comments of the anonymous scribe who accompanied a Persian embassy to Siam in the 1670s; he was most impressed with the turnout of "Frankish" armies, particularly the English and Dutch. *The Ship of Sulaimān*, trans. John O'Kane (New York, 1972), pp. 36, 223, 224, 232.

with whom the Turks were militarily engaged.[81] And it follows, too, that the timing of Russian borrowings of west European military innovation must be placed in the context of Russia's perception of the relative danger posed by its various neighbors. For understandable historical reasons the Russians long identified the steppe nomads as their most threatening foes.

What is critical here is the recognition that the nomads themselves were but slightly changed by their adoption of gunpowder weapons. This was because the Mongols and other nomads were "ecologically" committed to mounted combat and could not fully exploit the new technology without giving up the pastoral way of life. In the Latin West, by contrast, the aristocratic armored knights, while ideologically committed to mounted warfare, could be replaced by military recruits from other strata of European society who could be so employed in part by embracing and developing the new military technologies. After all, the key innovations in the new weaponry, tactics, training, and organization came from the artillerymen and infantrymen, not the horsemen.

For their part, the nomads, lacking any internal social or political challenge to cavalry warfare, simply continued their age-old modes of combat. In the post-Mongolian era the major steppe powers, Kazakhs and Junghars, preferred traditional weapons. Even though they could make their own powder and ball, their use of firearms was limited since they could only acquire handguns and cannon from their sedentary neighbors as trade goods and trophies, or by means of capturing urban-based artisans who could make such weapons for them. These, however, were always in short supply and never displaced weapons, such as bows, that the nomads could make for themselves.[82]

In eastern Europe the same pattern prevailed. The Crimean Tatars who regularly raided Poland, Lithuania and Moscovy down to the seventeenth century did so using traditional tactics and weapons.[83]

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[81] Jonathan Grant, "Rethinking Ottoman 'Decline': Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries," *Journal of World History*, 10 (1999), pp. 190–98.

[82] A. Sh. Kadyrbaev, *Sakskii voin-simvol dukha predkov* (Alma-Aty, 1998), pp. 82–83, 98–99.

[83] See the discussion of L.J.D. Collins, "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *War, Technology and Society*, pp. 257–76.

The presence of some handguns and light cannon among the raiders did not change the basic military equation for the harried defenders of the sown. It is not, therefore, surprising, as Richard Hellie has shown, that while Moscovy used gunpowder as early as the 1380s, at the end of the sixteenth century Russia's basic orientation "was still toward steppe warfare, with horsemen and bows and arrows."[84] This defense posture changed only in the course of the seventeenth century when new formations were created to contend with Russia's neighbors in the West who were using European tactics and weaponry.[85] Indeed, it may be offered as a working hypothesis that those states and cultures with a lengthy history of interaction with the nomads, who for so long lived under the threat and the spell of an earlier "cavalry revolution," were the more reluctant to accept the new technology diffused by the Mongols, the more hesitant to join the "gunpowder revolution," while those peoples on the extreme periphery of Eurasia, Europe and Japan, whose contact with the nomads was restricted and intermittant, were the more eager to interrogate and exploit its possibilities.

[84] Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Moscovy* (Chicago, 1977), pp. 165–66.

[85] John L.H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 15, 80–87.

## Glossary

Abuge 阿不哥
Alaowading 阿老瓦丁
Anmu He 暗木河
Anmuhai 暗木海
Bohochu 孛合出
Bu Bai 布伯
*chi* (Chinese foot) 尺
Dadu 大都
Dazu 大足
Guo Baoyu 郭寶玉
Guo Kan 郭侃
Huihui (Muslim) 回回
Huihui *pao* (Muslim catapults) 回回砲
*huo* (fire) 火
*huojian* (fire arrow, rocket) 火箭
*huojiang* (gunpowder-maker) 火匠
*huoqiang* (fire lance, flamethrower) 火槍
*huoyao* (fire drug, gunpowder) 火藥
*jiapao* (catapult on a mount) 架砲
Jin 金
*jin* (catty, Chinese pound) 斤
*jushipao* (catapult [for hurling] large stones) 巨石砲
Kaifeng 開封
*lu* (circuit) 路
Mahama Sha 馬哈馬沙
Mufali 木發里
Muhuali 木華黎
*pao* (catapult) 砲
*paojiang* (catapult-maker) 砲匠
*paoshou* (catapult operator) 砲手
*paoshuishou yuanshuai* (Marshal of Catapult Operators and Riverine Forces) 砲水手元帥
*paoshuishou junmin zhu serenjiang duyuanshuai*, (Grand Marshal of Catapult Operators, Riverine Forces and All Classes of Artisans [attached to] Military Households) 砲水手軍民諸色人匠都元帥
*paozuo* (catapult on a mount) 砲座
*qianhu* (1,000 households, military unit of 1,000) 千戶
*suilu paoshou daluhuachi* (Imperial Agent [*Darughachi*] of Catapult Operators of All Circuits) 隨路砲手達魯花赤
Song 宋
*xian* (county) 縣
Xiangyang 襄陽
Xiansigan 撏思干

*xinpaofa* (new catapult methods) 新砲法
Xu Ting 徐霆
*xuanfeng* (swivelled catapult) 旋風
Xue Dalahai 薛塔剌海
Xulie 旭烈
*yao* (drug, medicine, gunpowder) 藥
Yibulajin 亦不剌金
Yisimayin 亦思馬因
Yuan 元
*yunti* (cloud ladder, retractable scaling ladder) 雲梯
Zhang Badu 張拔都
Zhao Hong 趙珙
*zhou* (district) 州
*zhuanguan* (small catapult on a swivel) 轉關

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# THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF DALI: THE FAILED SECOND FRONT

John E. Herman

## *Introduction*

In the summer of 1251, an assembly of Mongol princes and high officials convened at Kode'u Aral, near the Kerulen River, to select the forty-two year old Möngke (1209–1259) to be the next Grand *Qan* (*qaghan*) of the Mongols.[1] This august assemblage, known as a *quriltai*, was organized by Batu (d. 1256), *Qan* of the Golden Horde and son of Jochi (d. 1227), and Sorqaghtani Beki (d. 1252), Möngke's mother and influential head of the Tolui lineage.[2] In addition to naming Möngke the Grand *Qan*, the *quriltai* of 1251 affirmed Chinggis *Qan*'s adventurous mandate "to conquer every country in the world."[3] Batu and Sorqaghtani Beki sought to use Chinggis *Qan*'s mandate to reassert the political authority of the Grand *Qan* over the regional *qans* who had by this time acquired a considerable degree of autonomy from the previous Grand *Qans*, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241) and Güyüg (r. 1246–1248).[4] In particular, Möngke and his supporters

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[1] Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Mongke in China, Russia, and The Islamic Lands, 1251–1259* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1987), pp. 24–27; Thomas T. Allsen, "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China," in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368*, eds. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 321–413; Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1988), pp. 19–20; Morris Rossabi, "The Reign of Khubilai Khan," in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368*, eds. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 414–489; Song Lian et al., *Yuan shi* (Beijing reprint, 1976), *juan* 3, p. 15. Möngke was the eldest son of Tolui and Sorqaghtani Beki, and a grandson of Chinggis *Qan* (1162–1227).

[2] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 21–23; Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, p. 392; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 19; Rossabi, *The Reign of Khubilai Khan*, pp. 414–417. Jochi was the eldest son of Chinggis *Qan*.

[3] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 1; Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, pp. 392–393; R.A. Skelton, trans., *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation* (New Haven, 1965), p. 90.

[4] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 21–33; Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*,

wanted to punish the leaders of the powerful Chaghadai *Qanate* for refusing to participate in the *quriltai* of 1251, and for refusing to recognize Möngke as Grand *Qan*.[5]

To accomplish this task Möngke ordered his younger brothers, Hülegü (d. 1265) and Qubilai (1215–1294), to lead two military campaigns: the first campaign was designed to isolate and enclose the Chaghadai *Qanate*, while the intent of the second campaign was to encircle Song China (960–1279) by opening a second front in the southwest. In the summer of 1253, Hülegü broke camp and began an arduous five-year campaign across Central Asia. Forced marches, bitter fighting, and rampant disease severely depleted Hülegü's army, but in February 1258 this stubborn Mongol commander willed his forces over the walls of Baghdad and defeated the Abbasid Caliphate.[6] Hülegü immediately declared his political intentions by announcing the creation of the Ilqan *Qanate*: "Ilqan" literally means "subservient *qan*," or in this instance, "the *qanate* subservient to the Grand *Qan*." With the Jochi family's Golden Horde *Qanate* to the north, Hülegü's control of Persia (present day Iran and Iraq) effectively blocked the Chaghadai *Qanate* from expanding any further west and north. As Hülegü marched west across Central Asia toward Baghdad, Möngke looked to his other brother Qubilai to help solidify the Grand *Qan*'s authority along the eastern front; specifically, Möngke wanted Qubilai to assist in the conquest of Song China.[7]

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pp. 392–396; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 17–19; Rossabi, *The Reign of Khubilai Khan*, pp. 414–417. While the regional *qans* were able to wrestle a degree of independence from the two *qans*, Ögödei and Güyüg, it was during the tenure of two regents, Ögödei's wife, Toregene, who served from 1241 to 1246, and Güyüg's wife, Öghul Qaimish (1248–1251), that the regional *qans* demanded greater autonomy. Naming Möngke as Grand *Qan* in 1251 was the final assault of political independence against the Ögödei family and the ascendancy of the Tolui family.

[5] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 45–79; Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, pp. 392–396; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 20.

[6] John Andrew Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Il-khans," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 5: The Seljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 340–351; R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260* (Albany, 1977), pp. 333–355; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 1–3, 47–48. Hülegü's advance force led by Ked Buqa continued south until September 1260, when it was crushed by the Egyptian Mamluks at the battle of Ain Jalut. For Ked Buqa's defeat at Ain Jalut, see John Masson Smith, "Ain Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44.2 (1984), pp. 307–345.

[7] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 48; Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, pp. 403–405; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 19.

In 1251, Möngke and his advisors understood that a direct frontal assault against Southern Song forces could easily fail. Previous Mongol forays into Song territory had suffered terribly, and now Song armies were concentrated along a defensive perimeter stretching from Sichuan in the east to Jiangsu in the west in anticipation of yet more Mongol raids from the north. In fact, during the 1240s Song forces often marched north from their defensive positions to challenge Mongol control of north China.[8] The Grand *Qan*'s tenuous control of north China and his seeming inability to conquer Song China reverberated throughout the Mongol empire as a sign of weakness, and a risky offensive against Song China, if unsuccessful, could fracture the Mongol empire and undermine the authority of the Grand *Qan*. Thus Möngke decided to outflank the entrenched Song armies by attacking from the southwest. Opening a second front would force Song China to redeploy men and material away from its defensive perimeter in the north, thereby weakening its overall military posture. According to Möngke, the main obstacle to this plan, outside of the adverse terrain and inhospitable weather his armies would need to overcome, was the presence of the tenaciously independent Dali kingdom (934–1253). In July 1252, Möngke selected Qubilai to lead this military campaign against the Dali kingdom.[9]

This essay will examine the Mongol conquest of the Dali kingdom during the second half of the thirteenth century. It begins with a brief description of the Dali kingdom and its political-commercial relations with several independent kingdoms located in an intermediate zone situated between itself and Song China. This intermediate zone encompassed nearly all of present-day Guizhou province.[10] With the stage set, we turn our attention to the Mongol military

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[8] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 4; Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, pp. 407–413; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 19; Rossabi, *The Reign of Khubilai Khan*, pp. 418–422.

[9] Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, pp. 405–406; *Yuan shi, juan* 121, pp. 2979–2981.

[10] This intermediate zone approximates present day Guizhou province. The concept of an "intermediate zone" is applied here instead of the more common "semiperiphery" because although this region was semiperipheral to both the Dali Kingdom and Song China, the people inhabiting this region probably did not see themselves as inhabiting a periphery. To them, Dali and Song China were the periphery. For this reason, then, I use the term "intermediate zone" so as not to marginalize the inhabitants of this region. For additional information on the role of semiperipheries and their role in the evolution of world-systems, see Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, *Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems* (Boulder, 1997), pp. 78–98.

campaign against the Dali kingdom, and then analyze the nature of Mongol political-military control over the former Dali territory from 1253 on. As the historical narrative will show, even though the Mongols accepted the surrender of the Dali king in 1255, due to the unanticipated resistance their armies encountered in the intermediate zone, the Mongols were unable to use the southwest as a platform to open a second front against Song China. Not until the 1280s, shortly after Mongol forces had stamped out the last remaining pockets of Song resistance in China proper, were Mongol armies able to push into the southwest frontier and "pacify" the independent kingdoms in the intermediate zone. In short, southwest China was not the first territory south of the Yangzi River to be conquered by Mongol forces; it was the last.

## *The Dali Kingdom*

From its inception in 934, the Dali kingdom was roughly equal in size to its predecessor the Nanzhao kingdom (762–902), and its early leaders adopted many of the former Nanzhao political institutions to govern their territory.[11] Beginning in 1093, though, a series of sweeping institutional reforms altered the political complexion of the Dali state. These reforms not only increased the Dali state's institutional presence, both horizontally and vertically throughout the more densely populated and resource-rich areas of Dali proper, but also gave rise to an increased assertiveness on the part of the Dali state

[11] The Nanzhao kingdom came to an abrupt end in 902, when a powerful local figure named Zheng Maisi rebelled against the Meng family and its control of the Nanzhao polity. Zheng replaced the Nanzhao with his own Da Changhe kingdom (902–927), but the Da Changhe never secured the allegiance of important segments of the former Nanzhao elite, so following Zheng's assassination in 927, the entire Da Changhe political edifice collapsed. Zheng Maisi's assassin, Yang Ganzhen, an official assigned to the Dongchuan Area Command (*jiedu*), immediately placed Zhao Shanzheng, an influential official from the town of Qingping, on the throne as king of the newly established Da Tianxing kingdom. But within a year, Yang became impatient with Zhao, assassinated him too, and then proclaimed himself king of the Da Yining kingdom. Yang's Da Yining kingdom enjoyed even less support than Zheng's Da Changhe. In 934, Duan Siping, an official in the Tonghai Area Command during the Nanzhao period, organized a coalition of Nanzhao sympathizers, defeated Yang's army, and established the Dali kingdom (934–1253). For more information see, Fang Guoyu, *Zhongguo xinan lishi dili kaoshi* (Taipei reprint, 1990), pp. 636–639; and Fang Guoyu, *Yizu shigao* (Chengdu, 1984), pp. 387–389.

to expand its geo-political borders east towards the intermediate zone.[12]

Early in the twelfth century, Dali leaders dispatched emissaries east along the Qian-Dian (Guizhou-Yunnan) highway to the prosperous market town of Yushi. Located along the western fringe of a large intermediate zone separating Dali-controlled territory and Song China, Yushi had by this time emerged as one of the more important conduits for trade between Song China, the Dali kingdom, and the Tran dynasty in northern Vietnam.[13] The precarious state of Song China's northern borders increased Chinese demand for quality horses, and it was at Yushi where Chinese merchants came to purchase and barter for prized Dali horses. Because of this increased commercial activity in Yushi, Dali's leaders hoped that by establishing relations with the preeminent authority in this part of the intermediate zone, the patriarch of the Deshi patriclan, they might extend Dali political and commercial influence into this strategically important zone. The Deshi patriclan were receptive to Dali entreaties, and as a result many of the other autonomous polities in the intermediate zone established relations with the Dali state.[14] The Dali state's increased political exposure in this part of the intermediate zone was successful for two reasons.

First, the lands directly north and east of Yushi were controlled by two powerful and fiercely independent patriclans: the Azhe ruled the vast territory of Shuixi and Shuidong to the north of Yushi, and the Bole held sway over territory nudged between Azhe lands to the north and Deshi lands to the southwest. According to the genealogical records of each patriclan, the Deshi, Azhe, and Bole were collateral patriclans. Each claimed descent from a common ancestor named Zzemuvyvy, who lived in the Dongchuan region of northeast Yunnan during the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.). In the third century C.E., some of Zzemuvyvy's descendants began migrating east from the Wumeng Mountains into what is now western Guizhou, and by the twelfth century the Deshi, Azhe, and Bole patriclans had forged three large kingdoms out of territory that had traditionally been an intermediate zone between China and polities

[12] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 639–640.
[13] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 680–684.
[14] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 715–716.

located further to the southwest.[15] The Dali leaders understood the genealogical ties between the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans, and they used the Deshi to convince the patriarchs of the Azhe and Bole patriclans to enter into relations with the Dali state.

Second, the Yushi market quickly became the focus of economic activity for the entire western half of the intermediate zone, in particular the sale of Dali horses to Chinese merchants. Ever since Tang China (618–906) and Tibet began their struggle for military supremacy along their common border, the horses raised in the Nanzhao kingdom had become famous for their temper, speed and endurance. Military commanders from China and Tibet regularly sent trade missions to the Nanzhao kingdom to purchase these prized horses, and when Nanzhao's rulers presented tribute to either Tang China or Tibet, they were "advised" to present only horses as tribute. The collapse of the Tang state did not diminish Chinese demands for quality mounts, and the emergent Dali state quickly seized control of this lucrative export to increase state revenue. Horse markets dotted the periphery of the Dali kingdom: the Moutong, Shanju and Jinchang markets catered exclusively to Tibetans, and the Jiading, Xuzhou and Luzhou markets in southern Sichuan supplied Chinese buyers with Dali horses.[16]

However, in the early years of the twelfth century, just as the Dali state was extending its influence to the Yushi market, the mass demo-

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[15] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 715–721; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 145–150; Hou Shaozhuang, Shi Jizhong, and Weng Jialie, *Guizhou Gudai Minzu Guanxi Shi* (Guiyang, 1991), pp. 180–198; Hu Qingjun, *Ming Qing Yizu shehuishi luncong* (Shanghai, 1981), pp. 1–3; *Xinan Yizhi* (Guiyang reprint, 1992), vol. 6, pp. 175–267; *Xinan Yizhi* (Guiyang reprint, 1994), vol. 8, pp. 284–312; Wang Jizhao and Wang Ziguo, eds., trans., *Yizu yuanliu* (Guiyang, 1997), pp. 132–140; "Yizu yuanzu ji Luodian Shuixi shexi biao," in *Cuanwen congke*, ed. Ma Xueliang (Chengdu, 1986), pp. 152–158; "Shuixi dadu he jianshiqiao ji," in *Cuanwen congke*, pp. 160–203; "Tudi minnu he zexi de guanli," in *Cuanwen congke*, pp. 115–141; Meng Xian, "Liangshan Yizu 'zimo tongzhi shiqi' chutan," in *Xinan minzu yanjiu* (Chengdu, 1987), pp. 277–309; Wang Guifu and Chen Ying, "Yizu liuzu yuanliu ji qi niandai wenti," in Sichuan Guizhou Yizu Shehui Lishi Diaocha, ed. Xi Tianxi (Kunming, 1986), pp. 162–174.

[16] Hou, *Guizhou Gudai*, pp. 151–157; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 760–761; Christopher I. Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese during the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ, 1987), pp. 1–75; Charles Backus, "The Nan-Chao Kingdom and Frontier Policy in Southwest China during the Sui and Tang Periods," (diss., Princeton University, 1978), p. 25; R.E. Latham, trans., *The Travels of Marco Polo* (New York reprint, 1986), p. 180.

graphic shift of northern Chinese into south China, the relocation of the Song government to south China, and the continuing state of war in north China all factored into an increase in Chinese merchants visiting the Yushi market. Likewise, merchants and middlemen from independent and semi-independent polities in the eastern and central portions of the intermediate zone ventured to Yushi to purchase Dali's famous horses. As one Chinese traveler to Yushi noted, "the Dali horse has a shape [that is] quite magnificent. They stand low with a muscular front, very similar to the shape of a chicken. The diaphragm is broad, shoulders thick, waist flat and back round. They are trained to squat on their rear ends like a dog. They easily climb steep terrain on command, and possess both speed and agility in chase. They have been raised on bitter buckwheat, so they require little to maintain. How could a horse like this not be considered a good horse?"[17]

Horses bred by the Deshi, Azhe and Bole were sold alongside horses from Dali; mineral products (silver, gold, and copper) from Dali also made their way to China via the Yushi market; and exotic foodstuffs and manufactured goods from China and Vietnam flowed through Yushi on their way to Dali.[18] Dali, Song China, the Tran dynasty, and the various polities in the intermediate zone were increasingly linked to a lively inter-regional trade network, and Möngke and his advisors were not unaware of this economic activity, especially the strategically important horse trade between Dali and Song China. In preparing his campaign against the Dali kingdom, Qubilai believed that the flow of Dali horses to Song China would cease once his campaign began, thereby crippling the ability of the Song to wage war.

## *The Dali Campaign*

Qubilai prepared meticulously for the Dali campaign. This was his first important military command, and at thirty-six years of age Qubilai was aware that a mistake at this critical juncture would jeopardize his political aspirations. It seems Möngke also understood the

[17] Tian Wen, *Qian Shu* (1690), *juan* 3, p. 76.
[18] Hou, *Guizhou Gudai*, pp. 191–196; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 760–763.

gamble of relying on his untested and inexperienced brother to execute the logistically demanding Dali campaign, and for this reason he assigned one of the most battle-proven military commanders of his day, Uriyangqadai (d. 1266), to be commander-in-chief of the Dali campaign. The son of Subötei, one of Chinggis *Qan*'s most fearsome generals, Uriyangqadai had proven himself time and again in several campaigns in Central Asia, and his political alliance with Batu in 1251, apparently assured the enthronement of Möngke as Grand *Qan* in 1251.[19] Qubilai relied heavily on Uriyangqadai's military expertise in planning the Dali campaign. After Qubilai received word that the Dali king had murdered envoys he sent to Dali demanding the king's surrender, Möngke ordered Qubilai to begin the campaign in the summer 1253.[20]

Qubilai divided his army into three columns. He gave command of the western column to Uriyangqadai and ordered him to march south from Lintao, in present-day Gansu, through the inhospitable Amdo and Kham regions of eastern Tibet toward Dali. Qubilai appointed Wang Dezhen (d. 1259) to lead the eastern column into Song-controlled portions of Sichuan.[21] As Wang's army marched south it passed just west of Chengdu before reuniting briefly with Qubilai's middle column near the town of Jianchang, in southern Sichuan. Qubilai's middle column followed the mountain trails through Kham, placing his army at the forefront of the attack force. Qubilai anticipated his column would engage the main Dali army along the Jinsha River, thus exposing Dali to attack from Uriyangqadai's army advancing from the northwest and from Wang Dezhen's army arriving from the east. Following several skirmishes in which Dali forces repeatedly turned back Mongol raids across the Jinsha River, Qubilai's army crossed the Jinsha River in a daring night-time raid and routed Dali defensive positions. With Dali forces in disarray, the three Mongol columns quickly converged on the city of Dali in late 1253.[22]

Instead of submitting to the Mongols and accepting Qubilai's terms, the King of Dali, Duan Xingzhi (d. 1273), abandoned the Dali capital to the Mongols and fled east to the town of Shanchan (present-

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[19] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 24.

[20] *Yuan shi, juan* 121, pp. 1310–1315; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 243–244; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 25–26.

[21] Allsen, *The Rise of the Mongolian Empire*, pp. 405–407.

[22] Francis W. Cleaves, "The biography of Bayan of the Barin in the *Yuan shih*," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 19 (1956), pp. 185–303.




Southwest China, ca. 1280

day Kunming), where he rallied pro-Dali forces against the Mongol invasion. Since Möngke's primary objective was to attack Song China from the southwest, not destroy the Dali kingdom and get bogged down in governing Dali directly, Duan Xingzhi's continued resistance was proving to be a costly obstacle to Möngke's larger scheme. It took another two years of fierce fighting in the Shanchan region before Uriyangqadai could announce the surrender of Duan Xingzhi and the end of Dali resistance in the region; however, by the end of 1255, Mongol forces were only in possession of the cities of Dali and Shanchan and the main road linking these two cities. Territory east of the city of Shanchan was still under the control of pro-Dali forces, and resistance here not only received direct military aid from the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans of the intermediate zone, but also financial assistance from the Song state.[23]

To the surprise of many involved in the Dali campaign, following a face-to-face meeting between Möngke and Duan Xingzhi in the first month of 1256, the Grand *Qan* bestowed upon the captive king a patent of investiture (*xinzhi*), three badges of authority (*paizi*) and an imperial seal (*yinxin*), and ordered him to return to Dali to rule his subjects as he had before the Mongol conquest, albeit now under Mongol supervision.[24] Because Qubilai had long since returned north to assist Möngke in planning the conquest of Song China, Uriyangqadai was ordered to remain in the southwest to oversee Duan Xingzhi's rule of Dali, and to push further east along the Qian-Dian highway toward Song positions in south China.[25]

Uriyangqadai worked quickly to solidify a Mongol presence in the southwest. By the middle of 1256, he had established nearly twenty military brigades (*wanhu fu*) throughout Dali proper, and had dispatched military units east in preparation to attack the town of Yushi.[26] Uriyangqadai relied on trusted Mongols and Central Asians to fill the brigade commander (*wanhu*) positions, as one might expect; yet, the sub-brigade battalions (*qianhu suo*) were staffed almost exclusively by members of the indigenous elite.[27] Although the informa-

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[23] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 243–244, 277–280.

[24] *Yuan shi, juan* 166, p. 1784.

[25] *Yuan shi, juan* 121, pp. 1310–1313; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, p. 243.

[26] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 24; Uriyangqadai's biography in the *Yuan shi* is the best account we have of the Mongol campaign in the Southwest. *Yuan shi, juan* 121, pp. 2979–2981.

[27] According to Charles Hucker, the brigade consisted of 10,000 soldiers divided

tion is still rather sketchy, it appears that in the region near the city of Shanchan a few of the new battalion commanders had previously held minor political posts under the Dali regime. For the most part, though, the newly appointed battalion heads had been rather low-ranking members of the local community prior to the arrival of the Mongols, and had sided with the Mongols during the prolonged conflict. When Uriyangqadai bestowed handsome rewards, land, slaves, livestock, and political office to these individuals who supported the Mongols in their campaign against Dali, he created a new elite to rival the old pro-Dali elite. As collaborators to the new occupiers, the fledgling pro-Mongol elite was influential only as long as Mongol military preeminence remained close by.

In the closing months of 1256, Mongol relations with their indigenous collaborators in Shanchan became strained when Uriyangqadai ordered many of these allies to march east along the Qian-Dian highway toward Chitugeer—the Mongol name for the area controlled by the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans in the intermediate zone. Uriyangqadai was determined to loosen the Deshi patriclan's grip over Yushi and attack the territory he himself described as inhabited by "spirit barbarians" (*guiman*); a reference to the political-religious leaders of the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans.[28] Angered by Uriyangqadai's demand that they attack Chitugeer, many refused to participate in this campaign, thus precipitating yet another Mongol military sweep through Shanchan. Interestingly, Song sources inform us that the Azhe leadership immediately dispatched representatives to notify the Song that Mongol forces now occupied Dali territory, and that Mongol and Dali troops were now moving east along the Qian-Dian highway. In response, the Song court gave 10,000 *taels* of silver each to the Azhe and Bole patriclans to help shore up defensive fortifications, and ordered Bozhou and Sizhou to dispatch forces to Yushi to fight the Mongols.[29]

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into 10 battalions (*qianhu suo*) of 1,000 soldiers each. In Yuan China, the brigade commander (*wanhu*) was regularly seen as the military authority at the route (*lu*) level of territorial administration. Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial Times* (Stanford, 1985), p. 562.

[28] *Yuan shi, juan* 121, p. 2980; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, p. 790.

[29] Hou, *Guizhou Gudai*, pp. 183–184. In Song sources, the Azhe patriclan are the leaders of the "Spirit kingdom of the Luo clan" (*luoshi gui guo*), *Song shi, juan* 73, pp. 53–55; see also, Richard von Glahn, *The Country of Streams and Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the Civilizing of the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, pp. 24–37.

Within a year these same Song allies were marching west into the Shanchan region to support a large-scale rebellion against Mongol rule. Late in 1257, Uriyangqadai was ordered to lead a military expedition south down the Red River delta to attack the Tran dynasty. With Mongol troop strength in the Dali-Shanchan region precariously weak, a number of prominent indigenous leaders, such as the prominent brigade commander named Sheliwei (d. 1274), attacked Mongol military installations throughout the Shanchan region. For over ten years, indigenous leaders from the Shanchan region, with assistance from the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans, battled Mongol forces and their Dali allies, and in a series of fierce encounters near the towns of Weichu and Yaoan in 1269–1270, they nearly displaced the Mongols from the southwest entirely. Not until 1274, after Mongol scouts ambushed and killed Sheliwei as he rode unescorted through the town of Dingyuan, did the Mongol-Dali alliance turn the tide in their war against the Shanchan "rebels."[30]

However, by 1274 Qubilai, now Grand *Qan* of the Mongols, no longer considered control of the southwest vital to the conquest of Song China. A year earlier in 1273, Mongol forces had emerged victorious in the five-year battle for the city of Xiangyang, a strategic point located along the Han River. The Song had built the city of Xiangyang into an impenetrable fortress in order to protect this critical area of the Yangzi River basin from Mongol attack. When initial attempts to destroy the city walls failed, Qubilai ordered engineers from Central Asia brought to China to construct large mangonels and catapults to be used in the siege. Eventually, Xiangyang's fortifications were destroyed, and in March 1273, Lu Wenhuan (d. 1279), the esteemed Song commander of the city, surrendered.[31] The Song capital of Hangzhou was now exposed to a frontal attack,

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[30] As a further check on their behavior, political residents (*darughachis*) were posted to the courts of the tributaries. Although the sources only note the presence of a *xuanfu shi* (pacification inspector) at the Nanzhao court, there undoubtedly was a *darughachi* on the scene as well; for as Hsia Kuang-nan points out in *Yuandai Yunnan shide zongkao* (Taipei, 1968), p. 65, every office of pacification inspector had attached to it both an inspector and a *darughachi*. These officials, usually Mongols or Central Asian Turks, had the general responsibility of ensuring that the orders and policies of the Grand *qan* actually were carried out on the local level. In many cases the *darughachi* had a body of troops under his command to enforce his authority. Francis W. Cleaves, "Daruya and Gerege," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 16 (1953), pp. 237–259.

[31] Rossabi, *The Reign of Khubilai Khan*, p. 431; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 82–85.

and within a few months Qubilai appointed Bayan (1237–1295) to command the final Mongol assault against Song China. Bayan ordered his armies across the Yangzi River in January 1275; he captured the Song capital in 1276; and he defeated the remnants of Song resistance near Canton in 1279.[32]

Although Qubilai focused his attention on attacking Song China from the north, he was aware that control of the southwest could prevent Song patriots from using the region to continue their resistance. For this reason, in 1274 he appointed Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din (d. 1286) to the newly created post of Manager of Governmental Affairs for the Branch Secretariat of Yunnan (*xing zhongshu sheng pingzhang zhengshi*) with orders to solidify Mongol control of the southwest.[33] Late in 1274, Saiyid arrived in Yunnan and immediately set out to restore the economic vitality of this war-ravaged region. He published handbooks on farming techniques and livestock maintenance; he issued seed, tools, and even livestock to indigenes and inmigrants alike; and he dispatched teams of agricultural specialists to demonstrate advanced agricultural practices. In Shanchan, Saiyid oversaw the construction of dams and reservoirs, dredged rivers and canals for transport purposes, and drained disease-infested swamps as part of his ambitious land reclamation project. And although wet-rice cultivation had existed in Yunnan since the Han dynasty, it was not until after Saiyid implemented these economic reforms that this type of cultivation came to dominate the agricultural landscape of central Yunnan.[34]

In addition to these measures, Saiyid quickly affirmed the Mongol military presence by establishing a series of small-sized garrisons and

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[32] Rossabi, *The Reign of Khubilai Khan*, pp. 433–434; Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 82–85; Cleaves, "The Biography of Bayan," pp. 185–303; Herbert Franke, ed., *Sung Biographies*, 4 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1976), 2:749–51.

[33] Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 201–203; Fang Guoyu, "Guanyu Saidianchi fu Dian gongji," *Renwen kexue zazhi*, 1 (1958), pp. 47–50. This was the only land in China to be ruled by Muslims. Rossabi speculates that Qubilai appointed Muslims to Yunnan for two reasons: first, the business acumen of Central Asian Muslims was well-known to all; and second, Yunnan controlled vital commercial routes between China and Southeast Asia, thus it seemed only natural to place businessmen in charge of important commercial areas.

[34] According to Rossabi, Saiyid introduced Chinese customs, not Muslim, Central Asian or Mongol customs to the southwest. This claim by Rossabi requires further study. Saiyid died in 1279, and in 1297 he was posthumously awarded the title of Prince of Xianyang (Xianyang wang). Two of his sons, Nasir al-Din and Masud, succeeded him as governors of Yunnan, and they continued their father's policies. Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 214.

outposts throughout the region. The main east-west highway connecting Dali and Shanchan was repaired, and an extensive network of seventy-eight postal relay stations (*yizhan*) was established from Dali in the west to the town of Shicheng in the east.[35] Each postal station included a small militia made up of locals, a stable of fifty horses, food and accommodations for overnight guests, and a general store. Saiyid pressed the local population to provide each postal station with such necessities, and he issued patents to those individuals who assumed responsibility for managing the hostel, restaurant, store and stable at each postal station. Initially postal station jobs and the accompanying patents were negotiated for a specific length of time, usually for five years, but Saiyid soon concluded that hereditary appointments to such posts would provide a measure of stability.[36]

To govern this ethnically complex region, Saiyid abandoned Uriyangqadai's tact of using military brigades to govern the people and decided instead to establish political units, circuits (*dao*), routes (*lu*), superior prefectures (*fu*), prefectures (*zhou*), and districts (*xian*). Clearly, demographic, geographic (physical and cultural), and strategic features played an important role in determining the type of political unit Saiyid established in Yunnan; nevertheless, his redrawing of the political map intensified the overall structure and pervasiveness of Mongol rule, for now it featured multiple layers of overlapping civilian jurisdictions that allowed Saiyid and the Mongols to exercise greater control over the indigenous-inmigrant population. As Endicott-West informs us, "Yuan civilian government departed from earlier patterns and precedents in Chinese governmental history in the multiplicity of its levels of sub-metropolitan government and the sheer number of civilian officials staffing those units of government."[37] For instance, Saiyid divided the Yunnan branch secretariat into ten circuits, each administered by either a pacification commissioner (*xuanwei shi*) or a pacification inspector (*xuanfu shi*). In time, many of these circuits became known simply as pacification

[35] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, p. 248.
[36] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 248–252.
[37] Elizabeth Endicott-West, "The Yuan Government and Society," in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368*, eds. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge, 1994), p. 593.

commissions (*xuanwei si*) with place-name prefixes, for example the Dali-Jinchi pacification commission.[38]

These circuits and pacification commissions directed a multiplicity of administrative levels, of which the route was the largest administrative unit in a circuit.[39] The Yuan state made a distinction between "greater" (*shang*) and "lesser" (*xia*) routes, generally on the basis of the size of the population and strategic location of the unit. The route was directly subordinate to both the branch secretariat and circuit, but in frontier areas like Yunnan, the pacification commissioner's authority was rarely challenged. His appointments to the two posts that managed route affairs, the route commander (*lu zongguan fu*) and the political resident or overseer (*darughachi*), were usually accepted without much interference from the head of the branch secretariat, the grand councilor (*chengxiang*).[40] Superior prefectures,

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[38] *Yuan shi, juan* 166, p. 53; Gong Yin, *Zhongguo tusi zhidu* (Kunming, 1992), p. 24. The office of pacification commission originated during the Tang dynasty as a position responsible for leading military campaigns and important diplomatic missions. Only the most able and influential were assigned to this prestigious position; however, by the end of the eighth century the office became increasingly identified with bandit suppression and pacification duties in frontier areas, and as a result it lost some of its appeal to non-military personnel hoping to advance their political careers. By the end of the Tang dynasty, the office was further distanced from the civilian realm when it became a permanent hereditary frontier post; in other words, an official assigned to the pacification commission could no longer expect his appointment to be a brief tour of duty—he and his family might never be allowed to leave the frontier. The Song pacification commission was similar to its Tang predecessor, so when Saiyid reached Yunnan in 1274, he had a blueprint of a hereditary frontier office that combined the functions of both civilian and military rule. *Yuan shi, juan* 91, p. 41; Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 23–28; Wu Yongzhang, *Zhongguo tusi zhidu yuanyuan yu fazhan shi* (Chengdu, 1988), pp. 129–133; She Yize, *Zhongguo tusi zhidu* (Shanghai reprint, 1947), pp. 4–13; Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, pp. 104, 250–251; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 51. The basic demands that the Mongols imposed on all of their sedentary subjects are clearly summarized in Qubilai's order in 1267 to the ruler of Annam: (1) the ruler must come personally to court, (2) sons and younger brothers are to be offered as hostages, (3) the population must be registered, (4) militia units are to be raised, (5) taxes are to be sent in, and (6) a *darughachi* is to take charge of all affairs. *Yuan shi, juan* 209, p. 2196.

