STUDIES ON THE MONGOL EMPIRE AND EARLY MUSLIM INDIA

Peter Jackson

VARIORUM COLLECTED STUDIES SERIES

Also in the Variorum Collected Studies Series:

PATRICIA CRONE
From Arabian Tribes to Islamic Empire
Army, State and Society in the Near East c.600–850

REUVEN AMITAI
The Mongols in the Islamic Lands
Studies in the History of the Ilkhanate

MICHAEL COOK
Studies in the Origins of Early Islamic Culture and Tradition

PETER B. GOLDEN
Nomads and their Neighbours in the Russian Steppe
Turks, Khazars and Qipchaqs

MICHAEL BRETT
Ibn Khaldun and the Medieval Maghrib

DONALD R. HILL (Ed. David King)
Studies in Medieval Islamic Technology
From Philo to al-Jazari – from Alexandria to Diyār Bakr

THOMAS S. NOONAN
The Islamic World, Russia and the Vikings, 750–900
The Numismatic Evidence

EDWARD S. KENNEDY
Astronomy and Astrology in the Medieval Islamic World

DENIS SINOR
Studies in Medieval Inner Asia

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER, JR (Ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz)
Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia

HERBERT FRANKE
China Under Mongol Rule

HERBERT FRANKE and HOK-LAM CHAN
Studies on the Jurchens and the Chin Dynasty

VARIORUM COLLECTED STUDIES SERIES

Studies on the Mongol Empire and Early Muslim India

Peter Jackson

Peter Jackson

Studies on the Mongol Empire and Early Muslim India

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2009 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition © 2009 by Peter Jackson

Peter Jackson has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Jackson, Peter, 1948 Jan. 27–
Studies on the Mongol Empire and early Muslim India.
– (Variorum collected studies series ; 923)
1. Mogul Empire – History. 2. India – History – 1526–1765.
I. Title II. Series
954'.025–dc22

ISBN 9780754659884 (hbk)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Jackson, Peter, 1948 Jan. 27
Studies on the Mongol empire and early Muslim India / Peter Jackson.
p. cm. (Variorum collected studies series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–7546–5988–4 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Mongols History To 1500. 2. Delhi (Sultanate) History. 3. Muslims – India – History.
I. Title.
DS19.J325 2009
954.02'2–dc22
2009010368

ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-5988-4 (hbk)

VARIORUM COLLECTED STUDIES SERIES CS923

CONTENTS

Preface vii

Acknowledgements xi

Abbreviations xii

THE MONGOL EMPIRE

I The dissolution of the Mongol empire 186–244
Central Asiatic Journal 22. Wiesbaden, 1978

II From *ulus* to khanate: the making of the Mongol states, *c.* 1220–*c.* 1290 1–25
The Mongol Empire and its Legacy, eds R. Amitai-Preiss and D.O. Morgan. Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp. 12–38

III Hülegü Khan and the Christians: the making of a myth 196–213
The Experience of Crusading 2: Defining the Crusader Kingdom, eds P. Edbury and J. Phillips. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

IV The Mongols and the faith of the conquered 1–32
Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World, eds R. Amitai and M. Biran. Leiden: Brill, 2005, pp. 245–78

V World-conquest and local accommodation: threat and blandishment in Mongol diplomacy 3–18
History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies in Honor of John E. Woods, eds J. Pfeiffer and S.A. Quinn in collaboration with Ernest Tucker. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2006

THE FORMATION OF MUSLIM INDIA

VI The fall of the Ghurid dynasty 1–30
Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth, II. The Sultan's Turret: Studies in Persian and Turkish Culture, ed. C. Hillenbrand. Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 207–37

VII Turkish slaves on Islam's Indian frontier 63–82
Slavery and South Asian History, eds I. Chatterjee and R.M. Eaton. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006

VIII The *Mamlūk* institution in early Muslim India 340–58
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Cambridge, 1990, no. 2

IX Sulṭān Raḍiyya bint Iltutmish 181–97
Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, and Piety, ed. G.R.G. Hambly. New York: St Martin's Press, 1998

THE MONGOLS AND THE DELHI SULTANATE

X Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols, and the Khwarazmian conquest of the Panjāb and Sind 1–19
Iran (Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies) 28. London, 1990, pp. 45–54

XI The Mongols and the Delhi sultanate in the reign of Muḥammad Tughluq (1325–1351) 118–57
Central Asiatic Journal 19. Wiesbaden, 1975

XII Delhi: the problem of a vast military encampment 18–33
Delhi Through the Ages: Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society, ed. R.E. Frykenberg. Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986

Index 1–18

This volume contains xii + 334 pages

PREFACE

The studies reprinted in this volume have been arranged under three distinct heads: the Mongol empire; early Muslim India; and the relations between the two. Broadly speaking, the theme that unites the great majority of them is the history and activity of peoples originating in the Eurasian steppe – whether Mongols governing a vast empire that stretched from China and Manchuria as far as the borders of Hungary and Syria or the Turkish immigrants and military slaves who forged and preserved the independent Delhi Sultanate, one of the few powers successfully to withstand the Mongol advance, at least until the sack of Delhi by the Turco-Mongol conqueror Temür (Tīmūr; 'Tamerlane') in 1398.

The first section brings together five studies on the Mongol empire founded by the chieftain Temüjin, better known as Chinggis Khan (d. 1227). Unlike so many of its precursors – steppe confederacies with no stable administrative framework – that empire did not break up following the conqueror's death. It was not until the era of his grandsons, in the early 1260s, that it disintegrated into at least four major polities: the khanate of the Golden Horde in the steppelands north of the Black Sea and the Caspian; the Chaghadayid khanate in Central Asia; the Ilkhanate in Iran and Iraq; and the dominions of the Great Khan (*qa'an*, *qaghan*) in China and Mongolia. It is a testimony to the abiding vigour of the Mongol military and administrative machine that each of these survived for some considerable time – and in the case of the two first-named khanates, for a few centuries. Nevertheless, certain tensions had been present within the imperial structure from an early date, and in 'The dissolution of the Mongol empire' (**I**) I attempted to demonstrate how these contributed to the collapse of the unitary empire in the period 1260–62. A paper published over twenty years later, 'From *ulus* to khanate: the making of the Mongol states, *c.* 1220–*c.* 1290' (**II**), represents a modification of the views expressed in my earlier work.

At a date that is uncertain but that probably falls within the reign of Chinggis Khan's successor Ögödei Qa'an (1229–41), the Mongols came to believe that the dynasty's revered founder had received a mandate from the Sky-god, Tenggeri, to rule the entire world – a political philosophy expressed in the ultimatums that they despatched to require the submission of independent rulers. In 'World-conquest and local accommodation' (**V**), I discuss the evidence for the emergence of this programme of world-domination, and explore also the more indirect and devious means that the Mongols employed in order to bring such princes under their sway or, on occasions, to secure their cooperation against other enemies.

One of the more common stratagems that Mongol khans adopted in relation to Catholic Christian powers of Western Europe was to portray themselves as particularly sympathetic towards the Christian faith. 'Hülegü Khan and the Christians: the making of a myth' (**III**) scrutinizes the alleged Christian leanings of the first Ilkhan, whose overtures to Western Europe in 1262 for simultaneous operations against the Egyptian Mamlūks inaugurated a series of diplomatic contacts that lasted for half a century. The Mongols' attitudes in religious matters were rather more complex, and are examined in 'The Mongols and the faith of the conquered' (**IV**).

When the Mongols first appeared on the horizons of the Islamic world, Turks had been entering Muslim territories for several centuries, both in large-scale tribal movements and as individuals, *déracinés* imported as military slaves (*ghulāms*, *mamlūks*). The most celebrated examples of the latter category are of course the slave guards and officers who created the Mamlūk regime in Egypt (1250–1517). But Turkish military slaves were also prominent in Islamic expansion into the Indian subcontinent from the tenth century onwards. 'Turkish slaves on Islam's Indian frontier' (**VII**) provides an overview of the role of *ghulāms* in this region. In particular, Turkish slave officers were instrumental in the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, the Muslim power which dominated northern India from the early thirteenth century to *c.* 1400 and which was in some respects the precursor of the still more formidable Mughal empire. The Sultanate emerged out of the break-up of the Ghurid empire, centred in present-day Afghanistan, a process in which Turkish *ghulāms* again played a prominent role and which is investigated in 'The fall of the Ghurid dynasty' (**VI**). During the thirteenth century, Turkish slave officers represented a significant proportion of the Delhi Sultanate's ruling class, and the respective founders of its two reigning dynasties for much of that century, Iltutmish (1211–36) and Balaban (1264–87), were themselves former *ghulāms*. The careers of Turkish slave commanders in the thirteenth-century Sultanate are the subject of 'The *Mamlūk* institution in early Muslim India' (**VIII**); while 'Sultān Raḍiyya bint Iltutmish' (**IX**), lastly, considers in greater detail the rise, during her brief reign (1237–40), of those of her father's *ghulām* officers, like Balaban, who would dominate the politics of the next three decades or more.

The papers comprising the final section of the volume are devoted to the relations between the Sultanate and the Mongol empire. 'Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols and the Khwarazmian conquest of the Panjāb and Sind' (**X**) endeavours to throw fresh light on the complex events surrounding the first Mongol invasion of India in Iltutmish's reign, on the basis of a hitherto largely untapped source. Under Balaban and his successors of the Khaljī (1290–1320) and Tughluqid (1320–1413) dynasties, the Sultanate came to experience more frequent, and ultimately more dangerous, attacks; and 'Delhi: the problems of a vast military

encampment' (**XII**) is concerned with the impact on the capital of the Sultans' strenuous defensive measures. In 'The Mongols and the Delhi sultanate in the reign of Muḥammad Tughluq (1325–1351)' (**XI**) I tried to illuminate a period that has been the focus of some considerable controversy and for which our chief primary sources throw up particularly thorny difficulties.

These studies first appeared between 1975 and 2006; two of them, (**I**) and (**XI**), represent chapters of my Cambridge Ph.D. thesis ('The Mongols and India', 1977). Inevitably, during a period spanning just over three decades, my ideas have sometimes changed. Nevertheless, the texts themselves remain unaltered except for the correction of occasional minor errors. But where I have subsequently modified a view that I expressed in print several years ago, this is indicated in an addendum at the end of the paper in question.

I am most grateful to Dr John Smedley and to Ashgate for providing me with the opportunity to reissue these papers in one volume.

PETER JACKSON

Keele University
January 2009

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Variorum Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.

Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and is quoted in the index entries.

In this volume, items II, IV, VI and X have necessarily been reset and repaginated, and in these articles the original pagination is shown in square brackets within the text, in bold type.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Grateful thanks are due to the following publishers and institutions for their kind permission to reproduce articles and papers in this volume: Messrs. Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, for permission to reprint **I** and **XI** from *Central Asiatic Journal*, and **V** from *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies in Honor of John E. Woods*; Koninklijke Brill N.V., Leiden, for permission to reset and republish **II** from *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, **IV** from *Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, and **VI** from *Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth, II. The Sultan's Turret*; Cambridge University Press, for permission to reprint **III** from *The Experience of Crusading, II. Defining the Crusader Kingdom*; Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, for permission to reprint **VII** from *Slavery and South Asian History*; The Royal Asiatic Society, London, for permission to reprint **VIII**; St. Martin's Press, New York, for permission to reprint **IX** from *Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, and Piety*; The British Institute of Persian Studies, London and Tehran, for permission to reset and republish **X** from *Iran* (*Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*); and Oxford University Press, New Delhi, for permission to reprint **XII** from *Delhi through the Ages: Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society*.

ABBREVIATIONS

AEMA	*Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal*
CHC, vi	*Cambridge History of China*, vi: *Alien Regimes and Border States 907-1368*, eds. H. Franke and D. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1994)
CHI	*Cambridge History of Iran*
EI^2	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn. by Ch. Pellat *et al.* (Leiden, 1954–2004)
GMS	E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series
HJAS	*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*
IC	*Islamic Culture*
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
JA	*Journal Asiatique*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JSAI	*Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*
MS	*Monumenta Serica*
PFEH	*Papers in Far Eastern History*
TP	*T'oung Pao*

I

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

In 1251 a three years' interregnum in the headship of the Mongol empire was terminated by the election as Great Khan (Mo. Qa'an < Qaghan) of Möngke, the eldest son of Chinggis Khan's fourth son Tolui. That this event represented a political coup of the first order is clear from the reaction which it provoked. Previously the dignity of Great Khan had remained in the family of Chinggis Khan's third son Ögedei (1229–1241), who had been succeeded, after a long interregnum, by his own eldest son Güyüg (1246–1248). This branch of the imperial dynasty now took up arms against the new sovereign, only to be ruthlessly suppressed. They and their cousins, the descendants of the conqueror's second son Chaghadai, were for the most part deprived of their possessions and suffered exile or death.[1] By this means Möngke's supremacy in the eastern half of the empire was assured. In the west the power of the 'Golden Horde,' ruled by the house of Jochi, Chinggis Khan's firstborn son, was if anything enhanced: the chief of this branch, Batu, to whose support Möngke owed his election, exercised with the new Qa'an a sort of *condominium*, as may be seen from the narrative of the Franciscan William of Rubruck, who visited both princes in the course of his mission of 1253–5.[2]

Möngke followed the practice of his predecessors in launching a series of fresh military campaigns against those regions of Asia

[1] On the attempt by Ögedei's family to recover power, and on their fate, see Sir H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, London 1876–1927 (3 vols in 4 & suppt), I, pp. 170–3; R. Grousset, *L'Empire Mongol (1re phase)*, Paris 1941 (Cavaignac, Histoire du Monde, VIII/3), pp. 306–11; idem, *L'Empire des Steppes*, 4th ed. Paris 1965 [henceforward *Steppes*], pp. 338–41; V. V. Bartol'd, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, 3rd. ed. C. E. Bosworth, London 1968 (Gibb Memorial Series, n. s., V), pp. 478–80.

[2] For Rubruck's testimony, see especially *Turkestan* 1968, p. 480, & Bartol'd, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, trans. V. Minorsky, Leyden 1956–62 (4 vols in 3), I, p. 121.

which remained unconquered. He himself devoted his main energies to continuing the subjugation of China, a process completed only in the reign of his brother Qubilai (1259–1294). Here we are concerned rather with events in Western Asia, where a vast expedition commanded by a third brother, Hülegü, overthrew the Assassins in their mountain strongholds south of the Caspian (1255–6), sacked Baghdād and murdered the Caliph (1258), and rolled onwards through 'Irāq into Syria. For a time it appeared that the entire Islamic world would succumb to this threat; then events further east supervened.

Within a space of three years, the Mongol empire was torn apart by two major wars between members of the imperial family. Möngke's death while besieging a fortress in China in 1259 unleashed a struggle for the succession on the part of Qubilai and Tolui's fourth son, Arigh-böke, of whom the former was victorious only after a five years' war which spread from Mongolia into Central Asia.[3] At the same time the new Mongol power in Iran clashed with its neighbours beyond the Caucasus, the Golden Horde, now ruled by Batu's brother, the Muslim convert Berke (1261). The rivalry of these two westernmost divisions of the empire was to last, with intervals, for almost a century. Its effect on the Mongol advance in the Near East, which had already been checked by the Mamlūk rulers of Egypt in two engagements, at 'Ain Jālūt and at Ḥimṣ, in 1260, was profound. Hülegü had withdrawn eastwards with the bulk of his army in order, presumably, to keep watch on the succession dispute in Mongolia, and these reverses were inflicted on the greatly depleted Mongol forces left in Syria and Palestine. In view of the threat from the Golden Horde, neither he nor the later monarchs of the dynasty he founded in Iran (the 'Īlkhāns') were ever able to concentrate their efforts on the overthrow of the Mamlūks, with whom Berke soon made an alliance (1263).

The following study is an attempt to explain the halting of the Mongol advance around 1260–2 in terms of the history of the Mongols over the preceding decades. If we are to seek causes for the loss of momentum in the Mongol assault on the Islamic world, still reeling from the destruction of the Caliphate, we must look rather at circumstances within the empire than at local military factors

---

[3] See Howorth, I, pp. 216–22; *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 317–24; *Steppes*, pp. 352–3; *Four Studies*, I, pp. 122–3.

such as the reverses in Syria.[4] The two civil wars I have mentioned were, each in its own way, decisive events in the history of the Near East and of Islam. Yet the exact connection between them, and their own relationship to the previous growth of the Mongol empire, stand in need of some elucidation.

I

Secondary authorities for the history of the Mongols in the west have relied most heavily on two of our Persian sources, the *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā* of 'Alā' al-dīn 'Atā Malik b. Bahā' al-dīn Muḥammad al-Juwainī (b. 623/1226, d. 681/1283) and the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-dīn Faḍl-allāh b. 'Imād al-dawla Abi'l-Khair al-Hamadānī (b. ca. 645/1247–8, d. 718/1318). Both these works were composed under the Īlkhāns by persons who ranked high among their administrative agents.[5] We possess no source originating from the territories of the Golden Horde. The Īlkhāns' régime maintained close contacts with the Toluid rulers of China, the victorious Qubilai and his descendants, whose influence is consequently to be discerned not only in the Chinese authorities (chiefly the *Yüan Shih*, the official dynastic history, compiled after the end of Mongol rule in 1368, but from contemporary documents), but also in the Persian accounts of events in the Far East. This is especially relevant, for our purposes, to the succession disputes in Mongolia: we have access to no source which drew its inspiration from the defeated elements in these struggles, whether from Ögedei's family or from Arigh-böke.[6]

---

[4] So runs the more recent verdict on 'Ain Jālūt: see Cl. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades*, Paris 1940, pp. 710–1; Bernard Lewis, art. "Ayn Djālūt' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. H. A. R. Gibb *et al.*, I, Leyden–London 1954–60, pp. 786–7.

[5] For Juwainī, see the introduction to the translation by J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, Manchester 1958 (2 vols), I, pp. xv–xxv: reference will be made occasionally to M. M. Qazwīnī's edition, Leyden–London 1912–37 (3 vols, Gibb Memorial Series, XVI) [hereafter Boyle and Juwainī respectively]. For Rashīd, see Boyle's trans. of part of the work, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, London–New York 1971 [hereafter *Successors*], introd., pp. 3–5.

[6] With the qualified exception of the *Mulḥaqāt al-ṣurāḥ* of Jamāl Qarshī, which was written in the Central Asian dominion founded by Qubilai's great rival Qaidu, but which provides only fragmentary data: extracts ed. Bartol'd in *Turkestan v epokhu mongol'skogo nashestviya*, St. Petersburg 1900 (2 vols), I, pp. 128–52. On this work, cf. *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 51–2.

The pronounced bias of our principal extant sources from within the Mongol empire was noticed by Blochet and by Grousset, though neither proceeded to examine it in detail.[7] This task was left to a more recent scholar, David Ayalon, who has exposed the partisan character of Juwainī and shown how the Mamlūk sources, composed under a régime which was hostile to the Īlkhāns and allied to their enemies the Golden Horde, reflect a totally different bias and supply a much-needed corrective.[8]

Although Ayalon's main concern is with the *Yasa*, or body of Mongol customary law as traditionally codified by Chinggis Khan, he has incidentally revolutionised our approach to the primary sources for the history of the Mongols in general. Juwainī wrote only a few years after Möngke's accession and the execution of most adult members of the lines of Ögedei and Chaghadai: as Ayalon suggests, had the latter been victorious a very different picture of the personalities and the rights involved would have come down to us. But his argument may be extended. Rashīd al-dīn's work, similarly, which is largely based on that of Juwainī for the early period of the Mongol hegemony, dates from a time when the rivalry of the Īlkhāns and the Golden Horde was already of forty years' standing. The Jochids find their only apologists in authors who were not most immediately concerned with Mongol history, namely the historians of Mamlūk Egypt and Syria. Of these, especial mention should be made at this point of Shihāb al-dīn Abu'l-'Abbās Aḥmad Ibn Faḍl-allāh al-'Umarī (b. 700/1301, d. 749/1349), who not only utilised Juwainī but also drew on a number of other sources, including oral information from Persian exiles who had arrived on Mamlūk soil during the upheavals of the 1330's.[9] The same degree of neutrality may be attributed to the Delhi historian Minhāj al-dīn Abū-'Umar 'Uthmān b. Sirāj al-dīn al-Jūzjānī, who wrote his *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* in 658/1260 for a court that was in touch both

---

[7] Edgar Blochet, 'Moufazzal ibn Abil-Fazaïl. Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks' [hereafter *Moufazzal*], i, in *Patrologia Orientalis*, XII, 1919 (pp. 343–550), p. 379, note, where the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh-böke is under discussion; *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 287–9.

[8] D. Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan: a re-examination', B, in *Studia Islamica*, XXXIV, 1971 (pp. 151–80), pp. 152–66.

[9] Ed. & trans. Klaus Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: Al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, Wiesbaden 1968 (Asiatische Forschungen, XXII): for 'Umarī's oral sources, see Lech's introd., pp. 29ff.

with Berke's Central Asian territories and with Hülegü in Iran.[10] Finally, many details not found elsewhere, and which throw fresh light on the quarrels within the imperial family, may be gleaned from non-Islamic sources. The earliest of these is the *Mangḥol un niuca tobca'an (Secret History of the Mongols)*, most of which was written around 1228 but which contains later additions and may have been 'doctored' by the Toluids:[11] and for the greater part the *Secret History* must be regarded as upholding the same tradition as that represented by Juwainī, by Rashīd and by the *Yüan Shih*.[12] Of considerably more value, as we shall see, are the narratives of European visitors to the court of the Great Khans, Carpini (1245–7) and Rubruck (1253–5),[13] and the Armenian historians of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, who were not unduly concerned, it appears, to express the point of view of their suzerain the Ilkhān as against that of other Mongol potentates.[14]

---

[10] References are to 'Abd al-Ḥaiy Ḥabībī's 2nd ed., Kābul 1342–3 sh./1963–4 (2 vols), and to H. G. Raverty's trans., *Ṭabaḳāt-i-Nāṣirī: a general history of the Muḥammadan Dynasties of Asia*, London 1873–81 (Bibliotheca Indica). On Berke's relations with Delhi, see Jean Richard, 'La conversion de Berke et les débuts de l'islamisation de la Horde d'Or', in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXV, 1967 (pp. 173–84), pp. 175 (& n. 4) & 177. Delhi was visited by merchants from Māwarā' al-nahr as well as by official envoys: Jūzjānī, II, p. 215; Raverty, pp. 1287ff. For Hülegü's embassy to Delhi, see Jūzjānī, II, pp. 83–8; Raverty, pp. 856–63, and section VIII below.

[11] See G. Doerfer, 'Zur Datierung der Geheimen Geschichte der Mongolen', in: *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, CXIII, 1963 (pp. 87–111), pp. 108ff.; Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Some Remarks on the Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*', in *MS*, XXIV, 1965 (pp. 185–206), pp. 198ff. References are to the text in transcription of L. Ligeti, *Histoire Secrète des Mongols*, Budapest 1971 (Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae Collecta, I), and the translation by Erich Haenisch, *Die Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, 2nd ed. Leipzig 1948.

[12] Cf. L. Hambis & P. Pelliot, *Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan*, Leyden 1951 (vol. I only), pp. xi–xv, for the probable relationship of this group of sources and the lost Mongol chronicle *Altan Debter*; also *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 565–80.

[13] See generally W. W. Rockhill, *The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World 1253–55*, London 1900 (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, IV), introd., pp. xxii ff. Carpini's *Ystoria Mongalorum* and Rubruck's *Itinerarium* are both edited by Anastasius van den Wyngaert in *Sinica Franciscana, I. Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum Saeculi XIII et XIV*, Quaracchi-Firenze 1929; and a variant account of Carpini's mission was ed. & trans. G. D. Painter, R. A. Skelton *et al.*, *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation*, Newhaven–London 1965 [hereafter *Tartar Relation*].

[14] For the Armenian authors Kirakos (d. 1272), Vardan (d. ca. 1270) and Grigor of Akner (d. 1335), see G. Altunian, *Die Mongolen und ihre Eroberungen in kaukasischen und kleinasiatischen Ländern im XIII. Jahrhundert*,

In the following sections I shall offer certain conclusions of which Ayalon's study stops short; but they will be based, similarly, on a comparison of the data given by the two Iranian authors with these other 'independent' sources, even at the risk of undervaluing Juwainī and Rashīd.

II

The dissensions which tore apart the Mongol empire after the death of Möngke have endowed the era of the first four Great Khans with an appearance of harmony and stability. Hence the orthodox view of these first fifty years or so, as expressed by Grousset: 'Cette phase centralisée de l'empire mongol devait au moins durer jusqu'au décès du grand-khan Mongka en 1259'; and during this period, relations among the princes of the imperial family are supposed to have exhibited the characteristics of a *concordia fratrum*.[15]

This assessment is only partially correct. The Mongol conquests, it is true, were regarded not as the possessions of the Qa'an but as the joint property of the entire family of Chinggis Khan. Nevertheless, this ideal found concrete expression in the granting of local rights to individual princes, who were given not, of course, territorial appanages, but lordship over specified groups among the subject peoples: of such dependants, the skilled craftsmen might well be tied to a particular workshop or arsenal, referred to in the Persian sources by the term *kārkhāna*.[16] Otherwise, the rights enjoyed by the princes appear to have consisted in the receipt of specified revenues or produce in kind: under this form the system survived longest in China, whence Mongol princes resident in Western Asia were still entitled to assignments on certain districts even in the fourteenth century.[17] The concept of the indivisibility of the empire

---

Berlin 1911 (Historische Studien, XCI), pp. 93ff.; Boyle, 'Kirakos of Ganjak on the Mongols', in *CAJ*, VIII, 1963 (pp. 199–214), pp. 199–200.

[15] *L'Empire Mongol*, p. 286.

[16] For references to the *kārkhānahā*, see especially the passages quoted in *Turkestan* 1968, notes 225 (pp. 516–7), 247 & 254 (pp. 518–9). To this category belong also the German captives mentioned by Rubruck (Wyngaert, pp. 224–5; Rockhill, pp. 136–8). Rashīd describes the line of Kölgen, Chinggis Khan's son by a wife of inferior status, as possessing a *kārkhāna* in Tabrīz even in his own day: trans. O. I. Smirnova, *Sbornik lyetopisei*, I/2, Moscow–Leningrad 1952, p. 276.

[17] For examples, see E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern*

was expressed likewise in the composition of the armies detailed to conquer fresh territories – the so-called *tama* system, which has been examined, with particular reference to the Indian borderlands, by Aubin.[18] The prince in command of an expedition was accompanied by relatives drawn from every other branch of the family, each bringing his own contingent. In the case of lesser campaigns, this representative function was performed by commanders *(noyans)* of non-imperial extraction. Campaigns were to be planned at an assembly *(quriltai)* of all the princes, to which the Qa'an was responsible.

There were, however, two tensions inherent from the beginning in the political system bequeathed to his family by Chinggis Khan. Firstly, the requirements of a pastoral society dictated that each prince should enjoy the use of a wide and specific area of territory for grazing his beasts in both summer and winter.[19] The tendency, therefore, was for each complex of herds and of nomadic peoples united in the possession of one prince to acquire a fixed territorial basis. The Mongol term for such an agglomeration – *ulus* – is often applied, *par excellence*, to the largest units, those in the control of Chinggis Khan's four sons by his chief wife and of his younger brothers: this, at any rate, appears to be the meaning of a passage in the *Secret History* which distinguishes between 'the princes who rule a territory' *(ulus medekün kö'üt)* and those who do not.[20] Juwainī defines the respective spheres of influence of Chinggis Khan's sons in terms whose precise significance will emerge later. For the moment it is sufficient to observe that this development was by no means in harmony with the *tama* system: it produced a situation in which a sizeable proportion of the troops quartered within the *ulus* of a particular prince owed allegiance not so much to him as to some external authority, whether the Qa'an or some other relative, with whom he might well be at variance. In other

---

Asiatic Sources, London 1888 (2 vols, Trübner's Oriental Series), II, pp. 11–14.

[18] Jean Aubin, 'L'Ethnogénèse des Qaraunas', in *Turcica*, I, 1969 (pp. 65–94), pp. 74–6 & 78.

[19] Cf. Rubruck's comment on the specification of pasturages for the 'captains': Wyngaert, p. 172; Rockhill, p. 53.

[20] *Secret History*, § 270 (Haenisch, p. 136: 'Die Prinzen Staatsregenten'), in the context of the preparations for the campaign of 1236–42 in Russia and Eastern Europe: the term would appear to have excluded Kölgen (cf. note 16 above), who is known to have participated in this expedition.

words, with the maintenance of the *tama* method of organisation, the occasions for internal conflict were multiplied rather than diminished.

The second source of tension lay in the Turco-Mongol pattern of inheritance. The custom whereby the father's original seat *(ordo)* passed on his death to his youngest son by his chief wife[21] was offset by at least an equal emphasis on seniority. This by no means corresponded to a law of primogeniture in the usual sense. Rather was seniority reckoned in terms of generation – of degrees of descent, that is, from a common ancestor. Only next, among members of the same generation, was the question of strict primogeniture taken into account.[22] Now this pattern should admittedly not be equated with a series of rules; though it tended to strike contemporary observers in their accounts of steppe peoples forcibly enough for them to allude to it in such terms. Even the nomads themselves refer to this preference for the senior over the junior as a custom. So the inscription of the seventh century Turkish potentate Kül-tegin refers to his father's having been succeeded by a younger brother rather than by his son 'in accordance with the custom' *(törüdä üzä)*;[23] and the succession of the Turkish *qaghans* in the sixth and early seventh centuries reflects a considerable attachment to the seniority principle.[24] Nor did this disappear in the later Turkish societies of Western Asia, being attested among both the Pechenegs and the Volga Bulgars.[25] And in the Far East the Khitan, the last steppe

---

[21] Boyle, I, p. 186. Cf. also Rubruck's testimony: Wyngaert, p. 185; Rockhill, p. 78. For further references, see B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, trans. M. Carsow, Paris 1948 (Annales du Musée Guimet, LII), pp. 60 & 66–7.

[22] See, by way of introduction, Kaare Grønbech, 'The turkish System of Kinship', in *Studia Orientalia Ioanni Pedersen . . . dicata*, Hauniae 1953 (pp. 124–9), p. 128: 'We must think of the Turkish generations not as horizontal and absolute, but as vertical and relative'.

[23] T. Tekin, *A grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, Bloomington 1968 (Indiana Univ. Publs. Uralic and Altaic Series), p. 234 (E 16: line 4): Tekin's translation (p. 266) of *törü* as 'state rules' is a trifle strong.

[24] Cf. L. N. Gumilev, 'Udyel'no-lyestvichnaya sistema u Tyurok v VI–VIII vyekakh', in *Sovyetskaya Etnografiya*, 1959, 3 (pp. 11–25), table p. 14. Later (p. 16) he quotes the statement attributed to the future *qaghan* *Chulohu in the *Sui-shu* that since the accession of *Moghan in 553 younger sons had been preferred to older and illegitimate to legitimate and hence the custom of his forefathers had been neglected: cf. Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe)*, Wiesbaden 1958 (1 vol. in 2. Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, X), p. 54.

[25] On the Pechenegs, see Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando*

people to rule both North China and large tracts of Mongolia prior to the advent of Chinggis Khan himself, observed the same custom of inheritance, at least until their conquest of the Middle Kingdom.[26]

It would, of course, be foolish to extrapolate from these scattered references to quite distinct nomadic peoples across the breadth of Asia the presence of a similar principle in the Mongol polity; but in fact the evidence for its existence there too is considerable. Chaghadai's *ulus* provides a whole series of examples,[27] though it appears that the claims of seniority were undermined more swiftly in those Mongol states which arose in areas of traditionally sedentary culture, China and Iran, where a different practice obtained.[28] This pattern

imperio, ed. Gy. Moravcsik & trans. R. J. H. Jenkins, Washington 1967 (Dumbarton Oaks Texts), text p. 166, tr. p. 167, where the succession is seen as passing not from father to son or even among brothers, but collaterally among different branches ('cousin' is a more reasonable translation of ἐξάδελφος than 'nephew' as adopted by earlier scholars). On the Volga Bulgars, cf. A. Z. V. Togan, *Ibn Faḍlān's Reisebericht*, Leipzig 1939 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXIV/3), text pp. 28–9 *(wa idhā māta minhum al-raǰul warithahu akhūhu dūna waladihi)*, tr. p. 64.

[26] K. A. Wittfogel & Fêng Chia-shêng, *History of Chinese Society. Liao 907–1125*, New York 1949 (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, XXXVI), pp. 398–400, for the pattern of succession among the chiefs of the I–la tribe down to the foundation of the Liao dynasty by A-pao-chi; pp. 401ff. for events thereafter.

[27] On his accession as Great Khan in 1246 Güyüg replaced Qara Hülegü, Chaghadai's grandson and successor (by Chaghadai's own will), with his uncle Yesü-möngke (Boyle, I, p. 255). Qara Hülegü was restored on the accession of Möngke Qa'an, but soon died. His son Mubārak-shāh's claim to succeed was first set aside for the benefit of his father's cousin Alghu, and later contested by Baraq, whose father was Qara Hülegü's elder brother (cf. his words in Rashīd: *Successors*, p. 265). When Baraq died, his son Du'a had to wait through the reigns of two more khans, both senior to him, before ascending the throne himself (ibid., p. 154). Du'a's sons succeeded each other in turn during the period 1307–ca. 1335, with the exception of a brief interval in which, again, the throne passed to a senior relative: see *Four Studies*, I, pp. 127–35.

[28] Even in Iran, however, it had its adherents: witness the success of Tegüder-Aḥmad's candidature in 1282 and of Gaikhatu's in 1291, and the number of plots against Rashīd's patron Ghazan (1295–1304) by, or on behalf of, senior representatives of collateral branches (*Cambridge History of Iran*, V, ed. Boyle, Cambridge 1968, pp. 364, 372, 381 & 385). Rashīd's silence on the brief reign of Baidu in 1295 strongly suggests that as a grandson of Hülegü his claim was superior to that of Ghazan, a great-grandson.
'Umarī's assertion that Mongol law as a whole was more regularly observed by the Chaghadayids and in the Qa'an's dominions than in the west (Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*, text p. 41:1–9, tr. pp. 118–9) may rest simply on the fact that he had access to more information on the two nearer *ulus*. Certainly the seniority principle was adhered to more closely in the Golden Horde in the last decades of the 13th century.

of inheritance was in part grasped during the last century by Howorth,[29] whose insights were nevertheless dismissed by Bartol'd on the grounds that among the nomads 'there can be no question of a regular order of succession ...'.[30] Yet it was the Russian scholar who was further from the truth. The Mongols were extremely sensitive to questions of status and of hierarchy, and matters of precedence frequently gave rise to feuds among them, particularly at their feasts and assemblies. The importance of this sort of etiquette was just one facet of the very great weight attached to the whole issue of seniority, which exerted its most vital political influence in the sphere of inheritance and succession. This will be illustrated as we proceed; for the present one final general observation should be made.

Bartol'd appears subsequently to have modified his verdict, in that he distinguished between the rules for the inheritance of personal property (that is, ultimogeniture) and those determining political primacy;[31] though he still omitted to formulate just what these latter principles were. Nevertheless, in drawing the distinction he was approaching the core of a major problem which beset the empire of Chinggis Khan: the efforts of successive rulers, from the founder himself onwards, to convert the dignity of Great Khan, or that of head of an *ulus*, into personal property, to be bequeathed to a descendant rather than thrown open to election by all the princes and passed to the next most senior member *(aqa)* of the family.[32] Juwainī, it will be seen, gives on occasions some prominence to the seniority factor; Rashīd al-dīn, who wrote at a time when it had long been frequently swept aside, makes no allusion to it at any point where he might thereby seem, even by implication, to challenge the *status quo*.

---

[29] See especially Howorth II/1, p. 105: 'In the East a man's son succeeds ... only when all his brothers are dead'.

[30] *Turkestan* 1968, p. 60.

[31] Ibid., p. 479; this view is expressed in the additional chapter published in English only in 1968 (in Russian: 1963), long after Bartol'd's death.

[32] For the uses of *aqa*, which occurs more often in the sources with the meaning of 'senior relative' than in the sense of 'elder brother' (except when, in conjunction with *ini*, it forms part of a phrase translatable as 'the whole family'), see G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, Wiesbaden 1963–75 (4 vols, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur: Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission, XVI, XIX, XX & XXI), I, pp. 133ff.

III

Events during Chinggis Khan's own lifetime had presaged the dissensions which would follow his death. The conquest of Khwārizm in 617–8/1221 had been impeded by a quarrel between his two elder sons Jochi and Chaghadai,[33] and after the fall of its capital Urgench in that year, they, together with Ögedei, are alleged to have tried to withhold from their father his share of the plunder.[34] The old conqueror's last years were clouded by an estrangement from Jochi, who was to predecease him by a matter of months without any reconciliation having been effected.[35] The Iranian sources give us fewer details of this dispute than does Jūzjānī, who asserts that Chinggis Khan's resentment against his eldest son was fanned by Chaghadai.[36] It is most likely that what underlay Jochi's disturbed relations with his younger brothers was his own questionable legitimacy. He had been born soon after his mother's release from captivity in the hands of Chinggis Khan's enemies the Merkit, and it had always been open to doubt whether he was in fact Chinggis Khan's son. According to Rashīd al-dīn, Jochi had been taunted with the circumstances of his birth by his brothers, excepting Tolui, with whom he remained on good terms.[37] One reason for this harmony is to be found, in all probability, in the fact that Jochi's senior wife, Bek-tutmish Fujin, and Tolui's, Sorqaqtani Beki, were sisters.[38] The alliance, which extended to the children of both princes after their deaths, was to have important political consequences.

The effects of these personal antipathies, as also of the tensions which we noticed earlier, are visible from the moment of Chinggis

---

[33] The quarrel is mentioned only by Rashīd (*Sbornik*, I/2, p. 216; *Successors*, pp. 118 & 146–7) and by the anonymous work represented in Bodleian MS Th. Hyde 31 (Sachau & Ethé, *Catalogue*, no. 144), foll. 112r:9–112v:1. On this work, cf. *Turkestan* 1968, p. 55, n. 4: it appears, in fact, to be based mainly on Juwainī, but the author has adopted a more rational arrangement of the material, which he supplements with details not found elsewhere. Juwainī himself makes no reference to the dispute (Boyle, I, pp. 124–8).

[34] *Secret History*, § 260 (Haenisch, pp. 130–1); quoted by Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', B, pp. 175–6.

[35] The estrangement is described, again, by Rashīd alone (*Successors*, pp. 118–9). Juwainī's brief reference to Jochi in these last years (Boyle, I, pp. 139–40) gives an exactly contrary impression.

[36] Jūzjānī, II, pp. 150 & 168; Raverty, pp. 1101 & 1146.

[37] *Successors*, pp. 97–8; and cf. n. 8 ibid. for references to the *Secret History*.

[38] Ibid., p. 99: they were Kereyit princesses.

Khan's death in 1227. They are to be seen most clearly in the years of interregnum in the office of Great Khan, which together account for almost one-third of the total period between this date and the end of Möngke's reign (1227–1259).[39]

Chinggis Khan willed his throne to Ögedei, his third son, ignoring the claims both of Tolui, the heir to his father's homeland, and of his own youngest brother, Temüge Ot-chigin,[40] who on the basis of the seniority principle was best qualified to succeed. Two years elapsed before the new sovereign could be elected. During this period, Tolui, by virtue of his status, exercised supreme authority as Regent. Juwainī and Rashīd portray him as working steadfastly for Ögedei's accession,[41] but according to Chinese sources the Regent was unwilling at first to summon a *quriltai* and yielded only to pressure from Chinggis Khan's chief minister Ye-liu ch'u-ts'ai.[42] When Ögedei was finally elected in 1229, one of the first problems confronting him was the dispute over a plundering expedition despatched by Tolui during the interregnum – and therefore without authorisation by all the princes. He settled it in his customarily mild fashion, promulgating an edict *(yasa)* by which past offences were pardoned and forgotten.[43]

Ögedei's reign (1229–1241) is represented universally by the sources as mild and beneficient. That his rule, however, was also firm, and in accordance with principles of justice, may be seen from his method of dealing with the one dispute in the imperial family which is known to have occurred in his time, and to which we shall return shortly.[44] After his death, and during the regency of his chief

---

[39] The years of interregnum were: 1227–9, 1241–6 & 1248–51. Cf. Ayalon's comments: 'The Great Yāsa', B, p. 163.

[40] For *ot-chigin* ('hearth-prince'), see Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, I, pp. 155–9 (no. 38).

[41] Boyle, II, p. 549; *Successors*, p. 166.

[42] *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 286–7; *Turkestan* 1968, p. 463.

[43] *Successors*, pp. 32–3. The corresponding passage in Juwainī (Boyle, I, pp. 189–90) mentions only the *yasa* without the particular dispute. Hence Rashīd alone refers to this campaign in 'Qūnqān' (otherwise unknown), which was sent by 'the princes and *amīrs* who had remained in the *ordo* of Chinggis Khan': if this is not a veiled reference to Tolui alone, then it must surely include him, as the foremost among them.

[44] See, on Ögedei's reign, *Turkestan* 1968, p. 464. The Qa'an certainly did over-reach himself on occasions: cf. Rashīd's story of his misappropriating two 'thousands' of troops which belonged to Sorqaqtani and her sons and giving them to his own son Köten: *Sbornik*, I/2, p. 278; *Successors*, pp. 169–70 (the details vary slightly).

wife, Töregene, the tensions among the princes were expressed more openly, it seems, than in the previous interregnum. According to Rashīd, the Qa'an had designated as his heir his grandson Shiremün;[45] but the young prince's claims appear to have won very little consideration. The first to make a bid for the throne was Temüge Otchigin, who gathered troops and attempted to take it by force. He was beguiled by Töregene into abandoning this plan, and was later seized, tried secretly, and executed, not long before the arrival in Mongolia of Carpini and the enthronement of Ögedei's eldest son Güyüg (1246).[46]

In so far as we are told much about Ot-chigin's attempted coup, we learn it mainly from Rashīd al-dīn. Juwainī makes only three obscure references to it;[47] and indeed, in view of his total silence concerning previous discord within the imperial line, such embarrassment is merely what we should expect. It is most prominent in the manner in which he treats of the rivalry between Güyüg and Batu.

Güyüg took part in the expedition of 1236–1242 in Russia and the Qipchaq steppe, under Batu's command, and returned to the east after his father's death. According to the *Secret History*, the two princes quarrelled during the campaign, and Güyüg left without Batu's permission – an act of insubordination for which he was severely reprimanded by Ögedei and sent back to be disciplined.[48]

---

[45] Shiremün is asserted to have been Ögedei's heir by Rashīd (*Successors*, pp. 19, 120, 180 & 201), and he is described in the *Yüan Shih* as *t'ai-tseu* ('prince imperial'), a title reserved for the heir-apparent: L. Hambis & P. Pelliot, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, Leyden 1945 (T'oung Pao, XXXVIII, Suppt), p. 76. But Juwainī, significantly, states merely that a party favoured him (Boyle, I, p. 251). Even Shiremün's genealogy is uncertain. Carpini lists him among Ögedei's sons (Wyngaert, p. 65), and Rashīd al-dīn, in his *Shu'ab-i panjgāna*, MS Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III, 2937, fol. 124v, gives a Shiremün as the Qa'an's fifth son as well as (fol. 125v) naming the grandson: on this work, the third volume in the later arrangement of the *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, cf. Togan in *CAJ*, VII, 1962, p. 68, & Karl Jahn in *CAJ*, IX, 1964, pp. 116 & 119.

[46] *Successors*, pp. 178 & 182. Carpini likewise refers to his attempted coup, though not mentioning him by name (Wyngaert, p. 64): 'Unum [*sc.* statutum] est quod quicumque in superbiam erectus, propria auctoritate sine electionem principum, voluerit esse Imperator, sine ulla miseratione debet occidi. Unde ante electionem Cuyuccan propter hoc unus de principibus, nepos ipsius Chingiscan fuit occisus. Volebat enim sine electione regnare'.

[47] Boyle, I, pp. 244, 248 & 255.

[48] *Secret History*, §§ 275–277 (Haenisch, pp. 139–41). This account serves to explain the self-contradictory data in Rashīd, who says at one stage (*Successors*, pp. 61 & 69) that Güyüg's return antedated his father's death, since he left the Qipchaq steppe in the autumn of the year of the Rat/637/1240 and

It is clear from this account that the dispute had arisen over the issue of precedence at a feast: over the question, that is, who should drink first from the cup. Güyüg, as the Qa'an's eldest son, must have resented being subordinated to Batu. But the words attributed to their cousin, Chaghadai's eldest son Büri,[49] who similarly deserted the army after insulting Batu, suggest that the quarrel was over Batu's right to command at all and involved the usual aspersions on his father Jochi's legitimacy. Possibly also this would explain why Batu, who with the death of Chaghadai in 1242 became senior of all the princes of the 'right hand',[50] was not elected Great Khan in 1246.

Juwainī says nothing of this, and glides very swiftly over Batu's failure either to participate in Güyüg's election or to attend his enthronement.[51] That the old grudge still rankled, however, is evident from the fuller version of Rashīd al-dīn, who ascribes the postponement of the *quriltai* for three years to Batu's tactics, and says that he was 'apprehensive because of the alarming nature of the past events'.[52]

---

arrived back in that of the Ox/638/1241 (Ögedei died on 5 jumādā II 639/11 Dec. 1241), but who in his chapter on Güyüg (*Successors*, pp. 176, 178 & 180) follows Juwainī (Boyle, I, pp. 240, 244 & 248). Güyüg's earlier return would then represent his desertion as recorded in the *Secret History*. Cf. also *Tartar Relation*, p. 81, for the report that Güyüg left Batu's army secretly on learning of Ögedei's demise: Painter (ibid., p. 80, ¶ 26, n. 2) assumes this to be incorrect on the grounds that Güyüg returned only once, *before* his father's death.

[49] So described in the *Secret History*, § 270 (Haenisch, p. 137). Later sources, following Rashīd (e.g. *Successors*, p. 138; *Shu'ab-i panjgāna*, fol. 118v), make Büri Chaghadai's grandson, but he is similarly called his son by Carpini: Wyngaert, p. 66 ('Filii Chyaaday sunt: Burim, Cadan'; cf. p. 114: '... duces Burin et Cadan, qui sunt fratres carnales'). Carpini's editors have generally pointed to this as an error, as also to the fact that Qadan was a son of Ögedei; but the Franciscan is otherwise remarkably well informed on the names of members of the imperial house and on their relationship one to another. Moreover, he is the only other contemporary authority to give Büri's genealogy (Juwainī nowhere does so). It may well be that Büri's senior rank was deliberately obscured after his execution by Batu in 1252. Cf. note 45; and for another example of such tampering with genealogies, Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*, Paris 1949 [hereafter *Horde d'Or*], pp. 37 & 44, n. 1. 'Cadan' may in this instance be a son of Chaghadai also, the prince called by Rashīd Qadaqai (*Successors*, pp. 135 & 144).

[50] That is, of the descendants of Chinggis Khan himself; those of his brothers were 'princes of the left hand'. On Batu's status, see further note 68.

[51] Boyle, I, p. 249.

[52] *Successors*, p. 120, where Batu is said to have been on the point of setting out when the *quriltai* was actually convened; cf. also p. 180. The interregnum lasted in fact for more than three years: 1241–1246.

Once established on the throne, Güyüg prepared to overthrow his old enemy. An army was sent west under the general Eljigidei, whose instructions, according to Juwainī, were to reduce the still independent territories in Iran and the west, beginning with the Assassins: significantly, he was given charge particularly of Anatolia, Georgia and Aleppo 'that no one else might interfere with them'.[53] The Mamlūk writer 'Umarī, who made good use of Juwainī's work, gives here a fuller picture. He tells us that Eljigidei was ordered to arrest Batu's lieutenants in the Caucasus.[54] 'Umarī further states that at the time of his death Güyüg himself was moving west with a considerable army to attack his rival;[55] and we find confirmation of this in our European sources. Before Carpini's party left Russia on their return journey, says the author of the *Tartar Relation*, they heard that Batu was moving east against Güyüg and that a great quarrel had broken out between the two princes.[56] William of Rubruck, who – understandably, since he passed through Asia during the era of Batu's hegemony – was able to learn 'nothing definite' concerning Güyüg's death, confirms that hostilities had been imminent, and mentions the two rumours that have reached him: that Güyüg had been poisoned by Batu's agents, and that he had engaged in a drunken brawl with Batu's brother Shiban in which both were killed.[57]

It is evident, therefore, that Güyüg's death averted a major war in Central Asia in 1248. Even Rashīd al-dīn goes so far as to say that Sorqaqtani Beki, Tolui's widow and the mother of the future Qa'an Möngke, suspected that Güyüg was moving against Batu and

---

[53] Boyle, I, pp. 256–7.

[54] Lech, text pp. 15:17–16:7, trans. pp. 100–1.

[55] Ibid., text p. 16:8–10, tr. p. 101. 'Umarī mistakenly places Güyüg's own move westwards after Eljigidei's arrest by Batu's officers and his execution in Batu's *ordo*; but Juwainī (Boyle, II, p. 590) says he was executed only in the reign of Möngke. Güyüg began to move west in the autumn of 1247 according to Chinese sources: see Pelliot, 'Les Mongols et la Papauté' [hereafter *Papauté*], iii, in *ROC*, XXVIII, 1931–2 (pp. 3–84), p. 57. Eljigidei had reached the Caucasus in July: *Papauté*, ii, in *ROC*, XXIV, 1924 (pp. 225–335), pp. 313–4.

[56] *Tartar Relation*, p. 83, ¶ 30. This detail is not found in the other two versions of Carpini's mission.

[57] Wyngaert, p. 241; Rockhill, p. 163. From Rubruck's account, it is clear that the alleged quarrel between Güyüg and Shiban was once again over the question of precedence in drinking from the cup: as a son of Jochi, Shiban was, like Batu, the Great Khan's *aqa*. On the form of the name, cf. *Horde d'Or*, pp. 44–7.

wrote to the latter to warn him.[58] But at this point Juwainī's reticence assumes absurd proportions. Not only does he say nothing of Güyüg's real intention or of Sorqaqtani's message, but he claims simply that Batu was on his way to court at Güyüg's request when he heard of the Great Khan's death.[59] In view of Juwainī's close ties with the Mongol administration, it is inconceivable that he should have been merely ignorant of the true facts. We must suspect him rather of concealing the truth in order to whitewash not only Sorqaqtani but Batu also. When the *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā* was written, Batu, to whom Möngke Qa'an owed his throne, had been dead for some years, but the relations of Juwainī's patron, Möngke's brother Hülegü, with the Jochid princes were still outwardly friendly.[60] Juwainī consequently felt obliged to suppress any unfavourable mention of Batu by name. Nevertheless, his work contains a number of references suggesting that Batu had epitomised that lawlessness among the princes which Juwainī everywhere condemns.

According to Juwainī, the only members of the imperial family found, on Güyüg's accession, not to have encroached upon the Great Khan's prerogatives since the death of Ögedei were Sorqaqtani and her sons.[61] Thus Batu is by implication accused of this infringement of the *Yasa*; and in a different context Juwainī does mention his extraordinary liberality in the issue of patents of authority *(yarlighs)* and of assignments of revenue.[62] Such a threat to the imperial power in Western Asia afforded Güyüg the pretext he required for moving against his rival; and at the time his action must have seemed, to some at least, to be justified. What view Sorqaqtani and her sons held privately is open to question. Juwainī depicts them as

---

[58] *Successors*, pp. 120, 170 & 185.

[59] Boyle, I, p. 267; on Güyüg's death, cf. also pp. 260–1, where Batu is not mentioned at all, & II, p. 557.

[60] Or if they were no longer, Juwainī chooses not to say so. It is significant that for all the praise he lavishes on his infidel patrons (Möngke's favour towards Islam being especially commended: see Boyle, I, p. xxiii), he nowhere mentions explicitly that the other chief Mongol prince, Hülegü's later enemy Berke, khan of the Golden Horde, had actually become a Muslim. Instead, he contents himself with vague references to the conversion of a number of Chinggis Khan's descendants (Boyle, I, pp. 16 & 26), and with the unobtrusive statement that at Möngke's enthronement the Muslim slaughter-ritual was observed in view of Berke's presence (ibid., II, p. 573).

[61] Boyle, I, pp. 243–4 & 255–6, & II, pp. 551–2.

[62] Ibid., I, p. 267: Juwainī is here stressing Batu's generous character.

having supported Güyüg's election,[63] and the princess's warning to Batu probably represents a timely *volte-face*. Juwainī's total failure to mention the confrontation of 1248 may further be attributed to the same factor which underlies his silence on earlier disputes within the imperial family. He clearly saw it as one of his tasks to highlight the spirit of unity which bound together the Mongol princes in contrast with the rulers of former great empires.[64] He could hardly reveal, therefore, that Sorqaqtani, to whom he devotes such high praise, and Batu, who had placed her son on the throne, had collaborated against a sovereign who was endeavouring to reassert the central authority through which alone that unity could be maintained.[65]

Nor do the new allies' subsequent actions show them in a more favourable light. Later authors refer to a tradition that the *quriltai* of 1246 had promised to keep the dignity of Great Khan in Güyüg's line.[66] Juwainī again makes no mention of this, but according to Rashīd the transfer of the Great Khanate now from Ögedei's family to Möngke was justified on the dubious grounds that Ögedei's will had already been contravened by his family a few years previously with the election of Güyüg in place of Shiremün.[67] The circumstances of Möngke's own election, however, suggest that there was some truth underlying the claims of Ögedei's family to retain the dignity of Great Khan. Custom demanded that the *quriltai* be held in the

---

[63] Ibid., p. 251. Cf. the corresponding passage in Rashīd al-dīn (*Successors*, p. 181), where Sorqaqtani and her sons are not mentioned as favouring Güyüg.

[64] Boyle, I, pp. 41–2 & 43, & II, pp. 593–4.

[65] Ayalon's judgment of Güyüg as a 'weak ruler' ('The Great Yāsa', B, p. 163) is a trifle hasty: Güyüg has in fact suffered far more than have even the Jochids, through having no apologist whatsoever. But cf. Grousset's more favourable verdict: *L'Empire Mongol*, p. 305.

[66] So according to Rashīd: *Successors*, pp. 181–2 & n. 18 (cf. also p. 215). Waṣṣāf too mentions the tradition that Ögedei's descendants were to retain the dignity of Great Khan so long as a single member should survive: it was employed by Qaidu as part of his propaganda in the 1260's when setting himself up in opposition to Qubilai; Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa tazjiyat al-a'ṣār*, lithog. ed. Bombay 1269/1853, p. 66:20–24; J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte Wassaf's*, Vienna 1856 (vol. I only), text pp. 132–3, tr. p. 126.

[67] *Successors*, pp. 121 & 201. In Rashīd's history of the tribes, the *noyan* Elchidei, a supporter of Ögedei's line, is said to have been silenced by Möngke's brother Qubilai with the use of this argument: ed. A. A. Khetagurov, Moscow 1968, pp. 140–1; trans. idem, *Sbornik lyetopisei*, I/1, Moscow–Leningrad 1952, pp. 95–6.

Mongol homeland on the Onan and Kerülen rivers, but Batu, whose right as *aqa* to convene the assembly appears to have been universally recognised, first summoned the princes to a gathering within the territory of the Jochids, in present-day Kazakhstān.[68] Shiremün and other members of Ögedei's family sent an envoy named Qonqurtaqai with instructions to abide by Batu's decision; while Güyüg's sons, Qucha (Khoja, Qocho) and Naqu, who were the first princes to arrive in person, left after a day or two, but appointed Temür Noyan as their representative, ordering him similarly to consent to any agreement reached.[69] We may infer from this both that Shiremün was confident of his own election from the outset, and that Naqu, who had been heir-apparent in his father's lifetime,[70] secured some sort of understanding from Batu that he, rather than Shiremün, would be proclaimed Qa'an. That these two grandsons of

---

[68] For the secondary authorities on the events of 1248–52, see the references in note 1 above. Juwainī says that this first assembly was held at Ala-Qamaq (Boyle, I, pp. 263–4 & n. 3 on p. 263, & II, pp. 557ff.), a week's distance from Qayaligh. Jamāl Qarshī says that Batu enthroned Möngke in the environs of Qayaligh in ṣafar 648/May 1250 (though erroneously placing this after the overthrow of Ögedei's line): *Turkestan* 1900, I, p. 137:1–5.

Batu's status as *aqa*, though well attested, is difficult to explain. He was Jochi's second son, and had succeeded his father as head of his *ulus* in place of the eldest, Orda (*Successors*, pp. 99–100 & 107). This is explicable on either of two grounds: Orda's mother may have lost her rank as chief wife after his birth; or he may have been her only son and so assumed the rights of the hearth-child rather than of the firstborn. The latter hypothesis is supported by the following facts: (1) Orda's *ulus* was plainly the kernel of Jochi's domain, and of all his sons' territories was most remote from its external frontier (i.e., the west); (2) he headed, within Jochi's *ulus*, the princes of 'the left hand', Batu commanding those of the right (cf. the position of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers); and (3) later authorities give him the surname *ejen* ('master'), usually reserved for the hearth-child (Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social*, pp. 60 & 67), though Pelliot assumes he bore it because he was the eldest (*Horde d'Or*, pp. 32–3). The whole question is obscure, but in any case Orda was probably dead by this time, since it appears that his son Qongqiran, who is known to have succeeded him (*Successors*, p. 105), was then ruling his *ulus* (Boyle, II, p. 585).

[69] Boyle, I, p. 264, & II, pp. 557–8. Rashīd conflates these details, making both Qonqurtaqai and Temür represent Güyüg's sons, who allegedly failed to attend at all (*Successors*, p. 200). Elsewhere (p. 170) he mentions that Batu was first summoned to a *quriltai* by Ögedei's family, who wanted Shiremün as Qa'an, but declined and demanded a meeting closer at hand because of his gout.

[70] He is described as *t'ai-tseu* by the *Yüan Shih*: Hambis & Pelliot, *Le Chapitre CVII*, p. 85 (cf. note 45 above). Naqu was of course Güyüg's hearth-child, the younger of the two sons of his chief wife, the then Regent Oghul-Qaimish (*Successors*, pp. 20 & 175).

Ögedei were rivals at this stage is suggested by Juwainī's hint of a reconciliation between them after the illegal *quriltai* had announced Möngke's election.[71] The news came to both as a total shock – witness the vigour of their protests[72] – and drove them into an alliance.

When Möngke had been offered the imperial throne by a rump assembly consisting of the Jochids, his own brothers, and a handful of junior princes of the lines of Chaghadai and Ögedei,[73] he returned to Mongolia, according to Rashīd, with a large armed escort commanded by Batu's brothers Berke and Toqa-temür.[74] Fresh invitations were now sent out to all the princes, summoning them to an official *quriltai* on the Kerülen. The rival party, headed by Shiremün, the sons of Güyüg, and the head of Chaghadai's *ulus*, his son Yesümöngke, now adopted tactics reminiscent of Batu's prior to 1246. They prevaricated, and in this manner delayed any final settlement, it appears, for at least a year and a half. Eventually Batu lost patience: orders were sent to Berke to proceed with the enthronement and to meet all opposition with force. On 9 rabī' II 649/1 July 1251 Möngke was officially raised up as Qa'an.[75]

There followed the bloodiest struggle within the imperial family

---

[71] Boyle, II, p. 566. Rashīd omits this detail in the corresponding passage (*Successors*, p. 204).

[72] Boyle, I, p. 265, & II, p. 562; *Successors*, p. 203.

[73] It is significant that those members of the branches of Chaghadai and Ögedei who did support Möngke were mostly 'have-nots' who had everything to gain by the downfall of their seniors. Juwainī mentions among those who participated in the second *quriltai* (Boyle, II, pp. 558 & 573) Qadaghan (Qadan) and Melik, who were both sons of Ögedei by a concubine and hence inferior in status (*Successors*, pp. 27 & 28); Mochi, who was Chaghadai's eldest son but by a concubine (ibid., p. 136); and Qara Hülegü, Chaghadai's grandson and successor, who had been deposed in Yesü-möngke's favour by Güyüg (cf. note 27 above). There remains the family of Ögedei's son by his chief wife, Köten (Boyle, II, p. 568), who are said by Rashīd, however, to have been on particularly good terms with the Toluids (*Sbornik*, I/2, p. 278; *Successors*, pp. 21 & 170).

[74] *Successors*, pp. 202–3. Elsewhere (p. 121) Rashīd speaks of this force as numbering 3 *tümens* (30,000) and commanded by Berke and Sartaq, Batu's son. Juwainī (Boyle, II, p. 563) mentions Berke and Toqa-temür simply as Batu's representatives, without any escort. 'Umarī names Berke alone and sets the escort at 100,000 (Lech, text p. 16:14–16, trans. p. 101).

[75] Boyle, II, pp. 567–8. Rashīd (*Successors*, p. 205) gives the year only in the Turco-Mongol animal cycle, that of the Pig(648–9/1251). From Juwainī's references to successive years or seasons, the interval clearly extended over the years 647–9/1249–51. Rashīd alone mentions Batu's message to Berke (*Successors*, p. 204).

so far. The official version which has come down to us in the works of Juwainī and Rashīd is in part reproduced by Jūzjānī and by William of Rubruck, both of whom, however, were in a position to obtain the story from the victorious party.[76] It runs as follows. In order to recover power, Shiremün, Naqu and other princes conspired to surprise Möngke and his adherents with an armed force while they were still busy with the celebrations which followed the enthronement. One of Möngke's falconers, however, came by chance upon the advancing troops, and on discovering their purpose hurried to warn the Qa'an. Möngke was totally unprepared for such treachery and at first disinclined to believe the story; but under pressure from his supporters he agreed to investigate, and an army was sent to forestall the conspirators. They were surrounded and placed in custody. After an inquiry, a number of *noyans* were executed, and the strongest measures taken: an enormous force, numbering – if Juwainī and Rashīd are to be believed – ten *tümens* (100,000), was despatched west to link up with the troops of the Jochid prince Qongqiran, and another moved into the upper Yenisei region, so that a vast hunting-ring *(nerge)* might be formed and gradually tightened around those of the enemy who remained at large. As they arrived, each was immediately placed under arrest. The Chaghadayids Yesü-möngke and Büri were sent to Batu, who executed them both; Güyüg's widow Oghul Qaimish and Shiremün's mother were put to death in Sorqaqtani's *ordo*. With the exception of Qucha, who had made a timely submission on the advice of one of his wives and who was now granted a pasturage near the river Selenga, the conspirators were exiled by being sent with the army during the subsequent campaign in China. We know, however, that at least two – Shiremün and a Chaghadayid prince, Qadaqchi – died shortly afterwards, the former on Möngke's orders; and of the remaining exiles nothing further is heard. Their young sons were to participate in the conflict between Möngke's brothers a decade later.[77] Of the victors, Ögedei's sons Qadan and Melik were rewarded

[76] Jūzjānī could have picked up this story either from Berke's embassy to Delhi or from Hülegü's envoys, who similarly arrived in 658/1260 (see note 10 above).

[77] For the official version, see Boyle, II, pp. 573–92, & *Successors*, pp. 207–16, and cf. Rubruck's account (Wyngaert, pp. 241–2; Rockhill, pp. 163–4) and Jūzjānī (II, pp. 179–80; Raverty, pp. 1182–6). Rashīd sets the number of *noyans* executed at 77 (*Successors*, p. 212), Rubruck at 300. They included Eljigidei (Boyle, II, p. 590) and his sons (*Successors*, pp. 212–3), of whom

for their support, while Chaghadai's grandson Qara Hülegü replaced Yesü-möngke as the head of his *ulus*. But even he failed to reap the full profit, dying en route for Turkistān in obscure circumstances: the guardianship of his infant son and successor, Mubārak-shāh, a Muslim, was entrusted to his widow Orqina, who – significantly enough – was closely linked by marriage with both the Jochids and the line of Tolui.[78]

There are aspects of the official version of these events which place the reader's credulity under a considerable strain. We are asked to believe, for example, that Möngke's party had taken no precautions and were utterly surprised by the news of the conspiracy, when their own actions had been of the kind precisely to arouse fierce opposition; and Rashīd's details of the large army which escorted the new Qa'an back to Mongolia on Batu's orders reveal that they were far from unprepared for a struggle.[79]

Möngke and his supporters were able to retain their newly won position only by the slaughter of the more senior members of the lines of Chaghadai and Ögedei and by the bestowal of their posses-

---

Harqasun had participated in the Qipchaq campaign of 1236–42 and had insulted Batu (*Secret History*, § 275; Haenisch, p. 140; cf. Boyle, II, p. 587 & n. 117). As regards the fate of Ögedei's descendants, of which the *Yüän Shih* gives a slightly different version from that of Rashīd and Juwainī (see *Papauté*, iii, pp. 65–6), Rubruck reports the execution of both Shiremün and Güyüg's elder son (? Qucha). Rashīd dates the former's murder after Möngke's own arrival in China, i.e. in 1258 (*Successors*, pp. 21–2; for the date, p. 224 & n. 95). The genealogy of Qadaqchi is uncertain (*Turkestan* 1968, pp. 483 & 511, n. 152): it is unlikely that he was Büri's son, called by Rashīd Narin Qadan and clearly a different person (cf. *Successors*, p. 224), and hence he was probably a son of Chaghadai (see note 49 above). Rubruck says that Güyüg's *ordo* was given to his infant son: this was probably not Naqu's son Chabat, as Bartol'd suggested (*Turkestan* 1968, p. 483, calling him 'Qanat'), but Güyüg's son by a concubine, Hoqu, who was living in this region 10 years later (Bretschneider, I, pp. 160–2) and who bore the title of *Ta-ming wang*: Hambis & Pelliot, *Le Chapitre CVIII du Yuan Che*, Leyden 1954 (T'oung Pao Monog. Series, III), p. 108. On him, see *Successors*, pp. 20 & 175.

[78] According to Rashīd, she was the daughter of the Oirat prince Törelchi by Chinggis Khan's daughter Chechegen: one of her sisters, Elchiqmish, married Arigh-böke, and another, Köpek, married Hülegü, in both cases as the chief wife (Khetagurov, pp. 222–5; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 119; Rashīd gives variants, but cf. *Successors*, p. 149). Waṣṣāf says that she had a sister Beki who married Batu (Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 28:18f., trans. pp. 29–30; lithog. ed., p. 14, omits the princess's name). Possibly the resemblance of this name to Sorqaqtani's surname led Jamāl Qarshī to make Orqina a relative of hers also: *Turkestan* 1900, I, p. 137:10–13.

[79] Cf. Ayalon, 'The Great Yasa', B, pp. 161–2.

sions on others who were either of tender years or of inferior status.[80] In this manner was preserved the unity of the empire by which Juwainī sets such store. The Toluid seizure of power, however, was achieved at the price of weakening the Qa'an's authority. Möngke had been offered the throne by Batu, acting as *aqa*, and – it is important to note – only after Batu himself had declined it.[81] It has been suggested that Batu hesitated to assume the sovereignty because of the stigma attached to his father's birth.[82] However this may be, by remaining in the west he appears to have felt he was obtaining the better half of the bargain, as Jūzjānī at least was aware.[83] The elimination of their Chaghadayid rivals led to the extension of Jochid control over Transoxiana (Māwarā' al-nahr) and western Turkistān,[84] so that when Rubruck travelled through Central Asia a few years later he found the Mongol world divided into two great spheres of influence, Möngke's in the east and that of his benefactor in the west. Rubruck's own impression was that Batu's authority, if anything, was greater in the Qa'an's dominions than was Möngke's in the territory of the Jochids.[85] The Franciscan reproduces on more than one occasion Möngke's own words, emphasising the spirit of harmonious coexistence in which he and Batu together ruled their vast empire.[86] The arrangement was

---

[80] See notes 73 & 77. The grim picture of the massacre of the Chaghadayids painted by non-Toluid sources (see *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 483 & 510, notes 150 & 151, and in addition to the authorities there cited, Waṣṣāf, p. 11:22–24; Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 22, tr. p. 24) is possibly exaggerated, but contrasts sharply with the clemency depicted by Juwainī and Rashīd.

[81] Boyle, II, p. 559. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 176:10–14 & 179:3ff.; Raverty, pp. 1172 & 1177–81. Lech, text p. 16:10–13, tr. p. 101. Kirakos, trans. M. F. Brosset, *Deux historiens arméniens, Kirakos de Gantzac, XIIIe s., Histoire d'Arménie, Oukhtanès d'Ourha, Xe s., ...*, St Petersburg 1870 (vol. I only), p. 172; trans. Éd. Dulaurier, 'Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens', i, in *JA*, 5e série, XI, 1858 (pp. 192–255 & 426–508), p. 457. Rashīd, less ready to ascribe the Toluids' assumption of power to Batu's self-denial, in view of their later enmity with Jochi's line, omits this important detail, though mentioning Batu's status as *aqa*: *Successors*, pp. 170 & 200–1 (cf. Boyle, II, pp. 557–8 & 561).

[82] *Steppes*, p. 471.

[83] Jūzjānī, II, p. 179:5ff.; Raverty, pp. 1177–81.

[84] *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 483 & 485.

[85] Wyngaert, p. 225 (Rockhill, p. 138); cf. also p. 314, where Möngke orders his letters to St Louis to be submitted to Batu en route (Rockhill, p. 257: 'if he wished to add, strike out, or alter anything in them, he was to do so').

[86] Wyngaert, pp. 251 & 299 (Rockhill, pp. 174 & 237–8).

destined not long to survive Batu's death, which occurred about 1256.[87]

The distant location of their *ulus* had afforded the Jochids a good deal of practical autonomy, a position which successive intervals in the office of Great Khan had enabled them to consolidate and to which Güyüg's accession was the first challenge. This they had overcome, and in such a way as greatly to increase their power in Western Asia. Nevertheless, the respite they secured in 1251–2 proved comparatively brief. The great expedition which Möngke despatched westwards in 1253 under his brother Hülegü was to develop into the second challenge to the Jochid position, and they were to meet it without success. Before proceeding, however, to the origins of the conflict between Hülegü and the Golden Horde, we must examine the nature of that position, which the inherent bias of our principal sources has contrived to obscure.

IV

The later rulers of the Golden Horde based their aggression against Hülegü's descendants upon a claim to the territories south of the Caucasus, Arrān and Ādharbāījān, in which the Īlkhāns most frequently resided. That these regions had been the subject of negotiations between Batu and Möngke is suggested by a letter from Özbeg, khan of the Golden Horde (1312–1341), to the Īlkhān Öljeitü (1304–1316). Sending an embassy to Iran at the very beginning of his reign, in jumādā II 712/October 1312, Özbeg demanded the cession of 'whatever is ours by right of the *yarligh* of Mengü (Möngke) Qa'an.'[88] Blochet believed this claim to rest on concessions made by Möngke in return for Batu's support in 1252;[89] while other authors

---

[87] On the date of Batu's death, which is incorrectly given as 650/1252–3 by Rashīd (*Successors*, p. 122), see *Horde d'Or*, p. 29. Both Pelliot and B. Spuler (*Die Goldene Horde*, 2nd ed. Wiesbaden 1965, pp. 31–2) opt for 1255. But the Armenian historians Kirakos (Brosset, p. 181; Dulaurier, i, p. 481) and Vardan (trans. Dulaurier, 'Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens', ii, in *JA*, 5e série, XVI, 1860 (pp. 273–322), p. 291) give the year 1256 (705 of the Armenian era), and are supported by Ḥamd-allāh Mustawfī: *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. E. G. Browne, Leyden–London 1910 (Gibb Memorial Series, XIV/1), p. 576:2f. (654/1256–7).

[88] Kāshānī, *Tārīkh-i Uljāītū Sulṭān*, ed. Mahīn Hambly, Ṭehrān 1348 sh./1969, p. 146:11–19.

[89] *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 378, n., & 445, n. 5.

suggested that Arrān and Ādharbāījān had been ceded to Berke, later, as the price of the aid rendered by his troops in Hülegü's conquest of Iran.[90] The evidence favours neither hypothesis, since it is clear elsewhere that the khans of the Golden Horde rested their claims to these territories not merely on some edict dating from the reign of Möngke, but on the will of Chinggis Khan himself.

According to Waṣṣāf, Özbeg's predecessor Toqto'a (Toqta) had sent a mission in 702/1302–3 to the Īlkhān Ghazan, claiming that Arrān and Ādharbāījān belonged to Batu's line by virtue of Chinggis Khan's own division of the empire.[91] In an earlier part of his work, Waṣṣāf goes into the history of this dispute between the two Mongol powers. Jochi, he tells us, had been allotted the territory as far as Derbend, and his descendants, who wintered beyond Derbend, had from time to time made inroads from that region into Arrān: hence they used to claim that Arrān and Ādharbāījān likewise formed part of their dominions.[92] Now Waṣṣāf was writing under the Īlkhāns, and was doubtless obliged to exercise caution in his treatment of a delicate subject such as this; but his account reveals far more than the official chronicle of Rashīd al-dīn, who makes only the briefest mention of the embassy of 1302–3 and says nothing whatever about its purpose.[93] Moreover, the details in Waṣṣāf harmonise strikingly with the testimony of an independent authority, the Mamlūk writer 'Umarī, who informs us that Chinggis Khan had bestowed on Jochi 'the Qipchaq steppe and its appurtenances *(dasht al-qibjāq wa mā ma'ahu)*, and added to it Arrān, Tabrīz, Hamadān and Marāgha.'[94]

That 'Umarī's statement is well grounded emerges from what we know of Chinggis Khan's territorial dispositions as a whole. According to Juwainī, Jochi received the territory stretching 'from the borders *(ḥudūd)* of Qayaligh and Khwārizm to the remotest parts of Saqsīn and Bulghār and from that side *(az ān jānib)* as far as the

---

[90] B. Grekov & A. Yakubovskiy, *La Horde d'Or*, trans. F. Thuret, Paris 1939, p. 76.

[91] Waṣṣāf, p. 398:13ff.

[92] Ibid., p. 50:4–7 (Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 96:13–16, tr. p. 93).

[93] Ed. A. A. Alizade & trans. A. K. Arends, *Dzhami-at-Tavarikh*, III, Baku 1957, text p. 352, tr. p. 197; ed. K. Jahn, *Geschichte Ġāzān Ḫān's*, London 1940 (Gibb Memorial Series, n.s., XIV), p. 143. Rashīd dates the embassy in jumādā II 702/January 1303.

[94] Lech, text p. 15:9f., tr. p. 100: 'Umarī is here citing Shams al-dīn al-Iṣfahānī, on whom see Lech's introd., pp. 32–4.

hoof of Tatar horse had advanced:'[95] at first sight, an incontrovertible claim to the steppes of Western Russia, with Europe thrown in for good measure.[96] But do Juwainī's words fully reflect Chinggis Khan's own intentions? It is strange that the conqueror appears, on this definition, to have made no provision for the territory west and south of the Āmūya (apart from Khwārizm), when in 617/1220 his generals Jebe and Sübedei had begun a long campaign which took them round the southern shores of the Caspian, through the Caucasus, and back to the east via the Qipchaq steppe.[97] In view of Juwainī's phrasing, we should expect this whole area to have been incorporated in Jochi's *ulus*: 'Umarī, by naming as the regions added to it precisely those traversed by Jebe and Sübedei, confirms that this is what actually occurred.[98]

This raises a further question. If the territory immediately south of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea was allotted to Jochi, what of eastern Khurāsān and the Indian borderlands, which had been trodden by the Mongol horses similarly during Chinggis Khan's own lifetime?[99] Now here a powerful objection may be raised: there is no evidence that China was ever assigned to any specific branch of the imperial family during these decades, and no reason, consequently, why regions of north-eastern Iran should not have remained a joint possession. But China was *par excellence* a region of sedentary culture and afforded no important steppe area for grazing.[100] The

---

[95] Juwainī, I, p. 31:7–9; cf. Boyle, I, p. 42.

[96] So Grousset (*L'Empire Mongol*, p. 380): 'Théoriquement, le prolongement occidental comprenait toute l'Europe'; cf. also *Steppes*, pp. 318 & 468–9.

[97] On this expedition, see Boyle, I, pp. 142–9; *Sbornik*, I/2, pp. 226–9; and for the Chinese data, Bretschneider, I, pp. 297–9. The return of the two generals is mentioned by Rashīd as falling after Chinggis Khan's death and the accession of Ögedei (Khetagurov, p. 150; *Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 98–9); but this is clearly too late, and he contradicts himself with the statement that they had promised to accomplish their task in 3 years and in fact did so in $2^1/_2$ (Khetagurov, p. 557; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 195). There is a much longer account of their campaign in Bodleian MS Th. Hyde 31 (foll. 119r–123v), where their return to Chinggis Khan's *ordo* is dated towards the end of 620/1223 (fol. 123r:1).

[98] This conclusion was adumbrated by Bartol'd on the basis of Juwainī's wording: see his articles 'Bātū-Khān' and 'Berke' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st ed. Th. Houtsma *et al.*, I, Leyden–London 1908–13, pp. 681 & 708.

[99] On the warfare in this region in the years 1220–2, see *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 312–21.

[100] As the Mongols realised: cf. *Yüan Shih*, ch. 146, quoted in R. P. Blake, 'The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East down to the Mongol Epoch', in *HJAS*, II, 1937 (pp. 291–328), p. 323.

pasturelands south of the Āmūya, on the other hand, just like those of north-western Iran, were highly prized by the Mongols; and it is therefore all the more likely that Chinggis Khan should have bestowed them upon one of his sons and not left them unapportioned. But we might well infer from Juwainī – and still more from Rashīd al-dīn, who takes, significantly enough, no opportunity of reproducing even Juwainī's details on the extent of Jochi's *ulus*[101] – that these territories, through a remarkable foresight on the part of Chinggis Khan, remained unattributed to any individual branch of his family, so that they should conveniently fall to the house of Tolui three decades later.[102]

The improbability of this may be seen from the description of the division of the empire as given, again, by Juwainī. He tells us that Tolui, as the youngest son, remained at his father's side and 'that locality was the middle of their empire like the centre of a circle.'[103] The respective camping grounds of the older sons were arranged, as it were, in the manner of concentric arcs around this point. Hence Ögedei's pasturelands were in the region of the Emil and the Qobuq, while Chaghadai, as the second son, received the territory 'from the borders of the Uighur country as far as Samarqand and Bukhārā' – one degree further removed, that is, from the Mongol homeland.[104] The fact that the domain of Jochi and his heirs was the most distant of all from this point gave them a logically prior claim to the pasturelands of northern Iran. Nor was this simply a

---

[101] Cf. *Sbornik*, I/2, p. 68, & *Successors*, pp. 97–9. Later (*Successors*, pp. 107–8 & 117–9) Rashīd quotes Chinggis Khan's commission to Jochi, as also that of Ögedei to Batu and his brothers, strictly in terms of the later territory of the Golden Horde ('the northern lands').

[102] So Howorth, II/1, p. 90: '... the country south of the Oxus, which was not disposed of by Jingis Khan's will, and which was apparently meant to be a joint possession shared by the masters of the three great Khanates'.

[103] Juwainī, I, pp. 31:13–32:2; cf. Boyle, I, p. 43, where *Tūlī nīz muttaṣil wa mujāwir-i ū būd* is translated 'Toli's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto': I suspect, however, that *ū* refers not to Ögedei but to Chinggis Khan, and that the translation is 'Tolui in turn was near him and at his side'. 'Umarī in the corresponding passage (Lech, text pp. 14:11–15:1) has *kāna waladuhu Tūlī muttaṣilan bihi*, which Lech renders (tr. p. 100) 'an dieses Gebiet grenzte auch das des ... Tūlī'.

[104] Juwainī, I, p. 31:9–11; cf. Boyle, I, pp. 42–3. These arcs extend outwards, of course, only to the west: for a remarkable discussion of Chinggis Khan's strategy in building his empire, and his aims, see Owen Lattimore, 'The Geography of Chingis Khan', in *Geographical Journal*, CCXXIX, 1963, pp. 1–7.

matter of political theory: the authority which, as we shall see, they enjoyed there indicates that the claim was recognised, initially at least, by their whole family.

V

The most outspoken statement regarding Batu's authority outside the regions generally acknowledged to have constituted the appanage of Jochi's sons is made by Jūzjānī, who says:[105] –

> [Of] every province in Iran which had come under Mongol control, he had his allotted share, and his representatives used to take away [that] part in proportion to his share; and all the Mongol grandees and generals obeyed him.

From this remark it is clear that Jūzjānī regarded Batu as holding a special position in Iran relative to the other princes: had the chief of every branch of the family received so prominent a share in these conquests, the circumstance would not have been worthy of comment. We know that at a later date, during the reign of Möngke, the khan of the Golden Horde claimed the right to a sizeable proportion of the spoils from this region.[106] But it is evident from the context that Jūzjānī viewed the situation he describes here as obtaining not only since Möngke's accession but also prior to it. This picture is confirmed by a more detailed examination of local operations in Iran, and of its administrative history, during the three decades preceding Hülegü's invasion.

Our main source for the history of eastern Khurāsān in the Mongol period is the *Tārīkh-nāma-yi Harāt* of Saifī, who was writing around 1322. Although his chronology is somewhat unreliable for much of the thirteenth century, Saifī nevertheless supplies us with a detailed account of the local rulers and of their relations with different Mongol princes and *noyans*. It is he who describes most fully the recapture of Herat in 618/1221 by the general Eljigidei, who was

---

[105] Jūzjānī, British Library MS Add. 26,189, fol. 255v:4–6: *wa har wilāyat dar Īrān ki dar ḍabṭ-i mughul āmada būd ūrā az ān diyār naṣīb mu'ayyan būd wa gumāshtagān-i ū dar ān miqdār ki qism-i ū būd naṣīb mīburdand wa jumla-yi buzurgān o lashgarkashān-i mughul ūrā munqād būd.* I have used the MS in preference to the printed text (II, p. 176:7–10), which reads *naṣb būdand* for *naṣīb mīburdand*; cf. Raverty, p. 1172. But the Berlin MS Petermann 386 (Pertsch, *Verzeichniss*, no. 367), fol. 146r:18f., has *mutaṣarrif būdand.*

[106] See section V and note 150 below.

appointed, according to Waṣṣāf, as the representative of Jochi in this region.[107] Eljigidei was still the military commander here in 637/1239–40, when Batu and Ögedei jointly sent officials to Herat to confirm the civil governors in their position.[108] This same joint authority is implied in the request made to Batu by a local *malik*, Majd al-dīn, that he be allowed to restore his town of Kālyūn.[109] Subsequently, Majd al-dīn extended his control over Herat, where he was noted for the preferential treatment he accorded Batu's envoys over those of the Qa'an,[110] rebuffing also an attempt by the Chaghadayid prince Yesü-möngke to intervene in the affairs of the city.[111] His death in 640/1242–3 at the hands of a subordinate of Arghun Aqa, the new governor of Khurāsān and the nominee of Batu's enemies, was followed by the installation of his son Shams al-dīn Muḥammad on Batu's authority: but he in turn was killed on his arrival back from the Jochid prince's *ordo* in 642/1244–5.[112]

These few incidents recorded by Saifī reflect the degree of Batu's influence in eastern Khurāsān, so far removed from his headquarters in the Qipchaq steppe, and reveal that efforts were made after Ögedei's death to undermine that influence by those who were to oppose him in the crisis of 1250–1. This emerges still more clearly from the course of events further west during this period. Following Ögedei's first *quriltai* in 626/1229, the *noyan* Chormaghun had been sent to Iran at the head of a large army as the Qa'an's lieutenant. Simultaneously, the governorship of the provinces of Khurāsān and Māzandarān was entrusted to Chin-temür, a dependant of Jochi who had previously been governor *(basqaq)* of Khwārizm (Urgench).[113] Chin-temür's position was challenged, however, by Dayir (or Tayir) Bahadur, a dependant of Ögedei whose claims were supported by Chormaghun; but the dispute was settled in 630/1232–3

[107] Waṣṣāf, p. 12:10–13 (Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 23, trans. p. 24). Saifī, *Tārikh-nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. M. Z. al-Ṣiddīqī, Calcutta 1944, pp. 76ff. Eljigidei is to be distinguished from his namesake, Güyüg's general in Iran in the 1240's: on his operations in Khurāsān, see *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, p. 316.

[108] Saifī, pp. 122–3.

[109] Ibid., pp. 124–5.

[110] Ibid., p. 128.

[111] Ibid., pp. 127–8, with the date 639/1241–2, when Yesü-möngke was not yet head of Chaghadai's *ulus*.

[112] Ibid., pp. 136–9; on the death of his father Majd al-dīn, cf. pp. 132–4.

[113] Boyle, II, pp. 482–3; *Successors*, p. 51. The history of Khurāsān in these years is summarised by Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 3rd ed. Berlin 1968, pp. 38–9.

by the Qa'an's decision in Chin-temür's favour.[114] The latter's death three years later was the signal for further dissensions, although this time the situation was possibly complicated by factors other than personal allegiances. There may have been some antagonism between the civil and military branches of the administration, since Nosal, Chin-temür's immediate successor in the governorship, was the army commander, with which capacity he was eventually obliged by Ögedei's decree to remain content.[115] Both he and his rival Körgüz, a Uighur secretary who had risen to be chamberlain and deputy to Chin-temür, were representatives of the Jochid princes,[116] as was Edgü-temür, Chin-temür's son, who claimed the governorship by hereditary right.[117] With Nosal's death in 637/1239–40 and the disgrace of Edgü-temür, the power of Körgüz was assured, but his overthrow followed closely on Ögedei's death two years later. Falling victim to the rancour of the Regent Töregene, he was given over to be executed in the *ordo* of Chaghadai's widow, one of whose men he had insulted.[118]

Like Chin-temür before him, Körgüz, although he belonged to Batu, had defeated his opponents owing to the favour he enjoyed with the Qa'an; and it is noteworthy that Ögedei was ready to support him even against his own local representative, Kul-bolad, whom Juwainī describes as the mainstay of the opposition.[119] When

---

[114] Boyle, II, pp. 485–7; *Successors*, pp. 52–3. On Dayir, see Khetagurov, pp. 423–4 (*Sbornik*, I/1, p. 168), where he is said to have belonged to Ögedei but to have been in attendance *(mulāzim)* on Chaghadai; cf. also Boyle, 'The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India according to the *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* of Jūzjānī', in *Islamic Studies*, II, 1963 (pp. 235–47), p. 240.

[115] The dispute is described by Juwainī (Boyle, II, pp. 488–9 & 492–3); cf. also *Successors*, p. 72. That Nosal (on the form of the name, cf. *Horde d'Or*, pp. 54–5) was simply a soldier is confirmed by Rashīd elsewhere: Khetagurov, p. 314 (*Sbornik*, I/1, p. 141).

[116] Nosal had accompanied Chin-temür as Batu's representative: Boyle, II, p. 483; *Successors*, p. 51. The early career of Körgüz is described by Juwainī (Boyle, II, pp. 483 & 490–2). Saifī too links his name with Batu's (p. 128).

[117] On Edgü-temür's conflict with Körgüz, see Boyle, II, pp. 494–500; that he had inherited his father's legal attachment to Batu is confirmed at p. 498. Cf. also *Successors*, pp. 72–4.

[118] Boyle, II, pp. 502–5; cf. also I, p. 243. Ḥamd-allāh Mustawfī (*Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 575:7f.) dates his execution in 645/1247–8, which seems too late. That it was Ögedei who had ordered Körgüz's arrest just before his own death is a version found only in Rashīd: Khetagurov, pp. 318–20 (*Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 142–3); *Successors*, pp. 74–5 & 189–90. But elsewhere Rashīd follows Juwainī (*Successors*, p. 177).

[119] Boyle, II, p. 496.

this protection was no longer available, he was completely exposed – as were Batu's protégés in Herat, whom we have just noticed – to the hostility of Ögedei's family and of their Chaghadayid allies. That the new governor appointed by Töregene, Arghun Aqa, succeeded in retaining his position throughout the vicissitudes of the next three decades[120] testifies to his skill in ingratiating himself with each branch of the imperial family. Having secured confirmation of his office at the accession of Güyüg, he was obliged to obey the instructions of Eljigidei, who arrived in Khurāsān shortly afterwards and set about refitting the armed forces.[121] During a subsequent visit to Mongolia in 647/1249, while the throne was vacant, however, Arghun took care to make overtures to Sorqaqtani and to Möngke, simultaneously despatching Niẓām al-dīn Shāh, the new secretary *(bitikchi)* on behalf of Batu, to the latter's *ordo*.[122] By dint of these tactics, his humble demeanour at Möngke's court three years later, and a timely visit to Batu in person not long afterwards,[123] Arghun escaped the fate of so many notables during the troubled years preceding Hülegü's great westward expedition in 653/1255–6.

The central rôle played by Batu's subordinates in events in Khurāsān throughout this period is most illuminating. Early in his account, Juwainī names all four *noyans* appointed by Ögedei to represent each branch of the imperial family under Chin-temür,[124] but thereafter we hear nothing of Chaghadai's representatives, very little of Sorqaqtani's, and progressively less about those of Ögedei. Under both Körgüz and Arghun, the principal figure in the civil and fiscal administration was Sharaf al-dīn, who had originally accompanied Chin-temür from Khwārizm[125] and had by him been made chief secretary *(ulugh-bitikchi)* on behalf of Batu.[126] Deprived of any authority under the iron rule of Körgüz,[127] and eventually impris-

[120] He died finally in 673/1275 (*Successors*, p. 309).

[121] See above, sect. III & note 55. Juwainī here dates Eljigidei's arrival in Khurāsān after Güyüg's death (Boyle, II, p. 512): probably the general had withdrawn to the Bādghīs after his visit to the Caucasus in 1247. On Arghun's journey to Güyüg's court, see Boyle, II, p. 509; also I, p. 257.

[122] Boyle, II, p. 513.

[123] Ibid., II, pp. 516–8 & 521.

[124] Ibid., II, p. 483.

[125] Ibid., II, p. 532.

[126] Ibid., II, pp. 533–4, for the appointment and Sharaf al-dīn's securing confirmation of it from Batu's *ordo* after Chin-temür's death; at p. 487, he is said to have been made *wazīr* on Batu's behalf.

[127] Ibid., II, pp. 494, 497 & 539.

oned,[128] he was released on Körgüz's downfall and reinstated as *ulugh-bitikchi* to Arghun,[129] who appears to have been powerless to prevent his exactions.[130] He died not long before Güyüg's accession. Of his successor as Batu's *bitikchi*, Niẓām al-dīn Shāh, we are told that it was he who, when Ögedei conferred on Körgüz all the territory conquered by Chormaghun west of the Āmūya,[131] had masterminded on Körgüz's behalf the assumption of control over 'Irāq, Arrān and Ādharbāījān out of the hands of Chormaghun's officers.[132]

Let us turn finally to these lastnamed regions and to Anatolia, over which Güyüg, as we have seen, was particularly concerned to assert his supremacy at Batu's expense, and which he entrusted for this purpose to Eljigidei. By this time Chormaghun's forces were under the command of Baichu, who was now subordinated to Eljigidei's authority.[133] Baichu's career is problematical. According to Rashīd al-dīn, he had been appointed to the command on Ögedei's orders after Chormaghun's death;[134] though the Armenian chronicler Kirakos and the Saljūqid historian Ibn Bībī are agreed that Baichu received the Qa'an's commission when Chormaghun had grown incapacitated owing to some paralytic disease.[135] The Arme-

[128] Ibid., II, pp. 502 & 536.

[129] Ibid., II, pp. 507 & 538. It is significant that at this juncture Sharaf al-dīn was summoned to Batu's *ordo* and narrowly escaped death there (see p. 538): presumably he had to account for his part in Körgüz's overthrow and his collaboration with Batu's enemies.

[130] Ibid., II, pp. 508 & 538ff.

[131] Ibid., II, p. 499.

[132] Ibid., II, p. 501. For his appointment as *bitikshi* and his death while at Batu's court, cf. p. 513.

[133] St. Louis learned of Baichu's demotion from Eljigidei's envoys, who met him in Cyprus in 1248. See the letter of the Papal Legate Eudes de Châteauroux to Innocent IV, dated 31 March 1249, in L. d'Achery, *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae Bibliothecis delituerant*, new ed. Étienne Baluze, E. Martène & L. F. J. de la Barre, III, Paris 1723, p. 627a ('Sed jam non habet tantam potestatem. Modo enim constitutus est sub potestate Erchelchai'): hence all subsequent authorities, beginning with Vincent de Beauvais, *Speculum Historiale*, ed. Straßburg 1473, xxxii, 93. Cf. also Kirakos: Brosset, p. 172; Dulaurier, i, p. 458. In spite of this testimony, both Pelliot (*Papauté*, ii, p. 315: 'La position exacte d'Älǧigidäi par rapport à Baiǰu n'apparaît pas très clairement') and Spuler (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 38: 'Allerdings wurde ihm [Baichu] nach sechs Jahren Älǧigidäi als Gehilfe (mit nicht genau umrissenen Befugnissen) beigegeben') had their reservations. But cf. Pelliot's later view of Eljigidei's mission (*Papauté*, iii, pp. 33–4), as also Spuler's in *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 30.

[134] Khetagurov, pp. 151 & 561 (*Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 99 & 195). For a summary of Baichu's career, see *Steppes*, pp. 328 & 420–4.

[135] Ibn Bībī, *Al-awāmir al-'alā'iya fi'l-umūr al-'alā'iya*, ed. A. S. Erzi,

nian sources further date his assumption of the command and his immediate move against the town of Karin in 1242, Kirakos specifying the early part of the year.[136] It seems more probable, therefore, that Baichu was nominated by Ögedei (who had died as recently as December 1241) – rather than by Töregene, as Pelliot suggested[137] – even if the orders reached him only after the Qa'an's death. But this raises a difficulty. If the new commander was an adherent of Ögedei's family, why should Güyüg have sent out Eljigidei to supersede him? More importantly, why, if Baichu represented Ögedei's line, did he not share the fate of Eljigidei and of the other principal followers of Ögedei's heirs in 1251? Instead, he appears to have retained his position for some years more. He was summoned before Hülegü in 655/1257 and, after a stormy interview in which the prince criticised his independent attitude, was sent into Anatolia to raise troops for the coming campaign against Baghdād, participating in its capture a year or so later.[138]

Ankara 1956 (Türk Tarıh Kurumu Yayınlarından, I. seri, 4a), p. 514:6–8. Cf. the abridged version of this source, *Mukhtaṣar-i Saljūq-nāma*, ed. Th. Houtsma, *Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineure*, Leyden 1902 (Recueil des textes relatifs à l'histoire des Seldjoucides, IV), p. 234:6–8; trans. Herbert W. Duda, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi*, Copenhagen 1959, pp. 222–3. Duda misinterprets this passage: 'Dem Čormaġun Nojan stand der Sinn danach, Erfolge zu erringen', reading *iflāḥ* ('success') for *iflāj* ('paralysis'). See also Kirakos: Brosset, pp. 130–1; Dulaurier, i, p. 243; though later Kirakos says first that Chormaghun's wife *Eltina was in charge during his incapacity (Brosset, p. 144; Dulaurier, i, p. 439), and then that Baichu took over on Chormaghun's death (Brosset, p. 156; Dulaurier, i, p. 450).

[136] 691 of the Armenian era: Brosset, pp. 138–9; Dulaurier, i, pp. 426–8; Vardan in Dulaurier, ii, p. 287. The year 1239 (Arm. era 688) given by Grigor of Akner is incorrect, and the error is acknowledged by the editors: R. P. Blake & R. N. Frye, 'History of the Nation of the Archers (the Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc'' in *HJAS*, XII, 1949 (pp. 269–399), pp. 307 & 387, n. 29. Spuler's statement (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 37) that Baichu assumed the command a year earlier, in Jan.–Feb. 1241, is erroneous, being apparently based on the misprint in Dulaurier, i, p. 426.

[137] *Papauté*, ii, n. 5 on pp. 247–8. Later (p. 304, n. 3) he quotes the Armenian author Het'um (Haython) to the effect that Baichu was sent out by Ögedei, so reversing his judgment. But Het'um's account is unreliable: he clearly confuses Baichu and Batu under the form Bayto, making him Ögedei's second son; see *Flos Historiarum Terrae Orientis*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens*, II, Paris 1906, French text p. 158, Latin p. 292.

[138] For Baichu's interview with Hülegü, see Alizade & Arends, text p. 39, trans. p. 31. Juwainī mentions simply that Baichu was sent ahead into Anatolia on Hülegü's arrival in Iran (Boyle, II, p. 609). In his history of the tribes, Rashīd speaks of Baichu's execution and the bestowal of his command on Chormaghun's son Shiremün (Khetagurov, pp. 561–2; *Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 195–6); but this must have occurred later (see below, note 210). For his part

The answer to this question would appear to be that Baichu was the representative not of Ögedei or of any other member of his line, but of the Jochid princes. That this is so is indicated by references in two of our Mamlūk sources. The first is the great encyclopaedia of Nuwairī (d. 732/1332), *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, where the army which invaded Anatolia in 641/1243, and of which Baichu is known to have been in command, is described as coming 'on behalf of Batu' *(min qibal Bātū)*.[139] Nuwairī's source here may have been Ibn al-'Amīd (d. 672/1273), whose narrative shows that Batu at least imposed his own control upon Baichu, whatever the latter's original allegiance;[140] while we know from Ibn Bībī that after his defeat by Baichu at Kösedagh in muḥarram 641/June–July 1243 the Saljūq Sultan Kaikhusrau II was obliged to send envoys to Batu in Russia.[141] The other Mamlūk authority is the *Zubdat al-fikra* of Baibars al-Manṣūrī (d. 725/1325). Reproducing, or at least summarising, the letter sent by Berke to the Egyptian Sultan in 661/1262–3, he speaks of the conversion to Islam of – among other *noyans* – 'all those who had gone forth with Baichu' *(kullu man tawajjaha ṣuḥbata Bāījū)*.[142] In other words, these two authorities imply strongly that Baichu was Batu's man from the outset. This would explain why Baichu had been Chormaghun's second-in-command,[143] since it was natural that this rank should fall to the representative of the prince who exercised a joint authority in this area with the Qa'an himself. It certainly suggests that Batu seized his opportunity on Ögedei's death to make fresh conquests on his

---

in the Baghdād campaign, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 346–8 & 350.

[139] Nuwairī, MS Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Arabe 1577, fol. 25v:13f.; V. G. Frhr. von Tiesenhausen, *Sbornik materialov otnosyashchikhsya k istorii Zolotoy Ordy*, I, St. Petersburg 1884, text p. 133, n. 1, trans. p. 154, n. 'Ainī (d. 855/1451) is still more explicit, mentioning Baichu by name (ibid., text p. 476:17f., tr. p. 504).

[140] Ibn al-'Amīd, *Kitāb al-majmū' al-mubārak*, ed. Cl. Cahen, 'La "Chronique des Ayyoubides" d'al-Makīn b. al-'Amīd', in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de Damas*, XV, 1955–7 (pp. 109–84), text p. 130:9–12. He is followed by Ibn al-Furāt (d. 807/1405), whose immediate source here appears to be the lost work of Shāfi' b. 'Alī (d. 730/1330), *Naẓm al-sulūk*: see *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, ed. Ḥassan al-Shammā', V/1, Baṣra 1390/1970, p. 214:3–7 (text reads *Tānjū* for *Bāījū*); cf. p. 210:9.

[141] Ibn Bībī, pp. 540–5; Houtsma, pp. 247–9 (Duda, pp. 236–7). For the date of Kösedagh, cf. Duda, p. 227 & notes 196 & 199 on p. 335. Spuler's year 1244 (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 43) is incorrect.

[142] Baibars al-Manṣūrī, MS British Library Ar. 1233 (Add. 23, 325), fol. 60r:2f.; Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 77:14f., tr. p. 99.

[143] So called by Grigor of Akner: Blake & Frye, p. 303.

own account by means of the newly appointed commander.[144] And we can have little doubt that Baichu was the chief of those lieutenants of Batu whom Eljigidei, according to 'Umarī, was sent to arrest, but without success:[145] of the various *noyans* mentioned in Armenian sources as operating in the Caucasus under Chormaghun and Baichu, the two of whom we know for certain from other authorities to which branch of the imperial family they were attached are both ascribed to Jochi's line.[146]

This completes our survey of the practical outworkings of Jochid hegemony in Iran and neighbouring regions to the west. There remains one final question, however, before we proceed to examine the events which brought it finally to an end and gave rise to the conflict that was permanently to halt the Mongol advance in Western Asia. Earlier it was noted that Özbeg of the Golden Horde appealed to some *yarligh* of Möngke as the basis, presumably, of

---

[144] The invasion of Aleppo by a Mongol force under the *noyan* Yasa'ur in 641/1244 must have been part of the same fresh offensive: see Barhebraeus, trans. E. Wallis Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l-Faraj ... commonly known as Bar Hebraeus*, Oxford–London 1932, I, p. 409; idem, *Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, ed. A. Ṣāliḥānī, Beirut 1890, p. 446. On Yasa'ur, cf. Boyle, 'The Journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke', in *CAJ*, IX, 1964 (pp. 175–89), p. 186, n. 96.

[145] Lech, text p. 16:1f., tr. p. 100.

[146] A list of all the Mongol generals and officials mentioned in the Armenian sources is given by Altunian, *Die Mongolen und ihre Eroberungen*, pp. 113–5. The two commanders here in question are: –

1) Qunan, mentioned by Grigor (Blake & Frye, p. 303), was commander of one of Jochi's four personal 'thousands': *Sbornik*, I/2, p. 274. Here, as in Khetagurov, p. 469 (*Sbornik*, I/1, p. 177), he appears as Qutan, but the form Qunan is confirmed by British Library MS Add. 7, 628, fol. 536v (new fol. numbering, 541v), and by the *Secret History*, § 210 (Haenisch, pp. 98–9), where he is described as commander of a *tümen* under Jochi, & § 243 (line omitted in Haenisch, p. 114): see F. W. Cleaves, 'The Mongolian Names and Terms in the *History of the Nation of the Archers* by Grigor of Akanc'', in *HJAS*, XII, 1949 (pp. 400–43), pp. 432–3.

2) Tainal, mentioned again by Grigor (Blake & Frye, p. 303), is referred to in the above-mentioned passage of Baibars al-Manṣūrī's *Zubdat al-fikra* (British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 60r:2, reads .ainal, which Tiesenhausen renders as Bainal) as having accompanied Baichu to Iran. On him, see Boyle, 'Some Additional Notes on the Mongolian Names in the History of the Nation of the Archers', in *Researches in Altaic Languages*, ed. L. Ligeti, Budapest 1975 (pp. 33–42), p. 41.

In conclusion to these remarks, it should be noted that even if Ögedei himself replaced Chormaghun by Baichu, this would not necessarily preclude his having been a Jochid agent: the Qa'an was quite capable of promoting Batu's people at the expense of his own, as we observed in connection with Chin-temür and with Körgüz.

his claims upon the Caucasus territories.[147] It may be, therefore, that Möngke's accession was followed by some agreement leading to a fresh delineation of spheres of influence. This is possibly the implication in Jūzjānī, who makes Batu renounce the imperial throne in 1251 on the grounds that he and his brother Berke already have so much territory in the west that the conquest and administration of Iran, Turkistān and China in addition would be too much for them.[148] Nevertheless, we may suspect this to be more in the nature of a rhetorical device, the context of which is, in any case, the headship of the whole empire. If we took it to mean that Batu was surrendering large areas of Jochid territory, we should be ignoring the testimony of Rubruck, an eye witness, concerning the khan of the Golden Horde's enormous authority in the west, not least in Turkistān. There is, however, another possibility. At the beginning of his reign, Möngke called in all *yarlighs* and patents issued by Great Khans and princes alike as far back as the time of Chinggis Khan himself, and gave instructions that none of the princes should issue orders in matters pertaining to the administration of the provinces without consulting the imperial officials.[149] This may well have resulted in a reapportionment of the revenues from the areas of sedentary culture, including Iran; though we find the khan of the Golden Horde a few years later claiming from one-fifth to one-third of this wealth, the remainder being divided between the Qa'an and the troops (presumably the *tama* force – the army of occupation).[150] And in 1254 we find representatives of Batu and Möngke jointly assessing the territories south of the Caucasus for purposes of taxation.[151] There is no evidence that the power of the Jochids in Iran had diminished at the time of Hülegü's advance westwards.

VI

Hülegü's invasion of Iran was the first expedition in this particular direction to be headed by princes of the blood. Significantly enough, Batu's relatives outnumbered the princes who brought contingents

---

147 See page 184 and note 88.
148 Jūzjānī, II, p. 179:5–8; Raverty, pp. 1177–9.
149 Juwainī, III, p. 76; cf. Boyle, II, pp. 598–9.
150 See the testimony of the Arabic sources, Ibn Shaddād (as cited in Mufaḍḍal) and Ibn Wāṣil, quoted by Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', B, p. 174.
151 Brosset, p. 175; Dulaurier, i, pp. 460–1.

representing the other royal lines. From the *ulus* of Jochi came Balagha, Tutar and Quli;[152] Hülegü was accompanied by his brother Sübedei, who died en route, Chaghadai's branch was represented by Tegüder, and no member of Ögedei's family is mentioned at all.[153] Hülegü's precise status does not emerge clearly from a comparison of the sources. Spuler's belief that Möngke Qa'an's intentions concerning Iran were made public from the outset[154] is not supported even by Rashīd al-dīn. What that most zealous apologist of Hülegü's line actually says runs as follows:[155] –

> Although Möngke Qa'an had planned and determined privately *(dar khāṭir)* that Hülegü Khan should, with the troops he had been given, settle in and reign over the realm of Iran in perpetuity *(hamwāra)*, and that this kingdom should be securely conferred upon him and his illustrious house *(orugh)*, just as it [now] is, nevertheless he ostensibly *(ẓāhiran)* ordered him, when he should have accomplished these tasks, to return to his original camping-grounds.

In other words, the establishment of the dynasty of the Īlkhāns is given the sanction of the revered founder of the Toluids' fortunes. Just how necessary was this appeal to Möngke's *imprimatur*, even at the beginning of the fourteenth century, may be inferred from

[152] Balagha was a son of Shiban (see note 57 above), and Quli the second son of Orda; both were therefore grandsons of Jochi, while Tutar was a great-grandson: see *Successors*, pp. 104, 111 & 113. A certain Qadaghan is also mentioned by the Armenian sources, of whom Kirakos (Brosset, p. 183; Dulaurier, i, p. 486) ascribes him explicitly to Jochi's *ulus*; but whether he was a prince of the blood or merely a *noyan* is not stated. Possibly he is to be identified with the *qorchi* (guard) Ghadaqan, the official who had arrested Eljigidei and taken him to Batu (Boyle, II, p. 590), and more certainly with the *noyan* Qataghan who took part in the sieges of Baghdād and of Mayyāfāriqīn (Baibars al-Manṣūrī, MS Ar. 1233, foll. 31r & 34v). See further Cleaves, 'The Mongolian Names', p. 421.

[153] The list is given by Juwainī (Boyle, II, pp. 607–8). Sübedei died near Samarqand in 653/1255 (ibid., p. 612). The Oirat chief Buqa-temür who accompanied the expedition was brother to Orqina, regent of the *ulus* of Chaghadai (see note 78).

[154] *Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 62 ('Mit Hülägü's Vormarsch war die Oberherrschaft über den Kaukasus ... endgültig an das südliche Mongolenreich übergegangen. Da indes bei dieser Neueinteilung der Wille Möngkes ganz offenbar maßgebend war, wäre ein Krieg wohl noch vermieden worden ...'); *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 38 ('Nun sollte Hülägü nach Möngkäs Willen Herr dieses Gebirges sein' – referring to the Caucasus). These statement, of course, are based on the assumption that Iran had not so far been apportioned to any branch of the imperial family. Only Jūzjānī (II, pp. 188:18f. & 189:15–17; Raverty, pp. 1215 & 1226) says that Möngke entrusted 'Iran' to his brother; but this probably means simply that Hülegü was made the Qa'an's lieutenant here just as Chormaghun had been under Ögedei or Eljigidei under Güyüg.

[155] Alizade, text p. 24:3–7; cf. Arends' translation, p. 22.

the account given by 'Umarī, writing thirty years after Rashīd al-dīn. Almost at the very commencement of his section on the Mongols, he refers to the claim made by the other Mongol rulers, as a counterblast to the Īlkhān's pretensions, that Hülegü had been merely his brother's representative *(mandūb)*.[156] I shall examine this question later. For the moment, the importance of these words of Rashīd lies elsewhere. If the western regions were in fact simply Möngke Qa'an's, to be disposed of as he saw fit, why should he have felt obliged to conceal his purpose? This incidental reference by a Toluid propagandist is one of the strongest indications we possess that the position of the Īlkhāns in Iran was based upon an act of usurpation.

Causes of friction between Hülegü and his Jochid colleagues arose within a comparatively short space. While still beyond the Āmūya, he received a visit from the new *malik* of Herat, Shams al-dīn Muḥammad Kart, who brought complaints, according to Saifī, concerning Balagha and Tutar. The *malik* had angrily rejected the demands of a local Jochid commander for the requisitions that had traditionally been levied on the city on behalf of Batu's *ulus*. Balagha, encamped at that time with Tutar in the Bādghīs region, had thereupon sent orders to the general Kit-buqa (later the celebrated Mongol commander at 'Ain Jālūt) to arrest Shams al-dīn. The latter, however, foiled Kit-buqa's troops, killing their ally the *malik* of Sīstān, 'Alī b. Mas'ūd, and at once made for Hülegü's headquarters. In the course of his journey another attempt to arrest him was made by the agents of Balagha and Tutar, and was frustrated only by the arrival on the scene of Hülegü's own envoys. When Shams al-dīn reached Hülegü, the prince was furious that the Jochids had tried to prevent the *malik* from coming to his *ordo*, and had their agents severely punished.[157] We are not told of the imme-

---

[156] Lech, text p. 2:1f., tr. p. 91.

[157] Saifī, pp. 228–33, is the only author to mention Shams al-dīn's original quarrel with the Jochids. He dates these events, including the *malik*'s visit to Hülegü (pp. 246–7), in 656/1258, but this is incorrect. The death of 'Alī b. Mas'ūd of Sīstān (Saifī, pp. 234–42) occurred in ṣafar 653/April 1255: see *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, ed. M. al-Sh. Bahār, Ṭehrān 1314 sh./1935, pp. 398–9, where Shams al-dīn's visit to Hülegü is similarly described as immediately following the murder. This must be the visit mentioned by Rashīd (Alizade & Arends, text p. 25, tr. p. 23) as falling in sha'bān-ramaḍān 653/Sept.–Oct. 1255 (Saifī actually dates his return to Herat in ramaḍān: p. 247:16f.). Kit-buqa, who had been sent on ahead of Hülegü (Boyle, II, pp. 596 & 610), had been operating in Sīstān since 652/1254–5, when 'Alī b. Mas'ūd had gone

diate consequences of this incident, which must, nevertheless, have led to considerable ill-feeling even while the great army was moving through Iran.

It is probable, moreover, that a clash was greatly facilitated by the internal struggles in the Golden Horde which followed Batu's death in 1256, since Möngke appears to have gone to considerable lengths to prevent Berke succeeding as head of Jochi's *ulus*. First, Batu's son Sartaq, who was on his way to visit the Qa'an at the time of his father's death, was sent back with a diploma conferring the *ulus* upon him and, if the Armenian author Vardan is to be believed, extending the territory under his control.[158] Sartaq, a Christian, was soon at loggerheads with his uncles Berke and Berkecher, by whom he was poisoned, according to Kirakos, after a reign of less than two years.[159] An attempt was next made by Boraqchin, Batu's widow, to secure the throne for an infant grandson, to whom Möngke again gave his recognition.[160] Faced with the continued antagonism of Batu's brothers, she appealed for assistance to Hülegü in Iran, and

---

to wait on him (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 398): Saifī's narrative suggests that Kitbuqa too may have been a Jochid dependant.

[158] Dulaurier, ii, p. 291. On Sartaq, see *Turkestan* 1968, p. 484, where the Armenian authorities in particular are quoted extensively, & *Horde d'Or*, p. 34. For his journey to Möngke's court, which began in summer 1254, cf. Pelliot, 'Mélanges sur l'époque des Croisades', in *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, XLIV/1, 1960 (pp. 1–97), pp. 49–52. That Sartaq had Möngke's backing is evident not only from Kirakos, who says that the Qa'an wished him to enjoy an authority in the empire second only to his own (Brosset, pp. 181–2; Dulaurier, i, pp. 481–2), but also from Jūzjānī (II, p. 217; Raverty, p. 1291) and Juwainī (Boyle, I, p. 268).

[159] His reign is put at 'one year and [some] months' by Nuwairī (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 130:2, tr. p. 150), who also mentions his struggle with Berke and Berkecher (ibid., text p. 129:7f., tr. loc. cit.). Vardan (Dulaurier, ii, p. 291) is less specific than Kirakos (Brosset, p. 182; Dulaurier, i, p. 482), and says he was poisoned by his 'brothers'. Jūzjānī alleges that his death came about through Berke's prayers, but quotes a rumour that he had been poisoned on Möngke's orders (II, pp. 217–8; Raverty, pp. 1291–2), a distorted version with an obvious kernel of truth. Rashīd (*Successors*, p. 122) says simply that Sartaq died on the way back from Möngke's court. It is always possible, of course, that he was poisoned by Möngke (cf. the strange fate of the Chaghadayid Qara Hülegü in 1252), though not for Berke's benefit – rather to secure the throne for some still more manageable prince. However, Kirakos' testimony (note 163 below) precludes this.

[160] For the confused data on this child, called Ulaghchi in the Persian sources and Töde-möngke by Nuwairī, see *Horde d'Or*, pp. 34–44. What is important here is that Möngke was prepared to instal a prince of this age as ruler: cf. especially Boyle, I, p. 268; *Successors*, p. 122; *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 576:4–6 (with Tūqchin for Boraqchin in error).

even set out in person for his camp, only to be overtaken and murdered by her enemies before he could move to her aid.[161] It seems that news of these struggles had even reached Delhi, where Jūzjānī speaks of the recent deaths of fifteen members of Jochi's line, all of whose possessions were inherited by Berke.[162]

In this fashion the accession of Berke, who was Batu's oldest surviving brother, had been deferred for over two years in favour of junior members of his family, one of whom was still a minor. That these tactics reflect a vital concern on the Qa'an's part is further indicated by Kirakos, who describes Sartaq's premature death as a heavy blow not only to the Christians of Western Asia, but also to Möngke and Hülegü.[163] In the present context, this otherwise unobtrusive statement assumes no little importance.

It is very likely that Möngke's efforts to prevent Berke from obtaining supremacy in the Jochid *ulus* were based on the knowledge that he would be aroused by the attack on Baghdād. According to 'Umarī, the initial plan had been merely to crush the Assassins, but Hülegü prevailed upon his brother to countenance an invasion also of the Caliph's territory. He was forbidden to proceed further by Batu, to whom Berke had complained; but after Batu's death he was able to resume the offensive.[164] And Jūzjānī confirms that by

---

[161] So in Nuwairī (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 130:2–11 & 131:3–8, tr. pp. 150–1), the details of whose account are rejected by Pelliot (*Horde d'Or*, pp. 43–4). Nuwairī certainly plays havoc with genealogies and dates, but in my view the only major detail to ring false is the suggestion that Hülegü could have been ready to aid Boraqchin at such an early juncture, i.e. about 1257–8 (on the approximate dates of Sartaq and Ulaghchi, see *Horde d'Or*, pp. 34–5; but cf. note 87 above). In the Georgian chronicle translated by Brosset (*Histoire de la Géorgie*, I, St. Petersburg 1849, p. 569), a very late source, there is mention of the arrival in Hülegü's camp of two princesses from the Golden Horde *after* the outbreak of war: one of the infants they brought was called 'Pharedjn' (Boraqchin ?).

[162] Jūzjānī, II, p. 218:10–12; Raverty, p. 1292.

[163] Brosset, p. 182; Dulaurier, i, p. 482.

[164] Lech, text p. 17:9ff., tr. pp. 101–2: the translation is somewhat misleading here, since 'Umarī is talking merely of intentions, and does not actually say that Hülegü began attacking the Caliph's territory until after Batu's death. Earlier, 'Umarī names the Kurds also as the objective of Hülegü's expedition: Lech, text p. 2:3–5, tr. p. 91; cf. too Ibn al-'Amīd, ed. Cahen, in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, XV, p. 165. Nowhere is it in fact suggested that the actual destruction of the Caliphate was one of the original aims, and even the confused remarks in Rubruck (Wyngaert, p. 287; Rockhill, p. 222) are inconclusive. The supplement to Juwainī's work composed by Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī on the fall of Baghdād indicates that the Caliph, who had submitted to the Mongols some time previously, was attacked because

1260 rumours had already reached Delhi that the assault on the Caliphate had brought about an estrangement between Berke and Hülegü.[165] Hence it is clear that the transfer of power in Western Asia (remembering the *condominium* that had been in existence since 1252) to a devout Muslim, whose faith had even occasioned friction between him and Batu during the latter's lifetime,[166] was yet another factor in the dissolution of the Jochid-Toluid alliance.

This is not to say, however, that the assault on the Caliphate was the principal reason for the war, as certain later Mamlūk authorities claim.[167] Here we must bear in mind the diplomatic realities of 1263, since the ultimate source of such information would have been Berke's envoys to the Egyptian Sultan. Once war had actually broken out, the khan of the Golden Horde would naturally have been keen to stress his rôle as a good Muslim: in the same fashion Hülegü and his successors, eager for an alliance with the Christian West, took pains to portray themselves as potential or actual Christians and to emphasise what a great opportunity for cooperation had been lost during the invasion of Syria in 1260.[168] Yet we may well doubt whether religious affiliations had been so important at the time. Prior to the outbreak of war between Hülegü and the Golden Horde,

---

he first neglected to furnish a contingent for the campaign against the Assassins and then failed to attend on Hülegü in person to explain his conduct: see Boyle, 'The Death of the Last 'Abbāsid Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account', in *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VI, 1961 (pp. 145–61), pp. 151–3.

[165] Jūzjānī, II, p. 198:16–18; Raverty, p. 1257.

[166] So according to Rubruck: Wyngaert, p. 209; Rockhill, p. 117. Pelliot suggests that Batu was simply resentful of Berke's appropriating gifts brought by Muslim envoys en route for the Volga, rather than that he was afraid lest Berke and they make common cause against him: *Recherches sur les Chrétiens d'Asie Centrale et d'Extrême-Orient*, Paris 1973, p. 104.

[167] Khalīl b. Aibak al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363), *Al-wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, British Library MS Ar. 1294 (Add. 23, 357), fol. 18r:13: *wa min a'ẓam al-waqā'i' bainahi wa baina Hūlākū yakūnuhu qatl al-khalīfa*. Hence also Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-manhal al-sāfī*, MS Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Arabe 2069, *s.v. Barka*.

