

IN THE SERVICE OF THE KHAN

*Eminent Personalities
of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period*

Edited by
Howard Rachewitz, Mok-lam Chan,
Tung-ch'ing and David Geier

With the assistance of May Ying

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
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12 JUL 2005	05.10.07
25 MAY 2007	10.10.07
13 MAR 2006	14 AUG 2007
- 2 MAY 2007	- 9 MAY 2008
- 4 MAY 2007	31 AUG 2007
22 AUG 2007	10 SEP 2007
18 SEP 2007	15 OCT 2007
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MONOGRAPHIENREIHE
ZUR GESCHICHTE, KULTUR UND SPRACHE
DER VÖLKER OST- UND ZENTRALASIENS

Herausgegeben für das Seminar für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft
Zentralasiens der Universität Bonn

von

Walther Heissig,

Klaus Sagaster, Veronika Veit und Michael Weiers

unter Mitwirkung von Herbert Franke und Charles R. Bawden

Band 121

1993

Harrassowitz Verlag · Wiesbaden

we can do it!

IN THE SERVICE OF THE KHAN

*Eminent Personalities
of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period
(1200–1300)*

Edited by
Igor de Rachewiltz, Hok-lam Chan,
Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing and Peter W. Geier

With the assistance of May Wang

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Harrassowitz Verlag · Wiesbaden

The signet shows a Mongol archer from the 14th century Chinese encyclopaedia *Shih-lin kuang-chi*.

Publication of this book was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

In the service of the Khan : eminent personalities of the early
Mongol-Yüan period (1200–1300) / ed. by Igor de Rachewiltz ...
With the assistance of May Wang. – Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, 1993
(Asiatische Forschungen ; Bd. 121)

ISBN 3-447-03339-8

NE: Rachewiltz, Igor de [Hrsg.]; GT

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Printing and binding by Hubert & Co., Göttingen

Printed on permanent/durable paper from Nordland, Dörpen/Ems.

Printed in Germany

ISSN 0571-320X

ISBN 3-447-03339-8

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Καὶ τώρα τί θὰ γένουμε χωρίς βαρβάρους.

Κ. Π. Χαβάφης

PREFACE

The present collection of biographical essays on early Mongol-Yüan personalities is the natural outcome of the Yüan Biographical Project launched by the Department of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University in 1968, and of a long-standing association with the Sonderforschungsbereich 12 ('Orientalistik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Zentralasiens') of Bonn University, which actively promoted the project.

The preparation of the individual *nien-p'u* and the subsequent editing of the biographical essays has proceeded *pari passu* with the compilation of a series of indices to biographical material in Chin and Yüan literary works (*wen-chi*), culminating in the publication in 1988 of I. de Rachewiltz and M. Wang's *Repertory of Proper Names in Yüan Literary Sources*. The long delay in the publication of the essays is due mainly to the need to take into account the new data that became available through the continuous sifting of the Chinese literary sources.

We have not included biographies of artists in the present collection, which covers only the period of the first five Mongol khans (Činggis to Qubilai). This omission is due to the fact that, at the very beginning of the project (1969), Professor Chu-tsing Li of the University of Kansas Department of the History of Art informed us that his Department was undertaking a biographical project of Yüan painters. We decided therefore to exclude this group from our own project in order to avoid duplication.

Another notable omission concerns eminent women of the Mongol-Yüan period. Unfortunately, our sources do not provide sufficient material for individual essays on Yüan women, whether Chinese, Mongol or Central Asian, with the exception of empresses. Since our aim was to concentrate on personalities other than the ruling élite, we also had to pass over this important group, much to our regret.

The criteria that have guided us in the selection of personalities and in the arrangement of the biographies are outlined in the Introduction. The present selection represents only one third of the individuals for whom we have prepared extensive

nien-p'u. It is our fervent hope that the exhaustive material which we have accumulated on these men, together with the additional information supplied by the biographical indices published so far, will be used in future for a sequel to the present work covering the period from Temür Öljeitü to the end of the Yüan dynasty.

Some of the biographical essays presented here have already been published in somewhat different versions. Those have been substantially revised and updated. We wish to thank: the editors of *Central Asiatic Journal* for permission to publish in translation P. Ratchnevsky's article on Šigi Qutuqu; the editors of *Papers on Far Eastern History* for permission to reprint H. L. Chan's articles on Wang E, Yang Huan and Yao Shu; C.C. Hsiao's article on Yen Shih; I. de Rachewiltz's and T. Russell's article on Ch'iu Ch'u-chi; and I. de Rachewiltz's article on Muqali; and finally Stanford University Press for permission to use I. de Rachewiltz's paper on Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai which appeared in *Confucian Personalities*, edited by A.F. Wright and D. Twitchett.

We wish to express our deep gratitude to the Australian National University for sponsoring the Yüan Biographical Project and supporting it for over two decades; and to Professor Wang Gungwu, former Head of the Department of Far Eastern History, for his constant interest and encouragement.

We also are greatly beholden to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for their generous grant towards the publication of this book.

For close participation in all stages of the project and invaluable contribution to it, we are especially grateful to our Research Assistant of long standing, Mrs. May Wang. Our sincere thanks to Mrs. H.O. Collins, Dr. J. Jorgensen, Mr. S. Rivers, Mrs. I. de Rachewiltz, Mrs. M. Varghese and Mrs. N. Geier for the preparation of the manuscript and assistance in editing the indices; and to the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies in the University of Washington for financial support in compiling the General Index.

We are greatly indebted to numerous institutions, colleagues and friends in Peking, Nanking, Hang-chou, Taipei, Tokyo, Kyoto, Munich and Canberra for providing microfilms and photocopies of rare source material, as well as for constructive criticism and generous advice.

Last, but certainly not least, we are immensely thankful to all the authors of the biographical essays in this collection, not only for their scholarly contribution, but also for their patience and forbearance through the years.

The Editors

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INTRODUCTION

Splendid – the three-foot sword of the Great Yüan!
In a lightning flash it cuts the spring wind.

Tsu-yüan (1226-86)

The Mongol conquest and domination of China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries constitutes one of the most extraordinary and fascinating chapters in Chinese history. The conquest itself represented the culmination of the perennial conflict between the Inner Asian societies and the sedentary Chinese, resulting for the first time in the subjugation of the whole of China by a nomadic people. Moreover, this was only a part of the Mongols' conquest of the world, and for some time China was merely a domain in the Mongol empire that spanned much of the Eurasian continent. Never before and never again until the last century was China so open to direct foreign influence, and never was the cultural confrontation so acute and multifarious between her and the outside world.

The acquisition of China by the Mongols and the establishment of Mongol rule were a long and arduous process comprising two distinct stages. During the fifty years from the first offensive launched by Činggis Qan in 1211 against the Jurchen Chin in north China to the accession of Qubilai Qa'an in 1260, the Yeke Mongqol Ulus or 'Great Mongol Nation'¹ was an ever-expanding empire whose centre of gravity still lay in northern Mongolia and whose core was the steppe of Eurasia. North China was conquered and ruled by the Mongols in the same manner as other sedentary societies in Central and Western Asia that they had seized. The country suffered great destruction and dislocation as a result of the long-drawn war and the subsequent Mongol misgovernment. The efforts of the sinicized Khitan statesman Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243) and other Sino-Jurchen literati in Ögödei's reign (1229-41) to reintroduce Chinese bureaucratic government and rationalize the system of taxation were thwarted by the stiff opposition of the Mongol nobility and the keen competition of the Muslim tax-farmers. The near-anarchical situation which existed

1. See Hsiao CC85.1. Cf. also I. de Rachewiltz's forthcoming paper 'The Mongols Rethink their Early History' in which the author argues that the designation Yeke Mongqol Ulus was probably adopted in 1206 when Činggis was elected supreme ruler of the Mongqol tribal confederation.

in north China since the last years of Ögödei's rule was retrieved by Möngke Qa'an's reforms. Yet Möngke (r. 1251-59) was no more than a 'fixer' whose aim remained traditionally Mongolian, viz. to assert imperial authority in order to maximize the mobilization of assets in all conquered territories.² Thus, north China remained a colony from which human and material resources were ruthlessly exacted by the Mongol conquerors to sustain their Heaven-decreed territorial expansion and to satisfy the lavish spending of their nobility. Throughout those fifty years, the imperial government at Qara Qorum in Mongolia (with the exception of approximately ten years during which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai exerted his influence) and the regional government of north China at Yen-ching (later Ta-tu, modern Peking) were operated by a body of officials which was truly multi-ethnic in composition and in which the Chinese were but little represented. Only at the local level did the northern Chinese (Han) military lords enjoy a measure of autonomy, with the assistance of the Chinese literati. The Mongol system of government was reoriented in favour of the Chinese only after the accession of Qubilai in 1260.

The enthronement of Qubilai in north China marked a turning point in Mongol imperial history in general, and in their rule of China in particular. Qubilai had long established close ties with the northern Chinese literati as a prince whose apanage was situated in north China, and with such military leaders as the viceroy of north China appointed by his elder brother Möngke in 1251. With north China as his power base, and the support of the human and material resources of the region, Qubilai was able to overcome the arguably legitimate contention for the throne of his younger brother Ariq Böke, and effectively deal with the violent protests and military challenges of his cousins in Mongolia. He proceeded forthwith to transfer the imperial capital from Qara Qorum to Shang-tu and Ta-tu in north China, adopting a Chinese-style dynastic name and reign-titles, as well as Chinese traditional institutions. He then completed the conquest of China by destroying the native Sung dynasty in the south in 1279. In this way, he virtually transformed the Yeke Mongqol Ulus of the steppe into a China-centred dynasty and, to a large degree, earned for himself legitimacy as the emperor of China. However, even though China had now become the primary object of his rule, his conception of rulership went beyond that of a Chinese emperor. As pointed out by previous scholars, most recently by Morris Rossabi, Qubilai never abandoned his aspiration to become a universal ruler who did not 'confine himself to the attractions of one culture (i.e., the Chinese)' and was 'ecumenical in his acceptance of traits and practices from the different territories he, in theory, controlled'.³ As such,

2. On Möngke's reign see Allsen 87.

3. Rossabi 88, 172.

the Yüan dynasty created by him was an institutional and cultural complex which never completely shed its Mongol and colonial character. Even though Qubilai adopted Chinese institutions and culture for his dynasty in an incomparably larger measure than his predecessors, allowing the Chinese a bigger representation and greater voice in his government, yet cultures, institutions, and religions of diverse origins still continued to compete as alternative options throughout Qubilai's reign and those of his successors, making the Yüan state the most pluralistic, protean and colourful in all Chinese history.

The Mongol conquest was more than merely a *Mongol* affair. From the start, it was a grand enterprise in which a galaxy of personages from many races and cultures participated, but always under Mongol leadership. In addition to the Mongols themselves, persons from such Turkic kingdoms and tribes as the Uighur, the Kereit, the Öngüt, the Qarluq, the Qangli and the Qipčaq, as well as Khitans, Jurchens, Koreans, Tibetans, Persians, and even Europeans, all took part in various stages of the Mongol conquest of China as advisers, generals, administrators, financiers, or religious teachers. Although the exact racial composition of the ruling élite of the empire and the relative importance of each of these ethnic groups varied greatly from one period to another, the poly-ethnic composition of the ruling élite was undoubtedly one of the most remarkable and constant features of the Mongol state. The enlistment by the Mongols of so many people of such diverse backgrounds in one grand common enterprise apparently has no historical precedent, and should be counted as one of the main reasons for whatever success was achieved by the Mongols. Whilst these people not only cooperated with each other in the service of their Mongol masters, they also competed and quarrelled, often violently, owing to differences in race, culture, profession and ideology. Their presence undoubtedly affected the political and cultural development of the Mongol dominion in China and greatly enhanced the historical complexities of the period.

The meeting and clashes of different races and cultures under Mongol rule are indeed reflected in the narrative histories about the Mongols. Those are by now quite numerous and their numbers are still growing.⁴ But, in our view, the general atmosphere and main problems of the age can be revealed equally well, if not better, by biographical studies of the leading figures of the period. In-depth studies on the lives and activities of such personages demonstrate how the lives of individuals of different background were affected by the calamitous Mongol conquest; how men strove to influence the decisions of the Mongol court on behalf of their personal,

4. An historian investigating the Mongol-Yüan period today has at his disposal more than twice the number of Chinese sources that were available a hundred years ago.

ethnic, regional or ideological interests; how their actions actually shaped the course of historical development and affected the governance of the Mongol-Yüan state; and the deep motives for the political alignments and factional conflicts in such a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural environment. Above all, this approach can help us to see more clearly the special characteristics and flavour of the age through a close examination of the interaction between the key historical protagonists and the special environment created by the Mongol conquest.

These considerations have led us to offer in the present volume a collection of thirty-seven individual or composite biographies concerning nearly fifty leading personalities active during the period of the Yeke Mongqol Ulus and the reign of Qubilai, in some cases during both, roughly from 1200 to 1300 A.D. The reason for our emphasis on the early Mongol period and Qubilai's reign to the exclusion of the post-Qubilai period is threefold. Firstly comes the question of space. The inclusion in our study of the post-Qubilai period of the Yüan – a period of seventy four years – would entail another volume as big as this one, exceeding the capacity of the present group of authors and editors in terms of time and energy.

Secondly, the characteristics of historical development in our period and in the post-Qubilai era differ significantly from one another. Our period is one of formation and development of the Mongol state in China. The main features of the period are the military conquest and the political conflicts among the various groups that competed for the shaping of the ideology and institutions of the Mongol state. By the end of Qubilai's reign, the Yüan state had taken a much more definite shape. The main task of Qubilai's heirs was to preserve the framework established by their revered dynastic founder and ancestor while responding creatively to new problems. Even though political struggles were by no means less violent in the mid- and late Yüan, the latitude of political and ideological choices was definitely much narrower than for the ruling élite than for its predecessors.

Thirdly, there is an apparent disparity in the state of knowledge between the early Yüan and the mid- and late Yüan. The period of Mongol conquest and that of Qubilai's rule have always been the focus of attention of the Mongol-Yüan scholars and are, relatively speaking, well developed fields of research. The general contour of the history and the careers of the leading personalities of the period can be established with a large measure of certainty, and all our authors have contributed in various ways to the establishment of this certainty in the past. By contrast, the history of the post-Qubilai Yüan period, with the exception of events directly relating to the downfall of the Yüan and the rise of the native Ming dynasty, has long been neglected by scholars for its apparent lack of historical significance and human drama. Few

major investigations of the period have been carried out⁵ and, in the present state of our knowledge, it would be premature to undertake a volume of the same scope as this one. It is, however, our sincere wish that the widening of our knowledge may enable us and/or other scholars to prepare a comparable work on the post-Qubilai era in the not-too-distant future.

The personalities selected for inclusion in the present volume – generals, politicians, counsellors, financiers and religious leaders – were all, in a broad sense, ‘imperial servants’. Albeit in different ways and degrees, they all helped to shape the political and cultural life of the period. While efforts have been made to include as many and diverse leading figures as possible, there has been no intention, however, to make the selection comprehensive. For the sake of economy of space and to avoid repetition, personages have been chosen, in many cases, as ‘representative types’. Other figures falling in the same category have been excluded, either because of their lesser importance, or because of the paucity of the relevant sources. Of all the Mongol generals who distinguished themselves in Činggis Qan’s reign, for instance, the most prominent formed two groups, respectively known as the ‘Four steeds’ (*dörben kǖlǖ üt*) and the ‘Four Hounds’ (*dörben noqais*), whose careers are by and large parallel. Muqali (1170-1223) and Sübōtei (1176-1248) have been selected not only as the chief representatives of these groups, but also as the most accomplished leaders in the war against the Chin and during the ‘Western Campaign’ in Central Asia and Eastern Europe respectively. The selection of religious leaders provides another example. During the period of the Yeke Mongqol Ulus, two religions, Taoism and Buddhism, vied strenuously with each other for the Mongols’ favour and were vastly influential in the Mongols’ Chinese domains. Ch’iu Ch’u-chi (1148-1227), the noted patriarch of the Ch’üan-chen sect of Taoism, and Hai-yün, the Ch’an Buddhist leader, have consequently been selected to represent the influence and contribution of these two religions. By the time of Qubilai’s reign, Tibetan Buddhism had established its supremacy at the Mongol court at the expense of all other teachings. ’P’ags-pa (1235-1280), the Tibetan Buddhist leader and Qubilai’s first imperial preceptor, is our only selection in the category of religious leaders for that period.

For various reasons, two categories of people are left out of our selection: the members of the Mongol imperial clan, and the southern Chinese. The main motive for the exclusion of the Mongol rulers is that we want to focus our attention on the imperial servants, and the inclusion of their masters would therefore defeat our purpose. Also, the lives and careers of the Mongol princes could not possibly be

5. Among these, Mote 60 and Dardess 73 deserve special attention.

treated adequately in limited essay-form and would be better left to monographic studies.⁶ The reason for ignoring the southern Chinese is simply that none of them was politically significant enough to warrant his inclusion in so far as Qubilai's reign is concerned. The southern Chinese, as is well known, were strongly discriminated against politically and socially after they had been conquered in 1279. The few who were fortunate enough to be employed by Qubilai, such as Yeh Li (1244-94), and Ch'eng Chü-fu (1249-1318), served mainly for token purposes and were unable to exert any real influence on Qubilai's government. Artists and women have also been omitted. The reason for their absence from our collection is given in the Preface.

Both as a reliable reference work and a collection of readable essays, our volume seeks, in so far as it is feasible, to be balanced in perspective and exhaustive of important factual details and source materials. Most of our biographies are based mainly on the private and official Chinese sources written during the Yüan period because of the paucity of relevant primary sources in other languages and of other periods. Nevertheless, to make our accounts and assessments as objective as possible, we have on the one hand balanced the Yüan sources, which often betray a pro-Mongol, dynastic viewpoint, with the Sung, Chin and Ming sources; and, on the other, the non-Chinese sources (Mongolian, Persian, Tibetan and European) have been used not only to fill the factual gaps in the Chinese sources, but also to counterbalance the traditional sinocentric biases inherent in the latter. The poor showing of some non-Chinese figures in our collection emerges, in our belief, from a careful comparison of different sources rather than as a result of ethnocentric bias in the Chinese authors. Whatever standard of objectivity has been achieved in this volume, it would not have been possible without the active involvement of a large group of scholars whose linguistic and cultural diversity is as great as the historical figures they have dealt with.

We shall briefly review hereafter the two periods covered by this volume and discuss the *dramatis personae* according to their professions and respective roles within their historical context.

I. The Yeke Mongqol Ulus Period (1206-1271)

Of the fifty odd personalities presented in this volume, nearly twenty were exclusively or mainly active in the period of the Yeke Mongqol Ulus. Since the Mongol state was then a unitary, ever-expanding steppe-centred empire and north China was neither its centre of gravity nor the focus of its rule, the personalities

6. In addition to Allsen 87 and Rossabi 88, recently published biographical studies on the Mongol/Yüan rulers include Ratchnevsky 83/91, and Chou LH86.

chosen from this period include not only the Chinese and non-Chinese generals who played important roles in the Mongols' conquest of north China, but also those who were responsible for empire-building elsewhere, as well as the chief administrators whose jurisdiction was empire-wide. In addition, two religious leaders are included because of their great contribution toward the mitigation of Mongol rule and the preservation of Chinese culture in north China.

◇ It is a truism that the Mongol conquest was above all a military feat accomplished under the leadership of the Mongols. Mongol cavalry always constituted the core of the conquering forces, and Mongol generals retained the overall control of operations. However, as required by changing geographical environments, tactical needs and numerical necessity, the Mongol armies soon became a truly multi-armed and poly-ethnic force in which a great number of generals of vastly different background played increasingly important roles.

Heading the Mongol military hierarchy during Činggis Qan's tribal wars and the early stages of his wars of conquest were a score of talented generals who had all been Činggis Qan's personal retainers (Mo. *nökör*) before his rise to supreme power. As mentioned earlier, the most famous of these former retainer-generals formed two groups respectively known as the 'Four Steeds (= Stalwarts)' and the 'Four Hounds (= Fierce Ones)'. They are represented in this volume by Muqali and Sübōtei, who were chiefly responsible for the success of the Mongol campaigns in north China and in the West. Muqali, as shown by Igor de Rachewiltz in the biography of Muqali and his descendants, was the closest confidant of Činggis Qan and a great military statesman. His policy of encouraging leading Khitans, Jurchens, and Chinese to defect, not only vastly undermined Chin resistance, but also helped to transform the Mongol campaigns in north China from a series of periodic forays into a permanent occupation. After his premature death in 1223, his son Bōl (1197-1228), and grandson Tas (1212-1239), inherited his rank and mission, thus precipitating the destruction of the Chin.

In contrast to Muqali, Sübōtei was the most valiant commander and brilliant strategist of his generation, whose fame rests chiefly on his brilliant campaigns in Central Asia, south Russia and eastern Europe. In the view of his biographer, Paul Buell, Sübōtei always conducted his campaigns 'with the greatest economy of force and minimal losses', for he, 'more perhaps than any general of his time, understood the limits and fragility of steppe power'. Uneducated by the standards of sedentary societies but deeply rooted in the tradition of steppe warfare, Muqali and Sübōtei knew how to maximize the advantages of nomadic military tradition at the expense of their sedentary adversaries. They were the real stars of the Mongol conquest, since without them the energy and skill of the generals of the other Turco-Mongolian tribes

and the defectors from sedentary societies could not have been harnessed, and the qa'ans' ambition of world conquest would have remained unfulfilled. Because of their forbears' immense contribution, the descendants of Muqali and Sübōtei (and their comrades-in-arms) continued to form the military ruling élite throughout the Mongol-Yüan period.⁷

Despite the brilliance of their generals, it would still have been difficult for the Mongols to conquer north China, and virtually impossible to consolidate their hold, without the collaboration of the Chinese, for the invaders were few in number and had no experience in either siegecraft or in ruling a sedentary society. Their task in this regard was greatly facilitated by the assistance they received from a score of Chinese generals. These were mostly defectors from the Chin state, and included both professional officers and local strongmen. Most of them were subsequently appointed commander-administrators of a region, exercising almost absolute power within the area under their control. Since their privileges were hereditary, they were known to their contemporaries as *shih-hou* or 'hereditary lords'. Shih T'ien-tse (1202-1275), Chang Jou (1190-1268), Yen Shih (1182-1240) and Li T'an (? - 1262) were four of the most prominent Chinese 'hereditary lords' (Li T'an's biography is placed in the section on Qubilai's reign because of the political significance of his revolt at the beginning of that reign). They all share a number of similarities in the role they played. Militarily, they were all instrumental in mobilizing local resources for the Mongols' campaigns and helped the latter to overcome an initial incompetence in siegecraft, thus contributing in varying degrees to the destruction of the Chin. Sociopolitically, they were responsible for the restoration of order and welfare in the areas under their jurisdiction, and for the reintroduction of a Chinese-style bureaucratic administration at the local level. Culturally, they helped to ensure the survival of Chinese values by providing protection for dislocated Confucian scholars and by promoting education. In other words, these Chinese overlords were not only the indispensable military collaborators of the Mongols, they also served to revive traditional polity and culture in war-ravaged China at a time when the Mongol rulers concerned themselves almost entirely with military strategy and the fiscal exploitation of the conquered territories.

The Chinese military lords, however, differed greatly from one another in family fortunes and achievements as a result of marked inequalities in their personal ambitions, the historical relations of their families with the Mongol imperial house, and the geopolitics of the period. As Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing's studies show, Chang Jou and

7. On the importance of the families of the 'Four Steeds' in the Yüan dynasty see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, 'Yüan-t'ai ssu-ta Meng-ku chia-tsu,' in Hsiao CC83, 141-230.

especially Shih T'ien-tse typify the most successful northern Chinese generals, heavily relied upon and deeply trusted by successive Mongol qa'ans. Both their families were based in present Hopei. They rallied to the Mongol cause early in the war and served it thereafter with unswerving loyalty. The Shihs and the Changs contributed significantly to the Mongol conquest and rule of north China, to the accession of Qubilai, and to the consolidation of his regime. Thus they were eventually able to evolve from clans of hereditary lords into families of ranking bureaucrats after Qubilai's adoption of a policy of centralisation early in his reign. As the Chinese counterparts to the old Mongol *nököt* of Činggis Qan's time, members of those families remained prominent representatives of the poly-ethnic ruling élite throughout most of the Yüan dynasty.⁸

Yen Shih and Li T'an represented another type of Chinese military magnate. Both Yen and Li were overlords of Shan-tung, an area which the Mongols came to control only after a long and bitter struggle with the Chin and the Sung in the 1210s and 1220s, and which continued to be under Sung threat for quite some time afterwards. In this highly volatile political climate, shifting political allegiances among the local strongmen were common. While the story of Li T'an and his adoptive father Li Ch'üan (? -1231) will be discussed in the next section, the most outstanding feature of Yen Shih's career was indeed the ease with which he switched allegiance, his guiding principle being a paramount concern for his own political and physical survival. Neither the Yens' commitment to the Mongols, nor the Mongols' trust in them were ever as strong as occurred in the case of the Shihs and Changs. Consequently the Yens lost their political eminence sooner than most other Chinese military clans, just as Li T'an ended his career and his life in an abortive rebellion. In explaining why the Chinese military lords in Shan-tung behaved differently from their counterparts in Hopei, Hsiao invokes, with the late Japanese scholar Inosaki Takaoki, the geopolitical difference between the regions.

All in all, the careers under review reflect the dilemma of the Mongols in dealing with the Chinese military leaders. On the one hand, imperial favours had to be showered on them since they were indispensable to the conquest and government of China; on the other, they could not be trusted completely since they were not always reliable, and constituted at all times a potential threat to the nomadic conqueror.

◇ For the administration of their far-flung empire, the Mongol rulers relied heavily on a poly-ethnic corps of civil servants. Very few Mongols were directly involved in civil administration since they were, in general, unfamiliar with the ways of governing sedentary societies, and most of them were by necessity kept in the army

8. See Hsiao CC92.

which formed the basis of their power. The few early Mongol civil administrators are represented in this volume by Šigi Qutuqu (*ca.* 1180- *ca.* 1260), the first in time known to us, and Buĵir (*fl.* 1206-60), the chief administrator in Möngke's reign. As shown by Ratchnevsky's study, Šigi Qutuqu, an adopted son of Činggis Qan, was one of the first Mongols to become literate. Appointed in 1206 as *yeke Jarquči* or grand judge, the highest position in Činggis Qan's steppe government, Qutuqu's authority was extended to north China in Ögödei's reign, after the destruction of the Chin had been completed. He is well known for the great census carried out in the former Chin territory in 1235/36. Buĵir, Thomas Allsen's subject of study, was the replacement of Šigi Qutuqu as grand judge in 1251 and perhaps also Maĥmūd Yalavač's successor as governor-general of north China in 1254. He was instrumental in assisting Möngke Qa'an in attaining the goals of vigorous internal reforms and external expansion. Both Qutuqu and Buĵir were apparently competent administrators, but both are seen by their respective biographers as conservatives in the Mongol tradition. Taking issue with Yao Ts'ung-wu's view that Šigi Qutuqu was a strong supporter of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's pro-Chinese reforms, Ratchnevsky sees Qutuqu as 'the chief representative of the Mongol faction at court which advocated a redefinition of the households for the purposes of taxation and which strongly opposed the adoption of alien administrative rules, such as those proposed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai'. In a similar vein, Allsen considers Buĵir a Mongol traditionalist who was partially responsible for thwarting Qubilai's Chinese-style reforms carried out in the north during Möngke's reign, and who supported the steppe-based Ariq Böke in the latter's contention for the throne with Qubilai.

Among the early leading administrators of the Mongol empire, more numerous than the Mongols and more powerful than the Chinese were individuals from Turco-Mongolian tribes or states with a cultural background similar to, but culturally more advanced than, that of the Mongols. Others came from sedentary societies in Central Asia who were better acquainted with 'the customs and laws of cities.' In his study on Činqai (*ca.* 1169-1252), Paul Buell attributes much of the functioning of the early Mongol state to what he calls 'steppe intelligentsia,' which he defines as far-sighted men who, 'while active in the life of the steppe, maintained traditions of literacy, organized long-range trade, and served as intermediaries between the deep steppe and the sedentary world.' In Buell's view, the members of this steppe intelligentsia were in most cases the products of the mixed, semi-sedentary cultures of the ethnically complex Sino-Mongolian frontier, and as such were able to approach 'the problem of governing in terms of experience gained in their own frontier societies, where native, Chinese and other elements interacted freely.' Činqai and the Yeh-lü brothers are

Buell's typical representatives of this group which left a notable imprint on the Mongol state.

Čingai is said to have been born somewhere on the fringe of the steppe, and his ethnic identity remains uncertain. He was a principal adviser of Činggis Qan and served twice as imperial chancellor in Ögödei's and Gügük's reigns. He was partially responsible for the establishment of a more rational imperial administration, over which he presided together with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. He experienced many ups and downs in his career at a time when the political situation at the Mongol court was most volatile, and was eventually removed by Möngke after the latter had seized the throne from the Ögödeids. Despite his support of the notorious Muslim tax-farmer 'Abd al-Rahmān who eventually brought about the downfall of Čingai himself as well as Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's, Čingai is seen nevertheless by Buell as a progressive who 'sought a more institutional system of governance and a more rational, less predatory exploitation of the peoples and resources of the empire.'

Like Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Yeh-lü A-hai (*ca.* 1151-1223) and his brother T'u-hua (d. 1231) were Khitans. Even though the Khitans are regarded as being of 'proto-Mongol' stock, most of them had become sinicized by the early thirteenth century, after several hundred years of acculturation with the Chinese since the establishment of the Liao dynasty in the tenth century, and particularly after its overthrow by the Jurchen Chin in the twelfth century. Nevertheless, Buell believes that A-hai and T'u-hua also qualify as representatives of the steppe intelligentsia since they too came from the tribal Khitans inhabiting the ethnically and culturally mixed Sino-Mongolian frontier. This frontier background enabled the brothers to become Činggis Qan's earliest experts in the affairs of sedentary populations in the south. While A-hai served as the senior administrator in Yen-ching and Bukhara, the most important regions in north China and Central Asia respectively, T'u-hua commanded the newly formed Han Armies in the attack against China.

The careers of Maḥmūd Yalavač (?-1254) and his sons, as described by Thomas Allsen, exemplify the best kind of 'empire men' in the service of the Mongols, men who could serve competently as heads of administrations in different regions of the empire irrespective of cultural differences. A Turkic-speaking merchant from Khwārazm in Central Asia, Yalavač was undoubtedly the most prominent Muslim politician of the Yeke Mongqol Ulus period. He was first appointed by Ögödei in 1239 to be in charge of the sedentary populations of Turkestan – the Western counterpart of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. Chiefly because of his expertise in governing cities, he is said to have revived the city life and trade in that region which had suffered most as a result of the Mongol conquest. Transferred to the post of chief administrator of north China in 1241, Yalavač, who was also a skilful politician,

survived the power struggles and purges at the Mongol court and was re-confirmed as *yeke jarquči* in charge of north China in both Güyük's and Möngke's reigns. While enjoying imperial favour, he was disliked by his Chinese colleagues, especially by the retainers of Prince Qubilai who had been appointed viceroy of north China in 1251. This conflict is regarded by Allsen as more than a mere personality clash, involving as it did the fundamental direction of the imperial policy in China. Allsen sees Yalavač as one of those 'Muslim and Turkish elements' at Möngke's court, who 'favoured a policy of minimizing Chinese participation in the administration of their homeland'. Among Yalavač's sons, Mas'ūd Beg replaced his father as governor-general of Turkestan, an office he was able to retain until his death. Thus, this family controlled for a significant period the two most important settled regions of the Yeke Mongqol Ulus – a fact reflecting not only the political dexterity of its members, but also the extent to which the Mongols relied on a small circle of 'experts' in controlling the sedentary populations under their sway.

Partly due to their cultural differences with the Mongols, and partly because of the Mongols' preference for Turco-Mongolians in the administration of the empire, the Chinese played a very limited role in the early Mongol government, with the exception of the Chinese military families who, as we have seen, held considerable power at the local level. The Chinese interest was championed at the Mongol court chiefly and almost exclusively by the famous Sino-Khitans, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. Igor de Rachewiltz's contribution examines both Ch'u-ts'ai's ideology and actions in the context of his times, and his role as mediator between two mutually incompatible ways of life. Ideologically, as shown by de Rachewiltz, Ch'u-ts'ai was a syncretist who had a deep personal commitment to Buddhist ideals; as a practical statesman, he immediately recognized the superiority of Confucian statecraft and strove to use it to mitigate the suffering of the populace. In practice, however, his Confucian dream was impossible to fulfil under the extant conditions. Even though he was able to gain considerable power, and indeed succeeded in persuading Ögödei to establish a formal bureaucracy and replace indiscriminate levies with a rational taxation system along Chinese lines, his courageous effort to 'Confucianize' the Mongol state failed in the end because of the Mongols' 'insatiable cupidity and their unwillingness to modify substantially their traditional law and customs.' The decline of his power in the latter part of Ögödei's reign marked the end of whatever influence had been exerted by the pro-Chinese faction at the Mongol court, and the rapid ascendancy of the Muslim financiers. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's failure reflects the difficulty of reconciling two opposite systems of government and ways of life in the very early stages of acculturation. It was left to Qubilai's Confucian advisers to continue the

work of 'education and transformation' begun by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai forty years earlier, with greater chances of success.

Due to the Mongols' reluctance to adopt the Chinese system of government even in their Chinese dominions, and to their failure to recognize the immediate relevance of Confucian learning, the early Mongol period was one of mass dislocation and unemployment for the Chinese literati. While many former Chin scholar-officials sought patronage from the Chinese military leaders and some found temporary asylum in the Taoist and Buddhist establishments, a few of them only were fortunate enough to be employed by the Mongol court, often in a specialized capacity and with limited influence. They are represented in this volume by Wang Chi (*ca.* 1181-1240), Yang Wei-chung (1206-60), and Yang Huan (1186-1255). Wang Chi, as indicated by Charles Peterson, was perhaps the earliest Chinese literatus in the service of the Mongols. He was used by them as 'an intermediary, a diplomat, and even a trouble shooter,' since his strengths 'were his education, his familiarity with conditions in north China, his judgement and adaptability, and perhaps his linguistic aptitude.'

Yang Wei-chung was even more suitable than Wang Chi as an intermediary in the Sino-Mongolian politico-cultural world, for he had served as an attendant to Prince Ögödei, the future Qa'an, when the latter was still an adolescent. His close rapport with Ögödei and formative experiences in the milieu of the Mongolian court, made Yang eminently suitable as secretary-interpreter and administrator. He was among the very few high ranking officials in Ögödei's and Güyük's courts who survived the bloody transfer of power from the house of Ögödei to that of Tolui in 1251. Apart from moderating the harshness of Mongol rule, Wei-chung is also credited by his biographer Chan Hok-lam with the promotion of classical studies and the dissemination of Neo-Confucian teachings in north China.

More prominent as a scholar, but less influential politically than Wang Chi and Yang Wei-chung, was Yang Huan. A dedicated teacher and expounder of the Confucian classics and an accomplished historian, he was nevertheless recruited by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai as the chief tax commissioner of Ho-nan. He eventually resigned, perhaps as a result of the rise of the Central Asian party at the Mongol court. His career dramatically illustrates the frustrations of the Chinese literati, rather than their accomplishments, in the difficult early stages of Mongol rule.

◇ In the first decades of the thirteenth century, native religious leaders played a vital role in relieving the sufferings of the populace and ensuring the survival of Chinese culture in the midst of general devastation and great political turmoil. The Mongol overlords, aspiring to achieve universal rule and wishing to use native religions to facilitate their conquest, showed equal favours to all Chinese and foreign creeds as long as peace and balance among the religious forces were maintained.

Aside from purely pragmatical and utilitarian aims, the Mongol rulers also sincerely believed in the efficacy of prayers to Heaven. Religious of all faiths were therefore encouraged 'to recite the sacred texts and speak to Heaven', so as to ensure the longevity of the emperor and the lasting fortune and prosperity of his house. They were thereby exempted from paying the heavy exactions imposed on the subject population, and were moreover granted land and buildings.

Facing both an unprecedented crisis and such open opportunities, the leaders of the various faiths and sects not only cooperated with each other in improving the welfare of the general populace, but also vied for the favour of the Mongol conqueror to ensure the survival and expansion of their own religion. Ch'iu Ch'u-chi (1148-1227), the patriarch of the Ch'üan-chen sect of Taoism, and Hai-yün (1203-57), head of the Lin-chi sect of Ch'an Buddhism, were the two most prominent religious leaders of that period. Neither Ch'iu Ch'u-chi nor Hai-yün were creative thinkers in terms of doctrine: rather they were men of action and political acumen, eminently able to cope with the problems of the day. As shown by Igor de Rachewiltz, Ch'iu concerned himself chiefly with proselytizing and was fully aware of the need to gain the full support of the Mongols for the survival of his movement. His famous and hazardous journey to the Hindukush at the summons of Činggis Qan in 1220-1224 gained for his followers complete exemption from taxes and duties, as well as other important privileges. As a result, the Ch'üan-chen temples and congregations expanded rapidly, performing 'the very practical social function of providing material relief and community service at a time when political turmoil discouraged the establishment of strong or sympathetic secular agencies'. Like Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, Hai-yün, although a relatively junior monk in the religious hierarchy, emerged as the undisputed leader of Buddhism in north China mainly because he was well connected with, and liked by, the all-powerful Mongol dignitaries. He was subsequently appointed by both Güyük and Möngke as the superintendent of all Buddhist affairs in north China. Thus he was able to expand the influence of Ch'an and at the same time safeguard the privileges of the Buddhist clergy. As in the case of Ch'iu, Hai-yün's contribution went beyond sectarian success. 'His repeated representations to the Mongol authorities,' writes Jan Yün-hua, 'certainly persuaded the conquerors to lighten their grip on the vanquished. He promoted the revival of Chinese traditional culture and values by helping scholars like K'ung Yüan-ts'u', and by extolling Confucian concepts of government to the Mongol authorities.

Ch'iu Ch'u-chi and Hai-yün not only ensured the survival of their respective religions but also accomplished much of what the Confucians were then in no position to do, viz. promoting the well-being of the ordinary people and preserving social and cultural institutions threatened with total collapse. In such an undertaking the two

religions found much common ground for cooperation. Unfortunately, increasing rivalry for court favours combined with unrelenting competition for continuous expansion sowed the seeds of bitter sectarian strife, a conflict that eventually led to the decline of their influence in favour of Tibetan Lamaism.

The intellectual and religious trends in north China and at the Mongol court in the early phase of the conquest deserve special attention. The biographies of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Ch'iu Ch'u-chi and Hai-yün provide a good deal of interesting information on the subject which the authors of the three essays in this volume discuss in considerable detail.

II. The Period of Qubilai and his Rule (1260/1271 – 1294)

The period of Yeke Mongqol Ulus and that of Qubilai's ascendancy and rule overlap, in so far as Qubilai was elected qa'an in 1260 but only adopted the designation Yüan for his dynasty in 1271. Until that year, the Mongol empire continued to be called Yeke Mongqol Ulus in Mongolian and Ta-Ch'ao, or Great Dynasty, in Chinese.⁹

In his long political career first as a prince, then as emperor, Qubilai sought advice and assistance from a great number of persons of widely divergent ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and ideological persuasions. Facing all sorts of challenges within and without, and harbouring vast imperial ambitions, Qubilai, a pragmatic ruler, favoured different groups at different stages of his career and in different spheres of his government. In Qubilai's innermost entourage there was always a group of Mongol and Turkic nobles and officials who were related to him by marriage or were retainers of long standing; in most cases, they were given the highest political positions and military commands. In his early career, Qubilai had shown great favour to the Chinese Confucian literati. These scholars had rendered him an invaluable service by establishing his credentials in north China as a wise administrator, eventually helping him to transform the Mongol imperial state from a steppe empire into a China-based dynasty. They were, in fact, chiefly responsible for the Chinese institutional structure adopted by Qubilai's government. The influence of the Confucian literati on Qubilai was, however, relatively short-lived and increasingly superficial. Their strenuous insistence on benevolent government ran counter to the true aims of Mongol rule: continuous military expansion and unlimited fiscal exploitation of the subject population. Because of the unwillingness and inability of the Confucian scholar-officials to maximize revenues in order to fill the court coffers and meet the high cost of military campaigns, Qubilai turned for help to a succession

9. See Hsiao CC85.1; and H. L. Chan's biography of Liu Ping-chung.

of unscrupulous Central Asian and Chinese financiers. Although these new recruits enjoyed great power for a time, they were merely the monarch's tools and were never allowed to establish a personal power-base. Without exception they were executed or disgraced whenever political opposition to them became too vocal. The continuous strife between Qubilai's Confucian counsellors and his financial experts is one of the most characteristic features of his reign and, for that matter, of the entire Yüan period, contributing immeasurably to the destabilization of the dynasty.

◇ The Chinese literati whom Qubilai had begun to recruit as advisers since 1239, when he was still a collateral prince, may be classified into three groups on the basis of their geographical origins, intellectual backgrounds, and political affiliations. The first, known as the Hsing-t'ai group, led by Qubilai's early principal adviser Liu Ping-chung (1216-74), consisted of people from Hsing-t'ai in modern Hopei, like Liu himself, and included his friends and students. They were mostly non-orthodox Confucian scholars who, as practical statesmen and bureaucrats, often combined Confucian scholarship with specialized skills. They entered Qubilai's service very early and made a great impression on the latter through the successful reforms which they introduced in Hsing-chou in 1251; subsequently, they were instrumental in assisting Qubilai to adopt Chinese institutions after his enthronement.

The second group consisted mostly of senior Confucian scholars who had served under the Chin rulers and, after the fall of the Chin, had sought the patronage of the northern Chinese generals, acting as teachers, advisers or local administrators. Members of this group carried on the Chin intellectual tradition which placed as much stress on literary and bureaucratic excellence as on Confucian classical learning. Many of them later served in the Han-lin Academy and the Department of National History, which was responsible for official literary and historiographical works.

The third group comprised orthodox Confucian scholars heavily influenced by Neo-Confucianism. They devoted much of their energy to education, and the National College was their institutional stronghold during Qubilai's reign. They were responsible for the dissemination of Neo-Confucianism in north China when it was first introduced from the south, and for its perpetuation under Qubilai.

Although the Chinese scholar-officials did not present themselves as a monolithic group and, indeed, varied greatly in their intellectual disposition and political affiliations, the above-mentioned groups should not be considered mutually exclusive or conflicting for there was in actual fact a good deal of interaction among the members of all three groups. Their opinions as how best to achieve their objectives and their capacity to serve may have differed, but they all shared the common goal of bending the Mongol administration towards the Chinese model.

The Hsing-t'ai group is represented in our collection by Liu Ping-chung, Chang Wen-ch'ien (1217-83), and Kuo Shou-ching (1231-1316). Liu, as shown by his biographer Chan Hok-lam, was a man of many parts and a remarkable figure on all counts. A Ch'üan-chen Taoist adept and Buddhist monk, Liu also excelled in Neo-Confucian philosophy and belles-lettres, and was conversant with astronomy, mathematics, architecture, geomancy, physiognomy and divination. His Buddhist background (he was a protégé of Hai-yün), his knowledge of Chinese statecraft and technical subjects, and his perspicacity made him the leading adviser of Qubilai both before and after the latter's enthronement. He exerted a strong influence on Qubilai, leading him to accept elements of the Chinese tradition and actually devising the blueprint of many institutions for Qubilai's government. He was also instrumental in the appointment of a number of Chinese officials, thus acting as a 'mediator and coordinator between the Mongol ruling class and the Chinese literati.' An unorthodox man by Confucian standards, Liu's political ascendancy represented, in Chan's view, the rise of an unusual figure in an extraordinary situation.

Among the personages brought into Qubilai's service by Liu Ping-chung, Chang Wen-ch'ien complemented Liu as a man of action, while Kuo Shou-ching inherited many of Liu's scientific and technical skills. A schoolmate of Liu, Chang was actively involved in the reforms in Hsing-chou and the general administrative changes after Qubilai's enthronement. Like many of his Confucian colleagues, Chang engaged in the protracted struggle against Qubilai's fiscal experts Wang Wen-t'ung (?-1262) and Ahmad (?-1282), and suffered as a result.

A disciple of Liu, Kuo Shou-ching was in Ho Peng Yoke's words 'the most outstanding hydrologist and astronomer of the Yüan dynasty' and 'may be regarded as the last – but only in the sense of time – of the great traditional astronomers and mathematicians in Chinese history.' As the leading astronomer and hydrologist at Qubilai's court, Kuo made many ingenious and significant contributions, including the compilation of the famous *Shou-shih li* (*Calendar for Fixing the Seasons*), and the construction of the T'ung-hui Canal in the metropolitan region. Without the assistance of indigenous scientific and technical experts such as Kuo (and of those from Muslim countries), the Mongol state would have been unable to run a great agrarian nation like China.

The group of the northern Chinese literati is represented in this volume by Wang E (1190-1273), Li Chih (1192-1279), Shang T'ing (1209-89), Hao Ching (1223-75), and Wang Yün (1227-1304). Wang E and Li Chih belonged to the generation of northern Chinese scholars who had already earned their *chin-shih* degree and made a reputation in official-literary circles under the Chin dynasty. Both had advised Qubilai on the Confucian principles of government when the latter was still a prince,

and were appointed Han-lin academicians after Qubilai's enthronement. Wang E devoted himself mainly to the restoration of traditional Chinese government institutions and the promotion of Confucian studies. His most important contribution was his successful attempt to revive the historiographical tradition taking as a starting point the compilation of the *Chin History*. In Chan's view, Wang E's dedication to this project not only 'attested to a Confucian expression of loyalty to an ideal political state and the cultural value it represented,' but was also designed 'to admonish the Mongol rulers to emulate their predecessors to promote and transmit the Han political and cultural heritage.'¹⁰ By contrast, Li Chih never actively served in Qubilai's government, using poor health as a 'screen for disdain of court politics and a token of his own intellectual integrity'. A versatile scholar and prolific writer, Li is best known in history as an algebraist who, in Ho's opinion, 'deserves to be regarded as one of the greatest mathematicians of a time when Chinese mathematics can be said to have achieved their golden age.'

Shang T'ing, Wang Yün, and Hao Ching were younger and more pragmatic in their approach than Wang E and Li Chih. Both Shang T'ing and Wang Yün were connected with the Tung-p'ing school of statecraft. Shang T'ing, a protégé of Yen Shih of Tung-p'ing, was not renowned for his Confucian scholarship, but rendered significant service to Qubilai as a capable administrator and astute adviser before and after the latter's enthronement. His otherwise brilliant career was tarnished by political intrigues, a fact, in Chan's view, which 'underscores the vulnerability of the Chinese literati in the service of Qubilai who used them as he saw fit, not hesitating to remove those suspected of deception however ill-founded the charges.'

Wang Yün, much younger than Shang, grew up under Mongol rule; nevertheless, he inherited the political culture that survived the collapse of the Chin dynasty, and was heavily influenced by the Tung-p'ing school. He began his career in Qubilai's reign and distinguished himself as a Han-lin academician, censorial official, provincial administrator and court chronicler. David Gedalecia sees Wang 'not merely as a functionary but rather a reformer trying to improve governance through legal and administrative means'. His pragmatic approach was 'in the vein of the Tung-p'ing school, which saw little need for deep philosophical speculation', thus fundamentally differing on this issue from the Neo-Confucianists. His voluminous writings remain a precious source on many aspects of the political, intellectual, social and religious life of the period.

Hao Ching had no direct connection with the Tung-p'ing school, but as a disciple of the great Chin scholar Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), he was a true inheritor of the

10. Chan HL82, 375.

Chin literary culture, even though somewhat affected by Neo-Confucianism through the influence of Chao Fu (*fl.* 1235-57) and Yao Shu (1203-1280). Serving Qubilai as adviser, military commissioner, and special envoy to the Sung, Hao commands attention mainly by the advice which he gave in a series of memorials submitted before and immediately after Qubilai's enthronement. In those documents, he displayed realistic foresight by urging Qubilai to conclude a peace with the Sung after the death of Möngke, and to withdraw to the north in order to seize the throne. More importantly, he also tried to convince Qubilai of the necessity of establishing a civil government based on impartial and universal laws by invoking the causes of the rise and fall of China's previous dynasties. As Richard Lynn rightly notes, 'Hao would have exerted much more influence on Qubilai had his career not been reduced by fifteen years' detention in Sung territory.'

The scholars and officials of the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucian school are represented by Yao Shu, Tou Mo (1196-1280), Hsü Heng (1209-81), and Liu Yin (1249-93). They were largely responsible for the introduction and dissemination of Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism in north China and for its promotion at the Mongol court, which ensured its eventual triumph as the state orthodoxy later in the Yüan period. Yao Shu and Tou Mo were two of the earliest Neo-Confucian converts in north China who actively propagated the new philosophy; both served Qubilai as his senior advisers and government officials. Yao Shu is presented by Chan Hok-lam not as a master of Confucian classics, but as 'a practical and versatile scholar who skilfully adapted his learning to changing circumstances'. A man of great ability, insight, and persuasiveness, Yao rendered invaluable services to Qubilai in his rise to power and he too made vigorous efforts to persuade Qubilai to adopt the Chinese mode of governance. The qa'an was very impressed by him. He once remarked that when it came to words and debate, Yao Shu could 'describe a round object as if it had a handle'. By contrast Tou Mo, perhaps the oldest among all Qubilai's Confucian counsellors, played a role at Qubilai's court that was more advisory than administrative. In Chan's view, he earned Qubilai's confidence, mainly because he consistently acted as a frank and outspoken critic of the monarch.

Hsü Heng and Liu Yin were undoubtedly the two most accomplished Neo-Confucian scholars of their time. Hsü Heng concerned himself little with metaphysical speculation, being totally committed to the promotion of the Neo-Confucian principles and their practical application in government and education. He distinguished himself mainly as an imperial adviser and educator. In the former capacity, Hsü was unique in urging the Mongol ruler to emulate the Confucian sage-kings of old in regarding moral conduct and self-improvement as the proper basis for all laws and institutions. As the first rector of the National College, he educated a

new generation of Mongols and Central Asians in accordance with the Neo-Confucian curriculum that put particular emphasis on the cultivation of moral values and practical learning. Thus even though Hsü Heng failed in his attempt to 'Confucianize' the Yüan as much as he would have wished, he contributed perhaps more than anyone else to the eventual triumph of Neo-Confucianism during the Yüan dynasty.

Liu Yin has often been contrasted with Hsü Heng: while Hsü was eager to engage in public service to advance the Way, Liu persistently abstained from politics in order to preserve the purity of the Way. In his study on Liu Yin, John Langlois disputes the views of F. W. Mote and Tu Wei-ming who both see Liu's withdrawal from the political stage as a form of protest against the nature of Yüan rule, and argues instead that Liu's attitude 'must be interpreted as a general indictment of political life as a whole', since Liu did not consider 'the Yüan any more "degenerate" than any other age'. Langlois holds that Liu detached himself from political involvement because he dedicated his life to maintaining personal integrity, and that Liu was deeply committed to the belief that 'the continuity of the main Chinese cultural tradition was of utmost importance and that its vitality was not dependent on ephemeral political institutions'.

All in all, the efforts of the Confucian literati to persuade Qubilai to sinicize his state were valiant, and the contributions of those men to the transformation of the Mongol state in China were manifold and historically significant. The frustrations which they experienced in their lifetime were due to the fundamental incompatibility between their lofty ideals on the one hand, and the very nature of Mongol rule in China and Qubilai's political ambitions on the other. Morris Rossabi has recently warned us not to exaggerate Qubilai's apparent reliance upon, and trust in, the Chinese advisers as is often done in Chinese sources, since those advisers constituted only one of many sources of counsel taken by the monarch.¹¹ The point is well taken. Nevertheless, the contribution which they made to the gradual transformation of the Mongol polity should also not be underestimated.

The Chinese scholar-officials could not have scored whatever success they achieved at Qubilai's court without the support of a number of Mongol and *se-mu* ('alien, ethnic') sympathizers, the latter being mostly literate Central and Western Asians. While most Mongols and *se-mu jen* remained ignorant of, or unsympathetic to, Chinese culture at this early stage, a number of them became sinicized to some extent and promoted the argument that the Confucian Way should be adopted to rule China. Consequently, they came forward to support the Confucian interest in different manners. An-t'ung (1245-93), Lien Hsi-hsien (1231-80), and Saiyid Aġall

11. See Rossabi 87, 47-83.

(1211-79), are the most prominent examples of Mongol and *se-mu* ministers who were sympathetic to the Confucian cause in Qubilai's government – as a result of which they received a very favourable press in the traditional Chinese historiography. These three men had two things in common: firstly, they were picked by Qubilai as the top members of the ruling élite either because they themselves or their families had had long and close relations with Qubilai's house; secondly, they had long been under Chinese cultural influence because of personal or family backgrounds. Both Lien and An-t'ung were related to Qubilai through marriage. An-t'ung's family had maintained close association with north China since the time of his great grandfather Muqali; and his father Bātur had been a member of Qubilai's entourage before the latter became emperor.¹² Lien came from a distinguished Uighur family and his father Buyruq Qaya had served the house of Tolui as a retainer especially versed in northern Chinese affairs. Like Buyruq Qaya, Saiyid Ajall, as shown by Paul Buell, had been the official representative of Tolui's house in various local and regional administrations in north China since Ögödei's time.

Politically and ideologically, both An-t'ung and Lien Hsi-hsien aligned themselves closely with the Chinese literati. As the longest serving Right chancellor in the Secretarial Council during Qubilai's reign, An-t'ung, together with the heir-apparent Jingim (1243-85), were regarded by the Chinese advisers as their leaders in the fight against Qubilai's financial experts. An-t'ung is seen by de Rachewiltz as 'a man of two cultures' whose attraction to Han civilisation is 'revealed not through written works, but through his continuous opposition to policies, such as those of Aḥmad and Sangha, that were detrimental to the Chinese.' While An-t'ung was not a scholar himself, Lien Hsi-hsien belonged to the first group of the Mongol and *se-mu* élite that was converted to Confucianism. A disciple of Wang E and nicknamed by Qubilai 'Lien Mencius,' Lien Hsi-hsien is described by Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing as 'a most dedicated practioner of Confucianism in both private and public life', and as a non-Chinese who 'perceived Confucianism as the universal truth transcending racial and national boundaries'. In almost every phase of the qa'an's endeavor to transform the Mongol state, Lien played an important role either as a central or regional chief executive, or as imperial counsellor, leaving a lasting imprint on Qubilai's government. In Hsiao's view, Lien's life 'demonstrates that ideology was as strong as ethnic background in deciding a man's political commitment', and he warns us not 'to overrate the influence of ethnic origin on the political inclination of the protagonists and the shaping of political alliances' in Yüan times.

12. For An-t'ung see the family biography of Muqali.

Saiyid Aġall's background and role differ significantly from those of An-t'ung and Lien Hsi-hsien, but like them he has been greatly admired by Chinese historians. A Muslim from Bukhara, Saiyid Aġall served mostly as a regional administrator with little opportunity to influence imperial policies. Although his career spanned five decades, it was the period of his tenure as the head of the Regional Secretarial Council of Yün-nan (1273-79) that not only earned him great distinction, but also left a lasting mark on the history of that region. Newly conquered by the Mongols, Yün-nan was in fact incorporated into the Chinese empire for the first time. As the highest administrator of the province, Aġall, so Paul Buell argues, 'more than any other, certainly more than any Chinese, was responsible for drawing [Yün-nan] definitely into the Chinese cultural field'. Equally important, Aġall is regarded as one of the major exponents of the Muslim community in southwestern China, and is still revered by many Muslims as the progenitor of their families. Even though his image may have been over-sinicized and Confucianized by traditional Chinese historians, it is certainly true, as Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein has noted in a recent paper,¹³ that the career of Saiyid Aġall provides a good example of the adaptability of some of the Mongol and *se-mu* officials in Qubilai's time to the Chinese environment.

◇ Li T'an (d. 1262), Wang Wen-t'ung (?-1262), Aġmad (? - 1282), and Sangha (? - 1291) were all important generals or officials during Qubilai's reign who met tragic ends and were officially condemned for their crimes at the time of their death. Their biographies were therefore relegated to the sections on the 'Rebellious Officials' (*p'an-ch'en*) and 'Traacherous Officials' (*chien-ch'en*) in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), in accordance with traditional historiographical practice. The totally negative light cast on them by the official records reflects both the political consensus at the time of their downfall and the subsequent moral judgement of the Confucian historians. This does not necessarily mean that they had made no positive contribution to the Yüan government during their careers. Indeed, their lives highlight in one way or another the challenges faced by Qubilai's regime, and the sharply conflicting political undercurrents of his reign.

The rebellion of Li T'an, a powerful Chinese military lord in eastern Shan-tung, in league with his father-in-law Wang Wen-t'ung who was then the moving spirit in Qubilai's newly established central administration, was the most serious challenge to Qubilai's rule in China and had far-reaching consequences on the future orientations of the Yüan government. Refuting the earlier view that Li's revolt of 1262 was inspired by Han nationalism to assist the Southern Sung in a bid to expel the Mongols, Chan Hok-lam shows that Li 'was motivated by no other reason than his

13. See Armijo-Hussein 89.

ambition to become a powerful and independent warlord on the model of his father'. (Li T'an's father Li Ch'üan had risen to power in Shan-tung by frequently shifting his allegiances between the Mongols, the Chin, and the Southern Sung as circumstances warranted in the early stage of Mongol conquest.) The lack of positive response from the northern generals, whose support was as vital to Qubilai as it was to Li T'an, clearly demonstrates the absence of any 'Han nationalism' during this period.

In his biography of Wang Wen-t'ung, Chan depicts his subject as a non-Confucian, highly practical functionary, free of dogmatic scruples and for whom the end justified the means; one whose 'administrative skills and fiscal expertise not only averted financial chaos at the most critical time of Qubilai's reign, but also laid the cornerstone of a fiscal administration that facilitated the Mongol hegemony'. Wang's implication in Li T'an's revolt, Chan cautions us, cannot be attested on the basis of present available sources. The deeper cause of Wang's misfortune was, apparently, his perennial conflict with Qubilai's Confucian advisers, who disliked Wang because of his non-Confucian background, his domineering personality and his departure from traditional principles of government. Ironically, despite the victory scored by Qubilai's Confucian advisers on this occasion, Li's revolt and Wang's complicity had the effect of reducing considerably Qubilai's trust in the Chinese, leading to the de-feudalization of the Han military establishment and to the ascendancy of the Central Asian fiscal experts at the expense of the Chinese scholar-officials.

Aḥmad and Sangha were the two most powerful and notorious financial experts in Qubilai's government. Since the Chinese authors are invariably condemnatory of them, Herbert Franke has drawn on Persian, Tibetan, and European sources as well as Chinese ones in his biographies of these two 'villains'. Nevertheless, the portrait of Aḥmad that eventually emerges from his study remains, by and large, an unpleasant one. A Muslim from Fanākat in Central Asia, Aḥmad rose from the position of retainer in the household of Qubilai's principal wife Čabui to that of chief fiscal manager and all-powerful minister. His career, as Franke puts it, was governed by 'relentless craving for total control over government finance'. Since he was able 'to squeeze the last drop out of every available resource throughout the empire', he retained Qubilai's trust until the end, exercising nearly unlimited authority and outmanoeuvring all his adversaries, including the heir-apparent Jingim. His career ended abruptly in 1282 when he was murdered as a result of a plot. Even though Marco Polo reports that this incident was an insurrection by the Chinese directed not only against Aḥmad but against all foreigners, Franke contends that the murder did not originate among Aḥmad's political adversaries, but 'was rather a desperate attempt on the part of some conspirators of low rank to eliminate the all-powerful minister', thus reflecting the widespread resentment against him.

Sangha's career was, in many ways, a repetition of Aḥmad's. An uighurized Tibetan, Sangha rose to power from the Buddhist ranks and became Qubilai's most trusted adviser and powerful minister during the monarch's last years. His chief concerns lay 'in exercising a rigid control of financial management throughout the empire and in prosecuting officials suspected of irregularities', and always 'hunting for fresh sources of revenue'. He was eventually brought down and executed in 1291 as a result of violent attacks from a large number of court officials who impeached him for abuse of power and corruption, and for being responsible for widespread unrest in the provinces. In assessing Sangha, Franke points to a wide discrepancy between the Chinese and Tibetan sources. While the Chinese sources almost uniformly depict Sangha as a treacherous villain, the Tibetan sources portray him as 'a wise and good minister who eventually fell victim to jealousy and slander'. 'History,' concludes Franke, 'must retain an open verdict on Sangha. Both his efficiency and his ruthlessness reflect the circumstances that prevailed in the ethnically heterogeneous government of Qubilai's time – when ability to produce revenue far outweighed respect for ethical standards and traditional rules of behaviour'.

The repeated appearance of powerful 'rapacious' financial experts and their eventual disgrace are symptomatic of both the economic predicament and political style of Qubilai. While the qa'an continued to recruit a large number of Confucian scholars as his advisers to make his government more legitimate in Chinese eyes, he needed financial experts to fill the state coffers by whatever methods to meet the exorbitant military expenditures, the lavish imperial grants and other court expenses. The ruthless money men raised funds for him and became his scapegoats whenever the protests from his Confucian counsellors and their Mongol and *se-mu* allies could no longer be ignored. Wang Wen-t'ung, Aḥmad and Sangha apparently held no independent power base and were a far cry from the powerful ministers of the mid- and late-Yüan like El Temür (?-1333) and the Merkid Bayan (?-1340) who were not only 'king makers' in the true sense of the word, but who also kept a tight grip on all government activities. Our 'treacherous' ministers were nothing more than Qubilai's hatchet men. The recurrence of their rise and fall highlights Qubilai's conflicting roles as the Chinese emperor who needed to maintain a Confucian façade, and the Mongol conqueror who had to sustain the imperialistic and feudal-patrimonial character of his regime.

◇ Even though Qubilai became emperor of China and earned for himself the epithet of 'Wise' (Mo. *sečen*), he was by no means a peace-loving, benevolent monarch in the Confucian mould. On the one hand, he remained a true expansionist Mongol sovereign always looking for new territories to conquer and devoting much of his

country's resources to that purpose. On the other, his dual supremacy as Mongol qa'an and Chinese emperor was challenged within by Chinese rebels like Li T'an, and without by his brothers and cousins such as Ariq Böke, Qaidu, Du'a, Širegi, and Nayan. Military activities were, therefore, an outstanding feature of Qubilai's reign. From the old Mongolian, *se-mu*, and Chinese military families which, in most cases, had served the Mongol rulers since Činggis Qan's time, there emerged a new generation of commanders to shoulder the burden of defending and expanding Qubilai's already massive empire, and fighting in regions of vastly different terrain and climate ranging from the Inner Asian steppes to Southeast Asian islands and jungles.

Of all his military endeavours, Qubilai's crowning achievement was the destruction of the native Sung dynasty in central and south China. That war was of the greatest significance both politically and historically. It meant not only the annexation of the whole of China by an alien regime for the first time in history, but also the reunification of the Chinese world after more than three centuries of political division and military conflicts, thus vastly enhancing Qubilai's prestige and legitimacy as the emperor of China. The generals chosen for discussion in this section, Bayan (1237-95), Chang Hung-fan (1238-80), and Tung Wen-ping (1217-78), the eldest of the Tung brothers, all played leading roles in the historic campaign.

Bayan, the commander-in-chief of the Yüan forces in the main phase of the conquest, was beyond doubt the greatest military leader of Qubilai's reign and, with Sübötei, of the entire Mongol-Yüan period. He represented a new brand of Mongol soldier, one educated bilingually – in Mongolian and Chinese (even literary!) – who could use a complex war machine to fight effectively on all sorts of terrain, and employ political means equally well as brute force to achieve his military objectives. Bayan's roles were indeed varied and all-important: a top-ranking, long-term civilian and military official, conqueror of the Sungs, chief defender of Inner Asian frontiers, and even king-maker of Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307), Qubilai's immediate successor. The conquest of the Sung represented, however, the pinnacle of his career. In carrying out this task Bayan clearly demonstrated the two qualities that had made him the man most suitable for the job. Firstly, he commanded and employed efficiently a large force that was not only poly-ethnic, but also truly multi-purpose and amphibious, as required by the geography of central and south China. Cavalry, which had been the key element in the earlier Mongol successes, was for the first time replaced in importance by the navy. Secondly, Bayan faithfully and successfully implemented Qubilai's policy of a speedy and comparatively humane conquest, which was predicated by Qubilai's new status as the Son-of Heaven. As Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing points out, Bayan 'put his trust in political and psychological means

to destroy the Sung defence,' and 'such means proved so effective that only a few pitched battles were fought, and massacres of inhabitants in fallen cities, which were so frequent elsewhere, occurred only twice in the entire campaign'.

As Qubilai's chief defender of Mongolia and Uighuristan against Qaidu and his allies for about a decade, Bayan stabilized these frontiers for Qubilai but was unable to achieve anything comparable to what he had accomplished against the Sung, and the war with Qaidu dragged on until after Qubilai's death. In Hsiao's view, Bayan's lack-lustre performance was not due to lack of expertise in steppe warfare, but to the passive nature of Qubilai's strategy, which in turn was determined by the weakness of the Yüan's position in Inner Asia. Because of the serious logistic problem of sustaining a war in the Inner Asian steppes from his bases in China, Qubilai, like the rulers of most Chinese dynasties, was compelled to adopt a defensive posture, conducting 'a protracted war of attrition that would deny the Mongolian homeland to his opponent while blocking his access to food-producing settlements.' Bayan faithfully implemented this policy which perforce reduced his role to that of defender in the steppe warfare.

While Bayan broke the Sung by destroying its main forces and seizing its capital Lin-an in 1276, Chang Hung-fan completed the conquest by annihilating the fleeing Sung court in a historic naval battle off the Kwangtung coast in 1279. As shown by Hsiao in his essay, Chang Jou's son Hung-fan represented the second generation of northern Chinese military clans in the service of the Mongols. Unlike his father in many respects, Hung-fan was a versatile scholar as well as a great general, a 'military bureaucrat' who could be transferred from one command to another (a common practice since Qubilai's integration of the Han Armies), and a skilful tactician who could fight effectively on water as well as on land. The fact that Hung-fan was appointed the first Chinese commander-in-chief of a combined Mongol-Chinese force in a major campaign underlines not only the great trust that Qubilai had in Hung-fan's family, but also the increasing degree of dependence of the Mongols on Chinese soldiers in the campaigns in central and south China where the terrain and the climate rendered the Mongol cavalymen less effective. As the Chinese general who completed the conquest of China for his Mongol master, Hung-fan has often been accused of being a 'traitor to the Chinese race.' In the last part of his study, Hsiao deals with the historiographical controversy about Hung-fan and stresses that the castigation of this personage is anachronistic, 'for it amounts to criticizing his conduct according to a concept of national identity which developed only at a later stage in Chinese history'. This argument can also help to explain why so many Chinese, military and civilians, entered the service of the Mongols without reluctance, thus justifying their conduct against the later historians' censorious judgement.

Like Chang Hung-fan, the three Tung brothers discussed in the composite biography by Hung Chin-fu belonged also to the second generation of the northern Chinese military clans, but their father Tung Chün (1186-1233) had been a rather undistinguished commander in the service of Shih T'ien-tse's family. The rise to prominence of the Tung brothers was directly related to the political ascendancy of Qubilai. They benefited from Qubilai's policy of centralization at the expense of other Chinese military clans for they had been Qubilai's personal retainers when Qubilai was still a prince, and served the latter loyally after his enthronement. All three brothers had varied and interesting careers. Wen-ping was one of Qubilai's most trusted generals and dependable trouble-shooter in the consolidation of his regime. He served with distinction as one of Bayan's chief deputies in the conquest of the Sung. Wen-yung rose slowly in the civil hierarchy and distinguished himself as a persistent, conscientious and outspoken critic of Qubilai's exploitative financial experts. Wen-chung, as the long-time keeper of the seals, remained in Qubilai's innermost entourage for nearly three decades and was a sort of majordomo enjoying the emperor's full confidence. Since the Tungs served Qubilai so competently and commanded his absolute trust, they became one of the prominent Chinese families in the Yüan. In Hung's words, the Tungs, as a group, 'very likely outshone and outlasted all other Chinese families in the Yüan government from the time of Qubilai's reign'.

In short, the careers of the Shihs, the Changs, and especially the Tungs, reflect the close interdependence between the Mongol regime and a group of northern Chinese military clans. On the one hand, even though Qubilai had to curtail the power of these families for the sake of dynastic security, his regime still had to depend on their services. Without their continuing loyal support the Mongols could not have conquered and ruled China successfully. On the other, their rise to eminence was largely the result of their incorporation into the very core of the conquest élite by the Mongol rulers.

◇ In ruling an empire of so many races and creeds, Qubilai continued the policy of his predecessors in favouring all faiths. He established a separate hierarchy of clerical bureaucracy for each of the important religions, and exempted all temples and monks from fiscal and other obligations. But the balance between religious forces had shifted greatly in favour of Tibetan Buddhism, commonly known as Lamaism, since the time of the early Mongol rulers, and this at the expense of Taoism and of native Chinese Buddhism. Under Qubilai, Lamaism enjoyed the highest patronage and attained a status approaching that of a state cult. 'P'ags-pa (1235-80), the subject of Luciano Petech's study, was the person chiefly responsible for the ascendancy of Lamaism at the Yüan court and was the leading religious figure in Qubilai's reign. As head of the powerful Saskya-pa sect of central Tibet, 'P'ags-pa was made the first

imperial preceptor, with jurisdiction over Tibet and Buddhism in China. According to Petech, the relationship between 'P'ags-pa and Qubilai was in theory 'that of patron and protégé (*mc'od-yon*), pupil and teacher', but in reality 'P'ags-pa was 'a tool utilized by Qubilai to implement a policy of control without conquest, adopted solely in Tibet'. Even though 'P'ags-pa was considered 'a sort of protecting saint of the Mongol dynasty' in the early fourteenth century, Petech cautions us not to overrate his role in his home country and his personal influence in state politics. In other words, 'P'ags-pa's prestige and power depended upon Qubilai's support, and Qubilai elevated both Tibetan Buddhism and 'P'ags-pa in order to keep Tibet as an integral part of his far-flung empire. In addition to the inherent attraction of Tibetan Buddhism for the Mongols (an interesting subject in itself), the political motivation of the Mongols in elevating this religion over all others should not be underestimated. In conclusion, religion was as much an instrument of conquest and rule as a matter of personal faith for the descendants of Činggis Qan.

The Editors

EXPLANATORY NOTES

I. *Arrangement of the Biographies*

1. The biographies are divided by period and arranged according to professional category (military leaders, advisers and administrators, etc.). Periods as well as professional categories sometimes overlap, since the era of Qubilai also includes the years before 1260 when Qubilai was still a prince. Moreover, as explained already in the Introduction, his rule as *Yüan* emperor actually begins in 1271 only. As regards professional categories, several personages performed in turn military, (civil) administrative, and advisory duties, sometimes even concurrently. The formal classification adopted in the present volume is therefore purely a matter of convenience, and should not be taken as a procrustean mould wherein to cast the subjects of our study.
2. The biographies concern single individuals, families, or ad hoc groupings of personages. Muqali's (no. 1) is a typical family biography, and so too is that of the Tung brothers (no. 36), whereas Maḥmūd Yalavač's (no. 9) is both a family and a group biography, since it deals also with the subject's sons, as well as with Buḡir. The latter's biography has been 'attached' to that of Maḥmūd partly because of professional continuity, partly because it is too short to warrant a separate essay. In the case of An-t'ung, this personage could have been dealt with equally well in Part Two with the Advisers and Administrators; and the same could have been done for two of the Tung brothers. A special category (Technologists and Mathematicians) could perhaps have been established for Kuo Shou-ching (no. 18) and Li Chih (no. 20). Other changes have also been suggested, such as the elimination of the 'Rebellious' and 'Treacherous' Officials, and the transfer of biographies nos. 30-33 to Military Leaders and Advisers and Administrators. Indeed, an entirely different system of classification could have been devised. We have tried to steer a middle course between a Western model and the Chinese traditional one, taking into account the respective lengths of the biographies. This has inevitably produced some minor incongruities, which however should not affect the general argument.
3. The Biographies provide all the basic information on their subjects: the various names (*ming*, *tzu*), styles (*hao*), offices and titles in translation, and relevant dates according to the Western calendar. People's ages are also computed by Western reckoning, but the word *sui* (= years since conception) has been used

occasionally. The Chinese characters for proper names, offices and titles, technical and other terms, and place names are given in the Chinese Character Indices (see below). Please note that homophones are numbered, e.g. Sang-ho¹, Sang-ho², the Chinese characters for the two different *ho* being given under 'Sang-ho' in the Proper Names Index. Official ranks are all in lower case; offices (= bureaux) and honorary titles are in upper case. Non-Chinese names appearing in Chinese transcription in our sources are normally shown in their original reconstructed form which, if doubtful, is prefixed by an asterisk. Place names are shown in the form of the original sources: their present-day equivalents are listed in the Place Names Index. Excepting a few well-known localities such as Peking and Nanking, place names are romanized according to Wade-Giles: Hang-chou, K'ai-p'ing fu. The names of the modern provinces are given in the traditional standard form: Hopei, Shantung; those names are hyphenated, however, whenever the homonymous districts of the Mongol-Yüan period are referred to: Ho-pei, Shan-tung.

4. The biographies often mention individuals discussed in other essays. Whenever such individuals are the object of separate biographies, we have referred to the latter by adding *q.v.* (*quem vide*) and *qq.v.* (*quos vide*) in parenthesis. If the same event has been considered elsewhere, we have referred to the other quotation(s) in a footnote.
5. Additional comments by the editors are occasionally given in an Editorial Note at the end of a biography.
6. The Bibliography appended to each biography is meant to cover all the *important* primary and secondary sources up to 1990-1991. All book titles and titles of articles are listed in abbreviated or simplified form: the full titles are found in the Bibliography and Abbreviations at the end of the work. Please note that the items in italics at the beginning of each Bibliography are reference works, such as the *Combined Indices to Thirty Collections of Liao, Chin, and Yüan Biographies (CIB)*, which contain, altogether, *most* of the references to biographical material on the relevant personage in the Chin, Sung, Yüan and early Ming sources. A certain amount of duplication has inevitably occurred in some bibliographies which were compiled before the publication in 1989 of de Rachewiltz and Wang, *Repertory of Proper Names in Yüan Literary Sources*. Especially important items in the bibliographies are prefixed by an asterisk. Roman figures after a title refer to the physical volume; Arabic figures after a Chinese title refer to the *chüan*; and the letters A, B, C, to sections designated in the book as *shang* ('upper' = I), *chung* ('middle' = II) and *hsia* ('lower' = III).

II. Transcription

For Chinese names and terms we have followed the Wade-Giles system with minor modifications, e.g. *yüeh* for *yo*, *i* for *yi*. The half-circle and the circumflex over *u* and *e* have been omitted.

For the romanization of Mongolian we have generally employed the Middle Mongolian pronunciation, e.g. Ča'āдай, Sübōtei, qa'an; however, the Written Mongolian form is also given in the General Index. The voiced deep velar stop *ɣ* is transcribed *ǰ* throughout.

Some common peoples' names are given in their usual Anglicized forms, thus Khitan, Jurchen in place of Qitan, Jürčen.

Please note that 'Qa'an', by itself and with capital Q, refers only and exclusively to the Emperor Ögödei (r. 1229-41).

III. Bibliography and Abbreviations (see also IV.1)

This Bibliography lists only the works cited in the bibliographies appended to the individual biographies. To save space we have dispensed with the romanization and translation of titles of works in Chinese and Japanese, on the assumption that readers who wish to consult them possess an adequate knowledge of these languages.

Further references to books and articles in Chinese, Japanese and other languages on the Sung-Chin-Yüan period can be found in the relevant sections of various publications, such as *AA* (esp. 24:1973, and 45:1983); *BAOS*; *BM*; *CKSYCTT*; (1981:1-); *CKYSYCTH* (1981:1-); *ET* (esp. 10:1979); *HSJ*; *SoM*; *SZ* (the May issue); *WMH*, and *YSHKS*.

IV. Chinese Character Indices

1. Topics and Terms

This index lists in alphabetical order not only philosophical, scientific and technical terms, but also the titles of Chinese poems, essays and works cited in the biographies which are not included in the Bibliography and Abbreviations.

2. Offices and Titles

All the Chinese official ranks and titles translated into English in the biographies are listed in this index, which also includes Mongolian offices and titles in transcription and their Chinese forms. The publication of Hucker 85 and Farquhar 90 came unfortunately too late for us to attempt to harmonize our English renderings with those of these two works, in particular with the latter. However, as this index provides the Chinese characters of all the offices and titles

found in the biographies, it will be easy to identify the same in both the above-mentioned works.

3. Proper Names

This index lists also the names of peoples, tribes and dynasties. For non-Han names, only doubtful or reconstructed forms (marked by an asterisk), and the names of some leading personages are entered.

4. Place Names

All place names found in the biographies are listed with their present-day equivalent in parenthesis if this is different from the name current in the Chin, Sung or Yüan periods. If the name is the same (with the regular passage of *chou* or *ch'eng* to *hsien*), only the province is given in parenthesis. This index includes also names of pavilions, temples and palaces, schools and private academies.

Please note that the following designations have been used in the biographies: district (Yüan), province (Sung) = *lu*; circuit = *tao*; administration = *fu*; prefecture = *chou*; commandery = *chen*, *chün*; county = *hsien*. For other place designations and geographical terms, see the comprehensive list at the beginning of the section on p.

V. General Index

This index contains page references to people and subjects, and major cities only.

VI. Weights and Measures of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period

Standard units include the following, with modern English equivalents:

<i>chang</i>	=	3.072 m
<i>li</i>	=	553 m
<i>mou</i>	=	5.66 m ²
<i>ch'ing</i> = 100 <i>mou</i>	=	566 m ²
<i>liang</i> ('tael, ounce')	=	37.3 g
<i>chün</i> ('catty')	=	596.8 g
<i>sheng</i>	=	.95 l
<i>shih</i> ('hundredweight')	=	94.9 l
<i>kuan</i> ('string of cash')	=	1,000 cash (<i>ch'ien</i>)

SOUTHERN SUNG, CHIN AND YÜAN RULERS

Southern Sung

Kao-tsung 1127-1162
 Hsiao-tsung 1163-1189
 Kuang-tsung 1190-1194
 Ning-tsung 1195-1224
 Li-tsung 1225-1264
 Tu-tsung 1265-1274
 Kung-tsung 1275-1276
 Tuan-tsung 1276-1278
 (Ti) Ping 1278-1279

Jurchen-Chin

T'ai-tsu 1115-1123
 T'ai-tsung 1123-1135
 Hsi-tsung 1135-1149
 Hai-ling wang 1149-1161
 Shih-tsung 1161-1189
 Chang-tsung 1190-1208
 Wei-shao wang 1209-1213
 Hsüan-tsung 1213-1224
 Ai-tsung 1224-1234
 Mo-ti 1234

Yeke Mongqol Ulus-Yüan

Činggis (T'ai-tsu)	1206-1227
Tolui (Jui-tsung)	1228 (Regent)
Ögödei (T'ai-tsung)	1229-1241
Töregene (Liu huang-hou)	1242-1245 (Regent)
Güyük (Ting-tsung)	1246-1248
Oğul Qaimiš	1249-1250 (Regent)
Möngke (Hsien-tsung)	1251-1259
Qubilai (Shih-tsu)	1260-1294
Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung)	1295-1307
Qaišan (Wu-tsung)	1308-1311
Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung)	1312-1320
Šidebala (Ying-tsung)	1321-1323
Yisün Temür (T'ai-ting ti)	1324-1328
Arigiba/Aragibağ	1328 (Usurper)
Tuq Temür (Wen-tsung)	1328
Qošila (Ming-tsung)	1328
Tuq Temür (Wen-tsung)	1329-1332
Irinjibal (Ning-tsung)	1332
Toqon Temür (Shun-ti)	1333-1368

ABBREVIATIONS

Common and conventional abbreviations are not listed

a.	=	ancestor
alter.	=	alternate
arab.	=	Arabic
astr.	=	astronomical
b.	=	brother
cal.	=	calendrical
ch.	=	chapter
ch.	=	<i>chüan</i>
chin.	=	Chinese
cycl.	=	cyclical
d.	=	died
f.	=	family, families
H.	=	<i>hao</i> : appellation, style, or pen name
Hs.	=	<i>hsing</i> : surname, clan name
imp.	=	imperial
M.	=	<i>ming</i> : personal or given name
m.	=	mother
math.	=	mathematical
mil.	=	military
mo.	=	Written Mongolian
Mo.	=	Middle Mongolian
nr.	=	near
r.	=	reigned
s.	=	son
S.	=	<i>shih</i> : posthumous name
skr.	=	Sanskrit
T.	=	<i>tzu</i> : courtesy name
tib.	=	Tibetan
tu.	=	(Middle) Turkic, Uighur
u.	=	uncle
unid.	=	unidentified
w.	=	wife

PART ONE

THE YEKE MONGQOL ULUS PERIOD

(1206-1271)

MILITARY LEADERS

1. MUQALI (1170-1223), BÖL (1197-1220), TAS (1212-1239), AN-T'UNG (1245-1293)

Muqali (Mu-hua-li) was born in 1170 into the 'White' clan of the Jalair tribe, or Ča'at Jalair, whose territory in the 12th century was situated 'east of the river Onon' in northeastern Mongolia. He was the third of the five sons of Gü'ün U'a and his wife Köküi.

His grandfather, Telegetü Bayan, and his father were with the Jürkins when these were defeated by Činggis Qan *ca.* 1197. Since the time of Činggis' ancestor Qaidu, the Jalairs had apparently been hereditary serfs of the Monqol tribe and this fact explains their presence in the Jürkin camp, the Jürkin chiefs Sača Beki and Taiču being the direct descendants, in the senior line, of Qaidu and Qabul Qan.

After the Jürkins' defeat, Gü'ün U'a, together with his brothers Čila'un Qayiči and Ĵebke, declared his allegiance to Činggis Qan, offering his two sons Muqali and Buqa to him as personal, or hereditary, slaves (*emčü bo'ol*). Čila'un Qayiči did the same with his two sons Töngge and Qaši, whereas Ĵebke was given to Činggis' younger brother Joči Qasar.

At this time Muqali was already in his late twenties. A later biographer who recorded the family tradition portrays him as a man of imposing stature and mien, and great physical strength; a good planner and an excellent archer.

He soon distinguished himself and with three other outstanding followers of Činggis Qan, Bo'orču, Boroqul and Čila'un, formed an élite group which came to be known as 'the Four Steeds (=Stalwarts)' (*dörben külü'üt*). Muqali is usually listed as the second in the four-man team, the first being Činggis' early companion Bo'orču. The other legendary four-man team, known as 'the Four Hounds' (*dörben noqais*), consisted of Ĵebe, Qubilai, Ĵelme and Sübötei.

In 1199(?) Muqali allegedly took part with his three comrades in the operation to rescue the Kereit troops attacked by Kökse'ü Sabraq after the joint Kereit-Mongol expedition against the Naimans. This episode is, however, of doubtful historicity.

Indirect evidence shows that Muqali participated also in the famous battle of Dalan Nemürges (near the Khalkha River in eastern Mongolia) against the Tatar coalition in the spring of 1202. His biographer reports how, during this campaign,

Muqali and Bo'orču displayed utter devotion to Činggis Qan by holding a felt cover over the sleeping leader throughout a rainy night. The *Secret History of the Mongols* gives credit for this act to Bo'orču alone.

The last expeditions in which Muqali took part before the great *quriltai* of 1206 were those against the Kereits (1203) and the Naimans (1204). On the third and final day of the battle against the Kereits, it was Muqali who, at the head of his picked troops, stormed the Ong Qan's camp at ǰer Qabčiqai Pass (probably in the southern Bayan Ula).

Muqali was handsomely rewarded for his services at the *quriltai* of 1206. Besides being appointed myriarch (*tümen-ü noyan*) of the Left (= East) Wing (*Je'ün qar*) of the newly reorganised army, Muqali was granted immunity for up to nine breaches of the law, a privilege that he shared with Bo'orču. The first thousand-man corps under his command was made up of his own ǰalair tribesmen and actually belonged to him. On the same occasion Bo'orču was appointed myriarch of the Right (= West) Wing (*bara'un qar*). He and Muqali had achieved the highest military rank.

Virtually nothing is known of Muqali's activity during the four years from 1207 to 1210, and there is no indication that he participated in the Mongol campaign against Hsi-Hsia in 1209, although he probably did.

As commander-in-chief of the Left Wing he played a leading role in the expedition against Chin launched by Činggis Qan in the spring of 1211. In that and the following year, his troops, operating in conjunction with the main army corps (*qol čerig*) led by Činggis, attacked and conquered fortresses along the Chin northern line of defence, among them Fu-chou, Hsüan-te and Te-hsing in present-day northern Hopei. His most important victory was probably the decisive battle of Huan-erh tsui or 'Badger's Mouth,' just west of Chang-pei, in September-October 1211, which opened the way for the capture of Hsüan-te and Te-hsing, and soon after of the strategic Chü-yung Pass (Čabčiyal Daba'an) north-west of the capital Chung-tu (Peking).

Muqali's movements in north China in 1212 cannot, however, be followed with any degree of certainty, and one can only assume that he was with Činggis Qan at the Mongol headquarters in Lung-hu t'ai (Šira Degtür), just south of the pass and some 10 km east of Ch'ang-p'ing, directing the operations of the Left Wing in Hopei.

When Činggis launched his massive three-pronged offensive in the latter part of the following year, Muqali's army joined him in the capture of various districts in Shantung, such as I-tu, Pin-chou and Ti-chou. He also seized the town of Mi-chou, where all the inhabitants were massacred. When Muqali's army returned to the north, several Chinese officials defected to his camp, probably at Pa-chou in Hopei. They included Shih T'ien-ni with his younger brother T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), Hsiao Po-tieh (alias

Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh), all of whom were later to play an important role in the Mongol conquest of north China.

Muqali was apparently with Činggis Qan at the first siege of Chung-tu early in 1214. In the middle of the year, Činggis sent Joči Qasar to conquer Lin-huang and the territory north of the Liao River, while Muqali was ordered to seize the Chin strongholds west and east of the Liao. In this campaign the Mongol general was assisted by Shih T'ien-hsiang and Shih-mo Yeh-hsien, whom he had appointed leaders of the newly formed Khitan-Chinese army, and by a special corps of Chinese auxiliaries numbering 12,000 men, known as the Black Army (*Hei-chün*), which had formerly been the élite force of Chang Chih.

The towns of Kao-chou in northeastern Hopei, and Chin-chou, I-chou and Kuang-ning in Liaoning were conquered by Muqali and his allies, sometimes – as in the case of Chin-chou, I-chou and Kuang-ning – more than once, until by August-September 1216 the whole country west of the Liao was subjugated with great loss of life among the native population. Contrary to statements by some historians, Muqali did not participate in the final siege of Chung-tu in March 1215.

The conquest of Liaotung was entrusted to Shih T'ien-hsiang and Aĵul (alias Aĵinai), who operated in conjunction with the Khitan defector Yeh-lü Liu-ko.

In September 1217 Muqali was back at Činggis Qan's camp at Sa'ari (Sāri) Ke'er, between the Kerulen and Tūla rivers in northern Mongolia, where the conqueror had returned in the spring of the previous year. On this occasion Činggis conferred on Muqali the hereditary titles of Prince-of-state (*güi-ong*) and Grand Preceptor (*taiši*), and gave him, as symbols of authority, a golden seal and a white standard of nine tails with a black crescent in the middle. He was also given control over the whole territory south of the T'ai-hang Mountains, and was appointed commander-in-chief of the operations in north China. (According to the Persian historian Rašīd al-Dīn, the title of *güi-ong* had already been given to him by the 'Jürced,' i.e. by the people of north China, and when Činggis sent him again to the conquest of the south he formally bestowed this title on him saying that it was of good omen. As for *taiši*, it was one of the few titles of Chinese origin that the Mongols had adopted, almost certainly through the intermediary of the Uighurs.)

The troops of the Left Wing under his command consisted of some 23,000 men drawn from the Mongol and Öngüt tribes, and an unspecified number of Chinese and Khitan auxiliaries led by Üyer, Mönggü Buqa, Yeh-lü T'u-hua (*q.v.*), Shih T'ien-hsiang, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien, Liu Po-lin and Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu. This body of soldiers formed a large portion of Činggis Qan's total army. According to Rašīd al-Dīn, the Left Wing was 62,000-men strong, but we do not know to which year this

figure applies. If the figure is correct and relates to the years around 1217, then more than half of Muqali's army was composed of Chinese and Khitan auxiliaries.

Muqali set up his military administration in north China at Chung-tu – now renamed Yen – and Hsi-ching, i.e. Ta-t'ung in Shansi, to direct from these centres the operations in Ho-pei (modern Hopei and northern Honan) and Ho-tung (Shansi and northwestern Honan) entrusted to his own army and the auxiliaries led by Shih-mo Yeh-hsien. At the same time a force led by Shih T'ien-ni and Liu Po-lin was sent to reduce Shantung.

In the early phase of this campaign, the invading forces met with uneven success because of the strenuous resistance often put up by the local garrisons and by the Chin counter-offensive. Thus Ta-ming in Hopei and several districts of eastern Shantung captured in the winter of 1217 were lost again soon after. However, in spite of these setbacks the Mongol armies occupied T'ai-yüan, Fen-chou, P'ing-yang and several other important towns in Shansi. The Chin commander Chang Jou (*q.v.*) defected to the Mongols and was appointed by Muqali to lead the campaign in western Hopei against Wu Hsien, the commander of Chen-ting.

In 1219, with the conquest of Shih-chou, Hsi-chou and Chiang-chou, virtually the whole of Shansi was brought under Muqali's control. The military and civil administration of this area was entrusted to Ančar Noyan and Li Shou-chung, who set up their headquarters at P'ing-yang.

Meanwhile, Chang Jou had carried out operations in Hopei, but it was not until autumn 1220 that Shih T'ien-hsiang obtained the peaceful capitulation of Chen-ting and the surrender of Wu Hsien. Shih T'ien-ni was then put in charge of Western Hopei with Wu Hsien to assist him. Soon after, Muqali regained Ta-ming which had also briefly passed into Sung hands and, entering into Shantung, took Chi-nan without fighting (October-November 1220).

With the fall of Chi-nan, Muqali received the surrender of Yen Shih (*q.v.*), the former Chin commander who had defected to the Sung the year before, whom he reappointed as commander of Western Shan-tung. Continuing his advance, Muqali inflicted a major defeat on the Chin army at Huang-ling kang (south-west of Ts'ao-hsien, Shantung) and Ming-chou in Honan in April-May 1221, and thereby secured control over Western Shan-tung. Muqali then returned to the north to make preparations for the invasion of Kuan-chung, i.e. Shensi and Kansu. He clearly believed that this could be achieved in a comparatively short time, possibly as a result of new diplomatic contacts with the Sung, in particular the missions of the Sung envoys Chao Hung to Muqali in 1221-1222, and Kou Meng-yü to Činggis Qan in 1221. (Chao's report, the *Meng-Ta pei-lu*, is the earliest and one of the most important Chinese sources on the Mongols.) This would explain the hardened attitude

of the Mongols, who in this year (1221) rejected the Chin peace proposals by posing unacceptable conditions, such as the cession of the remaining districts in Kuan-chung and the demotion of the Chin emperor to vassal king. (These conditions were put to the mission of the Chin envoy Wu-ku-sun Chung-tuan to Činggis Qan.)

Having received permission to pass through Tangut territory from the Hsi-Hsia court, which also provided a supporting force of 50,000 men, Muqali crossed the Yellow River and seized Chia-chou in Shensi, the strategic town on the right bank of the river (November 1221). In the following months the Mongol army conquered the main Chin strongholds in northern and western Shensi. The defections to the Mongols of the Sung general Shih Kuei and of the Chin general Chang Lin, who in 1219 had crossed over to the Sung, also gave the Mongols control over many disputed districts of southeastern Hopei and southwestern Shantung (July-December 1221).

In spring 1222, from the area of operations in the middle reaches of the Lo River, Muqali once more had to cross the Yellow River to recapture various towns in Shansi that had been taken by the Chin, including Hsi-chou and Tai-chou. Then, leaving Mönggü Buqa in charge of the operations in Shensi and Kansu, Muqali moved with the main army towards Yü-chou, and from there to Chi-chou, gaining control of all the Chin strongholds in the valley of the Fen River. His next step was to seize the strategic city of Ho-chung fu, where Shih T'ien-ying's forces were already deployed, and to proceed to Ching-chao and Feng-hsiang, where he was to be joined by Mönggü Buqa.

Ho-chung capitulated at the end of 1222, but Ching-chao and Feng-hsiang with their strong garrisons proved impregnable. Moreover the Hsi-Hsia withdrew their troops, thus depriving the Mongols of vital support at a critical time. This failure, and the temporary loss of Ho-chung, briefly recaptured by the Chin early in 1223, effectively checked the Mongol offensive in Shensi.

Muqali was consolidating his position on both sides of the Yellow River when he became seriously ill. He died at Wen-hsi hsien, Shansi, in April-March 1223, aged fifty-three. Before dying he called his younger brother Daisun and urged him to complete his unfinished task.

Muqali was unquestionably one of the leading Mongol personalities and a superb leader. He was also one of the very few men who could exert a real influence on Činggis Qan's decisions, as indicated on several occasions in the *Secret History of the Mongols*. He shared with Bo'orču the emperor's complete trust, hence the unique position and honours conferred on him by Činggis Qan. In a contemporary Chinese source (the *Meng-Ta pei-lu*), there is evidence that in China he lived, ruled and dressed like a true king. Although Chao Hung claims that Muqali's followers were all bad (some no doubt were), the latter's record in north China shows, on the whole,

remarkable wisdom in dealing with the local situation. He was, in fact, responsible for the reappointment of most of the leading Chinese, Jurchen and Khitan officials who had submitted to the Mongol forces (Shih T'ien-hsiang, Yen Shih, etc.), whose advice helped in reducing the wanton destruction of the country and in preserving Han culture. His name is also mentioned in Buddhist works for the protection he accorded to the Ch'an masters Chung-kuan and Hai-yün (q.v.) in 1219, and the privileges subsequently granted to their followers by Činggis Qan.

In physical appearance, he is described by Chao Hung as being a very tall man with curly whiskers and dark complexion. He was generous and fond of conviviality, and amusing episodes about him have been preserved in the Sung envoy's account. He had a principal wife, called Lai-man (= Naiman?) or Buqalun, and eight secondary ones, four of whom were Mongol and four Jurchen. He had apparently only one son, Bōl.

Muqali received many posthumous honours. In 1321 he was invested as Prince-of-state of Lu and was canonised as Chung-wu ('Loyal and Martial'). He is frequently mentioned in Rašīd al-Dīn's work, but the earlier Persian historian Juvainī is strangely silent about him. Muqali figures prominently, together with Bo'orču, in the 'Činggis Legend' of the later Mongol popular and literary tradition as reflected in the Mongol chronicles of the 17th century, in collections like the *Činggis qağan-u čadiğ*, and in epic and folkloristic oral literature.

Muqali's only son, Bōl (Po-lu = Bo'ol 'Slave'), inherited his father's position and duties upon the latter's death in 1223. Bōl was then twenty-six years old – he was born in 1197 – and serving in the Mongol army in Central Asia. When Činggis Qan was informed of the betrayal of the Hsi-Hsia ruler Li Te-wang (Hsien-tsung, r. 1223-26), he sent Bōl to deal with him, while Daisun stood in for Bōl in the war with China. Bōl led a punitive expedition against Yin-chou, Shensi, in October-November 1224, but after conquering the city and seizing a large booty, he interrupted the campaign in the following spring to pay homage to Činggis Qan who had just returned to Mongolia, and obtain from him further instructions regarding the operations in the south.

Wu Hsien took advantage of Bōl's absence to rebel and kill Shih T'ien-ni. In spring 1226 the Sung general Li Ch'üan took I-tu in Shantung from the Chin. While Shih T'ien-tse reconquered Chen-ting and the lost districts of western Hopei, Daisun – assisted by Chang Lin, Chang Jou and Liu Ni (alias Hei-ma, the son of Liu Po-lin) – launched an offensive in eastern Hopei and Shantung. At the end of 1226 Bōl took command of the operations and, having obtained the capitulation of I-tu and the surrender of Li Ch'üan, appointed the latter commander of Shan-tung and Huai-nan.

In this way most of Hopei and Shantung had been recovered by the Mongol-Chinese army by late 1227.

Böl went again to Mongolia for Činggis Qan's funeral which took place in the latter part of the year, and soon after his return to north China in June-July 1228 he died at the age of thirty-one. His biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) records his tolerance and generosity, and his skill both as an archer and a linguist. He had, perhaps in even greater measure than his father, a sympathetic approach to the Chinese and their culture.

Böl had a wife called Qaduqui and seven sons: Tas, Suqunčaq, Bātur, Bai Inal, Emegen, Ebügen and Arkiš.

Tas (T'a-ssu = tu. Taš 'Stone'), also called Čalawun (= Čila'un), the Mongolian equivalent of Taš, was born in 1212. He was Muqali's favourite grandson. The title of Prince-of-state (*güi-ong*) passed to him. After the accession of Ögödei in 1229, he and his brother Suqunčaq were actively engaged in the war with Chin, and campaigned in Shansi against Wu Hsien. He was with Ögödei's army in Shensi at the time of the attack on Feng-hsiang (December 1230-January 1231). In 1232 he took part, always with Ögödei, in the invasion of Honan and distinguished himself at the famous battle of San-feng shan. The following year he accompanied Güyük and the Left Wing in the expedition against P'u-hsien Wan-nu in Liaotung, which ended (October-November 1233) with the capture of the rebel general. Subsequently, Tas and Suqunčaq fought the Sung in Kōčü's army operating in Honan. Tas died prematurely of alcoholism in 1239. As his son Šikdūr was under age, the title of Prince-of-state passed to Suqunčaq and in turn, devolved to his son Qurimči. The title then went to Ho-t'ung, a son of Bātur. Another son of Bātur, An-t'ung, distinguished himself during the reign of Qubilai.

An-t'ung, born in 1245, was the eldest son of Tas' younger brother Bātur (d. 1261), who was already in Qubilai's entourage before he became emperor. An-t'ung's mother, the Qonggirat lady Temülün, was the daughter of Alči Noyan and the elder sister of Qubilai's principal wife Čabui (or Čabi).

An-t'ung grew up at the Mongol court and at an early age showed interest in things Chinese. This is not surprising since some of his close relatives, such as his cousins Nayan and Sang'ui, had had Chinese tutors. Sang'ui was the author of a translation of the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* into Mongolian, which is unfortunately lost.

At fifteen An-t'ung was made chief (*noyan*) in the Imperial Guard – an hereditary privilege of the descendants of Činggis Qan's four leading officials. He soon became one of Qubilai's close attendants. He apparently exerted a moderating influence on the emperor when Ariq Böke came to submit in 1264. In spite of his youth, An-t'ung was appointed one of the examiners of the rebel prince and his followers. Next year

he was promoted to the rank of Right chancellor in the Secretarial Council and was granted an apanage of 4,000 families. This was due, it seems, to the advice of Ts'ui Pin (1225-80), whom An-t'ung had previously recommended for appointment to Qubilai. At the same time, the famous general Bayan (*q.v.*), who had earlier married An-t'ung's younger sister, was appointed Left chancellor.

An-t'ung refused the post because of his youth and lack of experience, but his refusal was not accepted. However, to assist him in his administrative duties Qubilai summoned to court the Chinese scholar Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), who shortly before had declined the position of councillor on account of ill health. Heng accepted the new assignment and immediately put forth a plan for administrative reform, recommending the adoption of Chinese traditional usages and the promotion of education and agriculture. An-t'ung and Bayan also memorialised the throne on the need to adopt Chinese canonisation and ritual procedures – a significant fact showing that already at this time the selective adoption of Chinese practices was also encouraged by members of the Mongol ruling class.

In 1267 An-t'ung was instrumental in bringing about a change in the structure of the Secretarial Council, the five chancellors appointed earlier (1265) by Qubilai being now replaced by the two traditional ones of the Right and the Left, with An-t'ung retaining the office of the Right and Shih T'ien-tse that of the Left. Mongol, *se-mu* (mostly Central and Western Asian), and Chinese officials were appointed to the top positions in the Council, with councillors drawn from among Chinese scholars, such as the already-mentioned Hsü Heng, and Yao Shu (*q.v.*). In 1268 An-t'ung's colleagues successfully opposed the attempt of Aḥmad (*q.v.*) to weaken the Secretarial Council by convincing Qubilai to remove An-t'ung from his executive post and appoint him to an honorary position. However, in 1270 Aḥmad succeeded in establishing a Presidential Council in charge of finances with himself as director.

In the following years An-t'ung continued to fight against the growing influence of Aḥmad in the administration, but without much success. In 1275 he was sent by Qubilai to assist Nomuqan and the other princes in Almalīq in the armed confrontation with Qaidu. In 1276 he apparently offended Tolui's son Toq Temür by not offering him wine at a banquet. Following Toq Temür's betrayal in 1277, An-t'ung was handed over to Qaidu, while his cousin Nomuqan was sent as a prisoner to the Golden Horde. Nomuqan was released in March 1284 and An-t'ung soon after. In January 1285 he was reinstated as Right chancellor and given the honorary title of Gold and Purple Great Officer of Eminent Dignity. In view of this, Rašīd al-Dīn's statement that An-t'ung ('Hantum Noyan') was one of the military leaders appointed by Qubilai to suppress the disturbance that followed Aḥmad's murder (27 April 1282) is incorrect.

An-t'ung was also active in fighting the pernicious influence of Aḥmad's successor, Sangha (*q.v.*), who on the re-establishment of the Presidential Council in 1287 had been appointed its head. Unfortunately Qubilai trusted Sangha, just as he had previously trusted Aḥmad, and An-t'ungs remonstrations were to no avail. Deprived of effective authority An-t'ung asked to resign from the Secretarial Council. In 1289 he left office and resumed his early post in the Imperial Guard. He was not reinstated as chancellor after the death of Sangha and the suppression of the Presidential Council in 1291.

An-t'ung died on 26 February 1293 near Ta-tu (Peking) at the age of forty-eight. He was posthumously granted the title of Grand Preceptor, was invested as Prince of Tung-p'ing and canonised as Chung-hsien ('Loyal and Exemplary'). A man of two cultures, An-t'ung was obviously attracted to Han civilisation; his leanings in this direction are revealed not through written works, for he was not a scholar, but through his continual opposition to policies, such as those of Aḥmad and Sangha, that were detrimental to the Chinese.

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I. de Rachewiltz

Editorial Note

Muqali's genealogy as presented in this biography is based on *CHHWC*24:1a-2b and *YS*119:8b-15b, and on information quoted by Ch'ien Ta-hsin from the now lost family biography of Muqali by Yüan Yung-chen (*SCCYHL*13:308). Cf. Hambis 54, T5 (opp. p.40); Shen Wei-jung in *YSCK* 8:1984,116-120.

2. SÜBÖTEI BA'ATUR (1176-1248)

No Mongol general played a greater role than Sübōtei Ba'atur in establishing and maintaining the early Mongol empire. Trusted commander and retainer of Činggis, later highly respected servant of Ögödei and Güyük, Sübōtei served with great distinction in every phase of Mongolian national development during the first four decades of empire. When he first entered the service of Temüjin, the later Činggis Qan, the realm of that minor Mongol chieftain comprised only a few families. In his old age, Sübōtei saw a mighty dominion stretching from the borders of Hungary to the Sea of Japan, from the outskirts of Novgorod to the Persian Gulf and the Yangtze River. He had had no small part in creating it.

Sübōtei was probably born in 1176, into the Uriyangqai lineage somewhere in the region bounded by the Onon and Kerulen rivers. Two distinct ethnic groups called Uriyangqai are known in recent times. One is comprised of primitive, Turkic-speaking Soyot reindeer herdsman, situated along the north-west border of Mongolia with the former Soviet Union and in the former Tuvan Republic; the other, of Mongols resident in various places in western Mongolia and speaking a largely Oirat dialect. Two groupings of Uriyangqai existed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries as well: a body of 'Forest Uriyangqai' (Hoi-yin Uriyangqai), probably the ancestors of today's Soyot Uriyangqai; and a tribe of 'Mongol' Uriyangqai claiming descent from the Mongol ancestress Alan Qo'a, that nomadized in the Onon-Kerulen basin alongside other groups of like descent. Sübōtei is unquestionably to be associated with the latter. The evidence clearly suggests that his people were as Mongol in culture as the Kiyan lineage of Činggis Qan.

Behind the claimed common descent, moreover, were political connections between the Uriyangqai, the Kiyan and other components of the Onon-Kerulen Mongols, which were close and already long-standing in the twelfth century. Sübōtei's Chinese biographers note, for example, the alliance of the Uriyangqai with the Mongol chieftain Tumbinai Sečen, great-great-grandfather of Činggis Qan. This alliance was possibly established in connection with a general mobilisation of tribesmen ordered by their Liao overlords in a last-ditch effort to stem the Jurchen advance (*ca.* 1122). The Chinese historian T'u Chi suggests that, since Sübōtei's great-great-grandfather Nieh-li-pi (? *Nerbi) and Tumbinai Sečen were apparently contemporaries, it was the former who established the alliance.

In the last decades of the twelfth century, when the young Temüjin began his struggles for the recovery of his patrimony, and then for paramountcy, the Uriyangqai of Sübōtei's family maintained the political association established generations

earlier. We read in Sübōtei's Chinese biographies that his father, Qaban, supplied food to Temüjin when the latter was in dire straits at Baljuna, and that Qaban's sons, the elder Ča'urqan and the younger Sübōtei, drove off assailants threatening the supply mission. Despite the questionable historicity of events associated with Baljuna, Mongol Uriyangqai tribesmen were certainly among the nuclear groups following Temüjin. They are mentioned, for example, among tribal bodies associated with the Mongol chieftain in 1186 (?) at the time of his split with Jamuqa.

Sübōtei himself first entered the service of Temüjin *ca.* 1203 as a 'hostage' shortly after distinguishing himself at Baljuna. This date, however, seems late and the reference may only record Sübōtei's formal enrolment in the qan's bodyguard, established in 1203 as a force of eighty *kebtē'ül* (night guards), and seventy *turqa'ut* (day guards), also 'hostages.' The *Secret History of the Mongols* suggests in fact that Sübōtei was already a prominent member of Temüjin's establishment well before 1203. Sübōtei is mentioned as having been present with his elder brother Ča'urqan and uncle (?) Jelme, later one of Temüjin's most important commanders, when Temüjin was first elected qan by his followers in 1189 (?). Sübōtei and Ča'urqan are mentioned again in connection with the opening stages of the struggle against Jamuqa in the mid-1190s.

In early 1204 Temüjin completely defeated the powerful league formed against him by Tayang Qan of the Naiman, thereby assuring his dominance in the steppe. By the end of the following year, his enemies in Mongolia had either been destroyed, subdued, or forced to migrate. Among those actively fighting for Temüjin during these years was Sübōtei. By this time his brother Ča'urqan was dead, possibly from wounds received fighting the Naiman, and Sübōtei had inherited his rank of centurion. He commanded a hundred 'archers,' presumably Uriyangqai tribesmen. In 1206, with the great reorganisation of the steppe-world attendant upon Temüjin's second election as qan, this time of virtually all the peoples of Mongolia, Sübōtei was made a chiliarch. Although not yet an important commander, Sübōtei's reputation as one of Temüjin's *dörben noqais*, or 'Four Hounds' (with Jebe, Qubilai and Jelme) was already considerable. His designation as *ba'atur* 'valiant' (= élite officer) dates probably from that time. He would soon be assigned major responsibilities in the Mongol thrust towards the west.

Among the various groups fleeing Mongolia in the aftermath of the 1204 defeat of Tayang Qan's Naiman league, had been a body of Naiman survivors under Güčülük, a son of Tayang Qan, and a body of Merkits, under their chief, Toqto'a Beki. Both had moved westward, at first towards the foothills of the Altai, where they had to defend themselves against Mongol pursuers, and then north and westward

into southern Siberia. By 1206 they were on the Irtysh River, far beyond Mongolia, and thus appear to have evaded the armies of the qan.

The continued existence of such defeated groups presented a significant danger for the newly enthroned Činggis Qan: they could not be left in peace to recover their strength. To that effect, as also to control other hostile nomadic groups along the Mongolian borders to the north and west that had not recognised Činggis's sovereignty, Mongol power was gradually expanded in those directions. Joči, the eldest son of Činggis, and by Mongol tradition the recipient of his father's most distant pastures to the west, began to extend his patrimony into southern Siberia and towards the highly strategic Semirechye (a movement that culminated in the final subjugation of the Siberian 'Forest Peoples' (*hoi-yin irgen*) and definitive Mongol control in the area *ca.* 1218). Joči's advance brought the Mongols once again within striking range of the defeated Naiman and Merkit groups. In late 1208, guided by an Oirat turncoat, Joči led his army towards the Naiman and Merkit remnants on the Irtysh and crushed them completely. Toqto'a Beki was killed in the battle and his sons, led by the eldest, Qudu, were forced to flee south, towards Uighur domains. Güčülük, in very desperate circumstances, also fled into Turkestan with barely a handful of followers. His aim, however, was to gain the protection of the powerful gür-qan of the Qara Khitai.

Our sources are silent on the subject of Sübötei's participation in the climactic battle of 1208 on the Irtysh, but it is probable that he was present. Indeed, it was Sübötei who was ordered to pursue the defeated Qudu and his brothers, at the head of a force including 'iron wagons' (*temür telege*), apparently khibitkhas specially strengthened with metal hub-plates for rapid pursuit in difficult terrain. The task of destroying Güčülük was assigned to Jebe who seems to have held overall control of the expedition as senior commander. Both leaders set out to fulfill their appointed tasks soon after the battle on the Irtysh.

In the spring of 1209, Sübötei, in close pursuit of Qudu and his brothers who were showing great tactical skills, drew near to Uighur domains. The *ïduq-qut*, or local ruler, was in no mood to receive the fleeing Merkit princes. Shortly after the battle on the Irtysh, which seems to have seriously weakened Qara Khitai rule as well as Naiman and Merkit power, the Uighur ruler had killed the viceroy of the Qara Khitai gür-qan and gone over to the Mongols. As a consequence, the *ïduq-qut* killed the envoy of the Merkit princes who then suffered a decisive rout on the banks of the Džem or Čem River, at the hands of an Uighur army possibly reinforced by Sübötei's troops. The surviving Merkits, still led by Qudu, could only flee farther west, towards the Qipčaq Steppe, with Sübötei in hot pursuit. Meanwhile Jebe, who had chased Güčülük into Qara Khitai territory as far as he dared without risking an open conflict

with the *gür-qan*, linked his forces with *Sübötei*'s to finish off the *Merkit* once and for all.

Late that same year, or very early the following year, the two Mongol commanders came to grips once again with their old enemies, now allied with a large number of *Qangli* tribesmen. They defeated this combined force at an unidentified site called *Yü-yü* (Jade Valley) in the Chinese sources, located on or near the *Chu* River. Their task completed (at least as far as the *Merkits* were concerned, since *Qudu* was probably killed in the battle and his followers captured), the Mongols prepared to return home. Before they could leave the scene of their victory, however, they were forced to fight an engagement with a powerful new opponent.

According to the Persian historian *Juvainī*, the *Khwārazm shāh* *Muḥammad* was at the time hurrying to gain his share of a crumbling *Qara Khitai* empire which was then under full assault by *Güčülük*, now recovered from his defeat on the *Irtys*. When the *shāh* heard of the approach of the Mongol armies in the *Qipčaq* Steppe, he quickly assembled an army, moved north and in *Juvainī*'s words,

between the two rivers *Qaili* and *Qaimich* came upon a battle-field, where he beheld great piles of dead and fresh blood. Amongst the fallen a wounded man was discovered and questioned. It being ascertained that the Mongols had been the victors and had left the spot that very day, the Sultan, without stopping to consider, set his face to the road and hurried after them. The next day, when the scouts of Dawn raised their flashing swords out of the scabbard of the eastern horizon and removed the black bile from the brain of the army of Night, the Sultan overtook them and made ready for battle. The Mongol army did not lay hand on the skirt of war but held back, saying: 'We have no authority from *Chingis-Khan* to fight with thee. We have come upon another errand, seeking a quarry which had escaped from our net.' (*Juvainī*, II, 370-1.)

The *Khwārazm shāh* began hostilities nevertheless and fought a hard battle in which neither side was able to gain the advantage. When night fell both sides pitched camp, but 'the Mongol army then kindled a fire for every man and made off on their swift horses, casting dust in the eyes of Fate.' The story of the encounter is told in almost identical terms in *Sübötei*'s Chinese biographies – except that the fires were intended to make the numbers of the Mongol army seem greater than they were, and it was the *shāh* who fled, not the Mongols.

After the battle with the *shāh*, the Mongols returned east again, to join up with *Činggis Qan* in preparation for a planned assault on the *Chin* kingdom of north China. As they withdrew, *Sübötei* and *Jebe* left behind them a situation that had been stabilised, at least temporarily. In the steppe, the *Qanglis* were subdued for the time being following their defeat at *Yü-yü*. The important *Qarluqs* were cowed after a brief alliance with *Güčülük*, and made formal submission to *Činggis* in 1211, thereby guaranteeing Mongol control of the area around and immediately to the north of the

Chu River. In Turkestan, Güçülük remained at large and was gradually subverting the power of the Qara Khitai gür-qan. That activity soon drew upon him the attacks of former Qara Khitai vassals, anxious to secure a part of the spoils for themselves (among the former vassals, the Khwārazm shāh). It also seems to have determined many Qara Khitai loyalists to join the Mongols. Most important from the Mongolian point of view, the 1209-1210 campaigns of Sübōtei and Ĵebe in the west had assured the relative security of the trade route to the Khwārazmian empire and beyond through north Turkestan.

In 1211 Sübōtei rejoined the main armies of Činggis Qan in Mongolia and prepared to take part in the full-scale Mongol assault on Chin China that began in the autumn of that year. Mongol preoccupations with China were long-standing. Among other things, Činggis seems to have begun his rise to power as a vassal of the Chin ruler, as had the ong-qan To'oril of the Kereit. Both men had campaigned at the orders of the Chin court against a group of recalcitrant Tatars in 1196. At that time Činggis was granted the title *Ja'ut-quri* (? 'centurion'), almost certainly to be associated with the frontier organisation of the Chin. Later Činggis waged an intense struggle with the Chin government for the control of certain strategically positioned tribal groupings of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. This conflict culminated in the tribal uprising of 1207, when most of the important frontier groups deserted the Chin and went over to the Mongols. The Chin, however, were by no means content to let the situation so rest. Among other things, the loss of the frontier zone exposed their heartland to Mongol raids. They thus continued the struggle from various fortified positions on the Great Wall line and in front of it, including the towns of Huan-chou, Fu-chou and Te-hsing fu. With the construction (or renovation?) of the Wu-sha pao defence line, the Chin attempted once again to gain control of the pivotal border peoples. It was in direct response to the construction of the Wu-sha pao that the Mongols launched a full-scale offensive in the early autumn of 1211.

The Mongol thrust seems to have had two main objectives in its initial stages. One was the isolation or destruction of Chin positions on, and in front of, the Great Wall line, and of any forces holding them. The second was the conquest of southern Manchuria and its predominately tribal population. Sübōtei, again operating under the command of Ĵebe during the first years of the Chin campaign, was involved in achieving both goals. His Chinese biographers record that it was he who, in late 1211 or more likely in early 1212, was the first to scale the walls of Huan-chou and overcome resistance in that strategic frontier centre. Soon after (?) Ĵebe fought his way into the Manchurian interior and made a highly successful advance towards the Chin subordinate capital of Tung-ching (= Liao-yang, in Liaoning), which fell in early 1213. From there Ĵebe and Sübōtei swung back along the coast, through the old Po-

hai country, towards the then main Chin capital of Chung-tu (Peking), which came under Mongol siege in 1214. Due to an outbreak of plague among the Mongols and an epizootic disease among their livestock, Chung-tu was able to weather the storm. Thus weakened, the Mongols were forced to accept a truce, promising to restore many of the possessions lost by the Chin during the previous three years, and withdraw. However, no major transfer of territory seems to have taken place before 1215, after an alarmed Chin court had fled south to the safety of the Yellow River valley, when Mongol and local forces were able to isolate and capture the abandoned capital. With the taking of Chung-tu by the Mongols, the advantage was decisively in their hands and most of north China quickly passed under Mongol control. Neither Ĵebe nor Sübötei seem to have taken part in events leading to the fall of Chung-tu in early 1215, or in the broad advances that followed. Both had probably departed north the previous year with the main Mongol armies.

Nothing certain is known of Sübötei's whereabouts during the years 1215-1218, but most likely he spent at least the first of them in Mongolia, in comparative peace and quiet. At that time Činggis Qan was not making plans of conquest but remained in Mongolian pastures, ruler of a considerable empire. In the east, most of the tribal areas of Manchuria were under Mongol or allied control. Chin domains to the south had been subdued or left open to raiding. Hsi-Hsia was nominally a Mongol vassal, as were the Uighurs and various cities in the formerly Qara Khitai portions of Turkestan. In southern Siberia the Mongols controlled (albeit loosely) a territory reaching almost to the Caspian. The only unfinished business of any urgency seems to have been the matter of Güčülük, who had made himself gür-qan in 1211 against the will of the majority of his subjects. With the help of various external allies and conquerors, including the Mongols, those dissidents pursued a protracted struggle against him. Ĵebe was active in eastern Turkestan during the years 1217-1218 to protect Mongol interests. Although Sübötei's Chinese biographies say nothing specific about his participation in the campaign, he probably was involved, under Ĵebe's command. Güčülük was finally hunted down and killed in 1218 on the border of India by Ho-ssu-mai-li (*Hesmaīl = Esmaīl/Ismāīl), a former Qara Khitai *basqaq*, or governor, of Kāsān.

That same year the entire Mongol position in the West was seriously shaken by the celebrated Otrar (Uṯrār) massacre. Agents of Činggis, sent as merchants to Khwārazm, were murdered with the Khwārazm shāh's willing acceptance of the fait accompli, if not his complicity in the act. This event seriously threatened the status quo in Turkestan and required a response. After initial attempts to mediate, which failed due to the apparent recalcitrance of the shāh, Činggis prepared for a general assault on the offending Khwārazmian empire. In mid-1219 he took up position

along the Irtysh and, with the onset of autumn, began his advance. The Khwārazmian empire collapsed with astounding rapidity. Mongol troops were soon moving freely in its interior.

Two of the raiding forces deployed by the Mongols in their advance were commanded respectively by Ĵebe and Sübōtei, who had moved with the main Mongol armies towards the Irtysh in 1219. In late 1220, as the Khwārazmian defence crumbled and the Khwārazm shāh fled across the Amu Darya, Činggis detached his two lieutenants in pursuit of his defeated opponent. This they did relentlessly, across the desert into Khurāsān and finally Māzandarān. The shāh sought a last refuge on an island in the Caspian where he died at the very end of 1220.

Then a remarkable decision was made, at Sübōtei's suggestion. An expedition, 'which had never been attempted, and has never been repeated,' in the words of Gibbon, was proposed to push around the Caspian, through the Caucasian Mountains and into the Qipčaq Steppe. There the two commanders were to link up with forces under Ĵoči, moving west slowly after participating in the Mongol attack on Khwārazm.

The two commanders set out from winter campgrounds in the Moghan Steppe in the spring of 1221. After a short detour to Persian Iraq to avenge the slaying of a Mongol *daruqači*, they moved into Azerbaijan, Arran and Georgia, and then along the coast past Darband. Passage was gained by means of characteristic Mongol trickery: according to Ĵuvainī, the Mongol generals invited the ruler of Shīrvān to send a peace delegation. After the delegation had been received, one of its members was put to death and the remaining ten were forced to guide the Mongols through the pass.

Moving north from Darband into open territory, Ĵebe and Sübōtei encountered and defeated a coalition of Qipčaq and Caucasian princes. Encouraged by their victory, they then moved into the Russian steppe, stopping on the way to sack the rich trading center of Sudaq (Soldaia) in the Crimea. Soon after, probably on 16 June 1223, the two generals defeated on the Kalka River a force of Russians led by Mstislav of Galicia. The Mongols, however, failed to take advantage of this victory to undertake any deeper penetration of Russia at the time, but turned instead against the Volga Bulgars, where they were roughly treated. Ĵebe and Sübōtei finally made contact with Ĵoči sometime in late 1223 or early 1224. Ĵebe died soon after, leaving Sübōtei to become the resident Mongol expert on the West.

Shortly after his rendez-vous with Ĵoči's armies, Sübōtei requested the permission of the qan to use chiliarchies levied from various defeated groups, such as the Merkit, Naiman, Bulgar (?), Qangli and Qipčaq, to form an army under his command to hold the Qipčaq Steppe. Činggis accepted this request and the proposed army was established. This event must be taken as the first instance in Russia of the

Mongol *tamma*, a structure that was both a nomadic garrison force and the nucleus of a regional tribal federation in conquered domains. Further elements were added later, as recorded in the *Secret History*. Some recent groups of Volga Kalmyk apparently had their origin in units of this *tamma*.

Sübötei's plans for further campaigns in the West had to be cut short temporarily due to the qan's call for a general mobilisation against the Tanguts of Hsi-Hsia, who had refused his request for troops at the time of the assault on Khwārazm. When Sübötei returned east, obedient to the qan's orders, he brought with him 10,000 horses captured in the western campaigns. This was probably the qan's share of the expedition's booty.

Sübötei's operative role in Činggis' campaign was to attack Hsi-Hsia domains and allies across the inhospitable deserts of Turkestan. This line of approach was possibly Sübötei's own suggestion, since a movement from that direction would not only threaten parts of the Tangut domains that were otherwise virtually inaccessible, but would also position Sübötei's army strategically for later action against the Chin borderlands in West China, also difficult to reach by conventional invasion routes. First objectives of Sübötei's advance were the Saryğ Uighurs and other groups of the Kōkōnor area, possibly including nomadic Tibetan and Tangut tribesmen. Sübötei moved towards Tangut territory proper, harrying the border tribes and capturing large numbers of horses. As Hsi-Hsia was rapidly collapsing in the face of a determined Mongol advance, Sübötei marched into the western domains of Chin and soon captured areas in the mountain approaches to the strategic Wei River valley.

In 1227 Činggis Qan died in Kansu while subduing the last remnants of Tangut resistance. After nearly two years of interregnum during which his youngest son Tolui was regent, and major military operations had come to a virtual halt, Ögödei was elected qan and acted immediately to secure Sübötei's loyalty by the grant of an imperial princess, Tümegei. We are not told of Sübötei's whereabouts during the years of the regency or during the first year or so of Ögödei's reign. We must assume that he remained quartered in the mountainous regions on the western frontier of Chin, where he was positioned to operate in 1230. In that year Sübötei was ordered to the aid of a force under Doqolqu Čerbi that had been defeated on the southwestern border of the Chin territory by an army led by Wan-yen I. But Sübötei was unable to fight his way through, and Doqolqu was forced to withdraw from his exposed position after suffering heavy losses.

Although Doqolqu's defeat was hardly Sübötei's fault, his failure to support the defeated Čerbi and myriarch was a black mark against Sübötei in the eyes of the new qan Ögödei, for Doqolqu was a ranking figure in the Mongol military hierarchy. The following year Sübötei himself was beaten by Wan-yen I in the Tao-hui Valley, in the

mountains just south-east of modern Hsi-an, for which he was severely taken to task by Ögödei. According to Sübōtei's Chinese biographers, Tolui smoothed things over and reinstated Sübōtei in the qan's favour. Henceforth, until Tolui's death in 1233, Sübōtei and the Mongol prince remained close allies. In view of the continuing conflict between imperial power and the prerogative of princes during the reign of Ögödei, the qan's reprimand of Sübōtei for his defeat may have involved much more than military considerations. It is noteworthy here that Sübōtei should be among the conservatives singled out for attack by Sung Tzu-chen in his biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*). Long years of independent operation in the West may have accustomed Sübōtei to a very different political environment to that now prevailing under a centralist ruler like Ögödei.

In 1231 the general advance against Chin was resumed once again with far greater forces. Sübōtei was to play a most conspicuous role in it under the (largely pro forma) operational control of Tolui and Doqolqu Čerbi. The thrust was due west, towards Honan and the Chin capital of Pien-ching, via Sung domains, in a difficult but grandiose attempt to outflank the Chin defence through mountainous terrain. The Mongol army entered Chin territory south-west of Pien-ching (K'ai-feng) and ran up against the Chin general Wan-yen Ho-ta (d. 1232), himself hurrying north with a large army to help cover the capital. During the hard battle that followed, Sübōtei's force was surrounded on the peak of snowy Mount San-feng by far more numerous Chin troops. When a blizzard blew up (with the help of Mongol weather magic, or *Jada?*), Sübōtei fell upon his exhausted besiegers and utterly defeated them. Wan-yen Ho-ta escaped to a fortified town but was captured soon after. As a result of this amazing victory, the Chin position in southern Honan collapsed, clearing the road to Pien-ching. By 1232 most outlying Chin territory was in Mongol hands and the qan's armies were poised for a final assault on the Chin capital.

Pien-ching, however, was well defended and proved no easy mark. Thus in the late spring of 1232, Ögödei, feeling the strain of a prolonged campaign but also apparently ill, due perhaps to the overindulgence in alcohol for which he was famous, agreed to a truce and departed north with the main Mongol army, taking his brother Tolui with him. Sübōtei was left behind to guard Mongol domains in Honan against the Sung and any attempt at reconquest by the Chin. At his command was a large Mongol force and an even larger body of local allies, men such as the Chinese myriarchs Liu Hei-ma, Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), Chang Jou (*q.v.*) and their retainers. Realising that even these large forces would probably prove inadequate in further operations, Sübōtei quickly undertook a general mobilisation of local auxiliaries in neighbouring areas. He also carefully prepared a substantial siege train for future use against Pien-ching and other fortified places – for it seems that Sübōtei had no

intention of leaving the Mongol position stalemated in Honan. Intentionally or not, he sabotaged Ögödei's truce and, by preventing a vital resupply of the starving city of Pien-ching, now totally isolated by Mongol and Sung conquests, reduced its defenders to extremities. Plague soon compounded the effects of hunger and in early 1233 the Chin emperor fled the doomed city to try his luck in a counter-offensive. The attempt was defeated decisively by Sübōtei's army: Pien-ching surrendered soon after. In early 1234, the last Chin emperor, surrounded at Ts'ai-chou, was forced to commit suicide, thus bringing the Chin dynasty to an end. Sübōtei's persistence at Pien-ching in the face of difficulty played no small role in this outcome.

After the collapse of Chin, Sübōtei remained in Honan to pacify and defend the new Mongol conquests in the face of a clear threat by the Sung to expand their influence northwards once again. Consequently, Sübōtei launched a preemptive attack on Lo-yang that effectively thwarted Sung designs and began almost five decades of Mongol-Sung wars. The Mongol general also supported relief measures on behalf of the starving population of the former Chin capital, according to Sübōtei's Chinese biographers. But Sung Tzu-chen claims that Sübōtei was among those in favour of slaughtering the city's residents, and that it was only thanks to an impassioned plea by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai that their lives were spared. Both accounts may be true. Certainly the massacre of stubbornly hostile populations was a well-established Mongol practice (as reflected by the *yeke Jasaq*, 'imperial pronouncements', of Činggis Qan). But Sübōtei also seems to have carried out imperial orders scrupulously after they had been issued, at least when no other option was open to him. His management of relief measures is thus by no means totally inconsistent with a desire to wipe out Pien-ching!

With the defeat of Chin and the defence of the Mongols' conquests against their former allies, the Sung generals, the Mongols' attention turned once again to unfinished business in the West. In 1235 Ögödei convened a *quriltai* that decided to secure Mongol rule in the Qipčaq Steppe and advance into Russia. Sübōtei, who was to accompany the Mongol armies as senior commander, has generally been credited with the overall strategic planning of the masterly offensive that followed, beginning in the spring of 1236. In addition to Joči's son Batu, to whom most of the new territories would fall as heir to his father and thereby holder of the most distant Mongol pastures in the west, two future qans, i.e. Güyük, son of Ögödei, and Möngke, son of Tolui, and a host of other Mongol princes and princelings rode with the large army mobilised for the campaign. Also present was Sübōtei's son Uriyangqadai. The various forces assigned to the campaign assembled on the Volga to attack the Bulgars.

Of all their actual or probable enemies in the West, it seems that the Mongols, and Sübötei in particular, after his own painful experience at their hands in an earlier campaign, took the Bulgars the most seriously – and rightly so. The state of Bulgar had been founded in the tenth century by splinter groups of Kovrat's old Bulgarian empire under Khazar tutelage. With the gradual collapse of the Khazars in the late tenth and eleventh centuries, the Bulgar *eltebir* ('viceroy' of the Khazar qağan) became de facto an independent ruler and eventually took the title qan to indicate his new status. His state grew wealthy by levying a ten-percent toll on the rich commerce that passed through Bulgar domains. In 1224, when Jebe and Sübötei arrived, the Bulgars were powerful enough, despite the breakdown of a unified Bulgar state, not only to maintain their position but even to repulse the Mongols. In 1229, new forces under (Sübötei's son?) Kökötei and Sönidei were dispatched to the area, but there is no evidence that they were able to make any headway against the obstinate Bulgars either.

The arrival of a full Mongol army under Batu and Sübötei altered the situation completely and the major cities of the Bulgars, Bulgar itself, Bilyär and Suwar, quickly fell into Mongol hands. Although the region suffered damage in the process of conquest, it soon revived and came to form the heartland of the Golden Horde domains.

Having disposed of the Bulgars, the Mongols moved against the Qipčaq and their chief Bačman in pursuit of Bulgar refugees received by Russian princes, while launching incursions into Russian territory on another. Among the first Russian cities to suffer were Ryazan, stormed on 21 December 1237, and Vladimir, stormed on 7 February 1238. One city put up notable resistance to the Mongols: Torzhok, which is singled out for special mention in Sübötei's biographies. The city held out for two weeks in the face of a full-scale Mongol assault. Sübötei was called to the scene personally by Batu, to direct the siege. The Mongol commander, bringing with him a special force that apparently included some of his own Uriyangqai archers, captured the city in three days, after defeating the grand duke Iuri II of Vladimir (called a *pan* in Sübötei's biographies, a title of south Slavic origin) in battle. The city fell on 23 March 1238. After the siege of Pien-ching, it is unlikely that Torzhok could have presented much of a problem to the experienced Mongol general.

The prolonged resistance of Torzhok had played its role, since the winter campaigning season (in which frozen bodies of water and swamps could be crossed easily by Mongol horses) was now nearly past and a thaw had set in, threatening to trap the Mongols in hostile territory. They had no choice but to retreat south to the Russian steppe and Qipčaq region. Most of the remainder of 1238 was spent campaigning there. In addition to subduing the Qipčaqs (their chieftain Bačman was

chased onto an island of the Caspian by Möngke), the Mongols also conquered the Burtas and Bashkirs. Military action against Russia was confined to nearby cities. On 26 December 1238, Sudaq in the Crimea, sacked in 1223 by Ĵebe and Sübötei, was sacked again.

The Mongols spent most of 1239 and 1240 consolidating their new conquests, but with the coming of the winter campaigning season in 1240 they moved west in force once again. The campaign of 1240-1241, the last major campaign planned by Sübötei, was his masterpiece. It was begun with two objectives. The first was to complete the Mongol subjugation of Russia by attacking the more westerly Russian cities, including Kiev, which was taken on 6 December 1240, bringing to an end the Kievan era of Russian history. The second goal was the conquest of Hungary in retaliation for King Béla IV's acceptance of Qipčaq refugees in 1238 and various Russians at other times.

To achieve the conquest of the Hungarians (whom the Mongols seem to have rated highly, like the Bulgars), Sübötei planned a coordinated general offensive against eastern Europe, to be carried out by no fewer than five major forces. Each was assigned a distinct strategic objective. Two moved against the Poles, one was primarily concerned with the Czechs, and two advanced directly into Hungary. All were to unite, however, to achieve the ultimate aim of conquering Hungary. By carrying out an offensive with mobile forces on a number of fronts at once, Sübötei hoped to prevent the European powers, already warring among themselves in the struggles of the Hohenstaufens against the Church, from mobilising effectively against them.

Sübötei's strategy appears to have worked perfectly. At no point were the Mongols exposed to a unified and fully organised defence. The Hungarians were particularly disorganized. King Béla seems to have been able to assemble only a small part of his levies against the enemy and received no help whatever from his hard-pressed European allies. On 11 April 1241, the Hungarian king was defeated on the Plain of Mohi, near the mouth of the Sajó, and fled, but not before putting up fierce resistance. Sübötei's biographies record disagreement between Batu and Sübötei after the Mongol prince, in the absence of Sübötei who was off leading a raid in force to turn the Hungarian position, had conducted a costly frontal assault on the Hungarians holding a bridge, nearly losing the battle for the Mongols. In the end, Batu was forced to recognise the wisdom of Sübötei, who had built a pontoon bridge lower down the Sajó to outflank the Hungarians.

The Mongols remained in Hungary until the next winter campaigning season, primarily, it seems, at the insistence of Sübötei who argued vehemently against Batu's desire to abandon the campaign. On 25 December 1241, the Mongols crossed the

Danube, destroying the double city of Buda and Pest. Their raiding parties later penetrated into Austria, while other forces moved into Dalmatia in pursuit of King Béla. Before a serious offensive could develop in any direction, however, word came of the death of qan Ögödei and the Mongols withdrew from Hungary, never to return. Quite probably Sübötei would have pressed on, since the Europeans were as divided as ever and times were ripe for a Mongol conquest in Europe. The death of the qan must have radically altered Sübötei's bargaining position with Batu.

The Hungarian campaign was Sübötei's last. By 1244, aged sixty-eight, he was back in Mongolia and participated in the first *quriltai* convened to elect a successor to Ögödei. Sübötei's presence at this *quriltai* probably marked an open break with Batu, since Batu and Güyük, the favoured candidate for the office of qan, were the bitterest of enemies. Batu himself, despite Sübötei's urgings, refused to attend the *quriltai* at all and in so doing withheld his recognition of its probable outcome. In 1246, after much haggling, Güyük was finally elected. John of Pian di Carpine, who was among those present at the new qan's coronation, describes Sübötei as 'an old man who is known among them as "the knight".' (The epithet to which Friar John refers is no doubt the Mongolian *ba'atur*.) Certainly the old Mongol general must have been among the fervent supporters of the house of Ögödei in the growing rift that was ultimately to result in the collapse of a unified Mongol empire. It was perhaps as a reward for his support, although the need to have a reliable ally in a strategic position may also have played a role, that the new qan dispatched Sübötei to China, to command the important forces engaged there, together with the Tangut general Ča'an.

Sübötei does not seem to have held his appointment in China for long; he soon returned to the favoured Tüla basin, where he died in 1248 after almost fifty years of service to Činggis Qan and his family. His descendants continued to hold high positions for four generations after him. The military tradition was continued by his famous son Uriyangqadai (1201-72), who distinguished himself under Möngke in the war against Sung. Both Sübötei and Uriyangqadai were rewarded with posthumous honours. Sübötei was enfeoffed Prince of Ho-nan and was canonized as Chung-ting ('Loyal and Steadfast'). His son inherited the princely title and was canonized as Wu-i ('Martial and Resolute').

Summing up, it can be said of Sübötei that he, more perhaps than any other general of his time, understood the limits and fragility of steppe power: for that reason, his campaigns were always conducted with the greatest economy of force and minimal losses. This he achieved primarily through a remarkable imagination, thorough understanding of his enemies, and a willingness to take carefully calculated risks.

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P.D. Buell

3. SHIH T'IENT-TSE (1202-1275)

After the Mongols had started their offensive against the Chin state in 1211, many Chin officials and locally prominent families in north China surrendered voluntarily for a variety of reasons. Their collaboration was indispensable to the Mongols' conquest of, and rule over, sedentary China. Shih T'ien-tse, who was destined to be one of the most prominent Chinese soldier-statesmen in the early Yüan period, came from one of those families. His long career epitomises the roles played by Chinese collaborators in the Mongol conquest and the consolidation of Mongol rule in China.

T'ien-tse, T. Jun-fu, was a native of Hsing-lung li, a hamlet in Yung-ch'ing county just south of the Chin capital Chung-tu (Peking). Born in 1202, he was the youngest of the three sons of Shih Ping-chih (1175-1245). Not known for scholarly accomplishment or official status in the generations prior to their surrender to the Mongols, the Shih have been described by biographers as a prominent farming family. Their wealth and prominence dated from the time of Shih Lun, T'ien-tse's great-grandfather, whose affluence apparently resulted from the fortuitous discovery of some gold while building a house. This *nouveau riche* became known for his generosity and adventurous nature. He is said to have provided asylum for many scholars and soldiers of fortune in the declining years of the Chin dynasty, and in this way attracted a great following. His influence can be gauged by the fact that immediately after his death an organisation, known as the Ch'ing-lo she ('Pure-Happiness Society'), was formed in memory of him, with nearly 1,000 members in forty groups throughout the region. The family's position was consolidated by Shih Lun's son Ch'eng-kuei, also known for his generosity and his ability to make money. Ch'eng-kuei's son Ping-chih was by all accounts a man great in stature and of high ambition, but not particularly interested in scholarly pursuits during his early life. Of modest origins by conventional standards, the Shih enjoyed nevertheless both wealth and local influence, which was to stand them in good stead throughout the period of dynastic transition.

The family's critical decision to change their allegiance was made by Shih Ping-chih in the autumn of 1213, when the Mongolian army under Muqali (*q.v.*) had already seized many towns in Hopei and Shantung. Terrified by news of the massacre of all the inhabitants of Mi-chou, Ping-chih at first urged the members of his family to hide separately, but changed his mind when he learned that the Mongols would spare the lives of those who came over to them voluntarily. At the head of several thousand followers, Ping-chih submitted to Se'ünidei, a lieutenant of Muqali, at Cho-chou.

The surrender of the Shih family was indeed timely. By then the Mongols had penetrated deeply into north China and were about to lay siege to the strongly fortified Chin capital. They were facing a shortage of manpower and supplies, combined with a lack of experience in siege craft and warfare in densely populated areas. It had, therefore, become their practice to lavishly reward defectors who helped them overcome those problems.

Several members of the Shih family were given posts of considerable importance. Ping-chih's status was undoubtedly enhanced by his great local following. Consequently, even though he had declined Muqali's offer of office in favour of his sons and younger brothers, he was made responsible for the conquered households. T'ien-ni (1197-1225), his eldest son, is said to have been made a myriarch in charge of former Chin soldiers, but this is no doubt an error for chiliarch. T'ien-an (d. 1255), Ping-chih's second son, served for the time being as a recruit and hostage in Muqali's army. Shih Chin-tao (1179-1243), Ping-chih's younger brother, also became a commander. Huai-te, Ping-chih's cousin, was put in charge of the Black Army (*Hei-chün*) in Manchuria.

All these members of the Shih family performed well, thus paving the way for T'ien-tse's career. Ping-chih seems to have done much to assist the Mongols with their supplies and manpower problems. It is said that, soon after submitting, he assembled more than 100,000 families in Pa-chou alone and deported them to Mongolia – perhaps to serve as artisans, domestics and military colonists. Between 1215 and 1229, Ping-chih was in charge of military supplies in the district of Pei-ching (Ta-ming ch'eng) in Liaoning and made this district a temporary home for his family, being well connected through marriages with the local Mongol commander and influential Jurchen families.

T'ien-ni was the family's most eminent military man before T'ien-tse. Significantly, the core of his army was known as the Ch'ing-lo Army, being constituted of 10,000 men selected from among the traditional retainers of the Shih family. With this force he took part, always under Muqali, in the campaigns in Manchuria and contributed much to stabilising the situation in Hopei, Shantung and Shansi for the Mongols, at a time when the Chin's resistance was still vigorous. When Wu Hsien (d. 1234), the commander of Chen-ting, surrendered in 1220, T'ien-ni was appointed grand marshal of Western Ho-pei with Wu Hsien as his deputy. Four years later, he defeated the Sung general P'eng I-pin at En-chou, thereby thwarting the Sung plan to recover the north by taking advantage of the Mongol-Chin conflict.

T'ien-an was the least successful of Ping-chih's three sons; yet, he took part honourably in the campaign in Manchuria and served as the chief civil administrator of the Pei-ching district for many years before his retirement in 1234. T'ien-hsiang

(1191-1258), Huai-te's son, succeeded his father at the head of the Black Army (the latter having died in action at Pei-ching in 1214) and spent six years assisting Muqali in the conquest of the Chin territories east and west of the Liao River. Later, from 1219 on, he fought both in Shansi and Shantung, and also in the war against Hsi-Hsia in 1223, achieving the rank of acting grand marshal.

Before T'ien-tse made his *début* in 1225, several of his relatives, as noted above, had already shown their worth to the Mongols by providing badly needed supplies and effective leadership of the Chinese auxiliaries. Their early submission, loyalty to the new masters, and bravery in the field, undoubtedly played a significant part in the family's success. Ping-chih's eldest daughter became one of the wives of Muqali, which would have further consolidated the Shih's position.

With such foundations to build on, T'ien-tse's career should have had an easy start. Actually, it began with a family crisis in 1225 when T'ien-ni was murdered by his deputy, Wu Hsien. Responding to the Chin government's strong appeal to his loyalty, Wu Hsien killed his immediate superior and more than 100 members of the latter's family, and raised the Chin banner again. Several towns in western Hopei threw in their lot with him; and the Sung general P'eng I-pin also led his troops northwards from his headquarters at Ta-ming. This crisis not only shook the Shih family, but also threatened to end Mongol rule in much of Hopei.

T'ien-tse was then only twenty-three years old. He was a born soldier: very tall and with a resounding voice, he is said to have been exceedingly brave and a superb horseman and archer. Holding the post of captain of his brother's body-guard, T'ien-tse was fortunate enough to escape the disaster, for he happened to be in Yen (Peking) at the time.

On hearing of his brother's murder, he immediately rushed back to the south. When he reached Man-ch'eng in central Hopei, he had already gathered more than 1,000 men and 700 horses. Help was also obtained from Muqali's son Bōl and from Chang Jou (*qq.v.*), the commander of Man-ch'eng. Bōl confirmed T'ien-tse in his late brother's office as grand marshal of Western Ho-pei and sent Se'ünidei to his assistance with 3,000 élite Mongolian troops. With these additional forces T'ien-tse was able to take Chen-ting in the summer of 1225, thus saving his family's fortunes.

His struggle with Wu Hsien was not over, however. For the next five years the adversaries remained locked in bitter strife for the control of western Hopei and northern Honan. Driven at last out of Chen-ting, Wu Hsien now established his stronghold at Pao-tu Fort in the T'ai-hang Mountains and concluded an alliance with P'eng I-pin. T'ien-tse, together with Se'ünidei, managed to break this potentially powerful Sung-Chin alliance by dealing P'eng a crushing defeat at Tsan-huang, south of Chen-ting, and having him killed soon after. Now isolated, Wu Hsien was

nevertheless able to take Chen-ting by surprise several months later. Only when reinforcements were sent by Tung Chün (1186-1233), the commander of the neighbouring town of Kao-ch'eng, could T'ien-tse recapture Chen-ting and drive Wu Hsien back. In 1226, T'ien-tse dislodged Wu Hsien from his mountain fortress and subdued every other place still resisting the Mongols in western Hopei. Undaunted, Wu Hsien managed to set up a new base at Wei-chou in northern Honan, from where he launched occasional incursions into Hopei and southern Shansi. Only in 1230, and thanks to large reinforcements sent by Ögödei, was T'ien-tse able to seize Wei-chou, thus opening the northern gateway to the new Chin capital Pien (K'ai-feng).

By the time Ögödei was enthroned as qa'an in 1229, Shih T'ien-tse had already distinguished himself as one of the most powerful generals of the Han Armies in the service of the Mongols. Consequently, in Ögödei's reorganisation of the Han Armies into three myriarchies and thirty-six chiliarchies that same year in preparation for the final attack against Chin, T'ien-tse was made a myriarch, the other two being Liu Ni (alias Hei-ma) and Hsiao Cha-la-erh. All the Chinese troops of the five districts of Chen-ting, Ta-ming and Ho-chien in Hopei, and Chi-nan and Tung-p'ing in Shantung, were placed under T'ien-tse's command.

In the offensive of 1232-1234 which led to the liquidation of the Chin, T'ien-tse campaigned actively in the areas east of Pien. However, Wei-chou, which had been seized by T'ien-tse in 1230, did not become the springboard for the attack, for Ögödei adopted the surprising strategy of attacking Pien from the south-west in a grand circular movement through Sung territory. T'ien-tse was assigned the tasks of weakening the eastern flank of the Chin defence and of blocking reinforcements from that direction. He secured the surrender of a number of towns and, at Yang-i-tien (in Ning-ling, Honan), annihilated 15,000 Chin troops from Hsü-chou (Kiangsu) led by Wan-yen Ch'ing-shan-nu. After the Chin emperor Ai-tsung (r. 1224-34) had fled from Pien, T'ien-tse fought in the battle of Po-kung miao (in Chi-hsien), in which 80,000 Chin troops were crushed, thus thwarting the Chin ruler's plan to escape northwards. T'ien-tse also participated in the siege of Kuei-te and Ts'ai-chou, Ai-tsung's last refuge.

T'ien-tse seems to have taken part only in the early stage of the inconclusive war against the Sung in 1235-1241. Immediately after the destruction of Chin, war broke out between the two former allies over the division of Chin territory. In 1235, Ögödei launched a three-pronged offensive in retaliation for Sung's attempt to annex all of Honan. In this campaign, T'ien-tse served at first in the main army under the command of Kōcū, the third son of Ögödei, whose mission was to seize the strategic city of Hsiang-yang in northwestern Hupei. He is credited with the capture of Tsao-yang in 1235 and the crushing of Sung troops at Hsiao-shih-t'an, a victory that

contributed significantly to the surrender of Hsiang-yang in the spring of 1236. In the winter of 1237, he joined the Left (or East) Wing of the army under the command of Kō'ün Buqa, which was thrusting southeastwards into the Huai and Han valleys from southern Honan and through eastern Hupei. T'ien-tse played a major part in the capture of Kuang-chou in Honan and Fu-chou in Hupei, and he also participated in the conquest of Huai valley strongholds such as Shou-ch'un, Ch'u-chou and Pao-ying, altogether more than twenty cities.

Between wars, T'ien-tse undertook to consolidate his home base. In appearance at least, T'ien-tse's domain had been shrinking since he was first made a myriarch, because of the expansion of the Chinese armies during, and immediately after, the conquest of Chin. Chang Jung (1185-1265) of Chi-nan was made a myriarch in 1232; Yen Shih of Tung-p'ing (*q.v.*) and Chang Jou of Pao-chou in 1234; and Wang Chen of Ta-ming, in 1249. Those promotions left T'ien-tse with no more than the Chen-ting district and its troops in his charge. But T'ien-tse's command over the Chinese lords in these districts had never been more than nominal. Moreover, Chen-ting provided him with a base powerful enough in itself, strategically located, and comprising a district of more than thirty cities and towns. It was, in fact, one of the largest and most populous districts in north China. The city of Chen-ting was known to Marco Polo as 'Achbaluch' (tu. Aq Balīq, 'White City'); it impressed him as 'a city unusually large and handsome.'

After 1225 Chen-ting remained T'ien-tse's *de facto* fief for nearly four decades. The feudalisation of Chen-ting as T'ien-tse's domain reflected a common phenomenon in north China, resulting from the extension to Chinese collaborators of the privileges enjoyed by the aristocrats in the steppe society. By the time of Ögödei's accession, many Chinese defectors to the Mongols had become feudal lords, each exercising (hereditary) administrative, military, and fiscal powers over large areas, and hence were known to their contemporaries as *shih-hou* or 'hereditary lords.' There was some attempt during Ögödei's reign to undermine their power, but such measures did little in practice to change the status quo. The centralisation policies of Yeh-lü Ch'uts'ai (*q.v.*) resulted in nothing more than withdrawing some of the powers of tax collection from those lords. The allotment in 1236 of fiefs to Mongol nobles and Chinese overlords in north China was also economic in nature, for it granted those nobles a small portion of the taxes collected in their domains. And the stationing in the same year of detachments of the Tammači Army in five cities, including Chen-ting, served only to ensure the loyalty of the local Chinese power holders. The Chinese lords, therefore, still held general administrative and military powers over the areas under their jurisdiction on a hereditary basis.

Chen-ting, like other places in north China, had suffered severely from the ravages of war and the exploitative policies of the early period of Mongol rule. T'ien-tse proved a competent administrator and reformer by restoring order and prosperity, and by reviving Chinese institutions and culture at the local level. It is said that he began his reforms in Chen-ting immediately after he recovered the city from Wu Hsien in 1225, accelerating the process after the conquest of Chin. His biographers credit him with rallying the scattered population, repairing war ruins, building new city walls, establishing new laws and institutions, and recruiting talented people to the local schools and his own staff. From amongst former scholars and officials of Chin he appointed to his staff Li Ta-chieh, Chang Te-hui (1195-1274), Wang Ch'ang-ling (1201-63), Na-ho Sung-nien and Wang Shou-tao (d. 1270). These men received his complete trust. The scholars engaged for the prefectural school included Shih-ch'i Ch'eng-chih, Yen Po-chien (1218-89) and Chang Yen (1229-90). Other well-known literati who were both his protégés and advisers included Wang Jo-hsü (1174-1243), Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), Li Chih (1192-1279), Po Hua, Ts'ao Chü-i, Liu Po-hsi (1183-1256), Tuan Chi-ch'ang, Yang Kuo (1197-1269), T'u-tan Kung-lü and Chang T'iao-shan. Chen-ting, therefore, vied with Tung-p'ing (see Yen Shih's biography) as the main centre of learning and cultural renaissance in those troubled times. The poet Nai-hsien (1309-?), who visited Chen-ting decades later, was still impressed by its atmosphere, which he likened to the lustre of the old Chin capital.

T'ien-tse is also credited with improving the lot of the local population by rationalising tax collection and controlling usury. As elsewhere in north China, the people in Chen-ting were plagued by a double burden of military conscription and heavy taxation, for the military and civilian registers had not yet been completely separated. It is said that T'ien-tse managed to convince Ögödei that only middle-income families be entered in the military registers, listing the rest as civilians to be taxed differentially according to their wealth.

The people also suffered greatly from ruinous interest rates on the monies which officials borrowed on their behalf to pay the heavy taxes imposed by the Mongols. Such loans were often made by Central Asian merchants, acting in many cases as both tax farmers and money-lenders. Together with Chang Jou, T'ien-tse petitioned the court for the people's debts to be redeemed out of public funds, and for the compounding of interest to be forbidden, while the rates themselves should not exceed 100% p.a. A law to that effect was promulgated in 1237.

In the meantime, T'ien-tse further consolidated his fiscal policy by rationalising taxes levied for local government. In contrast with those due to the central government, local taxes had been levied heretofore whenever the need arose. T'ien-

tse converted the irregular levies to a lump sum payable annually in silver, computed according to the anticipated expenditures of local government.

All in all, it seems that Chen-ting was relatively stable and prosperous under T'ien-tse's rule, at a time when north China was generally afflicted by the exploitative practices of the foreign fiscal 'experts' who had dominated the Mongol court since the latter part of Ögödei's reign. T'ien-tse's biographer Wang Yün attributed to T'ien-tse's skilful management the fact that Chen-ting was more populous and able to support a larger army than other comparable places in north China.

As T'ien-tse's power base, Chen-ting provided a direct link with the house of Tolui, Ögödei's youngest brother. This proved extremely important in the second half of T'ien-tse's career, since the throne was to pass from the line of Ögödei to that of Tolui in 1251. T'ien-tse's close tie with the latter's family followed the allotment of Chen-ting in 1236 to Tolui's widow, the famous Princess Sorqaqtani (d. 1252). Consequently, T'ien-tse found himself acting as an official administrator of her family property. Sorqaqtani showed a keen personal interest in her new domain – something rather unusual for the Mongol nobility. She recruited to her staff skilled personnel from her fief and accepted T'ien-tse's request to repatriate Mongol troops garrisoned in Chen-ting, which had been upsetting the normal course of local affairs. When her son Möngke assumed the throne in 1251, he immediately granted five cities of Wei-chou in fief to T'ien-tse as a reward for loyal service.

More important for T'ien-tse's career, however, was his connection with Möngke's younger brother, Qubilai, who was soon to shift the fulcrum of the Mongolian empire from the steppe to north China. Perhaps because of his mother's influence, Qubilai had shown an interest in Chinese culture since his early years, gathering around him a group of Chinese advisers as early as 1244. His appointment in 1251 as viceroy of Mongol possessions in China gave him the opportunity to try out the techniques of government learned from his Chinese advisers, and to turn his domain into a personal power base. He not only set up an enlarged advisory body composed of Chinese literati, but also began to attract Chinese military overlords and strongmen such as Shih T'ien-tse and Chang Jou.

T'ien-tse's ability must have long been known to Qubilai because of his own keen interest in the family fief. Moreover, Chang Te-hui and Li Chih, both former protégés of T'ien-tse, had been summoned to court as advisers. Assuming that they had not been recommended to Qubilai by T'ien-tse in the first place, they would certainly have mentioned him to Qubilai in their interviews. T'ien-tse, like many Chinese literati and officials, must have seen in Qubilai the hope of implementing on a broader scene what he had himself achieved in Chen-ting; he was quite willing, therefore, to serve under the new master.

T'ien-tse did indeed play a major part in the reforms effected in north China under Qubilai. With the latter's consent, reforms were carried out in Hsing-chou, Ho-nan and Kuan-chung (Shensi), where a chaotic situation had prevailed. On the recommendation of Qubilai, T'ien-tse was appointed to Ho-nan in 1252 as one of four regional military commissioners. The task faced by T'ien-tse and his colleagues was twofold: to repair the ravages of war and restore a Chinese style of government, and to strengthen the region's military preparedness for continuing war against the Sung (this border province faced the Sung strongholds at Hsiang-yang and Fan-ch'eng). In addition to measures designed to improve the bureaucracy, the economy and law enforcement, military colonies were set up to insure the army's food supplies, and the *pao-chia* system was adopted to maintain order in the border region. At Teng-chou, a strategically important town in southwestern Honan, a myriarchy was established under the command of Shih Ch'üan, T'ien-tse's nephew, to serve for both defence and agricultural production.

In the meantime, reforms were also carried out in T'ien-tse's own fief, Wei-chou, in northern Honan. T'ien-tse entrusted this task to one of his old subordinates, Wang Ch'ang-ling (see above), who introduced uniform taxation, cleaned up the local bureaucracy, improved irrigation and transportation, and promoted agriculture. Within a couple of years (so our sources claim), order and prosperity returned to the region and its defence capability was greatly enhanced.

Shih T'ien-tse was also involved in the clash between Möngke and Qubilai that took place in 1257. By that time, Qubilai's pro-Chinese policies had attracted the hostility of the Mongol conservative faction at court, and his growing power had even aroused the suspicion of his own brother. In response to allegations that Qubilai had appropriated revenue from China for his own purposes, Möngke sent 'Alamdār to audit the revenues of Ho-nan and Kuan-chung. 'Alamdār, himself a member of the anti-Qubilai faction, put many functionaries to death on unspecified charges in those two regions, apparently with a view to discrediting Qubilai. Shih T'ien-tse, as the chief official of Ho-nan, insisted on taking all responsibility upon himself. It is said that many officials were exonerated because of T'ien-tse's intervention. His loyalty and responsible attitude as demonstrated in this crisis, together with the success of the earlier reforms in Ho-nan, undoubtedly strengthened Qubilai's confidence in him.

In 1258-1259, Shih T'ien-tse again took part in a campaign against Sung. In the two-pronged attack led separately by Möngke and Qubilai, T'ien-tse served in the Right (or West) Wing of the army which was operating in Szechwan under the personal command of Möngke. The campaign in Szechwan progressed well for the Mongols until the army reached Ho-chou, the Sung mountain stronghold situated at the junction of the Chia-ling River and its two tributaries. Here the Sung army

commanded by Wang Chien defended the city effectively for five months, i.e. until the siege was lifted after the sudden death of Möngke in August 1259. During this long siege, T'ien-tse is credited with driving back a fleet of more than 1,000 vessels under general Lü Wen-te, that had sailed up the Chia-ling to support the beleaguered fortress.

Möngke's death was followed by contention for the throne between Qubilai, who was then campaigning in central China, and his younger brother Ariq Böke (d. 1266), based in Mongolia. Shih T'ien-tse sided with Qubilai. The fact that the Chinese generals of the Right Wing, such as Shih T'ien-tse and Wang Liang-ch'en (1231-81), supported Qubilai while many of the Mongolian contingents of the same army sided with Ariq Böke indicates not only the degree of appreciation of Qubilai's past policies by the Chinese military leaders, but also the strength of the bond that had been established between them for nearly a decade.

The support of the Chinese generals as well as access to the economic resources of north China proved extremely important to Qubilai. Shih T'ien-tse was one of his strongest partisans and chief lieutenant in the unsettled years following Qubilai's enthronement at K'ai-p'ing in early 1260. Immediately after that event, T'ien-tse, who had just arrived from Szechwan, was entrusted with the task of organising the withdrawal of the troops left behind by Qubilai at E-chou. When the Pacification Bureaux were established in April, he was appointed pacification commissioner for Ho-nan. In June, he contributed 10,435 soldiers to the newly formed garrison in Chung-tu (Peking), which undoubtedly enhanced the security of the new government. Two months later, T'ien-tse was awarded 15,000 *liang* of silver, ostensibly for the service he had rendered to the late qa'an, but in reality for his support to the new government. In the same month, he was again dispatched south to serve as military commissioner for the Chiang-Huai region (modern Kiangsu and Anhwei), while Qubilai's own attention was directed to the campaign against Ariq Böke's supporters in Mongolia and northwestern China. However, a competent and seasoned soldier like T'ien-tse could not be left idle in this critical war, and he did, indeed, take part, as the commander of the Left Wing, in the famous battle of Šimultu or Šimultai (one of the small lakes of the eastern Gobi) in late 1261. This was the battle that sealed the fate of Ariq Böke and ensured the survival of Qubilai's new regime in China.

T'ien-tse also contributed as a statesman to the establishment of Qubilai's dominion. He was called to the inner imperial council soon after Qubilai's accession and thus became involved in the central civil and military administration during the formative years of the Yüan dynasty. Among other things, T'ien-tse suggested to Qubilai in early 1260 that the Secretarial Council and Six Ministries in the central government be re-established, and that a system of fixed remuneration be instituted in

order to reduce corruption among officials. In the following year he was appointed one of the two Right chancellors in the Secretarial Council, a top administrative post in the government. He held this position for the next six years, then served as the Left chancellor from 1267 to 1268. In the meantime, he served twice from 1262 to 1267 and from 1268 to 1269 as vice-commissioner of the newly founded Department of Military Affairs, the highest military agency of the state.

The recommendation which led to T'ien-tse's appointment as Right chancellor has been variously attributed to Tou Mo (*q.v.*), Yang Kuo (see above), and Ts'ui Pin (1225-80). This confusion may simply reflect the fact that T'ien-tse, as one of the most accomplished Chinese soldier-statesmen, was the common choice of the Chinese literati. Qubilai himself let it be known that T'ien-tse was his choice also: recommendations by the Chinese literati only served to confirm his decision.

As one of the senior government officials, T'ien-tse undoubtedly played a significant part in Qubilai's organisation of the state along traditional Chinese lines. He set up ten guidelines for the operation of the Secretarial Council, and we are told that 'the methods concerning the management of the country and the pacification of the people that he had proposed earlier were all put into practice.' Indeed, Wang Yün's diary, the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (*Memoirs of the Affairs of the Secretarial Council*), which details the activities of the Secretarial Council in 1260-1261, indicates that T'ien-tse presided over the daily operations of the Council in the second half of 1261. T'ien-tse was the leading official in the Chung-tu branch of the Council when the other members of this office accompanied Qubilai to his summer capital Shang-tu (the former K'ai-p'ing).

However, the extent of T'ien-tse's influence in the Council is an open question. It would seem that the dominant spirit in government during the period 1261-1262 was Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*), a director of political affairs and an expert in fiscal matters. The reason for Shih T'ien-tse's appointment over Wang Wen-t'ung was the former's seniority and past performance, even though Wang's ability was acknowledged as being unsurpassed among the officials. As the Right chancellor, T'ien-tse seems to have effaced himself and shown no particular desire to use his power. It is related that, in response to the suggestion that he should assert himself by exerting the full extent of his competence, T'ien-tse cited the words of Wei Ao, a T'ang official, to the effect that a successful prime minister was one who asserted no authority, since he would share everything with all-under-Heaven! On another occasion he described his function in the Secretarial Council as one of interpreter and mouth-piece. In effect, T'ien-tse's role was, by all accounts, that of a conciliator between the newly appointed, legalistically minded Wang Wen-t'ung, and the old advisers of Qubilai, most of whom were Confucians.

Wang Wen-t'ung was executed in 1262 because of his implication in Li T'an's (*q.v.*) rebellion, after which T'ien-tse came into conflict with the notorious Aḥmad Fanākati (*q.v.*), the financial expert who was appointed director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council in 1264. According to his biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), Aḥmad had impressed Qubilai not only by his financial skill, but also by his ability often to better T'ien-tse and his colleagues in argument. By the time T'ien-tse was dismissed from the Secretarial Council in 1268, many of his Chinese colleagues who had served in the Council during the first years of Qubilai's reign had already been driven out of office, their places going to Aḥmad's protégés. Significantly, throughout the rest of the Yüan dynasty, no other Chinese was ever again appointed Right chancellor, and never again did so many Chinese hold office in the Secretarial Council. Shih T'ien-tse's dismissal marks the ascendancy of the Central Asian financial experts over the Chinese soldier-statesmen and scholar-officials in the reign of Qubilai.

T'ien-tse certainly felt more at ease in his duties as vice-commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs. It is very likely that he was in fact the chief executive of the department, since the heir apparent Jingim (Chen-chin, 1243-85) was no more than its nominal head. In this capacity T'ien-tse was in a unique position to reconcile Mongol and Chinese military institutions, and to prepare the joint armies for the attack against Sung. Innovations specifically attributed to T'ien-tse's initiative include the organisation of the Chinese-style Imperial Guard in three divisions, implemented in 1271, and the use of soldiers as colonists (*t'un-t'ien chün*) for economic self-support.

During the period of his service in the central government, T'ien-tse proved his mettle once more in suppressing the rebellion of Li T'an, a military lord in eastern Shantung who had switched his allegiance to the Sung in 1262. T'ien-tse took over command of all troops in the campaign from Prince Qabiči, who had made little progress in quelling the revolt. Adopting a strategy recommended to him by Sung Tzu-chen (1186-1266), T'ien-tse blockaded the city of Chi-nan – Li T'an's stronghold – by building a wooden palisade around it. The defence collapsed after four months as a result of starvation in the city, and the rebellion ended with the capture and execution of Li T'an. Once again, T'ien-tse had helped Qubilai to overcome a serious crisis. (At Li T'an's trial, according to one of our sources, Li T'an accused T'ien-tse and Yen Chung-fan of having conspired with him to plot the rebellion. T'ien-tse, who presided over the trial, decided then to execute Li T'an forthwith without Qubilai's approval. Collusion between the two seems highly unlikely in view of the loyal service T'ien-tse had rendered to Qubilai's house, the high position he held at the time, and the trust shown to him by Qubilai before and after the rebellion.)

The revolt of Li T'an adversely affected the Chinese military families in general and that of T'ien-tse in particular in suppressing Chinese military feudalism. It is ironic that the support lent by the Chinese military leaders to Qubilai should eventually have turned against them. They had served Qubilai in the hope of restoring the traditional Chinese style of government and of mitigating the exploitation of north China by its new masters. However, those very objectives entailed the centralisation of military as well as civil and fiscal powers, and the suppression of hereditary privileges. Ever since its inception, Qubilai's regime had been moving towards such goals, through the institution of the Secretarial Council at the centre and of the Pacification Bureaux in the provinces. It had temporised in curtailing the power and privileges of the Chinese lords only because of the requirements of the war against Ariq Böke and the insecurity of the new regime. The defection of Li T'an to a Chinese state that was still at war with the Mongols inevitably raised the question of the political reliability of the Chinese military lords and the wisdom of leaving too much power in their hands.

In such circumstances, even a long-serving, trustworthy statesman like T'ien-tse was not immune to criticism and suspicion. Actually, critics were quick to remind Qubilai in 1262 that the Shih family might become uncontrollable, with so many of its members holding both military and civilian posts, and to urge that T'ien-tse be suspended from his chancellorship pending investigation. We are told that Qubilai was only dissuaded from taking action against T'ien-tse by a special plea from Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*), a junior member of the Secretarial Council who testified to T'ien-tse's loyalty and usefulness.

Wang Yün, however, suggests that it was T'ien-tse himself who first pressed Qubilai to separate military and civil powers, beginning with his own family (i.e. the Shih). Apparently T'ien-tse had done this to disarm criticism that was currently being expressed. In view of the unfavourable climate at the time, he had probably no other option. Moreover, T'ien-tse was one of the very few Chinese, if not the only one, to have successfully evolved from regional warlord to ranking bureaucrat of the new central government; regional powers, military and administrative, were no longer such high stakes as to warrant his pressing too hard for them. T'ien-tse's promptness in setting an example for other Chinese lords in this respect undoubtedly strengthened Qubilai's confidence in him.

The measures adopted by the court from 1262 to 1264 were momentous indeed for the Chinese lords. They included, notably, provisions to prevent more than one member of any Chinese family from holding military office, and to place the former domains of the Chinese lords under the jurisdiction of a centrally appointed district general administrator. In the case of the Shih family, seventeen of its members were

relieved of their military posts on the same day; only Shih Shu (1221-87), T'ien-tse's nephew, continued to serve as myriarch. Chen-ting, the old family domain, was soon put under the control of the general administrator. The family fief in Wei-chou was handed back to the central government at this time, if not earlier. The Shih, therefore, ceased to be hereditary lords, as a result of Qubilai's policy of centralising power and nationalising the Chinese armies.

The end of T'ien-tse's power as an hereditary lord entailed no lessening of his stature as a general and top government official. Before long, the situation in the south prompted Qubilai to send T'ien-tse once again on military expeditions. The offensive against Sung, which Qubilai had suspended since 1260, was resumed in 1268. The immediate objective was the recapture of Hsiang-yang, the Sung stronghold in the Han River valley.

Together with the Imperial son-in-law Quraçu, T'ien-tse was appointed director of political affairs of the newly established Ho-nan Regional Secretarial Council the following year, and was entrusted with the task of taking Hsiang-yang. As at Chinan, T'ien-tse decided to blockade the place. A long wall was erected south of the city to cut off the food supply. But sickness forced him to give up his command in early 1270, three years before the fall of Hsiang-yang, and to return to Chung-tu. The following year T'ien-tse, now old and frail, pleaded for permission to retire. Qubilai rejected his request, albeit with a gift of honorific titles and an assurance that T'ien-tse would be consulted henceforward on major matters only.

After the surrender of Hsiang-yang in 1273, Qubilai was ready to launch the massive onslaught that would eventually destroy the Sung. As his last assignment, T'ien-tse was given the honour of sharing the command of this campaign with Bayan (*q.v.*). In 1274 he was appointed, with Bayan, to lead the attack in the middle Yangtze valley as Left chancellor of the Ching-Hu Regional Secretarial Council, while a Huai-hsi Regional Secretarial Council was established to direct the offensive in the east. T'ien-tse is credited with bringing about a unified command by convincing Qubilai that the whole plan might fail for lack of proper coordination. As a result, the Ching-Hu Regional Secretarial Council was given over-all control of operations, whereas the competence of the Huai-hsi Regional Secretarial Council was downgraded to that of a mere Regional Department of Military Affairs.

Shih T'ien-tse's appointment is mentioned by Rašīd al-Dīn, who refers to the Chinese commander as 'Semeke Bahadur' ('Semeke' is derived from the Chinese 'San-ko', meaning 'The Third Brother'). According to Rašīd, Semeke Bahadur was put in charge of 'eighty *tümens* of Khitayan troops,' i.e. northern Chinese troops, and was made commander-in-chief 'because his *yasaq* was severe and he had always performed his tasks well.' Now as the co-commander-in-chief, T'ien-tse set out from

Hsiang-yang in October. When the army reached Ying-chou (in Hupei) a few days later, he was again stricken by illness and had to leave Bayan in sole charge of the attack.

After T'ien-tse returned to his home in Chen-ting, the emperor sent T'ien-tse's son, Kang, and an imperial doctor to care for the sick man. The last words T'ien-tse uttered were to beseech Qubilai to restrain the army from killing and plundering after it had crossed the Yangtze.

T'ien-tse died in March 1275 at the age of seventy-three. He was buried in T'ai-pao chuang, west of Chen-ting. As a last tribute, he was granted the posthumous title of Grand Commandant and was canonised as Chung-wu ('Loyal and Martial'). In 1319, he was given the higher posthumous title of Grand Preceptor and was invested as Prince of Chen-yang.

A soldier first and foremost, T'ien-tse showed nevertheless considerable interest and talent in intellectual pursuits, especially in the second half of his life. Perhaps under the influence of the literati surrounding him by then, he began at the age of forty to devote himself to serious study and was particularly fond of reading Ssu-ma Kuang's *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*. It is said that he was capable of sound judgement on any event according to principles inferred from that exemplary history. He is therefore listed as one of the followers of Ssu-ma Kuang's scholarship in the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an pu-i* compiled by the Ch'ing scholars Wang Tzu-ts'ai and Feng Yün-hao. T'ien-tse was also known as a poet. One piece attributed to him is preserved in the *Yüan-shih hsüan kuei-chi* compiled by Hsi Shih-ch'en.

However, T'ien-tse's intellectual interest was not limited to conventional Confucian scholarship and literature. He was also a playwright and patron of the emerging popular theatrical literature (*tsa-chü*). In that capacity, he had the honour of having his name listed in Chung Ssu-ch'eng's register of the famous Yüan playwrights, the *Lu-kuei pu*, and furthermore was closely associated with such celebrated playwrights as Hou K'o-chung, Po P'u (1226-?) and Yang Kuo. That Chen-ting produced so many playwrights in the early Yüan, as witnessed by the *Lu-kuei pu*, might well have been due to T'ien-tse's patronage.

As chancellor, T'ien-tse shared with Yao Shu (q.v.) the office of (titular) chief compiler of the administrative code known as *Hsin-ko* (*New Code*) completed in 1273; this lost work perhaps provided the basis of the *Chih-yüan hsin-ko* (*New Code of the Chih-yüan Period*), promulgated in 1291, and of all later Yüan codes. Together with Yeh-lü Chu (q.v.), he served from 1261 onward as the director of compilation in the Department of National History, an office concerned with the records of the early Mongol rulers.

T'ien-tse's marriages, as well as those of his father, reflect the prevalence of interracial unions in north China at the time, at least among the élite families. Ping-chih had two wives: one Chinese, née Chang; one Jurchen, née Na-ho. It is not certain whether T'ien-tse was the product of a mixed marriage, but most of his children surely were, since of his four wives only the principal one, née Shih, was perhaps a Chinese. The second, née Li, was a Korean; the other two, Na-ho and Mo-nien, were Jurchen.

The influence of T'ien-tse can also be gauged in a brief survey of the careers of his heirs. T'ien-tse had eight sons and seven daughters. In spite of the curtailment of privileges in 1262, the family soon managed to recover its prestige since all of T'ien-tse's sons held military or civil posts. The eldest, Ko, was the most prominent; he inherited the myriarchy of Teng-chou, distinguished himself in the conquest of Sung, and reached the culmination of his career as the director of political affairs of the Hu-Kuang Regional Secretarial Council. Chang, the second son, served as myriarch of Teng-chou and Shun-t'ien; under the name of Shih Chiu-san-hsien ('Shih, the Ninth Unconventional Immortal'), he became known as a follower of Taoist philosophy and as a playwright. Kang, the fourth son, held the position of Left chancellor of the Hu-Kuang Regional Secretarial Council and was regarded as a versatile painter. Pin, the youngest son, reached the position of Left chancellor of the Secretarial Council.

After T'ien-ni's death in 1225, T'ien-tse had also to promote the careers of his nephews, as the *de facto* patriarch of his clan. Of T'ien-ni's two sons, Chi (1214-72) acted as the caretaker and general administrator of the family establishment in Chen-ting. The younger, Ch'üan, became the myriarch of Teng-chou and, during Möngke's reign, was in charge of the defence of southern Honan. He held the post of high military administrator of Chiang-Han before taking over his elder brother's position at Chen-ting, in the wake of the integration of the Han Armies in 1262. Shu, T'ien-an's only son, followed Möngke in the campaigns in Szechwan and took part in the operations against Ariq Böke, Li T'an and Southern Sung; his last assignment was that of pacification commissioner of Eastern and Western Shan-tung.

Although none of the later heirs of the Shih brothers ever attained the prominence of their forebears, many of them continued nevertheless to hold civil or military posts of considerable importance. T'ien-tse had sixteen grandsons; only the names and careers of Shih Yao (1256-1305), Shih Ch'üan's adopted son by Shih Ko, and Shih Jung, Shih Ko's son, have been retained. Shih Yao distinguished himself in the suppression of rebellions south of the Yangtze late in Qubilai's reign, and held successively the Left chancellorship of several regional secretarial councils in the south. Shih Jung was the myriarch of Teng-chou by inheritance. Many of T'ien-ni's

grandsons served in the middle levels of the civil or military hierarchy, though none of them was outstanding.

The last members of the Shih family known to have had official careers were Shih Hsün, Shih Yao's son, who attained the position of Left chancellor of the Chiang-hsi Regional Secretarial Council in the 1320s, and Shih Yüan-heng (1264-1317), a great-grandson of T'ien-ni, whose final post was that of associate general administrator of Jao-chou.

All in all, even though later heirs did not match their ancestors, the Shih family undoubtedly had one of the most enduring and outstanding 'collective' careers among the Chinese under Mongol rule. Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng, the great Ch'ing historiographer and compiler of the *Yung-ch'ing Gazetteer* (*Yung-ch'ing hsien-chih*), does not exaggerate when he compares the Shih with the Wang and Hsieh of the Chin dynasty, the two best-known families in Chinese history. The lasting prominence of the Shih was due only in part to the fact that the Yüan placed more store on the principle of heredity than any other dynasty in post-T'ang China – it rested largely on T'ien-tse's personal contribution to the hegemony of the Yüan.

T'ien-tse's successful career spanned the reigns of five Mongol qans over a period of fifty years. The Mongol empire in the east had undergone tremendous change during that time. Apart from territorial expansion, the throne had been transferred from Ögödei's house to that of Tolui, and the empire itself had been transformed from an entity rooted in Mongolia to a dominion centred in China. T'ien-tse not only survived all these changes, but greatly prospered by them. Indeed, his career illustrates the extent to which the Mongols depended upon Chinese collaboration in their conquest of China and in the administration of the country.

Coming from a family long distinguished in helping the Mongols solve problems of military supplies and siege-warfare, T'ien-tse not only led the Chinese forces that took part in the destruction of Chin and the reduction of Sung territories, but furthermore was soon to prove his administrative ability by restoring order and prosperity in Chen-ting. T'ien-tse's contribution was even more important to Qubilai's struggle for the throne and his effort to establish Mongol rule in China. Firstly, as the protagonist of the Honan experiment in restoring local government on the Chinese model, he was instrumental in securing north China for Qubilai; then he assisted him against Ariq Böke's faction in Mongolia with troops under his own command, and by drawing support for his cause from the Chinese population. Equally important was the role that he played, as the most respected soldier-statesman, in presiding, on behalf of Qubilai, over the consolidation of a new government modelled, at least in appearance, on traditional Chinese institutions.

To explain the enduring success of T'ien-tse, one must go beyond a mere enumeration of his achievements, since he was only one of a host of Chinese collaborators who contributed in one way or another to the Mongol success in China. The historical tie with Tolui's house in general, and with Qubilai in particular, certainly played an important part: whereas Chen-ting became Sorqaqtani's fief by pure chance, T'ien-tse strove diligently to strengthen this tie, first by restoring the prosperity of Chen-ting and then by loyally supporting Qubilai's cause before and during the latter's struggle with Ariq Böke.

Some of T'ien-tse's personal qualities also help to explain his success as a collaborator. Apart from his competence as general and administrator, and his ability to win the respect of the literati, loyalty, caution and modesty seem to have figured prominently in T'ien-tse's personality and behaviour. Unlike Wu Hsien, Li T'an, and the Yen family of Tung-p'ing, who had either switched their allegiance to the Chin or the Sung, or showed their independence from the Mongols, T'ien-tse's loyalty to the Mongols was unswerving. This difference in the commitment of Chinese military leaders to the foreign overlords may have its roots partly in the geographic location of their respective bases, and partly in their personal backgrounds. Before rallying to the Mongols, T'ien-tse's family had never served either Chin or Sung, unlike Wu Hsien and Li T'an; and his headquarters at Chen-ting were much closer to Chung-tu than Li's and Yen's in Shan-tung. He might have felt that he had no choice but to serve the Mongols, and in so doing to regard them not as invaders but rather as benefactors. According to reports, T'ien-tse repeatedly told his offspring that he wished to die in battle for the Mongols, since his family, originally humble villagers, owed everything to their rule.

As the highest ranking Chinese in the Mongol army and administration, T'ien-tse constantly displayed a remarkable degree of prudence and modesty in his exercise of power. He was apparently well aware of the pitfalls that threatened a Chinese officer in an alien hierarchy. His restraint as Right chancellor and his prompt request to Qubilai in 1262 that the proposed separation of military and civil powers should be first enforced on T'ien-tse's own family clearly show his sensitivity to criticisms and his determination not to incur the Mongol ruler's suspicion.

His virtue in these and other regards did not leave Qubilai unimpressed. The latter was quoted as saying that T'ien-tse was the only person he knew who could be compared to Kuo Tzu-i (697-781) and Ts'ao Pin (931-99). Those two exemplary soldier-statesmen in Chinese history had rendered loyal and outstanding service to their respective dynasties and had never been accused of sharp practice or thirst for power. To vie for power was one of the worst mistakes possible in an autocracy, especially an alien one; T'ien-tse certainly never made it.

The loss both of T'ien-tse's status as de facto hereditary lord and of his chancellorship, even though he managed to retain Qubilai's confidence throughout the rest of his life, starkly reflects the precarious position of a Chinese high official in the Mongol administration. Curtailing the multifarious hereditary powers of the feudatories may have been a necessary step in the restoration of a centralised administration along Chinese lines; the fact that most feudal lords were Chinese made such a step inevitable, since the Chinese military clearly posed a great potential threat to Qubilai's regime in China.

Preserving political power in the hands of the Mongols was one of Qubilai's two chief concerns; the other was to raise the necessary funds for that purpose. T'ien-tse was certainly no fiscal expert. Moreover, even though he might not have been a doctrinal Confucianist, he, like many of his literati colleagues, could have been mindful of Confucian precepts when it came to collecting taxes, which would have made him far less efficient at increasing government revenues than the Central Asian specialists. It was therefore unavoidable that T'ien-tse, as well as his literati colleagues, should lose power to those unscrupulous agents. The Chinese officials enjoyed but one brief moment of eminence in the Yüan government, when Qubilai desperately needed support to defeat his rivals in Mongolia and to restore in China a bureaucratic government with a Confucian façade. Shih T'ien-tse seems to have represented the paragon of that short-lived glory.

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C.C. Hsiao

Editorial Note

The identification of Shih Chin-tao (instead of Shih Huai-te) as the younger brother of Shih Ping-chih (see above, p. 28) is in accordance with his funeral inscription composed by Tuan Shao-hsien and the family genealogy written by Liu Ch'i, both preserved in YCWC14.

4. CHANG JOU (1190-1268)

Chang Jou, T. Te-kang, was one of the most important commanders of the Han Armies (*Han-chün*) whose role was decisive in the Mongols' conquest of the Chin and in the early stages of the war against the Southern Sung. Born in 1190 to a common farmer, Fu-k'uan (1151-?), and his wife née Niu, at Ting-hsing in present central Hopei, Chang Jou was possessed of a nature ill-suited for peaceful pursuits and thus well in tune with his times. His biographers describe him as one of the *hsia* or knight-errantry, an inferior social category in the traditional Chinese historiography. He is said to have been uninterested in formal study but skilful in horsemanship and archery. Though poor he was generous and ambitious. Unrestrained in his behaviour by conventional standards, he was nevertheless well known for his chivalry.

The chaotic situation in north China since the beginning of the Mongol invasion gave Chang Jou his first opportunity to rise as a Chin militia leader in 1213. Earlier that year, Činggis Qan had launched his second attack against the Chin – a massive three-pronged offensive that was to sweep across much of north China. The areas north of the Yellow River were soon plunged into anarchy as the Chin forces withdrew to the now isolated capital Chung-tu (Peking), and to the south of the river, while the Mongols were neither willing nor able to hold the places they had overrun. People in those areas not only suffered from the marauding Mongols, but were also plagued by an outbreak of local banditry. To protect their families and property, they organised more and more militia groups under the leadership of prominent families or strongmen – a recurrent phenomenon in China in times of social breakdown. Some of those groups chose to surrender voluntarily to the Mongols; some turned to the Southern Sung for protection, while others remained loyal to the Chin. The Chin government encouraged local self-defence for, as its own army had been mauled by the Mongols, it expected the popular forces to assist in resisting the invaders and in recovering the lost territories. Consequently, it was Chin policy, after the capital had been removed to Pien (K'ai-feng) in Honan in 1214, to recognize militia units as 'righteous armies' (*i-chün*), showering their leaders with offices and titles.

Chang Jou was the leader of one such officially sanctioned band. He is said to have begun by assembling several thousand families of his 'clansmen and followers' (*tsu-tang*) and to have established a stronghold at Tung-liu ku in the Hsi-shan (T'ai-hang Mountains) for the purpose of self-protection. His band soon came under the aegis of Miao Tao-jun (d. 1218), the most powerful pro-Chin militia leader in Ho-pei. In 1216, when Miao was appointed pacification commissioner of Chung-tu by the Chin court, and entrusted with the task of recovering the lost capital, he made Chang

Jou both magistrate of Ting-hsing and defence commandant of Ch'ing-chou in Shantung. As Chang Jou's followers grew rapidly in number, the Chin court granted him the honorific title of Grand General Who Displays Valour, and promoted him to be concurrently military governor of the Yung-ning commandery *in absentia*, supervisory commissioner of Hsiung-chou, and provisional director-general of the Right with the authority to exercise the functions of the Marshal's Administration.

Chang Jou's biographies record no field action on his part before his surrender to the Mongols in 1218. This may be due in part to the fact that the Mongol attack had subsided temporarily after the seizure of Chung-tu and also to the scrapping of the Chin plan to recover Chung-tu, as a result of constant conflict between militia leaders on whom the Chin government had pinned their hopes. Chang Jou's role in these internecine struggles and his unswerving loyalty to his first patron, Miao Tao-jun, throughout the period are well documented. In 1218, when Miao was murdered by Chia Yü (d. 1218), another militia leader, Chang Jou rejected Chia's overtures, vowing to avenge his patron. His force was substantially increased by large contingents of Miao's army and he was consequently promoted to be the deputy of Li Ch'üeh-lü, the successor of Miao Tao-jun as pacification commissioner of Chung-tu. He would have to wait, however, before settling the score with his Chin colleague until the Mongols had made him a general in their service.

Chang Jou's surrender took place not long after the Mongols had renewed their large-scale attack late in 1217. This phase of the Mongol offensive was led by Muqali (q.v.), who had been entrusted by Činggis Qan earlier that year with the tasks of mopping up the remaining Chin forces north of the Yellow River and of pressing southward into the territory still under Chin control. Since Činggis Qan had committed the bulk of the Mongol army to the campaign against Khwārazm, Muqali could muster no more than 23,000 Mongol and Önggüt troops, and an unspecified but apparently limited number of rallied Khitan and Chinese. It was therefore imperative that Muqali attract as many Chinese generals and militia leaders as possible to the Mongol service. Chang Jou was one of those recruits. In 1218 at Lang-ya ling, Chang's army encountered a detachment of Muqali's forces which had broken into Hopei by way of Tzu-ching kuan (north-east of I-hsien in Hopei). In the ensuing battle, Chang Jou was not only defeated but, having been thrown from his horse, was made a prisoner. The Mongol commander, who can be tentatively identified as Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu (d. 1235), was impressed by Chang Jou's courage when he refused to kneel, and urged him to change sides. Chang Jou complied, it is said in his biographies, to save his life for his parents' service – apparently a later rationalisation. He was allowed to reassemble his troops and to retain the rank and titles that he had held under the Chin.

Now a Chinese general in the Mongol army, Chang Jou contributed importantly to pacifying western and northwestern Hopei for his new masters during the following two years, while Muqali concentrated his main force for an attack on Shansi. Immediately after siding with the Mongols, Chang Jou seized a number of Chin prefectures such as Hsiung-chou, I-chou, An-chou and Pao-chou. He had then the opportunity to take his personal revenge on Chia Yü while carrying out his mission to eradicate the Chin remnants: he invested K'ung-t'ai shan, Chia's stronghold, perhaps in Heng-shan. By cutting off the water supply from this mountain fortress, he forced Chia Yü to surrender. Vengefully, Chang Jou had Chia Yü executed and ordered his heart torn out as a sacrifice to the late Miao. That action is said to have earned Chang Jou the reputation of a righteous man, even though he had deserted the Chin dynasty which his old patron and he himself had both served. Clearly, Chang Jou's concept of loyalty at the time must have related to persons rather than political entities.

Chang Jou, however, was soon to meet a powerful adversary in the person of Wu Hsien (d. 1234). In 1217 this militia leader had reclaimed the strategically important west-central Hopei city of Chen-ting for the Chin. Wu Hsien was to gain fame as the strongest and the richest of the nine field commanders in Hopei, Shantung and Shansi who were made dukes by the Chin court in 1220. When Chang Jou seized Man-ch'eng and set up his headquarters there late in 1218, Wu Hsien responded to this new threat by attacking the place with 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; this was the first of numerous encounters between the two men in their bloody struggle for the control of west-central Hopei during the two years that followed. Lacking his main force which was on an expedition, Chang Jou had to mobilise the women, the old and the infirm to man the walls with the few hundred regulars of the garrison. By means of clever stratagems, Chang Jou finally forced the attackers to lift the siege with heavy losses. He wasted no time in celebrations, however, but pushed southwestward from Man-ch'eng to capture Wan-chou.

In the spring of 1219, Chang Jou repulsed Wu Hsien's attack for the second time. In the ensuing counter-attack, Lang-shan chai (in I-hsien), Ch'i-yang, and Ch'ü-yang surrendered to him – more than twenty Chin cities and towns in all. He subsequently laid siege to Chung-shan, which he captured only after having defeated Wu Hsien's reinforcements led by Ko T'ieh-ch'iang at Hsin-lo. In the summer, Chang Jou repulsed a major offensive against Man-ch'eng launched jointly by Wu Hsien and such Chin generals and militia leaders as Niu Hsien, Chang Fu, and Chung-ko. After defeating Wu Hsien for the fourth time at Ch'i-yang in the autumn, Chang Jou immediately started a major counter-offensive, overrunning more than thirty cities and towns in the east and the south of Chen-ting. He himself captured Ku-ch'eng, Shen-chou, Tse-chou, Ning-chin, and An-p'ing, while his generals seized P'ing-chi,

Kao-ch'eng, Wu-chi, and Luan-ch'eng. As the news of his victory over Wu Hsien spread, fortresses in the Hsi-shan such as Lu-erh, Yeh-li, and Lang-shan, which had held out in the hands of the Chin militia or of bandit groups, submitted to him voluntarily in rapid succession. Thus within a year of his own defection, Chang Jou had already regained control of much of north and central-western Hopei for the Mongols while isolating Wu Hsien in Chen-ting. In this way, he played a significant part in crushing the Chin's hope of ever recovering Hopei, and contributed to the bloodless surrender of Chen-ting on the return of Muqali's main army to Hopei in the summer of 1220. For his services Činggis Qan appointed Chang Jou grand marshal of the Eastern and Western Districts of Hopei in 1219, with the Chinese-style honorific title of Great Officer of Eminent Dignity and the Mongolian designation of *bātur* or 'hero.' He was allowed to appoint his own staff.

Chang Jou saw little field action in the following few years. By 1221, the north China theatre had become relatively quiet with the Mongols controlling Hopei, Shantung and Shansi, and Muqali was preparing to lead his main army in the autumn of that year against the Chin strongholds in Shensi through the Hsi-Hsia territories. With Shih T'ien-ni (1185-1225; see under Shih T'ien-tse) now holding the front against the Chin from his new headquarters at Chen-ting, Chang Jou's main duty was apparently to garrison north and central-western Hopei and to mop up local remnants of the Chin forces. One such operation was conducted against Ku-an and Hsin-an in central Hopei in 1221. These two cities, under the command of pacification commissioner Wang Tzu-ch'ang and of the Duke of Kao-yang, Chang Fu, respectively, had long held out for the Chin, posing a serious threat to Yen (Peking), the Mongols' headquarters in north China. Chang Jou captured Wang Tzu-ch'ang in a surprise attack against Ku-an, thereby compelling Chang Fu to abandon Hsin-an, at least for the time being.

Chang Jou's army saw heavy action again in 1225 when an old adversary, Wu Hsien, who had surrendered five years earlier, murdered his superior, Shih T'ien-ni, and raised the Chin banner again in Chen-ting. Several nearby cities responded to Wu Hsien's call and changed their allegiance back to the Chin. In a bid to recover Hopei for the Sung, the Sung general P'eng I-pin (d. 1225) took joint action with Wu Hsien, advancing northwards from Ta-ming in southern Hopei. To face this sudden threat to Mongol rule in Hopei, Chang Jou was to operate in close liaison with the Mongol general Se'ünidei and with Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), T'ien-ni's younger brother. He dispatched Ch'iao Wei-chung (1202-46), his brother-in-law and one of his most competent subordinates, with 3,000 infantry and several hundred cavalry to help Shih T'ien-tse and Se'ünidei recover Chen-ting in the summer of that year. After Shih T'ien-tse had destroyed P'eng I-pin's force at Tsan-huang, south of Chen-ting, and

retaken Chen-ting from Wu Hsien, the Mongols took the offensive to eradicate all Chin and Sung influence in Hopei and Shantung. In this campaign Chang Jou's troops commanded by Ch'iao Wei-chung and Sung Yen participated in the reconquest of Chang-te in Honan and of T'ai-an and Chi-nan in western Shantung; those led by Nieh Fu-chien helped capture Ta-ming in southeastern Hopei and the Shantung cities of I-tu and Tung-p'ing. In the autumn of 1226, Ch'iao Wei-chung took part in the siege of I-tu, which had been retaken by the Sung general Li Ch'üan and was not to capitulate until the early summer of the following year.

For his role in resolving the crisis created by Wu Hsien and P'eng I-pin, Chang Jou received the rank of field chiliarch from Činggis Qan in 1226, and was concurrently appointed grand marshal of Pao-chou and other places. Partly perhaps because of his new office, and partly because Man-ch'eng was too small a place to accommodate his more numerous staff and army, Chang Jou moved his headquarters in 1227 to Pao-chou south-east of Man-ch'eng. Pao-chou, which was to become the Shun-t'ien district (*lu*) in 1241 with a much expanded jurisdiction, was to be Chang Jou's home base and de facto fief for the next thirty-five years until 1262.

By the time he settled in Pao-chou, Chang Jou was already a member of the privileged group of Chinese military leaders in the Mongols' service commonly known as 'hereditary lords' (*shih-hou*). These early collaborators were accorded the same privileges as those originally enjoyed by the Mongol aristocracy in the steppe society and were allowed to exercise administrative, military and fiscal authority over large geographic areas as a hereditary right. Pao-chou was Chang Jou's domain. It is said that here Chang Jou held under his jurisdiction more than thirty cities and towns, several divisions of troops, and 100,000 households.

In ruling Pao-chou, Chang Jou faced the problem of restoring order and prosperity in an area that had been ravaged by war and lawlessness – a common problem facing many Chinese overlords at the time. In his reforms, Chang Jou was ably seconded by Chia Fu (1192-1254), an outstanding deputy. Chia Fu's administrative ability was widely known and admired even by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), the sinicized Khitan statesman at Ögödei's court. Chia assumed a number of administrative responsibilities on Chang Jou's behalf and is said to have assisted him also in reassembling dispersed populations, lightening taxes, and eliminating local racketeers and usurers.

Chang Jou's best known achievement in Pao-chou was the rebuilding of the city on a scale much grander than the original. When Chang Jou established his headquarters there, Pao-chou had been in ruins for fifteen years, since the time of the first Mongol invasion. With the assistance of a scholar called Mao Ch'ü-chieh, Chang Jou is said to have added seven new wards to the city and built office buildings, army

barracks, postal and customs stations, granaries and treasuries, dispensaries, watchtowers, Buddhist and Taoist monasteries, and a new Confucian temple. New aqueducts were also constructed, which not only improved the city's supply of drinking water, but also made it possible to grow rice in the immediate vicinity. Thanks to Chang Jou's efforts, Pao-chou became one of the greatest urban centres south of Yen.

After some years of military inaction, Chang Jou joined the massive attack launched by Ögödei Qa'an in 1232 to destroy the Chin. At the siege of the new Chin capital, Pien, Chang Jou had the task of attacking the city from the north-west; he defeated the Chin troops in several encounters. During the winter, when the Chin emperor Ai-tsung (r. 1224-34) managed to break out of the besieged capital and to cross the Yellow River in an attempt to seize Wei-chou in Honan, Chang Jou, in association with others, defeated the Chin army at Ou-ma kang north-west of Ch'ang-yüan, thus forcing the Chin emperor to recross the river and flee to Kuei-te. Chang Jou also participated in the 1233-1234 siege of Ts'ai-chou in southeastern Honan, where the emperor had ultimately taken refuge. This joint Mongol-Sung operation brought the Chin dynasty to an end. The Yüan and the Sung sources give differing accounts of Chang Jou's role in the campaign. According to Yüan records, it was Chang Jou who led twenty picked men to break into the Chin defence line outside the southern gate and whose troops first seized the inner moat of the city. However, according to the biographers of the Sung commander Meng Hung (1195-1246), whose accounts may be more reliable, Chang Jou had been wounded by arrows and was being seized by Chin soldiers when Meng Hung saved him from capture.

A wild, uneducated man in early life, Chang Jou had apparently mellowed by the time of the Chin downfall, and had actually begun to show interest in preserving culture as well as lives. This was perhaps due to the influence of his principal wife, née Mao (1198-1259), a learned and tactful woman from a Chin scholar-official family. She apparently exerted an educative and moderating influence on her husband for most of his life. Even before Chang Jou set out on the campaign against the Chin in 1232, we are told, he had informed his subordinates that he would refrain henceforth from unnecessary killing. After the fall of Pien in 1233, unlike other generals who vied with one another to seize treasure, Chang Jou went to the National Archives to save the *Veritable Records* (*shih-lu*) of the Chin rulers and other books from destruction. He carried the *Veritable Records* back with him to Pao-chou for safekeeping and handed them over to Qubilai in 1261: they were to provide the main source from which the Yüan court later undertook to compile the *Chin History* (*Chin-shih*).

At Pien, Chang Jou also saved the lives of many Chin scholar-officials. He sought out the elders and members of prominent families who had fled from Hopei with the Chin court. Thus Kao K'uei, a former minister of revenue, Yang Shu, a *chin-shih* of 1227, Chia T'ing-yang, also a *chin-shih*, and Li T'e-li, Chao Chih, Chao K'o-kang and Chao K'o-chi, and their relatives – more than ten families in all – were reunited by him and escorted safely back to their homes. Likewise after the capture of Ts'ai-chou, Chang Jou also prevented the execution of Wang E (*q.v.*), the successful *chin-shih* candidate for 1224 and noted historian.

A number of former Chin officials and literati found shelter at Chang Jou's headquarters in Pao-chou, at a time when many of their colleagues were unemployed and destitute. Among the scholars he brought back from Honan in 1233-1234 were Wang E, Lo K'uei, former Chin governor of Chung-tu, and Ching Hsüan, a *chin-shih* of 1221. Wang E is known to have served for nine years as the tutor of Chang Jou's children while assembling material for the *Chin History* from the *Veritable Records* kept in Chang Jou's library. Chang Jou must also have communicated frequently with, and from time to time played host to, the great poet-scholar Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257) whose wife, like his own, was from the Mao clan. Chang Jou's rescue of the Chin *Veritable Records* and protection of threatened scholar-officials may have occurred at the urging of Yüan Hao-wen; indeed, most of the scholars whom Chang Jou saved or employed were on a list of fifty-four leading Chin scholar-officials that Yüan had begged Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1233 to save from captivity. Yüan Hao-wen is known to have examined the Chin *Veritable Records* with Chang Jou's permission. In 1251, on Yüan's recommendation, Chang Jou also employed Hao Ching (*q.v.*), a disciple of Yüan, as his family tutor. Among Chang Jou's subordinates, Chia Fu was well known in his own right for sheltering former Chin officials and literati; he is said to have received no fewer than fifty of them. Like other Chinese military officers in the Mongol service, Chang Jou and his subordinates contributed significantly towards preserving Chinese culture and saving the lives of scholars at a time of violence and destruction.

After the defeat of the Chin, Chang Jou was granted an audience with Ögödei in 1234, promoted to the rank of military and civil myriarch, and given a golden tiger tablet. This might have been done not only in recognition of past services, but also in acknowledgement of his actual military power. The Sung envoy P'eng Ta-ya, who visited north China in 1232-1233, already noted in his travel record *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh* that Chang Jou was one of the four Han (Northern Chinese) myriarchs, the others being Yen Shih (*q.v.*), Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), and Liu Hei-ma, i.e. Liu Ni (1200-62). As a myriarch, Chang Jou ranked now among the most highly placed Chinese war leaders serving the Mongols.

Before long, Chang Jou set out on a campaign against the Sung. Conflict had arisen between the erstwhile allies immediately after the defeat of the Chin over the division of the conquered territories. In retaliation for Sung's abortive attempt to take over the whole of Honan in 1234, Ögödei launched three armies over the following years in attacks on Szechwan, Hsiang-yang, and the vast region extending from eastern Hupei to the Huai valley, respectively. Chang Jou fought actively in both the second and third theatre of this inconclusive six-year war. After participating in the capture of Tsao-yang in northern Hupei in 1235, Chang Jou was sent eastward to serve under the Mongolian commander Taičü against the Sung militia. Hsü-chou and P'ei-chou in present northern Kiangsu were taken in early 1236, after which Chang Jou joined forces with Čaqān (d. 1255), the deputy commander of the Left (=East) Wing, to invade the Sung territories east and west of the Huai. Back on the Hupei front in 1236, he took part in the capture of Ying-chou, which led to the surrender of Hsiang-yang in late spring. Setting out again in 1237 from his home base in Honan, he seized Chiu-li kuan (in Lo-shan, Honan) and Ts'ao-wu (in Ching-shan, Hupei). Pushing northwards from Ts'ao-wu, he stormed Hung-shan chai (in Ching-shan) and took part in the capture of Kuang-chou in southeastern Honan. Swinging his army southwards from Kuang-chou late in the year, he was involved in the abortive attempt to capture Huang-chou on the Yangtze. Shortly thereafter he went eastwards with 200 men to join Čaqān's army and played a major part in the seizure of Ch'u-chou in present Anhwei.

The Mongol invasion of Sung territories lost its momentum from 1239 on, however, except in Szechwan. It had been meant only to punish the Sung by destroying local agencies of government and plundering the territories under its control. The Mongols halted their advance, therefore, when the Sung armies surged forward under the leadership of Meng Hung, who recaptured Hsiang-yang in 1239, and of Tu Kao (1173-1248), who defeated the Mongol forces in 1238 at Lu-chou in Anhwei. The war came to an informal end on Ögödei's death in December 1241, and was not resumed on a large scale until 1258.

During this period of de facto armistice, Chang Jou was given an important role to play on the Sung front. While retaining his power base at Pao-chou, he assumed command in 1239 of all Han forces in Ho-nan with jurisdiction over more than thirty cities. After the Mongolian troops had evacuated Sung territory and withdrawn to the north, Chang Jou, as commander-in-chief in Ho-nan, was to play an essential role in shaping the relations between the Mongol and the Sung for the next twenty-one years until 1259. His policy sought steadily to strengthen the defensive capability of this region while keeping the Sung off balance by occasional raids, especially against their strongholds in the Huai region.

To defend Ho-nan against Sung incursions, Chang Jou was first assigned Ch'i as his headquarters in 1243. Seven years later, he reached out to Lung-kang (in Sui-hsien), where he built a fort. In 1254, he advanced his headquarters to Po-chou in the northeastern corner of present Anhwei. Since Po-chou was surrounded by the tributaries of the Huai which made communications precarious, Chang Jou not only strengthened the city walls and constructed defensive positions, but he also built bridges, embankments and causeways to facilitate the transport of supplies and goods. He extended the defence line south of Po-chou to Pai-chang k'ou, linking the two places by a causeway and erecting wooden palisades in the rivers to prevent the passage of Sung ships. Such precautions contributed greatly to preserving Honan from Sung attacks.

The supply of food was a serious difficulty for the Mongol army in Honan and in the Huai valley, for both regions had suffered heavily from the war. After a brief occupation in 1234, the Sung army was forced to withdraw from Honan where it was unable to maintain itself for lack of subsistence; likewise, during incursions into Sung territories after 1235, the Mongol armies also experienced the problem of provisioning troops from a ravaged base area. Chang Jou fully appreciated the critical importance of food in a long war of attrition. On the advice of his secretary, Wang Ju-ming (1209-68), he began in 1240 to turn his troops to farming in Hsü-chou and Cheng-chou. Three years later he sent Wang, accompanied by Nieh Fu-chien, to settle 1,000 men in military colonies in Hsiang-ch'eng. Chang Jou appears to have organised military farms in Ch'i and Po-chou also, thus helping to alleviate the problem of food supply.

During the same period, Chang Jou launched frequent raids into the Sung territories. In 1240 he crossed the Huai on a plundering expedition with seven other myriarchs. Two years later, his army reached Yang-chou, Ho-chou, and T'ung-chou on the lower Yangtze. In 1245 he followed Čaqān in again attacking the Huai region and the lower Yangtze. He also raided Ssu-chou in 1247, Lu-chou in 1253 and, with the Mongol general Būrilgidei, Ch'i-hsien and Wu-ho k'ou in 1255. Those attacks were probably no more than foraging operations in a low-key war of attrition. Nevertheless, by strengthening the defence capability of the southern theatre and keeping the Sung off balance, Chang Jou held his front securely for two decades while the Mongol court's attention was directed elsewhere. It is said that during this period the 'Sung people dared not look northward' because of his presence.

The war flared up again in 1258, when Möngke Qa'an launched a three-pronged offensive against the Sung. On this occasion, Chang followed Qubilai in 1259 in an attack on the stronghold of E-chou in the centre of the Yangtze valley. His command was split, however, to support two other offensives; his lieutenants Chang Kuo and

Wang Tsung-jen joined Möngke's expedition against Szechwan, while Wang An-kuo, Hu Chin, T'ien Po-jung and Sung Yen reported to prince Tāčar who was to attack the Huai valley city of Ching-shan in Anhwei. As for Chang Jou himself, he led one of the two armies under Qubilai into Hupei by way of Hu-t'ou kuan (north-west of the present Ma-ch'eng). After crossing the Yangtze at Huang-chou, he swung his army westward and joined up at E-chou with Qubilai's own force, which had come by the western route through Ta-sheng kuan (south of Lo-shan). During the siege of E-chou, Chang Jou supported Qubilai in an attempt to breach the city's defence by simultaneously tunnelling under the city walls and sending assault parties to climb the southwestern corner of the walls. Before Chang Jou's scheme could be put to the test, however, Qubilai accepted the Sung peace proposal in the winter of 1259-1260, following Möngke's death in Szechwan. When Qubilai left in December 1259 to contend for the throne against his younger brother Ariq Böke, Chang Jou and Bātur were appointed to command Qubilai's Han and Mongol armies respectively, with Po-lu-chi (in E-ch'eng) as their headquarters.

Chang Jou must have been in touch with Qubilai, the future qa'an, over a long period. From 1252, when Möngke had put Chang Jou in charge of affairs in north China, Qubilai had established close relationships with Han army commanders and also with the literati who assisted him in restoring order and prosperity in the region. Ho-nan, where Chang Jou served as commander of the Han Armies, happened to be one of the areas in which Qubilai encouraged reforms. Moreover, Wang E and Hao Ching, Chang Jou's family tutors and advisers, had been consulted by Qubilai in 1242 and in 1252; Hao Ching's appointment as an adviser by Qubilai is said to have been made on Chang Jou's recommendation. But there is no indication of a close tie between the general and the future qa'an until Chang Jou was placed under Qubilai's command in 1259. That Chang Jou supported Qubilai's bid for the throne might have been due to circumstances in late 1259; but it reflected perhaps the fact that Qubilai was the common choice of the Chinese generals and of the literati, who appreciated the reforms which he had implemented over almost a decade and approved his efforts to transform north China from a colony into the political centre of gravity of the Mongol empire.

In Qubilai's war against Ariq Böke, who was based in Mongolia, Chang Jou supported Qubilai with troops and matériel, as did many other Chinese generals. In the winter of 1261 when Qubilai was campaigning in Mongolia, Shun-t'ien, Chang Jou's home base, and adjoining districts were ordered to provide 5,000 sets of armour for men and 2,000 for horses as well as sundry iron equipment. On 8 November, Chang Jou's army, commanded perhaps by his son Hung-lüeh (d. 1296), and those of six other Han myriarchs were ordered to Mongolia as reinforcements. Those forces

were halted at the Kerülen River, however, after Qubilai's decisive victory over Ariq Böke at Šimultu on 27 November. Subsequently 3,500 of Chang Jou's men were retained in the capital as guards, and his son Hung-ch'ing remained at court as a hostage.

By 1261 Chang Jou had reached the advanced age of seventy-two and consequently petitioned Qubilai for permission to retire. In response, Qubilai invested him with the title of Duke of An-su and made his son Hung-lüeh his heir in office. But an experienced Chinese general like Chang Jou was still too valuable to Qubilai to be left in complete retirement. Chang Jou was called back the following year when Li T'an (*q.v.*), Li Ch'üan's son and a powerful Chinese lord in Shan-tung, revolted and went over to the Sung. Chang Jou, with his ninth son Hung-fan (*q.v.*), was ordered to secure the capital K'ai-p'ing with 2,000 men. Chang Jou apparently took part in the court's deliberations on this emergency. At a court conference called to consider an appropriate punishment for Wang Wen-t'ung (d. 1262), the director of political affairs of the Secretarial Council who had been implicated in Li T'an's case, Chang Jou insisted that Wang should be hacked to death. Meanwhile, his son Hung-fan was fighting bravely at the siege of Chi-nan, Li T'an's stronghold. An army sent to Li T'an's aid by the Sung court under the command of Hsia Kuei (1197-1279) was defeated by Hung-lüeh at Ch'i-hsien. Thus, even though Chang Jou was too old for field command, his army led by his sons still played a significant part in helping Qubilai to overcome yet another grave crisis.