[39] Endicott-West, "The Yuan Government and Society," p. 594. According to Hucker, "The circuit as a territorial unit of government was also part of the Censorate's field of operations. Surveillance Bureaus (*suzheng lianfang si*) of the Censorate were established in the circuit." The Censorate was responsible for making interrogations and audits relating to the functioning of government at all levels from pacification commissions and route commands down to districts, and for submitting reports and impeachments accordingly to the metropolitan Censorate (*yushi tai*). Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, p. 461.

[40] "*Darughachi* is a Mongol word; regarding the appointment of officials to

prefectures, and counties were under the direct supervision of the route commander, and each administrative unit was assigned a *darughachi* along with a civilian official. In each case, both were appointed at the same rank, given the same salary, and allotted the same amount of office land. Any directive by an administrative unit had to be co-signed by the *darughachi* and his civilian counterpart.[41]

In the Shanchan area of central Yunnan, Saiyid adopted the administrative map of the former Dali kingdom to create eight routes: Zhongqing, Dengjiang, Lingan, Yuanjiang, Guangxi, Qujing, Wuding, and Weichu.[42] Each route supervised a mixture of superior prefectures, prefectures, and counties, but by and large the geo-political landscape was dominated by an extra-bureaucratic office—the native official or *tuguan* post. *Tuguan* offices were introduced following Saiyid's rapid conquest of the southwest. The Yuan state possessed neither the human resources nor the financial wherewithal needed to administer the southwest directly; thus, Saiyid ordered his route commanders and *darughachi* to meet with powerful local figures, i.e., leaders of small confederations and village headmen, in order to gain their allegiance. In return for sworn loyalty to the Grand *Qan*, the local leader was granted the title of *tuguan*, which made him an official representative of the Yuan state. *Tuguan* were bestowed with large tracts of land as personal fiefs, and they received the right to pass on the *tuguan* office to their offspring. This was Saiyid's innovative *tuqiu weiguan* policy, "to make officials out of native chieftains," and

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prefectures (fu, zhou, jun) and districts (xian), each had a Mongol or Central Asian assigned as the Overseer (darughachi). They were appointed alongside the regular heads of many agencies in both central and territorial administrations as mandatory co-signers of all documents issuing from these agencies; commonly hereditary posts for Mongols with status in the Mongol military hierarchy." Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, p. 468. According to Endicott-West, "a similar feature existed at all levels below the Branch Secretariat. For each, a *darughachi* was appointed at the same rank and with the same salary and amount of office land as the other principal official. For example, the head official of a county, the magistrate (hsien-yin), was allotted the same salary and amount of office land as was the county *darughachi*, and the two officials were equal in rank. . . . Khubulai's imperial decrees reserving the office of darughachi for Mongols (or Western and Central Asians if there were no Mongols) proved difficult to enforce, and the Mongolian office of *darughachi* was sometimes filled by Chinese." Endicott-West, "The Yuan Government and Society," pp. 595–596.

[41] Endicott-West, "The Yuan Government and Society," p. 595.

[42] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 1095–1117; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 245–249, 281–284; *Yuan shi*, Saidianchi zhuan, *juan* 122, pp. 2998–3003.

it was strikingly similar to earlier prefecture (*dian*) and district (*bu*) offices used by the Dali state.[43]

According to records relating to the creation of *tuguan* offices in Kainan prefecture, as part of the Weichu route created by Saiyid in 1274, *tuguan* officials were ordered to register the land and population in their area with the Kainan prefect so that the area's land and labor taxes could be assessed. The Yuan assessment of land and labor taxes from *tuguan* offices was similar to what the Dali state demanded of its extra-bureaucratic offices; however, it was a clear departure from the Chinese model of extra-bureaucratic offices, the haltered and bridled prefectures (*jimi fuzhou*) employed throughout the southwest during the Tang and Song dynasties.[44] In addition, *tuguan* were obligated to present tribute (*gong*) annually to the Yunnan branch secretariat, usually in the form of horses or precious metals. Naturally, *tuguan* were expected to maintain law and order in their areas of jurisdiction, but the Yuan state allowed them to do so according to local customs, and refrained from imposing Yuan legal statutes to adjudicate cases. Finally, *tuguan* were ordered to deal firmly with anti-Yuan activity, and provide military assistance to Yuan commanders when requested.[45]

To authenticate the political stature of the *tuguan* official, Saiyid and the Yuan court bestowed upon the *tuguan* such articles as a certificate of appointment (*gaochi*), which was to be publicly displayed in the *tuguan*'s administrative headquarters for all to see. When ordered to pay taxes or present tribute, the *tuguan* was required to verify his position by presenting this certificate to the route commander and *darughachi*. Yuan authorities also gave the *tuguan* a seal (*yinzhang*), so that he could issue orders on behalf of the Yuan state. A tiger-shaped tally (*hufu*) was granted to *tuguan* so s/he could maintain a large stable of horses for military purposes. If urgent military situations arose, the Yuan court would send imperial letters *via* courier (*yizhuan xishu*)

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[43] *Yuan shi, juan* 166, pp. 53–54; Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 53–152; She, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 20–32, 38–43; Wu, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 157–178, 209–238. According to a 1319 text, following the death of a *tusi*, his son, nephew, and brother were expected to inherit the office. If none of the above individuals existed, then the deceased *tusi*'s wife could inherit the office. Based on Gong Yin's assessment of the evidence, the Yuan inheritance regulations were far less strict than what would be enforced during the Ming and Qing dynasties.

[44] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 253–258; Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 2–22; Wu, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 80–127.

[45] Ibid.

and issue either gold or silver tallies (*jin yin ziyuan fu*) that authorized the *tuguan* to mobilize resources for military purposes.[46]

Once Saiyid began to extend his political reach beyond the core area of the former Dali kingdom (Dali and Shanchan) toward Sichuan to the north and Chitugeer to the east, he soon found himself in contact with semi-peripheral populations that were reluctant to be governed by foreign institutions. The limits of the branch secretariat's administrative reach and the necessity to expand Mongol influence forced Saiyid to improvise. He did so by using the aforementioned offices of pacification commission and pacification inspector as a prestige device to gain the allegiance of influential leaders, such as the patriarchs of the Deshi, Azhe, and Bole patriclans. Similar to the description of *tuguan* office discussed above, local authority figures who accepted these Yuan offices were treated in a way similar to *tuguan* officials. In return for an oath of allegiance to the Grand *Qan*, the indigenous leader as pacification commissioner or pacification inspector was granted immunity from Mongol interference in his or her territory, except of course when the leader requested Mongol military assistance.[47] In other words, two types of pacification commissioners emerged in the southwest at this time: one supervised a circuit, was appointed directly by the grand councilor of the branch secretariat, and was an integral part of the sub-branch bureaucracy; the other was a powerful indigenous leader bestowed with a honorary title primarily meant to gain his or her allegiance.

For example, in order to secure safe travel along the main Chuan-Dian (Sichuan-Yunnan) highway connecting Dali and Kunming with the Sichuan capital of Chengdu, Saiyid ordered his forces to go north to occupy the three large towns of Huichuan, Dechang, and Jianchang. Because of their location north of the Jinsha River, these three towns were spared much of the violence that engulfed Dali and Shanchan during the 1250s and 1260s. Before Mongol troops entered these towns, Saiyid had already designated each town a route, assigned route commanders and *darughachi*s to them, and placed the entire region under the control of the newly formed Luoluosi pacification commission.[48] To placate the powerful patriclan leader

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 467–472.

[48] *Xichang Xianzhi* (1920 reprint), tusi zhuan, *juan* 14, pp. 5a–b; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 467–470; Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 336–337.

whose territory surrounded the town of Jianchang, Saiyid offered him the position of pacification commissioner of Luoluosi, and granted him the right to nominate his own subordinates to *tuguan* posts. This negotiated agreement allowed Saiyid to open a heretofore-dangerous stretch of the Chuan-Dian highway without expending valuable military resources.

Within a few years, though, Saiyid betrayed this agreement by creating nearly twenty-five prefectures and conferring numerous *tuguan* offices on influential indigenous leaders in the southern portion of the pacification commission. Even though nearly all of these prefectures were located well to the south of the patriclan's territory, Saiyid had extended Mongol control as far north as Dechang by garrisoning troops along the Chuan-Dian highway and ordering state farms (*tun*), both civilian farms (*mintun*) and military farms (*juntun*) to be established near each route headquarters. These state farms were primarily responsible for reclaiming lands and expanding agricultural production, but local records tell us that the Mongols also used the people enrolled in state farms to repair and maintain the Chuan-Dian highway; to build and repair government offices, postal stations and outposts; and to even assist in policing the road.[49] By 1280, there were approximately 500 households enrolled in the civilian farms near Huichuan and Dechang, and the population registers make clear that the majority of people in civilian farms were indigenous to the locality. The military farms, on the other hand, were made up primarily of troops drawn from the Shanchan region, but there are also accounts of Chinese enrolled in Mongol military farms along the Chuan-Dian highway.

Further to the east, Saiyid ordered his most capable military commander, Ailu (d. 1287), to lead a contingent of troops from the town of Qujing north along the ancient, though much less traveled Wumeng road. Saiyid knew this was a particularly dangerous assignment since Ailu would be leading his troops along the western edge of the Azhe patriclan's kingdom—known in Chinese texts at the time as the "Spirit kingdom of the Luo Clan" (*Luoshi guiguo*). From Qujing the road skirted along the eastern slope of the Wumeng Mountains before reaching the town of Wusa. It then angled north through the towns of Hezhang and Caoni before crossing the Chishui River and

[49] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 800–801, 925–939; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, p. 468.

heading due north to the Jinsha River and the major city of Luzhou in Sichuan.[50] As Richard von Glahn points out in his masterful study of the Luzhou region during the Song dynasty, by the end of the twelfth century the town of Luzhou was the southern most extension of the Song state. Song Chinese considered it to be the last significant outpost of Chinese civilization before one entered the mysterious and uncharted world of the "spirit masters" (*guizhu*). In 1276, Ailu was ordered to lead his multi-ethnic army of Mongols, Central Asians, Chinese, Cuan, and Bo soldiers into this unfamiliar territory in order to secure the road between Qujing and Luzhou for safe travel.[51]

Both Saiyid and Ailu knew that the people living near the Wumeng Mountains had received political appointments by the Dali state, but since the defeat of Dali they had stubbornly defended their independence from both the Song and the Yuan. Moreover, Ailu was aware that of the "eight tribes" inhabiting the region, three (the Wusa, Wumeng, and Mang) were related to the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans; therefore, Ailu anticipated resistance from the local population as his army marched into the Wumeng Mountains.[52] In preparation for the campaign, Saiyid had decided on the town of Wusa to be a route headquarters, and that Ailu would be its initial route commander. To quell the anticipated resistance, Saiyid authorized Ailu to dole out a liberal number of *tuguan* offices in hopes that the prestige of such an office, not to mention the rapid collapse of the Song state, would convince the leaders of the "eight tribes" to submit peacefully. Ailu proved an able negotiator, for in less than two years, Saiyid downgraded the Wusa route to the Wusa tribal command (*junmin zongguan fu*) and named the leader of the Wusa patriclan, a man named Amou, to be the political-military authority in the area. This move was calculated to free-up Ailu and his army for the much-anticipated campaign against the recalcitrant Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans, planned for the following spring.[53]

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[50] Wusa is the present-day city of Weining, located in northwest Guizhou. Caoni is the present-day city of Bijie, also in northwest Guizhou.

[51] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 825–831; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 470–472, 500–506; *Yuan shi*, Ailu zhuan, *juan* 122, pp. 3113–3114; von Glahn, *Streams and Grottoes*, pp. 90–141.

[52] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 435–439, 463–465. The eight patriclans in the Wusa-Wumeng area were the Wusa, Atou, Yixi, Yiniang, Wumeng, Bipan, Mang and Acheng.

[53] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 470–472. The military households of the Wusa state

### *The Scramble for Chitugeer*

Although orders to invade the territory controlled by the Deshi, Azhe and Bole patriclans were not announced until the middle of 1279, Qubilai had authorized the Tanzhou branch secretariat to send a reconnaissance mission into Chitugeer at the beginning of the year. Liu Jichang (d. 1291), a military commander (*zhaotaosi*) assigned to the Liangwei circuit in the recently established Tanzhou branch secretariat, led a contingent of troops west along the Qian-Xiang (Guizhou-Huguang) highway.[54] This road, as we have seen, bisected the intermediate zone that separated Song China from the Dali kingdom. The Chinese had long referred to this intermediate zone as "Qian," but in the latter decades of the thirteenth century the Mongols referred to the region as "Chitugeer." Liu Jichang's detachment encountered only sporadic resistance as it made its way through eastern Chitugeer, but when Liu reached Xintian in the sixth month of 1279, he was ordered to halt his march and reinforce his position. By the middle of 1279, then, Liu Jichang's Tanzhou army was positioned along the eastern edge of Azhe territory, while Saiyid's Yunnan forces pressed in from the west. It was at this time that Qubilai issued orders to secure control of Chitugeer.[55]

In compliance with Qubilai's orders, Liu Jichang employed the time-honored Mongol tactic of dispatching envoys ahead of the main army to intimidate communities into surrendering. Liu knew that if he pressed west along the main Qian-Dian-Xiang highway toward Yushi, he would expose his army to attack from the heretofore hostile Bafan (Eight barbarians) tribes located to the south of the road, from Azhe troops situated to its north, and from Bole and Deshi forces due west. Therefore, Liu sent envoys to meet with the preeminent political figure among the Bafan tribes, Wei Changsheng of the Da Longfan tribe, and with the patriarch of the Azhe patriclan, a man named Acha (d. 1285).[56] To Liu's surprise, his envoys returned

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farm totaled 110, whereas there were 86 civilian households. In 1290, there were 114 Cuan and Bo military households on state farms in Wusa. The Wusa pacification commission supervised 49 postal stations (45 horse and 4 water stations); and the Wumeng pacification commission supervised 9 stations (5 horse and 4 water).

[54] *Yuan shi, juan* 63, p. 15; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, p. 508; Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, p. 27. The city of Shanhua is near the present-day city of Changsha, in Hunan.

[55] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, p. 942. Xintian is the present-day city of Guiding, in Guizhou.

[56] There were nine tribes in the Bafan area: the Chengfan, Fengfan, Fangfan,

unharmed with news that both Wei Changsheng and Acha had agreed to submit to Mongol rule. As part of the surrender procedure, Wei Changsheng led a delegation of tribal leaders from Bafan to Liu's headquarters at Xintian and presented Liu with the land and population registers for the entire Bafan area. According to these registers, there were 1,186 villages (*zhaidong*) and 89,400 households among the nine tribes of Bafan. In return for peacefully agreeing to be a part of the Grand *Qan*'s empire, Liu appointed each of the nine tribal leaders to the office of military commissioner (*anfu shi*) and ordered them to govern their respective localities as they always had, although now as officials of the Yuan state and servants to the Grand *Qan*.[57]

Once Liu Jichang appointed the nine tribal leaders of the Bafan region to be military commissioners, he made them subordinate to the newly created Bafan pacification commission headquartered in Xintian.[58] However, Liu did not assign *darughachi*s to these nine military commissions, he did not order the nine military commissioners to collect taxes on behalf of the Yuan state, and he did not impose Yuan legal institutions in the areas governed by the military

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Hongfan, Da Longfan, Xiao Longfan, Jinshifan, Luofan, and Lufan tribes. Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 766–778; *Guizhou Shengzhi*, dili zhi (Guiyang, 1985), pp. 19–21; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 943–944.

[57] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, p. 508. In addition to the nine military commisions, Liu established three tribal commands (*manyi zhangguan si*) in the Bafan area. For a list of these tribal commands, see *Guizhou Shengzhi*, p. 21. The office of military commissioner (*anfu shi si*) originated during the Tang dynasty as a quasi-military post authorized by the central government to handle trouble spots throughout the realm. Initially, officials appointed to this post were assigned such tasks as managing famine relief programs; overseeing dike, road, and canal repair projects; as well as leading police actions and military campaigns to quell violence. Unlike the office of pacification commission discussed above, the military commission was closely associated with military affairs, and for this reason appointment to the post of military commission did not carry with it the honor and prestige of the office of pacification commission. For instance, toward the end of the Tang, the office of military commission was often assigned concurrent with the title of security commissioner (*jiedu shi*), with responsibility for suppressing frontier violence. A predominantly frontier office during the Song, the office of military commission acquired broad military and civil powers, similar to the pacification commission and pacification inspector; however, the military commissioner was clearly subordinate to the above two offices. As Mongol armies entered the southwest during the middle of the thirteenth century, this office became yet another piece in the Mongol repertoire of extra-bureaucratic offices to be established in the southwest. *Yuan shi, juan* 91, p. 41; Gong, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 23–28; Wu, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 129–133; She, *Zhongguo tusi*, pp. 4–13; Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, pp. 104, 250–251.

[58] Ibid.

commissioners. He did, however, order each military commissioner to present tribute to Yuan officials in Xintian every year.[59] In short, except for the yearly tribute mission to Xintian, the nine tribal leaders in Bafan governed their respective areas just as they had prior to the arrival of Liu's envoys. Moreover, they were authorized to appoint subordinates to *tuguan* offices just as Saiyid was doing in Yunnan at this time, thereby establishing a clear administrative hierarchy among the extra-bureaucratic offices: the pacification commissioner (*xuanwei shi*) was superior to the pacification inspector (*xuanfu shi*), who was superior to the military commissioner (*anfu shi*), and the *tuguan* officials were subordinate to all the above.

Acha, too, surrendered to Liu Jichang in Xintian, yet the land and population registers he provided Liu represented only a fraction of Azhe territory. According to these registers, the 1,626 villages and 11,168 households were located east of the Yachi River, in an area popularly known as Shuidong (east of the water), and did not include the vast Azhe-controlled territory of Shuixi (west of the water), located to the west of the Yachi River. While it is possible Liu did not know about Acha's considerable Shuixi domain, not to mention Ailu's preparations to attack Shuixi from Wusa, he nonetheless bestowed upon Acha the lofty title of pacification commissioner of Shunyuan, thereby making Acha a nominal official of the very same Yuan state Saiyid, Ailu, and all the other Yuan officials in the region were a part of.[60] Surprisingly, Acha's surrender to the Grand *Qan* and appointment to the post of pacification inspector failed to insulate Acha and the Azhe kingdom from Ailu's in Wusa, or for that matter from the Grand *Qan* himself.

Even though Yuan officials from the Tanzhou branch secretariat had negotiated Acha's surrender and appointed him Shunyuan pacification commissioner, Saiyid and Ailu were still carrying out Qubilai's directive issued in mid-1279. Specifically, Qubilai ordered the Yunnan branch secretariat to pacify "Yixibuxue" (the Mongolian translation for Shuixi) and to organize an army out of former Dali troops and attack the Mian kingdom.[61] In accordance with these

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[59] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, p. 508; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 942–952; *Guizhou Shengzhi*, pp. 19–21.

[60] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 942–944, 971–974; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 472–473, 506–514. The area of Shuidong encompasses the modern cities of Guiyang, Xiuwen, and Qingzhen.

[61] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 472–473, 506–514.

orders, which were not countermanded following Acha's surrender to Liu in Xintian, by the end of 1279 Ailu had amassed an impressive army in and around the city of Wusa: Ailu's army consisted of 6,000 Mongol and Central Asian troops, 10,000 Cuan and Bo troops from the Zhongqing area of central Yunnan, and another 10,000 Yaocihai and Wanjiannu troops from western Sichuan.[62] In addition, a Mongol force of about 10,000 troops under the command of Yesudinger had taken up position to the south of the city of Luzhou in order to attack Yixibuxue from the north. Finally, the ruthless Central Asian commander, Alihaya, had moved his personal cavalry of Central Asian warriors, estimated to be as large as 8,000 men, into eastern Chitugeer, despite assurances from Liu Jichang that his Tanzhou forces were firmly in control of the area.[63] Due to an unusually large snowfall during the winter months of 1279–1280, the armies from Yunnan and Sichuan did little more than provoke skirmishes with Azhe forces along the western edge of Yixibuxue; however, by the sixth month of 1280, the weather cleared and Ailu attacked Yixibuxue. To justify this action, Ailu announced that Acha had "rebelled" three months earlier, thus precipitating the invasion.

As Ailu and Yesudinger's armies attacked Yixibuxue from the west, Liu Jichang and his subordinates in Xintian scrambled to determine if Acha had in fact "rebelled." Liu Jichang ordered a military commander stationed in Bozhou, Li Dehui (1252–1297), to send a delegation into Shuixi to meet with Acha.[64] Five weeks later, Li Dehui's delegation emerged from the mountains of Yixibuxue leading a large delegation of Azhe officials and a gift of one thousand horses. Acha himself did not make the difficult journey to Bozhou due to ill health, but he did send two younger brothers and one son to deliver a let-

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According to several sources, the Chinese characters for "Yixibuxue" represent a transliteration of the Mongol script used to render "Shuixi" into Mongolian; in addition, the Mongolian script was apparently a transliteration of the indigenous Nuosu (Cuan or Yi) characters for "Shuixi."

[62] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 472–473; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 508–511, 983–989; *Yuan shi*, Ailu zhuan, *juan* 122, pp. 3113–3114; *Yuan shi*, Li Dehui zhuan, *juan* 123, pp. 3129–3131.

[63] Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989; *Yuan shi*, *juan* 122, pp. 3113–3114.

[64] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, p. 984; *Yuan shi*, *juan* 123, pp. 3129–3131. The term "Yixibuxue" referred to the entire area of Shuixi, as well as the main city within Shuixi. The city of Yixibuxue is present-day Dafang.

ter to Li Dehui explaining his position. According to Acha's letter, blame for the recent hostilities in Yixibuxue must be placed squarely on the shoulders of the Mongol commanders in Wusa—that is, Ailu. Acha charged that the officials in Wusa had been tricked by Acha's long-time nemesis, Wusuonuo, the patriarch of the Wumeng patriclan, into believing that he would never accept Mongol overlordship. The letter goes on to tell how the Wumeng patriclan had long coveted the territory belonging to Acha's patriclan, and now Wusuonuo was taking advantage of Mongol naiveté of the region to convince Ailu to attack Yixibuxue. Acha's letter reminded Li Dehui that he had assisted Liu Jichang in convincing Wei Changsheng, the powerful tribal leader among the Bafan, to submit to Mongol rule; also, he had submitted to Mongol rule over a year earlier and was appointed the pacification inspector of Shunyuan; and finally, he had never ordered his forces to threaten Ailu's position in Wusa.[65]

Evidently Li Dehui's negotiations with Acha's sons and retainers went well. He forwarded the information he collected from Acha's delegation to Liu Jichang in Xintian, and to Qubilai in the Yuan capital. Even though he was a relatively minor military commander, Li Dehui nonetheless forcefully recommended that hostilities toward Yixibuxue be stopped at once and that a thorough investigation of events in Wusa be ordered. Li also recommended that following Acha's death the Yuan state should confer upon his brother, Ali, the title of pacification inspector of Yixibuxue and Shunyuan, thus extending recognition to the entire territory under Azhe control. Clearly sympathetic to Acha's position, Li Dehui downplayed Acha's failure to present himself personally in Bozhou, which was a serious offense to Mongol protocol in such circumstances. Acha, according to Li Dehui's exculpatory report, was near death and the trip to Bozhou would have surely killed him.[66]

In response, an irate Qubilai blasted Li Dehui for failing to make Acha conform to Mongol protocol and submit personally to officials in Bozhou; for recommending that Acha's brother be appointed to a new office called Yixibuxue-Shunyuan pacification inspector; and most importantly, for suggesting that Mongol commanders in Yunnan

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[65] *Guizhou tongzhi* (1555), ed. Zhang Dao, *juan* 9, p. 2b; *Yuan shi, juan* 11, p. 226.
[66] *Yuan shi, juan* 123, pp. 3129–3131; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989.

and Sichuan were to blame for the escalating violence in Yixibuxue. To clear Saiyid and Ailu of such accusations, Qubilai included in this communiqué a copy of the original orders he issued to Saiyid in mid-1279 ordering Yunnan forces to attack Yixibuxue. Yet Qubilai, ever the pragmatist, also presented his military commanders with an alternative to war: he ordered Li Dehui to inform Acha that he had one month's time to personally surrender in person to Ailu in Wusa, or face attack. To make his point, Qubilai redeployed Alihaya's troops to Xintian, and ordered one thousand Mongol and Dongman ("Barbarians of the grottoes") troops to travel along the trail from Bozhou to the border of Yixibuxue in order to intimidate Acha.[67]

Acha's attempt to resolve what he considered a misunderstanding between himself and the Yuan state had failed, and Mongol forces continued to harass his villages near Wusa. In response to these provocative acts, Acha decided not to meet Ailu in Wusa, which he undoubtedly considered a one-way journey to execution, and instead opted to resist. As a result, Yunnan forces under Ailu moved forward from their positions in Wusa; Sichuan forces under Yesudinger attacked Yixibuxue from the north; Bozhou forces led by the Yang patriclan attacked from their mountain enclave to the northeast; and Tanzhou forces under Alihaya, Tahai, and Manggudai consolidated Yuan control over the Qian-Dian-Xiang highway between Xintian and Yushi before advancing north into Yixibuxue.[68] At the beginning of the campaign, Qubilai ordered that all captured Azhe soldiers were to be sent to the Mian front, but as the campaign dragged on for the next year and a half, many of the captured Azhe troops were simply incorporated into the various Mongol army units as slaves.[69]

By mid-1282, Mongol forces had pushed far into the interior of Yixibuxue and occupied the major towns of Caoni, Yixibuxue, Pingchiande, Daguzhai, and Mopoleipo.[70] Pockets of resistance con-

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[67] *Yuan shi juan* 11, pp. 227–228; *Yuan shi, juan* 123, pp. 3129–3131; *Yuan shi, juan* 123, pp. 3134–3136; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989.

[68] *Yuan shi, juan* 11, p. 230; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989.

[69] *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 240; *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 242; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989.

[70] Caoni is present-day Bijie, Yixibuxue is present-day Dafang, Pingchiande is present-day Qianxi, Daguzhai is present-day Jinsha, and Mopoleipo is present-day Zhijin.




Chitgueer (Yixibuxue) Region, ca. 1285

tinued to plague Mongol forces until the end of 1282, but by this time Yuan officials were well on their way towards carving up the former Azhe kingdom into administrative units. In this mountainous territory that extended from Bozhou in the east to Wusa in the west, and from Ayong Man (present day Shuyong in Sichuan) in the north to Luodian (present day Anshun) in the south, Yuan officials created ten prefectures (*zhou*): the Yao (Dafang), Hao (Zhijin), Lu (Bijie), Tangwang (Bijie and Shuicheng area), Jian (northeast of Dafang), Gong (Qianxi), Yi (northeast of Qianxi), and Hui (Zhijin) prefectures were located in Shuixi, while Juzhou (Guiyang) and Qingzhu (Qingzhen) prefectures were established in the Shuidong region east of the Yachi River.[71]

The eight prefectures in Yixibuxue were placed under the jurisdiction of three newly created routes: the Yixibuxue (Dafang), Pingchiande (Qianxi), and Mopoleipo (Zhijin) route commands. A route commander, *darughaci*, and contingent of Mongol troops were assigned to each route, and these Yuan officials were authorized to enfeoff influential local figures as *tuguan* officials. The routes, prefectures, and *tuguan* jurisdictions were incorporated into the newly established Shunyuan pacification commission (lit. *Shunyuan denglu junmin xuanwei shi si*, or the "pacification commission of Shunyuan and its immediate routes and tribal commands"). One of the three heroes of the Yixibuxue campaign, Suge, was appointed pacification commissioner, and the other two, Yesudaier and Yaocihai, were named chief military commander (*du yuanshuai*) and garrison commander (*zongling*), respectively.[72]

Interestingly, Suge, Yesudaier, and Yaocihai were all commanders of Sichuan armies involved in the Yixibuxue campaign, and their subordinates likewise filled important administrative posts throughout Yixibuxue. This meant that Chengdu, the administrative seat of the Sichuan branch secretariat, became responsible for rotating officials and troops into and out of Yixibuxue, and for provisioning its personnel in the region. Clearly this was no easy task. Because Yunnan and Sichuan bore the brunt of responsibility for directing the Mian

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[71] *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 244; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989. Bozhou is present-day Zunyi, Wusa is present-day Weining, Ayong Man is present-day Shuyong, in Sichuan province, and Luodian is present-day Anshun.

[72] Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 472–473, 506–514.

campaign, Mongol forces in Yixibuxue were not only stretched precariously thin, but also they lacked even basic necessities such as food, clothing, and horses to carry out policing activities in Yixibuxue. For example, when the Sanmao Revolt and the Revolt in Nine Streams and Eighteen Grottoes (*jiuxi shiba dong*) broke out along the northern periphery of Yixibuxue during the early months of 1283, Mongol commanders in Yixibuxue reported to Chengdu that disease, malnutrition, and the lack of adequate provisions prevented the garrison troops from suppressing these minor rebellions. Yaocihai, the garrison commander in Yixibuxue sent a number of dispatches to Chengdu urgently requesting supplies, but when these were not forthcoming he improvised by exchanging Yixibuxue livestock for grain with military commanders from Tanzhou and Yunnan.[73]

Yuan officials in Chengdu were not purposely abandoning their troops and officials in Yixibuxue; quite the contrary. They were well aware of the dire circumstances of their garrison troops in Yixibuxue, but there was very little they could do. Officials in Chengdu were under strict orders from Qubilai to mobilize and allocate all available resources in Sichuan for the Mian campaign. In the fourth month of 1283, officials in Chengdu had become so desperate for able-bodied men to fight in Mian that a general amnesty for criminals in Sichuan was declared, but only if they agreed to fight in Mian. As this explosive mix of exhausted troops, disgruntled civilians, freed prisoners, and ample military supplies filled the highways heading south to Yunnan and eventually Mian, the local people living along the line of march became easy targets for the raw and undisciplined recruits. The escalating violence along the main roads linking Yunnan to China proper forced Qubilai to temporarily withdraw troops from the Mian front and from Yixibuxue just to quell hostilities and hunt down deserters in Yunnan and Sichuan. As a result, almost immediately after Mongol forces occupied the remote, mountainous territory of Yixibuxue (Shuixi), they were ordered out. Yuan authorities in Chengdu had no other recourse but to turn over the day-to-day running of the administrative units in Yixibuxue to the local population.[74]

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[73] *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 247; *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 255. Shang Shexiong, the former rebel leader, was named the military commissioner of the various grottoes of Youba.

[74] *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 248; *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 254. When, in 1282, the Yunnan

### *The Yixibuxue Pacification Commission*

To deal with the growing level of anti-Mongol violence, Yuan officials decided in the fourth month of 1283 to concentrate Mongol and Central Asian forces in the main urban centers in the southwest, and to rely on the indigenous elite to govern the non-urban and non-strategic areas of southern Sichuan, Yunnan, and the recently pacified Chitugeer region. As soon as this new directive was announced, Yesudaier, the chief military commander of the Shunyuan pacification commission, was ordered back to Chengdu and placed in charge of the Sichuan provincial garrison. Chengdu had been under siege by rebel bands since the beginning of the year, and the number of Mongol troops stationed in Chengdu had dwindled to only a few hundred. Yaocihai, the garrison commander in the town of Yixibuxue, replaced Yesudaier as Shunyuan's chief military commander, but before he assumed his new posting he was ordered to select a new garrison commander and train a new garrison force for the town of Yixibuxue (Dafang). In doing so, he was ordered to rely solely on the indigenous population. In addition, Yaocihai was asked to offer recommendations on how to reduce the burdensome task of governing the entire Yixibuxue portion of the Shunyuan pacification commission.[75]

After a couple of months of heated exchanges between Yaocihai, provincial leaders in Chengdu, and officials assigned to the Shunyuan pacification commission, Yaocihai was granted permission to carry out a series of reforms that would eventually place the Azhe patriclan back in power in the Yixibuxue region of Chitugeer. First, remnant Mongol garrisons were withdrawn altogether and replaced by indigenous garrison forces led by native commanders. Yaocihai personally selected the garrison commanders from among the indigenous elite, but he allowed the commanders to build their own forces. Second, Yaocihai removed the Yixibuxue region from Shunyuan

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branch secretariat ordered Amou, the patriarch of the Wusa patriclan and head of the Wusa tribal command since 1278, to send Wusa reinforcements to the Miandian front, he rebelled. Soldiers from Sichuan heading for Miandian instead found themselves fighting in Wusa throughout much of 1282 and 1283. Eventually the central government decided to insure Yuan control of the Wumeng road, so in 1284 it established the Wusa-Wumeng pacification commission and staffed it with Mongol and Central Asian administrators. Fang Guoyu, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 470–71.