[168] On Hülegü's opening diplomatic relations with the Latin West, see below, note 233a. On the Syrian campaign, cf. the palpable attempt by the Armenian propagandist Het'um to play down the Mongols' war aims in 1260 and to throw responsibility for non-cooperation squarely on the Franks: *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens*, II, French text pp. 170 & 172–4, Latin pp. 301 & 303–5. In 1287 we find the Īlkhān Arghun using his imminent conversion as a bargaining counter to secure military aid from the West: see J.-B. Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du roi Argoun avec l'Occident', in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, II, 1894 (pp. 566–629), pp. 580ff.

the dominant aim of the Mongols was to bring all the known world into subjection; and we can detect a certain anxiety, in fact, not to be identified with the religions of any of the subject peoples (which were also the religions of their enemies).[169] The religious factor should not be underplayed; but just how little weight it carried even with Berke, as regards the eventual cause of hostilities, may be gauged merely from the lapse of time. Baghdād fell early in 656/1258; whereas in spite of the pronounced obscurity which surrounds the chronology of the next few years, it is evident that war between Hülegü and the Golden Horde broke out at least three full years later.

The accounts given in the sources of the events immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities vary considerably, Rashīd alone supplying three distinct versions. In his history of the Golden Horde, he tells us that Balagha was accused of plotting witchcraft against Hülegü and was returned to Berke, who sent him back to be dealt with at Hülegü's pleasure. Thereupon he was executed. The deaths of Quli and Tutar soon afterwards were attributed to poison and led to an estrangement between Hülegü and Berke.[170] Later, Rashīd repeats this story, but with the rôles of Balagha and Tutar transposed.[171] And finally, he informs us that Berke presumed upon Batu's and his own rôles in the election of Möngke, and irritated Hülegü by constantly sending instructions to him in Iran. At first Hülegü endured this out of deference to Berke's status as the *aqa*, but the deaths of the three Jochid princes gave rise to open hostilities[172] – a fairly obvious *non sequitur* on Rashīd's part. Grigor of Akner, on the other hand, who makes Quli die naturally some time prior to the execution of his colleagues,[173] supplies a fuller account of these events, to which we shall return later.

Two further circumstances intimately connected with the outbreak of the war are to be found in the Mamlūk sources. Firstly, according to Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285), the conflict arose from

[169] Cf. Rubruck's account of the reaction to his calling Sartaq a Christian: Wyngaert, p. 205; Rockhill, p. 107. On the world-domination theme, see Eric Voegelin, 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255', in *Byzantion*, XV, 1940–1, pp. 378–413.

[170] *Successors*, pp. 122–3, with the date 654/1256–7: this is unlikely, since we read subsequently in Rashīd (Alizade & Arends, text p. 56, tr. p. 42) that Balagha was still with the army in muḥarram 656/Jan.–Feb. 1258 at Baghdād.

[171] Alizade & Arends, text p. 77, tr. p. 54: here the deaths of all three princes are dated early in 658/1260.

[172] Ibid., text pp. 86–7, tr. pp. 59–60.

[173] See Blake & Frye, p. 331.

Berke's attempt to secure the revenues and spoils due to him from Iran: Balagha and Tutar are here mistaken for envoys recently despatched from the Golden Horde for this purpose, but the sorcery charge which led to their execution is repeated.[174] The division of the spoils is a highly important factor, of which our Persian sources make no mention whatsoever. The second such factor appears in the work of Abū-Shāma (d. 665/1267), reporting the arrival in Egypt in 660/1262 of refugee Mongol troops from Iran. According to their testimony, the war had been caused by the fact that in the struggle for the succession which broke out in Mongolia on Möngke's death Hülegü and Berke supported rival candidates:[175] this again is a crucial piece of evidence, which is corroborated by Kirakos.[176] Let us now turn to this conflict in Mongolia and its repercussions in the west.[177]

VII

The civil war between the two brothers in Mongolia is described most fully by Rashīd al-dīn, who derived his information, however, from those who were committed to the existing régime in China.[178]

---

[174] This portion of Ibn Shaddād's work is no longer extant. It is quoted, however, by Yūnīnī (d. 726/1326), *Dhail mir'āt al-zamān*, ed. Hyderabad, Deccan, 1374–80/1954–61 (4 vols), I, pp. 497:11–498:15, & II, pp. 161:11–162:9 (on the variant recensions of Yūnīnī's work for these years, cf. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 79–80, & in *Arabica*, IV, 1957, pp. 193–4); by Ibn al-Dawādārī (ca. 735/1335), *Kanz al-durar*, ed. Ulrich Haarmann, *Die Chronik des Ibn ad-Dawādārī*, VIII, Cairo 1391/1971, pp. 92–3; and by Mufaḍḍal (*Moufazzal*, i, pp. 444–6; Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 177:9–26, tr. pp. 188–9). Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) simply ascribes the war to Berke's claiming the revenues and Hülegü's killing his envoys, with no further details: *Al-bidāya wa'l-nihāya*, ed. Cairo 1351/1932–n.d., XIII, p. 234:24–26 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 272, tr. p. 275).

[175] Abū-Shāma, *Al-dhail 'ala'l-rawḍatain*, ed. M. Z. al-Kawtharī, *Tarājim rijāl al-qarnain*, Cairo 1366/1947, p. 220:17ff. Hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 497:1–5; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, p. 91:7–13; *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 443–4 (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 176:7–177:4, tr. p. 188).

[176] Brosset, p. 192; Dulaurier, i, p. 504.

[177] For a fuller examination of the war in Mongolia, particularly regarding Rashīd's evidence, than what follows, cf. my article 'The Accession of Qubilai Qa'an: a re-examination', in *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society*, II/1, 1975, pp. 1–10.

[178] For Rashīd's probable informant on these events, Bolad Chingsang, see Blochet, *Introduction à l'histoire des Mongols de Fadl Allah Rashid ed-Din*, Leyden–London 1910 (Gibb Memorial Series, XII), pp. 94–5; *Successors*, introd., pp. 10–11.

For him, Arigh-böke is a rebel and Qubilai the legitimate heir. And the extent of his bias emerges from a number of scattered references in other, more nearly contemporary, sources. It is significant, in the first place, that Kirakos, in reporting Möngke's death, describes Arigh-böke as his successor, without at this stage any mention of Qubilai.[179] Arigh is asserted elsewhere to have been the heir on the grounds that he had been left in command at Qaraqorum on Möngke's departure for China.[180] However this may be, Rashīd greatly underemphasises both the extent and the value of the support that Arigh-böke enjoyed from the outset. By custom the guardianship of the hearthlands, and the regency, should have passed on Möngke's death to his youngest son by his chief wife. This was Urung-tash, who is admitted by Rashīd to have been one of Arigh's chief adherents, though without stressing his importance.[181] We are given the impression in the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh* that the princes who supported Arigh's election constituted a rump assembly; but in reality they included the heads of the other two divisions of the empire. Although Rashīd acknowledges that the princess Orqina, regent of Chaghadai's *ulus*, was among their number,[182] he nevertheless totally suppresses the fact that Arigh was upheld by Berke in the west.[183] The reason for this is not far to seek. Berke was now, as his brother Batu had been before him, the most senior member of the entire family.[184] If Batu's had been the deciding voice in

---

[179] Brosset, p. 184; Dulaurier, i, p. 487.

[180] Jamāl Qarshī, in *Turkestan* 1900, I, p. 138:2f. Both Barhebraeus and Ibn al-'Amīd attribute this claim to him: Budge, *Chronography*, p. 439; *Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, p. 491:8–10; Ibn al-'Amīd, ed. Cahen, in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, XV, p. 173:13–15.

[181] *Successors*, p. 251: Urung-tash's authority is highlighted at p. 260, where he demands his father's great seal from Arigh and takes it to Qubilai in submission. He was the younger of Möngke's two sons by his chief wife Qutuqtai (ibid., p. 197): that both he and his mother supported Arigh is confirmed by Waṣṣāf (p. 11:5–7; Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 20, tr. p. 22: here the name is corrupted to Yurultash).

[182] *Successors*, pp. 251 & 252.

[183] Berke is alleged to have remained neutral (ibid., p. 256), and the rumour that he supported Arigh is attributed to the latter's agents (pp. 251 & 253). But he struck coins in Arigh's name (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, n. 4 on pp. 61–2), a fact which led Howorth (II/1, p. 113) to reverse his earlier verdict on Berke's neutrality (I, p. 218).

[184] Cf. Rashīd's incidental acknowledgement of the fact: Alizade & Arends, text p. 87, tr. pp. 59 & 60. This must also be the meaning of the phrase *kabīr mulūk al-tatār* used with reference to Berke by Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir (d. 692/1293): *Al-rawḍ al-zahir fī sīrat al-malik al-Ẓāhir*, ed. & trans. S. F.

Möngke's election (and the fact that Juwainī lays such stress on Batu's rôle indicates how far this, as opposed to any other consideration, had legitimised the transfer of power to Tolui's line), why should Berke in turn not have been allowed to dispose of the imperial dignity in 1259? Indeed, since news had reached Delhi of Möngke's death and of the *khuṭba* being read in Berke's name throughout Iran, Māwarā' al-nahr and Khurāsān shortly before Jūzjānī ceased writing in 658/1260,[185] it seems that the *aqa*'s rights were recognised at least in the western half of the empire. And that Berke would have used his authority to confer the sovereignty on Arigh-böke was a revelation that Rashīd's informants could not afford: it would have been to deny the legitimacy of the existing order in China – and hence, as we shall see, of that in Iran also.

Qubilai's proclamation as Qa'an in the Chinese city of K'ai-p'ing, several hundred miles from the Mongol capital, in May 1260 was a denial of the principles on which the whole succession procedure was based;[186] and Arigh's subsequent enthronement at Qaraqorum appears as a natural defensive reaction.[187] Moreover, it was Qubilai who first attempted to subvert the established régimes in his own favour by sending Büri's son Abishqa to replace Orqina as head of Chaghadai's *ulus*: the attempt miscarried, in fact, and Arigh-böke despatched the Chaghadayid Alghu to represent his own interests in Central Asia.[188] Yet in spite of such initial reverses, and of his lack of support in the empire as a whole, Qubilai was able to gain the upper hand, merely by virtue of possessing certain major advantages over his rival: a large army, quartered in a fertile country and with access to plentiful supplies. This enabled him, once he had con-

---

Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt*, O. U. P., Dacca 1956, text p. 28:5 (tr. p. 113 as 'the great Mongol king' ...); cf. Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 46 (tr. p. 55 with same error).

[185] Jūzjānī, II, p. 218:15–18; Raverty, pp. 1292–3. This reference puzzled Richard ('La conversion de Berke', in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXV, p. 176, n. 6). The territories named, of course, were all in the Jochid sphere of influence, as we have tried to show.

[186] See Otto Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*, IV, Leipzig 1948, p. 326, for the date. On the legality of Qubilai's election, cf. Howorth, I, p. 218 (the passage dismissed by Bartol'd: *Turkestan* 1968, p. 60 & n. 1); *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 318–9; *Steppes*, p. 352.

[187] For the date in the *Yüan Shih*, cf. *L'Empire Mongol*, p. 320 (one month after Qubilai): this is confirmed by Jamāl Qarshī (*Turkestan* 1900, I, pp. 137:28–138:2), with shawwāl 658/Sept.–Oct. 1260.

[188] *Successors*, pp. 138, 150 & 253, for Abishqa; on Alghu, cf. *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 488–90.

cluded a temporary peace with the Sung,[189] gradually to secure the other principal economic centres – on the upper Yenisei and in the Tangut region – and to force Arigh to evacuate Qaraqorum and move into Turkistān.[190] The remainder of the war, culminating in Arigh's submission in 1264, does not concern us; rather must we now return to Western Asia.

Rashīd al-dīn implies that the report of Möngke's death reached Hülegü in the first months of 658/1260, around the time of the fall of Damascus.[191] This is extremely unlikely on chronological grounds;[192] and more probably the news which induced Hülegü to retire from Syria at this juncture was of the dispute between his brothers, as indicated in Mamlūk sources.[193] The stages of his journey eastwards are obscure. Rashīd mentions only his arrival at Akhlāṭ on 24 jumādā II/7 June,[194] and thereafter tells us nothing of his movements until the outbreak of war in the Caucasus. Possibly he continued to move east with the intention, as Kirakos informs us, of wintering in the plain of Hamadān.[195] His aims in the longer term are equally uncertain. Het'um claims that he was expected himself to be a candidate for the imperial throne and discontinued his march on learning of Qubilai's election;[196] and certainly it seems that rumours of such an ambition had reached the ears of the Franks in Palestine.[197] The impression, however, that Hülegü now played a waiting game is confirmed by a curious detail given by the fourteenth century Persian historian Shabānkāra'ī, who says that Hülegü

---

[189] See Dietlinde Schlegel, 'Koexistenz oder Annexionskrieg ? Kublai Khans Politik gegenüber dem Sung-Reich 1256–1276', in *Saeculum*, XIX, 1968 (pp. 390–405), pp. 392ff.

[190] Cf. J. W. Dardess, 'From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty', in *MS*, XXX, 1972–3 (pp. 117–65), pp. 128–31.

[191] Alizade & Arends, text p. 70:10–13, tr. p. 50.

[192] For the date of Möngke's death (August 1259), cf. Franke, IV, p. 324; the news had reached Qubilai on 19 Sept. (ibid.; Schlegel, 'Koexistenz', p. 391).

[193] Ibn al-'Amīd, ed. Cahen, p. 173:11f. Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 37v:17: *lammā ittaṣala bihi min ikhtilāfin ḥaṣala baina ikhwatihi.*

[194] Alizade & Arends, text p. 70:13f., tr. p. 50.

[195] Brosset, p. 189; Dulaurier, i, p. 498.

[196] *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens*, II, French text p. 172, Latin p. 303.

[197] See the chronicle of the Frisian abbot Menko (d. ca. 1275), ed. L. Weiland, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, ed. G. H. Pertz, XXIII, Hanover 1874, p. 549: 'sperans se dominium suscepturum, ulterius non processit' (the context is the arrival in Syria of the news of Möngke's death).

was on the point of returning to Mongolia and had despatched a great quantity of treasure from Iran, but that on hearing of Möngke's death he immediately recalled it.[198] And his prolonged inactivity becomes more understandable if we remember how ill-defined was his status.

Earlier, we noticed that Rashīd al-dīn is suspiciously vague when speaking of Möngke's intentions in sending Hülegü west, and that 'Umarī describes him as having been merely his brother's representative in Iran.[199] 'Umarī later refers to Hülegü as Möngke's lieutenant *(nā'ib)*, and points out that he and his successors continued to strike coins in the Great Khan's name and to accept a permanent representative of his at their court down to the time of Ghazan, who asserted his own sovereign status.[200] This is in fact quite correct; though the coins of the early Īlkhāns bear only the Great Khan's title (*Qa'an al-a'ẓam* or *al-'ādil*) and not his name.[201] And that the style Īlkhān was itself indicative of some kind of subordinate rank appears to be borne out by the fact that Rashīd, writing under the first independent sovereign of Hülegü's line, Ghazan, who for him is nothing less than the *Pādishāh-i Islām*, scarcely employs the term even with reference to his master's predecessors.[202] There is some slight evidence, in fact, that the title Īlkhān was applicable to other Mongol potentates and not just to the early Toluids in Iran[203] – a

---

[198] Shabānkāra'ī, *Majma'al-ansāb*, MS Yeni Cami 909, fol. 255r:3–8. This episode is not mentioned in the other MSS of Shabānkāra'ī that I have examined, and it seems there have survived two recensions of the work. In this MS, which contains Faryūmadī's continuation, the current date is given as rabī' I 738/Oct. 1337 (fol. 224v:16): the accepted dates are 736 for the completion of the initial version, which was destroyed, and 743 for the later recension, which has come down to us in the majority of MSS (see C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature*, I/1, London 1927–39, pp. 84–5).

[199] See above, section VI & notes 155 & 156.

[200] Lech, text p. 19:10–20, tr. p. 103: his source is Shams al-dīn al-Iṣfahānī.

[201] S. Lane-Poole, *The Coins of the Mongols in the British Museum*, London 1881, pp. 10ff. C. M. Fraehn, 'De Il-Chanorum seu Chulaguidarum Numis', in *Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de Saint-Pétersbourg: sciences politiques, histoire et philologie*, 6e série, II, 1834 (pp. 479–548), pp. 496ff. On the relations between the Īlkhāns and the Qa'an, cf. Blochet, *Introduction à l'histoire des Mongols*, pp. 224–33.

[202] Cf. Alizade & Arends, index *s.v.* (p. 683): as often as not, it is coupled with the adjective *buzurg*.

[203] If Rashīd is to be believed: see *Successors*, p. 128 & n. 120, where the term is applied to Toqto'a of the Golden Horde. For a discussion of the meaning of this title, see Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, II, pp. 207–9: Doerfer adopts the idea of subordination as the most plausible ('Friedensfürst, untergebener Fürst, gehorsamer Fürst').

circumstance which would heighten the significance of Ghazan's action still further.

At another point, however, 'Umarī appears to contradict himself by telling us that after the fall of Baghdād Hülegü settled where he was, rebelled and declared his independence *(tamakkana wa 'aṣā wa istaqalla bi-nafsihi)*.[204] The two pieces of evidence are not irreconcilable. One other curious circumstance attached to the title Ilkhān is that Juwainī uses it even less than Rashīd (twice in all, and in both cases it is the reading of only one MS).[205] This harmonises well with the fact that it does not figure on Hülegü's coins until after Möngke's death: prior to that he styles himself simply Hülegü Khan.[206] It seems fair to assume, therefore, that Hülegü's status underwent a change at some time later than 1259.

The fullest account we possess of this transformation is to be found in the chronicle of Grigor of Akner. He tells us that after the capture of Baghdād the Mongol princes in Iran fell out, whereupon Hülegü sent a message to Möngke that included the sinister statement: 'We sent back the old troopers and the *tamachis (t'emayč'ik)* from here'.[207] The Qa'an wrote in reply that Hülegü was to have authority over the province. Summoned to a local *quriltai* by Hülegü, the princes were confronted with Möngke's decree. While the others submitted with a good grace, the four Jochids did not.[208] The three senior princes were strangled with the bowstring, but Mingqan, who had succeeded to his father Quli's command, was spared in view of his youth, and imprisoned on an island in Lake

---

[204] Lech, text p. 2:3–5, tr. p. 91. His source is Niẓām al-dīn Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥakīm, on whom see Lech's introd., pp. 36–7.

[205] Juwainī, III, pp. 130 & 136; Boyle, II, pp. 632 (& n. 55) & 636.

[206] Lane-Poole, pp. 8ff., Fraehn, pp. 493ff.

[207] The *tamachis* were troops of mixed extraction, specially picked out from all the 'thousands' and sent to a province to occupy it permanently, according to Rashīd's definition (Khetagurov, p. 151; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 99). Although the phrase *az nasl-i dīgar* used by Rashīd certainly indicates that the troops were picked from different tribes (as Aubin, 'L'Ethnogénèse', pp. 74ff., takes it in the immediate context), a further logical corollary is that such forces represented different princes. I assume Hülegü's admittedly obscure wording (if reported correctly) to mean that the army already operating in western Iran had been sent on ahead ('back' in the sense of 'further out', not to their homeland), as indeed we know it had been (see Boyle, II, p. 609, where Baichu is sent west into Anatolia – he presumably returned there after the Baghdād campaign; also Brosset, p. 182; Dulaurier, i, p. 482), and that consequently the Toluid party was more free to act.

[208] This includes Qadaghan (see note 152 above) as well as the princes listed in the Persian sources.

Urmiya. A great slaughter of the Jochid troops ensued at the hands of Hülegü and his Georgian and Armenian allies: only two chiefs escaped with twelve thousand men across the river Kur to Berke, on which account, says Grigor, 'they wreaked much evil for ten years'.[209] Simultaneously, secret orders were sent to Anatolia, as a result of which Baichu was probably executed about this time and his command transferred to Chormaghun's son Shiremün.[210]

The one detail that fails to ring true in this account is the mention of Möngke as currently ruling in the Far East. The attack on the Jochid generals and their forces cannot have occurred in Möngke's reign, since it must have immediately preceded the outbreak of war between Hülegü and the Golden Horde. And that the war began only in 1261 is the testimony not merely of the Armenian sources close at hand,[211] but of the Mamlūk authorities also. Baibars al-Manṣūrī informs us that the siege of al-Mawṣil (which fell to the Mongols in sha'bān 660/June–July 1262)[212] was protracted for nine months because Hülegü had been obliged to withdraw troops from there for the struggle with Berke.[213] News of the internecine strife in Iran as a consequence of the Great Khan's death was reaching Mamlūk Syria early in 660/1262;[214] and we may assume,

---

[209] Blake & Frye, pp. 337, 339 & 341. There is a briefer account of the Jochids' execution and the massacre of their troops in Kirakos: Brosset, p. 192; Dulaurier, i, p. 504. Mingqan (cf. *Successors*, p. 105) is called Mighan by Grigor: for the etymology, which Cleaves had given as *miqan* ('meat' – 'The Mongolian Names', p. 423), see now Boyle, 'Some Additional Notes', in *Researches in Altaic Languages*, p. 37.

[210] Blake & Frye, p. 339, for the message; and cf. note 138 above.

[211] See Kirakos (Brosset, p. 193; Dulaurier, i, p. 506). Stephan Orbelian mentions an engagement between the armies of Hülegü and Berke in this same year (Arm. era, 710) in which a prince of his family was killed: trans. Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, St. Petersburg 1864–6 (2 vols), I, p. 233. Curiously enough, the year 1261 for the outbreak of the war is given also by Marco Polo, whose dates are usually some years out: Sir Henry Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian*, 3rd ed. Henri Cordier, London 1903 (2 vols), II, p. 494; A. C. Moule & P. Pelliot, *The Description of the World*, London 1938 (2 vols), I, p. 478.

[212] Abū-Shāma, p. 219:11–13. Barhebraeus says that the siege lasted from December until the summer (Budge, *Chronography*, p. 443) or spring (*Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, p. 495:18f.). Rashīd says the city fell in ramaḍān 660/July–Aug. 1262, after 6 months: Alizade & Arends, text pp. 85–6, tr. p. 59.

[213] Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 49v:13f: *fa-ḥamalahum al-'ajz 'alā tasallumihā wa kāna Hūlākū qad arsala yastad'iyu'l-'askara'l-nāzil 'alaihā li-waq'a kānat bainahi wa baina Barka.*

[214] Abū-Shāma, p. 219:13f. Hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 487:3–5; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, p. 87:10f.; *Moufazzal*, i, p. 436.

therefore, that the war broke out during the winter of 1261–2.[215]

In these circumstances, the Qa'an to whom Hülegü appealed, and who responded by conferring on him a greater degree of authority in Iran, can only have been Qubilai; and it was most probably at this juncture that Hülegü first gave Qubilai his allegiance. There is no evidence, in fact, to support Rashīd al-dīn's constant implication that he had favoured Qubilai from the outset.[216] It is even possible, on the contrary, that he had supported Arigh-böke, since we find his eldest son Jumughur, who had been left in command of Hülegü's *ordos* in Mongolia in 1253–4, fighting on Arigh's side at an early stage.[217] The prince's recall by Hülegü, therefore, and his death en route for Iran must have occurred at this juncture, rather than in 662/1264 as Rashīd states.[218] This is all the more likely in view of the fact that Rashīd makes Jumughur's desertion coincide with Arigh's westward campaign against the Chaghadayid Alghu,[219] who had himself changed sides early in 1262, killing Arigh's representatives and transferring his allegiance to Qubilai.[220] Yet a further link in this complex chain is that Rashīd at one point speaks of Qubilai's simultaneously despatching patents of authority to Hülegü and Alghu;[221] while at another he makes it clear that Hülegü had not long been in possession of such a diploma when he moved in person against Berke in jumādā II 661/April–May 1263.[222]

---

[215] Rashīd at one point (*Successors*, p. 123) dates the attack on the Jochid contingent in Iran in shawwāl 660/Aug.–Sept. 1262. But since he later places Hülegü's despatch of Shiremün against Berke's army in the Caucasus at the onset of this same month (Alizade & Arends, text p. 87, tr. p. 60), there is clearly some confusion.

[216] His coinage, of course, gives us no indication at all, in view of the absence of the Qa'an's name (cf. above & note 201): Spuler's assumption that *Qā'ān al-'ādil* represents Qubilai's designation of *Sechen Qa'an* (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 271 & n. 1) is groundless.

[217] *Successors*, p. 253. Arigh's supporters claimed that he had Hülegü's backing as well as Berke's (ibid., p. 251).

[218] Ibid., p. 259 (where Jumughur's death is not mentioned).

[219] Alizade & Arends, text p. 9, tr. p. 17 (where his desertion is placed after Arigh's victory over Alghu), & text p. 106, tr. pp. 69–70 (where it is dated earlier, on Arigh's initial defeat).

[220] See *Successors*, pp. 150 & 258: although Rashīd gives 661/1262–3 in the former place, a contemporary Chinese observer indicates that Alghu's victory over Arigh's van under Qara-buqa at the very beginning of the war in Turkistān (cf. ibid., p. 259) occurred as early as 1262: Bretschneider, I, p. 162.

[221] *Successors*, pp. 255–6.

[222] Alizade & Arends, text p. 90, tr. p. 61: Alghu is here stated to be already dead, which must be incorrect.

Kirakos, finally, suggests that the revolts were connected, saying that Alghu wrote to Hülegü requesting his assistance, and that Hülegü sent his son and later successor, Abaqa, eastwards for this purpose.[223] It is doubtful, however, whether the forces of Hülegü and Alghu actually collaborated: more probably the diversion in Central Asia, where Alghu set about expelling Berke's governors and massacring his dependants just as Hülegü himself had done in Iran,[224] simply enabled the Īlkhān to prosecute the war in the Caucasus with greater success.

The precise chronology of these events must remain obscure: what does seem to emerge more clearly from the data we possess is that Hülegü seized his opportunity, at a point when the war in Mongolia had been under way for some time, to convert his position in Iran from being that of a mere representative of the Great Khan to the status of head of an *ulus* on a par with the rulers of the Golden Horde and of Central Asia. To effect this, it was necessary to destroy the Jochid hold on northern Iran and to secure official confirmation of his new status from a legitimating authority in the Far East: and here his interests harmonised ideally with those of Qubilai, naturally anxious to neutralise his rival's principal supporter, Berke. This is not to deny that there were already other factors – notably religious affiliations – which contributed to the hostility between Hülegü and the Golden Horde. But the major cause of the conflict of 1261–2 was the successful misappropriation by the Toluid prince of the territories south and west of the Āmūya which had hitherto been regarded as part of the Jochid sphere of influence by virtue of Chinggis Khan's own edict: that this was the specific *yasa* of Chinggis Khan which Berke, in his correspondence with the Mamlūk Sultan, accused Hülegü of infringing[225] seems an inescapable conclusion.

---

[223] Brosset, pp. 192–3; Dulaurier, i, pp. 504–5.

[224] *Successors*, pp. 257–8. Waṣṣāf, in describing Alghu's revolt (p. 12; Hammer-Purgstall, text pp. 23–4, tr. pp. 24–5), makes no mention of the assault on Berke's position in Māwarā' al-nahr, which he ascribes instead to a campaign by Qubilai's own forces (p. 51:2–5; Hammer-Purgstall, text p. 98, tr. p. 94); but most probably this is the same episode, and Alghu was acting on Qubilai's behalf.

[225] See Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', B, pp. 167–73 & 176–7, reproducing the testimony of Ibn Shaddād and Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir: Ayalon interprets these passages to mean that Hülegü was accused of violating an entire code.

VIII

The consequence of this audacious move by Hülegü was the sudden arresting of the Mongol advance in the west on three distinct fronts: in Eastern Europe, in Syria, and in Afghānistān. Let us conclude by briefly examining each of these areas in turn.

There can be little doubt that Berke had been preparing for a major offensive against Europe. An invasion of Poland in 1259[226] was apparently designed as a preliminary to the definitive subjugation of Hungary, whose king, Bela IV, received an ultimatum at some time early in that year: his appeal to Pope Alexander IV elicited only vague promises of help and a prohibition against entering into treaty with the Mongols, but Bela nevertheless prepared to resist.[227] Neither this incursion nor the long awaited forward thrust through Germany, heralded by a letter demanding the submission of St. Louis in the first months of 1261,[228] ever materialised; and the reason is clearly the outbreak of dissension within the Mongol empire. We may in fact justly regard Möngke's death in 1259 and the civil wars that followed, no less than Ögedei's death eighteen years previously and the ensuing interregnum, as having been the salvation of large tracts of Central and Western Europe.

If Latin Christendom had good cause to be grateful for these events as regards the fate of its own heartlands, it was otherwise, at least in the long term, with its outposts in Palestine and Syria, where the Mamlūks were swift to take advantage of the new

---

[226] Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 34–6: although the invasion is here dated 1258–9, the attack on Sandomir, at least, occurred as late as the end of Nov. 1259: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, II, ed. A. Bielowski, Lwów 1872, p. 585 ('ante diem festi S. Andreae').

[227] D. Sinor, 'Les relations entre les Mongols et l'Europe jusqu'à la mort d'Arghoun et de Bela IV', in *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, III/1, 1956 (pp. 39–62), pp. 58–9. For Alexander's letter *Tanquam bene sibi* of 14 Oct. 1259, see A. Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam Sacram Illustrantia*, Rome 1859–60 (2 vols), I, pp. 239–41. The invasion of Poland had served to guard the flank of the main force moving into Hungary in 1241.

[228] See the *Chronica Minor* of the Minorite of Erfurt, ed. O. Holder-Egger, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, XXIV, Hanover 1879, p. 202, *s.a.* 1262: since Alexander IV, to whom St. Louis forwarded the Mongol envoys under guard, died in May 1261, the embassy clearly arrived early in that year. The correct date is substituted by G. Golubovich, *Biblioteca Bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente Francescano*, II, Quaracchi–Firenze 1913, p. 394, who assumes the envoys came from Qubilai. But Berke is obviously in question: cf. G. Soranzo, *Il Papato, l'Europa Cristiana, e i Tartari*, Milan 1930, pp. 192–3.

diplomatic situation. Detailed reports of the struggle that had broken out within the Mongol empire reached Egypt only with the arrival of fugitive Mongol troops on 24 dhu'l-ḥijja 660/9 November 1262.[229] They were part of the Jochid contingent in Iran, who had been instructed by Berke to rejoin him or, failing this, to make their way to the dominions of the Mamlūk Sultan.[230] They were warmly welcomed by Baibars, who had already written to Berke in the previous year.[231] A Mamlūk embassy to the Golden Horde left Cairo in muḥarram 661/November 1262,[232] and in Constantinople met Berke's own envoys en route for Egypt, where they arrived in rajab/May 1263.[233] Thus began the alliance which was to be a corner-stone of the policies of both the Mamlūk Sultans and the khans of the Golden Horde well into the following century. It signifies the first occasion on which a Mongol prince was prepared to collaborate with an independent external power against fellow Mongols; and in this vital sense – remembering the claims to world-

---

[229] The date in Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir: Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt*, text p. 58:12, tr. p. 155. Hence Yūnīnī, II, p. 156:1–4; Nuwairī, in Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 142:3f., tr. p. 164. The date 27 *dhu*'l-qa'ada/13 Oct. given by Abū-Shāma (p. 220:12f.) is that of their arrival in Damascus: hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 496:9f.; *Moufazzal*, i, p. 442 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 176, tr. p. 187).

[230] Sadeque, text p. 58:4–7, tr. pp. 154–5. Hence Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 61r:12ff. (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 78–9, tr. p. 100), who conflates this and the next body of fugitives *s.a.* 661; similarly Nuwairī, in Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 141, tr. p. 163. It is noteworthy that Abū-Shāma (p. 220:14f.) describes these Mongols as refugees from Hülegü's army after a recent defeat by Berke: hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 496:11–14; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, p. 91:5f.; *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 442–3; Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 44. This seems unlikely, though it would at least obviate the chronological difficulties posed by their arrival in Egypt so long after Hülegü's attack on the Jochid contingent in his army: nevertheless, Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir's testimony that they were survivors of that contingent must be regarded as incontrovertible, in view of his position at the Mamlūk Sultan's court. For the subsequent career of these exiles, see Ayalon, 'The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom', in *Islamic Culture*, XXV, 1951 (pp. 89–104), pp. 98–9.

[231] Baibars al-Manṣūrī says that the Sultan had written to Berke as early as 659/1261: MS Ar. 1233, foll. 51r:16–51v:2 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 77:1–5, tr. p. 98). But the passage is clearly based on Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir's reference to a mission sent in 660: Sadeque, text p. 28:5–14, tr. p. 113 (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 46–7, tr. p. 55).

[232] Sadeque, text p. 60, tr. pp. 157–8 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 48, tr. pp. 57–8), for this mission and the meeting in Constantinople.

[233] Yūnīnī, I, p. 533, & II, pp. 194–5; *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 452–3 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 178:3ff., tr. p. 189). Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir says simply that news of their arrival reached the Sultan at Gaza, whence he returned to Cairo on 17 rajab: Sadeque, text pp. 77:10f. & 81:5–8, tr. pp. 181 & 187.

wide dominion that the Mongols had hitherto expressed – it may be said to signify the dissolution of their empire. The advantage that it brought the Mamlūks in the Near East was considerable, and their enemies were ill-prepared to reap any corresponding benefit: Hülegü's readiness now to effect a *rapprochement* with the Latin West – clearly a reflex to Berke's agreement with Muslim Egypt – was treated with no little reserve.[233a]

The new allies were unable, however, to undermine Hülegü's position in Anatolia, where the Saljūqid 'Izz al-dīn Kaikā'ūs II had quarrelled with his brother and co-regent, Rukn al-dīn Qilich Arslan IV, in ramaḍān 659/August 1261 and had been expelled by Hülegü's forces.[234] Early in the following year 'Izz al-dīn wrote to Baibars for assistance, prior to taking refuge with the Sultan's Byzantine ally Michael VIII.[235] Whether he was also in contact with Berke at this time we are not told. But we find the khan of the Golden Horde recommending him to Baibars as early as 661/1263 in the letter brought by his first embassy;[236] while at a slightly later date Berke's forces rescued the Saljūqid prince from a Thracian prison, where Michael had consigned him in an effort, presumably, to placate the Īlkhān and to keep favour with both sides.[237] Nevertheless, 'Izz al-dīn remained an exile until his death.

In eastern Iran and in the Indian borderlands, on the other hand,

---

[233a] Hülegü was announcing his desire for conversion to the Pope as early as 1263: cf. Urban IV's letter *Exultavit cor nostrum*, in O. Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici ... ubi desinit Cardinalis Baronius*, III, Lucae 1748, pp. 63–4 (*ad annum* 1260); and for the date, see Richard, 'Le début des relations entre la Papauté et les Mongols de Perse', in *JA*, CCXXXVII, 1949, pp. 291–7. But the Mongols' record in Eastern Europe had made the West cautious. See generally Sinor, 'Les relations', & Richard, 'The Mongols and the Franks', in *Journal of Asian History*, III, 1969, pp. 45–57.

[234] Yūnīnī, II, pp. 113–4; cf. also I, p. 458, & II, pp. 160–1; see also the anonymous *Tārīkh-i Āl-i Saljūq*, ed. F. N. Uzluk, *Anadolu Selçukluları Devleti Tarihi*, III, Ankara 1952, text pp. 54–5, tr. p. 36; Cahen, 'Quelques textes négligés concernant les Turcomans de Rûm au moment de l'invasion mongole', in *Byzantion*, XIV, 1939 (pp. 131–9), pp. 135–6.

[235] See Sadeque, text pp. 50–2, tr. pp. 145–7, for the embassy to Baibars; also Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 54v:9–17, who says that it left Anatolia before 'Izz al-dīn was actually expelled. Cf. M. Canard, 'Un traité entre Byzance et l'Égypte au XIIIe siècle', in *Mélanges offerts à Gaudefroy-Demombynes*, Cairo 1935–45 (pp. 197–224), pp. 209ff.

[236] Sadeque, text p. 81:20f., tr. p. 188 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 50:6f., tr. p. 59).

[237] For a discussion of this episode, and of Michael's simultaneous detention of an embassy from Baibars to Berke, see Canard, 'Un traité', pp. 213–9.

Hülegü's interests suffered a decisive check; and this requires to be examined in more detail. In 659/1261 the Jochid commander in this region, Negüder, acting on Berke's express orders, assisted a local chief, Tāj al-dīn, to recover the fortress of Mastung from Shams al-dīn Kart of Herat.[238] The same year saw the expulsion of the latter's troops also from Sīstān by the new *malik* Naṣīr al-dīn Muḥammad b. Abi'l-Fatḥ b. Mas'ūd, who had obtained a *yarligh* for his ancestral dominions from Hülegü in 657/1259 after some years of pleading at the *ordo*.[239] It must have been both these setbacks which prompted Shams al-dīn, who had himself been in revolt against Hülegü in 658/1260,[240] to become again his loyal supporter. Nor was an opportunity long in forthcoming. On the massacre of the Jochid forces in western Iran, some of the survivors fled into Khurāsān to join Negüder, with two of Hülegü's *noyans* in hot pursuit.[241] As he moved down from the Murghāb to Andkhūy in an attempt to cross the Āmūya and regain Jochid territory, Negüder learned of the advance of another army under Hülegü's son Tübshin, whereupon he hurried south into the Afghan (Awghān) country, but was overtaken in the vicinity of Shāl and Bīnī-yi Gāw by the combined forces of Tübshin and Shams al-dīn. His army, after a fierce resistance, was routed, and Negüder himself saved only by the timely arrival from Mastung of his client Tāj al-dīn, who fought an indecisive engagement with the pursuing Herat forces and obliged them to retire.[242] Negüder and his army then moved across the Indus.

The outbreak of hostilities between Hülegü and the Golden Horde had the effect of greatly reducing Mongol pressure on the Panjāb, where the frontiers of the Delhi Sultanate had been steadily receding since 1241.[243] The reign of Nāṣir al-dīn Maḥmūd (644/1246–664/

---

[238] Saifī, pp. 264–9; Aubin, 'L'Ethnogénèse', pp. 79–80. Mastung had been captured by Shams al-dīn from some kinsmen of Tāj al-dīn in 652, according to Saifī (pp. 201–5): this is probably too late, and it is noteworthy that Shams al-dīn's enemy, 'Alī b. Mas'ūd of Sīstān, had headed an expedition against it in that year (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 398). On Negüder, cf. Boyle, 'The Mongol Commanders', pp. 242–3; Aubin, pp. 73–4.

[239] *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 399–400.

[240] Waṣṣāf, p. 81:10–18; Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 164, tr. pp. 154–5. Saifī makes no mention of this episode.

[241] *Successors*, p. 123; cf. Aubin, pp. 80–1, for the correct interpretation of this passage.

[242] Saifī, pp. 270–2. For Bīnī-yi Gāw, see Boyle, 'The Mongol Commanders', p. 247, n. 74; Shāl was near the present-day Quetta.

[243] See generally A. B. M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in*

1266), far from meriting Jūzjānī's all too frequent panegyrics, appears to have witnessed a series of military and strategic disasters. In 651/1253–4 the Mongol general Sali had invaded India in an effort to instal at Delhi the renegade prince Jalāl al-dīn Mas'ūd b. El-tutmish, the Sultan's brother, who had fled to Möngke's court requesting assistance. The invaders were in fact unable to penetrate further than Jajnēr, and Jalāl al-dīn had to rest content with Lahore, Kūjāh and Sōdra, which were already subject to the Mongols.[244] Not long afterwards we find the governor of Uchch and Multān, 'Izz al-dīn Balaban Kishlu Khan, accepting into his dominions a Mongol representative *(shaḥna)*.[245] Mongol influence in the Panjāb may have suffered somewhat as a result of Jalāl al-dīn's expulsion from Lahore by Nuṣrat al-dīn Shīr Khan, who had similarly visited Möngke's court, but who now reached an agreement with Maḥmūd whereby his control was recognised over all the territories he had previously held.[246] Consequently, a further appeal for help – this time from Kishlu Khan to Hülegü in person[247] – elicited an immediate response. At the end of 655/ in the winter of 1257–8, Sali entered Sind in strength and dismantled the fortifications of Multān.[248] During the next few years the Mongols continued

India, 2nd ed. Allahabad 1961, pp. 204–22; U. N. Day, *Some Aspects of Medieval Indian History*, New Delhi 1971, pp. 31–41.

[244] Waṣṣāf, p. 310:10–18: hence Rashīd al-dīn, ed. Karl Jahn, *Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'*, The Hague 1965 (Central Asiatic Studies, X), Arabic text p. 18:4–13, Persian text pp. 71:10–72:7 & 116:13–22; Kāshānī, pp. 184–5; cf. also Jahn, 'Zum Problem der mongolischen Eroberungen in Indien (13.–14. Jahrhundert)', in *Akten des XXIV. Internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses, München ... 1957*, Wiesbaden 1959 (pp. 617–9), pp. 617–8. The Indian history of the Iranian authorities serves as a useful supplement, and even corrective, to the scattered and confused data on the Sultanate given for these years by Jūzjānī, who mentions only Jalāl al-dīn's flight from his *iqṭā'* of Budaon in 646/1248 (I, p. 482:12–14; Raverty, pp. 683–4): the lengthy expedition to the north-west for some unspecified purpose that he describes *s.a.* 650–1/1252–3 (I, pp. 486–7; Raverty, pp. 692–3) must have been connected with Sali's invasion. Sali retired not because of the existence of some truce with the Sultan, as Habibullah suggests (pp. 217–8), but in the face of strong resistance (cf. Rashīd's Arabic version: *li-quwwat ahl Dihlī*).

[245] Jūzjānī, II, pp. 38:24–39:2; Raverty, p. 784.

[246] Jūzjānī, II, p. 44 (cf. also p. 34:15–22); Raverty, pp. 792–3 (cf. also p. 768). This formula must have been intended to cover not merely Lahore, but also Sind, which Shīr Khan had earlier wrested from Kishlu Khan. Shīr Khan's party may well be the 'Indian envoys' who left Qaraqorum with Rubruck in 1254: Wyngaert, p. 306; Rockhill, p. 248.

[247] Jūzjānī, II, pp. 39:25–40:2; Raverty, p. 786.

[248] Jūzjānī, I, p. 494:9–11, & II, p. 76:1–5; Raverty, pp. 711 & 844 (where the year 653 is an error for 655).

to harass the frontier regions along the river Bēāh,[249] while preparing, presumably, for their next forward thrust. That it never came Jūzjānī ascribes to an exchange of envoys between Maḥmūd's *nā'ib* and future successor, Ghiyāth al-dīn Balaban Ulugh Khan, and Hülegü's satellites on the frontier, leading to a mission on Hülegü's own behalf in the first months of 658/1260.[250] He alleges that Hülegü, whose ambassadors were overawed by an impressive review of the Sultan's military establishment, ordered Sali to make no further incursions into Maḥmūd's territory.[251] In view of the increasingly precarious situation of the Delhi Sultanate at this time, however,[252] other factors must have been involved.

These events occurred at precisely the moment when Hülegü had received news of Möngke's death and the dispute between his brothers in Mongolia.[253] Since not only Hülegü but Berke also was in diplomatic contact with Delhi in this year, it is possible that both princes were making overtures with a view to their impending struggle, the one seeking the cooperation of a fellow-Muslim, the other endeavouring to secure his rear with a promise of neutrality on Maḥmūd's part.[254] But this must remain a matter of conjecture. More probably Hülegü simply called a halt to campaigning in this region, just as in Syria, prior to moving into Ādharbāījān and waiting upon events.[255] We can have little doubt that the attack on the gravely weakened Delhi Sultanate would have recommenced

---

[249] Jūzjānī, II, p. 79:14f.; Raverty, pp. 850–1.

[250] Jūzjānī, II, pp. 83–4 & 86–8; Raverty, pp. 856–63. The envoys, who were received in rabī' II/March, had arrived at the beginning of the year, when Ulugh Khan was about to depart on campaign against the Mēwāt (II, p. 79:15ff.; Raverty, p. 851).

[251] Jūzjānī, II, p. 88:3–7; Raverty, pp. 862–3.

[252] Maḥmūd's attempt to move against the Mongols after the collapse of Multān had been vitiated by the deliberate failure of two of his major *amīrs* to bring their contingents: they were chastised by a campaign under Ulugh Khan in the summer of 656/1258 (Jūzjānī, II, pp. 34–5 & 76–8; Raverty, pp. 768–9 & 847–9).

[253] Jūzjānī had at least heard of Möngke's death: II, p. 218:14–16; Raverty, p. 1292.

[254] M. 'Azīz Aḥmad, 'Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land', in *CAJ*, VI, 1961 (pp. 182–93), pp. 183–4 & 185; Aubin, p. 81. For Berke's embassy to Delhi, see Jūzjānī, II, p. 218:19ff.; Raverty, p. 1292 & n. 3, confuses the issue unnecessarily.

[255] Hülegü's ultimatum to the Egyptian Mamlūks was clearly sent prior to his withdrawal: see Maqrīzī, *Al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M. M. Ziada, I/2, Cairo 1936, p. 427; Alizade & Arends, text p. 71, tr. p. 51. Kit-buqa was left in Syria merely to guard the new conquests.

shortly; but within three years Hülegü had lost control of the Indian borderlands altogether.

Rashīd tells us of Negüder and his army only that they seized the territory 'from the mountains of Ghazna and Bīnī-yi Gāw to Multān and Lahore'.[256] Further details of their arrival in India, however, are given by Marco Polo, who narrowly escaped capture by the Negüderis while passing through Kirmān. Polo makes the fugitives traverse Badakhshān, the Pashāī and Kashmīr, until they reached 'Dilivar', which they wrested from its ruler 'Asidin Soldan' and where Negüder established his base.[257] It is some time before we hear of his followers terrorising Khurāsān and on occasion conducting raids into Fārs.[258] But in the meantime, the Īlkhāns' attempts to extend their authority even over the regions Negüder had vacated were greatly hampered by the opposition of local dynasts who had been in league with the Jochids, notably Naṣīr al-dīn of Sīstān, who gave shelter to the Jochid commander *Junjudar in 663/1264–5 and defied every attempt to reduce him to obedience over the following decades.[259] Hülegü and his successors were thus cut off from India

---

[256] *Successors*, p. 123.

[257] Yule & Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, I, pp. 98–9; Moule & Pelliot, *The Description of the World*, I, p. 121. Polo's account is confused, and Yule rightly noticed (Yule & Cordier, I, p. 103, n.) that he conflates two distinct episodes, one involving the Jochid general and the other the Chaghadayid prince Tegüder: cf. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, Paris 1959–63 (2 vols), I, pp. 190–5. The other proper names also present difficulties, but there can be little doubt that 'Asidin' is 'Izz al-dīn (as Pelliot, ibid., I, p. 52, suspected) and represents Kishlu Khan at Multān: in this case, of course, Polo would be incorrect in locating 'Asidin' at Lahore (on 'Dilivar', cf. Yule & Cordier, I, pp. 104–5, n.; also Pelliot, *Notes*, I, pp. 195–6, & II, p. 626). Lahore was in any case restored by Ghiyāth al-dīn Balaban shortly after his own accession as Sultan, according to the Delhi historian Baranī: *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, ed. S. A. Khān, Calcutta 1860–2 (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 61:4–8.

[258] The first raid mentioned by Rashīd fell in 677/1278–9: Alizade & Arends, text pp. 151–2, tr. p. 94; ed. Jahn, *Ta'rīḫ-i-Mubārak-i-Ġāzānī ... Geschichte der Ilḫāne Abāġā bis Gaiḫātū* (1265–1295), 's-Gravenhage 1957 (Central Asiatic Studies, II), pp. 35–6. Polo's experience in Kirmān would have occurred earlier, in 1272 (see Pelliot, *Notes*, I, p. 196).

[259] Aubin, p. 80, n. 3; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 400–1. The detachments from Herat left in Sīstān after the campaign by Hülegü's forces against *Junjudar were expelled in 667/1268–9 (ibid., pp. 401–3), and peace between Naṣīr al-dīn and Herat was made only in 693/1294 (p. 407). Relations with the *Īlkhān*, apart from a brief interval in the reign of Tegüder-Aḥmad (pp. 405–6), were strained for rather longer: the 15th Cent. *Tārīkh-i Jadīd*, a history of Yazd, by Aḥmad b. Ḥusain b. 'Alī al-Kātib, describes Sīstān as still not subject *(el)* in the time of Ghazan (ed. Īraj Afshār, Ṭehran 1345 sh./1966, p. 27:7f.).

at both the northern and the southern approaches through Afghānistān.

The establishment in the borderlands of a body of Mongol troops hostile to both the Īlkhāns and the Chaghadayids[260] was a factor of the utmost importance in the history of the Delhi Sultanate, since it postponed for almost four decades the time when India was to experience the full weight of a Mongol invasion. These forces, engaged as they were in raiding the Īlkhān's territories as frequently as India, were small enough not to threaten the survival of the Sultanate (to whose centre the Negüderis seem never to have penetrated), and still sufficiently large to obstruct any expansionist tendencies in this direction on the part of the two neighbouring *ulus*. Jahn's view that the Persian Mongols were prevented from making good their claims to this region by the constant need to defend their other frontiers[261] does not take full account of the situation that had arisen in Afghānistān. As for the Chaghadayids, Alghu's advance into the Indian borderlands, which resulted in the elimination of Sali also,[262] appears to have been merely temporary. In spite of Aubin's assertion that 'the impossibility of maintaining contact with the Golden Horde soon condemned the Negüderis to a change of masters which was already complete by 1270',[263] we may well question whether the Chaghadayids did in fact assume effective control here at this time – still less retain it in the troubled years that followed.[264] Not until the final decade of the century was

---

[260] Polo confirms that the Negüderis were politically isolated: Moule & Pelliot, I, p. 121: 'He (*sc.* Negüder) makes war on all the other Tartars who dwell round his kingdom'; cf. also Yule & Cordier, I, p. 99.

[261] Jahn, 'Zum Problem', p. 618: 'Die Ilchane waren eben durch die Ereignisse an den anderen Fronten ihres Reiches viel zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um dem Südosten das gleiche Interesse wie Hülägü entgegenzubringen'.

[262] Waṣṣāf, p. 12:17–23; Hammer–Purgstall, text pp. 23–4, tr. p. 25. Aubin (p. 82) assumes that this represents an attack on the Toluid position, but it should be seen rather in the context of Alghu's war against Berke, with which Waṣṣāf clearly links it: possibly, therefore, Sali too had been operating on behalf of the Jochids, in spite of Rashīd's suspiciously frequent statements that he belonged to Hülegü along with all the booty and territory he had acquired, and that the rights over his troops who were still there had now passed to Ghazan (Khetagurov, pp. 188–9; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 110, & I/2, pp. 279–80; Alizade & Arends, text p. 22:2–4, tr. p. 21). For Alghu's alliance with Hülegü, see above, section VII & notes 223–4.

[263] Aubin, p. 82.

[264] On the civil wars in Chaghadai's *ulus* after 1270, cf. *Four Studies*, I, pp. 126–7; *Steppes*, pp. 406–7.

a determined effort made from Central Asia to bring the Negüderis into subjection and to dominate the frontiers of India; and then the impact on the Delhi Sultanate was more keenly felt than at any time previously.[265]

If the Jochids had lost Iran, a faint echo of the authority they once enjoyed there nevertheless survives in a curious detail to be found in the Mamlūk sources. Beginning with Baibars al-Manṣūrī and Nuwairī, the Arabic authors ascribe to the head of the *ulus* of Orda, Jochi's eldest son, the style of '*malik* of Ghazna and Bāmiyān'. For a long time it was assumed that the White Horde, as this branch of Jochi's family was designated, actually ruled over these regions – so far south of their known territory – into the fourteenth century.[266] We may infer instead that the Mongol troops quartered here before the conflagration of 1261–2 belonged to Quli, Orda's second son, and that they persisted in a nominal allegiance to his relatives even afterwards.[267]

Additional Note [2009]

Since this article was published, I have modified the opinion expressed here, to the effect that the Jochids had a claim to Iran in its entirety. I am still of the view, however, that they had been granted the pasturelands of north-western Iran and of Khurāsān.

---

[265] For the Chaghadayid invasions of India between 1295 and 1307, see K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis A. D. 1290–1320*, 2nd ed. Calcutta 1967, pp. 124–52; *Steppes*, pp. 412–3; 'Azīz Aḥmad, pp. 186–8; Aubin, p. 84.

[266] See especially Howorth, II/1, pp. 216–21. R. Cottevieille-Giraudet, 'Un dirhem inédit de la Horde d'Or. Contribution à l'histoire des Mongols', in *Revue Numismatique*, 5e série, II, 1938, pp. 89–104, even tried to identify a coin as belonging to this non-existent principality. The error is taken up by Spuler (*Die Goldene Horde*, p. 81). On Orda, see note 68 above.

[267] Cf. Bartol'd, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, ed. & trans. Th. Menzel, Berlin 1935, p. 188. The statement that mention of this branch as ruling at Ghazna is first found in Abu'l-Fidā is incorrect: Baibars al-Manṣūrī (MS Ar. 1233, fol. 232v:7ff.; Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 93–4, tr. p. 118) and Nuwairī (MS Fonds Arabe 1577, fol. 32; cf. Tiesenhausen, I, addenda, p. 551) wrote some years earlier.

ABBREVIATIONS

CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal*
HJAS	*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*
JA	*Journal Asiatique*
MS	*Monumenta Serica*
ROC	*Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

II

From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220 – c. 1290

> Although authority and dominion ostensibly belong to one man, namely whoever is nominated *khan*, yet in reality all the children, descendants and uncles partake of kingship and property.[1]

So wrote the Persian historian Juwaynī in c. 1260. The Mongol conquests were regarded not as the possessions of the emperor or Great Khan (*qaghan*, *qa'an*) but as the joint property of the imperial family (*altan urugh*) as a whole, including female members. The sources suggest that there were a great many family members to cater for. The Franciscan friar William of Rubruck, who travelled east across the steppe in 1253, commented on the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants, who "are daily multiplying and spreading out over this vast wilderness."[2] Indeed, they appear to have doubled even while Juwaynī was writing, since the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants is put at more than 10,000 early in his work, but towards the end is said to exceed 20,000.[3] Such statistics hardly command confidence; though it is only fair to add that Rashīd al-Dīn, the great historian and wazir to the Mongol ruler of Iran in the early fourteenth century, credits Chinggis Khan's eldest son Jochi alone with approximately forty sons (of whom he was able to name, however, a mere fourteen).[4]

---

[1] 'Alā' al-Dīn Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī (G[ibb] M[emorial] S[eries], XVI. Leiden and London, 1912–37), I, 30–31, translation mine; *cf.* translation by J.A. Boyle, [*The*] *H*[*istory of the*] *W*[*orld*-]*C*[*onqueror*] (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols. with continuous pagination), p. 42.

[2] Rubruck, "Itinerarium," XXII, 2, in Anastasius Van den Wyngaert, O.F.M. (ed.), *S*[*inica*] *F*[*ranciscana*], I. *Itinera et relationes fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 222; tr. Peter Jackson, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke 1253–1255*, introduction, notes and appendices by P. Jackson with D.O. Morgan (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173. Cambridge, 1990), p. 142.

[3] Juwaynī, I, 32, and II, 68 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 43, 594).

[4] Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh al-Hamadānī, *J*[*āmi' al-*]*T*[*awārīkh*], II, ed. Edgar Blochet, *Tarikh-i Moubarek-i Ghazani* (GMS, XVIII/2. Leiden and London, 1911), p. 90; tr. J.A. Boyle, [*The*] *S*[*uccessors of*] *G*[*enghis*] *K*[*han*] (London and New York, 1971), p. 99.

[p. 13] The Four *Ulus*es

Provision had to be made for all these descendants. During his lifetime Chinggis Khan is believed to have granted to each of his four sons by his chief wife – Jochi (d. 1226/7), Chaghatai (d. 1242), Ögödei (d. 1241), his successor as qa'an, and Tolui (d. 1232) – a territory in the Asiatic steppe-forest zone (i.e. excluding, as far as we can tell, sedentary areas). These "appanages" or "domains" are denoted as *ulus* in the sources, and are to be distinguished, incidentally, from the *qol-un ulus*, or "*ulus* of the centre," of which the qa'an himself was master and which is examined in the work of Professor Buell[5] – not, in this case, an appanage or a principality, but a kind of "royal demesne," to borrow the terminology of the Latin West. Around the time that Juwaynī wrote, however, momentous changes were taking place within the empire. The transfer in 1251 of the dignity of qa'an from the family of Ögödei to that of Tolui was followed by the suppression of most of the princes of the lines of Chaghatai and Ögödei who opposed the new regime: these two middle branches of the imperial dynasty were drastically pruned and their possessions in large measure redistributed, so that the *ulus* of Ögödei virtually ceased to exist and that of Chaghatai survived only in attenuated form.[6] The new qa'an, Möngke, then put his younger brothers, Qubilai and Hülegü, in command of operations in China and Persia respectively. After Möngke's death in 1259, Qubilai profited from his location in an area of valuable sedentary resources to make a successful bid for the imperial dignity in opposition to his brother Arigh Böke. Taking advantage of the civil war further east, a grandson of Chaghatai named Alughu succeeded in reconstituting Chaghatai's *ulus* in Turkestan, and Hülegü converted [**p. 14**] his own position into that of an *ulus*-holder on a par with the other major princes. Qubilai was recognized as qa'an only by Hülegü and his successors, the Ilkhans, in Persia.[7]

---

[5] Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion," *Mongolian Studies*, 6 (1980), 43–4; see also his "Tribe, *qan* and *ulus* in early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yüan History," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Washington, 1977), pp. 36 ff. I am grateful to Dr. David Morgan for lending me a copy of this thesis given him by Professor Buell.

[6] W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed. by C.E. Bosworth, with additional chapter tr. by T. Minorsky (GMS, new series, V. London, 1968), p. 483. P. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *CAJ*, 22 (1978), 202–6. David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 115–17. Th.T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia and the Islamic Lands 1251–1259* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 22–44.

[7] Jackson, "The Dissolution," pp. 227–35. John W. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in China and Mongolia," *M[onumenta] S[erica]*, 30 (1972–73), 126–32. Thomas T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," in

In the second half of the thirteenth century, then, the Mongol empire seems to disintegrate into a number of separate – and often mutually hostile – states. These were: (1) the so-called khanate of the Golden Horde, ruled by the family of Jochi and founded by Jochi's son Batu (d. 1255/6); (2) the khanate ruled by Chaghatai's line in Turkestan and Transoxiana; (3) the Ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq, governed by the descendants of Hülegü (d. 1265); and (4) the dominions of the qa'an in China and Mongolia, of the line of Qubilai (d. 1294), who as Toluids were more closely related to the Ilkhans than any other branch of the imperial dynasty. This pattern of four khanates, it should be noted in passing, was not materially affected by the opposition to Qubilai of Ögödei's grandson Qaidu in Central Asia, for Qaidu presided over what was essentially a magnified version of the Chaghatayid polity.[8] Nor did it make any difference when, after Qaidu's death, the Mongol world again acknowledged a single emperor, in the person of Qubilai's grandson and successor Temür Öljeitü, and the various khanates made peace with one another (1303–1304), for the general reconciliation was shortlived. By this date the Ilkhanate was in practical terms autonomous, since Ghazan (1295–1304), who as a convert to Islam was eager to display his credentials as a Muslim sovereign, had deleted the qa'an's name from the coinage.[9]

From an early date, historians have grown accustomed to think of the Mongol world, at least until the collapse of Mongol government in Persia in the 1340s and the qa'an's expulsion from China in 1368, as consisting of these four states. Thus a fifteenth-century **[p. 15]** history of the Mongols, purporting to have been written by Temür's grandson Ulugh Beg, bears the title *Ta'rīkh-i ulūs-i arba'a-yi Chingīzī* ("History of the four Chinggisid *ulus*es"), by which are meant the powers listed above.[10] It must be stressed that this framework corresponded more to the realities of the early fourteenth century than to those of Chinggis Khan's own era. Only two of the *ulus*es allotted by the conqueror to his four sons – those of Jochi and Chaghatai – are recognizable in the khanates that emerged after 1260. Unfortunately, many modern historians tend to speak

---

G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), 226–7.

[8] The fullest survey of Qaidu and his empire is to be found in Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997). *Cf.* also the briefer account in W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, tr. V. and T. Minorsky (Leiden, 1956–62, 4 parts in 3 vols.), I, 124–9; Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959–73, 3 vols. with continuous pagination), pp. 124–9; J.A. Boyle, "Ḳaydu," *EI*²; more generally Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty," pp. 130–31.

[9] Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation," pp. 230–32, 235–6.

[10] See, on this work, which is no longer extant, Barthold, *Four Studies*, II, 136–8.

of the *ulus*es of Chinggis Khan's four sons in such terms as to imply either that these were coterminous with the whole empire or that the subsequent development of four separate regional khanates was in accordance with the conqueror's own design. Thus Professor Allsen, in his splendid book *Mongol Imperialism*, writes: "At Chinggis Qan's death in 1227, the empire was formally partitioned among his eldest sons." Or similarly, to quote the late Professor Joseph Fletcher, "Chinggis Khan had divided the territory of his realm into four 'nations' (*ulus*), which he gave to his four sons."[11] Professor Barfield has been an exception to this common tendency.[12] I, alas, have not;[13] and in the following paper, I want to ask what an *ulus* was, to investigate how many major *ulus*es there were, to examine the emergence of *ulus*es and khanates, and to try to offer a fresh perspective.

Ulus and Rulership

There is admittedly a single piece of textual evidence in favour of the view that the creation of an *ulus* for each of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons amounted to a division of the empire as a whole. Referring to events as early as c.1235, the *Secret History of the Mongols* distinguishes the princes who rule an *ulus* (*ulus medekün kö'üt*: rendered **[p. 16]** by De Rachewiltz as "the princes in charge of a domain") from those who do not.[14] The context is the despatch of princes to represent various branches of the dynasty on the great westward campaign of 1236–42 under Batu; and the list of princes chosen does suggest that those "with an *ulus*" comprised simply the heads of the branches founded by Chinggis Khan's four sons.

And yet there is also a good deal of evidence that should discourage us from reading too much into this isolated passage in the *Secret History*. In the first place, our principal source for Mongol history after 1260, the *Jāmi'*

---

[11] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 45. Joseph Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," *HJAS*, 46 (1986), 37, 48. See also Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, tr. Thomas Nivison Haining (Oxford, 1991), p. 207; D.O. Morgan, "Who Ran the Mongol Empire?," *JRAS* (1982), 126–7. Not far distant is Professor Morris Rossabi's formulation: "In 1229 the four Chinggisid lines effected a compromise, which eventually resulted in the first territorial division of the Mongol domains": *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), p. 8.

[12] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), p. 212.

[13] Jackson, "The Dissolution," p. 228.

[14] *S[ecret] H[istory of the Mongols (Mangghol-un niucha tobcha'an)]*, § 270, tr. Igor de Rachewiltz, chap. 12, *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 27 (and commentary at 61 *ibid.*); *cf.* the translation by Francis Woodman Cleaves (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 210.

al-Tawārīkh of Rashīd al-Dīn, is distressingly lax in its use of the term ***ulus***. True, we read here of the *ulus* of Jochi or of Batu; but we also encounter the ***ulus*** of Batu's brother Orda, corresponding to the eastern territories of the Golden Horde and covering, apparently, much of western Siberia (the power tentatively labelled by modern historians "the White Horde").[15] In quite another direction, the language used of a great-grandson of Qubilai Qa'an named Örüg Temür is striking, to say the least. The son of Prince Ananda, who at this time (the end of the thirteenth century) was still alive and held most or all of the Tangut region, Örüg Temür is described as "established and secure on the throne of rulership (*pādishāhī*) in his own *ulus*."[16] And Rashīd al-Dīn employs the term ***ulus*** with relative frequency of the domains held by the progeny of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers in what is now eastern Mongolia and Manchuria, representing the army "of the Left Hand" (i.e. the east). Here he speaks of the ***ulus***es of Jochi Qasar and Qachi'un's son Elchidei;[17] and tells us, too, that Taghachar, a descendant of the conqueror's youngest brother Temüge, held "a great deal of *ulus* and troops."[18]

Regarding this last group of princes Juwaynī has little to say, mentioning only that Temüge and others of his kin were stationed in **[p. 17]** northern China (*Khitāi*).[19] But Rashīd al-Dīn defines their territories more fully. The branch of Jochi Qasar lived in the north-east of Mongolia, around the Arghun and Qailar rivers and the Külün Nor, and Soviet archeologists have unearthed two of its walled towns in Transbaikalia.[20] Somewhere to the south, near the Ulqui river, close to the Great Wall and adjoining the Chorche region (Manchuria), was the territory of the descendants of Qachi'un, who had died relatively young but whose son Elchidei appears as the head of his line when troops and camping-grounds are being distributed. And to the north-east lay the pasturelands of Temüge, described as being situated "in the furthest parts of Mongolia."[21]

---

[15] Thomas T. Allsen, "The Princes of the Left Hand: An Introduction to the History of the *Ulus* of Orda in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *AEMA*, 5 (1985 [1987]), 5–40.

[16] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 603 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 326).

[17] *Ibid.*, I/2, ed. I.N. Berezin, "Sbornik letopisei," *T*[*rudy*] *V*[*ostochnogo*] *O*[*tdeleniia*] *I*[*mperatorskogo*] *R*[*usskogo*] *A*[*rkheologicheskogo*] *O*[*bshchestva*], 13 (1868), 89, 95; tr. O.I. Smirnova, *S*[*bornik*] *L*[*etopisei*], I/2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 52, 54.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56).

[19] Juwaynī, I, 32 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43).

[20] S.V. Kiselev (ed.), *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 23–58, 325–69. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty," p. 119.

[21] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 89, 95–6, 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 52, 54–5, 56).

Moreover, to focus on the arrangements made by Chinggis Khan for his four sons by his chief wife is to ignore his other offspring. One at least of the conqueror's daughters seems to have possessed an appanage: Alaqa Begi was in charge of the affairs of the Önggüt, though it is possible that she owed this position to the fact that she was the widow of the late ruler.[22] More importantly, we are told nothing of the appanage conferred on Kölgen, Chinggis Khan's son by a lesser wife. It would indeed be surprising if Kölgen had received no pasturelands, since Rashīd al-Dīn says that his father put him on the same footing as his other sons and that in the general distribution of troops he was given four "thousands" just as they were (see below), and describes Kölgen's offspring as inheriting his station (*jāt*) and troops.[23]

The Distribution of Troops and Spoils

This brings us to the next question we have to address. What were the *ulus*es in the early decades of the empire, and how did they [**p. 18**] come into existence?[24] The earliest general reference made in the *Secret History of the Mongols* to grants of property (*injü*) among the family of Chinggis Khan in c. 1206 relates to peoples, including both nomads and sedentary groups, and is surely anachronistic, since at that time the conqueror had yet to acquire any sedentary subjects.[25] But a slightly later passage carries more weight. Here, seemingly c. 1207, Chinggis Khan is shown apportioning a certain number of "thousands" to his mother Hö'elün, his surviving brothers Jochi Qasar, Temüge and Belgütei, his nephew Elchidei, and his four sons by his chief wife.[26] Rashīd al-Dīn, writing just under

---

[22] Chao Hung, *Meng-ta pei-lu*, tr. W. Olbricht and E. Pinks, *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh: chinesische Gesandtenberichte über die frühen Mongolen 1221 und 1237* (A[siatische] F[orschungen], 56. Wiesbaden, 1980), p. 24 (and see notes at pp. 31–3).

[23] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 130, and 15 (1888), 220–21 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 71, 276). We know from Chinese sources that Kölgen's son and grandson held the appanage of Ho-chien in Chih-li: *Y[üan] S[ih]*, chap. 107, ed. and tr. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, with notes by Paul Pelliot (*T'oung Pao*, 38, supplément. Leiden, 1945), p. 64; YS, chap. 108, ed. and tr. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII du Yuan Che* (Monographies du *T'oung Pao*, III. Leiden, 1954, vol. I only), p. 110. But this lies rather too far to the south of the steppe to be adjacent to his original *yurt*, and in the absence of further evidence the question must remain open.

[24] B.Ia. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, tr. M. Carsow (Paris, 1948), pp. 124 ff., translates *ulus* as "peuple-patrimoine."

[25] *SH*, § 203, tr. Cleaves, p. 143, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 8, *PFEH*, 21 (March 1980), 27; for the anachronism, see De Rachewiltz's note *ibid.*, p. 49.

[26] *Ibid.*, § 242, tr. Cleaves, p. 175, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 46. The troops of Jochi Qasar, with whom Chinggis Khan fell out, were subsequently reduced to

a century after these events, provides different figures for the sons, and as we have seen gives in addition a number for Kölgen, who is not mentioned in the *Secret History* at all.[27] This is in some measure corroborated by Juwaynī, who speaks in vague terms of grants to Chinggis Khan's "other, younger sons." Juwaynī indicates that the distribution to the four more senior sons was made from the Mongols and the Naiman tribe together with "all the troops" (i.e. nomads).[28] In time, these early grants were augmented by the gift of further population groups. Following a campaign in 1218–19, for example, by Jochi against the "Forest Peoples" (*hoi-yin irgen*) such as the Oyirad (Oirat) and the Kirghiz, they too were granted to Jochi.[29]

These grants were not, of course, territorial in the strict sense. Yet the requirements of a pastoral society dictated the allocation to the **[p. 19]** princes, princesses and commanders (*noyans*) of specified grazing-grounds for the various seasons of the year. According to Rubruck, each commander was familiar with his allotted pasturelands;[30] and a few years later Juwaynī tells us that every one of Chinggis Khan's descendants had his/her own station (*maqām*) and grazing-ground (*yurt*).[31] By *maqām* Juwaynī presumably means *orda*: just how many such camps there were, potentially, emerges from the statement of the papal envoy Carpini (1247) that a prince's camp was never dismantled on his death but continued in existence and was run by one of his wives.[32] This meant that in the Mongolian homeland the *ordas* of long-dead princes whose principal appanage had lain elsewhere still receive mention under Qubilai's reign.[33]

Juwaynī's account of the territorial dispositions made by Chinggis Khan suggests that they occurred later than the first distribution of peoples; and we shall be reviewing his testimony below. As time progressed, and the

---

1,400: Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 99–100 and 248 n. 35.

[27] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 220–21 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 276).

[28] Juwaynī, I, 29–30 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 40–41).

[29] *SH*, § 239, tr. Cleaves, pp. 173–4, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, in *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 44–5: see De Rachewiltz's note at pp. 64–5, on the conflation of two distinct campaigns in the *SH* tradition; but for a different view, see the editorial note in Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 254–5.

[30] Rubruck, II, 1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 172 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 72).

[31] Juwaynī, I, 32 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43).

[32] John of Plano Carpini, "Ystoria Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus," IX, 25, ed. Van den Wyngaert, *SF*, I, 115, and ed. Enrico Menestò *et al.*, *Storia dei Mongoli*, Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo (Spoleto, 1989), p. 315; tr. by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey in Christopher Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London and New York, 1955), p. 60.

[33] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 396, 399, 438–9, 566–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 254–5, 256, 267, 312).

Mongols encroached upon areas of sedentary culture, the fresh distributions of property came to involve more than merely pastoralist or forest-dwelling groups. Rubruck, passing through the Pontic steppe, notices that "the great lords" owned villages to the south.[34] After Chinggis Khan's death in 1227, Yesüi Khatun, one of his wives, was given a large part of the Tangut people in the recently subjugated kingdom of Hsi-Hsia.[35] The possessions of a prince might embrace settled districts adjoining his particular *yurt* or grazing-grounds. Thus Jochi, for instance, was in 1221 given the city of Ürgench in Khwārazm, which lay on the fringes of the steppe territory under his authority;[36]; and if we may believe a **[p. 20]** fourteenth-century author writing in the Mamlūk empire, Chinggis Khan also gave Jochi the regions of Arrān, Tabrīz, Hamadān and Marāgha, south of the Caucasus.[37]

Sometimes we find a prince enjoying lordship over specific groups among the conquered sedentary peoples, notably craftsmen and skilled artisans. When Samarqand fell in 1220, craftsmen to the number of 30,000 were distributed by Chinggis Khan among his sons and relatives.[38] These workers might well be tied to a particular workshop or arsenal, referred to in the Persian sources by the term *kārkhāna*: we are not told what happened to the Samarqand prisoners, but many of them would have been transported to some distant location in the steppes of Mongolia.[39] This fate in any event befell the most famous among such enslaved craftsmen, the Germans captured in Hungary who were the principal reason for Rubruck's mission. They had belonged to the Chaghatayid prince Büri and had been settled at Talas, but following his execution in 1251/2 they were handed over to the qa'an Möngke and moved to Bolad, some hundreds of miles to the east, where they were employed

---

[34] Rubruck, V, 1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 179 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 84).

[35] *SH*, § 268, tr. Cleaves, p. 209, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 12, in *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 25.

[36] Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Nasawī, *Sīrat al-Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn*, ed. and tr. Octave Houdas (Paris, 1891–5), text p. 93, tr. p. 154; also tr. Z.M. Buniiatov, *Zhizneopisanie Sultana Dzhalal ad-Dina Mankburny* (Baku, 1973), p. 137; 13th-century Persian trans. ed. Mujtabā Mīnuwī (Tehran, 1344 Sh./1965), p. 62. Jochi appointed Chin Temür as Mongol resident (*basqaq*) there: Juwaynī, II, 218 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 482).

[37] Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, partial ed. and tr. Klaus Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk* ... (AF, 22. Wiesbaden, 1968), Arabic text p. 15, German tr. p. 100; *cf.* also text p. 17, tr. p. 102, for Hamadān; but *cf.* below and n. 73.

[38] Juwaynī, I, 95 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 122).

[39] For evidence of this kind of transportation, see Paul Pelliot, "Une ville musulmane dans la Chine du Nord sous les Mongols," *JA*, 211 (1927), 266; Louis Hambis, "Notes sur Käm nom de l'Yénissei supérieur," *JA*, 244 (1956), 291.

in mining and manufacturing weapons.[40] At Möngke's headquarters Rubruck met the Parisian goldsmith Guillaume Buchier, the creator of a magnificent mechanical silver fountain which spurted forth a different kind of alcoholic beverage from each pipe. Buchier had been carried off from Hungary in 1241–42 by one of Möngke's half-brothers and presented to the future qa'an's mother Sorqaqtani, passing on her death into the hands of her youngest son, Arigh Böke.[41]

[**p. 21**] In addition to pasturelands and subject peoples, members of the imperial family received shares in the booty and revenues of those conquered sedentary territories – such as China, Persia and Transoxiana – which overall were retained by the qa'an as part of the growing "*ulus* of the centre." These regions were governed from c. 1241 onwards by officials at the head of large satellite administrations answerable to the qa'an himself; but individuals among the *ulus*-holders and other Chinggisids nevertheless had their representatives in the bureaucracy and were further granted rights within the region (the extent to which they enjoyed direct access to their revenues, or were simply dependent on the qa'an's officials to transmit to them what they were due, varied).[42] Princes were naturally alert for opportunities to extend their own appanages at the expense of the centre, and sometimes succeeded: when Chaghatai treated part of neighbouring Transoxiana as his own property, Ögödei benignly overlooked the offence and even granted him the territory in question.[43]

Occasionally the sources reveal a prince in possession of some city or fortress that he had captured in person, but which might well be far removed from his customary habitat. On his way back across the Caucasus, Rubruck came across an Alan fortress just north of Darband, which was the personal property of the qa'an Möngke, since it was he who had reduced the region in

---

[40] Rubruck, XXIII, 2–3, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 224–5 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 144–6); and *cf.* Peter Jackson, "William of Rubruck: A review article," *JRAS* (1987), 95–6. On the workshops, see I.P. Petrushevsky, "The Socio-economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-khāns," in J.A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. V. *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 512–13.

[41] Rubruck, XXXII, 5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 287 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 223–4). For Buchier, see Leonardo Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher, a French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore, 1946).

[42] Buell, "Tribe, *qan* and *ulus*," pp. 121–6, 149–52, 164–9. For restrictions on princely appanage-holders after Möngke's accession, see Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 80–81, 86–8; Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 90–103.

[43] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 196 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 156). The context of this episode is discussed by Paul Buell, "Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara," *Journal of Asian History*, 13 (1979), 143–6.

c. 1239 during Batu's invasion of eastern Europe.[44] There is evidence for this kind of arrangement in China also. In 1213 Chaghatai, accompanying his father on campaign against the Chin, received the plunder from the city of T'ai-yüan-fu.[45] This clearly gave him a more lasting proprietary association with the city, for when in 1236 the qa'an Ögödei **[p. 22]** divided up the populations of the recently subjugated Chin empire among his kindred, the inhabitants of T'ai-yüan-fu fell to Chaghatai's share.[46] Tolui had received the booty from Cheng-ting-fu, and it was presumably on these grounds that in the same distribution of 1236 the qa'an gave Tolui's widow Sorqoqtani the town as an appanage (*fen-ti*).[47]

But the distribution of spoils from a conquered territory was by no means confined to those who had taken part in the original campaign of conquest; it extended also to those who had not. This practice must surely be connected with the representative character of the armies sent to garrison newly conquered territories, or to reduce new territories, which has been illuminated by M. Jean Aubin. The prince in command of an expedition would be accompanied by contingents representing, or perhaps led by, princes from each of the other Chinggisid lines. The system is found in operation as early as Chinggis Khan's great expedition against the Khwārazmshāh.[48] It applied also when Ögödei's son, the qa'an Güyüg, sent the general Eljigidei to Persia in 1247 and in Hülegü's expedition of 1254–60.[49] Whether the principle of representative contingents obtained from the very outset in the Chinese campaigns, we do not know; though Juwaynī expressly informs us that the army with which Qubilai was sent against Yün-nan in 1252 was made up on this basis.[50]

---

[44] Rubruck, XXXVII, 17, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 318 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 260).

[45] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 181 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 146). This is Marco Polo's "Taianfu." For the date, see *YS*, chap. 1, tr. F.E.A. Krause, *Cingis Han: Die Geschichte seines Lebens nach den chinesischen Reichsannalen* (Heidelberg, 1922), p. 32.

[46] *YS*, chap. 2, tr. Waltraut Abramowski, "Die chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 10 (1976), 132.

[47] Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 14. For the grant to Tolui, see Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 216 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 165). This is Polo's "Acbalec": Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 8–9. On the appanages in China, see Paul Ratchnevsky, "Zum Ausdruck 'T'ou-hsia' in der Mongolenzeit," in Walther Heissig (ed.), *Collectanea Mongolica: Festschrift für Professor Dr. Rintchen zum 60. Geburtstag* (AF, 17. Wiesbaden, 1966), 173–91; Endicott-West, pp. 89 ff.

[48] Juwaynī, I, 66–7, 113, 117 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 86, 143, 151). See generally Jean Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas," *Turcica*, 1 (1969), 65–94. Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 464–5, seems to have been the first scholar to draw attention to this.

[49] Juwaynī, I, 211–12 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 256). Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, ed. A.A. Alizade and tr. A.K. Arends, *Dzhami-at-tavarikh*, III (Baku, 1957), text p. 22, tr. p. 21.

[50] Juwaynī, III, 90 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 607).

In this fashion Tolui, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, acquired rights over plunder and income not merely in northern China but also in the Qipchaq steppe – where he never fought in person – and elsewhere, and these rights were inherited by his offspring.[51] And the [**p. 23**] same author describes the progeny of Kölgen as owning a *kārkhāna* in Tabrīz even in his own day.[52] Outlining the situation in Persia in Ögödei's reign, the Delhi chronicler Jūzjānī wrote that Batu had his allotted share of every province in the country that had come under Mongol control, and that this share was duly taken away by his agents.[53] An early fourteenth-century chronicler of Herat furnishes precious corroboration of this when he describes the requisitions (transport animals, tents and an annual sum of 300 fine *dīnārs*) made upon the city on Batu's behalf by a local Mongol commander.[54]

Territorial Appanages

It is necessary now to examine the location of some of the first appanages. Juwaynī describes the enormous tracts allotted to Chinggis Khan's three elder sons, lying at an increasing distance from the Mongols' original homeland according to seniority. Hence Jochi received the lands stretching from Qayaligh and Khwārazm as far as Saqsīn and Bulghār and "from that side as far as the hooves of the Mongol horses had penetrated"; Chaghatai was given the land from the frontiers of the Uighur principality as far as Samarqand and Bukhārā, and resided in the vicinity of Almaligh on the Ili river; while Ögödei occupied the valleys of the Emil and the Qobuq. These lastnamed regions, of course, were Ögödei's personal appanage: when he was elected qa'an in 1229 (and consequently took over the *qol-un ulus*, "*ulus* of the centre"), two years after

---

[51] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 216–17 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 165).

[52] *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 135, and 15 (1888), 221 (tr. Smirnova, *SI*., I/2, table facing 72, and 276). Rashīd al-Dīn, *S[hu'ab-i] P[anjgāna]*, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, Istanbul, MS. III Ahmet 2937, fol. 106b.

[53] Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, British Library MS. Add. 26189, fol. 255b: *wa-har wilāyat dar Īrān ki dar ḍabṭ-i mughal āmada būd ūrā az ān diyār naṣīb mu'ayyan būd wa-gumāshtagān-i ū dar ān miqdār ki qism-i ū būd naṣīb mīburdand.* I have used this early 14th-century MS. in preference to the printed edition of 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (2nd ed., Kabul, 1342–43 Sh./1963–64), II, 176, which reads *naṣab būdand* for *naṣīb mīburdand*; *cf.* the translation by H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī* (Bibliotheca Indica. London, 1873–81), p. 1172.

[54] Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb Harawī (Sayfī), *Ta'rīkh-Nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. Muḥammad Zubayr aṣ-Ṣiddíqí (Calcutta, 1944), pp. 228–9.

his father's death, he transmitted them to his eldest son Güyüg.[55] We are not given specific information about the *qol-un ulus* which, according to the *Secret History*, [p. 24] was solemnly handed over to Ögödei.[56] But it evidently included Qaraqorum, which appears as the nucleus of Ögödei's seasonal migrations and of which Rubruck says that the Mongols regarded it as their "royal demesne."[57] The pasturelands of Chinggis Khan's fourth son Tolui will be considered below.

These territorial dispositions are problematic. Let us examine the description of the lands conferred on Jochi. Rashīd al-Dīn for the most part cites the conqueror's commission to his eldest son strictly in terms of the later territory of the Golden Horde, but at one point he supplies a different version. According to this, the prince was entrusted with all the territory and people (*ulus*) in the confines of the Irtysh river and the Altai mountains, and his pasturage (*yurt*) was on the Irtysh.[58] These territories lay, of course, further east – i.e. nearer the homeland – than those bestowed on the third brother, Ögödei; and the "Forest Peoples" conferred on Jochi in 1218 (above) dwelt further east still. If Juwaynī is correct, Rashīd al-Dīn's details concerning the Irtysh and the Altai must surely refer to an earlier arrangement, and the edict (*yarligh*) authorizing Jochi to take possession of the "Northern Countries" (enumerated as Ibir-Sibir, Bular/Bulghār, the Qipchaq steppe, and the lands of the Bashgird/Bashkir, Rus' and Cherkes/Circassians as far as Darband)[59] would have been promulgated later, doubtless in the wake of the expedition against the Khwārazmshāh. (It is naturally quite possible that this passage represents a hindsight, for the decision to attack the Volga Bulgars, the Alans and the Rus', at least, does not appear to have been taken until Ögödei's reign, when Jochi's place had devolved upon his sons.[60] Nevertheless, Jochi's forces are found quartered in the "Qipchaq steppe"

---

[55] Juwaynī, I, 31, 191–2 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 42–3, 236). See J.A. Boyle, "The Seasonal Residences of the Great Khan Ögedei," in Georg Hazai and Peter Zieme (eds.), *Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischen Völker: Protokolband der XII. Tagung der Permanent International Altaistic Conference 1969 zu Berlin* (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients, 5. Berlin, 1974), pp. 145–51; repr. in Boyle, *The Mongol World-Empire 1206–1370* (London, 1977). For Chaghatai, see also Juwaynī, I, 226 (tr. *HWC*, p. 271), and Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th Century," in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 248–9.

[56] *SH*, § 269, tr. Cleaves, p. 209, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 12, in *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 26 (and commentary at pp. 57–8).

[57] Boyle, "The Seasonal Residences"; Rubruck, XVII, 6, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 208 (*habent pro regali*; tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 125).

[58] Rashīd al-Dīn, II, 131 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 117).

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 107 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 107); cf. also pp. 131, 132 (tr. *SGK*, pp. 117, 118).

[60] Juwaynī, I, 224 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 268–9). Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 136–7.

– presumably the grazing-grounds of the Qangli – around the [**p. 25**] time of Chinggis Khan's homeward departure from Transoxiana in 1222–23.[61])

In all probability, therefore, the details furnished by Juwaynī are misleading. They imply that the allocation of pasturelands to Jochi occurred at a single instant, when in fact it seems, rather, that Jochi's territory shifted over the years. There is nothing especially surprising about this. Not only is it conceivable that the grants took place at different stages as the respective sons came of age, but – if Juwaynī's indications that distance was related to seniority are trustworthy – the portion of the eldest son would have moved westwards, or at least outwards, as the empire expanded, in order to accommodate the grants of territory to his younger brothers.[62] Chinggis Khan and his sons may even have envisaged that the centre of gravity of each primary appanage (i.e. those created in the conqueror's lifetime) would move away from the heartlands of the empire as the Mongol conquests continued to grow in future generations.[63] This is perhaps the significance of a remark by the ill-fated prince Büri, the owner of the German slaves who were the object of Rubruck's quest. According to the friar's informant, Büri had one day (while drunk) asked querulously why he should not move his livestock to the Volga and pasture there as Batu did: the remark subsequently cost him his life.[64] Büri may possibly have been articulating the belief that the conquests of Jochi's family on the empire's distant western frontiers made a transfer of their eastern grazing-grounds to their Chaghatayid neighbours somewhat overdue. But this must remain in the realm [**p. 26**] of surmise; *in vino veritas* is hardly the most reliable compass for the historian adrift in the Mongol empire. At any rate the Chaghatayids were to come off badly as a result of the territorial changes of the next decade or so, and to find

---

[61] Juwaynī, I, 110–11, 116 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 139–40, 149); cf. also I, 70 (tr. *HWC*, p. 90), where Jochi moves to the Qara Qum steppe, north of the Aral Sea (see Boyle, p. 89 n. 9 *ibid.*). Jūzjānī, II, 150 (tr. Raverty, p. 1101). A variant of Carpini's report, the so-called "Tartar Relation," § 20, enshrines a vague recollection of Jochi's operations here: Alf Önnerfors (ed.), *Hystoria Tartarorum C. de Bridia monachi* (Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen, 186. Berlin, 1967), p. 15. See generally Thomas T. Allsen, "Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217–1237," *AEMA*, 3 (1983), 11–14.

[62] See further the discussion in Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, pp. 209–10, n. 74, which is based, however, on the testimony of late and (for this purpose) unreliable Mongolian sources such as the *Altan Tobchi*. W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, ed. and tr. Th. Menzel (Berlin, 1935; repr. Hildesheim, 1962), p. 164; *idem*, *Four Studies*, I, 112–13.

[63] The notion appears plausible at least as far as concerns the West. In the eastern reaches of the empire, there was perhaps less scope; though Temüge was able to develop a suitably predatory relationship with the client kingdom of Koryŏ: W.E. Henthorn, *Korea. The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden, 1963), pp. 24, 28, 195, 202.

[64] Rubruck, XXIII, 2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 224 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 144–5).

themselves hemmed in by their kinsfolk, with little or no room for expansion. After the foundation of the Ilkhanate and the rise of Qaidu, we find the head of Chaghatai's *ulus*, Baraq (1266–71), expressing a sense of constriction and ill-usage.[65]

What of the pasturelands held by the descendants of the fourth son, Tolui? Juwaynī is remarkably unhelpful on this score, because what he actually seems to say is that during Chinggis Khan's lifetime Tolui remained at his side.[66] The sources emphasize that according to Turkish and Mongol custom the youngest son (by the chief wife), known as the *ot-chigin* ("hearth-child" or "-prince"), inherited the original *yurt* of the father and, incidentally, the mother.[67] We can observe this principle at work in the case of Tolui's own youngest son, Arigh Böke, whom Rubruck in 1254 found occupying the *orda* of his mother Sorqaqtani and who inherited the major part of her property, including, as we saw, the most widely talked-about Parisian goldsmith of the Middle Ages.[68] Now it seems that on Chinggis Khan's death Tolui, as "hearth-prince," inherited the Mongol homelands – the site of his father's residence (*takhtgāh*) and "the great *ordas*" – in the valleys of the Onon and Kerülen rivers.[69] In so far **[p. 27]** as we have any evidence, however, concerning the patrimony of Tolui's offspring, it relates to a quite different region altogether. We should have expected the "hearth-child" of Tolui and Sorqaqtani to have inherited the Onon-Kerülen region from his father. Yet Rashīd al-Dīn says that Arigh Böke had his summer-quarters in the Altai and wintered on the Ürünggü, and adds

---

[65] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, text p. 110, tr. p. 72.

[66] Juwaynī, I, 31–2: *Tūlī nīz muttaṣil-u mujāwir-i ū būd.* Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43, rendered this as: "Toli's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto." The word *ū*, however, refers not to Ögödei or his son Güyüg, who have just been mentioned, but back to Chinggis Khan, so that the translation should read: "Toli in turn was near him and at his side." This interpretation is confirmed by Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 126 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 69). It is noteworthy that the corresponding phrase used by al-'Umarī, (Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 14-15), who in this passage simply translated Juwaynī into Arabic, is *kāna waladuhu Tūlī muttaṣil*^{un} *bihi*, and Lech, like Boyle, was misled (tr. p. 100: "An dieses Gebiet grenzte auch das des ... Tūlī").

[67] Juwaynī, III, 3 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 549). Rubruck, VII, 4, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 185 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 92). Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/1, ed. A.A. Romaskevich *et al.* (Moscow, 1965), p. 550, and tr. A.A. Khetagurov, *SL*, I/1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 193; I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 47, 97 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55; sentence omitted at p. 30); II, 2, 16, 213, 277 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 17, 30–31, 163, 202).

[68] Rubruck, XXXII, 4 and 5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 287 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 223, 224). See also Juwaynī, II, 256 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 519).

[69] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 218 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 166). The site of "the great *ordas*" is discussed by Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 330–53.

that Sorqaqtani too had lived there.[70] On the other hand, Rubruck's testimony indicates that Arigh Böke, and Sorqaqtani before him, had a *yurt* rather closer to Qaraqorum.[71] Nor, of course, can we discount the possibility that in both cases the grazing-grounds ascribed to Arigh Böke had been acquired only since the downfall of Ögödei's line in 1251. In the present state of our knowledge the question must remain open. I can do no more here than draw attention to the problem posed by inconsistent data; and it is impossible to discuss matters of this kind without remembering that it was Tolui's line which seized upon the imperial dignity in 1251 and that our vision of developments in the thirteenth-century empire is refracted, as it were, through the Toluid lens of our principal sources.[72]

To recapitulate, then, the grazing-grounds conferred on Chinggis Khan's four senior sons do not represent the only grants of territory and peoples made to his family; nor do they prove quite as simple to define as we have sometimes assumed. The general effect of the principles I have described was to make an *ulus* more than just an assemblage of peoples and pasturelands: the *ulus* of a particular prince might be dispersed, in fact, over a far wider geographical area than just the territorial base – be it steppe or steppe-and-forest or steppe and steppe-agrarian frontier zone – which he occupied at the time. Throughout the empire there had arisen an extremely **[p. 28]** complex pattern of rights over tribal elements, colonies of enslaved subject peoples, and grazing-grounds, with perhaps the addition of nearby cities and their agricultural hinterlands with entitlement to urban commodities and revenues from further afield. These rights, transmitted by Chinggis Khan's sons and brothers to their descendants, were gravely undermined by the events of the mid-to-late thirteenth century.

---

[70] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 560–61 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 310). This passage, which is corrupted in Blochet's edition, is amended by Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 341–2: for the correct readings, see the translation by Iu.P. Verkhovskii, *SL*, II (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), 201.

[71] Rubruck, XXXII, 6–7, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 288 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 224).

[72] See, on Juwaynī for instance, David Ayalon, "The Great *Yāsa* of Chingiz Khān. A Re-examination. Part B," *Studia Islamica*, 34 (1971), 151–66; repr. in his *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam* (London, 1988). On the later doctoring of the *SH* by the Toluids, Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 36–42; Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some remarks on the dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *MS*, 24 (1965), 197–201, believes the entire section on Ögödei's reign was composed under Qubilai. The number of troops under Tolui's authority according to Rashīd al-Dīn presents a further problem: see Appendix.

The Emergence of the Khanates in Western and Central Asia

Möngke's accession and the overthrow of the lines of Ögödei and Chaghatai must be viewed as the first stage in this process. In Western Asia after 1251, resources appear to have been divided between Tolui's family and their Jochid allies. The great army sent westwards under Hülegü in 1253 was made up of representative contingents, as had been the pattern hitherto, but significantly no commanders are mentioned as representing Ögödei's family. Edicts of the new qa'an superseded previous territorial arrangements. The Mamlūk author al-ʿUmarī, for example, mentions at one juncture that Möngke allocated Tabrīz and Marāgha to Batu's brother and successor, Berke; and the later rulers of the Golden Horde seem to have based their claims to the Transcaucasus on Möngke's *yarligh*.[73] In Tibet, the influence of Ögödei's son Ködön (Köten), which had hitherto been paramount, underwent something of an eclipse, and new appanages were created for other princes, notably Hülegü.[74] Evidence from the period when the Mongol world erupted in civil war ten years later provides a similar picture. At that time the revenues of the land west of the Oxus were divided into three parts. The **[p. 29]** details vary: in one account, two-fifths went to the qa'an, two-fifths to the army (the Mongol forces operating in Persia, presumably) and one-fifth to the house of Batu; in the other version, the three shares appear as equal thirds.[75] In Bukhārā at the same date, the skilled artisans belonged either to Batu's family, to Sorqaqtani (who was by now dead and must have been succeeded by Arigh Böke) or to the *dalāī-yi buzurg* (i.e. the *ulus* of the

---

[73] Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd-Allāh b. ʿAlī Qāshānī, *Ta'rīkh-i Ūljāytū Sulṭān*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran, 1348 Sh./1969), p. 146. al-ʿUmarī, ed. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 20, 78, German tr. pp. 104, 143–4: this evidence was overlooked in Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 208–9, 219–20.

[74] Luciano Petech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols* (Rome, 1990), pp. 10–12, 89–90. Turrell V. Wylie, "The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted," *HJAS*, 37 (1977), 117. The date of Ködön's death varies in the sources, and it is unclear whether he died in 1251 or was still alive in 1260: see János Szerb, "Glosses on the Oeuvre of Bla-ma 'Phags-pa: II. Some notes on the events of the years 1251–1254," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 34 (1980), 264 n. 7, 269 n. 22, 277. Juwaynī, I, 201 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 245), has him die as early as the reign of Güyüg (1246–1248).

[75] Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, *al-Dhayl ʿalā' Mir'āt al-Zamān* (Hyderabad, A.P., 1374–80/1954–61, 4 vols only published), I, 498, and II, 161: his source was the lost portion of the biography of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars by Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285). Qirṭāy al-ʿIzzī al-Khazāndārī, *Ta'rīkh Majmūʿ al-Nawādir*, Gotha Forschungsbibliothek MS. (Pertsch, no. 1655), fol. 79a; extract (wrongly attributed to Ibn Wāṣil) tr. in V.G. Frhr. von Tiesenhausen, *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy*, I (St. Petersburg, 1884), text p. 71, tr. p. 73.

centre).[76] Apropos of all three regions the implications are clear: the shares of the two middle Chinggisid branches have largely been eliminated.

Qubilai and Hülegü were charged with particular tasks: the continuation of the war against the independent Sung dynasty in the one case, the overthrow of the Ismā'īlīs of northern Persia (the "Assassins") and perhaps also of the 'Abbasid Caliph on the other. What Möngke's longer-term aims were, we cannot know. There does appear to be evidence that Qubilai was regarded as a subordinate khan (*il-khan*) in China, on a par with his kinsmen who headed the other *ulus*es. Regarding Hülegü the evidence is more tortuous. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Möngke ostensibly made the commission a temporary one by ordering his brother to return to his original *yurt* in Mongolia once his task was accomplished, even though he privately intended Hülegü and his heirs to rule over Persia, just as they later in fact did. This looks rather like an attempt by the Ilkhanid historian to rationalize what had happened.[77] At any rate, there is no certain testimony that Hülegü assumed the title *il-khan* earlier than 1260.[78]

[**p. 30**] The events following Möngke's death in 1259 and the outbreak of civil war between the brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke produced a still more drastic simplification than that effected by the coup of 1251. The Jochids, headed now by Berke, were Arigh Böke's most powerful supporters. In Persia, Hülegü arrested and executed the leading Jochid princes and generals who had accompanied his expedition, and massacred their troops: the survivors fled eastwards to join the Jochid commander Negüder in present-day Afghanistan, where they came to form the independent Negüderis (or Qaraunas).[79] Alughu, switching his support to Qubilai from Arigh Böke, slaughtered the artisans in Bukhārā who belonged to the Jochids. Hülegü, Qubilai and Alughu were all successful in bringing under their control the bureaucracies which had been set up for their respective territories some twenty years previously and which had been designed to function on behalf of the "*ulus* of the centre." In Alughu's case, it is quite clear that Chaghatayid authority was extended not only over some former Jochid possessions but over the cities of Transoxiana, which had

---

[76] Waṣṣāf (Shihāb al-Dīn 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Izz al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh Shīrāzī), *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-A'ṣār*, lithograph edn. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 51: this evidence is discussed in Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 516–17 n. 225; *cf.* also Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people," p. 53 n. 24.

[77] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 47–9: he assumes that Qubilai and Hülegü enjoyed the same status. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, text p. 24, tr. p. 22. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 221–2; but *cf.* Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 148–9.

[78] Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence for the Early Use of the Title *ilkhan* among the Mongols," *JRAS*, 3rd series, 1 (1991), 353–61. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation," p. 227.

[79] Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse," pp. 79–81. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 239, 242–3.

hitherto been directly subject to the qa'an. Both Hülegü and Alughu received patents of legitimation from Qubilai, who needed their support in his own struggle with his brother's party.[80] But in Mongolia, at the same time, Arigh Böke seems to have appropriated the encampments of Hülegü's wives and sons, which are subsequently found in the hands of his offspring.[81]

Despite these profound changes, distribution of revenue continued in some measure, and certain of the assignments survived for a considerable time. With the conquest of Sung China in 1279, a fresh apportionment occurred, for Rashīd al-Dīn refers to Qubilai dividing "the provinces of Nangiyas" among the princes.[82] Chinggisid princes resident in Western Asia were still entitled to produce in kind from China, or to the revenues of certain districts there, in the fourteenth century;[83] though we are better informed about the transmission of goods and incomes to Persia, with whose Toluid rulers **[p. 31]** the qa'an was on consistently friendly terms. In 1298–99, when an embassy was sent by the Ilkhan Ghazan to the qa'an's court at Khanbaligh, it was noticed that the share owed to Hülegü's line had not been paid since Möngke's reign, and its equivalent in silk and fine garments was duly despatched back with the envoys.[84] Fourteen years later, Ghazan's brother and successor, Öljeitü, sent another mission, with instructions to collect the revenue that should have accrued in the interim.[85] The qa'an continued, of course, to demand his share of the plunder and revenue from Persia, and in the eyes of a European observer, at least, this drain on the Ilkhan's resources provided, interestingly enough (but probably wrongly), one reason for his desire for auxiliary troops from the Latin West.[86] But in some cases the arrangements for the transfer of revenue were sabotaged. Thus the Ilkhans were accused of withholding from the Jochids the revenue due to them from workshops (*kārkhānahā*) in Tabrīz and elsewhere.[87] And if Marco Polo is

---

[80] Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 218. For Alughu, see Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 419–20 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 260–61).

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 566–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 312).

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 453 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 273). For Nangiyas (*nan-chia*, "people of the south"), see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, p. 275.

[83] The evidence is summarized by Emil Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1888, 2 vols), II, 11–14.

[84] Waṣṣāf, p. 506.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 504.

[86] Hugues Revel, Master of the Hospitallers, to Edward I of England, 30 Sept. 1275, in Ch. Kohler and C.V. Langlois (eds.), "Lettres inédites concernant les croisades (1275–1307)," *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 52 (1891), 54 (*au grant Cham ... qui voleit aveir conte de ce que Alahaou, son pere d'Abaga, aveit gahagnié en Perse et a Baudac et au Cayre et a Halape*). The insertion of Cairo (which the editors incorrectly take to signify *Carrae* = Ḥarrān) is an obvious slip.

[87] al-'Umarī, ed. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 78–9, German tr. pp. 143–4.

to be believed, one of the causes underlying the bitter conflict between Qubilai and his enemy Qaidu was the qa'an's refusal to send Qaidu what was his due from China.[88]

The *ulus*es or khanates of the later thirteenth century were not the *ulus*es of the first generation. They represented, by and large, an administrative rationalization, a consolidation and concentration of resources in the hands of fewer princes. Control of agrarian and urban wealth by the rulers of the newly emergent *ulus*es in Persia and China, especially, may well have furnished them with a valuable leverage against their external enemies or a means of putting pressure on doubtful allies. The forfeiture of income and enslaved craftsmen in areas of sedentary culture, by princes who dwelt a considerable distance away and whose claims were hardly enforceable, reveals nomadic rulers at perhaps their most vulnerable, some decades **[p. 32]** before Mongol khans began to court a different kind of insecurity by abandoning the steppe to reside in nearby towns.

Ulus and Khanate in the Far East

The rationalization and consolidation of resources I have alluded to occurred for the most part in Central and Western Asia. In the east, however, a parallel process is discernible slightly later. Qubilai's failure to destroy Qaidu and his confederates in Turkestan was offset by a major triumph at the expense of his relatives in eastern Mongolia and Manchuria. One of the flaws in the traditional view of the partition of the Mongol empire, as we saw, is that it takes no account of the branches of the imperial dynasty descended from Chinggis Khan's brothers. The distant location of their princely domains has condemned them to an obscurity which is only fitfully pierced by brief and occasional references in the Persian sources. In the account of Chinggis Khan's distribution of troops found in the *Secret History*, Temüge and his mother Hö'elün jointly received ten "thousands"; Rashīd al-Dīn supplies separate figures of five "thousands" for Temüge and three for his mother.[89] Whichever number we choose to trust, it is clear that the conqueror's youngest brother was at this time granted a larger number of subjects than any other member of the dynasty. An envoy from Sung China writing in c. 1221 singles out Temüge for special mention,

---

[88] Marco Polo, *Le divisament dou monde*, ed. and tr. A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *The Description of the World* (London, 1938, 2 vols), I, 447–8; and tr. A. Ricci, *The Travels of Marco Polo* (London, 1931), pp. 359–60.

[89] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *IVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 98, and 15 (1888), 221, 223 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55, 277). *SH*, § 243, tr. Cleaves, p. 176, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PTEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 47. Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 195, suggests that the discrepancy in the figures can be explained by two separate allocations of troops.

noting that for the most part he commanded his own forces and perhaps thereby stressing his autonomy.[90] The Taoist patriarch Ch'ang Ch'un, who visited Temüge in the course of his journey from China to Chinggis Khan's headquarters in Afghanistan, was highly impressed by his encampment, which contained thousands of tents.[91] Clearly this was no minor princeling.

Temüge was for a considerable time Chinggis Khan's favourite brother and enjoyed a higher rank than the rest.[92] He appears in [**p. 33**] the *Yüan Shih* with the loftier title *kuo-wang* ("regional king," "viceroy"),[93] and when Chinggis Khan set out from Mongolia on his seven-year campaign to Western Asia in 1218 Temüge was left in charge of "the residence (*khāna*) and the *ordas*."[94] On the conqueror's return in 1225, however, Temüge seems to have fallen from favour;[95] and thereafter his career went rapidly downhill. Following the death of Ögödei in 1241, he made a bid for the vacant imperial throne, but was foiled by the empress-regent Töregene; and on Güyüg's accession in 1246 he was arrested, tried and put to death.[96] His political miscalculation may have affected the position of his offspring. Garbled rumours which reached independent Delhi suggest that during the uncertain years after Ögödei's death some of Temüge's sons had fled to China;[97] and this branch of the family does in fact appear to have been demoted, since Rashīd al-Dīn asserts that in more recent times precedence among the descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers had belonged not to Temüge's line but to the posterity of Jochi Qasar.[98] Possibly the reversal of status can be traced partly to the great services performed for Qubilai during the civil war of 1260–64 by Qasar's son Yesüngge.[99]

---

[90] Chao Hung, *Meng-ta pei-lu*, tr. Olbricht and Pinks, p. 24.

[91] Li Chih-ch'ang, *Hsi-yü chi*, tr. Arthur Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (Broadway Travellers. London, 1931), pp. 64–5.

[92] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55).

[93] Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, p. 23; and *cf.* also p. 150.

[94] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 222 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 277).

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 142 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 230).

[96] *Ibid.*, II, 236–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 178), for a slightly fuller version than that of Juwaynī, I, 199, 203, 210 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 244, 248, 255). *Cf.* also Carpini, V, 18, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 64, and ed. Menestò *et al.*, p. 264 (tr. in Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 25).

[97] Jūzjānī, II, 166 (tr. Raverty, pp. 1143–4).

[98] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 87 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 51). For the demotion of Jochi Qasar and his line by Chinggis Khan, see n. 26 above.

[99] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 88 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 52); II, 389, 392–3, 398 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 252, 253, 255). For his career, see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Stele of Yisüngge," in Walther Heissig *et al.* (eds.), *Tractata Altaica Denis Sinor sexagenario ... dedicata* (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 493–5.

Whatever the ranking of the progeny of Chinggis Khan's brothers, there is no doubt that they all grew disaffected late in Qubilai's reign. In 1287 these princes rose under the leadership of Temüge's descendant Nayan, who has been immortalized by Marco Polo; and with the support of, among others, Kölgen's grandson Ebügen and the family of Ögödei's son Ködön, they made common cause with Qaidu against the qa'an.[100] Qubilai was victorious in the field, and [**p. 34**] Nayan headed those who were executed by the time-honoured method of being wrapped in a carpet and beaten to death. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the princes' troops were taken from them and redistributed among the imperial family.[101] We know from Chinese sources that Qubilai went on to suppress the agents (*darughachis*) appointed by these princes to superintend their assignments in China.[102]

What was the reason for this relatively sudden and highly formidable opposition to the qa'an in the north-east? It is easy, perhaps, to understand the attitude of Ködön's line, whose position in the empire appears to have deteriorated steadily since the coup of 1251. Ködön himself had lost out in the course of events following Ögödei's death. At one time envisaged by Chinggis Khan himself as the next in line for the imperial throne after Ögödei,[103] he had first seen his brother Güyüg elected in his place and had then, as we noticed earlier, been obliged to relinquish his authority in Tibet after Möngke's accession. His sons, whose appanage lay in the Tangut region, may have nursed further grievances. Rashīd al-Dīn is noticeably coy on the subject, mentioning their participation in the 1287 revolt only once and everywhere else stressing

---

[100] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 99–100 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56); II, 533–5 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 298). Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, 192–201; tr. Ricci, pp. 103–9. For the chronology and other data from Chinese sources, see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 788–9; for a full narrative, Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 222–4. Nayan's descent as given in Berezin's text of *JT* is in error: *cf.* the correct version in *SP*, fols 103b–104a; also Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis (eds.), *Cheng-wou Ts'in-tcheng lou. Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan* (Leiden, 1951, vol. I only), pp. 178–9.

[101] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 90, 97 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 53, 55).

[102] *YS*, chap. 14, cited in Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 112. The allegation by Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 100 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56), that nobody of Temüge's line remained alive, should be treated with caution, since at least one of Temüge's descendants, Toqta, prince of Leao, is found holding an appanage in the 14th century: Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 42. His precise ancestry is uncertain: Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, pp. 35, 46 n.31; Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 503 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 286). For the resettlement of (some of?) Nayan's surviving dependants, see Herbert Franke, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft. Das Shan-kü sin-hua des Yang Yü* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXXII/2. Wiesbaden, 1956), p. 82.

[103] Juwaynī, I, 206 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 251); a more definite assertion in Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 243 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 181).

the ties of friendship that bound Ködön's line to the qa'ans Qubilai and Temür Öljeitü.[104] It may well be that this branch of the dynasty felt threatened by the creation **[p. 35]** in 1272 of a new principality at Ngan-si (Si-ngan) in Shan-si, ruled successively by Qubilai's son Manggala and grandson Ananda;[105] and certainly their survival is difficult to reconcile with the considerable sub-kingdom in Tangut over which Ananda clearly presided by the turn of the century.[106] As for Nayan, Chinese sources reveal a steady encroachment on his autonomy from 1284 as the Liao-tung region was brought more immediately under Qubilai's control.[107] This seems to be referred to only by Rashīd al-Dīn. When listing the major descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers, he mentions three times censuses instituted on Qubilai's orders with a view to counting the members of these branches of the imperial dynasty. The context is actually the great number of princes and princesses which emerged from the inquiry.[108] But the census was the mechanism with which the Mongols traditionally prefaced the imposition of taxation upon the subject peoples, and its application here, in remote parts of Mongolia, would indicate some greater degree of centralization on the part of the qa'an, involving an end to the fiscal exemptions enjoyed by his kinsfolk.[109]

Conclusion

I have tried to demonstrate that the *ulus* comprised more discrete elements than we have generally supposed. Nor was it static: the arrangements made for Chinggis Khan's eldest son Jochi, at least, appear to have changed over time. I have also argued that a greater number of major appanages existed than we have tended to believe. We occupy no vantage-point that enables us to discern which *ulus*-holders were intended to have pre-eminence: it is only hindsight that has elevated the appanages of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons to the status of official divisions of the Mongol empire at an early date. **[p. 36]** In

---

[104] *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 219, 226 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 276, 278); II, 6, 226 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 21, 170).

[105] Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 88: Ananda received the title in 1282.

[106] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 362, 593, 595, 597 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 243, 322, 323).

[107] E.P.J. Mullie, *De mongoolse prins Nayan* (Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, XXVI/3. Brussels, 1964), pp. 9–11.

[108] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 97, 99, 102 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55, 56, 57).

[109] For Qubilai's gradual build-up of imperial authority in other parts of Mongolia, see Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty," pp. 132 ff.

particular, the domains of Chinggis Khan's brothers have hitherto been left out of the reckoning, and I suggest that they should be viewed as *ulus*es until the *débâcle* of 1287 and their absorption into Qubilai's Chinese realm. And lastly, whatever Chinggis Khan's intentions were for the future development of his empire, the events of the mid-thirteenth century constituted a disruptive twist, creating powerful new *ulus*es and perhaps even in some measure fossilizing the organic growth that had been present in the system as a whole. We must not be mesmerized by these developments into assuming that they represented a natural progression from Chinggis Khan's own allocations of territory. The making of the Mongol states was almost as bloody and as tortuous a business as was the expansion of the empire itself for those powers and peoples that were its victims.

Appendix

Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Tolui received all the troops and peoples who remained after the distribution to the rest of his kindred.[110] At one juncture they are said to have totalled 101,000 men, as against the 4,000 allotted to each of Tolui's older brothers.[111] This testimony, which is accepted by modern authors,[112] nevertheless places a heavy strain on our credulity. How was Ögödei supposed to govern his empire when the vast majority of his forces even nominally belonged first to his youngest brother and then, after Tolui's death, to his widow Sorqaqtani and her sons? Rashīd al-Dīn offers a somewhat feeble explanation – Chinggis Khan foresaw that Tolui's line would eventually attain the imperial dignity, and so deliberately made them more powerful from the outset[113] – which amounts to no more than an attempt to justify the Toluid coup of 1251–52. Professor Allsen has drawn attention to the way in which the *Secret History*, for instance, first composed in 1228 or 1240, underwent revisions in the wake of that coup.[114] It may well be significant that even here Rashīd **[p. 37]** al-Dīn finds no corroboration; instead, the *Secret History* says plainly that Tolui

---

[110] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 224, 228 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 278, 279); II, 213–14 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 163, 164).

[111] *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 194–5 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 266); *cf.* also p. 215 (tr. p. 274).

[112] E.g., Fletcher, "The Mongols," p. 36; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 60–61; Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 195.

[113] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 214 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 164).

[114] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 39–42.

was given four "thousands" just as was each of his older brothers.[115] Rashīd al-Dīn's information looks as if it was the product of still later doctoring of the facts. If his testimony regarding the 101,000 troops has any basis in reality, it can only refer to the army of the centre (*qol*), which would have been under Tolui's command during the interregnum preceding Ögödei's election in 1229 and then handed over to the new qa'an. And possibly a faint echo of this is to be found elsewhere in the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, where Rashīd al-Dīn seems to admit that Tolui's forces were subordinate to "whoever rules the great *yurt* and station" (i.e. the qa'an).[116]

---

[115] *SH*, § 242, tr. Cleaves, p. 175, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (March 1982), 46.

[116] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 228 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 279). An anecdote designed to illustrate Sorqaqtani's loyalty may also be linked. The qa'an Ögödei arbitrarily transferred some "thousands" (the details vary in the two different versions found in the *JT*) which belonged to Sorqaqtani and her sons to his own son Ködön. Some *noyans* in the service of the Toluids protested vigorously to Sorqaqtani, who conceded that they were right but pointed out that all of them, including herself and her sons, belonged to the qa'an and it was his prerogative to do as he saw fit: *ibid.*, pp. 224–6 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 278); II, 223–4 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 169–70). The troops in question may have been part of the *qol* over which Tolui as regent had briefly wielded authority.



THE MONGOL IMPERIAL DYNASTY
(Qaghans in block capitals)

III

Hülegü Khan and the Christians: the making of a myth

By the late 1230s the Mongols had acquired the conviction that their rulers possessed a mandate from Heaven to conquer the entire world.[1] This mission was attended by a fair degree of success, since by Qubilai's election as Great Khan (*qaghan*) in 1260 they had taken control over much of China, present-day Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Inner Asian steppes as far as Hungary, and levied tribute on a host of client princes from Rus' to Korea. In 1261, however, with the eruption of civil war, the unitary empire began to disintegrate into a number of rival, though still powerful, khanates;[2] and in 1262 Hülegü Khan, the founder of one of these states, the Ilkhanate, and the first member of the Mongol imperial dynasty to rule over Iran, wrote to Louis IX of France proposing simultaneous operations against their common enemy, the Mamlūk empire in Egypt and Syria. The letter, contrasting sharply with the uncompromising ultimatums that had characterized earlier Mongol dealings with European powers, inaugurated a series of diplomatic contacts between the Ilkhans and the Latin West which lasted until 1307:[3] after that date they appear to have been abandoned, and in 1323 the Ilkhanate concluded a peace treaty with the Mamlūks.

A remote forebear of this paper was read in May 1997 to a symposium on the Ilkhanate convened at St Antony's College, Oxford, by Reuven Amitai-Preiss and Donald Richards. It is a pleasure to dedicate this revised version to Jonathan Riley-Smith, who twenty years earlier chaired the first seminar at which I spoke on relations between the Mongols and the Franks.

[1] D. O. Morgan, 'The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean', in *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. B. Arbel *et al.* (London, 1989 = *Mediterranean Historical Review* 4.1), p. 200. For the older literature, see E. Voegelin, 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255', *Byzantion* 15 (1940–41), 378–413; I. de Rachewiltz, 'Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire', *Papers on Far Eastern History* 7 (1973), 21–36.

[2] For the date, see P. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', *Central Asiatic Journal* 22 (1978), 233–4.

[3] For these contacts, see J. A. Boyle, 'The Il-Khans of Persia and the Princes of Europe', *Central Asiatic Journal* 20 (1976), 25–40; F. Schmieder, *Europa und die Fremden. Die Mongolen im Urteil des Abendlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahrhundert*, Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters 16 (Sigmaringen, 1994), pp. 89–109; J. Richard, 'D'Älğigidäi à Ġazan: la continuité d'une politique franque chez les Mongols d'Iran', in *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. D. Aigle, Bibliothèque Iranienne 45 (Tehran, 1997), pp. 61–6.

In his letter of 1262 to King Louis, Hülegü described himself as both 'eager ravager of the faithless races of the Saracens' and 'kindly exalter of the Christian faith', and claimed to have released Latin slaves who had been captured while on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Having learned, moreover, that the pope was not in fact the king or emperor of the Franks, as the Mongols had hitherto believed, but the head of all those who worshipped the Messiah, he had ordered the Holy City, together with everything else pertaining to the Latin kingdom, to be restored to him.[4] These claims resurface in the report which the envoys of Hülegü's son and successor, Abaqa (1265–82), made to the Second Council of Lyons in 1274. From this document, it appears that Hülegü owed his instruction in the realities of Frankish politics to the Dominican Friar David of Ashby, who had visited him as part of an embassy sent from Acre by the Papal Legate: the sole known manuscript of David's own account of the Mongols was destroyed in a fire in Turin in 1904, but a nineteenth-century abstract survives, from which we learn that the embassy was sent soon after the fall of Aleppo to Hülegü's forces (January 1260).[5] In their report Abaqa's envoys stated that Hülegü had restored to liberty any enslaved Christian prisoners the Mongols encountered (presumably Latins) and given them escort as far as the Mediterranean; it is also asserted, on the authority of Friar David, that Hülegü had made over to the Franks the Holy City 'with its entire kingdom' and had them put in possession.[6] How the Ilkhan is supposed to have accomplished this, at a time when Jerusalem was not even in Mongol hands,[7] is unclear; but the story was remarkably tenacious, since it was accepted as fact by the Dominican missionary Ricoldo of Montecroce in 1291 and is found also in the treatise which the expatriate Armenian prince Hayton of Gorighos presented to Pope Clement V in 1307.[8]

The bull *Exultavit cor nostrum*, which Pope Urban IV sent to the Ilkhan in 1263–64, shows that news of Hülegü's Christian sympathies had reached

[4] P. Meyvaert, 'An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France', *Viator* 11 (1980), 253, 257, 258.

[5] C. Brunel, 'David d'Ashby, auteur méconnu des *Faits des Tartares*', *Romania* 79 (1958), 39–46. For the abstract, see A. Schèler, 'Notices et extraits de deux manuscrits français de la bibliothèque royale de Turin', part 3, *Le Bibliophile Belge*, 3e série, 2 (1867), 26–8.

[6] B. Roberg, 'Die Tartaren auf dem 2. Konzil von Lyon', *Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum* 5 (1973), 299, 300. K.-E. Lupprian, *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels*, Studi e Testi 291 (Vatican City, 1981), no. 44, p. 229.