In spite of the role that its members had played in suppressing Li T'an's rebellion, the Chang family, like other families of Chinese hereditary lords, was affected adversely by the aftermath of the rebellion. To avoid another rebellion by a Chinese lord who combined hereditary civil and military powers in his family, Qubilai undertook from 1262 to separate military from civil offices and to remove as many kinsmen of the powerful military lords as possible from military commands. As a result, Hung-lüeh, who had inherited his father's offices of civil general administrator of Shun-t'ien, field myriarch, and commander of the forces in Po-chou, had to relinquish the last two posts. The command of the Shun-t'ien Myriarchy was transferred to his younger brother Hung-yen, and that of the Po-chou Myriarchy went to Chia Wen-pei, Chia Fu's son. Two years later, Hung-lüeh was posted to the Imperial Guard, leaving the general administratorship of Shun-t'ien to Hung-fan, who had been relieved from military command in 1262.

The family's control over its ancient fief was lost once and for all, however, when Hung-fan was transferred from Shun-t'ien to Ta-ming in 1265. Although the Chang were to serve as hereditary military commanders for a long time yet, they ceased to be 'hereditary lords' in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, the nature of their military

command was also changed; they were to serve as military officers liable to transfer, not as permanent heads of hereditary armies. Hung-yen was to be posted to the command of the E-chou Myriarchy, and Hung-fan was to serve successively as commander of the I-tu Tzu-lai Myriarchy, which was originally Li T'an's, and of the Teng-chou Myriarchy, which had been Shih Shu's. Hung-fan was able to recover for the family only the hereditary command of the Po-chou Myriarchy which had originally been entrusted to Chang Jou in 1279, after he had achieved great distinction in the conquest of the Sung.

Loss of feudal rights by his family entailed no reduction in the respect and consideration due to a senior soldier-statesman of Chang Jou's stature. As his last assignment, Chang Jou was ordered in the winter of 1266-1267 to take charge of the Ministry of Works, jointly with Tuan T'ien-yu and the Muslim architect Ikhtiyār al-Dīn, with the task of constructing new city walls and palaces at Yen, north-east of the ruined Chin capital. In this novel capacity, Chang Jou controlled 200,000 construction workers. In 1268 he was made Duke-of-state of Ts'ai.

Chang Jou died in the summer of 1268 at the age of seventy-nine and was buried at Kang-t'ou village north of Man-ch'eng, seven years before work on the new capital was completed. As a tribute to his half century of service to the Mongols, he was canonized as Wu-k'ang ('Martial and Strong') and was posthumously granted the title of Grand Preceptor. In 1318, Chang Jou was made Prince of Ju-nan and his canonical name was changed to Chung-wu ('Loyal and Martial').

Chang Jou is known to have had five wives, néés Li, Ching, Mao, Ma and Chao, twelve sons (Fo-shou, Hung-chi, Ming-shan, Sung-shan, Hung-tao, Hung-lüeh, Hung-yen, Hung-kuei, Hung-fan, Hung-cheng, Hung-ch'ing, and Hung-i), and ten daughters. Unlike their father, all Chang Jou's sons seem to have had an excellent literary education under the tutorship of the famous scholars Wang E and Hao Ching; Hung-fan, in particular, was as well known for his literary talent as for his generalship. Yet, like their father, most of Chang Jou's sons served as military commanders; Hung-yen, Hung-lüeh and Hung-fan being the most prominent. Hung-yen reached the position of deputy general control commissioner of the Imperial Guard. Hung-lüeh ended his career as the director of political affairs of the Ho-nan Regional Secretarial Council. Hung-fan is well known in history as the grand marshal of the Mongol and Han Armies in the campaign leading to the destruction of the last claimants to the Sung throne.

Of Chang Jou's later heirs, Chang Kuei (1264-1327) was the most outstanding; he was director of political affairs of the Secretarial Council from 1323 and is regarded as one of the most sagacious ministers at the Yüan court in the first quarter of the fourteenth century. The family's fortune was dealt heavy blows in 1328-1330 when

five of Chang Kuei's six sons were killed, and the family's properties were twice confiscated by Tuq Temür (r. 1328-32), because of Chang Kuei's earlier support of Yisün Temür (r. 1324-28) from whose house Tuq Temür had wrested the throne. The family's honour and status, however, were apparently restored in Toqōn Temür's reign (1333-68), since two of the grandsons of Chang Kuei and great-grandsons of Hung-fan, Wang and Hsü, served respectively as deputy pacification commissioner of Kuang-tung in 1342 and censorial inspector of the Chiang-nan Regional Censorate in 1350. By then, however, more than 130 years had elapsed since Chang Jou had rallied to the Mongol cause – and the Yüan themselves had less than two decades to go before their fall.

In brief, Chang Jou served the Mongols mainly as a soldier. In addition to the operations conducted jointly with other forces to defeat the Chin, and to the two campaigns against the Sung (1235-41, 1258-59), Chang Jou made two most significant contributions to the Mongol conquest. Firstly, in the seven years after changing sides in 1218 he was instrumental in consolidating Mongol rule in northwestern and west-central Hopei and in preventing any resurgence of the Chin cause in the region, at a time when the bulk of the Mongol forces were engaged elsewhere. Secondly, during the twenty years intermission between the first and second wars against the Sung, Chang Jou held the exposed southern Honan and northwestern Anhwei fronts virtually unaided – a region deeply cut by rivers and canals and thus unsuitable for the deployment of Mongol cavalry.

Undoubtedly, Chang Jou was one of the bravest and most effective field commanders of the Han in the service of the Mongols. It is said of him that he fought a score of battles without ever losing one. The title of *bātur* or 'hero' which Činggis Qan gave him was indeed well earned. Činggis' appreciation of Chang Jou's valour was echoed by his grandson Qubilai, who is recorded as stating in 1292:

The father and sons of the (Chang) family have succeeded one to another. Since the time of the Emperor T'ai-tsu (Činggis Qan), this family has contributed most to the state among the northern Chinese in the conquests of North and South China. Both the Chang and the Shih have been called *bātur*. Yet, accruing mainly as they did from clever plans and advice, the merits of the Shih are not as great as those of the Chang which arise from the hundreds of battles they have fought.

This statement, found in the inscriptions composed by Yü Chi (1272-1348) for Hung-fan and Chang Kuei, Chang Jou's son and grandson, may have underrated the military prowess of Shih T'ien-tse and his family; nevertheless it reflects the measure of Chang Jou's and his sons' contributions to the Mongol conquest of China in the perception of the Mongol monarch.

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C. C. Hsiao

5. YEN SHIH (1182-1240)

Yen Shih, T. Wu-shu, was one of the most powerful Chinese overlords in north China in the reigns of Činggis Qan and Ögödei Qa'an, and was a major promoter of Chinese culture in an age of turmoil. Born in 1182 as the youngest son of a farmer, Kuei, and his wife née Yang in Ch'ang-ch'ing, western Shantung, Yen Shih lacked the family background for a successful career under normal conditions. He had good looks and an alert mind, but had little or no formal education. He was bold and unconventional, generous and liked making friends. Due to his high spirits, he was often in serious difficulties and was imprisoned time and again for various reasons. He was, however, able to break out of gaol with the help of his young admirers. Even though his biographers try to portray him as a *hsia* – the Chinese equivalent of a knight-errant – in his early life Yen Shih was apparently a ruffian by ordinary standards.

The opportunity for Yen Shih to rise from the world of hoodlums to officialdom came in 1213, when much of north China experienced a major social breakdown as a result of the Mongol invasion. Instead of merely destroying the border defences of Chin as it had done in the previous two years, the Mongol army now launched a massive offensive, sweeping across Shantung and Shansi as well as Hopei. Even though the Mongol troops did not occupy the places which they attacked, they wreaked havoc wherever they went. One by-product of the dislocation and anarchy caused by the invasion and the subsequent withdrawal of the Mongol army was increased militarization throughout the country. For the purpose of self-protection or aggrandizement, armed bands of various sizes and political affiliations were formed by members of locally prominent families and individual strongmen. Unlike their counterparts in Hopei, many of whom had surrendered to the invading Mongols even before the Chin capital was moved to Pien (K'ai-feng in Honan) in 1214, the armed bands in Shantung either accepted the amnesty and enlistment offered by the Chin court after the Mongol withdrawal from the province, or continued to challenge the Chin government. Many rebel groups soon joined forces and formed the so-called Red Coats Army (*Hung-ao chün*). When, soon after, they gave their allegiance to the Sung government, their army was renamed the Loyal and Righteous Army of Shan-tung (*Shan-tung chung-i chün*).

Yen Shih was among those militia leaders who were enlisted by the Chin. According to his biographies, some time after the Mongols withdrew from Shantung in 1213, he was appointed a centurion in his native district by the Regional Presidential Council of Tung-p'ing (in southwestern Shantung), which had just been

established to reassert Chin authority in the area. It is very likely that he had already gathered a small armed band in the chaotic period following the Mongol incursion. For his allegiance to the Chin, Yen Shih is often described in Communist Chinese historiography as a leader of the 'landlord forces' in contrast to the 'peasant' leaders of the Red Coats Army, who combined class struggle with national struggle in their resistance to the alien Jurchens and Mongols. In terms of social background and motivation, it is actually difficult to distinguish Yen Shih from such Red Coats leaders as Yang An-erh (d. 1215), a former saddle dealer, and Li Ch'üan (d. 1231), originally a cattle dealer.

As an officer in the Chin army, Yen Shih soon had the opportunity to show his military talent in dealing with the Red Coats. In 1214 he repulsed an attack by Chang Ju-chi (d. 1215), a native of T'ai-an who had established his base at Ling-yen, south-east of Ch'ang-ch'ing. As a result, he was appointed sheriff of Ch'ang-ch'ing and, concurrently, officer in charge of bandit suppression in Tung-a, P'ing-yin and Ch'ang-ch'ing. In the summer of 1218 he was promoted to the post of magistrate of Ch'ang-ch'ing.

Historical circumstances, however, did not allow Yen Shih to progress slowly and smoothly in the Chin official hierarchy. His career was to take many unexpected turns in the highly volatile political climate of the late 1210s and 1220s. After the late 1210s, the Mongols, the Chin and the Sung struggled against one another in a triangular context for control of the North China Plain. On the Mongols' side, the campaign led by Muqali (*q.v.*) had been transformed by 1220 from one of consolidation of the conquered lands to one of continuing conquest. Consequently, the Mongol forces moved into Shantung again in 1220. The Chin, although greatly weakened by the loss of their northern territories to the Mongols, were far from being on the point of collapse. On the one hand, with the help of the militia leaders who rallied to their side, they tried to re-establish their authority in Shantung as well as in Hopei. On the other hand, they launched in 1217 a fruitless seven-year war against the Sung to compensate for their losses in the north. For their part, the Sung, still mindful of the disastrous attempt of 1206-1207 to recover the northern provinces, carefully avoided an open irredentist stand against the Chin until the 1230s; they nevertheless embraced an opportunist policy by enlisting the services of the Chin rebels and using them to recover Shantung. In this triangular conflict, the balance of power in Shantung and, to a lesser degree in Hopei, was constantly shifting. Yen Shih, like a chameleon, not only changed colour as required to survive all vicissitudes, but actually came out better off at each turn.

According to Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), author of Yen Shih's 'spirit-way inscription', his change of loyalties was determined by circumstances. In the second

half of 1218, the Sung army under the Red Coats leader Li Ch'üan seized several cities in southern and central Shantung, and, in the summer of the following year, the Chin commander Chang Lin of I-tu surrendered with several prefectures of central and eastern Shantung. Greatly encouraged by Chang Lin's submission, Li Ch'üan advanced his army westwards from I-tu. Under this threat, the Regional Presidential Council of Tung-p'ing ordered all local officials and commanders to strengthen their defences. Yen Shih was away from Ch'ang-ch'ing on a tax-collection trip at the time, and the city fell to the Sung forces before his return. Even though he reconquered it soon after, his superior suspected him of collusion with Sung and surrounded the city with troops. Whatever the truth of the accusation, which we cannot verify, Yen Shih escaped with his family to Ch'ing-yai ku, a fortress south-east of Ch'ang-ch'ing where he could count on the support of Chang Lin. Following his defection, the Sung appointed him director of the Chancellery at Chi-nan.

Yen Shih rapidly expanded his own authority with the upsurge of Sung power in north China. 'All the lands east of the T'ai-hang (Mountains),' writes Yüan Hao-wen, 'were under his control.' In early 1220, when the Sung envoy Chao Hung (1195-1246) passed through Ch'ing-yai ku on his way to the north, Yen Shih formally confirmed his allegiance to the Sung, bringing with him nine prefectures in western Shantung, southeastern Hopei and northern Honan.

Yen Shih was to regret his allegiance to the Sung before long, for the Sung forces in north China, lacking the full backing of the court and plagued by constant squabbles among the generals, could not maintain their momentum. The first indication of the unreliability of Sung support came in the third month (April-May) of 1220, when Yen Shih attempted to help Shan Chung, the commander of Chang-te, which was then under Chin attack. Yen Shih made repeated pleas for reinforcements on behalf of Shan Chung to his superior, Chang Lin, all in vain. When Yen Shih's own troops eventually reached Chang-te, Shan Chung had already been captured by the Chin. It seems that Yen Shih began to consider leaving the Sung camp immediately after this incident, since it is recorded in the *Chin History* (*Chin-shih*) that Kao Chü-shih, the Chin punitive commissioner of Shan-tung, obtained his promise to go back to the Chin side in the eighth month (August-September). His determination to abandon the Sung was further strengthened by the crushing defeat inflicted at Tung-p'ing on the joint forces of Li Ch'üan and Chang Lin by the Chin commander Meng-ku Kang (d. 1223) in the same month – a major blow to Sung prestige in the north.

An even better alternative presented itself when the Mongol army re-entered Shantung and took Chi-nan unopposed in the winter of 1220. Perceiving that the Mongols were destined to be the future masters of the country, Yen Shih wasted no

time in offering his submission to their leader Muqali. With his surrender, he presented the census of the 300,000 households of Po-chou and En-chou (Shantung); Ta-ming and Tz'u-chou (Hopei); and Chang-te, Ming-chou, Hua-chou and Chün-chou (Honan). Yen Shih's rally was a great boon to the Mongols, for not only did he bring with him the largest number of households ever surrendered by a defector, but with his change of allegiance he also exposed the Chin capital, Pien, to Mongol attack and greatly reduced Sung effectiveness as a contender for supremacy in north China. For his contribution Muqali awarded him the Chinese honorific title of Gold and Purple Great Officer of Eminent Dignity and appointed him chief of the Regional Presidential Council of Western Shan-tung.

Now fighting under the Mongol banner, Yen Shih assisted Muqali in clearing Chin forces out of western Shantung. He may have taken part in the important battle at Huang-ling kang, a strategic crossing point on the Yellow River south-west of Ts'ao-hsien. Here, Muqali routed a Chin army of (reportedly) 200,000 men sent by the court to reinforce its forces in Shantung. Following this victory, Yen Shih took part in the capture of Ch'u-ch'iu (south-east of Ts'ao-hsien), Chi-chou, Kun-chou and Shan-chou, thus isolating Tung-p'ing, the last Chin stronghold in Shantung.

For Yen Shih these victories were offset by great misfortunes at home. While he was in the field, his subordinate Li Hsin, whom he had entrusted with the defence of Ch'ing-yai ku, killed his wife, née Tu, his elder brother Pin and some other members of his family before surrendering to the Sung. It was only in 1221, with the aid of Muqali's troops, that Yen Shih was able to recapture Ch'ing-yai ku and have Li Hsin executed. This was only the first of a series of family tragedies which he was to suffer in the years to come.

Since the eleventh month (November-December) of 1220, Muqali had been laying siege to Tung-p'ing, where the Mongols met with an obstinate defence from the Chin commander Meng-ku Kang. Unable to capture the city quickly, Muqali directed his attention to Chin's western flank, leaving Yen Shih in charge of the siege together with Jirwā dai of the Onggirat and his three thousand Mongol troops. Tung-p'ing capitulated in the fifth month (May-June) of 1221, and its capture was a milestone in the Mongol conquest of north China and a high point in Yen Shih's career. It marked the end of Chin authority in Shantung and heralded the establishment of Mongol control over a significant part of that province. In accordance with Muqali's instructions, Yen Shih set up the Regional Presidential Council at Tung-p'ing to control western Shantung, southeastern Hopei and northern Honan. At the same time, Shih Kuei (d. 1232), a Red Coats leader who had defected to the Mongols two years earlier, was put in charge of southern Shantung. From this time on, Tung-p'ing became the power base of Yen Shih and his heirs for forty years.

In the following years Yen Shih was among the few high-ranking Chinese generals whose task was to deal with the Chin and the Sung in the east while Muqali was occupied with the conquest of Shansi and Shensi. This was not an easy task. After a brief expedition against Shang-tang in Shansi in 1222 conjointly with Muqali's offensive in that region, Yen Shih joined forces with Shih T'ien-ni (1197-1225), the commander of Western Ho-pei, in attacking Wei-chou (the Ho-wei of our sources) in northern Honan, a gateway to the Chin capital. Apparently underestimating the difficulties, Yen Shih volunteered to lead the attack, but was captured in action by the Chin defenders. He was rescued from captivity by Shih T'ien-ni's troops, but the campaign was soon called off (April 1223) because of the death of Muqali.

Even though Sung power in the north had been greatly reduced as a result of the defeat of Li Ch'üan at Tung-p'ing and the defection of Yen Shih and Shih Kuei to the Mongols, a new hero soon appeared in the Sung camp in the person of P'eng I-pin (d. 1225), a former Red Coats general from Shantung. Striking probably from Huai-an in northern Kiangsu, P'eng I-pin, along with the indefatigable Li Ch'üan, had by late 1222 taken over much of eastern Shantung from Chang Lin (who had since defected to the Mongols). Taking advantage of Yen Shih's absence, P'eng persuaded Ch'ao Hai, a subordinate of Yen Shih, to surrender Ch'ing-yai ku and take Yen Shih's family captive. Marching from Ch'ing-yai ku, P'eng seized many cities in western Shantung, eventually laying siege to Tung-p'ing in May-June 1225. Unable to get the reinforcements he had requested from the Mongol general Bulqa and facing the dreadful prospect of running out of food, Yen Shih once again changed sides and concluded an alliance with the Sung general. Hoping to get Yen Shih to conquer Hopei for the Sung, P'eng I-pin swore an oath of brotherhood with him and allowed him to retain the several thousand men still under him, but prudently kept his family hostage.

This time Yen Shih's capitulation was perhaps entirely determined by circumstances, for he certainly intended rejoining the Mongols as soon as the opportunity arose. And this is indeed what happened only two months later. Instead of fighting for P'eng I-pin in the encounter between P'eng and the Mongol forces led by Bulqa (or Se'ünidei according to other sources) and Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) at Tsan-huang, south of Chen-ting, Yen Shih defected to the Mongols. P'eng's army was crushed and P'eng himself was killed. Thus, once again, Yen Shih not only survived changing fortune, but also helped the Mongols to overcome one of the most serious crises that they had experienced since the beginning of the conquest. But these achievements had their price: before surrendering to the Chin after the death of his superior, Wang I-shen, one of P'eng's subordinates, killed all the members of the Yen family who had been left behind in Tung-p'ing.

Spending no time mourning the loss of his family, Yen Shih made good all his territorial losses within a month by a swift counter-offensive. Following Daisun, the younger brother of Muqali and deputy of Muqali's son Bōl (*q.v.*), he reconquered Chang-te in the winter of 1225 and P'u-chou and Tung-p'ing in the following year. In 1226 he took part, under Bōl, in the long siege of I-tu, which resulted in the surrender of Li Ch'üan in the summer of 1227 and the establishment of Mongol control over the whole of Shantung. Two years later at Chang-te, he defeated the Chin general Wu Hsien (d. 1234), who was then using Wei-chou as a base from which to launch raids into Mongol-controlled areas.

In 1230, after ten years of collaboration with the Mongols, Yen Shih was granted an audience with Ögödei Qa'an. This took place at the imperial camp of Niu-hsin (Inner Mongolia), at the outset of the new expedition against Chin led by the Qa'an himself and his younger brother Tolui. Ögödei honoured Yen Shih with a banquet, lasting a full day, at which he is quoted as saying, 'Yen Shih is indeed a man of good fortune.' On this occasion, the Qa'an also bestowed on him a golden tiger tablet, an emblem of authority usually given only to myriarchs. There is no indication, however, that Yen Shih had already attained this prestigious rank. In all likelihood Yen Shih was still subordinate to Shih T'ien-tse, who had been appointed one of the three myriarchs of the Han Armies in 1229 and had been given command of the troops of Tung-p'ing as well as of Chen-ting, Ta-ming, Ho-chien and Chi-nan.

In the massive attack launched in 1232, which led to the destruction of the Chin two years later, Yen Shih's role remains obscure. He apparently took part in the abortive siege of Kuei-te in spring 1232, since the *Chin History* says that the troops of Tung-p'ing were used in the siege. After this he was assigned the task of guarding Huang-ling kang. When the last Chin emperor, Ai-tsung, fled from Pien and attempted to cross the Yellow River at Huang-ling kang in the winter of 1232-1233, Yen Shih's army suffered a serious defeat and more than 1,000 of his men are said to have been captured by the Chin army. Western Shantung was shaken by this news and it was rumoured in Tung-p'ing that the enemy would arrive soon. The situation in Tung-p'ing was eased only when Shih T'ien-tse inflicted a crushing defeat on the Chin, but our sources are silent on Yen Shih's activity throughout the rest of the campaign. Perhaps he took little or no action in the last phase of the war since his troops needed reorganizing after their recent defeat.

After the operations against Chin, Yen Shih had another audience with Ögödei, this time at Qara Qorum. On this occasion he was appointed field myriarch of Tung-p'ing district. The new appointment was not only a reward for his past contributions, but also part of the Mongols' military and administrative reorganization of north China. It is in all probability at this time that Yen Shih was given also the office of

chief civil administrator of Tung-p'ing, which eventually devolved upon his heirs. The Regional Presidential Council of Tung-p'ing, over which he had presided for nearly fifteen years, was abolished. In the meantime, the area under Yen Shih's authority was redefined. Before this time he had had fifty-four cities in western Shantung, southeastern Hopei and northern Honan under his control, with a registered population of more than 200,000 households. As a result of the redefinition of boundaries, Ta-ming in Hopei and Chang-te in Honan were removed from his jurisdiction; what remained to him were prefectures such as Te-chou, Kun-chou, Chi-chou, and Shan-chou in western Shantung, in addition to Tung-p'ing itself. Although greatly reduced in area, his domain still consisted of twenty cities and remained one of the largest among those held by Chinese overlords in north China.

In addition to the land and people, Yen Shih had a sizeable army under his command. When he was appointed myriarch, eight of his subordinate generals were each given a golden tablet, the emblem of authority of a chiliarch. This meant that his army was at least 8,000 strong in 1234. The chiliarchs who were appointed under his command included his sons-in-law Chang Chin-heng (d. 1276) and Ch'i Jung-hsien; Shih Kuei's son Shih T'ien-lu (1183-1236); Liu T'ung (d. 1256); Chao T'ien-hsi (1191-1240) and Ch'i Kuei. Such generals as Yüeh Ts'un (1194-1262), Pi Shu-hsien (1200-54) and Yen Chen (1185-1241) may have also attained the rank of chiliarch under Yen Shih. The army had been expanded to seventeen chiliarchies when Yen Chung-chi inherited his father's office in 1240; it was again increased by 20,000 men in 1255 when the Mongol court was about to attack the Sung.

Yen Shih, however, was more than a powerful militarist: he distinguished himself by his efforts to mitigate the sufferings caused by the war and to carry out local reforms. First of all, he is credited with sparing many lives and providing aid to local populations. His biographies mention how he dissuaded the Mongol commanders from slaughtering tens of thousands of people at Chang-te, P'u-chou, Ts'ao-chou, Ting-t'ao (in Shantung), Ch'u-ch'iu and Shang-tang. In the massive attack against Pien, he apparently not only restrained his own men from indiscriminate killing, but even paid ransoms for civilians captured by other forces. After the fall of Pien he again saved many lives by providing food for starving refugees from the devastated Chin capital. These people were either sent back to their homes, or resettled in Tung-p'ing as farmers. In rescuing so many from certain death, Yen Shih was possibly motivated by both economic and humanitarian considerations. The argument for mercy that he put to Daisun in P'u-chou in 1225 was that the spared population could be used to grow food for the army. Indeed, at the time when north China suffered from serious depopulation, the preservation of lives was the most effective means to

increase productivity and revenue – an argument also used effectively by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*).

Apart from helping the civilian population at large, Yen Shih made a special effort to assist displaced Chin literati and officials many of whom he appointed to his own staff. Originally an uneducated man himself, Yen Shih became fond of learning in his later years and even married his son Chung-chi to a daughter of K'ung Yüan-ts'u (1181- *ca.* 1252), the fifty-first lineal descendant of Confucius and holder of the hereditary title Yen-sheng kung, or Duke of Overflowing Sageliness. It seems that in providing assistance to scholars Yen Shih was influenced by Sung Tzu-ch'en (1186-1266), Hsü Shih-lung (1206-85) and Chao T'ien-hsi. A graduate of the Chin National University and former advisor to P'eng I-pin, Sung Tzu-ch'en joined Yen Shih's staff when P'eng was slain in 1225; and it was he who recruited for Yen Shih such famous scholars as Chang T'e-li (1179-1253), a former Chin censorial inspector, and Li Ch'ang (1203-89) and Liu Su (1188-1263), both *chin-shih* of 1218. Hsü Shih-lung, a *chin-shih* who joined Yen Shih's staff after the conquest of Chin, strongly encouraged his patron to help destitute scholars and to appoint them in Tung-p'ing. Chao T'ien-hsi, a military man like Yen Shih, was famous as a host to a large number of distinguished Chin scholars at his headquarters in Kuan-shih. It was through him that Yen Shih came to know Yüan Hao-wen, the most eminent poet and literary critic of the late Chin and early Mongol period, as well as Shang T'ing (*q.v.*). As a result, Tung-p'ing attracted the largest congregation of scholars in north China during this period.

With so many literati to call on, Yeh Shih was able to staff his administration with highly qualified men. Those whom he appointed included Sung Tzu-ch'en himself as the first secretary of the Bureau of the Right; Liu Su as the second secretary of the Bureau of the Left; Chang Ch'eng as a councillor; Li Ch'ang, Hsü Shih-lung and Chang Fang as assistant secretaries; Chia Chü-ch'en (1218-80) as an adjunct; Wang Yü-ju (d. 1255) as an emissary to the court; Wang P'an (1202-93), a *chin-shih* of 1227, as instructor; and Shang T'ing as tutor to Yen Shih's children. Other scholars who served him in an advisory capacity included Yüan Hao-wen and Chang T'e-li.

Assisted by a competent civilian staff, Yen Shih was able to carry out a number of significant administrative, fiscal and educational reforms. Administratively, he did much to improve the integrity and efficiency of officials. At that time local officials were mostly appointed from among military officers or former militia leaders who were not only incompetent as civil administrators, but also tended to be oppressive and exploitative. Urged by Sung Tzu-ch'en, Yen Shih divided the district into three regions of surveillance for the purpose of repressing corruption and improving

administrative standards. Discipline, we are told, was thereby re-established among the Tung-p'ing officialdom.

Economically and fiscally, Yen Shih is known to have reduced and rationalized taxation and corvée, in addition to encouraging agriculture. He obtained approval from the Mongol court to exempt the local population from paying more than 100,000 *liang* of floss silk and 10,000 pieces of coloured pongee, a tax which had been imposed on the district over and above the regular taxes in silk and silver. Moreover, he put back on the tax register a large number of families belonging to the category of privately attached households (*pu-ch'ü hu*), thus reducing the tax burden on the rest of the population.

In broad perspective, however, the most significant contribution made by Yen Shih and his heirs was the revival of education and culture in Tung-p'ing. A well-endowed prefectural school was established there during the Northern Sung and Chin periods, but was destroyed in 1213 when the Mongols first devastated the area. Yen Shih revived the school by appointing Wang P'an as director of studies in 1236. Since Yen Shih died only four years later, we must look beyond his lifetime to appreciate the full significance of his promotion of education. On the foundations laid by his father, Chung-chi made Tung-p'ing one of the most important educational centres in north China in the pre-Qubilai era. Rebuilt in 1252-1255, the prefectural school had two classes. Sixty students selected from among the talented youth of ordinary families were placed under the tutorship of Liang Tung. Since Ch'ü-fu and Tsou-hsien, the birthplaces of Confucius and Mencius respectively, were under Tung-p'ing's jurisdiction, another fifteen students were selected from among the descendants of the two sages and placed under Wang P'an. The faculty also included K'ang Yeh, rector of the school and a specialist in the *Book of History* (*Shu-ching*); Li Ch'ang, who taught the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Ch'un-ch'iu*); and Li Chen, who lectured on the *Great Learning* (*Ta-hsüeh*). Yüan Hao-wen was invited to act as examiner. With the prefectural school as a model, the schools in Po-chou, Kuan-shih, and Ssu-shui were all soon revived.

Besides a centre of learning, Tung-p'ing also became a focus for the revival of rites and music – subjects usually considered as the core of Confucian culture. Much of the body of Confucian rites and music was in danger of being lost after the dispersal of personnel, documents and instruments of the Chin Court of Imperial Sacrifices in 1233. Happily, as a result of a plea made by K'ung Yüan-ts'u, Ögödei issued a decree in 1238 to reassemble all the personnel, documents and instruments and have them sent to Tung-p'ing. Experts in Confucian rites and music were placed under the jurisdiction of the Yen family and the direct supervision of Sung Tzu-ch'en. In the curriculum of the Tung-p'ing prefectural school, rites and music were

particularly stressed. In an article celebrating the completion of the rebuilding of the school, Yüan Hao-wen pointed out that that was why the school was different from its counterparts elsewhere.

As a Chinese overlord in the service of the Mongols, Yen Shih's power was under constant threat because of the contradictory policies of centralization and feudalization pursued by the Mongol court. Mainly prompted by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai since the beginning of Ögödei's reign, the court attempted to strengthen its administrative control over north China along traditional Chinese lines by separating the civil and fiscal authorities from military command, and by centralizing tax collection. In Tung-p'ing, two tax commissioners, Chang Yü and Wang Jui, were appointed in 1230 to collect taxes for the central government. The extent to which Yen Shih's fiscal power was actually curtailed by this move remains an open question, for a decree ordering Yen Shih not to collect taxes was still issued after the completion of the 1235-1236 census. The abolition of the Regional Presidential Council in 1234 was part of the current attempt to separate civil from military power at the local level. The concurrent appointment of Yen Shih as myriarch and chief civil administrator of Tung-p'ing meant, however, that the separation did not actually take place. The stationing of small contingents of the Tammači Army in five important cities of north China in 1236, including the contingent under Se'ünidei in Tung-p'ing, may have helped to ensure the loyalty of Chinese overlords like Yen Shih, but it did not affect their military command.

Thus, although the centralizing measures may have somewhat reduced Yen Shih's power, they did not undermine his status as overlord. That status was seriously threatened in 1236, however, by Ögödei's plan to feudalize north China for the benefit of the Mongol aristocracy. In the scheme announced by the court, the land and the people of Tung-p'ing were to be divided among ten imperial relatives and meritorious Mongol officials. Had the plan been implemented, Yen Shih would have been reduced to no more than a military commander, and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's centralization policy would have been nullified. Consequently, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and Yen Shih formed a temporary alliance to fight the introduction of Mongol feudalism in north China. In Qara Qorum, Wang Yü-ju and Ch'i Jung-hsien argued vigorously against the plan on Yen Shih's behalf. Wang, with the support of Yeh-lü, argued that the parcelling out of Tung-p'ing would not be a proper way to treat a meritorious general like Yen Shih, who had surrendered with 300,000 families and made great personal sacrifices for the Mongol cause. Wang's biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) may have exaggerated the importance of his role in persuading Ögödei to modify the plan, for we learn elsewhere that it was actually Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai who dissuaded the Qa'an from carrying it out.

Nevertheless, the modified plan still undercut the power of Yen Shih and other Chinese overlords, albeit far less substantially than the original scheme would have. Instead of receiving an entire prefecture or county as a fief, the overlords were assigned a certain number of households as apanage. From these households, officially designated as 'five-household silk households' (*wu-hu ssu hu*), the overlords would receive only a part of the tax that the households paid in silk; furthermore, the overlords had the right to appoint a resident commissioner (*daruqači*) to supervise the area in which the households were located. Tung-p'ing seems to have been among the hardest hit districts, for while only 44% of the registered households in north China became apanage-households, in Tung-p'ing more than 200,000 out of a total of 240,000 registered households were parcelled out. Even though these apanage-households still owed greater tax obligations to the government than to the apanage-holders, the revenues collected by Yen Shih and by the government decreased greatly. Moreover, in the *Yüan History* it is specifically stated that Tas Qorči, who was appointed *daruqači* of Tung-p'ing, was placed above Yen Shih.

Although Yen Shih had fought side by side with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1236, the relationship between the two men had not always been cordial. Apparently, at the beginning Yeh-lü was displeased with Yen Shih because the latter kept on sending memorials directly to the Qa'an bypassing the Secretariat, i.e. Yeh-lü's office at court. Relations improved only after Yen Shih, urged by Sung Tzu-chen, had taken conciliatory steps. It is evident that besides personal feelings and procedural problems, the interests of the two men were often conflicting. While they could form a temporary alliance against the imposition of Mongol practices in north China, Yeh-lü's centralization policies were undoubtedly detrimental to the interests of Yen Shih and other Chinese overlords, who favoured the continuation of Chinese military feudalism. The lack of full support from the Chinese overlords should be counted as an important reason for the failure of Yeh-lü's policies, just as much as the opposition of the Mongol nobility.

Yen Shih took part in the inconclusive war against the Sung, launched in 1235 in retaliation for the Sung attempt to seize Honan after the destruction of Chin. His role was probably not prominent since his biographies make no mention of it. We learn from other sources that he fought mainly in the Huai region, participating in the attacks against T'ai-chou and T'ung-chou in Kiangsu, An-feng, Hao-chou and An-ch'ing in Anhwei, and Chi-chou and Huang-chou in Hupei.

In 1237 Yen Shih was allowed by the court to quit his post and retire on the grounds of ill-health (he suffered from rheumatism or arthritis). He died three years later at the age of fifty-nine. Under Qubilai, he was posthumously enfeoffed

Duke-of-state of Lu and canonized as Wu-hui ('Martial and Benevolent'). He was subsequently elevated to the dignity of Prince of Lu.

Yen Shih had seven sons and seven daughters. As members of a distinguished military family, all his sons followed official careers with the exception of the eldest, Chung-chen, who died before his father. The second son, Chung-chi, inherited Yen Shih's offices and in the early years of his career served with distinction as administrator, army commander and promoter of culture. It was under him, as mentioned earlier, that Tung-p'ing flourished as one of the most important centres of learning. His army further expanded in 1255, when more than 20,000 men were added to the original seventeen chiliarchies, and all his younger brothers were appointed either myriarchs or chiliarchs. Under him the family fortunes reached their peak in terms of both social prestige and military power. In his later years, however, Chung-chi is said to have indulged in loose living and to have misplaced his trust in corrupt officials. More importantly, he was not sufficiently alert, politically, to adopt a prudent attitude when Qubilai began to consolidate his regime by centralizing power into his own hands. As a result, Chung-chi was vulnerable to charges made at court that he was excessively powerful and overbearing. Probably regarded by Qubilai as a political risk, he was removed from office in 1261 and replaced by his brother Chung-fan who had apparently reported many of Chung-chi's misdeeds to court. While there is no indication that Chung-chi had ever conspired with Li T'an (q.v.), it is not unlikely that his removal was simply carried out as a precautionary measure. Forced by decree to live in the capital, Chung-chi spent the rest of his life in retirement and poverty. He died in 1293.

Chung-fan rose to the position of minister of War and Justice in 1264. After a succession of ups and downs, his official career ended in tragedy. In 1275 he was sent on a mission to the Sung as deputy to the special envoy Lien Hsi-hsien (1247-75): his party was massacred that same year at Tu-sung kuan, in Kuang-te commandery (Anhwei). Chung-fan's death marked the end of the Yens' prestige. None of the other sons of Yen Shih nor their offspring was able to restore the family's fortunes, and their descendants faded into obscurity.

The most outstanding feature of Yen Shih's career was the ease with which he changed his allegiances. This reflects, to some extent, a lack of political commitment on the part of the northern Chinese, but other factors also played a part. It is well known that the northern Chinese showed no loyalty to the Chin, and that the defection of a large number of Chinese officials and militia leaders to the Mongols and the Sung was a major cause of the Chin collapse. Racial antipathy towards the Jurchen conquerors may be one of the reasons for the lack of sympathy to the Chin cause displayed by the Chinese, but whether Chinese ethnocentrism was a major factor in

the offer of allegiance to Sung by the Chin rebels (such as Li Ch'üan) must remain a moot question. Their commitment to the Sung, in fact, did not prevent many of them from going back to the Chin side, or from surrendering to the Môngols.

In the case of Yen Shih, it is clear that ethnic loyalty only played a small part in his two surrenders to the Sung: his decision in both instances was obviously dictated by circumstances, and he abandoned the Sung cause as readily as he had embraced it. His guiding principle was apparently none other than his own political and physical survival in a highly unstable situation. To understand his opportunism, one must also take into account the position of Shantung in the geopolitics of the period. Distance from the early power base of the Môngols in the north and proximity to the Sung accounted for the fluid and complex nature of the situation in that region. To protect himself, Yen Shih had to bend with the prevailing wind, since the balance of power between the Môngols, the Chin and the Sung was constantly shifting. As long as the continuing existence of Sung in the immediate south provided an alternative focus of allegiance, the loyalty of the Chinese lords in the region could never be relied upon. Inosaki Takaoki has described the Chinese overlords in Shantung as the 'rebellious type', in contrast to their counterparts in Hopei, whom he calls the 'loyal and obedient type'.

Though the Yens proved to have less staying power than most of their northern Chinese colleagues, their domination of Tung-p'ing for almost half a century allowed them sufficient time to play a historically important role in preserving traditional Han values. The contribution of the Yen family in this regard can be seen most concretely in the fact that Tung-p'ing was the richest repository of talents when Qubilai set out to reintroduce Chinese-style government in north China, both before and after his accession to the throne in 1260. Besides the already mentioned former Chin officials, many graduates of the Tung-p'ing prefectural school soon joined their teachers and elders in staffing Qubilai's administration. Writing in 1283, Hu Chih-yü (1227-95) pointed out that as many as half of the important officials of the central and provincial governments were Tung-p'ing graduates. Hu may have exaggerated the proportion of Tung-p'ing scholars in the Yüan bureaucracy, but his statement highlights the importance of Tung-p'ing as a reservoir of scholar-officials in Qubilai's time.

Under the Yüan, scholar-officials from Tung-p'ing played their most prominent role in the fields of literature and rites. On the whole, they perpetuated the late Chin tradition of literary excellence; consequently, their most important institutional stronghold was the Han-lin Academy and the Department of National History, which were responsible for literary and historiographical works, in contrast to Neo-Confucians such as Hsü Heng, Tou Mo and Yao Shu (*qq.v.*), whose base in government was the National College. Of the senior Tung-p'ing scholars, Li Ch'ang,

Wang P'an and Hsü Shih-lung, who were appointed in 1264, were among the earliest academicians. The Tung-p'ing graduates appointed to the Academy in various capacities at this time or later included Yen Fu (1236-1312), Meng Ch'i (1231-81), Li Ch'ien (1233-1311), Hsü Yen (d. 1301), Wang Kou (1245-1310), Chia-ku Chih-ch'i (d. 1289), Chang K'ung-sun (1233-1307), and Li Chih-shao (1254-1326). Yüan Ch'ieh (1266-1327), an academician from the south, observed in about 1300 that the scholars from Tung-p'ing accounted for sixty to seventy per cent of all academicians appointed.

Rites and music were the other areas in which the Tung-p'ing scholars excelled. The Court of Imperial Sacrifices, established in 1260 as the main agency in charge of ceremonies, was often dominated by them. As early as 1253 Sung Tzu-chen was appointed by Qubilai to supervise the body of musicians and ritualists assembled in Tung-p'ing. After him, Hsü Shih-lung emerged as the chief promoter of traditional Chinese rites and music at Qubilai's court. Elected president of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices in 1262, he suggested to Qubilai in 1269 the establishment of the Imperial Ancestral Temple and the introduction of proper court rituals. His Tung-p'ing colleagues Wang P'an, Meng Ch'i, Wang Kou, Shen-t'u Chih-yüan (d. 1298) and Li Chih-shao, as officials of the court of Imperial Sacrifices, all made contributions to the revival of traditional Chinese rites and music.

In retrospect, even though the Yen family failed to adjust successfully to the new centralized system established by Qubilai in north China and, as a consequence, lost its eminence sooner than most of the other Chinese military families of the time, the efforts made by Yen Shih and his sons to carry out reforms and revive Han culture represent a positive achievement. While helping greatly to alleviate the consequences of the Mongol invasion, especially in Shantung, the Yens not only provided Qubilai with expertise in government, but were also largely responsible for the actual survival of administrative and cultural institutions in the war-ravaged north.

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Muramatsu 60:264-67; Yao TW61/69; Yüan KF61; de Rachewiltz 66:119-21, 139-42; Peterson 75; Tao JS76:89-94; Li TF78,I:638-647; Hsiao CC78:12-13,230; Tang-Li 81; Huang SC83; CKTS:45,73,77,85,86; YCS,I:456a; Aubin 87; Huang KC88:171-233.

C.C. Hsiao

ADVISERS AND ADMINISTRATORS

6. ŠIGI QUTUQU (ca. 1180- ca. 1260)

Among the outstanding figures of the early Mongol period, Šigi Qutuqu deserves special attention. Closely connected since childhood with the family of Činggis Qan, he was one of the first Mongols to master the Uighur script. He owed his elevation to the position of grand judge, or arbitrator (*jarquči*), to his literacy, his own incorruptible character and his sense of justice. Since the allocation of apanages (*qubi*) was one of the grand judge's functions, his rulings in the matter played no small part in maintaining the peace among the aristocracy of the steppe, and thereby in ensuring the cohesion of the empire. According to the Persian historian Rašīd al-Dīn, Šigi Qutuqu's judgements still provided at the beginning of the 14th century the basis for the administration of justice in all countries where Mongol rule held sway.

As the focus of Mongol concern eventually shifted to north China under Činggis Qan's successor Ögödei (r. 1229-41), Šigi Qutuqu was entrusted in the occupied territories with the same offices that he had held in his nation's heartland. His judicial position entailed heavy administrative responsibilities. Within the framework of these responsibilities he carried out a far-reaching census to determine the condition of the conquered population. The effect of his activity in China at the height of Mongol expansion cannot be underestimated.

There are two versions of Šigi Qutuqu's origin, one reported in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, the other given by Rašīd al-Dīn. The *Secret History* relates as follows:

As they were plundering the Tatars' fortified camp at Naratu Šitü'en, our men found a little boy who had been left behind, and brought him back with them. The child had a gold nosering and was wearing a sable-lined silken jerkin embroidered with gold thread. Činggis Qan took him and gave him to Mother Hö'elün as a booty-present (*sauqa*). Said Mother Hö'elün, 'This is surely the son of a man of note; he must be the progeny of a man of distinguished lineage!' Naming him Šigi Qutuqu, the Mother made the child her sixth son and brought him up as the youngest brother of her own five boys.

Rašīd gives the following account:

Among the children of the Tatars who became notables and emirs at the time of Činggis Qan, having been raised by him and his wives, was one Qutuqu Noyan, also called Šigi Qutuqu. Here are the facts of his life. When (the Mongols) conquered the Tatar people, Činggis Qan still had no child although his senior wife, Börte Fuĵin, wanted one. (One day) Činggis Qan happened to come across a little boy lying on the roadside. He picked up

(the child) and sent it to Börte Fuĵin (with this message:) ‘Since you have always wanted a son, bring this one up as your own and take good care of him.’ (Činggis Qan’s) wife reared the child as her own in the bosom of her family, with all attendant honours and dignities. When the foundling reached manhood, he was named Šigi Qutuqu, but was also called Qutuqu Noyan; he (himself) addressed Činggis Qan as *ečiġe*, meaning ‘father,’ and Börte Fuĵin as *terigün eke* (Mo. ‘first mother’). It is reported that, after Börte Fuĵin’s death, (Šigi Qutuqu) beat upon her grave with his fists, wailing ‘*O, sayin eke minu!*’ (Mo. ‘Oh, my good mother!’) and grieved over her in this fashion.

The two versions differ significantly. That of the *Secret History* is difficult to reconcile with historical facts. The plundering of the Tatar camp at Naratu Šitü’en can be dated with reasonable accuracy. It took place when the ruler of the Kereit, To’oril, joined with Temüĵin to support the Chin general Wan-yen Hsiang in his campaign against the Tatar, i.e. in May-June 1196. Had Šigi Qutuqu been a child at the time, he could have hardly been made chiliarch and great judge a mere ten years later.

It is equally improbable that the child Šigi should have been taken into the family as the adoptive brother of Temüĵin. The 20-30 years’ difference in age between the two rules this out decisively. The story of a richly clothed child abandoned in a conquered camp to be picked up by the plundering troops and brought to Mother Hö’elün as a gift is a literary device that occurs repeatedly in the *Secret History*. Her naming the child Šigi Qutuqu is left unexplained. In Mongolian *šigi* means ‘flesh between the teeth’ (a physical characteristic of the foundling?), and *qutuqu* – a common name – is the Turkic form of Mongolian *qutuq* ‘happiness, bliss.’

Rašīd’s account is more plausible and reveals none of the anachronisms observed in the other version. We are not told where Šigi Qutuqu was picked up; Temüĵin was still childless at the time. Since Joči, Börte’s eldest son, was born no later than 1184, the ‘conquest of the Tatars’ cannot refer to the raid of 1196. The event must have occurred before Börte was abducted by the Merkit, yet not earlier than 1180, since Šigi Qutuqu was born some time about that date. Šigi would therefore have been a two to three-year-old child when he entered Temüĵin’s household, which agrees with the general tradition.

The story of Šigi Qutuqu’s adoption also seems more likely in Rašīd’s version than in that of the *Secret History*. It was not Hö’elün, but Börte who received the child as a gift. Börte, her husband’s senior by a year, longs for a child that he cannot give her (Temüĵin was a lad of fifteen or sixteen in 1182-83). Temüĵin wants to fulfil Börte’s wish: he sends her the Tatar brat found on the roadside as a substitute for her own son. There would thus have been a compelling psychological motivation for the special position which Šigi was given in Temüĵin’s household and for the loving attention that the foundling enjoyed in his adoptive family. The scene at Börte’s

funeral is described so vividly that it cannot have been made up, but was surely reported by eyewitnesses.

The version in the *Secret History* appears to have been intended to increase Šigi Qutuqu's standing in Mongol eyes, by making him out to be of noble descent and an adoptive brother of Temüjin. Rašid's account, on the other hand, explains Šigi Qutuqu's position in simple terms of human relationships – which enhances its credibility.

Rašid notes that many factors contributed to Šigi Qutuqu's distinction, 'some consigned to writing, two others related by trustworthy reporters.' The events to which he refers took place in Šigi Qutuqu's youth. They occurred as follows:

Činggis Qan's people were moving camp one winter when (Qutuqu) was fifteen years old. It was bitterly cold and there had been an unusually (heavy) snowfall. Küčügür Noyan was in charge of the column of march. A herd of gazelles came suddenly bounding by along the snowdrift on the side of the road. Qutuqu called out to Küčügür, 'Those gazelles can't run in this heavy snow: I'll catch up with them and kill them!' Küčügür said, 'Fine, go to it!' upon which (Qutuqu) chased after the gazelles. That evening, after the tribesmen had made camp, Činggis Qan called for (Qutuqu, but the lad) did not appear. (Činggis Qan) inquired (about him) from Küčügür, who answered, 'He went after the gazelles.' Činggis Qan flew into a towering rage, saying 'In (this) cold and (in this) snow, the lad will perish!' and he struck Küčügür over the head with a swingle-bar. When they had turned in, Qutuqu appeared. Činggis Qan asked him, 'What have you been doing?' He replied, 'Of the thirty gazelles, only three got away. I've killed the rest and left them back in the snow!' Činggis Qan greatly admired the boy's pluck and sent Küčügür with some of his companions (*nöker*) to fetch (the slain) gazelles. That is how Qutuqu earned Činggis Qan's affection.

The second episode went like this:

Once, when Qutuqu was twelve, Činggis Qan went on a campaign; no man was left at home. A mounted bandit came by, an enemy from the Tayiči'ut tribe. Činggis Qan's youngest son (Tolui) was a five-year-old boy (at the time); he ran out of the house to play. The Tayiči'ut (reached) down from his horse, and, meaning to kidnap (the child), grabbed him and wedged his head under his arm. The boy's mother rushed out and seized the assailant's hand; Qutuqu too, ran out and caught the Tayiči'ut's other hand, but the bandit was pressing the prince's head (so hard) that they were unable to pull him free. (At this very moment,) the dog Baraqa, that was herding sheep nearby, sprang up and attacked the bandit, enabling them to tear the prince from his grasp. When Činggis Qan returned, he sent a man after the Tayiči'ut, who was found and disposed of. (Činggis Qan) praised Qutuqu's courageous behaviour in his fight with the bandit.

A different account of the attack on, and freeing of, Tolui appears in the *Secret History*. The incident is described there as follows:

Further, Qargil Šira of the Tatars had escaped and become a fugitive at the time when we were destroying the Tatar people, our mortal enemies who had killed our ancestors and our father, and when we, seeking vengeance and retaliation, were putting them to the sword to the last man, measuring them against the linchpin (of a cart). Being in need and driven by hunger, he

returned (to the camp) and came to the mother in her yurt, saying, 'I beg for a hand-out,' (whereupon) he was told, 'If you've come for a hand-out, go and sit over there.' As he was sitting at the extreme end of the seats on the western side, the five-year-old Tolui entered (the yurt) from outside. But when (the child) turned to go out (again), Qargil Šira got up, packed the child under his arm and made to leave (the yurt). As he was going, he groped for his knife and pulled it from its sheath. Altani, Boroqul's wife, was sitting at the time in the eastern section of the mother's yurt when she heard the mother screaming, 'He's going to kill the child!' Altani ran out with her and, chasing after (the man), managed to grab hold of Qargil Šira's plaits. With her other hand, she seized his own hand which was drawing the knife and forced him to drop the weapon. Just then, to the north of the yurt, Jetei and Jelme were slaughtering a hornless black ox for provisions. At Altani's screams, both Jetei and Jelme came running up, each with axes in their hands and fists red (with blood). They killed Qargil Šira of the Tatars on the spot with their axes and knives.

The truth of the story of an attack on Tolui has been doubted. William Hung points to contradictions in the chronology of the *Secret History*'s version. He assumes that the massacre of the Tatars mentioned here occurred in 1202, at a time when Tolui was at least ten, and probably older. The events described pertain to the 'destruction' of the Čaqān, Alči, Duta'ut, and Aluqai Tatars in the spring of 1202, following the Mongols' victory at Dalan Nemürge; those events are therefore not relevant here. More likely in the present context are the happenings in the year 1196, when Ong Qan and Temüjin defeated the Tatars of Megüjin Se'ültü at Qusutu and Naratu Šitü'en. But disagreements continue to exist in this instance too. According to Rašid, there was an age difference of seven years between Tolui and Šigi Qutuqu. Šigi was born in 1182 at the latest, so that Tolui would have been born in 1188 or 1189, thus making him at least eight years old by Mongol reckoning in 1196, and probably more.

Besides the chronological discrepancies, the circumstances of the *Secret History*'s account are hardly credible. It is difficult to imagine that a Tatar would have dared to venture back to the victors' camp after the massacre of his people, and then attempt to seize the ruler's son from his mother's yurt, and to kill him in broad daylight. The incident is not mentioned in the biography of Tolui in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*). Is the story therefore an invention, as Hung suggests? The memory of the attack on Tolui was still alive among the Mongols one hundred years after the event; the incident was reported to Rašid by 'trustworthy Mongols.' Rašid's account contains no incredible element nor chronological contradiction. It does not relate the event to any particular campaign against the Tatar, but presents the attack as a not-infrequent occurrence between members of enemy tribes on the steppe.

The extent of Šigi Qutuqu's actual involvement in the freeing of Tolui is open to question, however. The *Secret History* does not mention his name. Typical of the work's character is the space devoted to the argument that arose in determining who deserved to claim the most credit in rescuing Tolui. According to the *Secret History*:

As Altani, Țetei and Țelme argued about who of the three had done the most to save the child's life, Țetei and Țelme both said, 'Had we not been there and, quickly running, had we not killed him, what could Altani, a woman, have achieved? The chief merit is certainly ours!' To which Altani said, 'Had you not heard my screams, how could you have come? Had I not run after him, grabbed his plaits, pulled back the hand that was drawing the knife, and had he not (then) dropped the knife, wouldn't the child have been done in by the time you two, Țetei and Țelme, had turned up?' After she had spoken thus, they acknowledged that she had done the most (to rescue Tolui).

On being made qan in 1206, Činggis issued the following ordinance: 'To those who have contributed to the founding of the empire, I wish hereby to address my thanks and I shall appoint them as chiliarchs when I form the chiliarchies.' The four adopted sons of Činggis Qan were among the newly-appointed chiliarchs: Boroquul, Šigi Qutuqu, Kūčū, and Kōkōčū. The most meritorious of his companions-in-arms, Bo'orču and Muqali, were to be accorded a special distinction, and Činggis Qan commanded Šigi Qutuqu to fetch them. Upon which Šigi Qutuqu protested:

'Have Bo'orču and Muqali deserved more recognition than others? Have they done more than others? When it comes to handing out rewards, have I gained less merit, have I given less service? From the time I lay in my cradle, I have grown up at your noble threshold until this beard grew on my chin, and in all that time I have had no other thought (but how best to serve you). From the time (they held) a piss-pot to my crotch, I have stood by your golden threshold and have grown (there) until this beard appeared, never distancing myself by as much as one step. You have allowed me to sleep at your feet and have raised me as a son. You have let me sleep at your side and brought me up like a younger brother. What recompense do you intend to give me?' So he spoke. To these words of Šigi Qutuqu Činggis Qan said, 'Are you not the sixth youngest son? To you, my adopted younger brother, (I grant) this favour: you shall be allotted the junior brothers' share. Moreover, in recognition of your services, you shall be exempted from punishment up to nine transgressions.' Such was his ruling. (He said further,) 'When I, with Heaven's protection, was subjecting all the people to my rule, you were the eye by which I saw and the ear by which I heard. Divide up all the people into shares for the mother, for ourselves, for the junior brothers, and for the sons, according to the name of the people, separating those that dwell in felt tents and setting apart those that live behind wooden doors. Let no one violate your word.' So ran the ruling. Moreover, he placed upon Šigi Qutuqu, as great judge in the empire, the responsibility for settling conflicts, by saying, 'Put down brigandage throughout the entire empire and deal with all cases of fraud. Those that deserve death, have them killed; those that deserve punishment, have them punished!' He ordered further, 'The allotments of the population made by you and your decisions in judicial matters shall be recorded in the blue register to be bound into a book. What Šigi Qutuqu decides with my consent, and is written down in blue ink on white paper to be bound as a book, shall remain unaltered into the most distant future. Those who would dare amend those documents shall be punished.' So did he speak. Šigi Qutuqu said, 'How can a mere adopted junior brother receive the same share (as the true brothers)? If it pleases you, grant me, as the qa'an's [*corr.* qan's] gift, (people) from the earth-walled cities!' Such was his reply. To those words, (Činggis Qan) said, 'You have set your own (reward)! You decide!' Having thus obtained a favour for himself, Šigi Qutuqu went out to fetch Bo'orču, Muqali, and the other chiefs (*noyat*).

Rašīd makes no mention of any disagreement about rewards between Šigi Qutuqu and Činggis Qan, but dwells on Šigi Qutuqu's activities as great judge. He writes:

(Šigi Qutuqu) settled his cases with fairness and gave the accused much help and compassion. He used to repeat, '(The accused) must not confess out of fear and anguish!' To the culprits he said, 'Don't be afraid and speak the truth!' From the proceedings of judges, it is evident that from Šigi Qutuqu's time to this, judicial matters have been conducted according to the rules (that he himself applied), not only in Mogulistan, but also in (all) countries (subject to the Mongols).

Rašīd has nothing to say on Šigi Qutuqu's allotments of apanages. The author of the *Secret History* obviously exaggerates Šigi Qutuqu's authority: the share of each member of the imperial family was in fact determined by Činggis Qan in person. His purpose is apparently to demonstrate that the retainers also had their say in the ruler's family affairs. The quarrel about Da'arитай's share is typical in this respect. Činggis Qan wants to deprive his uncle Da'arитай of his due portion. He declares:

'Da'arитай has been dealing with the Kereyit. I shall wipe him from my sight!' Upon which Bo'orču, Muqali and Šigi Qutuqu, all three, objected: '(By doing so,) you would be putting out the fire of your own (hearth); you would be bringing down your own yurt! That one uncle is all that remains alive of your noble father's memory! How can you sacrifice him? Forgive him, even if he has behaved unwisely. Your noble father's youngest (brother) and you should let the camp smoke swirl up.' This is what they told him, and the argument went on until the smoke came out of his nose. 'Be it so!' he said, and thinking of his noble father, he did calm down at the words of the three, Bo'orču, Muqali and Šigi Qutuqu.

The biased account of the *Secret History* notwithstanding, I consider that there can be no doubt about the importance of Šigi Qutuqu's role in the distribution of apanages. This is borne out by the reports of his activities under Ögödei (see below), as well as by the fact that imperial grants were still being made on the basis of his 'blue registers' at the beginning of the 14th century.

Šigi Qutuqu followed Činggis Qan on his campaign against Chin. The *Secret History* reports the following episode in the course of the campaign:

Altan Qan had left Jungdu [= Peking] after having installed Qada as governor (*liuśiu*) there. Činggis Qa'an sent Önggür Ba'urči, Arqai Qasar, and Šigi Qutuqu, the three of them, to take an inventory of whatever gold, silver, valuables, and silk there was at Jungdu. At the news of their approach, Qada set out from Jungdu to welcome them with gold-embroidered and patterned silk cloth. Šigi Qutuqu turned to Qada and said, 'The treasures of Jungdu, and Jungdu itself, used to belong to Altan Qan. But now Jungdu belongs to Činggis Qa'an! How can you make us gifts of Činggis Qa'an's treasures and silks which you have secretly stolen? I shall not take them!' Thus spoke Šigi Qutuqu and took nothing (for himself), whereas Önggür Ba'urči and Arqai did. Having recorded the valuables (found) at Jungdu, the three came back. Činggis Qa'an then asked Önggür, Arqai, and Qutuqu, all three, what Qada had given (them). Said Šigi Qutuqu, 'When Qada brought us gold-embroidered and patterned silk cloth, I said, "This Jungdu once belonged to

Altan Qan, but now it has become the property of Činggis Qa'an. How can you, Qada, make us gifts of Činggis Qa'an's treasures that you have secretly stolen?" That is what I said, and I took nothing. But those two, Önggür and Arqai, they've both accepted his presents!" Thus spoke he. Whereupon Činggis Qa'an greatly upbraided the two, Önggür and Arqai, but he praised Šigi Qutuqu highly, saying, 'You have observed the Great Law!' and he went on, 'Won't you be the eye that sees for me, and the ear that hears for me?'

Rašīd gives the following version of the incident:

Fuking Čingsang, whom Altan Qan had left behind in Jungdu with his own son, took poison in despair and died. Another one of the emirs, called Singjung, obeying (the dead man's) will, fled to Altan Qan in the district of Namging (Nan-ching). Minggan (Mingqan), whom Činggis Qan had sent together with Samuqa Bahadur, forced his way into the city of Jungdu and dispatched a runner to deliver the following message at the feet of Činggis Qan: 'Thanks to Činggis Qan's good fortune, we have seized the city of Jungdu!' At the time Činggis Qan was in a place called Kuangjiu [= Huan-chou]. He [thereupon] sent Qutuqu Noyan, the Tatar, also called Šigi – Činggis Qan had found him as a child by the roadside and given him to his wife so that she could bring him up – Önggür Ba'urči, and Harqai [= Arqai] Qasar, all three, to fetch Altan Qan's treasure and possessions that had been left in the city of Jungdu. When Altan Qan had fled that city, he had left behind two emirs, Qada and Goi [= Kuo-ho], as plenipotentiaries and administrators of the state property and treasury. This office is called *liu-shou* in Chinese. Those two, and (Altan Qan's) other emirs, offered the above-mentioned emirs (of Činggis Qan) presents of gold-embroidered apparel and other valuables. Önggür Ba'urči and Harqai Qasar accepted (the gifts), but Qutuqu Noyan refused them. Then the above-mentioned emirs proceeded to open all the treasure rooms and took back with them one of Altan Qan's treasure-keepers, an emir called Qada, whom they presented to (the Emperor). Činggis Qan asked Qutuqu Noyan, 'Has Qada given you any thing, yes or no?' The other replied, 'He has, but I have not accepted.' (Whereupon Činggis Qan) deigned to ask, 'Why?' The other replied, 'I thought to myself: before we had taken the city, all its contents were the property of Altan Qan, lock, stock, and barrel [lit. "from cord to kerchief"]. Now that the city has been conquered, it all belongs to Činggis Qan. How can one dispose secretly and dishonestly of another's property? That is my reason for having taken nothing!' Činggis Qan was pleased to say 'Qutuqu knows (the rulings of) the Great Law (*yosun*)!' and doubled his reward. Önggür Ba'urči and Harqai Qasar, however, he brought to book.

The incident is also mentioned in the Chinese sources. The *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu* (hereafter *CCL*) reports:

(Wan-yen) Fu-hsing killed himself by taking poison and (Mo-nien) Ch'in-chung fled the city. The grand guardian Mingqan forced his way (into the city) and occupied it; he dispatched a messenger to announce his victory (to the Emperor). The Emperor, who at the time was encamped in Huan-chou, ordered Qutuqu Noyan, with Önggür Ba'urči and Arqai Qasar, all three, to make an inventory of the contents of the treasury in Jungdu. Qada and Kuo-ho, who were then the Chin governors (of Chung-tu), welcomed the commissioners with gifts of gold and silk. Önggür and Arqai accepted theirs; only Qutuqu objected and refused to take his. He returned north, taking Qada and the others with him, as well as their possessions. The Emperor asked Qutuqu, 'Have Qada and the others given you goods?' (Qutuqu) replied, 'They did, but I did not dare accept.' The Emperor asked him why. (Qutuqu) replied, 'I told Qada, "Before the city fell every inch of

silk and every bit [lit. "foot"] of thread belonged to the Chin ruler. Now that the city has fallen, all that has become the property of our own lord. How dare you steal our lord's possessions to gain a personal favour?" The Emperor praised him greatly for having observed (the rulings of) the Great Law – while he severely condemned Önggür and Arqai's unfaithfulness.

In the *Yüan History*, a brief entry for 31 May 1215 runs as follows:

The Chin governor of Chung-tu, Wan-yen Fu-hsing, took poison and died. Mo-nien Chin-chung surrendered the city and fled. Mingqan entered (the city) and took over government. During that same month, (Cinggis Qan) set up his summer camp at Liang-ching in Huan-chou. He sent Qutuqu and others to confiscate the treasury at Chung-tu.

A comparison of the various versions of the incident shows that the *Secret History* takes an independent line. After the brief introductory sentence, 'Altan Qan has left Chung-tu, Qada is installed as governor,' the narrative focusses on the behaviour and person of Šigi Qutuqu. His words are twice reported verbatim, his encounter with Qada before the city gates is described in detail, and the last sentence, 'Won't you be the eye..., ' does not appear in the other sources.

Rašīd and the *CCL* agree in substance and also in wording. Both texts undoubtedly draw on a common Mongol source, although Rašīd, as is his wont, has also used other sources in his account and quotes details that do not appear in the *CCL*. Thus, he mentions that Altan Qan fled to Nan-ching, i.e. Pien-liang (K'ai-feng), and names Samuqa as conqueror of Chung-tu, besides Mingqan. Further, the actual wording of the victory message is reported; the sentence 'When Altan Qan withdrew from this city...' is missing in the *CCL*, but it opens the *Secret History*'s account of the incident. An explanation is inserted on the meaning of the term *liu-shou* and mention is made of Šigi Qutuqu's origin.

In contradistinction to the *Secret History*, Rašīd and the *CCL* dwell on the conditions in Chung-tu and the events of the conquest. They mention the famine that afflicted the beleaguered city, the death of Wan-yen Fu-hsing, the flight of Mo-nien Ch'in-chung, the seizure of the city by Mingqan, the report of his victory, and the fact that Kuo-ho was co-governor of the city with Qada. The wording of Šigi Qutuqu's speeches is consistent with that reported in the *Secret History*.

The *Yüan History* presents a brief summary of the facts mentioned in Rašīd and the *CCL*: the death of Fu-hsing, Ch'in-chung's escape, and the taking of the city by Mingqan. No more is said about Šigi Qutuqu beyond recording his assignment to seize the treasury at Chung-tu.

We know from the *Yüan History* that Šigi Qutuqu was also invested with administrative powers in the conquered territories of north China. The source states that, following the occupation of Yen(-ching) and Chi(-chou), 'Qutuqu Noyan assumed the power of government in those districts'; he appointed Chang Po-ta as

district assistant of the military governor and shortly thereafter made him prefect of T'ung-chou.

Šigi Qutuqu took part in Činggis Qan's western campaign. The troops under his command formed the vanguard of the imperial force and incurred the first major defeat that the Mongols were to suffer during this expedition. The *Secret History* touches only briefly on the incident:

In the Year of the Hare (1219), (Činggis Qan) crossed the Arai Pass to attack the Sarta'ul people.... He sent Jebe as vanguard. Sübe'etei was to guard Jebe's rear, while Toqučar followed Sübe'etei.... Thereupon Jebe set out and, passing the cities of Qan Melig without touching them, he bypassed them on the outside. After him came Sübe'etei, also passing (the cities) in the same way without touching them. But (coming) after him Toqučar looted the border cities of Qan Melig and carried off their peasants. When Qan Melig realized that his cities were being plundered, he withdrew with inimical (intent) and formed an alliance with Jalalding Soltan (= Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn). Jalalding Soltan and Qan Melig, together, moved out against Činggis Qa'an with combined forces. Šigi Qutuqu marched ahead of Činggis Qa'an as vanguard. Jalalding Soltan and Qan Melig both engaged Šigi Qutuqu, defeated him, and, while pursuing him, came upon Činggis Qa'an himself. Then Jebe, Sübe'etei and Toqučar, all three, fell from the rear upon both Jalalding Soltan and Qan Melig whom they defeated and killed.

Rašīd's account of the event is much more detailed:

At the time, Činggis Qan was concerned with the control and protection of the roads to Gazna, Garčistan, Zabul, and Qabul. He sent Šigi Qutuqu into the region with other emirs, notably Taqačaq, Mulgar, Iqar Qalja and 30,000 men on a mission to determine the possibility of occupying those regions, and also as scouting troops (*qaraul*) so that he himself and his son Tolui Qan would be free to deal with the conquest of [Qan Melik's] possessions in Khorāsān. Qan Melik happened to be close to the area where Šigi Qutuqu and his troops were.... Šigi Qutuqu's guards reported that Qan Melik, his subjects and his followers had broken camp to join Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn. Šigi Qutuqu immediately set out in pursuit with his entire force. He caught up with Qan Melik and would have had a good opportunity to attack him, but thought it prudent to delay the engagement till the early morning when the light would be better. Qan Melik rode all night and made contact with the Sultan at dawn in the vicinity of Parvān, the agreed rendez-vous.... A few days earlier, Taqačaq and Mulgar, members of Šigi Qutuqu's (force), had invested the stronghold of Vāliyān with the support of a few other emirs, and (the place) was expected to fall at any time. Jalāl al-Dīn left his train and heavy (baggage) behind at Parvān, surprised the (besieging troops) with his own force, and killed about 1,000 men of the Mongol vanguard. Because of their numerical weakness, the Mongol troops withdrew across the river and made a stand on the other bank. The two parties began shooting arrows at each other. The Mongol force pulled out after nightfall, caught up with Šigi Qutuqu, and joined for the second time in the pursuit of Qan Melik. After Qan Melik had made contact with the Sultan and told (him), 'The Mongol army is on my heels!' the Sultan moved out and came to (within approximately) one farsang of the Mongols.... He ordered all his troops to dismount, to tie the horses' reins to their belts, and to fight valiantly. The next day, the order was given to the Mongols that every rider should fix a dummy made of felt or other (material) behind him on his horse. They made (the dummies) during the night and the following day formed up in battle

array. When the Sultan's troops caught sight of such a mass of (warriors), they assumed that the Mongols had received reinforcements and made ready to flee. But the Sultan shouted to them, 'Our numbers are great; we will form up in battle order and get them in a pincer from right and left!' The troops took their positions... and attacked the Mongols. The Sultan's forces were the more numerous and manoeuvred to encircle the Mongols. Šigi Qutuqu exhorted his own men: 'When we engage them, keep a close watch on the direction of my banner (*tuq*)!' As the Sultan's troops were about to invest (the Mongols, the latter) could no longer hold their position and took to flight. The grassland in that region is full of holes and ditches, so that many of the Mongol warriors were thrown from their horses. As the Sultan's men rode good, light mounts, they were able to overtake and kill (the Mongols). A great part of the Mongol host perished in that battle. When Činggis Qan learnt of (this defeat), he remained impassive, although deeply grieved. All that he deigned to say was, 'Qutuqu is accustomed to being always successful and victorious, and so far has never had to face the cruelties of fate. Now that he has learned them, he will be more prudent and will have gained experience and a (better) understanding of (military) matters.' Whereupon he immediately undertook to reorganise the army. Šigi Qutuqu and the emirs that were with him returned shortly thereafter with the remnants of their routed force.... When Qutuqu Noyan reported to Činggis Qan, he rendered an account of everyone's zeal and shortcomings (in the fight). He complained of the negligent behaviour of the emirs Uqar Qalja and Qutur Qalja caused by their incessant joking and lightheadedness. He said, 'People renowned for their wit, their pranks and their clowning assume they are heroes – but on the day when courage (is needed), such men achieve nothing and only cause trouble.' In Mongolian, buffoons are called *qalja*. And so much for that!

These events are narrated as follows in the *CCL*:

In the summer (of 1221) after the Emperor had set up his military headquarters in the territory of the summer residence of the Sultan of the Western Region (= Khwārazm), he ordered Qutuqu Noyan to form the vanguard.... In the summer (of 1222), he went into summer quarters on the high plateau, in the mountain fortress of Taliqan. At the same time, the Sultan of the Western Region, Jalāl al-Dīn, began his retreat, whereupon (the Emperor) commanded Jebe to pursue him at the head of the vanguard. Further, he sent out Sübōtei Ba'atur to follow (Jebe); and he dispatched Toqučar at the head of the rearguard. When Jebe reached the cities of Melik Qan, he simply marched on avoiding hostilities. Sübōtei did likewise, (but) when Toqučar arrived, a fight broke out with the troops (of Melik Qan) that were outside (the city). Melik Qan took fright and giving up the city he moved away. When Qutuqu Noyan heard of this, he led his force forward in a surprise attack. By then (however) Melik Qan had joined forces with Jalāl al-Dīn. There was a battle and we were not successful. Thereupon a messenger was sent to inform the Emperor who personally led an élite force from the fortress of Taliqan and attacked (the enemy).

About the same events, the *Yüan History* notes laconically:

In the summer of the 17th year *jen-wu* (= 1222), (the Emperor) set up his summer quarters in the fortress of Taliqan. The ruler of the Western Region (i.e. Jalāl al-Dīn), had fled and joined up with Melik Qan. Qutuqu fought with them, but without success. The Emperor personally took over command and attacked them.

The only detailed account of Šigi Qutuqu's defeat at Parvān is to be found in Rašīd and other Persian authors (Juvainī, Jūzjānī). The other sources fail even to mention the fighting over the fortress of Vāliyān. The *Secret History* differs substantially not only from Rašīd al-Dīn's version, but also from the Chinese sources. The events described occur at the very beginning of the campaign in the Year of the Hare 1219. The conquest of Taliqan is not mentioned. Jalāl al-Dīn and Qan Melik take to the field against Činggis Qan and attack Šigi Qutuqu, the leader of the vanguard. After Šigi Qutuqu's defeat, Jebe, Sübōtei and Toqučar surprise Jalāl al-Dīn and Qan Melik from the rear, defeat and kill them. According to the *CCL* and the *Yüan History*, these engagements took place in summer 1222. Činggis Qan has already taken Taliqan, and Jalāl al-Dīn has begun his retreat. Šigi Qutuqu pursues Qan Melik who, however, has joined forces with Jalāl al-Dīn, and Šigi Qutuqu is beaten. After the news of the defeat, Činggis Qan takes personal command of an élite force and attacks Jalāl al-Dīn and Qan Melik.

Some complementary data about Šigi Qutuqu's activities during the campaign in the west are to be found in Juvainī. According to this author, before the events leading to his defeat at Parvān, Šigi Qutuqu had sacked the city of Gazna with a force of 10-12,000 men, burned the mosque, and killed a great number of inhabitants. Moreover, after the capture of Merv in the same year 1222, Šigi Qutuqu had destroyed the last remnants of that city. Juvainī states also that Šigi Qutuqu was with Činggis Qan on the Indus, where he was put in charge of the prisoners and captive artisans.

As the trusted executor of Činggis Qan's ambitions, Ögödei maintained his father's advisers and military commanders in their office and dignities. To Šigi Qutuqu he showed the kindness and regard befitting one of his father's closest confidants. He named him 'elder brother'; in order of precedence, Šigi Qutuqu took his place next to Ögödei's sons and before Möngke's. Rašīd reports that Šigi Qutuqu had placed himself at Ögödei's personal service; and that, after the death of Tolui, he was assigned to the apanage of Tolui's widow, Sorqaqtani Begi.

In keeping with Činggis Qan's wish, it fell to Ögödei to pursue the struggle against Chin. Šigi Qutuqu took part in the war in north China. Rašīd records an episode from which we learn that Šigi Qutuqu fought directly under Tolui's command in 1231. Apparently Qutuqu was sent by Tolui with 300 horsemen to lure the Chin forces from their stronghold at T'ung-kuan, the famous pass at the bend of the Yellow River, but the plan failed. According to the *CCL*, Qutuqu was at Ögödei's side when the southern capital of the Chin, Pien-liang, was conquered. 'When the Emperor reached Nan-ching in the third month (March-April 1232)' we are told, 'he ordered Šigi Qutuqu to attack the city.'

With the capture of the southern capital, most of north China had fallen to the Mongols, who were now facing the task of establishing an orderly polity in circumstances that were totally alien to them. Because of his open-minded attitude towards foreign cultures, Šigi Qutuqu was one of the best qualified among the Mongol leaders to contribute usefully towards resolving that problem. Ögödei appointed him to the same functions in north China which he had assumed already in the Mongol heartland. We read in the *Yüan History*: 'In the 7th month of the 6th year *chia-wu* (July-August 1234), Qutuqu Noyan was appointed judge in north China.' This office placed Šigi Qutuqu at the apex of the civil administration in the former Chin territories. In this capacity, he carried out a general population census in 1235-1236. Another Chinese source (the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*) notes: 'In the time of Emperor Ögödei, Qutuqu Noyan directed the census of the population.' We know that apanages were granted on the basis of these surveys to princes of the imperial clan (*chu-wang*), to the princesses (*kung-chu*), to the imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*), and to the Mongol dignitaries and members of the enfeoffed nobility (*t'ou-hsia kuan-yüan*). The written rulings which 'Šigi Qutuqu had made on orders from the Emperor and on orders from the princes of the imperial clan would remain binding long after their author's death.'

Census-taking in China differed essentially from the apportioning procedures of the nomads, in that the fiscal value of the apanages outweighed their military importance. In this respect too, Šigi Qutuqu appears first and foremost as the guardian of tradition in the purely Mongol apportioning procedures. This is illustrated by Rašīd in the following account: according to Mongol custom, the notables and the warriors who had been assigned to Tolui would, after his death, enter the service of his widow, Sorqaqtani Begi, and of his sons, Möngke, Qubilai, Hülegü, and Ariq Böke. Rašīd writes:

Since Ögödei was the Qa'an, he attached to his son Köten (Ködön), on his own counsel and without consulting the princes and emirs, a force of warriors that had been hitherto in the service of the children of Yeke Noyan [= Tolui] consisting of one chiliarchy of Sunit troops and two chiliarchies of the Suldus tribe, under the command of Emir Duladai Ba'urči, who was the brother of Iluqai Noyan, and an emir of the Sunit tribe. The most eminent of Činggis Qan's emirs who were in the service of Sorqaqtani Begi and the princes, that is, Šigi Qutuqu of the Tatars, whom Činggis Qan called his fifth son, Sodun Noyan of the Suldus, Jedei Noyan of the Mangqut, Mengeser Qorči of the Jalair, Butačın Qorči of the Yisut, Qubilai Qorči of the Baya'ut, Yesür Qorči of the Qungqotan, and other emir chiliarchs, jointly approached Sorqaqtani Begi, Mengü Qa'an, and his brothers, with this plea: 'These Suldus and Sunit warriors belong to us, yet Ögödei gives them now to his son Köten. Since Činggis Qan assigned them to us as our domain's (*ordo*'s) portion, why should we let them go (to another), thus infringing (Činggis Qan's) edict? We want to raise the matter before Ögödei Qa'an in order that we might (hear) what he has to say about it!' It pleased Sorqaqtani Begi to reply, 'Your words are right and appropriate! But I ask you: have we not

accumulated enough riches of all kinds to avoid troubling (the sovereign) about this business? (After all,) we too belong to the Qa'an; what he orders, he must judge to be right!' After she had spoken thus, in a manner (appropriate) to their understanding and ability, the emirs at once fell silent.

The *Yüan History* tells of another such conflict about apanages between Šigi Qutuqu and the Qa'an in the following words:

In the year *ping-shen* (1236), Qutuqu carried out a great census among the people of north China and apportioned the cities and towns with which the most deserving of the notables were to be enfeoffed. He gave Mengge 10,000 households from the population of T'ai-an chou (in Shantung). The Emperor questioned the small number (of households allotted to Mengge). Qutuqu replied, 'In my current estimates, I have been guided by the size of the previous (allotments). Mengge's former (share) was just 800 households.' The Emperor said, 'That is not right. (The number of) households granted to Uildar (Mengge's father) may have been small, but (Mengge's) services during the war were outstanding!' and he doubled (Mengge's) apanage to 20,000 households.

Similarly, the widow of *Saqis Buqa, née Yang, complained to the Emperor that, after the fall of Chin, the great dignitary (*ta-ch'en*) Qutuqu had been assigned the task of conducting a census and of granting fiefs to deserving officers, and although her maternal uncle and her husband had both been killed on service, she had been left nothing but their fame. The Emperor ruled as follows: '(Members) of two generations of this family have died for our nation; it is proper that 200 households of the new (i.e. newly conquered) population of Wei be granted as recompense and that *Saqis Buqa be given the title of Grand Preceptor with the posthumous name of Loyal and Martial; that Mingqandar be given the title of Grand Guardian with the posthumous name of Martial and Resolute; and that both be ennobled as Duke-of-state of Wei.'

During Šigi Qutuqu's term of office in north China under Ögödei, his involvement in things foreign made him naturally curious about the conquered peoples' customs and accessible to the foremost representatives of their culture. For instance, we know that Šigi Qutuqu had formed a lasting relation with the eminent Buddhist master Hai-yün at the time of the latter's ascendancy (*ca.* 1233). The powerful *Jarquči* must have held the monk in high regard for he is said to have consulted Hai-yün not only about practical matters but even on questions of personal conduct. For his part, according to Buddhist sources, Hai-yün used his undoubted influence over the Mongol great judge to succour distinguished compatriots fallen on hard times following the Mongol conquest; to safeguard and promote the interests of the Buddhist establishment; and, most relevantly, to dissuade Šigi Qutuqu from having the subject people branded in the course of the great census of 1236 (see the biography of Hai-yün).

Thus Šigi Qutuqu's role in connection with the census in north China can be variously judged, as indeed it has been, both by his contemporaries and by later historians. The late Professor Yao Ts'ung-wu has stressed Šigi Qutuqu's role in the great census and the fiscal reforms immediately following it. According to Yao, the credit for these reforms which represented, as we know, a turning point in the Mongol rule of north China (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai), goes in large measure to Šigi Qutuqu. Not only was this official in charge of the census, but, as *Jarquči* for the whole territory of north China under Mongol control, he was also responsible for approving Yeh-lü Ch'u-tsai's recommendations on administrative matters. His positive achievements in these affairs are praised by Chang Te-hui (1195-1274), a noted official of the Yüan dynasty, who refers to Šigi Qutuqu as a good statesman (see below). Rašīd al-Dīn echoes this evaluation by praising Qutuqu's integrity as a judge.

There are, however, discordant voices with regard to the part played by Šigi Qutuqu in the administration of north China. One of the two authors of the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, Hsü T'ing, who was in north China at the time, personally witnessed his activity. He comments: '(I,) T'ing, was in Yen-ching (Peking) when the present (imperial) commissioner, Chancellor Hu (= Qutuqu) arrived. His financial excesses were even more dreadful (than those of the previous commissioners). Even the guilds of school teachers and beggars had to give forth silver to make up the household tax (*ch'ai-fa*).'

We know, moreover, that Šigi Qutuqu was the chief representative of the Mongol faction at court which advocated a redefinition of the households for purposes of taxation and which strongly opposed the adoption of alien administrative rules, such as those proposed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. As in the above-mentioned episode concerning *Saqis Buqa's widow, one may surmise that it was not so much Qutuqu's willingness to comply with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's advice after the latter's vigorous attack on the proposed redefinition, but rather Ögödei's intervention that decided which of the two conflicting policies should be followed.

Also, against Chang Te-hui's words of praise, we have the opinion of Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*) who, in his famous memorial to Qubilai probably written before Šigi Qutuqu's death, blames the great judge for the establishment of excessive corvée duties and, generally, for an oppressive administration. Liu's words seem to confirm the overall impression that Šigi Qutuqu's policy towards north China was not as liberal as some claim.

Little is known regarding Šigi Qutuqu's other activities in China at the time. He participated, albeit briefly, in the campaign against Sung under the command of Ögödei's third son, Kōčü. This, however, must have taken place in 1235, and he may

have indeed been recalled from the field to take up his administrative duties in the north. According to a later Yüan source, Ögödei had appointed him a myriarch (*wan-hu*), as well as resident commissioner (*daruqači*) of Sui-chou (in Hupei), but this appointment may actually refer to another personage by the name of Qutuqu. In 1238, acting on behalf of the Mongol court, Šigi Qutuqu bestowed a religious title, or appellation, on the Taoist leader Li Chih-ch'ang (for whom see the biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi) – a further indication of his involvement in the religious and political affairs of China in the latter part of Ögödei's reign.

Our sources are silent on Šigi Qutuqu and his continuing role as *jarquči* in the troubled period between the death of Ögödei (1241) and the election of Möngke in 1251, but it seems certain that by 1249 he was no longer managing Chinese affairs, since in this year Chang Te-hui recommends to Qubilai, then still a prince, that a person like (Šigi) Qutuqu be put in charge of the civilian administration in China. Almost certainly Šigi Qutuqu had by then returned to Mongolia to take part in the contested issue of imperial succession after the death of Güyük in 1248. As is known, Joči's son Batu eventually secured Möngke's elevation as qa'an by threat of arms, in violation of Činggis Qan's will and political testament. The feelings of Činggis Qan's old companions are expressed in the words that Rašīd attributes to Öljidei: 'All of you had decided and declared that, so long as a piece of flesh remained of Ögödei's children – and even if that flesh were wrapped in grass, and the grass left uneaten by a cow; even if it were packed in fat, and the fat refused by a dog – (even then) would we acknowledge it as our qan, and no one else would ascend the throne. Why are you acting differently now?'

Did these words reflect Šigi Qutuqu's feelings also? Šigi Qutuqu had been one of Činggis Qan's closest collaborators, he had been a high official under Ögödei, yet he stood very close to Tolui's children and, according to Rašīd, was actually himself a vassal of the house of Tolui. The choice of Möngke as qa'an must have placed him in a moral dilemma. One thing only is certain, namely that Šigi Qutuqu was not responsible for the bloodbath that was to decimate the followers of the house of Ögödei. The culprit here was Mengeser, a retainer of the house of Tolui who was made grand judge in 1251.

In China, Möngke had Šigi Qutuqu replaced by Buĵir (*q.v.*) as grand judge 'in the capital and all districts of the realm (*t'ien-hsia*).⁷ It seems probable that Šigi Qutuqu's dismissal from office would have resulted from his attitude towards Möngke's election. Yet he was spared the fate of most of Ögödei's office-bearers, and, according to the *Yüan History*, in the new attribution of apanages of January 1253, 4,000 households in Kuang-p'ing and other places were awarded to him.

The last years of Šigi Qutuqu are cloaked in darkness. We know only that he survived Möngke and died during the war between Qubilai and Ariq Böke, aged 82 *sui* (81 years by our accounting). On whose side he stood in the struggle for the throne cannot be said with assurance. Ariq Böke had been elected qa'an in the Mongol heartland quite legally; he must have represented the national tradition. The proclamation of Qubilai as qa'an in China was in the nature of a *coup d'état*; Qubilai supported Buddhism and was open to western influence. A passage in the *Yüan History* suggests that Šigi Qutuqu at first took Ariq Böke's side, but later went over to Qubilai; however, the text contains contradictions and is difficult to interpret. I translate it tentatively as follows:

When Shih-tsu (Qubilai) went to war against Ariq Böke, Qada, accompanied by Qutuqu, knelt before the Emperor (?) and said, 'My father and grandfather had the good fortune to serve in the army under the previous rulers. They gained distinction by their valour in numerous campaigns. The imperial army is now fighting in the north. Fortunately, we are young and strong and we would like to use our strength in battle as our father and grandfather did. Having (thus) redeemed (our guilt), we are now cleansed (?). I ask therefore to be allowed to fight in the land of Shih-mu-wen-tu.'

My translation is uncertain and some obscure passages may be taken as infelicitous renderings of the original Mongol. The words 'Fortunately, we are young and strong' are certainly puzzling. Ketei is mentioned in the *Secret History* among the chiliarchs appointed by Činggis Qan in 1206. Considering the fact that the Mongols married young, Ketei's son, Qada, must have been between fifty and sixty years old in Qubilai's time, whereas Šigi Qutuqu had reached the venerable age of eighty! Perhaps the original meant 'By good Fortune (= by Heaven's favour) we are still vigorous (as when) we were young (i.e. in spite of our advanced age).'

There is yet another argument in support of the view that Šigi Qutuqu had first opposed Qubilai: although Šigi Qutuqu had played an outstanding role in the service of Činggis Qan, he rates no official biography in the *Yüan History*; his death is not recorded in the Annals (*pen-chi*). Nevertheless, Šigi Qutuqu's memory was not lost among the Mongols. He ranks as one of the nine *örlüg* ('stalwarts') in the Činggis Qan legend and is still mentioned in the writings of the late Middle Ages under the name Siri Qutug.

Finally, Šigi Qutuqu has yet another claim to our attention. That concerns the authorship of the *Secret History of the Mongols*. While some scholars would regard the work as an epic poem produced over the years by one or more anonymous poets from folk memories, others believe that the *Secret History* might have been written, or at least inspired, by Šigi Qutuqu.

Of all the Mongols known to us, Šigi Qutuqu is undeniably the best qualified to have produced a vast epic account of his times. He was one of the first Mongols to be

educated and literate: he knew the family traditions of the ruler's house as few others did, since he had grown up from earliest childhood in Temüjin's camp. He had lived by Činggis Qan's side as his personal attendant, both at home and in the field; he had assumed high offices which had afforded him a broad perspective on the events of his day; and, lastly, he enjoyed the trust and position required to advocate the rights and interests of the conqueror's retainers as forcefully as does the *Secret History*.

The author's main concern in this work is to exalt the role played by Činggis Qan's comrades-in-arms and close companions. He presents Činggis Qan as an equal among peers. Činggis Qan allows Bo'orču, Muqali and Šigi Qutuqu to remonstrate with him 'until smoke comes out of his nose'; he acknowledges without argument Šigi Qutuqu's claim to exceptional rewards; he admits that he owes his position to Bo'orču and Muqali. Šigi Qutuqu occupies a special place in the *Secret History*; all the episodes in which he appears are dealt with very fully and cast him in a favourable light. In contrast with this fulsomeness, however, Šigi Qutuqu's defeat in the western campaign is dismissed in one single sentence.

In my opinion, it seems quite unlikely that the author of the *Secret History* could have been an elderly illiterate storyteller. The numerous names and dates mentioned in the work preclude this hypothesis. Admittedly, the *Secret History* contains abundant folkloric material and many passages in verse might well have been declaimed by Mongol bards in the nomads' yurts. Yet the conception and the structure of the document certainly cannot be due to an illiterate or to a man who had not belonged to the cultured nobility.

It has been stressed repeatedly that the *Secret History* must have been produced by a follower of the house of Tolui, and, as stated earlier, Rašid claims that Šigi Qutuqu was indeed attached to the house of Tolui. Nevertheless, he held no further office after Möngke's election and retired completely from public life. We actually have some reasons to believe that he was not one of Möngke's supporters. Should we conclude from this that Šigi Qutuqu cannot be the author of the *Secret History*? It seems to me that the question can only be resolved in consideration of the text's history.

A number of scholars have discovered anachronisms in the *Secret History* which have led them to contest the dating of the text to the year 1240. As stated in the colophon, the final copy of the text was completed during an imperial assembly (*yeke qurilta*) at Ködö'e Aral on the Kerülen River in the seventh month of the Year of the Rat. There was no imperial assembly in either 1240 or 1264. Möngke was elected qa'an at the *qurilta* held at Ködö'e Aral in 1251. His elevation contravened Činggis Qan's will. This being so, Möngke would hardly have benefited from the commemoration and eulogy of the world-conqueror and of the heroic figures of that

bygone period at a time so close to his own irregular election. Only one other Year of the Rat comes into consideration here, and that is 1228. In the summer of that year, the princes gathered in a great imperial assembly to elect Ögödei as qa'an according to the will of Činggis Qan. We may assume that the *Secret History* was compiled and solemnly presented to the new ruler on that occasion. The work is intended to remind him of the deeds of the men who had gained honour in the service of the throne and the building of the empire. It should serve to justify and establish the rights accruing to the heroes of that epic and their descendants to the privileges of office, honours, distinctions and gifts. The original scope of the chronicle extended no further than the death of Činggis Qan in 1227 and the work concluded with the colophon. Paragraphs 269 to 281 dealing with Ögödei's reign were added later, so that para. 269 pursues the narrative from the Year of the Rat to which the colophon refers. The present hypothesis might also explain why the *Altan tobči* of bLo-bzañ bstan-'jin, which contains almost the entire text of the *Secret History*, makes no reference to that document beyond para. 268.

The original text of the *Secret History* has not only been added to; it has been revised, edited and amended. This explains the anachronisms and, above all, the designation of Činggis Qan as *qa'an*. Činggis Qan never assumed that title, which was taken by Ögödei. Rašīd always writes *xan* (= *qan*), and it is quite improbable that a contemporary Mongol would have used the title *qa'an* in relation to Činggis Qan. The custom of bestowing titles on the founder of a dynasty and his forebears, which would not have been current in their lifetimes, was only adopted by the Mongols at a later stage from the Chinese historiographers.

The participants in the debate about the authorship and history of the text appear to have overlooked the following relevant passage in para. 269: 'Ča'āдай and Tolui both assigned to Ögödei Qa'an the night-guards, quiver-bearers and 800 day-guards who had watched over the golden life of their father Činggis Qa'an, and the servants and 10,000 bodyguards who had been in the service of the person of my father the qan (*qan ečiḡe-yin minu beye ča'ada yabun aqsat*).' This text presents no linguistic difficulty, and the Chinese interlinear gloss correctly renders *minu* with 'my' (*wo-ti*), thus virtually excluding the possibility that *minu* is merely a graphic error for *inu* 'his' (i.e. Ögödei's). The phrase *qan ečiḡe-yin minu* is not used by Ča'āдай and Tolui, but by the author, speaking of Činggis Qan. The passage is significant: it establishes that the author is in a position to refer to Činggis Qan as his father.

Šigi Qutuqu was adopted as a child into Temüjin's family and actually addressed Temüjin as father according to Rašīd's testimony. On the other hand, the phrase is included in a paragraph which, in our opinion, is not part of the original text. Would Šigi Qutuqu himself have added the section on Ögödei to the original text?

The authorship of the *Secret History* raises some interesting questions which, at our present state of knowledge, must unfortunately be left unanswered. One of these concerns Šigi Qutuqu and Činqai (q.v.).

Šigi Qutuqu, by reason of his literacy and high office, belonged to an élite group of senior administrators and court advisers who were for the most part recruited from among educated individuals of Turkic and Chinese cultural backgrounds, such as Uighurs, Kereyits, and sinicized Khitans and Jurchens. Several of them were Nestorian Christians, particularly in the milieu of Princess Sorqaqtani (who was herself a Nestorian Kereit), to which Šigi Qutuqu belonged.

We know, for instance, that Qutuqu's closest colleague and assistant at the time of the great census in north China was an official called Yeh-li-shu, i.e. 'Elišu', a Nestorian Uighur from Kao-ch'ang (Qočo) and member of the local Uighur princely family.

The only personage in this cosmopolitan élite group who enjoyed – also by virtue of his early association with Činggis Qan – power and privileges comparable to those enjoyed by Šigi Qutuqu was the famous *protonotarius* Činqai, likewise a Nestorian Christian. Činqai and Šigi Qutuqu were contemporaries and their administrative functions, especially in the area of fiscal policies, must have put them in close touch. However, Činqai's name is nowhere linked with that of Šigi Qutuqu in the Chinese and Persian sources. These sources are very informative about Činqai's career and, interestingly enough, our main Chinese source on Činqai attributes to him the function of grand judge (*Jarquči*) at a time when it could have only been held by Šigi Qutuqu. All this points to some conflict of interest between these two top court dignitaries. Now, there is not a single reference to Činqai in the *Secret History*; this must be due either to wilful omission in the original redaction, or to a subsequent obliteration of all mentions of Činqai's name from the text. Bad relations between the two officials, and direct involvement of Šigi Qutuqu in the compilation of the *Secret History*, would provide, of course, a perfect explanation for this strange omission. There is, indeed, plenty of circumstantial evidence indicating that even if Šigi Qutuqu were not the actual author of the *Secret History*, he may have been closely involved in the composition of this work.

Šigi Qutuqu had a son, called San-la, who was a centurion in the Mongol Army. San-la's daughter married Hsü-shih-tai (fl. 1298), a sinicized Kereit who changed his name to Shih-hsi (T. Chi-chih). A hereditary chiliarch in the General Administration of Catapult Operators, Hsü-shih-tai personally funded the establishment of a private academy in I-ch'uan (Honan), which took ten years to build. His son, Mu-yen Temür, was also interested in Chinese scholarship and became a famous book collector:

Professor Ch'en Yüan has traced his career in his work on Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols.

From 'blue registers' kept in a Mongol yurt to a sophisticated collection of a myriad *chüan* in a Chinese academy – here is a fine example of continuous interest in books and writings spanning several generations, and crossing the cultural and geographical barriers separating the world of the nomads from that of settled civilization.

Bibliography

CIB:69c (erroneously lists biographies in YS and YSHP); *GG*S,II:1138a,b; *IBM*, 3:115 (Hu ch'eng-hsiang),120; *YCJML*,I:869/II:1659; *YJCC*,IV:2582. *YCPS*:135, 138,202, 203,214,242,252,257,260; *Juvainī*:135,166,406; *Rašīd* 52,I.1:95,107, 108,176, 179/I.2:174,221-223,257,269,278; *Rašīd* 71:35-36. Pelliot-Hambis 51:152,390; Hung W51:482; Hambis 54:173; Cleaves 56:241 and n. 438; *Yao TW57; de Rachewiltz 60:376-380,n. 215; *Ratchnevsky 65; Ch'en Y66:63; Boyle 68:318-319; Barthold 77:391,442-443,449,454; Li TF78,I:126-129; Shih IK81; Ratchnevsky 83:202b; CKTS:29,30,43,108; YS²:93; YCS,I:452a; Farquhar 90:244(45). Cf. also P. Pelliot in *TP* 27:1930,38-42,195-198.

P. Ratchnevsky

Editorial Note

Full references to all quotations from the original sources are given in Ratchnevsky 65, of which the above essay is an authorized translation and adaptation.

7. ČINQAI (*ca.* 1169-1252)

One of the major problems confronting the historian of the Mongol empire is the degree to which that empire was in fact Mongolian – that is, the extent to which it grew out of a Mongolian social and political environment and might justifiably be called a Mongol achievement. Was this empire a true Mongol product rather than a composite structure largely derived from the political cultures of the great sedentary societies surrounding the steppe, primarily those of China and the Islamic world? Crucial for the resolution of this issue is our understanding of the nature of early Mongol society itself, and here two schools of thought may be distinguished – schools that differ greatly both in their view of the Mongolian society of the age of empire, and in their evaluation of the contribution of that society to the shape and structure of the empire which it governed.

One school sees the Mongols purely as unsophisticated nomads, who ‘followed their flocks according to the availability of water and pasturage,’ and who, when it came time to rule, left it to their Chinese, Turkestanian and other subjects actually to organise and run their conquest. It follows, in this belief, that the ‘Mongol’ empire should quickly become assimilated to local entities.

The other view, while acknowledging the broad and continuing influence of the great sedentary cultures on the Mongols, sees a much more complex Mongol society, one that was part of the wider cultural and political environment of the Eurasian steppe. This postulates important, well developed native traditions that could, and did provide the indigenous matrix of a Mongolian empire and the paradigm for the empire’s governance. Essential to this notion is the belief that even before the time of Činggis Qan there existed the rudiments of what may be termed a ‘steppe intelligentsia’ in the ‘farsighted men’ of early Mongolian history who, while active in the life of the steppe, maintained traditions of literacy (most often in the service of minor steppe rulers), organised long-range trade, and served as intermediaries between the deep steppe and the sedentary world.

Conspicuous among these farsighted men were various representatives of the mixed, semi-sedentary cultures of the ethnically complex Sino-Mongolian frontier. Such personages found ready employment with aspiring empire-builders, including the chieftain Temüjin, the future Činggis Qan, whom they later, as trusted retainers, were able to influence in moulding the institutions of the new state. More often than not, they approached the problem of governing in terms of experience gained in their own frontier societies, where native, Chinese and other elements interacted freely:

their influence necessarily bearing the hallmark of that particular background. As a consequence, the constitution that the Mongol empire came to assume reflected in essence the mixed and intermediate culture of the frontier and the outlook of the steppe intelligentsia that was born of it. In other words, if the Mongol empire, as a total system, seems to be politically heterogeneous in many respects, that feature can be taken as an expression of the hybrid character proper to the steppe intelligentsia itself. Indeed, this was, by its very nature, a bridging element and, as such, an established factor in steppe history. The weight of the influence that it exerted should therefore come as no surprise since it was rooted in the very cast-of-mind of such people and in their historical function as a class.

Many members of the early Mongol steppe intelligentsia appear in our sources, such as T'a-t'a T'ung-a (*Tatar Toṇa?), an Uighur who formerly served the Tayang Qan of the Naiman as a secretary, but later became a treasury official for both Činggis and Ögödei and was apparently responsible for first adapting the Uighur script to the language of the Onon-Kerülen Mongols; Yeh-lü A-hai (*q.v.*) who, besides serving in other capacities, was Činggis Qan's chief resident commissioner (*yeke daruqači*) in the largely Sino-Khitan administration established by the Mongols for the region of Bukhara; and perhaps even Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*) himself, although there is some question here as to whether he was too sinicized to qualify as a genuine representative of the frontier zone or a true member of the steppe intelligentsia. Perhaps the best example of all, however, is provided by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's immediate superior, Činqai, a man from the border region of north China who became a trusted associate and principal advisor of Činggis and then chief minister to that qan and his successors Ögödei and Güyük, his service to the Mongols spanning nearly five decades. Činqai's life clearly bears the characteristic imprint of the steppe intelligentsia, the historical importance of which is manifested by Činqai's decisive role in the development of the Mongol empire.

Činqai (or Čingqai; chin. Chen-hai and Ch'eng-hai) was born *ca.* 1169, probably somewhere on the fringes of the steppe, but his precise ethnic affiliation is in doubt due to apparent contradictions in the sources. The most important Chinese tradition, represented by Činqai's biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), based in part on the earlier 'spirit-way inscription' (*shen-tao pei*) in his honour composed by the great Yüan literatus Hsü Yu-jen (1287-1364), makes him a Kereit, that is, a man of predominantly Mongolian stock from a largely nomadic group resident in the steppe and on its fringes. On the other hand, Juvainī, who in all probability knew Činqai personally, calls him an Uighur, a statement that seems to find support in the early 13th century *Hsi-yu chi* (for this work see the biographies of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi and Yeh-

lū Ch'u-ts'ai), which notes a close relationship between Činqai and an Uighur potentate.

The other information available in the many sources touching on Činqai is also contradictory and fails therefore to clarify the issue. There is the evidence of Činqai's religion and native language, for example. It is absolutely certain that Činqai was a Nestorian Christian, and this fact would seem to confirm his Kereit origins since that creed is known to have been well established among the Kereits but was rare among the Uighurs. On the other hand, it is nearly equally certain that Činqai's native language was a Turkic dialect, whereas the Kereits (of the steppe) are generally agreed to have spoken Mongolian, unlike the Turkic-speaking Uighurs. Invalidating both claims, however, is a certain amount of evidence suggesting on Činqai's part great familiarity with, and even assimilation to, Chinese culture at a time when neither the Kereits nor the Uighurs had yet been sinicized to any marked extent. The *Hsi-yu chi*, for example, could be interpreted to mean that Činqai spoke Chinese, and a passage in the *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, reporting that Činqai read and approved in writing documents from Yeh-lū Ch'u-ts'ai, presumably written in Chinese, may imply that Činqai was literate in that language. Apparently Činqai also took a Chinese surname, T'ien, something unheard of for a steppe Kereit of his time, and not very likely for an Uighur of the age either.

While the sources' evidence fails incontrovertibly to declare Činqai a Kereit Mongol or a Turkic-speaking Uighur, there is yet a third possibility, namely that Činqai was neither a Kereit nor an Uighur but an Önggüt, that is, a member of a Turkic-speaking, largely Nestorian ethnic group of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone that played an important bridging role between Chinese and steppe culture and was to some extent sinicized, at least in its ruling élite. Moreover, and this is a most important fact, the clan name Kereit (in Chinese Chieh-lieh, in place of the more conventional Ch'ieh-lieh) is known from the 14th century *Ere'öl Inscription to have existed among the Önggüt. Thus, Chinese mentions of Činqai's Kereit origin might refer to the Önggüt Kereit: as an Önggüt, Činqai could well have been both Turkic-speaking and Nestorian in religion.

In the event that Činqai was a Kereit Önggüt, why did Juvainī call him an Uighur? Here again a simple explanation is possible since Pelliot has strongly suggested that the ethnic term 'Turk', or 'Uighur', was widely applied to the Turkic-speaking Önggüt in the period of the Mongol empire (including apparently Rabban Sāumâ); and, in any case, the original Turkic culture of the Önggüt ruling class differed little from that of the Turfan Uighurs. Thus a case can be made that Činqai was actually an Önggüt, a member of a distinguished, Turkic-speaking, Christian clan – the same clan to which the ruling family of the Tenduk (T'ien-te) Önggüt belonged

– and grew up in an environment that was culturally mixed, where both Altaic and Chinese elements were strongly represented.

Činqai's biography in the *Yüan History* and the other Eastern and Western sources that mention him give virtually no information about his early life. But the *Meng-Ta pei-lu* of 1221 does contain the following brief notice about an 'Uighur' named T'ien (the same surname which in some Chinese sources is prefixed to Činqai's name):

Now there was an Uighur by surname T'ien. He was very rich and made enormous profits from trade. He travelled back and forth in Shan-tung and Ho-peï and provided detailed information (to the Tatars) about the people and things (of the area). Together with the Juyin (peoples) he persuaded the Tatars to raise an army and enter the frontiers to raid. Temüjin was angered by the (Chin) oppression and thus violated the frontiers. The prefectures along the frontier were all destroyed ...

From this account we may conclude that – if T'ien the 'Uighur' is in fact Činqai – Činqai, like many other important figures of the early Mongolian empire, most notably Maḥmūd Yalavāč, began his career as an ally-merchant and spy of the qan. What, however, is especially interesting about this passage is his clear association with the Juyin peoples – border Turkic people and other foederati of the Chin that included a large portion if not all of the Önggüt. Moreover, the passage in question refers primarily to the period between 1207 and 1211, that is, the years between the 1207 uprising of the Juyin peoples that brought the Sino-Mongolian border zone firmly under Mongolian influence, and the 1211 general invasion, events in which Činqai may have played a major role, possibly drawing upon his connections with the important Tenduc Önggüt. We may even speculate that, like Ḥasan, the merchant envoy of the Önggüt prince Ala Quš Tigin Quri, Činqai may first have come to Temüjin as an ambassador from the Tenduc Önggüt, or some other Önggüt (or associated group), as a reflection of the developing alliance between the Mongols on one hand, and the Önggüt and other frontier groups on the other. Likewise, Činqai's first stay at the young Mongol qan's court may have been as a hostage for the good intentions of a frontier lord; indeed Temüjin's bodyguard, which Činqai joined at an early date, was said to have been largely recruited from such hostages.

Assuming that Činqai was T'ien the merchant, his association with Temüjin clearly pre-dated the events described by the *Meng-Ta pei-lu*. For example, Činqai is mentioned as one of those stalwarts 'drinking the waters of Baljuna' in 1203 and, judging by the extensive list of campaigns contained in his Chinese biographies, he seems to have played an important role in the almost continuous warfare that characterised the difficult years immediately following the so-called Baljuna Covenant. By 1206, moreover, Činqai had his own 'hundred' (*ja'un*), which he led actively and apparently to good effect in battle.

Having defeated his major antagonists or forced them to flee Mongolia, Temüjin was elected in 1206 supreme ruler of the Mongolian world with the title Činggis Qan. As part of the ensuing reorganisation, Činqai, who had proved himself by then, was elevated to the function of *Jarquči*, i.e. 'arbitrator,' an appointment that marked the effective beginning of his career as a minister to the rulers of the Mongol empire.

Although our sources do not say so explicitly, Činqai's appointment is almost certainly linked to the creation of an imperial central administration within the establishment of the qan. In 1206, for example, Šigi Qutuqu, adopted brother and trusted associate of Činggis, was appointed the qan's senior *Jarquči* whose responsibilities comprised the administration of peoples and territories assigned to the office of the Mongol ruler and to the qan personally, as well as matters concerning the allocation of spoils of war and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom. Indeed, according to steppe custom, the Mongol empire was ruled feudally, with a distribution of booty that involved sharing the conquered people, or the revenues produced by them, between the qan's office, the qan himself, and the various princes and potentates of the Mongolian hierarchy. Imperial administration was, first and foremost, concerned with the maintenance of this system, the allocation of new spoils, and the settling of the inevitable and unending disputes that arose in the prevailing maze of conflicting, mutually antagonistic authorities.

Several members of the Imperial Guard were later specially assigned to assist Šigi Qutuqu. The *Jarquči* Činqai seems to have been among them, with the duty of supervising the high officials (usually other *Jarqučis*, but also officers such as *bičēčis*, or scribe-secretaries, as well) delegated by the princes to represent them in administering together with the qan an empire regarded as a joint patrimony (*ulus*) of the Mongol imperial clan, of which the qan himself was no more (in theory) than the designated head. Činqai's Chinese biographies record no fewer than sixty such dignitaries under his control, a formidable establishment in view of the small size of the imperial administration at the time. Moreover, Činqai's subsequent career as an actual chancellor to Činggis and his two successors strongly suggests that Činqai's office gave rise not only to the qan's central administration, but also to provincial governments, which began as the secondment of officers sent to deal with local matters in collaboration with the agents of the qan himself. We will return below to the matter of provincial administration.

Not long after Činqai's appointment as *Jarquči*, the Mongols, having overcome most of their steppe enemies, began large-scale raids, and later general offensives with permanent conquest in mind, on the domains of the sedentary empires of Hsi-Hsia and Chin. For those years, Činqai's Chinese biographers have him campaigning in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, probably in connection with the 1207 uprising of

Juyin and Önggüt elements; in Central Asia *ca.* 1210 against the Naiman emigré Güčülük (Küčlüg), who had re-established himself in Qara Khitai domains, and apparently against the Qipčaq as part of the same campaign; in Tangut territory; in Manchuria and China against Khitans and Jurchens; and in Muslim Turkestan. Later Činqai also fought as a military leader in the final campaigns against the Chin. It was at the time of the campaign against Güčülük that Činqai earned the golden tiger tablet and the position of *čerbi* or chamberlain, an important rank within the qan's domestic establishment.

In addition to his role as an active military leader, Činqai was soon given increased responsibilities relating to the large numbers of captives taken in recent campaigns. It was often the practice of steppe rulers (the Khitan rulers of Liao are one example) to settle such captives in special locations within the steppe where they might perform their services more conveniently. One such settlement came under the direct control of Činqai himself. At some undetermined time (Činqai's official biography suggests *ca.* 1212), but apparently some years before 1222, when the Taoist patriarch Ch'iu Ch'u-chi *alias* Ch'ang-ch'un (*q.v.*) and his party travelled through the region, Činqai was ordered to establish large numbers of artisans, farmers and others in a suitable site in western Mongolia, between the Khangai and Altai mountains, a place which became known as Činqai Balqasun, 'City of Činqai,' or, more correctly, 'Granary of Činqai.' The establishment of this particular supply centre in such remote country was probably dictated by the requirements of the Mongol army in the field at the time of the campaign against Khwārazm (*ca.* 1219), Činqai Balqasun being situated between Činggis' base camp (*a'uruq*) in northern Mongolia and the area of operations in Turkestan.

Founding an agricultural colony in the deep steppe was by no means an easy task – a number of captives, who proved unable to withstand the severities of the Mongolian climate, for example, had to be moved to a more favourable location at Hung-chou (in Hopei), which remained a major government establishment into Yüan times under the control of Činqai and his descendants. Nevertheless, Činqai seems to have been able to make the settlement in western Mongolia a success since it persisted into the 14th century at least. In fact, it is likely that a portion of the present-day, indigenous agricultural population of the area must trace its origin to Činqai's forced settlers. Činqai was thus to leave his personal imprint on the history of Mongolia.

Činqai's success in founding the colony confirmed the qan's high opinion of him, an esteem that had already found expression on earlier occasions. For example, *ca.* 1206, Činqai was awarded a riding horse by Činggis, as an expression of the qan's gratitude for Činqai's service against Tayang Qan of the Naiman, while in 1215, on

the occasion of the fall of the former Chin capital Chung-tu, Činqai was invited to mount the Ta-pei ko (Tower) and shoot arrows in the four directions to mark his claim of spoils for past services. As a consequence of the qan's favour, Činqai seems to have assumed an ever more senior role in imperial administration during the last years of Činggis Qan's rule – an administration that was rapidly growing in scope and character as a result of continued Mongol expansion, and because of the conqueror's growing attention to matters of governance.

In 1227 Činggis Qan died while campaigning against Hsi-Hsia. His death marked not only the end of an epoch in the history of the Mongol empire but heralded a major change in the career of Činqai as well, whose role would be henceforth that of a true imperial chancellor with the widest possible responsibilities and powers. His new position reflected radically changing relationships within the Mongolian empire itself and within the qan's establishment.

In 1229, when Ögödei came to the throne after an interregnum of nearly two years during which his younger brother Tolui had acted as regent, he found a treasury that was all but empty following the great military campaigns since 1218, and a growing administrative burden whose needs for revenue far exceeded its potential income. Not only did this situation entail a major fiscal crisis for the young Mongolian empire, it also placed a particularly difficult problem before the new qan. Indeed, as a second generation ruler, with many potential competitors for power among his brothers and other notables, Ögödei did not command the automatic obedience and prestige enjoyed by the dynastic founder. He was thus driven to establish a strong institutional base to make up for his lack of personal prestige.

To maintain the primacy of his office in a feudal empire, Ögödei had to find means of aggrandising his own establishment and its associated power base. This he sought to achieve by rationalising the administration of imperial rule, with a view to increasing the revenue produced by conquered lands. In 1229, as a first step towards that goal, Ögödei sanctioned the creation of two revenue administrations for the richest parts of his domains, China and Turkestan. Činqai was put in charge of both agencies after having been reappointed, *inter alia*, to his old position as *Jarquči* supervisor of princely representatives and head of the joint imperial administration constituted by them. Indeed, Činqai seems to have been among the first to whom the qan turned to reorganise his government. Significantly, Činqai's biographer notes that Činqai was the only one of Činggis' grand officers to have been immediately reinstated – a fact which emphasises Činqai's role in the reforms of the early years of Ögödei's reign and his position of trust with the new emperor.

In the military field, Činqai continued to play an active role during the operations against Chin in Shansi and Honan in 1232-1233, and took part in the final attack on

Ts'ai-chou in 1234, thereby earning honours and a 1,000-families fief (*t'ou-hsia*) in En-chou, Shantung. His range of functions gave him a commanding position in Ögödei's new administrative structure. The *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*, for example, reports that Činqai was at this time keeper of the qan's seal which had to be applied to all official documents, and notes that the documents issued by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai were required to bear Činqai's validation in Uighur script. Činqai's Chinese biographers, moreover, go so far as to make him Right chancellor of a non-existent Secretarial Council (*chung-shu sheng*), an office that was later the primary executive agency on the Chinese side of Yüan administration. (In view, however, of the origins of the Yüan *chung-shu sheng*, in the bodyguard and household establishment of the qan, and of Činqai's powers equivalent to those of the head of the Yüan institution, Chinese references to his position in terms of the later Secretarial Council are not unreasonable.) The best illustration of Činqai's chancellor-like powers may be found in the role that he played in the matter of the disputed succession to the office of Čin Temür, imperial viceroy and governor in Khorāsān and Māzandarān, as outlined in Juvaini's *History of the World-Conqueror*.

Notwithstanding early Mongol incursions into the area, Khorāsān and Māzandarān, unlike north China and Turkestan, only came under firm Mongol control in the 1230s, when the garrison commander (*tammači*) Čormaqaṇ was ordered west with a powerful army. To administer the new province, a number of offices were established in Tūs, including a tax administration headed by one Šaraf al-Dīn, a nominee of Batu, and an especially empowered regional *Jarquči* office that soon acquired the character of a provincial administration. Heading this administration was Čin Temür, a Qara Khitan, or (according to Pelliot) Önggüt, official. Like Šaraf al-Dīn, moreover, Čin Temür also had connections with the court of Batu, whose influence thus overshadowed that of all others in the new province.

In 1235/36 Čin Temür died and an acute struggle broke out over the succession to his important office. This was to last for most of the remaining years of Ögödei's reign, fuelled by a growing rivalry between the various princes and potentates of the Mongol world, opposition to the qan and his line, and continuing disputes among 'progressives' and 'conservatives' over the governance of the Mongol empire. Činqai, who seems to have held overall responsibility for provincial administrations, was soon actively involved in attempting to settle the protracted conflict.

Two principal contenders emerged for Čin Temür's office which, by established Mongol tradition, should normally have gone to his son or some other heir. These were Edgü Temür, Čin Temür's own son, and his former deputy Körgüz (George), an Uighur, possibly of Nestorian faith. Edgü Temür would seem to have been ill-fitted for the post, being young and lacking in administrative experience at a time when

such experience was increasingly required. He did, however, enjoy the support and patronage of Batu, who was anxious to retain (and possibly expand) the paramount influence that he had hitherto enjoyed in Khorāsān/Māzandarān through his agents Šaraf al-Dīn and Čin Temür.

Körgüz, on the other hand, while no relative of Čin Temür's, had come to court on many occasions as Čin Temür's representative, gaining there a reputation as an able administrator which won him the support of Činqai and of Ögödei himself. (If, as the name suggests, Körgüz was a Nestorian, this would have of course strengthened the bond between himself and Činqai, who was also a Nestorian Christian. However, Juvainī intimates that Körgüz was a Buddhist, and that Činqai supported Körgüz because the latter was an 'Uighur' like him.) Körgüz, moreover, was strongly favoured by the aristocracy and other influential persons within the region that he was to govern. Indeed, such notables feared the potential rapacity of any candidate with too close a connection to Batu or any other of the great princes, and a lack of proven administrative ability. Thus, tradition, which Činqai and Ögödei had so often worked to counter in their administrative reforms, favoured Edgü Temür, but administrative good sense was on Körgüz' side. Körgüz received the appointment, after soliciting the office on a visit to Qara Qorum.

This decision was badly received by Edgü Temür; more significantly, also by his principal supporter Batu; and it had its opponents at court as well. Among them was Dānišmand Hājib, who favoured a more traditional and more directly exploitative system of rule for the Mongol empire. As an early supporter and associate of Činggis Qan, Dānišmand Hājib enjoyed a special position of influence among the Mongols, and his opposition to Körgüz' appointment was thus of major import. It was, apparently, through Dānišmand Hājib that Edgü Temür's party was able, in the absence of Činqai, to bring about the establishment of a special commission to investigate Körgüz' conduct in office.

Although he held a personal rescript (*Jarliq*) from Ögödei and had performed creditably in office until the time of the investigation, Körgüz had no choice but to set out for Qara Qorum to defend himself. On his way there, however, Körgüz was arrested by members of Edgü Temür's faction before any official decision had intervened. He was brought back a prisoner to his headquarters which had been seized by Edgü Temür, Batu's representative Nosal and others. But Körgüz' own supporters soon rallied and brought the situation to the attention of Ögödei. The emperor summoned the leaders of the opposing parties to a *Jarqu* (here a 'joint investigation') which was to settle the dispute once and for all. Presiding was Činqai, whose authority had been severely compromised during the controversy and who no doubt had welcomed the opportunity to affirm his own paramount position.

After lengthy, heated attempts at conciliation, Činqai and his subordinates made their report to the throne, already prejudiced against Edgü Temür and his party after the unfortunate collapse of a tent that had been presented by Edgü Temür to Ögödei, causing the death of a royal concubine. Ögödei, with whom the final decision lay, found against Edgü Temür but refused to punish him, sending him back to Batu instead, as 'one of Batu's men.' Other members of the party, however, were turned over for punishment to Körgüz, who had suffered great personal injury at their hands. Most received his pardon, a wise act in view of Batu's great power.

Vindicated, Körgüz set out for Tūs, the seat of authority for Khorāsān, Māzandarān and the other lands conquered by Čormaqan. Anxious to conciliate Batu, Činqai had requested that Körgüz take with him the tax commissioner Šaraf al-Dīn, who had held the same office in Čin Temür's administration, and was an agent of Batu and a former supporter of Edgü Temür. Körgüz was back in his domains by late 1239, and quickly resumed his efficient and responsible administration. The continuing dispute between conservative and progressive elements within the Mongol hierarchy (and, for that matter, the growing competition among the various princely lines) that had marked Čin Temür's succession was, however, by no means allayed by the outcome of the *Jarqu* reinstating Körgüz. To the contrary, the conflict intensified with Ögödei's advancing alcoholism. As the qan's chief minister, Činqai continued to be actively involved. In China the dispute involved a protracted controversy over taxation procedures in the areas occupied by the Mongols, an issue that also had affected the dispute over Čin Temür's succession since it was Körgüz' attempts at fiscal reorganisation that had precipitated Edgü Temür and Batu's attempt to remove him from office by force.

During the earliest years of the Mongol invasion, no formal taxes were levied in conquered territories : it was simply the practice for the qan or some prince to make a list of his needs and send his agents out to collect or seize the required items, by hook or by crook (we possess such a list in a demand for tribute from the Korean court by Temüge Otčigin, the younger brother of Činggis). Later, as conditions returned once again to normal and it became clear to many Mongols that a system of rape, pillage and extortion greatly reduced the value of the subject population for long-term exploitation, attempts were made to tax rather than expropriate, relying on former Chin officials and others experienced in maximising official profits from subject sedentary populations. In the ex-Chin capital of Chung-tu, for example, a large revenue administration was installed under the Chin turncoat Liu Min to cover the former capital and its hinterland (the Yen-ching district). But no attempt had been made before Ögödei's time to establish a unified revenue system throughout Mongol China as a whole, or to restrict the rapacity of princely agents attempting to collect

their own taxes in direct competition with the agents of the crown. Consequently, the qan ordered Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai to create and oversee a tax administration for the ten pacified districts (*lu*, in Mongolian *čölge* 'oasis,' 'city and its hinterland').

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's new agency proved extremely successful; not only did it eliminate current abuses but it actually produced substantial revenue to support the imperial establishment and satisfy many of the great princes (who received their shares from the qan's agents, renouncing in exchange their rights to collect their own revenues directly). Yet the very success of the new tax system soon proved a source of difficulty. On the one hand, many of the qan's advisors, encouraged by the relative ease with which a large income had been produced, pressed for still greater revenues – a move strictly opposed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who felt that the conquered regions, so recently subject to fire and the sword, needed more time to recover before tax rates could be increased. On the other hand, notwithstanding their newly improved incomes, many of the great princes made ever greater demands on the system in their desire to keep up with an increasingly powerful imperial establishment. Since the Mongol empire was technically a joint patrimony (*ulus*) of the imperial clan, the qan found it difficult to expand his own revenues further while limiting those of his clansmen. Moreover, as stated above, there was a feeling at court that the conquered regions could be taxed more heavily. While otherwise inclined to moderation, Čingai seems to have thought so himself, although he was clearly not in favour of the extreme measures that soon became current.

In China, matters came to a head over the issue of tax farming, interestingly, just at the time when the dispute over Čin Temür's succession was at its most violent. Beginning in 1238 in an attempt to increase revenues, tax farming concessions were sold to various persons (by and large, but not exclusively, Khwārazmians and other west Asian Muslims), over the strenuous objections of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai who saw his own responsibilities and powers reduced by the scheme. Under tax farming, taxes in a given geographical area were assigned to a tax farmer in exchange for his contracting to deliver, or delivering in advance, a quota of revenue. The tax farmer, in turn, collected his quota in the field, plus his expenses and a substantial margin of profit. Sums actually levied could thus considerably exceed the established quotas, which themselves had often risen substantially above previous rates. Among the tax farmers mentioned in our sources are: one Liu T'ing-yü, who purchased rights to the Yen-ching district wine levy for 50,000 *liang* of silver; Liu *Quturma (possibly a sinicized Uighur), who conspired with powerful members of the Mongol aristocracy and purchased rights to the general levy (*ch'ai-fa*) for all of Mongol China; and one Šarīf al-Dīn, who gained rights to all revenues from houses, land and properties,

irrigation works, and swine and fowls, in exchange for a quota of 250,000 *liang* of silver. All were openly castigated by the ever vigilant Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's funerary inscription seems to suggest that Činqai was somehow associated with the development of tax farming. It records how the Uighur translator An-t'ien-ho (*Altınqa), who had attempted to ingratiate himself with Ch'u-ts'ai and failed, went to Činqai, whom he felt more likely to fulfil his expectations, and after entering his service recommended to Činqai 'Abd al-Raḥmān, the most notorious tax farmer of them all, a man who was later to replace Ch'u-ts'ai himself. It seems highly unlikely, however, that Činqai should have actively supported 'Abd al-Raḥmān and his ilk in their role as oppressive tax farmers. In taking such men into his service he must have been motivated (if he had any real choice in the matter) by their obvious competence and a possible distrust of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's largely Sino-Jurchen establishment.

Činqai was as much a victim of circumstances as Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. The very same forces that had brought tax farming to the fore and led to a decline in Ch'u-ts'ai's influence also contributed to the eclipse of Činqai himself. Conservative elements were gaining greater and greater power at court as the qan's health worsened, until he suffered what was apparently a crippling stroke in early 1241. Little stood now in the way of a total reaction against the progressive policies of the first two-thirds of Ögödei's reign. The death of Ögödei in December 1241, removed the last barrier and ushered in almost a decade of struggle interrupted only briefly by the short, troubled reign of Güyük (1246-48). Činqai, with Maḥmūd Yalavāč (*q.v.*) who had assumed overall charge of Mongol administration in China only a few months before (the capable Mas'ūd Beg had succeeded his father in Turkestan), was forced to flee the agents of Ögödei's vindictive empress, Töregene Qatun. They found refuge with the former qan's son, the powerful prince Köden, who, despite repeated requests from his mother, refused to surrender Činqai and Yalavāč pending the convening of a *quriltai* to elect a new qan. Other progressives were not so fortunate and among those put to death was Činqai's protégé Körgüz, killed on orders of the empress. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, whom the Chinese sources depict as an arch-villain, took control in China while Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (d. 1243) looked on helplessly.

The interregnum following the death of Ögödei lasted almost five years. We know nothing about Činqai's activities at the time except that he remained in Köden's protection. In late 1246, the Mongols finally managed to elect Ögödei's son Güyük as the new qan, and Činqai was once more restored to power as one of a coterie of predominantly Christian ministers. Güyük was himself a Nestorian and this religion made important gains under his rule, fostered, among others, by Činqai himself.

(Činqai's role in this respect is highlighted by Rašīd al-Dīn who clearly regarded such a development with disfavour.)

Güyük seems to have endeavoured to restore his father's administration and Činqai reassumed much the same powers that he had enjoyed under Ögödei. He seems once again to have become great arbitrator for the imperial administration with direct responsibility for the day-to-day affairs of the court; the government of the 'central domain' (*qol-un ulus*) of Mongolia and adjacent areas that came under the direct control of the court; and overall supervision of imperial administration as a whole, involving specifically the other three provinces (China, Turkestan and Khorāsān/Māzandarān). Having re-established his position, Činqai once again sought allies among the progressive elements in the Mongol world, elements that sought a more institutional system of governance and a more rational, less predatory exploitation of the peoples and resources of the empire, a goal no less desired by Güyük than it had been by his father before him.

Among Činqai's many functions in the current affairs of the qan's court was the reception of various embassies in the name of his master. We are fortunate, in view of the general paucity of information on Güyük's reign in other sources, to possess a first-hand account of such events in John of Pian di Carpine's *Historia Mongalorum*. Friar John, a Franciscan envoy sent by Innocent IV in 1245 in the hope of averting the Mongol threat to Europe and to gather intelligence, arrived at the Mongol court on 22 July 1246, just in time to witness the election and enthronement of the new qan. He was sent back with Güyük's reply on 17 November.

The Franciscan's account of his stay at the Mongol court mentions Činqai several times. The first relates to the initial appearance of the embassy before Güyük:

At that place [near Qara Qorum] we were summoned into the presence of the Emperor, and Chingay [Činqai] the protonotary wrote down our names and the names of those who had sent us, also the names of the chief of the Solangi [Koreans] and of others, and then calling out in a loud voice he recited them before the Emperor and all the chiefs. When this was finished each one of us genuflected four times on the left knee and they warned us not to touch the lower part of the threshold. After we had been most thoroughly searched for knives and they had found nothing at all, we entered by a door on the east side. For no one dare enter from the west with the sole exception of the emperor or, if it is a chief's tent, the chief; those of lower rank do not pay much attention to such things. This was the first time since Cuyuc [Güyük] had been made Emperor that we had entered his tent in his presence. He also received all the envoys in that place, but very few entered his tent. (From Dawson 1955, 63-64.)

Later Činqai is noticed again, in connection with the intricate work involved in drafting a reply to the Pope's letter to Güyük:

...The Emperor sent for us, and through Chingay his protonotary told us to write down what we had to say and our business, and give it to him. We did this and wrote out for him all that we said earlier to Bati [Batu]... A few days

passed by; then he had us summoned again and told us through Kadac [Qadaq], the procurator of the whole empire, in the presence of Bala and Chingay his protonotaries and many other scribes, to say all we had to say: we did this willingly and gladly. Our interpreter on this as on the previous occasion was Temer, a knight of Jerozlaus': and there were also present a cleric who was with him and another cleric who was with the Emperor. On this occasion we were asked if there were any people with the Lord Pope who understood the writing of the Russians or Saracens or even of the Tartars. We gave answer that we used neither the Ruthenian nor Saracen writing; there were however Saracens in the country but they were a long way from the Lord Pope; but we said that it seemed to us that the most expedient course would be for them to write in Tartar and translate it for us, and we would write it down carefully in our own script and we would take both the letter and the translation to the Lord Pope. Thereupon they left us to go to the Emperor. On St. Martin's day we were again summoned, and Kadac, Chingay and Bala, the aforementioned secretaries, came to us and translated the letter for us word by word. When we had written it in Latin, they had it translated so that they might hear a phrase at a time, for they wanted to know if we had made a mistake in any word. When both letters were written, they made us read it once and a second time in case we had left out anything, and they said to us: 'See that you clearly understand everything, for it would be inconvenient if you did not understand everything, seeing you have to travel to such far-distant lands.' When we replied 'We understand everything clearly' they wrote the letter once again in Saracenic, in case anyone would be found in those parts who could read it if the Lord Pope so wished. (*Ibid.*, 66-67.)

The Latin version of this letter is reproduced in the *Historia Mongalorum* and the Saracenic, that is, Persian version, was discovered in 1920 in the Papal archives in Rome. It was edited by Paul Pelliot in 1923. The Qadaq and Bala mentioned in the text were, respectively, the senior arbitrator (*Jarquči*) for the empire and the chief secretary (*bičēči*) of the Imperial Secretariat. Together with Činqai they were the most powerful of all the qan's ministers, and the effective heads of the government – as will be clear from the passages quoted above.

Great as it was, Činqai's restored power was not destined to last, for Güyük died (possibly by poison) in early 1248. Although retaining his rank and office during the regency of Oğul Qaimiš (1248-51), Činqai remained virtually unconsulted and played only a minor role in the actual administration of the empire. However, as a former minister under Činggis Qan and his two successors, Činqai still enjoyed considerable personal influence which he often used to settle old scores. For example, he seems to have been behind the arrest and execution of Töregene's favorite, Fatima, accused of causing by witchcraft the illness and death of Činqai's powerful protector, Köden. (According to the Tibetan sources, Köden died in 1251, after a long illness; Juvainī places the death of Köden and the arrest of Fatima much earlier.)

Činqai's association with the house of Ögödei was soon to prove fatal after the coup that rejected Güyük's heir and made the house of Tolui the new imperial dynasty in the person of Möngke (r. 1251-59). Činqai did not attend the *quriltai* that elected Möngke, preferring perhaps to await developments on the sidelines. This fact, in

addition to his having served under Ögödei, Güyük and Oğul Qaimiš, made Činqai highly suspect. When he finally did come (or was summoned) to declare his loyalty to the new qan, events had already progressed far beyond his power to influence their course any longer: shortly after Möngke's accession, a falconer named Keşik observed, or claimed to have observed, an armed party assembled under Širemün, a grandson of Ögödei, and Naqu, Güyük's son and principal heir, to dethrone Möngke and force the election of a new qan from Ögödei's line. Informed of the plot, Möngke quickly moved to consolidate his position by arresting the alleged conspirators and by having his senior *jarquči*, Mengeser Noyan, undertake a great purge of his enemies, in the course of which hundreds, even thousands, of Mongol notables great and small lost their lives, including Oğul Qaimiš, Güyük's empress and former regent, and Qadaq, the former senior *jarquči* of the empire and Činqai's superior.

None of the existing sources connects Činqai directly with the plot against Möngke. Činqai seems to have remained unaffected at first, although he is named in an edict of Möngke, reproduced by Rašīd al-Dīn, proscribing the house of Ögödei and its ministers. Moreover, he was almost certainly among those questioned by the grand inquisitor, Mengeser Noyan. But his time was not long. Changed political relationships, the suspicion of the qan, and the deaths of so many associates and protectors at the executioner's hand, had considerably weakened Činqai's position. His enemies seem to have been quick in taking advantage of the fact. Činqai was condemned to death and, according to Juvainī, he was executed, aged 83, by his old enemy Dānišmand Hājib (who, it will be recalled, had been among those opposing Körgüz' appointment to succeed Čin Temür), sometime in late 1252. Since this was some eighteen months after the discovery of the plot against Möngke, and well after the ensuing trials and executions, Činqai's death must be seen as a separate event, such as the result of a personal vendetta. The evidence is too slight to support T'u Chi's conclusion that Činqai was one of those executed for conspiracy, in view of Juvainī's clear statement that Činqai died in the year following that of the plot. Our main Chinese source on Činqai even claims to reproduce words of qan Möngke lamenting the death of the great statesman, perhaps to be understood in the sense that the execution took place against his wishes. This is unlikely, however, particularly since the source in question makes Činqai die 'at home', i.e. a natural death, and in a different year (*i-wei* = 1235; almost certainly a mistake for *i-mao* = 1255) – a deliberate falsification designed to obliterate the memory of his ignoble end.

Činqai had two wives. One had been given to him by Činggis Qan; the other, a Jurchen princess, was given to him by Ögödei in reward for his service in the final campaign against Chin in 1234. They bore him ten (one source says twelve) sons. Činqai's family does not seem to have suffered as a result of his disgrace. There is no

evidence, for instance, that any of Činqai's offices (with the possible exception of that of *čerbi*) or holdings were taken from his descendants. His eldest son Yašmūt succeeded Činqai as *jarquči*, inherited the golden tiger tablet, and apparently also obtained possession of his father's tribal holdings that later became a Runners' (*giügč'i*) chiliarchy. Other offices and prerogatives went to the younger sons, including the apanage in En-chou and rights to the Hung-chou 'factory' – by now a sizable colony of artisans and craftsmen. Činqai's family association with Hung-chou is shown by the fact that he was actually buried there.

Ten of his descendants are known to have held responsible offices in the Yüan civil and military administration throughout the dynasty. Nevertheless, the suppression by Činqai's Chinese biographer of the actual circumstances of his death, and the fact that none of his descendants ever enjoyed powers even remotely comparable to his, might indicate that Činqai could have died under a cloud, even though this would have been largely dispelled by the active support which the members of Činqai's family gave soon after to Qubilai. Činqai was rehabilitated as a result, but not to the extent of being granted a posthumous title, such as was given to many of the other early ministers and officials of the Mongol empire; nor is Činqai mentioned in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, or in any other Mongol source embodying records and material of the 13th and 14th centuries. This is astonishing not only in view of Činqai's many contributions, but also because his Chinese biographer specifically states that his name and merits were recorded in the *Tobč'iyān* or *National History* of the Mongol dynasty. Considering the fundamental role played by Činqai in the establishment of the dynasty, the removal of his name from the official records and the subsequent lack of recognition appear unworthy of the Yüan rulers.

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Buell 77/79/80; Li TF78:383; YSCK 4 (1980), 14; J.R.Hamilton in *Turcica* 1:1969,50, and *JA* 271:1984,430,n.11; CKTS:55,62,63,322,324; Ting KF86; YCS,I:453a/II:437; Allsen 87:32,70; Farquhar 90:169-170(32),244(45). (See also the biographies of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and Ch'iu Ch'u-chi in the present volume.)

P.D. Buell

Editorial Note

The biography of Činqai is fraught with problems due to conflicting statements in the Chinese and Persian sources. The following points should be stressed: 1) the ethnic origin of Činqai cannot be determined with any degree of certainty and his identification with the 'merchant T'ien' remains hypothetical, even though Činqai bore the Chinese surname or appellation of T'ien ('Field'), apparently because of his well-known activity in connection with the resettlement of population and the establishment of agricultural and artisans' colonies (*t'un-t'ien*). His personal name Činqai~Čingqai probably corresponds to tu. Sinqay (from chin. *hsin-chieh* [< *kāi*] 'novice'), originally a Buddhist title, but Činqai was unquestionably a Nestorian Christian (cf. the case of Ananda, Prince of An-hsi during the Yüan, who had a Buddhist name but was a Muslim convert). The designation 'Kereit' was used rather loosely in the Mongol period, and in the *Yüan-shih* (122, 18a) even the Central Asian Muslim merchant Ḥasan is called a Kereit! 2) there is also contradictory evidence regarding his office(s) besides those of *čerbi* (chamberlain) and *bičēčī* (scribe-secretary) which he definitely held, the former under Činggis Qan, and the latter under Ögödei and Güyük. The office of 'Protonotarius' assigned to him by John of Pian di Carpine refers beyond doubt to that of chief secretary, which he held under Güyük. According to Hsü Yu-jen, Činqai was appointed *Jar(u)qači* (usually a variant reading of *jarquči*), i.e. judge or arbitrator, during the early 13th century; and Juvainī says that he took part in the investigation (*jarqu*) of Körgüz's case under Ögödei. However, a few paragraphs later Juvainī mentions him again together with the '*bitikčīs*,' i.e. the *bičēčīs*, who prepared the report of the case for the emperor. It may well be that if Činqai held the office of *jarquči*, which is debatable, this was probably an ad hoc assignment directly related to his main function of 'recorder,' which was part of his secretarial duties at court. It is significant that such an exalted office as that of *jarquči* should not be mentioned at all in Činqai's biography in the *Yüan-shih*.

8. YEH-LÜ A-HAI (ca. 1151- ca. 1223), YEH-LÜ T'U-HUA (d. 1231)

The Khitan, rulers of the Liao dynasty overthrown in the early 12th century by the Jurchen of Chin, were one of many non-Chinese ethnic groups in the Chin empire which comprised not only the densely populated, Chinese-speaking Yellow River valley but present-day Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, the Soviet Maritime Region, and adjacent parts of Siberia and Mongolia. The Khitan, probably numbering well over one million, were notable in two ways under the Chin. They were, first and foremost, the most important tribal inhabitants of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, where they constituted a buffer against steppe raids and a military force available to the Chin court both for operations in the steppe and for action against sedentary enemies such as the Sung. Secondly, the many acculturated Khitan of the urban élite supplied cadres for the Jurchen, themselves little versed in the refinements of Chinese civilization and distrustful of an exclusively Chinese bureaucracy. Both groups of Khitan were important to the Chin regime: next to the Jurchen themselves, and the masses of their Chinese subjects powerful through sheer numbers, no ethnic group enjoyed such influence as the Khitan.

Both groups of Khitan, the tribal and the acculturated, had cast in their lot with their Jurchen conquerors by the late 12th century. Some, however, were reluctant to subordinate Khitan interests to those of the new rulers. Firstly, the Jurchen were the hated destroyers of Liao, and no matter how much the Chin court attempted to share power with the Khitan loyalists (*i-min*), the past could not be forgotten. Secondly, many of the Khitan tribesmen were alarmed by the accelerating sinicisation of the Chin, whose farming background inclined them to cultural assimilation with the agricultural society of China. For their part, the vast majority of Khitan were pastoral nomads at heart, and the penetration of the steppe by farmers, apparently encouraged by the Chin court, was seen by many of the tribesmen as a threat to their existence. A third issue, for the urban, acculturated Khitan most of whom identified with Confucian values, arose from the unacceptable nature of the Chin regime in Confucian terms; in their eyes the Jurchen rulers of Chin were harsh 'men on horseback,' supporting a regime of oppression rather than of enlightened wisdom. The Chin empire's large Khitan minority was therefore restive and presented a source of possible difficulties for the court.

The turn of the 13th century, a time when their dissatisfaction may have seemed most acute to many Khitan, was a period of accelerating change throughout Asia. Part and parcel of this change were the rapidly altering relationships between the

world of the sown and that of the steppe, precipitated by the rise of the Mongols to world power. The emergence of the Mongols as a dominant political force concerned the Khitan in yet another way, since Khitan and Mongols spoke related languages, enjoyed very similar cultures, and had formerly maintained close political connections. Moreover, the rise of the Mongols represented a reaction to the encroachment by sedentary communities that was also alarming many Khitan. It soon occurred to Khitan leaders that a renewed alliance with the Mongols was one way of restoring Khitan fortunes, or at least of replacing the Chin with a more amenable regime. Consequently, more Khitan looked to the steppe and ever fewer to the Chin court as the 13th century progressed. The Mongols, moreover, did not overlook the strategic significance of the border peoples in any bid to rule the steppe, as an entry port and a source of allies for raids into China.

In the circumstances, the Khitan came to play major roles in the emerging world empire of Činggis Qan, firstly and from a very early date, as important tribal allies. Secondly, they became valuable interpreters of Chinese ways for the Mongols when the latter attempted to establish a system of rule in conquered territories.

Two of the earliest Khitan allies of the Mongols were the brothers Yeh-lü A-hai and T'u-hua, who came from a tribe in the Huan-chou area, a major centre of Khitan population in the China borderlands of Inner Mongolia. Both men were to make great and enduring contributions to the early Mongol empire. Their many descendants served later Mongol rulers well into the fourteenth century.

Yeh-lü A-hai, the elder of the two brothers, was born about 1151 into a family of local notables. In the early 13th century, his grandfather, Sa-pa-erh, is said to have been prefect of Huan-chou, a small but strategic fortified settlement with 578 registered (sedentary) families, whereas his father, T'o-t'ieh-erh, was a minor official in the Chin Presidential Council. There is no indication that T'o-t'ieh-erh actually served at court and his appointment (an expression of his tribal position?) may have been to a regional administration office of the Presidential Council, meaning very little in practice.

Yeh-lü A-hai's biography stresses his military and linguistic accomplishments, suggesting that he grew up in the multicultural environment of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. There is no suggestion that, as a youth, he ever left the region of his birth for any extended period of time. His knowledge of the Chin empire as a whole, and in particular of its Chinese nucleus, may therefore have been limited. A-hai did, however, have an excellent knowledge of spoken Chinese, and an apparent understanding of Chinese administrative procedures and practices that was later to stand him in good stead.

Some time towards the close of the 12th century, when he was already in his forties, A-hai was sent as an envoy to To'oril Qan of the Kereit, a man better known to history by his later title, Ong Qan ('Prince Qan'). No date is given for this embassy in A-hai's biography, but it must refer to the mid-1190s when To'oril, and his young ally Temüjin, the later Činggis Qan, fought against recalcitrant Tatar led by one Megüjin Se'ültü. On the Chin side, the operation was conducted by Wan-yen Hsiang, who established his Regional Secretariat at Lin-huang (now Lin-hsi) in eastern Inner Mongolia. A-hai, who had probably been called up on Hsiang's orders, might have served as the Jurchen chancellor's envoy. It is possible that A-hai's father, T'o-t'ieh-erh, had himself been attached to Wan-yen Hsiang's office.

Although Ong Qan and his ally Temüjin were able to defeat and kill Megüjin Se'ültü in 1196, unrest, possibly caused by conflict between nomadic and sedentary elements, continued in the frontier zone, forcing the Chin to build (renovate?) a new defence line in its Pei-ching district and to maintain an increased and more heavy-handed presence. Such circumstances and an apparently growing Chin oppression of the border peoples, inclined Yeh-lü A-hai's sympathies more and more towards the steppe. According to A-hai's biography – and its account is not uninfluenced by the Yüan national myth of Činggis Qan as dynastic founder – the Khitan had met, and been highly impressed by, Temüjin during his embassy to Ong Qan. As a consequence, he had offered to enter the Mongol chieftain's service. The following year (1197/8), the account continues, when A-hai was once again sent as an envoy to Ong Qan, he brought with him his brother T'u-hua to serve as a hostage in Temüjin's bodyguard (?) thereby guaranteeing A-hai's loyalty. T'u-hua was at the time garrison commander at Huan-chou and, according to his own biography, went over to the Mongols with his 'people,' that is his family and family retainers, perhaps a score of persons in all. Both brothers, if we may credit their biographies, later fought in the qan's steppe wars; they were numbered among those loyalists 'drinking the waters of Baljuna.'

We know little about A-hai's activities during the period between the Baljuna covenant (traditionally assigned to 1203) and the massive Mongol assault on Chin of late 1211. Their biographies suggest that A-hai and T'u-hua took part in early Mongol raids on the sedentary world (against Chin and Hsi-Hsia) during these years, but these references may be to events closer to 1211. It is clear, however, that soon after A-hai's final departure for the steppe, the Chin government became suspicious of his continued absence and took his family into custody as hostages. To compensate A-hai for their loss, Temüjin gave him an aristocratic Mongol girl as a wife and a body of tribesmen as retainers. But those cannot have been many since A-hai is not named among the chiliarchs appointed in 1206.

In late 1211, as the Chin attempted to regain the influence on the Sino-Mongolian frontier lost in the great tribal uprising of 1207, the Mongols reacted in full force. Both A-hai and T'u-hua were involved in these campaigns as 'guides' for the invaders under the operational control of Ĵebe. Following the Mongol victory at the Wu-sha pao, and not before according to the Chinese historian T'u Chi, T'u-hua (and his brother A-hai) captured the large number of Chin horses mentioned in T'u-hua's biography. At the same time, with the defection of Liu Po-lin (1148-1221) and his followers to the Mongol side, T'u-hua also acquired the first contingents of local auxiliaries assigned to him, which were later to grow into a large army. Neither A-hai nor T'u-hua seems to have participated in the raid in force led by Ĵebe and Sübōtei into Manchuria but, after campaigning on either side of the Great Wall, both brothers appear to have been present during the first Mongol siege of the Chin capital of Chung-tu, during the winter of 1213-1214.

In the spring of 1214, when plague broke out among the besiegers and an epizootic disease struck their animals, the Mongols accepted Chin's peace proposals, lifted their siege, and departed north. The agreement accepted by the Mongols seems to have committed them to withdrawing, not only beyond the line of the Great Wall, but from the cities and settlements of the Sino-Mongolian border as well. There is no evidence of any attempt to do so, or indication that the Mongols ever intended to comply. Temüĵin, now Činggis Qan, did pull back his main army into Mongolia, but left behind numerous local allies firmly entrenched in the areas that should have been returned to the Chin government. The whereabouts of Yeh-lü A-hai during this period are not known, but it is highly probable that he was positioned near his brother in Te-hsing, which later became the centre of his apanage in China as Hsüan-te was to become that of T'u-hua (both A-hai and his brother were included among the seventeen great apanage holders, *t'ou-hsiang*, listed by P'eng Ta-ya in 1234, and the family continued to accumulate holdings after that time).

The peace of 1214, however, was destined to be brief. In the autumn of that year, the Chin emperor suddenly abandoned his capital in the north and fled south to Pien-liang, the Chin 'Southern Capital' (Nan-ching, present-day K'ai-feng in Honan), and the relative security of the Yellow River valley. Činggis Qan, apparently intent upon keeping the Chin ruler as a Mongol puppet, immediately ordered a resumption of hostilities. Overall command of the operations against the former Chin capital Chung-tu (i.e. Peking), the Mongols' first objective, went to the Mongols Sanĵar and Samuqa Ba'atur, but local Khitan and Chinese allies did most of the actual fighting. The brothers A-hai and T'u-hua were among them, apparently acting under the orders of another Khitan defector, Shih-mo Ming-an.

In the spring of 1215, Chung-tu surrendered, finally reduced by a highly effective blockade. Činggis Qan conferred high-sounding titles upon the major participants in the campaign, perhaps thinking of replacing the Chin puppet regime with a Khitan buffer government at his direct command. Ming-an, A-hai and T'u-hua were each granted one of the highly prestigious titles bestowed on the three chief aids to the Chinese ruler, the Three Dukes (or Excellencies), that stood traditionally at the apex of Chinese officialdom. Ming-an became the Grand Guardian, A-hai the Grand Preceptor, and T'u-hua the Grand Tutor, perhaps to impress upon Chinese subjects that these three personages were high ministers holding Chung-tu and its environs for their qan-emperor. In fact, Ming-an, A-hai, T'u-hua and their heirs were to dominate absolutely the Chung-tu area for some two decades or more. Ming-an and, after Ming-an's early death in 1216, his son and heir Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu (d. ca. 1235) became the resident commissioner or governor (*daruqači*) of the former Chin capital. T'u-hua's subordinates were reorganised and reinforced to become the Han Army (although not ethnically 'Han' since it included Khitan and other non-Chinese troops). T'u-hua himself became the supreme commander of military forces in the area as Imperial commander (*yeke noyan*), or, as the title was rendered for Chinese usage, *tsung-ling yeke noyan* 'Imperial commander in general control.' A-hai was made head of Regional Secretariat, apparently the Chinese designation for what was almost certainly a regional *daruqači* administration, with authority over several provinces. That was, in fact, the type of government instrumentality that A-hai was later to head in Bukhara. The importance of this administration, despite our almost complete lack of information about it, is underscored by the Sung envoy Chao Hung's reference to A-hai as the first of the Tatar (i.e. Mongol) 'chief ministers.' Činggis Qan formally expressed his own paramount interest in the conquered city by sending there a special delegation comprised of two members of the Imperial Guard, Arqai Qasar and the steward (*bawurči*) Önggür, and attended by the judge or arbitrator (*jarquči*) Šigi Qutuqu, to inventory and take over Chin treasuries and other booty in the city (see the biography of Šigi Qutuqu).

After the fall of Chung-tu, Mongol armies once again flooded into China and set about plundering and conquering Chin domains piecemeal. Local allies and armies situated in and about Chung-tu, in addition to providing security in the region, played active parts in these campaigns. As a result, the conquered territories in China had grown so large by 1217 (or 1218 according to another dating tradition), that a major reorganisation was necessary. In that year a garrison force (*tamma*), in the form of a regional 'tribal' federation, was created for the new Mongol domains under the myriarch Muqali (*q.v.*). This *tamma* comprised three distinct elements. One component, comprising the main striking force, was positioned under the direct

command of Muqali in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone and consisted of five tribal groupings of Onggirat, Ikires, Mangqut, Uru'ut and Ĵalayir, a large allied force provided by the 'Tenduc' (T'ien-te) Önggüt, and Tangut contingents. A second mobile element mustered small groups of scouts (*alginči*?) to deal with minor problems and to alert the main striking force in the event of a major incident. The third element, by far the largest group numerically, was made up of the armies of the various local Mongol allies in China. Among them was Yeh-lü T'u-hua, whose Han Army was now reorganised as part of the Mongol *tamma* structure, with three subordinate chiliarchies formed by the forces of the Khitan *jüyin* commander *Ĵalar, and the Chinese commanders Liu Po-lin and Shih T'ien-ni (1197-1225). The *jüyin* (chin. *chiu*) troops were special military units, largely but not exclusively made up of Khitan tribesmen, maintained as an élite army by the Chin regime. (It should be noted, however, that the identification of this *Ĵalar with the *jüyin* commander is contested by other scholars.) The assignment to T'u-hua, and other prominent Khitan personages associated with the developing Chung-tu power base, of new armies and the population groupings supporting them, considerably enhanced the growing influence of this Khitan faction within Mongol-occupied China.

Not long after the 1217 reorganisation in China, the Otrar (Uṯrār) massacre and growing dissension involving the powerful Khwārazmian empire forced the Mongols to turn their attention to the security of the western marches of their domains. In late 1219, after attempts to negotiate had failed, Mongol armies moved into western Turkestan from their base in the Irtysh valley. Faced with an unexpected full-scale Mongol assault, the Khwārazm shāh 'Alā al-dīn Muḥammad attempted to wait out the attack. He placed large garrisons in the great cities of Farghāna, Bukhara and Gurganj to blunt or delay the Mongol advance, while he took up position himself with the remainder of his army on the Iranian side of the Amu Darya. This scheme, however, served only to disperse the Khwārazmian forces and soon failed as many garrisons surrendered almost without a fight or abandoned their stations. By the end of 1220, when the harried Khwārazm shāh died from a lung ailment on an island in the Caspian Sea, most of his empire had fallen into Mongol hands (see the biography of Sübōtei).

Bukhara was among the parts of the Khwārazmian empire already under Mongol control at the death of the Khwārazm shāh. The city's garrison, except for a few defenders taking shelter in the citadel, simply fled, leaving it up to a delegation of influential residents to come to terms with the Mongols. In attempting to reduce the defenders of the citadel, the assailants accidentally burned much of the city, but the population remained largely unharmed. There was at first more resistance at Samarqand but, after the defeat of a large force of local militia in a Mongol ambush,

the gates there were thrown open to the conquerors. Part of the garrison cut its way out and escaped, part fought to the last man in the citadel, but most surrendered only to be slaughtered the next day by the victors. As at Bukhara, the population of Samarqand survived largely unscathed, although some slaves were taken in both places and local militias were raised to assault the remaining centres of resistance. The other major population centres in the region also fell to the Mongols more or less undamaged.

As soon as effective resistance had ceased at Bukhara, Samarqand and in the rest of the area, the Mongol armies moved on, leaving behind only small mobile forces, positioned in the open to provide a quick response to crisis as was the Mongol practice, supported by local allies to secure and expand the new conquests. The conquerors also appointed their *daruqači* for the population centres of Bukhara and for special categories such as military artisans. One such *daruqači* was Yeh-lü A-hai, called Taušā, after his Chinese title of Grand Preceptor (*t'ai-shih*), in Juvaini's history. He had been ordered to accompany the qan west at the time of the general mobilisation against the Khwārazmians. A-hai, however, was appointed *daruqači* not simply for one of the major cities of Bukhara, but for the entire region – in the role that he had perhaps assumed already in occupied north China.

As a regional *daruqači*, A-hai was a special personage since only a handful of regional *daruqači* are known to have been appointed during the first decades of Mongol rule, and few afterward. All, as far as can be determined, were men of considerable power and influence.

In this function, Yeh-lü A-hai seems to have held major responsibilities in two primary areas. He was, firstly, the senior *daruqači* of his jurisdiction, to whom various subordinate *daruqači* in Samarqand (his seat), in the city of Bukhara, and in towns and villages outside the major centres, were responsible. A-hai was thus probably charged with ensuring that the subordinate *daruqači* performed their functions effectively. Those functions included taxation, the maintenance of stations of the Mongol post-relay system (*jam*), dispatch of revenues and tribute items to court, the compiling of population registers; the raising of local corvée parties; the enlistment and supply of local security forces and garrisons, and the leading of these local forces in the field when necessary; and, when the occasion arose, the reception, feeding, clothing and dispatch of distinguished visitors and others enjoying the special favour or protection of the Mongol qan. Secondly, A-hai seems to have served as a plenipotentiary regional coordinator, a viceroy even, for the Mongols in Bukhara, entrusted with the difficult task of integrating the heterogeneous components of his 'province' into a coherent entity. And this he did through an administration of

multinational character, put together from alien and local elements, but on the whole Chinese in character.

We are comparatively well informed about A-hai's administration in Samarqand, due to the eyewitness account of Li Chih-ch'ang, the *Hsi-yu chi*, a document recording the travels of his master, the Neo-Taoist Ch'üan-chen patriarch Ch'ang-ch'un (i.e. Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, *q.v.*) to the court of Činggis Qan. From this source it is clear that although the countryside remained much disturbed, Samarqand, and through Samarqand the entire region of Bukhara as well, possessed the beginnings of a firm government in the well-ordered administration of Yeh-lü A-hai.

A-hai, in addition to governing Bukhara and arranging for the stay of the Taoist party in his domains, also participated in Ch'ang-ch'un's interviews with the Mongol qan, translating the visitors' words into Mongolian. His participation in the encounter between Ch'ang-ch'un and the Mongol qan is indicative of the high status enjoyed by A-hai and of Činggis's great personal regard for him.

The Taoist party finally set out for home in early 1223 and with its departure we lose sight of Yeh-lü A-hai. His biography records that he died in Samarqand and that he held office for only a short time before his death. He is last mentioned in the *Hsi-yu chi* in connection with events taking place on 10 November 1222, and his death must have occurred most likely in early 1223. His offices and titles, including that of Grand Preceptor, as well as his administration, were inherited by his son, Yeh-lü Mien-ssu-ko. Mien-ssu-ko is the Taušā mentioned by Ĵuvainī as being the senior *daruqači* in Bukhara at the time of the Tārāb rebellion of 1238/39. As an apparent consequence of that rebellion, which severely shook Mongol power throughout Bukhara, Mien-ssu-ko retired, or was forced to retire, from his office. This might have reflected a growing conflict between imperial officials, such as Mien-ssu-ko, representing the interests of the Mongol central authority, and the princes, anxious to reduce the powers of that central authority and plunder what they could from the increasingly important sedentary portions of Mongol domains. Mien-ssu-ko's administration, following that of his father A-hai, seems to have been the foundation for the Bukharan prosperity so praised by Ĵuvainī. His retirement, however, entailed no real loss of power since he was made Imperial commissioner (*yeke daruqači*) of the district of Chung-tu upon his return to China, probably in 1241.

After Yeh-lü A-hai's departure to the west, his younger brother T'u-hua continued to enjoy great powers in occupied China as more and more local allies were placed under his control. In 1220, Chao Hung noted that T'u-hua held powers second only to those of Muqali in the occupied north, although we know little about T'u-hua's activities at the time. It is only in connection with Ch'ang-ch'un's travels to the west that T'u-hua emerges briefly from obscurity. Like many notables in Mongol China,

the Khitan was a patron of Ch'üan-chen Taoism. In autumn 1220, he invited and received at Hsüan-te the voyager and his party, then on their way to the court of the qan in the west. He entertained his guests with great pomp: we are told that T'u-hua had a local temple, the Ch'ao-yüan kuan, restored to celebrate the arrival of Ch'ang-ch'un. T'u-hua was again visited by the Taoists on their way back to China in 1223, and he welcomed them once more in style.

Certain factions among the Mongols seem to have sought to check the growing Khitan influence in Mongol China in the late 1220s. An indication of this attempt may be seen in the mission headed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai sent to carry out investigations of improprieties in Chung-tu during the regency of Tolui (1227-29), apparently directed against Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu and his associates. T'u-hua's own power seems to have remained intact. Indeed, his position was reconfirmed in 1229 by Ögödei, and he even survived a scandal connected with imperial grain reserves at Hsüan-te in 1231, which had placed him at loggerheads with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who was then at the height of his power (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai).

It was probably to remove T'u-hua from his power base at Hsüan-te that, soon after this incident, Ögödei ordered him to follow Tolui in the Mongols' major push against the western domains of the Chin. T'u-hua was to lead the combined forces of Liu Po-lin's son Liu Ni (alias Hei-ma, 1200-62) and *Jalar, but when the invading army reached Hsi-ho in Kansu, T'u-hua died in unknown circumstances, virtually at the outset of the campaign.

T'u-hua's title of Grand Preceptor, his office of Imperial commander in general control, as also his command of the Han Armies, were inherited by his son Yeh-lü Mo-ko, who distinguished himself in the capture of the Chin's last stronghold, Ts'ai-chou, in 1234. The following year he led the seven myriarchies of the Han Armies, one of them under Liu Ni, to Szechwan, where he apparently died in 1236. The hereditary title and office were retained by T'u-hua's family until the great reorganisation of Qubilai's reign which sought to reduce the power of the military princelings such as Yeh-lü A-hai's and T'u-hua's descendants, who continued nevertheless to enjoy high military and civil rank under the new regime.

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9. MAḤMŪD YALAVAČ (? - 1254), MAS'ŪD BEG (?-1289), 'ALĪ BEG (?-1280); BUJĪR (*fl.* 1206-1260)

In creating their empire, the Mongols were continually forced to turn to their indigenous subjects for aid in administering their vast domains. This heavy reliance on outsiders to staff the imperial government was made necessary by the Mongols' lack of knowledge of 'the customs and laws of cities.' Maḥmūd Yalavač and his descendants, who served various Mongol rulers for at least four generations in Central Asia and China, were among the most prominent of these non-Mongol figures who played such a crucial role in the governance of the sedentary sector of the empire.

Information on Maḥmūd's early life is scanty; all that can be said with certainty is that he was a Turkish speaker from Khwārazm (for which he is also known as Maḥmūd Khwārazmī) and that he was a merchant by profession. Barthold's suggestion that Maḥmūd Yalavač is to be identified with Maḥmūd Bāy, the chief vizir to the last Qara Khitai gür-qan, Chih-lu-ku (d. 1213), is plausible, but as yet unconfirmed.

The first sure mention of Yalavač dates to the spring of 1218, when Činggis Qan sent Maḥmūd 'the Khwārazmian,' together with two other Muslim merchants as ambassadors to the Khwārazm shāh, Sultan Muḥammad (r. 1200-20). It is not possible to determine precisely when Maḥmūd entered the service of the Mongols, but, if Barthold's suggested identification is correct, it is likely that this would have been sometime after 1211, when Güčülük Qan, the Naiman rival of Činggis Qan, seized control of the Qara Khitai state.

According to the Muslim sources, the purpose of the embassy was to secure a treaty of trade and friendship with the Khwārazm shāh. Sultan Muḥammad, however, mistrusted the Mongolian ruler and closely questioned Maḥmūd in private in the hope that the ambassador, as a native of Khwārazm, would reveal Činggis Qan's true motives and intentions in sending this mission. Carefully parrying the sultan's queries, Maḥmūd finally convinced him that while Činggis Qan was a most powerful sovereign, he was in no positions to harm Khwārazmian interests, and that in any event the Mongolian ruler only desired to establish mutually beneficial commercial relations between the two parties.

The treaty that emerged from these negotiations was not long-lived. Before the year 1218 was out, one of the Khwārazm shāh's subordinates seized a Mongolian caravan at the city of Otrar (Uṭrār), on the middle Syr Darya, and massacred most of

its members. This incident led to a major military confrontation between the two powers, and ultimately to the complete destruction of the Khwārazmian state and its ruling house.

Following the completion of this diplomatic assignment, from which Maḥmūd acquired the name *Yalavač*, the Turkish word for ‘ambassador’ or ‘messenger,’ the sources are silent on his activities for over a decade. The statement in the *Secret History* (para. 263) that Činggis Qan appointed Yalavači (i.e. Maḥmūd Yalavač) as governor general of north China, and his son Masqud (i.e. Mas‘ūd Beg) as governor general of Central Asia shortly after the conquest of Turkestan in 1221, is unsupported by any other source, Chinese or Muslim, and is very likely anachronistic. The next clear reference to Maḥmūd is from the year 1229, when the Muslim chroniclers relate that Ögödei (r. 1229-41), the recently enthroned successor to Činggis Qan, put Maḥmūd in charge of the sedentary populations of East and West Turkestan. The fact that the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), in reporting this same event, names Ma-ha-mo-te Hua-la-hsi-mi (i.e. Maḥmūd the Khwārazmian) as the recipient of this honour, is a firm indication that we are dealing with a single individual possessing two names, and not with two separate personages.

Ögödei’s appointment of Maḥmūd, together with the contemporaneous selection of Yeh-lü Ch’u-ts’ai (*q.v.*) to govern north China, was part of an apparently concerted effort by the Qa’an to restore the economies of the sedentary areas of the empire that had been devastated during conquest. Maḥmūd’s task was a difficult one since no region of the empire was more heavily damaged than the urban centres of West Turkestan.

To revive the economic life of the areas under his jurisdiction, Maḥmūd, with the assistance of his son Mas‘ūd Beg and a network of resident commissioners (*daruqas*) stationed in all major population centres, undertook to rebuild the destroyed cities and villages, and, of equal importance, to restore the vital irrigation systems along the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Another essential ingredient in the revitalisation effort was a sweeping tax reform. Introduced in the early 1230s, the new system devised by Maḥmūd established two categories of taxes: a poll tax on all adult males, the *qubčir*, which was paid in coin, and a land tax, the *qalan*, which was remitted in kind. All other taxes, most particularly the endless extraordinary levies and exactions of the Mongolian princes, were abolished. Further, Maḥmūd used his influence to persuade the imperial court to curb its expenditures. To this end, he tried to convince Ögödei that as the ruler he had to set an example of frugality for the rest of the court. In this

effort Maḥmūd was only partially successful; Ögödei continued many of his extravagances despite the constant remonstrations of his minister.

Taken together these measures had a positive effect in the long run. Several contemporary observers speak of the rebirth of urban life and the revival of trade in West Turkestan between the 1230s and 1250s. The available numismatic evidence, moreover, supports their testimony.

Despite the overall effectiveness of his restoration programme, Maḥmūd was removed from office around 1239. Two factors working in conjunction seem to account for his dismissal. Most important was the growing tension between the Qa'an in Mongolia and the regional qanates that had been formed at Činggis Qan's death. Ča'ādai, who had inherited most of Turkestan, smarted under the close supervision of Ögödei and his agents, Maḥmūd in particular. The issue which brought the conflict to a head was Ča'ādai's unauthorised transfer of certain lands in Turkestan (which were under the jurisdiction of Maḥmūd) to another official. Maḥmūd protested loudly to Ögödei, who at first supported the Khwārazmian. Later, however, the Qa'an shifted his ground, no doubt to keep on friendly terms with his elder brother, and sanctioned the transfer. Given the now strained relations between Ča'ādai and Maḥmūd, Ögödei decided to remove his minister. But to make it clear that he was conceding none of his imperial prerogatives to his brother, Ögödei immediately named Mas'ūd Beg as the new governor general of Turkestan with the same authority as that previously enjoyed by his father.

Another factor that probably contributed to Maḥmūd's downfall was the so-called Tarabī uprising. In 1238/39 a sieve-maker from Tārāb, a small town near Bukhara, initiated a rebellion that attracted wide support among the lower classes. For a time the rebels even gained the upper hand, driving the Mongolian garrisons and officials from Bukhara. The Mongols then dispatched a huge army to the rebellious cities and the uprising was suppressed. At this point Maḥmūd intervened with Ögödei to prevent a general massacre of the population (a measure favoured by Ča'ādai?), arguing that only some of the people willingly participated. The Qa'an accepted this advice and the population was spared. Although precise information is lacking, it seems likely that Ča'ādai and his chief adviser Ḥabaš 'Amīd somehow turned this incident against Maḥmūd. In any event, shortly after the collapse of the Tārāb uprising, Ögödei determined that it was time for a change, and Maḥmūd relinquished his post in favour of his son.

Though no longer deemed the right man for the governor-generalship of Central Asia, Maḥmūd had by no means lost the confidence of Ögödei. This is clearly

evidenced by the fact that in the autumn of 1241 the Qa'an named Maḥmūd as his chief administrative officer in north China, replacing the much hated tax farmer 'Abd al-Raḥmān, who had supplanted Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1240. Quite probably it is Maḥmūd's appointment on this occasion which the compilers of the *Secret History*, through some confusion, mistakenly dated to the time of Činggis Qan.

Once in office, Maḥmūd was confronted with formidable problems. In the aftermath of 'Abd al-Raḥmān's administration, conditions were chaotic in north China: the peasantry was harshly exploited, official corruption and bribery were rampant, and there were endless quarrels among the Mongolian princes. Moreover, to add to his difficulties, Maḥmūd soon became embroiled in bitter controversies with the Chinese members of his staff, Liu Min (1201-59) and Yao Shu (*q.v.*), both of whom regarded their Muslim superior as overbearing and dishonest. Maḥmūd succeeded in driving Yao Shu from office, but his exchange of accusations with Liu Min became so heated that the affair reached the ears of the emperor, who promptly ordered an investigation. The inquiry, according to the biography of Liu Min in the *Yüan History*, found Maḥmūd guilty of fabricating charges against his colleague, and Ögödei, displeased with his minister's behaviour, dismissed him from office.

The Persian sources, however, account for Maḥmūd's dismissal in quite a different manner. According to Ḥuvainī and Rašīd al-Dīn, Maḥmūd retained his position, and Ögödei's trust, until the latter's death in December 1241, at which point, Töregene, the Qa'an's widow and the regent in the period 1241-1246, arbitrarily removed him from office and returned 'Abd al-Raḥmān to power. In this version of events, Maḥmūd's fall from grace is attributed to the fact that he paid insufficient heed to Töregene's orders and policies.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Maḥmūd's first tour of duty in north China was of short duration, a few months at the most, and it therefore seems unlikely that he had the opportunity to effect any significant policy changes within the territories under his jurisdiction.

Maḥmūd apparently spent the interregnum in the company of Köden, Ögödei's second son, to whom, according to Ḥuvainī, he had fled to escape Töregene's wrath. Her agents continuously demanded that he be handed over to the regent, but fortunately for Maḥmūd, Köden refused to comply.

When Töregene finally engineered the selection of her son Güyük as Ögödei's successor in 1246, Maḥmūd's forced banishment ended. Both he and his son Mas'ūd Beg were held in high esteem by Güyük, and the latter, upon assuming the throne, reappointed both to their former posts despite his mother's objections. 'Abd al-

Raḥmān was stripped of his authority and subsequently put to death. Maḥmūd was given general responsibility for the administration of north China, with the title of *yeke jarquči*, or grand judge. What policies he pursued at this time, or what kind of relationship he had with the imperial court, is nowhere recorded. When Güyük died in 1248, Maḥmūd quickly and wisely allied himself with the descendants of Tolui, the youngest son of Činggis Qan, in their power struggle with the Ögödeids. In the contest the Toluids soon emerged victorious, placing the eldest of the line, Möngke, on the imperial throne in 1251. The Muslim sources report that Maḥmūd, in order to assure himself of an important post in the new regime, found it expedient to entertain notable Toluid supporters with great lavishness at the diet (*quriltai*) that confirmed Möngke as qa'an.

In consequence of a long and impressive record of service and, of course, his early adherence to the Toluid cause, Maḥmūd's campaign for reappointment met with success. In 1251, Möngke, placed the Khwārazmian in charge of north China for the third and last time. Maḥmūd's influence, however, was not limited to Chinese affairs. He was consulted on the sensitive issue of how to deal with the Ögödeid opposition. Some urged Möngke to be magnanimous in his treatment of his defeated opponents, but Maḥmūd cautioned the qa'an against such a policy, arguing that they should be made to pay a high price for their 'treachery.' In the end, Möngke chose the latter course, and had many of the opposition put to death. Maḥmūd also made his influence felt in the selection of replacements for rulers of various dependent states deemed unreliable by the new regime. On his recommendation the reigning sultan of the Qara Khitai dynasty of Kirmān, Rukn al-Dīn, was deposed and replaced by a cousin, Quṭb al-Dīn, long a member of Maḥmūd's entourage.

As a sign of imperial favour, Maḥmūd was the first of the major administrative appointees allowed to leave the *quriltai* (held on the Kerülen River in Mongolia) to take up his post. His title, as given in the Chinese sources, corresponded to that of *yeke jarquči*. He was headquartered in Yen-ching (Peking) with a large staff, which included his senior associates, the Bukharan Saiyid Aḡall (*q.v.*), the Mongolian Buḡir (see below), the Chinese Chao Pi, and a host of clerical personnel, including his former antagonist, Liu Min, who now served as Maḥmūd's Chinese secretary. The pairing of the two rivals in this fashion was probably a conscious design on the part of Möngke, who might well have seen it as an effective means of keeping both parties honest.

The main responsibility of Maḥmūd and his staff was the assessment and collection of taxes. But before this could be done effectively, a general census of the

population had to be carried out. When this task was completed in 1252, a new tax system was introduced. On orders of the qa'an, the taxation of the entire realm was now to be based on the system first established in Central Asia by Maḥmūd in the early 1230s. This command was in fact implemented throughout the empire, with some adjustments to meet local traditions and needs. In China, for instance, the *qubčir*, known as the *k'o-ch'ai*, was not imposed on adult males, as in the Islamic lands, but on individual households. Further, in China this tax category was not collected entirely in coin: up to one-half could be paid in silk. Despite such amendments, Maḥmūd's basic tax categories were retained, and his system not only laid the foundations of later Yüan practice, but also served as a model for the Golden Horde, the Ča'āдай qanate, and the Īl-khāns of Iran.

While Maḥmūd stood high in the esteem of the Mongolian qa'ans and in the valuation of medieval Muslim historians, his reputation among the Chinese was an unsavoury one. This is not too surprising, since, as noted previously, his relations with Chinese officials were seldom cordial. They always suspected him of dishonesty, and in general viewed him as harsh, domineering, and 'lacking in shame.' Their differences, however, went beyond mere personality conflict. Much more substantive issues lay behind their disagreements: they fought over high rates of taxation and over the jurisdiction of Qubilai's princely estates (*fen-ti*) in Honan and Shensi. In these instances the Chinese faction won the day: tax rates were reduced and Maḥmūd's authority within Qubilai's estates was curtailed.

Much of this contention reflected the tensions between the qa'an, Möngke, and his brother, Qubilai, who held divergent views on how best to rule China. In most instances, Maḥmūd's difficulties were with the Chinese retainers of Qubilai, who were urging on their patron the adoption of more traditional 'Confucian' methods of governance for north China. Such proposals were generally opposed by Möngke and the Muslim and Turkish elements at court, who favoured a policy of minimising Chinese participation in the administration of their homeland. Seen in this light, Maḥmūd's difficulties with his Chinese colleagues, such as his dispute with Chao Pi (who represented Qubilai's interests at Peking) over the issuance of official seals, was not merely a difference of opinion on a matter of procedure: such contention was the by-product of a more generalised struggle over the fundamental direction of imperial policy in China.

The duration of Maḥmūd's third tour of duty in China is uncertain. According to the biography of Chao Pi in the *Yüan History*, Möngke terminated Maḥmūd's services in the *hsin-hai* year (24 Jan. 1251-11 Feb. 1252), i.e. in the same year that he had

appointed Maḥmūd to his post. This date, however, is not confirmed by any other source and is, moreover, directly contradicted by two passages found elsewhere in the *Yüan History* which indicate that Maḥmūd was still in office, actively discharging his duties as grand judge, in the following *jen-tzu* year (12 Feb. 1252-30 Jan. 1253). The Chinese sources make no further reference to Maḥmūd thereafter.

We are thus entirely dependent for the date and circumstances of Maḥmūd's death on the report of ʿJamāl Qāršī, an Arabic encyclopaedist of early fourteenth century Central Asia, who says that Maḥmūd died in Qan Balīq (Peking) in the spring of 1254. Given, however, the overall accuracy of this author's data on the Yalavač family and the failure of either the Chinese or Persian chroniclers to mention Maḥmūd after this date, there is no reason to dispute his statement.

While it is not explicitly so stated in any source, it seems probable that Maḥmūd's successor was Buḡir, the Mongol whom Möngke had named as his associate in 1251.

Mas'ūd Beg, presumably the eldest of Maḥmūd's sons, began his career as an assistant to his father in Central Asia sometime after 1229. As noted previously, when Maḥmūd was forced to give up the governor generalship of Turkestan in 1239, Ögödei named Mas'ūd Beg as his replacement. At the beginning of Töregene's regency, Mas'ūd Beg was in his turn compelled to flee for his life; he spent the next several years in the territory of the Golden Horde under Batu's personal protection. Güyük returned him to power in 1246, and in 1251 Möngke, with a great show of respect, confirmed him in office.

Upon returning to his post, Mas'ūd Beg found political conditions in Central Asia considerably changed. Following his accession, Möngke had placed his own candidate, Qara Hülegü, on the Ča'ādaid throne. The latter died almost immediately, and the new qa'an named Mubārak Shāh, the deceased ruler's young son, as successor, and appointed *Orğana, Qara Hülegü's widow, as regent until the heir apparent's majority. In the absence of an effective ruler in the Ča'ādaid qanate, a situation which remained unaltered throughout Möngke's reign, Mas'ūd Beg was able to carry out his duties unhindered by local opposition; he now functioned as the de facto head of the government of both East and West Turkestan, answerable only to the qa'an in Mongolia.

Mas'ūd Beg worked further to improve economic conditions within his jurisdiction, continuously travelling from one population centre to another. In the period 1251-1255, for instance, his presence is noted in Beš Balīq, Almalīq, and Samarqand. The sources are unanimous in picturing his administration as effective and beneficial to the local population. By the end of Möngke's reign in 1259,

economic activity in Central Asia is said to have reached the level prevailing before the conquest.

The death of Möngke, and the subsequent struggle for power among and within the various princely houses, brought to an end the qa'an's authority over the regional qanates and led to a decade of political chaos in Central Asia. Demonstrating a political dexterity which was characteristic of his family, Mas'ūd Beg succeeded in retaining office despite rapidly shifting alliances and frequent changes on the Ča'ādaid throne.

In consequence of the internecine warfare that accompanied this endless political intriguing, much of the restoration work of Mas'ūd Beg and his father was undone. Mas'ūd Beg used his influence to minimise the damage, as for instance when he dissuaded the Ča'ādaid qan Alǵu (r. 1260-65) from sacking Samarqand and Bukhara as a punitive measure. But in the absence of political stability, the economic deterioration continued.

In 1269 Baraq, the then reigning Ča'ādaid qan, and Qaidu, the leader of the Ögödeid line, formed an alliance, the purpose of which was to depose the Yüan emperor Qubilai, whose line, in their eyes, had no rightful claim to the imperial throne. To generate the revenues needed for this contest, the two princes charged Mas'ūd Beg with the task of restoring, once again, the crippled economy of Central Asia. In order to facilitate the latter's work, the princes undertook not to enter any city, pledging to remain in the steppe until victory was achieved.

Mas'ūd Beg's rehabilitation plans were delayed until the late 1270s due to incursions of the Persian Mongols. After the threat of foreign invasion had been averted, measures were introduced to revive agriculture, trade and urban life. Bukhara was completely rebuilt and a new town, Andijan, was established in the Fergana Valley. Extensive and long-lasting monetary reforms were introduced. From his own purse, Mas'ūd Beg had a large *madrassa*, or Muslim institution of learning, built in Bukhara. The tax revenue consequently produced enabled the Ögödeid and Ča'ādaid lines to continue the war for over three decades against their much wealthier China-based rivals. Having won the confidence of the Mongolian princes, Mas'ūd Beg was retained in office until his death in 1289.

Abū Bakr, the eldest son of the deceased minister was then appointed as his replacement by Qaidu, the dominant figure in the coalition of Central Asian princes. Abū Bakr was in turn succeeded in 1298 by his brother, Satilmiš. In 1302 Čabar, Qaidu's son and heir, named yet another of Mas'ūd Beg's sons, Sevinč, to fill the position which had been in the hands of Maḥmūd Yalavač and his descendants for

over seventy years. Amīr Ḥusain, one of Mas'ūd Beg's brothers, also served the Mongolian rulers of Central Asia. When Baraq invaded northern Iran and Afghanistan in the late 1260s, Amīr Ḥusain was appointed 'companion' to the vassal ruler of Herāt.

Another of Maḥmūd Yalavač's sons, 'Alī Beg, served the Yüan dynasty for many years in a variety of responsible positions. He seems to have begun his career as a Transport commissioner, perhaps during his father's last tour of duty in north China (1251-ca. 1254). He was instrumental in uncovering and exposing Li T'an's plans for rebellion in 1262, and received a promotion to the rank of assistant of the Right in 1264. Between 1267 and 1271, 'Alī Beg was a associate director of political affairs. Little is known of his activities at this time except that he became the subject of official criticism in early 1271 for having failed to put back into cultivation lands that had been abandoned when a number of military colonies were disbanded in Honan.

At this point, 'Alī Beg temporarily forsook his bureaucratic career for military service, the only one of Maḥmūd Yalavač's descendants to pursue the profession of arms. When Qubilai mounted his major thrust against the Sung in 1271, 'Alī Beg accompanied the commander-in-chief, Bayan, as a myriarch. By 1275 he had achieved the rank of vice-marshal. He was a participant in the capture of Huai-an in Kiangsu on 3 October 1275; a few months later he was assigned to garrison the city of Wan-t'ou near Hang-chou.

Sometime before 1279 he resumed his bureaucratic career as a director of political affairs in the provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei, i.e. in the very areas that he had just helped wrest from Sung control. While serving in this capacity, 'Alī Beg became embroiled in a controversy which ultimately cost him his life.

In March 1279, 'Alī Beg memorialised the central authorities requesting an investigation into the provincial government of Kiangsu and Anhwei and the Regional Censorate because of unspecified irregularities. The Censorate responded by arguing that not those instrumentalities, but 'Alī Beg himself should be made the object of an investigation. Inquiries followed, and it was discovered in July 1280 that 'Alī Beg had issued new paper money and abolished the old Sung currency of Kiangsu and Anhwei without official permission. Further examination revealed that 'Alī Beg and his associate, El Temür had collected taxes three years in advance, reassigned officials, and altered the disposition of local defence forces, all on their own authority. Once these facts became known, Aḥmad, Qubilai's chief minister, intervened in the case, personally interrogating 'Alī Beg. The latter proclaimed his innocence and attempted to defend his actions, but to no avail. Together with his confederate El

Temür, he was executed toward the end of December 1280 on explicit orders of the emperor. His guilt in this matter seems fairly certain; even a stele written in honor of 'Alī Beg's daughter Safaliq acknowledges that he 'broke the law.'

In addition to a daughter, 'Alī Beg had at least two sons, both of whom held posts in the Yüan administration: Ya'qūb Beg, who was a high official in the heavily Muslim province of Yunnan during the latter part of Qubilai's reign, and La-la-chi (perhaps the Persian *lālā*, 'tutor' and the Turkic suffix *-či*), who received an unnamed hereditary position in 1274 in consequence of his father's role in exposing Li T'an's rebellious intentions.

The most famous of 'Alī Beg's offspring, at least in Chinese eyes, was his daughter Safaliq (Arabic *ṣafā*, 'pure,' and the Turkic possessive suffix *-liq*). Her husband, Temür Buqa, was the son of the distinguished Yüan general of Qipčaq origin, Tuq Tuqa (T'u Tu-ha). When the latter died in 1297, the family found itself in much reduced circumstances. Forced suddenly to lead the life of a 'common person,' Safaliq is said to have maintained her dignity despite the trying conditions. According to her biographer Ma Tsu-ch'ang, she was a very knowledgeable and able woman who actively assisted her husband in his work as a *daruqači* in Chiang-nan.

Temür Buqa's death in 1300 placed Safaliq in even more straitened circumstances, but by dint of careful management she succeeded in keeping the family together without recourse to charity. Only twenty-nine years old at her spouse's demise, she steadfastly refused to remarry and died a widow in 1331. For so respecting the memory of her deceased husband, a highly regarded Confucian virtue, the local Chinese officials in Chien-k'ang honoured her with a public tablet. Posthumously, she was granted the title Lady-of-state of Jung. Safaliq had four sons, all of whom pursued official careers under the Yüan. The most noted was Aruq Quduq, who was a secretarial censor and a colleague of Ma Tsu-ch'ang, the family biographer.

* * *

Buĵir's date of birth, family background and tribal affiliation cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. According to Rašīd al-Dīn, Buĵir was the brother of Kehetei or Ketei of the Uru'ut, a Mongolian tribe closely akin to the Mangkut. From the Chinese and Mongolian sources it is known that Ketei was the eldest son of Ĵürčedei, the chief of the Uru'ut, who, after first siding with Ĵamuqa, went over to Činggis Qan with his force in about 1201. There are, however, reasons

for questioning the fraternity of Ketei and Buĵir. Firstly, there is much confusion in Rašīd al-Dīn's discussion of this family. Major incidents in the life of Ĵürċedei, such as Činggis Qan's gift of Ibaqa Beki, the Kereit princess, as a wife, are repeatedly and mistakenly ascribed to his son Ketei. Secondly, the biography of Ĵürċedei in the *Yüan History*, which speaks of his son Ketei at length, makes no mention of Buĵir, a circumstance that is difficult to explain, given the prominent position the latter held in Möngke's reign.

Buĵir's own biography in the *Yüan History* only serves further to becloud the issue of his origins. In this source Buĵir is called a Mongol of the T'o-t'o-li-t'ai clan. This puzzling ethnonym, which does not seem to be a transcription of 'Tatar' as some have assumed, is met with on a few other occasions, but never in connection with the Uru'ut. As regards family background, Buĵir's biography names Niu-erh-chieh as his father. Conceivably, Niu-erh-chieh could be a truncated and slightly corrupted transcription of Ĵürċedei, but the careers of these two figures as depicted in the Chinese and Mongolian sources, diverge widely on several key points. For instance, while the *Secret History of the Mongols* portrays Ĵürċedei as a tribal chieftain who joins Činggis Qan with numerous followers, according to the biography of Buĵir in the *Yüan History* Niu-erh-chieh is brought to the Mongolian leader's attention at an unspecified time because of his renown as a bow-and-arrow-maker. In this latter tradition, Niu-erh-chieh's talents and physical size (he is said to have been well over two m tall) make such an impression on Činggis Qan that both father and son are awarded positions in the Mongolian army.

However he gained entrance into the Mongolian military establishment, either as the son of an important tribal leader or as the son of a humble but skilled bowyer, Buĵir made the most of the opportunity. By 1206 he was a chiliarch (*mingqan-u noyan*) of the left hand, i.e. of the Left (= East) Wing of the army. What he did to achieve this high rank is nowhere explained. The only details we have on his military career come from after this date. He accompanied Činggis Qan on the campaign against Khwārazm in 1218-1221, and was a participant in the famous reconnaissance-in-force which the great Mongolian general Sübōtei (*q.v.*) conducted in the Caucasus and southern Russia in 1222-1223. For his bravery and initiative in these actions Buĵir was publicly praised by Činggis Qan.

Absolutely nothing is known of Buĵir's activities under Ögödei's rule (1229-41). When next encountered, during Güyük's brief reign (1246-48), he is in the service of Möngke, the eldest son of Tolui and future ruler of the Mongolian empire. It is likely that Buĵir was the commander of one of the many chiliarchies inherited by Tolui, the

youngest son of Činggis Qan, upon the latter's death, and that the missing years were spent in the household establishments of the Toluids.

In any event, in 1246 Möngke ordered Buĵir to assist in an investigation of irregularities in the administration of imperial land grants in the area of Ta-ming. In this inquiry, carried out in conjunction with the Tangut *Širi Gambu, who was the representative of the qa'an Güyük, Buĵir took custody of the official records of the Ta-ming censor, who apparently was at the centre of the irregularities. Whether this should be taken as evidence that Buĵir was literate is difficult to say, but considering the type of administrative work he did throughout the remainder of his career, it does seem likely that he was among that small and select group of Mongols who could read and write.

When Möngke came to power in 1251, supplanting the Ögödeid line, he named Buĵir as one of his chief officials in north China with the rank of *yeke Jarquči*, or grand judge. There Buĵir worked under the immediate direction of Maĥmūd Yalavač (see above). Together with his staff, which included the Öngüt *Yuhanai, Buĵir helped carry out the general census of 1252 and later supervised the printing of paper money, the issuance of which Möngke authorized in 1253.

Though the evidence is circumstantial, it appears probable that Buĵir succeeded Yalavač as governor general of north China when the Khwārazmian died in the spring of 1254. Indeed, an extant rescript (*jarliq*) of 1255, granting tax immunities to the various religious communities, leaves the impression that Buĵir was the chief administrative official in north China and that his appointment was a recent one. As was customary among the Mongols, Buĵir did not give up his military rank upon assuming a civilian office. Despite growing administrative responsibilities, he is still listed as one of the senior army commanders of the Left Wing in 1255; and Möngke Qa'an demonstrated his approval of the way Buĵir discharged his various duties by honouring him with gifts of expensive clothing and grants of land in Wei-chou and Ting-an (Hopei).

Following Möngke's death in 1259, Buĵir continued in office under the new regime for a while, but his relations with Qubilai (r. 1260-94) and the latter's supporters soon deteriorated. In fact, relations between the new qa'an and Buĵir had never been good. As early as 1251 Qubilai had severely reprimanded Buĵir for being too ready to invoke the death sentence against people accused of petty crimes. The qa'an's disfavour, however, resulted mainly from the suspicion that Buĵir had secretly embraced the cause of Ariq Böke, Qubilai's younger brother and chief rival for the throne between 1260 and 1264. Some time during this period, Mungsuz, an Uighur

adviser of Qubilai and a colleague of Buĵir, openly accused the latter of harbouring divided loyalties. Mungsuz received authorization to place the accused under arrest and to escort him to Peking. Since the appointees of Möngke actively supported the candidacy of Ariq Böke almost to a man, Mungsuz's suspicions may well have had a basis in fact.

Buĵir's final years, like his origins, are obscure. There is a reference in the *Yüan History* to a Buĵir who was engaged in water conservancy work in late 1273, but there is nothing to connect this individual with our subject. Moreover, the fact that Buĵir's own biography makes no mention of events subsequent to Möngke's reign and provides no concrete information on the date and circumstances of his death, suggests that his career did not extend far into Qubilai's time, and perhaps that his end was an unhappy one. It is not unlikely that he shared the fate of the many supporters of Ariq Böke who were executed or imprisoned when they fell into Qubilai's hands after the surrender of his rival in 1264.

Whatever difficulties Buĵir may have had with the new regime, his four sons Hao-li, Beg Temür, Buralki, and Ölĵei Buqa, all served Qubilai in various responsible civil and military posts.

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Th. T. Allsen

10. YEH-LÜ CH'U-TS'AI (1189-1243), YEH-LÜ CHU (1221-1285)

In the course of their conquests, the Mongols availed themselves of the services of numerous men with military, administrative and diplomatic skills, drawn from the sedentary civilizations of Inner and Eastern Asia. Very prominent among them, especially in the early phase of Mongol expansionism, were a number of Sinicized Khitans and Jurchens. A leading figure in this group was Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, whose fame rests chiefly on the administrative reforms that were carried out under his leadership during the reign of Ögödei (T'ai-tsung, r. 1229-41), and on his constant endeavour to mitigate the harsh Mongol rule in north China. It is mainly for these activities that he has been praised as one of the greatest political figures in the history of Asia. His achievements, however, are known to us only through Chinese sources; no mention of him is found in the works of the Persian historians or in the so-called *Secret History of the Mongols*. This fact led the great Turkologist W. Barthold to suggest that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's political role may have been exaggerated by the Chinese historians; while E. Blochet, pressing the argument further in an article published in 1926, made a daring but vain attempt to identify him with a well-known Muslim official of the time. Until very recently the extent of his authority at the Mongol court has been open to question.

Moreover, the biographies of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai written by Confucian scholars give a one-sided view of his personality, presenting him as an exemplar of the humane and wise Confucian statesman. It is only from his literary works that we learn about his deep Buddhist faith. To what extent then was Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai the genuine Confucian that the historians claim him to be, and were his actions truly motivated by orthodox thought?

Sometimes, general statements are also made about his civilizing influence on the Mongols and his indirect role in the policies later pursued by Qubilai. One wonders how far these statements are true.

I shall attempt here to throw some light on these problems by reviewing Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai actions in relation to (a) his milieu and the historical context, and (b) his political ideology and religious beliefs, so far at least as they can be discerned in his extant writings.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's lineage, as given in his 'spirit-way' inscription by Sung Tzu-chen (1187-1267), begins with T'u-yü, eldest son of the founder of the Liao dynasty, A-pao-chi (T'ai-tsu, r. 907-25). T'u-yü, whose personal name was Pei, is well known to history. A fervent admirer of Chinese culture, he was himself a scholar in both Khitan and Chinese, as well as a skilled painter. He ruled over Tung-tan, i.e. the old

kingdom of Po-hai, from 926 to 930 (whence his title of Prince of Tung-tan), and shortly afterwards had to flee Liao for fear of being assassinated by his brother Te-kuang (T'ai-tsung, r. 927-47), in whose favour he had been forced to abdicate the throne. He met a violent death in exile in 937.

Next in line stands T'u-yü's second son, Lou-kuo, younger brother of Emperor Shih-tsung (r. 947-51). He became governor of Yen-ching, the southern capital of Liao, and chief of the Political Council. In 952 he plotted rebellion against Emperor Mu-tsung (r. 951-69) in order to assert the claims of the senior branch of the clan to the imperial succession (Mu-tsung was a member of the junior line). He was discovered and arrested, and subsequently committed suicide. Of Lou-kuo's descendants for the next four generations we know only the names and official titles. Two grand preceptors figure among them.

T'u-yü's sixth-generation descendant, Te-yüan, took service under the Chin dynasty and rose to be commanding prefect of Hsing-p'ing (Hopei). Having no sons of his own, he adopted the son of a younger cousin and made him his heir. Te-yüan's adopted son, called Lü, was the father of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai.

Born in 1131, Yeh-lü Lü entered the civil service through the *yin* privilege and rapidly gained renown as a translator from Chinese into Khitan and Jurchen. He held various posts in the Department of National History, the Han-lin Academy, the Ministry of Rites, and the provincial administration. He attracted the attention of Emperor Shih-tsung (r. 1161-89), who, during his final illness, made him his personal attendant. After the emperor's death and the enthronement of Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208), Yeh-lü Lü rose to be minister of Rites and assistant of the Right in the Presidential Council. He died in office in 1191. His biographies portray him as capable and thoroughly Sinicized official. His funerary inscription relates several anecdotes illustrating his Confucian outlook. For example, when Chang-tsung was still heir apparent, Yeh-lü Lü dissuaded him from studying the *Tso-chuan* because, although a classic, 'it is on the whole full of intrigues and lacking purity'. Instead he recommended he concentrate on the *Shang-shu* (= *Book of History*) and *Meng-tzu* (*Mencius*), for these works 'contain the pure Way of the Sages'. Also, at the time when Yeh-lü Lü was serving in the Ministry of Rites, the question arose whether Shih-tsung's late mother should be buried separately, as stated in her will (she had become a Buddhist nun on her husband's death), or together with him, in the way proper to an Imperial consort. Yeh-lü Lü memorialized that her will should not be taken into account, on the ground that the 'regular statutes' took precedence over the Buddhist precepts, and the status of Queen Mother over that of devotee. The advice was followed.

During his long and successful career, Yeh-lü Lü accumulated a considerable fortune, and instances of his munificence are recorded in his biography. The family also enjoyed the income derived from a hereditary apanage in Tung-p'ing, Shantung, the origin of which is unknown. Yeh-lü Lü married three times. He had two sons by his first two wives. The third son, born to his third wife (née Yang), was Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, T. Chin-ch'ing, was born on 3 August 1189 in the Chin capital, Chung-tu (present-day Peking). Lü's house, where Ch'u-ts'ai was born, was situated between Jade Fountain Hill (Yü-ch'üan shan) and Fragrant Hill (Hsiang-shan) in the 'Western Hills' near the city – hence Ch'u-ts'ai style Yü-ch'üan occasionally found in his writings.

His father died when he was only two years old. His mother, a scholarly woman who later became an instructor, or tutoress, at the palace, brought him up and personally took care of his formal education. At the age of twelve he was busy studying the *Shih* (*Book of Odes*) and the *Shu* (*Book of History*). At seventeen he had the opportunity to enter the Chin civil service on the strength of the *yin* privilege, to which he was entitled as the son of a chief minister. He declined, however, in order to compete for the *chin-shih*. Shortly afterward he was granted special permission to compete in the 'decree examination' conducted by Chang-tsung, and came out first on the list. We have no information regarding his first appointment, but we know that upon conclusion of the 'examination of merits' (*k'ao*) he was promoted to vice-prefect of K'ai-chou in Hopei. From references contained in one of his poems, it appears that he held this post in 1213.

Meanwhile, the Mongols had begun their invasion of Chin. It may be recalled that since 1211 the Mongol army had been carrying out a series of attacks against the Jurchen fortresses in northern Shansi and Hopei, and in Jehol. In the autumn of 1213, Činggis Qan, taking advantage of the confusion following the murder of the Chin ruler Wei-shao wang in a palace revolution, launched a three-pronged offensive which took his armies deep into Shansi, Hopei, and Shantung. They eventually converged on Peking, but failed to take it owing to the city's exceptional defences. A peace treaty was then concluded between the newly elected Emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-24) and the Mongol ruler. No sooner had Činggis Qan retired than Hsüan-tsung, feeling unsafe in Peking, decided to move his capital south. At the end of June 1214 he transferred the court to Pien-liang (K'ai-feng, Honan), leaving Wan-yen Ch'eng-hui in charge of Peking under the orders of the heir apparent. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who had in the meantime been recalled from K'ai-chou, was appointed on Wan-yen Ch'eng-hui's recommendation second secretary of the Bureaux of the Left and Right in the old capital.

Činggis Qan, enraged at the news of the emperor's flight to Pien-liang, resumed hostilities, and in August his army again invested Peking. The siege – the worst in the city's history – lasted ten months. Of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's activity in this period we know nothing, except that even in the two months of serious famine before the fall of the city 'he attended to his official duties as usual'.

Peking was captured at the end of May 1215. One month of looting followed, in the course of which thousands of people were killed and a great part of the city was burned down. The suffering experienced by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai during the siege affected him deeply, precipitating a mental crisis.

Up to this time Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had shown a certain interest in Buddhism, but his knowledge of it was superficial. In the preface to one of his poems he says, 'In my youth I had a liking for Buddhism, as that was my natural inclination. When I reached manhood I had read superficially many Buddhist texts and although I gained a certain knowledge from these, I rather exaggerated my achievement'. He was particularly attracted by Ch'an Buddhism which was predominant at the time, and before the fall of Peking he often visited the monk Ch'eng at his temple, the Sheng-an ssu, discussing with him the 'recorded sayings' (*yü-lu*) of the old masters. As this was a favourite pastime among the literati, however, 'old' Ch'eng had never taken Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's interest seriously.

After the fall of Peking, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai decided 'to seek the Patriarch's (i.e. Bodhidharma's) doctrine more earnestly', and with this in mind he once more went to see his friend at the Sheng-an ssu. Ch'eng immediately realized that this time Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's desire for enlightenment was genuine and not merely an intellectual pursuit as before. But Ch'eng, pleading old age and inadequate knowledge of Confucianism, declined to instruct the young man. Instead, Ch'eng directed him to Wan-sung (Hsing-hsiu, 1166-1246), abbot of the Pao-en ssu, as one 'well versed in both Confucianism and Buddhism and very thorough in doctrine and expression', in other words, an outstanding teacher. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai could not have been given better advice, since Wan-sung was indeed one of the leading Ch'an masters of the time. Besides being a learned Buddhist scholar, he was equally versed in Confucianism and Taoism. Although officially belonging to the Ts'ao-tung school and, indeed, the spiritual successor of the renowned Ts'ao-tung master Hsüeh(-yen)-man (d. 1206), Wan-sung was in reality a syncretist who combined in his teaching the views on enlightenment peculiar to other schools of Ch'an (Yün-men and Lin-chi in particular), and maintained the theory, very popular in this period, of the common origin of the Three Teachings.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai began his training as a lay disciple under Wan-sung some time in 1215, and pursued it relentlessly for three years. During that period of rigorous

instruction, he cut himself off from family and friends, concentrating single-mindedly on his quest. He finally attained enlightenment, and his master recognized the achievement by conferring on him 'the seal of discipleship', and the Buddhist layman's style of Chan-jan *chü-shih*, with the name Ts'ung-yüan.

On 12 April 1218, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was summoned by Činggis Qan to Mongolia. The Mongol conqueror had rallied many Khitan hereditary leaders in the past, including several descendants of the imperial house of Liao (such as Yeh-lü Liu-ko [1165-1220] and the two brothers Yeh-lü A-hai and T'u-hua [*qq.v.*]), who had proved faithful allies in the struggle against Chin. Indeed from 1215 onwards the regional command of Chung-tu was largely in the hands of Khitan officials, such as the two Yeh-lü brothers, Shih-mo Ming-an (*Ming'an, d. 1216), and the latter's son Hsien-te-pu (*Sendeb, d. 1235+). These officials were directly responsible to Muqali (*q.v.*), Činggis Qan's representative in north China at the time. A further link may have been provided by Muqali's special connection with the Buddhist establishment (see the biography of Hai-yün), and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's close involvement with Ch'an masters after the fall of Chung-tu.

Besides racial affinity, Khitans and Mongols were united by their common hatred for the Jurchen. This is shown in the well-known words pronounced by Činggis, at the end of July, when he met Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai for the first time at his *ordos* in the Sāri Steppe (west of the great bend of the Kerulen River): 'Liao and Chin have been enemies for generations; I have taken revenge for you'. To which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai replied, 'My father and grandfather have both served it (i.e., Chin) respectfully. How can I, as a subject and a son, be so insincere at heart as to consider my sovereign and my father as enemies?' The Mongol is said to have been impressed by this frank reply, as well as by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's looks (he was a very tall man with a magnificent beard reaching to his waist) and sonorous voice. He gave him the nickname Urtu Saqal (Long Beard) and placed him in his retinue 'as an adviser'.

For a long time it was assumed that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had been captured by Činggis Qan immediately after the fall of Chung-tu, i.e. in 1215. In his outstanding 'chronological biography' (*nien-p'u*) of Ch'u-ts'ai, Wang Kuo-wei has disproved this, since the exact date of Činggis's summons is given by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai himself in his *Hsi-yu lu*, or *Record of a Journey to the West*, a manuscript copy of which was found in Japan only in 1926.

In the spring of the following year, Činggis Qan set out on his punitive expedition against the Khwārezmian empire, the so-called Western Campaign (1219-24). Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai accompanied him to Central Asia and remained there till 1226.

His itinerary is described, rather sketchily, in the *Hsi-yu lu*, and recollections of many of the places he crossed, or stopped at, are found in his poems. He left with the

Mongol army in May-June 1219, halting on the Eder River in June- July and on the Black Irtysh (where Činggis set up his summer camp) until the autumn. Thence the army proceeded across the Altai Mountains, through several passes because of its numbers.

From the Altai onward Ch'u-ts'ai followed approximately the same route as the Ch'üan-chen master Ch'ang-ch'un and his party two years later, in the summer and autumn of 1221 (see the biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi). From one of his poems, it seems that Ch'u-ts'ai was attached to the contingent of the invading army led by Činggis's second son Ča'adai, for part of the time at least. This force crossed the T'ien-shan (in the Dzungarian Ala-Tau) and entered the Ili valley via the Talki Pass, while the main body crossed the Emil valley and reached the plain of Qayaliq (west of modern Kopal in Kazakhstan) where all the Mongol forces and those of their allies assembled for the onslaught. Ch'u-ts'ai skirted Lake Sairam – 'The hundred-li, mirror-like lake atop the mountains/On which the morning and evening mist resembles floating vapour' – passed Almalıq, Balasağun and Talas, and eventually reached Samarqand, at the same time, or soon after, the city was invested by the Mongols in March 1220. His subsequent movements in the region are not clear, but he certainly spent part of his time in the 'Western Region' based at Samarqand, a city that figures prominently in his writings.

His duties during this period were varied. He combined the office of *bičžči* (scribe-secretary) in charge of official documents in Chinese with that of court astrologer-astronomer. Concerning the latter activity, several anecdotes are related in his funerary inscription. Činggis Qan, like all the Mongols, had a superstitious fear of unusual natural phenomena and used to consult Ch'u-ts'ai whenever these occurred. On such occasions the latter would take the omens in the Chinese fashion, while the emperor took them in the traditional Mongol way for additional assurance, by burning the thigh-bone of a sheep. According to our source, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai correctly predicted the successful outcome of the war against Khwārezm, the death of its ruler Muhammad, and that of the Chin emperor Hsüan-tsung. It was chiefly through his remarkable skill as an astrologer that he gradually established his authority at the Mongol court. From his biography (by Sung Tzu-chen) and his own writings, we know that Ch'u-ts'ai combined astrology with divination according to the *T'ai-hsüan* and *T'ai-i* methods, as well as with 'esoteric computation' (*nei-suan*) – a generic term for over thirty different systems of numerology (according to the contemporary Sung mathematician Ch'in Chiu-shao).

One episode related in the funerary inscription is of particular interest. I refer to the famous story of the apparition of the unicorn ('la farce de la Licorne', as Léon Wieger calls it), whose interpretation by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai is said to have caused the

withdrawal of the Mongol army from India. The inscription states that when Činggis was encamped at the Iron Gate Pass (present Buzgala Pass in Uzbekistan) his bodyguard saw an animal with a deer's body, a horse's tail, green and with a single horn. Addressing the bodyguard in human speech, it said, 'Your Lord should return home immediately!' When Činggis Qan questioned him on the incident, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai explained that this prodigious animal, called *chüeh-tuan*, could travel eighteen thousand *li* a day and speak all foreign languages. Symbolizing abhorrence of bloodshed, it had been sent by Heaven Above to warn the emperor against further killing. 'On the same day,' the inscription says, 'the Emperor issued the order to withdraw the army.'

This story, which is also related by several other contemporary authors, has until now been interpreted as a clever means devised by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai to prevent the Mongol conqueror from engaging in further warfare. I doubt the truth of this. In the account of the same event by Yeh-lü Liu-ch'i, a grandson of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the *chüeh-tuan* is described as having 'two eyes like torches, a scaly five-colored body, a single horn on top of its head, and being capable of speech.' According to him, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai advised the emperor 'to prepare offerings and to sacrifice to it in the place where it had appeared.' It is quite likely that we are dealing here with a real incident, and that what the Mongol patrol saw was a rhinoceros. This may well have happened during the raid into the Punjab in the summer of 1222. Although on its way to extinction, the rhinoceros was still to be found in the Punjab and Sind in the fourteenth century, and in the region of Peshāwar as late as the fifteenth century. The report of such a sight could have easily been distorted and exaggerated by the witnesses themselves, to whom the animal was totally unknown.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's identification of the animal and interpretation of the incident are based on the Chinese literary tradition, according to which the *chüeh-tuan* was a legendary beast symbolizing goodness, with the gift of languages and the ability to travel great distances. Bearing in mind the Shamanistic beliefs of his master, Ch'u-ts'ai made the portent proceed directly from Heaven Above, i.e. from *De'ere* (or *Möngke* 'Eternal') *Tenggiri* – the Supreme Power of the Mongol tribes.

We know from the Persian historians that in 1222 Činggis Qan had considered returning to Mongolia via India, the Himalayas, and Tibet. The reasons that dissuaded him from putting his plan into effect were, according to Jüzjānī, the news that the Tangut (Hsi-Hsia) had rebelled and the advice of the soothsayers. Rašīd al-Dīn speaks, on the other hand, of India's bad climate and drinking water, of physical obstacles and the news of the Tangut's rebellion, all of which accounted for Činggis Qan's change of mind. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's oracle probably had something to do with it, although it was by no means the only determinant factor.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai is also said to have greatly impressed Činggis Qan with his accurate prediction of eclipses. Yet the calendar which he composed in Central Asia, called *Hsi-cheng keng-wu-yüan li* (*Western Campaign Calendar of the Keng-wu Year* [1210]), was never officially adopted by the Mongols (on this calendar see below).

Evidence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's secretarial activity subsists in letters inviting Ch'ang-ch'un to join the Mongol conqueror in Central Asia. Činggis Qan summoned Ch'ang-ch'un on the advice of Liu Wen, a Chinese physician and arrow maker in his service. We know, however, that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had also recommended Ch'ang-ch'un to the emperor. Liu Wen's aim was to introduce to Činggis Qan an adept in possession of the elixir of life; Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai expected, on the other hand, that Ch'ang-ch'un would acquaint the emperor not only with the Taoist tenets, but also with the doctrines of Confucius and Buddha. His assumption was based on the fact that the Ch'üan-chen sect, of which Ch'ang-ch'un was the leader, professed a syncretist philosophy based on the *Tao-te ching*, the *Hsin-ching* (*Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra*), and the *Hsiao-ching*. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, under Wan-sung's influence, had also become an advocate of syncretism. As Ch'ang-ch'un enjoyed a high reputation in China, it is not surprising that Ch'u-ts'ai thought of him as the right person to teach Činggis Qan the Way of the Three Sages. In the *Hsi-yu lu* he states:

As I saw it, at the time of the foundation of the National (Mongol) Dynasty, since government affairs were very numerous and war was going on in the Western Region, there was then no leisure to cultivate civil virtues and to exalt goodness. Now the teachings of the Three Sages are all of benefit to mankind. When I read the two books on the Way and the Virtue (i.e., the *Tao-te ching*), my admiration was deeply roused. I wished to make Our Sovereign (Činggis Qan) tread loftily in the footsteps of the ancient worthies. This is the reason why I supported (Ch'ang-ch'un), whom, of course, I also intended to be an advocate of Confucianism and Buddhism.