[75] *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 253; *Guizhou Shengzhi*, pp. 18–35; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989.

pacification commission control and established an entirely independent Yixibuxue office of pacification inspector. Yaocihai appointed none other than Ali, the younger brother of Acha, to be not only the pacification inspector of Yixibuxue, but also the route commander of the Yixibuxue route. This dual appointment ensured that Ali and the Azhe patriclan would once again control the political landscape of Yixibuxue. Finally, Yaocihai withdrew Mongol forces from the Shuidong region east of the Yachi River and appointed Song Tianfu (d. 1307), a member of the illustrious Song family that had lived in the Shuidong area since the closing years of the Tang dynasty, to the post of Shunyuan battalion commander (*qianhu*), with authority over the entire Shuidong region, including area formerly controlled by the Azhe patriclan.[76]

Although the Mongol occupation of Yixibuxue was brief, the institutional foundation of Yuan extra-bureaucratic offices had an impact not only on the future political development of Yixibuxue, but also on how later Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) officials viewed the Yixibuxue (Shuixi) region. When officials of the Ming dynasty visited the region for the first time one hundred years later, in 1381–1382, they were surprised to find the non-Chinese (Chinese texts describe these people as Luoluo, the present-day Nuosu) peoples living in this remote part of the southwest governing their territory with an elaborate network of bureaucratic offices. In place of the ten Yuan prefectures created in 1282, the Ming travelers found the region divided into thirteen granaries (*zexi*), and each granary was governed by an official called *zimo*—usually a member of the extended Azhe patriclan.[77]

Subordinate to the thirteen *zimo* were forty-eight *muzhuo* (*tumu* in Chinese texts) offices. The *zimo* and *muzhuo* of Yixibuxue appointed

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[76] *Yuan shi, juan* 12, pp. 255–56; *Yuan shi, juan* 12, p. 256; Fang, *Yizu shigao*, pp. 508–515; Fang, *Zhongguo xinan lishi*, pp. 971–974, 983–989. Yaocihai was quite familiar with Ali, for he had named Ali battalion commander of Yixibuxue soon after the Mongol forces pacified the town of Yixibuxue. Prior to this appointment Song Tianfu had been a tribal commander stationed in the Shuidong portion of the Shunyuan route; but with this new appointment, and the near total withdrawal of Yuan officials from the region, Song became the sole Yuan authority in Shuidong.

[77] "Shuixi dadu he jianshiqiao ji," in *Cuanwen congke*, p. 184; "Tudi minnu he zexi de guanli," *Cuanwen congke*, pp. 115–141; Meng Xian, "Liangshan Yizu 'zimo tongzhi shiqi' chutan," *Xinan minzu yanjiu* (Chengdu, 1987), pp. 277–309; Hu, *Ming Qing Yizu*, pp. 31–33; Li Qing, "Guizhou Yizu tusi yange kao," *Guizhou Wenshi Congkan*, 4:69 (1996), pp. 35–36.

individuals, usually relatives, to additional sub-*zimo* and *muzhuo* administrative posts called *jiuzong* and *jiuche*. The *jiuzong* assistants were given offices and residences in the vicinity of the *zimo* and *muzhuo* yamens, and they provided advice on policy decisions. On the other hand, *jiuche* assistants were given field assignments, such as guarding strategic mountain passes and patrolling important transportation routes. The *muzhuo* also appointed individuals to subordinate political offices called *mayi* and *yixu*, and reportedly there were 120 *mayi* and 1,200 *yixu* offices managing nearly 7,000 villages (*zhai*) throughout the Yixibuxue region.[78] Individuals appointed to the *muzhuo, mayi*, and *yixu* territorial offices and to the *jiuzong* and *jiuche* administrative posts did not receive a salary but were awarded a grant of land by the *zimo*. If these individuals performed their tasks successfully, then their sons were allowed to inherit the post; however, if their performance proved less than satisfactory, then the family would be required to return the land grant and the post would be awarded to another individual. Later Ming and Qing sources described the *zexi* (granary) system as a local adaptation of the Yuan institutions established in Yixibuxue during the 1280s, not as an indigenous political institution. In short, although Yuan control of Yixibuxue (Shuixi) was surprisingly brief, later Chinese writings point to this time of Mongol control and the remnant political institutions, the *zexi* system, as one justification for "recovering" or "returning" the region to Chinese rule.

## *Conclusion*

Most historical texts treat the Dali campaign as a minor act in a much larger drama, the Mongol conquest of Song China, and in so doing assume that the campaign was a complete success following the Mongol capture of Dali in 1253. However, this essay has argued that even after the capture of Dali in 1253, the Mongol campaign in the southwest was far from a complete success. Armed resistance to the Mongol occupation of the southwest continued for another thirty years, or until Mongol forces fresh from defeating Song China were deployed to the southwest from China proper. Even then, the

[78] Ibid.

lack of centralized military coordination, not to mention the exceedingly ambitious Mongol campaigns into Mian and Vietnam, prevented the Yuan military from consolidating its control over large portions of the southwest. In other words, by the end of the thirteenth century the territory formerly associated with the Dali kingdom was still not fully incorporated into the polity of Yuan China.

This essay has suggested that part of the reason for the Mongol misfortune in the southwest stems from the very methods used to subjugate the region. First, instead of expending precious military capital in battle, Mongol commanders opted to negotiate their way to victory. The advantages of negotiation over warfare are clear, especially for an attacking force; but once the negotiations were completed, the Mongols were obliged to rely on indigenous collaborators to govern the territory, and these collaborators were not entirely sympathetic to Mongol rule. When Mongol armies requisitioned men and material from these collaborators for additional campaigns into Chitugeer, Vietnam, and Mian, the collaborators frequently resisted Mongol demands because such requests directly undermined their own political survival. In this pre-modern setting, military capital was a finite resource only to be used if the political benefits outweighed the military costs. By demanding men and material for distant campaigns, the Mongols placed their indigenous collaborators in a dangerously precarious position: they either provided the Mongols with the military capital requested, thereby running the risk of inciting local antipathy to their rule; or they refused such requests and faced the Mongol wrath. In the southwest, many of the collaborators decided to face the Mongol wrath and not antagonize their local population.

Second, the ethnic complexion of Mongol forces in the southwest presented an air of uncertainty and vulnerability to the Mongol campaigns. Mongol, Central Asian, and Chinese forces combined to assist Qubilai in his campaign against Dali in 1253, but as Uriyangqadai and Saiyid moved east toward the intermediate zone of Chitugeer, Mongol forces relied increasingly on soldiers indigenous to the recently conquered Dali and Shanchan regions of Yunnan. Uriyangqadai's initial stab into Chitugeer ended in failure, as indigenous collaborators in the Shanchan region rebelled against Mongol rule. Twenty years later, Saiyid was ordered to resume the campaign, but again the operation bogged down in the Wumeng mountains; however, this time Chinese and Central Asian troops from China proper

approached Chitugeer from the east, thereby encircling the region and ensuring victory. But even in victory the patchwork of Yuan armies resembled less a well-orchestrated military machine, and more a confused array of personal armies out for their own spoils of war. Communications between field commanders appeared confrontational, and the center did little to reduce these tensions. In fact, the center exacerbated the hostile climate by failing to curb its own appetite for military conquest. As we have seen, the Mian campaign seriously jeopardized Mongol control of the entire southwest, and it surely undermined any chance of extending direct Yuan state control over the region.

Finally, this essay examined the role of extra-bureaucratic offices as a means of both extending geo-political boundaries and controlling conquered territory. Our description of the Mongol occupation of former Dali territory traced the development of a series of extra-bureaucratic offices that were quite different from the *Jimi fuzhou* (haltered and bridled prefectures) administrative units employed by the Tang and Song states. Clearly the administrative institutions and extra-bureaucratic offices imparted on Yixibuxue (Shuixi) by the Mongols had a significant impact on the future development of the Yixibuxue political economy; but more importantly, the Yuan model of extra-bureaucratic offices described in this essay was ultimately shaped into an elaborate institutional network of *tusi* offices, and incorporated into the Ming and Qing repertoire of bureaucratic offices for governing China's frontiers.

## Glossary

Acha 阿察 (d. 1285)
Ailu 愛魯 (d. 1287)
Ali 阿利
Alihaya 阿里海牙
Amou 阿牟
anfu si (military commissioner) 安撫司
Anshun 安順
Ayong Man 阿永蠻
Azhe 阿哲
Bafan (eight barbarians) 八蕃
Bijie 畢節
Bo 僰
Bole 播勒
Bozhou 播州
bu (district Dali kingdom) 部
Caoni 漕泥
Chengdu 成都
chengxiang (grand councilor) 丞相
Chishui 赤水
Chitugeer 赤禿哥兒
Chuan (Sichuan) 川
Cuan 爨
Da Longfan 大龍蕃
Dafang 大方
Daguzhai 打鼓寨
Dali (934–1253) 大理
dao (circuit) 道
darughachi (political resident) 達魯花赤
Dechang 德昌
Deshi 德施
dian (prefecture, Dali kingdom) 殿
Dian (Yunnan) 滇
Dongchuan 東川
Dongman (grotto barbarians) 洞蠻
du yuanshuai (chief military commander) 都元帥
Duan Xingzhi (d. 1273) 段興智
fu (superior prefectures) 府
gaochi (certificate of appointment) 誥敕
gong (tribute) 貢
Gong 龔
Guangxi 廣西
guiman (spirit barbarians) 鬼蠻
Guiyang 貴陽
Guizhou 貴州

guizhu (spirit masters) 鬼住
Han (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) 漢
Hao 郝
Hezhang 赫章
hufu (tiger-shaped tally) 虎符
Hui 暉
Jian 犍
Jianchang 建昌
jiedu shi 節度使
jimi fu (haltered and bridled prefectures) 羈縻府
jin yin ziyuan fu (gold and silver tallies) 金銀字圓符
Jinsha 金沙
jiuche 九撦
jiuxi shiba dong (nine streams and eighteen grottoes) 九溪十八洞
jiuzong 九綜
junmin zongguan fu (tribal command) 軍民總官府
juntun (military farm) 軍屯
Juzhou 矩州
Kainan 開南
Kunming 昆明
Li Dehui (1252–1297) 李德輝
Liu Jichang (d. 1291) 劉繼昌
lu (route) 路
Lu 祿
lu zongguan fu (route commander) 路總官府
Luodian 羅甸
Luoluo 玀玀
Luoluosi 玀玀司
Luoshi guiguo (spirit kingdom of the Luo clan) 玀氏鬼國
Luzhou 瀘州
Mayi 禡裔
Mian 緬
mintun (civilian farm) 民屯
Mopoleipo 莫波淚波
muzhuo 穆濯
Nanzhao (762–902) 南詔
paizi (badges of authority) 牌字
Pingchiande 平池安的
Qian (Guizhou) 黔
qianhu suo (battalion) 千戶所
Qianxi 黔西
Qingzhen 清鎮
Qingzhu 清諸
Qujing 曲靖
Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din (d. 1286) 賽典赤贍思丁
Shanchan 善闡
shang 上

Sheliwei (d. 1274) 舍利畏
Shuidong 水東
Shuixi 水西
Shunyuan 順元
Shuyong 叔永
Sichuan 四川
Song (960–1279) 宋
Song Tianfu (d. 1307) 宋添富
Suge 速哥
Tahai 塔海
Tang (618–906) 唐
Tangwang 湯望
Tanzhou 潭州
tuguan (native official) 土官
tumu (tribal leader) 土目
tuqiu weiguan (to make officials out of native chiefs) 土酋爲官
tusi (native offices) 土司
Uriyangqadai (d. 1266) 兀良合台
wanhu (brigade commander) 萬戶
wanhu fu (military brigades) 萬戶府
Wang Dezhen (d. 1259) 汪德臣
Wei Changsheng 韋昌盛
Weichu 威楚
Wuding 武定
Wumeng 烏蒙
Wusa 烏撒
Wusuonuo 烏鎖諾
xia 下
xian (districts) 縣
Xiang (Huguang) 湘
Xiangyang 襄陽
xing zhongshu sheng pingzhang zhengshi (manager of governmental affairs for the branch secretariat) 行中書省平章政事
Xintian 新添
xinzhi (patent of investiture) 信紙
xuanfu si (pacification inspector) 宣撫司
xuanwei si (pacification commissioner) 宣慰司
Yachi 鴨池
Yaocihai 藥剌海
Yesudinger 也速答兒
Yi 義
yinxin (seal) 印信
Yixibuxue 亦奚不薛
yizhan (postal relay stations) 驛站
yinzhang 印章
yixu 奕續
yizhuan (courier) 驛傳

Yunnan 雲南
Yushi 于矢
zexi (granary) 則溪
zhaidong (village) 寨洞
zhaotaosi (military commander) 招討司
Zhijin 織金
zhou (prefecture) 州
zimo 茲莫
zongling (garrison commander) 總領

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PART THREE

# THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD (1400–1800)

# MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE MANCHU WARS AGAINST THE ČAQARS

Nicola Di Cosmo

The war fought by Hung Taiji (Qing Taizong, r. 1627–1643) and his Mongol allies against the Čaqar leader Ligdan Khan was a defining moment in the rise of Manchu power to the north of the Great wall.[1] Throughout the political and military confrontation, which lasted from 1619 to 1633, alliances were forged between several Mongols tribes and the Manchus, which were crucial to the growth of the Manchu state. Most Mongols simply joined the Manchus out of a desire for survival or revenge against their Čaqar enemies. They not only accepted Manchu sovereignty but were absorbed into the very fabric of the Manchu military and political machine, the Eight Banner system. The type of relationship that was established between Hung Taiji and several Mongol leaders also gave the Manchus the possibility to issue laws among the Mongols and to assume the role of judicial authority. At the end of the Čaqar wars, the political map of inter-Mongol and Manchu-Mongol relations had been fully redrawn, and the Manchus had eliminated a most serious challenge, while the incorporation of the tribes of eastern and southern Mongolia strengthened enormously their position against the Ming.[2]

By the rise to power of Hung Taiji, hostilities between Čaqars and Manchus had been brewing for some time, as both of them had been engaged in nation-building efforts whose success rested on their respective ability to control increasing amounts of human and economic resources. The early stage of this confrontation can be traced back to 1619, when the brash Ligdan decided to occupy the Chinese city of Guangning, a frontier trading post whose importance lay in its horse markets.[3] Access to the markets and to the

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[1] On Ligdan Khan see Walther Heissig, *Die Zeit des letzten mongolischen Grosskhans Ligdan (1604–1634).* (Opladen, 1979).

[2] On the history of the Mongol tribes south of the Gobi in the late Ming see the excellent work by Dalizhabu, *Mingdai Mo nan Menggu lishi yanjiu*, pp. 251–336 (Hailar, 1997).

[3] On this see Michael Weiers, "Die Kuang-Ning Affäre, Beginn des Zerwürfnisses

revenues and food supplies that could be obtained through trade with China were crucial factors to Ligdan's strategy of regional dominance. On the other hand the Manchus, being by now openly at war with the Ming, whose large expeditionary army had been crushed at the battle of Mount Sarhû, were on the verge of launching a campaign of territorial expansion into Chinese areas, leading eventually to their conquest of Liaodong.[4] Clearly, Ligdan's independent actions to control the areas into which the Manchus were planning to expand set the two leaders on a collision course. While direct hostilities had not yet come to the surface, the language of diplomatic relations between Nurhaci and Ligdan became more intransigent and left no room for a reconciliation.[5] As the diplomatic situation deteriorated, the other Mongol tribes were placed in the extremely uncomfortable position of having to choose between the two camps, knowing perfectly well that the wrong choice could cost them dearly. In addition, in the 1620s the Ming were far from an inconsiderable military presence in the region, and represented an alternative possibility for economic and military support, which attracted at least some Mongols, such as the Bayarin. The system of Mongol-Manchu relations was made even more complex by the network of marital and family ties established between the various tribes as a common means of expanding one's political reach. The fact that Ligdan's wife Sutai was the granddaughter of the Yehe chieftain Gintaisi, a fierce adversary of Nurhaci's who had been killed with the destruction of the Yehe tribe, contributed to making their mutual relations even more tense.

The situation became more heated after Nurhaci's defeat at the hands of the Chinese general Yuan Chonghuan in 1626, when Manchu troops were repelled as they attempted in vain to storm the Ming fortress of Ningyuan.[6] Nurhaci himself died a few months later presumably as a result of wounds suffered in this battle. Considering

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zwischen den Mongolischen Tsakhar und den Manschuren," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979): 73–91. On the general issue of horse trade during the Ming see Morris Rossabi, "The Tea and Hose Trade in inner Asian during the Ming," *Journal of Asian History* 4.2 (1970): 136–168.

[4] Ray Huang, "The Liao-tung Campaign of 1619," *Oriens Extremus* 28.1 (1981): 30–54.

[5] Veronika Veit, "Die mongolischen Völkerschaften vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1691," in *Die Mongolen: Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur*, ed. Michael Weiers, p. 397 (Darmstadt, 1986).

[6] There are many studies on the Ningyuan battle. One of the best, especially

the leadership crisis that followed the death of Nurhaci and the weaker position of the Manchus, it is not surprising that the Čaqar stepped up their military challenge.[7] On the Manchu side, the political direction and "management" of the relations with the Mongol tribes was from the beginning in the hands of Hung Taiji, and for the first eight years of his reign the struggle with the Čaqar continued to occupy him politically and militarily.

Under both Nurhaci (Qing Taizu, r. 1616–1626) and Hung Taiji, many Mongols joined the Manchus as a direct or indirect consequence of the Čaqar wars. For instance, the Bayut joined the Manchus on 24 February 24 1624, and the Qorčin under Oba with the Jalayid, Dörbed and Gorlos concluded a treaty on 3 April 1624. On 15 August 1627 the Aoqan and the Naiman joined with the Manchus, and on 14 December 1627 the first Čaqar cheiftains defected to the Manchu camp. The Baγarin joined Hung Taiji, after a rather troubled relationship, on 28 May 28 1628, and some chiefs of the Qaračin swore an oath on 31 August 1628.[8] The Tümed presented tribute on 2 August 1629. The Dörben-Keüked joined on 31 December 1630, followed by the Ongniγud in 1631, by the Kesigten in 1633, and by the Moomingγan on 10 March 1634. The large Qalqa confederation first entered a treaty on 6 December 1619 but relations were not smooth. Various Qalqa groups joined at different stages (e.g., on 30 December 1621, and 27 March 1622).[9] When Ligdan finally fled Mongolia, in 1634, the territory, size, and political affiliation of the southern Mongol tribes had been entirely transformed.

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with the respect to the broader military context is: Yan Chongnian, "Lun Ningyuan zhengju," in Yan Chongnian, *Manxue lunji*, pp. 110–45 (Beijing, 1999).

[7] On 18 April 1622 Nurhaci issued an edict that sanctioned a system of collective rulership of a council of eight *hošoi beile* (Cardinal Noblemen) who not only nominate the Han but can also demote him. The position of the Han was initially subordinated to the collective will of the council. Hung Taiji was elected Han on 21 October 1626, and swore an oath that admitted to his initial subordination to the other Councillors. See *Tongki Fuka Sindaha Hergen I Dangse: 'The Secret Chronicles of the Manchu Dynasty' 1607–1637 A.D.* Trans. and Annotated by Kanda Nobuo, et al., vol. 2, pp. 554–58 (Tokyo, 1955–1963) (hereafter TFSHD). On this system see also Zhou Yuanlian, "Hou Jin ba heshuo beile 'gongzhi guozheng' lun," *Qingshi luncong* 2 (1980): 244–62. On the accession of Hung Taiji see also Jiang Liangqi, *Dong Hua Lu* (Beijing, 1980), pp. 16–17.

[8] TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 138–139.

[9] See Veit, "Die mongolischen Völkerschaften," pp. 398–99, and Weiers, "Die Kuang-Ning Affäre," pp. 78–79.

How did the Manchus win this war? The historiography has concentrated on general flaws in the Čaqar leadership, especially on Ligdan's scorched-earth strategy that alienated potential allies.[10] Yet scorched-earth campaigns were nothing new in Inner Asian warfare, and were not, by definition, doomed to fail. This essay explores more closely some of the strategic and tactical aspects of these wars, in particular logistic questions, military regulations and discipline, treatment of refugees and the conduct of troops of both sides, tactical aspects in respect both to battles fought in the steppes and the use of static fortifications, and finally diplomatic and political aspects that impinged closely upon military operations.

## *Logistic issues: the rendezvous problem*

Strategy in steppe warfare traditionally required meticulous preparation and precise arrangements.[11] The most difficult part of the preparation stage of a military campaign was the coordination among the various groups of armed men that were to take part in the expedition, and, once time and place had been fixed by sending messengers back and forth, it was imperative that everyone be punctual. Failure to observe this obligation could potentially lead to disastrous consequences for the party left to fend for itself. It is therefore not surprising that missing a rendezvous was an offense that typically carried grave consequences.

This is the case of an episode in the turbulent relationship between the Manchus and the Qorčin tribe, led by Tüsiyetü Khan, which led to Hung Taiji's public denunciation of his "three crimes and nine sins." Two of these "sins" refer specifically to the Qorčin leader's failure to cooperate adequately in military operations against the Čaqar. Hung Taiji thundered: "Many times you [Tüsiyetü Khan] sent envoys to us wishing that we would send an army against the

[10] See, for instance, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1, p. 202, n. 136. (Berkeley, 1985).

[11] See Denis Sinor, "On Mongol Strategy," in *Proceeding of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference*, ed. Ch'en Chieh-hsien, pp. 238–249 (Tainan, 1975) [rpt. Denis Sinor, *Inner Asia and its Contacts with Medieval Europe*, XVI (London, 1977)].

Čaqars. In fact, when we resolved to send an army, you did not come [to the rendezvous],[12] and while we were confronting an enemy state, you withdrew early; is this how you are going to reach an old age? This evil scheme in which you did not keep your own word is your eighth sin."[13] As it is reported in the Manchu sources, Hung Taiji was extremely angry ("*ambula jili*")[14] at the failure of the Qorčin to join the expedition.

Similar anger was directed at the Manchu leader by the Tümed leader Jobiltu Qong Taiji for failing to join an expedition against the Čaqar in 1629. The text of the document speaks for itself:

> Sečen Qaγan, you presented a letter to these many noblemen: Jolbitai Qong Taiji, Oombu Čügekür Taiji, Aγun Sonum Taiji, and Abatai Taiji, [which said:] "Did the Čaqar Qaγan seize anything from me? The well-known reason for my setting out on an expedition [against the Čaqar] is that the Qaγan of the Qaračin, Donui Günji, and Buyan Qong Taiji sent a messenger to me, asking that I avenge [them] against [their] enemy. They said that the evil-minded black Qaγan [*i.e.*, Ligdan] killed all the noblemen of the eastern Mongol tribes, and [aked] that I should destroy him."
>
> When I heard that, I thought that these words were right, and swearing an oath to Heaven I set out on an expedition. But you did not join this alliance. Were [then] the Čaqar your ally, while they were our enemy? Now you do not think anything of us. I am furious at you [*bi tandu aγurlanam bi*]. If you wish to cleanse this fault of yours, immediately find out about the people of the Black Qaγan, and send immediately a messenger here. While I was riding [against the Čaqar], you had gone far enough to reach the border [of Čaqar territory]; why did you not proceed [to attack them]?
>
> Are the Mongol tribes of the right wing, headed by the noblemen Bošuγ-tu Qaγan, Jinong Qaγan, Yunγšiyebu, and the Qaračin Qaγan, not relatives of yours? Are they [only] my relatives? Why do you not know your relatives?[15]

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[12] On this expedition see TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 176–78. This took place on 13 October 1628.

[13] *Arban dolodugar jaγun-u emün-e qaγas-tu qolbaγdaqu mongγol-un bičig debter. Shiqi shiji menggu wen wenshu dang'an (1600–1650)*, ed. Li Baowen, pp. 35–37 (Tongliao, 1997) (hereafter AQMBD). The Manchu version is reported in the TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 184:4–8.

[14] TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 177:11.

[15] AQMBD, pp. 137–39.

While the Mongol chieftain was understandably irate, his anger did not lead to a breach with the Manchus, who later on even rewarded his son with a high-ranking post.[16]

Given the seriousness of the offence, several chiefs tried to justify a missed rendezvous and prevent retaliatory action. Darqan Taiji, that is, the Dörbet chief Aduči, sent Hung Taiji a letter of apology in November-December 1628 in which he attempted to justify his failure to appear at the rendezvous for the planned expedition against the Čaqar—the same which Tüsiyetü Khan and other Mongol chiefs had also deserted. According to the document in question, Darqan Taiji claimed to have sent a messenger to another Mongol chief (the brother of Tüsiyetü Khan, Qatan Baγatur) announcing that he was going to be late at the rendezvous and requesting instructions. Then waited for a messenger to be sent back to him. After several days, this messenger had not yet arrived, and when the Mongol chief finally heard that Hung Taiji's army had already left the rendezvous place, he set out trying to catch up with the main army, but did not succeed, at which point he turned back.[17] In practice, he was shifting the blame from himself to Tüsiyetü and his brother, who failed to send instructions.

Another document, sent by an unknown Mongol chieftain around 1632 to Hung Taiji, explains the reason for a failed rendezvous with Hife Bagsi.[18] The troops led by the Mongol chieftain had been delayed initially because they had to fight some enemies on the way. They sent a messenger ahead to inform Hife of the delay, but when they finally arrived at the rendezvous place Hife was no longer there, and since no words came from either Hife or the Manchu army, they turned back. Other reasons mentioned by the author of this document to exculpate himself were that the soldiers lacked "suits of armor"—meaning that they were not sufficiently equipped to undertake a campaign—and that he needed to take care of the wounded.[19]

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[16] A record of this episode can be seen in the TFSHD vol. 6, pp. 1103:7–8.

[17] AQMBD, pp. 3–4.

[18] Hife (d. 1652) was a prominent Manchu commander and statesman, well versed in languages and often in charge of diplomatic relations, in Mongol documents his name is Kibe Baγsi. See Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 663 (Washington, 1943; [rpt. Taipei, 1970)].

[19] AQMBD, p. 157.

While punctuality was of crucial importance to the proper functioning of a military joint operations, those who missed the rendezvous could present apologies and justifications, and although trust must have been eroded by such episodes, they rarely led to an automatic breach of diplomatic relations, retaliations, or war. As we can see below, these offences were usually dealt with as breaches of military procedure, which incurred certain specific penalties and sanctions.

## *Regulations*

Several sources mention regulations that the army and their commanders had to observe while in the field. I have selected here two examples: the first refers to the rules to be observed in preparation of a military expedition. The second refers to the discipline of the troops in battle. The latter were issued in Manchu when an expeditionary army was assembled; copies in Mongol were handed out to the Mongol allies and read aloud to the troops by their commanders.

A decree issued on 3 March 1629 by Hung Taiji to various Mongol leaders, of which we have the Mongol version, expresses some of the main concerns and relative rules.[20] The document distinguishes between the regulations to be observed in the campaign against the Čaqars and those that apply instead to campaigns against the Ming. Against the Čaqar, all the members of the aristocracy between the ages of thirteen and seventy-three were obliged to join. The noblemen who could not join the campaign, however, could pay a fine of one hundred horses and ten camels. Further fines were postulated for those who failed to arrive at the place of rendezvous at the appointed time, in the following order: ten horses for those who fail to arrive within three days from the established time, and one hundred horses and ten camels for those who do not arrive by the time the whole army had set out.

When the army faced the Chinese, then each "large banner" was supposed to provide "one hundred good soldiers" under the leadership of a ruling nobleman (Mo. *jasaq noyan*, Ma. *dalaha taiji*) and two

[20] AQMBD, pp. 47–49.

princes.[21] The punishment for failing to join was one thousand horses and one hundred camels to be taken from the "large banner." The same penalty was imposed for failing to arrive at the rendezvous place by the time the army set out, while only ten horses were to be paid in case they joined the main body of the army with a delay of more than three days. Those who took individual action and attacked before joining the other troops at the rendezvous were to be charged a fine of one hundred horses and ten camels. The time required by an army to reach the place of the rendezvous was calculated with an "excess" of five days, that is, fifteen days were allocated to cover the distance of ten-day march and twenty days for a fifteen-day march.

Additional regulations referred to the obligation for the nobleman in charge to deal effectively with any type of criminal behavior that may arise among his troops. Severe fines and punishments were imposed in case a messenger from the Manchu khan was beaten, delayed, or was not given an appropriate replacement horse. At the same time, the envoys were punished in case they tried to use horses they were not supposed to ride.

As we can see, a delay of more than three days was not punished, and sufficient extra time was allocated to minimize the possibility that appointments may be missed. The main distinction made between the campaigns against the Čaqars and those against the Ming seems to seem to concern in particular the type of military levy. Whereas with regard to the Čaqars this was universal, only a portion of the potentially available troops was supposed to take part in the operations against the Ming. Also, whereas in the first case the fines were allocated individually, in the second it seems that the whole tribe would have to answer for their leaders' misdemeanours.

A similar set of regulations are reported in the Manchu annals, dated 12 May 1631,[22] but this text is more extensive, and includes a larger number of provisions and possible violations.[23] For instance, with respect to what legal codes should be applied and under what circumstances, the text says:

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[21] On the Mongol "banner" *qosiγu*, and on the meaning of Ruling Nobleman see J. Legrand, *L'Administration dans la domination Sino-Mandschue en Mongolie Qalq-a*, pp. 105–123 (Paris, 1976).

[22] TFSHD vol. 5, pp. 504–508.

[23] The Mongol text of these regulations can also be found in the *Jiu Manzhou Dang* (Old Manchu Archives). It is translated in Michael Weiers, "Mandschu-

> When a Manchu goes to the Qorčin and Abaγa and commits a crime, [the crime] must be dealt with according to the laws of the Qorčin an Abaγa. When a Qorčin and Abaγa goes to the Manchus and commits a crime, [this crime] must be dealt with according to the rules of the Manchus. When one commits a crime exactly in the middle of two nations, [the crime] must be dealt with according to each person's laws.[24]

This type of provision shows that, in a situation in which different legal and customary traditions came into close contact, order needed to be reaffirmed beyond the specific requirements of a given military campaign, but in relations to any level of interaction: while ethnic traditions were respected, the law-issuing authority rested with the Manchus.

The same document also includes provisions regarding the refugees, both to protect their legal rights, as they were often subject to mistreatment, and to punish them in case of misconduct. In keeping with the aristocratic nature of Manchu and Mongol societies, differences in treatment existed between nobles and commoners, but also between hereditary nobles and nobles in a position of political authority. For instance, one rule established that "when the *noyan* of the Nonni-Qorčin, Abaγa, Auqan, Naiman, Qalqa, Qaračin and Tümed commit a robbery, they should forfeit one hundred horses and ten camels. When a commoner commits a robbery, one should kill the thief, and take his wife and son without getting any money and give them [to the victim]." Another rule set the penalty for a nobleman that injured state-owned horses at twenty horses and two camels, but members of the hereditary nobility would pay only half of that. The supreme judicial authority, above any Mongol authority, remained Hung Taiji.[25]

An altogether different type of regulations refers to the behavior of the troops towards the enemy. The text of the document can be quoted *in extenso*:[26]

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Mongolische Strafgesetze aus dem Jahre 1631 und deren Stellung in der Gesetzgebung der Mongolen," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979): 137–90.

[24] TFSHD vol. 5, pp. 506–507.

[25] We refer here expressly to the Mongol version included in the old-script Manchu documents, or *Chiu Man-chou Tang* (CMCT); see Weiers, "Mandschu-Mongolische Strafgesetze aus dem Jahre 1631," pp. 152–57.

[26] TFSHD vol. 5, pp. 756–57. See also a similar set of regulations issued a few days later, on pp. 762–63.

> On the 28th (of the fourth month of the sixth year of Tiancong [15 June 1632]) after resting, the commanders of the Jušen, Mongol and Nikan troops gathered their soldiers and read alod the imperial decree: "By decree of the Han: In the areas under military occupation, kill whoever resists or flees; do not kill those who do not resist. Do not separate husbands and wives; do not have intercourse with women before the prisoners have been distributed. If you separate husbands and wives, or rape women, these are capital crimes. If you kill people who do not resist, or remove and take the clothes they wear, your [portion of] booty will be reduced and [this part] given to the plaintiff, and you will be beaten according to the crime. You can only kill a pig or a chicken, but cannot kill a sheep, or goat or larger animal. If you do, an equivalent amount will be deducted from your [allocated] booty and given to the plaintiff, and will be beaten according to the crime. Do not destroy temples. Do not loot any of the paraphernalia placed in the temple to perform rituals. If you disobey, this is capital crime. Do not take prisoner [lit. loot] the monks who live in the temple and do not take anything that belongs to them. Make a record of the number of monks [in the temple] and report it. If there are people or livestock who have fled inside the temple, take them. Do not set up camp inside the temple's premises." A Mongol copy of this document has been made and distributed to each of the chieftains of each tribe of the Korcin, Jarut, Aru, Aohan, Naiman, Karacin, and Jalait.

It may be of interest to compare these rules with those of another document issued in the course of an expedition against the Ming, issued on 4 December 1629 as the troops were resting at the Qaračin city of Qara Qota in the course of an expedition against the Ming garrison at Hongshankou. This text says:

> Kill anyone fighting you. Do not seize any [animal] larger than a pig or a chicken from the people who surrender. Of the people taken as booty, do not separate father and son or husband and wife, do not rape women; do not take their clothes and wear them; do not ruin houses and temples; do not damage any arm or weapon; do not chop down fruit trees. Those who, disregarding these words, kill surrendered people, or rape women, will be killed. Those who ruin houses and buildings, chop down fruit trees, take their clothes, or, splitting from their unit, rake up a village, will be beaten to death. Do not eat or drink immoderately the food and alcoholic beverages of the Chinese. There are many poisons inside the Shanhaiguan [i.e., in China]. Do not give excessive dry fodder to the horse; to skinny horses give a little [dry fodder] after having boiled it; to fat horses give grass. Make them eat after they have rested.[27]

[27] TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 235–6.

The soldiers in the Manchu army were always forbidden not only to mistreat the enemy, but also to engage in any form of wasteful and destructive actions. However, the emphasis of the preservation of property, down to food and fodder, was more explicit (and the punishments harsher) when fighting in Chinese territory than in Mongolia. Scrupulous care to preserve dry fodder may have derived from the need to economize on a terrain that may not have supported many horses. Similar concerns were not voiced in the case of wars against the Čaqars. The regulations common to both campaigns were aimed at protecting the common interest of the army, and the interests of the enemies who surrendered or did not oppose resistance. The loot was going to be assigned according to equitable distribution, and therefore any appropriation that took place outside the distribution was regarded as a crime. Raping women was not allowed, or, to be more precise, their "appropriation" was allowed only after the distribution of the spoils, that is, after the women captured had become the "legal" property of the soldier. The prohibition of separating husbands and wives probably referred to need to keep families united as they were going to be assigned as a family. Some families were also freed and turned into commoners (see below, section on "attacking the enemy"). The distribution of the spoils, as we learn from a later Manchu source, was an extremely lengthy and hierarchical process, which established a firm priority for the military top brass and aristocracy, and therefore the regulations served to protect what we might call the "class privilege" of the Manchu and Mongol elites.[28]

### *Conduct of war*

An important clue into the economic ramifications of the Čaqar-Manchu war comes from some documents that mention the massacre of Čaqar merchants who had reached the city of Bayan Süme, (in Mongol, Temple of Wealth; Ma. Bayan Sube, Ch. Zhangjiakou) but had failed to establish trade relations with them. On their way

[28] A vivid description of the distribution of the spoils of war by the Qing army can be seen in the military diary of the Manchu officer. See Dzengšeo [Zeng Shou], *Sui jun ji xing yizhu.* Trans. Ji Yonghai. (Beijing, 1987), p. 72.

back, they were intercepted by Qaračin troops, who "massacred them without sparing any."[29] The number of three thousand merchants, as described in the document, seems excessive, and it is possible that this figure included the merchants and their military escort. Nevertheless, it is a shocking statement that reveals the ferocity of this war.