[7] His forces had briefly entered Jerusalem in 1260. R. Amitai, 'Mongol Raids into Palestine (AD 1260 and 1300)', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1987), 237–8.

[8] *Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor*, ed. J. C. M. Laurent, 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1873), p. 120; Hayton, *La flor des estoires de la terre d'Orient* 3.20 and 21, in *RHC arm* 2 (Paris, 1906), Fr. text, pp. 170, 172 (Latin text, pp. 301, 303).

western Europe by other channels also. The pope had learned from a certain John the Hungarian, who claimed to be Hülegü's envoy, that the Ilkhan strongly desired to become a Christian and asked Urban to send some suitable person to administer the sacrament of baptism and to instruct him in the essentials of the faith; Urban ordered William of Agen, the newly created patriarch of Jerusalem, to investigate.[9] Virtually nothing is known of John, but he was clearly a person of some standing at the Ilkhan's court, since the letter of 1262 refers to him in terms that suggest he was Hülegü's intermediary in dealing with the Christians.[10] The question whether Hülegü's preference for Christianity was genuine is of central importance in view of his efforts, and those of his successors, to portray themselves in their correspondence with the popes and western kings as pro-Christian.

What do we know of Hülegü's religious leanings? According to Abaqa's envoys, he had revealed to Friar David and his (unnamed) colleague many intimate secrets of his heart which he had never vouchsafed to anyone else, regarding his conversion to the Christian faith and receiving baptism.[11] Strikingly similar testimony is given by the Armenian chronicler Vardan Arewelçi, who visited the Ilkhan in 1264. Hülegü told him and his companions that he had been a Christian since birth, through the influence of his mother, the Kereyid princess Sorqaqtani (d. 1252). Vardan assured the Ilkhan that Christian clergy 'by land and by sea' were praying for him; Hülegü expressed some doubt over the efficacy of such intercessions where the clergy were not actually treading God's path, and bestowed gifts of money on the party despite their protests that they valued only gifts that were timeless and inexhaustible. Vardan adds, however, that by his death early in the following year (1265) Hülegü had been seduced by the 'astrologers and priests of some images called Šakmonia', i.e. Buddhist priests (*toyins*). The Buddhists even prevailed upon him to build an idol-temple, where he prayed and where 'they worked whatever witchcraft they desired upon him'.[12] Vardan's contemporary, Kirakos of Ganjak (d. *c.* 1272), admits that the efforts of the Ilkhan's chief wife, Doquz Khātūn, to wean him away

[9] Lupprian, *Die Beziehungen*, no. 41, pp. 217–18. Lupprian reconstitutes the pope's letter, which had previously been extant in two distinct fragments. See *Les registres d'Urbain IV*, ed. J. Guiraud, 4 vols. (Paris, 1901–58), nos. 2864, 2814 *bis* (in that order). The date was established by J. Richard, 'Le début des relations entre la papauté et les Mongols de Perse', *Journal Asiatique* 237 (1949), 291–7, repr. in his *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age. Études et documents* (London, 1977). William is described as patriarch-elect as early as 9 December 1262. *Registres d'Urbain IV*, no. 168.

[10] Meyvaert, 'An Unknown Letter', pp. 257, 258.

[11] Roberg, 'Die Tartaren', pp. 299–300; Lupprian, *Die Beziehungen*, no. 44, p. 229.

[12] Vardan Arewelçi, *Hawak'umn patmut'ean*, trans. R. W. Thomson, 'The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelc'i', *DOP* 43 (1989), 220–1.

from his dependence on the *toyins* were unavailing.[13] We know, too, that Hülegü was the last Ilkhan to be interred in accordance with traditional Mongol custom, involving even the burial of live female slaves to minister to their lord in the afterlife.[14] It was perhaps on this account that when Doquz Khātūn asked the Armenian clergy to celebrate Mass for her husband's soul, they refused, says Vardan, although the Nestorians agreed to do so.[15]

Nevertheless, the notion that the first Ilkhan had been strongly pro-Christian was well established by the early fourteenth century. For the Armenian Grigor of Akner, Hülegü was 'very good, loving Christians, the church and priests'; he was 'friendly and pro-Christian'; he 'was a great shedder of blood, but he slew only the wicked and his enemies, and not the good or righteous'; 'he loved the Christian folk more than the infidels'.[16] Hayton claims that Hülegü greatly honoured Christians, whereas the Muslims were reduced to servitude.[17] A few years earlier, another Armenian chronicler, Step'annos Orbelian (d. 1304), had called Hülegü 'the hope and providence of Christians' and had hailed him and Doquz Khātūn as the equals in piety of Constantine and Helena.[18] Indeed, Hülegü had shown 'such affection towards the Christians that all the faithful submitted with pleasure and rendered him the most active assistance'.[19] The Jacobite Christian chronicler Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) is more restrained regarding Hülegü's Christian sympathies, though his epitaph on the first Ilkhan is still somewhat effusive: 'Hulawu, king of kings, departed from this world. The wisdom of this man, and his greatness of soul, and his wonderful actions are incomparable.'[20]

[13] Kirakos Ganjakeçi, *Patmut'iwn Hayoç*, trans. R. Bedrosian, *Kirakos Ganjaketsi's History of the Armenians* (New York, 1986), pp. 333–4.

[14] Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-Aṣār* (1298), lithograph edn. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 52; partially ed. J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte Waṣṣaf's* (Vienna, 1856, vol. 1 only), text p. 97; D. O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), p. 158.

[15] Vardan, trans. Thomson, p. 222; B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit 1220–1350*, 4th edn. (Leiden, 1985), p. 177.

[16] R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, 'History of the Nation of the Archers (the Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc'', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12 (1949), 341, 343. Hülegü allegedly levied on the Armenians an annual tribute of pigs, and then sent 2,000 pigs to each Muslim city with orders for the populace to eat pork on pain of death!

[17] Hayton, *La flor des estoires* 3.19, Fr. text p. 169 (Latin text p. 301).

[18] Step'annos Orbelian, *Patmut'iwn nahangin Sisakan*, trans. M. F. Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1864–6), 1: 234, 235. See also J. M. Fiey, 'Iconographie syriaque: Hulagu, Doquz Khatun . . . et six ambons?' *Le Muséon* 88 (1975), 59–64.

[19] Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, 1: 227.

[20] Bar Hebraeus, *Makhtebhânûth zabhnê*, trans. E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abû 'l-Faraj . . . Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus*, 2 vols. (Oxford and London, 1932), 1 (trans.): 444. In his Arabic chronicle, *Mukhtaṣar Ta'rīkhi l-Duwal*, ed. A. Ṣāliḥānī (Beirut, 1890; repr. 1403/1983), p. 497,

There seems little doubt that Doquz Khātūn – like Sorqaqtani, a member of the Kereyid tribe, among whom Christianity had been entrenched for some generations – was a Christian. Although she was thus a Nestorian, Vardan observed that 'with sincere love [she] honoured all the Christian race'.[21] He credits her with the advancement of the cause of Christianity in the Near East, while for Kirakos of Ganjak she was the protectress and supporter of Christians.[22] Grigor of Akner, too, says that she 'much loved all Christians, Armenians and Syrians' and that all Christians were very much grieved by her death.[23] For Bar Hebraeus, 'this truly believing and Christian queen . . . raised on high the horn [i.e. position] of the Christians in all the earth'. Describing how Doquz Khātūn followed Hülegü to the grave in the summer of 1265, he lamented that 'great sorrow came over all the Christians throughout the world because of the departure of these two great lights, who had made the Christian religion triumphant'.[24] Even the Persian Muslim chronicler Rashīd al-Dīn refers to the protection extended to Christians by Doquz Khātūn and the rise in their fortunes during her lifetime, and says that to please her Hülegü showed them favour.[25] He tells us that Hülegü's brother, the qaghan Möngke, at the time he despatched him westwards in 1254, had urged him to consult Doquz Khātūn in all matters.[26] Whether or not this is actually true, it suggests at least that Rashīd al-Dīn felt a need to explain the considerable influence Hülegü's chief wife wielded over him.

On the face of it, there is nothing intrinsically improbable about a Mongol prince harbouring Christian sympathies, or about the kind of royal confidence enjoyed by both Vardan and David of Ashby. As early as 1247, the papal ambassador Carpini had reported that the Mongols acknowledged one supreme god, and it has been suggested that during the

Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al-'Ibrī) says merely that Hülegü was possessed of an intellect and understanding which endeared him to wise men and the *'ulamā*. On this – a separate work, rather than merely an Arabic translation of the Syriac *Chronography* – see L. I. Conrad, 'On the Arabic Chronicle of Bar Hebraeus', in *Actes du 4^e Congrès international d'études arabes chrétiennes: Cambridge, septembre 1992*, ed. S. K. Samir *et al.*, II (Kaslik, Lebanon, 1994 = *Parole de l'Orient* 19), 319–78. The remarks found in the *Chronography* about Hülegü's favour towards Christians are here either considerably toned down or omitted.

[21] Vardan, trans. Thomson, p. 217.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 222; Kirakos, trans. Bedrosian, p. 334.

[23] Grigor, trans. Blake and Frye, pp. 341, 351.

[24] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, pp. 419, 444. In the first corresponding passage in *Mukhtaṣar* (p. 461), he calls her a faithful Christian; in the second (p. 497) he comments merely on her great wisdom.

[25] Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh al-Hamadānī, *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, ed. A. A. Alizade, 3 (Baku, 1957), text p. 7; trans. W. M. Thackston, *Jami'u'-t-Tawarikh. Compendium of chronicles*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1998–9), II: 472.

[26] *Ibid.*, text p. 24 (trans. Thackston, p. 479).

early conquest period the sky-god (Tenggeri) of the steppe tribes was becoming assimilated to the omnipotent deity of the monotheistic peoples with whom the Mongols had long had contact.[27] Various members of the Mongol imperial dynasty were believed to have adopted the Christian faith, and conversations with Mongol rulers about religious matters are reported elsewhere. As Vardan knew, Hülegü's mother Sorqaqtani had been a Christian, and his youngest brother Ariq Böke, who emerged in 1260 as Qubilai Qa'an's rival for the imperial dignity, appears to have inclined towards Christianity.[28] According to Marco Polo's book, Qubilai himself inquired of Polo's father and uncle about the practices of the Roman Church and often spoke to them about his interest in the Christian faith, to which, we are told, he desired to be converted; he was held back by fear of retaliation from the 'idolators', and wanted them first to be confuted by wise men sent from the pope.[29] Although this account – like other details in the book which inflate the Polos' importance – may be suspect,[30] rumours of Qubilai's Christian sympathies had certainly reached Bar Hebraeus, who calls him 'the just and wise king, and lover of Christians'.[31] For Hayton, Qubilai actually was a Christian.[32]

To what extent do Hülegü's actions and those of his troops bear witness to any sympathy for Christians or Christianity?[33] During his visit to Iraq in 1291 Ricoldo was told that when the Mongols invaded the Near East only the Muslims were massacred; Hülegü forbade his forces to enter the houses of Christians or to do them any injury.[34] And Grigor claims that

[27] John of Plano Carpini, *Ystoria Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus* 3.2, ed. E. Menestò *et al.*, *Storia dei Mongoli* (Spoleto, 1989), p. 236; trans. by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey, in *The Mongol Mission*, ed. C. Dawson (London, 1955), p. 9; A. M. Khazanov, 'Muhammad and Jenghiz Khan Compared: the Religious Factor in World Empire Building', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993), 465–6.

[28] William of Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 32.7–8, in *Sinica Franciscana*, 1. *Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*, ed. A. Van den Wyngaert (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), p. 288; trans. P. Jackson and D. O. Morgan, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck. His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke (1253–1255)*, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173 (London, 1990), pp. 224–5.

[29] *Le divisament dou monde*, ed. and trans. A. C. Moule and P. Pelliot, *The Description of the World*, 2 vols. (London, 1938), 1: 78–9, 201–2 (only in Ramusio's sixteenth-century version); trans. R. Latham, *Marco Polo: the Travels* (Harmondsworth, 1958), pp. 36, 119–20.

[30] P. Jackson, 'Marco Polo and his "Travels"', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61 (1998), 95–101. I cannot agree with Frances Wood, who argues in *Did Marco Polo go to China?* (London, 1995) that the Venetian probably travelled no further than the Crimea.

[31] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, p. 439.

[32] Hayton, *La flor des estoires* 3.12, Fr. text p. 160 (Latin text p. 294).

[33] Most of the episodes below are discussed in J. M. Fiey, *Chrétiens syriaques sous les Mongols (Il-Khanat de Perse, XIIIe–XIVe s.)*, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, subsidia 44 (Louvain, 1975), ch. 2, 'Le nouveau Constantin: Hülagu (1256–1265)', but drawing rather different conclusions.

[34] Laurent, ed., *Peregrinatores*, p. 120.

the Christians were spared at Mayyāfāriqīn in 1260.[35] The piece of evidence most commonly quoted is that during the sack of Baghdad the Mongol troops were ordered to spare the Christian population, whose homes were placed under guard.[36] Yet we should note that a number of sources give the credit for this not to the Ilkhan but to others in his entourage. Both Kirakos and Vardan say that the Christians of Baghdad were spared at the intercession of Doquz Khātūn; while for Bar Hebraeus they owed their lives to the action of the Jacobite Catholicus, who had accompanied the Mongols into the city (having previously formed part of an unsuccessful delegation to Hülegü from the caliph) and gathered them in the church of the Tuesday Bazaar.[37]

Whatever the impulse behind the preservation of Baghdad's Christian inhabitants, their *confrères* elsewhere in the Near East were less fortunate. Even Ricoldo cites an incident from a town near Baghdad where the Christian inhabitants took pity on their Muslim neighbours and gave them shelter, but were massacred alongside them by way of reprisal on the conqueror's express orders.[38] It is clear from the chronicle of Bar Hebraeus that in other towns that resisted, such as Sarūj, Manbij, Qal'at Najm, Qal'at Ja'bār and Bālāsh, the entire populace was massacred; there is no mention of the Christians being exempted.[39] At Aleppo, where the slaughter was allegedly worse than at Baghdad, Bar Hebraeus tells us that the Mongols destroyed 'the upper portion of the walls of our church'. He himself, as the Jacobite metropolitan, had gone out during the siege in January 1260 to intercede with Hülegü, but was taken into custody and imprisoned at Qal'at Najm. Most of the believers, he continues, assembled in the Greek Orthodox basilica: here the menfolk were slaughtered, while their families were made captive.[40] At Ḥārim, the inhabitants were ready to yield to the Mongols, but demanded an oath to respect their lives through the medium of the former governor of Aleppo, a Muslim: Hülegü agreed, but

[35] Grigor, trans. Blake and Frye, p. 335.

[36] See, for instance, *al-Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a* (early fourteenth century; attributed to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī), ed. Bashshār 'Awwād Ma'rūf and 'Imād 'Abd al-Salām Ra'ūf (Beirut, 1997), p. 359.

[37] Kirakos, trans. Bedrosian, p. 318; Vardan, trans. Thomson, p. 217; Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, p. 431 (all this is omitted in his *Mukhtaṣar*).

[38] Laurent, ed., *Peregrinatores*, p. 120.

[39] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, p. 435; *Mukhtaṣar*, p. 486.

[40] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, pp. 435–6; *Mukhtaṣar*, p. 487 (much briefer). A.-M. Eddé, *La principauté ayyoubide d'Alep (579/1183–658/1260)*, Freiburger Islamstudien 21 (Stuttgart, 1999), p. 179. Cf. Armenian testimony that the Mongols did not slaughter the Christians of Aleppo but merely plundered their possessions. *La chronique attribuée au Connétable Smbat*, trans. G. Dédéyan, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 13 (Paris, 1980), p. 105; S. Der Nersessian, 'The Armenian Chronicle of the Constable Smpad or of the "Royal Historian"', *DOP* 13 (1959), 160.

was so angry at this stipulation that once the gates were opened they were all massacred except an Armenian blacksmith.[41] Now it was not unknown for the Mongols or their auxiliary troops to disregard orders in the heat of the campaign, at least if Bar Hebraeus is to be believed, since he tells us that the slaughter of Christians during Abaqa's Anatolian expedition in 1277 contravened the Ilkhan's command that they were to be spared.[42] But the evidence of the sources is that the massacres of 1260, by contrast, were authorized by Hülegü himself. Such testimony is somewhat inconvenient for anyone who shares the confidence of the late Professor Fiey that the slaughter of Christians 'may be considered as accidental'.[43]

Mongol goodwill towards Christian subjects and auxiliaries was certainly not to be taken for granted. The Coptic Christian author Ibn al-'Amīd tells us that he and many of his co-religionists fled from Damascus with their wives and families at the very beginning of 1260 from fear of the advancing Mongols: clearly no news had reached them of any pro-Christian stance.[44] Even where Christians did not perish in the bloodbaths inflicted on their Muslim fellow citizens during these early years, they might still not survive for long. In March 1258, just after the sack of Baghdad, the Christians of Takrīt, who had requested from the Catholicus an official to protect them, were denounced to the Mongol governor by a Muslim on the grounds that they had secretly misappropriated the goods of slain Muslims. This was reported to Hülegü, and a Mongol army was sent to put them all to the sword, save for a few old people and children who were carried off into captivity.[45] The people of Sassun, according to Kirakos, had submitted to Hülegü and benefited initially from the favour enjoyed by their prince, the Armenian Christian Sadun, but the Mongols subsequently violated their oath and conducted many massacres in the region.[46] Nor did excessive zeal

[41] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, p. 436; *Mukhtaṣar*, pp. 487–8. For Ḥārim, see also Rashīd al-Dīn, III: 69 (trans. Thackston, p. 503), where the Armenian is described as a goldsmith. Ibn Shaddād (d. 1285), *al-A'lāq al-Khaṭīra fi Dhikr Umarā'i l-Shām wa l-Jazīra*, British Library MS Add. 23,334, fol. 54r, and trans. A.-M. Eddé-Terrasse, *Description de la Syrie du Nord* (Damascus, 1984), pp. 42–3, confirms in outline the details of the surrender.

[42] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, p. 458.

[43] Fiey, *Chrétiens syriaques*, p. 25.

[44] al-Makīn b. al-'Amīd, *Kitāb al-Majmū'i l-Mubārak*, ed. C. Cahen, 'La «Chronique des Ayyoubides» d'al-Makīn b. al-'Amīd', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas* 15 (1955–7), 172, trans. A.-M. Eddé and F. Micheau, *Chronique des Ayyoubides (602-658/1205-6-1259-60)*, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 16 (Paris, 1994), p. 114. R. S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols. The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260* (Albany, N.Y., 1977), p. 351, accounts for the choice of Tyre on the grounds that the Mongols 'had so far displayed a markedly pro-Christian policy in the Near East'.

[45] Bar Hebraeus, trans. Wallis Budge, *Chronography*, p. 433; Fiey, *Chrétiens syriaques*, p. 24.

[46] Kirakos, trans. Bedrosian, p. 322.

in the war against the Muslims necessarily win Mongol approval. Following the capture of Aleppo in 1260, King Het'um's Armenian troops, who had assisted in the attack, burned down the cathedral mosque, an act of vandalism for which many of them were slaughtered on Hülegü's orders.[47]

Favouritism towards any particular faith or religious group, in fact, was incompatible with the Mongols' view of their imperial mission. Chinggis Khan had issued an edict that the Mongols were to regard all sects as one and were not to distinguish between them.[48] The Mongol general Eljigidei had drawn this circumstance to the attention of King Louis himself in 1248,[49] and we know that during the brief occupation of Damascus by his forces in 1260 Hülegü sent an edict granting freedom of worship to Christians, Jews, Muslims and 'idolators'.[50] Such latitude in matters of religion towards those who submitted has been likened to a kind of insurance policy, on the premise that any faith might be true;[51] another way of putting it would be that the Mongol rulers regarded all religious observance as the worship of the one god from whom they derived their mandate. Christians, as one of the elements previously disadvantaged under Muslim rule, were emancipated by the Mongol conquest, being relieved of the discriminatory poll tax and permitted to propagate their faith; Christian priests and monks benefited from the patronage of the Mongol ruling class, who valued their prayers and perceived skills in magic and healing, and enjoyed exemption from military service, corvée duties and certain taxes.[52] But this applied in equal measure to the 'holy men' of other confessional groups. As the Franciscan missionary William of Rubruck noticed in 1253, the Mongols required the 'religious' of all faiths and sects to pray for them.[53] Thus Hülegü, like his wife, sought the prayers of Christians.[54] But the

[47] Ibn Shaddād, *al-A'lāq*, ed. D. Sourdel, *La description d'Alep d'Ibn Šaddād* (Damascus, 1953), p. 36; Eddé, *La principauté*, pp. 179–80.

[48] Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, Gibb Memorial Series 18, 3 vols. (Leiden and London, 1912–37), I: 18–19; trans. J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, 2 vols. (Manchester, 1958), I: 26. For Chinggis Khan's 'religious policy', see P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: his Life and Legacy*, trans. T. N. Haining (Oxford, 1991), pp. 197–8.

[49] *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliotecis delituerant*, ed L. d'Achéry, new edn. ed. É. Baluze *et al.*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1723), III: 625–6. The text has been checked against Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 3768, fols. 77v–78r.

[50] P. Jackson, 'The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260', *EHR* 95 (1980), 493; D. Sourdel, 'Bohémond et les chrétiens à Damas sous l'occupation mongole', in *Dei gesta per Francos. Études sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard*, ed. M. Balard, B. Z. Kedar and J. S. C. Riley-Smith (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 295–9.

[51] Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 41, 44.

[52] See generally T. T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: the Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic lands, 1251–1259* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 121–2.

[53] Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 29.15, p. 256 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 187).

[54] Vardan, trans. Thomson, p. 217.

Muslim Juwaynī praises Sorqaqtani for the fact that, despite her Christian allegiance, she had bestowed alms and gifts upon imams and shaykhs and endowed pious foundations (*awqāf*) in Bukhārā;[55] and in his Arabic chronicle Bar Hebraeus describes Qubilai's stance on religious matters in rather different terms from those in his Syriac *Chronography*, saying that the qaghan loved wise men, the *'ulamā*, and the godly of all sects and nations.[56]

The concern of Mongol rulers, then, to preside even-handedly over the different religious communities among their subjects could give rise to confusion.[57] Rubruck was assured that Hülegü's brother, the qaghan Möngke (d. 1259), put his faith only in the Christians;[58] but according to the Chinese dynastic history, the *Yüan Shih*, Möngke remained addicted to shamanistic practices, and he is alleged in another Chinese source (admittedly a Buddhist one) to have likened the relationship between Buddhism and other faiths to that between the palm of the hand and the fingers.[59] Rubruck's final audience with him hardly encouraged hopes of his conversion.[60] The friar concluded that Möngke believed in none of the religious groups; yet, he says, 'they all follow his court as flies do honey, and he makes them all gifts and all of them believe they are on intimate terms with him and forecast his good fortune'.[61] The prevalence of such optimism is starkly illustrated in two statements that might seem mutually contradictory: Step'annos Orbelian's assertion that Möngke had been 'a good Christian', and Juwaynī's claim that Möngke showed the greatest honour and respect to Muslims.[62] Rubruck is sharply critical of the Nestorians for spreading rumours that Möngke and certain of his kinsmen were Christians – and thereby exhibiting the kind of gullibility that had nurtured the legend of Prester John.[63]

[55] Juwaynī, III: 8–9 (trans. Boyle, II: 552–3); cf. also I: 84 (trans. Boyle, I: 108).

[56] Bar Hebraeus, *Mukhtaṣar*, p. 491.

[57] See M. Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan. His Life and Times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), pp. 141–7, on that ruler's 'chameleon-like transformations' as he tried to appeal to all religious and cultural elements in China.

[58] Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 29.15, p. 256 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 187).

[59] W. Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen des Möngke. Übersetzung des 3. Kapitels des *Yüan Shih*', *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979), 33; É. Chavannes, 'Inscriptions et pièces de chancellerie chinoises de l'époque mongole', *T'oung Pao*, 2e série, 5 (1904), 381–3; P. Demiéville, 'La situation religieuse en Chine au temps de Marco Polo', in *Oriente Poliano. Studi e conferenze tenute all'Is. M. E. O. in occasione del VII. Centenario della nascita di Marco Polo (1254–1954)* (Rome, 1957), p. 195, suggested that the sources can be reconciled by dating the shift towards Buddhism on Möngke's part around 1255.

[60] Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 34.2, p. 298 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 236–7).

[61] *Ibid.*, 29.15, p. 256 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 187).

[62] Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, I: 230; Juwaynī, III: 79–80 (trans. Boyle, II: 600–1).

[63] Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 17.2, p. 206 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 122).

Even those members of the dynasty whose preference for Christianity (or some other religion) was especially pronounced had to tread with care. A case in point is Sartaq, a prince of the Golden Horde in the Pontic and Caspian steppes. His Christian faith is attested not only by Christian authors but also by Muslim witnesses, who by contrast had no interest in misrepresenting his beliefs;[64] and yet Kirakos, mentioning the prince's issue of a decree for the enfranchisement of Christian churches and priests, says that it also embraced mosques and their personnel.[65] Significantly, a Mamlūk historian, himself a native of Damascus, remarks that following his entry into the city in 1260, Hülegü's general, the Christian Kitbuqa, did not display any partiality for his own religion, in obedience to Chinggis Khan's edict on the equality of all faiths.[66] 'You must not call our master a Christian', Rubruck was told at Sartaq's encampment in 1253; 'he is not a Christian, he is a Mongol.'[67] In other words, the duty to execute Heaven's mandate took precedence over the private religious affiliations of the individual.[68]

In some measure the widespread and persistent illusions concerning the religious partisanship of Hülegü and other members of his dynasty were a function of the geopolitical transformation in south-western Asia. The Mongols' operations here had been winning them a reputation for being pro-Christian since Chinggis Khan's time, primarily because their victims were overwhelmingly Muslim and their victories encouraged eastern Christians to indulge hopes of a Christian polity.[69] In Muslim lands, Christians (and Jews) were promoted to administrative office alongside Muslims under the conquerors.[70] Even the story about the release of Christian prisoners was current some decades before Hülegü's campaigns, for in 1221, when

[64] Juwaynī, I: 223 (trans. Boyle, I: 268); Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* (1260), ed. 'Abd al-Ḥaiy Ḥabībī, 2nd edn., 2 vols. (Kabul, 1342–3 Shamsī/1963–4), II: 217; trans. H. G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i-Nāṣirī: a General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia*, Bibliotheca Indica, 2 vols. (London and Calcutta, 1872–81), II: 1291.

[65] Kirakos, trans. Bedrosian, p. 295.

[66] al-Yūnīnī (d. 1326), *Dhayl Mir'āti l-Zamān*, 4 vols. (Hyderabad, A. P., 1374–81/1954–61), II: 35.

[67] Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 16.5, p. 205 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 120).

[68] But Rubruck's interlocutor, and other Mongols, may have thought of only priests and monks (Mong. *erke'ün*) as 'Christians'. See J. Hamilton, 'Le texte turc en caractères syriaques du grand sceau cruciforme de Mār Yahballāhā III', *Journal Asiatique* 260 (1972), 163–4. This would explain the furious reaction of the Mongols in Azerbaijan in 1247 to the appeal by a papal embassy that they become Christians. Simon of Saint-Quentin, *Historia Tartarorum*, ed. J. Richard, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 8 (Paris, 1965), pp. 100–1 = Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum Historiale*, ed. Johann Mentelin (Straßburg, 1473), 32.43.

[69] J. M. Fiey, 'Chrétiens syriaques entre croisés et Mongols', in *Symposium syriacum 1972: célebré dans les jours 26–31 octobre 1972 à l'Institut Pontifical de Rome. Rapports et communications*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 197 (Rome, 1974), pp. 327–41.

[70] Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 109–10.

Chinggis Khan's Mongols were being mistaken for the Christian host of Prester John or his putative grandson 'King David', rumours reached the army of the Fifth Crusade that the newcomers had freed Frankish prisoners and sent them to Antioch.[71] The Armenian Constable Smbat, in a letter of 1248 that came to be widely diffused throughout western Europe by Vincent of Beauvais and others, asserted that Chinggis Khan had forbidden anyone to do any harm to Christians.[72] In much the same way, what underlay Hülegü's reputation at one level was the fact that his western campaign of 1255–60 was responsible for the subjection or annihilation of major Islamic powers, notably the 'Abbasid Caliphate in 1258. Christian prelates sometimes received formerly Islamic property: Hülegü and Doquz Khātūn gave the Nestorian Catholicus, for instance, the 'palace of the Arab kings' in Baghdad.[73] It may have been this particular gift that led a Muslim poet to write of the cross being raised on high over the *minbars* of the city and to lament the fact that he who had once worn the *zunnār* (the distinctive girdle that was the hallmark of the Peoples of the Book) was now the master.[74] But of course none of these favours in themselves amounted to a positive sympathy towards the Christian faith.

From a relatively early date, it seems, stories were circulating about the conversion of Mongol grandees, possibly spread by Nestorians, who were the most widespread of all the Christian sects and had perhaps enjoyed a longer acquaintance with the new masters of Asia than had any of the others. Rumours of the baptism of the qaghan Güyüg (1246–8) are echoed in the Constable Smbat's letter,[75] and reached Louis IX's crusading army on Cyprus by way of Eljigidei's envoys in the winter of 1248–9.[76] One

[71] *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry (1160/1170–1240) évêque de Saint-Jean d'Acre*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960), pp. 149–50. Oliver of Paderborn, *Historia Damiatina* 56, ed. H. Hoogeweg, *Die Schriften des kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal-Bischofs von S. Sabina Oliverus* (Tübingen, 1894), p. 259; trans. in E. Peters, *Christian Society and the Crusades 1198–1229* (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 114. For the reports concerning the Mongols in 1221, see J. Richard, 'The *Relatio de Davide* as a Source for Mongol History and the Legend of Prester John', in *Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes*, ed. C. F. Beckingham and B. Hamilton (Aldershot, 1996), pp. 139–58.

[72] J. Richard, 'La lettre du Connétable Smbat et les rapports entre Chrétiens et Mongols au milieu du XIII^{ème} siècle', in *Études arméniennes in memoriam Haïg Berbérian*, ed. D. Kouymjian (Lisbon, 1986), pp. 689, 691.

[73] *The Monks of Kûblâi Khân Emperor of China*, trans. E. A. Wallis Budge (London, 1928), p. 223.

[74] Joseph de Somogyi, 'A *Qaṣda* on the Destruction of Baghdād by the Mongols', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 7 (1933–5), 44 (text), 45 (trans.). The verses are preserved by al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), *Ta'rikh al-Islām 651–660*, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut, 1419/1999), p. 38.

[75] Richard, 'La lettre du Connétable Smbat', pp. 690–1.

[76] On this episode, see J. Richard, 'Ultimatums mongols et lettres apocryphes: l'Occident et les motifs de guerre des Tartares', *Central Asiatic Journal* 17 (1973), 217–18, repr. in his *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations (XIIe–XVe s.)* (London, 1976).

tale, notably, was picked up by the Dominicans whom Louis despatched in response, and through them found its way into the *Bonum universale de apibus* of Thomas of Cantimpré and, subsequently, into Joinville's *Life of Saint Louis*. The kernel of the story was apparently that a Mongol prince, lost in the wilderness, had come upon a magnificent king on a golden throne who announced himself to be the Lord of Heaven and Earth and had a 'knight' escort the prince safely back to his people. The details in the two versions differ. That retailed by Thomas has a more Christian flavour than Joinville's account; Joinville's magnificent king orders the prince to tell Chinggis Khan that he is giving him power to conquer the world, of which Thomas makes no mention; in Thomas' version the knight rides a white horse.

We are evidently confronted here with corruptions of a story, current within Mongol society, about the transmission of Heaven's mandate to Chinggis Khan through the medium of the shaman Teb-Tenggeri (Kököchü).[77] Though not found in our sole extant Mongolian source, the *Secret History*, this is mentioned around 1260 by Juwaynī (from whom it was taken over by Bar Hebraeus)[78] and is also referred to in Hülegü's letter of 1262 (see below). According to a source dating from the turn of the century, the common folk had believed that Teb-Tenggeri used to ascend to Heaven on a white horse.[79] The fact that the theme of the lost prince is found in Bar Hebraeus' account of the much earlier Christianization of the Kereyid[80] demonstrates the way in which older elements were attaching themselves to the idea of Mongol conversion. Clearly the French envoys in 1249 had met Nestorians who were endeavouring to reclothe Mongol legend in Christian garb.

Other considerations can help to explain the mindset of eastern Christian authors writing around the turn of the century. The extremely disappointing adoption of Islam by the Mongols of Iran in 1295 served to distort the past, so that in retrospect the conquerors appeared more pro-Christian than they really were and Step'annos Orbelian could describe the Mongols of an earlier generation not only as familiar with the faith but even as

[77] Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 98–101.

[78] Juwaynī, 1: 28–9 (trans. Boyle, 1: 39). See generally L. J. Friedman, 'Joinville's Tartar visionary', *Medium Aevum* 27 (1958), 1–7, though he was unaware of Juwaynī as Bar Hebraeus' source.

[79] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, ed. A. A. Romaskevich *et al.*, 1.1 (Moscow, 1965), pp. 420–1 (trans. Thackston, p. 90). Cf. the tale of a knight on a white horse transmitting Heaven's mandate to Chinggis Khan in Hayton, 3.1 and 6, Fr. text pp. 148, 152 (Latin text pp. 284, 287).

[80] Bar Hebraeus, *Chronicon ecclesiasticum*, ed. and trans. J. B. Abbeloos and T. J. Lamy, 3 vols. in 2 (Louvain, 1872–7), III: coll. 279–81; E. C. C. Hunter, 'The Conversion of the Kerait to Christianity in A.D. 1007', *Zentralasiatische Studien* 22 (1989), 142–63.

'singularly cherishing the Christians'.[81] The Armenians, moreover, had long entertained hopes of Mongol-western collaboration against the Muslims: in 1253 Rubruck had suspected Armenian translators of deliberately giving a false rendering of Louis IX's letter to Sartaq, in order to convey the impression that the French king was seeking Mongol military assistance.[82] One powerful impulse behind Hayton's work was to induce the west to cooperate with the Ilkhanate against the Mamlūks in the interests of his native land.[83] To that end he was prepared, for instance, to play down and explain away the embarrassing clash that had occurred between Kitbuqa's forces and the Franks of Sidon in 1260.[84]

All the Armenian authors are concerned to stress the influence Armenians enjoyed with their Mongol overlords.[85] According to Vardan, King Het'um 'freed from death the Christians, ecclesiastics and laymen, in every place'.[86] The fact that Christians were spared and churches and relics respected at Mayyāfāriqīn in 1260 is linked implicitly with the presence in the victorious army of a contingent of Armenians.[87] If Grigor of Akner does not exaggerate, Hülegü 'liked the Armenian and Georgian forces greatly because of their extreme bravery which they evidenced before him in every battle'.[88] It is indeed possible that in the new Mongol world-order the military usefulness of the Armenians and Georgians may have guaranteed their peoples a share of privilege and influence not necessarily extended to other Christians who lacked a military tradition. It is equally possible, of course, that there was no consistency to Hülegü's policy, so that those alone were spared who found influential voices – whether his wife or his Armenian satellites – to speak on their behalf.

Hayton and Step'annos Orbelian, in particular, each sought to glorify the memory of a close kinsman – respectively the Armenian king Het'um I

[81] Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, I: 226.

[82] Rubruck, *Itinerarium* 27.II, p. 243 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 171); J. Richard, 'Sur les pas de Plancarpin et de Rubrouck: la lettre de saint Louis à Sartaq', *Journal des Savants* (1977), 56–7, repr. in his *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: les perspectives orientales du monde occidental médiéval* (London, 1983).

[83] W. Giese, 'Asienkunde für den kreuzfahrenden Westen. Die "Flos historiarum terrae orientis" des Hayto von Gorhigos (O.Praem.) aus dem Jahre 1307', in *Secundum regulam vivere. Festschrift für P. Norbert Backmund O.Praem.*, ed. G. Melville (Windberg, 1978), pp. 245–64; A. Leopold, *How to Recover the Holy Land: the Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Aldershot, 2000), p. 114. For a different analysis of the aims behind Hayton's work, see D. D. Bundy, 'Het'um's *La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient*: a Study in Medieval Armenian Historiography and Propaganda', *Revue des Études Arméniennes* n.s. 20 (1986–7), 223–35.

[84] Jackson, 'The Crisis', pp. 484–6.

[85] See the comments of J. J. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (London, 1971), p. 229 n. 62, and of Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 192.

[86] Vardan, trans. Thomson, p. 218. [87] Kirakos, trans. Bedrosian, p. 323.

[88] Grigor, trans. Blake and Frye, p. 343.

and the prince Smbat Orbelian – by inflating his credit with the Mongols. Symptomatic is Hayton's claim, found in no previous Armenian source, that King Het'um during his visit to Mongolia in 1254 made seven requests of the qaghan, including Möngke's own baptism and the restoration of the Holy Land to Christian possession, all of which requests were granted; in this fashion, even the dispatch of Hülegü to western Asia is turned into a favour bestowed by the qaghan on the Armenian king. Symptomatic, too, is the assurance of Step'annos Orbelian that Möngke had given his uncle Smbat, in 1251, an edict for the enfranchisement of all the priests and churches of Armenia and that the prince enjoyed the particular affection and esteem of Hülegü, who often entrusted him with the conduct of his affairs.[89] Statements of this kind go far beyond the genuine readiness of Mongol rulers to exploit the administrative talents and experience of representatives of the subject nations.

In his interview with Vardan, Hülegü claimed that his respect for Christians underlay the breach between him and his 'brothers', who favoured the Muslims.[90] By this he meant, not his siblings (one of whom at least, as we have noticed, may have been a Nestorian) but his *aqa* and *ini* ('elder and younger brothers') – his kinsfolk,[91] and particularly the Mongol princes of the Golden Horde led by his Muslim cousin Berke, with whom he had been at war since 1261. Although we have no direct evidence from Berke himself, Muslim chroniclers reproduce claims by his ambassadors to Cairo that his conflict with the Ilkhan arose from his sense of outrage at the overthrow and murder of the last 'Abbasid Caliph.[92] They allege that in his first letter to the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars, in 1263, Berke declared that he loved Islam and that the infidel Hülegü intended to massacre the Muslims.[93] The problem with this testimony is that following the sacrilegious assault on the Caliphate, Berke seems to have waited for a full three years before making war upon the perpetrator. There are good grounds for assuming, rather,

[89] For Smbat Orbelian, see Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, I: 231, 233; for Het'um, Hayton, 3.16–18, Fr. text pp. 164–7 (Latin text pp. 297–9), and J. A. Boyle, 'The Journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke', *Central Asiatic Journal* 9 (1964), 175–89, repr. in his *The Mongol World-Empire 1206–1370* (London, 1977).

[90] Vardan, trans. Thomson, p. 221.

[91] For the phrase *aqa-u ini*, see, e.g., Juwaynī, I: 220 (trans. Boyle, I: 266).

[92] Jūzjānī, II: 198 (trans. Raverty, II: 1257); al-Yūnīnī, II: 365; al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363–4), *al-Wāfī bi l-Wafayāt*, ed. H. Ritter *et al.*, Bibliotheca Islamica 6 (Wiesbaden etc., 1931–), X: 118. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, III: 87 (trans. Thackston, p. 511), Berke objected more precisely to the fact that Hülegü had destroyed the caliph without consulting his kinsfolk (*aqa-u ini*).

[93] (al-Mufaḍḍal) Ibn Abi l-Faḍā'il (*c.* 1340), *al-Nahj al-Sadīd*, ed. and trans. E. Blochet, 'Moufazzal ibn Abil-Fazaïl. Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks', *Patrologia Orientalis* 12 (1919), pp. 452–3. The old shamanistic taboos were still observed in Berke's encampment. *Ibid.*, pp. 458–9.

that the conflict between the two Mongol princes arose over booty and territory in north-western Iran,[94] and that each of them, in his subsequent attempts to enlist an external ally, said nothing of this, pointing instead to a religious motivation.

Hülegü's overture to Louis IX, like that of Berke to Baybars, has to be seen in the context of well-tried Mongol diplomatic resourcefulness. As early as 1247, the papal envoy Carpini had stressed the Mongols' tendency to conquer by guile rather than by force, describing how they dealt more mildly with nations who lay at some distance, or who bordered on peoples with whom they were currently at war, in order not to provoke these distant powers into attacking them and not to deter them from submission.[95] Recounting the experiences of another papal embassy to the Mongol army in Azerbaijan, in the same year, the encyclopaedist Vincent of Beauvais had made a more specific accusation – that the Mongols pretended to be Christians in order to dupe the Franks and to deflect crusading forces away from territories that lay within their own current sphere of operations. He was surely alluding to the ostensibly friendly Mongol overtures that reached Louis IX on Cyprus in 1248, which we have already mentioned and to which, according to Joinville, the French king subsequently regretted his ready response.[96] Twelve years later, when Hülegü's troops had entered Syria, the same charge – of simulating friendship towards Christians – was levelled at the Mongols by no less a figure than Pope Alexander IV.[97]

It may be no accident that the evidence, such as it is, for Hülegü's inner spiritual debate comes from the period after 1262, the date of his letter to the French king. That letter really is a remarkable document. It begins with the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews: 'God, who at sundry times and in diverse manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken . . .' Now at this juncture anyone familiar with the New Testament would have anticipated 'spoken to us through his

[94] Jackson, 'The Dissolution', pp. 225–7. For Berke's Islamic faith, see J. Richard, 'La conversion de Berke et les débuts de l'islamisation de la Horde d'Or', *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 35 (1967), 173–84, repr. in his *Orient et Occident*; I. Vásáry, '"History and legend" in Berke Khan's Conversion to Islam', in *Aspects of Altaic Civilization, III. Proceedings of the Thirtieth Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, June 15–19, 1987*, ed. D. Sinor, Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series 145 (Bloomington, 1990), pp. 230–52; D. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde* (University Park, Penn., 1994), pp. 83–6.

[95] Carpini, *Ystoria* 7.8, pp. 288–9 (trans. Dawson, p. 41); cf. also *ibid.* 4.6 and 8.3, pp. 247, 294–5 (trans. Dawson, pp. 16, 44). For briefer comments on Mongol duplicity, see Simon of Saint-Quentin, p. 39 = Vincent of Beauvais, 30.77.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 97–8 = Vincent of Beauvais, 32.41.

[97] 'Annales monasterii de Burton', in *Annales monastici*, ed. H. R. Luard, RS, 5 vols. (London, 1864–69), I: 497.

Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds . . .' But not at all! Instead Hülegü continues:

> spoken unto our grandfather Chinggis Khan through Teb-Tenggeri, disclosing to him events which would miraculously come to pass in the future . . . and declaring, 'I am the one all-powerful God in the highest, and I have set thee to be lord over the nations and the kingdoms and to be ruler of the whole earth, to root out and to pull down, to destroy and to cast down, to build and to plant . . .'[98]

Heaven's mandate to Chinggis Khan is thus embedded in quotations from the New Testament and the Book of Jeremiah, in an audacious bid to press Judaeo-Christian scripture into the service of the Mongol world-rulership idea. This is naturally not the only evidence of such eclecticism on the part of the Mongol imperial family. One might well compare the use of scripture by the Ilkhan's chancery in the letter to Louis IX with the recruitment of Confucian terminology under his brother Qubilai first for the qaghan's reign-name as a Chinese emperor and then for the title of the Yüan dynasty itself, steps taken with the express purpose of legitimizing the Mongol regime in China.[99]

We have seen that the myth of Hülegü's attachment to the Christian faith is part of a wider picture: one in which Mongol qaghans and princes patronized the religious class and could, with relatively little effort on their part, be 'appropriated' by the various confessional groups in their encampments. During Hülegü's campaigns of conquest in the years 1256–60 eastern Christians seldom fared appreciably better than their Muslim neighbours. The evidence we have for Hülegü's personal leanings towards Christianity comes from a slightly later era, when he had set out to secure the cooperation of the Latin West against the Mamlūks, and it is possible that his blandishments towards Christians like Vardan were closely linked with an ostensible change in foreign policy. Modern scholarship has tended to see in the Ilkhanid overtures to the Franks from 1262 onwards a profound ideological shift, entailing the abandonment of the Mongols' uncompromising claims to world-dominion and a readiness to enter into alliance with independent powers on equal terms.[100] It is more likely, however, that with the

[98] Meyvaert, 'An Unknown Letter', p. 252. Cf. Jeremiah, 1.10.

[99] H. Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: the Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty*, Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse (Munich, 1978), pp. 26–9.

[100] E.g. Jackson, 'The Crisis', p. 512. Cf. Richard, 'D'Älğigidāi à Ġazan', p. 67, for whom the claims to world-domination were abandoned by Hülegü's successors; and P. Jackson, 'Europa en het mongoolse rijk', *Spiegel Historiael* 33 (1998), 50, who suggests that they were never abandoned.

dissolution of the Mongol empire the old programme of world-conquest was merely put away under wraps, as it were, pending the emergence of more favourable circumstances, and that Hülegü's new-found friendliness towards the west was a ploy of a kind that had been encountered before. With the onset of what appeared to be a fresh chapter in relations between Mongol Persia and the Catholic world from 1262 onwards, persistent Frankish suspicions had by no means become redundant. They undoubtedly contributed to the fruitlessness of Mongol–Frankish negotiations in the later decades of the thirteenth century.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

IV

The Mongols and the Faith of the Conquered[1]

This paper aims to examine various questions relating to the Mongols' attitude towards religious matters: specifically, the way in which the Mongols exploited the religious allegiances of their unsubdued enemies, their much-vaunted "religious toleration," their attitude towards the "religious classes" within their conquests, and the possible contexts for their eventual conversion to Islam or Buddhism. Further discussion of these questions is important, not least in order to reach a fuller explanation of the failure of Latin missionaries from Western Europe to win over the Mongol rulers: in a recent article, Professor James Ryan lays the blame for this squarely at the door of the missionaries themselves.[2] The scope of the paper will largely be confined to the thirteenth century.

Sources and Problems

We owe our acquaintance with the ancestral cultic practices of the thirteenth-century Mongols[3] to a number of foreign observers. The Persian historian Juwaynī gives a short account, and some data can be gleaned from the narrative of the journey of the Daoist patriarch Chang Chun to Chinggis Khan's headquarters in 1222.[4] But the most detailed accounts of Mongol religion emanate from visitors from **[p. 246]** Latin Europe. The majority of them formed part of the embassies which Pope Innocent IV despatched to the Mongols in

---

[1] I am most grateful to Professors Reuven Amitai and Anatoly Khazanov for reading an earlier draft and making invaluable suggestions. Any errors that have survived their criticism spring from my own recalcitrance.

[2] J.D. Ryan, "Christian Wives of Mongol Khans: Tartar Queens and Missionary Expectations in Asia," *JRAS*, 3rd series, 8 (1998), p. 421.

[3] See generally W. Heissig, *The Religions of Mongolia*, tr. Geoffrey Samuel (London, 1980), chs. 1–2; J.-P. Roux, *La religion des Turcs et Mongols* (Paris, 1984).

[4] Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i jahān-gushā*, ed. M.M. Qazwīnī, GMS, n.s., 16 (Leiden and London, 1912–37), i, pp. 43–4; tr. John Andrew Boyle, *The History of the World-conqueror* (rpt. 1997, of Manchester, 1958), i, p. 59. Li Zhichang, *Xi you ji*, tr. A. Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist. The Journey of the Taoist Ch'ang-ch'un from China to the Hindukush at the Summons of Chingiz Khan* (London, 1931).

1245: the Franciscan friar John of Plano Carpini, who took the northerly route through the Pontic steppe and travelled as far as the court of the Qa'an (< Qaghan) Güyüg (1246–48); and the Dominicans Andrew of Longjumeau and Ascelin, whose respective missions took them to the Mongol forces quartered south of the Caucasus. In addition to Carpini's own report, which exists in two recensions, an account of the Mongols based on his experiences – the so-called "Tartar Relation" – had been drafted a few months earlier in eastern Europe on the basis of information supplied by his companion Benedict, who also dictated another, very brief report later in Cologne. Although the report of Ascelin's mission, written by one of his companions, Simon of Saint-Quentin, is lost, much of it was fortunately preserved in the encyclopaedic work of Vincent of Beauvais (*c.*1255). Andrew of Longjumeau's account survives only in an abstract incorporated in the chronicle of the English Benedictine Matthew Paris.[5] Special mention should also be made of the data furnished by the Franciscan William of Rubruck, who left the crusading army of King Louis IX of France in Palestine in 1253 to travel as a missionary to the court of the Qa'an Möngke (1251–59), and provides us with the fullest account of Mongol religious practices that we possess, especially of the activities of the shamans.[6]

Western authors, of course, arrived in Asia with their own preconceptions,[7] and the picture they draw of Mongol ideas on religious matters may well be skewed on occasions by their monotheistic vision. **[p. 247]** A more obviously tendentious image is to be derived from a number of eastern Christian sources. Rubruck writes scathingly about the propensity of the Nestorians to "create big rumours out of nothing" (like the legend of Prester John).[8] In addition, for

---

[5] For these embassies, see I. de Rachewiltz, *Papal Envoys to the Great Khans* (London, 1971); G.A. Bezzola, *Die Mongolen in abendländischer Sicht [1220–1270]. Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Völkerbegegnungen* (Berne and Munich, 1974), pp. 118–49; also P. Jackson, "Early Missions to the Mongols: Carpini and his Contemporaries," *Hakluyt Society. Annual Report for 1994*, pp. 14–32.

[6] For a picture of shamanistic practices, as drawn by Western European observers, see J.A. Boyle, "Turkish and Mongol Shamanism in the Middle Ages," *Folklore*, 83 (1972), pp. 177–93 (rpt. in J.A. Boyle, *The Mongol World-empire 1206–1370* [London, 1977]); P. Vitebsky, "Some Medieval European Views of Mongolian Shamanism," *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society*, 1 (1974), pp. 24–42. Of the sources not used in these articles, Simon of Saint-Quentin, *Historia Tartarorum*, ed. J. Richard, *Simon de Saint-Quentin. Histoire des Tartares*, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 8 (Paris, 1965), p. 34 (= Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum historiale*, ed. J. Mentelin [Straßburg, 1473], 30.74), provides a brief account.

[7] See P. Jackson, "Christians, Barbarians and Monsters: The European Discovery of the World beyond Islam," in *The Medieval World*, eds. P. Linehan and J. Nelson (London, 2001), pp. 93–110.

[8] Rubruck, "Itinerarium," 17.2, in A. Van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana*, i. *Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), p. 206; tr. P. Jackson and

Christian authors writing in the Ilkhanate after 1296 the conversion to Islam of the Mongols of Iran gave earlier decades the complexion of a golden age, in which the Mongols seemed more pro-Christian than they really were.[9] And all the Armenian authors are concerned to stress the influence the Christian kingdom of Lesser Armenia enjoyed with its Mongol overlords.[10] More particularly, it is clear that two Armenian writers, Hayton and Step'anos Orbelean, each sought to glorify the memory of a close kinsman – respectively the Armenian king Het'um I and the prince Smbat Orbelean – by inflating his credit with the Mongols. Thus Hayton claims that King Het'um during his visit to Mongolia in 1254 made seven requests of the Qa'an, including Möngke's own baptism and the restoration of the Holy Land to Christian possession, all of which requests Möngke is said to have granted.[11] This quite false information is found in no earlier source, even an Armenian one.[12] Symptomatic, too, is the assurance of Step'anos Orbelean that Möngke had conferred on his uncle Smbat in 1251 an edict for the enfranchisement of all the priests and churches of Greater Armenia and that the prince enjoyed the particular **[p. 248]** affection and esteem of Hülegü, who often entrusted him with the conduct of his affairs.[13]

There is no doubt that the Mongols did rely upon servitors from a wide range of geographical and confessional backgrounds, among them Christians from the Kereyid and Önggüd tribes;[14] but this had much less to do with their rulers' religious sympathies than with an eclecticism that made use of whatever

---

D. Morgan, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck. His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173 (London, 1990), p. 122.

[9] E.g. Step'anos Orbelean, *Patmut'iwn nahangin Sisakan*, tr. M.-F. Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie* (St. Petersburg, 1864–66, 2 vols), i, p. 226.

[10] See the comments of J.J. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (London, 1971), p. 229, n. 62, and of B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit, 1220–1350*, 4th edn. (Leiden, 1985), p. 192.

[11] Hayton of Gorighos, "La flor des estoires de la terre d'orient," 3.16–18, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents arméniens*, ii (Paris, 1906), French text, pp. 164–7 (Latin text, pp. 297–9); and for Het'um's visit to Möngke, see J.A. Boyle, "The Journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke," *CAJ*, 9 (1964), pp. 175–89 (rpt. in Boyle, *Mongol World-empire*). One Armenian source says that Het'um returned laden with honours and with the grant of "several provinces": Vahram, "Chronique rimée des rois de la Petite Arménie," *Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents arméniens*, i (Paris, 1869), p. 519.

[12] Kirakos Ganjakec'i says merely that King Het'um obtained a diploma from Möngke "for the freedom of the church everywhere": *Patmut'iwn Hayoc'*, tr. R. Bedrosian, *Kirakos Ganjakets'i's History of the Armenians*, Sources of the Armenian Tradition (New York, 1986), p. 304; see also Boyle, "Journey of Het'um I," p. 181.

[13] Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, i, pp. 231, 233.

[14] P. Pelliot, "Chrétiens d'Asie centrale et d'extrême-orient," *TP*, 15 (1914), pp. 627–36.

talents were available.[15] Nor did it have any bearing on foreign policy. The origins of the Mongols' ideology of world-domination are uncertain; but, although Chinese influence cannot be discounted, Chinggis Khan most probably derived his concept of empire, rather, from the Mongols' nomadic precursors like the eighth-century Turks: the initial formulae of Mongol diplomatic documents were in Turkish.[16] This is not to deny, of course, that the Turks in turn may have drawn some of their ideas from the Middle Kingdom.[17] The difference between the Mongols and the Turks seems to have lain in the fact that, whereas the latter conceived of sovereignty only over the steppe peoples, the Mongols thought in terms of the reduction of the entire world.[18] By the late 1230s this took the highest priority;[19] and the fact that the Qa'an Güyüg had Nestorian Christian advisers did not prevent him from planning a new expedition (which in the event did not materialize) against Christian Europe.[20]

[p. 249] Mongol Diplomacy

We are also likely to be misled, no less than were contemporaries, by the behaviour of the Mongols themselves during their military campaigns and in their correspondence with independent foreign rulers, namely the way in which

---

[15] D.O. Morgan, "Who Ran the Mongol Empire?," *JRAS* (1982), pp. 124–36.

[16] P. Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la papauté" [part 1], R[*evue de l'*]O[*rient*] C[*hrétien*], 23 (1922–23), pp. 24–5.

[17] See the comments of Thomas T. Allsen, "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China," in *CHC*, vi: *Alien Regimes and Border States 907–1368*, eds. H. Franke and D. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 347–8. P.B. Golden, "Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Činggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia," *AEMA*, 2 (1982), p. 48, points out that the borrowing of imperial ideas from China goes back at least as far as the Xiongnu. A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, tr. Julia Crookenden, 2nd edn. (Madison, 1994), pp. 238–9, doubts whether Chinggis Khan knew much about the earlier Turkish qaghanates.

[18] A.M. Khazanov, "Muhammad and Jenghiz Khan Compared: The Religious Factor in World Empire Building," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 35 (1993), p. 465. For the same distinction, see also J.-P. Roux, "Sacerdoce et empire universels chez les Turco-Mongols," R[*evue de l'*]H[*istoire des*] R[*eligions*], 204 (1987), pp. 167–8.

[19] E. Voegelin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255," *Byzantion*, 15 (1940–41), pp. 378–413. I. de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire," *PFEH*, 7 (1973), pp. 21–36. R. Amitai-Preiss, "Mongol Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War against the Mamluks," in *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, eds. R. Amitai-Preiss and D.O. Morgan, Islamic History and Civilization: Studies and Texts 24 (Leiden, 1999), pp. 57–72.

[20] P. Jackson, "The Mongols and Europe," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, v: c.*1198*–c.*1300*, ed. D. Abulafia (Cambridge, 1999), p. 713.

they deliberately exploited the religious sensitivities of their enemies. It is known that during the 1221–23 campaign by Jebe and Sübētei in the Caucasus and the Pontic steppe the Mongols made efforts, prior to battle, to detach separate elements from a heterogeneous opposition. They first induced the Qipchaq/Polovtsy to desert their Alan confederates on the grounds of their common nomadic heritage; they essayed a similar tactic, though unsuccessfully, in order to separate the Rus' from their Polovtsian allies prior to the engagement on the Kalka River in 1223.[21] What is not generally known is that the appeal was also made to a shared religion.

When news of the campaign of Jebe and Sübētei reached the Fifth Crusade in Egypt, the Mongols were taken to be the long-awaited army of Prester John or (in view of the Christian priest-king's improbable age by this time) his grandson, "King David."[22] Although in some degree the fulfilment of Western European wishful thinking, the identification of the Mongols with a Christian host was possibly reinforced by the invaders' own tactics. The Georgian Constable Ivané later complained to Pope Honorius III that the Mongols had tricked his people by having a cross carried in front of their army.[23] According to the Armenian chronicler Kirakos Ganjakec'i, rumours had preceded the Mongols to the effect that they were "magi" or Christians, bringing with them both a portable tent-church and a miracle-working cross, and had come to avenge the injuries inflicted on the Christians by the Muslims. The people were thus deceived and made no preparations for defence, while one priest and his flock **[p. 250]** even went to meet the invaders holding crosses aloft; they were massacred.[24] This episode, which may have found its way into a Western European chronicle,[25] seems to have been repeated not long afterwards hundreds of miles further north. A Galician chronicle transmits an account of the Mongol capture in 1223 of the small town of Novgorod Sviatopolch, on the west bank of the

---

[21] Golden, "Imperial Ideology," p. 71, citing Ibn al-Athīr. *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016–1471*, tr. R. Michell and N. Forbes, Camden Society, 3rd series, 25 (London, 1914), p. 65. J. Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200–1304* (London, 1983), p. 65.

[22] See generally J. Richard, "The *Relatio de Davide* as a Source for Mongol History and the Legend of Prester John," in *Prester John, the Mongols and the Ten Lost Tribes*, eds. C.F. Beckingham and B. Hamilton (Aldershot, 1996), pp. 139–58.

[23] *M[onumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica,] Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum selectae*, ed. C. Rodenberg (Berlin, 1883–94, 3 vols), i, p. 179 (no. 252). Hansgerd Göckenjan, "Frühe Nachrichten über Zentralasien und die Seidenstraßen in der 'Relatio de Davide Rege'," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, n.F., 8 (1988), pp. 113–14, sees behind this only the wishful thinking of eastern Christians.

[24] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, p. 166.

[25] Aubry of Trois-Fontaines, "Chronica....a monacho novi monasterii Hoiensis interpolata," in *MGH Scriptores*, eds. G.H. Pertz *et al.* (Hanover etc., 1826–1934, 32 vols), xxiii, pp. 943–4.

Dnieper. On this occasion nothing is said directly of the Mongols' carrying a cross or pretending to be Christians, but we read that the people "were not aware of their treachery and came out to meet them with crosses in their hands, but the Tatars slaughtered all of them."[26] Such episodes must have given rise to the statements in the documents circulating within the Fifth Crusade that the forty divisions of King David's army were each preceded by a cross.[27] As far as the Georgians were concerned, the subterfuge was highly effective. "We did not take precautions against them," the Georgian Queen Rusudan told the Pope, "because we believed them to be Christians."[28] If we are to take these accounts seriously (and it is always conceivable that the defeated peoples sought to rationalize their humiliation *ex post facto*), then we are perhaps dealing with yet another instance of the [**p. 251**] Mongols' excellent intelligence. They would have learned, for example, of the Georgian army's practice of carrying the cross before it on campaign;[29] they must also have heard of the reverence in which the cross was held among the Caucasian Alans, to the extent that

---

[26] *P[olnoe] S[obranie] R[usskikh] L[etopisei]*, ii/3. *Ipatievskaia letopis'* (St. Petersburg, 1843), p. 165 = *PSRL*, ii, 2nd edn. (St. Petersburg, 1908), col. 745; tr. G.A. Perfecky, *The Hypatian Codex, Part Two: The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 16/2 (Munich, 1973), p. 30. The sixteenth-century Nikonian chronicle doubtless preserves a distorted version of some similar gambit when it depicts the Mongol envoys, prior to the battle on the Kalka earlier in 1223, trying to detach the Rus' princes from the Polovtsy by claiming that they and the Rus' were "alike of the stock of Adam": *PSRL*, x. *Patriarshaia ili Nikonovskaia letopis'* (St. Petersburg, 1885, rpt. Moscow, 1965), p. 90: вси есмя человъци, и вси Адамого племя, почто всуе и туне кровь свою проливаемь, которающеся и біющеся...; tr. S.A. Zenkovsky and B.J. Zenkovsky, *The Nikonian Chronicle* (Princeton, 1984–89, 5 vols), ii, p. 286. Cf. G. Vernadskii, "K voprosu o veroispovedanii mongol'skikh posol 1223 g.," *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, 3 (1929), pp. 145–7 (English abstract, "Were the Mongol Envoys of 1223 Christians?," p. 148), who ignores the possibility of subterfuge. The Nikonian testimony is roundly dismissed by John Fennell, "The Tatar Invasion of 1223: Source Problems," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 27 (1980), pp. 29–30; and cf. also p. 21.

[27] F. Zarncke, "Der Priester Johannes" [part 2], *Abhandlungen der königlich sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse*, 8 (1876), p. 59; other references cited in Bezzola, *Die Mongolen*, p. 51. Cf. also Richard of San Germano, "Chronica," *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, new edn. C. Garufi *et al.* (Bologna etc., 1934–), vii/2, p. 111.

[28] *MGH Epistolae*, i, p. 179 (no. 251): *non cavebamus ab ipsis quia credebamus eos Christianos esse.*

[29] Richard, "*Relatio de Davide*," p. 145; his ultimate source is Bar Hebraeus, tr. E.A.W. Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l-Faraj...commonly known as Bar Hebraeus* (Oxford and London, 1932), i (tr.), p. 287. For recent examples, from the reign of Queen Tamara (1184–1212), see *Kartlis Chovreba* (the Georgian Chronicle), tr. M.-F. Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie, 1re partie. Histoire ancienne, jusqu'en 1469 de J.-C.* (St. Petersburg, 1849–50), pp. 440, 442, 459.

anyone bearing a cross tied to a spear could allegedly travel in security even among pagans.[30]

It is possible that the same tactic had already been successful with the Muslims of the Qara-Khitai empire further east. At the onset of Chinggis Khan's seven-year expedition to the West, Jebe had sent heralds proclaiming religious freedom in Kashgar, prior to the final destruction of the Qara-Khitai ruler, the conqueror's old enemy Güchülüg, a noted oppressor of Muslims. A few decades later, says Juwaynī, the local Muslims still saw the Mongols as deliverers.[31] But the conditional nature of Mongol religious toleration would have emerged clearly from the treatment meted out subsequently to those Muslim subjects of the Khwārazm-shāh who resisted the invaders.

Over subsequent decades, the Mongols deployed more subtle tactics, notably in the embassy which the general Eljigidei in 1248 despatched to the crusading King Louis IX of France. Its ostensible purpose was to urge the French king to secure equitable treatment for eastern Christians living under Latin rule in the Levant and thus – it should be noted – to comply with a prescription (*yasa*) of Chinggis Khan himself. But it was the oral statements of Eljigidei's envoys that attracted the greatest attention. They reported that the Qa'an Güyüg had been baptized and that Eljigidei was planning to attack the ʿAbbāsid Caliph, and asked Louis to direct his own expedition against Egypt, to prevent the two Muslim powers from assisting one another; and in a manner reminiscent of the rumours that had **[p. 252]** reached Armenia in the early 1220s, they spoke of "avenging the injuries done to the Christian faith," in this case the Khwārazmian sack of Jerusalem in 1244.[32] Simon of Saint-Quentin (or possibly Vincent of Beauvais, commenting in parentheses on Simon's report) had this embassy in mind when he spoke of the Mongols' concern to deflect

---

[30] According to a Dominican report of 1236: H. Dörrie (ed.), *Drei Texte zur Geschichte der Ungarn und Mongolen: die Missionsreisen des fr. Iulianus O.P. ins Ural-Gebiet (1234/5) und nach Rußland (1237) und der Bericht des Erzbischofs Peter über die Tartaren*, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, phil.-hist. Klasse (1956), no. 6, p. 154.

[31] Juwaynī, i, pp. 49–50 (tr. Boyle, i, pp. 66–7). D. Morgan, "Prester John and the Mongols," in *Prester John*, eds. Beckingham and Hamilton, p. 162.

[32] L. d'Achéry (ed.), *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliotecis delituerant*, new edn., eds. E. Baluze *et al.* (Paris, 1723), iii, coll. 625b, for Eljigidei's request, and 627b for the envoys' statement; I have checked the text against BN, Paris, ms. latin 3768, fos. 77v–78r, 80r. See J. Richard, "Ultimatums mongols et lettres apocryphes," *CAJ*, 17 (1973), pp. 217–18 (rpt. in his *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations (XII^{e}–XV^{e} s.)* [London, 1976]). F. Schmieder, *Europa und die Fremden. Die Mongolen im Urteil des Abendlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahrhundert*, Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters, 16 (Sigmaringen, 1994), pp. 80–83, suggests that eastern Christians rather than the Mongols themselves may have been behind the distortion.

the crusading army from territories, like Aleppo and Anatolia, which lay within the penumbra of their control; he accused them of seeking to dupe the Franks by pretending to be Christians and therefore allies.[33] Carpini, too, had drawn attention to Mongol deviousness of this kind: the Mongols, he says, dealt more mildly with peoples who lay at some distance, or who bordered on others with whom they were at war, so that these distant rulers might not attack them and others might not be deterred from submitting.[34] When Pope Alexander IV spoke in 1260, therefore, of the Mongols' habit of feigning friendship towards Christians,[35] he was referring to a well-established practice that seemingly went back to the time of Chinggis Khan himself. The Ilkhans' efforts to secure Western European military collaboration against the Mamlūks after 1262, following the disintegration of the Mongol empire into a number of discrete and often rival khanates, belong in the same context: here too, as in 1248, the oral statements of the envoys regarding the Ilkhans' Christian sympathies sometimes went much further than the text of the letters they carried.[36]

[p. 253] The Mongols and Religion

Before we turn to the Mongols' beliefs and their attitudes towards the religions of others, some general observations are in order. We cannot take it for granted that the motives for, or indeed character of, "conversion" in the thirteenth century will be identical with those we would recognize today – or certainly those which would meet with the approval of the purist. In particular, such motives might have more to do with political, diplomatic or economic considerations than with inner conviction. We should be wrong to emphasize the individualistic over against the communal, the internal over against the outward form of law or cultic practice, and the profoundly personal

---

[33] Simon of Saint-Quentin, pp. 97–8 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 32.41).

[34] Carpini, *Ystoria Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus*, 7.8, eds. E. Menestò *et al.*, *Giovanni di Pian di Carpine. Storia dei Mongoli* (Spoleto, 1989), pp. 288–9; tr. in C. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission. Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in China and Mongolia in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London and New York, 1955), p. 41.

[35] "Annales monasterii de Burton," in *Annales monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls Series (London, 1864–9), i, p. 497.

[36] See generally Schmieder, *Europa*, pp. 93–5; J. Richard, "D'Älğigidäi à Ġazan: la continuité d'une politique franque chez les Mongols d'Iran," in *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. D. Aigle, Bibliothèque Iranienne, 45 (Tehran, 1997), pp. 57–69; Jackson, "Mongols and Europe," pp. 713–17.

transformation over against the adoption of additional cultural norms.[37] For instance, the Uighur conversion to Manichaeism in the late eighth century had owed something to economic relations with Sogdian merchants, and it has also been called – like the Khazar qaghans' adoption of Judaism – "a declaration of ideological independence."[38]

Like earlier steppe rulers, the Mongol qa'ans presided over public debates between representatives of different faiths. The impulse behind these events is unclear. In a recent article, Richard Foltz points out that the effect of the whole policy was to make mischief, but he stops short of suggesting that the aim was to divide and rule.[39] It has been proposed that a debate took place at the point when the sovereign meditated a change of religious allegiance.[40] There may be some truth in this: Juwaynī's account of the conversion of the Uighurs some **[p. 254]** centuries previously, indeed, appears to be based upon the idea that such debates were always the means of bringing the ruler to a new faith.[41] But we cannot discount the possibility that one purpose was entertainment – that the public religious disputation, in other words, was the intellectual counterpart of the bloody gladiatorial conflicts which the Mongols staged between captured enemy soldiers.[42]

Lastly, the frontiers between different faiths were not impermeable. "Shamanism" was itself an amalgam, and we occupy no vantage-point that enables us to distinguish some pristine model from accretions that might have attached themselves to the Mongols' beliefs in the few centuries preceding the rise of Chinggis Khan. (I shall employ the traditional label "Shamanism,"

---

[37] J.H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters. Cross-cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-modern Times* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 6–20. D. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde. Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park, PA, 1994), pp. 22–7. P.B. Golden, "Religion among the Qıpčaqs of Medieval Eurasia," *CAJ*, 42 (1998), pp. 226–9.

[38] A. Khazanov, "World Religions in the Eurasian Steppes: Some Regularities of Dissemination," in *Altaic Religious Beliefs and Practices. Proceedings of the 33rd Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Budapest June 24–29, 1990*, eds. G. Bethlenfalvy *et al.* (Budapest, 1992), p. 199. *Idem*, "The Spread of World Religions in Medieval Nomadic Societies of the Eurasian Steppes," in *Nomadic Diplomacy, Destruction and Religion from the Pacific to the Adriatic*, eds. M. Gervers and W. Schlepp, Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia 1 (Toronto, 1994), pp. 16–21. Golden, "Religion among the Qıpčaqs," pp. 230–31. On the Khazars, see *idem*, "Khazaria and Judaism," *AEMA*, 3 (1983), p. 137.

[39] R. Foltz, "Ecumenical Mischief under the Mongols," *CAJ*, 43 (1999), pp. 42–69.

[40] See generally J.-P. Roux, "La tolérance religieuse dans les empires turco-mongols," *RHR*, 203 (1986), pp. 146–51.

[41] Juwaynī, i, p. 44 (tr. Boyle, i, pp. 59–60), erroneously making Buddhism rather than Manichaeism their new faith.

[42] On which see Simon of Saint-Quentin, pp. 73–4 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 31.146).

even though it is a misnomer because it ignores the daily practices of all but the minority who were religious specialists.)[43] A syncretistic approach had long been the hallmark of the nomads' religious beliefs; it is reflected in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, where elements from the mythical history of the early Turks, the Khitans and other steppe and forest peoples are appropriated and integrated into the Mongols' own origin myths.[44]

Intent as the Mongols may have been on sharing the world only with subjects, they were also compelled to share it with a plethora of spirits, often malevolently inclined and in any case termed "demons" by Western European writers. When Rubruck's little group in 1253 passed through a difficult stretch in the Tarbaghatai range, his guide asked the friars to chant a prayer that would put the demons to flight.[45] Diagnosis of the activity of these invisible powers, and if possible their harnessing for good purposes, was the job of the shamans; and there [**p. 255**] is no dearth of testimony that by the middle decades of the thirteenth century Mongol rulers manifested a heavy dependence upon shamans and fortune-tellers.[46] As Carpini noticed, shamanistic activities are geared to influencing conditions in this life, not to securing an afterlife.[47] The Mongols' ancestral beliefs and practices and the great world religions, in other words, were valid for different spheres: hence the "tolerant" policy of the Mongol qa'ans,[48] to which we shall return. So it was not at all incongruous that a Mongol sovereign or prince should make some formal gesture towards, say,

---

[43] DeWeese, *Islamization*, pp. 33–9. C. Humphrey, "Shamanic Practices and the State in Northern Asia: Views from the Centre and Periphery," in *Shamanism, History and the State*, eds. N. Thomas and C. Humphrey (Ann Arbor, 1994), pp. 191–228 (esp. pp. 198–201).

[44] K. Uray-Kőhalmi, "Synkretismus im Staatskult der frühen Dschinggisiden," in *Synkretismus in den Religionen Zentralasiens*, eds. W. Heissig and H.J. Klimkeit, Studies in Oriental Religions, 13 (Wiesbaden, 1987), pp. 136–58. On the syncretistic approach of Inner Asian peoples, see J.-P. Roux, "Les religions dans les sociétés turco-mongoles," *RHR*, 201 (1984), pp. 406–12.

[45] Rubruck, 27.4, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 240 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 166). For other references to demons, see *ibid.*, 8.5 and 35.12–13, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 187, 305 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 96, 245). Chang Chun was told of demons in this same region: Waley, *Travels of an Alchemist*, pp. 75–6.

[46] E. Endicott-West, "Notes on Shamans, Fortune-tellers and *yin-yang* Practitioners and Civil Administration in Yüan China," in *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, eds. Amitai-Preiss and Morgan, pp. 226–8.

[47] Carpini, 3.9, ed. Menestò, p. 240 (tr. Dawson, p. 12). "Tartar Relation," § 42, ed. A. Önnerfors, *Hystoria Tartarorum C. de Bridia monachi*, Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen, 186 (Berlin, 1967), p. 28. See Heissig, *Religions of Mongolia*, pp. 11, 16; D. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), p. 44.

[48] S. Jagchid, "Why the Mongolian Khans Adopted Tibetan Buddhism as their Faith," in *Proceedings of the 3rd East Asian Altaistic Conference* (Taipei, 1969), p. 109 (rpt. in his *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, Monograph Series of the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham

Christianity or Islam while continuing to observe the "shamanistic" practices of his forebears: Rubruck saw even those of Möngke's wives who had no knowledge of the Christian faith venerating the cross.[49] We do not have to see this as some kind of celestial insurance, as if any of the several faiths with which the Mongols were confronted might embody the Truth and so it was advisable to court them all,[50] although the idea finds support in a speech ascribed to Qubilai by Marco Polo.[51]

[**p. 256**] On leaving the camp of the Mongol prince Sartaq, Rubruck was told, "Do not call our master a Christian: he is not a Christian; he is a Mongol." Although he goes on to say that "they regard the term Christendom as the name of a people" (i.e. presumably the Franks of Europe), it is doubtful whether this necessarily supports DeWeese's contention that religion in Inner Asia was a communal affair.[52] It may well have been so; but Rubruck (whose interpreter was proverbially inadequate) could easily have misunderstood the reason for the warning, and a different explanation comes to mind. We should notice that on several occasions the Mongol terms for religious specialists seem to have been interpreted as denoting the religious community as a whole. Rubruck, for instance, employs the Mongol word *toyin* (Chinese *daoren*, "man of the path," i.e. Buddhist priest) as a designation for the Buddhists ("idolators") in general.[53]

Young University, 3 [Provo, UT, 1988], pp. 83–4); see also S. Jagchid and P. Hyer, ***Mongolia's Culture and Society*** (Boulder, 1979), pp. 172–3.

[49] Rubruck, 29.31, 35, 40, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 263, 264, 266 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 195, 196, 198).

[50] See, e.g. Morgan, *Mongols*, pp. 41, 44.

[51] Marco Polo, *Le divisament dou monde*, eds. and trs. A.C. Moule and P. Pelliot, ***The Description of the World*** (London, 1938, 2 vols), i, p. 201. See the translation by R. Latham, ***The Travels of Marco Polo*** (Harmondsworth, 1958), p. 119: "There are four prophets who are worshipped and to whom all the world does reverence. The Christians say that their God was Jesus Christ, the Saracens Mahomet, the Jews Moses, and the idolaters Sakyamuni Burkhan,... And I do honour and reverence to all four, so that I may be sure of doing it to him who is greatest in heaven and truest." It will be noticed that the Polo account does not betray any marked theological refinement. Certainly, if the Qa'an is quoted with any degree of accuracy, his understanding of the nature of Islam and Judaism, at least, was decidedly imperfect. The passage is cited also by P. Demiéville, "La situation religieuse en Chine au temps de Marco Polo," in ***Oriente Poliano. Studi e conferenze tenute all'Is.M.E.O. in occasione del VII. centenario della nascità di Marco Polo (1254–1954)*** (Rome, 1957), p. 196.

[52] Rubruck, 16.5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 205 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 120). See DeWeese, *Islamization*, pp. 100–101, n.73.

[53] Rubruck, 26.14 and 28.12, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 238, 248 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 164, 176). For *toyin*, see G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur: Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommission, 16, 19–21 (Wiesbaden, 1963–75, 4 vols), ii, pp. 648–51 (no. 993).

And the use of *erke'ün* ("Christian priest") betrays a similar confusion in the thirteenth-century sources.[54] This might explain the apparent bewilderment of the Qa'an Güyüg at Innocent IV's request that he become a Christian, and the anger in the camp of the Mongol general Baiju over the same injunction on the part of Ascelin.[55] The Qa'an Möngke, too, objected when Rubruck was misrepresented as having called him a *toyin*.[56] It is possible that with one exception the Mongolian lexicon recognized only religious *specialists* and contained no word for the respective religious community *en masse*. The exception was the **[p. 257]** Muslims who confronted Chinggis Khan in the shape of the powerful Khwārazmian empire. Here two words were available: *sarta'ul*, employed in the *Secret History* to designate the Khwārazm-shāh's subjects, and *dashman* (from Persian *dānishmand*, literally "learned man"), which denoted the Muslim religious class. But to the best of our knowledge the language contained no word for "Christian" or "Buddhist," as opposed to *erke'ün* or *toyin* for priest/monk. Even in the late thirteenth century Persian authors in the Mongol empire equated "Christian" (Persian: *tarsā*) with "Uighur" on account of the large number of Christians among that people.[57]

At what juncture "Shamanism" merits being called a religion, it is difficult to say. It has been proposed that in any consideration of the religious beliefs and practices of Inner Asian peoples we need to distinguish between "popular"

---

[54] For *erke'ün*, see *ibid.*, i, pp. 123–5 (no. 15). For the equation of *erke'ün* and "Christian," see below; also J. Richard, "La lettre du Connétable Smbat et les rapports entre Chrétiens et Mongols au milieu du XIII[ème] siècle," in *Études arméniennes in memoriam Haïg Berbérian*, ed. D. Kouymjian (Lisbon, 1986), p. 691; Juwaynī, iii, p. 77 (tr. Boyle, ii, p. 599); N. Poppe, *The Mongolian Monuments in ḥP'ags-pa script*, 2nd edn. by J.R. Krueger, Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen 8 (Wiesbaden, 1957), pp. 82–3; J. Hamilton, "Le texte turc en caractères syriaques du grand sceau cruciforme de Mār Yahballāhā III" *J[ournal] A[siatique]*, 260 (1972), pp. 163–4. Examples from Chinese sources are listed in A.C. Moule, *Christians in China before the Year 1550* (London, 1930), pp. 218–25 (and notes).

[55] Persian text of Güyüg's letter in Pelliot, "Mongols et la papauté," p. 17 (tr. p. 22). Simon of Saint-Quentin, pp. 100–101 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 32.43).

[56] Rubruck, 34.1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 297 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 236); cf. 33.6, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 292 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 229).

[57] Pelliot, "Chrétiens d'Asie centrale," p. 636. By the late twelfth century, the term "Tarse" in Western Europe denoted the land of the Three Magi: see U. Monneret de Villard, *Le leggende orientali sui Magi evangelici*, Studi e Testi 163 (Vatican City, 1952), esp. pp. 163–4; Bezzola, *Mongolen*, pp. 35–6; D. Sinor, "Le Mongol vu par l'Occident," in *1274, année charnière. Mutations et continuités*, Colloques internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 558 (Paris, 1977), pp. 58–9 (rpt. in D. Sinor, *Studies in Medieval Inner Asia* [Aldershot, 1997]). These important links are not discussed in L.H. Hornstein, "The Historical Background of *The King of Tars*," *Speculum*, 16 (1941), pp. 405–6.

cultic practice – "folk religion," as Heissig calls it[58] – and what has been termed "Tenggerism," centred on the sky-god, i.e. those beliefs and practices associated with a monarchy based on divine sanction.[59] DeWeese is sceptical, and sees the dichotomy as between, not two competing levels of religious thought and ritual, but "imperial" and "domestic" styles of evoking essentially the same system of religious values and practices.[60] A clash between the aspiring steppe emperor and the representative of popular traditions might, nevertheless, provide a framework within which we can locate the downfall of Teb Tenggeri (Kököchü), the shaman who had been instrumental in Chinggis Khan's enthronement but had then got above himself and was eliminated.[61] Rashīd al-Dīn seems to suggest **[p. 258]** that Teb Tenggeri had a following among the ordinary Mongols, who were ready to believe in his spiritual accomplishments.[62] The difficulty with this scenario is that it was Teb Tenggeri who invoked Heaven's mandate and Chinggis Khan who disregarded it.

The notion that the early thirteenth-century Mongols worshipped the supreme sky-god, Tengri (Tenggeri), has been challenged on the basis of the way in which the term *tenggeri* is used in the *Secret History*, the only Mongolian narrative source that has come down to us.[63] But Anatoly Khazanov makes the plausible suggestion that the Mongols were experiencing the pull of monotheism, as Tengri took on more of the attributes of the omnipotent God.[64] Indeed, a shift is visible during the early decades of the conquest period,

---

[58] Heissig, *Religions of Mongolia*, pp. 46–7.

[59] E.g. A. Róna-Tas, "Materialien zur alten Religion der Türken," in *Synkretismus*, eds. Heissig and Klimkeit, p. 34; J.-P. Roux, "La religion des peuples de la steppe," in *Popoli delle steppe: Unni, Avari, Ungari, 23–29 aprile 1987*, Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo (Spoleto, 1988, 2 vols), ii, pp. 514–15; L. Bazin, "Manichéisme et syncrétisme chez les Ouïgours," *Turcica*, 21–3 (1991), p. 24.

[60] DeWeese, *Islamization*, pp. 38–9; and cf. also pp. 521–2.

[61] L. Hambis, "Un épisode mal connu de l'histoire de Gengis-Khan," *Journal des Savants* (1975), pp. 3–46. Roux, "Sacerdoce," p. 155. P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan. His Life and Legacy*, tr. T.N. Haining (Oxford, 1991), pp. 98–101. Humphrey, "Shamanic Practices," pp. 202–5.

[62] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, i/1, eds. A.A. Romaskevich *et al.* (Moscow, 1965), p. 419; tr. W.M. Thackston, *Jami'u'l-Tawarikh. Compendium of Chronicles* (Cambridge, MA, 1998–99), i, p. 90. Teb Tenggeri's role in Chinggis Khan's enthronement is not mentioned in the *Secret History*: the earliest reference to it is in Juwaynī, i, pp. 28–9 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 39).

[63] M.-L. Beffa, "Le concept de *tänggäri*, «ciel», dans l'*Histoire Secrète des Mongols*," *Études Mongoles et Sibériennes*, 24 (1993), pp. 215–36.

[64] Khazanov, "Muhammad and Jenghiz Khan," pp. 465–6. Cf. also W. Hage, "Christentum und Schamanismus: zur Krise des Nestorianertums in Zentralasien," in *Tradition-Krisis-Renovatio aus theologischer Sicht. Festschrift Winfried Zeller zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. B. Jasper and R. Mohr (Mainz, 1976), p. 121; Beffa, "Concept de *tänggäri*," pp. 226–7; and (in the Khazar context) Golden, "Khazaria and Judaism," pp. 136–7.

to judge from the comments of contemporary observers (while bearing in mind the possible distortion that I mentioned earlier). Carpini noticed that the Mongols believed in one God, creator of all things visible and invisible, though they did not worship Him, as was fitting, reverencing idols instead.[65] Subsequent observers, at any rate, were ready to class the Mongols as monotheistic. Rubruck assumed that they had acquired monotheism from the Uighurs.[66] "You are not a polytheist," Qadi Ḥamīd al-Dīn Sābiq Samarqandī told Qubilai Qa'an during the clampdown on Islamic observance in China in the 1280s, "because you write the name of the great God at the head of your edicts (*yarlighs*)."[67] This development, of course, made it easier for representatives of the different confessional groups to claim the Qa'an as one of their own.

[p. 259] The Question of Toleration

The idea that Mongol rulers were indifferent to the religious practices of their (non-Mongol) subjects has been remarkably longlived,[68] and certainly appears to be well-grounded in the sources. Take Marco Polo:

> These Tartars do not care what God is worshipped in their lands. If only all are faithful to the lord Kaan, and quite obedient, and give therefore of the appointed tribute, and justice is well kept, thou mayest do what pleaseth thee with thy soul.[69]

Or Simon of Saint-Quentin:

> They allow Christian religious observances (*ritus*) and [those of] every sect whatsoever, and worship by men of every kind to be practised amongst them in safety and freedom, and wherever they hold power, moreover, they do not bother about the customs of anyone whatsoever, provided they are given service just as they command.[70]

Carpini's party formed a similar opinion about Mongol tolerance[71] (though Carpini himself – or whoever reworked his report – added a rider in the second redaction of his *Ystoria Mongalorum*, expressing the fear that it would be

---

[65] "Tartar Relation," § 39, ed. Önnerfors, p. 25. Carpini, 3.2, ed. Menestò, p. 236 (tr. Dawson, p. 9).

[66] Rubruck, 25.9, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 232 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 156).

[67] Rashīd al-Dīn, ii, ed. E. Blochet, *Djami el-Tévarikh. Histoire générale du monde par Fadl-Allah Rashid ed-Din*, GMS, 18 (Leiden and London, 1911), p. 524 (tr. Thackston, p. 452).

[68] See, for instance, Roux, "Tolérance."

[69] Marco Polo, eds. Moule and Pelliot, ii, p. 96 (the Z text).

[70] Simon of Saint-Quentin, p. 47 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 30.84).

[71] "Tartar Relation," § 42, ed. Önnerfors, p. 28.

jettisoned once the Mongols were secure in their mastery).[72] Testimony of this sort, which is further corroborated by Juwaynī and by the Jacobite Christian ecclesiastic Bar Hebraeus,[73] has helped to entrench the idea of Mongol religious toleration.

Benedict and Andrew of Longjumeau were well aware, however, that, even if the Mongols did not persecute their subjects on the grounds of religion *per se*, they cared only too much about some practices; and since they intervened in these as a means of giving visible and tangible imprint to their political domination, certain of the subject groups at various times experienced Mongol rule as markedly intolerant.[74] **[p. 260]** One instance is veneration of the image of Chinggis Khan, an obligation which, we are told, the Mongols especially imposed on foreign grandees who visited them.[75] Another example was the institution of the levirate, which meant that a Christian Rus' prince was forced to marry his brother's widow, despite the repugnance of both parties,[76] while in the early Yuan era the levirate was made obligatory for the Han population of China from 1272, though with less rigour after 1276.[77] Christians could also find themselves obliged to enter into bigamous unions, so that the Armenian Constable, Smbat, whom his brother King Het'um sent as ambassador to Güyüg's court in 1248–49, was given a Mongol princess in marriage, even though his first wife was almost certainly still alive.[78] The Mongol *coiffure* may

---

[72] Carpini, 3.5, ed. Menestò, p. 238 (tr. Dawson, p. 10). See D. Ostrowski, "Second-redaction Additions in Carpini's *Ystoria Mongalorum*," in *Adelphotes. A Tribute to Omeljan Pritsak by His Students* (Cambridge, MA, 1990 = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 14/3–4 [1990]), p. 539.

[73] Juwaynī, i, p. 18 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 26). Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 490.

[74] "Tartar Relation," § 42, ed. Önnerfors, p. 28. Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls Series (London, 1872–83), vi, p. 114. For objections to "indifference," see Hage, "Christentum und Schamanismus," p. 121, and his "Religiöse Toleranz in der nestorianischen Asienmission," in *Glaube und Toleranz. Das theologische Erbe der Aufklärung*, ed. T. Rendtorff (Gütersloh, 1982), pp. 110–12; DeWeese, *Islamization*, pp. 100–101, n. 73. For further remarks about Mongol intolerance, see Endicott-West, "Notes on Shamans," p. 236.

[75] Carpini, 3.3–4, ed. Menestò, pp. 237–38 (tr. Dawson, pp. 9–10). "Tartar Relation," §§ 39–40, ed. Önnerfors, pp. 25–26.

[76] Carpini, 3.6, ed. Menestò, p. 239 (tr. Dawson, p. 11). More briefly in "Tartar Relation," § 42, ed. Önnerfors, p. 28.

[77] J. Holmgren, "Observations on Marriage and Inheritances Practices in Early Mongol and Yüan Society, with Particular Reference to the Levirate," *Journal of Asian History*, 20/2 (1986), pp. 179–83. B. Birge, "Levirate Marriage and the Revival of Widow Chastity in Yüan China," *Asia Major*, 3rd series, 8/2 (1995), pp. 120–28.

[78] Richard, "Lettre du Connétable Smbat," p. 696, n. 59.

also have been imposed on sections of the conquered populations, though the evidence is tenuous.[79]

In addition, the Mongols tried to abolish those practices that conflicted with the customary law of the steppe. In this regard the taboos of which we are told particularly affected Muslims, for whom the day-to-day observance of their faith entailed the infringement of important Mongol customs. Thus they were forbidden to wash in running water in the spring and summer or to slaughter animals in the manner required by the Sharī'a.[80] Either of these practices, incidentally, [**p. 261**] may lie at the root of objections later raised against the conversion to Islam of individual Mongol khans by those who claimed to uphold "the *yasa* [regulation] of Chinggis Khan"; though to my knowledge such objections are not framed in specific terms in our sources.

That Chinggis Khan had indeed issued an edict prohibiting the Muslim slaughter ritual is confirmed by what is perhaps the best-known instance of such cultural oppression, namely Qubilai's edict (1280) forbidding Muslims in China and, allegedly, Jews also to slaughter animals in their accustomed fashion and adding a prohibition against circumcision for good measure. This episode was allegedly sparked off by the refusal of some Muslim guests to eat the meat Qubilai offered them, which had not been slaughtered in the appropriate manner.[81] Qubilai's edict asserts that Chinggis Khan's prohibition

---

[79] Former officials of the Chin regime in North China: Xu Ting, *Heda shilue* (1237), in *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh. Chinesische Gesandtenberichte über die frühen Mongolen (1221 und 1237)*, tr. W. Olbricht and E. Pinks, Asiatische Forschungen, 56 (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp. 155 and 157, n. 9. Polovtsy and even Muslims: Simon of Saint-Quentin, p. 31 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 30.71). Qangli in Transoxiana: P.B. Golden, "'I will give the people unto thee': The Činggisid Conquests and their Aftermath in the Turkic World," *JRAS*, 3rd series, 10 (2000), p. 31, citing Rashīd al-Dīn (cf. Thackston tr., i, pp. 248–9); but the corresponding passage in Juwaynī, i, p. 95 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 121), makes it clear that the aim was to lull these Qangli into a false sense of security prior to their massacre.

[80] Juwaynī, i, pp. 161–3, 227 (tr. Boyle, i, pp. 204–6, 272). Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, 2nd edn. (Kabul, 1342–3 Shamsī/1963–4, 2 vols), ii, pp. 152–3, 167; tr. H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī. A General History of the Mohammedan Dynasties of Asia*, Bibliotheca Indica (London, 1873–81, 2 vols with continuous pagination), ii, pp. 1107–9, 1146. That the prohibition of washing the body and drying laundry applied only in spring and summer is clear from Juwaynī, i, p. 161 (tr. Boyle, i, pp. 204–5), and Waley, *Travels of an Alchemist*, p. 115, n. 3. See generally P. Ratchnevsky, "Die Rechtsverhältnisse bei den Mongolen im 12.–13. Jahrhundert," *CAJ*, 31 (1987), pp. 78–9. The prohibition of the Muslim slaughter ritual is the only (in its effect) anti-Muslim measure on Chinggis Khan's part noticed by M. Rossabi, "The Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty," in *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. J.D. Langlois, Jr. (Princeton, NJ, 1981), pp. 257–95 (see esp. p. 261).

[81] P. Ratchnevsky, "Rašīd ad-Dīn über die Mohammedaner-Verfolgungen in China unter Qubilai," *CAJ*, 14 (1970), pp. 163-80; a better translation of the edict in F.W. Cleaves, "The Rescript

had been discontinued under Ögödei. Such a cavalier attitude towards the great man's edicts (by no means easy to imagine) is not confirmed elsewhere, but it is doubtless linked with the numerous anecdotes concerning Ögödei's mild and generous treatment of Muslims recounted by Juwaynī. It may also explain a story told by the Armenian chronicler Kirakos from the 1230s about a Georgian prince who refused to taste the selection of clean and unclean food and fermented mare's milk (*qumis*) which the Mongol general Chormaghun set before him and his entourage, on the grounds that much of it was forbidden to Christians. In response, far from exploding **[p. 262]** with rage, Chormaghun simply had them provided with food that was acceptable to them.[82]

Yet despite the enforcement of certain steppe customs and taboos (and we cannot be at all sure that they were enforced outside the principal centres of Mongol power), there is no doubt that in different regions different religious groups gained from the qa'ans' rule a freedom of action that they had not enjoyed before the advent of the Mongols. This applied to Muslims, of whom Simon of Saint-Quentin complained that they were now able to proselytize all the more freely among the Mongol troops.[83] But it is most conspicuously true of Christians living in territories that had previously been under Muslim rule. In the 1230s the Nestorian monk Simeon Rabban-ata was able, with the approval of the Mongol military, to build Christian churches and erect crosses in Muslim Azerbaijan.[84] A *qaṣīda* lamenting the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258 speaks (figuratively, perhaps) of the cross raised over the *minbars* and of authority in the hands of those who used to wear the *zunnār* (girdle, i.e. the *dhimmīs*).[85] And during the brief Mongol occupation of Damascus in 1260, the Christians there were able to assert themselves at the expense of their Muslim

---

of Qubilai Prohibiting the Slaughtering of Animals by Slitting the Throat," in *Richard Nelson Frye Festschrift I. Essays Presented to Richard Nelson Frye on his Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students* (Cambridge, MA, 1992 = *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 16 [1992]), pp. 67–89 (I am indebted to Dr. Michal Biran for this reference). For a briefer account of the episode, see M. Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan. His Life and Times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), pp. 199–203, and his "Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty," pp. 291–5. The principal non-Chinese source is Rashīd al-Dīn, ii, ed. Blochet, pp. 521–3 (tr. Thackston, ii, pp. 451–2).

[82] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, pp. 219–20.

[83] Simon of Saint-Quentin, p. 47 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 30.84).

[84] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, pp. 237–9. See generally Pelliot, "Mongols et la papauté" [part 2], *ROC*, 24 (1924), pp. 225–62.

[85] J. de Somogyi, "A *Qaṣīda* on the Destruction of Baghdād by the Mongols," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, 7 (1933–35), pp. 41–8 (text at p. 44, tr. p. 45). The verses are preserved in al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), *Ta'rīkh al-Islām, 651–660*, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut, 1419/1999), p. 38. *Dhimmī* is a member of one of the non-Muslim groups (mainly Christians or Jews) protected under Islamic sovereignty.

fellow citizens, for which they paid dearly once the news arrived of the battle of 'Ayn Jālūt and the Mongols' expulsion from Syria in September.[86]

The Status of the "Religious Classes"

In particular, the "religious class" within each confessional group received significant privileges. The background to this is disputed. Caroline Humphrey's view is that, after the murder of Teb Tenggeri, Chinggis Khan took care to avoid giving clear precedence to any [**p. 263**] particular religious practitioners.[87] At one level, it is clear that the Mongols recognized how useful religious leaders could be in securing the submission of the local population. "Have you won over the common people?" Chinggis Khan wrote to the Daoist patriarch Chang Chun in 1223.[88] It is not too far-fetched, perhaps, to view the Ilkhans' subsequent correspondence with the Papacy partly in this same light. In his letter of 1262 to Louis IX of France, Hülegü says that the Mongols used to think that the Pope was the over-king of the Franks but had now realised that he was "a holy man who prays unceasingly to God for all peoples, ... the vicegerent on earth of Mishiqa Tenggeri [i.e. Jesus Christ], and the head of all who believe in and pray to Christ."[89] If handled properly, the Pope could surely bring over people in even larger numbers than the Daoist patriarch.

Mongol rulers had another, more personal interest in supporting the "religious." Chinggis Khan's eagerness to meet Chang Chun, who was reputed to be three hundred years old, and the privileges he granted to the Daoists,

---

[86] D. Sourdel, "Bohémond et les chrétiens à Damas sous l'occupation mongole," in *Dei gesta per Francos. Études sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard*, eds. M. Balard *et al.* (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 295–9.

[87] Humphrey, "Shamanic Practices," p. 206; cf. also R.F. Young, "*Deus unus* or *Dei plures sunt*? The Function of Inclusivism in the Buddhist Defense of Mongol Folk Religion against William of Rubruck (1254)," in *Universality and Uniqueness in the Context of Religious Pluralism* (Philadelphia, 1989 = *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 26/1), p. 106; more generally, Roux, "Tolérance," pp. 151–6, 159–63.

[88] Demiéville, "La situation religieuse," p. 195. See more generally P. Ratchnevsky, "Die mongolischen Großkhane und die buddhistische Kirche," in *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet von seinen Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern*, eds. J. Schubert and U. Schneider (Leipzig, 1954), pp. 489–90. I. de Rachewiltz and T. Russell, "Ch'iu Ch'u-chi (1148–1227)," *PFEH*, 29 (March 1984), p. 11; also in *In the Service of the Khan. Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period*, eds. I. de Rachewiltz *et al.*, Asiatische Forschungen 121 (Wiesbaden, 1993), p. 214. For a good overview of Chinggis Khan's "religious policy," see Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 197–8.

[89] P. Meyvaert, "An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France," *Viator*, 11 (1980), p. 258: *intelleximus ipsum esse virum sanctum deum iugiter orantem pro nationibus universis ipsius Misicatengrin....locum in terris tenentem et caput omnium in Christo credentium et precantium.*

sprang from a straightforwardly biological understanding of immortality. In his summons to the Daoist patriarch, he expressed his hope of learning the means of preserving life, and one of the first questions he put to Chang Chun was what medicine of long life he had brought with him.[90] From the decree issued to Chang Chun in April 1223, it is clear the conqueror was under the impression that the Daoists were praying for his longevity – to **[p. 264]** the tune of one hundred million years.[91] This was highly ironic in view of the fact that the sect had abandoned the earlier ideas about physical immortality propagated by its founder, Wang Zhe.[92] Chang Chun's denial of his power to prolong life did not prevent the Mongols in subsequent generations from seeking the prayers of other holy men for this purpose. "They like one to pray for their lives," says Rubruck,[93] who at Mongol encampments was frequently asked whether the Pope was five hundred years old.[94] To put it more broadly, the Mongol rulers wished to avail themselves of the technical expertise of the religious leaders, in much the same way as they and ordinary Mongols had been accustomed to make use of the expertise of the shaman: it will be proposed below that the requisite talents related above all to magic, healing and foretelling the future.

The Mongols' need for religious specialists, among others, was reflected in the privileges they conferred upon them. Chinggis Khan's Khitan adviser, Yelü Chucai, who accompanied him on his Western campaign, observes that "all those who cultivate goodness" in the far west, whether Buddhists or others, were exempted from taxes and labour services.[95] Only two relevant documents have come down to us from the conqueror's own era, however: an order to his general Muqali to provide subsistence for the Buddhist monk Haiyun (1202–57) and his master, to put them in authority over their confrères, and to allot them *darqan* (*tarkhan*) status, i.e. exemption from the poll-tax and labour services;[96] and the subsequent edict in favour of Chang Chun, dated April 1223

---

[90] Tao-chung Yao, "Ch'iu Ch'u-chi and Chinggis Khan," *HJAS*, 46 (1986), pp. 205–7, 211.

[91] Yelü Chucai, *Xi you lu*, tr. I. de Rachewiltz, "The *Hsi-yu lu* by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," *MS*, 21 (1962), p. 25. Éd. Chavannes, "Inscriptions et pièces de chancellerie chinoises de l'époque mongole," *TP*, 5 (1904), p. 369.

[92] Demiéville, "Situation religieuse," pp. 197–8. De Rachewiltz and Russell, "Ch'iu Ch'u-chi," pp. 15–19 (in *In the Service of the Khan*, pp. 218–21).

[93] Rubruck, 28.16, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 250 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 179); see also 22.2 and 27.6, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 221–2, 241 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 141, 167–8); and more generally Roux, "Tolérance," pp. 163–5.

[94] Rubruck, 22.2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 222 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 142).

[95] Yelü Chucai, *Xi you lu*, tr. De Rachewiltz, pp. 28–9.

[96] Demiéville, "Situation religieuse," p. 202; also I. de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period," *J[ournal of the] E[conomic and] S[ocial] H[istory of the] O[rient]*, 9 (1966), p. 133, n.1; garbled in S. Jagchid, "Chinese Buddhism and Taoism

and granting exemption from all requisitions and taxes.[97] The two privileges are difficult to reconcile, [**p. 265**] and gave rise to bitter conflict between the Daoists and the Buddhists.[98]

In later tradition the conqueror was credited with nothing less than making the "religious" a distinct caste. According to Juwaynī, Chinggis Khan had issued a *yasa* that the pious and learned of every sect were to be honoured and to be treated equally.[99] Later the same author asserts that both Chinggis Khan and Ögödei had promulgated a *yarligh* granting exemption from contributions (*mu'an*) to "great sayyids and shaykhs and excellent imams, ... *erke'üns*, priests, monks and rabbis (*aḥbār*), ... and *toyins*..." It was renewed by Möngke, although he expressly excepted the rabbis, for reasons that are not given.[100] Legislation from the eastern reaches of the Mongol empire tells the same tale. All the relevant fourteenth-century Yuan edicts that have survived speak of exemption from all taxation of whatever kind, in return for praying to Heaven and pronouncing benedictions.[101] And the earliest *yarligh* from the Golden Horde in favour of the Rus' church similarly attributes to Chinggis Khan an edict granting immunity to the religious class in return for prayers.[102] Privileges for the Confucians seem to have come relatively late: it was Ögödei who, at Haiyun's instigation, restored the ranks of Confucius's descendants and extended to them exemption from services.[103] Otherwise, the overall impression created by these documents is that the founder of the Mongol empire had exempted all the "religious" not

---

during the Mongolian Rule of China," *Mongolian Studies*, 6 (1980), p. 63 (rpt. in Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 94–5). Y.H. Jan, "Hai-yün (1203–1257)," in *In the Service of the Khan*, p. 227.

[97] Chavannes, "Inscriptions," *TP*, 5 (1904), pp. 368–71 (a second edict, p. 372, dated October 1223, makes no mention of exemptions). Jagchid and Hyer, p. 173.

[98] J. Thiel, "Der Streit der Buddhisten und Taoisten zur Mongolenzeit," *MS*, 20 (1961), pp. 1–81.

[99] Juwaynī, i, pp. 18–19 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 26).

[100] *Ibid.*, iii, pp. 77–8 (tr. Boyle, ii, p. 599, reads "scholars" for *aḥbār*). Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 418.

[101] Edict of 1311: Chavannes, "Inscriptions," *TP*, 5 (1904), pp. 419–21. Edict of 1314: Poppe, *Mongolian Monuments*, pp. 49–50. Edict of 1321: *ibid.*, p. 55. Edict of 1324: Chavannes, "Inscriptions," *TP*, 6 (1905), pp. 40–42. Edict of 1335: *ibid.*, *TP*, 5 (1904), pp. 438–41. See also the reference to a document of 1294 in Jagchid, "Chinese Buddhism," p. 80 (in Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 105–6). With the exception of the 1324 edict, these documents restrict exempt status to Buddhist, Christian and Daoist clergy and omit the Muslims.

[102] H.F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," *HJAS*, 19 (1956), pp. 343–4.

[103] H. Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God. The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty*, Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 2 (Munich, 1978), pp. 34–5 (rpt. in his *China under Mongol Rule* [Aldershot, 1994]). Jagchid, "Chinese Buddhism," pp. 75–6 (in Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 103–4). Jan, "Hai-yün," p. 232.

only from forced labour and the provision of services but from taxation of any kind.

The privileges extended to Christian priests and monks find mention also in Mongol diplomatic correspondence with Western European **[p. 266]** rulers. Eljigidei's letter of 1248 to Louis IX stresses the Mongols' favour towards Christians in general, and not just towards the "religious" (although there may be a genuine confusion here, again, between "Christian" and "Christian priest," *erke'ün*: see above). But the letter also speaks of the immunity granted to them without mentioning that the same privileges were enjoyed also by Muslim clerics and Buddhist priests.[104] The same misleading picture emerges from the correspondence of the Ilkhans Abagha and Arghun with the Popes, designed to bring about assistance for the Mongols in the shape of a new crusade. Arghun's letter to Honorius IV, dated May 1285, expressly credits Chinggis Khan with having issued an order that "all Christians should not yield tribute and should be free [*franchi*] in their own land."[105]

Now the immunity mentioned in Chinggis Khan's decree to Chang Chun in April 1223 can be discounted. Its authenticity was being challenged at a very early date: Chinggis Khan's Khitan adviser Yelü Chucai, writing his *Xi you lu* in 1229, would claim that the Daoists themselves drafted the document, in the absence of the relevant imperial official.[106] In an article more often cited than read, moreover, Ratchnevsky suggested in 1954 that the later traditions that speak of comprehensive tax exemptions for the "religious" are all likewise suspect. References in edicts of the later Yuan emperors sought to justify, by means of Chinggis Khan's sanction, practices that had in fact grown up since his time, while mention of the exemption of Christian clergy in Ilkhanid diplomatic correspondence was merely a ploy to secure an alliance with the Catholic West.[107]

The fact is that Chinggis Khan had exempted (and on an *ad hoc* basis, rather than as part of some general concession) only those who had abandoned the world completely. Even in the edicts issued to Chang Chun in 1223, it is those who have *left the world* to devote **[p. 267]** themselves to religion who are to enjoy immunity from taxation and forced labour and who are to be subject

---

[104] D'Achéry, *Spicilegium*, iii, col. 625b (BN ms. latin 3768, fo. 77v).

[105] K.-E. Lupprian (ed.), *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels*, Studi e Testi 291 (Vatican City, 1981), pp. 229, 239, 246.

[106] Yelü Chucai, *Xi you lu*, tr. de Rachewiltz, pp. 29–31, 82–3, n. 215; for the date of this work, see *ibid.*, pp. 3, 13, n. 20. De Rachewiltz and Russell, "Ch'iu Ch'u-chi," p. 12 (in *In the Service of the Khan*, pp. 214–15). Jagchid, "Chinese Buddhism," pp. 65–7 (in Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 96–7).

[107] Ratchnevsky, "Die mongolischen Großkhane," pp. 489–90, n. 1.

to the Daoist patriarch.[108] Yelü Chucai's phrase "all who cultivate goodness" (i.e. ascetics) obviously denotes this same class.[109] In time this entailed drawing a sharp distinction between the different occupations of one and the same "religious," i.e. his spiritual pursuits and any economic activity in which he might engage, since the *Yuan shi* demonstrates that under Ögödei Buddhist and Daoist monks were exempt from the poll tax (*qubchur*) but nevertheless paid tax on their landed property.[110] It was only in Güyüg's reign that fiscal immunity was extended to cover all those religious who engaged in agriculture and commerce.[111] An Armenian source dating from 1248 appears to describe this situation when it states that churches and their attendants were exempt from the heavy demands for both people and animals to which the rest of the population were subjected.[112] Güyüg's policy was maintained even under his reform-minded successor Möngke, since Kirakos tells us that in the early 1250s the agents of the fiscal administrator Arghun Aqa spared ecclesiastics and demanded no tax from them, because it would have run counter to their orders from the Qa'an.[113]

Not until 1264, during Qubilai's reign, was the old distinction reasserted between those religious who remained active in the world and those who did not.[114] This differentiation is also manifest in the specific imposts from which the religious secured release. An edict of Qubilai's son Manggala, dated 1276 and written in the new *'phags-pa* [**p. 268**] Mongolian script, ascribes to Chinggis Khan and Ögödei edicts exempting Buddhist, Christian, Daoist and Muslim "clergy" from tribute and taxes, other than land and commercial taxes, in return for praying to Heaven and pronouncing benedictions (the fact that the Chinese version of this document speaks, rather, of total exemption might well indicate that Chinese officials were endeavouring on the quiet to broaden

---

[108] Chavannes, "Inscriptions," *TP*, 5 (1904), pp. 368–70, 372.

[109] Yelü Chucai, *Xi you lu*, tr. de Rachewiltz, pp. 28–9.

[110] *Yuan shi*, ch. 95, cited in Ratchnevsky, "Die mongolischen Großkhane," p. 491. E. Haenisch, *Steuergerechtsame der chinesischen Klöster unter der Mongolenherrschaft: eine kulturgeschichtliche Untersuchung mit Beigabe dreier noch unveröffentlichter Phagspa-Inschriften*, Berichte über die Verhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 92/2 (Leipzig, 1940), p. 14 (year 1236).

[111] *Yuan dianzhong*, cited in P. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, i, Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises 4 (Paris, 1937), p. 209; also Haenisch, *Steuergerechtsame*, p. 23.

[112] A.G. Galstian, *Armianskie istochniki o Mongolakh izvlecheniia iz rukopisei XIII–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1962), p. 47.

[113] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, p. 300.

[114] Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, pp. 208–10. Haenisch, *Steuergerechtsame*, pp. 23–4; cf. also pp. 45–6. J.M. Fiey, *Chrétiens syriaques sous les Mongols (Il-khanat de Perse, XIII^e–XIV^e s.)*, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Subsidia, 44 (Louvain, 1975), p. 15.

Daoist privileges).[115] There is no reason, however, why this edict should have been enforced elsewhere in the Mongol world, since by this time the Qa'an's writ was scarcely effective outside China and Mongolia. It doubtless still carried some weight in the territories of his ally the Ilkhan, and there are signs that here a similar principle was observed: a treatise on fiscal matters from Iran, dating from the 1260s, assumes that the religious have *tarkhan* status, i.e. enjoy dispensation from the poll-tax (*qubchur*) but not from other incidents.[116] By contrast, in the Golden Horde, which did not currently acknowledge Qubilai, an almost contemporaneous edict of the khan Möngke Temür (1267) clearly envisages that Rus' ecclesiastics will possess landed property and exempts them from the plough tax.[117] It is not unduly cynical to see here one of the reasons for the readiness of the Russian Church to encourage princely acceptance of the "Tatar Yoke."[118]

The Attitudes of Individual Princes

Turning now to the religious inclinations of individual Mongol rulers, we cannot always be sure to what extent we are dealing with personal conviction or with political favoritism or simply with the wishful thinking of our highly partisan sources. I suggest that we need to distinguish between: (a) personal affiliation with one or other of the "world" religions; (b) marked favour to the adherents of one religion or sect; and (c) active persecution, or at the very least downgrading, [**p. 269**] of the rival faiths (in the case of conversion to Islam, this would necessitate, for instance, imposition of the *jizya* [poll tax] on Christians and Jews).

We can dismiss statements by the Muslim Jūzjānī that both Ögödei and Batu favoured the Muslims and converted secretly to Islam:[119] in Ögödei's case, at least, the reason may be his disregard for Chinggis Khan's *yasa* on slaughtering animals (see above). With the religious allegiance of Batu's brother Berke, later ruler of the Golden Horde (1256–67), to Islam we are, however, on firmer ground. Here there is evidence both for a public affiliation to Islam and for observance in practice; Rubruck was told that Berke did not allow pork to

---

[115] Chavannes, "Inscriptions," *TP*, 9 (1908), pp. 376–81. Poppe, *Mongolian Monuments*, p. 47 (and notes at pp. 83–5).

[116] M. Minovi and V. Minorsky, "Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī on Finance," in Minorsky, *Iranica. Twenty Articles*, University of Tehran Publications 775 (Tehran, 1964), p. 73 (and notes at pp. 79–80).

[117] Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices," pp. 342–6.

[118] J.T. Fuhrmann, "Metropolitan Cyril II (1242–1281) and the Politics of Accommodation," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 24 (1976), pp. 161–72.

[119] Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 151, 157, 176 (tr. Raverty, ii, pp. 1106–7, 1115, 1172–3).

be eaten in his encampment (*ordo*).[120] Nor is there any shortage of sources claiming that Batu's son Sartaq was a Christian: this includes our principal Muslim sources, though they supply no further details.[121] Of the Christian writers, Kirakos tells us that Sartaq was reared by a Christian nurse and was then baptized by "Syrians" (i.e. Nestorians) as an adult;[122] his death was allegedly "a great blow" to all Christians.[123] According to the Armenian Vardan, Sartaq was a "true Christian" who won over many to his faith.[124] Bar Hebraeus even claims that the prince was a deacon, though this may have derived from the Nestorian practice of ordaining all male children in the course of extremely infrequent visitations by the bishop.[125] Yet Kirakos mentions a decree of enfranchisement for Christian churches and priests promulgated [**p. 270**] by Sartaq, but embracing also mosques and their personnel, as being issued "with the acquiescence of his father."[126] Either Batu had intervened so as to counter his son's partiality or (more probably) Sartaq was careful, in the traditional Mongol fashion, to avoid giving preferential treatment to any one faith.

The courts of the Qa'ans Güyüg and Möngke were rife with optimistic speculation about the imminent conversion of the monarch, as representatives of rival faiths jostled for influence and privilege. The Christians of Güyüg's household assured Carpini that the Qa'an was about to embrace the faith, on the grounds that he supported Christian clerics and maintained a portable chapel in front of his tent.[127] Only a few years later, Nestorian priests told Rubruck that Möngke had been baptized that very day, though the friar did not

---

[120] Rubruck, 18.2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 209 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 127). See J. Richard, "La conversion de Berke et les débuts de l'islamisation de la Horde d'Or," *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 35 (1967), pp. 173–84 (rpt. in Richard, *Orient et Occident*); I. Vásáry, "'History and Legend' in Berke Khan's Conversion to Islam," in *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III. Proceedings of the 30th Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, June 19–25, 1987*, ed. D. Sinor, Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series 145 (Bloomington, 1990), pp. 230–52; DeWeese, *Islamization*, pp. 83–6.

[121] Juwaynī, i, p. 223 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 268). Jūzjānī, ii, p. 217 (tr. Raverty, ii, p. 1291).

[122] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, p. 295; briefer references to his faith at pp. 303 (also in Boyle, "Journey of Het'um I," p. 180), 309. Pope Innocent IV was told that Sartaq had been baptized by an Armenian cleric: F. Pagnotti, "Niccolò da Calvi e la sua vita d'Innocenzo IV," *Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria*, 21 (1898), pp. 114–15.

[123] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, p. 310. See also Galstian, *Armianskie istochniki*, p. 27.

[124] Vardan Arewelc'i, *Hawak'umn patmut'ean*, tr. R.W. Thomson, "The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelc'i," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 43 (1989), p. 217.

[125] Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 398. Cf. Rubruck, 26.13, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 238 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 163–4).

[126] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, p. 295.

[127] Carpini, 9.43, ed. Menestò, p. 327 (tr. Dawson, p. 68).

believe them since he had not been present at the event.[128] The same claims and counter-claims reverberate through our other written sources. Even the Muslim Juwaynī alleges that Güyüg had been reared by the Nestorian Christian Qadaq and accordingly favoured Christians and denounced the Islamic faith.[129] He is followed by Bar Hebraeus, who (though brief) says that Güyüg was "a true Christian" and that in his time "the position of many followers of Christ was exalted."[130] Jūzjānī, on the other hand, had not heard that Güyüg was a Christian, but suggests instead that he was surrounded by – among others – Buddhist priests (*toyins*), who encouraged him to oppress Muslims.[131] This is corroborated by the *Yuan shi*, which says that Güyüg took as his teacher the Kashmiri Buddhist monk Namo,[132] who subsequently played a key role in the eventual acceptance of Lamaism by the Mongol court. It may be significant that Armenian sources – so impressed by Sartaq's Christianity – are silent regarding Güyüg's Christian sympathies.

[p. 271] Möngke's inclinations are even more opaque than those of his predecessor. Jagchid proposes that initially, as a result of the influence of his Christian mother Sorqaqtani, he was "much partial to Nestorianism," but that he was "offended by the apparent arrogance of Christian doctrine" and "its assumption of superiority over all other doctrines and gods"; he ordered the great debate of 1254 in which Rubruck participated, so the argument runs, because he was already contemplating the adoption of Buddhism, and that between Buddhists and Daoists in 1256 for the same reason (see above).[133] But we should note, firstly, that Sorqaqtani's case was not at all straightforward. Despite her attachment to Christianity and the fact that she was buried in a Christian church in the Gansu circuit,[134] Juwaynī makes great play of her benefactions to colleges (*madrasas*) and gifts to needy Muslims.[135] Her attitude is closely paralleled by her contemporary, the princess Orqina, who governed

---

[128] Rubruck, 29.14–16, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 256–7 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 187–8).

[129] Juwaynī, i, pp. 213–14 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 259). W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd edn. C.E. Bosworth, with new chapter tr. T. Minorsky, GMS, n.s., 5 (London, 1968), p. 477, follows this testimony.

[130] Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 411: Budge translates as "horn" the word *ḳarn* which I have rendered as "position."

[131] Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 171–5 (tr. Raverty, ii, pp. 1157–63).

[132] *Yuan shi*, ch. 125, cited in Jagchid and Hyer, p. 178.

[133] L.W. Moses, *The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism* (Bloomington, 1977), pp. 57–62, 73.

[134] G. Devéria, "Notes d'épigraphie mongole-chinoise," *JA*, 9e série, 8/2 (1896), pp. 419–20, citing *Yuan shi*, ch. 38.