In the letter that Liu Wen personally took to Ch'ang-ch'un in 1219 (which, I believe, was written by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai himself), the Taoist adept is invited to join the emperor in order to advise him on matters of government and the means of prolonging life. Ch'ang-ch'un set out under Mongol escort, but when he arrived in Te-hsing (present Cho-lu hsien in Hopei), distressed at the thought of the distance he still had to cover, he sent the emperor a message requesting permission to end his journey there on the grounds of his great age and incompetence in administrative affairs. Upon receipt of Ch'ang-ch'un's message, Činggis, who was anxious to meet the adept, ordered Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai to draft another letter urging him to continue his journey. In very polite phraseology Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai makes clear the emperor's wish and, in answer to Ch'ang-ch'un's objections, states that political advice is not at all what the emperor expects from him, but only moral advice. To emphasize further the

importance of Ch'ang-ch'un's mission to Činggis, he quotes the cases of Bodhidharma, who travelled to the east in order to transmit the Mind, and of Lao-tzu, who went west to convert the barbarians and attain enlightenment, i.e. to become Buddha.

I think that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai used the latter illustration to suggest a parallel between the civilizing work of Lao-tzu and that of Ch'ang-ch'un, both engaged in the conversion (*hua*) of the barbarians (*hu*). The parallel is particularly apt, since the barbarians supposedly converted by Lao-tzu were in the west, as were Činggis Qan and his Mongols at this time. In drawing this comparison, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai implied that he accepted the thesis propounded by the apocryphal *Book of the Conversion of the Barbarians* (*Hua-hu ching*). True, he inserted as a safeguard a hypothetical *huo* in his statement ('when Lao-tzu went to the west, it was, so it seems [*huo*], to convert the barbarians ...'). Nevertheless, this must have exposed him to attack from Buddhists when, a few years later, the followers of Ch'ang-ch'un began propagating on a large scale the idea that Buddha was merely one of Lao-tzu's incarnations.

Ch'ang-ch'un did continue his journey, and his meeting with Činggis Qan and subsequent deeds are well known through his disciple's account, the *Hsi-yu chi*. Significantly, there is no mention of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in this work; for information on the relationship between him and Ch'ang-ch'un, as also for references to those of Ch'ang-ch'un's doings that are not recorded in the *Hsi-yu chi*, we must turn to the *Hsi-yu lu*. There, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai admits that his relations with Ch'ang-ch'un were at first very friendly; he was, naturally enough, looking for congenial company after four years spent in alien surroundings among most unenlightened people. The two men exchanged poems (which we still possess), drank tea together, made trips to the famous gardens around Samarqand, and conversed late into the night. Ch'ang-ch'un, however, was not particularly eager to exert his civilizing influence on the Mongol conqueror in the way desired by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. On the contrary, he used all his skill to convert the emperor to alchemical or esoteric Taoism, relating the mystical feats of Lin Ling-su (1075-1119) and Emperor Hui-tsung (r. 1101-25) of Sung, and extolling the ecstasies and trances dear to the followers of the Ch'üan-chen sect. But it was in his attitude toward Buddhism that, according to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Ch'ang-ch'un finally revealed his true self. Not only did he show contempt for the members of the Ch'an sect, but betrayed through a casual remark his utter ignorance of Buddhist doctrine. 'Thereafter', says Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, 'I behaved politely in his presence, but in my mind I thought little of him'. To add insult to injury, Ch'ang-ch'un's disciples suggested that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai should become a lay disciple of their master. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai brushed them off, saying, 'In my youth I practiced Confucianism; when I grew older I embraced Buddhism. Why should I "descend from lofty trees to enter into a dark valley"?'

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's hopes of enlightening the emperor were thus frustrated. Although his disappointment was intense, particularly since Činggis showed a genuine liking for Ch'ang-ch'un, he refrained from criticizing the latter openly. 'As our faiths were different', he says in the *Hsi-yu lu*, 'had I attacked him it would have created a dispute. This is why I disapproved of him in my mind and laughed at him in private.'

Ch'ang-ch'un's subsequent actions were to turn disappointment into bitter resentment. In his sermons delivered to the emperor (one of which was recorded in Chinese by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai), Ch'ang-ch'un had touched upon the subject of practical administration and suggested that the people of north China, harassed by many years of war, be relieved of taxation for three years. Činggis did not follow this advice but, shortly before Ch'ang-ch'un and his party left for China, gave orders that the Taoist leader be granted an edict exempting the clergy from taxes and corvée. According to the *Hsi-yu chi*, the exemption was granted only to Ch'ang-ch'un and his disciples. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, on the other hand, states in the *Hsi-yu lu* that Ch'ang-ch'un had requested Činggis Qan to exempt from taxation all persons who had entered monastic life, and that Činggis had acceded to the request on condition that there be no further ordinations. As the man in charge of drafting imperial decrees in Chinese (i.e. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai) was away at the time, however, the Taoists were given permission to draft the edict themselves. Instead of making clear that taxation was remitted for *both* Buddhist and Taoist monks, Ch'ang-ch'un phrased the edict in such a way as to make it valid only for the 'monks' subject to himself. The term for monks used in the edict was *ch'u-chia*, literally 'those who have left home', a term originally applied to Buddhist monks. The text of the edict thus opened the way to a double interpretation of which the Taoists soon took advantage in order to gain control over the Buddhist clergy. The Taoist party returned to China armed with the 'forged' edict and a warrant that authorized them to make free use of the postal relay service (*Mo. Jam*). Once back, they immediately began appropriating Buddhist and Confucian temples. The possession of the powerful warrant enabled them to move freely from place to place for this purpose. In Peking, where Ch'ang-ch'un had established his headquarters, the Taoist clergy enjoyed, moreover, the protection of Shih-mo Hsiente-pu, the local military commander, a great admirer of Ch'ang-ch'un. Within a few years the Ch'üan-chen sect reached the apex of its power, and many of the Buddhist clergy had passed under its control by the time Ch'ang-ch'un died (1227).

Meanwhile Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was busy in Central Asia and, although acquainted with events at home, could do little to remedy a state of affairs for which, no doubt, he felt partly responsible. In the *Hsi-yu lu* he says that when he heard of the abuses which Ch'ang-ch'un was perpetrating in China, he wanted to condemn his evil actions

to his face, but was prevented by official duties from meeting him. This may be true, but it is not the whole truth. Until the year of his death the conqueror continued to show friendship for Ch'ang-ch'un and to bestow favours on him. Thus, it is very doubtful whether Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai would have taken a definite stand against Ch'ang-ch'un during the emperor's lifetime. In 1226 he wrote an attack against the Dhūta (chin. T'ou-t'o), a heretic Buddhist sect which had quite a number of followers in China but of which almost nothing is known. In the preface, the only surviving part of the work, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai refers to Yang Chu (? IV c. B.C.) and Mo Ti (ca. 479-ca. 381 B.C.) as 'the evil of Confucianism', and to the Dhūtaists as 'the evil of Buddhism'. He does not refer, however, to the followers of the Ch'üan-chen sect as 'the evil of Taoism', as he does in the preface to the *Hsi-yu lu*, written three years later. His anti-Ch'üan-chen feelings during the years in Central Asia are only expressed in a few poems satirizing some of his friends in Peking, who, during his absence, had turned philo-Taoists, and on the whole these are in the form of mild reprimands.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's duties as astrologer, secretary and adviser to the qan (especially in matters concerning north China) comprised his main functions at court. He performed other duties of an administrative-logistic nature, however, such as supervising the recruitment and transfer of people from different localities in Central Asia, e.g. from Samarqand to Talas, to establish military colonies. We know that Činqai (q.v.) was entrusted with similar functions in this period and that he too, like Ch'u-ts'ai, performed advisory and secretarial duties at court in his capacity as *čerbi*, or chamberlain, but obviously at a much more senior level. The association of Činqai and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai may well date from the period of the Western Campaign, although we have no textual evidence of it.

Činggis Qan returned to his *ordos* in northern Mongolia in the spring of 1225 to prepare his expedition against Hsi-Hsia, whose ruler Li Te-wang (Hsien-tsung, r. 1223-26) had 'breached faith' by refusing to send contingents to the qan and failing to send his own son as hostage to the Mongol court. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai remained behind in Central Asia, no doubt detained by administrative tasks of the kind just described, for we know from his writings that he was still at Qara Qočo (ca. 27 km east of Turfan in Sinkiang) in the middle of December 1225, on his way to rejoin the imperial army.

The Tangut Campaign – Činggis's last exploit – began the following spring, with the first Hsi-Hsia town, Qara Qoto, falling to the Mongols in March 1226. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was with the Mongol army when Su-chou (in Kansu) and Ling-wu (in Ningsia) were captured in June and December respectively. While Ling-wu was being mercilessly sacked and plundered, Ch'u-ts'ai took for himself 'only a few books

and two camel-loads of rhubarb' so his biographer informs us. And that same rhubarb, he used, soon after, to treat a great number of soldiers affected by an epidemic that had broken out in the Mongol army.

Činggis Qan died in August 1227 south of Liu-p'an Mt. in Kansu, as the campaign was drawing to an end. According to his will, his body was brought back to his homeland for burial at Mount Burqan Qaldun (present Kentei Khan).

After the last Tangut resistance had been quelled and Tolui, Činggis's younger son, had assumed the regency of the empire (1227-29), Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai obtained permission from the court to travel to Yen-ching (the former Chung-tu of the Chin, i.e. Peking), allegedly 'to search for some literary texts'. I suspect that the real motive for this journey was to revisit his native city and find out the truth about the disturbing reports that he had been receiving on conditions there, as also on the activities of the Ch'üan-chen followers. He arrived in Yen-ching in February-March 1228 after about ten years' absence. Any doubts he may still have had on both counts were dispelled by the sight that confronted him.

Former Buddhist temples now used by Taoists were crowded with 'converts' whose only aim was to avail themselves of the tax exemption granted by the Mongols. The Buddhist clergy were reluctant to defend their rights for fear of incurring the wrath of the authorities who, impressed by the marks of favour accorded by the emperor to Ch'ang-ch'un, supported and protected the Ch'üan-chen sect. Ch'ang-ch'un had died in odour of sanctity the previous year (only a few days before Činggis Qan), and his successor, Yin Chih-p'ing, was more determined than ever to carry out the late patriarch's acquisitive policy.

Banditry had assumed alarming proportions in the city owing to the bad administration of Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu, a corrupt and cruel official. Robbers had apparently become so daring that they operated in broad daylight, and even took carts with them when making their forays. The local intelligentsia blamed Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai for having initially supported Ch'ang-ch'un and held him indirectly responsible for the abuses of the Taoists. It was to clarify his position that he immediately set to writing the *Hsi-yu lu*, a kind of apologia in the form of a dialogue with an imaginary guest, in which he answers the main criticism raised against him. Written in haste, printed at his own expenses (in 1229), and largely polemical in nature, the *Hsi-yu lu* was clearly meant by the same token to counter the Taoists' claims in the *Hsi-yu chi*, which had just been published in Yen-ching (see the biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chü.).

On his return to Mongolia shortly afterwards, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai received an order from Tolui – almost certainly at Ch'u-ts'ai's own prompting – to go back to Peking to deal with the local banditry. He and his Mongol colleague Tāčar, assisted by Liu Min (another Chinese in the Mongols' service), arrested and executed the ringleaders, who

proved to be either relatives of Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu or members of powerful families. Hsien-te-pu himself escaped punishment but was temporarily dismissed from office. Wang Chi (*q.v.*), a local official and friend of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, took over the Yen-ching administration from Hsien-te-pu.

In the course of his two short and busy visits to Yen-ching, Ch'u-ts'ai not only re-established contact with his old friends (he had been corresponding from Central Asia with several of them, including Wang Chi and Wan-sung), but also met and befriended a number of ex-Chin scholar-officials seeking patronage. He set up in this way a network of personal relationships which helped him greatly when, soon after, he began his program of fiscal, administrative and educational reforms in north China.

On 13 September 1229 Ögödei was elected qa'an by a Mongol assembly convoked at Köde'e Aral on the Kerulen, the first Mongol ruler to assume this Turkic title. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's role on that occasion is not very clear. We know from the Chinese sources that there was disagreement in the assembly, a section of which supported Tolui's candidature against Ögödei's. According to the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), Tolui wished to postpone the election on account of this disagreement. As court astrologer Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai insisted that the day fixed was auspicious and no deferment should be made. Moreover, he persuaded Ča'āдай (then the eldest surviving son of Činggis) that he should himself lead the imperial clan and court officials, and that they all pay obeisance to Ögödei in order of rank. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai has therefore been credited not only with bringing about the enthronement of Ögödei, the successor designated by Činggis Qan, but also with the introduction of two new elements in the Mongol inauguration ritual, i.e. the obeisance of the clan elders to the new qa'an and the assignment of precedence to the princes of the blood, members of the imperial clan, and Mongol notables, according to their dignity. These innovations suggest a Chinese model. Similarly, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's stand in support of the legal succession has a strong Confucian tinge. To what extent the Chinese sources are reliable on this issue is difficult to determine. No doubt Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai may have exerted a certain influence on the assembly as court astrologer, and he may well have been responsible for fixing the date of the inauguration. His direct intervention in the affairs of the assembly, however, could have been justified only if he had been personally entrusted with Činggis Qan's testament. Although a passage from one of his biographies supports this view, the question can hardly be settled since it is not even certain that Činggis left a written will.

As for Ögödei's investiture, we learn from the Persian sources that it was carried out in the traditional Mongolian form, and no reference is made to a hierarchical placing *more sinico*. Moreover, if such procedure was in fact introduced, it remained an isolated instance and was not followed by the Mongols at their subsequent

assemblies until 1271, the year in which the Chinese court ceremonial was officially adopted by Qubilai. We know from the biography of the academician Wang P'an (1202-91) that at the beginning of the Chih-yüan period (1264) there were as yet neither audience halls nor a fixed court ceremonial, and that 'whenever they were to greet (the Emperor), the court officials and the commoners, without distinction of rank, all gathered in front of the imperial pavilion'. There is no doubt, in my opinion, that here, as in the case of Činggis Qan's 'withdrawal' from India, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's role was exaggerated by his Chinese biographer.

After his enthronement, Ögödei was faced with a double task in north China: firstly, to destroy Chin; secondly, to consolidate Mongol rule and devise effective means of exploiting the conquered territories. Whereas the campaign against Chin presented tactical problems which Ögödei and his generals could easily overcome, the second task was beset by serious difficulties. In the course of the long war against Chin, the Mongols had enforced in the newly conquered territories their customary law and the modes of exploitation peculiar to their nomadic society. Large groups of people in the occupied areas were given by the court as slaves to victorious generals and nobles, and were often removed from their homes. The heavy exactions and harsh rules imposed by the Mongol officials in the territories under their jurisdiction had also caused many 'to flee and disperse', thus adding to the already considerable number of civilians uprooted by the war with Chin. The monasteries gradually became crowded with escaped prisoners, army deserters, displaced civilians, and frightened peasants. The land suffered, particularly since the Mongols, as their Jurchen predecessors, seized large areas for grazing. A group of die-hards at the Mongol court, led by Begder, favoured complete annihilation of the native population and insisted that the entire occupied territory should be turned to pasture. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai opposed this extreme suggestion and illustrated with figures the material advantages to be gained by a more rational exploitation of the country. He won the argument and in 1229 was put in charge of taxation in north China. Knowledge of conditions there as well as familiarity with the Mongolian outlook suited him admirably for this task.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's first step was to obtain from Ögödei a decree to the effect that crimes committed before the first month of 1229 should not be punished. This was an important measure, for the Chinese were not yet acquainted with the conquerors' code (*Jasaq*) and, in their ignorance, were constantly infringing Mongol prohibitions. Also it was the first time that an amnesty was granted by the Mongols, a practice so far unknown to them. He then submitted to the emperor an eighteen-point plan designed to overcome the chaos prevailing in north China. Only the principal measures proposed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in his memorial are known. His chief concern was to

restore order and to create a strong, centralized government, a prerequisite for the systematic and effective exploitation of the country. This was impossible, however, unless a strict division was achieved between military and civil authority. There was no separation between them at the time, and the conquered areas were under the control of military leaders or overlords (called in Chinese *hsing-sheng* or *shih-hou*), some of whom were virtually independent of the court.

Aware of this problem, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai divided the country into ten principal administrative units or districts (chin. *lu*, Mo. *čölge*) and established a Tax-collection Bureau administered by two civil officials at the centre of each. These functionaries were drawn from former Chin personnel rallied to the Mongols. The appointment of such officials, who were directly responsible to the court (at this time synonymous with the government), was designed specifically to stop the arbitrary collection of taxes by the local military officials. This served a dual purpose. On the one hand, it asserted the authority of the court over local rule; on the other, it tended to reduce the fiscal burden on the subject people. Before Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was put in charge of the fiscal program, there had been no regular system of taxation in north China. The Chinese populace was exploited irrationally, the levies imposed by their masters consisting of periodical and irregular exactions of goods and labour, cumulatively known in Mongolian as *alba qubčiri* and in Chinese as *ch'ai-fa*.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's fiscal reforms of the years 1229-1230 represented the first step toward transforming those arbitrary practices into a rational system on Chinese lines. He introduced a land tax on a household basis, as well as a poll tax on all adults, but with different rates for town dwellers and peasants. The taxes were to be paid in silk (usually commuted to silver) and grain. He also introduced a tax on commerce and the traditional Chinese duties on liquor and vinegar, salt, iron smelters, and mining products.

The clergy had so far been exempted from levies of any kind, thanks to Činggis Qan's edict. Consequently, the monasteries had grown in number and power, the monks now possessing land and engaging in commerce. Immediately after his election, Ögödei, no doubt on Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's recommendation, issued an edict to the effect that Buddhist and Taoist monks below the age of fifty should pass an examination on the subject of their respective scriptures in order to qualify for the priesthood and be allowed to reside in monasteries. Furthermore, the edict warned monks of both faiths against the unlawful appropriation of temples and the destruction of religious images. Finally, it imposed fiscal obligations on monks who cultivated land and engaged in commerce.

These measures are clear evidence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's intention to curb the power of the clergy, one of the traditional enemies of the Chinese government. Mere

fiscal reforms were doomed to failure, however, without a supporting network of civil officials capable of enforcing their application. The appointment of tax collectors was the initial step toward the establishment of a local bureaucracy. But the use of Chinese nationals in positions of responsibility was regarded with disfavour by the ruling Mongols. Like all the other alien rulers before them, they had an evident distrust of a politically independent Chinese leadership. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's civil background and outlook had already been subject to criticism at court. During Činggis Qan's lifetime some had denounced the incongruity of a man of letters holding office in a military society. The dispute with Begder must certainly have brought him more enemies. His establishment of the Tax-collection Bureaux dealt a serious blow to the authority of the powerful military leaders. One of the most prominent among them, the afore-mentioned Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu, with the support of Ögödei's uncle Temüge Otčigin, accused Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai of displaying a 'treacherous mind,' because of his appointment of former Chin personnel while members of his own family were still serving Chin (a reference to Ch'u-ts'ai's two brothers). Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was able to clear himself, but it is significant that no action was taken against the slanderer, who was still in office in 1235.

In September 1231, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's fiscal reforms bore their first fruit. In Yün-chung (modern Ta-t'ung in Shansi), the tax collectors of the ten districts submitted to Ögödei the granary inventories and the revenue (in silver and silk) collected for the treasury. The amount raised tallied with the figure originally stated by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. The qa'an was so pleased that he appointed Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai chief of the Secretariat (*chung-shu ling*) on the spot.

The Secretariat (*chung-shu sheng*) was nothing more than the Chinese section of the rudimentary Sino-Uighur chancellery established under Činggis Qan, in which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had worked since the beginning of his career at the Mongol court. Its main functions, as already noted, were the drafting of rescripts, decrees and other official documents, and the keeping of records. The work was done by a small group of officials (*bičēčis*, *čerbis*) conversant with the Turkic Uighur script recently adopted to write Mongolian, with the Chinese script and, possibly, with other languages and scripts as well (Jurchen, Tangut, Persian). Being culturally superior to the rest of the Mongols, these officials acted also as personal advisers to the ruler, assisting him in formulating policies concerning the conquered territories.

Thus, the two principal sections of this 'tent' chancellery, viz. the Uighur-Mongolian and Chinese sections, assumed increasingly numerous and varied administrative responsibilities with the continuing acquisition of territory and subjects in China and the West. We see these secretaries and chamberlains acting as scribes, interpreters, envoys on special missions, astronomers-astrologers, fiscal experts and

supervisors of military colonies according to the need of the moment. Some, like Činqai and the sinicized Jurchen Nien-ho Chung-shan – a junior colleague of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's – performed military functions as well and led troops when the occasion demanded; others, like Ch'u-ts'ai, performed purely 'civil' functions. Being officials in the immediate entourage of the ruler, they were assimilated to the Guard (*kešik*) as a matter of course, and it seems that they were at first (*ca.* 1222) under the control of Alči Noyan of the Qonggirat, a brother-in-law of Činggis Qan's, and subsequently of Eljigidei, a senior officer in the Guard. There is, however, no indication, direct or indirect, that Ch'u-ts'ai himself belonged to, or had any connection with, the prestigious *kešik*. This may be explained by the fact that he was regarded first and foremost as a 'diviner (from other countries)' (*tölgečin*) in Činggis's time, and that he belonged as such to that restricted group of special advisers, like Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*) under Qubilai, who were *outside* the Guard's jurisdiction, which would also explain why he was never entrusted with military duties.

Although we have no information as to the structure of the 'tent' chancellery under Činggis Qan, we know that Ch'u-ts'ai served in a subordinate position until Ögödei's election, for he refers to himself in the *Hsi-yu lu* (1229) as 'the assistant chief in the Secretariat' (*chung-shu shih-lang*). The turning point in his career came in 1231 when, as we have seen, Ögödei entrusted him with the fiscal management of the conquered territories in the South, with a mandate to act in the manner that Ch'u-ts'ai deemed the most appropriate to maximize returns.

It is on this occasion that the former, loose chancellery of Činggis Qan became a truly administrative bureau, one section of which, dealing with Chinese affairs, was organized on Chinese lines under Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, assisted by Nien-ho Chung-shan. The Uighur-Mongol section, which handled affairs concerning the Western Region, was headed by Činqai, whose representative *in situ* was the famous Maḥmūd Yalavač (*q.v.*), appointed in 1229 governor general of all Mongol possessions in Central Asia. Later on, anxious to enhance the role of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, his Chinese biographer claimed that Činqai and Nien-ho Chung-shan were both subordinate to Ch'u-ts'ai in the new agency. This is unlikely. As heads of their respective bureaux, Ch'u-ts'ai and Činqai were indeed colleagues, but Činqai – a former 'Baljuna comrade' of Činggis's – was unquestionably the senior partner and, moreover, it was he who held the Imperial Seal: all documents issued by the Chinese Secretariat had to be countersigned by him. The association of a Kereit, possibly with Uighur affiliations (Činqai), with a Khitan of Chinese culture (Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai) and a Jurchen (Nien-ho Chung-shan) is interesting because it illustrates the Mongols' practice of placing people of different nationalities and culture in the same office so that they would keep

each other in check. This policy was maintained throughout the period of Mongol rule in China.

Now, one of the Secretariat's first actions was to obtain Ögödei's formal sanction for the conferment and use of Chinese official ranks and titles. These had been in actual use well before that date and, indeed, in Činggis' time and before, the Mongols themselves had borne titles like *ong* (= chin. *wang* 'King, Prince'), *güi-ong* (= chin. *kuo-wang* 'Prince-of-state'), *taiši* (= chin. *t'ai-tzu* 'Prince of the blood'), and *jautau* (= chin. *chao-t'ao* [*shih*] 'punitive commissioner'). But these were exceptions, for the Mongols, like the Turks, had their own (Altaic) ranks and titles, and the Chinese official nomenclature and bureaucratic system were alien to them. It was therefore left to cultural 'middlemen' like Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and his Secretariat colleagues to confer Chinese ranks and titles, or – a more frequent occurrence at the time – to sanction, or legitimize, those arbitrarily assumed by Han officials who had rallied to the Mongols and were now fighting on their side in north China. For them, traditional ranks and dignities, meaningless to their masters, were of course of paramount importance, as was also the time-honoured system of promotion, inheritance of rank and title, posthumous titles and appellations, etc. Since the Han military leaders carried out their task under the orders of, and in conjunction with, Mongol officers, the latter too had to be given appropriate Chinese ranks and titles for the sake of their Han colleagues and subordinates, in keeping with the system within which they had to operate. It was mainly to check the proliferation and arbitrary use of such ranks and titles among the military and in the civil administration of north China that the Secretariat intervened to assert its authority in the matter.

Such concessions on the part of Ögödei might be interpreted as a victory for the more enlightened element at court, and as a sign of progressive acculturation. To a certain extent this is no doubt true. We must not forget, however, that such changes were purely formal and did not really affect the basic attitude of the Mongols toward their subjects. The adoption of certain traditional elements of Chinese culture was only designed to ensure a better and more efficient system of exploitation, and the Mongol ruling élite was in no way affected by the Han-inspired reforms introduced in this period, except in terms of revenue.

The number of civil officials in charge of tax collecting was small at first. After his initial success, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai fully realized that it would be unwise to antagonize the more conservative element at court. Moreover, as it dragged on, the war with Chin made the full enforcement of his administrative program increasingly difficult. The Mongol armies in China were in constant need of supplies and revenue, which they continued to exact from the local populations over and above the latter's dues under the new regulations. As the administrative machinery was still

rudimentary, the revenue exacted by the court was collected in the form of annual quotas, fixed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1230 at 10,000 ingots of silver (equal to 500,000 *liang*). Population displacement, in addition to the famines and epidemics that characterized the early period of Ögödei's reign, seriously reduced the number of taxpayers at a time when the government's need of revenue was increasing. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai tried in vain to impose on the privileged non-Chinese residents of north China (Mongols, Central Asians, and so on) the same fiscal obligations to which the Chinese were subject. Contrary to what is stated by Sung Tzu-ch'en, his proposal was not carried into effect. Instead, we know that by 1232-1233 the land tax (for the Chinese!) had been raised to four *sheng* from the original two. With the conquest of Honan in 1233-1234, the annual levy of silver was also doubled.

Although the reforms of 1229-1230 represented a step toward the resurrection of the Chinese administrative tradition and state power, in practice they had the effect of rendering the already intricate fiscal system even more confusing, and of aggravating the tax burden. Before tax categories could be redefined, it was necessary to carry out a general census, which was not possible until Chin had been destroyed. A partial census of north China was taken in 1233, showing a population of about 3,650,000 individuals. The fall of Chin in 1234 increased the dislocation of people in Honan; the floating population reached enormous proportions: according to Sung Tzu-ch'en, the number of slaves owned by the Mongol princes, dignitaries, and army leaders comprised half the population of north China. The Mongol high officials, dissatisfied with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's rearrangement of the fiscal program along traditional Chinese lines and anxious to increase revenue above the limit set by him, insisted that the basic unit for taxation purposes should be the individual adult male (instead of the household). They pointed out that this was the practice of the Mongols as well as being the one enforced in the Western Region, whereas the system introduced by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was based on the administrative rules of a defeated country. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai opposed the redefinition and won his point by stating that if it were introduced, the population would pay taxes for one year, but would then flee and disperse.

A national census was then ordered by Ögödei in 1234, ostensibly upon Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's recommendation. The latter, through the central Secretariat and the ten district centres in north China, was responsible for its smooth operation. (Although Ch'u-ts'ai himself was attached to the Mongol court, the Secretariat normally operated through its main regional office in Yen-ching.) Overall control of the census was exercised by the great judge (*yeke Jarquči*) Šigi Qutuqu (*q.v.*), an adopted brother of Činggis Qan whom the latter had earlier appointed keeper of the so-called 'Blue Books' (*kökö debter*). These books (called 'blue' from the colour of the ink)

contained records of court decisions on rewards and punishments to provide guidelines in legal proceedings. They also served as population registers, essential for the distribution of subjects among the ruling family, the court nobility and the military leaders, and decisions on such allocations were duly recorded in them. It must be emphasized that while Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai favoured the census for administrative reasons, its justification for the Mongols was a very different one. In the eyes of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the registration of the population was necessary to fix the social status and obligations of those registered, so as eventually to do away with the Mongol system of arbitrary tributes and levies. For the Mongol rulers the census not only proclaimed the definitive appropriation of the new territory, but also made it possible to grant equitable shares of land (with the people attached to it) to members of the imperial family and the nobility. The Mongols had by now realized the impracticability of displacing large sections of conquered people, and had started granting land to the aristocracy and deserving officers as hereditary fiefs (*soyurqal*). The aims of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and those of his immediate supervisor Šigi Qutuqu were clearly conflicting. Indeed, we know that Šigi Qutuqu was one of the court dignitaries who had originally proposed that the individual made adult be regarded as the basic unit for taxation in China. Although he lost on this point owing to Ögödei's personal intervention, Šigi Qutuqu's authority as great judge and virtual *procurator* of the Mongol court in north China was not affected. Furthermore, he enjoyed the support and friendship of influential Chinese religious leaders, such as Hai-yün (q.v.), to whom he had extended his protection.

The census lists were returned in 1236 and they showed a total population of 1,730,000 households for the ten districts, i.e. about eight and a half million people. (The last national census taken in 1207-8 by the Chin had shown a population of 7,684,438 households, equal to 45,816,079 individuals.) Of these, 900,000 households were in the category of those already attached to the apanages, thus confirming Sung Tzu-ch'en's estimate.

Upon completion of the census, Ögödei, on Šigi Qutuqu's advice and ignoring Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's remonstrances, proceeded to parcel out north China into apanages for the court, the nobility and the military, including Han leaders that had distinguished themselves fighting for the Mongols. This measure brought about a further decentralization, for the court had no effective control over the newly created domains. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai proposed thereupon the appointment of government officials entrusted with the collection of revenue from the apanages, which was to be handed over to the treasury and redistributed to the apnage holders. Although the proposal was adopted by Ögödei *in principle*, it was not until the reign of Qubilai that the central government actually gained financial control over the apanages. All that

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai achieved was to withdraw some of the powers of tax collection from the new overlords. The parcelling out of the country into a series of independent administrative units was a serious obstacle to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's policy of establishing a strong centralized administration. This did not prevent him, however, from carrying out the proposed program of fiscal reforms.

The land tax that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had introduced in 1229-1230 on a household basis was now (1236/37) reassessed, and varied from two to five *sheng* of grain per *mou* (acre) according to the quality and quantity of the land owned, thus fully conforming to the traditional Chinese system. The poll or head tax was continued but at reduced rates: one *shih* of grain per free male adult and half a *shih* per adult male slave in the 'old households' (i.e. those registered before the 1235-36 census). The 'new households' were taxed only half that amount. A new silk tax, assessed on the basis of the household, was created to replace the loose system of specifically Mongolian tributes. This was levied according to household categories, and varied from one *chin* of silk yarn payable to the state (plus some sheer silk and coloured cloth to local agencies) levied on two 'free' households, to the same amount levied on five 'bound' households (i.e. attached to the apanages). Labor service and duties on commerce, salt, liquor, etc., were of course retained. All in all, the new rates represented about one-tenth of those previously exacted. Simultaneous with the tax reforms of those years was the nation-wide introduction of paper money (*yin-ch'ao*), which was issued in various denominations against a silver reserve. Apparently, only a limited number of notes were printed and circulated, and the issue of paper money was discontinued soon after.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai then proceeded to reorganize the civil service. With the fall of Pien-liang and the subsequent annexation of Chin, the administrative machinery of the Jurchen state had fallen into the hands of the Mongols. In response to a moving appeal by the great Chin literatus Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257) immediately after the capitulation of Pien-liang (May-June 1233), Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had rescued from captivity a few scores of former leading Chin scholars and notables, including the fifty-first lineal descendant of Confucius, K'ung Yüan-ts'u (1181-*ca.* 1252). The text of Yüan Hao-wen's letter to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (dated 1 June 1233) is not only extant, but it has also attracted a good deal of attention on the part of Chinese scholars for its human interest. Of the fifty-four people 'recommended' by Yüan, over half are known to history, and several of them, such as Wang E, Li Chih, Yang Huan, Shang T'ing (*qq.v.*), Liu Ch'i (1203-50) and Hsü Shih-lung (1206-85), rank among the great scholars of the 13th century. It is noteworthy that, according to the Buddhist source *Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai*, the credit for restoring K'ung Yüan-ts'u to his hereditary title and office goes to Hai-yün, who apparently recommended him strongly to Šigi

Qutuqu. This indicates that the Buddhist clergy, as well as the Taoists (as shown by Ch'en Yüan) and officials like Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, were all engaged in a vast operation to rescue Chinese lives and culture at a time of great crisis.

Through the good offices of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and of Šigi Qutuqu, K'ung was quickly restored by imperial edict to the title of Duke of Overflowing Sageliness (Yen-sheng kung) and to his traditional privileges as magistrate of Ch'ü-fu, Confucius' birthplace in Shantung.

During the following years, yet more scholars were gathered with the assistance of K'ung Yüan-ts'u and other Chinese officials in the Mongol service. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was now faced with the difficult task of finding suitable appointments for them. While some obtained employment in the Mongol administration and in the domains of Han overlords like Yen Shih (q.v.), others were absorbed in newly created institutions, such as the Bureau of Compilation in Yen-ching and the Bureau of Literature in P'ing-yang (Lin-fen hsien, Shansi), both established by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1236 to edit and publish books under official sponsorship. Ironically, it was at P'ing-yang that the Taoist Canon (*Tao-tsang*) was reprinted a few years later (1237-44) by Ch'üan-chen monks with the Mongol court's support, whereas Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's efforts to reprint the Buddhist scriptures, i.e. the Chinese *Tripitaka*, were unsuccessful because of lack of private sponsors. The first edition of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's *Collected Works* was published in 1234 at P'ing-yang (see below).

Ch'u-ts'ai was also instrumental in promoting education by setting up schools and colleges with former Chin scholars. In Yen-ching the Confucian temple Hsüan-sheng miao was established in the grounds of the old Department of Military Affairs of the Chin: a sacrifice to the Master performed in this temple in 1229 was celebrated by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in a poem praising Wang Chi for his part in the restoration of the building. In 1233, on Ch'u-ts'ai's recommendation, the school set up in this temple became the National College, with Yang Wei-chung (q.v.) and Ch'en Shih-k'o as superintendents. Instructors were appointed to impart basic education, covering Mongolian and Chinese languages and culture, as well as archery, to the sons of Mongol and Chinese officials. The employment of Confucians as tutors to the Mongol aristocracy is of particular significance, for, as far as we know, the very limited literary education of the nobles had mainly been provided by Uighur teachers and Taoists. Later in the dynasty this task was to be shared by Buddhists (of various denominations and nationalities) and Confucians, although instances of Taoist preceptors are not unknown. One of the early instructors at the College was the great literatus Yao Shu (q.v.), who in 1238 assisted Yang Wei-chung in founding the first private academy (*shu-yüan*) in Yen-ching, known as the Private Academy of the Supreme Ultimate (T'ai-chi shu-yüan). This school was the main centre for the spread

of the Neo-Confucian teachings in north China. One of the Chinese officials directly involved in founding the academy and promoting education was Liu Min, the colleague and friend of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai who subsequently became one of the top administrators of north China, sharing office with the Muslim Maḥmūd Yalavač.

The scholars recruited in this way by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and his colleagues were the surviving élite of the former Chin administration, and their assignment to various offices had been made possible, as in the case of the earlier tax collectors, through the personal recommendation of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai or other high dignitaries. Not only were the great majority of former Chin officials still unemployed, but a considerable number of them had been attached to the households of Mongol leaders after the collapse of the dynasty, and subsequently registered as slaves (*ch'ü-k'ou*) in the census lists. In order to redeem them from bondage and at the same time promote the creation of a Chinese bureaucracy distinct from the Mongol and Central Asian officialdom, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai memorialized in 1237, advocating the appointment of Chinese through competitive examinations. Ögödei gave his consent. Examinations were then held in 1237/38 throughout the various districts, the required subjects being classical exegesis, poetry (rhymeprose), and essays. The rules set up by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai were such as to enable the largest possible number of candidates to participate. Severe penalties (our sources speak of capital punishment) were decreed for all owners of enslaved scholars who prevented them from attending. The examinations produced 4,030 successful candidates, about a thousand of whom, former slaves, 'were sent back to their homes,' i.e., regained their freedom. Regarding their employment, the *Yüan History* informs us that they were allowed to participate in the administration of their native places as 'councillors'. For many of them, this simply meant that they were used in an advisory capacity on local administrative matters by their Mongol or Central Asian superiors who naturally continued to hold all the senior posts. One of the first on the list of the successful candidates was Yüan Hao-wen's friend Yang Huan who travelled to the north after the examination and had an audience with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, whereupon he was appointed chief of the Tax-collection Bureau and surveillance commissioner for Ho-nan. From this and similar instances, it appears that one of the main aims of the Secretariat was to recruit more administrators by means of this test, and specifically officials versed in fiscal matters (Yang had previously been an accountant, and Liu Chung, the chief examiner, was himself an expert in fiscal administration). The main incentive, on the part of the candidates, was of course the re-classification of their status: by passing the state examinations, they gained the status of 'Confucian scholar' in the household registration and were thereby exempted from taxes and corvée (see the biographies of Hsü Heng and Yang Huan).

According to Sung Tzu-chen, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai prescribed special examinations on the canonical texts for Buddhist and Taoist monks at the same time that he introduced government examinations for Confucian scholars. We have seen that a decree to this effect had already been issued in 1229; it appears, however, that it was never enforced, probably because of resistance on the part of the clergy and collusion with the authorities in north China. At the time of the great census, another attempt was made to enforce the holding of the examination; this failed, we know, because of the opposition of the famous Ch'an master Hai-yün, who argued that Buddhist monks should be concerned not with the knowledge of books but with the cultivation of virtue. He had the full backing of other Buddhist masters, including Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's former teacher Wan-sung, who were well aware of the illiteracy of the majority of monks at the time. Hai-yün obtained the support of his powerful patron Šigi Qutuqu, and the examination was reduced as a result to a mere formality, with no failure and admission to the monasteries continuing virtually as before. In 1237 the question of the examination for the priesthood was discussed again, probably in connection with the civil service examination, and a new attempt was made to carry it out. But no practical result ensued and the question did not arise again until the end of Qubilai's reign, when an edict was issued to the effect that only persons versed in the canons were allowed to take up monastic life. It is doubtful whether this condition alone ever constituted a serious obstacle for those wishing to enter a monastery. The civil service examination also proved short-lived: no examination was held after 1238.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's failure effectively to introduce the traditional examination system coincides with, and is partly explained by, the decline of his power at the Mongol court. Several factors contributed to this. After 1235 Ögödei, an alcoholic, withdrew more and more from active participation in government affairs. Efforts by members of his family to curb his vice, as well as pleas and remonstrations from some court officials – including Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai – were all in vain. The anti-Chinese element at court, opposed from the beginning to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's policy, had been further aroused by the reforms of 1236. These had imposed a limit on the fiscal exploitation of Chinese subjects at a time when the lavish use of revenues by the emperor and his entourage necessitated drawing an increasing amount of silver from the conquered territories. The Central Asian merchants, who had followed in the wake of the Mongol invasion and now monopolized the money-lending business in north China, came forward with the alluring offer of vastly increasing the income of the Mongol court by the well-known system of tax-farming. The merchants in question, mostly belonging to trade associations or 'partnerships' known in Turkic as *ortaq* (lit. 'partner', from which Mo. *ortoq*), had become rich and influential after

years of investing in high interest loans the money they borrowed from the Mongol court and from wealthy Mongol nobles. These loans were much in demand in north China because of the chronic inability on the part of large sections of the population to withstand fiscal exactions and the increasing cost of living at a time of war, famine and natural disasters. The Muslim moneylenders apparently charged an interest of 100% p.a., converting interest into principal every year; in this way, the principal and the compound interest would amount after ten years to 1,000 times the original loan. Having established the *ortaq* as a valuable and reliable source of income for the Mongol court (Ögödei is reported to have reaped enormous profits through these agencies), the merchants offered their masters additional gains by bidding for the privilege of collecting the taxes themselves in place of the official collectors appointed by the Secretariat. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, aware that such a measure, if adopted, would weaken the authority of the government and bring about a still greater decentralization, vigorously opposed it. He declared that the annual quota (which in 1238 was 22,000 ingots) could be doubled, but only through the enforcement of stern laws, and that the people would become destitute and inevitably take to crime. His words were of no avail: the emperor, influenced by the opinion prevailing at court, conferred in 1239 the privilege of farming the taxes in north China on the Muslim businessman 'Abd al-Rahmān. The annual quota was then immediately raised to 44,000 ingots (= 2,200,000 *liang*).

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's authority had also been undermined by personal conflict with his nearest colleagues in the Secretariat. It seems that there had already been some dissension with Činqai before these events, and Činqai's name is associated with that of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's *bête noire* (Shih-mo) Hsien-te-pu in some official documents of the mid-1230s. Further, our sources ascribe 'Abd al-Rahmān's introduction at court to a Central Asian translator called An-t'ien-ho, aided by Činqai who may have also been instrumental in recommending him for the tax-farming assignment. Certainly Činqai, who later showed marked hostility towards the Muslims, supported them at this stage, perhaps to thwart Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. This conflict went probably beyond personalities and may well reflect the basic incompatibility of the two opposing 'tendencies' (as Munkuev calls them) in the attitude of the early Mongol qans towards the conquered people to which reference has already been made. Činqai, like Šigi Qutuqu, Begder and Sübötei (*q.v.* – also specifically mentioned by Sung Tzu-chen), were upholders of the Mongol tradition, which was being eroded in their view by the 'alien' policies and reforms of the Sino-Khitan-Jurchen 'clique' headed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. While Ögödei was still in active control of state management, Ch'u-ts'ai could count on the emperor's sympathy and support; there is, indeed, plenty of evidence that, in spite of occasional outbursts on the part of the Qa'an, there existed a

warm personal relationship between the two men. Unfortunately this was not to last. Charges of embezzlement and corruption brought against Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and some of the Chinese tax-collecting officials (in the latter's case, apparently not unfounded) made Ch'u-ts'ai's position at court increasingly difficult. Serious doubts grew even in the emperor's mind as to the true worth of the principles proposed by him, and about the honesty of the Confucian scholar-officials in general.

The struggle between the various factions and cliques at Qara Qorum during the latter part of Ögödei's reign helped to weaken the already precarious administrative structure established by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. The pro-Chinese party was replaced in power by the pro-Muslim faction, and in 1240 the hated 'Abd al-Raḥmān was put in charge of all Tax-collection Bureaux in north China. Soon after, Maḥmūd Yalavač was recalled from Central Asia and given a key administrative post in Yen-ching. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai retained his title of chief of the Secretariat, but he no longer had a part in government affairs. The Secretariat, stripped of its policy-making authority and administrative powers, continued to exist purely in name.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's advice was now sought only on astrological matters, especially in connection with Ögödei's failing health. Early in 1241 he recommended a second amnesty in north China as a means to propitiate Heaven, so that the emperor might recover from a stroke he had suffered while hunting. The amnesty was promulgated and Ögödei recovered.

The last act which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai performed for his sovereign was to warn him repeatedly, after taking the omens, not to go on a great hunt in December of the same year, well aware that the emperor had not been taking medicine for a long time and that he was in no condition to travel. Ögödei, prompted by his courtiers, ignored the advice. On 10 December, he returned after the hunt to his 'travelling camp' at Mount Ötegü Qulan (near the Ongin River in the area of present-day Arbai Kheere). There, according to the *Yüan History*, "'Abd al-Raḥmān offered him liquor and the Emperor drank merrily all through the night.' He died at dawn aged fifty-five. Soon after his death Töregene (d. ca. 1248) assumed the regency of the empire. She had been Ögödei's second qatun (lady) and had borne him five sons. A forceful woman, she had virtually taken control of the state in the last years of Ögödei's life and had backed the pro-Muslim faction at court. When, some time later, the question of succession was debated at court, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai once again strongly opposed suggestions that violated the deceased emperor's will. Although our sources are cautious here and mention no names, it appears that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai spoke in favour of electing Ögödei's grandson Širemün, the successor designated by the Qa'an himself, whereas Töregene and her party favoured the candidature of Töregene's own son Güyük, who was eventually elected in 1246.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's protests no longer carried any weight. Töregene resented his opposition, but, according to Sung Tzu-chen, 'she still endeavoured to treat him with respect and deference, in consideration of his long and distinguished service during the previous reigns.' This might have changed to active hostility, however, had not Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai died (some say of a broken heart) on 2 June 1243. Two severe blows which may have hastened his demise were the death of his wife in the spring of 1243, and Töregene's appointment of 'Abd al-Raḥmān as supreme head of the Mongol administration in north China by transferring to him also the authority previously held by Maḥmūd Yalavač in Yen-ching. (Yalavač was reinstated, however, in 1246, when 'Abd al-Raḥmān was executed by order of Güyük.)

As it was, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's death was openly deplored by many. According to Sung Tzu-chen, the Mongol capital went into mourning, and Ch'u-ts'ai's wish to be buried with his wife at the foot of Weng-shan was honoured. (Weng Shan is the old name of Wan-shou shan, or 'Longevity Hill', so renamed by the Ch'ien-lung emperor in 1751. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's tomb faced the West Lake and was barely 3 km east of Jade Fountain Hill and the nearby family home. The impressive mausoleum, containing also the marble statues of the statesman and his second wife, was plundered at the end of the Ming dynasty, but its ruins could still be seen in the middle of the 18th century. Repaired in 1750-1751 by order of Ch'ien-lung, who also added a new shrine and commemorative stele inscribed with a poem written by the emperor himself, the tomb was badly damaged by the British and French forces in 1860; it was moved south of the new Summer Palace at the time of the construction of the I-ho yüan in 1886-91. In the 1960s it was again moved to another part of the Summer Palace closer to Wan-shou shan, but the stele remained *in situ*. Both are still found at those locations, after suffering further damage during the 'Cultural Revolution' and undergoing renovation in recent years. The restored image of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, represented sitting gravely with his beard and moustache reaching down to his knees, is the one erected by Ch'ien-lung.)

Among the posthumous honours conferred on Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai by Emperor Toq Temür (Wen-tsung, r. 1330-32) in 1330 were the titles of Grand Preceptor and Supreme Pillar of State. He was canonized as Wen-cheng ('Cultured and Correct'), and posthumously enfeoffed as Prince of I-ning. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and his descendants enjoyed also the revenue from a family estate in Tung-p'ing, Shantung, as well as from a number of households in Yen-ching/Ta-tu and other localities.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had two wives. The first one, née Liang, bore him one son, Hsüan. They were separated at the time of the Mongol invasion and she died in Chin-held territory *ca.* 1230. Hsüan (T. Pu-ming) eventually became inspector of the K'ai-p'ing granaries and died between 1260 and 1267. Ch'u-ts'ai's second wife, née Su,

was the daughter of Su Kung-pi, a fourth-generation descendant of Su Tung-p'o (1036-1101). She also bore Ch'u-ts'ai one son, Chu (see below).

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's *Collected Works*, entitled *Chan-jan chü-shih wen-chi* (14 *chüan*), contain 505 'pieces' – mostly poems, but also prefaces and 'inscriptions' – written between 1216 and 1236. This is a most important source of information on his life, and Wang Kuo-wei made extensive use of it for his 'Chronological biography' (*nien-p'u*) of the statesman. The first edition of the *Collected Works* was published in P'ing-yang in 1234; it comprised only 9 *chüan*. The edition in 14 *chüan* published after 1236 is the one reproduced in the *Sse-pu ts'ung-k'an* collection on the basis of a Yüan manuscript copy. There is also: the 1895 edition in the *Chien-hsi-ts'un-she ts'ung-k'o*, based on a different text and with annotations by Li Wen-t'ien (1834-1895); the punctuated editions of the *Ts'ung-shu chi-cheng* (Shanghai, 1937) and the *Chung-hua shu-chü* (Peking, 1986); and finally a complete Japanese translation by Iida Rigyō (Tokyo, 1985; see the Bibliography).

The *Hsi-yu lu*, to which frequent mention has been made, was written in 1228 and published in 1229. It contains a sketchy description of the places seen, sometimes only heard of, by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai during his years in Central Asia (1219-26), followed by a sharp attack on Ch'ang-ch'un and the Ch'üan-chen sect. The geographical section occupies only one-fourth of the whole. By the end of the 13th century this work was already very rare, a fact that has prompted Ch'en Yüan to suggest that Ch'u-ts'ai's son Chu, a Taoist sympathizer, may have destroyed the printing blocks after his father's death. The geographical section and sections from the polemical part were incorporated into other works, such as Hsiang-mai's *Pien-wei lu* (1265). The geographical section was translated into English and annotated by E. Bretschneider in *Mediaeval Researches from East Asiatic Sources* (1888). Two manuscript copies of the complete text were found in Japan in 1926, and this has since been published in Tokyo (1927), in China (1927, 1980), and Taiwan (1962), not without printing errors, however. An annotated English translation of the *Hsi-yu lu* was published by I. de Rachewiltz in 1962, together with a photoreproduction of the best manuscript copy.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's calendrical work, the *Hsi-cheng keng-wu-yüan li*, was apparently published privately by the author, as was the *Hsi-yu lu*. It has fortunately been preserved in the *Yüan History* (ch. 56-57). While in Samarqand, Ch'u-ts'ai had made contact with Muslim and Chinese astronomers. Aware that the official Chin calendar (the 'revised' *Ta-ming li* of 1171) was no longer accurate, he produced the above calendar in 1222 wherein, according to Ch'ien Pao-tsung, he adopted the Arabic procedures of geographic time correction while retaining the Chinese methods of computation for the five planets. This calendar, as well as another calendrical

work by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai now unfortunately lost (the *Ma-ta-pa* Calendar – apparently based on Islamic astronomical tables), were never officially adopted by the Mongol government in China. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's calendrical *opus* may be regarded as the forerunner of the calendars compiled during the Yüan under the influence of Arabic-Persian astronomy (see the biography of Kuo Shou-ching).

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was also the author of a work entitled *Pien-hsieh lun* (*Refutation of Heresy*) in which he attacked the Dhūta, a 'heretic' Buddhist sect which was attracting followers in north China at the time. This work, now lost, was written *ca.* 1225, which is the date of its preface preserved in the *Collected Works*.

As stated earlier, the *Collected Works* contain no 'piece' composed after 1236, i.e. nothing that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai wrote between this year and the year of his death (1243). They are therefore incomplete. Only a single post-1236 poem has survived on the original scroll in Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's handwriting – the only extant autograph of this great man. The poem, dated 1 November 1240, is dedicated to Liu Man, an able administrator of the Yün-chung and Hsüan-te region. It is at present in the John M. Crawford Jr. Collection in New York. The autograph is especially interesting because it is also a splendid example of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's brushwork, which Shujirō Shimada has described as 'bold and vigorous, as if cast in iron, and is imbued with a resolute spirit.'

Among Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's other accomplishments, one should mention his knowledge of languages, in particular Khitan, for he seems to be one of the last people who actually studied it and became proficient enough to actually translate from it into Chinese. Ch'u-ts'ai was also, by all accounts, an accomplished lute player (he refers to himself as 'addicted' to the lute), and several of his poems are on a 'lute' theme.

The language of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's poems, as well as of his prose, is direct and unpolished, i.e. more concerned with meaning than with elegance and style. He makes constant use of literary allusions but his main preoccupation is always self-improvement, education, and the transformation of society (see below). Many of his poems are imbued with 'the flavour of Ch'an', and the Buddhist influence is evident throughout. So is the influence of Su Tung-p'o's style, in particular the careful avoidance of excessive display of emotions. The general impression is that of a strong and vigorous personality, of a man of integrity totally devoted to his task, yet full of humanity – an impression confirmed by his brushstroke and by Sung Tzu-ch'en's eulogy. 'It was not his normal habit,' Sung writes, 'to talk and laugh heedlessly; thus, he may have appeared to be sharp and overbearing, but as soon as one was received by him, he became warm and affable, so that one could not forget

him.' He also says of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai that 'every time that the State's interest and the people's prosperity were discussed, his tone of voice became very earnest and he would spare no effort. The Emperor then used to say, "Are you going to shed tears for the people again?" But afterwards he would treat him with increased esteem.' And again: 'He was so earnest in his love of learning (that he pursued it) without ceasing day or night. He used to admonish his son, saying, "Although public duties are numerous, the day belongs to the office and the night to oneself. So one can still (find time to) study".'

The lighter side of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's character is best illustrated in an anecdote also reported by Sung Tzu-chen. Although critical of Ögödei's excessive drinking, Ch'u-ts'ai did not disdain wine himself, which is frequently mentioned in his poems. On one occasion, after feasting with the Mongol princes, he became intoxicated and went to lie down in a carriage. Ögödei noticed him, got into the carriage and shook him awake, whereupon Ch'u-ts'ai, not realizing who it was, showed anger at being disturbed. When he came to his senses, he jumped up in fright and apologized. Ögödei then said to him, 'So you take liquor and get drunk alone, rather than enjoy yourself with Us!', and went away laughing. Ch'u-ts'ai, quickly rode after him, without even reaching for his cap and sash. The story ended with another banquet and much merriment.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's personality was undoubtedly a complex one. We should state at the outset that he firmly believed that the Mongol dynasty possessed the Heavenly Mandate and clearly proclaimed this in his works. For him the success that accompanied Činggis Qan's expedition against the state of Chin was granted by Heaven. The Emperor's 'pacification' of the country in less than five years (*sic*) was a feat 'that human power (alone) could not have achieved.' In other words, Činggis Qan had proved his right by victory, and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai considered himself free from allegiance to Chin thereafter. As an eyewitness of the Mongols' conquest of Central Asia and north China, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai no doubt believed that the whole of China would eventually be unified under their rule. The following words addressed to Hsü T'ing – Sung envoy to north China in 1235-1236 – seem to confirm this view: 'You (Southern Sung) only rely on the Great River (Yangtze, for protection), but our horses' hoofs can reach any place, be it heaven or sea!' Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's conviction that the Mongols were in possession of the mandate to rule 'all-under-heaven' may have also been confirmed by his masters' dogmatic faith in the Heaven-ordained submission of the world to Mongol sovereignty.

Yet legitimacy of the new imperial house was not sufficient in itself to ensure good government. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai realized that it was imperative to make the emperor appreciate and adopt those principles that would guide him in establishing a

stable and efficient polity after the destruction that inevitably accompanies a period of transition. He plainly stated in the *Hsi-yu lu* that he wished to make Činggis Qan 'tread in the footsteps of the ancient worthies,' and this, we know, he hoped to achieve by acquainting him with the doctrines of the Three Sages. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, as has been mentioned, held the view that Confucius, Buddha, and Lao-tzu had taught the same truth. The old theory of the fundamental identity of the Three Teachings was very popular in that age of philosophical syncretism. Indeed it was a characteristic feature of the intellectual history of the Chin period. Wan-sung, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's teacher, maintained that the Three Teachings had a common origin in the Storing Center of Ideation (*ālaya-vijñāna*), a view influenced no doubt by the monistic Hua-yen philosophy in which he was particularly well versed, and which had by now been fully assimilated by Ch'an Buddhism.

Under Wan-sung's influence, Li Ch'un-fu (1185-1231) and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, his two most prominent lay disciples, developed syncretic inclinations. While Li Ch'un-fu's attempt to combine Confucianism and Taoism with Buddhism in a grandiose construct embracing and fusing diverse and complex teachings shows pre-eminently philosophical preoccupations, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's synthesis was driven by a practical spirit.

His premise was of course the same, namely, that the doctrines of the Three Sages had a common origin, and that the different traditions of their schools (*tsung-feng*) had developed only to meet the exigencies of the times. Although essentially identical – only the fool, said Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, would deny this truth – the three doctrines in relation to man and society had thus acquired individual characteristics and fulfilled different purposes. Taoism and Confucianism were the repository of ancient wisdom and illustrated as such the teachings of the Sage-Kings of the past; whereas the doctrine of Buddha and the Patriarchs penetrated both the realms of the absolute and the relative-phenomenal in its temporal and real aspect. With regard to their specific functions, he stated that the aim of Taoism was to foster man's nature (*yang-hsing*); Confucianism, with its emphasis on man's proper duties and well-defined obligations, provided the key to social order; while Buddhism constituted the ideal means of self-cultivation.

Although Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai emphasized the need for the teachings of the Three Sages to 'stand firmly in the world like the three legs of a tripod', it is quite clear that he did not attribute equal value to each of the three doctrines. His syncretism was, in fact, strongly biased in favour of Confucianism and Buddhism. His practical formula for social and mental transformation was twofold, not threefold: 'To rule the state with Confucianism and the mind with Buddhism.' In giving advice to his son Chu on his fifteenth birthday, he exhorted him not to neglect the Confucian doctrine, and to

cherish that of the Ch'an Patriarchs, but he made no mention of Taoism. To a friend who warned him against forgetting Confucius' tenets, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai replied, 'To grasp fully the universal principle and get to the bottom of one's nature, nothing is better than the *Buddhadharma*; to help society and pacify the people, nothing is better than the teachings of Confucius. In office, I follow the constant Way of Hsüan-ni (Confucius); in private, I enjoy the Absolute Truth of Buddhism. Surely this is not wrong?'

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's urge to convert Činggis Qan to the Way of the Sages shows the statesman's concern with the ideals of education and transformation (*chiao-hua*) so strongly advocated by Confucianism. Even before his encounter with the Mongol emperor he cherished the ambition of attaining enough power to put these ideals into practice. In 1216, at the time when he had just started his training under Wan-sung, he wrote:

Now, the reason why a superior man pursues his study is not a selfish one. His aim is: 'My prince should be a prince like Yao and Shun; my people should be like the people of Yao and Shun.' And, even if there were only one man or woman who did not enjoy the benefits of Yao and Shun, would not the superior man feel ashamed? Therefore, is it not a delight for him to be in power and have sufficient standing to practice the Way of the Sages, and sufficient means to confer extensive benefits upon the people?

The task he had set himself was fraught with immense difficulties. No real 'transformation' could in fact be carried out without first educating the ruler and bringing him to an understanding of the social situation which he had to deal with in his newly conquered empire. The Mongols were not interested in the mores of the Chinese, but merely in the exploitation of their territory and resources. Nor did they consider Chinese culture to be superior to their own; on the contrary, they despised it. It would have been useless to exalt the rules of civilized life unless their adoption offered hopes of greater material gain. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's plans for social and administrative reform therefore did not stress the moral so much as the practical aspect. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai has passed into history for his humanitarian acts; these, however, could not have been carried out except by appealing to the Mongols' cupidity. When he pleaded with the emperor to spare the people of Honan, he pointedly remarked that 'they could be used as a source of troops and revenue as the occasion may demand.' He is also said to have prevented the wholesale massacre of the inhabitants of Pien-liang in 1233 by showing that the destruction of the population, which included skilled artisans, would have meant a loss of valuable services for the Mongols. In order to obtain Ögödei's endorsement of his proposal for the reinstitution of civil service examinations, he again referred to the 'skilled artisans,' drawing a parallel between their useful role and that of the Confucian officials. Similarly, when he opposed some bad scheme put forward by one of the

court dignitaries, he was careful to point out the material loss that would eventually ensue if it were enforced. The gain-and-loss argument, however, was not always successful, owing to the Mongols' insatiable cupidity and their unwillingness to modify substantially their traditional law and customs.

In addition to strong factional opposition within the court, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had furthermore to contend with the hostility of the clergy. Following his bitter struggle with the Taoists he faced the antagonism of the Buddhist authorities when he tried to reintroduce the special examination for monks. We have already seen that his attempt was foiled by the direct intervention of the Buddhist leader Hai-yün. In these circumstances it is not surprising that many of his proposals met with failure. According to Sung Tzu-chen, of all his plans only 'two or three out of ten' were actually put into effect.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's Confucian attitude is also clearly present in his emphasis on 'rectification' and orthodoxy. He used the age-old argument of the 'rectification of names' to repudiate what he considered heterodox teachings. Speaking of the *Hsi-yu lu*, he wrote:

In it, I have been rather concerned with the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the teachings of the Three Sages. Some people have criticized my love of making distinctions. My reply to them is: 'The *Lun-yü* says, "What is necessary is to rectify names," and it also says, "Have no depraved thoughts."' This means that to discriminate between orthodoxy and heterodoxy should not be neglected.

After this introduction he listed the theories that he regarded as heterodox. Among them were the philosophies of Yang Chu, Mo Ti, and T'ien P'ien; the teachings of the Chen-yen, Dhūta, and White Lotus; and the doctrines preached by the Ch'üan-chen, Ta-tao, Hun-yüan, and T'ai-i sects. He dismissed the 'alchemical' practices of the Taoists as the corruption of the 'techniques' (*fang-chi*), and noted with regret that 'the tolerance and benevolence advocated while the State was in the making' had resulted in the growth of error. He concluded by stating that Han Yü's repudiation of Buddhism and Taoism represented 'the wrong way of discriminating,' while Mencius' repudiation of Yang Chu and Mo Ti as well as his own rejection of the Dhūta and of Ch'ang-ch'un represented the correct one.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's conception of 'evil' (or 'heterodox') was basically Confucian. His violent denunciation of sects like the Dhūta and the Ch'üan-chen arose from the actions, harmful to other religious groups or to the whole community, carried out by their followers. He accused the Dhūtaists of destroying Buddhist images, oppressing the Buddhist monks, failing to help people in distress, and corrupting filial custom. Similarly, his criticism of the Ch'üan-chen sect was aimed mainly at the behaviour of its members, not at their doctrine. He was obviously more concerned with Ch'ang-

ch'un's appropriation of temples and illegal use of travel credentials than with his religious tenets. He considered Lin Ling-su an arch-criminal for having gained his position at the Sung court through 'prodigies and artful powers,' but maintained that he was not as bad as the followers of the Ch'üan-ch'en sect, for 'he did not dare to rename Buddhist temples as Taoist temples or change Buddhist images into Taoist ones.'

This clearly illustrates the emphasis that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai placed on the moral duties of the individual towards society. But if adherence to the Confucian norm was the best way to achieve social stability, according to his twofold formula the cultivation of the self, or mind transformation, was best carried out by following the Buddhist doctrine. It was in Buddhism, not in Confucianism, that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai found his source of moral strength. In the preface to the *Hsi-yu lu* he wrote:

When in the past superior men went beyond the great mountain ranges in the south or the Yang Pass in the west, however strong and determined they were, they could not help feeling sad and discouraged. When, by imperial decree, I undertook a trip of several tens of thousands of *li* to the west, it was by virtue of my training in the vast expanse of the Law (= *dharma*), and not of other methods, that I remained steady and unperturbed.

Does this mean that he regarded the Confucian teachings as inadequate for self-cultivation and the principles of Buddhism as unsuitable for the practical affairs of the state? The answer to this important question is given by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai himself. Wan-sung once wrote to him on the subject of the formula quoted above and warned him against the danger of furthering Confucianism at the expense of Buddhism. The text of Wan-sung's letter is lost, but we possess Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's reply. This can be summarized as follows: Man's most important undertaking was the cultivation of the mind, for, as stated in the *Ta-hsüeh*, it was only when the mind was rectified that the state could be properly ruled. In so far as mind cultivation was concerned, however, the teachings of Confucius could not match Buddhism, for they lacked the latter's depth. According to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the Confucian doctrine of the Five Constant Virtues (*wu-ch'ang chih tao*) corresponded to the more superficial teaching of Buddha. As Buddhism alone provided the ideal means of self-cultivation, it followed that it was also the doctrine best suited for government. He would then dispense with the Confucian tenets altogether, but, in order not to displease the 'petty Confucian scholars' (*yung-ju*), he had adopted – as a mere 'expedient' – his conciliatory formula. Even so, the petty scholars were vexed and dissatisfied; they 'gnash their teeth' and accuse him of 'violating the doctrine and forgetting the fundamentals.' Such being the case, exclaimed Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, 'it is certainly not worth speaking of the Great Doctrine!' From these statements it would seem that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai conceived as the ultimate goal the realization of a society that transcended Confucianism. He

envisaged, as we can infer from his reference to the Great Doctrine (*ta-tao*), the utopian order of the Great Unity (*ta-t'ung*) – a world morally regenerated by the superior ethic of Buddhism. Because of the disruption of contemporary society, however, all that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai could hope to attain in his own lifetime were conditions of *relative* social and administrative stability. His Confucian-inspired reforms were therefore directed toward the restoration of the Small Tranquillity (*hsiao-k'ang*), a task for which he still required the traditional services of the 'petty Confucian scholar.' For all his leanings toward syncretism and his personal devotion to Buddhist ideals, yet as a practical statesman he was forced to admit the immediate superiority of Confucianist realism. We know, however, that this approach earned him the bitter criticism of contemporary scholars who advocated the precedence of moral over administrative reform.

His decline and death marked the end of Chinese influence at the Mongol court and a return to a state of administrative confusion similar to that existing before the accession of Ögödei. 'Abd al-Raḥmān held administrative control over north China from 1243 to 1246 and continued his policy of reckless exploitation, as a result of which 'the people did not know how to move hand or foot.'

The Secretariat remained nominally in existence, but, as we have seen, it had already ceased to function as the central administrative bureau at the end of Ögödei's reign. The *Yüan History* laconically states, 'From the year *jen-yin* (1242) onward, the law was no longer one; there was dissension inside and outside the court, and the good government of T'ai-tsung (= Ögödei) declined.'

The election of Möngke in 1251 and the transfer of power from the line of Ögödei to that of Tolui saw the beginning of the reconstruction of state power. The fiscal reforms carried out under Möngke by Maḥmūd Yalavač were directed towards a further rationalization of tributes and levies (the aim pursued by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai) and paved the way to the centralizing fiscal reforms of Qubilai (Shih-tsu, r. 1260-94). But Möngke reaffirmed the conquerors' preference for a non-Chinese officialdom and, although he also exempted the Confucians from taxation and corvée, he did not conceal his contempt for them as a class of no practical use in his opinion.

Complete centralization was finally achieved with the advent of Qubilai and the removal of the capital from remote Qara Qorum to Peking. The administrative reforms of the early part of Qubilai's reign represented the outcome of the slow process of acculturation or sinicization that had started during the reign of Ögödei. The re-establishment of the Secretariat as the supreme administrative body in 1260, and the subsequent creation of a bureaucratic structure modelled on the Chinese, the adoption of the *nien-hao* and of the Chinese court ceremonial, the unification and systematization of the tax structure, the separation of civil from military authority, the

subordination of the apanages to the fiscal control of the central government, the promotion of agriculture, the restriction of privileges of the *ortaq* merchants and the clergy, the promotion of learning through the founding of schools and academies for Mongols, Muslims, and Chinese, all showed the progress made from the time that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai drew up the blueprint for the Mongol administrative organization. The pattern of civil, as opposed to military, control which he had restored under Ögödei was carried on under Qubilai by an élite group of Chinese counsellors, among whom was the famous Buddhio-Confucian statesman Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*). Like Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, he maintained – in terms used by Confucians since the founding of the Han – that 'although the empire had been conquered on horseback, it could not be administered on horseback.' Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's important contribution to this process is both acknowledged and praised by members of this group, in particular Hao Ching (*q.v.*).

It would be incorrect, however, to think that the reforms in the civil administration, carried out on the recommendation of Qubilai's Chinese advisers, were inspired by similar reforms previously introduced or advocated by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. Faced with the particular *forma mentis* of the Chinese, who recognize no culture other than their own, and the irreconcilable character of the Chinese and Mongol societies, the conquerors had to choose: they had either to annihilate Chinese civilization or adapt themselves to it. Since they had rejected the former course, thanks to the momentous intervention of men like Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, a change in their original policy became unavoidable.

The scholar-officials, who helped to elaborate the new policy in their capacity as experts on local conditions, were, apart from the clergy, the principal link between the Mongol and Chinese cultures.

It is for his role of mediator between two ways of life that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai commands our special interest. As a sinicized Khitan, he was particularly well fitted to undertake this task. His racial origin made it possible for him to become a trusted adviser, first to Činggis, then to Ögödei, neither of whom would have entertained the proffered advice as readily had it come from a Chinese. Furthermore, though trained in Chinese ways and thoroughly familiar with the Confucian tradition, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai gave neither his unqualified allegiance. His intellectual horizon, as witness his acceptance of Buddhism as the higher ethic, refused to be bounded by Confucianism alone. His racial origin, and subsequent political experience, gave him 'a foot in both camps'; and his syncretic turn of mind seems, at least to some degree, to have reflected this.

He was unrivalled in his understanding of the Mongols, and, above all, of their motivation. He recognized for what it was the Mongol power which he sought to

bridle and restrain in China: a predatory nomadic feudalism. He was fully conscious that his arguments should be directed to the cupidity of the conquerors if they were to influence Mongol policy. Hence his choice of weapons. The appeal to Buddhist idealism would have to be deferred to less troubled times, while for the moment policies based on hard-headed Confucian practicality offered the better chances of success. It is almost as if Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had taken as his guide an early version of the 19th-century *t'i-yung* formula, which we might express as: *Fo-hsüeh wei t'i, Ju-hsüeh wei yung* ('Buddhism for the substance, Confucianism for the functions'). For him, however, this reflected a personal, much more than a cultural, dilemma.

His success in preventing the devastation of north China and its reduction to pastures for the horses of the nomads, was a real one. That he should have been rejected thereafter in favour of Muslim advisers whose willingness to appeal to the rapacity of their Mongol employers was uninhibited by even the 'lower' social ethic by which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had constantly been guided, was his personal tragedy.

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's second son Chu (T. Ch'eng-chung, H. Shuang-ch'i, Tu-tsui tao-chih) was born in Central Asia, probably at Samarqand, in 1221. He spent his youth at Qara Qorum and was eventually to inherit his father's rank as chief of the Secretariat – a purely nominal rank at the time, both in view of his young age (he was only twenty-two) and because the administrative functions of the Secretariat in north China were actually performed by other officials, such as the earlier mentioned 'Abd al-Rahmān, Yang Wei-chung and Maḥmūd Yalavač. Apparently he maintained good relations with the Regent Töregene, who in fact arranged his marriage to a Mongolian noblewoman called Čitegi. By all accounts, he was an excellent rider and archer.

In 1258 Chu took part in the expedition against Southern Sung led by Möngke (Hsien-tsung, r. 1251-59), serving with distinction in the Guard in Szechwan. When Möngke died in August 1259, Chu was proceeding northwards to Shensi with the heavy baggage of the army. He promptly joined Qubilai who, upon his enthronement at K'ai-p'ing in the following year, sent him to Qunduqai, the Mongol general supporting Ariq Böke, in order to win him to his side. The mission failed and Chu quickly returned to Qubilai; such was his haste that he left several members of his family behind in Kansu. These were immediately arrested by Qunduqai and their subsequent adventures are related in the long biography of Chu's son Hsi-liang in the *Yüan History* (ch. 180). Qubilai, pleased with Chu's loyalty, bestowed upon him many honours. In 1261 he appointed Chu Left chancellor in the new Secretarial Council – the former Secretariat – a post that he held three times in the course of his long career. Chu was concurrently made director of compilation of the *Liao and Chin Histories*. His other offices included that of regional commander of Shan-tung in 1264 or 1265 and director of compilation of the National History in 1276. Although

Chu shared office with Aḥmad (*q.v.*) in the Secretarial Council, he does not seem to have interfered with the notorious minister's questionable activities. He did, however, resign once from the Council in protest against Qubilai's unfair reprimand in the matter of Nizām al-Dīn's release from prison (see the biography of Lien Hsi-hsien). One of his major reforms (1282) entailed checking abuses committed by the officials in charge of selecting maidens for the imperial harem.

Chu died in 1285 and was canonized as Wen-chung ('Cultured and Loyal') in 1330. He was a prolific poet, but whereas Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was a fervent Ch'an Buddhist, Chu had strong Taoist leanings and his sympathies were with the Ch'üan-chen doctrines, as amply shown by his extant poetry. His collected poetical works, the *Shuang-ch'i tsui-yin chi*, have reached us incomplete. At the time of compiling the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* (1773-82), all that could be found of Chu's works in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* was collected and edited in six *chüan*. The *Shuang-ch'i tsui-yin chi* was reprinted in the third series of the *Chih-fu-chai ts'ung-shu* (1892), as well as in the sixth series of the *Liao-hai ts'ung-shu* (1931-34), with a valuable commentary by Li Wen-t'ien. A supplement in one *chüan* was published in the *Chiang-ts'un ts'ung-shu* (1922). It is from one of Chu's poems that we learn the interesting fact that he was responsible for the 'discovery' of the famous stele of Kül Tegin near Qara Qorum, and thereby proved that the Turkic title *tegin* ('prince') is wrongly transcribed in the *T'ang Histories*. In other poems we find hints at certain attempts on Chu's part to bring about a reconciliation between Buddhist and Taoist leaders, a question that deserves further investigation. As convincingly shown by M. Nakano, much of his poetry is less 'restrained' than that of his father and – an unusual trend for the times – centres on nature and personal feelings, thus following the style of mainstream T'ang poetry.

Chu had eleven sons and five daughters. The most famous of his sons is Yeh-lü Hsi-liang (T. Ming-fu, H. Su-hsüan), born south of Qara Qorum in 1247. His Mongolian nickname was Tuḡus ('Peacock'), apparently given to him by Töregene from the place where he was born, which was known as the Peacock Pavilion.

Hsi-liang received his early education in Yen-ching under the tutorship of the eminent *chin-shih* Chao Yen. In 1258 he left Yen-ching to join his father who was then campaigning with Möngke in Szechwan. In 1260 he and his mother were taken prisoners by the Mongol general Qundugai in Kansu. His subsequent vicissitudes took him to Central Asia whence he was not able to return to China before 1263.

In 1279, Hsi-liang was appointed minister of Rites, but was soon after transferred to the post of minister of Personnel. He retired in 1282 ostensibly on account of ill health. In 1309 Qaišan (Wu-tsung, r. 1308-11) appointed him to the Han-lin Academy, where he became academician for the transmission of directives in charge of Imperial Edicts, as well as redactor of the National History. He died in 1327 and,

like his father and grandfather, received posthumous honours in 1330, being canonized as Chung-chia ('Loyal and Commendable').

Yeh-lü Hsi-liang was a keen scholar till the end of his life. His collected works, published in 30 *chüan* under the title of *Su-hsüan chi*, included an account of his experiences in Central Asia, a summary of which is found in his biography in the *Yüan History* (ch. 180). The *Su-hsüan chi* is now unfortunately lost. A short notice of his experiences in Central Asia based on the *Yüan History* account was published by Bretschneider in his *Mediaeval Researches*.

Several descendants of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai achieved distinction during the Yüan dynasty. Significantly, members of the Yeh-lü clan had begun adopting the Chinese surname Liu already in the Chin dynasty, possibly for its phonetic resemblance to Yeh-lü. This practice continued during the Yüan and especially during the Ming periods; it probably accounts for the gradual disappearance of this surname and the apparent 'extinction' of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's line.

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I. de Rachewiltz

11. WANG CHI (ca. 1181-1240)

Wang Chi was an early convert to the Mongol cause and served it well all his life. He typifies that group of Chinese, Khitan and Jurchen, whose adherence was crucial to the Mongols' success in north China, first as conquerors and then as rulers. This was the group which, making up a second echelon of leadership below the Mongol aristocracy itself, was primarily responsible for the execution of Mongol rulings concerning the native population. While Wang Chi never enjoyed the power and influence of such former Chin subjects as the high minister Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*) or the great satrap Yen Shih (*q.v.*), he was called upon time and again to serve as the link between Mongol and Chinese. In this capacity he seems to have blunted the sharp edge of some Mongol actions and policies, softening their effects on his fellow Chinese, which probably served long-range Mongol interests all the more effectively. His career encompassed the roles of military commander, administrator and diplomat, the last two proving far more important than the first.

Wang Chi, T. Chü-ch'uan, H. Tz'u-yen weng, was born *ca.* 1181 in Kuo county, Feng-hsiang (Shensi), the son of a minor Chin official. Nothing is known of his early life until the time when, still in his teens and clearly overconfident, he stood for the *chin-shih* examination and failed. A period of further study ensued at a retreat in the hills near Lo-yang where, in his preference for the military classics, he revealed the temper of a man of action. Again he tried his hand at the state examination (*ca.* 1205) and having failed again, he abandoned this means of gaining office in favour of a direct approach to the court. His memorial on current problems presumably gained the attention of the emperor (or more likely of some high official), winning him appointment as executive assistant on the staff of the marshal of Chin-shan (a military command north-west of modern Peking).

Soon thereafter *chin-shih* status was conferred upon him on the recommendation of the marshal, Chu-hu Kao-ch'i, and, promoted to the office of deputy military controller, he was placed in charge of Cho-lu Pass in northern Hopei. Thus, by his mid-twenties Wang Chi was launched on an official career that promised to be at least moderately successful.

The Mongol invasion drastically changed his life and fortunes, as it did those of countless people in north China at the time. Following its major victory at Huan-erh tsui in September 1211, the main Mongol army proceeded south-east, approximately along the route of the present Peking-Kalgan (Chang-chia k'ou) railway line, and overran Wang Chi's position as well as a number of others. The sources provide no more than a stereotyped account of his surrender to the Mongols and entry into their

service. According to this account he defended his position heroically for three days before being captured, whereupon, refusing to beg for clemency he stoically confronted death. This so impressed Činggis, however, that the Mongol leader released him and immediately posted him to his own forces. It is impossible to gauge the truth of this account; moreover, we can only speculate as to Wang's motivation. He had no apparent reason for dissatisfaction with his own ruler and government, and surely had absorbed the traditional teachings on the high demands of loyalty. Nevertheless, the choice of survival over death with honour was perhaps more the rule than the exception and having submitted, Wang remained unwavering in his loyalty to his new masters.

Wang was active in the Mongol conquest of Hopei in the years 1213-1215, though probably more as an administrator and a diplomat than as a field commander. When the Mongol army, following the seizure of several important positions in 1213, was held up by the stiff defence of Hsiung-chou, it was Wang Chi who convinced the local commander, one Sun Wu, of the wisdom of surrendering. Wang's good intelligence, moreover, subsequently enabled him to forestall Sun's attempt to restore the locality to Chin control. In 1214, in his new offices of pacification commissioner and acting president of the Six Ministries, he served under Yeh-lü T'u-hua and Shih-mo Ming-an in further operations in Hopei. Success in these brought over to the Mongol side thousands of vanquished Chinese troops who were soon employed in the first siege of the principal Chin capital Chung-tu (Peking). Following the truce that ended the siege and the unanticipated flight of the Chin court to its southern capital Pien-ching (K'ai-feng) in Honan, those forces all took part in the second siege of Chung-tu, an arduous, ten-month effort which resulted in the capture of the broken, starving city in May 1215. In all likelihood no official but the commander-in-chief himself could have prevented the looting that followed. However, in order to bring some measure of relief to the populace and yet satisfy the soldiers' desire for booty, Wang Chi appealed to their cupidity. He obtained authorisation for them to carry foodstuffs into the city and put them up for sale. As a result, a large volume of hitherto hidden valuables suddenly appeared and were traded for food. He also gained acceptance for a proposal to return ten percent of the cattle seized in the area to local peasants to assist them in bringing their fields back under cultivation. This may strike us as little more than a token measure, but it must be seen in the context of Mongol practices which allowed for no consideration at all for the welfare of the conquered.

Accounts of Wang's involvement in ensuing events further stress his civil virtues and incidentally reveal the tentative character of many of the gains made by both sides in this period. Charged with announcing the capture of Chung-tu by the

Mongols to the cities and towns of central Hopei, he successfully brought a number of them into the Mongol fold – so many, we are told, as to require a new Regional Military Control Bureau at Ts'ang-chou. Yet, after the withdrawal of some of the main Mongol forces and the return of their commanders (including Wang) to court, several of those cities reverted to Chin control. After receiving new honours as chiliarch with hereditary rights, chief censor, and Silver and Blue Great Officer of Eminent Dignity, Wang took part in the effort to recover the lost territories under the overall direction of Botu. At the head of a mixed force of only 3,000 troops, he was able to occupy Ho-chien and capture some 10,000 of the defenders. Botu's inclination was to execute them all as traitors. Likening them to sheep, however, Wang argued that only their leaders need be eliminated while the rank-and-file could be put to work for the Mongols as soldiers and peasants. Indeed, he even referred to the whole development as 'Heaven-sent.' Then, in a twist that exhibits the personal aspect of power and responsibility among the Mongols, Botu agreed to let the captives survive only upon Wang's written guarantee that they would not revolt again. Once this was provided the affair was settled.

The high standing that Wang enjoyed with Činggis himself appears in two incidents from about this time, both bearing on important aspects of early Mongol policy in China. As is widely known, the basic Mongol procedure to dispose of conquered lands was to distribute them as hereditary apanages (Mo. *soyurqal*, *qubi*) to members of the Mongol aristocracy and even to meritorious non-Mongol allies. While Činggis no doubt determined who was to share in the spoils and on what scale, the counsel of a native with access to information on the territories in question was clearly desirable, particularly in the case of the latter group. As he was searching for the right individual, Činggis observed to his *čerbi* ('chamberlain' – perhaps Činqai, *q.v.*), 'A Chinese like Commissioner Wang could be entrusted with the task (of allotting the apanages).' Wang was thus given this responsibility. As is equally well known, the Mongols eagerly sought to recruit the skilled craftsmen of the conquered areas. Ordering his provincial officials to list the artisans under their jurisdiction, Činggis sought an experienced official to take charge of this operation. His Khitan minister Yeh-lü A-hai (*q.v.*) proposed a number of high-ranking officials for this job, but Činggis rejected them all, saying, 'I have someone else in mind, but I just cannot recall his name.' After a short while, though, he declared, 'I have it. Our veteran Commissioner Wang should be given this responsibility.' So Wang was chosen once again to deal with matters that stood close to the heart of the Mongols leadership. Admittedly, an incredible number of words and deeds are attributed to the founder of the Mongol empire. But there is nothing unlikely about these lines or about the qan's personal familiarity with one of his earliest followers in China.

From the time of its capture, the site of Peking served as headquarters for the Mongol command in China, usually referred to by the name Yen-ching. From about 1220 (if not earlier) Wang Chi usually seems to have been based there. What his regular post and duties were is difficult to tell; but he continues to be referred to as 'pacification commissioner' and probably performed a variety of political and administrative tasks for the Mongols and for the Khitan officials whom they had placed in charge. It may be recalled that the bitter struggle for north China continued throughout the 1220s, with the Mongols pitted against the Jurchens, independent warlords, crypto-Sung loyalists, and eventually the Tanguts of Hsi-Hsia. The Mongols' efforts were seriously impeded by several developments: the death in 1223 of their commander-in-chief in China, the gifted Muqali (*q.v.*); a partial recovery by Chin as a result of a truce in its war with Sung; the death of Činggis in 1227 and the uncertainties of the succession. Yet, northern Hopei remained among the safer territories in Mongol hands, and the order and stability prevailing in the region might have induced Wang Chi to lead a more gentlemanly life than had been possible since his youth. This at least is the impression given by references to him in the *Hsi-yu chi*, the famous account of the journey to the Far West of the great Taoist master Ch'ang-ch'un (i.e. Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, *q.v.*) on his way to meet Činggis Qan.

Ch'ang-ch'un enjoyed an enormous reputation in his own day. It is, therefore, no surprise that, when he stopped for a visit in Yen-ching in 1220 before his departure westward, he was lionised by the Chinese officials serving there in the Mongol administration. These included Wang Chi with whom the Master in fact exchanged poems. A cordial relationship evidently developed between the two men from this time, which had both an official and a private aspect. For example, Wang was called upon to act as intermediary in extending an invitation for Ch'ang-ch'un to visit Temüge Otčigin, Činggis' youngest brother, at his encampment in northeastern Mongolia. Later in 1225, after Ch'ang-ch'un had returned from his western excursion and taken up residence in Yen-ching, Wang appealed to him, clearly on behalf of the local authorities, to perform a religious ceremony to ward off an impending disaster revealed by astrology. (Ch'ang-ch'un did so successfully, we are told.)

The author of the *Hsi-yu chi*, who comments on Wang's deep interest in Taoism and warm admiration for Ch'ang-ch'un, relates a charming anecdote about the Master's visit to Wang's residence. Having complimented his host on the quality of his bamboo grove, Ch'ang-ch'un declared, 'Now I am growing old and the time for my Departure is drawing near. Give me a few score of these bamboos to plant outside the northern verandah of the Pao-hsüan [a hall in the temple where he resided], to keep the light from my eyes.' Wang Chi, however, expressed deep disappointment over Ch'ang-ch'un's apparent satisfaction with his own personal fate, despite the bitter

troubles of the day which the Master's powers and wisdom could no doubt have helped alleviate. By his statement, 'the Qan has a great respect for you and sets store by the Taoist religion,' was Wang alluding to Ch'ang-ch'un's *practical* value in influencing Mongol policies? In any event, recognising that Wang and the others present were not on his own metaphysical level, the Master only replied, 'The will of Heaven is fixed. What can man do?' Two years later when Ch'ang-ch'un died, Wang organised and presided over a grandiose funeral which the author of the *Hsi-yu chi* praises for having proceeded in perfect order, despite the huge crowds. In honour of his late friend and teacher, Wang bestowed new names on the residential quarters and hall of the temple which Ch'ang-ch'un had made his headquarters, contributing an inscription in his own hand.

Wang's last significant service under Činggis occurred in the conclusive war of 1226-1227 against Hsi-Hsia. His notable contribution to this campaign came at an early stage when the Mongol army, advancing along the Kansu Corridor, found its way blocked near Ch'in-chou (near T'ien-shui) by the Tanguts' removal of the bridges over the river Wei. Since this area is not normally associated with problems of high waters, we can only assume that during this particular February the river was in spate and allowed for no easy fording. No one on Činggis' staff was able to find a solution until Wang Chi took the initiative to organise and lead a work force in the construction of a stone-and-timber bridge. This had to be accomplished at night since Tangut soldiers, presumably armed with missiles, held the opposite bank. By dawn the task was completed and the Mongol advance continued. From remarks made later to a Sung envoy, it appears that Wang remained with this expeditionary force until the final victory. We have little concrete information, however, about his role in any subsequent military operation. We know that he served under Ögödei in the Wei Valley campaign against Chin in 1230. His responsibilities might again have been mainly political, since we hear about his inducing dozens of his erstwhile compatriots (and no doubt others) at Feng-hsiang to defect to the Mongols. He is said to have participated in the siege and capture of Pien-ching, the southern Chin capital, in 1232-1233, though again in an unknown capacity.

In the interval, in 1228, he had been called upon by the regent Tolui to discharge a difficult and delicate task at Yen-ching, for which he was provisionally placed in charge of the regional administration there. This was evidently on the recommendation of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai who also became involved in the case. A serious problem of law and order had developed involving bandit gangs operating with impunity on the outskirts of the city. In order to ensure the inhabitants' safety, Wang had a new moat built around the city walls. This was a major and costly enterprise, but he paid for it by forced loans from merchants instead of increasing

taxes on the population as a whole. He also sent his son at the head of a military unit to attack and destroy the bandits' lair. What complicated those efforts was evidence of collusion between the former chief resident commissioner Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu (d. ca. 1235) and the outlaws. Since Shih-mo was eventually reinstated despite this blot on his record, Wang could easily have found himself in trouble. That he suffered no adverse consequence was probably due to the patronage he enjoyed at the Mongol court, chiefly through Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, with whom he was in friendly terms, and to his own diplomatic skills (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai).

One other measure taken while he was involved in the Yen-ching administration is singled out for praise. This was the establishment as early as 1222 of a Confucian temple on the grounds formerly occupied by the Department of Military Affairs of the Chin. A sacrifice to Confucius performed in this temple in 1229 is celebrated in a poem by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. A school, which became the National College, was established in the temple four years later (see the biography of Yang Wei-chung).

By 1233 Wang had been in Mongol service for over two decades and had unquestionably proven his value in both military and civil capacities. Nevertheless, he still had found no firm place in the Mongol power structure; indeed, he exercised no independent command in the field, held no ministerial position at court, and did not even exercise administrative responsibility over any territory, except on an ad hoc basis. Since his loyalty never seems to have been questioned – indeed perhaps quite the reverse – the Mongols probably utilised him according to his aptitudes. That is, he was probably not an exceptional military commander and, therefore, the Mongols normally gave him a subordinate (though not unimportant) role in military operations. His strengths, on the other hand, were his education, his familiarity with conditions in north China, his judgment and adaptability, and perhaps his linguistic aptitude. On the latter point there is no explicit evidence of how many languages he knew. But it is reasonable to infer that, besides his native Chinese, he could hardly have grown up in Jurchen service without knowing some spoken Jurchen and that his routine, *direct* contact with the Mongol leadership was only possible because of his mastery of Mongol. On balance, it is not difficult to understand why the Mongols employed him primarily as an intermediary, a diplomat and even a trouble-shooter. This may explain why for the last decade of his life he filled the role for which he is best known, that of diplomat.

Official Mongol-Sung contacts up to 1233 had been infrequent and characterised by distrust, especially on the Sung side. Early Mongol initiatives to establish relations had been rebuffed by a court which remembered all too well that, almost exactly a century earlier, an alliance with a new barbarian power (the Jurchen) against a common enemy (the Khitan) had resulted in that court's permanent exile to Hang-

chou. An exchange of envoys did in fact take place in 1221-1223 but led to no tangible political results. For the next decade, competing interests in Shantung and Hopei, and Sung's unwillingness to give the Mongol army free passage in its drive from the west against the Chin southern capital, could well have resulted in open hostilities. But Sung policy was rigorously passive at this time and the Mongols clearly had no intention of taking on Sung before north China was securely in their hands. By the beginning of 1233, this goal seemed close to realisation with Chin control reduced to an area comprising little more than K'ai-feng and eastern Honan. Yet at this point Ögödei sent Wang Chi at the head of an embassy to negotiate aid from Sung. Why? The sources provide no explicit information on his, and his advisors', motives and calculations. The inability of any attacker to maintain a long siege in this war-ravaged area must have been a factor, however, and we do find Sung making substantial supplies available to the Mongol army in their eventual joint campaign. The Mongol leadership may also have sought to test and momentarily neutralise Sung irredentist intentions in the North.

Wang Chi's advice probably carried some weight in defining the Mongols' diplomatic position; and he was certainly responsible for the successful completion of the negotiations. The latter were undertaken in two stages, a preliminary proposal early in 1233 and the conclusion of actual terms in late summer. Both were conducted with military frontier authorities rather than with the Sung court directly. The interval between the two sessions can probably be explained by the uncertain course of further Chin resistance, though objections to the alliance in some Sung quarters may have played a role too. In fact, at the time when Wang Chi's first mission got underway, the Chin emperor suddenly fled his obviously doomed city (which surrendered shortly afterwards) and moved south to Kuei-te. Such a transfer must have raised the prospect of an immediate and complete disintegration of Chin authority. This failed to happen, however, though the Chin court found it expedient by mid-summer to move again, this time to Ts'ai-chou (modern Ju-nan). The second round of Sung-Mongol negotiations was conducted thereafter with the specific purpose of cornering the Chin court at Ts'ai-chou and achieving the complete destruction of the dynasty. After a joint campaign launched late in autumn, this goal was realised at the beginning of 1234 when the decades-long Mongol war of annihilation against the Jurchen state finally came to an end and Sung honour (as a sometime victim of Chin) was at last partly redeemed.

The negotiations of 1233 were probably the only genuine ones ever to occur between the Mongols and Sung, in the sense that both parties shared a common goal in pursuit of which a bargain could be struck. It has never been made clear, however, what Sung was to gain from the bargain other than the negative satisfaction of

destroying Chin. Some sources suggest territory; but the Mongols ceded none after the campaign and indeed reacted decisively to the attempt by Sung to occupy Honan later in 1234. That endeavour resulted in a permanent state of belligerency – or brought it about earlier than would otherwise have been the case. It is notable that the Mongols were far from prepared to launch a full-scale war against Sung. In fact, they were absorbed since 1235 in preparations for the extraordinary series of campaigns that would carry them all the way to eastern Europe. Reluctance to divide their effort between future areas of expansion, as well as internal circumstances, explain why the Mongol court kept the diplomatic door open.

Early in 1235, Wang Chi arrived at Hang-chou on a mission which, according to a Sung source, had been intended since before Sung's aggression in Honan. Our source, the eminent scholar-official Chen Te-hsiu (1178-1235), questions the utility of the visit under the conditions that now obtained. Characteristically, he expresses the profoundest skepticism about the feasibility of any accord with the Mongols and urges caution politically and militarily. On this and subsequent embassies in 1238 and 1240, Wang could not have remained unaware of the relative inflexibility of Sung's approach to further peace talks. Moreover, while from our later perspective we might well be convinced of the determination of the Sung government to keep the peace, Wang's Mongol overlords could be excused, in view of the opportunistic pattern of Sung's conduct over the preceding two decades, for feeling rather less certain of this intention. More significantly for future developments, the Mongol leadership was not in fact interested in any *definitive* arrangement that fell short of Sung's – or for that matter any state's – complete submission. Its objectives in pursuing negotiations were, accordingly, limited in scope and tactical in nature. Embassies, useful for acquiring intelligence in any case, could usually be counted on to conclude or maintain a needed truce.

Wang Ch'i role as intermediary, therefore, could hardly have been an easy one. The contemporary Chinese historian Sun K'o-k'uan is convinced that Wang, as a bona fide Chinese literatus, worked zealously to achieve peace and to preserve Chinese civilisation. He cites the visit that Wang paid in 1237 to Yang Huan (*q.v.*) – who is our source – during which the former revealed a deep commitment to maintaining peace between the two sides. We have already observed Wang pursuing a rather refined style of life once peace was established in northern Hopei. Moreover, we are told by more than one source that he acquired considerable prestige among Sung officials, enjoying an esteem that went well beyond diplomatic niceties. Indeed, the exchanges with Wang reported by Hsü T'ing (*fl.* 1230-40) during his own 1235 embassy to the North suggest amiable and even familiar relations. Nevertheless, the evidence is by no means compelling that Wang privately disagreed with either short-

or long-range Mongol goals, nor that he laboured, as it were, to preserve the Sung state as the repository of Chinese culture. His record as a loyal Mongol official should make us wary of assuming that, because he was Chinese and because he was educated, he must have identified more closely with Sung than with the Mongols. It was, after all, under the latter that he became powerful and probably rich, while neither he nor his immediate forebears had ever served the former.

Wang was said to have led a total of five embassies to Sung. If this figure includes the two missions of 1233, then – the others falling in 1235, 1238 and 1240 – all are accounted for. It was on the last of these, in the spring of 1240, that Wang took ill and died in Hang-chou, at approximately sixty years of age. So sparse is the information provided on any of the negotiations which he conducted that it is unfortunately not possible to make a meaningful assessment of his diplomatic achievements. (It should also be stated that the dates of Wang's birth and death pose a problem, as our sources disagree; therefore, they are given here with reservations.)

Wang's remains were accorded full honours by Sung authorities, who escorted them back to the North for eventual burial at Yen-ching. He had six sons, one of whom, Wang Shou-ch'ien, attained some prominence in the repression of banditry. Wang Chi left a collection of writings, including an account of his embassies (or perhaps of only one of them) to Sung, the *Shih Sung lu*, evidently in manuscript form, which survived until the end of the thirteenth century but was lost sometime thereafter. The result, inevitably, has been to blur the image of Wang Chi the individual, even though the main lines of his career can be determined.

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12. YANG WEI-CHUNG (1206-1260)

Yang Wei-chung, T. Yen-ch'eng, secretary-interpreter, military commander, and district administrator under Ögödei Qa'an (T'ai-tsung, r. 1229-41), was a native of Hung-chou, in modern Yang-yüan (Hopei). The dates of Wei-chung's birth and death are not recorded in his *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) biography, but according to his 'spirit-way inscription' composed by his one-time colleague Hao Ching (*q.v.*), he died in January 1260, and, since he lived to fifty-four, Wei-chung must have been born sometime in 1206.

According to his biographical records, Yang Wei-chung was raised in a family of professional soldiers. His father was a respected officer under the Jurchen rulers of the Chin state, but we know nothing about his career or the early years of his son. Wei-chung was orphaned as a child. He was conscripted during his teen years to be an attendant (probably a *sügürči*) in Ögödei's Guard at Qara Qorum. This seems to have occurred sometime after 1212, when the Mongol general Muqali (*q.v.*) overran part of the Chin territory with his invincible army before sweeping through north China and setting up a military administration in Hopei, Shansi and Honan. It appears that Wei-chung was captured by the Mongol forces and, being found to be a bright young lad, was sent to the Mongol court in service to the princes. Wei-chung is said to have impressed Ögödei by his taste for learning and physical courage; according to the Ch'ing historian T'u Chi (1856-1921), he became fluent in Mongolian as well as Uighur under Ögödei's tutelage. His early service with the future Mongol ruler and his gift of languages were greatly to influence his career.

Sometime after 1224, at the age of twenty or so, Yang Wei-chung received his first official assignment as member of a special embassy despatched by Činggis Qan to the kingdoms in Central and Western Asia. This was probably sent after Činggis had concluded his campaigns in those regions (1219-24), with a view to confirming their submission and sustaining the Mongol interest. Contrary to the Chinese records, it seems unlikely that a man as young and inexperienced as Wei-chung was at the time should have been given a senior rank in the mission; because of his command of the foreign tongues, he would have served most likely as an interpreter. The sources go on to say that he instructed the native rulers in compiling population registers and records of official appointment in their kingdom, to Ögödei's great satisfaction. Such duties would fall normally to a scribe-secretary (*bičēči*) in the Imperial Guard, which sheds some light on Yang Wei-chung's position in those early years.

Yang Wei-chung's next recorded assignment occurred after 1225, at about the time of Ögödei's accession in 1229, and concerned the suppression of the followers of the Chin commander Wu Hsien (d. 1234), who were harassing the T'ai-hang Mountain regions of Hopei, northern Honan and eastern Shansi. On this occasion, Wei-chung recommended at Ögödei's request a former Chin notable, Chiao Te-yü (1220-88), to pacify the rebels.

Wu Hsien was one of nine Chinese local warlords enfeoffed by the Chin emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-24) in a desperate attempt to rally their support against the Mongol invasion. In March 1220, Wu was made Duke of Heng-shan; three months later, after opposing the Mongol forces unsuccessfully, he made a pretence of surrendering in order to save his forces from destruction. He was thereupon appointed vice-marshal of Chen-ting (Hopei) under Shih T'ien-ni (1197-1225), one of the most distinguished generals of the Mongolian-Han Army (see the biography of Shih T'ien-tse). Five years later (March 1225), however, taking advantage of Činggis' commitment to the Western Campaign, Wu Hsien rebelled, killing Shih T'ien-ni in Cheng-ting, and raided the neighbouring counties. Shih T'ien-tse, T'ien-ni's younger brother, immediately mobilised his forces: with reinforcements from the local notable Tung Chün (1186-1233), father of the famous Tung brothers (*qq.v.*), he drove Wu Hsien from his stronghold. During the following decade, Wu launched successive waves of guerrilla warfare in the mountain regions of Hopei and Honan, plundering cities and towns. He suffered several defeats by the Mongols but managed to recover, while his followers Chao Kuei, Wang Hsien, Ch'i Fu and others recaptured their leader's former stronghold, and periodically pillaged the T'ai-hang Mountain regions.

Yang Wei-chung's recommendation of Chiao Te-yü, therefore, was made after Wu Hsien had survived defeat at the hands of Shih T'ien-tse. Before long, Chiao had subdued Ch'i Fu, captured Chao Kuei, and defeated Wang Hsien, restoring order to several counties in the vicinity of Chen-ting. In June 1234, Wu Hsien was slain by a subordinate in Tse-chou, Hopei, shortly after the Mongols' destruction of the Chin state, but remnants of his followers fled to T'ai-yüan (Shansi) and Chen-ting. There they occupied Ta-ming ch'uan. They launched sporadic raids into the neighbouring counties, repulsing several Mongol attempts to subdue them. Yang Wei-chung was summoned again: this time, he attended to the matter personally and managed to rally some rebel leaders. He executed those who remained hostile, thus putting a prompt end to the insurrection.

Yang Wei-chung was then given an assignment by Ögödei that greatly affected his career. In 1233, the Qa'an apparently under the influence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), chief of the Chinese Secretariat, realised the urgent need for a better understanding of Chinese affairs among the Mongol princes and of Mongol culture

among the sons of rallied Chinese officials. He ordered therefore that a school be established in Yen-ching (modern Peking) to provide an appropriate education for these youngsters. This school, known as the National College, was set up in a former Confucian temple (the Hsüan-sheng miao); eighteen Mongol youngsters and twelve Chinese students were admitted. The former were sons of the Mongol *bičēči*, and the latter, those of Chinese court officials. The students were divided into four groups and studied Chinese language and literature, Mongolian language and culture, as well as archery under qualified instructors. Ögödei appointed a former Chin scholar, Feng Chih-heng, who held the title of *bičēči*, as chief instructor, and made Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*) and Ch'en Shih-k'o, a tax commissioner of the Yen-ching district, superintendents of the school. Wei-chung must have earned such an important office through his administrative experience and multi-lingual expertise. It is reported that, hearing of Yang Wei-chung's appointment, Yao Shu (*q.v.*), a budding Confucian scholar who had earlier made his acquaintance, went to join Wei-chung in Yen-ching. Upon Yang Wei-chung's recommendation, Yao Shu became an instructor of the school and found the opportunity to gain access to Ögödei; he was later to become a noted Confucian scholar and imperial adviser under Qubilai Qa'an.

In early 1235, Ögödei ordered his third son Köčü and his trusted lieutenant Qutuqu to lead a military expedition against the Southern Sung in the region of the Huai River. Yang Wei-chung and the Left chancellor of the Secretariat, Nien-ho Ch'ung-shan, a former Jurchen noble, were entrusted with the affairs of the Regional Secretariat in the field. The Chinese title conveys the notion of an important appointment, but in the Mongol hierarchy it designated no more than a *bičēči* in charge of documents on the staff of the military commander. In this capacity, Ögödei gave Yang Wei-chung a special commission to recruit scribes, Buddhists, physicians, physiognomists, brewers, artisans, and musicians for service at court, and sent Yao Shu to accompany him on the expedition (see the biography of Yao Shu).

In November, the Mongol forces overran and pillaged a number of prefectures and counties in modern Hupei, including Ts'ao-yang (Hsiang-yang), Te-an (An-lu), and the Hsiang, Teng and Ying prefectures in Honan, before returning to the north a year later. While the Mongol commanders crushed Chinese resistance, capturing booty and prisoners, Yang Wei-chung and Yao Shu set about their mission by recruiting a number of outstanding scholars and collecting many classical and historical books. Their most distinguished recruit was Chao Fu (*fl.* 1235-57), a prominent Confucian teacher in south China who was rescued from attempted suicide by Yao Shu; another, albeit less well known, was the scholar-physician Tou Mo (*q.v.*), who was engaged by Yang Wei-chung in Te-an. The former became the apostle of Neo-Confucianism in north China and the latter, an eminent adviser to

Qubilai. Other Chinese scholars and eminent individuals were also attracted to the Mongol court by Yang Wei-chung. Sometime in 1236 he recruited Wang P'an (1202-93), a noted Confucian scholar who also became Qubilai's adviser, from west of the Lo River, Honan, and in autumn of the same year he secured the return of the leading Taoist priest Ch'ing-ho (Yin Chih-p'ing, 1169-1251), who had been preaching Taoism in Shensi, to Yen-ching, there to become patriarch of the Ch'üan-chen sect in the future capital of the Mongol-Chinese dynasty (see the biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi).

Yang Wei-chung's activities between 1237 and 1240 are not verifiable. The biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in the *Yüan History* mentions a scandal involving Yeh-lü himself and an interpreter (*t'ung-shih*, Mo. *kelemürči*) called Yang Wei-chung. According to the report, this Yang Wei-chung almost cost Yeh-lü his life in a squabble between Taoist factions. It is said that around 1237 two of the leading Taoist priests in Yen-ching, whose names are not revealed, vied for the sect's leadership. One of them falsely accused two of his rival's followers of having deserted from the army; he had them arrested and executed, in collusion with a certain Mongol noble and Yang Wei-chung. When Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai heard of this, he investigated the case and ordered Wei-chung imprisoned. Wei-chung's alleged Mongol accomplice immediately reported the incident to Ögödei, charging Yeh-lü with exceeding his authority; the emperor, greatly angered, ordered Yeh-lü's arrest but later acquitted him.

This account is not corroborated by other sources, and we know nothing more about self-seeking Taoists currying favour from the powerful court officials. It is also doubtful whether the party concerned was the Yang Wei-chung considered here, even though he is also identified as an interpreter. Should they be the same person, the incident would undoubtedly have strained Wei-chung's relationship with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. The two had apparently got on well together in earlier years. While serving as joint chief of the Regional Secretariat in the field, Wei-chung had once sought advice from Ch'u-ts'ai about obtaining leave to quit his post, probably after returning from the expedition against the Southern Sung in the Huai region. Ch'u-ts'ai wrote back, advising patience and praising Wei-chung's ability; he urged him to remain at his post to emulate Li Ch'üan in his service of the Mongol court (Li, a Sung rebel from Shantung who surrendered to the Mongols in 1227, was appointed chief of the Regional Secretariat of the Shan-tung and Huai-nan districts; and he died in 1231 at Yang-chou during the campaign against the Sung. This letter addressing Wei-chung as 'chief of the Regional Secretariat' [*hsing-sheng*] is preserved in Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai collected works. He was the foster father of Li T'an [*q.v.*]).

Under the influence of Confucian scholars, notably Chao Fu and Yao Shu, Yang Wei-chung developed an active interest in Neo-Confucian studies and exerted himself

to procure favourable conditions for their advancement. A primary task was to assemble the relevant classical and historical works, and to establish an academy for the dissemination of the new teaching. To that effect, in about 1240-1241, Yang Wei-chung joined forces with Yao Shu to set up in Yen-ching a library of books which they had acquired from south China, following the example of Chu Hsi (1130-1200) and other Sung Neo-Confucians. The collection was housed in a private academy which they founded under the name of T'ai-chi shu-yüan, or Private Academy of the Supreme Ultimate. There they erected a shrine in honour of Chou Tun-i (1017-73), the doyen of Sung Neo-Confucianism, and inscribed on its walls his diagram of the 'Supreme Ultimate' and passages from his philosophical treatise *T'ung shu*, or *Chou-tzu T'ung shu*. They then invited Chao Fu and a noted Chin scholar, Wang Tsui (original M. Yüan-liang, T. Tzu-cheng), to lecture the students on the new philosophy. These activities have been vividly recorded by Hao Ching in his essays 'T'ai-chi shu-yüan chi' ('Account of the T'ai-chi Academy') and 'Chou-tzu tz'u-t'ang pei' ('Epitaph of Master Chou's Shrine'), written on Yang Wei-chung's commission to commemorate the enterprise.

At the same time, Yang Wei-chung and Yao Shu concerned themselves with the publication of the major Neo-Confucian works. It is reported that Yao Shu made the printing blocks for the *Elementary Learning* (*Hsiao-hsüeh*) of Chu Hsi, the *Book of History*, the *Analects*, *Mencius* and the *Book of Rites*, and that Wei-chung was responsible for Chu Hsi's commentaries on the *Four Books* and other items. Moreover, a scholar named T'ien Ho-ch'ing took credit for printing the commentary on the *Book of Changes* by Ch'eng I (1033-1107), the commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* by Hu An-kuo (1074-1183), and other classical works. They were all published in Yen-ching and provided the basic texts for the study of Neo-Confucian teachings in north China. These books also marked an important stage in the history of printing for they were the first set of works produced under Mongol rule by means of the traditional wood blocks.

All those endeavours contributed greatly to the dissemination of Neo-Confucianism in north China during the early years of Mongol rule. The T'ai-chi Academy and the Shrine of Chou Tun-i were the first institutions of their kind ever established in Yen-ching, and they greatly facilitated the study of the new philosophy and its spread. The Neo-Confucian works reprinted by Yang Wei-chung and his associates also had far-reaching significance by making possible a breadth of circulation for classical writings that had been rarely achieved in the North before this time. Yang Wei-chung's printing of the *Four Books* was of paramount importance in the extension of Chu Hsi Confucianism under Mongol rule. On the one hand, it enhanced the popularity of Chu's commentaries on these classical primers, thus

promoting his philosophy which eventually replaced the teachings of Chou Tun-i as the dominant school of Neo-Confucianism in north China. On the other hand, it also rendered possible the acceptance of Chu Hsi's ideas as the state orthodoxy under Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20), when Chu's commentaries were adopted as the official syllabus for the revived civil service examinations in 1313-1315.

On Ögödei's death in late 1241, the Mongol court fell under the dominance of his wife the Empress Töregene (r. 1242-46), who served as regent until the accession of Güyük (Ting-tsung) in 1246. Those five years of interregnum saw a drastic change in the power structure of Mongol rule, entailing a steady loss of influence by Ögödei's old advisers such as Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and the Chinese scholars. Empress Töregene succumbed in her turn to the blandishments of the Central Asian financier 'Abd al-Rahmān and the 'witch' Fatima, who now took precedence over the pro-Chinese court officials. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's death in June 1243 finally put an end to his reform programmes and to the vestigial influence of his supporters. Meanwhile, the Mongol court had fallen into disarray after Güyük's death in 1248, whose wife Oğul Qaimiš purported to govern until the election to the throne of Möngke (Hsien-tsung, d. 1259) in July 1251.

The epitaph of Yang Wei-chung by Hao Ching asserts that after Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's death Wei-chung was appointed chief of the Secretariat by Töregene, conveying the impression that he emerged as a dominant Chinese personality at the Mongol court during the period of the regency. It would seem however that, notwithstanding his title, Wei-chung had charge only of the official documents, a function in which use could be made of his multilingual abilities. He could not have held much power anyway, since the Secretariat had been stripped of most of the authority that it enjoyed in the last years of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. T'u Chi doubts in his *Meng-wu-erh shih chi* that Yang Wei-chung was ever chief of the Secretariat, since no corroborative evidence confirms any such appointment after Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's death. He considers that Wei-chung may have served in effect as a *bičēči* and that, though nominally appointed chief of the Secretariat, Wei-chung played only a minor role in government. Should one accept Hao Ching's statement that Yang Wei-chung was appointed to succeed Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, which attests to the empress' good will, Wei-chung could not therefore, as Hao claimed, have 'played the role of a sole chancellor and shouldered the burden of empire!'

We know little about Yang Wei-chung's activities during the next few years, except that he was sent to P'ing-yang district (Shansi) in 1246 to investigate the alleged maladministration and abuses of a certain local Mongol resident commissioner (*daruqači*). Wei-chung had the latter indicted and executed, and

restored order to the administration, adding thereby to his creditable record and earning the gratitude of the Chinese inhabitants.

In 1252, after the accession of Möngke, Yang Wei-chung found an opportunity to serve under Möngke's brother Qubilai, the future emperor. Following his enthronement in 1251, Möngke appointed Qubilai to administer the Han territories in north China, and Qubilai established his headquarters at Chin-lien ch'uan on the Shan-tien River in present day Inner Mongolia. The following year, taking advantage of the chaotic situations in Shansi and Honan, Qubilai asked the emperor for permission to extend his control over those districts; to establish a regional military commission at Pien (K'ai-feng), Honan, the former Sung capital; and to set up military farms in that region. Möngke gave his approval, and Qubilai appointed Menggü, Shih T'ien-tse, Yang Wei-chung and others as commissioners, charging them with developing military farms in a number of prefectures in the former Chin state (see the biography of Yao Shu).

Yang Wei-chung's activities in this new capacity have been recorded on several counts. Firstly, he indicted and executed the notorious general administrator of the Ho-nan district, Liu Fu, a former Chin myriarch who had committed numerous crimes of graft and extortion against the local people, and proceeded to reform the administration. Next, he established schools in Pien to instruct students in the classics, thereby promoting Neo-Confucianism in that region. Finally, he reorganised and encouraged ship-building in the Ho-nan region. In this he was apparently acting on Möngke's orders, in preparation for the military expedition against the Southern Sung; as the Mongols had no fleet at the time, the enterprise was considered urgent.

In 1253, Qubilai was given the land of Ching-chao (Shensi), which commanded the fertile Kuan-chung region, as the new headquarters of his expanded jurisdiction in north China. That summer, he directed Yao Shu, now his trusted adviser, to set up a Pacification Bureau in the area. Yang Wei-chung and Shang T'ing (*q.v.*), another imperial adviser and capable administrator, were appointed commissioners. In discharging his duties, however, Wei-chung was affronted by arrogant military officers who flouted the civil authority and caused the population intolerable suffering. He found the behaviour of the soldiers inadmissible, particularly that of a chiliarch named Kuo who had committed a series of exactions and indiscriminate killings. Wei-chung summoned him to his presence and had him executed on the spot. Such an act, his biographers quote him as having explained, was not motivated by bloodlust, but was necessary to set an example of the prince's justice. It was in no small measure due to the courageous actions of imperial commissioners such as Yang Wei-chung and Shang T'ing that Qubilai was able to suppress the remnants of the local warlords and bring peace to his administration. After only a year's service,

however, Wei-chung was replaced by Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*), the distinguished sinicised Uighur scholar; our records give no explanation of the event.

We know little about Yang Wei-chung's activities until 1259, when he was called to serve Qubilai in Möngke's push into south China to conquer the Southern Sung. In August of that year, Qubilai took personal command of military operations, accompanied by several of his Chinese advisers including Liu Ping-chung and Yao Shu (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung), and by military officials appointed by him to ensure the pacification of the conquered territories. He designated Wei-chung to be pacification commissioner for Chiang-chou, Huai-chou and Ching-chou (i.e. southern Hupei and northern Hunan), with Hao Ching as his deputy. Wei-chung and Hao Ching moved out of Kuei-te, Honan, ahead of the main forces. Their mission was to make a show of strength to procure the submission of the Chinese population before the start of military operations. In mid-campaign, however, a dispute broke out between Yang Wei-chung and Hao Ching over the course to follow. The *Yüan History* asserts that Wei-chung wished to break off the advance and lead his troops back to Pien, whereas Hao insisted on continuing the expedition, reminding Wei-chung of their commission to pacify the South.

This episode is quite uncertain, since Wei-chung's epitaph by Hao Ching does not mention it, and contemporary records offer no supporting evidence. It may be that Wei-chung, who knew Pien, was anxious to secure that region as Qubilai's operational base, and consequently reluctant to disperse his forces in south China at this time. At any rate, according to Hao Ching's biography, Hao's argument prevailed and Wei-chung yielded after three days of stubborn opposition. He allegedly said to Hao, 'Such resolution stems from moral strength inspired by reading the classics; I have no choice but to obey you!'. It seems that Yang Wei-chung might have appreciated the situation correctly after all, for, as Hao Ching himself came subsequently to realise, an unresolved and prolonged campaign against the Sung might have weakened Qubilai's position as a contestant for the throne.

In January 1260 while the expedition was returning to the north after having pacified the Sung regions as far as the northern shore of the Yangtze, Yang Wei-chung died in Ts'ai-chou, the last Chin capital in Honan, at the age of fifty-four. This places his death shortly before Qubilai's enthronement. Wei-chung was survived by his wife and a son who was then a student at the National College. In 1261, Qubilai bestowed upon him the posthumous name Chung-su ('Loyal and Decorous'), and sometime later Hao Ching composed a 'spirit-way inscription' in his memory. This epitaph, together with other commemorative essays written by Hao, have been preserved in his collected works, *Ling-ch'uan chi*, and they provide the primary sources for a study of Yang Wei-chung's life and career.

In retrospect, Yang Wei-chung's career vividly illustrates how an individual of humble origin could rise to become an influential official at the Mongol court during the initial phase of the conquest of north China. He was advantaged by his early affiliation with Ögödei; his multilingual abilities which met an urgent need of the Mongol rulers, and his military and administrative talents, stood him in good stead. With those qualifications, he served eminently as interpreter on diplomatic missions, as secretary in charge of documents, as pacification commissioner in charge of stamping out resistance to Mongol rule, and as administrator of local districts with a large Chinese population. In the latter capacities, he performed his duties competently but prudently, seeking to temper military harshness with Confucian benevolence. His attitude was undoubtedly influenced by the Chinese scholars through whom he became familiar with Neo-Confucianism, and by his concern to maintain a high standard of justice that was often lacking among Mongol administrators.

More significantly, Yang Wei-chung played a decisive role as a catalyst in the promotion of classical studies and dissemination of the Neo-Confucian teachings of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi in north China. Although these initiatives came from Ögödei, it was Wei-chung who, by virtue of his fluency in Mongolian which made him a mediator in the Sino-Mongolian political and cultural world, assumed the mission and achieved its success. It was upon Wei-chung's recommendation that Yao Shu was sent to recruit scholars and men of talent during the military expedition into south China in 1235-1236, as a consequence of which the eminent Confucian master Chao Fu and other scholars, and also rare Chinese books, were brought to the North. Similarly, it was due to Wei-chung's close association with Ögödei, as well as his own interest in Confucian studies, that the first private academy was established in Yen-ching and that important texts were printed to facilitate the study of Confucian tenets and Neo-Confucian teachings. It is true that credit should go to eminent scholars such as Chao Fu and Hsü Heng (*q.v.*) for disseminating the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucian philosophy in north China after that region had been cut off from the main intellectual currents in the South for more than a century. Yet, but for Yang Wei-chung who served as an intermediary between the Mongolian and Chinese interests and provided favourable conditions and political protection, such developments would have been retarded and might have taken a different course. In this view, Yang Wei-chung, and his Chinese colleagues who followed a similar career, deserve full recognition for their contributions to the Sino-Mongolian cultural interactions, as also for the promotion of Neo-Confucianism in north China during this critical period of alien rule in Chinese history.

Though not a distinguished scholar or belle-lettrist, Yang Wei-chung produced a number of literary works. Their collection, entitled *T'ai-p'ing kuang-hui*, in ten *chi* and ninety-six *p'ien*, evidently contained important information on administrative and military affairs. It has unfortunately been lost. But three of Wei-chung's poems have survived in the *Yüan-shih hsüan* compiled by Hsi Shih-ch'en (d. 1888). They are written in a natural and rhythmic style, with polished diction and lucid phraseology, vividly attesting to his skilled command of the classical language and literature.

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H.L. Chan

13. YANG HUAN (1186-1255)

Yang Huan, alternate M. Chih-chang, T. Huan-jan or Huan-jo, a native of Feng-t'ien, Ch'ien-chou (Shensi), was one of the many outstanding Chin scholars who entered the service of the Mongols during the early phase of their establishment in China.

Yang Huan was known by various names at different stages of his life. His name Huan was originally written with a 'fire' radical meaning 'brightness,' after his mother had perceived the auspicious omen of a radiant sunbeam at the time of his birth. During his teens he adopted the title Tzu-yang as his *hao*, after having dreamt that he was the reincarnation of a Taoist from the Tzu-yang Pavilion. Later, after his second failure in the *chin-shih* examination, when he withdrew to engage in teaching, he was honoured by his disciples as Kuan-hsi fu-tzu, or 'Master from the West of the Pass.' After the fall of Chin he spelled his name without the fire radical, probably for safety, but when he sat for the civil service examination under Ögödei (T'ai-tsung, r. 1229-41), a scribal error rendered his name as Yang Ying; he is consequently also known by this name in the official *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*). In his later years he also adopted the studio name Feng-t'ien lao-min, or 'Elder from Feng-t'ien.' Most of the time, however, he used the name Yang Huan with the character of his given name written without the fire radical.

Born in 1186, Yang Huan was the twentieth-generation descendant of a well-to-do peasant who had settled in a village – later known as Yang-ts'un – in Feng-t'ien, in the early years of the T'ang dynasty. According to the family genealogy, Yang's first forebear to follow an official career was his eleventh-generation ancestor who served as a censor in the late T'ang court, but none of his later kin sought distinction either in government service or in scholarship. The family continued to flourish in the village of Feng-t'ien until the early years of Jurchen rule, when Yang Huan's great-grandfather moved to a place south of Ch'ien-chou, where he established a separate branch of the family and engaged in farming. West of what was traditionally known as Kuan-chung, Ch'ien-chou was situated in the central plain of Shensi, famous since antiquity for its strategic, economic and cultural importance in north China. Yang's father, Yang Chen (1153-1215), the first in the family to devote himself to studies, served as a junior official in the local administration and earned a good name as an upright and capable administrator. Yang Chen married three times; his second wife, née Ch'eng (1166-97), bore him six sons, three of whom became officials, but only Yang Huan, the second son, gained the *chin-shih* degree and achieved a distinguished career.

Yang Huan began the study of the classics under the tutelage of his mother, a virtuous and learned woman who is said to have sold her personal jewels in order to buy a library of several thousand *chüan* for the family. She had a great influence on the upbringing of her children, particularly Huan. When she died, Yang Huan, who was only eleven at the time, expressed his sorrow by reciting daily passages from the *Classic of Filial Piety (Hsiao-ching)*. In the autumn of 1200, Yang Huan, then fourteen, went to Ch'ang-an to take his first examination. He passed with distinction, and also topped the list of successful candidates in the prefectural examination held in the spring of the following year. His ability caught the attention of the authorities, and two years later the local prefect hired him as an accountant in the prefectural office. Yang Huan worked diligently; his superior was so impressed that he encouraged him to further his studies under a local Confucian scholar. These three years as an accountant also gave Yang experience in the management of fiscal matters, which he put to good use later when serving under the Mongols.

In the fall of 1205, the nineteen-year old Yang Huan made another bid for advancement by taking the departmental test at Ch'ang-an; he qualified, and presented himself in April of the following year at the palace examination for the *chin-shih* degree in the Chin capital Yen-ching (modern Peking). There were 1,200 participants, but only twenty-eight passed and Yang Huan was one of the unsuccessful candidates. The main reason for his failure apparently lay in the extreme ambiguity of the examination essay, the title of which was so vague that the candidates could not understand it. Yang contended, as did the contemporary scholar Liu Ch'i (1203-50) in his *Kuei-ch'ien chih*, that the Chin emperor Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208), ill-advised by the chief examiner, deliberately tricked the candidates to test their command of classical prose rather than their ability to display their knowledge of practical subjects. It seems likely, however, that Yang's disdain for the ornamental literary style was a contributing factor to his successive failures in examinations.

Little is known of Yang Huan's activity in the years following his setback in the *chin-shih* examination; presumably he returned home to further his studies in preparation for another test. On his father's death in April 1215, Huan went to Lo-yang to bring the body home for burial and went into retreat for the required mourning period. In the autumn of 1220, Yang, then thirty-four, returned to Ch'ang-an to make another attempt at the highest examinations. He passed the qualifying test, but again failed the *chin-shih* examination held at the new capital Pien-ching (i.e. Pien-liang, modern K'ai-feng, Honan) in the spring of the following year. This discouraged him greatly. Many of his friends sought to console him and proposed alternative courses of action. Some, such as Chao Ping-wen (1159-1232), advised

him to devote himself to study and teaching, while others, including Li Hsien-neng (1192-1232) and his brother Li Hsien-fu (1195-1234), tried to persuade him to seek an easier way by taking a test to become a clerk in the lower bureaucracy. They pointed out that such clerical positions were lucrative and powerful, admired and envied even by the *literati*. Yang Huan declined, saying not only that it would be beneath his dignity to contemplate this option, but that it would also ignore the wishes of his deceased mother.

Despite his several failures in the examinations, Yang Huan remained firm in his resolve to pursue an official career. He sought to make himself known in official circles and found an opportunity when the accession of Emperor Ai-tsung (d. 1234) in 1224 inaugurated an era of incipient change. He prepared a lengthy memorial proposing various reforms designed to strengthen the state and enrich the people. The contents of the memorial are not known, but his contemporaries praised it as a bold document dealing critically with contemporary social and political problems. He was dissuaded, however, from submitting it to the throne by his friends who feared that the document's frankness might spell disaster for its author. Yang Huan left the capital in great despair. He retreated to a scenic spot at the foot of Mt. Chung-nan west of Ch'ang-an and devoted himself to study, teaching and writing. He spent five years there, during which his scholarship attracted over a hundred students. Those were the ones who honoured him as the 'Master from the West of Pass.' To please him, they planted a thousand willow trees along the pond of his residence, which came to be known as Liu-t'ang ('Willow Pond'). They also constructed for him a small pavilion in the middle of the pond, called Ch'ing-feng ko ('Spring-breeze Pavilion'), or Tzu-yang ko, after his *hao*.

During this time, Yang Huan became increasingly interested in Taoism and composed numerous essays praising the monks of the Ch'üan-chen sect for their spiritual guidance and their devotion to communal welfare. His Confucian orthodoxy seems to have prevented him, however, from directly teaching Taoist concepts to his students. A few of Yang's essays have survived in his collected works and they provide important evidence of the influence of this new syncretic Taoism on the intellectuals of this period. As a result of Yang Huan's activity, the Willow Pond became a centre of learning during the late Chin, and the master's fame spread far and wide. Four hundred years later, in 1610, some Ming scholars founded an academy on the site of the Willow Pond, called the Kuan-chung Private Academy (*shu-yüan*), thus continuing the educational tradition begun by Yang Huan.

In 1229, the prefect of Ch'ien-chou, having heard of Yang Huan's reputation, invited him to be a senior clerk in the prefectural office, but Yang declined the offer, as also a later call to serve in a similar position at Lung-chou, Shensi. Following this,

he was invited to act as military adviser, first at Ch'ien-chou and then at Huan-chou (in present-day Inner Mongolia); he reluctantly accepted the post at the urging of his friends, but left it a few months later. The following year he went to the capital Pien for the second time, to sit for the palace examination. When he left, his friend Sung Chiu-chia (d. 1233) sent a letter of recommendation to his own teacher Li Ch'un-fu (1185-1231), a distinguished scholar then living in Pien-ching, hoping that the latter might further his friend's career.

During his stay in the capital, Yang Huan was invited by the Left chancellor of the Presidential Council, Chang Hsing-hsin (1163-1231), to be his family's tutor, and we know that Yang subsequently enjoyed the chancellor's patronage. Yang enrolled at the National University for further studies, but the sources do not indicate whether he had failed the examination before doing so. In Pien he renewed his acquaintance with several distinguished men of letters of the time, including Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), Shang T'ing (*q.v.*), Liu Ch'i and others. Unfortunately Yang Huan's sojourn at Pien coincided with renewed attacks by the Mongols against the Chin state following the accession of Ögödei, the third son of Činggis Qan, who had reaffirmed his father's intention of completing the conquest of north China. In the spring of 1231, Ögödei launched a three-pronged offensive with the assistance of his brother Tolui and his lieutenants Sübötei and Tāčar. Under the command of Ögödei, the Mongol vanguard crossed the Yellow River into Honan to the north of Pien; then the forces of Tolui and of Sübötei and Tāčar converged in summer from Shensi and Shantung respectively, to besiege the Chin capital.

Although the situation at the capital became desperate for lack of provisions, the Chin court was determined to fight the invaders to the end. Emperor Ai-tsung took personal charge of defence and imposed a series of emergency measures; all able-bodied male adults were drafted into the defence units; those who evaded the order were summarily executed. There was no exemption even for university students, and Yang Huan was conscripted like the rest. Later, however, the students were found physically unsuitable as front-line troops and were ordered instead to man the catapults. On behalf of his fellow students, an outraged Yang presented a petition to the emperor when the latter came out on an inspection tour, begging that they be excused from military duty on the grounds that their only training had been as future civil servants. The emperor accepted the plea and gave orders to withdraw the students from active duty; but their action had angered the director of political affairs Nei-tsu Po-sa (d. 1233), who accused Yang Huan and his friends of communicating with the emperor outside the proper channels. As a punishment, he made them serve food and drink to the soldiers, and attend to the sick and wounded. He also ordered

them to fly kites summoning the deserters to return, and exposed them to great danger by having them tend the lanterns used at night for signalling on the defence walls.

During those long months, as Liu Ch'i recalled in his *Kuei-ch'ien chih*, Yang Huan and his fellow scholar-officials suffered the full impact of the Mongol onslaught and led an extremely precarious existence in the beleaguered capital. Despite heroic efforts, the Chin resistance was crumbling rapidly under the intensified Mongol onslaught, due to lack of food and the failure to obtain reinforcements. Ai-tsung's belated attempt to sue for peace was rejected by the Mongols who now felt certain of victory. In January 1233 the emperor fled from Pien-ching with a small retinue and sought refuge first at Kuei-te, then in July at Ts'ai-chou, Honan. Less than a month after the emperor's flight, Ts'ui Li (d. 1234), the grand marshal of the defending forces, staged a coup, killing members of the imperial family and a number of senior officials, and surrendered the capital without further resistance.

In the event, many leading Chin scholar-officials and notables were captured by the Mongols, while others fled as refugees. In this difficult hour, the distinguished scholar Yüan Hao-wen, who had also become a prisoner of war, sent a moving appeal to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (q.v.), pleading for his intervention to rescue the top Chin officials from servitude so that they could be used in public service later on (see also the biography of Wang E). Yüan specifically mentioned Yang Huan together with fifty-three other scholars and officials. No immediate relief was forthcoming, however, and the unfortunate scholars were dispersed in various localities. Nonetheless, Yüan's plea brought those people to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's attention; it was probably through this appeal that Yeh-lü came to know of Yang Huan whom he later appointed to an important position in his administration.

Yang Huan disguised himself as a refugee, crossed the Yellow River to the north, and avoided falling into Mongol hands. Before long, he made his way into Shantung where he was given shelter by Chao T'ien-hsi (1191-1240), a commander of the Chinese forces in the Mongolian army then in charge of the administration of Kuan-shih (present day Kuan-hsien). Chao, like his superior Yen Shih (q.v.), the famous Chinese general in the Mongol service and overlord of Shan-tung, granted his protection to many former Chin scholar-officials. For four years Yang Huan led a quiet life in Kuan-shih under Chao's patronage along with scores of his friends; they exchanged poems, discussed the problems of the day, and devoted themselves to study with Chao himself taking a keen interest in their scholarly pursuits. Yang Huan also spent time compiling an account of the last reign of Emperor Ai-tsung entitled *T'ien-hsing chin-chien* (*The Recent Mirror of the T'ien-hsing Period* [1232-34]), in 30 *chüan*, which is unfortunately lost. In the meantime Yen Shih, who was then gathering a group of former Chin literati at the seat of his administration in Tung-

p'ing, made several approaches to Yang Huan. But Yang did not respond considering that since he had enjoyed the hospitality of Chao T'ien-hsi, it would have been improper to leave him for another master; moreover, Yen Shih had never sent him a formal invitation. It was probably for this reason that though Yang later made a trip to Tung-p'ing, he did not call upon Yen, nor did he meet with any of the eminent former Chin officials who were now enjoying Yen's protection.

A marked change in the political situation took place about this time with Ögödei's appointment of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai as the official responsible for tax collection and administrative affairs in north China within the ambit of the newly established, Chinese-style Secretariat at the Mongol court in Qara Qorum, operating through its regional office in Yen-ching. Yeh-lü initiated a series of administrative and fiscal reforms which included a reorganisation of the central government separating the civil from the military authority; a division of the country into ten principal administrative units; the establishment of tax-collection bureaux in these districts (to be administered by civil officials); and the revival of the traditional civil service examinations for the recruitment of public servants. Those measures were designed to strengthen the power of the central government over the privileged Mongol nobility and the military, and to centralise the collection of revenue in the hands of the civil servants in order to ensure a rational and systematic exploitation of the economic resources of the recently-conquered Chinese territories.

Of the important reforms introduced by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the one that had the greatest impact on the Chinese literati such as Yang Huan and his contemporaries was the re-introduction of the civil service examinations. The first session of examinations was held in 1237/38 in various districts of north China, all qualified individuals being allowed to participate, including enslaved scholars. The prescribed subjects were classical exegesis, poetry (rhymeprose) and essays. Elated by this opportunity, in 1238 Yang Huan, then fifty-two, sat for the test at Tung-p'ing along with many younger literati from his locality. He topped the list of successful candidates in two of the subjects (essays and rhymeprose) and was among the first in a total of 4,030 students to have passed all levels. Much impressed by his performance, the Chinese chief examiner Liu Chung, then a chief of the Tax-collection Bureau for the Hsüan-te district (Shansi), appointed Yang a member of the examining commission, and it was in this capacity that he travelled to the north. There (at Yen-ching or in Qara Qorum) he had an audience with Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who had heard of him through Yüan Hao-wen. The chief of the Secretariat recommended that Yang be appointed chief of the Tax-collection Bureau and surveillance commissioner for Ho-nan. The fact that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai promoted Yang Huan to such an important position was probably due, in part at least, to Yang's

previous experience as an accountant, as well as to the recommendation of Liu Chung, a man well versed in fiscal administration.

The Ho-nan Tax-collection Bureau had been set up after the collapse of the Chin state on the model of the fiscal and administrative bureaux established in north China by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1230-1231. These had been created for the express purpose of stopping the imposition of arbitrary taxes by local military officials, and represented the first step towards transforming exactions into a rational fiscal system on Chinese lines. Contributions, to be paid in silk and grain (normally commuted to silver), consisted of a land tax assessed on a household basis, a poll tax on all male adults, plus a levy on commerce and the traditional Chinese excise on liquor, salt, iron smelters and mining products. In 1230-1231 the amount to be levied in the ten districts totalled 10,000 ingots (=500,000 *liang*) of silver. Following the acquisition of new territory south of the Yellow River, the quota was raised, reaching 22,000 ingots (=1,100,000 *liang*) in 1238. We do not know how much of this was to be found in Ho-nan, but, as the region was wealthy and agriculturally productive under the Chin, it must have been made to contribute a substantial share of the increase.

The task confronting Yang Huan was a difficult one inasmuch as Ho-nan, having just been ravaged by war, could not possibly meet such fiscal obligations without worsening the plight of the population. It appears that Yang Huan had not accepted his appointment without misgivings. Indeed, he informed Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai that, being a scholar, he was not versed in matters of finance but had accepted the post mainly to serve the community and to alleviate the people's suffering. He proposed to proceed gradually and with caution, with a view to restoring the economic health of the province. This plan received a warm response and support from Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai.

On assuming his charge, Yang consulted several fiscal experts, such as Yang Kuo (1197-1269), Wang Yüan-li, Hsüeh Hsüan (d. 1271) and others, in order to obtain their guidance. They considered the situation carefully, assessing the taxable capacity of the province and the amount to be collected, and concluded that the quota should be reduced by one quarter. They advised the head of the Secretariat accordingly. This was implemented, much to the population's relief. In the course of his inspection tours, Yang Huan revisited the former Chin capital at Pien and saw what remained of its buildings. Wishing to leave an account of the conditions of the city, he later composed an essay entitled 'Pien ku-kung chi,' which is preserved in his collected works. This is a most valuable source on the imperial palaces of the Chin rulers.

During the period of Yang Huan's service in the administration of Ho-nan, he found time to continue teaching. This is mentioned in the works of contemporary Chinese scholars with most of whom Yang had established ties of close friendship. Besides Yüan Hao-wen, Liu Ch'i and Hsüeh Hsüan, those included notably Chia Sun-

chih, Hsin Yüan, the two Ch'en brothers Keng and Ying, Liu Ang-hsiao, Li Hsien-ch'ing, Li Wei, Ma Ko, Tu Jen-chieh, Yao Shu (*q.v.*) and Wang P'an (1202-93). Several are named in Yüan Hao-wen's famous letter to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. The scholars used to gather at a place north-east of Lo-ning hsien (in Honan), where they held free lectures on literary and philosophical topics. They attracted and influenced younger scholars, some of whom, like Wang Yün (*q.v.*), subsequently became famous men of letters. The tradition of this early 'free school' (*i-shu*) was continued after the death of Yang Huan and his colleagues by the son of Hsüeh Hsüan, Yu-liang. In 1318 the school received the name of Lo-hsi Private Academy, i.e. Private Academy West of the River Lo. It was one of several such centres of learning in which Han culture was kept alive during the Mongol period. In Yang Huan's time it must have also provided a living for several unemployed scholars, who no doubt benefited from their friend Yang's official position.

Yang Huan served in this post for twelve years until his resignation in 1251. It is difficult to assess his real contribution, since his initial success in lightening the tax burden of Ho-nan was largely due to the standing and support of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. Yeh-lü's influence, however, began to wane shortly after Yang Huan assumed office, when the Mongol court placed its trust in the Central Asian financiers who favoured the introduction of tax-farming as a means of increasing the national revenue. Influenced by prevailing opinion, Ögödei conferred in 1239 the privilege of farming taxes in north China on the Moslem merchant 'Abd al-Raḥmān; thereupon, the annual quota was raised to 44,000 ingots (=2,000,000 *liang*) of silver. Yang remained at his post after 'Abd al-Raḥmān had taken over the administration of the tax-collection bureaux in 1240, and even served a second term under another Central Asian financier, Maḥmūd Yalavāč, when 'Abd al-Raḥmān was executed by Ögödei's successor Güyük (1246-48) in a political purge. There is scant information on Yang Huan's activity during these troubled years; apparently, he continued to perform his administration duties undeterred.

In 1251 Möngke (d. 1259) succeeded to the throne with the support of the Mongol and Central Asian factions, thus bringing to an end the period of administrative and fiscal reforms launched by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. Early in the year, Yang Huan, then sixty-five and in declining health, proceeded to Yen-ching to tender his resignation, leaving the administration of Ho-nan in the care of his nephew Yang Yüan-chen. Yang returned home in April and, after a rest, paid a visit to Tung-p'ing in April of the following year. While at Tung-p'ing, he was the guest of the administration of Shan-tung and enjoyed meeting his former colleagues and friends. He then left for Confucius' native place at Ch'ü-fou, and later wrote a detailed account of the historical places seen during his journey. This essay, entitled 'Tung-yu chi'

('Memoir of a Journey to the East') provides important information on the Confucian shrines in Chin times.

While travelling in Shantung in the summer of 1252, Yang Huan received an invitation from Qubilai, the younger brother of Möngke, to visit him at his Chin-lien ch'uan headquarters on the Shan-tien River (Inner Mongolia). By this time Qubilai had already recruited a number of Chinese literati under the leadership of the Buddhist-Taoist Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*), whom he used to gain information on conditions in China and consulted as advisers in his bid for power. One of his early attendants was the leading scholar-official Wang E (*q.v.*), who had been called to Qubilai's residence in Qara Qorum early in 1244. Wang E had convinced Qubilai of the need to compile a history of the Chin state, and recommended Yang Yuan, Yüan Hao-wen, Li Chih (*q.v.*) and others to be put in charge of the enterprise. The project did not materialise immediately, for Qubilai was not yet in power at the time, but Wang E's recommendation was probably a decisive factor in Qubilai's summoning of Yang Huan in 1252.

Yang Huan came to Chin-lien ch'uan in the spring of 1253. There he had an audience with Qubilai who, impressed by his personality, offered him the post of surveillance commissioner of the Ching-chao district in the princely domain. Yang Huan did not accept, however, and begged for permission to retire; besides feeling his age, he was perhaps disillusioned with service under the Mongols. He returned home where he had a pavilion built, called Kuei-lai t'ang ('Hall of Returning'), and devoted himself to study and composing essays and poetry. It was in these last two years of his life that he produced most of his writings, but unfortunately only a few have come to us.

After a short illness, Yang Huan died on 2 October 1255 at his place of birth, aged sixty-nine. He was survived by his third wife née Wu and by four daughters. As all his four sons had died in infancy, he had adopted a year before his death a kinsman's son, Yang Pao-tung, as his heir under the name of Yang Yüan-ssu. His third daughter married Yao Sui (1238-1314), a nephew of Yang Huan's friend, the distinguished Neo-Confucian scholar Yao Shu. Yao Sui later became a renowned scholar-official under Qubilai, thus continuing the tradition of his father-in-law. After Yang Huan's death, his close friend Shang T'ing (*q.v.*) composed his 'account of conduct', and a year later Yüan Hao-wen wrote a tomb-epitaph in his memory, which was inscribed on a stele and erected in 1264. The 'account of conduct' is lost, but the tomb-epitaph has been preserved in Yüan's collected works, *I-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi*. It provides the basic source for Yang Huan's composite biography compiled by Su T'ien-chüeh (1294-1352) for his *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* (1335).

Subsequently, Qubilai conferred on Yang Huan the posthumous title of Wen-hsien ('Cultured and Exemplary'); Yang is also known by this honorific in later writings.

In retrospect, Yang Huan's career attests to the vicissitudes of the Chinese literati during the momentuous years that witnessed the extinction of the Chin state and the consolidation of Mongol power in north China. Despite his literary achievements Yang Huan was a frustrated scholar under the Chin, having failed several times in the state examinations, and had to earn his living as an itinerant teacher. His failure in the examinations may be partly attributed to misfortune, but it may also have been due to his disdain for the assessment rules which placed more emphasis on literary excellence than on practical knowledge. He was successful in the 1238 examinations and was appointed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai as a tax collector. At the time, this was considered an important position, but, as Yang himself confessed, it did not give him much satisfaction even though he proved to be a competent administrator. His career was abruptly interrupted by his voluntary resignation, prompted perhaps by the changed political climate following the rise of the Central Asian party at the Mongol court.

Despite these setbacks, Yang Huan still earned a name as a scholar and, above all, as a dedicated teacher of Confucian classics. He was praised by his distinguished contemporaries such as Chao Ping-wen (1222-93), Li Ch'un-fu (1185-1231), Chao Fu (*fl.* 1235-57) and others, for his enthusiasm in expounding the original meaning of the classics, and for his denunciation of ornate literary styles, which he maintained were detrimental to originality and substance. This attitude to scholarship not only characterised his thought and action as expressed in his literary works, but also became the hallmark of his teaching, to which a great portion of his career was devoted. It was through teaching that Yang influenced his juniors and earned the respect of his disciples, the most distinguished among whom was Hao Ching (*q.v.*). This is attested by their correspondence included in Yang Huan's collected works.

It is difficult, however, to estimate Yang's contribution to scholarship because of the loss of most of his writings. He has written commentaries on the *Four Books*, stressing the importance of true learning for all aspirants to government service, rather than the quest for fame and profit. He is also reputed to have composed treatises deploring the departure from the classical Confucian tradition of the T'ang scholars and Sung Neo-Confucianists, including such celebrated figures as Han Yü (768-824) and Su Shih (1036-1101), but little is known of the substance of his criticism since all these writings have been lost. He is, moreover, honoured as a thinker in the Neo-Confucian anthology *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an* of Huang Tsung-hsi, but it seems that his inclusion in this work was due more to his family relationship with

Yao Shu, a disciple of the eminent philosopher Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), than to his contribution to Neo-Confucianism.

Yang Huan's literary achievements, however, can be more easily evaluated in the area of historical scholarship through his authorship of two important works. The first was *T'ien-hsing chin-chien*, in 30 *chüan*, which, as already mentioned, is an account of the last reign of the Chin emperor Ai-tsung, composed shortly after the fall of the capital Pien-ching. It covers the events from the first month of 1232 to the sixth month of 1234, three months after the Mongol annihilation of the Chin state. This work was an attempt, as the title indicates, to apply the principles of praise and blame to historiography in order to provide a 'mirror,' i.e. a paradigm to posterity. In addition, it presented a first-hand account of the events of this period from personal experience; as such, it provided a major source for the composition of the official *Chin History* (*Chin-shih*) completed under the auspices of Yüan historiographical office in 1344. This work no longer survives, but a fragment has been identified in the *Chin History*, *ch.* 55, being a passage on the daily expenses paid to officials travelling on government missions.

The other major historical work by Yang Huan, also lost, was a huge chronological compilation entitled *Cheng-t'ung shu* (*On the Legitimate Line of Succession*), or *Cheng-t'ung pa li* (*Eight Illustrations of the Principles of Legitimate Line of Succession*), in 60 *chüan*. This was an attempt to deal with the thorny issue of the legitimacy of many states in China's past according to the criteria of the 'legitimate line of succession' – an issue which had been much discussed by political theorists and historians since the Later Han dynasty. The issue received renewed attention with the rise of Neo-Confucianism during the Sung, and was elaborated, among others, by Ssu-ma Kuang in his *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, and by Chu Hsi in the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*. It is said that Yang Huan first came to consider this issue out of dissatisfaction with Ssu-ma Kuang's treatment of the Three Kingdoms period, which conferred legitimacy on the Wei state (220-65) of the Ts'ao family, to the exclusion of Shu (221-63) founded by a scion of the Liu family of Han. Yang undertook thereupon a revision of the Han dynastic history, restoring legitimacy to Shu in an attempt to rectify what he regarded as an injustice, but he gave up his work when he found out that Chu Hsi had already set things aright in his abridgement of the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*. It appears that this abortive project inspired Yang Huan to compile the *Cheng-t'ung shu*, in which he revised Chu Hsi's views and expounded his own criteria for establishing the legitimacy of many of the states in Chinese history.

The main feature of the *Cheng-t'ung shu*, as outlined in the preface which has fortunately survived in Yang's collected works, was a rejection of currently popular arguments to legitimise regimes established by force. The work also criticised an

excessive emphasis on genealogical affiliation and territorial occupation as conditions for establishing dynastic legitimacy. Instead of formulating his own theory, Yang Huan enumerated eight conditions affecting the rise and fall of states since antiquity, from the legendary emperor Yao to the rulers of the Five Dynasties. The eight conditions took into account, *inter alia*, the political and military circumstances in which the rulers came to power. Those conditions remained rather nebulous for the earlier periods from antiquity down to Chou, but became much better understood for the later eras from the Ch'in down to the Five Dynasties. He did not affirm the legitimacy of those states, but, having measured their merits and faults by the yardstick of Confucian morality, he left the question of legitimacy to the judgment of later generations. In this way, Yang Huan's *Cheng-t'ung shu* marks a departure from Ssu-ma Kuang and Chu Hsi, and, by virtue of his rejection of the established criteria of dynastic legitimacy, Yang made a fresh approach to a controversial historical issue. It is not known whether he ever completed his *magnum opus*, since he confessed in an essay written in 1254, a year before his death, that he needed to expand his work to 120 *chüan*. Nonetheless, this work apparently had considerable influence on contemporary scholars, particularly on his son-in-law Yao Sui, who later produced a similar compilation (though more modest in scope) after Yang Huan's model, entitled *Kuo-t'ung li-ho piao*. This work is also lost.

Many of Yang Huan's literary works – essays and poetry – have been assembled in a collection known as *Tzu-yang wen-chi*, or *Huan-shan chi*, originally totalling more than 100 *chüan*. The first printed edition, including a preface by Chao Fu dated 1246, contained 60 *chüan*, but this collection had already been lost by the middle of the Ming dynasty. The extant edition, entitled *Huan-shan i-kao*, contains only a fraction of the original, in 2 *chüan*. It was edited by the sixteenth-century scholar-official Sung T'ing-tso, a *chin-shih* of 1511 and one-time prefect of Nan-yang, Honan, after thirty years of labour collecting Yang Huan's preserved writings. It includes one *chüan* with sixteen essays, one *chüan* of poetry, an outline of Yang's chronological biography (*nien-p'u*), as well as a compendium of biographical materials in the appendix. These materials were culled from available anthologies, rubbings, and unpublished manuscripts from private collections. The most important are Yang's account of the former Chin imperial palaces at Pien-ching, the reminiscences of his visit to Confucius' native place at Ch'ü-fou, as well as biographical sketches of his contemporaries, including leading Taoist priests, and also the commemorative essays on Taoist establishments. The Ming edition of *Huan-shan i-kao*, containing a preface by a certain Wang Yüan-k'ai dated 1522, is extremely rare. It was, however, included in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* and was later incorporated in the *Shih-yüan ts'ung-shu* collection edited by Chang Chün-heng (*chü-jen* of 1898). This edition includes an

additional fifteen poems taken from the *Yüan-shih hsüan* compiled by Ku Ssu-li (1669-1722), second series (1702), and is the most comprehensive collection of source material for a study of Yang Huan's life and career.

In addition, the well-known encyclopaedia *Shuo-fu* by T'ao Tsung-i (ca. 1315-ca. 1402) includes one of Yang Huan's short collections of miscellaneous notes on historical geography entitled *Shan-ling tsa-chi*.

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H.L. Chan

RELIGIOUS LEADERS

14. CH'IU CH'U-CHI (1148-1227) ·

Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, T. T'ung-mi, H. Ch'ang-ch'un *chen-jen*, patriarch of the Ch'üan-chen sect of Taoism, was a native of P'in-tu, a hamlet just north of Ch'i-hsia in eastern Shantung. He was born there on 10 February 1148 of farmer parents who both died when he was still a child. He was presumably brought up by relatives, and nothing is known about his early life until 1166. In that year, aged only eighteen, he decided to leave home and join the Taoist hermits at K'un-yü shan, not far from the Ning-hai prefecture further east.

Ch'iu spent about a year in one of the mountain caves practising self-cultivation. Having heard that Wang Che, alias Wang Ch'ung-yang (1112/13-70), was staying at Ning-hai, he went to visit him. Wang was the eccentric founder of a new Taoist syncretic movement which became known as the Ch'üan-chen, or 'Complete Perfection' sect, from the name of his retreat in Ning-hai.

Wang accepted young 'Brother Ch'iu' (Ch'iu-ko) as his disciple and gave the *ming* and *tsu* by which he is known (Ch'iu's original *ming* has not been handed down). Later, Ch'iu styled himself Ch'ang-ch'un or 'Everlasting Spring.'

It seems that his first duties were largely secretarial: this compelled him to learn quickly a large number of ideograms. He thus acquired the reputation of a man endowed with a prodigious memory. At the same time he learned also to compose verse, following the example of his master who often used poetry to convey his ideas and teachings and to attract converts from among the country gentry.

Under Wang's guidance, Ch'iu spent the following two years training together with the former's three other disciples, viz. Ma Yü (H. Tan-yang), T'an Ch'u-tuan (H. Ch'ang-chen) and Wang Ch'u-i (H. Yü-yang). They first stayed at K'un-yü shan, then moved to Wang's new retreat in Teng-chou, Shantung, where a lay congregation (*hui*) was established in 1168. Soon after, in 1169, Wang took his disciples back to Ning-hai and thence to Lai-chou and, finally, Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan), making converts and establishing congregations. His close followers now included also Liu Ch'u-hsüan (H. Ch'ang-sheng), Hao Ta-t'ung (H. Kuang-ning) and Sun Pu-erh (H. Ch'ing-ching), this last being Ma Yü's wife and the only female member of the group. Together they formed Wang Che's core of seven principal disciples – the 'apostles' of the Ch'üan-chen creed.

After Wang's death on his way to Pien at the age of fifty-seven, Ma Yü (1123-83) became the leader of the sect according to the dying master's instructions. Wang's coffin was brought back to his native village of Liu-chiang in Chung-nan county, Shensi, by Ma, T'an, Liu and Ch'iu. There, by the master's grave, the four lived in mourning until 1174, when they decided to separate and go their own ways to continue their spiritual quest and spread Wang's teaching. Before parting each expressed an earnest wish: Ma to be poor, T'an to be righteous, Liu to be steadfast and Ch'iu 'to enjoy leisure,' i.e. to be free from worldly ties and commitments in order to practise self-cultivation.

Ch'iu also decided to move further west and for the following twelve years he gave himself up to study and ascetic practices ('subduing the emotions and refining the conduct') as a means of attaining the Tao, first at P'an-ch'i, southeast of Pao-chi, then – after 1180 – in a cave of Lung-men shan, northwest of Lung-chou, always in Shensi.

During this long period of seclusion, Ch'iu's reputation as a holy man and teacher grew steadily. At first he used to beg for food but after he had moved to the mountain cave he cooked for himself or had food brought to him by his disciples. His needs were few, for he led a rigorous life following strict dietary rules which later became an important element in the sect's teaching (see below).

In the meantime Ma Yü had been spreading the Ch'üan-chén doctrine with considerable success in central Shensi, especially among farmers, simple folk and women. He eventually returned to Shantung, possibly, as some authorities maintain, by order of the government which viewed his proselytising activity with suspicion. He continued his preaching at Lai-yang in Shantung, where he died in 1183 at the age of sixty, appointing T'an Ch'u-tuan (1123-85) as his successor.

When T'an, who had settled in Lo-yang, died only two years later, Wang Ch'u-i (1142-1217) became head of the sect. It was under his dynamic leadership that Ch'üan-chén achieved a dramatic rise in popularity: in the country through the activity of the now numerous congregations (particularly in Shantung, Honan and Shensi), and in the capital through court patronage.

In 1187 Wang was summoned to Chung-tu (Peking) by the Chin emperor Shih-tsung (r. 1161-89) who was eager to find out – just like Činggis Qan thirty years later – whether the Ch'üan-chén adepts were capable of prolonging life. He is also said to have sought political advice from Wang. The fact that Wang Che had died at the modest age of fifty-seven, Ma Yü at sixty and T'an Ch'u-tuan at sixty-two, evidently had not deterred the Jurchen ruler, who was himself sixty-four at the time and in poor health owing to over-indulgence in sex (according to Taoist sources).

From 1187 on, the sect enjoyed court patronage and its leaders were invited to the capital on several occasions to advise the emperor not only on health matters, but apparently also on current problems, such as the causes of internal unrest in troubled areas and the means of dealing with them. They were also called upon to perform the *chiao* sacrifice and pray for blessings. The Chin court bestowed favours on the Ch'üan-chen sect by subsidising the building of temples, conferring titles on the leaders, and making other grants.

It was at this time of rising fortunes for the sect that Ch'iu returned to society. In 1186, at the age of thirty-eight, he completed his spiritual training and 'attained the Tao,' i.e. he achieved enlightenment. Soon after, he left the Lung-men mountain retreat and made a pilgrimage to Wang Che's grave (now the Founder's Hall); from there he went to a nearby former abode of Wang on Chung-nan shan west of Hsi-an, where he resided intermittently until 1191.

Early in 1188 he was also invited to Chung-tu by Shih-tsung, no doubt on the recommendation of Wang Ch'u-i who was in the capital at the time. Ch'iu had several audiences with the debilitated ruler to whom he preached self-restraint and on whose behalf he performed the *chiao* sacrifice. Ch'iu spent several months in Chung-tu, staying part of the time in the T'ien-chang kuan, an important Taoist temple dating from the T'ang which had been restored in the early sixties and which later became the headquarters of the sect (see below).

The imperial favour was shown in a substantial cash grant and in a rescript authorising Ch'iu to cast bronze statues of Lü Tung-pin (fl. A.D. 770), Wang Che and Ma Yü – a fact indicating that by 1188 the Ch'üan-chen sect officially recognised Lü Tung-pin also as one of its patriarchs.

Ch'iu and Wang Ch'u-i were allowed to leave in the autumn of that year and although Shih-tsung died soon after, the popularity of Ch'üan-chen, and of Ch'iu in particular, was further increased by their visit to court.

The following Chin emperor, Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208), at first continued to patronise Taoism and even authorised the construction of a building attached to the T'ien-chang kuan to store the wooden blocks of the *Taoist Canon* that had just been used (1190) to print a new edition of the scriptures known as the (*Ta-Chin*) *Hsüan-tu pao-tsang*.

In 1191 Ch'iu left the Chung-shan Mountains for good and returned to his native village of P'in-tu in Shantung, where he and his followers built the T'ai-hsü kuan, later known as the Ch'ang-ch'ün kuan, which became his residence for the next twenty-seven years. The reasons behind his move are not clear, and one cannot exclude that they had something to do with Chang-tsung's sudden change of heart towards Ch'üan-chen. At the end of 1190, the emperor had banned the sect on the grounds that 'it

confused the multitudes and caused trouble among the people.' Soon after, he forbade Buddhist monks and Taoist priests to visit the households of imperial relatives and high officials.

The emperor's displeasure, whatever its cause, was of a temporary nature, however, for in 1207 Lady née Li, the principal imperial concubine, presented a copy of the *Canon* to Ch'iu's T'ai-hsü kuan. By this time Ch'iu had gathered around him a group of keen and active disciples who were to form the backbone of the sect in the following decades. Among them was Yin Chih-p'ing (H. Ch'ing-ho; 1169-1251), who had joined Ch'iu in 1190, and who was emerging as one of the leading personalities of the sect. This was a time when the political situation in the country, and particularly in Shantung, was rapidly deteriorating because of renewed hostilities between Sung and Chin from 1205 on. People were turned out of their homes and bands of marauders roamed the countryside. In addition to their purely religious duties, such as the performance of the *chiao* in towns and villages, Ch'iu and his followers engaged in relief work, helping and sheltering refugees from war-torn areas, and organising the delivery of supplies through the temples. All this was in compliance with the philanthropic principles advocated by the sect, the two cornerstones of which were self-cultivation and good works.

Ch'iu stayed in Ch'i-hsia until 1218. During this long period he made only one trip to the capital in 1211 at the invitation of the newly elected and short-lived ruler of Chin, Wei-shao wang (r. 1209-13). On that occasion he apparently journeyed as far as the mountains near Te-hsing in northern Hopei, just as the Mongol army began the invasion of Chin.

The following years were difficult ones for the Jurchens, who lost Chung-tu to the Mongols in 1215. Emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-24) withdrew to Pien, south of the Yellow river. Shantung was divided and in a state of chaos owing to the activities of the Red Coats (*Hung-ao*) led by Yang An-erh, the Chin generals' efforts to suppress them, the Sung intervention, and the inroads of the Mongol army (1217-18).

It was almost certainly on account of these troubles and of his advanced age (sixty-eight) that Ch'iu politely refused an imperial invitation to go to Pien in 1216. Subsequent invitations to court also went unheeded. Instead, in 1218 Ch'iu moved from the T'ai-hsü kuan to the Hao-t'ien kuan in Lai-chou, just southwest of Teng-chou. This move may be related to Ch'iu's assumption of the leadership of the sect following the death of Wang Ch'u-i in 1217.

When Lai-chou fell under Sung control in 1218, the two Sung generals P'eng I-pin and Li Ch'üan personally invited Ch'iu to go with them, no doubt with the intention of securing his cooperation in pacifying the region and turning to the Sung's advantage the prestige that the Taoist leader and the Ch'üan-ch'en sect enjoyed at the

popular level in the north. Presumably this was also the object of the earlier invitations from the Chin court. As before, Ch'iu firmly refused to move.

By this time (1218-19), Ch'iu's fame had reached even Činggis Qan in Mongolia through reports about the sage and his sect submitted by two members of the ruler's immediate entourage, viz. the Chinese physician and arrow-maker Liu Wen (T. Chung-lu) and the sinicised Khitan Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), then serving Činggis Qan as secretary-scribe (*bičēči*) and astrologer-astronomer (*tölgečin*). Both men had recommended Ch'iu to the Mongol conqueror. Liu Wen had sung his praise, claiming that the Taoist adept possessed the secret of long life and was himself three hundred years old. Liu was backed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who secretly cherished the hope that should he visit the Mongol court, Ch'iu might introduce Činggis not only to Taoism, but also to Confucianism and Buddhism, and thus exert a civilising influence on him.

Činggis Qan's interest was aroused, all the more as he knew Ch'iu to be an influential spiritual leader with a great number of followers in areas of north China where the Mongols were then fighting. And so, in June 1219, when the Mongol army was on the Irtysh preparing to invade Khwārazm, Činggis sent Liu with an escort of twenty men and a letter of invitation to Ch'iu, requesting the latter to join him in Central Asia in order to advise him on current affairs and teach him the technique of longevity. The letter, in Chinese, was probably drafted either by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai or by Liu himself.

Because of the confused situation in north China, the party took six months to reach Lai-chou. The seventy-two-year-old patriarch, knowing that a refusal was out of the question, embarked on the long and hazardous journey with eighteen disciples. Among them were Yin Chih-p'ing – the future head of the sect – and Li Chih-ch'ang (H. T'ung-hsüan, 1193-1256), a recent convert who was responsible for keeping a detailed record of the journey, published in 1228 under the title of *Hsi-yu chi* or *Account of a Journey to the West*.

The group left on 23 February 1220 and on 28 March reached Yen-ching, the former Chung-tu of the Chin, where Ch'iu was welcomed by the governor and the local élite. During his short stay in the city, Ch'iu was able to establish friendly relations with the Chinese officials in the Mongol service and members of the former Chin intelligentsia. A particularly useful connection was developed with Wang Chi (*q.v.*), an early defector to the Mongols and friend of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who had risen high in the north China administration. It was he who conveyed to Ch'iu an invitation to visit Činggis' younger brother, Temüge Otčigin, whose camp was in the northeastern corner of Mongolia.

Ch'iu and his disciples left Yen-ching on 19 May, but they lingered in the border area (Te-hsing and Hsüan-te) until the spring of the following year on various

pretexts, one of them being Ch'iu's refusal to travel in the same convoy with the girls collected by Liu Wen for the imperial harem.

Eventually, on 3 March 1221, the Taoist party and their escort left Te-hsing for Fu-chou in northern Hopei and Yü-erh p'o (modern Ta-li po), and thence proceeded across the desert to Temüge's camp, just southeast of Lake Kulun, which they reached on 24 April. From there they travelled along the Kerulen and into the Orkhon basin, where they found the remains of a former Khitan outpost (possibly Chen-chou), which they investigated and of which Li Chih-ch'ang gives a brief description in his book. Ch'iu can thus claim to have been the first archeologist of Mongolia. Their route took them across the Khangai and Altai mountains. Between the two ranges and just north of the Abuqan (= ?Hasagtu) Mountains was Činqai Balaqasun or Činqai City – a military colony established by Činqai (*q.v.*) on orders from Činggis Qan as a storage and supply centre for the Mongol armies in the field. The colony was largely made up of Chinese artisans and craftsmen. Ch'iu and his party halted there for a few days and one of the disciples was left behind to supervise the building of a Taoist temple to serve the local community. Činqai himself joined the group, which he led with Liu Wen for the rest of the journey.

The perilous crossing of the Altai along the route only recently opened by Ögödei, and that of the Dzungarian desert, took about two weeks, a record time. By mid-September the travellers reached the Uighur town of Beš Baliq, near modern Jimsa (Fu-yüan) in Sinkiang, from whence they proceeded to Samarqand via Lun-t'ai (Urumchi), Čam Baliq (Ch'ang-chi), Almaliq (north-west of Kuldja), Balasağun (south-west of Toqmaq in Kazakhstan), Talas (Jambul) and what is now Tashkent, crossing on the way the T'ien Shan and the rivers Ili, Chu and Syr Darya. Many important observations regarding the geography and ethnography of the countries which the Taoists traversed are recorded in the *Hsi-yu chi*. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had followed the same route only two years before, but his account of the journey (in the early portion of the *Hsi-yu lu*) is extremely sketchy by comparison.

When Ch'iu reached Samarqand (3 December), the city was recovering from the frightful destruction wrought by the Mongol army in 1220, the population having been reduced, according to Li Chih-ch'ang, to one quarter of its original number. The resident commissioner (*daruqači*) of the city was Yeh-lü A-hai (*q.v.*). Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was either there already or joined Ch'iu soon after the latter's arrival. Činggis Qan was engaged in military operations south of the Hindu Kush at the time and it was to his camp near Parvān that the patriarch was instructed to proceed at the end of April 1222.

The road passed through Kesh (Shahr-i-sabr in Uzbekistan) and the famous 'Iron Gate,' i.e. the Buzgala Pass. Ch'iu crossed the Amu Darya on 4 May and on the 17th finally reached Činggis Qan's encampment.

When they met, Činggis immediately asked him whether he possessed the elixir of long life, to which Ch'iu honestly replied that he had the means of protecting life, but could not prolong it. The Taoist master expounded his philosophy in subsequent meetings (see below). Although much of the advice that he gave the Mongol conqueror recommended moderation, the avoidance of sensual and cruel pastimes and the need for self-cultivation, Ch'iu did not forget the sad plight of his countrymen. He spoke to Činggis of north China and the intolerable tax burden placed on its people, and he pressed the qan to appoint competent officials so that the country could recover quickly from the ravages of war. He also proposed that a Chinese ruler be established as a figure-head in the conquered territory, like the Chin had done with Liu Yü (1074-1143) in Shantung in the early phase of their rule.

Činggis Qan may not have been greatly impressed by all the moral precepts and political advice he received in place of the elixir of long life; nevertheless, it seems that he took a genuine liking to the old Chinese sage, whom he chose to address by his Chinese title of *shen-hsien* ('Holy Immortal'), in Mongolian **šinsen*. He was well aware furthermore that befriending a popular religious leader like Ch'iu could gain him the allegiance of large sections of the Chinese population and speed up the Mongol conquest of the northern provinces. This is evident from a message that Činggis sent to Ch'iu after the latter's return to Yen-ching at the end of 1223, in which the emperor asked the sage whether he had persuaded the common people to support the Mongols.

The conqueror showed his favour to Ch'iu concretely by exempting him and his followers from taxes and corvées, and by putting him in sole control of all the people in China who had embraced a religious life and were praying for the prosperity of the emperor. The wording of the Chinese version of the decree is ambiguous (the Mongol original is lost) and could be understood to mean that Ch'iu's authority extended to both Taoists and Buddhists.

The records of some of the conversations between Činggis Qan and Ch'iu have been preserved, as has the text of the leading sermon on Ch'üan-ch'en doctrine that Ch'iu preached to the qan on 20 November 1222, which was taken down in Chinese by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in his secretarial capacity. The latter, who at first had welcomed the patriarch and exchanged poems with him in Samarqand, soon turned against him as he realised that Ch'iu was only interested in promoting his own teachings – emphasising apparently the supernatural element so dear to the Mongols – and that he and his disciples were bent on gaining power and privileges at the expense of the

Buddhist clergy. In the *Hsi-yu lu*, which Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai published in Yen-ching in 1229, he went so far as to accuse Ch'iu and his disciples of actually forging the Chinese text of the tax-exemption decree. Whatever the truth of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's allegations, the relationship between the qan and the patriarch remained excellent.

Ch'iu accompanied Činggis Qan on part of the latter's return journey to Central Asia, and after repeated requests eventually obtained permission to leave for China (12 April 1223): not only was he anxious to fulfil the prophecy made in 1221 that he would be back in three-year's time, but he also wished to put into effect the imperial decree as soon as possible. His advanced age and the situation in China made this task an urgent one.

The return journey through Mongolia, this time on an almost straight diagonal across the Gobi from Činqai Balaqasun to present-day Köke Qota in Inner Mongolia, took only five weeks (14 June-22 July). Even before reaching Yen-ching, Ch'iu and his disciples made use of their special credentials, which included a tablet of authority or *paiza* authorising the use of government post-horses and the requisition of Confucian halls and Buddhist temples in Shansi, which they renamed and turned into Taoist temples. At the same time, Ch'iu issued proclamations enjoining the people of Shantung to surrender to the Mongol armies.

In Yen-ching, which he reached at the end of March 1224, Ch'iu set up the headquarters of the sect in the T'ien-ch'ang kuan, while his disciples were promptly dispatched to various districts to take possession of war-damaged temples and bring the Taoist and Buddhist clergy firmly under Ch'üan-chen control.

With the assistance of the local authorities and strengthened by further friendly messages from Činggis Qan, who continued to show favour to the patriarch until his death, Ch'iu managed within a few years to extend his authority over most of the religious establishments in Mongol-controlled north China. People flocked to the Ch'üan-chen temples, which now served also as hospices and places of refuge, to obtain religious certificates and thus avoid taxes and corvées. Numerous new congregations were created in and outside the capital. By making widespread use of Činggis' decree, Ch'iu's disciples in the country could relieve a great number of homeless people and even ransom war prisoners with money collected by the congregations. This fact is amply acknowledged by Yüan authors, even though writers of Buddhist persuasion strongly condemn the Taoists for their misappropriation of temples and other abuses.

Ch'iu had the T'ien-ch'ang kuan thoroughly renovated and enlarged, being granted part of the grounds of the former Chin imperial palace, i.e. the Ch'iung-hua tao, later known as Wan-sui shan. In June 1227 the T'ien-ch'ang kuan was renamed Ch'ang-ch'un kung (not to be confused with the Ch'ang-ch'un kuan mentioned earlier)

in honour of the patriarch. Soon after, on 22 August, Ch'iu died after an attack of dysentery at the age of seventy-nine, his death almost coinciding with that of Činggis Qan in Kansu. While his disciples and friends lamented and glorified the departed master, his numerous enemies openly gloated over his death in the privy, making it the subject of indecent puns.

In the spring of the following year, Ch'iu's successor as head of the Ch'üan-chen sect, Yin Chih-p'ing, proposed that a hall be built on the eastern side of the Ch'ang-ch'un kung to hallow the patriarch's remains. This new building, completed in 1229 and named Po-yün kuan or White Cloud Temple, was the original structure of the present temple of that name outside Hsi-pien men, largely rebuilt in its actual (i.e. pre-Cultural Revolution) form during the reign of Ch'ien-lung. A rare, if not unique, copy of the Ming (early 16th century) edition of the *Taoist Canon* (*Tao-tsang*) was kept in the Po-yün kuan. This is the edition that the Commercial Press reprinted photographically in 1923-1926 (latest reprints: I-wen yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1962, 1977). The Ch'ang-ch'un kung, partly damaged during the fire set to it by the Taoists themselves in 1280 to incriminate the Buddhists and subsequently restored (1296), was completely destroyed during the troubles at the end of the dynasty and was never rebuilt.

The Ch'üan-chen sect reached its high point during the last years of Ch'iu's life – a remarkable achievement largely due to the master's leadership, political acumen, and, above all, to his skilful management of the sect's affairs. In order to understand the man and his motivation more fully, let us briefly examine Ch'üan-chen ideology and consider Ch'iu's own contribution to the religious movement founded by Wang Che.

During the early stages of its development, up to and including the lifetime of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, the Ch'üan-chen movement possessed no unified system of doctrine. The teachings of Wang Che held assuredly a position of pre-eminence, but his disciples enjoyed a considerable degree of independence in their interpretation of them. This seeming lack of a clearly defined dogma was by no means a failing of the movement, since the mission of the Ch'üan-chen master was essentially to revive and animate beliefs already widely dispersed in China. This is not to say that the sect had nothing new to offer. It certainly had. But 'newness' was related here to the manner in which old ideas were combined and synthesised as a new entity. This observation is fully consistent with the avowed intentions of Wang Che and his disciples, in whose writings we are repeatedly told that their teachings are founded on the belief in the essential identity of the three major doctrinal traditions (*san-chiao*), viz. Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Because of this belief, the Ch'üan-chen sect borrowed terminology and concepts openly and widely from all three streams of

thought. In fact, the name Ch'üan-chên, or 'Complete Perfection,' derives from the conviction that the sect's teachings cut through to the core of those traditions, extracting from them the most basic and 'perfect' truth.

We must not conclude, however, that Ch'üan-chên was a homogeneous blend of the three traditions. There is no question that Wang Che's primary frame of reference was Taoism, as was that of his followers. Nor must we think that by weaving Buddhist and Confucian ideas into the Taoist tradition Wang Che engaged in anything novel. Indeed, the history of religion in China, at both the popular and élite levels, is characterised by a free movement of ideas between the various traditions. The uniqueness and success of Ch'üan-chên religion relate not to the fact of syncretism, but rather to the nature and content of the synthesised product.

Ch'üan-chên doctrine sought to resolve spiritual and ethical problems at several levels. As a basic premise, there was a firm belief in the need for both internal and external cultivation. In the area of formal ethics and deportment, the Ch'üan-chên patriarchs followed in the common tradition of Buddhism and Taoism by establishing a code of conduct that included abstinence from wine and meat, prohibition of theft and killing, as well as injunctions against avarice, the accumulation of wealth and sexual licence. Followers were further admonished to value non-aggressiveness and yielding above self-assertion, and to practise loyalty and filiality.

There was in the Ch'üan-chên tradition a distinctly Buddhistic appeal for compassion and a concern for unostentatious virtue or achievement (*yin-te*), combined with the concept, already popular in Sung times, of spiritual reward for good works, as expressed in the *T'ai-shang kan-ying-p'ien*. Those ideas no doubt fostered the interest in social welfare that marked Ch'üan-chên institutions and earned the sect much popular support. Ch'üan-chên temples and the lay adherents' religious congregations (*hui*) became centres of community guidance and leadership, with women converts also playing an important part in the movement. The active participation of women is, indeed, one of the most distinctive features of the sect.

Temples and congregations provided the base for spiritual operations in the form of rites of propitiation or *chiao*. Whereas the Ch'üan-chên repertoire of ritual seems to have been somewhat limited in comparison to earlier Taoist movements, it attached nevertheless considerable importance to such rites as it had preserved. The 'Sacrifice of the Yellow Register' (*Huang-lu chiao*), a religious service favoured by Ch'üan-chên priests, was essentially a pledge or oath of spiritual allegiance (*cheng-meng*) to the celestial divinities. The *chiao* has a long history, probably going back to Han times. Beginning with Wang Che himself, it became a mainstay of Ch'üan-chên religion and was favoured equally among the populace at large and at the imperial court on those

occasions when supernatural intervention was called for (to ward off evil influences, for rain-making, etc.).

At the core of Ch'üan-chen, however, lies self-cultivation. Drawing on both Taoism and Buddhism, and under the influence of Sung cosmological speculations, Wang concluded that sickness and death resulted from an imbalance in our natural life-essence or *hsing-ming*. The terms *hsing* and *ming* are often used to represent separate elements, *hsing* being the cosmic element *Yang* which takes form within the body as the 'primal spirit' (*yüan-shen*), and *ming* the element *Yin* which takes form as the 'primal pneuma' (*yüan-ch'i*). When individual lives are in perfect and rightful relation to the cosmos, those two fundamental elements exist in a state of tranquil and unimpeded flow throughout the body. But when one allows the mind and body to become agitated by sensual experience and emotional attachments, they can no longer function properly. They become damaged and impeded, and the ultimate result is old age, sickness and death. To avoid or, at any rate, retard this process, Ch'üan-chen stressed quietism, asceticism, and meditation. It is in these practices, incidentally, that we observe a debt to Ch'an Buddhism, which had gained considerable popularity among the literati since the early T'ang. The adept endeavoured to eliminate all worldly thoughts and attachments. In so doing he hoped to return to his natural, uncontrived state of being (*fan-p'u*). He was urged to leave his home and become celibate so as to have fewer material encumbrances in his spiritual quest. Following the example set by Wang Che, later Ch'üan-chen patriarchs prescribed tireless and strenuous discipline. For instance, special emphasis was placed on avoidance of sleep (a practice common to most schools interested in meditation) in order to disperse the 'Yin ghosts' (*yin-kuei*), i.e. the base sexual impulses that cause havoc in the unguarded sleeping mind. This has prompted some authors to state that Ch'üan-chen followers practised a fanatical and rabid asceticism, which is certainly an exaggeration.

But there was more to Ch'üan-chen meditation than freedom from subjective attachment to the material world. Wang entered the Taoist tradition after gaining initiation into the arcana of the Great Elixir (*ta-tan*) technique. He subsequently devoted much effort to this technique and its implications, eventually making it a major part of his system of cultivation and metaphysics. The specific features of the Great Elixir process developed in the Ch'üan-chen tradition are as yet very poorly understood. In this respect, the Ch'üan-chen sect followed essentially the teachings of the Southern School of Taoism, of which Chang Po-tuan (ca.980-ca.1078) was the most outstanding figure. The essence of the process was that the adept should learn to circulate and transmute the spiritual and carnal elements (*hsing* and *ming*) in his body, so that they might ultimately unite to create a transcendent embryo (*tai*). Techniques of this nature existed already in the Han era. The principal innovation of the Southern

School and the Ch'üan-chen sect was to apply the terminology of alchemy to these entirely physiological activities. The 'embryo' came to be known as the *tan* or cinnabar elixir; the 'primal spirit' was equated with lead; and the 'primal pneuma' with mercury. In this context, the adept no longer laboured with crucible and furnace in search of the chemical elixir of immortality, he employed yoga and mind control to induce an analogous embryonic elixir to grow in his body.

But this elixir was immaterial as was the form of immortality which it promised. Ch'üan-chen doctrine recognised the contradiction inherent in the concept of perpetual material existence in a universe where only insubstantial entities survive. It was held that, having successfully completed the Great Elixir within the body, one achieved a state of insubstantial, spiritual existence and was thus assured an unending life. At the time of death, the adept would simply slough off his earthly shell and ascend the celestial realms as a *hsien* or *shen-hsien*, i.e. as an immortal spirit. Special techniques to achieve this aim are described in Ch'üan-chen literature.

Such spiritual immortality was the ultimate goal of a Ch'üan-chen believer. But there was also hope of attaining a kind of immortal bliss while one lived physically on earth. Wang Che and his disciples borrowed a modified form of the concept of enlightenment from Ch'an Buddhism and proposed that, should one successfully cast off all worldly attachments and 'perceive one's true nature' (*chien-hsing*), he would enter a state equivalent to that of celestial immortality, a process obviously similar to realising one's 'Buddha nature.' Wang even maintained that this state might be achieved instantaneously, as in the case of 'sudden enlightenment' in Ch'an doctrine.

In further elaborating the nature of this enlightenment, Wang sometimes equated man's nature directly with the 'inner elixir.' Thus a man had not so much to create as simply to realise the existence of the 'inner elixir' in order to achieve immortality. The person who 'attained the Tao' (*te-tao*) in this way during his lifetime became ipso facto a 'perfected (= realised) man' (*chen-jen*).

Although the Ch'üan-chen sect, with its stress on morality and its development in the northern provinces, is regarded as the main representative of the Northern School of Taoism, its spiritual origins are strongly rooted in the alchemical pursuits of the Southern School, as can be seen from the above.

We must now examine the personal contribution of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi to the development of Ch'üan-chen doctrine and institutions. At the time of Wang Che's death, Ch'iu was only twenty-two years old and had not yet attained the Tao; the leadership of the sect devolved therefore upon Wang's closest associate, Ma Yü. Under Ma's guidance the sect gained popularity and received a much firmer institutional basis than it had known under Wang Che. Ma gave fuller definition to his teacher's doctrine, concentrating on Taoist aspects. He also cultivated the support

of both the general populace and the literati. When Ch'iu eventually descended from his mountain retreat to assume a more active role in sect affairs, he largely continued where Ma had left off, furthering sect organisation through the establishment of temples and congregations, and cultivating support from all levels of society, including the Chin court – a policy pursued, as we have seen, by Wang Ch'u-i. He seems, however, to have been especially concerned with proselytising. His collected poetry, for example, contains a considerable number of pieces entitled 'To show (= to inform) the multitude' (*shih-chung*) – i.e. to instruct the followers – in which a deliberate effort is made to simplify dogma. He also travelled very actively about the countryside, performing *chiao* sacrifices and appealing to the divinities on behalf of the people.

In doctrinal matters Ch'iu was rather less original than either Wang Che or Ma Yü. He subscribed in a general way to all the major tenets expounded by his teachers, but added very little to the content of Ch'üan-chen doctrine. This is not to say that Ch'iu had no influence in this area, for he did. His role was, however, more in moulding the complex and often contradictory teachings of Wang and Ma into a pabulum more accessible to lay followers, and so to increase the number of converts.

Ch'iu's poetry tends, in fact, to be rather free of specific points of dogma. He often treats such themes as the transient, illusory nature of life and the need for non-attachment, but, especially in those poems addressed to members of the literati class, the religious message is presented in the context of established landscape *topoi*. It would seem that Ch'iu had made an effort to de-emphasise the more blatantly doctrinal aspects of Ch'üan-chen religion in order to cater to the conventional taste of the intellectual élite. He was later remembered by some of his followers as having been more concerned with tangible achievements and 'outward activity' (*yu-wei*), than with inner spiritual cultivation.

On the other hand, Ch'iu was personally very sensitive to the role of supernatural beings in the functioning of the cosmos. He was preoccupied with means of combating the potentially destructive influences of ill-intentioned demons and, in his approach to the *chiao* sacrifice, he was especially conscious of the ritual's function as a medium of communication with the celestial beings.

Ch'iu was also interested in the Great Elixir theory and physical cultivation. Works on these subjects have been attributed to him (see below) and the imagery of alchemy and celestial immortality plays a significant role in his poetry. In this area too, he made a moderate departure from earlier doctrine.

In summary, it seems clear that the success and influence of Ch'üan-chen can be attributed to a number of factors. In the area of pure doctrine, the founding fathers were conscious of a fundamental dissatisfaction with all the major doctrinal traditions.

They responded with a deft syncretism that incorporated aspects of those traditions which most appealed to the literati of the time. In effect, this involved providing a more appealing view of after-life than was possible in the context of traditional and more sophisticated forms of Buddhism, while purging some of the more controversial elements from the Taoist tradition.

Ch'üan-chen priests fulfilled a very basic socio-religious function by acting as intercessors between man and the celestial divinities. In this role they relied heavily on Taoist rituals such as the *chiao* sacrifice. Ch'üan-chen temples and religious congregations also served the very practical social function of providing material relief and community service at a time when political turmoil discouraged the establishment of strong or sympathetic secular agencies. In urban centres, Ch'üan-chen monasteries were established after the Buddhist model. These appealed to the bourgeoisie whose exposure to the foreign religion led them to feel that such institutions of religious learning and devotion were not only dignified and proper, but also useful in their personal spiritual pursuits. The monasteries also provided Ch'üan-chen priests with a strong base in their dealings with secular authorities at various levels.

Finally, the part played by the Ch'üan-chen sect in acting as liaison between foreign governments, and the culture and people of China, cannot be ignored. While Ch'üan-chen leaders realised the need to gain the support of temporal powers for their own survival, they also acted to alleviate the obvious tension between the courts of the Chin and Yüan, and the Chinese masses. The efforts of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi in face of a brutal Mongol overlordship are particularly noteworthy in this respect and represent perhaps his greatest overall contribution to Chinese society.

In view of this achievement and the effect that it had on the preservation of Han culture in the early phase of Mongol rule, it is regrettable that much of the first patriarchs' good work was spoiled after Ch'iu's death through bitter sectarian strife with the Buddhist clergy. Within barely two generations, the Ch'üan-chen sect suffered such severe blows that by 1280 it was on its knees and to all intents and purposes a spent force. Although it still continued to attract the interest of scholars and intellectuals, the lives and exploits of 'Crazy Wang' (Wang Hai-feng), i.e. Wang Che, and his Seven Apostles being immortalised in popular plays and stories, the Ch'üan-chen sect never regained the power and prestige that it had possessed in the first half of the thirteenth century. Knowledge of it during the Ming – indeed one can say its popularity – was mainly due to the large number of plays dealing with the Ch'üan-chen masters and their exploits. During the Ch'ing, and especially from the Ch'ien-lung period onward, the sect enjoyed a revival proclaimed by its impressive headquarters in the renovated Po-yün kuan in Peking and numerous affiliated temples

throughout the country: with the T'ien-shih Tao, or Way of the Heavenly Masters (whose headquarters were at Lung-hu shan in Kiangsi), it became one of the two mainstreams of modern religious Taoism in China.

Ch'iu left a number of works, most of which are included in the *Tao-tsang*, as are also those of Wang Che and other Ch'üan-chen masters. His major literary work is a collection of poems in six *chüan* entitled *P'an-ch'i chi* (TT 797), mostly written after 1174. His alchemical-philosophical theory is expounded in the rather obscure treatise *Ta-tan chih-chih* (*Straight Guide to the Great Elixir*) in two *chüan* (TT 115). His poems written during his journey to and from Central Asia are included in Li Chih-ch'ang's *Hsi-yu chi* (TT 1056), first published in 1228. Because of its importance as a primary source for the history and geography of China and Inner Asia in the first half of the thirteenth century, the latter work has appeared in many editions and has been translated several times. The best critical edition is that by Wang Kuo-wei in *WKW* (*ts'e* 39), which contains also a rich commentary. The first (complete) translation was made in Russian (Palladiï 66). The *Hsi-yu chi* was subsequently translated into English twice (Bretschneider 10,I:35-108; and Waley 31). Both these translations are incomplete: Bretschneider leaves out all, and Waley most, of Ch'iu's poems. However, Bretschneider's work is still invaluable on account of its geographical commentary. There is also a Japanese translation by Iwamura Shinobu (Iwamura 48), as well as geographical studies by Ch'ing and contemporary scholars (see Bibliography). Ch'iu is also the author of a short treatise in one *chüan* on seasonal health care entitled *She-sheng hsiao-hsi lun*, which has been reprinted in *TSCC* (1st Series) from *HHLP*, and of a treatise on the internal elixir in one *chüan* entitled *Ch'iu-tsu ch'üan-shu*, edited by Fu Chin-ch'üan (fl.1823) and reprinted in *CTPS*.

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I. de Rachewiltz and T. Russell

15. HAI-YÜN (1203-1257)

If one reviews the religious history of the Yüan period from the viewpoint of the dynastic history, *Yüan-shih*, one may gain the impression that the Chinese contribution was limited to the Confucian and Taoist traditions whereas Tibetan lamas controlled Buddhism exclusively, for such is the picture presented in all official sources. Although these sources reflect the situation accurately as far as the Yüan is concerned from 1260 onward, this is not the case for the early decades of the Mongols' occupation of northern China. Then Chinese Buddhist leaders held sway among the intelligentsia, as well as at the Mongol court. They successfully retained their religious tradition during the critical period of political transition, served the people at large, and helped Confucians to survive. Among those Buddhist leaders, the most influential was a monk, the great master Hai-yün.

Hai-yün was the monastic style (*fa-hao*) of Sung Yin-chien, born at Ning-yüan in Lan-ku (Lan-hsien), Shansi, on 29 January 1203 (not in 1202 as generally stated).

Though well to do, the Sung family was without any official distinction. An inscription of 1255 (see below) states clearly that the family 'had not been seeking hereditary emoluments,' i.e. its members had not been on the government payroll. This is confirmed by Hai-yün's biography contained in *Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai*. All sources agree that the family had adhered to Buddhism for many generations. The name of Hai-yün's father has been lost: at Lan-ku he was apparently known simply as Mr Hsü-ching (a sobriquet). His mother, née Wang, was from Chin-yüan (in present-day Inner Mongolia).

All accounts agree that Hai-yün was a very precocious child. He started school at seven by traditional Chinese reckoning. As he was being taught the first chapter of the *Classic of Filial Piety* (*Hsiao-ching*) entitled 'Explaining the Scope and Illustrating the Meaning (of the Treatise),' the boy immediately asked, 'What is the scope of explaining? And what is the meaning of illustrating?' When his parents heard of these questions, they began to doubt whether their son was fitted for the study of Confucian texts. Buddhist sources claim that the boy was tutored by his own father, but the 1255 inscription should be more reliable since it was composed in Hai-yün's life time. According to the *Nan-Sung Yüan Ming Ch'an-lin seng-pao chuan*, Hai-yün found the Confucian classics and their commentaries too elementary, and had very soon mastered them. The same source reports further, on the question of happiness and sorrow, that the boy regarded Confucian texts as unhelpful, however closely he endeavoured to read them.

Hai-yün having finally been declared unsuitable for Confucian studies, his parents entrusted him to the Reverend Yen, an expert on Buddhist monastic discipline. Reverend Yen taught the boy the 'Ts'ao-an ko' or 'Song from a Thatched Hut'. When the old monk reached the verse 'Through decay or survival, the Lord exists for ever...', the boy cut in and asked, 'Where does the Lord exist?' 'Which Lord?' the monk asked. 'The one who is independent of decay and survival.' The monk said, 'That is the guest.' 'The Lord feels shame and can only stutter,' the boy said. Although this story is not recorded in the inscription, it seems authentic for the inscription states that 'The boy was shaved,' i.e. he was accepted as a novice, before having been sent for proper instruction to Chung-kuan (*ca.* 1161-1120), a local Ch'an master of the Lin-chi school.

Meeting Chung-kuan was a landmark in Hai-yün's career. Chung-kuan gave the boy the clerical name of Yin-chien and introduced him to monastic life. This, for a novice, was routine and unexciting, and could not satisfy an active and intelligent youth like Hai-yün, who consequently began to play up. One day he jokingly donned his teacher's five-piece ceremonial robe, climbed into the master's seat, and declaimed the master's lecture from memory to his fellow monks. As someone took him to task over the prank, the novice answered, 'Do you remember that Lord Buddha said, "What I have preached for 49 years is the Dharma spoken by the Buddhas of the past, present and future. I did not add even a single word to them!"' When Chung-kuan heard of the escapade, he commented laughingly that the boy would make a fine religious leader yet! Thereupon, he admitted Hai-yün to the inner circle of his disciples.

By a special dispensation of Prince Wei-shao (r. 1209-13), Hai-yün was fully ordained in 1212 at the age of nine. A high priest called Hung-yen asked him, 'Since you are now a fully-fledged monk, why do you still remain so juvenile?' 'Because I am young, which makes the commandments even more onerous!' the boy said, adding 'May I ask the honourable high priest, is he young or old?' The monk replied, 'My body, though old...' However, before he could finish his reply, the boy cut him short and screamed, 'Stop making distinctions!'

Close association with Chung-kuan provided an excellent opportunity for the spiritual training of the young monk, who began practising meditation assiduously under his guidance. Several Ch'an-flavoured anecdotes are recorded in our sources concerning master and disciple. One day when Hai-yün was walking with Chung-kuan, the latter, quoting a verse by the Ch'an master Fa-teng (1075-1126) said, "'The work in the house becomes heavy, who will shoulder the load?" What do you make of it?' Hai-yün pulled the master's hands silently. Chung-kuan commented, 'This is the

spirit of a wild fox!' Hai-yün immediately responded, 'Yes sir, yes sir!' 'You should have another contemplation, then you might get it,' the master commanded.

When Chung-kuan took up residence at the Kuang-hui ssu in Lan-chou (Lan-hsien) in 1214, Hai-yün went with him. At that time a disastrous famine occurred in the area and Hai-yün was forced to seek donations by lecturing on Buddhist scriptures. Not only was he thus able to support his master, but he even managed to assist victims of the famine. When this was reported to the Chin court, Emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-23) conferred on Hai-yün the title of Great Master of Unimpaired Profundity and Extensive Kindness in recognition of his merits.

Hai-yün's achievements during the second quarter of the 13th century rested largely on his connection with the Mongol authorities at Yen-ching (Peking). The date of his first contact with the Mongols has been disputed, however. Earlier scholars dated the event to 1214, following the *Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai* which states that the monk saw Činggis Qan in Lan-chou and made personal contact with him there. But the Japanese scholar Iwai Hirosato (Daikai) has correctly pointed out that neither the qan nor the Mongol army were at Lan-chou at the time. The inscription of 1255 indicates that the date of Hai-yün's first encounter with the Mongols was actually 1219, when Lan-chou was taken by Muqali (q.v.). On the eve of the city's submission, Chung-kuan feared for the future of his young disciple and at one point advised him to flee for his life. He said, 'I am an old monk, it would be natural if I were to die in this war. You, however, are still young and you should therefore try to escape the disaster.' Touched by this attention, Hai-yün wept and said, 'Cause and effect are the same, life and death are a matter of destiny. How can I abandon my own teacher at this critical moment? What will I tell our old friends when I meet them afterwards, assuming that I make my escape?' He also reminded the master that they were monks who had renounced worldly life, and consequently should not be troubled by matters of life and death. Moved in turn by the filial sentiments of Hai-yün, Chung-kuan said, 'As your mind is made up, I believe that your future lies in the north. You and I should obey the will of Heaven and go to the north together.'

When Lan-chou fell to the Mongols and most of the population fled in terror, two Chinese generals in the Mongol service, Shih T'ien-hsiang (a cousin of Shih T'ien-tse, q.v.) and Li Ch'i-ko (i.e. Li Shou-hsien, 1189-1234), were in charge of the operations under Muqali's command. As they entered the ravaged town, they saw Chung-kuan and Hai-yün who were moving about totally unconcerned. On being asked whether they were not afraid of being killed by the troops, Hai-yün calmly replied that, on the contrary, they relied on their protection, whereupon he introduced his master. Muqali was so impressed by their behavior that he forthwith wrote a report about them to Činggis Qan, who was then in Central Asia at the outset of his invasion of Khwārazm.

Under Muqali's protection, Chung-kuan and Hai-yün proceeded to the north as planned, and after several months' travelling through war-torn areas of Shansi and Hopei, they arrived at Ch'ih-ch'eng in Hopei. There they were received as guests in the house of a family named Chang. While they were staying in Ch'ih-ch'eng, Muqali received instructions from Činggis Qan to the effect that the two monks, being truly 'speakers to Heaven' were to be fed, clothed and treated well, and were to be regarded as *darqan*, i.e. as Mongol freemen, exempted from taxes and corvée. Consequently, Muqali invited Chung-kuan and Hai-yün to take up residence at the Hsiang-ch'üan ssu in Hsing-an (Hopei). He further bestowed religious titles on them, but Chung-kuan declined the honour and the two monks became known simply as the Senior Venerable and the Junior Venerable respectively.

Old age (Chung-kuan was about sixty at the time), the hardships of travel and the loss of familiar surroundings must all have contributed to hasten Chung-kuan's death in the summer of 1220. The loss of his master was undoubtedly a blow to the young disciple. Hai-yün arranged the funeral, begged for food and saw to the pagoda in which Chung-kuan was buried. One night Hai-yün dreamed that he was ordered by a spirit to leave Hsing-an and settle elsewhere. Hai-yün followed those alleged instructions and began his search for a new abode.

He travelled south in 1221. While stopping overnight at a place called Sung-p'u, the monk attained enlightenment on seeing sparks flying from a piece of struck flint. He touched his face with his hands and exclaimed, 'Today for the first time I realise that eyebrows run horizontally while the nose is set vertically. Only now I am aware of the fact that the old and learned monks in the world do not talk in their sleep!' As usual in Ch'an Buddhist tradition, the exact meaning of Hai-yün's exclamation is unintelligible because religious experience is always subjective and subtle. One may guess from Hai-yün's exclamation that he had discovered his own true identity for the first time. In other words, from physical features like eyebrows and nose, he had finally come to realise that he was himself the object, as well as the subject, of his religious quest. In the past he might have lectured on Buddhist doctrine or sat in meditation, yet he probably never identified the practice and the goal with himself here and now. The flashing sparks seemed to suggest that, though different in essence to the stone, sparks and flint are not unrelated. Once the distinction of object and subject is overcome, one gains a new outlook upon all things. And, although still active in the world of common sense, one is no longer confused thereafter by external objects and inner feelings.

The morning after his enlightenment Hai-yün travelled to Ching-chou and visited the monk Pen-wu Hsüan, who asked him where he came from. Hai-yün replied, 'The clouds have cleared away from the dark valley.' 'Where will you go from here?' said

Hsüan. 'The moon shines over the tall pines,' Hai-yün replied. Hsüan acknowledged Hai-yün's answers with a nod and said, 'Mr. Meng the eighth has gone in the same manner.' Hai-yün then went away saying 'Yes, yes....'

Puzzling conversations between host and guest like the one above are an important feature of Ch'an Buddhism, following immediately on a person's claim to have attained enlightenment. In the present case, the questions asked by the host were commonsensical as well as spiritual. But the answers were altogether in the spiritual mode. 'The clouds have cleared away from the dark valley' seems to mean that the guest has had his experience of enlightenment and is completely free from doubts. 'The moon shines over the tall pines' might describe the state of the enlightened mind. The deepest doubts, any more than tall trees, cannot keep out the light. The host's nod indicated understanding and acceptance of the claim, meaning that Hai-yün's enlightenment had now been acknowledged.

The same Buddhist source claims that while passing through Chü-chou, Hai-yün met a scholar named Chang Tzu-chen. 'Reverend, why don't you settle down in a temple instead of coming to this town?' asked Chang. Hai-yün replied, 'When there is none in the river, one must get his fish from the market.' This shows that, having become his own master, the monk went in search of whatever he needed without being restrained by any worldly convention.

Important though they were, those encounters were no substitute for the status accruing from recognition by Hai-yün's own school. Unacknowledged by that authority, Hai-yün's position in the tradition would remain questionable. Consequently Hai-yün went to Yen-ching and visited master Chung-ho (d. 1232), a junior clerical brother of the late Master Chung-kuan. The night before Hai-yün's arrival, Chung-ho dreamt that a monk entering the monastery made straight for the great hall and sat on the 'lion throne.' Thereupon, he told the brother in charge of visitors, 'Today there may be a visiting monk. Should he come, bring the visitor to me.' When Hai-yün arrived, and was led to Chung-ho, the old master thought, 'This is the monk whom I saw in my dream.' As the two Ch'an masters faced each other, a dramatic conversation immediately ensued. Hai-yün said, 'I came here unintentionally. How are we going to proceed with our meeting?' Chung-ho replied, 'If you are meditating, then you should continue your meditation. But if you have woken up, as you claim, then you should not play games with me!' 'While striking a flint I saw flying sparks, and realised that eyebrows run horizontally whereas a nose is set vertically,' Hai-yün said. 'My position is different,' said the master. 'How do you justify that?' Hai-yün asked. The master said, 'Teeth are a mouthful of bones, and ears are two pieces of skin.' 'I thought you had something else in mind,' said Hai-yün.

'Wrong! Wrong!' yelled the master; and Hai-yün screamed back, 'The bandit is soundly defeated!' Thereupon the master withdrew.

The two monks met again the next day, and Chung-ho mentioned a *kung-an* (a 'theme' for Ch'an meditation), which said that when the heads of two monasteries met, all they did was shout at each other. Master Lin-chi (I-hsüan, d. 866) was asked whether the roles of host and guest could still be assumed in such circumstances. Lin-chi answered that they could. 'What does this story mean?' asked Chung-ho. Hai-yün replied with a four-line poem:

The old mirror of the Ch'in period is shattered,
But the ancient awl remains polished and sharp.
The dragon flies beyond the clouds.
Why should one toil, hammering at (this question)?

'This considers only the opportunity (*chi*), but it ignores function (*yung*),' commented Chung-ho. Hai-yün at once overturned a meditation couch. The master said, 'You may be enjoying the trip, but you have not reached home yet!' Hai-yün struck his host and said, 'You are the ghost of a thousand-year-old fox. To know you is worthless!' 'You have only understood function, but not yet substance (*i*),' commented Chung-ho. Whereupon Hai-yün stepped forward and said:

The blue mountain rises above the wintry scene,
Moonlight brightens a stream of clouds.

Chung-ho observed: 'You have grasped only substance, but not yet wisdom (*chih/prajñā*)'. Hai-yün immediately responded with another verse:

Water flows east and west,
Falling flowers fly in any direction.

The master commented, 'You may be clever enough in conversation, but that is irrelevant to essence.' Hai-yün raised his fist and clapped his hands, which shook the room. Chung-ho finally said, 'So it is, so it is!' Hai-yün immediately withdrew. The next day, he was appointed secretary to Chung-ho.

Whereas the above conversation is not recorded in the 1255 inscription, it seems authentic enough, for the inscription confirms that in the first meeting between Hai-yün and Chung-ho 'there were questions and answers, and the two monks were in deep agreement on many points.'

The conversation mentioned above is not only relevant to Hai-yün's career and spiritual attainment, it is also one of the rare documents relating to Lin-chi Buddhism during the Yüan period. Scholars of Ch'an Buddhism often make too much of the unconventional behaviour and arcane sayings cultivated by the tradition's followers. Some even consider that these features were the school's only characteristics. As far as the present document is concerned, it is true that both traits are much in evidence,

yet the tradition seems in essence more systematic and more poetic than it has received credit for. It also appears that this poetic quality later became a prominent attribute of Ch'an Buddhism. There is no doubt that verbal and physical exchanges such as those reported above conveyed deep meanings. By means of verbal exchanges and gestures, Master Chung-ho had verified Hai-yün's claim of enlightenment. The process had begun with the mention of 'opportunity,' progressing by way of 'function' and 'substance' to the end-point of 'wisdom.' The unwritten rules of the 'repartee test' were evidently well understood by the initiated, as were the other symbolic gestures that accompanied the dialogue.

Hai-yün's association with Chung-ho is the most important event in the young monk's career since it meant that his religious attainment had been authoritatively tested and recognised. Hai-yün thus became the protégé of a renowned and influential master, who also happened to be the abbot of a very flourishing monastery. Most importantly, that monastery was located in the political and cultural centre of north China. During his stay there, the young secretary was tested again and again by Chung-ho, and always responded worthily. One day he told Hai-yün, 'You have now reached the stage of great peace and joy. You should preserve it with care and skill.' With these words, he gave Hai-yün the robe and a poem as symbols of transmission of the patriarchal authority.

Having thus been designated by the master as his spiritual heir, Hai-yün became the leader of the school and, as such, was extremely active in the region. In 1222 he was appointed abbot of the Lin-chi temple, the Jen-chih ssu, at Hsing-chou (Hopei). The following year, he was invited by the chief officials of the Yen-ching district, as well as by other noble and powerful local families, to lecture at the Ch'ing-shou ssu, one of the most important temples in Yen-ching. At the same time, he ruled the Hsing-kuo ssu at I-chou, but withdrew to the eastern peak of Shih-ching Mountain (in Fang-shan, Hopei) when unrest broke out at I-chou.

During the autumn of 1224, Bōl (Muqali's son, who had succeeded to his father in 1223; see Biography No. 1) invited Hai-yün to be the founding abbot of the Yung-ch'ing ssu at Hsing-an. Hai-yün accepted the position and managed the new establishment brilliantly. Within a period of less than three years, it became a great centre with a membership of thousands. Bōl was impressed and thereafter requested the monk to travel to various places, notably to the island of Liao-yang (in the southern part of Liaoning), to offer incense and prayers for the welfare of the empire. Hai-yün paid his respects to the ancestral tomb of his teacher Chung-ho when he passed I-chou (I-hsien, Liaoning) en route to Liao-yang.

Hai-yün's connection with high officials and his proven ability in the management of religious affairs made him one of the most outstanding Buddhist

leaders in north China. His brilliance caught the eye of the Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), then a chief secretary-astrologer at the Mongol court and himself a Ch'an Buddhist of the Ts'ao-tung school. In 1228 Yeh-lü recommended that Hai-yün be appointed Chung-ho's successor as abbot of the Ch'ing-shou ssu, and the recommendation was accepted. This new position made Hai-yün the undisputed head of the local Buddhist congregation in Yen-ching. His reputation attracted more monks to the monastery, and the establishment was enlarged with splendid ornaments and new buildings. During his tenure as abbot, Hai-yün honoured his old master, Chung-ho, and had him comfortably accommodated in the West Hall, the customary residence of distinguished retired abbots.

Hai-yün returned as abbot to the Yung-ch'ing ssu at Hsing-an for a second term in 1230. The following year his association with the Mongol court developed further and, no doubt through the intercession of influential patrons like Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, he was granted honorary titles by Ögödei Qa'an (T'ai-tsung, r. 1229-1241) and his younger brother Tolui (d. 1232).

Hai-yün stayed at Hsing-an till June-July of 1232 when he received the news of his old master's death. He immediately returned to Yen-ching and made all the arrangements for the late abbot's funeral and burial. He then spent a short time at the K'ai-yüan ssu in P'ing-chou (Hopei) at the invitation of the regional commander Tabun (d. 1243), before returning to the Ch'ing-shou ssu in Yen-ching in the autumn of 1233. His sojourn in that city proved to be crucial to his career for he made connections there with the highest authorities in the Mongol bureaucracy.

At this time, Hsia-li (*Sariq), a high official, came to Yen-ching as 'chancellor' (*ch'eng-hsiang*) under instructions from Ögödei. As Hsia-li had already heard of Hai-yün's reputation, he asked the surveillance commissioner Turqaq to accompany him on a visit to the monk. Hai-yün addressed the officials and also preached the Pure Commandments to them. There might have been ulterior motives for this call, as hinted by the text of the inscription reporting the event. Indeed, the source states also that, following this meeting, the monk received a letter from the Qa'an, which 'discounted the frequently reported rumours.' Thereafter, the buildings of the monastery were reserved exclusively for Buddhist rites.

Sometime after their first meeting, Hsia-li organised a religious ceremony at which Hai-yün was to act as master. Hai-yün took the opportunity to inform Hsia-li of complaints according to which the latter dealt harshly with his subordinates and inspired much fear among the populace. Hai-yün pleaded that 'the people of Yen-ching have just experienced great misfortunes; only a handful of men have survived the long siege of the city.... (Their situation) resembles the grass and plants left after a harsh frost: they can only revive under the warm sun of spring.' He argued further

that 'people are the foundation of a country; how can a country be a country if there are no people? If Your Excellency is willing to provide the money for this ceremony to honour the Buddha, he should also follow the Lord's way in improving the lot of the people....' Hsia-li took Hai-yün's advice and other officials praised the master for it.

Among the officials whom Hai-yün came to know at Yen-ching, Šigi Qutuqu (*ca.* 1180-1260) (*q.v.*) was the most influential, being the powerful *Jarquči* ('judge, arbitrator') for north China. Because the 1255 inscription is damaged, the time and circumstances of Hai-yün's association with Šigi Qutuqu are not certain. Yet a fragment of the inscription suggests that the connection was somehow related to the monk's meeting with Hsia-li. It reports that sometime after that meeting, Šigi Qutuqu asked Hai-yün how he should deal with a plague of locusts that was ravaging the region. Hai-yün answered that the situation required a concerted approach combining official policies and popular support. When Šigi Qutuqu consulted him about hunting, a popular pastime among the Mongols, the monk observed that the most urgent task of officials was to preserve human lives, and not to indulge in such games as hunting and horse riding. He also insisted that reward and punishment should be guided by humanity and selflessness.

Although Hai-yün's advice was not necessarily always followed, his relationship with Šigi Qutuqu no doubt served to enhance his influence. When K'ung Yüan-ts'u (1181-*ca.* 1252), a fifty-first generation descendant of Confucius, found himself in trouble, Hai-yün was able to help, thanks to his influence with the Mongols. K'ung had inherited the title of Yen-sheng kung or Duke of Overflowing Sageliness from his father in 1190, an honour accorded by the Chin ruler as a gesture of patronage to Confucianism. When the Mongol army captured the Chin's southern capital, Pien (K'ai-feng), in 1232, K'ung lost his position and became a refugee. During that time, Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), the distinguished Chin literatus, wrote to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai urging him to select talented scholars and notables from among the refugees for employment in the new government. He produced a list of fifty-four eminent individuals and K'ung was one of them. Yeh-lü accepted the suggestion and consequently had K'ung engaged in the service of the Mongol administration, restoring his hereditary title and privileges by imperial edict.

According to the Buddhist sources, K'ung Yüan-ts'u left K'ai-feng and fled to his native Ch'ü-fu, in Shantung, where he obtained a letter of introduction from the Chinese overlord, general Yen Shih (*q.v.*). He then called on Hai-yün at Yen-ching. The monk welcomed Yüan-ts'u and put his case to Šigi Qutuqu. During their interview, Hai-yün stressed the centuries-old contribution that the Confucian tradition had made to the government of China. Although the tradition itself predated

Confucius, the latter's compilation of the Classics had brought Confucian teaching into high esteem by rulers and common folk alike. It also made ministers, scholars and commoners aware and mindful of their respective positions. Hai-yün praised Confucius as a sage of divine birth, very learned in ancient culture, who had taught the great Way of justice, setting the norm of human relationships. For these reasons, Confucius' descendants through fifty-one generations had continuously been honoured with the title of Duke of Overflowing Sageliness by all those who ruled the country. That was also why sacrifices to Confucius had never ceased in the past. The grand judge heard the argument and accepted it; he restored K'ung's title and had the sacrifices to Confucius resumed soon after.