In the same document, the Mongol author lists a series of evil actions by the Čaqar khan Ligdan. He was accused of having "illegally killed and plundered his own clan members," and of "oppressing the Qaračin people by abducting women, children, and livestock."[30] Ligdan, as we know, had a reputation for cruelty, and was denounced repeatedly for arbitrary killing and other crimes. Another Mongol report sent to Hung Taiji by a Tümed chief informed him on the Čaqar, who were retreating in a hurry in front of a joint expedition of several Mongol tribes. As they retreated, they left behind the poor Tümed people they had captured on a previous campaign, while keeping the rich ones, and then killing them after having seized their property. Of course, in the long run this strategy would prevent the numerically growth of Ligdan's camp. The perceptive comment of the author of this document, was that "[Ligdan's] troops are not being increased."[31]

It is especially in the accounts of refugees that the extent of the tragedy is perceived more directly, as the murder of noblemen (even related to the Čaqars by ties of kinship and marriage) and the seizure of their daughters were common practice.[32] The level of violence created a steady stream of refugees who entered Manchu territory or the territory of other Mongol tribes. In some cases the migrations from one area to the other were marred with all sorts of dangers. The Manchus needed to deal with the refugee problem, and the general attitude they took was to welcome and feed such refugees, thereby increasing their political capital among the Mongols. A letter sent by Sečen Daičing, a leader of the Asud tribe of the Qaračin tribe, explicitly states that after they were attacked by the Čaqars, out of seven groups ("banners") five were captured and only two made it through and into Manchu territory. There they received

[29] AQMBD, pp. 23 and 26; TFSHD vol. 4, p. 119.
[30] AQMBD, p. 26.
[31] AQMBD, p. 89.
[32] AQMBD, p. 144.

food and other provisions out of the public purse, which literally saved their lives.[33]

In some cases a degree of competition arose between different political leaders as to who should "welcome" the refugee tribes displaced by the Čaqars. A sense of this competition can be detected in a letter sent by Tüsiyetü Khan to Hung Taiji after the Baγarin and Jaraγud tribes had fled to his territory. The powerful Qorčin leader asked Sečen Qaγan whether these tribes should be allowed to stay independent. The implicit question was whether Hung Taiji would allow the Qorčin to keep these tribes as their retainers.[34] Surely there is no indication that the Qorčin leader was unwilling to support them. However, in the Manchu record we find that after the Jaraγud (Ma. Jarut) were defeated by the Čaqar and Qalqa, and went over to the Qorčin for protection, but since "the Qorčin noblemen were unable to support them," they then went to the Manchus.[35] Likewise, when the chiefs of the Barin tribes were attacked by the Čaqars and had to flee, they entered the territory of the Qorčin of the Nonni river, but, according again to the Manchu records, they decided to leave and go over to the Manchus because the Nonni-Qorčin were treating them harshly.[36] One might wonder whether the lack of support and oppression met by Mongol refugees at the hands of other Mongol tribes was real, or was rather, at least in some cases, a pretext to cover the political pressure applied by the Manchus to attract these refugees to their camp. Eventually these tribes as a matter of course swore oaths of alliances with the Manchus.

The dilemma of a number of Mongol chieftains, who found themselves squeezed between the Čaqar and the Manchus, can be exemplified in the situation faced by the Qorčin leader Mangγus.[37] Being attacked by a coalition of Čaqar and Qalqa, he turned to the Manchus for protection. This happened in the aftermath of the aforementioned defeat suffered by the Manchus at Ningyuan. Mangγus faced three problems, the first was that the Manchus appeared to be weak, the second that the Manchus and the Qalqa has made a pact of

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[33] AQMBD, p. 109.
[34] AQMBD, p. 134.
[35] TFSHD vol. 4, p. 192.
[36] TFSHD vol. 4, p. 129.
[37] The sender of this letter is not specified, but since it says that he was related to Hung Taiji by marriage, this is probably Mangγus, whose daughter married Hung Taiji in 1614.

allegiance in the fourth year of *tian ming* (1619–20) which bound the Manchus to a pact of mutual protection.[38] The third was the internal disagreement among Qorčin chieftains. The decisive factors in the request for protection are a pact made between the Qorčin and the Manchus on 3 April 1624 (sixteenth day, second month, of the ninth year of Tianming)[39] and the marriage relations contracted between Hung Taiji and the sender. These two conditions seem to carry an obligation for the Manchus to extend their protection to the refugees.

> By order of Kündülen Qaγan [Nurhaci], two *baγsi* [that is, Hife and Kurcan] came [to us]. We sacrificed a white horse to Heaven and a black bull to Earth, and pledged to one another that we would protect each other until death and that would not break [this pact]. The Čaqar and the Qalqa have come to kill and to plunder us. They say that until you have killed eight hundred thousand Chinese, you shall protect [them], but I think this is a lie. I heard that three noblemen and hundreds of thousands of you [Manchu people] were killed. My elder brothers [and I] are not in harmony on this matter, and [therefore, the Qalqa] are now discussing about mounting an expedition. If the Kündülen Qaγan does not protect me mercifully, I will not have the strength to engage them in battle. Since my older and younger brothers are in disagreement, and because our life is dear [to us], we shall keep on offering tribute. Qong Taiji, please disregard the faulty words [that may be contained] in this letter, and, adding your own opinion to those words that may be right, timidly present this letter to the Qaγan. If we are not protected by you, we shall have no place to flee and no strength to fight. Do not think that there are ulterior motives in my words. Since you, Qong Taiji, are a relative of mine by marriage, I told you the truth.[40]

In the end, the Mongol chieftains who cast their lot in with the Manchus were rewarded with honours, acquired Manchu princesses as wives, and rose to the upper ranks of the Manchu political hierarchy. But Hung Taiji was careful never to alienate those who, having opposed him, decided to turn back and submit to him. Even the son of Ligdan, Erke Qongγor Eje (1622–1641), was rewarded after he surrendered in 1635, married a Manchu princess, and was raised to the rank of prince of the first degree.[41]

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[38] See on this Michael Weiers, "Die Vertragstexte des Mandschu-Khalkha Bundes von 1919/20," *Aetas Manjurica* 1 (1987): 119–65.

[39] See *Manzhou shilu* (hereafter MZSL), p. 367 (Beijing, 1986).

[40] AQMBD, pp. 3–4.

[41] Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 304.

*Cities and fortifications*

One intriguing question raised by the correspondence refers to the use of fortified cities in what was essentially a "steppe" war. One of the key victories against Ligdan had been achieved by a federations of tribes which included Ordos, Abaγa, Qalqa, and Qaračin who had united in retaliation to a Čaqar attack on the Qaračin in late 1627. The retaliatory attack took place against the Čaqar army stationed in Köke Qota, located in the Tümed territory, and led to the expulsion of forty thousand Čaqar from the city.[42]

This was not the only example of the use of fortresses in this war. Already Nurhaci had persuaded the Qorčin chieftain Oba to build a fortress in 1625. For the Mongols, however, this manner of fighting, relying on defensive structures, was anomalous, and the suggestion had not been heeded. One of these pieces of correspondence refers to a letter written by Nurhaci to Oba Taiji, dated September 18, 1625, the Qorčin leader, in which Nurhaci explains the rationale for building fortresses in the steppe.[43]

> As for the troops you are bringing, if you wish to bring many, then bring many; if you wish to bring few, then bring few. You need not worry too much. The question is not whether [the soldiers] are many or few; the question is Heaven's will. All nations have been established by Heaven. If the many kill the few, is not still Heaven that shall allow it? If you repair and fortify your town, or attack and capture a city, the Čaqar would not be able to capture a city and would withdraw.. If this is not so, then they would be defeated and flee, and their power would be destroyed. If they withdraw without have been routed, they will still think that they cannot conquer you. And therefore, at this point, your heart will be in peace. Sometime ago Jasaktu Khan could not defeat five hundred troopers and fifty armored soldiers of the Hoifa [tribe] and withdrew; thereupon he was unable to raid the Hoifa. Giving battle in the steppe [*tala*] is like throwing knucklebone dice,[44] they can fall on one side or the other. People who wish to fight in the steppe are cowards. Do not trust their words. Those who wish to conquer a city and then give battle, they are brave people. Those who fight in the city, and then, when the enemies withdraw as they are unable to prevail, they seize the opportunity, go out [of the city], give battle and defeat them, these are especially

[42] TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 118–119.
[43] TFSHD vol. 3, pp. 981–983.
[44] A game consisting of throwing dice made out of sheep knuckle bones.

> courageous men. Now you wish to become reconciled with the Čaqar and put an end to this matter. Ever since the time of Tumen Han up to now Čaqar and Qalqa have been raiding and looting you. Have you committed any fault? Although you intend to become reconciled and settle the matter, if they so wish they may decide to kill you, can you avoid it by saying that you have no fault? The Chinese, Korean, Ula, Hoifa, Yehe, Hada and our Manchu state [have towns], if we did not have fortified towns, would you Mongols have fed us a single bowl of food?[45] In our incompetence [or, stupidity], we still rely on and live in towns.

The sarcastic conclusion of this letter shows that Nurhaci held the Mongols in considerable contempt, and was defending the Manchu way of warfare, which had been one of gradual territorial expansion by the acquisition of towns. The defensive advantages of towns stressed again in another document. On 10 July 1626, Nurhaci wrote a letter to Oba (here addressed by his title of Tusiyetu Han), in the following terms:

> You [Tusiyetu Han] told me: "After I build a fortified town [*hoton*] I shall not have high officials stay there, and [instead] I will let only commoners live there." In my heart I did not agree, but could not say it face to face. Therefore I decided to send you these words [of mine]. If you only let commoners stay in the city, [then] you, high officials and princes, will not build your own houses, and will be living outside. If anything happens, and [you] enter the town, will then the houses of the common people, and their food and fodder, be sufficient? If you exhaust whatever little livelihood the common people have, how will they survive? This would be a catastrophe. This

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[45] This sentence in Manchu reads "*nikan, solho, ula, hoifa, yehe, hada, meni manju gurun, mende hoton akûci, suweni monggo membe emu moro buda ulebumbio.*" This seems to be elliptic and has been understood differently. The Chinese translation of this last passage (*Manwen Laodang*, vol. 1, p. 638:27 reads: "The Ming, Korean, Ula, Hoifa, Yehe Hada, opposed our Manchu state; if we did not have fortified towns, could you Mongols have fed us a single bowl of food?" The word "opposed" is not in the Manchu text in either the JMZD or the TFSHD. On the comparison between the two texts see Michael Weiers, "Konkordanz zum Aktenmaterial der *Chiu Manchou Tang* und *Man-wen lao-tang* Jahrgänge 1620–1630," *Aetas Manjurica* 1 (1987): 343. While the Chinese interpretation is historically sensible, since all the people mentioned before "our Manchu state" were enemies of the Manchus, it does require an additional verb. The Japanese translation (TFSHD vol. 6, p. 983) reads the list, from *nikan* to *manju gurun* as a single subject of "did not have fortresses," but then sacrifices *mende*, "we," which is the grammatical subject of *akûci*. The sentence could also be read as I have translated it, but still requires an emendation, though less dramatic than the others. In my view, Nurhaci's intention is to draw a contrast between Chinese, Korean and Manchu peoples, who use fortresses, and the Mongols. I offer this as an additional interpretation rather than as a solution.

> year, [the people of] Dai Darhan and Cing Joriktu have been added to your [people], and your [provisions] are been consumed like [melting] ice. If the nobles and high officials built their houses, and gathered and stored food and fodder, they can occupy themselves in wandering with the herds, and when they are afraid can then come to stay in the town for one or two months. Each of them would go to their own houses and to their provisions right away, is this not so? If you had the leaders [*ambasa*] of the commoners stay in the city, and they were afraid [to stay there] then [the leaders] would take charge and lead everyone together to move the herds, is this not so?[46]

In reply to this letter, the Mongol leader agreed to build a city and also agreed that the nobles and high officials would build residences in the city itself.

A third document asserts to the Manchu determination to modify the fighting ways of the Mongols by the introduction of forts in the steppe. In a letter sent by Hung Taiji some time after June 3 1627, the urgent need to build fortresses is again emphasized.

> In my opinion the three banners of Tüšiy-e-tü Qaγan, Dai Darqan and and Jasaγ-tu Dügüreng, should build one fortress, Bingtü, Ildüči and Badma should build one fortress, and the four banners of Joriγ-tu Qong Taiji should build one fortress. After you have spotted a good location you should build the three fortresses close by and immediately fortify them. Having done that, after you have fortified your own territories, if the Čaqar attacked you, then in accordance with our former agreement, you should send some noblemen [to inform me] and we will send you supplementary troops. If you do not fortify the land and the towns, when the Čaqar attack you, where are you going to fight, and how are we to know where to go?[47]

If we take these three documents together, we see that the Manchus tried consistently to persuade their Mongol allies to rely on fortress for a variety of reasons. First, fortified towns were important simply as a temporary sanctuaries in case of enemy attack. It is relevant that Nurhaci conceives of sieges as lasting "one or two months," and that enough provisions should be stored to suffice for that length of time. It may be possible that this period was the longest that an enemy army could keep a large number of horses in one place, after which the siege had to be lifted as the horses had exhausted the available pasture. But clearly the Manchus were running into

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[46] TFSHD vol. 3, pp. 1079–81.
[47] AQMBD, pp. 17–19.

something of a cultural resistance. The appeal to bravery and courage clearly seems to counter a Mongol reluctance to fighting behind walls as being unmanly and cowardly. Finally, there is an important logistic advantage in having towns, and that is that the many problems related to arranging a rendezvous in the steppes, which led, as we have seen above, to numerous complications and dangers, would be avoided by the simple method of locating the allied troops by reaching them at a fixed location.

On yet another occasion the Manchus sent the Qaračin chieftain Šamba Tabunung to defend the city of Da'ankou that they had captured from the Chinese. But Šamba left the city to "nomadize" (*nuktembi*).The Chinese of Da'ankou then reported to the Ming army that there were no soldiers in the city, and Chinese troops—three thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry—then walked into the open city gates. At that point the Manchus were forced to send their commander Unege to retake the city.[48] This episode may be witness to the Mongol discomfort with being enclosed behind city walls.

### *Attacking the enemy*

Gathering information about the whereabouts of the enemy was a vital part in the preparation for an attack. Spies were sent by all parties involved. From the following document, which contains a spy's report, it is clear that the decision to attack was based on these secret reports:

> According to Sečen Qaγan's order, we sent a person to investigate the tribe of the Čaqar Qaγan. The person we sent came back with an envoy of the [Chinese] governor[49] of our White City.[50] The Čaqar tribe was staying at the city of Jau [i.e. Köke Qota, Huhhot]. They know that you joined forces with the Jürčid, and captured the southern *tümen*. As of right now, the might of the Čaqar is feeble. At this very moment, as I am reporting to you, we shall ride [to battle] immediately. I am also informing you that, if [you] hesitate and do not go to battle, then we will give battle for you, and our own people will fight to the death.[51]

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[48] TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 347–48.

[49] Mo. *sulang* from Chinese *shilang*.

[50] In Mongol *čaγan qota*, corresponds to the city of Yanghe, near the city of Datong in Shanxi province.

[51] AQMBD, p. 84.

Valuable information was also gathered from refugees, who, as we have seen, were pouring into Manchu-controlled territory.

War in the steppe occurred by a series of attacks and raids that forced people either to leave or to surrender to the enemy. The Čaqar were particularly adept at this sort of "*blitzkrieg*". Keeping open lines of communication among the different tribes was another was a serious problem, as messengers could be intercepted by the enemy. In the following document we can see how a "steppe" warfare attack was carried out. The alleged reason for seeking out and destroying the Dolot camp was to prevent them from intercepting envoys.

> The envoys sent by the Manchu Sure Han [Hung Taiji] to the Qaračin had been intercepted and killed twice by the Dolot tribe of the Čaqar, then Sure Han with a few troops set out on the eighth or the second month to attack the Čaqar tribe of the Alaqcot, and spent the night at Dadai Subargan. On that day, the khan gathered all the nobles and officials and ordered them "Those who come this time must be specially selected all able men; why should we need many soldiers? Act smartly, and don't create confusion!" On the fifteen, Sure Han told his nobles: take the soldiers you have selected and go in front. If you meet the enemy, stop and seize them cleverly. Then report here every bit of information [from the enemy]. With our troops we shall be right behind you." The people who went forward captured and interrogated people, and reported that Sereng Cing Baturu and the encampment of the tribal leaders was on the Oo river. Thereupon [the Han] waited for all the troops and had everyone wear armor. With the Han and the lords personally at the head they charged at gallop, Dorji Hatan Baturu of the Dolot, was wounded but fled and got away. We captured all the women and killed Guru Taiji. We captured 11,200 prisoners, of these 1,200 Mongols and Chinese were organized into families [of commoners]. The remaining ones were kept as prisoners.[52]

We then learn that these prisoners were distributed among the soldiers and officers who had suffered battle wounds. In this description we find several elements of interest. First the Manchu reliance of a relatively small group of valiant soldiers. Then, the scouting and interrogation of "enemies" which in fact must have included anyone they came across who could provide information. Once the enemy camp has been identified, the Manchus hit them at high speed in full armor, which suggests a shock tactic. Only ten percent of the

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[52] TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 122–124.

prisoners were effectively set free as commoners. What is interesting is that Chinese people are included in this number, who may have been artisans and craftsmen working for the Mongols. The distribution of the loot favours those who had been wounded in action, which was undoubtedly a good incentive for the soldiers to do their utmost.

Another document alerts us to another type of tactic. The Čaqar had become partly reliant on agriculture, tilling fields. In one letter probably dated 1631 or 1632 Hung Taiji orders three Mongol allies of the Naiman and Auqan tribes to attack the Čaqar camp and seize the crops' seeds. They are explicitly told to take the seeds so that they could use them the following year, but probably this was also to prevent the Čaqar from harvesting.[53]

Finally, an indication of the importance of fodder for the animals in the planning of a campaign comes from a letter sent by Tüsiyetü Khan to Hung Taiji. Here it is mentioned that the Čaqar were dithering, not knowing what course of action to take, and therefore, because "the grass is now high" (*ene noγun degere*), the Qorčin and the Manchus could set out on an expedition.[54] As we have seen above, considerations regarding the best time to set off on a military expedition had to include the foraging of the animals: leaving an area empty and unguarded could become a liability as the "high grass" might allow the enemy to make military use of it.

## *Diplomacy*

In steppe warfare diplomacy and military operations proceeded together in a single political context. Propaganda was a key element of the diplomatic correspondence, and the Manchus revealed substantial skills in the "war of words" that raged almost as intensely as the war of swords. Manchu anti-Čaqar propaganda was based on two cardinal principles, the ability to preserve order, and their fighting a "righteous war."

Divided by fratricidal struggles, the Mongol tribes were in a state of disarray, to the point that the whole period of the Čaqar wars is

[53] AQMBD, pp. 82–3.
[54] AQMBD, p. 144.

often referred to in the Manchu records as the time in which the Mongol nation was in chaos (*facuhûn*). In a letter sent to the Qorčin nobleman Yeldeng Taiji in November-December 1629, Hung Taiji makes it clear that he would not tolerate abuses among the people who have pledged allegiance to him.[55] Yeldeng was accused by Hung Taiji of raiding his own tribesmen, and of being in league with the Čaqars. Therefore, he was regarded as an element of disturbance in the restoration of law and order among his own co-tribesmen, the Qorčin. Hung Taiji ask the rhetorical questions: "Would it not be good if all of you *noyans* of the Naγun Qorčin lived happily embracing peace and law, settling where the water is good, and breeding your own livestock? Would it not be bad if you acted in such a way as to destroy the political order and to stir up disorder and violence?" Hung Taiji felt he could address the problems caused by Yeldeng among the Qorčin because "we have become relatives and have an alliance." By doing so, Hung Taiji consciously assumed the role of guarantor of order among the Mongol tribes, and makes good behavior not only towards him, but also towards the other Mongol tribes who have become allied or subjects of the Manchus as a condition for the establishment or continuation of an alliance.

This role was appealed to, for instance, by the Qaračin nobleman Čoski in a letter dated June-July 1629. He and his people had become the retainers of the Qaračin lord Qong Taiji (Buyan Aqai) but after his death had been inherited by his son Birasi. Because Birasi had mistreated them, Čoski moved to another Qaračin lord, Subudi Dügüreng, but Biraci was threatening to kill him. Hence, Čoski went to Hung Taiji to request protection. That the Manchu perseverance to intervene in defence of peoples' rights contributed greatly to the rise of their influence among the Mongols is confirmed in several other items of correspondence, such as a letter sent by a Mongol nobleman, Qolači Baγatur, in which it is said that his tribe decided to join the Manchus of their free will because there they could find peace, and not because they felt an obligation to do so.[56]

Second, Hung Taiji affirmed the justness of his intervention on several grounds. In the following document, dated March 18, 1627, and addressed to the Qong Baγatur of the Naiman nation, we can appreciate the "historical depth" of the "just war" theme as it was

[55] AQMBD, pp. 72–75.
[56] AQMBD, pp. 69–71.

applied to the current situation. In this case, Hung taiji is attempting to persuade Qong Baγatur of the wisdom of an alliance with the Manchus against the Čaqars. The case of the Qalqa tribes, which had been recently attacked by the Čaqars, is brought up to explain why the Manchus had not intervened in their defence even though there was a treaty of alliance between Qalqa and Manchus, and therefore persuade them of the truthfulness and reliability of the Manchu offer. The Naiman were at this point being squeezed between Manchus and Čaqars, and were also receiving offers of aid from the Ming. Eventually they agreed to sign a treaty with the Manchus.

> From my ancestors down to me, our course of action has been such that we have not encroached upon people who held correct principles, and have not yielded to those people who behaved badly or immorally. We have not fought with other nations with the intention of being their enemy. Praying for Heaven ['s protection], we have [only] fought against the countries that hated [us]. We wanted to keep friendly relation with the Chinese state, but did not succeed. They protected the Yehe [people] . . . they gave our betrothed to the Mongols. Moreover, sending troops, they did not allow the Jurchen [i.e., Manchus] who lived near the border walls to harvest their crops. They set all the houses of the local people on fire and chased them away; their evil deeds were too many to enumerate. In this way, we became indignant and waged war to the Chinese.
>
> For two generations we got along with the Qalqa quite well. [Then] Jaisai attacked our city of Ujilu town; he killed the messenger that I sent, and married our betrothed. Baγa Darqan also married our betrothed. Afterward, when we caught Jaisai, all the Qalqa noblemen of the five tribes in the year of the Yellowish Sheep [1619] established an alliance with us.[57] We sacrificed a white horse to Heaven, and a black bull to Earth, and we swore [the following] oath:
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> "Should one of us fight the Chinese, we shall fight together; should one of us join [the Chinese] we shall join together in harmony. If the Qalqa fall under the crafty scheme and attractive goods of the Chinese and become reconciled with China without a [previous] agreement with the Manchus, we will bring retribution to the Qalqa. If the Manchus should reach an accord with the Chinese without the Qalqa's agreement, you will bring retribution to the Manchus."
>
> The Qalqa did not abide by these sworn words. They did not attack the Chinese, but fell to their valuable goods and crafty schemes; they protected the Chinese, and, sending troops, killed our sentry and

[57] On this see also MZSL, *juan* 6, p. 286.

brought the corpse to the Chinese.[58] Moreover, they attacked us many times and seized our livestock.[59] In such a way they committed evil deeds. But we said nothing. When our troops attacked Qaratai, we could not capture it because the city walls had frozen, so we withdrew our troops.[60] After that, thinking that many of our soldiers had been killed by the Chinese, the Qalqa intended to attack us by adding their troops to the Chinese ones, and so they moved to the pasture grounds near our border.

They constantly intercepted and killed the messengers we sent to the Qorčin and you wished to obstruct our expedition against the Qaratai. As they acted in this way we attacked the Qalqa.

Our nation and the Korean nation had also been on good terms for generations without [mutual] harm. Later on, when they came [to attack us] having added their troops to the Chinese [army], being Heaven merciful to us, all the Korean nobles, and soldiers were captured by us. We did not kill them but released them, and wanted to find an agreement, but they refused. Then they sheltered Chinese people. In order to pursue these fugitives we attacked Korea.[61] We have never harbored hostility and attacked any country unless this country was at fault. What good is there in having enemies? what harm is there in having a peaceful government?

The Qaγan of the Čaqar wiped out the Qalqa and carried off [people and property], and appointed a common man as a commander over the noblemen. Separating the noblewomen from their husbands, he seized them; separating the unmarried women from their parents, he gave them to his bodyguards and servants. Of this speech of mine, is there something that you do not (already) know? If you believe that these words [of mine] are true, please send this letter to the noblemen of the two [wings of the] Kesigten tribe [living] near you.[62]

The message was quite explicit, but nonetheless cleverly argued. The Manchus never harbored evil intentions, but had to react to external aggressions. The Chinese, the Qalqa, and the Koreans were, in principle, not Manchu enemies but they became so through their hostile actions. The impressive list of enemies that had been in one

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[58] The term *čongji* in Manchu is *tai niyalma*, lit. "tower person" that is, a person in charge of a look-out tower, or a sentry. The corpse probably indicates only one part of the body, most likely the head, as indicated in the MZSL, *juan* 8, p. 400.

[59] On this event see *Taizong Wenhuangdi shilu* (hereafter QTZSL), *juan* 1, p. 27 (Beijing, 1985).

[60] Qaratai is probably the Mongol name of Ningyuan. The reference to frozen walls is confirmed in the Manchu record. See TFSHD vol. 4, p. 12:9.

[61] This episode refers to the war of 1627, when The Manchus attacked Korea for harboring the Ming general and guerrilla fighter Mao Wenlong. See TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 39–42.

[62] On the Kesigten tribe see TFSHD vol. 4, p. 13.

way or another beaten by the Manchus was surely intimidating for an enfeebled Mongol tribe. The crucial point is the reminder that the Manchus would not attack anyone arbitrarily. The concluding paragraph, reminding them the fate they would suffer in case they did not make the right choice, was significant in that it did not threaten the Naiman directly, but exposed them to the realities of a situation that was already familiar to them. The choice was between the orderly and reliable support the Manchus could provide (in exchange for loyalty) and a very dangerous course should they decide to stay on their own.

In some of the treaties between the Manchus and the Mongols there is an interesting element of flexibility. The text of a treaty-oath between the Qaračin and the Manchus written on June 28, 1628 (the actual oath was to be sworn later by the parties involved) while clearly meant to prevent any alliance with either Čaqar or Chinese, allowed explicitly trade between Chinese and Qaračin at the Ming city of Datong.[63] This is in my view another indication of the pragmatic attitude of the Manchus, who cold not forbid Chinese trade because they were probably not in a position to make up for Qaračin losses in trade revenues.

Another very important aspect of the Mongol-Manchu diplomacy at this time concerns the forging of family ties by means of marriage. Two of Hung Taiji's primary consorts and five additional consorts of varius ranks were Mongol, and came from the Qorčin, Abaγa, Jarut, and Čaqar. Additional ties were established by the marriage of Manchu women to Mongol nobles, including ten of Hung Taiji's daughters.[64] In the aforementioned document sent by Hung Taiji to some Qorčin leaders the reason to endorse a marriage relationship is explained in the following terms: "In my opinion our two nations should marry each other's daughters and the marriage relationship should not be interrupted. If you were to be wiped out by the Čaqars, then we would be able to continue [your] line with any other nation".[65] The marital alliance, then, became a way to preserve, as it were, the genetic pool of tribes threatened of extinction by the Čaqars.

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[63] AQMBD, p. 32.

[64] Sechin Jagchid, "Mongolian-Manchu Intermarriage in the Ch'ing Period," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 19 (1986): 69–87.

[65] AQMBD, p. 17.

The chieftains involved Uγšan Batma and Gongkor Mafa both swore an oath with the Manchus in 1627.

## *Conclusion*

Inner Asian warfare was not, as von Clausewitz would put it, the continuation of politics by other means. Rather, war contributed to the definition of what remained essentially a political confrontation, which encompassed also marriage relations, economic aid, and legal matters. The hostilities between Čaqars and Manchus, which lasted altogether sixteen years (1619–1635), are an example of the function of warfare in steppe politics. If the Čaqar strategy was to scare other Mongol tribes into submission by threatening them with enslavement and physical extermination, the Manchu strategy was articulated on different levels, which included trading military and economic support for greater political and legal power, while allowing most Mongols to enter a relationship of subordination in the form of apparently equal treaties. Limiting our conclusion to the military aspects of this overall strategy, we can come to the following conclusions.

(1) Manchu military intervention helped introduce elements of legislation among the Mongol tribes as a means of ordering and regulating the military operations. The anxiety shown in several documents over the missed rendezvous describes well the treacherous nature of this war, and therefore explains why the Manchus were keen to limit the potential volatility of such agreements by imposing legal punishments, and by acquiring the role of legal authority. The legal authority of the Manchus was later extended to criminal matters, quite unrelated to the military expeditions per se.

(2) The Manchus made political capital out of their military aid to the Mongols, weaving a web of alliances and effectively redefining traditional tribal alignments within a new political framework, firmly controlled by Manchu interests and goals. The oaths signed with the Mongols were surely in the first instance military alliances against common Mongol enemies, the Čaqars and in some cases the Qalqa. But they also forced the Mongols to side with the Manchus in their anti-Chinese wars, so that Mongol tribes could not remain neutral, while previously they had the freedom to choose any side they wished, including the Ming. The inclusion of the Mongols within

the Manchu Eight-Banner army increased the manpower of the Manchu army and limited the options available to the Chinese in frontier diplomacy.

(3) The Manchu involvement also seems to have introduced tactical changes in the way steppe warfare was fought. Manchu intervention in the steppe may have caused an important change in the way war was fought. Operations such as "punitive expeditions" and raids were still conducted in classic Inner Asian style. The phases of these operations included preliminary parleys to fix the size of the armies and the time and place of the rendezvous. The second stage involved assembling the expeditionary force by having the various tribal armies converge at a given place, and beginning the march towards enemy territory. The third phase included gathering information en route by a vanguard squadron and scout patrols. Once the main enemy camp had been identified the attack could take place, which was the fourth phase of the campaign. Assuming that the attack was successful, the campaign would end in the distribution of the spoils. The Manchus, however, needed to limit the damage that the Čaqars could inflict upon their Mongol allies, and also make sure that relief armies could find the precise location where these Mongols were staying without having to look for them. Therefore we find several references to cities that the Mongols were strongly encouraged to conquer or build and then garrison. An additional military reason for seeking protection behind city walls was that the Čaqars probably could not carry out a siege that lasted longer than two months. Two months was also possibly regarded as sufficient time to prepare and send relief troops to succour the besieged towns. Building cities may have also been a means to limit the flow of refugees caused by the Čaqar attacks into Manchu as well as Mongol-controlled areas—an additional source of social and economic disruption that the Manchus were eager to limit.

(4) While the Čaqar were feared because of their ruthlessness in treating their prisoners, the Manchus took care to build a reputation for welcoming refugees, and for granting them asylum and sustenance. The Manchus also tried to treat the prisoners better, by limiting "war crimes" such as arbitrary killing and raping. A percentage of the prisoners was also granted free status. This strategy carried several advantages. Ideologically, Hung Taiji could boast that his rule guaranteed "law and order." In military terms, fair handling of prisoners reduced resistance, and therefore limited the Manchus'

losses, while increasing their wealth and manpower. Socially, it allowed, as we have already mentioned, the introduction of legal norms that established the Manchus as the law-giving authority and supreme judicial court.

(5) Finally, we should note that the Čaqar scorched-earth strategy was dictated probably by considerations that went beyond Ligdan Khan's own proclivity for violence. The military operations against other Mongol tribes seem to accelerate after the Manchu defeat at Ningyuan. The ferocity with which they were conducted was probably meant to maximise their impact, and scare the other Mongols into submission before the Manchus could organize a political and military counter-offensive. Meanwhile, the Čaqar were also requesting and fighting over greater access to Chinese markets. If successful, this strategy could have led to an isolation of the Manchus on both the Chinese and the Mongol fronts. As it was, Hung Taiji was able to react to this situation more rapidly than was probably expected, a speed that is surprising considering the economic difficulties the Manchus were facing in Liaodong.[66] As the Manchus were able to manoeuver their position inside Mongol politics, and to exploit to their advantage both inter-Mongol divisions and the chaos created by Ligdan's attacks, the tide turned against Ligdan, who eventually had to flee Mongolia and died probably of smallpox in Qinghai in 1634.

While we have not analysed here every aspect of the Čaqar-Manchu confrontation, the military aspects of it show that, paradoxically, a potentially deadly threat turned into one of the greatest assets for the Manchu conquest of China. Throughout the duration of the war, Hung Taiji continued to recruit Mongol allies—thereby increasing his military forces—and eliminated political competition from the steppes. One might reasonably argue, then, that without the Čaqar war the unification of so many Mongol tribes under the Manchu standards (and into the Manchu Banners) would have been a lengthier and far more convoluted process. As in many cases in steppe history, it was the crisis that periodically hit the tribal order that lay the foundation for the creation of new political alignments, and the possibility of the rise of a new, more centralized, ruling elite.

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[66] Gertraude Roth, "The Manchu Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636," in *From Ming to Qing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, eds. Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., pp. 26–27 (New Haven, 1979).

The crisis created by the Čaqar leader placed the Manchus in a position to control and direct the process or re-establishment of order, which they did with superb political skills and dogged determination. Hung Taiji, in his victory proclamation of January 28, 1636, boasted to have finally conquered the seal of Činggis Khan, which Ligdan had claimed to possess to boost his political ambitions.[67] In the eyes of many Mongols, by unifying a large number of Mongol tribes and restoring order, Hung Taiji, the Khan of the "Mongol people with Red-Tasseled Hats" (as the Manchus were called),[68] might have rightfully inherited the historical mantle of the great Mongol empire-builder.

[67] The ceremony in which Hung Taiji announces the acquisition of the precious seal of the Mongol nation is reported in *Chiu Man Chou Tang: 'The Old Manchu Archives': The Ninth Year of T'ien-ts'ung*, Trans. and Annotated by Kanda Nobuo et al., vol. 2, p. 360 (Tokyo, 1972). On a comparison between the manchu and the Chinese version of this episode see Nicola Di Cosmo, "Due 'messaggi sacrificali' dei Jin Posteriori," *Cina* 18 (1982): 117–129.

[68] AQMBD, p. 69.

## Glossary

Datong 大通
Da'ankou 大安口
Guangning 廣寧
Hongshangkou 洪上口
Hung Taiji 黃太極
Ningyuan 寧遠
Qing Taizu 清太祖
Qing Taizong 清太宗
Qinghai 青海
Shanhaiguan 山海關
shilang 侍郎
Tianming 天命
Yanghe 陽和
Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥
Zhangjiakou 張家口

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# FATE AND FORTUNE IN CENTRAL EURASIAN WARFARE: THREE QING EMPERORS AND THEIR MONGOL RIVALS

Peter C. Perdue

Military history is the oldest form of history writing, in both Asian and Western traditions. The natural human fascination with the bloody fates of soldiers and kings has inspired epics and dramatic narratives everywhere. Somewhat derided by professional historians in recent times, military history has begun to regain ground. One reason is that the future of the contemporary world looks much more uncertain than it used to, and conventional paradigms have lost their persuasive power. Wars and states can no longer be dismissed as epiphenomena of underlying socio-economic determinants, when sudden shifts in the power and stability of states occur every week. The well-defined nineteenth-century structures of capitalism and the nation-state seem much more precarious now; this leaves more room for human agency, but also a disturbing awareness of the constant presence of sharp, sudden change.