[135] Juwaynī, iii, pp. 8–9 (tr. Boyle, ii, pp. 552–3); see also i, p. 84 (tr. Boyle, i, p. 108), for her construction of the Madrasa-yi Khānī in Bukhārā.

the Chaghadayid *ulus* during the 1250s and early 1260s, since although she was an "idolator" she too is praised for patronizing Muslims.[136]

Secondly, as far as Möngke himself is concerned, the evidence is far from homogeneous. It goes almost without saying that according to the *Yuan shi* the Qa'an remained attached to his ancestral shamanism,[137] and that Rubruck witnessed Möngke's use of the old technique of scapulimancy prior to reaching decisions on important matters.[138] Muslim authors speak of his favour to their coreligionists. Juwaynī says that he showed most honour and respect to Muslims, who received the largest gifts.[139] Jūzjānī at one point claims even that the [**p. 272**] Qa'an recited the Islamic profession of faith (*shahāda*) prior to his enthronement; but we might suspect, given his use of the conventional phrase "went to hell" when he describes Möngke's death, that for Jūzjānī this did not amount to a conversion to Islam.[140] In his final interview with Rubruck, Möngke compared the different faiths open to humankind with the different fingers of the hand.[141] A Chinese Buddhist source preserves a different version of the Qa'an's sentiments, in which Buddhism is likened to the palm and the other faiths to the fingers:[142] this may, of course, reflect Buddhist distortion, or it could be, alternatively, that Rubruck heard the same formula but misunderstood it. We are surely nearest the true state of affairs with the friar's remark that Möngke wanted representatives of the different religious communities to pray for him, and that they all believed he shared their faith and all "follow his court as flies do honey."[143] Rubruck, though prepared to concede that they showed

---

[136] Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-a'ṣār*, lithograph edn. (Bombay, 1269/1853, rpt. Tehran, 1338 Shamsī/1959), pp. 14–15: *Hurghana har chand butī khᵘud parast būd bā dīn-i islām mayli-yi tamām dāsht-u paywasta ta'aṣṣub-i musulmānān kardī.* But Jamāl al-Qarshī, *Mulḥaqāt al-ṣurāḥ* (*c.*1303), nevertheless calls her a Muslim: V.V. Bartol'd, *Turkestan v epokhu mongol'skogo nashestviia*, i. *Teksty* (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 138.

[137] Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 481. W. Abramowski, "Die chinesischen Annalen des Möngke: Übersetzung des 3. Kapitels des Yüan-Shih," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 13 (1979), p. 33.

[138] Rubruck, 29.26, 41, 54, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 261, 267, 272–3 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 192–3, 198, 205).

[139] Juwaynī, iii, pp. 79–80 (tr. Boyle, ii, pp. 600–601).

[140] Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 179, 218 (tr. Raverty, ii, pp. 1181, 1292).

[141] Rubruck, 34.2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 298 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 236).

[142] Xiangmai, *Bian wei lu* (1291), tr. in P.Y. Saeki, *The Nestorian Documents and Relics in China*, 2nd edn. (Tokyo, 1951), p. 495, app. XV(A); on this work, see Thiel, "Der Streit," pp. 6–8. Demiéville, "Situation religieuse," p. 195, sees in the difference between the two quotations a genuine shift on the Qa'an's part.

[143] Rubruck, 29.15, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 256 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 187). See Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 481, for a similar verdict.

greater favour to Christians, was dismissive of the Christian convictions of Güyüg, Möngke *and* Sartaq alike.[144]

We could be forgiven for thinking that the Qa'ans – with the possible exception of Güyüg, who allowed free rein to his anti-Muslim sentiments – fought a rearguard action to avoid being associated too closely with any particular faith; and certainly this is the strong impression given by Qubilai's behaviour in China. The clampdown on Muslims, which lasted for seven years or so, appears to have represented in part a reaction against the undue influence that Muslims had wielded hitherto in the fiscal affairs of the Middle Kingdom.[145] But even after his alleged conversion to Buddhism, Qubilai refused to preside over the ceremony of sacrifices to the ancestors, conducted in the Chinese manner; so too did most of his successors.[146]

[**p. 273**] The same reluctance to abandon the position laid down by Chinggis Khan seems to characterize the Ilkhans prior to Ghazan's accession and perhaps even down to his death. They exhibit the same bewildering variety of attachments. Hülegü and his Nestorian wife, Doquz Khatun, were hailed in Armenian sources as the equals in piety of Constantine and Helena.[147] But despite intimate conversations in which he claimed to have been a Christian since birth and expressed his desire for baptism,[148] Armenian writers acknowledge that Hülegü by the time of his death was greatly attached to astrologers and Buddhist priests (*toyins*).[149] Both Abaqa (1265–82) and his son Arghun (1284–91) struck coins with Christian legends – and not just in those subject territories that were Christian, like Georgia.[150] Abaqa was baptized immediately prior to his marriage to a Byzantine princess,[151] and attended Easter service in a Christian church in Hamadān in 1282, shortly before his death.[152] Arghun, described by the Dominican missionary Ricoldo of Montecroce in the 1290s as "the friend of Christians," nevertheless made a pilgrimage to the shrine of Abū Yazīd

---

[144] Rubruck, 17.2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 206 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 122).

[145] Rossabi, "Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty," pp. 271, 292.

[146] P. Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult am Hofe der Großkhane in China," in *Mongolian Studies*, ed. L. Ligeti, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica 14 (Budapest, 1970), p. 425.

[147] Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, i, pp. 234, 235. J.M. Fiey, "Iconographie syriaque: Hulagu, Doquz Khatun...et six ambons?," *Le Muséon*, 88 (1975), pp. 59–64.

[148] Lupprian, *Die Beziehungen der Päpste*, p. 229. Vardan, tr. Thomson, pp. 220–21.

[149] *Ibid.*, p. 222. Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, pp. 333–4. See further P. Jackson, "Hülegü Khan and the Christians: The Making of a Myth," in *The Experience of Crusading*, ii. *Defining the Crusader Kingdom*, eds. J. Phillips and P. Edbury (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 196–213.

[150] Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 178 and n. 71.

[151] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, p. 335. Vardan, tr. Thomson, p. 222, reports merely a rumour to this effect.

[152] Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 466.

at Bisṭām and numbered among his courtiers Shaykh Maḥmūd Dīnawārī.[153] For Hayton, the Ilkhan Baidu was "a good Christian";[154] and according to Rashīd al-Dīn, it was Baidu's excessive favour towards "Christians, [namely] the Catholicus, the priests and the monks" which pushed Shaykh Maḥmūd into the camp of Arghun's son, the Muslim Ghazan, in 1295.[155] Yet more than one Christian source depicts Baidu too as a late convert to Islam.[156]

[p. 274] Aḥmad Tegüder (1282–84) is always assumed to have been the first Ilkhan to embrace Islam. Adel Allouche has shown that his diplomatic approach to Mamlūk Egypt in 1283–84 was not, as previously held, a pacific move: it represented yet another ultimatum demanding submission, but on the new grounds that the Ilkhan's conversion rendered continued resistance unnecessary.[157] Aḥmad had in mind the same goal as his father and elder brother before him, but was dispensing with European aid. The Egyptians professed not to believe in his conversion; it comes as a greater surprise, however, to discover that, in the eyes of the Ilkhanid minister and historian Rashīd al-Dīn, too, the Ilkhan only "claimed to be a Muslim."[158] It was naturally important to Rashīd al-Dīn to distinguish Aḥmad from the contemporary monarch, his master Ghazan: he had not merely to gloss over the fact that Ghazan's pagan father had overthrown the Muslim Aḥmad, but also to cast into relief Ghazan's own credentials as the first Muslim Ilkhan, who, as Rashīd al-Dīn expressly tells us, "compelled the people to practise good conduct and ... avoid evil."[159] But his phrasing may also owe something to the fact that Aḥmad is described in Christian sources as especially merciful to Christian churchmen, writing patents

---

[153] Ricoldo of Montecroce, "Itinerarium," in *Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor*, ed. J.C.M. Laurent, 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1873), p. 121. Rashīd al-Dīn, iii, ed. ʿA.ʿA. ʿAlīzādah, *Dẕhami-at-Tavarikh*, iii (Baku, 1957), pp. 182, 607 (tr. Thackston, iii, pp. 554, 622).

[154] Hayton, 3.37–8, French text, pp. 189–90 (Latin text, p. 315).

[155] Rashīd al-Dīn, iii, ed. ʿAlīzādah, p. 608 (tr. Thackston, iii, p. 622).

[156] Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, i, p. 260. Continuator of Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 505, saying that he became a Muslim to please the large number of Muslim Mongols, but did not participate in worship and secretly remained a Christian.

[157] A. Allouche, "Tegüder's Ultimatum to Qalawun," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22 (1990), pp. 437–46. See further R. Amitai, "The Conversion of Tegüder Ilkhan to Islam," *JSAI*, 25 (2001), pp. 30–33.

[158] Rashīd al-Dīn, iii, ed. ʿAlīzādah, p. 170: *daʿwā-yi musulmānī mīkard*; the sense is perhaps deliberately ambiguous (tr. Thackston, iii, p. 549).

[159] *Ibid.*, p. 616 (tr. Thackston, iii, p. 628). See more generally D. Morgan, "Rašīd al-dīn and Ġazan Khan," in *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. Aigle, p. 186.

which freed all the churches, religious houses, priests and monks from taxation and imposts[160] – in other words, business as usual.

At first sight, developments early in Ghazan's reign (1295-1304) seem to be of a quite different order. But in fact the drive behind the persecution of Christians was the work of the Muslim Mongol amir Nawrūz, who had been instrumental in Ghazan's enthronement and of whom the young Ilkhan initially stood in some awe; it did not last beyond Nawrūz's downfall in 697/1297.[161] After that year [**p. 275**] the *jizya* was no longer being levied on Christians at least; their situation thus contrasts sharply with that of the Buddhists, whose lamas were given the choice between Islam and emigration from Persia.[162] Only in the reign of Ghazan's brother and successor Öljeitü (1304–16) does the poll-tax seem to have been imposed on Christians (other than ecclesiastics);[163] and indeed eastern Christian sources give the impression that the reign of Öljeitü (described as having "a kind of hatred of the Christians") witnessed a marked deterioration in their condition.[164] The longer-term treatment of the *dhimmīs* during Ghazan's reign constitutes reasonable grounds for challenging his status, like that of his precursor Aḥmad Tegüder, as a wholeheartedly Muslim ruler, and serves to cast further doubt on the fullness of his conversion to his new faith.[165]

---

[160] Notably Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, p. 467. The contradictory information in the sources regarding Aḥmad's attitude towards the *dhimmīs* is discussed in Amitai, "Conversion of Tegüder," pp. 27–30.

[161] This is very much the picture drawn by Hayton, 3.39, French text, p. 191 (Latin text, p. 316), though without naming Nawrūz. But he then tries to make out that Ghazan became pro-Christian and anti-Muslim – a clear confusion of domestic with foreign policy.

[162] C. Melville, "*Pādshāh-i Islām*: The Conversion of Sultan Maḥmūd Ghāzān Khān," in *Pembroke Papers*, i. *Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of P.W. Avery*, ed. C. Melville (Cambridge, 1990), p. 170, and J. Aubin, *Émirs mongols et vizirs persans dans les remous de l'acculturation*, Studia Iranica, Cahier 15 (Paris, 1995), pp. 61–2, 64, 65–6, make sense of the various tergiversations. The main Christian sources are Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, pp. 506–7; Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, i, pp. 261–3.

[163] Life of Mar Yahballaha III, tr. E.A.W. Budge, *The Monks of Kûblâi Khân, Emperor of China* (London, 1928), pp. 258–60. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 183.

[164] D. Bundy, "The Syriac and Armenian Christian Responses to the Islamification of the Mongols," in *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam: A Book of Essays*, ed. J.V. Tolan (New York and London, 1996), pp. 40–41. For the hatred, see Budge, *Monks of Kûblâi Khân*, pp. 255–6.

[165] R. Amitai-Preiss, "Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamlūk Sultanate," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 59 (1996), pp. 1–10.

The Appeal of Magic

Rubruck doubtless hit the nail on the head when he observed that had he been able to work miracles the Qa'an Möngke might have humbled himself;[166] he told the English Franciscan Roger Bacon, apparently, that he would have fared better had he been conversant with astronomy.[167] This possibly represents an interpolation by Bacon himself, who was fascinated by astronomy and magic.[168] But there [**p. 276**] is no shortage of evidence to support the view that the talents the Mongols especially prized were related to magic, astrology and the healing arts (see above). Simon of Saint-Quentin may well have been correct when he ascribed the influence of the Nestorian monk Rabban-ata in the 1240s to his skill in divination.[169] It was because of their familiarity with magic, above all, that Tibetan Buddhist priests appealed to the Mongol Qa'ans in the east and that Qubilai decided in 1258 to favour them over the Daoists, who proved unable to perform such impressive feats.[170] Qubilai's Buddhist counsellor, Liu Ping-zhong, was well versed in astronomy and divination; and at his death in 1274 the Qa'an spoke warmly of Liu's understanding of the occult and his ability to predict the future.[171] Hülegü was similarly susceptible. His favour to the Shī'ī astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī is well known;[172] another Muslim astronomer, Muḥyī al-Dīn, was the only member of the entourage of the Ayyūbid Sultan of Aleppo to be spared by Hülegü's men in 1260; and the Nestorian bishop of Gâzartâ (Jazīrat Ibn 'Umar) secured a reprieve for his town by assuring Hülegü that he was conversant with alchemy.[173] According to Armenian sources, the

---

[166] Rubruck, 34.7, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 300 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 239).

[167] Roger Bacon, *Opus majus*, ed. J.H. Bridges, *The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon* (Oxford and London, 1897–1900), i, p. 400. This statement, which is nowhere to be found in the written report, must be based on Rubruck's oral testimony: see J. Charpentier, "William of Rubruck and Roger Bacon," in *Hyllningsskrift tillägnad Sven Hedin på hans 70-årsdag den 19. Febr. 1935* (Stockholm, 1935), pp. 255–67.

[168] Bezzola, *Die Mongolen*, pp. 202–5.

[169] Simon of Saint-Quentin, p. 30 (= Vincent of Beauvais, 30.70).

[170] Demiéville, "Situation religieuse," p. 206. Young, "*Deus unus*," pp. 118–19, 122–3. Cf. also Sh. Bira, "Qubilai Qa'an and 'Phags-pa bLa-ma," in *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, eds. Amitai-Preiss and Morgan, p. 242. Roux, "Tolérance," pp. 163–4, makes a tentative link between magic and prayers for the sovereign.

[171] *Yuan shi*, ch. 157, cited in Demiéville, "Situation religieuse," pp. 203–4. Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung (1216–1274): a Buddhist-Taoist statesman at the court of Khubilai Khan," *TP*, 53 (1967), p. 142; see also pp. 117, 141.

[172] J. Calmard, "Le chiisme imamite sous les Ilkhans," in *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. Aigle, p. 274.

[173] Rashīd al-Dīn, iii, ed. 'Alīzādah, p. 76 (tr. Thackston, iii, p. 506). Bar Hebraeus, tr. Budge, pp. 438, 443.

reason for Hülegü's addiction to the company of Buddhist priests was that they held out the promise of immortality.[174] Arghun actually died as the result of a life-prolonging drug administered by a Buddhist priest (*bakhshī*).[175] When the Qa'an Möngke demanded of the Confucians what use they were for magic and healing,[176] he was posing a question that might have been put by any other member of the imperial dynasty.

Now Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, the confidant of Aḥmad Tegüder and the man credited with introducing him to the Islamic faith, is **[p. 277]** depicted by Mamlūk authors as dabbling in sorcery (*siḥr*) and natural magic (*sīmiyyā*); he had earlier gained influence over Abaqa by claiming a knowledge of alchemy and then duping the Ilkhan with conjuring tricks (*sha'badha*).[177] Aḥmad Tegüder's brief reign was the heyday of sufis (dervishes) of the less respectable sort;[178] and what we are told of Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān fits well into the context of the known interests of Mongol rulers. Rashīd al-Dīn is at pains to stress that Ghazan, on the other hand, did not come to Islam through any urging or encouragement on the part of amirs or shaykhs.[179] This is a tendentious image of the conversion of Ghazan, who seems to have received Islam at the hands of the moderate Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥamūyī (d. 722/1321–22).[180] We know little of Ṣadr al-Dīn, though it has been suggested that his influence on Ghazan and the Mongols derived in some measure from the reputation and accomplishments of his father Sa'd al-Dīn Muḥammad, who had had a propensity for mystical trances.[181]

---

[174] Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, pp. 333–4. Cf. Vardan, tr. Thomson, p. 221.

[175] P. Jackson, "Arḡūn," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, ii, p. 404.

[176] *Yuan shi*, ch. 125, cited in Demiéville, "Situation religieuse," p. 217.

[177] Allouche, "Tegüder's Ultimatum," p. 443: of the sources he does not quote, see al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, xviii, ed. Aiman Fu'ād Sayyid, Bibliotheca Islamica 6r (Stuttgart, 1988), p. 314 (citing al-Jazarī). The most detailed non-Mamlūk account is in *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi'a* (early fourteenth century; attributed to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī), ed. Muṣṭafā Jawād (Baghdad, 1351/1932), pp. 431–2.

[178] R. Amitai-Preiss, "Sufis and Shamans: Some Remarks on the Islamization of the Mongols of the Ilkhanate," *JESHO*, 42 (1999), pp. 30–32.

[179] Rashīd al-Dīn, iii, ed. ʿAlīzādah, pp. 374, 376 (tr. Thackston, iii, pp. 664, 665).

[180] Melville, "*Pādshāh-i Islām*," pp. 160-69. Amitai-Preiss, "Sufis and Shamans," pp. 32–4.

[181] J.J. Elias, "The Sufi Lords of Bahrabad: Sa'd al-Din and Sadr al-Din Hamuwayi," *Iranian Studies*, 27 (1994), pp. 53–75 (esp. pp. 60, 68).

Conclusion

The "tolerance" of Mongol rulers has been overstated, and such even-handedness as they displayed in religious matters was not the product merely of a natural inclination towards syncretism. It sprang from the same roots, namely *Realpolitik*, as their habit of exploiting the religious susceptibilities of independent powers for diplomatic and strategic purposes. The privileges conferred upon holy men of all persuasions were at first rather restricted; only later did they expand to embrace economic activity by monks and clerics, and under Qubilai in China a sustained effort was made to curtail them once more. **[p. 278]** The respect in which religious specialists were held was related not just to the efficacy of their prayers but to (perceived) expertise in magic, healing and the prolongation of life. In explaining why Mongol rulers appeared to lean towards particular faiths during the thirteenth century, I suggest that we may need to look harder in the direction of these skills than at the exigencies of foreign policy or even matters of doctrine.

V

World-Conquest and Local Accommodation: Threat and Blandishment in Mongol Diplomacy

It is almost a commonplace that the thirteenth-century Mongols believed in a mandate from Heaven (Tenggeri) granting them sovereignty over the entire world, and that this belief was articulated in clear – indeed, formulaic – terms in the ultimatums they sent out to rulers who had not yet submitted to them.[1] This paper will review the evidence regarding the programme of world-rulership, and will then draw attention to the less direct approaches and methods by which the Mongols sought to bring other nations under their yoke. It is a pleasure to dedicate this piece to Professor Woods, who some years ago drew attention to a different aspect of Mongol artifice.[2]

The edict of Chinggis Khan and the chronology of the world-domination programme

Whether the programme of world-conquest dates from Chinggis Khan's own day is still a matter of debate. Some years ago Professor David Morgan pointed out that there was no evidence whether Chinggis Khan regarded himself as ruler of the world, and proposed that the Mongols began to believe in a mission of world-conquest only once they found that this was the task in which they were engaged, as no power appeared to be capable of withstanding them.[3] At issue here is not whether Heaven was regarded as conferring some kind of mandate on Chinggis Khan during his lifetime: envoys from Sung China make it clear that golden tablets of authority (*paizas*) issued by the Mongol chancery were citing such a mandate as early as

---

1 ERIC VOEGELIN, "The Mongol orders of submission to European powers, 1245–1255," *Byzantion* 15 (1940–1), pp. 378–413; KLAUS SAGASTER, "Herrschaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen," *CAJ* 17 (1973), pp. 223–42 (at pp. 238–42); IGOR DE RACHEWILTZ, "Some remarks on the ideological foundations of Chingis Khan's empire," *PFEH* 7 (1973), pp. 21–36.

2 "A note on the Mongol capture of Iṣfahān." *JNES* 36 (1977), pp. 49–51.

3 DAVID MORGAN, "The Mongols and the eastern Mediterranean," in Benjamin Arbel *et al.* (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, 1989), pp. 198–211 (at p. 200). Cf. also PAUL D. BUELL, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people: thoughts on the mechanics and impact of Mongol expansion," *Mongolian Studies* 6 (1979), pp. 41–59 (at p. 41).

1221.[4] But the *Secret History of the Mongols* (dating from 1228 in its original form) mentions Heaven's mandate to Chinggis Khan only once, in words spoken by the shaman Kököchü (Teb-Tenggeri), and the context is rule over the Mongol *ulus*, i.e. (at that time) the steppe nomads; there is no question of world-rulership.[5] Elsewhere – in the speech of the vanquished Jamuqa just prior to his execution – the same work contains the statement that the world is 'ready' for Chinggis Khan;[6] but it would perhaps be unwise to read too much into this. (Incidentally, the first element in the conqueror's title – at one time believed to mean 'oceanic' [i.e. 'world-'] – is now seen as signifying 'fierce' or 'hard', and is consequently immaterial in this connection.[7]) Yet by the time the papal envoy John of Plano Carpini reached Mongol headquarters and witnessed the enthronement of the Great Khan (*qaghan*) Güyüg in August 1246, it is clear that the Mongols not only believed in a divine mandate to conquer the world but associated this mission with an edict of Chinggis Khan himself (Carpini uses words like *statutum* and *mandatum*, which are surely designed to convey the sense of the Turkish/Mongol word *yasa/jasagh*).[8]

Nasawī, writing in 639/1242 and our most immediate Muslim source for the diplomatic contacts between Chinggis Khan and the Khvārazmshāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Tekish in *ca.* 615/1218, omits any explicit reference to the Mongols' design to conquer the world. But the account he gives of Chinggis Khan's letter to 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad does exhibit some characteristics that are germane to this theme.[9] Firstly, Chinggis Khan speaks of the two rulers being at 'peace' with one

---

4 *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh. Chinesische Gesandtenberichte über die frühen Mongolen 1221 und 1237*, trans. Peter Olbricht and Elisabeth Pinks, Asiatische Forschungen 56 (Wiesbaden, 1980), p. 65 (and n. 5 at p. 67).

5 *Mangghol'un niuca tobca'an*, § 244, trans. Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols. Chapter Ten," *PFEH* 26 (Sept. 1982), p. 48. MARIE-LISE BEFFA, "Le concept de *tänggäri*, «ciel», dans l'*Histoire secrète des Mongols*," *Etudes Mongoles et Sibériennes* 24 (1993), pp. 215–36 (at pp. 222–3).

6 *Mangghol'un niuca tobca'an*, § 201, trans. de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols. Chapter Eight," *PFEH* 21 (March 1980), p. 23 and note at p. 40.

7 DE RACHEWILTZ, "The title Činggis Qan/Qayan re-examined," in Walther Heissig and Klaus Sagaster (eds.), *Gedanke und Wirkung. Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Nikolaus Poppe*, Asiatische Forschungen 108 (Wiesbaden, 1989), pp. 281–98.

8 JOHN OF PLANO CARPINI, *Ystoria Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus*, v, 18, vii, 2, and viii, 2, ed. Enrico Menestò *et al.*, *Giovanni di Pian di Carpine. Storia dei Mongoli* (Spoleto, 1989), pp. 264, 284–5, 293; trans. in Christopher Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol mission: narratives and letters of the Franciscan Friars in China and Mongolia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries* (London, 1955; repr. as *Mission to Asia*, New York, 1966, 1979), pp. 25, 38, 43. See DE RACHEWILTZ, "Some reflections on Činggis Qan's *jasay*," *East Asian History* 6 (1993), pp. 91–104 (at pp. 101–2).

9 NASAWĪ, *Sīrat al-sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn Mingbirnī*, ed. Octave Houdas (Paris, 1891), p. 33; trans. Z.M. Buniiatov, *Zhizneopisanie sultana Dzhalal ad-dina Mankburny* (Baku, 1973), p. 78; 13th-century Persian translation, ed. Mujtabā Mīnuvī (Tehran, 1344 h.sh./1965), pp. 49–50. DAVID MORGAN, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), p. 68.

another. The word used here (translated as *ṣulḥ*) can only be the Turkish *īl(ī)*/ Mongol *el*, which meant both 'peace' and 'submission': it is found, for instance, in the original Persian text of the letter brought back by Plano Carpini in 1247. The term was the opposite of the word *bulgha(q)*, 'rebellion', which was applied to anyone who opposed the Mongols: in other words, there could be no peace without submission.[10] The second significant feature of the letter is that Chinggis Khan clearly arrogated to himself the superior rank, assuring the Khvārazmshāh that he regarded him as the dearest of his offspring – a statement at which 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad took umbrage. The Mongol sovereign's overture may have been couched in amicable terms, but elements of it already hint at a demand for recognition of his paramountcy. For what it is worth, the *Secret History*, prior to the campaign against the Khvārazmshāh, has Chinggis Khan accuse him of breaking the 'golden halter' (*altan arqamji*), i.e. severing the bonds of Mongol overlordship; though, as Professor Igor de Rachewiltz suggests, the use of the phrase here is probably anachronistic.[11]

Professor John Masson Smith, Jr., has picked out material which, he argues, draws on documents contemporary with Chinggis Khan.[12] The Persian historian Juvaynī alleges that Heaven's mandate conferring dominion over the whole earth was conveyed to the great conqueror through Teb-Tenggeri, and describes Chinggis Khan as sending out ultimatums which terminated with virtually the same warning phrase as that found at the end of Güyüg's letter to Innocent IV: 'If they do not submit (*īl-u munqād nashavand*), what do we know of it? The ancient God, He knows'.[13] Juvaynī actually cites an ultimatum sent to the populace of Nīshāpūr in 617/1220.[14] It is nevertheless still conceivable, of course, that this author, writing as he did in *ca.* 658/1260, was reading back into Chinggis Khan's own lifetime a doctrine that had taken hold only in the intervening period.

---

10 On *īl* and *bulgha*, see PAUL PELLIOT, "Les Mongols et la papauté," *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien* 23, 24 and 28 (1922, 1923, 1931–2), pp. 26, 126–7 [references are to the pagination of the separatum]; ANTOINE MOSTAERT and FRANCIS WOODMAN CLEAVES, "Trois documents mongols des archives secrètes vaticanes," *HJAS* 15 (1952), pp. 419–506 (at pp. 485, 492–3); GERHARD DOERFER, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* II, pp. 194–201, 317–20 (nos. 653, 768).

11 *Mangghol'un niuca tobca'an*, §§ 254, 256, trans. De Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols. Chapter Eleven," *PFEH* 30 (Sept. 1984), pp. 88, 95 (and note at pp. 131–2).

12 JOHN MASSON SMITH, JR., "The Mongols and world conquest," *Mongolica: an international annual of Mongol studies* 5 (1994), pp. 206–14 (at p. 207).

13 'ALĀ' AL-DĪN AṬĀ MALIK JUVAYNĪ, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazvīnī, Gibb Memorial series, new series, 16 (Leiden and London, 1912–37, 3 vols.), I, pp. 28–9; trans. John Andrew Boyle, *The history of the world-conqueror* (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols. with continuous pagination; repr. in 1 vol., 1997), I, p. 39 (I have modified Boyle's rendering).

14 *Ibid.*, I, p. 18 (trans. Boyle, I, pp. 25–6).

V

6

The earliest evidence for the programme of world-conquest is usually taken to date from the era of Chinggis Khan's successors. This includes the direct evidence, i.e. the Mongol ultimatums that have come down to us, of which the most celebrated is the letter of the *qaghan* Güyüg conveyed to Pope Innocent IV in 1247 by his envoy, the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini. We possess the original, in Persian, and two Latin translations.[15] It is a starkly uncompromising document, expressing in no uncertain terms the mandate from Heaven entitling the Mongols to rule the world. Even though the threat with which it ended was a vague one, suggesting that God alone knew the consequences of defiance, the Mongols' recent devastation of Poland, Moravia and Hungary in 1241–2 would have left the pope in little doubt as to the form divine chastisement would take.

Güyüg's was not the first Mongol ultimatum received by a Western monarch. That dates from the reign of Ögedei, and was brought back in 1237 by the Hungarian Dominican Julian, following his journey almost as far as the (then) western limits of the Mongol empire in present-day Bashkiria; he incorporated it (in Latin translation) in his report to the papal legate in Hungary, which in turn found its way into a collection of letters made in, or at least very soon after, 1241.[16] Demanding the submission of the Hungarian King Béla IV, the *qaghan* (*Chayn*) calls himself 'the representative (*nuntius*) of the Heavenly King', who has given him the power to exalt those who yield and to cast down his adversaries.[17] The earliest ultimatum of all known from Ögedei's reign has, to the best of my knowledge, escaped notice. The chronicler Ibn Bībī cites a letter which a certain Shams al-Dīn 'Umar Qazvīnī delivered to the Seljuk Sultan of Rūm on Ögedei's behalf in

---

15 Persian text in PELLIOT, "Les Mongols et la papauté," pp. 15–16; English trans. (by J.A. Boyle) in IGOR DE RACHEWILTZ, *Papal envoys to the Great Khans* (London, 1971), p. 213. Latin versions: BENEDICTUS POLONUS, "Relatio," § 13, in Anastasius Van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana*, I. *Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), pp. 142–3 (trans. in Dawson, *The Mongol mission*, 83); and SALIMBENE DE ADAM, *Cronica*, ed. Giuseppe Scalia (Turnhout, 1998–9, 2 vols.), I, pp. 313–14 (Salimbene had met Carpini in France in 1247–8).

16 Innsbruck Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 187, fols. 1v–8v. On this ms., see WALTER NEUHAUSER, *Katalog der Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Innsbruck, Teil 2* (Vienna, 1991), pp. 174–7; ROBERT E. LERNER, *The Powers of Prophecy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 11–13. Its existence was unknown to Heinrich Dörrie when he came to produce his edition of JULIAN's letter: see DÖRRIE, "Drei Texte zur Geschichte der Ungarn und Mongolen," *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* (1956), no. 6, pp. 127–202 (at pp. 162–5; and cf. p. 164, n.3).

17 JULIAN, "Epistola de vita Tartarorum," in DÖRRIE, "Drei Texte," p. 179; trans. in Hansgerd Göckenjan and James R. Sweeney (eds.), *Der Mongolensturm. Berichte von Augenzeugen und Zeitgenossen 1235–1250*, Ungarns Geschichtsschreiber 3 (Graz etc., 1985), pp. 107–8; English trans. in DENIS SINOR, "Diplomatic practices in medieval Inner Asia," in C.E. Bosworth *et al.* (eds.), *Essays in honor of Bernard Lewis. The Islamic world from classical to modern times* (Princeton, NJ, 1988), pp. 337–55 (at p. 344), and repr. in SINOR, *Studies in medieval Inner Asia* (Aldershot, 1997).

633/1236; it describes the whole earth's surface as granted to the Mongols by God.[18] Of course, this document – embedded in a narrative source written *ca.* 679/1280 – is open to the same objection as is the material quoted by Juvaynī.

With the exception of the ultimatum brought back by Carpini, the Mongol demands for submission which were despatched to European rulers have come down to us only in a Latin version – with all the attendant risk of mistranslation. These documents generally mention the 'command of God' to Chinggis Khan, and sometimes incorporate direct quotations from it. When, for instance, the general Baiju sent Pope Innocent IV's envoy, the Dominican Friar Ascelin, and his party back to Europe in 1247, he forwarded with his own ultimatum a letter which the *qaghan* Güyüg had sent him. Both documents were inserted by one of Ascelin's colleagues, Simon of Saint-Quentin, in his *Historia Tartarorum*, and hence found their way into the *Speculum Historiale* of their fellow Dominican, Vincent of Beauvais (*ca.* 1253). The following statement occurs in the body of Baiju's letter:

> *Preceptum Dei stabile et statutum ejus qui tocius faciem orbis continet ad nos sic est: quicumque statutum audierint, super propriam terram, aquam et patrimonium sedeant, et ei qui faciem tocius orbis continet virtutem tradant. Quicumque autem preceptum et statutum non audierint sed aliter fecerint, illi deleantur et perdantur. Nunc super hoc istud statutum et preceptum ad vos transmittimus.* ['The immutable command of God, and the decree of him who holds the surface of the whole world, to us is this: Whosoever shall hear the decree, let them abide in their own land and water and patrimony, surrendering their power to him who holds the surface of the entire world. But whosoever does not hearken to the command and decree, but acts otherwise, let them be destroyed and annihilated. We are now despatching to you the decree and command on this matter.']

The accompanying letter from Güyüg contains the following phrase:

> *Per preceptum Dei vivi Cingischam filius Dei dulcis et venerabilis dicit quia Deus excelsus super omnia, ipse est Deus immortalis et super terram Cingischam solus dominus* ['By the command of the living God, Chinggis Khan, the dear and revered son of God, says that God, the Highest over all things, is God immortal, and Chinggis Khan is the sole ruler on earth'].[20]

Güyüg continues with instructions to his general to promulgate the 'command of God'; only a few lines later does he revert to quoting Chinggis Khan:

---

18 IBN BĪBĪ, *al-Avāmir al-'alā'iyya fi l-umūri l-'alā'iyya*, ed. Adnan Sadık Erzi (Ankara, 1956), pp. 454–5; abridged version, *Mukhtaṣar-i Saljūq-nāma*, ed. Th. Houtsma, *Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineure* (Leiden, 1902), p. 203, and trans. Herbert W. Duda, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bībī* (Copenhagen, 1959), pp. 194–5.

19 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, *Speculum Historiale*, ed. Johann Mentelin (Straßburg, 1473), xxxii, 51; text from extracts ed. Jean Richard, SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN. *Histoire des Tartares*, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 8 (Paris, 1965), p. 114.

20 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, xxxii, 52; also in SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, ed. Richard, pp. 115–16.

quicumque non audierit hoc meum mandatum erit surdus et quicumque viderit hoc meum mandatum et non fecerit erit cecus et quicumque fecerit secundum istud meum judicium cognoscens pacem et non facit eam erit claudus. [The last few phrases appear to have been corrupted, but the sense is clearly: 'Whosoever shall see this my decree, and shall not hearken to it, shall be deaf; and whosoever shall see this my decree, and shall not fulfil it, shall be blind; and whosoever shall not act in accordance with this my judgement and acknowledge peace, shall be lame.']21

Even when the Mongol world-empire was in the process of dissolution from 1261–2 onwards, and Mongol princes were beginning to look for external allies against their Mongol rivals, it was still deemed appropriate to cite Heaven's mandate to Chinggis Khan. Thus in April 1262, in a letter seeking the cooperation of the French King Louis IX against Mamluk Egypt, Chinggis Khan's grandson, the Ilkhan Hülegü, began by citing the message vouchsafed to Teb-Tenggeri and then proceeded with what are evidently excerpts from the 'command of God':

In excelsis ego sum Deus omnipotens solus et te super gentes et regna constitui dominatorem et regem fieri tocius orbis. Annuncio igitur tibi ut mandatum meum cunctis generationibus et linguis et tribubus orientalibus, meridionalibus, septentrionalibus, occidentalibus notifices nunciesque singulis totius orbis partibus in quibus inperatores inperant vel reges regnant, presides presunt, dominia exercentur ubicumque equorum plante poterunt calcare, naves navigare, nuncii pervenire, litere audiri, ut habentes aures audiant, audientes intellegant, intellegentes credant. ['I am the one almighty God in the highest, and I have set thee above the nations and kingdoms to be master and ruler of the entire world. I make known to thee, therefore, that thou shalt bring my decree to the notice of all races and tongues and tribes of the east, the south, the north and the west, and shalt proclaim it to each and every part of the entire world where emperors reign, kings rule, prelates have authority and lordship is exercised, and wheresoever the hooves of horses are able to tread, ships to sail, envoys to penetrate, and letters to be heard; so that they who have ears may hear, and hearing they may comprehend, and comprehending they may believe'.]22

On only one occasion, however, does it seem that a Mongol ultimatum purported to cite the full text of Chinggis Khan's own edict. This transpired in 1254, when the *qaghan* Möngke sent back the Franciscan missionary William of Rubruck as his emissary to King Louis IX of France; Rubruck reproduced the texts in Latin translation in the report he composed the following year. To Eric Voegelin belongs the credit for distinguishing the two documents in question.[23] Chinggis Khan's edict is incorporated in the middle of Möngke's letter, and begins with the 'command of God':

---

21 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, xxxii, 52; also in SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, ed. Richard, p. 117.

22 PAUL MEYVAERT, "An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France," *Viator* 11 (1980), pp. 245–58 (at pp. 252–3).

23 VOEGELIN, "The Mongol orders of submission," p. 398.

Preceptum eterni Dei est: In celo non est nisi unus Deus eternus, super terram non sit nisi unus dominus Chingischan. Filii Dei [here Rubruck inserts a parenthetical comment] hoc est verbum quod vobis dictum est. Quicumque sumus Moal, quicumque Naiman, quicumque Merkit, quicumque Musceleman et ubicumque possunt aures audire, quocumque potest equus ambulare, ibi faciatis audiri vel intellegi. Ex quo audierint preceptum meum et intellexerint, et noluerint credere et voluerint facere exercitum contra nos, audietis et videbitis quod erunt habentes oculos, non videntes; et cum voluerint aliquid tenere, erunt sine manibus; et cum voluerint ambulare, erunt sine pedibus. Hoc est preceptum eterni Dei. ['The decree of the everlasting God is as follows: In Heaven there is only one eternal God, and on earth let there be only one ruler, Chinggis Khan. This is the word of the son of God that is addressed to you. Whosoever we are – whether Moal [Mongol] or Naiman or Merkit or Muslim – and wheresoever ears are capable of hearing and wheresoever horse is able to tread, there you shall cause it to be heard or understood. From the moment they hear my decree and comprehend it, but are unwilling to believe it and desire to make war against us, you shall hear and see that though they have eyes they shall be blind, and when they would grasp they shall have no hands, and when they would walk they shall have no feet. This is the command of the everlasting God.'][24]

It will be seen how strikingly some of these phrases evoke Güyüg's letter to Baiju ('though they have eyes they shall be blind, ...and when they would walk they shall have no feet') and Hülegü's subsequent letter to King Louis ('wheresoever ears are capable of hearing and wheresoever horse is able to tread'). But the importance of the letter, as Smith has pointed out, is that the phrase 'Whosoever we are, whether Mongol or Naiman or Merkit or Muslim', as a way of describing the constituent peoples in the Chinggisid empire, is palpably archaic. The argument is problematic – why no mention of the Kereyit, for example? But if Smith is right, the words lend his argument significantly stronger support than does Juvaynī. They indicate that we have here a text (or fragment of a text) dating from the era of the first Mongol conquests in the steppe (prior to the onset of the conquest of China, and perhaps even to the submission of the Uighurs in 1209).[25] The document brought back by Rubruck may therefore provide evidence for belief in a mandate to conquer the world at large already in the early phases of Mongol expansion.

---

24 WILLIAM OF RUBRUCK, *Itinerarium*, xxxvi, 6–7, in Van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana*, I, p. 307; trans. Peter Jackson and David Morgan, *The mission of Friar William of Rubruck. His journey to the court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173 (Cambridge, 1990), p. 248. See PAUL PELLIOT, *Recherches sur les chrétiens d'Asie centrale et d'extrême-orient*, ed. with additional notes by Jean Dauvillier (Paris, 1973), p. 211; and for the correct punctuation of Möngke's letter, PELLIOT, "Les Mongols et la papauté," p. 125.

25 SMITH, "The Mongols and world conquest," pp. 207–8, 210. It is possible that the formula dates from the era immediately following the Baljuna covenant, when Chinggis Khan's followers certainly included Muslims in addition to Naiman and Merkit.

The balance of probability is that the idea of a mandate from Heaven conferring world-rulership had already emerged in the lifetime of Chinggis Khan. Initially he doubtless aspired to rule only over the steppe nomads – 'the people of the felt-walled tents', as the *Secret History of the Mongols* puts it when recounting his enthronement in 1206 near the source of the River Onon.[26] He may well have been encouraged to look further afield by the growing number of *literati* in his entourage who were of Chinese origin or had imbibed Chinese political ideas.[27] But the flight of his defeated nomadic enemies into the territories of their sedentary neighbours – the Naiman prince Küchlüg into the Qara-Khitan empire, for instance, at the head of a body of Naiman and Merkit fugitives, in *ca.* 1210[28] – must have provided a further incentive to broaden his horizon and to contemplate the reduction of non-nomadic peoples. This transformation of Chinggis Khan's ambitions was doubtless a gradual one. It is worth noting that the Hungarian Dominican Julian, writing in 1237, was under the impression that the Mongol sovereign had embarked on the conquest of the world in the wake of his successful campaign against the Khvārazmshāh (*i.e.* in the early 1220s).[29] Something also needs to be said, incidentally, about the priorities behind the actual process of expansion. Lattimore's thesis – that Chinggis Khan sought to eliminate all potential opposition in the steppe prior to embarking on the conquest of China[30] – does not quite harmonize with the evidence. Envoys from Sung China who visited Ögedei's court in 1237 thought that Chinggis Khan had deliberately postponed further campaigns against the Qïpchaq until the Jurchen-Chin should have been overthrown.[31] It appears that his successor adhered to this policy, since substantial forces were not despatched into the western steppe until 1236.[32]

---

26 *Mangghol'un niuca tobca'an*, § 202, trans. De Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols. Chapter Eight," *PFEH* 21 (March 1980), p. 25.

27 DE RACHEWILTZ, "Some remarks on the ideological foundations," pp. 31–6.

28 For a revised version of these events, see PAUL D. BUELL, "Early Mongol expansion in Western Siberia and Turkestan (1207–1219): a reconstruction," *CAJ* 36 (1992), pp. 1–32.

29 DÖRRIE, "Drei Texte," p. 172 (trans. Göckenjan and Sweeney, *Der Mongolensturm*, pp. 103–4). Cf. also the vaguer statement (probably based on Julian) in THOMAS OF SPALATO (d. 1266), *Historia Salonitanorum pontificum atque Spalatensium*, ed. Fr. Rački, Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium 26 (Zagreb, 1894), p. 169 (trans. in *Der Mongolensturm*, p. 251).

30 OWEN LATTIMORE, "The geography of Chingis Khan," *Geographical Journal* 129 (1963), pp. 1–7.

31 *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, trans. Olbricht and Pinks, p. 209. Cf. also A.M. KHAZANOV, *Nomads and the outside world*, trans. Julia Crookenden, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI, 1994), p. 236, n.1.

32 THOMAS T. ALLSEN, "Prelude to the western campaigns: Mongol military operations in the Volga-Ural region, 1217–1237," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 3 (1983), pp. 5–24 (at pp. 14–18).

The techniques of subjection

Forthright claims to world-dominion, accompanied by veiled threats in the event of defiance, comprised only one element in the Mongol diplomatic arsenal. It was possible that they might merely have the effect of encouraging resistance; and so, paradoxically, it was necessary also to find ways of sidestepping confrontation. In his report to the Pope, Carpini drew attention to the less direct tactics employed by the Mongols as a means of bringing nations into subjection. At first, he said, they spoke smooth words, but later they stung like a scorpion.[33] It was their practice to adopt a gentler tone with rulers whose territories lay at some distance: these princes might thereby be deterred from allying with the Mongols' more immediate enemies and entering the fight against them.[34] At one level, such observations – like the claim by Rubruck that the Mongols had achieved their conquests less by strength than by guile and that making peace with them spelled ruin[35] – were designed to bolster resistance on the part of the Latin West.[36] But there was also a good deal of truth behind them, and events appear to have borne out Carpini's warning within a matter of months.

In December 1248 the French King Louis IX, whose crusading army had recently landed in Cyprus in preparation for an assault upon Egypt, was met by envoys from the Mongol general Eljigidei, then operating somewhere in eastern Persia.[37] The fact that Eljigidei's letter bore a date (Muḥarram 646) corresponding to May 1248, when the crusading army had not even embarked from France, bears eloquent testimony to his haste to make contact with Louis. Moreover, in contrast with the ultimatums to which the West was growing accustomed, it contained no demand for submission; in fact, the only hint that powers of equal status were not involved here lay in the fact that Louis was addressed as 'son' (as Chinggis Khan had addressed the Khvārazmshāh; see above) and was asked to ensure that non-Latin Christians living under Latin rule in the Levant received equitable treatment. Eljigidei stressed that the Mongols themselves did not distinguish between different types of Christian – a grossly misleading half-truth, since they were concerned not to

---

33 CARPINI, iv, 6, and viii, 3, ed. Menestò, pp. 247, 294–5 (trans. Dawson, *Mongol mission*, pp. 16, 44).

34 *Ibid.*, vii, 8, ed. Menestò, pp. 288–9 (trans. Dawson, *Mongol mission*, p. 41).

35 RUBRUCK, xxxiii, 3, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 290 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, p. 227). On Mongol duplicity, see more briefly VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, xxx, 77; also in SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, ed. Richard, p. 39.

36 CARPINI, viii, 9, ed. Menestò, p. 298 (trans. Dawson, *Mongol Mission*, p. 47). VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, xxx, 77, 82, and xxxi, 149; also in SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, ed. Richard, pp. 39, 45, 77–8. For the friars' attempts to stiffen Western resolve, see DONALD OSTROWSKI, "Second-redaction additions in Carpini's *Ystoria Mongalorum*," in *Adelphotes: a tribute to Omeljan Pritsak by his students* (Cambridge, MA, 1989 = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, parts 3–4), pp. 522–50 (at pp. 549–50).

37 PETER JACKSON, "Eljigidei," *Encyclopaedia Iranica* 8 (1998), pp. 366–67.

distinguish between different confessional groups at all, including Muslims and Buddhists.[38] The cordial tone of the message was reinforced by Eljigidei's wishing the French king success in his crusade. His envoys further assured Louis that their master was a Christian, as was the *qaghan* Güyüg himself.[39]

Louis was sufficiently heartened to send back the Mongol embassy with envoys of his own bearing choice gifts, but the result was extremely disappointing, for they returned in 1251 with a letter from Güyüg's widow Oghul Qaimish thanking the French king for his 'tribute' and requiring further proof of his submission. Although Eljigidei's embassy had created quite a stir in Europe,[40] Western Christians came to believe that they had been duped. One contemporary observer, Vincent of Beauvais, surely had Eljigidei's overtures in mind when he suggested that the Mongols' concern was to encourage the crusade to attack more remote territories such as Egypt and to keep them away from regions, like Aleppo and Anatolia (Rūm), which lay within their immediate sphere of operations.[41] The notion, too, which gained ground in the West, that the Mongols lured Christian peoples into submission by simulating friendship towards Christians[42] must also have its roots in this episode. The ploy was nothing new; it appears to have been used similarly on campaign. In the course of their great reconnaissance raid northwards through Azerbaijan and the Caucasus in 1222–3, the generals Jebe and Sübe'edei had duped the Christian Georgians and Rus' by having crosses carried in front of their army.[43]

---

38 For Mongol religious policy, see PAUL RATCHNEVSKY, *Genghis Khan: his life and legacy*, trans. Thomas Nivison Haining (Oxford, 1991), pp. 197–8.

39 Text of Eljigidei's letter (reproduced by VOEGELIN, "The Mongol orders of submission," p. 390), which was incorporated in a letter of the papal legate ODO OF CHÂTEAUROUX to Innocent IV, 31 March 1249, in LUC D'ACHÉRY (ed.), *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliothecis delituerant*, new edn. by Ét. de la Barre *et al.* (Paris, 1723, 3 vols.), III, pp. 625–6; the envoys' statements at p. 627. I have checked the printed version against Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, ms. lat. 3768, fols. 77v–78r, 79v–80r.

40 MATTHEW PARIS, *Chronica majora*, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls Series 57 (London, 1872–83, 7 vols.), V, p. 87.

41 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, xxxii, 41. The passage possibly formed part of the *Historia Tartarorum* of Simon of Saint-Quentin (1248): see SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, ed. Richard, pp. 97–8; also JEAN RICHARD, "Ultimatums mongols et lettres apocryphes: l'Occident et les motifs de guerre des Tartares," *CAJ* 17 (1973), pp. 212–22 (at pp. 217–18), repr. In RICHARD, *Orient et Occident au moyen-âge. Contacts et relations (XII^{e}–XV^{e} s.)* (London, 1976).

42 Pope Alexander IV, 17 Dec. 1260: "Annales monasterii de Burton," in *Annales monastici*, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls Series 36 (London, 1864–9, 5 vols.), I, p. 497: *simulant se ad Christianos privatae affectionis habere propositum.* PETER JACKSON, "Prester John *redivivus*: a review article," *JRAS*, 3rd series, 7 (1997), pp. 425–31 (at pp. 430–1).

43 PIERRE-VINCENT CLAVERIE, "L'apparition des Mongols sur la scène politique occidentale (1220–1223)," *Le Moyen Age* 105 (1999), pp. 601–13 (at pp. 608–9). For further evidence from this campaign, see PETER JACKSON, "The Mongols and the faith of the

The overture of 1248 presaged later developments. It is possible, though by no means certain, that Eljigidei had just learned of Güyüg's death in April and anticipated an interregnum during which the Mongols would have no wish whatsoever to see a sizeable Latin army appearing on their western horizon. A similar situation arose on the frontier with Sung China when Möngke died in 1259. Here his brother Qubilai, immediately following his proclamation as *qaghan* at K'ai-p'ing, entered into peace negotiations with the Sung government in May 1260 in order to free his hands for the forthcoming conflict with the rival candidate Arïq Böke in Mongolia.[44] In the Near East, Hülegü was confronted by the Egyptian Mamluk regime which had taken over much of Syria in the wake of its victory over the Mongols at 'Ayn Jālūt in 1260, and was menaced in the rear by the Mongols of the Golden Horde. His reaction to this emergency is more reminiscent of Eljigidei. He wrote to Louis IX to persuade him to blockade Egypt by sea while the Mongols attacked it by land, thus inaugurating a series of diplomatic exchanges between the Ilkhans and European monarchs which lasted into the fourteenth century.[45] One difference from 1248, of course, was that an attack on Egypt was now on the immediate agenda for the Mongol armies operating in the Near East.

So far we have been dealing with occasions when the Mongol high command reacted to a parlous situation by seeking to avert a confrontation or by securing a termination of hostilities. In each case their actions involved a retreat from the habitual claims to world-rulership and demands for surrender. But this was only a temporary expedient: Mongol governments continued to harbour the old ambitions, and the Ilkhanid regime, for instance, articulated claims to world-dominion in its vitriolic correspondence with the Mamluk enemy.[46] Even the accession of the Muslim Ilkhan Aḥmad Tegüder in 1282 was presented to the Mamluk Sultan Qalā'ūn as an inducement for him to submit.[47]

---

conquered," in Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran (eds.), *Mongols, Turks and others: Eurasian nomads and the world* (Leiden, forthcoming); and for another possible example of disinformation, from the invasion of Eastern Europe in 1241–2, RICHARD, "Ultimatums mongols," p. 215 and n. 12.

44 DIETLINDE SCHLEGEL, "Koexistenz oder Annexionskrieg? Kublai Khans Politik gegenüber dem Sung-Reich 1256–1276," *Saeculum* 19 (1968), pp. 390–405 (at pp. 397–402).

45 MEYVAERT, "An unknown letter." See more generally J.A. BOYLE, "The Ilkhans of Persia and the princes of Europe," *CAJ* 20 (1976), pp. 25–40; FELICITAS SCHMIEDER, *Europa und die Fremden. Die Mongolen im Urteil des Abendlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahrhundert* (Sigmaringen, 1994), pp. 89–109 (with a list of embassies at pp. 328–35).

46 REUVEN AMITAI-PREISS, "Mongol imperial ideology and the Ilkhanid war against the Mamluks," in Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan (eds.), *The Mongol empire and its Legacy* (Leiden, 1999), pp. 57–72.

47 ADEL ALLOUCHE, "Tegüder's Ultimatum to Qalawun," *IJMES* 22 (1990), pp. 437–46. REUVEN AMITAI, "The conversion of Tegüder Ilkhan to Islam," *JSAI* 25 (2001), pp. 15–43 (here pp. 30–3). THOMAS T. ALLSEN, *Culture and conquest in Mongol Eurasia*

But it was necessary not only for the Mongols' enemies, but for the Frankish allies whom the Ilkhans courted in Western Europe, to proceed with caution. In 1304 the various Mongol regional khanates made peace and once more acknowledged a single *qaghan* in the east, in the person of Qubilai's grandson Temür; the Ilkhan Öljeitü took care to pass on the good news to King Philip the Fair of France. Now the Persian historian Vaṣṣāf, describing the Central Asian Mongols' overture to the *qaghan* which had brought about this general reconciliation, has them listing the external enemies on whom the different Mongol states should now concentrate their attention rather than engaging in internecine wars. Those confronting the Ilkhanate are said to comprise North Africa (*Maghrib*), Egypt, Rūm (probably the Byzantine Empire) and – significantly – the Franks.[48] In other words, the would-be confederates of yesterday could now once more be envisaged as the target of hostilities. Vaṣṣāf was writing for the court (though in the event Öljeitü could allegedly make no sense of his convoluted Persian);[49] so we can presumably take this to indicate at least the expectations of the Persian bureaucrats who served the Mongols. And the most celebrated of them, Rashīd al-Dīn, evidently thought it worthwhile to mention, in his great history of the Mongols (composed in 1303–4), that certain countries were still 'in rebellion' against the *qaghan* or were subject to him.[50] In Ilkhanid Iran, at least, the idea of world-domination was still in the air.

The agents of Mongol imperialism

The Mongols employed a great many agents and satellites in their diplomatic contacts with independent powers. Those who conducted the Ilkhans' negotiations

---

(Cambridge, 2001), pp. 26–7, suggests that Aḥmad was in general trying to broaden the bases of his legitimation.

48 VAṢṢĀF, *Tajziyat al-amṣār va tazjiyat al-a'ṣār*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 454.

49 MORGAN, *The Mongols*, p. 21.

50 In rebellion: Hungary: RASHĪD AL-DĪN, *Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*, eds. Muḥammad Rawshan and Muṣṭafā Mūsavī (Tehran, 1373 h.sh./1994, 4 vols. with continuous pagination), I, p. 667; trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, *Jami'u't-tawarikh. Compendium of chronicles* (Cambridge, MA, 1998–9, 3 vols. with continuous pagination), II, p. 326; Japan, and "Lūchak and Khaynām:" *ibid.*, eds. Rawshan and Mūsavī, II, pp. 911–12 (trans. Thackston, II, p. 446). Khaynām is doubtless Hainan; on the possible identity of Lūchak (Marco Polo's "Logiak," somewhere in S.E. Asia), see the inconclusive discussion in PAUL PELLIOT, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959–73, 3 vols. with continuous pagination), II, pp. 767–70. Countries 'subject' to the *qaghan*, including Champa (now southern Vietnam) and "Zar-dandān" (Chin-ch'ih, situated between northern Burma and Yün-nan: PELLIOT, *Notes*, I, pp. 603–6), are mentioned in the Indian section of RASHĪD AL-DĪN's history: *Die Indiengeschichte des Rašīd ad-Dīn*, ed. and trans. Karl Jahn (Vienna, 1980), Tafeln 15–16, 52, facsimiles of Persian text, Topkapı Sarayı ms. Hazine 1654, fols. 335v–336r, and Arabic text, ms. A.27 formerly belonging to the Royal Asiatic Society, fol. 2063v (German trans. pp. 38–9).

with the Latin West were generally eastern Christians and expatriate Europeans like the Genoese Buscarello di Ghisolfi or the Pisan Isolo da Anastasio[51] – precisely the sort of envoys who could be counted on to inspire confidence on the part of fellow Christians. But such men might well have their own reasons for misrepresenting the conquerors' aims and thereby inducing independent rulers to submit or cooperate. Eljigidei's envoys to Louis IX in 1248, for instance (both of them Christians from the Mosul region) spoke of their master's intention to take Baghdad in order to avenge the recent sack of Jerusalem by the Khvarazmians[52] – an aspiration which could have been lifted straight from the French king's own recruitment propaganda.

Translators in the Mongols' service might give a tendentious rendering of a friendly letter from a foreign prince and thereby foster the impression that the sender desired closer links with the Mongols than was actually the case. When Rubruck left Louis IX's crusading army in 1253, he carried with him a letter from the French king, asking the Mongol prince Sartaq to grant the Friars safe-conduct and urging him (since he was rumoured to be a Christian) to be a friend to all Christians and an enemy to the enemies of the Cross. Despite Rubruck's repeated disclaimers, the Mongols took him to be an official envoy, and he was sent on to the court of the *qaghan* Möngke. The Franciscan later suspected that the Armenians who translated this letter at the first major Mongol encampment had deliberately distorted the sense so that Louis appeared to ask Sartaq for military assistance against the Muslims.[53] Their purpose would have been to accelerate the downfall of the hated Muslim enemy by engineering cooperation between the Mongols and the Latins.

The events of 1304 gave rise to another bid by translators to camouflage the truth. Passing on the news of the general peace between the various Mongol rulers to Louis IX's grandson Philip the Fair, Öljeitü expressed the restoration of unity in vivid language with the statement that their postal relay-stations were now linked up once more 'from Nangiyas [i.e. Southern China], where the sun rises, as far as the Ocean Sea *[talu dalai]*'. This last phrase long puzzled commentators, but – as Professor Sinor demonstrated – it denotes, not the Mediterranean (which might have been described as one border of the Ilkhanate), but the Ocean which was believed to surround the Eurasian land-mass. Öljeitü's phrasing, in other words, indicated that

---

51 JEAN RICHARD, "D'Älğigidäi à Ġazan: la continuité d'une politique franque chez les Mongols d'Iran," in Denise Aigle (ed.), *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, Bibliothèque Iranienne 45 (Tehran, 1997), pp. 57–69 (here p. 64), and repr. in RICHARD, *Francs et Orientaux dans le monde des croisades* (Aldershot, 2003).

52 ODO OF CHÂTEAUROUX to Innocent IV, in D'ACHÉRY (ed.), *Spicilegium*, III, p. 627 (= ms. lat. 3768, fol. 80r): *vindicare injuriam a Corosminis illatam Domino Jesu-Christo.*

53 RUBRUCK, xxvii, 11, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 243 (trans. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 170–1). See generally JEAN RICHARD, "Sur les pas de Plancarpin et de Rubrouck: la lettre de saint Louis à Sartaq," *Journal des Savants* (1977), pp. 49–61, repr. in RICHARD, *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: les perspectives orientales du monde latin médiéval* (London, 1983).

Mongol dominion extended to the world's very limits. This was not a notion of reality to which any Catholic ruler could assent; and the phrase was tactfully omitted from the two Italian translations made at Philip's court by the Europeans who accompanied the embassy. Hence, when the envoys crossed the Channel, Edward II, too, was led to believe that the letter described Mongol rule as extending to 'the frontiers of Outremer'.[54]

Princes who had already acknowledged the *qaghan*'s overlordship might in turn serve as useful intermediaries with foreign powers. In 666/1268 we find King Het'um of Lesser Armenia offering his services (unavailingly) as a negotiator to the Mamluk Sultan Baybars, in an effort to bring about 'peace' between Egypt and the Ilkhan Abaqa, i.e. the Sultan's submission.[55] In 658/1260, according to the Delhi historian Jūzjānī, Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan Qarluq, the tributary ruler of Binbān (Bannu) in the Indian borderlands, forwarded to Hülegü in Iraq an embassy that had arrived at his court from Delhi. With it he sent his own envoys and a letter drafted by his chancery but purporting to come from the Delhi Sultan and his viceroy (*nā'ib*), Ulugh Khān Balaban, and offering submission. His aim, presumably, was either to cover up a correspondence with the independent Sultanate which might have spelled danger, or to gain credit for himself with his Mongol overlords by sponsoring a new client for them to add to the galaxy of subject princes in south-west Asia. Jūzjānī tells us that as a result Hülegü ordered his generals to refrain from attacks on the territory of the Delhi Sultanate; unfortunately, he ends his narrative with this year, so that we do not learn the sequel.[56]

A third group that may have identified its own best interests with the aggrandisement of the Mongol empire comprised merchants engaged in long-distance trade. We know the names of a few Muslim traders who had attached

---

54 ANTOINE MOSTAERT and FRANCIS WOODMAN CLEAVES, *Les lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Aryun et Öljeitü à Philippe le Bel*, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Scripta Mongolica Monograph Series 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1962), pp. 56, 72–4. T. Rymer (ed.), *Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cuiuscumque generis acta publica* (Amsterdam, 1739–45), I, part 4, p. 93. DENIS SINOR, "The mysterious 'Talu Sea' in Öljeitü's letter to Philip the Fair of France," in John G. Hangin and Urgunge Onon (eds.), *Analecta Mongolica dedicated to the seventieth birthday of Professor Owen Lattimore*, Mongolia Society Occasional Papers 8 (Bloomington, IN, 1972), pp. 115–21, and repr. in SINOR, *Inner Asia and its contacts with medieval Europe* (London, 1977).

55 REUVEN AMITAI-PREISS, "An exchange of letters in Arabic between Abaya Īlkhān and Sultan Baybars (A.H. 667/A.D. 1268–69)," *CAJ* 38 (1994), pp. 11–33 (here pp. 12–13).

56 JŪZJĀNĪ, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, 2nd edn. (Kabul, 1342–3 h.sh./1963–4), II, pp. 86–7; trans. H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī: a general history of the Muhammadan dynasties of Asia*, Bibliotheca Indica (London, 1873–81, 2 vols. with continuous pagination), II, pp. 859–61. PETER JACKSON, *The Delhi Sultanate: a political and military history* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 114. For Ḥasan Qarluq's principality, see IQTIDAR HUSAIN SIDDIQUI, "The Qarlugh kingdom in north-western India during the thirteenth century," *IC* 54/2 (1980), pp. 75–91.

themselves to Chinggis Khan at an early stage in his career in Mongolia.[57] It goes without saying that merchants served the Mongols as envoys and intelligence agents. But members of this class sometimes made a still more significant contribution to the process of expansion. Describing the Mongol capture of Lahore in 639/1241, Jūzjānī alleges that the majority of the populace were merchants who had each received a *laissez-passer* from the Mongols beyond the Indus, entitling them to travel to and from Khurasan and Turkestan on trading ventures; as a result, their hearts were not in resistance and they neglected to play their proper part in the city's defence.[58] The impulse behind this may not have been simply the reduction in the overhead costs of trade afforded by the shortlived *Pax Mongolica*. True, Mongol princes were in the habit of giving merchants a tablet of authority (*pā'iza*) and commissioning them to purchase goods. But Mongol rule also held out the promise of other lucrative occupations; in the conquered regions of China, Muslim traders and financiers were recruited as tax-farmers, a development heartily deplored, but unsuccessfully resisted, by Chinese and Khitan bureaucrats.[59]

It was the same in the Near East. The above-mentioned Shams al-Dīn 'Umar Qazvīnī, a dealer in precious stones who had entered the *qaghan*'s service and transmitted an ultimatum to the Seljuk Sultan in 633/1236, prevailed upon him to recognize the Mongols' overlordship on the quite spurious grounds that their yoke was an easy one to bear. Submission (*īlī*), he said, involved nothing more than the annual despatch of garments, horses and gold in small quantities.[60]

This bland assurance could hardly have prepared the sultan for Baiju's onslaught of 641/1242–3, or for the reality of Mongol domination in Rūm, as described for us by Simon of Saint-Quentin a few years later.[61] In the circumstances, it comes as little surprise that in the 1250s the Mongol government gave Qazvīnī oversight of the tribute arrangements for Rūm,[62] a position which may have been in his mind's eye from the outset.

---

57 RATCHNEVSKY, *Genghis Khan*, p. 72. THOMAS T. ALLSEN, "Mongolian princes and their merchant partners, 1200–1260," *Asia Major*, 3rd series, 2, part 2 (1989), pp. 83–126 (here p. 87).

58 JŪZJĀNĪ, II, pp. 163–4 (trans. Raverty, p. 1133).

59 THOMAS T. ALLSEN, "The rise of the Mongolian empire and Mongolian rule in North China," in Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (eds.), *CHC* VI. *Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 321–413 (at pp. 377, 380–1). *Idem*, "Mongolian princes," pp. 97–105.

60 IBN BIBĪ, *al-Avāmir*, pp. 452–6; *Mukhtaṣar-i Saljūq-nāma*, pp. 202–4 (trans. Duda, pp. 193–6).

61 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, xxxii, 28; also in SIMON DE SAINT-QUENTIN, ed. Richard, pp. 85–6. For the Mongol invasion of Rūm, see CLAUDE CAHEN, *The formation of Turkey*, trans. P.M. Holt (London, 2001), pp. 70–1.

62 IBN BIBĪ, *al-Avāmir*, p. 617; *Mukhtaṣar-i Saljūq-nāma*, p. 284 (trans. Duda, p. 270).

Conclusion

Although the conquerors' orders of submission left little room for misapprehension on the part of the recipient, and although, in the last resort, the Mongols repeatedly demonstrated that they possessed the military resources to crush resistance, they also proved adept at using both personnel and tactics which were calculated to lull potential enemies into making concessions. These diplomatic ploys merit closer attention from historians than they have received to date. The relatively rapid spread of Mongol sovereignty was evidently a more subtle and variegated process than is commonly believed.

VI

The Fall of the Ghurid Dynasty

Introduction and Early History

During the latter half of the 6th/12th century the Shansabanid rulers of Ghūr (more commonly known as the Ghurids) in present-day Afghanistan emerged as a major power in the Islamic world.[1] From fairly modest beginnings as petty lords (*maliks*) of Mandēsh, one of the districts into which this mountainous region was divided, they had come to dominate the entire region of Ghūr, reducing the other local rulers to subordinate status. The various branches of the dynasty, descended from the sons of ʿIzz al-Dīn Ḥusayn (d. in *c.* 1140), ruled at centres such as Warshād, Istiya, Sanga, Mādīn and Jurmās (Jurwās); but the empire was essentially a family confederacy under the senior prince at Fīrūzkūh, the new capital built in the 1140s and identified by André Maricq in 1957 with ruins at Jām on the Harī Rūd.[2] Tributaries at first of the Ghaznawids and then of the Seljuqs, the Ghurids profited from the upheavals that accompanied the arrival of the Ghuzz (Oghuz), Turkish tribesmen who had been dislodged from Central Asia by the heathen Qara-Khitan. The Ghurid ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Ḥusayn (d. 556/1161), who had already earned himself the sobriquet of *Jahānsūz* ("World-burner") by sacking Ghazna in *c.* 545/1150, was able to establish his autonomy and to assume the style of sultan.[3]

Following the brief reign of his son Sayf al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 558/1163), the throne of Fīrūzkūh passed to the branch of the family [**p. 208**] ruling at Sanga,

---

[1] Maricq and Wiet, *Le minaret*, 31–44, for a survey of the dynasty's history down to 1206; *ibid.*, 61–4, for remarks on the earlier history of Ghūr. For the whole period, see Bosworth, "Ghūrids"; the section on the Ghurids' last years in Kieffer, "Les Ghôrides", part II, 40–44, is superficial.

[2] Maricq and Wiet, *Le minaret*, 55–60; Kieffer, "Le minaret". For a revival of the older view that Fīrūzkūh lay well to the south, in the vicinity of Taywāra, see Leshnik, "Ghor". But Maricq's identification is supported by the fact that Jūzjānī says that Pul-i Āhangarān was close by, *TN*, 1:127 (tr. 1047), and that he gives the distance from Fīrūzkūh to the town of Zamīndāwar as forty *farsakhs* (approximately 200 km.), *ibid.*, 1:364 (tr. 386).

[3] For the struggle with the Ghaznawids, see Bosworth, *The later Ghaznavids*, 111–31.

in the person of a cousin, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām (d. 599/1203).[4] Throughout his reign Ghiyāth al-Dīn acted in more or less close collaboration with his brother Muʿizz al-Dīn (formerly Shihāb al-Dīn) Muḥammad. Muʿizz al-Dīn, installed at Ghazna when Ghiyāth al-Dīn had wrested it from the Ghuzz in 569/1173–74, spent much of his time in campaigns further east, where the truncated Ghaznawid principality at Lahore was extinguished (582/1186) and much of the north Gangetic plain was conquered from its Hindu rulers. But he was also called upon to support his brother in Khurāsān, where Ghiyāth al-Dīn was in conflict with the Turkish Khwārazmshāhs.[5] The Khwārazmshāhs, who like the Ghurids were former tributaries of the Seljuqs, suffered from two handicaps that did not afflict their rivals: the overlordship of the heathen Qara-Khitan to their rear and the hostility of the ʿAbbasid Caliph al-Nāṣir (575–622/1180–1225). Incited by a series of caliphal embassies, Ghiyāth al-Dīn and his brother made war on the Khwārazmshāhs Tekish (d. 595/1200) and his son ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad (595–618/1200–1221). After Ghiyāth al-Dīn's death (599/1203), Muʿizz al-Dīn mounted an invasion of Khwārazm, only to suffer a major defeat at Andkhūd (601/1204) by the Qara-Khitan, to whom the shah had appealed for assistance. He was preparing for another campaign against the Qara-Khitan when he was murdered at Dumyak,[6] on his way back from India, on 1 Shaʿbān 602/13 March 1206. During the next few years the Ghurid empire disintegrated. While his kinsmen struggled for control of Fīrūzkūh and Ghūr, Ghazna and the Indian provinces passed into the hands of his Turkish slave lieutenants. Only one power benefited from these conflicts: the Ghurids' great rival, the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, who by 612/1215–16 had asserted his control not merely over the dynasty's conquests in Khurāsān but also over its core territories. His triumph was shortlived, however, since within a few years Muḥammad and his empire were overwhelmed by the Mongols of Chinggis Khan, who estab[**p. 209**]lished their rule over the erstwhile Ghurid dominions west of the Indus.

This paper is concerned with events following Muʿizz al-Dīn's death. It relies principally upon the great Iraqi chronicler Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1232), whose information is often very full, though his sources are obscure;[7] and

---

[4] Sanga, the capital (*dār al-mulk*) of Mandēsh, had been the seat of his father Bahāʾ al-Dīn Sām b. Ḥusayn: *TN*, 1:336, 337 (tr. 340, 341). IA, 11:109/166, confirms that Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad and his brother held Sanga (SNJH) early in their career.

[5] For the conflict with the Khwārazmshāhs, see Bosworth, "Political and dynastic history", 159–66.

[6] The spelling of this name, which normally appears in secondary works as "Damyak", is suggested by the form DWMYK found in Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajara*, 72.

[7] Richards, "Ibn al-Athīr", 88.

Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, whose general history, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, written at Delhi in 658/1260, is in some measure a chronicle of the Ghurid dynasty in particular.[8] The history of the Khwārazmshāhs found in the *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā* of Juwaynī (d. 682/1283) yields a more skeletal account of the Khwarazmian advance in Khurāsān: Juwaynī's version is naturally slanted towards the glorification of the Khwārazmshāhs in the same way that Jūzjānī favours the Ghurids. Nasawī's biography of the last Khwārazmshāh, Muḥammad's son Jalāl al-Dīn *Mingbarnī (d. 628/1231),[9] yields some detail on the later activities of Ghūrīs in Khwarazmian service at the time of the Mongol invasion.

The Succession to Mu'izz al-Dīn

Despite the reverse at Andkhūd, the empire at the time of Mu'izz al-Dīn's assassination was still extensive. To the west, Herat and certain other towns in Khurāsān were in the hands of Ghurid lieutenants. To the south the Ghurids ruled over Zamīndāwar, Jarūm, Tigīnābād and Bust.[10] To the north-east, 'Alā' al-Dīn had established at Bāmiyān another brother, Fakhr al-Dīn Mas'ūd. This branch of the dynasty had extended its control over Shughnān, Ṭukhāristān as far as Dārkōt, and Bolor, regions that were richly endowed with mines of silver and gold and precious stones.[11] It too was drawn into the war against the Khwārazmshāh. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mas'ūd seconded his cousins' efforts, receiving from them in return [**p. 210**] in 587/1191 the style of sultan;[12] in 594/1198 his son and successor, Bahā' al-Dīn Sām, seized Balkh from the Qara-Khitan, while in 601/1205 his governor at Balkh took Tirmid from them also.[13] The succession to Mu'izz al-Dīn's territories was a matter of some moment, given the wealth at stake. Ghazna was a valuable prize in view of the booty from India amassed there by Mu'izz al-Dīn, including (or so Jūzjānī was

---

[8] A critical edition of this work is very much a *desideratum*: I have checked Ḥabībī's printed text against the early 14th-century B.L. ms. Add. 26,189.

[9] The form Mingīrnī (from Turkish *ming*, "thousand", and *eren*, "men"), proposed by Jackson, "Jalāl al-Dīn", 51, n.1, must be discarded (unpublished paper by Mr. W. Spengler).

[10] *TN*, 1:348–9, 357 (tr. 362–3, 376). The precise location of Tigīnābād is unknown: for the argument that it must have lain close to Qandahār and may even have been identical with it, see Bosworth, *The later Ghaznavids*, 149–51.

[11] *TN*, 1:385, 387 (tr. 422–4, 426); for mineral wealth, see 1:384 (tr. 421).

[12] *Ibid.*, 1:303, 359, 387 (tr. 249, 379, 427).

[13] IA, 12:88/134, 135/206.

told by the late sultan's treasurer) 1,500 *manns* of jewels; and the late monarch had not touched his brother's hoard at Fīrūzkūh.[14]

The dynasty had come to rely for its military forces and high-ranking officers not only on the tribesmen of Ghūr itself, but also upon other groups: "Tājīk" elements from the new conquests in Khurāsān; the Khalaj, inhabiting the warm tracts, or *garmsīr*, of present-day southern Afghanistan, who have long been classed as Turks, although their ethnicity is by no means certain;[15] Ghuzz tribesmen; and elite Turkish slave (*ghulām*, *banda*) troops of the kind recruited by Muslim rulers since as early as the 2nd/8th century. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad is known to have maintained Turkish slaves (*turkān-i khāṣṣ*) early in his reign; and Jūzjānī expressly tells us that Mu'izz al-Dīn purchased a great number of them.[16] Ghurid conquests in the eastern Panjāb were largely the work of his Turkish slave lieutenants, notably Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg, who occupied Delhi in 589/1193 and made it his headquarters. Professor Irfan Habib has recently suggested that Mu'izz al-Dīn was careful to promote *ghulām*s in particular to administrative and military office in his own territories of Ghazna and India, in contrast with the older Ghurid lands.[17]

Jūzjānī alleges that Mu'izz al-Dīn, who left no son, intended his dominions to pass to his slaves after his death, and Ghazna in par[**p. 211**]ticular to Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz, who is described as the senior or chief among them[18] and who held the *iqṭā'* of Kurramān. Mu'izz al-Dīn is also credited with a prediction that his slaves would take over his inheritance.[19] Jūzjānī, of course, writing in the Delhi Sultanate, clearly saw it as his duty to portray its monarchs as Mu'izz al-Dīn's true heirs within his Indian territories.[20] Here he was confronted by a major stumbling-block, since the proclamation of Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg as

---

[14] *TN*, 1:375 (tr. 405), for Fīrūzkūh (400 camel-loads of pure gold, etc.); 1:404 (tr. 487–8), for Ghazna; see also the share carried away by Jalāl al-Dīn 'Alī of Bāmiyān in 602/1206, allegedly totalling 250 camel-loads of gold ingots, vessels of gold and silver, and articles encrusted with jewels, *ibid.*, 1:390, 408 (tr. 433, 494).

[15] Bosworth, "Khaladj"; Minorsky, "The Turkish dialect"; Bosworth and Clauson, "Al-Xwārazmī", 6, 8–9; and cf. Habib, "Formation", 3, n.12.

[16] *TN*, 1:410 (tr. 497), for Mu'izz al-Dīn's purchase of Turkish slaves; 1:354–5 (tr. 371), for Turks at Ghiyāth al-Dīn's court.

[17] Habib, "Formation", 4–7. For the Indian conquests, see Habibullah, chap. 3, "The initial conquest"; K.A. Nizami, in Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, 156–90.

[18] For Yildiz's rank, see IA, 12:141/215; *TN*, 1:411 (tr. 498). According to a later tradition, he was Mu'izz al-Dīn's son-in-law: Baranī, *Ta'rīkh*, 550. His name is Turkish *yulduz/yildiz*, "star": Clauson, *An etymological dictionary*, 922–3.

[19] For Mu'izz al-Dīn's alleged intentions, see generally *TN*, 1:410–11 (tr. 497); regarding Yildiz, 1:393, 412 (tr. 438, 500).

[20] *Ibid.*, 1:323, 411, 415 (tr. 310, 497–8, 508–12).

ruler at Lahore in 602/1206 and of Aybeg's own *ghulām* Iltutmish at Delhi in 607/1210–11 constituted a disjunction from what had gone before. Jūzjānī therefore had to fashion some kind of continuity with the Ghurid regime, in just the same way as Fakhr-i Mudabbir earlier in the century had sought to depict his patron Aybeg as Muʿizz al-Dīn's designated successor.[21] But modern writers have accepted and even refined upon Jūzjānī's testimony. In the view of Professor M. ʿAziz Ahmad, for instance, Muʿizz al-Dīn's Indian conquests were his *peculium* which therefore passed by right to his slaves rather than to his heirs by blood.[22] This is, to say the least, a highly dubious proposition. In Islamic law it is the master who inherits the slave's property and has some claim to that of his freedman.[23]

What arrangements, if any, Muʿizz al-Dīn had actually made for his extensive dominions, we cannot know. Although there appear to have been no recognized rules for the succession, considerable weight was given to seniority. Early in Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad's reign, his surviving uncle, Fakhr al-Dīn Masʿūd of Bāmiyān, had made an abortive bid for the throne of Fīrūzkūh. Jūzjānī states that even after his defeat the sultans and *malik*s of Ghūr attended his court (*ūrā khidmat kardandī*), suggesting that the paramountcy of Ghiyāth al-Dīn and his brother may have dated only from Fakhr al- Dīn's death.[24] By 602/1206 there were a number of plausible senior candidates. ʿAlāʾ [**p. 212**] al-Dīn Atsiz, for instance, the son of "Jahānsūz", had earlier been in Muʿizz al-Dīn's service at Ghazna, but had been dismissed from court when Ghūrī amirs began to view him as their future sovereign. The representative of a line that had forfeited the sovereignty in 558/1163, he seems to have enjoyed an exalted status among the Ghurids.[25] Another senior prince was ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn (formerly Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī, of the branch that ruled at Jurmās, who was married to a daughter of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad and who, we are expressly told, was older than his cousins the sultans. On his brother's death in 599/1203, Muʿizz al-Dīn had transferred ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad from Bust to Fīrūzkūh and bestowed on him the territories of Ghūr, Gharchistān and Zamīndāwar. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad was an experienced campaigner who had recently fought against the Ismāʿīlīs in Qūhistān and earlier, in 596/1200, had

---

[21] Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajara*, 28, 32–3. On this, see Nizami's comments, in Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, 197–8.

[22] ʿAzīz Ahmad, *Political history*, 99; see also 118, 146, 149.

[23] Crone, *Roman, provincial and Islamic law*, 36–8. Forand, "The relation", 61.

[24] *TN*, 1:355, 386 (tr. 371–2, 425).

[25] *Ibid.*, 1:379–80 (tr. 413–14).

served as governor of Nīshāpūr during the brief Ghurid occupation.[26] That he is the only Shansabanid prince known to have accompanied Muʿizz al-Dīn on campaign in India[27] may possibly indicate that he was being groomed for the succession to the headship of the empire. But whatever the case, Muʿizz al-Dīn had kinsmen enough to whom he might bequeath his territories, either in their entirety or piecemeal, without being obliged to fall back upon his *ghulāms*: that savours rather too much of *ex post facto* justification.[28]

These kinsmen, moreover, had plans of their own. Muʿizz al-Dīn's action in 599/1203 had bypassed the late sultan's son, his nephew Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, whom he deemed unsuitable and who was compensated with an appanage comprising Bust, Isfizār and Farāh.[29] The most powerful member of the dynasty was the sultan of Bāmiyān, Bahā' al-Dīn Sām, a cousin of Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Muʿizz al-Dīn and also their sister's son, who had formed the design of taking over the Ghurid dominions in succession to his uncles. He had accordingly made a pact with the disgruntled Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd for **[p. 213]** the partition of the empire on Muʿizz al-Dīn's death: Maḥmūd was to receive his father's territories, Ghūr and Fīrūzkūh, while Bahā' al-Dīn would take Ghazna and India. Now, on the news of the assassination at Dumyak, Bahā' al-Dīn wrote to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, to ʿAlā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī, and to the Ghurid governor of Herat, ordering them to make the *khuṭba* in his name. But as he moved on Ghazna, he died, a mere nineteen days after the late sultan. His final instructions to his two sons, ʿAlā' al-Dīn Muḥammad and Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAlī, were to continue the march and to reach an accommodation with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd.[30]

The Rise of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd and the Failure of the Bāmiyān Princes

Following Muʿizz al-Dīn's death, Fīrūzkūh only briefly remained under the rule of ʿAlā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī, who had extracted oaths from the leading amirs that they would assist him against the Khwārazmshāh or against

---

[26] IA, 12:124/189, and *TN*, 1:370–71 (tr. 393), for Qūhistān; for Nīshāpūr, see *TN*, 1:360, 370 (tr. 381, 393), and Juwaynī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2:49 (tr. 316). For his marriage, see *TN*, 1:360, 369, 373 (tr. 381, 391–2, 397); and for his ancestry and age, *ibid.*, 1:340, 369 (tr. 345–6, 391). Jurmās (or Jurwās) lay "in the heart of Ghūr": *ibid.*, 1:381 (tr. 416); for its probable location, see Maricq and Wiet, *Le minaret*, 61–3.

[27] *TN*, 1:370 (tr. 393).

[28] See also the comments of Nizami, in Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, 198–9.

[29] IA, 12:118/181. *TN*, 1:370, 372–3, 401 (tr. 392, 393, 396–7, 472).

[30] IA, 12:142–3/217–18, 147/223. For his death, see also *TN*, 1:389 (tr. 431–2).

Bahā' al-Dīn Sām; Ibn al-Athīr notes that Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd's name was omitted out of contempt. Maḥmūd himself, at Bust, initially made no move and waited to see what Bahā' al-Dīn Sām would do; but on learning of the death of his powerful relative, he had the *khuṭba* read in his own name and advanced on Fīrūzkūh. The Ghūrī amirs were induced to abandon the army sent against him under 'Alā' al-Dīn's son, who withdrew. 'Alā' al-Dīn himself, fleeing from Fīrūzkūh, was pursued, brought back and imprisoned in the fortress of Ashiyār in Gharchistān.[31] A year later his son Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh made an attempt on Fīrūzkūh which was beaten off.[32]

At Ghazna the situation was more balanced. Here, although the populace looked to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, Bahā' al-Dīn's sons could count on significant support. Their father had been popular with the Ghūrīs in Ghazna: Ghūrī amirs had brought him the news of Mu'izz al-Dīn's murder, and the justiciar (*amīr-i dād*), who acted as governor (*wālī*) of the citadel, had written urging him to make [**p. 214**] haste.[33] This was Sulaymān b. Shīsh, who according to Jūzjānī had held that office under Mu'izz al-Dīn: the same author names Sulaymān and the *sipāhsālār* Kharvash (or Kharfash) as the two leading Ghūrī amirs in Ghazna who summoned Bahā' al-Dīn.[34] They may have been among the "amirs of Ghūr" whom Mu'izz al-Dīn had brought from Fīrūzkūh and installed at Ghazna following his brother's death in 599/1203, in preparation for the invasion of Khwārazm.[35]

That Bahā' al-Dīn's sons were nevertheless unable to establish themselves at Ghazna was due primarily to the actions of Mu'izz al-Dīn's vizier, Mu'ayyad al-Mulk Muḥammad b. 'Abd-Allāh Sajzī,[36] and the late sultan's Turkish slave elite. Already, as Mu'ayyad al-Mulk, together with troops of the Indian army (*lashgar-i Hindūstān*), conveyed Mu'izz al-Dīn's bier from Dumyak, tensions had arisen among them between the Ghūrīs and the Turks,[37] the former upholding

---

[31] IA, 12:146–8/223–4. *TN*, 1:371, 373 (tr. 394, 397–8), furnishes a briefer account, but specifies Ashiyār.

[32] *Ibid.*, 1:371, 374 (tr. 395, 399): the attack is said to have occurred when Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd had been on the throne for one year, i.e. in 603/1206–1207.

[33] IA, 12:142–3/217.

[34] *TN*, 1:390, 408 (tr. 433, 493–4); for Sulaymān as *amīr-i dād*, see *ibid.*, 1:406 (to be corrected from B.L. ms. Add. 26,189, fol. 163b; cf. also tr., 491).

[35] *Ibid.*, 1:401 (tr. 473); Habib, "Formation", 7.

[36] Mu'ayyad al-Mulk's *nisba* generally appears as "Sanjarī" in Ḥabībī's edition of *TN* and is so transcribed by Raverty, but the "Sijistān" of IA, 12:140/213, and the "Sīstānī" of *TN*, 1:380 (tr. 415), are conclusive.

[37] For Jūzjānī, the word "Turk" seems generally to signify "Turkish *ghulām*". Note in this context the contrasting juxtaposition of "Turks and free men" (*atrāk-u aḥrār*) in the account of the last Ghaznawid Sultan: *ibid.*, 1:243 (Raverty's trans., 114, fails to bring out the full significance).

the claims of Bahā' al-Dīn Sām whereas the Turks supported Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Jūzjānī has the Turks securing a decisive advantage when they took possession not only of Mu'izz al-Dīn's bier but also of his treasure.[38] Ibn al-Athīr, however, shows that this occurred in two distinct stages. First Mu'ayyad al-Mulk and the Turks induced the Ghūrīs to follow an alternative route via Nangrahār, while they themselves made for *Shinqurān and Kurramān. Here they were met by Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz, who prevailed upon the vizier to surrender Mu'izz al-Dīn's treasure. Yildiz then accompanied them to Ghazna, where they arrived on 22 Sha'bān/3 April 1206 and buried their late master.[39] Ibn al-Athīr's more circumstantial account [**p. 215**] is preferable to that of Jūzjānī, who alleges that Mu'ayyad al-Mulk and the Turkish amirs made contact with Yildiz, inviting him to come and oust the princes of Bāmiyān, only when the army reached Ghazna.[40]

'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām and his brother arrived at Ghazna on 1 Ramaḍān 602/11 April 1206. Yildiz had evidently returned to Kurramān, and at first the Turks acquiesced reluctantly in the welcome given to 'Alā' al-Dīn and Jalāl al-Dīn by the Ghūrīs. By distributing largesse among the Turks, the Bāmiyān princes secured an oath of loyalty, but only saving the rights of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd. At this juncture Yildiz advanced on Ghazna at the head of an army of Turks, Khalaj, Ghuzz and others, spurning an offer from the Bāmiyān princes of a larger *iqṭā'* in return for his allegiance. When he arrived outside the city, 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām sent troops against him, but among them were a number of Turks, headed by Yildiz's brother-in-law Sevinch, who deserted to Yildiz and massacred the Ghūrīs. Jalāl al-Dīn 'Alī fled, and after a short investment of the citadel 'Alā' al-Dīn was compelled to surrender and to withdraw to Bāmiyān. Yildiz took up residence at Ghazna on 10 Ramaḍān/20 April 1206.[41] In mid Ramaḍān/at the end of April 1206, he was able to act against the pro-Bāmiyān party in the city, arresting the *amīr-i dād*. A

---

[38] IA, 12:140–41/213–15. *TN*, 1:390, 408 (tr. 432, 492).

[39] IA, 12:141/214–15 (but reading NNKRHAR for the MKRHAN of the text). Nangrahār lay on the middle Kabul river and is the present-day Jalalabad region: see C.E. Bosworth, "Nangrahār, Ningrahār", *EI²*. Shinqurān, often mentioned with Kurramān, was identified by Raverty (498–9 n. 7 of his trans. of *TN*) with Shalūzān, and may also be connected with the Shinwārī tribe of Afghans (Bosworth, *The later Ghaznavids*, 125): it lay astride one of the routes from Peshawar to Ghazna (IA, 12:140/214), on which see Bivar, "Naghar".

[40] *TN*, 1:408–9 (tr. 494).

[41] IA, 12:143–5/218–20; for the dates of this, his second stay at Ghazna, see 12:153/231–2.

feeble riposte by Ghūrīs in the service of Bāmiyān, who plundered Kurramān and *Shinqurān, was soundly checked by Yildiz's forces under Sevinch.[42]

At the beginning of Dhu'l-Qa'da/in the second week of June 1206, the brothers 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad and Jalāl al-Dīn 'Alī occupied Ghazna a second time, defeating Yildiz, who fled to Kurramān, only to be dislodged from here in turn by the Bāmiyān forces. Deflected from plundering Ghazna by Sulaymān b. Shīsh, the rulers of Bāmiyān compensated their troops from the treasure that Yildiz had earlier extracted from Mu'ayyad al-Mulk and which had now fallen into their hands. But the brothers shortly fell out over Mu'ayyad al-Mulk, whom each wished to appoint as his vizier and who was arrested [**p. 216**] and imprisoned by 'Alā' al-Dīn a fit of pique, while Jalāl al-Dīn left. From Ibn al-Athīr's account of this incident, it appears to have lost the princes of Bāmiyān much of their support among the people of Ghazna.[43] Yildiz was thus encouraged to make another bid to take over the city. The Ghūrī force in Kurramān was eliminated by a detachment under Aytegin, a former *ghulām* of Mu'izz al-Dīn, and towards the end of Dhu'l-Ḥijja/early in August 1206 Yildiz himself appeared before Ghazna and besieged 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām in the citadel. When Jalāl al-Dīn 'Alī came to his brother's assistance, he was routed and taken prisoner. After a four-month investment, 'Alā' al-Dīn was obliged to surrender by Yildiz's threat to massacre his captives. Most of his Ghūrī troops had already abandoned him and gone off to join Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd at Fīrūzkūh: one of the more distinguished among them was Sulaymān b. Shīsh, whose son had fallen in the encounter with Yildiz's forces in Kurramān; in Ṣafar 603/September–October 1206 he was appointed *amīr-i dād* at Fīrūzkūh.[44] Yildiz released 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad and his brother and allowed them to return to Bāmiyān; but they soon quarrelled, and 'Alā' al-Dīn left for Khwārazm, in a vain attempt to obtain the shah's intervention on his behalf.[45] For the time being, Yildiz's control of Ghazna was undisputed.

Our sources afford sporadic insights into the reasons why the various contenders won or lost support. It is possible that the stance initially taken by Sulaymān b. Shīsh at Ghazna echoes a feud that had developed between the Ghurid Sultans and the Shishanids some decades previously. Sulaymān's brother Abu'l-'Abbās had avenged the murder of a third brother by slaying Sultan Sayf al-Dīn Muḥammad in 558/1163, and had then been instrumental in Ghiyāth al-

---

[42] *Ibid.*, 12:145–6/221–2 (with SWRAN); see also his brief résumé of Yildiz's takeover in Ghazna at 12:153/231–2.

[43] *Ibid.*, 12:153–4/232–4.

[44] *Ibid.*, 12:155–6/234–6. There are briefer references to Yildiz's second seizure of Ghazna in *TN*, 1:390, 409 (tr. 433–4, 495), of which the latter gives the duration of the siege.

[45] *Ibid.*, 1:409–10 (tr. 495–6).

Dīn Muḥammad's succession. But Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Mu'izz al-Dīn had in turn encompassed the death of Abu'l-'Abbās.[46] Sulaymān had no cause, therefore, to love the late sultans, and his partisanship of Bahā' al-Dīn Sām could perhaps be seen as a more subtle form of revenge on them.

[p. 217] For Ibn al-Athīr the choice at Fīrūzkūh was all a matter of religious affiliation. In 595/1198–99 the court and military establishment there had been torn by a dispute between the Karāmī sect and the orthodox Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī schools, as a result of which Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad had abandoned the Karāmiyya for the Shāfi'iyya.[47] 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī 'Alī had championed the Karāmiyya on that occasion, and we are told that the people of Fīrūzkūh in 602/1206 rejected him partly because he was a Karāmī and they were Shāfi'īs: indeed, after his fall and imprisonment some of his amirs, also described as Karāmīs, were executed.[48] The leading antagonist of the Karāmiyya at Fīrūzkūh had been the scholar Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, who had meanwhile taken up residence at Mu'izz al-Dīn's court at Ghazna. He was now falsely accused of the sultan's murder by certain "mischief-makers" (*mufsidūn*) in that city, but escaped thanks to the protection of the vizier Mu'ayyad al-Mulk.[49] This suggests that similar religious considerations may have underlain the struggle for Ghazna, where the people were predominantly Ḥanafīs.[50] According to Ibn al-Athīr, Rāzī had arrived at Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad's court after leaving the service of Bahā' al-Dīn Sām,[51] and it is possible that the court at Bāmiyān, like most of the Ghūrīs, inclined towards the Karāmiyya. But this must remain a matter of conjecture.

Even taking into account these sectarian conflicts, however, the widespread popularity of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd is striking and is not easily explained. When he advanced on Fīrūzkūh, Maḥmūd, according to Jūzjānī, was joined by the Khalaj amirs of the Garmsīr with a numerous following. Their leader was doubtless the chief called Ismā'īl al-Khaljī, who according to Ibn al-Athīr won over a number of Ghūrī amirs.[52] It was a Ghūrī, the *sipāhsālār* Ḥasan-i 'Abd al-Malik *sar-i ẓarrād*, who commanded the squadron that brought back the fugitive 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī 'Alī.[53] One prominent element

---

[46] *Ibid.*, 1:351–2, 354–5 (tr. 366–7, 369–71).

[47] IA, 12:99–100/151–2, 101/154. On this episode, see Bosworth, "The early Islamic history", 129–32.

[48] IA, 12:147/223, 148/224; for his Karāmī sympathies, see also 12:99/151.

[49] *Ibid.*, 12:140/214. This episode is omitted in Anawati, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī".

[50] *TN*, 1:362 (tr. 384).

[51] IA, 12:99/151.

[52] *TN*, 1:373 (tr. 397). IA, 12:147–8/224.

[53] *TN*, 1:371 (tr. 394).

among the Ghūrīs was the Marghanī family, who had [**p. 218**] transferred to the Ghurids' service after the death of their previous master, Sulṭān Shāh, brother to the Khwārazmshāh Tekish, in 587/1191–92.[54] Muḥammad al-Marghanī and his brother, together with Muḥammad b. 'Uthmān al-Marghanī, are named among the amirs of Fīrūzkūh whom 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī 'Alī ordered to submit in 602/1206 but who within a few weeks went over to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd.[55] Ibn al-Athīr also names Sevinch the *amīr-i shikār*, Zangī b. Kharjūm and Ḥusayn al-Ghūrī, lord of Tigīnābād, among those who rallied to Maḥmūd's banner.[56] The list is significant, suggesting as it does that Maḥmūd could count on the allegiance of representatives of each of three distinct groupings in the Ghurid dominions: the Khalaj troops, Turkish *ghulām*s, and the Ghūrīs. There is a striking contrast with Maḥmūd's later opponent, 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad's son Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh, whose support was drawn mainly from the Kashī tribe, a recalcitrant people on the fringes of Ghūrī society, as it were, and ever ready to back dissident princes.[57]

In some measure Maḥmūd clearly benefited from the loyalty of many of the Ghurids' subjects to the son of their old sultan, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad; one of his first actions had been to appoint to the vizierate 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Muḥammad al-Kīdānī, who had been his father's vizier.[58] Perhaps also his character played a part. He gained a reputation as a convivial, pleasure-loving prince, much given to acts of generosity. He is also accused of lethargy and irresponsibility.[59] But there may have been more to Maḥmūd's character. Some energy and military skill can possibly be discerned behind Jūzjānī's laconic reference to his campaign against Marw in 601/1204.[60] Later he personally led the armies that defeated successive attempts on [**p. 219**] Fīrūzkūh by Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh and by 'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz (below, p. 223).[61] This testifies, perhaps, to Maḥmūd's capacity in the field.

---

[54] IA, 12:115/176. 'Umar al-Marghanī, governor of Herat for Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad, had defended the city against the Khwārazmshāh in 598/1202: *ibid.*, 11:252/384 and 12:108/164, 115–16/176; Juwaynī, 2:50–51 (tr. 318–19), giving him the *laqab* 'Izz al-Dīn. His daughter married the king of Sīstān: *TN*, 1:280 (tr. 193). His brother Ḥusayn fell fighting against the Khwarazmians at Qara-su in 600/1204: IA, 12:121–2/185–6.

[55] *Ibid.*, 12:147–8/223–4.

[56] *Ibid.*, 12:147/223, 224.

[57] *TN*, 1:371 (tr. 395). For the insubordinate character of the Kashīs, see also 1:348, 350 (tr. 361–2, 364).

[58] IA, 12:147/223; for the vizier, 12:148/224.

[59] *TN*, 1:372, 375–6 (tr. 396, 404–6). Juwaynī, 2:62 (tr. 328).

[60] *TN*, 1:373 (tr. 397).

[61] *Ibid.*, 1:371, 374, 380 (tr. 395, 399–400, 414).

The Vicissitudes of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd

The task confronting Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, that of asserting his authority over the rest of his father's and his uncle's empire, was a daunting one. Jūzjānī alleges not only that "the outlying parts (*aṭrāf*) of the kingdom of Ghūr, namely Gharchistān, Ṭāliqān, Gurzuwān, the territory of Qādis, and the Garmsīr", came under the control of his servitors, but that the *khuṭba* was made for him "throughout Ghūr, Ghazna and Hindūstān".[62] This is an overstatement. In India, it is true, his authority was in theory recognized by Muʿizz al-Dīn's *ghulām* lieutenant and commander of the Hindūstān forces, Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg. Troopers who held *iqṭāʿ*s from Aybeg, and who were with Muʿizz al-Dīn's army at the time of his assassination, were duly sent back to India by Mu'ayyad al-Mulk when he conveyed the sultan's bier to Ghazna,[63] so that Aybeg may have benefited from an increase in his military strength at this juncture. At any rate, he advanced from Delhi to Lahore and on 17 Dhu'l-Qaʿda/25 June 1206 set himself up as ruler there.[64] He seems to have been careful to act in Maḥmūd's name from the outset.[65]

At Ghazna it was a different matter. The regime of Bahā' al-Dīn Sām's sons was hostile, as might be expected. Jūzjānī's account suggests that Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh enjoyed the support of the Bāmiyān princes for his attempt on Fīrūzkūh, since he came from Ghazna and withdrew there on his defeat.[66] Another rival claimant who enjoyed the hospitality of the Bāmiyān rulers was the son of Jahānsūz, 'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz, whose daughter was married to 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām and who at some point (probably [**p. 220**] in the wake of the *débâcle* at Ghazna) left for Khwārazm to seek assistance in a bid for the throne of Fīrūzkūh.[67]

Yet if Ghazna under 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām was a haven for his enemies, Maḥmūd nevertheless failed to derive any substantial benefit from the transfer of the city to Yildiz. For a short time Yildiz affected to be representing Maḥmūd, from whom, he had assured Mu'ayyad al-Mulk and the Turks at the

---

62 *Ibid.*, 1:373 (tr. 398–9: at 398 Raverty reads "his slaves, such as ... Yalduz...", which is misleading).

63 IA, 12:140/214.

64 The date is in Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajara*, 32–3. *TN*, 1:417, has the 18th (but cf. tr. 525–6).

65 IA, 12:165/249.

66 *TN*, 1:371, 374 (tr. 395, 399).

67 *Ibid.*, 1:374, 380 (tr. 399, 414).

outset, he had received authorization to act as his lieutenant (*nā'ib*) in Ghazna.[68] Significantly, however, he had the *khuṭba* made there not for Maḥmūd but simply for the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Nāṣir. And on 16 Ramaḍān/26 April 1206, after moving against the pro-Bāmiyān party in the city, he showed his hand by proclaiming his own sovereignty at Ghazna in an assembly comprising the military commanders, the jurists, the *qāḍī*s, and the caliphal envoy Ibn al-Rabī'.[69] The Turks who supported Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd were chagrined, but they were quietened by a judicious distribution of *iqṭā'*s and gifts of money. Mu'ayyad al-Mulk agreed reluctantly to act as Yildiz's vizier. Various Ghūrī amirs obtained Yildiz's permission to leave, and made their way either to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd at Fīrūzkūh or to Bāmiyān.[70]

According to Ibn al-Athīr, Maḥmūd had written to Yildiz thanking him for dislodging the Bāmiyān princes from Ghazna on the first occasion, sent him a robe of honour, and requested him to strike coins and make the *khuṭba* in his name. Yildiz declined, and sought manumission, the style of "Malik", and a marriage alliance with the dynasty; this demand in turn was rejected by Maḥmūd.[71] Following his second victory over the rulers of Bāmiyān, Yildiz again wrote to Maḥmūd, forwarding their standards and some of his captives;[72] but he was clearly unprepared to acknowledge him as his sovereign. His response to Maḥmūd's renewed demand that he be mentioned in **[p. 221]** the *khuṭba* was to have the prayers read in his own name and to boast to the Ghurid Sultan of having won Ghazna by his own efforts.[73] At length, it seems, Maḥmūd decided to make the best of the situation. His despatch of a ceremonial parasol (*chatr*) and a deed of investiture (*mithāl*) entitling Yildiz to take possession of the Ghazna region, as reported by Jūzjānī, must have occurred immediately after this. Such appears to be the implication of Ibn al-Athīr, who adds that Maḥmūd now manumitted Yildiz and that the latter sent back the parasol.[74]

---

[68] IA, 12:141/215, 144/219. Echoes of this specious claim are found in *TN*, 1:412 (tr. 501–2).

[69] The qadi Majd al-Dīn Abū 'Alī Yaḥyā b. al-Rabī' b. Sulaymān al-Wāsiṭī, twice caliphal ambassador to the Ghurids. He had left Baghdad for Ghazna in Muḥarram 601/Sept. 1204 and was to die on 27 Dhu'l-Qa'da 606/23 May 1210: Ibn al-Sā'ī, *al-Jāmi'*, 9:143, 297–9. For his embassies to the Ghurids, see also *TN*, 1:301–2 (tr. 243). The obituary in IA, 12:190/288, ignores them and dates his death in Shawwāl 606/March–April 1210.

[70] *Ibid.*, 12:145–6/221–2.

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] *Ibid.*, 12:156/236.

[73] *Ibid.*, 12:163–4/247. Yildiz's coins bear the name of the late sultan Mu'izz al-Dīn as well as his own: Sourdel, *Inventaire*, 129–32.

[74] *TN*, 1:373 (tr. 398). IA, 12:164/248.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd's main problem, however, was Herat, whose governor, ʿIzz al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Kharmīl, had a history of duplicity. At the battle of Andkhūd in 601/1204 he had deserted Muʿizz al-Dīn and had been prevented from fleeing to Khwārazm only by the grant of the office of *amīr-ḥājib*.[75] When he learned of Muʿizz al-Dīn's assassination, he was reluctant to submit to the authority of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd and tried to extract oaths of allegiance from the populace against possible enemies, though they stipulated that Maḥmūd be excepted. While Ibn Kharmīl therefore played for time by corresponding with Maḥmūd, he appealed to the Khwārazmshāh, and Khwarazmian forces based at Nīshāpūr and other towns in Khurāsān were ordered to move to his assistance. Although warned of Ibn Kharmīl's double game by Ḥusām al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Abī ʿAlī, lord of Kālyūn, Maḥmūd was dissuaded from moving against Herat by some of his amirs, who counselled waiting on events.[76] When Ibn Kharmīl welcomed Khwarazmian troops into Herat, Maḥmūd retaliated by confiscating his *iqṭāʿ* of Gurzuwān.[77] But the army he sent against Herat was betrayed by Amīrān b. Qayṣar, who had been deprived of his *iqṭāʿ* of Ṭāliqān by Maḥmūd only to be then unaccountably placed in command of the van. Maḥmūd's forces were consequently ambushed and defeated by Ibn Kharmīl: the capture of the Khalaj chief Ismāʿīl may well have dealt the sultan a severe [**p. 222**] blow.[78] Maḥmūd would have advanced on Herat in person, but the news that ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām had recovered Ghazna led him to adopt a cautious posture.[79]

In the meantime the Khwārazmshāh's first move, on learning of Muʿizz al-Dīn's murder, had been against Balkh. Here again the role played by the simultaneous conflict over Ghazna further south was crucial. At first Balkh put up a strenuous resistance under its governor, the amir ʿImād al-Dīn ʿUmar b. al-Ḥusayn al-Fīwārī, who represented the rulers of Bāmiyān. When his brother ʿAlī Shāh failed to secure the submission of the city, the Khwārazmshāh in person arrived before Balkh in Dhu'l-Qaʿda/June–July 1206. The reinforcements ʿImād al-Dīn had expected from Bāmiyān did not materialize. Jalāl al-Dīn, who had been preparing to go to his aid, was diverted to Ghazna by his brother's appeal; and on the news that the Bāmiyān princes had been taken prisoner by Yildiz,

---

[75] *Ibid.*, 12:122/187. For his desertion, see also *TN*, 1:402 (tr. 474–5).

[76] IA, 12:148–9/224–6. This is presumably the person called Ḥusām al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī, lord of Fīwār and Kālyūn, by Jūzjānī: *TN*, 1:378, 379 (tr. 409, 412).

[77] IA, 12:149–50/226–7. *TN*, 1:402 (tr. 474–5), earlier refers to him as one of the maliks of "Juzurwān".

[78] IA, 12:149–51/226–8.

[79] *Ibid.*, 12:151/229. There is a brief account of the Khwarazmian takeover of Herat in Juwaynī, 2:62 (tr. 328–9).

ʿImād al-Dīn surrendered at the end of Rabīʿ I 603/beginning of October 1206.[80] Over the next few months, the Khwārazmshāh took Gurzuwān from Ḥusām al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Abī ʿAlī and Tirmid from ʿImād al-Dīn's son. At the same time ʿImād al-Dīn was arrested and sent to Khwārazm, and Balkh was conferred on Badr al-Dīn Chaghir.[81] From Tirmid the Khwārazmshāh moved to Maymana and Andkhūd and reduced Ṭāliqān, which was held by Maḥmūd's *amīr-i shikār* Sevinch. A bid to secure the submission of Ḥusām al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Abī ʿAlī at Kālyūn, however, failed, and the Khwārazmshāh retired to Herat in Jumādā I 603/December 1206.[82] Ibn Kharmīl had meanwhile obtained the surrender of Isfizār in Rabīʿ I/October–November, and had induced the malik of Sīstān to make the *khuṭba* in the name of the Khwārazmshāh.[83]

The Khwarazmian advance must have been a bitter blow to the [**p. 223**] successor of the two men who had devoted their last years to checking it. But Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd was prepared to turn the situation to good account. When the Khwārazmshāh wrote to propose a marriage alliance and offered to help him wrest Ghazna from Yildiz in return for a share of its revenues, he agreed. Whether the offer was sincere is unclear; but in any case no aid was forthcoming, since the Khwārazmshāh was distracted by the need to intervene in a succession struggle in Māzandarān.[84] At some point in the year 604/1207–1208 he was to make peace with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd on the basis of their existing territorial possessions in Khurāsān, in order to concentrate on his war against the Qara-Khitan. Maḥmūd then finally recognized Khwarazmian overlordship and acquiesced, presumably, in Ibn Kharmīl's position as the shah's viceroy in Herat.[85] It was presumably prior to this settlement that Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd was called upon to repulse an attempt by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Atsiz b. Ḥusayn to take Fīrūzkūh with Khwarazmian assistance;[86] though we cannot

---

[80] IA, 12:151–2/229–30; cf. also 12:156/235. For a less detailed account of the submission of ʿImād al-Dīn, called "the chief amir of Bāmiyān", see Juwaynī, 2:63–4 (tr. 329–30).

[81] IA, 12:152–3/230–31. Juwaynī, 2:64 (tr. 330–31). The Khwarazmian commander's name is *ṣaqir* ("blue", "blue-grey"): Clauson, *An etymological dictionary*, 409.

[82] IA, 12:162/245–6. For Ṭāliqān, see also Juwaynī, 2:64–5 (tr. 331).

[83] IA, 12:163/246. Juwaynī, 2:65 (tr. 331), says that the malik attended the Khwārazmshāh's court.

[84] IA, 12:164/248; for the death of the ruler of Māzandarān, and subsequent developments, in 603/1206–1207, see 12:166/251. The more contemporary Ibn Isfandiyār, *Taʾrīkh-i Ṭabaristān*, 2:171, dates the death of the ruler, Ḥusām al-Dīn Ardashīr, in 602/1205–1206.

[85] IA, 12:172/260. Juwaynī, 2:65–6 (tr. 332), dating the Shah's return to Khwārazm in Jumādā II of an unspecified year: in 604, this month would have begun on 23 Dec. 1207.

[86] *TN*, 1:374 (tr. 399): the invasion is dated two and a half years into Maḥmūd's reign, i.e. at the turn of 604–605/in the summer of 1208.

discount the possibility that the episode represented a breach of the treaty by the shah.

Ibn Kharmīl did not long enjoy the fruits of his treachery towards the Ghurids. While the Khwārazmshāh was preparing for his attack on the Qara-Khitan, his officers encountered opposition from Ibn Kharmīl, who wrote to him to complain about the treatment of the peasants of Herat by Khwarazmian troops. A force was sent to Herat under 'Izz al-Dīn *Childeg b. Toghril. Ibn Kharmīl was treacherously arrested, and executed when his vizier thereupon barricaded the city against the Khwarazmians. But despite the arrival of reinforcements, *Childeg was unable to take Herat; and when news arrived from Transoxiana that the Khwārazmshāh had been defeated and captured by the Qara-Khitan, the besieging army scattered. It was not until the Khwārazmshāh's release and his appearance in Khurāsān in person in 605/1208–1209 that the campaign was resumed [**p. 224**] and after an eleven-month investment Herat finally passed under his direct government.[87]

The Second Struggle for Ghazna

The news of possible military cooperation between Maḥmūd and the formidable Khwārazmshāh had alarmed Yildiz, who occupied Tigīnābād and Bust and had the *khuṭba* for Maḥmūd there discontinued. At the same time he wrote to both Ibn Kharmīl and the malik of Sīstān, ordering them also to end the *khuṭba* for Maḥmūd and threatening to attack them.[88] That he had already invaded Sīstān once we know from the indigenous chronicle tradition, which briefly describes Yildiz's devastation of the country *sub anno* 602/1206.[89] Jūzjānī, who omits any mention of Yildiz's recalcitrance towards the sultan at Fīrūzkūh, believed – or

---

[87] IA, 12:172–6/260–66. The Khwarazmian commander's name, spelled JLDK by IA, seems to be *çildeg*, "an ulcer which forms on the chest of a horse": Clauson, *An etymological dictionary*, 419. For the duration of the siege, see *TN*, 1:307, and 2:121 (tr. 259, 1038); though Jūzjānī confuses this campaign with the Khwārazmshāh's earlier expedition to Herat at Ibn Kharmīl's invitation, and hence follows it with the attack on Balkh (above). The chronology in Juwaynī, 2:66 (tr. 333), is also confused here, since he has Ibn Kharmīl (who was already dead) intriguing with the Ghurid Maḥmūd in the wake of rumours of the Khwārazmshāh's capture. But at 2:70–71 (tr. 337), he dates the Khwārazmshāh's arrival at Shadyākh, on his way to Herat, on 11 Ramaḍān 604/30 March 1208, which would place the city's fall squarely in 605/1208–1209. For Ibn Kharmīl's execution and the subsequent resistance of his vizier, see *ibid.*, 2:67–9 (tr. 334–6). The date 604, which is also given in the anonymous *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*, 392 (tr. 366), is accepted by Barthold, *Turkestan*, 359, 361–2.

[88] IA, 12:164/248–9.

[89] Anonymous, *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*, 392 (tr. 366). *TN*, 1:413 (tr. 503–4). Bosworth, *The history of the Saffarids*, 401–2.

intended his readers to believe – that these operations were mounted on behalf of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd.[90]

At this juncture, however, Yildiz found his power jeopardized by a major coalition of his enemies. Following his second capture of Ghazna, he had sent off Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Sām to recover his throne, which had been usurped during his captivity by an uncle or a cousin;[91] Jalāl al-Dīn was escorted by a force under Aytegin, Yildiz's [**p. 225**] *muqṭaʿ* of Kābul, who was under orders to assist him. But Aytegin left the prince and made for Kābul. Here he entered into correspondence with Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg, whom Maḥmūd had manumitted at the same time as Yildiz and who had occupied Peshawar, evidently in preparation for hostilities with Yildiz.[92] Aybeg urged Aytegin to attack Ghazna, and also wrote to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, advising him to accept the Khwārazmshāh's demands for the present until the problem of Yildiz had been dealt with. Yildiz himself had been forewarned, however, and had sent word to his lieutenants, so that when Aytegin reached Ghazna on 1 Rajab 603/1 February 1207 the citadel held out and he was able to do no more than plunder the city and make the *khuṭba* for Maḥmūd. Yildiz, covering himself by the reinstatement of Maḥmūd's name in the prayers at Tigīnābād, now hurried back to Ghazna, and Aytegin withdrew to Tamurān in Ghūr, whence he sent Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd a portion of the treasure he had looted. In return Maḥmūd manumitted him and conferred upon him the style of chief amir (*malik al-umarāʾ*). Reinforcements were sent to Aytegin, and Maḥmūd himself reoccupied Bust and the neighbouring region.[93]

The outcome of this struggle is unknown. It is evidently to be distinguished from a subsequent clash between Yildiz and Aybeg, which is referred to by Jūzjānī. His description of this conflict as originating over Lahore suggests that Yildiz claimed authority over Muʿizz al-Dīn's territories east of the Indus as well as Ghazna, and that he endeavoured to enforce his claim by invading Aybeg's principality. The engagement was fought somewhere near the Panjāb:

---

[90] *TN*, 1:412–13 (tr. 503).

[91] Both IA, 12:161–2/244–5, and *TN*, 1:390–92 (tr. 434, 435–7), speak of the seizure of Bāmiyān by an uncle. The former calls him ʿAbbās (saying earlier, 12:142/217, that he had briefly occupied the throne on the death of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, but had been displaced by Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Muʿizz al-Dīn in favour of their nephew Bahāʾ al-Dīn Sām); Jūzjānī names him as ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Masʿūd. But since IA, 12:165/249, says that Yildiz gave Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAlī aid against a cousin (*ibn ʿamm*), we appear to be dealing with two separate episodes.

[92] IA, 12:164/248. Aytegin's name is spelled 'YDKZ in error throughout, but is clearly *ay*, "moon", and *tegin*, "prince": Sauvaget, "Noms et surnoms", 40 (no. 41). Ḥasan-i Niẓāmī, *Tāj al-Maʾāthir*, fol. 210b, confirms that Aybeg's authority was acknowledged at Peshawar after Yildiz's defeat (*baʿd az inhizām-i malik tāj al-dīn*).

[93] IA, 12:164–6/249–51.

Yildiz was defeated, and Aybeg was able to advance on Ghazna and occupy the city. But after a period of forty days devoted, if we are to believe Jūzjānī, exclusively to revelry, he was obliged to retire when Yildiz was invited back by "the Turks of Ghaznīn and the Mu'izzī *malik*s".[94] This episode seems to belong to 605/1208–1209, for Jūzjānī **[p. 226]** speaks elsewhere of Aybeg's advance to Ghazna and his despatch of a certain Niẓām al-Dīn Muḥammad as envoy to Fīrūzkūh in that year: Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd responded by sending a scarlet *chatr* and a diploma investing Aybeg with the government of India.[95] Two years later, in 607/1210–11, Aybeg died in an accident while playing polo (*chawgān*) at Lahore. The lack of any evidence for campaigns against the independent Hindu powers during his four-year reign[96] may well indicate either residual designs on Ghazna or a continuing reluctance to expose his capital to incursions by Yildiz. After Aybeg's death Yildiz no longer had to fear any attempt on Ghazna from the east. He and Nāṣir al-Dīn Qubacha, another former slave of Mu'izz al-Dīn who controlled the lower and middle Indus valley, disputed Lahore;[97] while Aybeg's own *ghulām* Iltutmish, who now set himself up as ruler at Delhi, was ready to acknowledge Yildiz's authority and accepted from him a *chatr* and a *dūrbāsh*.[98]

The Khwarazmian Conquest of Ghūr and Ghazna

The year in which Aybeg died also saw the death of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd. He had for some months been host to the fugitive Khwarazmian prince 'Alī Shāh, whose activities during the Khwārazmshāh's captivity in Transoxiana had aroused his brother's anger.[99] The account of what followed as given by Ibn al-Athīr lacks detail: he says simply that the Khwarazmian general Amīn Malik was sent against Fīrūzkūh, that Maḥmūd asked for quarter, and that he and 'Alī Shāh were arrested and put to death on the Khwārazmshāh's orders.[100] Since this appears both to telescope events that transpired over several months

---

[94] *TN*, 1:412, 413–14, 417 (tr. 503, 506, 526–8).

[95] *Ibid.*, 1:373 (tr. 398). The printed text has "Ghūr, Ghaznīn and Hindūstān", but B.L. ms. Add. 26,189, fol. 152a, reads simply *bi-ḍabṭ-i mamālik-i Hind.*

[96] Hardy, "Dihlī Sultanate", 260. Jackson, "Ḳuṭb al-Dīn Aybak".

[97] *TN*, 1:418, 419 (tr. 530, 532).

[98] *Ibid.*, 1:444 (tr. 607). For his name, see Digby, "Iletmish". For the *dūrbāsh*, "the mace or club used as an emblem of military dignity", see Burton-Page, "Dūrbāsh", where it is stated in error, however, that the earliest mention of it in Muslim India is found in Amīr Khusraw's *Nuh Sipihr* (718/1318); also Hodivala, *Studies*, 1:375.

[99] IA, 12:174–6/263–5.

[100] *Ibid.*, 12:176/266–7.

and to confuse Maḥmūd with his son and successor, Jūzjānī's version is to be preferred. According to that author, 'Alī Shāh arrived at Fīrūzkūh four years after Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd's **[p. 227]** accession (i.e. in 606/1209–10), only to be imprisoned at the Khwārazmshāh's instigation.[101] 'Alī Shāh's followers, frustrated that their pleas for his release were ignored, assassinated Maḥmūd in his palace (*qaṣr*) on the night of Tuesday 7 Ṣafar 607/31 July 1210.[102] Not long into the brief reign of Maḥmūd's infant son Bahā' al-Dīn Sām, the Khwarazmian army appeared before Fīrūzkūh in a second bid to instal 'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz. 'Alī Shāh was therefore set free by the Ghūrīs and took charge of the defence of Fīrūzkūh, which fell, however, on Friday 15 Jumādā I/4 Nov. 1210. 'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz was enthroned as sultan, while 'Alī Shāh escaped and made for Ghazna.[103]

With the establishment of a pro-Khwarazmian regime in Fīrūzkūh, Ghazna became the main focus of opposition to the Khwārazmshāh. Yildiz had already begun to secure allies for himself. When releasing the rulers of Bāmiyān, he had made a compact with them (*har dū-rā 'ahd dād*); and it was in fact Jalāl al-Dīn 'Alī b. Sām who alerted him to Aytegin's projected revolt.[104] 'Alī Shāh was doubtless welcome at Ghazna as a counterweight to the Khwārazmshāh's pretensions, and is said to have remained there some time, until induced to leave Ghazna by overtures from his brother: he thereupon rejoined the Khwarazmian forces, but was treacherously put to death at Tigīnābād in 609/1212–13.[105] From Ghazna Yildiz also engaged in hostilities with the puppet regime at Fīrūzkūh headed by 'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz. His first efforts were attended by failure, when his vizier Mu'ayyad al-Mulk Sajzī, moving against Fīrūzkūh with an army, was defeated in the region of Kīdān and Margh-i Nūla.[106] Then in 610/1213–14 Yildiz sent another army, under the command of his *amīr-i shikār*, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ḥusayn. Atsiz was killed and the Ghazna forces were able to occupy Fīrūzkūh.[107] Initially a Ghūrī malik, Ḥusām **[p. 228]** al-Dīn Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Malik *sar-i zarrād*, was put

---

[101] *TN*, 1:305, 374–5 (tr. 253, 400, 402–3). Juwaynī, 2:85 (tr. 352), says that he arrived during the Khwārazmshāh's campaign against the Qara-Khitan, i.e. early in 607, *ibid.*, 2:76 (tr. 344).