Further, Hai-yün requested that the descendants of Yen Hui (521-490 B.C.) and Mencius (372-289 B.C.) be exempted from labour service as students of the Confucian Classics, and therefore persons contributing to the public good. This request was also granted.

Although Hai-yün was instrumental in the restoration of privileges to Confucian families, his contribution is ignored by the compilers of the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) and by some modern scholars. The evidence from Buddhist sources is quite substantial, however. It seems that at the time of the collapse of the Chin dynasty, K'ung Yüan-ts'u had sought help from different quarters. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had supported him at court, while Hai-yün pressed his cause at Yen-ching.

Notwithstanding his assistance to the Confucian élite, Hai-yün's main concern remained naturally with his own religion. His most important contribution to the Buddhist community of Yen-ching relates to the examinations for the clergy.

The growth of the monastic population and its impact on the economy was a touchy problem under most dynasties in imperial China, and the Mongols were no exception. As early as 1229/30, i.e. immediately after Ögödei was elected to the throne, monks under the age of fifty were directed to undergo qualifying examinations. Those who failed would be disrobed, thus making them liable to normal taxation and corvée duties (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai). The matter reached a crisis in 1235, posing a serious threat to the Buddhist community in Yen-ching and causing great concern among Buddhist leaders, such as Wan-sung (Hsing-hsiu, 1166-1246), the prominent head of the Ts'ao-tung school of Ch'an in north China and former teacher of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. In discussing the matter with Hai-yün, Wan-sung argued that an examination of the monks at that particular time would be disastrous as religious lectures had been interrupted because of the war and most of the monks were in fact illiterate. It seems that Hai-yün himself was doubtful whether he could be of much help. He remarked that the proposed examination was an imperial decision and must therefore have been taken for good reasons. He also

observed that most monks 'had given little attention to the observance of commandments, neglected the learning of rituals, and lived in a manner that was far removed from the Way.' These words sound more like the statement of a government official justifying the proposed examination than the objections of an opponent.

Nevertheless, Hai-yün's opposition was clear and unambiguous when he discussed the matter with chancellor Hsia-li. The tone of the exchange between monk and official was very sharp. Hsia-li reiterated the government's decree that only such as were able to read the religious scriptures should be allowed clerical status. Hai-yün retorted, 'I am myself an uneducated monk. I never consult the scriptures and cannot read even a single word.' 'If you cannot read,' said the chancellor, 'how could you become an abbot?' The monk countered with another question: 'Is his Excellency the Grand Officer (i.e. Šigi Qutuqu) able to read?' The exchange took place in the presence of many officials, who were shocked by the master's aggressiveness. Hsia-li finally conceded and asked, 'How should we deal with this matter?' The master said, 'How can monks be examined like school boys? What the government should do is to accumulate merits by worshipping the Three Jewels (of Buddhism), thus paying respect to Heaven in order that the empire may be extended.' Nevertheless, the official decree prevailed. The examination of the clergy took place, but 'no candidate was failed.' Moreover, another imperial decree promulgated after the examination reaffirmed Činggis Qan's former edict to the effect that the Buddhist clergy should be exempt from taxation and corvée.

In 1236, according to a Buddhist source, the Mongols were thinking of branding people on the arm, as they branded horses. Hai-yün intervened and was successful in thwarting the project. He argued with Šigi Qutuqu that men were not cattle. They had made their peace and become subjects of the empire; anyway, where could they flee to, since the whole world belonged to the Mongols? The proposal was dropped.

In addition to these activities, Hai-yün fulfilled a number of appointments in various monasteries. In 1235 he became the abbot of the Lin-chi ssu at Chen-ting (Hopei), on the invitation of general Shih T'ien-tse, the overlord and commander of the region. It seems that Hai-yün did not really wish to leave Yen-ching, where he had more success and exerted greater influence on the Mongol government and the Buddhist community. But the monastery at Chen-ting was the Founder's Temple of the Lin-chi school of Ch'an Buddhism, and consequently a place of pilgrimage; furthermore, Shih T'ien-tse was a powerful man. The invitation was finally accepted. Having taken charge of the monastery, Hai-yün restored the buildings to their original splendour, while still remaining abbot of the monastery at Yen-ching. He also became the head priest of the Chu-lin ssu sometime before 1237. He rebuilt that temple, but did not reside there for long. After putting its affairs in order, he had

himself replaced as abbot by one of his disciples, whereupon he travelled to the coast and the islands.

According to the *Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai*, Hai-yün received the title of Eminent Scholar, Brilliant Heavenly Guardian of the State, from Činggis Qan's Second Empress (? Qulan Qatun) in 1237. Although this event is confirmed in another source, the date cannot be verified. In the autumn of 1239, Hai-yün again became abbot of the Ch'ing-shou ssu. Two years later, monks from another Ch'an establishment offered their house to Hai-yün as a place for the master's retirement. Hai-yün was not even forty at the time, so the offer seems to have been meant essentially as a sign of respect. Nevertheless, Hai-yün accepted it and left the Ch'ing-shou ssu. On the eve of his departure, he called the senior monks together and explained the problems involved in managing the monastery through the current difficult decade. He besought them to work together to safeguard it and to appoint none but virtuous abbots.

Hai-yün's reputation and accomplishments finally came to the attention of Qubilai, then an ambitious young prince of the Mongol royal family, who summoned the monk to his camp at Qara Qorum in 1242. Hai-yün responded and gained audience with the prince. Two significant points emerged from this meeting: firstly, Hai-yün's interview with Qubilai began a continuing rapport with the future qa'an and his family. Secondly, Hai-yün's introduction of Liu Ping-chung (q.v.) to Qubilai contributed indirectly towards the establishment of the Yüan dynasty and its capital city Ta-tu (Daidu).

There are two versions of this encounter with Qubilai. According to the Buddhist records, the first question asked by the prince was whether Buddhism offered a way to achieve peace for the world. Hai-yün replied that Buddhism contained the *dharmadhātu* and nourished the four classes of living beings. Thus, Buddhism encompassed the entire universe, the world 'within the four seas' being merely a fraction of it. He told the prince that the prosperity of the empire was dependent on the happiness of the people, whose feelings were shaped by the policies of the government and by Heaven. Both Heaven and man impinged on the mind, though most people did not distinguish the two influences. In order to apply the law of Buddhism effectively, the distinction between Heaven and man should be understood. As far as the Buddhist view of man's role was concerned, 'its principle is discussed in the *Wang-fa cheng-lun p'in* (i.e. the *Devendra-samaya*). The principle is explicit, it is neither easy nor difficult; the problem is whether Your Highness is willing to practise it.' The monk also advised Qubilai to engage men of great virtue and Confucian learning, and to question them about the flourishing and the decline of dynasties. He

was sure that the prince would obtain useful answers from such scholars and worthy men.

The next question asked by Qubilai concerned the relative position of the Three Teachings of China, viz. Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism. The question consisted of three parts: which one of the three was the most esteemed? Which was the supreme law? And which priests were the most exalted? 'Our Buddha is the supreme sage among all holy men,' Hai-yün replied; 'the Buddhist Law is the most worthy; and among priests only Buddhist monks are sincere. Buddhism, therefore, occupies the highest position among the Three Teachings.' He also claimed that this had been acknowledged since ancient times.

Hai-yün's interview seems to have been very successful; the prince received the Bodhisattva-ordination for the lay observant, by which the latter pledged himself to follow the Commandments of the Great Vehicle. The prince bestowed a silk robe with jewellery ornaments on the master and treated him with the regard due to a teacher. The empress (Töregene Qatun), who was then holding the regency, was pleased with the monk and instructed the court to respect the order of precedence established by Činggis Qan, according to which Buddhist monks ranked first in court status, and Taoist priests were forbidden to stand above them.

The prince also enquired about the practice of Buddhist Law (Dharma). Hai-yün advised that it was difficult to achieve a receptive state of mind and goodness. As both conditions had already been acknowledged by the prince, they should be carefully nurtured henceforward. Having received the Commandments, the prince should find no fault with Buddhism. He should also promote the well-being of all men; diligently suppress evil; be just in reward and punishment; appoint virtuous men and be receptive to their remonstrances. The monk concluded that to accomplish those things at all times was to practise the Dharma.

According to another source, the questions asked by Qubilai bore on two points, viz., the principle and the fruit, or effect, of Buddhism; and the difference between the law for those who renounce the world and the law for those who remain in the world, in other words, for monks and for laymen. In answer to these questions, Hai-yün said that the Dharma covered everything. It was neither pure nor impure, neither living nor dead. In view of this, how could there be any difference as to whether one had renounced the world or one had chosen to remain in it? The master claimed that the Dharma supports heaven and earth, and makes the sun and the moon shine. At the level of mankind, it entailed 'governing without action' on the part of the emperor, the loyal service of princes to the sovereign, and filial piety towards parents. Therefore, the prince should promote virtue; relieve men's suffering; resist delusions; accept rightful orders and good advice; shun extravagance; and never make improper

utterances. He should worship Buddha by achieving contentment. He should always distinguish right from wrong. If matters arose about which he ought to speak frankly, then he should do so even at the risk of incurring his superior's displeasure.

The main difference between the two versions of the conversation between the monk and the prince is that in the former Hai-yün valued his own religion far above the others, and advised Qubilai accordingly. By contrast, the latter version lays stress on the oneness of the principle ruling both clergy and laymen. The latter version is syncretic. Phrases like 'governing without action' and 'achieving contentment' are well-known Taoist terms; and expressions such as 'loyal services to the sovereign and filial piety towards parents' are obviously Confucian. Here, the Buddhist elements, though strong, are much less evident than in the former account. Both versions derived probably from the same original report, of which each came to stress a different aspect. As far as the monk's religious attitudes are concerned, he seemed more liberal than most of his colleagues. Yet this open-mindedness did not preclude a preference for his own religious commitment.

Hai-yün's relations with Qubilai and his recommendation of Liu Ping-chung raise an interesting question. There is no doubt that it was on the master's recommendation that Liu joined the staff of the Mongol prince, though the connection between the monk and Liu was more casual than most historians have made out. Liu was originally a disciple of Hsü-chao (1196-1252), a master of the Ts'ao-tung school of Ch'an Buddhism. Liu followed Hsü-chao to the Nan-t'ang ssu, the great monastery at Yün-chung (Shansi). It seems that Hsü-chao left Yün-chung after a short stay, but Liu remained behind and somehow became associated with K'o-an Lang, a senior disciple of Hai-yün. When the latter was summoned by Qubilai, he met Liu at Yün-chung en route to Qubilai's camp. Hai-yün was impressed by the young monk's broad learning and quick wit, and he invited Liu to join his party (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung). This indicates that the master had not known Liu previously, and could have had no intention of including him among his travelling companions. Hai-yün and Liu's relation as master and disciple seems therefore to have been limited to the duration of the journey.

After arriving at the camp and meeting the prince, the monk declined a royal request to stay on and returned to Yen-ching, while Liu became a member of Qubilai's staff. Although their contact had been brief, it proved significant to both men. For Hai-yün, the recruitment of such a talented youth represented a signal service to Qubilai; having a disciple at the centre of political power provided a means of exercising continuing influence on the course of events. As for Liu, he would gain authority from the protection of such a prominent and influential master.

Hai-yün took advantage of his new association with the royal family to reconstruct and enlarge the Ch'ing-shou ssu, to which he had returned. The main hall, the library and other buildings of the temple complex were either renovated or rebuilt. Among those who made donations to support the project were the two princes, Möge and *Širegi.

The royal connection remained strong during the years following the meeting. When Prince Jingim was born in 1243, Hai-yün had the honour of naming the infant, which he did, performing a ceremony which amounted to a Buddhist baptism. The name he conferred on the infant was Chen-chin 'True Gold' (>Mo. Jingim). Qubilai offered the master a hat made of pearls in 1244; and on Töregene's request, the master performed a religious ceremony at Wu-t'ai shan in 1245, for the country's welfare. The empress again summoned the master to Qara Qorum in 1246, but he had to turn back to Yen-ching after taking sick half-way through the journey.

In 1247 Hai-yün was ordered by the newly enthroned emperor, Güyük (Ting-tsung; r. 1246-1248), to take charge of all Buddhist affairs in north China. A gift of ten thousand ounces of silver was bestowed on the master by the emperor for conducting a religious ceremony at the Hao-t'ien ssu to ensure the welfare of the empire. Soon after, Ögödei's fourth son, Qaračar, invited Hai-yün to Qara Qorum. The master complied and was accommodated at the T'ai-p'ing hsing-kuo monastery.

Güyük died in March-April of the following year. The monk was again invited to conduct an appropriate ceremony. He had copied the (*Ta-ch'eng*) *San-chü-chieh*, a Buddhist text on monastic discipline, in his own blood. An inscription confirms this, adding that the master copied the book using as ink blood from his own hands mixed with gold powder. Sixteen copies were made and distributed to different monasteries in the country as a means of safeguarding the empire. This act was appreciated by the empress, Oğul Qaimiș, who bestowed a robe on the monk and honoured him with the title of Master of the Sect; she requested him to continue teaching and praying for the good of the empire. In the meantime, he resigned as abbot of the Ch'ing-shou ssu, to be succeeded by one of his disciples.

Hai-yün visited Yün-chung again in 1250 and had several ruined monasteries repaired. The master's career reached its high point when Möngke was elected as qa'an in 1251. Möngke reconfirmed Hai-yün as superintendent of Buddhist Affairs in north China, and renewed the previous emperors' edicts exempting monks and nuns from taxation and corvée. However, the situation changed abruptly the following year, with Hai-yün relinquishing his position in favour of his disciple Chih-lang. Such a decision on Hai-yün's part was no doubt prompted by the Mongol court's appointment in 1252 (in rather obscure circumstances) of the Tibetan lama Na-mo as

general administrator of Buddhist Affairs – signifying a definite switch from Chinese (Ch'an) Buddhism to Tibetan Lamaism at Qara Qorum.

Hai-yün's interests then began to turn increasingly towards the expansion of the monastic establishment, with a view to perpetuating the traditions of his school. To that effect, he expanded the P'u-chi Ch'an-ssu into a large monastery. This time the cost of the project was entirely defrayed by the master and his disciples. Even the materials and furnishings were supplied and made by members of the clergy. The construction was completed within less than half a year. When Qubilai was informed of this, he renamed the monastery Hai-yün Ch'an-ssu.

In May-June of 1252, Hai-yün was again summoned by Qubilai to his camp, which was then at Chin-lien ch'uan on the Shan-tien River (Inner Mongolia), north-west of Peking. Qubilai was genuinely fond of Hai-yün, and he was at the time also deeply involved in the affairs of China. Qubilai questioned him about the 'ultimate meaning' (*ti-i*) of Buddhism. The monk told the prince that good government and peace were paramount, and that in his leisure time he should investigate 'the original mind of Buddha and the Patriarchs.' Apparently, Qubilai and his entourage were impressed by Hai-yün's discourse, and showed him great respect and devotion.

On 16 October 1255, a stele with an important commemorative inscription in honour of Hai-yün was erected in the Ch'ing-shou ssu at Yen-ching. The event was unusual, since such tributes were normally posthumous. This inscription, still extant although badly damaged, constitutes the earliest authoritative document on the monk's career. Its inauguration coincided with the victory of the Buddhists, led by Hai-yün's confrère Fu-yü (1203-75), in the first round of the Buddho-Taoist confrontation which had erupted that year after three decades of acrimonious debates and mutual accusations. The edict condemning the Taoists had in fact been issued only two weeks before, on 30 October, from Möngke's camp in Mongolia.

On New Year's day (29 January) of 1256, Hai-yün conducted a ceremony for the welfare of the state at the Hao-t'ien ssu. The next day he was paralysed by a stroke, from which he had partially recovered by the following summer. Prince Širegi sent a message with the gift of a golden staff and of precious material for a robe, requesting in return a copy of Hai-yün's 'religious discourse' (*fa-yü*). These discourses may well be the 'recorded sayings' (*yü-lu*) of Hai-yün, which were compiled before 1255 (they are mentioned in the Ch'ing-shou ssu inscription) and circulated under the title of *Tsa-tu hai* or *The Ocean of Sundry Poisons*. This is the only known work of Hai-yün and it does not seem to have survived, unfortunately.

Realising that the end was near, Hai-yün gave instructions soon after for the safe-keeping of some of his personal property and for appropriate funeral arrangements.

On 18 May 1257, he urged that a painting be made of a storm at sea on the west wall of the Hua-yen ssu, where he was staying at the time. The next day, having chanted a hymn, he requested his companions to be silent for he wished to rest. The monk in attendance immediately reported this to the abbot, but Hai-yün was dead by the time the high priest had run to his side. He was fifty-four years old. Although no sources indicate where the Hua-yen ssu was situated, it seems that it was the one at Yün-chung. Hai-yün was cremated in a great ceremony attended by many dignitaries. His ashes were brought back to the Ch'ing-shou ssu to be enshrined, for the most part in a pagoda at the south-west corner of the compound. The rest of the ashes was distributed among the seven temples with which Hai-yün had been connected. The posthumous title of Buddha-Sun, Perfectly Enlightened Great Patriarch was conferred on the late master.

Ten years later, when the new capital Ta-tu was being built north-east of the old Yen-ching, a plot of land, 46 metres in circumference, was allocated for the master's memorial pagoda next to the Ch'ing-shou ssu and within the city walls. Another title was conferred on him in 1314, elevating him posthumously to the rank of National Teacher (*kuo-shih*). This makes Hai-yün the only Chinese monk to have been honoured with such an exalted title by the Yüan court, all other National Teachers being of non-Han origin. On that occasion, the pagoda was repaired and a new inscription, the text of which had been composed by the academician Ch'eng Chü-fu (1249-1318), was erected on the site by imperial command.

Hai-yün's activities were twofold, monastic and secular. His contribution to Buddhism consists essentially in the strengthening of Lin-chi Ch'an Buddhism in north China. His authority over that school as its sixteenth generation patriarch has been acknowledged by the Buddhist historians, who also stress his role in the great flourishing that the Lin-chi school experienced in Yen-ching/Ta-tu in the Yüan period. His achievements as a leader are demonstrated by the great number of temples under his jurisdiction, and by the fact that he was twice abbot of the Yung-ch'ing ssu and three times abbot of the Ch'ing-shou ssu. As the undisputed head of Chinese Buddhists in Yen-ching and north China at the time, Hai-yün was able to negotiate with the Mongol authorities also on behalf of his Ts'ao-tung confrères over the delicate matter of Buddhist privileges, and it was thanks to him that the proposed examination for the Buddhist clergy was tactfully forgotten. He was also responsible for the construction and repair of numerous temples: this achievement was all the more remarkable since it not only took place during the troubled decades following the Mongol conquest of north China, but was carried out in the face of overt hostility from Taoist quarters.

Hai-yün's contribution to the welfare of the common people of north China seems even more impressive, especially during the transition from Chin to Mongol rule. His repeated representations to the Mongol authorities certainly persuaded the conquerors to lighten their grip on the vanquished. He promoted the revival of Chinese traditional culture and values by helping scholars like K'ung Yüan-ts'u, and by introducing to Qubilai the former Buddhist monk Liu Ping-chung, who was to become one of the most influential advisers at the Mongol court. His ecclesiastical services to the Mongol authorities in Yen-ching, and his numerous converts and friendly relations with the imperial family gained Hai-yün much respect and prestige.

Hai-yün is not noted as an outstanding thinker, but the fragmentary reports of his conversations that have reached us suggest that he has probably been underestimated by later scholars. As a religious teacher, Hai-yün was inspired by the tenets and methods of his school, with emphasis on 'no dependence on the four modes of observance,' and reliance on personal effort. His philosophical outlook displays a Buddhō-Confucian approach characteristic of Sung period syncretism, with much emphasis placed on good government and the welfare of the people. These 'liberal' attitudes should not be interpreted as a sign of his weakness in the Buddhist faith: they flow naturally from the concept of the One or Universal Mind. According to Hai-yün, the Dharma is ultimately the same for the layfolk and for such as have withdrawn from the world, although there may be differences of practice. The Universal Mind is known also as the Buddha-nature, which permeates and embraces everything. In everyday terms, Ch'an Buddhists saw no conflict between their doctrine and those of other philosophical schools; but on the transcendental plane, Buddhists claimed of course that only through their religion can one achieve ultimate enlightenment. In this broader conception, not only could Hai-yün acknowledge Confucianism's particular contribution to the order of family and government, but he was even able to accommodate some Taoist concepts such as 'non-action' or 'rest in contentment' without invalidating the basic Ch'an teaching. A very similar outlook was held by his contemporary, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, and other prominent lay Buddhists.

Hai-yün had many disciples, of whom the 1255 inscription lists the principal. Only one, Hsi-yün An, was to achieve later fame in his own right: he was abbot of the Ch'ing-shou ssu towards the end of the thirteenth century and was honoured with an inscription written by the eminent painter and man of letters, Chao Meng-fu (1254-1322). The temple itself was a landmark of Peking for centuries. It was popularly known as Shuang-t'a ssu, or Twin-Pagodas Temple, because the relics-pagodas (*stūpas*) of Hai-yün and his disciple Chih-lang were both built inside the temple compound. The old site of the temple was located in West Ch'ang-an Street; unfortunately the temple with the pagodas was demolished when the street was

broadened in 1955. A number of relics related to Hai-yün were discovered in his pagoda and they have been preserved in the Capital Museum (Shou-tu po-wu-kuan). The inscription of 1255 was moved to the Fa-yüan ssu, where it still is.

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Y.H. Jan

PART TWO

THE PERIOD OF QUBILAI AND HIS RULE

(1260/1271-1294)

ADVISERS AND ADMINISTRATORS

16. LIU PING-CHUNG (1216-1274)

Liu Ping-chung, who rose from humble Buddhist novice to become principal adviser of Qubilai and leader of the Chinese literati serving at the Mongol court, was born in Hsing-t'ai, Hsing-chou (renamed Shun-te in 1262), Hopei in 1216 in the reign of the Chin emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-1224). He came from a prominent landlord family originally from Jui-chou in Liaoning. His forebears had held various official appointments under the Liao emperors and continued to serve under the Chin rulers. His great-grandfather once served the Chin as vice commanding prefect of Hsing-chou, and since his grandfather's time the family had settled there, adopting the place as their seat. His father Liu Jun (d. 1246), a gifted musician and capable administrator, submitted to the Mongols in 1220 when Muqali (*q.v.*) overran Hsing-chou, and served in the Marshal's Administration established by the Mongol conquerors. He was later appointed general controller, then acting registrar of Hsing-chou, and subsequently functioned served as superintendent of various government offices in Chü-lu and Nei-ch'iu counties in Hopei. Liu Jun married twice: his first wife née Ma gave birth to Liu Ping-chung, and his second wife née Chang bore him another son, Liu Ping-shu, who also had a successful official career under the Mongol rulers.

Liu Ping-chung was known by different names throughout his life, each marking a distinctive phase in his long career. On his birth, he was given the name K'an, T. Chung-hui, but when he became a Buddhist convert *ca.* 1238, he adopted the name Tzu-tsung and the accompanying appellation Ts'ang-ch'un, or Ts'ang-ch'un san(shang)-jen (The Venerable Ts'ang-ch'un). He retained these religious names after he entered the service of Qubilai around 1239, and only used the name Ping-chung after it was granted him as an honorific appellation by Qubilai in 1264.

A precocious child, Liu Ping-chung started his formal education in the local school at the age of seven and is said to have been capable of memorising several hundred characters a day – an historical chiché indicative of strong application to study. In that school he had among his classmates another boy from Hsing-chou, Chang Wen-ch'ien (*q.v.*), who later became his closest associate and a distinguished official under Qubilai Qa'an. During his teens, Liu Ping-chung already showed exceptional promise, outshining his companions by his leadership, resolute character

and carefree disposition. At the age of twelve, in 1228, an important event occurred in his life: his father Liu Jun was made registrar in Hsing-chou. According to the current regulations, he was required to send his son to the Marshal's Administration as a hostage. The local marshal was struck by Liu Ping-chung's appearance and, recognising his worth, let him pursue his studies instead of having him perform menial tasks as was usual for hostage sons.

Upon his father's retirement in 1232, Liu Ping-chung was freed and appointed scribe-secretary in the prefectural governor's administration, where he greatly impressed his peers with his ability and diligence. His new position gave him little satisfaction, however, and he soon tired of the routine. In 1236 his mother died and he took leave to attend her burial, which depressed him deeply. It is said that one day he grew so tired of his work that he threw away his brush and sighed, 'Life is so short, yet there is no end to worldly affairs'; thereupon he resigned his office and retreated to Mt. Wu-an, in Ch'ing-hua county north-east of Hsin-yang, Honan. (The *Yüan History* [*Yüan-shih*] biography records a different version of his remarks: 'The members of my family have enjoyed distinguished careers for generations, how can I languish as a clerk? A great man should withdraw and live in seclusion.')

There is no precise information on Liu Ping-chung's activities during his sojourn on Mt. Wu-an. One source claims that he met an extraordinary man there and began doing mathematics under him, but he most probably took up Taoist studies and practices, spending time with the followers of the syncretic Taoist Ch'üan-chen sect (see the biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi). He was discouraged from becoming a Taoist by his childhood friend Hao Chih-wen (1217-67), a Buddhist convert later known as monk P'u-an. On the latter's advice, Liu engaged in Buddhist studies and sought enlightenment from the monks in his vicinity. Before long, the renowned Ch'an monk of Khitan extraction, Hsü-chao (1196-1252), who was a patriarch of the Ts'ao-tung sect, arrived in Hsing-chou at the invitation of the local officials to become abbot of T'ien-ning monastery. Hearing of Liu Ping-chung's interest in Buddhism, he sent for him and took him as his disciple. Liu, then twenty-two years old, thus returned to his native place and entered the Buddhist church under the new name of Tzu-tsung. Because of his literary knowledge, he was put in charge of secretarial matters, while being instructed in the Buddhist religion by his master. This was the beginning of Liu Ping-chung's formal association with Ch'an Buddhism.

It is not certain what attracted Liu to Buddhism. Frustration with his early official career may partly account for his conversion and his interest in Buddhist philosophy, particularly Ch'an. His predilection for Ch'an Buddhism notwithstanding, Liu retained much interest in Taoist studies and practices, nor did his religious tendencies distract him from political events. He continued to show strong

sympathy with the Confucian ideal, and was eager to perpetuate it in his service of the state. There was, therefore, a significant element of syncretism in his intellectual orientation which he used to his advantage when he came to serve under Qubilai a decade later.

In autumn 1238 Hsing-chou was plagued by locusts, and Hsü-chao was forced to move to Yün-chung (Shansi), taking Liu Ping-chung with him, but he returned to Hsing-chou in the following year. Liu remained in Yün-chung where he took up residence in Nan-t'ang monastery. There he befriended a learned monk, K'o-an Lang, who was a senior disciple of the leading Ch'an master Hai-yün (*q.v.*) of the Lin-chi sect, and with him studied astrology, *Yin-Yang* philosophy, divination, geomancy and other pseudo-sciences. Hai-yün later passed through Yün-chung on his way to Qara Qorum where he was summoned by Qubilai for consultation on state affairs. Through his disciple he met Liu Ping-chung and, impressed by his erudition, invited Liu to accompany him on his northern journey.

His summons of Hai-yün in 1239 had important implications for Qubilai who, under the guidance of his mother Sorqaqtani Beki (d. 1252), was then coming to prominence at the Mongol court. Sorqaqtani had been allotted the territory of Chen-ting in Hopei by Ögödei in 1232, after the death of her husband Tolui. An astute and enlightened woman, she had employed Chinese scholar-officials with great success in the administration of her domain, and Qubilai was thus exposed to Chinese influence when still in his teens. He gradually became convinced of the advisability of enlisting the support of the literati in his bid for power. The invitation extended to Hai-yün and others to an audience in Qara Qorum was the first step taken to that effect.

Liu Ping-chung's association with Qubilai was the turning-point in his career. His service under Qubilai must have provided an excellent opportunity for him to realise his fervent aspiration of preserving the Confucian tradition. Despite his Buddhist outlook, Liu shared the anxiety of many religious leaders of the time, such as the Chüan-chen patriarch Ch'iu Ch'u-chi (*q.v.*) and the Ch'an master Hai-yün, regarding the long term effects of Mongol rule in China. By gaining Qubilai's confidence, he found the opportunity to play a major role in softening the rough edges of the Mongol administration and in perpetuating the Confucian heritage at a time when it was in real danger of collapse. In this preoccupation, he did not allow his religious beliefs to interfere with his commitment to defending the native tradition. In his private life he was attracted to Buddhism and Taoism, yet in his public career he was wholly dedicated to the ideal of modifying Mongol institutions according to Confucian principles, and he aspired to become an influential statesman under an enlightened ruler. This dual aspect of Liu Ping-chung is the key to our understanding of this extraordinary personality.

Upon their arrival in Qara Qorum, Hai-yün and his companions received a cordial welcome from Qubilai, for they were the first Chinese to accept his invitation to advise him on state affairs. In his audiences with Qubilai, Hai-yün frequently called upon Liu Ping-chung's resourcefulness. Liu responded with great competence for he was well-versed in the *Book of Changes*, astrology, mathematics, the calendar, music, geography, divination, and the different schools of ritual. Qubilai was particularly impressed by his knowledge of current events and insight into political matters. It is doubtful that Liu Ping-chung possessed a knowledge of spoken Mongolian, although the modern scholar Yüan Chi (see the Bibliography) suggests that he may have learned some from his teacher Hsü-chao, who, being a Khitan, should have been familiar with that language. In any event, it appears more likely that the conversation with Qubilai was conducted through an interpreter. The visitors were invited to stay, and when Hai-yün later departed because of old age, Liu Ping-chung became Qubilai's closest Chinese adviser. During the next few years he gained frequent access to Qubilai, offering counsel on statecraft and administration, and recommending several of his friends for official appointments, including his childhood classmate Chang Wen-ch'ien, Li Te-hui, and other men of talent.

In 1246 his father died, whereupon Liu begged for leave and arrived home in the following year. He spent the next three years in Hsing-t'ai observing the mourning period, studying and befriending local scholars and officials, until he was called back to Qara Qorum in spring of 1249. While on his way north, he took the opportunity to recruit several able people for Qubilai's service, including Ma Heng (1207-77), who later became an expert in fiscal administration; but little is known of Liu Ping-chung's activities until 1251, when a major change occurred in Qubilai's fortunes.

In July of that year, Möngke (1223-59), Qubilai's older brother, was elected to the Mongol qa'anate. Soon after, he delegated the administration of the conquered territories to his relatives and supporters and, because of Qubilai's experience, he put him in charge of the Chinese population south of Čila'un Mt. in present Inner Mongolia. Qubilai established his headquarters at Chin-lien ch'uan, i.e. on the Shan-tien River, and started organising the administration of the new domain in consultation with his advisers. Liu Ping-chung seized this opportunity to submit a lengthy memorial to Qubilai outlining a plan of government based on Confucian principles and traditional Chinese models.

Liu began his memorial with a reference to Confucian morality as expressed in the 'three bonds,' the 'five constant virtues' and the traditional institutions, pointing out that these were the basic principles of earlier successful governments. Turning to Mongol rule, Liu mentioned the famous dictum of Lu Chia to Han Kao-tsu (r. 202 - 195 B.C.), subsequently repeated by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (q.v.) to Ögödei Qa'an, that

'even though an empire may be conquered on horseback, it could not be administered on horseback.' Citing the example of the service rendered in ancient times by the Duke of Chou to his brother King Wu, Liu urged Qubilai to follow this example and serve his elder brother Möngke in such a way as to bring about an era of peace and prosperity. He then offered a detailed programme for the future Mongol government in China which included the following main points:

Firstly, the establishment of a hierarchical bureaucracy on the Chinese model with civil and military officials recruited on merit through regular channels. Secondly, the reduction of existing rates of taxation to normal levels (i.e. one-half or one-third of current quota) in order to encourage those that had fled to return to their homes and occupations. Thirdly, the introduction of legislation on scales of salary, prerogatives of officials and punishments for offences and abuses, and the formulation of a simplified code of law together with an impartial system of justice to enforce it. Fourthly, the partial remission of debts accumulated by the people, the elimination of irregular imposts and the introduction of standard units of weights and measures to facilitate business transactions. Fifthly, the restriction of honours and decorations to high ranking officials, with a view to insuring the proper use of prerogatives; and the appointment of officials in charge of promoting agricultural production. Sixthly, the establishment of a traditional school system at the metropolitan, prefectural and county levels, and the restoration of competitive examinations for the recruitment of government officials. Seventhly, the appointment of officials to supervise agriculture in the fertile regions of Shensi and Honan for the purpose of provisioning the army and breeding horses for the forces; and the reduction of levies on salt, iron and wine to support their producers. Eighthly, the establishment of orphanages and old-age homes to provide food and shelter for the underprivileged, and resting quarters for envoys travelling to court in order to avoid imposing on the local people. Ninthly, the restoration of sacrificial offerings to Confucian temples and of time-honoured rituals and musical instruments, and the updating of the current calendrical system to confirm the authority of the new reign. Tenthly, the compilation of the official history of the defunct Chin state, so that the merits of the rulers and ministers might be transmitted to future generations – for 'even though a state may be vanquished, its history remains.'

Furthermore, Liu Ping-chung placed great emphasis on the importance of scholar-officials in the bureaucracy, pointing out that it was the state's duty to protect them from poverty and to exempt them from arbitrary levies, thus enabling them to fulfil their obligations to the state. He also asserted that it was necessary to make a clear distinction in the selection of officials between men of virtue and inferior candidates, since the former would offer proper counsel to benefit state and people,

whereas the latter would only pursue their own self-interest and bring disgrace to their master. He concluded by stating that if his recommendations were adopted, and a hierarchical bureaucracy were established, staffed by conscientious officials and provided with a system of justice to maintain order, the empire would be ruled without trouble.

In brief, Liu Ping-chung's memorial for the restoration of traditional Chinese institutions reflects not only his faith in the universality of the Confucian ideal of government and its practical principles, but also his political acumen, since what he suggested was the only means whereby to end the chaos caused by prolonged military disorder and uncontrolled exploitation. In this, he echoed many of the views and proposals presented by scholar-officials such as Yao Shu, Hsü Heng and Hao Ching (*qq.v.*) in their audiences with Qubilai. Several of these recommendations, when adopted by Qubilai after his enthronement, had a revolutionary impact on the Mongol administration, for they meant the replacement of traditional Mongol practices, the continued use of which was advocated by the conservative elements at court. Qubilai was apparently impressed by this memorial, but was unable to implement the proposed reforms since he was not yet in a position of authority.

In the following years Liu Ping-chung's contribution as Qubilai's principal counsellor was twofold: firstly he organised a body of political advisers at Qubilai's headquarters at Chin-lien ch'uan, and secondly he initiated a series of reforms in his native prefecture, then under Qubilai's direct administration, to test the suitability of some of his recommendations. Between 1244 and 1250 Liu had already introduced Chang Wen-ch'ien and Li Te-hui to Qubilai. He recruited other talented men, such as Chang Keng and Liu Su (1188-1263), to serve on Qubilai's advisory staff. These were not accomplished academics, but all were able bureaucrats who later distinguished themselves as local administrators. The most outstanding of them was Chang Wen-ch'ien, who became Liu's closest associate during the early years of his career. Under Liu's supervision, Chang Wen-ch'ien helped in preparing the plans for many institutional changes and policy recommendations, and played an important role in designing the programme of reforms in Hsing-chou in 1251/52. When Qubilai was enthroned as qa'an in 1260, Chang became one of his trusted advisers and, like Liu Ping-chung, used his influence to recruit other capable Chinese to serve the Mongol court.

Liu Ping-chung first demonstrated the value of his recommendations on being instructed to carry out a series of administrative and economic reforms in his native Hsing-chou in 1251. Hsing-chou was a key prefecture in the Chinese territories assigned to Qubilai. Up to that time, the Mongol administrators had placed high priority on economic exploitation with scant regard for the welfare of the population,

the result being that the people, tired of the officials' abuses and burdened by heavy and irregular taxation, had deserted the fields. Households had decreased from more than 19,000 to only several hundred. Both the local people and the Mongol officials brought their complaints to court, upon which Qubilai consulted his advisers for a remedy. Liu Ping-chung and Chang Wen-ch'ien pleaded with the prince to introduce immediate reforms and, having gained his approval, Liu drafted a plan in consultation with his colleagues, recommending that Chang Keng, Liu Su and others be nominated to implement it. These officials, appointed as pacification commissioners, arrived in Hsing-chou later in the year leading a staff of competent administrators.

In spring 1252, Chang Keng and Liu Su introduced a series of sweeping measures involving a thorough reorganisation of the entire Mongol administration. They established a Pacification Bureau staffed by Chinese bureaucrats, abolished irregular methods of taxation, punished a number of officials, and devoted their attention to restoring economic health to the prefecture. Exploiting the local iron mines so as to provide additional income for the government, they issued paper money to facilitate commercial transactions, improved the methods of cultivation and transportation, and introduced a fixed system of taxation. Under the direction of these able administrators Hsing-chou eventually recovered: over 20,000 people are said to have returned to their occupations within a few months.

This remarkable performance impressed Qubilai, and Liu Ping-chung was encouraged to recruit more Chinese officials. On the latter's recommendation the Confucian scholar Wang Hsün (1235-81) was invited by Qubilai in 1253 to serve as tutor to his second son Jingim (1243-85), and the Buddhist Hao Chih-wen (P'u-an) – one of Liu's earliest associates – was recommended about this time for the office of head of the Buddhist establishments in north China. That same year, during Qubilai's visit to Hsing-chou, Liu introduced to him a precocious youth called Wang Hsien-tsu (1241-1307); Qubilai liked the lad's looks and asked Liu to bring him up as his own son. It does not appear that Liu formally adopted Wang but, under Liu's patronage, Wang Hsien-tsu eventually became an important government official.

In September 1253, on Möngke's order, Qubilai launched a punitive expedition against the Thai kingdom of Ta-li in Yunnan, then ruled by King Tuan Hsing-chih (r. 1251-53). He moved from his base in Lin-t'ao (Kansu) with a large force led by general Uriyangqadai (1201-72), the princes Čaqan and Ejil, and others. Liu Ping-chung and several Chinese officials, including Yao Shu, were invited to accompany the expedition as military advisers. They all requested Qubilai to refrain from indiscriminate slaughter and to avoid oppressive measures in order to encourage the people's submission. In November the Mongol forces crossed into Yunnan and reached the outskirts of the capital Ta-li in the following month. Thereupon, Qubilai

dispatched three envoys to the enemy court to arrange a peaceful surrender, but all were executed at the instigation of the chief minister. In January 1254, the Mongol forces launched a fierce assault from all directions on the capital. It is said that Qubilai, angered by the slaying of his envoys, contemplated exterminating all the inhabitants, but Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu and Chang Wen-ch'ien intervened. They pointed out that the responsibility for the murder lay with the treacherous chief minister Kao T'ai-hsiang, and that neither the king nor the people were to blame. Qubilai was convinced and issued a proclamation that there should be no indiscriminate slaughter. The capital fell before long. The king fled east to Shan-ch'an, but finally surrendered to Qubilai, who spared his life and restored him as ruler of his people under Mongol control. Qubilai then returned north with part of the army and his advisers. Acting on Möngke's orders, he set up temporary headquarters at Mt. Liu-p'an in Kansu, returning to his fief towards the end of the year. In the following spring, the entire Ta-li kingdom was brought under submission and incorporated into the Mongol empire, with a population of over 1,200,000 households.

After these events Liu Ping-chung remained at Qubilai's headquarters as the prince's confidant and leader of the many Chinese scholar-officials recruited for the Mongol administration. By now those included Chao Pi (1220-76), Wang E (*q.v.*), Chang Te-hui (1195-1274), Yao Shu, Tou Mo (*q.v.*), Chao Ping-wen (1222-93) and several others. Late in 1254, the Confucian master Hsü Heng (*q.v.*) also arrived at Chin-lien ch'uan on the indirect recommendation of Liu Ping-chung.

In April 1256, two years after the pacification of Ta-li, Liu Ping-chung received a new assignment from Qubilai – the drafting of a scheme for the construction of a capital city in his new domain. Liu received much assistance from his junior associate Chao Ping-wen both in selecting the site and in drafting the construction plans. The site chosen for the metropolis was at Lung-kang, east of Huan-chou and now north of the Luan (i.e. Shan-tien) River, overlooking Chin-lien ch'uan in the south. Under the supervision of skilled architects such as Chia Chü-chen (1218-80) and the Jurchen Kao Chün (d. 1290), the construction was completed in 1260. The new city was called K'ai-p'ing fu but the name was changed to Shang-tu ('Upper Capital') on 16 June 1263 and, as a consequence of this change, the former Chin capital Yen-ching (Peking) was re-named Chung-tu the following year. The ruins of the city are now located about 20 km north-east of the administrative seat of the Cheng-lan ch'i in Inner Mongolia.

Shang-tu was protected by a rectangular outer wall of 8.8 km with a gate on each side, and by an inner walls of 3.3 km, with entrances corresponding to those in the outer walls. Inside the city, there were Buddhist and Taoist monasteries besides grand palaces and civilian quarters. The layout of the Buddhist establishments followed the

arrangement of the eight trigrams according to the pattern of the *Book of Changes* in the tradition of King Wen of Chou. In the geographical section of the *Yüan History* we read, for instance, that two Buddhist monasteries known as Ch'ien-yüan ssu and Hua-yen ssu were constructed in the *ch'ien* and *ken* corners of the inner walls; this has been confirmed by recent archaeological discoveries which have located them in the northwestern and northeastern corners of the ruins of the capital. In appreciation of Liu Ping-chung's service, Qubilai ordered the construction of a secluded lodge for him on a southern hill in the city, known as Mt. Nan-p'ing, where Liu took up regular residence in later years.

There has been much speculation on Liu Ping-chung's reasons for selecting this particular site for the construction of the new metropolis. Geographical and strategic factors must have been primary considerations, since it is located on the marches between the pastoral regions of Mongolia and the cultivated territories of China. While Qubilai had not yet come to power as ruler of China in his own right, he was ambitious to do so and such a residence would undoubtedly serve as an ideal base from which to assert his ascendancy. According to a late Yüan legend, the site was inhabited by a dragon (hence the name Lung-kang) and had a lake in its centre. When Liu Ping-chung decided to build the capital city there, he had to cast a magic spell to evict the dragon and erect a tall iron pennant endowed with magic powers to prevent its return. The lake was then drained to provide land for construction. This story evokes not only the geographical environment of the new metropolis, but also the people's acknowledgement of Liu Ping-chung's extraordinary architectural skills. Shang-tu only lost its strategic importance after Qubilai had been enthroned and founded the Yüan dynasty; nonetheless, it remained the summer residence of the Mongol ruler and the centre of political manoeuvring among the powerful Mongol leaders.

In 1258, Liu Ping-chung was involved in a somewhat different task, that of participating in the heated debates between the Buddhists and Taoists held under Qubilai's supervision in the hope of resolving their sectarian differences. The dispute between Buddhists and Taoists, which first flared up in 1255, was the culmination of decades of acute rivalry dating back to the establishment of the Mongols in north China. In this early period, the Taoists of the Ch'üan-ch'en sect had enjoyed official protection owing to the friendly regard shown by Činggis Qan towards their patriarch Ch'iu Ch'u-chi. They had taken advantage of their privileged position to seize Buddhist temples, replace the Buddhist images with Taoist ones, and to propagate two apocryphal works, the *Pa-shih-i hua t'u* or *Illustrations of the Eighty-one Incarnations (of Lao-tzu)*, and the *Hua-Hu ching* or *Scripture of (Lao-tzu's) Conversion of the Barbarians*, which represented the historical Buddha as one of Lao-tzu's incarnations.

In retaliation, the Buddhists appealed to Möngke for an open hearing to voice their complaints, and the first round of debates was convened before the emperor at Qara Qorum in 1255. In this encounter, the issue centred on the authenticity of the *Pa-shih-i hua t'u* and the *Hua-Hu ching*, and the Taoists lost their argument when they failed to establish the authorship of these two texts. As a result, the Taoists were ordered to return the illegally acquired properties to the Buddhists and destroy the two apocryphal books. They refused to comply, and the Buddhists continued to press charges against them at the Mongol court. Another confrontation took place at Qara Qorum the following year; the Taoists lost again, but again made no reparations. Then in October 1257, the Buddhists submitted another plea to Möngke for a further debate, but by this time the emperor was weary of these wranglings and handed the matter over to Qubilai, who was familiar with the background and the personalities involved in the controversy.

Early in 1258, Qubilai convened a grand assembly at K'ai-p'ing fu, attended by over three hundred Buddhists and two hundred Taoists, and he summoned over two hundred court officials and Confucian scholars as moderators. The Taoists were led by Chang Chih-ching (1220-70) and the Buddhists by Fu-yü (1203-75), whereas Yao Shu, Tou Mo and Chang Wen-ch'ien headed the official delegation. Liu Ping-chung's name appears on the list of the Buddhist participants under his religious title. This time the debate was again focused on the *Pa-shih-i hua t'u* and the *Hua-Hu ching*, and the Taoists, as before, failed to prove their point and came out the losers. A score of leading Taoists were ordered to shave their heads and become Buddhists, while the two texts and many other 'forged scriptures' were destroyed. It appears, however, that the real cause of the quarrel between the Buddhists and Taoists was not the religious issue, but their rivalry over land and property, as well as tax-exemption privileges. Liu Ping-chung's participation in these debates was motivated by duty as Qubilai's chief Chinese adviser rather than personal animosity towards the Taoist church. As a private individual, and notwithstanding his Buddhist affiliation, Liu was deeply interested in Taoist philosophy and rituals and, like many of the Confucian participants, had cultivated a close relationship with the Taoists.

In August 1259 Qubilai set out on his expedition against the strongholds of Southern Sung in the Huai valley, in accordance with Möngke's grand plan for the conquest of China. He ordered his trusted lieutenant Bātur and the Chinese myriarchs Chang Jou and Shih T'ien-tse to lead the invading forces; as before, he took with him several members of his Chinese 'brain trust' to advise on military matters. Liu Ping-chung headed the list of counsellors, which also included Yao Shu, Chang Wen-ch'ien and Chang I (d. 1282). In the course of the campaign this group strongly remonstrated with Qubilai in an effort to restrain the Mongol commanders from

wanton slaughter and plunder of the Chinese population. The Mongol forces proved invincible throughout: they crossed the Huai River in August-September 1259, and reached the opposite bank at E-chou (Wu-chang, Hupei), a key city in the Sung line of defence overlooking the Yangtze River. In mid-September word came that Möngke had died (11 August) while fighting the Sung in Ho-chou, Szechwan, but Qubilai continued his offensive as planned. He attacked E-chou, encountering a vigorous resistance from newly arrived reinforcements sent by the Sung chief councillor Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75). Impressed by Chia, Qubilai is said to have deplored not having the service of such a talented man. Liu and Chang I then reminded him that Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*) of Shantung was a man of the same calibre. Wang, then an adviser of Li T'an (*q.v.*), chief administrator of Shantung and later his father-in-law, thus came to the fore and was appointed director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council upon Qubilai's accession in 1260.

In December more adverse reports reached Qubilai, claiming that his brother Ariq Böke (d. 1266) had been intriguing at court to seize the throne. At the urging of Möngke's widow in Qara Qorum and of his own close advisers, Qubilai hurried north, leaving Bātur and others to prosecute the siege (which was lifted soon after). In the course of this campaign, the Mongol forces reportedly inflicted only minimum damage on the Chinese population, presumably following the remonstrations made by Liu Ping-chung and his colleagues.

On 5 May 1260, to counter Ariq Böke's election at Qara Qorum, Qubilai's supporters elected him as qa'an in K'ai-p'ing fu, thus making him by the same token the *de facto* ruler of China. Qubilai then began the military struggle against Ariq Böke and his party in the north, while at the same time devoting himself to the administrative problems of his new empire with the assistance of Liu Ping-chung and his other Chinese advisers. In due course, Liu then forty-four years of age, submitted a memorial on the organisation of a Chinese-inspired central bureaucracy to be headed by the Secretarial Council, with a hierarchical echelon of offices in charge of civil and military affairs down to the local level; the selection of a new era-name, Chung-t'ung ('Pivotal Succession'); and the restoration of traditional rites, music and other ceremonies. Thereupon, Qubilai appointed Maḥmūd Yalavač (*q.v.*) Right chancellor of the Secretarial Council, and Wang Wen-t'ung, who had earlier been recommended by Liu Ping-chung, as director of political affairs, and proceeded to implement some of the proposals for the reorganisation of the state's institutions.

The recommendations submitted by Liu Ping-chung entailed the adoption of the traditional Chinese offices of state under T'ang and Sung as modified by the Jurchen Chin to complement the existing Mongol establishment. The central administration was to comprise a Secretarial Council, Department of Military Affairs and the

Censorate, respectively in charge of state, military and censorial affairs. The Secretarial Council was an extension of the Secretariat established by Ögödei on the recommendation of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, achieved by enlarging the existing staff and broadening the scope of the new Council's operations. The functions of the central government were assumed by a bureaucracy subdivided into the following offices: the Bureaux (*ssu*), the Directorates (*chien*), the Guards (*wei*), the Administrations (*fu*) and others. Those were supplemented by agencies coordinating the functions of the provincial administrations such as the Regional Secretarial Councils, the Pacification Bureaux, the Surveillance Bureaux, etc. The local administration was subdivided into several levels or units such as the district (*lu*), the administrations (*fu*), the prefecture (*chou*) and the county (*hsien*). In addition, the system of recruiting civil servants initiated by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was to be reintroduced. These several recommendations, with the sole exception of that advocating the recruitment of officials by competitive examinations, were adopted within a decade, and the resulting governmental offices, subject to minor modifications, remained in being until the end of Mongol rule and were copied by the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties.

Liu Ping-chung is also known to have contributed significantly to the currency reform. He was credited, for instance, with the introduction of the paper money known as *ssu-ch'ao* or *chiao-ch'ao* designed to replace metal coins as the principal medium of transaction. Before this time, the Mongol rulers had already used paper money similar to that of the Sung called *hui-tzu*, and had issued, in 1236 and 1253, exchange notes called *chiao-ch'ao*, using the Chin model. These notes, however, were not produced in large quantities and there was no attempt to unify the various forms of paper money issued by the local authorities. In late 1260, under the direction of Wang Wen-t'ung, three new types of notes were issued, one of which was called *Chung-t'ung* (*yüan-pao*) *chiao-ch'ao* from the name of the era. The new notes were printed in ten denominations convertible into either silver or copper cash, and became the standard currency of the empire (see the biographies of Aḥmad and Wang Wen-t'ung).

Liu Ping-chung's role in the introduction of the *chiao-ch'ao* is not recorded in the official history, but he is credited with its initiative in the *Cho-keng lu* of T'ao Tsung-i (ca. 1315-ca. 1402), which gives his reasons in a rather curious account. He is reported to have argued that metal currency could be used only in 'bright' (*yang*) regions and paper money in 'dark' (*yin*) regions; that China was the bright, or sunnier, region and the steppe the dark region; hence, the Mongols who came from the desert to rule over China should adopt the paper currency. Although this is of course more of an anecdote than an historical statement, it should not be entirely dismissed. It is highly probable that Liu Ping-chung did make the recommendation for the issue of

paper money, since exchange notes had been produced in the reform of Hsing-chou in 1251-52 to unify the local currency and to stimulate a depressed economy. He may well have invented this rationalization in the hope that it would induce the superstitious Mongol leaders to accept his proposal.

In addition, Liu Ping-chung submitted several recommendations for the further recruitment of talented individuals, including Wang I (1240-92), Ch'eng Ssu-lien (1235-96), Wang Kou (1245-1310), Hsü Shih-lung (1206-85), and Ch'en Yüan-k'ai (1235-1312). With a few exceptions, they were not true scholars of the Confucian classics, but they were either experienced in administration or skilled in technical subjects. They discharged important governmental functions and rose to prominent positions in the Mongol administration during Qubilai's reign.

All this time Liu Ping-chung held no official position but remained behind the scenes, advising Qubilai on a wide range of state affairs and recruiting personnel. He enjoyed the emperor's confidence and had a close relationship with him even though their conversations must have been carried out entirely through interpreters (as we know such was the case between Hsü Heng and Qubilai). In August 1261, as reward for his services, Qubilai granted Liu parcels of fifty *ch'ing* of land each in Huai, Meng and Hsing prefectures, to provide a regular income for himself and his family. While serving as Qubilai's confidant, Liu Ping-chung did not forego his study of Buddhism, and often retired to a monastery for long periods of meditation. This, however, did not interfere with his public duties; on the contrary it enabled him to avoid administrative routine and afforded him a better opportunity for political manoeuvring. It also befitted his ethical concerns in government matters and made him more readily acceptable to the diverse ideological and political groups at the Mongol court.

In the meantime, while all these proposals for institutional reform were gradually being realised, Liu Ping-chung met with great disappointment in his campaign to advance the political influence of Chinese literati, as a result of a series of unexpected events. In late February 1262, Li T'an, the chief administrator of the Regional Secretarial Council in Shantung, rebelled against the Mongols. The attempt was short-lived. Li T'an perished and Wang Wen-t'ung, the director of political affairs whom Liu Ping-chung had earlier recommended for office, was executed for his implication in the matter. Many officials were dismissed, and although Liu and his fellow advisers were not impeached, they were affected nonetheless by the ensuing backlash against all Chinese scholar-officials.

Qubilai became increasingly apprehensive of the political threat posed by the Chinese literati and began favouring the Central Asian administrators led by Aḥmad (*q.v.*), who had shown much expertise in increasing revenue for the imperial treasury.

Late that year, the qa'an appointed Aḥmad as chief of the Bureaux of the Left and Right overseeing the general service administration under the Secretarial Council, and concurrently transport commissioner of all districts. These appointments gave Aḥmad extraordinary power and, in 1263, he proposed to separate the fiscal agency from the Secretarial Council in an attempt to monopolise the financial administration of the empire. The Chinese court officials, alarmed by such a radical move, mounted a stiff opposition; Liu Ping-chung, joining forces with colleagues such as Shang T'ing (*q.v.*), recommended that the heir apparent Ĵingim be appointed chief of the Secretarial Council and head of the Department of Military Affairs. This step was taken in the hope that Ĵingim, a sinicised Mongol prince and moderate political figure, would stabilise the Secretarial Council, bolster Chinese influence and thwart the ambition of the Central Asian officials. The recommendation was approved, but contrary to expectation, Ĵingim functioned only as a titular head, and though his presence did temporarily discourage Aḥmad and his colleagues, it could not offset their influence altogether.

Up to this time Liu Ping-chung had lived as a Buddhist monk and people addressed him as Secretary Tsung (Tsung shu-chi), or by his religious designation, the Venerable Ts'ang-ch'un. Then in September 1264, following recommendation by the executive Han-lin academician Wang E, Qubilai invested Liu as Great Officer of Brilliant Dignity with the honorary rank of Grand Guardian, appointed him a councillor of the Secretarial Council, and conferred on him the name Ping-chung ('Steadfast Loyalty'). Thus, he came to be formally known as Liu Ping-chung. This was the first time that the Mongol ruler bestowed the Grand Guardian title on a Chinese and it must have been a great honour for Liu and his supporters.

In 1265, having succeeded in his recommendation for the transfer of the seat of government to Yen-ching (Chung-tu) in September of the previous year, Liu Ping-chung was commissioned by Qubilai to design a grand metropolis to serve as the national capital. The need to build a new city rather than renovate the old Chin capital, was due to the fact that many of the Jurchen palaces had been destroyed by the Mongols in 1215. Moreover, the supply of water provided by the Lien-hua Lake to the west of the old city was deemed inadequate to meet the needs of a grand metropolis. Liu Ping-chung again sought assistance in drafting the plans from his junior colleague Chao Ping-wen, profiting from their common experience in the construction of K'ai-p'ing fu in 1256. A project was submitted to the throne in due course, and Liu was awarded fifty *liang* of gold for his contribution. In January 1267, Qubilai appointed as supervisors of the construction Chang Jou, the veteran myriarch of the Han Armies, and Tuan T'ien-yu, minister of Works, with the Arab Ikhtiyār al-Dīn and the Jurchen Kao Hsi as principal architects.

The new city, according to the original plan, was to be built to the north-east of the former Chin capital in order to take advantage of the water from Ch'iung-hua Island – site of the Jurchen summer palaces – which was supplied by the fine Kao-liang River to the west. The design was modelled after the capital of the ancient Chou kingdom as idealised in the 'K'ao-kung chi' ('Treatise on Construction') section of the *Chou-li* (*Rites of Chou*).

Archaeological evidence confirms that while the proposed site was actually adopted, the original design of the capital city was slightly modified. According to the *Ts'ao-mu tzu* of Yeh Tzu-ch'i (d. 1385?), Liu Ping-chung chose this particular location because he realised that the soil in old Yen-ching was too hard for auspicious geomancy, and he intended to divert the water flowing from Chü-yung kuan to loosen it. The need to tap the rich water resources was genuine, but it may not have been for the sake of geomancy. The main reason for the slight deviation from the Chou model, it appears, was the need to incorporate the existing Jurchen summer palaces on Ch'iung-hua Island into the new design. Modern scholars think that if Liu Ping-chung had stuck to the *Chou-li* model, it would have been necessary to demolish all the existing structures, which would have been too costly and wasteful.

The construction was carried out in several stages. It was formally started in early 1267; the imperial temples and palace walls were completed in the following year; while additional palaces, temples, official quarters and walls were built between 1270 and 1272. In March 1272, the capital was renamed Ta-tu (Grand [= Imperial] Capital); all the imperial palaces and sacrificial halls were completed in early 1274; and the initial phase of the building programme was concluded in 1276. The city walls, made of tamped earth (sections of which are still extant) instead of bricks, reached their first stage of completion in 1283 together with the administrative offices, but they were not finished until August 1292. The rectangular perimeter of Ta-tu allegedly measured 33 km (or rather 28,600 metres according to the estimates of an archaeological team), and had eleven gates. In autumn 1293, shortly before Qubilai's death, the distinguished astronomer, mathematician and engineer Kuo Shou-ching (q.v.) also completed work on a series of lock-gates for the T'ung-hui section of the Grand Canal between Ta-tu and T'ung-chou. The project not only brought in a new supply of water from Po-fou Spring on Mt. Pei to Ta-tu, but also greatly facilitated the transport of grain to the capital.

The new city was unique in having eleven gates along its rectangular perimeters, rather than the traditional eight, ten, or twelve. The Yüan sources give no explanation for this, although there must have been a compelling reason. Some late Yüan accounts, however, credit Liu Ping-chung with adopting this singular arrangement with reference to the body of the legendary Buddhist demon-exorciser No-cha, who

had three heads, six arms, and two feet. It was alleged that the three southern gates symbolised No-cha heads, the six eastern and western gates his arms, and the two northern gates his feet. No-cha (Sanskrit Nāṭa), was the third son of Vaiśravaṇa, one of the four Heavenly Kings in the Tantric Buddhist tradition. In China, Vaiśravaṇa was identified with the mythologised T'ang general Li Ching (571-649), and No-cha was sent by Heaven to become his son. That No-cha was invoked in this instance may be explained not only by the fact that No-cha was often featured in the protection of cities since T'ang times, but by a belief that Yen-ching had been short of water due to the presence of the dragon-king of the sea beneath the city. No-cha, according to popular sources, had once fought a fierce battle with the third son of the dragon-king and slain him. Thus it was thought that No-cha's presence would exorcise the dragon-king and relieve the people from water shortage. As in the legend mentioned earlier about the dragon that had to be exorcised before the construction of Shang-tu could begin, the attribution to Liu Ping-chung of a magical intervention in the design of Ta-tu again attests strongly to the people's belief in his great wisdom.

All these burdensome commitments affected Liu Ping-chung's health and late in 1268 he submitted a request for leave to relinquish his duties in the Secretarial Council. This was approved, but he stayed on as Qubilai's adviser and retained his title of Grand Guardian. Some months later, however, as the initial phase in the construction of the capital came to an end, Qubilai again summoned Liu, ordering him and his colleagues to prepare a new set of rituals for the court ceremonial. Liu Ping-chung sought advice from Hsü Heng, who had also just resigned from the Secretarial Council, and from the Han-lin academician Hsü Shih-lung, then president of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, and instructed his disciples Chao Ping-wen, Shang Wen (1236-1327) and others to collect information on the rites of the previous dynasties. Eventually, they retained the K'ai-yüan rites of the T'ang and those of the Jurchen-Chin from which they compiled a new code for submission to court. Liu Ping-chung then summoned ten junior Confucian scholars including Chou To, Liu Chih-chung (1242-96), Yüeh Ch'en, Kuan Ssu-i and Hou Tso-hsien, and asked them to practice these rituals under the guidance of former Chin scholars like Wu-ku-lun Chü-chen, Wan-yen Fu-chao, Wan-yen Ts'ung-yü and K'o Ts'ung-liang. Liu and his associates also concerned themselves in creating the court music appropriate for state ceremonials. To that effect, they engaged several former Chin musicians, such as Ts'ao Chi, Liu Chin and Cheng Chung, who produced the required music in six months. Liu then nominated more than two hundred Mongol courtiers acquainted with Chinese culture who should practise the new rites and music, so that the Chinese tradition could be handed down to the Mongols of future generations. Furthermore,

Liu was involved in the design of new official costumes in consultation with his colleagues and submitted recommendations to court.

While so engaged, Liu Ping-chung, together with Hsü Heng, Chang Wen-ch'ien, Wang Hsün and others, was commissioned by Qubilai to conduct a thorough review of the efficiency of the governmental institutions that had been established over the previous years. The board of review submitted detailed recommendations for rationalising various agencies at all levels. These included proposals for eliminating supernumerary and obsolete offices, strengthening the liaison between the inner and outer courts, and instituting internal checks and controls, while supporting maintenance of the hierarchical structure in the bureaucracy. All these findings are said to have been approved and to have laid the foundations of the government institutions that were to last until the end of the Mongol dynasty.

Late the following year, when the revision of rites and music was completed, Liu Ping-chung and his colleagues again approached the court requesting new offices and the appointment of additional personnel to take charge of state ceremonials. The request was eventually granted. That same year, in token of his appreciation of Liu's services, Qubilai gave him as wife the second daughter of the Han-lin academician Tou Mo. In addition, the emperor awarded him a grand mansion in the Feng-hsien ward of the capital, and put the registered households attached to the imperial workshops at his disposal. These were the most generous grants ever made until then to a Chinese by the Mongol emperor.

Late in 1271, as all the new state ceremonials were being adopted, Liu Ping-chung submitted another important memorial proposing a new dynastic title in accordance with the Chinese tradition. It has been generally assumed that the Mongol state founded by Činggis Qan in 1206 and originally known in Mongolian as *Yeke Mongqol Ulus*, or the Great Mongol Nation, did not have an official Chinese name until Qubilai's time. As pointed out recently by Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, however, Činggis Qan did adopt the Chinese designation *Ta-Ch'ao*, or Great Dynasty, ca. 1217, which had remained in continual use thereafter. To glorify Qubilai's reign, Liu suggested the name *Ta-Yüan*, which he took from the *Book of Changes*. *Yüan* has been usually interpreted as meaning 'the primal force,' or 'the origin (or beginning) of the universe,' but, according to Hsiao, its primary meaning in the tradition of the *Book of Changes* should be *ta*, greatness. This reading is preferable because *Ta-Yüan*, like *Ta-Ch'ao*, is an abbreviated Chinese rendition of the original Mongol state name. In this instance, *Ta-Yüan* should be translated as Great Greatness. Qubilai was delighted with Liu Ping-chung's proposal and adopted it in December 1271. (The imperial decree was issued on 18 December.) This was the first time in Chinese history that the official designation of a state or dynasty was not derived from the name of the

imperial family or the geographical origin of the founder, but expressed an abstract, philosophical notion. It also marks the culmination of Liu's effort to provide the Mongol regime with the full trappings of a traditional Chinese dynasty.

During the last years of his life, Liu Ping-chung gradually withdrew from active participation in government; he preferred to remain in the shadow of the throne, offering occasional advice on state affairs and recommending talented individuals for official appointment. In October 1273, for instance, he joined Yao Shu, Tou Mo and others in proposing Wang Hsün, the former tutor of Prince Jingim, as rector of the National College to succeed Hsü Heng. At the same time he urged the appointment of additional staff to the Heir Apparent's Office to assist Jingim prepare for his role as imperial heir. In the same year he recommended that the noted astrologer Yüeh Hsüan (1249-1312) should serve in the Department of Calendrical Affairs.

During this period Liu Ping-chung spent much time at his private retreat on Mt. Nan-p'ing where he led a simple life devoted mainly to study and self-cultivation. While pursuing his interest in Buddhism, he seems to have become deeply involved in the *Book of Changes* and in Taoist philosophy and rituals. He became so well versed in Taoism that he was actually given charge of two Taoist temples, one on the 'Western Hills' near Ta-tu, the other on Mt. Nan-p'ing in Shang-tu, both called Ling-ying wan-shou kung (they had been erected on imperial order for the worship of the T'ai-i and Liu-ting deities). He remained the master of these temples until his death, after which they were placed under the supervision of Li Chü-shou (1221-80), the patriarch of the T'ai-i sect.

In his last years Liu Ping-chung also expended much effort to produce a new calendar for the dynasty, an enterprise which he had recommended earlier to Qubilai Qa'an. This endeavour stemmed not only from his interest in mathematics and astronomy, but also from an obvious need, since the old calendars were no longer accurate. He worked assiduously at the project, occasionally consulting astronomer friends such as Yüeh Hsüan and T'ien Chung-liang (1243-1317) whom he had earlier recommended for office, but was unable to complete the work before his death. Thereafter, the task was entrusted to a special commission set up by Qubilai in 1276, and the new calendar, called *Shou-shih li*, chiefly the work of Kuo Shou-ching, was completed in 1280 and subsequently adopted as the standard calendar of the dynasty.

Early in 1274, Liu Ping-chung accompanied Qubilai to Shang-tu for consultation on state affairs and took up residence in his retreat on Mt. Nan-p'ing. He died unexpectedly on 20 September, at the age of fifty-eight. His death is shrouded in mystery. One account alleges that he had predicted the hour of the event. Late in the evening before his final day, Liu reportedly asked his servants to retire, and started chanting until dawn. He died in the early morning, but his attendants found him

sitting up as usual, as though enjoying a nap. Some learned men considered that he had attained spiritual liberation. Another source reports that on 18 August, about a month before Liu Ping-chung's death, an air current was seen moving through the 'three terraces' (*san-t'ai*) of the constellation Ursa Major. Startled, Qubilai asked the astrologer T'ien Chung-liang what that meant. T'ien sighed and said: 'Isn't the *san-kung* ('the third duke' or Grand Guardian, i.e. Liu Ping-chung) going to die soon?' Liu Ping-chung was survived by his wife, a daughter, and his adopted heir Lan-chang, the son of his younger brother Liu Ping-shu.

Qubilai was shocked and grieved at the news of Liu Ping-chung's death. He reportedly exclaimed to his courtiers, 'Ping-chung had served me for more than thirty years. He was attentive and cautious. He took no heed of difficulties and dangers, and (always) spoke (the truth) without hiding his feelings. He was so conversant with the occult sciences that he could predict the future with extreme accuracy. Only I know it; others don't.' He instructed Chao Ping-wen, the vice-minister of Rites, to escort the body back to Ta-tu, where Liu Ping-chung was buried at a site north of the Lu-kou Bridge (the so-called Marco Polo Bridge) outside the capital in a solemn ceremony presided over by the empress. A decade or so later his body was transferred to the family tomb in the village of Chia-ts'un, just south-west of Liu Ping-chung's native Hsing-t'ai.

In 1275, acknowledging Liu Ping-chung's long years of distinguished service, Qubilai bestowed upon him the posthumous title of Grand Tutor, and the name Wen-chen ('Cultured and Virtuous'). In 1287, his widow and adopted son assembled Liu Ping-chung's writings into a collection entitled *Ts'ang-ch'un chi*. This is said to have originally contained 10 *chüan* of essays and 22 *chüan* of poetry, but only 5 *chüan* of poetry survive. A manuscript copy of this work is incorporated in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*, and it was reproduced photolithographically in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen*.

In 1287 Sangha (*q.v.*) rose to power as chief of the Presidential Council, an independent department specially created for the central administration of the state. Sangha had been at odds with the Chinese officialdom. To display to his power he ordered the confiscation of Liu's land on the grounds that Liu had died without an heir. Only after Liu's widow had submitted a petition declaring that her husband had an adopted son did Qubilai decree, in 1291, the return of a hundred *ch'ing* of land to Liu Ping-chung's descendants.

More posthumous honours were conferred on Liu Ping-chung during the reign of Emperor Temür (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307). That emperor elevated him to Grand Preceptor, with the accompanying rank of Supreme Pillar of State and investiture as Duke-of-state of Chao, and bestowed upon him the new posthumous name of Wen-cheng ('Cultured and Correct'). Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) further

honoured Liu by investing him as Prince of Ch'ang-shan. Then in 1314, forty years after his death, the local authorities erected a shrine to his memory in Hsing-t'ai at the request of his nephews. During the middle of the Wan-li period of the Ming emperor Shen-tsung (r. 1573-1620), the prefectural magistrate of Hsing-t'ai removed the spiritual tablets of Wei Cheng (580-643) and Sung Ching (663-737), two eminent T'ang scholar-statesmen who had been granted the same posthumous name (Wen-chen) as Liu, and housed them together in Liu Ping-chung's shrine, renaming it San Wen-chen kung tz'u (Shrine of the Three Wen-chen Excellencies). This was an explicit recognition of Liu Ping-chung's contribution to the foundation of Mongol rule, comparable to that accorded to his two distinguished predecessors in the golden era of the T'ang dynasty.

There is a rich amount of biographical material written by Liu Ping-chung's contemporaries available for the study of his life and career. In general, those biographical writings present a detailed account of Liu Ping-chung's life, but they also contain an excessive amount of laudatory clichés in the traditional Confucian hagiographical style, casting their hero in the stereotype of the exemplary imperial adviser established by the literati. They compare Liu to Duke Chao of Chou, Chang Liang (d. 189 B.C.) of Former Han, Chu-ko Liang (181-234) of the Three Kingdoms period, the Monk Hui-lin of the Liu-Sung dynasty (420-79), Tu Yü (222-84) of the Western Chin, and Li Pi (722-89) of the T'ang, and invest him with their attributes. They thus distorted Liu's outstanding achievements and, ironically, hindered an objective appraisal of the man's true historical standing.

There is no biographical information on Liu Ping-chung's adopted son Lan-chang. His daughter was later married to Chang Chiu-ssu (1242-1302), a noted scholar-official who rose to be a director of political affairs in 1298. Much more is known about his brother Liu Ping-shu who rates a brief biography in the *Yüan History*. Liu Ping-shu, T. Ch'ang-ch'ing, studied the *Book of Changes* in his early years under Liu Su, and pursued a commendable official career in the shadow of his brother. After holding several important posts, he was transferred in 1264 to be chief administrator of five districts in modern Hopei and Honan, and later became minister of Rites and then pacification commissioner of the Huai-hsi district (Anhui). He died at the age of fifty-nine while serving as chief administrator of the P'ing-yang district during the last years of Qubilai's reign.

In retrospect, Liu Ping-chung must be ranked as one of the most important Chinese personalities to have helped Qubilai consolidate his power and lay the foundations of Mongol rule in China. To illustrate Liu's historical role as Qubilai's principal adviser, we may consider two major contributions: the reorganisation of

Mongol institutions based on the Chinese model, and the promotion of Chinese influence in the political field.

The adoption of Chinese political institutions was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the successful establishment of the Mongols in China. Replacing the unsuitable Mongol tribal methods which had been a source of instability and domestic disorder, these instrumentalities provided the most effective mechanism for political centralisation and for the orderly exploitation of economic resources. But Qubilai's adoption of China's traditional institutions did not indicate his unqualified acceptance of Chinese civilisation or transform the Mongol emperor into a Chinese-style sage ruler. Aspiring as he did to be a universal sovereign and the true successor of Činggis Qan, Qubilai was eager to adopt any institutional device to attain his political objectives. Nevertheless, his use of Chinese institutions and the resulting sinicisation of an alien rule meant a marked departure from the Mongol tradition. This in turn antagonised the conservative elements at court and in the outlying regions of the empire, exacerbating the schismatic tensions within the ruling hierarchy. By virtue of his familiarity with Qubilai in early years, Liu Ping-chung undoubtedly played a significant role in this important process of political transformation.

Liu Ping-chung deserves equal credit for promoting Chinese participation in the Mongol government through his recommendations of talented individuals for official appointment. He opened a channel for the advancement of men of calibre and ability into the bureaucratic service at a time when a feasible alternative to the defunct civil service examination system had not yet appeared. Thanks to him, scores of Chinese scholars entered the new government either as advisers or as administrators, and in due course there rallied around Qubilai a solid core of Chinese literati who earned the confidence of the Mongol ruler by virtue of their technical knowledge and administrative skills. In a dedicatory poem to his mentor, the contemporary scholar Wang Yün has these two lines: 'He is not too hampered by the Buddhist alms-bowl; / His disciples are like peach and plum blossoms in the spring breeze!' This was a most appropriate eulogy to Liu Ping-chung's dedication to the cause of the literati. Although many of those scholar-officials soon fell into disfavour with the rise of the Central Asian financiers, the brief season of Chinese influence at court had important consequences for the political development of the Mongol empire.

Liu Ping-chung's rise to political eminence also evokes the drama of a humble individual fated to become an historical figure. He was not an orthodox Confucian scholar or statesman like his counterparts in past Chinese history, despite the laudatory attributes accorded him by his biographers. His accession to power must be considered rather unusual in the Confucian tradition, but the time and setting favoured a person of his erudition and perspicacity. Liu Ping-chung was able to ingratiate

himself with Qubilai not only because he was a Buddhist monk for whom the qa'an felt much esteem and confidence, but also because he possessed the qualities of statesmanship which the Mongol ruler found useful for his political objectives. His knowledge of Chinese statecraft and technical subjects made him indispensable to Qubilai at a time when the prince was groping for models in the administration of his Chinese empire. Liu's 'official' status as a Ch'an Buddhist rather than a Confucian scholar was another important factor in his success. His Buddhist-Taoist outlook, supported by his broad knowledge of the occult sciences, must have made him a more impressive and more readily acceptable person at the Mongol court than one assuming the attitude of a traditional Confucian scholar. In addition, his cautious attitude in politics, his reluctance to occupy high office other than as an unobtrusive adviser, his skilful diplomacy in avoiding open conflict with the Mongol nobles, and his withdrawal from political activities at the peak of his career, also insured his relatively stable position and continuing influence at court.

Nevertheless, Liu Ping-chung's success could not have been possible without the assistance and support of the Chinese literati, for Liu was more of an 'ideas' man' than a man of action. As Qubilai's principal adviser he was able to make propositions, but he needed the service of a body of experienced bureaucrats and scholar-officials to carry out his plans. And, to restore their lost prestige and perpetuate the Confucian heritage, members of the Chinese élite were ready to rally around the man who could influence the Mongol ruler. Thus Liu Ping-chung, a half-hearted Buddhist monk and Taoist adept, became the leader of the Chinese literati who, in an alliance of convenience, were eager to draw him willy-nilly into the mainstream of the Confucian tradition.

Liu Ping-chung stood in fact on the margins of two mutually alien groupings: the Mongol ruling class on the one hand and the Chinese literati on the other. Cautiously steering a middle course, he served as a mediator and coordinator between the two parties, parties that were equally desirous of his services in order to attain their own objectives. Therein lies the essence of Liu's success, and the starting point for assessing the historical standing of this eminent figure in thirteenth century China.

In addition to his key political role and his skill in adapting the great Han tradition to exceptional circumstances, Liu Ping-chung also gained his contemporaries' admiration for his manifold scholarly achievements. In the area of Confucian studies, he did not specialise in classical exegesis, but in the metaphysical philosophy based on the *Book of Changes*, and he developed a deep interest in the mathematical interpretation proposed in the *Huang-chi ching-shih shu* by the renowned Sung philosopher Shao Yung (1011-77). He is said to have excelled in the speculative philosophies of the Neo-Confucian tradition and to have skilfully

reconciled them with the Buddhist and Taoist philosophies, so that, in the lavish praise of a contemporary biographer, he was able 'to penetrate the three chambers of learning, and combined them to form one school.' This may be an exaggeration, but it does point to his exceptional ability to grasp the main intellectual currents of this time.

It was, however, in the technical field and in the pseudo-sciences that Liu Ping-chung realised the most impressive achievement. He was by all accounts well-versed in astronomy, mathematics, architecture, geomancy, physiognomy and divination. His expertise in astronomy and mathematics, probably derived from his study of the mathematical interpretation of the *Book of Changes*, is attested by his work on the revision of the calendar. His biography in the *Yüan History* claims that his mastery of mathematics ranked equal to that of Li Chün-min, one of the most distinguished mathematicians of the late Chin and early Yüan. Liu's knowledge of architecture and city planning was demonstrated by his contribution to the construction of K'ai-p'ing fu in 1256 and Chung-tu/Ta-tu in 1267. Although he was not personally involved in the supervision of the construction work, and had no doubt received assistance from architects and technical experts, he was recognised as the main planner of the two cities.

Liu Ping-chung's expertise in the various branches of Chinese pseudo-sciences is less conspicuous and it is clouded by popular legends. He is said, for instance, to have applied his knowledge of astronomy and mathematics in devising military stratagems for Qubilai, and to have used Taoist magical charms in overcoming enemy resistance during the campaigns against the Ta-li kingdom and the Southern Sung. He is also alleged to have made use of his knowledge of geomancy in persuading Qubilai to replace metal currency with paper money, and he reportedly applied the same knowledge in designing the new capital at Yen-ching. In later times, he was thought to have authored several treatises on geomancy: he is reputed to have written, together with the legendary early Ming imperial adviser Liu Chi (1311-75), a major work called *Yü-ch'ih ching* (*The Jade Measure Canon*) in 4 *chüan*, which according to the Ch'ing scholar Chiang P'ing-chieh, was actually produced by an anonymous geomancer. Similarly, tradition has it that his skill in physiognomy and divination enabled him to foretell the good fortune of several of his contemporaries, as well as his own life-expectancy a few years before his death.

These legends resulted undoubtedly from Liu Ping-chung's adulation by admiring contemporaries. The Liu Ping-chung mythology became even more elaborate in the post-Yüan period, when champions of the Han restoration exploited prevailing popular traditions to conjure up new legends in support of their cause. They claimed that Liu, by virtue of his knowledge of geomancy and divination, had accurately

predicted the advent of the pseudo-religious peasant uprisings against the Yüan government, the collapse of Mongol rule and the rise of the founder of the Ming dynasty. It is also alleged that he had left a prophetic scripture called *Liu T'ai-pao hsieh-lou t'ien-chi* (*Liu T'ai-pao* [i.e. Ping-chung] *Divulging the Mandate of Providence*), in which he predicted historical events in China (this work was probably fabricated by the pseudo-religious rebel leaders during the last quarter of the fifteenth century). In the course of time these mythical accounts transformed Liu Ping-chung from a statesman and scholar into a supernatural being and popular hero, completely distorting the historical reality and the man's true role.

Liu Ping-chung was also accomplished in belles-lettres – prose and poetry – and in the traditional arts: music, calligraphy and painting, as attested by the comments of his contemporaries and samples of his preserved writings.

With the exception of his lengthy memorial submitted to Qubilai in 1251, which was incorporated in his *Yüan History* biography, few of Liu Ping-chung's essays have survived, but many of his poems in both the regular and irregular forms (*shih* and *tz'u*) have been preserved in his *Ts'ang-ch'un chi*. His poetry, tinged with Buddhist and Taoist overtones, has been much commended by his contemporaries for its lofty and vigorous style and its plain and elegant phraseology, free of embroidery and obsolete diction. In these poems, one finds a reflection of Liu's involvement in state affairs and military campaigns, his relationship with the political leaders and literati, and, above all, his inner emotions, moments of joy and melancholy.

In his poetry, Liu Ping-chung expresses much admiration for Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), the literary prodigy of the late Chin, in particular for his theory of poetics. Having personally discussed poetry with Yüan Hao-wen, Liu expounded his views in ten quatrains called 'Tu I-shan shih' ('On Reading Yüan Hao-wen's Poetry'), on the model of Yüan's 'Lun shih chüeh-chü' ('Quatrains on Poetics'), and in several other poems. He believed that good poetry should express one's genuine feelings; he favoured a natural and rhythmic style, and decried the excessive use of ornate phraseology. Furthermore, he considered that a meticulous choice of diction is basic to good poetry, echoing in this the view of the T'ang poet Tu Fu (712-70) that 'a poet should not feel content unless every word of his poem has been refined.'

Apparently, Liu Ping-chung excelled in the metrical form of poetry called *san-ch'ü*, much in vogue in his time. Furthermore, he has been hailed as an accomplished musician skilled in the scores of the eminent masters Juan Hsien and Wang Hui-chih of the Chin dynasty, and is known to have composed musical plays (*tsa-chü*) as shown by the list of playwrights in the *Lu-kuei pu* by Chung Ssu-ch'eng (ca. 1330).

Finally, we should mention Liu Ping-chung's skill in calligraphy and painting. In calligraphy, he is said to have modelled himself (like his predecessor Yeh-lü Ch'u-

ts'ai) on the T'ang master Yen Chen-ch'ing (709-85) for the regular style (*k'ai-shu*), and on Wang Hsi-chih (321-79) and Wang Hsien-chih (344-88) of the Chin for the cursive style (*hsing-shu*), thus achieving an untrammelled and vigorous style of his own. In the opinion of a biographer, Liu Ping-chung's mastery of this art is comparable to that of Chao Feng (*chin-shih* of 1182), a well-known calligrapher of the Chin period. This view is echoed by several of his contemporaries, including Yüan Hao-wen and Wang Yün, but no specimen of his calligraphy has survived. He has, however, left several poems expounding his views on calligraphy. He considered that good calligraphy lies in the ability to emulate the model of the masters without being restricted by it, and that only by practicing the art freely could one accomplish a unique, distinguished style.

Liu Ping-chung also made his mark in the art of painting. One of his best known pieces was a scroll called 'Shan-chü t'u' ('Habitation in the Mountain'), noted for its heavy strokes and unconventional setting. It elicited much admiration from the early Ming Buddhist statesman Yao Kuang-hsiao (1335-1418), popularly known as the monk Tao-yüan, a great admirer of Liu Ping-chung who often compared his own role to that of his spiritual mentor. Unfortunately this scroll has not survived.

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17. CHANG WEN-CH' IEN (1217-1283)

Chang Wen-ch'ien, T. Chung-ch'ien, H. I-chai, who rose from humble origins to become a political adviser and senior administrator under Qubilai, was a native of Sha-ho, Hsing-chou (known as Shun-te prefecture under the Yüan), east of modern Ta-ming, Hopei. He was born in 1217, during the reign of the Chin emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-23), in a family that had settled there and engaged in agriculture for generations. Little is known of his ancestors and none of them had held government office before his father, Chang Ying, was appointed superintendent of the arsenal in Hsing-chou under the Chin ruler. A precocious child, Chang Wen-ch'ien entered the local school at an early age; there he became a classmate of Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*), also from Hsing-chou, and thus began a life-long association with the man who later rose to be the most influential statesman at the Mongol court. When still in his teens, Chang Wen-ch'ien is said to have contemplated a clerical career, probably because it was an easy avenue to high office under the current political system, but his father discouraged him and urged him instead to study the classics and become a scholar-official.

During the next few years, Chang Wen-ch'ien devoted himself to serious studies in preparation for the civil service examination, but that option disappeared when the Chin regime fell to the Mongols early in 1234. Like many of his contemporaries, Chang found himself a refugee, and eventually came under the protection of Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) who was then in charge of the military administration of Chen-ting in Hopei. Shih, a distinguished military leader, was also a generous patron of the Chinese literati and had given shelter to many unemployed scholars and notables in this troubled period of the Mongol conquest. Among the leading Chin scholars whom he assisted at the time were Wang Jo-hsü (1174-1243), Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), Li Chih (*q.v.*) and T'u-tan Kung-lü (1190-1257). Thus, Chang Wen-ch'ien was able personally to befriend those distinguished men, and to benefit from their learning and scholarship.

There is no information on Chang's activities until 1238, when he participated in the first civil service examinations held by the Mongol government. They were set by Ögödei for September of that year on the recommendation of the chief of the Secretariat Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*). Chang sat for the examination in the Ta-ming administration and was one of the 4,030 candidates to pass the tests. It is not known what degree he gained, but he and his family were exempted from taxes and corvée on the strength of his success. He probably received an official appointment, but our

record is completely silent on his subsequent career until a decade later, when his childhood friend Liu Ping-chung became a close adviser of Qubilai in Qara Qorum.

The rise of Liu Ping-chung from being a Buddhist monk to holding an exalted position in Qubilai's entourage was decisive for the careers of many of his former friends. As early as 1239, the Mongol prince had started to summon Chinese scholars and notables to Qara Qorum for consultation on state affairs, with a view to spotting potential allies. That year, the Ch'an master Hai-yün (*q.v.*) came to court accompanied by Liu Ping-chung, and Qubilai invited them to stay on as political advisers and to help recruit talented individuals for service in his administration. Consequently, Liu Ping-chung recommended several of his friends to Qubilai in the first few years of his sojourn at the Mongol capital (1240-44): the first to be summoned to court was Chang Wen-ch'ien. Chang arrived at Qara Qorum in 1247, while Liu Ping-chung was on leave at Hsing-t'ai to observe the period of mourning for his father. Qubilai was pleased with Chang and put him in charge of secretarial matters.

Chang Wen-ch'ien and his colleagues found an opportunity for political advancement when Möngke was elected emperor in July 1251. The new ruler delegated the administration of the conquered territories to members of his family and his principal supporters, and, because of Qubilai's achievements, he made Qubilai responsible for matters concerning the Chinese population. Chang, together with Liu Ping-chung, submitted a number of proposals for administrative and economic reform, but we know little of his specific contributions, although they may have been similar to those of Liu Ping-chung as listed in the latter's biography.

Later in the year Chang Wen-ch'ien joined Liu Ping-chung in initiating a series of administrative and economic reforms in Hsing-chou (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung). This region, a fertile and productive area under Qubilai's control, was then suffering from wanton exploitation by the Mongol nobles who had been granted the benefit of imposts on the local households. Most of the population had fled and the land lay waste. This catastrophic situation was brought to Qubilai's attention, who immediately consulted his advisers to find a remedy. Chang Wen-ch'ien and Liu Ping-chung proposed sweeping reforms in Hsing-chou and received Qubilai's permission to implement them. Liu then drew up a detailed program in consultation with Wen-ch'ien, and nominated his principal aides Chang Keng and Liu Su to be the pacification commissioners in charge of realising the reforms.

In due course a number of administrative and economic policies were introduced in Hsing-chou to replace the previous arbitrary methods of tax collection. The newly appointed officials established a Pacification Bureau staffed by experienced administrators, abolished irregular levies, fought corruption, and devoted themselves

to reorganising the fiscal administration and improving the productivity of the region. At the same time, they had the iron mines worked so as to create additional income for the government, issued paper money to increase the flow of currency, and improved the transportation system. These reforms turned out to be a great success: within a few months several thousand householders returned to their homeland and Hsing-chou was brought back to normality. Such a remarkable achievement greatly impressed Qubilai, and although Chang Wen-ch'ien did not play a direct role in the implementation of the reforms, he deserved credit for their success since he had laboured with Liu Ping-chung on the details of the program.

In October 1253, Chang Wen-ch'ien was summoned by Qubilai to serve as military adviser on his expedition against the kingdom of Ta-li in Yunnan. With him in the imperial entourage were several of Qubilai's Chinese assistants, including Liu Ping-chung and Yao Shu (*q.v.*). It is reported that they all admonished their lord to abstain from indiscriminate killing and spare the civilian population in order to encourage their submission (see the biographies of Liu Ping-chung and Yao Shu). They also remonstrated with Qubilai when he proposed to slaughter all the inhabitants of Ta-li in reprisal for the execution of Mongol envoys.

Early in 1258, Chang Wen-ch'ien and several of his colleagues were involved in the debates between the Buddhists and Taoists in K'ai-p'ing fu, seeking to resolve their differences. It appears that Chang intervened primarily in his official capacity, and that, like many of his colleagues, he bore no animosity towards the Taoist sect, especially since the controversy was not exclusively over religious issues, but over matters of political, social and economic supremacy.

In the following year Chang Wen-ch'ien was given another assignment by Qubilai, when Möngke ordered the latter to lead the campaign against the Sung strongholds in the Huai valley with a view to bringing about the unification of China. In August 1259 Qubilai set out with his forces, and Chang was again included in his entourage with Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu and others. As before, they urged the prince to restrain his generals from wanton slaughter. The Mongol forces encountered little resistance on the way and crossed the Huai River in September, reaching E-chou on the opposite bank the following month. The news then came of Möngke's death (11 August) in Ho-chou, Szechwan. While waiting confirmation of that report, Qubilai proceeded as planned: he dispatched Chang Wen-ch'ien to assemble naval vessels to recross the river, but the Mongols encountered stiff resistance from Sung reinforcements. In December, however, informed that his brother Ariq Böke had been intriguing to seize the throne, Qubilai set off for the north, leaving his generals to continue the siege of E-chou. At the same time, he ordered Chang Wen-ch'ien to increase his vigilance against the spies of Ariq Böke and to assemble the conquered

Chinese civilian populace, which numbered more than 20,000 households, and to bring them to the north in the Mongol service.

After his enthronement as qa'an in May 1260, Qubilai established the Secretarial Council on the recommendation of Liu Ping-chung and other advisers, appointed Wang Wen-t'ung as director of political affairs, and made Chang Wen-ch'ien, then forty-three, the assistant of the Left. These two Chinese officials worked together to develop principles of government and administrative policies. They soon clashed over economic issues, however, since Wen-t'ung, an expert on fiscal matters, wanted to give high priority to policies designed to increase the national wealth, whereas Chang being a Confucian moralist, was more concerned with the people's immediate welfare. As disagreement deepened, Chang Wen-ch'ien requested leave of office, but was appointed in June as commissioner of the Pacification Bureaux of Ta-ming, Chang-te and other adjacent districts in Hopei, while retaining his original rank in the Secretarial Council. These bureaux were established by Qubilai as a means of tightening Mongol control over the Chinese territories.

Upon his departure, Chang Wen-ch'ien is said to have pleaded with Wang Wen-t'ung to reduce the land rent and tax levies imposed on the households in north China that had suffered from a long drought and the ravages of war. In addition, he pointed out that when the people regained prosperity the state would benefit, and that even if it were desirable to increase the government revenue, that should be attempted only after a good harvest. Wang is said to have been convinced, perhaps out of political expedience rather than as a matter of principle, and recommended a reduction of one-tenth on the ordinary items of taxation, and of one-fifth on the levies on commerce and wine, much to the relief of the populace (see the biography of Wang Wen-t'ung).

Chang Wen-ch'ien took with him to his new posting a number of capable officials, including the talented young scientist Kuo Shou-ching (*q.v.*) who made a thorough survey of the irrigation system of the region. Although Chang spent only a few months as pacification commissioner, he made a commendable contribution. He revitalised the administration, dismissed corrupt officials, and generally improved the lot of the people. At the same time, he recruited a number of worthy scholars, including Tu Ying (1204-73), Hu Chih-yü (1227-95), and the distinguished Tung Wen-yung (*q.v.*), to serve respectively as superintendent of schools, second secretary, and first secretary of the Bureaux of the Left and the Right in charge of general administration.

Early in 1261, Chang Wen-ch'ien returned to K'ai-p'ing fu to resume duty as assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, a position he held intermittently until 1267. He was thus able to participate in the major activities of the Mongol government. Much information on his activity during the first year in office can be

found in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (*Memoirs of the Affairs of the Secretarial Council*) of Wang Yün (q.v.), a detailed contemporary account of proceedings by the central administration between 1260 and 1261. According to this source, Chang Wen-ch'ien held frequent discussions with Wang Wen-t'ung on the selection of officials for government appointments, the reduction of taxes, and the formulation of policies on paper currency. It also records an interesting incident which occurred in July 1261 when Qubilai ordered the Right chancellor Shih T'ien-tse to prepare a feast for the heir apparent of the King of Koryŏ (Korea), Wang Chik, and his retinue, who had come to pay homage and to congratulate Qubilai on the submission of Ariq Böke. Chang Wen-ch'ien and several other senior officials were invited to attend. During the feast Chang Wen-ch'ien asked whether the Korean royal family was descended from a hereditary minister. The prince denied this, saying that it issued from the thirteenth generation grandson of the T'ang emperor Shun-tsung (r. 805-6) who had fled to Korea during troubles in China. This claim, however, is highly dubious since it is not corroborated by the Korean sources (the latter only refer to Su-tsung); it might have been made to emphasise the Korean ruler's links with the Chinese imperial house. Nevertheless, it is an interesting episode in the annals of Korea's intercourse with the Mongol ruler of China.

Before long, Chang Wen-ch'ien and his colleagues came into bitter conflict with Aḥmad, who had received his first major assignment the previous year when he was transferred from his post of co-director of the Metropolitan Bureau in K'ai-p'ing fu to Yen-ching (Peking, later renamed Chung-tu and Ta-tu), there to supervise the inventory of the Imperial Treasury (see the biography of Aḥmad). Aḥmad was subsequently appointed to the concurrent office of commissioner of the Imperial Granary, and took charge of the Office for Harmonious Purchase, which he helped establish in order to increase the stores of grain. In late 1262, Qubilai, in recognition of his services, made him chief of the Left and the Right Boards of the Secretarial Council, and concurrently commissioner of the Transportation Bureaux of all the districts in the empire. These successive appointments gave Aḥmad extraordinary power over fiscal management; but being subordinate to the Secretarial Council, he still could not exercise independent authority. Consequently, he submitted a request to Qubilai asking to be made directly answerable to the emperor in fiscal matters, and the case was referred to the court for deliberation. At this point, Chang Wen-ch'ien led the opposition to Aḥmad's proposal, arguing that this would risk placing the management of the empire's finances under a single individual and would impose an additional burden on the emperor by compelling him to supervise personally an important branch of the administration. Qubilai accepted Chang Wen-ch'ien's objections and dismissed Aḥmad's suggestion; but Aḥmad did not give in and merely

changed tactics in his attempt to bypass the Secretarial Council. He ultimately achieved his aim, though only temporarily.

During the following two years of his tenure at the Secretarial Council, Chang Wen-ch'ien found an opportunity to befriend the renowned Confucian master Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), who was then residing in K'ai-p'ing fu (which was renamed Shang-tu in 1263) at Qubilai's instigation. Greatly impressed by Hsü Heng's erudition, Chang Wen-ch'ien sought to become his disciple, but Hsü advised him instead to devote himself to Confucian studies and to recommending worthy individuals for service in the government. Thereafter, Chang frequently sought Hsü's counsel, not only in the management of state affairs, but also on the subject of Neo-Confucianism, with which he became increasingly concerned towards the end of his life. In late 1262, deeply disturbed by the calumnies spread by his rival Aḥmad and other officials, he wrote to Hsü Heng asking for advice. In reply, Hsü expressed great sympathy for his troubles, but exhorted him to adhere to the principle of sincerity and righteousness, and to wait for the storm to blow over, acknowledging that it was difficult for a conscientious statesman to deal with such evil forces. During this time, besides discharging his many duties, Chang Wen-ch'ien also devoted much attention to the recruitment of capable scholars for the Mongol administration. That year, for instance, he recommended Kuo Shou-ching (*q.v.*), an erudite scholar skilled in astronomy and hydrological technology who later played an important role in the preparation of a new calendar for the dynasty.

In early 1264, after Qubilai had authorised the transfer of the capital to Chung-tu, Chang Wen-ch'ien was additionally called to serve as assistant of the Left in the Regional Secretarial Councils of Hsi-Hsia, Chung-hsing and other districts, responsible for the territories of the former Tangut Hsi-Hsia state in modern Kansu and Shensi which the Mongols had conquered in 1227. He summoned a number of experienced officials to accompany him there, including Kuo Shou-ching, then a vice-commissioner of waterways, and Tung Wen-yung, who was subsequently appointed first secretary of the Regional Secretarial Council. On his arrival Chang discovered that the local people, mainly Tanguts, were largely ignorant of Chinese customs and were not accustomed to the Chinese methods of government. He thereupon freed several of the educated Chinese from Szechwan who had been enslaved by the Mongols, had them trained in administration procedures, and used them to establish a bureaucratic administration. It is said that the Tanguts, inspired by his efforts, sent their children to be educated in the Chinese way – in consequence of which their customs changed rapidly. At the same time, finding that the two canals known as T'ang-lai and Han-yen, which had been the main means of irrigation in the region, had become silted, Chang charged Kuo and Tung with the task of dredging the waterways.

The project was completed within a year, rendering the canals adequate to irrigate over 100,000 *ching* of land; this greatly enhanced productivity and induced the return to farming of over 40,000 households. In early 1266, Chang was recalled to serve again as assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council at Chung-tu; the Regional Secretarial Council of Chung-hsing was subsequently abolished.

Chang Wen-ch'ien was immediately involved in the matter of a claim submitted by powerful Mongol nobles for several thousand Chinese families to serve as their personal slaves. He and his colleagues reviewed the case and proposed adopting the registration record for the year 1235 (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai) as the starting point: all households that were then registered as slave, whether or not they had owned any land, should be allotted to the claimants, whereas all others should be treated as free. Qubilai accepted the recommendation and made it law, thus preventing a dangerous precedent. In April of the following year, Qubilai, acting on the recommendation of An-t'ung (*q.v.*), the Right chancellor, reduced the supernumerary positions in the upper echelon of the Secretarial Council. This affected several Mongol and Chinese officials, and Chang Wen-ch'ien, who was one of them, found himself demoted to the function of associate director of political affairs. Nevertheless, he continued to enjoy Qubilai's trust and discharged various important duties during the following years.

In summer 1268, Chang Wen-ch'ien played a major role in suppressing the consequences of an uprising of a group of heretical religious rebels in Tzu-chou (Shantung). More than a hundred members of the movement, including their self-proclaimed spiritual leader Hu Wang, were captured by the local authorities. Their case was referred to the Secretarial Council for consideration. Chang examined the causes of the sedition and spoke in defence of the group, finding that many of the followers were harmless people beguiled by their leader's claim of magical powers, and that only the ringleaders should be punished, as an example for the rest. An-t'ung concurred with this judgement and dispatched Chang Wen-ch'ien with a Mongol overseer (*daruqači*) to Tzu-chou to carry it out. This done, Chang returned to court and, in September, was summoned by Qubilai to undertake a thorough review of the governmental agencies that had been established over the past years, in cooperation with Liu Ping-chung, Hsü Heng, the academician Wang Hsün (1235-81) and others (see the biography of Hsü Heng). The committee submitted a number of recommendations that are said to have been approved, thus strengthening the base of the Mongol regime.

On the recommendation of his advisers, Qubilai authorised the establishment of a Bureau of Agriculture in March 1270, and appointed Chang Wen-ch'ien its director. When the office was upgraded to Grand Bureau of Agriculture early in 1271, Chang

was promoted accordingly. He devoted himself to the task, proposing that agricultural bureaux be established in various districts to encourage cultivation, initiating the allocation of land to provide income for sacrificial offerings to ancestors and to the patron deities of agriculture and sericulture, and opening schools in the countryside. Further, he submitted with Tou Mo (*q.v.*) and others a memorial proposing the establishment of a National College in the new capital (renamed Ta-tu, or 'Great Capital' in March 1272) and recommending Hsü Heng, then assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, to be its rector. The proposal was adopted, thus starting the tradition of official sponsorship for Confucian studies at various levels, and furthering the advancement of Chinese scholars in government service.

In all these pursuits, Chang Wen-ch'ien and his colleagues were not without enemies; they soon were to clash with Aḥmad and his associates. In early 1270 Aḥmad had risen from commissioner of the fiscal agency known as the Office for Regulating State Expenditure (created in 1266) to director of political affairs, i.e. chief, of the Presidential Council. The Council was in charge of the overall fiscal administration and was independent of the Secretarial Council. Aḥmad planned a number of fiscal policies to increase state revenue, without much consideration for the welfare of the population. These measures included introducing a monopoly on the iron used to manufacture agricultural implements – which would then be sold at a high price; establishing separate Pacification Bureaux in the Tung-p'ing and Ta-ming districts for the purpose of tax collection; and issuing unsecured paper money. Pressure was put on local officials to support the proposals, thus giving Aḥmad a freer hand to carry out his plans. Having learned of this, Chang Wen-ch'ien joined with his colleagues to denounce Aḥmad's scheme before Qubilai. The emperor accepted their representations and ordered Aḥmad to desist from some of his intentions. Seeking vengeance for this interference, Aḥmad attempted to slander Chang and his other critics, but to no avail.

Chang Wen-ch'ien and his colleagues had another run-in with Aḥmad in March 1275, when, in the wake of the conquest of Sung, Qubilai sought advice at court about policies for the fiscal management of south China. Besides Chang and Aḥmad, the consultants also included Yao Shu and T'u-tan Kung-lü (see the biography of Yao Shu). Aḥmad proposed to replace the Sung credit notes, such as the *chiao-tzu* and *hui-tzu*, with the Yüan currency, but Yao and T'u-tan dissented on the ground that such a proposal would lead to monetary chaos. Further, T'u-tan pointed out that marshal Bayan (*q.v.*), who led the campaign against Southern Sung, had publicly promised the Sung people that he intended to honour their currencies; it would thus be a breach of faith to adopt a contrary policy. While expressing support for T'u-tan, Chang Wen-ch'ien proposed to defer action until further advice was obtained from

Bayan on the matter. As Qubilai had endorsed his scheme for drawing additional revenue to the state, Aḥmad had his way and introduced a series of measures designed to exploit the wealth of the former Sung territories. Those included not only the replacement of the Sung paper money, but also the imposition of a government monopoly on salt and herbal medicine. This was a major defeat for the Chinese advisers.

In 1276 Chang Wen-ch'ien was appointed chief censor, thus bringing to an end his long service in the Secretarial Council. He clashed again with Aḥmad when the latter, fearful lest his illegal activities be exposed, proposed to do away with the Judicial and Inspection Bureaux in the local circuits. Chang pleaded successfully with Qubilai to retain these agencies, but, concerned about the possible repercussions of his actions, he requested and obtained leave of office.

In the following year, Chang Wen-ch'ien was given a new appointment as senior academician of the Chao-wen Academy, and he also assumed supervision of a special bureau for the compilation of a new calendar, established in July of the previous year. (Most Yüan sources claim that Chang was concurrently appointed director of the Department of Calendrical Affairs. However, this office was not established until February 1278 to expedite the preparation of the calendar. The department was formally headed by the academician Hsü Heng, but was actually in the charge of Wang Hsün, tutor to the heir apparent.) Before this time, the Mongol rulers had successively used three different calendars: the *Ta-ming li* of the Chin first promulgated in 1137 and revised in 1182, the *Keng-wu yüan-li* compiled by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai at the time of Činggis Qan's Western Campaign, and the *Wan-nien li* compiled by the Persian astronomer Ĵamāl al-Dīn in 1267. All those calendars, based on earlier Chin and Sung reckonings, became increasingly inaccurate with time. In his later years Liu Ping-chung had tried to produce a replacement, but had died before completing the task.

As head of Qubilai's special calendrical commission, Chang Wen-ch'ien was assisted by a number of distinguished scholars. They included Wang Hsün, Chang I and Hsü Heng, but the main task was assigned to Kuo Shou-ching who, being an expert in astronomy, was primarily responsible for the reform. The new calendar, based on a thorough re-examination and revision of the *Ta-ming li* of the Chin and of a number of Sung works, was completed in late 1280; it came to be known as the *Shou-shih li* and was subsequently adopted as the official calendar of the Yüan dynasty (see the biography of Kuo Shou-ching).

During this period, Chang Wen-ch'ien was also involved in an incident worth recording. In June 1277 Qubilai was taken ill at Shang-tu, and some of his officials, disturbed by what they regarded as the inauspicious omen of an accidental fire that

had destroyed many civilian residences, proposed to move the summer capital elsewhere. When the matter was referred to the court for discussion, Chang joined Chang I and others in opposing the suggestion, and advised the emperor not to be swayed by such superstitious claptrap. The proposal was dismissed, but Qubilai, who like most Mongol rulers believed in omens, did not fail to express his disappointment at the decision.

Chang Wen-ch'ien stayed on as senior academician until January 1283, when he was transferred to the post of vice-commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs. In this capacity, he submitted a number of proposals aimed at improving the military administration, which involved notably the elimination of sinecures, the secondment of soldiers for advanced training, and the provision of adequate family allowances. Unfortunately, he fell ill before his plans were put into effect and died on 28 March, at the age of sixty-six. He was buried in Ta-tu with full honours.

Chang Wen-chien was survived by three sons and seven daughters by two wives and one concubine. His first wife, who died early, gave birth to a daughter, and his second wife, née Liu bore him two male heirs, Chang Yen and Chang Kao, and five daughters, while his concubine produced a son, Chang Sheng, and a daughter.

In 1295, upon the enthronement of Emperor Temür (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307), Chang was granted the posthumous titles of Supreme Pillar of State, Grand Preceptor and Great Officer of Brilliant Dignity, and was named Wen-hsüan ('Cultured and Expressive'). Furthermore, the academician Li Ch'ien composed a solemn epitaph in his honour. This, now preserved in the *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* of Su T'ien-chüeh, and the biography included in the *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* by the same author, provide the basic information on Chang Wen-ch'ien's life and career. In 1330 Chang's heir Chang Yen transferred his father's remains to his native place; at Yen's request, the eminent academician Yü Chi (1272-1348) composed a eulogy, entitled 'Chang-shih hsin-ying chi' to commemorate the occasion. This essay, later included in Yü Chi's collected works, sheds additional light on the family history and on later scholars' appraisal of Chang Wen-ch'ien's political career.

Chang Yen, the most illustrious of Chang Wen-ch'ien's sons, was an accomplished scholar and pursued a worthy official career in the footsteps of his father. Under Qubilai, he served successively as first secretary in the ministries of Justice and Rites, and as assistant director of the Bureau of Agriculture. After Temür's accession, he was appointed lecturer-in-waiting of the Chi-hsien Academy and was invited to lecture at court on the classics and history. He was later promoted to chief censor in the Regional Censorate of Shensi and retired from office in 1321. He lived for another decade or so and, after his death, was granted the rank of director

of political affairs in the Secretarial Council of the region. He was posthumously named Wen-ching ('Cultured and Pacific').

Chang Wen-ch'ien deserves a high place among the many Chinese who served the Mongol rulers during the early phase of their settlement in China. He was not a distinguished Confucian scholar or *littérateur* like some of his colleagues; while he was included in the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an* of Huang Tsung-hsi, this was primarily because of his ties to Hsü Heng rather than for his achievements in the field of Neo-Confucianism.

As Qubilai's adviser, Chang Wen-ch'ien became a close associate of Liu Ping-chung, and both men worked as a team in formulating and implementing policies for the prince. In general Liu was the driving force while Chang took care of the details, thus complementing his colleague's contribution. Their collaborative effort appears in the recommendations for the reorganisation of governmental institutions, the formulation of social and economic policies, and in many other proposals of national importance. This also holds true of their executive proceedings, such as local reforms – particularly in Hsing-chou in 1251-1252; the promotion of Confucian studies through the institution of the National College; in military campaigns; and in various aspects of state affairs before Qubilai's accession in 1260. In many of these instances, although strongly influenced and inspired by Liu Ping-chung, Chang Wen-ch'ien took a number of independent initiatives, displaying insight and good judgement. At the same time, like other contemporary top-ranking advisers, he recommended talented scholars and capable individuals for official appointments, thereby contributing significantly to the efficiency of the Mongol administration and to the promotion of Chinese influence in government during the early years of Qubilai's reign.

Chang Wen-ch'ien emerged as a more independent political figure after Qubilai's accession, when he was appointed to the Secretarial Council and given various assignments as a commissioner in the Pacification Bureau, and other posts. He carried out his duties cautiously but efficiently according to the Confucian ideal of government, strengthening the state without overtaxing the population, and sought to achieve those goals through institutional reforms, efficient management and the pursuit of justice. The contemporary academician Wang Yün, reminiscing about Chang Wen-ch'ien, made this apt remark: 'His character was calm, peaceful, quiet and respectable. He was diligent in government affairs. He did not shout or show an angry face.' Then, recalling an instruction received from him while serving in the Secretarial Council, Wang Yün wrote: '(He instructed me as follows:) "As for court matters, there are big ones and small ones. On big matters, we must (first) deliberate, (then) we dare memorialise (the emperor). It is all right (even if matters) are

somewhat behind schedule.” These commendable qualities probably accounted for much of Chang Wen-ch’ien’s success in the early phase of his career.

In later years, however, Chang Wen-ch’ien found it increasingly difficult to discharge his duties in the changed political circumstances following Aḥmad’s rise to power. Together with many of his colleagues, he mounted a vigorous opposition to Aḥmad and tried to contain the man’s influence, but he lost out because the emperor, while valuing the contribution of his Chinese advisers, was under pressure to increase state revenue. Nonetheless, Chang Wen-ch’ien maintained his integrity and dedicated himself to minimising the impact of Aḥmad’s harmful policies.

While he was not an accomplished man of letters, Chang Wen-ch’ien dabbled in painting and his work was noticed by a contemporary, Yang Hung-tao, in his *Hsiao-heng chi*. However, none of it has survived.

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18. KUO SHOU-CHING (1231-1316)

Kuo Shou-ching, T. Jo-ssu, was born in 1231 at Hsing-t'ai, in the Shun-te administration (Hopei), during the reign of the Chin emperor Ai-tsung (r. 1224-34). The names of his parents can no longer be traced, but it is known that his grandfather, Kuo Jung, was well-educated in the classics and mathematics, and had an interest in water works. Kuo Yung was a friend of his townsman, Liu Ping-chung (q.v.), later the Buddho-Taoist confidant of Qubilai Qa'an, who possessed a good knowledge of astronomy, mathematics, and geography.

As a child Kuo Shou-ching is said to have already shown traits setting him apart from other children, inasmuch as he took no pleasure in games and play. At the age of fourteen or fifteen, he came across a diagram of the 'Lotus Clepsydra' (*lien-hua lou*) and was able to understand at first sight the principle of this time-keeping device. (The 'Lotus Clepsydra' was so called because the top of the recipient vessel was shaped like a lotus flower.) The instrument had been devised by the Northern Sung scientist Yen Su and officially adopted in 1036. In 1246, Liu Ping-chung returned to Hsing-t'ai to observe the mourning period for his father and stayed there for a few years. During that time, Liu and a group of scholars, including Chang Wen-ch'ien (q.v.), Chang I (d. 1282), Wang Hsün (1235-81) and others were in the habit of meeting regularly for scholarly discussions at Tzu-chin Mountain, west of Hsing-chou (Shun-te). All were versed in classical scholarship, and especially in astronomy and mathematics. Kuo Yung seized this opportunity to make his grandson study under Liu Ping-chung, most likely sometime between 1246 and 1249. In this way, Kuo Shou-ching became known to the other scholars, especially to Chang Wen-ch'ien who later recommended him to Qubilai.

In late 1251, as a lad of twenty, Kuo Shou-ching got his first chance to demonstrate his scientific talent. The countryside north of Hsing-chou was encompassed by three converging rivers, the Liao-shui, the Ta-huo ch'üan, and the Kang-shui, all flowing westward. When the Mongols overran China, the lower course of the Liao-shui became obstructed, which caused the waters to bank up in a vast muddy marsh. There were stone bridges on all three rivers, but that over the Ta-huo ch'üan was washed away and no trace of its foundations could be found. It was replaced in due course by a temporary wooden structure so flimsy that it kept collapsing and had to be rebuilt repeatedly over the years, causing the local people a great deal of inconvenience. In autumn 1251, Chang Keng and Liu Su (1188-1263) were appointed pacification commissioners of the region by Möngke. Anxious to

resolve the problems of the bridge, they took counsel with the local elders and with such as knew the river, and inspected the site personally. Informed of Kuo Shou-ching's talents, they had him produce plans and cost estimates, and put him in charge of the restoration project. Kuo surveyed the area and located the site of the old bridge. He cleared the mud that covered its footings and had the structure rebuilt, thus ensuring easy passage once again. The project required only four hundred labourers and was completed in forty days. This feat was duly recorded by the great former Chin literatus Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257) in a commemorative document written for this occasion.

In June 1260, after Qubilai's enthronement, Chang Wen-ch'ien was appointed assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, and shortly thereafter was despatched to Ta-ming, Chang-te, and adjacent districts, to overhaul the local administration. He took Kuo Shou-ching with him, which gave the young engineer an opportunity thoroughly to survey the irrigation systems of the region. At the same time, Kuo had undertaken to improve the instruments of astronomy. He cast a bronze clepsydra (*t'ung-hu*) for the local observatory; constructed a bamboo *hsüan-chi* instrument after a diagram from the *Shu-ching* (*Book of History*); and also a tower for observing the twenty-eight lunar mansions (*hsiu*), as well as the larger stars and the constellations. (Whereas Michel interprets the *hsüan-chi* as a template, Kuo's apparatus seems more likely to have been an armillary sphere.) The clepsydra, known as the Pao-shan clepsydra, was completed in March 1262 and was subsequently moved to the capital city Yen-ching (later Ta-tu), i.e. the present-day Peking.

Greatly impressed, Chang Wen-ch'ien recommended Kuo Shou-ching to Qubilai in 1262, praising his expertise in water works and his extraordinary intelligence. In August, the qa'an granted Kuo an audience at Shang-tu. On that occasion, Kuo presented six different schemes for improving irrigation and waterways in the region south of Yen-ching and north of the Yellow River. They were:

1. The water flowing from Yü-ch'üan Mountain (the famous 'Jade Fountain') north-west of the capital could be diverted into the disused canal constructed by the Chin, which had become unserviceable by Kuo's time. This would reactivate the canal connecting the capital and T'ung-chou (in Hopei) and save 60,000 *min* in road transport expenses annually. Furthermore, an extension of the canal from the mouth of the Lin-yü River south of T'ung-chou, to Yang-ts'un (north-west of Tientsin), would present three advantages: it would avoid the shallow and muddy stretches of the river; it would offer shelter from wind and waves; and it would eliminate the need for transshipping cargo.

2. The water from the Ta-huo ch'üan to the north of Shun-te could be diverted to run into the walled city so that it would flow eastwards in three tributaries. The water could be used to irrigate the farms to the east of the city.
3. The Li River, which flowed northwards from south of Shun-te to Jen-ch'eng (also in Hopei), was blocked by mud at that time and had inundated more than 1,300 *ch'ing* of farm land. With proper drainage the farms could become arable once again and the Li River would flow towards Hsiao-wang ts'un where it would join the Hu-t'o River and enter the Yü River (i.e. the Wei River) and would be navigable all the way.
4. At the junction of the Fu and Chang rivers north-east of Tz'u-chou (Hopei), a canal could be dug to lead the waters northwards to Han-tan and Yung-nien, and via Chi-tse (north-west of Ch'ü-chou, Hopei) into the Li River, providing irrigation for over 3,000 *ch'ing* of farm land.
5. Although the course of the Ch'in River between Huai-chou and Meng-chou (Honan) provided some irrigation facilities, the channel was overloaded and banks had been broken by excess water. Irrigation for over 2,000 *ch'ing* could be provided if the latter were diverted to collect the overflow from the Tan before being led into the Yü River north of Wu-ch'ih.
6. West of Meng-chou, a waterway could be dug on the northern shore of the Yellow River, running north then east between the new and old sites of Meng-chou and then along the course of the Yellow River to Wen county before it rejoined the Yellow River further south. This would irrigate more than 2,000 *ch'ing* of farm land.

Kuo's presentation greatly impressed Qubilai, who immediately appointed him superintendent of waterways for the various districts. The first of Kuo's suggestions was actually implemented. The following year Kuo was rewarded with promotion to the rank of vice-commissioner of waterways, and was granted the silver tablet (*yin-fu*).

Early in 1264, in his capacity as assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, Chang Wen-ch'ien was appointed assistant of the Left in the Regional Secretarial Councils of Hsi-Hsia, Chung-hsing and neighbouring districts, comprising the territories of the defunct Tangut state in Kansu and Shensi. Once again, he took Kuo and a Mongol official, Ai Dö'en, with him to restore the irrigation systems along the Yellow River in Hsi-Hsia that had become blocked or damaged during the years of war. Those systems, the most extensive of which was the T'ang-lai ch'ü, (*ca.* 220 km in length) and the second largest, the Han-yen ch'ü (*ca.* 140 km), included more than

ten main channels flowing from the Yellow River into some sixty-eight branch canals. The area irrigated by this network amounted to some half a million hectares. After Kuo had completed his mission, the Tangut people built a temple on the bank of a canal to make offerings to him even though he was still alive.

The following year Kuo Shou-ching was appointed vice-director of waterways on his return to the capital. On his way back he had sailed four days and nights on the Yellow River to Tung-sheng (in Inner Mongolia) and discovered that this particular stretch of the river was navigable for large cargo boats. He also went past the Cha-po-wu-lang Sea (Wu-liang-su, in Inner Mongolia) and observed many derelict canals that might be restored. These findings were duly reported to the Mongol court. Kuo may thus have been the first to survey the sources of the Yellow River. Similarly, Kuo drew attention to another old canal constructed under the Chin between Ma-ku ts'un (north-west of Shih-ching Mountain, and some 20 km west of Yen-ching) and the Lu-kou River (i.e. the Yung-ting River). Its waters came out of the mountain range to the west of the capital, at a place known as Chin-k'ou. A vast area of farm land between Chin-k'ou and the capital used to be irrigated from this canal, but the outflow at Chin-k'ou had been blocked during the war between the Mongols and the Jurchens, after which the responsible government official was loath to reopen the outlet for fear of flooding downstream. Kuo suggested that the old canal be widened and deepened, so that it could be used both for navigation and for irrigation while safely draining away any excess water. This suggestion was adopted.

In 1271 Kuo Shou-ching was made director of waterways. Later that year Qubilai adopted the dynastic title of 'Great Yüan' (Ta-Yüan), and renamed the capital Ta-tu shortly thereafter. The emperor then launched his troops against the Southern Sung; the Mongol forces, under the command of Bayan (*q.v.*), met with great success in several campaigns. In 1275 Bayan commanded Kuo to survey the plain at the confluence of the Yellow and Huai rivers with a view to building ports and waterways for the supply of the southern front with men and material. Kuo produced a map indicating how Chi-chou, Ta-ming, and Tung-p'ing could be linked by waterways with the Ssu, Wen and Yü rivers, which he presented to the emperor. He also compared the elevations above sea-level of the capital, P'ei county and Lü-liang (Honan). In the following year, the Directorate of Waterways was reorganised and absorbed into the Ministry of Works; Kuo thus lost his post in the former department and became a first secretary in the ministry.

At that time, the calendar in official use was the revised *Ta-ming li* adopted by the Chin court in 1182. (The original *Ta-ming li* was compiled in the Liu-Sung period, 420-79.) But, after more than ninety years, its accuracy had deteriorated; indeed, the solar cycle had fallen out of step with the lunar cycle by as much as two days. Yeh-lü

Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*) had earlier suggested adopting the *Keng-wu yüan-li* calendar which he had compiled to replace the *Ta-ming li*, and the Persian astronomer Ĵamāl al-Dīn had also presented a *Wan-nien li* calendar based on the Muslim system (*Hui-hui li-fa*) to Qubilai in 1267. Neither system was accepted. A few years before his death in 1274, Liu Ping-chung had memorialised the emperor on the need for reforming the calendar and proposed to undertake the task himself, but he died shortly thereafter. In 1276, when the capital of Southern Sung, Lin-an (Hang-chou), had fallen to the Mongol army, Qubilai considered that the time had come to introduce a new calendar. In July of that year, he commissioned a special bureau to that effect, with Wang Hsün, then tutor to the heir apparent Ĵingim and an expert mathematician, and also Chang I, in charge of the task. The calendrical bureau passed subsequently under the supervision of Chang Wen-ch'ien, then a senior academician of the Chao-wen Academy. In addition to Wang Hsün and Chang I, Chang invited Kuo Shou-ching and Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), the retired rector of the National College and an expert in calendar science, to lead a group of astronomers in making and compiling observations of the sun at an array of latitudes.

According to Kuo, the accuracy of the calendar depended on the accuracy of the observations, which in turn depended on the precision of the astronomical instruments employed. He pointed out that the armillary sphere used at that time at the capital Ta-tu had been made by the Sung at their own capital of Pien (K'ai-feng) and that there was a difference of about 4 degrees between the two sites; moreover, the gnomon erected by the Sung had become tilted with the passage of time. Kuo then set about to construct seventeen different astronomical instruments, the first thirteen for use in the observatory and the other four for field work. These instruments were:

1. *Chien i* ('Simplified Instrument'). This is the equatorial torquetum. A replica, made by the Ming astronomer Huang-fu Chung-ho in 1437, is displayed at the Tzu-chin Mountain Observatory, Nanking. It looks like a medieval Arabic and European torquetum without the ecliptic components – which makes it equatorial and justifies the name 'simplified.' Indeed, Kuo appears to have adapted the conventional torquetum which read ecliptic coordinates to one which read equatorial coordinates directly. The original instrument was examined but described inaccurately by Matteo Ricci in the early seventeenth century.
2. *Kao-piao* ('High Gnomons'). Giant gnomons, some 12 m high. There is an example of this instrument at Yang-ch'eng which is described by Tung Tso-pin and his collaborators.

3. *Hou-chi i* ('Pole-Observing Instrument'). Probably a pole-sighting tube provided at its upper end with a 'pole-determining circle.' The tube might have been included in the equatorial torquetum in (1) above.
4. *Hun-t'ien hsiang* ('Celestial Globe'). This was a large globe and, according to Ricci, three men with outstretched arms could hardly have embraced it. It was provided with meridians and declination circles parallel to the equator. Any markings of stars that it probably carried originally would have been erased by exposure to the elements in Ricci's time.
5. *Ling-lung i* ('Ingenious Armillary Sphere'). This instrument was examined and described by Ricci, who said:

The second instrument was a great (armillary) sphere not less in diameter than that measure of the outstretched arms which is commonly called a geometric pace. It had a horizon (-circle) and poles; instead of (solid) circles it was provided with certain double hoops (armillae), the void space between the pair serving the same purpose as the circles of our spheres. All these were divided into 365 degrees and some odd minutes. There was no globe representing the earth in the centre, but there was a certain tube, bored like a gun-barrel, which could readily be turned about and placed at any degree or altitude so as to observe any particular star, just as we do with our vane sights – not at all a despicable device. (From Needham, III:368.)

This tube, which appeared so strange to Ricci, was of course the sighting-tube used in Chinese astronomy. A replica of this equatorial armillary sphere made in 1437 by Huang-fu Chung-ho can be seen in the grounds of the Tzu-chin Mountain Observatory. However, Po Shu-ren (Po SR82) suggests that what Ricci saw and described was not the *ling-lung i*, but only the *hun-i* (armillary sphere), and that (5) was probably a large copper sphere with perforations on its surface to mark the positions of the stars.

6. *Yang-i* ('Upward-Looking Instrument'). A hemispherical sundial.
7. *Li-yün i* ('Vertical Revolving Circle'). The vertical circle in the equatorial torquetum in (1) above. Together with the azimuthal circle in (14) below, this would be equivalent of modern altazimuths and theodolites.
8. *Cheng-li i* ('Verification Instrument'). An instrument used to determine the exact positions of the sun and the moon near the ecliptic and above the horizon. It might have been an ecliptically mounted sighting-tube, or perhaps a component of the Ingenious Armillary Sphere in (5) above.

9. *Ching-fu* ('Shadow Definer'). An ingenious device using the principle of the pin-hole to focus the image of a cross-bar mounted on top of a gnomon, whereby to determine more easily the position of the shadow projected by the apex of the gnomon. The pin-hole was made in the middle of a copper leaf 2 inches wide and 4 inches long, set on an horizontal graduated runner facing the horizontal cross-bar on top of the gnomon. When the cross-bar was seen through the pin-hole to bisect the sun's disc, the position of the device measured the shadow of the cross-bar on the horizontal graduated scale.
10. *K'uei-chi* ('Observing Table'). The text of Kuo Shou-ch'ing's biography in the *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* compiled by Su T'ien-ch'üeh (1294-1352) merely says, 'Although the moon is bright, it is difficult to measure its shadow, (and hence) the *k'uei-chi* was made.' Needham suggests that this was apparently an adaptation of the gnomon and shadow-definer for lunar observations.
11. *Jih-yüeh-shih i* ('Instrument for Observing Solar and Lunar Eclipses'). Our sources give no explanation, but according to Needham this was perhaps the adjustable dioptra described by Arabic writers for determining disc diameters in partial eclipses.
12. *Hsing-kuei* ('Star Dial'). In the absence of factual information, Needham speculates that this could have been the 'nocturnal,' a device for telling the time at night by the fixed stars, consisting of a graduated disc or dial with a hole in the centre and a long projecting arm that could be rotated.
13. *Ting-shih i* ('Time-Determining Instrument'). Little is known about this instrument. Needham suggests that it could either be the 'diurnal circle' of the equatorial torquetum in (1) above, or another name for the Star Dial in (12). Po Shu-ren is inclined to think that (12) and (13) refer to one and the same instrument and that the *Hsing-kuei ting-shi i* was probably a modified form of the *al-Uṣṭurlāb*.
14. *Cheng-fang an* ('Direction-Determining Table'). This was the azimuthal circle, probably used as a component of the equatorial torquetum in (1) above.
15. *Wan-piao hsüan* ('Suspended Bob-Indicator'). Probably the hanging plumb-line used for checking the trueness of instruments such as the gnomons. Po Shu-ren suggests that (15) should be read as *Wan-piao*, probably a portable type of spherical sun-dial.

16. *Cheng-i* ('Rectifying Instrument'). No description of this instrument is given. If the Suspended Bob-Indicator in (15) above served as a plumb-line, the Rectifying Instrument might have been a water-level, although nothing substantiates this inference. Po Shu-ren thinks that (16) should read *Hsüan cheng-i* ('Suspended Rectifying Instrument') with a suspended plumb-line.
17. *Tso-cheng i* ('Rectifying Instrument on a Stand'). In the absence of any information about it, this instrument may be taken to have been the same as (16) above, mounted on a stand. Po Shu-ren suggests that this was probably an improved version of the water-level.

After the fall of the Yüan, the instruments constructed by Kuo Shou-ching and preserved at the observatory in Ta-tu were removed to Nanking. Between 1437 and 1442, Huang-fu Chung-ho made bronze replicas of all of them. They greatly impressed the Jesuit astronomer Johann Adam Schall von Bell (in Chinese T'ang Jo-wang, 1591-1666), then in the service of the Manchu court. In 1715, however, another Jesuit, Bernard Kilian Stumpf (Chi Li-an 1655-1720), then director of the Astronomical Bureau at Nanking, melted down Kuo's original bronze instruments and also most of Huang-fu's replicas, using the recycled metal to cast new instruments. What remains today are only the Ming replicas of Kuo's equatorial armillary sphere, the equatorial torquetum and the celestial globe.

In February 1278, to expedite the compilation of the new calendar, Qubilai made the calendrical bureau into a full Department of Calendrical Affairs of which Hsü Heng, then senior academician of the Chi-hsien Court, was appointed titular supervisor. The actual administration was entrusted to Wang Hsün, who became director with Kuo Shou-ching as co-director. Wang and Kuo suggested jointly to Qubilai that a new observatory be built at Ta-tu and that it be provided with its own set of bronze astronomical instruments including a gnomon 12 m high to project a long, clear shadow. They further recommended setting up observation stations at five different localities. Qubilai adopted their proposal: he appointed Tuan Chen, vice-minister of Works, to supervise the building of observatories, and later made Aniga, an official of Nepalese origin, responsible for the production of the astronomical instruments. In spring of 1279, a suitable site was chosen close by the eastern adobe wall, outside Chien-kuo men in modern Peking and north of the P'ao-tzu River. Work on the new observatory, exceeding in scale that of Marāgha built in 1259 by Nāṣir al-Dīn Tūsī (1201-74), was then begun. When completed, the complex was provided with offices for the staff not only of the observatory itself but also of the Directorate of Astronomy, with suitable rooms and platforms for housing the various astronomical

instruments, not to mention library and archives, meeting rooms, and even a printing press for printing calendars and almanacs.

All the astronomical instruments were completed and tested that same year. Kuo Shou-ching presented them and explained their functions to Qubilai, who is said to have followed the demonstration untiringly from morning to afternoon. Kuo seized this opportunity to address the emperor on the desirability of two urgent initiatives. The first was to seek experts in calendar science throughout the country to assist in the current task, and the second was to despatch parties of observers to measure the length of gnomon shadows cast by the sun along a transect from the capital through Ho-nan to Nan-hai in south China. Kuo explained that it was essential that shadow-measurements should be carried out over a wider set of latitudes in order to achieve greater accuracy than that obtained by I-hsing and Nan-kung Yüeh during the T'ang dynasty. Qubilai accepted this and appointed fourteen observing officers, who were sent to Koryŏ (Korea) in the east, to T'ien-ch'ih (Yunnan) in the west, to the country of the T'ieh-le (Töles) people in the Irtysh-Yenisei region in the north, and to Chu-ai (in Hainan Island) in the south. Field observers operated at twenty-seven stations, and readings made during the summer solstice at some of the stations were recorded as follows:

Station	North Polar Distance	Observations at Summer Solstice		
		Shadow Length and Direction	Length of day	Length of night
Nan-hai (Kuang-chou, Kwangtung)	15 <i>tu</i> ¹ (14.8°)	1.16 ft S. of gnomon	54 <i>k'o</i>	46 <i>k'o</i> ²
Heng-yüeh (N. of Heng- yang, Hunan)	25 <i>tu</i> (24.6°)	nil; sun directly overhead	56 <i>k'o</i>	44 <i>k'o</i>
Yüeh-t'ai (Hsiang-fu, Honan)	35 <i>tu</i> (34.5°)	1.48 ft N. of gnomon	60 <i>k'o</i>	40 <i>k'o</i>
Ta-tu (Peking)	40 1/12 <i>tu</i> (39.7°)	10.236 ft N. of gnomon ³	62 <i>k'o</i>	38 <i>k'o</i>
Ho-lin (Qara Qorum, Mongolia)	45 <i>tu</i> (44.4°)	3.24 ft N. of gnomon	64 <i>k'o</i>	36 <i>k'o</i>

1. 365.25 *tu* = 360°.

2. 1 *k'o* = 14.4 mins = 1/100th of 24 hrs day.

3. Apparently a 40-ft-high gnomon was used in the capital instead of the usual 8-ft-high gnomon.

T'ieh-le (Töles)	55 <i>tu</i> (54.2°)	5.10 ft N. of gnomon	70 <i>k'o</i>	30 <i>k'o</i>
Pei-hai (Lake Baikal)	65 <i>tu</i> (64.1°)	6.78 ft N. of gnomon	82 <i>k'o</i>	18 <i>k'o</i>

North Polar distances were also recorded for the following localities:

Shang-tu	43 1/4	<i>tu</i> ¹	(42.6°)
Pei-ching	42 1/12	<i>tu</i>	(42.5°)
I-tu	37 1/4	<i>tu</i>	(36.7°)
Teng-chou	38 1/4	<i>tu</i>	(37.7°)
Kao-li (Korea)	38 1/4	<i>tu</i>	(37.7°)
Hsi-ching	40 1/4	<i>tu</i>	(39.7°)
T'ai-yüan	38 1/4	<i>tu</i>	(37.7°)
An-hsi fu	34 7/8	<i>tu</i>	(34.4°)
Hsing-yüan	33 7/8	<i>tu</i>	(33.4°)
Ch'eng-tu	31 5/8	<i>tu</i>	(31.2°)
Hsi-liang chou	40 1/12	<i>tu</i>	(39.5°)
Tung-p'ing	35 3/4	<i>tu</i>	(35.2°)
Ta-ming	36	<i>tu</i>	(35.5°)
Nan-ching	34 5/6	<i>tu</i>	(34.3°)
Yang-ch'eng	34 2/3	<i>tu</i>	(34.2°)
Yang-chou	33	<i>tu</i>	(32.5°)
E-chou	31 1/2	<i>tu</i>	(31.1°)
Chi-chou	26 1/2	<i>tu</i>	(26.1°)
Lei-chou	19 3/4	<i>tu</i>	(19.5°)
Ch'iung-chou	20 3/4	<i>tu</i>	(26.1°)

That same year, the newly established department also recruited an eminent mathematician, Yang Kung-i (1225-94), who was an expert in calendar science. He made a contribution to the compilation of the new calendar no less significant than that of Kuo Shou-ching and his associates.

The *Shou-shih li*, or Calendar for Fixing the Seasons, was finally completed in spring 1280 and formally presented to the court. With great delight, Qubilai promulgated the calendar at the end of the year and ordered its formal adoption in the first month of the following year. It remained in use until its replacement by the *Ta-t'ung li* towards the end of the Ming dynasty. Kuo Shou-ching and all those engaged in the compilation project were richly rewarded according to their rank. In his memorial to Qubilai accompanying the presentation of the *Shou-shih li* submitted jointly with Yang Kung-i and others, Kuo reported that the author had checked and revised seven old parameters and adopted five new ones. The seven old parameters were:

1. The sub-divisions of the *tu* are after Yabuuti as described in Ho PY66:61-62.

1. *Determination of the exact time of winter solstice for the year 1280*

By taking daily observations of the length of the gnomon's meridian shadow beginning from the 1276 *li-tung* (fortnightly period at mid-point between the autumn equinox and the winter solstice) onward, the winter solstice in 1277 was calculated to occur at 8.5 *k'o* after midnight on the *wu-hsü* day (9/12/1277 at 02.02,2 hours); the summer solstice in the same year, at 70 *k'o* after midnight on the *keng-tzu* day (14/6/1277 at 16.48 hours); the winter solstice in 1278, at 33 *k'o* after midnight on the *kuei-mao* day (9/12/1278 at 07.55,2 hours); the winter solstice in 1279, at 57.5 *k'o* after midnight on the *wu-shen* day (9/12/1279 at 12.08 hours); and the winter solstice 1280, at 81.5 *k'o* after midnight on the *kuei-ch'ou* day (8/12/1280 at 14.33,6 hours). These values differed from those in the original *Ta-ming li* by 18 *k'o* (4 hours 19.2 mins.).

2. *Tropical year*

By taking the estimated time of the winter solstice in six different years recorded over a period of 810 years since the promulgation of the *Ta-ming li*, a value of 365.2425 days was determined for the tropical year.

3. *Positions of the sun*

From the lunar eclipse on the *kuei-yu* day of the 4th lunar month of the *ting-ch'ou* year (8 May 1277), the position of the sun at the winter solstice was calculated to be 10 *tu* (9.8°) from the determinant star of the Chi lunar mansion (γ Sagittarius) on the equator and just over 9 *tu* (8.9°) from the same determinant star on the ecliptic.

4. *Lunar motion*

The daily motion of the moon was recorded from the *ting-ch'ou* year (1277); phases of acceleration and deceleration were noted and the eclipses checked. The *Ta-ming li* was found to be out by 30 *k'o* (7 hours 12 mins).

5. *Nodes*

Nodes were calculated from daily observations of the moon starting from the fifth lunar month of the *ting-ch'ou* year (1277); the times at which the moon's path crossed the ecliptic did not differ much from those predicted by the *Ta-ming li*.

6. Distances from the determinant-stars of the 28 lunar mansions

In the new instruments used for measuring distances from the determinant-stars, each *tu* was divided into 36 *fen*, and the terms *t'ai*, *pan* and *shao* were used to denote 27 *fen*, 18 *fen* and 9 *fen*, respectively.

7. Time of sunrise and sunset

Kuo determined the times of sunrise and sunset on the summer and winter solstices at the Mongol capital of Ta-tu.

The following five new methods were introduced for that purpose by Kuo and his associates:

- i. The method of finite difference was employed to express the irregularities of the sun's angular motion. Because of the elliptical orbit of the earth round the sun at a focus and the non-uniformity of the earth's orbital velocity, the apparent angular motion of the sun is also not uniform. There is a difference between the daily angular motion on any one occasion and the average daily angular motion which is one *tu* or 360/365.25 degree. Previously, two arbitrary constants, known as the *p'ing-ch'a* and the *t'ing-ch'a* were used to represent the differences between the observed values and the average value of the sun's daily angular motion, and these two constants resulted in the solution of quadratic equations. The 7th century astronomer Liu Ch'o was the first to use this method. Kuo Shou-ching, however, introduced a third arbitrary constant, called the *li-ch'a*, resulting in the extraction of the cubic root. If x represents the interval between winter solstice and any given occasion, the difference between observed angular velocity and average angular velocity of the sun can be expressed as a function of a power series of x , i.e. $F(x) = Ax - Bx^2 - Cx^3$, where A , B , and C are the arbitrary constants *p'ing-ch'a*, *ting-ch'a* and *li-ch'a*, respectively. The average daily angular velocity over a period x is given by $F(x)/x = A - Bx - Cx^2$. Kuo observed that the sun moved through 90 degrees (i.e. $365.24/4 = 91.31$ *tu*) in 88.92 days from the last winter solstice. He divided these 88.92 days into six intervals ℓ , each more or less equal to a fortnight, and observed the angular difference at the end of each interval. The results are shown in the following table:

	x No. of days from winter solstice	$F(x)$ Angular diff- (erence in 1/10,000 tu p.d.)	$F(x)/x$ Average daily angular differ- ence (in 1/10,000 tu)	Δ^1 First differ- ence	Δ^2 Second differ- ence	Δ^3 Third differ- ence
Initial ($\ell=0$)	0	0	[513.32]*			
1st interval (ℓ)	14.82	7058.0250	476.25	[-37.07]	[-1.38]	
2nd interval (2ℓ)	29.64	12976.3920	437.80	-38.45	-1.38	[0]
3rd interval (3ℓ)	44.46	17693.7462	397.97	-39.83	-1.38	0
4th interval (4ℓ)	59.28	21148.7328	356.76	-41.21	-1.38	0
5th interval (5ℓ)	74.10	23279.9970	314.17	-42.59	-1.38	0
6th interval (6ℓ)	88.92	24026.1840	270.20	-43.97		

*[] uses data outside the range of columns x and $F(x)$.

Supposing one wished to find the average daily angular difference x days from the last winter solstice. After converting the number of days into the number of periods ℓ , i.e. $\ell = x/14.82$, we have the expression

$$F(x)/x = 513.32 + (x/14.82)(-37.07) + 1/2[(x/14.82) - 1](-1.38)$$


$$= 513.32 - 2.46x - 0.0031x^2$$

$$\text{Hence } F(x) = 513.32x - 2.46x^2 - 0.0031x^3$$

From this equation the angular difference of the sun on any particular day of the year can be calculated.

- ii. The method of finite difference was also applied to calculate the irregularities of the moon's angular motion. This was more accurate than any method used previously in China.
- iii. Before Kuo Shou-ching's time, conversion from ecliptical to equatorial readings were made directly on the armillary sphere and not by calculation. In his 'Simplified Instrument' Kuo and his team had already eliminated the ecliptical component. At the same time he had also used spherical trigonometry to determine (a) the tu - $l\u{u}$, tu on the equator converted from tu on the ecliptic; (b) the chi - $ch'a$, the value of chords for given ecliptic area, and (c) the $ch'a$ - $l\u{u}$, the difference between chords of arcs differing by 1 tu .

In the following figure CE is the equator, BD the ecliptic, BC and DE the two meridian arcs, O the centre of the celestial sphere and D the summer solstice point. $BLMN$ was the rectangle formed by Kuo for his calculations. Let $\angle a$ be the latitude $\angle BOC$; $\angle b$ the equatorial longitude $\angle AOC$; $\angle c$ the ecliptical longitude $\angle AOB$; and $\angle \alpha$ the obliquity of the ecliptic $\angle EOD$.



Expressed in modern mathematics, the following relationships would have been arrived at by Kuo:

$$\sin a = \sin c \sin \alpha \quad (1)$$

$$\cos b = \cos c / \sqrt{\sin^2 c \cos^2 \alpha + \cos^2 c} \quad (2)$$


$$\sin b = \sin b \cos \alpha / \sqrt{\sin^2 c \cos^2 \alpha + \cos^2 c} \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Hence } \tan b = \tan c \cos \alpha \quad (4)$$

The whole method was described by him as 'the consideration of right-angled triangles, chords and sagittae, squares and rectangles, all contained, inclined or straight, within circles.' Equations (1) and (4) were used earlier by al-Battānī (ca.858-929). The elaborate calculations employed by Kuo to obtain the same results show that he was not acquainted with the spherical trigonometry used by Muslim astronomers.

- iv. Kuo Shou-ching employed the method of spherical trigonometry to compute accurately the obliquity of the ecliptic. He obtained a value of $23.90 \text{ } tu$ which is equivalent to $23^\circ 31' 58.5''$. This measurement has an absolute error of only $1' 6.8''$ and was at the time the most accurate ever obtained. In his calculations Kuo used an interesting equation to find the length of an arc a in terms of the diameter d of a circle and the length of the sagitta s in the form:

$$d^2 (a/2)^2 - d^3 s - (d^2 - ad) s^2 + s^4 = 0$$



- v. Kuo Shou-ching determined the positions at which the path of the moon crossed the equator.

Wang Hsün died in 1282, a year after the adoption of the *Shou-shih li*, leaving unfinished the drafts of the methodology used to construct the new calendar. Subsequently, Kuo worked over those notes, from which he produced the following books: *T'ui-pu*, 7 chüan; *Li-ch'eng*, 2 chüan; *Li-i ni-kao*, 3 chüan; *Chuan-shen hsüan-tse*, 2 chüan; and *Shang-chung-hsia san-li chu-shih*, 12 chüan. Promoted to the post of director of the Department of Calendrical Affairs in early 1286, Kuo Shou-ching presented those works to court together with several other treatises on the calendar and astronomy which he had written during the past few years. They included: *Shih-hou chien-chu*, 2 chüan; *Hsiu-kai yüan-liu*, 1 chüan; *I-hsiang fa-shih*, 2 chüan; *Erh-chih kuei-ching k'ao*, 20 chüan; *Wu-hsing hsi-hsing k'ao*, 50 chüan; *Ku-chin chiao-shih k'ao*, 1 chüan; *Hsin-ts'e erh-shih-pa-she tsa-tso chu-hsing ju-hsiu ch'ü-chi*, 1 chüan; *Hsin-ts'e wu-ming chu-hsing*, 1 chüan; and *Yüeh-li k'ao*, 1 chüan. Unfortunately none of these works survived because the Mongol court, following the Chinese tradition, prohibited the dissemination of astronomical and calendrical treatises to prevent their misuse. Only some of Kuo's writings on the *Shou-shih li*, and instructions for the use of the astronomical instruments that he and his colleagues had constructed, are quoted in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*).

There is little information on Kuo Shou-ching's activities until 1291, when he was

There is little information on Kuo Shou-ching's activities until 1291, when he was involved in improving transport on the Grand Canal. In that year some officials convinced Qubilai that it would be advantageous to carry grain by water from Ta-tu to Shang-tu. There was one suggestion that the Luan River could be made navigable from Yung-p'ing, and another that a water route could be established on the Lu-kou River. The emperor thereupon sent two expeditions to explore those waterways, and Kuo Shou-ching led the party that surveyed the Lu-kou River. Both expeditions failed to find a route to Shang-tu. However, Kuo later returned to Shang-tu by himself, after which he presented a revised plan to the emperor. This scheme involved the construction of a series of lock-gates on the T'ung-hui section of the Grand Canal between Ta-tu and T'ung-chou. According to Kuo's survey, the rise over this stretch of the country measured some 10 m. We find a description of the plan in Kuo Shou-ching's biography in the *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei*:

Instead of using the head waters of the I-mou ch'üan spring for the grain shipment to Ta-tu, (Kuo) channelled water from the Po-fu ch'üan source in Pei-shan Mountain towards the west, passing the Weng-shan anchorage to the south, and entering the walled city from the western watergate to run into a reservoir. From there the water flowed eastwards and then to the south to pass the southern watergate into the old canal. A flash-lock (*cha*) was to be established every ten *li*. (Thus from Ta-tu) to T'ung-chou there would be seven flash-lock gates. At a distance of one *li* or more from each flash-lock gate a double lock-gate (*ch'ung-chih tou-men*) would be built, so arranged as to open (*t'i*, lit. 'lift') and shut (*e*) in concert to allow boats through while holding back the water.

Qubilai liked Kuo's idea and ordered that it be carried out immediately.

The same year, while engaged in the Grand Canal project, Kuo Shou-ching recommended to court one Ch'i Lü-ch'ien (1263-1329), an expert in calendar and astronomy, for the post of director of Calendrical Studies. Ch'i was then charged with the responsibility of completing the astronomical instruments that were still under construction. In February 1272, Kuo was appointed director of Waterways. During the second half of the year, construction began on the section of the waterway between T'ung-chou and Ta-tu, consisting of fourteen canals. Twenty-thousand military and civilian labourers were conscripted. Another large canal was constructed joining the nearby rivers for irrigation at Ch'ang-p'ing (Hopei). It is said that Qubilai ordered all the civil servants from the chancellors down to form the workforce which, under Kuo's supervision, was to initiate the project, as a token of the latter's importance. The canals were completed by the autumn of 1293; they greatly expedited communications between T'ung-chou and the capital. Previously, when government food supplies had to be carried by land, many beasts of burden would be lost during the autumn rains. Qubilai rejoiced at the sight of the boats on the canal, which he named T'ung-hui. For his pains, Kuo Shou-ching was awarded 12,500 *min* of paper money, and charged with

administering the new canal, in addition to his other duties. Thereafter, Kuo proposed several other schemes to extend the canal system, without success.

In 1294, shortly before his death, Qubilai raised Kuo Shou-ching to the dignity of senior academician of the Chao-wen Court, and kept him in charge of the Department of Calendrical Affairs. During Qubilai's reign, Kuo made further inventions, such as a 'Seven-Treasures Illuminated Clock' (*ch'i-pao teng-lou*). The clock was provided with bells and drums which sounded on the hour. The qa'an had the instrument set up in the Ta-ming Hall at the palace whenever state functions were held. In addition, Kuo presented to Qubilai models of wheelbarrows that he had devised. These contraptions, named 'Wooden Ox' (*mu-niu*) and 'Gliding Horse' (*liu-ma*), differing somewhat from the ancient designs of Chu-ko Liang (181-234), were quite ingenious.

In 1298, Temür (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1294-1307), the new qa'an, on being reminded of Kuo Shou-ching's earlier proposals, summoned Kuo to Ta-tu to plan a new canal south of Shang-tu, which would divert waters from T'ieh-fan kan Peak (north of Tushih k'ou in Ch'ih-ch'eng county, Hopei) to the Luan River. Kuo advised that the canal should be at least 50 to 70 *pu* (=77 to 107 m) wide to carry the summer surge. But senior officials wishing to save costs had the width of the canal reduced by one-third against Kuo's recommendation. Duly completed, the canal broke its banks in 1299, causing great loss of life and property, and almost flooding the imperial palace. Greatly disturbed, Temür expressed deep regret for not having listened to Kuo Shou-ching. Also in 1298, Kuo constructed a water-clock-driven armillary sphere. This comprised some twenty-five wooden cog-wheels of various sizes, linked together so as to drive a celestial sphere marked with the positions of the stars. Two rings circled the sphere, marking the paths of the sun and the moon. The sphere turned anticlockwise following the movement of the heavens, while the two rings revolved clockwise to simulate the movements of the heavenly bodies. Furthermore, Kuo attempted to reconstruct Chang Heng's (ca. 100 AD) seismoscope (*ti-tung i*), without success.

In 1303, all the civil servants aged seventy *sui* or more were ordered to retire. Yet Temür kept Kuo in service because the latter's expertise and experience were still needed. In fact, all the Han-lin academicians and officials of the Department of Calendrical Affairs and the Directorate of Astronomy were thereafter exempted from mandatory retirement. Despite his official rank, Kuo Shou-ching chose to live henceforward in virtual retirement. His only significant contribution thereafter was the construction of the 'Cabinet Incense-Clock' (*kuei-hsiang lou*) and the 'Movable Door-Screen Incense-Clock' (*p'ing-feng hsiang lou*), presumably two types of combustion clocks. In addition, he also made a small 'Portable Clepsydra' (*hsing lou*),

for Temür's use while performing sacrifices to Heaven (*chiao-miao*), and on his travels.

Kuo Shou-ching died in 1316 at the age of eighty-five, and was buried at a spot about 16 km north-west of his birthplace, Hsin-t'ai. His disciple Ch'i Lü-ch'ien wrote an 'account of conduct' (*hsing-chuang*) in Kuo's memory, and this became the main source of his biography in the *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* as well as the *Yüan History*. Little is known about Kuo's posterity; a great-grandson, Kuo Kuei, served as an official in the Directorate of Astronomy during the T'ien-shun era (1457-64) of the Ming emperor Ying-tsung and contributed to the preparation of the *Ta-t'ung li* based on the *Shou-shih li*, thus continuing the calendrical work of his distinguished forebear.

In light of his many ingenious and original contributions, Kuo Shou-ching must be hailed as the most outstanding hydrologist and astronomer of the Yüan dynasty. In the 17th century, Johann Adam Schall von Bell called him 'the Tycho Brahe of China' after having examined some of the astronomical instruments constructed by Kuo. Indeed, while he undoubtedly benefitted from the assistance of several contemporary scientists, Kuo Shou-ching may nevertheless be regarded as the last – but only in the sense of time – of the great traditional astronomers and mathematicians in Chinese history.

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19. WANG E (1190-1273)

Wang E, T. Pai-i, H. Shen-tu, a top-ranking *chin-shih* under the last Chin emperor Ai-tsung, (r. 1224-34), served Qubilai Qa'an as a senior Han-lin academician and played a prominent role in the development of official historiography. A native of Tung-ming, Ts'ao-chou in modern Hopei, Wang E was born in 1190. Little is known of his family background or his scholastic affiliation, and only the names of his great grandfather (Ch'eng), his grandfather (Li) and his father (Shen) have been recorded. His contemporary Liu Ch'i (1203-50) asserts in the *Kuei-ch'ien chih* that he was a disciple of a scholar from his native region, Chang T'e-li (1179-1253), who specialised in the commentary on the *Book of Changes* by the Sung philosopher Ch'eng I (1033-1107). It is not known, however, whether Wang actually studied under Chang T'e-li, or whether he merely appeared before him in the civil service examinations. Moreover, even if he had studied under Chang, Wang E does not seem to have been much influenced by that teacher since he was devoted to belles-lettres and showed little interest in the Ch'eng I school of Neo-Confucianism.

In 1208, having excelled in the prefectural examination at Tung-ming, Wang E was recommended at the age of eighteen to participate in the departmental examination held in Chung-tu (Yen-ching, Peking). He passed brilliantly. His bid for the highest degree, however, was frustrated in the following years by the Mongol invasion in the wake of Činggis Qan's conquest of North Asia. In the spring of 1211, the Mongol forces overran two major defences on the Great Wall in Inner Mongolia, posing a direct threat to the North China plain. Exploiting the internal chaos of the Chin state, they launched several destructive raids in Shansi, Hopei and Shantung over the next two years. Late in 1213, the Chin emperor posthumously known as Wei-shao wang (r. 1209-13) was slain by his opponents in a palace coup and a struggle for succession ensued. The accession of Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-24) ended the political crisis, but the Mongol threat intensified. In June of the following year, Hsüan-tsung moved his seat of government to the Southern Capital, Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan); Chung-tu fell into Mongol hands a year later. Thereupon Činggis turned his attention to Central Asia, leaving the conquest of north China to his subordinates; in 1217, he placed Muqali (q.v.) in command of operations against the Chin, but the Mongol thrust was temporarily halted following Muqali's death in 1223.

There is scant information on Wang E's activities during those years. Like many of his contemporaries, he and his family sought refuge south of the Yellow River, but he continued his studies in preparation for an official career. The situation changed

when Ai-tsung ascended the throne in 1224. By then the Mongol push had slackened in north China and, as Činggis was still engaged in his western campaigns, the Chin state enjoyed a respite from Mongol pressure. That year Wang E sat for the palace examination at Pien, at the age of thirty-four, and won the title of *chuang-yüan* ('optimus') by topping the list of successful *chin-shih* candidates in belles-lettres. He was immediately appointed a curator of documents in the Han-lin Academy and, concurrently, a compiler in the Department of National History. There he found among his colleagues the distinguished belletrist and historian Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), and became familiar with the procedures of historiography which he put to good use after the fall of the Chin state. In 1229, after having served for five years in the academy, Wang E was appointed district assistant in the Kuei-te administration and acting magistrate of the Ch'eng-fu county of Po-chou, both in Honan. A year later, he was promoted to be vice-prefect of Shen-chou, as well as acting magistrate of Ju-yang county in Ts'ai-chou (modern Ju-nan), Honan. In these capacities he distinguished himself as a just and capable official, and won acclaim for his promotion of morality and his ability to maintain peace and order among the population. His grandmother died later that year; he consequently asked for permission to be relieved of his duties to observe the mourning period and retired to Ts'ai for several years.

The peace temporarily enjoyed by the Chin was shattered by renewed waves of Mongol invasion shortly after the ascension of Ögödei, Činggis' third son, in September 1229. In spring 1231, the new qan launched an offensive against the Chin state on three fronts, aiming to capture its capital Pien and thereby to complete the conquest of north China. Under Ögödei's command the Mongol vanguard crossed the Yellow River into Honan north of Pien. The following summer the forces of Tolui (d. 1232), Sübötei (q.v.), and Tāčar (d. 1238) converged from Shensi and Shantung to lay siege to the Chin capital. Following a series of defeats, Emperor Ai-tsung tried to sue for peace on humiliating terms, but the Mongol commanders balked and the fall of the capital became imminent.

In early February 1233, as the situation deteriorated, the emperor hurriedly fled Pien with a small retinue of followers, first south to Kuei-te and then to Ts'ai-chou in July. There Ai-tsung set up a makeshift court and a temporary capital. A month later, Ts'ui Li (d. 1234), the grand marshal in charge of the defense of Pien, staged a coup, slaughtering the members of the royal family and senior officials who had remained behind, and delivered the capital to the enemy without resistance. Many of the leading Chin scholar-officials thus became prisoners of war, including Yüan Hao-wen, then holding a junior post at the Chin court. In this hour of crisis, Yüan addressed a written appeal to the influential chief of the Secretariat Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (q.v.), pleading for his assistance in rescuing scores of top Chin officials from

captivity in order to use them later in the public service. The list included Wang E and fifty-three other former Chin scholars and eminent persons. Although no immediate relief eventuated, it was through this recommendation that Wang came to be known to some of the senior officials in the Mongol service. The incident was to have a decisive effect on his life and subsequent career.

At the time, Wang E was at Ts'ai, the emergency capital, in mourning for his grandmother, and was not directly involved in the political crisis attending the fall of Pien. In August 1233, however, he attracted the Chin emperor's attention when he was called upon by the Presidential Council to compose a rescript summoning Wu Hsien (d. 1234), the Duke of Heng-shan, to rally to the imperial cause. Wu, a powerful Chinese military commander in the Chin service, was then fighting the Mongols in Hopei and Honan. Much impressed by Wang's eloquence, Ai-tsung appointed him assistant secretary in the Presidential Council and relieved him of his mourning obligations, thus enabling him to assume his duties immediately. Wang E was subsequently made a second secretary, serving as director in the Bureau of the Left and Right of the same council. In this capacity he was responsible for the transmission of memorials, the composition of imperial daily records, and other secretarial matters.

Being a latecomer to the Chin court, Wang E never attained the influence of key decision-makers such as Wan-yen Chung-te (d. 1234), Wu-ku-lun Hao (d. 1234), Chang T'ien-kang (d. after 1234), and others. Yet, through his official position, he gained frequent access to the emperor and acquired an intimate knowledge of state affairs. Wang E's most important contribution at this time was a recommendation made in late September (1233) to organise a corps of investigative officials, called security officials of the Four Wards, charged with keeping watch on the inhabitants in Ts'ai-chou to strengthen imperial control. The emperor accepted the proposal, and named him chief of this special bureau. It was on Wang E's recommendation that Ai-tsung ordered the execution, in late January 1234, of the notorious Ch'üan-chen Taoist Wu-ku-lun, styled Mister Ma-p'i, who had earlier seduced the emperor's elder sister and sought to regain imperial favour by declaring that he could relieve Ts'ai-chou from the besieging Mongols by the use of magic powers.

Chin resistance ended in disaster. Despite the heroic efforts of the defenders, Ts'ai fell to the Mongols on 9 February owing to lack of food and manpower, and the impossibility of obtaining reinforcements. Grief-stricken, Ai-tsung abdicated the throne in favour of Wan-yen Ch'eng-lin, the marshal charged with defending the eastern section of the capital. But before the day was over the Mongol forces breached the Chin defence and spilled into the capital. In the ensuing mêlée, Ai-tsung hanged himself and Ch'eng-lin died in combat, thus ending the Chin dynasty.

Following the victory, the Mongol supreme commander, Tāčar, in accordance with nomad practice, issued an order to exterminate the survivors of Ts'ai-chou. Wang E, who had been taken prisoner with many of his colleagues, was among those facing execution. Fortunately, Chang Jou (*q.v.*), the myriarch of the Han Armies participating in the siege of the Chin capital, happened to be on the scene and, having learned of Wang E's identity, secured his release. Chang, a cultured warlord and patron of Confucian scholar-officials, had probably heard of Wang through either Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai or Yüan Hao-wen who had earlier recommended him. He then took Wang E as a house guest to his headquarters at Pao-chou (near Peking). For the next nine years Wang E served as tutor to Chang Jou's children and began collecting source materials for a Chin history. In this endeavour he gained access to the *Veritable Records* of the Chin rulers rescued by Chang Jou from the state archives during the capture of Pien, presumably on the advice of Yüan Hao-wen. At the same time, at the urging of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and Chang Jou, he composed an account of the last days of the Chin court at Ts'ai-chou, called *Ju-nan i-shih* (*A Memoir of Ju-nan*), drawing primarily on the diary he had kept during the Mongol siege.

Before long, however, Wang E's withdrawal from public life was interrupted by a summons from Qubilai. The great prince had by then emerged as a powerful contender in Qara Qorum, thanks partly to the special favour his family enjoyed at the Mongol court after his father's death. In 1236, as a tribute to his late brother's services, Ögödei allotted to Tolui's widow Sorqaqtani Beki (d. 1252) the territories of Chen-ting in modern Hopei. A capable and enlightened woman, Sorqaqtani had the wisdom to enlist the assistance of Chinese literati in administering her domain. Under his mother's tutelage, Qubilai was exposed to Chinese influence in his early years, and became convinced of the need to employ the scholars in his struggle for political ascendancy. As early as 1242 he began summoning learned people to Qara Qorum to advise him on political affairs; those included prominent visitors such as the Ch'an monk Hai-yün and his disciple Liu Ping-chung (*qq.v.*), who later became one of Qubilai's most trusted confidants. As a distinguished former Chin official known to the Mongol court through the recommendation of both Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai and Chang Jou, Wang E was an obvious candidate for the prince's entourage. He accepted Qubilai's invitation, probably moved less by the desire to resume his official career under the new regime than by concern for the preservation of the heritage of the Chin state and the Confucian tradition under Mongol rule.

Late in 1244, Qubilai's emissaries Chao Pi (1220-76) and Hsü Kuo-ch'en arrived in Pao-chou to invite Wang E to visit the Mongol capital. Upon his arrival there, Wang received a cordial welcome from Qubilai, who honoured him by calling him *chuang-yüan* (mo. **jöng-ön*); he in turn presented the prince with a portrait of

Confucius given to him by a friend at the start of his journey. It was then the second month of autumn (4 Sept.-3 Oct.), and Wang E took the opportunity to advise his patron to offer a sacrifice to the Sage. Qubilai agreed and invited Wang to officiate at the ceremony. Thereafter, offerings to Confucius in spring and autumn became a regular feature in the state sacrifices of the Mongol-Yüan regime. During his stay in Qara Qorum, Wang E was a frequent guest at Qubilai's quarters, lecturing on the major classics, and expounding to the prince the Confucian ethical code and principles of government. On several occasions Wang pressed the prince to sponsor the compilation of a history of the Chin state, recommending Yang Huan, Li Chih (*qq.v.*), Yüan Hao-wen and others to implement the project. It seems that Qubilai showed some interest in the proposal, but took no action until after his elevation to the throne in the following decade.

Two years later, troubled by poor health, Wang E begged for permission to leave Qara Qorum and his wish was granted. Qubilai sent five able servants to escort Wang home and instructed them to study the Confucian classics and the traditional principles of government under him. The most outstanding of those disciples was the Uighur Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*), who later became a learned Confucian scholar and close adviser to the future qa'an. Sometime later, Qubilai awarded Wang E a mansion in Yen-ching and invited him to reside there. Wang complied and spent the next few years in the future capital of the Yüan regime. Continuing to profess his loyalty to the fallen Jurchen state, Wang E asked Qubilai for permission to return to Ts'ai-chou to accord a proper burial to the late Chin emperor Ai-tsung, who had been hastily interred after his suicide. His request was granted, but Wang was unable to locate the emperor's temporary grave near the Ju River because of a flood, and could only deliver a funereal eulogy of the former emperor at the river bank. (In fact, according to the *Sung History* [*Sung-shih*], Ai-tsung's remains were later taken by the Sung forces and presented to the Chinese court.) He then privately canonised him as I-tsung ('Righteous Ancestor'), but later the official Chin history adopted instead Ai-tsung ('Grievous Ancestor') as the temple name of the last Chin monarch.

There is scant information about Wang E in subsequent years. It is reported that he was again summoned to Qara Qorum in spring 1250, together with Wei Fan (*chin-shih* of 1215), another former Chin scholar-official, for consultation on state affairs. This invitation came from Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251-59) who had presumably heard of Wang E and his companion from Qubilai, and the emperor is said to have offered him a government position. He declined however, and returned to Yen-ching shortly afterward, there to remain out of office until the next decade.

Following his enthronement at K'ai-p'ing fu in April 1260, Qubilai devoted himself to organising the new government with the advice of his counsellors. Those

included, besides Wang E, several outstanding former Chin scholar-officials and eminent persons such as Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu, Tou Mo, Hsü Heng, Shang T'ing (*qq.v.*), Hsü Shih-lung and others. Wang was the author of the edict which proclaimed the inauguration of the new era named Chung-t'ung ('Pivotal Succession') in May that year. A new Secretarial Council was established the same month and, in August, Qubilai named Wang E, then seventy, executive academician in charge of compiling historical records, in anticipation of the formation of a full-fledged Han-lin Academy. Thereupon Wang assumed responsibility for drafting imperial edicts and planning the restoration of traditional government agencies, thus becoming an important member of Qubilai's circle of advisers at the new court.

Under the leadership of Liu Ping-chung, the Buddho-Taoist who emerged as the qa'an's trusted confidant, those counsellors endeavoured to reconstruct state institutions on traditional Chinese lines, while promoting the political influence of the literati. They opposed the Central Asian faction led by the Muslim Maḥmūd Yalavač and later the notorious Aḥmad (*qq.v.*) who both advocated ruthless exploitation of the economic resources of the conquered territories as the top priority of the new regime. Shortly after his enthronement, Qubilai appointed Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*), a Chinese expert in fiscal matters, to the position of director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council. Many of the Chinese advisers acquiesced, but Wang E, Yao Shu and Tou Mo dissented. They saw Wang Wen-t'ung as a grasping and unreliable man, and recommended Hsü Heng for the post, but Qubilai ignored their advice. It was soon evident, however, that their fears were justified for early in 1262 Wang Wen-t'ung was implicated in the abortive rebellion of his son-in-law Li T'an (*q.v.*), and was executed as a conspirator. As a result, Qubilai became keenly aware of the potential threat presented by the Chinese literati and turned to his Central Asian counsellors for advice and support.

However discouraged, the Chinese leaders persevered in their efforts to check the ascendancy of Aḥmad, who was then coveting the vacant position of director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council. In 1264, following the designation of Yen-ching as the new national capital (renamed Ta-tu in 1272), Wang E and his colleagues sought to promote the leadership of Liu Ping-chung, who still enjoyed Qubilai's confidence, to counteract the Central Asian ascendancy. They proposed that Liu be awarded an official rank for his meritorious services. The recommendation was approved; Liu Ping-chung was made grand tutor and appointed a councillor of the Secretarial Council. When Qubilai considered appointing Aḥmad to the Secretarial Council late in the same year, Wang E and Tou Mo again remonstrated, denouncing the Muslim's sycophantic character and treacherous designs. But the qa'an valued Aḥmad's expertise in providing the resources needed for his military campaigns and

did not heed their advice. As a last resort, Wang joined with Liu Ping-chung and Shang T'ing in persuading Qubilai to make the heir apparent Ĵingim chief of the Secretarial Council, in the hope that this Chinese-educated crown prince would turn the tide in their favour. The appointment of Ĵingim did exert some restraint on the Central Asian faction; but, secure in Qubilai's support, Aĥmad pressed on undeterred, finally winning the post of director of political affairs in 1271 to the great detriment of the Chinese cause.

Wang E's political manoeuvrings at the Mongol court remained secondary, however, to his dedicated endeavours to revive the Chinese historical records, not only of the defunct Liao and Chin states but also of the Mongols, and to promote the establishment of the Department of National History within the Han-lin Academy. These recommendations were submitted to Qubilai shortly after Wang's appointment as executive academician in August 1260, and no later than summer 1261. In his initial memorial, Wang E reiterated his earlier plea to Qubilai during his first visit to Qara Qorum that the historical records of the early Mongol qans be compiled, as well as those of the Liao and Chin. He stated emphatically that it had been a time-honoured practice in China for the reigning rulers to establish historical records, not only of their own rule but also of the former states, so that respective merits and faults should be revealed to posterity. Therefore it should be imperative for the court to compile the records of the great Činggis Qan, who had conquered 'all (the countries of) the four directions with majestic military might,' in order to present his meritorious deeds to future generations. It was also desirable to write the history of the Liao and Chin, which the Mongols had subdued, to fulfill the obligation of a dynastic successor and to enable later generations to learn the lessons of the past.

Following this, Wang submitted another memorial proposing the establishment of the Department of National History within the Academy (*Han-lin kuo-shih yüan*), thus charging this institution not only with counselling the emperor and drafting documents, but also with keeping historical records. To strengthen his earlier arguments, Wang asserted in this memorial that it was at the heart of the Chinese tradition that the history of a preceding dynasty be compiled by its successor, since judgment and evaluation can only be impartial in later generations.

Wang E recommended a number of former Chin officials and distinguished scholars to be Han-lin academicians and historiographers. He nominated Li Chih, Hao Ching (*q.q.v.*), Li Ch'ang (1203-89), Wang P'an (1202-93), T'u-tan Kung-lü, Hsü Shih-lung, and Kao Ming (1209-74) as academicians; Yang Shu and Meng P'an-lin (1204-67) as academicians-in-waiting; Wang Yün (*q.v.*) and Lei Ying (1225-97) as redactor-compilers; Chou Ti, Hu Chih-yü (1227-95), Meng Ch'i (1231-81), Yen Fu (1236-1312), and Liu Yüan as curators of documents. It is significant that Wang E

should have subordinated the compilation of the Liao and Chin records to the processing of the documents pertaining to early Mongol rulers and recommended the establishment of the Department of National History within the Academy. The former step was apparently a skilful device to impress upon Qubilai the importance of the project and to justify the imperial sponsorship of the editing of the Liao and Chin archives. The latter move was an institutional innovation, evidently intended to utilise the influence of the Han-lin academicians, most of whom were Qubilai's advisers, to expedite the enterprise.

Impressed by Wang E's argument, Qubilai ordered the establishment of the *Han-lin kuo-shih yüan* in August 1261, and appointed Wang E as the project manager of the national historiographic programme. The qa'an staffed the Academy with many of the candidates recommended by Wang E for the historical commissions. Furthermore, responding to Wang's request, Qubilai named Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) director of compilation of the National History programme, and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's son Chu (*q.v.*) as well as Wang Wen-t'ung, directors of compilation of the *Liao and Chin Histories*. Circumstances were especially favourable in respect of the *Chin History* (*Chin-shih*). In March 1261, Chang Jou had presented to the Secretarial Council sets of the *Veritable Records* which he had seized at Ts'ai-chou, supplementing a considerable amount of Chin documents already available. Unfortunately, the execution of Wang Wen-t'ung in early 1262 deprived the Liao and Chin history projects of a nominal director, and the subsequent political crisis further retarded the composition of the histories.

Wang E was not deterred and he continued his work nevertheless with enthusiasm and determination. He spent the following two years collecting material for the Department of National History not only on the Chin state, but also on the early years of Činggis Qan. In July 1264 he and Yao Shu were called to Shang-tu for consultation on state affairs, presumably in connection with the plan, recommended by Liu Ping-chung, to transfer the national capital to Yen-ching. On this occasion, Wang was granted the honorary title Great Officer Endowed with Goodness in recognition of his services. In October, with the Mongol capital established at Yen-ching and the Department of National History formally installed there, Wang E and his colleagues persevered in their plea for official sponsorship of the historiographic programme. To that end, the academician Shang T'ing, also an influential Confucian adviser, memorialised Qubilai on the importance of studying history. He proposed to include the Liao and Chin records in the history of the early Mongol rulers, and recommended that Wang E take charge of the project with Li Chih, Hsü Shih-lung, Kao Ming, Hu Chih-yü, Chou Ti and others.

In March of the following year, further to impress Qubilai, Wang E and his colleagues Wang P'an and Hsü Shih-lung presented an account of the reign of Emperor Shih-tsung (r. 1161-89) – the golden era of Chin government – titled *Ta-ting chih-chi* (*Administrative Record of the Ta-ting Era*), in 2 *chüan*. This work, an extract from the *Veritable Records* of the Chin emperor, is now lost, but it was a major source for the official *Chin History* and an inspiration to Qubilai's rule.

In September 1266, as a result of Wang E's insistence, Qubilai called him to a meeting with court officials to review the history programme. On that occasion, Wang proposed transcribing the records of the early Mongol qans for safekeeping at the Department of National History. The following summer, he promoted the search for further sources on Činggis Qan to provide material for the same department. Those efforts produced several documents in Mongolian which became the main sources for the completion in 1303, during the reign of Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307), of the Chinese-style *Veritable Records* of the first five Mongol rulers. Yet no progress was made in the compilation of the *Liao and Chin Histories* during Qubilai's time, largely because of the loss of political influence by the Chinese literati and the ascendancy of the Central Asian faction after Wang Wen-t'ung's execution.

Nonetheless, Wang E's contribution to the Chin history project was fundamental. Besides persistently petitioning Qubilai for official sponsorship of the project and strenuously devoting himself to collecting source materials, he also drafted an overall plan for the writing of Chin history. He revealed this to Wang Yün (q.v.), his protégé at the Department of National History, in a letter dated 1261 preserved in Wang Yün's collected works. It included specific instructions on the appointment of additional personnel to the programme, the location of source materials, and the people to be consulted for further information, as well as an outline of the *Chin History* modelled on the traditional dynastic accounts. This outline includes nine Imperial Annals (*pen-chi*), seven Treatises (*chih*), and ten Classified Biographies (*lieh-chuan*). The annals cover all the Chin rulers from T'ai-tsu (r. 1115-23) to Ai-tsung, including Hai-ling wang (r. 1149-61) and Wei-shao wang who were both posthumously disgraced by their successors. Concerning the biographies, Wang E noted that, in the existing *Veritable Records*, officials in the third grade or above were accorded a biographical notice. He felt, however, that certain outstanding individuals whose deeds were equally meritorious should also be included. By and large Wang E's proposed table of contents provided the framework for the official *Chin History* completed concurrently with that of the Liao and the Sung in late 1344 under the last Yüan emperor Toqön Temür (Shun-ti, r. 1337-68).

Furthermore, Wang E provided much of the source material for the *Chin History*, particularly for the reigns of Emperor Shih-tsung, Wei-shao wang, and Ai-tsung. As

previously mentioned, he and his colleagues wrote the *Ta-ting chih-chi*, which became a main source for the Annals of Shih-tsung. Wei-shao wang, who was denied a temple name as a result of posthumous disgrace after being slain in a palace coup, was not accorded a reign chronicle by his successor Hsüan-tsung. It was again through Wang E's efforts that source materials about this reign were collected. The encomium of Wei-shao wang in the *Chin History*, ch. 13, credits Wang with gathering seven categories of miscellaneous records from diverse sources for this chapter. Finally, Wang E supplied the primary source of information for Ai-tsung's reign in his own reminiscences (the *Ju-nan i-shih*) on the makeshift Chin court at Ts'ai-chou under Mongol siege. In addition, Wang appears to have also gathered some materials for the treatises and to have produced drafts on sections dealing with Ai-tsung's reign. The Yüan official historiographers who completed the *Chin History* towards the end of the dynasty were therefore indebted to Wang E's dedication and painstaking scholarship.

Wang E's other distinguished contribution, no less important than the history projects, lay in his promotion of Confucian studies and his efforts to revive the civil service examinations. In October 1261, shortly after he submitted his proposal for the compilation of historical records, he memorialised Qubilai on the state of the education system and proposed a more rigorous supervision of public schools. In this memorial he deplored the disarray of the existing school system and its failure to provide adequate training for students aspiring to government service, and proposed appointing qualified scholars to supervise the management of local schools. The recommendation was accepted, and school superintendents were appointed in the ten Regional Secretariats of the empire.

In subsequent years, Wang E and his colleagues continued to promote Confucian studies in various ways. In 1266, he collaborated with Yao Shu, Tou Mo, Shang T'ing and others to edit a digest of quotations from the Five Classics, called *Wu-ching yao-yü* (*Essentials of the Five Classics*), in twenty-eight sections. This work, now lost, was presented to Qubilai in a further attempt to enforce the Confucian moral code and principles of government. It was probably intended for lectures at court and as an instructional manual in the public schools.

Following this, in October 1267, Wang E and several colleagues submitted a proposal for the revival of the traditional civil service examinations, with a draft plan for their implementation prepared by Hsü Heng, the leading scholar-educator. They hoped thereby to institutionalise a system which would guarantee a steady inflow of educated officials into government services and enhance the supremacy of the Chinese literati in the bureaucracy. In their lengthy memorial, partially preserved in the *Yüan History*, they traced the history of the examination system from its alleged

inception in classical Chou times down to the T'ang and Sung, outlining its merits and giving a detailed account of how the system functioned under the Liao and Chin rulers. They also pointed out that this procedure had been temporarily revived under Ögödei in 1237/8 on the advice of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, producing some 4,000 successful candidates who staffed the civil bureaucracy (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai), and urged Qubilai to follow that precedent. Although this submission reportedly impressed the qa'an, he did not implement it for various reasons, chief among which was the steadfast opposition from the conservative Mongols and their Central Asian allies. In the absence of a regular recruitment procedure, the Confucian advisers resorted to personal recommendations. Wang E, like several of his colleagues, played an important role in attracting talented individuals to bureaucratic service. He contributed in this way to perpetuating Chinese influence in the early Yüan government until 1313-1315 when, under Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20), the examination system was fully restored.

In 1268, stricken by illness, Wang E pleaded for permission to retire. Qubilai granted his wish and authorised continued payment of his stipend, but still frequently sent emissaries to seek his advice on state affairs. Wang died in September 1273, at the age of eighty-three. It is said that, as a dedicated Confucian, he forbade his friends to offer him a funeral sacrifice with Buddhist 'ghost paper money'. Wang was survived by a daughter married to a scholar named Chou To, whose son, Chou Chih-kang, became Wang's adopted heir and assumed the family surname. In 1278, upon the recommendation of academician Chang Wen-ch'ien (*q.v.*) and others, Qubilai bestowed on Wang E the posthumous name Wen-k'ang ('Cultured and Prosperous') as a tribute to his literary achievement and physical longevity. His colleague Hsü Shih-lung composed a tomb-epitaph in his memory, followed by a biographical account by Li K'ai. Neither of these two documents survived, but excerpts have been quoted in Wang E's composite biography by Su T'ien-chüeh (1294-1352). The latter includes also fragments of an epitaph for Wang's ancestors by Shang T'ing. These materials provided the primary sources for Wang's biography in the official and private histories of the Yüan dynasty.

In retrospect, Wang E might properly be regarded as a personage of the Chin period since he spent many of his adult years in the Jurchen state; yet, he really earned his place in history later, through his activities under the Mongols. It was because of Qubilai's determination to enlist the advice and service of Chinese scholar-officials that Wang E was able to resume an official career. While still professing nostalgia for the fallen Jurchen regime, he served Qubilai in the hope of reviving and perpetuating traditional Chinese institutions during another era of alien conquest. His prestige as a senior official of the last Chin court and his familiarity with traditional

procedures made him a valuable asset in reconstructing the state at the time of the Mongol settlement in China.

In addition to successfully promoting official historiography, Wang E, as we have seen, wrote in his *Ju-nan i-shih* an eye-witness account of the Mongol siege of the last Chin capital. In this moving account he provides a contemporary view of circumstances in the last days of the Chin court, and makes his mark as a historian of insight.

The title *Ju-nan i-shih* is taken from the ancient name of the commandery which controlled Ts'ai-chou – the Ju-nan commandery. The work contains four *chüan* with over eighty individual entries, and is classified as a Miscellaneous History (*tsa-shih*) in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu*. Wang E's narrative begins with Ai-tsung's flight from Pien to Ts'ai-chou under the Mongol pressure on 14 July 1233, and ends with an account of the tragic state of the beleaguered capital on 4 February 1234, five days before the emperor committed suicide on the eve of its capitulation, thus covering a period of over six months. These accounts are presented in a daily chronology under appropriate headings and are interspersed with detailed notes on pertinent events and the personalities involved. The *Ju-nan i-shih* is noted not only for its vividness and abundant information, but also for its candour and detachment, free from the restraints of formal historiography.

He begins his narrative by describing the objection of P'u-ch'a Kuan-nu (d. July 1233), a senior Jurchen military commander, to moving the capital to Ts'ai rather than to Sui-yang (south-east of Pien and east of Kuei-te), arguing that the former was indefensible, and how the emperor ignored P'u-ch'a's remonstrance and ordered his execution. Thereupon, Wan-yen Yung-an (alias Kuo An-yung, d. Feb. 1234), chief of the Regional Presidential Council of Shan-tung, raised a similar objection. He submitted that Ts'ai-chou was too close to the Sung territories, making it difficult to resupply in an emergency, and he implored the emperor to retreat to his province, pointing out the strategic and economic advantages of Shan-tung over other localities. Ai-tsung persisted in his choice nevertheless, mainly because he suspected the dissidents' motives, though he was soon to discover the weakness of Ts'ai-chou's position and came to regret his decision when the capital was beleaguered by the Mongol armies.

In relating these events, Wang E recounts the circumstances in which he joined the service of the Chin emperor and his major activities during his tenure of office. Wang E then relates how he urged Ai-tsung to adopt proper ritual and music at court; how the emperor responded to his proposal for the creation of a special corps in charge of the capital's security; and how his subsequent investigations led to the

execution of the Taoist Wu-ku-lun. His self-portrayal sheds much light on Wang's achievements during this period.

Wang E gives a mixed impression of Ai-tsung. On the one hand, he depicts the emperor during these difficult times as a weak, indecisive and unrealistic monarch. He thus remarks that Ai-tsung renovated the palace pavilion for his pleasures, selected additional ladies for his harem, and sought to appease Wu Hsien whose loyalty was dubious. He also relates that the emperor was inclined to entertain the unwise suggestion of waging war against the Sung; that he listened to slanderous allegations against faithful servants such as Wu-ku-lun Hao and others; and that he had to tolerate the Imperial Brigade's arrogant behaviour in the capital to ensure its allegiance. On the other hand, however, Wang cites approvingly the emperor's leniency towards offending officials; his willingness to cancel unreasonably expensive entertainments upon remonstrance by his councillors; his measures to relieve the common people's distress; and his generous rewards to the soldiers defending the capital.

In Wang E's memoir, Wan-yen Chung-te and Chang T'ien-kang emerge as the two most capable officials and vigorous supporters of the last Chin court. They held top positions in the Presidential Council and enjoyed the imperial confidence. Wan-yen Chung-te constantly remonstrated with Ai-tsung, cautioning him against sycophants and restraining him from making unwise decisions at critical moments. He was, moreover, responsible for such important items as grain storage, the supply of horses and weapons, and maintaining the morale of the soldiers defending the capital. Chang T'ien-kang, the leading Chinese official at the time, likewise advised the emperor on major policy matters, and also counselled Wan-yen whose chief deputy he was. Inter alia, Chang had managed to talk Ai-tsung out of accepting impractical plans for a desperate attempt to ward off the Mongol assault on the capital.

On the other hand, Wang E is highly critical of many of the military commanders, Jurchen and Chinese alike, for their lack of diligence in leading reinforcements to relieve the capital. He is particularly harsh on Wu Hsien, the Chinese overlord of Hopei and Honan, who allegedly wavered in his commitment to the Chin cause and delayed coming to the emperor's rescue in order to conserve his own forces. This assessment of Wu Hsien, reflecting as it does the official view at that time, is in sharp contrast with contemporary private records, and should be carefully evaluated for an impartial appraisal of this important Chinese military leader. In the version presented in private records, Wu Hsien is shown to have reserved his forces with a view to pursuing the fight for the Jurchen cause in the event of the capitulation of Ts'ai-chou.

The Chin position deteriorated rapidly in October 1233 when a series of military setbacks made the situation at Ts'ai-chou very precarious. The capital was not only endangered by the joint Mongol onslaught and the Sung offensive, but was also afflicted by grain shortage, soaring inflation and the ebbing morale of the troops. Due to lack of provisions, food prices increased several times in a single day; a peck of rice was reported worth ten *liang* of 'white' gold; as supplies dwindled, the inhabitants took to cannibalism and human flesh was offered for sale. An earlier attempt to negotiate with the Sung court for food supplies had failed; instead, Sung forces raided the outskirts of Ts'ai-chou and combined with the Mongols to hasten its capture. At this critical hour court officials considered a number of schemes, some preposterous, to avert the impending disaster. One of these was a proposal by Wan-yen Chung-te to employ the magic powers of the Taoist Wu-ku-lun to frighten the invaders away. Thanks to Chang T'ien-kang the plan was not taken up.

Wang E ends with an account of the last week in the besieged capital, when the defence forces had suffered such losses through casualties and defection that even court servants and menials were drafted to front-line positions. Out of respect for his former master, however, the author did not include the events leading to Ai-tsung's abdication in favour of Wan-yen Ch'eng-lin and his suicide on the eve of the city's fall on 9 February. Instead, Wang concludes his reminiscences with a moving eulogy of the Chin emperor. It reads:

Emperor I-tsung reigned over eleven years. Concerned with the weakness of the ruling house and the accumulated shortcomings of previous reigns owing to the harshness and pettiness of the civil administrators, he did not allow officials to break the law with selfish desires. Aware that the generals and soldiers profited from the campaigns, he did not wage war to vent his grievances. When the courtiers committed an offence, he punished them leniently by demotion, and never executed any of them. When the empress dowager was found to be without a palace, he only remodelled (existing facilities) and did not propose to build a new residence. He also honoured and promoted Confucian studies, investigated the appointment of military officials, relinquished hunting grounds for the benefit of the people, and inaugurated court lectures on the classics to expound Confucian principles.

Furthermore, he introduced 'six criteria' to evaluate the performance of the country magistrates, so that waste lands were brought under cultivation and revenue and tax became evenly distributed. [These six criteria were: cultivating waste lands, effecting equal distribution of revenue and tax, achieving harmony between the military and civil populations, increasing the registered households, suppressing thieves and bandits, and settling judicial disputes.] He also established Agricultural Promotion Bureaux in the three capital routes (i.e. the eastern, western and southern) charged with evaluating local officials, so that the good and honest received promotion and the wicked and crooked were dismissed from office. Therefore, the households accumulated reserves and savings, and the population flourished.

Although the state fell short of achieving great peace, it at least attained modest prosperity and temporary rest.

Yea, Heaven decreed unification; the land passed onto the Great (=Mongol) Dynasty, and the Chin house came to be extinguished! Still, there is much to be praised. Even though the emperor did not command the six reins of horses in combat or lead the three armies in person, he offered his own utensils to celebrate war victories and slaughtered imperial horses to reward the soldiers. Consequently, one man showed courage equal to a hundred, viewing death as an act of homecoming. While the father was stabbed in the front, the son raised his spear in the rear. Several thousands of men were inspired by the righteousness of ministers like Wan-yen Chung-te, and tens of thousands demonstrated the unflagging morale of the palace attendant Chiang-shan [d. Feb. 1234]. They all died for the state, without distinction of rank. Writing about their deeds in the chronicles evokes no shame from past or present generations!

In these impassioned words, Wang E delivered his verdict on the last Chin emperor and his court. Written by a loyal official whose memory of events was still fresh, it is an eulogy charged with emotion and nostalgia, yet it is objective in judgment, factual, and devoid of hyperbole. It is a graceful and elegant ending to the tragic narrative of the fall of the Chin state.

The bibliographical history of the *Ju-nan i-shih* is not at all clear. There is no record of a Yüan edition; presumably the work circulated only in manuscript form, later to be made available to the archives of the Yüan Department of National History. Being the sole surviving account of the last days of the Chin court, the *Ju-nan i-shih* became not only an indispensable source concerning these events for the *Chin History*, but also the main source for the account of the last months in the Annals of Ai-tsung drafted by the sinicised Arab historiographer Šams (1278-1351), one of the compilers of the *Chin History*. Šams, however, did not quote Wang E's eulogy, which reflects the conqueror's attitude. Similarly, the *Ju-nan i-shih* provided much information for the biographies of leading Chin civil and military officials. In many instances, entire passages of the original were copied into the new text: a comparison of the *Chin History* to the *Ju-nan i-shih* reveals the indebtedness of the former to Wang E's writing.

The present version of the *Ju-nan i-shih* has been preserved through incorporation in scattered entries into the early Ming imperial encyclopaedia *Yung-lo ta-tien*. The original text was probably found by Ming officials in the Yüan historical archives at the capital Ta-tu, and was later delivered to the commission in charge of compiling this encyclopaedia. The text was then recast and transcribed by the editors of the *Ssu-k'u* collection at the emperor's orders in the 1770s. In the Ch'ing editions of the *Ju-nan i-shih*, the text includes Wang E's explanatory notes interspersed among the daily entries. Those are supplemented by notes by the editors of the *Ssu-k'u* collection resulting from a comparative reading of the text with the *Chin History*.

Wang E was a prolific writer, but most of his works, including a collection said to total 40 *chüan*, have been lost; only fragments have survived in contemporary anthologies. Four of the numerous commemorative essays he composed during his tenure as Han-lin academician, including the edict for the inauguration of Qubilai's first reign year in June 1260, are preserved in the *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* of Su T'ien-chüeh. Several of his essays on the Taoist establishments with which he had much contact also survived. In these essays Wang E greatly praises the Taoists for their spiritual guidance and dedication to community welfare during the turbulent era of the Mongol conquest; but, echoing at the same time the criticism of his contemporaries, he does not conceal his contempt for their lax discipline and for the questionable behaviour of many converts. These writings provide useful information on religious life in north China at the time.

Wang E was also known as a good poet and portrait painter. A sample of his poetry is available in the *Yüan-shih hsüan kwei-chi* compiled by Hsi Shih-ch'en, and references to his paintings are found in the works of several of his contemporaries.

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H.L. Chan

20. LI CHIH (1192-1279)

Li Chih, T. Jen-ch'ing, H. Ching-chai, a native of Luan-ch'eng, Chen-ting prefecture, Hopei, was a scholar and mathematician of the late Chin and early Yüan periods. Li's family claimed to be descended from the T'ang emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 712-756) but little is known of its ancestors before the end of the Northern Sung dynasty. It is also clear that the family did not enjoy much distinction before Li Chih's father achieved a bureaucratic and literary career: his children followed in his footsteps.

Li Chih's personal name was commonly written Yeh instead of Chih in contemporary writings, which has caused much controversy since the late Ch'ing. There have been three different schools of opinion on the subject. The first contends that Li's name was originally Chih and that Yeh was a scribal error; this view was expressed by Shih Kuo-ch'i (1750-1824) and later elaborated by Miao Ch'üan-sun (1844-1919). Miao adduced the argument that Li's two other brothers, Li Ch'e and Li Tzu, both had the water radical in their personal names so that Li's should have been Chih by custom. This has been accepted by the modern scholars Ch'ien Pao-tsung and Yao Ts'ung-wu (1894-1970). The second opinion asserts that Li's name was originally Chih but that he later changed it to Yeh; this view was first proposed by K'o Shao-min (1850-1933) and shared by T'u Chi (1856-1921). It was endorsed by Miao Yüeh, who suggested that Li probably changed his name to Yeh during the late Chin when he discovered that it violated the taboo of the T'ang emperor Kao-tsung (r. 650-683), whose name was also Li Chih. The third thesis, proposed by Ch'en Shu-t'ao, contends that Li's name should have been Yeh since this was commonly used in Yüan works, and believes that Chih was a later scribal mistake. Most Western authors, including Louis Vanhée and Joseph Needham, gave Li's name as Yeh without verification, after Yüan literature. It appears most likely, however, that Li's original personal name was Chih, although it is not improbable that he changed it to Yeh at a later date. As this remains unsubstantiated, however, we shall refer to Li as Li Chih throughout this biography.

Li Chih was born in 1192, in Kao-ch'eng, Chen-ting prefecture, where his immediate forebears practised medicine. His great-grandfather, Li Ch'i, who made his home in Chi-nan, Shantung, fled with his family to Chen-chou, Hopei, around 1125 during the Jurchen invasion of the Northern Sung. There he took refuge with a physician whose art he learned and passed on to his son, Li Ch'eng, Li Chih's grandfather, who later moved to Luan-ch'eng and made a reputation as a

compassionate physician. Li Chih's father, Li Yü, also practised medicine, but one day, we are told, he became unsure of his diagnosis and abandoned the profession. He then embarked on the study of law, but soon gave it up for the Confucian classics and became proficient in belles-lettres. In 1191, he achieved the *chin-shih* degree in the category of prose literature, and was appointed magistrate of Kao-ch'eng. He raised three sons: the eldest, Li Ch'e, by his second wife née Liu; the second, Li Chih, by his third wife née Wang; and the youngest, Li Tzu, by his fourth wife née Ts'ui.

Li Chih, the only eminent member of the family, is said to have been extremely precocious and an eager student since his boyhood, but his early years were much affected by his father's official career. Around 1204, Li Yü was appointed a judge of Ta-hsing prefecture, Hopei, then under the administration of the powerful Jurchen general Hu-sha-hu (also known as Ho-shih-lieh Chi-chung, d. 1213). The latter, having enjoyed imperial favour because of his military distinction, became notorious for his cruelty, graft, and oppression of the local people. For two years Li Yü sought repeatedly to curb the tyrant's excesses, to little effect but that of incurring the latter's displeasure. In reprisal, Hu-sha-hu falsely charged Li with grossly favouring the Han Chinese over the Jurchen and tried to destroy him. Fearing for their safety, Li Yü sent his relatives back to his place of birth, but placed Li Chih at a school in Yüan-shih county, Hopei, to continue his education. Less than a year later Li Yü left office to accept an appointment as salt commissioner of the Liao-tung district, and Li Chih moved again to join his father for a while.

We know little about Li Chih's activity during these years, except that he devoted himself earnestly to study and began to show talent in belles-lettres. He became close friends with future distinguished men of letters such as Li Hsien-neng (1192-1232), Li Fen (1192-1232), and Chi Yü-hsi (1192-1237). In the meantime, his father persevered in his official career. Early in 1213, amid the Mongol invasion of north China under Činggis Qan, Li Yü was appointed commanding prefect of Ching-nan, Shensi, before being transferred to Hsü-ch'ang in Honan, where he failed to assume office because of the Hsi-Hsia invasion. In September, he became deputy general administrator of Soldiers and Horses of the Western Shan-tung district and took charge of the administration of Tung-p'ing prefecture. No sooner was the appointment announced, however, than Hu-sha-hu, his former accuser, slew the Chin emperor (posthumously demoted to Prince Wei-shao, r. 1209-1213) in the palace in Yen-ching (Peking), and made himself grand preceptor, chief of the Presidential Council and grand marshal of the military forces with paramount powers. Hearing this, Li Yü resigned his commission on the pretext of illness and went to Yang-ti county in Honan, where he built a house called Chi-an ('Temporary Abode') on the bank of the Ying River in which to live out his retirement. There Li Yü found leisure

for literary pursuits and his achievements soon drew the attention of a large number of well-wishers and disciples. He earned the high praise, for example, of the leading scholars and belles-lettrists such as Wang T'ing-yün (1156-1202), a Han-lin redactor-compiler, Chao Ping-wen (1159-1232), minister of Rites, and Li Ch'un-fu (1185-1231), a Han-lin academician. In due course, many younger scholars flocked to his quarters for inspiration, including the illustrious Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), who is said to have frequently consulted Li Yü on literary subjects for over ten years.

It is not certain that Li Chih was with his father at the time, but because of the latter's reputation, the son naturally did not escape the scholars' attention. He and Yüan Hao-wen, who had become close friends, were frequent guests of Chao Ping-wen as well as Yang Yün-i (1170-1228), a learned Han-lin redactor-compiler and vice-minister of Rites. Li Chih also made a strong impression on Li Ch'un-fu. Li Ch'un-fu once asked Li Chih to compose a few tomb-inscriptions which were completed overnight, much to Li Ch'un-fu's amazement. Li Ch'un-fu later wrote a poem congratulating Li Chih. One of the couplets exclaims: 'Jen-ch'ing is no ordinary human being; he is the spirit of Li T'ai-po and the bones of Li I-shan!' This comparison with Li Po (669-762) and Li Shang-yin (812-858), two of the greatest Chinese poets, vividly attests to Li Chih's poetic ability.

In due course, Li Chih was to emerge as a literary celebrity and erudite scholar whose fame became widespread in Honan. In 1230, at the late age of thirty-eight, he achieved his *chin-shih* degree in prose literature, and was appointed a registrar of Kao-ling county in Shensi. Before taking up the post, however, he was re-assigned, on the recommendation of a senior court official, to be prefect of Chün-chou in Honan. By this time, Honan was threatened by the Mongol invasion, and Chün-chou, located between the strategic Tung-kuan and Pien (K'ai-feng), the southern capital, had become the mobilisation area of Chin forces. Li Chih assumed personal charge of the accounting office where he performed outstanding service, undoubtedly due to his mathematical skills.

In February 1232, however, the Chin forces suffered a serious setback at the hands of the Mongols at Mt. San-feng, south of Chün-chou, and the prefecture subsequently fell into enemy hands. Li Chih fled in disguise into Shansi and sought shelter first in Hsin and Kuo counties, and then in T'ai-yüan prefecture. Despite hardship and privation, he accepted his fate philosophically, immersing himself in study as did a number of his distinguished contemporaries. In May the following year, the Mongols captured Pien without resistance, and many leading Chin scholar-officials became prisoners of war and refugees. In this hour of crisis, Yüan Hao-wen submitted a letter of appeal to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), pleading for him to rescue from captivity scores of top Chin scholar-officials and notables whose services might

benefit the new government. Li Chih was mentioned with fifty-three other Chin personalities, and while no immediate relief was forthcoming, it was undoubtedly thanks to this recommendation that he later received an invitation to the Mongol court.

During the next few years, Li Chih, like many of his former colleagues and friends, wandered homelessly in Shansi, Shantung and Honan. He once joined Yüan Hao-wen and others in Tung-p'ing at the invitation of Yen Shih (*q.v.*), the Chinese myriarch in the Mongol service who had extended gracious patronage to many of the eminent refugees. Some time later, Li Chih left Shantung for P'ing-ting, where he was the guest of marshal Nieh Kuei (1197-1252), chief military commander of P'ing-ting and other prefectures, who was greatly impressed by his extensive learning. During these years, Li Chih found the time to perfect not only his literary skills, but also his mathematical knowledge by studying the ancient treatises that came into his possession.

In 1242, he left for Yang-ti to convey the coffin of his recently deceased father to Luan-ch'eng for burial at his birth place. There he found that his brothers Li Ch'e and Li Tzu had also died and he remained at his home for a few years. By this time, Li Chih had already gained a considerable reputation and enjoyed the friendship of several outstanding personages who were later invited by Qubilai, now a powerful prince at the Mongol court, for consultation on governmental matters. Therefore, when Chang Te-hui (1195-1274), a prominent former Chin scholar-official, was granted an audience by Qubilai in June 1247 at Qara Qorum, he recommended Li Chih together with Yüan Hao-wen, Wei Fan (*chin-shih* of 1215), and others. Although there was to be no immediate consequence, the recommendation had paved the way for Li Chih's meeting with the future qa'an a decade later.

In the meantime, Li Chih devoted himself diligently to his mathematical investigations; in 1248, he completed his *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* (*hsi-ts'ao*) (*Sea Mirror of Circle Measurements*) in 12 *chüan*. This treatise, an ingenious exposition of algebraic and geometric knowledge in medieval China, was published by his disciples in 1282, three years after his death.

Li Chih returned to Yüan-shih in 1251 and found a permanent home there after two decades of unsettled life. He bought land at the foot of Mt. Feng-lung to provide his sustenance while he devoted himself to study and teaching. Before long, students from far and near flocked to his house and crowded the place. Thereupon the villagers told Li Chih that there was higher up the hill the now dilapidated retreat of the erstwhile Sung chief councillor Li Fang (925-996), and they suggested that it be repaired for his own use. Li Chih agreed, and, with the assistance of the local people, he had the building renovated and turned it into a private academy called Lung-shan

shu-yüan. The Han-lin academician Wang P'an (1202-1293) later wrote about it describing its setting. At this time, Li Chih's friends Chang Te-hui and Yüan Hao-wen also briefly resided there. They came to be known as 'Feng-lung san-lao,' or 'Three Elders of Mt. Feng-lung,' and Li Chih also called himself 'Feng-lung shan-jen,' or 'The Recluse of Mt. Feng-lung.' This marked the beginning for Li Chih of six years of concentrated study until he was called to the Mongol court to advise on government affairs.

This happened in June 1257, when Qubilai, acting on the recommendation of his Chinese advisers, dispatched Temür and Tung Wen-yung (*q.v.*) to Honan to summon Li Chih, Wei Fan, Tou Mo, Yao Shu (*qq.v.*) and other former Chin scholars to Qara Qorum for an audience. The invitees all responded enthusiastically. At a meeting with Qubilai each expounded his views on the principles and methods of good government. Li Chih later recorded his conversation with the future qa'an in an account called 'Wang-t'ing wen-tui' ('Response to Questions at the Prince's Court'). This is now included in Li Chih's biography by Su T'ien-chüeh (1294-1352) in the latter's *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* (1333). It is one of the rare documents of its kind and deserves close examination.

During the conversation, Qubilai posed a number of questions to Li Chih, concerning for example his evaluation of prominent personages in the Chin, his impression of the Uighurs and his views on the principles and methods of government, to which Li Chih responded with candour and wisdom. Qubilai began by asking who were the best officials in Ho-nan, trying thus to elicit information about the last Chin administration. Li Chih named the late acting chief of the Presidential Council, Wan-yen Chung-te (d. 1234), saying that he was most praiseworthy for his bravery and dedication. However, he denounced the Jurchen generals Wan-yen Ho-ta (d. 1232) and I-la P'u-a (d. 1232) for their mediocrity and shortsightedness, arguing that since the last Chin emperor had put his complete trust in them, they were responsible for the fall of the state.

Next Qubilai enquired about the celebrated historic figures Wei Cheng (580-643) and Ts'ao Pin (931-999), who were frequently mentioned in Qubilai's conversation with the Chinese scholars summoned to his audiences. Wei Cheng was an upright counselor and eminent statesman under Emperor T'ang T'ai-tsung (r. 627-649), and Ts'ao Pin, a general serving under Emperor Sung T'ai-tsung (r. 976-997), was acclaimed for his ingenuity and magnanimity on the battlefield. Li Chih, like his predecessors, praised Wei highly for his fidelity and wisdom, saying that he was the most exemplary T'ang official. He also expressed much admiration for Ts'ao Pin, commenting that when the latter was charged with pacifying the Southern T'ang kingdom in central China, he did not kill a single innocent individual. The

implication here was that Qubilai should employ scholar-officials of high calibre such as Wei Cheng, and that the Mongol generals should behave like Ts'ao Pin and avoid indiscriminate killing in the conquest of China. Qubilai then asked whom Li Chih would consider the equals of Wei Cheng among contemporary government officials. Li sighed despondently, saying that most people were used to flattery, and that none could match the great T'ang statesman. However, when asked if there were any virtuous individuals about, Li Chih named Wei Fan, Wang E (*q.v.*), Li Hsien-ch'ing, Chao Fu, Hao Ching (*q.v.*) and others, and pleaded for their employment in government.

Qubilai then changed the subject, asking Li Chih what he thought of the Uighurs, who had been extensively employed by the Mongol court as financial administrators and tax collectors. In reply Li said that, as with the Han Chinese, there were both good and bad Uighurs, but pointed out that most of them were cunning and greedy, and implored the court to exercise prudence in making appointments. This is a very significant statement because the Uighurs had been an unmentionable subject for the Chinese scholars in their submissions to the Mongol rulers, and Li Chih's comment was one of the few frank expressions of opinion on the matter that has been preserved.

Following this, Qubilai put to Li Chih the most important question in the entire conversation: How should the empire be ruled? This was an issue which greatly concerned him and which he frequently raised with Chinese visitors. Li responded as did his colleagues with the familiar Confucian adage that, in order to rule a country, it is imperative to establish sound institutions and practices, as well as just laws and procedures. In addition, the ruler should entrust authority to responsible officials, employ men of virtue and keep scoundrels out of government. In this way, the bond of mutual trust between ruler and subjects could be maintained without recourse to reward and punishment. He went on to criticise the current state of affairs: there was neither law nor order, too many corrupt and greedy officials oppressed the people, and no standards existed whereby to reward and punish. From such sources could flow nothing but chaos and disorder. Qubilai made no comment, but seemed to have been greatly impressed.

Lastly, Qubilai, being aware of Li Chih's scientific interests, questioned him about the cause of the earthquake that had recently shaken the Mongol capital. In reply, Li offered a moralising explanation. He said that earth tremors resulted from excessive *yin* forces. The reason for excessive *yin* forces, he surmised, was either the presence at court of wicked people, whores and sycophants, or the too-frequent occurrence of injustices and warlike actions. Heaven caused the earth to erupt as a warning signal; but if all the misdeeds were rectified, such phenomena would turn

into auspicious omens. Thus Li Chih, like many of the Chinese scholar-officials in the pre-modern era, had seized the opportunity to further the Confucian practice of admonishing the imperial rulers against maladministration.

In summary, Li Chih dwelt on a number of important points in his reply to Qubilai, trying to make him adopt Confucian methods of government for his future administration. Li Chih's responses were very much to the point, but he often made succinct and concrete digressions to deal with general principles and specific issues. Qubilai is said to have been greatly impressed, but was unable to implement Li Chih's proposals or others made by the Chinese scholars since he held no position as yet. Nevertheless, such contacts had made him more aware of the problems to be expected in governing China, and he put some of these recommendations to good use after his accession to the throne.

As Qubilai did not offer him an official appointment, Li Chih returned to his former residence and resumed his mathematical studies. He continued work on circular measurements, and, dissatisfied with the traditional computation methods formulated by his near contemporary Chiang Chou in the *I-ku chi*, he corrected and elaborated them in a new treatise called *I-ku yen-tuan* (*New Steps in Computation*) in 3 *chüan*. This was completed in August 1259 but was only published posthumously in 1282.

In summer 1260, shortly after his enthronement in K'ai-p'ing, Qubilai summoned a number of Chin scholars and notables to join his new government. Li Chih was among those invited and he arrived at the Mongol court with several of his former colleagues and friends. In September he was made a Han-lin academician in charge of imperial documents and also, upon the earlier recommendation of Wang E, a redactor of the National History and of Liao and Chin Histories. However, Li Chih begged to refuse the appointment on the grounds of ill health; his request was granted, and he returned to Mt. Feng-lung. Early in 1264, after the formal establishment of the Han-lin Academy and Department of National History in Yen-ching (Ta-tu), the academician Shang T'ing (*q.v.*) submitted another proposal for the compilation of the national history and the records of the Liao and Chin states. Again he recommended the appointment of Li Chih and several other ex-Chin scholars including Wang E, T'u-tan Kung-lü, Hao Ching, Hsü Shih-lung (1206-85), and Wang Yün (*q.v.*) to the historical commission. Consequently, a year later, Li Chih was summoned to court for the second time and reappointed Han-lin academician; he resigned because of sickness after a month in office.

It appears that Li Chih used poor health as an excuse to shun an official appointment not to his liking in the current political and intellectual climate. He had deplored in his writings, for instance, that the Han-lin scholars should be subject to

the emperor's orders and that the historiographers, under the supervision of the state chancellors, should be reduced to the role of mere scribes. In a letter to members of the Han-lin Academy, he also complained that the academy was beset with politics, that he was sick of intrigue and prejudice, and preferred consequently to spend his time in the mountains and woods. Li Chih's claims of ill health were thus only a screen for his disdain of court politics and a token of his own intellectual integrity.

We know little about Li Chih's activity during the following years; apparently he enjoyed writing poems, drinking with friends, and extending his knowledge of mathematics. He died in 1279 at his residence in Mt. Feng-lung, at the age of eighty-seven. It is reported that during his last hours he told his son Li K'o-hsiu that all his writings should be burnt after his death, but not the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching*, his treatise on circular measurements. There is no trace of Li Chih's epitaph or tomb-inscription, but a number of commemorative essays written by his contemporaries have survived. These and other fragmentary records provided the basic source of Li Chih's composite biography by Su T'ien-chüeh for his *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh*. Sometime later, Qubilai conferred upon Li Chih the posthumous name Wen-cheng ('Cultured and Correct'), by which he is also known in later writings. In 1336, the prefect of P'ing-ting, Liu T'ien-lu, honoured Li Chih in a newly erected shrine called the 'Hall of the Four Worthies' (Ssu-hsien t'ang), with three other distinguished contemporaries: Wang T'ing-yün, Chao Ping-wen, and Yang Yün-i.

Li Chih was a versatile scholar and prolific writer not only on the subject of the classics and belles-lettres, but particularly on that of mathematics, devoting most of his life to study and authorship. He once said that from the age of twenty he had delighted in composing prose and poems; that at thirty he had found pleasure in music and songs; and at forty had enjoyed dabbling in philosophy. At fifty however, having reconsidered his earlier pursuits, he had realised how superficial they had been. He formulated five rules for authorship, i.e. that one should not write without purpose or under duress, that an author should never violate his conscience or misguide the public, and above all, that one should write nothing that he would be ashamed to show posterity. These statements show Li Chih to have been a rigorous scholar and a conscientious author.