Historians have always tried to balance the influences of fate and fortune, or, in modern terminology, structure and agency.[1] While we recognize that long-term economic and environmental processes condition human behavior, we also know that these factors never absolutely determine particular outcomes. Studying military conflict highlights such dramatic interactions between necessity and contingency, because the results of strategies, tactics, and individual battles cannot be firmly predicted in advance. After the battles have been lost and won, it is tempting to search for definitive causes of one side's victory, but it is equally important to recapture the sense of uncertainty that the protagonists experienced during the fog of war. New military historians try to avoid merely looking at the paper plans of generals in

[1] Cf. James Z. Lee and Cameron Campbell, *Fate and Fortune in Rural China: Social Organization and Population Behavior in Liaoning, 1774–1873* (Cambridge, England, 1997), reviewed by Peter C. Perdue in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 57, no. 3 (August 1998) 854–6.

order to reconstruct the roles of leadership, individual soldiers' experience of battle, and the vicissitudes of weather and logistics.[2] They have expanded the study of war beyond the abstractions of general staffs, so as to encompass the entire experience of societies in conflict. They question established approaches to the history of warfare, which rely heavily on the historiography of individual nations. Instead, they follow complex interactions of many states and peoples, trying to avoid privileging the viewpoint of the victors.

The military conquests of kings and peoples feature prominently in nationalist histories. Usually, victory in battle is treated as the fulfillment of the destiny of a people to occupy a specified territory. Territorial expansion fits the teleological assumption that a nation has 'natural boundaries' that define the essential unity of a people and their land. This notion of a historical process filling up a preconceived space masks how new identities are constructed through conquest and expansion. For example, Chinese historians view the campaigns of the Qing rulers against the Western Mongol (Zunghar) state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the inevitable "unification" of China's multinational state.[3] The Zunghars, as "splittists" who undermined this unity, were therefore doomed to failure by the forces of history.[4] In this view, there is no room for accident, and no drama pits equally matched forces against each other. Instead, the victorious emperors are seen as the direct predecessors of the modern nation, while those who resist them can only be "rebels" or "bandits". In this grand narrative, one structured process overwhelms all human agency. The nationalist account draws its structure from

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[2] E.g. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle.* (New York, 1976).

[3] The Zunghars (from Mongolian "Jegun[or Zun]"—"ghar", "Left Hand" or "North Wing"; Chinese Zhungar) were originally one of the four tribes of the Western Mongols, the Oyirod, known to Westerners as "Eleuth", to the Chinese as "Elute" or "Weilate", to the Manchus as Urût. After the mid-seventeenth century, the name "Zunghar" was used along with "Eleuth" for all the Mongols under their dominion. For simplicity, here I use "Zunghar" throughout. Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 267; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley, 1999), p. 314 n. 55.

[4] "The Qing government's suppression of the Zunghar uprising was a righteous struggle to protect the unity of the nation and to resist Russian aggression. This battle followed the historical trend of our nation to restore unity, and accommodate the common desire of all the nationalities for unity and peace. Therefore it necessarily received the support of all the nationalities". Zhungeer Shilue Bianxiezu, *Zhungeer Shilue* (Outline History of the Zunghars) (Beijing, 1985), p. 120.

the great narrative commissioned by the Kangxi emperor himself, which also justified the victory over the Zunghars as determined by Heaven.[5]

In fact, the outcome of the Zunghar campaigns from 1690 to 1760 was not predetermined, and the adversaries were well matched. Both the Zunghar and Qing states arose during the same period of state formation in the second half of the seventeenth century, along with the Muscovite/Russian state, and all three were contenders for control over Central Eurasia until the mid-eighteenth century. The crushing of the Zunghar state and the partition of Central Eurasia between the Qing and the Russians was the outcome of a protracted struggle, in which economics, ecology, and personal character all played their part. To reconstruct the conquests, we must look at the personalities of both the emperors and the Zunghar leaders, and how they wrestled with issues of military supply, diplomatic alliances, and battlefield tactics. Each side had a repertoire of strategies, but how they deployed them depended on the particularities of each situation.

The Qing conquest of Central Eurasia extended over nearly a century, from the Kangxi emperor's first campaigns against Galdan in 1690 to the Qianlong emperor's elimination of Mongol resistance in 1760. These campaigns secured control over a huge region which had never before been held for a significant period of time by a dynasty centered in the Chinese heartland. Aggressive rulers of the Han and Tang dynasties had succeeded in mounting expeditions into the steppe, at great cost, but not in controlling the region. The Mongols had ruled briefly both Central Eurasia and the Chinese heartland from their capital in Karakorum. The Manchu rulers of the Qing eliminated the nomadic presence as an autonomous force and established Chinese rule over both the oases and the steppe. This was an unprecedented historical achievement.

The conquest of Central Eurasia was the second stage of the Manchu "Great Enterprise", following directly on their establishment of control over Han China.[6] Their unquestioned authority over China

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[5] Zhang Yushu, comp. *Qinzheng Pingding Shuomo Fanglue* (Chronicle of the Emperor's Personal Expeditions to Pacify the Northwest Frontier), 1708.

[6] The term "Great Enterprise" [Chinese *dashi*, Manchu *amba baita* [#Check] refers to the conquest of Han China by the Manchu armies and their allies from the late sixteenth thru mid-seventeenth centuries. See Frederic Wakeman, jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu reconstruction of Imperial order in Seventeenth-Century China* (Berkeley, 1985).

proper was not secured until the defeat of the Three Feudatories (*Sanfan*) uprising in 1681. Only then could Kangxi, now 27 years old, turn his attention to the northwestern frontier, where the Zunghar Mongols had already been constructing a powerful state.

We should also keep in mind the interactions between the war-making and statemaking of the Chinese, Russian, and Mongol states. During the late seventeenth century three major powers in Central Eurasia concurrently built powerful states: the Russians, the Zunghars, and the Qing. The reigns of three powerful rulers coincide at this time: Peter I (r. 1689–1725), Galdan (r. 1671–1697), and Kangxi (r. 1662–1722). Each of them aimed to create powerful armies, with modern weaponry, supported by enhanced bureaucratic apparati and new means of extraction of resources from their agrarian base. They had to overcome opposition to centralized control from territorial and kinship-based nobilities (Russian *boyars*, Mongolian *noyan*, or Manchu *beile*). Each in his way enunciated doctrines of absolutist control, and each used warfare as a means of consolidating central rule. Central Eurasia was a significant arena of contention for all three, but their motives varied. Peter expected economic benefits from occupying Siberia, based primarily on fur trade with the Qing. For the Qing, strategic considerations—preventing a Russian-Zunghar alliance—outranked economic costs. For the Zunghars, squeezed between these giant agrarian empires, both economic, military and strategic alliances were crucial to their survival. In the end, only two states survived. The elimination of the last Mongol effort at creating an independent state in the steppe (at least until the twentieth century) secured the Chinese northwestern frontier for over a century. The great reputation of the "flourishing age" (*shengshi*) of High Qing rule in the eighteenth century rests on these victorious conquests.

From the Chinese side, this is a tale of three emperors, Kangxi (r. 1662–1722), Yongzheng (r. 1723–1735), and Qianlong (r. 1736–1795), who carried out in succession a policy of domination of Central Eurasia and elimination of Mongolian autonomy. Each of the emperors combined diplomatic, economic, and military maneuvers to achieve their objectives. They succeeded because, as Manchus, they were much more familiar than their Chinese counterparts with Mongols and steppe politics. On the other hand, it took time to devise appropriate strategies to overcome the long-standing obstacles to Chinese domination of the steppe. From the Mongol side, we can tell a nearly parallel story of three Khans, Galdan (r. 1671–1697), Tsewang Rabdan

(r. 1697–1727), and Galdan Tsereng (r. 1727–45), who stubbornly asserted autonomy against persistent Qing pressure. They relied on time-tested nomadic methods of warfare and state formation, but proved to be remarkably innovative as well. Only after 1745, when Zungharian leadership fragmented, were the Qing able to seize the opportunity to destroy their state.

As Thomas Barfield has argued, Central Eurasia and China have gone through symbiotic cycles of centralization and fragmentation for nearly two millennia.[7] Because the dispersed resources of the steppe could not support a large military or bureaucratic organization, nomadic empire builders had to accumulate wealth through trade, tribute, or plunder from neighboring agrarian states. More often than not, the steppe remained fragmented, with only brief moments of unification.

On the other hand, the bureaucratic empires could seldom control their borders securely, because the steppe was too poor to support their armies. Unlike nomads, who could live off the pasturelands, Chinese armies, primarily foot soldiers, needed vast supplies of grain, clothing, and weaponry which had to be transported thousands of kilometers over hostile terrain. The essential reason for the Qing success, which made them different from their predecessors, was their mastery of the logistical problems of sustaining a large army in the steppe for an extended period of time, at first for months, and later for years. Learning how to do this was a painful and protracted process. The Zunghars, for their part, also aimed to enhance state resources both by internal economic development and promotion of trade. They, too, made considerable progress toward self-strengthening, but not enough to save them from destruction.

## *Kangxi's Campaigns against Galdan, 1690–1697*

The building of the Zunghar state began with Batur Hungtaiji (r. 1634–53), who had begun to build a powerful state that aimed to unify all of the Mongols. With Russian support, he dominated the Tarbagatai region and the Urumqi oasis, he built a permanent capital, and obtained the backing of the Yellow Teaching Buddhists

[7] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).

(*Huangjiao*) in Tibet. Meanwhile, his son, Galdan, probably born in 1644, spent his youth in Lhasa, where he was educated under the Fifth Dalai Lama (d. 1682). Batur's son Sengge succeeded him in 1653, but he was murdered in 1671. Galdan returned from Lhasa to take control, and by 1679 had conquered Eastern Turkestan, including the oases of Hami and Turfan. The Dalai Lama gave him the title Boshughtu Khan, or "ruler decreed by Heaven". Kangxi had taken personal rule from his regents in 1667. In 1679 he was too engrossed in the suppression of the Three Feudatories revolt in southwest China (1674–81) to intervene in Mongolian affairs. He reluctantly confirmed Galdan's title.

A few years later, however, both Galdan and Kangxi were drawn into rivalries between two khans of the Eastern Mongols, or Khalkhas. Galdan backed the Jasaktu Khan against the Tushetu Khan, while Kangxi aimed to negotiate peace between the rival factions. The peace conference of Dolon Nor, held in 1686, aimed to settle the dispute, but at the conference, the Jebtsungdanba Hutukhtu, brother of the Tushetu Khan and leading Buddhist cleric of Mongolia, was seated on the same level with the Tibetan representative of the Dalai Lama. Galdan, seeing this as an insult to the Dalai Lama, joined with the Jasaktu Khan to move with 30,000 men east into the Tushetu Khan's territory. The Tushetu Khan killed the Jasaktu Khan and Galdan's brother, provoking Galdan to crush the Khalkha army. When the Jebtsungdanba Hutukhtu and tens of thousands of Khalkha refugees fled to ask for Kangxi's protection, the emperor provided them with food and sheltered the Hutukhtu. He rejected the new Tushetu Khan's request for an expedition against Galdan, but failed to get the Dalai Lama to settle the Zunghar—Khalkha conflict. Even though he admitted that the Tushetu Khan was at fault for killing Galdan's brother, he appealed to Galdan to make peace and cease burning Khalkha temples.

One year later, in 1689, negotiations with the Russians over trade and the delineation of the border concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The Russians, who had decided that the lure of the lucrative fur trade to Beijing outweighed the benefits from a Zunghar alliance, denied Galdan's appeals for support. In July, 1690, Kangxi decided to lead a personal expedition against Galdan. With the conclusion of the Russian negotiations, he could now turn his full force against the rival Mongol state. Illness forced the emperor to return to the capital before the decisive battle of Ulan Butong on

September 3, 1690, only 300 kilometers from Beijing. Qing artillery damaged Galdan's forces badly, but in negotiations mediated by the Dalai Lama's envoy, the Manchu general Arni allowed Galdan to retreat after swearing an oath of allegiance to Kangxi. The emperor attacked Arni for cowardice, but serious concerns about food supplies for the expedition indicated that the Qing forces lacked the ability to pursue Galdan. Kangxi's greatest success from the battle of Ulan Butong was not the destruction of Galdan, but the final winning over of the Khalkha Mongols. At a meeting with the Khalkha chieftains in 1691, Kangxi offered them his protection in return for their subordination to Qing rule. Praising Kangxi as their savior from Zunghar attack, they willingly yielded their autonomy to their imperial protector.

This first encounter between Qing and Zunghar troops illustrates both the character of the rival rulers and the importance of logistics. Galdan had rashly advanced too close to Beijing, violating the nomadic principle of remaining out of reach of Chinese supply lines. His crushing victory over the Khalkha Mongols led him to overestimate his troops' prowess. Kangxi, determined to eliminate Galdan permanently, nevertheless found that advancing troops even a short distance beyond the Great Wall made them extremely vulnerable. Sandstorms, rain, and hail struck suddenly, supply carts became mired in mud, and the troops quickly ran out of supplies. Arni made the sensible decision to negotiate a truce, because he knew that he could not pursue Galdan's defeated army. Despite Kangxi's frustration, the constraints of steppe warfare severely limited his options.

Both men altered strategy to prepare for their second great encounter. In Western Mongolia, 2,500 kilometers from Beijing, Galdan rebuilt his army. Kangxi pursued a double strategy: to lengthen the Qing logistical network and to lure Galdan out of his distant lair. By 1695, poor harvests in Zungharia forced Galdan to move east. When he arrived at the Kerulen and Tula Rivers, near present day Ulan Bator, with 20,000 men, Kangxi announced his second major expedition. Three armies of 35,000 men each would travel over 1,100 kilometers to cut off Galdan in a pincer attack. Defying rumors of a Russian army of 60,000 men supporting Galdan, the emperor repressed dissenting voices as he assembled food, horses, donkeys, carts, armor, weaponry, and uniforms for a definitive battle. This time, the emperor's personal presence drove the troops onward to the Kerulen River, even though support troops were delayed, and

the soldiers were once again short of rations. Galdan's men, fleeing westward when they heard of the huge Qing army, ran directly into the west route army commanded by Fiyanggû (1645–1701). In the famous battle of Jaomodo, on June 12, 1696, Galdan's force was destroyed. The actual battle was less momentous than Kangxi's apparent ability to achieve the impossible: to supply three major armies for a long march into the steppe.

Galdan still managed to escape, and Kangxi relentlessly mounted two more expeditions against him. These only reached as far as the Ordos and Ningxia regions, with smaller, faster forces. They impressed the local Mongols with Qing power and abundance, and they deprived Galdan of the ability to raid along the border. But Galdan's end was not the result of a battlefield victory; he died on April 4, 1697, under suspicious circumstances. Although the emperor and his ministers propagated the myth that Galdan committed suicide out of despair, it is much more probable that one of Galdan's close advisors poisoned him so as to surrender him to the Qing.[8]

How can we summarize this epic confrontation between two remorseless enemies? After 1690, there was little urgent strategic need to eliminate Galdan; far away in Zungharia, he was no threat to the Qing state. Even when Galdan began raiding to the east, Kangxi could have embraced a defensive strategy at less cost. His motives of personal revenge and individual challenge reveal the Qing emperor's embrace of khanship as a personal exhibition of will and a claim to be backed by Heaven: only personal victory in battle could justify his claim to be an uncontested ruler. Han literati and Manchu Grand Councillors alike expressed severe criticism of the emperor's plans. Galdan, likewise, appeared unable to follow consistently the safer path of building up his defenses and local resources. Although he had begun to develop the economic resources of his domain, he could not resist ambitious military campaigns. Raiding and settlement fit together awkwardly.

Supply constraints were severe for both sides: the Qing armies faced near starvation on each of their expeditions; only the fortuitous encounter with the Zunghar army saved them from an embar-

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[8] Lü Yiran, "Gaerdan fudu zishashuo bianwei" (A critical analysis of the story that Galdan committed suicide). *Zhungershi Lunwenji* (Collected Essays on the Zunghars), ed. Zhungeer Shilue Bianxiezu, et al., (Beijing, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 191–3; Okada Hidehirô, "Galdan's death—when and how", *Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko*, Vol. 37, 1979, pp. 91–97; Peter C. Perdue, "The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia".

rassing retreat. After the victory, the uncertainties were smoothed away, and the battles were inscribed into the history books as Heavenly-mandated victories. This version, constructed by the emperor shortly after the events, remains intact today. Recapturing the contingencies of the time gives us a more accurate picture and reveals the shaky foundations of both imperial and nationalist myths.[9]

## *Yongzheng's Triumphs and Disasters*

The contradictory experiences of the Yongzheng emperor in Central Eurasia are less well known than the spectacular victories of the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors, but his mixed record highlights the difficulties of Qing strategy in the region. His policy in the northwest was marked by three features: a serious program of troop withdrawals and truce negotiations; the invasion of Qinghai in 1724; and a catastrophic loss to the Zunghars in battle in 1731.

### *Qing Victory in Qinghai, 1724*

During the last year's of Kangxi's reign, Tibet became the main arena of competition. Kangxi had Galdan's ashes displayed on the walls of Beijing to awe the public, but, back in Zungharia, Tsewang Rabtan (r. 1697–1727) had taken power after Galdan's death, where the state survived. Initially relations with the Qing were peaceful, for Tsewang Rabdan had allied with the Qing against Galdan; but then he promoted aggressive expansion in Tibet and Turkestan. After the Zunghars invaded and pillaged Lhasa in 1717, Kangxi sent two armies to drive them out.

The Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723–35), however, preferred negotiations to campaigns. His succession inaugurated a new phase in Qing frontier policy. Much more interested in cutting costs than in military adventures, he began a sustained program of troop withdrawals from the distant frontiers. Underlying this retrenchment was Yongzheng's program of domestic austerity and institutional reform.[10]

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[9] For more details, see Peter C. Perdue, "The Qing Empire in Eurasian Time and Space," *The Qing Formation: Placements in Time*, ed. Lynn Struve (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming).

[10] Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley, 1991); Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing China* (Berkeley, 1984).

He pulled troops out of Tibet in 1723, concentrating them mainly in Xining and Dajianlu in Western Sichuan.[11] In Turkestan, Nian Gengyao (d. 1726), the brilliant general who had led the Tibetan campaigns under Kangxi, began to implement the new defensive strategy, relying on static defenses, reduced forces, and the promotion of military colonies.

Yongzheng's aggressive intervention in Qinghai the next year, however, seems to contradict his defensive stance. The Khoshot Mongol princes of Qinghai (in Mongolian, Kokonor) had been accustomed since the days of Gushi Khan (d. 1656) to exerting substantial influence in Tibet. Prince Lobzang Danjin, (In Tibetan, Blo-bzan-bstan-dsin) was a grandson of Gushi Khan, a powerful Kokonor chief who had supported the Chinese intervention in Lhasa.[12] Chaghan Danjin, another grandson of Gushi Khan from a different lineage, was his major rival. In 1723, Chaghan, backed by Yongzheng, appeared to be expanding his territory. Lobzang began to attack other Kokonor princes, who fled in defeat, asking for Qing protection. Nian Gengyao advised non-intervention, saying "if the [Qinghai princes] should now forget their great indebtedness to our country and kill their own flesh and blood, it is of no concern to us". He knew well that as so often in nomadic warfare, an advance by Qing troops "would only waste the strength of our own forces while the Mongols fled far off into the distance on their well-fed horses".[13]

The new emperor, however, overruled Nian Gengyao, ordering him to protect refugees who fled to Qing lands. Qing support of refugees from a rising Mongolian power paralleled the course that had drawn Kangxi into internecine disputes among the Khalkhas and Zunghars. Lobzang Danjin would be offered the opportunity to repent and submit to the Qing, but if he refused, a righteous army of extermination (*zhengjiao*) would be sent against him. Lobzang, as expected, rejected Qing offers to mediate a peace agreement. Changshou, the Qing envoy, reported that Lobzang intended to assemble all the princes of Kokonor to proclaim him khan, after defeating

[11] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer Fanglue.* (Lhasa, 1990), Yongzheng 1/3.

[12] L. Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet.* (Leiden, 1950), p. 82.

[13] Kato Naoto, "Lobzang Danjin's rebellion of 1723: With a focus on the eve of the rebellion," *Acta Asiatica*, Vol. 64 (1993), pp. 57–80; Nian Gengyao, *Nian Gengyao Zouzhe.* (Taibei, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 89–94.

Chaghan Danjin. As rumors spread that Lobzang had invited the Zunghars to enter Qinghai, Nian and the emperor agreed on a secret plan to "pacify Kokonor" (*ding Xihai*).[14] What they feared most was a potential alliance of the discontented princes against the Qing, backed by Tsewang Rabdan. They succeeded in inducing Lobzang to attack Chaghan Danjin on September 16, 1723. Lobzang claim to the title of Dalai Hungtaiji, indicating that he aimed to unite all the Khoshot Mongols as they had been under Gushi Khan, provided the pretext for Qing military intervention. Nian was again cautious, believing that Chaghan Danjin could hold out against Lobzang, but the emperor ordered him to advance immediately. On November 16, 1723, the Qing army drove Lobzang's men back from the Taersi temple, twenty kilometers from Xining, and in less than a month the war was over. Zunghar support for Lobzang never arrived.

Rituals held in the capital celebrated this campaign as equivalent to the repression of the Three Feudatories and the destruction of Galdan.[15] Officials formally reported the victory to eleven temples around the city, including the temples of Heaven and Earth (*Tiandi miao*), the Altars of Soil and Grain (*Sheji*), the Imperial Lineage (*Zongmiao*), as well as the tombs of the imperial ancestors (*Yongling, Fuling, Zhaoling*).[16] After a remarkably quick campaign, Yongzheng could rightly claim to have brought another vast territory under permanent Qing control. After the repression, officials imposed strictly the banner and *jasak* administration on Qinghai that had been enacted in Mongolia. The princes of Kokonor could no longer act with real autonomy.

The causes of Lobzang Danjin's actions have been much debated, but the claim of Yongzheng and his generals that it was a "rebellion" against Qing rule is problematic. The Qing term "rebellion" (*panluan*) implies that a previously "loyal" population rejected imperial grace and directly challenged its authority. Until 1723, however, the Khoshot Mongols had been quite autonomous. Kato Naoto argues

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[14] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 1/6,7; Ishihama Yumiko, "Gushi Han Ôka no Chibetto Ôken sôshitsu katei ni kansuru ichi kôsatsu: Ropusan Danjin no hanran saikô (The process by which the Gusi Khan family lost its authority over Tibet: A reconsideration of the Lobzang Danjin 'rebellion')," *Toyo Gakuho*, Vol. 69, Nos. 3 & 4 (1988), p. 157.

[15] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 2/3 *dinghai*.

[16] On the importance of these rituals, see Angela Zito, *Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China* (Chicago, 1997), pp. 127–32.

that there were pro-Qing and anti-Qing factions among the Kokonor princes, and that Lobzang Danjin's attack on Chaghan Khan represented a struggle between these two factions; but Ishihama Yumiko argues more convincingly that there were no clear lines between the feuding princes; and at one point there was a serious potential for an alliance of the princes against the Qing, with Zunghar support.[17] The Yongzheng emperor, seeing division among the princes, took advantage of their weakness to launch a military campaign with the intention of bringing all of Qinghai under Qing control. His initial instincts for caution and austerity were overcome by the prospects of matching his father's successes in expanding the empire's territory.

Yongzheng pushed his aggressive policy against the opposition of the cautious Nian Gengyao. Once entrusted with the campaign, this vigorous Chinese-martial (*Hanjun*) general acted with great decisiveness, brutality, and success, but he soon fell out of favor. By 1725 Nian had been impeached for ninety-two crimes of maladministration, corruption, and treasonous intrigue, and he was allowed to commit suicide in 1726.[18] Nian's rapid downfall was closely connected to his intimate knowledge of the shadowy circumstances of Yongzheng's succession; his great military success made him both indispensable and dangerous.[19] Without Nian, the emperor would overreach his grasp and suffer an embarrassing defeat.

### *Defeat at Hoton Nor, 1731*

Yongzheng's program of troop withdrawals resumed after the end of the rebellion, while in Zungharia, Galdan Tsereng succeeded Tsewang Rabdan in 1727. Peaceful relations lasted for only a year, as both sides tried to feel their way to a new relationship. The Qing secured the border with Russia with the Kiakhta treaty of 1727,

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[17] Ishihama, "Gushi Han Ôka"; Kato Naoto, "Robuzan Danjin no hanran to Shinchô: hanran no keiko o chûshin to shite (The rebellion of Lobzang Danjin and the Qing dynasty)," *Toyoshi Kenkyu*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1986), pp. 28–54; Kato, "Lobzang Danjin's rebellion of 1723"; Sato, Hisashi, "Lobzan Danjin no hanran ni tsuite (On Lobzang Danjin's rebellion)," *Shirin*, Vol. 55, No. 6 (1972), pp. 1–32.

[18] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 3/12; Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese*, 587–90; Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, *Nian Gengyao Zouzhe*; Miyazaki Ichisada. *Yôseitei: Chûgoku no Dokusai Kunshu* (The Yongzheng emperor: China's Abolute Ruler) (Tokyo, 1950).

[19] Xu, Zengzhong. "Qing Shizong Yinzhen jicheng huangwei wenti xintan (A new discussion of the question of the succession of Yinzhen to the throne)." *KangYongqian Sandi Pingyi*. Ed. Zuo Buqing. Beijing, 1986, pp. 253–4.

resolving the disputes that were unresolved in the Nerchinsk treaty of 1689 and establishing regular trading missions. The Russians, induced by trading concessions, could be relied upon not to support the Zunghars, and they would exert control over the mobile peoples of Siberia and Northeast, fixing them in place. No refugees or criminals would be sheltered by either side, and boundary stones would mark the frontier.[20]

Galdan Tsereng, likewise, was offered the privilege of regular tribute trading missions if he would agree to settle the border with the Qing. A Zunghar embassy visited the capital in 1728.[21] Two strict Qing conditions, however, limited the prospects for peace: Qing determination to cut off the Zunghars from any formal relations with Tibet, and the surrender of Lobzang Danjin to Qing custody. Contemptuously describing the Zunghars as "a small tribe in the northwestern corner," the emperor aimed to isolate their state from both of their closest cultural neighbors—Mongolians and Tibetans—as well as from Russia.[22] Yongzheng could have enforced this defensive quarantine without any military action, but in 1729, the emperor once again abandoned his peace policy and called for an aggressive campaign to exterminate the Zunghar state. His lengthy justification reviewed all the outrages committed by the Zunghars since the days of Galdan. All the other Mongols had now submitted to the Qing; only they stubbornly refused to surrender. Even though sagely emperors tried to avoid exhausting the army with excessive campaigns (*qiongbing duwu*, literally "defile the name of warfare by wanton use of troops"), Yongzheng vowed to finish the task begun by Kangxi. There would be no military glory to be gained by wiping out these remote tribes, but if they were allowed to exist, they would seriously endanger the nation (*guojia*).[23]

Yongzheng cited many of the same grievances already expressed by Kangxi, but he struck a more defensive tone, one of exasperation rather than confidence. From the imperial point of view, merciful acts intended to arouse gratitude and promote prosperity among

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[20] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 5/8 *jiachen*; Peter C. Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia," *International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 263–286.

[21] Petech, *China and Tibet*, p. 135.

[22] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 5/12 *jiawu*.

[23] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 7/2, 9/4.

these obstreperous Mongols had been repaid only with violence. A repeated pattern of Zunghar broken promises justified reluctant endorsement of extreme acts of violence.

These imperial legitimations of military action expressed a distinctive ideology. The Qing viewed the Mongols as human actors, who could take responsibility for their decisions.[24] Ming rulers could see them only as beasts, constantly driven by greed and violence, over which the empire could exert no control. Paradoxically, Ming alienation from the Mongols and belief in their inhumanity led them to practice a more defensive policy. After the mid-fifteenth century, they made no grand efforts to eradicate the nomads: since they were more like a natural force than a human society, it would be as futile as trying to eliminate wolves or floods. The Qing goal of universal peace among humankind led them to endorse eliminationist policies toward those who obstinately refused to knuckle under to the imperial view. Those who defied the imperial vision had to pay the cost: elimination by a "righteous punitive expedition" (*zhengjiao*) designed to return the human world to a rational order.

Concepts of universal peace and benevolence, however, fit awkwardly with endorsements of violence. These tensions are more prominent in Yongzheng than in Kangxi. His repeated denials that he was indulging in *qiongbing duwu* indicate that he knew that the proper role of a wise ruler, in Confucian terms, was to exert moral suasion, not material force. Kangxi, by contrast, was closer to a tradition that valued individual valor on the battlefield along with efficient administration and moral authority. These three values were more coherently united during his reign, as expansion and economic recovery brought peace and active support of the Manchu regime.

Yongzheng faced greater tensions in an expanded empire now straining at the limits of its administrative and logistical resources. His instinctive response was retrenchment, careful husbanding of resources, and lengthy, cautious preparation. The withdrawal and consolidation of troops, sparing burdens on the treasury and on the local people, had been his fundamental goal. The intervention in Kokonor against Lobzang Danjin was exceptional, brief, and apparently successful. But the persistence of the Zunghar state wounded

[24] Perdue, Peter C. "Culture, history, and imperial Chinese strategy: Legacies of the Qing conquests." *Warfare in Chinese History*. Ed. Hans van de Ven. Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 252–87.

the unified imperial body like an open sore. As long as one group recognizably part of the traditional Central Eurasian world rejected the universal sovereign, he could not be content. The glaring contradiction between the view of the Zunghars as a "small remote tribe in the northwest corner" and as a major threat to the security of the entire national community reveals that there was no strategic logic to this ambitious campaign. The overweening ambition was generated by the burgeoning ideology of the empire, whereby the emperor had to enforce universal peace over all its component parts.

In April, 1729, Furdan (1683–1753) was made Jingbian Dajiangjun (Generalissimo for Tranquilizing the Frontier), in charge of the north route army, while Yue Zhongqi (1686–1754), with 324 officers and 26,500 troops was appointed Ningyuan Dajiangjun (Generalissimo for Pacifying Distant Regions) of the west route army. Both would set out for Galdan Tsereng's base in Ili on converging routes in the fifth or sixth lunar month.[25] When an envoy arrived from Galdan Tsereng, promising to deliver Lobzang Danjin, the emperor seized this opportunity to negotiate peace, recalled the generals to the capital, and delayed the army's advance for a year. Furdan and Yue Zhongqi returned to the capital. Just as they arrived, Zunghar detachments began raiding frontier posts in Qinghai and Turfan, taking away large numbers of horses. Yongzheng took no aggressive action, even though Yue Zhongqi insisted on strengthening the frontier garrisons with at least 5,000 more troops. The emperor insisted on keeping major forces only in the Gansu corridor and at Xining, and on not sending large forces out beyond the pass. He regretfully turned down Yue's sixteen proposals for bolstering the frontier garrisons, admitting that he respected Yue's passion to wipe out the enemy, but asserted that "now is not the right time".[26] Luckily, the garrison at Turfan succeeded in driving off the Zunghars and recovering the stolen horses, while the Mongolian *jasaks* successfully defended Qinghai. Now, in a reverse of Kangxi's approach, or Yongzheng's prompting of Nian Gengyao, it was the aggressive frontier general who was held back by the cautious emperor.[27]

Furdan with his northern army had begun to build a fortress at Khobdo, farther west than any Qing forces had ever penetrated into

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[25] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 7/3.
[26] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 9/1, 2.
[27] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 9//2 *guichou.*

Mongolia. Falsely informed that the Zunghars had divided their forces, Furdan seized the opportunity to attack. Ten thousand men in three divisions advanced to meet the Zunghars, leaving 7,300 behind to guard Khobdo. On July 20, 1731, he found 2,000 of the enemy and put them to flight with 3,000 troops.

Furdan was actually marching into a trap. Small Zunghar forces lured him forward with harassing raids, while the main force stayed hidden in the mountains. On July 23, the Zunghars poured out of the mountains and surrounded the Qing army with a full force of 20,000 at Hoton Nor, a small lake 210 kilometers west of Khobdo. After fierce fighting, on July 27 Furdan broke the siege and retreated with his men back to Khobdo with only two thousand men.[28] Confessing that he had advanced too rashly, Furdan desperately pleaded with the emperor to sentence him to execution. The emperor, however, pardoned him, and insisted that he focus his efforts on defense.

The outcome of Yongzheng and Furdan's aggressive ambitions was a military disaster, the first major defeat of a Qing army by the Zunghars.[29] Driven by the desire to surpass his father's glories, Yongzheng violated his own instincts for caution. Once again, tried and true nomadic tactics had lured an army from China beyond its supply lines and destroyed it. The next year, Galdan Tsereng in turn overreached himself with an attack on the Khalkhas. When his troops were crushed by the Khalkha khan at Erdeni Zhao, on the Orkhon River, he had to retreat to the Altai mountains. Retrenchment and stabilization of the border became the main watchwords of Qing and Zunghar policy for the next twenty years.[30]

Yongzheng's puzzling decision to name Furdan as the leader of the attacking force may have been a result of Manchu-Han tensions. Furdan was deeply loyal to the emperor, but he had none of the aggressive, contentious flair of Yue Zhongqi. He was not known for imagination. In Miyazaki Ichisada's evaluation, he was "merely conscientious" (*kinchoku ippô*).[31] His main military roles had been defensive: building forts and clearing land.[32] Yue had openly proposed a

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[28] Fu Heng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer*, Yongzheng 9/7 *jiashen, yihai.*

[29] Chiba Muneo, *Kara Bûran* (Black Whirlwind) (Tokyo, 1986) vol. 2, p. 58; Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese*, p. 264.

[30] Qingshi Bianwei Hui, ed., *Qingdai Renwu Zhuangao* (Qing Biographies), 1992, Vol. 1, No. 8, p. 309.

[31] Miyazaki, *Yôseitei*, p. 144.

[32] Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese*, p. 264.

detailed, expensive, and ambitious campaign to secure Urumqi first before attacking in far Western Mongolia. He knew well the true costs of defense and support in the oases, but the thrifty Yongzheng rejected his calculations. Both men had illustrious ancestors, but although Yue had much greater competence than Furdan, he was a Han descendant of the Song dynasty military hero Yue Fei, while Furdan was a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner and Suwan Gûwalgiya lineage, one of the most prominent in the empire.[33]

Because of his famous lineage, the deluded country literatus Zeng Jing (1679–1736) had sent Yue a notorious proposal urging him to throw off Manchu rule.[34] The loyal Yue Zhongqi immediately reported Zeng's sedition, earning Yongzheng's undying gratitude. Without Yue's detailed investigation, the emperor would not have opened the political campaign that culminated in his long, polemical text, the *Dayi Juemilu* (Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion) with its fierce defense of the Manchus as the civilized successors to the Mandate of Heaven. Nevertheless, one wonders if Yue was not tainted by the events despite his efforts. Yongzheng's suspicions of successful frontier generals had been fully revealed in his persecution of the Chinese-martial general Nian Gengyao. Promoting the Manchu Furdan ahead of Yue Zhongqi offered Yongzheng the chance to prove that Manchus could achieve military glory as well as they imposed civil order.