[102] *TN*, 1:376–7 (tr. 406–7). IA dates Maḥmūd's death in 605, which is too early; Juwaynī, 2:85 (tr. 352), in 609, which is too late. In the B.L. ms Add. 26,189 of *TN*, fols 153b etc., as in the printed edition, the year appears consistently as 607.

[103] *TN*, 1:378–9 (tr. 409–11); this episode is abridged in 'Alī Shāh's biography at 1:305–6 (tr. 253).

[104] *Ibid.*, 1:409 (tr. 495), for the compact. IA, 12:165/250, for Jalāl al-Dīn 'Alī's warning to Yildiz.

[105] *TN*, 1:306 (tr. 253).

[106] *Ibid.*, 1:380–81 (tr. 415).

[107] *Ibid.*, 1:381, 382 (tr. 415–16, 417): at 1:382 the printed text gives as the year "610 or 611", but B.L. ms. Add. 26,189, fol. 155a, has simply 610.

in control, but not long afterwards Yildiz reinstated as ruler at Fīrūzkūh ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī, whom his troops had freed from confinement in Ashiyār and sent to Ghazna.[108]

If the new ruler was intended to act as a bulwark against Khwarazmian expansion, the expedient was a failure, for ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad held the throne for little more than a year before surrendering Fīrūzkūh to the Khwārazmshāh in 612/1215–16.[109] During this period, Khwarazmian pressure on the Ghurids had mounted steadily. In *c.* 610/1213–14 the Khwārazmshāh annexed Bāmiyān and put to death Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Sām.[110] Parts of Gharchistān were held for a time after the death of Atsiz by his two elder sons, who were put to death by the Khwārazmshāh's agents at the instigation of the governor of Herat, Amīn Malik; but at what point we are not told.[111] The shah was now free to turn his attention towards Ghazna. According to Ibn al-Athīr, he was treacherously invited into the city during Yildiz's absence by one of the latter's officers, a former *ghulām* of Muʿizz al-Dīn named Qutlughtegin, whose only reward was execution. Jūzjānī says nothing of this, but his briefer account does suggest that Yildiz was currently away on campaign in India. Bereft of his capital, Yildiz moved into the Panjāb, where he wrested Lahore from Qubacha; but as he pushed east he was defeated on 3 Shawwāl 612/25 January 1216 by his erstwhile subordinate, Iltutmish, the ruler of Delhi, imprisoned and later put to death.[112] His tomb at Badāʾūn became a place of pilgrimage according to Jūzjānī, who does not explain why;[113] but it is possible that Yildiz was remembered as the Khwārazmshāh's principal opponent in the region.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī was treated with honour in Khwārazm, where he died some years later.[114] A number of the last Ghurids remained in captivity there until the Mongol onslaught. [p. 229] Jūzjānī implies that ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām died following the capture of Bāmiyān,[115] but according to Nasawī he was put to death later, on the orders of the Khwārazmshāh's mother Terken Khātūn when she evacuated Ürgench and fled before the

---

[108] *Ibid.*, 1:382 (tr. 417–18).

[109] *Ibid.*, 1:382–3 (tr. 418–19).

[110] *Ibid.*, 1:309, 391 (tr. 266–7, 434). Jalāl al-Dīn is credited with a reign of seven years at Bāmiyān, i.e. presumably dating from 603 when he and his brother were released by Yildiz and he wrested Bāmiyān from his uncle (above and n. 91).

[111] *TN*, 1:381–2, to be corrected from B.L. ms Add. 26,189, fol. 155a (see also tr., 416–17).

[112] *Ibid.*, 1:309, 413, 445 (tr. 267, 505–6, 608). IA, 12:202–3/309–12. The account given by Juwaynī, 2:85 (tr. 353), appears garbled.

[113] *TN*, 1:413 (tr. 506).

[114] *Ibid.*, 1:383 (tr. 419).

[115] *Ibid.*, 1:410 (tr. 496).

Mongols in 616/1219–20. The same fate befell the sons of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, Bahā' al-Dīn Sām, who as a boy had briefly reigned at Fīrūzkūh in 607/1210, and his brother Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad.[116] The Shansabanid prince of Mādīn, Shihāb al-Dīn 'Alī b. Sūrī b. Muḥammad, had been put to death by the Khwarazmians when they took Fīrūzkūh, where he was at that time imprisoned.[117] But at least one member of the dynasty, his brother Nāṣir al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Sūrī, is known to have survived and obtained asylum in Delhi.[118]

The Downfall of the Dynasty: An Assessment

In assessing the reasons for the collapse of the Ghurid empire, some credit should be given to the Khwārazmshāh's diplomatic acumen. Even during the lifetime of Mu'izz al-Dīn he had made an agreement with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd that each would regard the other's enemies as his own,[119] and at the fall of Nīshāpūr in 596/1199–1200 had extracted an oath from 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī 'Alī not to take up arms against him at any time.[120] These mortgages were each called in at a critical juncture, securing first the incarceration of his brother 'Alī Shāh and then the surrender of Fīrūzkūh itself in 612/1215–16. It may be no accident, either, that the shah's final moves against the Ghurids occurred only after he [**p. 230**] had repudiated the overlordship of the heathen Qara-Khitan and could thus pose as an exponent of the *jihād*.[121]

But the Ghurid polity was intrinsically vulnerable. It was easy for an external rival to profit from the disputes among Mu'izz al-Dīn's kinsmen and his *ghulāms*, so that the kingdom of Sīstān, for instance, was soon detached from the Ghurid sphere of influence and providing troops instead for the Khwārazmshāh.[122] In his operations, the shah was sometimes able to capitalize on events elsewhere

---

[116] *Ibid.*, 1:379 (tr. 412); for the brother's name, see 1:377 (tr. 408). For the deaths of all the Ghurid princes held captive in Khwārazm, see also Nasawī, Pers. tr., 57; Houdas' Arabic text, 39 (tr. 66), here omits the sons of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, though their captivity is mentioned earlier (21, tr. 37).

[117] He is known to have been imprisoned there following the murder of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd: *TN*, 1:377 (tr. 408). *Ibid.*, 1:339 (tr. 344), Jūzjānī speaks of his death "at the hands of the Turks of Khwārazm at the time of their conquest", which could well refer to the point at which 'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz and his allies took over Fīrūzkūh in 607/1210.

[118] *TN*, 1:340 (tr. 345): he is listed among the *malik*s of Sultan Iltutmish at 1:451 (tr. 626).

[119] *Ibid.*, 1:374 (tr. 400–402).

[120] *Ibid.*, 1:382 (tr. 418); for the surrender of Nīshāpūr, see 1:370 (tr. 393).

[121] See Barthold, *Turkestan*, 353 ff.

[122] Bosworth, *The history of the Saffarids*, 401–2.

in the Ghurid dominions, for instance the embarrassments of the rulers of Bāmiyān. We are told that in 603/1206–1207 he had actually abandoned the siege of Balkh and was withdrawing when he learned of their capture by Yildiz, of which he duly, and with some relish, notified their lieutenant ʿImād al-Dīn. Again, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd would have advanced on Herat late in 602/in mid 1206 had it not been for the recovery of Ghazna by his Bāmiyān rivals.[123] We should also not forget the notoriously refractory character of the Ghūrī clans: Jūzjānī remarks that every year one district or another would rebel and withhold revenue, right down to the end of the Ghurid regime.[124] This may have cost the government at Fīrūzkūh resources which were vital for its capacity to mount an effective resistance.

The conflicts among the Ghurids' supporters did not necessarily pit Ghūrī and Tājīk against Turk. At Fīrūzkūh, as we have seen (pp. 217–18), Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd won the support of both groups. By the time Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh attacked Fīrūzkūh, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd may well have taken steps to reduce his dependence on the Ghūrīs, since Jūzjānī seems to draw a distinction between his forces and the vanquished "Ghūrīs" led by his opponent.[125] In this connection, the fact that Maḥmūd purchased and promoted numerous Turkish slaves, as his uncle Muʿizz al-Dīn had done, is surely significant.[126] Yet after his death Jūzjānī depicts "the Ghūrī and Turkish amirs" as gathering in unison around the throne of his infant son; though the *ghulām*s were a turbulent group and put to death or imprisoned a number of Ghurid princes (includ **[p. 231]** ing Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh himself) whom they saw as a danger to their new master.[127]

On the other hand, Ghūrī amirs are found supporting the Khwarazmians and their clients, and there is strong evidence that many of them accepted the shah's rule. He employed a leading Ghūrī amir, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Bashīr, to win over the Ghurids' adherents at Balkh by peaceful means and later to oversee the murder of ʿAlī Shāh.[128] When Fīrūzkūh fell to Atsiz and his Khwarazmian allies in 607/1210, Jūzjānī indicates that those who commanded the hill-tops at Fīrūzkūh were left unharmed. This must include ʿUthmān al-Marghanī the *sar-i jāndār* and Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. ʿAlī b. Abī ʿAlī, a member of another distinguished Ghūrī clan, the "Bāʿalīs", since these amirs are named among

---

123 IA, 12:151–2/229–30.

124 *TN*, 1:333 (tr. 334).

125 *Ibid.*, 1:371 (tr. 395); cf. also 1:374 (tr. 399).

126 *Ibid.*, 1:375–6 (tr. 405).

127 *Ibid.*, 1:371–2, 377 (tr. 395–6, 408).

128 IA, 12:151/229. Juwaynī, 2:85 (tr. 353).

the defenders.[129] Both are shortly found in the service of Atsiz, commanding the right wing in the battle with the Ghazna forces in 611/1214–15.[130] Later, the Khwārazmshāh deputed a group of Ghūrī amirs to serve under his son Rukn al-Dīn "Ghūrīshānastī" in newly conquered Iraq,[131] and at the time of the Mongol onslaught he relied considerably on Ghūrīs in arranging for the defence both of Ghūr itself and of Transoxiana. The amirs commissioned by the Khwārazmshāh with the task of garrisoning and setting in order the fortresses of Ghūr were Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan "Bā'alī" and the Ḥasan-i 'Abd al-Malik *sar-i ẓarrād* who had earlier served Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd (p. 217).[132] Ghūrī amirs and their troops are mentioned among the garrison of Samarqand in Muḥarram 617/March–April 1220: they included Zangī b. Kharjūm, who had rallied to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd in 602/1206.[133] Even Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Alī Kharpūst, who had held out **[p. 232]** against the Khwarazmian forces for ten years in a fortress near Ṭāliqān, was subsequently appointed to the *iqṭā'* of Peshawar and is found in the service of the shah's son Jalāl al-Dīn at the time of the Mongol invasion.[134] We are left with the impression that powerful elements in Ghūr knew when to change sides and that the shah was ready to recruit them.

Such a pattern of fickle allegiances may have been repeated a decade after the fall of the Ghurid dynasty. When the Khwarazmian empire was reeling from the Mongol invasion, the activities of Ghūrī elements may have served further to undermine it. Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Kharpūst now seized control of Ghazna, an action seen at the time as the prelude to a Ghūrī revolt against the

---

[129] *TN*, 1:378 (tr. 410), for the amirs named; 1:379 for their survival (tr., 412, "escaped in safety", for *ba-salāmat bimāndand*, is slightly misleading). Quṭb al-Dīn's name is given as Ḥusayn in the printed text and by Raverty, but appears consistently throughout B.L. ms. Add. 26,189 as Ḥasan. He later served the Delhi Sultans. Jūzjānī employs the *nisba* "Ba'alī" for his cousin 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī: *TN*, 2:132 (tr. 1056). Raverty read it as "Ba'lamī", but the mss. give clearly B'LY. There is a parallel formation, "Bāhalīm", from "Bū Hālīm": *ibid.*, 1:241–2 (tr. 110); Bosworth, *The later Ghaznavids*, 102.

[130] *TN*, 1:381 (tr. 416).

[131] *Ibid.*, 1:309, 314 (tr. 266, 282).

[132] *Ibid.*, 2:110–11, 135 (tr. 1002–3, 1063).

[133] *Ibid.*, 1:312, and 2:107 (tr. 274, 979–80). Nasawī, Arabic text, ed. Houdas, 36 (tr. 62–3; tr. Buniiatov, 81, incorrectly punctuated), and Persian trans., ed. Mīnuwī, 54, including among them "the son of 'Izz al-Dīn K.t": regrettably there is a lacuna in the B.L. ms. Or. 5,662 (between fols 15 and 16) at this point, but the name looks suspiciously like "Kart" (see below and n.138). IA, 12:147/223, for Zangī b. Kharjūm's joining Maḥmūd.

[134] *TN*, 2:110, 116 (tr. 1002, 1013); for the grant see *ibid.*, 1:315 (tr. 285–6).

Khwārazmshāh.[135] Shortly afterwards, Ghazna was occupied by another group of Ghūrīs headed by A'ẓam Malik, allegedly the son of the one-time ruler of Balkh, 'Imād al-Dīn, although they made a timely submission to prince Jalāl al-Dīn on his arrival.[136] One particular Ghūrī clan was to carve out a distinguished path for itself on the ruins of the Ghurid and Khwarazmian empires. This was a branch of the Marghanī family, which we have already encountered. In 622–3/1225–26 Jūzjānī travelled on a series of missions for Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Uthmān al-Marghanī, the commander of Khaysār,[137] who at this late date can only have held the fortress on behalf of the Mongols. He was in all probability the amir listed among Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd's supporters in 602/1206 and the son of the above-mentioned *sar-i jāndār* 'Uthmān. There is good reason to believe that he was also the father of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, founder of the Kartid dynasty which reigned at Herat from the 1240s until its destruction by Temür in [**p. 233**] 791/1389. Shams al-Dīn's genealogy varies in the sources;[138] but this possibility, first suggested by Raverty, finds corroboration in a source of which he was unaware. According to Waṣṣāf, writing towards the end of the 7th/13th century, Shams al-Dīn alleged in a petition to the Mongol *qaghan* Möngke that his family had governed Khaysār and Ghūr by virtue of a diploma (*yarligh*) from Chinggis Khan.[139] That Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad and his

---

[135] Juwaynī, 2:192–3 (tr. 460–61). Nasawī, ed. Houdas, Arabic text, 79 (tr. 132; tr. Buniiatov, 123). The account in *TN*, 2:116 (tr. 1012–13), is briefer. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 440, thought the charge groundless.

[136] Juwaynī, 2:195 (tr. 462–3). *TN*, 2:117 (tr. 1015–16). There is evidently some confusion regarding this A'ẓam Malik, whom Nasawī, ed. Houdas, Arabic text, 21, 80 (tr. 37, 134; tr. Buniiatov, 65, 124), twice refers to among the captive princes in Khwārazm (though on the first occasion calling him the son of "Tāj al-Dīn"). It is therefore conceivable that we are here dealing with a different person.

[137] *TN*, 1:285, 297, and 2:122, 135, 183–5 (tr. 201, 233, 1039, 1061–2, 1198–1205); cf. also 2:104 (tr. 967).

[138] For the dynasty, see Haig and Spuler, "Kart". Their ancestry is discussed in a note to Ḥabībī's edition of the *TN* (1:280) and in a long and confused note to Raverty's translation (1198–1200 n. 8). The earliest extant chronicler of Herat, Sayfī, 140–41, makes Shams al-Dīn the son of Rukn al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. 'Izz al-Dīn 'Umar, but also mentions, 144–5, a Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Tāj al-Dīn 'Uthmān. Abū Bakr was surely the Abū Bakr Marghanī (? Marjaqī in the text) who was installed by the Mongols alongside their own representative following their first capture of Herat in 1220 (*ibid.*, 71, 72–6), and the son of the 'Izz al-Dīn 'Umar who had governed the city at an earlier date (above, n.54). For yet another genealogy, which makes Shams al-Dīn's father Rukn al-Dīn Abū Bakr the son of a certain Sanjar and the maternal grandson of 'Uthmān Marghanī, see Faṣīḥ-i Khwāfī, *Mujmal*, 3:102.

[139] Waṣṣāf, lithograph ed., 81/ed. and tr. Hammer-Purgstall, 1:163 (tr. 154). This section of Waṣṣāf's work forms part of the first book, which was completed in 698/1298–29: lithograph ed., 25/ed. Hammer-Purgstall, 1:50 (tr. 48–9).

father 'Uthmān may thus have served three different regimes in turn – the last of them heathen and Islam's deadly enemy – should not perhaps surprise us. In the first quarter or so of the 7th/13th century the loyalties of these Ghūrī chiefs were in a constant state of flux.

Abbreviations used

B.L.	British Library
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal*
EI²	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. (Brill: Leiden, 1954– in progress)
IA	Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi'l-Ta'rīkh*
TN	Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*

Bibliography

Anawati, G.C., "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *EI²*.

Anonymous, *Ta'rīkh-i Sīstān*, ed. Malik al-Shu'arā' Bahār, Tehran, 1332/1914; tr. L.P. Smirnova, *Istoriia Sistana*, Pamiatniki pis'mennosti vostoka, 42, Moscow, 1974.

'Aziz Ahmad, Muhammad, *Political history and institutions of the early Turkish empire of Delhi (1206–1290 A.D.)*, Lahore, 1949; repr.: New Delhi, 1972.

Baranī, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, ed. S.A. Khán, Calcutta, 1861–62.

Barthold, W., *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, 3rd ed. by C.E. Bosworth, London, 1968.

Bivar, A.D.H., "Naghar and Īryāb: two little known Islamic sites of the north-west frontier of Afghanistan and Pakistan", *Iran* 24 (1986), 131–8.

Bosworth, C.E., "The early Islamic history of Ghur", *CAJ* 6 (1961), 116–33; repr. in his *The medieval history of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*, London, 1977.

---------, "Ghūrids", *EI²*.

---------, *The history of the Saffarids of Sistan and the Maliks of Nimruz (247/861–949/1542–3)*, Costa Mesa, California, and New York, 1994.

---------, "Khaladj, i. History", *EI²*.

---------, *The later Ghaznavids: splendour and decay. The dynasty in Afghanistan and northern India 1040–1186*, Edinburgh, 1977.

---------, "Nangrahār, Ningrahār", *EI²*.

---------, "Political and dynastic history of the Iranian world (A.D. 1000–1217)", in J.A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, v. *The Saljuq and Mongol periods*, Cambridge, 1968.

---------, and Clauson, Sir Gerard, "Al-Xwārazmī on the peoples of Central Asia", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1965), 2–12; repr. in Bosworth, *The medieval history of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*, London, 1977.

Burton-Page, J., "Dūrbāsh", *EI²*.

Clauson, Sir Gerard, *An etymological dictionary of pre-thirteenth-century Turkish*, Oxford, 1972.

Crone, Patricia, *Roman, provincial and Islamic law*, Cambridge, 1987.

Digby, Simon, "Iletmish or Iltutmish? A reconsideration of the name of the Dehlī Sultan", *Iran* 8 (1970), 57–64.

Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajarat al-Ansāb*, partial ed. Sir E. Denison Ross, *Ta'rīkh* [*sic*]*-i Fakhru'd-dín Mubárakshāh*, London, 1927.

Faṣīḥ-i Khwāfī, *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, ed. Maḥmūd Farrukh, 3 vols., Tehran, 1339–41 Sh./1960–62.

Forand, P.G., "The relation of the slave and the client to the master or patron in medieval Islam", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971), 59–66.

Habib, Irfan, "Formation of the Sultanate ruling class of the thirteenth century", in Habib, I. (ed.), *Medieval India I: researches in the history of India 1200–1750*, Oxford and Delhi, 1992, 1–21.

Habib, Mohammad, and Nizami, Khaliq Ahmad (eds.), *The Delhi Sultanat (A.D. 1206–1526)*, A comprehensive history of India, v, New Delhi, 1970.

Habibullah, A.B.M., *The foundation of Muslim rule in India*, 2nd ed. Allahabad, 1961.

Haig, T.W., and Spuler, B., "Kart", *EI²*.

Hardy, P., "Dihlī Sultanate", *EI²*.

Ḥasan-i Niẓāmī al-Nīshāpūrī, *Tāj al-Ma'āthir*, India Office Library ms. 15 (Ethé, no. 210).

Hodivala, S.H., *Studies in Indo-Muslim history*, 2 vols., Bombay, 1939–57.

Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi'l-Ta'rīkh*, ed. C.J. Tornberg, Leiden, 1851-63; repr. Beirut, 1385-6/1965–6, with different pagination [references are given to both printings, in that order].

Ibn al-Sā'ī, *al-Jāmi' al-Mukhtaṣar*, ed. Muṣṭafā Jawād and Anastase Marie de St. Elie, Baghdad, 1353/1934.

Ibn Isfandiyār, *Ta'rīkh-i Ṭabaristān*, ed. 'Abbās Iqbāl, Tehran, n.d.

Jackson, Peter, "Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols and the Khwarazmian conquest of the Panjāb and Sind", *Iran* 28 (1990), 45–54.

---------, "Ḳuṭb al-Dīn Aybak", *EI²*.

Juwaynī, 'Alā' al-Dīn Aṭā Malik, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, 3 vols., Leiden and London, 1912–37; tr. J.A. Boyle, *The history of the World-conqueror*, 2 vols. with continuous pagination, Manchester, 1958.

Jūzjānī, Minhāj-i Sirāj, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, 2nd ed. 'Abd al-Ḥaiy Ḥabībī, 2 vols., Kabul, 1342–3 Sh./1963–4; tr. H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī*, 2 vols. with continuous pagination, Calcutta, 1873–81; B.L. ms. Add. 26,189.

Kieffer, Ch., "Les Ghôrides, une grande dynastie nationale, IIIe partie: le déclin et le démembrement de l'empire ghôride", *Afghanistan* 16 (1961), part IV, 37–50, and 17 (1962), part II, 40–56.

---------, "Le minaret de Ghiyath al-Din à Firouzkoh (minaret de Djam)", *Afghanistan* 16 (1960), part IV, 16–60.

Leshnik, Lorenz S., "Ghor, Firuzkoh and the Minar-i Jam", *CAJ* 12 (1968), 36–49.

Maricq, André, and Wiet, Gaston, *Le minaret de Djam. La découverte de la capitale des sultans Ghorides* (XII^{e}–XIII^{e} siècles), Mémoires de la délégation archéologique française en Afghanistan, 16, Paris, 1959.

Minorsky, V., "The Turkish dialect of the Khalaj", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 10 (1940), 417–37; repr. in his *The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the Middle Ages*, London, 1978.

Nasawī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, *Sīrat al-Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn*, Arabic text ed. and tr. O. Houdas, *Histoire du Sultan Djélal ed-Din Mankubirti*, 2 vols., Paris, 1891–5; also tr. Z.M. Buniiatov, *Dzhizneopisanie Sultana Dzhalal ad-dina Mankburny*, Baku, 1973; 13th-century Persian translation ed. Mujtabā Mīnuwī, Persian Texts series, 19, Tehran, 1344 Sh./1965.

Richards, D.S., "Ibn al-Athīr and the later parts of the Kāmil: a study of aims and methods", in *Medieval historical writing in the Christian and Islamic worlds*, ed. D.O. Morgan, London, 1982, 76–108.

Sauvaget, Jean, "Noms et surnoms de Mamelouks", *Journal Asiatique* 238 (1950), 31–58.

Sayfī (Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Harawī), *Taʾrīkh-Nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. M.Z. aṣ-Ṣiddíqí, Calcutta, 1944.

Sourdel, Dominique, *Inventaire des monnaies musulmanes anciennes du Musée de Cabul*, Damascus, 1953.

Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-Aʿṣār*, lithograph ed., Bombay, 1269/1853; ed. and tr. J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte Wassafs*, vol. i, Vienna, 1856; all published.

'Izz al-Dīn
Ḥusayn
Fakhr al-Dīn
Mas'ūd
Quṭb al-Dīn
Muḥammad
Sayf al-Dīn
Sūrī
Bahā' al-Dīn
Sām
'ALĀ' AL-DĪN
ḤUSAYN
("Jahānsūz")
(1150–1161)
Shihāb al-Dīn
Muḥammad
Shujā' al-Dīn
'Alī
(Jurmās
branch)
(Sanga
branch)
Shams al-Dīn
Muḥammad
GHIYĀTH AL-DĪN
MUḤAMMAD
(1163–1203)
MU'IZZ AL-DĪN
MUḤAMMAD
(1203–1206)
SAYF AL-DĪN
MUḤAMMAD
(1161–1163)
'ALĀ' AL-DĪN
ATSIZ
(1210–1214)
Sayf al-Dīn
Sūrī
'Alā' al-Dīn
Abū 'Alī
Bahā' al-Dīn
Sām
(d. 1206)
'Abbās
GHIYĀTH AL-DĪN
MAḤMŪD
(1206–1210)
Shihāb al-Dīn
'Alī
Nāṣir al-Dīn
Abū Bakr
'ALĀ' AL-DĪN
MUḤAMMAD
(1206;
1214–1215)
(Mādīn
branch)
'Alā' al-Dīn
Muḥammad
Jalāl al-Dīn
'Alī
BAHĀ' AL-DĪN
SĀM
(1210)
Shams al-Dīn
Muḥammad
Rukn al-Dīn
Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh
(Bāmiyān
branch)
THE GHURIDS

MĀ WARĀ' AL-NAHR
Andkhūd
Balkh
Tirmid
Āmū Daryā
BADAKHSHĀN
ṬUKHĀRISTĀN
Ṭālaqān
Bāmiyān
Kabul R.
Kābul
NANGRAHĀR
Peshawar
BHIMBHAR (?)
KURRAMĀN
Lahore
Multān
Ghazna
ZĀBULISTĀN
Qādis
GHARCHISTĀN
Herāt
Ghaznīn
Kāsrī
Tūlak
GHŪR
Khajūr
ZAMĪNDĀWAR
Bust
Farāh
SĪSTĀN
THE GHURID TERRITORIES
0 50 100 150 200 km.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

VII

Turkish Slaves on Islam's Indian Frontier

In his *Ta'rikh-i Firuz Shahi,* written in 1357, the Delhi historian Ziya al-Din Barani scathingly contrasts men of illustrious birth with those "bought for money."[1] He was referring to *amir*s (commanders) who had been purchased as slaves, though for him they were just one category of the low-born among many. Elsewhere in this work—as in the *Fatawa-yi Jahandari,* a "Mirror for Princes" in the Persian tradition, which he produced a few years later—he leaves the reader in no doubt that he sees high birth as a prerequisite for office.[2] Yet the Turkish military slave (Arabic *ghulam, mamluk;* Persian *banda*) had a long and venerable history in the Muslim world: when the Delhi Sultanate came into existence in c. 1210–11, such troops had already been active on Islam's Indian frontier for almost three hundred years. In an article published some years ago, I examined the role of Turkish slave-*amir*s in the tangled politics of the mid-thirteenth-century Delhi Sultanate;[3] here I shall confine my attention to the early history of Turkish slaves in India down to the first decades of the sultanate's history.

Historical Background

The ninth-century ʿAbbasid caliphs had first recruited Turks from Central Asia as an elite guard corps in their successive capitals, Baghdad and Samarra. To what extent these were technically slaves has been questioned, and it has been proposed that the men who appear in the sources are often free in status and belong more to the tradition of the *comitatus,* the warband.[4] Whatever the individual case, some were certainly *ghulam*s, and the use of slave-soldiers became increasingly widespread. As the ʿAbbasid empire disintegrated and real power passed into the hands of hereditary

Chatterjee, Indrani, and Richard M. Eaton, eds. *Slavery and South Asian History,* pp. 63–82. © 2006. Reprinted with permission of Indiana University Press.

provincial governors, they in turn buttressed their illegitimate rule by recruiting Turkish slave-contingents of their own. A few of these upstarts were themselves *ghulam*s. Both Alptegin, who carved out a quasi-independent principality at Ghazni around 962, and Sebuktegin, the effective founder of the Yaminid or Ghaznawid dynasty (977–1186), which would carry Muslim arms deep into the Panjab, were Turkish slave-officers (see map 1).

The Ghaznawids' nemesis, the Shansabanid or Ghurid dynasty (early twelfth century to 1215–16), also maintained Turkish slaves by the beginning of the reign of Ghiyas al-Din Muhammad b. Sam (1163–1203).[5] His brother and successor, Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad (d. 1206), is said to have been especially keen to acquire them.[6] As the subjugation of the Jamuna-Ganges *doab* gathered pace in the mid-1190s, he largely entrusted his new conquests to his slave-officers, rather than to Ghuris, Tajiks, or other Turks of free status.[7] It was one of these, Qutb al-Din Aybak (d. 1210), who was to lay the foundations of an independent Muslim state in India, and Aybak's own *ghulam*, Shams al-Din Iltutmish (d. 1236), who would be the real architect of the Delhi Sultanate.

Functions

By the eleventh century, then, Turkish slave-regiments formed the nucleus of most armies in the eastern Islamic world. Even Turkish dynasties whose power was initially based on a mass nomadic following, like the Qarakhanids (tenth–early thirteenth centuries) in Transoxiana and Turkestan and the Seljuks (1040–1194) in Iran and the Near East, employed them.[8] *Ghulam* officers might be favored as an instrument of despotism—as a highly disciplined counterweight to an indigenous aristocracy or to tribal leaders for whom a monarch was simply *primus inter pares*.[9] In addition to holding high rank in the military, such as that of military chamberlain (*hajib, amir-hajib*), favored Turkish *ghulam*s filled ceremonial positions at court. Under the Ghaznawids and the early Delhi sultans, we find them serving as cupbearer (*tasht-dar*), holder of the royal parasol (*chatr-dar*), intendant of the royal stable (*amir-i akhur*), and so on. It is true that the Turkish general Ahmad Inaltegin is described as treasurer (*khazin*) to Mahmud of Ghazni.[10] This office was usually entrusted to members of the Persian bureaucratic class, but from a hint by the Ghaznawid historian Bayhaqi that Mahmud was possibly Ahmad Inaltegin's father, there is reason to doubt that he was a first-generation *ghulam*.[11] Ahmad's mother may have been the child of a Turkish slave, or he himself may have been a free-status Turkish immigrant.

The impulse to purchase Turkish *ghulam*s in significant numbers was sometimes clearly a matter of military exigency. The Ghurids, whose own

subjects were a people of the uplands (*jibal*) accustomed to infantry combat, presumably bought Turks in order to develop a strong cavalry arm, and in particular to amass a corps of mounted archers.[12] There is no solid evidence regarding the training of Ghaznawid *ghulams*,[13] or indeed of any other slave-troops outside the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, and such meager information as the Delhi historian Juzjani (c. 1260) supplies about the training of the sultanate's Turkish slave-commanders amounts to no more than vague allusions to archery (*tir-andazi*) and horsemanship (*sawari*).[14] Yet we should note, at this juncture, that the *ghulams*' value to their employers did not reside in the celebrated skills of the light-cavalry archer. The tradition of fighting as heavy cavalry also existed in certain regions of the steppe, and Turkish slave-troops were trained to fight in this manner, with weapons like the mace (*gurz*), rather than as lightly armed mounted bowmen.[15] It is generally accepted that under the 'Abbasids relatively small numbers of these heavily armed and highly skilled warriors had supplanted the larger infantry armies of an earlier era.[16] Doubtless their value in the Indian subcontinent lay in the ability of such a small but superb force to tilt the fortunes of an engagement.[17]

Reliable numbers are elusive. Juzjani—a late source in this respect—tells us that Mahmud of Ghazni's court was guarded by four thousand Turkish slave-youths, armed with maces;[18] the figure seems to have been derived from the description by Bayhaqi of a caliphal embassy in 1031–32.[19] The figure of ten thousand actually cited on the authority of a caliphal envoy to Mahmud, and found elsewhere,[20] may well reflect, rather, the total number of Turkish *ghulams* in the army.[21] We are given no indication of how many Turkish *ghulams* were in the service of the later Ghurids at any time or what numbers were maintained by the early sultans of Delhi.

Information as to the equipment and attire of these slave-guards is also non-existent after the Ghaznawid era, when Bayhaqi furnishes detailed descriptions of the ceremonial apparel of the Turkish *ghulams*, with their rich robes, bejeweled belts and sashes, and weapons decorated with gold and silver.[22] The remains of mural paintings found in the audience hall of the Ghaznawid palace at Lashkar-i Bazar are strikingly evocative of Bayhaqi's data. They depict forty-four figures, each clad in a sumptuously decorated kaftan and carrying on the left shoulder the haft of what is probably a mace. The facings, and the fact that various items, including a wallet, are suspended from the belt, are reminiscent of Central Asia; and although the heads are almost totally obscured, the face of a beardless adolescent with evidently Central Asian features has survived in an adjacent room.[23] It is generally assumed, therefore, that the subjects of these paintings are the Ghaznawid sultan's Turkish guards. It would doubtless be hazardous, however, to

assume that the military slaves of, for example, the early Delhi Sultanate presented much the same appearance.

Provenance

The tribal background of Turkish slave-soldiers varied considerably. One circumstance that helps to cloud the matter of origin is the tendency of Muslim writers to lump together the non-Muslim peoples of the northern and eastern regions under the general designation of "Turks." Thus several Arabic and Persian geographical works class the Hungarians (*Majar*), Slavs (*Saqaliba*), and Greeks (*Rum*) as Turks. The Arabic narrative sources that furnish us with data about the Seljukid and Ayyubid empires or, later, the Mamluk state distinguish the Slavs, for instance, from the Turks when referring to the background of slaves. But this is not the case with the smaller corpus of Persian authors on whom we are dependent for information about the eastern Islamic world, and for whom the ranks of the Turkish peoples are often swollen also by Tibetans or nomadic peoples of Mongolian ("Tatar") type from eastern Asia.[24] Notable among this last category were the Khitan, a people who had ruled over part of northern China as the Liao dynasty (907–1125), and the Qara-Khitan, refugees from the defunct Khitan regime who had migrated westward: they founded an empire that dominated Central Asia (1128–1218), including Muslim states such as Khwarazm and the fragmented Qarakhanid polity, until it collapsed under pressure from the advancing Mongols and the steppe peoples they had dislodged.

The Ghaznawid slave-contingents had included men from the Qarluq (from whom, possibly, the Qarakhanids themselves had sprung),[25] Yaghma, Tukhsi, and Chigil tribes, all of whom nomadized in the region of the Issik Kul and more or less acknowledged the authority of the Qarakhanid sovereigns; from the Qarakhanid towns of Kashghar and Barskhan (this last town the birthplace of Sebuktegin); and from Khotan, the center of a Buddhist kingdom which in the early eleventh century had only recently been reduced by the Qarakhanids. It should be noted, of course, that at this date by no means all the Qarakhanids' subjects, whether nomads or town-dwellers, would have been Muslims. Slaves are also mentioned from among the Kimek, the Qayi, and the Qirghiz, whose lands lay at a greater distance to the east, toward Mongolia, and who at this stage were undoubtedly pagans.[26] In addition, control of Khwarazm and the Dihistan region gave the Ghaznawid sultans, and subsequently the Seljuks, access to the nomadic peoples of the Pontic and Caspian steppes, who were largely untouched by Islam until the Mongol era. From the mid-eleventh century, these were the grazing grounds

of the confederacy known to the Muslims as the Qipchaq, to the Byzantines as the Cumans, and to the Rus as the Polovtsy.[27]

The Pontic and Caspian steppes would attain a greater prominence as a source of Turkish *ghulams* in the first half of the thirteenth century. The Delhi historian Juzjani, compiling his *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* in c. 1260, devotes the penultimate *tabaqa* to biographies of twenty-five Shamsis, i.e., slave-*amirs* of the first Delhi sultan, Iltutmish; the list is by no means exhaustive and the criteria used by Juzjani in his selection are unclear, though his own patron, the future sultan Ghiyas al-Din Balban (1266–86), is naturally accorded the longest biography. In some cases tribal origins are not given. Three, however, are described as *Rumis* (i.e., Greeks or possibly Slavs or Bulgars who had arrived from the Byzantine territories).[28] Two came from the Qara-Khitan;[29] so also, in all probability, did two others, described as "Khita'is":[30] in any event, rather than being themselves ethnically Khitan, they may simply have belonged to peoples who were subject to the Qara-Khitan empire. Six other slaves are said to have originated from the Qipchaq confederacy;[31] and three more, including Balban, belonged to Iltutmish's own tribe, the Olberli, a subgroup of the Qipchaq (or possibly of the Qangli, a closely related people who were their eastern neighbors and whose pasturelands extended from the Ural River to the Aral Sea).[32]

Such a high proportion of the Shamsi slaves whose origins are specified came from the Pontic and Caspian steppes because of the upheavals caused by the Mongol campaigns in these regions in 1222–23 and 1236–39.[33] In 1253 the Franciscan missionary William of Rubruck, on his way through the Crimea, would hear an eyewitness describe the pitiful condition of the Qipchaq ("Cumans") who, in terror of the Mongols, had crowded into the peninsula, the living eating the dying in desperation.[34] Many of the fugitives surely ended up as slaves in Anatolia, as did Baybars, the future Mamluk sultan of Egypt (1260–77) and himself (like Iltutmish and Balban) an Olberli, who was treacherously seized by a local chieftain and bundled off to the market at Sivas.[35] A glut in the supply of Qipchaq slaves by the 1240s, which certainly fed the ambitions of the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt and enabled him to build up a corps of mamluks,[36] is just one aspect of the strikingly widespread and prolonged diaspora unleashed by the Mongol conquests. That diaspora, which in part resulted from the Mongols' deliberate dispersal of subject Turkish peoples across the breadth of their empire,[37] also included the migration of numerous Muslim nobles, scholars, and soldiers from Central Asia into India during the 1220s and 1230s; and the westward migration of Qipchaq/Cumans, into Hungary and the Balkans (1239–41), and of Khwarazmians (largely former Qipchaq auxiliaries of the Khwarazm-Shah),

first into Persia and thence (from c. 1231) into Mesopotamia and (in 1244) Syria.[38]

Many Turkish slaves who reached India in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, prior to the advent of the Mongols, would have been prisoners captured in the frequent conflicts that involved the Qara-Khitan. Just as Mahmud of Ghazni had repeatedly clashed with the Qarakhanids, so the Ghurid sultans Ghiyas al-Din and Mu'izz al-Din engaged in a bitter struggle with the Khwarazm-Shahs around the turn of the twelfth century, and on occasion the Qara-Khitan came to the aid of their client. In 1198 and 1205 the Ghurid ruler of Bamiyan wrested Balkh and Tirmiz respectively from their Qara-Khitan garrisons,[39] and in 1204 Mu'izz al-Din's attempt to invade Khwarazm itself suffered a decisive check at the hands of the Qara-Khitan and their subordinates near Andkhud (now Andkhoi). After the Khwarazm-Shah Muhammad b. Tekish repudiated the suzerainty of the Qara-Khitan in c. 1208, "Khita'is" would have been taken prisoner in the battles that brought him control over Transoxiana and other regions to the east.[40]

Turkish slaves also reached the Ghurids and their successors, the Delhi sultans, through a flourishing commercial traffic. In the 1330s the Moroccan visitor Ibn Battuta heard that Iltutmish had sent agents to Transoxiana to buy slaves on his behalf;[41] and slave merchants may have followed the sultan as he moved around northern India on campaign, since he bought one future *amir* while investing Mandor, in Rajasthan, in 1227.[42] It was not unknown for tribal nomads to sell their own kin into slavery. Juzjani claims that Iltutmish's brothers, from jealousy of his beauty and his noble qualities, had sold him to a slave merchant, which enables the historian to liken him to the Biblical patriarch Joseph (the Qur'anic Yusuf: *sura* 12:7–20).[43] The same author describes one of Iltutmish's *amirs* as having been enslaved "through the perversity of kindred."[44] He heard rumors that two others were of Muslim parentage and had therefore been enslaved unlawfully.[45] During the reduction of the western steppelands, the Mongols would themselves take part in the slave traffic, selling off those of their captives who were surplus to their requirements, like Balban's younger brother.[46]

It is worth bearing in mind that Turkish slave-soldiers did not necessarily arrive in India directly from the pagan steppe. Where we are told something of the early career of a slave-*amir*, we may find that he had spent several years elsewhere in the Muslim world before being sold again and brought to the subcontinent. Iltutmish passed some years in Bukhara, where his first owner was a kinsman of the Sadr-i Jahan, the effective ruler of the city;[47] and Balban's first owner was based in Baghdad (though Ibn Battuta would later hear that Balban too had been purchased in Bukhara).[48] Clearly, such an interval might furnish the opportunity to learn Arabic, since for a

time Aybak was the property of a prominent *imam* in the Khurasanian city of Nishapur, who appears to have taught him to read the Qur'an.[49] In such cases it is conceivable that a *ghulam* had imbibed not merely the rudiments of Islam but also something of the politics and statecraft of the Islamic heartlands; but this can only be a matter for conjecture.

A word needs to be said here about manumission, a subject to which our sources allude very rarely. Balban is one of the few Turkish slave-officers in the early Delhi Sultanate to be described as a freedman.[50] Juzjani tells us that Aybak had manumitted Iltutmish on the express orders of Sultan Mu'izz al-Din.[51] At this time, surprisingly, Aybak himself was still of unfree status, since after Mu'izz al-Din's death he and other Turkish slave-officers are said to have asked the late monarch's nephew and eventual successor, Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud, for deeds of enfranchisement (*khutut-i 'itq*).[52] In the 1330s Ibn Battuta picked up a tale that the jurists had required Iltutmish to furnish proof of his manumission before acknowledging him as their ruler.[53]

We should notice also that the death of the master did not automatically confer freedom, as it evidently did in the Deccan at a later date (see Eaton, this volume). In the Ghaznawid empire the slaves of a dead slave-commander passed to the sultan.[54] If Juzjani's story about Aybak and his colleagues were not enough to demonstrate that this situation still obtained in the early thirteenth century, his description of them as now the slaves (*bandagan*) of Sultan 'Ala al-Din Muhammad (who in 1206 briefly succeeded Mu'izz al-Din in Ghur before being ousted in favor of Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud) would confirm it.[55] In the same way, Juzjani shows us that Iltutmish acquired the *ghulams* of masters who had died: the fact that in each case the *amir* in question is said to have been purchased from his master's heirs makes it clear that he had not been freed.[56] Another of Iltutmish's Turkish officers had formerly belonged to Mu'izz al-Din himself, though regrettably Juzjani fails to tell us whether he passed to Iltutmish through purchase.[57]

The Perceived Qualities of the Turk

Slave status, then, for Turks, was no barrier to favor, promotion, or eventual rulership; it was, rather, a major pathway to advancement. The Turkish peoples were highly regarded within the Muslim world for their courage, stamina, and military skill, and Turkish *ghulams* further acquired a reputation for steadfastness and orthodoxy in Islam.[58] Within a very short time after the Seljuk conquest of Baghdad, we find Ibn Hassul (d. 1058) singing the praises of both Turkish tribesman and Turkish slave-soldier for his new masters.[59] Admittedly, the mainly Persian members of the bureaucratic (*dabir*) class who produced our literary sources sometimes impute to the

Turkish military a lack of sophistication. Bayhaqi describes the two *ghulam* generals, Asightegin and Eryaruq, for all their military prowess, as inexperienced and naïvely reliant for advice on a group of worthless individuals they had gathered around them.[60] Almost two centuries later, when one of Iltutmish's *ghulam* officers was accused of financial improprieties, the sultan's *wazir* advised him to entrust the investigation to a Tajik rather than a Turk, on the grounds not of possible bias but of Turkish "brashness [*tahawwur*]."[61] But even this lack of finesse might be turned to good account, as when a veteran slave-commander was brought in to dissuade the Ghaznawid sultan Mas'ud (1031–40) from a particularly rash enterprise and succeeded by dint of his plain speaking where others had failed.[62]

One of the principal virtues of the Turkish *ghulam* (as opposed to the free Turkish immigrant tribesman) was his detachment from family or territorial interest, so that his loyalty was (in theory, at least) to the master who had bought, trained, and—sometimes—manumitted him. This trait, rehearsed by a series of Muslim writers from al-Jahiz (d. 868–69) onward, assumes the character of a topos. In a famous passage cited by the Seljuk *wazir* Nizam al-Mulk, the loyalty and goodwill of the slave toward his master are contrasted with the aspirations of the son, who desires his father's death.[63]

Fakhr-i Mudabbir, in the *Shajarat* (or *Bahr*) *al-ansab,* which he dedicated to Qutb al-Din Aybak at Lahore (c. 1206), was harping on a well-worn theme (if in more highly figurative language than most of his precursors) when he wrote that

> there is no kind of infidel people which is brought over to Islam and does not look with longing at home, mother, father, and kindred. For a time they are bound to adopt Islam, but in most cases they apostatize and relapse into paganism. The exception is the Turkish race, who, when they are brought over to Islam, fix their hearts in Islam so firmly that they no longer remember home or region or kinsfolk. . . . The Turk is like a pearl that lies in the oyster in the sea. For as long as it is in its habitat, it is devoid of power and worth; but when it emerges from the oyster and from the sea, it acquires value and becomes precious, decorating the crown of kings and adorning the neck and ears of brides.[64]

This was an idealized picture, of course. It is undeniable that the Turks who entered India, in sharp contrast with their non-Turkish precursors from the Inner Asian steppes, strongly resisted indigenous cultural influences—whether Hindu or Buddhist—and retained a markedly separate identity which centered on Persian culture and, especially, on the religion of Islam.[65] According to Juzjani, every one of the slaves of the Ghurid dynasty "spread the carpet of justice over the surface of the world and raised palaces of beneficence and liberality";[66] and it was through their rule that "the light of

the faith of Muhammad . . . had remained on the pages of the furthest limits of the empire of Hindustan."[67] Thirteenth-century Turkish slave-sultans and *amir*s are known to have done the Muslim cause signal service by building mosques in territory conquered from the Hindus.[68] What has to be asked, even so, is how far the Turkish military slave—a first-generation Muslim—had really turned his back on the steppe, where the dominant religious traditions were shamanistic or perhaps Manichaean (or sometimes Nestorian Christian).

Two illustrations will suffice. Firstly, Sebuktegin seems to have designated his youngest son as his successor at Ghazni, to the exclusion of Mahmud, the eldest, and it has been proposed that this echoes the tradition, familiar to the Central Asian Turks and Mongols, of ultimogeniture in succession to the "hearthland."[69] And in the second place, the enthronement at Delhi in 1236 of a female sovereign (Iltutmish's daughter Raziyya), an episode without precedent in the Islamic world outside the Yemen, might well hark back to the more prominent political role of royal women in steppe society, particularly among the Khitan and the Qara-Khitan, peoples to which some of the leading *amir*s involved traced their origins.[70] It is possible that a thorough sifting of our sources could identify other pagan "hangovers";[71] though the research so far devoted to the subject has tended to focus on the nomadic Turco-Mongol societies in Inner Asia that had embraced Islam, as opposed to the *déraciné* Turkish *ghulam*s.[72]

So too there were certainly striking instances of fidelity to a master: at Andkhud in 1204 the Ghurid sultan Muʿizz al-Din Muhammad was carried from the battlefield by one of his Turkish *ghulam*s, after being abandoned by a significant number of his Ghurid and Tajik troops.[73] But there had been occasions in the Ghaznawid period when Turkish slave-contingents deserted their master and went over to the enemy, notably prior to the battle of Dandanqan (1040) against the Turkish Seljuks.[74] And just as in the ninth century a number of ʿAbbasid caliphs had been killed in risings by their Turkish slave-troops, and as Turan Shah, the last Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, was assassinated by a group of mamluks in 1250, so acts of regicide were not unknown in the eastern Islamic territories. The most notorious instance of disloyalty was that of Mahmud of Ghazni's slave Tughril (immortalized in the sources under epithets such as *kafir-i niʿmat*, "the ingrate"). Having after his master's death joined the Seljuks, he subsequently returned to the Ghaznawids' service, but was finally encouraged by his military successes to murder Sultan ʿAbd al-Rashid b. Mahmud in 1051 and usurp the throne.[75] Service in the subcontinent offered an ever-present temptation to revolt against a distant sovereign, as the Turkish general Ahmad Inaltegin demonstrated when he rose against Sultan Masʿud in 1033 (having, incidentally, sent

agents to Central Asia to recruit Turkish *ghulams* on his behalf and forward them to him in India).[76] Following his disastrous defeat by the Qara-Khitan at Andkhud in 1204, Mu'izz al-Din had to suppress the insurrection of a Turkish slave-officer who had reacted to rumors of his discomfiture by seizing control of Multan.[77] In the circumstances, the tribute paid to the faithfulness of Turkish slaves by successive authors begins to smack of literary affectation.

Turks in thirteenth-century India certainly did not enjoy an unalloyed reputation. Whatever their value as military assets, they were also believed, as a race, to exhibit less desirable characteristics and, with the growth of antipathy toward the Turk on the part of Arab and Persian populations, some of these traits, like an inordinate love of plunder, were aired in Muslim writings further west.[78] The final years of the Ghurid dynasty furnish a couple of incidents which highlight the capacity of Turkish slave-troops to riot when the firm hand of their master was removed. Following the death of Sultan Mu'izz al-Din in 1206, the younger Turkish *ghulams* had wanted to plunder his baggage and had with difficulty been restrained by his *wazir* and by their own officers.[79] Juzjani himself recalled how, when Mu'izz al-Din's nephew and successor, Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud, died at Firuzkuh in 1210–11, his Turkish slaves raised an "uproar [*ghawgha*]" and put to the sword a number of Ghurid princes, ostensibly in order to safeguard the throne for his infant son.[80]

Similar turbulence would manifest itself in the Delhi Sultanate, first during the brief reign of Iltutmish's son and successor, Rukn al-Din Firuz Shah (1236), when the Turkish slaves massacred a body of Tajik bureaucrats at Tarain.[81] Barani devotes a long passage of his history to the way in which Iltutmish's Turkish slave-commanders—the Shamsi khans and *malik*s, as he calls them—profited from the weakness of his progeny to destroy a host of immigrant Tajik nobles. This is undoubtedly simplistic; but there is nevertheless a substratum of truth beneath his analysis.[82] As had been the case in ninth-century Samarra, the impulse underlying such violent outbreaks was usually fear of hostile action by the ruler and the instinct to maintain a position that was perceived as under threat. Thus it is no accident that Turkish slave-*amir*s deposed Sultana Raziyya in 1240 because she relied inordinately (in their view) on a Black African ("Habshi," or "Abyssinian") slave-*amir*, Jamal al-Din Yaqut; or that they brought down her brother and successor, Sultan Mu'izz al-Din Bahram Shah b. Iltutmish, in 1242 because he was rumored to be planning the wholesale removal of the Turkish slave-elite; or that they set upon and killed their former ally, the *wazir* Muhadhdhab al-Din, in the following year because he sought to concentrate all affairs of state in his own hands at their expense.[83] This is not to deny that other "excluded"

elements—free Turkish grandees, Ghuri military leaders, or even Tajik bureaucrats—joined forces with them on each occasion.[84]

Providence and Panegyric

The obscure origins of the Turkish slave-commanders, lying in the *Dar al-Harb*, often far beyond the horizons of their future Muslim subjects, rendered it possible—and indeed desirable—for those who catalogued their exploits to indulge in a little historical creativity. At a fairly mundane level, the slave trader who purchased Sebuktegin was supposed to have seen in him signs of valor and acumen;[85] and Juzjani, similarly, claims that his patron Balban had displayed the marks of rectitude and ingenuity (*rushd-u shahamat*) for the benefit of his first owner.[86] More impressively, omens of greatness were naturally discernible at an early date in those whom God had destined to fill the highest office. A tale circulated about Iltutmish that when he was a mere child slave in Bukhara a holy man (*darwish*) had foretold his rise to power and made him promise to show generosity toward ascetics (although Juzjani, who transmits this anecdote, ascribes it ultimately to Iltutmish himself).[87] Decades later, Ibn Battuta heard a cognate story in which a *faqir* in Bukhara conferred the "kingdom of India" on Balban in return for some trifling service.[88]

Hindsight of this kind was given the fullest latitude, perhaps, when it remolded slave-officers into the heirs of their dead lords.[89] According to Juzjani, the Ghurid sultan Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad, who had no son, had intended that his most senior slave, Taj al-Din Yildiz, should succeed him as ruler of Ghazni,[90] when in fact the material he himself provides, and the information given by the well-informed Mosuli historian Ibn al-Athir (d. 1233), alike demonstrate that the Turkish *ghulams* at Ghazni regarded Mu'izz al-Din's nephew Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud as his rightful heir. It was Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud's failure to move on Ghazni in 1206 that enabled Yildiz to take control there.[91] In what is possibly a later embellishment of the legends purveyed by Juzjani, Yildiz was alleged to be Mu'izz al-Din's adopted son.[92]

Juzjani further makes out that Mu'izz al-Din had bequeathed his Indian dominions to his Turkish slaves. "I have several thousand sons," he supposedly told those who bewailed his lack of male offspring, "whose inheritance will be my kingdom";[93] and after his death events had duly transpired just as he had prophesied.[94] This legacy, moreover, had now devolved upon the sovereigns of Iltutmish's line, in the person of the reigning sultan, Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah b. Iltutmish (1246–66).[95] What had perhaps made this possible was that Aybak had seen Iltutmish as a future ruler and had adopted

him—or so Juzjani tells us elsewhere.[96] Juzjani seeks, in other words, to fashion some kind of continuity between the extinct Ghurid dynasty and the regime at Delhi under which he was writing. All this was to discount the realities of the master-slave relationship in Islam, whereby the master inherits from the slave and not vice versa.[97] It also conveniently ignored the vicissitudes of the early thirteenth century in which Aybak and Iltutmish had each in turn seized power in default of Ghurid intervention and held it in the face of Turkish competitors.[98]

The panegyrists, moreover, were not above devising a more exalted background for Turkish slaves who attained sovereignty. One tradition had placed Sebuktegin's origins, as we have seen above, in the town of Barskhan, in Qarakhanid territory, close to the shores of the Issik Kul. Yet Juzjani cites a now lost work which traced Sebuktegin's descent, somewhat less plausibly, from Yazdagird III, the last Sasanian king of Persia, who had died in flight from the victorious Arabs in 651.[99] There may have been some reluctance to acknowledge that the Ghaznawids' ancestry lay among subjects of the rival Qarakhanid dynasty; though it is equally possible that the genealogy quoted by Juzjani had arisen in part as a counterblast to the pretensions of other antagonists, the Buyids in central and western Persia,[100] or to the spectacular (and more dangerous) rise of the Seljuks.

Whatever the case, by the mid-thirteenth century, Turkish dynasties—whether founded by nomadic chieftains like the Seljuks or by slave officers like the Ghaznawids and the Khwarazm-Shahs—had governed Persia for several decades, and steppe antecedents were now sufficiently respectable for Turkish slave-rulers to dispense with bogus Iranian pedigrees and to embrace instead an illustrious nomadic Inner Asian ancestry. Thus Juzjani could describe Balban's forebears as "khans of the Olberli and rulers of the Yemek [i.e., the Kimek]," and claim that Balban's father had been khan over some ten thousand families.[101] He referred also to the father of his first patron, Iltutmish, as a khan of the Olberli, with "numerous dependants, kindred, and horsemen [*atbaʿ-u aqribaʾ-u khayl-i bisyar*]"; but predictably, perhaps, his very vagueness conveys the impression of a less substantial figure than Balban's progenitor.[102] Parallel examples of retrospective promotion are found in connection with the leaders of other Turkish nomadic groups transplanted from their habitat to provide military service for sedentary princes.[103]

Conclusion

Turkish military slavery differed markedly from other kinds of slavery. It did not, properly speaking, hinge on a particular social status but on a rela-

tionship to a ruler (or to a series of rulers) and on a career of a particular type. Turkish slaves also differed in terms of their service from the free Turkish tribesmen among whose ranks they had originated. Turkish slave-officers and their troops were not recruited in order to replicate the tactics traditionally associated with the light cavalry of the steppe. Yet in other respects the former *ghulam* who attained high office shared some of the characteristics of his free brethren who came to dominate large swaths of the Islamic world. These included a mixed reputation—for greed and turbulence as well as for martial accomplishments and perseverance in Islam. The Turkish slave-elite were not an unmitigated blessing to their masters; and their actions were not necessarily designed to court popularity among contemporaries at large. But they undoubtedly played a prominent role in the implantation of Muslim rule in India and in the politics of the fledgling Delhi Sultanate. In crafting a more respectable ancestry for such patrons and in seeking, eventually, to rewrite the process by which they had attained power, the Persian literati who dedicated their works to them were perhaps registering a belief that Turkish paramountcy was there to stay. They could hardly have foreseen that it would pass away within two generations of Juzjani's era.

Notes

1. Ziya al-Din Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz Shahi,* ed. Saiyid Ahmad Khan, Bibliotheca Indica 33 (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1860–62), 27.

2. Irfan Habib, "Barani's Theory of the History of the Delhi Sultanate," *Indian Historical Review* 7, no. 2 (1980–81), 106–108.

3. Peter Jackson, "The *Mamluk* Institution in Early Muslim India," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1990), 340–58; idem, *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 4, "Turks, Tajiks and Khalaj."

4. C. I. Beckwith, "Aspects of the Early History of the Central-Asian Guard Corps in Islam," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984), 29–43; and Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates,* 2nd ed. (Harlow: Longman, 2004), 157–58.

5. Minhaj al-Din Abu 'Umar 'Uthman b. Siraj al-Din Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* ed. 'Abd al-Hayy Habibi, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Kabul: Anjuman-i Ta'rikh-i Afghanistan, 1963–64), 1:354–55, uses the term *turkan-i khass;* the translation by H. G. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia,* Bibliotheca Indica, 2 vols. with continuous pagination (London, 1872–81), 1:371 ("their own immediate Turkish followers"), obscures the sense. The chronological context suggests a date at the very outset of the reign.

6. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:410 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:497).

7. Irfan Habib, "Formation of the Sultanate Ruling Class of the Thirteenth Century," in Irfan Habib, ed., *Medieval India,* vol. 1, *Researches in the History of India, 1200–1750* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 4–7.

8. See the evidence analyzed in David Ayalon, "The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* 3rd series, 6, no. 3 (Nov. 1996), 305–33.

9. For a useful introduction to the institution of military slavery, see the various articles by D. Sourdel, C. E. Bosworth, and P. Hardy, "Ghulam," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al., new ed., (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954–2002), 2:1079–85; and Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1382* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 3–10. More detailed studies are Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

10. Abu l-Fadl Muhammad b. al-Husayn Bayhaqi, *Ta'rikh-i Bayhaqi,* ed. Qasim Ghani and 'Ali Akbar Fayyad (Tehran: Bang-i Milli-yi Iran, 1945), 267; Abu Sa'id 'Abd al-Hayy b. al-Dahhak b. Mahmud Gardizi, *Zayn al-akhbar,* ed. Muhammad Nazim, E. G. Browne Memorial Series 1 (London: Luzac, 1928), 97.

11. Bayhaqi, *Ta'rikh-i Bayhaqi,* 401. See generally C. E. Bosworth, "Ahmad Inaltigin," in Ehsan Yarshater, ed., *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (London: Routledge; Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda; New York: Bibliotheca Persica and Encyclopaedia Iranica Foundation, 1982–), 1:647.

12. André Wink, *Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World,* vol. 2, *The Slave Kings and the Islamic Conquest, 11th–13th Centuries* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 90–94; and Jackson, *Delhi Sultanate,* 11–12.

13. C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994–1040,* 2nd ed. (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1973), 102–103.

14. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:416, 443, and 2:27 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:513, 604–605, and 2:756). At 2:5, he is still vaguer: *harafha-yi jang-u dilawari-u jaladat* ("the discourse of warfare, valor, and courage"; cf. Raverty's translation, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:725).

15. As pointed out by Yuri Bregel, "Turko-Mongol Influences in Central Asia," in Robert L. Canfield, ed., *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 67; cf. also Claude Cahen, "Les changements techniques militaires dans le Proche Orient médiéval et leur importance historique," in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 121.

16. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates,* 158.

17. Wink, *Al-Hind,* 2:91–94. Thus the Khalaj freebooter Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar is alleged to have burst into the city of Bihar in c. 1204 with only two hundred heavily armed (*bar-gustuwan*) horsemen: Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:423 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:551–52).

18. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:230 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:83–84).

19. Bayhaqi, *Ta'rikh-i Bayhaqi,* 288.

20. C. E. Bosworth, "An Embassy to Mahmud of Ghazna Recorded in Qadi Ibn az-Zubayr's *Kitab adh-dhaka'ir wa't-tuha,*" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 85 (1965), 405.

21. For a discussion of numbers, see C. E. Bosworth, "Ghaznevid Military Organisation," *Der Islam* 36 (1961), 48; also idem, *Ghaznavids,* 105.

22. Bayhaqi, *Ta'rikh-i Bayhaqi,* 540. For a translation, see Bosworth, *Ghaznavids,* 136.

23. Daniel Schlumberger, "Le palais ghaznévide de Lashkari Bazar," *Syria* 29 (1952), 261–67 and plates xxxi/2–xxxii/1; and C. E. Bosworth, "Lashkar-i Bazar," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam.*

24. So the Rusi (*Urus*), the Slavs (*Saqalai* < *Saqaliba*), the Tibetans (*Tibat*), and the Tatars are listed among the Turkish peoples in c. 1206 by Fakhr-i Mudabbir (Muhammad Mubarakshah b. Mansur al-Qurashi), *Shajarat* (or *Bahr*) *al-Ansab,* partial ed. by E. Denison Ross as *Ta'rikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah,* James G. Forlong Fund 4 (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1927), 47; and see E. Denison Ross, "The Genealogies of Fakhr-ud-Din, Mubarak Shah," in T. W. Arnold and Reynold A. Nicholson, eds., *'Ajab-nama: A Volume of Oriental Studies Presented to Edward G. Browne. . . . on His 60th Birthday* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 407. For similar usage by other authors, including Juzjani, see Wink, *Al-Hind,* 2:68–69; also idem, "India and Central Asia: The Coming of the Turks in the Eleventh Century," in A. W. Van den Hoek, D. H. A. Kolff, and M. S. Oort, eds., *Ritual, State, and History in South Asia: Essays in Honour of J. C. Heesterman* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 761, 766.

25. Omeljan Pritsak, "Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden," *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 101 (1951), 270–300, and repr. in idem, *Studies in Medieval Eurasian History* (London: Variorum, 1981).

26. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids,* 103, 109; cf. also idem, *The Later Ghaznavids: Splendour and Decay; The Dynasty in Afghanistan and Northern India, 1040–1186* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1977), 60; and idem, "Notes on Some Turkish Names in Abu'l-Fadl Bayhaqi's Tarikh-i Mas'udi," *Oriens* 36 (2001), 309. For the Kimek, a sizable Turkish confederacy in the upper Irtysh basin which dissolved under pressure from the advancing Qipchaq in the eleventh century, see C. E. Bosworth, "Kimäk," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam;* Peter B. Golden, "The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe," in Denis Sinor, ed., *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 277–80; and Linda Amy Kimball, "The Vanished Kimak Empire," in Edward H. Kaplan and Donald W. Whisenhunt, eds., *Opuscula Altaica: Essays Presented in Honor of Henry Schwarz,* Studies on East Asia 19 (Bellingham, Wash.: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 1994), 371–92.

27. For the Qipchaq-Cumans, see Golden, "Peoples of the South Russian Steppe," 277–84; and G. Hazai, "Kipčak" and "Kuman," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* 5:125–26, 5:373.

28. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:5, 24, 42 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:724, 752, 787). For what follows, see also Habib, "Formation," 10.

29. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:13, 19, 22 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:736, 746, 749).

30. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:9, 28 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:731, 757).

31. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:17, 25, 27, 30, 36, 40 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:742, 754, 756, 761, 775, 788–89).

32. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:43, 45, 47 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:791, 796, 800). For the Olberli, see P. B. Golden, "Cumanica II: The Ölberli (Ölperli); The Fortunes and Misfortunes of an Inner Asian Nomadic Clan," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 6 (1988 [1986]), 27–28. The name appears in the mss. of Juzjani's work as Albari (Raverty's "Ilbari"). On the vexed question of the Qipchaq-Qangli relationship, see Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan:*

Cheng-wou Ts'in-tcheng-lou (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951, only one volume published), 95–116; and C. E. Bosworth, "Kanghlı," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam.*

33. Thomas T. Allsen, "Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217–1237," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 3 (1983), 5–24.

34. William of Rubruck, *Itinerarium,* ed. Anastasius Van den Wyngaert, O.F.M., in *Sinica Franciscana,* vol. 1, *Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1929), 171; translated by Peter Jackson and David Morgan, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255,* Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 70.

35. Qutb al-Din Musa al-Yunini (d. 1326), *Al-Dhayl ʿala Mirʾat al-zaman,* 4 vols. (Hyderabad, A.P.: Dairatuʾl-Maʿarifiʾl-Osmania, 1954–61), 3:240; Salah al-Din Khalil b. Aybak al-Safadi (d. 1363), *Al-Wafi bi l-wafayat,* 10, ed. Ali Amara and Jacqueline Sublet (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980), 329, citing Ibn Shaddad (d. 1285), whose informant was Baybars's fellow Olberli, Baysarï; and Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century,* trans. Peter Holt (Harlow: Longman, 1992), 28.

36. Irwin, *Middle East,* 17–19; and Thorau, *Lion of Egypt,* 16–18. But for an important qualification, see R. Stephen Humphreys, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," *Studia Islamica* 45 (1977), 67–100 (esp. 94–99), and 46 (1977), 147–82.

37. P. B. Golden, "'I will give the people unto thee': The Činggisid Conquests and Their Aftermath in the Turkic World," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* 3rd series, 10 (2000), 21–41.

38. For immigration into India, see Habib, "Formation," 13–14, and Jackson, *Delhi Sultanate,* 39–43; and for the Near East, R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1977), index s.v. "Khwarizmians." For Eastern Europe, see generally James Ross Sweeney, "'Spurred on by the fear of death': Refugees and Displaced Populations during the Mongol Invasion of Hungary," in Michael Gervers and Wayne Schlepp, eds., *Nomadic Diplomacy, Destruction, and Religion from the Pacific to the Adriatic,* Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia 1 (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), 34–62; James Ross Sweeney, "Identifying the Medieval Refugee: Hungarians in Flight during the Mongol Invasion," in Ladislaus Jöb et al., eds., *Forms of Identity: Definitions and Changes* (Szeged: Attila József University, 1994), 63–76; A. Pálóczi-Horváth, "L'immigration et l'établissement des Comans en Hongrie," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29 (1975), 313–33; and Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 134–40, 142–47.

39. Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil fi l-taʾrikh,* ed. C. J. Tornberg, 12 vols. (Leiden, 1851–76), 12:88, 134; reprinted with different pagination in 12 vols. (Beirut: Dar el-Sader, 1965–66), 12:134, 206.

40. For the events of this period, see W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion,* 3rd ed. (London: Luzac, 1968), 349 ff.

41. Ibn Battuta, *Tuhfat al-nuzzar fi gharaʾib al-amsar,* ed. Ch. Defrémery and B. S. Sanguinetti, 4 vols. (Paris, 1853–58), 3:171; translated by H. A. R. Gibb and C. F. Beckingham, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta, A.D. 1325–1354,* 5 vols. with continu-

ous pagination, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 110, 117, 141, 178, 190 (Cambridge: Published for the Hakluyt Society at the University Press, 1958–2000), 3:633.

42. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:36 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:777–79).

43. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:441 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:599–600); cf. also Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:440 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:598), and the remarks about Yusufin Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:439 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:596–97).

44. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:41, omits the phrase *ba-ʿinad-i aqriba,* which is found in the reliable fourteenth-century British Library ms. Add. 26,189, fol. 211r (and see Raverty's trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:790).

45. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:24, 33–34 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:752, 766).

46. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:45 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:796).

47. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:441–42 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:600–601). For the dynasty of Sadr-i Jahans in Bukhara, see Omeljan Pritsak, "Al-i Burhan," *Der Islam* 30 (1952), 81–96, repr. in his *Studies in Medieval Eurasian History.*

48. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:48 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:801); and cf. Ibn Battuta, *Tuhfat al-nuzzar,* 3:171 (trans. Gibb and Beckingham, *Travels of Ibn Battuta,* 3:633).

49. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Taʾrikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah,* 21.

50. Barani, *Taʾrikh-i Firuz Shahi,* 25: *azad shuda.*

51. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:443–44 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:605).

52. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:373 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:398).

53. Ibn Battuta, *Tuhfat al-nuzzar,* 3:164–65 (trans. Gibb and Beckingham, *Travels of Ibn Battuta,* 3:629–30).

54. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids,* 106.

55. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:373 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:398).

56. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:5, 7, 9 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:725, 727, 731).

57. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:10 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:732).

58. C. E. Bosworth, "Barbarian Incursions: The Coming of the Turks into the Islamic World," in D. S. Richards, ed., *Islamic Civilisation, 950–1150,* Papers on Islamic History 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 6–7, and repr. in C. E. Bosworth, *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (London: Variorum, 1977).

59. Abbas Azzavi, "İbni Hassul'ün Türkler hakkında bir eseri" [*Türk Tarih Kurumu*], *Belleten* 4 (1940), 235–66, plus fifty pages of Arabic text (here 40–43); extracts trans. in Ayalon, "Mamluks of the Seljuks," 314–15.

60. Bayhaqi, *Taʾrikh-i Bayhaqi,* 221.

61. Sadid al-Din Muhammad b. Muhammad ʿAwfi, *Jawamiʿ al-hikayat* (c. 1232–33), British Library ms. Or. 6376, fols. 263v-264r: this is the anecdote listed as no. 1729 in Muhammad Nizamʾd-Din, *Introduction to the Jawamiʿuʾl-hikayat wa lawamiʿuʾr-riwayat,* Gibb Memorial Series, new series, 8 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1929), 228.

62. Bayhaqi, *Taʾrikh-i Bayhaqi,* 615.

63. Nizam al-Mulk, *Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasat-nama,* ed. Hubert Darke (Tehran: Bangah-i Tarjama-u Nashr-i Kitab, 1968), 158; translated as Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government, or Rules for Kings: The Siyar al-Muluk, or Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk,* trans. Hubert Darke, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 117.

64. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Ta'rikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah,* 35–37. The simile of the pearl is first found in an early eleventh-century work: C. Edmund Bosworth, "Tha'alibi's Information on the Turks," in Rudolf Veselý and Eduard Gombár, eds., *Zafar Name: Memorial Volume of Felix Tauer* (Prague: Enigma, 1996), 61–66 (Arabic text at 63, tr. 64).

65. Wink, "India and Central Asia," 768.

66. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:323 (Raverty's trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:310, modified).

67. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:415 (Raverty's trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:512, modified).

68. E.g., in the Doab (Sultan Balban): Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz Shahi,* 57–58; in the Badaon and Katehr regions (Taj al-Din Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq): Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:26 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:755).

69. C. E. Bosworth, "A Turco-Mongol Practice amongst the Early Ghaznavids?" *Central Asiatic Journal* 7 (1962), 237–40, and repr. in idem, *Medieval History of Iran.* Cf. also Peter B. Golden, "The Karakhanids and Early Islam," in Sinor, ed., *Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia,* 359.

70. Peter Jackson, "Sultan Radiyya bint Iltutmish," in Gavin R. G. Hambly, ed., *Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, Piety* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 181–97.

71. Turkish officers continued to observe a taboo well known among Inner Asian nomadic societies—namely, the practice of beating to death in a carpet those of princely status in order to avoid shedding their blood on the ground: see Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, "La proibizione di versare il sangue nell'esecuzione d'un membro della dinastia presso i Turchi ed i Mongoli," in *Scritti in onore Luigi Bonelli,* Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, nuova serie 1 (Rome: Edizioni universitarie, 1940), 15–23. Unfortunately, the only piece of hard evidence from the Delhi Sultanate relates to the murder of Sultan Kayqubad in 1290, when the perpetrator may have been an immigrant Mongol *amir* rather than a Turk: Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz Shahi,* 173.

72. Jean-Paul Roux, "Recherche des survivances pré-islamiques dans les textes turcs musulmans: Le *Babur-Name,*" *Journal asiatique* 256 (1969), 247–61; idem, "Recherche des survivances pré-islamiques dans les textes turcs musulmans: Le *Kitab-i Dede Qorqut,*" *Journal asiatique* 264 (1976), 35–55.

73. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:403 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:476–78).

74. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids,* 106, points out, however, that a considerable proportion of these *ghulams* had formerly belonged to *amirs* who had fallen foul of the Ghaznawid sultan Mas'ud. For an earlier example of desertion to the Seljuks, see Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:250 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:129).

75. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:236 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:99–100). On this version of Tughril's career, however, see the doubts expressed by Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids,* 42–43.

76. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids,* 105–106.

77. Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil fi l-ta'rikh,* 12:122–23 (Beirut reprint, 12:187–88); he also alleges that a leading *ghulam* commander, Taj al-Din Yildiz, made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Ghazni, though no other source confirms this.

78. Wink, "India and Central Asia," 764–65.

79. Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil fi l-ta'rikh,* 12:140 (Beirut reprint, 12:214).

80. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:371–72 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:395–96); a slightly different version, claiming that the late sultan's widow put them up to it, is in Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:377 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:408). See Peter Jackson, "The Fall of the Ghurid Dynasty," in Carole Hillenbrand, ed., *Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth,* vol. 2, *The Sultan's Turret: Studies in Persian and Turkish Culture* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 230–31.

81. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:456 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:634–35); see also 2:36 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:779).

82. Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz Shahi,* 27–28, 550. Cf. Jackson, "*Mamluk* Institution," 345–49; and idem, *Delhi Sultanate,* 65–70. The passage from Barani is translated in Habib, "Formation," 15–16.

83. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:460 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:642–43), for Raziyya; and cf. 1:461 (trans. 1:645) for Yaqut's Habshi origins; and 1:466–67, 469 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:642–43, 658, 662) for Bahram Shah and Muhadhdhab al-Din respectively.

84. See Jackson, "*Mamluk* Institution," 349; and idem, *Delhi Sultanate,* 68–69.

85. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:226 (cf. Raverty trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:71).

86. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 2:48 (cf. Raverty trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 2:801).

87. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:442 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:600).

88. Ibn Battuta, *Tuhfat al-nuzzar,* 3:171 (trans. Gibb and Beckingham, *Travels of Ibn Battuta,* 3:633).

89. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:268–69 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:169–70), for example, suggests that the great Seljuk sultan Sanjar envisaged his dominions passing into the hands of his slaves because he had no son.

90. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:412 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:500); at 1:393 (trans., 1:438), he is alleged to have entrusted (*sipurd*) Ghazni to Yildiz.

91. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:412 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:501); and Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil fi l-ta'rikh,* 12:140–41, 146 (Beirut reprint, 12:214, 221). For the struggle for Ghazni, from which Yildiz emerged victorious, see Jackson, "Fall of the Ghurid Dynasty," 213–16, 220.

92. Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz Shahi,* 550.

93. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:410–11 (Raverty's trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:497, modified).

94. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:411, 415 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:497–98, 508–12).

95. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:323 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:310).

96. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:418: *qutb al-dinra nazar-i mulkdari bar sultan shams al-din bud-u ura pisar khwanda bud* (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:530); see also 1:443: *ura farzand khwand* (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:603).

97. Paul G. Forand, "The Relation of the Slave and the Client to the Master or Patron in Medieval Islam," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971), 61; and Patricia Crone, *Roman, Provincial, and Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 36–38.

98. On all this, see Jackson, *Delhi Sultanate,* 26–27, 31–32; and idem, "Fall of the Ghurid Dynasty," 210–11.

99. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri,* 1:226 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri,* 1:69–70). See also C. E. Bosworth, "The Heritage of Rulership in Early Islamic Iran and the Search for Dynastic Connections with the Past," *Iran* 11 (1973), 61, repr. in his *Medieval History of Iran.*

100. On which see Bosworth, "Heritage of Rulership," 57.

101. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 2:43, 45, 47–48, 220–21 (trans. Raverty, *Tabakat-i Nasiri*, 2:791, 796, 799–800, 1295). For the Yemek/Kimek, see above, note 26.

102. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 2:441 (cf. Raverty trans., *Tabakat-i Nasiri*, 1:599).

103. See, for instance, the adoption of the title "daughter of the Emperor of the Cumans" by Elizabeth (consort of István V of Hungary, 1270–72), whose father can only have been chief over one among several Cuman groupings: cited by T. Halasi-Kun, "Ottoman Data on Lesser Cumania: Keçkemet Nahiyesi—Varoş-i Halaş—Kariye-i Kökut," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984), 95n19; and by Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom*, 262.

VIII

THE *MAMLŪK* INSTITUTION IN EARLY MUSLIM INDIA*

When Muslim forces under the Ghurid sultan, Mu'izz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, made their first major breakthrough into Hindūstān in the 1190s, they brought with them two institutions that had long since taken root in the Islamic world. One was the *iqṭā'*, or assignment of land or its revenue, in some cases in return for military service (sometimes misrepresented as "fief" on the Western European model).[1] The other was the *mamlūk*, or military slave. *Mamlūk* status, it should be stressed, bore none of the degrading connotations associated with other types of slavery: *mamlūks* – generally Turks from the Eurasian steppelands – were highly prized by their masters, receiving both instruction in the Islamic faith and a rigorous training in the martial arts, and were not employed in any menial capacity. The *mamlūk* institution, whose origins go back to the first century of Islam, came into vogue from the first half of the third/ninth century, as the 'Abbasid Caliphs built up a corps of Turkish *mamlūk* guards and their example was followed, with the disintegration of their empire, by the various autonomous dynasties that sprang up in the provinces.[2] Turkish slave officers themselves went on

* The substance of a previous draft of this paper was read at a conference on "Islamization in South Asia" sponsored by the Oxford Centre of Islamic Studies and the Centre for Indian Studies in Oxford in July 1989. It arises out of a book on the history of the Delhi Sultanate on which I am currently working.

Abbreviations:

ARIE	*Annual Report on Indian Epigraphy*
BSO(A)S	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies*
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal*
EI²	*The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. by Ch. Pellat *et al.* (Leiden, 1954– in progress)
JA	*Journal Asiatique*
RCEA	*Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*, ed. Ét. Combe *et al.* (Cairo, 1931– in progress)

[1] See Cl. Cahen, "L'évolution de l'iqṭā' du ix^e^ au xiii^e^ siècle. Contribution à une histoire comparée des sociétés médiévales", *Annales: économies sociétés, civilisations*, viii (1953), pp. 25–52, repr. in his *Les peuples musulmans dans l'histoire médiévale* (Damascus, 1977), pp. 231–69; A. K. S. Lambton, "Reflections on the *iqṭā'*", in George Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 358–76, repr. in her *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government* (London, 1980); C. E. Bosworth, "Barbarian incursions: the coming of the Turks into the Islamic world", in D. S. Richards (ed.), *Islamic Civilisation 950–1150* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 14–15, repr. in his *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (London, 1977).

[2] David Ayalon, "Preliminary remarks on the *Mamlūk* military institution in Islam", in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 44–58, repr. in his *The Mamlūk Military Society* (London, 1979); Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Polity* (Cambridge, 1980); Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven and London, 1981); Bosworth, "Barbarian incursions", pp. 4–10.

to found dynasties, as in the case of the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids in Egypt and the Ghaznawids in the eastern Iranian world. The institution surely entered upon its heyday in the seventh/thirteenth century, with the military coup of 648/1250 in Cairo: a group of *mamlūk* officers overthrew the last Ayyubid sultan of Egypt and inaugurated a regime in which slave status was the essential qualification for high military and administrative office. This polity – the "Mamlūk Sultanate" *par excellence* – has to its credit the successful defence of Egypt and Syria against the pagan Mongols and the elimination of the Christian states on the eastern Mediterranean littoral; it was also remarkable for its longevity, surviving until the Ottoman conquest in 922–3/1516–17.

The Delhi state too has been designated as a "Mamlūk Sultanate" with regard to the first nine decades of its history. It was founded by *mamlūk*s: Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg, one of the numerous Turkish slaves whom the Ghurid Mu'izz al-Dīn is known to have accumulated,[3] and Aybeg's own slave Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish. For much of the seventh/thirteenth century it rested upon an élite corps of Turkish *mamlūk*s, who largely provided the military leadership, the provincial governors and the great officers of state. It is of course misleading to speak of Mamlūk or Slave "dynasties" at either Cairo or Delhi. Only one Egyptian Mamlūk sultan, the formidable Qalāwūn (d. 689/1290), whose descendants governed Egypt and Syria, with two brief intervals, down until 784/1382, can be said to have founded a dynasty.[4] In Delhi, prior to the so-called "Khaljī revolution" (which, by an odd yet totally meaningless coincidence, occurred in the very year that Qalāwūn died), the throne had been occupied first by Iltutmish and his descendants (607–664/1211–1266) and then by Iltutmish's former *mamlūk* Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban and his family (664–689/1266–1290); but apart from the respective founders no member of either dynasty was a slave. (Perhaps appellations like "the Shamsid dynasty" and "the Ghiyathids" would be more useful.)

By comparison with their *confrères* in Egypt and Syria, the *mamlūk*s in Muslim India have been sadly neglected. *Mamlūk* notables have been dealt with either in the context of the nobility in general, as for example in Nigam's book (where slave status is not mentioned until p. 24 and then only

[3] Minhāj al-Dīn Abū-'Umar 'Uthmān b. Sirāj al-Dīn Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, 2nd ed. (Kabul, 1342–3 sh./1963–4, 2 vols), i, p. 410, tr. H. G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i-Nāṣirī: a General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia* (London, 1872–81, 2 vols with continuous pagination), p. 497.

[4] See Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: the Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382* (London, 1986).

fleetingly),[5] or in the course of a straight narrative of political events.[6] This paper represents an attempt to understand the history of the seventh/thirteenth-century Sultanate in the light of developments in the near-contemporary empire based at Cairo. Such a comparison can, of course, only be partial: the two "Mamlūk" Sultanates differed considerably in many respects, including the nature of the *mamlūk* aristocracy itself. And there are admittedly problems attendant on a study of the Turkish *mamlūk* élite in India. One is the mutilation of Turkish proper names in the Arabic-Persian script (this includes nicknames, e.g. *qabaqulaq*, literally "he of the protruding ears",[7] which has generally been rendered "Qīqluq" or "Qutluq"). Another is the titulature employed at the Delhi court, which was largely consistent from one reign to another. Whether there was a recognised *cursus honorum* we cannot tell. But a particular proper name seems to be regularly linked with a particular *laqab*, e.g. Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin, Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar. And titles evidently did rotate, so that the same style, say, Qutlugh Khān or 'Ayn al-Mulk, might be borne by a succession of officers within as short a space as two decades. Unfortunately, this has sometimes been ignored by modern writers, who have assumed that they are dealing with one man when two or more are in question.[8] It is only seldom that our sources help us by being more explicit, as when Baranī refers to Malik Qiran-i 'Alā'ī,[9] i.e. "the Malik Qiran of 'Alā' al-Dīn's reign".

But the greatest problem is undoubtedly the dearth of sources, since the

[5] S. B. P. Nigam, *Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi* (New Delhi, 1968).

[6] Muḥammad 'Azīz Aḥmad, *Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi (1206–1290 A.D.)* (Lahore, 1949).

[7] Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 25–7, 36 (tr. pp. 754–6, 780): in the very old B.L. MS Add. 26,189, the third letter is clearly *qāf*, and at fo. 186^{v} the name is spelled QBQLQ; cf. also India Office MS I.O. 3745, fo. 280^{v}. For the two words, see Sir Gerard Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-thirteenth-century Turkish* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 580–1, 621. A number of Turkish names encountered among Egyptian *mamlūk*s are listed in Jean Sauvaget, "Noms et surnoms de Mamelouks", *JA*, CCXXXVIII (1950), pp. 31–58; see also A. von Le Coq, "Türkische Namen und Titel in Indien", in *Aus Indiens Kultur: Festgabe für Richard von Garbe...zu seinem 70. Geburtstag* (Erlangen, 1927), pp. 1–7.

[8] For example, Ishwari Prasad, *A History of the Qaraunah Turks in India* (Allāhābād, 1936), pp. 5–6, identified a Malik Jawna in the reign of 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī with the future sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq, who bore that title prior to his father's accession in 720/1320. Yet Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Baranī, *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, ed. Saiyid Aḥmad Khán (Calcutta, 1860–2), p. 336, lists the first Jawna among the nobles who backed 'Alā' al-Dīn's treacherous coup against his uncle and who survived only a few years thereafter; cf. also p. 248, where the reference to "the former Malik Jawna" makes it clear that this is an honorific. Ghulam Husain Yazdani, too, seriously believed that the Nuṣrat Khān of an inscription dated 669/1271 was the Nuṣrat Khān of the early years of 'Alā' al-Dīn Khalji: "Inscription of Sultan Balban from Bayana, Bharatpur State", *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica* (1937–8), pp. 5–6. But we are in fact clearly told that Malik Nuṣrat Jalīsarī received this title on 'Alā' al-Dīn's accession in 695/1296: Baranī, p. 242. In *ARIE* (1972–3), p. 14, Yazdani's suggestion is refuted, but Nuṣrat Khān is wrongly equated with Balaban's cousin Shīr Khān.

[9] Baranī, p. 40.

student of mediaeval Indian history has access to nothing like the rich corpus of material (chronicles, biographies, administrative manuals, and biographical dictionaries) that is available for contemporary Egypt.[10] From the rhapsodic passages on the Turks composed by Fakhr-i Mudabbir, writing in Lahore at the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century, and by Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, writing in Delhi a few decades later, we can infer that the qualities for which *mamlūk*s were prized in India and in the West were identical: courage, extreme hardiness born of infancy in the steppe, steadfastness in Islam, and so on.[11] But it is impossible, for example, to document the training of the Sultanate's *mamlūk*s, investigated in the Egyptian context by Dr Hassanein Rabie,[12] or even to compose a survey of the slave contingents in the army in the way that Professor Edmund Bosworth has done for the Ghaznawids.[13] And we hardly ever know the precise point at which a slave was manumitted, because the sources fail to tell us[14] (hence, at every occurrence of the word "slave" in this paper, please add: "or possibly freedman"!).

Moreover, a significant proportion even of what source material we do possess is unreliable. The early decades of the Sultanate are covered by Jūzjānī's *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*. But from 658/1260, when that work was completed, down to the reign of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī (695–715/1296–1316) – forty years or so which were of major importance in the history of the *mamlūk* institution in India – there are simply no contemporary chronicles (with the exception of two *mathnawī*s by the poet Amīr Khusraw: *Qirān al-sa'dayn*, recounting the meeting between Sultan Kayqubād and his father in 686/1287, and *Miftāḥ al-futūh*, commemorating the victories of Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī in the years 689–90/1290–1). We are consequently thrown back on the mid eighth/fourteenth-century writer Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Baranī, whose *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, as Dr Peter Hardy has shown, is not so much a

[10] Evidenced in the numerous articles on the Egyptian *mamlūk*s in Ayalon, *The Mamlūk Military Society*, and in his other collection, *Studies on the Mamlūks of Egypt (1250–1517)* (London, 1977).

[11] Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajara* (or *Baḥr*) *al-ansāb*, partial ed. E. Denison Ross, *Ta'rikh* [*sic*] *-i Fakhru'd-Din Mubárakshàh* (London, 1927), pp. 37, 49–50; Jūzjānī, i, p. 410 (tr. p. 497).

[12] H. Rabie, "The training of the Mamlūk Fāris", in Parry and Yapp, pp. 153–63.

[13] C. E. Bosworth, "Ghaznevid military organisation", *Der Islam*, XXXVI (1960), pp. 40–50; *idem*, *The Ghaznavids*, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1973), pp. 101–6.

[14] Jūzjānī, i, p. 373 (tr. p. 398), alleges that on Mu'izz al-Dīn's death in 602/1206 his slaves Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz and Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg had requested manumission from the new sultan of Ghūr, his nephew Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd. According to the same author, i, p. 444 (tr. p. 605), Iltutmish had been freed (before this!) by Aybeg on the express orders of Mu'izz al-Dīn. Baranī, p. 25, specifies that Balaban had been freed (*āzād shuda*): Khāliq Aḥmad Niẓāmī, in Muḥammad Ḥabīb and K. A. Niẓāmī (eds), *The Delhi Sultanat (A.D. 1206–1526)* (Delhi, 1970. *A Comprehensive History of India*, v), p. 281, is therefore incorrect in stating that there is no reference to his manumission.

chronicle as a series of highly impressionistic vignettes calculated to express the author's own view of morality and history.[15]

Jūzjānī dedicated his work to Sultan Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Iltutmish, but he wrote as a client of the *de facto* ruler and future sultan, Ulugh Khān Balaban, who held the office of *nā'ib* or "viceroy", and he accordingly focuses attention on Balaban's master Iltutmish and on Iltutmish's slaves, the Shamsīs, to whose number Balaban belonged. The penultimate *ṭabaqa* (xxii) of the work comprises biographies of twenty-five of these slaves, and Balaban is accorded the longest biography of all. The subjects of the other notices range from slaves who had been purchased at an early date by Iltutmish, but were by now long dead, to Balaban's own brother and cousin. There are, however, significant omissions. The career of Balaban's great enemy Qutlugh Khān is nowhere sketched.[16] Only one of the biographies is devoted to a non-Turkish slave, the Indian-born Hindū Khān, and none at all to a free-born grandee. The Ghūrī *malik* Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. 'Alī (d. 653/1255), for instance, is known twice to have held the office second only to the sultan, that of *nā'ib*. Yet he and other non-Turkish commanders are mentioned only in passing, in the biographies of their *mamlūk* colleagues.[17]

This pronounced slant of the *Ṭabaqāt* serves to obscure an important fact. Turkish slaves never enjoyed quite the monopoly of political authority in the Delhi Sultanate, even in the seventh/thirteenth century, that they did in Mamlūk Egypt. In different degrees at different times they had to share power with other groups, principally: (1) free-born immigrants, primarily from Transoxiana and Khurāsān (including notables from Ghūr and Turkish *amīr*s), whose entry into the Sultanate was accelerated in the wake of the Mongol irruption of 1219–23; (2) Khalaj tribesmen, originally from the "Garmsīr" of present-day Afghanistan,[18] who were responsible for the establishment of Muslim rule over western Bengal around the turn of the

[15] P. Hardy, *Historians of Medieval India* (London, 1960), especially chapter 2; *idem*, "Baranī", *EI*²; cf. also *idem*, "Didactic historical writing in Indian Islam: Ziyā al-Dīn Baranī's treatment of the reign of Sultan Muḥammad Tughluq (1324–1351)", in Yohanan Friedmann (ed.), *Islam in Asia*, i. *South Asia* (Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 38–59.

[16] Were it not for an 'Alīgaṛh inscription of 652/1254, we should not even know his personal name (Balaban) and other honorifics: *RCEA*, XI (1941–2), pp. 258–9 (no. 4394). Nigam, pp. 41, 198–9, 203, follows the incorrect readings of the Nassau Lees ed. of Jūzjānī and hence confuses Qutlugh Khān with Qilich Khān, a free-born noble who was the son of 'Alā' al-Dīn Jānī. For the same error, see also Niẓāmī, in Ḥabīb and Niẓāmī, pp. 262, 271–2; at pp. 262, 265, he calls him "Ḥusām al-Dīn" by confusion with yet a third person.

[17] Jūzjānī, i, pp. 468, 489 (tr. pp. 661, 702). He had at one time been *wakīl-i dar* to Iltutmish, according to Baranī, p. 39. The same author, p. 113, tells us that one Shams-i Mu'īn composed volumes (*mujalladāt*) in commemoration of Quṭb al-Dīn; apparently none of this work has survived.

[18] Vladimir Minorsky, "The Turkish dialect of the Khalaj", *BSOS*, X (1940), pp. 417–37, repr. in his *The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the Middle Ages* (London, 1978); C. E. Bosworth, "Khaladj. I. History", *EI*².

sixth/twelfth century, continued to feature in the heterogeneous armies of the Delhi Sultans thereafter,[19] and from 689/1290 to 720/1320 provided the ruling dynasty; and (3) slaves of non-Turkish extraction, among whom particular mention should be made of Indians and black Africans ("Ḥabashīs"). To these three groups we might add the last two in order of appearance on the scene: (4) Indian converts to Islam; and (5) "neo-Muslims", a term seemingly reserved for those Mongol immigrants who entered the Sultanate following the upheavals in the Mongol world after *c.* 1260. It is as yet too early to include (6) the Afghans, who are first being employed by Balaban as garrisons in newly constructed fortresses in the mid seventh/thirteenth century[20] but are not found in the higher *échelons* of the administration before the Tughluqid era.

What, then, do the sources tell us of the position of the Turkish *mamlūk*s during the seventh/thirteenth century? Baranī begins his history with the reign of Balaban, but he prefaces it with some brief remarks about Balaban's predecessors and the domination of the Shamsīs. During the reign of Iltutmish, he says, *malik*s, *wazīr*s and other notables (*ma'ārif*) came to his court to escape the Mongol terror. But after his death his Turkish *chihilgānī* slaves grew powerful and, through the weakness of his successors, were able to kill the immigrant grandees on every pretext: with their removal, the Shamsī slaves rose and became *khān*s.[21] Who were the *chihilgānī*s? The question has been investigated by Professor Gavin Hambly, who reached no definite conclusion as to the origin of the term.[22] At one point Baranī refers to "the forty" (*chihil*), and this led the later compilators Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad and Firishta to assert that Iltutmish had forty slaves:[23] their testimony is of dubious value, though it nevertheless gave rise to notions of a "college of forty".[24] Yet we cannot be certain that these magnates were forty in number. Baranī on every other occasion uses the distributive

[19] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 46 (tr. Raverty, p. 798).

[20] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 80 (tr. pp. 852–3). Baranī, pp. 57, 58.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[22] Gavin Hambly, "Who were the Chihilgānī, the Forty Slaves of Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish of Delhi?", *Iran*, X (1972), pp. 57–62.

[23] Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad Bakhshī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Akbarī*, i, ed. B. De (Calcutta, 1927), p. 78, and tr. *idem* (Calcutta, 1927), p. 93; Firishta, *Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1247/1831–2, 2 vols), i, p. 130. Possibly these authors were also influenced by 'Iṣāmī's story that Iltutmish was offered forty slaves by a trader: he bought them all except Balaban, the future sultan: *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. A. S. Usha (Madras, 1948), p. 122, tr. A. Mahdi Husain ('Alīgaṛh, 1967–77, 3 vols with continuous pagination), p. 238. In a similar tale transmitted by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, however, the number of slaves the sultan was offered is a hundred: *Tuḥfat al-nuẓẓār*, ed. and tr. Ch. Defrémery and B. R. Sanguinetti (Paris, 1853–8, 4 vols), iii, pp. 171–2, tr. H. A. R. Gibb, *The travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa A.D. 1325–1354* (Cambridge, 1958–71, 3 vols so far with continuous pagination), pp. 633–4.

[24] Sir Wolseley Haig, in *The Cambridge History of India*, iii. *Turks and Afghans* (Cambridge,

numeral, which suggests, rather, that each of the *chihilgānī*s commanded a corps of forty *mamlūk*s. This can only be a matter of conjecture, but we should notice in passing that in Egypt the royal *mamlūk*s were divided into groups of forty, each under an *amīr ṭablkhāna* (so termed from the band that played outside his gatès as a mark of honour).[25]

Hambly reviewed a number of theories about the *chihilgānī*s, none of which, he observed, rested on any solid evidence. It is true that the bloody conflict described by Baranī is nowhere expressly mentioned by Jūzjānī, writing in 658/1260 when the hegemony of the Shamsī *mamlūk*s was almost at its zenith. But the onset of the process is clearly visible in his account of the troubled reign of Rukn al-Dīn Fīrūz Shāh (633–4/1236), who, according to the eighth/fourteenth-century author 'Iṣāmī, failed to accord his father's Turkish officers sufficient attention.[26] Some of these Turks, it seems, had already shown their disenchantment with him by leaving the court and making for "Hindūstān", but they were brought back: among them was Balaban-i Khʷurd ("the Lesser" – the future sultan), who suffered a short spell of imprisonment.[27] And when Fīrūz Shāh set out against a group of rebel *amīr*s, the Turks mutinied in the Tarā'in region and slew a great many bureaucrats of non-Turkish ("Tājīk") extraction.[28] A few years later, on the deposition of Raḍiyya and the enthronement of Mu'izz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh in 637/1240, the Turkish *amīr*s took a further step to concentrate power in their own hands, with the institution of the office of *nā'ib* (viceroy), which was entrusted to Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin.[29] In 640/1242 the *wazīr* Muhadhdhab al-Dīn began to give himself airs and tried to exclude "the Turkish *amīr*s" from all state business, whereupon they attacked and killed him outside Delhi.[30] In 653/1255, the Ghūrī *malik* Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. 'Alī, who had apparently been *nā'ib* during Balaban's brief period of disgrace, was summarily executed soon after Balaban's resumption of power.[31]

1928), pp. 61–2. A. B. M. Habibullah, *The foundation of Muslim rule in India*, 2nd ed. (Allāhābād, 1961), p. 346. K. A. Niẓāmī, *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century* ('Alīgaṛh, 1961), p. 127, n. 7, and in Ḥabīb and Niẓāmī, pp. 232–4.

[25] Ayalon, "Studies on the structure of the Mamlūk army – II", *BSOAS*, XV (1953), pp. 469–70, repr. in his *Studies on the Mamlūks of Egypt*.

[26] 'Iṣāmī, p. 130 (tr. Husain, p. 248; though at n. 1 Husain wrongly lists the Turks in question as the sultan's brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn and the rebel *amīr*s Sālārī, Jānī, Kabīr Khān and "Kirjī" [i.e. Kūchī], none of whom except Kabīr Khān was a *mamlūk*).

[27] Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 49, 51 (tr. Raverty, pp. 802, 805). Raverty (p. 802, n. 2) was surely wrong to identify this obscure episode with the mutiny at Tarā'in (see below).

[28] *Ibid.*, i, p. 456 (tr. Raverty, pp. 634–5). Habibullah (p. 116) describes the victims ambiguously as the sultan's "personal attendants": this term applies more to the perpetrators.

[29] Jūzjānī, i, pp. 462–3, and ii, p. 23 (tr. Raverty, pp. 649–50, 750–1).

[30] *Ibid.*, i, p. 469, and ii, pp. 27, 42 (tr. pp. 662, 757, 787).

[31] *Ibid.*, i, p. 489 (tr. p. 702; and see Raverty's comments at n. 3 *ibid.*).

Thus far, then, other sources do provide corroborating evidence for Baranī's analysis. There are grounds, nevertheless, for regarding that analysis as somewhat simplistic. To speak of the Turkish *mamlūk* element without further qualification, as if it constituted a monolithic group, is misleading. In the first place, we need to distinguish between slaves who had attained prominence in the state apparatus, receiving perhaps a large *iqṭā'*, and those still maintained in the sultan's household (*bandagān-i khāṣṣ*), who tended, while on campaign, to be stationed in the centre (*qalb*) of the army. The slave officers of the household and of the sultan's own guard – referred to by Jūzjānī as "the Turkish *amīr*s and household slaves who were in attendance on the centre" or, again, as "the centre contingents and Turkish *amīr*s"[32] – appear initially as a group with distinct interests of their own. Probably many of them were slaves purchased by Iltutmish at a relatively late date. One of the two men named as ringleaders at Tarā'in, 'Izz al-Dīn Balaban (subsequently entitled Küshlü Khān), had been acquired in 624/1227; by the time of the sultan's death (633/1236) he had become *muqṭa'* of Baran.[33] But the *émeute* surely involved many others who had not as yet obtained important office within the private household of the sovereign. It is noteworthy that Balaban-i Khʷurd had entered Iltutmish's service as recently as 630/1232–3 and at his master's death had risen no higher than the rank of falconer (*khāṣadār*), where he remained into the reign of Raḍiyya.[34] Of his brother, Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg (subsequently Keshli Khān), who seems to have been purchased by one of Iltutmish's envoys to Baghdad and Egypt in 629/1231–2, we are told that until Raḍiyya's reign he was simply a member of the private household.[35] Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar (the later Arslan Khān), who had been obtained from the same source and doubtless at the same time, was also a mere falconer until that point.[36] As we shall see, even these *mamlūk*s

[32] *Ibid.*, i, p. 456 (tr. pp. 634, 636).

[33] *Ibid*, ii, p. 36 (tr. 778–9): he was purchased outside the walls of Mandōr. The title is *küshlü*[*k*] ("strong", "powerful"): Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–75, 4 vols), iii, p. 639 (no. 1676).

[34] Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 48, 51 (tr. Raverty, pp. 801–2, 806): the meaning of *khāṣadār* was established by S. H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim history* (Bombay, 1939–57, 2 vols), ii, pp. 67–8.

[35] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 46, *khidmat-i dargāh-i khāṣṣ mīkard* (tr. pp. 797–8). This mission, during which he was purchased by Ikhtiyār al-Mulk Abū-Bakr Ḥabash, is doubtless identical with the embassy from India mentioned by an Egyptian chronicler *s.a.* 629: Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, vii, ed. Sa'īd 'Āshūr, *Der Bericht über die Ayyubiden* (Freiburg, 1391/1972. Deutsches archäologisches Institut, Kairo: Quellen zur Geschichte des islamischen Ägyptens, Ig), p. 305. The precise form of his title is obscure, but it seems to be identical with that borne by a Khwarazmian *amīr* earlier in the century: Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī (Leiden and London, 1912–37, 3 vols. Gibb Memorial Series, xvi), i, p. 80, tr. J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-conqueror* (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols with continuous pagination), p. 103 (though Boyle, n. 19 *ibid.*, erroneously equates Keshli with Küshlü, as Barthold had done).

[36] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 34, with the reading *khāṣadār*, which is found also in the B.L. MS Add. 26,189, fo. 207ᵛ (cf. tr. pp. 766–7, based on the alternative *jāmadār*, "keeper of the wardrobe").

would not always act as a homogeneous group; but for the time being, at any rate, they seem to have been more conscious of what separated them from outsiders than of internal differences. Their status and aspirations would have set them not only against free-born nobles – including Turks – but even, on occasions, against the more senior *mamlūk*s of Iltutmish.

Moreover, if the Shamsī *mamlūk*s resented undue influence on the part of immigrant grandees and bureaucrats, their jealousy could also be provoked by the rise of slaves belonging to whoever of Iltutmish's progeny was on the throne. In the later Ayyubid and Mamlūk empires based in Cairo, it was the aim of each new sovereign to reduce the influence of his predecessor's *mamlūk*s and to promote his own.[37] This was the case whether he was his predecessor's son or a usurper totally unrelated to him. The task had to be accomplished gradually and in circumspect fashion. The example of Tūrān Shāh, the last Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, shows us what could happen when subtle tactics were jettisoned: by endeavouring to bring in his own party too quickly, he alienated his father's Baḥrī *mamlūk* regiment and precipitated his own downfall and that of his dynasty. The pattern of developments in Egypt raises questions about what was happening in Muslim India at a slightly earlier date. There is evidence that for a time the most serviceable instruments available to a new sovereign seeking to build up his own party were slaves of African origin. Raḍiyya, for example, relied excessively on her African (Ḥabashī) slave master of the horse (*amīr-i ākhūr*), Jamāl al-Dīn Yāqūt, so that in 637/1240 the Turkish *amīr*s mutinied, executed Yāqūt and deposed her.[38] 'Alā' al-Dīn Mas'ūd Shāh (639–644/1242–1246), too, is alleged by Jūzjānī to have listened to base nobodies; according to the later chronicler Sihrindī, they included Ḥabashīs.[39] In such cases, the antipathy of Turkish slave elements might also have had a racial dimension. Yet from time to time we glimpse a Turkish slave belonging to some former sultan other than Iltutmish, such as Begtemür Orkhān-i Ruknī (presumably a *mamlūk* of Sultan Rukn al-Dīn Fīrūz Shāh), who was killed fighting in Balaban's cause in 653/1255.[40] It may be that *mamlūk*s of former rulers who had lost out on their master's downfall later retrieved their fortunes in some measure by

[37] Ayalon, "Studies on the structure of the Mamlūk army – I", *BSOAS*, XV (1953), pp. 208–10. For an earlier parallel, from the reign of the Ghaznawid Mas'ūd I, see Bosworth, "Ghaznevid military organisation", pp. 44–5.

[38] 'Iṣāmī, p. 134 (tr. Husain, p. 253). See also Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, iii, p. 167 (tr. Gibb, p. 631), who adds that he was a slave of *hers*. At one point Jūzjānī specifies that the mutineers were the Shamsī slaves: ii, p. 21, *mulūk-u umarā-yi turk ki bandagān-i Shamsī būdand* (tr. Raverty, p. 748, is misleading); but see below and n. 42.

[39] Jūzjānī, i, p. 471 (tr. pp. 668–9). Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad Sihrindī, *Ta'rīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, ed. S. M. Hidayat Hosain (Calcutta, 1931), p. 34.

[40] Jūzjānī, i, p. 490, and ii, p. 29 (tr. pp. 703, 760).

enlisting in a new political constellation,[41] and that such an opportunity was furnished by the split within the ranks of the Shamsīs themselves.

At no time, finally, did an identifiable party of Turkish *mamlūk*s exclude free-born and non-Turkish elements. According to Jūzjānī, Ghūrī and "Tājīk" as well as Turkish *malik*s were scandalised at the position of Yāqūt in Raḍiyya's counsels.[42] And of her successor Mu'izz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh (637–639/1240–1242), we are told, again, that he aroused the distrust of "Ghūrī and Turkish *amīr*s".[43] Indeed, the structure of power that emerged following Bahrām Shāh's overthrow bears the marks of a compromise between the different groups. At first, the leading figure among the rebels, Küshlü Khān, endeavoured to have himself recognised as sultan. But he found no support: possibly the Ghūrīs and others resisted the succession of a Turkish slave, and his fellow-Shamsīs for their part were unwilling to jettison the family of their old master Iltutmish. The sultanate was accordingly settled on a son of Fīrūz Shāh, 'Alā' al-Dīn Mas'ūd. The office of *nā'ib* was recreated and entrusted to Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan, who presumably headed the Ghūrī *amīr*s offended by the late sultan; one of the senior Shamsī *mamlūk*s, Qaraqush Khān, became *amīr ḥājib*; while Küshlü Khān was consoled with an extensive but distant *iqṭā'*.[44]

So far, I have tried to show that the picture given by Baranī of the reigns of Iltutmish's first successors is simplistic and misleading. Later in his history, Baranī tells how Balaban destroyed his fellow-Shamsī slaves; and here – though perhaps because he is our only source – he would appear to be more reliable. Balaban's rise dates from 642/1244 when he replaced Qaraqush Khān as *amīr ḥājib*.[45] In 647/1249 he became *nā'ib* and was granted the style of Ulugh Khān, and the sultan, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh (644–664/1246–1266), married his daughter. Now for the first time we can witness the creation of a new party among the Shamsī slave establishment. The viceroy transmitted his office of *amīr ḥājib* to his brother Keshli Khān, and a number of other supporters were promoted: the Shamsī Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar *Teniz Khān, who invariably appears as a loyal henchman of Balaban, became deputy *amīr ḥājib*; Balaban's own slave, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin-i *mūī darāz* ("the Long-haired"), moved up to succeed Keshli Khān as *amīr-i*

[41] As certainly occurred in Mamlūk Egypt: Ayalon, "Studies on the structure of the Mamlūk army – I", pp. 217–20.

[42] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 23 (tr. p. 750).

[43] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 164 (tr. p. 1133).

[44] *Ibid.*, i, p. 468, and ii, pp. 20, 36–7 (tr. pp. 661–2, 747, 780). Habibullah (p. 124) was surely right to see some kind of coalition behind these arrangements.

[45] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 53 (tr. p. 809); earlier, i, p. 469 (tr. p. 664), the date of this promotion is given as 640/1242.

ākhūr; and so on.[46] The new regime proceeded in 648–9/1250–1 to make a concerted attack on Küshlü Khān, who was deprived of all his *iqṭā*'s in favour of the viceroy's supporters and kinsmen: his holdings in Sind were secured by Balaban's cousin Shīr Khān, while Keshli Khān obtained Nāgawr.[47] From this point too we can discern the formation of an opposition faction, also led, it is important to note, by Shamsīs.[48] In 650/1252 Küshlü Khān had his revenge when Balaban was dismissed and replaced as viceroy by Quṭb al-Din Ḥasan Ghūrī; and in a general reshuffle of appointments his friends and family were demoted.[49] Küshlü Khān and his allies, who included the shadowy Qutlugh Khān and the Indian eunuch 'Imād al-Dīn Rayhān,[50] shared out offices among themselves until Balaban was restored to favour in 652/1254.

Nigam sees the pattern as the elimination of rival elements such as Africans or Tājīks, leaving the Turks unchallenged, followed by a phase in which rival Turkish factions struggled for power but in a more restrained fashion, involving bloodless changes of regime and compromises.[51] Whether the conflicts of the 1250s were in fact more restrained is questionable. Certainly there was no repetition of the massacre of 634/1236, which has the appearance of small-scale genocide; but we still see the political murders of individuals like 'Imād al-Dīn Rayhān and Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. 'Alī Ghūrī, who both perished following Balaban's restoration.[52] In contrast, moreover,

[46] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 60 (tr. pp. 820–1). For Keshli Khān, see also ii, p. 46 (tr. p. 798). *Teniz Khān's appointment and his support for Balaban are also mentioned at ii, p. 29 (tr. p. 759). His title is uncertain. Raverty rendered it as "Tīz Khān", and Ḥabībī's edition reads TR, but in the B.L. MS Add. 26,189, fo. 206^{r-v}, the "tooth" between T and Z has no diacritical points: for *teniz/dengiz* ("sea", "ocean"), see Doerfer, iii, pp. 205–7 (no. 1192); Clauson, p. 527. That Aytegin-i *mūī-yi darāz* was Balaban's own slave emerges from Baranī, p. 83.

[47] Jūzjānī, i, pp. 484–5, and ii, pp. 37–8, 46 (tr. pp. 689–90, 781, 783–4, 798). Habibullah, pp. 134–5.

[48] Habibullah, p. 126, was quite wrong to see the government during Balaban's eclipse in 650–2/1252–4 as a "non-Turkish administration" attempting to "overshadow" the Turkish element; see also pp. 132, 195. So too P. Saran, "Politics and personalities in the reign of Nasir al-Din Mahmud", *Studies in Medieval Indian History* (Delhi, 1952), p. 228, assumed that Balaban's enemy, the Indian-born Rayhān (see below), was opposed by "the Turks". Niẓāmī, *Some Aspects*, p. 141, speaks of "the non-Turkish group"; and in Ḥabīb and Niẓāmī, p. 262, he alleges, amazingly, that Rayhān "had no following among the Turkish officers and the public".

[49] Jūzjānī, i, pp. 486–7, and ii, pp. 63–4 (tr. pp. 693–4, 826–7). Quṭb al-Dīn's reappointment as *nā'ib* is not mentioned here, but he held the office in 653/1255 at the time of Balaban's return to power: *ibid.*, i, p. 489 (tr. p. 702).

[50] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 66 (tr. p. 829), for the only details we are given of his origins. The fact that he was a eunuch strongly suggests that he too was a slave and cannot really be ascribed, therefore, to an emerging Indo-Muslim aristocracy as he has been in the past.

[51] Nigam, pp. 37–8.

[52] Jūzjānī, i, p. 489 (tr. p. 702), for Quṭb al-Dīn, whose *iqṭā'* of Mīrat was conferred on Balaban's brother Keshli Khān; ii, p. 46 (tr. pp. 798–9); i, p. 490, and ii, p. 70 (tr. pp. 703, 836), for Rayhān.

with the earlier period, the antagonisms of the 1250s gave rise to full-blown civil war. The sense of solidarity among the Shamsīs – what the Egyptian Arabic sources term *khushdāshiyya*, the group feeling conventionally associated with the slaves of the same master[53] – was remarkably absent, and the virulence of the struggle surprised not only contemporary observers but even the protagonists. When Küshlü Khān was obliged in 648/1250 to go to relieve Uchch, which was under attack from Balaban's cousin Shīr Khān, he pinned his faith, we are told, on the fact that they were both "of one house and one threshold".[54] In other words, since the two *amīr*s had been slaves of Iltutmish, he hoped to be able to reach some amicable arrangement. He was disappointed: Shīr Khān placed him in custody and captured the city. "Never could there be a more amazing case than this", exclaimed Jūzjānī, describing how Balaban's forces and those of Küshlü Khān and Qutlugh Khān confronted each other in the neighbourhood of Sāmāna in 655/1257; "for they were all alike of one purse and messmates of one dish, between whom the accursed Satan had brought forth such discord".[55] But Satan or not, discord there was – and it persisted until after Jūzjānī had laid down his pen.

There are grounds for suggesting, in fact, that the situation in the 1250s was not less, but more, dangerous because it could not be resolved merely by the mass disposal of a group of Persian bureaucrats; rather, it involved a contest between two more nearly equal parties, both of whom were capable of resorting to arms and, worse still, of calling in the Sultanate's Mongol enemies. Balaban and his followers regained power in 652/1254 by dint of allying with Sultan Maḥmūd's renegade brother Jalāl al-Dīn Mas'ūd, who had taken refuge with the Mongols some years before and had now returned from the Great Khan's court with a Mongol army.[56] Balaban's cousin Shīr Khān had also fraternised with the Mongols during the *nā'ib*'s eclipse, and following his return to India joined Jalāl al-Dīn at Lahore; though he subsequently expelled the prince and presumably reaffirmed his allegiance to Delhi.[57] The rival faction in turn sought Mongol protection. In 655/1257 Küshlü Khān, who with his allies had been first defeated in Awadh and then

[53] D. Ayalon, "L'esclavage du Mamelouk", *Israel Oriental Notes and Studies*, i (1951), pp. 29–31, 34–7, repr. in his *The Mamlūk Military Society*.

[54] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 38 (tr. p. 783).

[55] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 73 (tr. p. 841).

[56] *Ibid.*, i, pp. 488–9, and ii, pp. 66–7 (tr. pp. 699–700, 830–1). We learn more of his flight to the Mongols, and his return, from chroniclers writing in Mongol Iran, beginning with Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-a'ṣār*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 310, whence the account given in Rashīd al-Dīn's history of India is derived; see Karl Jahn, "Zum Problem der mongolischen Eroberungen in Indien (13.–14. Jahrhundert)", in *Akten des XXIV. internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses München...1957* (Wiesbaden, 1959), p. 618.

[57] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 44 (tr. pp. 792–3).

thwarted at the gates of Delhi itself, turned his *iqṭā'* of Sind into a Mongol province by inviting in a representative of the Great Khan and dismantling the walls of Multān.[58] At the time when Jūzjānī wrote, the Sultanate might well have appeared to be in a state of disintegration. Why it did not disintegrate, we shall probably never know; but certainly Delhi's rulers had good reason to be grateful for the internecine war that tore apart the Mongol empire after 1260 and severely reduced the Mongols' striking power on the north-west frontier.[59]

After 658/1260 Jūzjānī's voice falls silent. We know nothing of the last years of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh, and for the reign of Balaban as Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn (664–686/1266–1287) our main source is Baranī, who alleges that Balaban endeavoured to uproot the great Shamsī slaves, of whom a number may have been poisoned,[60] and that those who survived did so only by virtue of his patronage.[61] His cousin Shīr Khān, who held the *iqṭā'*s of Sunām, Lahore and Dēōpālpūr and was allegedly a bulwark against the Mongols, neglected to attend court either in Maḥmūd Shāh's reign or in Balaban's, for fear of an attempt on his life: eventually, *c.* 668/1270, the sultan had him poisoned too.[62] Temür Khān and 'Ādil Khān are also mentioned as former Shamsī slaves.[63] Temür Khān succeeded to Shīr Khān's *iqṭā'*s of Sunām and Sāmāna, but had apparently been transferred elsewhere by the time of Toghril's revolt in Bengal.[64] 'Ādil Khān is at one point called "Shamsī 'Ajamī" and hence is doubtless identical with the Aybeg-i Shamsī 'Ajamī, the *dādbeg* (chief justice) of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh's reign: his son Muḥammad left an inscription at Farrukhnagar in Gurgaon, dated 674/1276.[65] The ultimate fate of these two magnates is unknown. The Shamsī slave 'Imād al-Mulk, the *rāwat-i 'arḍ* (muster-master) and maternal

[58] *Ibid.*, i, p. 494, and ii, pp. 38–40, 71–6 (tr. pp. 711, 784–6, 837–44). Qutlugh Khān, concerning whose ultimate fate Jūzjānī says nothing, is alleged by Iranian authors to have sought refuge with the Mongols also: Waṣṣāf, p. 310. Tāj al-Dīn, "son of Qutlugh Khān-i Shamsī", is later found in Balaban's service (Baranī, pp. 24, 83), but this must have been an earlier Qutlugh Khān, probably the one who is known from an Abōhar inscription to have died in 635/1237–8: *ARIE* (1970–1), pp. 18–19, 119 (no. 4).

[59] For the effects of the Mongol civil war on relations with Delhi, see Peter Jackson, "The dissolution of the Mongol empire", *CAJ*, XXII (1978), pp. 239–41.

[60] Baranī, pp. 47–8.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 50, *az ḥimāyat-i Balabanī bar ṣadr-i ḥayāt mānda būdand.*

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 65: the date given is 4 or 5 years after Balaban's accession (p. 64).

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 50; at p. 37 they are called Balaban's *khwājatāshān*, i.e. slaves of the same master.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 83. *Pace* Hambly (p. 61), he is mentioned by Jūzjānī, but only in the list of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd's *malik*s and *amīr*s, where he is called Temür Khān Sonqur-i 'Ajamī, *malik* of Kuhrām: i, p. 476 (tr. p. 673).