Li Chih left several volumes of literary and scientific works, some of which have survived. The collection of his own literary writings, called *Ching-chai wen-chi*, 40 *chüan*, is not extant, but a number of his poems and essays are preserved in several anthologies. Li Chih's earliest miscellaneous collection of essays on the classics, literature and scientific subjects called *Fan-shuo*, or (*Ching-chai*) *Fan-lun*, 40 *chüan*, is also lost, and only four entries have been preserved in his biography in the *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh*. Fortunately, his most important collection of

miscellaneous writings, the *Ching-chai ku-chin chi* (or *t'ou*), 14 *chüan*, has survived and been reprinted several times. It includes various notes on the classics, history, literature, Buddhism, Taoism and scientific subjects. This work was first reconstructed from the early Ming encyclopaedia *Yung-lo ta-tien* and incorporated into the *Ssu-k'ü ch'üan-shu* collection as 8 *chüan*. It was later amended and expanded by Miao Ch'üan-sun from the surviving Ming editions into 14 *chüan* and printed with a critical postscript in his *Ou-hsiang ling-shih* collection (1902).

Li Chih's other extant works are his two treatises on mathematics: the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* (*hsi-ts'ao*), 12 *chüan*, and the *I-ku yen-tuan*, 3 *chüan*. The *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching*, first published in 1282, was reprinted in 1287; it has been more commonly known by its abbreviated title since then. It was incorporated in the *Ssu-k'ü ch'üan-shu* and some marginal notes were added to certain sections of this version by the mathematician K'ung Kuang-sen (1752-86). Later, Juan Yüan (1764-1849), then director of education in Chekiang, ordered his subordinate Li Jui (1768-1812) to prepare a collated edition based on the *Ssu-ku* version and a 14th century transcription. This was completed in 1797 and printed the following year in the *Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu* compiled by Pao Ting-po (1728-1814). The mathematician Li Shan-lan (1811-82), while teaching at the T'ung-wen kuan, published in 1876 the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* which later became known as the T'ung-wen kuan edition. The *I-ku yen-tuan* was probably among the pieces that Li Chih asked his son to burn after his death, but it somehow escaped destruction. The text was first incorporated in the *Yung-lo ta-tien*, and was thereafter reconstructed and copied into the *Ssu-k'ü* collection. It was also reprinted in the *Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu*; and it has been translated into French by L. Vanhée (1913).

Li Chih's major contribution to mathematics, as expounded in his *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* and *I-ku yen-tuan*, consists in verifying and elaborating the solutions to complex problems of circular measurement proposed by earlier and contemporary authors.


In ancient China, the most authoritative text on mathematics was the *Chiu-chang suan-shu* (*Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art*) written by an unknown author during the 1st century A.D. The surviving version includes an introduction by Liu Hui written just before the year 260 A.D. and contains nine chapters covering a total of 246 problems. The sixteenth problem in chapter nine relates the diameter of a circle inscribed within a right triangle to the three sides of the triangle. Using modern mathematical notations, if d is the diameter of the inscribed circle, a the base of the right triangle, b its height, and c the hypotenuse, then

$$d = \frac{2ab}{a+b+c}$$

Before Li Chih, Tung-yüan, an otherwise unknown mathematician, had considered problems involving circles and triangles – such as those of escribed circles of a right triangle; of circles centring on one of the sides, and tangent to the other sides, of a right triangle; and finally of produced sides of triangles in the preceding instances. A total of nine cases expressing the relations between the diameters of such circles and the sides of the respective right triangles, designated the ‘Nine (cases of the right triangle) accommodating (the circle) of Tung-yuan’ (‘Tung-yüan chiu-yung’) in the *Ts’e-yüan hai-ching*, were apparently known only to Li Chih.

The *Ts’e-yüan hai-ching* contains 170 problems. The book begins with a diagram showing a circle inscribed in a right triangle ABC, touching the sides AC and BC at U and Q respectively. (Modern notation is used here instead of the original.) The circle is enclosed by a square EDCW, such that side DC is concurrent with AC and FC with BC; side ED cuts AB at G and is tangent to the circle at N; and side EF cuts AB at H and is tangent to the circle at S. From G, GJ is drawn parallel to AC, meeting BC at J; and from H, HK is drawn parallel to BC, meeting AC at K. Then through the centre O of the circle, MNPOQ is drawn parallel to AC, meeting AB at M and cutting HK at P; and RSTOU is drawn parallel to BC, meeting AB at R and cutting GJ at T. Finally MV is drawn parallel to BC meeting AC at V, and RW is drawn parallel to AC meeting BC at W. As a result fifteen different right triangles are obtained. (See Figure 1 below, ignoring the dotted line YOX which is meant to show one of the ‘Tung-yüan chiu-yung’ relations.)

Figure 1



Assuming $AC = 600$ and $BC = 320$, Li Chih works out the hypotenuse AB as well as the values of the three sides of all the other right triangles in the diagram. The *Ts' e-yüan hai-ching* gives the following list.

<u>Triangle</u>	<u>Hypotenuse c</u>	<u>Base a</u>	<u>Height b</u>
ABC	680	320	600
ARU	544	256	480
MBQ	425	200	375
AHK	510	240	450
GBJ	272	128	240
AMV	255	120	225
MHP	255	120	225
GRT	136	64	120
RBW	136	64	120
AGD	408	192	360
HBF	170	80	150
MRO	289	136	255
GHL	102	48	90
MGN	153	72	135
HRS	34	16	30

The text then presents the following ten expressions, the first taken from the *Chiu-chang suan-shu* and the rest from the 'Tung-yüan chiu-yung,' relating the diameter d of the circle to the base a , height b and hypotenuse c of the right triangle in each case.

<u>Triangle</u>	<u>Relation of d to a, b and c</u>
ABC	$d = \frac{2ab}{a+b+c}$
ARU	$d = \frac{2ab}{b+c}$
MBQ	$d = \frac{2ab}{a+c}$
MRO	$d = \frac{2ab}{c}$
XYC (dotted line where XY is through the centre O of the circle and is parallel to AB)	$d = \frac{2ab}{a+b}$
AGD	$d = \frac{2ab}{c+(b-a)}$
HBF	$d = \frac{2ab}{c-(b-a)}$
GHL	$d = \frac{2ab}{c-(a+b)}$
MGN	$d = \frac{2ab}{c-a}$
HRS	$d = \frac{2ab}{c-b}$

In the same chapter Li Chih also formulates the relationship between the diameter of the circle and the two parallel sides of each of the two trapeziums AUSH and GNQB. He finds the diameter of the circle given the height of one triangle and the base of another, for example AD and BF, MN and RS, and AU and BQ. Finally he calculates the diameter of the circle in terms of the bases of two given right triangles, as in the case of BQ and GN in triangles MBQ and MGN. The following results are shown by Li Chih:

$$\begin{aligned}\sqrt{\text{AU} \times \text{HS}} &= r, \text{ the radius of the circle;} \\ \sqrt{4\text{BQ} \times \text{GN}} &= d, \text{ the diameter of the circle;} \\ \sqrt{\text{BQ} \times \text{GN}} &= r, \text{ the radius of the circle;} \\ \sqrt{2\text{BF} \times \text{AD}} &= d, \text{ the diameter of the circle}\end{aligned}$$

If $\text{RS} = \text{MN}$, then $5\text{RS} = d$, the diameter of the circle;
given $\text{BQ} = a$ and $\text{AU} = b$, the diameter x of the circle
is given by the expression $x^4 + 2(a+b)x - 4ab = 0$

Understanding as he did the properties of circle and right triangle, Li Chih was able to resolve many complicated problems with ease. Take for example the following problem in Ch'in Chiu-shao's *Shu-shu chiu-chang* (*Mathematical Treatise in Nine Sections*) (1247), an important mathematical work written by his Southern Sung contemporary (d. after 1260):


There is a circular city-wall of unknown diameter but with its four gates (one at each cardinal point) opened. Three *li* directly outside the North Gate is a tree. An observer moving due east as soon as he leaves the South Gate can just see the tree after having travelled a distance of nine *li*. Find the diameter of the city-wall.

Ch'in Chiu-shao got the answer by solving a numerical equation of the 10th degree in the form

$$x^{10} + 5ax^8 + 8a^2x^6 - 4a(b^2 - a^2)x^4 - 16a^2b^2x^2 - 16a^3b^2 = 0$$

where x is the diameter of the city-wall, a is the distance from the tree to the North Gate, and b is the distance travelled from the South Gate. To resolve a similar question in the fourth problem of chapter 3 of the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching*, Li Chih simply reduces it to the case of a circle with its centre O lying along the base RU of a right triangle ARU , and tangent to the two sides AR and AU of the same triangle (Figure 2):

Figure 2



In triangles ARU and HRS, $AU = b$ and $RS = a$. Let x be the diameter of the circle. The base $RU = a + x$. Li Chih finds the value of HS from the similar triangles ARU and HRS as follows:

$$\frac{a b}{a + x} = HS$$

He has already worked out an equation for the radius of the circle given the two sides AU and HS in the form $\sqrt{AU \times HS} = r$.

Therefore the diameter $x = 2r = 2 \sqrt{AU \times HS} = 2 \sqrt{\frac{ab^2}{a+x}}$

$$x^2 = \frac{4ab^2}{a+x}$$

giving a cubic equation

$$x^3 + ax^2 - 4ab^2 = 0$$

Li Chih's answer thus entails a numerical equation of the 3rd degree, instead of one of the 10th degree as does Ch'in chiu-shao's. Indeed in his *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* Li Chih finds very few occasions when he needs to compute functions beyond the fourth degree – most of his equations are either quadratic or cubic.

Methods of solving numerical equations of higher degrees were developed before Li Chih's time. Numerical quartic equations were considered by Chia Hsien about the year 1200, while numerical cubic equations are elaborated by Wang Hsiao-t'ung in the 7th century *Ch'i-ku suan-ching* (*Continuation of Ancient Mathematics*). These solutions can be traced to the method used for extracting cube roots in the 5th century

Chang Ch'iu-chien suan-ching (*Chang Ch'iu-chien's Mathematical Manual*), and even earlier to the method used for solving quadratic equations in the *Chiu-chang suan-shu*. Li Chih did not describe how he solved his equations, noting that his procedure was familiar to other mathematicians of the time. The method was used by Ch'in Chiu-shao for example, and it is very similar to that rediscovered independently by Ruffini and Horner in the early 19th century.

Li Chih introduced an algebraic process known as the *t'ien-yüan shu* ('Method of the Celestial Element') to set up numerical equations to any degree. With the decline of traditional mathematics in China during the early 14th century, this method was forgotten after the time of Chu Shih-chieh. It was only after the introduction of algebra from the West by the Jesuits in the 17th century that Chinese mathematicians of the 18th century rediscovered the algebra of the *t'ien-yüan shu*. The method had survived in Japan, however, exerting a profound influence on the mathematics of that country. Known as *tengenjutsu* in Japan, it enabled Seki Takakazu (also known as Seki Kōwa) to develop a formula for infinite expansion which is now achieved by calculus.

Li Chih was not the originator of the *t'ien-yüan shu* method. Tsu I noted in the preface of Chu Shih-chieh's *Ssu-yüan yü-chien* (*Precious Mirror of the Four Elements*) (1303) that the method had been mentioned earlier by Chiang Chou in the *I-ku (chi)*; by Li Wen-i in the *Chao-tan*; by Shih Hsin-tao in the *Ch'ien-ching*; by Liu Ju-hsieh in the *Ju-chi shih-so*; and that it was explained in detail by Yüan Yü (not to be confused with Yüan Hao-wen, T. Yü-chih, see below). Unfortunately none of these books has survived; in fact, it is only through Li Chih's *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* and *I-ku yen-tuan* that we know anything about the *Ch'ien-ching* and the *I-ku (chi)*. Chu Shih-chieh reports that Li Chih's old friend, the celebrated scholar Yüan Hao-wen, was also acquainted with the *t'ien-yüan shu* method. Yet the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* represents the earliest exposition of the method in existence. The *t'ien-yüan shu* deals with numerical algebraic equations of one unknown to any degree. The unknown quantity x is denoted by the word *yüan* ('element') and the absolute term by the word *t'ai*. In the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching*, an equation is arranged as a series of lines over and under a reference line marked by the sign *t'ai*. On this line, the power of the unknown is zero ($x^0=1$), which in effect makes the corresponding absolute term a constant. On the line immediately above, the power of x is 1 ($x^1=x$). It is 2 on the next line up, and so forth. Conversely, the powers of x regress with each line below the reference line, from -1 on the line immediately under the reference (negative powers or reciprocals). Because of this convention, there is no need, as in modern algebra, specifically to denote the *yüan* corresponding to each absolute term of an equation: that value is immediately apparent from the absolute term's position relative to the reference line.

Thus an arrangement of counting rods in Chapter 11, Problem 18 as shown in Figure 3, represents the equation *

$$-4x^2 + 232x + 39900 + 11681280x^{-1} + 788486400x^{-2} = 0$$

Figure 3

t'ien yüan shu notation		current equivalent
		$-4x^2$
		$+232x^1$
		$+39\ 900x^0$
		$+11\ 681\ 280x^{-1}$
		$+788\ 486\ 400x^{-2}$

* The numerical notations used by Li Chih are as follows:

place-value	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Units and even powers of ten (both +ve and -ve)	○						┐	┐┐	┐┐┐	┐┐┐┐
Tens and odd powers of ten (both +ve and -ve)	○	—	≡	≡≡	≡≡≡	≡≡≡≡	└	└└	└└└	└└└└

A minus sign is denoted by a counting-rod placed obliquely over one of the digits in the number concerned. Thus -123 is denoted by $| = \text{III}$

It is interesting to note that Li Chih later reversed the order by placing the absolute term (*t'ai*) above the positive powers of the unknown quantity (*yüan*). Hence ascending powers of the unknown were ranged below the absolute term, in order of increasing values from the latter, and vice versa for the reciprocals. Li Chih adopts this procedure in his *I-ku yen-tuan*, and according to his statement in the *Ching-chai ku-chin chi*, it followed the fashion derived by P'eng Tse from consideration of the

theory of the *I-ching* (*Book of Changes*). In the *I-ku yen-tuan*, an equation such as $25x^2 + 280x - 6905 = 0$ is represented as in Figure 4.

Figure 4

<i>t'ien yüan shu</i> notation	current notation
太 (<i>t'ai</i>) ⊥	$-6905x^0$
	$+280x^1$
○	$+25x^2$
≡	
○	
≡	

This second method was generally adopted by later mathematicians. It may be useful to note here the zero symbol used by Li Chih. The same was in fact used by Ch'in Chiu-shao. The zero symbol first appears in Chinese literature at about the same time in the writings of these two great mathematicians who probably knew nothing of each other, suggesting that it would have been used in China before that. The dot (*bindu*) was introduced to China from India by Ch'ü-t'an Hsi-ta's (Gautama Siddhārtha) *K'ai-yüan chan-ching* (*The K'ai-yüan [Period] Treatise on Astrology*) (ca. 729), and the circle denoting zero was first found in a magic square brought to China from the Islamic culture-area in the 13th century. It has been suggested, however, by both Ch'ien Pao-tsung and Yen Tun-chieh that the circle in China might have evolved independently during the 12th century from the empty square meaning zero.

The *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* standardises the terminology used in Chinese mathematics involving regarding higher degree equations of the general form:

$$ax^6 + bx^5 + cx^4 + dx^3 + ex^2 + fx + g = 0$$

The constant or the absolute term g is known generally as *shih*. More specifically, it is known as *p'ing-shih* in the case of a linear equation, *fang-shih* in the case of a quadratic equation, *erh-ch'eng fang-shih* in the case of a cubic equation, *san-ch'eng fang-shih* in the case of a quartic equation, *ssu-ch'eng fang-shih* in the case of an equation of the 5th degree, and *wu-cheng fang-shih* in the case of an equation of the 6th degree. The coefficients a to f have the following names:

a	<i>yü; yü-fa; ch'ang-fa</i>
b	<i>ti-ssu-lien</i>
c	<i>ti-san-lien</i>
d	<i>ti-erh-lien</i>
e	<i>ti-i-lien</i>
f	<i>ts'ung; ts'ung-fang</i>

These terms are for positive integers only. In the case of negative integers, the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* adds either the word *i* or the word *hsü* before the coefficients of x and powers of x .

The *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* attracted the attention of very few scholars until the 17th century. Ku Ying-hsiang (1483-1565) wrote the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching shih-shu* in 12 *chüan* in 1550 and the *Ts'e-yüan suan-shu* in 4 *chüan* in 1553, but he left out the detailed explanations contained in the original, while Chou Shu-hsüeh in 1558, K'o Shang-ch'ien in 1578, and Ch'eng Ta-wei in 1593, confined their attention to the relations between the diameter of the inscribed circle of a right triangle and the three sides of that triangle as given in the Han mathematical manual *Chiu-chang suan-shu*. As noted above, Chinese mathematicians took a new interest in the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* with the introduction of Euclidean geometry by the Jesuits. At first, they confined their attention once again to the problem in the *Chiu-chang suan-shu*, looking at it afresh in the light of their new knowledge of geometry. No one was yet able to comprehend the *t'ien-yüan shu* method. About the year 1761 Mei Ku-ch'eng (1681-1763) employed the modern way of extracting square roots in his *Ch'ih-shui i-chen* (*Pearls Recovered from the Red River*) to explain one of the problems in the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching*, but the implications of the *t'ien-yüan shu* method were still not understood. In the early 19th century, Chiao Hsün (1763-1820) and his colleague Li Jui (1765-1814), who were both serving under Juan Yüan in Hangchow, finally recognised the *t'ien-yüan shu* as a Chinese method of representing algebraic equations of higher degrees. Chiao Hsün wrote the *T'ien-yüan i-shih* (*Complete Explanation of the Celestial Element [Method]*) in 2 *chüan* (1800) and the *K'ai-fang t'ung-shih* (*Complete Explanation of Equations of Higher Degrees*) (1801) to demonstrate the method, while in 1803 Li Jui applied the *t'ien-yüan shu* to explain the problems in the T'ang mathematical manual *Ch'i-ku suan-ching*.

A number of Ch'ing scholars studied the text of the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* besides K'ung Kuang-sen (1752-86) and Li Jui. Some of their works and modern studies of the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching* are listed in the Bibliography; the most comprehensive study to date is that by Li Yen.

Li Chih's other mathematical treatise, the *I-ku yen-tuan*, was based in part on an earlier work, the *I-ku chi*, written by Chiang Chou between 1178 and 1224. The *I-ku yen-tuan* consists of three *chüan* with sixty-four problems in all, of which twenty-one are referred to by Li Chih as the 'old method' (*chiu-shu*), presumably meaning the *I-ku chi*. The first ten problems concern a circle in the centre of a square; each considers different parameters, such as areas, and distances between certain points of the circle and the square. They seek to find the side or perimeter of the square and the diameter or circumference of the circle, and in the ninth and tenth problems, also the


distance from the sides or angles of the square to the circle. In the next ten problems, the square is contained within a circle. Problem twenty-one gives the total area and the total perimeter of three squares of different sizes, and seeks to determine the sides of each of these squares which form an arithmetic progression. Problem twenty-two, the last problem in *chüan* 1, concerns a square with one of its corners cut away. Problems twenty-three to twenty-nine deal with squares and circles, while Problem thirty considers the combination of two circles.

As an illustration, Problem two in the *I-ku yen-tuan* translates as follows:


There is a square farm with a circular pool at its centre. The farm has an area of 13 *mou* and 7 1/2 tenths of a *mou* (i.e. 17.75 *mou*). However, neither the diameter nor the area (of the circle) is given. One only knows that the southern boundary of the farm is located 40 *pu* from the northernmost point of the pool. Find the diameter of the pool and the side of the square farm.

Answer: As above (i.e. side of square = 60 *pu* and diameter of circle = 20 *pu*, as in Question 1).

Method:




Enter one counting rod as the 'celestial element,' representing the diameter of the pool. Subtracting it from twice the distance (from the southern edge of the farm to the northernmost point of the pool), the side of the square farm is given below:




[In modern algebra, side of square = $-x + 80$, where x is the diameter of the circular pool.]

On squaring the expression of the farm's side, the combined area of the square farm and the pool is obtained as below:




[In modern algebra, $(-x + 80)^2 = x^2 - 160x + 6400$ gives the combined area of the square farm and the pool.]

Squaring the 'celestial element,' which is the diameter of the pool, multiplying it by 3 and dividing it by 4 provides the area of the pool, as below:




[In modern algebra, taking $\pi = 3$, area of pool $x^2 = 0.75x^2$]

Subtracting the area of the pool from the combined area of farm and pool gives the area of the farm, i.e.



[In modern algebra, $x^2 - 160x + 6400 - 0.75x^2 = 0.25x^2 - 160x + 6400$ expresses the area of the farm.]

Equating this with the given area 3300 square *pu* (where 1 *mou* = 240 square *pu*) we get:



[In modern algebra $3300 = 0.25x^2 - 160x + 6400$, i.e. $-0.25x^2 + 160x - 3100 = 0$.]

Taking the root of this quadratic equation, we obtain 20 *pu* for the diameter of the pool, and subtracting that from twice the given distance 40 *pu*, we find 60 *pu* for the length of the side of the square farm.

[In modern algebra, $x = 20$ and $2 \times 40 - x = 60$.]

Li Chih deserves to be regarded as one of the greatest mathematicians of a time when Chinese mathematics can be said to have achieved their golden age. He was a contemporary of Ch'in Chiu-shao, whose *Shu-shu chiu-chang* was written in 1247, just one year before the *Ts'e-yüan hai-ching*. Yet it is most unlikely that the two authors had ever even heard of each other, such being their geographical and political isolation. Li Chih was living in the North, first under the rule of the Jurchen and then under the Mongols, while Ch'in Chiu-shao resided in the South under Southern Sung. Neither mentioned the other in his writings. The terminology which they employed in equations of higher degrees is similar but not identical. They used the term *t'ien-yüan* ('celestial element') in different ways. To Li Chih it meant the unknown quantity x in an equation, but for Ch'in Chiu-shao it was a datum. Furthermore, unlike Li Chih, the latter never used this term in his numerical equations. Ch'in Chiu-shao explained the process of solving his numerical equations in great detail, without describing how his equations were constructed from the given data of his problems. Li Chih, on the contrary, expounded the reasoning followed to formulate his equations algebraically, but did not bother setting out the method of their solution. For George Sarton, therefore, Li Chih is essentially an outstanding algebraist whose work complemented the contribution of Ch'in Chiu-shao in promoting the flowering of mathematics in late imperial China.

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H. L. Chan and P. Y. Ho

21. SHANG T'ING (1209-1289)

Shang T'ing, T. Meng-ch'ing, H. Tso-shan lao-jen, was born in 1209 during the reign of the Chin ruler Wei-shao wang (r. 1209-13), in Ch'i-yin county, Ts'ao-chou, in Shantung. Descended of an eminent scholar-official of the Jurchen-Chin, he rose to become a distinguished administrator and a close adviser to Qubilai. His ancestors, who originally came from Ch'ang-p'ing county in the ancient state of Ch'en, north-east of modern Hsi-hua in Honan, were known by the surname Yin before the Sung dynasty. For successive generations under the T'ang emperors, they had gained the *chin-shih* degree and occupied high government positions. One of them, Yin Huai-ch'in (869-963), a magistrate of Nan-hua (Hopei), founded a separate branch of the family by changing his surname to Shang in order to avoid the character *yin* that was made taboo by its occurrence in the name of Chao Hung-yin, father of the founder of the Sung, Chao K'uang-yin.

Descendants of Shang Huai-ch'in continued to serve the Sung in various capacities; many of them attained the highest honours in the civil service examinations and distinguished themselves in scholarship and belles-lettres. Shang T'ing's great-great-grandfather Shang Kang pursued a military career under the Sung and later joined the service of the Jurchen. Shang T'ing's great-grandfather did likewise, becoming a renowned Confucian scholar and teacher during the middle years of the Chin dynasty. Shang Heng (1185-1231), T'ing's father, was an outstanding scholar-official and man of letters. In early 1231, while serving as senior clerk in the Marshal's Administration in charge of the defence of Shensi, he was captured by the invading Mongol army and, refusing to surrender, died a hero. Shang Heng had married twice and was survived by two sons: Shang T'ing and Shang Yüan (or Lung), the former fated to become by far the more illustrious.

There is no information on Shang T'ing's early life before the 1230s, when he took up residence in the Chin capital Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan), possibly to prepare for the civil service examination. There he befriended a number of renowned scholars including Yüan Hao-wen and Yang Huan (*q.v.*). In January 1233, when Pien was besieged by the Mongol forces under Sübötei (*q.v.*) and Tāčar, the Chin supreme commander, Marshal Ts'ui Li (d. 1234), treacherously surrendered the city without resistance. As a result, many of the leading Chin scholar-officials became prisoners of war, including Yüan Hao-wen and his friends. It is not certain whether Shang T'ing was also captured; at any rate, he joined the ranks of the refugees. Concerned with the plight of his friends in this difficult hour, Yüan Hao-wen sent his famous

entreaty to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (q.v.), chief of the Chinese bureau of the Mongol Secretariat, pleading for his assistance in rescuing the leading Chin scholars and notables from servitude. Shang T'ing's name was among the fifty-four mentioned. All were spared, but most were compelled to disperse in search of sustenance.

Shang T'ing found his way to Kuan-shih in Shantung, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Chao T'ien-hsi (1191-1240), a commander of the Han Armies then in charge of the administration of the county. He was joined by Yüan Hao-wen, Yang Huan, and other former associates who had also sought refuge there. Some time later, hearing that Yen Shih (q.v.), the powerful military leader and governor of Tung-p'ing, was eager to promote Confucian studies in his administration, Shang and his friends made their way to him. Impressed by Shang's erudition, Yen Shih employed him as tutor to his sons Chung-chi, Chung-fan, Chung-ssu and others. Shang T'ing, who was in his late twenties, spent the next few years with the Yen brothers. After Chung-chi's appointment as governor of Tung-p'ing in 1240 in succession to his father, Shang was made a senior clerk in the administration and was later sent to act as judge in his native Ts'ao prefecture, then under the jurisdiction of the Yen family.

Shang returned eventually to Tung-p'ing where he continued to serve as registrar and to assist Yen Chung-chi in setting up schools and promoting Confucian learning. He recommended that the former Chin scholars K'ang Yeh, Li Ch'ang (1203-89) and Li Chen should lecture on the *Book of History*, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, and the *Great Learning*, respectively. At the same time Shang attended to the education of students in preparation for the civil service examination that had been reinstituted by the Mongol court on the recommendation of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in 1237/38. These tasks occupied him fully during the next decade.

Early in 1252 Shang T'ing, then forty-three, was summoned by Qubilai to his retreat at Yen-chou (Inner Mongolia). Qubilai, who had heard about Shang, wanted to meet him personally with a view to using his services in the administration of his Chinese domain. During the interview, while conversing on state affairs, Shang took the opportunity of bringing to Qubilai's attention the hardships visited on the people of Shantung by the government's levy of grain for the local army. He asserted that the administration was requiring the people of Tung-p'ing to provide 10,000 bushels of grain to supply the forces of Li T'an (q.v.) stationed at Mt. Chü (near Lin-chü in central Shantung). The shipments had to make a long journey across rugged territory (Tung-p'ing was situated at the western end of the region), frequently incurring considerable losses and delays in the rainy seasons, with the result that innocent people were often severely punished for any shortcomings. He went on to request that Qubilai change the procedure and order that the grain be sent to the more accessible I-chou (Lin-i) south of Mt. Chü, from whence the army should

henceforward draw its supplies. This was approved and the population of Tung-p'ing was relieved of a great burden.

Subsequently, Shang T'ing was recruited at first secretary by the veteran official Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*) when Yang was appointed pacification commissioner of the Kuan-chung region. That region, covering eight prefectures and twelve counties in modern Shensi, had been populous and wealthy, but population had fallen to fewer than 10,000 households, i.e. about 50,000 individuals, as a result of war. Yang and Shang devoted themselves to improving conditions in the region by reorganising the local administration, punishing unscrupulous officials, issuing paper money, introducing a fixed salary for functionaries, encouraging agriculture, and recommending a halving in taxes and levies. Consequently, many of the households that had fled came back and life returned to normal, much to the credit of Yang Wei-chung and Shang T'ing. When Yang was replaced by the sinicised Uighur Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*) in July 1254, Shang T'ing was appointed his deputy, and served in this capacity until 1258.

In late 1256 Emperor Möngke entrusted the military campaign against the Southern Sung to Qubilai, who immediately ordered the requisition from Ching-chao of 10,000 rolls of cloth, 3,000 rolls of plain silk and 3,000 bushels of rice, as well as vast quantities of weapons and military equipment for the armies stationed at P'ing-liang in Kansu. The deadline was close and the people were worried. Shang T'ing then pleaded with his superior, stressing the difficulty of shipping rice over a distance of 1,000 *li* (550 km), and the fact that conscripting peasants for transport duty would seriously disrupt local silk production and the wheat harvest. His next step was to consult a local chief of Mei-chou (in Shensi) called Wang, who was a native of P'ing-liang. Wang acknowledged that he owned a large store of grain in his native home, and agreed to deliver it to the army for a price. The plan was approved and the grain was shipped to its destination well within the time limit, without causing much inconvenience to the local people.

Under the administration of Lien Hsi-hsien and Shang T'ing, Kuan-chung enjoyed order and prosperity, and the emperor, impressed by their achievement, appointed them to serve concurrently as pacification commissioners of neighbouring Huai-chou and Meng-chou in Hopei. They remained in these posts until Möngke, on the recommendation of his confidants 'Alamdār and Liu T'ai-p'ing, abolished all the Pacification Bureaux in the regional administrations early in 1258 to curb the excessive power of the administrators appointed previously by Qubilai (see the biography of Yao Shu). Thereupon Shang T'ing returned to Tung-p'ing, but he was summoned soon after by Qubilai to join the latter's expedition against the Sung territories in the Huai valley.

During this campaign Shang T'ing not only advised Qubilai on matters of strategy, but also took the opportunity of commenting on Möngke's invasion of the Sung strongholds in Szechwan. He remarked that Szechwan, being a distant and well-protected region, was difficult to attack, and the emperor should have carefully weighed the situation before committing himself to such an important decision. This impressed Qubilai favourably. The Mongol army scored several victories over the Sung forces in the Huai valley in August/September, but Qubilai was forced to halt his offensive in December after receiving confirmation that Möngke had died in Ho-chou, Szechwan (11 Aug.), and that Qubilai's brother Ariq Böke was attempting to seize the throne. When Qubilai left for the north with a contingent of troops, Shang T'ing urged him to tighten security against the spies of Ariq Böke; Qubilai took his advice, and entrusted Chang Wen-ch'ien with the task. Shortly afterwards Ariq Böke sent envoys to demand his brother's submission, but Qubilai refused and executed the emissaries. On Qubilai's instructions, the Mongol commanders eventually reached a peace settlement with the Sung enemy and this concluded for the time being the Mongol effort to complete the conquest of China.

Upon his arrival at K'ai-p'ing fu early in 1260, Qubilai summoned several of his Chinese confidants, including Shang T'ing and Lien Hsi-hsien, and took advice on how to deal with the problem of Ariq Böke. Apparently the counsellors all urged him to assume the imperial title and take the initiative against his brother. In May, Qubilai proclaimed himself emperor at K'ai-p'ing fu, and Shang memorialised on that occasion to the effect that Qubilai should recall the expeditionary forces from the south in order to strengthen his position, while retaining the armies in the northwestern regions as a protection against possible incursions by Ariq Böke's forces. The advice was followed. Qubilai appointed Lien Hsi-hsien pacification commissioner of Shensi and Szechwan, with Shang T'ing, who is said to have strongly supported Lien's appointment, as deputy commissioner.

Lien and Shang arrived to set up the Pacification Bureau at Ching-chao, the seat of Qubilai's former domain under Möngke, but were immediately faced with a rebellion. Qara Buqa, an army commander then stationed at Mt. Liu-p'an, had joined his former subordinate Qundukai, who had distinguished himself in the Szechwan campaign, in a rising to support Ariq Böke. Lien Hsi-hsien sought Shang T'ing's assessment of the situation. Shang T'ing concluded that Qara Buqa had three options: to move east and attack Ching-chao; to concentrate his troops at Mt. Liu-p'an and wait for an opportunity to strike at Qubilai's forces; or to go north and join Ariq Böke in an attack against Qara Qorum. He contended, however, that Qara Buqa would choose the third option, and this was exactly what happened.

Having tightened the security of Ching-chao, Lien Hsi-hsien and Shang T'ing made plans to move against Qara Buqa and his supporters. They received assistance from Wang Liang-ch'en (1231-81), a general then posted at Kung-ch'ang in Shensi, whom they subsequently asked Qubilai to entrust with the suppression of the rebel forces. They raised 15,000 *liang* of silver from their treasury to provision his army and build defensive positions in his territory in preparation for the hostilities. Furthermore, they called up General Bačun, who soon joined forces with Wang Liang-ch'en in Kan-chou. Then in September, the Pacification Bureaux of Shen-hsi and Ssu-ch'uan were reorganised into a Regional Secretariat Council; Lien Hsi-hsien became assistant of the Right and Shang T'ing, deputy administrator.

In the meantime, the rebel generals had already made their move. Qara Buqa and Qunduqai were leading their forces to the north-west towards Qara Qorum, whereas 'Alamdār, who had now allied himself with Ariq Böke, was leading his troops southwards from Qara Qorum. They met at Kan-chou. A dispute flared up between Qara Buqa and 'Alamdār, as a result of which the former led his troops north while the latter, joined by Qunduqai, marched south. Before this, Qubilai had dispatched Prince Qadan, the sixth son of Möngke, with reinforcements for Wang Liang-ch'en and Bačun in Kansu. In October, 'Alamdār and Qunduqai's army was annihilated east of Kan-chou; both leaders were captured and executed. Qubilai was greatly relieved by this victory; he not only honoured his generals, but also rewarded Lien Hsi-hsien and Shang T'ing handsomely for their contribution.

In June 1261, Lien Hsi-hsien and Shang T'ing were recalled to Yen-ching (Peking) and were appointed respectively director and associate administrator of political affairs in the Secretarial Council under Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) and Buqa, the Left and Right chancellor respectively. Shang T'ing was thus to hold an important position in the central administration during the next five years, until the reorganisation of the Secretarial Council in 1266. Shortly after his appointment, a disturbance having again broken out in Shensi, Shang advised Shih T'ien-tse to post Lien Hsi-hsien back to the region because of his previous experience. Shih accepted this advice and appointed Yeh-lü Chu (*q.v.*), the eldest son of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, to replace Lien in the Secretarial Council. After that, Shang T'ing was ordered to investigate the conduct of Liu Cheng (1213-75), an ex-Sung general who had submitted to Qubilai in July of that year and had been appointed administrator of the Regional Secretarial Council of K'uei-chou in Szechwan. On surrendering, Liu had brought with him several hundred Chinese and Mongol soldiers who had earlier defected to Sung; he wished thereby to demonstrate that he had rejected his former allegiance. Many officials at that time recommended capital punishment for the renegades, but Shang pleaded for leniency and they were all spared. Sometime later,

a quarrel flared up among the generals in Szechwan, and Shang again interceded, successfully settling their differences and restoring stability to the region.

Early in 1263, Shang T'ing, then aged fifty-four, was implicated in a trumped-up charge that almost ruined his career. It happened that Fei Yin (or Fei Cheng-yin), a judge in the county of Hsing-yüan in Shensi, was found guilty of an offence. Fearful of punishment, Fei falsely accused both Lien Hsi-hsien and Shang T'ing. He charged Shang with illegally employing Wang Liang-ch'en's army for the construction of the defence walls at Kung-ch'ang, and with having recommended the appointment of Wang Wen-t'ung, the notorious administrator of political affairs in the Secretarial Council who had been executed for his involvement in Li T'an's insurrection. Qubilai recalled Shang to Shang-tu for interrogation. In his defence, Shang T'ing claimed that he had exerted himself to the utmost to quell the rebellions in Shensi, that the use of government troops for the construction of the defence walls had been an emergency measure, and that he had received the court's prior permission to do so. When questioned about his role in the recommendation of Wang Wen-t'ung, he was somewhat evasive, probably because, coming from Tung-p'ing, he might have had close ties with him. He stated, however, that even though he had made no effort to impeach Wang, he had expressed his disapproval of his character and performance to Chao Ping (1222-80), one of the imperial confidants. Qubilai was not satisfied, but, recalling Shang's meritorious service, pardoned him. In April of that year, through the intercession of Yao Shu, who spoke highly of Shang T'ing, Qubilai appointed Shang as acting chief of the Regional Department of Military Affairs in Ch'eng-tu, Szechwan, in charge of judicial and fiscal matters.

Shortly afterwards Qubilai recalled Shang T'ing to the capital and reappointed him associate director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council. Shang then submitted a memorial proposing the compilation of the records of the present dynasty as well as of the history of the Liao and Chin dynasties by the Department of National History, reiterating a similar recommendation made earlier by Liu Ping-chung and Wang E (*qq.v.*). In this memorial he recommended that Wang E, Li Chih, Hsü Shih-lung, Kao Ming (1209-74), Hu Chih-yü and Chou Ti be put in charge of producing the Liao and Chin histories. Qubilai was pleased with the suggestion, but little progress was made with the project during his reign. Later in the year, after Liu Ping-chung and others had succeeded in having Jingim appointed (in January 1263) as chief of the Secretarial Council to counteract the influence of Aḥmad, Shang T'ing joined his colleagues in requesting the establishment of a special staff to assist the heir apparent in his duties. The request was granted.

Early in 1265 Shang T'ing was appointed deputy chief of the Ho-tung Regional Secretarial Council under Yeh-lü Chu, but was soon recalled to the Secretarial

Council to resume his duty as associate director of political affairs. On An-t'ung's recommendation he was relieved of this office several months later as a result of the reorganisation of the Secretarial Council (April 1266). It is not certain whether Shang T'ing was given another post, but he probably remained as a counsellor in the Council. In that year, he collaborated with his colleagues Wang E, Yao Shu, Tou Mo, and others in compiling a digest of quotations from the classics. Then in 1268, Aḥmad proposed the establishment of a Presidential Council in charge of fiscal administration, independent of the Secretarial Council; and in order to remove An-t'ung from power, Aḥmad proposed that he be made one of the Three Dukes. With his colleagues, Shang T'ing immediately opposed the recommendation, asserting that An-t'ung was the key to the stability of the Secretarial Council and should not be removed. As a result An-t'ung continued to serve in the Secretarial Council, which, however, did not prevent Aḥmad from becoming chief of the powerful Presidential Council at the expense of the central administration (see the biographies of Aḥmad and An-t'ung).

In 1269, Shang T'ing was appointed joint deputy administrator of military affairs; he was made vice-commissioner in 1271. In this new capacity Shang fixed the stipend of the army officers according to their rank, and submitted a request to engage over 4,000 soldiers in agricultural production at the military colonies. Over 30,000 *mou* of land were then opened up for cultivation, which provided extra revenue for the provisioning of the emperor's personal forces. In the meantime Shang T'ing also laid off over 30,000 soldiers who were holders of sinecures, and in this way saved enough to support a large unit of the standing army, thereby reducing waste and improving the quality and morale of the military forces.

In November 1272 Qubilai invested his third son, Manggala, as Prince of An-hsi in order to strengthen his control over the northwestern regions. The principedom was established at Ching-chao in Shensi, the seat of Qubilai's former fief, and a military headquarters was set up at Mt. Liu-p'an with civil and military jurisdiction over the populations of Chinese Turkestan, Kansu and Szechwan. Qubilai appointed Shang T'ing and Li Te-hui (1218-80) as administrators of the principedom and exhorted them to assist the prince. During the following years Manggala divided his time between Ch'ang-an (Hsi-an) and Mt. Liu-p'an, whereas Shang and his colleagues occupied themselves with the management of civil and military affairs. After 1275, Li Te-hui was sent to oversee the princely administration in Szechwan, and Shang T'ing became the principal administrator of the principedom.

In 1277 Manggala was ordered by Qubilai to lead an expeditionary force against a rebel Mongol general in the north. It is not clear who this general was, but he may have been associated with Širegi, the fourth son of Möngke, who had rebelled in

Almalıq (near modern Kulja) in autumn of the previous year, taking Nomuqan and Kököçü, Qubilai's fourth and eighth sons, as hostages. Manggala left immediately for the north, putting Shang T'ing in charge of his domain. At the same time Qubilai appointed Chao Ping, now a senior official (*daruqači*) in the Department of Military Affairs, as joint administrator of the principedom to assist Shang. As a precaution, Shang and his colleagues then subjected the local militia in Yen-an to vigorous training. Indeed, when the Mongol general Tuqluq revolted at Mt. Liu-p'an in support of Širegi, Shang challenged the rebels without delay and crushed the uprising with that force. Marshal Bayan, whom Qubilai had entrusted with the elimination of Širegi, and Manggala also brought their military operations to a successful conclusion.

Upon Manggala's return to Ching-chao in 1278, Shang T'ing presented him with a ten-point memorial on ways to strengthen the administration of the principedom. He urged the prince to maintain an harmonious relationship with his subjects; respect their traditional occupations; improve the resources to meet their needs; promote the general welfare of the population; exert caution in delegating authority; practice self-examination; give special attention to administrative matters; and maintain a channel of communication with his people. The prince, unfortunately, died in December without having been able to benefit from this advice. Thereupon, Manggala's widow asked Shang T'ing to request that Qubilai appoint her eldest son and heir Ananda as successor to his late father. After some hesitation Qubilai granted the request a year later, and as Ananda was still under age, the qa'an placed Shang in sole charge of the Princely Establishment. Shang, however, now almost seventy, was sick in Ch'ang-an at the time, and so the task fell to Chao Ping. Shang T'ing was thus spared a major responsibility, which did not save him, however, from becoming the scapegoat for a political incident the following year.

This began in the autumn of 1279, when Chao Ping was called to Ta-tu for a routine report on his administration. During the audience with Qubilai, Chao stated that after Manggala's death the administrators of the principedom at Ching-chao had abused their power. He named as principal culprits Kuo Ts'ung, the Transport commissioner, and Kuo Shu-yün, the first secretary of the Princely Establishment, claiming that they had abused their prerogatives and were involved in various illegal activities. Qubilai ordered Chao Ping and his associates to return to the principedom and investigate the matter.

When they arrived in Ch'ang-an later in the year, Ananda was away at Mt. Liu-p'an; seizing this opportunity, Kuo Ts'ung and his accomplices forged an order and arrested Chao and his party on a spurious charge. They subsequently sent their prisoner and his subordinates, as well as his wife and servants, to Mt. Kung-t'ung,

north of P'ing-liang in Kansu, where they were incarcerated. Fortunately, Chao's son Chao Jen-jung was away at that time; when he was informed of those events, he submitted a complaint to court, upon which Qubilai immediately sent two of his personal attendants with a contingent of guards to P'ing-liang to rescue the imprisoned officials. In April of the following year, the imperial envoys arrived at P'ing-liang, but Kuo Ts'ung and his friends enticed them to a feast, made them drunk, and poisoned Chao Ping in prison (April 1280). The imperial representatives soon uncovered the plot. They arrested Kuo Ts'ung with over a hundred of his subordinates and sent them to the capital.

Qubilai immediately conducted the trial in person, charging the principals with the murder of Chao Ping and others. Both Kuo Ts'ung and Kuo Shu-yün were executed. Until then, the incident had not involved Shang T'ing since the testimony of the main culprits had not mentioned him. During the trial, however, a female attendant in the Princely Establishment by the name of Hsi Chieh-chieh was also found guilty and was sentenced to death as an accomplice. In a desperate attempt to save herself, she put the blame on Shang and his eldest son Shang Hu, claiming that they had foreknowledge of the plot. Disturbed by the allegation, Qubilai ordered the arrest of Shang and his son. Both the minister of Personnel Ch'ing-yang Meng-yen (an ex-Sung scholar-official) and the distinguished Tung Wen-chung (*q.v.*), who was then a seals secretary, came to the defence of the accused. They emphatically rejected the charge, saying that they had found no evidence linking Shang T'ing to the murder of Chao Ping; they argued that, in view of Shang's distinguished service record, he should be pardoned even though he might have been implicated. Qubilai was relieved and freed Shang T'ing and his son, but he did not exonerate Shang completely and ordered the confiscation of his properties as token punishment. In 1283, three years after the incident, Qubilai rehabilitated Shang, reappointing him vice-commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs, but Shang resigned almost immediately on account of poor health. A year later, Chao Ping's son brought a complaint to avenge his father's death, and Shang T'ing was again arrested and questioned; he spent three months in prison before his name was finally cleared.

After his release, Shang T'ing was dispirited and felt increasingly despondent; he retired to his home, dissociating himself completely from state affairs. He devoted his time to literary pursuits and befriending Taoists; also he adopted the new style of Tso-shan lao-jen ('Old man from Mt. Tso') after the name of a mountain of his native place Ts'ao-chou. Qubilai did not forget him completely and is said to have frequently enquired about Shang's health, but he did not summon him to court presumably because of his advanced age.

Shang T'ing died in early January 1289 at the age of seventy-nine. Though disgraced in the latter part of his career, he was awarded lavish posthumous honours in the reign of Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) together with several of Qubilai's principal Chinese advisers. He was granted the titles of Grand Preceptor, Supreme Pillar of State, Duke-of-state of Lu, as well as the posthumous name Wen-ting ('Cultured and Steadfast'). Sometime later, the Han-lin academician Yüan Ming-shan (1269-1322) wrote a memorial epitaph in Shang's honour, drawing primarily on the information from the tomb-inscription, now lost, composed by one of his contemporaries. This essay is preserved in Yüan's collected works, the *Ch'ing-ho chi*, and has been used by Su T'ien-chüeh in the preparation of Shang T'ing's biography.

Shang T'ing married the daughter of the renowned Chin scholar Chao Tzu; she died before him. Shang was survived by five sons: Shang Hu, Shang Lin, Shang T'ang, Shang Huan and Shang Ch'i. They all served the Yüan government either as civil officials or military commanders, but the most distinguished were Shang Hu and Shang Ch'i. Shang Hu, T. T'ai-fu, was appointed in 1277 regional censorial inspector for the Chiang-nan region on the recommendation of Yao Shu and Hsü Heng. During his tenure he distinguished himself for his dedication to justice and to the welfare of the people. In 1290 he was promoted to censorial inspector and became dean of studies in the National College in Ta-tu three years later. He died shortly afterwards. Shang Ch'i, T. Te-fu, began his career in 1304 as an officer in the Imperial Guard under Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307). In 1312 he became a lecturer-in-waiting at the Chi-hsien Court, then reader-in-waiting in 1317, and director of the Imperial Archives in 1324, shortly before his death. He was also known as an accomplished landscape painter.

In retrospect, Shang T'ing career illustrates the vicissitudes of a gifted individual rising to political prominence in extraordinary circumstances. Though frustrated by the Mongol conquest in his early career under the Chin, he found an opportunity to demonstrate his abilities under the patronage of Yen Shih, the overlord of Tung-p'ing. Subsequently, his skill in fiscal management impressed Yang Wei-chung, a trusted adviser of Qubilai, and Shang gained recognition in the administration of the Kuan-chung region. Shang T'ing did not impress Qubilai as a Confucian scholar of Yao Shu or Hsü Heng's prominence, but primarily as a capable administrator and an astute political adviser. It was because of these qualities that he was appointed to assist Lien Hsi-hsien in Shensi and Szechwan, and it was Shang's perceptive insight that helped formulate an effective strategy to cope with the rebellious Mongol generals siding with Ariq Böke in the early years of Qubilai's reign.

Despite his contributions, not only as adviser to Qubilai but also as chief administrator of Prince Manggala's fief, Shang T'ing fell victim to political intrigues

that tarnished much of his otherwise brilliant career. The first entailed his implication in the appointment of Wang Wen-t'ung because of his early association with the literati from Tung-p'ing, and the second resulted in the trumped-up charge by his rivals involving him in the murder of a local administrator, in consequence of his earlier affiliation with the prince. He was cleared in both cases, but lost Qubilai's confidence and never regained his previous political eminence. Shang's career, therefore, underscores the vulnerability of the Chinese literati in the service of Qubilai, who used them as he saw fit, not hesitating to remove those suspected of deception, however ill-founded the charges. In this instance, much as the Confucian historians would stress the qa'an's cordial relations with the Chinese literati, they could not conceal the reality.

Shang T'ing was also a prolific and versatile writer. He produced a considerable number of official memorials, epitaphs and tomb-inscriptions for the dignitaries of his time, but the collection of his essays has been lost and only a few have survived in contemporary anthologies. Shang T'ing was equally well-known as a gifted poet, particularly in the *san-ch'ü* lyrical genre; as an accomplished artist; and above all, as a gifted calligrapher. Several of his poems are preserved in the *Yüan-shih hsüan kuei-chi* compiled by Ku Ssu-li and in the *Sung-yüan shih-hui* by Ch'en Cho, and a collection of his lyrical songs is available in the *Chin-Yüan san-ch'ü* published by Sui Shu-sen in 1964.

As a calligrapher, Shang enjoyed a wide reputation among his contemporaries. Specialising in the *li-shu*, he emulated the Northern Sung master Su Shih (1036-1101) and was particularly noted for his heavy brush strokes and vigorous, carefree style. One of Shang T'ing's admirers, the Han-lin academician Wang Yün (q.v.), frequently sought his views on calligraphy and wrote essays praising his art. Unfortunately, none of Shang's works of calligraphy has survived. There is no record either of any landscape painting by him. Shang T'ing was, moreover, a connoisseur of antiques. He assembled a substantial collection of his own, comprising particularly inkslabs, and exhorted his friends, such as Lien Hsi-hsien, to follow his example, not only out of antiquarian interest, but also for the preservation of cultural artifacts capable of broadening one's view of history.

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H.L. Chan

22. HAO CHING (1223-1275)

Hao Ching, T. Po-ch'ang, was a Confucian scholar who served Qubilai Qa'an as adviser, military commissioner, and special envoy to the Sung. He was born in December 1223, the inaugural year of the Chin emperor Ai-tsung (r. 1224-34), at Ch'eng-kao chen, near modern Hsü-ch'ang in Honan. Hao's family came from a distinguished Shansi clan that claimed to have originated in legendary antiquity. According to record, the clan resided at first in the territory of Hao (later known as T'ai-yüan) in Shansi. Tradition has it that the clan ancestor was the son of a concubine of the twenty-ninth Shang king, Ti I (r. 1191-55 B.C.?); he was invested with a local fief by the king, and his descendents took Hao as surname. Hao I, an ancestor eight generations removed from Hao Ching, came from T'ai-yüan to Lu-chou; but his successor, Hao Tso, brought the clansmen to settle in Ling-ch'uan (always in Shansi), which was adopted as the clan's home.

Several members of the Hao clan of Ling-ch'uan had been Confucian scholars for eight generations before Hao Ching; a sixth-generation ancestor was a student of the renowned Sung Neo-Confucian philosopher Ch'eng Hao (1032-85). Under Hao Yüan, the family's reputation for learning greatly increased in the following generation, when seven of the Hao brothers studied and taught the classics - one of them, Hao Chen, becoming the most famous of local teachers. Hao Ching's grandfather, Hao T'ien-t'ing (1161-1217), was the master of Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), the great Chin literatus. Yüan prepared for his *chin-shih* examination under Hao's instruction, who is said to have advised Yüan that 'learning is not for the sake of mere belles-lettres, and being selected to serve in office is not for the mere sake of personal profit and the keeping of a family.' Hao T'ien-t'ing himself despised the examination system from an early age and never attempted to acquire a degree, preferring to eke out an existence by teaching the classics. He was a man of stern and upright character, which his grandson Hao Ching seems to have inherited.

By the time of Hao Ching's birth, much of the area north and east of the Yellow River was already under Mongol control, and in May 1223 the Mongol army attacked Ling-ch'uan, then the last Chin stronghold in Ho-tung. Hao's father, Hao Ssu-wen (1191-1258), and his mother, née Hsü (1198-1246), fled across the river and took refuge in Ch'eng-kao. There they settled in time for their first child's birth and lived for the next eight years. During those troubled times, Hao Ssu-wen eked out a meagre living as a teacher. In 1231 disorders broke out in the region, and Hao Ching's father removed his family to Lu-shan in Honan. But that area was itself soon immersed in

the chaos of deserting soldiers and wandering bandits. With others, the Hao family sought to hide in a storage pit, but rampaging soldiers discovered them and lit a fire to smoke them out. More than a hundred people perished in the affray and the ensuing panic. Hao's mother fainted and seemed on the verge of death, but Hao, crawling about in the darkness of the pit, found a jar of pickles. He mashed them up and mixing them with honey poured the mixture into his mother's mouth. She soon revived, and with her life saved, all present marvelled at the wisdom of the eight year old Hao Ching.

The following year (1232), when that part of Honan fell to the Mongols and order was restored, Hao's father took his family north to Pao-chou (near modern Peking), and there he began teaching again. Although Hao Ching was never to know a truly settled existence for the rest of his childhood and adolescence (the family was to change residences ten times!), at least his immediate family had survived the disorders attending the Mongol conquest of the Chin. The families of every one of his uncles and great-uncles seeking refuge in Honan had perished in the turmoil. The troubles of the Hao family were far from over, however, for Hao Ssu-wen found teaching a difficult profession to follow in those hard times. The following year he concluded that since his own income was not sufficient, his eldest son Ching ought to abandon study and devote his time and energy supplementing it. The second son, Hao I, too young for manual work, should be allowed to study in the hope that he might maintain the family's scholarly reputation. Hao Ching's mother objected, adducing Ching's determination to study, and the father relented. Because he wanted his son to place the classics above all else, Hao Ssu-wen gave him the *ming* (personal name) Ching ('Classics') (his earlier *ming* is not known). By the following year (1234), Hao Ching had developed regular habits of work and study. He also helped out the family by providing firewood and water, and by doing odd jobs to earn a little money. His father was deeply moved and composed a poem, one couplet of which read: 'If time and circumstances allow,/Classics will finally cure the poverty of my descendants!'

When Hao Ching turned fifteen in 1238, he declared that he wanted to abandon his studies and become the family's main breadwinner. His mother intervened once again and urged him to uphold the Hao clan's scholarly reputation. Hao Ching thereupon resumed studying. He became adept at writing both poetry and prose and developed an interest in astronomy and astrology. At about that time, Ögödei ordered examinations to be held in various districts of north China to select Han scholars for government service. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), chief of the Secretariat, had requested this the year before (1237), and the examinations eventually produced 4,030 successful candidates. Although too young to sit for these tests, Hao Ching was

apparently spurred on by the event to a total commitment to study, literally to 'make nights of study extend into the following days.'

That same year, Hao Ssu-wen found employment as a tutor-retainer with a family living nearby in Man-ch'eng. Hao Ching accompanied his father there, taking up temporary lodgings in the South Hall of the T'ieh-Fo ssu (Temple of the Iron Buddha). To make a living, he taught children of local families while spending his nights studying commentaries to the classics. This he did for the next five years. In 1240 he paid a visit to Liu Ch'i (1203-50) and stayed for a short time in Liu's compound, which seems to have been Hao Ching's first encounter with the influential men of his day. Liu received the young lad as a social equal and this greatly impressed and inspired Hao Ching. Liu Ch'i had been a student at the National University under the Chin, and was later appointed chief examiner for the Shan-tung and Shan-si regions when the examinations were held there in 1237 and 1238. At the time of Hao Ching's visit, Liu resided in Shun-t'ien writing his memoirs, the *Kuei-ch'ien chih* (*Records Written on Returning to Retirement*).

In 1242 Hao Ching married a daughter of the Hsü family of Man-ch'eng. He continued teaching at the T'ieh-Fo ssu, but his own studies took a new turn that year, for it is recorded that he had just obtained copies of the Neo-Confucian writings printed by Yao Shu (q.v.) at Su-men in Honan. The works of Chu Hsi and the Ch'eng brothers were becoming known at the time in north China. They had a tremendous impact on people like Hao Ching and Hsü Heng (q.v.), whose first experience of Neo-Confucian writings from the south had come through Yao's editions. The next year Hao was invited to enter the service of Chia Fu (1192-1254) and tutor Chia's sons, Wen-pei and Wen-chien. Chia was then Left vice-marshal of Shun-t'ien. Hao accepted the offer, left the temple and moved to the marshal's official compound where he took up lodgings in a hall located in the Wan-chüan lou ('Library of a Myriad Books'). For the first time in his life, Hao gained direct access to a fine library; his association with the Chia family lasted for the next seven years and provided him with a rich opportunity to become a first-rate scholar and well-known writer.

Although a fair amount of his poetry pre-dates 1243, the extensive prose writings which are preserved in Hao Ching's collected works, the *Ling-ch'uan chi*, really begin that year. One of the earliest examples of his prose is indicative of his lifelong interest in governmental institutions and their devolution through the ages: it is a preface to the *Shan-chu hsing-t'ung fu* (*An Edited and Annotated Version of the Rhyme Prose on the Penal Conspectus*) written by the Sung scholar Fu Lin and edited and annotated by Li Yu-chih.

In February 1244, Hao Ching's first son, Ts'ai-yün (A-pao), was born. This was apparently the occasion for a change to better family lodgings in Nan-li (still in Pao-chou). Two months later, Hao completed a 'Record of the Library of a Myriad Books,' being an account of how the collection was formed and a tribute to Chia Fu who had worked hard at preserving and promoting learning during those troubled times. Hao's interest in poetry appears in a preface written that year to a *T'ang Sung chin-t'i shih-hsüan* (*An Anthology of Regulated Verse of the T'ang and Sung Eras*), which he had compiled (it was apparently never published and has not survived). An essay composed the following year, the 'Tsui-ching chi' ('An Account of How One Gets Drunk on the Classics') is a thoroughgoing synthesis of what Hao apparently learned from the Neo-Confucian works that he had obtained three years before: it reduces the substance of the classics to two basics, *i* ('righteousness') and *li* ('principle'); these constitute the 'essence' of the classics, the elixir which will infuse the drinker with goodness (*shan*). He wrote this in September.

On the tenth day of November, Hao Ching's mother was taken very ill; she never recovered and died in April of the following year at the age of forty-eight. Hao loved her dearly, and later wrote a moving account, the 'Hsien-pi hsing-chuang,' in a tender remembrance of her strengths and virtues wherein Hao fully acknowledges his great debt to her for protecting and encouraging his scholarly career. The year 1246 brought a second sorrow to him as well; in June his son contracted a violent chill and died. He was buried next to Hao's mother.

The Hao residence in Nan-li must have been rather spacious and comfortable, with Hao Ching's salary as retainer-tutor to the Chia family allowing a measure of well-being. The compound comprised a guest house, the T'iao-k'o an ('Cicada Shell Retreat') where Hao began to entertain visitors. In late 1247 Hao received his first guest, Chao Fu (*fl.* 1235-57), a renowned Confucian scholar and teacher from Hupei who was rescued from captivity by Yang Wei-chung and Yao Shu (*qq.v.*) when the Mongol forces had overrun the district in 1235. Chao was already familiar with the works of the Southern Sung Neo-Confucians and did much to disseminate their philosophy in north China. Yang eventually became Chao's patron. He installed Chao in Yen-ching (Peking) together with more than a hundred of his students. The fact that he came to visit Hao Ching attests to Hao's growing reputation as a scholar and student of Neo-Confucianism. Hao continued to exchange views on Neo-Confucianism with Chao Fu in letters, one of which, a lengthy discussion of *hsing* ('human nature') dated 1248, is preserved in Hao's collected works.

It was about then that Hao began to receive commissions for literary pieces. One essay produced in this way is the 'Yung-chai chi' ('An Account of the Studio Devoted to Commonality') written for one Yang Ch'un-ch'ing, the owner of the studio. *Yung*

(‘commonality’) is of course, to be understood in conjunction with *chung* (‘centrality’), and Hao Ching uses this essay to expound a Neo-Confucian interpretation of the Confucian classic, the *Chung-yung* (usually translated as *The Doctrine of the Mean*). The following year (1249), he wrote the text of an inscription for the stele to be erected at the grave of Chao Fu (1165-1202) who had been general administrator in the Hsü and Cheng prefectures (Honan). The inscription is essentially a chronicle of the Chao clan, in which Hao demonstrates his historiographic expertise.

In 1250, Hao Ching met several times with Liu Ch’i, who was to die a year later as he travelled back and forth through north China from his base in Yen-ching. During the spring, they seem to have enjoyed a brief teacher-disciple relationship which meant a great deal to Hao. On Liu’s death, Hao wrote a moving lament (*ai-tz’u*) in which he proclaims his respect and affection for his deceased friend. It is likely that much of Hao’s own Neo-Confucianism derived from those encounters, for Hao acknowledges that he profited greatly from Liu’s moral views as well as from his textual explanations of the classics and Neo-Confucian writings.

In spring 1250, Hao left the employment of Chia Fu and devoted himself full-time to study and writing. His fame in both pursuits seems to have been already well established by this time, and he probably was able to provide for the financial needs of his family by writing inscriptions, epitaphs, records, and similar texts on commission. It was the time of Hao’s meeting with Yüan Hao-wen, an event which might have set Hao on this course, for he became Yüan’s disciple and diligently studied the art of poetry and prose writing under him for more than a year. Yüan, who had not accepted to serve at the Mongol court, was highly regarded in official circles nevertheless and many of the government dignitaries in north China sought and valued his friendship and his advice. As a former disciple of Hao’s grandfather, Hao T’ien-t’ing, Yüan paid a courtesy visit to the Hao residence in Nan-li during the course of his travels in north China. He is said to have immediately recognized Hao Ching’s talent and scholarship, and to have encouraged him to emulate his grandfather. With Yüan Hao-wen, Hao Ching formed another deep teacher-student relationship. On Yüan’s death in late 1257, seven years later, Hao travelled the 170 km to Huo-lu (Hopei) from Yen-ching (where the Hao were then living), to mourn the deceased as a disciple should honour his master. He wrote three elegies in Yüan’s memory, including an epitaph that has become one of the primary sources for Yüan Hao-wen’s biography.

The year 1252 brought another turning point to Hao Ching’s life. The great patron of Confucian scholars, Chang Jou (*q.v.*), myriarch of the Han Armies and governor of Shun-t’ien, became aware of Hao’s scholarly reputation. He invited Hao

to take up residence at his headquarters and to tutor his sons, Hung-lüeh, Hung-fan, and others. From 1234 to 1243 their tutor had been Wang E (*q.v.*), the great historian and later adviser to Qubilai Qa'an. The library in Chang's compound was perhaps the best in all of north China at that time and Hao Ching was thus given an opportunity to put this great collection to use. It was there also that Hao became acquainted with Ho Po-hsiang (1203-59), general civil and military administrator of the districts surrounding Shun-t'ien, a position directly subordinate to the governor. When Ho fell sick and died at the siege of E-chou (Hupei) in 1259, Hao wrote his eulogy, describing his friend as a scupulously just and honest military leader, utterly loyal to the Mongols – whom he regarded as liberators rather than foreign conquerors, and as representing the only power capable of unifying and pacifying the empire. Hao's own views, when he became Qubilai's official a few years later, were exactly the same; it may have been his close association and friendship with Ho Po-hsiang that helped form them.

In summer 1253 Hao Ching visited the ruins of the former Chin capital, Chung-tu. There he inspected what little remained of the palace buildings, pillaged by the Mongols in 1215. He climbed the Ch'iung-hua tao, an artificial hill built in the middle of a lake at the centre of the city, which had formed part of a palace complex called the Wan-ning kung or Palace of Myriad Tranquillities. Hao wrote a poem to mark the occasion, in which he reflects on the past glories and subsequent downfall of the Chin – deceptive glories, since they grew out of the exploitation of the people by a tyrannical, benighted and inept government. The piece closes, as the author surveys the scene from the mountain 'built not of stone but of the people's blood,' with an indictment of the Chin: 'Should they not be ashamed of (all) this!'

Hao Ching spent most of 1254 at Ch'i, in western Shantung; the sources do not indicate the purpose of his sojourn there, but we know that he stayed for a time at the famous Wan-chu t'ang ('Hall of the Myriad Bamboos'), property of the Tu family of Ch'ang-ch'ing, near modern Chi-nan. The owner was currently engaged in restoring the extensive bamboo groves and the buildings which had been ruined during the troubles. This prompted Hao to compose a 'Wan-chu t'ang chi' ('Record of the Hall of the Myriad Bamboos') extolling the beauty of the place and the efforts made to recover its former grandeur. It is likely that Hao spent his time in Shantung in private study and writing.

April 1255 brought the birth of Hao's second son, Ts'ai-feng (A-ch'ang); his mother was Hao's second wife, of the Chang family in Ch'i-ao (Honan). It appears that Hao's first wife, née Hsü, was unable to bear children after the death of her son, Ts'ai-yün, in 1246. She had therefore returned to her family, leaving Hao free to remarry, presumably sometime in the first half of 1254, but what bearing this event

may have had on his sojourn in Shantung is unclear. In autumn 1255, Hao set out on a pilgrimage to Ch'ü-fu, the birthplace of Confucius in Shantung, and to Mount T'ai (T'ai-shan), the Sacred Mountain of the East. He was inspired to write a number of poems on the scenery, historical sights and monuments of those localities, and their moral, indeed cosmic, significance. He returned home to Nan-li, probably during the tenth month, arriving just in time to receive a messenger from Qubilai summoning him to Chin-lien ch'uan, on the Shan-tien River (Inner Mongolia). But Hao did not respond, and a second messenger arrived a month later. Only then did Hao journey to Qubilai's headquarters in the north, and to his real place in Chinese history.

Hao Ching's first audience with Qubilai took place in February 1256; Hao was then thirty-three, and Qubilai was four years away from assuming the throne as emperor and qa'an. Appointed administrator of north China by Möngke, his eldest brother (r. 1251-59), Qubilai had been gathering Chinese scholars around him as advisers and adopting much of their advice as he extended and consolidated his rule. These guests included the Buddhist-Taoist Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*), as well as Confucian scholars like Hsü Heng, Yao Shu and others. Hao had thus joined a very illustrious company. At that first meeting, Qubilai consulted Hao Ching about the proper actions of a sovereign, and Hao responded by citing examples from the reigns of the sage-kings T'ang and Yü, and of the virtuous kings of the Hsia, Shang, and Chou. The prince then engaged Hao in continuous dialogue from morning to night for the next several days, and felt such respect for Hao's opinions that he ordered him to prepare an itemized memorandum on the proper conduct of government. A few days later, Hao Ching submitted a 'Plan to Manage the State' ('Li-kuo kuei-mo') which addressed twenty different areas of concern. Thereupon Qubilai asked Hao to define current issues most in need of redress, and Hao listed eleven ills which were harming both the people and the state. It is said that Qubilai believed both memoranda to have been correct in their analysis and advice; he therefore fully accepted all of Hao's conclusions. At this time Möngke endowed Qubilai with Huai-chou and Meng-chou (in Honan), which became the prince's personal fief; Qubilai thereupon granted Hao Ching a residence in Huai-chou and some land in Ho-hang (in Meng-chou).

Hao Ching returned to his home in Nan-li later in the spring and suggested to his father, Hao Ssu-wen, that they travel together to Ling-ch'uan and pay their respects to the family graves. But, before they could set out that summer, Hao Ssu-wen suffered a complete blockage of the urinary tract. This was the second time he had been afflicted by such a painful ailment. The present crisis was very severe and lasted more than ten days before Liu Mao-chih, a local Taoist physician, resolved it by massaging the affected area. Hao Ching was extremely grateful to Liu, and when his father finally died after a third and fatal blockage in December 1258, he addressed a

long poem to Liu expressing great admiration for his skill and gratitude for his assistance.

In spring 1257 another son, Ts'ai-lin, was born to Hao Ching. The Hao's had moved to a new residence within Yen-ching itself. Except for short journeys, Hao was to remain there, writing and caring for his invalid father until the old man's death almost two years later. Sometime during 1257, Li Chih (*q.v.*) had recommended Hao for high office to Qubilai but without immediate effect, perhaps because Qubilai knew that Hao was then at home caring for his dying father. Hao Ssu-wen died at sixty-seven; he had produced some 120 literary works and left a number of disciples, who gave him the unofficial title of Ching-chih ch'u-shih ('Secluded and Incorruptible Retired Scholar'). Among them was Kou Tsung-tao, a native of Pao-chou, who later accompanied Hao Ching as his secretary on his embassy to the Sung in 1260. Hao buried his father outside the west city wall of Pao-chou.

During the spring of 1259, Hao Ching was summoned to join Qubilai's forces as they proceeded south for the assault on E-chou. He had left home when his second son, Ts'ai-feng, died on the twelfth day of the third month - an event of which Hao remained ignorant until he returned home in the spring of the following year. He caught up with the army at P'u-chou (Ts'ao-chou in western Shantung) in the fifth month. Soon after his arrival, a maternal uncle named Niu came to see him. He told Hao that the flowering almond tree in the court of the Ti-hua t'ang ('Hall of the Almond Blossom'), the old family residence in Ling-ch'uan, had been blooming most abundantly in recent years, which meant that 'you and your brothers are sure to be very successful!' Hao Ching lost no time in making his presence felt in Qubilai's councils. The month of his arrival, he intervened in the policy debate that had been opened by Sung Tzu-chen (1186-1266), the councillor for the Tung-p'ing district in Shantung. Sung advocated a policy of mercy and restraint in the campaign, urging in particular that those who had surrendered be spared, which would prevent the Sung from exploiting the people's fear of the Mongol forces, thus greatly lessening resistance to their advance. Hao's contribution to the discussion seems to have greatly impressed Qubilai and to have carried the day:

In the past, those who unified the Empire did so not through force of arms but through the exercise of virtue (*te*). Until now the enemy has not yet provoked an all-out fight to the death, yet You have used all the resources of Your realm to launch this campaign. The nobles are waiting secretly for a chance to cause trouble from within while Your populace is being impoverished and exhausted. I can see the danger in this, but I cannot see any advantage to it. It would be better if You, Our Sovereign, cultivated Your virtue and spread Your benevolence far and near, were benevolent to the others in the Royal Clan, appointed the worthy to office, pacified and won over to You those in distant parts, brought all the areas in Your realm under control, formed alliances, set everything in order and waited for the Western Army [under Möngke then campaigning in Szechwan] to link up

with You. Above all, act in accordance with the Will of Heaven and keep the aspirations of the people constantly in mind. If you do this, and time your move correctly, whatever the Sung might attempt to resist will not be worth the worry.

Qubilai was surprised that a Confucian scholar could give such astute military advice and is said to have asked Hao if he had already discussed the matter with his old patron, commander Chang Jou. Hao replied that although he had often benefited from conversations with the general in the past, the present appreciation was entirely his own. Qubilai then asked him to elaborate what he had said in a detailed submission, and Hao composed a 'Ch'i-tao i' ('Discussion on Seven Fundamental Principles of Action') of over seven thousand characters.

Convinced of Hao's wisdom and competence, Qubilai appointed him to military office. In August that year, he made Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*) the pacification commissioner for Chiang-chou, Huai-chou, and Ching-chou (i.e. Honan and Hupei) with Hao as his deputy. Their mission was to lead the Kuei-te Army to the Yangtze, in advance of the main force, proclaiming Qubilai's mercy and benevolence, and calling upon all to submit and tender allegiance. On the march, however, Yang wished to turn back to Pien, apparently worried by the exposed position of his force. It is said that Hao rebuked him, urging that they carry on as ordered, and that, after three days of stubborn refusal on Yang's part, Hao took command of the troops and led them south himself. At this point, Yang yielded to Hao's insistence. Together they entered Sung territory, proceeding southwest, crossed the Pi River, and moved west up the Huai River valley as far as Ch'un-ling (near the Honan-Hupei border, south of modern Nan-yang). There they encountered the typical terrain of south China: diked ponds; mazes of interconnecting waterways; market villages so close together that they almost grew into one another, the unused land so thickly grown with trees, bamboo, and flowering shrubs as to be virtually impassable. As a northerner, Hao Ching had never seen anything like that and found it all very strange. His troops then turned south into Hupei and proceeded toward E-chou, probably down the Han River, where they re-joined the main force which was encamped on the north shore of the Yangtze at Han-yang. The mission had been successful, for many thousands who might have died resisting Qubilai's forces in this region submitted peaceably and were thus spared.

Upon his return, Hao learned that Möngke's Western Army had failed to achieve any notable success for some time, which prompted him to draft another memorandum to Qubilai presenting his strategic concerns. This paper, entitled 'Tung-shih i' ('Discussion on the Eastern Army'), reiterated many of the points which he had made earlier. Hao pressed again for a consolidation of gains already made, for caution and painstaking preparation – urging the development of a complete system

of laws and regulations and its implementation, the appointment of talented generals and ministers, the selection of worthy and able men to serve in office, the gathering of sufficient taxes equitably levied and the stockpiling of sufficient foodstuffs – so that there would be good order in the territories already conquered, and strong defence on the borders. Hao suggested also that Qubilai dispatch a messenger to Möngke requesting his permission to set up temporary headquarters; that he send envoys to the Sung to inform them of his intentions to confiscate coins and currency from such as had surrendered; and that hostages be taken from recently occupied areas to insure their continuing submission and loyalty. In Hao's view, it was now time to call a halt to military operations and give the troops a rest, in order to regroup and plan for an all-out offensive against the Sung later on. In the meantime it should be well advertised that Qubilai intended to pursue a policy of mercy, offering immunity to Sung deserters, and that he was anxious to avoid bloodshed whenever possible. In due course, one force should move against Hsiang and Cheng (southern Honan and northern Hupei), another against Shou-ch'un (Anhwei), and a third against Wei-yang (Kiangsu), in a concerted operation. Thus, a united front could be formed from east to west, while Qubilai himself should hold a fourth contingent in reserve, as a general intervention force, which should leave him with an uncommitted element in hand. Such a plan would cater for all contingencies, and eventual mistakes could be made good without delay.

Qubilai, however, was determined to proceed forthwith; having come so far already, he was loath to turn back in mid-course. His forces crossed the Yangtze in September and laid siege to E-chou, but in the very next month came word from Prince Möge in Szechwan that Möngke had died and that Qubilai should return to the north in all haste to insure that he was elected the new qa'an. At first, Qubilai still wished to complete the campaign against E-chou, but on hearing that Ariq Bökö, his younger brother, was trying to take over the throne in Qara Qorum, Qubilai immediately called a meeting to solicit the views of all his commanders, and Hao Ching responded with another memorandum, the 'Pan-shih i' ('Discussion on Withdrawing the Troops'). The document began with a quotation from the *I-ching* (*Book of Changes*): 'He who knows when to advance and when to retreat, when a situation can be saved and when it is lost, while always keeping on the correct path, is beyond all question a sage!' Hao declared that Qubilai must take a sage's view of the situation and that he could only accomplish what he wanted to accomplish if he took over the throne and consolidated his rule. He also pointed out that there were many jealous Mongol nobles in the north waiting for an opportunity to seize power for the Prince-of-state Tāčar, Činggis' grand-nephew, who was related to the powerful warlord Li T'an by marriage. Moreover, some unstable Central Asian chieftains were

also potentially dangerous. Hao then implored Qubilai to conclude a peace with the Sung, to settle the boundary and obtain a yearly tribute from them, to return north immediately to quash his rival's plans, and to do whatever was necessary to ensure the peace and prosperity of his realm. Qubilai accepted Hao's advice, and the withdrawal to the north began.

Hao Ching arrived back in Yen-ching in spring of 1260. Before going home, he stopped off at his father's grave to pay his respects and there discovered a little grave-mound added to its foot. Hurrying home and seeing his wife in tears, he was shocked and grieved to learn that his son Ts'ai-feng had died. A few days later, he composed a funerary record (*pin-chih*):

.... Heaven! How very cruel Heaven is to our Hao family! A month after my mother died, my son A-pao died too and was buried at the side of her grave, and two months after my father died A-ch'ang joined him in the other world. Could it be that Mother so loved A-pao that she took him by the hand and led him away, and that Father so loved A-ch'ang that he would cuddle him and could not bear to let him go? So in each case one died and then the other, to be buried next to his grandparent. Or is it because I am so lacking in virtue and so unfilial that it causes my sons to be unable to live to maturity? If only my lack of virtue were not so great as to bring disaster to my sons, then they would not have died so young!

In this frame of mind, he paid a visit to the Iron Buddha Temple during the third month. The abbot Chang Chung-an invited him in to tour the grounds, but when he reached his former lodgings where he had spent so many years in work and study, he was suddenly overwhelmed by the realization that his mother and father were no longer living and broke down in tears.

In May of 1260, Qubilai summoned Hao Ching with the intention of appointing him special envoy to the Sung with a letter to the emperor, Li-tsung (r. 1225-64), announcing Qubilai's accession to the throne and his wish to establish peace between them. Apparently, Qubilai selected Hao for this mission at the suggestion of Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*), then just appointed director of political affairs. Wang had been jealous of Hao for some time and was allegedly conspiring with his son-in-law Li T'an (*q.v.*) (the chief regional administrator for Chiang-Huai who was actually a quasi-independent warlord in control of Shantung) to ensure that Hao's mission should fail. Li was to delay Hao's progress as the party passed through his territory on its way south. If that were ineffective, Li was to launch a limited attack on the Sung after Hao had crossed the border, with a view to discrediting the peace mission; if all went 'well', Hao might be imprisoned, or even killed. Some accounts say that Hao was informed of Wang Wen-t'ung's treason. Before Hao left Yen-ching to answer the emperor's call, someone also warned him of danger ahead. This man allegedly said, 'The Sung are deceitful and not to be trusted; should you not decline this mission on the pretext of illness?' Hao is said to have replied, 'I have read about the Way and

studied it for thirty years, yet I have not yet accomplished any real good in the world. Now the North and the South are courting disaster, a situation which has reached calamitous proportions. If I can stop the armies from fighting, calm the disturbances, and save the lives of millions of people who are now living under the shadow of war, my learning will finally be of some use!’ Thereupon, with great courage and determination, he proceeded to K’ai-p’ing where Qubilai, having appointed him reader-in-waiting in the Han-lin Academy, made him his envoy plenipotentiary, with right to carry the golden tiger tablet.

The embassy comprised Ho Yüan, Hao Ching’s clerk (an academician-in-waiting), Liu Jen-chieh (a first secretary in the Ministry of Rites), Kao T’ao (a councillor in the Secretarial Council), and Ch’eng Yü (a chief military intendant in the regional administration). Kou Tsung-tao, the former disciple of Hao’s father, was recruited as recording officer, i.e. as the secretary-scribe. Hao’s personal suite included K’ung Chin and Ma Te-lin. In all, Hao’s retinue consisted of about forty officers and men. Hao requested that Qubilai appoint one or two ranking Mongol officials to the mission as well, but the emperor refused saying that this was strictly a matter for properly trained and educated Chinese scholars.

Qubilai granted Hao Ching an audience before sending him on his way. After having made him drink three goblets of grape wine, the emperor asked Hao to submit a memorandum setting out Hao’s views of the current situation. Before he left, Hao composed a ‘Li-cheng i’ (‘Discussion on Strengthening the Government’), a lengthy essay in which he tried to convince Qubilai of the great moral and even cosmic significance of his responsibility to bring peace and order to the world, and warned the emperor to be mindful of the judgement of history which was certain to follow in later ages. He begged the qa’an to join those great emperors in Chinese history ‘whose ambitions were to create a peaceful and prosperous world’ – something that would be impossible so as long as Qubilai continued to think exclusively in military terms, while neglecting to establish a civil government based on impartial and universal laws. If that were done, it would be possible to unify the world under a new Han or T’ang dynasty, the perfect epitome of greatness. Hao described the institutions of a properly run empire as constituting a hierarchical, interdependent network, upon which rested the very security of the throne. If any part of the system failed, all would fail, and, rather than rely on the spurious security of military might (something the state had depended upon for too long already), a network of effective institutions should be established. This should involve a state of law and order based on civil authority, a system of civil appointment, an array of administrative centres all over the empire covering large cities as well as small towns; the founding of schools; the inculcation of *lien* (‘honesty’) and *ch’ih* (‘shame’), and of strict standards of discipline

in the civil and military administration; and the encouragement of talented men whose participation was a prerequisite for an undertaking of this kind. Hao cited the great contributions that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (q.v.) had made during the conquest of the Chin and the rule of Činggis in taking the first steps toward such an administrative reform, and deplored the lack of a continuing improvement since then. Now, the world was looking to Qubilai to realize that ideal. Administrative institutions, of course, would have to be re-created *de novo*, and Hao suggested that those of the new empire should be derived not only from T'ang and Sung models, but also in part at least from those of the Liao and the Chin. He hoped Qubilai would be mindful of the Chin, those 'few hundred men from a minor tribe on the northeastern frontier' who had turned themselves into a great state by virtue of their use of Liao and Sung institutions, and by recruiting prominent Sung and Liao officials to positions of high authority. He recalled the golden age of the Chin under Shih-tsung (r. 1161-89), when peace was concluded with the Sung: the state was well ordered and prosperous, and the people were living in virtue and harmony. This, declared Hao, was an era of history which reflected eternally valid lessons. Success thus depended upon three things: a just peace with the Sung, the systematic appointment of talented, learned and worthy candidates, and the constitution of a 'Chinese style' government.

In June the embassy reached Chi-nan (Shantung), where a dispatch from Li T'ang ordered them to stop and proceed no further. Thereupon, Hao Ching declared that he was under the direct orders of Qubilai and would be remiss if he let himself be deterred from his mission by a mere border commandant. He sent Li's note back to court and kept on going. The embassy reached Su-chou (Anhwei), midway between the Yüan and Sung lines of defence, the next month, and Hao wrote ahead requesting permission to enter Sung territory. The route south from Su-chou was slow due to flooded roads, heavy rains, and the steamy, heavy air was making many sick, but by the next month the party had reached Wu-ho-k'ou on the Huai River, just west of the Kiangsu border. There, at the Sung forward position, the embassy was met by Chu Pao-ch'en and Ch'in Chih-ts'ai, joined on 30 September by P'an Kung-po. That day, they crossed the Huai into Sung territory, of which Hao Ching duly advised Qubilai by special courier. After meeting P'an, Hao observed the most rigorous rules of diplomatic etiquette in order to inspire trust in his hosts, but P'an soon told him that the military commissioner, Li T'ing-chih (d. 1276), wished to see the state letter that Hao carried. Hao refused, saying that it was to be delivered by himself personally to the Sung emperor, adding that he could not understand what legitimate reasons could lie behind such a request – which was not repeated. The Hao embassy reached Chen-chou, near Yang-chou in Kiangsu, a month later; Hao was to remain there for the next sixteen years, until the Yüan forces conquered the south in 1275.

Hao's party was taken to the Chung-yung Fort at I-chen outside Yang-chou, where quarters had been prepared for the detention of the embassy. Earlier that year in the fourth month, a great fire had swept through Yang-chou and no suitable place could be found for the envoy in the city, so that the Sung authorities converted the headquarters compound of the fort (which had been formerly the governor's mansion) into a prison – spikes on the walls, locks on the gates and doors, and guards on watch day and night.

After a month had passed, a letter arrived from Li T'ing-chih informing Hao that, although Hao's intentions were undoubtedly beyond reproach, his mission was under suspicion because its arrival in Sung territory had coincided with an attack by Li T'an from his base in Shantung. Hao understood that Li had betrayed him, while realizing also that the Sung would believe his own mission to have been a ruse to distract their attention from the Mongols' impending offensive. He wrote immediately to both Li T'ing-chih and the Sung emperor. To Li he said, 'Why should an act of hostility on the part of a border general acting in defiance of orders have anything to do with my mission?' His letter to the emperor affirmed the sincerity of his mission and included the assertion that 'I wish to remain true to the intentions of Lu (Chung-)lien [of the state of Ch'i during the Warring States period] and be a peacemaker, and I disclaim any ability to emulate T'ang Chien [a confidant of the first T'ang emperor] who made plans for war while deceiving those in other states about his intention.' He then wrote once more to Li T'ing-chih, requesting that the embassy be allowed to proceed to the Sung capital, Lin-an (Hang-chou), and be received in audience with the emperor.

There was no reply to any of those communications. Undeterred, Hao wrote to officials in all three of the departments of state in the Sung central government and again to the emperor – tens of thousands of characters that remained unanswered. The officials guarding him would only say, 'Your court has already made its decision (to betray you); see how cunningly and deceitfully it is acting!' They wanted to shake his confidence, and some of Hao's subordinates began to believe them and to waver in their loyalty. Hao addressed them, pointing out that they were utterly dependent upon their guards even as to whether they lived or died, but that, for his own part, he could never allow himself to be humiliated or disgraced. He then added, 'You are unfortunate in that you may have to lay down your lives in order to do your duty, but, from what I can discern in the general condition of the world and the trend of the times, the reign of the Sung cannot last much longer!' Everyone was comforted by these words and regained a measure of hope.

Pressure continued to be exerted on the prisoners, however, as Chu Pao-ch'en and the other guards fed them more false reports of events in Qubilai's court. In particular, his jailers sought to break Hao and bring him to submit to the Sung. Hao

finally lost patience and said in his sternest voice, 'This affair may or may not come to a conclusion, but if it does you should let us return home.' He then had all those in his retinue pack their bags and set camp in the courtyard – to demonstrate their desire to be allowed to return north. The guards then realized that Hao would not yield and invited the prisoners to move back indoors, thereafter giving up all attempt to make them defect.

Hao was pleasantly surprised in April of the next year (1261), when several sprigs of a rare hortensia (a symbol of longevity and very precious, now apparently extinct) arrived as a gift from Li T'ing-chih. In addition to the letters which Hao had addressed to him, it is likely that Li intercepted Hao's letters to the Sung emperor and other officials. If he had not heard of Hao's literary gifts previously, he certainly would have realized from Hao's writings what a brilliant, learned and sincere figure he had in his care. Li's gift of the hortensia acknowledged this, representing as it did a mark of the highest respect.

At that time, Qubilai despatched Ts'ui Ming-yüan and Li Ch'üan-i (or Ho-i) as investigating officers to the Huai-tung Military Commission under Li T'an's command, with orders to visit Hao at his place of detention. Hao's youngest brother, Hao Yung, also requested an escort that would enable him to travel personally to the Sung court and appeal against the injustice done to Hao Ching. Qubilai agreed, and the missions duly set off, but the Sung would not receive them.

It is not clear why Hao's party was kept incommunicado outside Yung-chou, unable to communicate either with the Sung court or with the Mongol authorities. The official immediately responsible for this situation was of course Li T'ing-chih, but one theory has him acting on orders from Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75), the Sung director of state military affairs. The assumption was that Chia feared lest the truth of the lifting of the siege of E-chou in 1259 should come to light if Hao reached the emperor – namely, that Chia had not won a major victory there, as he had claimed, but that Qubilai's forces had withdrawn of their own accord. Some have speculated that Chia had offered tribute to induce the Mongols to lift the siege, a fact potentially even more damaging to Chia's credit. Therefore, on either count, Hao Ching had to be kept from seeing the emperor or from communicating with him in any way. Even if these allegations were true, however, they do not explain why Hao should have been prevented from returning to the north. It is probable that several factors contributed to the present events. Chia Ssu-tao may have wished to prevent direct communication between Qubilai and his own emperor for his own selfish reasons (which may or may not have been related to the siege of E-chou), initially at least. Li T'an's attack made Hao's mission seem like a deception, and this, fanned by the Sung's absolute distrust of the Mongols and their allies, would have convinced both Li T'ing-

chih and his superior Chia Ssu-tao (as well as other leaders) that Hao's mission had best be neutralized before it succeeded in weakening the Sung's will to resist. We should note that Hao Ching refused to let Li T'ing-chih or anyone else but the Sung emperor see the letter which he brought from Qubilai. The military leaders of the Sung might not have wished the emperor and other potential critics of their efforts to gain an outlook on the war from the enemy's point of view. Mistrust and indecision may have been the first consequences of Hao's arrival; later, when Li and Chia had realized what a potential prize and valuable hostage Hao Ching would make in future dealings with the Mongols, they would have decided to keep him and his entourage locked up in a safe place, to be used when the opportunity arose. But that chance never came, and Hao remained where he was for almost the rest of his life.

Later Chinese histories, the *Yüan History* included, blame Chia for Hao's long incarceration. In particular, they claim that Chia wanted to keep knowledge of his 'secret' negotiations with the Mongols, which included the promise of tribute, from the court. This seems to be the product of either an inaccurate or a biased investigation of the sources – if not a complete invention as part of the general attempt to discredit Chia as a 'bad last minister.'

Utterly frustrated by November of 1261, Qubilai and his ministers gave up hope of ever seeing Hao and his assistant Liu Jen-chieh again, and so the court awarded compensation grants to their families, as if they had died. However, life did go on at I-chen for the ill-fated embassy. Hao began to compose poetry and prose essays on various topics, and undertook some historical writings. He also became Kou Tsung-tao's teacher in the Confucian classics, their commentaries, Neo-Confucian writings, and historical sources, most of which he taught from memory, since almost no books could be obtained locally. Hao also began to teach his personal attendants, Ma Te-lin and K'ung Chin, who hitherto had been illiterate, to read and write. Hao, the other officers and those close to him, seem to have been able to make the best of their confinement, but the ordinary soldiers who made up the rest of the mission had a hard time and soon grew restless and sullen. Hao gave them lectures from time to time to keep up their spirits, but an explosion of temper and frustration was bound to occur sooner or later. In March 1263 Qubilai tried again to discover what had happened to Hao's embassy. He dispatched another envoy plenipotentiary, Wang Te-su, with an assistant, Liu Kung-liang, to deliver a letter of inquiry to the Sung emperor, but they were denied admittance to Sung territory.

In 1264 Hao Ching entered his forty-first year of age and his fourth year of detention. He had apparently brought with him a complete collection of his writings; these and more recent pieces he now collated, with help from Kou Tsung-tao, under the title *Chia-tzu chi* (*Collection Edited in the Chia-tzu [1264] Year*). On 25 July a

comet appeared which did not vanish until 7 October. Hao carefully recorded its occurrence as an ominous event and a portent of war. In the eleventh month he was informed that the Sung emperor, Li-tsung, had died the previous month, but, whereas a general amnesty had been declared, there was no order for his own release.

In March of the following year (1265), Hao Ching completed his *Ch'un-ch'iu wai-chuan* (*An Unofficial Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*), which he had begun the year before, when Kou Tsung-tao had asked for a commentary on the *Ch'un-ch'iu* in addition to the original text. Without references to hand, Hao reproduced the work from memory, added a commentary of his own, divided the text into paragraphs and sentences, wrote notes on pronunciation and meaning, and established an order of priority among the three existing commentaries (the *Tso-chuan*, the *Kung-yang chuan*, and the *Ku-liang chuan*). He included a *Chih-tso pen-yüan* (*Formulation of Sources*), a *Pi-lei t'iao-mu* (*Comparative Table of the Sections Contained*), a *Ch'un-ch'iu san-chuan che-chung* (*Compromise Among the Three Commentaries to the Ch'un-ch'iu*), a *San-chuan hsü-lun* (*An Introduction to the Three Commentaries*), and a *Lieh-kuo hsü-lun* (*An Introduction to the Various States Mentioned*), altogether 82 *chüan*. All these works are now lost. Hao also wrote his *Shih-shih t'ang chi* (*Record of the Hall where Right is Really Right*), an account of how he named his own lodging in the fort. This he produced after a member of the embassy, confused by the mission's treatment at the hands of the Sung, had wondered whether the Sung's concept of right and wrong differed from that of the North. Hao assured him that there was only one norm of right and wrong, and that it lay with them and not with the Sung. Hao named his lodgings accordingly and explained his reasons on the wall next to the door.

The spring of 1266 was a bad one for Hao Ching, for during the second month a number of fires broke out and burned down everything in the compound except the original guest house and the headquarters building. Then in the following month a quarrel broke out among the soldiers of his retinue; some were killed and others ran wild, climbing over the gate into Hao's own quarters. They killed his personal attendants Ma Te-lin and K'ung Chin and tried to murder Hao himself. In the confusion Hao managed to escape into the courtyard and hide behind some trees. The mutineers came out after him brandishing makeshift spears, and had almost caught him when he succeeded in climbing over the compound wall and called the Sung guards for help. Ch'eng Yü, the army officer in charge of the soldiers, also died in the mêlée. After the affray, on the twenty-first day of the month (27 April), Hao composed a votive text to be read at his funeral, then he addressed what remained of the retinue: 'You have been kept prisoners here so long that you do not seem to have much will left to go on living. Consequently, I cannot remain in your company under

such distressing conditions – I am afraid more trouble will occur, and you will disgrace us all.’ At that, with Kou Tsung-tao and six others, Hao constructed shelters in the courtyard against the east wall of the compound. This became known as the Hsin-kuan (‘New Hall’). After seven years of confinement, more than half of the original party of forty were dead, and Hao rejected the rest, declining all responsibility for them, excepting Kou and the other six who had not taken part in the rampage. Hao was now a lonely man with plenty of time to kill; he wrote a great deal, especially poetry, continued to tutor Kou Tsung-tao, and managed to draw enough solace from those occupations to keep himself going.

In 1270 Hao Ching’s younger brother Hao Yung again asked the court to provide him with an escort in order that he should go to Sung and denounce their injustice, but Qubilai’s chief ministers decided after discussion that the request was not acceptable at that time. Hao Yung made the same plea the following year, and this time the court did agree to dispatch him with an escort, but the party was compelled to turn back at Chien-k’ang (Kiangsu) after a score or more of its members had been wounded in skirmishes with Sung soldiers.

In June of that same year, Hao Ching asked the commander of the Sung guard to borrow books for him from Yin Ying-lei, currently military commissioner of the Liang-Huai region. Hao was provided with a set of the *Han-shu* (*History of the Former Han*), of the *Hou-Han shu* (*History of the Later Han*), of the *San-kuo chih* (*Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms*), and of the *Chin-shu* (*History of the Chin*). He thus began to write his own *cheng-shih* (‘standard history’) of the Han state in Szechwan during the Three Kingdoms period (221-64). He noted the inconsistencies in P’ei Sung-chih’s (372-451) annotations to the *San-kuo chih*, the selections and omissions made in that part of Ssu-ma Kuang’s (1019-86) *Tzu-chih t’ung-chien* (*Comprehensive Mirror for Aiding the Conduct of Government*) which deals with Han kingdom, and the form and arrangement of the Han kingdom material included in Chu Hsi’s (1130-1200) *T’ung-chien kang-mu* (*Abridgement and Outline of the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien*). All of these he collated into a critical text with the intention of showing how the *cheng-t’ung*, the legitimate dynastic line, continued into the Han kingdom, and to prove that the Wei and the Wu states were both usurpers. He entitled his work *Hsü Hou-Han shu* (*Supplement to the History of the Later Han*). This 90 *chüan* work is still extant.

About this time, Hao also began to write poems which echoed the rhyme-schemes of poetry by T’ao Ch’ien (372-427), something which gave him much joy and consolation. He eventually wrote more than one hundred poems lauding the quiet life of inner attainment, the simple pleasures found in the passing of the seasons and the events of everyday existence. Hao finished the *Hsü Hou-han shu* in November 1272

and almost immediately launched into other scholarly projects; by the end of the next year he had corrected certain errors in the *San-kuo chih*, to which he had appended his own findings as eight *lu* ('records'). He also compiled a *Li-hsiang lu* (*Record of Astronomical Portents in Successive Ages*). In this work Hao attempted to list all such phenomena recorded in the Confucian classics, the *Three Commentaries* to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, in the various ancient philosophical works and early histories, as well as in later sources. After he had finished, Kou Tsung-tao wrote a phonological and textual commentary and asked Hao to collate the whole work into one contribution to be published in its own right. Hao agreed and rearranged the material in order of importance, adding an account of losses and benefits which could be referred to such phenomena; he designed an introductory diagram to illustrate how such phenomena were interrelated. In all, the work came to 12 *chüan* and was entitled the *Yü-heng chen-kuan* (*True Observations Made with the Jade Crossbar*), the jade crossbar being an ancient astronomical instrument. It is listed in Ch'ien T'ahsin's (1728-1804) *Pu Yüan-shih i-wen chih* (*Bibliographical Monograph to be Appended to the Yüan History*), but it is not known whether it has survived.

By autumn 1274 Hao had turned fifty-one and had been imprisoned in I-chen for fifteen years, totally cut off from any direct communication with the North. At the beginning of the autumn someone had caught a wild goose which was migrating south and presented it to Hao. Instead of having it plucked for the pot, Hao ordered that it be cared for as a pet. Over a number of weeks, whenever the goose saw Hao it began to beat its wings and honk at him as if it were trying to tell him something; eventually Hao came to a realization of what he thought this meant. On the first day of the ninth month (2 October) he assembled the few remaining members of what had been his retinue, set up an incense altar, faced the north, and with great ceremony had two of his men carry the goose forwards and place it in front of the altar. He himself tied to the goose's leg a text which he had written on silk, rolled tight into a ball and covered with wax. The text contained this poem:

As frosts fall and winds blow high, follow your inclination and head
south,
But before you know it, it will be time for your return in early spring.
May the Emperor in his Supreme Park take up his bow and harpoon
arrow,
And learn that his official imprisoned so far away has written Him a
letter on silk.

A goose released on the first day of the ninth month in the fifteenth year of Chung-t'ung – Hunters, do not kill it! The Envoy Plenipotentiary Hao Ching wrote this at the New Pavilion in the Loyal and Brave Fort in Chen-chou.

The text consisted of fifty-nine characters written on a piece of silk two inches wide and five inches long. On the reverse side was Hao's seal and the ink had

penetrated through to the reverse side so that the characters could clearly be seen. It seems that a hunter killed the goose in the third month of the following year at Chin-ming ch'ih near Pien (K'ai-feng), by which time Hao had already returned to Yen-ching, now renamed Ta-tu; it was not possible to return the piece of silk to him. Later, Hao's message came into the possession of a certain Wang Shih-chung; in 1318 the scholar Kuo Kuan (1250-1331), a Han-lin academician, found it and presented it to the court. Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) ordered that palace attendants take charge of it and that it be provided with a proper container and mounted on a scroll. A number of literary courtiers annotated it with expressions of praise, and it was finally lodged as a state treasure in the palace. Hao's dating of 'the fifteenth year of Chung-t'ung' is especially poignant, for the Chung-t'ung period had actually only lasted until 1264. Hao was not even aware that the era name had been changed to Chih-yüan in that year, or he would have dated it 'the eleventh year of Chih-yüan'!

Meanwhile, of course, great events were unfolding: Marshal Bayan (*q.v.*) had gathered the Mongol forces at E-chou during the seventh month; by the ninth month he had crossed the Yangtze and was advancing rapidly through Sung territory. In that month Qubilai dispatched Lien Hsi-hsien (1247-75), the minister of Rites, and Hao Yung, Hao's younger brother who was then a secretary in the Regional Department of Military Affairs, to the Sung capital Lin-an, to find out why Hao and his embassy had been detained all this time in Chen-chou. With the enemy decidedly holding the upper hand, the Sung were frightened enough to have Hao and his party released in all haste. In March of the following year (1275), the district general administrator Tuan Yu was sent to escort Hao Ching and the others back to Yüan territory in all ceremony. Qubilai then ordered Ch'in Chung, the district assistant of Chien-k'ang to welcome Hao and escort him to the capital. Hao was taken sick on the way to Ta-tu; when Qubilai heard of this, he sent the imperial grand physician to join Hao's party and give him all care and comfort. As Hao journeyed triumphantly through towns and villages, the elders all came out and lined his route, often moved to tears at the sight of the hero. In May they reached Ta-tu and Hao was immediately received in audience by Qubilai. All efforts were then made to help his recovery, but his health worsened. On the sixteenth day of the seventh month (9 August 1275), his surviving son Ts'ai-lin came to his deathbed to receive his father's final instructions. Ts'ai-lin produced brush, ink and paper, and Hao Ching began to write; but after tracing only four characters, *t'ien feng hai t'ao* 'wind in the sky and waves on the sea,' he put down his brush and died. He was only fifty-two.

Twenty-eight days later, Hao Ts'ai-lin took possession of his father's coffin and, together with an official from the Secretarial Council, escorted it back to Pao-chou

where it was buried at the side of the grave of Hao Ching's father. Thereupon, Kou Tsung-tao, who had also survived the ill-fated embassy to the Sung, prepared an 'account of conduct' of Hao Ching for the Hao family record. Hao's Han-lin colleague Yen Fu (1236-1312) composed an inscription for Hao's tomb; subsequently, a junior scholar, Lu Chih, wrote the text of the 'spirit-way inscription.' These and other records were later incorporated into Hao's biography in Su T'ien-chüeh's *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh*, and served as primary sources for Hao's biography in the *Yüan History*.

Sometime later, having been deeply moved by Hao's loyalty, the Mongol court granted his son Ts'ai-lin the title of Great Officer Recipient of Precepts and made him magistrate of Lin-chou (Honan). In 1305 it conferred posthumously on Hao Ching the office of senior academician of the Chao-wen Court, and the honorific title of Great Officer Endowed with Goodness. In 1317 he was designated a Meritorious Official Who Promoted Sincerity and Preserved Integrity, and was also named Great Officer of Eminent Dignity, made a Grand Instructor and granted the title of Pillar of the State. Finally Hao Ching was enfeoffed as Duke-of-state of Chi and given the posthumous name of Wen-chung ('Cultured and Loyal').

Hao Ching was survived by his two brothers. The youngest, Hao Yung, continued his official career after Hao's death and eventually became magistrate of Ying-chou, Anhwei. His other brother, Hao I, lived his entire life privately and never served in office. As to Hao's son, after being appointed magistrate of Lin-chou following his father's death, Hao Ts'ai-lin rose steadily to higher offices and eventually became Surveillance Bureau commissioner for the districts in Shan-nan and Chiang-pei. Hao's disciple and companion during his embassy, Kou Tsung-tao, also had a successful official career: he eventually became rector of the National College.

Although much of what he wrote did not survive, Hao Ching was, above all, a prolific author – which he probably would have been even if he had not been kept in confinement for so many years. His oeuvre includes, in addition to the major works already mentioned, a *Chou I wai-chuan* (*Unofficial Commentary on the Classic of Changes*) in 80 *chüan* and a *T'ai-chi yen* (*Detailed Explanations of the Supreme Ultimate*) in 20 *chüan*. However, many of his scattered writings are conserved in his collected works, the *Ling-ch'uan chi*. This collection, collated as mentioned by Kuo Kuan sometime after Hao Ching's death, was printed in 1318 in Ta-tu simultaneously with Hao's *Hsü Hou-Han shu*. It contained 39 *chüan*, and was reprinted in 1519 under the Ming. This was the basis of the edition prepared by Wang Lo and printed in 1738. Entitled *Hao Wen-chung kung Ling-ch'uan wen-chi* (LCWC), it includes an additional *chüan* of biographical material, as well as a chronology of Hao Ching

compiled by the Ch'ing scholar Chang Chu and two associates. This edition was reprinted in 1798.

The *Ling-ch'uan chi* was also incorporated in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* in the 1770s, and is now reproduced (without the supplementary material) in the fourth series of the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen* (SKCSCP). There is a shorter version of the *Ling-ch'uan chi* entitled *Hao Wen-chung kung chi* in 25 *chüan*, printed in 1848.

In many ways, the *Ling-ch'uan chi* epitomises Hao Ching's erudite scholarship and broad interests. It includes, besides 15 *chüan* of poetry, a large number of prose essays on a variety of subjects. Those range from biographies, tablet inscriptions, laments, lengthy theses on questions of moral philosophy, political and military affairs, to vignettes on the geography, local lore, monuments, ancient relics, personages and events of historical significance in north China. It is a goldmine of information and insight, as well as a rich record of the introduction of Neo-Confucianism into the North before the unification of the empire in the 1270s. Beyond the light which they throw on his philosophical and political thinking, Hao Ching's preserved writings vividly attest his literary brilliance. His remarks on the nature and function of prose show him to be in that grand tradition of Han Yü (768-824), Su Shih (1036-1101) and his teacher Yüan Hao-wen, which regarded *wen* ('literary art') as a manifestation of the *tao* ('way'). His poetry reveals him to have been not only a master of technique which allowed him to write in the styles of a wide range of earlier models, but also a thoroughgoing expressionist who used poetry as an outlet for profound states of mind and feeling. He must be ranked as one of the most outstanding scholars and belles-lettrists of his age.

Hao Ching's long confinement evidently wrecked his official career. Hao became envoy plenipotentiary at the prime of life; had he remained in the North at the emperor's side during his sixteen wasted years in Chen-chou, he would have become one of the most influential advisers in Qubilai's entourage. His forceful personality, learning, integrity of character, and commitment to Confucian principles of government might have enabled him to influence significantly the subsequent course of Mongol rule in China. In particular, he might have contributed to prevent the worst abuses of the Mongol diehards and of the Central Asian fiscal managers for whom China was essentially a source of revenue.

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23. WANG YÜN (1227-1304)

Wang Yün, T. Chung-mou, H. Ch'iu-chien, a distinguished Han-lin scholar, censorial official, provincial administrator, court chronicler and historian under Qubilai Qa'an and Temür Öljeitü, was a native of Chi-hsien, Wei-chou (Honan), where his family had moved at the time of the demise of the Northern Sung. His great-great-grandfather, Wang Po-ying (or Chung-ying), had been a clerk in Ho-p'ing, as had been at least one of his sons. Another son, Wang Yün's great grandfather, was named Ching (1139-1214); Yün's grandfather, Yü (1174-1224), served as a judicial clerk of minor rank under the Chin dynasty in Wei-chou. In that position, Wang Yü apparently made a name for himself with his superiors and peers alike, and the family fortunes rose accordingly.

Early in the Cheng-ta period (1224-32) of the Chin, Wang Yün's father, T'ien-to (1202-57), obtained the highest degree in the examination in legal studies (the *lü-k'o*), and became in 1232 a superintendent in the Ministry of Revenue, having been sponsored by several high Chin officials and by a member of the Jurchen royal house. Upon the demise of the Chin, Wang T'ien-to retired and returned home from the capital. He was employed by the Mongols briefly and, during the last twenty years of his life, devoted his time to Wang Yün's education and to the study of the classics, especially the *Book of Changes*, producing a collection of commentaries on the text by notable scholars in conjunction with Wang Yüan-li. He associated with many Chin intellectuals who had served in official positions. Chao Pi (1220-76), Qubilai's envoy who had recruited the distinguished former Chin academician Wang E (*q.v.*) in 1244, attempted to enlist Wang T'ien-to's services, without success, shortly before the latter's death in 1257.

Born in May 1227, Wang Yün was Wang T'ien-to's eldest son. His mother, née Chin, a learned woman, was the daughter of a county magistrate. Wang Yün spent his infant years in the company of his parents until the age of nine. He received intensive instruction in the classics from his father as early as 1236, after the latter's retirement. Thus Wang Yün acquired the clerical skills which had become part of the family tradition, as well as an interest in intellectual matters and in classical study, the latter fostered through his father's personal instruction and his mother's persistent tutoring.

In 1243, Wang Yün proceeded to Su-men (see the biography of Yao Shu) where he came under the influence of his father's erstwhile associates, such as Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), Liu Ch'i (1203-50), Yang Huan (*q.v.*), Wang P'an (1202-93), Hu

Chih-yü (1227-95), Hao Ching (*q.v.*) and Yang Kuo (1197-1269). Those men guided Wang Yün's intellectual development while he attended lectures at the 'free school' (*i-shu*) run by several of these scholars near Lo-ning in Honan. He studied there under former Chin scholar-officials inclined toward civil values; this fostered Wang's motivation to preserve Chinese values under alien rule and transformed him from a gifted student into a capable scholar. As the Chin fell to the Mongols in 1234, Chin literati were to transmit their cherished values to their Mongol patrons.

Wang Yün was married in the year 1244 to a woman surnamed T'ui, whose father and grandfather had been physicians in Honan. The couple's first son, Kung-ju, was born sometime during the following five years. When the military commander Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) joined in the Mongol campaign against the Sung in the early 1250s, he passed through Wei prefecture in Honan and became acquainted with Wang Yün. Wang was also on close terms with Yüan Hao-wen in the mid-1250s, received literary instruction from him, and impressed the great Chin scholar with his enthusiasm for study. During these years he was also closely associated with the patriarch Hsiao Fu-tao of the Taoist T'ai-i sect, a close friend of Yüan Hao-wen and an early supporter of the Chin history project with which Wang Yün would become involved in the 1260s.

In May 1260, three years after the death of Wang's father, Qubilai ascended the throne in K'ai-p'ing fu (later Shang-tu). Yao Shu was sent as pacification commissioner to Tung-p'ing where he probably met Wang Yün. In autumn, he recommended Wang for the post of administrative consultant in the Secretarial Council. In September, Wang arrived in the capital and was appointed editor, serving in the Secretarial Council with Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*), who had been recruited by Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*) and Chao Pi. In this capacity, he wrote during the following year his well-known account of government affairs, the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (*Memoirs of the Affairs of the Secretarial Council*), covering the period from November 1260 to September 1261. Wang's report of his responsibilities and activities are quite detailed and include a record of deliberations in the Council on matters concerning finance, taxation, relief, law, diplomacy, the military and the bureaucracy.

While serving in the Secretarial Council, Wang travelled to K'ai-p'ing fu at the summons of Qubilai in April 1261. Later that year, in August, Wang E, the executive Han-lin academician, secured concurrent appointments for him with the newly established Department of National History within the Academy (*Han-lin kuo-shih yüan*), where he served with distinction as a senior editor and compiler, helping to edit the official history of the fallen Chin dynasty. He joined other illustrious scholars recommended by Wang E to the Academy, such as Li Chih (*q.v.*), Wang P'an, Hao Ching and Hu Chih-yü, as well as Shih T'ien-tse, the supervisor of the National History project, and Wang Wen-t'ung and Yeh-lü Chu (*q.v.*), who were to direct the

compilation of the Liao and Chin histories. During that year, Wang Yün also wrote an illustrated text, the *Cheng-yao (Essentials of Government)*, describing the procedures of former emperors and ministers (see below).

The *Chin History* project was a well thought out undertaking and Wang E carefully planned it on the model of the standard dynastic histories (Wang E had first recommended such a project to Qubilai in 1234, which was followed by a similar recommendation from Liu Ping-chung in 1249). This blueprint was entrusted to Wang Yün but, as it turned out, the project would not be completed until 1344, some forty years after Wang's death. One of the reasons for the delay was the execution of Wang Wen-t'ung in 1262 for his alleged involvement in the rebellion of his son-in-law Li T'an (*q.v.*) in Shantung. A purge of officials connected with Wang Wen-t'ung ensued and although Wang Yün was protected by his mentor Shih T'ien-tse, he was forced to leave office between late 1261 and 1268, after his return to Yen-ching (later Ta-tu) from K'ai-p'ing fu in October of 1261. Wang E, Wang P'an and others attempted to revive the Chin project in the mid-1260s with the support of Shang T'ing (*q.v.*), but by this time Qubilai had begun favouring the Central Asian advisers to the detriment of the Chinese group.

While out of office, Wang Yün travelled in Shantung, Tung-p'ing and Pien, but mostly lived in retirement in his native place. He limited his activities to writing and composed many of his prefaces, including presumably that to the *Chi-chüen (r'u-)chih*, a gazetteer of his native place, begun by his father (see below). In 1267, after an illness, Wang wrote a preface for an edition of Yüan Hao-wen's *Ti-wang ching-lüeh*, a handbook on statecraft based on T'ang dynasty models.

In August 1268, the Censorate was established and Wang Yün was appointed censorial inspector. A year later, in 1269, he memorialised the throne recommending that a law code, called *Chih-yüan hsin-fa (New Code for the Chih-yüan Period [1264-94])*, be promulgated, using elements of the Mongol *Jasaq* where appropriate. The request was turned down, as were similar appeals in 1292 and 1294. Nevertheless, during his tenure in the Censorate, Wang was quite vocal when it came to matters of official impropriety and was involved in about twenty impeachment proceedings, documentation for which can be found in his *Wu-t'ai pi-pu (Proposals at the Censorate)*. A notable case concerned the director of Waterways, Liu Cheng (1213-75), who had been implicated in illegal appointments, embezzlement and incompetent construction practices involving the imperial ancestral temple. Between 1269 and 1271, Wang Yün also recommended more than a dozen people for official appointments.

After his term as censor, Wang went on to settle a number of criminal cases and lawsuits as district assistant in the P'ing-yang administration in Shansi between the

years 1272 and 1277. Here Wang dealt with one case involving the bribery of officials in order to gain their legal support, and was able, through court action, to get unfairly imprisoned people released and the true criminal punished. Shih T'ien-tse, along with others such as Hsü Heng (*q.v.*) and Wang P'an, described Wang as an upright magistrate on the strength of his activities at the time.

In the mid-1270s, Wang travelled a great deal and wrote many commemorative literary pieces. In 1276, he composed an index of the calligraphy and paintings in the collection of Sung masterpieces which had recently been brought to Ta-tu from the Southern Sung capital at Lin-an (Hang-chou). Later that year, he examined Confucian scholars seeking appointment. In March 1277, he was made academician-in-waiting, and, in autumn the following year, became a deputy inspection commissioner for the Ho-pei and Ho-nan circuits.

We may conclude that Wang was first able to exhibit his talent for dealing with administrative problems in the decade from the mid-1260s to the mid-1270s. Although his initial appointments resulted perhaps from his literary acumen and family connections with eminent Chin-era Confucian scholar-officials, Wang's legal expertise and tireless devotion to the exposure of corruption undoubtedly led to important public appointments and promotions later on, without prejudice to his standing as a scholar and historian of note.

After declining a post in the Regional Censorate in 1281, Wang presented in 1282 the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh* (*Summary of Examples for the Heir Apparent*) to Jingim (1243-85), the second son of Qubilai and heir apparent since 1273, whom Wang met in a personal audience in autumn that year to discuss the themes presented in this essay. Wang had been introduced to Jingim by the high administrator Chang Chiu-ssu (1242-1302), who, together with Juqunai, then helped to interpret the work for the crown prince.

In this work, Wang Yün placed himself squarely in the Tung-p'ing tradition of Confucian statecraft, quoting historical precedents to instruct the heir apparent in his role as a Confucian-style emperor; this required in particular accepting the advice of Confucian scholar-officials and affirming principles of frugality and simplicity in government, after the great models of the Han, T'ang and Chin dynasties. Jingim, who had already studied Confucian works such as the *Hsiao-ching* (*Classic of Filial Piety*) and the *Shih-ching* (*Book of Odes*), was impressed by Wang's insistence on diligence and directed all the imperial grandsons to read Wang's edifying text.

Between 1283 (or 1282) and 1284, Wang served as inspection commissioner for the Eastern and Western Shan-tung circuits, returning thereafter to his native Honan because of sickness. In 1285 (or possibly before his return home), he was appointed first secretary in the Bureau of the Left of the Secretarial Council. At the time, the

corrupt assistant of the Right in the Council, Lu Shih-yung (d. 1285), was responsible for recruitment and though he urged Wang to assume the post to which he had been appointed, Wang declined, feeling that Lu's corrupt activities would soon be exposed. When this occurred, Wang was praised for his skill in steering clear of a troublesome political affiliation. During his convalescence from 1285 to 1289, Wang busied himself with writing and studying. We find him delving into the *Huai-nan tzu* and also composing a preface for his *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (in 1287) and for a work on the *Book of Changes* begun by his father (in 1288).

In 1289, Wang was given the court rank of Junior Great Officer and was appointed inspection commissioner for the Min-hai circuit in Fukien, an area recently conquered by the Mongols that was still unstable and rife with corruption. Wang proceeded to demote unscrupulous officials and released prisoners who had been wrongfully detained. He also prohibited the practice of billeting troops in the homes of civilians and built proper barracks to house the military, thereby removing a cause of resentment among the people. He memorialised the court on the issue of the selection of honest officials for positions in local government in Fukien, noting that laxity in administration after the demise of Sung control in the region had resulted in rampant banditry and consequent brutal reprisals by Mongol government troops. His solution was to select officials who were above reproach for executive administrative positions which were vacant in the Regional Secretarial Council, with the hope that such high-minded people could control bureaucratic corruption and military anarchy.

The main problem for administrative reform in Fukien accrued from the activities of the rebel leader Chung Ming-liang during the years 1289-1290. Chung, despite punitive campaigns against him under the Mongol general Ötmiš and his forced surrenders on two occasions, was only eliminated as a source of unrest following an all-out campaign and a major effort to pacify the citizenry that had initially joined Chung's revolt. At the time, Wang Yün advised both the court and Ötmiš on ways of weakening the rebels' resistance.

After a brief respite to recover his health in his native Honan late in 1290, and after investigating the problem of flooding in that province, Wang was called to the capital in 1291 (or possibly 1292) and in the following year, 1292 (or 1293), had an audience with Qubilai at the latter's travelling headquarters in Liu-lin, south-east of Ta-tu. At this meeting, Wang delivered to the emperor a ten-thousand-word memorial on current governmental issues. The submission was organised under general topic-headings dealing with matters ranging from finance to education and was designed to strengthen the government by suggesting the adoption of specific statutes and regulations. Soon after, Wang was appointed Han-lin academician, with the court rank of Great Officer of Excellent Counsel.

When Temür Öljaitü ascended the throne in 1294 as Qubilai's successor, Wang presented to the new emperor his work entitled the (*Yüan-chen*) *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* (*A Mirror of Actions for Preserving the Achievements [of the Yüan-chen Period (1295-96)]*). In it, Wang elaborated on a series of themes which were to serve as guiding principles for the new monarch (a kind of recapitulation in more general terms of many of the ideas that Wang had presented to Temür's father, Jïngim). In this text, however, Wang mapped out a plan for future governance which stressed especially the need for standard procedures of recruitment. In this respect, T'ang T'ai-tsung (r. 627-49) and the Chin emperor Shih-tsung (r. 1161-89) were conceived as model rulers who not only purified their own characters but who were wise enough to recognise that able administrators must lend lustre to their reigns. In stressing the exemplary roles of such emperors (and we must note Wang's interest in T'ang statecraft as reflected in his 1267 preface to Yüan Hao-wen's handbook, above), Wang found sources for their behaviour in principles derived from the classics, thus blending universal ideals with actual historical examples.

In 1295, Wang Yün received the court rank of Great Officer of Penetrating Counsel, and the positions of drafter of Imperial Edicts and co-redactor in the Department of National History. Furthermore, he was instructed by imperial decree to compile the *Shih-tsu shih-lu* (*Veritable Records of [the Reign of Emperor] Shih-tsu* [i.e. Qubilai]). This important scholarly undertaking to glorify and legitimise Mongol rule in China led to his promotion to the rank of Great Officer in Palace Attendance in 1297 and, in 1298, to a special grant of ten-thousand strings of cash.

Wang Yün's request for leave to retire, which had originally been made in 1297, was not approved until 1301, at which point the court appointed his son, Wang Kung-ju (the eventual author of Wang Yün's funeral tablet, upon which other biographies are based), to the position of prefectural judge in Wei-chou, so that Wang Yün could be cared for in his old age. Wang's grandson, Wang Ko, was appointed imperial librarian for the same purpose.

On 23 July 1304, Wang Yün died of disease in his seventy-eighth year and was buried beside his wife in the hamlet of Ho-hsi. He was posthumously given the title of executive academician with the rank of Great Officer Endowed with Goodness. He was also enfeoffed as the Duke-of-Commandery of T'ai-yüan and canonised as Wen-ting ('Cultured and Steadfast') by Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) in 1312.

Wang Yün's wife, née T'ui, who died in 1286, bore his eldest son, Kung-ju. He had two other sons by a concubine. One of them, Kung-i, was made a vice-prefect of Tz'u-chou in Hopei through the *yin* privilege; another Kung-yüeh, became a principal of the Confucian School in Wei-hui county in Honan. Wang Yün's grandson, Ko,

achieved a directorship in the Ministry of Justice, and one of his grand-daughters married Yeh-lü K'ai, the great-grand-nephew of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*).

Wang Yün was one of the generation of Chinese whose formative years were spent in the main under Mongol rule in the newly conquered North, after the demise of the Chin state, yet whose heritage was clearly related to traditions of service under Jurchen rule. With the assistance of his trusted minister Liu Ping-chung, Qubilai brought talented officials to Qara Qorum even before he ascended the throne in 1260. During the first decade of Qubilai's rule, Liu was actively promoting Chinese influence behind the scenes at court. This phase of administrative Confucianisation had a model in the earlier efforts of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who had protected Chin scholars such as Yang Huan, Wang E and Yüan Hao-wen, and provided a model for the later practices of Ch'eng Chü-fu (1249-1318) in the South, who himself had been supported by Wang P'an, one of the mentors of Wang Yün.

Whereas many of the northern Chinese in Qubilai's inner circle, such as Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu, Hsü Heng, Tou Mo (*q.v.*) and Shang T'ing, as well as several of the associates of Wang Yün's father who became Wang Yün's teachers, had passed from the scene by about 1280 (at which time their chief rival in the Mongol central government, the head of the Central Asian faction, Aḥmad [*q.v.*], was in his last years), Wang Yün lived through the rest of Qubilai's reign and beyond. In the circumstances, men like him, well-versed in administrative skills, took the place of such as would normally have been selected through the traditional examination process.

The influence of Wang's family background, with its tradition of service and emphasis on clerical skills, was certainly reinforced by Wang's contacts with the scholarly culture of Chin in his formative years. More precisely, one sees that Wang was also exposed to the influence of the so-called Tung-p'ing school, centred in the Shantung region near his home. The school, as represented by men such as Wang Wen-t'ung, attempted to sinicise governmental institutions under foreign rule through a practical emphasis on statecraft. From what we learn of Wang Yün's career, his audiences with the Mongol leadership, and his writings, he participated actively in these efforts to Confucianise the ruling order.

Surveying Wang Yün's official career, it may be noted that he actually served in official position for only about ten of his seventy-eight years. While this hardly means that Wang was a hermit, it does indicate that his service in government was balanced by long periods of travel, writing and reflection.

Wang's first experience in government lasted for only about one year because of the political turmoil surrounding the Wang Wen-t'ung episode, yet his record of the proceedings of the Secretarial Council between 1260 and 1261, the *Chung-t'ang shih-*

chi, is a unique document that is invaluable in studying the early Yüan period. He went on to serve with practical effectiveness in the 1270s by decisively attacking bureaucratic corruption; in this he acted not merely as a functionary but rather as a reformer trying to improve governance through legal and administrative means. That aspect of his official career was affirmed in the 1280s when he served as inspection commissioner in Fukien, acting again with moral decisiveness. In sum, during those two decades, Wang Yün exercised to the full his remarkable combination of historical and practical skills.

Wang's submissions to the throne over the following two decades indicate that this blend of ideology and pragmatism resulted in a plan to influence the top level of Mongol authority through an appeal to T'ang and Chin models. In assessing this imperial phase, it is clear that Jingim, Qubilai and Temür were also receptive to the kind of advice that Wang advanced; they were fully aware of the need to use Chinese models of exemplary rule in order to stabilise and legitimise their own. Nevertheless, this does not diminish Wang Yün's position as counsellor to the Mongol leadership nor his legacy as one of the few Chinese to have his counsels promoted in the Mongolian language.

Wang Yün was thus able to exert a civilizing influence on Qubilai, on his heir apparent, and on his eventual successor, all of whom were sympathetic to ideas that they believed would perpetuate their rule, throughout and beyond the crucial Chung-t'ung (1260-63) and Chih-yüan (1264-94) periods. Wang's importance lies not only in the practical administrative-legal services which he performed but also in his skills in composition and interpretation: the historical chronicle of the Secretarial Council during the first two years of Qubilai's reign, which became a source for the *Veritable Records* of the entire reign that he and others edited and compiled; the memorial on government that he presented to Qubilai; and the two texts that he interpreted personally for Jingim and Temür, which were later translated into Mongolian.

Wang Yün's approach to reforming the institutions and practices of the day was cast in a broadly-based Confucian-minded pragmatism in the vein of the Tung-p'ing school, which saw little need for deep philosophical speculation. It is interesting, therefore, to seek what Wang's intellectual roots and predilections might have been as we view his ideas in the context of his time.

According to one of the prefaces to the *Collected Works* of Wang Yün by Wang Ping-i of the late Yüan, Wang took Han Yü, Liu Tsung-yüan, Ou-yang Hsiu and Su Tung-p'o as models of essay writing. As noted earlier, Wang came under the influence of Yüan Hao-wen, especially in his poetry. Even though Wang was hardly as eminent as those literary giants, he was certainly an accomplished and prolific writer.

His literary sensibilities were probably stimulated by his peripatetic career, as the many poems written during his travels suggest, but travel may well have contributed even more to shaping his historical outlook. The accuracy and importance of the historical records provided in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*, for example, are due no doubt to the informed nature of Wang's experience.

Wang's affinities with Taoism have been inferred by some authors from his personal relationships with contemporary Taoist luminaries and connections with the T'ai-i sect, his writings about those masters, his interest in the *Book of Changes* and *Huai-nan tzu*, and the naming of a text referring to his study: *Tsui-ching t'ang chi* (*Record of the Hall of the Intoxicated Classics*). While such interests may be casual or reflect the eclectic outlook of many scholars of the day, they still indicate that Wang's interests in Taoism and penchant for travel helped balance what was an often hectic and, at the outset, dangerous official career.

Wang Ping-i's preface states that Wang Yün took Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung, the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi as models when discussing 'human nature and reason' (*hsing-li*), but it is doubtful that Wang was as philosophically minded as this might imply. Wang had an abiding respect for Chu Hsi but was mostly unconcerned with metaphysical issues in his own writings. Nor was Wang apparently influenced by Chu's interpretation of the concept of legitimate dynastic succession, or *cheng-t'ung*. In departing from the Neo-Confucian interpretation, Wang tended more toward the five-agents cosmological theory in his analysis. Wang Yün, therefore, cannot be included among thinkers such as Yao Shu and Hsü Heng, who were eminently responsible for the propagation of the philosophy of the Sung Neo-Confucian masters in north China in early Yüan times.

From Wang's career and writings, one can see that his administrative activity was informed by the practical moral outlook associated with the Tung-p'ing school and by his own Chin heritage. This is revealed in his words to Wang Wen-t'ung and others about governmental service (10 May 1261): 'It would be best if we could have accomplishments without losing the essence. This should be the foremost concern of high officials.' Wang's devotion to the straightforward goal of achieving practical ends without losing sight of the moral foundation, and the degree to which he attained that goal, make him one of the most important politician-scholars in the Yüan era.

Wang Yün was a prolific and versatile writer, and most of his extant writings have been preserved in his monumental collection, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan wen-chi* (*Collected Works of Master Ch'iu-chien*). It represents the most voluminous literary document of the era and reflects Wang's desire to leave an accurate record of his work for posterity. The collection comprises 100 *chüan* and was first printed in 1321. The *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* edition is a reprint of the Ming edition of 1498, which

was based on the earlier Yüan edition. (The Yüan edition is available in the National Central Library in Taipei.)

The *Collected Works* contain an array of literary pieces, including poems in various genres, eulogies (including family biographies of people such as Wang's patron, Shih T'ien-tse), as well as commemorative and funerary inscriptions and miscellaneous literary works (including letters, dedications, and memorials, a notable one being Wang's ten-thousand word memorial to Qubilai of 1292). They also include five longer pieces that stand on their own: the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (3 chüan), the *Wu-t'ai pi-pu* (10 chüan), the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh* (2 chüan), the (*Yüan-chen*) *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* (1 chüan), and the *Yü-t'ang chia-hua* (8 chüan). The appendix (*fu-lu*) includes Wang's funeral tablet, the basic biographical source composed by his son, Wang Kung-ju.

In the *Collected Works* there are prefaces to works on the Confucian classics, the *Book of Changes* and Taoist works; and biographies on a half-dozen or more important T'ai-i sect figures and at least as many on those of the Ch'üan-chen sect. There is also a large number of pieces on painting and painters, reminding us that Wang personally catalogued Sung masterpieces. He even has a colophon to the *ts'ao-shu* (cursive style) rendering of the *Ch'ien-tzu wen* (*Thousand Character Classic*) by the famous T'ang dynasty calligrapher Huai-su (737-?). Wang composed many dedicatory pieces for his associates and on well-known scholars such as Yüan Hao-wen, Wang P'an, Wang E, Shih T'ien-tse, Yao Shu, Hao Ching and Hsü Heng. There are also some to his father. Wang E's draft for the Chin historical project may also be found in the *Collected Works*.

Regarding practical subjects, Wang wrote on agricultural policy, taxation, geography, methods of governmental control, legal regulations and the penal system, the government monopolies, relief measures, and military regulations and organisation. He also composed biographies of military leaders of the time, both Mongol and Chinese.

Wang Yün's memorial of 1292 to Qubilai is illustrative of his political opinions. This essay on contemporary governmental affairs offers guidance to the emperor on the matter of unifying the state politically and culturally. It was originally written under sixteen headings and exhorted the emperor to: (1) frame laws designed to strengthen the government; (2) establish rules to curb corruption; (3) economise; (4) favour honest officials and have this serve as an example throughout the bureaucracy; (5) establish a system of selection for government service leading to the appointment of able individuals; (6) end exactions by the military; (7) provide relief for the populace (including dispensation from service in the militia) as a way to strengthen the emperor's rule; and (8) improve the people's education.

As stated earlier, the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* is a record of Wang Yün's service in the Secretarial Council during the years 1260-1261, up to the time he left following the Wang Wen-t'ung affair. The document records political events in the Secretarial Council chronologically, in the style of *shih-lu* historiography; much material from the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* was doubtless incorporated into Wang's later work on the *Shih-tsu shih-lu*. The preface to the work is dated 1287, when Wang made some revisions; further editing occurred as late as 1294.

The *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* contains Wang's own writing and opinions as well as important government documents. As to content, the work deals with taxation procedures, taxes, the issuing of currency, water conservation, water transport, the government iron monopoly, the *t'ou-hsia* (private domains) households, the mobilisation and conscription of the people, the supply of troops involved in military campaigns, the problem of Mongol troops destroying crops and looting farms, relief measures for the impoverished, legal regulations, procedures for criminal cases, bureaucratic procedures (especially in regard to the recruitment and promotion of officials), and procedures for memorialising the throne. Wang Yün describes deliberations on those subjects in the Council and also expresses his opinions on many of the issues. Much of the material covered may be compared with similar items in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) and is indicative of administrative problems faced in the early Yüan.

The *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* also describes Wang Yün's travels north of Yen-ching and the Great Wall to Chin-lien (where the Chin emperors used to spend the summer months), and from there to K'ai-p'ing. The work is therefore important for its references to the geography of north China.

Concerning reports of historical events that made the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* important, we note Wang Yün's attendance at the state visit of the Korean heir apparent in July 1261, as well as a mention of the difficult relations with the Southern Sung which, despite peace negotiations, were clouded by frequent clashes between Mongol and Sung troops. Wang also describes the first visit of a Western nation's envoy to the Yüan court.

Wang Yün mentions the establishment of the Department of National History, thanks to the efforts of Wang E and his own, as well as his appointment to editorial posts in it (24 August 1261). Elsewhere he mentions significant appointments, such as that of Shih T'ien-tse as Left chancellor in the Secretarial Council (20 June 1261; Wang records his drunkenness at the reception for Shih!); of Hsü Heng as rector in the National College (3 September 1261); and of Yao Shu as tutor to the heir apparent (28 August 1261). Notable also is Wang's corroboration of the Baljuna covenant, whereby Činggis Qan and his followers swore allegiance against the Kereit.

The *Wu-t'ai pi-pu* (*Proposals at the Censorate*) is a work composed during Wang's tenure in the Censorate, ca. 1268-1272. It contains more than 150 proposals, discussions and case-histories, but, beyond its wealth of information on specific instances, much can be gleaned on more general issues. Thus Wang describes the weaknesses in the Yüan political system, especially recruitment practices, economic management and measures for grain relief (e.g. the 'ever-normal granaries'), problems in relations between ethnic groups, the census, the penal system and practices at court. There are many pieces dealing with military affairs as well. Individual cases of corruption and mismanagement expose deeper problems in governance, personnel and customs, and in the overall stability of cultural institutions of the early Yüan. Those problems are highlighted in discussions of attempts to solve such abuses, as also of steps taken by the government to deal with instances of harsh rule and social unrest.

The *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh* (*Summary of Examples for the Heir Apparent*) now comprises two *chüan*, though it was originally in six. It was completed in 1281 when Wang Yün was academician-in-waiting. In 1282 Wang presented the document with an accompanying letter to the heir apparent, Jingim. Basically the text cites the actions of former crown princes by way of cautionary advice to Jingim. Jingim was apparently pleased, but even so Wang Yün was not granted a personal audience with Jingim until 13 November 1282, almost ten months after he had submitted the document. On that occasion, Jingim asked for explanations of the various sections and his advisors, Chang Chiu-ssu and Juqunai, answered.

Regarding the origin of the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh*, it is important to note that early in 1261, some twenty years before the composition of the text, Wang had written a piece called the *Cheng-yao* (*Essentials of Government*) during his tenure in the Secretarial Council. This work, now lost, also contained illustrations and was the precursor for the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh*. The *Cheng-yao* described exemplary ministers and emperors of previous dynasties as well as the worthy and filial conduct of heirs apparent. Wang had apparently prepared the text for lectures to the heir apparent; all that remains of it is his reference to the work in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*.

The *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh* (so named because of the Ch'eng-hua Gate at the palace of the heir apparent) consists of twenty thematic sections, or paragraphs, each comprising examples and discussions. The themes include such things as filial piety, the encouragement of learning, personal discipline, government respect for Confucian scholars, magnanimity, and proper relations with the emperor. The preface states that filiality comes first because it represents the foundation of all the following subjects. The headings thus summarise a crown prince's obligations.

Although Wang frequently quotes from the classics in the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh*, most examples are from the dynastic histories. Most often mentioned are emperors of the T'ang (especially T'ai-tsung and Hsüan-tsung), Han, and Chin, in that order. Wang's use of the T'ang work *Chen-kuan cheng-yao* (*The Essence of Government in the Chen-kuan Period* [627-49 A.D.]) emphasises the importance attributed to this work in the Yüan, as evidenced by the fact that it was translated into Mongolian. The T'ang document had also been extolled at the Chin court by Chao Ping-wen (1159-1232), and Wang Yün's earlier *Cheng-yao* was obviously inspired by it.

In the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh*, Wang also mentions measures taken by Jingim and Qubilai, notably the latter's lightening of military obligations and provision of relief for the hard-pressed populace. Wang Yün's biography in the *Yüan History* states that Jingim expressed approval of the passages dealing with the acknowledgement of rank and status, and with the value of upright ministers who warned their sovereign of potentially dangerous developments. Wang was naturally desirous of encouraging Jingim to increase the status of officials like himself. The heir apparent's death in 1286 was to cut short their budding relationship.

The (*Yüan-chen*) *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* (*A Mirror of Actions for Preserving the Achievements* [of the *Yüan-chen Period*]) is the work in one *chüan* which Wang Yün presented to Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307) in 1294, when Wang held the post of Han-lin academician. The term *shou-ch'eng* ('preserving achievements') in the title is taken from the T'ang work *Chen-kuan cheng-yao*; the work is modelled structurally on T'ang T'ai-tsung's *Ti-fan* (*Examples of the Emperor*), especially in its use of two-character headings which sum up most of the themes in the body of the text.

In the biography of Wang Yün written for his father's funeral tablet, Wang's son compares the *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* to the writings of Wei Cheng (580-643), the illustrious 'mirror' of T'ang T'ai-tsung, no doubt because Wang Yün cites that emperor as a model ruler. Wang also portrays the Chin emperor Shih-tsung (r. 1161-89) in the same light. Compared to the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh*, the *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* deals with more practical issues: the emphasis is on historical precedents for the establishment of administrative rules, especially in the appointment of officials, a theme introduced in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* and the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh*.

During Temür's reign, Wang points out the need for reintroducing a standard examination system, invoking Qubilai's and Jingim's alleged agreement to the scheme. He suggests, moreover, that correct government procedures, the maintenance of public welfare, and a far-sighted moral outlook will help the ruler preserve the empire. To achieve those goals, Wang invokes a continuity between T'ang and Chin which he hopes will endure under the Yüan.

It is noteworthy that the *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* was translated into Mongolian and was used until the fifteenth century by language students in Korea to prepare for examinations in Mongolian.

The *Yü-t'ang chia-hua* (*Estimable Talks in the Yü-t'ang* [the Han-lin Academy]) is a work in eight *chüan*. It was written in 1288 and records Wang's activities in the Academy, first between 1260 and 1261 when he was an editor, and later between 1277 and 1294 when he returned as an academician-in-waiting. It contains some of Wang's longer pieces and various biographies, as well as interpolations of works by two of his contemporaries: the *Chi-hsing* of Chang Te-hui (1195-1274) and the *Hsi-shih chi* of Liu Yü, both of which are travelogues that have been translated into Russian and English by Archimandrite Palladii (P.I. Kafarov) and E. Bretschneider respectively.

The text includes writings on history, the economy, and on military expeditions. There are also various pieces on prominent personages such as Wen T'ien-hsiang (1236-83), Wang P'an, Wang E, and Lei Ying (1225-97). Wang presents a discussion of 'legitimate dynastic succession' (*cheng-t'ung*) in this work. The catalogue of Sung painting and calligraphy appears here, and there are also interesting snippets of information on philology and astronomy. Discussions of contemporary historiography are significant as well, and Wang is quick to expose flaws in the kind of historical analysis that is not fully based on fact.

Three works attributed to Wang Yün must be counted as lost. The first, the previously mentioned *Shih-tsu shih-lu*, was the historical record of Qubilai's reign, begun in the sixth month of 1294, completed a year later, and presented to the throne in July 1295. The supervising redactor was Tung Wen-yung (q.v.) and the co-redactors, besides Wang Yün, were Wang Kou, Chao Meng-fu, Kao Tao-ning, Chang Sheng, Li Chih-shao, and others. The work consisted of 270 *chüan*, and included six *chüan* of basic edicts and decrees entitled *Shih-tsu sheng-hsün* (*The Holy Injunctions of Qubilai*). What remains of the *Veritable Records* is the address to the court which accompanied the text.

In this memorial, Wang Yün praises Qubilai's establishment of orderly government and outlines some of the principles adopted in compiling the work. These involved the careful investigation and classification of materials relating to government and daily affairs, the clarification of terminology, the simplification of complex material, and an emphasis on factual reporting. In its wording, the memorial also shows that the Imperial Annals (*pen-chi*) in the *Yüan History* were based on the *shih-lu* (which, as we have already noted above, used material from Wang's *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*).

In 1304, during the reign of Temür, the Grand Instructor Sarman published in Mongolian an abbreviated version in one volume of the *Veritable Records*, as well as an eighty-volume Chinese edition. According to the *Yüan History*, a Mongolian translation of the *Holy Injunctions* apparently existed after 1326, when the *Huang-t'u ta-hsün* (*The Great Injunctions of the August Planners*) was compiled from it and translated into Mongolian. The *Huang-t'u ta-hsün* contained the edicts and policy statements of the early Yüan emperors. We may assume that Wang Yün's careful historical record-keeping in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* served as source material for entries on Qubilai, ca. 1260-1261, though Wang possibly also used the reign chronicles first compiled in Mongolian and presented to the throne by Sarman in 1288 and 1290, which were subsequently translated into Chinese.

Significantly, Wang's work on the *Holy Injunctions* was the source for important records in Mongolian of the edicts of Qubilai and of other early Yüan emperors. More generally, however, Wang's contribution to the compilation of the *Veritable Records* provided the basis for presenting Qubilai in the image of a sinicised emperor, as he was later portrayed in the *Yüan History*. This, as we have noted above, was one of the aims of the Tung-p'ing school.

The second lost work, called *Hsiang-chien* (*A Mirror for the Prime Minister*), is mentioned in the biographical sources on Wang Yün. It comprised fifty *chüan*; a preface to it dated 1283 may be found in the *Collected Works*. Not much is known about this text, even though the dating of the preface indicates that it might have been written around the time that Wang Yün presented the *Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh* to Jingim.

The third lost work is the *Chi-chün* (*t'u-chih*), a gazetteer of Wang Yün's native district in fifteen *chüan*, of which only the preface and index (dated 1266) are extant. The work was begun by Wang Yün's father, Wang T'ien-to, and completed by Wang Yün between 1262 and 1268, after he had left the Secretarial Council.

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D. Gedalecia

24. YAO SHU (1203-1280)

Yao Shu, T. Kung-mao, H. Hsüeh-chai, a noted Confucian scholar who served Qubilai as political adviser and senior government official, was born in Fen-chou (now Fen-yang) in Shansi in 1203. He came from a prominent family of Liu-ch'eng (Ch'ao-yang) in present-day Inner Mongolia, traceable to the Five Dynasties, with an outstanding record of government service. One of his ancestors, Yao Ch'ing, had been a military governor during the Later T'ang (923-36), and his descendants had gained fame subsequently as generals and local administrators under the Later Chou (951-60), the Liao (907-1125), and the Chin (1115-1234) dynasties. Yao Shu's father Yao Chung-hung, who inherited the title of general, served one term as magistrate of An-hua (in Kansu) under the Chin rulers. He raised three sons by his wife née Chang; Shu was the eldest and most illustrious.

Little is known of Yao Shu's early life. He is said to have been extremely studious, devoting himself to the Confucian classics and literature, and to have delighted his parents and friends with his achievements. He spent most of his youth in Fen. At the age of nineteen he moved to Hsü (Hsü-ch'ang) in Honan, where his father had been appointed a judge. By then he may already have been a competent scholar, but he did not attract attention until *ca.* 1228, when he came to the notice of Sung Chiu-chia (d. 1233), a Han-lin academician who had retired in Hsü to recover from an illness. Sung, a renowned man of letters, was most impressed by Yao Shu and invited him to be a guest in his house, which was then frequented by well-known scholars and officials. In due course Yao Shu became acquainted with a number of distinguished Chin literary figures, including the great Yüan Hao-wen (1190-1257), Yang Huan (*q.v.*) and Hsüeh Hsüan (d. 1271) under whose influence he fell. There is no clear indication, however, that he ever sat for the civil service examinations, or that he held any specific position in government. Then, in 1232, when the Mongol forces under the command of Tolui, Sübōtei (*q.v.*) and Tāčar laid siege to Hsü, he was put in charge of the warehouses of military supplies, but before long the place capitulated and Yao Shu hurriedly fled with his family, thus concluding a rather insignificant phase of his career under Chin rule.

Fortunately, Yao Shu's plight was short-lived. The opportunity to resume his activity came in 1233, when Ögödei approved the establishment of a National College for the promotion of Confucian studies in Yen-ching (Peking). Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*), a former acquaintance of Yao Shu, was appointed superintendent of the college. Informed of this, Yao Shu proceeded to Yen-ching to visit his friend. He

was well received and was employed briefly in the new college, probably as an instructor. Soon after, Yang Wei-chung took Yao Shu to Qara Qorum and introduced him to Ögödei who, delighted with all-too-rare visits by Chinese scholars, treated him cordially and invited him to stay. The ground was thus laid for Yao Shu to advance in the service of the Mongol ruler.

Yao Shu received his first official assignment early in 1235, when Ögödei sent his third son Kōcū and his trusted lieutenant Šigi Qutuqu (*q.v.*) to fight the Sung in the Huai region. The Mongol emperor instructed Yao Shu to accompany Yang Wei-chung on this expedition for the purpose of recruiting staff (secretaries, doctors, artisans etc.) for service at court. In November, the Mongol forces took Tsao-yang (in Hupei) and their commander ordered the extermination of the captives, among whom were a number of skilled people whom Yao Shu had selected. Yao remonstrated with the commander to no avail; he managed, however, to help some of the prisoners to escape and to hide in the woods until the killing was over.

Following this, the Mongol forces overran Te-an where they seized a number of local scholars, including the renowned Confucian teacher Chao Fu who was eventually brought before Yao Shu. Upon meeting Yao, Chao Fu was surprised to see him dressed like a Mongol and thought he was a Central Asian; he soon discovered that he was a learned Chinese scholar and the two became friends. Yao Shu invited him to stay; Chao Fu, deeply distressed by the loss of all his family and belongings, went out to the river bank one night, contemplating suicide. But Yao was alerted and came out to succour him. Yao tried to persuade Chao to go on living for the sake of perpetuating the Chinese cultural heritage, and comforted him with assurances of favoured treatment and guarantees of safety. Chao Fu was finally placated and delivered to Yao many of the basic Neo-Confucian commentaries on the classics by such distinguished scholars as Ch'eng Hao (1032-85), Ch'eng I (1033-1107), as well as by Chu Hsi (1130-1200), who had not been widely known in the north under Chin rule. In the next few months, the Mongols raided the Hsiang, Teng and Ying prefectures; then, having concluded their campaign, they returned to the north early in 1236 with their booty and prisoners. Yao Shu took Chao Fu with him and returned to Yen-ching with over a hundred of Chao's disciples who wanted to continue their studies under their master. As a result, Neo-Confucianism began to flourish in north China after several decades of intellectual and cultural disruption, and Yao must be given credit for his key role as an agent in this development.

In 1238 Yao Shu assisted Yang Wei-chung in founding the T'ai-chi shu-yüan or Private Academy of the Supreme Ultimate in Yen-ching. There they erected a shrine in honour of Chou Tun-i (1017-73) and six other eminent scholars and philosophers, including the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi; they assembled a library of Neo-

Confucian literature numbering over 8,000 *chüan*, and invited Chao Fu and others to lecture the students on the new philosophy. This was the first private academy ever established in Yen-ching and it had a major impact on the development of Neo-Confucian studies in north China during this early phase of Mongol rule.

In 1241, having awarded Yao Shu a golden tablet for his service, Ögödei appointed him first secretary of the Yen-ching Regional Censorate, but Yao soon came into conflict with his Central Asian colleagues and asked to be relieved of his office. Before this time, the Chinese population in Yen-ching had been placed under the administration of Liu Min (1201-59), a mitigation commissioner who was fluent in Mongolian and had good relations with the Chinese court officials. In November of 1241, however, Ögödei had appointed the Khwārazmian Maḥmūd Yalavač (*q.v.*), who had just been recalled from Bukhara, as chief of the Yen-ching Regional Censorate with the rank of judge, or arbitrator (*jarquči*), thus placing him in virtual control of the imperial administration of north China. This appointment aroused considerable animosity. According to Chinese sources – which may be biased – Maḥmūd was an avaricious and crafty man, given to graft, who had attempted to corrupt Ögödei's Chinese advisers. Several of the court officials had apparently accepted his bribes.

For his part, Yao Shu remained untouched but, resenting the pressure put upon him, he left office and retired to Mt. Su-men in Hui-chou, Honan, spending almost ten years there. During this long period, Yao preoccupied himself with a variety of activities and made many new friends, Confucian scholars as well as religious personages. While working on the land to support his family, he found time for classical studies, literary pursuits, and teaching students. He was most enthusiastic in propagating the Neo-Confucian philosophy that he had learned from the refugee teacher Chao Fu. As a testimony to his commitment, he erected a temple in the village in which he hung the portraits of the six most eminent Sung Neo-Confucian scholars.

Shortly after his retreat to Su-men, having heard that Hsü Heng (*q.v.*) had settled in Wei county at Ta-ming fu, Hopei, Yao travelled there to pay him his respect. In Wei he expounded the Neo-Confucian philosophy to both Hsü Heng and Tou Mo (*q.v.*), who was then residing in the vicinity, and apparently made a tremendous impression on them, something akin to religious enlightenment. Hsü then journeyed to Su-men to make a return visit, and transcribed all the commentaries and writings by the Sung Neo-Confucian philosophers in Yao's possession. In the meantime, Yao Shu persevered in his mission to propagate the Neo-Confucian teaching in various ways. Finding books difficult to procure, he made printing blocks of a number of the basic Confucian texts, including the *Four Books*, major philosophical works,

commentaries on the classics, and writings of the Sung Neo-Confucianists. He used some of those blocks to produce several works himself, and gave the rest to his friends for printing. He also spent time lecturing in neighbouring counties, and taught at the free school (*i-shu*) in Lo-ning, Honan, later known as the Lo-hsi Private Academy.

Yao Shu became widely known and attracted the attention of many scholars and aspiring students. In 1250 Hsü Heng moved to Mt. Su-men from Wei after a futile attempt to return to his native place, and he frequently discussed Neo-Confucian philosophy with Yao Shu, as well as teaching students, thus eliciting considerable interest in the scholarly community of the time.

Early in 1251 Yao Shu received a visit from Chao Pi (1220-76), a special envoy sent by Qubilai to invite him to Qara Qorum for consultation on state affairs. Aspiring to political ascendancy, the Mongol prince was then making strenuous efforts to recruit prominent Chinese to his body of advisers under Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*). Qubilai had heard of Yao Shu from Tou Mo, one of his counsellors. Yao was happy to accept the invitation, not only out of desire for another opportunity to further his career, but also because he was presumably anxious to rejoin many of his former friends now in Qubilai's services. He was then already forty-eight years of age.

On his arrival at Qara Qorum, Yao Shu received a warm welcome from Qubilai, who invited him to stay and who frequently sought his opinion on state matters. Yao submitted a lengthy memorial on the basic principles of government and the measures necessary for their immediate implementation. He began with an eight-point outline of enlightened rule based on the Confucian moral doctrine as expounded in the *Great Learning*, namely, self-rectification, devotion to learning, respect for the worthy, affection for the family, attention to Heaven's warnings, benevolence toward the people, cultivation of the virtuous and avoidance of sycophants. He sought in this way to impress on Qubilai the cardinal virtues of a wise Chinese ruler. Subsequently, he presented to the throne some thirty recommendations for government and administrative reform. They included the establishment of regular ministries under the Secretariat, the recruitment of talented individuals for government service, procedures for the appointment and promotion of officials, the elimination of sinecures, and set scales of remuneration for civil servants. They also included such diverse matters as rationalising the legal system, introducing various administrative and bureaucratic procedures, reducing taxes, improving courier and transportation services, encouraging education and agriculture, and introducing welfare and relief measures. Yao Shu claimed that if these various measures were implemented, they would bring about an orderly government that would strengthen the state and benefit the people.

Yao Shu entertained great hopes for the future of Mongol rule in China and his recommendations were designed to realise them. He attempted, on the one hand, to imbue Qubilai with the Confucian virtues of benevolent rule and have him adopt the traditional Chinese model of government; on the other, he sought to repair the disastrous situation resulting from Mongol misrule. These aspirations were not particular to Yao Shu, but were shared by the other Chinese scholars who had responded to Qubilai's invitation, such as Liu Ping-chung, Tou Mo and Hao Ching (*q.v.*). They too submitted similar proposals and Qubilai was apparently impressed. However, it is very doubtful that he would have been in a position of sufficient authority at the time to implement them. Nevertheless, he was so pleased with Yao Shu's advice that he appointed him tutor to his second son Jingim (1243-85), and sent some of the Mongol princes to study Chinese classics and literature under Yao.

In July 1251, Qubilai found a new opportunity for political advancement when Möngke, his eldest brother, was elected qa'an at the *quriltai*. The new emperor parcelled out the conquered territories among the members of his family and his principal supporters, and entrusted Qubilai with the administration of north China. It is said that Qubilai ordered a celebration to mark the appointment, but Yao Shu remained reserved during the festivities, admitting his concern that the new ruler, having granted the most productive part of the empire's territories to his brother, would thereby antagonise the Mongol nobility and find himself eventually compelled to rescind his decision. Yao urged Qubilai to keep the armed forces under strict control and to serve the emperor with the utmost diligence in order to retain his confidence. The prince was reportedly convinced and pledged military assistance to Möngke. At the same time Yao proposed establishing military farms (*t'un-t'ien*) and administrative offices in Qubilai's domain with a view effectively to supporting the army while improving control over the population. Thereupon Qubilai set up his headquarters at Chin-lien ch'uan, on the Shan-tien River in present-day Inner Mongolia, and adopted Yao's practical recommendations for the administration of Chinese territories.

The following year, taking advantage of the chaotic situation in Shensi and Honan, Qubilai asked Möngke, on Yao Shu's advice, for permission to extend his control over those provinces by means of a special regional military commission in charge of military farms at Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan). The emperor agreed and Qubilai proceeded with his plans. He appointed Shih T'ien-tse, Yang Wei-chung and Chao Pi commissioners, and entrusted them with the organisation of military farms in T'ang and Teng, two key prefectures in southern Honan on the border of the war zone with the Sung. These undertakings had both military and economic significance, since the establishment of military farms not only strengthened the defence of such strategic

areas, but also made the latter economically self-sufficient, thus enhancing Qubilai's preparedness for subsequent military action against the Sung in the south. In due course, Honan became an orderly and productive province, thanks largely to Yao Shu's advice and to the skill and dedication of the Chinese administrators.

In July 1252 Qubilai was summoned by Möngke to Qara Qorum and ordered to organise a strike against the kingdom of Ta-li in Yunnan, which had not yet submitted to Mongol rule. At the same time Möngke was planning to enfeoff members of his family and deserving officials with domains in north China. He asked Qubilai to choose between Nan-ching (K'ai-feng) and Ching-chao (Hsi-an, Shensi) as his portion. Qubilai consulted his advisers, including Yao Shu, and Yao advised him to choose Ching-chao as it commanded the fertile Kuan-chung regions, whereas Nan-ching, being too close to the Yellow River, was subject to flooding. Qubilai informed Möngke of his preference and received Ching-chao as his fief the following year. He then sent officials to administer the key prefectures in the Hsing-yüan district in Shensi, requested control of Hsieh-chou (Shansi) to the north-east in order to exploit its rich salt-pans to provision the army, and encouraged people to accept salt in exchange for grain shipped to his headquarters. That same summer (1252), he directed Yao Shu to set up a Pacification Bureau in Ching-chao, and established a superintendency for the printing of exchange notes (*chiao-ch'ao*) to facilitate monetary transactions. As a result, Kuan-chung, like Honan, prospered under Mongol rule and provided another power base for Qubilai that became increasingly important as time went by.

In October 1253, after much preparation, Qubilai launched his offensive against the Ta-li kingdom from his base in Kansu. He was accompanied in the field by several of his Chinese advisers, including Yao Shu. In the course of the campaign, Yao Shu is said to have related to Qubilai the story of Ts'ao Pin (931-99), a general sent by the Sung emperor T'ai-tsung (r. 976-97) against the Southern T'ang kingdom, urging Qubilai to avoid wholesale massacres of unarmed populations. When, in November, the Mongol envoys were put to death by the king of Ta-li and Qubilai planned to exterminate all the inhabitants of the capital, Yao Shu, Liu Ping-chung and Chang Wen-ch'ien (*q.v.*), pleaded successfully for their lives. Following his triumphant entry into Ta-li, Qubilai directed Yao Shu to collect the local archives and, after a short stay, returned north with his troops.

After returning from Yunnan, Qubilai devoted himself to improving his domain in Shensi and Honan with the assistance of Chinese administrators. In July 1254 he appointed the Uighur Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*) pacification commissioner of Ching-chao, while Yao Shu, then lying sick in Ching-chao, was made agricultural promotion commissioner of the Kuan-chung region. Despite his poor health, Yao accepted the

assignment which compelled him to travel extensively in the area. According to his contemporaries, it was due to Yao's counsel that land was opened up for cultivation and mulberry trees planted in all the prefectures.

By this time Qubilai had gained control of large tracts of Chinese territory and had established a well-structured administration staffed by competent bureaucrats. He had also accumulated considerable wealth from the product of the land, instituted a financial agency to issue paper money in his domain, and recently led a victorious campaign in south-west China. All this enhanced his prestige in China to such a degree that it could not fail to provoke the jealousy and fear of the Mongol conservative party at Qara Qorum.

In spring 1257, at the instigation of Qubilai's enemies at court, Möngke sent his lieutenants 'Alamdār and Liu T'ai-p'ing (who were executed for sedition in October and July 1260 respectively) to establish a special commission to investigate the collection of revenue in Kuan-chung. The extent of the discrepancy which they discovered in the taxation records is not known, but they listed a total of one hundred and forty-two breaches of regulations by local administrators of all ranks. The outcome of the investigation was that the incriminated officials were executed on the spot, with the exception of the powerful military commanders Shih T'ien-tse and Liu Ni (alias Hei-ma, 1200-62), who were allowed to present their cases at court. This ruthless action took Qubilai by surprise. Quick to realise how vulnerable his position had become, he asked his confidants for advice on the best course to follow in the crisis. Yao Shu, it is related, suggested that Qubilai, together with his family, should proceed to the Mongol court to renew his pledge of allegiance and dispel Möngke's suspicions. After much deliberation, Qubilai accepted Yao's advice and, in January 1258, presented himself before Möngke in Qara Qorum to clarify his position; the emperor, pleased at his coming, was convinced of his sincerity. This, however, did not prevent Möngke from abolishing the fief in Kuan-chung and temporarily blocking his brother's attempt to extend his control in north China.

In any event, Möngke continued to use Qubilai for various services in the last years of his reign. He ordered him to organise an expedition against the Sung strongholds in the Huai valley, setting the date for the following year (1259). Furthermore, he appointed him to adjudicate in the bitter controversy between Buddhists and Taoists. In both instances, Yao Shu and several of his colleagues were called upon for advice and made a positive contribution.

When, early in 1258, Qubilai convened a grand assembly at K'ai-p'ing fu attended by over three hundred Buddhists and two hundred Taoists, he also summoned over two hundred court officials and Confucian scholars as moderators. The Taoists were led by Chang Chih-ching (1220-70) and the Buddhists by Fu-yü

(1203-75), whereas Yao Shu and Tou Mo headed the Confucian scholars. As on the two previous occasions (1255 and 1256), the debate centred on the authenticity of the Taoist apocrypha *Pa-shih-i hua t'u* (*Illustrations of the Eighty-one Incarnations [of Lao-tzu]*) and the *Hua-Hu ching* (*Scripture of [Lao-tzu's] Conversion of the Barbarians*). Yao Shu and his colleagues invoked the Confucian classics in refuting the Taoists' claim that much of the Confucian moral teaching originated from Lao-tzu. For instance, when asked about the origin of the concepts of benevolence and righteousness, Yao Shu replied that they had been formulated by Confucius, and not by Lao-tzu as the Taoists contended. As a result of the Buddhist and Confucian refutation, the Taoists again lost the contest and, with it, much material gain and influence (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung).

It appears that Yao Shu and the other Confucian scholars who participated in the controversy bore no personal grudge against the Taoist church, and that they spoke out against the Taoists only when the latter tried to misrepresent the Confucian doctrine in a desperate attempt to save their cause. In private, the Confucians maintained friendly relations with the Buddhists and Taoists, as is attested by the numerous laudatory essays addressed to leaders of both faiths in appreciation of their spiritual guidance and their work for community welfare.

In August 1259, after a year of preparation, Qubilai embarked on his campaign against the Southern Sung empire. Yao Shu accompanied the expedition with Liu Ping-chung, Chang Wen-ch'ien and others. Yao Shu is said to have assisted in formulating strategy and to have thus contributed greatly to Qubilai's initial success. The Sung chief councillor Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75), who commanded the defence of E-chou (Wu-ch'ang, Hupei), was apparently impressed by Yao's ingenuity, and hailed him as the equal of Wang Meng (325-75), an outstanding military adviser and tactician under Fu Chien (357-85), the ruler of the Former Ch'in kingdom (351-95). Soon afterwards, however, the war was brought to a halt by the news of Möngke's death in Szechwan on 11 August and Qubilai's subsequent return to the north.

Following his enthronement as the new qa'an in K'ai-p'ing fu on 5 May 1260, Qubilai employed several of his principal supporters and Chinese advisers in the new government, and pursued a policy of political centralization and economic reorganization. In May, after instituting the Secretarial Council on the recommendation of Liu Ping-chung, he appointed Wang Wen-t'ung (q.v.) as director of political affairs and entrusted him with the financial management of the Chinese territories. Wang Wen-t'ung, who had previously served on the advisory staff of Li T'an (q.v.), the chief of the Regional Secretariat of Shan-tung to whom he later betrothed his daughter, had been hitherto an inconspicuous figure. He was chosen for this prestigious position because he was a skilful administrator and fiscal expert who

satisfied Qubilai's demands efficiently, and also because he was supported by several of the Chinese advisers, including Liu Ping-chung and Shang T'ing (*q.v.*). Yao Shu, Tou Mo, and other Confucian officials objected, however, to Wang's non-Confucian background and lack of scruples, and feared that he would pursue an exploitative policy on the Mongol ruler's behalf to the detriment of the Chinese population. They did not succeed in discouraging Qubilai from appointing him, but their opposition led to conflict with Wang Wen-t'ung and eventually spelt his doom when he was implicated in the rebellion fostered by his son-in-law less than two years later.

In July Qubilai established ten Pacification Bureaux in north China in order to strengthen Mongol control over this vast and varied region. Yao Shu was appointed pacification commissioner of the Tung-p'ing district, then governed by Yen Chung-chi (d. 1293), son of the former powerful overlord Yen Shih (*q.v.*). Yen Chung-chi had been at odds with his brother Yen Chung-fan (d. 1275), which had caused considerable dissension in Yen Chung-chi's domain in Shantung. Yao, then fifty-seven, spent three months in Tung-p'ing, during which time he appointed officials to promote agriculture and exercise police functions, introduced a fair rate of taxation based on productivity, and relaxed the iron monopoly to ease the financial burden on the population. These measures worked satisfactorily and greatly improved the economic situation in Tung-p'ing, while the confirmation of Yen Chung-fan as chief civil administrator of Tung-p'ing a year later (in June 1261), probably on Yao Shu's recommendation, put an end to the feud between the Yen brothers.

His task accomplished, Yao Shu was called back to Yen-ching later in the year, but he soon ran into difficulties with Wang Wen-t'ung. Wang, who had been the target of criticism by his Chinese colleagues, such as Yao Shu, Tou Mo and Wang E, became enraged when, in June 1261, they openly opposed his candidacy for the chancellorship. Therefore, he devised a plan to remove them from direct involvement in government by proposing that Qubilai should elevate Yao, together with Tou Mo and Hsü Heng, to perfunctory offices as advisers to the heir apparent. The qa'an took the advice and offered Yao Shu the title of Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent, but Yao declined, under Hsü Heng's advice, as did his colleagues, saying that it would be inappropriate to create such an office before the heir apparent was designated (Jingim was not appointed heir apparent until April 1273). Qubilai then made Yao director of the Bureau of Agriculture, thereby enhancing his political influence, but widening the rift between Wang Wen-t'ung and other Confucian advisers.

In his new capacity Yao Shu submitted several memorials on a variety of subjects, and discharged numerous important duties. Among other things he proposed maintaining the conferment of the hereditary title of Duke of Overflowing Sageliness (Yen-sheng kung) on Confucius' descendants so as to perpetuate the official

patronage of Confucianism. He also proposed exhorting the officials in Tung-p'ing to revive the practice of Confucian rites and music, selecting the descendants of Confucius and those of his immediate disciples – Mencius and Yen Hui – to promote literary education, and appointing erudite scholars to take charge of those activities. Yao's recommendations were all subsequently adopted. Furthermore, in an eight-point memorial to Qubilai, Yao submitted once again some of the measures that he had proposed earlier. He pressed for the appointment of worthy elders to advise the heir apparent; for entrusting the officials in the Secretarial Council with greater power to rationalise administrative procedures; and for standardising the official appointment system, besides making four specific proposals dealing with the army, military farms, schools and agriculture. He memorialised further on the need to care for the people, to strengthen central authority over the provinces, to reform internal administration, to improve external defence, to promote agriculture and to discourage profiteering.

Following this, he submitted a more detailed document devoted exclusively to military matters. In it, he stated that since the Chinese people in the interior provinces were not trained in the use of arms, they should be made to contribute additional levies to the treasury instead of being subject to conscription, whereas the men of the Hsi-ching (Shensi) and Pei-ching (Hopei) districts, who were better soldiers, should be exempted from call-up and made to serve in the local security forces (*pao-chia*) and in military farms. He proposed to incorporate the best men from the élite units of the Han Armies in a force of thirty thousand to guard the Yen-ching region, instead of deploying the whole army to secure the border with Southern Sung.

Impressed by Yao Shu's proposals, Qubilai summoned him frequently to the Secretarial Council for consultation, together with Shih T'ien-tse, then Right chancellor, and Liu Su (1188-1263), the minister of Revenue who had distinguished himself in the reforms of Hsing-chou in 1251. Then, in March 1262, the qa'an entrusted Yao Shu and Shih T'ien-tse with the preparation of a new Chinese code of justice. This, known as the *Ta-Yüan hsin-lü* (*New Code of the Great Yüan*), was completed in 1271/2, based on the Chin *T'ai-ho lü* (*Statutes of the T'ai-ho [Period]*) and the *T'ang Code*; although it was never promulgated, it formed the basis of the *Chih-yüan hsin-ko* (*New Code of the Chih-yüan [Period]*), completed in 1291 under the editorship of Ho Jung-tsu (?1228-?1306), an assistant of the Right in the Secretarial Council.

In the meantime, however, the Mongol court was rocked by the rebellion of Li T'an. This insurrection, which broke out in late February 1262 and lasted until the end of the year, was a turning point in the Mongol rule of northern China and the political influence of the Chinese officials. Its causes and implications are complex.

Some historians claim that it was sparked off by Han ethnic consciousness, but others see it as the outcome of Li T'an's ambition to become an independent ruler (see the biography of Li T'an).

The Mongol court had already detected signs of unrest late in 1261: when Li T'an's son fled from Yen-ching (where he resided as a hostage) early in the following year, Qubilai became seriously concerned and questioned his Chinese advisers about Li's intentions. Yao Shu conceded that Li might attempt to gain the support of the Chinese leaders in Shantung and join forces with the Sung, but he expressed confidence that the court would eventually defeat the rebels. Early in March, the qa'an mobilised a large Mongol and Chinese force (i.e. the Han Armies) under the command of Qabiči, Aju, Shih T'ien-tse, Chang Hung-fan (*q.v.*), and others, in a large-scale effort to crush the rebellion. Wang Wen-t'ung was detained and executed as an accomplice. The Mongol punitive operations were successful: in August Li T'an was captured and his followers were annihilated during the following months.

The suppression of the rebellion and Wang Wen-t'ung's execution did not result in a triumph for the Chinese scholar-officials: on the contrary, it alerted Qubilai and the Mongol conservative party to the threat which they posed to the throne. It induced the ruling élite to lean yet further towards the Central Asians for support, thereby enhancing their influence at the expense of the Chinese. The notorious Aḥmad (*q.v.*), for instance, exploited the incident to discredit the Chinese advisers with the qa'an, alleging that they too were potential rebels. Although Qubilai did not follow Aḥmad's advice to banish his Chinese confidants, he did become more wary of the Chinese administrators as a result of the rebellion and undertook to curb their political influence.

Yao Shu and his colleagues continued nevertheless to enjoy Qubilai's patronage, probably because they had forewarned him of Li T'an's rebellion and of Wang Wen-t'ung's intrigues. In February 1263 Yao Shu received a new appointment as assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council under the direction of the Right chancellors, Senjin and Shih T'ien-tse. In his new capacity Yao proposed several measures to centralise government and to improve the efficiency of the administration. They included appointing officials from the Secretarial Council to oversee regional administrations, abrogating the hereditary privileges of the Mongol nobles in the commanderies, establishing standard procedures for official transfers and suppressing the supernumerary offices in the regional districts. These measures were all implemented in the following year.

In July 1264 Yao Shu was summoned to Shang-tu for consultation on state affairs with his colleague Wang E (*q.v.*), presumably in connection with Liu Ping-chung's plan to transfer the national capital to Yen-ching (Ta-tu). A year later Qubilai

despatched Yao to supervise the administration of the Regional Secretarial Councils of Hsi-ching, P'ing-yang and T'ai-yüan in modern Shensi and Shansi. Yao spent about a year in these districts.

Upon his return in 1266, he was confronted with charges of malpractice in the Secretarial Council, presumably brought to the qa'an's notice by hostile Mongol and Central Asian officials. The nature of the allegations is not known, but the emperor took them seriously and inflicted punishment on many of the Chinese officials. Yao acted as a conciliator in this difficult situation. He pointed out that much of the alleged mismanagement was not the result of human failing, but was caused by the frequent changes in administrative procedures since the inauguration of the new reign. He pleaded with Qubilai not to be swayed by slanderous charges and begged him to institute administrative procedures such that officials could discharge their duties without intimidation or harassment. Qubilai is reported to have accepted Yao's explanations and to have taken his advice. In that year also, Yao Shu collaborated with Tou Mo, Shang T'ing and Wang E to compile a digest of quotations from the *Five Classics* to spread further the Confucian moral doctrine and principles of government (see the biography of Wang E).

At this juncture, a proposal to reform the Secretarial Council threatened to remove Yao Shu and his colleagues from direct participation in central government administration. The previous year, five positions of chancellor had been created in the Secretarial Council, presumably in response to an increase in administrative activities. These additional appointments were criticised by An-t'ung (q.v.), a Right chancellor and the most powerful Mongol official in the council. In April 1267 he submitted a memorial stating that such an increase in the number of senior officials violated established practice since there used to be but one director of political affairs and one assistant when the system was reorganised following Qubilai's accession. He proposed reducing the number of chancellors to two, the positions to be filled by Mongol officials already serving in the Secretarial Council. The qa'an saw some merit in this, but continued to employ his Chinese advisers to create a balance of power. He appointed An-t'ung and Shih T'ien-tse as Right and Left chancellors respectively, retained Yao Shu and two other senior Chinese officials as ad hoc counsellors, and gave orders to select a set number of subordinate officials from among both Mongol and Chinese candidates. Though formally relieved of his office as assistant of the Left following the reorganisation of the Secretarial Council, Yao Shu continued in this way to participate in major political decisions.

In November 1268 Yao Shu received a new assignment when Ariq Qaya (1227-86), then associate director of political affairs, was appointed chief of the Ho-nan Regional Secretarial Council in connection with the campaign against the Southern

Sung. Yao was sent to serve under Ariq Qaya as his assistant in charge of the management of military farms. This was an important task since the Mongol forces had by then laid siege to the Sung stronghold of Hsiang-yang in northern Hupei, and Yao Shu's experience was required to increase agricultural production to supply the expeditionary forces. He spent the next two years in Honan, apparently discharging his duties most effectively.

In 1271 Yao Shu was ordered back to the capital and resumed his service as counsellor in the Secretarial Council. Later in the year he, Tou Mo, Hsü Heng and others participated in a court debate on the nature of Confucian doctrine with the Han-lin academician T'u-tan Kung-lü, following the latter's submission of a proposal for the revival of the civil service examinations. On that occasion, T'u-tan argued in favour of the adoption of the classical Confucian doctrine for the examination syllabuses, claiming that the metaphysical philosophy of the Neo-Confucians ought to be rejected for its similarity to Ch'an Buddhism. Qubilai was perplexed and asked Yao Shu and others to clarify the point. There is no record of their respective position on this issue, but we may surmise that Yao and his colleagues would have vigorously defended the Confucian basis of Neo-Confucianism, and proposed that the commentaries on the classics be incorporated in the examination curricula. This was eventually realized when the civil service examinations were restored in 1313-1315 after the enthronement of Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) (see the biography of Hsü Heng).

Following this, Yao Shu received a different assignment, namely that of investigating the charge of sedition brought against Liu Cheng (1213-75), a former Sung general in the Mongol service who had been given command of an independent force under Aju in the campaign against Hsiang-yang in August 1268. Late in 1272 the Sung commander of the Ching-hu region, Li T'ing-chih (d. 1276), attempted to discredit Liu Cheng by sending to his headquarters a Buddhist monk acting as Li's agent, with the ostensible offer of a military rank and a title from the Sung emperor. The scheme, however, was prematurely exposed and the Mongol court was alarmed. Qubilai recalled Liu Cheng to the capital and sent Yao Shu, together with the director of political affairs, Chang I (d. 1282), to conduct a inquiry. The investigators discovered the plot and cleared the name of Liu Cheng; the agent and his accomplices were found and executed. Thereupon, Liu resumed his campaign as instructed and played a decisive role in forcing the Sung commander of Hsiang-yang to surrender to the Mongols in March of the following year.

Early in 1273, while retaining his advisory duties in the Secretarial Council, Yao Shu was appointed a senior academician in the Chao-wen Academy. In this capacity he was consulted on the standardisation of Confucian rituals at the Mongol court, and

on the pursuit of the campaign against Southern Sung after the fall of Hsiang-yang (which he approved in principle). In October of the same year, upon the resignation of Hsü Heng as rector of the National College due to ill health, Yao Shu joined with Liu Ping-chung, Tou Mo and others in supporting the candidacy of Wang Hsün (1235-81), a tutor to Prince Jingim. At the same time, Yao and his colleagues also proposed increasing the number of students at the college, as well as appointing more tutors to the imperial princes. These recommendations were all adopted.

After the fall of Hsiang-yang, the Mongol court began planning an all-out offensive against Sung. Qubilai summoned his trusted advisers to consult on strategy and on the choice of a commander-in-chief. In February 1274, after much deliberation, the qa'an appointed Bayan (*q.v.*), an outstanding officer then serving as Left chancellor. The appointment was unanimously supported by Yao Shu and his colleagues in the Secretarial Council. In August, when Bayan set out for the south, Qubilai is said to have quoted the story of Ts'ao Pin under Sung T'ai-tsung, thereby admonishing Bayan to avoid indiscriminate massacres during the campaign. Apparently on his Chinese advisers' recommendation, this instruction was given not only on humanitarian grounds, but also with a view to encouraging the submission of the population in south China.

In October Bayan assembled his lieutenants at Hsiang-yang – they included Ariq Qaya, Aju and Chang Hung-fan, son of the distinguished Chang Jou – and divided his forces into three armies which, supported by a sizeable fleet, advanced simultaneously towards the Sung strongholds in northern Hupei. The campaign proceeded smoothly, the resistance was routed with ease, and the Sung fortresses along the Han River fell one after the other. In January 1275 the Mongol forces reached the Yangtze River, overran Han-k'ou and captured E-chou, which had successfully withstood the Mongol siege during the earlier campaign of 1259. When informed of this initial success, instead of rejoicing, Qubilai worried about the possibility of a prolonged resistance by the Sung forces and summoned his counsellors for further consultations. Yao Shu allegedly advised Qubilai that Bayan should play for time by fortifying E-chou instead of forcing the river, and by sending an emissary to reproach the Sung emperor for having failed to pay the annual tribute and for detaining the Mongol envoy. This counsel apparently went unheeded, for there is no indication that Bayan halted his march or that he despatched an envoy to the Sung court as advised. Leaving Ariq Qaya in E-chou, he personally led the bulk of the Mongol army across the Yangtze. Bayan's forces went on to achieve several victories and seized a number of cities, but met with stiffening resistance as they approached the Sung capital, Lin-an (modern Hang-chou, Chekiang).

At this juncture, Yao Shu again memorialised Qubilai to instruct the Mongol commanders to abstain from indiscriminate killing and to treat the prisoners of war humanely. He also begged the qa'an to forbid the harsh punishments used against the rebellious Chinese, such as whipping, face tattooing and drowning. He also requested that the state monopoly on salt, iron and wine be lifted to relieve the people's misery and speed up the pacification of the country. It is obvious that Yao Shu, like the rest of Qubilai's Chinese entourage, saw the Sung collapse as inevitable, and tried to minimise the impact of the conquest by preventing the destruction of cities and sparing the lives of innocent people. The qa'an was apparently convinced by Yao Shu's arguments and ordered an end to harsh punishments, but he postponed action on the recommendation about state monopolies. Although the remonstrances of these Chinese scholar-officials may have contributed, the fact that Bayan's campaign against the Sung, which reached its climax in the fall of Lin-an in March 1276, could be conducted with a minimum of bloodshed was due without doubt to the early defection of several Sung generals and the prompt surrender of the Sung court. The casualties on both sides became far heavier in the ensuing battles, however, as remnants of the Sung court made a last stand against the Mongols in Fukien and Kwangtung between 1277 and 1279.

Following the capitulation of Lin-an and the impending collapse of the Sung state, the Mongol court became concerned with the fiscal administration of the newly won territories from which badly needed revenue was to be obtained. Qubilai had already attempted to centralise the state's financial administration when he created, early in 1266, the Office for Regulating State Expenditure under the direction of the Secretarial Council and appointed Aḥmad as its head. This was an expedient intended to make up for the cost of the campaign against Li T'an and the siege of Hsiang-yang, while imposing stringent control over the empire's expenditure and revenue collection. Then, in 1270, the qa'an took a further step by replacing the agency with a Presidential Council, thus conferring independent status on the state financial administration and investing it with supreme authority. Aḥmad was appointed chief of the Presidential Council and pursued a highly exploitative fiscal policy until his death in 1282, despite bitter opposition from both Mongol and Chinese members of the Secretarial Council (see the biography of Aḥmad).

Following Aḥmad's appointment, Qubilai summoned his advisers Yao Shu, T'u-tan Kung-lü, Chang Wen-ch'ien, Ch'en Han-kuei and Yang Ch'eng for joint discussions on the formulation of procedures for the exploitation of the Sung territories. The items under consideration included salt, paper money, herbal medicines and other lucrative commodities. To avoid monetary chaos, Yao and T'u-tan were in favour of retaining Sung exchange notes (*chiao-tzu* and *hui-tzu*) and of

granting licences to deal in salt and herbal medicine in return for a fixed commission. Ch'en and Yang, however, proposed redeeming the Sung notes with the Yüan paper money *Chung-t'ung chiao-ch'ao* (first issued in late 1260), and standardising the currency in order to facilitate financial transactions. Aḥmad, on the other hand, favoured exchanging the Sung notes for Yüan currency (at a virtually confiscatory rate), and placing trade in salt and herbal medicines under state monopoly rather than private management. Faced with this conflicting advice, Qubilai endorsed Aḥmad's proposals since these would increase the revenue of the empire – always the main concern of the Mongol court – and he rebuked Yao Shu and T'u-tan for their shortsightedness.

With the qa'an's backing, Aḥmad enjoyed unchallenged power in fiscal management; he became more and more arrogant and abusive, further straining relations with the Mongol and Chinese court officials. Yao Shu, probably in despair at his own inability to change the course of events, stayed away from Aḥmad and resigned himself to the inevitable. When finally reports reached the court that Aḥmad was accepting bribes and engaging in illegal sales of offices, thus creating an excess of government officials in the south, Yao Shu and his colleagues became the scapegoats and were reprimanded by Qubilai for failing to inform him of Aḥmad's corrupt activities. In many ways this marked the nadir of the Chinese advisers' influence on the qa'an's policies to assimilate Southern Sung into the Mongol empire.

In May 1276 Yao Shu was called to Shang-tu by Qubilai, to be appointed executive academician in reward for his long years of service. He then returned to Yen-ching and served in the Han-lin Academy as elder statesman. By this time, however, he was quite advanced in age and did not actively participate in major decisions. He was only called upon to attend ceremonial functions, meet foreign visitors and dignitaries, and offer advice on matters pertaining to Confucian rituals at court.

In April of the following year, Qubilai, worried by a six-months-long drought, asked for advice on how to bring relief to the people. Yao proposed that the state should forbid brewing wine, thus conserving grain, and dispense with fastuous religious ceremonies and other unnecessary expenses. While he was addressing the emperor, he suddenly fell to his knees, speechless, probably suffering a stroke. He was immediately escorted home; although his health improved three months later, he never completely recovered and rarely appeared at court. Three years later, in August 1280, Yao suffered a relapse; he slipped into a coma for three days and died at the age of seventy-seven. He was given a fitting burial outside the capital, as a tribute to his long years of distinguished service under the Mongol rulers.

(Yao Shu's death in 1280 at seventy-eight *sui* is recorded in both the 'spirit-way inscription' composed by his nephew Yao Sui [1238-1313] and the commemorative essay on the Hsüeh-chai Private Academy composed by the late Yüan Confucian Hsü Yu-jen [1287-1364]. In the *nien-p'u* of Yao Sui compiled by his contemporary Liu Chih and appended to Yao Sui's collected works *Mu-an chi*, however, Yao Shu's death is registered under the 15th year of Chih-yüan, on the 23rd day of the 7th month, i.e. 12 August 1278, at seventy-eight *sui*. Liu erred in recording the year of Yao Shu's death, but the month and day may be correct. Substituting the correct year of 1280 and retaining the original month and day would place Yao Shu's death on 19 August 1280 by western reckoning.)

In June 1296 Yao Shu's son Yao Wei (1266-1326+) transferred his father's coffin for permanent interment at his adopted home in Hui-chou, Honan, and later in the year Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307) conferred on Yao the posthumous name Wen-hsien ('Cultured and Exemplary') and the honorary title of Junior Preceptor. His nephew Yao Sui composed the 'spirit-way inscription' in his memory, later included in Yao Sui's *Mu-an chi*, which is the basic source for the study of Yao Shu's life and career.

In 1293, on the initiative of Hou Jen, prefect of Hui-chou, the local authorities erected a shrine called San-hsien t'ang ('Hall of the Three Worthies'), attached to the prefectural school, in honour of Yao Shu, of Hsü Heng and of another distinguished Confucian scholar-official, Wang P'an (1202-93). Then, in 1310, Emperor Qaišan (Wu-tsung, r. 1308-11) posthumously promoted Yao Shu to Grand Preceptor, with the additional title of Duke-of-state of Lu which was extended to his parents and grandparents. Finally, in 1347, on the recommendation of a censor, the Hsüeh-chai Private Academy was established at Hui-chou, as a tribute to Yao Shu's dedication to Confucian studies. This is revealed in the commemorative essay by Hsü Yu-jen, written at the request of Yao Shu's grandson. It is preserved in the anthology *Chung-chou ming-hsien wen-piao* compiled by the mid-Ming scholar Liu Ch'ang (1424-80).

Yao Shu was married four times. His first wife née Wang died before him without offspring; his second wife née Sung (d. 1285) bore him a daughter, and so did his third wife née Wan-yen (d. 1297), a Jurchen lady. His fourth wife, née Li, gave birth to Yao Wei, who became his sole heir.

Yao Wei (T. Kuang-fu) pursued a commendable official career under his father's aegis. He was appointed an assistant of the Left in the Ho-nan Regional Secretarial Council during Qubilai's reign, and remained in the same office under Emperor Yisün Temür (Chin-tsung, r. 1324-28). He is known to have submitted in 1325 a memorial requesting that the supervisors of the military farms be restrained from encroaching upon the livelihood of the local households, that taxes be reduced, and that a

Directorate of Waterways be established at Pien for the purpose of strengthening the dykes to prevent flooding by the Yellow River. He was then promoted vice-censor in the Shen-hsi Regional Censorate and concluded his career as the director of political affairs of the Regional Secretarial Council of the same province a few years later. Both Yao Shu's daughters were betrothed to Shih Chi (1214-72), a younger son of Shih T'ien-tse, who later became a surveillance commissioner of the Huai-tung circuit (in modern Chekiang).

Although one of the most distinguished personalities in the early phase of the Mongol conquest of China, Yao Shu was not, despite the claims of his contemporaries, a master of the Confucian classics in the class of Chao Fu or Hsü Heng, but a practical and versatile scholar who skilfully adapted his classical learning to changing circumstances. He seized the opportunity for political advancement when the Mongol emperors sought the service of Chinese scholars to consolidate their rule, and he responded with adroitness and flexibility, gaining the appreciation of his patrons and of later historians. In numerous ways, he tried to impress on the Mongol rulers the importance of Confucian principles as the basis of governmental institutions, and he contributed significantly to the promotion of Confucian studies and effectively advanced the participation of the literati in the administration of the new government.

Already under Ögödei, Yao Shu was noted for his ability to recruit skilled personnel for the Mongols and, in particular, for his patronage of the Confucian teacher Chao Fu, which helped perpetuate the study of Neo-Confucian philosophy in north China. But it was the personal protection of Qubilai that provided Yao Shu with a further opportunity to make a distinguished contribution to the Mongol establishment. In his role as adviser, he discharged important services which helped Qubilai's rise to power, and subsequently carried out various administrative programmes, in particular the organisation of local government and promotion of agriculture in Honan and adjacent regions. He helped to reduce the wanton destruction of life by the Mongol army and advised on the ways and means to assimilate the Sung territories in a peaceful and orderly manner. In all these endeavours, Yao Shu distinguished himself not only by his ability and foresight, but also by his remarkable gifts of exposition and persuasiveness. Qubilai, greatly impressed, once openly praised him with the remark, 'Kung-mao is good at words and debate. He can describe a round object as if it had a handle.'

Yao Shu's political achievements and his ability to realise his aspirations were, however, largely defeated by Qubilai's own ideas about the administration of the Chinese empire, and by the overt hostility of the conservative Mongols and their Central Asian allies. The qa'an was a pragmatic autocrat who invoked all the

available 'traditions' to pursue his political and economic objectives. While he might have been impressed by the Confucian ideal of government and the advice of his Chinese assistants, he placed high priority on the exploitation of the wealth of China, and though he had adopted some of the time-honoured Han institutions and values, these were mostly limited to questions of practical statecraft for the establishment of a more efficient administration. This accounts for his special patronage of fiscal experts like the Chinese Wang Wen-t'ung and, later, the Central Asian Aḥmad and his associates. In all instances where there was a clash of opinion over fiscal policies, Qubilai supported the Central Asians and their ruthless policies, and ignored, even rebuked, his Chinese counsellors who were trying to relieve the Chinese population of some of their financial burden. It seems that they managed to retain their position in government and to enjoy the continued patronage of the Mongol ruler only by adopting a compromising attitude, often with serious misgivings.

Apart from his political contributions, Yao Shu was also highly praised by his contemporaries for his achievements in classical literature, poetry, calligraphy and painting. It is difficult for us to appreciate his literary skills since his collected works, *Hsüeh-chai chi*, are now lost, and what has been preserved consists of a few poems in anthologies like the *Yüan-shih hsüan* by Ku Ssu-li (1669-1722) and the *Sung-Yüan shih-hui* by Ch'en Cho of the early Ch'ing. The same is true of his works on calligraphy and painting, for only one specimen of his calligraphy is known to have survived: a letter written in an elegant 'formal style' (*k'ai-shu*) now in the Palace Museum in Taipei. It appears that he was very gifted in calligraphy, judging at least by the laudatory comments of some of his contemporaries, such as Hu Chih-yü (1227-95), Ch'eng Chü-fu (1249-1318) and Yüan Chüeh (1266-1327). They assert that he skilfully emulated the styles of the distinguished T'ang masters Huai-su (737-?99+) and Hsü Hao (i.e. Hsü Chi-hai, 703-82), who later inspired Sung writers like Su Shih and Huang T'ing-chien (1045-1105), and achieved a synthesis of artistic fashions which few of his contemporaries could match. Therefore, even allowing for a certain degree of exaggeration, Yao Shu also deserves a place in the history of calligraphy, although this talent was overshadowed by his political achievements.

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H.L. Chan

25. TOU MO (1196-1280)

Tou Mo, T. Tzu-sheng, who rose from obscurity as a physician to become a political adviser to Qubilai and a Han-lin academician, was a native of Fei-hsiang in Hopei. Tou Mo's original name was Chieh, T. Han-ch'ing. He was born in Fei-hsiang in 1196 during the reign of the Chin emperor Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208). His forebears were humble peasants about whom little is known. During the Cheng-lung era (1156-1161), his great-grandfather was conscripted into the army of Hai-ling wang (r. 1149-1161), when the Jurchen ruler launched his military campaigns against the Southern Sung. Tou Mo's grandfather and father eked out a living as ordinary farmers and neither of them served in government.

During his early years, Tou Mo was fond of study and wanted to become a scholar. His grand-uncle Tou Wang, then a functionary in his native prefecture, sought vainly to discourage this intent and make the youngster prepare for a clerical career. In late 1213, the Mongol army led by Tolui, Činggis Qan's fourth son, raided Hopei and Shantung, capturing a number of prefectures and counties. Thus Fei-hsiang fell to the Mongols in the following year and many of the local people were captured and enslaved by the invaders. In due course Tou, then known as Chieh, was also taken prisoner, but he managed to escape and found his way home after the retreat of the Mongol forces. He rejoined his mother née Wu who had been too frightened to leave with the rest of the family. Mother and son thereupon fell ill from shock and privations, and the mother died. No sooner had Tou Mo buried her than the Mongol army returned (probably in 1218), and he had to flee again. He crossed the Yellow River and sought shelter with his mother's family in the south.

Before long, he befriended a physician named Wang from the area of the Ch'ing-liu River in Anhwei; he subsequently married Wang's daughter and lived with his family. His father-in-law pressed Tou Mo to take up medical practice, saying that in times of war and disorder such a profession would not only help relieve the suffering of others, but would also ensure the practitioner's safety. Tou Mo took this advice and in his late twenties began studying assiduously to become a physician.

There is no record of Tou Mo's activities until 1232, when he took up residence in Hsi-hua county in Ch'en-chou, Honan, and opened an office as a professional physician. Soon after, however, the Mongol army led by Ögödei invaded the prefecture, and Tou had once more to flee for his life. When he returned, he found his home in ruins and his family had disappeared. He then sought refuge in Ts'ai-chou (Ju-nan, Honan). There he met a noted physician named Li Hao and studied

acupuncture under him. (Li Hao, a native of Shantung, was a renowned doctor. He has left several important treatises on medical diagnosis and pharmacology. According to the *T'eng-hsien chih* [1846], Tou Mo learned acupuncture not from Li Hao, but from his son Li Yüan. Tou later recommended Yüan to Qubilai, but Li Yüan, being advanced in age, declined an official appointment.)

Under Mongol pressure, the last Chin emperor Ai-tsung (r. 1224-1234) moved his capital to Ts'ai in July 1233, and this city became the main target of the Mongol invasion. Fearing for his own safety, Tou sought shelter in the Sung territories and settled at Hsiao-kan, in the Te-an administration, Hupei. There he attracted the attention of the local magistrate, a scholarly man named Hsieh Hsien-tzu, who, realising his worth, gave him instruction in the *Four Books* and in Neo-Confucian literature. This provided Tou with his first opportunity to devote himself to serious studies.

In the meantime, the Mongol forces proceeded to destroy the Chin regime: in February 1234 they captured Ts'ai-chou and the Jurchen emperor committed suicide. Ögödei returned to the north and soon after began planning the conquest of Sung. Early in 1235 he commanded his third son Kōčü to direct the campaign and ordered Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*), one of his trusted Mongolian-speaking advisers, to join the expedition with the specific task of recruiting talented individuals to serve at the Mongol court. While in Te-an, Wei-chung met Tou Mo and took him north when the campaign ended a year later. It was at this time also that Tou Mo made the acquaintance of Yao Shu (*q.v.*), who had entered Ögödei's service earlier and was then on the advisory staff of the expeditionary forces. Tou Mo was later resettled in Ta-ming, Hopei, but only for short time for he soon obtained permission to return to his place of birth. There he taught school and practised medicine, and his generosity and care for the sick soon earned him the respect of the local people. Sometime after 1242 Yao Shu withdrew from government service and went to live on Mt. Su-men in Hui county, Honan. Informed of this, Tou went to receive instruction from him. It was there, around 1248, that Tou met the distinguished Confucian master Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), then a frequent guest at Yao Shu's residence, and was able to pursue his studies under him. During these few years, Tou mastered not only the Confucian classics and Neo-Confucian philosophy, but also such practical matters as ritual, music, astronomy and calendrical science, military science, law and economics, all of which were to prove very useful to him later in his career.

Tou Mo, then in his early fifties, met Qubilai in 1249. The future Mongol emperor had begun as early as 1239 recruiting Chinese leaders to advise him on political affairs, when he invited the Ch'an master Hai-yün and his disciple Liu Ping-chung (*qq.v.*) to Qara Qorum. Ten years later, hearing of Tou Mo from Li Te-hui

(1218-80), who had joined his advisory staff earlier through the good offices of Liu Ping-chung, Qubilai dispatched an emissary to Tou's birth place. By this time Tou had changed his name from Chieh to Mo ('Silence'), fearing possible reprisals as a former Chin official; he eluded the Mongol envoy. The latter thereupon sent a personal friend to Tou and, after much argument, Tou accompanied the messenger to the Mongol capital. (It seems, however, that Tou continued to use the name Chieh in his service under Qubilai, since it was mentioned by the contemporary Han-lin academician Wang Yün [*q.v.*] in his *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*.)

When Qubilai met Tou Mo, he questioned him about the essentials of government, as was his wont with the Chinese literati who accepted his invitation. Tou, like Liu Ping-chung before him, spoke of the 'three bonds' and the 'five constant virtues' of Confucianism as the fundamentals of good government. Further, he stressed the importance for the monarch of sincerity and purity of mind, stating that, under a ruler whose mind was righteous, all officials, far and near, would respect the moral law in thought and action, and the country would enjoy peace and prosperity. In this instance, Tou Mo propounded the abstract principles of Confucian government and made no attempt to discuss the practical problems of statecraft. This may have been because he was not versed in such matters, or else the biographical records may have omitted part of his discourse. In any case, it would appear that Qubilai had been favourably impressed. Subsequently, he was often to consult Tou Mo on matters of government and made him one of his most intimate guests. He may have also used him for medical advice, for Tou specialised in acupuncture. (We know that Mongol emperors employed Chinese physicians, Chinese medicine being highly regarded by them; both Činggis Qan and Ögödei had Chinese personal physicians whose names have been preserved.)

Tou Mo recommended several of his acquaintances to Qubilai for employment, including the distinguished Yao Shu, who later became a close adviser of the qa'an and an influential government official. In winter 1252, Tou had an audience with Qubilai's mother Sorqaqtani Beki, shortly before her death. We are told she was impressed by his understanding of Confucianism and presented him with a sable hat and coat. Qubilai eventually appointed him tutor to his eldest son Jingim. This appointment gave Tou Mo an opportunity to cultivate a very close relationship with the heir apparent.

In September 1253 Qubilai led an expedition against the kingdom of Ta-li in Yunnan. He took with him several of his Chinese advisers, but asked Tou Mo to continue tutoring Jingim, claiming that he could not find a substitute. He rewarded Tou with a jade belt buckle, saying that it was a jewel that had belonged to the former Chin emperor, the wearing of which would inspire respect in the royal prince. Tou

Mo stayed on as Jingim's principal tutor until Qubilai's triumphant return from Yunnan in the summer of 1254. He then begged for permission to relinquish his charge and return home; this was granted, and Qubilai instructed the authorities in the Ta-ming and Shun-te districts to offer Tou Mo land and lodgings, and to furnish him each year with clothes and money.

Tou Mo lived in obscurity until about 1257 when Qubilai again called him to court. That year Emperor Möngke ordered an inquest into fiscal matters in Qubilai's domain in north China, following which a number of key administrators were severely punished. Although Qubilai was not implicated, his fief in Ching-chao, Shensi, was abolished and many of his advisers were dismissed. This may account for Qubilai's attempt at the time to recall some of his former staff to court and to recruit additional talented men to strengthen his advisory body for future political manoeuvring.

Tou Mo's first major assignment after rejoining Qubilai was to participate in a series of debates to resolve the extremely bitter dispute between Buddhists and Taoists. Early in 1258 Tou Mo, Yao Shu and Chang Wen-ch'ien (*q.v.*) led the official delegation at the grand assembly convened by Qubilai at K'ai-p'ing fu, where they opposed the Taoists' arguments.

In May 1260 Qubilai was enthroned as qa'an in K'ai-p'ing fu. While pursuing the struggle against Ariq Böke and his supporters, he sought advice from his Chinese 'brain-trust' on the organisation of the new government. Qubilai consulted Tou Mo about the appointment of senior official to his administration, saying that he would like to have the services of someone like Wei Cheng (580-643) of the T'ang dynasty. Tou replied that he would recommend Hsü Heng as a man of principle, upright and unwavering, and Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) as one with the leadership ability and talent of a prime minister. The former was a renowned Confucian teacher and the latter a distinguished general; both had earned the respect of Qubilai and of the serving Chinese scholar-officials. It turned out, however, that Qubilai appointed Maḥmūd Yalavač (*q.v.*), as chief of the Secretarial Council, and Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*), a Chinese official from Shantung without academic background but experienced in fiscal administration, as the powerful administrator of political affairs. Not until a year later did he offer Shih T'ien-tse an important position as Left chancellor in the Secretarial Council. In the meantime, Qubilai appointed Tou Mo as lecturer-in-waiting of the Han-lin Academy, a post which he held until his death in 1280.

Like several of his colleagues who were concerned with the welfare of the people, Tou Mo deplored the appointment of Wang Wen-t'ung, who, as the leading Chinese official in the new administration, sought solely to fill the state's coffers. In due course Tou submitted a memorial to Qubilai advising him to employ men of

integrity and to dismiss those who tried to seduce the emperor with the prospect of increasing profits, stating that the latter threatened the very foundations of the empire. He cited the evils caused by the unscrupulous and greedy officials of the previous reign, alluding to Maḥmūd Yalavaç and others, and asserted that the sole aim of such people was to eliminate worthy men from office and to dominate the government. In his address Tou Mo apparently had Wang Wen-t'ung in mind, although he did not mention him by name, and Qubilai obviously understood the allusion, for Wang's appointment had upset most of his Chinese advisers.

As there was no immediate response from the qa'an, Tou continued his criticism of Wang Wen-t'ung, supported by Yao Shu, Wang E (*q.v.*) and others. It is recorded that those officials once openly censored Wang before Qubilai, with Tou denouncing Wang as a fraud and claiming that he should not continue in office lest his activities bring disaster to the empire. Qubilai had them nominate a possible replacement, whereupon they proposed Hsü Heng. The qa'an was not satisfied, however, and the matter lapsed. Failure to remove Wang Wen-t'ung was obviously due to Qubilai's resolve that the economic wealth of the Chinese territories should be tapped to meet soaring administrative and military costs: to that end, he clearly valued Wang Wen-t'ung's fiscal expertise. It was obvious to the qa'an that, for all his learning and wisdom, a scholar like Hsü Heng was not a man who could serve the immediate interests of the court.

Meanwhile Wang Wen-t'ung, infuriated by his Confucian critics, manoeuvred to undermine their influence in the government. In June 1261 he proposed the appointment of Yao Shu as grand preceptor of the heir apparent, of Tou as grand tutor of the heir apparent, and of Hsü Heng as grand guardian of the heir apparent. In this way he hoped to neutralize his adversaries while providing them with honourable positions at court. The appointments were made in October, but both Yao and Tou, following Hsü Heng's advice, declined on the grounds that it would be inappropriate to accept these offices before the formal designation of the heir apparent. Tou Mo continued as Han-lin lecturer-in-waiting, but begged for leave shortly after on account of poor health; to reward his services, Qubilai ordered the Pacification Bureaux of Taming and the adjacent districts to supply Tou with annual allowances of clothing and grain, and granted him a permanent holding of land.

Wang Wen-t'ung met his downfall in February 1262 following the rebellion of his son-in-law Li T'an (*q.v.*), the chief administrator of Shan-tung. He was implicated in the insurrection and executed as an accomplice. Many senior government officials were purged, but few of Qubilai's Chinese advisers suffered any reprisals. On the contrary, Qubilai appreciated their earlier words of warning and publicly praised Tou Mo, stating that had he had one or two more such equally outspoken advisers, the

incident could have been averted. This was pure cant, however, since in addition to Tou Mo, both Yao Shu and Hsü Heng had warned the qa'an about Wang Wen-t'ung. Qubilai thereupon recalled Tou to the capital and, to show his appreciation, granted him a residence as well as a daily allowance, and often sought his opinion on government affairs.

In May 1263 Qubilai summoned a number of his Chinese advisers, including Tou Mo, to K'ai-p'ing, presumably in connection with Liu Ping-chung's recommendation that the seat of government be transferred to Yen-ching. The next year Qubilai gave Tou's daughter to be the wife of Liu Ping-chung, thus further binding the relationship between two of his key advisers. During the following years Tou Mo continued as Han-lin lecturer-in-waiting, as before actively promoting traditional Chinese principles of government and Confucian studies. In 1266 he collaborated with Yao Shu, Wang E and Shang T'ing (*q.v.*) in the compilation of a digest of quotations from the *Five Classics*. The authors informed Qubilai of meritorious deeds by past rulers of China, and recommended that learned scholars be invited to lecture at court. In 1270 Tou Mo and Chang Wen-ch'ien submitted a joint memorial on the advisability of establishing schools and training scholars. They proposed the establishment of a National College and recommended that Hsü Heng, then assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, be made its rector.

Together with Yao Shu, Hsü Heng and others, Tou Mo was involved in 1271 in a debate with the Han-lin academician T'u-tan Kung-lü on the nature of the Confucian teachings in relation to the latter's proposal for the revival of the civil service examinations. In early 1273, the rectorship of the National College became vacant due to Hsü Heng's retirement. In September, Tou Mo, Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu, Wang P'an and others recommended that the erudite scholar Wang Hsün (1235-81), who had served as tutor to Prince Jingim, be appointed to replace Hsü Heng. They also proposed that the number of students at the College be increased and that more staff be appointed to the Heir Apparent's Administration to help the prince prepare for his future role as emperor. All these recommendations were subsequently implemented and Qubilai rewarded Tou Mo the following year by conferring on him the honorary title of Great Officer of Commendable Counsel.

In April 1275 Tou Mo, Wang P'an and other colleagues submitted a memorial for the establishment of a separate academy devoted to Mongolian studies, under the executive Han-lin academician *S'ad Midir. This new institution should include a branch of the Department of National History with the executive academician and Imperial diarist Harqasun as its head. The suggestion was subsequently approved, resulting in two separate Han-lin academies and departments of National History. As Tou had now reached the age of eighty (according to Chinese reckoning), he asked for

permission to retire. Qubilai, who valued his service, was reluctant and only grudgingly approved his request, but continually sent messengers to seek his advice on state affairs. Thus in April 1277, worried by the possible effects of a long drought, the qa'an dispatched an emissary to seek the elderly statesman's opinion on ways to succour the people. Tou Mo advised the emperor to block unnecessary government outlays forthwith, particularly those related to wine-making in order to conserve grain, and curtail costly religious festivities and similar activities. His recommendations are said to have been adopted.

Early in 1280 Qubilai further honoured Tou by appointing him senior academician of the Chao-wen Academy and granting him the more prestigious title of Great Officer of Correct Counsel. In late August of that year, Tou died at his residence in the capital, aged eighty-four. The emperor ordered a state funeral for him, while the heir apparent Jingim contributed two thousand strings of cash towards the cost of the ceremony out of gratitude to his former tutor. By imperial order, the Han-lin academician Wang P'an wrote a 'spirit-way' epitaph in Tou's memory. This essay, now preserved in the *Chi-fu t'ung-chih*, and the tomb-inscription composed by Li Ch'ien, are the primary sources of information on Tou Mo's life and career. In 1281, Wang Yün composed a sacrificial eulogy in his honour; this provides additional insight into the view held of the man by his contemporaries. Several years after Tou's death, his coffin was transferred from Ta-tu to his native place in Fei-hsiang. He was granted the posthumous titles of Grand Preceptor and Duke-of-state of Wei,¹ and was canonised as Wen-cheng ('Cultured and Correct') probably during the reign of Emperor Temür (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307).

Tou Mo married many times; his first three wives died childless, only the third survived him. His fourth and fifth wives, néés Wang and Jung, bore him one son and three daughters. His son Lü served in the Ministry of Personnel during Qubilai's reign and was later promoted to senior academician of the Chi-hsien Academy. All of Tou Mo's daughters married distinguished scholar-officials. The eldest was betrothed to Liu Chih-chung (1242-96) who, after serving as an attendant to Jingim on the recommendation of Wang Hsün, was recruited by Liu Ping-chung in 1269 to assist in the reform of the Confucian rituals. Tou's second daughter became the wife of Liu Ping-chung. His youngest daughter was married to Liu Kuei, a judge in the administration of the Ta-ming district during Qubilai's reign.

While Tou Mo was known to be mild, courteous and generous to his friends and associates, he nevertheless left his mark at court as a frank and outspoken critic. He was not a great Confucian scholar like Yao Shu or Hsü Heng, and though he is listed in the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an* of Huang Tsung-hsi this was mainly because of his affiliation with Hsü Heng. It seems that he earned Qubilai's confidence not only

because he was able to impart to the qa'an his knowledge of Confucian ethics and principles of government, but more importantly because he spoke out without fear on important issues, as in his denunciation of Wang Wen-t'ung.

Tou Mo's biography in the *Yüan History (Yüan-shih)* contains an anecdote which vividly illustrates his character. It relates how, on one occasion while attending Qubilai together with Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu, Shang T'ing and others, Tou Mo remarked on the relationship between the ruler and his ministers. He said that, according to their traditional obligations, ministers should speak out unequivocally and without hesitation when the ruler was wrong, yet ministers had become mere yes-men in present times, content in all things to echo the ruler's opinions. This, he added, was not conducive to good government. The qa'an is said to have welcomed the outburst.

Apparently Qubilai held Tou Mo in such high esteem for his unusual qualities as to assert after Tou's death that, during thirty years' searching for outstanding men, he had found only two: Tou Mo and the scholar-mathematician Li Chün-min (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung). Qubilai also commented that if he could combine the 'heart' of Tou Mo with the 'ability' of Yao Shu, he would have a perfect minister. This remark is interesting because it reveals the difficulties encountered by Qubilai in his search for Chinese ministers that were at once able and attentive, frank and loyal.

Besides his political achievements, Tou Mo enjoyed wide renown for his medical skill. It has already been noted that he spent much of his career as a professional physician when not on government duty. Not only did he help transmit the medical tradition of the Jurchen-Chin, particularly the technique of acupuncture developed by the Li family of Shantung, but also perfected some diagnostic methods and contributed to pharmacological knowledge in his long years of practice. He attended to the health of many important men and passed on much of his knowledge and experience to his contemporaries. One of the beneficiaries was Lo T'ien-i (*fl.* 1246-83), a distinguished physician from Chen-ting, Hopei, who was a government medical officer during the early years of Qubilai's reign. In his *Wei-sheng pao-chien* of 1281, Lo mentions meeting with Tou Mo in 1253, when they were both summoned by Qubilai to spend the winter at his headquarters in Kansu on the eve of the expedition against Ta-li. He used this opportunity to discuss the methods of healing and prescribing medicine with Tou Mo, and learned much from the latter on the techniques of acupuncture.

Tou Mo has been credited with the authorship of several major treatises on diagnostics, pharmacology and, in particular, acupuncture, but few of them have been handed down. The most important medical text dealing with acupuncture attributed to Tou Mo that has survived is the *Liu-chu chih-yao fu*, written as early as 1232 in

rhyme-prose. In roughly one thousand characters, Tou Mo summarised the basic methods of locating the vital points for applying the needles on the human body, and explained how acupuncture healed various kinds of ailments. Those ranged from pains in the head, ear, eye, nose, teeth, spine, waist and limbs, to diseases of the internal organs like the intestine, abdomen, stomach, heart and kidneys, and more complex cases like rheumatism, stroke, paralysis, malaria, and even mental disturbances. This short essay demonstrates Tou Mo's mastery of classical prose in addition to his medical proficiency. It was later copied into Lo T'ien-i's *Wei-sheng pao-chien* and attracted more notice when it was incorporated into the *Chi-sheng pa-ts'ui*, a manual on general medicine compiled in 1315 by the Yüan physician Tu Ssu-ching (1235-1320).

Tou Mo is also said to have written a more comprehensive manual on the methods of acupuncture and moxibustion, called *Chen-chiu chih-nan*, also known as *Tou T'ai-shih chen-chiu*, around 1241, but this work has not survived. There is yet another medical treatise attributed to Tou Mo, under his old name Chieh. This is the *Tou shih (Chieh) ch'uang-yang ching-yen ch'üan-shu*, a manual on the treatment of malignant boils and ulcers. The authenticity of this work, however, is highly doubtful, and it seems likely that the work was written by late Ming physicians.