Yongzheng's campaign disaster demonstrates how much he differed from his father. He clearly disliked preparing for extended campaigns, and he never participated in any campaigns personally. His half-hearted attempt to achieve quick gains as a conqueror of the steppes ended in failure. The greatest effects of the Yongzheng campaign were felt not in Central Eurasia, but in the Qing internal administration. The preparations for the Zunghar campaign paved the way for the establishment of the Grand Council as the central deliberative body and communication center of the empire.[35] Yonghzheng's most significant legacies were the early form of the Grand Council, the "nourishing virtue" salary supplements (*yanglianyin*) and other tax reforms, and the incorporation of tribal chieftains (*tusi*) into regular

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[33] Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World*, (Princeton, 1990), Chapter 2; Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, p. 112.
[34] Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp. 253–8; Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese*, p. 957.
[35] Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*. 128–34.

district administration. All of these were indirect results of the need to control and finance frontier administration.

An overall evaluation of Yongzheng as a military strategist, on the other hand, would not be favorable. The successes of Qing armies in this period were due to the leadership of his generals, Nian Gengyao and Yue Zhongqi. Both were highly talented holdovers from the Kangxi reign; both labored under a cloud of suspicion under Yongzheng. Yongzheng repeatedly degraded generals who succeeded on the frontier. Yinti (1688–1755), Kangxi's fourteenth son, had been the presumptive heir to the throne because of his successes in Tibet in 1720, but he was put under house arrest immediately after Yongzheng's succession. Nian Gengyao, as mentioned above, was impeached and allowed to commit suicide in 1726. Yue Zhongqi lasted longer, but also fell into disgrace. As Nian's deputy, he helped to repress Lobzang Danjin's rebellion, but he turned against Nian in 1725, helping to substantiate the charges against him. He was rebuked in 1730 for failing to protect Hami, degraded in rank, and recalled to the capital. Yue was imprisoned, had his property confiscated, sentenced to decapitation, and then let off with a commuted sentence. He was finally released under Qianlong in 1737.[36] Furdan lost a major battle, but he was effective on defense. Still, he was also condemned to execution in 1735, although the Qianlong emperor commuted his sentence to imprisonment.

Thus the Yongzheng emperor left a trail of disgraced and executed generals, who were punished despite considerable military achievement. Dispassionate observers might note that many of the military failures resulted from Yongzheng's refusal to follow his generals' advice. For example, after rejecting Yue Zhongqi's impressive proposal to fortify Turfan, he blamed the general for not being able to hold off Zunghar raids on Turfan with his main troops at Barkul, which was a week's march away. The emperor's hand clearly marked this decision, and he should have borne responsibility for its consequences.

On the other hand, the Qing still faced severe limits on their supply lines during Yongzheng's reign. The colossal forces requested by Yue Zhongqi would have heavily burdened both the oasis agriculturalists of Turfan and the peasantry of Gansu. It is the common practice of emperors and politicians to ask military commanders to

[36] Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese*, p. 958.

achieve unreasonable tasks with insufficient supplies, only to blame them for the inevitable failure. The constraints on military supply made the defense of these oases against raids extremely difficult, once the emperor had ruled out a large aggressive campaign.

Furdan's rash attack is less defensible. He fell into a classic trap that nomadic warriors had sprung on armies of settled empires for centuries. As the Zunghars withdrew from open battle, the Qing forces extended their supply lines too far. The Zunghars lay in ambush and surrounded the Qing troops, forcing them into a desperate retreat. Furdan had been rash, but the emperor had not tried to restrain him. The contradictory aims of Yongzheng's policy became apparent. On the one hand, he wanted to surpass his father's achievements by "exterminating" the Zunghars with a bold, aggressive stroke. At the same time, he knew that logistics and expenses constrained Qing capabilities. Caught between the hope of sudden success and the more prudent counsels of reason, he urged his general into a situation that had recurred repeatedly in history. Perhaps the emperor's pardon of Furdan tacitly admitted his complicity in the decision.

Thus the curious personality of the emperor interacted with logistical constraints to permit the continued survival of the Zunghar state. Autocratic yet vacillating, a disciplined, careful domestic reformer, but a rash military adventurer, the contradictory facets of the ruler reflected the hybrid nature of the Qing state, as it attempted to embrace both the Han Chinese interior and the radically different environment of the Eurasian steppe.

### *Qianlong's Final Blows, 1755–1760*

Furdan's defeat brought about a thirty-year stalemate in the Qing-Zunghar struggle. In the last year of his reign, Yongzheng entered into negotiations to fix the boundary between Zunghar and Khalkha Mongol lands. Frustrated by the failures of his commanders, he tacitly abandoned his ambitious aims to exterminate the rival state. The Qianlong emperor, in the early years of his reign, confirmed the agreement to leave the Zunghars alone in the Altai, while the Zunghars promised not to raid the Khalkhas to their east. They agreed to leave vacant lands between the Mongol territories as a buffer zone.[37] Tsewang Rabdan's assassination in 1727 did not shake centralized

[37] Chiba, *Kara Bûran*, Vol. 2, Chapter 2; Fuheng, ed., *Pingding Zhungar, juan* 37 Yongzheng 13/4.

rule; his successor Galdan Tsereng still maintained control.

Galdan Tsereng's death in 1745, however, led to an outbreak of internecine strife that ultimately doomed the Zunghar state. Tsewang Dorji Namjal, the second son of Galdan Tsereng, succeeded as khan, but he was a violent, perverse ruler, who failed in an attempt to kill his elder brother, Lama Darja. The high ministers of the state then deposed Tsewang Dorji Najal, blinded him, and exiled him to Aksu, where he died in 1750.[38] Lama Darja then took over the khanship, but he in turn was killed by an alliance of the princes Dawaci (d. 1759) and Amursana (d. 1757) in 1753. Dawaci drove out Amursana in 1753 and named himself khan, while Amursana turned to the Qing to restore him to power. The turbulent succession in Zungharia, in sharp contrast with the stability of Qianlong's reign, provided the Qing with an excellent opportunity to launch a new military campaign. Qianlong decided to back Amursana's claim to Zungharia by sending out the first of his three major military expeditions to Eastern Central Asia. In 1754, Amursana, as assistant commander, led 30,000 men from Uliyasutai, and 20,000 men left from Hami and Barkul. Dawaci was quickly defeated the following year and delivered alive to Qianlong in Beijing. Amursana, however, after being appointed khan, attempted to free himself from Qing control. Qianlong's second campaign, begun late in 1755, ended in 1757, when Amursana fled across the Russian border. Qianlong's third campaign, from 1757 to 1759, sent Qing armies against the Khojas, Turkic Muslim leaders of the oases of southern Xinjiang.

These three campaigns followed closely upon each other and included many of the same commanders and soldiers. Because they lasted much longer and covered much greater distances than any of the preceding ones, supply lines were even more critical to moving an army so far beyond the Gansu corridor. Qianlong carefully prepared supplies in advance of the first campaign and left surpluses in garrison storehouses when it was over. In the second campaign, Amursana's rebellion caught the Qing commanders off guard, and their armies suffered several near disasters until they could put supply routes in order. The third campaign, unlike the first two, essentially involved siege warfare against the cities of Turkestan. Slow, steady transport of supplies to the Qing garrisons was more critical

[38] Fuheng, ed., *Pingding Zhungeer, juan* 52 *Qianlong 14/4.*

than rapid provisions to troops on the move. But in all three campaigns, supply routes stretching back to northwest China were the vital links in the chain of wagons bringing food, animals, weaponry, and clothing to the far-flung Qing garrisons.

I will only summarize the supply issues in Qianlong's campaigns, which I have discussed elsewhere.[39] The commanders of both armies prepared a chain of magazine posts (*taizhan*) extending along the Gansu corridor into the oases of Turkestan. For the twenty thousand men of the West Route Army, six months of supplies were stocked in advance, including 11,200 *shi* (ca. 745 tons) of grain plus noodles, bread, mutton, and live animals. The main sources of supply were the markets of northwest China, primarily Gansu, but also the provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, and even Henan. Lands cleared by military garrisons in the Turkestan oases of Hami and Barkul also provided significant grain reserves, which were transported to the army using oxen imported from the northwest. By contrast to the Yongzheng emperor's experience thirty years earlier, when the commanders could not even support their own garrisons in Turfan, the grain network linking the oases and the northwest could provide enough for local guard troops and large campaign armies. They also brought with them extra grain to feed surrendered Mongol tribes, and tea to initiate trade relations.

Transport costs were extraordinarily high, but the treasury had a large enough surplus to pay them. The total cost of Qianlong's three Xinjiang campaigns was 33 million taels.[40] To move 100, 000 *shi* (ca. 6650 tons) of grain from the nearest production region in western Gansu to Hami cost one million taels, about ten times the cost of purchasing the grain itself. Furthermore, all the mules, camels, carts, porters, and their fodder and rations also had to be purchased on interior markets. The only alternative was to exact levies on the subject Mongol tribes. When the Qing put pressure on the Mongols, however, these levies became so severe that they incited a brief

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[39] Peter C. Perdue, "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-century China, Russia, and Mongolia," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 757–93; See also Lai Fushun, *Qianlong Zhongyao Zhanzheng zhi Junxu Yanjiu* (Studies on Military Supplies in Qianlong's Major Campaigns) (Taipei, 1984).

[40] Chen Feng, *Qingdai Junfei Yanjiu* (Military Expenses in the Qing Dynasty). (Wuhan, 1991), p. 261.

rebellion by the Khalkha chieftain Chinggünjav in 1756–7.[41] But the sparse population of Mongols alone could not feed the Chinese troops, and they were unreliable allies.

Despite these extraordinary challenges, Qianlong's commanders succeeded in delivering continuous flows of military supplies to the distant armies. It was this constant routine support that guaranteed success in the end, where Kangxi and Yongzheng had failed. The mid-eighteenth century victories resulted from a very different approach to warfare in the steppe, one which finally overcame the millennial balance between the rulers of China's core and their rivals in Central Eurasia. Ever since the Xiongnu nomadic confederation rose alongside the Han dynasty, steppe empires and settled Chinese empires had coexisted in hostile proximity. The rulers of the settled states had never been able to eliminate the nomads permanently, because they could not overcome the logistical barriers. Qianlong and his commanders devised the successful strategy, but it was only possible because of the unprecedented commercialization of the eighteenth-century economy. The successful linkage of agrarian commercial growth and military supply explains why the Qing by 1760 had become the largest empire in the world in both size and population.

## *Warfare in the Steppe: Chinese and Nomadic*

I will conclude with some general observations about the development of imperial strategy. The three Qing emperors responded creatively to the persistent obstacles of warfare in the steppe. Nomadic warrior armies were usually much smaller than the armies of the settled empires they confronted. Classic nomadic military tactics were to attack by ambush, provoking the lumbering enemy army into motion, then to retreat quickly into the steppe, inducing the enemy to overextend himself in pursuit. Either the enemy gave up when he outran his supply lines, or he became vulnerable to a devastating counterattack on his famished troops by nomadic raids. From the days of the Parthians to the ambush of the Ming emperor in the Tumu incident (1449), many large armies of settled bureaucratic empires had been destroyed by these tactics. Even if the nomads did

[41] C.R. Bawden, "The Mongol rebellion of 1756–1757," *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1968), pp. 1–31.

not win these battles, they could still escape into the steppe beyond the reach of the settled army's supply lines. Nomadic armies could only be eliminated if their retreat were cut off, a strategy that required several armies to conduct an encirclement campaign, which is why Kangxi sent three separate armies against Galdan in his second campaign, and Qianlong divided his army into two wings.

Mobilizing such large forces, of 30,000 to 50,000 men per army, put great strains on the agrarian economy, especially the peasantry of the poor northwest through which the army usually had to pass. Demands for food from local peasantry could drive grain prices up to dizzying heights: prices quadrupled in Gansu when Qianlong's armies crossed the region. Kangxi avoided this problem during his second campaign by sending two of his armies directly across the Gobi desert into Outer Mongolia. Only the Western army, under Fiyanggû, set out from Guihua, in Ningxia. Galdan was crushed at the battle of Jaomodo two and one half months after Kangxi led his army out of Peking. Even so, supplying this expedition required an enormous mobilization of supplies from interior China.

Each of Kangxi's expeditions led him farther away from Beijing; each required larger logistical mobilization, and caused constant worry about supplies of grain and water. The Qing economy in the late seventeenth century had recovered significantly from the Ming-Qing transition wars, but it was not yet well integrated commercially or highly productive agriculturally. By contrast, Qianlong in the 1750s could take advantage of a century of growing market activity, regional specialization, improvements in agricultural yields and overall gains from economic integration. His three expeditions into the steppe went much farther than Kangxi's, reaching beyond the current Sino-Soviet border, and Qianlong supported larger armies for much longer periods of time. He was only able to do this because of the great growth both of the Chinese economy and of the fiscal and bureaucratic apparatus of extraction from the late seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries.

I have provided only a few examples of the extensive demands made by the Qing armies on the resources of interior China and the high costs of transport and provisioning in the steppe. The shifts in strategy pursued by the leaders of these campaigns reflect increasing Qing awareness of these costs. Kangxi's campaigns were personal acts of valor and endurance, directed at a single enemy—Galdan himself and his purported treachery—and had the sole purpose of

eliminating his personal power. Kangxi, thinking in Manchurian and Central Asian terms, viewed the personal charisma of a single man as the primary focus of loyalty of the Zunghar soldiers. Kangxi likewise relied on personal appeal to secure the loyalty of his own troops. His personal participation in the campaign demonstrated his toughness, thus inspiring his followers. Both he and Qianlong faced resistance from their generals to such costly, protracted, and dangerous campaigns, but Kangxi regarded many of his generals as lacking in courage. He believed, for example, that Galdan escaped encirclement at Ulan Butong because General Arni was too timorous to pursue him. Arni probably made a wise decision in not pursuing Galdan, but Kangxi gave him no credit for it. On the second campaign, he vowed to continue marching into the steppe regardless of the dangers to his health. He seems not to have been aware of the logistical limitations that prevented pursuit in the first campaign. No extensive mobilization of supplies had been done, but fortunately the battle took place only 300 kilometers from Beijing.

Qianlong, on the other hand, remained home. Although he closely planned strategy, he was only a desk general. The much improved communication system of the Qing bureaucracy after the establishment of the Grand Council in 1738 allowed him to direct the course of battle thousands of kilometers away. Unlike Kangxi, Qianlong's campaigns were aimed at the entire Zunghar Mongol people, not just a single individual. Qianlong's main adversary, the Mongol prince Amursana, had much less prestige than Galdan and faced serious internal rivalry. Galdan had successfully intervened in rivalries among the Eastern Mongols (Khalkhas) to gain additional support, but in Qianlong's time, the Khalkhas were firmly on the Qing side. Amursana never posed a serious threat to the Qing empire, and never approached Beijing. Still, he did aim to construct an independent state in Central Eurasia, backed by the Dalai Lama and many Western Mongols. Qianlong, following his grandfather's lead, was determined to eliminate this state. Although he ordered his generals to pursue Amursana relentlessly, he also deliberately set out to destroy the economic basis of the Mongolian regime. The constant use of the terms *jiao* or *jiaomie* (extermination) in Qianlong's edicts leaves no doubt of his goal. He used scorched earth tactics, execution of prisoners, and deliberate massacre, combined with the use of grain relief to induce surrender and defection, to achieve a final solution to the Mongolian question.

Nearly all the Mongols who followed Amursana were either exter-

minated, given as slaves to Manchu and Chinese generals, or assigned to pasturelands closer to the Chinese interior, under direct military supervision. According to a contemporary Russian estimate, only thirty to forty thousand of the approximately six hundred thousand Mongols in Zungharia were able to save themselves by fleeing across the Russian border.[42] Wei Yuan (1794–1856), writing over half a century later, estimated that forty percent of the several hundred thousand Zunghar households died of smallpox, thirty percent were massacred by Qing troops, and twenty percent found refuge among the Russians and Kazakhs.[43]

Unlike Kangxi, Qianlong did not see the essence of the campaign as a test of his personal endurance in the steppes. He remained safely in Beijing while hectoring his reluctant generals into relentless pursuit of the shattered Zunghar forces. The key to victory was not the personal prowess of the leader; it was a cold-blooded tracking down of all resistance combined with large scale bureaucratic organization. Yet the personal element—the Manchu or Central Eurasian factor—had not disappeared. Qianlong's determination to exterminate (*jiao*) the Zunghars reveals "the wounded vanity of a universal sovereign whose diplomacy and armies had been humiliated by barbarian chiefs".[44] Even after Amursana fled across the Russian border, Qianlong hounded the Russians for the return of Amursana's head, to the point of seriously disrupting diplomatic relations, until they finally handed over his ashes. Qianlong, however, did not find it necessary to display his ashes on the walls of Beijing. His thirst for personal revenge did not go quite as far as Kangxi's.

The emperor took great pride in these three military successes, including them in his self-congratulatory inventory of "Ten Great Campaigns". Although the other campaigns on his list (especially the Vietnamese, Burmese, and two Jinchuan campaigns) have very dubious claims to glory, few would dispute the real accomplishments of the Qing armies in the northwest.[45] On the other hand, not many scholars have really tried to explain their success. It is not obvious

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[42] Zlatkin, I. Ia. *Istoriia Dzhungarskogo Khanstvo (1635–1758)* (History of the Zunghar Khanate) (Moscow, 1964), p. 461.

[43] Wei Yuan, *Shengwuji* (Record of Sacred Military Victories) (Beijing, 1984), p. 156.

[44] Maurice Courant, *L'Asie Centrale aux 17e et 18e siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou.* (Paris, 1912), p. 111.

[45] In 1792, the Qianlong emperor enumerated his "Ten Great Campaigns"

that the commanders in the northwest were of uniquely outstanding quality: some did well, and others were at best mediocre. Chinese writers, from the Qing to today, haven taken the ultimate victory of Chinese over Central Eurasians for granted. The sorry results of the Song and Ming efforts to drive back their northwestern rivals makes this assumption questionable.

We also need to explain why Qianlong, against the advice of several top generals, undertook the expeditions in the first place. As discussed above, Yongzheng had preferred more defensive measures, until his one aggressive move brought a debacle. Qianlong had available a repertory of other, safer frontier policies: defensive military colonies (*tuntian*) supporting garrisons along the Great Wall; "loose-reign" (*jimi*) policies granting autonomy to selected chiefs; using barbarians to control barbarians by setting rival Mongols against each other; and veiled protection payments under the tributary system.[46] All these strategies took effect in the long term, along with some Qing innovations: support of religious indoctrination by lamas of the Yellow Teaching sect favorable to the Qing, sedentarization of the nomads, followed by commercial penetration and demographic decimation. Still, the lasting effect of these policies relied first on the successful prosecution of aggressive military campaigns.

We need to reassess the military potential of the pre-modern Chinese state. Whatever its inadequacies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Qing empire during the Golden Age met the challenges it faced with greater success than any of its predecessors. From the Chinese imperial point of view, population growth, territorial expansion, and commercial development were all indicators of the emperor's virtue and the grace of Heaven. None of these trends was unique to the Qing, but the ability to link together these developments in the service of the empire was more effective during the Qing than ever before. In the early seventh century, for example,

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十全 [*shiquan*] as two conquests of the Zunghars in 1755 and 1756–57, the conquest of Turkestan in 1758–59, two wars against rebels in Jinchuan, western Sichuan in 1747–49, and 1771–76, suppression of a rebellion in Taiwan in 1787–88, the Burmese campaign of 1766–70, the Vietnamese campaign of 1788–89, and two wars against the Gurkhas of Nepal from 1790–92. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 369–70. Alexander Woodside, "The Ch'ien-lung Reign", draft chapter for *The Cambridge History of China*, stresses the serious failures of the southwestern campaigns.

[46] Summaries of Chinese techniques of frontier pacification are found in John K. Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1968), pp. 1–33.

Tang Taizong's armies had also asserted control over the same region, including the Tarim basin and the oases as far west as the Pamirs, but less than a century later, the powerful Tibetan kingdom threatened the northwestern frontiers.[47] The Qing not only conquered the region, but maintained control of it until its collapse in 1911.

The extensive military campaigns extracted the abundant resources of China's hundreds of millions of peasant households to subdue a few million nomads. Looking backward, such an uneven weight of numbers might lead us to assume an inevitable Qing victory, but looking forward, as the events occurred, demonstrates the great obstacles to conquest. Ingenuity, determination, luck, and a prosperous economy were all essential elements of the Qing expansion. By no means did victory look inevitable to the emperors or their commanders.

The Qing expansion was an incremental process, led by three emperors, each of whom brought different perspectives to the frontier security problem. Likewise, the three successive khans of the Zunghars developed their policies in reaction to the Qing. Kangxi, who led his troops personally, took great pride in his participation in the military campaigns; his letters home to his son show that he enjoyed the hard life of the steppe.[48] His counterpart Galdan likewise led bold military thrusts inspired by his personal commitment to victory. In this phase, up to 1697, frontier security depended on the fluctuating allegiance of the Mongol chieftains, who were strongly influenced by evidence of military might. Kangxi succeeded in winning over the Khalkha Mongols primarily because of his powerful demonstrations of military force.

Their successors had mixed records, reflecting their difficulties in balancing consolidation of the internal resources of the state with ambitious expansionist goals. Neither side had sufficient resources to eliminate the other permanently, but both yielded to the temptation to go beyond the limits set by logistics. After Galdan's death, Tsewang Rabdan initiated more careful consolidation of his state's resources. He avoided risky intervention in internecine Mongolian politics, and

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[47] Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds. *Perspectives on the T'ang.* New Haven: (Yale University Press), 1973, p. 4.

[48] Jaqa Cimeddorji, *Die Briefe des K'ang-hsi Kaisers aus 1696–7 den Kronprinzen Yinch'eng: Ein Beitrag zum ersten Dzungarenkrieg der Ch'ing, 1690–1697.* (Bonn, 1989); Okada Hidehirô, ed., *Kôkitei no Tegami* (Kangxi's Letters) (Tokyo, 1979).

recognized that economic development focused on military industries was essential to his state's survival. Galdan had begun the development of mines to produce saltpeter and metals for weapons casting. Tsewang Rabdan continued these projects with the aid of a Swedish artillery captain captured from Russians, and he turned to the Russians to develop commercial relations.[49] At the same time, he kept Qing troops off guard with raids on the oases of East Turkestan, preventing them from mounting ambitious expeditions. He held off Russian efforts at expansion and conducted campaigns against the Kazakhs to the west. His invasion of Tibet, however, provoked a Qing counter stroke in 1720, which drove out the Zunghars and established permanent Qing influence over the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Under Tsewang Rabdan the Zunghars achieved their peak in size and power, but their future was clouded by the success of Kangxi in the last years of his reign in cutting their ties with Tibet. Yongzheng's great victory in Qinghai was likewise balanced by his defeat in Mongolia, where the ambitious plan to annihilate the Zunghars was aborted by Furdan's loss at Hoton Nor.

The third generation leaders were the most cautious. After defeating the Qing forces in 1731, Galdan Tsereng launched an attack to the east, which was beaten back at Erdeni Zhao by Mongol Khalkha forces. Then he gave up on expansion, and negotiated a division of the border with the Qing. The Zunghars could no longer expand, but they had a chance of holding out, if they could strengthen the state internally and avoid giving the Qing pretexts to intervene. Qianlong also seemed to accept the continued existence of the Zunghar state, and only attempted to "soften" its military might with trading relations, as he had done with the Russians. Perhaps if Galdan Tsereng's reign had been as long as Qianlong's, the Zunghars could have successfully stabilized their state. His early death in 1745, and the resulting division of leadership, gave Qianlong the opportunity to crush the state. Personal accidents of leadership played as important a role in the fate of both states as supplies and economic development.

The disappearance of the Zunghars offered new potential for integrating the Qing empire. The territory won by conquest served in

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[49] Peter C. Perdue, "The Agrarian Basis of Qing Expansion into Central Asia". Paper presented at Third International Conference on Sinology, Taipei, Taiwan, 2000.

turn as an outlet for Han migration. Kangxi had established the first military colonies there, but, after the 1760s, Qianlong began serious encouragement of land clearance and settlement of Han civilians in Xinjiang.[50] Offers of thirty *mou* (ca. five acres) per family were excellent incentives for Han peasants to leave the overcrowded interior. His officials succeeded in raising grain yields, promoting irrigation, and establishing a substantial self-supporting civilian population around Ili and Urumqi. By 1800, there were at least 50,000 households around Urumqi, cultivating over 350,000 acres of land. Agrarian settlers in turn attracted craftsmen and merchants who kept up trade links to the interior. This frontier settlement, like the Han movements to the southwestern, southeastern, and northeast frontiers, solidified control and further stimulated commercial links with the interior.

Yet, by a dialectical process, the culmination of the empire's potential also meant the beginning of its downfall. The expanding frontier populations brought Han culture to distant regions, but they stimulated intense resistance from the people upon whom they encroached. The numerous rebellions on China's frontiers in the late Qianlong era have common roots in the intrusion of settlers into new frontiers, touching off conflicts either between Han and non-Han or between subethnic Han groups: Han vs. Miao in Western Hunan, Hui vs Han in Gansu, White Lotus organization in Northern Hubei, Tibetan bandits in Sichuan known as *guolu*, Hakka-Punti feuding in Guangxi.[51] Military challenges to the Qing now came from peoples within the empire, not from nomads outside it. The Jahangir rebellion in Xinjiang in 1820–28 indicated constant potential for unrest, demonstrated even more dramatically by Yakub Beg's conquest of the entire region from 1864 to 1874.

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[50] Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia, c. 1800," *The Cambridge History of China: Volume 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part I*, Ed. John K. Fairbank. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 65. Hua Li, "Qianlong nianjian yimin chuguan yu Qing qianqi Tianshan Beilu nongye di fazhan. (Migration of people beyond the wall in early Qianlong and development of agriculture in Northern Tianshan in the early Qing)." *Xibei Shidi*, April, 1987, pp. 119–31; Hua Li. *Qingdai Xinjiang Nongye Fazhanshi* (History of the Development of Agriculture in Xinjiang in the Qing). (Heilongjiang, 1995); James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia*, (Stanford, 1998), pp. 50–52.

[51] Susan Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn, "Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion", *The Cambridge History of China*, pp. 107–62.

The expansion of the eighteenth century generated the tensions that brought it down in the nineteenth century. The sheer unwieldiness of the empire, demographically and territorially, radically limited the powers of the Qing rulers to keep order from the center. Just as successful integration of the empire meant linking regions through trade and migration and tapping resources for the purpose of unification, disintegration meant the breaking of the links between local economy, society, and state power, coupled with resistance to the right of the central government to direct local production for national needs. Ultimately, the empire collapsed under the strain, but in the Golden Age of Qianlong's peak years, these problems were far in the future. The successes in Central Eurasia were only one facet of the multiple potential of the largest of China's empires.

## Glossary

Aksu 阿克蘇
Amursana (d. 1757) 阿睦爾撒納
Arni 阿喇尼
Barkul (Balikun) 巴里坤
Batur Hung Taiji (r. 1634–53) 巴圖爾琿台吉
beile (Manchu noble) 貝勒
Boshughtu Khan 博碩克圖汗
Chaghan Danjin 察汗丹津
Changshou 常壽
Dajianlu 打箭爐
Dawaci (d. 1759) 達瓦齊
Dayi Juemilu (Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion) 大義覺迷錄
ding Xihai (Pacify the West) 定西海
Dolon Nor (Peace conference, 1696) 多倫諾爾
Erdeni Zhao 額爾德尼昭
Fiyanggû (1645–1701) 費揚古
Fuling 福陵
Furdan (1683–1753) 傅爾丹
Galdan (r. 1671–1697) 噶爾丹
Galdan Tsereng (r. 1727–45) 噶爾丹策零
Gansu 甘肅
Guihua 歸化
guojia (nation) 國家
guolu (Tibetan bandits) 嘓嚕
Gushi Khan (d. 1656) 顧實汗
Hami 哈密
Han dynasty 漢
Hanjun (Chinese-martial soldiers) 漢軍
Huangjiao (Yellow Teaching) 黃教
Ili 伊犁
jasak (Mongolian chieftain) 札薩克
Jasaktu Khan 扎薩克圖汗
Jebtsungdanba Hutukhtu 哲卜尊丹巴呼圖克圖
jiao (exterminate) 剿
jiaomie (exterminate) 剿滅
jimi (loose reign) 羈縻
Jingbian Dajiangjun 靖邊大將軍

Kangxi emperor (r. 1662–1722) 康熙
Kerulen River 克噜倫
Khalkhas 客爾客
Khobdo 科布多
Khoshot 和碩特
kinchoku ippô (conscientious) 謹直一方
Lhasa 喇薩
Lobzang Danjin, (Blo-bzan-bstan-dsin) 羅卜藏丹津
mou (Chinese acre) 畝
Nian Gengyao (d. 1726) 年羹堯
Ningxia 寧夏
Ningyuan Dajiangjun 寧遠大將軍
panluan (rebellion) 叛亂
Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–1795) 乾隆
Qing dynasty (1644–1911) 清
Qinghai 清海
qiongbing duwu 窮兵黷武
Sengge (r. 1653–1671) 僧格
Sheji (Altars of Soil and Grain) 社稷
shengshi (flourishing age) 盛世
*Shiquan* (Ten Great Campaigns) 十全
Song dynasty 宋
Taersi Temple 塔爾寺
Taizhan (Magazine posts) 台站
Tang dynasty 唐
Tarbagatai 塔爾巴哈台
Sanfan (Three Feudatories) 三藩
Tiandimiao (Temple of Heaven and Hearth) 天地廟
Tsewang Dorji Namjal 策妄多爾濟那木札爾
Tsewang Rabdan (r. 1697–1727) 策妄阿拉布坦
Tula River 圖拉
Tumu incident (1449) 土木
tuntian (military colony) 屯田
Turfan 吐魯番
Tushetu Khan 圖謝圖汗
tusi (native tribal chief) 土司
Ulan Butong (Battle, September 3, 1690) 烏蘭布通
Uliyasutai 烏里雅蘇台
Urumqi 烏魯木齊
Wei Yuan (1794–1856) 魏源

Xining 西寧
yanglianyin (nourishing virtue salary supplements) 養廉銀
Yinti (1688–1755) 胤 禵
Yongling 永陵
Yongzheng (r. 1723–1735) 雍正
Yue Fei (1103–42) 岳飛
Yue Zhongqi (1686–1754) 岳鍾琪
Zeng Jing (1679–1736) 曾靜
Zhaoling 昭陵
zhengjiao (righteous army of extermination) 征剿
Zongmiao 宗廟
Zunghar 準噶爾

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# MILITARY RITUAL AND THE QING EMPIRE[1]

Joanna Waley-Cohen

In 1993, Christies' auction galleries in New York City sold two eighteenth-century Chinese scrolls out of an original set of four. The scrolls depict certain awe-inspiring ceremonies held in Chang'an (modern Xi'an) to mark the departure of imperial troops on campaign. The collaborative work of several artists of the imperial painting academy, each scroll included an imperial poem, eleven collectors' seals of the Qianlong Emperor (1736–1795), and a jade catch engraved with the title of the scroll and the words "*Qianlong Nianzhi*" (made in the Qianlong period).

If Qianlong could have known of the presence of scrolls such as these on the international art market almost two hundred years after his death, he would have been enormously gratified. The emperor, an ethnic Manchu who generally thought and functioned in military fashion, devoted a good deal of attention both to directing a series of wars and to the orchestration of a parallel campaign that aimed to bring about profound cultural change. Specifically, this campaign was intended to create a distinctively Qing culture that would be founded on the bedrock of Manchu martial (*wu*) ideals, to which such more "civilized" (*wen*) virtues as literary and artistic accomplishment, traditionally dominant in Chinese culture, would yield at least some of their extraordinary prestige. Commemorative art, such as the Christies scrolls, was produced to achieve these ends. Not only did it serve to document and publicize the news of Qing military (*wu*) successes, but, as we will see, the rituals themselves that the paintings portrayed also marked an important intersection of *wen* and *wu*. Finally the scrolls, the rituals they depicted, and (although Qianlong could scarcely have imagined the specific context) their appearance in late-twentieth-century New York, fulfilled two of the emperor's

[1] I wish to acknowledge gratefully the following, among many who have offered advice and more along the way: Richard Belsky, Michael Chang, Nicola Di Cosmo, Michael Crook, Nixi Cura, David Goodrich, Jonathan Hay, Liu Yuan, Iona Mancheong, Evelyn Rawski, Louise Young, and Angela Zito.

most cherished wishes: the accomplishment of multiple goals by a single means (*yi ju liang de*), and the instruction and edification of later generations into the distant future (*chuishi jiuyuan*).[2]

The centerpiece of the Qing cultural campaign was an intense focus on the value of military preparedness and the concomitant virtue of martial prowess, attributes specifically associated with a Manchu culture that was more or less invented during the Qianlong era. The campaign had begun to take shape in a relatively unfocussed manner under the Kangxi Emperor (1662–1722), but escalated sharply from about 1750, when Qianlong began to raise the celebration of war and of martial values to new heights. He did so in part because of his passion for warfare and all its trappings, and his delight in military success—even when this was more rhetorical than real—and in part because he profoundly grasped the utility of both public display and ritual symbolism to the overarching project of imperial expansion. Military ritual (*junli*), with its vast and highly visible theatricality, became an integral part of the process of cultural transformation.[3]

The Qing empire reached its height in the second half of the eighteenth century. By that time the Manchus, who had taken over the rulership of China in 1644, had successfully built an empire that brought the territories ruled from Beijing to the greatest extent in history. In addition to China itself, it encompassed not only the

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[2] For some imperial references to *yi ju liang de*, see *Daqing Lichao Shilu* (Veritable Records of Successive Emperors of the Great Qing), Qianlong, *juan* 599, pp. 17b–18a, 24/10/21 (1759); ibid. *juan* 716, pp. 16a, 29/8/2 (1764); *Qinding Daqing Huidian Shili* (1899) rpt., Taibei, 1976, ("HDSL") *juan* 729, pp. 16a–b (1761), and the discussion throughout my *Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758–1820* (New Haven, 1991). For *chuishi jiuyuan* see, for instance, *Shang Yu Dang* (Archive of Imperial Edicts), (Beijing), Qianlong 41/8/20 (1776), p. 293, and my "Commemorating War in Eighteenth-Century China," *Modern Asian Studies* 30.4 (October, 1996): pp, 869–899. On the scrolls—themselves, of course, the product of *wen* skills—see Zhang and Liang, *Shiqu Baoji Xubian* (1793); rpt., Taibei, 1969–1971, vol. 4, pp. 1869–1870. For illustrations, see Christies (New York), *Fine Chinese Paintings and Calligraphy*, sale 7790, 1 December 1993, pp. 149–153. The *Shiqu Baoji Xubian* dates the scrolls to 1748, but lists them as depicting the "First Jinchuan war" so the title must have been added after 1776, when the Qing again defeated the Jinchuan. The other two scrolls in the set apparently depicted aspects of the victory celebrations discussed below.

[3] The Qing promotion of a much more military cast in Chinese culture is treated in detail in my "Qing Culture and Chinese Modernity," (London, forthcoming). On the reinvention of Manchu culture, see Crossley, "*Manzhou Yuanliu Kao* and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46.4 (November 1987): pp. 761–790.