[65] *RCEA*, xii (1943), pp. 206–7 (no. 4711). For Aybeg's biography (down to 658/1260), see Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 40–2 (tr. pp. 788–91).

grandfather, incidentally, of the poet Amīr Khusraw, seems to have continued in office for some time and died naturally around 671/1273–4.[66]

Balaban has been accused of sapping the roots of Turkish power in India; [67] but his purpose in destroying the Shamsīs was, of course, to substitute his own *mamlūk*s. It was especially vital for him to establish a power-base, since his assumption of the sultanate represented the end of a dynasty which had been on the throne for nearly sixty years. Of the *mamlūk*s of Balaban who attained high office, it is unfortunate that we hear most about those who suffered death or disgrace for exceeding their authority or for dereliction of duty. *Buqbuq, *muqṭa'* of Budaon, was executed for killing a chamberlain, and Haybat Khān, *muqṭa'* of Awadh, narrowly escaped the same fate for a similar offence.[68] The most notorious of Balaban's *mamlūk*s, of course, is Toghril, who usurped control of the distant province of Lakhnawtī, proclaimed himself Sulṭān Mughīth al-Dīn, and obliged the sultan to march against him in person before he was finally overthrown in 680/1281–2.[69] Prior to this Balaban had hanged another of his *mamlūk*s, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin-i *mūī-yi darāz*, who was *muqṭa'* of Awadh early in the reign and bore the title of Amīn Khān, for his failure to crush the rebels.[70] But we know of at least one other *mamlūk* of Balaban who survived for longer: Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Begbars Sulṭānī, *bārbeg* (or *amīr ḥājib*) in the 680s/1280s and a regular campaigner against the invading Mongols.[71] Others among Balaban's slaves left sons (designated as the sultan's *mawlāzādagān*, literally "the sons of freedmen") to be promoted, such as Ikhtiyār al-Dīn 'Alī b. Aybeg, the *sar-i jāndār*, who at the outset of the reign received the *iqṭā'* of Amrōha and was later moved to Awadh, and whose

[66] M. Wahīd Mīrzā, *The Life and Works of Amir Khusrau* (Calcutta, 1935), pp. 29–31, 36–7; for his slave status, see Baranī, pp. 36, 114–15.

[67] E.g. by Niẓāmī, *Some Aspects*, p. 143.

[68] Baranī, p. 40. The correct spelling of the former name is uncertain: the B.L. MS of Baranī, Or. 2,039, fo. 15r, reads BQBQ, but elsewhere the diacritical points are obscured.

[69] For Toghril's slave origins, see Amīr Ḥasan Dihlawī, *Fawā'id al-fu'ād*, ed. Muḥammad Laṭīf Malik (Lahore, 1386/1966), p. 343; also Baranī, pp. 81, 83; 'Iṣāmī, p. 165 (tr. Husain, p. 292). His revolt is discussed by Habibullah, pp. 172–5. The campaign involving his overthrow ended with Balaban's return to Delhi on 5 Shawwāl 680/17 Jan. 1282, according to the *fatḥ-nāma* in Amīr Khusraw, *Rasā'il al-i'jāz* (Lucknow, 1876, 5 vols in 2), v, p. 13.

[70] Baranī, pp. 83–4. A different version is given in Sihrindī, pp. 40–1, where Amīn Khān is said to have been given the *iqṭā'* of Lakhnawtī on the death of Tatar Khān, with Toghril as his *nā'ib*: the two later fell out and Amīn Khān was forced to flee.

[71] Baranī, pp. 24, 61, 81, 88. The name is usually transliterated as "Bektars", but shows clearly in B.L. MS Or. 2,039, fos. 32r, 47r, as BYKBRS; for the same form in contemporary Egypt, see al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi' l-wafayāt*, ed. 'Alī Amāra and Jacqueline Sublet, *Das biographische Lexikon des Ṣalāḥaddīn Ḫalīl b. Aibak aṣ-Ṣafadī*, x (Wiesbaden, 1980. Bibliotheca Islamica, 6j), pp. 187–8 (BKBRS). 'Azīz Aḥmad, "The early Turkish nucleus in India", *Turcica*, ix (1977), p. 101, is wrong to see *sulṭānī* in the reign of Iltutmish as the style of free-born immigrants: the suffix, as pointed out by Niẓāmī, in Ḥabīb and Niẓāmī (p. 224), always denotes a slave of the reigning sultan.

generosity won him the title of Ḥātam Khān and eulogies from Amīr Khusraw.[72] The career of this noble illustrates one important difference between the system which obtained in the Delhi Sultanate and that in contemporary Egypt. In Egypt, the offspring of *mamlūks* were debarred from inheriting their status or their power. In the Delhi Sultanate, on the other hand, the son of a great slave officer was in no way a second-class citizen and might even succeed to his father's position.[73]

Balaban as sultan did not, of course, rely exclusively on his slaves or on their progeny. He also placed in positions of power members of his own more immediate family,[74] and benefited from the renewed influx of refugees – this time Mongols – following the outbreak of civil war in the Mongol empire in *c.* 659/1261.[75] The Mongol *amīr*s in his service were sufficiently numerous and influential in the reign of his son Mu'izz al-Dīn Kayqubād (686–689/1287–1290) to attract the unwelcome attentions of the powerful *dādbeg* Niẓām al-Dīn, who had them all arrested and executed.[76] But Niẓām al-Dīn's primary objective was the removal of Balaban's old slaves and their descendants. Describing his policy, Baranī writes of the fears of the "*malik*s and slaves of Balaban, who were very numerous and had become the pillars of the monarchy of Mu'izz [al-Dīn]".[77] He makes it clear that the *dādbeg*'s aim was to bring down the great military households (*khaylkhānahā*), and specifies at one point that the destruction of the Mongol *amīr*s had been followed by the arrest of many of Balaban's *mawlāzādagān*, who were bound to them by ties of marriage and friendship.[78] It looks as if Niẓām al-Dīn, rather than the late Balaban,[79] did most to undermine the power and

[72] Baranī, pp. 36, 118–19. His full name is given by Amīr Khusraw: Mīrzā, *The Life and Works*, p. 72. For the meaning of *mawlāzāda*, see Hodivala, i, p. 342.

[73] As Keshli Khān's son inherited his father's office (see next note). For the system in Mamlūk Egypt and Syria, see Ayalon, "Studies on the structure of the Mamlūk army – I", pp. 456–8; more briefly in his "Awlād al-nās", *EI*[2].

[74] His brother Keshli Khān seems to have been a loyal adherent during the reign of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd and shared his temporary eclipse in 651–2/1253–4, and after his death in 657/1259 his office of *amīr ḥājib* was conferred on his son 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad: Jūzjānī, i, p. 495 (tr. p. 713); Baranī, pp. 36–7, 113–14. Muḥammad in turn served Balaban well during the latter's own reign, though later it seems he aroused the sultan's jealousy. He was entitled Malik Chhajjū: Amīr Khusraw, cited in Mīrzā, p. 38; cf. also Baranī, p. 181. As Balaban's sons came of age, they too were given positions of trust: the elder, Muḥammad, received the *iqṭā'* of Kōl at an early date (Baranī, p. 66), and later Sind; the younger, Maḥmūd, entitled Bughra Khān, was allotted the *iqṭā'*s of Sunām and Sāmāna (*ibid.*, p. 80), and later Bengal *c.* 681/1283 after the suppression of Toghril's revolt (*ibid.*, p. 92). It is significant that, as Baranī points out (p. 82), both were tested by holding for a time an important command on the Mongol frontier. When Muḥammad fell in battle with the Mongols (683/1285), his son Kaykhusraw succeeded him at Multān (*ibid.*, p. 110).

[75] Firishta, i, p. 131.

[76] Baranī, pp. 133–4.

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–2.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 134; and see also pp. 132, 133, for the *khaylkhāna*s.

[79] As suggested, for instance, by Niẓāmī, in Ḥabīb and Niẓāmī, pp. 285–6.

influence of Turkish *mamlūk*s and their families in the years immediately preceding the Khaljī revolution. Even so, members of Balaban's slave establishment were still at large after Kayqubād tired of Niẓām al-Dīn's tutelage and had him murdered. It was "Balaban's slaves among the *malik*s, *amīr*s, nobles and military commanders" who despaired of the ailing Kayqubād at the beginning of 689/1290 and endeavoured to rule through his infant son, Shams al-Dīn Kayūmarth. Two of them, Aytemür *Kechhen and Aytemür Surkha, who after Niẓām al-Dīn's downfall had obtained the important offices of *bārbeg* (*amīr ḥājib*) and *wakīl-i dar* respectively, were killed while opposing the Khaljī seizure of power.[80]

Describing the advent of the Khaljīs to the throne of Delhi in 689/1290, the eleventh/seventeenth-century historian Firishta commented that

> the sovereignty passed from the Turks, who were the slaves (*ghulāmān*) of the sultans of Ghūr, to the dynasty of the Khaljīs.[81]

Now nobody would claim that Firishta is the most reliable source for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and I am certainly not about to do so. But it does seem that with this reference to slaves he has put his finger on the significance of the so-called "Khaljī revolution" in a way that earlier chroniclers did not. Baranī and 'Iṣāmī, in what are the earliest accounts of these events, speak in terms merely of the sovereignty of "the Turks". The Khaljī revolution in fact broke the hold enjoyed by a tradition that conferred power primarily (though not exclusively) on Turkish slaves and their progeny. It is important to realise that this was what was at stake rather than some question of race. The Khaljīs were Turks, ethnically speaking, but Turks who had entered the Sultanate as free men; and the struggle in 689/1290 was not so much between Turk and non-Turk as between slaves (and the descendants of slaves) and free men. That Balaban's dynasty had become a focus for his *mamlūk*s' loyalty in turn and provided in their eyes the real key to their power is clear from the revolt at Kara of his nephew 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad Chhajjū (Keshli Khān's son), which was supported by Balaban's old slaves (and by his *mawlāzāda*, 'Alī the *sar-i jāndār*) and which occurred only after Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī had set aside the child sultan Kayūmarth and secured the throne for himself.[82] After the insurrection had

[80] Baranī, pp. 170–1. For the role of the two Aytemürs in the events of 689/1290, see Habibullah, pp. 194–6.

[81] Firishta, i, p. 153, *pādishāhī az turkān ki ghulāmān-i salāṭīn-i Ghūr būdand bi-silsila-yi khaljiyya intiqāl yāft.*

[82] Baranī, pp. 181, 183; more details are given by Sihrindī, p. 63. For Malik Chhajjū, see above, n. 74.

been suppressed, Jalāl al-Dīn's nephew 'Alā' al-Dīn was sent to Kara as *muqṭa'*, and within a few years former supporters of Chhajjū are found there, encouraging the treasonable designs which led to Jalāl al-Dīn's murder in 695/1296 and the overthrow of his sons.[83] The impact of Jalāl al-Dīn's seizure of power is evident in the hostile attitude of the principal families of Delhi: it was some time before the new sultan was able to leave Kīlōkhrī and to take up residence in the old city.[84] Early in the reign Balaban's *mawlāzāda*s appear as a pool of "the disinherited", ready to attach themselves to any group which could promise a change of sovereign and hence a renewal of their prosperity. Jalāl al-Dīn was old; and when the party which had gathered round his eldest son, the Khān-i Khānān, lost its figurehead with the prince's untimely death in *c.* 690/1291, a means was sought of preventing the succession of Jalāl al-Dīn's second son, Erkli Khān. A plot was hatched to murder the sultan and to proclaim as *khalīfa* the dervish Sīdī Muwallih, whose *khānaqāh* had been frequented by the dead prince and who had been his mentor. The conspiracy, which was betrayed and suppressed, included Balaban's *mawlāzāda*s, who were banished to outlying regions.[85]

Yet the coming of the Khaljī dynasty did not spell the end for Turkish *mamlūk*s. One at least of Balaban's *mawlāzāda*s held office in the time of 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī;[86] though Baranī claims that, as a result of that monarch's policy, no descendant of Balaban's slaves or of his other officers remained alive in his day.[87] Certainly, the Khaljī sultans appear to have given preference to Indian slaves, like Malik Kāfūr Hazārdīnārī and Khusraw Khān, who usurped the throne briefly in 720/1320.[88] But after the end of the Khaljīs, the fashion seems to have changed once more. Khusraw Khān's murder of the last Khaljī sovereign, Quṭb al-Dīn, was avenged by one of the leading *amīr*s, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq, who became sultan (720–724/1320–1324) and founded a new dynasty. Tughluq himself was probably of slave origin,[89] and the Tughluqid era may have witnessed a renewed

[83] Baranī, pp. 187, 224.

[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 173, 175–7; cf. also p. 181.

[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 210–11. The episode is elucidated by Hodivala, i, pp. 267–8; and see also Simon Digby, "Qalandars and related groups", in Friedmann, *Islam in Asia*, i, pp. 67–8.

[86] Malik Qiran-i 'Alā'ī, the son of Haybat Khān (above, p. 353): Baranī, p. 41.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[88] On the Khaljī era, see the brief remarks in P. Hardy, "Ghulām: iii. India", *EI*², and 'Azīz Aḥmad, "The early Turkish nucleus", p. 106.

[89] The Indian historical tradition varies considerably regarding Ghiyāth al-Dīn's antecedents. There is an ambiguous reference in Amīr Khusraw, *Tughluq-nāma*, ed. Sayyid Hāshimī Farīdābādī (Awrangābād, 1352/1933), p. 136, to him as "freed" (*āzāda*). The earliest Indian author to give an unequivocal statement of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's slave origins is Firishta (i, pp. 230–1): A. Mahdi Husain, *Tughluq Dynasty* (Calcutta, 1963), pp. 16–18. But contemporary Egyptian sources testify that Ghiyāth al-Dīn had been a *mamlūk*: al-Mufaḍḍal b. Abi'l-Faḍā'il, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, ed. and tr. Samira Kortantamer, *Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341*

dependence on Turkish *mamlūk*s. The evidence is unfortunately scanty and sometimes ambiguous, and if we are to believe Baranī, at least, the price of Turkish slaves had risen by several hundred per cent since the days of 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī, implying a reduction in the purchasing power of the sultans.[90] However that may be, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who spent some years at the court of Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq (724–752/1324–1351), claims that he had been collecting *mamlūk*s in great numbers prior to his accession;[91] and the contemporary encyclopaedist al-'Umarī, writing in Syria but relying on several informants from India, credits him with 20,000 Turkish slaves.[92] This is a relatively low figure and perhaps refers merely to the *mamlūk*s in the capital, since according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa there were 4,000 of the sultan's *mamlūk*s stationed at Amrōha alone.[93] The Moroccan traveller's vivid description of Muḥammad's processions suggests that many of his *amīr*s may have been *mamlūk*s.[94] Among those who definitely were, we may number 'Imād al-Mulk Sartīz, for a time *amīr* of Sind,[95] and Qiran Ṣafdar Malik (or al-Mulk).[96] Muḥammad's successor Fīrūz Shāh (752–790/1351–1388) is said to have accumulated the extraordinary total of 180,000 slaves in the capital and scattered throughout the *iqṭā*'s: of these, 40,000 are said to have attended him as guards either on campaign or in residence.[97] What proportion of them were Turks, we are not told.

Much of what I have said – regarding their treatment of Persian bureaucrats in the 1230s and 1240s, for example, and their fratricidal struggles in the 1250s – will have cast the *mamlūk*s in an unfavourable light. If we were to conclude by assessing their contribution to the Islamisation (on

(Freiburg i. Br., 1973. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 23), text p. 27, tr. p. 104, citing the *shaykh* Tāj al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Dillī; al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, ed. Sven Dedering, *Das biographische Lexikon*, iii (Damascus, 1953. Bibliotheca Islamica, 6c), p. 172. For the date of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's death and his son Muḥammad's accession (usually taken to be 725/1325), see Jackson, review elsewhere in this volume (pp. 171–2) of M. Shokoohy (ed.), *Corpus inscriptionum Iranicarum*, pt. IV, XLVII. *Haryana*, I (London, 1988).

[90] Baranī, p. 314. The Egyptian encyclopaedist al-'Umarī, however, was told (approximately two decades earlier) that Turkish slaves were still in plentiful supply: *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. and tr. Otto Spies, *Ibn Faḍlallāh al 'Omarī's Bericht über Indien in seinem Werke...* (Leipzig, 1943. Sammlung orientalischer Arbeiten, xiv), text p. 27, tr. p. 53.

[91] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, iii, p. 211 (tr. Gibb, p. 654).

[92] Spies, *Ibn Faḍlallāh al-'Omarī's Bericht über Indien*, text p. 13, tr. p. 38.

[93] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, iii, p. 439 (tr. p. 763).

[94] *Ibid.*, iii, p. 231 (tr. p. 665).

[95] *Ibid.*, iii, pp. 94, 107 (tr. pp. 593, 600). The printed text adopts the reading *mamālīk* (hence Gibb's translation, "inspector-general of the mamluks"); but see the alternative reading *mamālik* suggested in the French editors' note at pp. 458–9: Sartīz was clearly the muster-master (*'āriḍ-i mamālik*).

[96] On him see Hodivala, i, pp. 300–1. That he was a Turk is evident from his personal name (*qiran*, "he who slaughters"): Sauvaget, "Noms et surnoms", p. 54 (no. 182).

[97] Shams-i Sirāj 'Afīf, *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, ed. Maulavi Viláyat Husain (Calcutta, 1888–91), p. 270, *chihil hazār banda har rūz dar nawbat-i suwārī wa-khāna ḥāḍir mībūdand.*

any definition of that term) of the subcontinent, it might still prove difficult to reach a positive judgement. Islamisation, of course, rests on a process of conquest and annexation of territory to the *Dār al-Islām*; and militarily the achievements of the *mamlūk* era were limited. As far as we can judge from the exiguous material at our disposal, the Turkish *mamlūk*s may have seen their task as no more than the defence of the Muslim community against external pagan aggression and the replenishing of the treasury of God with booty taken on swashbuckling raids. Under their leadership Muslim arms penetrated nowhere near as far as in the Khaljī era, and territory was lost for a time both to independent Indian *rājā*s and to the Mongols. At best, they may have secured Muslim control over districts closer to the centre – as did Balaban when he reduced Amrōha and the Mēwāt area immediately south of Delhi – while being obliged to relinquish a tenuous hold on more distant and less readily absorbed tracts like Ranthanbōr.[98] Perhaps the fact that the *mamlūk*s tend to be overshadowed by their Khaljī successors threatens, in any case, to deprive us of perspective. Had they maintained some kind of unity, the *mamlūk*s might admittedly have achieved more; but given the instability of the regimes at Delhi between the death of Iltutmish and the reign of Balaban, it is astonishing that they achieved what they did.

And yet to focus exclusively on the frontiers of expansion would be to do the *mamlūk*s an injustice. On the credit side, it must be said that even plundering and punitive campaigns were accompanied by the implantation of Islamic institutions. When he reduced the turbulent regions of Kanpil, Patiyālī and Bhōjpūr in *c.* 665/1266–7, Balaban is alleged also to have founded mosques there;[99] so too had Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq in the Badaon area some two decades previously.[100] *Mamlūk*s endowed *awqāf* and patronised poets and scholars.[101] Of Balaban's enemy Küshlü Khan, Jūzjānī is ready to testify, surprisingly, that he was "the support of the *'ulamā'*, the righteous, the good, and ascetics".[102] It is fruitless to ask whether such attitudes were determined by genuine (if conventional) piety or by expediency. Like the equally unappealing Norman warlords in the history of Western Europe, *mamlūk* grandees were doubtless capable of responding to either stimulus, and their pious displays may well represent a sincere attempt to offset their more brutal traits.

[98] See Habibullah, pp. 151–2, on Ranthanbōr, and pp. 155–6 on Amrōha, which, as he points out, first appears as an *iqṭā'* early in Balaban's reign. For the Mēwāt, see Jūzjānī, ii, pp. 78–82 (tr. pp. 850–6), and Baranī, pp. 55–7.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[100] Jūzjānī, ii, p. 26 (tr. p. 755).

[101] Niẓāmī, *Some Aspects*, pp. 148–9, citing, among other testimony, the encomium by Baranī (pp. 119–20) on the generosity of the *khān*s and *malik*s, most of them Turks. For an example, see Jūzjānī, ii, p. 5 (tr. p. 724), on the pious foundations of Kezlik Khān (d. 629/1231–2).

[102] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 36, *'ulamā' wa-ṣulaḥā' wa-ahl-i khayr wa-zuhhād-rā mu'taqid būd* (translation mine; cf. Raverty's tr., pp. 775–6).

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

IX

SULṬĀN RAḌIYYA BINT ILTUTMISH

Although some medieval Muslim women exercised political power behind the scenes, Raḍiyya bint Iltutmish was one of the few who dared to stand forth as actual ruler.

When Shajarat al-Durr, the favorite wife of the late Sulṭān al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, was proclaimed sulṭān of Egypt following the murder of the Sulṭān's son and successor ,Tūrān Shāh, in 648/1250, the chronicler Ibn Wāṣil observed that the enthronement of a woman was without precedent in the Islamic world: there had been female regents recently in Aleppo, but they had not enjoyed the privilege of being named in the Friday prayers [*khuṭba*].[1] Yet Ibn Wāṣil was mistaken. Half a generation earlier, the princess Raḍiyya bint Iltutmish had reigned for three years or more (634–37/1236–40) as sulṭān of Delhi.[2] It is noteworthy that like Shajarat al-Durr, whose enthronement would be the work of the Turkish slave [Ar. *mamlūk*, *ghulām*; Pers. *banda*] commanders of her late husband al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, Raḍiyya was brought to power by the Turkish slave officers of her father Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish.[3]

At Iltutmish's death in 633/1236, the aristocracy of the Delhi Sulṭānate comprised a motley assemblage of Ghūrī and other Tājīk (*i.e.*, non-Turkish) warriors and bureaucrats, amirs of the Khalaj (a people of Turkish, or at least Turkicized, stock whose homeland lay in the southern parts of modern Afghanistan), Turkish leaders of free status from Khwārazm and Transoxiana, and Turkish slave officers of the late sulṭān. Many of those in the former categories had fled into India during the invasion of Central Asia and the Iranian world by the Mongols under Čingiz Khān; but the Mongol campaigns were also responsible for an increase in the availability of slaves from among the Turkish tribes of the Caspian and Pontic

steppes, particularly Iltutmish's own people, the Ölberli.[4] Although Iltutmish had built up a corps of *ghulāms* (known, from the sulṭān's own *laqab*, as Shamsīs), promoting a few of them to the new dignity of *khān*, the evidence suggests that he had maintained a balance among the different elements within the ranks of the élite.[5] After his death, claims the later historian Ḍiyā' Baranī (*c.* 758/1357), his slaves profited from the weakness of Iltutmish's successors to eliminate their competitors.[6] The climax of this process was the transfer of the sovereignty in 664/1266 from Iltutmish's family, whom, for convenience, we may call the Shamsids, to Balaban-i Khwurd [the Lesser], himself an Ölberli *ghulām* of Iltutmish and the founder of a new dynasty.

Our source material for Raḍiyya's reign is fairly restricted. An early eighth/fourteenth-century chronicle from Baghdad, the *Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a*, ascribed (probably in error) to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, furnishes a brief notice of Iltutmish's death, the reign of his son Fīrūz Shāh and Raḍiyya's accession in the year 635/1237–38.[7] For an identical passage (though omitting the date) Ibn Abi'l-Faḍā'il, a Coptic chronicler of the mid-eighth/fourteenth century, cites a now lost section of the *Ta'rīkh Baghdād* of Ibn al-Sā'ī (d. 674/1276),[8] who is therefore in all probability the author of the *Ḥawādith* also. Ibn al-Sā'ī may well have derived his information from the caliphal envoy Ṣaghānī, who had brought Iltutmish a diploma [*manshūr*] and a standard from the 'Abbāsid court in 626/1229, and who is known to have arrived back in Baghdad in 637/1239–40.[9] But after this date, accurate information on the Sulṭānate suddenly seems to stop being transmitted westwards, and the perspective on Delhi from elsewhere in the Islamic world is somewhat hazier. It is noteworthy that the list of Delhi Sulṭāns transmitted by the Īlkhānid chronicler Waṣṣāf, writing in *c.* 702/1303, and by Ibn Abi'l-Faḍā'il himself omits Raḍiyya's two immediate successors, Mu'izz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh (r. 637–39/1240–42) and 'Alā' al-Dīn Mas'ūd Shāh (r. 639–44/1242–46), and leaps from Raḍiyya to the relatively long reign of her youngest brother Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh (r. 644–64/1246–66).[10] But perhaps we should not read too much into this. The version of the Sulṭānate's history picked up by the Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who spent some time in Delhi from 734/1333 onwards, contains an identical *lacuna*.[11] The omission of Raḍiyya's two successors may merely reflect, after all, the impact that a female sulṭān had on people in different parts of the *dār al-Islām*.

The only contemporary source for this era in which Turkish *ghulāms* gained ascendancy is a chronicle composed at Delhi. The *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* of the Ghūrī Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, completed in 658/1260, is a general history of the eastern Islamic world, divided into twenty-three sections [*ṭabaqāt*], of which the final three are devoted respectively to the reigns of Iltutmish and his successors (21), the biographies of twenty-five Shamsī *ghulām* commanders (22), and the Mongol irruption into the lands of Islam (23). The history is dedicated to the reigning sulṭān, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Iltutmish, and to Balaban, his deputy [*nā'ib*]. Although greatly superior to Baranī's work in its attention to detail, the *Ṭabaqāt* lacks the later chronicler's analytical quality. Jūzjānī's practice, moreover, is often to defer what were clearly important events from *ṭabaqa* 21 for notice in one of the biographies in *ṭabaqa* 22, and to describe the same episode in markedly distinct terms in different *ṭabaqāt*. Combined with a marked tendency to be merely allusive, this often serves to obfuscate important developments. A case in point is Iltutmish's designation of a successor.

Iltutmish's eldest son, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd, who had been widely expected to succeed him, died prematurely in 626/1229;[12] and it was the next son, Rukn al-Dīn Fīrūz Shāh, who ascended the throne within a few days of his father's death on 20 Sha'bān 633/29 April 1236. Following an expedition to Gwāliyōr in 630/1233, Fīrūz Shāh had been granted the *iqṭā'* of Lahore, at one time held by Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd. The impression that he was being groomed for the succession is fostered by the fact that he accompanied Iltutmish back to Delhi during the sulṭān's final illness; and Jūzjānī confirms that the eyes of the people were on the prince.[13] A work composed in Iltutmish's last years is dedicated to the sulṭān and Fīrūz Shāh jointly, as if the latter were heir-apparent.[14] All this seems fairly conclusive. But at another juncture Jūzjānī claims that in the wake of the Gwāliyōr expedition Iltutmish had marked out for the succession Raḍiyya, who was his eldest daughter (and hence possibly his firstborn child) and whose mother was his chief wife, and had even caused a diploma to be drawn up naming her as the next sulṭān. When certain officials objected, he allegedly predicted that none of his sons would be found worthy of the sovereignty.[15] We must bear in mind, however, that Jūzjānī had been left at Gwāliyōr and did not return to Delhi until 635/1238 (i.e., during Raḍiyya's own reign):[16]

he could not have witnessed this episode, and indeed he does not claim to have seen the diploma for Raḍiyya. In these circumstances, we have to consider the possibility that the story is apocryphal and was put about by those who made her sulṭān. Given its disparagement of the Shamsid princes (including the reigning sulṭān, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh),[17] of course, the tale could have acquired a new significance at the time Jūzjānī was writing, when the replacement of Iltutmish's dynasty may already have been on the horizon.

During Fīrūz Shāh's brief reign, effective control of affairs was abandoned to his mother Shāh Terken, who seized the opportunity to pay off old scores in the *ḥaram*, blinded and then put to death one of the sulṭān's half-brothers, and later sought to kill Raḍiyya in turn. These actions seem to have provoked widespread revolts.[18] One rising, in Awadh, was led by another brother, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad. A second comprised a number of Iltutmish's senior *amīrs*, notably the *ghulām* Kabīr Khān Ayāz, who had been in the late sulṭān's service from an early date;[19] the free Turkish *amīr* 'Alā' al-Dīn Jānī, bombastically described by Jūzjānī as 'prince of Turkistān';[20] and 'Izz al-Dīn Muḥammad Sālārī, probably a Ghūrī, who held the *iqṭā'* of Badā'ūn; while the *wazīr* Junaydī deserted Fīrūz Shāh's encampment to join them. The relationship, if any, between this insurrection and the activities of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad is unclear. Some of these *amīrs* may have had other motives for rebellion: it is possibly significant that both Kabīr Khān and Jānī had suffered a fall from favor in the last years of the previous reign, and that Sālārī, who under Iltutmish had occupied the important post of military chamberlain [*amīr-ḥājib*], is not so described in Fīrūz Shāh's era.[21] Nor were Kabīr Khān and his allies satisfied by a change of regime at Delhi. Even when Shāh Terken was overthrown in Delhi by yet another faction, and Fīrūz Shāh himself was arrested and put to death on 18 Rabī' I 634/19 November 1236, the insurgent *amīrs* refused to recognize Raḍiyya, who had been enthroned in his place, and besieged her in the capital. The new sulṭān eventually won over Sālārī and Kabīr Khān, and the rebellion collapsed: the *wazīr* Junaydī ended his days as a fugitive in the Sirmūr region of the sub-Himalaya.[22]

Fīrūz Shāh's enthronement appears to have been the work of the great *amīrs*, provincial governors and *iqṭā'*-holders [*muqṭa's*] who were temporarily in Delhi, having accompanied Iltutmish back to

the capital from his last campaign.[23] By contrast, Raḍiyya's support came from two quarters: the citizens of Delhi, who brought down Shāh Terken, and the Shamsī *ghulāms*, who put Raḍiyya on the throne. A century later Ibn Baṭṭūṭa would hear how Raḍiyya appeared on the terrace of the royal palace [*dawlatkhāna*] and how the people rose in response to her impassioned appeal to her father's memory. Jūzjānī's more sober account says simply that they revolted and stormed the palace [*qaṣr*] when Shāh Terken attempted to arrest the princess.[24] Raḍiyya would continue to enjoy the support of Delhi's citizens, both during its investment by the rebel *amīrs*[25] and later, when her enemies had to lure her out of the capital in order to encompass her deposition (see below).

But those chiefly instrumental in Raḍiyya's enthronement were Iltutmish's slave officers, who at this juncture first surface as an identifiable force in the politics of the Sulṭānate. A group described by Jūzjānī as *turkān-i ḥaḍrat* [the Turks of the court, or 'the capital'], had manifested their disenchantment with Fīrūz Shāh at an early stage by leaving Delhi for Hindūstān, conceivably in a bid to join his brother in Awadh, but they were brought back; among them was Balaban 'the Lesser,' who underwent a brief spell of imprisonment.[26] When Fīrūz Shāh moved against Kabīr Khān and his confederates at Kuhrām [Ghuram], "the Turkish *amīrs* and personal slaves who were serving in the center" [*umarā-yi turk-u bandagān-i khāṣṣ ki dar khidmat-i qalb būdand*] mutinied at Tarā'in and put to death several Tājīk bureaucrats, including a son of the *wazīr* Junaydī. And when the sulṭān turned back for the capital on the news of his mother's downfall, it was these same officers, called now 'the center [consisting] of Turkish *amīrs*' [*qalb-i umarā-yi turk*], who deserted him at Kīlōkhrī and recognized Raḍiyya.[27] During the siege of Delhi by the rebel *amīrs* Kabīr Khān, Sālārī and Junaydī, against whom her brother had headed his ill-starred expedition, Raḍiyya was vigorously supported by her father's Turkish *ghulāms* [*umarā-yi turk ki bandagān-i Shamsī būdand*].[28] The veteran Shamsī *amīr*, Nuṣrat al-Dīn *Tāīsī, on whom Raḍiyya had conferred Awadh following the sudden (and unexplained) demise of her brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad, was on his way to her assistance when he was intercepted by the rebels and died in captivity. Among the defenders of Delhi were two other former slaves of Iltutmish: Ikhtiyār al-Dīn *Altunapa, Iltutmish's chief canopy-bearer [*sar-i čatrdār*],

and 'Izz al-Dīn Balaban (later to be entitled Küshlü Khān), who held the *iqṭā'* of Baran and was one of two Turkish commanders known to have been the ringleaders in the *émeute* at Tarā'īn.[29]

According to the later author 'Iṣāmī, Fīrūz Shāh had failed to pay his father's *ghulāms* sufficient attention,[30] which doubtless indicates that his government relied excessively on the Tājīk officials whom the Shamsīs so ruthlessly eliminated. During Raḍiyya's reign a number of Iltutmish's more junior household *ghulāms* obtained court office for the first time or received their first *iqṭā's*. Of Balaban 'the Lesser' we are told that at her accession he was still, as he had been under her father, a falconer [*khāṣadār*], and that she promoted him to chief huntsman [*amīr-i shikār*].[31] His brother Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg (the future Kishli Khān), who had simply been serving in the sulṭān's private household [*khidmat-i dargā-i khāṣṣ mīkard*], became deputy commander of the guard [*nā'ib-i sar-i jāndār*].[32] Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar (later Arslan Khān), who had probably been purchased at the same time as Sayf al-Dīn, was like Balaban a falconer; but Raḍiyya made him cupbearer [*čāshnīgīr*] and subsequently allotted him the *iqṭā'* of Balārām.[33] *Ghulāms* of a slightly more senior rank were also promoted. Baran was given in *iqṭā'* to *Altunapa.[34] Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin, *muqṭa'* of Kūjāh and Nandana, was first transferred to Badā'ūn and then raised to the pivotal rank of *amīr-ḥājib*.[35] We are surely entitled to see in these appointments—in some cases, the first steps towards power by those who would dominate the 1250s—as a reward for bringing Raḍiyya to the throne.

But although several Shamsī slaves might thus have identified Raḍiyya's reign with a turning-point in their fortunes, the sulṭān nevertheless proved reluctant to rely exclusively on her father's *ghulāms*; and if her backers had expected her to remain in the shadows, they were to be disappointed. The rank of deputy commander-in-chief [*nā'ib-i lashgar*] had been bestowed on a Turkish officer, Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg-i *Totaq, with the title of Qutlugh Khān. On his death in 635/1237–38, however, the post was given not to a Turk but to the Ghūrī *malik* Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. 'Alī.[36] In 636/1238–39, moreover, Raḍiyya took the *iqṭā'* of Baran from Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq, who had replaced *Altunapa when the latter was sent to command the crown fortress of Tabarhindh, and bestowed it on a son of Ḥasan Qarluq, the Khwarazmian ruler of Binbān, whom she had welcomed at her

court.[37] The transfer of *iqṭā's* in this fashion was an obvious device to prevent the formation of local ties on the part of the grandees, and hence an important instrument of royal authority; it appeared all the more alarming, however, when the beneficiary happened to be an outsider. It has become obligatory at this juncture to exonerate Raḍiyya from the charge of improper relations with a different kind of outsider, the African [*Ḥabaśẖī*] slave *amīr* Jamāl al-Dīn Yāqūt, which was current when Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited Delhi a century later but which is unsupported by contemporary evidence.[38] But the question is irrelevant. What mattered was that Raḍiyya sought to develop a power-base of her own and neglected the Turkish slave élite which she and Fīrūz Shāh had inherited from their father. Her dependence on Yāqūt and his promotion to the rank of intendant of the imperial stables [*amīr-i ākẖūr*] must be seen in this context. It is alleged not only to have offended the *amīr-ḥājib* Aytegin in particular but to have aroused the resentment of Turks, Ghūrīs, and Tājīks alike.[39] Raḍiyya's coinage, too, seems to testify to her emancipation. Initially coins struck at Delhi reflected the vulnerability of her regime, since they bore either her father's name alone or proclaimed Iltutmish as *Sulṭān al-'Aẓam* with Raḍiyya herself given the subordinate title of *Sulṭān al-Mu'aẓẓam*. But the style changed, possibly again in 635/1237–38, when Raḍiyya alone was named on the coinage.[40]

Jūzjānī claims that the power of the Delhi state was extended under Raḍiyya, who was acknowledged "from the territory of Lakhnawtī [western Bengal] as far as Dīwal and Damrīla [lower Sind]."[41] In Sind royal authority does appear to have been reasserted. Here the news of Iltutmish's death had provoked an attack on Uchch by Ḥasan Qarluq's forces, which was beaten off by the *muqṭa'*, Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg. Aybeg then, in Jūzjānī's obscure phrasing, "grew powerful," possibly implying that he considered declaring his independence of Delhi. But he died in an accident shortly afterwards, and the next *muqṭa'* of Uchch, Hindū Khān, was Raḍiyya's appointee and was removed, significantly, only after her downfall.[42] In the east, however, Raḍiyya's reign may have witnessed a decline in the authority of the center. To secure the allegiance of the *muqṭa'* of Lakhnawtī, Toghan Khān, she felt obliged to confer on him a standard and a ceremonial parasol [*čatr*], and thereby virtually conceded his autonomy.[43]

There are signs, moreover, that in her dealings with independent Hindu powers Raḍiyya espoused retrenchment. Immediately following his appointment as *nā'ib-i lashgar* in 635/1238, Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan was despatched to Ranthanbōr, which had been under siege by the independent Chawhāns for some time. The Muslim garrison was evacuated and the fortifications were destroyed.[44] In Sha'bān of the same year, March–April 1238, forces under Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq, the *muqṭa'* of Baran, moved to Gwāliyōr. One motive for this expedition may possibly have been to remove the castellan [*kōtwāl*], who seems from his *nisba* to have been a kinsman of the fallen *wazīr* Junaydī. But it looks as if here too the garrison and the Muslim populace, including the chronicler Jūzjānī, who had been *qāḍī* of Gwāliyōr since its capture in 630/1233, were evacuated and escorted back to Delhi.[45] Although Jūzjānī's office of *qāḍī* was renewed, he was simultaneously given another position in the capital, which suggests that the Gwāliyōr post was *in partibus infidelium*. And later in the reign we find Temür Khān, who held the *iqṭā'* of Qinnawj, heading a campaign "towards Gwāliyōr and Mālwa,"[46] indicating no doubt that the fortress had passed back into Hindu hands. Both Ranthanbōr and Gwāliyōr represented major conquests from the reign of the sulṭān's revered father Iltutmish;[47] and their loss will hardly have endeared her to his old *ghulāms*.

In these circumstances, and faced with the distressing signs of autonomy mentioned above, the *amīrs* grew restive. In 636/1238–39 Kabīr Khān, whose betrayal of his fellow-rebels had been rewarded with 'Alā' al-Dīn Jānī's *iqṭā'* of Lahore, rose in revolt there, but when in the following year the sulṭān in person moved against him, he was unable to retreat beyond the Chenāb and yielded. Raḍiyya treated him leniently, merely compelling him to exchange *iqṭā'*s with Qaraqush Khān, who had hitherto held Multān.[48] A more widespread conspiracy, however, was successful. The sulṭān was lured away from Delhi, where she was popular, by a rising at Tabarhindh, where *Altunapa was in secret contact with the *amīr-ḥājib* Aytegin at court; Yāqūt was seized and put to death while the army was on the march, and Raḍiyya was incarcerated at Tabarhindh.[49] With the enthronement of one of her half-brothers as Mu'izz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh on 27 Ramaḍān 637/21 April 1240, the *amīrs* took steps to secure a tighter grip on the government. Significantly, they gave their allegiance [*bay'at*] to Bahrām Shāh only when he had

agreed to the creation of the new office of 'viceroy' [*nā'ib*], which went to the *amīr-ḥājib* Aytegin.[50]

Although Aytegin was intended to act for just one year in view of the sulṭān's youth, he soon aroused the new sovereign's resentment, securing Bahrām Shāh's sister in marriage and arrogating to himself imperial prerogatives. He was murdered on the sulṭān's orders on 8 Muḥarram 638/30 July 1240, and the office of *nā'ib* lapsed.[51] This provoked an unsuccessful bid to restore Raḍiyya, whose jailer *Altunapa reacted to the elimination of his ally Aytegin by releasing and marrying his prisoner.[52] Sālārī and Qaraqush Khān are alleged to have rallied to Raḍiyya's cause; but it is unclear whether they took part in the ensuing engagement. Near Tarā'īn, in the very region where in 587/1192 the Muslim forces had won the victory that gave them Delhi and where in 612/1216 her father Iltutmish had secured his precarious throne by overthrowing his overlord Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz, Raḍiyya and her husband, at the head of an army that included contingents from the Hindu tribes of the eastern Panjāb, were routed by the imperial army under Bahrām Shāh in person on 24 Rabī' I 638/13 October 1240. Shortly afterwards the couple were killed by Hindus while fleeing through the neighbourhood of Kaithal.[53]

Both Shajarat al-Durr and Raḍiyya owed their position in part to Turkish slave officers, first-generation converts from the steppe, who originated in a society where women enjoyed a wider latitude.[54] Jūzjānī notices that Raḍiyya discarded her female attire, emerged from purdah, and allowed herself to be seen in public riding on an elephant.[55] But however scandalous this might have been to the Tājīk *'ulamā'* of Delhi, it would surely have had less impact on the Turkish military. Although this is not the place to consider the persistence of non-Islamic attitudes within medieval Turkish Muslim societies,[56] it is worth noting that in the following century Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, recalling his journey among the nomads of the Pontic steppes, would comment on the greater freedom of Turkish women (including Muslim women), relative to those in the rest of Islamic society, and would observe that they did not wear the veil.[57] If we move from these relaxed attitudes, however, to the incidence of female sovereigns, the evidence tends to come not from the Turkish peoples, but from the Mongol-type peoples of the eastern steppes. On two occasions in the middle decades of the sixth/twelfth century, princesses ruled over the Qara-Khitan empire in Turkestan—itself

founded by refugees from the Khitan [Liao] dynasty of northern China, who are generally regarded as being of proto-Mongol stock —with powers that seem to have amounted to more than merely those of a regent.[58] Now a number of Iltutmish's *ghulāms*—Aytegin and Qaraqush Khān for instance—were of Khitan or Qara-Khitan stock and may have been influenced by such precedents in their homeland.[59] But it should also be borne in mind that other peoples from whom Iltutmish drew his slave officers belonged themselves to 'Mongol' ethnic groups. The term 'Qipčaq' embraced a great many tribal groups between the Dnieper and the Irtysh, of whom some are known—like Iltutmish's own tribe, the Ölberli—to have dwelt at an earlier date in the eastern steppes.[60] One such group—the Bayaut branch of the Kimek [Yemek] people, whose pasturelands lay somewhere to the north of the Aral Sea and the Sir-daryā—had produced Terken Khātūn, the mother of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, who until the Mongol conquest in 618/1221 ruled Khwārazm in virtual independence of her son, with the support of troops drawn from her own tribe.[61]

Raḍiyya may also have enjoyed a claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the Turks as Iltutmish's eldest child. Loyalty to the memory of their master was strong among his Turkish *ghulāms*. In the wake of Bahrām Shāh's overthrow in 639/1242, when the Shamsī slave 'Izz al-Dīn Balaban (shortly to receive the style of Küshlü Khān) made a bid for the throne, he was frustrated by a group of his colleagues, who assembled at Iltutmish's grave.[62] It may be surmised that Raḍiyya had similarly provided a focus for such loyalty in 634/1236 and that she continued to do so even after her deposition and death, particularly since the Turkish *ghulām* élite came to enjoy a far more fraught relationship with her successor and her reign may accordingly have taken on the color of a golden age. Jūzjānī, writing in part for his benefactor Balaban, who—it should be recalled—had obtained his first important office during Raḍiyya's reign, does not hesitate to praise her qualities as a ruler, imputing to her the sole defect that she was not a man: it is striking that she is the only one of Iltutmish's dynasty whom he credits with being a war-leader [*lashgarkash*].[63] The fact that her tomb near Delhi had become a place of pilgrimage by the time Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited India[64] may testify less to the abiding respect in which she was held by the citizens of the capital than to

the efforts of successive governments to harness such sentiments to their own purposes.[65]

Raḍiyya's reign did not mark a transition, as did that of Shajarat al-Durr, between the era of a non-Turkish ruling dynasty and a Mamlūk regime.[66] Unlike the Ayyubids, Iltutmish himself had been a Turkish slave, and his *ghulāms* continued to jostle for power with Tājīk and Ghūrī *amīrs* for some decades after Raḍiyya's overthrow. Nor did they ever succeed in monopolizing the principal offices of state as did their confrères in Egypt; there would be many reverses along the way before one of their number displaced the Shamsid dynasty and ascended the throne. Yet the period of Raḍiyya's rule did witness a major landmark in this process. If the *ghulāms* did not acquire a dangerous preponderance in the ranks of the élite, their heyday began with Raḍiyya. The intrusion of a greater number of Turkish slave commanders into *iqṭās* and the higher offices constitutes a half-way house between the first promotions under Iltutmish and the creation of the post of *nā'ib* at the accession of her brother Bahrām Shāh. That Raḍiyya, having contributed to the advancement of the Turkish *ghulāms*, then attempted vigorously (albeit unavailingly) to check them by forming an alternative power-base is perhaps irrelevant; though it gives the lie to Baranī's generalizations, noted above, about the feebleness of Iltutmish's dynasty.

NOTES

1. Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-Kurūb fī Akhbār Banī Ayyūb*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. arabe 1702, fol. 372v; trans. in Francesco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 298. In this essay, an asterisk (*) is used to indicate that we cannot be certain how to reconstruct the proper name in question.

2. For her reign, see generally A.B.M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 2nd ed. (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1961), pp. 116–22; idem, "Sulṭānah Rāziah" [sic], *Indian Historical Quarterly* 16 (1940): 750–72; Mohammad Habib and Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, eds., *The Delhi Sultanat (A.D. 1206–1526), A Comprehensive History of India* 5 (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1970), pp. 237–44.

3. That both women were installed by Turks is noticed in Fatima Mernissi, *The Forgotten Queens of Islam*, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Cambridge, Eng.: Polity Press, 1993), see pp. 89–99. For Shajarat al-Durr, see further Götz Schregle, *Die Sultanin von Ägypten. Šağarat ad-Durr in der arabischen*

Geschichtsschreibung und Literatur (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961), pp. 59–61.

4. Thomas T. Allsen, "Prelude to the Western campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217–37," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 3 (1983): 16; Peter B. Golden, "Cumanica II. The Ölberli (Ölperli): The Fortunes and Misfortunes of an Inner Asian Nomadic Clan," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 6 (1986 [1988]): 26–28. The name of this tribe, which is given as 'LBRY by Jūzjānī, usually therefore appears as 'Ilbarī' in secondary works on Indian history.

5. Irfan Habib, "Formation of the Sultanate Ruling Class of the Thirteenth Century," in Habib, ed., *Medieval India 1: Researches in the History of India 1200–1750* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 9–15.

6. Baranī, *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz-Shāhī*, ed. Saiyid Aḥmad Khān (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1861–2), pp. 27–28: for a translation of the relevant passage, see Habib, "Formation," pp. 15–16. On the Turkish *ghulāms* in India, see more generally Gavin Hambly, "Who Were the Chihilgānī, the Forty Slaves of Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish of Delhi?" *Iran* 10 (1972): 57–62; Peter Jackson, "The Mamlūk Institution in Early Muslim India," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1990): 340–58.

7. *Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a*, ed. Muṣṭafā Jawād (Baghdad, 1351/1932), p. 104.

8. Ibn Abi'l-Faḍā'il, *al-Nahj al-Sadīd*, ed. and trans. Samira Kortantamer, *Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaḍḍal b. Abi'l-Faḍā'il*, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 23 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz, 1973), Arabic text pp. 28–29 (German trans., p. 107).

9. Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-Wafayāt*, ed. Helmut Ritter et al., 12, Bibliotheca Islamica 61 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1979), p. 241.

10. Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-A'ṣār*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 310; hence *Die Indiengeschichte des Rašīd ad-Dīn*, ed. and trans. Karl Jahn (Vienna: Öesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, Denkschriften 144, 1980), Persian text Tafel 22, Arabic text Tafel 57 (German trans., p. 48). Ibn Abi'l-Faḍā'il, Arabic text pp. 28–29 (German trans., p. 107).

11. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Tuḥfat al-Nuẓẓār*, ed. Ch. Defrémery and B.R. Sanguinetti, 4 vols. (Paris: Société Asiatique, 1853–58), vol. 3, pp. 167–69, and idem, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa A.D. 1325–1354*, 4 vols. thus far with continuous pagination, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 110, 117, 141, 178 (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1958–94), vol. 3, pp. 631–32.

12. Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Kabul, 1342–43 SH/1963–64), vol. 1, p. 447, and idem, *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī: A General History of the Muḥammadan Dynasties of Asia*, 2 vols. with continuous pagination, trans. H.G. Raverty (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1872–81), vol. 1, pp. 616–17.

13. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 454–55 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 630, 631).

14. Anonymous translation of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī's *Sirr al-Makhtūma*, Paris, BN ms. supp. persan 384, fol. 2r.

15. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 458 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 638–39); we are told at vol. 1, p. 456 (trans.p. 635), that Raḍiyya was his eldest daughter. Nizami (in Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, pp. 230–31) believes that Iltutmish originally designated Raḍiyya, but then changed his mind and groomed Fīrūz Shāh instead. Similarly Habibullah, *The Foundation*, p. 115, sees Fīrūz Shāh's enthronement as "technically a supersession of Raziah."

16. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 448–49, 460 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 620, 643–44); and see below.

17. As Nizami points out, in Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, pp. 230–31, n. 84; cf. also his *On History and Historians of Medieval India* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983), p. 84. It is unfortunate that Nizami's insight is undermined in *The Delhi Sultanat*, pp. 253, 256, by his assertion, on the less reliable testimony of the mid-eighth/fourteenth–century author 'Iṣāmī, that Maḥmūd Shāh was not Iltutmish's youngest son, born after his namesake's death, as Jūzjānī tells us, but the old sulṭān's grandson.

18. For Shāh Terken's tyranny and the revolts, see Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 455–56 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 632–34).

19. He was purchased from the heirs of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ḥusayn, chief huntsman [*amīr-i shikār*] to Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz of Ghazna, on the former's murder: Jūzjānī. vol. 2, p. 5 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 724–25). This event, which coincided with the murder of Yildiz's *wazīr*, can be dated to 611/1214–15: Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 413 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 504–505); Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi'l-Ta'rīkh*, ed. C.J. Tornberg, *Ibn el-Athiri Chronicon quod perfectissimum scribitur*, 12 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1851–76), vol. 12, p. 199, repr. with different pagination (Beirut: Dar Sader, 1385–87/1965–67), vol. 12, pp. 304–305.

20. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 452 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 626).

21. For Kabīr Khān and Jānī, see Jūzjānī, vol. 2, pp. 6, 9 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 726, 731–32). For Sālārī, see Habib, "Formation," p. 13; also 'Awfī, "Preface," *Jawāmi' al-Ḥikāyāt*, 1, ed. Muḥammad Mu'īn, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1340 SH/1961), p. 12.

22. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 458–59 (the text reads Sirhind for Sirmūr; but cf. British Library ms. Add. 26189, fol. 182v, and Raverty's trans., vol. 1, pp. 640–41).

23. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 455 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 631–32). Habibullah, "Sulṭānah Rāziah," p. 757, and *The Foundation*, p. 115.

24. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, vol. 3, pp. 166–67 (trans. Gibb, vol. 3, p. 631). Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 456 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 636).

25. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 6 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 726).

26. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, pp. 48–49, 51 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 802, 805).

27. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 456–57 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 634–35, 636).

28. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 36 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 779). At vol. 1, p. 458, Jūzjānī calls Raḍiyya's adherents simply *umarā-yi turk*.

29. For *Tāīsī, see Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 458, and vol. 2, p. 13 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 639–40; vol. 2, pp. 735–36); the origin of this name is obscure. For *Altunapa, see Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 21 (trans. vol. 2, p. 748, is misleading, since Raverty renders *dar-bandān* as 'imprisonment' rather than 'siege'). The name is spelled 'LTWNYH in the printed text [Raverty's 'Altūnīah'], but I suspect we have here a form composed of Turkish *altun*, 'golden,' and *oba*, 'clan,' or *apa*, 'ancestor,' and found among the Qipčaq/Polovtsi: *Pol'noe sobranie russkikh letopisei, 1. Lavrent'evskaia letopis'*, 2nd ed. (Leningrad: Akademiya Nauk, 1926–28), col. 278; Sir Gerard Clauson, *An etymological dictionary of pre-thirteenth-century Turkish* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 5, 131. Küshlü Khān: Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 36 (garbled in Raverty's trans., vol. 2, p. 779): he was briefly taken prisoner by the insurgent *amīrs* while fighting for Raḍiyya outside the capital.

30. 'Iṣāmī, *Futūḥ al-Salāṭīn*, ed. A.S. Usha (Madras: Madras University Islamic Series, 9, 1948), p. 130, and trans. A. Mahdi Husain, 3 vols. with continuous pagination (Aligarh Muslim University Press: Aligarh, 1967–77), vol. 2, p. 248 (on which n. 1 erroneously cites as examples nobles who were not slaves).

31. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, pp. 48, 51 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 802, 806). The meaning of *khāṣadār* was established by S.H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, 2 vols. (Bombay, 1939–57), vol. 2, pp. 67–68.

32. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 46 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 797–98).

33. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 34 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 766–67, reading *jāmadār* for *khāṣadār*). For the date at which Iltutmish had purchased them, see Jackson, "The *Mamlūk* institution," p. 347 and n. 35.

34. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 21 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 748).

35. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 460, and vol. 2, p. 22 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 642; vol. 2, p. 750). For *ay*, 'moon,' and *tegin*, 'prince,' see Jean Sauvaget, "Noms et surnoms des Mamelouks," *Journal Asiatique* 238 (1950): 31–58, no. 41.

36. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 459 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 641–42). Sayf al-Dīn's sobriquet, which is given as BHTW in Ḥabībī's text and 'Bihaq' by Raverty, appears as TTQ in ms. Add. 26189, fols. 182v, 183r. This looks like the Tu. title *totaq*, or conceivably a nickname, *tutuq*, 'tongue-tied': Clauson, p. 453; Denis Sinor, "The Turkish title *tutuq* rehabilitated," in *Turcica et Orientalia. Studies in Honor of Gunnar Jarring* (Istanbul: Transactions of the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul 1, 1988), pp. 145–48. For his epitaph, from Abūhar, see *Annual Report on Indian Epigraphy* 4 (1970–71): 18–19, 119.

37. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 21 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 748), for *Altunapa; vol. 2, p. 25–26 (trans. vol. 2, p. 754), for Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq; vol. 2, p. 162 (trans. vol. 2, p. 1129), for Ḥasan Qarluq's son. It is clear from ms. Add. 26189, fol. 186v, that Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar's sobriquet, given as 'Qīqluq' by Raverty, is to be read *qabaqulaq*, 'protruding ears': Clauson, pp. 580–81, 621; Jackson, "The *Mamlūk* institution," p. 342, n.7. On Qarluq's

principality, see Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, "The Qarlugh Kingdom in North-Western India during the Thirteenth Century," *Islamic Culture* 54 (1980): 75–91. Habibullah, in "Sulṭānah Rāziah," pp. 762–64, speculated that Qarluq was making an unsuccessful bid to involve Raḍiyya in a joint anti-Mongol front.

38. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, vol. 3, p. 167 (trans. Gibb, vol. 3, p. 631). He heard that Yāqūt had been Raḍiyya's slave. The statement of 'Iṣāmī, p. 134 (trans. Husain, vol. 2, p. 253), that Yāqūt was a slave of Iltutmish and had served both that sulṭān and Fīrūz Shāh as *amīr-i ākhūr*, was accepted by Habibullah, "Sulṭānah Rāziah," p. 766; but Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 24 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 752), seems to suggest that Badr al-Dīn Sonqur held this office from Iltutmish's reign into that of Raḍiyya. See also Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, p. 240, n. 21.

39. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 460, and vol. 2, pp. 21, 22–23 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 642–43; vol. 2, pp. 748, 750). Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, pp. 240, 243. Ms. Add. 26189, fol. 183r, gives Yāqūt the title 'chief *amīr*' [*amīr al-umarā*'], a phrase omitted in Ḥabībī's edition of Jūzjānī (vol. 1, p. 460).

40. H. Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sulṭāns of Dehlī* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 40 (nos. 161, 161A). Coins struck in distant Lakhnawtī carried Raḍiyya's name alone throughout, apparently, see p. 41 (nos. 161B–61D).

41. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 459 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 641).

42. The phrase *qūī-yi ḥāl gasht*, found in ms. Add. 26189, fol. 199r, is omitted in Ḥabībī's edition, vol. 2, p. 9, but cf. Raverty's trans. in Jūzjānī, vol. 2, pp. 730–31. Hindū Khān, Jūzjānī,, vol. 2, p. 19 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 746).

43. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 14 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 737). For *toghan*, 'falcon,' see Sauvaget, no. 140.

44. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 459–60 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 642).

45. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 460, and vol. 2, pp. 25–26 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 643–44; vol. 2, pp. 754–55). The evacuees included Muslim envoys from the Mongols of the Qipčaq steppe, who were removed to Qinnawj [Kanauj]: ibid., vol. 2, p. 214 (trans. vol. 2, p. 1285, where Raverty's phrase "In the end this sovereign was put in seclusion" is a misunderstanding of Jūzjānī's remarks about the envoys).

46. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, p. 17 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 743).

47. See Jūzjānī's account of the two campaigns: ibid., vol. 1, pp. 445–46, 448–49 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 610–11, 619–21).

48. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 460, and vol. 2, pp. 6, 20 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 644–45; vol. 2, pp. 726–27, 747). For *qaraqush*, 'eagle,' see Clauson, p. 670.

49. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 460–61, and vol. 2, p. 21 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 645, vol. 2, pp. 748–49).

50.Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 463 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 649).

51. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, pp. 463–64, and vol. 2, p. 23 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 649–51; vol. 2, p. 751).

52. Professor Nizami (in Habib and Nizami, *The Delhi Sultanat*, p. 242) believes that *Altunapa turned against the new regime because he had been double-crossed by Aytegin; but the chronology suggests, in my view, that he revolted on the news of Aytegin's murder.

53. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 462, and vol. 2, p. 22 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 647–48; vol. 2, p. 749). For the support of the Hindu tribes, see" 'Iṣāmī," in p. 139 (trans. Husain, vol. 2, p. 259).

54. Schregle, pp. 75–76; see also Golden's comments in "Cumanica II. The Ölberli," p. 27.

55. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 460 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 643–44). This is mentioned also by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, vol. 3, p. 167 (trans. Gibb, vol. 3, p. 631).

56. See J.P. Roux, "Recherche des survivances pré-islamiques dans les textes turcs musulmans: le *'Bābar-Nāme,'*" *Journal Asiatique* 256 (1968): 247–61, and "Recherche des survivances pré-islamiques dans les textes turcs musulmans: le *Kitab-i Dede Qorqut,*" *Journal Asiatique* 264 (1976): 35–55.

57. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, vol. 2, pp. 377–79 (trans. Gibb, vol. 2, pp. 480–81); see also vol. 2, p. 384 (trans. Gibb, vol. 2, p. 483), on the public appearances of the wives of the Khān Özbeg.

58. Karl A. Wittfogel and Fēng Chia-shēng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao 907–1125*, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, new series, 36 [for 1946] (Philadelphia, 1949), pp. 643, 644, 646; see also the remarks about the Liao rulers in China at pp. 199–202. For the role of women in Mongol society, see Paul Ratchnevsky, "La condition de la femme mongole au XII^{e}/XIII^{e} siècle," in Walther Heissig et al., eds., *Tractata Altaica Denis Sinor....dedicata* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1976), pp. 509–30, especially pp. 517–23.

59. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, pp. 19, 22 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 746, 749). The point was well made by Habibullah, "Sulṭānah Rāziah," p. 752; although the examples that follow from the Islamic world (pp. 752–53) include women, like Ḍayfa Khātūn of Aleppo, who were merely regents.

60. Omeljan Pritsak, "Two migratory movements in the Eurasian steppe in the 9th–11th centuries," in *Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi 1964* 2 (New Delhi, 1968): 157–63. Golden, "Cumanica II. The Ölberli," pp. 10–22.

61. See W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed., ed. C.E. Bosworth, Gibb Memorial Series, new series, 5 (London: Luzac, 1968), pp. 349, 428; Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan. Cheng-Wou Ts'in-tcheng Lou* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1951), pp. 89–97; her clan may have been linked with the Ölberli (see pp. 107–08). The sources are Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, 3 vols, Gibb Memorial Series, 16 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, and London: Luzac, 1912–37), vol. 2, pp. 198–99, and trans. J.A. Boyle, *The History of the World-*

Conqueror, 2 vols. with continuous pagination (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 465–66; and Nasawī, *Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti*, ed. and trans. Octave Houdas (Paris: École des langues orientales vivantes, 3e série, 9 and 10, 1891–95), text p. 42, trans. pp. 72–73.

62. Jūzjānī, vol. 2, pp. 36–37 (trans. Raverty, vol. 2, p. 780).

63. Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 457 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, pp. 637–38).

64. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, vol. 3, p. 169 (trans. Gibb, vol. 3, p. 632). For the tomb, see also Shams-i Sirāj 'Afīf, *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz-Shāhī,* ed. Maulavi Vilayat Husain (Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1888–91), p. 134. The district was included in the new settlement of Fīrūzābād founded by Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq. Raḍiyya's brothers Rukn al-Dīn and Mu'izz al-Dīn were buried at Malikpūr: Fīrūz Shāh, *Futūḥāt-i Fīrūz-Shāhī,* ed. Shaikh Abdur Rashid (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1954), p. 13, and trans. N.B. Roy, "The Victories of Sultān Fīrūz Shāh of the Tughluq Dynasty," *Islamic Culture* 15 (1941): 460.

65. There seems to be a parallel with the grave of Iltutmish's rival Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz at Badā'ūn, which had become a focus of pilgrimage by the time Jūzjānī wrote. See Jūzjānī, vol. 1, p. 413 (trans. Raverty, vol. 1, p. 506). Here again we have a monarch to whose overthrow the regime at Delhi was indebted for its very survival, but whose memory—in this case as the senior *ghulām* of Mu'izz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, the Ghūrid conqueror of northern India, and later the bulwark of Muslim India against the Khwārazmshāh—commanded reverence. For Yildiz as the opponent of the Khwārazmshāh, see Peter Jackson, "The Fall of the Ghurid Dynasty," in *Festschrift for Professor C.E. Bosworth* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming).

66. See Schregle, p. 143.

X

Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols, and the Khwarazmian Conquest of the Panjāb and Sind

During the invasion of Western Asia by Chinggis Khan in the years 615–20/1218–23, and the destruction of the empire of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish, one of the few figures to offer effective opposition to the Mongols was the shāh's son Jalāl al-Dīn *Mingīrinī.[1] On his father's death as an abject fugitive in the Caspian region, Jalāl al-Dīn made for Ghazna in present-day Afghanistan, where he was able to rally a considerable following. But after some relatively minor victories over the Mongols, he was finally overwhelmed in battle with an army under Chinggis Khan in person on the banks of the Indus in the autumn of 618/1221. Jalāl al-Dīn, barely escaping with his life, swam alone across the river, and in time gathered together the remnants of the Khwarazmian army. He went on to create a short-lived empire in the Panjāb and Sind which, had he stayed, might well have supplanted the infant Delhi Sultanate as the chief protagonist of Islam in the subcontinent. But his flight had ushered in the first Mongol invasion of India; and although the detachments sent in pursuit failed to make contact with him their presence caused him at length to depart for the west. In 620/1223, after a stay of two years in India, the Khwārazmshāh made his way back to Iran via the Makrān desert, in the hope of rebuilding his father's empire. Eventually, following a stormy career of aggression in Iraq

---

[1] This sobriquet has not been identified, and the form generally adopted, *Mengübirtī*, is based on an etymology that has now been discarded. The solution appears to lie in a passage of Jūzjānī which to my knowledge has been cited in the present context (though he was unable to identify correctly the elements in the name) only by S.H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, I (Bombay, 1939), pp. 240–41, and II ed. R.S. Hodivala (Poona, 1957), p. 75. It concerns the *amīr* Kabīr Khān Ayāz, whose surname is strongly reminiscent of that of Jalāl al-Dīn. According to Jūzjānī, he was given this because he was popularly known as *Hazārmarda*: *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, 2nd ed. (Kābul, 1342–43 Sh./1963–64), II, p. 6, tr. H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabakāt-i Nāṣirī* (London, 1873–81, 2 vols with continuous pagination. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 725. The elements are therefore *ming* ('thousand') and *eren* ('men'): see Sir Gerard Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 232, 346–7.

and the Caucasus, he was killed in Kurdistān, while once more fleeing from the Mongols, in 628/1231.[2]

I

For our knowledge of events during Jalāl al-Dīn's sojourn in India we are dependent on a variety of sources. Those from the Far East comprise the so-called *Secret History of the Mongols* (*ca.* 1240?), of which the Mongolian text has survived in Chinese transcription; the *Shêng-wu ch'in-ch'êng lu*, which is apparently a Chinese translation of another Mongolian chronicle, the lost *Altan Debter* (between 1263 and 1285); and the *Yüan Shih*, the history of the Mongol imperial dynasty in China compiled after its fall in 1368 but from contemporary documents.[3] We learn here nothing of Jalāl al-Dīn's own activities, however, and are given only a sketch of Chinggis Khan's movements in the Indian borderlands. The confused and inadequate nature of the Far Eastern material has been noticed more than once.[4] In addition, for the last few years of the conqueror's life the chronology is at least one year awry; but a valuable check upon the dates of his homeward march is provided by the itinerary of the Taoist patriarch Ch'ang-ch'un, who was in his entourage in the years 1222–23.[5]

Concerning Jalāl al-Dīn's exploits we learn most, as might be expected, from sources composed within the Islamic world. Some of the reports circulating in Western Asia at this time need not long detain us. In these, Jalāl al-Dīn's mother is alleged to have originated from India and even from its ruling dynasty. Jalāl al-Dīn was furnished with reinforcements in India by its king (presumably the Delhi Sultan, Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish), with which he kept up the struggle with the Mongols until eventually fleeing alone to Kirmān. According to a

---

[2] For a brief biography, see J.A. Boyle, *EI*[2] art. 'Djalāl al-Dīn Khʷārazm-Shāh'. Accounts of his resistance to the Mongols are found in Paul Ratchnevsky, *Činggis-Khan, sein Leben und Wirken*, Münchener Ostasiatische Studien, 32 (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 119–20; Z.M. Buniyatov, *Gosudarstvo xorezmšaxov-anuštegинidov 1097–1231* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 156–8; W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed. by C.E. Bosworth, GMS, new series, V (London, 1968), pp. 441–6; Boyle, 'Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-khāns', in *CHI*, V (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 317–21.

[3] The relationship between these Far Eastern sources is discussed by Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis in the introduction to their partial translation of the *Shêng-wu: Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan* (Leiden, 1951, vol. I only), pp. xiii–xv. The section of this work relevant to our purposes was translated by Erich Haenisch in 'Die letzten Feldzüge Činggis Ḫan's und sein Tod', *Asia Major* IX (1933), pp. 527–9.

[4] Boyle, '*Iru* and *Maru* in the *Secret History of the Mongols*', *HJAS* XVII (1954), pp. 403–10. On the inaccuracy of the *Secret History* in particular, see Igor de Rachewiltz, in his translation of ch. xi, in *Papers in Far Eastern History* XXX (Sept. 1984), pp. 142–3.

[5] Li Chih-ch'ang, *Hsi-yu chi*, tr. Arthur Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (London, 1931).

still more bizarre story, the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad himself escaped from the Caspian region, took refuge in India, and was incarcerated for a time by Iltutmish, allegedly his kinsman by marriage; but he contrived to escape and made his way by boat to Kirmān, dying in Fārs![6] Fortunately not all the information at our disposal is of this calibre; but it must be said that of three major Muslim authors who were contemporary with these events, and are among our most valuable sources for the Mongol invasion of Western Asia, two are remarkably disappointing. Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233) dismisses Jalāl al-Dīn's stay in India in a couple of lines.[7] Jūzjānī (writing in 658/1260), who must have been better informed since he arrived in Delhi from Khurāsān a few years later, makes three tantalizingly brief references to the Khwarazmian invasion, though treating the Mongol operations in slightly greater detail. The only strictly contemporary writer to provide a full account of events in the Panjāb and Sind is Nasawī, who entered Jalāl al-Dīn's service after his reappearance in Iran and completed a biography of the prince in 639/1241–42: it should be noted, therefore, that he had not participated in the events with which we are concerned.[8] Our other principal Islamic source is Juwaynī (d. 681/1283), writing a generation later, in 658/1260, when Mongol rule over the Iranian world was securely established. His *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā* is essentially a history of the rise of the Mongol empire, divided into three sections: the second constitutes an account of the Khwārazmshāhs down to the death of Jalāl al-Dīn, of whom Juwaynī was a great admirer.[9]

[p. 47] To ascertain what transpired in the Panjāb and Sind in the period 618–21/1221–24 is no easy task. Not merely are we required to reconcile the versions of Juwaynī and Nasawī; but the arrangement of Juwaynī's own work is problematic, since the same episode may be recounted twice and the details

---

[6] See Cl. Cahen, "Abdallaṭīf al-Baghdādī et les Khwārizmiens', in C.E. Bosworth (ed.), *Iran and Islam* (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 158, 159–60, for Jalāl al-Dīn; the apocryphal tale about Muḥammad is found in Ibn Abi'l-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*, ed. M.A. Ibrāhīm (Cairo, 1378–87/1959–67, 20 vols), VIII, pp. 227–9. The references to kinship may well derive from a confusion between the Delhi Sultan and a certain Fīrūz-i Iltutmish, described as a 'prince of Khwārazm' and related to the Khwārazmshāhs, who is known to have taken up residence at the Delhi court: Jūzjānī, I, pp. 284, 299, 452, tr. pp. 199, 235, 625.

[7] Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi't-ta'rīkh*, ed. C.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851–76, 12 vols), XII, p. 276.

[8] Nasawī, *Sīrat al-Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn*, ed. and tr. Octave Houdas (Paris, 1891–95, 2 vols), tr. Z.M. Buniyatov, *Żizneopisanie Sultana Dżalal ad-Dina Mankburny* (Baku, 1973). There is also a seventh/thirteenth-century Persian translation, ed. Mujtabā Mīnuwī (Tehran, 1344 Sh./1965).

[9] On Juwaynī's attitude towards Jalāl al-Dīn, see the introduction to Boyle's translation: *The History of the World-Conqueror* (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols with continuous pagination), pp. xxxi–xxxii.


SAMARQAND
Transoxiana
R. Oxus
BALKH
Badakhshān
Jūzjān
Baghlān
Parwān
Kapīsā
Bāmiyān
Kābul R.
Ghūr
KĀBUL
Nīngnahār
Bājaur
Kashmīr
PESHAWAR
Kurramān
GHAZNA
GARDĪZ
R. Indus
Kūh-i Jūd Range (Salt Range)
Zamīndāwar
Zābulistān
Bindān
KULLŪR
R. Jhelum
Jammū
GUJRĀT
SIYĀLKŪT
SŪDRA PASRŪR
BUST
KARKhanās territory
LAHORE
R. Ravi
AJMĪR (?)
R. Beās
MULTĀN
R. Sutlej
MASTUNG
Bolān Pass
UCH
DELHI
INDUS
BHAKKAR
Makrān
SĪWISTĀN
Arabian Sea
DĒBUL (?)
NORTH-WEST INDIA
AT THE TIME OF
THE KHWARAZMIAN INVASION
(1221)

given in the second section sometimes clash with those found in the first, on the reigns of Chinggis Khan and his successors down to *ca.* 1250. This difficulty is compounded, rather than resolved, by the great Il-khanid minister and chronicler, Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh (d. 718/1318), writing in the early eighth/fourteenth century. He chose to incorporate in his general history, the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, an abridged form of the material found in Juwaynī together with data from a Mongolian source, most probably the *Altan Debter*, which as we saw above was apparently the lost Mongolian original of the *Shêng-wu*.[10] His use of the material, however, is on occasions highly dubious. One example will suffice. According to Juwaynī, the Mongol general sent in pursuit of Jalāl al-Dīn was Dörbei Doqshin ('the Brutal'), whereas the Far Eastern sources name him as Bala of the Jalayir tribe; Rashīd al-Dīn simply turns both men into joint commanders.[11] Yet we cannot be certain that this kind of synthesization was always warranted by any additional evidence at his disposal.

In these circumstances, the anonymous chronicle represented by the incomplete MS Th. Hyde 31 in the Bodleian Library is an authority of considerable interest and importance. The work was noticed by Barthold, who nevertheless included only one excerpt from it among the texts in the Russian edition of his *Turkestan*.[12] The date of composition is hard to determine. Barthold placed it no earlier than the eighth/fourteenth century, since the author quotes the *Mir'āt al-jinān* of Yāfi'ī (d. 768/1367).[13] But there is one further clue to the date. Mention is made of Tīmūr's ancestor Qarachar as *atabeg* to Chinggis Khan's second son Chaghadai, and subsequently as joint regent of Chaghadai's *ulus* with his widow Yesülün on behalf of Chaghadai's young grandson Qara Hülegü.[14] These details point to a date at the earliest during the era of Tīmūr. Even Rashīd al-Dīn had mentioned Qarachar, however, if only as one of Chaghadai's four commanders of a 'thousand';[15] nor do we find in MS Hyde 31

---

[10] See Boyle, 'Juvaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn as Sources on the History of the Mongols', in B. Lewis and P.M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 133–7; also the introduction to Boyle's partial translation of the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh: The Successors of Genghis Khan* (London and New York, 1971), pp. 10–11.

[11] Boyle, '*Iru* and *Maru*', pp. 406–10.

[12] *Turkestan v epoxu mongol'skogo našestviya* (St. Petersburg, 1898–1900, 2 vols), I (texts), p. 156.

[13] Fol. 116b; see Barthold, *Turkestan*, 3rd ed., p. 55, n. 4. At fols. 30a, 114b, he further cites the metrical history of Shams al-Dīn Kāshānī, written during the reign of the Īl-khān Öljeitü (703–16/1304–16): see on this work C.A. Storey, *Persian Literature: a Bio-Bibliographical Survey*, I (London, 1927–39), p. 266.

[14] MS Hyde 31, fols. 227a and b.

[15] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, I/2, ed. I.N. Berezin, in *Trudy Vostočnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arxeologičeskago Obščestva* XV (1888), p. 217, tr. O.I. Smirnova, *Sbornik*

any allusion to Qarachar's illustrious descendant, or the historical falsifications which are commonly inserted in the writings of Timurid historians in order to legitimize their sovereign's rise to power.[16] Hence the work in all likelihood antedates at least the apex of Tīmūr's career, from about 1395 onwards. As for the manuscript's contents, it is apparently part of a detailed history of the Mongols, since it begins with Yāfith (Japhet), son of Nūḥ (Noah), and continues down as far as 642/1244, during the interregnum following the death of the *qaghan* Ögödei.[17] The material, and even the phraseology, bear a marked resemblance to Juwaynī's with two important qualifications. Additional details are sometimes inserted which illuminate obscure episodes in the *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā*; and where Juwaynī recounts events at different points in his history or in a confused order, the author of MS Hyde 31 has adopted a more rational arrangement. These two advantages are not least obvious in his treatment of Jalāl al-Dīn's operations and those of his Mongol pursuers in the Panjāb and Sind. The sources in general supply very few dates in their account of Jalāl al-Dīn's sojourn in India, and in this respect the anonymous chronicle, regrettably, does not lighten our task. The following paper is nevertheless an attempt to reconstruct the course of events in north-western India during the period 618–21/1221–24.[18]

II

Following the defeat of the Khwarazmian army on the Indus in the autumn of 618/1221, Chinggis Khan at first moved upstream, sending troops to continue the pursuit of the fugitives only on hearing a report that Jalāl al-Dīn had recrossed the river to bury his dead. The conqueror's son Chaghadai, who commanded this detachment, was unable to find the prince in the Kurramān and *Shinqurān region, and rejoined his father. Thereupon Chinggis Khan despatched two *tümens* (20,000 men) under Dörbei Doqshin to press on with the

---

letopiseĭ, I/2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), p. 275; see also II, ed. E. Blochet, GMS, XVIII/1 (Leiden and London, 1911), p. 178, tr. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 145.

[16] On these, see Barthold, *Turkestan*, 3rd ed., pp. 52–3.

[17] And does not terminate with the death of Ögödei, as stated in E. Sachau and H. Ethé, *Catalogue of the Persian, Turkish, Hindûstânî, and Pushtu Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library*, I (Oxford, 1889), col. 83 (with 637/1239 in error): for the date 642, see fol. 234b.

[18] Boyle, 'Jalal al-Din Khwarazm-Shah in the Indus valley', in Hamida Khuhro (ed.), *Sind Through the Centuries* (O.U.P., Karachi, 1981), pp. 124–9, compares the data furnished by Juwaynī and Nasawī but does not take account of the material in MS Hyde 31.

hunt beyond the Indus.[19] At one juncture Juwaynī alleges that Dörbei was sent after the army had crossed the Oxus on its way home to Mongolia,[20] a curious statement which is at odds with the rest of his testimony and to which we shall revert later. Elsewhere he states that Chinggis Khan was in the Ghazna region when Dörbei was sent, and he later makes the general pass through Ghazna on his return, prior to overtaking Chinggis Khan.[21] Although the town of Ghazna itself lay some distance from the route which Chinggis Khan is known to have followed, the name is doubtless used vaguely to embrace also the Kābul region: hence Jūzjānī in turn speaks of the conqueror making his way back, after the winter, via the passes of the territory of Ghazna and Kābul.[22] We can therefore conclude that Dörbei was sent at the end of the winter of 618–19/1221–22, as Chinggis Khan began the long march home.

The Mongol sovereign had set up his winter-quarters in a region called in our sources by a variety of names.[23] According to Juwaynī, he stayed in Katūr, where the local ruler, Sālār Aḥmad, showed himself appropriately submissive and provided as far as possible for the troops' needs; and the MS Hyde 31 adds that the Mongols then moved on to Pandkhūr (perhaps the valley of the Panjkora river).[24] Jūzjānī, on the other hand, specifies that Chinggis Khan was

---

[19] Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, GMS, XVI (Leiden and London, 1912–37, 3 vols), I, pp. 108, 112, tr. Boyle, pp. 136, 141. Chaghadai's expedition lasted only a short time, since by Jan.-Feb. 1222 he was operating not far south of the Oxus and seeing to the repair of bridges: Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist*, pp. 95–6. *Shinqurān, often mentioned in the sources in conjunction with Kurramān, is apparently identical with Shalūzān: see Raverty's n. 7 at pp. 498–9 of his translation of Jūzjānī. It may also be linked with the Shinwārī tribe of Afghans: C.E. Bosworth, *The Later Ghaznavids* (Edinburgh, 1977), p. 125. The name appears in the printed text of Ibn al-Athīr as SWRAN (ŠNWRAN?): see XII, p. 140, where the place is said to lie, with Kurramān, on one of the two routes from Peshawar to Ghazna (the other passing through MKRHAN, i.e. Nanagrahār, the present-day Jalālābād region). For this route, see A.D.H. Bivar, 'Naghar and Īryāb: Two Little Known Sites on the North-West Frontier of Afghanistan and Pakistan', *Iran* XXIV (1986), pp. 131–8 (with map).

[20] Juwaynī, I, p. 110, tr. p. 139.

[21] *Ibid.*, II, p. 144, tr. p. 413, I, p. 112, tr. p. 142, for his return via Ghazna.

[22] Jūzjānī, II, p. 127, tr. Raverty, p. 1047.

[23] The Far Eastern tradition provides little information here. The *Secret History*, §257, tr. de Rachewiltz, p. 97, speaks of Chinggis Khan moving up the Indus, plundering Badakhshān and reaching the Eke-qoroqan ('Eke brook') and the Ge'ün-qoroqan ('Mare brook'), which de Rachewiltz, p. 145, suggests were 'almost certainly tributaries of the Kabul River'.

[24] Juwaynī, I, pp. 108–9, tr. pp. 136–7, with BWYH KTWR: the first element, as MS Hyde 31, fol. 137b, suggests, should read SWBH (*sūba*). Juwaynī calls Katūr a town in Ashtaqār. This is evidently Hashtnaghar, the district near Peshawar mentioned in the *Ā'īn-i Akbarī*, II, tr. H.S. Jarrett, 2nd ed. by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Bibl. Indica (Calcutta, 1949), p. 413. It may also be the place referred to as Shashnaghār by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, tr. H.A.R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, A.D.*

pursuing the army of Ighraq, i.e. a body of Khalaj, **[p. 48]** Türkmen and Ghūrī tribesmen under Sayf al-Dīn Ighraq who had deserted Jalāl al-Dīn prior to the *débâcle* on the Indus. With this aim, he passed three months in a region called Gīrī, capturing the fortress of that name as well as other strongholds in the foothills (*kūhpāya*).[25] There is in fact no contradiction between these witnesses. Both Katūr and a locality named Gīrak are listed in Bābur's memoirs among places lying in the mountains of Kāfiristān, north-east and east of Kābul.[26] The fortress occupied by Ighraq and his army must be identical with the place named *Darwaz (?) by Nasawī: on its capture, the occupants were all put to the sword.[27]

Chinggis Khan's initial plan was to seek a homeward route directly east through India and on towards China by way of the Himalayas (*kūh-i Qarāchīl*), Bengal (Lakhnawtī), Assam (Kāmrūd) and the subject Tangut kingdom. According to Jūzjānī, he sent an embassy to the Delhi Sultan, Iltutmish, asking permission to pass through his dominions. We are told nothing of the fate of the envoys, merely that Chinggis Khan abandoned his plan in view of unfavourable auguries.[28] This finds an echo in the *Yüan Shih*, where the bad

---

1325–1354, Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, CX, CXVII, CXLI (Cambridge, 1958–, 3 vols so far with continuous pagination), p. 591 (though cf. *ibid.*, n. 212).

[25] Jūzjānī, II, pp. 126, 146, tr. Raverty, pp. 1043–5, 1081; for Gīrī, see also II, pp. 127, 143, tr. pp. 1047, 1073. Raverty, who identified the region with 'Bājaur and the tracts forming its southern boundary' (p. 1043, n. 1), adopted the spelling 'Gībarī' but the B.L. MS Add. 26,189 has throughout GYRY; see further Bosworth, *The Later Ghaznavids*, p. 14 and nn. 29 and 47 (at pp. 160, 161–2). Juwaynī, I, p. 109, tr. p. 137, mentions the siege of Ighraq's stronghold: concerning Ighraq, see Boyle, 'Dynastic and Political History', p. 319. The expeditions against numerous 'enemies', mentioned in the *Shêng-wu* (tr. Haenisch, 'Die letzten Feldzüge', p. 529), may possibly be an echo of these operations, although they allegedly occurred while Chinggis Khan was in his summer-quarters on the Parwān river (i.e. in Baghlān: see below).

[26] *Bābur-nāma*, facs. ed. Annette S. Beveridge, GMS, I (Leiden and London, 1905), fol. 131a; tr. *eadem*, *The Bābur-nāme in English* (London, 1921–2, 2 vols), I, p. 207. Beveridge reads GBRK. Material on Katūr (Katwar) is collected in G. Scarcia, *Ṣifat-nāma-yi Darwīš Muḥammad Ḫān-i Ġāzī: cronaca di una crociata musulmana contro i Kafiri di Laġmān nell'anno 1582*, Serie Orientale Roma, XXXII (Rome, 1965), pp. cxiv–cxviii; see further Bosworth, *EI²* art. 'Kāfiristān'.

[27] Nasawī, text p. 84, tr. p. 140, tr. Buniyatov, p. 128; the Paris MS used by Houdas reads DRWDH; the B.L. MS Or. 5,662, fol. 31b, ḌRWDH; and Mīnuwī's Persian text, p. 111, DRWḌH. Nasawī calls the leader A'ẓam Malik. But according to a more detailed account in Juwaynī, II, pp. 196–8, tr. pp. 463–5, this commander had already been killed by Ighraq's men in Nanagrahār before the final destruction of Ighraq himself and the rest of the tribesmen by the Mongols.

[28] Jūzjānī, II, pp. 126–7, tr. Raverty, pp. 1045–7; for the auguries, see also II, p. 146, tr. pp. 1081–4. Later (II, p. 214, tr. p. 1284), Jūzjānī asserts that Iltutmish would never entertain diplomatic relations with the Mongols, though he refrained from killing their envoys. The correct form of the Delhi Sultan's name was determined by Simon Digby, 'Iletmish or Iltutmish? A Reconsideration of the Name of the Dehlī Sultan', *Iran* VIII (1970), pp. 57–64.

omen is described as a unicorn – presumably a rhinoceros.[29] Juwaynī, who does not mention diplomatic relations with Delhi, claims that the conqueror advanced several stages but that in view of the lack of a road he retraced his steps as far as Peshawar, where he remained until the spring. Here news reached him of the revolt of the distant Tangut (Hsi-Hsia) kingdom, which lay to the west of China and which had submitted in 1209. He thereupon traversed the Hindu Kush, spending the summer (of 619/1222) in Baghlān, where his heavy baggage had preceded him.[30] Somewhere in this region he first granted audience, in May, to the Taoist patriarch Ch'ang-ch'un.[31] In the autumn he crossed over the Oxus and took up his winter-quarters in the neighbourhood of Samarqand, where Ch'ang-ch'un dates his arrival around the beginning of November 1222.[32] It is at this point that we recall the somewhat puzzling testimony of Juwaynī referred to above, concerning the despatch of Dörbei Doqshin in pursuit of Jalāl al-Dīn from somewhere north of the Oxus. The explanation – that Dörbei was sent after the Khwārazmshāh on two separate occasions – is supplied only in MS Hyde 31. According to this account, Dörbei rejoined the main army at Samarqand, but his lack of success so infuriated Chinggis Khan that the unfortunate general again set out for India under strict orders not to return without having secured Jalāl al-Dīn.[33]

---

[29] Ch. i, tr. F.E.A. Krause, *Čingis Ḫan. Die Geschichte seines Lebens nach den chinesischen Reichsannalen* (Heidelberg, 1922), p. 39 (with the impossible year 1224). See also Ratchnevsky, p. 120.

[30] Juwaynī, I, pp. 109–10, tr. Boyle, pp. 137–9. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 127, 146, tr. pp. 1047, 1082–4, likewise says that the news of the Tangut revolt caused him to retire. For relations with the Tangut, see H. Desmond Martin, 'The Mongol Wars with Hsi Hsia (1205–1227)', *JRAS* (1942), pp. 195–228; Ratchnevsky, pp. 93–5, 125–6. The Far Eastern sources speak of Chinggis Khan spending the summer in the valley of the Parwān river: *Secret History*, §257, tr. De Rachewiltz, p. 97; and see p. 145; Krause, p. 38; Haenisch, 'Die letzten Feldzüge', p. 529. They are followed by Rashīd al-Dīn, I/2, ed. Berezin, p. 130, tr. Smirnova, *Sbornik letopisei*, I/2, p. 225.

[31] Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist*, p. 100.

[32] Juwaynī, I, p. 110, tr. p. 139; Waley, p. 113.

[33] MS Hyde 31, fol. 141b: *wa-Būrtāī Bakhshī* [sic] *ki az dunbāl-i Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn firistāda būd wa-ū tā ḥudūd-i Mūltān rafta wa-Sulṭānrā nayāfta murāja'at namūda būd dar īn maḥall birasīd az nayāftan-i Sulṭān wa-bāz gashtan-i īshān ghaḍab farmūd wa-dīgar bār ūrā az dunbāl-i Sulṭān bi-ṣawb-i Hindūstān bāz gardānīd wa-mubālagha farmūd tā ūrā bi-dast nayārad murāja'at nanamāyad*; see also fol. 147a. If the allusion to Multān refers to the siege, the author is in error, since this occurred in 621/1224, during Dörbei's second campaign: see below. Chinggis Khan left Samarqand at the end of Dec. 1222: Waley, p. 115.

III

We must now follow Jalāl al-Dīn's movements from the point at which he crossed the Indus. A large number of fortresses in the eastern Panjāb and the north Gangetic plain had been conquered for Islam around the turn of the sixth/twelfth century by the Ghurid Sultan Mu'izz al-Dīn (originally Shihāb al-Dīn) Muḥammad b. Sām and his Turkish slave (*mamlūk*) lieutenant, Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak. After Muḥammad's assassination in 602/1206, his empire had disintegrated. One of his more senior *mamlūks*, Yildiz, took over his capital, Ghazna. The Indian provinces were appropriated by Aybak, who ruled with practically sovereign powers until his death in 607/1210–11. Then his territory was divided: his own slave, Iltutmish, was proclaimed ruler at Delhi, while another former Ghurid *mamlūk*, Nāṣir al-Dīn Qubacha, made himself independent at Multān and established an impressive empire in the Indus valley. From here he disputed with Yildiz and Iltutmish possession of Lahore, which had been Aybak's residence and was the traditional capital of Muslim India.[34] In many areas, Muslim lordship over the Hindu tribes had proved short-lived. The Khokhars, for example, inhabiting the tracts between the Jhēlum and the Ravi, had been crushed by Mu'izz al-Dīn just before his death, but had then recovered their independence: at the advent of Jalāl al-Dīn, the rivalry between Qubacha and their chief, *Sangīn, is described as of long standing.[35] In the meantime, the Ghurid dominions in what is now Afghanistan had gradually been prised from the hands of the last feeble members of the dynasty by their great rival, Jalāl al-Dīn's father, the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, who also wrested Ghazna from Yildiz in 612/1215.[36] Jalāl al-Dīn himself was granted Ghūr, Bāmiyān, Ghazna, Bust, Tigīnābād and Zamīndāwar by his father in or soon after that date: although he does not appear to have visited his appanage until the Mongol onslaught and Muḥammad's death, he was represented there by a number of lieutenants.[37] Had it not been for the Mongols, the Khwārazmshāh might well have absorbed even the Indian conquests. It seems that his forces had already

---

[34] Events in India following Mu'izz al-Dīn's murder are covered by A.B.M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 2nd ed. (Allāhābād, 1961), pp. 88–94; see also P. Jackson, *EI²* art. 'Ḳuṭb al-Dīn Aybak'.

[35] MS Hyde 31, fol. 146a; the word *dīrīna* is not found in the corresponding passage of Juwaynī, II, p. 146.

[36] Bosworth, *EI²* art. 'Ghūrids'.

[37] Jūzjānī, I, pp. 309, 315, tr. Raverty, pp. 267, 285–6. The briefer account of Ibn al-Athīr, XII, pp. 202–3, speaks of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad 'stationing' Jalāl al-Dīn here; but cf. Nasawī, text pp. 25, 79, tr. pp. 45, 131–2, tr. Buniyatov, pp. 70, 123. The name of the prince's *nā'ib* at Ghazna is given by both Nasawī and Jūzjānī as KRBZ (*pace* Buniyatov, who transliterates it as Кузбар).

begun to push further east. Ibn al-Athīr tells us that the campaign into Makrān in 611/1214–15 had secured the tracts west of the Indus as far (north) as the borders of Kābul, while Jūzjānī, in his account of the destruction of the Ghurids a year later, says explicitly that Muḥammad's territory now extended to the Indus, i.e. presumably embracing the Kābul river valley also.[38] Some of these acquisitions were made at the expense of former Ghurid *mamlūk* lieutenants in India. Peshawar, which for a time had been held by Qubacha, had evidently passed into Khwarazmian hands by 618/1221.[39]

Jalāl al-Dīn's arrival in India, then, even as a fugitive, was hardly calculated to secure him a welcome from the enemies of his dynasty. Nasawī's phrasing suggests that the Khwarazmian forces may in the past have conducted hostilities with the ruler of the Salt Range (*Kūh-i Jūd*), Rāna Shatra, who is said to have [**p. 49**] now seized his opportunity to obtain revenge.[40] He led a body of six thousand troops against the Khwārazmshāh, whose forces, although outnumbered ten to one, routed him: Rāna Shatra was killed in the engagement. After this, Jalāl al-Dīn's army was swollen by fresh contingents until it numbered three or four thousand.[41] It was essential for him to reach some kind of understanding with his most powerful neighbour, Nāṣir al-Dīn Qubacha at Multān. Qubacha's lieutenant at Nandana, Qamar al-Dīn Kurramānī, had hastened to ingratiate himself with Jalāl al-Dīn immediately after the overthrow of Rāna Shatra, sending gifts in order to purchase immunity from attack.[42] His master too was ready to be conciliatory, and forwarded under escort the daughter of the Khwarazmian governor of Herat, Amīn Malik, a lady related to

---

[38] Ibn al-Athīr, XII, p. 198. Jūzjānī, I, p. 267, tr. p. 309.

[39] Juwaynī, II, p. 61, tr. Boyle, p. 328, describes Peshawar as at one time part of Qubacha's empire: for its conferment on a Ghūrī lieutenant of the Khwārazmshāh, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Kharpūst, see Jūzjānī, I, p. 315, and II, p. 116, tr. pp. 285–6, 1012; Nasawī, text p. 79, tr. p. 132, tr. Buniyatov, p. 123.

[40] Nasawī, text p. 86 (*li-nuhẓati'l-intiṣāf*), tr. p. 142, tr. Buniyatov, p. 130.

[41] The fullest account of the battle is in Nasawī, text pp. 85–6, tr. pp. 142–3, tr. Buniyatov, p. 130. Juwaynī, II, p. 144, tr. Boyle, pp. 412–13, gives a briefer version, and describes the enemy as coming from 'the mountains of Balāla and Nakāla': these names are discussed by Hodivala, I, pp. 233–4.

[42] Nasawī, text p. 86: Qamar al-Dīn is clearly described as Qubacha's *nā'ib*, but this is omitted in Houdas's translation (p. 144; cf. tr. Buniyatov, p. 131), which misled Boyle (n. 3 at pp. 141–2 of his tr. of Juwaynī). The localities in his charge figure in the Paris MS used by Houdas as DNDNH and SAQWN, but the B.L. MS Or. 5,662, fol. 32b, has DNDTH and STAQWN (cf. also Mīnuwī's Persian text, pp. 114–15: DNDNH). The first is undoubtedly Nandana, in 32° 43′ N., 73° 17′ E.: *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, new ed. (Oxford, 1907–1909), XVIII, p. 349 (see Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, p. 141, n. 2). But the second is problematic; possibly it represents a corruption of Siyālkōt.

Jalāl al-Dīn who had taken refuge in Qubacha's territory after her father's death in the battle on the Indus.

For a time the two potentates maintained friendly relations. But an estrangement came about through the fate of certain other members of Jalāl al-Dīn's entourage who had escaped into Sind: Amīn Malik's son, who was set upon and murdered by Qubacha's subjects in the town of Kullūr (Kullūrkōt), and Jalāl al-Dīn's *wazīr*, Shihāb al-Dīn Alp Sarakhsī, who had at first been given a hospitable welcome by Qubacha but subsequently put to death. At what date war broke out, we cannot be sure. In all probability it was in the winter of 619–20/1222–23, since Nasawī says that the Khwārazmshāh had to conceal his resentment until he was joined by *amīrs* who had deserted from the army of his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn in Iran.[43] It seems he was further encouraged to begin hostilities by *Sangīn, the Khokhar chief, an enemy of Qubacha who had married his daughter to Jalāl al-Dīn and furnished him with auxiliaries.[44] With these reinforcements, he was able to sack first Kullūr and then Qubacha's fortress at *T.rnū.ch.[45] Immediately prior to the attack on Qubacha's territory, Juwaynī says that Jalāl al-Dīn sent a force under Tāj al-Dīn 'Malik-i Khalaj' to ravage the Salt Range;[46] and it may well have been this expedition that replaced Kurramānī at Nandana with one of the Khwārazmshāh's own officers.[47] If we

---

[43] Nasawī, text pp. 87–8, tr. pp. 144–7, tr. Buniyatov, p. 132. The newly-arrived commanders included Elchi Pahlawān, whose flight to India from Sabzawār in Khurāsān *ca.* 619/1222 is referred to earlier: text p. 68, tr. p. 115, tr. Buniyatov, p. 113.

[44] Juwaynī, II, pp. 145–6, tr. Boyle, p. 414. Habibullah, p. 94, incorrectly has Jalāl al-Dīn forging a marriage alliance with the ruler of the Salt Range.

[45] Nasawī, text p. 88, tr. p. 147, tr. Buniyatov, pp. 132–3: Kullūrkōt lies near the Indus, at 32° 10′ N., 71° 17′ E.: Edward Thornton, *A Gazetteer of the Territories Under the Government of the East-India Company* (London, 1854), *s.v.* 'Kullour'. The second name presents difficulties. The Paris MS reads *TR'TWZḤ*, but the B.L. Ms, fol. 33a, has TRNWRJ, and Mīnuwī, p. 118, TRTWWJ. I am tempted to see here the name listed among the dependencies of Wayhind, on the upper Indus, by the fourth/tenth-century geographer Muqaddasī, though the printed text makes two separate places out of it, BYTR (variant TYBR) and NWJ: M.J. de Goeje, BGA, III (Leiden, 1877), p. 477. Alternatively, since undotted *tā* and *rā*, written carelessly so as to appear joined to the succeeding letter, would resemble *kāf*, it could be the locality appearing under the form KWRJ in the *Ādāb al-ḥarb* of Fakhr-i Mudabbir, facs. ed. Ananiasz Zajączkowski, *Le traité iranien de l'art militaire Ādāb al-ḥarb wa-š-šağā'a du XIII^e siècle* (Warsaw, 1969), p. 206, and said to lie on the banks of the Indus near KDWR (KLWR?).

[46] Juwaynī, II, p. 145, tr. p. 414.

[47] *Ibid.*, I, p. 112, tr. p. 141, alleging that it was held by one of Jalāl al-Dīn's officers at the time of Dörbei's attack (see below). A Tāj al-Dīn Khalaj is mentioned in the account of the war between the Khwārazmshāh and the Ghurids *ca.* 1203: *ibid.*, II, p. 52, tr. p. 319. Possibly he is also identical with the 'Malik Khān Khalaj' who entered Qubacha's territory in 623/1226 and was defeated and slain: Jūzjānī, I, p. 420, tr. Raverty, pp. 539–41; below, p. 51.

are to believe Nasawī, Qubacha, in attempting to avenge these outrages, was aided by troops from the Delhi Sultan Iltutmish. But despite his numerical superiority he was crushed by Jalāl al-Dīn's vanguard under Üzbek-bei, at a spot which Juwaynī locates one *parasang* from Uchch, and fled with the loss of all his baggage first to the island stronghold of Bhakkar and then to Multān.[48]

At some point Jalāl al-Dīn had also opened relations with Iltutmish at Delhi. Here our only source is Juwaynī, who says that after his victory over the Hindus of the Salt Range – probably late in the winter of 618–19/1221–22 – the Khwārazmshāh learned of Dörbei's approach. He thereupon hurried forward into the Panjāb, and arriving a few days' journey from Delhi requested asylum from Iltutmish, to whom he proposed an alliance against the Mongols. Iltutmish had no desire to jeopardize his relatively new-found sovereignty by installing Jalāl al-Dīn close at hand. He had the Khwarazmian envoy ʿAyn al-Mulk murdered and returned an evasive answer, whereupon Jalāl al-Dīn withdrew after ravaging the locality and fell back upon the Salt Range.[49] For their part, the Mongols had heard of his flight deep into India and had retired, devastating as they went the region of Malikpūr.[50]

It is possible that we have here a somewhat distorted version of the negotiations between the Khwārazmshāh and the Delhi Sultan which are referred to at a later juncture by Nasawī (see below). Otherwise, neither Nasawī nor Jūzjānī mentions this embassy to Delhi. Nasawī was presumably reluctant to depict Jalāl al-Dīn as a suppliant. Jūzjānī, for his part, writing in the reign of Iltutmish's son and as a protégé of Iltutmish's *mamlūk* Balaban, was possibly embarrassed at the failure of the late sovereign to assist a fellow-Muslim against the pagan Mongols. Whatever the case, he treats of the whole question

---

[48] Juwaynī, II, pp. 146–7, tr. pp. 414–15, giving the strength of Qubacha's army as 20,000. Nasawī, text pp. 88–9, tr. pp. 148–9, tr. Buniyatov, pp. 133–4, furnishes a longer account of the battle, with a figure of 10,000, which perhaps excludes the reinforcements from Delhi. Regarding these, Houdas's translation, 'lui avait amené quelques-unes de ses troupes', stretches the meaning of the Arabic (*wa-anjadahu bi-baʿḍ ʿaskarihi*); there is no reason to believe that Iltutmish came in person. Habibullah, n. 36 at p. 107, views such assistance from Iltutmish as improbable. On Bhakkar, 'a fortified island on the Indus', between Sukkur and Rohri, at 27° 43′ N., 68° 56′ E., see *Imperial Gazetteer*, IX, pp. 46–7.

[49] MS Hyde 31, fols. 139b–140a (with Iltutmish's reply in full), 145b (a shorter summary). Juwaynī, II, pp. 144–5, tr. pp. 413–14, does not mention Jalāl al-Dīn's laying waste the district before he withdrew.

[50] *Ibid.*, II, p. 144, tr. p. 413. MS Hyde 31, fol. 140b, places the devastation of Malikpūr during Dörbei's second invasion, after the siege of Multān (below, p. 50). Raverty (p. 537, n.) located Malikpūr in the Rawalpindi district, but no such name is found in the gazetteers. He may have had in mind Mānikpūr (now Mānikiyāla), about 14 miles south of Rawalpindi: *Punjab District Gazetteers*, XXVIIIA. *Rawalpindi district* (Lahore, 1909), pp. 33–5.

of Jalāl al-Dīn's presence on Indian soil in the most frustratingly reticent and confusing manner. At one point he alleges that Iltutmish merely sent troops to repulse the Khwārazmshāh, who turned aside and moved towards Uchch and Multān;[51] elsewhere in his narrative, he says that the Delhi Sultan personally led an army in the direction of Lahore, whereupon Jalāl al-Dīn made for Sind and Sīwistān.[52] Although Jūzjānī is quite capable of contradicting himself, and frequently does so, the solution in this case appears to be that he is referring to two distinct military campaigns, both mentioned by Nasawī. The first of these must relate to the army despatched to aid Qubacha (though Jūzjānī reverses the order of events, implying that the Khwārazmshāh attacked the heart of Qubacha's dominions following the advance of the Delhi forces). Jūzjānī's second statement is to be linked with Nasawī's account of a clash between the Khwarazmian vanguard and an army led by Iltutmish in person, following which the two potentates exchanged amicable messages and retired. Nasawī places this incident after the Khwarazmian descent on Sīwistān and the Indus delta (see below) and not long prior to Jalāl al-Dīn's departure for Iran. Yet this seems implausible: the confrontation with Iltutmish, which will be discussed shortly, fits in better before the Khwārazmshāh launched his second attack on Qubacha and then penetrated into the lower Indus region.

Following his defeat near Uchch, Qubacha agreed to pay tribute to the Khwārazmshāh, and Jalāl al-Dīn withdrew to spend the summer (of 620/1223, presumably) in the Salt Range.[53] He also received the submission of Qubacha's son, who had rebelled against his **[p. 50]** father at Lahore: the prince was confirmed in possession of the city on condition of an immediate cash payment and the promise of an annual tribute.[54] En route for his quarters, Jalāl al-Dīn captured the fortress of Pasraur in the Siyālkōt region and massacred the entire garrison. According to Juwaynī, news reached him at Pasraur that the Mongols were once more in pursuit[55] – a reference to the second expedition of Dörbei, who had left Samarqand in the winter of 1222–23. But it must almost certainly have been at this point that Iltutmish advanced against him, since Jūzjānī, as we have seen, says that the Delhi Sultan led his army in the direction

---

[51] I, p. 316, reading *pīsh-i ū kas bāz firistād*, but the B.L. MS Add. 26,189, fol. 132b, has *fanjī az ḥasham pīsh-i ū bāz firistād* (cf. also Raverty's tr., pp. 293–4).

[52] I, p. 445, tr. pp. 609–10.

[53] Juwaynī, II, p. 147, tr. p. 415.

[54] Nasawī, text p. 90, tr. p. 149, tr. Buniyatov, p. 134.

[55] Juwaynī, II, p. 147, tr. p. 415: he calls the place sacked Parasraur. It lies about 16 miles south of Siyālkōt, at 32° 16′ N., 74° 40′ E.: *Imperial Gazetteer*, XX, p. 23. MS Hyde 31, fol. 147a, inserts: *dar ānjā khabar rasīd ki Jinkīz Khān Būrtāī Bakhshīrā* [sic] *khiṭāb* [sic - *khiṭā*'?] *karda wa-bi-ṭalab-i Sulṭān bāz gardānīda ānak nazdīk rasīdand.*

of Lahore. It seems that Jalāl al-Dīn moved to meet this new threat, and that his vanguard under Jahān Pahlawān Üzbek-bei clashed with the Delhi Sultan's forces; Iltutmish offered the Khwārazmshāh an armistice and a marriage alliance and disclaimed any intention of fighting a Muslim sovereign who was being pursued by the enemies of the faith. In the course of these negotiations two of the Khwārazmshāh's *amīrs*, weary of the ordeals they had undergone, abandoned him and entered the service of Iltutmish.[56]

We can now resume the story as told by Juwaynī, who says nothing of the clash with the Delhi Sultan's army. According to his version, on learning of the renewal of the Mongol pursuit Jalāl al-Dīn fell back on Sind and demanded further tribute payment from Qubacha as he passed by Multān. But Qubacha, resentful of the Khwarazmian yoke and sensing deliverance at hand, adopted defiant tactics. Jalāl al-Dīn declined to give battle outside Multān and moved on to Uchch, while Qubacha despatched messages all over his dominions urging his lieutenants to hold out. Unable to remain more than two days at Uchch in the face of the resistance of its inhabitants, the Khwārazmshāh fired the locality and withdrew down the Indus.[57] Nasawī, who definitely reverses the order of events at this juncture, placing the demonstration at Uchch after the campaign against Sīwistān, says that he left on payment of a sum of money.[58] Sīwistān (close to the modern Sehwān) held out under its governor, Fakhr al-Dīn Sālārī, but on the defeat of his army by Jalāl al-Dīn's van he capitulated and was confirmed in command of the city.[59] At Dēbul in the Indus delta, whose ruler Sinān al-Dīn *Chanīsar had escaped by sea, the Khwārazmshāh

---

[56] Nasawī, text pp. 90–91, tr. pp. 150–51, tr. Buniyatov, pp. 134–5. Yet Raverty (p. 294, n.) discounted the possibility that Iltutmish used force against Jalāl al-Dīn; Habibullah, p. 95, also states that it did not come to actual fighting. The loss of the two disgruntled *amīrs*, incidentally, constitutes further evidence that the clash with Iltutmish occurred at this stage, rather than after the plundering of the rich cities of Dēbul and Nahrwāla. Juwaynī's version of events has Jalāl al-Dīn leaving for Makrān directly from Dēbul: for what it is worth, this is also the implication of a brief reference in Jūzjānī, I, p. 419, tr. p. 534.

[57] II, p. 147, tr. pp. 415–16.

[58] Text p. 90, tr. pp. 149–50, tr. Buniyatov, p. 134.

[59] Juwaynī, II, pp. 147–8, tr. p. 416. SDWSAN and its variants are probably a corruption of SYWSTAN; but cf. Jūzjānī's usage 'Sindustān' as in I, p. 419, and II, p. 170. Nasawī, text p. 90, tr. p. 149, tr. Buniyatov, p. 134, records simply Fakhr al-Dīn's submission: the Paris MS used by Houdas reads SYSTAN, but the B.L. MS (fol. 33b) has correctly SYBSTAN, as does the Persian translation edited by Mīnuwī (p. 119). For Sehwān, which now lies at some distance from the Indus, at 26° 26′ N., 67° 54′ E., see *Imperial Gazetteer*, XXII, pp. 162–3. Buniyatov, n. 5 at p. 346, identifies Fakhr al-Dīn with 'Izz al-Dīn Muḥammad Sālārī, named by Jūzjānī as an *amīr* of Iltutmish from 625/1228 onwards; but there is no proof that this was the same man.

rested from his exertions, merely sending a plundering expedition to Nahrwāla (Anhilvāra, now Patan) in Gujarāt.[60]

It was in lower Sind that Jalāl al-Dīn heard reports of the eagerness with which the subjects of his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn in western Iran desired his return.[61] If Nasawī is to be believed, on the other hand, he had been alarmed by rumours of a coalition among the rulers of northern India, headed by Iltutmish and Qubacha and including Hindu chiefs (*rāyāt wa-takākirāt*), whose forces had occupied the banks of the 'Jajnēr river' (most probably the Sutlej) in order to cut off his retreat.[62] His generals were divided in opinion: the officers formerly in the service of Ghiyāth al-Dīn urged Jalāl al-Dīn to leave for Iran and profit from his brother's weakness, while Üzbek-bei in particular was in favour of remaining in India.[63] The Khwārazmshāh chose to return to the west, and passed through the wastes of Makrān to Kirmān late in the year 620/1223.[64]

---

[60] Juwaynī, II, p. 148, tr. pp. 416–17. Nasawī, text p. 90, tr. p. 150, tr. Buniyatov, p. 134, turns the name of the ruler into that of the place, whose *rai* was allegedly a dependant of Iltutmish and submitted without opposition. For his *laqab*, see Jūzjānī, I, p. 447, tr. Raverty, pp. 614–15; and for the probable form of his name, H.C. Ray, *The Dynastic History of Northern India* (Calcutta, 1931–36, 2 vols), I, p. 36, and Hodivala, I, pp. 214–15: he was a member of the Sūmra dynasty. The exact site of Dēbul is uncertain: see S. Qudratullah Fatimi, 'The Twin Ports of Daybul', in Khuhro, *Sind Through the Centuries*, pp. 97–105.

[61] Juwaynī, II, pp. 148–9, tr. p. 417.

[62] Text p. 91, tr. p. 151 ('Khandjîr'; tr. Buniyatov, p. 135, 'Пянджшир'). On Jajnēr, which figures as ḤḤNYR in the Paris MS and as ḤJNYR in the B.L. MS (fol. 34a), cf. Hodivala, I, pp. 52–3, who, following al-Bīrūnī, identifies it with Janēr in the Fīrūzpūr district. See also Rashīd al-Dīn, as cited in n. 79 below. The Hindu chiefs referred to were doubtless tributaries of the Delhi Sultan, like those who had served Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak and, at an earlier date, the Ghaznawid Sultans: see Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajarat al-ansāb*, partial ed. E. Denison Ross, *Ta'rīkh* [sic]*-i Fakhru'd-Dín Mubárakshāh* (London, 1927), text p. 33 (with RATGAN for RAYGAN); Bosworth, *The Later Ghaznavids*, pp. 102, 116.

[63] Nasawī, text pp. 91–2. Üzbek-bei's advice is a translator's nightmare. The printed text reads: *wa-ashāra 'alayhi Jahān Bahlawān Uzbak bi-luzūm bilādi'l-Hind min Jinkiz Khān istiẓrāf*^{im} *wa-bi-mulūki'l-Hind istiḍāf*^{im}, which Houdas rendered (p. 152) as 'Djihân Bahlaouân Ouzbek conseillait comme plus glorieux de rester dans l'Inde pour protéger ce pays, dont les princes étaient trop faibles, contre Djenguiz-Khân'; cf. also Buniyatov tr. p. 136, 'остаться в Индии, [защищая] ее от Чингиз-хана, находя это наиболее правильным и учитывая слабость владык (мулук) Индии'. But for *istiẓrāf*^{im} the B.L. MS (fol. 34b) reads *istiṭrāf*^{im}, which is supported by Mīnuwī's Persian text (p. 121), *az muẓāhamat-i Chingiz Khān bar ṭarafī uftāda ast*. The phrase was therefore possibly designed to indicate that India lay away from the path of Chinggis Khan's advance.

[64] So in Rashīd al-Dīn, tr. Smirnova, *Sbornik letopiseĭ*, I/2, p. 239 (not in Berezin's text). Nasawī, text p. 94, tr. p. 157, tr. Buniyatov, p. 139, dates his first operations back in Iran in 621/1224, and Juwaynī, II, p. 153, tr. p. 421, places his eventual arrival in Khūzistān from Rayy in the early part of that year.

IV

According to Juwaynī, Jalāl al-Dīn had been encouraged to leave India also by the fact that the Mongols were still on his heels.[65] For their operations in India during Dörbei's second invasion we are given additional details by Jūzjānī and by another writer, Muḥammad b. 'Umar Samarqandī, in a note appended to one of the works of his friend 'Awfī. Both sources, incidentally, specify the year 621/1224 for Dörbei's abortive siege of Multān,[66] and thereby provide conclusive evidence that this attack belongs to the latter of the two Mongol campaigns. Dörbei first took Nandana from one of the Khwārazmshāh's lieutenants and sacked it. Then he moved southwards to Multān. The dearth of stone in the neighbourhood obliged the Mongols to quarry material for projectiles further along the river and to convey it to Multān by raft. But the city was energetically defended by Qubacha, and after an investment lasting forty-two days, according to Jūzjānī (though Samarqandī gives a round figure of three months), the Mongol army withdrew on the approach of the hot weather.[67] We can consequently date their retreat around April 1224. Thereafter the Mongols did not cross the Indus again until 639/1241, when they captured and destroyed Lahore.[68] Of Dörbei Doqshin nothing more is known from sources emanating from within the Mongol empire. But what we learn in MS Hyde 31 of Chinggis Khan's menacing instructions on sending him a second time into India may well explain the curious statement by Jūzjānī that the Mongol general later joined Jalāl al-Dīn and became a convert to Islam.[69]

Jalāl al-Dīn's departure did not signify the immediate end of the Khwarazmian dominion in India. According to Nasawī, Üzbek-bei was left behind to govern Jalāl al-Dīn's Indian conquests and Sayf al-Dīn Ḥasan Qarluq, surnamed Wafā Malik, was entrusted with those parts of Ghūr and Ghazna

---

[65] II, p. 149, tr. p. 417.

[66] Jūzjānī, I, p. 420, tr. p. 539; Samarqandī, *faṣl* at the end of 'Awfī's Persian translation of Tanūkhī's *al-Faraj ba'd al-shidda*, India Office MS 1432, fol. 458a, and printed in M. Niẓámuddín, *Introduction to the Jawámi'u'l-ḥikáyát*, GMS, new series, VIII (London, 1929), p. 16. In view of this testimony, Barthold, *Turkestan*, 3rd ed., p. 446, was wrong to imply that the siege of Multān occurred in 1222.

[67] Juwaynī, I, p. 112, tr. pp. 141–2, furnishes most of these details. Jūzjānī, I, pp. 419–20, tr. Raverty, pp. 534–9, refers to Nandana only in passing but says more about Multān. Samarqandī, fol. 458a (Niẓámuddín, *Introduction*, p. 16).

[68] Habibullah, pp. 212–13.

[69] I, p. 317, tr. p. 297 (Raverty consistently renders the name 'Tūrtī'). Cf. Boyle, '*Iru* and *Maru*', p. 410, where this story is described as 'almost certainly apocryphal'.

which had so far escaped invasion by the Mongols.[70] Ḥasan Qarluq's sway seems to have extended as far south as Mastung, since some decades later local Afghan chiefs could recall the paramountcy of 'Malik Wafā' in this region.[71] Much of his domain was shortly overrun by Mongol armies. This seems to have occurred in 623/1226, when the chronicler Jūzjānī was finally brought [**p. 51**] to abandon his homeland in Ghūr and emigrate to India. It was around this time that 'the *maliks* of Ghūr' similarly fled before the Mongols and made their way to Qubacha's court; and in the latter half of the year Qubacha was obliged to crush a large band of Khalaj tribesmen – hitherto in the Khwārazmshāh's service, we are told, and therefore presumably under Ḥasan Qarluq's authority – who had pushed east and occupied lower Sind.[72] Nevertheless, Qarluq himself, whose career has been examined by Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, maintained a fragile hold over Kurramān and Binbān down to 636/1238–39, when he was dislodged by a Mongol army and fled to Sind also.[73]

Üzbek-bei's province had survived as technically part of Jalāl al-Dīn's empire for a shorter time. The Khwarazmian incursions had acted as a catalyst in Sind, and Qubacha's power must have been somewhat undermined. ʿAwfī, writing around 630/1232–33 and introducing his accounts of the conquest of Sind by Iltutmish five years earlier, speaks of 'undertakings' and 'engagements' of which Qubacha was unmindful and the breach of which served as a *casus belli*.[74] This raises the possibility that in order to secure assistance against Jalāl al-Dīn Qubacha had either made some gesture in recognition of Iltutmish's sovereignty or had promised to surrender territory to the Delhi Sultan. He was overthrown in 625/1228, and Iltutmish, whose power according to Nasawī already extended as far as 'the gates of Kashmīr', then turned on the less stable Khwarazmian principality to the north. In 627/1229–30 an army was sent to eject Üzbek-bei, who departed to rejoin his sovereign in Persian Iraq.[75] The territory he controlled is nowhere specified. From a coin

---

[70] Text p. 92, tr. pp. 152–3, tr. Buniyatov, p. 136.

[71] Sayfī, *Taʾrīkh-nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. M.Z. Siddīqī (Calcutta, 1944), p. 198.

[72] Jūzjānī, I, p. 420, tr. pp. 539–41. For the chronicler's emigration, see *ibid.*, I, p. 420, and II, pp. 184–5, tr. pp. 541, 1203-4; he reached Uchch in Jumādā I 624/May 1227.

[73] *Ibid.*, II, p. 162, tr. p. 1129. See generally I.H. Siddiqui, 'The Qarlūgh Kingdom in North-Western India During the Thirteenth Century', *Islamic Culture* LIV (1980), pp. 75–91.

[74] ʿAwfī, *Jawāmiʿ al-ḥikāyāt*, I, preface, ed. Muḥammad Muʿīn, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1340 Sh./1961), p. 10 (*mawāthiq wa-ʿuhūd*); III, B.L. MS Or. 2,676, fol. 232a (*sawgandhā....wa-ʿahdhā*).