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H.L. Chan

26. HSÜ HENG (1209-1281)

Hsü Heng, T. Chung-p'ing, H. Lu-chai, distinguished Confucian master, educator, and adviser to Qubilai Qa'an, was born on 15 October 1209, the inaugural year of the Chin ruler Wei-shao wang (r. 1209-13). A native of Ho-nei (Ch'in-yang) in Honan, Hsü Heng came from a peasant family of little distinction. The biographical records state that shortly before Hsü's birth, his father Hsü T'ung and his mother née Li, fleeing from local disorders, came to settle in Hsin-cheng, several hundred miles south of the Yellow River in central Honan, and that Hsü Heng was born there. Apparently this event was not connected with Činggis Qan's invasion of north China, since that did not take place until late 1213, when Muqali (*q.v.*) mounted a major campaign against the Chin dominions in Hopei and Shantung. The Mongol offensive forced Emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-24) to flee to Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan), the former Sung capital, but the attacks ceased for a time after the fall of the Chin capital Chung-tu (Yen-ching, modern Peking) in May 1215. Nevertheless, Hsü Heng suffered greatly from the misery and the turmoil caused by renewed Mongol invasions in the ensuing decades. His peasant background and the hardships endured in those years undoubtedly moulded his character and guided the development of his philosophical views. They strengthened his resolve and fostered in him the unusual combination of a profound belief in moral perfectibility, and a worldly trust in the value of practical experience that was to inform his later career.

In 1216/17, at the age of seven or eight, Hsü Heng began his exegetical education in Hsin-cheng under an elderly teacher who had failed the examinations. Hsü possessed a remarkable memory and displayed unusual intelligence and inquisitiveness. An anecdote is recorded by his biographers. One day during a lesson, Hsü surprised his teacher by asking, 'What is the purpose of studying books?' The teacher, amazed by the child's precocity, gave the trite reply: 'To take the examinations and advance in official ranks.' Undaunted, young Hsü retorted, 'Is that all?' This was too much for the teacher: fearful lest he should disappoint such an unusual student, he advised Hsü's father to find his son another tutor. Whereupon the lad was sent to study under three local masters. If not apocryphal, the story demonstrates Hsü Heng's urge to search for knowledge beyond conventional book learning, a search that persisted into his mature years.

Hsü Heng was able to pursue his study in Hsin-cheng in a peaceful environment during the next few years, despite renewed Mongol offensives against north China that did not spare Honan. Then in 1224, aged fifteen, he went to work in a menial

position for his maternal uncle, then a secretary in charge of the clerks in the local magistrate's office. This gave Hsü his first experience in government service during which he learned much about law and regulations. It was not a pleasant initiation, however, for he had to assist his uncle in raising from local resources the means to construct the mausoleum of the late emperor Hsüan-tsung. Hsü left his job and resumed his studies after failing to curb his employer's ruthless exactions of materials and labour, which imposed a crushing burden on the populace. In such troubled times, books were hard to procure, especially for a destitute young lad. It is said that Hsü would travel long distances at considerable risk to copy interesting works, often accompanied by his father. Meanwhile, despairing of his family's lot, Hsü's father wanted his son to study divination in order to recognise bad omens as well as making a living; Hsü was therefore apprenticed to a local astrologer. This was a fortunate event: in the course of studying divination, Hsü Heng learned much about the pseudo-sciences, which significantly broadened his outlook. Also, he came across an incomplete text of an old commentary on the *Book of History* in the home of the astrologer. This so stimulated him that he copied the document, which greatly influenced the course of his studies.

Before long, the tranquility of north China was shattered once again by renewed Mongol attacks under Ögödei Qa'an (r. 1229-41), Činggis' third son and successor. In spring 1231, the great qan launched a series of offensives against Honan, aiming to capture the capital, Pien, and thus complete the conquest of the Chin state. That summer, Ögödei's own army was joined by the forces of Tolui (1186/90-1232/33), Sübötei (1176-1248) (*q.v.*) and others converging from Shensi and Shantung, and they advanced to the outskirts of the Jurchen capital in early 1232. The Chin situation deteriorated late that year as defences crumbled before the enemy onslaught. When the Mongol commanders rejected the abject pleas for peace of Emperor Ai-tsung (r. 1224-34), the fall of Pien became imminent. In February 1233, by now desperate, the Chin emperor and his retinue hurriedly fled south, first to Kuei-te and, in July, to Ts'ai-chou (Ju-nan) in southern Honan. A month after the emperor's flight, Ts'ui Li (d. 1234), the marshal in charge of the defence of the western sector of Pien, betrayed his trust and delivered the capital to the enemy without resistance. Thereupon, the invaders pressed on under the command of Tāčar (d. 1238), occupying a number of prefectures and counties to the south of Pien, and laying siege to the makeshift capital at Ts'ai-chou late that year. They easily overran the Chin defence, and when Ai-tsung committed suicide on the eve of the fall of his last stronghold, the Jurchen state formally ceased to exist.

The Mongol invasion brought great misery to Honan where the assailants not only laid waste cities and towns, but even carried away many of the surviving

inhabitants as prisoners. Hsü Heng was one of the many Chinese scholars captured by the invading Mongol cavalry. This occurred early in 1232, when the Mongol armies under Ögödei's personal command took Cheng-chou, north of Hsin-cheng. Hsü Heng and his fellow captives were placed in the custody of a Mongol myriarch who was a cruel, bloodthirsty drunkard. Yet, according to an implausible story, Hsü prevailed upon him by playing on his superstitious nature. Consequently, the brute was restrained by moral persuasion from wanton killing, and many innocent lives were spared. Sometime in 1234, after two years of internment, Hsü Heng regained his freedom when the Mongol commander was summoned to join an expedition against the Southern Sung. The commander either released some of his prisoners or they found a way to escape.

Hsü Heng, then twenty-five, travelled 1,600 km to central Shantung. He found an abode in Mt. Ts'u-lai, a traditional retreat for scholars south-east of the prefectural capital of T'ai-an chou, but in late 1234 or early 1235 he moved to the township of Tung-kuan in the same prefecture. During his retreat at Mt. Ts'u-lai, Hsü came into possession of a copy of the commentary on the *Book of Changes* by Wang Pi (226-49); he studied it eagerly and tried to live up to its implied moral injunctions. After a short sojourn in T'ai-an ca. 1236/37, Hsü Heng travelled to Ta-ming on the bank of the Grand Canal in Hopei, and settled in the Wei county of that administration. Everywhere he went, Hsü busied himself with study and teaching, always attracting students in search of erudite masters. During his stay in Ta-ming, he named his place of work 'Lu' and he was known thereafter as Master Lu-chai to his admirers and disciples.

In those years, two important events took place in north China that were greatly to affect Hsü Heng and his fellow Confucian scholars. In early 1235 Ögödei Qa'an launched his campaign against the Sung in the Huai River region, and ordered the Chinese commander Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*) to recruit learned personnel such as scribes, Buddhists, Taoists, physicians, artisans, and musicians, to serve the Mongol state. Yang had with him Yao Shu (*q.v.*), a reputed Confucian scholar. Late that year, the Mongol armies captured Te-an in Hupei taking many prisoners, including the learned Confucian teacher Chao Fu (*fl.* 1235-57). Yao recognized Chao in the prisoners' compound, secured his release, and prevented him from committing suicide. He then escorted Chao Fu to Yen-ching where he was welcomed as a great Confucian master. It was mainly through Chao's effort that the Neo-Confucian commentaries on the classics by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, expounding the metaphysical and moral philosophy of the Confucian system, were transmitted to north China to the great benefit of Hsü Heng and his contemporaries.

The other event concerning Hsü Heng occurred in 1237/38 when the first civil service examination under the Mongol rulers was organised by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*), chief of the Secretariat, in various districts of the north. On this occasion, Hsü, then residing in Wei, was persuaded by the local people to take the test at the prefectural capital, and, at twenty-nine, he became one of the 4,030 successful candidates. His two distinguished contemporaries, Yang Huan (*q.v.*) and Liu Ch'i (1203-50), also passed the examination. Hsü Heng professed no interest in serving the government, but like many others he took the examination for a practical reason. As a successful candidate, he would gain the status of 'Confucian scholar' in the household registration, exempting him from taxes and corvée. This was a coveted privilege among the Chinese literati under Mongol rule. It is not certain whether Hsü Heng was offered an official appointment which he declined, but he stayed on in Ta-ming for the next two years, engaged in study and teaching.

Sometime in 1241, Hsü Heng returned to his native Ho-nei with a cartload of books, hoping to start a new career. Having failed to find his younger brother Hsü K'an with whom he had lost contact during the Mongol invasion, he journeyed south-west to Lo-yang, where he finally located him. Hsü Heng desisted from settling in Ho-nei, having heard that people in Huai-chou (of which Ho-nei was a dependency) were being oppressed by a harsh administrator. He proceeded instead to Ta-ming and again took up residence in Wei for the next several years. During this time, Hsü Heng had the good fortune of associating with two reputed Confucian scholars who were to have a great impact on his studies and future career. They were Tou Mo (*q.v.*), thirteen years his senior, and Yao Shu, also several years older than Hsü; both happened to live in the vicinity. Their recommendations were to introduce Hsü Heng to Qubilai and make him eventually the most influential educator at the Mongol court.

Tou Mo, a learned and versatile scholar from Ming-chou, Honan, was taken by Yang Wei-chung during his military expedition against the Sung at Te-an, and brought to Yen-ching in autumn 1236 together with a host of Chinese scholars. After a brief sojourn in the north, Tou managed to leave and went to live in Ta-ming for a few years, about the time Hsü Heng settled there; they subsequently became close friends. Tou Mo was most anxious to further his study of Confucian classics and literature, while Hsü Heng was delighted by the opportunity to share Tou's knowledge, and also to learn about medicine and other fields of knowledge from his peer. The two thus undertook studies in common on a wide range of subjects including classical philosophy, literature, statecraft, law, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, divination, and even Buddhist and Taoist philosophies.

Sometime in 1242 (?), shortly before Tou Mo departed for his birthplace, Yao Shu, having heard of Hsü Heng's reputation, called upon the latter at Wei, and,

together with Tou Mo, discussed Neo-Confucian studies. This was after Yao Shu, following a dispute with his colleague, the Central Asian Maḥmūd Yalavač (*q.v.*), in late 1241, had left his post as secretary of the Yen-ching regional administration and retired to Mt. Su-men in Hui-chou, Honan. There he devoted himself to propagating the Neo-Confucian philosophy commonly known as *li-hsüeh* ('Doctrine of the Principle') or *tao-hsüeh* ('Doctrine of the [True] Way'), which he had learned from Chao Fu and from such texts as the commentaries on the classics by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. Upon hearing Yao Shu's exposition of the Neo-Confucian teachings, Hsü Heng and Tou Mo were greatly attracted to the new philosophy. In due course, Hsü Heng travelled to Mt. Su-men to visit Yao Shu and copied all the commentaries and writings by the Sung Neo-Confucian philosophers before Yao had them printed for wider dissemination. Those documents included the commentary on the *Book of Changes* by Ch'eng I, the collected commentaries on the *Four Books* by Chu Hsi, as well as the master's *Huo-wen* (*Questions and Answers [Concerning the Classics]*), *Hsiao-hsüeh* (*Elementary Learning*), and other works.

Indeed, these Neo-Confucian commentaries on the classics and philosophical writings opened up a new vista for Hsü Heng that brought a fundamental change to his intellectual orientation and teaching methods. Not only did they expound the cosmological and metaphysical system of the Confucian tenets, the philosophy of human nature and reason (*hsing-li*), and the relationship between moral ethics and the socio-political order, but they also put forward the correct succession in the orthodox tradition (*tao-t'ung*), and the methods and procedures of study and self-cultivation to realize the Way and achieve the union of man, heaven and earth. The lasting impact on Hsü Heng came however from Chu Hsi's writings, because of their emphasis on moral cultivation and practical learning.

After returning to Wei, Hsü closely studied those writings, obtained from Yao Shu. He was greatly inspired by Chu Hsi's commentaries on the *Four Books* and his *Elementary Learning* which elucidated, *inter alia*, the Neo-Confucian *hsin-fa*, or, in de Bary's translation, 'the study or learning of the mind-and-heart' for self-improvement, as the gateway to virtue and harmony in the human community. In particular, the *Elementary Learning*, which stresses the importance of moral training by prescribing a detailed course of study from the elementary level to the ultimate reaches, caused a radical departure in Hsü Heng's teaching methods.

Hsü subsequently told his students that all his former exegetical teaching had been a waste of time, and only now did he understand how to promote learning. If pupils wanted to continue studying with him, they would need to follow a new program. Henceforward, they would do such ordinary household chores as 'sprinkling and sweeping,' and engage in the mundane intercourse of 'responding to

questions and requests,' and 'advancing and retiring,' as steps towards acquiring simple virtue. If they demurred, they should seek another teacher. To begin one's education by concentrating on the ordinary actions of daily life, according to Chu Hsi, was to undergo early initiation into the social conventions as the premise of moral improvement. This should precede serious study of the classics, for it aimed to establish the basis for self-development in higher studies and to set the pattern for later participation in the community at large. The contention was that the wisdom of the sage, being so vast and subtle, could not be grasped all at once and should be absorbed in stages. It is said that Hsü's students, old and young, all agreed and, having burned the copy-books which they had been using, only retained the *Elementary Learning*. Hsü Heng himself studied the primer day and night, and practised its teachings to set the students an example.

There is a gap in the records of Hsü Heng's activities during the next few years. What is important to note, however, is that his exposure to Chu Hsi's commentaries on the *Four Books* and the *Elementary Learning* caused him to undergo an intellectual conversion. In 1248, having reached the age of thirty-nine and having studied the writings of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi for years, Hsü Heng is said to have felt that he had at last grasped the meaning of the Confucian Way, expressing great joy at his enlightenment. Until that time, Hsü was reputed an authority on the recondite and mysterious *Book of Changes*. (He wrote an essay called *Tu I ssu yen* to analyse this primary classic in the light of his Neo-Confucian beliefs. According to one source, it was written ten years after his conversion. This text is incorporated among his extant works.) Thereafter, however, when people asked for his guidance in interpreting this obscure text, he advised them first to read the *Elementary Learning*. Several records of Hsü Heng's experience at the time have him 'finding (the Way) for himself' (*tzu-te*), or accepting the new teachings with the devotion of a religious convert. In particular, the fundamentalist approach of the *Elementary Learning* and the *Four Books* struck a deep chord in Hsü's down-to-earth peasant soul, evoking a reverential response. In a letter of 1266, recommending those works to his eldest son Hsü Shih-k'o, he wrote: 'I revere and believe in ...(these books) as if they were divine!'

In the meantime, Hsü Heng maintained close contacts with his friends Tou Mo and Yao Shu. It appears that, when Tou went to Qara Qorum in response to Qubilai's summons sometime in 1249, he visited Hsü at Wei on the way, and Hsü composed two poems bidding him farewell and wishing him success. A year later, troubled by sickness, Hsü also left Wei for his native Ho-nei, hoping to find rest there. However, when he passed through Wei-chou (Chi-hsien, Honan), on the northern bank of the Yellow River, he heard that Huai-chou was still oppressed by a harsh administration, and so changed his mind. He went to the nearby Mt. Su-men, north-west of Wei, in

order to reside near Yao Shu and to further his career of study and teaching. Later in the year, however, Yao also left for Qara Qorum, having accepted an invitation from Qubilai to consult on state affairs. Hsü Heng was temporarily deprived of a genuine friend. Yao Shu offered Hsü the use of his private residence while he was away, but Hsü declined.

It was about that time, according to our sources, that Hsü Heng resolved to make the propagation of the Confucian Way his life's work. For years, wherever he went, Hsü beseeched his followers always to maintain the three bonds and five constants of human relationship: even though rulers failed to heed them, they should nevertheless be upheld by the common people. Also, he exhorted the local folk to observe the ancient Confucian rites for funerals, sacrifices, betrothals and marriages, and the villagers, inspired by his preaching, flocked to receive instruction. Despite his fame, Hsü remained poor, but was content with a simple, frugal life. It is said that he gave his clansmen and needy pupils any money or grain that he could spare, and, in the true spirit of the Confucian sage, would only accept offerings made in the spirit of righteousness.

Yao Shu's arrival at Qubilai's court in early 1251 highlights the powerful prince's efforts to befriend talented Chinese whose support might strengthen his bid for political ascendancy. The prince began to do this as early as 1239 when he summoned the erudite Ch'an master Hai-yün (*q.v.*) and his disciple the Buddho-Taoist Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*) to Qara Qorum. Liu subsequently became Qubilai's principal adviser and started recruiting a number of his former associates and talented people among the northern Chinese literati to form a corps of consultants for the prince. Between 1244 and 1250, Qubilai had called a host of scholars and dignitaries to his headquarters on Liu's recommendation, and many of them stayed in his service. Those included Liu Ping-chung's former acquaintances Chang Wen-ch'ien (*q.v.*), Li Te-hui (1218-80), Ma Heng (1207-77), scholars and notables such as Chang Te-hui (1195-1274), Tou Mo, Wang E (*qq.v.*), Tung Wen-yung and his brothers (see the biographies of the Tung family), and a score of others. Some were ex-Chin scholar-officials like Wang E and several of his colleagues, others were prominent local dignitaries like the Tung brothers, and the rest were either experienced administrators or people versed in practical matters.

In July 1251, shortly after Yao Shu responded to Qubilai's summons, Möngke became emperor and awarded his favourite brother the Chinese territories south of Mt. Čila'un (Tu-shih k'ou, Inner Mongolia) as his personal fief. This investiture further strengthened Qubilai's relationship with the Chinese population; after his administrative headquarters had been established at Chin-lien ch'uan (on the Shan-tien

River, Inner Mongolia) the following year, the prince's need for the support of the literati became greater than ever.

It was Qubilai's continued search for talents to serve his expanded domain that brought Hsü Heng and a number of the latter's future colleagues to the attention of the Mongol prince. This happened after July 1253 when Qubilai had received from Möngke the principality of Ching-chao in Shensi as a new addition to his fief, for which he began to organise a bureaucratic administration. The prince sent Yao Shu to set up a Pacification Bureau and appointed two of his Chinese advisers, Yang Wei-chung and Shang T'ing (*qq.v.*), as pacification commissioner and first secretary respectively. A year later, following his return from the campaign against the Ta-li kingdom in Yunnan, Qubilai moved the administrative staff of his fief. In July 1254, he appointed the sinicized Uighur Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*) as pacification commissioner of the Kuan-hsi circuit and transferred Yao Shu to be the agricultural promotion commissioner. It was then that Lien, undoubtedly at Yao Shu's suggestion, invited Hsü Heng to Ching-chao to serve as master of the district school. It is said that when Hsü learned of this, he returned to Wei in the hope of not being found. But when the imperial messengers caught up with him there, he agreed to accompany them to the north. When Hsü arrived at Ching-chao, the local people, in great need of teachers, received him with open arms, and Hsü, delighted at the warm reception, devoted himself to teaching and propagating the Confucian Way. At about that time, he produced his commentary on the *Elementary Learning*, called *Hsiao-hsüeh ta-i* (*General Meaning of the Elementary Learning*). This was written in the vernacular language, from lectures to his students on the important Neo-Confucian primer. It is now included among Hsü's extant works.

A year later, acknowledging Hsü Heng's success, Lien Hsi-hsien recommended to the court that his friend be appointed superintendent of Confucian studies of Ching-chao, with a regular official stipend. Informed of the news, Hsü sought to decline the post, but to no avail; he was thereupon taken sick for several days. When the appointment was formally announced, Hsü begged the Pacification Bureau to let him withdraw, claiming that he was only a humble teacher, lacking knowledge of the examination system, and without the ability to supervise students and inspire people, required of an education official. Further, he sent letters to Lien Hsi-hsien and his old acquaintances Liu Ping-chung, Tou Mo and others, urging them to press the authorities on his behalf. He pleaded that he saw his role primarily as that of an educator, not an official, and he feared lest his new office might provoke envy and slander, and even embroil him in political squabbles fatal to his teaching career. These grounds were genuine enough, but above all Hsü Heng dreaded the appointment because, as he wrote other friends, he was loath to preside over public

schools where poetry and prose composition were taught primarily to prepare the students for bureaucratic service. Before long and to his great relief, Hsü's appointment was rescinded, undoubtedly thanks to his friends' intercession.

Meanwhile, Hsü Heng pursued his dedication to teaching. Apart from lecturing on the customary subjects, he also discussed with his students the ancient 'well-field' system of land use and bought a piece of land to plant mulberry trees in support of charitable works. Then in 1259, feeling that he had accomplished his mission, he went back to Huai-chou, but had been there a short time only when he received a formal summons from the new emperor.

In May 1260, having won the power struggle against Ariq Böke, Qubilai was enthroned at K'ai-p'ing fu, north-east of Dolōn Nōr, Inner Mongolia (renamed Shang-tu in 1263), succeeding Möngke as the Mongol qa'an and emperor of China. Thereupon, while pursuing his campaign against his recalcitrant brother, Qubilai applied himself to setting up a Chinese-style government capable of consolidating his administration of north China. After summoning his Chinese advisers, including Liu Ping-chung, Tou Mo, Yao Shu, and scores of others, to the new court, he undertook to attract further talented people to his service. It is said that one day, having wished that his confidants might recommend for his service men as good as Wei Cheng (580-643), the able adviser to T'ang T'ai-tsung (r. 627-49), Qubilai enquired of Tou Mo if there were such a person in the country. Thereupon Tou named Hsü Heng and Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), commenting that Hsü was a strong-willed man of high principles. Consequently, an order was sent in June summoning Hsü Heng to court. Hsü, then already fifty-one, responded immediately. Like his friends, he probably hoped to gain Mongol patronage for his promotion of the Confucian Way. (T'ao Tsung-i, *ca.* 1315-*ca.* 1402, records in his *Cho-keng lu* that Hsü called upon Liu Yin [*q.v.*], an eminent Confucian scholar known for his refusal to serve the Mongol court, on his way north. Hsü explained to Liu that he was obeying Qubilai's summons in order to serve the Confucian cause. But such a meeting could not have taken place since Liu was then a child of eleven. The episode may have been mistaken for a similar encounter years later when Liu retorted that to serve the state would fail to show respect of the Confucian Way.)

After a brief meeting with the qa'an, Hsü Heng was granted a formal audience in K'ai-p'ing a month later. On that occasion, Qubilai first asked Hsü Heng what he had studied, and Hsü responded: 'I have been following the teachings of Confucius.' When questioned about his special interests, Hsü protested that his ability had been much exaggerated, confessing that as a teacher and farmer, he knew only about instructing children and ploughing the fields. Qubilai then enquired about the civil service examination system, and Hsü confided candidly that the current system would

not work. He did not dismiss the validity of the system for the purpose of recruiting bureaucrats, but contended that the curriculum should seek to explain the classics and to teach practical subjects. The qa'an greatly appreciated Hsü's frankness, saying that he himself considered the current examination system too superficial to be worthwhile. Thereupon Qubilai retained Hsü Heng at his headquarters, but Hsü was soon allowed to leave for reasons of health. He returned to Yen-ching in August, but was again called back to K'ai-p'ing in April of the following year.

When Hsü Heng rejoined Qubilai's court in May 1261, Mongol rule in China had progressed significantly by adopting a Chinese system of administration. As recommended by Liu Ping-chung, Tou Mo, Yao Shu, Wang E, and others, a rudimentary bureaucracy had been established in K'ai-p'ing and the local districts. In May 1260, the Secretarial Council was instituted as the state's highest administrative organ; subsequently it was supplemented by an array of executive and judicial agencies, and in due course, a hierarchy of bureaux, offices, courts, and directorates, was established to assume various functions of central government and local administration.

At its inception, the Secretarial Council was dominated by several Mongol, Central Asian, and Han scholar-officials, who held important executive positions. For instance, the Muslim Maḥmūd Yalavač was appointed Right chancellor; Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*) and the scholar Chao Pi (1220-76) became directors of political affairs; while Lien Hsi-hsien and Chang Wen-ch'ien served as assistants of the Right and Left. In August 1260, Maḥmūd, Wang Wen-t'ung and Chao Pi went to Yen-ching with the Secretarial Council. The most powerful Chinese official in the central government, however, was Wang Wen-t'ung, who gained Qubilai's confidence and rose to prominence by virtue of his expertise in fiscal administration. It was to him that Hsü Heng was presented on his arrival at court in May 1261, with the nine newly appointed pacification commissioners. This event is recorded in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* of Wang Yün (*q.v.*). But Hsü loathed Wang Wen-t'ung because of his non-Confucian background, his greed and his lust for power. Among the officials at court, Hsü was particularly impressed by Chang Wen-ch'ien, who paid Hsü Heng a visit to convey his respect immediately after Hsü's appointment as pacification commissioner. Hsü Heng showed little interest in court politics, but because of his close link to Tou Mo and Yao Shu, he was inadvertently involved in a power struggle with Wang Wen-t'ung.

This began when several of Qubilai's Confucian advisers including Tou Mo, Yao Shu and Wang E, differing from Wang Wen-t'ung on ideological and political grounds, endeavoured to remove him from office. Thus, in June, when Qubilai sought to strengthen the post of chancellor of the Secretarial Council after the

dismissal of Maḥmūd Yalavač, they openly declared Wang unfit to serve as chancellor. When asked who was best qualified for the post, Tou Mo and Wang E nominated Hsü Heng, but the qa'an ignored their advice. Instead, Qubilai appointed the Mongol noble Buqa and the veteran Han general Shih T'ien-tse as two of the chancellors, and retained Wang Wen-t'ung as administrator of political affairs. As a result, Wang came to hate his Confucian colleagues and manoeuvred to undercut their political influence. In June, according to Hsü Heng's biographies, he proposed to the emperor to make Yao Shu Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent, Tou Mo Grand Tutor of the Heir Apparent, and Hsü Heng Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent. (Wang Yün gives a somewhat different account.)

Wang Wen-t'ung's recommendation appeared to pay tribute to those Confucian advisers for their outstanding contributions, but since the proposed offices were merely honorific, it was in effect a manoeuvre to remove rivals from direct political power. None of the nominees accepted the offer, however, undoubtedly because they were aware of the trap. On Hsü Heng's advice, they declared that, according to ancient Confucian prescriptions, it was inappropriate for them to hold such an office before the heir apparent was appointed. (Jingim was not designated the heir apparent until April 1273). The Confucians had their way, but on September 3 and 4 respectively, probably once again at Wang Wen-t'ung's suggestion, Qubilai appointed Hsü Heng as rector of the National College and Yao Shu as director of the Bureau of Agriculture, but retained Tou Mo as lecturer-in-waiting at the Han-lin Academy.

Hsü Heng's new appointment superseded the earlier offer, but it still involved an honorific post since the National College was not formally established until 1269, nine years later. Hsü again declined the office for health reasons and, in October, obtained permission to return to his place of birth. The nature of Hsü Heng's illness at this time is unknown, but he definitely suffered from a chronic ailment which sometimes confined him to bed for weeks on end. Later he complained that his feet were often painful, possibly from gout induced by poor diet and inadequate medical care. The condition was never cured and became a source of persistent trouble. Hsü Heng's poor health apparently induced him to study and practise medicine, as shown by his discussions of medical diagnosis in his correspondence with several friends, collected in Hsü's surviving works. Hsü Heng's absence from the capital saved him from experiencing the political upheaval that followed Wang Wen-t'ung's execution in March of the following year for having abetted the rebellion of his son-in-law Li T'an (*q.v.*).

In October 1262, as the political crisis subsided, Qubilai again commanded Hsü Heng to return to K'ai-p'ing. On reaching Yen-ching, Hsü once more succumbed to his chronic condition, and was forced to rest for a time. During the following months,

Hsü Heng resided in a Taoist temple, frequently entertaining his former associates Yao Shu, Tou Mo, and others, but avoiding contacts with local dignitaries. Whatever Hsü's reasons for delaying his visit to K'ai-p'ing, it was obviously to his advantage to stay away from the centre of political struggle. Following Wang Wen-t'ung's execution, many of Qubilai's Chinese advisers came under suspicion, and the Central Asians, headed by the Muslim Aḥmad (*q.v.*), were increasingly influential at court. At that time, Aḥmad assumed extraordinary powers as chief of the Left and Right Boards of the Secretarial Council, and concurrently commissioner of Transport Bureaux of all districts in the empire. By his unwavering opposition, Chang Wen-ch'ien was able to convince Qubilai (temporarily) that the emperor should turn down Aḥmad's proposal to create a separate office, which Aḥmad would direct, to take charge of fiscal management independently of the Secretarial Council. Hsü became aware of this power struggle when Chang Wen-ch'ien sought his advice. In characteristic Confucian manner, Hsü admonished his friend to observe the principles of righteousness and sincerity, follow the way of Heaven, and await events serenely. After staying in Yen-ching for more than a year, Hsü Heng again appealed to Qubilai for permission to leave. His request was granted and he returned to Huai-chou in February 1264. There he fulfilled the qa'an's earlier request by establishing a school in his own house, without ever taking up his earlier imperial appointment as master of the district schools.

In September 1265, Qubilai once again called Hsü Heng to court after Yen-ching had been declared the state capital and its name changed to Chung-tu. This time, the qa'an was anxious to consult as widely as possible on ways of strengthening the central administration after its transfer to the new location. Hsü Heng arrived at Chung-tu in November. He first sought to avoid an audience, citing a recent thunderstorm as an inauspicious portent, but failed and grudgingly complied. When ordered to attend the Secretarial Council for a discussion of state affairs in January of the following year, he again begged to be excused, pleading poor health. Hsü was visited by An-t'ung (*q.v.*), Muqali's twenty-year-old grandson, who had recently been appointed Right chancellor of the Secretarial Council. An-t'ung, a sinicized Mongol prince, had at first declined the office in consideration of his youth and inexperience, but Qubilai had insisted. An admirer of Hsü Heng, An-t'ung sought the master's advice, and Hsü, impressed by the other's sincerity, held the young man in high regard.

In April 1266, Qubilai again summoned Hsü Heng, this time to his field headquarters at Li-chia chuang in T'an-chou, Hopei. During the meeting, Qubilai first chided Hsü for not having supported Tou Mo in denouncing Wang Wen-t'ung's heretical beliefs and devious schemes, adding that he forgave Hsü, but would tolerate

no repetition of that mistake. The incident strongly suggests that Hsü Heng might have had reasons other than his health to avoid Qubilai's presence so persistently after Wang Wen-t'ung's execution. Thereupon the qa'an charged Hsü with the responsibility of advising An-t'ung in his new office, adding that Hsü should feel free to use An-t'ung as a channel through which Hsü might submit his thoughts on government to the emperor himself.

A month later, Hsü Heng was again invited to K'ai-p'ing, now Shang-tu, to be consulted on state affairs. Hsü frequently visited the court and the Secretarial Council, and was held in high regard by the imperial guards and senior officials. (We know that officials of the Secretarial Council took their business to Shang-tu when the emperor resided there in summer.) At this juncture, having achieved political recognition at fifty-seven, Hsü Heng felt it his duty towards Qubilai and his Confucian colleagues to speak out on state affairs, after having remained silent through seven previous summonses. Consequently he drafted a lengthy memorial which was read to Qubilai by an interpreter during a formal audience. At the start of his address, Hsü disclaimed any intention of seeking a government appointment, but stressed the moral aspects of a minister's duty in offering counsel to his ruler. Citing the precept 'if one cannot serve the ruler in accordance with the Way, one must withdraw from his service' (*Analects*, 11:23) to affirm his position, he repeatedly exhorted the emperor to take the *Great Learning* and *Mencius* as his guides in government. Succinctly, he touched on five major items of current affairs: 'a plan to organise the state'; 'essential elements of central administration'; 'difficulties facing the sovereign'; 'agriculture and schools'; and 'pay attention to minor matters.' Hsü argued as follows:

In his 'plan to organise the state,' Hsü Heng claimed firstly that success depended on the sovereign's ability to win the hearts of his subjects. This was achieved by displaying 'love' (*ai*) and 'impartiality' (*kung*). Love put people at ease, and impartiality encouraged them to submit to authority. Only under such conditions could laws be implemented effectively and the country ruled in peace. There were, however, precedents to be followed. In former times, northern peoples who had been able to dominate China for a long time had all adopted the 'Han' methods of government, failing which they could not have lasted. The successes of the Northern Wei, Liao, and Chin demonstrated this fact. It was therefore imperative that the present ruler should follow their lead, remembering, however, that the policy would take at least thirty years to bear fruit, because of the fundamental differences between the Mongol and Chinese cultures. He should aim to make the people prosperous, to develop schools and to improve the armed forces, thus creating the conditions for stable government. Further, Hsü contended that as long as the emperor placed his

trust in his Chinese advisers, followed the enunciated principles, kept greedy men in check and did not expect instant results, he would win the hearts of his subjects and govern the state successfully.

Secondly, in the 'essential elements of central administration,' Hsü stressed the need to appoint the right people to office and to enact effective legislation. He pointed out that laws govern men, but men maintain the laws, the two functions being mutually dependent; examples from the past were many, which the ruler might use as models. To achieve an effective public service, appointees should be rewarded fairly in order to keep them honest. Applicants for government employment should be clearly informed of terms and conditions to avoid later disappointment. Overview agencies were essential to ensure that officials did their duty and to ensure that promotions were made on merit. A comprehensive system of appointment, advancement, and control, should therefore be established, with a view, notably, to maintaining a degree of homogeneity throughout the public service. Similarly, laws should be formulated without delay to govern the hereditary privileges of the nobility, the *yin* appointments, and registration of households. In the last analysis, the effectiveness of laws and regulations depended on the quality of a ruler's servants.

Thirdly, in 'difficulties facing the sovereign,' Hsü Heng enumerated the six major accomplishments of a monarch wishing to achieve good governance. Those were: keeping promises; keeping subordinates honest; appointing good men to office; weeding out the unworthy; winning the people's loyalty; and following the Way of Heaven. Stressing the importance of winning the hearts of one's subjects, Hsü cited the wisdom of the ancient rulers: 'In ancient times, according to the Way of the *Great Learning*, self-improvement was the basis of government. One public word or one public action could set a model for the whole world. Similarly, one reward or one punishment could arouse the public spirit of all-under-Heaven.'

Fourthly, in 'agriculture and schools,' Hsü emphasised the importance of promoting agriculture and schools as joint measures to feed the people and govern the state. He pointed out that all the ancient sage-kings of China dedicated themselves to supporting agriculture and education. On the other hand, Hsü deplored that the current administration should be excessively preoccupied with exacting revenue and keeping people under control. As a result, it had dried up the source of wealth and failed to rely on people's sense of duty. To overcome those deficiencies, the ruler had to provide food and clothing to sustain people's lives, and support religion to nourish their minds. The promotion of agriculture and schools was therefore inseparable. Hsü contended that, under effective agricultural policies, treasuries and stores would be full in ten years. Similarly, by educating the sons of the nobles and commoners alike,

the state would contribute to unifying the people, thus bringing peace throughout the empire within a decade.

Lastly, under the general theme of 'pay attention to minor matters,' Hsü Heng dealt with a number of moral precepts to help the monarch govern in accordance with Confucian teaching. These 'minor matters' referred to details of which the ruler ought never to lose sight. Above all, the monarch should endeavour to 'be accepted by the people.' When the country was at peace, the ruler should 'venerate the principles of tolerance and concession' in order to accommodate minority views – which should help prevent internal strife. Furthermore, the ruler should 'exercise restraint in expressing joy and anger', in order to make his commands clear and rational. He should also 'keep his faith,' for when the ruler is true to his word, the people feel secure. In summary, the primary concern of the monarch should be to secure the good will of the people.

It took Hsü Heng many long hours to present his views, which had to be read and translated. At one stage, seeing that Qubilai showed signs of weariness, Hsü rolled up his scroll and begged permission to withdraw. But the qa'an pulled himself together and told Hsü to go on. At the end, he asked Hsü to transcribe his address for formal submission. The final text, entitled 'Shih-wu wu-shih' (also known as 'Shang shih-wu shu'), is now included in Hsü Heng's *Lu-chai i-shu* (*Extant Writings of Lu-chai*). There are several versions of this document, but the substance remains the same in all.

Hsü's submission marks an important stage in the adoption of Han methods of government by the Mongol emperor. Whenever Hsü Heng made similar presentations thereafter, Qubilai called for the best interpreters to ensure accurate translation. Out of consideration for Hsü Heng's ill health, Qubilai allowed him to attend the Secretarial Council only one day in five, and often had him sent some of the best Central Asian medicines to build up his strength. Clearly Qubilai had taken Hsü Heng into his confidence and valued his opinion highly.

What then is the significance of Hsü Heng's memorial, how novel were his recommendations, and what effect did they have on Qubilai's conduct of government? There is no doubt that Hsü's memorial was as important as those previously submitted by Liu Ping-chung, Hao Ching (*q.v.*), Yao Shu, and others, since it advocated the adoption of the Han system for governing China. In essence, Hsü Heng's recommendations covered similar grounds to those of his colleagues, but his dealt more with general principles than specific details. Noteworthy in Hsü Heng's memorial, however, is its Confucian insistence that the moral leadership of a sage ruler and the rule of law are essential to good government and social harmony. Such views, blending idealism and realism, reflect the thrust of Neo-Confucian thinking since the Sung era. They assumed renewed significance in Hsü Heng's time, however,

when the Chinese literati strove to convert the Mongol ruler to their own traditional beliefs.

It is not easy to ascertain how much was due to Hsü Heng's influence in the subsequent implementation of measures that had been recommended by other Confucian advisers also. Several of the major measures introduced over the following few years embodied some of Hsü's suggestions. Those rulings included: the allocation of fixed salaries and parcels of land to the members of local government offices (Dec. 1266); the appointment of Yao Shu and other Confucian scholars to the Secretarial Council (April 1267); regulations covering hereditary and *yin* appointments (Nov. 1267); the institution of the Censorate (Aug. 1268) and of the National College (Aug. 1269); the promulgation of decrees to promote regional agriculture (Sept. 1269); and other similar measures. It may thus be said that Hsü Heng's was definitely a major contribution towards bringing about the adoption of Han methods of government.

Early in 1267, Hsü Heng was again laid low by his chronic condition. No longer able to attend the Secretarial Council, he obtained permission to return home. But Qubilai appointed Hsü rector of the National College in October, in possible preparation for the establishment of an institute of Confucian studies – whereupon Hsü returned to the capital. The following summer Hsü presented to court a compendium of pronouncements on the art of government by the sage kings and worthy ministers since ancient times, drawn from a variety of sources. Qubilai had requested that his Confucian advisers prepare a series of such documents, which were to become his customary reading matter and source of references. In addition, Hsü and his colleagues began a regular course of lectures on Confucian classics, known as 'The Classics Mat (= Tutorial),' for the benefit of the Mongol rulers.

In early 1269, Qubilai appointed Hsü Heng and other Confucian advisers, notably Liu Ping-chung, Chang Wen-ch'ien, and Wang Hsün, to inquire into the functions and structure of the administrative system. By this time, a number of key agencies had been established on the Chinese model at both central and local levels of governments.

However, the lack of systematic planning, failure to define responsibilities, and inter-service rivalries, had resulted in frequent overlaps and produced a plethora of personnel in the bureaucratic structure. Consequently, Hsü Heng and his colleagues reviewed the political systems of the T'ang and Sung, assessed contemporary situations, and produced a detailed report for the emperor. The proposed blueprint sought to streamline existing services in both the central and local administrations, supplementing them whenever required, and eliminating redundant offices and personnel. It also listed territorial units of administration throughout the country

according to the traditional Chinese pattern. The purpose of this exercise was to define the duties, authority and prerogatives of each instrumentality – executive, administrative civil and military – to prescribe mutual obligations and to ensure functional coordination within the public service. All this was vital since the Mongol rulers were unfamiliar with the procedures of Chinese government. Clearly, the emperor's continuing trust in his Confucian advisers would depend thereafter on the smooth operation of the administrative machinery that they had assembled.

The results of this reform are not clearly documented, but an episode in Hsü Heng's biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) would indicate how ill-defined were the service channels in the central administration. On one occasion after Hsü's blueprint had been submitted in early 1270, Qubilai summoned the senior court officials to discuss communications between the Secretarial Council and the various government agencies, such as the Censorate and the Department of Military Affairs. Hsü suggested that, since the Central Secretariat assisted the Son of Heaven in the administration of the state, other agencies should communicate with the emperor through the Council. Shang T'ing and Kao Ming (1209-74), who held key positions in the Department of Military Affairs and the Censorate, immediately dissented, pointing out that all the leading officials in the agencies were members of the Mongol imperial clan who could not be slighted without risking troublesome repercussions. But Hsü was unmoved, answering, 'I am only concerned here with the machinery of state, not with personalities.' Later, Shang and Kao repeated their objection to Qubilai, but the emperor supported Hsü Heng. Hsü Heng had intended to amplify his blueprint on government in a detailed reference manual on the bureaucratic system, but never found the time to complete the project.

In February 1269, Qubilai commanded his confidant Liu Ping-chung to direct the preparation of a new set of rites and appropriate music for court ceremonies. To that effect, Liu recruited junior Confucian scholars whom he instructed to consult former Chin scholar-officials versed in the matter. Hsü Heng and Hsü Shih-lung (1206-85), then president of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, were to be senior advisors to the project. This was completed in November of that year, prescribing court procedures, music, and the design and colours of costumes to be worn by officials. The code was approved early in the following year; it was greatly to facilitate acceptance of Chinese-style administration as the model for Yüan government until the end of the dynasty (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung).

In the midst of these tasks, Hsü Heng continued to press for the development of schools and public education. In May 1269, the court promulgated a series of ordinances instituting regular courses in the classics and history at the public schools of various districts. They commanded the judicial and surveillance officials to lead

their staff, on the first and fifteenth day of each month, in attending lectures given by the educational officials in the local schools. They were to participate in discussions of the subject matter with the students and the public in attendance. Additionally, those officials were charged with finding suitable persons in each locality to instruct the peasants during the latter's leisure to enhance moral awareness and promote social propriety. These measures were later to result in the establishment of 'community schools.' The authors of the ordinances in question have not been identified, but since their prescriptions reflect Hsü Heng's educational principles so clearly, it appears that he must himself have been involved in drafting them.

In October of the same year, Wang E, the executive Han-lin academician, submitted a memorial advocating the restoration of the civil service examination system. The proposal deeply impressed Qubilai, but it was held in abeyance for various reasons, notably the unsettled question of examination curricula – belle-lettres versus classical exegesis. It is not known whether Hsü Heng concerned himself with the matter, although he would definitely have favoured classical exegesis and practical subjects. He eventually formulated a plan for the examination syllabus when the court further deliberated on the subject two years later.

In February 1270, after those major tasks had been completed, Qubilai elevated Hsü Heng to be the assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, thereby involving him directly in the administrative function. Surprised by the move, Hsü immediately begged to decline the post, pleading personal inadequacy. Qubilai rejected Hsü's request despite repeated appeals. Hsü reluctantly followed the members of the Secretarial Council to Shang-tu in June to attend to his new duties at the summer palace.

Whatever the validity of Hsü Heng's excuses for declining the new post, he must have acted first and foremost out of fear of direct involvement in court politics. The possibility of clashing with the powerful Aḥmad was certainly Hsü's main worry and indeed conflict was soon to erupt. In early 1266, Aḥmad had persuaded Qubilai to establish an ad hoc agency under the Secretarial Council known as the Office for Regulating State Expenditure, and to appoint him its head (see the biography of Aḥmad). Then, in early 1270, at the time of Hsü Heng's appointment, Qubilai replaced this agency on Aḥmad's advice with a centralised financial administration, the Presidential Council: it was to remain independent of the Secretarial Council for two years. Aḥmad was made its director of political affairs, with the powerful Chinese administrator Chang I (d. 1282) as his deputy. Aḥmad thus found himself invested with supreme authority in fiscal matters. Designed allegedly to produce more revenue for the state, many of Aḥmad's policies served also to enrich him at public expense. This made the Muslim a prime target for attacks by the Confucian

scholar-officials, including Hsü Heng, who submitted several memorials to curb his excesses.

Before long, Aḥmad tried further to extend his powers by having his own son (Husain) made deputy administrator of military affairs. This was opposed outright by Hsü Heng and his colleagues. Hsü pointed out that the state's authority rested on its control of the army, the people, and the treasury. Since Aḥmad had already gained control of the people and of the treasury as head of the Presidential Council, too much power would be concentrated in a single family if his son were given so much authority over the army. Whereupon, Qubilai asked whether Hsü feared that Aḥmad might stage a coup d'état. Hsü replied that even though Aḥmad might not, he certainly would be given the means to do so. The emperor had Aḥmad informed of this remark. Enraged by the innuendo, Aḥmad berated Hsü Heng who calmly observed that men had turned traitors in the past because they had been allowed too much power, adding that should Aḥmad have no such intention, why would he want to carry so much authority? Thus rebuffed, Aḥmad grew yet more hostile to Hsü Heng, and undertook to defame him.

After repeated failures to check Aḥmad's policies and appointments, Hsü could bear the situation no longer and became determined to leave his post. To that effect, he submitted a plea to An-t'ung, the Right chancellor, repeating the reasons for his resignation given in his earlier petition to Qubilai. At first, An-t'ung sought to dissuade Hsü, but finally supported him. Qubilai approved Hsü Heng's request, but summoned Hsü's son Shih-k'o, to offer him his father's post. Shih-k'o declined, lest he appear to condone nepotism. As neither Qubilai nor his Confucian advisers wished Hsü Heng to leave the court, Qubilai, acting on the recommendation of Chang Wen-ch'ien and others, offered Hsü in April 1271 a new appointment as senior academician of the Chi-hsien Academy and concurrently rector of the National College.

Hsü Heng, then sixty-two-years old, willingly accepted. This appointment marked an important stage in his career for it helped him realise his cherished wish of promoting Confucian education under state patronage. In his 1266 memorial to Qubilai, Hsü had already stressed the need to promote schools and provide Confucian education for young Mongol nobles as well as for Chinese commoners. While serving in the Secretarial Council, Hsü personally tutored eleven sons of Mongol and Central Asian functionaries, selected by the emperor to undertake Confucian studies. (This evidently followed the tradition dating back to Ögödei when a National College was established *ca.* 1233 in Yen-ching under the administration of Yang Wei-chung to provide Confucian education to the children of the foremost Mongol and Chinese notables.) Hsü's colleagues Tou Mo, Yao Shu, Chang Wen-ch'ien and others had also

called for a state college in the capital as well as for public schools in the country. Hsü Heng's appointment as head of the National College was the outcome of those representations.

In accepting the new assignment, Hsü recognised the importance of training the young of the Mongol, Central Asian and Chinese élite in the Han methods of government. At this time, his health may also have been sufficiently improved for him to accept such an arduous responsibility. A fully-fledged Directorate for the National College was subsequently established in the former building of the Bureau of Military Affairs in the southern section of the capital. This school was reserved for the children of nobles and officials to be prepared for government services. Hsü Heng took complete charge of the college's organisation, appointing administrators and instructors, recruiting students, and drawing up the regulations and curricula; he also lectured and paid meticulous attention to the conduct and well-being of the students.

The National College was headed by the rector, responsible for the overall administration and assisted by the dean of studies. Under them were two instructors, one professor and one assistant instructor. Those personages were in turn assisted by a number of 'monitors' (*p'ei-tu*) whose role was to provide personal guidance in the students' studies. The monitors were scholars of sufficient distinction to be recommended for their post by court officials above the third grade. Hsü Heng had personally recruited twelve of his former pupils, now all accomplished scholars, as monitors at the college. They formed the core of the teaching staff under Hsü Heng and his associates, and continued to serve the National College in similar capacities after Hsü's departure.

The students, ranging in age from seven to fourteen and above, were recruited from four categories of families: the imperial households, leading Mongol clans, the Imperial Guard, and Chinese court officials above the seventh grade. The intake of the college was originally set at two hundred students, under twenty monitors, but only one hundred students were actually admitted. Of those, half were Mongols, and the rest were *se-mu* or 'ethnics' (mostly Central Asians) and Chinese in equal proportions. The course began with only eighty students and twelve monitors. These students attended either pre-college courses (from eight to fourteen *sui*) or college, according to age and ability. They were divided into classes under the guidance of the monitors; textbooks and curricula were prescribed for each level. The monitors played a key role in implementing Hsü Heng's innovative 'guidance system': not only did they assist students in exegetical reading, but also served as models of exemplary conduct in daily life. In that role, their tuition was essential for the Mongol and Central Asian students, who were less literate in Chinese and generally unfamiliar with Chinese customs.

Basic textbooks for the pre-college students were the *Hsiao-ching* (*Classic of Filial Piety*), the *Elementary Learning*, as well as the *Four Books*. Besides the *Four Books*, the college students' reading list included the *Five Classics* and other classical and historical works. The *Elementary Learning* and *Great Learning* were given special attention since they provided the moral training and guidance for advancement to higher studies and public office. In particular, the *Elementary Learning* summarises Chu Hsi's basic doctrines for moral and practical education under the headings of 'organising instruction,' 'clarifying moral relations' and 'respecting the person.' It also provides an essential vocabulary for exegetical reading and historical illustrations of moral conduct. The prescribed version was Chu Hsi's collected commentaries, but Hsü Heng also used his own elaboration, the *General Meaning of Elementary Learning*, to facilitate the students' comprehension. As to the *Four Books*, besides the collected commentaries compiled by Chu Hsi, Hsü also introduced his own notes composed in the vernacular. Those included the *Essentials of The Great Learning* (*Ta-hsüeh yao-lüeh*), and the 'straightforward explanation' (*chih-chieh*) of the *Great Learning* and the *Doctrine of the Mean*. Both the *Elementary Learning* and the *Four Books* had been popularly used by Confucian scholars since Chu Hsi's time as primers in a system of universal schooling because they related to the everyday life of common people. Still, it is noteworthy that Hsü Heng judged those works to be appropriate for the education of culturally-distant Mongols and Central Asians.

Additionally, Hsü Heng wrote three major teaching texts in rhyme to facilitate memorisation, namely: the *Chi-ku ch'ien-wen*, a glossary of 1,000 essential characters presented in a brief narrative of historical events from antiquity to the Mongol conquest; the *She-ch'i ko*, a reference manual for the performance of rites; and the *Pien-nien ko k'uo*, an historical chronology for instruction in elementary arithmetic, extending from the ancient kings to the last Chin emperor.

The study programs consisted generally of reading and recitation, tuition in rituals and ceremonies, writing and calligraphy, as well as instruction in elementary arithmetic. Hsü's teaching methods are vividly documented by his leading disciple Yeh-lü Yu-shang, appointed rector of the National College in 1287, in an account called 'Kuo-hsüeh shih-chi' now included in Hsü's extant works. According to this report, Hsü Heng had developed a program of instruction based on his belief that human nature was perfectible, although people's abilities differed. Since men were fundamentally good despite their imperfections, the purpose of education was to identify and correct such faults. Working at a pace commensurate with their aptitudes, students should be left to absorb what they were taught, rather than be exposed to too broad and too intensive a program. Consequently, Hsü exercised great

patience and tolerance in instruction, and admonished his associates to do likewise. In teaching the classics, for instance, he made his pupils read the passages over and over, even scores of times, until they completely mastered them. If the meaning still remained unclear, he would discuss it in the light of existing commentaries until it was correctly understood. Only by such means could the students fully understand what they were learning and prepare to apply their knowledge steadfastly throughout their life.

Further, Hsü strove for unity in knowledge and in education. He was not concerned merely with abstract instruction, but also with the pursuit of practical skills. He often urged his students to ponder what they were taught and to consider how they would apply classical learning to actual problems. He would discuss contemporary affairs to illustrate his points. For instance, in his 'straightforward explanation' of the *Great Learning*, commenting on the passage in the classical text dealing with money and grain, he remarked that it was bad for a prime minister to be solely concerned with money. This was apparently meant as a criticism of Aḥmad; the quote served to admonish the Mongol and Central Asian students not to follow the steps of this greedy functionary when they entered public service.

Similarly, because Hsü Heng regarded the students' enlightenment as a main goal of education, he endeavoured to communicate with them directly and personally on a variety of topics about which students were encouraged to form an opinion. This method had been commonly used as a means of intellectual stimulation by Neo-Confucian scholars since Sung times. Some of the questions and answers between Hsü Heng and his students have been preserved in the *Yü-lu* (*Recorded Sayings*); they provide an important insight into the master's teaching methods.

Hsü's didactic aims were manifold. For instance, when directing his pupils to practise calligraphy by seeking to imitate the T'ang stylist Yen Chen-ch'ing (709-85), he admonished them not just to master the elegant strokes, but also to achieve thereby a character-forming spirit of reverence. When teaching arithmetic, using the historical chronology *Pien-nien ko k'uo* as a textbook, he sought to awaken his students' interest in the study of history. When giving instruction in the classics, philosophy, and historical writings, he would evoke examples from the past to impress on his pupils the correct attitude towards life and people. All this served to widen the students' horizon beyond the pursuit of pure knowledge and practical skills.

Finally, Hsü Heng was keenly anxious to cultivate his students' enthusiasm for study. This was particularly important in the case of the Mongol and Central Asian pupils because of their alien cultural background. Hsü devised various extracurricular activities to that effect. For instance, he assigned the older, more advanced Mongol students to perform Chinese rites. When the junior students showed signs of

inattention, they were made to practise forms of courtesy. In addition, they also had to take part in archery and other contests, and the losers were punished by being made to read the text-book several times. These activities served several purposes. They helped improve the students' behaviour, teach them manners, and enhance their awareness of the Confucian moral-ethical code in social intercourse.

Hsü Heng and his fellow instructors were no less devoted to the students' moral development as an integral part of education. This special concern grew out of Hsü's belief that the primary objective of education should be to mould men's character and foster good conduct. He considered that men were innately good, and that a teacher's duty was to cultivate his pupils' virtue, rather than impose sets of arbitrary rulings. In the true spirit of the Sung Neo-Confucian tradition, Hsü Heng preferred to instill in the students a sense of shame so that they became aware of their own shortcomings and corrected those without coercion. He treated all his pupils as his own children, paid careful heed to their upbringing, and avoided harsh discipline. Consequently, as Hsü's disciples recalled, a spirit of mutual affection pervaded the college and the students took to Hsü's instruction with genuine zeal.

Throughout his tenure, Hsü Heng spent his time at the National College attending to administrative matters. He left the care of his personal affairs to his eldest son Shih-k'o; he entertained no guests, ate simple meals at the college, and spent long hours at work. Although Hsü presided over the college for only two years, his enlightened program of education and unflagging devotion to teaching achieved impressive results. He had trained a new generation of Chinese and Mongol leaders in the Confucian tradition, many of whom became distinguished officials and administrators. Some of the more illustrious are mentioned together with Hsü Heng's disciples in an appendix to Hsü's biography in the *Sung Yüan hsüeh-an* by Huang Tsung-hsi. All are praised for their moral integrity and outstanding achievements in statecraft and scholarship. Hsü Heng's program remained virtually unchanged after his departure. Hsü's immediate successor as rector of the National College was his close colleague Wang Hsün, to be followed in 1287 by Hsü's leading disciple Yeh-lü Yu-shang.

Late in 1271, Hsü Heng was involved with his colleagues Yao Shu, Tung Wen-chung (q.v.), Yang Kung-i (1225-94), and others, in a debate at court on the substance of the proposed civil service examinations. The discussion was prompted by a recent memorial submitted by a scholar-official of the defunct Chin regime, T'u-tan Kung-lü, now a reader-in-waiting in the Hanlin Academy, advocating the revival of the examination system for the recruitment of public servants. In the event, T'u-tan endeavoured to exploit Qubilai's known preference for the more traditional Buddhism over Ch'an Buddhism by drawing a similar distinction between the original form of

Confucianism supposedly fostered by the examinations of the conventional type, and Neo-Confucianism, which he sought to discredit by equating it with Ch'an Buddhism. Perplexed by the analogy, Qubilai summoned Hsü Heng and others for clarification. In response, Tung Wen-chung did not discuss Neo-Confucianism, but asserted that scholars should concentrate on studying the classics and exploring the ways of Confucius and Mencius, rather than compose prose and poetry. Yang Kung-i expressed a similar view; he proposed that the candidates should be examined on their understanding of the *Five Classics* and *Four Books* and on their knowledge of history as related to contemporary problems. The opinions of Hsü Heng and Yao Shu are not known, but both men would evidently have stressed the timeliness of the Chu Hsi school and assigned primary importance to the classics, history, and practical subjects in the examination curricula.

Confucian scholars in early Yüan fell into two major groups according to their intellectual background and geographical affiliation. One group, men like Wang E, Wang P'an, T'u-tan Kung-lü, were adherents of the classical Confucianism of late Chin, or were scholars associated with the Tung-p'ing region in Shantung (see the biography of Yen Shih), who favoured above all achievements in the belles-lettres. The others were adherents of Sung Neo-Confucianism headed by Hsü Heng, Yao Shu, Tou Mo, and other northern scholars, who cultivated moral values and practical learning under the inspiration of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. Those groups represented two intellectual traditions; though both desired the revival of the civil service examinations, they disagreed on the basic tenets of Confucian tradition and the particular aspects to be emphasised in the examination syllabuses. According to the treatise on selection of officials of the *Yüan History*, Hsü Heng had devised a program for the implementation of the examination system that favoured classical exegesis at the expense of literary composition. But the academic debates continued, greatly complicating the political issues and thereby delaying the resumption of the examinations. Nevertheless, when the process was finally revived after the enthronement of Emperor Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) in 1313-1315, the curriculum comprised the *Five Classics* and *Four Books* with the commentaries by Chu Hsi and other Sung Neo-Confucians, and placed primary emphasis on command of classical exegesis and practical subjects. Hsü Heng and his colleagues had triumphed.

In early 1273, Qubilai considered launching an all-out offensive against the Southern Sung to complete the conquest of China. This was shortly after the Mongol forces had seized Hsiang-yang and Fan-ch'eng, the twin pillars of the Sung defence in modern Hupei. To justify his intention and gain support for it, Qubilai made a show of consulting his advisers, although his mind had already been made up. Hsü Heng

was one of the few who opposed the campaign. In a characteristic Confucian argument, Hsü contended that it would be preferable for the Mongol ruler to cultivate his own virtue to such a degree as to charm the Sung people into submission: if military action were undertaken, casualties would be high on both sides with no guarantee of victory. Hsü's advice fell on deaf ears. Thereupon, on the pretext of having to rebury his deceased parents, Hsü begged leave from his post at the National College and was subsequently summoned to Shang-tu for an audience. It appears that Hsü may have resigned in protest against Qubilai's planned invasion of Southern Sung. The real reason, however, was his frustration at the powerful Aḥmad's repeated attempts to curtail Hsü's prerogatives and to reduce the college students' stipend, much to the latter's alarm.

Hsü Heng's feelings are clearly revealed in statements made by Wang P'an and Yao Shu, two of his closest colleagues in the Secretarial Council, at the time of Hsü Heng's arrival at Shang-tu. On that occasion, Qubilai sent Chang Wen-ch'ien to enquire of Wang and Yao what they thought of Hsü Heng's request. Wang P'an pointed out that Hsü had made a major contribution to the state by his teaching methods; since many of his students were about to complete their training as officials, Hsü should be asked to stay. Wang suspected that Hsü may have wanted to leave the National College because, as an honest and frugal man, Hsü felt uneasy drawing a handsome stipend while student enrolments declined. Consequently, Wang recommended increasing student numbers: his advice was taken. (However, the decree admitting three hundred students to the college was only made in 1311.) On the other hand, Yao Shu thought that Hsü Heng's action might affect the Way; yet, as a man of principle, Hsü must have considered his decision, and should therefore not be forced to change his mind. Yao's view apparently convinced Wang P'an. Thus the two advised Qubilai that Hsü Heng, though only sixty-four, should be allowed to retire on grounds of health and age, in addition to Hsü's personal obligation in the matter of his parents' burial. After receiving similar advice from Tou Mo and Wang E, Qubilai approved Hsü's request, and the latter thereupon returned to his place of birth.

In October, acting on the recommendation of Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu, Tou Mo and others, the qa'an appointed Wang Hsün, tutor of the heir apparent Jingim, to the vacant rectorship of the National College. Wang Hsün retained the existing staff, the structure of the college and the teaching programs, so that the foundation laid by Hsü Heng was preserved intact and perpetuated in state education.

During the following two years, Hsü Heng lived quietly in Ho-nei, spending his time in study, teaching, and tending the fields. In July 1276, he was bidden by Qubilai Qa'an chiefly on the recommendation of Chang I, Chang Wen-ch'ien and

Wang Hsün, to take part in the revision of the existing calendar. A new calendar was urgently needed because the old Chin *Ta-ming li* had become inaccurate; and the formal surrender of the last Sung emperor early that year provided an auspicious occasion for reform. Qubilai had a special commission headed by Wang Hsün established to that effect. Chang I, the vice-commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and Chang Wen-ch'ien, then senior academician of the Chao-wen Academy, were appointed to oversee the commission, whereas astronomers such as Kuo Shou-ching (*q.v.*), Yang Kung-i and others were recruited to provide technical expertise. Hsü Heng's collaboration was sought because he was also skilled in the subject; he accepted the appointment gladly.

From late in 1276, Hsü Heng resided in Ta-tu while participating in the compilation of the new calendar. In March 1278, having reappointed Hsü as senior academician of the Chi-hsien Academy, Qubilai had him oversee the newly-established Department of Calendrical Affairs which was under the administration of Wang Hsün and Kuo Shou-ching. It is not certain how much Hsü Heng actually contributed to the new calendar which appeared to have been largely the work of Kuo Shou-ching, Yang Kung-i, and other astronomers and mathematicians. However, Hsü had joined with his colleagues in recommending a series of measures to collate the Chin and Sung calendars as the basis for the revision. They requested that astronomical instruments and calendrical writings of the Sung be collected and studied, observatory stations be established all over the country, and officials be appointed to make observations and collect primary data (see the biography of Kuo Shou-ching). It is probable that Hsü Heng also assisted in editing the new calendar in the classical style. A thoroughly revised calendar was eventually completed and presented to court in late 1280. With great satisfaction, Qubilai bestowed on it the name *Shou-shih li* ('Calendar for Fixing the Seasons'), and ordered that it be adopted early the following year. Hsü Heng's health had deteriorated in July 1280, and, with Jingim's support, Hsü secured Qubilai's leave to retire two months later. On this occasion, the qa'an also appointed Hsü's eldest son Shih-k'o as general administrator of the Huai-Meng district in order that he should be on hand to care for his father at home.

In early 1281, a few months after he returned to Ho-nei, Hsü Heng fell seriously ill. Aware of his condition and versed in medicine, Hsü realised that his death was near. He rejected his physician's assurance that he was recovering, maintaining that what appeared to be a welcome remission was in fact the sure sign of an incurable condition. Consequently, Hsü ceased taking medicine, but insisted on participating in the spring sacrifice to his ancestors, to set an example for his descendants. Then on

23 March, having stepped out of doors leaning on a cane, Hsü chanted a *tz'u* poem by Chu Hsi, and died at the age of seventy-two.

When the news of Hsü Heng's death was known, Qubilai and the court officials were shocked and grieved, none more than his friends and disciples, many of whom travelled long distances to pay homage. After the period of mourning, Hsü Heng was buried on 5 May among his ancestral graves in Li-feng village, north-east of Ho-nei. Before his death, Hsü had confided to his eldest son that he regretted having been spoiled by fame, and urged his son neither to request a canonical name nor to erect an epitaph for him, but only to inscribe the characters 'Mr. Hsü's Grave' on the tombstone. His contention was that a person, worthy or not, did not need the eulogies of an epitaph: his son heeded his injunction. Later, Hsü's leading disciple Yeh-lü Yu-shang wrote a short account of Hsü Heng's life and a brief chronology of his career for the records of history.

Hsü Heng was highly praised both by his contemporaries and by later scholars for his personality, erudition, and above all, commitment to the Confucian Way. He had the earthy, modest nature of a country gentleman, frank, honest, and sincere, but he also showed the rugged, strong-willed character of an embattled scholar during crises — serious, upright, and extremely committed to his profession. Those outstanding qualities had earned him the admiration and respect of his colleagues and disciples, as well as of the Mongol ruler and many non-Han officials.

Hsü Heng had two wives, néés Ching and Ho respectively, who together bore him four sons and three daughters; the latter produced a number of grandchildren. His sons, the three elder by his first wife, were Shih-k'o, Shih-hsün, Shih-fu, and Shih-ching. The eldest and the youngest achieved distinction in the public service; the second remained in private life, whereas the third son died in childhood. Hsü Shih-k'o, who had learned to speak Mongolian, rose to be general administrator firstly of Wei-hui district, then of Hsiang-yang, and died in office as general administrator of Kuang-p'ing district. He was given the posthumous rank of minister of Rites. Hsü Shih-ching became rector of the National College and executive academician, ending his career as chief censor.

Shortly after his death, apparently much against his wishes, Hsü Heng was showered with posthumous honours by the later Mongol rulers and state officials. In 1293, the prefect of Hui-chou erected the San-hsien t'ang ('Hall of Three Worthies') to house the spirit-tablets of Hsü Heng, Yao Shu and Wang P'an. Four years later (1297), Emperor Temür (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1294-1307) conferred on Hsü Heng the canonical name Wen-cheng ('Cultured and Correct'). Then in 1309 Qaišan (Wu-tsung, r. 1307-11) raised him to the dignity of Grand Tutor and made him Duke-of-state of Wei. In 1313, Ayurbarvada decreed that Hsü Heng be reburied as a

companion of the sage in Confucius' temple in the capital, and offered sacrifices, as were nine other leading Sung Confucian scholars. In the early years of Yen-yu (1314-20), the emperor ordered that the Lu-chai Private Academy (Lu-chai shu-yüan) be established in Ching-chao, in memory of Hsü Heng's contribution to education. Then in 1335, at the command of Toqön Temür (Shun-ti, r. 1333-67), the Han-lin academician and rector of the National College, Ou-yang Hsüan (1283-1357), composed the text for the inscription on the 'spirit-way stele' in Hsü's honor. This epitaph provides the basic account of Hsü Heng's life and career, and constitutes an important supplement to Hsü's earlier biography by Su T'ien-chüeh (1294-1352) in his *Kuo(Yüan)-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* completed in 1328.

Hsü Heng was not a prolific writer by contemporary standards since, as a dedicated educator, he spent his adult life teaching rather than cultivating philosophical speculation. With few exceptions, his philosophical essays are limited, as mentioned earlier, to discussions of the classics and Neo-Confucian commentaries, mainly for teaching purposes. They were, moreover, presented in a simple, unadorned style and often in the vernacular; Hsü did not strive for originality or stylistic effects, seeking only to convert the uninitiated to the Confucian Way. These writings include his elaborations of the *Book of Changes*, the *Classic of Filial Piety*, Chu Hsi's *Elementary Learning*, and the *Four Books*. A few of those items were printed as independent editions, but most of his contributions were incorporated in the collected works compiled by his disciples and by later scholars. This collection, known as *Lu-chai i-shu*, underwent successive compilations and revisions. It was first assembled by a local prefect and engraved in 6 *chüan* in 1306. This edition, however, was only a partial compilation of Hsü Heng's writings since it did not include his elaborations of the classics and Neo-Confucian commentaries, and other miscellaneous writings.

In 1518, a new edition of Hsü's writings entitled *Lu-chai ch'üan-shu* in 7 *chüan*, was compiled by Hao Kuan, son-in-law of a descendant of Hsü Heng. This again is a meagre collection, and efforts to produce fuller collections of Hsü Heng's writings continued. In 1525, an enlarged edition of Hsü's works, also entitled *Lu-chai i-shu*, was printed by Hsiao Ming-feng, a noted scholar and publisher. It included most, if not all, of Hsü Heng's extant writings in 10 *chüan*, including 2 *chüan* of appendixes. During the next decades, two new 6-*chüan* editions of Hsü's works appeared, probably based on the original Yüan edition or the 1518 revised edition.

Then in 1596 another extended edition of Hsü Heng's writings, also called *Lu-chai i-shu* in 11 *chüan* with 3 *chüan* of appendixes, was printed by an official in Huai-ch'ing fu. This was probably the edition of *Lu-chai i-shu* in 14 *chüan* copied into the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* collection in the 1770s. The text of the *Lu-chai i-shu* copied into

the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* was reproduced photo-lithographically by the Taiwan Commercial Press in 1973. This edition includes practically all of Hsü Heng's extant writings as well as a rich collection of biographical and bibliographical materials.

Hsü Heng must be hailed as an outstanding personality for his unwavering commitment to promoting the Neo-Confucian tradition and to applying its principles in government and education. With many of his contemporaries, he responded to Qubilai's call in the hope of reviving the Confucian Way at a time when Han culture was threatened by alien conquerors, and of converting the 'barbarian' rulers to the civilised world of the Chinese. The qa'an called repeatedly for Hsü's services not only because he appreciated Hsü's modesty, character, and commitment, but also because he valued his wisdom and resourcefulness in strengthening the Mongol regime. Yet, Hsü Heng rejected all personal participation in government; he coveted neither honours nor wealth, and, to avoid political involvement, had actually ignored several of Qubilai's summonses. His true concern went to promoting Confucian education for Chinese and Mongols. Only in 1266 did he at last submit a substantial memorial touching on affairs of state. In a passage seeking to reconcile his service of the 'barbarian' Mongol with his sense of Confucian duty, Hsü, citing Confucius as his authority, claimed that the mind of the sage reflected the very essence of heaven and earth, whether or not the conquerors whom it enlightened had received the sublime mandate.

Hsü Heng's memorial made a significant contribution to statecraft by urging the Mongol ruler to regard moral conduct and improvement of self as the proper basis for all laws and institutions. In no uncertain terms, Hsü exhorted Qubilai to win the hearts of the people by deeds of love and justice – the cornerstone of Confucian public morality – in order to achieve peace and order. More importantly, Hsü used those arguments to press for dispensing Confucian education to Mongol and Central Asian youngsters so as to produce a new generation of leaders capable of upholding the government.

From his late thirties, Hsü was steadfastly committed to the orthodox tradition of Chu Hsi's Neo-Confucianism; he renounced his previous classical learning, and rejected both Buddhism and Taoism, exhorting his disciples and people at large to do likewise. Although Hsü did not condemn the Buddhist faithful, an eminent local monk, overwhelmed by the master's grace, ceased all effort to attract converts. As to religious Taoism, Hsü Heng declared that it can lead neither to long life nor to immortality, since, whereas everything in the world needs a paradigm, there is none for either immortality or extreme longevity. He also condemned the Taoist priests of his time for indulging in mundane and worldly activities, and betraying their patriarch's advocacy of purity and non-action as the way to betterment. Hsü was less

critical of Lao-tzu's teachings: while pointing out the drawbacks of this philosophy of withdrawal and retreat in an assertive and positive world, Hsü himself benefitted by its practice as the way to overcome crisis and uncertainty. Nevertheless, as a dedicated and practical Confucian, his outlook was wholly committed to the orthodox Ch'eng-Chu tradition and remained unaffected by other schools or religious doctrines.

Indeed, Hsü Heng's philosophy displays little deviation from orthodox Cheng-Chu Neo-Confucianism. He conceived of mind, nature and heaven as the embodiment of a single principle (*li*) identified as the *t'ai-chi*, or Great Ultimate. This metaphysical principle is the order of all things in the universe, conferring on them their individuality. All of nature, including man, is formed by the interaction of *yin* and *yang* according to this principle. To explain the evolution of the universe, Hsü adopted the 'law of reversal' of the *Book of Changes* and the numerological theories of Shao Yung (1011-77), developing his own independent views on the fluctuations of *yin* and *yang* as represented in the configurations of the hexagrams of the *Book of Changes*.

The gist of Hsü Heng's philosophy of human nature (*hsing*) was derived from the *Hsin-ching* (*Classic of the Mind*), an exposition by Chen Te-hsiu (1178-1235) of Chu Hsi's ideas on the relationship between the cosmological order and human ethics. Since man, like the whole universe, is constituted of *ch'i* or 'material force,' the *ch'i* of the human mind likewise has good and evil aspects, and evolves, causing birth, ageing and death. Human nature then is determined by the nature of the *ch'i* innate in the individual, and the human mind is a manifestation of that nature or principle (*li*), which makes it good, but the emotions emanating from the *ch'i* are both good and evil. Human nature is the substance (*t'i*) and the emotions the functioning (*yung*) of the mind. If the *ch'i* of the mind is purified, the principle will become evident and the emotions (*ch'ing*) controlled. The resultant enlightened mind can identify with the universe, producing both harmony and the model for ethical conduct in government and society.

Hsü Heng extended these concepts in an attempt to clarify the relationship between human nature (*hsing*) and destiny or fate (*ming*), a controversial subject in Neo-Confucianism. Like Chu Hsi, Hsü defined *ming* as that with which Heaven endows an individual, and *hsing* as the innate qualities of that endowment. While Hsü believed that destiny was inexorable, he remained optimistic, considering Heaven to be benign: if an individual cultivated his goodness and avoided evil, he could thus become a worthy man and enjoy peace. This way of thinking vividly reflects the delicate position of a Chinese literatus living under the unpredictable rule of the Mongols.

Hsü Heng elaborated his ethical concepts practically by defining the Neo-Confucian mean (*chung*) as 'rectifying the mind' (*cheng-hsin*), and harmony (*ho*) as 'sincerity of the will' (*ch'eng-i*). He asserted, through the concept of total participation, that if the mind is 'rectified,' the universe shall also be 'rectified.' Following Chu Hsi, Hsü considered benevolence (*jen*) to be the foremost of the four Confucian virtues, for it was thought to be the source of creation in that it embodied the principles of nourishment, love, and impartiality innate in man. As such it was capable of informing the mind of man, as well as heaven and earth.

The thrust of Hsü Heng's philosophy was not directed to metaphysical speculation, but rather to the pragmatic application of the ethical and governmental consequences of those speculations. Therefore he especially emphasised self-improvement (*hsiu-shen*), which rests on the 'rectification of the mind' and 'sincerity of the will.' These in turn are founded on study and education, and so Hsü devoted himself to the creation of educational programs for moral training and the pursuit of useful knowledge. He believed that one could cultivate the human virtues to their utmost by following his prescribed study program, and implementing his precepts of 'setting up instruction,' 'clarifying human relations,' 'revering the person,' and the doctrines of 'manifesting the brilliant virtue' (*ming ming-te*) and 'renewing the people' (*hsin-min*). 'Rectification of the mind' here is the key to self-improvement since, although naturally endowed with goodness in the form of principle, a man is liable to be misled by selfish desires (*ssu-yü*) resulting from the evil influences in life. Convinced of the perfectibility of human nature, he believed that when the mind was rectified, the self would be cultivated, the will made sincere, and all human virtues realised. Therein resided the principle of 'governing men through self-discipline' which provided the basis of a harmonious moral, social and political order.

Like most Neo-Confucian philosophers, Hsü Heng stressed the 'investigation of things' (*ko-wu*) for achieving an 'extension of knowledge' (*chih-chih*) and the 'rectification of the mind.' There had been heated controversy between Chu Hsi and his rival Lu Chiu-yüan (1139-92) over the interpretation of this important doctrine. Hsü apparently dismissed the controversy as relating merely to different ways of reaching the same goal.

Hsü Heng's Neo-Confucianism is most remarkable for its application to realpolitik and universal education: the 'learning of the emperors and kings' (*ti-wang hsüeh*) was to influence imperial rulers and design a program of study for universal education. He advocated its adoption by the Mongol sovereign, stressing the importance of promoting agriculture and establishing public schools to strengthen the foundation of a moral society. Hsü was consequently given an opportunity to put his

educational philosophy to work when he was appointed rector of the National College.

In sum, Hsü's optimism about man's perfectibility convinced him that by such an education in practical morality, an individual could develop his potential for wisdom, and the ruler could become a sage-king. Most significantly, Hsü Heng considered these doctrines practical, and had faith moreover in their universal efficacy. Steeped in that confidence, he committed himself unreservedly to what he must have regarded as his sacred task.

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H.L. Chan

27. LIU YIN (1249-1293)

Liu Yin, a distinguished scholar and philosopher of the early Yüan, was a native of Jung-ch'eng county, Hsiung-chou, in Pao-ting district, modern Hopei. Born on 22 February 1249, he was given the name Yin (written with the radical meaning 'horse') by his father Liu Shu because of a dream the latter had had immediately before the boy's birth. Liu Yin's father, who had not yet had an heir by his spouse née Yang by the age of forty, dreamt that a spirit delivered a baby boy on horseback and then departed with the words, 'Raise him well.' Because the baby was born upon the father's awakening, he named him Yin, 'Piebald Horse.' Liu Yin retained this name until his twenties, when he dropped the 'horse' radical. This effectively changed the meaning of his name to 'Successor.' His earlier courtesy name, Meng-chi, 'Dreaming of a fast horse,' was also changed, this time to the homophone Meng-chi, 'Dreaming of good fortune.' Although the superficial meaning of these names is clear, we can only speculate as to what prompted their adoption, for Liu Yin left no writings on the subject.

Liu Yin had several pen names. The best-known was Ching-hsiu which he adopted after he reached adulthood. It was taken from Chu-ko Liang's (181-234) famous phrase, *ching i hsiu shen* ('quiescence wherewith to cultivate the self'). Later, he also styled himself Lei-ch'i chen-yin ('True hermit from the Lei Stream'), Mu-ch'i Weng ('Old man from the Mu Stream'), Ch'iao Weng ('Old man of the Woods'), Fan Weng ('Old man from Fan'), and Hsüeh-tsui Weng ('Old man of the "Snowy Green Studio"'). These names were adopted from either his place of residence or his studio.

Despite his early death at forty-four, Liu Yin became famous for his erudition, poetry, and character. Of these three, it is the last for which he is best known today. Liu Yin was one of the leading literati of north China in early Yüan times, and he was invited by Qubilai Qa'an to assume an official post. But Liu Yin served only for an extremely short period and subsequently remained completely detached from the political milieu. The reasons for this were philosophical, for he dedicated his life to maintaining a personal integrity that required the preservation of distance between himself and the political arena. In doing so, he remained faithful to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, the guiding lights of an ethical philosophy which stressed devotion to the pursuit of moral progress. Liu Yin has therefore been aptly called a leading representative of 'Confucian eremitism' by F. W. Mote. Ordinarily, Confucianism encouraged public service. Men with moral and intellectual gifts were bound to dedicate themselves to the cause of good government. Liu Yin consistently

refused to do this, insisting instead on living as a private teacher in his home district.

In moral terms, Liu Yin is often matched with Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), a Confucian scholar who served Qubilai as a court literatus and political adviser. Liu and Hsü were paired in late Yüan times by T'ao Tsung-i (*ca.* 1315-*ca.* 1402) in his *Cho-keng lu*. According to T'ao, Hsü, en route to take up an office at the Mongol court, had called on Liu in 1260. When Liu challenged Hsü to explain why he had accepted the appointment with such alacrity, Hsü supposedly said, 'Were I to behave otherwise, then the Confucian Way would not be practised.' Many years later, the two met again and Hsü Heng asked Liu to explain his refusal to accept government employment. Liu supposedly replied, 'Were I to behave otherwise, then the Way would not be honoured.' Either T'ao has the dates wrong or this episode is fictitious, for we cannot believe that Hsü Heng would have consulted an eleven-year-old about his career choices. It seems likely, in fact, that the story arose to illustrate two equally legitimate, but mutually exclusive, Confucian responses to the political conditions of the early Yüan.

Liu Yin's lineage was moderately prominent. His great-great-grandfather Liu Fang served in Lin-t'ao fu (Shansi) as a judicial officer under the Jurchen Chin, and his great-grandfather Liu Yü held the post of registrar in Chung-shan fu (Hopei). Liu Yin's grandfather's brother Liu Kuo-pao won the *chin-shih* during the Hsing-ting reign (1217-22) of the Chin emperor Hsüan-tsung and advanced to become a senior clerk in the Department of Military Affairs. The grandfather, Liu Ping-shan, never held a government post. But it was he who moved the family south, probably at the time the Chin court left Chung-tu (Peking) and fled to Nan-ching (K'ai-feng) before the Mongol onslaught in the summer of 1214.

The family's ties to the Chin, however, were apparently broken in 1232, two years before the capitulation of the Jurchen regime to the Mongols. Liu Yin's father, Liu Shu, moved the family back north to Chen-ting, then under Mongol rule. Sometime later, Liu Shu became a judicial clerk under Liu Su (1188-1263, no relation) who was at the time administering the territory assigned to the apanage of the Princess Sorqaqtani, the mother of Qubilai. It was he who helped introduce significant reforms on the latter's behalf at Hsing-chou (Hopei) in the 1250s (see the biography of Liu Ping-chung). Liu Shu was a devoted student of Sung Confucian philosophy, although it is unclear why the sources record his 'fondness for long whistling' (*hao ch'ang-shao*) which is a well-known Taoist longevity practice. He allegedly also declined an offer of a magistracy at Wu-i (Hopei), on grounds of health.

A precocious child, Liu Yin begun his studies at the age of three and is said to have been able to memorise more than a thousand words daily. The Liu family lived

at Jung-ch'eng until 1254, when they moved to T'an-yüan, Chen-chou, where they stayed for the next decade. Liu Yin's mother died in 1256, and Liu Yin was then placed in the care of his stepmother, towards whom he displayed intense filial piety. During this time, Liu Yin made rapid progress in classical studies and literary composition, and so impressed his father with his abilities that in 1264, shortly after concluding his administrative duties at Hsing-chou, Liu Shu moved the family to a quiet place in Pao-ting to give his son an opportunity for a better education. There the father devoted all his energies to teaching the boy. Liu Shu's role model may have set the pattern for Yin's later life, although Liu senior died before his son reached adulthood. Liu Yin, however, had another teacher, Yen Mi-chien (1212-89), a reputable scholar from the South. It was probably around this time or a few years later that Liu Yin heard that Yen, later a dean of studies of the National College, was appointed an instructor in the prefectural school of Chen-ting. Liu Yin went to further his studies there. Yen was so impressed with his new pupil that he mentioned to Liu Shu that his son was destined to become a distinguished Confucian scholar. Moreover, around this time, Liu Yin acquired the commentaries on the classics by Northern Sung Confucians such as Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Shao Yung and Chu Hsi, from Yao Shu (*q.v.*), a renowned contemporary scholar. He was greatly impressed with their subtle metaphysical interpretations, which he felt vindicated his earlier suspicions about the older commentaries. Of all the Sung Confucian philosophers, Liu Yin admired Chu Hsi the most, for he perceived his views to be the profoundest and broadest.

Liu Yin set his own intellectual and moral directions early in life, recording them in an essay written in 1267 when he was eighteen. Entitled 'Hsi sheng chieh' ('An Explanation of the Term "Aspiring to become a Sage"'), the essay shows how Liu Yin was early committed to the Confucian goal of moral perfection. The essay is an attempt to convey the meaning of a line in the important Sung Confucian text, the *T'ung Shu* (*Penetrating the Book of Changes*) by Chou Tun-i (1017-73). Chou had written, 'The scholar aims at becoming a worthy, the worthy at becoming a sage, and the sage at becoming Heaven.' Liu Yin mulled over these words on an autumn day after finding his wine tasteless and his zither (*ch'in*) discordant. But he could not enjoy them either, for, as he noted, 'How could anyone really aim so high? Master Chou is duping us foolish men of later times.' Then he chanted a song:

Profound indeed the Great Void, wherein resides
 human nature and destiny,
 Bright indeed the Great Simplicity, wherein resides
 the primordial breath.
 Fu Hsi and Hsien-yüan (the Yellow Emperor) are remote;
 to whom shall I turn?

Confucius and the Lord on High are distant; upon
whom shall I rely?

Thereupon he fell asleep in a chair and dreamt that he awoke with a start only to see three old men in his courtyard. One had an open and expansive countenance, 'like smooth wind and the clear moon after rain.' A second seemed compassionate yet shrewd, while the third had the air of a gentleman of antiquity. The three men bowed and introduced themselves to Liu Yin. The first:

I live with the endowment of the pure integrity of the Supreme Ultimate, the essence of the two (*yin* and *yang*) and the five (elements). My position is that of the Supreme Ultimate and Lord of the universe. Now I am old, with no accomplishments, and have retired to dwell at Wu Stream. My name is Clumsy Old One (Cho Weng).

The second:

I have borrowed the face of the Supreme Ultimate and the shape of the Supreme Ultimate, and was born before Heaven. Supreme Beginning is my mother, August Supreme Lord my elder brother. Desiring to be named, having no name, I dwell in idleness at the Western Lo (River). I am Old Mr No-name (Wu-ming Kung).

And the third:

Commanding of Heaven and Earth is my nature, blocking Heaven and Earth is my essence. *Ch'ien*, the male creative force, is my father, and *k'un*, the female creative force, my mother. I am their child, dwelling in insignificance in the Western Land. I am Master Sincerity-Brilliance-Centrality (Ch'eng-ming-chung Tzu).

Tu Wei-ming has shown that these three figures represented three major Northern Sung philosophers. Clumsy Old One, whose advice is given the greatest attention, represents Chou Tun-i, while Old Mr No-name and Master Sincerity-Brilliance-Centrality represent Shao Yung (1011-77) and Chang Tsai (1020-77). The point driven home by the three philosophers is made chiefly by Clumsy Old One, to the effect that Liu Yin has to be pure and remain faithful to his own humanity, for therein lies the path to wisdom. Ultimately, Liu Yin uses the dream as a literary device to describe his own enlightenment. His sudden comprehension of the meaning of the aspiration to sagehood, and of the reality thereof, as the overriding purpose of life, implies a commitment. This perspective on self-cultivation is one in which the process of becoming is personal and largely private. No implication regarding political service obtains, for at issue are simply one's commitment and sincerity. In the hierarchy of values, sagehood is placed first, while nothing is said about steering one's career. No need to serve in government is suggested. There exists therefore a Confucian paradigm for living that is divorced from politics.

Liu Yin, however, was certainly not immune from the human desire for recognition, as a poem translated in part by F. W. Mote clearly reveals:

In this life, the years of youth
 Are so fleeting. How sad it is!
 Beside the humble scholar's window, when one is old –
 How petty that life; what good comes of it?
 Learn swordsmanship, and win with it a principedom!
 With martial valour face every enemy.
 If man's ambition is to serve men,
 What use has this devotion to book and sword?
 My mind is bright and clear,
 It holds within it ways to rule the world in peace.
 If someday I encounter recognition and opportunity,
 And on all sides worthy routes open,
 I shall mount to the highest power and rank,
 Soaring aloft, borne up by strong wings.
 I shall bring all the universe to order,
 Thereby establishing my name for a thousand years.

Recognition here seems to imply a career of public service, but this of course is only one route to fame. Another is the career of scholarship, teaching, and self-cultivation. Indeed, it is the latter that entails the highest degree of 'purity'. As Old Mr No-name and Master Sincerity-Brilliance-Centrality said to Liu Yin in the dream, 'Apply yourself diligently. There will come a day when we shall hear of a man of purity in the world; and that man will be you' (tr. Mote). The aim is purity, characterised by 'singleness,' or 'the absence of (selfish) desires.' The dream dialogue between Clumsy Old One and Liu Yin, taken in fact from Chou Tun-i's *T'ung Shu* (as Tu Weiming has shown), reveals that Liu Yin had contemplated the theory that 'all people under Heaven can become sages.' Very early in life he had set his mind in an effort to test the theory's validity and had wrestled with his own doubts about it.

Liu Yin's youthful desire to make his reputation in the world was expressed in heroic yearnings as well as moral aspirations. He disclosed his romantic bent in an essay mourning the death of the brave, unsuccessful assassin of the First Emperor of the Ch'in, Ching K'o. Liu Yin was moved by Ching K'o's suicidal attempt to eliminate a scourge of civilisation. Yet Liu's own personal behaviour seems to have been completely unaffected by Ching K'o's example. His appreciation of Ching K'o notwithstanding, Liu Yin's personality was quite alien to his hero's aggressive response.

Liu revealed his philosophical understanding of the value of quiescence in an essay entitled 'Taming a Mouse' ('Hsün shu chi'), written in 1270 when he was twenty-one. The essay argues that the man who stills his heart and calms his breath (*ch'i*) will find that all living things in the world will come to him. He wrote: 'As soon as the mechanism of the heart moves, the breath follows it. Pressed by fire, one sweats. Being close to ice, one shivers. The breath of things can cause a person to move; similarly, when a thing encounters the breath of a person, it moves.'

In the essay he begins as follows:

The mouse is apt to fear people. One day while I was sitting quietly, a mouse came out and wandered around my lap as though it didn't know I was a person. Watching it closely, I couldn't see that it was apt to fear people. So I got to thinking about my late father who once drank with guests beside the River I. A swarm of bees came close, and everybody began swatting at them to drive them off. They were all stung, but my father, who alone stood still, was not molested by the bees.

This is probably because an approaching creature will eventually go away if it is not provoked by a person's disquiet. Its coming will be as though forgotten. And when a creature goes away, it will come back if it isn't provoked. Its leaving will also be as though forgotten. This is because tranquil and auspicious breath does not offend the creatures, and because creatures on their part cause no trouble. Quieten your heart, calm your breath, and it won't be only bees or mice among the myriad creatures that come to you.

The last line in the essay adds a note of caution, however, which is addressed to those who might interpret his philosophy as Taoistic: 'Although one may apply this approach in life, if one does not know how to do so with perfect diligence he will lapse into the irreverence of Chuang Chou (Chuang-tzu) and Lieh Yü-k'ou (Lieh-tzu) and worse.' For Liu Yin, these Taoists affected a cynical and unhealthy disdain for worldly affairs. In this respect, Liu displayed a fundamental antagonism to Taoist nihilism.

Liu's antipathy towards aspects of Taoist thought persisted throughout his life. His views, as he expressed them in 1270 in his essay on the tame mouse, were developed in later writings. Liu's basic position was that Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu taught methods of self-preservation that were selfish and dishonest. As Liu put it in his essay, 'Explanation of "The Studio of Stupidity"' ('Ch'un-chai shuo'), 'their purpose is to benefit themselves and nothing more.' Beyond this, Taoism was seen by Liu as irrational. In his essay on a painting of Chuang-tzu dreaming that he was a butterfly, Liu wrote that Chuang-tzu, out of sorts with the world, sought a way to guard himself in a time of disorder. But his method disregarded ethical principles. He sought an expedient way out and, failing that, reduced everything to vagueness and fantasy. That is to betray the teachings of morality. Taoism, in short, is insincere games-playing: 'Knowing, one appears ignorant; skilful in argumentation, one appears to be a stammerer; clever, one appears clumsy; virile, one appears feminine; noble, one appears base.' The 'methods' (*shu*) of Taoism, such as they are, were designed to ensure that their devotee remains inscrutable, shielded from view: 'Its pivotal point and bellows cannot be spotted and known, its trigger and basis cannot be grasped, its indeterminate vagueness cannot be given shape and thus seized. Indeed, anyone who applies these methods will measure the joys and sorrows of the world by the standard of his own personal profits and losses, and ultimately will bring ruin to

the state and harm to the people. And even then he will place himself apart from the myriad creatures and refuse to accept their censure.'

Liu began a career as a private teacher in Pao-ting around 1260, before he had reached twenty, and was soon to become famous. His tomb inscription composed by Su T'ien-chüeh (1294-1352) in 1348 states that his reputation was such that many dignitaries tried to call on him on their way to and from the capital Ta-tu (Peking) by way of Pao-ting. They continued to visit him after he moved back to Jung-ch'eng in 1272. But Liu Yin often declined to grant interviews, preferring to keep aloof from the political arena. Some took this as arrogance, Su notes, but Liu remained indifferent to this charge. Liu suffered increasing poverty during these years. It is said that he was only able to afford a proper burial for his grandfather and father with the assistance of Yang Shu, a Han-lin academician-in-waiting.

Yet Liu Yin was deeply moved by the major event of the thirteenth century, the Mongol war against the Southern Sung and the subsequent reunification of China in 1279. In 1274 the Mongol ruler Qubilai Qa'an sent his armies across the Yangtze under the command of Bayan (*q.v.*) in a concerted attack on the Sung capital city Lin-an (Hang-chou). Liu Yin hailed the event as an auspicious start to the task of reunification, and marked the occasion by writing a 'prose poem' entitled 'Crossing the Yangtze' ('Tu Chiang fu').

In this piece written at Jung-ch'eng when he was twenty-six, Liu Yin expresses sympathy for the plight of Sung while proclaiming his support for reunification and accepting as inevitable the defeat of Sung. He writes: 'The Sung ruler is to be pitied. If he fights, he will become the soil in hell, and if he surrenders he will wind up a slave in blue dress. From above he has lost the protection of the K'uei constellation (the star of literature and culture), and on earth he has had to give up his sacred domain. Grass will grow wild in Chin-ling (modern Nanking), deer will run free in Ku-su (Su-chou), the five rivers (of Chiang-nan) will become burnt ground, the seven marshes a wasteland. How painful.' This might sound as though Liu opposed the war against the Sung, but as one reads on he soon realises that the author is simply acknowledging the tragic face of a necessary war.

Liu notes that someone had challenged him to explain why the great Sung empire was defeated despite its allegedly impregnable position and its massive defence forces. Referring to himself as a 'retired scholar' (*ch'u-shih*), Liu cited five reasons why the Yüan victory was assured: 1. We (the Yüan) are strong and upright, they (the Sung) are bent and old; we are just and numerous, they are unprincipled and few in number; 2. Their river fortifications are spread over a huge distance. If they disperse their forces to hold all these positions, their strength will be spent. But if they concentrate their troops, they will lose the strongholds that they leave unsecured;

3. They are over-confident, and the longer they remain on the alert, the less watchful they will become; 4. The troops guarding the crossing point at Ching(-chou) and E(-chou) are exhausted by military preparations: 'When they see the fur coats (of our troops), they will lose all their courage, and when they dream of our felt tents, they will be dispirited.' There will be no protracted war because the people have given up and the Sung troops have fallen to pieces; 5. They have detained our envoy (Hao Ching, *q.v.*) and showed enmity to our great state; all the heroes in the world have for many years volunteered to take up arms and set sail, ready to take to the Yangtze. Today Heaven is about to open and the Sung is about to fall. Our Middle Kingdom is about to be united, our trusted envoy to be returned. By submitting to Heaven and following the people's wish there will be a conquest but no war.

Liu Yin expressed elsewhere similar views on Qubilai's conquest of the Sung. In a memorial tablet inscription for a myriarch in Bayan's invading army, Liu wrote: 'In the eleventh year of the Chih-yüan reign (1274), the Throne commanded the great minister Bayan to lead the generals and soldiers to chastise the Sung. Men of high ambition all joyously seized the moment, turned their minds to devising plans, and summoned their courage.' And to a member of a distinguished northern family, Liu wrote:

The south-east is richly endowed with beautiful scenery but was cut off from the north so that one could not travel everywhere and see the sights. This had caused the people to feel despondent, as though they had been deprived of something precious. But after the fall of Sung, the division that had lasted a hundred and fifty years was suddenly ended, and all the famous spots in the south-east again became places where one could go as one pleased. This is certainly a joyful thing for those not bogged down in worldly affairs who enjoy sightseeing. Now there is no turmoil in the empire, affairs are well ordered, and men of talent and ability who don't set themselves apart from the common people regret only that they cannot exert their abilities more fully. Now that all things along the river, north and south, have come into our power, the common people are not content to till the soil in peace, but seek to bring about many changes. Corrupt practices have been reformed, harmful influences removed. All these events are happily greeted by men of ambition in worldly affairs who possess the determination to accomplish things.

Liu Yin's praise of Qubilai's efforts to reunify China was not unique among the northern Chinese élite, but such attitudes were criticised by Ming scholars (after the restoration of Chinese rule). Several of them chided Liu for taking pleasure in the demise of the Sung and for lack of concern for his native land. But there were apologists for Liu who claimed that it was the only way to save China from devastation. Several scholars defended Liu on the grounds that as a subject of Yüan lacking any affiliation with Sung, his support of the Mongol cause was not a violation of duty. This ambivalent attitude by Ming scholars was commonly adopted towards Chinese literati who served the Mongol court.

Between 1274 and 1280, Liu Yin was largely inactive, only occasionally serving as tutor to the children of his admirers. In 1275 he was invited by a certain 'chancellor' T'ien, a sinicised West Asian nobleman, to come to the capital, Ta-tu, as his family instructor. Liu declined on the pretext that he had to stay close to his ageing stepmother and his sick father-in-law, District Assistant Kuo, who died later that year. Three years later, however, Liu accepted an offer from Ho Wei (1245-1310), a retired commissioner of the Salt Administration of the Huai district, to be his family tutor in the neighbouring prefecture of I-chou. He accepted, it is said, because of Ho's earnest desire for learning and because of his rich library of classical works. Liu Yin stayed with the Ho family for about three years until 1281, when his patron was appointed a councillor of the Secretarial Council. He then returned to Jung-ch'eng.

Meanwhile, Qubilai's reunification of China seems to have awakened Liu Yin's interest in government service. A poem written in December 1278 entitled 'Record of a Dream' ('Chi-meng'), reveals that Liu dreamt of being recommended to the Yüan court by a group of elderly men. They heaped praise upon him for his literary attainments and moral superiority. The poem may therefore represent Liu Yin's deep-seated desire for recognition in the vastly expanded Yüan empire.

Liu's first formal offer of government employment came less than four years after the dream. In 1281 he was recommended to the court by the Qangli nobleman Buqumu (1255-1300), and late the following year he was summoned to the capital to be given an appointment as grand instructor in the newly established Household Department of the Heir Apparent headed by Chang Chiu-ssu (1242-1302). This was the year when the corrupt Central Asian finance minister Aḥmad was executed and Qubilai attempted a full reform of his court. The principal student at Qubilai's court was the heir apparent, Ĵingim (1243-85), and Liu Yin became the successor to the prince's former tutor Wang Hsün (1235-81), who had died the previous year. Ĵingim was being carefully groomed by the qa'an to take his place on his father's death. He had tutors in Buddhist and Confucian studies, and by all accounts was a conscientious student of high promise. A talented body of scholars and monks was assembled by Qubilai to educate the future ruler. But Liu Yin only served the heir apparent for a short time, departing rather suddenly for Jung-ch'eng in early 1283 to care for his stepmother who had recently suffered a stroke. She died a few months later, but Liu Yin never resumed government service.

During the decade until his death in 1293, Liu Yin lived in his native place, and engaged in teaching and writing. He had attracted a number of students, some of whom later gained distinction, such as Wu Ch'ung (1264-1315) and An Hsi (1270-

1311). It appears that he derived much satisfaction from the company of scholars and disciples, although his health had gradually deteriorated.

Liu Yin's withdrawal from the political stage has been seen by both Mote and Tu Wei-ming as a form of protest against the nature of Yüan rule. Tu in particular invests Liu's critical comments on worldly affairs with great symbolic significance, arguing that Liu meant to challenge his contemporaries in office. Mote is more cautious, saying that Liu's critical comments remain ambiguous, couched as they are in poetic allusions. Both authors base their views on the assumption, which neither undertakes to demonstrate, that Yüan rule was cruel and brutal and therefore unacceptably deficient in Confucian virtues.

There is no doubt that Liu Yin was critical of his times and that he used poetry to convey his dislike of contemporary politics. But there is no evidence that he considered his own day to be any worse than earlier eras. To that extent, therefore, his protest must be interpreted as a general indictment of political life as a whole. It would be a mistake to read Liu Yin as though he were a modern-day dissident in a totalitarian state.

In September 1291, Liu Yin was again recommended by Buqumu, now a powerful chancellor, for the position of academician in the Chi-hsien Academy and the honorary title of Great Officer of Excellent Counsel, but Liu declined. He explained his reasons in a letter to the chief minister which has been studied carefully by scholars for signs of systematic alienation. Here again one must consider his exact words. Liu is at pains to describe his illness, since he had declined the appointment on the grounds of ill health. He had contracted malaria in 1290, and the disease may have considerably weakened him. But this is not to deny Liu's commitment to the Confucian eremitic life of withdrawal, to which he paid tribute throughout his life. Furthermore, he had earned by 1291 a solid reputation for his unwillingness to become involved in politics. Before examining the letter to the chief minister, it would be useful to study a letter of recommendation written by a contemporary on Liu Yin's behalf very shortly after Liu had turned down the imperial summons.

Wu Ming, a native of Ta-t'ung (Shansi), who wrote this letter in 1292, was an assistant instructor in the National College. The letter recommends Liu Yin's appointment to the position of rector of the College. In it, Wu observes that the dynasty established the College in 1287, and that only some 200 students, the sons of officers of the three uppermost ranks, were initially eligible to study there. Supplies for their studies, such as paper and ink, were supplied by the Imperial Household, while even mats, gourds, charcoal and fire wood were provided for the students. Yet during its five years of existence, the College had not prospered. The scholars in residence were never numerous, and the school was a sham, existing in name only.

The dormitories were empty, the students few. Eligibility had been extended to include sons of officers of the first five ranks, but to little effect. Censors advised widening the intake even further to admit sons of the lower rank officials and even outstanding commoners. Yet those measures had not transformed the school, and the reason for this was that the teachers were inadequate. Wu Ming included himself among the teachers whose learning and culture were insufficient to rescue the school from oblivion. An outstanding man was needed to head the college, and in Wu Ming's eyes none was more suitable than Liu Yin.

But everyone knew that Liu Yin was unwilling to serve in government and had just turned down an appointment as academician in the Chi-hsien Academy. Who would believe that Liu Yin might accept any offer of appointment? Consequently, Wu Ming had to explain Liu Yin's behaviour, both by justifying Liu's refusal on Confucian grounds, and by affirming Liu Yin's identity as a Confucian. At the same time, Wu had to strike a formula that would virtually compel Liu Yin's acquiescence with the scheme.

Regarding Confucian insistence on public service, Wu wrote, 'What is a Confucian scholar but someone who studies Confucius and Mencius?' Confucius and Mencius left the state of Lu, went to Wei, served in Ch'i, and taught in Liang. 'When they had no ruler (to serve), they grew restless, left the territory and donned armour. Such is the learning of sages and worthies. And why is it so?' The answer, in Wu's view, is 'the *Tao* of Yao and Shun,' which in turn is 'awakening the people with this very *Tao*.' Liu Yin is such a person, Wu states.

That being the case, 'how is it that he does not serve?', Wu asks. His answer is: 'It's not that he does not follow the *Tao*, but merely that he is unwilling to be promoted against his principles.' Liu resigned his earlier appointment to the heir apparent's staff for good reason, namely his mother's illness and age. But how is it that he has now refused to accept the honoured position of attendant in the Chi-hsien Academy? Wu explains:

Let me discuss it in relation to reason. The court held Liu in high esteem and raised his rank from five to three and his position from palace official to imperial attendant because it felt that otherwise his worth would not have been properly acknowledged. This was eminently correct. But it only dealt with half of the problem. His appointment to the Chi-hsien Academy was a selection to one of the mountains of the immortals, but the officers there are numerous and the business (of the attendants) is not specialised. Although in status it is high, its function is not important. This is why he would not take up the job, and pleaded illness as a pretext for not accepting.

What office *will* he accept? In his daily life he gathers students and instructs them. In doing so he is rigorous, fulfilling the *Tao* of the teacher, and taking as his personal responsibility the teaching and nurturing of men of talent. All in the land view him in this way, saying that ever since Hsü Heng no one but Liu has matched the master in moral cultivation and classical learning.

Wu Ming then goes on to propose that Liu Yin be offered the rectorship of the National College.

Wu Ming must have worried about Liu's possible rejection of the position, for he added a line which has a somewhat defensive ring:

If he fails to take up this appointment, it must be because he does not value the examples set by Confucius and Mencius of service, and must therefore adhere to some other ethical system, truly not one that I can fathom in my ignorance.

Finally, as though warning Liu Yin of serious consequences should he refuse the appointment, Wu Ming concludes:

Who says Mr. Liu has given up ethical principles and is willing to join the crowd of the birds and beasts? In my opinion, if Mr. Liu understands my humble words, he will await the edict of appointment outside the north gate of Pao-ting with his horse and carriage at the ready.

Wu Ming's letter was probably an attempt to badger Liu Yin into taking office if a post were actually offered by the throne: indeed the tone of the letter hardly makes sense unless we assume that Liu Yin received a copy of it. Furthermore, Wu Ming's apparently coercive style makes sense when we read it as a response to Liu Yin's letter of 1291 to Buqumu.

In this letter Liu detailed his reasons for declining to serve, including his bout of malaria, his stepmother's illness and death, the death of his only son in 1290, the recurrence of malaria on the 25 June 1291, and so forth. His physical condition was deteriorating, for on 28 July he suffered piercing abdominal pains and passed blood. Expecting death, he had sent someone to his native Jung-ch'eng to build a hut beside his ancestors' tombs. If his illness did not subside, he would move there to live out his remaining days. The sickness grew worse. And then, on the 14 September, an envoy came bearing the imperial summons and appointment to the Chi-hsien Academy. Liu had intended to entertain the envoy for a short time until his condition improved, whereupon he would have accompanied the envoy to Ta-tu. But his condition did not improve, so he sent the envoy on ahead, planning to join him as soon as he was able. Thus did Liu Yin respond to the appointment, dating his letter the 21 October 1291.

Qubilai did not force Liu Yin to obey the summons; indeed, of what use would a man in Liu's condition have been at court? But the qa'an did compliment Liu on being 'a minister who could not be summoned,' alluding to a passage in *Mencius*. In that passage, Tseng-tzu is quoted as having observed that a great prince will always have ministers whom he cannot summon. They are great men, and the prince shall go to them if he wants to have the benefit of their wise advice. In any event, Liu Yin never had a chance to follow this up, for he died about a year and a half later on 23

May 1293, at the age of forty-four. He was survived by his spouse née Kuo, who died in 1301, and three daughters, all married into distinguished families.

Besides his 1291 letter, Liu Yin also subtly expressed his distrust of the political world in several of his poems. He wrote at least seventy-eight poems in response to the eremitic verse of T'ao Yüan-ming (?365-427), the great poet of the Eastern Chin period. One revealing poem in this collection, translated by F. W. Mote, is worth quoting here:

Those who uphold *tao* (i.e. ethics) frequently are led
to follow a solitary course.
This practice has existed since Ch'in and Han times.
The solitary course of the recluse moreover merits
approval;
What kind of person would weakly submit to defiling
himself?

.....

In a degenerate final age,
Is it not meaningless to possess Confucian rank and
office?

As Mote has observed, Liu's poems of 'protest' are really quite subtle and even ambiguous. There is no certainty that he considered the Yüan any more 'degenerate' than any other age or that serving in any government was necessarily 'defiling.' Yet it is true that he never sought office, remained detached from politics, and set an example to his students that they were to follow themselves.

Liu's deepest motivation was probably his culturalism, the belief that the continuity of the main Chinese cultural tradition was of utmost importance and that its vitality was not dependent on ephemeral political institutions. Confucius confirmed this philosophical attitude by claiming that he was a transmitter of culture and values, not their creator or inventor. For Liu Yin, the most valuable service he could perform for his fellow humans was to promote the continuity of the cultural tradition. This is eloquently borne out in a poem translated by Tu Wei-ming:

As I silently sit in the autumn breeze of the
Confucian temple,
A thousand years of antiquity overwhelmingly enter
into my deep meditation.
I offer myself totally (to the great task), noting
still the presence of the primordial mind.
Nowadays who will truly continue the *tao*?

The poem was written in February 1279, the year of the final battles against the Sung, when Liu Yin was thirty.

By all accounts, Liu Yin was a teacher rather than an original scholar. His main contributions rest in the formulation of a curriculum of study for his students, which he set forth in his essay 'Hsü hsüeh' ('On Learning'), which has been discussed briefly

by Tu Wei-ming. Furthermore, the only substantial item of his scholarly work to have survived is the unoriginal *Ssu-shu chi-i ching-yao* (*Essentials of 'The Collected Meanings of the Four Books'*). Other extant scholarly fragments are a few short essays on the *Book of Changes*. Liu Yin must also have written a commentary to the 'Hsi-tz'u' section of the *Book of Changes*, entitled 'I hsi-tz'u shuo,' and a handbook on the *Four Books* for young students, entitled *Hsiao-hsüeh Ssu-shu pei-yao*. These two works seem to have been lost.

Liu Yin's *Ssu-shu chi-i ching-yao* was published posthumously in Hang-chou. The preface marking the event is dated May 1330. According to the preface, a collection of Chu Hsi's teachings on the *Four Books* had been circulating under the title *Ssu-shu chi-i*. This comprised the master's teachings as they had been taken down by his students. The collection was enormous, totalling several million characters, far too bulky to serve as a useful reference for most students. Furthermore, many of the entries did not represent the master's definitive views accurately. Liu consequently applied his vast erudition to the task of paring the collection down to its most reliable core. This he did, producing the 'Essentials' in 30 *chüan*. The Yüan edition is rare, but the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* transcription in 28 *chüan* has been reproduced in 1972. The text reveals that it indeed reports the genuine teachings of Chu Hsi; no interpolations by Liu Yin are detectable. This was therefore a faithful effort by Liu to preserve Chu Hsi's teachings in a handy and reliable form, in full accord with Liu's basic philosophical outlook.

Liu Yin's blueprint for learning, the essay entitled 'Hsü hsüeh,' shows a similar dedication to the transmission of Confucian culture. The breadth of scholarship which it displays is impressive, while a solid classical core provides the strength of the programme.

He begins with a basic observation: 'Everything is controlled by nature, everything is governed by the heart, the 'breath' or energy (*ch'i*) is fully present in everything, and it is all this that gives life to the human being. Therefore, (the human being) is completely endowed with material substance (*ts'ai*). If by chance one is not complete in this respect, the fault lies not with his material substance. It is due to lack of learning, insufficient moral quality, and the harm and delusion of heterodox thoughts.' Liu asserts, 'I don't believe anyone who says his substance cannot be made complete (through diligent study).' The essay then outlines, as Liu puts it, 'the proper order of study.'

The underlying theme, then, is that a person can become whatever he wants to become. This is driven home in the essay's concluding passage:

If in this way one studies the classics and the histories, the philosophers and the writings of the great Sung scholars, and if in this way one devotes himself to poetry, prose, calligraphy and painting, then whether old or

young, tall or short, shallow or deep, slow or quick, each one who reaches completeness (through study) will be able to become a ruler's minister, or a general, or someone able to transform his ruler into a Yao or a Shun, or to place the empire in a condition of stability just like that of Mt. T'ai. But if the times do not favour one's ambition, or if one's talents are not given proper employment, then one will be able to assert his moral character or to establish his teachings, creating works for posterity, or to become a great scholar, and so not perish as do the plants nor have to eke out a humdrum existence, fading away in loneliness, demeaning the perfect goodness of Heaven and holding one's own talents in contempt. That is all, students. Do no disregard these commands.

'On Study' is thus a programme for development. The result for any given individual will be a product of his own effort and personal choices, and of circumstances. But no matter what the latter may be, every person has the opportunity to reach his full potential and to achieve thereby a kind of immortality.

Studies should be based on the six classics (*Book of Odes*, *Book of History*, *Book of Rites*, *Rites of Chou*, *Spring and Autumn Annals* and *Book of Changes*) and the *Analects* and *Mencius*. One is also to master the Han commentaries, the T'ang subcommentaries, and the Sung interpretations, in that order.

The next stage in the curriculum is to cover the histories, beginning with the *Tso-chuan*, *Kuo-yü*, *Chan-kuo ts'e*, and *Shih-chi*, and then the histories of the Former Han through to the Five Dynasties. For Sung and Jurchen Chin times, one should read the *Veritable Records* of these dynasties and the *Tung-tu shih-lüeh* (*Record of the Eastern Capital* [*K'ai-feng*]) by Wang Ch'eng (d. ca. 1200). Ssu-ma Kuang's *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* should be studied as well.

Stage three introduces the student to the philosophers. First one should examine the Taoist texts, *Lao-tzu*, *Chuang-tzu*, and *Lieh-tzu*, along with the *Yin-fu ching* (*Canon of the Dark Tally*); then the *Su wen*, a medical text, before considering the military writings of Sun-tzu and others. Hsün-tzu should be studied at this time, as well as Kuan-tzu, then the Han scholars Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.-A.D. 18), Chia I (200-108 B.C.), Tung Chung-shu (176-104 B.C.) and Liu Hsiang (77-6 B.C.). The Sung scholars mentioned include notably Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai, the Ch'eng brothers, Shao Yung, Ou-yang Hsiu, Su Shih, and Ssu-ma Kuang.

At the next stage the student should turn to cultivating the arts: painting, calligraphy, as well as poetry and prose.

Perhaps the most obvious omission from these lists is the name of Chu Hsi. He is never mentioned. And as Tu points out, Buddhism is excluded, as are Legalist and Mohist texts. The exclusion of Chu Hsi could hardly imply that he was not to be studied, however, since Liu Yin edited Chu's teachings himself in the *Ssu-shu chi-i ching-yao*. Rather, it may mean that the programme of study outlined by Liu was preparatory to the study of Chu Hsi's teachings. With Buddhism and Legalism, however, we may suppose that Liu saw little value in their study.

The strongest point Liu makes in 'On Study' is his insistence that through careful study, a student develop his own understanding of the classics, and not rush headlong into the Sung interpretations. In Liu's words:

The *Changes* is that with which the sages perfected the end and the beginning. But students have torn out their hearts over it. This is why one cannot study the *Spring and Autumn Annals* unless he has fully understood the *Odes*, the *History*, and the two *Rites*. And if one has not yet fully mastered the five classics, he cannot study the *Changes*. For if one has not understood that which is crude, how can he understand that which is highly refined? If one has not fully mastered that which is near at hand, how can he comprehend that which is remote? Students frequently are fond of the lofty and profound, pursuing the form and disregarding the substance, taking subjects out of sequence and plunging into matters unprepared, dissipating their effort. So with all the irregular interpretations and schools of thought, the message of the sages is obscured. After the six classics were burned in the Ch'in, commentaries were written in the Han, subcommentaries in the T'ang, and interpretations in the Sung, but alterations were introduced at each stage. Students should be aware of this and not let the historical process cloud their natural judgement. In recent times students have tended to skip the commentaries and subcommentaries, and go straight on to the interpretations of the Sung scholars. These people don't realise that the interpretations themselves derive from the commentaries and subcommentaries, and only aim to produce impressive, high sounding theories. But the commentaries and subcommentaries only capture sixty to seventy percent of the classics' (full meaning). The Sung scholars were diligent in their endeavour to weed out the false and nurture the true, and succeeded in restoring that missing thirty or forty percent. Therefore it is essential to study first the commentaries and then the subcommentaries, and later the interpretations. From beginning to end, follow the correct order, draw out the true facts, and apply your own intelligence to the facts in order to conclude wisely, submitting everything to the criterion of heavenly principle and human circumstances. Don't hanker after the new and marvellous or the biased and the unusual; don't relish slandering people or inventing contrived interpretations. Keep your heart level and your breath even. Strengthen yourself so as to uncover the subtle, but don't be duped by nonsense. As in letting loose a powerful bow, one must strike the target and pierce thoroughly. As in interrogating a criminal charged with a major crime, one uses blows of the stick that draw blood at each stroke in order to elicit the truth, but one must not be cruel or petty or deceitful; don't scour the depths to promote yourself. Seek the facts and elucidate them. Do so openly and compassionately, and then you will get at the truth.

The process of learning, then, is one in which the student must independently uncover the true meaning of the classics. But he must do so openly and honestly, and not torture the texts to force out some predetermined meaning. Furthermore, the role of the teacher is merely to point the way. He must not spoon-feed the student or implant his own views in the latter's mind. In this way, Liu Yin's selfless dedication to the role of the teacher outweighs his scholarly contributions, for he declined to tell others how to interpret the classics.

Liu Yin left a considerable amount of prose, poems, and philosophical essays besides those already mentioned, most of which can be found in his collected literary

works which were first printed by the local educational intendancies under an imperial decree issued in late 1349. The anthology includes his own selection of poetry, *Ting-hai chi* (compiled in the *ting-hai* year, i.e. 1287) in 5 *chüan*, as well as over 20 *chüan* of miscellaneous writings; a total of 30 *chüan*. A condensed Yüan edition, entitled *Liu Ching-hsiu hsien-sheng wen-chi*, 22 *chüan*, was published privately in 1330. The 30 *chüan* edition was copied into the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* in the 1770s, whereas the 22 *chüan* edition was reproduced in the *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* series. There were several Ming editions of Liu's literary collection.

In addition, there is a selection of Liu Yin's *shih* poetry in the *Yüan-shih hsüan*, compiled by Ku Ssu-li and printed in 1694. It includes a total of 234 poems. Collections of Liu's *tz'u* poetry are found in four major *tz'u* anthologies compiled in the late Ming through the early Republican periods.

Despite his political detachment and avoidance of government service, Liu Yin was showered with posthumous honours by the Yüan court two decades after his death. In the Yen-yu reign (1314-20) of Emperor Ayurbarvada, acting on the earlier plea of Wu Ming, the court awarded Liu the title of Han-lin academician, Great Officer Endowed with Virtue, the rank of Duke of Jung-ch'eng Commandery, and the canonical name Wen-ching ('Cultured and Pacific'). During the reign of Emperor Toqon Temür, a number of scholar-officials proposed to admit the spirit-tablet of Liu Yin together with Hsü Heng into Confucius' temple. The petition was discussed at the National College in 1342, but it was rejected on the ground that Liu had not actively served in government as had Hsü Heng. Nevertheless, similar proposals were repeatedly submitted to the authorities by Liu's admirers down to the Ming, attesting to his continuing popularity. Liu Yin, however, was above all revered as a dedicated and farsighted Confucian educator, and a number of memorial shrines and private academies were founded in his honour in the Yüan and Ming. Most of these monuments, according to the *Chi-fu t'ung-chih* (1735), were located at his place of birth and in the counties in Pao-ting fu, some of them surviving into the Ch'ing dynasty.

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J. D. Langlois

28. SAIYID AJALL (1211-1279)

The Mongol empire was unique in world history in the degree to which it employed a truly multinational corps of officers and officials for the administration of the empire as a whole, and of its diverse regional components. At court, Khitan, Jurchen, Chinese, Khwārazmians, Uighurs, Iranians, Europeans and others worked side by side and all but dominated the central government of the qan, with trusted Mongol retainers in little more than titular control. In provinces of the empire, Khitan, with Chinese in Turkestan, held control in the Muslim west for decades, while Persians and Persian-speaking officials occupied such an important position in China that Persian ultimately became a more important administrative language and lingua franca than Mongolian and, at the highest levels at least, than Chinese. For later Mongol administration in China, the example provided by the career of Qubilai's Venetian official, Marco Polo, is too well known to require comment.

The reasons for this remarkable cosmopolitanism were many. Firstly, the Mongolian empire was a true world empire whose diversity naturally had influenced its political structure and administrative machinery. But there were also other, less obvious, reasons. Among them was Mongolia's position as a cultural bridge in East Asia; and there were practical political considerations too.

As modern Mongol historians have argued in support of Mongol national integrity in relation to China, Mongolia maintained close relations with a number of other important cultural spheres, despite its geographical proximity to China and accessibility to Chinese culture. Chinese culture may have been the most influential foreign culture among the Mongols, but hardly less important were the developing Turkic culture of Turkestan and southern Siberia, the Iranian (Tadjik) culture of southern Turkestan and Iran, the Arab dominated world of the south, and the cultures of Tibet – not to mention a host of minor societies including the highly influential China border peoples.

When the Mongols set about creating an empire, they did so by drawing upon the political cultures of virtually every ethnic group around them. Just as the Mongols themselves served as intermediaries for these cultures, so their imperial political system, while remaining essentially Mongolian, became the vehicle for a number of foreign political cultures, viewed as more or less equal by the Mongols. The evolution of multinational cadres was both natural and necessary in such a syncretic polity.

Multinational cadres served also to allay the Mongol minority's basic distrust of

the various ethnic groups over which they ruled. As an empire-wide institution, those cadres enabled the Mongols to avoid excessive reliance for their local administrations on natives whose regional ties might conflict with the service of imperial and Mongol interests. The Sino-Khitans administration of Bukhara in the 1220s and 1230s, and the largely Khwārazmian-Bukharan administration in Chung-tu (Peking) for north China, are good examples of this policy.

The Bukharan Šams al-Dīn ‘Umar Saiyid Aǰall (1211-79) was a typical product of Mongol political cosmopolitanism. A member of a distinguished Turkestan family, he became a bureaucrat in the Mongol imperial mould. He served with distinction far from his native Bukhara, in many areas of the Mongol imperial administration in occupied China, and then went on to an equally distinguished career in Qubilai’s Yüan qanate (1260-1368). He died in 1279 in far away Yunnan, an area which he, more than any other, certainly more than any Chinese, was responsible for drawing definitively into the Chinese cultural field. Moreover, throughout a career spanning almost five decades, Saiyid Aǰall administered in a highly sophisticated manner, fully reflective of the complex environment from which he himself had sprung. How else could a Bukharan Muslim gain a reputation as a patron of both the Chinese Confucian tradition and of his own native Islam in the rough, semi-tribal surroundings of Yunnan in the late thirteenth century?

Chinese accounts stress the distinction of Saiyid Aǰall’s immediate family background, but little is known of his more distant ancestors. Like many others of the best Turkestan families, his traced its origin to ‘Alī, the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, a claim that found expression, among other things, in the use of the Arabo-Persian title *Saiyid*, used to designate the descendants of ‘Alī, as a kind of family name. The real founder of Saiyid Aǰall’s own immediate line, however, was his grandfather, Saiyid Aǰall Šams al-Dīn Bukhārī, after whom our hero was named. When the Mongols took Bukhara in 1220, it was apparently this Saiyid Aǰall (Bukhārī) who surrendered at the head of a thousand horsemen, bearing gifts of leopards and white falcons, and not the future Muslim minister himself, then a boy of nine or ten, contrary to his Chinese biography. And it must have been Saiyid Aǰall’s father, Kamāl al-Dīn, and not his young son, who joined the qan’s bodyguard as a hostage and fought subsequently in the wars of the Mongols. It seems also to have been Kamāl al-Dīn, who first received the nickname, later inherited by Saiyid Aǰall himself and other members of his family, *Sai-tien-ch’ih Shan-ssu-ting*, ‘Saiyid *elči*,’ or ‘Saiyid the Envoy Šamsdin (= Šams al-Dīn).’ The Mongols always had difficulty in remembering complicated foreign names and such nicknames were common among them (e.g. Urtu Saqal, ‘Long Beard’, for Yeh-lü Ch’u-ts’ai).

Saiyid Ajall himself first appears in our sources *ca.* 1229, when Ögödei (r. 1229-41) appointed him to the office of *yeke daruqači* of the three prefectures of Feng, Ching and Yün-nei in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. This post had probably been held already by his father, since many of the Chinese sources closely associate Saiyid Ajall's family with the Yün-nei area. This is best explained on the assumption that Saiyid Ajall's father had already settled there and held office (as *daruqači*, or resident commissioner) before him.

A few years later, Saiyid Ajall was given another similar post, that of *daruqači* of the two districts of T'ai-yüan and P'ing-yang. Since the office of *yeke daruqači* (lit. 'great *daruqači*') is often seen in our sources to rank higher than that of *daruqači*, this new appointment would seem to have entailed a demotion. In fact, that was almost certainly not the case. Saiyid Ajall's holding office as *daruqači*, rather than *yeke daruqači*, in T'ai-yüan and P'ing-yüan, is more likely a reflection of the fact that the houses of Ča'ādai (in T'ai-yüan) and Joči (in P'ing-yang) held extensive apanages in the two districts after the general census and reorganisation of the conquered domains in China carried out in the mid-1230s under the general direction of the *yeke Jarquči*, Šigi Qutuqu (*q.v.*). Saiyid Ajall was probably appointed to serve as a representative of these great princely houses, rather than as an agent of the qan's imperial establishment. Available evidence suggests that only imperial officials and officers appointed by the qan to serve his person, his establishment and his domains used the adjective *yeke*, 'great,' or 'imperial,' before their titles: Saiyid Ajall was no longer functioning as an imperial official in his new capacity. Nevertheless we must assume that the transfer marked a radical increase of responsibility for the young Muslim minister, since the population of the princely holdings in the two districts alone far outnumbered that in the sparsely populated settlements of Inner Mongolia formerly under his control. Moreover, for a Bukharan at least, problems of administration were necessarily more complicated in the north Chinese interior than in the familiar, mixed cultural environment of the frontier zone.

Young Saiyid Ajall must have performed successfully since, after an indeterminate period of service in T'ai-yüan and P'ing-yang, he was given a far more important post, that of *Jarquči*, i.e. judge or arbitrator, for the region of the old Chin capital of Chung-tu. He was to hold that post for more than a decade. The date of his appointment is not given in his biography, but must have been during the very last years of Ögödei's reign; at that time, newcomers, mostly Muslim, were displacing a largely Khitan and Chinese establishment in Chung-tu, which had become the effective centre of Mongol administration for occupied China. We are told nothing of Saiyid Ajall's responsibilities and duties during his early years as *Jarquči* in Chung-tu,

but much can be surmised from what is known of early Mongol administration in China and of the office of the *Jarquči*.

The Mongol empire of Činggis Qan marked, in many respects, a total break with the past, but deep-seated traditional values and social realities survived, however modified by the new order. One major link with the past was the well-established Mongol tradition of common ownership and collective exercise of power by the various entities comprising Mongol society. In the pre-imperial steppe, this tradition found expression in the ownership of nomadic territories (*nuntuq*), not by individuals, i.e. chieftains or other powerful persons, but by the collective body of herdsmen (construed as a joint descent group or *oboq*) using the territory. Similarly, the new Mongolian empire was not the exclusive property of the qan, but a common patrimony (*ulus*) of the ruling clan (*altan uruq*) and of all those associated with it through marriage (*qari*), subject as such to joint rule and joint exploitation. A special administrative machinery was required, consequently, to implement Mongol custom on an imperial scale.

One such institution was the *qubi* ('apportionment') whereby newly acquired populations and territories were parcelled out to beneficiaries as either permanent (*inje*, lit. 'dowry') or revocable grants (*soyurqal*, 'grant, boon'). Thus, the ruling clan held the empire in three types of holding: the qan's personal possessions; the apanages, either permanent or revocable, of imperial beneficiaries; and the common domains held and ruled in joint ownership as the imperial clan's patrimony. Members of the clan formed groups of common interest in the exploitation and governance of the empire. Such a group, or *Jarqu*, would nominate an agent, or *Jarquči*, to manage its affairs in the ambit of the imperial clan's business. Theoretically an imperial appointee, a *Jarquči* would be as concerned with the apportioning of booty in behalf of his principals – and the conflicts arising therefrom – as with the actual government of the empire (excluding the *inje* holdings). In these functions, he would collaborate with other *Jarqučis* including the *yeke Jarquči* representing the qan's personal interests.

In the beginning, there appears to have been relatively few *Jarqučis*, but their numbers increased apace as the Mongol empire grew in size and in complexity, and as apanages multiplied at every level. In time, the *Jarquči* came to function not solely as the ad hoc representative of a *Jarqu*, but as a permanently appointed agent in an administrative area (regional or local administration) of which his *Jarqu* had assumed the charge. Such standing *Jarqu*s, which were staffed not only by *Jarqučis*, but by other officials as well, including *bičečis* (scribe-secretaries), progressively took over real power in the conquered regions. Because those regions naturally attracted the active interest of powerful members of the imperial clan (who usually provided the

tammačis, or regional garrison commanders and their tribal entourage), the local *jarquš* became the real centres of Mongol administration in the conquered territories.

At the time of Saiyid Aĵall's appointment as *jarquči* in Chung-tu, this process was already well advanced in Mongol China. Power there had originally been vested in the *tammači* Muqali (*q.v.*), and after him in his sons, Bōl and Tas (or Čila'un, *qq.v.*); but with the passage of time, a counter-administration of sorts had developed in Chung-tu, apparently growing out of the office of the Mongol *yeke daruqači* for the region, and largely staffed by former Chin officials of Khitan ancestry, now in Mongol service. By the 1230s moreover, Chung-tu had also become the seat of a regional *jarquči*. In the late 1230s, a chief *jarquči* was resident there, responsible for the administration of Mongol China as a whole. This official replaced the *tammači* in all but his specific military functions and position as head of a diminishing 'tribal federation' in China. The first man to hold this new office was probably the Khwārazmian, Maḥmūd Yalavač (*q.v.*), who came to power in 1241 as the predominantly Khitan officials that had served previously with Muslims were being replaced: Saiyid Aĵall was apparently Maḥmūd's subordinate.

We are not told whether Saiyid Aĵall served as an imperial *jarquči* (i.e. *yeke jarquči*) or as a princely house's nominee, although his Chinese biographer implies that the former was the case. What we know of the Muslim minister's later career strongly suggests that he took office as a *jarquči* for the house of Tolui, with which Saiyid Aĵall later had the closest association, rather than for those of Ča'āдай or Joči. We must assume that as *jarquči* of the Chung-tu region, Saiyid Aĵall dealt with such affairs as population registration, the setting of taxes, matters of apportionment, and dispensing justice among members of the diverse categories into which the north Chinese population had been divided by the Mongols. All of these functions, and others, are known to have been performed by other regional *jarqučis* that held office at the same time in other regions (e.g. by the Uighur *jarquči* Buyruq Qaya, south of Chung-tu and in the Shun-t'ien area).

Not long after Saiyid Aĵall's appointment, Ögödei died and power passed into the hands of his empress, Töregene Qatun (regent 1241-46). That woman is notorious in the Chinese sources for her rapacious exploitation of the Mongol domains in China by means of tax-farming, first under 'Abd al-Raḥmān and later under his associates when the relatively moderate Maḥmūd was forced to flee for his life in 1242. Saiyid Aĵall, for his part, seems to have remained in office during these difficult years, as also later during the short reign of Güyük (r. 1246-48) and that of his regent, Oġul Qaimiš (regent 1248-51). Little is known about Mongol administration at the time, nor are there any records of Saiyid Aĵall's activities.

In 1251, however, after protracted political struggle and the threat of civil war, the house of Tolui emerged victorious with qan Möngke (r. 1251-59), and Saiyid Ajall, now a mature man of forty with two decades of service behind him, assumed increased responsibility. In 1251, soon after his accession, Möngke charged his younger brother, Qubilai, with temporary control in China. The latter thereupon appointed (or reappointed) a number of *Jarqučis* and others to 'go to Chung-tu and pacify and control the army and the people.' Among those appointed to this task was Saiyid Ajall. Rašid al-Dīn calls him Qubilai's man, and this would seem to be confirmed by Saiyid Ajall's inclusion in a group largely comprised of Qubilai's personal retainers.

Not many months later, after Möngke had strengthened his hold on the throne in a series of great purges supervised by the *yeke Jarquči* Mengeser Noyan, a more formal administration, called a *hsing-sheng*, or Regional Secretarial Council, in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), was established in Chung-tu, headed by the *yeke Jarquči* Buḡir (*q.v.*) and Maḥmūd Yalavač. Among those participating in the new administration under Buḡir and Maḥmūd was, once again, Saiyid Ajall, presumably as Qubilai's representative. Saiyid Ajall's Chinese biography gives his final office in the Regional Secretarial Council as that of general administrator (*tsung-kuan*) for the Yen-ching district, but, in fact, there is no reason to assume that Saiyid Ajall held any other office than that of *Jarquči* for the region which he had held for almost a decade. The Chinese term is nothing more than a crude translation: in the Yüan system, a *tsung-kuan* was normally subordinate to a *darugači*, whereas Saiyid Ajall's powers were clearly far greater. As a consequence of the growing power of the central Mongol administration in China, responsibility was no longer strictly confined to the Chung-tu area. With Mongol preparations for a general advance into Szechwan, he became increasingly active in the region of Kuan-chung, where he took charge of supplies for the qan's own advance, after having contributed importantly to Qubilai's expedition in Yunnan. This was the beginning of a long association with west China that was to last for most of Saiyid Ajall's remaining years.

In August 1259, Möngke died while personally leading the Mongol advance in Szechwan. His death ushered in a period of intense change in the Mongolian world. Saiyid Ajall was deeply involved in these events, as a supporter of Qubilai's interest. From his power base in China, the latter usurped imperial power and undertook to gain recognition by the remainder of the Mongol world order of his self-proclaimed status as successor to Möngke.

Qubilai had evidently to consolidate his position in China as an eventual starting point for world conquest, while denying his younger brother Ariq Böke, a rival contender for the empire, any means of advancing his own cause. To that effect,

Qubilai immediately called upon his household officers and other associates, including former imperial officials willing or forced to throw in their lot with the usurper, to establish a control structure in China and adjacent areas. At the head of this control structure was the Yen-ching Pacification Bureau, as it is called in Chinese sources. Subordinate to it were ten pacification commissioners, who were positioned strategically across north and west China. Notwithstanding the Chinese nomenclature, this represented no real break with past Mongol practice and seems to have been a carry-over of the regional *jarquči* offices under new circumstances. At the head of the new structure was Möngke's former *yeke jarquči*, Maḥmūd, while most of the ten pacification commissioners had themselves previously served as *jarquči*, including Saiyid Ajall. (See, however, the biography of Yalavač.) He was sent back to his old post at Chung-tu, then threatened by Ariq Böke's armies.

Soon after his arrival, when any immediate danger to north China had been eliminated, the Pacification Bureau moved to Chung-tu, in succession to Möngke's former imperial administration. In mid-1260 Qubilai's central administration for China, located at his princely residence in K'ai-p'ing, was renamed the Secretarial Council, while in July the branch administration headed by Maḥmūd in Chung-tu became a Regional Secretarial Council. Not long after, perhaps in imitation of Möngke's administration which had governed through three great regional offices (in Chung-tu, Tūs and Beš Baliq), two other Regional Secretarial Councils were created, one for the former Tangut domains, and the other in west China. Saiyid Ajall served in Chung-tu as the pacification commissioner for the Yen-ching district for about a year and a half, until the late summer of 1261 when he was recalled by Qubilai.

Little is known of Saiyid Ajall's activities during the almost three years he spent attached to Qubilai's central administration for China. According to the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*, in July 1261 he was jointly appointed with Liu Su (1188-1263), the pacification commissioner of Chen-ting district, as president of the Three Ministries of the Left, i.e. Personnel, Revenue and Rites. Clearly, he was intended to play an important role since soon after he was concurrently made director of the Bureau of Agriculture, and director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council (*p'ing-chang cheng-shih*: Rašid al-Dīn's '*finjan*') – an office with powers closely similar to those of the *yeke jarquči* under the Mongol imperial system. Early the following year, we find Saiyid Ajall assisting in the establishment of the Yüan paper currency system, and shortly thereafter in charge of public works. In 1264 he was commissioned to take charge of Qubilai's Regional Secretarial Councils for west China (southern Shensi and northern Szechwan). There, he took charge of an administration that was increasingly concerned with operations in Szechwan and beyond, an area of growing importance

for Qubilai, who had now begun to think of conquering Sung and unifying China under his rule.

At the time of the Mongol invasions, Szechwan had long been a part of China, both culturally and politically. It was, however, a border area, touching in the south on the South-east Asian cultural sphere represented by the Ta-li kingdom of Yunnan; in the west on Tibet's principalities and petty kingdoms; and in the north on the mixed cultural area of Kōkōnor. Moreover, within Szechwan itself were numerous non-Chinese minority groups, often living side by side with Chinese inhabitants.

Szechwan had long served as a corridor for the movement of peoples, ideas and goods. It was connected to the south Chinese heartland by a series of long east-west river valleys forming natural invasion routes. Its geography was as varied as its ethnic composition: indeed, an abundant distribution of mountain pastures made it possible for the Mongols never to leave terrain that favoured them during their advance. Most importantly, as a people vitally interested in commerce, the Mongols saw Szechwan as the nexus of a major north-south trade route, one that extended from Mongolia into Tangut domains through what is now Kansu, into the Kōkōnor region, and then on south via Szechwan and eastern Tibet into Yunnan and beyond.

It was this trade route that may have first drawn Mongol attention to Szechwan and west China in general, although strategic considerations, in the wake of deteriorating relationships with Sung China, soon played their role as well. In the mid-1220s, Sübōtei (*q.v.*), charged with advancing on Hsi-Hsia from the west as part of the final Mongol assault on Sung, subdued various tribes in the Kōkōnor area, including, we must assume, many of the Altaic-speaking Hor groups. Those were descendants of various Hsien-pei tribesmen of the T'u-yü-hun and other groups involved in north-south trade, who had gained the first Mongol foothold in the region. Later under Ögödei, during the Mongol assault on the last Chin holdings, Sübōtei took advantage of the mountain valleys of northern Szechwan and southern Shensi to outflank Chin defenders and advance on Pien-liang (K'ai-feng) from the badly defended south. With the outbreak of border warfare between the Mongol and Sung empires after the collapse of Chin, Sübōtei soon found many imitators seeking to achieve a general encirclement of the Sung position.

By the late 1230s, Szechwan had become a major theatre of the growing conflict between the Mongols and their enemies in the south, and an area of main military concern for themselves and their allies. By the reign of Möngke, a large part of Szechwan was under Mongol control. So was much of eastern Tibet, in consequence of a treaty between the Mongol prince Köden, a son of Ögödei, and the ruling house of the Sa-skya monastery, which controlled a number of minor, but strategically

important kingdoms in the Sino-Tibetan border regions. In 1257 Möngke took personal charge of the advance.

Möngke, however, died before achieving all his goals in west and south China (parts of Szechwan, in fact, were to resist the Mongol invaders for another two decades). Because of Qubilai's concerns in the north, Szechwan was left to languish for half a decade, divided between Mongol and Chinese zones of control. This neglect soon affected the Mongol position there; a strong hand was required if full control was to be retained. To govern the strategic region of Kuan-chung, conjoined with Szechwan and other areas to make up the Regional Secretarial Council, Qubilai called upon Saiyid Ajall, by then in his early fifties, with decades of loyal services behind him, to serve as his viceroy in west China.

Saiyid Ajall held office for some nine years as head of the Regional Secretarial Council in west China. During this period, he seems to have undertaken a large scale reorganisation; besides bringing the province under firmer Mongol control, this laid the foundation for a truly effective regional administration that became the real instrument of subsequent Mongol power in the region. Among Saiyid Ajall's accomplishments, one notes a population survey, a fiscal reform, and a general restructuring of the administration, designed to place most local authorities firmly under the control of the Regional Secretarial Council's central administration (in 1266/67, for example, the military command that had hitherto controlled Szechwan was abolished and its functions taken over by the Regional Secretarial Council).

In 1270, after putting his Shensi house in order, Saiyid Ajall moved from Ching-ch'ao, where he had formerly established his Regional Secretarial Council headquarters, to Szechwan proper, where he took personal charge of operations as Qubilai stepped up pressure on the Sung. The arrival of Saiyid Ajall seems to have had an immediate impact on the Sung defender, Tsan Wan-shou, who had held Chia-ting, athwart communication lines with Mongol forces in the south, and blocking the Mongols' advance into the Sung heartland. The following year, after a brief visit to court to confer on strategy, Saiyid Ajall again took the field, this time together with a Mongol and a Chinese colleague. He participated in a land and river battle against two Sung generals positioned near Chia-ting, in support of the Mongols besieging the fortresses about Hsiang-yang in central China. After gaining a total victory, Saiyid Ajall returned north once again and established his Regional Secretarial Council headquarters at Hsing-yüan and there, repeating his role at the time of Möngke's advance into Szechwan, he took charge of supplies for Qubilai's offensive.

His mission accomplished, Saiyid Ajall was again transferred in 1273, this time to a completely new Regional Secretarial Council established for Yunnan and adjacent parts of southern Szechwan. His function there was to be much the same as

before, but the problems that would confront him in Yunnan were to differ radically inasmuch as the area of his new jurisdiction had had hitherto only the most tenuous connections with the predominantly Chinese-speaking regions in which Saiyid Aĵall had operated previously.

Many of the same considerations prompted the Mongol advance into Yunnan that had determined Mongol ambitions in Szechwan. In particular, Yunnan (known to the Mongols as *Qara Ĵang*, a name first used to designate the *Ta-li* kingdom and its capital in particular) was an important section of the same north-south trade route, and provided an even better position from which to penetrate Sung (not to mention adjacent Burmese, Khmer and Vietnamese) domains. Moreover, like Szechwan, Yunnan, which became a major centre of Mongol demographic concentration under the *Yüan*, was well provided with the mountain pastures so highly praised by the Mongols. In fact, so suitable did the pastures in Yunnan prove to be that Mongol tribesmen and local allies were able to hold out there for some two decades after *Yüan* power had collapsed elsewhere. Actually, Mongol influence continued in Yunnan even under Ming rule.

The Mongol advance into Yunnan began in 1253, shortly before the entry into Szechwan of the main Mongol armies under Möngke. It was carried out under the titular leadership of the then prince Qubilai, although operational control was exercised by the capable Uriyangqadai, a son of Sübötei. After a difficult advance against determined resistance, the campaign culminated in the capture in 1257 of *Ta-li*, and then of *Yün-nan fu* (known to the Mongols as *Yaĉi*, present-day *K'un-ming*), the two capitals of the indigenous *Ta-li* kingdom. Incursions followed into what is now Kweichow, Kwangsi, parts of Kwangtung and, ultimately, northern Vietnam. No enduring conquests, however, seem to have resulted from these operations executed as a series of probing raids. The Sung government took a serious view of those movements as evidenced by the raising of local militias and a general militarisation of social units in the Canton delta – such local forces, which seem to have continued in existence, later provided an instrument for renewed resistance to the Mongols in south-east China after the fall of *Hang-chou*.

Between 1258, when Qubilai marched his armies north again, and 1273, when Saiyid Aĵall arrived to take control, Yunnan was largely left to its own devices, with small Mongol garrison forces and feudatory troops barely able to maintain Mongol suzerainty, and little direct imperial presence. Qubilai's fears about the precariousness of Mongol dominion there, as expressed in the edict appointing Saiyid Aĵall, were well justified in fact.

After making a careful study of all available information on his new province, Saiyid Aĵall set out for *Ta-li*, where he arrived after an extended journey in August

1273. Even before his arrival in what was to be the headquarters of his Regional Secretarial Council, however, Saiyid Aĵall faced a major obstacle to his rule in the person of the Mongol prince *Toqur (?), whose troops were among those garrisoning Yunnan, and who, becoming alarmed at the potential threat to his authority posed by Saiyid Aĵall, prepared to resist the latter's arrival by force. Saiyid Aĵall defused the crisis by dispatching his son, Nāṣir al-Dīn, to the Mongol prince as Saiyid Aĵall's personal representative and by inviting the prince's own representatives to participate in the new Regional Secretarial Council, in accordance with the accepted Mongol practice. Mollified by Nāṣir al-Dīn's presence and unwilling to act openly against Saiyid Aĵall as Qubilai's minister, the prince accepted the offer; Saiyid Aĵall's office in Ta-li was to include two of the prince's retainers as *Jarqučis*. Also attached to the Regional Secretarial Council as a *Jarquči* was Saiyid Aĵall's son, Nāṣir al-Dīn.

Because of the tenuous hold of Mongol authority in the newly-conquered territory, Saiyid Aĵall had to organise his provincial administration almost from scratch. He must have begun with a population census, a reorganisation of fiscal structure and fiscal administration, and the creation of civil administrative units (districts, administrations, prefectures and counties) to replace the military and tribal units (chiliarchies and myriarchies) that had exercised Mongol power until then. An important task was to establish the Mongol *ĵam* system in Yunnan and adjacent areas, since this was essential for maintaining communications with Qubilai's court and the main Mongol administration for China, and also for ensuring that Saiyid Aĵall's commands were obeyed in the vast province assigned to his control. One administrative change not carried out, however, was the introduction of Yüan paper currency as sole legal tender in Yunnan. Realising the impracticality of such an innovation in the relatively primitive south-west, Saiyid Aĵall petitioned the throne to retain native means of exchange (primarily cowrie shells but also precious metals) concurrently with Yüan notes, and his petition was accepted.

Saiyid Aĵall's powers were by no means solely administrative. His name is, in fact, associated with two major accomplishments that were to play a major role in the long-term sinification of his remote province. One concerned flood control and water-works, an area not unfamiliar to a Bukharan, which involved a concerted effort to control drainage in central Yunnan as a prerequisite for wet-field rice cultivation. Some of the irrigation canals built by order of Sayid Aĵall in the area of Yün-nan fu are apparently still in use today. This development not only permitted a greatly enhanced food production in the south-west, but was also instrumental in drawing large numbers of Chinese colonists to what had been considered a barbarian region before the Mongol conquest. A second initiative was cultural and was associated with Saiyid Aĵall's encouragement of the ritualistic and formal aspects of the Confucian

tradition, so important as identifying characteristics of Chinese culture. For example, shortly after his arrival in Ta-li, the Muslim minister ordered the establishment of the first Confucian temple in Chung-ch'ing (Yün-nan fu), under his personal patronage and protection. He later established further Confucian temples in other population centres of his province, with schools teaching the classics which he had printed for local use. He made active efforts to encourage the introduction of Chinese marriage and funeral rites, and Chinese conceptions of social intercourse hitherto alien to the native inhabitants.

Interestingly, Saiyid Ajall is also reputed to have been one of the major protagonists of the present-day Muslim community in south-west China. Saiyid Ajall's personal role in the introduction of Islam in large parts of Yunnan is probably overstated (see below), for it is extremely likely that there was a Muslim community in Yunnan before the Mongol conquest. The coming of Islam to the area is due primarily to the large numbers of Muslims in the armies stationed there, although Saiyid Ajall must surely have promoted Islam in the region – he is reputed to have built two mosques – as well as Confucianism, seeing in both traditions a positive, civilising force in a remote, backward area (the same could be said about Saiyid Ajall's reported patronage of Buddhism as well). Moreover, Islam and Confucianism were by no means incompatible, since Confucianism was essentially political rather than religious.

Saiyid Ajall's many reforms and efforts at reorganisation, and the new model administration, which brought the Muslim minister into conflict with Prince *Toqr even before his arrival in Ta-li, encountered many opponents. Among them was a faction of unnamed local officials who attempted (unsuccessfully, since the emperor seems to have had complete confidence in his representative) to slander Saiyid Ajall at court and bring about his recall. Also the chief of the Lo-p'an-tien (or Lo-p'u-tien) aborigines (*man*), taking advantage of difficult terrain and his remoteness from the central authority, sought to refuse it allegiance.

Saiyid Ajall subdued that group in 1275, pacifying a number of other tribes during the campaign. Whereas he favoured a policy of moderation towards conquered people, hoping thereby to conserve their value as tax-payers, he had to contend with the rapacity of the Mongol contingents of garrison troops at his disposal. Those forces lived off the land and, according to tribal custom, were greedy for loot. Nor was plundering the sole preserve of common soldiers: Rašid al-Dīn reports that Qubilai had Hügeči flogged for stealing 'some waterfowl from a village in excess (of his needs).'

Subsequently Saiyid Ajall succeeded in obtaining that military forces be directly subordinated to the Regional Secretarial Council, under the command of his son,

Nāṣir al-Dīn. It must have been with those forces, supported in emergencies by elite Mongol troops, that Saiyid Aḡall undertook to extend his power, even beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. In 1276 for example, some 400,000 families in what is now Kwangsi and Kweichow were conquered during the final advance on Sung. Saiyid Aḡall also established connections with, and, in some instances, a loose suzerainty over various petty kingdoms and dynasties in Burma, Vietnam and other areas. During the years of his administration, Saiyid Aḡall also laid the foundations of the *t'u-ssu*, or Aboriginal Bureaux, whereby local authority was entrusted to tribal leaders of communities, such as the Lo-p'an-tien.

Saiyid Aḡall died in office in 1279, aged sixty-eight, after serving some five years in Yunnan, and was buried south-east of Yün-nan fu. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Nāṣir al-Dīn, who governed the province for another twelve years. As other family members (including Nāṣir al-Dīn's brother, Mas'ūd, and his son, Ḥusain) ruled after Nāṣir al-Dīn was transferred to Shensi in 1291, Saiyid Aḡall's influence was felt for some decades after his death (members of his family continued to hold high office in other parts of the Yüan empire well into the fourteenth century). In 1297 he was enfeoffed as Prince of Hsien-yang and given the posthumous name of Chung-i ('Loyal and Admirable'), subsequently changed to Chung-hui ('Loyal and Compassionate').

Saiyid Aḡall's role as a promoter of Islam, of Confucianism and of Chinese culture in general, has attracted much attention in the past and is currently being reconsidered. (See the important contributions of Ch'en Yüan and J.M. Armijo-Hussein listed in the Bibliography.) There is no doubt, however, that Saiyid Aḡall and his line contributed to bringing Yunnan definitely into the Chinese fold – culturally and politically – thus rendering a great service to China. As an 'intermediary of culture,' and indeed as a man, Saiyid Aḡall was a typical product of the polyethnic and multicultural environment of the Mongol world. The spirit of this background might perhaps have survived in the unique cultural ambience of south-west China today, where South-east Asian, Chinese, Tibetan, Islamic, and even ancient Altaic tribal traditions, coexist and interact in such a striking manner.

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For Saiyid Aġall's family tree and further data on his descendants see Leslie 86:83-85; for additional bibliographical data see *ibid.*, 163.

P.D. Buell

29. LIEN HSI-HSIEN (1231-1280)

Qubilai's transformation of the Mongol state from a steppe empire into a China-centred dynasty, and the simultaneous restoration, however partial, of a Chinese form of government, were important developments in the history both of the Mongol empire and of China itself. Confucian literati played an essential part in these developments: firstly, they spared no effort to help Qubilai consolidate his rule in north China; and then they brought him to adopt an entire set of institutions and policies rooted in Chinese and Confucian tradition. In concert with Qubilai's old retainers and the northern Chinese generals, the scholars achieved the first object when the political centre of the Mongol empire shifted from Mongolia to north China. But their success was incomplete on the second count inasmuch as their Confucian ideals, and Qubilai's views and constraints as a conqueror, were bound to clash. As a result, the Yüan era differed in many ways from previous Chinese dynasties and was, of course, far from being a 'Confucian state.'

In describing the present developments, historians have tended to overrate the influence of ethnic origin on the political inclination of the protagonists and the shaping of political alliances. The supporters of Qubilai and those of his chief rival for the throne, Ariq Böke (d. 1266), have frequently been described as Chinese Confucian scholars and generals on the one hand, and Mongol traditionalists on the other. Likewise, the political vicissitudes of Qubilai's reign are often attributed to the conflicts between the Chinese Confucians and the Central Asian fiscal experts. The life of Lien Hsi-hsien, the subject of this study, demonstrates that ideology was as strong as ethnic background in deciding a man's political commitment, for Lien was a non-Chinese Confucian who played a key role in winning the throne for Qubilai and subsequently bore the brunt of the fight against the fiscal experts in defending the Confucian outlook. His life illustrates also the limitations of the Confucians' interest at Qubilai's court for, despite his non-Chinese background, his long and intimate relationship with Qubilai, and his important contributions to the founding and consolidation of the Yüan dynasty, Hsi-hsien was, in later years, to suffer serious political setbacks for his beliefs.

Hsi-hsien was born in a Uighur family originally from Beš Balıq, the old Uighur capital north-west of present-day Ch'i-t'ai in Sinkiang. His family had been prominent in its native state and also in the early Mongol empire. Both his great-grandfather and his grandfather, Yarp Qaya and Qıtay Qaya, served the Uighur state with distinction in official capacities. After the Uighur had surrendered to the Mongols in 1209, Hsi-hsien's father, Buyruq Qaya (1197-1265), followed the Uighur

ruler, Barčuq Art Tegin, and entered the service of the Mongols. Serving in the Imperial Guard, Buyruq Qaya fought with Činggis Qan during the latter's campaigns in Central Asia. For his reward, Činggis gave him a wife from the consort clan of the Qara Khitai royal house, née Shih-mo (d. 1264), who was to be the mother of Hsi-hsien.

Of importance to Hsi-hsien's future career was his father's long association with the house of Tolui as a retainer dealing with northern Chinese affairs. Sometime early in Ögödei's reign (1229-41), Sorqaqtani Beki (d. 1252), Tolui's wife, petitioned the throne for Buyruq Qaya's services and put him in charge of her households in Yen-ching (Peking) and Chung-shan, in present Hopei. She subsequently appointed him resident commissioner (*daruqači*) of Chen-ting (Cheng-ting) where her apanage was located. In 1231, Buyruq Qaya was appointed surveillance commissioner (*lien-fang shih*) of the Yen-nan circuit and concurrently judge, or arbitrator (*Jarquči*), of the same circuit. It is apparent that he served in these capacities as a retainer of Tolui's house as well as an imperial official. As such, he forged close ties with the future qa'ans, Möngke and Qubilai, sons of Tolui and Sorqaqtani Beki. In 1260, when Qubilai had established his rule in north China and proceeded to install his advisers and the retainers of his house as pacification commissioners of the ten circuits of north China, Buyruq Qaya was appointed to Chen-ting. Shortly thereafter, he was posted as pacification commissioner of the Shun-te (Hsing-t'ai) and other circuits. He is known to have been subsequently made chief censor, perhaps merely an honorific title at this time, and, in 1261, director of the Bureau of Agriculture. At his death in 1265, he had served Tolui's house and assumed official posts in north China for over thirty years. Because of his close connection with Tolui's house and in particular with Qubilai's interest, many of his thirteen sons and fifty-three grandsons were to achieve prominent positions in the Yüan bureaucracy. Hsi-hsien was to be the most exalted of them all.

Hsi-hsien (his Uighur name was Hindu [Hsin-tu], T. Shan-fu) was Buyruq Qaya's second son. At his birth on the 25th of the fifth month (= 26 June) of 1231, his father had just been appointed surveillance commissioner. Buyruq took the coincidence as an auspicious omen for the family and decided to adopt the first character of his new office, *lien*, as family name. The adoption of a Chinese family name at this early date is indicative of the Chinese milieu in which the family lived. Indeed, Hsi-hsien's early environment would have steeped him in Chinese ways. It is not certain whether Buyruq Qaya himself ever studied Chinese, but he is known to have been an educated man versed in the Uighur script and appreciative of learning. He was among the few very early non-Chinese officials in the service of the Mongols to have had their children educated in the Chinese fashion. He is said to have hired good teachers to

give his children a classical Confucian upbringing. It is not surprising that, of his sons, not only Hsi-hsien but also Hsi-kung, who was to distinguish himself as one of the best Yüan calligraphers, were renowned for their Chinese scholarship. Hsi-hsien himself is reputed actually to have practised the great precepts which he had acquired from the classics.

As a member of a distinguished Uighur family in the service of the Mongol royal clan, Hsi-hsien found the way to political success open to him early in life. He entered the entourage of Qubilai at Qara Qorum, perhaps as a hostage, in 1244, if not earlier. Merely fourteen years of age, Hsi-hsien served very likely as a member of Qubilai's Guard, a Mongol imperial and princely institution whose members combined the roles of royal bodyguard, hostage, household supervisor and trainee for future political and military careers. It was in the Guard that Hsi-hsien served his political apprenticeship and established a lasting bond of personal duty to Qubilai. As early as 1242, Qubilai, then still a young and aspiring prince, had summoned many famous scholars to his headquarters at Qara Qorum to constitute a group of political advisers. Among them was Wang E (*q.v.*), the top *chin-shih* of 1224 and a prominent Chin scholar. Hsi-hsien was one of five young retainers assigned to study under the distinguished Chinese scholar after his arrival in 1244. When Wang E left Qara Qorum two years later, Hsi-hsien and his fellow-students were sent to escort their master home.

As a disciple of Wang E, Hsi-hsien's understanding and fondness of Confucian learning were immeasurably increased. It is said that he was keenly interested in the classics and history and was never without a book in his hands. One day while he was reading the *Mencius*, he was summoned by Qubilai and appeared in all haste before him with the book. When Qubilai inquired about the teachings of Mencius, Hsi-hsien outlined the master's teachings on the innate goodness of human nature, righteousness and self-interest, benevolence and violence. Qubilai was much impressed and dubbed the young man Lien Mencius. The name stuck. Yet, as a Uighur nobleman, Hsi-hsien was by no means a bookworm. He is reputed to have demonstrated his skill at archery in the presence of Qubilai and to have been admired by his colleagues as a man equally accomplished in the literary and the martial arts. Moreover, Hsi-hsien seemed to have enjoyed Qubilai's special favour on account of the indirect matrimonial link between their families. Sometime around 1250, Hsi-hsien married one of the daughters of Mungsuz (1206-67), a fellow Uighur, and, like Buyruq Qaya, a manager of Sorqaqtani Beki's apanage. Since Mungsuz's second wife, Ketülün, was the younger sister of Qubilai's wife, Čabui, Hsi-hsien was Qubilai's nephew by marriage.

Hsi-hsien's chance to make his debut occurred as the political fortunes of Qubilai were beginning to rise. In 1251, Qubilai was given the task of supervising the administration of north China on behalf of his elder brother Möngke Qa'an, who had just won the throne from the house of Ögödei. Finding himself in charge of a country ravaged by constant warfare and the exactions of the Mongol nobility, the Muslim tax-farmers and the Chinese warlords, Qubilai set out to test the feasibility of restoring the Chinese system of government in selected localities while striving to turn the entire region into his personal power base. Hsi-hsien accompanied Qubilai on his punitive expedition against the Ta-li kingdom (in present Yunnan) in 1253, and was appointed a year later to be pacification commissioner of Ching-chao in present Shensi, which Qubilai had received in fief. Hsi-hsien's task was facilitated by the fact that the previous administration under Yang Wei-chung (*q.v.*) and Po-lan had succeeded within one year in restoring a degree of order to the region.

In ruling Ching-chao, Hsi-hsien was supported by a strong Chinese and largely Confucian staff, on which Shang T'ing (*q.v.*) served as his deputy, Yao Shu (*q.v.*) as agricultural promotion commissioner, Hsü Heng (*q.v.*) as superintendent of schools, Ma Heng (1207-77) as chief of the Tax-collection Bureau, Chao Liang-pi (1217-86 or 1214-86) as first secretary, and Yang Huan (*q.v.*) and Chih Yü as councillors. Among his colleagues, Hsi-hsien is said to have shown great respect to Hsü Heng and Yao Shu, both renowned Confucian scholars, frequently consulting them on the way of good government, and to have ordered his actions according to the Confucian principle of caring for the people. He is given credit for freeing many Confucian scholars from slavery. The national policy of the Mongols, formulated in 1238, neither to enslave scholars nor to impose corvée labour on them had not been observed in Ching-chao. Hsi-hsien proved very liberal in his recognition of scholarship, and even dug into his own pockets to ransom some nonentities. Many schools that had been closed down were reopened, mainly under the direction of Hsü Heng, which reportedly rekindled the people's interest in learning. Hsi-hsien's efforts to promote the material well-being of the population were ably supported by Yao Shu and Ma Heng. Yao Shu achieved some success in reviving agriculture and Ma Heng carried out a taxation policy that is described as having been both lenient towards the tax payers and sufficiently productive. Furthermore, Hsi-hsien himself is praised for setting a strict ceiling on the usurious rate of interest known as 'baby lamb interest' (*yang-kao li*), which had been a scourge in Ching-chao and elsewhere in the early Mongol period.

The success of the reforms carried out by Hsi-hsien in Ching-chao was soon to involve him in a major conflict between Qubilai and Möngke. By 1257, Qubilai's growing strength accruing from his Chinese-style reforms had evoked the wrath of the

Mongol traditionalists at Möngke's court and even aroused the suspicion of the qa'an himself. In response to allegations that Qubilai had falsified tax revenues and ingratiated himself with the people of north China, Möngke despatched 'Alamdār (d. 1260) and Liu T'ai-p'ing (d. 1260) to audit fiscal records in both Ching-chao and Ho-nan, another of Qubilai's power bases. With their headquarters in Ching-chao, the imperial commissioners conducted a wide-ranging investigation throughout the two regions, resulting in the death of over twenty officials in Ching-chao alone. Hsi-hsien declared himself fully responsible for the proceedings of the pacification commissioner of Ching-chao. In the end, however, we are told that the auditors failed to discover the slightest evidence of irregularity on the part of the Ching-chao officials. Nevertheless, the Pacification Commissions were abolished in Ching-chao and Ho-nan, and Möngke deprived Qubilai of his fiefs there. Even so, the Ching-chao experience resulted favourably for Hsi-hsien, by proving him as an administrator, while earning him Qubilai's deepest confidence.

Having lost his post as an imperial commissioner, Hsi-hsien returned with Qubilai to the latter's headquarters at Lung-kang, the future K'ai-p'ing, in present Inner Mongolia. Hsi-hsien resumed duties as an official in a princely household and was put in charge of all the Chinese belonging to Qubilai's apanage. Also, his name appears as one of the two hundred officials and scholars who served as moderators in the famous Buddhist-Taoist debate held under Qubilai's auspices at Lung-kang in early 1258.

The peaceful life at Lung-kang was to be but a brief respite, for Hsi-hsien had soon to follow Qubilai in the field once again. In late 1258, Möngke launched a three-pronged offensive against the Sung. Assigned to command the central thrust towards the Sung stronghold of E-chou (Wu-ch'ang) in the middle course of the Yangtze, Qubilai took Hsi-hsien and many other literati with him. Hsi-hsien's attention was again drawn to the plight of the many scholars taken prisoners of war. He reportedly urged Qubilai to ransom the captured literati out of public funds; more than 500 were set free as a result.

The campaign against the Sung was soon brought to a halt by the death of Möngke Qa'an at Tiao-yü shan in the seventh month of 1259. This immediately raised the issue of his succession, plunging Qubilai into a bitter struggle for the throne with his younger brother, Ariq Böke, whom Möngke had left in charge of the Mongolian homeland. Qubilai's conflict with Ariq Böke was not merely a contest for power but represented also a clash of ideologies affecting the future of the Mongol Empire and China's place in it. Ariq Böke relied on the support of Möngke Qa'an's old retainers who had carried out the inquest against Qubilai; Qubilai, with north China as his power base, depended for his part on the loyalty of the Chinese literati and generals.

Hsi-hsien was to play a determinant part in Qubilai's ultimate victory, not least by firming the latter's resolve on several occasions. As Qubilai was still undecided whether to pursue the siege of E-chou or to return north and contest the throne, Hsi-hsien was among the first to urge the latter course of action. He reportedly argued that Qubilai was in a unique position to take the throne, not only because of his position in the imperial clan but also on the strength of his military achievements and of the large retinue of talented men which he had assembled. When Qubilai decided to contend for the throne, Hsi-hsien was sent ahead to gauge the situation in the north. He urged Qubilai to destroy the force mobilised by Dorji whom Ariq Böke had sent to deny Qubilai the Yen-ching region. Hsi-hsien is further credited with persuading Prince Tāčar – the grandson of Temüge Otčigin, and the most powerful of the 'left-hand' (i.e. eastern) princes, to throw in his lot with Qubilai.

When the *quriltai* was called in the third month of 1260 at Lung-kang, Tāčar actually led the left-hand princes in electing Qubilai as the new qa'an. But Qubilai would not accept at first, perhaps as a gesture dictated by the poor attendance of the right-hand (i.e. western) princes. Together with Mungsuz, his father-in-law, Shang T'ing and Chao Liang-pi, his former colleagues in Ching-chao, Hsi-hsien pressed Qubilai to take the throne lest the initiative be lost to Ariq Böke. Qubilai consented and enthroned himself the next day.

The western part of China proper – Kuan-chung (Shensi), Szechwan and Kansu – became one of the main theatre of operations in the early stages of the ensuing war. Here Hsi-hsien played a key role in crushing Ariq Böke's supporters, whose strength and vital importance he recognised from the outset, having personally served for four years in the area as pacification commissioner of Ching-chao. After Chao Liang-pi, who had been sent to investigate the situation on Hsi-hsien's recommendation, had confirmed the threat from Ariq Böke's supporters, Qubilai appointed Hsi-hsien pacification commissioner of Shan-hsi and Ssu-ch'uan in the fourth month of 1260, with Shang T'ing as his deputy and Chao Liang-pi as councillor. When Hsi-hsien reached Ching-chao the following month, many former generals of Möngke had declared for Ariq Böke. Liu T'ai-p'ing and *Qoduqui (d. 1260) had occupied Ching-chao two days earlier, claiming that they had been appointed by Ariq Böke to set up a Regional Presidential Council there. Qunduqai, stationed by Möngke at Liu-p'an shan with 20,000 élite cavalry, had also announced his allegiance to Ariq Böke. So had Ket Buqa (d. 1260), in charge of the Mongol army at Ch'ing-chü shan in eastern Szechwan, and Melik Qoja (d. 1260), the commander at Ch'eng-tu in western Szechwan.

Even though the political and military alignment in western China clearly favoured Ariq Böke's faction, Hsi-hsien's fast and bold action crushed the opposition

in five months. Without troops of his own, Hsi-hsien commanded such respect among the inhabitants for his past services that he was able to call on the local Chinese levies, most of whom were loyal to Qubilai. Shortly after his arrival, Hsi-hsien dispatched with lightning speed Liu Ni (1200-62), the distinguished myriarch of the Han Armies, to arrest Liu T'ai-p'ing and Qoduqui at Ching-chao and to kill Melik Qoĵa at Ch'eng-tu. He also sent Wang Wei-cheng (1242-85), a young Öngüt commander of the Han Armies, to dispose of Ket Buqa at Ch'ing-chü shan.

Hsi-hsien's sudden blows greatly weakened the political influence of Ariq Böke's faction in the region. Nevertheless, he still had to face the threat to Ching-chao that Qunduqai posed from Liu-p'an shan. Hsi-hsien managed to hold Ching-chao by persuading Wang Liang-ch'en (1231-81), an uncle of Wang Wei-cheng, to join him with his command and by organising a makeshift force of 4,000 men under Pa-ch'un, a former *Jarquči*. Qunduqai gave up his planned attack on learning that the defences of Ching-chao had been strengthened, and moved his troops northwestward to Kan-chou in the Kansu corridor with a view perhaps to joining Ariq Böke's forces in Mongolia.

But the military crisis was not over yet for Qubilai's supporters in western China, for 'Alamdār had arrived in Kansu with a large army and joined forces with Qunduqai at Yen-chih shan southeast of Kan-chou in the ninth month. Seeking to rally Ariq Böke's supporters, 'Alamdār was able not only to establish extensive contacts with the Mongol generals in Szechwan, Shansi and Kansu, but even to beat some of Qubilai's forces. Thunderstruck by this sudden reversal, the court actually considered evacuating Szechwan entirely and withdrawing all forces to Hsing-yüan. The proposal foundered on Hsi-hsien's strenuous objections. Hsi-hsien's confidence was soon vindicated. His forces, under Wang Liang-ch'en and Pa-ch'un, with reinforcements commanded by the Princes Qadan and Qabiči, succeeded in crushing 'Alamdār's troops at Yao-pei ku, east of Kan-chou, later in the month. Both 'Alamdār and Qunduqai were killed. With this decisive victory, Qubilai's control over western China was secured: Ariq Böke lost all influence south of the Gobi desert and found himself deprived of supplies from north China. Hsi-hsien's achievements had shown him to be not only an able scholar-administrator but also a tough-minded statesman-general capable of facing an extreme crisis intelligently, resolutely and even ruthlessly. It is not surprising that Qubilai should have called Hsi-hsien a 'true man' on hearing of the victory.

By the time of this victory, Hsi-hsien's appointments had been changed twice since his arrival in Ching-chao a few months before. In the fifth month, when Qubilai established ten Pacification Bureaux in order to consolidate his control and rationalise the administration of north China, Hsi-hsien was confirmed in his position with the

title of pacification commissioner of Ching-chao and other circuits. With a view probably to strengthening his authority in office, Hsi-hsien was promoted in the eighth month, to be assistant of the Right of the newly established Regional Secretarial Council of Ch'in-Shu while Chao Liang-pi was appointed to Hsi-hsien's original post as pacification commissioner and concurrently a councillor of the Regional Secretarial Council. Hsi-hsien was once again elevated to the rank of director of political affairs of the same council, as a reward for his contribution to the defeat of 'Alamdār's forces. In the third month of 1262, the Regional Secretarial Council was reorganised. Ma-ma, the former chief of the Secretarial Council, joined Hsi-hsien as a director of political affairs in the Regional Council, while Shang T'ing was to serve under them as associate director of political affairs. Even though his titles changed several times, however, Hsi-hsien remained the key man in Qubilai's administration in western China for a period of nearly three years, interrupted only briefly by a visit to the capital in 1261, until he left the region in early 1263.

Hsi-hsien's jurisdiction covered not only Shansi and Kansu but also Szechwan, where Mongols and Sung observed an uneasy truce. Such circumstances demanded not only that he alleviate the suffering of the people and restore order and prosperity to the areas under his jurisdiction, but also that he undermine Sung power by all means short of open warfare. He is credited with having suspended the requisition of horses and oxen for a period of two years in Kuan-chung, and ordering the demobilisation of the contingents levied from the salt-households of Hsieh-chou and of the colonists in Ling-chou originally conscripted from Ching-chao.

In Szechwan, reports claim that he put an end to the slave trade and plunder practised by Mongol troops. To induce the Sung soldiers and officials to surrender, Hsi-hsien is said to have given provisions to the families of Sung generals residing in Mongol-held territory, and allowed those who were still serving with the Sung to cross the lines to visit their relatives. When Liu Cheng (1213-75), the Sung commander at Lu-chou, surrendered, it was Hsi-hsien who recommended that the defector be treated generously in order to ensure the latter's loyalty to the Mongols. All these initiatives contributed to the strengthening of the Mongols' position in this key region.

Even though he had been the main architect of Qubilai's control over western China, Hsi-hsien was not above allegations of treason. Early in 1262 Wang Wen-t'ung (*q.v.*), a director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council, was implicated in the rebellion of Li T'an (*q.v.*), a Chinese warlord of Shantung who had defected to the Sung. This came as a great shock to Qubilai and touched off a witchhunt at court. Among others, Hsi-hsien was accused by Chao Pi (1220-76), another director of political affairs in the Council, alleged to have always been jealous of Hsi-hsien.

According to Chao, Hsi-hsien was to be held responsible for Wang Wen-t'ung's treason, for it was he, together with Chang I (d. 1282), who had recommended Wang to Qubilai. Chao Pi further warned Qubilai of the potential threat posed by Hsi-hsien's popularity in the strategic Kuan-chung area and his association with men of Shang T'ing and Chao Liang-pi's ability. The allegation was apparently groundless since some time later Qubilai accepted Hsi-hsien's explanation that it was Chang I and Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*), not he, who had recommended Wang Weng-t'ung. In any case, Qubilai's trust in Hsi-hsien was not at all shaken by this incident. He told Chao Pi, 'Hsi-hsien has served us since his adolescence. We know his heart. Both Shang T'ing and Chao Liang-pi are upright scholars. We need not worry about them.' Similarly when Buyruq Qaya, apparently to protect his son, begged Qubilai to recall Hsi-hsien, Qubilai refused, saying that Hsi-hsien was irreplaceable in the 'south-west' and that he should have no cause to worry. The word had been put about, perhaps at that time, that some of the many Liens then in office should be dismissed. Qubilai again rejected the suggestion and is quoted as declaring to his entourage, 'Buyruq Qaya's merits are numerous. We know his descendants very well too. This is not a matter in which you should interfere!'

Even though Hsi-hsien escaped that time, he was not left wholly unscathed by another charge brought against him the following year. The charge this time was made by Fei Yin, a renegade Sung official who had been imprisoned by Hsi-hsien and Shang T'ing. Fei accused Hsi-hsien and his colleague of nine crimes, including arbitrary use of their power at the time of Ariq Böke's rebellion and conspiracy to rebel as demonstrated by the fortification of their cities during Li T'an's revolt. In a suspicious mood after the rebellions, Qubilai imprisoned Shang T'ing, suspended Hsi-hsien from office, and sent Nien-ho Nan-ho (d. *ca.* 1268) to take charge of the Regional Secretarial Council and investigate the alleged crimes. Hsi-hsien's loyalty, however, was vindicated by Nien-ho's investigation and by Chao Liang-pi's vigorous testimony at the court. Nevertheless, Hsi-hsien was summoned to the capital in early 1262 and appointed director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council. His three years of service as regional chief executive came thus to an end.

This was Hsi-hsien's second appointment to the Secretarial Council. His first term as a central bureaucrat had been brief, lasting about four months. He had joined the Secretarial Council in the third month of 1261 as an assistant of the Right under Ma-ma, the Right chancellor. When the Council was reorganised two months later after Ma-ma's administration had failed to increase revenue, he was made director of political affairs under the Mongol Buqa and the Chinese statesman, Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), the Right and Left chancellor respectively. Later in the month when the Council was divided, Hsi-hsien found himself among the staff posted to Yen-ching as

a branch office. He was prevented from going and had to return to Ching-chao instead, for Shang T'ing had requested that Qubilai send him back on the grounds that he was indispensable in the region. Hsi-hsien's specific contribution during this brief term is not known. From Wang Yün's (*q.v.*) account of the daily activities of the Council, *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*, we learn that Hsi-hsien participated in policy discussions on the paper currency, the bureaucratic structure, population registration and revenue, whereas his position in these matters remains unknown. We also infer from Wang Yün's account that Hsi-hsien maintained at least a cordial working relationship with Wang Wen-t'ung, the moving spirit of the Council after its reorganisation. Indeed, Hsi-hsien took part in the Council debate that led to the fall of Ma-ma and the rise of Wang who pressed Qubilai to keep Hsi-hsien on the Council even though Qubilai had already accepted Shang T'ing's plea to send him back to Ching-chao.

Hsi-hsien's second term in the Secretarial Council lasted from late 1263 to the first month of 1270. During these six years, his service was interrupted on three occasions, twice on account of the deaths of his mother and father, in 1264 and 1265 respectively. The third time when he was temporarily discharged from the Council in the second month of 1265 and the subsequent two months in the summer of the same year to act on special assignment as director of political affairs in the Regional Secretarial Council of Shan-tung. Discounting these period of leave, his service on the Secretarial Council lasted about five years – a relatively long term during a period when Qubilai's administration was still in a state of flux. For most of the period, his official title was director of political affairs; it was downgraded to assistant of the Left in the sixth month of 1267. This, however, entailed no loss of status for Hsi-hsien, for it resulted from a general reduction in the Council's staff. These six years represent the culmination of his career.

In his second term on the Secretarial Council, Hsi-hsien played an active role in counselling the emperor, running the daily administration of the Council, and shaping the institutions of the empire that were still being elaborated. As a personal retainer of long standing, Hsi-hsien was apparently in the unrivalled position of being able to speak candidly before the qa'an. A devoted Confucian, Hsi-hsien seems to have always remonstrated with Qubilai whenever he considered some decision to have been wrong, and striven to advise the emperor to emulate the sage rulers of Chinese history. On one occasion, we are told, Qubilai revealed to Hsi-hsien his pleasure in having the latter serve as his minister because he no longer had to worry about the corruption of officials and the neglect of talented subjects, that had plagued previous reigns. Hsi-hsien's response was typically Confucian. He urged the emperor, though somewhat indirectly, not to be complacent but to imitate the legendary sage-kings,

Yao and Shun, in bringing about great harmony and peace. Another time, when Qubilai mentioned Wei Cheng (580-643) who had a great reputation as a worthy minister and staunch remonstrator, Hsi-hsien told the emperor that the difference between dynasties was not caused by the numbers of worthy officials in their service, but by the ruler's ability to make proper use of them. The emperor once asked Hsi-hsien why his advice had become much more direct and inflexible since Qubilai's elevation to the throne. Hsi-hsien explained that it was necessary for him to be firm since the actions of an emperor would have a much wider impact than those of a prince.

As a director of political affairs, Hsi-hsien not only offered his advice freely to the emperor, but also engaged actively in the routine operations of the Council. Early in Qubilai's reign, the directors of political affairs were in charge of the actual administration of the Council while the chancellors restricted themselves to important decision-making. Both Wang Wen-t'ung and Aḥmad played a dominant role in that position. As a non-Chinese who was nevertheless an expert in Chinese affairs, Hsi-hsien enjoyed an advantage over most of his colleagues and played an important part in running the organisation. His absence on leave to mourn his father caused a back-up of thousands of cases which Qubilai had decreed should all be dealt with by Hsi-hsien – who managed to settle all of them within ten days of his return. Qubilai was so pleased that he reportedly said, 'We need not worry any more, since we have got the right man as our minister.'

Hsi-hsien contributed directly in shaping Yüan institutions such, for instance, as the Secretarial Council, the instrumentality which Qubilai had striven to cast in the Chinese mould, and which only achieved its final development after Hsi-hsien had rejoined it in 1263. The restoration of a centrally appointed local bureaucracy and the censorial system are also attributed to his personal initiative.

A centrally appointed and controlled bureaucracy had operated at the local level since the beginning of Imperial China in the third century B.C. A process of feudalisation, however, had followed the Mongol conquest. Many of the prominent personages who had surrendered had been allowed to exercise civil, military and fiscal powers over their domains on a hereditary basis. Even though Li T'an's rebellion of 1262 had prompted Qubilai to enforce the separation of the military command from the civil administration, many members of the former hereditary families still ruled their districts as civil administrators.

It was Hsi-hsien, perhaps with Yao Shu, who urged Qubilai to rationalise this state of affairs by making the local offices of civil administration transferable. Hsi-hsien's recommendation was apparently adopted, since, in the fifth intercalary month (June-July) of 1265, he was assigned the task of reorganising the local administration

in Shantung, while Chao Pi and Yao Shu were to do the same in Honan and Shansi respectively. Hsi-hsien's assignment in Shantung was certainly a difficult one, for Li T'an's rebellion had only been suppressed there three years before. Nevertheless Hsi-hsien was able to complete his assignment within two months. In the meantime, he also suggested to the court that each circuit should annually nominate two men – one specialised in Confucian studies and the other in clerical duties – for official appointment to the central government. This apparently represents the origin of the Yüan system of 'annual tribute of Confucian scholars and clerks' (*sui-kung ju-li*), which was initiated in 1269. The scheme provided the Yüan government with an alternative means of recruiting public servants at a time when the traditional civil service examination had been suspended indefinitely.

Hsi-hsien is also credited with the restoration of the censorial system. The Censorate and its branches, the Inspection Bureaux, which had been a distinctive and integral part of Chinese government, were not re-established until 1268, although other organs on the Chinese model had already been in existence for some time. The Yüan sources attribute the restoration of the system variously to Kao Chih-yao, a Tangut Han-lin academician, Chang Hsiung-fei, Hsi-hsien's protégé who is said to have made the suggestion in 1265, and Hsi-hsien himself. Hsi-hsien may not have conceived the idea but he was certainly its most powerful proponent and may even have determined its adoption. He also helped to keep the new system alive, for he stood as its advocate against attacks from the powerful Aḥmad, who was in charge of the state's finance, and who had condemned the censorial system in general, and the Inspection Bureaux in particular, on the grounds that the inspection system would impede the normal functioning of government. Hsi-hsien argued in response that inspection was part of the ancient system and benefited the state by weeding out treacherous and corrupt officials. It appears that Hsi-hsien triumphed over Aḥmad, for this once at least, since the censorial system continued unaltered thereafter.

Hsi-hsien's defence of the censorial system was part of a wider conflict opposing the Confucians to Aḥmad. That feud lasted nearly two decades and dominated the latter part of Hsi-hsien's career. Ever since Li T'an's rebellion and the implication of Wang Wen-t'ung, the Confucian scholars had been losing their influence in government to Muslim financial experts. The Li T'an and Wang Wen-t'ung incidents had clearly cast doubts in Qubilai's mind on the reliability of the Chinese. Moreover, the Muslim financial experts were immeasurably more efficient than the Chinese literati in satisfying Qubilai's need for additional revenue to support his many military campaigns and public works projects. Aḥmad, who was able to raise the necessary funds without regard to the burdens imposed on the Chinese populace, emerged as the new favourite of the qa'an to the detriment of the Chinese scholars. In their protracted

struggle with Aḥmad, the scholars depended on the support of such non-Chinese colleagues as Hsi-hsien, An-t'ung (*q.v.*), the great-grandson of Muqali and nephew of Qubilai, and lastly Jingim (1243-85), Qubilai's heir apparent. As the head of the Board of the Left and the Right of the Secretarial Council, Aḥmad often acted in total disregard for the authority of the Council. Hsi-hsien's alignment with the Confucian scholars was apparently motivated both by conscience and by professional concern as a senior council member.

His break with Aḥmad was consummated in 1264 when some internal bickering among Aḥmad's followers gave Hsi-hsien the opportunity to expose Aḥmad's wrongdoings. Since Aḥmad was very powerful at the time, none of Hsi-hsien's colleagues in the Council dared to investigate the crimes of Aḥmad's followers, even though they had been instructed by the throne to do so. Undaunted, Hsi-hsien undertook to conduct alone a thorough investigation that implicated Aḥmad. According to Hsi-hsien's biographies, 'Aḥmad was beaten with a stick and deprived of all under his charge as a result of Hsi-hsien's report.' That must be an exaggeration, for even though the Ministry of the Left and Right was abolished, Aḥmad was reappointed director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council in the eighth month of the same year. Our sources are almost silent on Hsi-hsien's relations with Aḥmad. We know only that he 'often subdued Aḥmad with justice.' Since Aḥmad's power was growing, it would seem that Hsi-hsien's position must have become increasingly precarious.

Hsi-hsien resigned from the Secretarial Council in the first month of 1270. The exact reason for his resignation is still unclear. The cause suggested in his biographies is Hsi-hsien's desire to protest against the inconsistency of Qubilai's decrees. It is said that Nizām al-Dīn, a member of the Regional Secretariat of Yen-ching in Möngke's reign imprisoned for alleged corruption, was released by the Secretarial Council in accordance with an amnesty proclaimed by Qubilai. But the emperor then reprimanded the Council for the release. Hsi-hsien, together with his colleague, Yeh-lü Chu (*q.v.*), resigned in protest. The reason given may be no more than a pretext. Even though the issue involved was a matter of principle, it was of no political significance. The inscription for the 'spirit-way stele' of Ch'en Ssu-chi (1232-1301) written by Yü Chi (1272-1348) asserts on the other hand that Hsi-hsien had been the victim of a slander. Although the inscription specifies neither the nature of the slander nor the name of its perpetrator, we may infer that the deed can be attributed to Aḥmad, since the brief statement is made in reference to Hsi-hsien's conflict with the latter. Moreover, the circumstances in which Hsi-hsien submitted his resignation could reflect Hsi-hsien's indignation at Aḥmad's increasing power.

Indeed, his resignation coincided with the establishment of the Presidential Council, which was to have exclusive jurisdiction over fiscal matters under Aḥmad's direction.

Hsi-hsien spent his four years of retirement at home, reading and tutoring his children. But it is said that, as a true Confucian, he never set aside his worries about the sorry state of government affairs. His dissension with Aḥmad, moreover, did not cease after he left office. Possibly to forestall Hsi-hsien's return to power, Aḥmad continued to slander him. As Qubilai sought to know how Hsi-hsien was faring, Aḥmad told the emperor that Hsi-hsien was enjoying banquets and music with his wives and children. But Qubilai could not accept Aḥmad's version of Hsi-hsien's lifestyle, being well aware that Hsi-hsien was too poor to afford frequent feasts. For his part, Hsi-hsien showed his contempt for his foe by turning down Aḥmad's offer of granulated sugar which his doctors had prescribed as a cure. Furthermore, Hsi-hsien was by no means a forgotten figure and still had many supporters in government – especially in the Censorate which was the stronghold of the Confucians in their struggle against Aḥmad. Both the censors, Wei Ch'u (1232-1292) and Wang Yün, petitioned Qubilai in 1271 and 1273 respectively to recall Hsi-hsien and put him in charge of the affairs in southwestern China. What is more important, An-t'ung, Hsi-hsien's chief ally and Right chancellor, also requested that the throne appoint Hsi-hsien to take charge of administration in Ho-hsi. The request failed only because of Qubilai's fear that the indomitable Hsi-hsien would be unable to maintain good working relations with the imperial princes settled in the region.

Perhaps in response to pleas for Hsi-hsien's return, Qubilai appointed him director of political affairs in the Regional Secretarial Council of Pei-ching in the second month of 1274. In this post, Hsi-hsien was supposed to work with T'ou-lien-ko (also known as Qurumši), great-grandson of Muqali and inheritor of the title of Prince-of-state (mo. *gui-ong*, chin. *kuo-wang*), whose administration over the previous two years had aroused many complaints. The situation in the region was unique in the empire because the area comprised both steppes and cultivated land. It was practically impossible for ordinary officials to govern the region, for many fiefs of the descendants of the younger brothers of Činggis Qan and those of the imperial consort clans and meritorious officials were situated within its borders. Hsi-hsien was considered the most suitable for the task, as Qubilai told him before his departure, because he was greatly respected by Tāčar and other princes.

At a time when Qubilai was still trying to transform the Mongol Empire from a patrimonial estate of the Borjigin clan into his personal autocracy, Hsi-hsien's duty was apparently to strengthen imperial authority without alienating the feudal princes in the region. To that effect, Hsi-hsien paid special attention to protocol in his dealings with the princes. At one time when the envoy of Prince Tāčar called on the

Regional Secretarial Council, even T'ou-lien-ko, the *gui-ong*, rose to his feet in deference to Tāčar. Hsi-hsien, however, remained seated, explaining that a minister of state did not stand up for a prince. Hsi-hsien endeavoured to subject the nobility to the rule of law. When the Princess Nanggiajan, the eldest daughter of the emperor, and her husband, Oločin (d. 1277), damaged crops while hunting on their way to the capital, Hsi-hsien threatened to report them to the throne. The princess herself had to provide funds to make good the loss. Nobles are said to have watched their step thereafter when crossing Hsi-hsien's territory. Qubilai was apparently satisfied with Hsi-hsien's performance, since only a few months after Hsi-hsien's arrival he relieved T'ou-lien-ko of his administrative responsibilities and placed the Council completely in Hsi-hsien's charge.

After one year of service outside the Great Wall, Hsi-hsien was re-assigned to the middle Yangtze region as assistant of the Right in the Ching-Hu Regional Secretarial Council. Our sources do not agree on the reason for Hsi-hsien's transfer. Hsi-hsien's biographies say that it followed a request from Ariq Qaya (1226-86), who had just conquered the region. We learn from other documents that Hsi-hsien's new appointment was made at the suggestion of Aḥmad who hoped to prevent Hsi-hsien's return to the Secretarial Council. This is plausible, for we know that in the eighth month of 1274 Wei Ch'u had again requested Qubilai to recall Hsi-hsien to the Council and send Chao Liang-pi to Pei-ching in his stead. Since Chao Liang-pi was subsequently sent to Pei-ching, it is very likely that Hsi-hsien was indeed considered for a reappointment in the capital. But Qubilai changed his mind at the urging of his favorite fiscal expert.

Whatever the circumstances of his posting to Chiang-ling, the capital of the Ching-Hu Regional Secretarial Council, Hsi-hsien undertook there the difficult but challenging task of pacifying a newly conquered territory. The region had just been occupied by Ariq Qaya in the course of Qubilai's major offensive leading to the downfall of the Sung in 1276. Hsi-hsien lived up to his reputation as an experienced trouble-shooter and administrator in his effort to restore order and prosperity to the territory under his jurisdiction. To bring life back to normal, he lifted the curfew and ordered the troops back to their lines. He strictly forbade plundering, the murder of captives by Mongol soldiers and the selling of wives and children as slaves by the local populace. In order to strengthen the local gentry's confidence in the new regime, he reappointed over twenty former Sung officials to his administration. To improve the local economy, tens of thousands of *mou* of land were reclaimed by draining the marshes around Chiang-ling city, for settlement by new farming communities. As he had done at Ching-chao, Hsi-hsien reopened local schools, notably the Chu-lin Academy, and stimulated the revival of education. Such was the fame of his

administration, we are told, that even the tribal chieftains in present-day Kweichow and the Sung commander of Ch'ung-ch'ing asked him to accept their surrender.

Hsi-hsien was recalled to the capital in 1278 at the suggestion of Tung Wen-chung (*q.v.*), a former fellow-student under Wang E and close retainer of Qubilai. Wen-chung appealed to Qubilai, claiming that the emperor's popularity would suffer if he kept a minister of Hsi-hsien's stature in a provincial post for long, especially when the prime minister's post was vacant. Moreover, Wen-chung mentioned the detrimental effect of the humid weather of the Yangtze region on Hsi-hsien's health as an added reason for the latter's recall. Wen-chung's appeal seems to have expressed the common desire of the literati in the government: Hsi-hsien's recall would strengthen their hand against Aḥmad, who had established near-complete dominance over the government after An-t'ung had left in 1275 to campaign in Mongolia. Hsi-hsien was recalled following Wen-chung's recommendation, to the great disappointment of the people of Chiang-ling. As a testimony to his incorruptibility, he is said to have brought back from the wealthy Yangtze province nothing but his flute and books.

On his return to Shang-tu in the fifth month of 1278, Hsi-hsien was showered with imperial favours. Unfortunately, he was unable to re-enter the Secretarial Council as his Chinese colleagues had hoped, partly because of ill health and partly because of Aḥmad's continued objection to his reinstatement. At that time Qubilai was considering the establishment of the Chancellery, which had acted as a policy reviewing organ under the T'ang, to balance the power of the Secretarial Council, and he had Hsi-hsien in mind for the directorship. The heir apparent, Jingim, promised to give Hsi-hsien all the support he needed. However, the Chancellery project was eventually abandoned because of Aḥmad's opposition. In the spring of the following year, Qubilai ordered Hsi-hsien back to the Secretarial Council. By this time, however, Hsi-hsien was too sick to accept the appointment. Nevertheless, when Jingim sent a retainer to inquire about his health, Hsi-hsien took the opportunity to express his worries about the exercise of power by disloyal parties – apparently referring to Aḥmad – and urged the crown prince to emulate the ancient sage-kings and to get rid of the traitors forthwith.

Hsi-hsien did not live long enough to witness the end of his main adversary and tormentor, who was to be murdered in 1282. Hsi-hsien died on the nineteenth of the eleventh month (= 12 December) of 1280 at the age of forty-nine and was buried at Hsi-yüan in Wan-p'ing. His death was a great blow to Qubilai and to many of Hsi-hsien's colleagues. Qubilai supposedly declared, 'Only Lien Hsi-hsien was capable of making decisions on important matters in the great assemblies attended by princes of blood.' Likewise, the great general Bayan (*q.v.*), conqueror of the Sung, admired Hsi-

hsien as 'a true chief minister among chief ministers, and a true man among men.' The great sorrow of the literati, who had pinned on Hsi-hsien their hope for the realisation of their Confucian ideals, is manifested in the elegies and poems written on his death by Yen Fu (1236-1312), Hu Chih-yü (1227-95), Hòu K'o-chung, Yao Sui (1238-1313) and Li Yüan-li, that are still preserved. To honour the great statesman, Temür Öljaitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307) conferred on Hsi-hsien in 1304 the posthumous dignity of Wen-cheng ('Cultured and Correct') and the honorific titles of Grand Tutor and Duke-of-state of Wei. About a decade later, Ayurbarvada (Jen-tsung, r. 1312-20) posthumously promoted Hsi-hsien to the rank of Grand Preceptor with the title of Prince of Heng-yang.

Hsi-hsien had two wives. The first was the daughter of Mungsuz. She bore Hsi-hsien a son, Fu (also known as I, T. Kung-hui), who reached the position of deputy chief of the Regional Secretarial Council of Liao-yang, and three daughters, who were married to high officials. Hsi-hsien's second wife, née Wan-yen, was a Jurchen lady. She bore Hsi-hsien five sons and three daughters. All her sons distinguished themselves in government service, and, like Hsi-hsien himself, were all well educated in Chinese. Of them, Tun seems to have been most outstanding in literary accomplishments. He is the author of the collection entitled *Lien Wen-ching kung chi*, some pieces of which are still preserved in the *Yung-lo ta-tien*.

Hsi-hsien is historically significant because of the range of important contributions he made to the establishment and the consolidation of the Yüan dynasty. In almost every phase of Qubilai's endeavour to transform the Mongol state from a steppe empire into a China-based dynasty, Hsi-hsien played an important role as either a central or regional chief executive, or an imperial counsellor. As a man versed in the language, culture and history of China, Hsi-hsien provided the kind of expertise indispensable to rule China that few of his non-Chinese colleagues possessed at this early stage of acculturation. As a non-Chinese from a family bound for decades to the Čingisids, and to Tolui's house in particular, and who himself had served Qubilai as a retainer and official loyally and competently since his own adolescence, Hsi-hsien gained Qubilai's trust and intimacy to a degree that none of his Chinese colleagues could ever hope to equal. In that unique position, Hsi-hsien enjoyed the best of the two worlds and accomplished for Qubilai what his Mongol and Central Asian colleagues were unable to do, and which his Chinese colleagues had no opportunity to undertake.

Hsi-hsien is equally outstanding as one of the earliest, most devoted, and most exalted Confucians among the non-Chinese in the Yüan period. As a non-Chinese, he apparently perceived Confucianism as the universal truth transcending racial and national boundaries. To be sure, he was not a master of Confucian philosophy nor an

accomplished scholar, since he left no writings of any kind. He was nevertheless a most dedicated practitioner of Confucianism in both private and public life. He is said to have even refused Qubilai's order to undergo Buddhist initiation, on the grounds that he had already taken the Confucian vow to 'be loyal as a subject and filial as a son.' As a person, he was an exacting scholar, personally anxious for intellectual and moral improvement. Collecting books seems to have been his only indulgence (both the Chih-shan t'ang ['Hall of Achieving Goodness'] and the Tu-shu t'ang ['Hall of Book-learning'], which he set up in Ching-chao and in the capital during the 1250s and 1260s respectively, are known to have had large collections of books). His life was otherwise simple and untainted by corruption, as befits a scholar-official. He was also a filial son and figured among the earliest non-Chinese observers of the Confucian customs of mourning.

In the public realm too, Hsi-hsien acted according to Confucian precepts and strove to imbue government institutions and policies with Confucian standards. In the Imperial Patent written by Yüan Ming-shan (1269-1322) and issued on the conferment of his posthumous titles, Hsi-hsien is described as one who 'never presented anything to His Majesty that was not cited from the *Book of Odes* or the *Book of History* and never put anything into effect that was not benevolent and righteous.' This description apparently reflects the picture of the man perceived by many contemporaries as well as by the court. To influence and help Qubilai in making government benevolent and righteous seems to have been Hsi-hsien's ideal throughout his public life. In the circumstances, the realisation of Confucian political ideals and the restoration of the traditional Chinese government overlapped to a significant extent. This must have been at least one of the reasons why Hsi-hsien worked so hard in support of Qubilai's efforts to relocate the political center of gravity of the empire, and to develop a Chinese form of government first at regional level and then on a national scale. As a member of the Secretarial Council and imperial counsellor, he repeatedly urged the emperor to emulate the ancient sage-kings and helped the latter to adopt Chinese political institutions. As a regional chief executive he seems to have always made special efforts to alleviate the miseries of the people under his jurisdiction.

As a Confucian, Hsi-hsien is notable also for the special favours which he bestowed upon scholars. His unusual compassion for scholars in distress is vividly expressed in a story, perhaps apocryphal, describing the contrasting treatment he meted out respectively to Liu Cheng and to a group of poor and humble scholars. Hsi-hsien is said to have refused outright to receive Liu Cheng, the high-ranking Sung general rallied to the Mongols, but treated a group of Sung scholars clothed in rags in a most warm and courteous manner. He explained that, as an influential minister of

state, he had to show special respect for scholars lest Confucianism be lost as a doctrine. In addition to emancipating enslaved scholars and setting up schools wherever he went, Hsi-hsien is also known to have recruited many learned men for official appointment. Those recommended or appointed by him include Hsü Heng, Chih Yü, T'ung Chi-hsien, Chang Ch'u (1232-94), K'ou Yüan-te, Chang K'ung-sun (1233-1307), Wang Li-yung, Ch'en Ssu-chi (1232-1301), Kuo Hao (1194-1268), Kuo Ang, Li T'ing (1194-1277), Meng Ch'i, Chang Hsiung-fei, Wang Jen (1241-1311) and Hsü Chi. It is significant that all the above-named scholars were Confucian by training and Chinese by race. Since Hsi-hsien was not Chinese himself, his criterion in political recruitment was apparently ideological rather than racial.

Hsi-hsien's protracted but losing struggle against Aḥmad reflects not only his devotion to the Confucian cause but also his limitations as a politician. In Hsi-hsien's eyes, Aḥmad's ruthlessly exploitative fiscal policies were diametrically opposed to the Confucian principles of government; they could only aggravate the plight of the people and accelerate the ruin of the state. Moreover, it was his belief, which he frequently expressed to the emperor and the heir apparent, that gentlemen (*chün-tzu*) and mean individuals (*hsiao-jen*) could not coexist in the same government: small-minded busybodies like Aḥmad should be eliminated as a prerequisite of sound governance. Consequently Hsi-hsien devoted the second half of his career to this purpose in order to achieve the ideal Confucian government. To be sure, Hsi-hsien was too intelligent to overlook the fact that behind the ruthlessly exploitative policies of Aḥmad was the goad of Qubilai's own unquenchable lust for additional revenue. He was too sincere a Confucian statesman, nevertheless, to compromise his principles for the sake of power. He believed that by consistent argument and concerted action with other upright men like An-t'ung and a host of Chinese Confucians, he would be able to convince the emperor to eliminate Aḥmad and to adopt more benevolent policies. He was apparently too sanguine. His task was made more difficult by the fact that Qubilai was not only an autocrat but also a conqueror. Even though Qubilai had found it opportune to adopt some Chinese institutions and provide his government with a Confucian façade for the purpose of ruling China, he had no intention of accepting the Chinese institutions *in toto*, nor was he willing to bend his desires and principles of government to Confucian ideals. It was impossible for Hsi-hsien or anyone else to alter this fact. It had been difficult for the Confucians of the past to persuade the native Chinese autocrats to refrain from extravagant spending and military adventures. It was doubly difficult to lead a conqueror to do so. Thus, notwithstanding his long and close association with Qubilai, and his great contributions in founding the Yüan dynasty, Hsi-hsien's self-assumed mission to Confucianise Qubilai and the Mongol state was doomed from the beginning. The

political setbacks that Hsi-hsien suffered in his later years were the price which he had to pay for his idealism.

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C.C. Hsiao

‘REBELLIOUS’ AND ‘TREACHEROUS’ OFFICIALS

30. LI T’AN (? – 1262)

Li T’an, T. Sung-shou, a native of Wei-chou in I-tu district, Shantung, was the chief of the Regional Secretariat for that district under Möngke and Qubilai Qa’an. In early 1262, he launched a large-scale rebellion in Shantung that rocked the foundation of Mongol rule in China. At the outset of his uprising, Li surrendered three cities under his jurisdiction to the Southern Sung, but he was defeated by the Mongol forces within six months and was executed in August of the same year. Despite its failure, the insurrection had lasting consequences: it seriously affected Qubilai’s state policies and attitude towards the Han intelligentsia and military commanders. There is no lack of information on Li T’an in the Sung and Yüan sources, but accounts are rather diffuse, fraught with lacunae and discrepancies, and are subject to contradictory interpretations. The Yüan records invariably condemn him as a traitor and a rebel attempting to overturn the new regime, and the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) mentions him among the biographies of ‘Treacherous Officials.’ The Sung sources generally hail him as a national hero, although some question the sincerity of his defection. Such historiographical differences must be resolved if a proper assessment is to be made of Li T’an’s career and of the significance of his revolt.

Available information is sketchy on Li T’an’s family origin and early years. Most sources make him the son of Li Ch’üan (d. 1231), one of several leaders of freebooting anti-government rebel bands in Hopei and Shantung under the late Chin. Li Ch’üan later brought his forces over to the Sung who rewarded him with an official position. He rebelled eventually and defected to the Mongols to become chief of the Shan-tung Regional Secretariat. Two accounts, however, claim that Li T’an was the son of Hsü Hsi-ch’i, a notable from Ch’ü-chou, Chekiang. Hsü served as an adviser to Chia She (d. 1223, father of the powerful Sung chancellor Chia Ssu-tao, 1211-75), when She was posted to Yang-chou as military vice-commissioner of East Huai-nan circuit. (This probably occurred around 1220; Hsü rose to become the military commissioner of the same region in 1225.) Chia She was very fond of Hsü Hsi-ch’i’s son and invited him to study with his own children. At that time, Li Ch’üan was still childless, and, hoping to flatter Chia She, begged him to procure a child for Li Ch’üan’s adoption. Assuming that Hsü was on good terms with Li Ch’üan, Chia

recommended Hsü's son, and renamed him T'an. This story is not verifiable, but if it were true, T'an would have been a teenager at the time, presumably born in the late 1220s. In any event, Li T'an spent his early years in Li Ch'üan's care and rose to prominence under the latter's aegis.

Li Ch'üan was one of a number of outlaw chieftains in Shantung who organised the war-weary populace for self-protection, but eventually became roving freebooters and anti-government rebels during the last decades of Jurchen rule. The change occurred around the time of the Chin punitive campaign against the Southern Sung in 1206, when war mobilisation caused considerable hardship in the regions of Hopei and Shantung, fomenting widespread banditry. The situation deteriorated further after the Mongol general Muqali's (*q.v.*) attack against the Chin capital Chung-tu (modern Peking) on Ögödei's orders in 1213. As a result, the Chin ruler, Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213-23) moved his court to Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan) the following year, leaving a power vacuum in the Huai River regions.

Li Ch'üan's career was by no means unique. In Shantung, as in Hopei where the powerful Tung and Shih families had achieved prominence (see the biographies of the Tung brothers, and of Shih T'ien-tse), there were already well-established outlaws such as Liu Erh-tsu and Yang Kuo-an, better known as Yang An-erh, leaders of the so-called Red Coats. There was also Yen Shih (*q.v.*), who later became a famous myriarch in the Han army of Tung-p'ing under the Mongols. They all made good as Chin control waned in Hopei and Shantung, rallying the oppressed villagers, and attracting opportunist and even criminal elements to their ranks. Those leaders had no clear national identity or political goal, and changed their allegiance as circumstances warranted. To the Chin court, they were mere bandits and rebels; to the Southern Sung, they could be either loyalists or renegades depending on their current commitment. The Mongols saw them as unreliable opportunists, concerned above all in promoting their own interest.

According to his biography in the section on 'Treacherous Officials' in the *Sung History* (*Sung-shih*), Li Ch'üan was the youngest son of a peasant family from Pei-hai, Wei-chou, in north central Shantung not far from the coast. Of rugged physique, shrewd and dashing, Li excelled at horsemanship and spear drill – which earned him the surname Li T'ieh-ch'iang ('Li the Iron-spear'). There are, however, discrepancies between the *Sung History* and the *Chin History* (*Chin-shih*) about Li Ch'üan's later activities. The *Sung History* biography asserts that Li, like his more powerful peers from Shantung, Liu Erh-tsu and Yang An-erh, did not attract attention until after the Mongol seizure of Chung-tu in 1215. It states that it was sometime after 1216, following the sack of Shantung by the Mongols in which both his mother and his eldest brother perished, that Li Ch'üan and his surviving elder brother Li Fu, rallied

several thousand locals and organised them for action. There is evidence, however, that Li Ch'üan was already fomenting disorder as early as the summer of 1205 when he participated in the raid against Lien-shui on the north bank of the Huai River in Kiangsu, then under Chin rule. The *Chin History* accounts, on the other hand, claim that the 'criminal elements' in Shantung were numerous at the time of the Chin punitive campaign of 1206, when military operations caused considerable disorder in Hopei and Shantung. Some of those outlaws were neutralised but they again rose in defiance when the Mongols attacked the Chin capital in 1213, and captured it two years later.

It was in those circumstances that the *Chin History* places the uprisings of Liu Erh-tsu, Yang An-erh and other outlaws in Hopei and Shantung. In summer 1214, after Hsüan-tsung had moved his capital to Pien, the most powerful leader, Yang, with a considerable force, seized Lai-chou and Teng-chou in northeastern Shantung bordering the coast, and attacked Ning-hai and Wei-chou to the south-west. He proclaimed himself king, adopted a dynastic name, and set up an administration. Li Ch'üan is mentioned in this context as having occupied Lin-chü, south-west of Wei-chou, and planned an attack on I-tu in the north-west. Meanwhile, the Chin armies launched a fierce counterattack under the command of pacification commissioner Pusan An-chen (d. 1221). Yang's forces were annihilated and he himself perished in early 1216. Liu Erh-tsu's band was routed in turn and its leader executed with his supporters. Nevertheless, remnants of Yang and Liu's forces continued to plunder northern Shantung under Liu's lieutenants. Leadership of Yang An-erh's men was assumed by his fourth sister Yang Miao-chen, popularly known as Yang Ssu-niang, a daring woman skilled in combat. Li Ch'üan subsequently rallied to her support. Impressed with him, Yang Miao-chen became his wife: together they moulded the Red Coats into a formidable force of over one hundred thousand in Shantung.

In the following years, Li Ch'üan and Yang Miao-chen's men raided many prefectures in Shantung and caused great trouble to the Chin even though lacking any clear objective. Meanwhile, recognising the value to them of those rebel forces, the Sung authorities sought to secure their services, thus further weakening the Chin. The military commissioner of the Chiang-Huai region (modern Kiangsu and Anhwei), Li Chüeh, and the prefect of Ch'u-chou in Kiangsu, Ying Ch'un-chih, began overtures to that effect. They succeeded in turning to their side several officers of Liu Erh-tsu and Yang An-erh, but Li Ch'üan at first did not respond. Yet in late 1217, Li and his men were driven by famine to cross the Huai River and join Ying Ch'un-chih's command. (The *Sung History Annals* report that Li submitted in February 1218, to be immediately appointed general administrator of the East Ching-tung circuit.) Thereupon, seeking to demonstrate his loyalty, Li led his followers in an attack on the

Chin cities of Chü-chou and Mi-chou in central Shantung, while his brother Li Fu captured I-tu. The Sung court thereupon awarded Li Ch'üan the title of Great Officer of the Military Wing, and his force was henceforth to be known as the Loyal and Righteous Army.

In the meantime, reacting to Li Ch'üan's defection, the Jurchen commander Hoshih-lieh Ya-wu-t'a (d. 1231) launched attacks on the prefectures held by Li, which resulted in a succession of pitched battles with gains and losses on both sides. Li Ch'üan eventually gained the upper hand. In early 1219, he laid siege to I-tu (recaptured earlier by the Chin), and persuaded the local commander, Chang Lin, to cease resistance. Chang yielded, and in July he surrendered twelve prefectures, including Chi-nan, giving the Sung control of a large part of northeastern Shantung. The Sung court awarded Chang the rank of pacification commissioner and general administrator of the East Ching-tung circuit, while retaining Li Ch'üan as general administrator of the same region, with the additional rank of surveillance commissioner of Kuang-chou. In summer 1220, Li was further honoured with the title of Grand General of the Left Military Guard.

Meanwhile, having attempted unsuccessfully to recall Li Ch'üan to his former allegiance, the Chin court stepped up its efforts against him. At the same time, feuds had developed between Li's brother Li Fu and Chang Lin, on the one hand, and between Li Ch'üan and some erstwhile followers of Liu Erh-tsu and Yang An-erh, on the other, for reasons of personal interest. In autumn 1221, unable to resist Li Ch'üan and his allies, Chang Lin surrendered to Muqali, the Mongol commander-in-chief, with his men and territories. (The *Sung History*, however, places Chang Lin's defection in early 1222.) Chang thereupon became chief of the Secretariat of the East Shantung district, thus posing a direct threat to Li Ch'üan and his comrades.