Northeastern homelands of the ruling house (Manchuria), but also Mongolia, Tibet, and East Turkestan, known as Xinjiang. Embracing the diversity of the lands and peoples they controlled, the Qing drew on cultural traditions deriving from Inner Asia as well as from China to reinforce and legitimize their rule. In general, therefore, it should be borne in mind that in this essay "Qing" does not necessarily mean the same thing as "Chinese."

The essay contains two main, intersecting threads. The first describes and analyzes a variety of Qing military rituals, each anchored by the emperor as cosmic actor and central powerhouse. Specifically, it discusses peacetime troop reviews held primarily to exhibit military might (*dayue*); ceremonies that marked the launching of a new campaign, such as those depicted in the Christies scrolls (*mingjiang*); and the series of triumphant celebrations that attended the successful conclusion of a war (*kaizu*). I have selected these particular examples of military ritual mainly because each illustrates the interplay both of *wu* and *wen* and of Inner Asian and Chinese elements, and because each involved both spectacular performance and detailed textual prescription. A notable abundance of visual sources supplementing the written record, moreover, indicates these rituals' unusual prominence. The second thread of the essay explores the dissemination of military ritual to an audience extending well beyond participants and other eyewitnesses. What nowadays we might call the Qing propaganda machine exploited all available means of promoting the new Qing culture as broadly as possible. Yet the performance and broadcasting of military ritual also involved much more than mere propaganda. Beyond simply constituting the expression or symbol of imperial power, military ritual and its dissemination constituted an essential component of the accumulation and reiteration of imperial power. In *Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China*, Angela Zito argues persuasively that the symbolic construction of imperial rule relied on both ritual texts and ritual performance. This investigation of military ritual of the same period, an aspect of imperial ritual not touched on in Zito's work, in general confirms her findings, and goes on to show how the Qing utilized both the texts and performance of military ritual to promote their imperial and cultural objectives.[4]

[4] For similar conclusions about imperial uses of different varieties of ritual in

Military ritual was of special relevance to the promotion of Qing culture not least because of its obvious pertinence to the relationship of civil and military, *wen* and *wu*. As the result of the close connection of ritual texts and performance, and of the systematic production of commemorative writings, paintings, and monuments, it offered an almost perfect opportunity for the achievement of two closely related goals. These goals were, first, the deployment of *wen* in the service of *wu* rather than the other way around, which was the more traditional way in which *wen* and *wu* tended to operate and, second, a virtually seamless integration of *wen* and *wu* in a context that could scarcely fail to advance the emphasis on and prestige of the latter. Military ritual thus helped tilt the balance between civil and military in favor of the latter.

Military ritual also offered a number of other advantages within the context of the cultural campaign. First, at a time when state censorship sought to limit the proliferation of theater and drama as a hedge against their supposed corrupting influence on members of the elite, the spectacle of military rituals in some sense offered a state-sanctioned alternative, meant to educate by projecting the power of the Qing state and the martial prowess upon which it rested. Second, by injecting a markedly more military ethos into the mainstream of Qing culture, it promoted the enforcement of rule by bringing into being a new collective self-imagination.[5]

Both the highly visible drama of military ritual, and the production and dissemination of written accounts and pictorial images of the drama, were of central importance to this process, which is reminiscent of the "theatre of majesty" that Foucault and others have regarded as an effective means of reifying and reinforcing political

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eighteenth-century China, see Angela Zito, *Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China* (Chicago and London, 1997); Evelyn Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions*. (Berkeley and London, 1998); ibid., "The Creation of an Emperor in Eighteenth-Century China," in Yung, Bell, Evelyn S. Rawski and Rubie S. Watson, eds., *Harmony and Counterpoint: Ritual Music in Chinese Context*, (Stanford, 1996), pp. 150–174; Iona Man-cheong, "The Class of 1761: Examinations, State, and Elites in Eighteenth Century China" (Stanford, forthcoming), all citing Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*: (New York and Oxford, 1992).

[5] This tactic somewhat resembled that identified in eighteenth-century England by Corrigan and Sayer, despite the profoundly different historical context. See Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, (Oxford, 1985), especially p. 102.

power.[6] The deployment of highly theatrical and symbolically charged spectacle to reinforce political power offered matchless possibilities for making Qing power and its military foundations at first acceptable and then a source of pride to an audience that was, in effect, indispensable to the overall production. These techniques recall in at least some respects those described by Chandra Mukerji in her discussion of the Versailles gardens of Louis XIV of France, which were constructed using designs and engineering techniques derived from the military sphere, with the specific intention of drawing domestic and international attention both to French military power and to the central role it played in the formation of a newly formidable state.[7]

In the mid-eighteenth century, as Qianlong raised the cultural campaign to a new level of intensity, the reconfiguration of texts on the theory, the practice, and the history of ritual more generally, became a major focus of scholarly attention. In the early to middle Qianlong reign, three seminal texts on ritual were published within a few years of one another. These texts were, first, *Da Qing Tongli* (Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing) (1756); second, *Wuli Tongkao* (A Comprehensive Investigation of the Five Rites) (1761); and third, *Huangchao Liqi Tushi* (Illustrated Regulations and Models of Ritual Paraphernalia of Our August Dynasty) (1766).[8] The first and third of these were published specifically under imperial auspices, while the *Comprehensive Investigation* was privately compiled with the help of contributors who included men affiliated in one way or another with the court and the government. With such connections, this work was as susceptible to imperial influence as the overtly imperially-

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[6] On a "theatre of majesty," see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, (New York, 1977) whose work has of course been explored extensively since, e.g. by David Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition', c. 1820–1977," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 101–164.

[7] Chandra Mukerji, *Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles* (Cambridge, 1997). I have found Mukerji work on Louis XIV enormously suggestive of the Qing experience in a variety of ways. Louis XIV is known to have been in contact with Qianlong's grandfather, the Kangxi emperor (1662–1722) through the good offices of Jesuit missionaries, and it is not impossible that Qing emperors were aware of the Versailles program described by Mukerji and that they may even have grasped its implications and potential.

[8] Angela Zito's analysis of these texts (primarily in Part Two of *Of Body and Brush*) disregards—since it is irrelevant to her argument—their military component.

sponsored compilations, so that we should not be surprised to discover that within it, as much as in the other two, military ritual featured prominently.

*Da Qing Tongli*, the official handbook for rituals, lays out in detail the regulations for each individual part of every ritual activity, including all the audiovisual effects: who should participate, what each person should wear, where they should stand, in what direction they should face, how they should move, precise timing, musical instruments to be played, specific pieces of music appropriate for different stages of the ritual, number of cannon-shots to be fired, and so on. It is divided into sections according to the five rituals of the Chinese institutional tradition. Among these, military ritual appears as the third category of rituals that claimed venerable ancestry in some cases dating back as far as the classical period of the Zhou (12th–3rd centuries B.C.E.); the other categories are, in order, auspicious rituals (*jili*); joyous rituals (*jiali*); guest rituals (*binli*), and funerary rituals (*xiongli*).[9] Under the imperatives of the Qing cultural campaign, in the *Da Qing Tongli* military ritual advanced its position in the hierarchy of ritual categories from fourth to third, on the grounds that this better conformed with ancient practice.[10] The claim was disingenuous, however, for these structural changes also gave strikingly greater prominence to ritual pertaining to military matters. The shift in emphasis was, of course, fully intentional. To leave no room for doubt, the introductory remarks prefacing the section on military rituals declared, in what were becoming formulaic terms, that the military accomplishments of the Qing *guojia* ("state") far surpassed those of antiquity.[11]

In the second text, *Wuli Tongkao*, whose principal compiler was the ritual authority Qin Huitian (1702–64), military rituals occupy fourteen out of two hundred sixty-two chapters (*juan*). The subject-matter covered is as much historical as prescriptive, including for instance a chronological account of the military system as it had evolved since Zhou times. The subheadings address a number of topics, such as equine administration (*mazheng*), and hunting (*tianlie*), that were favored Qing pursuits explicitly linked to Inner Asian martial prowess,

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[9] *Qinding Daqing Huidian* (1899), rpt., Taibei, 1976, *juan* 26, p. 6a.

[10] See *Qingchao Tongdian* (Shanghai, 1936) *juan* 58, p. 1423; see also *Siku Quanshu Zongmu* (1782); rpt., Beijing, 1992, pp. 82, 707.

[11] Laibao, comp., *Da Qing Tongli* (1756), *juan* 41, p. 1a.

but were excluded from the sections of the institutional compendia on military ritual, which were based on Chinese precedents.[12]

The third text, *Huangchao Liqi Tushi*, illustrates ritual paraphernalia and provides detailed specifications. It is divided into six sections: 1) ritual vessels and objects in jade, porcelain, bronze and lacquered wood; 2) astronomical instruments used to determine the dates for rituals; 3) costume; 4) musical instruments; 5) imperial insignia; and 6) armor and weapons, under the revealing heading of "military preparedness" (*wubei*). It was somewhat unusual to include the sixth category. Both the imperial preface to this text, and the eighteenth-century authors of its entry in the annotated index to the imperial bibliographical collection (*Siku Quanshu Zongmu*), explicitly justify the inclusion of weapons (and astronomical instruments) among the ritual paraphernalia by reference to their intrinsic importance to governance as well as to the practices of the Zhou period of antiquity.[13] At least some of the weapons illustrated in this text were certainly used in battle as well as for ritual purposes in the Qing, suggesting that in this case at least, no clear functional distinction was drawn. This fuzzy demarcation underscored the way in which, under the Qing, military ritual increasingly possessed practical as well as symbolic attributes.

By reconfiguring the hierarchy of rituals to give greater prominence to military ritual, by diluting their Chinese pedigree with the introduction of elements from the Inner Asian tradition, and by including weapons among ritual paraphernalia, these texts helped transform traditional ritual into composite forms more suitable to the new cultural emphasis. Even when the texts did reiterate classical Chinese forms, once a means of claiming the virtually unimpeachable sanction of antiquity, they edged into a cultural minefield: devotion to recovering the authentic ritual texts of old once had signified the expression of anti-Qing sentiment on the part of Han-Chinese scholars. In these texts, however, the Qing themselves had co-opted this formerly autonomous scholarly trend to serve imperial purposes, in a form of manipulation that was integral to their style of ruling. In doing so, they transformed these texts into legitimizing documents of Qing culture.[14]

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[12] Qin Huitian, *Wuli Tongkao* (1761), *juan* 233–245.

[13] See Fu Long'an et al., comps., *Huangchao Liqi Tushi*, (1766), imperial preface, especially pp. 3b–4a, and see *Siku Quanshu Zongmu, juan* 82, pp. 706–707.

[14] See Kai-wing Chow, *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China.* (Stanford,

For present purposes, the term, military ritual (*junli*), refers to formal, public, ceremonial events listed in such institutional compendia as the *Da Qing Tongli*.[15] As in the Qing, the term does not encompass the worship of the god of war, Guandi, a cult increasingly widespread during the Qing period, and with whom the apotheosized Qing founder, Nurhaci (1550–1626) , came to be associated;[16] nor does it cover in any detail reverence for the god of artillery (*paoshen*), an important figure ranking in the lower echelons of the national pantheon to whom, for instance, roadside sacrifices might be made en route to a war. The *junli* listed in the institutional compendia did not include shamanic rituals relating to war, which are referred to only very briefly in this essay, nor did they include the annual hunts held at Mulan in Manchuria, because these were not Chinese but Inner Asian in origin. The latter, however, are addressed in this essay, first, because of their military content and purpose; second, because they provided a subtle means of drawing diverse imperial subjects together in a military context; and third, because like the Chinese military rituals they provided material for artistic production. In all these ways they served the Qing cultural campaign. We turn now to examine the stipulated procedures and actual practice of some of these rituals.

## *Grand Inspections (Dayue)*

Grand Inspections were the first listed under the general heading of military ritual in the *Da Qing Tongli*, in a Qing innovation giving greater prominence to these periodic peacetime troop reviews than

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1994). On hunting and other Inner Asian rituals, see Chia Ning, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian rituals in the early Qing, 1644–1795," (*Late Imperial China*, 14.1 (1992): pp. 160–192, and see below. On the Qing co-optation of "private" intellectual trends in another context, see my *Exile in Mid-Qing China*, especially pp. 213–215.

[15] For a complete list of the categories of military ritual, see *Qinding Daqing Huidian, juan* 26, pp. 8b–9a; *Da Qing Tongli, juan* 41–45; HDSL *juan* 411–4.

[16] See Nicola Di Cosmo, "Manchu Shamanic Rituals at the Qing Court," in Joseph McDermott, ed., *State and Ritual in China* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 351–96, at pp. 370, 375; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology,* (Berkeley and London, 1999), pp. 244–6, 285–6. On Guandi, see also Prasenjit Duara, "Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, God of War," in *Journal of Asian Studies* 47.4 (November, 1988), pp. 778–795.

they had previously enjoyed.[17] This shift may well have related to the fact that after the 1690s, when Kangxi rode out on campaign against the Western Mongol leader Galdan, no emperor participated directly in battle. After that time, therefore, the several formal categories of imperial ritual involving personal campaigning by the emperor became, in effect, anachronistic, and emperors had to find other means of showcasing their martial skills. The Qing reordering of military rituals may also have borne some relationship to the adjustment of hierarchy among the various categories of ritual discussed above.

What later became ascribed as the first Qing *dayue*—although at the time it may not have been performed with the deliberate intention of setting a formal and specific precedent—took place prior to 1636, under Hung Taiji (1592–1643), son of dynastic founder Nurhaci and originator of Qing imperial ambitions. Subsequently *dayue* became a regular feature of public ritual performance, although it took some time before it reached a fixed form and became a regular event. In 1685, for instance, the Kangxi Emperor noted, as he often did, the imperial need for conspicuous military preparedness, and proposed that drills and training take place annually. He also ordered that Inspections should be performed for the specific edification of the Inner Asian vassal states. Eventually triennal *dayue* were called for, although in practice they seem to have taken place rather less frequently.[18]

In Beijing, Grand Inspections took place in the park of Nanyuan, a hunting preserve located to the south of the city. Others were performed in the pre-conquest capital of Shenyang. The choice of these locations, physically and symbolically close to imperial power, lent the occasions a special awesomeness that helped enforce Qing rule; conversely, Nanyuan in particular became known (beyond the already martial connotations of a hunting-ground) chiefly for its association with *dayue.*

The sheer scale of a *dayue* was enormous. Over a period of several months, it absorbed ritual experts; workmen who erected the necessary temporary structures; participating troops and officers (and no doubt members of their families who must have been aware of what was taking place); and members of the imperial household; as

[17] See *Qingchao Tongdian*, (Shanghai, 1936), *juan* 58, p. 1423.
[18] *Qingchao Tongdian juan* 58, p. 1424.

well as a range of civil servants—from the Boards of War, Rites, and Works (*bingbu, libu, gongbu*), the Imperial Household Department (*neiwufu*), the Grand Secretariat (*neige*), the Imperial Equipage Department (*luanyiwei*), the Imperial Armory (*wubeiyuan*); the Imperial Board of Astronomy (*qintianjian*), the Court of State Ceremonial (*honglusi*) and the Music Bureau (*yuebu*)—who were involved in practical planning and preparation. It was a piece of political theater in which the act of viewing effectively incorporated spectators into the performance. Beyond this, the transfer of so much manpower, ritual accoutrements, and weaponry to and from the training ground, and along the almost ten kilometers route to the Nanyuan, helped to hammer home the notion of the state as repository of massive military strength. None of those involved, directly or indirectly, can have failed to grasp on some level the hugely authoritative affirmation of Qing military power.[19] In a variety of ways, then, the *dayue* became, literally, a force to be reckoned with in the lived experience of substantial numbers of people.

The preparation and actual ceremony of a *dayue* absorbed several months. It began with orders to the various military divisions within the Eight Banners to get their weapons, armor, drums, flags, and banners into good repair. The Imperial Board of Astronomy determined the appropriate day for the ceremony. Two months ahead of the date set, the various divisions undertook training at the military inspection grounds (*yanwuchang*), practising every drill and maneuver until it was ready for perfect performance on the day of the ceremony.[20] One month ahead, the place where the ritual was to be performed was formally selected and purified. In final preparation, the soldiers were brought by the supervising civil officials and military officers to work on the choreographic details and practise their drills *in situ*. The directors of the Imperial Armory also began to prepare the setting for the ceremony as a military encampment, installing a

[19] See Averil Cameron, "The Byzantine Book of Ceremonies," in David Cannadine and Simon Price, eds., "Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies," pp. 106–136, (Cambridge, 1987), at p. 128, and Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual."

[20] The location of the *yanwuchang* awaits further research. Possibly it was located where the current Tuancheng drill grounds of Beijing are now, some two kilometres south of Xiangshan park outside Beijing, although surviving structures at the latter location date only from 1749. It may, however, have been much closer to the center of the capital.

circular tent in which a throne was placed dead center. Inside the tent they placed the equipment the emperor would use, including his ceremonial armor, bow, and arrows. Soldiers of the Eight Banners were ranged on two sides, with bordered yellow, plain white, bordered white and plain blue on the east side, and plain yellow, plain red, bordered red and bordered blue on the west side. Silence was required. Each division set up its flag, gong and drum, and weaponry until everything was deemed to be exactly right. One day before the actual ceremony, ritual experts of the Imperial Equipage Department set out the imperial insignia. The imperial route having first been appropriately purified, the emperor entered his carriage and proceeded to his temporary palace, escorted as always both ahead and to the rear. Meanwhile members of the imperial family and officials welcomed and paid their respects to the insignia.[21]

The *Comprehensive Rites* specified in detail who participated in the Grand Inspection, giving quotas for each banner and its military divisions. Participants ran to tens of thousands of people including—aside from the emperor—officers, armed soldiers, musketeers, cannoneers, drummers, beaters of the gong, bearers of the various regimental and ceremonial colors, horse managers, and so on. Each banner was to present ten *shenwei* cannon, for a total of eighty; other weapons, such as the *zimu* cannon, were also on display. Some, as we will see, were fired in the course of the ceremony.[22] At the appointed moment, each man took up his precisely prescribed position, while senior officials of the Board of War (staff positions normally filled through the civil appointments process) went to report to the emperor at his temporary palace. The cannon fired three times and musicians performed a form of military music, *naoge dayue*, that had venerable antecedents dating back to the Han empire (206

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[21] There were four varieties of imperial insignia used on different occasions during the Qing. On this occasion the *dajia lubo* was the insignia used. For detailed descriptions, and illustrations, of its various components, see *Huangchao Liqi Tushi, juan* 10; for the musical instruments of *lubo*, see *ibid., juan* 9. See also Grace Wong and Goh Eck Kheng, *Imperial Life in the Qing Dynasty: Treasures from the Shenyang Palace Museum, China*, (Singapore, 1989), pp. 48–51, 118–119; and see Wan Yi and Huang Haitao, *Qingdai Gongting Yinyue*, (Beijing, 1985), p. 23.

[22] *Daqing Tongli, juan* 41, pp. 3b–12b. For an account of the different types of cannon, see Giovanni Stary, "The 'Manchu Cannons' Cast by Ferdinand Verbiest and the Hitherto Unknown Title of his Instructions" in John W. Witek, ed., *Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688): Jesuit Missionary, Scientist, Engineer and Diplomat*, (Nettetal, 1994). For illustrations, see *Huangchao Liqi Tushi, juan* 16, especially pp. 6a–8b, 16a–17b.

B.C.E.–220 C.E.) The spectacle of such a throng of people and weaponry and the sound of cannonfire and martial music gave unambiguous visual and auditory expression to the triple mantra of military power, combat-readiness, and devotion to martial ideals.[23]

The emperor, clad in ceremonial armor with a helmet whose Sanskrit inscription referred to a form of universal rulership derived from the Inner Asian tradition, rode out of his temporary palace to the imperial encampment where the ritual would take place. He was escorted by some sixty officers, armed with muskets, swords or quivers with bows and arrows, and when he reached the encampment the president of the Board of War formally requested that he inspect the troops. The main ceremony then began.

Officials of the Imperial Armory carrried a golden-dragon canopy in front of the emperor as, already armed with a sword, he donned a ceremonial quiver and bow-holder and rode out, escorted by the president of the Board of War and two vice-presidents, and followed by various other senior officials and bodyguards.[24] The emperor passed down the middle of the precisely-arrayed troops, with the Guards (*hujunying*), Vanguard Division (*qianfengying*), and Corps of the Line (*xiaojiying*) in front of him and the Artillery and Musketry Division (*huoqiying*) behind. Then the emperor returned to the front of the encampment, dismounted, removed his quiver and bow-holder, and proceeded to the tent. The various officials in attendance dismounted and followed, each standing in his prescribed position and facing in

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[23] On *naoge dayue*, see HDSL *juan* 540, for the particular piece played, *zhuang jun rong*, see *ibid.*, pp. 7a–8a. See also *Daqing Tongli, juan 41*, pp. 13a–b. See *Huangchao Liqi Tushi juan* 9, pp. 64a–69b, for illustrations of *naoge* instruments used in rituals celebrating military success (*kaizu*; see text accompanying notes 38–41). See also Wan and Huang, *Qingdai Gongting Yinyue.* pp. 21–23, 82–83; and see Rawski, "The Creation of an Emperor", especially pp. 161–169. In most instances a particular piece of music was associated with an individual ritual.

[24] For a description and an illustration of these quivers and bow-holders, elaborately decorated in silver and gold thread, see *Huangchao Liqi Tushi, juan* 14, pp. 1a–b; see also Bowers Museum of Cultural Art, *Secret World of the Forbidden City: Splendors from China's Imperial Palace, exhibition catalog*, (Santa Ana, CA, 2000), p. 87. For a photograph of the emperor's ceremonial armor, and heavily padded and covered with gilt metal plates bordered by brocade, and "designed for actual warfare," see Wong and Goh, *Imperial Life in the Qing Dynasty*, p. 49. This armor, said to have been used in the early years of the Qianlong reign, appears different from that shown in Lang Shining's painting (see note 30 and accompanying text) possibly because the painting dates from a later period. It closely resembled a suit of ceremonial armor illustrated in Bowers Museum, *Secret World of the Forbidden City*, p. 91, that dates from the Xianfeng period (1851–1861) and may never have been used.

the prescribed direction beside his horse, with golden-dragon pennants and great banners aloft. To avoid any possible disturbance to the ritual sequence, thirty Manchu, Solon, and Mongol guards experienced at handling horses were assigned to each group, ready to calm them in case any should become startled.[25]

Upon a signal from the emperor, the princes and officials performed an obeisance and sat down. Then the president of the Board of War stepped forward and requested that a horn be blown to commence the drills. He returned to his position once this was granted, and the Imperial Equipage Department led forward the hornblowers, who blew the Mongolian great horn in front of the encampment. Conch-shell and drum were sounded, and cannon fired.[26] Different groups passed in and out of a deerhorn barricade erected for the purpose, performing drills in swordplay, firearms, archery, and other martial skills. The conclusion of the ceremony was announced by the president of the Board of War. The emperor removed his armor and helmet, followed in short order by the various attendants, and, now clad in semiformal dress, they followed the imperial carriage back to the temporary palace. The cannon fired three times and to conclude, more martial music played.[27] After the ceremonies were over, the emperor bestowed gifts of wine and other delicacies on the assembled officers and bureaucrats.

A few examples, drawn from the above description, suffice to demonstrate how Grand Inspections neatly incorporated elements from the Inner Asian tradition into an originally Chinese military ritual. For instance, the inclusion of horses in the ritual was an encoded reference, unlikely to have escaped anyone, both to the military power to which horses were essential, and to the Inner Asian regions from which horses were imported and with which Qing mar-

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[25] The Solons were a Tungusic tribe who had migrated south from the Amur region and eventually submitted to the Manchus. They fought on the Qing side against the Russians and became incorporated into the banners.

[26] For an illustration of an elaborately mounted "conch shell military horn" see Wong and Goh, *Imperial Life in the Qing Dynasty*, p. 25. According to this work, conch shells used to signal advances and retreats, and especially in ritual performances, were heard so frequently that a new idiom developed, referring to those who talked nonsense as 'those who blew the conch shell'.

[27] *Daqing Tongli juan* 41, pp. 12b–18a. The particular music played at this point was the *changhuangwei* piece of *naoge qingyue*. See HDSL 541; Wan and Huang, *Qingdai Gongting Yinyue*, 88–90.

tial prowess was closely associated. The emperor's ceremonial helmet, marked with references to Inner Asian traditions yet simultaneously capable of linkage to ancient Chinese notions of universal rulership, served a similar function. The inclusion of the Mongolian horn, in addition to the more usual conch-shell horn, and the prominence of archery in the displays of military skills—a routine sign of Manchu martial prowess yet also one of the "six skills" (*liuyi*) of Chinese antiquity—illustrate some other ways in which it was possible for the Qing to impress their mark upon Chinese practice. The multiplicity of meanings kneaded into the *dayue* were, simply, emblematic of the new Qing culture.

Grand Inspections were the subject of at least two documentary paintings done by court artists, whose function often resembled that of official photographers in our own times. A famous example done by the Jesuit artist Castiglione (Lang Shining, 1688–1766) depicts the Qianlong Emperor at a *dayue*. He is mounted on horseback, wearing armor and helmet, and carrying a bow and a quiver of arrows.[28] Another *dayue* painting, an anonymous handscroll on silk, thought on the basis of archival evidence to have been done by court artist Jin Kun in 1746, gives a fine sense of the serried troops awaiting inspection, their different-colored banners aloft.[29] Both these paintings are now in the Palace Museum, Beijing.[30]

The Qianlong Emperor wrote a number of poems describing *dayue*, the general tone of which promoted the goals of the campaign to "militarize" culture. Thus one that refers to the first Grand Inspection of his reign, held in 1739, is rife with metaphors drawn from hunting, and expresses the wish to spread word of the fine imperial troops throughout the empire. Another, dating from 1758, draws attention

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[28] A helmet supposed to have belonged to Qianlong, and somewhat resembling the one he wears in this portrait, is now in the Arms and Armor Collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. However, it bears Tibetan rather than the Sanskrit script of the *dayue* helmet depicted in Castiglione's painting. For specifications of helmets used in *dayue*, see *Huangchao Liqi Tushi, juan* 13, pp. 1–5, which indicates the introduction of a new version of the helmet in 1756, around the time that the Xinjiang wars were coming to an end.

[29] Gugong Bowuyuan, *Qingdai Gongting Huihua*, (Beijing, 1992), no. 83.

[30] On the Castiglione painting, see Zhu Jiajin, "Qianlong Huangdi Dayue Tu," *Zijincheng* 1980.2, p. 28; *ibid.*, "Castiglione's *Tieluo* Paintings," *Orientations* (November 1988), pp. 80–83. See also Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp. 271–80, where Crossley notes that Qianlong 'considered Castiglione . . . integral to the process of conquest.' (p. 272)

to the roaring of the cannon, testimony to Qing military strength. Such ritual-related texts were another way of inserting reference to military power into the written record beyond the ritual compilations and institutional compendia. They surfaced in a wide variety of contemporary works, including collections of imperial poetry, a history of Beijing (in the section on the Nanyuan park), and the catalog of the imperial paintings collection. This type of widespread reproduction ensured further attention to the Grand Inspection, not least by the range of scholars who worked on, heard about, and actually read such works. In other words, the *dayue* became a part of the wider artistic and literary record of the period and helped ensure that cultural memorabilia of this era were imbued with a specifically Qing character; in other words, that they resonated with the power of armed force and martial skills.[31]

### *Dispatching Generals Embarking on Campaign (Mingjiang)*

Like Grand Inspections, *mingjiang* shows how extremely adept the Qianlong Emperor could be both at melding *wen* and *wu* and at invoking apparently legitimizing precedents drawn from either or both Chinese and Inner Asian traditions. In 1616, Nurhaci had solemnized his declaration of war on the Ming by performing a ritual ceremony at the Tangse, the site for state shamanic rituals, in his capital at Hetu Ala, burning a written oath to Heaven upon a yellow altar and enumerating his causes for war.[32] This act, later solemnized as a key moment in the Manchus' assumption of the Mandate of Heaven, was invoked by Nurhaci's successors as a precedent for the performance of some form of ceremonial act on occasions of this nature.

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[31] For the poems, see Yu Minzhong, comp., *Rixia Jiuwen Kao*, (Beijing, 1781; rpt., Beijing, 1983), *juan* 74, pp. 1240–1. For an illustration see the cover of Bowers Museum, *Secret World of the Forbidden City*. The painting's date remains somewhat unclear; it seems to have been done between 1748 and 1758. For a detailed description of the ritual performance of a dayue (in this case that of 1739) in the imperial paintings catalog, see Zhang and Liang, *Shiqu Baoji Xubian*, volume 4, pp. 1871–1875. The painting to which this description relates apparently hung in the Zhonghua palace in the imperial palace (*ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 105).

[32] For a composite description of these ceremonies under Nurhaci, see Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp. 135–6. The Manchus and then the Qing built a new Tangse in each capital; see Rawski, *Last Emperors*, p. 236. Hetu Ala was located in modern Jilin province.

Some such sense may have prompted Nurhaci's son, Hung Taiji, to perform ceremonies at the Tangse in Shengjing, by this time the new (interim) Qing capital, when he dispatched his brothers, Dodo (Duoduo) (1614–49) and Ajige (1605–51), to do battle against the Ming in 1636. Later he went personally to bid them farewell. Hung Taiji's ceremonies themselves later were cited as early examples of the performance of *mingjiang* by a Qing ruler, but this assertion may have formed part of the retroactive elevation of Hung Taiji to the rank of first emperor of the Qing, made after the anticipated empire had become a reality. In any event, Hung Taiji's rites formed a bridge between those of his father, Nurhaci, and those claimed in the eighteenth century as direct descendants of the practices of Chinese antiquity.

Under Qianlong, as the emperor steadily appropriated and institutionalized the more fluid practices of his forebears so as to create a Qing tradition, *mingjiang* assumed a fixed form that drew on both Chinese and Inner Asian traditions. Qing rulers came to regard these polyvalent rituals as necessary legitimating acts.[33]

*Mingjiang* involved a range of civil as well as military officials. The imperial insignia were set out, with stone chimes for musical accompaniment, and a table was set up in the Taihedian (the Hall of Supreme Harmony, located in the Forbidden City, where important state rituals were held) for the imperial credentials sent by the emperor. Princes, lords, and officials, clad in formal ceremonial clothing (*mangpao*) decorated with different dragons depending on rank, and bearing their rank badges, stood in order of precedence.[34] The general and officers who were actually going on campaign waited on the east side facing west, similarly attired. Senior officials from the Board of Rites proceeded to the gate of Sovereign Purity, (Qianqing—in the heart of the Forbidden City) to request the emperor's attendance, and at the Meridian Gate (*Wumen*—the front entrance of the Forbidden City), bells and drums were sounded. Clothed in full imperial dragon

[33] On Manchu rituals and national culture, see di Cosmo, "Manchu Shamanic Rituals," McDermott, *State and Ritual*, pp. 351–396. I am indebted to Michael Chang for his articulation of the notion of polyvalence in the context of Qing rule. The moment at which the earlier episodes were reified as precedents is difficult to pinpoint with any precision, although the 1740s are the latest likely date. In any event, this was probably a gradual process rather than a sudden change.

[34] On court robes, see Rawski, *Last Emperors*, pp. 41–42. *Ibid.*, p. 243, discusses the performance in front of Taihedian of shamanic rituals featuring Nurhaci's success in combating his enemies.

robes, the emperor rode out in his carriage as far as the north side of the Taihedian, then alighted and entered the hall. A prescribed piece of court music was played until the emperor had ascended the throne; the whipcrack sounded three times, followed by more music.[35]

Surrounded on either side by those who were going on campaign, all kneeling, the commander-in-chief was then led forward to receive the credentials, which were passed from official to official and eventually handed over with great ceremony by a Grand Secretary, to a musical accompaniment. After he and the other officers preparing to go on campaign performed three kneelings and nine obeisances, the music stopped. All left and the whipcrack sounded. The emperor rose as more music was played, and then returned to the palace.

On the actual day of departure, the emperor went through the Meridian Gate to the Tangse, preceded by the imperial insignia. There horn and conch were blown, and ceremonies took place in which emperor, commander-in-chief, and princes going on campaign all took part. Then the emperor proceeded to a specially erected yellow tent outside the Chang'an Gate in the south wall of the Imperial Palace, where he personally handed wine to the commander-in-chief from a temporary throne. After ritually partaking, the commander led the other campaigning officers in performing the three kneelings and nine obeisances. Armed with their bows and arrows, they took their leave of the emperor, mounted their horses and set off. After the emperor had passed back through the Meridian Gate, he sent an official to give a farewell feast with tea and wine outside the gates of the capital. After the feast, which involved further ceremonial, they made obeisance towards the capital to thank the emperor for his beneficence.[36]

As in the case of the *dayue*, court painters often were commissioned to record *mingjiang* so as to popularize them as far afield as possible. The aforementioned Christies' scrolls, for example, were produced to mark just such an occasion, in this case the departure of troops under Fuheng (d. 1770) to fight the Jinchuan peoples in western Sichuan in the 1740s. Military rituals such as these, with

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[35] For illustrations of the musical instruments involved, see *Huangchao Liqi Tushi, juan* 8. The type of music played was, first, the *longping* piece of *zhonghe shaoyue* music, and second, the *qingping* piece see HDSL 535, pp. 24a–b; Wan and Huang, *Qingdai Gongting Yinyue*, pp. 62–63, and see Rawski, "The Creation of an Emperor," Yung, Rawski and Watson, *Harmony and Counterpoint*, pp. 150–174.

[36] HDSL *juan* 412, pp. 1a–5a. The type of insignia in this case was *fajia lubo.*

their impressive ceremonial and spectacle, were ideal subject-matter for a visual record of the military preparedness and martial prowess that formed the centerpiece of Qing culture.

### *Welcoming a Victorious Army Upon Return (Jiaolao)*

*Jiaolao* formed the most important and most spectacular portion of the series of rituals classified under the umbrella term of "returning triumphant from war" (*kaizu*). The term, *jiaolao*, denotes the practice of emperors who rode out beyond the limits of the capital city to welcome and applaud generals returning victorious from a campaign, bestowing on them such favors as rewards and feasts. *Jiaolao* was known in theory from the canonical books of the ancient Zhou rites (the *Zhouli* and the *Yili*) and from the *Zuozhuan* commentary to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Qunqiu*) attributed to Confucius, and hence laid claim to the most venerable of classical Chinese origins. As in the case of *mingjiang*, this ceremony also had "Qing antecedents" and could trace its origins to Nurhaci, who in 1621 had held a formal celebration to mark the capture of Liaodong. As the wars to gain control of the Ming empire gathered momentum, such ceremonies became almost commonplace among the Manchus. At least ten times, between 1627 and 1642, Hung Taiji had ridden out to greet triumphant returning armies. As we have already seen with both *dayue* and *mingjiang*, these earlier *jiaolao* ceremonies may have been specifically identified only later as formal military rituals conforming to Chinese tradition, although it is also possible that Hung Taiji adopted the practice after learning of it from Chinese officials and commanders who had transferred their allegiance to the Manchus.