[75] Nasawī, text p. 217: *ilā mā yalī darb Qashmīr* (tr. Buniyatov, p. 267; Houdas's translation, p. 362, is misleading). Gardīzī, *Zayn al-akhbār*, ed. Muḥammad Nāẓim (London, 1928), p. 72, mentions the *dara-yi Kashmīr*, which Nāẓim, in *The Life and Times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*

which has come down to us, we know that his authority was acknowledged in Binbān, where he was evidently succeeded by Ḥasan Qarluq.[76] He must also, however, have ruled Nandana (presumably reoccupied after its sack by Dörbei), Kūjāh (Kūjarāt, Gujrāt), Sūdra and Siyālkōt, all districts lying close to the upper reaches of the Jhēlum and Chenāb rivers and listed among Iltutmish's conquests by Jūzjānī.[77] We know nothing either of the character of Khwarazmian government in this region. If the conduct of Üzbek-bei's troops resembled that of the Khwarazmian forces operating at a slightly later date in the Jazīra and Syria, the advent of Iltutmish's army must have been greeted by the local Muslim population with unqualified relief.[78] Yet the authority of the Delhi Sultan in these parts – like the Khwarazmian regime it supplanted – was ephemeral. The Mongol advance not only destroyed Lahore; it also entailed the loss of the 'upper territories' (*aqālīm-i bālā*). By about 1250, the frontier of the Sultanate had receded as far as Jajnēr: Kūjāh and Sūdra, at

(Cambridge, 1931), p. 91, n. 6, believed to be identical with the lower part of the Loharin valley. For the date of Üzbek-bei's expulsion, see the reference given in n. 70 above; on Iltutmish's conquest of Sind, Habibullah, p. 96.

[76] M. Longworth Dames, 'The Mint of Kuramān [*sic*], with Special Reference to the Coins of the Qarlughs and the Khwārizm-Shāhs', *JRAS* (1908), pp. 391, 405. There is no evidence that Ḥasan Qarluq collaborated with Iltutmish to expel Üzbek-bei, as Habibullah asserts (pp. 210–11): Nasawī asserts simply that Üzbek-bei was driven out and that Qarluq and others submitted to the Delhi Sultan.

[77] For the first, see Jūzjānī, B.L. MS Add. 26,189, fol. 180a (KWJRAT); India Office MS I.O. 3745, fol. 243a (KJRAT); and the variant readings in Ḥabībī's edition, I, p. 452, tr. Raverty, p. 627. This is surely not Girjhāk, as proposed by Hodivala, I, pp. 459–60, and II, p. 79, but Gujrāt, about 5 miles north of the right bank of the Chenāb, at 32° 34′ N., 74° 5′ E.: *Imperial Gazetteer*, XII, pp. 373–4. For Sūdra in the Gujrānwāla district, at 32° 29′ N., 74° 14′ E., see *ibid.*, XXIII, p. 68. The name is badly corrupted: B.L. MS reads MWDWDH, and the India Office copy has MWDDH. Kūjāh and Nandana were conferred by Iltutmish on Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin, his *sar-i jāndār*: Jūzjānī, II, p. 22, with KWJAT (but cf. B.L. MS Add. 26,189, fol. 204a, KWJAH; tr. p. 750). Siddiqui's claim ('The Qarlūgh Kingdom', p. 77 and n. 20 at p. 88) that Üzbek-bei had resided at Nandana is nowhere endorsed by the sources.

[78] Cf. the 'Rothelin' continuation of William of Tyre, in *Recueil des historiens des Croisades. Historiens occidentaux*, II (Paris, 1859), p. 562: 'Il ne porent onques trouver genz de leur loi qui les detenissent, pour leurz granz felonnies et les granz cruautez qui estoient en elx'; *Chronica de Mailros*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1835), p. 157: 'Corosmini, quorum crudelitas bestialem feritatem excedit'; Cahen, "Abdallaṭīf al-Baghdādī', pp. 155–6, 158–9. For Khwarazmian activity in the Jazīra and Syria, see *idem*, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), pp. 635–8, 645–9; J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1975, 2 vols), II, pp. 310–15.

least, now lay within the Mongol empire,[79] and Iltutmish's successors faced a much more formidable threat than had been posed by the Khwarazmian armies.

Additional Note [2009]

My reading of the shah's name, 'Mingīrnī', has since been convincingly challenged, on the basis of numismatic evidence, in an unpublished paper by Mr William Spengler; though the most probable reading, MNGBRNY, has yet to be explained.

[79] As, for a short time, did Lahore: Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 310. *Die Indiengeschichte des Rašīd ad-Dīn*, ed. Karl Jahn (Vienna, 1980), Arabic text, Tafel 57 (with the best readings: *ḤḤ*NYR, KWJH, SWDRH), Persian text, Tafel 22; though in the translation (p. 48) Jajnēr (above, n. 62) is unaccountably rendered as 'Ḫaibar'. See generally Jahn, 'Zum Problem der mongolischen Eroberungen in Indien (13.–14. Jahrhundert)', in *Akten des XXIV. internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses München....1957* (Wiesbaden, 1959), pp. 617–19; Habibullah, pp. 210–25; P. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', *Central Asiatic Journal* XXII (1978), pp. 239–41.

XI

THE MONGOLS AND THE DELHI SULTANATE IN THE REIGN OF MUḤAMMAD TUGHLUQ (1325—1351)

As is well known, the period in which the Mongols exerted their greatest pressure upon the independent Muslim power in northern India fell during the early years of the Khiljī dynasty (689/1290–720/1320). The reign of sultan 'Alā' al-dīn (695/1296–716/1316), especially, witnessed a series of Mongol invasions from the Chaghatai khanate in Central Asia, in the course of which the enemy twice reached the outskirts of Delhi. After about 706/1307, however, the Mongol threat suddenly receded; and only on one occasion subsequently does it appear to have attained to the same proportions. Early in the reign of Muḥammad Tughluq (725/1325–752/1351), the Chaghatai khan Tarmashirin led an incursion from Māwarā' al-nahr in which the Mongol forces once again advanced to the Jumna but retired without actually entering the capital. Thereafter, Hindūstān was free of major inroads from this quarter for another sixty years or more, until the sack of Delhi by Tīmūr in 801/1398.

Unlike the invasions of the Khiljī era, Muḥammad's dealings with the Mongols have not been subjected to detailed investigation.[1] The aim of this paper is to show whether Muḥammad Tughluq may be said to have had a "Mongol policy" in any sense, to examine his relations with the Chaghatai Mongols (and, incidentally, with their cousins in Iran and China), and thereby – it is hoped – to elucidate in some degree the internal history of Central Asia during the second quarter of the fourteenth century.

---

[1] On the earlier Mongol inroads, vide K. S. Lal, "History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320," 2nd ed. Calcutta 1967, pp. 131–52; also D. Pal, "'Alā' -ud-Dīn Khiljī's Mongol Policy," IC XXI (1947), pp. 255–63, & U. N. Ray, "The North-West Frontier under the Khalji Sultans of Delhi," IHQ XXXIX (1963), pp. 98–108.

I

When Muḥammad succeeded his father Ghiyāṡ al-dīn Tughluq, the situation on the northwestern frontier was still one of sporadic hostilities. Baranī tells us that Ghiyāṡ al-dīn himself, as warden of the marches at Dēōpālpūr prior to his accession, had conducted annual raids into the Mongol borderlands.[2] According to the same historian, the Mongols had not threatened the empire again before the end of the reign of Quṭb al-dīn Khiljī (716/1316–720/1320),[3] but the earliest raid of which he makes specific mention occurred shortly after the victorious Deccan campaign of 722/1322.[4] A more detailed account of this invasion is to be found in the epic *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn* of 'Iṣāmī, who says that the Mongols formed two companies, each of which was defeated in turn by Gurshāsp, the sultan's lieutenant at Sāmāna. The names of their commanders are given as Shir, Zakariyā, Hindu and Orus: of these, Shir was killed in the field, while Zakariyā was captured and taken to Delhi in triumph.[5]

Not long after his accession, Muḥammad led a punitive expedition into Mongol-occupied territory.[6] The sultan himself halted at Lahore, but the main force moved ahead and took Kalānaur and Peshāwar (Farashvar), where the *khuṭba* was read in Muḥammad's name. After pushing beyond, however, into the waste regions of Afghanistān, the Delhi troops were obliged to retire owing to lack of fodder, and it is uncertain whether the campaign achieved any permanent results. In fact, it doubtless provoked the next Mongol invasion, led this time not by minor chieftains but by the Chaghatai khan in person.

II

Tarmashirin's invasion of Hindūstān has been the subject of some controversy. Mahdi Husain has advanced the thesis[7] that the

---

[2] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, ed. S. A. Khan, Calcutta 1860–2, pp. 322: 20–323: 6. Cf. also Amīr Khusrau, *Rasā'il al-i'jāz*, lithog. ed. Lucknow 1876, vol. IV, pp. 144–56, where there is reference to an expedition by the sultan's forces in which Ghazna was taken and the *khuṭba* there read in 'Alā' al-dīn's name.

[3] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 322: 15–20 & 323: 6–10.

[4] Ibid., p. 450: 13–16.

[5] *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. A. M. Husain, Agra 1938, pp. 394–8; ed. A. S. Usha, Madras 1948, pp. 404–9.

[6] *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, pp. 410–1; ed. Usha, pp. 423–4.

[7] A. M. Husain, "The Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq," London 1938, pp. 100–8; "Tughluq Dynasty," Calcutta 1963, pp. 119–43.

Chaghatai khan's campaign, which is attested alike by authors writing in India and Iran, never took place: his sole evidence for this is Baranī's total silence concerning the invasion, together with a number of allegedly cryptic remarks made by that author, and an incidental reference in Ibn Baṭṭūṭa to the friendly relations which had existed between the two sovereigns. Husain's view has not found favour with later historians, but his evidence has not been exposed to any detailed analysis.[8] It will be seen that one of the twin pillars of his argument is very shaky indeed, since we possess an earlier recension of Baranī's work in which the invasion is in fact mentioned. To this I shall return shortly. First I should like to examine our other sources, and to establish on what points they are agreed.

Of the Indian authorities, the first to mention Tarmashirin's campaign is 'Iṣāmī, writing in 750/1349–50. According to his account,[9] the Chaghatai khan was routed in the vicinity of Meerut (Mīrat) by a detachment under Yūsuf Bughrā:[10] only on receipt of this news did the sultan advance from his headquarters at Sīrī as far as Thānesar, but then contented himself with forwarding troops who pursued the enemy to the banks of the Indus. Later chroniclers – contrary to Ḥusain's statement ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 123) – do not seem to have followed 'Iṣāmī to any appreciable extent. Rather would it be true to say that the pattern was set by the fifteenth century writer Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Sīrindī,[11] who says that Tarmashirin advanced as far as the river Jumna (tā konāra-yi āb) but then retired immediately (hamchonān): when the Mongols had recrossed the Indus, Muḥammad moved in pursuit as far as Kalānaur, whence he himself returned to Delhi, leaving some of his generals to continue the chase.[12] This version was followed in the

[8] Cf. R. C. Majumdar in Chapter IV of "The Delhi Sultanate," Bombay 1960, pp. 70–1; M. Aziz Ahmad in "Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land," CAJ VI (1961), pp. 188–9. S. Moinul Haq, "Barani's history of the Tughluqs. II. Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq," JPHS VII (1959), pp. 85–7, accepts Husain's thesis without question.

[9] *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, pp. 444–7; ed. Usha, pp. 462–6.

[10] Yūsuf Bughrā is known from other sources. Baranī (p. 454: 9) lists him among Muḥammad's maliks, and he is mentioned by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (tr. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa A.D. 1325–1354," vol. III, Cambridge 1971, pp. 665, 667 & 696–7). He was killed near Kanbāyat during Taghai's rebellion (Baranī, p. 517: 20f.).

[11] On the spelling of this *nisba*, cf. C. A. Storey, "Persian Literature: a bio-bibliographical survey," vol. I, part 1, London 1927–39, p. 512 & note 1 ibid.

[12] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, ed. S. M. H. Husain, Calcutta 1931, p. 101.

next century by Ḥājjī al-dabīr, author of a history of Gujarāt in Arabic,[13] and by Budā'unī,[14] practically word for word.

Tarmashirin's invasion of Hindūstān is mentioned also by Iranian authors writing in the fifteenth century. When Tīmūr appeared before Meerut in 801/1399, its commanders were inspired to resist partly by the memory of Tarmashirin's unsuccessful attempt on the fortress over seventy years previously. For this fact we are fortunately not dependent on Tīmūr's memoirs (the *Malfūẓāt-i Tīmūrī*), which are of doubtful authenticity.[15] Their author apparently derived his information from the diary of Tīmūr's Hindūstān campaign, written by Ghiyāṡ al-dīn 'Alī Yazdī in the first years of the fifteenth century[16] and followed by both Niẓām-i Shāmī[17] and Sharaf al-dīn 'Alī Yazdī.[18] The lastnamed gives in addition a brief account of Tarmashirin's invasion in the prologue to the *Ẓafar-nāma*, composed six years before the main work, in 822/1419. It reads as follows:[19]

> Gathering an army, he (Tarmashirin) moved on Hindūstān, and advanced as far as the borders (dar) of Delhi. When his victorious host appeared before Delhi, the ruler (vālī) of Delhi sent out several choice articles as presents (pīshkash), with a number of the nobles and grandees. Thence he departed, and having attacked Gujarāt in turn he retired safe and sound to his own *ulus*.

Sharaf al-dīn is the first author to mention an incursion into Gujarāt, and it was on his narrative that the writer of the *Shajarat al-atrāk* based his account in the middle of the century, amplifying it, however, with the pillage specifically of Somnāth and Surat.[20] It is indeed possible that the introduction of Gujarāt into Tarma-

---

[13] *Ẓafar al-wālih bi-muẓaffar wa ālih*, ed. Sir E. D. Ross, "An Arabic History of Gujarat," vol. III, London 1928, p. 865.

[14] *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, ed. M. A. 'Ali, vol. I, Calcutta 1868, pp. 227–8.

[15] Storey, "Persian Literature," vol. I, part 1, p. 280 Yet cf. Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," p. 580.

[16] *Rūz-nāma-yi ghazavāt-i Hindūstān*, tr. A. A. Semenov, "Dnyevnik pokhoda Timura v Indiyu," Moscow 1958, p. 129. On Ghiyāṡ al-dīn, vide W. Hinz, "Quellenstudien zur Geschichte der Timuriden," ZDMG n. F. XV (1936), pp. 358–9.

[17] Ed. F. Tauer, "Histoire des conquêtes de Tamerlan intitulée Ẓafarnāma par Niẓāmuddīn Šāmī avec des additions empruntées au Zubdatu-t-tawārīḫ-i Bāysunġurī de Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū," Prague 1937–56, text vol. I, p. 194.

[18] *Ẓafar-nāma*, ed. M. M. Ilahdad, Calcutta 1885–8, vol. II, p. 129.

[19] *Ẓafar-nāma*, muqaddima, MSS British Museum, Add. 6538, foll. 99r: 19–99v: 3, & Add. 18406, fol. 65v: 3ff.

[20] Tr. Miles, "The Shajrat ul-atrak, or genealogical tree of the Turks and Tatars," London 1838, p. 371; quoted in Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," p. 130.

shirin's campaign is an error. Such a detour figures in no other independent authority, and it may be either that the Tīmūrid chronicler misread his source or that some place of the same name is involved.[21]

Moreover, the Chaghatai khan's invasion is referred to in the Tīmūrid sources at another point also. When Tīmūr reached the confluence of the Jhēlum and the Chenāb on his march towards Delhi, during muḥarram 801/October 1398, he crossed the latter river by means of constructing a bridge. At this juncture, Ghiyāṡ al-dīn says:[22]

> No hand, however energetic, could have achieved this. As far as concerns earlier princes, not one of them had proved able to ford this deep river, with the exception of the emperor Tarmashirin, who did cross it, though without constructing a bridge.

This detail is omitted in the corresponding section of Niẓām-i Shāmī's work,[23] but Sharaf al-dīn refers to Tarmashirin's exploit at this point in his own narrative.[24]

Let us now turn to Baranī. It would certainly be strange had the author of the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī* made no mention of Tarmashirin's invasion, not least because Ḥājjī al-dabīr twice quotes Baranī's testimony on this particular head during his own account.[25] It is true that in the version which is contained in the majority of manuscripts and which is most readily available in the Calcutta edition, Baranī does not refer to the attack at any point; and the probable reason for this will be suggested later.[26] Nevertheless, there does exist at least one manuscript of an earlier recension of Baranī's work, written two years before, in about 756/1355.[27] Here Tarmashirin's invasion is described briefly:[28]

---

[21] There is, for example, a locality named Gujrāt in the Punjāb, lying 9 miles west of the Chenāb river (32° 35' N., 74° 06' E.). Legend has it that it was destroyed in 1303, however, and rebuilt only under Akbar; Sir A. Cunningham, "The Ancient Geography of India," London 1871, p. 179. The Tīmūrid account of Tarmashirin's attack on Gujarāt is reproduced by the Indian historian Firishta (lithog. ed. Bombay 1831–2, vol. I, p. 238: 11–13).

[22] Tr. Semenov, "Dnyevnik pokhoda Timura v Indiyu," pp. 83–4.

[23] Ed. Tauer, "Histoire des conquêtes de Tamerlan," text vol. I, p. 179: 2–5.

[24] *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. II, p. 53: 4ff.

[25] Ed. Ross, "An Arabic History of Gujarat," vol. III, p. 865: 14, 22; Baranī is here referred to simply by his *laqab* of Ẓiyā' al-dīn.

[26] Vide infra, section VI.

[27] Bodleian MS, Elliot 353 (Ethé's Catalogue, no. 173, col. 98, reads "253"

After the citizens (of Delhi) had been despatched to Daulatābād, he (Muḥammad) remained in the city for two years. During this time Tarmashirin invaded Hindūstān with numerous troops and advanced into the Dōāb (tā miyān-i dō āb). Sultan Muḥammad too gathered many forces. In this emergency the amirs and nobles of Lakhnautī sought to depart and return to their own territory and stir up rebellion . . .[29] And he (Tarmashirin) withdrew with his army to Tirmid.

This version appears in a slightly expanded form in the *Tārīkh-i Muḥammadī* of Muḥammad Bihāmadkhānī, who wrote about 842/1438–9. In his account it is stated explicitly that Tarmashirin advanced to the Jumna, but the seditious behaviour of the Bengālī amirs is omitted.[30]

Ḥusain's alarm ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 131) at discrepancies among the various sources as to the route taken by the invaders is unnecessary. 'Iṣāmī, Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad, and Bihāmadkhānī are all agreed in making Tarmashirin reach the Jumna. Yaḥyā's statement that the Mongol army plundered Lahore, Sāmāna, Indrī, and the territory as far as the borders of Budāōn[31] need not mean that Tarmashirin's path lay through all these districts. It implies simply that during his march he sent out raiding parties; and in this respect Ḥājjī al-dabīr's account, based on the *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, provides an exegesis (intashara 'askaruhu fī jihāt Lūhūr wa Budā'un wa Sāmānah).[32] Again, there is no substantial disagreement over

---

in error). The differences between this recension and the Calcutta edition are most noticeable in regard to the reigns of the three Tughluq sultans, the Bodleian MS containing rather more dates and more precise chronological data as a whole. The last year mentioned is 755 (fol. 229r: 7f.), and on fol. 231v. it is stated that Fīrūz Shāh has been ruling for four years (cf. the Calcutta edition, p. 602: 3, where the corresponding number is six; also p. 23: 1f., 18). I take it that this MS is similar to that in the private possession of Mr. Simon Digby, who utilised it for his "War-horse and Elephant in the Dehli sultanate: a study of military supplies," Oxford-Karachi 1971 (cf. especially the bibliography, p. 83, & index under 'Ta'rikh-i Ferozshahi of Barani').

[28] MS Elliot 353, fol. 192r: 13–19.

[29] A line may well be omitted here. The text reads: a*, which is incomprehensible.

[30] *Tārīkh-i Muḥammadī*, MS British Museum, Or. 137, foll. 400r: 11–400v: 3. On Bihāmadkhānī, vide C. Rieu, "Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum," vol. I, London 1879, pp. 84–6, & P. Hardy, "The Tarikh-i-Muhammadi by Muhammad Bihamad Khani," in "Essays presented to Sir Jadunath Sarkar," Hoshiarpur 1958, pp. 181–90.

[31] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 101: 9f.

[32] "An Arabic History of Gujarat," vol. III, p. 865: 18.

---

* As to the foreign languages please see page 157.

the final stages of the campaign. 'Iṣāmī makes it clear that the sultan and his main force did not actually engage the Mongols, and both Yaḥyā and Ḥājjī al-dabīr state explicitly that Muḥammad began the pursuit only when the enemy had recrossed the Indus. The sources diverge, it is true, on the question as to how far the sultan in person advanced in the wake of the retreating Mongol army: 'Iṣāmī says that he halted at Thānesar, Yaḥyā that he moved as far as the borders of Kalānaur.[33] Yet Muḥammad's route becomes problematical only if Yaḥyā is treated as a quite independent authority; in fact we may suspect him of synthesising two distinct episodes.[34] He very possibly gleaned the reference to Kalānaur from 'Iṣāmī's account of the sultan's earlier expedition, and assumed without question that this fell after the Mongol invasion rather than preceded it.[35] The sole contribution by Yaḥyā which is in the full sense original is his mention of the enfeoffment of Mujīr al-dīn Abū Rijā with Kalānaur: this information is to be traced in none of the earlier writers.[36]

---

[33] *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, p. 446: 19ff.; ed. Usha, p. 465: 12ff. *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-shāhī*, p. 101: 12f. Thānesar (29° 59' N., 76° 49' E.) lies on the Saraswati, about 100 miles due north of Delhi. Kalānaur (32° 01' N., 75° 13' E.), not far from the left bank of the Rāvī, is in the Gurdaspur district, north-east of Lahore.

[34] Yaḥyā does this in at least one other connection. He is the first author to date Muḥammad's ill-fated Qarāchīl expedition (cf. section V, infra) in 738/1337–8, presumably through identifying it with the campaign in which Nagarkot was taken: the date of this latter campaign is given as 738 in a chronogram by the poet Badr-i Chāchī (tr. in Elliot & Dowson, "History of India," vol. III, London 1871, p. 570). For a discussion of these two episodes, vide Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 178–84.

Yaḥyā's chronology for the latter half of Muḥammad's reign, where we are able to check it against the mass of data in Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, is particularly unreliable. Many errors were pointed out by Sir Wolseley Haig: "Five Questions in the History of the Tughluq Dynasty of Dihli," JRAS (1922), section iv: "Chronology of the Reign of Muhammad Tughluq," pp. 336–65. Budā'unī regularly adopts Yaḥyā's dating. The seventeenth century author Firishta (tr. J. Briggs, "History of the rise of the Mahomedan power in India," revised ed., 4 vols., Calcutta 1908–10) does likewise, though carelessly on occasions (cf. Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," p. 217, on the revolt of Bahā' al-dīn Gurshāsp). Sometimes, however, in deviating from it he has his own reasons, as in the case of Tarmashirin's invasion, which he seeks to put before the sultan's selection of Daulatābād as the second capital in 727/1327 (Husain, op. cit., p. 124).

[35] Ḥusain ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 202) makes the same assumption.

[36] Mujīr al-dīn is known from other sources. He is mentioned by Baranī in the list of Muḥammad's maliks (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 454: 10, with[b] for[c] in error). According to 'Iṣāmī (*Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, p. 413; ed.

It appears, therefore, that the invasion took place in 729 or 730, since Baranī has previously placed the selection of Daulatābād as the second capital in 727/1327.[37] Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad in turn gives the year 729 for Tarmashirin's attack, and is followed by Budā'unī.[38] That the Chaghatai khan seized his opportunity when the city was thus partly denuded of defenders, as both Bihāmadkhānī and Ḥājjī al-dabīr suggest,[39] is highly probable, for in earlier reigns the Mongols had been swift to take advantage of such critical situations in the capital,[40] and on this present occasion Muḥammad's own invasion of the Peshāwar region had afforded them the additional motive of revenge.

Tarmashirin's invasion of Hindūstān must clearly be accepted as a fact. The testimony of 'Iṣāmī alone among contemporary authors might well have seemed insufficient, since 'Iṣāmī had moved from Delhi to Daulatābād two years prior to the attack and was never in the north again.[41] Baranī's evidence, however, must carry more

---

Usha, p. 427) and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 710), he took part in the campaign against the rebel Gurshāsp early in the reign. Later he was commander of Bayāna, 120 miles south of Delhi (C. Defrémery & B. R. Sanguinetti, "Voyages d'Ibn Batoutah," Paris 1853–8, vol. IV, p. 5), whence he came to help suppress the rebellion of 'Ain al-mulk (*Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, p. 453; ed. Usha, p. 473). On his death, vide 'Afīf, *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, ed. M. V. Husain, Calcutta 1888–91, pp. 451–3.

[37] MS Elliot 353, fol. 190v:16f. The later recension (Calcutta ed., pp. 473–5) contains no date. In the Bodleian MS, Baranī states (fol. 192r: 2ff.) that the transfer of population did not occur until after the suppression of Kishlū Khan's revolt, which he has dated (fol. 191v: 7f.) "towards the end of that year," i.e. of 727. Hence Bihāmadkhānī (MS Or. 137, fol. 400r: 11f.) places Tarmashirin's campaign "two or three" years later. On the respective positions of Delhi and Daulatābād under Muḥammad Tughluq, vide Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 144–73.

[38] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 101: 7. *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. I, p. 227: 19.

[39] MS Or. 137, loc. cit. "An Arabic History of Gujarat," p. 865: 15f.

[40] Notably in 703/1303–4, when 'Alā' al-dīn had been engaged in the Chitor campaign, and Taraghai, the lieutenant of Tarmashirin's elder brother Qutlugh Khwāja, had advanced as far as the Jumna, only to be thwarted by the sultan's powerful entrenchments at Sīrī; cf. Lal, "History of the Khaljis," pp. 140–2, for references.

[41] In the *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn* (ed. Husain, pp. 431ff.; ed. Usha, pp. 447ff.), 'Iṣāmī describes the journey south in the company of his aged grandfather, who died en route. Even so, he is at some points remarkably well informed: in calling Tarmashirin the brother of Qutlugh Khwāja, he gives the relationship quite correctly, in spite of Husain's remarks to the contrary ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 123); cf. *Mu'izz al-ansāb*, MS Bibliothèque Nationale, Anc. Fonds Persan 67, fol. 32.

weight. He appears to have been resident in this part of Muḥammad's dominions throughout, and entered the sultan's own service only a few years later.[42] His reference to the invasion undermines the credibility of Husain's second line of argument ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 140), namely that Tarmashirin may have visited India to seek Muḥammad's help after his defeat by the Persian Mongols in 726/1326.[43] A diplomatic triumph of this sort could not have gone unnoticed, and would hardly have passed into history as an invasion. It is far more likely that his reverse at the hands of the Īlkhān's forces prompted Tarmashirin to turn his attention towards the Delhi sultanate, and this is what the circumstantial evidence of the Iranian sources suggests. In 728/1328 the Īlkhān's court was notified of troop movements in the Chaghatayid borderlands, and took steps to meet an invasion which does not seem in fact to have materialised:[44] we may assume, from the chronology, that this alarm was occasioned by the preparations for Tarmashirin's Indian campaign.

Having as far as possible established the course of Tarmashirin's invasion,[45] we are confronted with two problems: (1) Why does Baranī suppress any mention of it in the second recension of the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*? And (2) why does Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, far from referring to it, describe the relations between the Chaghatai khan and the Delhi sultan in terms of "friendship and the exchange of letters and gifts"?[46]

---

[42] He says that he was in Muḥammad's service for 17 years (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 504: 16ff.), i.e. presumably from about 734/1333–4.

[43] On the invasion of the Ghaznīn by the Īlkhān's general Ḥasan b. Choban, vide B. Spuler, "Die Mongolen in Iran," 2nd ed. Berlin 1955, p. 123; also *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. E. G. Browne, Leyden-London 1910, p. 607, on which the accounts quoted by Spuler are ultimately based.

[44] *Ẓail-i Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, MS British Museum, Or. 2885, fol. 416r: 19ff.; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, ed. K. Bayani, text vol. I, Tehran 1939/1317s., p. 140.

[45] There remains admittedly the conflicting testimony of Sharaf al-dīn, who says that the sultan bribed Tarmashirin to depart, and of the Indian historians, in whose accounts we nowhere read of such a capitulation. On balance, the latter would seem more trustworthy: Sharaf al-dīn wrote some eighty years after the event, and Baranī and 'Iṣāmī at least were contemporaries of Muḥammad. Moreover, had the sultan behaved in such a craven fashion, it is inconceivable that 'Iṣāmī especially, as a bitter enemy of Muḥammad's and a supporter of his rival Ḥasan Gangū (founder of the Baḥmanid dynasty), should not have mentioned it.

[46] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 562.

III

Let us first examine the background to Muḥammad's policy towards the Mongols. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa supplies ample evidence of the way in which the sultan's generosity had become proverbial throughout western Asia.[47] We may note in particular the following statement:[48]

> The king of India ... makes a practice of honouring strangers and showing affection to them and singling them out for governorships or high dignities of state. The majority of his courtiers, palace officials, ministers of state, judges, and relatives by marriage are foreigners ...

Nor was this influx confined to the civil administration. The army likewise contained a large proportion of foreigners, among whom 'Umarī mentions Turks, "natives of Khitā," and Persians,[49] while Ibn Baṭṭūṭa himself refers more than once to "the amirs of Khurāsān."[50]

Muḥammad's actions were not directed simply at acquiring an unrivalled reputation for munificence. That this was a matter of deliberate policy is confirmed by his method of welcoming visitors to his empire. An elaborate intelligence-network furnished the sultan with detailed information on all newcomers,[51] and immigrants from "Khurāsān" were obliged to sign a contract engaging them not to depart immediately.[52] The sultan was most reluctant to give any foreigner permission to depart,[53] and severe penalties were inflicted on those who attempted to leave without his authorisation.[54] Nevertheless, many did come in the hope of making a quick profit and of then departing at once, among them the notables presented to Muḥammad at the same time as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa.[55]

[47] Op. cit., vol. II, Cambridge 1962, pp. 311–3 (where his remarks refer to the year 748/1347; cf. note 118 on p. 306); vol. III, p. 671. 'Umarī too comments on Muḥammad's generosity: tr. E. Quatremère, "Notice de l'ouvrage qui a pour titre 'Mesalek alabsar fi memalek alamsar'", in "Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi," vol. XIII, Paris 1838, part 1, pp. 194–7; ed. O. Spies, "Ibn Faḍlallāh al-'Omarī's Bericht über Indien in seinem Werke usw.," Leipzig 1943, text pp. 23: 18–25: 18, trans. pp. 49–51

[48] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 595.

[49] Tr. Quatremère, p. 180; ed. Spies, text p. 13: 2, trans. p. 38.

[50] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 721 & 723.

[51] Ibid., pp. 569 & 595.

[52] Ibid., p. 607. On the significance of the term "Khurāsān," vide page 9, infra.

[53] Op. cit., vol. I, Cambridge 1958, p. 263.

[54] Op. cit., vol. III, p. 706 (Ṭūghān al-Farghānī) & pp. 728–9 (Amīr Bakht).

[55] Ibid., p. 745: "Everyone was silent at first, for what they were wanting was to gain riches and return to their countries."

It is clear, from at least one remark by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,[56] that this policy aroused considerable opposition among the native aristocracy. Baranī too criticises Muḥammad's openhandedness – especially to foreigners – as leading to the impoverishment of the treasury.[57] Subsequently, he again singles out this policy for mention among the sultan's wasteful projects, linking it specifically with his design of conquering Khurāsān and 'Irāq.[58]

IV

The Khurāsān project is surrounded by much obscurity. Husain ("Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 138–43) sees it as undertaken by Muḥammad at the instigation of Tarmashirin, and as directed against their common enemy, the Īlkhān. He notes that 'Iṣāmī makes no reference to the project, and assumes in consequence that the poet simply attributed the enormous levy required for Khurāsān to the need to repel the Chaghatayid offensive. He further rejects (op. cit., p. 180) the connection made by Baranī with the ill-fated Qarāchīl expedition, which we shall examine shortly. Yet it is clear that Husain's unreadiness to accept the factual character of Tarmashirin's invasion has obliged him to entertain certain misconceptions about the Khurāsān enterprise also.

It should first be noticed that the Indian Muslims were remarkably vague in their use of the name Khurāsān. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa observes that "all foreigners are called by them Khurasanians,"[59] and the tendency was still current in the era of Bābar, almost two centuries later.[60] In its narrowest application the term seems to have embraced a considerable area west and north-west of the Indus: it was thus capable of including both the dominions of the Īlkhān (that is, the territory properly called Khurāsān in the Iranian sources) and the possessions of the Chaghatayids in what is now northern Afghanistān,

---

[56] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 721–2: "The amīrs of Khurāsān and the foreigners were in the greatest fear of this rebel ('Ain al-mulk), because he was an Indian, and the people of India hold the foreigners in hatred because of the Sultan's favouritism for them."

[57] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 461: 10–462: 13.

[58] Ibid., p. 476: 13ff.

[59] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 664.

[60] Cf. A. S. Beveridge, "The Bābur-nāma in English," London 1921–2, vol. I, p. 202: "Just as 'Arabs call every place outside 'Arab (Arabia), 'Ajam, so Hindūstānīs call every place outside Hindūstān, Khurāsān."

centred on Ghazna.[61] Authors writing later than Baranī are quite misleading, since they use the designation for the Chaghatai khanate itself: so it is that Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad and Budā'unī both describe the Chaghatai khan as "emperor of Khurāsān."[62]

Muḥammad's ambitions, therefore, may have been directed against either Iran or the Chaghatai khanate. Husain, in asserting that the Īlkhān's territories were the objective, claims that Muḥammad and Tarmashirin were united by their Sunnī antipathy towards the Shi'ite regime established by the Īlkhān Öljeitü (703/1304–716/1316). But this is quite groundless, as since the accession of Öljeitü's son Abū Sa'īd there had been a return to orthodox Islam in Iran.[63] We may in fact discern in the first few decades of the fourteenth century a steady growth in cordial relations between the Īlkhāns and the sultans of Delhi. Vaṣṣāf describes how Öljeitü had sent an embassy to 'Alā' al-dīn Khiljī, demanding the homage which his predecessors had allegedly paid to the Mongol Qa'ans of the thirteenth century, and how 'Alā' al-dīn had responded by executing the envoys.[64] A letter from Öljeitü's celebrated minister Rashīd al-dīn to his son Khwāja Ibrāhīm, governor of Shīrāz, refers to an expedition by the Īlkhān's forces in which Lahore was taken and the province of Sind pillaged.[65] This may well have been in reprisal for 'Alā' al-dīn's action, but no other source mentions the campaign, and the

---

[61] So Ibn Baṭṭūṭa refers incidentally (tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 621) to "the city of Ghazna, in the province of Khurāsān." Gibb's statement (ibid., note 104 on p. 682) that Ghazna was at this time a dependency of Herāt is ill-founded, since we have read previously (p. 589) that Tarmashirin's amir Boroldai (Burunṭaih) had his lieutenants in the city. 'Umarī too makes it a Chaghatayid dependency: tr. Quatremère, op. cit., pp. 232–5; ed. Klaus Lech, "Das Mongolische Weltreich: Al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk usw.," Wiesbaden 1968, text pp. 36: 8f., 37: 4f., & 38: 8f., trans. pp. 115, 116, & 117.

[62] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 101: 8 & p. 117: 9f.; *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. I, p. 227: 20 & p. 240 :16.

[63] Spuler, "Die Mongolen in Iran," 2nd ed., p. 191; A. Bausani in Chapter VII, "Cambridge History of Iran," vol. V, Cambridge 1968, p. 543. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (tr. Gibb, vol. II, pp. 302–4) relates that before his death Öljeitü had abandoned "the doctrine of the Rāfiḍīs" and reverted to Sunnism; but cf. Gibb's note 113 ibid.

[64] *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa tajziyat al-a'ṣār*, lithog. ed. Bombay 1853, p. 528: 11ff. The embassy is dated (ibid., line 9) about the same time as the sultan's Ma'bar expedition, i.e. about 710/1310–1.

[65] *Mukātibāt-i Rashīdī* (no. 52); ed. M. Shafi', Lahore 1947, pp 323–5; tr. A. I. Falina, "Rashīd ad-Dīn: Perepiska," Moscow 1971, pp. 346–8.

authenticity of the letter is suspect.[66] We are told in the *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī* that an embassy from Muḥammad arrived at Abū Sa'īd's court in shawwāl 728/August–September 1328: on its return to India it was accompanied by the Īlkhān's own envoy, Sayyid 'Aẓad al-dīn.[67] According to 'Umarī, it was hoped at court that 'Aẓad al-dīn (whom he calls 'Aẓad, son of the qāḍī of Yezd) would be executed on his arrival in Delhi, but Muḥammad treated him with great esteem, sending him back with gifts for Abū Sa'īd.[68] Subsequently the sultan despatched another mission to Iran, but when it arrived the Īlkhān was already dead.[69]

It is, on the whole, unlikely that Muḥammad contemplated an invasion of Iran during the reign of Abū Sa'īd, when the Īlkhān's power was still considerable. The civil wars which succeeded that monarch's death in 736/1335 admittedly offered greater opportunities, and for a brief space the sultan was host to Ḥājjī Ke'ün, a

---

[66] Ibrāhīm was executed with his father in 718/1318, at the age of sixteen. Falina (op. cit., note 1 on p. 428) therefore dates the letter in the last years of Öljeitü's reign or in the first two years of Abū Sa'īd. This is supported by the fact that another of Rashīd's sons, Jalāl al-dīn, who is mentioned in the text as commanding the troops of Rūm, was appointed *ṣāḥib-dīvān* there only in 716/1316 (Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, ed. Bayani, text vol. I, p. 73; Aqsarā'ī, *Musāmarat al-akhbār*, ed. O. Turan, Ankara 1944, p. 313, reports the appointment, but with no exact date), having previously governed 'Irāq since 713/1313–4 (Kāshānī, *Tārīkh-i Ūljāītū Sulṭān*, ed. M. Hambly, Tehran 1969/1348s., pp. 154 & 196). However, it appears that Rashīd had two sons named Ibrāhīm (contrary to the list in "İslâm Ansiklopedisi," vol. IX, Istanbul 1964, p. 708b): in the *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī* (ed. M. Farrukh, Meshhed 1960/1339s., p. 44) the death is reported, on 8 shawwāl 734/12 June 1334, of 'Imād al-millat wa'l-dīn 'Abd al-mu'min b. Ibrāhīm b. Khwāja Rashīd al-dīn Faẓl-allāh, who was born on 17 sha'bān 703/25 March 1304, and whose father can therefore scarcely have been a youth in 718.

But Ibn Zarkūb, in his *Shīrāz-nāma*, composed in 744/1343–4, makes no mention of Khwāja Ibrāhīm as governor ([d]) of Shīrāz in these years, when the entire province of Fārs was in the control of Shaikh Jamāl al-dīn 'Arab and his sons (ed. B. Karimi, Tehran 1931/1310s., pp. 73–5); cf. also Kāshānī, ed. Hambly, pp. 156–63.

On the authenticity of many of Rashīd's letters, vide Reuben Levy, "The Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh," JRAS (1946), pp. 74–8.

[67] *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, ed. Farrukh, pp. 39–40; Aziz Ahmad, "Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land," p. 189.

[68] Tr. Quatremère, pp. 193–4; ed. Spies, text p. 22: 12ff., trans. pp. 48–9. Baranī (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 461: 17) mentions Muḥammad's generosity to one Sayyid 'Aẓad al-daulat: the *laqab* varies as between different MSS, and in the first recension (MS Elliot 353, fol. 188r) it is given as 'Aẓad al-mulk.

[69] Tr. Quatremère, p. 187: ed. Spies, text p. 17: 14ff., trans. p. 43. Its purpose was to distribute a million *tangas* throughout the holy places of 'Irāq.

brother of the Īlkhān Mūsā.[70] Nevertheless, had there been any question of military support, we might expect some reference to the fact from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who was at court during Ḥājjī's visit;[71] whereas the Moroccan traveller nowhere mentions the Khurāsān project. Nor, finally, is there evidence for the coalition to which Husain refers ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 177) between Muḥammad, Tarmashirin and Al-Nāṣir of Egypt.[72] Indeed, Al-Nāṣir's treaty with Abū Sa'īd in 720/1320 had inaugurated a new phase in the relations between the Egyptian Mamlūks and the Mongols of Iran.[73] Although the Delhi sultan maintained diplomatic contacts with Cairo, these were concerned primarily with his recognition of the puppet 'Abbāsid Caliph: the sources give no hint that they were directed against the Īlkhān.[74]

---

[70] Gibb, "The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa," vol. III, pp. 677–9. Ḥājjī is unknown from other sources, and does not appear in the *Mu'izz al-ansāb* (MS Ancien Fonds Persan 67, fol. 63r.). A few years before, in about 733/1332–3, Niẓām al-dīn, a scion of the dispossessed ruling house of Fārs (supra, note 66, had sought Muḥammad's aid in recovering Qais, but to no avail; J. Aubin, "Les princes d'Ormuz du XIIIe au XVe siècle," JA CCXLI (1953), p. 105, quoting Shabānkāra'ī's *Majma' al-ansāb*.

[71] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 663 & 678.

[72] Mufaḍḍal (*Nahj al-shadīd*, MS Bibl. Nat., Ancien Fonds Arabe 619/ Slane no. 4525, fol. 238r: 9–13) describes Tarmashirin ([e]) as being on friendly terms ([f]) with Al-Nāṣir (though sub anno 741). Abū Sa'īd himself has been similarly described, however, in a number of places, beginning sub anno 724 (fol. 198r: 7f.).

[73] The terms are quoted by Maqrīzī: *Al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M. M. Ziada, vol. II, part 1, Cairo 1941, pp. 209: 19–210: 2. Although not ratified until 723/1323 (ibid., pp. 242: 11–16 & 245–6), the treaty had by then already affected Al-Nāṣir's alliance with the Īlkhān's principal enemies, the Mongols of Russia: cf. Spuler, "Die Goldene Horde," 2nd ed. Wiesbaden 1965, pp. 94–5; S. Zakirov, "Diplomaticheskiye otnosheniya Zolotoy Ordy s Egiptom (XIII–XIV vv.)," Moscow 1966, pp. 82ff.

[74] Maqrīzī (*Al-sulūk*, vol. II, part 2, Cairo 1942, p. 333: 3f.) reports the arrival of envoys from "the king of Al-Hind" in Sha'bān 731/May–June 1331 (cf. also K. V. Zetterstéen, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlūkensultane in den Jahren 690–741 der Higra," Leyden 1919, text p. 183: 20f.): their mission concerned Baghdād. This must be the initial enquiry about the fate of the 'Abbāsids to which Baranī refers (p. 491: 18ff.), though erroneously dating it after Muḥammad's move to Sargadvārī, i.e. towards the end of the decade. According to Mufaḍḍal (fol. 215r: 2–6) a previous envoy from Al-Hind had been arrested and murdered by Al-Mujāhid 'Alī, the Rasūlid ruler of the Yemen: in retaliation Al-Nāṣir threw Al-Mujāhid's own emissaries into prison in 730 (Maqrīzī, p. 322: 19ff., gives the date as 19 shawwāl/5 August 1330). Some details of this incident are found in 'Umarī's *Al-ta'rīf bi'l-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf* (ed. Cairo 1894, p. 49: 14ff.); whence the account in Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī's biographical dictionary *Al-durar al-kāminat* (ed. Hyderabad 1929–

It appears, therefore, that the project was aimed at the dominions of the Chaghatayids. To the hypothesis that Muḥammad's purpose was to aid Tarmashirin's son, who took refuge with him on his father's overthrow,[75] a similar objection may be raised as in the case of Ḥājjī Ke'ün, namely that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa is totally silent on this count. We must assume either that the project was both mooted and abandoned during the traveller's absence from court, or that it was already a thing of the past when he arrived in India. Of these two alternatives, the latter is the more probable.[76] Moreover, a date prior to 734/1333 is supported by Baranī, who asserts that part of the levy intended for Khurāsān was sent to the Qarāchīl mountains.[77]

32, vol. III, pp. 460: 18–461: 4; trans. Husain in "Tughluq Dynasty," Appendix E, pp. 610–1). Mufaḍḍal reports a further embassy from Delhi in 737 (MS Ancien Fonds Arabe 619, fol. 229v: 16; cf. Tiesenhausen, "Sbornik materialov otnosyashchikhsya k istorii Zolotoy Ordy," vol. I, St Petersburg 1884, text p. 187 (with year in error)[kk], trans. p. 199). S. Y. Labib ("Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171–1517)," Wiesbaden 1965, pp. 70–1) asserts that Muḥammad tried unsuccessfully to incite the Mamlūks against the Īlkhān: of the two authorities he quotes, the passages from the *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā* of Qalqashandī do not apply, being concerned only with Egyptian-Persian relations, while this section of Ibn Shākir's *'Uyūn al-tawārīkh* appears to exist only in the Cairo MS, and is therefore unfortunately inaccessible to me.

[75] Gibb, vol. III, pp. 562 & 564. His name is given as Bashai, but the *Mu'izz al-ansāb* (fol. 32r.) reads[g], suggesting Bashaitai – "man of the Pashai" (on which area cf. Gibb's note 197 on p. 587). Tarmashirin's death is dated 735/1334–5 by Ibn Ḥajar (*Al-durar al-kāminat*, vol. I, p. 517: 5) and by Maqrīzī (*Al-sulūk*, vol. II, part 2, p. 389: 10ff.), of whom the former clearly derived his information from the vast biographical lexicon of Al-Ṣafadī (died 764/1363): *Al-wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, MS British Museum, Add. 23357, fol. 83v. The dates 728 and 729 generally given in the Tīmūrid histories are of course quite erroneous.

[76] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa remained in Delhi when Muḥammad left for Ma'bar in 735 (tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 716), and seems to have rejoined him only on his return from the south (p. 663) two and a half years later (p. 719). He did not accompany Muḥammad to Sargadvārī, but joined him there some time before the rebellion of 'Ain al-mulk (pp. 720 & 765). During neither of these two periods of absence from the court could such a vast levy of troops – 370, 000, according to Baranī (p. 477: 8) – conceivably have been implemented without Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's knowledge, if at all. In the earlier recension (MS Elliot 353, fol. 201v: 8ff.) Baranī had given the figure as 470,000. Husain plausibly connects the Dōāb rising (cf. Gibb, vol. III, p. 617 & note 87 ibid., & Baranī, pp. 479–80) with the disbandment of this vast force: "Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 191 & 233–42. Vide also Muḥammad b. Mubārak (Mīr-i khwurd), *Siyar al-auliyā'*, lithog. ed. Delhi 1885, p. 271: 12ff., where the Khurāsān project is by implication placed soon after the move to Daulatābād.

[77] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 477: 15f. ([h]), 20f. ([i]). On the approximate date of the Qarāchīl expedition, cf. Husain, op. cit., note 4 on pp. 179–80, & Gibb, vol. III, note 13 on p. 713.

Baranī further implies that the Qarāchīl manoeuvre was designed to facilitate the invasion of Khurāsān:[78]

It occurred to Sultan Muḥammad that since the preliminaries (pīshnihādhā) for the conquest of Khurāsān and Māwarā' al-nahr had been effected (dar kār shoda ast), the Qarāchil mountains, which lay on the direct route (dar rāh-i nazdīk) (as) a boundary and a screen between the empire of India and the empire of China, should be subjected to the banner of Islam, so that the route of entry of horses and of the march of troops (rāh-i dar āmad-i asp va raftan-i lashgar) should be rendered easy.

There are two points to be noted here. Firstly the mention of China is quite incidental, and serves merely to clarify the location of the mountain range in question: nevertheless, it misled Firishta into believing that Muḥammad planned the conquest of China.[79] And in the second place, Baranī is speaking no longer of "Khurāsān and 'Irāq," but of "Khurāsān and Māwarā' al-nahr"; in other words, the Ghaznīn and the territory beyond the Āmūya – the Chaghatai khanate. In his earlier recension, Baranī is more specific: here he refers to the object of Muḥammad's ambitions as "the bālā-dast country" (aqālīm-i bālā dast), a term signifying the Central Asian regions which were a major source of choice mounts for the Delhi army.[80] In view of the final clause in the passage quoted above, the safeguarding of this trade may well have been an important factor in Muḥammad's projected military operations in the north-west.

V

Baranī is admittedly alone in thus linking the Qarāchīl campaign with the Khurāsān project. Not only do Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and 'Iṣāmī make no reference to Muḥammad's designs on the trans-Indus regions, but Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad and Budā'unī, who otherwise follow

---

[78] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, MS British Museum, Or. 2039, fol. 236v: 1–4. I have used the MS in preference to the Calcutta edition (p. 477: 16–20), which is here slightly defective.

[79] Lithog. ed. Bombay, vol. I, p. 240: 6; tr. Briggs, vol. I, p. 416. Such a false impression is only perpetuated by translations of the above passage like that given by Moinul Haq ("Barani's history of the Tughluqs," JPHS VII, p. 87): ". . . and as the Qarājil mountain intervened and obstructed the shorter route between the countries of Hind and China . . ."

[80] MS Elliot 353, fol. 201v: 1ff: [j] Cf. also fol. 200r: 16 ([k]). On the "bālā-dast" regions and the horse trade, vide Digby, "War-horse and Elephant," pp. 34–6 et passim.

Baranī in narrating the disasters of the reign, omit here any mention of Khurāsān.[81] Even Firishta, dwelling at some length on the Khurāsān expedition,[82] fails to connect it with the Qarāchīl campaign. Such a connection, however, is by no means as unlikely as Husain ("Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 180ff.) suggests. Had the Delhi forces moved through Lahore in the direction of Kalānaur and Peshāwar, so following the route taken in Muḥammad's earlier offensive against the Mongols, then a considerable extent of Hindu-occupied mountainous territory would have lain on their right flank, which the ill-fated Qarāchīl manoeuvre could have been intended at least to secure.

The precise geographical objective of the Qarāchīl expedition has been much debated.[83] Husain identifies Qarāchīl with the Kumāōn-Gahrwāl region, and – on the grounds of a statement by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa – places Sambhal in Rohilkhand (eighty miles east of Delhi) on the route of the expedition. It should be noticed, however, that in the passage in question[84] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa nowhere associates the sack of Sambhal by Muḥammad's forces with the Qarāchīl campaign, and it is far more likely to have occurred during the expedition of 738/1337–8.[85] We have, therefore, no exact indication as to the goal of the Qarāchīl enterprise or the route taken.[86] Notwithstanding, a

[81] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, pp. 113–6. *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. I, pp. 237–8.

[82] Lithog. ed., vol. I, pp. 239–40; tr. Briggs, vol. I, p. 414. His details are from Baranī.

[83] Cf. S. H. Hodivala, "Studies in Indo-Muslim history," Bombay 1939, pp. 294–5 and 382–3; Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 178–84; Aziz Ahmad, "Mongol Pressure," CAJ VI, pp. 189–90; Gibb, vol. III, note 13 on p. 713. There is nothing to support Husain's identification (note 2 on p. 178) of Qarāchīl with Al-Bīrūnī's Kulārjak, which Stein ("Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī: a chronicle of the kings of Kaśmīr," Westminster 1900, vol. II, pp. 297–9) believed to be the Taṭakūṭī peak in Kashmīr (33° 45' N., 74° 33' E.).

[84] Tr. Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. IV, p. 2 (text pp. 1–2). Yule ("Cathay and the Way Thither," revised ed. H. Cordier, vol. IV, London 1916, note 4 on pp. 17–8) was the first to identify Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's Samhal (l) with Sambhal (28° 35' N., 78° 34' E.).

[85] This campaign, which is described briefly and with no date by Baranī (pp. 483–4), is generally assumed to have included the capture of Nagarkot (cf. supra, note 34). If the sack of Sambhal did indeed provoke an embassy from China in 742/1341–2, as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa claims (tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 766–7; Defrémery & Sangninetti, vol. IV, pp. 1–2), then it almost certainly occurred at this point rather than during the Qarāchīl expedition.

[86] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 713–4) mentions only two towns, named Jidya and Warangal (Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. III, text pp. 325–6: m). Both are otherwise unknown, and the second is suspect, since it is the name of the capital of Telingana (Tiling) in southern India. Neither 'Iṣāmī

number of factors suggest that the territory which the sultan's generals invaded with some initial success but which ultimately defied them was in fact Kashmīr.[87]

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa describes Qarāchīl as "a great range of mountains extending for a distance of three months' journey, and ten days' journey from Dihlī,"[88] from which it is clear that the Himalayas are in question. But his next remark – that "its Sultan is one of the most powerful sultans of the infidels" – indicates that he has in mind a particular principality. Since it does not appear from the Moroccan traveller's account of his stay in India that he was ever near the Himalayas, we may reasonably suppose that the details concerning Qarāchīl which he gives at various points in his narrative are derived principally from survivors of the expedition. That these details are somewhat scanty is explicable on two grounds: the Qarāchīl enterprise was over a few years before his arrival in India, and its disastrous nature very probably made it a dangerous topic of conversation in an empire whose ruler was well served by spies and informants.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's reference to gold mines in the Qarāchīl range puzzled both Gibb and Husain, and did so no less in view of his simultaneous mention of poisonous grasses on account of which the water coming down from the mountains was unfit to drink.[89] There are topographical inaccuracies at this juncture in the account, since Amrōha, which is described as lying near the river Sarjū (Sārū), is situated in fact not far from the Ganges;[90] and this error – along with the

---

(ed. Husain, pp. 447–9; ed. Usha, pp. 466–8) nor Baranī (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 477–8) names any specific locality. The account in Baranī's first recension (MS Elliot 353, foll. 193r: 18–193v: 1) is extremely brief.

[87] Aziz Ahmad ("Mongol Pressure," pp. 189–90) similarly assumes that Kashmīr lay on the projected route of the expedition, but does not develop this idea. His identification of Qarāchīl with the Qaraqorum range, south of Kashgharia, is, however, dubious, and he erroneously makes this campaign and that of 738 twin pincers of the same attack.

[88] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 713.

[89] Gibb, vol. II, p. 274, & vol. III, pp. 762–3 & note 35 ibid. Husain, "The Reḥla of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa," Baroda 1953 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series CXXII), note 5 on p. 145.

[90] Assuming, of course, that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's Amrūhā, or Hazār Amrūhā, is identical with Amrōha in the Morādābād district (28° 54' N., 78° 14' E.), as Husain suggests ("The Reḥla," note 6 on p. 144). The Sarjū rises in western Nepal, whereas the source of the Ganges lies in the Gahrwāl region. Elsewhere (tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 726) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa locates the town of Bahraich on the Sārū, quite correctly (though Gibb himself, in note 27 ibid., places it on the Ganges).

bizarre data on the Qarāchīl mountains – might tempt us to dismiss the passages in question altogether, but for the fact that they find an echo in other authors. 'Umarī too refers to gold mines in the Qarāchīl range, although his account of the mountains is brief and confused.[91] It is in the form of gold dust, however, that the metal has been more commonly obtained in northern India, a fact which is noticed even by Classical writers.[92] In the Muslim era Abu'l-faẓl 'Allāmī, writing towards the end of the sixteenth century, relates how gold dust is found in the environs of Ayodhya (Awadh) at times of recent inundation of the Gogra, the Sarjū, and other neighbouring rivers.[93] But it is with respect to the western Himalayas that we most frequently find in other sources details which are reminiscent of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's observations concerning Qarāchīl. Although Kashmīr itself possesses no gold deposits, those of Ladakh to the east are well known.[94] Abu'l-faẓl alludes to gold-washing in the river-beds of Gilgit and Paklī (the present-day Hazāra district, west of Kashmīr),[95] and Mīrzā Ḥaidar Dughlat, who spent ten years in Kashmīr in the middle of the sixteenth century, describes gold-beating as one of the country's industries.[96] In this connection Ibn Battūta's own reference not simply to treasure but also to precious metals (ma'ādin) among the booty initially secured by the Delhi forces in Qarāchīl may be more significant than it at first appears.[97] Even his poisonous grasses occur elsewhere: Sharaf al-dīn

---

[91] Ed. Spies, text p. 5: 5ff., trans. p. 23. 'Umarī locates the Qarāchīl range in the south of the empire (ibid., text p. 7: 15ff., trans. p. 29).

[92] Strabo, XV, 57: . . . φησιν ὁ Μεγασθένης, ὅτι οἱ ποταμοὶ καταφέροιεν ψῆγμα χρυσοῦ . . .; 69: . . . λέγουσι ('Ινδοι) . . . ψήγματά τε χρυσοῦ καταφέρειν τοὺς ποταμούς. Pliny, XXXIII, 66: Aurum invenitur . . . fluminum ramentis, ut in . . . Gange Indiae . . .

[93] *Ā'īn-i Akbarī*, vol. II, tr. H. S. Jarrett, Calcutta 1891, p. 171.

[94] They are mentioned in the *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* of Mīrzā Ḥaidar Dughlat (tr. N. Elias & E. D. Ross, "A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia," new ed. London 1898, pp. 411–2). Cf. also Sir A. Cunningham, "Ladák: physical, statistical, and historical," London 1854, pp. 232–4; H. H. Wilson, "Travels in the Himalayan provinces of Hindustan and the Panjab . . . by W. Moorcroft and G. Trebeck from 1819 to 1825," London 1841, vol. I, pp. 313–4.

[95] *Ā'īn-i Akbarī*, vol. II, tr. Jarrett, p. 365. On gold-washing in the Gilgit and Hunza rivers, vide Wilson, "Travels in the Himalayan provinces," vol. II, p. 267, & G. N. Curzon, "The Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus," GJ VII (1896), p. 25.

[96] Tr. Elias & Ross, op. cit., p. 434.

[97] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 714; Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. III, text p. 327: 2.

'Alī Yazdī mentions them as the major hazard on the otherwise comparatively safe route from Kashmīr into Ladakh.[98]

Such details are, of course, hardly conclusive. In their respective accounts of India, however, neither Ibn Baṭṭūṭa nor 'Umarī refers to Kashmīr by name, and the last Muslim geographer to survey the country in depth is Al-Bīrūnī in the eleventh century.[99] Since Indian historians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries likewise appear not to know the name, we may ask whether the region had not come to be subsumed under the general designation of Qarāchīl. This is admittedly an argument 'ex silentio'; but the one reference to Kashmīr which we do possess from this period is highly suggestive. Mīr-i khwurd tells us that the shaikh Shams al-dīn Yaḥyā was summoned by Muḥammad Tughluq and ordered to Kashmīr to convert the infidel, but died while preparations were still being made for his escort.[100] According to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa the commander of the Qarāchīl force, malik Negübei,[101] having occupied the infidels' capital, notified the sultan, who thereupon sent a qāḍī and a khaṭīb to join the army. It is tempting to see in the summons to Shams al-dīn the sultan's initial efforts to find suitable candidates, and this would explain an incident which is otherwise incomprehensible.

On examining the internal history of Kashmīr in this period, we discover at once two foreign invasions, both described by Jonarāja,

---

[98] *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. II, p. 180: 13–16. The entire passage (pp. 177–80) is quoted by Mīrzā Ḥaidar (tr. Elias & Ross, pp. 430–2), who like Sharaf al-dīn always calls Ladakh Tibet. Cf. Elias's note 1 on p. 432, referring to poisonous weeds at Bāltal, near the western foot of the Zoji-la pass: "Nowhere else in these regions (as far as I am aware) do similar poisonous herbs occur." It should be noticed, however, that the natives are prone to attribute to such noxious grasses the effects of what is really altitude-sickness, called by Ḥaidar 'dam-girī'; ibid., pp. 412–3 & note 1 on p. 413.

[99] *Ta'rīkh al-Hind*, tr. E. C. Sachau, "Alberuni's India," London 1888, vol. I, pp. 206–8. Though Al-Bīrūnī does not here refer to the gold deposits of the neighbouring regions, he does so in his *Al-jamāhir fī ma'rifat al-jawāhir*; ed. F. Kremkow, Hyderabad 1936, pp. 236–7; tr. A. M. Belenitskiy, "Sobraniye svyedenii dlya poznaniya dragotsennostey (mineralogiya)," Moscow 1963, pp. 221–2. Yāqūt gives only a brief account of Kashmīr in the *Mu'jam al-buldān*; ed. H. G. Wüstenfeld, "Jacut's geographisches Wörterbuch," Leipzig 1866–73, vol. IV, pp. 103–4.

[100] *Siyar al-auliyā'*, lithog. ed. Delhi, p. 228: 5–22.

[101] Gibb's 'Nukbiya' (vol. III, pp. 665, 667 & 713–4); the text reads[n] (Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. III, p. 231 et passim). He is mentioned by Baranī among Muḥammad's maliks (p. 454: 16f.) under the form[o]. 'Iṣāmī (ed. Husain, pp. 448–9; ed. Usha, pp. 466–8), and hence Firishta (lithog. ed. vol. I, pp. 239–40), name the commander-in-chief as the sultan's nephew Khusrau Malik.

author of the continuation of Kalhaṇa's celebrated *Rājataraṅgiṇī*. The first of these was led by the Turuṣka (Turk) Ḍulucha, who towards the end of the reign of rāja Suhadēva (1301–1320) occupied the country for eight months with a force composed of "Mleccha, Turuṣka and Tājika" troops – that is, of Muslims, Turks and Persians.[102] This inroad, it has been commonly assumed, represents a Mongol offensive, probably from Central Asia.[103] There is, however, no evidence for such an identification, and the hypothesis that the invaders were Mongols at all has been challenged by Jahn.[104] Jonarāja in fact describes Ḍulucha simply as the general of "the great king (*chakravartin*) Karmasena," whose identity has yet to be established, and the categories he lists would apply equally to the composition of any army sent from Delhi.[105] Moreover, although Jonarāja is silent as to the direction from which Ḍulucha entered Kashmīr, the later Muslim historians assert that he came through the Bāramūla pass – that is, by the path leading from the upper Jhēlum river and the western Punjāb – rather than by any of the passes connecting Kashmīr with Central Asia.[106] Had the invaders

---

[102] *Dvitīya Rājataraṅgiṇī*, tr. J. C. Dutt in "Kings of Káshmíra," vol. III, Calcutta 1898, pp. 16–17. The invader's name is variously spelled in the secondary authorities, but figures clearly in the Sanskrit text (ed. P. Peterson, "Râjataraṅgiṇî," vol. III, Bombay 1896, verse 152 et passim) as^{p} – Ḍulucha. Dutt's translation omits the composition of the invading army, which is given in verse 170 (quoted in S. C. Ray, "Early History and Culture of Kashmir," 2nd ed. New Delhi 1970, p. 93).

[103] Mohibbul Hasan, "Kashmir under the Sultans," Calcutta 1959, pp. 33–4; R. K. Parmu, "A History of Muslim Rule in Kashmir 1320–1819," New Delhi 1969, pp. 71–4; Ray, loc. cit. Cf. also Jean Naudou, "Les Bouddhistes Kaśmīriens au moyen âge," Paris 1968 (Annales du Musée Guimet LXVIII), pp. 202–3, where Ḍulucha is most improbably suggested to have been a lieutenant of the Mongol general Negüder (fl. 1238–1262).

[104] Karl Jahn, "A Note on Kashmīr and the Mongols," CAJ II (1956), note 11 on p. 178; reprinted in "Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'", The Hague 1965 (note 10 on pp. lxxxviii–lxxxix).

[105] Cf. supra, page 8; also Gibb, op. cit., vol. III, p. 724. On the *chakravartin*, cf. J. Przyluski, "La légende de l'empereur Açoka (Açoka-Avadāna) dans les textes Indiens et Chinois," Paris 1923 (Annales du Musée Guimet XXXII), p. 102; here the implication is that the term has become over the centuries, if vaguer, yet more elevated.

[106] *Bahāristān-i Shāhī*, MS British Museum, Add. 16706, fol. 8v: 8–11; Ḥaidar Malik of Chādūra, MS Add. 16705, fol. 102r: 5–11. Both authors here describe the invader as coming from Turkistān. His name appears in the *Bahāristān* as^{q}, and in Ḥaidar Malik as^{r}. Further on (fol. 104v: 16), Ḥaidar Malik says that he entered Kashmīr by way of Paklī. On the Bāramūla route, vide Ray, p. 8, & Parmu, pp. 42–3. I can find no evidence for the assertion of Sir Aurel Stein ("Kalhaṇa's Rāja taraṅgiṇī," vol. II, p. 408 &

been Mongols from the Peshāwar region, they might with equal probability have used the Bāramūla route; but this appears to be precluded by the information in the *Dvitīya Rājataraṅgiṇī*. Jonarāja tells us that Suhadēva at first sent Udyānadēva to buy off Ḍulucha, but that the mission was unsuccessful and Udyānadēva fled to Gandhāra.[107] Now Gandhāra is in fact the ancient name of the Peshāwar district and of the territory lying between the Kābul and Indus rivers;[108] and it is hardly likely that Udyānadēva would have taken refuge in the very direction from which the invaders had just arrived. That they had come from the south-east, therefore, seems a more plausible hypothesis. Finally, whereas Jonarāja contents himself with the statement that Ḍulucha left "by a good military road," the later chroniclers make it clear that he was actually heading for Hindūstān but that his forces were overwhelmed by a blizzard while crossing the Būdil pass.[109]

The account which the sources give of the second invasion, which occurred when Udyānadēva himself was on the throne of Kashmīr (1323–1339), is less detailed. Jonarāja calls the leader Achala, and says that he came with troops supplied by "the lord of Mugdhapura," who is otherwise unknown.[110] The later authors, however, give a quite different name, describing the marauder as a Turk who entered Kashmīr by way of Hirapur – that is, by the route connecting the country with the central Punjāb.[111] Jonarāja's language concerning Achala's fate is obscure, but it appears that Udyānadēva having fled ignominiously to Ladakh the resistance was organised by his

---

note 21 ibid.) that Ḍulucha came by way of the Zoji-la pass, i.e. from Ladakh.

[107] These details, omitted in Dutt's translation, are from vv. 229–30, translated by Pandit D. R. Sahni in "References to the Bhottas or Bhauttas in the Rajatarangini of Kashmir," IA XXXVII (1908), p. 185.

[108] Cunningham, "The Ancient Geography of India," pp. 47–9.

[109] *Bahāristān-i Shāhī*, MS India Office no. 943/Ethé no. 509, foll. 11r: 10–11v: 4 (this passage is abbreviated in the British Museum MS); Ḥaidar Malik, fol. 105r: 4–13. On the Būdil pass (spelled by these authors[s] respectively), vide Stein, op. cit., vol. II, p. 393.

[110] Tr. Dutt, p. 25; here the form given is "Mughdapura," but in Peterson's edition (v. 266) the name is quite clearly[t] – Mugdhapura. The spelling of Achala's own name is confirmed by Jonarāja's punning upon it (Skr.[u] – "mountain").

[111] *Bahāristān-i Shāhī*, MS Add. 16706, foll. 13v: 14–14r: 7; Ḥaidar Malik, MS Add. 16705, foll. 111v: 15–112v: 12. The *Bahāristān* does not name the invader, but Ḥaidar Malik calls him[v] (in India Office MS no. 1100/Ethé no. 510, fol. 104:[w]). On the Hirapur route, which led over the Pir Panjal pass, vide Stein, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 392–8.

queen, Koṭā, who deceived Achala with promises of the throne whilst rallying her forces; the Muslim authors say less, but agree that the Turkish army was obliged to retire. This is the last invasion recorded by the historians of Kashmīr before the sixteenth century, and not long afterwards occurred the dynastic revolution which gave the country its first Muslim royal house.

Jonarāja's chronology presents certain difficulties,[112] but it is on the whole both detailed and reliable: it is significant that in this one respect at least the Muslim chroniclers do not deviate from the information given in the *Dvitīya Rājataraṅgiṇī*.[113] Hence the second invasion – that of Achala – has the greater claim to be identified with the Qarāchīl expedition, with which, on the basis of Jonarāja's dating, it was roughly contemporaneous.[114]

---

[112] Events in the *Dvitīya Rājataraṅgiṇī* are not always narrated in strict order: hence vv. 141–151 deal with Ḍulucha's invasion, vv. 152–69 describe the advent of the Ladakhī chief Rinchaṅa (Rin-c'en) and his antecedents, vv. 170–94 are again concerned with Ḍulucha, and vv. 195ff. cover the reign of Rinchaṅa over Kashmīr (1320–1323). Most of this section is translated by Sahni, op. cit., IA XXXVII, pp. 182–6. The most puzzling reference of all occurs later, in the account of Achala's invasion, where it is stated that after Udyānadēva's flight Koṭā set up as rāja "one Rinchaṅa, a Bhoṭṭa" (tr. Dutt, p. 25): he is presumably to be distinguished from his namesake above, but we cannot be certain.

[113] The Muslim authors follow faithfully Jonarāja's figures for the duration of each reign. In converting from the Laukika to the Muslim era, however, the author of the *Bahāristān* appears to have calculated on the basis of the lunar year rather than of Jonarāja's solar one; hence Suhadēva's death is dated 725, instead of 720, and so on. Ḥaidar Malik's dates are a further ten or eleven years out. On the whole question of the chronology of Kashmīr in this period, vide A. K. Majumdar, "A Note on the Chronology of the Sultāns of Kashmir in the "Ain-i-Akbarī'," JAS 3rd series XXII (1956), Letters pp. 85–97.

[114] This would by no means preclude the possibility of contacts between Delhi and Kashmīr in the previous decade. In his list of the maliks of Ghiyāṡ al-dīn Tughluq, Baranī mentions a "Malik Kashmīr" (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 424: 6f.). Later he took part in the revolt of Kishlū Khān, to whom he was related by marriage (*Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, pp. 421, 423 & 425; ed. Usha, pp. 435, 438 & 440). It is tempting, moreover, to see in the name Ḍulucha that of the Tughluqī general Duljī (so called by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 709; Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. III, text p. 317: 7:[x]). He was of "Tatar" origin, and appears in 'Iṣāmī as[y] (ed. Husain, pp. 401ff.; ed. Usha, pp. 412ff.). This latter form is highly reminiscent of that of the invader of Kashmīr as known to Mīrzā Ḥaidar Dughlat and quoted in the *Bahāristān* (MSS Add. 16706, fol. 8v: 9f.:[z], & India Office no. 943/Ethé no. 509, fol. 10r: 12f:[aa]; a brief reference suggesting that Mīrzā Ḥaidar himself wrote a history of Kashmīr which is no longer extant). However, our sources for the history of the Delhi sultans mention no earlier campaigns in the

In equating Kashmīr with the region invaded by Muḥammad Tughluq's forces around 1330, my argument has had a threefold basis. (1) The references to Qarāchīl made by Ibn Battūta, as a non-native resident in India for a limited period, are more likely to apply to Qarāchīl in a narrower sense – as the object of Muḥammad's expedition. (2) The details we are given are admittedly few, but they evoke certain features peculiar rather to Kashmīr-Ladakh than to the main Himalayan range further east. And (3) Kashmīr's own chroniclers suggest (sometimes in spite of themselves) that the two invasions which they record for this period – and particularly the second – came neither from Central Asia nor from northern Afghanistān, but from the south – from Hindūstān. But there are two further powerful reasons for the identification.

The first is the absence of any indication that the Qarāchīl expedition was operating elsewhere. From the language used by Ibn Battūta, we must look for a major infidel state, and Baranī's account suggests a territory well to the west of Nepal, where in any case internal sources contain no reference to an invasion between Ghiyāṡ al-dīn Tughluq's attack on Tirhut in 725/1325 and the inroads from Bengāl some twenty years later.[115] The most powerful of the Punjāb hill-states at this time was Trigarta, with its centre at Kāngra-Nagarkot;[116] but this is precisely the region which Muḥammad invaded in person in 738/1337–8 without apparently encountering the hazards endured by the troops he had sent to Qarāchīl. The lesser hill-states, such as Kulū and Chambā, must be discounted in view of their weak condition during these years, when they were for the most part subject to Trigarta.[117] Both Aziz Ahmad and Husain quote the *vaṁśavalī* of the rājas of Kulū, which relates how during the reign of rāja Sikandarpāl the army of the ruler of Delhi passed through the region on a campaign extending as far

---

western Himalayas in this century, and the existence of previous contacts must remain a matter of conjecture.

[115] Luciano Petech, "Mediaeval History of Nepal (c. 750–1480)," Rome 1958 (Serie Orientale Roma X), pp. 111–3 & 118–22. D. R. Regmi, "Medieval Nepal," Calcutta 1965–6, Part I, pp. 278–93 & 312–20.

[116] Hermann Goetz, "History of Chambā State in the Later Middle Ages (ca. A.D. 1190 to 1623/1641)," in "Studies in the History and Art of Kashmir and the Indian Himalaya," Wiesbaden 1969 (Schriftenreihe d. Südasien-Instituts d. Univ. Heidelberg IV), pp. 103–4.

[117] Ibid., p. 103. J. Hutchison & J. P. Vogel, "History of the Panjab Hill States," Lahore 1933, vol. I, pp. 295–6, & vol. II, p. 439.

north as Little Tibet (Baltistān).[118] Nevertheless, it is by no means certain that this legend refers to the Qarāchīl expedition. The chronology of the rajas listed in the *vaṁśāvalī* is riddled with difficulties, and the legend makes the dubious assertion that Sikandarpāl had appealed to Delhi for help against the Chinese, who had invaded his kingdom.[119]

The second reason is that Kashmīr's position as a Mongol dependency, which has been demonstrated by Jahn,[120] enables us to see why Baranī connects the Qarāchīl manoeuvre with the abortive Khurāsān project. In the third quarter of the thirteenth century Kashmīr had been more closely linked, both culturally and politically, with the Mongols of Iran than with those of China.[121] By the turn of the century, however, the influence of the Īlkhān in northern Afghanistān – immediately to the west of Kashmīr – had been replaced by that of the Chaghatayids, who had become the Delhi sultanate's most formidable adversaries beyond the Indus;[122] and it is reasonable to assume that Kashmīr itself had shared this fate.

The Qarāchīl disaster represents Muḥammad Tughluq's last attempt to take the offensive against the Mongols. That he had

---

[118] "Historical Documents of Kuḷū," in "Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for 1907–8," Calcutta 1911, pp. 260–76 (p. 263). Aziz Ahmad, "Mongol Pressure," pp. 189–90. Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," note 1 on p. 184. Cf. also Hutchison & Vogel, vol. II, pp. 438–9.

[119] For a list of Kulū rājas, cf. "Historical Documents" (supra) & A. F. P. Harcourt, "The Himalayan Districts of Koolloo, Lahoul and Spiti," London 1871, pp. 372–3. Sikandarpāl's fourth successor is described in the *vaṁśāvalī* as a contemporary of sultan 'Alī Shīr of Kashmīr – i.e. of 'Alā' al-dīn (1344–1355), although in "Historical Documents" (p. 263) he is mistaken for 'Alī Shāh (1413–1420). Sikandarpāl's 21st successor, Udhranpāl, is known to have been reigning in 1418 & 1428 (Hutchison & Vogel, vol. II, pp. 439 & 441–2). However, Kulū became subject to Trigarta, and then recovered its autonomy, under his 11th and 13th successors respectively (ibid., p. 439), both of which events, as Goetz suggests (op. cit., p. 103), are more likely to have antedated Muḥammad Tughluq's attack on Kāngra-Nagarkot in 1337–8. Moreover, a trans-Himalayan campaign by the Mongols of China – assuming the *vaṁśāvalī* is not in error here – would hardly have occurred under the weak successors of Buyantu Qa'an (1311–1320).

[120] Jahn, "A Note on Kashmīr and the Mongols," CAJ II, pp. 179–80 & note 16 ibid.; "Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'", pp. xc–xci & note 15 ibid.

[121] Op. cit., CAJ II, p. 180 & note 17; "Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'", p. xci & note 16.

[122] Jahn, "Zum Problem der mongolischen Eroberungen in Indien (13.–14. Jahrhundert)," in "Akten des XXIV. Internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses, München ... 1957," Wiesbaden 1959, pp. 618–9. The process is examined in some detail by Jean Aubin in "L'Ethnogénèse des Qaraunas," Turcica I (1969), pp. 82–4 & 90–1.

learned at least one lesson from his earlier campaign is clear from the Indian sources. On that occasion his troops had undergone considerable privations in the wastes of Afghanistān;[123] and some effort now to establish supply-lines may be inferred from the accounts of Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad and Budā'unī, who in amplifying Baranī's narrative mention redoubts (t'hānaha) and garrisons (mohāfiẓān) designed to secure communications.[124]

VI

This new offensive in turn having met with disaster, the sultan was obliged to adopt different tactics. It may well be that he established friendly relations with Tarmashirin, as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa suggests. But even if the Moroccan traveller was mistaken, a large-scale expedition to the west was in any case ruled out increasingly after 734/1333–4 by the series of revolts which engaged Muḥammad's attention up to his death. When Ibn Baṭṭūṭa reached Delhi in the middle of that year, Muḥammad was absent at Kanauj, where he was in all probability busy with the suppression of the Dōāb rebellion.[125] Within a year the governor of Ma'bar had risen in revolt[126] and established a kingdom which was to maintain its independence for over forty years before being absorbed by the Hindu empire of Vijāyanagar. After this, insurrections by provincial governors became practically an annual occurrence, so that by the time the sultan moved his residence to Sargadvārī on the Ganges nothing remained of his empire, to quote Baranī, but Dēōgīr (Daulatābād) and Gujarāt.[127]

Conditions north of the Āmūya likewise militated against further operations by the Chaghatai khan on the Indian frontier. The growing counter-attack by the Delhi sultan offers one very probable explanation for Tarmashirin's preoccupation with the south-western

---

[123] *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, pp. 410: 21–411: 1; ed. Usha, pp. 423: 20–424: 2.

[124] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 103: 13f. *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. I, p. 229: 13f.

[125] Supra, note 76.

[126] Gibb's year 1341 (in note 30 on p. 758) is incorrect. Numismatic evidence indicates that Aḥsan Shāh had revolted in Ma'bar some years before: E. Hultzsch, "The Coinage of the Sultans of Madura," JRAS (1909), pp. 667–83 (especially nos. 6 & 7 on p. 673). Cf. also Baranī, who implies (p. 480: 7ff.) that news of the rebellion reached Muḥammad while he was still at Kanauj.

[127] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 471: 16f. & 484: 14f.

part of his dominions during the last four years of his reign.[128] However this may be, his absence was resented by the Mongols in the east of his empire – the traditional centre of gravity of the khanate – and led to a rising in which he was overthrown and killed. There followed a period of confusion, with no strong central authority, until the advent of Tīmūr.[129]

That two at least of these three factors – the Delhi sultan's seizure of the offensive against the Mongols and the subsequent outbreak of civil war in Māwarā' al-nahr – were the primary causes of the end of hostilities between the two powers is evident from certain statements of 'Umarī, writing no earlier than 733/1333 and probably a good deal later.[130] 'Umarī nowhere alludes to the existence of cordial relations between Muḥammad and the Chaghatai khan. Instead, having commented on the inveterate rivalry of the peoples of Māwarā' al-nahr and of India, and on the poor resistance offered by the latter over the centuries until the rise of Islam in India and the advent of the present monarch, he continues:[131]

. . . And so the eyes of the people of this country (hādhihi'l-bilād – i.e., Māwarā' al-nahr) slumbered in awe of this ever-vigilant (li-'adm hujūdihi) monarch, and their crafty foxes cowered before the roaring of his lions. The people of this country (Māwarā' al-nahr) used more and more to

---

[128] Gibb, op. cit., vol. III, p. 561. Another reason possibly lay in Tarmashirin's relations with the Īlkhān (supra, page 7).

[129] Sharaf al-dīn 'Alī Yazdī indicates that Tarmashirin's nephew and successor Buzun, who had led the revolt, was unable to establish his authority over the khanate; *Ẓafar-nāma*, muqaddima, MSS British Museum, Add. 6538, fol. 99v: 7ff., & Add. 18406, fol. 65v: 8ff. Although the division of the Chaghatai khanate into two separate political entities has usually been placed by historians in 1348, numismatic evidence suggests it occurred some years earlier. In sha'bān 746/December 1345, while Qazan (vide infra, page 25) was ruling in the west, a coin was struck at Almalīgh in the name of Muḥammad b. Bolad; A. K. Markov, "Inventarnyy katalog musul'manskikh monyet Ermitazha," St Petersburg 1896–1904, p. 560 (no. 278).

[130] The date of composition of the *Masālik al-abṣār* is discussed by Lech in "Das Mongolische Weltreich," pp. 38–41. Regarding the Indian section of the work, 'Umarī mentions at one point, in recording the testimony of Shaikh Mubārak, that when his informant left India Qubbat al-Islām (i.e. Daulatābād) was not yet completed, and that the shaikh had now been left six years (ed. Spies, text p. 8: 2f., trans. p. 29): Daulatābād was finished not long after 727/1327 (cf. supra, page 7 & note 37).

[131] Lech, op. cit., text p. 40: 15–20. In his translation (p. 118), Lech quite obscures the sense by rendering[bb] (text, line 19): "Die Inder waren mit ihren Fürsten uneins." The subject of this statement – as of the whole chapter – is the inhabitants of the Chaghatai khanate: the people of India are referred to here as[cc] (line 12).

scour the borders of India (with) their horses and to carry off (in) their torrents (its) wealth and (its) children, until there arose in India her present monarch (sultānuhu'l-āna). He made ready his hosts (dhail) for war, and fought with (jāhada) the enemy in every quarter. The people of this country (Māwarā' al-nahr) fell out with its rulers; and so they desisted (fa-inkaffūa), because of this monarch's might and (their own) dissensions (li-ba'as dhālika'l-sulṭān wa ikhtilāf dhāt al-bain).

The context of this passage is not without significance.[132] 'Umarī appears to be positing some sort of continuity between the struggle waged by the great Muslim conquerors – Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd of Ghazna – against the infidels of northern India, and the later raids by the heathen – and only recently Islamicised[133] – Mongols of Central Asia on the Muslim sultanate of Delhi: both alike are seen as phases in an age-old conflict between Hindūstān and Tūrān. And his emphasis is undoubtedly twofold: that the balance in this conflict had swung in favour of the Indian element only since Islam had become predominant in Hindūstān, and that this was a development most fully epitomised in the reign of the present sultan – that is, of Muḥammad Tughluq.

Now at last we are in a position more clearly to understand the reasons for Baranī's silence concerning Tarmashirin's invasion of Hindūstān early in Muḥammad's reign – and on certain other matters also – in the second recension of the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*. Were it not for the existence of an earlier version in which the invasion does receive notice, albeit briefly, it would have been possible to concur with Hodivala's view that its omission "must be due to carelessness or inadvertence."[134] Again, in the second recension the emphasis is on a thematic, rather than a chronological, treatment of Muḥammad's reign, and Tarmashirin's invasion might have proved difficult to accommodate within this new framework, or indeed to have had no relevance to it: such a possibility is at least supported by Baranī's own remarks, to the effect that he had not included in his survey of the reign every episode without exception.[135] But it is well known that Baranī held no brief for the sultan and,

---

[132] For the context of the above quotation, vide Lech, op. cit., text p. 39: 17ff., trans. pp. 117–8.

[133] The conversion of the Chaghatayid rulers is dated elsewhere by 'Umarī as "since 725"; Lech, op. cit., text p. 38: 12ff., trans. p. 117 (with 750 in error); trans. Quatremère, p. 235.

[134] S. H. Hodivala, "Studies in Indo-Muslim history," p. 362.

[135] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 468: 1–3. Remarks of this kind are absent in the first recension.

writing under his successor Fīrūz Shāh, was able to expose him without fear for his own safety.[136] And if he does not paint Muḥammad in the blackest of colours, he nevertheless betrays in general a greater concern to avoid elevating the good in men's characters at the expense of noticing the evil than the reverse error.[137] We may look, therefore, for a better reason for the omission than mere negligence.

It is more probable that Baranī suppressed in the final version of his work any mention of the invasion because its inclusion would have cast Muḥammad in a more favourable light. That this is so is suggested by two circumstances. Firstly, Muḥammad's tactics in the face of Tarmashirin's incursion reflect no discredit upon him. They were in fact identical with those adopted by 'Alā' al-dīn Khiljī during Taraghai's attack a quarter of a century previously. In describing 'Alā' al-dīn's conduct on that occasion, Baranī does not arraign him for cowardice: rather, he takes him to task for his unpreparedness to deal with what had become a regular threat of alarming proportions.[138] And secondly, he omits not simply Tarmashirin's invasion but all Muḥammad's dealings with the Mongols which were of a military character. Consequently, were Baranī our sole authority, we would be allowed to infer that the Mongol threat had ended with the reign of Ghiyāṡ al-dīn Tughluq[139] and had reappeared only in the reign of Fīrūz Shāh, to be suppressed then with a swiftness which evokes the historian's open admiration.[140] By neglecting to show that the Mongols still constituted a very real menace in Muḥammad's early years (as Tarmashirin's invasion revealed) Baranī is spared any obligation similarly to praise that

---

[136] Baranī's view of Muḥammad is admittedly a complex one. Cf. P. Hardy, "The Treatment of History by Ẓiyā' al-dīn Baranī in the 'Ta'rīkh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī,'" in "Historians of Medieval India," London 1960, pp. 20–39; Husain, "Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 124–5, 476–81, & 559–63; K. A. Nizami, "Ziya-ud-Din Barani," in "Historians of Medieval India" (ed. Mohibbul Hasan), New Delhi 1968, pp. 37–52.

[137] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 237: 21–238: 3.

[138] Ibid., pp. 300: 13–302: 7, for Baranī's account of Taraghai's invasion; his comments on 'Alā' al-dīn's unpreparedness are contained in p. 302: 7ff. Muḥammad could not be charged with the same fault, since the Mongol menace had receded, as Baranī himself admits (pp. 322–3).

[139] It is possibly significant that the Mongol raid which occurred in Ghiyāṡ al-dīn's reign (vide supra, section I) is in fact not mentioned at all in Baranī's first recension, which is an indication of its comparative unimportance.

[140] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 601: 3ff., where two apparently minor inroads are described.

monarch for taking the offensive against them. Finally, by giving only the barest hint that the Khurāsān project and the Qarāchīl expedition were a part of that offensive, he is enabled to depict them as nothing more than a drain on the exchequer, the conceptions of an extravagant and visionary nature.[141]

VII

In his treatment of Muḥammad's policy towards foreign visitors Baranī, as we have seen,[142] is likewise harshly critical of the sultan for inflicting a further strain upon an already depleted treasury. Yet again, however, it would appear that the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūz-shāhī* presents a picture which is misleading. That Muḥammad's generosity – at least towards dignitaries from the Chaghatai khanate – was at all connected with the Khurāsān project is a matter for considerable doubt:[143] the implication of the sources is that it was part of a consistent policy designed for quite a different object.

From an analysis of the notables of the Chaghatai khanate mentioned by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa as present at Muḥammad's court, it seems that the sultan's practice of welcoming guests from this part of the world, and of placing them in high office, dates roughly from the time of the Moroccan traveller's own arrival. A sizeable group of such visitors – Khudāvandzāda Qawwām al-dīn, qāḍī of Tirmid, and his brothers, along with Mubārakshāh, a notable of Samarqand, and the Turk Arun Bugha (probably Uzun Bugha) from Bukhārā – was presented to the sultan simultaneously with Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (trans. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 735 & 743–4). Of these, Qawwām al-dīn had preceded Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's party through the desert (p. 592), and when they reached Multān he was still there awaiting his brothers (p. 606).

[141] It may be objected to this entire hypothesis that 'Iṣāmī, who was no better disposed towards Muḥammad, shows no reluctance to describe the sultan's first Mongol campaign and even emphasises how he was turning the tables on the enemy (*Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. Husain, p. 410: 15–17; ed. Usha, p. 423: 14–16). But 'Iṣāmī safeguards himself by pointing to a radical change in Muḥammad's temperament two years later (ed. Husain, p. 411: 9f.; ed. Usha, p. 424: 10f.), before the move to Daulatābād.

[142] Supra, page 9.

[143] In the second recension (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 476), Baranī would have us believe that Muḥammad's generosity was intended to suborn the grandees in the regions he intended to conquer. But we find no such emphasis in the earlier version: here, if Baranī makes any connection at all, it is that these visitors encouraged such grandiose designs by their flattery; MS Elliot 353, foll. 199r: 14–199v: 6 & 200r: 12–19.

Their cousin, Khudāvandzāda Ghiyāṡ al-dīn, arrived with Ibn Battūta's own party (p. 743).[144] Again, it is clear from the narrative that "the preacher from Tirmid," Nāṣir al-dīn, reached India a year before Muḥammad left on the Ma'bar campaign (p. 675) – that is, about 734/1334 – and during his visit Ibn Battūta met him personally, as we read elsewhere (pp. 749 & 756). Nāṣir al-dīn was at court when the 'Abbāsid pretender Ghiyāṡ al-dīn Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-qāhir (known as Ibn al-khalīfat) first sent envoys to the sultan for permission to come to India from Māwarā' al-nahr (p. 679), and the implication is that Bahrām, the malik of Ghazna, who was tactlessly lodged in the town of Sīrī, belonging to his old enemy Ibn al-khalīfat, arrived even later (p. 682).[145] The entry into India, therefore, of all these grandees – along with that of the Ṣadr-i Jahān, qāḍī of Samarqand, who is explicitly said to have left Māwarā'al-nahr after Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and to have died en route at Multān (p. 569) – must be dated in or after 734.[146]

In spite of the sultan's strictness regarding the departure of foreign visitors, it is clear that a certain discretion was exercised on both sides of the border. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa says of Khudāvandzāda Ghiyāṡ al-dīn that "he frequently made the journey from his own country to visit the sultan" (p. 743); while his cousin the qāḍī was on his way to seek leave from Tarmashirin to go to India when the Moroccan traveller first met him (p. 571). Again, after the suppression of his revolt the rebel 'Alī Shāh Kar was exiled to Ghazna (p. 728),[147] a fact which Husain ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 256) takes to be conclusive evidence of Muḥammad's friendly relations with the Mongols. The chronology of this event,[148] however, only confirms

---

[144] Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. III, text p. 393; the relative pronoun appears to refer to Ghiyāṡ al-dīn rather than to his cousin the qāḍī.

[145] Husain's identification of Bahrām with Tarmashirin's amir Boroldai (Burunṭaih) is quite erroneous ("Tughluq Dynasty," note 2 on p. 137).

[146] Mention should be made at this point of the Grand Qāḍī of the empire, Kamāl al-dīn Muḥammad b. al-Burhān, of Ghazna, who appears, however, to have been an immigrant of the second generation and himself to have originated from Hānsī (Gibb, vol. III, p. 617). It is possible that our text is defective here, as Gibb points out (note 84 ibid.); but Baranī mentions both Kamāl al-dīn and his father (here called Burhān al-dīn) as receiving honours at the accession of Ghiyāṡ al-dīn Tughluq in 720/1320 (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 428: 10–13). Kamāl al-dīn is referred to also by 'Umarī: ed. Spies, text p. 16: 3, trans. p. 41; trans. Quatremère, p. 185.

[147] This is confirmed by Baranī (p. 489: 6f.).

[148] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 727) dates 'Alī Shāh's revolt after Muḥammad's defeat of the rebel 'Ain al-mulk and his return from Sargadvārī,

the verdict we have already reached – namely that all the evidence of peaceful exchanges between the Delhi sultan and the Chaghatai khanate dates at the earliest from the year of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's arrival in India; in other words, from the very last years of Tarmashirin, when the Khurāsān project had been abandoned for some time.

Moreover, although Baranī provides no chronological framework for Muḥammad's reign,[149] and his statements concerning the sultan's generosity to the Mongols occur at various points in the narrative, the emphasis appears to be that the court was inundated with Mongol grandees in the latter half of his reign rather than in the early years. This emerges from a comparison of three passages, the first of which reads:[150]

He (Muḥammad) used to give every year to malik Bahrām of the Ghaznīn a hundred *laks* of *tangas*, and to the qāḍī of the Ghaznīn he gave as much money and jewels as he had never before beheld. Neither in the whole extent of his reign did men of station and power . . ., who kept coming (from) Khurāsān, 'Irāq, Māwarā' al-nahr, Khwārizm, Sīstān, Harīv, Egypt and Damascus to the august court of Muḥammad Shāh in the hope of his generosity and bounty, go away loaded with (such) riches; nor towards the end of the sultan's reign did so many Mongols – amirs of *tümens* and of thousands, Mongol nobles, and the great ladies (khātūnān) and grandees of Moghulistān – keep arriving every year at the court of sultan Muḥammad Shāh, to do service (bi-bandagī va chākirī) in friendship and goodwill.

The second is more explicit:[151]

The second occupation of sultan Muḥammad during those few years in which he stayed in Delhi[152] consisted in favouring and rewarding the Mongols. Year after year at the onset of winter, numbers of amirs of *tümens* and of thousands, and princesses and princes of the blood (khā-

---

i.e. about 740–1/1339–41. Baranī says (p. 488: 15f.) that it occurred after Muḥammad had been at Sargadvārī "for some months." The move to Sargadvārī must have occurred shortly after 738/1337–1338, since Baranī has previously implied (p. 484: 19ff.) that it followed the campaign generally associated with the fall of Nagarkot. Nevertheless Haig ("Five Questions," p. 347) dates it "in the autumn of 1337." Husain ("Tughluq Dynasty," pp. 254 & 658) and Gibb (note 153 on p. 698) both place it in 1338.

[149] In fact, he disclaims any attempt to do so: *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 468: 3 & 478: 14ff.

[150] Ibid., pp. 461: 19–462: 7. Cf. MS Elliot 353, foll. 187v: 19–188r: 5, where this passage is much abbreviated.

[151] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 499: 8–14.

[152] Cf. ibid., pp. 497: 22ff. & 498: 3f. The years referred to fell between the sultan's return from Sargadvārī and his departure on campaign in ramaḍān 745/Jan.–Feb. 1345 (ibid., pp. 507: 16f. & 509: 4, 14f.).

tūnān va ughlīān) kept arriving . . . For two or three months (each year) the sultan was engaged in nothing but granting favours and rewards.

The implication is that these events must be assigned to Muḥammad's later years. Both Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad and Budā'unī place the arrival of the "Khurāsānians" under one year – 744/1343–4 –, even though on their faulty chronology the sultan was then residing, or about to reside, at Sargadvārī.[153] They were led to do so, presumably, by Baranī's third passage on the Mongols, in which he describes how Muḥammad, in welcoming them, made great play of his decree of investiture from the Caliph:[154]

He (Muḥammad) gave orders that whatsoever captains (umarā') and amirs of *tümens* of Moghulistān and Khurāsān entered the service of sultan Muḥammad should be commanded to do homage with the diploma (manshūr) of the Amīr al-mu'minīn. A Qur'ān, the (mashāriq) and the diploma of the Amīr al-mu'minīn were brought forth, and they were made to do homage, and written undertakings and agreements (khuṭūṭ va 'uhūd va mavāṡīq) were obtained (from them). From as many princes (ughlīān), amirs of thousands and of hundreds, Mongol grandees and their great ladies as came to the sultan's court, was first obtained an act of fealty (bai'at-nāma) in the name of the Amīr al-mu'minīn, (and) then *laks* and *kurors* were lavished upon them.

This – and the fact that Baranī nowhere stigmatises the sultan's Mongol guests as infidels – is highly significant. Such a practice would have had little to commend it had the newcomers not been

---

[153] *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 107: 13ff. *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. I, p. 232: 7ff.

[154] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, pp. 494: 21–495: 7. We are told specifically of two messages to Muḥammad from the Caliph (for their relations in the 730's, cf. supra, note 74). Ibn Baṭṭūṭa describes how Shaikh Sa'īd al-Hindī gratuitously secured for the sultan a letter from the Caliph Abu'l-'Abbās al-Ḥākim appointing him his delegate in India; tr. Gibb, vol. I, pp. 225–7. Baranī, calling him Ḥājjī Sa'īd Ṣarṣarī, records his arrival in 744/1343–4 (*Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 492: 9f.). Muḥammad had also sent to Cairo an accredited envoy, Shaikh Rajab al-Burqu'ī: Maqrīzī notices the embassy's arrival there under muḥarram 744/May–June 1343 (*Al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Ziada, vol. II, part 3, Cairo 1958, p. 645: 2–8). Rajab's return, along with the Egyptian Grand Shaikh Rukn al-dīn, is described both by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Gibb, vol. I, pp. 227–8, & vol. III, p. 674) and by Baranī, who dates it two years after that of Ṣarṣarī (p. 494: 4ff.). The chronogram given for Rajab's arrival by Badr-i Chāchī (lithog. ed. & comm. M. 'U. Khan, Rampur 1872–3, vol. I, pp. 245–6) supplies a date variously rendered as 745 or 746; cf. Moinul Haq, "Barani's history of the Tughluqs," JPHS VII, p. 135 & note 2 ibid. It is clear from his subsequent remarks (p. 495: 7ff.) that in the above-quoted passage Baranī is speaking of Rajab's mission and the diploma brought by Shaikh Rukn al-dīn.

Muslims. It is very probable that whereas earlier Mongol visitors had come simply in the hope of making a fortune and of then returning to Māwarā' al-nahr, this later influx consisted of refugees, fleeing from the upheavals of the decade which followed Tarmashirin's overthrow. We know from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa that Tarmashirin's son, with his sister and her husband, had sought asylum with Muḥammad on the khan's martyrdom;[155] and since the accession of the Chaghatai khan Changshī in 1336 there had been a reaction against the Islamicising tendencies of the preceding years.[156] From this the reign of the Muslim 'Alī Sultān (circa 741/1340) offered in all probability only a brief respite.[157] If refugees from Māwarā' al-nahr were still arriving after Muḥammad had received the Caliph's diploma, they must have been escaping from the rule of Qazan (circa 743/1343–747/1346), whom the sources depict as an oppressive tyrant and who is not known for certain to have been a Muslim.[158] His victorious rival, the amir Qazaghan, who controlled the affairs of the khanate from 747/1346 to 759/1358, was undoubtedly a Muslim,[159] and it was he who furnished Muḥammad Tughluq with a force of Mongol auxiliaries for his final campaign in Gujarāt and Sind in 751/1350–1.[160]

---

[155] Tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 562 & 564. He calls the khan's son-in-law Fīrūz, whereas the name given by Baranī (p. 533) is Naurūz.

[156] Natanzī, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu'īnī*, ed. J. Aubin, Tehran 1957/1336s., p. 112. *Zail-i Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, MS Or. 2885, fol. 422r: 4f. Cf. also V. V. Bartol'd, "Four Studies on the History of Central Asia" (trans. V. Minorsky), vol. I, Leyden 1956, pp. 135–6. The date of Changshī's accession is to be found in a funerary inscription edited by Ch. Dzhumagulov: "Die syrisch-türkischen (nestorianischen) Denkmäler in Kirgisien," MIOF XIV (1968), p. 478. On the khan's name, cf. P. Pelliot & L. Hambis, "Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan," vol. I, Leyden 1951, pp. 91–5.

[157] And even Muslim authors describe him as a tyrant: *Ẓafar-nāma*, muqaddima, MSS Add. 6538, foll. 99v: 17–100r: 3, & Add. 18406, fol. 65v: 17ff. Cf. Bartol'd, op. cit., p. 136.

[158] Qazan's father Yasa'ur had been a convert to Islam (Kāshānī, ed. Hambly, p. 213: 18), but he himself had been captured on his father's death in 720/1320 by the troops of the heathen Chaghatai khan Köpek; *Zail-i Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, MS Or. 2885, foll. 404v: 21–405r: 1; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, ed. Bayani, text vol. I, p. 113. On Qazan's reign, cf. *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, pp. 27–8; Bartol'd, op. cit., pp. 53 & 137.

[159] His murder is uniformly described in terms of martyrdom by the sources: *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu'īnī*, p. 203: 7; Niẓām-i Shāmī, ed. Tauer, text vol. I, p. 15: 2f.; *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, p. 39: 4.

[160] Baranī, pp. 524: 3f. & 533: 6ff. *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 117: 9ff. *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. I, p. 240: 15ff.

It appears very likely, therefore, that the sultan's court had become a natural asylum for those Muslim notables of Māwarā' al-nahr – Mongols and non-Mongols alike – who sought to escape from the hostility of Tarmashirin's heathen successors. For Muḥammad, this represented the culmination of a policy which is discernible at least from the abandonment of his plans for trans-Indus conquests: one of building up an aristocracy of foreign extraction, bound to him by ties of personal loyalty and by fear of the Indian Muslims. The main precedent for such a policy in regard to the Mongols was far from auspicious. Large numbers of Mongol troops, with their families, had settled in the empire after the invasion of 691/1292 during the reign of Jalāl al-dīn Khiljī, but these so-called "neo-Muslims" had been massacred by 'Alā' al-dīn on the discovery of a plot by certain of them to assassinate him.[161] During Muḥammad's own lifetime, certainly, his policy seems on the whole to have been successful. We know of only one revolt on the part of a Mongol feudatory – that of Hülechü, whom he had appointed commander at Lahore. This rising, which occurred during the sultan's absence on the Ma'bar campaign, was crushed by the wazir Khwāja Jahān with a force that included, significantly enough, a regiment of "Khurāsānians".[162] The ill effects of the policy stemmed, it seems, less from the unreliability of the foreigners themselves than from the reaction of the native Turkish and Indian aristocracy, whose opposition to such preferment was no doubt one of the reasons for the whole series of provincial revolts lasting from about 734/1334 until Muḥammad's death.[163]

When Muḥammad died at Tatta in muḥarram 752/March 1351, the recently arrived Mongol auxiliaries from Māwarā' al-nahr mutinied and were joined by not a few of their compatriots who had been domiciled in India for a longer period, all returning to their

---

[161] Lal, "History of the Khaljis," 2nd ed., pp. 262–3. On their initially taking service with the sultan, vide Baranī, p. 219: 12ff.

[162] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (tr. Gibb, vol. III, pp. 716–7) calls the rebel Hulājūn; Defrémery & Sanguinetti, vol. III, text p. 332: dd. Husain ("Tughluq Dynasty," p. 245), apparently following Haig, sees this as a variant form of Hülegü. It is more probably, however, the same name as that borne by Hülegü Khan's seventh son; cf. *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, vol. III, ed. A. A. Alizade, Baku 1957, index sub ee. Baranī refers to this revolt only briefly (p. 481: 4f.), without giving the leader's name, but he is mentioned by 'Iṣāmī (ed. Husain, p. 451; ed. Usha, p. 471). Khwāja Jahān's regiment appears to have contained a notable proportion of foreigners; cf. Gibb, op. cit., vol. III, p. 724.

[163] Supra, page 9 & note 56.

homeland; among them was Tarmashirin's son-in-law, Naurūz Küregen.[164] One of the new sovereign's first acts was to reverse his predecessor's policy towards foreign notables, dismissing – as Baranī informs us with ill-concealed relish – those who had come from as far away as Egypt and had frequented the late sultan's court in the expectation of some favour.[165] Nevertheless, some of the Mongol nobility did remain in the service of Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq – Baranī notices in particular Qītbugha and Aḥmad-i Iqbāl –;[166] while it appears that certain of the non-Mongol element among the immigrants from Māwarā' al-nahr also supported the new monarch against the mutineers and were consequently rewarded.[167]

VIII

As regards, then, the security of Hindūstān's north-western frontier from attack, Muḥammad's failure, due to the Qarāchīl disaster, to maintain his offensive against the Mongols was offset by two factors: the disintegration of the central authority in Māwarā' al-nahr which had itself of late come to assume direction of the Mongol pressure on India, and the sultan's own policy of absorbing peacefully Mongol chieftains who might otherwise have been active in local operations against his frontiers. The abandon-

---

[164] Baranī, pp. 533–7. On Naurūz, cf. supra, note 155. The account in the *Maḷṭa' al-sa'dain* of 'Abd al-razzāq al-Samarqandī (MS British Museum, Add. 17928, foll. 86r: 20–87r: 10), which is derived in the first instance from Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's *Zubdat al-tawārīkh* (cf. the description of the Istanbul MS Fatiḥ 4371 by Tauer: "Analyse des matières de la première moitié du Zubdatu-t-tawārīḫ de Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū," in "Charisteria Orientalia," Prague 1956, p. 352, sub anno 752), is remarkably similar to Baranī's narrative.

[165] *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, p. 538: 1–4.

[166] Ibid., pp. 584–5. Qītbugha's name, which appears as[ff] in the *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī* (p. 122: 14), is presumably identical with that of the celebrated Mongol general at 'Ain Jālūt in 1260. But elsewhere in Baranī (pp. 527: 12 & 544: 17) he figures as[gg]. This would represent[hh] – "bag, pouch, purse" (F.D.Lessing, "Mongolian-English Dictionary," Berkeley-Los Angeles 1960, p. 899: xabtara). Aḥmad's father was probably the Iqbāl who invaded Hindūstān in 'Alā' al-dīn's reign; cf. Amīr Khusrau, *Khazā'in al-futūḥ*, ed. M. W. Mirza, Calcutta 1953, pp. 43–5; Baranī, p. 322: 7–12; also Lal, op. cit., pp. 146–9.

[167] Khudāvandzāda Qawwām al-dīn, having held the rank of *nā'ib-i vakildar* under Muḥammad (Baranī, p. 454: 17), was promoted to that of *vakildar* by Fīrūz Shāh; ibid., p. 580: 13f.; *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 124: 7f. Malik Bahrām of the Ghaznīn was decorated for his services after the rout of the Mongol auxiliaries (ibid., p. 119: 8).

ment of his plans for conquering the trans-Indus regions, however, had its consequences over the ensuing decades for Afghanistān also.

It ensured that the Mongol amirs of Māwarā' al-nahr retained control of the territories south of the Āmūya even during the chaotic period following Tarmashirin's death. In this the simultaneous decline of the power of the Īlkhāns in Iran undoubtedly played some part. But the Persian Mongols had not constituted a positive threat in eastern Khurāsān since the second decade of the century, when Öljeitü had first put his own client in command of the Negüderi Mongols of the Ghaznīn region[168] and had then established the renegade Chaghatayid prince Yasa'ur in the Āmūya borderlands.[169] Subsequently, the Chaghatai khans had reasserted over these regions an ascendancy which had been only briefly disturbed by the Īlkhān's forces in 726/1326.[170] Now, with the collapse of Muḥammad's ambitions of conquest in Afghanistān, the Mongol amirs were secure from every quarter. An attempt by the Chaghatai khan Qazan, under whom the central power enjoyed a temporary resurgence, to overthrow the chief of them, Qazaghan, ended in the khan's defeat and death in 747/1346.[171] During the paramountcy of Qazaghan, whose summer quarters were at Mūnk in Khuttalān and whose winter residence was Sālī Sarāī on the Āmūya,[172] the

---

[168] Kāshānī, ed. Hambly, pp. 152–3 & 201–2. Saifī, *Tārīkh-nāma-yi Herāt*, ed. M. Z. Siddiqi, Calcutta 1944, pp. 595–8. René Grousset, "L'Empire des Steppes," Paris 1939, p. 413.

[169] Kāshānī, pp. 218–9. Saifī, pp. 640–5. Vaṣṣāf, lithog. ed. Bombay, pp. 613: 11–614: 3. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, ed. Bayani, text vol. I, pp. 61–5 & 67–8. Spuler, "Die Mongolen in Iran," 2nd ed., pp. 115–6. Grousset, op. cit., pp. 413–4.

[170] Supra, page 7. The Ghaznīn had assumed some importance under Tarmashirin, in whose reign it was ruled by "the chief of his amīrs and his close confidant," Boroldai (Gibb, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 561 & 589): his jurisdiction extended as far north as Qunduz (ibid., pp. 585–6). We are told nothing of Boroldai's fate, but when in 759/1358 Qazaghan refused to bestow Boroldai's *ulus* on the latter's son Qutlugh Temür, the disgruntled claimant killed him, only to be slain himself by Qazaghan's supporters; *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, pp. 38: 20–39: 9 (the text is defective: MS Add. 6538, fol. 110v: 6, calls Qutlugh Temür explicitly[ii]); cf. also Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's *Zubdat al-tawārīkh* in Tauer, "Histoire des conquêtes de Tamerlan," vol. II, commentary, p. 11: 1–10.

[171] Vide especially Natanzī, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu'īnī*, ed. Aubin, p. 116: 8ff.

[172] *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, p. 38: 12ff.; Niẓām-i Shāmī, ed. Tauer, text vol. I, p. 14: 28. Cf. *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu'īnī*, pp. 197 & 200: here Qazaghan is said (p. 197: 5) to be of the Qaraunas (jj), and his sons are described (p. 197: 17f.) as fleeing on his death to Kābul and the Ghaznīn. Certainly we

Mongols of Māwarā' al-nahr once more turned their attention to the regions lying south of the river: not now towards Hindūstān – since the amir was, as we have seen, on friendly terms with Muḥammad –, but towards eastern Khurāsān, where in 752/1351–2 an expedition led by Qazaghan himself reduced to vassalage the malik of Herāt, Mu'izz al-dīn Ḥusain Kurt.[173] This victory has not received the attention it deserves. It was obtained not over some moribund and effete power, but over a dynasty whose city had defied numerous attacks by Īlkhāns and Chaghatayids alike,[174] and whose growing strength and independence had recently found expression in an invasion of Sīstān, in the defeat of the Sarbadārs, and in the assumption of the full insignia of royalty.[175] It signifies that at this

find his grandson Ḥusain (later Tīmūr's chief rival) at Kābul in 761/1360 when he headed the revolt against the amir Buyan Süldüs (*Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, p. 48: 20). All this suggests that the family's power base was in this region. On Mūnk, the later Baljuan, vide Bartol'd, "Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion" (tr. Gibb), new ed. London 1968, p. 69.

[173] *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, pp. 32–6. Tauer, "Cinq Opuscules de Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū," Prague 1959 (Archiv Orientální, Supplementa V), text pp. 38–43. It appears that Qazaghan permitted raids on Hindūstān after the death of his ally Muḥammad Tughluq: Baranī, p. 601; *Tārīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, p. 127: 1ff. (where a Mongol raid on Dēōpālpūr in 759/1358 is reported).

[174] A list of the various attempts on Herāt over the preceding hundred years recorded by Saifī is to be found in I. P. Petrushevskiy, "Trud Seyfi, kak istochnik po istorii Vostochnogo Khorasana" (in "Trudy Yuzhno-turkmenistanskoy arkheologicheskoy kompleksnoy ekspeditsii," vol. V, Ashkhabad 1955), pp. 140–2.

[175] *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, pp. 30–2. Tauer, "Cinq Opuscules," text p. 37: 13ff., where Ḥusain's assumption of the insignia of royalty is dated immediately after his victory over the Sarbadārs in 743/1342. The Sīstān campaign had occurred in 734/1333–4 (*Iḥyā' al-mulūk*, ed. M. Sutuda, Tehran 1966/1344s., p. 95): it had resulted in compromise, but its significance lies in the fact that no previous attempt on the part of the Kurt maliks to expand into Sīstān is recorded since the 650's (cf. Saifī, pp. 233–43, & *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, ed. M. Sh. Bahar, Tehran 1935/1314s., pp. 398–9). Malik Ḥusain's more successful offensives against the Mongol amirs of the Arulat and the Apardi, south of the Āmūya, were the immediate cause of Qazaghan's intervention; *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, p. 32: 2f.; Tauer, "Cinq Opuscules," text p. 38. On the growth in the dynasty's authority over Khurāsān since the fall of the Chaghatayid prince Yasa'ur, vide Saifī, pp. 737–9, 742–6, 754–65, & 771–3.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's assertion (tr. Gibb, vol. III, p. 580) that malik Ḥusain had become a vassal of the Delhi sultan – at some point during the later 740's, from the context, since this allegedly occurred after the death of Ḥusain's relative, malik Varnā (cf. note 159 ibid.) – is not confirmed elsewhere, and runs counter to all our other evidence concerning the dynasty's fortunes in these years. It may well be based on a misunderstanding of formalities – e.g. of the use of Muḥammad's name in the *khuṭba* at Herāt, possibly: for an example of such confusion, vide D. Ayalon in "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khān. A Re-examination (C[1])," SI XXXVI (1972), pp. 137ff.

time the expansionist tendencies of the Mongols of Māwarā' al-nahr were at their height.

When the effort was made after Qazaghan's death to contain these tendencies, it was neither from Iran nor from India, but from the east – from the so-called Jata Mongols – that the challenge came. Their khan Tughluq Temür (died 765/1364) overran, in the course of his second invasion, the territory as far south as the passes of the Hindū Kush, where he spent the spring and summer of 762/1361.[176] He was nevertheless unable to establish any permanent hegemony over the amirs of Māwarā' al-nahr, one of whom, Tīmūr, was thereby granted the opportunity to build up his own authority in this region over the next decade, and to begin a career of conquest in which the rulers of Jata, the various successors of the Īlkhāns in Iran, and the Tughluqid sultan of Delhi were alike subjected to humiliating defeat.

Additional Note [2009]

Since publishing this article, I have discovered a brief allusion by the contemporary Syrian author Ibn al-Jazarī (d. 738/1338), *Ḥawādith al-zamān*, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut, 1419/1998, 3 vols), II, p. 377, to a Mongol invasion of Muḥammad's dominions early in 730 (began 25 Oct. 1329). This clearly furnishes additional evidence for the authenticity of Tarmashirin's attack.

The Sultan's name, both in the title and throughout the body of the article, should read 'Muḥammad bin Tughluq'. I have also revised the date of his accession to 724/1324: see Jackson, *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History* (Cambridge, 1999), Appendix V, pp. 330–31.

Abbreviations used:

CAJ = Central Asiatic Journal
GJ = Geographical Journal
IA = Indian Antiquary
IC = Islamic Culture
IHQ = Indian Historical Quarterly
JA = Journal Asiatique
JAS = Journal of the Asiatic Society
JPHS = Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
MIOF = Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung
SI = Studia Islamica
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft

[176] Niẓām-i Shāmī, ed. Tauer, text vol. I, p. 19: 1f.; cf. also Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's emendations in vol. II, commentary p. 15: 6f. *Ẓafar-nāma*, vol. I, p. 59: 10ff.

[a] سلطان را با ترمه شیرین هم جندان تبعی و اعانی نکرد

[b] ججر

[c] مجیر

[d] حاکم

[e] طاری مَا سَرین

[f] مُصالح

[g] باشاسی

[h] خرق حشم مستقیم شد.

[i] بسیاری از حشم مستقیم گشته

[j] چون سلطان محمّد را از علو همّت که بدان مجهول بود هواء ضبط کردن و گرفتن اقالیم بالا دست در سر افتاد خواست که از شهر تا غزنین بی عدد مال خرج کند

[k] اقالیم بالا

[l] سمهل

[m] وَرَنگل & جِدْیَة

[n] نُکبیة

[o] نیکپی

[p] उलुच

[q] ذولجو or دولجو

[r] زلجو and ذلجو , دلجو

[s] برسل and برسل

[t] सुन्धपुर

[u] ऋचल

[v] اوردن

[w] اوردل

[x] ذلجی

[y] زلجی

[z] زلاجی

[aa] زلاجی

[bb] و اختلفت کلمة اهل هذه البلاد علی ملوکها

[cc] سکّان الهند

[dd] هلاجون

[ee] هولاجو

[ff] کتبغه

[gg] قبتغه

[hh] بسهمقمر

[ii] پسر بورلدای

[jj] قراغوناس

[kk] ۷۳۱

XII

DELHI:
The Problem of a Vast Military Encampment

The Sultanate of Delhi, properly so called, dates from the reign of Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (A.D. 1211–36). When the last great Ghurid ruler Muizz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām was murdered in 1206 and his empire began to disintegrate, it was at Lahore—traditionally the administrative centre of the Indian provinces under both the Ghaznawid and the Ghurid dynasties—that his Turkish slave lieutenant Aybeg assumed the canopy of state; and there too that he died four years later.[1] For Fakhr-i Mudabbir, who wrote during Aybeg's reign, Lahore was still the capital of Muslim India[2]; and only through the action of Iltutmish, Aybeg's governor at Budaon, who seized power in a *coup* at Delhi following his master's death, did this freshly conquered Hindu city become a Muslim capital. That it remained so was due to a combination of circumstances. Firstly, several years elapsed before Iltutmish was able definitively to occupy Lahore and the western Punjab.[3] And secondly, his annexation of Bengal in 1230–1 secured him the status of Islam's sole protagonist in the subcontinent, the ruler of an empire which both extended much further to the east than that of Aybeg or the Ghurids and also was facing a considerably greater threat on its north-west flank. In view of the growing pressure of the Mongols beyond the Indus, the ideal centre of the infant Indo-Muslim polity was not Lahore but Delhi; a circumstance incidentally emphasised by the Mongols themselves when they took and sacked Lahore in 1241. This was their first attack on the territory of the Sultanate itself. Thereafter they are known to have invaded the Punjab and on occasions even Hindūstān, in 1245–6, 1257–8, 1285, 1287, 1292, 1297–8, 1299–300, 1303, 1305, *c.* 1306, *c.* 1322 and *c.* 1329.[3a]

Mongol pressure contributed in a more positive fashion, however, to Delhi's primacy. The city fast became the natural refuge for those

in Khurāsān and Central Asia—whether bureaucrats, soldiers, scholars, or mystics—who fled from the Mongol terror; and Iltutmish, at least, followed a policy of actively encouraging them to settle in his capital.[4] Delhi's growth during the thirteenth century is largely attributable to this influx, which was swollen, after the outbreak of civil war within the Mongol empire around 1261, by groups of Mongol fugitives also.[5] By the 1290s Delhi's suburbs sprawled along the banks of the Yamuna, where the quarters of Indrapat, Kīlōkhrī (attested as early as 1237 and described in 1260 as 'the new town'[6]), Ghiyāthpūr and Talūka were at this time receiving a further body of Mongol settlers who had entered the service of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī.[7]

We possess no statistics for the population of Delhi in the Middle Ages, and the details that have come down to us are all derived from foreign observers of the fourteenth century. The Moroccan Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who resided in the city for much of the period 1333–42, has left us his testimony as to its vast extent and population.[8] Roughly contemporaneous were the informants of the Egyptian encyclopaedist al-Umarī (d. 1349), who credits Delhi with a circumference of forty miles.[9] It contained, he was told, seventy hospitals and a thousand *madrasas*;[10] though the latter figure is surely exaggerated, and more reliance may be placed on the number sixty or seventy furnished by another Egyptian contemporary, al-Mufaḍḍal.[11] Delhi clearly struck the imagination of all its visitors; and it is not surprising that the Indian historian Baranī (wrote *c.* 1357), who regrettably lacks the precision of these external observers, equates it with Cairo and Baghdad.[12] By this time, moreover, a century of Mongol invasions had thrown into relief the city's function of being not simply an administrative capital and a commercial metropolis, but a vast armed camp. The origins of this development are to be found during the reign of Sultan Alā al-Dīn Khaljī (1296–1316).

The first Mongol invasions of the Sultanate's territory had not penetrated further than the western Punjab, where by the reign of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (1266–86) the frontier appears to have lain along the river Bēās.[13] The Mongol raids of Balban's era were the work of an independent grouping known as the Negüderis or Qaraunas, based locally in what is now Afghanistan.[14] Towards the end of the century, however, they were brought under the control of the great Central Asian Khanate headed by Qaidu and Dua,[15] resulting in a sudden increase in Mongol striking power.