In early 1223, to reward Li Ch'üan's fidelity, the Sung court appointed him commanding prefect of Pao-ning, and also made him deputy pacification commissioner of the East Ching-tung district. Meanwhile, the Chin ruler attempted once again to make Li Ch'üan reverse his position. Later that same year, the Jurchen commander Meng-ku Kang (d. 1223) sent a Sung turncoat to Li's camp inviting him to come over, but Li Ch'üan had the emissary disfigured before sending him back. During the next two years (1224 to 1226), Li Ch'üan seized Ch'ing-chou, his former base of I-tu, whereas his wife led her own men to Shan-yang at the meeting of the Huai River and the Grand Canal in Kiangsu. While affecting allegiance to the Sung, husband and wife were often at odds with brother-officers and occasionally raided Mongol-controlled territories with a view to shoring up their own position. Such activities posed a serious threat to Mongol supremacy in Shantung, but no immediate

response was possible on account of a campaign being waged against the Mongols by the Chin warlord Wu Hsien (d. 1234) in Hopei and Honan.

Finally, in April 1226, Ögödei dispatched a force under Daisun, Muqali's brother, to eliminate Li Ch'üan's band. The adversaries clashed at I-tu in October; after suffering grievous losses, Li Ch'üan withdrew into the city, but the Mongol commander pressed on, encircling the stronghold. In desperation, Li sent his brother Li Fu and a counsellor over the city wall to Ch'u-chou with a plea for Sung assistance. But the Sung authorities remained unforgiving: not only did they refuse aid, but even sent a fleet up the Huai River to cut any possible retreat from I-tu by the waterway. Early the next year, Bōl (*q.v.*), Muqali's son, despairing of the stalemate, brought reinforcements to Daisun, while, through an emissary, inviting Li Ch'üan to surrender. Li considered the offer, but rejected it in the face of his subordinates' opposition, and killed Bōl's envoy. But Li Ch'üan finally had to submit in May 1227, after having been besieged for more than a year and exhausted all provisions. Some of the Mongol commanders wanted Li killed in revenge, but Bōl intervened, judging that Li might make a useful collaborator. In fact, Bōl secured for Li Ch'üan an appointment as chief of the Regional Secretariat for Shan-tung, Huai-nan and Ch'u-chou, to be based at I-tu.

Thereafter, Li Ch'üan became a vassal of the Mongol court, remitting annual tributes of gold and silver, while seeking at the same time to expand his jurisdiction at the expense of both Sung and Chin. At this juncture, the Chin court made yet another attempt to regain Li's allegiance by offering him a princely investiture, which he again rejected. Emperor Hsüan-tsung then contemplated military reprisals, but was dissuaded by his ministers because of the Mongol menace. In 1230, Li Ch'üan began making plans to attack the Sung city of Yang-chou at the meeting of the Grand Canal and the Yangtze, in preparation for which he launched a raid in March on the capital Lin-an (Hang-chou), resulting in the destruction of an arsenal. The Sung court thereupon declared a full-scale war on Li Ch'üan. In February 1231, Li undertook a massive offensive on Yang-chou, but the Sung forces were ready for him. He was defeated and killed. His wife Yang Miao-chen, hurrying from Ch'u-chou, rallied the routed forces and withdrew to the north. She then assumed her late husband's office as chief of the Regional Secretariat at I-tu, endeavouring unceasingly to gain the support of the local notables. She even attempted to invade Sung to avenge Li Ch'üan's death, but failed. She died several years later, and Li T'an took over the command of her troops as well as the official commission conferred by the Mongol court.

There is scarce information on Li T'an in the literary records for the period of twenty-five years after he became the chief of the Shan-tung Regional Secretariat.

Recently, however, the Japanese scholar Morita Kenji found several stone inscriptions in modern editions of Shantung gazetteers which shed new light on Li T'an's activities. Besides confirming that T'an was indeed Hsü Hsi-ch'i's natural son, these sources show that since the mid-1230s Li T'an gradually expanded his influence over Ning-hai chou, where he won over the commanding prefect Chiang Fang (1185-1240) and other notables. He is also said to have rallied the local scholars by patronising Confucian studies, and may have even introduced civil service examinations in his domain to maintain a bureaucratic administration. These were not easy years for Li T'an, however, for in spite of his successful territorial expansion, he had to be subservient to Muqali's descendants and their associates who were attempting to tighten direct Mongol control over the region. In addition, these sources mention three or four individuals who claimed to be Li T'an's siblings. If these claims were genuine, it would indicate that Li Ch'üan had adopted quite a number of children to increase his progeny.

Thereafter, our knowledge of Li T'an depends almost exclusively on the *Yüan History* accounts, which are strongly prejudiced against him for they were written after his abortive rebellion. They portray him as a grasping and power-hungry warlord, betraying the trust of the Mongol court for personal gain. His biography reports a succession of political intrigues and crafty manoeuvres to promote his interest at the expense of the Mongol rulers as well as of the Southern Sung. The Sung accounts are contradictory: some hail his defection to the loyalists, while others depict him as an unworthy turncoat.

Of the few glimpses we are given of Li T'an's activities in the early years of his career, the first comes from the *Yüan History* biography of Wang Wen-t'ung (q.v.), who was executed as Li's accomplice in early 1262. The source asserts that Li T'an, at some point in his attempt to expand his power, recruited the resourceful but crafty Wen-t'ung as adviser. Li married Wang's daughter shortly thereafter. Another report appears in the reminiscences of one of Li T'an's followers who survived the Mongol onslaught as a refugee in the Southern Sung. It was preserved in abridged form by the Ming literatus Chu Yün-ming (1461-1527) in his miscellany *Ch'ien-wen chi*. According to this account, Li T'an had taken the sister of prince Tāčar, a grand nephew of Činggis Qan, as his second wife. This was probably sometime in Möngke's reign. Li T'an's intimate relationship with these important personages at the Mongol court, particularly with Wang Wen-t'ung, helps explain his rebellion. Wang was later to approach Qubilai through the recommendation of scholars from Tung-p'ing, and was appointed director of political affairs upon Qubilai's enthronement. Tāčar was a powerful Mongol prince-of-state and military leader who played a prominent role in the suppression of Ariq Böke. Although Tāčar had no part in Li

T'an's insurrection, it was generally believed that Li had invoked his relationship to Tāčar as a means of personal aggrandisement.

The first dated event involving Li T'an is recorded in the Annals of Emperor Li-tsung (r. 1225-64) in the *Sung History*, which mentions that Li, usually known as Li Sung-shou in the Sung accounts, rebuilt the walls of the prefectural seat of Hai-chou (in Kiangsu), north of Lien-shui bordering the Shantung coast; raided the waterway to the south; but was finally defeated by the forces of Sung. Thereafter Li T'an's biography in the *Yüan History* reports that Möngke, having planned a massive campaign against the Sung strongholds in Szechwan, summoned Li with the troops under his command for mobilisation at Shang-tu in May 1257. But Li astutely argued that his own administration, I-tu, needed a strong defence as the key to coastal communication with the Sung. It would not be advisable therefore to call on his garrison troops to join the planned expedition. Möngke was convinced, and, swayed by Li's argument, ordered him to undertake operations against the East Huai-nan circuit of the Sung. Li, allegedly on Wang Wen-t'ung's advice, launched attacks on Hai-chou and Lien-chou. Four cities capitulated in those prefectures, enabling Li to claim a substantial achievement at the Mongol court.

After Qubilai's accession as emperor of China, Li T'an remained in his post as chief administrator of the Regional Secretariat at I-tu. It is apparent that Qubilai had gained a good impression of Li's ability and potential, and that he also needed the support of the Han Chinese regional warlords. Meanwhile, Li T'an endeavoured to strengthen his power base in Shantung: his move to block a direct official contact between the Mongol court and the Southern Sung offers a good example of his *modus operandi*. This occurred in May 1260, shortly after Qubilai's enthronement. The qa'an, in a conciliatory gesture towards the Sung, commanded the Han-lin reader-in-waiting Hao Ching (*q.v.*) to lead an embassy to Sung carrying a personal letter to Emperor Li-tsung, which proclaimed his accession and his wish for peace. It is said that Wang Wen-t'ung, now the powerful director of political affairs, recommended Hao Ching's appointment, but secretly plotted to sabotage the mission. The reason was that a successful outcome would have limited his opportunities for intrigue and reduced his role in government. It was apparent that Li T'an, as Wang's son-in-law, also shared this view since an accommodation with the Sung would unavoidably undercut his position.

Consequently, Li T'an secured the court's agreement that he should dispatch two special emissaries of his own to the Sung before Hao Ching's departure, ostensibly to obtain advanced information of use to the mission. In June, when Hao and his party reached Chi-nan on the south bank of the Yellow River, Li sent him a written message entreating him to stop, and warning that it would be dangerous and futile to

proceed. He allegedly advised Hao that his two men had been seized and executed by the Sung prefect at Huai-an, and that, according to his intelligence, the enemy court absolutely refused to negotiate with the Mongols. Hao Ching ignored the warning; he referred Li's message back to court and continued his journey. We do not know how Qubilai reacted to Li T'an's intervention but it must have been taken as friendly advice since it elicited no reprisal. As it turned out, Hao Ching's mission was doomed: he and his associates were detained by the Sung court as spies following Li T'an's invasion of the East Huai-nan prefectures. It was not until March 1275, almost fifteen years later, that the Sung authorities, alarmed by the progress of Mongol expeditionary forces towards Lin-an, released the delegates and sent them north under an official escort.

In the midst of these manoeuvres, Qubilai showed additional favour to Li T'an by raising him (July 1260) to the rank of high military administrator of the Chiang-Huai region. Later he also appointed the veteran Han myriarch Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) military commissioner of the same region. This new appointment, in effect, recognised not only Li's position at I-tu, but also his authority over the Sung prefectures which he had recently occupied in the Huai-nan circuit. From then on, the *Yüan History* biography gives a rather one-sided account of Li T'an's abuse of Qubilai's trust and of his schemes to strengthen his position as a prelude to open revolt. Shortly after his new appointment, Li T'an reported to the qa'an that information obtained from refugees indicated that the Sung councillor Chia Ssu-tao was mobilising forces with a view to recapturing Lien-shui. Moreover, he warned that the enemy had assembled warships at Hsü-p'u (the mouth of the Yangtze) and in Lake She-yang to the north, ready to sail up the Shantung coast, and asked for assistance to strengthen the fortifications of I-tu. The request was approved. In August, Qubilai allowed Li T'an ten golden and five silver tablets (*fu*) to reward his troops for distinguished service, and awarded also 300 *ting* of silver to Li himself. Moreover, he ordered all Mongol and Han forces on the Sung border to be placed under Li T'an's command.

Thereupon, Li T'an submitted a succession of memorials to Qubilai, in which he denounced the hostility of the Sung, and made repeated requests for assistance to strengthen the defence of his own region and to organise punitive expeditions. First of all, he reported (September) that the Sung military commissioner Lü Wen-te (d. 1269) had mobilised 75,000 soldiers from the Huai-nan circuits, ready to attack Lien-shui, and that Li had received very provocative communications from Chia Ssu-tao, the Sung councillor, and from Lü Wen-te himself. Li feared lest the Sung should invade Shantung, having learned that the Mongol court was plagued at the time by internal dissensions (i.e. Ariq Böke's insurrection). Therefore, he implored the court

to strengthen the border defence, and proposed that he should make a preemptive strike to punish the arrogance of the Sung commanders. Qubilai, however, rejected Li T'an's request after consultation with the senior officials in the Secretarial Council. He decreed that since the court had initiated peace negotiations with the Sung (i.e. by dispatching Hao Ching's embassy), the commanders on the border should maintain a defensive posture. Moreover, he pointed out, probably rightly, that the southern Chinese were deceitful, and since the enemy had not attacked, the defenders should not begin hostilities.

(Indeed, according to both the *Sung History* and *Yüan History* annals, Li T'an and the Sung forces clashed several times in and around Lien-shui at the time. In September, the Sung launched a first attack on Lien-shui; Li called for help from the court and mounted a counter-thrust. The Sung armies were thrown back, but returned to Lien-shui two months later and defeated Li's forces.)

Hard-pressed by the Sung offensives, Li T'an submitted another memorial to court in October again pleading for assistance. This time he argued that his I-tu administration was barren and thinly populated, and that after several years of war, soldiers and inhabitants were exhausted. It was due solely to good fortune that he had been able to capture the Sung prefectures of Lien-shui and Hai-chou, and to overwhelm the superior forces of general Hsia Kuei (1197-1279); but another such victory should not be expected.

He went on to report that since the Sung rulers suffered no pressure on their western front, they remained free to concentrate their effort in the east. Should they dispatch their fleet to attack Chiao-hsi and Lai-chou on the coast, and push their armies north against the prefectures of I (Lin-i), Chü, Teng and I (Kun-chou), Shantung might be lost. He claimed that he had the means to strike at the Sung positions deep in the south after mounting a hot pursuit of the enemy to Huai-an, and that he had only failed to capture Yang-chou and Ch'u-chou because of the executive officials' objections. He requested therefore that the court place at his disposal the armies in southern Honan facing the Sung prefectures to the south, and allow him to lead a joint operation against Yang-chou and Ch'u-chou. He asserted that the East Huai-nan region would then be pacified, whereupon further expeditions could be launched to the south of the Yangtze; this was the most efficient way to deal with the Sung. Li T'an's eloquence again failed to convince the court, for, as the *Yüan History* claims, the senior officials had been quite disturbed by his independent initiative. As a gesture of recognition, however, the court recommended in January 1261 that cash rewards be granted by the treasury of I-tu to the area's military officials for their meritorious services.

In February 1261, Li T'an submitted another memorial to the Secretarial Council, reporting that the Sung had assembled several hundred thousand men and corresponding supplies, and concentrated thirteen thousand warships at Hsü-p'u, ready for an all-out invasion of Shantung. Li was deeply worried lest the Pacification Bureau fail to keep supplies flowing; indeed, should the enemy block the land and sea routes, Li would not be able to keep his lines of communication open. Therefore, Li again urged the court to reinforce him and mount a diversionary assault on Sung strongholds to ease the pressure, and to exploit a Sung defeat with a thrust into the southern Huai River region. As before, the Secretarial Council was not encouraging, but the court presented Li with seventeen golden and twenty-nine silver tablets in further reward to his men for having repelled the Sung invasion of Lien-shui the previous year.

Shortly thereafter, according to the *Yüan History*, Li T'an, angered by the Mongol court's lack of positive response, took the liberty of using his troops to strengthen the defence works of the I-tu administration. Moreover, he reported to court that the Sung forces had again attacked Lien-shui, but had been thrown back. This at last convinced Qubilai, who ordered General Aju (1234-87), Sübōtei's grandson Qara Botu, and others to lead reinforcements to I-tu, after calling up some of the local forces at their command. Elated at the news, Li requested that he be given supreme command of all the forces assembled in his territory, and asked for additional weapons. The Secretarial Council proposed sending him 30,000 arrows, but Qubilai increased the amount to 100,000. Li T'an's offensive appears to have been victorious, for in July 1261 he sent a messenger to report a triumph over the Sung forces at Lien-shui. In February of the following year, Li T'an again wrote to the court submitting letters allegedly sent by the Sung councillor Chia Ssu-tao to Li's two general administrators, with a view to procuring their defection. The contents of the letters are not revealed and we do not know whether they were genuine. The *Yüan History* dismisses them as fabrications with which Li sought to cajole the Mongol court into providing more manpower and supplies.

On 22 February 1262 Li T'an suddenly rebelled, defecting to the Sung with the cities of Hai-chou and Lien-shui. He massacred the Mongol garrisons and ordered the warships under his command to attack I-tu. Li T'an's *Yüan History* biography alleges that he had previously instructed his son Li Yen-chien, then a hostage in the Mongol capital of Yen-ching (Ta-tu), to escape and make for Shantung. Yen-chien's disappearance was reported on the 19th. The next day (20 February), Li T'an notified the Sung court of his intention to submit. Emperor Li-tsung immediately called a conference, and Chia Ssu-tao proposed that Li be accepted only if he proved his sincerity by bringing over the cities of Lien-shui and Hai-chou. No formal reply was

sent to Li T'an until 1 March, but Li acted nevertheless only two days after contacting the Sung court. (The Sung court was not informed until 3 March that the two prefectures had been handed over; according to the *Sung History* this news was only received on 15 March.) The *Yüan History* and *Sung History* give only brief accounts of the course of the rebellion from February to August; however, events can be substantiated from the reminiscences of Li T'an's earlier-mentioned surviving follower. Despite its dramatic overtones, this personal memoir is highly reliable; it corroborates Sung and Yüan sources and sheds therefore considerable new light on the insurrection.

According to the *Yüan History*, Li T'an, after delivering the cities to the Sung, returned on 27 February to seize I-tu with an army of over fifty thousand, and plundered the government treasuries and stores to reward his men before ordering them to invade the neighbouring prefectures. On 6 March, Li's forces raided P'u-t'ai (on the north bank of the Yellow River north-east of I-tu), but there was no spontaneous uprising by the local inhabitants. On hearing of the rebellion, as the Yüan sources have it, people either withdrew to the walled cities or fled into the hills. There was utter silence for several hundred *li* between I-tu and Lin-tzu.

Meanwhile, the Mongol court had learned of the rebellion through Wang P'an (1202-93), a deputy pacification commissioner of I-tu and other districts. Wang managed to flee to Chi-nan before Li T'an seized I-tu, and rushed on from there to the capital. Qubilai was greatly affected by the report, although he had been warned repeatedly by senior officials such as Nien-ho Nan-ho (d. ca. 1268) of Li T'an's unreliability. He immediately summoned Wang P'an and his adviser Yao Shu (q.v.). Wang dismissed Li as a petty crook who should be easily dealt with. Yao, on the other hand, offered a more perceptive analysis of the situation. He said that Li T'an had the option of three courses of action. His best chance would be to take advantage of Ariq Böke's insurrection in the north and strike along the coast directly at Yen-ching, which would present the most dangerous threat. His next best course would be to make peace with the Sung, strengthen his position on the border regions, and organise sporadic raids into the north. The worst plan for Li, and therefore the most advantageous for the Mongol court, would be for him to attack Chi-nan and wait there for the malcontents to rally his cause. Yao predicted that Li T'an would make the third choice, which turned out to be correct, thus enabling the Mongol forces to crush the insurrection with relative ease.

On 8 March, Qubilai immediately issued a decree condemning Li T'an and ordered several Han myriarchs to mobilise the Mongol and Han Armies, as well as the naval forces in Shantung, and to engage the rebels forthwith. The decree directed the naval commander Hsieh Ch'eng (d. 1262), Chang Jung-shih (1218-78), the Han

military commander Wang Wen-kan of Ta-ming (Hopei), and the myriarch Yen Chung-fan (see the biography of Yen Shih) to concentrate their troops at Tung-p'ing, south-west of I-tu. In addition, the myriarch Chang Hung (1229-87) of Chi-nan, Ti Chieh (1223-99) of Kuei-te (Honan), the artillery chief of the Imperial Guard Hsüeh Chün-sheng (d. 1268), and other field officers were ordered to join forces in Pin and Ti prefectures. The decree also commanded Chang Hung and Han Shih-an (d. 1271), pacification commissioners of Pin and Ti, to strengthen their fortifications with the help of local levies. Furthermore, the veteran Han myriarch Chang Jou and his son Chang Hung-fan (*qq.v.*) were ordered to lead two thousand of their troops to the capital to reinforce its defence. Then, on 11 March, Qubilai appointed Prince Qabiči as supreme commander of the punitive forces and sent General Buji Aibuqan and the administrator of political affairs Chao Pi (1220-76) to direct all the military formations in Hopei and Honan to converge on Chi-nan. These armies, in all more than one hundred thousand strong, were later reinforced by several tens of thousands of men, and became one of the largest military forces to take the field in the Mongol conquest of China.

The engagements between the Mongol forces and those of Li T'an, the events at the Mongol court, and the Sung military response during the next five months, are clearly documented in our sources. Shortly after Qubilai's mobilisation order, some advanced Han units confronted Li T'an's men at Lao-ts'ang k'ou, about 28 km. south of Chi-nan and north-east of Tung-p'ing, and suffered a first defeat. Then, on 14 March, Qubilai ordered the execution of Wang Wen-t'ung for implication in the rebellion. The next day, the Sung court conferred on Li T'an the rank of commanding prefect of Pao-hsin and Ning-wu, in charge of the Ching-tung and Ho-pei armies. Li also received the investiture of Commandery Prince of Ch'i, while his late father Li Ch'üan's official ranks were posthumously restored.

On the 16th, Qubilai ordered the commander-in-chief Aqai to secure the P'ing-luan (later renamed Yung-p'ing) district, and the Hai-k'ou, Tung-ching, Kuang-ning and I-chou prefectures of the Liao-yang district in Manchuria and Hopei, with part of his troops, and to lead the rest to the capital. One of the reasons for this disposition was that Li T'an's eldest son, Li Ch'ung-shan, had been named general administrator of P'ing-chou, which made precautionary measures necessary. The next day, Li T'an launched his offensive against Chi-nan, whose commander Chang Hung, caught unprepared, hastily fled to the capital. One day later, Li entered the prefectural capital which he turned into an operational base. On the same day, the Sung forces launched their first strike, invading T'eng-chou ostensibly to join up with Li T'an. Then on the 21st, order was given to General *Batu Motai to mobilise the garrisons of

Hsi-chou (Honan), to proceed to Chi-nan, and to direct the myriarch Yen Chung-ch'i to join the expeditionary forces with some of his troops.

For the next few months, the accounts of the rebellion in the *Yüan History* are usefully supplemented by the reminiscences of one of Li T'an's followers. According to the latter, Li T'an won a minor victory in the vicinity of Lao-ts'ang k'ou on 26 March. Then, on 7 April, Qubilai instructed Shih Shu (1221-87), a nephew of Shih T'ien-tse, Aju, and others, to lead their own troops to Chi-nan. Chang Hung-fan was appointed general field administrator, and ordered to rally the punitive forces with part of his father's troops at Yen-ching. Li T'an's men intercepted some of the advanced units, plundering their equipment and supplies, and inflicted heavy casualties on a party of Mongols approaching Chi-nan. Li T'an then withdrew into the city, but suffered a major setback on the 8th, losing over four thousand men. On the 12th, the myriarch Han Shih-an led his men to a victory over Li T'an's forces at Kao-yüan (Huan-t'ai), thereby facilitating the Mongol advance towards Chi-nan from the south-west. At that moment the Sung general Hsia Kuei took advantage of the chaotic situation to attack the counties in the north, first Fu-li (9 April), and then Ch'i (Su-hsien) (19 April) in Anhwei.

On the 20th, the Mongol expeditionary forces reached the outskirts of Chi-nan from all sides and they began building walls and digging ditches around the city in preparation for a prolonged siege. Some of those forces were led by Mongol commanders, such as Prince Qabiči, Södü (d. 1284), Boroqan (1239-1300), Batur, and others. In addition, the assailants were reinforced by a division of the Imperial Guard led by Tung Wen-ping (*q.v.*), and a contingent of Korean soldiers under Wang Sun (1223-83), a nephew (?) of the king of Koryŏ, on orders from the court. There are no details of events during the next three weeks, other than reports of the Sung invasion of the Hsü, P'ei (Kiangsu), and Po (Anhwei) prefectures (22, 30 April, and 7 May). Then on 19 May, Qubilai dispatched the Right chancellor Shih T'ien-tse to take charge of all troops before Chi-nan. Five days later, Shih, said to be advised by his counsellor Sung Tzu-chien (1187-1266), directed his forces to complete the ring of forts surrounding the city, thus denying the enemy any route of escape. During the following weeks, Chang Hung-fan, concentrating his troops west of the city, repulsed attempts by the rebels to breach the siege. Tung Wen-ping, it is reported, personally approached the city wall calling upon Li T'an's chief lieutenant to surrender. The news of Li T'an's plight soon reached the south, and on 21 June the Sung court sent 50,000 *liang* of silver to I-tu to stiffen the soldiers' morale. At the same time, it ordered Ch'ing-yang Meng-yen, a civil official, to lead a relief army to the rescue of Chi-nan, but Meng-yen procrastinated in Shantung and failed to carry out his mission.

Surrounded by the Mongol government's troops and bereft of Sung support, Li T'an began to suffer increasing hardship from June onward. It is said that he forced the young women of the city to entertain the troops and sent soldiers to seize food from the civilians. Late in July, as food was almost exhausted, the soldiers began to lose heart; many clambered down the wall to surrender, and Li T'an was powerless to stop them. On the morning of 6 August, realising that the city was about to fall, T'an dismissed his advisers, knifed his favourite concubine, and went out alone in a boat to Lake Ta-ming (also known as Hai-k'ou tzu). He jumped into the lake to end his life, but the water was too shallow and he survived. Meanwhile, the Mongol troops had entered the city, and he was captured by Chang Hung-fan's soldiers. Li T'an was bound and brought before Qabiči, Yen Chung-fan and Shih T'ien-tse. According to the account of Li T'an's surviving follower, both Yen and Shih interrogated Li as to why he had rebelled against the qa'an and refused to surrender. Li replied that they themselves had agreed to join him, and in turn accused them of having betrayed him. Shih T'ien-tse did not answer; instead, he ordered the guard to chop off Li's arms and then to cut him to ribbons in such a way as to prolong his agony as much as possible. Prince Qabiči, it is said, wanted to exterminate the residents of Chi-nan in revenge, but was dissuaded by his subordinate Sargis, no doubt supported by the senior Han commanders.

Li T'an had two wives and six sons. Of the latter, the first three, Ch'ung-shan, Ch'i-shan, and Nan-shan were born to his first wife née Wang (Wang Wen-t'ung's daughter). The fourth, Feng-shan, was by Li's second wife, Tāčar's sister. The mother of the youngest sons, Niu-shan and Ching-shan is not known. Li Ch'ung-shan was placed in Qubilai's custody; Feng-shan was claimed by Tāčar; Niu-shan and Ching-shan survived also. After the triumphant conclusion of the punitive campaign, the Han-lin Academician Wang Yün (*q.v.*) wrote a commemorative ode entitled 'Chung-t'ung shen-wu sung' ('In Praise of the Divine Military Exploits of the Chung-t'ung Era') to record the event. Upon receiving the news of Li T'an's end, the Sung court awarded him the posthumous title of Grand Preceptor, and had a plate engraved with the words 'Ching-chung' ('Utmost Loyalty') placed in a temple to honour him.

The suppression of the rebellion brought heavy casualties to both sides. While we know little of Li T'an's losses, the toll on the Mongols was considerable. According to a report submitted by Sargis, who was appointed high military administrator of the I-tu district in February 1263, the numbers of civilians and soldiers of Lien-shui killed by Li T'an's forces, and of the Mongol, Jurchen and *tammači* fighting men lost to the Sung, amounted to 7,922. The Mongol court made generous awards to the generals and troops who had taken part in the campaign.

A series of measures were ordered to pacify the local population and to reorganise the military administration of Li T'an's former territories. Most importantly, Qubilai appointed Tung Wen-ping regional military commissioner of Shan-tung in October 1262, ordering him to incorporate the soldiers of I-tu into the military forces garrisoning the southern frontiers. The qa'an also instructed Sargis and Tung Wen-ping to review the population registers of the district, and to conscript one man from every five households to serve in the army. A month later, another decree was issued concerning I-tu, which put Tung Wen-ping in charge of military personnel, and Sargis of the civilian population. At the same time, orders were given to grant remission of taxes and corvée to the people of Chi-nan and other famine-stricken prefectures, and also to spare the local inhabitants who had been forced to join Li T'an's rebellion. The Mongol nobles, civil and military officials, were forbidden to harrass the people wantonly, and all properties and animals seized by Li T'an were to be returned to their original owners. Those measures were designed to rehabilitate the war-torn population and to facilitate the restoration of law and order.

One may wonder what led Li T'an to rebel against Mongol rule, and what his objectives might have been in doing so; what support was he hoping to attract, and why did the uprising collapse so suddenly? The historical sources allow no satisfactory answer to any of those questions, and we may but speculate on the matter. There is, however, more reliable information concerning the effects of the rebellion on the Mongol policies in general, and on the treatment of the Han élite and military commanders in particular.

Firstly, it would appear that Li T'an was motivated by no other reason than his ambition to become a powerful and independent warlord on the model of his father. This is confirmed by his biography in the *Yüan History* which asserts that Li had for many years schemed to expand his military power by exploiting the conflict between Mongols and Southern Sung. There is no evidence that the Mongol court exerted on Li T'an any pressure that might have goaded him to rebel; on the contrary, both Möngke and Qubilai had treated him most cordially. It appears rather that, as an ambitious, power-hungry official, Li had perceived the weakness of the Mongol position in north China during Qubilai's war of succession with Ariq Böke, and decided to take his chance. He might have anticipated the collapse of the Mongol hegemony, which would have allowed him to become ruler of an antonomous kingdom in Shantung, pending further opportunities. It is highly doubtful, as some of the Sung accounts and modern scholars contend, that Li T'an was inspired by Han nationalism to support the Southern Sung in a bid to expel the Mongols. This interpretation evidently reflects what must have been the Sung 'official line' designed to bolster support for the tottering regime; but even court officials dismissed Li as an

opportunist who, after fighting the Sung ruthlessly for years, had suddenly undertaken to submit even before he had secured a firm *quid pro quo*. In this light, the Sung court's posthumous award of major honours to Li T'an must be seen more as a propaganda exercise than as a token of genuine appreciation.

Concerning his strategy, Li T'an abstained from attacking Yen-ching, not only because the Mongol forces were still strong in the north, but also because his power base was in Shantung and the south. He probably had hoped that, by consolidating his gains in northern Shantung, he might strengthen his position and expand into the southern Huai region of the Sung. This was the main reason, as Yao Shu had so perceptively observed, why Li had first invaded the prefectures neighbouring I-tu and seized Chi-nan to the south-west as a staging area for further advances. In so doing, he evidently expected several developments. Firstly, he assumed that Qubilai would be continually engaged in campaigns against Ariq Böke in the north, precluding the deployment of troops in the south. Secondly, Li anticipated that Wang Wen-t'ung, with whom he had a close relationship and who supported his intentions, would succeed in his schemes to foment subversion at the Mongol court. Thirdly, he hoped that some of the Han myriarchs in Hopei and Shantung, such as Chang Jou, Shih T'ien-tse, Tung Wen-ping and others with whom he had had previous contacts, would either rally to his cause, or at least remain neutral. Finally, he must have believed either that the Sung court would give him all-out support in a bid to restore national integrity, or that the local people who did not welcome Mongol rule would rise spontaneously under his leadership. With only fifty thousand men at his command, Li T'an's hope of success would have had to depend heavily on those assumptions.

Events, however, were to fail him. Shortly before the start of Li T'an's rebellion, Qubilai had won a major victory over Ariq Böke who, weakened by defections, had fled to the west with the remnants of his forces. Wang Wen-t'ung was executed a month after the uprising, and all senior Chinese court officials condemned the rebellion. The Han military commanders too remained true to Qubilai (even though they might have had previous truck with Li T'an) for they had become part of the establishment and wanted to preserve their privileges under Mongol patronage. Save for a few local military leaders and civil officials who defected to Li out of self-interest, there was no response from the general population who yearned for peace and order after decades of military strife and social dislocation. Contrary to expectation, the Sung court also failed to give Li T'an's cause any sustained support, because opinion remained divided about Li's professed irredentism and the probable outcome of the conflict. That a civil official lacking combat experience was dispatched to lead a relief army to Li's rescue is a clear indication of the Sung court's frame of mind. In the meantime, Li T'an's forces were outnumbered by the well-

equipped and experienced Mongol and Han armies, and were doomed to defeat in the besieged Ch'i-nan by shortage of food and lack of reinforcements.

The consequences of Li T'an's insurrection were wide-ranging. Not only did they affect the political fortunes of the Chinese imperial advisers and senior government officials and determine the ascendancy of the Central Asian factions, but they also generated a drastic reorganisation of the civil and military administrations that ended the domination of the hereditary Han myriarchs. Li's rebellion greatly accelerated Qubilai's consolidation of power in north China and laid the foundation of Mongol rule in later reigns.

Shortly after the start of the rebellion, Qubilai ordered an extensive investigation into the conduct of his Chinese advisers and senior government officials to detect possible disloyalties. Those subjected to close scrutiny included imperial confidants such as Liu Ping-chung, Yao Shu, Tou Mo (*qq.v.*), and, in particular, those who held prominent posts in the Secretarial Council like Wang Wen-t'ung, Lien Hsi-hsien, Shang T'ing (*qq.v.*) and others. All natives of Shantung, especially of Tung-p'ing, came under suspicion. Yet the only one to be executed was Wang Wen-t'ung, because of his intimate relationship with Li T'an. Qubilai's Chinese advisers, most of whom had immediately denounced Wang Wen-t'ung, were soon cleared. A few senior officials such as Lien Hsi-hsien, Shang T'ing and Chao Liang-pi (1214-85 or 1217-86) were indicted as accomplices of Wang Wen-t'ung. But evidence showed that they had been falsely charged by political rivals, and they were eventually released and rehabilitated.

As it turned out, no senior Chinese government official other than Wang Wen-t'ung was found to have been directly involved either in plotting against the throne or in the rebellion. Nevertheless, Wang Wen-t'ung's complicity in Li T'an's insurrection aroused Qubilai's suspicions about the trustworthiness of his Chinese counsellors: some were pensioned off, while others fell from favour as a result of the recent crisis. No Chinese official ever again reached the heights of power and influence that had been accessible to his predecessors. Qubilai relied instead on the Mongol nobles and on members of the Central Asian faction at court for support, and filled the major government positions from their ranks. Many of those Central Asians, under the leadership of the Muslims Aḥmad and Sangha (*qq.v.*), had already gained the Mongol ruler's favour through their expertise in financial matters. They also sought to ingratiate themselves with Qubilai by openly criticising the Chinese officials. In fact, Aḥmad and Sangha dominated the fiscal administration during the twenty years following Wang Wen-t'ung's death. They did much to increase the revenues accruing to the Mongol qa'an, but also committed serious exactions at the expense both of the court and of the common people. The sequels of Li T'an's rebellion were thus

adversely to affect the stability and the welfare of the empire during Qubilai's remaining years.

As to the Han military commanders, Qubilai also enquired into their behaviour at the outbreak of the rebellion, but all proved to have remained loyal at all times. For this reason Qubilai appointed prominent officers such as Yen Chung-ch'i, Chang Hung-fan, T'ung Wen-ping and others to lead the troops in the punitive forces, and made the veteran Shih T'ien-tse commander-in-chief at the siege of Ch'i-nan. But since many of them had had contacts with Li T'an, whether they shared his aspirations or not, the Han warlords must have felt uneasy about their prospects. That is probably why, for instance, Chang Jou demanded the death sentence for Wang Wen-t'ung, and Shih T'ien-tse had Li T'an executed most cruelly without first obtaining Qubilai's approval. In the latter case, Shih's conduct surprised many of his contemporaries, among them Wang Yün, for his brutal action was unprecedented and completely out of character with his humane temperament. There was no proof that Shih T'ien-tse had entered into any compact with Li T'an, as the latter had claimed so eloquently, but on his return to court, Shih craved Qubilai's forgiveness for his initiative. As the qa'an believed him to be sincere and loyal, Shih received no reprimand. Nevertheless, alarmed by the possible consequences of Li T'an's insurrection, Shih made seventeen members of his family divest themselves of their military commands, in the hope of averting the emperor's displeasure. This set a precedent that other Han myriarchs felt compelled to imitate.

Qubilai undoubtedly managed the crisis with great discretion and restraint. Aware of his need for the continued support of the Han overlords, he had no wish to antagonise them, so long as they had not been directly involved in the rebellion. He even gave lenient treatment to some of those who had been implicated, such as Chang Pang-chih, the myriarch of P'ei-chou, and his uncle Chang Hung, the myriarch of Ch'i-nan. In May 1264, Chang Pang-chih and his brother were found guilty of collusion with Li T'an, which also implicated Chang Hung. But the decree announcing the verdict and punishment (February 1265) made no mention of their involvement with Li T'an: instead, they were charged with illegally selling government horses, for which they were sentenced to death. Chang Hung's indictment was made out to be that of misappropriating government property, and capital punishment was commuted in his case to dismissal on the grounds that he had reported Li T'an's rebellion. These two instances demonstrate Qubilai's desire to avoid an open rift with the Han regional leaders, for fear of fomenting another rebellion.

This restraint did not apply, however, when it came to depriving the Han military leaders of many privileges and potentially dangerous powers, in a reform begun

shortly after the uprising had been quelled. Since Ögödei's reign, those personages had behaved like feudal lords enjoying the supreme authority in civil and military matters over their jurisdictions on a hereditary basis. At first, Qubilai had continued to recognise their special status but, after Li T'an's insurrection, the qa'an undertook to curb their power. The initial step occurred after the recapture of I-tu, when the order was given, as mentioned earlier, to split off the administration of civilian affairs from that of the military, making each branch the responsibility of different officials. It is alleged that Shih T'ien-tse personally urged Qubilai to separate military and civil powers as a matter of principle, as Shih had done within his own family. Ironically, what had started out as a ploy to allay Qubilai's suspicions ended up entailing a succession of far-reaching and radical reforms.

Between 1262 and 1266, Qubilai introduced a series of dispositions to defeudalise the Chinese military families and to place their armed forces under central command. Mainly, those measures comprised: the dismissal from military office of kinsmen of the most powerful Han overlords; the abrogation of their hereditary rights to commands and offices as well as to personal fiefs (all their enfeoffed households were to be registered as civilian households); rigorous enforcement of the administrative separation of civil and military affairs by officials directly responsible to the court; and appointment of outsiders to lead Han armies, thus eliminating the power of hereditary commanders. These new rulings applied to all military families such as the Chang, Shih, Tung, and Yen, as well as other minor houses in Hopei, Honan and Shantung.

In addition, a number of similar measures were adopted further to reduce the military power of the Chinese overlords and to nationalize the Han armies. Firstly, members of the *kešig*, the traditional Mongol Imperial Guard, were appointed supervising combat myriarchs or supervising combat commissioners to control the commanding officers. Secondly, the *a'uruq*, or Base Camps, which were in the charge of the local military administration responsible for conscription and supplies, were placed outside the jurisdiction of the field officers. The first office of general administrator of the Base Camps was set up in each of the ten districts five months after Li T'an's rebellion. This meant that the Chinese generals were no longer able to control the Base Camps and found themselves restricted to the functions of tactical commanders. The Base Camps of the Han armies were initially placed in the jurisdiction of local civil officials (those of the Mongol armies remained under the control of their commanders), who soon became answerable to the Department of Military Affairs established in 1263 as the central military headquarters.

The establishment of this department with supreme authority over all military affairs and armed forces, Han as well as Mongol, not only eradicated all feudal

Chinese influence, but also improved military administration and facilitated central control of the army. Finally, in early 1265, it was decreed that Mongols should serve as resident commissioners, Chinese as general administrators, and Uighurs as associate administrators. This further restrained the authority of the Chinese civil officials. Such measures were evidently meant to correct the circumstances that had made Li T'an's insurrection possible, and were instrumental to Qubilai's centralisation of power.

All in all, Li T'an's rebellion mirrored the wide range of problems facing Qubilai upon his accession in the task of consolidating Mongol rule in north China. Events demonstrate that the qa'an dealt skilfully with the Chinese literati and the hereditary Han military leaders, whose support and assistance were absolutely indispensable to control the Chinese population until the Mongols were strong enough to impose a central rule. The outbreak of the rebellion and the ensuing crisis served to precipitate centralisation and defeudalisation at the expense of the Chinese literati and their military counterparts. The power and influence of the Han leaders decreased accordingly at court, clearing the way for the ascent of the Mongol and Central Asian factions. As a result, Qubilai's power was greatly enhanced and an institutional pattern was set for the policies for his successors. In various ways, therefore, Li T'an's insurrection truly marked a turning point in Qubilai's reign and profoundly affected Mongol rule in China.

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H. L. Chan

31. WANG WEN-T'UNG (?- 1262)

Wang Wen-t'ung, T. I-tao (d. March 1262), prominent figure from Shantung who rose from humble origins to become the powerful director of political affairs of the Secretarial Council upon Qubilai's enthronement, was one of the most controversial political figures in Yüan history. While his meteoric rise, due to outstanding administrative skills and fiscal expertise, aroused the ire of moralising Confucian scholar-officials, his execution for implication in the rebellion of his son-in-law Li T'an (*q.v.*) made him the most severely condemned Chinese official in Qubilai's administration. As a result, he was not only treated with great hostility in the writings of his contemporaries, but was also denigrated as a 'traitorous official' in the biographical classification of the Yüan history. The latter, finding its main sources in Qubilai's *Veritable Records* (*shih-lu*) compiled by the Confucian scholars, reflected consequently the political prejudices that had played down Wang Wen-t'ung's positive contributions to early Yüan government. It requires a careful collation of the piecemeal information available and a critical examination of Qubilai's reconstruction of China properly to gauge the man's achievement and historical significance.

Information about Wang Wen-t'ung's early life and career is fragmentary. Wang's biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) states that he hailed from I-tu prefecture, Shantung, whereas according to Wang Yün (*q.v.*), his protégé, he came from Ta-ting prefecture. Wang's statement is problematic since, under the Chin, Ta-ting prefecture would have been located in modern Liaoning, a great distance from Shantung. It is also possible that Ta-ting could be a scribal error for Ta-ming, which would place it in modern Hopei. Wang Wen-t'ung's birth date is not recorded, but according to Wang Yün, who, in his memoir *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (see below), reports a conversation between Qubilai and Wang Wen-t'ung in June 1261, on which occasion Qubilai remarked that Wang was already in his old age (over sixty?), Wen-t'ung would have been born during the reign of the Chin emperor Chang-tsung (r. 1190-1208). Wang Yün also claims that Wang Wen-t'ung was a *chin-shih* graduate in the classics under the Chin, but this cannot be corroborated by contemporary evidence. Wen-t'ung studied the classics during his early years: he was particularly fond of books dealing with clever schemes and political intrigues, and liked to impress people by his displays of cunning. When he reached adulthood, he made frequent visits to the powerful office holders in Shantung and Honan seeking employment, but met with no response. Later, he compiled a compendium of excerpts from the classics and history on deceitful stratagems and treacherous

dealings in order to impress his peers. He once showed this work to a scholar of Honan, Hsüeh Hsüan (d. 1271), who, being a devout Confucian, instantly dismissed it. Hsüeh pointed out that Confucian teachings provided all the guidance needed to bring about peace and tranquillity – without any need for resorting to unworthy practices.

Finally, after repeated rejections, Wang Wen-t'ung found an eager audience in Li T'an, then chief administrator of the Mongol Regional Secretariat of Shantung at I-tu. Wang is alleged to have called at Li T'an's headquarters, and, after having struck Li by his sagacity and persuasiveness, was invited to join the latter's staff. This probably occurred sometime in the 1240s when Li T'an had securely established himself as the absolute master of his administration. Thereafter Wang became Li T'an's counsellor and principal agent. As their intimacy grew, Li asked Wang to tutor his son Li Yen-chien, and Wang gave his daughter to be Li's new wife. For Wang Wen-t'ung, this marriage sealed an indissoluble relationship with one of the most powerful local warlords of that time. Li frequently consulted Wang not only on administrative matters but also in political and military affairs, and made decisions in accordance with his advice. Li T'an soon extended his sphere of influence beyond his original domain: as revealed later, it was on Wang Wen-t'ung's counsel that he raided the Sung territories in 1258 and seized the prefectural seats of Lien-shui, Hai-chou, and two other cities of the Eastern Huai-nan circuit in modern Kiangsu.

Wang Wen-t'ung's association with Li T'an proved without doubt beneficial for Wang's subsequent career. It gave him an opportunity to demonstrate his administrative and strategic talent in support of Li T'an's bid for power. His service under Li enabled him moreover to cultivate the friendship of a group of Chinese scholars and notables in Shantung and Honan known as the Tung-p'ing group, including such men as Yen Shih, Shang T'ing (*qq.v.*) and Wang P'an (1202-93), who had served the Mongol rulers in various capacities. It is likely that these scholars, having formed a good impression of Wang Wen-t'ung, brought him to the attention of their friends Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*), Chang I (d. 1282), or others who had been Qubilai's principal advisers when he emerged as the most powerful prince at the Mongol court.

As his reputation spread, Wang Wen-t'ung found before long an opportunity to gain access to Qubilai. The occasion, according to his *Yüan History* biography, came in September 1259 when Qubilai, leading a punitive expedition against the Southern Sung on orders of Möngke, was besieging E-chou in modern Wu-chang, Hupei. The city received reinforcements led by the Sung Right councillor Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75), who had built a heavy wooden rampart around the city which he defended vigorously. Greatly impressed, Qubilai had sighed, 'How could I secure a man like Chia for my own service!' and gestured towards his Confucian advisers. Thereupon, Liu Ping-

chung and Chang I retorted that there was indeed one Wang Wen-t'ung of Shan-tung, a man of great talent and ingenuity, in Li T'an's administration. The prince was to remember that name.

Meanwhile Qubilai was forced to cut short his campaign on learning of Möngke's death (in August); he returned hurriedly to Mongolia to engage in the struggle for the throne. In his desire to recruit more helpers from the Chinese community, Qubilai made several enquiries about Wang Wen-t'ung. A number of the Confucian scholars recommended Wang, but Yao Shu (*q.v.*) dissented, claiming that Wen-t'ung's scholarship was 'impure', being unduly concerned with power and profit. Yao remarked also that Wang had sought to imbue local magnates with treasonable ideas, and predicted that he would eventually rebel against his lord. Qubilai, however, was swayed by the reports of Wang's extraordinary ability and summoned him to court.

In May 1260, Qubilai was enthroned in K'ai-p'ing fu as qa'an and emperor of China, and adopted the era name Chung-t'ung ('Pivotal Succession') in the following month. Thereupon, while pursuing the military struggle in the north against his brother Ariq Böke who challenged his accession, the qa'an embarked on various plans for political consolidation and economic reorganisation. On the recommendation of his trusted advisers Liu Ping-chung, Hsü Heng, Yao Shu, Hao Ching (*qq.v.*) and others, Chinese-style government institutions were organised and programmes of economic reconstruction were implemented. These reforms profoundly affected the central administration, the appointment of officials and the collection of taxes. Such programmes proceeded eventually from measures, initiated already under Ögödei and Möngke, to foster rural productivity and the pastoral economy, and to exploit more efficiently the natural resources of the Chinese territories. Financed from the taxes on land and commerce, they involved a system of labour service and aimed to promote agriculture and trade, notably by improving facilities for irrigation and transport. Such programmes were intended to generate revenue not only for the increasing expenses of governmental administration, but also, more urgently, for Qubilai's military campaigns against his younger brother Ariq Böke and other dissident Mongol leaders.

The Secretarial Council established in May 1260 was an extension of the old central Secretariat founded by Ögödei on the advice of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*q.v.*): it assumed a primary role in the administration of the state. In August, a Regional Secretarial Council was set up at Yen-ching (Peking) to serve as an extended administrative arm of the central government. It became the central Secretarial Council when the national capital was transferred to Yen-ching 1264. The first chief administrators of the Secretarial Council included Ma-ma (? Maḥmūd Yalavač, *q.v.*) as Right chancellor, Wang Wen-t'ung and Chao Pi (1220-76) as directors of political

affairs, the sinicised Uighur Lien Hsi-hsien and Chang Wen-ch'ien (*qq.v.*) as assistants of the Right and the Left respectively, and Chang Ch'i-yüan as associate director of political affairs. When the Regional Secretarial Council was established, Ma-ma, Wang Wen-t'ung and Chao Pi served on it concurrently in the same positions, whereas Chang I was appointed associate director of political affairs. The following year, some changes were made in the staff of the Secretarial Council, bringing advancement to several prominent Mongol and sinicised Central Asian officials. For his part, Wang Wen-t'ung retained his post and continued to influence the central administration until his demise in early 1262.

It is apparent that Wang Wen-t'ung, secure in Qubilai's trust, played a prominent part in both the Secretarial Council and the Regional Secretarial Council at K'ai-p'ing fu and Yen-ching for almost two years. There is good evidence of his wide-ranging activities in Wang Yün's *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* (*Memoirs of the Affairs of the Secretarial Council*), a personal memoir of the events and personalities at the central administration from November 1260 to September 1261. This and other records show that while Wang Wen-t'ung may have cooperated with others in formulating fiscal policies such as fixing rates for land and monopoly taxes, mobilising resources in support of Qubilai's campaign against Ariq Böke, and issuing new forms of paper currency, he was personally responsible for their implementation. To assist him in the task, he recruited a number of competent fiscal administrators, notably Yang Shih and Liu Su (1188-1263) among others. He also approached distinguished Confucian scholars, but several of them, such as Hsüeh Hsüan and Tu Ying (1204-73), disdainful of his profit-seeking motives, declined his invitation. Wang Wen-t'ung's excessive zeal was eventually to bring him into conflict with his colleagues at the Secretarial Council, particularly Chang Wen-ch'ien, then assistant of the Left.

Wang Wen-t'ung's quarrel with Chang Wen-ch'ien, which became apparent in spring 1260, arose not only from the protagonists' different temperaments but also from their opposing views on state affairs. Whereas Wang was a headstrong administrator extremely jealous of his power, for whom maximising revenue was the top priority, Chang was a Confucian moralist who regarded the state's stability and the people's welfare as the highest goals of government. Consequently, Chang sought to restrain Wen-t'ung's preoccupation with increasing fiscal yield, thus arousing Wang's enmity after they had been colleagues for less than two months.

In June that year, Qubilai established ten Pacification Bureaux in north China and, on Wang Wen-t'ung's recommendation, appointed a number of officials – Mongols, Central Asians and Chinese – to be the commissioners. Their main duties were to set new rates for the collection of the silk, silver and land taxes. Chang Wen-ch'ien was appointed the commissioner of Ta-ming, Chang-te, and other adjacent

districts in modern Hopei, while retaining his rank in the Secretarial Council. According to his biography, Wang Wen-t'ung plotted to get rid of Chang, but Chang's biography has it that he himself requested to be transferred after having failed to overcome Wang's obstinacy. In either account, Wang Wen-t'ung's enmity was the main reason for Chang's departure. Chang was ordered to return to his former post a year later. This incident marked the beginning of a series of confrontations over economic issues and state priorities between the self-willed fiscal administrator and the Confucian scholars.

Before his departure, according to Chang Wen-ch'ien's biography, he made an ultimate plea for Wang Wen-t'ung to reduce the rates of land rent and tax levies for the households in north China to relieve their plight after a long drought. Wang refused, claiming that the new government was starved for funds, to which Chang retorted with the conventional Confucian argument. He asserted forcefully that when the people were prosperous, the state benefited; even if taxes had to be increased, that should not be done before the people had recovered from a poor harvest. This call was apparently heard: Wang Wen-t'ung recommended a remission of two-fifths in ordinary taxes, and of one-fifth of the levies on liquor, to the great relief of the population. While we may not dispute the success of Chang Wen-ch'ien's intercession, it is doubtful nevertheless that Wang Wen-t'ung would have yielded spontaneously to moralising persuasion. More probably, the situation in north China was so terrible at the time that tax concessions were unavoidable: in granting them, Wang only demonstrated his sense of pragmatic policy and flexible administration.

It should be recalled that following Ögödei's tax legislation of 1236/37, the annual imposts levied on the Chinese population up to Qubilai's accession included land and head taxes, household taxes, and monopoly taxes. The rate of the annual head-tax was one *shih* of grain per free male adult and half a *shih* per adult male slave in old-established households; it was halved for 'new households' first registered in the 1235/36 census. The annual land-tax rates varied from two to five *sheng* of grain per *mou* depending on the land's quality. Household taxes were levied in kind by both central and local administration according to two systems affecting different categories of households. In the first, two households owed jointly one *chin* of silk yarn to the state, and some sheer silk and coloured cloth to other agencies, whereas the same charges were born by five households in the second system (see the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai). During Möngke's reign, an annual silver tax, known as *pao-yin*, was imposed on the northern Chinese following the tax-farming system introduced by Ögödei's *ortaq* merchants. It was first set at six *liang* (ounces) per household but was later lowered to four *liang*: two *liang* to be paid in silver and two *liang* in goods such as sheer silk and coloured cloth. This system was reorganised by

Qubilai with the establishment of more categories of households paying taxes in silver and in kind at various rates. Some categories paid in both silk and silver while others paid in one or the other; the silver tax was subsequently made payable in paper currency. In addition to those 'ordinary taxes,' the Mongol administration up to Qubilai's reign drew additional revenue from varying levies on such essentials as salt, iron, copper, silver, liquor, and later, tea, over which the state maintained a monopoly. There are unfortunately few data available on the rates imposed on the production and sale of those commodities with the exception of salt. Some knowledge of the tax system is required to understand what Wang Wen-t'ung's tax concessions meant to the Chinese people, although the lack of statistics precludes a quantified evaluation.

In autumn 1260, another urgent task befell Wang Wen-t'ung, as Qubilai was campaigning against his rebellious brother Ariq Böke in the north. The campaign called for an extensive mobilisation not only of military units but also of grain supplies, and Qubilai put Wang in complete charge of the operation. His responsibilities are said to have included the requisition of grains and of other provisions, their shipment to the front and the procurement of labour forces, besides having to produce more revenue by means, notably, of monopoly taxes on salt, iron, and other commodities. The campaign proceeded successfully; Ariq Böke's resistance was overcome in due course – an outcome to which Wang Wen-t'ung's skilful management of logistics had contributed in no small degree.

Meanwhile, Wang Wen-t'ung and his colleagues in the Regional Secretarial Council at Yen-ching were reorganising the financial administration with a view to increasing the state's revenue. In August 1260 and during the following months, a number of new measures were enacted upon their recommendation. The most important was the introduction of new forms of paper currency, collectively known as *chiao-ch'ao* ('exchange notes'), to facilitate monetary transaction. Government-controlled markets were established in Ying and Lien prefectures and in the Kuang-hua military administration (in modern Honan) on the border with the Sung, to generate additional revenue. It appears that Wang Wen-t'ung not only helped initiate those measures, but also played a key role in their implementation, particularly in the administration of the paper currency.

Paper money was first issued by local authorities for regional use in north China in the late 1220s. It was introduced nation-wide in 1236/37 under Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's fiscal reform. It was drawn in various denominations against a silver reserve (hence the name *yin-ch'ao*), but the amount of notes in circulation was small. Similar forms of paper money were printed by various administrations up to Qubilai's time, but those issues were limited and local. As a package of fiscal reforms, Qubilai's new paper currency served to normalise a situation that had become increasingly confused.

Three new kinds of paper money were introduced throughout the country: the *chiao-ch'ao*, also known as *ssu-ch'ao* ('silk notes'), the *Chung-t'ung yüan-pao ch'ao*, and the *Chung-t'ung yin-huo*. The *chiao-ch'ao* was first printed in 1260/61, against a revenue of silk yarn; one *liang* of silver was worth twenty *liang* of silk notes. The *Chung-t'ung yüan-pao ch'ao*, printed in November 1260, was issued in various denominations and had no set period of validity. The *Chung-t'ung yin-huo* was made of patterned damask and was issued in five denominations, each *liang* in these denominations being equivalent to one *liang* of silver. Of the three forms of currency, the *Chung-t'ung yüan-pao ch'ao* was the most important and lasting; it subsequently replaced the *chiao-ch'ao*, whereas the *yin-huo* was probably never circulated.

Under the careful management of Wang Wen-t'ung and other fiscal administrators, the *Chung-t'ung yüan-pao ch'ao* proved a useful and durable means of exchange, at least during the first decade of its circulation. According to Wang Yün's treatise on paper currency and other contemporary accounts, it owed its success to several reasons. Firstly, the amount of the new currency in circulation was relatively modest and hence controllable. When it was introduced in late 1260, only the equivalent of 73,352 *ting* of silver was issued, and that was almost halved to 39,139 *ting* the following year. Secondly, the notes were printed against adequate gold and silver reserves to ensure convertibility. Local administrations had to deliver the corresponding sum in bullion to the central government before they could receive the notes for circulation in their regions. Thirdly, to ensure the popularity of the new currency, decrees were proclaimed making it possible to pay taxes in paper money instead of silver. Finally, attention was given to stabilising the price of commodities so as to maintain the value of the paper money. The strength of the *Chung-t'ung yüan-pao ch'ao* rested on a sufficiency of gold and silver reserves without which the scheme would soon have collapsed.

Shortly after the new paper currency was introduced, an event occurred which illustrates the difficulties of local administrators who happened to be short of bullion for exchange against the notes. The incident took place in the Chen-ting district, Hopei, and was resolved mainly through Wang Wen-t'ung's intervention. According to the biography of the Uighur Buyruq Qaya (1197-1265) in the *Yüan History*, Buyruq, then pacification commissioner of Chen-ting, held no reserves of gold and silver in his administration for local funds had all been seized by Qubilai's mother Sorqagtani Beki (Li Tse-fen suggests that the party responsible may have been Qubilai's empress Čabui [d. 1281], since the qa'an's mother died in 1252.) Consequently, the new notes could not be acquired, which resulted in an acute shortage of currency. Buyruq sent his adviser Hsing Tse to appeal to Wang Wen-

t'ung for help. Wang, aware of the situation, immediately released 5,000 *ting* of the paper money as an emergency measure.

There is another version of this episode. In his own biography, Liu Su, then joint pacification commissioner of Chen-ting, is presented as the author of the petition to Wang Wen-t'ung. It was reported that even though the new currency had been introduced to Chen-ting, there was still at that time over 8,000 *kuan* of the old *yin-ch'ao* in circulation. The latter was devalued in exchange for the new currency, which entailed a serious monetary crisis. Thereupon Liu Su proposed three possible solutions to the Secretarial Council: firstly, to continue using the old currency at face value; secondly, to use both the old and new currency concurrently; and thirdly, to have the government exchange the old currency for the new. The Secretarial Council adopted the third option, and released 500,000 *kuan* (= 10,000 *ting*) of the new money. Though Wang Wen-t'ung's name is not mentioned, he was evidently involved. In either version, the episode clearly illustrates Wang Wen-t'ung's skills as a fiscal administrator.

In March 1261, as normality needed to be restored to the northern territories following the suppression of Ariq Böke's insurrection, Qubilai ordered Maḥmūd Yalavač and Wang Wen-t'ung to summon the pacification commissioners of the various districts to K'ai-p'ing fu, there to receive the emperor's instructions. During the next few months, Qubilai put Wang in charge of replacing emergency measures with regular laws in order to lay a proper foundation for government. At the same time, the qa'an prescribed a number of specific rules for the pacification commissioners, exhorting them to implement them in their respective administrations. Most dealt with tax collection and the enforcement of the state monopolies on designated commodities.

Wang Wen-t'ung stayed at K'ai-p'ing fu to discharge his Secretarial Council duties, before returning to Yen-ching in July that same year. Those four months of Wang's activities, from April to July 1261, have been sparsely documented in Wang Yün's *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*. In separate entries, it records Wang Wen-t'ung's discussions with Qubilai and leading court officials on various aspects of state affairs, most of which concerned financial matters. It also mentions other activities, such as drafting Qubilai's response to the King of Koryŏ (i.e. Wang Sik or Wŏnjong, r. 1260-74), meeting with the latter's heir apparent, recommending scholars for official appointment, and other duties. Though often episodic and short of detail, those accounts provide indispensable information on Wang Wen-t'ung's interests at this critical stage of his career.

To begin with, there are several entries for May on Wang Wen-t'ung's leading role in the financial management of the new administration. The first reports a

discussion of state affairs between Wang, Chang Wen-ch'ien and Lien Hsi-hsien, showing that Wang supported the *kung-li*, i.e. the pragmatic approach to government business, even though some Confucian moralists would condemn it. In traditional statecraft, the *kung-li* approach stressed two interrelated goals: achieving specific results (*kung*) and maximising the benefits (*li*) of government action to society. This shows Wang Wen-t'ung to have been a highly practical functionary, free of dogmatic scruples, for whom the end justified the means. Such was certainly his attitude in subsequent discussions with his colleagues on matters of official appointments, reduction of household taxes, and the like, as shown in later accounts.

Indeed, two subsequent episodes vividly reveal those superior skills that thrust Wang Wen-t'ung to the pinnacle of the fiscal administration. During an audience with Wang on 26 May, Qubilai questioned him about the intended taxation programme; Wang answered clearly and intelligently without omitting one item. He had previously appreciated the state of civil and military affairs, made careful calculations and plans, and drawn logical conclusions which enabled him to brief the emperor accurately. Consequently, Wang Wen-t'ung was ordered the very next day to question a certain senior official of the Secretarial Council about the reliability of the figure given for the amount of taxes collected in 1260 as compared with that of the previous year. Wang again demonstrated his expert knowledge and the man was confounded. The official's name has not been recorded, but according to Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, he must have been Ma-ma, the Right chancellor, who was subsequently removed from his post, certainly on grounds of incompetence. In effect, those two incidents reflect the court's preoccupation with the reasons for the discrepancy between the total taxes collected from the civilian households in either year. As shown in a subsequent account, the officials who examined the records revealed that, whereas more kinds of taxes had been levied in 1259 and the numbers of the taxable households had been the same in both years, the total yield of taxation had been substantially lower in 1259 than in 1260. This was evidently the discrepancy that Wang Wen-t'ung had uncovered: it represented the type of fiscal malfeasance that Wang sought to weed out during his administration.

There are several other episodes in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* for the fifth month, i.e. May to June, that shed further light on Wang Wen-t'ung's meticulous attention to fiscal management. Following his confrontation with the former senior official in the Secretarial Council, Wang became aware that the accumulating mass of documents pertaining to fiscal matters tended to make access to information ever more difficult. Therefore he instructed his subordinates to classify records in such a way as to keep them accessible at all times for consultation by the emperor. Moreover, Wang Wen-t'ung paid attention to even minute details when it came to financial matters. In late

May, for example, when the numbers of fur garments manufactured in the nine districts were made available, he had asked a subordinate to undertake an analysis of cost effectiveness to determine which of the various lines produced were actually profitable.

Wang's major interest, however, remained in taxation planning. In this regard, he did not rely on established data and often made original assessment of the current situation. In early June, for instance, he instructed the agricultural promotion commissioner of the Huai-meng district (Hopei) to inspect the irrigation system in a county of the adjacent district in order to determine the amount of private land brought under irrigation. This finding apparently provided a benchmark by which to evaluate the productivity of farmland for the purpose of taxation. Indeed, similar investigations show that Wang Wen-t'ung did not take existing statistics at face value, but, with his colleagues at the Secretarial Council, conducted frequent inquiries into household and population figures. Such information attests to Wang Wen-t'ung's methodical approach: he took full account of facts and sought to adjust collection rates with a view both to meeting the state's requirements and to spreading the tax burden as equitably as possible.

Meanwhile, Qubilai made plans to increase the senior staff of the Secretarial Council in accordance with its extended responsibilities. He had a number of candidates in mind for the top post of chancellor, to replace the incompetent Ma-ma who was subsequently transferred to Yen-ching. The northern Chinese general Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), a loyal veteran, was definitely one of the front runners, but before making the appointment, Qubilai summoned the court officials for an opinion. According to the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi*, entry for 17 June, pacification commissioners Sung Tzu-chen (1186-1266), Liu Su, Chang Te-hui (1195-1274) and Yang Kuo (1197-1269) all spoke highly of Wang Wen-t'ung for the position, but expressed some concern about his lack of familiarity with the administration and the hostility which his eventual appointment might arouse among the more experienced officials. They finally backed Shih T'ien-tse, observing that, with Wang Wen-t'ung to assist him, he would greatly improve the administration. This episode suggests that whereas Wang Wen-t'ung might have had supporters in his own quest for the top post, his candidature also inspired misgivings and outright opposition. The latter came mainly from Qubilai's Confucian advisers, notably Yao Shu, Hsü Heng, Tou Mo, Wang E (*qq.v.*) and others, who resented Wang Wen-t'ung's non-Confucian background and his departures from the traditional principles of government. In effect, Qubilai had already made up his mind: the following day, he appointed the Mongol nobleman Buqa and Shih T'ien-tse as Right chancellors, and Quru Buqa, another Mongol, and Yeh-lü Chu (*q.v.*), son of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, as Left chancellors. Wang Wen-t'ung

was retained as administrator of political affairs together with three new appointees, Tāčar, Saiyid Elči (i.e. Saiyid Ajall, *q.v.*), and Lien Hsi-hsien. Chang Ch'i-yüan and Chang Wen-ch'ien were promoted assistants of the Right and Left, whereas Shang T'ing (*q.v.*) and Yang Kuo became associate directors of political affairs.

We should note, however, that Qubilai's appointment of Shih T'ien-tse and others to the chancellorship, bypassing Wang Wen-t'ung, did not signal his displeasure with his principal administrator. The chancellorship was customarily reserved for Qubilai's oldest companions; it dealt with the affairs of the empire, not with routine administration. That Wang Wen-t'ung was kept as director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council indicated in effect that the qa'an continued to value his ability and to regard his services as indispensable. This is revealed in several accounts of the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* showing Qubilai to have had private meetings with Wang Wen-t'ung and having made much use of his advice. In one instance, out of regard for Wang's advanced age, Qubilai suggested that he might exercise his prerogative not to consult the emperor on every item of business before taking action. The qa'an also told Wang that Wang need only see him on important affairs requiring his personal decision, but should communicate minor matters through the channel of subordinate officials. No other Chinese administrator of the time received such favoured treatment.

On 27 June, however, Qubilai ordered Wang Wen-t'ung, Chang Wen-ch'ien and others to return to Yen-ching. This was presumably because affairs at K'ai-p'ing fu were in hand, following the appointment of Shih T'ien-tse and his colleagues, and it had thus become desirable for the more experienced administrators to attend to urgent business in the Regional Secretarial Council.

The last entry in the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* concerning Wang Wen-t'ung records his farewell to the emperor and court officials on 10 July, and his departure with his staff the next day. On the eve of his farewell, Wang Wen-t'ung attended a banquet given by Shih T'ien-tse at the Secretarial Council, in honour of the heir apparent of the King of Koryŏ, Wang Sim (later King Ch'ungyŏl, r. 1274-1308) and his party who had come to pay homage to the qa'an and to congratulate him on the submission of Ariq Böke. This event is vividly described by Wang Yün and deserves mention. After several rounds of drinks, written statements were exchanged between hosts and guests. Wang Wen-t'ung asked the prince about the harvest in Koryŏ and whether that state still honoured the Sung calendar, which reveals Wang Wen-t'ung's overriding interest in economic and political facts, even concerning vassal states.

There are few records of Wang Wen-t'ung's activities during the rest of the year. He certainly came under pressure from Qubilai's Confucian advisers seeking his removal. Earlier, mention has been made of Yao Shu's criticism of Wang Wen-t'ung

before Qubilai took Wang into his confidence. The Confucians' animosity became overt when Qubilai retained Wang Wen-t'ung in his old post at the Secretarial Council. In July, both Wang E and Tou Mo submitted to the qa'an that Wang should not serve, recommending Hsü Heng in his place. Tou Mo claimed that Wang's learning was unsound, that he would lead the country to disaster, and was unfit to occupy the post of prime minister. But Qubilai ignored the charges for he needed Wang Wen-t'ung's administrative skills and fiscal expertise. As a result, Wang Wen-t'ung took a violent dislike to his Confucian adversaries and manoeuvred to undermine their influence in government. He proposed that Qubilai appoint Yao Shu as grand preceptor of the heir apparent, Tou Mo as grand tutor, and Hsü Heng as grand guardian. Wang obviously hoped that their promotion to such honourable but perfunctory positions would remove them from direct involvement in state affairs, thus reducing their political influence. None of the parties concerned accepted the offer: as Tou Mo commented, they deemed it improper to take up such posts before the emperor had officially proclaimed his heir apparent.

In September, however, probably again on Wang Wen-t'ung's initiative, Hsü Heng was appointed rector of the National College, Yao Shu became the director of the Bureau of Agriculture, whereas Tou Mo stayed on as Han-lin lecturer-in-waiting. The political influence of those Confucian advisers was thus temporarily neutralised, but it was not long before they themselves would rejoice in the ruin of their enemy.

In late February 1262, the Mongol court was rocked by the rebellion of Li T'an (q.v.), the powerful chief of the Regional Secretariat of I-tu who, since 1260, held also the post of high military administrator of the Chiang-Huai region. The insurrection engulfed a large part of Shantung, Hopei and Honan, and, though swiftly suppressed, it left a permanent mark on Mongol rule in north China. Wang Wen-t'ung, who was Li T'an's father-in-law and maintained close connections with him, was immediately implicated as an accomplice and ignominiously executed. Li T'an's rebellion, as detailed in his own biography, is a complex event, further confused by the conflicting and disparate nature of the available records. More uncertain still is Wang Wen-t'ung's role, since the sole information about it comes from his *Yüan History* biography, based on a one-sided official verdict. This account is as contradictory and inconclusive as that on Li T'an, and it is only possible to present a tentative picture of the incident.

Li T'an's treason was revealed on 22 February when he surrendered the prefectural seats of Lien-shui, Hai-chou, and another city of his administration to the Southern Sung. When news of the rebellion became public, many court officials charged that Wang Wen-t'ung had sent his own son, Wang Jao, to communicate secretly with Li T'an. Qubilai summoned Wang Wen-t'ung to interrogate him

forthwith. The qa'an asked, 'For several years you have been abetting Li T'an and the whole country knows it. How did you plan this? Give me all the details.' Wang Wen-t'ung demurred, apologising that it had slipped his mind and he would answer in due course. He then drafted a memorial the full content of which is not known, but containing a plea for mercy: 'If my worthless life were spared, I could guarantee that the Chiang-nan districts [i.e. the areas surrendered to the Sung by Li T'an] would be pacified.' Qubilai, sensing his duplicity, was outraged by Wang's evasiveness.

At this juncture, a messenger dispatched by Li T'an arrived at court from Ming-shui carrying three letters allegedly written to him by Wang Wen-t'ung. (It is puzzling that Li T'an should have revealed this correspondence; he might have intended to show that he enjoyed the support of a powerful official, or to divide opinion at court. The content of these letters has not been revealed, and their authenticity is uncertain; nevertheless, they proved very damaging to Wang Wen-t'ung.) Confronted with these documents, Wang was dumfounded; when the letters were read, one was found to contain the sentence: 'Wait till the *chia-tzu* year.' Qubilai demanded an immediate explanation. Hesitantly, Wang Wen-t'ung confessed that Li T'an had entertained treasonable intentions for some time, but did not act on them because of Wang's central role in government. Wang said that he had long considered denouncing his son-in-law and had procrastinated because the court was then engaged in the campaign against Ariq Böke. He then claimed that the reference to the '*chia-tzu*' year was a ploy to put off Li's rebellion for a few years. (The *chia-tzu* year would correspond to 1264, i.e. two years after the actual event.) In any case, it was a fragile defence since it amounted to a confession, but despite the emperor's rejection of it, Wang never admitted his guilt and asked for a death sentence.

Furious, Qubilai dismissed Wang Wen-t'ung, ordered the guards to bind him, and summoned his senior advisers Tou Mo, Yao Shu, Wang E, Liu Ping-chung and others. He showed them Wang's alleged communications with Li T'an and requested them to pass judgment. The civil officials cited the traditional admonition, 'A court servant is no general, if he behaves so, he ought to be executed' – in other words a civil servant should be condemned to die if he meddled in military affairs. Chang Jou (*q.v.*), the veteran myriarch of the Han Armies, shouted, 'Slice him!' Thereupon, with the emperor concurring, all the officials present agreed that Wang Wen-t'ung should die. The sentence was carried out on 14 March; both Wang Wen-t'ung and his son Wang Jao were publicly executed. Qubilai then issued a proclamation condemning Wang Wen-t'ung for betraying his trust and plotting to join in Li T'an's rebellion; all subjects were enjoined to heed the traitor's fate.

Notwithstanding its official assumption, Wang Wen-t'ung's implication in Li T'an's insurrection raises more questions than it answers. If we accept the *Yüan*

History version, Wang Wen-t'ung had long suspected Li's treason but did not report it because, as he argued, the court could not afford to face another rebellion at the time of Ariq Böke's uprising. Instead, he devised a stratagem to delay Li T'an's action for as long as the country was too weak to deal with such an emergency. This, however, is a preposterous excuse since it is self-incriminating and could hardly serve to exonerate its author. The main question is, why did Wang Wen-t'ung, having won Qubilai's trust and achieved the most prestigious government position, risk his career by consorting with a feckless rebel? Was it because he hoped to overthrow the throne? Existing records give no indication of such an aim, and some conjecture may be permitted here. It seems probable that, having established himself in the Secretarial Council, Wang Wen-t'ung might have sought to dissociate himself from Li T'an, but was himself used and perhaps intimidated by the latter on the ground of their past relationship. This seems credible in the light of the letters which Wang Wen-t'ung had written to Li T'an (if they were genuine), and of Wang's plea that he had sought unsuccessfully to restrain Li. The truth, alas, is buried forever.

Whatever may have been Wang Wen-t'ung's complicity in Li T'an's rebellion, it is apparent that none of his colleagues came to his defence. This is understandable because of the serious nature of the charge, but Wang's colleagues had their own reasons. Some of them, like Liu Ping-chung and Chang I, who had recommended Wang Wen-t'ung's appointment to the Secretarial Council, were apprehensive lest they be personally involved. Others, such as Tou Mo, Yao Shu, Hsü Heng and Wang E, who had earlier spoken out against Wang, naturally took delight in his demise. There was also no support either from the Han Armies commanders, such as Chang Jou and Shih T'ien-tse. Chang and his son Chang Hung-fan (*q.v.*) were then leading their troops to guard the capital against a possible threat from Li T'an; Chang Hung-fan subsequently participated in the siege of Chi-nan, and Shih was later appointed commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces against Li T'an. They had no reason to show leniency towards Wang, especially since any display of sympathy might indirectly implicate them in the rebellion. It is doubtful also that Qubilai would have spared Wang anyway, given the gravity of the charge. In the end, Wang Wen-t'ung became the victim not only of his past associations with Li T'an, but also of his non-Confucian background, of his domineering personality, and of his unconventional methods.

In retrospect, Wang Wen-t'ung deserves special recognition for his unique contributions to the formative years of Yüan government, despite his ignoble death and his denigration by Confucian historians. His administrative skills and fiscal expertise not only averted financial chaos at the most critical time of Qubilai's reign, but also laid the cornerstone of a fiscal administration that facilitated the Mongol

hegemony. He was largely responsible for mobilising the resources required by Qubilai's campaign against Ariq Böke, for expanding the state's revenue, and for improving the circulation of money. Thus he contributed eminently to satisfying Qubilai's most urgent needs and thereby won the qa'an's trust, which made him the most powerful Chinese minister in the Mongol government, outranking many of the well-established scholar-officials.

Unfortunately, Wang Wen-t'ung's personality and policies had aroused the antagonism and jealousy of many of Qubilai's Confucian advisers. Those veteran counsellors, who were obsessed with the idealist Confucian principles of moral government, placed the general welfare of the Chinese population above the Mongol rulers' perceived needs. They accused Wang of greed for power and profit, and of preferring the interest of the state to that of its subjects. This acrimonious relationship, however, stemmed more from philosophical differences and personality conflicts than from substantive issues.

The fact is, Wang Wen-t'ung prudently followed without major departure the fiscal policies laid down before Qubilai's time, seeking only to close existing loopholes and to ensure that all taxable households met their obligations. He may have adopted a more determined way of gathering revenue, but he did not advocate augmenting the tax categories to broaden the state's base of income. On the contrary, he showed himself pragmatic, willing to make concessions and ready to alter customary procedures as circumstances required. This is seen in his recommendation to grant tax remissions to the drought-stricken districts, and to release the new paper currency to local administrations that fell short of required bullion reserves. Wang Wen-t'ung was definitely not an avaricious, profit-hungry financial administrator like Aḥmad (*q.v.*), Lu Shih-yung (d. 1285) and Sangha (*q.v.*) in later years. It was they who doubled the land and head taxes and raised the other levies to such heights as to impoverish the population and to undermine the state's economic welfare. There appears to have been two reasons for the savage criticism that Qubilai's Confucian advisers directed at Wang Wen-t'ung: the first pertains to Wang's unorthodox learning and assertive personality; the other was to make him a scapegoat for the rapacious policies of the Mongols, which few dared to attack directly.

Nevertheless, since he proved to be the most competent fiscal administrator in government, Wang Wen-t'ung might have emerged unscathed but for his implication in Li T'an's rebellion. While we may never know the nature of Wang's involvement, the insurrection provided an opportunity for his opponents to take the offensive. They sought to demonstrate his guilt in order not only to destroy his fiscal policies, closely identified with Qubilai though they were, in the hope of promoting the Confucian principles of economic management, but also to strengthen their own threatened

political standing; this was especially true of those who had recommended or supported Wang's appointments. Those accusations fed Qubilai's suspicions and finally sealed Wang Wen-t'ung's fate and that of the other scholar-officials implicated in the case.

The execution of Wang Wen-t'ung as Li T'an's accomplice seriously affected later political events. Some of those consequences cannot be seen specifically as the aftermath of Li T'an's rebellion, e.g. the drastic curtailment of the powers of the Chinese overlords and ensuing changes in the administration of Chinese territories, but two immediate developments at least were directly related to Wang Wen-t'ung's downfall. The first was Qubilai's sudden alienation from his Chinese confidants in matters of government; the other concerned his new-found preference for, and employment of, Central Asian advisers and financial administrators.

Qubilai's alienation from his Chinese servants in the aftermath of Wang Wen-t'ung's treason was not surprising since the qa'an must have been deeply shaken by the treachery of a trusted confidant. The event not only triggered the outcry against Wang Wen-t'ung by his former associates anxious to save their own position, but it also brought a spate of recriminations from Mongol and Central Asian officials. The latter, who had been suppressed under Wang's administration, denounced him vehemently, declaring that whereas the Uighurs might have been embezzlers, they were not as bad as the 'cultivated gentleman' who dared to rebel. Surprisingly, however, whereas some of Wang Wen-t'ung's former associates were sacked or jailed, no far-reaching purge of the administration occurred. Many of the Chinese advisers, such as Liu Ping-chung, Tou Mo, Yao Shu and Wang E, were exonerated after showing proof of their innocence; in fact, some had warned Qubilai about Wang Wen-t'ung.

The only senior officials to be indicted were Wang's close colleagues Lien Hsi-hsien, Shang T'ing, and Chao Liang-pi (1214-85 or 1217-86), then a councillor in the Shen-hsi Regional Secretarial Council. They were charged as co-conspirators with Wang Wen-t'ung on a false accusation brought by a local judge, Fei Yin (or Fei Cheng-yin), out of personal enmity. Lien Hsi-hsien, then serving as director of political affairs in the Regional Secretarial Council of Ch'in-Shu, was recalled to the capital; Shang T'ing was incarcerated at Shang-tu; and Chao Liang-pi was also imprisoned. Before long, however, the charges were withdrawn; the accused were all released and their accuser was executed. Several of Wang Wen-t'ung's junior associates were incriminated and purged, including Wang Yün, who was spared only through the intercession of Shih T'ien-tse but remained a political outcast for several years. (Lao Yan-shuan suggests in his study of the *Chung-t'ang shih-chi* that Wang

Yün, seeking to conceal his former association with Wang Wen-t'ung, chose to address Wang by his rarely-used style-name Yün-sao in several pieces of his writing.)

It appears that Qubilai's lenient treatment was intended to avoid alienating his Chinese supporters; nevertheless, the qa'an became thenceforward deeply apprehensive of their potential threat. He no longer displayed unreserved trust in his Confucian advisers: though he continued to treat them cordially, he relegated them to unimportant posts or sent them away to local administrations. Thereafter, no Chinese scholar-official in Qubilai's court ever reached the positions of power which his kind had achieved in the past. Indeed, Li T'an's rebellion and Wang Wen-t'ung's execution sealed the political fortune of the Chinese literati and ushered in a new era of power politics at the Mongol court.

In the meantime, as he turned away from his Chinese confidants, Qubilai drew closer to the Central Asian officials, and appointed them to senior government positions. There were good reasons for this, since not only were the Central Asians ethnically closer to the Mongols, but they were also skilled financial managers who had given great service to the early Mongol rulers. This ethnic group therefore fulfilled Qubilai's new need for both political allies and fiscal administrators, and Central Asians consequently took control of the financial administration for the following two decades. The first Central Asian appointed by Qubilai as chief financial administrator after Wang Wen-t'ung's execution was the Muslim Aḥmad who ruled the fiscal administration for twenty years. After his assassination in 1282, Aḥmad was succeeded in 1285 by Lu Shih-yung, his former Chinese associate, but Lu was executed for corruption after only four months. Thereupon, Qubilai appointed the Tibetan Sangha, who remained in office until his death in 1287.

This is not the place to evaluate those men's performance, but several points deserve attention. Most importantly, both Aḥmad and Sangha, who were condemned as avaricious and crafty by their Chinese colleagues, were notorious for their reckless fiscal policies. Under their administration the land and head taxes were doubled and tripled, the various monopoly levies were raised several times to more than tenfold the original rates, and revenue from new sources was ruthlessly exacted in south China after the conquest of Southern Sung. Secondly, new institutions solely devoted to financial management were created, abolished, restored and dissolved, such as the State Finance Bureau and Presidential Council, to give Aḥmad and Sangha supreme authority, independently of the Secretarial Council. These changes, moreover, were punctuated by bitter power struggles between the Central Asian administrators and the Chinese court officials, which no-one appears to have won. Finally, whereas Aḥmad and Sangha recklessly widened the base of the state's revenue to meet Qubilai's needs, their sharp practices bred widespread corruption within their own offices and

undermined the financial welfare of the state and of its subjects. The devaluation of the paper money caused by a steep rise in the volume of notes issued without adequate bullion cover exacerbated the inflationary trend and wrecked the foundation of the state economy. This was noted by Lu Shih-yung in his memorial: 'Ever since Wang Wen-t'ung's departure, the paper currency system had deteriorated.' This shows clearly why the treasury officials had come to regret Wang's departure. Indeed, Wang Wen-t'ung's mistakes or crimes in matters of fiscal administration, as alleged by the Confucian scholar-officials, were dwarfed by those of the Central Asian financiers.

In sum, despite his ignominious death and posthumous disgrace, Wang Wen-t'ung was not totally forgotten thanks to his important contributions to fiscal administration. For that reason, he emerged in a more favourable light during the latter Yüan period, when the political turmoil of the early years had faded into history. This is seen, for example, in a conversation between the last Yüan emperor Toqōn Temür (Shun-ti, r. 1333-67) and his Left chancellor Temür Taš (1302-47), recorded in the latter's biography in the *Yüan History*. The emperor, during an audience with Temür Taš on matters of government, commented on Wang Wen-t'ung's extraordinary talent and regretted not having a man of his calibre in his service. Toqon Temür was probably alluding to the current fiscal chaos precipitated by the devaluation of the paper currency in the absence of capable administrators. But the Left chancellor, who was well versed in Neo-Confucian teaching, dissented. He exclaimed, 'Shih-tsu (i.e. Qubilai) had the wisdom of Yao and Shun, but Wang Wen-t'ung did not inform his lord of the kingly way. He worshipped the craft of the hegemon and was infatuated with profit; this was definitely the emperor's guilty man!' What is significant here is that Temür Taš condemned Wang for his non-Confucian outlook and profit-seeking policies, without mentioning his involvement in Li T'an's rebellion.

Seen in this context, the appraisal of Wang Wen-t'ung remained ambivalent in late Yüan. From the Mongol ruler's standpoint, Wang Wen-t'ung, despite his alleged treachery, was appreciated for his administrative skills and pragmatic policies. As the Confucian scholar-officials saw it, however, Wang's political conduct and fiscal programmes grew out of a world-view inimical to Confucianism, and were therefore detrimental to the people's welfare. Wang's merits or faults, therefore, varied according to the interests of the observers. In this light, we should note a comment in the encomium of Wang Wen-t'ung's *Yüan History* biography written by early Ming historiographers. It says: 'Although Wang Wen-t'ung was executed because of (Li T'an's) rebellion, many in the country considered that the institutions, rules and measures of the Yüan establishment owed greatly to his contribution.' This is evidently a more balanced opinion, perhaps an attempt to reconcile the conflicting viewpoints that prevailed at the end of the Yüan dynasty. In this view, a proper

appraisal of Wang Wen-t'ung must consider the entirety of his career under Qubilai and ignore the prejudices of the Confucian scholar-officials who were motivated by a different conception of statecraft and of Mongol rule in China.

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H.L. Chan

32. AḥMAD (? – 1282)

Aḥmad (in Chinese A-ho-ma), for many years a trusted adviser and financial expert under Qubilai, stands out in Yüan history not only for being mentioned in Chinese and Islamic sources, but for becoming known even in medieval Europe through the book of Marco Polo. Although he rates a biography in *ch.* 205 of the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), such was the compilers' opinion of Aḥmad that they dealt with him in the section of their work devoted to 'treacherous officials' (*chien-ch'en*). As a rule, biographies of that kind depart from the normal format in that they do not draw their substance from systematic records, necrologies, and similar primary sources, but amount rather to a patchwork of items culled from other parts of the *History*. Thus, as in other Chinese documents, information on Aḥmad in the *Yüan History* pertains solely to the period extending from his appearance at court to his dramatic assassination. The compilers of the *History* admit to not knowing who it was that presented Aḥmad to the emperor. The Chinese literature of the Yüan period never mentions Aḥmad's origin and early life, beyond stating that he was a Muslim (*hui-hui jen*).

The Persian historiographer Rašīd al-Dīn, however, has preserved some information on Aḥmad's background. Aḥmad is said to have come from Fanākat (or Banākat, south-west of Tashkent, Uzbek SSR). This would make him a native of the former Qara Khitai empire which had been absorbed by the Mongols in *ca.* 1218 – 1220 and whose population was of mixed Iranian and Turkic stock. Aḥmad's career seems to have begun in the household of Alčīn Noyan of the Qonggirat tribe, a brother-in-law of Činggis Qan, who died after 1237. He also seems to have been in the service of Čabui or Čabi (d. 1281 ?), a descendant of Alčīn Noyan, who was married to Qubilai in 1239 and became his empress after he ascended the throne in 1260. Rašīd al-Dīn says that 'when she became the Qa'an's wife, (Aḥmad) was in attendance at her *ordo*.' We may therefore regard Aḥmad as a household retainer of Alčīn Noyan, who had found favour with Čabui and come through her to Qubilai's attention. Indeed we find Aḥmad in the service of Qubilai during the years 1247 and 1253 together with Li Te-hui (1218 – 80) in an unspecified position attached to the heir apparent's residence. At that time, Li managed Qubilai's finances and military expenditures, so that we may assume that Aḥmad served him in a similar capacity – which would fit perfectly with what we know of his career after Qubilai's accession, governed as it was by relentless craving for total control over government finances.

The early stages of Aḥmad's career in the Chinese bureaucracy coincide with a period of relative disorganization and regionalism. It is not surprising therefore that Aḥmad's earliest recorded activities after Qubilai's enthronement should concern local rather than state-wide affairs. In the 5th month of 1261, being co-director of the Metropolitan Bureau in K'ai-p'ing fu (To-lun in Inner Mongolia), he was ordered to make an inventory of the Imperial Treasury in Yen-ching (Peking). Two days later he was appointed commissioner of the Imperial Granary. In that capacity he requested that an Office for Harmonious Purchase be established, through which grain might be bought at a fixed price for the purpose of creating reserves. Under their engaging title, institutions of that kind were often nothing more than a device to requisition supplies for the host of military and civil retainers at Qubilai's court. Such an agency was indeed set up in this instance, to be known as the Office for Regulated Management. Thus we may infer that Aḥmad's function in 1261 did not radically differ from that which he assumed when Qubilai was still heir apparent, namely that of a sort of major-domo responsible for provisioning the princely residence. His aspirations, however, went much beyond that.

This was demonstrated in 1262. Aḥmad had apparently been found worthy of promotion. He was made chief of the Left and Right Boards of the Secretarial Council and, concurrently, commissioner of Transport Bureaux in all districts. This gave him great power in fiscal matters although he still remained under the supervision of the Secretarial Council. He seems to have resented that control, for Aḥmad requested that he should not have to report to the Council but be henceforward responsible solely to the emperor himself. This attempt to bypass the existing hierarchy – still in its formative stage at the time – was resisted, of course, by the officials in the Council. Their spokesman was Chang Wen-ch'ien (*q.v.*), then assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council. Chang protested strongly against Aḥmad's proposal and managed to have Qubilai reject it. The confrontation between Aḥmad and Chang Wen-ch'ien was the first of many similar incidents which were to become a leitmotiv for the next twenty years: unceasing attempts by Aḥmad to emasculate the Secretarial Council and to secure for himself a position of power equal, if not superior, to it. In this struggle he encountered the opposition of many Chinese advisers to the emperor, themselves steeped in the tradition of a proper chain of command and of delimited power within the bureaucracy.

In 1263, the prefecture of K'ai-p'ing, which had been the summer residence of Qubilai, was elevated to the rank of a capital and renamed Shang-tu. Aḥmad's position was not affected by this change, and he continued to suggest innovations in fiscal matters. He sought to increase government income by tightening control over the production of iron. At that time there existed government operated mines and

smelters besides privately owned works. In a memorial Aḥmad proposed to increase the revenue from the casting of iron tools in the government foundries of Chün and Hsü prefectures (in Honan and Hopei, respectively). His idea was to raise annual production to 200,000 articles and to have those supplied to farmers in exchange for 40,000 *shih* of grain. It seems therefore that the main objective was to increase the grain reserves of the state. Another proposal by Aḥmad put forward in 1263 was the introduction of a sales tax (*shang-shui*) for transactions in government silver in the capital. This must be seen against the background of the so-called *ortaq* merchants who were recipients of government silver loans against interest. Aḥmad requested that these merchants should have to pay a sales tax to the metropolitan tax bureau and that merchants who could not produce a licence (tax-receipt) when entering the capital should be prosecuted for tax evasion. All these proposals were adopted by the emperor.

A most important source of public income had always been the salt monopoly. It is therefore no wonder that Aḥmad also tried to increase government revenues from this commodity. In 1263 or 1264 – the dates given by the sources are conflicting – he pointed out that people in T'ai-yüan (Shansi) produced cheap low-quality salt for sale abroad. This was in his opinion an unfair competition to the government-supplied salt from Chieh (Shansi) which could not be exported and yielded the equivalent of only 7,500 *liang* of silver a year. Aḥmad requested that this revenue be raised by another 5,000 *liang* and that tax exemptions, which apparently existed heretofore for such people as Buddhist and Taoist monks, soldiers and artisans, be abolished.

The year 1264 brought Aḥmad a crucial promotion. He became a director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council, while concurrently serving as commissioner of the Transport Bureau and supervisor of the Imperial Treasury – a combination of fiscal and political power which foreshadowed his further career. All this did not go smoothly nor without opposition from other officials. Already in 1264 Aḥmad must have sometimes behaved with singular arrogance at court. It is reported that his followers (or bodyguard) started a fight. The emperor ordered the Secretarial Council to investigate this incident but at first nobody dared start a prosecution. This was eventually undertaken by the respected Sino-Uighur statesman Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*) who informed the emperor of Aḥmad's lack of control over his retainers. The culprits were handed over to the authorities for prosecution, and Aḥmad himself received a beating. To inflict corporal punishment on a high official was not uncommon under the Liao, Chin and Yüan dynasties, in contrast to the Sung who observed the ancient rule that no such treatment should be inflicted upon dignitaries. It is interesting to note that the incident did by no means entail a break in Aḥmad's

career; it is rather an indication of the rough-and-ready way in which justice was meted out at the Mongol court.

Early in 1266 a new agency for fiscal management was created and again Aḥmad was made its head. The name of the new office was Office for Regulating State Expenditure. The duties of this agency were similar to those of a court of general auditing and supervision of public expenditure. A memorial issuing from this new office soon after its establishment reveals the concerns of Aḥmad and his officials, and shows to what degree he was informed of local shortcomings which could affect state revenues. The memorial complains that the linen cloth supplied by Liao-yang (in southern Manchuria) was of bad quality and unfit for use; the gold and silver from the foundries of Chen-ting and Shun-t'ien (Hopei) were not up to standard and that the casting of ingots should be improved. It goes on to say that in the Pieh-ch'ieh-ch'ih (*Bekeči) mountains (which must have been somewhere in Central Asia), asbestos could be found from which non-flammable cloth could be woven, and government officials should be sent there to collect it. The memorial ends with a stern warning that expenditures would have to be restricted in future if no additional revenue could be raised. This obvious desire to increase state income can easily be understood if it is remembered that the resources of the state at that time had to meet heavy commitments. Grain was needed because the 1263 harvest in north China had been bad and damaged by locusts; much grain and money was also required for the armies which were fighting the Sung in Szechwan and the pretender Ariq Böke in Mongolia. In view of all this we can understand that Aḥmad strove to mobilize even the smallest potential sources of additional state revenue. His Office for Regulating State Expenditure, for example, reported towards the end of 1266 that silver could be found in a place called Huan-chou yü in the district of Shang-tu and that about 160,000 *chin* of ore had already been mined. Three *liang* of silver and fifteen *liang* of tin could be smelted from each 100 *chin*. It was suggested that the tin be sold and the proceeds paid into government coffers. Seven hundred-odd kilograms of tin could surely not have amounted to much, but even this was considered a valuable addition to the state's revenue. Thus did Aḥmad endeavour to squeeze the last drop out of every available resource throughout the empire.

A first attempt by Aḥmad to obtain powers equal to that of the Secretarial Council was made in 1268 when he proposed to establish a Presidential Council. This move met with resistance from within the Secretarial Council. The Mongol An-t'ung, (*q.v.*) of the Jalair tribe, a fourth-generation descendant of Muqali (*q.v.*) who had been Right chancellor since 1265, and Shang T'ing (*q.v.*) who had been associate director of political affairs from 1261 to 1266, both opposed the motion and for the moment the matter was dropped. The year 1268 also saw the establishment of a Censorate

with regional branch offices (Inspection Bureaux) in all provinces. Aḥmad suspected that this new agency might eventually interfere with his own power base in the metropolitan bureaucracy. He is reported to have said, 'Why should we have a Censorate – there is no reason for this as long as money and grain come in!' – a statement which shows his exclusive concern with government income. He was opposed by Lien Hsi-hsien who pointed out that a Censorate was indeed necessary in order to maintain traditional principles of government. Aḥmad's view did not prevail and the Censorate was established after all.

Aḥmad's aspirations were contained only temporarily, however. Two years later, in 1270, he succeeded in persuading Qubilai to set up a Presidential Council and to appoint him director of political affairs. Thus a super-ministry of finance had come into being, not without strong opposition from the leading officials in the Secretarial Council. These included in addition to the Mongol chancellors An-t'ung and Hsien-chen of the Tübeyen tribe, who both were on good terms with the Chinese officials, the trusted adviser Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*) who had been Right chancellor since 1261. Other opponents were the famous scholar-official Hsü Heng (*q.v.*), who had been made an assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council in 1270, and Lien Hsi-hsien, named assistant of the Left after having been demoted from the position of director of political affairs in 1267. The eventual victory of Aḥmad over his opponents must be attributed to his previous success in increasing government revenues and also to his gifts as a debater, which must have been considerable.

In any case there existed now four high-level government organisations: Secretarial Council, Presidential Council, Department of Military Affairs and Censorate. While the Department of Military Affairs remained more or less outside the power-struggle between the other three, it became a permanent issue as to which would be first to secure the emperor's approval without having to consult the others. A case in point was the employment of personnel. Originally Aḥmad had appointed his subordinates in the Office for Regulating Expenditure without consulting the Ministry of Personnel which was in turn subject to the Secretarial Council. When the Presidential Council was set up, it was decreed that each appointment in the Presidential Council should first be drafted in the Ministry of Personnel and then be passed on to the Presidential Council which in turn should transmit it to the emperor for approval. This would have given the Secretarial Council a chance to influence the staffing of the Presidential Council and to thwart Aḥmad's selection of personnel. Aḥmad protested in the presence of the emperor and insisted on his right to select his subordinate officials. He scored a victory over An-t'ung and the Secretarial Council because after some debate it was ordered that only serious criminal cases and the appointment of general administrators had to be submitted to An-t'ung; all other

business was entrusted to Aḥmad. But this apparently did not yet satisfy him. He even proposed to abolish the Secretarial Council and, as a consolation prize, to promote An-t'ung to the high dignity of grand preceptor. Not even Aḥmad's own subordinates supported him in this move which would have amounted to a coup d'état. The associate director of political affairs in the Presidential Council, Ch'en Yu (1222-77), voiced strong protest and maintained that a time-honoured organization like the Secretarial Council could not be dispensed with so easily. Aḥmad avenged himself by having Ch'en Yu demoted to a provincial post. Another of his victims was the director of the Board of the Left in the Presidential Council, Ma Heng (1207-77). Aḥmad had him dismissed from office, presumably for the same reason as Ch'en Yu.

Among the various actions taken by the Presidential Council soon after its establishment, we should mention the application submitted in the 5th month of 1270. It was requested that a general census of households and individuals be taken throughout the empire. This was certainly relevant to fiscal matters; without an approximate knowledge of population figures neither Aḥmad nor any other minister of finance would have been able to assess correctly the fiscal potential of the empire. It seems that an annual census was taken, but that only the number of households and not the individuals per household were counted, since all census figures from Qubilai's reign prior to 1290 record the former only. However, the Censorate asked for a deferment on the grounds that the population had suffered from locust plagues and that a census would create unnecessary trouble. In 1271 the Presidential Council again applied to organise a census, once more, it seems, without success.

A major stage on Aḥmad's way to supreme power was reached in 1272 when the Presidential Council was integrated into the Secretarial Council. Aḥmad and his close associate Chang I (? – 1282) both became directors of political affairs in the Secretarial Council. At the same time a comprehensive reorganisation of the metropolitan offices took place and many new appointments were made. One of Aḥmad's protégés was the Chinese Chang Hui (1223 – 85), who was made assistant of the Left in 1273. He and Aḥmad were attacked soon afterwards by An-t'ung who complained to the emperor that these two were equal in power to a chancellor, but that they were no more than merchants who wanted to make profits at all costs and at the expense of the people. Aḥmad was informed of this accusation and demanded that he should be given an opportunity to discuss this openly at court. When the confrontation took place, An-t'ung no longer accused Aḥmad directly but as a scapegoat named Chou Hsiang, an underling, as a major profiteer who should be demoted. Qubilai approved this.

The strength of Aḥmad's position as shown by this incident is also demonstrated by the fact that he succeeded in having his son Ḥusain appointed as general

administrator of Ta-tu (Peking) and concurrently metropolitan prefect. A second attempt by An-t'ung to incriminate Aḥmad was as unsuccessful as the first. He impeached Aḥmad for preying upon the country and injuring the people, complaining at the same time that all the unworthy persons among his subordinates should be subject to a renewed selection process. Indeed the emperor ordered a thorough investigation but apparently nothing serious happened to Aḥmad's protégés. At the same time a Chinese censor, Yao T'ien-fu (1230-1302) had impeached Aḥmad for twenty-four crimes. This temerity impressed Qubilai greatly but again nothing came of Yao's action. Yao was commended for his brave behaviour and that was all. Indeed Yao's fearless attitude on an earlier occasion had already earned him the Mongolian nickname of Bars ('Tiger'), a distinction conferred upon him by Qubilai in person.

This was in 1274, at a time when the resources of the whole empire were mobilised for the last and decisive attacks against the Sung state. Increased state expenditure was, of course, required and again Aḥmad took the lead in organising the supplies for the army. In January 1275 the Mongol forces had reached the Yangtze River and the complete overthrow of the Sung seemed to be a matter of a few months only. At this juncture the future policies for exploiting the rich newly-conquered Sung territories were discussed in great detail before Qubilai. The emperor had summoned, in addition to Aḥmad, his advisers Yao Shu (*q.v.*), Chang Wen-ch'ien, T'u-tan Kung-lü, Ch'en Han-kuei and Yang Ch'eng, all Chinese intellectuals whom the emperor trusted. The discussion was heated, particularly with regard to the question of whether the Sung paper money should continue to circulate or be replaced by the Yüan paper money (*Chung-t'ung chiao-ch'ao*) which had been introduced in the Chung-t'ung period (1260-63). Aḥmad was strongly in favor of imposing Yüan paper money as sole currency in the newly conquered territories. Yao Shu and T'u-shan Kung-lü objected; the latter pointed out that the Mongol commander-in-chief Bayan (*q.v.*) had publicly proclaimed to the population in the south that the Sung paper money (*chiao-tzu* and *hui-tzu*) would not be replaced or exchanged, so that the introduction of Yüan money would entail a loss of credibility. Also Chang Wen-ch'ien shared this opinion and proposed to ask Bayan for his considered opinion in the matter. Qubilai, however, replied that he had asked Ch'en Yen (d. 1299), a former Sung *chin-shih* who had joined the Mongols, for his opinion and that he too had advocated an exchange of money. Yang Ch'eng and Ch'en Han-kuei both were in favour of exchanging the Sung money for the northern currency. In view of this divided opinion among his Chinese advisers, Qubilai followed Aḥmad's proposal and consequently the Sung money was exchanged for Yüan money throughout the former Sung territories. The rate of exchange was almost confiscatory; fifty notes of Sung

money were declared equivalent to one note of Yüan money of the same denomination.

Another proposal of Aḥmad was the extension to the South of the state monopoly on salt and on medicinal herbs. Yao Shu and T'u-tan Kung-lü advocated the tolerance of free trade but Aḥmad insisted that the expenditures for the campaign required a sizable increase in revenues and that the former practice of allowing the general administrations to collect annual monopoly taxes (*k'o-ch'eng*) should be abandoned. Instead, new Transport Bureaux should be established and the tax rates on salt increased. All iron, whether cast privately or in government foundries, should be sold by the government and a general prohibition placed on the private manufacture of bronze tools. The emperor overruled the objections raised by Yao and T'u-tan and followed Aḥmad's requests. This must be considered as another defeat for the Chinese advisers and a major victory for Aḥmad. On the institutional level Aḥmad's fiscal policies resulted in the creation of eleven Transport Bureaux. The *Yüan History* has preserved the names of the eleven commissioners and it is interesting to note that five of them had Muslim names, two Jurchen names and only four were Chinese. The preference granted to non-Chinese officials was certainly a factor which tended to alienate the new bureaucracy from the people in the South. On the other hand it seems plausible that Aḥmad and his followers at court preferred foreigners because they were less liable to engage in collusion with influential Chinese in their respective districts.

Aḥmad had now reached the peak of his power and achieved complete control over the finances of the state. Some hitherto influential Chinese advisers of the emperor had either resigned or become disillusioned with the situation at court. But there were still potential enemies who could check him. Most prominent among these was An-t'ung, and in fact Aḥmad tried hard to have him removed from the inner circle of advisers. He eventually succeeded in persuading the emperor to send An-t'ung abroad as Right chancellor of the Regional Secretarial Council in Almalıq (north-west of Kuldja in Sinkiang) where he was supposed to assist the Prince of Pei-p'ing, i.e. Qubilai's fourth son Nomuqan (d. *ca.* 1292). Nomuqan had been stationed at Almalıq in the far west of Qubilai's dominion since 1271 in order to prevent incursions from the unruly descendants of Ča'āдай and Ögödei who continued to endanger the frontiers of Qubilai's state. Now that An-t'ung was safely out of the way, Aḥmad had in fact become the most powerful figure at the court. Biographical information for the remaining few years of his life includes a great number of episodes either denouncing the arbitrariness of his rule or praising the opposition of other officials, Chinese, Mongol and Uighur alike. Some of these suffered intense persecution and not a few of them eventually died in prison or were formally executed.

Not even the great military leader Bayan (*q.v.*) was spared Aḥmad's enmity if we are to credit an incident recorded in Bayan's biography. After the victorious general returned to Ta-tu, an order was given for metropolitan officials to greet and congratulate him outside the gates. Aḥmad arrived ahead of the others and Bayan gave him as a present a jade belt-buckle which he had on him, observing that he, Bayan, would take nothing for himself from the jade treasures of the Sung. Aḥmad considered this a slight and began to scheme against him. He falsely accused Bayan of having appropriated a jade cup from the Sung booty. The emperor ordered an investigation but the charge could not be substantiated and Bayan was exonerated. The cup in question was recovered after Aḥmad's death and the emperor realised how close to ruin it had brought a loyal and brave servant of the throne. Aḥmad also slandered Bayan by alleging that he had had Sung soldiers killed in Ting-chia chou (Anhwei province) after they had surrendered, but this second attempt to eliminate Bayan apparently failed.

Apart from his personal grudges, such as that against Bayan, Aḥmad had a constant fear that the Censorate in the capital and the provinces would interfere with his high-handed activities which after 1275 also covered the former Sung provinces. He memorialised in 1276 to abolish the Regional Judicial Bureaux, but Chang Wen-ch'ien who had just been named chief censor opposed this in a submission of his own and was thus able to prevent a weakening of the controlling power of the Censorate in the provinces. Other institutional changes which might have limited Aḥmad's power were also opposed by him. In 1277, when the court discussed the establishment of an Imperial Chancellery and Lien Hsi-hsien, with whom Aḥmad had been on bad terms for a long time, was considered for the post of director, Aḥmad succeeded in blocking the plan.

Nevertheless there existed a slowly growing opposition to Aḥmad and his ways, even within the regional branches of the Secretarial Council. An ardent spokesman for this faction was Ts'ui Pin (1225-80) who had been a member of Qubilai's staff since before 1260 and who had distinguished himself in the campaigns against Sung. In 1278, when he was assistant of the Left in the Regional Secretarial Council in Chiang-Huai, he submitted a memorial denouncing Aḥmad. He complained that Aḥmad had established many unnecessary agencies in the province and that a great number of Aḥmad's relatives had been given important posts throughout the empire, notwithstanding an earlier promise by Aḥmad not to employ them. Ts'ui Pin's initiative was temporarily successful since an edict was issued to dismiss members of Aḥmad's family from government service. Some of those, including Aḥmad's son Ḥusain, were soon reinstated, however; but others, like his nephews Badr al-Dīn and Šams al-Dīn and his son Mas'ūd, were not reemployed although Chang Hui spoke in

their favour. Ts'ui Pin fell soon afterwards to Aḥmad's revenge. An inquiry into the finances of Chiang-Huai province was ordered and it was alleged that Ts'ui Pin together with his colleagues 'Alī Beg (*q.v.*) and El Temür had stolen hundreds of thousands of *shih* of government grain. Other charges against Ts'ui Pin and 'Alī Beg were to the effect that they had cast bronze seals for themselves without proper authorisation. The three men were executed in 1280 as a result of these machinations.

Ḥusain's reinstatement had already taken place in 1279. This coincided more or less with the establishment of a new set of agencies in Chiang-nan called Merchant Tax Superintendency which served to exploit local resources ever more fully. Ḥusain was also given charge of all artisans in the Hang-chou region and responsibility for collecting the grain tax. It is said that he doubled the people's burden. This cannot be regarded solely as the result of Ḥusain's or Aḥmad's greed, or of indifference to the people's welfare. The years from 1278 to 1281 were a period of costly campaigns overseas and the rich fertile regions of the lower Yangtze were crucial in providing supplies for the army and the navy. Military expeditions included the second attempt to attack Japan (1281), the first expedition against Burma (1278), and the first naval campaign against Java (1281). All this required abundant provisions of grain, technical skills and, last but not least, of money. We can perhaps understand better in the light of such military endeavours that some officials should protest against the increased exploitation of the population. Aḥmad himself repeatedly stressed the necessity to register the grain reserves in Chiang-nan and complained that the figures given in the reports were untrue and that grain had been embezzled by the local officials. He therefore requested in 1280 that special agents of the Censorate should inquire into alleged corruption at the local level and that the recently established Tax Superintendencies should by no means be abolished as had been proposed by some. Aḥmad's opinion prevailed once again with Qubilai who apparently gave priority to military considerations. Officers from the Censorate were sent out to investigate. One of them should have been Chang Hsiung-fei (d. after 1286), but Aḥmad, knowing that Chang hated Ḥusain, made sure that the former was not sent to the south and had him appointed instead inspection commissioner of a district in Shensi. This is a good example of how Aḥmad tried to combine personal motives with his overall concern for increasing state revenues.

It must have been around 1280 that Ĵingim, heir apparent and second son of Qubilai, developed a strong dislike for Aḥmad. The *Yüan History* records several incidents which show the prince's hatred for his father's Muslim minister. It is not improbable that Ĵingim was influenced by Chinese courtiers because it is well known that he, unlike other members of his clan, favoured Chinese advisers and even tried to learn some Chinese. Aḥmad, on the other hand, feared Ĵingim and did not dare to

confront him openly. On one occasion Ĵingim hit Aĥmad in the face so hard that he could no longer open his mouth. When Qubilai asked Aĥmad what had happened to him, Aĥmad claimed to have hurt himself falling off a horse. Another time Aĥmad was physically attacked by Ĵingim in the emperor's presence but the latter took no notice of the incident. Ĵingim also resented the plot against Ts'ui Pin, who was a protégé of his but whose death the prince was unable to prevent. He had sent envoys to stop the execution but they arrived too late to save the victim's life. It is not impossible that we must view Aĥmad's request to establish a High Court of Justice in the light of his fear of Ĵingim. A memorial to that effect was submitted by Aĥmad in 1280. It must be remembered that the proposed instrumentality should have held jurisdiction over the imperial princes themselves. Yet as a similar institution had already been in existence since 1261, there did not seem much point in requesting the creation of this new agency. In the same memorial Aĥmad also proposed to abolish the Base Camp Office of Shang-tu and to place its affairs in the care of the local governor. In any case Qubilai did not adopt Aĥmad's proposal – he even reproached him for having brought up the matter and said that he had never heard before of *tsung-cheng*, a term which can also be interpreted as 'censure of the (imperial) clan.'

In 1281 two creatures of Aĥmad were promoted on his initiative. These were Hao Chen and Keng Jen; Hao had been associate director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council since 1276, and Keng had held the same rank since 1278. Now both were promoted to the rank of assistant of the Left. In the sources they too are described, like Aĥmad, as greedy, corrupt and neglectful of the welfare of the people. They had raised the annual tax quota in Ching-ch'ao district (Hsi-an, Shensi) from 19,000 *ting* to 54,000 *ting* (2.7 million strings of cash or the equivalent in paper money). Even this considerable sum did not satisfy Aĥmad who said that even more could be extracted from the district. The emperor, however, thought this was enough and the whole matter was dropped.

The year 1281 also saw the Ch'in Ch'ang-ch'ing affair. Ch'in came from an old family in Lo-yang and had been taken to Qubilai's court when the latter was still a prince. He later served in the Imperial Guard together with Liu Hsüan. He wrote a letter to the emperor in which he denounced Aĥmad in the strongest possible terms for corruption, bribery and generally for being a rogue. Aĥmad had him dismissed from court and sent to serve as co-director of the government iron foundries in Hsing-ho and Hsüan-te (both in Hopei). Aĥmad then accused him of having failed to deliver 10,000 *kuan* of money of the quota set for those works. Ch'in was demoted to the position of a simple clerk, his property was confiscated and he was eventually thrown into prison where he was illegally executed by jail attendants. The censor Chang Hsiung-fei had tried to block the trial of Ch'in but failed. The injustice committed

against Ch'in Ch'ang-ch'ing was never formally redressed although his sons and grandsons later reached high and important offices.

Aḥmad's last fiscal activity recorded in 1281 concerns the provision of funds to open up the Chi-chou River in Shantung for navigation, as a part of the Grand Canal system. The general administrator in this region had estimated that 10,000 *ting* of paper money were needed for hiring labour in addition to the food for the work force. This had been approved by the emperor in 1280. One year later the Right chancellor Qorqosun furthered the general administrator's plan by suggesting that the taxes from the three adjoining prefectures should be used for one year to finance the project directly, instead of being paid into the treasury. This scheme was also accepted by the emperor, after Aḥmad and other senior officials had stressed its efficiency.

In the spring of 1282 Aḥmad, who apparently enjoyed Qubilai's complete confidence, was promoted to the rank of Left chancellor. This put him on a par with the other Left chancellor Yeh-lü Chu, a son of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (*qq.v.*), who, incidentally, does not seem to have ever interfered with Aḥmad's business in the Secretarial Council. Aḥmad had now reached the highest position, except for that of Right chancellor, to which he could have aspired. But his fall was imminent, not through any particular action of his but because of a plot to assassinate him. Qubilai trusted Aḥmad until the end. The story of how Aḥmad was murdered is one of the most colourful episodes in Yüan history which was promptly made known to the world outside China by Rašīd al-Dīn and Marco Polo.

The plot against Aḥmad did not originate among his political adversaries. It was rather a desperate attempt on the part of some conspirators of low rank to eliminate the all-powerful minister. The leading part seems to have been played by Wang Chu (1254-82). Hailing from I-tu in Shantung, the man is said to have despised material wealth and cared nothing for trifles. He had joined the army and reached the rank of chiliarch (*ch'ien-hu*). During a campaign in the north, he met the 'magician' (*yao*) Buddhist monk Kao who became one of his fellow-conspirators. It is not clear whether Wang Chu was a Buddhist nor is there any indication that he might have been the tool of some high-ranking personage. The sources say only that Wang Chu 'loathed and detested' Aḥmad. No particular reason for this hatred is mentioned anywhere, so that it seems justified to regard the plot as the individual initiative of a person who considered Aḥmad a criminal and wished to destroy him, even at the cost of his own life. The magician monk Kao must have been a shady figure. The *Yüan History* reports that he practised secret arts while attached to a military expedition, but his spells failed and he left the army. He spread the rumour of his death, and, before disappearing, killed one of his followers whose corpse was made to pass for Kao's. In

other words, this monk was a desperado, a fugitive from justice who had become acquainted with Wang Chu during the campaign.

In the spring of 1282 Qubilai had gone to Shang-tu in the company of the heir apparent Jingim, and Aḥmad was left at Ta-tu in charge of government. This gave the conspirators their chance. On 26 April Wang and Kao sent two Tibetan monks to the Secretarial Council. These men were to announce that the heir apparent and the Imperial Preceptor (the chief Lamaist dignitary) were returning to Ta-tu for a religious ceremony that evening. The guard of the palace precincts was then in the care of Kao Hsi (1238-90), who became suspicious and had the two monks arrested. But Wang Chu was not deterred. He sent a forged document purporting to come from Jingim to the director of political affairs and vice-commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs Chang I, ordering him to proceed for further instructions to the prince's residence with the ready troops in his command. Chang I fell for this deception and indeed despatched a captain with a detachment of guards to Jingim's palace. Then Wang Chu went to Aḥmad and told him that the heir apparent was about to arrive: all members of the Secretarial Council should turn out to meet him in front of his palace. In the middle of the night a noise of men and horses was heard and a crowd with torches and lanterns approached the palace gate. This was the gang of conspirators, some eighty to hundred people, one of whom (perhaps the monk Kao) remained on horseback pretending to be the heir apparent while the other accomplices dismounted. The impersonator then ordered the Council members to come forward, whereupon Wang Chu drew a brass club that he held concealed in his sleeve and bludgeoned Aḥmad to death on the spot. The assistant of the Left Hao Chen was also killed, and Chang Hui, the assistant of the Right, was seized. There followed a general confusion. Kao Hsi, whose suspicions were now confirmed, and Chang Chiu-ssu (1242-1302), a protégé of Jingim and minister of Works who happened to be at the palace, gathered a strike force to counter the coup. Arrows were shot indiscriminately and the crowd of conspirators dispersed. Wang Chu did not flee but gave himself up. Two days later the monk Kao was found and arrested. Both were executed on 1 May. Before dying Wang Chu cried out that he had rid the state of a pest. Chang I was executed too because he had moved his forces without proper orders.

Qubilai had been informed of the massacre by Kao Hsi personally while he was staying at Čaqān Nōr. He proceeded to Shang-tu the same day and ordered the vice-commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs Bolod, the chancellor Qorqosun, and others to carry out a thorough investigation of the Wang Chu incident. Until then Qubilai had been unaware of Aḥmad's villainy but when he questioned Bolod he was told what sort of person Aḥmad had been. The emperor flew into a rage and ordered

that Aḥmad's followers be prosecuted. On 10 May 1282 he called a full meeting of the Secretarial Council, the Censorate, the Department of Military Affairs and the Han-lin Academy under Qorqosun's chairmanship. At the same time Qorqosun was promoted Right chancellor. The annals for the following months are full of entries recording details of the prosecution of Aḥmad clan members and other associates. These actions took place in the capitals as well as in the provinces.

On 4 June it was decreed that all those who had offered their wives, daughters or sisters to Aḥmad in order to obtain a post should be dismissed, and that the properties stolen from the people should be returned to their original owners. As a Muslim, Aḥmad seems to have had a considerable harem. Marco Polo actually reports that Aḥmad and his gang used to force beautiful women into their harems by promising offices to their relatives. One such case is recorded in the *Yüan History*. Chang Yung, a Transport commissioner, had given his younger sister to Aḥmad whose favorite she soon became. After Aḥmad's death she became a government slave and served in Sangha's (*q.v.*) household. Sangha too made her his favorite. She must have been clever, or beautiful, or both.

The number of Aḥmad's appointees was determined three days later (7 June). Altogether there were 714 of whom 133 had already been replaced; the remaining 581 were all to be dismissed. An inventory was taken of Aḥmad's property: it included 3,758 horses, camels, oxen, sheep and donkeys. On the same day, an order was made to open Aḥmad's tomb and to feed his corpse to the dogs outside the northern gate of Ta-tu. The private property of Aḥmad's wives, sons and relatives was itemised and his slaves freed. In July 1282 those goods were confiscated; Aḥmad's private residence was given as a present to Qorqosun. In autumn – which was the season for capital punishments according to Chinese tradition – a series of executions took place. The first to die was Aḥmad's third son Ḥasan. He was followed by the fourth son, Hindu, and a nephew, Zayn al-Dīn. Aḥmad's two eldest sons, Ḥusain and Mas'ūd, were executed in Yang-chou on 30 November. Their bodies were pickled as an additional disgrace. A similar aggravation of the death sentence was also applied to Ḥasan, who had been flayed after execution as a warning. A black list containing the names of all members of Aḥmad's faction was compiled and finally, on 12 December, it was decreed that all crimes committed by Aḥmad should be proclaimed in the capitals and provinces throughout the empire.

The establishment's revenge on Aḥmad was not limited to members of his family. His subordinate Keng Jen, the assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council, was also executed together with Hindu and a Muslim official called Ṣadr al-Dīn. This man could be the same Ṣadr al-Dīn who had been sent as an envoy to Japan in 1275. In August 1283 Ts'ai Chung-ying, the father of one of Aḥmad's many wives, was

arrested and asked to make restitution of 200,000 *ting* of paper money which he had borrowed from the government. Later he was accused of embezzlement and executed in 1285. However thorough the elimination of Aḥmad's relatives and followers may have been, not all members of his family were dismissed from office in 1282 and 1283. As late as 1303 a nephew of his, also named Hindu, was a resident commissioner (*daruqači*) of the Nan-chien district in Fukien. He had extorted by threat 50 *ting* of paper money from a man under his jurisdiction and was accused of having caused the man's death. Hindu was sentenced to pay double the amount of the funeral expenses and to be dismissed from his office. His other crimes fell under an amnesty.

The death of Aḥmad and his posthumous disgrace had some far-reaching consequences at the institutional level. Already in his lifetime he had been attacked by court officials for having established many unnecessary offices. This bureaucratic proliferation was brought to an end by a decree of 12 July 1282. Out of 204 government offices only 33 were kept, and all the others abolished. An interesting opinion on what had been wrong in the past and what should be done in the future was expressed in 1283 by the minister of Justice Ts'ui Yü (d. 1298) in a long memorial. He complained that many censors had kept silent during Aḥmad's lifetime, but had joined the chorus of detractors after his death. The same was true of Han-lin academicians who had praised the merits of Aḥmad while he lived. Such people were to be replaced. In punishing Aḥmad's followers, equal sentences should apply for identical crimes, and persons who had lost their offices through Aḥmad's interference should be reinstated. While Aḥmad was in power, the treatment of prisoners must have become harsher, mainly because of men like the vice-minister Wang I who had devised sadistic methods to torture even the innocent. In 1283 the government tried to curb these excesses in the course of the general reforms following Aḥmad's demise.

A strange find among Aḥmad's possessions was made when his property was being listed for confiscation. Two tanned human skins were discovered in a cupboard, but the domestic eunuch in charge of the key did not know what they were for. He only said that when they were placed on an altar and incantations recited, the response was immediate. This enigmatic passage occurs in Aḥmad's biography in the *Yüan History* and the curious rituals that might have been performed in Aḥmad's household remain a matter for speculation. Such proceedings seem foreign to Islam. Furthermore, two silk scrolls were discovered, painted by a person named Ch'en. They represented several rows of horsemen surrounding a tent-hall; the soldiers had their bows drawn and were brandishing their swords as if attacking someone inside. The authorities apparently related the painting to illegal cults because the painter was

executed, as were the eunuch and two soothsayers, Ts'ao Chen-kuei and Wang T'ai-p'an, who had been employed by Aḥmad.

A person like Aḥmad who had held almost unlimited power for so many years cannot fail to have made an impact on the people's mind. It is said that in the year 1264, which was a *chia-tzu* year and thus the beginning of a new sexagenary cycle, a song called 'Western Barbarian Eighteen' (*Hu shih-pa*) was in vogue. This was interpreted by numerologists as meaning that the Western Barbarian Aḥmad would remain in power for eighteen years and no more. Nobody believed it in 1264 but the prediction of Aḥmad's fall proved correct eighteen years later, in 1282. This is evidently one of the many instances of a *vaticinium post eventum* to be found in Chinese popular lore; nevertheless, it shows that the imagination of the literati who dabbled in such prognostications was powerfully aroused by Aḥmad's personality.

The account of Aḥmad given by Rašīd al-Dīn does not completely tally with the information found in the Chinese sources, but the general outline of the plot culminating in Aḥmad's assassination is more or less the same, with the exception of the names of some of the protagonists. The enmity between the heir apparent Ĵingim and Aḥmad is also mentioned by Rašīd al-Dīn who mentions that Ĵingim once struck Aḥmad in the face. The plot against Aḥmad is described in Rašīd al-Dīn as having originated among the 'Khitayans,' that is the Chinese, and Aḥmad's killer is said to have been Gau Finĵan, a 'vizier' of Qubilai. 'Finĵan' is a rendering of the Chinese *p'ing-chang* ('director of political affairs'), but no such person served with Aḥmad in either of the Councils. This must be a confusion with the magician monk Kao who, according to the Chinese sources, was a co-conspirator of Wang Chu. On the other hand the *p'ing-chang* Chang I was implicated in the murder of Aḥmad as we have seen above. According to Rašīd it was also Gau Finĵan who impersonated the heir apparent the night of the plot and who slew Aḥmad. Qubilai's change of mind which resulted in Aḥmad's posthumous disgrace was occasioned, according to the Persian historiographer, by the following incident. Two merchants had given Aḥmad a precious stone and had asked him to hand it over to the emperor. After Aḥmad's death this stone was discovered among the possessions of Aḥmad's wife Inĵü Qatun (whose name also occurs in Chinese sources as Yin-chu). This angered Qubilai so much that he ordered Aḥmad's body to be exhumed and hanged in the market-place, before being cut down for its head to be crushed under chariot wheels. Inĵü was put to death; Aḥmad's other forty wives and 400 concubines were given away to others, and his personal property confiscated.

Marco Polo gives an equally colourful account of Aḥmad's assassination in his chapter on the 'Wicked tyranny of Acmat the Bailo'. In this text the plot is described as a widespread rebellion of the Chinese contrived by Ĵingim. Contrary to what we

read in Rašid al-Dīn, Marco Polo regards the 'Saracen' Aḥmad from the beginning as a villain who deserved his fate. He explains why Wang Chu hated Aḥmad so much: Wang's mother, wife and daughter are said to have been taken forcefully by Aḥmad. This can hardly be true as far as the daughter is concerned because Wang Chu was only twenty-eight years old in 1282. In any case the broad outline of the plot given in Marco Polo's book is not much different from the accounts in Rašid's work and the Chinese sources. Marco Polo also reports that Aḥmad was afraid of Jingim. According to Marco the rebellion was directed not only against Aḥmad personally, but against all Saracens, Tartars (i.e. Mongols) and Christians; in other words, Marco Polo describes the plot as an insurrection of the Chinese against the foreigners. He adds that after Aḥmad's death Qubilai forbade ritual slaughter of animals as practiced by Muslims and Jews, and ordered all Muslims to follow the Tartar matrimonial laws. Rašid al-Dīn also records this anti-Islamic edict and dates it to the time when Sangha had succeeded Aḥmad as 'vizier.' The prohibition of ritual slaughter (arab. *dakāt*) is also attested by Chinese sources, but it cannot have followed Aḥmad's fall since the edict had already been promulgated in January 1280 when Aḥmad was still in power. In any event it can be said with some certainty that Aḥmad's rule may have increased anti-Muslim feelings among the Chinese and even the Mongols.

It is difficult to characterize Aḥmad's personality and his activities. The Chinese sources are without exception biased against him. Things might perhaps have developed differently if he had died peacefully in his bed around 1280. But even so some passages in the *Yüan History* concede that he was versatile, clever, skilled in debating and gifted with a keen feeling for practical matters. Marco Polo describes him as clever and energetic. Aḥmad was able to provide the government with the financial resources needed for the many costly campaigns ordered by Qubilai. At the same time he was successful in supplying the wherewithal to keep up the splendour of the imperial court which so impressed the Venetian. That all this was achieved at the cost of exploiting the people – above all the Chinese – is another matter.

As a politician Aḥmad had tried with singular purposefulness over many years to concentrate power in his own hands. He tried constantly to weaken the Secretarial Council by increasing the prerogatives of the Presidential Council. Most judicial and all financial matters became vested in the Presidential Council and, after the merger of the two councils, actual power remained with the latter. In this he was opposed not only by many Chinese officials, but also by pro-Chinese Mongols such as An-t'ung and the crown prince Jingim.

The strongest opposition to his rule was always voiced by those Chinese advisers who were protégés of An-t'ung and Jingim. An additional factor which alienated Aḥmad from this group of Chinese intellectuals was that he relied heavily on Muslims

and favoured them in financial affairs. It would be wrong, however, to say that Aḥmad was anti-Chinese. He promoted many Chinese officials and even within the Presidential Council they were a majority among the leading officials. It is not impossible however that many Buddhists may have harboured hostile feelings towards Aḥmad. Be that as it may, it seems justified to say that the period of Muslim power under Qubilai came to an end with Aḥmad's death. Buddhist and Lamaist influences prevailed thereafter, personified by Sangha. It should finally be observed that Aḥmad's monopolizing of government functions cannot be seen solely as the mark of a power-hungry upstart. Aḥmad's whole career shows that his ideas of government were those of a politician brought up in the neareastern tradition of statecraft, where an omnipotent vizier served an equally omnipotent ruler or despot. Chinese government with its carefully balanced and departmentalized institutions remained basically alien to a man like Aḥmad: he belonged to a type of politician that differed radically from those Chinese advisers of Qubilai who had opposed him throughout his career. In spite of all his intelligence Aḥmad had not been able to adapt to Chinese ways of government. In politics as in religion he remained an outsider.

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H. Franke

33. SANGHA (? - 1291)

Sangha was a leading court official and minister towards the end of Qubilai's reign and, like the ill-fated Aḥmad (*q.v.*), for some time the almost omnipotent manager of Yüan China's finances. He also shares with Aḥmad the unflattering distinction of having been included by the compilers of the *Yüan History* among the 'treacherous officials.' His biography in the *History* is, therefore, full of bias against him and particularly uninformative about his origin and early career. His name is transcribed differently in Chinese sources. The *Yüan History* has Sang-ko¹; other Chinese variants are Sang-ko² and Hsiang-ko. The form Seng-ko which has been adopted in some later editions of Yüan works is to be rejected because it goes back to the unfortunate spelling 'reform' of the Ch'ien-lung period. Tibetan sources spell the name as Sam-gha, Zam-gha or Zam-k'a; the history of Rašīd al-Dīn has S'nk'h. All these versions point to an original Sanga or Sangha, which must be seen as a rendering of Sanskrit *saṃgha* 'religious community.' This word occurs mostly as part of Buddhist personal names, but it is occasionally used alone as a name. The Chinese sources do not mention Sangha's nationality or place of origin.

Rašīd al-Dīn's history says that he was an Uighur. Tibetan sources, however, make it reasonably clear that he came from the Tibetan tribe bKa'-ma-log which had settled in the northwestern borderlands of China proper as early as the 7th century under the T'ang. Sangha therefore might have descended from a partly Uighurized family, and this would explain why Rašīd al-Dīn calls him an Uighur.

The *Yüan History* reports that Sangha was in his early years a pupil of the Buddhist Tibetan cleric Dam-pa Kun-dga'-grags (Tan-pa, 1230-1303), an imperial preceptor under Qubilai and his successor, but Sangha was to repudiate him after rising to power and never mentioned his former master. Tibetan sources, however, give a different picture: Sangha had a good command of many languages such as Chinese, Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian – a fact which is corroborated by the *Yüan History*. He became first an interpreter and later a member of the political retinue of the 'P'ags-pa Lama (*q.v.*). In subsequent years he served the Lama as a parasol-bearer (Mo. *sügürči*), that is, as a sort of chamberlain. It seems to be a safe assumption that Sangha became known at Qubilai's court shortly after the visit of 'P'ags-pa Lama to China in 1268. Apparently the emperor was impressed by Sangha's linguistic abilities and therefore attached him to the Yüan government. It is not clear whether Sangha held an ecclesiastic rank or had taken monastic vows, although it is certain that he had been consecrated by Dam-pa. But such initiations could also be conferred on laymen, and many Mongols, including Qubilai himself, were initiated according to Lamaist

rites. However that may be, it was through Buddhist channels that Sangha first became an official in China where he was to achieve a meteoric career.

Not much is known about the early years of Sangha's stay in China. One Chinese author describes the lavish Buddhist rituals performed each year on the eighth day of the second month, which was traditionally regarded as the birthday of the Buddha. These rituals took place on the outskirts of Peking near the Buddhist temple of Kao-liang ssu on the Kao-liang River. It is said that the extravagance and luxury of these public festivities increased greatly after Sangha had gained the emperor's favour. No date is given for the beginning of Sangha's career. The earliest mention of his activities at the Mongol court seems to be in 1280, when an expedition into Tibet was planned to explore the sources of the Yellow River. Sangha had been sent there at the time to quell a rebellion started by Kun-dga'-bzañ-po.

The first influential office held by Sangha was that of commissioner of the Department of Buddhist Affairs. This office was not only responsible for the Buddhist clergy but also for Tibetan affairs, both military and civilian. In 1288, following a request from Sangha, it was reorganised and renamed the Department of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs (see below). We do not know how long he remained head of this office because none of the extant sources gives a date for his appointment. We do know for certain, however, what offices were held by Sangha in 1284 because a document, the date of which corresponds to the 21 March of that year, mentions him as commissioner of the Department of Buddhist Affairs and, concurrently, director of the Bureau for Religious Merits; at that time he also held the honorific title of Great Officer Endowed with Virtue. Sangha's activity in Tibet, as recorded for 1280, must certainly have been related to his duties as commissioner of Buddhist Affairs. The Bureau for Religious Merits was a government agency responsible for the supervision of the Buddhist clergy within China, similar to the Department of Buddhist Affairs whose jurisdiction concerned Tibet. Sangha's power base at the court was therefore the Buddhist bureaucracy until 1287, when he was appointed director of political affairs in the Presidential Council, a purely political position. But Sangha seems already to have taken a strong interest in fiscal management before that, which must have endeared him to the emperor whose dependence on financial experts grew ever greater as government expenses continued to soar. It appears that Sangha frequently tried to influence appointments, chiefly in the judicial and censorial branch of the metropolitan bureaucracy. The appointment of Lu Shih-yung (d.1285) as assistant of the Right in the Secretarial Council in 1284 was also due to Sangha's recommendation. Sangha had praised Lu's gift for financial affairs pointing out that Lu would be able to rationalise the paper money system and increase tax revenues.

Sangha showed a business-like turn of mind even in relatively minor matters. An episode occurring in 1281 or 1282 may be typical of his preoccupation with profit. He managed to persuade the grand preceptor Qorqosun that trade in oil from the government reserve could be profitable if it were managed, not by Chinese but by a Buddhist monastery, in the form of an interest-bearing loan. This proposition was implemented and Qorqosun was pleasantly surprised to receive from Sangha the promised commission. Shortly thereafter Sangha was given an opportunity to discuss the problems of 'harmonious purchase' (*ho-mai*) and 'harmonious hiring' (*ho-ku*) in the presence of the emperor. Those were schemes to have grain and labor, respectively, supplied by contract for government uses. The emperor was impressed and began to consider employing Sangha in more important functions.

In the *Annals (pen-chi)* of the *Yüan History* Sangha is mentioned for the first time in 1282, in connection with a ship-building project in the P'ing-luan prefecture (Hopei). This initiative may have been intended to replace the losses incurred the previous year during the disastrous second expedition against Japan. Nine thousand soldiers and civilians were mobilised, and trees had to be felled in the mountains. Even the forests around Buddhist and Taoist monasteries were not to be exempted, although those communities received compensation for their trees. Sangha was ordered to provide supervisors to oversee the lumbermen's work, perhaps because he was the official responsible for government control over the Buddhist monks.

In the same year Dam-pa, Sangha's former teacher, asked for permission to return to his native Tibet. It is said in one of his biographies that Dam-pa feared lest Sangha use his rising influence to ruin him because of the growing alienation between himself and his erstwhile pupil. Later, when Sangha was at the peak of his power (1289), he ordered Dam-pa to come back and to take up residence in a temple in the capital. Dam-pa obeyed the summons, but instead of being lodged in the capital, he was sent to Ch'ao prefecture in modern Kwangtung province, a distant locality considered unhealthy and for Dam-pa nothing more than a place of banishment. Only after Sangha's fall could Dam-pa return to the capital where he remained attached to the imperial court until his death. All this shows that Dam-pa must have been a person of some influence in the Buddhist community; his persecution by Sangha would make no sense otherwise.

A major reorganisation of the Secretarial Council took place in 1284. The Right chancellor Qorqosun and other leading officials of the Council were dismissed; Qorqosun was succeeded by An-t'ung (*q.v.*) of the Jalair tribe, who had opposed Aḥmad some years before and had therefore been temporarily distanced from the court. Lu Shih-yung who had been Tea Monopoly commissioner in Chiang-hsi, became assistant of the Right in the Council. Sangha may have been partly

responsible for the new appointments, and not only for that of Lu Shih-yung whom he had recommended on an earlier occasion.

Another one of Sangha's activities recorded for 1284 concerned the religious situation in the empire. Sangha was ordered by decree to have the Han-lin Academy compose the text for a stele commemorating the burning of the Taoist apocryphal scriptures. The proscription of religious Taoist books had of course been a victory for the Buddhist party at court and Sangha, as head of the government agencies dealing with Buddhism, certainly was on the winning side, although he had not taken part personally in the preceding controversies. Indeed most of Sangha's recorded dealings for the years 1284 to 1287 concern Buddhist affairs.

Sangha's name is linked also with the desecration of the Sung imperial mausoleums in Shao-hsing (Chekiang). One of Sangha's protégés was Yang Lien-chen-chia, a Buddhist monk of Tangut or Tibetan origin whose personal name renders perhaps the Tibetan Rin-chen-skyabs. Yang's career had begun before Sangha reached high government posts. The monk was appointed in 1277 as supervisor of the Buddhist Religion in the newly conquered territories of southern China shortly after the former Sung seat in Hang-chou had been occupied by Mongol armies (1276). In this capacity he concentrated on restoring to Buddhism the buildings and sites of former Buddhist temples which had been appropriated by the Taoists, or converted to other uses, such as the state cult and mausoleums for Sung emperors. Between 1285 and 1287 Yang recovered over thirty Buddhist temples. Gold and silver taken from the Sung imperial tombs was spent on redecorating Buddhist temples, and the former Altar of Heaven of the Sung in Hang-chou was converted into a Buddhist place of worship. Many buildings in the precincts of the imperial mausoleums near Shao-hsing too were returned to their original function as Buddhist temples. But Yang was not content to restore the Buddhist temples. In 1286 he obtained a decree transferring to his office all lands and fields formerly belonging to Buddhist monasteries, the income from which was to serve in future for the upkeep and repair of Buddhist temples. Of the former Sung palaces, Yang reported in 1288 that one had been turned into a stūpa and five into temples. All this aroused fierce anti-Mongol and Sung-loyalist feelings in the south; in particular, the desecration of the Sung tombs and the revolting treatment of the deceased emperors' remains were widely resented. Furthermore, Yang must also have enriched himself and his followers, including one of his sons named An-p'u, in the course of his activities as supervisor of the Buddhist Religion. Only after Sangha's fall in 1291 did the full extent of Yang's depredations come to light (see below). Sangha himself must have inspired the order which Yang received in 1286 to send some Sung imperial clan-members and relatives of Sung

empresses to the Mongol court as hostages. This was clearly a political move, aimed at eliminating a potential hotbed of loyalist sentiment.

Sangha's first action to betray his political ambitions was an attempt to eliminate officials of the Secretarial Council whom he considered unfit. In the seventh month of 1286, he submitted to the emperor a list of functionaries whose replacement he recommended. This was obviously outside the jurisdiction of his own office, or not of direct relevance to it. His initiative was shelved at first, but not for long. An opportunity arose for Sangha to present himself as an expert financial administrator when the introduction of a new kind of paper money, the *Chih-yüan pao-ch'ao* ('Precious Paper Money of the Chih-yüan Period') was mooted. The debate took place on 19 March 1287. Present were Majd al-Dīn and Temür. Majd al-Dīn had been an assistant of the Right in the Secretarial Council since 1282 after Aḥmad's death. Other participants were Yang Chü-k'uan (1233-87), associate director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council since 1286, and the Uighur Han-lin scholar Arḡun Salī (1245-1307). Three former Sung officials who had been invited to become advisers to Qubilai also attended the meeting. These were Ch'eng Chü-fu (1249-1318), Yeh Li (1244-94) and Chao Meng-fu (1254-1322) whose fame in Chinese history is due to his achievements as a painter and calligrapher more than to his political career. Majd al-Dīn declared himself in favour of restoring the Presidential Council because this would facilitate fiscal management as it allegedly had in the past. The meeting resulted in a decree to establish the Presidential Council in addition to the Secretarial Council, and to subordinate the existing regional offices of the Secretarial Council to the Presidential Council. Sangha and Temür were made directors of political affairs in the Presidential Council; Yeh Li was appointed assistant of the Left. Ma Shao (1239-1300), who was at that time minister of Justice, became associate director of political affairs.

As a consequence of this reorganisation, Sangha had reached a position of executive power of the highest importance, extending also to the provinces. Even more power was given to the Presidential Council by subordinating to it the Six Ministries which had been heretofore under the jurisdiction of the Secretarial Council. The immediate reason, or rather pretext, for this far-reaching reorganisation of the highest political agencies was apparently an order commanding Sangha to carry out a revision of the financial management of the Secretarial Council. During this action a discrepancy of several thousands *ting* of paper money had been discovered in the Secretarial Council's accounts, and Sangha used the fact to blackmail the leading officials into admitting their guilt. The new regulations on the issue of paper money were introduced shortly afterwards (17 April 1287). The Chih-yüan money was printed in denominations ranging from 5 *wen* (cash) to 2 *kuan* (strings), and

circulated concurrently with the paper money of the Chung-t'ung period (see the biography of Aḥmad). The rate of exchange was fixed at one to five, which amounted to an 80% devaluation of the Chung-t'ung currency. The new currency remained in circulation for a very long time, through repeated reforms.

From 1287 to his fall in 1291, Sangha enjoyed the favour of the emperor. The sources provide only a partial picture of his activities during this period, involving mostly struggles against opposing officials, chiefly those in the Censorate, and the ruthless elimination of critics. Other episodes illustrate his vanity and greed. But from 1288 to 1291 Sangha does not seem to have produced any innovative legislation comparable to the currency reform of 1287. He appears to have been mainly concerned in exercising a rigid control of financial management throughout the empire and in prosecuting officials suspected of irregularities.

The first victims of Sangha were two high-ranking Chinese officials of the Secretarial Council, Yang Chü-k'uan and Kuo Yu. Yang, a man from Tung-ch'ang in Shantung, had started his career in the Secretarial Council as a clerk; he became vice-minister of Personnel in 1276. He was prefect of Hang-chou for some time and, in 1286, became associate director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council. Kuo had been a vice-censor and in this capacity had impeached the notorious Lu Shih-yung. He eventually became associate director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council and, together with Majd al-Dīn, was ordered in 1286 to supervise the collection of taxes. Both Yang and Kao were held responsible for a shortfall in revenue discovered soon after; they were beaten, tried, and finally executed in the tenth month of 1287. Buqumu (1255-1300), a Qangli nobleman who was minister of Justice at the time, attempted in vain to protect Yang and Kuo. His intercession in their favour won him of course the deep hatred of Sangha who repeatedly plotted against him and also bribed a Western merchant to accuse Buqumu of mishandling a law-suit. Tired of Sangha's persecutions, Buqumu eventually resigned his office on grounds of ill-health to become an academician for the transmission of directives, a position in which he believed to be less exposed to court intrigues. The sentence against Yang Chü-k'uan included also the enslavement of members of his family. His wife née Ma, who came from a commoner family in Hang-chou, was given as an imperial present to an officer in the guards but she feigned illness and threatened to commit suicide rather than let a new husband approach her. She was then redeemed from slavery through the influence of her dead husband's family, but she stayed near his tomb, cut her hair and took an oath never to remarry. She was rehabilitated after Sangha's fall and rejoined her parents.

Another victim of Sangha was Wang Liang-pi, a clerk in the censorate. Wang had discussed with others the reorganisation of the two Councils, and had deplored

that the Secretarial Council had been reduced to a powerless position and that the Presidential Council was rife with corruption. He had predicted, moreover, that in time the censors would become aware of Sangha's misdeeds, which must result in Sangha's execution. When Sangha was informed of this, he instructed the grand judge of the Secretarial Council to arrest and try Wang, insisting that he be put to death as a warning. Wang was duly executed and his family enslaved. The same fate was suffered by Wu Te, a former resident commissioner (*daruqači*) in Chiang-ning county (Kiangsu). He too had voiced in conversations the opinion that one day the Secretarial Council might once more become more powerful than the Presidential Council and that Sangha might not survive such a reversal.

Among the administrative events in connection with which reference is made to Sangha, the restoration of the Bureau of Maritime Trade in the summer of 1287 deserves a special mention. This office was placed under the supervision of a newly installed regional Bureau of Foreign Trade and Ortaq Administration in Ch'üan-chou (Fukien). Two Muslim officials, Šihāb al-Dīn and 'Umar, were appointed to the new bureau. The *ortaq* administration dealt with the affairs of *ortaq* merchants, who received government funds as interest-bearing loans to encourage their business. Sangha must therefore be regarded as a protector of the *ortaq* system, and his decision, in 1281 or 1282, to issue government oil on loan (see above) can be seen in this context. The reorganisation of the maritime trade agencies had also some impact on the government-sponsored maritime navigation program whereby the grain surplus from the south was shipped to the north by sea. This program had started in 1282 and was carried out with the help of rich Chinese ship-owners, prominent among whom were Chang Hsüan and Chu Ch'ing, both former pirates. These two were temporarily eclipsed, however, as a result of Šihāb al-Dīn's appointment, but were to regain their influence after Sangha's death, when the regional *ortaq* administration was abolished. The appointment of Šihāb al-Dīn and 'Umar had been recommended by Sangha, bypassing the chancellor An-t'ung.

At the local level, Sangha undertook a reform which – at least according to modern notions of administrative efficiency – must be regarded as useful. No direct contact existed originally between the regional censorates and the regional (branch) offices of the Secretarial Council. All judicial matters submitted by the regional censors were first sent to the metropolitan censorate. They went from there to the Secretarial Council, which in turn informed the emperor. Sangha considered this to be unwieldy and proposed that the Regional Censorate and the Regional Council should communicate directly. A similar procedure was suggested for the Judicial Bureaux. Sangha adduced as an additional argument for these reforms an order

emanating from Činggis Qan who had allegedly ruled that all local officials should know and control each other.

The situation in the southern provinces was a matter of permanent concern for Sangha and other officials in the capital. Towards the end of 1287, Üs Temür, who was chief censor at that time, pointed out that, whereas Chiang-nan, the territory of the former Sung state, had been annexed ten years earlier, it was still plagued with unrest and brigandage. Yeh Li (see above) shared Sangha's view of the situation, adding that he had lived for ten years in Chang-chou in Fu-kien and had therefore had a good opportunity to observe what was going on. Yeh Li said that many military governors were rapacious and acted in collusion with local 'bandits'; to remedy this, all garrisons and their commanders should be rotated every three years. This suggestion was implemented by the emperor, as was Sangha's proposal that a deadline be set for the arrest of law-breakers and that local officials unable to act accordingly be dismissed. The disciplining of local officials was one of Sangha's main preoccupations. He also called for the punishment of clerks and officials in the counties, prefectures and other local government agencies, including the Pacification Bureaux, who were found negligent in their duties. Special envoys were to be sent out to the provinces to reprimand and inflict beatings on those found guilty. Sangha was clever enough, however, to point out in such a case that two local pacification commissioners charged with neglect of duty happened to be descendants of old trusted servants of the emperor; final judgment in the matter was therefore left to Qubilai. The emperor ordered the two men dismissed without further punishment.

Some minor activities of Sangha are recorded for 1287. He presented a memorial in which he pointed out that government-controlled artisans applying for food rations had families the size of which varied greatly, ranging from two or three to twenty members. Sangha proposed that families should continue to draw rations according to their size – but that the latter would be deemed never to exceed a maximum of four persons. On two occasions, Sangha took action affecting the status and household administration of imperial princes. He denounced Ananda, the son of Manggala (Qubilai's grandson), for having succeeded his father in 1280 in two separate fiefs concurrently, as both Prince of Ch'in and Prince of An-hsi. Now, Ananda and his younger brother Altan Buqa were sharing these titles and prerogatives among themselves, Ananda having assumed the title of Prince of An-hsi and Altan Buqa that of Prince of Ch'in. Sangha regarded this practice as improper and memorialised the emperor to this effect. Qubilai then decreed that Ananda should inherit the position of Prince of An-hsi with the household administration pertaining to it, whereas Altan Buqa was to renounce the title, seal and administrative prerogatives of Prince of Ch'in. The interest taken by Sangha in this matter can be easily explained because

Manggala's fief endowment included the overlordship of Tibet, the Tangut lands (Hohsi), and Ssu-ch'uan. Some weeks before, Sangha had already interceded on behalf of Qubilai's fourth son Nomuqan who, he said, had not yet been granted an official seal for his household administration. Sangha also complained that the imperial prince Šingnaqar, a descendant of Činggis Qan's younger brother Qači'un, should use a seal inscribed 'Precious seal of the imperial nephew from exalted ancestry.' Sangha considered this a breach of etiquette and requested that, as for other princely fiefholders, a geographical designation be adopted – in the present case, Prince of Chinan. Qubilai accepted these proposals. It is noteworthy that, very soon afterwards, Šingnaqar joined the rebellion of Prince Nayan.

While Sangha sought to control the local officials by intimidation, he was no less forceful in the capital. It must perhaps be seen in this context that he applied to return the Secretarial Council back to the palace precinct from which Aḥmad had had it transferred to an outside building. This entailed of course closer supervision by the emperor and his personal entourage. Discipline within the Council was harsh. Sangha had the officials of all ministries beaten for arriving at a meeting after the starting bell had sounded. Chao Meng-fu himself was once late and the court judge was about to have him beaten. Chao appealed to the assistant of the Right Yeh Li, arguing that in old times high officials were not subjected to corporal punishments, and observing that the public humiliation of a dignitary amounted to a humiliation of the court itself. Sangha intervened, calmed Chao and sent him out of the room. As a result of this incident, only lower officials from the scribes downward were beaten thereafter. Interestingly, Sangha appears here as a protector of Chao Meng-fu, as he does also in the following episode. One day Chao was riding along a wall outside the eastern confines of the palace. The road was narrow, his horse stumbled and Chao fell into the river. Sangha was informed and reported the incident to the emperor who ordered that the wall be moved two *chang* (ca. 6m) to the west to widen the road. Sangha may have practiced a stick-and-carrot policy in dealing with other officials, including the Chinese. In 1287 he requested that an imperial gift be presented to Yeh Li, Ma Shao, Kao Chu, and Buqumu. Yeh was granted 150 *ting* of paper money, a considerable sum, and the others 100 *ting* each. It was certainly a clever move on Sangha's part to include his enemy Buqumu among the beneficiaries of the gift. The fourth person mentioned, Kao Chu, later became associate director of political affairs in 1291. He must have been a junior official in 1287.

Towards the end of 1287, Sangha was promoted once more. Qubilai had asked the Han-lin scholars whether the Presidential Council had had a chancellor as its head under the Han and T'ang. On learning that it did, Yeh Li informed the emperor accordingly and suggested that the director of political affairs, Sangha, be made Right

chancellor of the Presidential Council, in addition to his other functions as head of the Department of Buddhist Affairs and of the Bureau for Religious Merits. This promotion was decreed on 11 December 1287 with other new appointments. Sangha's previous post was given to Temür; Arğun Salı became assistant of the Right, Yeh Li was promoted to assistant of the Left and Ma Shao to associate director of political affairs. Furthermore, Sangha was granted the rank of Gold and Purple Great Officer of Eminent Dignity, a very high civil distinction carrying the rank 1a. The collusion between Yeh Li, the former Sung official, and Sangha which appears in this instance is confirmed by other reports. Sangha's commanding personality must have impressed Yeh Li – whose political fortunes were even to survive the purge of Sangha's faction in 1291, no mean achievement in the circumstances.

For 1288 the records show a great number of fiscal activities involving Sangha, together with the customary allegations of his having persecuted officials whom he considered inadequate. This happened for example to the associate director of political affairs of the Regional Presidential Council of Kan-su and to the director of political affairs in Chiang-si. Both were Mongols and both were dismissed for alleged neglect of duty. Moreover, the minister of War Qududar was impeached because of incompetence; Sangha had him beaten and dismissed without even informing the emperor. But Qubilai did not object and expressly approved Sangha's action on learning of it. A case involving the sale of office is also reported for 1288. A commoner called Ts'ao Meng-yen in Sung-chiang (Kiangsu) had offered to give the government 10,000 *shih* of rice every year in return for being exempted from corvée duties and given an official position. Sangha agreed and nominated Ts'ao for the post of deputy pacification commissioner for the district of Che-tung. Among the claims of unjustified persecutions, one notes the case of Oros (1258-1313), who was administrator of the household of the Prince of Yün-nan (at that time Esen Temür, a son of Qubilai's fifth son Hügeči). For some unknown reason, Oros incurred the anger of Sangha who calumniated him and had his house confiscated. When the inventory was being taken, one belt of jade and gold and 50 *liang* of gold, both imperial presents, were discovered. Sangha attempted to make out a charge of illegal possession of government property, but failed for Qubilai directed him to let the matter rest.

In the fourth month of 1288 Sangha reported to the throne that many instances of theft and embezzlement had occurred in the Office for Harmonious Purchase in Ying-ch'ang (Inner Mongolia), requesting that a judicial investigation be undertaken. He informed the emperor at the same time that the officers of the imperial retinue owned large expanses of cultivated land on which they were not taxed. He proposed to tax them according to the rules for military postal stations: owners of more than four

ch'ing of land should pay land tax according to the size of the property. Qubilai approved all those suggestions. Some time later, in the fifth month, Sangha submitted that the Chung-t'ung paper money had been in circulation for over thirty years, but that none of the Council officials knew how much of it remained in use. He requested leave to conduct a survey of all districts with a view to assessing the amounts of Chung-t'ung money kept in all offices. This also was approved by the emperor.

Sangha's fine sense of economy was displayed in very minor matters too. He reported that over 70,000 tablets and sashes were rotting away in the Imperial Treasury : they should be taken apart and put to some productive use. Another case concerned imperial presents to Prince Čubai, a great-grandson of Ča'āдай. The presents consisted of 25,000 *liang* of silver and 10,000 bolts of textiles. Those gifts were transported by government-owned donkey train, but, when the caravan arrived at Čubai's residence, he kept the animals, regarding them as part of the present. Sangha remarked that it would have been much better if the donkeys had been used to transport jade back to court rather than being left with Čubai. Such acute concern for potential gains ingratiated Sangha with Qubilai. Čubai's fief was located in the far north-west, in western Kansu province – a jade producing region, which explains Sangha's proposed use of the government donkeys.

Among the cases of high functionaries being dismissed for failing to exercise proper supervision over the affairs of their office, that of Kerait is worthy of mention. In his capacity as overseer of the Grain Transport Bureau, Kerait had never inspected the granaries located by the inland waterways. Much grain had consequently been stolen, spoiled or embezzled. Sangha had the negligent official dismissed and replaced by the vice-minister of War Tāčar. The transport of grain to the north, especially to the two capital territories, was naturally of paramount importance, which explains Sangha's concern in this instance. Sangha endeavoured to improve the taxation and grain transport systems in several ways, such as tightening control over the local offices and granaries, upgrading inland waterways, and increasing the tonnage shipped by sea. Financial control and constant auditing of local offices became a permanent activity for Sangha and the Presidential Council. In the ninth month of 1288, he obtained a decree establishing an Inquiry Bureau for the sole purpose of recovering unpaid taxes. The associate director of political affairs of the Kan-su Regional Council Türe Yangqa was made commissioner with a Chinese, Wu Ch'eng, as his deputy. The *Yüan History* adds that the financial controls and the efforts to recover tax monies from culpable officials were very strict, and that many lost their private property because they could not satisfy the commissioner's scrutinies. It even happened that no replacements could be found for the dismissed officials; indeed people preferred to leave their homes rather than accept an

appointment in the granaries and treasury offices. One month later (3 November 1288), Sangha implemented a control mechanism that was more thorough still. Complaining once again that theft and embezzlement were rife in all provinces, he suggested that two plenipotentiary officials should effect a general audit in each of six regions, Chiang-Huai, Chiang-hsi, Fu-chien, Ssu-ch'uan, Kan-su and An-hsi. To carry out their duties, these commissioners should be given a special seal and a retinue of soldiers. The names of the twelve officials are known; they must all be regarded as protégés of Sangha. They were recruited mostly from the metropolitan offices and included the minister of Finance Wang Chü-chi, the associate director of political affairs Hindu, the minister of Justice An Yu, as well as several judges and censors. No ethnic or religious preferences can be detected in their selection: of the twelve, six were Chinese, whereas the names of the others are Muslim, Mongol or Turkic.

Sangha's attempt to improve grain transport on inland waterways occurred in early winter 1288. In his memorial on the subject, he had noted that the section of the canal between An-shan and Lin-ch'ing in Shantung, measuring 265 *li* (i.e. over 130 km), was badly silted. It would take 3 million labor units costing 30,000 *ting* of paper money, in addition to 40,000 *shih* of rice and 50,000 of salt, to reopen it for barge traffic. Sangha proposed to impose the status of commoners on the 13,000 families employed in land transport, thus making them liable to the payment of taxes. Their taxes were expected to yield 28,000 *ting* plus fodder and grain – enough to cover the intended expenditure. Supplies of grain should be prepared during winter for the dredging of the canal to begin without delay the following spring. All this was approved by the emperor. Meanwhile Sangha tried to increase the transport of grain by sea. He prescribed that yearly shipments out of Chiang-nan should reach 1 million *shih*. It seems that this was achieved in 1289-1290 when 935,000 *shih* were shipped, of which 919,943 *shih* reached Ta-tu. A great leap forward occurred the year after that: shipments totalled 1,595,000 *shih* of which 1,513,856 *shih* were received in the capital.

Sangha sought not only to increase the revenues of the state: he strove also to check its expenditures. He once told the emperor that many officials only pretended to be poor in their requests for imperial presents, adding that money did not fall from the sky or grow out of the earth – but had to be taken from the people. Reckless spending would therefore ruin the state. Qubilai agreed and ordered that Sangha should in future review all requests for presents and submit for the emperor's decision only those which he considered worthy of favourable attention. Nevertheless, we know of cases where Sangha was very much in favour of granting presents. The pacification commissioner for dBus-gtsang in Central Tibet, Juan-nu-wang-chu, had

once succoured famine-stricken families of the postal stations with grain. Sangha applied on his behalf for a gift, as a result of which this Tibetan governor received an imperial present of 2,500 *liang* of silver.

In 1288 Sangha proposed structural changes in the administration on several occasions. In the spring he applied to issue detailed instructions for the proceedings of the censorial inspectors : an edict of 5 March 1288 proclaimed the revised guidelines. The most important event took place the following winter. The Department of Buddhist Affairs had control of the pacification commissioners in Tibet, dealing with the military, civil and financial aspects of Tibetan affairs. It seemed desirable therefore to raise the status of this office. Sangha applied to change its name to Department of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs and to allow it a silver seal. When Qubilai asked who should become the head of the reorganised office, Sangha answered, 'Myself and Toyin.' Sangha was in fact appointed director of the new department, while retaining his current office with the Bureau for Religious Merits. He received also the highest civil honorific title of Commander Unequalled in Honour (17 December 1288). At the same time he was elevated to the rank of Right chancellor in the Presidential Council. Sangha's answer to Qubilai, when asked who should become head of the reorganised Department of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs, is not altogether clear to us. The word *toyin* means 'monk' in Uighur and Mongolian so that the answer could mean 'myself and the monk,' that is, the head Lama. But it concerned more probably Toyin Sevinč, an Uighur who had already been chief commissioner of the Bureau for Religious Merits in 1281.

In the spring of 1288, orders were issued for the construction of an office building to house the Presidential Council (8 April 1288). The labour force appointed for that purpose comprised 1200 Chinese soldiers of the Imperial Guard, 400 soldiers from the newly recruited armies (that is, former Sung servicemen enrolled by the Mongols) and 400 men from military colonies. Most of the former Sung troops were stationed in southern Manchuria (Liao-yang region) and received orders to proceed to the capital. The building was completed on 7 September 1288.

Sangha's fame had reached its peak in 1288; so had his political career. It comes as no surprise that many persons tried to attach their fortunes to his and that he became the object of much sycophancy. A commoner from Ta-tu by the name of Shih Chi applied to the court for permission to erect a stele with an inscription praising Sangha's achievements. When the emperor was informed of this request he said that people were free to do so; the gesture would certainly please Sangha. Thereupon the Chinese scholar Yen Fu, noted Han-lin academician, was invited to compose an appropriate text. The stele was completed one year later and set up in

front of the Presidential Council. Yen Fu's readiness to eulogise Sangha was to cost him his post as surveillance commissioner three years later.

As in previous years, increasing the State's revenue remained Sangha's main concern in 1289. In the autumn of that year, he submitted a long memorial to the emperor expressing concern over rising expenditures. Although tight financial control over taxation offices throughout the empire had reduced theft and embezzlement, he claimed that there still was a deficit of over one million *ting*. To make good this shortfall, he proposed to raise the charge for one salt licence (required for the sale of one *yin*, or load, of salt) from 30 *kuan* to one *ting* (i.e. 50 *kuan*) and to double that for a tea licence from 5 to 10 *kuan*. Also the contributions from the wine and vinegar monopolies should be raised by 100,000 *ting* in Chiang-nan, and by 50,000 *ting* in the inner (northern) territories. Further income was to accrue from the suppression of previous tax exemptions. In 1276 the land tax had been reduced by half for households without adult males, the so-called 'families entitled to public assistance' (*hsieh-chi hu*). Sangha argued that such households had surely acquired adult males by natural growth since then, and should consequently pay full taxes henceforward. All those proposals were accepted by the emperor. The yield of the commercial tax was increased consequently to 250,000 *ting* in Chiang-nan and to 200,000 *ting* in the metropolitan region.

Sangha also introduced new rules governing the control of the Council and its ministries by the censors. Previously, the clerks of the ministries had carried their documents to the building of the Censorate, where the censorial scribes had examined them for mistakes or irregularities. Believing that the clerks, particularly those in the ministries of Finance and Public Works, were overburdened, Sangha ordered that censors should carry out their inspections in future on the premises of the Council and its ministries, personally signing each scroll reviewed. The object of this exercise was to gain control over the controllers; the Censorate had so far escaped Sangha's direct influence, whereas the new ruling now put the censors in a position of weakness which could be exploited. For one thing, they were received discourteously by minor employees in the ministries and the Council; some were even beaten for allegedly neglecting their duties.

The management of key personnel came increasingly under Sangha's influence. No appointment or promotion was made without his approval. The emperor sanctioned this by ordering that all nomination decrees should first be submitted to the Presidential Council. The *Yüan History* strongly condemns Sangha's personnel management, asserting that everything could be had from him for a bribe. Punishments and rewards were for sale, and offices could be obtained by purchase. An interesting case which shows the degree to which Sangha was able to protect his

followers is that of Hsiao I. This man, once a clerk under Sangha, had risen to the position of district assistant in the Office of General Administration at Ta-tu. Hsiao was accused of having accepted bribes. When the affair became known, Qubilai commuted his death sentence and wanted to commit him to a government-run gold-panning station. But Sangha protested. He said that Hsiao had once carried out a very successful audit in the Imperial Treasury and shown a great ability for recovering money. He should therefore be dismissed from his present office, given a beating, and appointed to the Treasury. Qubilai grudgingly concurred.

But not all of Sangha's requests were successful. Towards the end of the year, the district assistant of Shao-hsing, Po Hsieh-chü, reported that many members of the former Sung imperial clan, Chao, lived in Chiang-nan where they still enjoyed the population's greatest respect. He proposed to have them arrested and transported to the capital. Sangha forwarded this report to the emperor with the request that Pai should be made a drafting official in the Presidential Council. This was granted, but some months later in 1290, the Regional Council of Chiang-Huai opposed the action against the Sung imperial clan members on the grounds that it would create additional unrest; people in Chiang-nan were already complaining about increased taxation and requisition. The operation should therefore be deferred to a later date, a suggestion which the emperor accepted.

Sangha exploited Qubilai's continuing favour to increase his own status in even relatively minor matters. He once told the emperor that, while in Shang-tu, he had inspected daily all the imperial treasures and store-houses. This year he asked permission to use a small carriage for his tours of inspection. Qubilai agreed, although that was a prerogative of the emperor. Meanwhile the stele praising Sangha's virtues had been set up in front of the Presidential Council, but some of Sangha's followers apparently thought that this was not enough. The younger brother of one of Sangha's wives, Pa-chi (or Pa-chi-yu) was pacification commissioner in the district of Yen-nan. He persuaded some people to erect similar steles in the counties of his district, and asked the local director of Confucian studies Chang Yen (1229-90) to compose a suitable text. But Chang refused and resigned his office. His strength of character was praised by other scholars.

It took some courage for opponents of Sangha to voice their complaints openly. One who did was the famous scholar Ch'eng Chü-fu, an academician of the Chi-hsien Academy. In 1289 he submitted a memorial pointing out the reasons for the growing unrest in the empire. He accused the Presidential Council of exploiting the people, and said that all appointees of the Council were greedy and self-seeking. Ch'eng called for a purge of the Presidential Council in the capital and for a curb on the powers of the Regional Council. Officials obsessed with material profit should be

dismissed. Sangha's rage when he heard of this may be imagined : he applied six times to have Ch'eng executed, but Qubilai did not give in.

Sangha's principal opponent was probably Tung Wen-yung (*q.v.*). A vice-censor, Tung had the courage to confront Sangha openly. He ignored the suggestion made through an intermediary that he should praise Sangha in the emperor's presence, and also refused to arrange a huge banquet for Sangha in the latter's office. Tung actually told Sangha that the unrest among the population was a consequence of harsh laws and excessive taxation: the chancellor should wholeheartedly support the censors' efforts to abolish abuses, rather than constantly oppose the Censorate. Without the Censorate, Tung continued, the people would have no one to hear their complaints, which must endanger the very essence of government. Sangha retaliated by calumniating Tung Wen-yung, whom he denounced to the emperor as the only man at court to be obstreperous in his opposition to the Presidential Council, and thereby deserving of severe punishment. Qubilai replied that it was no crime for a censor to do his job.

It became obvious the following year that the ruthless fiscal policies of Sangha did foment discontent among the masses and the local officials. Millions of *ting* had been recovered in arrears and fines but still that was not enough. According to the biography of Chao Meng-fu, many families went bankrupt; people were imprisoned, while others fled to the mountains. Chao was a good friend of the Uighur Arġun Salī to whom he once remarked in confidence that the campaigns of financial inquisition should cease and that the best policy would be to proclaim an amnesty, to remit taxes and to stop soldiers from pursuing absconding people. Only thus could the sufferings of the people be alleviated. Chao even went so far as to say that the earthquakes from which the country had recently suffered were a sign from Heaven that government was not in order. The worst had occurred on 20 September 1290 in Wu-p'ing district (north of Peking) where over 7,000 people had perished and 480 public buildings had been damaged. Following his conversation with Chao Meng-fu, Arġun Salī submitted a memorial to the throne in which he repeated Chao Meng-fu's argument. A decree was drafted accordingly, which Chao Meng-fu was ordered to read in the presence of the senior officials of the Council, Sangha among them. When Chao reached the passage on remittance of taxes and labor services, Sangha protested furiously, claiming that this would be contrary to the emperor's will. Chao rejoined that seeking to recover taxes by means of exactions would be futile. By now, defaulters had died or fled; and where should future taxes come from? He concluded that a refusal to remit taxation now would mean the loss to the Council of millions in future revenue. Sangha gave in; the edict was proclaimed; and 'for the first time, the people had a hope for recovery and rest.' The text does not make clear which edict on tax

remittance is meant here. The annals of the *Yüan History* record many remittances for regions which had suffered from catastrophes and floods in 1289.

As usual, Sangha was busy in 1290 hunting for fresh sources of revenue. In summer he established a Silver Superintendency to handle the silver from the mines in Yün-nan, of which government inspectors had obtained 4,048 *liang*. Two months later, Sangha instructed the general administrator of Ch'ing-yüan district (Ning-po, Chekiang), Mao Wen-pao, to requisition the gold and silver which people had retained from the time of the Sung. Both measures are consistent with Sangha's general policy regarding the Stabilisation Treasuries. The first of those offices had been established in 1263 at Yen-ching (Peking) to serve as a sort of reserve bank holding the counterpart in gold and silver of the government's issue of paper money. Sangha prescribed in 1290 that each district should maintain its own reserves of gold, silver and paper money.

Sangha was also responsible for increasing the number of registered tax-payers. In January 1291 the vice-minister of War Chin Jung had been delegated to inspect and register the military families in the three regions of An-hsi, Feng-hsiang and Yen-an (in Shensi). The original records had listed 4,000 families, in addition to which a further 33,280 adult males were now found to reside in the regions. The Department of Military Affairs wanted to register all the latter as military personnel but Sangha objected and the emperor followed his advice. The point was, of course, that the military families in the north enjoyed certain tax exemptions, whereas common households were liable to full taxation.

Sangha's name is linked with a minor change in the conditions of public employment. It had been the rule that metropolitan and provincial officials who had failed to take up their position, or who had not undergone an efficiency review within five years of their appointment, should be dismissed and become ineligible for further government employment. Sangha proposed that, barring some major impediment, such men should not be excluded for ever from holding official posts; the emperor agreed.

Records for 1290 show two more cases of officials being persecuted by Sangha. One concerns the Uighur Töre who had repeatedly opposed Sangha's schemes. He was unjustly charged, dismissed and killed for alleged crimes. The other, more fortunate victim was Wang Kou (1245-1310), a secretarial censor who had been delegated with Buqumu, Sangha's arch-enemy, to audit the taxes levied in the district of Yen-nan and to supervise the recovery of arrears. Wang exceeded the deadline set for the job, but assured Buqumu, who was his senior, that he, Wang, would assume full responsibility for the delay in the event that they should be taken to task. Wang was indeed punished; he was pardoned only after Sangha's death.

This came soon after. The annals of the *Yüan History* record laconically on the day *jen-hsü* of the first month of the 28th year of Chih-yüan (23 February 1291) : 'The official Sangha of the Presidential Council was dismissed because of crimes.' An order to that effect from Qubilai, who was at that time hunting in the imperial reserve of Liu-lin near Peking, was issued after a small group of three court officials had impeached Sangha for abuse of power and corruption. One of Sangha's accusers was Čerig (1260-1306), a Mongol noble from the Eljigitei clan. He had previously tried to impeach Sangha when he was vice-censor but met with no success. The second accuser was Yeh-li-shen-pan (*Irišenbal) of whom nothing else is known. The name – if it is written correctly – sounds Tibetan (? Irinjinbal, tib. Rin-chen-dpal). The third was Esen Temür. He may be the man of that name who was made associate director of political affairs of the Secretarial Council in 1297; the name, however, is common in the 13th and 14th centuries. After these three had submitted their memorial, the emperor summoned Buqumu who was then director of political affairs of the Secretarial Council. Buqumu confirmed the charges against Sangha whom he held responsible for the widespread unrest in the provinces, and urged for the immediate execution of the accused. During the following weeks, many other officials joined the chorus against Sangha. Some had tried to impeach him previously. It seems that the growing number of Sangha's accusers impressed the emperor. Among them we find the chief censor Ürlüg, that is, Üs Temür, whose alternative name was Ürlüg Noyan; the governor of Shang-tu Ho Bayan; the associate censor Tu Ssu-ching (1235-1320); and even a subordinate of Sangha in the Presidential Council, the director of political affairs Yesüder. Some of the charges preferred against Sangha were of a general nature such as bribery and corruption, but in some cases reference is made to specific crimes. Sangha was charged with having exempted rich people in Ta-tu from taxation, with having used government artisans for private purposes, and – which certainly would not have endeared him to the Censorate – with having on several occasions flogged censors for alleged neglect of duties.

The accusations against Sangha were strong enough for the emperor to deal with them forthwith. While at Ta-k'ou, a stage between Shang-tu and Ta-tu, he summoned the leading officials of the Censorate and the two Councils to a conference on Sangha's case. This was 16 March 1291. Sangha was given a chance to defend himself before the assembly. But Qubilai became more and more outraged as one official after another rose to denounce Sangha. He even blamed the censors for not having impeached Sangha long ago. As an immediate outcome of this conference, an inventory was taken of Sangha's property (26 March). Sangha's arrest was decreed on 12 June 1291. He was imprisoned in the Tso-i men building and put in fetters. As an

additional disgrace, the imperial physician Qurqosun was ordered to spit in Sangha's face : he refused. The emperor was impressed by Qurqosun's character and even rewarded him with a white jade belt. Qurqosun's real name was Hsü Chün-fu. He was a close friend of chancellor An-t'ung and had always been an opponent of Sangha. Sangha was executed on 17 August 1291. A detail concerning his execution is mentioned in the gloss of a poem written by Wang Yün some weeks earlier (23 July). This gloss says that when the chief steward Türe was put to death, wild cats were made to bite and claw his flesh. Now, so Wang Yün wants to make us believe, Sangha asked of his own accord to die like Türe. Could this be an indication of last-minute repentance, or, perhaps, an expression of the Buddhist precept of self-immolation by giving his body to wild animals?

The execution of Sangha led as a matter of course to the downfall of most of his followers and relatives. The first of his cronies to go was the resident commissioner of Yang-chou (9 March). On 1 April, Sangha's brother-in-law Pa-chi was executed for having made illicit profits. The stele praising Sangha's merits was destroyed on the same day. Its author, Yen Fu, lost his post of surveillance commissioner in the district of Che-hsi. A formal request to dismiss from office all protégés and relatives of Sangha was made by Ts'ui Yü and Majd al-Dīn on 5 June; it was approved by the emperor. A prominent member of Sangha's group was Yašmūt, the director of political affairs in Hu-Kuang. He was accused of dozens of infringements. His property was found to include 4,000 *liang* of gold. He had held his office in Hu-Kuang since 1284 where he is said to have been a rapacious and oppressive official. He also harassed subordinates who opposed him, such as Wu-ku-sun Tse, a district assistant in Yung-chou whom Yašmūt imprisoned and who was released only after Sangha's fall. Yašmūt was also accused of a grave breach of etiquette. On New Year's Day, the officials of the Regional Council used to gather at the office building to wish the emperor good luck in the coming year. Yašmūt, however, summoned his subordinates to his private residence first, and only after he had received their congratulations did he repair to the office and perform his ceremonial duties to the emperor. The order for his execution was given on 12 June 1291.

A younger brother of Sangha had been pacification commissioner in Kung-ch'ang (Kansu), an office created expressly for him. Fearing punishment after Sangha's fall, he committed suicide. His name is given in the *Yüan History* as Ta-ma-la-ta-ssu, which is perhaps a garbled version of a Buddhist name corresponding to Sanskrit Dharmadāsa, 'Servant of the *Dharma*.'

Yeh Li, who had been a close associate of Sangha during the currency reform of 1287, managed to escape persecution. After Sangha's fall he asked leave to return to his home in the south on grounds of ill-health. Thereupon the superintendent of

studies in Yang-chou, Li Kan, wrote a letter to the emperor denouncing Yeh Li in the strongest possible terms and asking for his execution. Qubilai flew into a rage and said that Yeh Li had always been an upright and honest servant of the state. He even proposed to promote him to director of political affairs in the reorganised Secretarial Council, but Yeh Li declined this offer and died soon afterwards (second month of 1292). He was dead when Li K'an arrived in the capital on the emperor's summons. Although Qubilai had not approved of Li K'an's attack on Yeh Li, he nevertheless praised him for his upright and brave words, and made him director of studies in Chiang-yin district.

On 13 December 1291, the censors impeached more members of Sangha's faction, including Šihāb al-Dīn, Naṣr al-Dīn Melik, 'Umar, Wang Chü-chi and others, whom they accused of having oppressed the people in Chiang-nan. A formal request for their prosecution was made on 8 March 1292 by the chief censor Üs Temür. On 3 April, Naṣr al-Dīn was executed for having stolen from the people over 130,000 *ting* of paper money; so was Hindu, a former colleague of Yeh Li as assistant of the Right, for having caused the death of 520 persons during his tenure as controller of finances. Wang Chü-chi was also executed, although a charge of illicit gains could not be substantiated. Altogether thirteen cases of illicit gains were proved against members of Sangha's faction.

Other literati besides Yen Fu found themselves in trouble for having sung the praise of Sangha while he was in power. The emperor was inclined not to forgive those Han-lin scholars who had joined Yen Fu in his adulation. But he balked in the summer of 1292 when some officials in the Secretarial Council wished to have a certain Feng Tzu-chen punished. Although Feng had himself written poems in praise of Sangha, he denounced other academicians for having supported him when the tide turned. Qubilai, who apparently took a very realistic view of the intellectuals of Feng's calibre, said, 'If it should be a crime to have praised Sangha, what about all the other court officials who did the same?' and added that he himself had previously held Sangha in high regard. It seems generally that the urge to punish former associates of Sangha tended to abate somewhat over the years. Sun Min-hsien, one of Sangha's and Yašmūt's followers who, as co-director of affairs of the governor's office in Shang-tu, had accepted bribes and reduced the courtiers' allowance, saved his life but had his family property confiscated and his wife enslaved (4 December 1293).

Things were different for the Buddhist monk Yang Rin-chen-skyabs and his associates. After the fall of Sangha, he was accused of having made illicit gains. It took the authorities some time before the inventory of his property was completed. His profits were estimated at 116,200 *ting* of paper money and 23,000 *mou* of paddy-fields; he had also acquired 1,700 *liang* of gold, 6,800 *liang* of silver, and

many more precious objects. Yang was furthermore accused of having desecrated 101 tombs and caused the death of four innocent people. Nevertheless, it does not seem that he was executed like other followers or protégés of Sangha, but the fiscal consequences of Yang's rule over the Buddhist clergy in Chiang-nan continued to occupy the attention of the government for many years. Yang had listed many previously free peasants as tenants of monasteries. In 1292 it was ordered that fields and tenants that had been attached to the residences of monks and nuns be returned to their original owners and landlords. But as late as 1299 the number of households abusively designated as monastery tenants was still estimated at 500,000. The Secretarial Council requested that this should be made good. The emperor agreed. The office of supervisor of the Buddhist Religion in Chiang-nan was abolished that same year. The transfer of peasant families from the status of tenants to that of free farmers was, of course, important for the economy of the state; as tenants, the farmers were usually exempt from taxes. In fact registration as monastery tenant might have been welcome for that reason to many peasants in southern China.

Following the dismissal and execution of Sangha, action was taken to reorganise metropolitan and other offices, and to review some of the measures introduced by him. On 14 June 1291, the Presidential Council was dissolved and reintegrated into the Secretarial Council. The former Right chancellor of the Presidential Council Öljei was made Right chancellor in the Secretarial Council; Majd al-Dīn and Buqumu became directors of political affairs; other officials like Ho Jung-tsu, Ho Sheng, Kao Chu and Ma Shao, were also transferred to the Secretarial Council. Three days later, the Council reported that Sangha and his associates had accepted payments for services, monopoly goods and taxes only in Chih-yüan money, to the exclusion of Chung-t'ung currency. The latter was now declared legal tender, the continuing circulation of which was formally sanctioned. In January of 1292 a minor financial reorganisation took place. In Sangha's time the fines imposed for illicit profits had all been channelled to the Regional Presidential Councils, Pacification Bureaux and General Administrations. From 1292 on, these monies were to go to the Censorate, as they had done before Sangha came to power. The sums involved were very large; they amounted to 170,000 *ting* in 1288. Further, the classification of soldiers as civilian tax-payers which Sangha had arranged in 1290 was abolished. On application from the Department of Military Affairs, 3,000 persons were re-enlisted as military colonists and garrisoned in the Liu-p'an Mountains, a strategic area in western Shensi. One of the constant complaints of many officials in Aḥmad's and Sangha's time had concerned the haphazard appointment of functionaries. To remedy this, new and stricter rules were proclaimed for promotion and demotion (15 March 1295) in the reign of Temür, Qubilai's successor.

In some cases the wrongs committed by Sangha and his followers could not be remedied because the victims were already dead. But in others some restitution to family members was possible. A certain Chou Tsu had been a regional censorial inspector and as such had impeached the Regional Presidential Council's officials. Sangha accused him of imaginary crimes so that Chou was eventually banished to Central Asia. His wife and children were seized by the government, but returned to him after Sangha's fall. Another case concerned the family of Liu Ping-chung (*q.v.*), the famous Chinese adviser of Qubilai. Liu had died without a son, and Sangha had appropriated his land. Liu's widow said that Liu had reared his nephew Liu Lan-chang like a son and wished to make him his heir. It was resolved to give back 100 *ch'ing* of land to the Liu family. In 1292 also the confiscated properties of Yang Chü-k'uan and Kuo Yu were restored to their original owners.

The general attitude of the Chinese authors towards Sangha is overwhelmingly negative. We find a summary of this attitude, which is also shared by later Chinese historiographers, in a 1304 document issuing jointly from the Secretarial Council and the Censorate : Sangha (and Aḥmad who is expressly included) was careless in appointing officials and in conferring rank, but took great care of his personal interests; he created superfluous offices and ignored the principles of proper selection. The evil and wicked came to power, the greedy and oppressive ruled the people.

Sangha is also mentioned in Rašīd al-Dīn's work, but not in as much detail as Aḥmad. He is said to have been 'vizier' after Aḥmad for seven years, but nothing is reported about his affiliations with the Buddhist clergy or his origins, except that he is called an Uighur. According to the Persian historian, Sangha was instrumental in repealing the legislation which forbade Muslims to practise ritual slaughter (for this see also the biography of Aḥmad). Rašīd says that a group of Muslim officials bribed Sangha to obtain an imperial decree to that effect. They also pointed out that the current legislation prevented Muslim merchants from coming to China, importing precious goods and paying commercial tax. Some of the Muslims mentioned by Rašīd figure also in Chinese sources, e.g. Naṣr al-Dīn Melik, Hindu, 'Umar and Sādī (the Sha-ti of the Yüan History, who was eventually dismissed for theft and bribery from his post as general administrator of Ta-tu in 1297). Sangha's fall is attributed by Rašīd al-Dīn to a quarrel over jewelry. On being asked for pearls by the emperor, Sangha replied that he had none, but a Muslim courtier denounced him for having hidden treasures in his house. The Muslim was sent to Sangha's residence, and indeed many jewels and pearls were found there. Qubilai reprimanded Sangha for keeping valuables for himself and giving only coarse fabrics to his ruler. Sangha replied insolently: the emperor flew into a rage, had him seized, had his mouth filled with filth and finally put him to death with others of the 'Tāzīk emirs.' But 'Umar and Sādī

were spared because Prince Aġigi, who was a descendant of Ča'ā dai, interceded on their behalf. The emperor then replaced Sangha by Öljei.

This story agrees only in part with the Chinese sources. The repeal of the anti-Muslim legislation is not corroborated by the *Yüan History*, nor are bribes to Sangha mentioned in this context; and the reasons for the execution of Wang Chü-chi, Naşr al-Dīn and Hindu are given by the Chinese sources in very general terms only. The main charge against them was their association with Sangha, a fact which is evident from both the Persian historian and the Chinese authors. It should be added that Naşr al-Dīn, if he is the man of the same name who rates a biography in *ch.* 173 of the *Yüan History*, was posthumously rehabilitated; his descendants continued to serve the Mongols in high positions.

The Tibetan sources give yet another picture of Sangha. They describe in some detail the exploits of his military expedition in Tibet (1280-81) and the distribution of Mongol garrisons over central Tibet and the Tibetan borders. Sangha also reorganised the courier service in Tibet and introduced a system whereby the cost of the postal services was not shouldered exclusively by the Tibetan population. Sangha's Tibetan biographer praises him therefore as a benefactor of the people. Another episode mentioned in this text is difficult to interpret. It concerns perhaps the introduction of regular salaries and stipends for Chinese officials, and may be regarded as an imprecise reference to two imperial decrees of 1285 and 1286 which systematised the remuneration of officials and increased salaries in general. The Tibetan sources remark at this point that Sangha considered his actions in the matter of religious affairs, of the postal service and of almsgiving as a service to his Lama for the good of the people. The end of Sangha, who was 'wise and wealthy,' is explained in a way that differs markedly from the Chinese accounts. Although the report is rather garbled, it alludes to a controversy between Ürlüg (Üs Temür) and Sangha originating apparently in the discontent of officers of the Imperial Guard whose pay Sangha was said to have withheld. Sangha was 'accused because of his property' so that the emperor in the end turned against him. He charged Sangha with breaches of etiquette in three cases: Sangha had sat on a seat reserved for the emperor while travelling from Shang-tu to Ta-tu; he had eaten fruit from a box sent to the emperor; and he had worn a robe more sumptuous than the emperor's. The Tibetan source also says that after Sangha's execution the emperor repented and had Sangha's accusers punished. Thus, the Tibetan sources picture Sangha as a wise and good minister who eventually fell victim to jealousy and slander.

It is difficult to reconcile this view with the Chinese accounts, even if we admit that these are heavily biassed against Sangha: on the one hand a wise and good minister, on the other a treacherous villain. It is perhaps not idle speculation to

consider how the Chinese intellectuals who wrote history would have viewed Sangha in the light of his financial and political achievements alone, had he been born into a family of Chinese literati instead of an obscure Tibeto-Uighur clan, and if he had quoted Confucius rather than declaring himself a Buddhist believer. The Chinese sources concede, however grudgingly, that Sangha was highly intelligent, hard-working, and a good organiser. All in all the currency reform which he introduced was a success. The state economy survived his activities and the Chih-yüan money remained in circulation almost up to the end of the dynasty. Temür, Qubilai's successor who as heir-apparent must have had the opportunity to observe Sangha in action, once complained that the work of the Secretarial Council was sluggish and that orders were not obeyed promptly. He accused his ministers of laziness and added that Sangha might have been an evil and wicked person, but that his subordinates respected his authority and that, under him, government affairs were dealt with expeditiously. This was not too long after Sangha's death (14 November 1294), and the memory of his rule must still have been vivid at court.

Who were Sangha's followers, who supported him, and who were his chief opponents? This cannot be answered in simple terms of nationality or religion. Certainly the personal favors and the confidence of Qubilai were the deciding factors in Sangha's rise to the highest offices. So far as we know, Sangha himself did not favour Tibetans or Tanguts as such outside of his role as protector and supervisor of the Buddhist clergy. It is true that many of his appointees in the provinces were Muslims, but it would be difficult to prove that Sangha's followers included a greater proportion of Muslims than that prevailing at the time among officials throughout the empire. And he certainly was not anti-Chinese *per se*. Many presumed members of 'Sangha's gang' bear Chinese names; in fact, Sangha might be suspected of entertaining a slight preference for southerners: his closest associate in currency matters was Yeh Li, a former Sung official. One thing is perfectly clear, however; hardly any Mongols belonged to his faction. But this could be expected because Mongol aristocrats would not as a rule be either competent or even interested in financial affairs. On the other hand, Sangha's main opponents included several high-ranking Mongols such as An-t'ung, Üs Temür and the Qangli Turk Buqumu. They might have seen Sangha as a threat to their established power. Equally hostile as a group were those Chinese intellectuals who had been advisers to Qubilai for a long time. Tung Wen-yung was one of them. Their antagonism might have resulted from Sangha's disregard for the accepted criteria of personnel recruitment, for Sangha seems indeed to have appointed chiefly men who could be relied upon to act as ruthless tax collectors, rather than bureaucrats in the scholar-official's tradition.

It is not surprising then that those intellectuals' opinion of Sangha should have found such wide expression, in addition to the *Yüan History* and its primary sources. In Chinese literature the names of Aḥmad and Sangha have become bywords for exploitation and greed. We do not know how many Chinese rejoiced in Sangha's elimination, nor whether the masses of the population were better off after 1291. But it cannot be denied that discontent must have been rife until then, particularly among educated Chinese. A curious episode which shows how popular superstitions began to grow around Sangha is reported in a 14th century document. When the art of glyphomancy, making predictions based on the structure of written characters, was applied to Sangha's personal name, the character *sang* was found to yield the numerical value of 48; in the case of the alternative character *hsiang*, the value was the same. At first nobody knew how to interpret this result : did it refer to Sangha's age or to his time in office? All became clear when he was dismissed in the first month of 1291, 48 months exactly after the establishment of the Presidential Council. Another anecdote refers to the year 1290 when a stele praising the virtues of Sangha and Šihāb al-Dīn was erected in Hang-chou. It was to be a huge affair and a correspondingly big stone was needed for its foundation. A man who wished to ingratiate himself suggested that a stone from the site of the tomb of Yang Ts'un-chung (1102-66), a famous Sung official, should be used, and thousands of labour-conscripts toiled to haul the block to its new site. When the work was finished, a stove in the Council building began to emit strange noises during the night, which ceased only at dawn. Owls hooted in the rafters, and tigers entered the town. All this was regarded as an omen of Sangha's imminent fall.

In the final analysis, history must probably return an open verdict on Sangha. Both his efficiency and his ruthlessness reflect the circumstances that prevailed in the ethnically heterogeneous government of Qubilai's time – when ability to produce revenue far outweighed respect for ethical standards and traditional rules of official behaviour.

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H. Franke

MILITARY LEADERS

34. BAYAN (1237-1295)

The conquest of the Southern Sung by the Yüan meant not only the annexation of the whole of China by an alien regime for the first time in Chinese history, but also the re-unification of the Chinese world after more than three centuries of political division and military conflicts from the late T'ang times. When the Yüan army triumphantly entered Lin-an (present-day Hang-chou) and forced the Sung court to surrender in the spring of 1276, this historic conquest had essentially been accomplished; what remained to complete it was no more than the mopping up of the Sung loyalists in central and south China. Equally important, this historic campaign was carried out in less than one and a half years' time, entailing minimum bloodshed and destruction, in sharp contrast to the bloody conquest of the Chin four decades earlier. Bayan, better known to the West as Baian Hundred Eyes from the colourful account of Marco Polo, was the commander-in-chief of the Yüan army in this campaign and the man who made this speedy and peaceful conquest possible.

Belonging to the Ničügüt ('Naked') branch of the Bārin tribe, Bayan was from a Mongol family which had served Činggis Qan's house with great distinction during the three previous generations. The family had originally been subjected to Tarqutai Kiriltuq, a chieftain of the Tayiči'ut tribe and the chief tormentor of Činggis in his adolescence. Bayan's great-grandfather Širgü'etü, his grandfather Alaq, and his great-uncle Nayā, all surrendered to Činggis Qan in 1201 just after he had destroyed the Tayiči'ut. All three made significant contributions in the subsequent wars to unify Mongolia. Both Alaq and Nayā were among the eighty-eight chiliarchs appointed in 1206 when Činggis was transforming his newly unified Mongols into a monolithic war-machine. According to the *Secret History of the Mongols*, Nayā even enjoyed the distinction of being appointed the commander of '10,000 of the Center,' i.e. of the main army (according to the Persian historian Rašīd al-Dīn, Nayā was made the deputy commander-in-chief of Muqali's Left [= East] Wing, with 3,000 Bārin tribesmen under his personal command). In the campaigns against Khwārazm, Alaq is known to have played an active role in the seizure of Fanākat and Khojend in 1219-1220, and been given Khojend as his apanage.

In view of the imperial favours subsequently enjoyed by his descendants, Rašīd al-Dīn's statement that Alaq was 'executed for a great crime' is not convincing. The

Chinese sources are perhaps right in saying that Alaḡ died in Möngke's campaign against the Sung in Szechwan in 1258-1259. Bayan's father, Se'ügütei (or Kököčü as he is called by Rašīd al-Dīn) accompanied Hülegü during the conquest of Persia which started in 1256, and was subsequently killed in action there.

Bayan – the name means 'Rich' in Mongolian – was born in 1236. Although his birthplace is not known, he is said to have been brought up in the Western Region (Hsi-yü, i.e. Central Asia and the Middle East) and he accompanied his father on the campaigns in Persia. He came to China in 1265 at the age of twenty-eight. According to Rašīd al-Dīn, Bayan had originally 'fallen to the lot and share' of Qubilai Qa'an, i.e. had been allocated to Qubilai's house as a retainer – at Qubilai's specific request. Bayan's Chinese biographers, however, maintain that Bayan was sent by Hülegü as an envoy and was subsequently kept by Qubilai in his own service. The reason given in the Chinese sources for Qubilai's retention of him is that Qubilai was greatly impressed by his imposing appearance and incisive speech, and became convinced that Bayan's character deserved greater distinction than being the subject of a vassal king. Bayan's illustrious family background and his status as the representative of the Il-qan may also have enhanced his stature in Qubilai's mind at a time when the qa'an was still trying to rally as much support as possible from the Mongol princes.

Even though Bayan had previously taken a wife in Persia, Qubilai personally arranged his marriage to Besüjin, a Ĵalayir lady, perhaps to help Bayan re-settle in China and to strengthen his loyalty. Since Besüjin was the niece of Qubilai's own principal consort, Čabui (or Čabi), and the younger sister of An-t'ung (1245-93), a great-grandson of Muqali (*qq.v.*) and the Right chancellor in the Secretarial Council for many years to come, Bayan became related to the emperor and the powerful Muqali house by marrying her. Still a newcomer at Qubilai's court, Bayan was now politically unassailable.

Indeed, Bayan's political fortunes progressed rapidly: when a reorganisation of the Secretarial Council took place in the fall of 1265, Bayan was appointed Left chancellor, while his brother-in-law, An-t'ung, became Right chancellor. Bayan was to remain a member of this top administrative body for the next five years – first as the Left chancellor and, from 1267 when a general retrenchment of the council took place, as the junior assistant of the Right.

By the time Bayan became a member of the Secretarial Council, Qubilai's regime had already weathered its severest tests and its institutional reforms had nearly been completed. It is not known exactly what kind of role Bayan played in running the administration. It was the practice early in Qubilai's reign for the director of political affairs to be in actual charge of routine administration, while the chancellors, usually

members of noble Mongol families, concerned themselves only with important decisions. It was precisely in such matters that Bayan excelled. He is said to have been admired by his colleagues as a 'true prime minister' for he was able to find solutions unhurriedly and concisely to the problems that his colleagues considered the most intractable.

When Bayan was a chief executive in the Secretarial Council, the famous conflict between the Chinese scholar-officials and a group of Muslim fiscal experts led by the notorious Aḥmad (*q.v.*), had already begun to rage inside and outside the council. During this protracted struggle the Chinese scholar-officials depended upon the sympathy and support of their non-Chinese colleagues such as Ĵingim (1243-85), Qubilai's heir apparent and the titular head of the council, An-t'ung and Lien Hsi-hsien (*q.v.*), an Uighur Confucian statesman. Our sources are silent on Bayan's attitude to the issue. Although himself not ideologically committed, Bayan seems to have been much closer to the pro-Confucian faction than to Aḥmad in personal relationships, if not in political stand. On the one hand, not only was he related to Ĵingim, An-t'ung and Lien Hsi-hsien through marriage, but he apparently also enjoyed good working relations with them as well as with Chinese scholar-officials. On the other hand, whereas we do not know how Bayan and Aḥmad interacted at this stage, their relations in later years were certainly not cordial. It is said that Aḥmad falsely accused Bayan of having appropriated a peach-shaped jade cup from the Sung palace, because he felt that Bayan had not handed out enough presents after his triumphant return from the Sung conquest in 1276. It is also said that Aḥmad accused Bayan of having massacred Sung soldiers at Ting-chia chou (in present-day Anhwei); but Aḥmad failed to get Chiao Te-yü (1220-88), a subordinate of Bayan in the Sung campaign and then an associate director of political affairs in the Secretarial Council, to testify against Bayan. If those episodes can be taken as evidence that Bayan had never got on with Aḥmad, Bayan's departure from the Secretarial Council in 1270 was most timely since the power of that agency was to be seriously undermined when the Presidential Council was established in the same year with Aḥmad as its head.

Bayan changed in 1270 from being a civilian chief executive to becoming a top military administrator and commander, thus realising his main talents. He was appointed the associate commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs, a post which he was to hold for the next four years. Since the department, as the highest military instrumentality in the empire, was only nominally headed by Ĵingim, Bayan, as the associate commissioner, was its effective chief. Bayan apparently acquitted himself with expertise in this role. It is said in the *P'ing-Sung lu*, or *Record of the Pacification of the Sung*, that Bayan was 'efficient in disposing the troops in the four quarters, even when the situation was difficult.' After the attack against Hsiang-yang

and Fan-ch'eng, the Sung strongholds in the Han valley, had begun in 1268 as the preliminary step in an all-out offensive against the Sung, Bayan's functions seem to have included developing strategies and mobilizing the human and material resources for that onslaught.

Before Bayan could assert himself in the campaigns against the Sung, however, the military situation in Inner Asia called him temporarily away from the south. Qaidu (?1235-1301), the grandson of Ögödei Qa'an, using Qayaliq as his base, formed an alliance with the Ča'adai princes in 1269, openly challenging Qubilai's legitimacy as the overlord of all Mongols. Apparently as a precautionary measure against the possible invasion of Mongolia by Qaidu, Qubilai despatched Jिंगim in the spring of 1270 on a military tour of inspection to Činqai (see the biography of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi), an important garrison in northwestern Mongolia, with Bayan as his adviser. Before their departure the emperor advised his son: 'Bayan combines in his person the talents of a general and of a minister. He is trustworthy in everything.... You must not treat him as an ordinary person.' Jिंगim showed great deference to Bayan as a result. Since Qaidu took no action against Mongolia, the party returned to the capital that same winter.

With the fall of Hsiang-yang at the beginning of 1273, the door to the Yangtze valley was opened to the Yüan army. The Yüan court began seriously to consider an all-out offensive against the Sung. When Qubilai consulted his Chinese advisers in the summer, Yao Shu (*q.v.*), Hsü Heng (*q.v.*) and T'u-tan Kung-lü all urged him to take prompt action. The final decision was made at the beginning of the following year when the field commanders Ariq Qaya (1227-86) and Aju (1234-87) returned to court advising the emperor to take advantage of the seizure of Hsiang-yang and the decline of the Sung's military capability. While the exact role played by Bayan in the decision to attack the Sung is not known, it is also uncertain how he came to be appointed commander-in-chief of the operation. The recommendation of Bayan for the post is variously attributed in the Chinese sources to the soldier-statesman Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*), the scholar-advisers Yao Shu and Liu Ping-chung (*qq.v.*), and the court astrologist T'ien Chung-liang (1243-1317). In the meantime, the Tibetan chronicle, *rGya Bod yig ts'an*, attributes the recommendation to 'P'ags-pa (*q.v.*), the great lama and Imperial Preceptor, who praised Bayan as 'hero of heroes' and prayed for the latter's victory in the campaign. This confusion reflects perhaps the fact that Bayan was the unanimous choice of Qubilai's advisers. In April Qubilai appointed Bayan, together with Shih T'ien-tse, Left chancellor of the Ching-Hu Regional Secretarial Council, to direct the offensive in the middle Yangtze valley. In the meantime, Qadaq was appointed the Left chancellor of the Huai-hsi Regional Secretarial Council which would attack from the east. Bayan, however, soon became

commander-in-chief of the entire campaign after the Huai-hsi Regional Secretarial Council had been reclassified as a Regional Department of Military Affairs in September, and after Shih T'ien-tse had relinquished his command in October because of sickness.

The grand strategy to destroy the Sung had been determined before Bayan's appointment as commander-in-chief. From the start, Qubilai had ruled out an attack on the Sung heartland directly through the Huai valley, since the Sung defences between the Huai and the Yangtze rivers were almost impregnable. Möngke Qa'an (r. 1251-59) had attempted to breach them from Szechwan but had become bogged down and had indeed perished in that mountainous region. Liu Cheng, former Sung commander of Lu-chou, urged Qubilai to seize Hsiang-yang and then sail down the Yangtze. This was accepted by Qubilai in 1267. Now with Hsiang-yang in Mongol hands, the main force of the Yüan army under Bayan and his deputies Aju and Ariq Qaya, the director of political affairs and the assistant of the Left of the Ching-Hu Regional Secretarial Council respectively, would set out from Hsiang-yang for E-chou on the Yangtze, and then use that river as the route to the Sung heartland. In the meantime the forces of the Huai-hsi Regional Department of Military Affairs would launch a simultaneous but secondary offensive from the middle Huai valley towards Ho-chou and An-ch'ing on the northern bank of the Yangtze. The purpose of that operation was two-fold: firstly, to prevent the Sung forces in the Huai area from reinforcing the Han region; and secondly to make a way for Bayan's forces when they began to move eastwards from the Han valley.

Assembling their army at Hsiang-yang, Bayan and Aju set out from that city in mid-October to begin the historic sixteen-month campaign. In the first phase, which lasted three months, Bayan's forces marched from Hsiang-yang along three different routes. While the main corps, under the personal command of Bayan and Aju, advanced along the Han River toward E-chou on the Yangtze, a smaller division of 10,000 men commanded by Södü (d. 1284) set out to occupy the Ssu-k'ung Mountain by way of Tsao-yang east of Hsiang-yang, in order to cover the left flank of the main corps. Another 10,000 troops, under Chai Wen-pin, were to seize Ching-nan (present-day Chiang-ling, Hupei) in order to block eventual Sung reinforcements from Szechwan.

The numerical strength of Bayan's army according to the Persian historian Rašīd al-Dīn was thirty myriarchies (*tümen*) of Mongols and eighty myriarchies of Khitayans, i.e. northern Chinese. These numbers are probably exaggerated. The figure of '200,000 men' stated in the Chinese biographies of Bayan is more credible. Of these 200,000, half were conscripts called up in early 1274 specifically for the offensive. In any event, Bayan did not enjoy a numerical advantage over the Sung

army, since the Sung government still had 700,000 men at its disposal at the time. However Bayan's lack of superiority in numbers was compensated by the support of the Yüan navy. To overcome Sung superiority in naval warfare, Liu Cheng had trained a river naval force for the Yüan, comprising 5,000 vessels and 70,000 men, which was used effectively in the siege of Hsiang-yang. In early 1274, 800 warships were built at Pien-liang for the offensive. Thus contrary to the British military expert B.H. Liddel-Hart's claim that the 'use of a single arm', cavalry, was the 'secret' of the unbroken sweep of Mongolian victories, the forces commanded by Bayan were amphibious as well as multi-racial. Mongol cavalry, Chinese infantry and the new navy gave Bayan the winning combination to overcome Sung resistance.

When Bayan took leave of the throne and set out to assume his command in August, Qubilai advised him to emulate the general Ts'ao Pin (931-99) who, because he refrained from indiscriminate killing, achieved a swift conquest of south China for the Sung dynasty in the tenth century. To kill as few people as possible was the advice which the Chinese scholar-officials had repeatedly urged upon Qubilai when he led a campaign against the Sung in 1258, and it had now become one of the directives set for Bayan's campaign.

The first stronghold which Bayan's army encountered was Ying-chou, where the Sung had concentrated over 100,000 men and 1,000 warships in anticipation of the Yüan advance, under the command of the famous general Chang Shih-chieh (1236-79). Not only did the city itself have massive stone walls, but the Sung had built another fortress across the river, linking the warships with an iron cable and setting up numerous piles in the river to block the passage of the Yüan fleet. Fearful of repeating the experience at Hsiang-yang, whose siege had lasted five years, Bayan wisely decided to bypass Ying-chou, despite strong opposition from his generals. He made the troops portage their boats on split-bamboo ramps and re-enter the Han River to the south of Ying-chou. When the Sung forces came out of Ying-chou in pursuit, Yüan troops killed more than 500 men: Bayan himself is said to have killed one Sung general and captured another.

After successfully bypassing the strongest Sung fortress on the Han, Bayan's army marched towards the Yangtze with relative ease. After Yüan forces had overpowered the Sung resistance at Sha-yang and Hsin-ch'eng in late November, Fu-chou (Mien-yang), at the south-west of Han-yang, peacefully surrendered on December 13. With this surrender, the route to the Yangtze stood wide open.

On 22 December, the army reached Ts'ai-tien, west of Han-k'ou, where Bayan convened his generals to discuss the crossing of the Yangtze. In the metropolitan area of the triple city, Bayan was to have his first real test as campaign commander. The Sung not only had the Yangtze River to rely on for its defence, but had also

concentrated there a force of 100,000 men. In addition to the local garrisons, Hsia Kuei (1197-1279), the military commissioner of Huai-hsi, had rallied with a large fleet and occupied various strategic points along the Yangtze. Wang Ta, a campaign commander sent by Chao Chin, the military commissioner of the Yangtze, garrisoned Yang-lo Fortress, the strategic islet east of the triple city, with 8,000 men. Upstream, the vanguard sent by Chu Ssu-sun, the pacification commissioner of Ching-Hu and Ssu-ch'uan, held the middle course of the river.

Bayan originally intended to make his army enter the Yangtze from the Han River by way of the Sha-wu River east of Han-k'ou. Hsia Kuei, however, promptly occupied the mouth of the Sha-wu River with élite troops. To lure Hsia Kuei's force away, Bayan laid siege to Han-yang, announcing that his army would cross the Yangtze at Han-k'ou. As soon as Hsia Kuei moved his troops to strengthen the defence of Han-yang, Bayan's army struck swiftly and on 7 January 1275 successfully established a base on the northern bank of the Yangtze at the mouth of the Sha-wu River. By the following day, the bulk of Bayan's army had been concentrated on the banks of the Yangtze.

Bayan's first target on the Yangtze was the Yang-lo Fortress, a historically important crossing point in Huang-kang, east of the Sha-wu River. After an unsuccessful assault that lasted three days, Bayan took counsel with Aju and decided to launch a surprise attack against the Sung forces upstream. On 11 January he ordered Ariq Qaya to resume the assault against the fortress in order to induce Hsia Kuei to reinforce its garrison. In the meantime, Bayan dispatched Aju 22 km upstream with four myriarchies. It was snowing heavily the night that Aju's division occupied the sandbars in the middle of the river after suffering very heavy losses. They then seized Ch'ing-shan-chi on the southern bank of the river by means of pontoon bridges. As a result of this surprising manoeuvre, the Sung forces were thrown off balance. The following day Bayan personally led his main force in an attack on the Yang-lo front. The naval force commanded by Chang Jung-shih and Hsieh Ju-chi dealt Hsia Kuei's fleet a decisive blow. Hsia Kuei escaped to his own home base at Lu-chou (Ho-fei) with 300 ships. The resistance of the Sung army at Yang-lo collapsed after this naval defeat. During the battle for Yang-lo, the fortress commander, Wang Ta, was killed. After the flight of Hsia Kuei and Chu I-sun, who had escaped to Chiang-ling, the triple city became isolated.

While some of his generals urged him to move promptly to seize Ch'i-chou and Huang-chou downstream, Bayan accepted Aju's recommendation to capture the triple city first in order to secure the army's rear. The Sung army had been completely demoralised after the fall of Yang-lo: Chang Yen-jan, the prefect of E-chou, Wang I, the prefect of Han-yang, and Ch'eng P'eng-fei, a field commander, all surrendered by

16 January. Most of the Sung officials who submitted were re-confirmed in their former positions not only as a means of maintaining local political stability, but also to tempt more Sung officials to switch sides.

With the triple city now safely in his hands, Bayan divided his army, leaving 40,000 men with Ariq Qaya to extend and consolidate Yüan control in the Ching-Hu region. Bayan himself set out on 25 January with his main force for a new stage of the campaign. In this phase, which lasted only two months, Bayan's army moved speedily toward Chien-k'ang (present-day Nanking). Now Bayan effectively used turncoat generals and officials to persuade the various Sung cities to submit to his advancing army. Lü Wen-huan, the former commander of Hsiang-yang, as well as the prefect of Huang-chou and the commander of Chiang-chou, were all called on for this purpose. Lü was particularly helpful in persuading the Sung commanders to surrender since many of them in the cities along the Yangtze had been the subordinates of either Wen-huan or his elder brother, Wen-te. As a result, the Sung cities in eastern Hupei, Kiangsi and western Anhwei fell to the Yüan like dominoes within forty days of Bayan's departure from E-chou.

The surrender of Fan Wen-hu (?-1301), the Sung commander at An-ch'ing, was particularly significant, for An-ch'ing, a mountain city with a large garrison and sufficient provisions, had held up the Yüan troops of the Huai-hsi Regional Department of Military Affairs under Ataqai and Tung Wen-ping (*q.v.*) who had swept down from the Huai River in northern Anhwei. With the surrender of An-ch'ing, the army under Ataqai and Tung Wen-ping was able to join forces with Bayan's, considerably increasing the latter's offensive power.

Despite Bayan's rapid advance, a major battle was in the offing. Ever since the fall of E-chou, public opinion in the Sung capital pressed Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75), the powerful prime minister, to confront the invading enemy in person. Chia hurriedly assembled a force of about 130,000 men and reached Wu-hu in eastern Anhwei in late February. Still unresolved to play his last card, he sent Sung Ching to Bayan to sue for a peace settlement, promising to pay annual tributes in exchange for the Yüan's withdrawal and the return of the Sung's lost cities. Urged by Aju not to accept the peace proposal, Bayan requested that the plea for peace be presented by Chia in person. Since such terms were unacceptable to Chia, negotiations were promptly broken off.