During the Kangxi reign, some form of ceremony resembling *jiaolao* took place several times during and upon the conclusion of the war against the Three Feudatories (*sanfan*, 1673–81). *Jiaolao* also marked Kangxi's defeat of Galdan in 1697, and the capture of rebel Khoshote leaders in Qinghai in 1724, under Kangxi's successor Yongzheng. But, as we have seen in other cases as well, it was only the Qianlong emperor who institutionalized *jiaolao*, in a series of regulations issued in 1749.

The first major military victory of the Qianlong reign—albeit achieved only after the execution for ineptitude and dishonesty of both original commanders—was the defeat of the Jinchuan in 1749.

Although the emperor formally saw the troops off to war, as depicted in the Christies scrolls, he did not personally ride out to greet Fuheng, the victorious general, that year. Instead he sent others to do so in his place, while limiting himself to holding a banquet and bestowing rewards. It was only later that Qianlong retroactively elevated the first Jinchuan war to a position of particular significance. He included it in the list of the ten great victories (*shiquan wugong*) to which he laid claim when he assumed the sobriquet *shiquan laoren* (old man of the ten complete victories) towards the end of his reign.[37]

Nonetheless, 1749 was the year in which Qianlong began to set the stage for the spectacular celebration of his subsequent victories by establishing a series of regulations that institutionalized the form of *kaizu* (returning triumphant from a war) rituals for the future. From then on, when a commander-in-chief sent word of victory, it became the rule that sacrifices and a formal, ritual announcement were performed at the temples of Heaven and Earth, the Taimiao (Temple to the Imperial Ancestors), the national altars, the imperial tombs, and Confucius' tomb. Furthermore, a commemorative text was to be engraved on a stele that would be installed at the National Academy (*guozijian*). At the same time, the form of the rituals (*xianfu, shoufu*), in which war captives were presented to the emperor and disposed of, was established. These rituals are discussed in detail below. Further regulations implemented in that same year prescribed the formal ceremonies at which a victorious commander would return his credentials to the emperor and attend an imperial feast. The Board of War would scrutinize the record and propose rewards for meritorious acts on the part of the commander-in-chief, officers, and soldiers who had gone on campaign; rewards would then be distributed as appropriate. Finally, a new sub-agency of the Grand Council was created. It had special responsibility for the production of official campaign histories (*fanglüe*), earlier versions of which had been produced in a relatively ad hoc manner by senior scholars. This historiographical office not only produced official histories of all subsequent major campaigns but also compiled an account of the wars of dynastic transition of the preceding century.[38]

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[37] See Waley-Cohen, "Commemorating War in Eighteenth-Century China."

[38] HDSL *juan* 413, pp. 14a–15b; 414, p. 12b. Further research might establish that Qing emperors' decision to make use of stele inscriptions to further their cultural agenda was aroused in part by a revival of scholarly interest in epigraphy.

Major ritual victory celebrations, including a full-scale *jiaolao*, marked the mid-century conclusion of the wars for the conquest of Xinjiang, the major military achievement of the Qianlong reign. Thus in 1760, accompanied by all the senior officials in the capital, attired in ceremonial garb, and preceded by the awe-inspiring imperial insignia, Qianlong rode out to a temporary palace set up at Huangxinzhuang (Liangxiang county), located outside the city walls approximately thirty kilometers from the imperial palace. There, in person, he ritually welcomed back commander-in-chief Zhaohui (1708–64) and his army, including Muslims who had fought in the campaign. A yellow tent was set up with an imperial throne in the center, facing south, flanked on each side by eight blue tents. Beyond, a special platform was constructed, adorned with flags, at least some of which represented trophies captured from the enemy. As musicians played the appropriate ritual music, the emperor ascended the platform, and together with all the senior generals in full armor, and selected senior civilian officials, he made obeisance to heaven, performing the ritual of three kneelings and nine obeisances in gratitude for the victory, which was formally attributed to divine assistance. Afterwards, the emperor received each man in the yellow tent.[39]

There can be little doubt that the spectacle of the emperor, in full ritual garb, displaying the elaborate imperial insignia, journeying with a huge retinue of troops, officials and musicians, over several kilometers to a location beyond the city walls, attracted enormous attention. This political theater surely rivetted the attention of all who came into contact with it. Moreover, the triumphant atmosphere in this case undoubtedly meant that *jiaolao* surpassed in impact both the military display of troop reviews and the general optimism surrounding the launch of a new campaign, precisely because it reconfirmed the martial core of Qing culture at the same time as it promoted it. Overall, *jiaolao* contributed signally to the identification of the entire ritual sequence as integral to the accumulation of imperial power in ways that texts, paintings, and monuments could not achieve alone. At the same time, the opportunity to share in imperial glory helped foment a desire to belong to the new Qing col-

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Such a finding would certainly conform to the pattern of imperial co-optation of independent intellectual focuses of interest.

[39] HDSL *juan* 413, pp. 15b–19a. Earlier Qing *jiaolao* took place at Lugoujiao.

lectivity, whose defining ethos was, increasingly, military prowess and the triumphs it could and did achieve.

Qianlong took a close personal interest in *jiaolao*, as we can see from his correspondence with general Agui (1717–97) upon the successful conclusion of the second Jinchuan war in 1776, a victory that the emperor had long and anxiously awaited. In that correspondence we see the emperor, for instance, fretting about the precise timing of the *jiaolao* in relation to the announcements of victory that had to be made to the ancestors and at Confucius' tomb in accordance with the 1749 regulations, both because of his own schedule and because Agui needed to stay in Sichuan for some time to attend to matters arising from the conclusion of the war. Although originally the emperor had proposed that Agui make his way to Huangxinzhuang—once again the site for the *jiaolao*—by the middle of the fourth month, eventually he postponed the ceremony until the end of the fourth month to allow everyone plenty of time to get there.

The emperor explicitly noted that the purpose of the *jiaolao* ceremony was not merely to honor the victorious returning general, but to manifest the substantial quality of his martial valour (and, by implication, that of the Qing themselves) and his exceptional loyalty and merit (*yi zhang ding wu hong xun*). In other words, since the personal glory of the victorious Qing general brought glory upon the state in its wake, *jiaolao*, by identifying the military commander with the state, marked the exaltation of both.[40]

Fully conscious of this identification, the emperor composed commemorative poems for the *jiaolao* marking the conquest of Xinjiang in 1755 and in 1760 and for that following the suppression of the Jinchuan in 1776. At least one of these (that of 1760) was engraved on a monument installed at Liangxiang, where Huangxinzhuang was located, to mark the celebration of the *jiaolao*. Liangxiang thus assumed a special place in the imperial history with which it was indelibly associated. And as the imperial last word, the text of the inscription assumed an almost sanctified status; it was reprinted in local histories of Liangxiang county, in a history of Beijing, in the catalog of the imperial paintings collection, and elsewhere.[41] In such ways, word

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[40] See Nayancheng, comp., *A Wencheng Gong Nianpu* (1813); rpt., (Taibei, 1971) vol. 4, pp. 1849–50 (n.d., about the tenth day of the first month of Qianlong 41 (1776); see also pp. 1872–3 for a document dating from the twenty-fourth day of the first month, proposing the 27th for the *jiaolao*.

[41] See, e.g., Yu Minzhong., *Rixia Jiuwen Kao, juan* 133, pp. 2136–7.

of Qing military glory was disseminated to a broad, albeit a primarily elite, readership, reinforcing the message conveyed by the performance of *jiaolao*.

### *The Presentation and Reception of Captives (Xianfu, Shoufu)*

The twin ceremonies of *xianfu* and *shoufu* involved the presentation and disposition of war captives, and were reserved for important victories. Known in some form since antiquity, they were particularly associated by cognoscenti of the Chinese ritual tradition with emperor Taizong of the Tang, thought to have embodied in ideal proportions the virtues of *wen* and *wu* and a model whom Qianlong explicitly and repeatedly sought first to emulate and then to surpass. *Xianfu* and *shoufu* not only signalled major victories, but defined the moment and the space in which they occurred. Thus, for instance, a late eighteenth-century description of the Meridian Gate, where the emperor presided over these rituals, explicitly noted the principal association of the place: the *shoufu* ritual performed to reverence military victory.[42] It was of course the emperor's intention that military success should be the defining characteristic of his reign and everything minutely associated with it.

During the Qing, *xianfu* and *shoufu* were performed less than a dozen times, for the most part in connection with the protracted campaigns in Central Asia. The ceremonies took place for the last time in 1828, after the suppression of an uprising in Xinjiang, in an attempt to resuscitate old glories.[43] In theory the two ceremonies routinely followed *jiaolao* and a formal banquet held for the victorious army, succeeding one another within twenty-four hours, but in practice the sequence appears sometimes to have been interrupted or altered. In 1776, for instance, when as we have seen the emperor personally attended to the timing of the series of rituals marking the

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[42] Yu, *Rixia Jiuwen Kao, juan* 10, pp. 142–145. I have briefly discussed *xianfu* and *shoufu* in my article, "Commemorating War in Eighteenth-Century China," especially pp. 142–145.

[43] See HDSL, *juan* 414, pp. 10b–21a. Imperial verses on the ceremonies, complete with contemporary annotation, appear in a late-eighteenth-century history of Beijing: Yu et al., *Rixia Jiuwen Kao, juan* 10, pp. 143–4. See also Arthur Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington D.C., 1943), p. 68, which omits to mention the 1760 *xianfu* ceremony.

end of the second Jinchuan war, *xianfu* took place on the 25th of the fourth month, and then, without the *shoufu* being performed, the emperor departed for Huangxinzhuang the following day for a *jiaolao* that took place on the 27th. The celebratory banquet took place the same day—the emperor himself pouring wine for his generals in the presence of the Grand Councillors—and included dancing performances and some tribal displays by captive Jinchuan children, perhaps to the accompaniment of music played on Jinchuan instruments.[44] *Shoufu* was performed on the 28th, a full three days after *xianfu*.[45]

The emperor sometimes thought strict adherence to the letter of the regulations governing the series of celebratory rituals unnecessary, as we can see from the following comment:

> With regard to the Board of Rites' memorial concerning the *shoufu* [set for] the 28th: they have made an annotation to the effect that the generals shall enter in the company of all the officials and shall perform the ritual at the Meridian Gate. But the generals have already carried out rituals twice; once at the *jiaolao* and once at the celebratory banquet. The generals and those who returned from the army to the capital and have paraded in Our presence at the Qianqing gate are to join Our retinue up on the Meridian Gate; there is no need for them to [be directly involved in] perform[ing further] rituals. Only Fukang'an is to bring in the prisoners and perform the [*shoufu*] ceremony before the Meridian Gate.

We may infer that ceremonies of this type offered opportunities not only to the state for the enhancement of imperial prestige but also to individuals for the embellishment of their political stature, and to the emperor for the bestowal of selective patronage. Fukang' an (d. 1796), whose stellar later career included command of Qing troops against the Gurkhas, and the governor-generalship in Guangzhou, had distinguished himself in the Jinchuan campaign, but was still relatively junior in 1776. Possibly he was singled out in this way as

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[44] For a description, see Qinggui, comp., *Guochao Gongshi Xubian*, Qinggui, comp., *Qing Gong Shi Xu Bian* (History of the Qing Palaces, continued) (1810) rpt. (Beiping, 1921) *juan* 43, p. 2b. Court music included several subcategories of music that appear to have related to the Ten Great Victories. Amongst these "*fanzi yue*" (barbarian music) was played on instruments identified as of Jinchuan origin; such music may have featured at the celebratory banquet. See Wan and Huang, *Qingdai Gongting Yinyue*, p. 19.

[45] Nayencheng, *A Wencheng Gong Nianpu*, vol. 4, pp. 1936–1943.

the result of his association with the rapidly rising star of the imperial favorite, Heshen.[46]

As with all rituals, the participants' every movement in *xianfu* and *shoufu* was strictly prescribed. On the day appointed for the *xianfu*, designated officials of the Board of War brought in the prisoners through the right-hand entrance of the Chang'an gate to the Tian'an gate, leading them by a white silken cord fastened around the neck. They waited by the outer gate of the Taimiao. They formally announced the victory and capture of the prisoners, who were then turned over to the Board of Justice (*xingbu*) for punishment.

An eyewitness account of the 1776 *shoufu* ceremony that followed the eventual suppression of the Jinchuan was sent to France by Father Amiot (1718–93), one of the leading French Jesuits at the Qing court, where he remained from 1751 until his death in 1793. His description is worth quoting at some length for the vivid image it presents of a highly theatric ceremony:

> . . . The *shoufu* consists of receiving war captives and deciding their fate. For this occasion the empire brought together as much that was grand and august as possible. This ceremony takes place in the third court of the Palace bordered to the north by the gate known as Wu-men. The emperor is [seated upon] a throne installed in a raised gallery on a twenty-five-foot high terrace, surmounted by a building that might be as much as fifty feet tall. Next to the emperor are the senior officers of the Crown, while below are the Princes, Dignitaries (*Regulos*), Counts, and great Mandarins. Up and down this immense courtyard, as far as the eye can see, are the imperial insignia, flags, standards, pikes, maces, clubs, dragons, instruments, symbolic figures and I know not what, two parallel lines, on the east and west sides, going on ad infinitum. The bearers are dressed in red silk embroidered with gold; a second line is made up of the imperial officials (*tribuneaux*), and a third consists of the Imperial Guard armed as for war. In the forward courtyard are the emperor's elephants, bearing gilded towers, with war chariots to either side of them. Musicians and their instruments flank the two sides of the gallery that borders the great courtyard to the north where the emperor is seated upon his throne. The Board of Rites had set the ceremony to begin at seven in the morning but the emperor issued a counter-order during the night: he wished the ceremony to begin at half past four.

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[46] For the quotation, see *ibid.*, at pp. 1942–43. Heshen rose to power in 1775 after attracting the emperor's attention while serving as an imperial guardsman. He exercised enormous influence until the latter's death in 1799.

> The Emperor appears on his throne when he hears the sound of the music and of all the extremely noisy instruments. First he receives homage and congratulations, then a Mandarin from the Board of Rites shouts loudly: "Officers who have brought the captives here, advance, prostrate yourselves, kowtow!" Once this ceremony has been performed to the sound of the instruments, the victorious generals withdraw and at once the same Mandarin shouts again: "Officials of the Board of War and Generals, come and present your prisoners!"
>
> Seven unfortunate Jinchuan prisoners appear from afar before the emperor and this entire, redoubtable assembly, each with a kind of white silk cord around his neck. They advance several steps, then are ordered to kneel. Beside them is placed a cage containing the head of Seng-ge-sang, one of the rebels [whose brother is among the prisoners]. Behind them are one hundred military officers; to their right fifty civil officials and metropolitan troops; to their left, fifty officers of the "*Tribunal des Princes*". To this display, which is replete with terror, one of the prisoners, a Jinchuan general, cannot restrain himself from a slight movement that appears resentful but can be seen only by those close to him. Even so he knocks the ground with his forehead with the other prisoners, and then they are at once removed to a side chamber. The emperor again receives congratulations from every important dignitary in the empire, then he withdraws to the sound of music and the noisy instruments, having made no decision as to the fate of these illustrious captives, but it soon became known that they were lost.[47]

Amiot concluded his account by describing the grisly execution of all seven. His description of this impressively staged ritual performance leaves little doubt about Qing uses of the theatre of majesty to impress the extent and nature of their power on all who observed it.

It is perhaps worth noting that, if one of the reasons Amiot was permitted to attend this ritual was that Qianlong hoped to impress upon foreigners the fearsome fate that awaited those who opposed the great Qing empire, it backfired. Amiot's Parisian correspondents expressed outrage when they read his account of the *shoufu*, implying that if Amiot regarded such behavior in a favorable light he must have lost his finer European sensibility through too long a sojourn in China. The Frenchmen—all unknowing of the fate that awaited many of them only a few years later at the guillotine—

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[47] Amiot, "Lettre sur la Reduction des Miao-tsee, en 1776" (and anonymous supplement), *Memoires Concernant l'Histoire, les Sciences, les arts, les moeurs, les usages &c des chinois; par les missionaires de Pekin.* (Paris, 1777–1814, volume III, pp. 420–421 (my translation). The identity of the "Tribunal des Princes" is unclear; it is perhaps used to designate the Imperial Household Department (*neiwufu*).

concluded that the Qing general was "*perfidious*, and his master a *cannibal*! [underlining in original]"[48]

According to a description of a painting of an earlier *xianfu*, done by court artist Xu Yang and published in 1793 in the catalogue of the imperial paintings collection, a substantial audience witnessed such celebrations, for the opportunity to parade Qing might was too valuable to squander. In 1760, not only had large numbers of civil and military Qing officials attended the event, but so did an astonishing range of foreign visitors bearing a flag identifying their nationality, whom the catalogue described as "offering tribute." These foreigners apparently included French, English, Dutch, Koreans, and Japanese, as well as representatives of numerous Southeast Asian and Central Asian states. This seems surprising. Thirty-odd years prior to the Macartney mission, which took place the same year the description was published but the coincidence is probably no more than just that, it seems inconceivable either that the Qing recognized any foreigners as diplomats in the modern sense, or that representatives of King George 'presented tribute' to the Qing emperor. Most Englishmen then in China were traders, but the absence of East India Company records for this period makes verification of the identity of the Englishmen in the audience almost impossible. Questions arise about other nationalities as well. With regard to the French, missionaries from France (Amiot among them) who lived at Qianlong's court in 1760 often claimed close links to the French crown. Could they have assumed the responsibility of acting as diplomatic representatives, in the absence of any formal arrangements? Did the painting in fact accurately represent the event, or is this an example of the record consciously altering the event recorded? Given Qianlong's acute desire to shape the historical record, the emperor, whose awareness of international developments was far keener than he has sometimes been credited with, may well have ordered the adaptation of the pictorial record (or at least its catalog description), to suit his own purposes.[49]

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[48] Bibliotheque de l'Institut de France, volume 1522, p. 154. This letter to Amiot from the great sinophile Henri Bertin quotes the words of an unnamed third party.

[49] For an illustration of a copper-engraving of one version of this scene, see Gugong Bowuyuan, *Qingdai Gongting Huihua*, no. 131.14. For the description of Xu Yang's painting, see Zhang and Liang, *Shiqu Baoji Xubian*, volume 2, p. 788. The sources state that these paintings depict the *xianfu* ritual but, given that they clearly show the Meridian Gate, where *xianfu* was not held, possibly they in fact depict

At least as interesting as these speculations are the implications of the statement that each foreign representative was carrying a flag identifying his nationality. This indicates that the Qing court was quite conscious of the significance of the use of flags to represent a foreign nation. Such an implication supports the argument, which I develop more fully elsewhere, that the campaign to create a new Qing culture had to do with the deliberate development of a sense of community, a Qing form of early modern nationalism. Suffice it here to say that the sophistication suggested by these paintings and their descriptions belies the conventional wisdom of a Chinese empire blissfully unaware of the outside world, and supports the need to distinguish between the the drawing of a distinction between the Qing empire and the Chinese imperial tradition.[50]

## *The Autumn Hunts at Mulan*

The autumn hunts at Mulan were explicitly intended by Qing emperors as the martial (*wu*) counterpart to the civil (*wen*) agricultural rituals (*qin geng*) central to the Chinese ceremonial calendar.[51] The hunts were not listed among the eighteen military rituals in the compendia that recorded the Chinese ritual tradition, because, as Chia Ning has shown, they were Inner Asian in origin. Unlike Chinese military rituals, which took place only intermittently to mark specific moments surrounding imperial military campaigns, the hunts were distinguished by their regular, seasonal occurrence. Yet hunting rituals also had been known in China since distant antiquity, and also were associated with military preparedness. In important respects, the annual Qing hunts did resemble other military rituals, both

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*shoufu*, although the white silk cord corresponds with the prescriptions for *xianfu*, not *shoufu*. There is also some question as to the date of the ceremony depicted in Xu Yang' s work. *Shiqu Baoji Xubian* gives the first month of Qianlong 25, i.e. 1760. On the other hand Hu Jing, a contemporary observer who was intimately familiar with the imperial paintings collection, gives 1755. See Hu Jing, "Guochao Yuanhua Lu," *Huashi Congshu* (1816); rpt., Shanghai, 1963, p. 52. I am grateful to Nie Chongzheng for making a copy of this text available to me.

[50] See my "Qing Culture and Chinese Modernity" (London, forthcoming). On differences between Qing and Chinese, see also Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1758–1864*, (Stanford, 1998).

[51] *Wuli Tongkao, juan 242*, pp. 1a–b; Chia Ning, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals", pp. 62, 69.

because of their theatricality and because one of their principal purposes was to impress the centrality of military preparedness in the Qing polity upon an audience that was both domestic and foreign. They were, in short, another form of ritual in which the Qing sought to draw together the different traditions from which they derived legitimacy and to make each meaningful to the other, in the process creating a new, specifically Qing, cultural context.

The Kangxi Emperor instituted the annual hunts at Mulan in 1681 and hunted there annually, except when on campaign, until his death in 1722. Alfter a hiatus during the reign of the Yongzheng emperor—who expressed his regret at his failure to maintain this important ancestral practice—Qianlong re-instituted the tradition a few years after his accession, and held more than forty hunts at Mulan over the course of his long reign. Many imperial princes took part in the hunts, and troops from the capital were chosen to participate on the basis of such military skills as archery, that were tested earlier in the year. The emperor invited—one might say required—Inner Asian lords to participate in rotation, making it possible both to cultivate important personal relationships and to assemble the desired audience for this implicitly intimidatory parade of military power.

Beyond the display of power, a major function of the hunts was to provide an opportunity to practice making war. Among the diversions offered during the month or so spent annually at Mulan were mock battles, archery displays, and wrestling contests. The most famous of the various forms of hunt involved the formation of a huge circle by mounted troops who surrounded the quarry—sometimes deer, sometimes tigers, sometimes other animals or birds—and drove it towards the waiting marksman, often the emperor himself.[52]

Given the massive scale of the arrangements for the provisioning, accommodation, and choreography required for the smooth functioning of the entire operation, these displays of military prowess, like the rituals described above, involved logistics as much as they did skills. The hunts involved tens of thousands of people, most of whom would have travelled the seventy-five miles from the summer capital at Chengde to Mulan each year. The mobilisation of the emperor and his primarily military entourage, and the temporary

[52] See Hou and Pirazzoli-t'Serstevens, *Mulan Tu yu Qianlong Qiujie Dalie de Yanjiu*, (Taibei, 1982), especially pp. 33–37; see Rawski, *Last Emperors*, pp. 20–21.

palaces erected along the way, created an extraordinary spectacle that must have caused a tremendous stir among all who beheld it.

As in the case of the other military rituals discussed above, the annual hunts were commemorated in numerous paintings produced by artists of the court painting academy. The hunts thus further expanded the imperially-sponsored artistic production whose main purpose was to focus attention on the high degree of military sophistication in Qing culture and the imperial power that rested upon it.[53]

### *Documenting and Disseminating Military Ritual*

As we have seen, by the mid-eighteenth century a number of military rituals, like the wars from which they derived their *raison d'etre*, were the subject of paintings executed on imperial commission by court painters, with the intention of glorifying Qing power and martiality and proclaiming its accomplishments to generations yet to come. Examples include the two *dayue* paintings done by Castiglione and Jin Kun, discussed above, the collaborative scrolls depicting the send-off of troops, Xu Yang's *xianfu* painting, and numerous others, such as much of Castiglione's oeuvre—his many paintings of horses spring immediately to mind—and Yao Wenhan's "An Imperial Banquet at the Zi Guang Ge," now in the Palace Museum.[54] Yet such paintings generally remained within the palace, which limited the scope of their usefulness as propaganda.

The dissemination of some texts and pictures with military content or at least referents was far less restricted. The foreign missionary artists Castiglione, Attiret, Sichelbart and Salusti produced a set of sixteen illustrations of the Xinjiang wars for the emperor. The originals were hung in the Pavilion of Purple Radiance (*Zi Guang Ge*), a pavilion reconstructed by Qianlong in 1760 in the centre of Beijing specifically to display military art and trophies and to receive foreign tributaries. Copies of these paintings travelled to Paris to be engraved in copper by the best engravers that could be found, while artists trained by one of the court missionaries later made further copies in China. These copper-engravings eventually bedecked

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[53] For a detailed account of some of these paintings, now located in the Musee Guimet in Paris, see Hou Ching-lang and Michele Pirazzoli-t'Serstevens, *Mulan Tu*.

[54] Gugong Bowuyuan, *Qingdai Gongting Huihua*, no. 82.

public buildings all round the empire and were distributed to deserving officials as a mark of imperial favor. They thus enjoyed a wide circulation and were likely seen by a geographically far-flung and socially diverse audience.

Some of these war illustrations (*zhantu*) depicted battle scenes while others, specifically the first and the last three in the series of sixteen, showed episodes connected to the victory that technically came into the category of military ritual. These included scenes of enemies surrendering, a tableau of a celebratory banquet held at the Zi Guang Ge, the *jiaolao* home-welcoming ceremony, and the *xianfu* and *shoufu* ceremonies.

The Xinjiang series of war paintings set a precedent. Most of the subsequent campaigns that qualified as one of the "ten great victories" were recorded in sets of paintings produced collaboratively by court artists, though apparently never again by any of the Jesuits. Several of these later series included military ritual among the subjects depicted. For instance, the last three of a set of sixteen paintings that marked the suppression of the Jinchuan rebellion in 1776 depicted the *jiaolao* involving Agui, the *shoufu* held at the Meridian Gate, and the celebratory feast, part of the *kaizu* ritual, given for the victors at the Zi Guang Ge (all described above). Almost all the others showed scenes of specific battles said to have played a pivotal role in the long-drawn-out war to overcome Jinchuan resistance to Qing rule. Another series, only twelve paintings in all, produced to celebrate victory in Taiwan in the 1780s, included a celebratory banquet as the last of its series. The several series of war paintings were significant tools of propaganda because, following the precedent of the Xinjiang series, they were engraved in copper for mass distribution. All later engraving work, however, was done in China rather than in Europe.[55]

The wide-ranging dissemination of these images, and the message of Qing military might that they bore, was augmented by the repro-

[55] Zhang and Liang, *Shiqu Baoji Xubian*, volume 2, pp. 806–16 lists the sixteen war paintings relating to the Xinjiang wars, and reproduces their inscriptions and other related material, much of it eulogizing the war effort. For a list of the Jinchuan battle pictures of the late 1770s, see *ibid.*, p. 817. I am grateful to Nie Chongzheng for letting me see these in the Palace Museum, many years ago. For a list of the Taiwan battle pictures, see *ibid.*, p. 823; those for the Annan and Gurkha wars are listed at ibid., pp. 827 and 837.

duction of their inscriptions, which appeared, for instance, in the catalog of imperial paintings and in collections of imperial writings. These latter appeared in a variety of forms. A collection of stelae engraved with hundreds of examples of imperial commentaries on military affairs was erected near the Wu Cheng Dian (Hall of Military Achievements), behind the Zi Guang Ge. Like the imperial commemorative inscription engraved on a monument installed at Liangxiang to mark the celebration of the *jiaolao*, the accounts these inscriptions presented were completely authoritative. They were widely reprinted. All the stone-engravings also could be mass reproduced in the form of rubbings, liable to be circulated as much as an example of imperial calligraphy as for their content, from which they were, of course, inseparable. Many, in addition, referred to the divine assistance that had brought about Qing victory, thus giving imperial power a cosmic inevitability.

Mass production, for commercial or ideological purposes, or simply for the sake of manufacturing efficiency, was far from new in China. Lothar Ledderose has recently argued that much Chinese art can be broken down into a series of modules that could be and were endlessly re-assembled in multiple combinations. The large-scale production of copperplates of documentary paintings or rubbings of imperial inscriptions, while not precisely modular, developed from these kinds of precedents.[56] Nor was Qianlong by any means the first to use the mass production and reproduction of words and images for ideological purposes. Illustrated Buddhist and Confucian texts had enjoyed a wide circulation for centuries, while by the late sixteenth century illustrated explanations of a Ming sacred edict on proper behavior circulated through "a number of reproductive processes, with painted pictures . . . being subsequently transferred to stone, from which rubbings were made, which in turn were repainted and transferred onto woodblocks for printing." At about the same time, pictorial biographies of Confucius were made in multiple media: paintings on silk, woodblock prints, and engraved stone tablets.[57]

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[56] Lothar Ledderose, *Ten Thousand Things: Module and Mass Production in Chinese Art*, (Princeton, 2000).

[57] For the quotation, see Craig Clunas, *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China*, (Princeton, 1997, originally published London, 1997), p. 50; Julia K. Murray, "The Temple of Confucius and Pictorial Biographies of the Sage," *Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 55.2 (May, 1996), pp. 269–300.

Qing China had recourse to most of these techniques as the dissemination cultural products and motifs was relentlessly reiterated: a commemorative monument was mentioned in a local history, its inscription was reproduced in a variety of printed texts, an imperial stele inscription was reproduced as a rubbing, and a rubbing was converted into a woodblock print. Similarly, paintings of military rituals were reproduced en masse as copper-engravings, their inscriptions reproduced in catalogs, and so on.

Thus when Qianlong arranged to circulate propaganda on military power in a wide variety of media, he was able to draw and build on an existing precedent, so that although the shift in cultural orientation he was seeking to bring about was in many ways revolutionary, the methods and forms employed to achieve it did not seem altogether unfamiliar. In this way, they stood a better chance of acceptance. This technique recalls that noted by Corrigan and Sayer in their discussion of the central role of cultural change in English state formation: "As so often . . . revolutionary transformations were accomplished (and concealed) through new uses of old forms and the tracing of a thousand lineages from the past."[58]

By such mass production and reproduction, Qianlong availed himself of a twofold opportunity. First, by sending his war illustrations to Paris for engraving he managed to convey to the French, of whose power he was well aware through the accounts of resident Jesuit missionaries such as Father Amiot, the clear impression that the Qing were militarily formidable. Second, he was able to exert a strong influence over the direction of "mass culture," in both senses of a culture that reached most of the people and of a culture mass-produced by "industrial" techniques.[59] In this way, the Qing could push a much broader spectrum of people to pay more attention and respect to martiality and to hold military power in far higher esteem than previously, even though most direct participants in and audience of military ritual were members of the elite. The broadly simultaneous and empire-wide dissemination of pictorial images and written documents all promoting the same range of views created a new

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[58] Corrigan and Sayer, *The Great Arch*, p. 92.

[59] This working definition of mass culture is adopted from James Naremore and Patrick Brantlinger, eds, *Modernity and Mass Culture*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1991) p. 2. Despite the wholly different context, this definition seems applicable to eighteenth-century China.

common cultural ground whose driving force was the deployment of military power, and whose ultimate objective was empire.

## *Conclusion*

By the end of the eighteenth century, military rituals in many ways epitomized the special hybridity of Qing culture. They also bore the unmistakable imprint of the Qianlong emperor's desire to achieve multiple goals with a single means and to leave a lasting historical record of the imperial achievements of his reign. First, military rituals brought together the ritual traditions of China and Inner Asia, blurring ethnic or national cultural differences beyond meaningful distinction. Second, through their highly theatrical celebrations of Qing military power, they staged the consequence of that power, the great Qing empire, for a twofold audience. Its international component consisted chiefly of Inner Asian vassals but also included Europeans and other peoples of whose more long-range menace the Qianlong emperor was certainly aware. Its domestic component consisted of the diverse subjects of the empire, both those who took part in the rituals as participant or spectator and the much broader audience of the textual and pictorial record. Ritual texts and monuments, documentary paintings and copper-engravings, stele inscriptions and their rubbings all combined with performed rituals to effectively disseminate a single, tripartite message: Qing, military success, and empire.

Finally, Qing military rituals embodied the relationship of *wen* and *wu* as this was cultivated under the Qing, a period in which warfare thoroughly permeated the world of cultural production. It appeared in ritual texts, it was reproduced in paintings and copper-engravings, it expanded the musical repertory, and it occupied great numbers of officers and soldiers in the imperial armies as well as those responsible for provisioning and transporting them. It also began to assume a pervasive significance in the work of the vast numbers of scholars and civil officials involved in the organization of military rituals. More broadly, scholarship—in the most expansive sense of the literary and artistic tradition—more often than ever before concerned itself with matters of war and empire. Even those who wished to criticize or ridicule the Qing imperial project, however obliquely, could not help but operate within the same general

idiomatic parameters.[60] In the long run, the shift of emphasis in the Chinese cultural world, promoted by the concerted campaign of their Inner Asian rulers, endured beyond the fall of the Qing empire to affect profoundly the nature of the twentieth-century nation-state.

[60] See Hay, "Culture, ethnicity, and empire in the work of two eighteenth-century "eccentric artists," *Res: Anthropology and aesthetics* 35 (Spring, 1999): pp. 201–223.

## Glossary

Agui 阿桂
Ajige 阿濟格
bingbu 兵部
binli 賓禮
Chang'an 長安
changhuangwei 嵕皇威
chuishi jiuyuan 垂示久遠
*Chunqiu* 春秋
*Da Qing Tongli* 大清通禮
dajia lubo 大駕鹵簿
dayue 大閱
Duoduo 多鐸
fajia lubo 法駕鹵簿.
fanglüe 方略
fanzi yue 番子樂
Fuheng 傅恆
Fukang'an 福康安
Galdan 噶爾丹
gongbu 工部
Guandi 關帝
guojia 國家
guozijian 國子監
Heshen 和珅
honglusi 鴻臚寺
*Huangchao Liqi Tushi* 皇朝禮器圖式
Huangxinzhuang 黃新莊
hujunying 護軍營
Hung Taiji 皇太極
huoqiying 火器營
jiali 嘉禮
jiaolao 郊勞
jili 吉禮
Jin Kun 金昆
Jinchuan 金川
junli 軍禮
kaizu 凱旋
Kangxi 康熙
Lang Shining 郎世寧
Liangxiang 良鄉
libu 禮部
liuyi 六藝
Longping 隆平
luanyiwei 鑾儀衛
mangpao 蟒袍

mazheng 馬政
mingjiang 命將
Mulan 木蘭
Nanyuan 南苑
naoge dayue 鐃歌大樂
neige 內閣
neiwufu 內務府
Nurhaci 努爾哈赤
paoshen 炮神
qianfengying 前鋒營
Qianlongnianzhi 乾隆年製
Qianqingmen 乾清門
Qin Huitian 秦蕙田
qin'geng 親耕
Qingping 慶平
qingyue 清樂
qintianjian 欽天監
sanfan 三番
shenwei 神威
shi quan lao ren 十全老人
shi quan wu gong 十全武功
shoufu 受俘
Siku quanshu zongmu 四庫全書總目
Taihedian 太和殿
Taimiao 太廟
tangse 堂子
tianlie 田獵
wen 文
wu 武
wubei 武備院
wubeiyuan 武成殿
Wu Cheng Dian 武成殿
*Wuli Tongkao* 五禮通考
Wumen 午門
xianfu 獻俘
xiaojiying 驍騎營
xingbu 刑部
xiongli 凶禮
Xu Yang 徐揚
yanwuchang 演武場
Yao Wenhan 姚文瀚
yi ju liang de 一舉兩得
yi zhang ding wu hong xun 以彰定武鴻勳
Yili 儀禮
yuebu 樂部
Zhaohui 兆會
Zhonghe Shaoyue 中和韶樂

*Zhouli* 周禮
zhuang jun rong 壯軍容
Zi Guang Ge 紫光閣
zimu 子母
*Zuozhuan* 左轉

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