From Alā al-Dīn's reign, the entire Dōāb, and even territory beyond the Ganga, lay within range of the Mongols' depredations. In 1299–1300 Dua's son Qutlugh Qocha invaded India and moved directly on Delhi, abandoning the usual practice of ravaging the country en route, and advancing by forced marches in order to gain the maximum advantage from a surprise blow.[16] He was checked only at Kīlī, a locality which is now unknown but which appears to have lain not far south of Sāmāna.[17] The Mongol prince died on the return march,[18] but in 1303 his lieutenant Taraghai advanced to the very outskirts of Delhi and subjected the city to a two-month investment.[19] A subsequent inroad by two Mongol generals Alī Beg and Tartaq in 1305 avoided the capital itself, but ravaged large tracts to the north and east, including Budaon and Avadh, and was defeated in the vicinity of Amrōha.[20] After this, there appear to have been no major invasions until the time of Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq (1325–51), when the Central Asian ruler Tarmashirin, a younger son and successor of Dua, swept across the Dōāb and devastated the territory at least as far as Mīrath (Meerut).[21] Baranī attributes the respite gained after about 1306 to the efficacy of Alā al-Dīn's military and administrative reorganization,[22] when in fact the Mongols' own internal dissensions must have been at least equally responsible, just as they were again to prevent further invasions after that of Tarmashirin for the remainder of Muḥammad b. Tughluq's reign.[23] The importance of Alā al-Dīn's measures for us lies elsewhere, in their contribution to the increasingly militaristic character of the Sultanate and more particularly in their effect upon the status of Delhi.

The manpower of India had long been proverbial throughout Western Asia;[24] and the Delhi Sultans inherited the aggregate capacity of a number of major Hindu potentates to put enormous armies into the field. When the envoys of the Mongol prince Hülegü visited Delhi in 1260, Ulugh Khān—the future Sultan Balban—took pains to overawe them by staging a review of some 200,000 foot and 50,000 horse.[25] How far these represented principally the entire forces stationed in and around the capital, and to what extent Balban had been obliged to draw on levies from the *iqṭās*, we cannot say: Jūzjānī describes the troops as being brought both 'from the provinces and from about the vicinity of the court' (*az aṭrāf wa ḥawālī-yi ḥaḍrat-i alā*). Subsequently, Balban was able to review an army of 200,000 men at Avadh, on his way to crush a revolt in Bengal.[26] Alā al-Dīn's reign appears to have witnessed a considerable increase in the military

establishment.[27] Iranian sources at the beginning of the fourteenth century report that his forces stood at more than 300,000;[28] while two decades later the current size of the Delhi army is given as 475,000.[29] Under Muḥammad b. Tughluq, who is alleged to have built up an unprecedentedly large force within a very short space for his so-called Khurāsān project,[30] the figures which reached the West are even more impressive. Iranian authors supply no details of the Sultanate's military establishment for this period, and we are dependent on Arabic writers who clearly benefited from the opening up of diplomatic relations between Egypt and India around 1330. Umarī was told that Muḥammad's troops in the capital and the provinces totalled 900,000.[31] The slightly later author al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363), however, who reproduces this figure on the authority of an official envoy from Muḥammad to the Mamlūk Sultan al-Nāṣir, is sceptical, adding that the true number is reputed to be nearer 600,000.[32] The figure of forty lakhs (four million) for the infantry given, finally, by Mufaḍḍal is doubtless due to a confusion of units and should doubtless stand at 400,000: his 300,000 for the horsemen would then produce a total of 700,000, which harmonizes more closely with the testimony of other sources.[33] In these circumstances, Baranī's details concerning the force of 470,000 destined for the Khurāsān project[34] clearly apply to a specially raised contingent which was distinct from the provincial levies:[35] such a temporary increase may well account for the extraordinarily high figure of 900,000 which Ṣafadī rejected.

The priority given to the maintenance of such vast armies entailed certain consequences. If the troops were to be paid regularly, the Sultan required a considerable revenue; and furthermore they had to be kept occupied and in training.[36] One way in which the latter aim was accomplished was through hunting expeditions in which large army detachments participated,[37] a practice which may even have been inspired by the Mongol example.[38] But the most effective means whereby these enormous armies could be both raised and kept active was undoubtedly regular campaigning against the Hindus. The Mongol threat appears in some sense to have reversed the order of priorities within the framework of military policy. In its early years the Sultanate's chief task had been one of maintaining the offensive against the infidel powers of the subcontinent. But as far back as 1247 Jūzjānī portrays Ulugh Ḵẖān Balban as advocating a policy of raiding Hindu territory not merely in order to chastise the idolator but to amass booty which could then be used to maintain a defensive army

in the face of Mongol attacks from the north.[39] The fact that Jūzjānī wrote as a contemporary, and still more his proximity to Balban, make it very likely that these words indicate the adoption of a conscious policy on the part of Delhi's rulers following the intensification of Mongol pressure after 1240. The passage contrasts sharply with the more simplistic statement of Baranī, who represents Balban, when Sultan, as refusing to launch campaigns against the Hindus as long as the Mongol menace persisted.[40] And we have good reason to distrust him again when he describes how Taraghai's great invasion of 1303 induced Alā al-Dīn to give up 'campaigning and taking fortresses' (*laṣḫkar-kaṣḫī wa ḥiṣār-gīrī*).[41] On Baranī's own admission, this was simply not the case. Even were we to disregard the expeditions which Alā al-Dīn personally led against Sevāna (1308) and Jālōr (*c.* 1311), and to which Baranī makes only the briefest reference,[42] the notice he gives of Malik Kāfūr's campaign in the south would alone demonstrate that the above statement is worthless. A certain amount of successful—and lucrative—military activity against the independent Hindu states, far from being a drain on the Sultanate's resources and an irrelevant distraction to its rulers, was a vital factor in its strategy for survival. The real problems arose only when plundering campaigns were abandoned in favour of outright annexation, a development which was accelerated from 1318.[43] Launching regular attacks upon enemy territory in order largely to finance a sizeable standing army for defence elsewhere was one matter; it was quite another to maintain garrisons and a civil administration in a conquered province, with all the additional expense involved.[44] Newly acquired provinces, moreover, could not be treated in the same rapacious manner that characterizes warfare in enemy country. With the imposition of direct rule over vast new regions in the south, therefore, the Delhi Sultans effectively suffered a loss which was twofold. In all likelihood, it was to be one of the factors underlying the economic difficulties of Muḥammad b. Tughluq's reign.

The mere accumulation of vast stocks of specie in the Sultan's treasury, however, was in itself insufficient. Like any other large city, Delhi suffered periodically from famine brought on by crop failure in its hinterland,[45] on which it was increasingly dependent. Balban at least had laid up stores of rice and millet in the capital in order to meet such emergencies;[46] but in a real crisis they can scarcely have proved adequate. Significantly, prior to Tīmūr's invasion in 1398 the Mongol attack which came nearest to success was that of

Taraghai, who secured the Yamuna crossings and so cut the city's supply lines:[47] Muḥammad b. Tughluq was to profit from this lesson to maintain communications with the eastern provinces during Tarmashirin's invasion by establishing his headquarters at Indrapat.[48] But even at times of comparative peace, a large standing army—particularly when a significant proportion of it was quartered in the capital and its environs—necessitated regular supplies of foodstuffs and clothing materials at low prices. Alā al-Dīn, again, is the first monarch known to have enacted economic measures specifically for the sake of the military establishment. The entire Dōāb region, together with the provinces of Amrōha and Kābar immediately east of the Ganga, was resumed from the existing grantees and brought into the category of state land (*khāliṣa*), and the whole of the revenue demand (*maḥṣūl*) earmarked for the upkeep of the troops and of the state industries (*kārkhānahā*).[49] The *kharāj* of the Dōāb was to be paid, moreover, in grain rather than in cash as previously;[50] and Baranī tells us at another point that the level was fixed at half the produce—in other words, at the maximum allowed according to the Ḥanifite school.[51] We cannot discount the possibility that the Sultan's vigorous campaign against the manufacture and consumption of wine and drugs, the success of which would entail a loss of revenue,[52] was in part designed to encourage concentration within the agrarian sector on cereal production.[53] However this may be, Alā al-Dīn appears, by dint of increasing the capacity of the state granaries and of giving Delhi a virtual monopoly on the purchase of vital commodities other than grain, to have ensured low prices for the capital, and hence for the army, during the remainder of his reign.[54]

One of the effects of Alā al-Dīn's policies had been to reduce, to a large extent, the power of intermediaries between the central government and the cultivators. But his policies were abandoned under his immediate successors. His son Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārak Khaljī (1316–20) reduced the *kharāj*, allowed prices to rise once more, and was obliged in consequence to increase the pay of the troops;[55] while in addition some of the lands resumed under Alā al-Dīn were again alienated.[56] And although Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (1320–25) instituted inquiries into certain of these grants,[57] his reign appears on balance to have witnessed concessions to the nobility and a corresponding curtailment of royal power in relation to the peasants.[58] It is against the background of these two developments—a contraction in the state's resources and an erosion of its effective control over what

remained—that we must view the economic measures of Muḥammad b. Tughluq, who was obliged to interfere with the existing land-revenue system in the Dōāb in order to support the rapid expansion of his military establishment.

The exact proportions of the increase in the demand are obscure. Baranī's vague phraseology, suggesting either a five to ten per cent increase or one of ten- to twenty-fold, was dismissed by Moreland as a mere rhetorical device.[59] Certainly, any increase in the *ḵẖarāj*, following so soon on Tarmaṣẖirin's devastation of the province,[60] would have provoked severe discontent, even had the level of taxation been less harsh than the fifty per cent demanded under Alā al-Dīn. But there are two points worth noticing. Firstly, Baranī's earlier recension (which is even vaguer, incidentally, regarding the size of the increase) demonstrates that what the Dōāb cultivators found particularly irksome was that they were being asked to pay at least a part of the new assessment in cash[61] (rather than the whole in kind as under Alā al-Dīn). And secondly, his phrasing elsewhere suggests that we are here dealing with an increase not only in the *ḵẖarāj* but also in the *jizya*, which had now evidently ceased to be a simple poll-tax and was assessed on income.[62] Possibly these two circumstances help to account for the violent reaction of the Dōāb's inhabitants; but we cannot be certain. If, however, the nature of the new requisitions has caused confusion, greater still has been that surrounding the context of the increase. Only Moreland attempted to place the Dōāb assessment in the context of Muḥammad's other measures, and his analysis was based on a misunderstanding. In linking it—correctly—with the so-called transfer of capital from Delhi to Dēōgīr (Daulatābād), he assumed that Delhi was left deserted and that consequently there was no market for the extra produce.[63] But this is to be misled by the hyperboles of Iṣāmī and, in places, of Baranī. Let us examine the Daulatābād project.

The old city of Delhi had been repeatedly abandoned by different Sultans, beginning with Muizz al-Dīn Kaiqubād (1286–90), who built a new palace at Kīlōkhrī on the Yamuna and thereby provoked an exodus by the grandees in turn.[64] Kīlōkhrī remained the capital during the early years of the Khaljī dynasty, since the new regime was viewed with considerable hostility in the old city;[65] and in fact there is no evidence that the seat of government was restored to Delhi until Alā al-Dīn's accession.[66] Delhi's exposed position was highlighted in the course of Taraghai's invasion, and Alā al-Dīn subsequently moved

his residence to Sīrī, to the north-east, which had served as his headquarters during both the recent campaign and Qutlugh Qocha's earlier attack.[67] Here he began the construction of a new fortress, which was to be completed only in the reign of Quṭb al-Dīn;[68] while at the same time the dilapidated walls of old Delhi were restored.[69] A third fortified residence, Tughluqābād, situated four or five miles to the east and named after its founder Ghiyāth al-Dīn, ceased to be the capital following the accession of Muḥammad, who temporarily moved back into the old city;[70] though we shortly find him storing at Tughluqābād at least a part of his treasury.[71] Muḥammad himself set about further building, adding a smaller fortress, Ādilābād, to Tughluqābād and linking old Delhi to Sīrī in 1327 by means of walls which enclosed an area known henceforward as Jahān-panāh.[72] It is clear from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's narrative that like his Khaljī predecessors Muḥammad resided in the palace of Hazār Sutūn, which had been built by Alā al-Dīn outside the Sīrī fortress and lay within this new settlement.[73] According to the same author, Muḥammad had intended at one point to surround all four 'cities' (that is, old Delhi, Sīrī, Jahān-panāh, and Tughluqābād) with one enormous wall, but was compelled to relinquish the idea in view of the expense involved.[74]

This extensive building programme hardly supports the view that the Delhi conurbation was virtually abandoned in favour of Daulatābād early in Muḥammad's reign. We should note at this juncture that 'Delhi' was a term applied equally to the original city wrested from its Hindu rulers in the twelfth century and to the entire complex of towns that had grown up since;[75] and Baranī, at least, distinguishes on occasions between old Delhi (*shahr*—'the city' par excellence) and the neighbouring settlements.[76] What actually happened around 1327[77] was that the principal Muslim residents of the *old* city, together with their dependants and their considerable households, were despatched south.[78] The exception was the military personnel. Baranī states clearly that 'the *amīrs*, *maliks* and troops' remained with the Sultan in the north when their families were in Daulatābād;[79] and Iṣāmī's bitter allusions to the repopulation of the capital with Hindus[80] surely refer in part to the drafting of peasants for the Khurāsān expedition. The old city, therefore, was not deserted, precisely because it was in the process of becoming a vast barracks. This provides a strong indication of the essential coherence of Muḥammad's policy. The two projects—the recruitment of the Khurāsān force and the emigration to Daulatābād—had to coincide[81] in order to minimise the increase in

consumption in Delhi and the setting of impossible targets for the grain-producers. Nor does it appear that the Sultan had totally miscalculated. It is significant that Baranī attributes the disbandment of the Ḵẖurāsān force after one year not to a shortage of supplies but to a lack of sufficient funds to pay its wages.[82]

Muḥammad's error lay in demanding excessive cash amounts from the Dōāb cultivators, over and above their grain contributions. It is possible that he was driven to this expedient by monetary fluctuations about which we are all too imperfectly informed. His introduction of a so-called token currency (in reality, simply low denomination coins) has been seen as a response to a chronic silver shortage.[83] Certainly the flow of silver to Delhi would be greatly reduced after the loss of Bengal around 1335–6;[84] but at this earlier juncture the treasury may have been suffering more from a decrease in the value of its gold reserves, since it appears that the price of gold was falling. An Iranian author writing in 1339–40 tells us that as a result of Muḥammad's heavy expenditure (and, by implication, the release of large quantities of gold into the Indian economy) it was no longer profitable to export gold from Iran to India, and the direction of this traffic was now reversed.[85] At any rate, the new copper and bronze coins, which Baranī at one point explicitly connects with the enlistment of the Ḵẖurāsān army,[86] came to be rejected by the public, in all likelihood because of the great number of counterfeit coins that were soon in circulation;[87] and the scheme was discarded. It may have been in part this same desire for specie which prompted the Sultan to launch the ill-fated Qarāčẖīl expedition around 1332–3.[88] But Baranī's frequent statements that the treasury was emptied as a result of Muḥammad's policies should be treated with caution. Had this been the case, the government would have been in no position to redeem the 'token' coins[89] (although it possibly did so at a discount); still less would Muḥammad have advanced huge sums, at a time when his revenues were drastically curtailed by the rebellions in Bengal and the south, to the peasants for the purposes of restoring cultivation.[90]

By 1335–6 the Daulatābād project in turn had been abandoned: not because it was intrinsically unworkable, but because the original motives behind the emigration were now redundant. That one of these motives had been simply to cream off a part of Delhi's enormous population is hinted in at least one source.[91] But the choice of Daulatābād had been dictated by geographical considerations. The city not only lay within the newly annexed territories in the south;

it was also centrally situated in relation to the empire as a whole.[92] For a time the Sultanate was regarded as possessing two capitals,[93] and it may be that Muḥammad envisaged ultimately making Daulatābād the actual seat of government. If so, the ambition was never realized. When the Deccan grew exposed to enemy attack with the secession of Mabar and disturbances in Warangal, Muḥammad allowed those of the emigrants who so wished to return to their homes in Delhi.[94] Probably he was swayed not least by the fact that since the disbandment of the Khurāsān force much of the old city, as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa observed on his arrival in India, was uninhabited.[95]

NOTES

1. Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, 2nd ed., Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (Kābul, 1342–3 *sh.*/1963–4, 2 vols.), I, pp. 417, 444; tr. H. G. Raverty, *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī: a general history of the Muḥammadan dynasties of Asia* (London, 1873–81, 2 vols., Bibliotheca Indica), I, pp. 525–6, 605; Ḥasan Niẓāmī, *Tāj al-maāṯir*, B.L. MS Add. 7, 623, f^{os} 84^{v}–86^{r}.
2. *Tarīkh-i Fakhru'd-dīn Mubārakshāh*, [*sic*] ed. Sir E. D. Ross (London, 1927, James G. Forlong Fund), p. 30 (*markaz-i Islām-i Hind*). Cf. also Ḥasan Niẓāmī, f^{o} 81^{v}.
3. See generally A. B. M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 2nd ed. (Allahabad, 1961), pp. 92–6.
4. Jūzjāni, I, pp. 440–1 (trs. Raverty, pp. 598–9). Cf. also Baranī, *Tarīkh-i Fīrūz-shāhī*, ed. S. A. Khān (Calcutta, 1860–2. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 27; Iṣāmī, *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, ed. A. S. Usha (Madras, 1948), pp. 114–15, tr. A. M. Ḥusain, *Futūḥu's Salāṭīn or Shāh Nāmah-i Hind of Iṣāmī* (Aligarh, 1967–77, 3 vols.), II, pp. 226–7.
5. Firishta, *Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1247/1831–2, 2 vols.), I, p. 131, quoting the lost 14th-century work of Shaykh Ayn al-Dīn Bijāpūrī. For the civil war in the Mongol empire, see P. Jackson, 'The dissolution of the Mongol empire', *CAJ*, XXII (1978), pp. 227 ff.
6. Jūzjānī, I, p. 456, & II, p. 83 (tr. Ráverty, I, pp. 634, 636, & II, pp. 856–7).
7. Baranī, p. 219.
8. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Tuḥfat al-nuẓẓār fī gharāib al-amṣār*, ed. & tr. C. Defrémery & B. R. Sanguinetti, *Voyages d' Ibn Batoutah* (Paris, 1853–8, 4 vols.), III, p. 146; tr. H. A. R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa A.D. 1325–1354* (Cambridge, 1958–71, 3 vols. Hakluyt Society, CX, CXVII, CXLI), III, pp. 618–19.
9. *Ibn Faḍlallāh al-Omarī's Bericht über Indien in seinem Werke Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. & tr. Otto Spies (Leipzig, 1943. Sammlung Orientalischer Arbeiten, XIV), text p. 11, tr. p. 36.
10. Ibid., text p. 12, tr. p. 36.
11. Mufaḍḍal, *Al-nahj al-sadīd*, ed. & tr. Samira Kortantamer, *Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaḍḍal b. Abī l-Faḍāil* (Freiburg i. Br., 1973. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 23), text p. 28, tr. p. 105.

12. Baranī, p. 474; cf. also p. 341, in the cultural context, where it is further claimed to be the equal of Constantinople and Jerusalem.
13. Ibid., p. 81.
14. See Jackson, 'The Dissolution', pp. 238–44.
15. René Grousset, *L'Empire des Steppes* (4th ed., Paris, 1965), p. 412; see further, Jean Aubin, 'L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas', *Turcica*, I (1969), pp. 83–4.
16. Baranī, p. 254.
17. All the Indian sources are agreed on Kīlī as the site of the engagement. For a discussion of its possible location, see S. H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History* (Bombay, 1939–57, 2 vols.), I, p. 271. Of the sources not available to Hodivala, Iṣāmī (p. 259, tr. Ḥusain, II, p. 430) says that it lay in the Dōāb, while a variant in an earlier recension of Baranī's work specifies that Alā al-Dīn advanced *7 kurōhs* (about 15 miles) from Delhi to the battlefield: Bodleian Library MS Elliot 353, f° 145r.
18. Amīr Ḵẖusraw, *Deval Rānī*, lithograph ed. Raṣẖīd Aḥmad (Aligarh, 1336/1917), p. 61. See also the Iranian authors: *Rashīd al-Dīn's History of India*, ed. Karl Jahn (The Hague, 1965. Central Asiatic Studies, X), Arabic text p. 20, Pers. text pp. 75, 118; Kāṣẖānī, *Tārīḵẖ-i Ūljāītū Sulṭān*, ed. Gavin R. Hambly (Tehran, 1348 *sh.*/1969), pp. 193, 201, where Qutlugẖ Qoḉa's invasion is duplicated.
19. Baranī, pp. 201–2. The spelling Taraghai is preferable to the form 'Targhi' usually adopted by Indian historians: cf. W. Radloff, *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte* (St Petersburg, 1893–1911, 4 vols.), III, col. 840 (E. Turkish *taraghai*: 'hawk').
20. Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa tazjiyat al-aṣār*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 526. Amīr Ḵẖusraw, *Ḵẖazā in al-futūḥ*, ed. M. Wahīd Mīrzā (Calcutta, 1953. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 38, speaks of the inhabitants making for the Ganga crossings. On this invasion, see generally K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis A.D. 1290–1320*, 2nd ed. (Calcutta, 1967), pp. 144–5.
21. Iṣāmī, pp. 463–5 (tr. Ḥusain, III, pp. 698–700), for the attack on the Mīrath region. For the Dōāb, cf. Muḥammad Bihāmad-ḵẖānī, *Tārīḵẖ-i Muhammadī*, B.L. MS Or. 137, f° 400r; Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad Sihrindi, *Tārīḵẖ-i Mubārak-ṣẖāhī*, ed. S. M. H. Ḥusain (Calcutta, 1931. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 101. On the authenticity of this invasion, which had been questioned, see Jackson, 'The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate in the reign of Muhammad Tughluq (1325–1351)', *CAJ*, XIX (1975), pp. 119–26.
22. Baranī, pp. 319–20.
23. See W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, tr. V. & T. Minorsky (Leiden, 1956–62, 4 vols. in 3), I, pp. 129–33; Grousset, pp. 410–12 (and for the internal wars of 1313–20) 413–14; Jackson, *CAJ*, XIX, pp. 143–5 (for the period after 1330).
24. See the 10th century *Ḥudūd al-ālam*, tr. V. Minorsky, 2nd ed. C. E. Bosworth (London, 1970), Gibb Memorial Series, n.s., XI, p. 89, for the total of 150,000 horse attributed to the ruler of Kanauj alone. The corresponding statistic found in Masūdī a few decades earlier is wildly exaggerated: *Murūj al-ḏẖahab*, ed. & tr. C. Barbier de Meynard & Pavet de Courteille, *Les Prairies d'Or* (Paris, 1861–77, 9 vols.), I, p. 374.
25. Jūzjānī, II, p. 83 (tr. Raverty, II, p. 856).
26. Baranī, p. 86.

27. Ibid., p. 340. Cf. also the views retailed to Mufaḍḍal later: Kortantamer, text p. 29 (*jannada l-junūd wa l-asākir*), tr. p. 109.
28. Waṣṣāf, p. 309; hence *Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'*, Arabic text, p. 15, Persian text pp. 68, 112.
29. Waṣṣāf, p. 528 (in the portion of his work completed *c.* 727/1327): the figure is ultimately reproduced by Firishta (I, pp. 199–200), in the context of Alā al-Dīn's reforms, but the intermediate authority is difficult to identify.
30. Baranī, pp. 476–7. On the Khurāsān project, see now Jackson, *CAJ*, XIX, pp. 128 ff.
31. Spies, text pp. 12–13, tr. p. 37.
32. Ṣafadī, *Al-wāfī bil-wafayāt*, ed. Sven Dedering, *Das biographische Lexicon des Ṣalāḥaddīn Ḫalīl ibn Aibak aṣ-Ṣafadī*, III (Damascus, 1953. Bibliotheca Islamica, VIc), p. 173; cf., however, his *Ayān al-aṣr*, MS Süleimaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, Aşir Efendi 588, f° 2^{v}, with 7 for 9. Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, *Al-durar al-kāmina* (Hyderabad, 1348–50/1929–32, 4 vols.), III, p. 461, follows *Al-wāfī*, but quoting only the lower number of 600,000.
33. Kortantamer, text p. 27, tr. p. 104 (though the number of horse is extraordinarily high).
34. The figure given in the earlier recension: Bodleian MS, f° 201^{v}; MS in private collection of Simon Digby, f° 167^{r}. In the standard version (Baranī, p. 477) it is reduced to 370,000. I am most grateful to Mr Digby for lending me a photostat copy of his MS and for allowing me to consult the original.
35. S. Digby, *War-horse and Elephant in the Dehli Sultanate: a Study of Military Supplies* (Oxford–Karachi, 1971), p. 24 & n. 41a, compares Baranī's figure with those given for Alā al-Dīn's reign, which make it appear far less remarkable. But the evidence of other sources suggests that this was a special army, falling well short of the total numbers under arms in Muḥammad's empire: see Firishta, I, p. 240.
36. Cf. Baranī, *Fatāwa-yi Jahāndārī*, I.O. MS 1149, f° 73^{v}, for the importance attached to this.
37. See Baranī, p. 55; Spies, text p. 19, tr. p. 44 (hunting expeditions involving 100,000 troops in Muḥammad b. Tughluq's reign); Afīf, *Tarīkh-i Fīrūz-shāhī*, ed. M. V. Ḥusain (Calcutta, 1888–91. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 321 (for a large tract in Rohilkhand reserved for the chase under Fīrūz Shāh). In all probability, the expedition to the Baran region around 1333 by Muḥammad, which has been defined as a 'manhunt' by certain secondary authorities, following Baranī's account (pp. 479–80) was really the same sort of manoeuvre.
38. Cf. Juwaynī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, tr. J. A. Boyle, *History of the World-Conqueror* (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols.), I, pp. 27–8.
39. Jūzjānī, II, p. 57 (tr. Raverty, II, p. 816).
40. Baranī, pp. 50–1.
41. Ibid., p. 302: later (pp. 325–6) he qualifies this by asserting that Alā al-Dīn resumed his more adventurous policy when the construction work at Sīrī (see below) was finished; though it is clear that Sīrī was completed only under his son Quṭb al-Dīn.
42. Ibid., p. 323, where they are mentioned for the first time, in connection with their assignment to *wālīs* and *muqṭas*. For the Sevāna and Jālōr campaigns, see Lal, pp. 115–19.

43. See P. Hardy, 'Dihlī Sultanate', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden–London, 1954), II, p. 269. The annexation of Dēōgīr (1318) and of Tilang and Mabar (*c.* 1322) and the reconquest of Bengal (*c.* 1324) meant that the Sultanate came to embrace the greater part of the subcontinent within an extremely short period. It is to this process of expansion that Baranī (pp. 468–9) is referring when he describes the unprecedented scope and efficiency of the revenue system during the early years of Muḥammad b. Tughluq.
44. The dangers were obvious even to Baranī, who saw the absorption of fresh territories as leading to the loss of older provinces (pp. 471, 472); though he also blames the Sultan's allegedly chimerical projects such as the Khurāsān enterprise (p. 471).
45. See, for example, ibid., p. 212; Iṣāmī, pp. 217 ff. (tr. Ḥusain, II, pp. 383 ff.).
46. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 146 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 621).
47. Baranī, pp. 300–1, 302: this further prevented Delhi acquiring reinforcements from the eastern provinces.
48. Bihāmad-khānī, f° 400r.
49. Baranī, pp. 323–4: on the significance of *maḥṣūl* as 'revenue-demand' rather than 'produce', at least from the time of Afīf, see W. H. Moreland, *The Agrarian System of Moslem India* (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 232 n.1, 249. For the Delhi *kārkẖānahā*, cf. I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, 5th ed. (New Delhi, 1971), pp. 69 ff. (where the term is translated as departments of the commissariat); and for an example, see Spies, text p. 14, tr. p. 40.
50. Baranī, pp. 305–6.
51. Ibid., p. 287: the area in question is defined at p. 288 and included not merely Delhi and the Dōāb but Lahore and Dēōpālpūr. On the Ḥanifite prescription, cf. N. P. Aghnides, *Mohammedan Theories of Finance* (New York, 1916), pp. 379–80.
52. Baranī, pp. 284–6.
53. Although Baranī claims that it was intended simply to reduce the incidence of convivial gatherings that might lead to conspiracy and rebellion. According to Sir George Watt, *A Dictionary of the Economic Products of India* (London–Calcutta, 1889–93, 6 vols. in 9), VI/4, pp. 273–4, the grapes of the N.W. provinces and Avadh are hardly suitable for the manufacture of wine, and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 129 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 610) confirms that the grape was rare in India in his time, though found in the Delhi region and one other province whose name is blank in all the MSs. Nevertheless, we do find indications in other sources that wine production was prominent in Avadh and in Kōl and Mīrath, all regions which were the object of Alā al-Dīn's economic measures: see Baranī, p. 157; M. W. Mirzā, *The Life and Works of Amir Khusrau* (Calcutta, 1935), p. 72.
54. Amīr Khusraw, *Khazāin*, pp. 21–3; *Rasāil al-ijāz*, lithograph ed. (Lucknow, 1876, 5 vols. in 2), I, pp. 19–20. See Baranī, pp. 303–4, and for specific prices pp. 305, 310, 314, 315.
55. Ibid., p. 382 for the troops' pay; p. 383 for the reduction in the *kẖarāj*; pp. 384–5 for the rise in prices.
56. Ibid., pp. 382–3.
57. Ibid., p. 439.
58. Ibid., pp. 431–2, for the revenues conceded to the *muqṭas* and *wālīs* over and

above their stipends (*mawājib*); and cf. the more general observations at pp. 438–40.

59. Moreland, p. 48 n.1. The phrase used by Baranī (p. 473), ***yakī bi-dah wa yakī bi-bīst***, does not occur in his first recension (see below). But it is interestingly echoed in his *Fatāwa-yi Jahāndārī*, f° 192^{v}, where we read of an increased revenue-demand of ***yakī bi-panj wa yakī bi-dah*** levied on the cultivators by an apocryphal tyrant Yazdagird for the purpose of raising an enormous army. Yazdagird in fact bears a marked resemblance to Muḥammad b. Tughluq.
60. Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad, *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-shāhī*, p. 113, is the first author to refer explicitly to its effect upon the province.
61. Bodleian MS, f° 192^{v}; MS Digby Coll., f° 161^{r}.
62. See Baranī, p. 574 (under the reign of Fīrūz Shāh); also *Fatāwa*, *loc. cit.*, where the revenue-demand is defined as ***jizya wa kharāj***. Baranī's usage puzzled Moreland (p. 231 n.1), but that an illegal *jizya* assessed on property (*jizya-yi tuyūl*) had existed prior to Fīrūz Shāh's reforms is confirmed by that monarch in his *Futūḥāt-i Fīrūz-shāhī*, ed. Shaikh Abdur Rashīd (Aligarh, 1954), p. 5 (with *tanbūl* in error).
63. Moreland, pp. 48–9.
64. Baranī, p. 130.
65. Ibid., pp. 173, 175 ff.
66. Baranī's references to 'Delhi' during his coverage of Jalāl al-Dīn's reign seem to refer to the general conurbation rather than to the old city: cf. pp. 187, 212, 228, where the Sultan is based at Kīlōkhrī.
67. Ibid., pp. 255, 259, 301. Sīrī had earlier served as Jalāl al-Dīn's *arḍ-gāh* before setting out on campaign: Amīr Khusraw, *Miftāḥ al-futūḥ*, ed. Shaikh Abdur Rashīd (Aligarh, 1954), pp. 23, 25.
68. Baranī, p. 302. For its completion by Quṭb al-Dīn, see Amīr Khusraw, *Nuh Sipihr*, ed. M. W. Mīrzā (Oxford–London, 1950), pp. 76–80.
69. *Khazāin*, pp. 27–8; also Baranī, p. 302. The cement for this fortification later included the blood of Mongols captured during Köpek's invasion around 1306 (*Khazāin*, pp. 45–6).
70. Baranī, pp. 456–7; this was overlooked by Hilary Waddington, 'Ādilābād: A Part of the "Fourth" Delhi', *Ancient India*, I (1946), p. 62 n.9, who assumed that the capital 'deserted' under Muḥammad was Tughluqābād.
71. Baranī, p. 476; but cf. p. 468, where treasure is mentioned as being stored in Hazār Sutūn.
72. See A. M. Ḥusain, *The Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq* (London, 1938; reprint, Delhi, 1972), pp. 117–19; *Tughluq Dynasty* (Calcutta, 1963), pp. 166–8.
73. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, pp. 220, 399 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 660, 746). Ḥusain thinks that the Hazār Sutūn palace was founded by Muḥammad: *Rise and Fall*, p. 119 n.2; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 169 n.3, 172. But this is not actually supported by the authority he quotes, the *Qaṣāid* of Badr-i Chāchī: see lithograph ed. M. Hādī Alī (Kanpur, n.d.), p. 53. And Baranī's first recension states categorically that it was the work of Alā al-Dīn (MS Digby Coll., f° 114^{r}): in any case, the standard version shows that it had been the later Khaljīs' residence (Baranī, pp. 284, 396, 403, etc.). At one point Iṣāmī suggests that Muḥammad was residing at the Dār al-Khilāfat, i.e. Sīrī (p. 466; tr. Ḥusain, III, p. 702); though we know from Umarī's sources that he moved from palace to palace (Spies, text p. 18, tr. p. 44).

74. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 147 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 619, 621).
75. Spies, text pp. 11, 12, tr. p. 36. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 146 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 619).
76. E.g., Baranī, pp. 449–50.
77. For the date, see Baranī's first recension, Bodleian MS f° 190^{v}; MS Digby Coll., f° 159^{v}.
78. Baranī, p. 473 (*k̲h̲awāṣṣ-i k̲h̲alq; mardum-i guzīda wa c̲h̲īda*); cf. *Rise and Fall*, pp. 110 ff.; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 146 ff.
79. Baranī, p. 479.
80. Iṣāmī, pp. 450, 453 (tr. Ḥusain, III, pp. 680–1, 684–5). Cf. also Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 316 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 708), who speaks simply of 'the inhabitants of the provinces'.
81. As Muḥammad b. Mubārak (Mīr-i K̲h̲wurd), *Siyar al-awliyā*, lithograph ed. (Delhi, 1302/1885), p. 271, implies that they did.
82. Baranī, p. 477.
83. See Ishwari Prasad, *A History of the Qaraunah Turks in India* (Allahabad, 1936, vol. I), pp. 105 ff. Ḥusain (*Rise and Fall*, pp. 132–3; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 186–7) qualifies the view expressed earlier by H. Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sulṭāns of Dehlī* (Delhi, 1936), p. 400.
84. According to Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad, Qadr K̲h̲ān, the governor of Bengal, was amassing great quantities of coined silver to send to Delhi at the time of the province's revolt: *Tārīk̲h̲-i Mubārak-ṣ̲h̲āhī*, p. 104 (his date 739/1338–9 is incorrect: both Iṣāmī, p. 472, tr. Ḥusain, III, p. 709, and Baranī, p. 480, imply that the rebellion occurred around the time of the secession of Mabar and of Muḥammad's Kanauj campaign, on which cf. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 144, tr. Gibb, III, p. 617). On the plentiful silver coinage of Bengal during the period of its independence, see Digby, *War-horse and Elephant*, p. 44 & n.121.
85. Ḥamd-allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, ed. Guy Le Strange, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulub* (Leiden–London, 1915–19, 2 vols., Gibb Memorial Series, XXIII/1 & 2), I (text), p. 230, II (trans.), p. 222.
86. Baranī, p. 475.
87. Ibid. There is a parallel instance in contemporary Egypt: see H. Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341* (Oxford–London, 1972), pp. 195–7.
88. See Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, pp. 325–8 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 713–14); Jackson, *CAJ*, XIX, pp. 132 ff. The date is suggested by N. V. Ramanayya, 'The date of the rebellions of Tilang and Kampila against Sultan Muḥammad bin Tug̲h̲laq', *Indian Culture*, V (1938–9), p. 140 n.l. The 'token' coins range from 730 to 732/1329 to 1332 (Nelson Wright, pp. 139–46). Baranī makes it clear that the Qarāc̲h̲īl force was a part of the army raised for K̲h̲urāsān (p. 477).
89. Ibid., p. 476.
90. Ibid., pp. 498–9.
91. Iṣāmī, p. 466 (tr. Ḥusain, III, p. 702): the context is the Qarāc̲h̲īl campaign, which Iṣāmī depicts as a deliberate ploy by Muḥammad to reduce the surplus population!
92. Baranī, pp. 473–4. See also Ṣafadī, *Al-wāfī*, III, p. 174; *Ayān*, f° 2^{r}.
93. Spies, text pp. 7, 32; tr. pp. 29, 59.
94. Baranī, p. 481: his edict was issued at the time of setting out for Tilang, i.e. presumably at the outset of the abortive Mabar campaign, in 1334.

95. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 316 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 708). Ḥusain (*Rise and Fall*, pp. 121–3; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 171–3), assumed that this remark was based on hearsay and hence unreliable; but if we accept that it applies only to old Delhi, it does not contradict Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's other observations.

Abbreviations

B.L.	British Library
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal*

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

INDEX

Persian and Arabic proper names and technical terms are spelled in this index in accordance with the system adopted in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd edition, Leiden, 1954–2004). Thus Persian forms are given as if they were Arabic, with *ay* for *ai*, *ḍ* for *ẓ*, *th* for *s̱*, *w* for *v*, for instance; although I have retained *ch*, *q* and *j*, in place of the *č*, *ḳ* and *ǧ* adopted in the *Encyclopaedia*. I have tried to standardize spellings, citing and cross-referencing the variant forms used in different articles and inserting diacritical marks even where the original article excludes them. Chinese names are transcribed here uniformly according to Wade-Giles rather than Pinyin, and Turkish and Mongol names follow the principles adopted by J.A. Boyle, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* (London and New York, 1971). I apologise if any confusion arises despite – or indeed as a result of – such precautions.

The following abbreviations are used to indicate the language of technical terms

Mo.= Mongolian
Tu. = Turkish

Abaqa, Ilkhan, I 235; III 197–8, 203; IV 21, 27, 31; V 16
'Abbasids, II 17; III 207, 210; VI 2; VII 63, 65, 71; VIII 340; IX 182; XI 131, 150n
see also Caliph; Caliphate; al-Ḥākim; al-Nāṣir
'Abd al-Jabbār b. Muḥammad al-Kīdānī, Ghurid vizier, VI 11
'Abd al-Raḥmān, Shaykh, IV 31
'Abd al-Rashīd b. Maḥmūd, Ghaznawid Sultan, VII 71
Abishqa, Chaghadayid prince, I 229
Abōhar, VIII 352n
Abū'l-'Abbās b. Shīsh, VI 9–10
Abū'l-Faḍl 'Allāmī, Mughal author, XI 136
Abū Sa'īd, Ilkhan, XI 129–31
Abū Shāma, historian of Damascus, I 227, 237n
Abū Yazīd, IV 27
Achala, XI 139–40
Acre, III 197
Ādharbāījān, *see* Azerbaijan
'Ādil Khān, *see* Aybeg-i Shamsī 'Ajamī
'Ādilābād, XII 25
Afghanistan, Afghans, I 236, 239, 243; II 17, 20; III 196; VI 1, 4, 8n; VIII 344–5; IX 181; X 7n, 10; XI 119, 128, 142–3, 154; XII 19
Africa, North, *see* Maghrib
Africans, VIII 345, 350
see also Ḥabshīs
Ahmad, Aziz, XI 135n, 141
Ahmad, M. 'Azīz, VI 5
Aḥmad-i Iqbāl, Mongol amir, XI 153
Aḥmad Inaltegin, Ghaznawid amir, VII 64, 71
Aḥmad-Tegüder, Ilkhan, I 194n; IV 28–9, 31; V 13
Aḥsan Shāh, Sultan of Ma'bar, XI 143n
Akhlāṭ, I 230
Ala-Qamaq, I 203n
'Alā' al-Dīn Atsiz b. Ḥusayn 'Jahānsūz', Ghurid Sultan, VI 5, 11–12, 15, 19–20, 21n, 22–3
'Alā' al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Ḥusayn ('Jahānsūz'), Ghurid Sultan, VI 1, 3
'Alā' al-Dīn Jānī, Delhi amir, VIII 344n, 346n; IX 184, 188
'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 342n, 343, 356–7; XI 118, 125n, 129, 146, 152, 153n; XII 19–20, 22–5

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Masʿūd Shāh b. Fīrūz Shāh, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 348–9; IX 182
ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAlī, Ghurid Sultan, VI 5–7, 10–11, 20–21; VII 69
ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aybeg Keshli Khān, Malik Chhajū, Delhi amir, VIII 354n, 355–6
ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, Ghurid Sultan of Bāmiyān, VI 6, 8–9, 12, 14, 20
ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Tekish, Khwārazmshāh, V 4–5; VI *passim*; VII 68; IX 190; X 1, 3, 10
Alans, II 9, 12; IV 5–6
Alaqa Begi, daughter of Chinggis Khan, II 6
Aleppo, I 200, 219n; III 197, 202, 204; IV 8, 30; V 12; IX 181
Alexander IV, Pope, I 236; III 211; IV 8
Alghu/Alughu, Chaghadayid khan, I 194n, 229, 234–5, 243; II 2, 17–18
ʿAlī b. Masʿūd, malik of Sīstān, I 222, 239n
ʿAlī Beg, Mongol commander, XII 20
ʿAlī Shāh b. Tekish, Khwarazmian prince, VI 14, 18–19, 21–2
ʿAlī Shāh Kar, XI 148
ʿAlī Sulṭān, Chaghadayid khan, XI 151
Allsen, Thomas T., II 4, 23
Almaligh, II 11; XI 144n
Alptegin, Ghaznawid ruler, VII 64
Altai, mountains, II 12, 14
Altan Debter, I 190n; X 2, 5
Amīn Malik, Khwarazmian amir, VI 18, 20; X 11–12
Amīr Khusraw Dihlawī, VI 18n; VIII 343, 353–4
Amīrān b. Qayṣar, VI 14
Amrōha, VIII 353, 357–8; XI 135; XII 20, 23
Āmūya, River, *see* Oxus
Ananda, Mongol prince, II 5, 22
Anatolia, I 200, 216–18, 232n, 233, 238; III 203; IV 8; V 12; VII 67
see also Rūm
Andkhūy/Andkhūd, I 239; VI 15
battle of, VI 2–3, 14; VII 68, 71–2
Andrew of Longjumeau, Dominican Friar, IV 2, 15
Antioch, III 207
Apardi, Mongol tribe, XI 155n
aqa (Mo. senior kinsman), I 195, 203, 207, 229; III 210
Aral Sea, II 13n; VII 67; IX 190
Arghun, Ilkhan, I 225n; IV 21, 27, 31
Arghun, River, II 5
Arghun Aqa, Mongol governor of Khurāsān, I 213, 215–16
Arigh/Ariq-böke, Mongol Qaghan, I 187–8, 206n, 228–30, 234; II 2, 9, 14–18; III 201; V 13
Armenia, Greater, IV 3
Armenia, Lesser (Cilicia), kingdom, IV 2–3
see also Hetʿum I
Armenians, I 233; III 203, 209–10; IV 3, 27; V 15
Armenian clergy, III 199
Armenian historians, I 190, 216–17, 219, 233; III 209–10; IV 22, 25, 27, 30
see also Grigor; Hayton; Kirakos; Orbelian, Stepʿannos; Vardan
Arrān, I 208–9, 216; II 8
Arulat, Mongol tribe, XI 155n
Ascelin, Dominican Friar, IV 2, 12; V 7
Ashiyār, VI 7, 20
Asightegin, Ghaznawid amir, VII 70
Assassins, I 187, 200, 224, 225n
see also Ismāʿīlīs
Aubin, Jean, I 192, 243; II 10
Awadh (Oudh), VIII 351, 353; IX 184–5; XI 136; XII 20, 30n
ʿAwfī, X 17–18
Ayalon, David, I 189, 191
Aybak/Aybeg, *see* Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg
Aybeg-i Shamsī ʿAjamī ʿĀdil Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 352
ʿAyn al-Dīn Bījāpūrī, Shaykh, XII 27n
ʿAyn al-Mulk, Delhi amir, XI 125n, 132n, 148n
ʿAyn al-Mulk, Khwarazmian envoy, X 13
ʿAyn Jālūt, battle of, I 187, 222; IV 18; V 13; XI 153n
Ayodhya, *see* Awadh
Aytegin, Turkish slave officer, VI 9, 17, 19
Aytemür Kechhen, Delhi amir, VIII 355
Aytemür Surkha, Delhi amir, VIII 355
Ayyubids, IV 30; VII 66–7; VIII 341, 348; IX 191
Aʿẓam Malik, Ghūrī amir, VI 24; X 8n
Azerbaijan, I 208–9, 216, 241; III 211; IV 17; V 12

Bāʿalīs, Ghūrī clan, VI 22, 23n
see also Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. ʿAlī
Bābur, Ẓahīr al-Dīn Muḥammad, Mughal emperor, X 8; XI 128
Badakhshān, I 242; X 7n
Badāʾūn (Budaon), VI 20; VII 80n; VIII 353, 358; IX 186, 197n; XI 123; XII 18, 20

Badā'ūnī, Mughal historian, XI 121, 124n, 129, 133, 143, 150
Bādghīs, I 215n, 222
Badr al-Dīn Chaghir, VI 15
Badr al-Dīn Sonqur, Delhi amir, IX 195n
Badr-i Chāchī, XI 124n; XII 31n
Baghdad, I 187, 217, 221n, 224, 226, 232; III 202–3, 207; IV 17; V 15; VII 63, 68–9; VIII 347; IX 182; XI 131n; XII 19
Baghlān, X 8n, 9
Bahā' al-Dīn Sām b. Maḥmūd, Ghurid Sultan, VI 19, 21
Bahā' al-Dīn Sām b. Muḥammad, Ghurid Sultan of Bāmiyān, VI 3, 6–8, 10, 17n
Bahāristān-i Shāhī, history of Kashmīr, XI 138n, 140n
Bahrām, malik of Ghazna, XI 148–9, 153n
Baḥrīs, Baḥriyya, mamlūk regiment in Egypt, VIII 348
Baichu/Baiju, Mongol commander, I 215n, 216–19, 232n, 233; IV 12; V 7, 9, 17
Baidu, Ilkhan, I 194n; IV 28
bakhshī (Buddhist priest), IV 31
Bala, Mongol commander, X 5
bālā-dast, XI 133
Balaban-i Khwurd ('the Lesser'), Ulugh Khān, V 16; VIII 343n, 344, 346–52; IX 182, 185–6, 190; XII 20–21
  as Sultan, *see* Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban
Balagha, Jochid prince, I 221–2, 226–7
Balārām, IX 186
Bālāsh, III 202
Balban *see* Balaban-i Khwurd; Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban
Balkh, VI 3, 14–15, 22; VII 68
Bāmiyān, I 244; VI 3, 8–9, 12–14, 17n, 20; VII 68; X 10
Bar Hebraeus, Jacobite prelate and historian, III 199–203, 205, 208; IV 6n, 15, 24–5
  his *Chronography*, III 205
Barāmūla Pass, XI 138
Baran (Bulandshahr), VIII 347; IX 186, 188; XII 29n
Baranī, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, VII 63, 72; VIII 342, 345–7, 349, 352, 354–7; IX 182, 191; XI 119–20, 122, 125, 126n, 128, 132–4, 142–3, 145–7, 149–50, 153; XII 19, 21–26
  his *Fatāwā-yi Jahāndārī*, VII 63; XII 31n
  his *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī*, VII 63; XI 126, 145, 147; first recension of, XI 120, 122–3, 132n, 135n, 145, 147n; XII 28n, 29n, 31n, 32n
Baraq, Chaghadayid khan, I 194n; II 14
Barfield, Thomas, II 4
Barskhān, VII 66, 74
Bartol'd/Barthold, V.V., I 195; X 5
Bashkirs/Bashgird, Bashkiria, II 12; V 6
Batu, khan of the Golden Horde, I 186, 198–208, 212–16, 218–20, 222–5, 228; II 3–5, 10–11, 13; IV 23–4
Bayāna, XI 125n
Bayaut, a branch of the Kimek tribe, IX 190
Baybars I, al-Ẓāhir Rukn al-Dīn, Mamlūk Sultan, I 237–8; II 16n; III 210–11; V 16; VII 67
Baybars al-Manṣūrī, Mamlūk historian, I 218, 233, 244
Bayhaqī, Persian historian, VII 64–5, 70
Bēāh/Bēās, River, I 241; XII 19
Begtemür Orkhān-i Ruknī, Delhi amir, VIII 348
Bek-tutmish Fujin, wife of Jochi, I 196
Béla IV, king of Hungary, I 236; V 6
Belgütei, brother of Chinggis Khan, II 6
Benedict, Franciscan Friar, IV 2, 15
Bengal, VIII 344, 352; X 8; XI 141; XII 18, 20, 26, 30n, 32n
Berke, khan of the Golden Horde, I 187, 190, 201n, 204, 209, 218, 220, 223–9, 233–9, 241, 243n; II 16–17; III 210–11; IV 23
Berkecher, Mongol prince, I 223
Bhakkar, X 13
Bhōjpūr, VIII 358
Bihāmadkhānī, Muḥammad, XI 123, 125
  his *Ta'rīkh-i Muḥammadī*, XI 123
Bihār, VII 76n
Binbān (Bannu), V 16; IX 186; X 18–19
Bīnī-yi Gāw, I 239, 242
al-Bīrūnī, XI 134n, 137
Bisṭām, IV 28
bitikchi (secretary), I 215
Blochet, Edgar, I 189
Bodleian ms. Th. Hyde 31, X 5–6, 9, 17
Bolad, II 8
Bolad Chingsang, Mongol envoy, I 227n
Bolor, VI 3
Boraqchin, wife of Batu, I 223
Boroldai, Mongol commander, XI 129n, 148n, 154n
Bosworth, Edmund, VIII 343
Buchier, Guillaume, II 9
Budaon, *see* Badā'ūn
Buddhism, Buddhists, III 198; IV 9n, 11–12, 19–22, 25–7, 29–31; V 12; VII 70
  see also bakhshī; *toyin*

Būdil Pass, XI 139
Buell, Paul, II 2
Bukhārā, I 211; II 11, 16–17; III 205; VII 68, 73; XI 147
bulqhaq (Tu./Mo. 'rebellion'), V 5
Bulghār, I 209; II 11–12
  see also Volga Bulgars
Buqa-temür, Oirat chief, I 221n
Buqbuq, Delhi amir, VIII 353
Büri, Chaghadayid prince, I 199, 205, 229; II 8, 13
Buscarello di Ghisolfi, Ilkhanid envoy, V 15
Bust, VI 3, 5–7, 16–17; X 10
Buyantu, Mongol Qaghan, XI 142n
Buyids, VII 74
Buzun, Chaghadayid khan, XI 144n
Byzantine empire, Byzantines, I 238; IV 27; V 14; VII 67

Cairo, I 237; III 210; VIII 341–2, 348; XI 131; XII 19
Caliph, Caliphate, I 187, 224–5; II 17; III 202; IV 7; VII 63; XI 150–51
  see also 'Abbasids
Carpini, John of Plano, Franciscan Friar and papal envoy, I 190, 198, 199n, 200; II 7; III 200, 211; IV 2, 8, 10, 14, 24; V 4–7, 11
  see also Ystoria Mongalorum
Caspian Sea, I 187, 210
Caucasus, I 187, 200, 208, 210, 215n, 219–20, 221n, 230, 235; II 8–9; X 2
Chabat, Mongol prince, I 206n
Chaghadai/Chaghatai, Mongol khan, I 186, 189, 194, 196, 199, 211, 214n, 215; II 2, 9–10; X 5–6, 7n
  his *ulus*, I 211, 228–9; II 2–3, 9, 11, 13–14, 17; IV 26; X 5
Chaghadayid khanate, Chaghadayids, I 186, 204–6, 207n, 215, 221, 234, 242–3; II 2, 13, 16; XI 118–20, 122, 125–6, 128–9, 132–3, 142–4, 145n, 147, 149, 154–5
  khans, *see* Alughu; Baraq; Buzun; Changshi; Du'a; Kōpek; Mubārakshāh; Muḥammad b. Bolad; Qara Hülegü; Qazan; Tarmashirin; Tughluq Temür; Yesü Mōngke
  see also Jata; Qutlugh Qocha
Chambā, XI 141
Champa, V 14n
Ch'ang-ch'un, Taoist patriarch, II 20; IV 1, 10n, 18–19, 21; X 2, 9
Changshi, Chaghadayid khan, XI 151
chatr (ceremonial parasol), VI 13, 18; VII 64; IX 187
Chawhāns, IX 188
Chechegen, daughter of Chinggis Khan, I 206n
Chenāb, River, IX 188; X 19; XI 122
Cheng-ting-fu, II 10
Chigil, tribe, VII 66
Chihilgānīs, VIII 345–6
Chin dynasty, II 10
Chin Temür, Mongol governor of Khurāsān, I 213–15, 219n; II 8n
China, Chinese, I 187–8, 191, 194, 205, 210, 220, 227, 229; II 2–3, 5, 9, 11, 17–20; III 196, 212; IV 4, 14–15, 23, 32; V 3, 9–10, 13, 17; VII 66; X 2, 8–9; XI 133, 134n, 142
Chinggis Khan (Temüjin), I 186, 189, 191–2, 194–7, 209–11, 220, 235; II 1–8, 10, 13–14, 20–21; III 204, 206–8, 212; IV 1, 4, 7–9, 12–13, 15–16, 18–22; V 3–11, 17; VI 2, 24; IX 181; X 1–2, 5–9
  meaning of title, V 4
Chitor, XI 125n
Chormaghun, Mongol commander, I 213, 216, 217n, 218–19, 221n; IV 17
Christians
  in Asia, I 224; IV 2–3, 7, 12
    see also Jacobite Church; Nestorians
  Western (Latin), I 225
    see also Franks; Latin West
Circassians (Cherkes), II 12
Clement V, Pope, III 197
Cologne, IV 2
Confucians, III 212; IV 20, 31
Constantine the Great, III 199; IV 27
Constantinople, I 237; XII 28n
Crimea, VII 67
Crusade, Fifth, III 207; IV 5–6
crusaders, III 207, 211; IV 2, 7–8, 21; V 11–12
  see also Franks
Cyprus, III 207, 211; V 11

Damascus, I 230; III 203–4, 206; IV 17; XI 149
Damrīla, IX 187
Dandānqān, battle of, VII 71
Daoists, *see* Taoists
Darband (Derbend), I 209; II 9, 12
Dārkōt, VI 3
dashman (Muslim scholar), IV 12
David of Ashby, Dominican Friar, III 197–8, 200

Dawlatābād, XI 123, 124n, 125, 132n, 143, 144n, 147n; XII 24–7
see also Dēōgīr
Ḍayfa Khātūn, regent of Aleppo, IX 196n
Dayir Bahadur, Mongol commander, I 213
De Rachewiltz, Igor, II 4; V 5
Dēbul, IX 187; X 15
Deccan, XI 119; XII 27
Delhi, I 189, 190n, 205n, 224–5, 229, 240–41; II 20; V 16; VI 3–5, 12, 18, 21; VII 71, 74; VIII *passim*; IX 183–5, 187–9; X 3, 9, 13; XI 118–19, 138, 141, 143, 149; XII *passim*
old city of, XII 24–5, 27, 33n
see also ʿĀdilābād; Jahānpanāh; Sīrī; Tughluqābād
population of, IX 185, 190; XII 18–19, 25, 27
their removal (1327), XI 123, 125n, 147n; XII 25
see also Dawlatābād
Delhi Sultanate, I 239, 241, 243–4; V 16; VI 4; VII 63–4, 69, 72, 75; VIII *passim*; IX *passim*; X 1, 19; XI *passim*; XII *passim*
coinage, IX 187, 195n; XII 26
see also tangas
size of army, XII 20–21
see also 'Khurāsān project'
taxation, XII 23–4, 26
Dēōgīr, XII 24, 30n
see also Dawlatābād
Dēōpālpūr, VIII 352; XI 119; XII 30n
Derbend, *see* Darband
DeWeese, Devin, IV 11
dhimmīs (Christians and Jews under Muslim rule), IV 17, 29
Digby, Simon, XI 123n; XII 29n
Dihistān, VII 66
Dīnawārī, Shaykh Maḥmūd, IV 28
Dīwal, *see* Dēbul
Dnieper, River, IV 6; IX 190
Dōāb, XI 123, 132n, 143; XII 20, 23–4, 26
Dominicans, III 208
see also Andrew of Longjumeau; Ascelin; David of Ashby; Julian; Ricoldo of Montecroce; Simon of Saint-Quentin; Vincent of Beauvais
Doquz Khatun, wife of Hülegü, III 198–200, 202, 207; IV 27
Dörbei Doqshin, Mongol commander, X 5–7, 9, 13–14, 17, 19
Du'a, Chaghadayid khan, XII 19–20
Ḍulucha, XI 138–9, 140n
Dumyak, VI 2, 6–7
dūrbāsh, VI 18

Ebügen, Mongol prince, II 21
Edgü Temür, Mongol commander, I 214
Edward II, king of England, V 16
Egypt, Egyptians, I 187, 189, 225, 227, 237–8; IV 5, 7, 28; V 11–14, 16; VII 67; VIII 341, 343, 346–8, 354; IX 181, 191; XI 149, 153; XII 19, 21, 32n
see also Mamlūks; Mamlūk historians
ejen (Mo. 'master', honorific title), I 203n
el/il(i) (Tu./Mo. 'peace', 'submission'), I 242n; V 5
Elchi Pahlawān, Khwarazmian amir, X 12n
Elchidei, Mongol prince, II 5–6
Elizabeth, wife of István V, king of Hungary, VII 82n
Eljigidei, Mongol commander (fl. 1221), I 212–13
Eljigidei, Mongol commander (d. 1251), I 200, 205n, 213n, 215–17, 219, 221n; II 10; III 204, 207; IV 7, 21; V 11–13, 15
Eltina, wife of Chormaghun, I 217n
Emil, I 211; II 11
erke'ün (Mo. Christian priest), IV 12, 20–21
Erkli Khān, Delhi prince, VIII 356
Eryaruq, Ghaznawid amir, VII 70
Eudes de Châteauroux, papal legate, I 216n
Europe, I 210, 236; II 10; IV 1, 4; VIII 358
see also Christians, Western; Franks; Latin West

Fakhr al-Dīn Masʿūd, Ghurid ruler of Bāmiyān, VI 3, 5
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, VI 10
Fakhr al-Dīn Sālārī, X 15
Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Muslim author, VI 5; VII 70; VIII 343; XII 18
Farāh, VI 6
Farrukhnagar, VIII 352
Fārs, I 242; X 3; XI 131n
Fiey, J.-M., III 203
Firishta, Mughal historian, VIII 345, 355; XI 124n, 133–4
Fīrūz Shāh b. Iltutmish, Sultan of Delhi *see* Rukn al-Dīn Fīrūz Shāh
Fīrūz Shāh, Tughluqid Sultan of Delhi, VIII 357; IX 197n; XI 123n, 146, 153; XII 31n
Fīrūz-i Iltutmish, Khwarazmian prince, X 3n

Fīrūzābād, IX 197n
Fīrūzkūh, VI 1–2, 4–7, 9–13, 15–16, 19–22; VII 72
Fletcher, Joseph, II 4
Foltz, Richard, IV 9
'Forest Peoples', II 7, 12
France, V 11
  see also Louis IX
Franks, I 230; III 197, 209, 211–13; IV 8, 18; V 14
  diplomatic contacts of, with the Mongols, I 225, 238; III 196–8, 207–8, 211–12; IV 7–8, 18, 21; V 8, 11–16
  see also crusaders; Latin West

Gahrwāl, XI 134
Gaikhatu, Ilkhan, I 194n
Galicia (Halicz), IV 5
Gandhāra, XI 139
  see also Peshawar
Ganges/Ganga, River, XI 135; XII 20, 23, 28n
garmsīr, Garmsīr, VI 4, 10, 12; VIII 344
Genoese, V 15
Georgia, Georgians, I 200, 233; III 209; IV 5–6, 17, 27; V 12
Germans, Germany, I 236; II 8, 13
Gharchistān, VI 5, 7, 12, 20
Ghazan, Ilkhan, I 194n, 209, 231–2; II 3, 18; IV 27–9, 31
Ghazna (Ghazni, Ghaznīn), I 242, 244; VI 1–4, 6–10, 12–15, 17–20, 22–4; VII 64, 71, 73, 80n, 81n; X 1, 7, 10, 17; XI 119n, 126n, 129, 133, 148–9, 154
Ghaznawids, VI 1–2; VII 64–5, 74; VIII 341, 343; XII 18
Ghiyāth al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, Timurid historian, XI 121–2
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban (Ulugh Khān), Sultan of Delhi, I 241, 242n; V 16; VII 67–9, 73; VIII 345, 352–8; X 13; XII 19–20, 22
  see also Balaban-i Khwurd
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, Ghurid Sultan, VI 6–19, 21–4; VII 69, 71, 73; VIII 343n
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qāhir (Ibn al-Khalīfat), 'Abbasid pretender, XI 148
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Iltutmish, VIII 346n; IX 184–5
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, Ghurid Sultan, VI 2, 4–6, 9–11, 17n; VII 64, 68
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Pīr Shāh b. Muḥammad, Khwarazmian prince, X 12, 16
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 356, 357n; XI 119, 140n, 141, 146; XII 23, 25
Ghiyāthpūr, XII 19
ghulāms (Turkish slaves), VI 4; VII 63–5; IX 181–2
  see also mamlūks; Turkish slaves
Ghūr, VI 2, 4–6, 12, 23 and *passim*; VIII 344; X 10, 17–18
Ghurids, VI *passim*; VII 64–5, 68, 70, 72, 74; VIII 355; X 10–11; XII 18
Ghūrīs, VI 3, 5, 7–11, 13, 19, 22–5; VII 64; VIII 349; IX 181, 187, 191; X 8, 18
Ghuzz/Oghuz, VI 1–2, 4, 8
Gibb, Sir Hamilton, XI 135
Gilgit, XI 136
Gīrī/Gīrak, X 8
Gogra, River, XI 136
gold, XI 136, 137n; XII 26
gold-silver ratio, in India, XII 26
Golden Horde, I 186–9, 194n, 208–9, 212, 220, 223, 225–7, 233, 237, 239; II 3, 12, 16; III 206, 210; IV 20, 23; V 13
  see also Jochids; Batu; Berke; Möngke Temür; Özbeg; Sartaq; Toqto'a; Ulaghchi
Great Khan, *see* Qa'an
Greeks ('Rūm', 'Rūmīs'), VII 66–7
Grigor of Akner, Armenian historian, I 190n, 226, 232–3; III 199–201, 209
Grousset, René, I 189, 191
Güchülüg/Küchlüg, Naiman prince, IV 7; V 10
Gujarāt, X 16; XI 121, 122n, 143, 151
Gurshāsp, Bahā' al-Dīn, Delhi amir, XI 119, 124n, 125n
Gurzuwān, VI 12, 14–15
Güyüg, Mongol Qaghan, I 186, 194n, 198–202, 208, 215–17; II 10, 12, 20; III 207; IV 2, 4, 7, 12, 15, 22, 24–5, 27; V 4–7, 9, 12–13
  his family, I 202–4
Gwāliyōr, IX 183, 188

Habib, Irfan, VI 4
Ḥabshīs/Ḥabashīs (Africans), VII 72; VIII 345, 348; IX 187
Hai-yün, Buddhist monk, IV 19–20
Haig, Sir Wolseley, XI 124n
Ḥājjī al-Dabīr, historian of Gujarāt, XI 121–5
Ḥājjī Ke'ün, Ilkhanid prince, XI 130–32
al-Ḥākim, Abū'l-'Abbās, 'Abbasid Caliph at Cairo, XI 150n

Hamadān, I 230; II 8; IV 27
Hambly, Gavin, VIII 345–6
al-Ḥamūyī, Sa'd al-Dīn Muḥammad, IV 31
al-Ḥamūyī, Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, IV 31
Ḥanafīs, VI 10; XII 23
Hānsī, XI 148n
Hardy, Peter, VIII 343
Ḥārim, III 202
Ḥasan b. Choban, Ilkhanid amir, XI 126n
Ḥasan Gangū, Baḥmanid Sultan of the Deccan, XI 126n
Ḥasan Qarluq, Sayf al-Dīn, 'Wafā Malik', Khwarazmian amir, V 16n; IX 186–7, 194–5n; X 17–19
Ḥasan-i 'Abd al-Malik, Ghūrī amir, VI 10
Hashtnaghar, X 7n
Ḥawādith al-jāmi'a, IX 182
Haybat Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 353
Ḥaydar Malik, historian of Kashmīr, XI 138n, 139n
Hayton (Het'um) of Gorighos, Armenian prince and historian, I 217n, 230; III 197, 199, 201, 209–10; IV 3, 28, 29n
Hazār Sutūn, palace, XII 25
Heissig, Walther, IV 13
Helena, mother of Constantine the Great, III 199; IV 27
Herat, I 213, 215, 222, 242n; II 11; VI 3, 6, 14–16, 20, 22, 24; X 11; XI 129n, 149, 155
see also 'Izz al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Kharmīl; Kartids
Het'um of Gorighos, Armenian prince, *see* Hayton
Het'um I, king of Lesser Armenia, III 204, 209–10; IV 3, 15; V 16
Himalayas, X 8; XI 135
see also Qarāchīl
Ḥimṣ, battle of (1260), I 187
Hindu, Mongol commander, XI 119
Hindū Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 344; IX 187
Hindu Kush, X 9; XI 156
Hindus, Hindu states, VI 2, 18; VII 70–71; IX 188–9; X 10, 13, 16; XI 134, 143; XII 20–22, 25
Hindūstān, *see* India
in the narrower sense (territory E. of the Ganges), VIII 346; IX 185
Hirapur, XI 139
Hodivala, S.H., XI 145
Hö'elün, mother of Chinggis Khan, II 6, 19
hoi-yin irgen, *see* 'Forest Peoples'
Holy City, *see* Jerusalem
Holy Land, IV 3
Honorius III, Pope, IV 5–6
Honorius IV, Pope, IV 21
Hoqu, Mongol prince, I 206n
horse trade, XI 133
Howorth, Sir Henry, I 195, 211n
Hsi-Hsia, kingdom of, II 8
see also Tangut
Hülechü, Mongol amir, XI 152
Hülegü, Ilkhan, I 187, 190, 201, 206n, 208, 215, 217, 220–27, 230–36, 238–42; II 2, 16–18; III *passim*; IV 3, 18, 27, 30–31; V 8–9, 13, 16; XI 152n; XII 20
and Christianity, III *passim*
Humphrey, Caroline, IV 18
Hungary, Hungarians, I 236; II 8–9; III 196; V 6; VII 67
see also Béla IV; Mājār
hunting, XII 21, 29n
Husain, A. Mahdi, XI 119–20, 123, 126, 128, 131, 134–5, 141, 148
Ḥusām al-Dīn 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī, lord of Kālyūn, VI 14–15
Ḥusām al-Dīn Ḥasan-i 'Abd al-Malik, Ghūrī amir, VI 19, 23
Ḥusayn, Chaghadayid amir and rival of Temür, XI 155n
Ḥusayn al-Ghūrī, lord of Tigīnābād, VI 11
Ḥusayn al-Marghanī, VI 11n

Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir, Mamlūk historian, I 237n
Ibn Abī'l-Faḍā'il, al-Mufaḍḍal, Coptic historian, IX 182; XII 19, 21
Ibn al-'Amīd, Coptic historian, I 218; III 203
Ibn al-Athīr, Muslim historian, VI 2, 7–11, 13; VII 73; X 3, 11
Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Muslim historian, IX 182
Ibn al-Jazarī, Mamlūk historian, XI 156
Ibn al-Rabī', Majd al-Dīn, caliphal envoy, VI 13
Ibn al-Sā'ī, historian of Baghdad, IX 182
Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, VII 68–9, 73; VIII 345n, 357; IX 182, 185, 187, 189–90; XI 120, 124n, 126–8, 131–7, 141, 143, 147–9, 151, 155n; XII 19, 25, 27
Ibn Bībī, Seljükid historian, I 216, 218; V 6
Ibn Ḥaṣṣūl, Muslim author, VII 69
Ibn Kharmīl, *see* 'Izz al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Kharmīl
Ibn Shaddād, 'Izz al-Dīn, Mamlūk historian, I 226, 227n; II 16n
Ibn Wāṣil, Muslim historian, IX 181

Ibn Zarkūb, XI 130n
Ikhshidids, VIII 341
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Aybeg, Ḫātam Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 353–5
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Altunapa, Delhi amir, IX 185–6, 188–9, 194n, 196n
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin, Delhi amir, VIII 346; IX 186–9, 196n; X 19n
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Aytegin-i *mūī-yi darāz*, Amīn Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 349, 350n, 353
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Begbars, Delhi amir, VIII 353
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Kharpūst, Ghūrī amir, VI 23; X 11n
Ikhtiyār al-Mulk Abū Bakr Ḥabash, VIII 347n
Ili, River, II 11
Ilkhans, Ilkhanate, I 187–9, 208–9, 221–2, 231, 235, 238, 242–3; II 2–3, 14; III 196; IV 8, 27–9; V 13–15; XI 126, 128–9, 142, 154–6
see also Abaqa; Abū Saʿīd; Aḥmad-Tegüder; Arghun; Baidu; Gaikhatu; Ghazan; Hūlegū; Mūsā; Öljeitū
title, I 231–2; II 17
Iltutmish, *see* Shams al-Dīn
ʿImād al-Dīn Rayhān, Delhi amir, VIII 350
ʿImād al-Dīn ʿUmar b. al-Ḥusayn al-Fīwārī, Ghurid governor of Balkh, VI 14–15, 22, 24
ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī ʿBāʿalī', Ghūrī amir, VI 23n
ʿImād al-Mulk, Delhi amir, VIII 352
ʿImād al-Mulk Sartīz, Delhi amir, VIII 357
India, I 192, 210, 238, 240–44; V 16; VI 2–6, 12, 18, 20; VII *passim*; VIII *passim*; IX 181, 190; X *passim*; XI *passim*
Indians, as slaves of the Sultans of Delhi, VIII 344–5, 350n, 356
Indrapat, XII 19, 23
Indrī, XI 123
Indus, River, I 239; V 17; VI 2, 17–18; X 7, 10, 12n, 14–15, 17; XI 124, 128, 133, 139, 142, 154
battle on the (1221), X 1, 6, 12
ini (Mo. junior kinsman), I 195n; III 210
injü (Mo. personal property), II 6
Innocent IV, Pope, I 216n; IV 1, 12; V 5–7
Iqbāl, Mongol commander, XI 153n
iqṭāʿ, VI 4, 8, 12–14, 23; VIII 340, 347, 349–50, 352, 353n, 354n, 357, 358n; IX 183–4, 186–8, 191; XII 20
Iran, I 187, 190, 194, 200, 208–12, 219–23, 226–7, 229, 234–5, 237–9, 244; IV 3; X 1, 3, 12, 14, 16; XII 26
see also Persia
Iraq, I 187; 216; II 3; III 196; V 16; VI 23; X 1; XI 128, 130n, 149
Iraq, Persian (ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam), X 18
Irtysh, River, II 12; VII 77n; IX 190
ʿIṣāmī, VIII 345n, 346, 355; IX 186; XI 119–20, 123–5, 126n, 133, 147; XII 24–5, 28n
his *Futūḥ al-salāṭīn*, XI 119
Isfizār, VI 6, 15
Ismāʿīl, Khalaj chief, VI 10, 14
Ismāʿīlīs, II 17; VI 5
Isolo da Anastasio, V 15
Issik Kul, VII 66, 74
Istiya, VI 1
Ivané, Georgian Constable, IV 5
ʿIzz al-Dīn Balaban Küshlü Khān, I 240, 242n; VIII 347, 349–51, 358; IX 186, 190
ʿIzz al-Dīn Childeg b. Toghril, VI 16
ʿIzz al-Dīn Ḥusayn, Ghurid prince, VI 1
ʿIzz al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Kharmīl, VI 14–16
ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Marghanī, VI 11n

Jacobite Church, III 202
Jagchid, Sechin, IV 25
Jahānpanāh, XII 25
al-Jāḥiẓ, Muslim author, VII 70
Jahn, Karl, I 243; XI 138, 142
Jajnēr, X 16, 19, 20n
Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Sām, Ghurid Sultan of Bāmiyān, VI 6, 8–9, 14, 17, 19–20
Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 343, 355–6; XI 152; XII 19, 31n
Jalāl al-Dīn Masʿūd b. Iltutmish, Delhi prince, I 240; VIII 351
Jalāl al-Dīn Mingbirnī (?), Khwārazmshāh, VI 3, 23–4; X *passim*
Jālōr, XII 22
Jām, VI 1
Jamāl al-Dīn Yāqūt, Delhi amir, VII 72; VIII 348–9; IX 187–8, 195n
Jamāl Qarshī, I 188n
Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh, I 188, 228; II 4–5; X 5
see also Rashīd al-Dīn
Jamuqa, Mongol chief, V 4
Jarūm, VI 3
Jata (eastern Chaghadayid Mongols), XI 156
Jazīra, X 19
Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar, IV 30
Jebe, Mongol commander, I 210; IV 5, 7; V 12

Jerusalem, III 197; IV 7; V 15; XII 28n
kingdom of, III 197
Jhēlum, River, X 10, 19; XI 122, 138
jizya (Islamic poll tax), IV 23, 29; XII 24, 31n
Jochi, son of Chinggis Khan, I 186, 196, 199, 209, 213; II 1–2, 7–8
his descendants, *see* Jochids
his *ulus*, I 203n, 209–11, 221, 223–4; II 5, 8, 11–13, 22
Jochids, I 189, 201, 203–8, 212, 214, 218–19, 221n, 222, 224, 226, 235, 242, 243n, 244; II 3, 12–13, 16–18
territory of, I 203, 207, 220
see also Golden Horde
Jochi Qasar, brother of Chinggis Khan, II 5–6, 20
John the Hungarian, Ilkhanid envoy, III 198
Joinville, John of, III 208, 211
Jonarāja, historian of Kashmīr, XI 137, 139–40
his *Dvitīya Rājataraṅginī*, XI 139–40
Judaism, Jews, III 204, 206; IV 9, 16
Julian, Hungarian Dominican Friar, V 6, 10
Jumna, River, *see* Yamuna
Jumughur, Ilkhanid prince, I 234
Junaydī, Niẓām al-Mulk, Delhi vizier, IX 184–5, 188
Junjudar, Mongol commander, I 242
Jurchen-Chin, V 10
see also Chin dynasty
Jurmās, VI 1, 5, 6n
Juwaynī, 'Alā' al-Dīn Aṭā Malik, Persian historian, I 188–9, 191–2, 195, 197–202, 203n, 204–5, 207, 209–10, 214–15, 229, 232; II 1–2, 5, 7, 10–13; III 205, 208; IV 1, 7, 9, 15, 17, 20, 25–6; V 5, 7, 9; VI 3, 16n; X 3, 5–7, 9, 13, 15, 17
see also Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā
Jūzjānī, Minhāj al-Dīn, Persian historian, I 189, 196, 205, 207, 212, 220, 224, 229, 240–41; II 11; IV 23, 25–6; V 16–17; VI 1n, 3–5, 7, 10–13, 16–19, 22, 24; VII 65, 67–70, 73–4; VIII 343–4, 346–9, 351–2, 358; IX 183–4, 187, 190; X 3, 7–8, 11, 13–14, 17–19; XII 21–2
see also Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī

Kābar, XII 23
Kabīr Khān Ayāz, Delhi amir, VIII 346n; IX 184–5, 188; X 1n
Kābul, VI 17; X 7–8, 11; XI 154n, 155n
Kābul River, X 7n, 11; XI 139
Kāfiristān, X 8
K'ai-p'ing, I 229; V 13
Kaithal, IX 189
Kalānaur, XI 119, 124, 134
Kalhana, historian of Kashmīr, XI 138
Kalka, River, battle of the, IV 5, 6n
Kālyūn, I 213; VI 15
Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Burhān, grand qadi of Delhi, XI 148n
Kāmrūd (Assam), X 8
Kanauj, IX 188, 195n; XI 143; XII 28n, 32n
Kāngra, *see* Nagarkōt
Kanpil, VIII 358
Kara, VIII 355–6
Karāmiyya, Islamic sect, VI 10
Karin (Erzurum), I 217
kārkhāna (workshop), I 191; II 8, 11, 18; XII 23
Kartids, dynasty, VI 24; XI 155n
Kashgar, IV 7; VII 66
Kashīs, a tribe of Ghūr, VI 11
Kashmīr, I 242; X 18; XI 135–42
Katēhr (Rohilkhand), VII 80n; XII 29n
Katūr, X 7–8
Kaykā'ūs II, 'Izz al-Dīn, Seljük Sultan of Rūm, I 238
Kaykhusraw b. Muḥammad, Delhi prince, VIII 354n
Kaykhusraw II, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Seljük Sultan of Rūm, I 218
Kazakhstan, I 203
Kereyid/Kerait, tribe, III 198, 200, 208; IV 3; V 9
Kerülen, River, I 203–4; II 14
Keshli Khān, *see* Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg Keshli Khān
Khalaj, tribe, VI 4, 8, 10–11; VIII 344; IX 181; X 8, 18
khāliṣa (state land), XII 23
Khaljīs, VIII 341, 355–6, 358; XI 118; XII 24–5, 31n
see also 'Alā' al-Dīn; Jalāl al-Dīn; Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh
'Khān-i Khānān', son of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī, VIII 356
Khanbaligh, II 18
kharāj (land tax), XII 23–4
Kharvash/Kharfash, Ghūrī amir, VI 7
Khaynām (Hainan), V 14n
Khaysār, VI 24
Khazanov, Anatoly, IV 13
Khazars, IV 9
Khiljīs, *see* Khaljīs
Khitā, XI 127
see also China

Khitans, I 193; IV 10; V 17; VII 66–7, 71; **IX 190**
Khokhars, X 10
Khotan, VII 66
Khudāwandzāda Ghiyāth al-Dīn, XI 148
Khudāwandzāda Qawwām al-Dīn, qadi of **Tirmid**, XI 147–8, 153n
Khurāsān, I 210, 212–13, 215, 229, 239, **242, 244**; V 17; VI 2–4, 15–16; **VIII 344**; X 3; XI 127–9, 132–4, **147, 149–50**, 154–5; XII 19
  broader meaning of, XI 128–9
'Khurāsān project', XI 128–9, 131–4, 147, **149; XII** 21, 25–7, 30n
Khurasanians, XI 150, 152
khushdāshiyya, VIII 351
Khusraw Khān, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 356
Khusraw Malik, XI 137n
Khuttalān, XI 154
Khūzistān, X 16n
Khwāja Ibrāhīm b. Rashīd al-Dīn, governor **of Shīrāz**, XI 129, 130n
Khwāja Jahān, Delhi vizier, XI 152
Khwārazm/Khwārizm, I 196, 209–10, 213, **215; II 8**, 11; VI 2, 7, 9, 12, 14; **VII 66**, 68; IX 181, 190; XI 149
Khwarazmians, IV 7; V 15; VI 3, 14–16, **18–24**; **VII** 67; IX 186; X *passim*
Khwārazmshāhs, II 10, 12; IV 7, 12; **V 10–11**; VI 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–23; **VII 68**, 74; IX 197n; X *passim*
  see also **'Alā'** al-Dīn Muḥammad; Jalāl **al-Dīn** Mingbirnī; Tekish
Kīdān, VI 19
Kīlī, XII 20, 28n
Kīlōkhrī, VIII 356; IX 185; XII 19, **24**, 31n
Kimek, tribe, VII 66, 74, 77n; IX 190
'King David', III 207; IV 5–6
  see also **Pr**ester John
Kirakos Ganjakec'i, Armenian historian, **I 190n**, 216–17, 223, 227–8, 230; **III 198**, 200, 202–3, 206; IV 3n, 5, **17, 22, 24**
Kirghiz/Qirghiz, tribe, II 7; VII, 66
Kirmān, I, 242; X 2–3, 16
Kishlū Khān, *see* Küshlü Khān
Kit-buqa/Ked-buqa, Mongol commander, **I 222**, 223n; III 206, 209
Kököchü, *see* Teb Tenggeri
Kōl, VIII 354n; XII 30n
Kölgen, son of Chinggis Khan, I 191n, **192n; II** 6–7, 11, 21
Köpek, Chaghadayid commander, XII 31n
Köpek/Kebek, Chaghadayid khan, XI 151n
Korea, III 196
  see also Koryŏ
Körgüz, Mongol governor of Khurāsān, I 214–16, 219n
Koryŏ, II 13n
Kösedagh, battle of, I 218
Koṭā, queen of Kashmīr, XI 140
Köten/Ködön, Mongol prince, I 197n, 204n; II 16, 21, 24n
  his descendants, II 21–22
Küchlüg, *see* Güchülüg
Kuhrām (Ghuram), IX 185
Kūjāh (Gujrat, in the Panjāb), I 240; IX 186; X 19; XI 122n
Kul-bolad, Mongol commander, I 214
Kül-tegin, Turkish Qaghan, I 193
Kulārjak, XI 134n
Kullūr (Kullūrkōt), X 12
Kulū, XI 141, 142n
Külün Nor, II 5
Kumaon, XI 134
Kur, River, I 233
Kurds, Kurdistān, I 224n; X 1
Kurramān, VI 4, 8–9; X 6, 7n, 18
Küshlü Khān, Shamsī, Delhi amir, *see* 'Izz al-Dīn Balaban Küshlü Khān
Küshlü Khān, Delhi amir under the Tughluqids, XI 125n, 140n

Ladakh, XI 136–7, 139, 141
Lahore, I 240, 242; V 17; VI 2, 12, 17–18; VII 70; VIII 351–2; IX 183, 188; X 10, 14–15, 17, 19, 20n; XI 119, 123, 129, 134, 152; XII 18, 30n
Lakhnawtī, VIII 353; IX 187, 195n; X 8; XI 123
  see also Bengal
Lashkar-i Bazar, VII 65
Latin Kingdom *see* Jerusalem, kingdom of
Latin West, Latins, I 225, 236, 238; II 2, 18; III *passim*; IV 21; V 11–13, 15
  see also Franks, diplomatic contacts of, with the Mongols
Lattimore, Owen, V 10
levirate, IV 15
Liao dynasty, I 194n; VII 66; IX 190, 196n
Liao-tung, II 22
Little Tibet (Baltistān), XI 142
Liu P'ing-chung, IV 30
Louis IX, king of France (St. Louis), I 207n, 236; III 196–7, 204, 207–9, 211–12; IV 2, 7, 18, 21; V 8–9, 11–13, 15
Lūchak, V 14n
Lyons, Second Council of (1274), III 197

Ma'bar, XI 129n, 132n, 143, 148, 152; XII 27, 30n, 32n
Mādīn, VI 1, 21
Maghrib, V 14
Maḥmūd of Ghazna, VII 64–5, 68, 71; XI 145
Maḥmūd Bughra Khān b. Balaban, Sultan of Bengal, VIII 354n
Mājār (Hungarians), VII 66
Majd al-Dīn, malik of Kālyūn, I 213
Makrān, X 1, 11, 15n, 16
Malik Kāfūr Hazārdīnārī, Delhi amir, VIII 356; XII 22
Malik Kashmīr, Delhi amir, XI 140n
Malikpūr, IX 197n; X 13
Mālwa, IX 188
mamlūks, VII 63; VIII *passim*; IX 181; X 10–11
  their offspring, VIII 353–4
  see also ghulāms; Turkish slaves
Mamlūk historians, I 189, 218, 225–6, 233, 244; II 8, 16
Mamlūks (of Egypt), Mamlūk Sultanate, I 187, 189, 233, 237–8; III 196, 209–10; IV 8, 28; V 8, 13; VII 65; VIII 341, 344, 348; XI 131, 132n
  see also Baybars; al-Nāṣir Muḥammad; Qalāwūn
Manbij, III 202
Manchuria, II 5, 19
Mandēsh, VI 1, 2n
Mandōr, VII 68; VIII 347n
Manichaeans, Manichaeism, IV 9; VII 71
Manggala, Mongol prince, II 22
Marāgha, I 209; II 8, 16
Marco Polo, I 233n, 242; II 18, 21; III 201; IV 11, 14; V 14n
  his father and uncle, III 201
Marghanī, Ghūrī clan, VI 11, 24
Maricq, André, VI 1
Marw/Merv, VI 11
Mastung, I 239; X 18
Mas'ūd I b. Maḥmūd, Ghaznawid Sultan, VII 70–71, 80n; VIII 348n; XI 145
Matthew Paris, IV 2
Māwarā' al-nahr, I 190n, 229, 235n; XI, 118, 133, 144–5, 148–9, 151–6; *see also* Transoxiana
al-Mawṣil, *see* Mosul
Maymana, VI 15
Mayyāfāriqīn, I 221n; III 202, 209
Māzandarān, I 213; VI 15
Mediterranean, V 15
Melik, Mongol prince, I 204n, 205
Merkit, tribe, I 196; V 9–10
Mesopotamia, VII 68
Mēwāt, I 241n; VIII 358
Michael VIII, Byzantine Emperor, I 238
Mingqan, Jochid prince, I 232
Mīr-i Khwurd, XI 137
Mīrat (Meerut), VIII 350n; XI 120–21; XII 20, 30n
Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt, XI 136, 137n, 140n
Mochi, Chaghadayid prince, I 204n
Moghulistān, XI 149–50
Möngke, Mongol Qaghan, I 186, 189, 191, 194n, 197, 200–202, 204–8, 212, 215, 219–24, 226–33, 236, 240–41; II 2, 9, 16–17, 21; III 200, 205, 210; IV 2–3, 11–12, 20, 22, 24–7, 31; V 8, 13, 15; VI 24
Möngke Temür, khan of the Golden Horde, IV 23
Mongolia, I 187–8, 194, 198, 204, 206, 215, 227, 231, 234–5, 241; II 3, 5, 7–8, 17–20, 22; III 210; V 13, 17; VII 66; X 7
Mongols, I-V *passim*; VI 2, 24; VII 66–8, 71; VIII 341, 345, 351–2; IX 181, 189–90, 195n; X *passim*; XII 21
  attacks on India, VIII 353, 354n; X-XI *passim*; XII 18–20, 22–3
  and Buddhists, III 198, 205; IV 19, 21–2, 25–7, 29–31; V 12
  and Christians, III *passim*; IV 3–8, 11, 15, 17–18, 20–25, 27–9; V 11–12, 15
  conversion of
    to Buddhism, IV 27
    to Christianity, I 223
    to Islam, I 201n, 206, 225; III 208; IV 17, 23, 28–9, 31; XI 145, 150–51
  idea of world-domination, III 208, 211–12; IV 4; V *passim*
  immigrants to India, VIII 345, 354; XI 149–53; XII 19
    see also neo-Muslims
  and magic, III 204; IV 30–31
  and Muslims, I 201n; III 199, 204–5; IV 7, 14, 16–17, 20, 23–30; V 12, 16–17
  and the religious classes, III 204–6; IV 18–23
  and Taoists, IV 18–19, 21–22, 30
  inheritance customs, I 193–5
  'religious toleration' of, III 204; IV 10, 14–17
Moravia, V 6
Moreland, W.H., XII 24, 31n
Morgan, David, V 3
Mosul, I 233; V 15

Mu'ayyad al-Mulk Muḥammad Sajzī, Ghurid vizier, VI 7–10, 12–13, 19
Mubārakshāh, Chaghadayid khan, I 194n, 206
Mubārakshāh, a notable of Samarqand, XI 147
al-Mufaḍḍal, *see* Ibn Abī'l-Faḍā'il
Muhadhdhab al-Dīn, Delhi vizier, VII 72; VIII 346
Muḥammad al-Marghanī, VI 11
Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Bashīr, Ghūrī amir, VI 22
Muḥammad b. Bakhtiyār, Khalaj amir, VII 76n
Muḥammad b. Balaban, Delhi prince, VIII 354n
Muḥammad b. Bolad, Chaghadayid khan, XI 144n
Muḥammad b. Tekish, *see* 'Alā' al-Dīn
Muḥammad b. Tughluq, Sultan of Delhi VIII 342n, 357; XI *passim*; XII 20–27; *see also* 'Khurāsān project'; Qarāchīl expedition
Mu'izz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh b. Iltutmish, Sultan of Delhi, VII 72; VIII 346, 349; IX 182, 188–91, 197n
Mu'izz al-Dīn Ḥusayn, Kartid malik of Herat, XI 155
Mu'izz al-Dīn Kayqubād, Sultan of Delhi, VII 80n; VIII 343, 354–5; XII 24
Mu'izz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, Ghurid Sultan, VI 2–8, 12, 14, 17, 20, 22; VII 64, 68–9, 71–3; VIII 340–41, 343n; IX 197n; X 10; XII 18
al-Mujāhid 'Alī, Rasulid ruler of the Yemen, XI 131n
Mujīr al-Dīn Abū Rijā, Delhi amir, XI 124
Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī, XI 130
Multān, I 240, 241n, 242; VIII 352; IX 188; X 9n, 10–11, 13–15, 17; XI 147–8
Mūnk (Baljuan), XI 154, 155n
Muqali, Mongol commander, IV 19
Murghāb, River, I 239
Mūsā, Ilkhan, XI 131
Muslims, III 201–4, 206–7, 209–10, 212; IV 5, 7, 12, 16–17; V 9, 12
  in China, IV 14, 16, 27

Nagarkōt, XI 124n, 134n, 141, 142n, 149n
Nāgawr, VIII 350
Nahrwāla (Anhilvāra, Patan), X 15n, 16
nā'ib (viceroy, in the Delhi Sultanate), V 16; VIII 344, 349, 351; IX 189, 191
nā'ib-i lashgar (deputy commander-in-chief of the army), IX 186, 188
Naiman, tribe, II 7; V 9–10
Namo, Kashmiri Buddhist, IV 25
Nandana, IX 186; X 11–12, 17, 19
Nangiyas (South China), II 18; V 15
Nangrahār, VI 8; X 7n, 8n
Naqu, Mongol prince, I 203, 205
al-Nasawī, Muslim historian, V 4; VI 3, 20; X 3, 8, 11–18
al-Nāṣir, 'Abbasid Caliph, VI 2, 13
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, Mamlūk Sultan of Egypt, XI 131; XII 21
Nāṣir al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Sūrī, Ghurid prince, VI 21
Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Iltutmish, IX 183
Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh b. Iltutmish, Sultan of Delhi, I 239–41; VII 73; VIII 344, 349, 351–2, 354n; IX 182–4, 193n
Nāṣir al-Dīn, preacher of Tirmid, XI 148
Naṣīr al-Dīn Ḥusayn, VI 19; IX 193n
Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad, malik of Sīstān, I 239, 242
Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan Qarluq, ruler of Binbān, V 16
Nāṣir al-Dīn Qubacha, ruler of Sind, VI 18; X 10–18
Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, IV 30
Nawrūz, Mongol amir, IV 29
Nawrūz Küregen, son-in-law of Tarmashirin, XI 151n, 153
Nayan, Mongol prince, II 21–2
Negübei, Delhi amir, XI 137
Negüder, Mongol commander, I 239, 242; II 17; XI 138n
Negüderis, I 239, 242–4; II 17; XI 154; XII 19
  see also Qaraunas
neo-Muslims, XI 152
Nepal, XI 141
nerge (Mo. hunting-ring), I 205
Nestorianism, Nestorian Christians, III 199–200, 205, 207–8, 210; IV 2, 4, 24–5, 30; VII 71
Ngan-si (Si-ngan), II 22
Nigam, S.B.P., VIII 350
Nikonian Chronicle, IV 6n
Nīshāpūr, V 5; VI 6, 14, 21; VII 69
Niẓām al-Dīn, Delhi amir, VIII 354–5
Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad, Mughal historian, VIII 345
Niẓām al-Dīn Muḥammad, VI 18
Niẓām al-Dīn Shāh, I 215–16
Niẓām al-Mulk, Seljükid vizier, VII 70
Niẓām-i Shāmī, Timurid historian, XI 121–2

Normans, VIII 358
Nosal, Mongol governor of Khurāsān, I 214
Novgorod Sviatopolch, IV 5
noyan (Mo. commander), I 192, 205
Nuṣrat al-Dīn Shīr Khān, *see* Shīr Khān
Nuṣrat al-Dīn Tāīsī, Delhi amir, IX 185
al-Nuwayrī, Mamlūk historian, I 218, 244

Ocean Sea, V 15
Oghul Qaimish, wife of Güyüg, I 203n, 205; V 12
Ögödei/Ögedei, Mongol Qaghan, I 186, 188, 196–8, 211, 213–18, 219n, 236; II, 2, 9, 11–12, 20–21, 23–4; IV 17, 20, 22–3; V 6, 10; X 6
his descendants, I 186, 202–6, 215, 217–18, 221; II 2, 15–16
his *ulus* I 211; II 2, 11
Oirat/Oyirad, tribe, I 221n; II 7
Ölberli, tribe, VII 67, 74, 77n; IX 182, 190, 196n
Öljeitü, Ilkhan, I 208; II 18; IV 29; V 14–15; XI 129, 154
Onan/Onon, River, I 203; II 14; V 10
Önggüt, tribe, II 6; IV 3
Orbelian/Orbelean, Smbat, Armenian prince, III 210; IV 3
Orbelian/Orbelean, Step'annos (Stephan), Armenian historian, I 233n; III 199, 205, 208–10; IV 3
Orda, khan of the White Horde, I 203n, 221n, 244; II 5
ordo/orda (Tu./Mo. encampment, residence), I 193, 205, 213–15, 222, 239; II 7
the 'Great *Ordas*', II 14, 20
Orqina, wife of Qara Hülegü, I 206, 221n, 228–9; IV 25–6
Örüg Temür, Mongol prince, II 5
Orus, Mongol commander, XI 119
ot-chigin (Mo. 'hearth-child'), II 14
Outremer, V 16
Oxus, River (Āmūya, Amū-daryā), I 210–11, 216, 222, 235, 239; II 16; X 7, 9; XI 133, 143, 154
Özbeg (Ūzbek), khan of the Golden Horde, I 208–9, 219

paiza (tablet of authority), III 3; V 3, 17
Paklī (Hazara District), XI 136, 138n
Palestine, I 187, 230, 236; IV 2
Pandkhūr, X 7
Panjāb (Punjab), I 239–40; VI 4, 17; VII 64; IX 189; X 1, 3, 6, 10, 13; XI 138–9, 141; XII 18–19
parasol, *see chatr*
Parwān, River, X 8n, 9n
Pashāī, I 242; XI 132n
Pasraur, X 14
Patiyālī, VIII 358
Pax Mongolica, V 17
Pechenegs, I 193
Pelliot, Paul, I 203n, 217
Persia, II 2–3, 9, 16, 18; IV 29; V 11; VII 74; XI 130–31
see also Iran
Persians, XI 127
see also Tājīks
Peshawar, VI 17, 23; X 7n, 9, 11; XI 119, 125, 134, 139
'phags-pa (Mongolian square script), IV 22
Philip IV (the Fair), king of France, V 14–16
Pir Panjal Pass, XI 139n
Pisans, V 15
Poland, I 236; V 6
polo (*chawgān*), VI 18
Prester John, III 205; IV 2, 5

Qa'an/Qaghan (Tu./Mo. Great Khan), I 186, 191–2, 197–9, 201–8, 213, 218, 220, 231–5; II 1–3, 9, 16, 18, 21–22; III 200–201; IV 9–10, 14, 22, 27, 30; V 13–14, 17; VIII 352
see also Güyüg; Möngke; Ögödei; Qubilai; Temür Öljeitü
Qachi'un, brother of Chinggis Khan, II 5
Qadaghan/Ghadaqan, Mongol commander, I 221n, 232n
Qadan, Mongol prince, I 204n, 205
Qadan (Qadaqai), Mongol prince, I 199n
Qadaq, IV 25
Qadaqchi, Chaghadayid prince, I 205, 206n
Qādis, VI 12
Qadr Khān, governor of Bengal, XII 32n
Qaidu, Mongol khan, I 188n; II 3, 14, 19; XII 19
Qailar, River, II 5
Qais, XI 131n
Qal'at Ja'bār, III 202
Qal'at Najm, III 202
Qalāwūn/Qalā'ūn, al-Manṣūr Sayf al-Dīn, Mamlūk Sultan, V 13; VIII 341
Qamar al-Dīn Kurramānī, X 11–12
Qangli, tribe, II 13, 16n; VII 67
Qara Hülegü, Chaghadayid khan, I 194n, 204n, 206, 223n; X 5
Qara-buqa, Mongol commander, I 234n
Qarachar, Mongol commander and ancestor of Temür, X 5–6

Qarāchīl (Himalayas), X 8; XI 124n, 128, 132–7, 140–42, 147, 153
Qarāchīl expedition, XI 132–43; XII 26, 32n
Qarakhanids, VII 64, 66, 68, 74
Qara-Khitan/-Khitai, IV 7; V 10; VI 1–3, 15–16, 19n, 21; VII 66–8, 71–2; IX 189–90
Qaraqorum, I 228–30, 240n; II 12, 15
Qara-qum steppe, II 13n
Qaraqush Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 349; IX 188–9
Qaraunas, II 17; XI 154n
see also Negüderis
Qayaligh, I 209; II 11
Qayi, tribe, VII 66
Qazaghan, Chaghadayid amir, XI 151, 154–6
Qazan, Chaghadayid khan, XI 144n, 151, 154
Qilich Arslan IV, Rukn al-Dīn, Seljük Sultan of Rūm, I 238
Qilich Khān b. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Jānī, Delhi amir, VIII 344n
Qinnawj, *see* Kanauj
Qipchaq/Cumans/Polovtsy, IV 5, 6n, 16n; V 10; VII 67, 77n; IX 190
Qipchaq steppe, I 198, 209–10, 213; II 11–12; IX 195n
Qiran Ṣafdar Malik, VIII 357
Qitbugha, Mongol amir, XI 153
Qobuq, River, I 211; II 11
qol-un ulus, *see ulus* of the centre
Qongqiran, Mongol prince, I 203n, 205
Qonqurtaqai, I 203
qorchi (Mo. guard), I 221n
qubchur (Mo. poll tax), IV 22–3
Qubilai, Mongol Qaghan, I 187–8, 228–30, 234; II 2–3, 7, 10, 17–23; III 196, 201, 205, 212; IV 11, 14, 16, 22–3, 27, 30, 32; V 13–14
Qucha (Khoja, Qocho), Mongol prince, I 203, 205
Qūhistān, VI 5
Quli, Jochid prince, I 221, 226, 232, 244
qumis (Tu./Mo. fermented mare's milk), IV 17
Qunan, Mongol commander, I 219n
Qunduz, XI 154n
quriltai (Mo. imperial assembly), I 192, 197, 199, 202, 204, 213
Quṭb al-Dīn Aybeg, Turkish amir and ruler of Muslim India, VI 4–5, 12, 17–18; VII 64, 69–70, 73–4; VIII 341, 343n; X 10, 16n; XII 18
Quṭb al-Dīn Ḥasan b. ʿAlī b. Abī ʿAlī 'Bāʿalī', Ghūrī amir, VI 22–3; VIII 344, 346, 350; IX 186, 188
Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh Khaljī, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 356; XI 119; XII 23, 25, 29n, 31n
Qutlugh Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 344, 351
Qutlugh Qocha/Khwāja, Chaghadayid prince, XI 125n; XII 20, 25, 28n
Qutlugh Temür, Chaghadayid amir, XI 154n
Qutlughtegin, Turkish slave officer, VI 20

Rabban-ata, Simeon, Nestorian monk, IV 17, 30
Rabie, Hassanein, VIII 343
Raḍiyya bint Iltutmish, Sultan of Delhi, VII 71–2; VIII 346–9; IX *passim*
Rāna Shatra, ruler of the Salt Range, X 11
Ranthanbōr, VIII 358; IX 188
Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-allāh al-Hamadānī, Ilkhanid vizier and Persian historian, I 188, 190–91, 194n, 195–200, 202, 204–5, 209, 211, 216, 221–2, 226–31, 242; II 1, 5, 11–12, 17, 19, 21–24; III 200; IV 13, 28, 31; V 14; VIII 351n; X 5; XI 129
his sons, XI 130n
see also Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh
Ratchnevsky, Paul, IV 21
Raverty, H.G., VI 7n, 8n, 12n, 24
Ravi, River, X 10
Rayy, X 16n
Ricoldo of Montecroce, Dominican Friar, III 197, 201–2; IV 27
Rinchana, king of Kashmīr, XI 140n
Roger Bacon, IV 30
Rohilkhand, *see* Katēhr
Rossabi, Morris, II 4
Rubruck, William of, Franciscan Friar, I 186, 190, 200, 205, 207, 220, 240n; II 1, 7–9, 13–14; III 204–6, 209; IV 2, 10–12, 14, 19, 23–6, 30; V 8–9, 11, 15; VII 67
Rukn al-Dīn, Egyptian Grand Shaykh, XI 150n
Rukn al-Dīn Fīrūz Shāh b. Iltutmish, Sultan of Delhi, VII 72; VIII 346, 348; IX 182–7, 193, 197n
Rukn al-Dīn Ghūrīshānastī, Khwarazmian prince, VI 23
Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Īrān Shāh b. Muḥammad, Ghurid prince, VI 7, 11–12, 22
Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān al-Marghanī, VI 11, 24
Rūm, V 6, 14, 17; VII 66; XI 130n
see also Anatolia; Greeks

Rus′, Russia, I 192n, 198, 200, 210, 218; II 12; IV 5, 6n, 15, 20, 23; V 12; VII 77n
Rus′/Russian Church, IV 20, 23
Rusudan, queen of Georgia, IV 6
Ryan, James, IV 1

Sabzawār, X 12n
Ṣadr-i Jahān, qadi of Samarqand, XI 148
Sadun, Armenian prince, III 203
al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl b. Aybak, Mamlūk author, XII 21
al-Ṣaghānī, caliphal envoy, IX 182
St Louis, *see* Louis IX
Sālār Aḥmad, ruler of Katūr, X 7
Sālārī, ʿIzz al-Dīn Muḥammad, Delhi amir, VIII 346n; IX 184–5, 189; X 15n
Sali, Mongol commander, I 240–41, 243
Sālī Sarāī, XI 154
al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, IX 181
Salt Range (*kūh-i Jūd*), X 11–14
Sāmāna, VIII 351–2, 354n; XI 119, 123; XII 20
Samarqand, I 211, 221n; II 8, 11; VI 23; X 9, 14; XI 147–8
Samarqandī, Muḥammad b. ʿUmar, Muslim author, X 17
Samarqandī, Qadi Ḥamīd al-Dīn Sābiq, IV 14
Sāmarrā, VII 63, 72
Sambhal, XI 134
Sandomir, I 236n
Sanga, VI 1, 2n
Sangīn, Khokhar chief, X 10, 12
Sanjar, Seljük Sultan, VII 81n
Saqāliba (Slavs), VII 66, 77n
Saqsīn, I 209; II 11
Sarbadārs, XI 155
Sargadwārī, XI 131n, 132n, 143, 148n, 149–50
Sarjū, River, XI 135–6
sarta'ul (Mo. Muslim), IV 12
Sartaq, khan of the Golden Horde, I 204n, 223–4; III 206, 209; IV 11, 24–5, 27; V 15
Sarūj, III 202
Sassun, III 203
Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg, Delhi amir, IX 187
Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg Keshli Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 347, 349–50, 354n; IX 186
Sayf al-Dīn Aybeg-i Totaq Qutlugh Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 352n; IX 186
Sayf al-Dīn Ighraq, X 8
Sayf al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn, Ghurid Sultan, VI 1, 9
Sayfī (Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Harawī), historian of Herat, I 212–13, 222; II 11
Sayyid ʿAzad (ʿAḍud) al-Dīn, Ilkhanid envoy, XI 130
sayyids, IV 20
Sebüktegin, Ghaznawid ruler, VII 64, 66, 71, 73–4
'Secret History of the Mongols' (*Mangghol-un niucha tobcha'an*), I 190, 192, 198; II 4, 6–7, 12, 15n, 23; III 208; IV 10, 12, 14; V 4–5, 10; X 2
Seljüks/Seljuqs/Seljükids, V 6, 17; VI 2; VII 64, 66, 69, 71, 74
Sevana, XII 22
Sevinch, Turkish amir, VI 8–9, 11, 15
Shabānkāra'ī, Persian historian, I 230, 231n
Shāfiʿīs, VI 10
Shāh Terken, widow of Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish, IX 184–5
Shajarat al-atrāk, Timurid history, XI 121
Shajarat al-Durr, Sultan of Egypt, IX 181, 189, 191
Shāl, I 239
shamans, shamanism, III 208; IV 2, 9–13, 26
Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish, Sultan of Delhi, VI 5, 18, 20; VII 64, 67–9, 73–4; VIII 341, 344, 347–9, 358; IX 181–3, 185, 187, 189–91; X 2–3, 8, 10, 13–16, 18–20; XII 18
  his dynasty, *see* Shamsids
  his slaves, *see* Shamsīs
Shams al-Dīn Kāshānī, Muslim historian, X 5n
Shams al-Dīn Kayūmarth, Sultan of Delhi, VIII 355
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, malik of Kālyūn, I 213
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Masʿūd, Ghurid Sultan of Bāmiyān, VI 3, 17n
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām, Ghurid prince, VI 21
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kart, malik of Herat, I 222, 239; VI 24
Shams al-Dīn ʿUmar Qazwīnī, V 6, 17
Shams al-Dīn Yaḥyā, Shaykh, XI 137
Shamsids, dynasty of Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish, VIII 341; IX 182, 184
Shamsīs (slaves of Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish), VII 67, 72; VIII 344–53; IX 182–3, 185–8, 190–91
Shansabanids, VI 1, 6, 21; VII 64
  see also Ghurids

Sharaf al-Dīn, fiscal administrator in Persia, I 215
Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī, Timurid historian, XI 121–2, 126n, 136–7, 144n
his *Ẓafar-nāma*, XI 121
Sharīʿa, IV 16
Shaykh Rajab al-Burquʿī, Delhi envoy, XI 150n
Shaykh Saʿīd al-Hindī, Delhi envoy, XI 150n
Sheng-wu ch'in-ch'eng lu, X 2, 5, 8n
Shiban, Jochid prince, I 200, 221n
Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Sūrī, Ghurid prince, VI 21
Shihāb al-Dīn Alp Sarakhsī, Khwarazmian vizier, X 12
Shīʿites, XI 129
Shinqurān, VI 8–9; X 6, 7n
Shir, Mongol commander, XI 119
Shīr Khān, Nuṣrat al-Dīn, Delhi amir, I 240; VIII 342n, 350–52
Shiremün, Mongol prince, I 198, 202–5
Shiremün, son of Chormaghun, I 217n, 233
Shughnān, VI 3
Siberia, II 5
Siddiqui, Iqtidar Husain, X 18
Sīdī Muwallih, VIII 356
Sidon, III 209
Sihrindī, Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad, Muslim historian, VIII 348; XI 120, 123–5, 129, 133, 143, 150
his *Ta'rīkh-i Mubārakshāhī*, XI 123
Sikandarpāl, raja of Kulū, XI 141–2
silver, XII 26, 32n
see also gold-silver ratio
Simon of Saint-Quentin, Dominican Friar, IV 2, 7, 14, 17, 30; V 7, 17
Sinān al-Dīn Chanīsar, ruler of Dēbul, X 15
Sind, I 240; VIII 350, 352, 357; IX 187; X 1, 3, 6, 12, 14–16; XI 129, 151
Sinor, Denis, V 15
Sir-daryā (Jaxartes), River, IX 190
Sīrī, XI 120, 125n, 148; XII 25, 29n
Sirmūr, IX 184
Sīstān, I 239, 242n; VI 11n, 15–16, 21; XI 149, 155
Sivas, VII 67
Sīwistān, X 14–15
Siyālkōt, X 11n, 14, 19
Smbat, Constable of Lesser Armenia, III 207; IV 15
Smith, John Masson, V 5, 9
Sōdra/Sūdra, I 240; X 19
Sogdians, IV 9
Somnāth, XI 121
Sorqaqtani Beki, wife of Tolui, I 196, 197n, 200–202, 215; II 9–10, 14–16, 24n; III 198, 200–201, 205; IV 25
Spengler, William, X 20
Spuler, Bertold, I 221
Sübedei/Sübetei, Mongol commander, I 210; IV 5; V 12
Sübedei, Mongol prince, I 221
Sūdra, *see* Sōdra
sufis, IV 31
Suhadēva, king of Kashmīr, XI 138–9
Sulaymān b. Shīsh, Ghūrī amir, VI 7, 9
Sulṭān Shāh, Khwarazmian prince, VI 11
Sūmras, dynasty, X 16n
Sunām, VIII 352, 354n
Sung dynasty, I 230; II 17–19; V 3, 10, 13
Surat, XI 121
Sutlej, River, X 16
Syria, I 187–9, 225, 230, 233, 236, 241; III 196, 211; IV 18; V 13; VII 68; VIII 341, 357; X 19

Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, I 189; VI 3; VII 67; VIII 343–4; IX 183
see also Jūzjānī
Tabarhindh, IX 186, 188
Tabrīz, I 191n, 209; II 8, 11, 16, 18
T'ai-yüan-fu, II 10
Tainal, Mongol commander, I 219n
Tāj al-Dīn, chief in Afghanistan, I 239
Tāj al-Dīn, Khalaj chief, X 12
Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar Arslan Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 347; IX 186
Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar Teniz Khān, Delhi amir, VIII 349
Tāj al-Dīn Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq, Delhi amir, VII 80n; VIII 342, 358; IX 186, 188
Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz, Turkish amir and ruler of Ghazna, VI 4, 8–9, 12–20, 22; VII 73, 80n, 81n; VIII 343n; IX 189, 193n, 197n; X 10
Tājīks (Persians, non-Turks), VI 4, 22; VII 64, 71–3; VIII 346, 349–50; IX 181, 185–7, 189, 191; XI 138
Takrīt, III 203
Talas, II 8
Ṭāliqān, VI 12, 14–15, 23
Talūka, XII 19
tama system, I 192–3, 220; II 10
tamachis, I 232
Tamurān, VI 17
tanga (coin of the Delhi Sultanate), XI 130n, 149

Tangut, people/kingdom, I 230; II 5, 8, 21–22; X 8–9
see also Hsi-Hsia
Taoists (Daoists), IV 18–23, 30
see also Ch'ang-ch'un
Taraghai, Mongol commander, XI 125n, 146; XII 20, 22–4, 28n
Tarā'in, VII 72; VIII 346–7; IX 185–6, 189
Tarbaghatai, mountains, IV 10
Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-gushā, I 188, 201; VI 3; X 3, 6
see also Juwaynī
Ta'rīkh-i ulūs-i arba'a-yi Chingīzī, II 3
tarkhan, IV 19, 23
Tarmashirin, Chaghadayid khan, XI 118–23, 125–6, 128–9, 131, 143, 145–6, 148–9, 151–4, 156; XII 20, 23–4
his son, XI 132, 151
Tartaq, Mongol commander, XII 20
Tartar Relation, I 200; II 13n; IV 2
Tatars, VII 77n
Tatta, XI 152
Teb Tenggeri (Kököchü), III 208, 212; IV 13, 18; V 4–5, 8
Tegüder, Chaghadayid prince, I 221
Tegüder-Aḥmad, *see* Aḥmad-Tegüder
Tekish, Khwārazmshāh, VI 2, 11
Temüge Ot-chigin, brother of Chinggis Khan, I 197–8; II 5–6, 13n, 19–20
his descendants, II 20–21
Temüjin, *see* Chinggis Khan
Temür (Tīmūr-i Lang, Tamerlane), Turco-Mongol conqueror, II 3; VI 24; X 5–6; XI 118, 121–2, 144, 155n, 156; XII 22
Temür Khān, Delhi amir, IX 188
Temür Khān Sonqur-i 'Ajamī, Delhi amir, VIII 352
Temür Noyan, I 203
Temür Öljeitü, Mongol Qaghan, II 3, 22; V 14
Tenggeri (the sky, sky-god), III 201; IV 13–14; V 3
Terken Khātūn, mother of the Khwārazmshāh 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad, VI 20; IX 190
Thānesar, XI 120, 124
Thomas of Cantimpré, III 208
Tibet, Tibetans, II 16, 21; IV 30; VII 66; XI 137n
Tigīnābād, VI 3, 16–17, 19; X 10
Tilang (Telingāna), XII 30n
Tīmūr, *see* Temür
Timurids, X 6
Tirhut, XI 141
Tirmid, VI 3, 15; VII 68; XI 123
Toghan Khān, Delhi amir, IX 187
Toghril (Sultan Mughīth al-Dīn), Delhi amir in Bengal, VIII 352–3, 354n
Tolui, son of Chinggis Khan, I 186–7, 196–7, 211; II 2, 10–12, 14, 23–4
his territory, II 14–15
Toluids, I 188, 190, 206–7, 211, 221, 231; II 3
Toqa-temür, Mongol prince, I 204
Toqto'a, khan of the Golden Horde, I 209, 231n
Töregene, wife of Ögödei, I 198, 214–15, 217; II 20
toyin (Mo. Buddhist priest), III 198; IV 11–12, 20, 25, 27
Transoxiana, I 190n, 207, 235n; II 3, 9, 13, 17; VI 16, 18, 23; VII 64, 68; VIII 344; IX 181
see also Māwarā' al-nahr
T.rnū.ch (?), X 12
Tübshin, Ilkhanid prince, I 239
Tughluq Temür, Chaghadayid khan, XI 156
Tughluqābād, XII 25
Tughluqids, dynasty, VIII 345, 356–7; XI 156 and *passim*
see also Fīrūz Shāh; Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq; Muḥammad b. Tughluq
Tughril, Ghaznawid Sultan, VII 71
Ṭukhāristān, VI 3
Tukhsi, tribe, VII 66
Tulunids, VIII 341
tümen (Mo. military unit of ten thousand), I 205; XI 149–50
Tūrān Shāh, Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, VII 71; VIII 348; IX 181
Turkestan/Turkistān, I 206–7, 220, 230; II 2–3, 19; V 17; VII 64; IX 184, 189; XI 138n
Türkmens, X 8
Turks, Turkish, I 193; IV 4, 10; VI 7–8, 12–13, 18, 21n, 22; VII *passim*; VIII 340, 342–4, 348, 353, 355, 357; IX 181, 184–7, 189; XI 139
see also Turkish slaves; Türkmens; Ghuzz; Kimek; Ölberli; Qipchaq
Turkish slaves, VI 2, 4, 7, 11, 22; VII *passim*; VIII *passim*
see also ghulāms; *mamlūks*; Shamsīs
Tutar, Jochid prince, I 221–2, 226–7

Uchch, VIII 351; IX 187; X 13–15, 18n
Udyānadēva, king of Kashmīr, XI 139, 140n
Uighurs, I 211; II 11; IV 9, 12, 14; V 9
Ulaghchi, khan of the Golden Horde, I 223n
'ulamā, VIII 358; IX 189
Ulqui, River, II 5

Ulugh Beg, Timurid ruler, II 3
ulugh-bitikchi (Mo. chief secretary), I 215–16
Ulugh Khān Balaban *see* Balaban-i Khwurd; Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban
ulus (Tu./Mo. territory), I 192; II 2, 4–15, 19, 22–3
  ulus of the centre, II 2, 9, 11–12, 16–17, 24
al-'Umarī, Ibn Faḍl-allāh, I 189, 200, 204n, 209–10, 211n, 219, 222, 231; II 16; VIII 357; XI 127, 129n, 130, 136, 144–5; XII 19, 21
Ural, River, VII 67
Urban IV, Pope, III 197–8
Ürgench, I 196; II 8; VI 20
Urmiya, Lake, I 232–3
Urung-tash, Mongol prince, I 228
Ürünggü, River, II 14
'Uthmān al-Marghanī, VI 22, 24
Üzbek-bei, Jahān-Pahlawān, Khwarazmian amir, X 13, 15–19
Uzun Bugha, XI 147

Vardan Arewelc'i, Armenian historian, I 190n, 223; III 198–202, 209–10, 212; IV 24
Vijāyanagar, XI 143
Vincent of Beauvais, Dominican Friar and historian, III 207, 211; IV 2, 7; V 7, 12
  his *Speculum Historiale*, V 7
Voegelin, Eric, V 8
Volga, River, I 225n; II 13
Volga Bulgars, I 193, 194n; II 12; VII 67

Warangal, XII 27
Warshād, VI 1
Waṣṣāf, Persian historian, I 202n, 209, 213, 243n; V 14; VI 24; VIII 351n; IX 182; XI 129
Wayhind, X 12n
West, Catholic; Western Europe, *see* Latin West
White Horde, I 244; II 5
William of Agen, patriarch of Jerusalem, III 198

al-Yāfi'ī, X 5
Yāfith (Japhet), son of Nūḥ (Noah), X 6
Yaghma, tribe, VII 66
Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad Sihrindī, *see* Sihrindī
Yamuna, River, XI 118, 120, 123, 125n; XII 19, 23
Yāqūt, Muslim geographer, XI 137n
yarligh (patent of authority; order), I 201, 219–20, 239; II 16; IV 14, 20; VI 24
yasa (edict), I 197, 235; IV 7, 16, 20; V 4; Yasa as legal code (i.e. 'Great Yasa'), I 189, 201
Yasa'ur, Chaghadayid prince, XI 151n, 154, 155n
Yasa'ur, Mongol commander, I 219n
Yazdagird, apocryphal tyrant, XII 31n
Yazdagird III, Sasanian king of Persia, VII 74
Ye-liu ch'u-ts'ai, I 197; IV 19, 21–2
Yemek, *see* Kimek
Yemen, VII 71; XI 131n
Yenisei, River, I 205, 230
Yesü Möngke, Chaghadayid khan, I 204–6, 213
Yesüi, wife of Chinggis Khan, II 8
Yesülün, wife of Chaghadai, X 5
Yesünggc, Mongol prince, II 20
Yezd, XI 130
Yildiz, *see* Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz
Ystoria Mongalorum, IV 14
  see also Carpini
Yüan dynasty, III 212; IV 15, 20–21
Yüan Shih, I 188, 190; III 205; IV 25–6; X 2, 8
Yün-nan, II 10
al-Yūnīnī, Mamlūk historian, I 227n
yurt (Tu./Mo. 'dwelling place'), II 7–8, 14–15, 24
Yūsuf (Joseph), VII 68
Yūsuf Bughrā, Delhi amir, XI 120

Zakariyā, Mongol commander, XI 119
Zamīndāwar, VI 1n, 3, 5; X 10
Zangī b. Kharjūm, Ghūrī amir, VI 11, 23
Zar-dandān, V 14n