Never having intended to make peace with the Sung, Bayan pressed forward and reached Ting-chia Islet, north-east of T'ung-ling, on 19 March. Here, the main Sung force of 70,000 men under the command of Sun Hu-ch'en was positioned on both banks of the river which itself was blocked by 2,500 warships commanded by Hsia. Facing this formidable defence, Bayan launched cavalry and infantry assaults against

the Sung positions on both banks, bombarding them as well as the fleet with catapults. The Sung army consisted of Imperial Guardsmen and garrison troops from the rear without experience in the field, while the fleet under Hsia Kuei had no will to fight after its recent defeat at E-chou. Resistance collapsed at the first push. Chia Ssu-tao, Hsia Kuei and Sung Hu-ch'en led the flight. As a result of this rout, many Sung soldiers were drowned and over 2,000 vessels together with a large quantity of military supplies were captured.

The victory at Ting-chia Islet was significant for the Yüan, entailing as it did not only the destruction of the enemy's main force but also the downfall of Chia Ssu-tao, the strongman in the Sung government, who was banished and killed soon after. As a result, the advance of Bayan's forces was made ever easier. T'ai-p'ing, Wu-wei and Ho-chou (Ho-hsien) in eastern Anhwei all surrendered as soon as the Yüan forces arrived. More importantly, Hsü Wang-yung, a field commander, surrendered Chien-k'ang on 30 March after his superior Chao Chin had fled the city. The fall of this administrative centre and strategic position immediately sent a shockwave throughout the region south of the lower Yangtze. Several important cities in present-day southern Kiangsu and southeastern Anhwei, including Chen-chiang, Wu-hsi, Ning-kuo and Kuang-te, surrendered in quick succession.

With much of the Yangtze delta under Yüan control, the destruction of the Sung would seem to have been imminent. But the need for consolidation in the newly occupied areas and for reorganising the victorious army, the military demands elsewhere in the empire, and the resurgence of Sung resistance as well as the advancing season, all contributed to delay the coup de grâce for a period of nearly eight months. Not long after the seizure of Chien-k'ang, Bayan began to busy himself with the tasks of administration. With the approval of the throne, he relocated his regional secretarial council to Chien-k'ang in mid-April, renaming it the Chiang-Huai Regional Secretarial Council. At the same time the Huai-hsi Regional Department of Military Affairs was moved to Chen-chiang to guard the cities on both banks of the lower Yangtze. Aju was detached to seize Yang-chou on the northern bank of the Yangtze, where the Sung general Li T'ing-chih (d. 1276) offered a gallant defence and posed a serious threat to Bayan's forces.

Yüan-Sung relations soon took a turn for the worse because of some unexpected incidents. Lien Hsi-hsien and Yen Chung-fan, the envoys sent by Qubilai to the Sung court, were killed by a local garrison commander on 12 April 1275 when they reached Tu-sung Ridge north-west of the Sung capital. Subsequently the Sung court dispatched a messenger to disclaim responsibility for the murder and to beg once again for the cessation of hostilities. In response, Bayan sent Chang Yü, a counsellor,

to demand Sung's immediate surrender. Unfortunately, Chang Yü was also killed by the Sung populace when his party reached P'ing-chiang.

On 21 May, before he could retaliate, Bayan received an imperial directive enjoining him to hold off the attack until the autumn on account of the summer heat in the Yangtze valley which was particularly debilitating for the northern Chinese and the Mongols. Determined to crush the Sung as quickly as possible, Bayan sent a memorial urging the emperor not to let the opportunity slip away. Apparently agreeing, the emperor instructed Bayan to decide for himself according to the situation in the field. Before Bayan could complete his preparations for the offensive, however, the situation in Inner Asia compelled Qubilai to put off the operation and summon Bayan to the capital. Qaidu, taking advantage of Qubilai's preoccupation with the conquest of Sung, had mounted an attack against the Yüan garrisons in Uighuristan and Mongolia. Faced with this serious challenge, Qubilai needed the expert advice of Bayan.

Before setting out for Shang-tu in mid-June, Bayan appointed the Mongol myriarch Alaqa (1233-81) associate director of political affairs to take charge of the Regional Secretarial Council during Bayan's absence. During his stay in Shang-tu, Bayan no doubt took part in the deliberations regarding the campaign against Qaidu. These led notably to the assignment of An-t'ung to assist Nomuqa (see the biography of Muqali), who had been responsible for the operations against Qaidu since 1271. In addition, having gained the emperor's approval of his strategic plan for the final conquest of Sung, Bayan must also have succeeded in convincing the emperor that, events in Inner Asia notwithstanding, the campaign in the south should receive top priority. In August, the emperor issued the general order for Bayan's army to attack the Sung capital directly, while Ariq Qaya was to advance in Hu-nan and Sundudai to conquer Chiang-hsi. As a reward for past performance and a spur to further achievements, Bayan was promoted to the rank of Right chancellor and Aju to that of Left chancellor. In the meantime, the Huai-hsi Regional Department of Military Affairs was abolished in order to unify the command of the forces in the lower Yangtze valley.

During Bayan's three-month absence, the military situation in this region had tipped even further in favour of the Yüan. The Yüan army had succeeded in isolating the Sung forces at Yang-chou and Lu-chou (in Anhwei). By July Aju had been able to inflict a decisive blow on Li T'ing-chih and to besiege the city of Yang-chou. In the meantime, the Tangut general Anggir (d. 1295), whom Bayan had assigned to deal with the Sung force in Huai-hsi, had turned back an attack by Hsia Kuei, then the commander at Lu-chou, and immobilised the latter's force. As the Sung capital had always depended upon the support of the two Huai regions, with the defeat of both Li

and Hsia, Bayan no longer needed to worry about threats to his rear when he moved his forces towards the Sung capital.

On the southern bank of the Yangtze, Bayan's colleagues were able to contain renewed activity by the Sung forces. Ever since the fall of Chien-k'ang in March, the Sung court had made a desperate effort to rally support from all over the shrinking empire and had thus been able to muster a force estimated at 170,000 men. Several cities, such as Ch'ang-chou, P'ing-chiang, and Wu-hsi, which had surrendered earlier, either resumed their allegiance voluntarily or were re-captured by the Sung forces. By early summer, the Sung had spread their area of control to the Yangtze River; they concentrated an immense fleet under the command of Chang Shih-chieh and Sun Huch'en and occupied Chiao-shan, an islet in the Yangtze north-east of Chen-chiang. Yet the Yüan fleet commanded by Aju succeeded in crushing the Sung fleet on 26 July. It is said that after this defeat the Sung were 'no longer able to form an army.' Thus Bayan's deputies had successfully withstood the Sung's resurgence and opened the way for the offensive which he would launch on his return.

With his plan to eradicate the Sung approved by the throne, Bayan set out from Shang-tu for the front in late August. On the way, he contributed further to weakening the Sung position on the northern bank of the lower Yangtze. When he arrived in Chen-chiang he immediately began to work out the details of the final stage of the campaign and to reorganise the command structure. On 27 November he divided his army into three corps which would advance simultaneously towards the Sung capital by different routes. The right wing, under the command of Alaqan and A'uruqči (1232-97), set out from Chien-k'ang and took the route along the western bank of Lake T'ai. The left wing, mainly a naval force commanded by Tung Wen-ping and Sang'ui (1241-84), sailed from Chiang-yin and approached the Sung capital from the sea. Bayan himself commanded the centre with the assistance of Ataqai, and advanced along the southernmost section of the Grand Canal. The respective strength of these forces as recorded in the *P'ing-Sung lu* was: over 10,000 on the right, several hundreds of thousands on the left, and 10,000 men in the centre. The figure given for the left wing is clearly exaggerated, whereas the one given for the centre may be an underestimate, although not necessarily so, in view of the fact that the myriarchy of the centre was traditionally made up of élite troops chosen for their mobility.

As the main forces of the Sung had been annihilated and the Sung court lacked the will to fight to the last, all three Yüan corps advanced rapidly towards the Sung capital with little fighting. The only resistance encountered by Bayan's centre force occurred at Ch'ang-chou. The city, which had massacred the Yüan garrison, doggedly resisted the subsequent Yüan attempts to re-capture it. Its defence had been strengthened by 3,000 men sent by Wen T'ien-hsiang (1236-83), the military

commissioner of Che-hsi and Chiang-tung, and 2,000 men sent by the new chancellor Ch'en I-chung (1228-*ca.*1285). When his corps reached the city on 4 December, Bayan tried to persuade the Sung defenders to surrender peacefully. Failing to get any positive response, his army stormed the city within two days and massacred the populace in punishment for its revolt and resistance – a traditional Mongol practice.

After overcoming the Sung resistance at Ch'ang-chou, the military phase of the conquest was nearly over. For two and a half months thereafter until his triumphant entry into Lin-an, Bayan tried to persuade the Sung court to surrender while the Mongol army was steadily and speedily encircling the capital. A short while later, after the re-capture of Ch'ang-chou, he sent the Sung court a copy of Qubilai's edict demanding complete surrender in exchange for the preservation of the Sung imperial family and its ancestral temple. From mid-December 1275 to the end of January 1276, the Sung court sent out several peace missions, offering progressively more submissive terms ranging from a promise to pay an annual tribute to one of honouring Qubilai as the uncle of the Sung sovereign. Bayan firmly rejected all those proposals, demanding nothing less than total surrender.

By late January 1276 the Yüan position had been immeasurably reinforced. Before Bayan's centre army had reached Chia-hsing on 20 January, Alaqa's right wing had seized the strategic Tu-sung Ridge and encroached upon the Sung capital itself, while Tung Wen-ping's left wing had embarked for Cha-p'u to the north-east of the capital. Facing a hopeless situation, the Sung court, under the direction of Empress Dowager Hsieh Tao-ch'ing (1209-84) and Chancellor Ch'en I-chung, rejected the advice given by Wen T'ien-hsiang and Chang Shih-chieh to defend the capital to the last man. They decided instead, firstly to surrender according to the conditions set by the Yüan, and secondly to send the princes Shih (1268-78) and Ping (1272-79) to south China where they might ensure the continuity of the imperial house. On 26 January, the Sung court sent Liu Chieh, a censor, to present to Bayan the draft of a document acknowledging the overlordship of Qubilai. More symbolic as an act of surrender, on 4 February at the Kao-t'ing Mountain, about 16 km north of Lin-an, Chia Yü-ch'ing, the prefect of Lin-an, presented on behalf of the Sung court the dynastic seal as well as a memorial. The memorial indicated the Sung emperor's willingness to give up the imperial title and to submit all his territories to the Yüan. By this time, both Alaqa and Tung Wen-ping had already joined forces with Bayan at Ch'ang-an chen and Kao-t'ing Mountain respectively.

On 10 February, when Lin-an was already firmly under his control, Bayan triumphantly entered the city accompanied by the full retinue of the commander-in-chief of a victorious army and the myriarchs of the Left and Right. But the real historic moment came only on 21 February when the young Sung emperor led his

civil and military officials to perform the formal act of surrender by making obeisance towards the Yüan court in the north. This act symbolised the substitution of Mongol for Sung rule, even though the work of pacifying south China still remained to be done.

As soon as the surrender of the Sung court was certain, Bayan began to concentrate on the speedy and peaceful takeover of the Sung government and capital. He reportedly guaranteed the personal safety and dignity of the imperial family members and prohibited the desecration of their mausoleum. To maintain social order and stability, he forbade the Yüan troops to enter the city, commit arson, or enslave the local populace. He also allowed the Sung style of dress and its monetary system to remain unchanged. To ensure a peaceful and complete administrative transition, he abolished all the Sung government organs and ordered the registration of the local population, the recording of captured grain and treasure, and the collection of all patents, seals, regalia, ceremonial, musical and sacrificial instruments, as well as of the archives, maps, and books of the Sung government. In addition, he posted troops at strategic points inside and outside Lin-an and set up a Military Command Administration for Liang-Che, with Mangqudai and the turncoat Sung general Fan Wen-hu as its heads. Under this office, the Pacification Bureau of Chen-tung-hsi was established, with Mai Kuei and Chiao Yu-chih as its commissioners and Yang Chü-k'uan (1233-87) as deputy commissioner. Yang served concurrently as the first prefect of Lin-an. In one and a half months, Bayan had not only achieved a bloodless surrender, but also the peaceful takeover of the Sung government and capital. 'The market places of the nine thoroughfares were not moved and the splendours of a whole era remained as of old' – these were the phrases used by the Mongol general when he proudly described the situation in the congratulatory memorial which he submitted on 23 February to report the conquest. The description is indeed not far from the truth.

Bayan's concern was by no means confined to Lin-an alone. He used to good effect the surrender of the Sung court and the lenient treatment of Lin-an to speed up the surrender of the rest of the Sung empire. He obtained proclamations from the Sung emperor and the Empress Dowager personally instructing loyal officials to cease their resistance. He also dispatched officials, mostly Sung who had surrendered, to persuade other Sung officials everywhere to lay down their arms. By late March, not only had most of the Sung officials in Che-tung, Che-hsi and Chiang-tung offered their surrender, but Hsia Kuei, who had long held out at Lu-chou (Ho-fei), had also capitulated. Bayan's most important achievement in this regard, however, was his success in persuading the Prince of Fu, Chao Yü-jui, the most senior member of the

Sung royal family, to make his peace. This event greatly weakened the Sung resistance movement.

The conquest of the Sung had largely been completed by March. What remained was a matter of pacification and consolidation. Believing that he needed Bayan more urgently to deal with the situation on the northwestern frontiers, Qubilai summoned him back on 11 March. Before his departure for the capital, Bayan appointed Alaquan and Tung Wen-ping to take charge of the Regional Secretarial Council of Chiang-Huai and to destroy the Sung partisans in Fukien and Kwangtung. He also named Mangqudai, the military commander of Liang-Che, to govern Che-hsi, and Sōdū, the pacification commissioner, to govern Che-tung.

On 26 March Bayan left Lin-an, taking with him the deposed Sung emperor, imperial clansmen, officials and even the imperial university students > several thousand persons altogether. On 14 June the party reached Shang-tu, where Qubilai was spending the summer. In his elation, Qubilai honoured Bayan by having him report the historic victory to the altars of Heaven and Earth and the Imperial Ancestral Temple, bestowing upon him twenty sets of *ĵisiūn* or 'garments of a single colour,' a great honour in the Mongol tradition, and re-appointing him associate commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs. When the emperor commended him for his achievement, Bayan responded with characteristic modesty, attributing his success to the emperor's plans and Aju's efforts.

Bayan had been resting for only half a year when he went on campaign in Mongolia. The situation there had taken an unexpected turn in the summer of 1276, when Širegi, son of Möngke Qa'an, and Tuq Temür, son of Sögēdū and grandson of Tolui, both of whom had followed Nomuqan in the campaign against Qaidu, suddenly mutinied. Abducting both Nomuqan and An-t'ung they chose to side with Qaidu against the Yüan, and seizing the Yenisei area they used it as a base to storm Qara Qorum. To make the situation worse, their revolt was supported by Ĵirwāдай, younger brother of Oločin, the chieftain of the Onggirat tribe, who seized Ying-ch'ang (165 km north of Shang-tu), and by Hoqu, son of Güyük Qa'an, in the Liu-p'an Mountains in Kansu. Facing the dreadful prospect of the collapse of the defence system outside the Great Wall and in north-west China, Qubilai was compelled to pull back a large number of the Chinese as well as the Mongol forces from the newly conquered Sung territories to fight the rebellious Mongol princes. Bayan was the natural choice for the post of commander-in-chief of this operation. After Prince Bai Temür and the Qipčaq general Tuq Tuqa (1237-97) had destroyed Ĵirwāдай's forces, Bayan's army encountered Širegi and Tuq Temür on the Orkhon River. The two armies faced each other from opposite banks. Having noticed the enemy's relaxed vigilance, Bayan split his army into two divisions which he pushed across the river. Caught by surprise,

Širegi and Tuq Temür were both put to flight. While Širegi withdrew to the Irtysh River, Tuq Temür fled to Kirghiz territory. As a result of this victory, the old capital Qara Qorum was recovered. Subsequently, the rebel party was further weakened by internal discord over the question of leadership. As a result, Tuq Temür was killed by Širegi, while Širegi himself was captured by his former allies and sent to Qubilai. The rest of the rebel princes surrendered to Qubilai in 1283. The degree of Bayan's involvement in the subsequent Yüan actions against these rebel princes remains unknown, however.

After making Mongolia secure once again for Qubilai, Bayan returned to the capital. As the associate commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs, he was responsible for the military operations and administration of the empire. During his years as the associate commissioner, the Yüan armies were very active in all directions. In this period, the Mongols completed the destruction of the Sung remnants (1279) and invaded Burma (1278), Japan (1281), Champa (1282-84) and Annam (1284-85). Even though he did not take part personally in any of those campaigns, Bayan must have played an important role in their planning and execution. However, his activities during the next several years, as described in our sources, only include his recommendations in 1283 that the former Sung soldiers be used alongside the Mongol troops in the campaign against Burma and that 83,600 men of the former Sung forces be reorganised and incorporated into the Yüan army. He also recommended in 1284 that 1,000 Korean troops be used to replace the 400-strong garrison on Tamna Island off the Korean coast.

More significant was his proposal to ship grain by sea from the grain-rich lower Yangtze valley to the metropolitan region. Before this time, grain travelled mainly by canals and coastal routes, which proved to be either time-consuming or dangerous. Recalling the earlier success of Chu Ch'ing (1237-1303) and Chang Hsüan (?-1303), commissioned by him six years earlier to transport the Sung archives and treasures to Ta-tu by maritime routes, Bayan suggested that Chu and Chang be ordered to construct sixty flat-bottomed, ocean-going vessels to transport 46,000 *shih* of grain from the mouth of the Yangtze to Chih-ku near the capital. There were some delays due to technical problems and unfavourable winds, so it took the flotilla half a year to reach its destination. Although the government was not impressed by the attempt, the system of shipping grain by sea was adopted nevertheless. When traffic on the sea route peaked in the 1320s, more than 3,000,000 *shih* of grain were transported each year and the Yüan government depended heavily on it to support its huge bureaucracy and army in the metropolitan region.

Even though Qubilai could have also used Bayan in the capital, the emperor needed him still more urgently to deal with the fluid situation in the north and north-

west. Despite the suppression by the Yüan of their allies in Mongolia, the forces of Qaidu and Du'a had grown more powerful than ever. The Yüan outpost of Almalıq had been lost to Qaidu since the abduction of Nomuqan, and so had Khotan in the south of T'ien-shan since 1282. This frontier had become so insecure that the Yüan court had to move the Uighur royal house to Yung-ch'ang in Kansu in 1283, and to take over complete responsibility for the defence and administration of Uighuristan. Two years later, after Ajigi, great grandson of Ča'āдай and the commander-in-chief of all the Yüan forces in Central Asia, was defeated by Qaidu's forces, Qubilai assigned Bayan to replace Ajigi and to save the defence of the region from collapse. Qaidu's forces were so powerful that even Bayan's presence seems to have helped the situation very little. Perhaps in the spring of 1286, Bayan's forces encountered those of Qaidu at Mt. Hung-shui (south-west of Hu-t'u-pi in Sinkiang) near Beš Baliq and were overwhelmed by the latter. As a result, the Chinese generals Ch'i Kung-chih and Li Chin, among others, were captured by the enemy.

Even though he accomplished little in the field, Bayan apparently did tighten the Yüan defence system in Uighuristan. He is said to have posted lookouts far afield, and been fair in handing out rewards and punishments, thus ensuring good morale in his army. To help solve the difficult problem of supplying food to this remote, dry frontier, he ordered his troops to gather edible plants like the snake-weed (*meke'er*) and the great burnet (*südün*) for the needy days of winter. He also had his soldiers save the skins of marmots and send them to the capital in exchange for clothing.

After less than two years as commander-in-chief in Uighuristan, Bayan was transferred back to Mongolia when the Nayan (d. 1287) rebellion broke out. Perhaps in reaction to Qubilai's centralisation policy in eastern Mongolia and Manchuria, Nayan, the great-great grandson of Činggis Qan's younger brother Ötčigin, together with some other descendants of Činggis Qan's younger brothers in these regions, revolted and joined forces with Qaidu in 1287. The alliance of Nayan, the most powerful of all 'Eastern princes,' with Qaidu posed a formidable challenge to Qubilai. Should Nayan be able to form a lasting alliance with Qaidu, the Yüan control over the steppe region would be completely lost. Because of the seriousness of the threat, Qubilai himself took to the field in June. Relying as much on his Chinese infantry as on his Mongol cavalry, Qubilai was able to destroy Nayan's forces and had the rebel executed. The role played by Bayan in this campaign, however, remains uncertain. His biographies say that he had been dispatched by Qubilai to watch Nayan in the spring of 1287, before Nayan's open revolt, and that he had managed to escape when Nayan's attempt to seize him was discovered. According to his biographies, Bayan accompanied Qubilai on the campaign and his many recommendations, including that of engaging the Chinese army and of adopting the Chinese method of fighting, were

largely responsible for the victory. However, the historians C. D'Ohsson (1780-1855) and T'u Chi (1856-1921) have suggested more convincingly that Bayan's real assignment in this war was to secure Qara Qorum with a large force in order to prevent Qaidu from reinforcing Nayan. They also suggested that it was because Bayan had kept Qaidu in check so effectively that Qubilai was able to destroy the isolated Nayan with relative ease.

Even though Nayan's rebellion had been put down, Qaidu remained a constant threat to Mongolia. Consequently, in March 1289 Qubilai promoted Bayan to be the administrator of the Department of Military Affairs and directed him to set up a new branch of that department at Qara Qorum in command of the forces in Mongolia. Bayan's task was by no means an easy one. By the late 1280s Qaidu's forces had not only seized Uighuristan, but had also taken the Yenisei valley from the Yüan, thus enabling Qaidu to raid Mongolia more frequently than ever. Even before Bayan took up his command, the Prince of Chin, Kammala (1263-1302), son of Ĵingim, was defeated by Qaidu in the Khangai Mountains. In the meantime, Kibek, the Yüan pacification commissioner of Qara Qorum, had defected to Qaidu in July 1289. The situation was in fact so serious that Qubilai felt compelled to set out on his last expedition, notwithstanding his advanced age. The emperor was not able to engage Qaidu's forces, however, because as usual Qaidu had retreated before the Yüan's main body had arrived. Qaidu again raided Mongolia the following year, crushing the Yüan forces guarding the great *ordo* of Činggis Qan on the Selenga River – a victory of great symbolic significance in internal Mongol politics.

According to the sources, Bayan's first field action after assuming command resulted in the defeat in the autumn of 1292 of Ariq Böke's son, Minglik Temür, who had defected to Qaidu. Bayan is said to have personally led his men in the assault on Minglik Temür's battle line on the Asaghtu Range and subsequently to have persuaded him to surrender.

Despite this minor success, Bayan apparently achieved nothing comparable to what he had accomplished against the Sung. Such lacklustre performance reflects perhaps more upon Qubilai's grand strategy than upon the veteran general's ability. Now based in China, the Yüan dynasty seems to have been reduced to a defensive posture in the conflict with its steppe brothers by the logistic problems involved in sustaining such a war from China. What was intended by Qubilai was not a destructive all-out strike against Qaidu, but a protracted war of attrition that would deny the Mongolian homeland to his opponent while blocking his access to food-producing settlements. Bayan might have faithfully implemented this strategy, but in doing so he was vulnerable to attacks at court. Late in 1292 he was accused of collusion with Qaidu and blamed for having gained no ground as a result of his

conservative strategy. The attack was so virulent that Qubilai had to relieve Bayan of his command and order him to go to Ta-t'ung in northern Shansi and to wait there for further instructions. The chief censor Üs Temür (1242-95), grandson of the great general Bōrju and a hero in the war against Nayan, was appointed as his replacement.

Bayan was determined to show his true mettle before handing over his command. Learning that Qaidu's forces were on the march once again, Bayan delayed Üs Temür's arrival, insisting that he had to deal with the invading enemy before turning over the army to his successor. To entice the enemy forces deeply into Yüan territory with a view to capturing Qaidu, Bayan retreated for seven days without allowing his troops to make a determined stand. Only in the face of the violent protests of his own generals who believed Bayan was being pusillanimous, did Bayan order his forces to hit back. Although the enemy was crushed, Qaidu, to Bayan's regret, managed to escape once again.

The loss of his field command heralded by no means the eclipse of this soldier-statesman's political influence. Bayan was to play a key role in the enthronement of Temür Öljeitü (Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1295-1307), the third son of Jingim, as Qubilai's successor. Bayan was summoned to Ta-tu from Ta-t'ung when Qubilai fell ill in January 1294 and was designated by the emperor – along with Üs Temür and the Qangli Confucian statesman Buqumu (1255-1300) – as one of the executors of his will. Perhaps the will contained the order for Temür's elevation. After Qubilai's death in February, Bayan is said to have been placed at the head of 'sundry officials in stabilizing the sentiments of the nation.' At the time, the question of succession still hung in the balance since no system of imperial succession had been firmly established. Eight years after the death of Jingim in 1285, i.e. in 1293, Temür was only designated informally as the heir apparent and his succession still had to be confirmed in the *quriltai*, the assembly of imperial relatives and ministers, as required by Mongol tradition. It is apparent that, during the two-month interval after Qubilai's death, Bayan worked closely with Üs Temür in ensuring Temür's smooth accession.

When the *quriltai* was finally convened on 18 April, there was no lack of supporters for the candidature of Kammala, Temür's elder brother. To resolve the dispute, according to Rašīd al-Dīn, Kökejin Qatun, Jingim's widow, made Kammala and Temür both recite the *biligs* or 'maxims' of Činggis Qan in the *quriltai*. Temür was proclaimed the new qa'an because his recitation had been the better. It is highly unlikely, however, that the grave problem of imperial succession would have been settled solely by means of such a test. In fact, Bayan and Üs Temür overwhelmed Kammala's supporters. While Üs Temür is said to have convinced Kammala that he should lead the way in urging his younger brother to accept the throne, Bayan took a more forceful posture in making Temür's elevation acceptable to the dissenters. It is

said that, standing on the steps of the audience hall with a sword in his hand, Bayan proclaimed the will of Qubilai and explained the reasons why Temür should be enthroned. As a result, we are told, 'the princes of the blood, trembling, hurried to the hall to make obeisance.' Apparently the prestige and power that Bayan had gained over the years carried enormous weight in the matter of Temür's succession.

As one of the most important king-makers, Bayan was lavishly rewarded by the newly enthroned Temür. He was given fifty *liang* of gold and re-appointed to the post of administrator of the Department of Military Affairs, with the prestigious and honorific title of Grand Tutor. Revered and powerful as he had become, Bayan was still not immune from attacks. It is said that the emperor originally intended to make him one of the senior ministers of the Secretarial Council. The idea was dropped as a result of the jealousy of a certain minister – this might have been Öljei (1246-1303), then the Right chancellor. Bayan approached this minister and is quoted as saying, 'Please give me a couple of pots of good wine. I shall drink them with the princes in front of the palace. As for the rest, it is not my concern.'

Bayan did not have much time to enjoy his honours nor his wine: he was soon to fall ill. Even on his sickbed, he was consulted by the emperor. By this time the Regional Departments of Military Affairs of the three provinces south of the Yangtze (which had been established in 1285 to suppress the rebellion in those regions) had become the subject of much dissension among provincial officials because of the separation of the civil and military authorities at the provincial level. Consequently, there were repeated pleas for the abolition of those departments. Asked by the emperor for his views, Bayan recommended that while the civil and military authorities should remain distinct at the level of central government, it would be more efficient to combine them at the provincial level. As a result, the departments were abolished and the Regional Secretarial Council exercised military as well as civil power thereafter. This was Bayan's last contribution to the development of the dynasty's institutions.

Bayan died on 11 January 1295 at the age of fifty-eight and was buried in the ancestral grave at Mount Baijiraq in the southern Khangai region in Mongolia. He was deservedly granted the posthumous name Chung-wu ('Loyal and Martial') and the title of Grand Preceptor in 1308. In addition, he was invested with the title of Prince of Huai-an. On this occasion, a 'stele of meritorious virtue,' composed by Shih Chou-ch'ing, was erected in Hang-chou, the former Lin-an, to commemorate Bayan's bloodless conquest of the city. In 1309 the court ordered a temple be built in Hang-chou in memory of Bayan. When the temple was completed six years later, a stele composed by Liu Min-chung (1243-1318) was erected there. In the meantime, another stele, composed by Yüan Ming-shan, was dedicated in Ta-tu. Subsequently

20 *ch'ing* of land were granted to the temple in Hang-chou to support half-yearly sacrifices. The temple was rebuilt in 1347 after it had burned down, as were those of his colleagues, Aju and Alaqa. Another temple in memory of both Bayan and his predecessor, the great Muqali, was built in Tung-p'ing in 1347. At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, the founder, Emperor T'ai-tsu (r. 1368-98), rejected the proposal to destroy Bayan's temple in Hang-chou, on the grounds that Bayan had done great service to the local people by conquering them without bloodshed.

Bayan married three times. His wife in Persia, whose name is not known, bore him a son called Noqai who may have remained in Persia. His wives in China, Besüjin, the sister of An-t'ung, and Dinnu bore him three sons: Maidi, Nanggiadai, and Dojinpü. Because of Bayan's military achievements, his descendants were almost automatically appointed to the ranking positions of the Department of Military Affairs. Moreover, since both Bayan and his grandson Senggeširi married ladies of Muqali's lineage, their family seems to have had a very close relationship with that most prominent Mongol clan.

Surprisingly, although a military man and despite his upbringing in Persia, Bayan seems to have mastered the Chinese literary arts to a creditable degree. Hsü Yu-jen (1287-1364), who had the opportunity to view two examples of Bayan's signature, considered his brush-strokes as vigorous as a veteran calligrapher's. Wu Sheng, a Ch'ing calligraphic connoisseur, said that Bayan was versed in the cursive style of calligraphy and saw in his elegant and calm strokes the influence of the great Chin master Jen Hsün. Four Chinese poems by Bayan have survived, as well as a *san-ch'ü* lyric. The following is his poem 'With an Order to Conquer Chiang-nan':

Swords point at the blue mountains,
The mountains are about to crack.
Horses drink at the (Yangtze) River,
The river is about to dry.
A million élite soldiers conquer Chiang-nan,
Arms will not be stained with human blood.

In terms of diction, the poem leaves much to be desired. In spirit, however, Bayan effectively conveys the vigour of a Mongol warrior and his humanitarian desire to achieve the bloodless conquest which Qubilai had expected of him.

Because Bayan's conquest of the Sung was of such great historical significance, a number of legends grew around him during and after the event. One of these is reported in both Chinese and Western accounts. According to the *Yü-t'ang chia-hua* by Wang Yün (q.v.), a ditty in Chiang-nan predicted before the fall of the Sung that the region would not be conquered until 'a hundred wild geese (*pai yen*) had come.' Only after the conquest did the people realise that 'a hundred wild geese' referred to Bayan, since the words *pai yen* and the Chinese transcription of the name Bayan were

homophones. A variant of the same pun in the form of *po-yen* or 'white wild goose' appeared in the 'Song of the White Wild Goose' ('Po-yen hsing') written by the noted Confucian scholar Liu Yin (*q.v.*), in which the Sung dynasty was said to have been destroyed when the white wild goose had come. Marco Polo, who perhaps heard of the prophecy from the Mongol side, gives us a more elaborate but substantially different version. According to Marco, the king of Mangi, i.e. the Sung emperor, had discovered from astrology that he could not lose his kingdom except to a man who had a hundred eyes. Since he did not know that 'Baian Hundred Eyes' had been dispatched to conquer the Sung, he felt safe in the belief that no normal man could have a hundred eyes (the Chinese phrase 'hundred eyes' was *pai yen*, another pun for Bayan). Later, after the king had fled, his queen surrendered the kingdom when she learned that the commander of the invading army was no other than Baian Hundred Eyes, a confirmation of the punning prophecy.

Another cluster of legends centres around Bayan and the bores of the Che River, which was known for its violent tidal waves. Immediately after the takeover of Lin-an, Bayan positioned part of his troops under the command of Fan Wen-hu on the sandflats of the river, apparently to guard the eastern flank of the city against the Sung loyalists. The Sung Empress Dowager Hsieh is said have prayed for the coming of the tidal wave to wipe out the Yüan forces. However, the Yüan army remained safe, for the tide, which came in twice a day as a rule, failed to rise for three days. This was attributed at the time to the assistance given by Heaven to the Yüan. Another version of the story which can only be traced to the Ming writer Wu Kuei-ch'eng has it that the bore failed to come only because Bayan had shot three arrows in the water before he took his troops to the river. These legends reflect the fact that in the minds of the people at the time and later, the conquest of the Sung by the Yüan resulted from Bayan's personal might, besides having been the Sung's destiny as mandated by Heaven.

In appearance and character, Bayan is depicted by his contemporary, the scholar-official Wang Yün, as 'majestic but not fierce, and simple yet courteous'; by Yüan Ming-shan, the author of his stele, as 'rich in endowment and tranquil in appearance,' 'lofty, magnanimous, firm and incorruptible, fearless and unfathomable in emotion.' As a general he is described in the *P'ing-Sung lu* as a superb strategist and tactician who could use arms of all sorts to attack or to defend at the most opportune times and places, an excellent commander who won the hearts of his subordinates by handing out rewards and punishments always in a fair manner, and a good judge of men who never failed to put the right person in the right job. His biography in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*) sums up his leadership as follows: 'He led a host of 200,000 to attack the

Sung as if he were leading but a single man. His generals looked up to him as if he were a god.'

As the commander-in-chief in the destruction of the Sung and one of the most important political as well as military pillars of Qubilai's and the beginning of Temür's reigns, Bayan was naturally praised in the highest terms by writers throughout the Yüan dynasty. The patent of canonisation written by Yen Fu exalted him for providing the empire with great stability as a civil administrator, for supporting Temür's enthronement after Qubilai's death, and more importantly for realising Qubilai's humane wishes regarding the conquest of the Sung as a result of which the country was speedily unified. In a similar vein, Su T'ien-chüeh (1294-1352), the famous late-Yüan historian, praised his achievement in unifying China after a three-century division by faithfully carrying out Qubilai's instruction to prevent wanton killing during the conquest of the Sung. Even Chao Meng-fu (1254-1322), a Sung imperial clansman and one of the most highly respected literati of the Yüan period, wrote a poem to eulogize the humane way in which Bayan unified China.

This appraisal of Bayan, however, changed drastically soon after the overthrow of the Mongols by the native Ming dynasty. Li Shan-ch'ang (1314-90), the Left chancellor of the Ming founder, T'ai-tsu, rejected the likening of Bayan to Ts'ao Pin by citing as evidence of his brutality the massacres at Sha-yang and Ch'ang-chou which were carried out under Bayan's orders. Li also condemned Bayan's arrogance when he referred to the Sung as 'island barbarians' and Lin-an as the 'mock capital' in the congratulatory memorial he submitted to Qubilai upon the Sung surrender. One century later, the renowned Confucian thinker Ch'iu Chün (1420-95) denied Bayan's humanity in even stronger terms. He believed that the precept of sparing lives was practiced only at Lin-an, not elsewhere during the conquest, and that Lin-an was taken without bloodshed only because of the Sung's voluntary surrender, not as a result of Bayan's compassion. In fact, cruelty, in Ch'iu's view, was a part of the nature of the 'barbarians'; Bayan, as a barbarian, could never be expected to act like Ts'ao Pin. Such drastic revision reflects not only the dynastic change from the Yüan to the Ming, but also the rise of a militant Han ethnocentrism in Chinese politics and thought during the Ming period.

In retrospect, Bayan was undoubtedly the greatest soldier-statesman of Qubilai's times. As a statesman, Bayan served as one of the highest ranking civil and military executives in the central government for nearly two decades, concerned in many important decisions relating to the expansion and consolidation of the Yüan empire. As a field commander, Bayan was a key figure in stabilising the Yüan defence in Mongolia and Central Asia against Qaidu and his allies. His historical importance, however, rests mainly in his contribution to the conquest of the Sung.

To be sure, the Mongol conquest of the Sung cannot be ascribed to Bayan alone. The Mongols' success where the Jurchens had failed should be attributed, to a large extent, to the solid foundations laid by Qubilai's predecessors, and to the correct military and political strategies adopted by Qubilai. By the time Bayan assumed command in 1274, the Mongols had been attacking the Sung intermittently for forty years, thereby exhausting the latter's ability and will to resist. As in any war, the responsibility for the higher direction of the conquest of the Sung lay in political hands. It was Qubilai who adopted the grand strategy of attacking the Sung by way of the Han valley instead of Szechwan as had previously been done by Möngke Qa'an. It was also Qubilai who decided to rely as much on political persuasion as on force to conquer the Sung. Nevertheless, without Bayan's faithful and efficient implementation of his policies, Qubilai's desire for the conquest would have remained unfulfilled.

Throughout the campaign, Bayan showed a single-minded devotion to the purpose of a speedy and humane conquest of the Sung. In order to crush the Sung as quickly as possible, he never allowed the advance of his armies to be delayed for the sake of secondary gains. Even when Qubilai instructed him to halt the advance in the early summer of 1275 because of weather conditions, Bayan insisted on pressing on. But the consideration of speed never led him to rely on force alone. At no time, it seems, did Bayan forget the instructions given by Qubilai to emulate Ts'ao Pin in conquering the South as bloodlessly as possible. He put his trust in political and psychological means to destroy the Sung defence: strict discipline over his own troops and generous promises to the Sung generals and officials were his most effective instruments to induce the Sung people to submit. Such means proved so effective that only a few pitched battles were fought, and massacres of inhabitants in fallen cities, which were so frequent elsewhere, occurred only twice in the entire campaign. Bayan's speedy conquest and restrained behaviour not only enabled the Yüan to take over the area south of the Yangtze, the richest in the entire empire, largely undamaged, but also helped his lord to strengthen his position as the legitimate ruler of the whole of China.

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C.C. Hsiao

35. CHANG HUNG-FAN (1238-1280)

The drowning in 1279 of the last claimant to the Sung throne at Yai-shan off the Kwangtung coast marked not only the completion of the Mongol conquest of China which had started nearly seventy years earlier, but also the first annexation of the whole of China by an alien regime. The commander-in-chief of the combined Sino-Mongolian forces that accomplished this historic campaign was the Chinese general Chang Hung-fan. Consequently, Hung-fan has become a controversial figure in Chinese history, receiving much praise during the Yüan and severe condemnations in later times.

Actually, Chang Hung-fan, T. Chung-ch'ou, came from a region that had long been under alien rule. His family had served the Mongols with distinction since the early Mongol campaigns in China. His native district, Ting-hsing, belonging originally to Cho-chou, was part of the sixteen prefectures of Yen-Yün which were ceded to the Khitans in 939 and subsequently ruled by the Khitans and Jurchens for nearly 300 years before being conquered by the Mongols. Hung-fan was the ninth son of Chang Jou (*q.v.*), which accounts for his other name, Chang Chiu or Chang the Ninth. By the time Hung-fan was born in 1238, his father, originally a Chin general, had served the Mongols for twenty years and distinguished himself as one of the most powerful myriarchs (*wan-hu*) of the Han Armies (*Han-chün*). With Pao-chou (Pao-ting in Hopei) as his headquarters and *de facto* fief, Chang Jou had under his jurisdiction more than thirty cities and towns, several divisions of 10,000 troops and 100,000 civilian families. Clearly, Hung-fan's family was one of the most illustrious among the Chinese under Mongol rule and it had never served the Sung or any other Chinese dynasty.

As the son of a distinguished general, immersed in a military environment from childhood, Hung-fan developed quite naturally into an outstanding commander. But his family also provided this young man with an excellent literary education. In Hung-fan's upbringing, the role played by his 'mothers' seems to have been as important as that of his father. Since Chang Jou assumed on behalf of the Mongols the major responsibility of defending the Honan and Anhwei frontiers against the Sung in 1239-1259 and was away from home for most of the time, the upbringing of his children was apparently left to his wives. Little is known about Hung-fan's own mother, née Chao; but the principal wife of Chang Jou, née Mao (1198-1259), was regarded as a learned and capable woman from a Chin scholar-official family. It was she who actually managed the household and it would seem that she had much

influence on the young Hung-fan. Even though Chang Jou had grown up as an unlettered man, he had learned to respect culture and scholars by the time of the conquest of the Chin in 1234. Gathered at his headquarters in Pao-chou were a number of famous Chin officials and literati, and his family library comprised over ten thousand volumes. He engaged as tutors for his children Wang E (*q.v.*), a top-ranking laureate of the Chin civil service examinations and prominent historian, and Hao Ching (*q.v.*), a young scholar destined to become a famous literatus and official at Qubilai's court. Although Hung-fan was at the time too young to be a pupil of Wang E, who left the Chang family for Qara Qorum in 1244 at the summon of Qubilai, he apparently learned much from Hao Ching, who began to teach Chang's children in 1252 if not earlier. Hung-fan, therefore, had an upbringing which was quite different from that of his father. It is little wonder that he should have become a fine literatus as well as a great general.

Hung-fan showed his ability as an official early in life. When his elder brother, Hung-lüeh (d. 1296), went to Möngke's temporary court at Shou-yang in Shansi in 1257 to make an annual report, Hung-fan was asked to act in his brother's absence as the general administrator of the Shun-t'ien district, the former Pao-chou. Although merely twenty years old, Hung-fan is said to have impressed his subordinates and the local population with his intelligence and resolution. For example, he arrested and flogged the Mongolian soldiers in transit who had done violence to the people in Shun-t'ien. Thereafter, the story goes that no Mongolian soldier dared break the law within the Shun-t'ien district. In those days it was a brave Chinese official who dared to discipline the Mongolian military outside his jurisdiction.

Hung-fan began his formal career under Qubilai's new regime in China. In his struggle for the throne with his younger brother Ariq Böke based in Mongolia, Qubilai depended upon the support of northern Chinese generals such as Chang Jou. Consequently, after Qubilai had established his authority in 1260, Hung-fan was immediately appointed, perhaps by virtue of his father's recommendation, to be the general administrator of the newly established Imperial Supplies Service. After staying in the new imperial capital as a young bureaucrat for only two years, Hung-fan was given the opportunity to show his military talent for the first time in 1262 when Li T'an (*q.v.*), a powerful Chinese military lord in Shantung, changed his allegiance to the Sung. By this time Chang Jou had already been retired for one year because of old age. When Li T'an's rebellion broke out, Hung-fan, in concert with his father who was called back to active service, was first ordered to take 2,000 soldiers to guard the capital as a precautionary measure. He was soon appointed field general administrator, to join with a part of his father's troops in the campaign against Li T'an conducted under the command first of Prince Qabiči and then of the Chinese soldier-

statesman Shih T'ien-tse (*q.v.*). In the three-month siege of Li T'an's stronghold in Chi-nan during the summer of 1262, Hung-fan was directed to position his troops west of the city and is credited with ambushing a sortie ordered by Li T'an. In his biographies he is praised as the most meritorious general in the entire campaign. On being told of Hung-fan's performance, his father proudly proclaimed: 'He is truly my son!' Clearly, though only twenty-five, Hung-fan had made his mark as a general.

The merit won by this young leader did not further his career for some time, however, for Qubilai proceeded to eradicate Chinese military feudalism as soon as the Li T'an rebellion had been suppressed. The revolt of such a powerful Chinese military lord incited Qubilai to centralize power by separating local civil administration from military command, and to remove as many members as possible of the Chinese military families. As a result of this reorganization, the civil administration of the old fief of Hung-fan's family, Shun-t'ien, devolved upon his elder brother, Hung-lüeh; the command of the Shun-t'ien and Po-chou myriarchies were assigned respectively to Hung-yen, another elder brother, and Chia Wen-pei (d. 1304), son of an old aid of Chang Jou. Hung-fan was unfortunately relieved of his command and left jobless for the time being. But this unhappy situation did not last long: in 1264 Hung-fan succeeded his elder brother as the general administrator of Shun-t'ien when Hung-lüeh was appointed to the Imperial Guard in the capital. By this time, however, the general administratorship of a district was no longer a hereditary post, but had become transferable under the direct control of Qubilai's strengthened central government. Consequently, Hung-fan was posted the following year to become the general administrator of Ta-ming in Hopei. This transfer broke his family's ties with Shun-t'ien which had lasted since 1227, when Chang Jou first established his headquarters there.

Though ending in dismissal two years later, Hung-fan's time of office in Ta-ming demonstrated his willingness to shoulder responsibilities. In 1265, when the area was affected by serious floods, we are told that he relieved the local populace from much of the taxes. Officials in charge of finance consequently accused him at court of having acted without authority. He was only cleared of the charge after having explained the situation to the emperor in person. But he was less fortunate two years later on being implicated in a case of corruption. According to his biographers, Hung-fan was dismissed from office for protecting his colleague Ayirüt who had caused a person's death. The Annals (*pen-chi*) of Qubilai's reign in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan-shih*), however, say that both Hung-fan and Ayirüt were dismissed as the result of their purloining of government funds. In any case, Hung-fan had to live once more in obscurity for the next two years. This adversity was made doubly painful by the loss of his father who died in 1268 at the advanced age of seventy-nine.

Hung-fan had little time for mourning for he was soon called back when Qubilai resumed the war against the Sung. In 1267, having consolidated his rule in China, Qubilai sent the Mongol general Aju (1223-87) to besiege the twin cities of Hsiang-yang and Fan-ch'eng, which commanded the lower Han basin in Hupei and the gateway to the Yangtze valley. Before long, Qubilai had to mobilize a large number of northern Chinese troops to reinforce Aju and to reinstate in commanding positions many members of the Chinese military families who had been dismissed after the suppression of the Li T'an rebellion. In consequence, Hung-fan was appointed in 1269 field myriarch of I-tu, Tzu-lai and other districts, in command of Li T'an's troops. At this long siege that was to last for five years – one of the most famous in Chinese history – Hung-fan proved his worth both as a fighting leader and as a tactician. He was first assigned to garrison Lu-men shan (on the east bank of the Han river south-east of Hsiang-yang) in order to cut off supplies to the city from the south. With a view to making the blockade more effective, Hung-fan urged Shih T'ien-tse, the commander-in-chief in 1269-1270, to isolate the city from the west by means of fortifications at Wan-shan and to establish ramparts at Kuan-tzu t'an, thus cutting off the city from the east. When the plan was adopted, Hung-fan was given 1,000 troops to fortify Wan-shan. In March 1270, after the work had been completed, Hung-fan defeated a Sung relief force of more than 10,000 men sent up from Hsiang-yang in 100 ships. For this victory he was highly commended by the court.

The siege was making only slow progress; for the next few years Hung-fan continued to be engaged in its prosecution. In 1271, his troops helped construct the wall connecting all the forts built earlier, thus tightening the noose around the twin cities. The following March, he participated in an attack on Fan-ch'eng and breached the outer defences of the city, but the Sung army commanded by Fan T'ien-shun (d. 1273) managed to close the inner wall and held it. Although the Yüan army intensified the attack in early February 1273, little progress was made and Hung-fan himself was wounded by an arrow. This did not prevent him from reporting to Ariq Qaya and Aju with the suggestion that a floating bridge linking the two cities should be destroyed to stop reinforcements moving between them. By following Hung-fan's advice, the Yüan army was able to cause the fall of Fan-ch'eng that same month and to force the surrender of Hsiang-yang in March. After that event, Hung-fan led Lü Wen-huan, the Sung commander of the surrendered city, to court and was consequently awarded brocades, silver and a jewelled saddle by Qubilai.

With the fall of Hsiang-yang, the door to the Yangtze valley was opened. In the following year, the Yüan army launched a three-pronged attack that was to lead to the capture of the Sung capital Lin-an in 1276. Rushing back from the north, Hung-fan joined the central army under the commander-in-chief Bayan (*q.v.*) himself. Setting

out in October 1274 from Hsiang-yang, this army advanced with a large flotilla along the Han River toward the Yangtze. To cross the Yangtze, Hung-fan first took part in the assault on Wu-chi Fortress in early January 1275, which enabled the Yüan army to gain a footing on the northern bank of the river. A few days later under the command of Ariq Qaya, Hung-fan and the Yüan army seized Yang-lo Fortress, the strategic islet in the river, thus successfully crossing the Yangtze. This, together with the surrender the same month of the important city of E-chou meant that the Yüan army was now poised to move down the river toward the Sung heartland.

The Yüan army met little resistance along the Yangtze until it reached Ting-chia chou (north-east of T'ung-ling in Anhwei), where a decisive battle took place on 19 March. In this battle, during which Hung-fan fought in the vanguard, the Yüan army routed a large Sung force of more than 100,000 men and 2,500 ships commanded by the Sung prime minister Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75) in person. This crushing victory was proof that the Yüan army was able to defeat the Sung's last defence, the navy.

After the Yüan army had entered Chien-k'ang, the modern Nanking, without a fight in late March, Bayan received an order two months later instructing him to cease operations till the autumn, on the grounds that summer was at its height. It was Hung-fan, according to his biographies, who urged Bayan not to comply with the order, arguing that the enemy should be given no breathing-space. Thus while Bayan was away between June and November explaining the situation to Qubilai, the army he left behind continued to consolidate its gains on both banks of the lower Yangtze.

During that period, Hung-fan followed Aju in an attack against the major city on the Grand Canal, Yang-chou, where the Sung general Li T'ing-chih (d. 1276) offered a gallant defence. Hung-fan was first assigned to garrison Kua-chou at the confluence of the Grand Canal and the Yangtze, where Aju had set up his headquarters. When the advance troops commanded by Shih Pi (1212-97) were attacked in July by the Sung general Chiang Ts'ai (d. 1276) with 20,000 men at Yang-tzu ch'iao, about 8 km south of Yang-chou, Hung-fan followed Aju to reinforce Shih Pi's forces. In the ensuing battle on the banks of the Grand Canal, Hung-fan clearly demonstrated his courage and prowess. He is credited with having led a party of only thirteen horsemen across the canal and to have charged into the Sung ranks causing a panic in the Sung army that led to its final collapse. As a result, more than 10,000 Sung soldiers are said to have been killed by the Yüan army which followed the charge, and only one tenth of their original number managed to escape. After this victory, the Yüan army was able to besiege Yang-chou, even though that city was not to be captured until mid 1276, after the fall of the Sung capital.

Hung-fan also contributed to the naval victory at Chiao-shan, which helped prevent the resurgence of the Sung forces in the lower Yangtze. By mid 1275, the

Sung forces were again active in the area south of the Yangtze and several cities such as Ch'ang-chou, P'ing-chiang and Wu-hsi, which had surrendered earlier, changed their allegiance back to the Sung. The Sung generals Chang Shih-chieh (1236-79) and Sun Hu-ch'en assembled an immense fleet of 10,000 vessels and occupied Chiao-shan, an islet in the Yangtze north-east of Chen-chiang. The Yüan fleet commanded by Aju destroyed this armada on 26 July by means of fire arrows. For his part, Hung-fan captured eighty Sung vessels and more than 1,000 soldiers. After this battle, Sung was said to be no longer able to form an army and its fate was largely sealed. As a reward for his contribution, Hung-fan was allowed to exchange the command of the Teng-chou myriarchy for that of Po-chou which had belonged to his father. Moreover, in appreciation of his bravery, Qubilai gave him the Mongolian title *bätür* or 'hero', a rare honour which Möngke had conferred on Hung-fan's father.

In the final attack on the Sung capital that was launched in late November after Bayan had returned from the north, Hung-fan joined the left wing of the army commanded by Tung Wen-ping (*q.v.*) which was to approach Lin-an by sea. The fleet set out from Hsü-p'u at the mouth of the Yangtze in late December 1275 and disembarked in Yen-kuan at the head of the Gulf of Hang-chou in late January 1276. After joining forces at the Kao-t'ing Mountain, 16 km from Lin-an, with two other armies led respectively by Bayan and Alaqa (1233-81), which had come by land, Hung-fan served as emissary in the final phase of negotiations with the terrified Sung court. He is credited with forcing the Sung ministers to rephrase the memorial of surrender, reducing the terms of relationship between the two emperors from that of uncle and nephew to one of sovereign and subject.

The formal surrender of the Sung emperor Kung-ti (r. 1275-76) on 21 February did not mean the conclusion of the war, however, since much of south China still held out for the Sung. Moreover, two half-brothers of the captive Sung emperor, Shih and Ping, had fled to the south. In June, Shih was enthroned by some loyalist at Fu-chou in Fukien, to be known as the Emperor Tuan-tsung (r. 1276-78). The fugitive Sung court thus became the rallying point of Sung loyalism in south China. Hung-fan was destined to play an increasingly important role in the war against the Sung loyalists that was to last three more years.

In late 1276 and early 1277, Hung-fan was engaged in the pacification of Che-tung under the command of Tung Wen-ping and Alaqa, who had been in charge of the conquest of Che-tung and Fu-chien after Bayan had returned north with the main army in late March 1276. By late 1276, many cities in the Che-tung which had earlier surrendered to the Yüan again rallied to the Sung. Hung-fan, together with Södü (d. 1284), was ordered to pacify these places. When his army captured T'ai-chou, where the envoy sent by him to negotiate for surrender had been murdered, many of his

subordinates urged him to slaughter all the inhabitants. Hung-fan, it is said, rejected this proposal and executed only those who were mainly responsible for the death of the envoy. After completing the campaign in 1277, he was granted the honorific title of Grand General Defender of the State and appointed pacification commissioner of the Chiang-tung region with his headquarters in Chien-k'ang.

The resilience of the fugitive Sung court was to offer Hung-fan the opportunity to crown his career. By the summer of 1278 the fortune of the Sung state had further declined. The court had long fled Fukien before the pursuing Yüan forces, to set up temporary residence at various places near the mouth of the Pearl River in Kwangtung. The young Sung emperor Shih died in May 1278 at Kang-chou, an island off the eastern coast of the Lei-chou peninsula. His younger brother, Ping, then a boy of six, was proclaimed emperor a few days later by the loyalists Chang Shih-chieh and Lu Hsiu-fu (1238-79). Ping's court was moved to Yai-shan, an island about 40 km south of Hsin-hui, in late June. The court still commanded 200,000 soldiers and civilians and over 1,000 vessels, and it could be supplied from the various prefectures of Kuang-yu in Kwangsi and Hai-wai ssu-chou in Hainan. Some places in Fu-chien, Kuang-tung and Hu-nan still responded to its call. The continued existence of the fugitive Sung court in southernmost China posed a real threat both to the Yüan's legitimacy and to the order the Yüan sought to establish in south China.

In the summer of 1278, Hung-fan reported the situation to Qubilai during an audience, urging him to undertake a new campaign to wipe out the remnants of the Sung once and for all. His proposal immediately struck a responsive chord and in late July Qubilai appointed him grand marshal of the Mongol and Han Armies, to take charge of the campaign by sea. In appointing Hung-fan the supreme commander of this campaign, Qubilai perhaps had little option, since many senior generals were tied up in a war against the Mongol princes Qaidu and Širegi who, from the northern steppes, were challenging Qubilai's legitimacy as qa'an. Moreover, the campaign against the fugitive Sung court was to be conducted in an area where the climate and terrain were not suitable for the horsemen from the steppes. Soldiers and sailors from central and south China were required. Hung-fan who came from a family that had rendered long and distinguished service and who had demonstrated his naval skills in the battles of Ting-chia chou and Chiao-shan, was apparently an acceptable candidate to command this amphibious campaign. As the appointment of a Chinese general to lead the Mongol as well as the Chinese armies in the field was unprecedented, Hung-fan asked Qubilai to assign a trusted Mongol general to assist him. Qubilai rejected his proposal, reminding Hung-fan that Chang Jou, his father, had once lost a captured Sung city, possibly in 1238, only because the Mongol commander Čaqān had failed to adopt Chang Jou's advice. Qubilai further admonished Hung-fan to serve the state

with the same devotion as his father. But Hung-fan was prudent enough successfully to suggest that the Tangut general Li Heng (1236-85) be appointed his deputy. Hung-fan's insistence on having a Mongol or *se-mu* general share his command reflects the difficult position of a Chinese commander in the armed forces of the conquering regime. That Qubilai set a precedent in appointing Hung-fan commander-in-chief clearly shows the degree of trust Qubilai had in him.

When Hung-fan took leave of the throne, Qubilai bestowed on him a suit of precious armour and a jewelled sword that symbolised the discretionary powers the emperor was investing in him. After enlisting 20,000 men (1,000 Mongol cavalrymen, 4,000 infantrymen and 15,000 marines) from the Regional Secretariat Council of Chiang-Huai in Yang-chou, Hung-fan embarked his troops at Ming-chou and Hsiu-chou in Chekiang. His army first landed in the Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou region to suppress the Sung loyalist forces in southern Fukien and northeastern Kwangtung. Seizing Chang-chou on 28 December, Hung-fan was informed that the redoubtable Sung loyalist Wen T'ien-hsiang (1236-83) was in Ch'ao-yang. He immediately sent his younger brother Hung-cheng with a vanguard of 5,000 light cavalrymen to pursue Wen. On 2 February, Hung-cheng caught up with Wen's troops at Wu-p'o ling, north of Hai-feng, and took Wen prisoner. By capturing Wen T'ien-hsiang, Hung-fan had removed a threat to the Yüan from one of the most determined Sung loyalists.

Unable to persuade Wen T'ien-hsiang to enter the Mongol service, Hung-fan decided to take Wen with him when he sailed from Ch'ao-yang on 14 February in pursuit of the fugitive Sung court. Upon reaching Chia-tzu-men in Hui-chou, he learned the exact whereabouts of the Sung court from captured enemy scouts. His fleet arrived in Yai-shan on 22 February; six days later, Li Heng, who had come from Chiang-hsi by land via Kuang-chou, joined him with 120 vessels and an unspecified number of men.

The remnant Sung forces were perhaps not inferior to those commanded by Hung-fan in effectives, and actually superior in numbers and sizes of vessels. While the Yüan fleet consisted of 500 vessels of various tonnage, according to Wen T'ien-hsiang who witnessed the battle of Yai-shan as a captive, the Sung had over 1,000 ships, most of them large. Morale and tactics won the day. While the Yüan army consisted of crack troops especially selected for the offensive, the Sung forces were demoralised by constant retreat and long confinement on a small island. Their poor condition forced Chang Shih-chieh, the Sung commander, to adopt a completely defensive strategy. He had all the temporary palaces and market places on Yai-shan burned, and withdrew with the court and all his troops to Yai-men Bay where the fleet was anchored. All the vessels of the fleet were chained together to form a square like

a floating city. As Wen T'ien-hsiang noticed, this arrangement practically wasted the fleet as a mobile force.

Even so, Hung-fan was not anxious to attack the Sung fleet. He made several attempts to secure Chang Shih-chieh's surrender. Shih-chieh had once been a subordinate of Chang Jou and had only joined the Sung army after being found guilty of crimes. Therefore Hung-fan invited him to come over to his side and talk about old times. Shih-chieh refused (in his *Hsin-shih*, the staunch Sung loyalist Cheng Ssu-hsiao [1239-1316] claims that Shih-chieh was the uncle of Hung-fan; but that is highly unlikely). Then Hung-fan requested Wen T'ien-hsiang to write a letter urging Chang Shih-chieh to capitulate; Wen declined to do so. Refusing to give up, Hung-fan dispatched on three occasions one Han, Shih-chieh's nephew, whom he had made a junior officer in his army, to make Shih-chieh lay down his arms – to no avail.

Failing to induce the Sung fleet to surrender, Hung-fan had no option but to launch his attack. He first positioned a force to cut off the Sung fleet from its source of drinking water on the island, thereby seriously weakening the Sung troops' fighting ability within some ten days. He then tried to burn the Sung fleet by means of fire ships, but failed for the vessels were protected by a coating of mud covering hulls and rigging, and by beams that staved off the fire boats. Dividing his fleet into four squadrons to attack from all sides, Hung-fan personally led a party that broke into the Sung formation from the south-west. After a day of ferocious fighting, the Sung defence collapsed. Eight hundred Sung vessels are reported to have been captured and more than 100,000 men to have perished – perhaps an exaggeration. Lu Hsiu-fu drowned himself, carrying the child emperor in his arms. Chang Shih-chieh managed to escape and attempted to reach Champa to continue fighting for the Sung cause, but he too perished at sea in June. Thus, with the naval victory at Yai-shan, Hung-fan completed the annihilation of the Sung and the conquest of all of China for the Mongols. To commemorate his achievement, Hung-fan had these proud words engraved on a rock at Yai-shan: 'Here the great Yüan general, Chang Hung-fan, destroyed the Sung.'

Returning triumphantly to the imperial capital in November, Hung-fan received a hero's welcome which he certainly deserved. Qubilai gave a banquet in his honour. Unfortunately, Hung-fan did not have much time to relish the glory he had won on the battlefield, for he soon was stricken by a disease caught while campaigning in southernmost China. The emperor sent one of his personal physicians to care for him, and detailed imperial guardsmen to keep unwelcome visitors away. Nevertheless, by 11 February 1280 the patient's condition had worsened so much that Hung-fan knew his time had come. He requested his family not to give him a lavish funeral, but to bury him with only a set of armour and a sword. To his son Kuei (1264-1327) he left

the armour and the sword bestowed on him by Qubilai, with the reminder that those had been the instruments of his greatness. He died peacefully after completing his instructions. He was only forty-three. He was buried in his family graveyard at Honei li, Ting-hsing. As a last tribute to the great soldier, Qubilai granted him posthumously the honorific title of Great Officer of Eminent Dignity and the rank of director of political affairs, and canonized him as Wu-lüeh ('Martial and Strategist'). In 1311 he was invested as Duke-of-state of Ch'i and re-canonized as Chung-wu ('Loyal and Martial'). Eight years later, he was elevated to Prince of Huai-yang and his canonization was changed anew to Hsien-wu ('Sagacious and Martial').

Hung-fan's wife, née Chao, was the daughter of a general subordinate to Chang Jou, Chao Ming, who was killed in action in 1242. Chang Kuei was her only son, whose brilliance consoled her for not having given him brothers. Appointed commanding myriarch in 1279 at the age of sixteen, Kuei served as a respected minister under six reigns. The family suffered a major setback in 1328-1330, however: five of Chang Kuei's six sons were executed and the family's property was twice impounded by Tuq Temür (r. 1328-32) because Kuei had supported Yisün Temür (r. 1324-28), from whom Tuq Temür had wrested the throne. Even so, two of Chang Kuei's grandsons, Wang and Hsü, are known to have served respectively as deputy pacification commissioner of Kuang-tung in 1342 and as a censorial inspector of Chiang-nan in 1350. Thus, the good fortune of Hung-fan's family was to last almost as long as the Yüan dynasty itself.

Hung-fan was a versatile literatus as well as a distinguished soldier, a 'scholar-general' (*ju-chiang*) par excellence. It is reported that he was an avid reader and very quick to grasp the essence of what he read. Because he studied under Hao Ching, he is listed as one of the latter's followers in the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an pu-i*. He is also known to have been a fine poet, equally versed in the genres of *shih*, *tz'u* and *san-ch'ü*. As a writer of *san-ch'ü*, he had the honour of being listed as one of the precursors of that genre in Chung Ssu-ch'eng's *Lu-kuei pu*, a register of the famous *san-ch'ü* and *tsa-chü* writers of the Yüan. As a soldier poet whose poems were virile and vigorous, Hung-fan has often been compared to Ts'ao Ts'ao (155-220), the famous statesman-poet of the Three Kingdoms period. His collected poetic works, now known as the *Huai-yang chi*, are composed of two parts containing 120 *shih*, 26 *tz'u* and 5 *san-ch'ü*. They were first published, apparently not long after Hung-fan's death, as the *Chang Hsien-wu wang chi* by the Ching-i tang ('Hall of Reverence and Righteousness') of the Wang family of Chin-t'ai, and were reprinted in 1350 by the author's great-grandson Chang Hsü. The present title was adopted in 1511, when the work was published once again by Chou Yüeh, the magistrate of Kung-an. The *Huai-yang chi* was incorporated in 1781 into the great imperial collection *Ssu-k'u ch'üan*.

shu. This edition is now easily accessible as it has been included in the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen* published in Taipei. Another edition was published in 1895 by Lu Chuan-lin. Some of Hung-fan's *shih*-poems have been selected and printed in the *Yüan-shih hsüan* and in the *Sung Yüan shih-hui*. Hung-fan's *tz'u* and *san-ch'ü* were also published separately in the *Ssu-yin chai k'o Sung Yüan san-shih-i chia tz'u*. Some of his *san-ch'ü* also appear in such collections as: *Li-yüan an-shih yüeh-fu hsin-sheng*, compiled by an anonymous Yüan author; *Yüeh-fu ch'ün-chu*, compiled during the Ming; *Yao-shan-t'ang wai-chi*, compiled by Chiang I-k'uei; and the *Ch'üan Yüan san-ch'ü*.

As the Chinese general who completed the Mongol conquest of China, Hung-fan was universally praised during the Yüan dynasty. The late Yüan scholar Liu Yüeh-sheng, for example, compared him to Yang Hu (221-78) and Ts'ao Pin (931-99), soldiers whose role was paramount in unifying China under the Chin and Sung dynasties respectively, and he admired Hung-fan greatly for establishing Yüan's 'legitimate' rule over China. Esteem for Hung-fan waned, however, after the fall of the Yüan. As the native Ming dynasty replaced the Mongol regime, and the distinction between Chinese and 'barbarians' intensified in Chinese thinking, Hung-fan came consequently to be castigated as a traitor to the Chinese race. Huang Ch'un, compiler of the *Ch'ung-hsiu Yai-shan chih*, asserted that Chang Jou and Hung-fan, father and son, were guilty of monstrous crimes, since Chang Jou, originally a Sung subject, had dishonoured himself first by serving the Chin and again by helping the Mongols destroy the Chin; Hung-fan, for his part, had destroyed the native Sung dynasty on behalf of the Mongols. Similarly, in the best tradition of Chinese 'praise and blame' (*pao-pien*) in historiography, the great Ming Neo-Confucianist Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500) is said to have taken the liberty of changing a key word in Hung-fan's inscription at Yai-shan. To highlight the latter's treason, he made it read: 'Here did the great Sung general, Chang Hung-fan, destroy the Sung.' In 1479, Ch'en also had a stone engraved at Yai-shan with a poem in which his friend Chao Yao further berated Hung-fan for his action:

Heartlessly, they seized China for alien barbarians.
How sad it is when one looks back into history!
Chang Hung-fan, who inscribed his merits on a singular stone,
Was not a barbarian but a Chinese!

Moreover, in order to denigrate Hung-fan's achievement and to commemorate the death of his Sung adversaries, Ch'en K'ai, an educational intendant, completely erased Hung-fan's Yai-shan inscription and wrote in its stead: 'Here the young emperor of Sung and his subject, Lu Hsiu-fu, gave their lives for their country.'

Hung-fan was dealt with more harshly still in literary and political writings when modern Chinese nationalism, and its anti-Manchu streak in particular, emerged

around the turn of the twentieth century to become the driving force of the 1911 Revolution. The earlier figures who collaborated with nomad conquerors, such as Hung-fan, tended to be identified with the supporters of the Manchus, and even with the colonial powers. In the historical novel *T'ung-shih* (*The Sad Story*) serialized in 1902-1906, which related the Mongol conquest of the Sung, Wu Wo-yao (1867-1910) sharply contrasted Hung-fan's treachery with the loyalty of Wen T'ien-hsiang and Chang Shih-chieh, denouncing Hung-fan as a shameless little man who invaded his motherland and mercilessly killed his fellow countrymen for the sake of glory and wealth. Similarly, in his influential revolutionary tract *Ko-ming chün* (*The Revolutionary Army*), the revolutionary prodigy, Tsou Jung (1885-1905), lumped Hung-fan together with Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593-1665), a famous *erh-ch'eng* ('disloyal minister') who helped the Manchus destroy the Ming whom he had served. Further, Tsou Jung mentioned Hung-fan in the same breadth with Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-72), Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-85), and Li Hung-chang (1823-1901), the three Chinese officials in the service of the Manchus responsible for suppressing the T'ai-p'ing movement, whom he accused of enslaving their compatriots on behalf of alien lords. In the same vein, Ch'en T'ien-hua (1875-1905), in his inflammatory *Meng hui-t'ou* (*Sudden Realization*) published in 1903, compared Hung-fan to an owl and a Muntjac tiger (*hsiao-ching*), animals believed to devour their own parents. Ch'en asserted that Hung-fan deserved the punishment of being hacked to pieces. Moreover, hatred for an alleged traitor like Hung-fan was felt in the late Ch'ing not only by people with revolutionary leanings; followers of the leading reformer K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927), including Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929), are said to have destroyed Hung-fan's tablet in K'ang's school, the Wan-mu ts'ao-t'ang, on the ground that Hung-fan, as a member of the Han race, had served as the 'claws and teeth' of the 'barbarian slaves' in destroying the native Sung dynasty.

Much of the invectives that have been directed against Hung-fan are not necessarily fair or historically accurate. The allegation that he was disloyal to the Sung dynasty is not founded in fact, since neither Hung-fan nor his father had ever been subjects of the Sung or served under the Sung in official capacities. As mentioned earlier, his native town, Ting-hsing, was in a part of Hopei that had not been ruled by the Sung. Moreover, by the time he completed the conquest of China, his family had been in the Mongols' service for all of sixty-one years. His ultimate loyalty was naturally to the Yüan. It was as normal for him to assist his dynastic masters in completing the conquest of the Sung, as for Wen T'ien-hsiang and Chang Shih-chieh to sacrifice their lives for the Sung; all conformed with the highest standards of loyalty in imperial Confucianism.

The charge that Hung-fan was a Chinese traitor is an anachronism, for it amounts to criticising his conduct according to a concept of national identity which developed only at a later stage in Chinese history. As is well-known, the notion of Chinese nationhood was cultural rather than ethnic for most of the imperial era. The idea of a state founded on a racial entity was lacking. To serve an alien ruler who had professed to practice the 'ways of the former kings,' as Kung-chuan Hsiao put it, 'involved not the slightest humiliation.' Even though a few Southern Sung scholars such as Ch'en Liang (1143-94) had developed proto-nationalist ideas by the late twelfth century, stressing ethnic loyalty and the distinction between Chinese and foreigners, their influence was limited and confined to south China only. Ethnically based proto-nationalism did not become a fact until the early Ming, when it was promoted by scholars as well as by the government; it only assumed a virulent modern form at the turn of the twentieth century when the concept of nation-state was accepted in the throws of imperialist onslaughts which the Manchu government was impotent to defeat. By the political and ethical standard of his time, Hung-fan is blameless: he has fallen a victim to changing conceptions of national loyalty and identity.

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36. THE TUNG BROTHERS: TUNG WEN-PING (1217-1278), TUNG WEN-YUNG (1224-1297), TUNG WEN-CHUNG (1230-1281)

Tung Wen-ping (T. Yen-ming), Wen-yung (T. Yen-ts'ai) and Wen-chung (T. Yen-ch'eng) were three of the nine sons of a Chinese farmer turned militia leader who rallied to the Mongols in the early stages of their invasion of north China. They were still under-age when their father died in battle on the eve of the Mongol conquest of the Chin state in 1234. In the early 1250s, they joined Qubilai's entourage and were to enjoy distinguished careers during his reign as qa'an (1260-94). A born general, the eldest, Wen-ping, took part in numerous military campaigns and reached the apex of his career with the capture of the Southern Sung capital Lin-an (Hang-chou) in 1276. An outspoken scholar-official, the third-born, Wen-yung, held many important offices and lived an eventful political life. As Qubilai Qa'an's lifetime seal keeper, the eighth-born brother, Wen-chung, remained extremely close to his master. He was one of the most trusted Chinese subjects and a nearly indispensable servant in the daily life of the Mongol ruler.

Rise of the Family

The three brothers were natives of Kao-ch'eng, a small town east of Chen-ting (Cheng-ting) in western Hopei. Their father Tung Chün (T. Yung-chang, 1186-1233) was a barely literate young farmer when the Mongols began their attack on the Chin state in 1211. Brave, robust and skilled in horsemanship and archery, he rose to distinction in the troubled years immediately following the Mongol invasion. By virtue of his prowess, he was elected the leader of a militia band newly organised by the magistrate of his home town in 1213 or 1214. He is said to have led his men against the enemy, but whether he actually fought the Mongols is not known.

Soon after the Mongols had captured Chung-tu (Peking) and advanced southward in 1215, Tung Chün surrendered outside Kao-ch'eng. At the time he commanded only a few hundred soldiers at most, and never in his life did the number of his troops exceed a thousand. In the years following his surrender, however, he played an important role in helping the Mongols bring to terms Wu Hsien (d. 1234), the most powerful Chin militia leader active in western Hopei. For his contributions, he was granted in 1220 the honorific title Supreme General of the Dragon and Tiger Guard and the authority to exercise the functions of the Marshal's Administration in his home town. Thus, in a few years of chaos the orphaned son of an ordinary farmer under Jurchen rule became a local strongman in the service of the Mongols.

In 1225 Wu Hsien, then the deputy commander in Chen-ting, killed his immediate superior Shih T'ien-ni (b. 1197) and rebelled (see the biography of Shih T'ien-tse). Most cities and towns in western Hopei followed him, but Tung Chün stood firmly for the Mongols. He not only drove back numerous attacks on his isolated stronghold but also contributed to the recovery of Chen-ting. He gave Shih T'ien-tse, younger brother of Shih T'ien-ni, 600 élite soldiers and together they drove Wu Hsien from the city in a surprise attack. Tung Chün thus saved the Shih family from ruin, and became a protégé of the younger but much more powerful warrior Shih T'ien-tse.

In 1229 the newly enthroned Ögödei Qa'an (T'ai-tsung, r. 1229-41) reorganised the Han (North Chinese) Armies in preparation for the final attack on the Chin state, which since 1214 had retreated south of the Yellow River with Pien (K'ai-feng, Honan) as its new capital. Tung Chün was made chiliarch under the newly appointed myriarch, Shih T'ien-tse. Just four years later, however, Tung Chün gave his life for the Mongols during the siege of Kuei-te where the last Chin ruler Ai-tsung (1224-34) had fled after breaking out from his embattled capital.

Against the advice of T'ien-tse, who had previously left for Pien, the Mongol general Sargis Buqa, T'ien-tse's superior, stationed his army between the northern gate of the besieged city and the southern bank of the Sui River. One night in the summer of 1233, the Chin general P'u-ch'a Kuan-nu (d. 1233) launched a surprise attack on these ill-positioned besiegers. Sargis Buqa and his 3,500 troops all lost their lives, most of them drowned in the river. Tung Chün is said to have fought to the death that night.

The future of his bereaved sons appeared gloomy. As his soldiers had nearly all perished in the tragedy of Kuei-te, his sons were deprived of the privilege of inheriting his command of a *de facto* private army with which they might have established themselves more easily, just as Tung Chün himself had done. Consequently, unlike the descendants of most other military leaders, the careers of Wen-ping and his younger brothers were largely self-made.

At that time Wen-ping was but seventeen; Wen-yung, ten; and Wen-chung, four. They grew up in the care of their able and strict mother née Li (1194-?). Their formal education was entrusted to the renowned Neo-Confucian scholar, Shih-ch'i Chu of Pien, who had been invited to serve as family tutor by Tung Chün only several months before his death. Shih-chi Chu later became the superintendent of schools in the Chen-ting district, the power base of Shih T'ien-tse.

The opportunity for the Tung brothers to re-establish their family's fortune came in 1235 when Wen-ping, at nineteen, was appointed magistrate of Kao-ch'eng. According to his biographies, the appointment was due to the *yin* ('protection')

privilege enjoyed by the heirs of a deceased man of merit. It seems more likely, however, that it was made in compliance with the Mongol rule that placed rallied Chinese and their heirs in charge of their native districts. It is also probable that Shih T'ien-tse, former superior and patron of Tung Chün, and Shih-chi Chu, Wen-ping's teacher, had a hand in the appointment. Whatever the case, Wen-ping remained in office for nearly two decades, thus enabling the Tung family to establish a close relationship with Qubilai.

Wen-ping soon proved himself a competent administrator by exercising his authority wisely and issuing sound judgements. He thus earned the respect of his subordinates, who had at first regarded him as too young to be their superior. More important yet were the policies which he instituted on behalf of his fellow townsmen. First of all, he made sure that his people would be free from oppressive taxation by altering the census taken in 1235-1236 preparatory to the allotment of apanages to the Mongol nobles. Against the opposition of his immediate subordinates and a few commoners, and at the risk of severe punishment to himself, he registered as many persons as possible as members of the same household in order to reduce the total number of households and consequently the burden of household-tax on his people. According to Wang P'an (1202-93), Wen-ping reported only some 600 households, most of which were given as households of the elderly, the young, the maimed and the sick. In contrast, many officials in other places deliberately increased household numbers by registering members of a single family as forming two or more households, with the aim, in the words of Wang P'an, of 'fawning on (their) superiors.'

Wen-ping aided his people in other ways. He provided relief for the poor and paid taxes on their behalf. To help the people earn a living and to attract the war-scattered townsmen back home, he allotted uncultivated public lands to them and protected them from oppression by locally influential families. Like people elsewhere in north China at that time, the inhabitants in Kao-ch'eng also suffered from a ruinous interest rate on the money which Wen-ping's predecessor had borrowed to defray the crushing taxes that they had been unable to pay. For such loans, usually made by Muslim merchants, the principal of one *liang* of silver might yield an interest as high as 1,000 *liang* (1,024 according to *Hei-Ta shih-lüeh*) in ten years. These loans were so profitable that they were compared with a sheep (*yang*) bringing forth lambs (*kao*), thus accounting for the term *yang-hsi* or *yang-kao li*, meaning compound interest (see the biographies of Lien Hsi-hsien and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai). To save his people from such a curse, Wen-ping reportedly sold some of his family properties to repay the usurers. Wen-ping thus brought a measure of stability and prosperity to his home

town and proved himself to be not only a competent but also a benevolent administrator.

The exploitative policies of Mongol rule frustrated this popular magistrate so deeply, however, that Wen-ping was finally forced to give up his office. During the last years of his tenure, he repeatedly refused to exact payments from his people to satisfy his superior in the Chen-ting prefectural government whose pressing demands seem to have originated with Sorqaqtani Beki (d. 1252), mother of Möngke Qa'an (Hsien-tsung, r. 1251-59), Qubilai Qa'an, and the founder of the Il-Khanate, Hülegü (d. 1265). As the principal wife of Tolui (d. 1232), Činggis Qan's fourth son, she was assigned in 1236 the Chen-ting district, including Kao-ch'eng county, as her apanage. She made this district the major source of her wealth, using all the gold and silver collected there to reward the nobility for their support of her son Möngke (r. 1251-1259) in his claim to the throne. So much so that when Möngke's successor, Qubilai, extended the use of paper money nationwide in 1260, the Chen-ting district was unable to provide a sufficiency of gold and silver as cover for the new currency. Presumably, Wen-ping's superior must have played an important role in Sorqaqtani's exploitation of her apanage, for he was in charge of the family properties of the house of Tolui in north China. He would consequently have been enraged by Wen-ping's refusal to cooperate. Unwilling to compromise at the expense of his people, Wen-ping had no option but to resign from official life. He did so sometime between 1250 when Wen-ping came back from Qara Qorum, and 1253 when he joined Qubilai's expedition against the Ta-li kingdom in Yünnan.

Wen-ping visited Qara Qorum in 1250 with his younger brother Wen-yung, on Sorqaqtani's order that the sons or brothers of officials in charge of her apanage in north China be sent to her. This amounted to hostage-taking, a common practice of the time among apanage holders. The hostages usually served in the princely guards. Some of them subsequently rose to distinction, as did Wen-yung. Like his elder brothers, Wen-yung studied under Shih-chi Chu; he developed a stronger interest in scholarship than they did. He passed an examination in poetry and rhymeprose (*fu*) when he was about twenty years old. By the time he came to Qara Qorum, he had, at twenty-seven, already established himself as a young scholar. Following an audience with Sorqaqtani, he was soon assigned to her son Qubilai. A direct relationship between the Mongol prince and the Tung family was thus established.

Qubilai first put Wen-yung in charge of official documents. Later, in 1257, he was given the task of teaching the Chinese Classics to the prince's sons Nomuqan (d. 1301) and Hügeči. But perhaps the most important contribution he made during his ten years of service to Qubilai was the assistance he gave in assembling such distinguished scholars as Li Chih, Tou Mo, Yao Shu (*qq.v.*), Li Chün-min (1176-

1260) and Wei Fan (a *chin-shih* of 1215) at the prince's headquarters. Such concentration of talent was a clear indication of Qubilai's esteem for Chinese culture, and it explains in part why it was he, and not his younger brother Ariq Böke (d. 1265/66), who secured the support of the Chinese people when the two brothers vied for the throne after Möngke's death in 1259. Wen-yung's own scholarship must have greatly benefited from constant contact with his learned colleagues.

The relationship between the Tung family and Qubilai was further strengthened when Wen-chung, at twenty-three, came in 1252 to join his brother Wen-yung in the service of the prince, one year after Qubilai had been given control over the conquered Chinese territory, with headquarters at Chin-lien ch'uan in the area of the upper Luan River in present-day Inner Mongolia. Little is known about Wen-chung's early life except that he enjoyed a good education provided by his elder brothers. Unlike Wen-yung, Wen-chung showed no interest in belles-lettres. He considered poetry to be worthless in personal cultivation and government. Scholarship for him was the application of the lessons of the Confucian Classics which he regarded as 'the real learning' (*shih-hsüeh*). On one occasion, in reply to Wang E's (*q.v.*) inquiry on whether he wrote poetry, Wen-chung said that poetry was not his subject and that his knowledge extended no further than the need to serve parents and rulers with devotion. Thus, in fact, did Wen-chung serve his lord, and so valued was his service that he was kept in closest attendance from the time he came to Qubilai in 1252 until he died in 1281.

The ties between the Tung family and Qubilai were further strengthened in 1253 when Wen-ping undertook a long and arduous journey to Yünnan to offer his service to the prince. The previous year, Qubilai had left his headquarters by order of Möngke Qa'an to lead an expeditionary force against the Ta-li kingdom. In this campaign, the prince's first, Wen-yung and Wen-chung were in charge of supplies and acted at times as advisers. Inspired by the news of the prince's campaign, Wen-ping, then in retirement, wasted no time in assembling forty-six men with two hundred horses (another source has forty men and a third says two hundred 'family followers') and setting out posthaste to join the prince. They marched via Honan, Shensi and Kansu, where they turned south and entered the difficult Tibetan lands. The great majority of Wen-ping's followers died there. Wen-ping himself was exhausted and fell sick. Qubilai was deeply moved by his loyalty and dedication.

Wen-ping's decision to join the army was not surprising, since he was a man who belonged in the field. Born to a distinguished general and raised in a military environment, he had developed from childhood an interest in the art of war. Like his father, he was a champion horseman and archer. Although educated by a renowned scholar, he was not particularly interested in scholarship. His favourite book was the

Tso-chuan, which has been classed as a *hsiang-k'an shu* or 'book on war.' A born soldier, Wen-ping would have found it easier to rise to distinction in times of troubles than in peacetime. But he commanded no troops when he served as the magistrate of his home town, for he had inherited no command from his father. The expedition led by Qubilai thus provided Wen-ping with a chance not only to revive his career but also to demonstrate his natural talent.

His deep loyalty proven by the efforts which he had made to join the prince's camp, Wen-ping was soon given the chiliarch's golden tablet (*chin-fu*), although he had but two followers. Only when ordered by Qubilai in 1255 to raise troops in Shansi and Shensi did Wen-ping command an army. For the next two years, he was in charge of the construction work at K'ai-p'ing (renamed Shang-tu in 1265), Qubilai's new headquarters and the future summer capital of the Yüan emperors. During those years, Wen-yung busied himself with the recruitment of Chinese scholars, while Wen-chung remained at the princely residence.

Two other scions of the Tung family, Wen-wei (T. Yen-hua, d. 1268) and Wen-chih (T. Yen-cheng, 1225-76), also gained fame in those years. Wen-wei, who had not obtained an appointment since he led a small group of men to the south in 1241, was made a campaigning chiliarch of the Kao-ch'eng region by Qubilai in 1254, partly because of his own ability and partly on account of his brothers' connections with the prince. He was soon sent to the south once again. Stationed at Teng-chou, Honan, under the acting myriarch Shih Ch'üan, a nephew of Shih T'ien-tse, Wen-wei contributed greatly to the defence of the areas north of the Southern Sung strongholds of Hsiang-yang and Fan-ch'eng in Hupei. He is credited with having built fortresses at Kuang-hua, P'i-yang and Tsao-yang over the following few years. In 1257, he took part in the attack on Hsiang-yang and displayed his prowess by leading élite troops to capture the outer walls of the city. Like his eldest brother Wen-ping, he was a career soldier famed for his success in military service.

During the same years, Wen-chih served as the magistrate of Kao-ch'eng. His election to succeed his father Chün and eldest brother Wen-ping in the office seems to have owed more to the Tung family's newly established relation with Qubilai than to the Mongol rule of putting rallied Chinese and their heirs in hereditary charge of their native district. As in the case of his brothers Wen-ping and Wen-wei, Wen-chih was also granted the golden tablet.

The Tung brothers served with distinction on both fronts of the two-pronged attack of 1258/59 against the Sung, led respectively by Möngke Qa'an and Qubilai. When the army under Möngke's personal command was held up by the Sung general Wang Chien's (d. 1264) obstinate resistance at the mountain stronghold of Tiao-yü ch'eng in Ho-chou (Szechuan), probably in the first half of 1259, Wen-wei, joined by

Wen-ping's eldest son Shih-yüan (T. Ch'ang-ch'ing, 1235-76), hastily led his élite troops westward from his headquarters at Teng-chou. He attacked the enemy soon after his arrival at the imperial camp, but like other Mongol generals, was repulsed by the stones and arrows poured down from the enemy's inaccessible stronghold. He was nevertheless granted imperial favours for his bravery.

At that time, Wen-ping, Wen-yung and Wen-chung were engaged further east in a campaign under the immediate command of Qubilai. After crossing the Huai River in autumn 1259, Wen-ping was detached to capture the Sung stronghold of T'ai-shan chai at Huang-p'i in Hupeh. He later rejoined the prince and arrived at the Yang-lo fortress guarding a ford on the Yangtze. With his two brothers, Wen-ping led a force against the Sung navy deployed on the Yangtze and advanced to crush the enemy on the south bank of the river. Qubilai was then able to cross the Yangtze safely and proceeded to besiege the Sung stronghold of E-chou. The siege was raised about two months later when Qubilai realised that his hope to succeed Möngke Qa'an, who had died at Tiao-yü ch'eng in August 1259, was threatened by his younger brother Ariq Böke in Mongolia. Qubilai returned to the north to deal with this situation. The Tung brothers accompanied him.

By the time Qubilai proclaimed himself qa'an of the Mongol Empire at K'ai-p'ing on 5 May 1260, the Tung brothers had undoubtedly reached prominent positions in his entourage. Their loyal service and great contributions in the past years guaranteed them an important role in the new qa'an's regime.

Wen-ping: the General

After Qubilai's enthronement in 1260, his authority was defied by his younger brother Ariq Böke, and then by the Chinese warlord Li T'an (*q.v.*). Having restored internal order, Qubilai embarked on the conquest of the Southern Sung. These events provided Wen-ping with the opportunity to pursue his military career. As his father Tung Chün had risen during the Mongol invasion of north China, so did Wen-ping make his name during the years of strife attending the Mongol advance into south China.

On the very day Qubilai ascended the throne, he appointed Wen-ping one of three pacification commissioners of the area south of Yen-ching (Peking), the two others being Ma-ma and Chao Pi (1220-76). This area was in turmoil due partly to the conscription of soldiers by Ariq Böke's supporter Dorji during the interregnum. Wen-ping re-established order and so facilitated Qubilai's campaign against Ariq Böke who had been crowned at Qara Qorum days only after Qubilai's own accession at K'ai-p'ing.

The following summer, leading the Han Army, Wen-ping followed Qubilai in his attack on Ariq Böke. He provided the qa'an's guard and did not engage in actual combat. Ariq Böke fled westward and Qubilai failed to catch up with him.

Back in K'ai-p'ing in early 1261, Wen-ping was soon appointed pacification commissioner of Eastern Shan-tung. But on his way to assume office in September, he was summoned back to K'ai-p'ing to assume an office of even greater importance. He was made general control commissioner of the Imperial Guard. Composed of Han effectives, this newly organised unit of the Guard was at first placed under the sole command of Li Po-yu, a Korean who had formerly served in Shih T'ien-t'se's army. The appointment of Wen-ping as co-commander indicates Qubilai's trust in him. Wen-ping also received the myriarch's golden tiger tablet on his appointment. Having joined Qubilai in 1253 with two followers only, Wen-ping had now become one of the most trusted and powerful Chinese military leaders.

In autumn 1261 Ariq Böke recaptured Qara Qorum and headed for K'ai-p'ing. Qubilai mobilised his troops to repel the advancing enemy. At the same time Wen-ping set out from Yü-erh po (Ta-li po/Dalai Nör in Inner Mongolia) with 1,000 mounted archers to rendezvous with Qubilai. Later that year the two rival forces met and fought at Šimultu, an unidentified lake in the eastern Gobi. Ariq Böke was badly defeated, but did not surrender until the summer of 1264.

Back from Mongolia, Wen-ping was soon engaged in another campaign. This time he enjoyed the company of his brothers Wen-wei and Wen-yung, and of Wen-chih's son Shih-piao (T. Chin-ch'ing, 1245-97). The campaign was directed against Li T'an, the powerful overlord of eastern Shantung who had switched his allegiance to the Sung in February 1262. Li T'an's revolt forced Qubilai to face the possibility of being attacked simultaneously by Ariq Böke on one front and by Li on the other. To overcome this serious threat, Qubilai called up a great number of Mongolian and Chinese soldiers. Li was finally captured and executed in August. After the victory, Prince Qabiči, the commander-in-chief, ordered that 20,000 captured soldiers from Hai-chou and Lien-shui in northeastern Kiangsu be put to death by the victors. Two thousand such prospective victims were reportedly sent to Wen-ping, but following his father's example, he refused to slaughter them. He even persuaded Qabiči to revoke the order. Thus, in addition to his role in suppressing of the revolt, Wen-ping is credited with the preservation of more than 10,000 lives.

The revolt of Li T'an adversely affected the Chinese overlords in the north. Ever since their defection to the Mongols in the early stages of the invasion, these local Chinese strongmen had all exercised hereditary civil and military powers over large areas, and were known consequently as *shih-hou* or hereditary lords. The revolt of Li T'an, however, called their political reliability into question. Steps were taken to

reduce their influence in the wake of the rebellion. These measures included the separation of military and civil powers, the suppression of hereditary privileges and the withdrawal of their fiefs, as well as the removal of as many as possible of their kinsmen from military posts. As a result, authority was centralised and the Chinese armies under the hereditary lords were nationalised. The Mongol rule over China was thereby further consolidated.

The Tung brothers had nothing to lose from the centralisation policies since they had neither fief nor private army and so posed no threat to the Mongols. One limitation placed on the Chinese overlords after Li T'an's rebellion excluded Chinese families from holding more than one military command each. Both Wen-ping and Wen-wei, however, retained their posts in the Imperial Guard as general control commissioner and chiliarch respectively. Moreover, more soldiers were incorporated in the Guard under Wen-ping's command. In 1265, Wen-ping took over the command of two myriarchies from the family of Shih T'ien-tse. When Wen-wei died heirless in 1268, Wen-ping's son Shih-yüan was appointed to succeed in his uncle's office. The fifth Tung brother, Wen-i, was also made a field chiliarch of Teng-chou, probably soon after Li T'an's rebellion. These exceptions to the military regulations underline the extraordinary position of the Tung brothers in Qubilai's new imperial order.

In September following Li T'an's rebellion, a Regional Military Bureau was established to deal with the chaotic post-war situation in Shantung, which was exacerbated by the anti-Mongol activities of Li T'an's lieutenant, Mao Chang, who had rallied some of his former colleagues and was about to stage a second revolt. Not surprisingly, Qubilai chose Wen-ping to undertake the difficult but important task of suppressing Mao. He was made regional military commissioner with discretionary powers. Bringing fifty gold and silver tablets of office with him to use as he thought fit, Wen-ping soon arrived in I-tu. About this time, Sargis, high military administrator of the I-tu Regional Secretarial Council, killed Mao. But Mao's men were reportedly still rebellious. In order not to panic them and make things worse, Wen-ping entered the city with only a few followers. Bearing no weapons, he persuaded the rebellious troops to lay down their arms, promising them military posts as rewards. Thus, Wen-ping brought peace back to Shantung without open violence. He remained in Shantung for about two years in command of the military forces while Sargis dealt with civil affairs.

Wen-ping's force grew larger soon after his arrival at I-tu. By imperial order, it absorbed the so-called Old Army of I-tu and the troops which Li T'an had recruited and transferred to I-tu from Hai-chou, Tung-hai and Lien-shui, and whom Wen-ping had saved from execution. It was expanded further when every five households in the

I-tu district were made to provide a recruit. These conscripts might have formed the so-called New Army of I-tu. Wen-ping was now in command of a greatly enlarged force that consisted of the new and old armies of I-tu. He was referred to henceforth as the myriarch of the New and Old Armies, responsible for the defence of southern Shantung against Sung raids.

In early 1265, as a warning to the Chinese military leaders, two members of the Shih family were removed from office (as the field myriarchs of Teng-chou and Kuang-hua respectively). Wen-ping took over their command and was concurrently made the vice-commissioner of the Military Control Bureau of Ho-nan, in the areas south of the Yellow River. Posted to this strategically most important frontier, Wen-ping was apparently expected to play a major role in the final attack on the Sung. In preparation for that attack, he built 500 warships and trained his soldiers in naval warfare. He was summoned back to court to discuss military strategy with Qubilai. On that occasion Wen-ping told Qubilai that incessant campaigning had so impoverished his officers that even those of higher rank had no horses. A salary system was consequently established in autumn 1270, by which officers were paid according to rank.

In 1270, Wen-ping was transferred back to southern Shantung. Three years later, in April 1273, he was again posted to the Huai-hsi frontier, in the western valley of the Huai River, as the director of the newly established Huai-hsi Regional Department of Military Affairs. Wen-ping built two forts at Cheng-yang (west of Shou-hsien, Anhwei) where his headquarters were located, one on each bank of the Huai. He armed them with some 200 catapults, thus enabling the Yüan forces to block the passage of Sung ships through Cheng-yang. In the summer of 1274, a sizable fleet of Sung warships attacked Cheng-yang but was crushingly defeated. In this battle, Wen-ping was hit by an arrow which struck his ribs through his left arm. His second son Shih-hsüan (T. Shun-ch'ing, 1253-1321) temporarily took over command, capturing a Sung general in his first battle.

The attack that led to the Mongol seizure of the Sung capital Lin-an began in autumn 1274. Setting out from his headquarters at Cheng-yang, Wen-ping reached An-ch'ing in southern Anhwei in early 1275, where he joined the commander-in-chief Bayan (*q.v.*) who had come from Hsiang-yang along the Han River and the Yangtze. With Wen-ping in the vanguard, the Yüan army advanced northeastward along the Yangtze with a large flotilla, meeting little resistance until it reached Ting-chia Island (north-east of T'ung-ling, Anhwei) in March. There, a large Sung army of more than 100,000 men and 2,500 ships commanded by the prime minister Chia Ssu-tao (1213-75) was routed. The Yüan army entered Chien-k'ang (Nanking) shortly after without a fight. Later, an imperial decree instructed Bayan to cease operations on the grounds

that summer was at its height. Bayan obediently stayed at Chien-k'ang and Wen-ping proceeded to Chen-chiang where he received in late March the surrender of Shih Tsu-chung, the general administrator of the Metropolitan Cavalry.

In the next two months, Wen-ping saw little action, but his eldest son Shih-yüan, a chiliarch of the Imperial Guard, was engaged in battles in the lower basin of the Huai River. After capturing the fortifications of Huai-an, a town on the Grand Canal in central Kiangsu, Shih-yüan went south and stationed his forces at Wan-t'ou pao in preparation for an attack on Yang-chou. On 26 June, Chiang Ts'ai (d. 1276), the Sung general at Yang-chou, attacked the fort at night with superior forces. At dawn, Shih-yüan was found lying in the mud. He had been speared seventeen times. He died immediately after being carried back to camp. He was the second Tung, with his grandfather Chün, to die in battle for the Mongols.

Soon after the death of his son, Wen-ping and other commanders again crushed the Sung navy at the battle of Chiao-shan in late July 1275. In an attempt to halt and destroy the Yüan army at Chen-chiang, the Sung generals Chang Shih-chieh (d. 1279) and Sun Hu-ch'en gathered more than 10,000 warships around Chiao-shan, an islet in the Yangtze north-east of Chen-chiang. Determined to fight to the last, the Sung generals had their ships tied together in groups of ten to form a unit called a *fang*. No ship could lift anchor without an order from the unit commander. To counter this challenge, the Yüan commanders grouped their ships into five squadrons, planning to attack the enemy from all sides. The attack started at dawn on 26 July. Wen-ping directed the southern attack with all the ships of the myriarchies of the Huai-hsi Department of Military Affairs. With his flag-ship flanked by the ships of his son Shih-hsüan and nephew Shih-piao, Wen-ping launched a fierce assault on the enemy, fighting at close quarters for hours while his archers shot fire arrows into the sails of the stationary Sung ships. Tens of thousands of Sung soldiers and a great number of their vessels were destroyed. The Sung general Chang Shih-chieh was forced to flee from the battle-field but was soon overtaken by Wen-ping at Ch'uang-shan, south-east of Chiao-shan, where Wen-ping captured about 700 Sung vessels and more than 10,000 Sung soldiers. Chang Shih-chieh escaped to sea, where Wen-ping could not follow in his flimsy craft.

Wen-ping reached the pinnacle of his career in the final attack that led to the capture of Lin-an. In late November 1275, the commander-in-chief Bayan regrouped the Yüan forces into three corps. Bayan and Alaqa (1233-81) commanded the two corps that were to march toward Lin-an by land. Wen-ping was in command of the third that was to approach Lin-an from the sea. Setting out from Chen-chiang late that year with his generals Esen Buqa, Qutuqu and Chang Hung-fan (*q.v.*), Wen-ping progressed along the Yangtze, receiving the surrender of Chiang-yin and Hsü-p'u. At

the turn of the year, he reached Ch'ung-ming, an island at the mouth of the Yangtze, and successfully called for the submission of Chu Ch'ing (1237-1303) and Chang Hsüan (d. 1303), the powerful pirates and salt smugglers who operated along the north China coast from Ch'ung-ming Island. This added more than 500 large ships and several thousand men to his fleet.

Wen-ping continued to advance along the coast, and the towns and cities on the way submitted without resistance. On 23 January 1276, his troops disembarked at Yen-kuan (Hai-ning), fifty km from the Sung capital. Eleven days later, he caught up with Bayan at Ch'ang-an chen. Two days after that, Wen-ping and Bayan moved to Kao-t'ing Mountain, eleven km from Lin-an, where they were joined by Alaqa.

After a series of negotiations, the Sung emperor Kung-ti (r. 1275-76) formally surrendered on 21 February 1276. On that day, Wen-ping entered the Sung capital in accordance with Bayan's orders. He abolished the institutions of the Sung government, disbanded the armed forces, sealed the treasuries, and took charge of the imperial ritual regalia, the maps, the registers and all other archives, including the books in the Imperial Archives. He maintained strict order, even dispatching soldiers to escort merchants visiting the capital. The people of Lin-an consequently suffered little from the change of dynasties, in sharp contrast to the cruel fate of Pien when it fell to the Mongols in early 1233.

Just as Chang Jou (*q.v.*) is credited with saving the Chin *Veritable Records*, Wen-ping is praised for having preserved the source materials of the standard history of the Sung. It is said that when Li P'an, a member of the Han-lin Academy, arrived in Lin-an with Qubilai's order to recruit Sung scholars for service in the Yüan government, Wen-ping told Li, 'A state can be eliminated, but not its history. The sixteen rulers of the Sung reigned over the empire for more than three hundred years. Records by their official historians are kept in the Historiography Institute. They should be preserved....' Thereupon, the 5,000-odd volumes of the *National History*, the *Diaries of Activity and Repose*, the *Records of Current Government* and the *Veritable Records* of the Sung were turned over to Li and sent by sea to the Yüan Department of National History. A slightly different version is given by two Yüan scholars. According to Yüan Chüeh (1266-1327) and Yü Chi (1272-1348), it was the scholar Wang Kou (1245-1310) who advised Wen-ping of the importance of preserving the source materials for the *Sung History* (*Sung-shih*). In August-September 1276, Wen-ping was promoted assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council and, at the same time, made Great Officer Endowed with Virtue.

The capture of Lin-an did not mean the end of the war. Much of south China still refused to submit to the Mongols. As a general with experience in naval warfare, Wen-ping was entrusted by Bayan with the task of pacifying the coastal areas of Che-

tung, Fukien and Kwantung after Bayan had left Lin-an for the court in late March 1276. Wen-ping began his campaign in autumn, strictly forbidding his soldiers to molest or enslave the people. He arrived at T'ai-chou in Chekiang and forced Chang Shih-chieh to flee to the south with Shih (1268-78), the half-brother of the captive Sung emperor Kung-ti. Wen-ping then proceeded toward Wen-chou, where he captured and executed a Sung general who had set fire to the city before fleeing. He stormed Hsing-hua in Fukien only after the place persistently refused to surrender; and he executed only those who resisted.

By the end of that year, Wen-ping reached Ch'üan-chou. It was here that he received the submission of the famous Muslim P'u Shou-keng, the superintendent of Maritime Trade in that important seaport. Enraged by Chang Shih-chieh's requisitioning of his ships and properties, P'u had killed more than 2,000 members of the Sung royal family only shortly before Wen-ping's arrival. Considering that P'u would be of great use in helping the Yüan defend China's southeastern coast with his ships and thousands of followers, Wen-ping gave his own golden tiger tablet to P'u, without heeding the possible consequences of this unauthorised delegation of a myriarch's authority.

After pacifying much of Fukien and setting the stage for the elimination of the last claimant to the Sung throne at Yai-shan by his subordinate Chang Hung-fan off the Kwangtung coast in 1279, Wen-ping was summoned back to court in early 1277. He arrived at Shang-tu (K'ai-ping) in late spring and immediately obtained an audience with Qubilai Qa'an. He requested in vain to take part in the intermittent but prolonged war against the rebel princes under the leadership of Ögödei's grandson Qaidu (d. 1301). Instead, he was confirmed in his post in the Secretarial Council and retained as assistant in the Department of Military Affairs. The emperor pressed him to take up his duties in Ta-tu without delay. So, three days later, after an imperial banquet probably in his honour and a short visit to the heir apparent Jingim, Wen-ping set off for the capital. A distinguished and meritorious general who had spent much of the past quarter of a century in the field thus unwillingly left the army.

Back at Ta-tu, deprived of his command, Wen-ping seems to have felt depressed, with little heart for administrative work. He went to his office in the Secretarial Council and the Department of Military Affairs on alternate days but accomplished nothing significant enough to be recorded. He had little power in the Secretariat which had long been under the control of the notorious Aḥmad (*q.v.*), the director of political affairs. Wen-ping regarded Aḥmad as a vicious man, partly because his brother Wen-yung had recently been ousted from the Secretarial Council by Aḥmad, while another brother, Wen-chung, was also being victimised by the high-handed minister. As a meritorious general who had just conquered the Sung and as a high

official who was next only to Aḥmad in rank in the Secretarial Council, Wen-ping might have been expected by Aḥmad's opponents to challenge their common enemy. But Wen-ping was a novice in politics and Aḥmad had the ear of the emperor; all Wen-ping could do was refuse to co-sign the documents of the Council. Deeply depressed, Wen-ping resigned in the summer of 1278 on grounds of sickness brought about by his constant campaigning in the south. He was ordered to travel to Shang-tu for the sake of his health. Upon his arrival, however, he once more asked for permission to take part in the war against the rebel princes. Obviously, Wen-ping would have rather returned to the army than stay in the capital. But his request was again rejected. On 16 September Qubilai granted him a seat of honour at the emperor's birthday banquet. Back home that night, Wen-ping had a relapse. Imperial physicians attended him daily. On 18 September, he was appointed signatory official of the Department of Military Affairs. Thirteen days later, on 1 October, he died at Shang-tu at the age of sixty-two. His last words, uttered to his brother Wen-chung, were that he regretted being unable to die on the field of battle as his father had done, and he hoped the Tung family would produce generations of able and patriotic military men.

Wen-ping's body was carried back to Kao-ch'eng in late 1278. By imperial order, local officials held mourning ceremonies when the funeral procession passed through their cities and towns. Thousands of Mongol soldiers coming back from Qara Qorum dismounted to mourn their respected commander when they encountered the procession. As a last tribute to the general who had served so loyally and made such great contributions over the past twenty-five years, Qubilai gave Wen-ping, whom he had nicknamed Tung Ta-ko, 'Tung the Eldest Brother,' the posthumous title of Gold and Purple Great Officer of Brilliant Dignity, the posthumous office of director of political affairs, and canonised him as Chung-hsien ('Loyal and Devoted'). In 1312-1313, Wen-ping was given the higher posthumous title of Grand Commandant and was invested as Duke-of-state of Chao. He was buried in the family graveyard at Kao-li in Kao-ch'eng.

Wen-yung: the Scholar-Official

Wen-yung's rise in the civil hierarchy was rather slow compared to his brother Wen-ping's career in the Yüan armed forces. When he was made vice-censor in 1288, the highest position in the Censorate open to a Chinese official, twenty-seven years had passed since he had first obtained an official appointment in the year Qubilai ascended the throne. Also, unlike Wen-ping, Wen-yung suffered many political setbacks during nearly forty years of official service, because of his unyielding attitude toward such as his contemporaries called 'high-handed' and 'vicious'

ministers. He became noted as an outspoken scholar-official and is said to have cared only for the welfare of the dynasty and the people. His political life exemplifies the difficult position of a Chinese official supporting a conqueror's regime.

Shortly after Qubilai's enthronement, Wen-yung was first assigned to select soldiers from the armies on the frontiers to form a guard for the new qa'an. Back at court in autumn on the request of Chang Wen-ch'ien (1217-83), the new pacification commissioner of Ta-ming and Chang-te in southern Hopei, Wen-yung was appointed first secretary of the Bureaux of the Left and Right, an office subordinate to the newly formed Secretarial Council. Next year, he was appointed the first secretary of the Ministry of War. When Li T'an revolted in 1262, Wen-yung followed the Mongol general Kōkōdei (d. 1262), son of Sübōtei (*q.v.*), to participate in the war against Li as a military adviser. Later, when Kōkōdei's nephew Aju (1234-87) was to go south to attack the Sung, Wen-yung was offered a position by Aju. He declined on the grounds that, since his brother Wen-ping was already commanding a large force in Shantung, his acceptance would breach the new regulation, established in the wake of the suppression of Li T'an's rebellion, that forbade a Chinese family to hold more than one military post. Although he was told by Aju that the regulation did not apply to the old followers of the new qa'an, Wen-yung insisted on declining the office because of ill health.

Two years later, in 1264, Wen-yung was called out of retirement by the emperor himself. He was appointed first secretary in the Regional Secretarial Council of the districts of Hsi-hsia and Chung-hsing, collectively known as Ho-hsi. Wen-yung worked there for about three years until the Regional Secretarial Council was abolished in 1266. During this period, he actively participated in the restoration of order after the war fought there by Qubilai's army and the forces led by 'Alamdār (d. 1260) and Qunduqai (or Qundaqai), both supporters of Ariq Böke. He built irrigation canals and opened up lands in Chung-hsing in Ninghsia, and Hsi-liang, Kan-chou, Su-chou, Kua-chou and Sha-chou in Kansu. Between 40,000 and 50,000 refugee households returned to their farms, to be given grain seed and farming tools. Boats were provided for both the defeated rebels and hostile local tribesmen when they submitted. Thus, Wen-yung helped stabilise Ninghsia and Kansu.

It was during this period that Wen-yung was first humiliated by the Mongol conquerors. Prince Ĵibik Temür, grandson of Ögödei, was then in command of an army stationed at Ho-hsi, his family apanage. The establishment of the Regional Secretarial Council in late 1261 was aimed at reducing the power of the prince. But this provincial government does not seem to have been very effective in carrying out its task. When Wen-yung came to Ho-hsi in 1264, Ĵibik Temür's followers were still oppressing the people harshly. As usual, they forced the Council to meet their

demands. For fear of the prince, no one in the government dared speak up. Indignant and courageous, Wen-yung often reprimanded these wrongdoers publicly. He was slandered as a result. Ĵibik Temür grew angry, called in Wen-yung and had him questioned by his retainers. Wen-yung refused to submit to such improper procedure, saying that he would only justify his actions to the prince's tutor, who, he thought, had the authority to question him. Wen-yung reported scores of offences committed by the prince's men to the tutor, who had attended Sorqaqtani Beki and might have thus been acquainted with Wen-yung. He added bitterly: 'I am a Han, and (a Han's) life or how true death is not worthy of concern.' The tutor is said to have been surprised to learn of the exactions committed by Ĵibik Temür's men, and in the end the prince himself allegedly praised Wen-yung for his loyal service. Wen-yung's biographies state that the Regional Secretarial Council was able to hold its own thereafter. Such a report may have been exaggerated, for the Regional Secretarial Council was soon abolished in 1266, very likely as a result of Ĵibik Temür's opposition to it.

Frustrated, Wen-yung declined the first secretary's office in the Secretarial Council when he returned from Ho-hsi in 1266. Two years later, Wen-yung rejected a post in the newly established Censorate because of the death of his brother Wen-wei. In 1270 or 1271, he re-entered public life as the commissioner-on-tour for the promotion of agriculture in Shan-tung. He held that office for the next five years, serving with distinction.

In 1275, on the recommendation of the young chancellor of the Right An-t'ung (*q.v.*), a fourth-generation descendant of Muqali (*q.v.*) and leader of the anti-Aḥmad faction in Ta-Tu, Wen-yung was appointed vice-minister of War, replacing a Jurchen named Ho-shih-li, a protégé of Aḥmad. Shortly after An-tung had left for Mongolia to assist Prince Nomuqan in the war against Qaidu, the chief falconer charged the vice-minister of War at Aḥmad's instigation with failure to provide food for the falcons. Hearing the report that the falcons were about to die of hunger, Qubilai angrily ordered the arrest of the vice-minister. Wen-yung was brought before the emperor. Only then, realising who the culprit was, did Qubilai declare that Wen-yung was too exalted a personage to be serving the needs of the chief falconer. Wen-yung was pardoned and the falconer was instructed to get food for the falcons through another office.

Soon after this incident, Wen-yung left the Secretarial Council, probably driven out by Aḥmad, and in 1276 took the office of general administrator of the Wei-hui district in northern Honan. There he released thousands of poor people from the obligation of having to transport treasure and grain from the newly conquered territory in the south to the capital. He used petty clerks and government runners instead. He established a postal relay system for the same purpose, in cooperation

with the neighbouring districts. In 1277, he went to Pien and dissuaded the local transport officials from diverting the Ch'in River into the Yü River, because Wei-hui in northern Honan and Ch'ang-lu in Hopei would be flooded in the process. For such actions the people of Wei-hui erected a commemorative stele in honour of Wen-yung when he left his office in 1278/1279.

Back from Honan, Wen-yung went into retirement for the third time. He built a cottage in Kao-ch'eng, calling it Hsia-kuan t'ing ('Far-sighted Cottage'). He styled himself Yeh-chuang lao-jen or the 'Old Man of the Villa.' He led the life of a hermit, busying himself with reading and writing. He was weary, it seems, of public service after having been humiliated on at least two occasions. In 1281, he even turned down a posting to the Censorate which the heir apparent Jingim had procured for him.

Yet Wen-yung was soon to obtain an exalted office in the bureaucracy. After Wang Chu (1254-82) and the monk Kao had assassinated Aḥmad in April 1282, the court reappointed most of the officials purged during Aḥmad's ascendancy. Wen-yung was made minister of War and probably served also as representative of the heir apparent in the Secretariat. Thereafter, as the head of a ministry, he attended every court conference at which policy matters were considered.

At those conferences, Wen-yung's counsel against curtailing the powers of the Regional Secretarial Councils proved decisive. In 1283, in an attempt to rid itself of censorial control, the Chiang-Huai Regional Secretarial Council proposed to subordinate the Regional Censorate to its authority. Wen-yung argued successfully against this move at court by likening the Censorate to a tiger: just as one had to envisage the consequence before one undertook to provoke the tiger, one had to remember the possibility of impeachment by the Censorate before one proceeded to break the law. If the Regional Censorate was controlled by the Regional Secretarial Councils, so his argument ran, there would be no deterrent to corrupt officials.

In late 1283 or early 1284, Wen-yung was transferred to the Ministry of Rites and, in March of 1284, was appointed an academician in both the Han-lin Academy and the Chi-hsien Academy. He was made concurrently the director of the Imperial Archives.

As an academician, Wen-yung retained the right to attend court conferences where he remained as outspoken as before. This time he directed his criticism at a powerful Chinese official from Ta-ming named Lu Shih-yung (d. 1285). Lu is said to have entered officialdom by bribing Aḥmad. Years later, at the end of 1284, Lu was appointed assistant of the Right in the Secretarial Council as a fiscal expert and entrusted with the task of stabilising the paper currency and increasing state revenues, on the recommendation of Sangha (*q.v.*). He had reinstated many of Aḥmad's men and thus became the target of recriminations by a number of Aḥmad's erstwhile foes.

Wen-yung was one of his main critics. When Lu claimed that he could triple revenue without increasing taxes, a court conference was held to debate the proposition. No one dared speak in the conference until Wen-yung told Lu to his face that, to make true his promises, he would have to contribute the funds himself or levy higher taxes on the people. One might be able to draw much revenue from the people over a short period but such levels of exaction were not sustainable in the long term since the taxpayers would be apt to die of starvation in the process. Thus, Wen-yung is said to have silenced Lu Shih-jung, who was dismissed in May 1285 and executed late that year.

Shortly after, in 1285, Wen-yung was appointed associate director of political affairs in the Chiang-Huai Regional Secretarial Council at Yang-chou, Kiangsu. He remained in that office for the next three years, frequently arguing with his arrogant superior, presumably a Mongol noble, who treated his colleagues like petty clerks. Wen-yung reportedly dissuaded that man from sending his rapacious underlings to seize land from the people. He is also credited with saving many lives when, in opposition to the same official, he suspended construction work which the emperor had approved on a pagoda and a large Buddhist temple in the former imperial palace of the Sung dynasty. As a consequence, people no longer had to get building timber in the snowy mountains where hundreds of workers had perished. In 1286, the Chiang-Huai Regional Secretarial Council hastened the building of warships, training of troops and gathering of supplies in preparation for the third expedition against Japan. Corrupt officials used the opportunity for personal aggrandizement. Thinking it unwise to exhaust the nation's resources for the conquest of a distant and useless little island country, Wen-yung went to court and remonstrated with the emperor. His objection is said to have contributed to the cancellation of the projected expedition.

Wen-yung's official career reached its pinnacle in 1288 when he returned to the capital as vice-censor, the highest position open to a Chinese in the Censorate. In this capacity, he recommended Hsü Yen (d. 1301) and Wei Ch'u (1232-92) as his counterparts in the Chiang-nan Regional Censorate, and more than ten men, including Hu Chih-yü (1227-95) and Wang Yün (*q.v.*), as inspection commissioners of the locally-based Inspection Bureaux. He is reputed to have made the best selection of Censorate officials in his time.

But Wen-yung was only to retain his prestigious office in the Censorate for under two years. At the end of this short period, he clashed with Sangha, the powerful director of political affairs of the newly established Presidential Council responsible for state finances. A shrewd man proficient in several languages and a self-styled financial expert, Sangha had long been Qubilai's favourite. In early 1287, he was given extensive powers to save the state from financial disaster. Brooking no

opposition to his policies, he had a number of ranking officials and petty clerks dismissed or even executed for incompetence or insubordination. On several occasions he even came to blows with his critics. Yet he continued to enjoy the emperor's full support. When Čerig (1260-1306), a Mongol noble of Eljigitei's clan and an intimate of Qubilai, for example, was railing against Sangha in front of the emperor, the emperor ordered Čerig to be slapped on the face immediately. In the circumstances, Wen-yung first adopted an attitude of silent opposition. Later, he refused to take the hint that he should praise Sangha to the emperor. He further disappointed Sangha by refusing his personal offer of an alliance. When Sangha tried to bring the Censorate to its knees, Wen-yung stood up in opposition, entreating him to desist for the sake of the state. Enraged, Sangha complained unceasingly about the Censorate and berated the obstreperous vice-censor. Wen-yung impeached Sangha to no avail. Sangha accused Wen-yung of obstructing the implementation of his policies and requested that Wen-yung be severely punished. The emperor rejected so extreme a measure, but Wen-yung was removed from the Censorate and transferred to the Bureau of Agriculture. Yet, because of his opposition to the policy of converting privately-owned holdings into government-controlled agricultural colonies, Wen-yung was soon transferred once again to the Han-lin Academy as one of its executive academicians, a high-sounding title. As a victim of Sangha's political purges himself, Wen-yung was one of the Secretarial Council and Censorate members called to deliberate on the fate of Sangha's partisans after the latter's execution in August 1291.

In 1290, at the request of Jingim's widow Kōkōjin (d. 1300), Wen-yung became the tutor of her son Temür (i.e. Temür Öljeitü, r. 1294-1307), the grandson and immediate successor of Qubilai. As he had done some thirty years earlier, he lectured on the Chinese Classics. To help Temür fully understand the texts, Wen-yung repeatedly drew analogies with contemporary political events, so earning much respect from the prince. Temür left for Mongolia in 1293, returning to Shang-tu to ascend the throne the following year. Sent from Ta-tu by the prince's mother Kōkōjin, Wen-yung attended the coronation and followed the new qa'an on an imperial progress to San-pu-la (San-pu-lo), 385 km south-west of Shang-tu. On the way, Wen-yung was often summoned to the imperial tent to talk about events of the preceding reign. He constantly praised the virtues of Qubilai, with a view further to educating the young ruler. These conversations reportedly lasted sometimes until midnight.

In mid-1294, Wen-yung was made concurrently the drafter of Imperial Edicts and the redactor of the National History. He took part in writing the *Veritable Records* of Qubilai's reign. His knowledge of the genealogies and deeds of the royal family, the imperial relatives and the court dignitaries, greatly facilitated the completion of the

work within one year (July 1294 – July 1295). His biographers say that Wen-yung, after serving the royal family for so long, was able to give prompt, correct and detailed answers to the questions put to him by other compilers.

In summer 1297, Wen-yung retired, aged seventy-four. He was pensioned off with an allowance of 10,000 *kuan* of paper currency. One of his sons (probably Shih-heng who started his official career as an assistant in the General Administration of the Chen-ting district) was appointed an official in his native prefecture in order to care for him. Wen-yung died of illness on 7 July. He bequeathed nothing to his family but books and sacrificial instruments. Buried in his family's graveyard, he was given the posthumous titles Silver and Blue Great Officer of Eminent Dignity and Junior Guardian, canonised as Chung-mu ('Loyal and Reverent') and invested as Duke-of-state of Chao, probably in 1301.

Wen-chung: the Imperial Seals Keeper

Unlike his elder brothers, the military commander Wen-ping and the scholar-official Wen-yung, who spent many years away from the capital, Wen-chung remained stationed there in the service of Qubilai Qa'an. Appointed seals secretary when Qubilai ascended the throne in 1260, he held that office for twenty years until he assumed the concurrent appointment of deputy administrator of the Department of Military Affairs a few months before he died in 1281. As required by his duties of keeper of the imperial seals, he followed Qubilai at all times, whether on a hunting expedition or a military campaign. He was probably the only person to remain in Qubilai's innermost entourage for nearly three decades.

As no special ability was required of the keeper of the seals, one might expect Wen-chung to have discharged his duties with ease and enjoyed a comfortable living in the imperial palace. According to witness accounts, however, nothing would be further from the truth. As personal attendant to Qubilai, he had often to endure great physical discomfort because of the requirements of court etiquette.

In fact, Wen-chung's duties included much more than his official title indicated. According to Yao Sui (1238-1313), Wen-chung was in charge of the imperial carriages and of no fewer than one hundred bags containing such items as clothing, belts and medicines. He was thus not merely an imperial seals keeper, but also a sort of major-domo to Qubilai, indeed a most diligent and competent one. He was in attendance from dawn until late at night. On one occasion he never once returned home in forty days. At night he slept on the ground next to the imperial bed, notwithstanding the presence of the concubines. Even in the dead of night, he was able to retrieve any item that Qubilai might require, without striking a light.

Thanks to his privileged position, Wen-chung seems to have been acknowledged as an influential courtier soon after Qubilai's accession to the throne. As early as 1263, at the instigation of Jingim, the heir apparent, he requested imperial permission to transfer the ownership of the hunters and falconers under the hereditary jurisdiction of Kao Liang from the government to the prince. The plea was granted as Jingim expected. That Jingim did not approach his father, but should have conveyed his wish through Wen-chung, indicates the influence which Wen-chung was seen to exert on Qubilai.

Indeed, Wen-chung had the ear of the emperor. His opinions were almost always accorded favourable consideration. His opposition to the old-fashioned civil service examination system was regarded as a decisive factor in frustrating the attempt to revive it made in 1271 by T'u-tan Kung-lü, a prominent Jurchen member of the Han-lin Academy. In 1274, when so-called magicians (*yao-jen*) appeared in such places as I-tu and Chang-te to spread misleading rumours among the populace, Wen-chung successfully proposed that the officials of the local Surveillance Bureaux, the resident commissioners, and the community leaders, be held responsible for their failure to forestall rumour-mongering. In 1277, knowing that there had been an abrupt increase in the number of prisoners held in the capital due to the imperial decree ordering the imprisonment and execution of any Chinese who stole even six *wen* of paper currency, Wen-chung again remonstrated successfully with Qubilai over such excessive severity. He argued that a distinction should be made between 'robbery' (*ch'iang-tao*) and 'theft' (*ch'ieh-tao*) in setting the punishment for stealing, and that the value of the goods involved should also be considered. Moreover, Wen-chung is credited with persuading Qubilai to abstain from levying additional imposts in 1274 when the people were already overburdened by the taxes and corvées exacted for the war against the Sung; to allow the people in 1276 to make farming tools for their own use instead of having to buy them from the government; and in the same years, to allow the families of poor hunters to stay in Ta-tu instead of having to move east of the Ta-hung Mountains in Hupei, thus saving the hunters from having to sell their wives or children to pay for their relocation.

Besides acting as a critic and adviser, Wen-chung was occasionally assigned special tasks by the emperor. For instance, when Qubilai learnt that many high officials in the newly conquered South had obtained appointments by bribing Aḥmad, Wen-chung and four others were commissioned to dismiss the unqualified office-holders. In 1276, angered by a report that a Chinese had assaulted and wounded a Mongol, and that Lu Chih, a clerk in the Imperial Treasury, had misappropriated cloth, Qubilai summarily ordered the execution of both Chinese as a warning. Wen-chung alone dared to remonstrate with the furious emperor. As a death sentence had

to be reviewed before a prisoner was executed, he said, it appeared unjust to put a man to death merely because he was accused. Praised for his frankness, Wen-chung himself was thereupon ordered to investigate the case of Lu, who was ultimately cleared of the charge.

As one of his regular duties, Wen-chung seems also to have had to supervise the imperial bodyguards, for he was one of the few people allowed to inspect the Guard at will. Once, when the bodyguards were entering the Yen-ch'un ko ('Lingering Spring Pavilion') at the time of an imperial banquet, Qubilai noticed that a scholar named Wang Ssu-lien (1238-1320) occupied the space reserved for the guards. Wen-chung was reprimanded for this faux-pas, for he had helped arrange the banquet.

A fluent Mongolian speaker, Wen-chung frequently acted as an interpreter for Qubilai who apparently did not speak Chinese. He sometimes acted as the announcer of imperial decrees and would report to the throne on behalf of those unable to obtain an imperial audience. On such occasions, he was often consulted by Qubilai on a variety of matters. For instance, when Qubilai summoned the Sung generals to determine the reason for their surrender and the Sung collapse, Wen-chung was present ostensibly as an interpreter. Wen-chung was asked to comment on the generals' claim that the last Sung prime minister Chia Ssu-tao was to blame, inasmuch as his overt contempt for the military had shattered their morale. Praised for his pertinent comments, Wen-chung was immediately ordered by Qubilai to rebuke the generals for shifting the blame for their action, observing that their surrender was a betrayal of the ruler who had rewarded them with high titles and great wealth. Whereupon Qubilai asked the generals: did not Chia despise you because he knew you for what you were?

After having remained imperial seals keeper for eighteen years, Wen-chung was offered his eldest brother Wen-ping's position of assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council and deputy administrator of the Department of Military Affairs on the incumbent's death in 1278. He declined on the grounds that his own achievements could not compare with his brother's in the conquest of the Sung. In early 1281, with the establishment of the Directorate of Imperial Insignia (replacing the former Imperial Seals Office), Wen-chung was made its first president. In the meantime, he was appointed to the office in the Department of Military Affairs which he had earlier refused. Only then was Wen-chung released from his obligation to accompany Qubilai whenever the latter left the capital, in view of the expanded duties which his new offices entailed. He had overall responsibility for many matters, including the imperial palace, the city gates, the duty houses, the guarded streets, the imperial carriages, and such establishments as the Imperial Treasury, the Directorate of Imperial Workshops and the Directorate of Military Supplies. The General Control

Bureau of Soldiers and Horses of the metropolitan district, previously subordinate to the Secretarial Council, was also put under Wen-chung's jurisdiction, although the Secretarial Council sought time and again to recover control over it from the Department of Military Affairs. Wen-chung's achievements through the past decades had apparently been so impressive that Qubilai entrusted his faithful retainer with a further array of important charges.

Unfortunately, Wen-chung died soon after these new appointments. On 7 December 1281, when about to resume his duties after home leave, he suddenly collapsed gasping for breath. The courier that Qubilai immediately dispatched with medicine arrived too late to save his life. Qubilai ordered that Wen-chung's remains not be put into the coffin for five days, after which all hope of a miraculous resurrection had to be abandoned for the man who had devoted well over half of his fifty-two years to the personal service of Qubilai.

Wen-chung was buried in his family graveyard. In 1301 he was given the posthumous title of Great Officer of Brilliant Dignity and Grand Instructor, canonised as Chung-chen ('Loyal and Virtuous') and invested as Duke-of-state of Shou. Years later he was accorded the higher posthumous title of Grand Preceptor, reCanonised as Cheng-hsien ('Correct and Devoted') and reinvested as Duke-of-state of Chao.

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Wen-ping, Wen-yung and Wen-chung not only successfully revived the fortunes of their family, which had reached its nadir in 1233 when their father was killed in action, but also established for their descendants a career path that differed from that of other northern Chinese military families. Four of the other six Tung brothers, ten of their sons, twenty-one of their grandsons, and ten of their great-grandsons are known to have held official posts. As individuals, few of the Tungs could match Shih T'ien-tse, Chang Hung-fan or Chang Kuei, the outstanding members of other Chinese military families, in terms of rank and achievement. As a group, however, they very likely outshone and outlasted all other Chinese families in the Yüan government from the time of Qubilai's reign. Moreover, they most commonly held posts in the palace services, the Imperial Guard and the Censorate, reflecting the high degree of imperial esteem enjoyed by the Tung family.

Although the Tungs emerged and rose as a military clan whose fortune reflected its members' prowess against the enemies of Mongol rule, they were unlike any other Chinese military family. During the Mongol conquest of the Chin, the Tungs were a fairly obscure lineage, always fighting under the aegis of the Shih family of Chen-ting. Their rise to prominence was closely connected with the political ascendancy of

Qubilai. Taking full advantage of their service in the apanage of Qubilai's mother, Sorqaqtani, the Tung brothers established themselves as Qubilai's personal retainers and confidants when Qubilai was still a young prince. After Qubilai's accession, they served the new monarch most faithfully and competently by fending off a number of challenges and by promoting a centralised power structure for the Mongol regime in China. Consequently, unlike other Chinese military families which Qubilai deemed threatening and which consequently were all reduced by the qa'an's centralising policies, the Tungs benefited greatly from the new system which they had helped Qubilai construct.

As members of the Chinese family most trusted by Qubilai, the Tungs served the Mongol monarch as more than just his 'claws and teeth.' In addition to being competent commanders, conscientious administrators, faithful counsellors and diligent retainers, the Tungs also acted as a link between the Mongol monarch and the Chinese world. On the one hand, they were used effectively by Qubilai to control the Chinese armies and to communicate with the Chinese literati; on the other, the Tungs championed Chinese interests at the Mongol court by recommending Confucian scholars for public service, by opposing the exactions of the monarch's finance experts, and by protecting the cultural heritage of the Sung from destruction. The Tungs were highly esteemed by the Chinese scholar-officials not only because they enjoyed the emperor's confidence, but also because of the family's Confucian credentials attested by the education and discipline of its scions. Deeply trusted by the Mongols and widely respected by the Chinese, the Tungs were uniquely qualified for their role as go-betweens. Consequently, the family continued to enjoy high status and respect throughout the period of Mongol rule in China.

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C.F. Hung

RELIGIOUS LEADER

37. 'P'AGS-PA (1235-1280)

In the course of their conquest of China, the Mongol qa'ans were compelled to formulate a religious policy in order to consolidate their hold over newly occupied territories. The early Mongol rulers had remained substantially neutral in the religious field, which helped them to act as umpires in the disputes between Buddhists and Taoists that had reached an intolerable level of acrimony by the fifties of the 13th century. The need for religious peace drove Möngke and then Qubilai to convene three disputations between the two creeds (1255, 1256, 1258). Those encounters resulted in the victory of the Buddhist party, which the Mongols tended increasingly to favour since their commanders in north China had given their support to the Ch'an master Hai-yün (*q.v.*). In 1252 Na-mo, a monk from the Western Countries (Hsi-yü), had been appointed as a sort of general supervisor of Buddhist affairs in the Mongol empire. But even before ascending the throne, Qubilai preferred as a matter of policy to be served by Tibetan Buddhists than by Chinese monks.

The increasing importance of Tibet within the Mongol empire contributed to the change. Later traditional accounts notwithstanding, that mountainous country had remained wholly outside the purview of Činggis Qan, and in the main also of his successor Ögödei. It was left to the younger son of the latter, Köden, to involve the Mongols in Tibet. In 1240 he sent a raiding party into the country, and he embarked soon after on a deliberate scheme of political penetration. He needed local support in order to win the allegiance of the heads of the various sects who held the real power at the time in Tibet. He was soon able to decide that the head of the Sa-skyapa sect would be the best choice for this task. The position of abbot of the Sa-skyapa monastery in central Tibet (founded in 1073) was hereditary in the 'K'on family. The see was then occupied by the great scholar Kun-dga'-rgyal-mts'an, usually called Sa-skyapa Paṇ-c'en or Sa Paṇ for short (1182-1251). Köden summoned him to his fief in western Kansu, and this invitation turned out to be the starting point for the career of Sa-skyapa Paṇ-c'en's young nephew.

Blo-gros-rgyal-mts'an, usually known by the honorific surname 'P'ags-pa ('holy'; chin. Pa-ssu-pa, Pa-ho[=ha]-ssu-pa and similar forms), was the son of Sa-skyapa Paṇ-c'en's younger brother Zañ-ts'a bSod-nams-rgyal-mts'an (1184-1239). He was born on 26 March 1235 (the date 1239 given by all the Chinese sources is certainly

incorrect) at Klu-k'uñ in the Nam-riñs district of western Tibet. He undertook the usual course of religious and philosophical studies under the supervision of his uncle, in whose train he departed from Sa-skya in 1244.

The party travelled leisurely, spending the whole of the year 1245 in dBus (central Tibet). During the journey the boy took his vows as a novice (*dge-tś'ul*), with Sa-skya Pañ-c'en acting as his disciplinary superior (*mk'an-po*) and Zul-p'u-ba as his religious master (*slob-dpon*). In 1246 uncle and nephew reached Byañ-ños, i.e. Liang-chou, Köden's headquarters, and waited there for the prince, who had gone to Mongolia to attend the great *quriltai* assembled for the election of the new qa'an. In 1247 Sa-skya Pañ-c'en and Köden met at last and concluded an agreement whereby Sa Pañ was to act as the Mongols' main agent in Tibet. Accordingly, the latter addressed a sort of circular to the clergy and aristocracy of Tibet, entreating all recipients to submit willingly to the Mongols and to pay tribute, rather than attempt a hopeless resistance. For his own part, Sa Pañ remained with Prince Köden at Liang-chou, where he died at the end of 1251.

The death of Sa-skya Pañ-c'en closed the first chapter of the Mongols' relationship with Tibet. Köden was to lose prestige and authority that same year, when Ögödei's branch of the empire's ruling clan was replaced by that of Tolui. Although the new qa'an, Möngke, acknowledged the Sa-skya sect as part of Köden's sphere of influence, 'P'ags-pa, who had inherited his uncle's religious office and was then only sixteen, found himself in a precarious position. Not only did he fail to command the respect enjoyed by his uncle, but other sects (Ts'al-pa, Karma-pa) vied for the favour and support of Möngke and of his younger brother, Qubilai, the governor of Mongol China.

The situation came to a head in 1253 when Qubilai ordered Köden to deliver the young Sa-skya abbot into his custody. 'P'ags-pa was brought to Qubilai's camp where he was well received. According to the Tibetan tradition, he immediately conferred on the prince a preliminary initiation into Buddhism; but this is probably an anticipation of later events. As a matter of fact, he was left virtually on his own when his new patron left in September 1253 for his successful campaign in Szechwan and Yunnan, from which he returned only in the late spring of the following year. During Qubilai's absence 'P'ags-pa travelled to Liang-chou, where he dedicated the cenotaph of his uncle. He then departed for central Tibet, where he intended to undergo full ordination and receive further tuition from 'U-yug-pa; but he had only reached Amdo when news reached him of that master's death in 1253. He thereupon turned back and joined Qubilai who was then on his way back to north China. It was then that the prince granted him the so-called 'diploma in the Tibetan script' (*'ja'-sa bod-yig-ma*), conferring on the monasteries of the central Tibetan province of gTsañ (where Sa-

skya is situated) immunity from military service, *corvée* and taxation. That dispensation was allegedly issued on 6 July 1254 'at Muñ-pa-śar on the Chinese-Tibetan border'. The document may be authentic, but the date and place of its release are open to doubt, for we know that Qubilai was residing at the Liu-p'an shan in eastern Kansu in June of that year.

During the following years (1255-56), 'P'ags-pa may have followed Qubilai as he travelled his extensive fief on the northern fringe of China. He took his final monastic vows on 21 June 1255, by the Great River on the Mongol-Chinese border (the Yellow River), in a ceremony led by sÑe-t'añ-pa Grags-pa-señ-ge. He was not regarded as an important personage at the time: the most revered Lamaist churchman at the court of the qa'an was the famous miracle-worker, Karma Pakši (1206-83), the head of the Žva-nag (Black Hat) section of the Karma-pa sect. But his early fall from favour was to pave the way for the ascent of the Sa-skya abbot.

'P'ags-pa's career in Mongol China really started in 1258, when he initiated Qubilai into Lamaism, actually for the first time. The Sa-skya-pa considered this event to have triggered the expansion of Tibetan Buddhism throughout the Mongol empire. In the same year 'P'ags-pa took part in the third and last disputation between Buddhists and Taoists, held before Qubilai at Shang-tu, on which occasion he presented a short refutation in verse; his intervention during the last stages of the conference proved decisive, at least according to the Buddhist sources.

Immediately after the conference Qubilai left for the Sung frontier in command of the Mongol army. His absence lasted until the autumn of 1259, when the death of Möngke brought him back to the North. Qubilai's proclamation as qa'an and emperor was followed by a long war against the other pretender to the throne, his younger brother Ariq Böke. This conflict also settled the contest between the Karma-pa and the Sa-skya-pa. Karma Pakši was suspected of being a partisan of Ariq Böke; upon his ill-advised return to north China, he was imprisoned, sentenced to death, but reprieved and banished. He was brought back to the court in 1263 but his influence had dissipated and he was permitted to go back to his convent in Tibet. Qubilai had already decided that 'P'ags-pa was the best tool available for his designs; on 9 January 1261, he awarded him the title of National Teacher and made him the supreme head of the Buddhist clergy.

During the following few years 'P'ags-pa stayed on at the court of Qubilai, at Chung-tu and K'ai-p'ing (or Ta-tu and Shang-tu as they were soon to be re-named). These were also the first years of his abundant literary output. His letters, tracts, booklets, blessings, prayers, etc. usually mention date and place of composition, thus allowing us to follow the movements of their author in some detail.

On 26 June 1264, Qubilai granted 'P'ags-pa the famous 'pearl diploma' (*'ja'-sa mu-tig-ma*), which proclaimed explicitly the latter's authority over the Lamaist clergy while confirming the clergy's privileges and immunities in the whole of Tibet; the monks were also freed from administrative supervision and were exempted from the charge of supplying lodgings to imperial envoys. The occasion for the grant of the 'pearl diploma' was apparently 'P'ags-pa's departure for his homeland; the document was intended to serve as a sort of imperial commission in dealing with the Tibetan monasteries and sects. It is noteworthy that the document should make no mention whatsoever of a temporal sovereignty of the Sa-skya abbot over Tibet; it could not even be construed as granting any political or administrative powers. He must have left the imperial capital at once, for he was already in Amdo the following September. It seems that some opposition was expected and actually offered to his progress, because an imperial army under General Qongridar had to crush the resistance of the clans in T'u-fan, the Yüan name for Amdo. In 1265 'P'ags-pa was back in Sa-skya after an absence of more than twenty years.

Qubilai intended that the return of the abbot to his see as imperial protégé and representative should facilitate the establishment of Mongol sovereignty in central Tibet. This was to be achieved while paying due respect to the feelings, religion and traditions of the people. We do not know what part 'P'ags-pa played in the events. He would not have been supposed to participate directly in political and administrative affairs, since, upon his arrival, his younger brother P'yag-na-rdo-rje (1239-67) was appointed head of the Tibetan administration, with the title of Prince of Pai-lan, a golden seal and the rank of associate commissioner. As the Tibetan texts are at pains to emphasise, this was the first time that an imperial seal was presented to a Tibetan. Actually, P'yag-na-rdo-rje appears to have been in charge of the judiciary only.

This first resolution of the Tibetan question was of short duration, however. Following the young 'governor's' premature death in 1267, the new regime soon collapsed and 'P'ags-pa himself had to vacate his see. In November 1267, he was in 'Dam, the region to the south of Lake Tengri (Tengri Nör), from which he issued the only document of his that has come down to us in the original; it confirmed the privileges and estates of a monastery. It appears that widespread uprisings had broken out, fomented by the 'Bri-guñ-pa sect which, from the very beginning and until its final defeat in 1290, led the resistance to the Sa-skya-pa and their Mongol protectors. The emperor took prompt action. An expeditionary force under K'er-k'e-ta or K'er-t'a'i (possibly *Qitay Salig) started from Amdo and penetrated as far as 'Dam, apparently with the aim of rescuing 'P'ags-pa from his perilous position. This move cowed the opposition and paved the way for the establishment of Mongol rule

in Tibet, which was to last for the next eighty years. A census was taken, a mail service was organised and the civil government was entrusted to a Pacification Bureau, staffed mainly by Mongols. 'P'ags-pa, whom the Mongol commanders on the spot apparently considered as useless for practical purposes, was allowed no part in these measures. He was not even permitted to return to Sa-skya, but was brought to western China, at Ch'in-chou (Kansu) and Man-goñ (?), where he resided during the whole of 1268. The following year he travelled to Qubilai's court at Shang-tu.

In the meantime the emperor had charged 'P'ags-pa with devising a new script, to be used both for Chinese and for Mongolian, on the basis of the Tibetan alphabet. The completed project was submitted to the throne, and, on 17 March 1269, the 'P'ags-pa alphabet was officially adopted as the national script, to be used compulsorily in official documents. This was a personal success for its creator, whose ascent culminated with the award of the title of Imperial Preceptor at the end of 1269 or early in 1270.

It strikes us as rather surprising that he should have left the court soon after. During the following years 1271-1273, he resided habitually at Śin-kun (Lin-t'ao, in Kansu) where he founded a temple; he then sojourned for some months in Liang-chou. In 1274 he returned to Shang-tu, but this was merely in order to apply for leave to return home. The emperor was loath to let him go, but 'P'ags-pa would not be denied. His departure was to be final, since in the 3rd month of that year he renounced the office of Imperial Preceptor, to which his half-brother Rin-c'en-rgyal-mts'an (1238-79) was thereupon appointed. Once more the journey home of the Sa-skya abbot had to be covered by an imperial expeditionary force; in the 3rd month of 1275 the emperor commanded three princes to send their contingents to reinforce A'uruqči, Prince of Hsi-p'ing, who was campaigning in Amdo. We know that 'P'ags-pa passed most of the year 1275 and the first months of 1276 at various places in the region of the rMa-c'u (upper Yellow River), which might suggest that his return was meeting with some opposition. Not till the last months of 1276 did he and Prince A'uruqči arrive at Sa-skya. The unrest was put down with some executions.

In 1277 'P'ags-pa summoned a general assembly of the clergy to affirm the ecclesiastical ascendancy of the Sa-skya see. This was the so-called council of C'u-mig, near sNar-t'añ in central Tibet. The Mongol heir apparent, Jīngim, donated the means to meet the expenses and the bKa'-gdams-pa master mC'ims Nam-mk'a'-grags, apparently as a token of regard and conciliation, acted as chairman under the overall direction of the Sa-skya hierarch.

'P'ags-pa spent his last years peacefully at Sa-skya, where he composed his most important religious work, the *Śes-bya rab-gsal*. He died there on 14 December 1280. He was only forty-five years old, and this early death gave rise to suspicions of foul

play; the *dpon-c'en* Kun-dga'-bzañ-po was accused, possibly without reason, of having poisoned him. The *dpon-c'en* was caught and executed by an imperial force under the future minister Sangha (*q.v.*).

'P'ags-pa was an outstanding figure in Mongol China and represented a major element of Qubilai's politics in two areas: Tibet and the Buddhist clergy. But his role in his home country should not be overrated. He never wielded any personal power in Tibet, due both to his long periods of absence and to the fact that administrative responsibility was entrusted at first to his younger brother, and finally to the Pacification Bureau established in Tibet about 1268. The bureau comprised five members, one of whom was the Sa-skya administrator (*dpon-c'en*). Thereafter Tibetans considered the *dpon-c'en* to be the actual ruler of the country. But the documents from the Žva-lu monastery published by G. Tucci show that, in the early 14th century, authority in Tibet was vested in the Pacification Bureau. The powers of 'P'ags-pa, as finally defined, rested upon his title of Imperial Preceptor, an office whose holder would reside in the capital, in close attendance on the emperor. It was as Imperial Preceptor that he issued orders to the Pacification Bureau and to the Tibetan authorities in the name of the emperor, not as the abbot of Sa-skya. After the death of his nephew and successor Dharmapālarakṣita in 1287, the two offices were never again united in the same person. When 'P'ags-pa finally returned to Tibet after renouncing the post of Imperial Preceptor, it appears that his later activities were limited to the religious field.

According to the later Tibetan chronicles, 'P'ags-pa initiated Qubilai into the Buddhist religion on three occasions. The first time, the emperor rewarded him with the gift of the thirteen districts (or myriarchies, *k'ri-skor*) of central Tibet; the second time, he received the three districts (tib. *c'ol-k'a*, mo. *čölge*) of Tibet; and the third time, Qubilai donated some precious relics and perhaps a large quantity of serfs in China. Actually, as we have seen above, the two documents vouchsafing the emperor's grants, whose authenticity seems to be established even if their dates are not beyond doubt, imply only overall authority over the clergy; their import has been vastly exaggerated by the later Lamaist historians.

It is difficult to tell whether 'P'ags-pa's position of control over the Chinese clergy, as distinct from the Tibetan, carried any actual substance. His successor to the office of Imperial Preceptor came to wield power over the Tibetan monks in China, and to a lesser extent over the Chinese monks as well.

Theoretically, the relationship between 'P'ags-pa and Qubilai was that of patron and protégé (*mc'od-yon*), pupil and teacher. But in reality the Sa-skya hierarchy appears as a tool utilised by Qubilai to implement a policy of control without conquest, adopted solely in Tibet. His prestige was no doubt great and was

sedulously bolstered up by the emperor. But positive evidence of a personal influence in the politics of the empire is lacking, although a Tibetan source (*rGya-Bod yig-tś'añ*) maintains that the appointment of Bayan to lead the final campaign against the Sung empire was due to his recommendation.

'P'ags-pa's fame increased considerably after his death. Early in 1283 a cenotaph was erected in Ta-tu. In 1318 a gift of 10,000 strings of cash was granted to the Ta-hsing-chiao ssu in his honour. The climax of his posthumous career came under the rule of Śidebala (Ying-tsung, r. 1321-23), an earnest follower of Buddhism. On 22 December 1320, the emperor ordered that memorial halls devoted to the Imperial Preceptor 'P'ags-pa should be built in all the districts, and that the rites performed in them should follow the model of those practised in the temple of Confucius. In 1321 a 'P'ags-pa monastery was built in the capital, and the Sa-skya convent(s) received an offering of 250 ounces of gold, 2,200 ounces of silver, and 20,000 red cassocks, in addition to gifts of banners, pieces of silk and tea to the monks. Further donations were made to the 'P'ags-pa temple in 1323. In the following year portraits of the Imperial Preceptor were sent to each of the eleven provinces and an order was issued to present offerings to his tablets. In 1332 a sum of 50,000 strings of cash was presented to his memorial hall. All this tends to show that early in the 14th century 'P'ags-pa was considered as a sort of protecting saint of the Mongol dynasty. This belief resulted in the period of the Mongol dynasty being regarded as crucial to the history of the Buddhist church, as shown by such works as the *Fo-tsu li-tai r'ung-tśai*.

'P'ags-pa undeniably played a considerable role in the religious and cultural history of Tibet. He was a prolific author, his collected works (*gsuñ-'bum*) amounting to 321 items, most of them very short. But his literary output was heavily constrained by the imperatives of his political life. His contribution to doctrine is inferior to his revered uncle's, the Sa-skya Pañ-c'en. His most important work is the *Śes-bya rab-gsal*, composed in 1278 for the heir apparent Ĵingim; it is a short (36 leaves) summary of doctrine, of the type called *bśad-mdzod* in Tibetan. It enjoyed great diffusion and was translated into Chinese by Śar-pa (1259-1314) in 1306, under the title *Chang-so-chih-lun* (TSD 1645). A free Mongol version was made by Siregetü güüsi čorĵi (fl.1580-1620), titled *Čiqula kereglegči tegüs udqatu šastir*. An English translation was published by C. Hoog, *Prince Ĵingim's textbook of Tibetan Buddhism*, Leiden, 1983. Two short tracts on the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin are also included in the Chinese canon (TSD 1904 and 1905). Another remarkable booklet is the *rGyal-po-la gdams-pa'i rab-byed*, a summary of the main points of Buddhism addressed to Qubilai in the form of an epistle in verse. In the same vein 'P'ags-pa wrote several epistles of religious instruction to members of the imperial family; a similar letter was addressed to the clergy of central Tibet on the eve of his final return there (1274).

Generally speaking, his main interests lay in the field of Tantric literature and related liturgy.

Like his uncle, 'P'ags-pa maintained some connections with Nepal, and thus with Indian culture. One of his letters is addressed to the Nepalese scholar Lakṣmīkāra, who in collaboration with the Tibetan Śoṅ-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mts'an translated the *Bodhisattvāvadāna-kalpalatā* of Kṣemendra, the *Kāvyādarśa* of Daṇḍin, and the *Nāgānanda* of Harṣadeva. He also requested a translation of the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghōṣa. By means of versions of those works, he promoted the introduction into Tibet of the best Indian models and handbooks of ornate style (*alaṅkāra*). They were much appreciated and keenly followed, with profound influences on Tibetan literary style.

The period of 'P'ags-pa was no less fruitful in the artistic field. He had apparently no direct hand in the large building activity started at Sa-skya by the *dpon-c'en* Śākya-bzañ-po and continued by his successor Kun-dga'-bzañ-po. The main undertaking was the construction of the huge Lha-k'añ c'en-mo, a palace and fortress which served as the centre of the Tibetan administrative agencies in the Mongol period. 'P'ags-pa's influence was more direct in sculpture. In 1260 he had been ordered by Qubilai to build a gilt stupa in T'u-fan (i.e. probably in Amdo); the work was to be entrusted to Nepalese artisans, a quite common procedure at that time. Eighty craftsmen were enrolled, but nobody was prepared to act as director of the work, till a Nepalese youth of noble birth called A-ni-ko (Aniga, 1245-1306) boldly offered himself for the task. He was accepted, and the work was completed within the year, whereupon 'P'ags-pa insisted that the task-master should proceed to court with him. A-ni-ko complied; Qubilai was quite satisfied with his work, and in 1273 granted him authority over all the metal workers in the empire. A-ni-ko founded a flourishing school, and his tradition lasted for a long time in the Buddhist sculpture of China.

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Thiel 61; Fujishima 67; Kubo 68.2; Kučera 70; Nakano 71:24-38; Inaba 75 (also items 118-120 in GKBM); Imaeda 74; Žva-sgab-pa 76,I:281-299 (cf. Shakabpa 67:64-69); Wylie 77; Schuh 77; Hsiao CC78:57,161,n.64; Jagchid 80; Cha-ch'i Ssu-ch'in 80,II:895-936; Szerb 80; Schuh 81:341-348 (for 'P'ags-pa's original document); Petech 83; Hoog 83; Chang JY84; Franke H84; Ch'en CY85; Wang-Ch'en 85:1-81; Petech 87; Petech 88; Petech 90:160b. Cf. also *YSCK* 8:1984, 1-8.

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- AA* = *Acta Asiatica*
ACHSPNW = *Annals of the Chinese Historical Society of the Pacific Northwest*
*AM*² = *Asia Major*, Second Series
*AM*³ = *Asia Major*, Third Series
AOH = *Acta Orientalia Hung.*
ARJ = アジア歴史辭典, 東京, 1962
BAOS = The Toho Gakkai, ed., *Books and Articles on Oriental Subjects Published in Japan*, Tokyo
BEFEO = *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient*
BM = H.G. Schwarz, *Bibliotheca Mongolica*, I, Western Washington University, Bellingham, 1978
BSYS = *Bulletin of Sung Yuan Studies* (formerly *SSN*)
Bunka = 文化
CAJ = *Central Asiatic Journal*
CCTS = 丁謙, 浙江圖書館叢書, 1915
CIAS = *Central and Inner Asian Studies*
CIB = *Combined Indices to Thirty Collections of Liao, Chin, and Yüan Biographies*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, No.35, 2nd ed., Tokyo, 1960
CKCH = 中國哲學
CKPC = 中國邊政
CKSHCCSCK = 中國社會經濟史集刊
CKSHKH = 中國社會科學
CKSLSYC = 中國水利史研究
CKSYC = 中國史研究
CKSYCTT = 中國史研究動態
CKTSTL = 上海圖書館, 中國叢書綜錄, 上海, 1959-62
CKYSYCTH = 中國元史研究通訊
CKYTHSHK = 中國營造學社彙刊 (*Bulletin of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture*)
CMR = *The Canada-Mongolia Review*
CPTCTS = 知不足齋叢書, 1921
CSISWP = 章學誠, 章氏遺書外編, 1922
CTCKSLTK = 沈雲龍, 近代中國史料叢刊, 臺北, 1966-73
CTPS = 證道秘書, 1823
CTT = 摘藻堂四庫全書薈要, 1773
CYYY = 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 (*Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology Academia Sinica*)
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 ET = *Études mongoles*
 FJHC = 輔仁學誌
 GGS = 田村實造編, 元史語彙集成, I-III, 京都, 1961-63
 GKBM = 山根幸夫, 大島立子, 元代史研究文獻目錄 (*A Classified Bibliography of Articles and Books Concerning the Yüan Period in Japanese and Chinese*), 東京, 1971
 HCIY = 新中醫藥
 HDGBK = 北海道大學外國語外國文學研究
 HEPCI = 哈爾濱中醫
 HHLP = 學海類編, 1920
 HHYC = 漢學研究
 HHYK = 華學月刊
 HJAS = *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*
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 HSJ = The National Committee of Japanese Historians, ed., *Historical Studies in Japan. A Bibliography*, Tokyo
 HTC = 續藏經, 臺北, 1971
 HTYC = 西藏研究
 HUS = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*
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 JA = *Journal Asiatique*
 JAH = *Journal of Asian History*
 JDS = *Journal des Savants*
 JESHO = *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
 JNCBRAS = *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*
 JOS = *Journal of Oriental Studies*
 JSEAH = *Journal of Southeast Asian History*
 JTS = *Journal of Turkish Studies*
 KAG = 北亞細亞學報
 KGS = 小野川秀美編, 金史語彙集成, I-III, 京都, 1960-62
 KHCPTS = 國學基本叢書
 KK = 考古
 KKSK = 考古社刊
 KLCYTSKKK = 國立中央圖書館館刊
 KLPIKKK = 國立編譯館館刊

- KTHCTS* = 廣倉學窘叢書甲類, 1916
LSCH = 歷史教學
MKSYC = 蒙古史研究
MRDTB = *Memoires of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*
MS = *Monumenta Serica*
MSt = *Mongolian Studies*
MSTS = 美術叢書, 1936
NCGH = 日本中國學會報
NMKSHKH = 內蒙古社會科學
NMKTHHP = 內蒙古大學學報
NMKTK = 內蒙古大學學報叢刊
ODKN = 大谷大學研究年報
OE = *Oriens Extremus*
OGH = 大谷學報
OHLS = 藕香零拾, 1895-1910
PCCIHYP = 北京中醫學院學報
PCHSTK = 筆記小說大觀, 民國
PFEH = *Papers on Far Eastern History*
PFLT = 北方論叢
PN = 百衲本
RB = 立命館文學
RDTR = 立教大學東洋史論集
RDDGN = 立教大學大學院年報
RG = 龍谷學報
RJG = 六條學報
RK = 歷史教育
RMM = *Revue du Monde Musulman*
SB = H. Franke, ed., *Sung Biographies*, I-IV, Wiesbaden, 1976
SBS = 社會文化史學
SCTCYC = 世界宗教研究
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 SSYCC = 宋史研究集 (臺北)
 ST = *Studia Tibetica*
 SY = 史原
 SYTFCTS = 宋元地方志叢書
 SYTS = 適園叢書, 1913-16
 SZ = 史學雜誌
 TBKK = 東洋文化研究所紀要
 TČRDMP = *Trudy Členov Rossijskoï Dukhovnoï Missii v Pekine*
 TFTC = 東方雜誌
 TG = 東方學
 TGH = 東洋學報
 THCTS = 讀畫齋叢書, 1799
 TK = 東洋史研究
 TKH = 東亞研究所報
 TLTC = 大陸雜誌
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YSLT = 元史論叢

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ADDENDUM

CSSLT = 中算史論叢

CHINESE CHARACTER INDICES

1. TOPICS AND TERMS

This index includes also titles of essays
and books quoted in the biographies

'account of conduct' see *hsing-chuang*

ai 愛 ('love')

ai-tz'u 哀辭 ('lament')

Analects see *Lun-yü*

Black Army see *Hei-chün*

Book of Changes see *I-ching*

Book of History (or *Classic of Documents*) see *Shu-ching*

Book of Odes see *Shih-ching*

Book of Rites see *Li-chi*

cha 槌 (mech. device)

ch'ai-fa 差發 ('household tax')

Chan-jan chü-shih wen-chi 湛然居士文集

Chan-kuo ts'e 戰國策

Ch'an 禪 (Buddhist sect)

chang 丈 (measure)

Chang Ch'iu-chien suan-ching 張邱建算經

Chang Hsien-wu wang chi see *Huai-yang chi*

'Chang-shih hsin-ying chi' 張氏新瑩記

Chang-so-chih-lun 彰所知論

ch'ang-fa 常法 (math. expression)

Chao-tan 照膽

Chen-chiu chih-nan 針灸指南 (= *Tou T'ai-shih chen-chiu* 竇太師針灸)

chen-jen 真人 ('perfected [= realized] man')

Chen-kuan cheng-yao 貞觀政要

cheng-fang an 正方案 (astr. instrument)

cheng-hsin 正心 ('rectification of the mind')

cheng-i 正儀 (astr. instrument)

cheng-li i 証理儀 (astr. instrument)

Cheng-lung 正隆 (reign period: 1156-61)

cheng-meng 證盟 ('oath of [spiritual] allegiance')

cheng-shih 正史 ('standard history')

Cheng-ta 正大 (reign period: 1224-32)

cheng-t'ung 正統 ('legitimate [dynastic] succession')

Cheng-t'ung pa-li 正統八例

Cheng-t'ung shu 正統書

Cheng-yao 政要

Ch'eng-hua shih-lüeh 承華事略

ch'eng-i 誠意 ('sincerity of the will')

chi 集 ('series')
chi 機 ('opportunity')
Chi 箕 (lunar mansion)
chi-an 寄庵 ('temporary abode')
Chi-chün (t'u-) *chih* 汲郡(圖)志
Chi-fu t'ung-chih 畿輔通志
Chi-hsing 紀行
Chi-ku ch'ien-wen 稽古千文
 'Chi-meng' 記夢
Chi-sheng pa-ts'ui 濟生拔萃
ch'i 氣 ('breath; material or vital force')
Ch'i-chü chu 起居注
Ch'i-ku suan-ching 緝古算經
ch'i-lin 麒麟 ('unicorn')
Ch'i-pao teng-lou 七寶燈漏 (clock)
 'Ch'i-tao i' 七道議
chia-tzu 甲子 (cycl. year)
Chia-tzu chi 甲子集
chia-wu 甲午 (cycl. year)
Chiang-ts'un ts'ung-shu 彊村叢書
ch'iang-tao 強盜 ('robbery')
chiao 醮 (Taoist religious service)
chiao-ch'ao 交鈔 ('exchange notes,' paper money)
chiao-hua 教化 ('to educate and transform')
chiao-miao 郊廟 (sacrifice)
chiao-tzu 交子 (paper money)
ch'ieh-tao 竊盜 ('theft')
chien-ch'en 姦臣 ('treacherous officials')
Chien-hsi-ts'un-she ts'ung-k'o 漸西村舍叢刻
chien-hsing 見性 ('to perceive one's true nature')
chien-i 簡儀 (astr. instrument)
ch'ien 乾 (trigram)
ch'ien 錢 ('cash')
Ch'ien-ching 鈐經
ch'ien-hu 千戶 ('chiliarchy')
Ch'ien-tzu wen 千字文
Ch'ien-wen chi 前聞記
chih 志 ('treatise')
chih 智 ('wisdom' = skr. *prajñā*)
chih 制 ('Imperial patent')
chih-chih 致知 ('extension of knowledge')
Chih-fu-chai ts'ung-shu 知服齋叢書
Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu 知不足齋叢書
Chih-tso pen-yüan 制作本原

- Chih-yüan 至元 (reign periods: 1264-94; 1335-40)
 Chih-yüan hsin-fa 至元新法
 Chih-yüan hsin-ko 至元新格
 Chih-yüan pao-ch'ao 至元寶鈔 (paper money)
 ch'ih 恥 ('shame')
 Ch'ih-shui i-chen 赤水遺珍
 chin 斤 (measure: 'catty')
 chin-fu 金符 ('golden tablet')
 chin hu fu 金虎符 ('golden tiger tablet')
 Chün-shih 金史
 Chün-shu 晉書
 Chin-Yüan san-ch'ü 金元散曲
 ch'in 琴 ('zither')
 ching 經 ('classic')
 Ching-chai ku-chin chi (or t'ou) 敬齋古今集(註)
 Ching-chai wen-chi 敬齋文集
 ching-chieh 淨戒 ('pure commandments')
 ching-chung 精忠 ('utmost loyalty')
 ching-fu 景符 (astr. instrument)
 ching i hsiu shen 靜以修身
 ching-t'ien (chih) 井田(制) ('well-field [system]')
 ch'ing 情 ('emotion[s]')
 ch'ing 頃 (measure)
 Ch'ing-lo she 清樂社 ('Pure Happiness Society')
 chiu 糾 (mil. unit)
 Chiu-chang suan-shu 九章算術
 chiu-shu 舊術 ('old method')
 Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-chüan wen-chi 秋澗先生大全文集
 Ch'iu-tsu ch'üan-shu 丘祖全書
 Cho-keng lu 輟耕錄
 Chou I wai-chuan 周易外傳
 Chou-li 周禮
 Chou-tzu T'ung shu 周子通書
 'Chou-tzu tz'u-t'ang pei' 周子祠堂碑
 chu-wang 諸王 ('imperial princes')
 ch'u-chia 出家 ('those who have left home' - i.e. to enter religious life)
 ch'u-shih 處士 ('retired scholar')
 Chuan-shen hsüan-tse 轉神選擇
 chuang-yüan 狀元 ('optimus')
 'Ch'un-chai shuo' 惔齋說
 Ch'un-ch'iu 春秋
 Ch'un-ch'iu san-chuan che-chung 春秋三傳折衷
 Ch'un-ch'iu wai-chuan 春秋外傳
 chung 中 ('centrality, mean, middle')

- Chung-chou ming-hsien wen-piao* 中州名賢文表
Chung-hua shu-chū 中華書局
Chung-t'ang shih-chi 中堂事記
Chung-t'ung 中統 (reign period: 1260-64)
Chung-t'ung (yüan-pao) chiao-ch'ao 中統(元寶)交鈔 (paper money)
 'Chung-t'ung shen-wu sung' 中統神武頌
Chung-t'ung yin-huo 中統銀貨 (paper money)
Chung-yung 中庸
ch'ung-chih tou-men 重置斗門 (mech. device)
Ch'ung-hsiu Yai-shan chih 重修崖山志
chü-jen 舉人 ('graduate')
chüan 卷 ('section, chapter' of a book)
chüan-mo 卷末
ch'ü-k'ou 驅口 ('slave')
Ch'üan-ch'en 全真 (Taoist sect)
Ch'üan Yüan san-ch'ü 全元散曲
chüeh-tuan 角端 (myth. animal)
chün-tzu 君子 ('gentleman')
Classic of Filial Piety see *Hsiao-ching*
 community schools see *she-hsüeh*
Doctrine of the Mean see *Chung-yung*
e 闕 ('to shut')
Elementary Learning see *Hsiao-hsüeh*
erh-ch'en 貳臣 ('disloyal minister')
erh-ch'eng fang-shih 二乘方實 (math. expression)
Erh-chih kuei-ching k'ao 二至晷景考
fa-hao 法號 ('monastic name')
fa-yü 法語 ('religious discourses')
fan-p'u 返樸 ('return to the natural state of being')
Fan-shuo (Fan-lun) 泛說(泛論)
fang 舫 ('naval unit')
fang-chi 方技 ('techniques')
fang-shih 方實 (math. expression)
fen 分 (division of *tu* 度)
fen-ti 分地 ('princely estate, apanage')
Five Classics see *Wu-ching*
 'five constant virtues' see *wu-ch'ang*
Fo-hsüeh wei t'i, Ju-hsüeh wei yung 佛學爲體儒學爲用
Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai 佛祖歷代通載
Four Books see *Ssu-shu*
fu 符 ('tablet')
fu 府 ('administration')
fu 賦 ('prose-poem, rhymeprose')
fu-lu 附錄 ('appendix')

- fu-ma* 駙馬 ('imperial son-in-law')
 golden tablet see *chin-fu*
 golden tiger tablet see *chün hu fu*
Great Learning see *Ta-hsüeh*
 Han 漢 ('[Northern] Chinese')
 Han (= Northern Chinese) Armies see *Han-chün*
Han-chün 漢軍 ('Northern Chinese Armies')
Han-shu 漢書
hao 號 ('appellation, style')
hao ch'ang-shao 好長哨 ('fondness for long whistling')
Hao Wen-chung kung chi 郝文忠公集
Hei-chün 黑軍 ('Black Army')
Hei-Ta shih-lüeh 黑韃事略
ho 和 ('harmony')
ho-ku 和雇 ('harmonious hiring')
ho-mai 和買 ('harmonious purchase')
hou-chi i 侯極儀 (astr. instrument)
Hou-Han shu 後漢書
hou-hsü 後序 ('postface')
 'Hsi sheng chieh' 希聖解
Hsi-shih chi 西使記
 'Hsi-tz'u' 繫辭
Hsi-yu chi 西遊記
Hsi-yu lu 西遊錄
hsia 下 ('lower')
hsia 俠 ('knight-errant')
hsiang 相 (first character [alter. form] of Sangha's Chinese name), cf. *sang*
Hsiang-chien 相鑑
hsiang-k'an shu 相砍書 ('book on war')
hsiao-ching 梟獍 ('owl and Muntjac tiger')
Hsiao-ching 孝經
Hsiao-heng chi 小亨集
Hsiao-hsüeh 小學
Hsiao-hsüeh Ssu-shu pei-yao 小學四書備要
Hsiao-hsüeh ta-i 小學大義
hsiao-jen 小人 ('mean individual')
hsiao-k'ang 小康 ('Small Tranquillity')
hsieh-chi hu 協濟戶 ('families entitled to public assistance')
hsien 仙 ('immortal') see also *shen-hsien*
 'Hsien-pi hsing-chuang' 先妣行狀
hsin-chieh 新戒 ('novice')
hsin-fa 心法 ('study or learning of the mind-and-heart')
hsin-hai 辛亥 (cycl. year)
Hsin-ko 新格

Hsin-kuan 新館 ('New Hall')

hsin-min 新民 ('to renew the people')

Hsin-shih 心史

Hsin-ts'e erh-shih-pa-she tsa-tso chu-hsing ju-hsiu ch'ü-chi

新測二十八舍雜坐諸星入宿去拯

Hsin-ts'e wu-ming chu-hsing 新測無名諸星

hsing 性 ('human nature; one's pure nature or innate essence')

hsing 姓 ('surname, clan name')

hsing-chuang 行狀 ('account of conduct')

hsing-kuei 星晷 (astr. instrument)

hsing-kuei ting-shih i 星晷定時儀 (astr. instrument)

hsing-li 性理 ('human nature and reason')

hsing-lou 行漏 (time-keeping device)

hsing-ming 性命 ('natural life-essence')

hsing-shu 行書 (style of calligraphy)

Hsing-ting 興定 (reign period: 1217-22)

hsiu 宿 (lunar mansion)

Hsiu-kai yüan-liu 修改源流

hsiu-shen 修身 ('self-improvement')

hsü 虛 (math. term)

Hsü Hou-Han shu 續後漢書

'Hsü hsüeh' 敘學

hsüan cheng-i 懸正儀 (astr. instrument)

hsüan-chi 璇璣 (astr. instrument)

Hsüeh-chai chi 雪齋集

'Hsün shu chi' 馴鼠記

hsün-te pei 勳德碑 ('stele of meritorious virtue')

hu 胡 ('barbarian, foreigner')

Hu shih-pa 胡十八

hua 化 ('to transform, to convert')

Hua-hu ching 化胡經

Hua-yen 華嚴 (Buddhist sect)

Huai-nan tzu 淮南子

Huai-yang chi 淮陽集 (= Chang Hsien-wu wang chi 張獻武王集)

Huan-shan chi 還山集

Huan-shan i-kao 還山遺稿

Huang-chi ching-shih shu 皇極經世書

huang-chih kuei-tsung chih pao 皇姪貴宗之寶

Huang-lu chiao 黃籙醮 (sacrifice)

Huang-t'u ta-hsün 皇圖大訓

hui 會 (Taoist 'lay congregation')

hui-hui jen 回回人 ('Muslim')

Hui-hui li-fa 回回曆法

hui-tzu 會子 (paper money)

- hun-t'ien hsiang* 渾天象 (astr. instrument)
Hun-yüan 混元 (religious sect)
Hung-ao chün 紅襖軍 ('Red Coats Army')
Hung-ao tse 紅襖賊 ('Red Coat Bandits')
huo 或 ('perhaps, so it seems')
Huo-wen 或問
i 益 (math. term)
i 義 ('righteousness')
I-ching 易經
I-chün 義軍 ('Righteous Armies')
'I hsi-tz'u shuo' 易繫辭說
I-hsiang fa-shih 儀象法式
i-hsin 一心 ('One [or Universal] Mind')
I-ku chi 益古集
I-ku yen-tuan 益古演段
i-min 遺民 ('loyalist')
I-shan hsien-sheng wen-chi 遺山先生文集
i-shu 義塾 ('free school')
I-tu chiu-chün 益都舊軍 ('Old Army of I-tu')
I-tu hsün-chün 益都新軍 ('New Army of I-tu')
I-wen yin-shu-kuan 藝文印書館
 Imperial Ancestral Temple see *tsung-miao*
 Imperial patent see *chih* 制
jen 仁 ('benevolence')
jen-tzu 壬子 (cycl. year)
jih-yüeh-shih i 日月食儀 (astr. instrument)
Ju-chi shih-so 如積釋鎖
ju-chiang 儒將 ('scholar-general')
Ju-nan i-shih 汝南遺事
K'ai-fang t'ung-shih 開方通釋
k'ai-shu 楷書 (style of calligraphy)
K'ai-yüan 開元 (rites)
K'ai-yüan chan-ching 開元占經
kao 羔 ('lamb')
kao-piao 高表 (astr. instrument)
k'ao 考 ('examination of merits')
'K'ao-kung chi' 考工記
k'ao-sui lüeh 考歲略
ken 艮 (trigram)
keng-tzu 庚子 (cycl. day)
Keng-wu yüan-li 庚午元曆
Ko-ming chün 革命軍
ko-wu 格物 ('investigation of things')
k'o 刻 (measure of time)

k'o-ch'ai 科差 ('household tax')
k'o-ch'eng 課程 ('taxes')
Ku-chin chiao-shih k'ao 古今交食考
Ku-liang chuan 穀梁傳
kuan 貫 ('string [of cash]')
kuan 觀 ('belvedere')
Kuei-ch'ien chih 歸潛志
kuei-ch'ou 癸丑 (cycl. day)
kuei-hsiang-lou 櫃香漏 (clock)
kuei-mao 癸卯 (cycl. day)
Kuei-te chün 歸德軍 ('Kuei-te Army')
kuei-yu 癸酉 (cycl. day)
K'uei 奎 (constellation)
k'uei-chi 闕几 (astr. instrument)
k'un 坤 (trigram)
kung 公 ('impartiality')
kung-an 公案 (Ch'an 'theme' for meditation)
kung-chu 公主 ('Imperial princess')
kung-li 功利 (pragmatic policies)
Kung-yang chuan 公羊傳
Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei 國朝文類
Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh 國朝名臣事略
'Kuo-hsüeh shih-chi' 國學事蹟
Kuo-shih 國史
Kuo-t'ung li-ho piao 國統離合表
Kuo-yü 國語
li 里 (measure)
li 理 ('principle')
'Li-cheng i' 立政議
Li-ch'eng 立成
Li-chi 禮記
Li-hsiang lu 歷象錄
li-hsüeh 理學 ('doctrine of the Principle')
Li-i ni-kao 曆議擬稿
'Li-kuo kuei-mo' 立國規模
li-shu 隸書 (style of calligraphy)
li-tung 立冬 (cal. term)
Li-yüan an-shih yüeh-fu hsin-sheng 梨園按試樂府新聲
li-yün i 立運儀 (astr. instrument)
liang 兩 (ounce of silver, 'tael')
Liao-hai ts'ung-shu 遼海叢書
lieh-chuan 列傳 ('Classified Biographies')
Lieh-kuo hsi-lun 列國序論
lien 廉 ('honesty')

- lien-hua lou* 蓮花漏 (clepsydra)
Lien Wen-ching kung chi 廉文靖公集
Lin-chi 臨濟 (Ch'an Buddhist sect)
Ling-ch'uan chi 陵川集
ling-lung i 玲瓏儀 (astr. instrument)
Liu Ching-hsiu hsien-sheng wen-chi 劉靜修先生文集
Liu-chu chih-yao fu 流注指要賦
liu-ma 流馬 (device)
Liu T'ai-pao hsieh-lou t'ien-chi 劉太保洩漏天機
Liu-ting 六丁 (Taoist deities)
 Loyal and Righteous Army of Shan-tung see *Shan-tung chung-i chün*
lu 錄 ('record')
Lu-chai ch'üan-shu 魯齋全書
Lu-chai i-shu 魯齋遺書
Lu-kuei pu 錄鬼簿
 'Lun shih chüeh-chü' 論詩絕句
Lun-yü 論語
lū-k'o 律科 (degree)
Ma-ta-pa li 麻答把曆
Mencius see *Meng-tzu*
man 蠻 ('southern aborigines')
Meng hui-t'ou 猛回頭
Meng-ku chün 蒙古軍 ('Mongol Army')
Meng-ku Han-chün 蒙古漢軍 ('Mongol and Han [= Northern Chinese] Armies')
Meng-Ta pei-lu 蒙韃備錄
Meng-tzu 孟子
min 緡 ('string of cash')
ming 命 ('one's destiny, mandate')
ming 名 ('personal or given name')
ming ming-te 明明德 ('to manifest the brilliant virtue')
 Mongol and Han (= Northern Chinese) Armies see *Meng-ku Han-chün*
 Mongol Army see *Meng-ku chün*
mou 畝 (measure)
Mu-an chi 牧庵集
mu-niu 木牛 (device)
Nan-Sung Yüan Ming ch'an-lin seng-pao chuan see the Bibliography under CLSPC
National History see *Kuo-shih*
nei-suan 內算 ('esoteric computation')
 New Army of I-tu see *I-tu hsin-chün*
nien-p'u 年譜 ('chronological biography')
 Old Army of I-tu see *I-tu chiu-chün*
 One (or Universal) Mind see *i-hsin*

ortaq, ortoq see *wo-t'o*

Ou-hsiang ling-shih 藕香零拾

Pa-shih-i hua t'u 八十一化圖

pai yen 百眼 ('a hundred eyes')

pai yen 百雁 ('hundred wild geese')

paiza = *p'ai-tzu* 牌子 ('tablet of authority', 'paiza')

pan 半 (division of *tu* 度)

'Pan-shih i' 班師儀

p'an-ch'en 叛臣 ('rebellious officials')

P'an-ch'i chi 磻溪集

pao-chia 保甲 (system)

pao-pien 褒貶 ('praise and blame')

Pao-shan lou 寶山漏 (clepsydra)

pao-yin 包銀 ('tax in silver')

patent of canonization see *tseng shih chih*

pen-chi 本紀 ('[Imperial] Annals')

Pi-lei t'iao-mu 比類條目

Pien ku-kung chi 汴故宮記

Pien-nien ko k'uo 編年歌括

Pien-wei lu 辯僞錄

p'ien 篇 ('section' of a book)

pin-chih 殯誌 ('funerary record')

ping-shen 丙申 (cycl. year)

p'ing-feng hsiang-lou 屏風香漏 (clock)

p'ing-shih 平實 (math. expression)

P'ing-sung lu 平宋錄

po-yen 白雁 ('white wild goose')

'po-yen hsing' 白雁行

Precious seal of the Imperial nephew from exalted ancestry see *huang-chih*

kuei-tsung chih pao

pu 步 (measure)

pu-ch'ü hu 部曲戶 ('privately attached households')

Pu Yüan-shih i-wen chih 補元史藝文志

'pure commandments' see *ching-chieh*

Records of Current Government see *Shih-cheng chi*

Red Coats (bandits) see *Hung-ao tse*

Red Coats Army see *Hung-ao chün*

Righteous Armies see *I-chün*

san-ch'eng fang-shih 三乘方實 (math. expression)

san-chiao 三教 ('the Three Teachings')

San-chuan 三傳

San-chuan hsü-lun 三傳序論

san-ch'ü 散曲 (song form)

san-kang 三綱 ('the three bonds')

- 'San-ko' 三哥 ('The Third Brother')
san-kung 三公 ('The Third Duke', i.e. the Grand Guardian)
San-kuo chih 三國志
san-t'ai 三臺 ('the three terraces')
sang 桑 (first character of Sangha's Chinese name)
se-mu (jen) 色目人 ('miscellaneous aliens' or 'ethnics')
shan 善 ('goodness')
Shan-chu hsing-t'ung fu 刪注刑統賦
 'Shan-chü t'u' 山居圖
Shan-ling tsa-chi 山陵雜記
Shan-tung chung-i chün 山東忠義軍 ('Loyal and Righteous Army of Shan-tung')
shang 上 ('upper')
Shang-chung-hsia san-li chu-shih 上中下三曆注式
shang-shui 商稅 ('sales tax')
shao 少 (division of *tu* 度)
She-ch'i ko 設器歌
she-hsüeh 社學 ('community school')
She-sheng hsiao-hsi lun 攝生消息論
shen-hsien 神仙 ('holy immortal'), see also *hsien*
shen-tao 神道 ('spirit-way')
shen-tao pei 神道碑 ('spirit-way stele')
shen-tao pei ming 神道碑銘 ('inscription on the spirit-way stele')
sheng 升 (measure)
Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu 聖武親征錄
shih 石 (measure)
shih 詩 (poetic genre)
shih 實 (math. expression)
shih 謚 ('posthumous name')
Shih-cheng chi 時政記
Shih-chi 史記
Shih-ching 詩經
shih-chung 示眾 ('to show [=inform] the multitude')
shih-hou 世侯 ('hereditary lords')
Shih-hou chien-chu 時候箋注
shih-hsüeh 實學 ('the real learning')
shih-lu 實錄 ('Veritable Records')
Shih-shih t'ang chi 是是堂記
Shih Sung lu 使宋錄
Shih-tsu sheng-hsün 世祖聖訓
 'Shih-wu wu-shih' (or 'Shang shih-wu shu') 時務五事 (上時務書)
Shih-yüan ts'ung-shu 適園叢書
Shou-shih li 授時曆
shu 術 ('method, technique')

Shu-ching 書經

Shu-shu chiu-chang 數書九章

Shuang-ch'i tsui-yin chi 雙溪醉隱集

Shuo-fu 說郛

silver tablet see *yin-fu*

'spirit-way' see *shen-tao*

'spirit-way inscription' (i.e. inscription on the spirit-way stele)

see *shen-tao pei ming*

'spirit-way stele' see *shen-tao pei*

Spring and Autumn Annals see *Ch'un-ch'iu*

ssu-ch'ao 絲鈔 ('silk notes', paper money)

ssu-ch'eng fang-shih 四乘方實 (math. expression)

Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu 四庫全書

Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen 四庫全書珍本

Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu 四庫全書綜目

Ssu-shu 四書

Ssu-shu chi-i 四書集義

Ssu-shu chi-i ching-yao 四書集義精要

Ssu-yin chai k'o Sung Yüan san-shih-i chia tz'u 四印齋刻宋元三十一家詞

ssu-yü 私慾 ('selfish desires')

Ssu-yüan yü-chien 四元玉鑑

'stele of meritorious virtue' see *hsün-te pei*

stupa see *t'a*

Su-hsüan chi 慄軒集

Su wen 素問

sui 歲 ('years' since conception)

sui-kung ju-li 歲貢儒吏 ('annual tribute of Confucian scholars and clerks')

Sung History see *Sung-shih*

Sung-shih 宋史

Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an 宋元學案

Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an pu-i 宋元學案補遺

Sung Yüan shih-hui 宋元詩薈

Ta-ch'ao 大朝 ('Great Dynasty')

(*Ta-ch'eng*) *San-chü-chieh* (大乘) 三聚戒

(*Ta-Chin*) *Hsüan-tu pao-tsang* (大金) 玄都寶藏

Ta-hsüeh 大學

Ta-ming 大明 (Palace hall)

Ta-ming li 大明曆

ta-tan 大丹 ('Great Elixir')

Ta-tan chih-chih 大丹直指

ta-tao 大道 ('Great Doctrine')

Ta-tao 大道 (Taoist sect)

Ta-ting chih-chi 大定治蹟

ta-t'ung 大同 ('Great Unity')

- Ta-t'ung li* 大統曆
Ta-Yüan 大元 ('Great Yuan')
Ta-Yüan hsin-lü 大元新律
t'a 塔 ('stupa, pagoda')
tai 胎 ('transcendent embryo')
t'ai 太 (math. term; a division of *tu* 度)
t'ai-chi 太極 ('Great Ultimate')
'T'ai-chi shu-yüan chi' 太極書院記
T'ai-chi yen 太極演
T'ai-ho lu 泰和律
T'ai-hsüan (ching) 太玄(經)
T'ai-i 太一 (Taoist sect and deity; method of divination)
T'ai-p'ing kuang-hui 太平廣彙
T'ai-shang kan-ying-p'ien 太上感應篇
Tammači Army see *t'an-ma-ch'ih chün*
tan 丹 ('cinnabar elixir')
t'an-ma-ch'ih chün 探馬赤軍 ('Tammači Army')
T'ang Code see *T'ang lü*
T'ang lü 唐律
T'ang Sung chin-t'i shih-hsüan 唐宋近體詩選
tao 道 ('the Way')
Taoist Canon see *Tao-tsang*
tao-hsüeh 道學 ('Doctrine of the [True] Way')
Tao-tsang 道藏
tao-t'ung 道統 ('transmission of the [True] Way' or 'orthodox transmission')
te 德 ('virtue')
te-tao 得道 ('to attain the Tao')
T'eng-hsien chih 滕縣志
tengenjutsu see *t'ien-yüan shu*
 'three bonds' see *san-kang*
Three Commentaries see *San-chuan*
Three Teachings see *San-chiao*
ti-erh-lien 第二廉 (math. expression)
Ti-fan 帝範
ti-i 的意 ('ultimate meaning')
ti-i-lien 第一廉 (math. expression)
ti-san-lien 第三廉 (math. expression)
ti-ssu-lien 第四廉 (math. expression)
ti-tung i 地動儀 (instrument)
Ti-wang ching-lüeh 帝王鏡略
ti-wang hsüeh 帝王學 ('learning of the emperors and kings')
t'i 提 ('to lift, open')
t'i 體 ('substance')
t'i-yao 提要

- t'i-yung* 體用 ('substance and function')
't'ien feng hai t'ao' 天風海濤
t'ien-hsia 天下 ('empire, realm')
T'ien-hsing chin-chien 天興近鑑
T'ien-shih tao 天師道 ('Way of the Heavenly Masters')
T'ien-shun 天順 (reign period: 1457-64)
t'ien-yüan 天元 (math. expression)
T'ien-yüan i-shih 天元一釋
t'ien-yüan shu (tengenjutsu) 天元術 (algebraic process)
ting 錠 ('ingot')
ting-ch'ou 丁丑 (cycl. year)
T'ing-hai chi 丁亥集
Ting-shih i 定時儀 (astr. instrument)
Tou shih (Chieh) ch'uang-yang ching-yen ch'üan-shu
 寶氏(傑)瘡瘍經驗全書
Tou T'ai-shih chen-chiu see *Chen-chiu chih-nan*
t'ou-hsia 投下 ('private domain, fief, apanage')
t'ou-hsia kuan-yüan 投下官員 (Mongol enfeoffed nobility serving in the
 government, at court, or in the army)
t'ou-hsiang 頭項 (apanage holder)
T'ou-to 頭陀 (Dhūta - a Buddhist 'heretical' sect)
t'ou-chü 雜劇 (plays)
t'ou-shih 雜史 ('Miscellaneous History')
Tsa-tu hai 雜毒海
ts'ai 材 ('material substance')
Ts'ang-ch'un chi 藏春集
'Ts'ao-an ko' 草庵歌
Ts'ao-mu tzu 草木子
ts'ao-shu 草書 (cursive style of writing)
Ts'ao-tung 曹洞 (Ch'an Buddhist sect)
ts'e 冊 ('volume')
Ts'e-yüan hai-ching (hsi-ts'ao) 測圓海鏡(細艸)
Ts'e-yüan hai-ching shih-shu 測圓海鏡釋術
Ts'e-yüan suan-shu 測圓算術
tseng shih chih 贈諡制 ('patent of canonization')
tso-cheng i 座正儀 (astr. instrument)
Tso-chuan 左傳
tsu-tang 族黨 ('clansmen and followers')
'Tsui ching chi' 醉經記
Tsui-ching t'ang chi 醉經堂記
tsung-cheng 宗正 ('censure of the [imperial] clan')
tsung-feng 宗鳳 ('tradition of a [particular] school')
tsung-miao 宗廟 ('Imperial Ancestral Temple')
ts'ung 從, *ts'ung-fang* 從方 (math. terms)

- tu* 度 ('degree')
 'Tu Chiang fu' 渡江賦
 'Tu I-shan shih' 讀遺山詩
Tu I ssu yen 讀易私言
T'ui-pu 推步
t'un-t'ien 屯田 ('agricultural colony; military farm')
t'un-t'ien chün 屯田軍 ('military colonists')
 'Tung-shih i' 東師議
Tung-tu shih-lüeh 東都事略
Tung-yu chi 東遊記
 'Tung-yüan chiu-yung' 洞淵九容
T'ung-chih t'iao-ko 通制條格
t'ung-hu 銅壺 ('bronze clepsydra')
T'ung-shih 痛史
T'ung Shu 通書
tzu 字 ('courtesy name')
Tzu-chih t'ung-chien 資治通鑑
Tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu 資治通鑑綱目
tzu-te 自得 ('finding [the Way] for himself')
Tzu-yang wen-chi 紫陽文集
tz'u 詞 (poetic genre)
al-Uṣṭurlāb see *hsing-kuei ting-shih i*
Veritable Records see *shih-lu*
 'Wan-chu t'ang chi' 萬竹堂記
wan-hu 萬戶 ('myriarchy')
 Wan-li 萬曆 (reign period: 1573-1615)
Wan-nien li 萬年曆
wan-piao hsüan 丸表懸 (astr. instrument)
Wang-fa cheng-lun p'in 王法正論品
 'Wang-t'ing wen-tui' 王庭問對
Wei-sheng pao-chien 衛生寶鑑
 'well field' (system) see *ching-t'ien (chih)*
wen 文 ('cash; literary art')
wo-ti 我的 ('my')
wo-t'o 幹脫 (*ortoq, ortaq* 'associations, merchants')
wu-ch'ang 五常 ('the five constant virtues')
wu-ch'ang chih tao 五常之道 ('doctrine of the Five Constant Virtues')
wu-ch'eng fang-shih 五乘方實 (math. expression)
Wu-ching 五經
Wu-ching yao-yü 五經要語
Wu-hsing hsi-hsing k'ao 五星細行考
wu-hsü 戊戌 (cycl. day)
wu-hu ssu hu 五戶絲戶 ('five-household silk household')
wu-shen 戊申 (cycl. day)

Wu-t'ai pi-pu 烏臺筆補

yang 陽 (cosmic element or force)

yang-hsi 羊息 = *yang-kao li*

yang-hsing 養性 ('to foster [man's] nature')

yang-i 仰儀 (astr. instrument)

yang-kao li 羊羔利 ('baby lamb [= compound] interest')

yao 妖, *yao-jen* 妖人 ('magician')

Yao-shan-t'ang wai-chi 堯山堂外紀

yen-hu 鹽戶 ('salt-household')

Yen-yu 延祐 (reign period: 1314-20)

yin 引 ('load' of salt)

yin 陰 (cosmic element or force)

yin 蔭 ('protection' privilege or prerogative for appointment to office)

yin-ch'ao 銀鈔 (paper money)

yin-fu 銀符 ('silver tablet')

yin-fu ching 陰符經

yin-kuei 陰鬼 ('Yin ghosts')

yin-te 陰德 ('unostentatious virtue')

Yin-Yang 陰陽 (philosophy)

yu-wei 有爲 ('outward activity')

ying 用 ('function, functioning')

ying 庸 ('commonality')

'Yung-chai chi' 庸齋記

Yung-ch'ing hsien-chih 永清縣志

ying-ju 庸儒 ('petty Confucian scholar')

Yung-lo ta-tien 永樂大典

yü 隅, *yü-fa* 隅法 (math. terms)

Yü-ch'ih ching 玉尺經

Yü-heng chen-kuan 玉衡真觀

yü-lu 語錄 ('recorded sayings')

Yü-t'ang chia-hua 玉堂嘉話

yüan 元 ('head, chief'; math. term)

Yüan-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh see *Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh*

(*Yüan-chen*) *Shou-ch'eng shih-chien* (元貞) 守成事鑑

yüan-ch'i 元氣 ('primal pneuma')

Yüan History see *Yüan-shih*

yüan-shen 元神 ('primal spirit')

Yüan-shih 元史

Yüan-shih hsüan 元詩選

Yüan-shih hsüan kuei-chi 元詩選癸集

Yüeh-fu ch'ün-chu 樂府群珠

Yüeh-li k'ao 月離考

Yün-men 雲門 (Buddhist sect)

2. OFFICES AND TITLES

abbot 主, 長, 住持

Aboriginal Bureau 土司

academician (Han-lin) (翰林)學士

senior - 大學士

academician (Han-lin) for the transmission of directives 翰林學士承旨

academician (Han-lin) for the transmission of directives in charge of

Imperial Edicts 翰林學士承旨知制誥

academician-in-waiting (Han-lin) 翰林待制

Academy for the Glorification of Literature see Chao-wen Academy

Academy of the Bamboo Grove see Chu-lin Academy

Academy of Worthies see Chi-hsien Academy

accountant 掌出納

acting (chief of)... 行...事

acting chief of the Presidential Council (Chin) 行尙書省事

acting president of the Six Ministries 行尙書六部事

adjunct 從事

Administration 府

administrative consultant 詳議官

administrator see military administrator

administrator of...知...事

administrator of military affairs see administrator of the Department
of Military Affairs

administrator of the Department of Military Affairs 知樞密院事

joint deputy administrator - 同僉樞密院事

Agricultural Promotion Bureau (Chin) 勸農(使)司

agricultural promotion commissioner 勸農使

arbitrator see judge

assistant see district assistant

assistant chief (in the Secretariat) (中書)侍郎

assistant (director) 丞

assistant instructor 助教

assistant in the Imperial Archives 秘書郎

assistant military controller 副統軍

assistant of the Left in the Secretarial Council 中書左丞

assistant of the Right in the Presidential Council (Chin) 尙書右丞

assistant of the Right in the Secretarial Council 中書右丞

assistant secretary see secretary

associate (commissioner, administrator) 同知 see general administrator

associate censor 侍御史

associate commissioner of the Department of Military Affairs 同知樞密院使

associate director of political affairs 參知政事

attendant see personal attendant

- a'uruq* see Base Camp (Office)
ba'atur ('valiant, brave') see élite officer
 Base Camp (Office) 奧魯 (Mo. *a'uruq*)
bičēči (= *bičigeči*) see scribe-secretary
 Board of the Left (in the Presidential Council) 左部
 Branch see Regional
 Buddha-Sun, Perfectly Enlightened Great Patriarch 佛日圓明大宗師
 Bureau for Religious Merits 功德使司
 director of the - 領功德使司事
 Bureau of Agriculture 司農司 (later Grand - 大 -)
 director of the - 大司農(卿)
 Bureau of Compilation 編修所
 Bureau of Foreign Trade and Ortaq Administration 泉府司
 Bureau of Literature 經籍所
 Bureau of Maritime Trade 市舶提舉司
 Bureau of the Left 左司
 Bureau of the Right 右司
 Bureaux of the Left and Right 左右司
 campaign commander see field commander
 censor 御史 see chief censor, investigating censor (Sung), censorial
 inspector, regional censorial inspector, secretarial censor
 vice- 御史中丞
 Censorate 御史臺, 臺 see Inspection Bureau
 censorial inspector 監察御史
 centurion (Chin) 百夫長, (Yüan) 百戶 (Mo. *ǰa'un-u noyan*)
 chamberlain 闈里必 (Mo. *čerbi*)
 Chancellery (= the Imperial Chancellery) 門下省
 director of the - 侍中
 chancellor 丞相
 Right - 右丞相 (= prime minister [Sung])
 Left - 左丞相
 Chao-wen Academy (= Academy for the Glorification of Literature) 昭文館
 Chi-hsien Academy (= Academy of Worthies) 集賢院
 chief 長官, 令 (Mo. *noyan*)
 chief administrative officer of - 主管...公事
 chief administrator (in the Secretarial Council) = chancellor; see also
 director of political affairs, assistant (of the Right and of the Left),
 associate director of political affairs, and chief administrative officer
 chief censor 御史大夫
 chief civil administrator 管民長官
 chief councillor (=chief minister) 宰相
 chief falconer 鷹監
 chief military intendant in the regional administration 行府提控都管
 chief minister (=chief councillor) 宰相, 首相

- chief of the Left and Right Boards of the Secretarial Council see L.
and R. Boards of the secretarial council
- chief of the Political Council (Liao) 政事令
- chief of the Presidential Council see Presidential Council
- chief of the Regional Secretariat see Regional Secretariat
- chief of the Secretariat/Secretarial Council see Secretarial Council/
Secretariat
- chief of the Tax-collection Bureau see Tax-collection Bureau
- chief resident commissioner see resident commissioner
- chief secretary see chief of the Secretariat
- chief steward 奉御 see steward
- ch'ien-hu* see chiliarch
- chiliarch 千戶 (Mo. *mingqan-u noyan*)
- chin-shih* 進士
- Chu-lin Academy (=Academy of the Bamboo Grove) 竹林館
- clerk 吏
senior - 經歷(官)
- co-director of the Metropolitan Bureau 留守同知
- College of Foreign Languages (Ch'ing) 同文館
- Commander Unequalled in Honour 開府儀同三司
- commander-in-chief see marshal, grand marshal
- Commandery Prince of Ch'i 齊郡王
- commanding prefect (Sung, Chin) 節度使
vice- 節度副使
- commissioner 使 see also pacification commissioner
vice- 副使, 副...使
- commissioner of the Department of Buddhist Affairs 總制院使
- commissioner of the Department of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs 宣政院使
- commissioner of the Imperial Granary 太倉使
- commissioner of the Transport Bureau see Transport commissioner
- commissioner-on-tour for the promotion of agriculture 巡行勸農使
- community leader 社長
- compiler 編修官
- co-redactor 同修
- Correct and Devoted (S.) 正獻
- Council see Secretarial Council, Presidential Council
- councillor 參議
- counsellor 議事官
- Court of Imperial Sacrifices 太常寺
president of the - 太常卿
- Court of Justice see High Court of Justice
- Cultured and Correct (S.) 文正
- Cultured and Exemplary (S.) 文憲
- Cultured and Expressive (S.) 文宣

- Cultured and Loyal (S.) 文忠
 Cultured and Pacific (S.) 文靖
 Cultured and Prosperous (S.) 文康
 Cultured and Steadfast (S.) 文定
 Cultured and Virtuous (S.) 文貞
 curator of documents in the Han-Lin Academy 應奉翰林文字
čerbi see chamberlain
darqan see freeman
daruqa = *daruqači* see resident commissioner
 dean of studies 司業
 defence commandant 防禦使
 Department of Buddhist Affairs 總制院 (later Department of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs, *q.v.*)
 Department of Calendrical Affairs 太史院
 director of the - 領太史院事, 太史令
 co-director of the - 太史同知
 Department of Military Affairs 樞密院
 Regional - 行樞密院
 Department of National History 國史院
 Department of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs 宣政院 (formerly Department of Buddhist Affairs)
 deputy 副 see deputy chief and vice-
 deputy administrator of... 僉...事 see general administrator
 deputy administrator of military affairs 僉書樞密事
 deputy chief (of the Regional Secretarial Council) 副 (行省)
 deputy commander (of a locality) 副治
 deputy inspection commissioner 提刑按察副使
 director 領(...事), 監
 director of Calendrical Studies 皇曆教授
 director of compilation 監修
 director of Confucian studies 儒學教授
 director of political affairs 平章政事
 associate - 參知政事
 director of state military affairs 平章軍國事
 director of Waterways 都水監
 vice- 都水少監
 Directorate of Astronomy 司天監
 Directorate of Imperial Insignia 典瑞監
 president of the - 典瑞卿
 Directorate of Imperial Workshops 少府監
 Directorate of Military Supplies 軍器監
 Directorate of the National College 國子監
 Directorate of Waterways 都水監
 district assistant 判官

- district assistant of the military governor 節度判官
 drafter of Imperial Edicts 知制誥
 drafting official 舍人
 Duke of An-su 安肅公
 Duke-of-commandery of T'ai-yüan 太原郡公
 Duke of Heng-shan 恆山公
 Duke of Jung-ch'eng Commandery 容城郡公
 Duke of Kao-yang 高陽公
 Duke of Overflowing Sageliness 衍聖公
 Duke-of-state of Chao 趙國公
 Duke-of-state of Chi 冀國公
 Duke-of-state of Ch'i 齊國公
 Duke-of-state of Lu 魯國公
 Duke-of-state of Shou 壽國公
 Duke-of-state of Ts'ai 蔡國公
 Duke-of-state of Wei 衛國公
 Duke-of-state of Wei⁴ 魏國公
 editor 詳定官
 élite officer 拔都兒 (Mo. *ba'atur*)
 Eminent Scholar, Brilliant Heavenly Guardian of the State 光天鎮國大師
 emissary 奏差 (官)
 envoy (official -) 使(臣) (Mo. *elči*) see special (government) envoy
 envoy plenipotentiary 國信使
 Exchange Notes Superintendency 交鈔提舉司
 executive (Han-lin) academician (翰林)學士承旨
 executive assistant 給事
 exercising the functions of (= acting)...行...事
 female attendant 女
 field - , in the field 行軍, 軍前
 field administrator see general administrator
 field commander 都統 see general controller
 first secretary see secretary
 freeman 答剌罕 (Mo. *darqan*)
 garrison commander 探馬赤 (Mo. *tammači*)
 general 將軍
 General Administration (of a district 路) 總管府
 General Administration of the Catapult Operators 砲手軍總管
 general administrator (of a district) (都)總管
 associate administrator 同知...總管府事
 deputy administrator 副都總管
 field administrator 行軍總管
 general civil and military administrator (of a district) 軍民總管
 General Control Bureau of Soldiers and Horses 兵馬都指揮使司
 general control commissioner of the Imperial Guard 侍衛親軍都指揮使

- general controller 都統 see field commander
 general field administrator see general administrator
 Gold and Purple Great Officer of Brilliant Dignity 金紫光祿大夫
 governor 留守 (Mo. *liuśiu*) see military governor
 Grain Transport Bureau 漕運司
 Grand Bureau of Agriculture 大司農司 (formerly Bureau of Agriculture)
 grand commandant 太尉
 Grand General Defender of the State 鎮國大將軍
 Grand General of the Left Military Guard 左武衛大將軍
 Grand General Who Displays Valour 昭勇大將軍
 grand guardian 太保
 - of the Heir Apparent 太子太保
 grand instructor 司徒
 grand judge 斷事官, (也可)札魯忽赤 (Mo. [yeke] *jarquči*) see judge
 grand marshal (兵馬)都元帥
 acting - 行...(兵馬)都元帥府事
 grand officer 大官
 grand physician 尙醫, 太醫
 grand preceptor 太師 (Mo. *taiši*)
 - of the Heir Apparent 太子太師
 grand tutor 太傅
 - of the Heir Apparent 太子太傅
 great arbitrator see grand judge
 great dignitary 大臣
 Great Master of Unimpaired Profundity and Extensive Kindness 通玄廣惠大師
 Great Officer Endowed with Goodness 資善大夫
 Great Officer Endowed with Virtue 資德大夫
 Great Officer in Palace Attendance 中奉大夫
 Great Officer of Brilliant Dignity 光祿大夫
 Great Officer of Eminent Dignity 榮祿大夫
 Great Officer of Commendable Counsel 懿議大夫
 Great Officer of Correct Counsel 正議大夫
 Great Officer of Excellent Counsel 嘉議大夫
 Great Officer of the Military Wing 武翼大夫
 Great Officer of Penetrating Counsel 通議大夫
 Great Officer Recipient of Precepts 奉訓大夫
 Guard(s) see Imperial Guard
 Han-lin academician see academician (Han-lin)
 Han-lin Academy (or the Academy) 翰林院
 Han-lin Academy and Department of National History 翰林(兼)國史院
 Heir Apparent's Administration see Household Department of the Heir Apparent
 hereditary lord see overlord
 High Court of Justice 大宗正府

- high military administrator 大都督 see military administrator
 Historiography Institute (Sung) 史館
 Household Department of the Heir Apparent 詹事院
 Imperial Ancestral Temple 太廟
 Imperial Archives 秘書監
 director of the - 知秘書監, 秘書卿
 Imperial Brigade (Chin) 忠孝軍
 Imperial Chancellery 門下省 see Chancellery
 Imperial commander (in general control) 總領 (Mo. *yeke noyan*)
 Imperial commissioner see chief resident commissioner
 Imperial consort 皇后
 Imperial diarist 修(起居)注
 Imperial Guard 衛, 侍衛, 怯薛 (Mo. *kešig*)
 - Guards(men) 怯薛丹 (Mo. *kešigten*)
 Imperial Preceptor 帝師
 Imperial Seals Office 符寶局
 Imperial Secretariat see Secretariat
 Imperial son-in-law 駙馬 (Mo. *güregen*)
 Imperial Supplies Service 御用局
 Imperial Treasury 萬億庫
 in charge of... 行... 事
 Inquiry Bureau 徵理司
 Inspection Bureau 提刑按察司
 inspection commissioner 提刑按察使
 inspector of granaries 監倉
 inspector of the Silver Superintendency 銀場官
 instructor 教授
 assistant - 助教
 interpreter 通事 (Mo. *keleme[r]či*)
 investigating censor 監察御史
 investigating officer 詳問官
 (Imperial) grand physician see grand physician
 joint - 同 -
 joint deputy administrator of military affairs see administrator of military affairs
 judge, arbitrator 斷事官, 札魯忽赤 (Mo. *jarquči*) see grand judge, prefectural judge
 Judicial Bureau(x) 按察司
 Junior Great Officer 少中大夫
 Junior Guardian 少保
 Junior Preceptor 少師
 Junior Venerable 少長
 Lady-of-state of Jung 容國夫人
 lecturer-in-waiting 侍講學士

- Left and Right Boards (of the Secretarial Council) (中書)左右部
 chief of the - 領中書左右部
 Left chancellor see chancellor
 Left Three Ministries 左三部
 Left vice-marshal 左副元帥
 Loyal and Admirable (S.) 忠懿
 Loyal and Commendable (S.) 忠嘉
 Loyal and Compassionate (S.) 忠惠
 Loyal and Decorous (S.) 忠肅
 Loyal and Devoted (S.) 忠獻
 Loyal and Exemplary (S.) 忠憲
 Loyal and Martial (S.) 忠武
 Loyal and Reverent (S.) 忠穆
 Loyal and Steadfast (S.) 忠定
 Loyal and Virtuous (S.) 忠貞
 magistrate 令
 marshal (= commander-in-chief) 元帥
 grand - 都元帥
 vice- 副都元帥
 Marshal's Administration 元帥府
 Martial and Benevolent (S.) 武惠
 Martial and Resolute (S.) 武毅
 Martial and Strategist (S.) 武略
 Martial and Strong (S.) 武康
 Master of the Sect 宗師
 Merchant Tax Superintendency 宣課提舉司
 Meritorious Official Who Promoted Sincerity and Preserved Integrity 推誠
 保節功臣
 metropolitan prefect 尹 see prefect
 military administrator 參軍事
 high - 大都督
 Military Bureau see Regional Military Bureau
 Military Command Administration 都督府
 military commander 都督
 Military Commission 制司
 military commissioner 制(置)使
 - of Huai-hsi 淮西 -
 - of the Yangtze 沿江 -
 regional - 經略使
 m. vice-commissioner 制置副使
 Military Control Bureau see Regional Military Control Bureau
 military controller 統軍
 deputy - 副統軍
 military governor 節度使

military intendent see chief military intendent

military vice-commissioner see military commissioner

Minister 尙書

- of Justice 刑部尙書

- of Revenue 戶部尙書

- of Rites 禮部尙書

- of War 兵部尙書

- of Works 工部尙書

vice- 侍郎

Ministry 部 see Six Ministries, Three Ministries of the Left

- of Justice 刑部

- of Personnel 吏部

- of Revenue 戶部

- of Rites 禮部

- of Works 工部

mitigation commissioner 安撫使

Mobile see Regional

monitor 陪讀

myriarch 萬戶 (Mo. *tümen-ü noyan*)

field - 行軍萬戶

commanding - 管軍萬戶

civil and military - 軍民萬戶

- of the New and Old Armies 新舊軍萬戶

National Archives 史館

National College 國子學

National Teacher 國師

National University (Chin) 太學

noyan see chief

observing officer 監侯官

Office for Harmonious Hiring 和雇所

Office for Harmonious Purchase 和糴所

Office for Regulated Management 規措所

Office for Regulating State Expenditure 制國用使司

office head 長官, 達魯花赤 (Mo. *daruqači*) see senior official

office manager (in a prefecture) 錄事

acting - 署(州)錄事

Office of General Administration see General Administration

officer in charge of bandit suppression 提調捕盜官

overlord (= hereditary lord) 世侯, 行省

overseer see resident commissioner

Pacification Bureau 宣撫司, 宣慰司

pacification commissioner 宣慰使

deputy - 宣慰副使

parasol-bearer 速古兒赤 (Mo. *sügürči*)

- personal attendant (to the Emperor) (入)侍, 近臣, 近侍
Pillar of the State 柱國
 Supreme - 上柱國
prefect 知(府,州)事 see metropolitan prefect
 vice- 同治...事
prefectural judge 推官 see judge
prefectural school 府學
Presidential Council (Chin, Yüan) 尙書省 see Regional Presidential Council
 chief of the - 尙書令
prime minister (Sung) see chancellor
Prince of An-hsi 安西王
Prince of Ch'ang-shan 常山王
Prince of Chen-yang 鎮陽王
Prince of Chi-nan 濟南王
Prince of Chin 晉王
Prince of Ch'in 秦王
Prince of Fu 福王
Prince of Ho-nan 河南王
Prince of Hsi-p'ing 西平王
Prince of Hsiang-yang 咸陽王
Prince of Huai-yang 淮陽王
Prince of I-ning 懿寧王
Prince of Ju-nan 汝南王
Prince of Lu 魯王
Prince of Pai(Po)-lan 白蘭王
Prince of Pei-p'ing 北平王
Prince-of-state 國王 (Mo. *güi-ong*)
 - of Lu 魯國王
Prince of Tung-p'ing 東平王
Prince of Yün-nan 雲南王
Princely Establishment 王[相]府
 administrator of the - 王[相府]相
principal of the Confucian School 儒學正
professor 博士
provisional director-general of the Right 權右都監
punitive commissioner 招討使
Queen Mother 母后
reader-in-waiting (in the Han-lin Academy) (翰林)侍讀學士
recording officer 書狀官
rector 祭酒
redactor-compiler (in the Han-lin Academy) (翰林)修撰
redactor of the National History 修國史
region see Regional Secretarial Council
regional administrator (for a region) 大都督

Regional (Branch) Office 行...

Regional Censorate 行御史臺, 行臺

regional censorial inspector 行臺監察御史

regional commander (=overlord) 行省

Regional Council see Regional Presidential Council, Regional Secretarial Council

Regional Department of Military Affairs see Department of Military Affairs

Regional Military Bureau 經略司

regional military commissioner see military commissioner

Regional Military Control Bureau 行統軍司, 行司

Regional Presidential Council (of Chin) 行臺尚書省

chief of the - 行尚書省事 (early Mongol period)

Regional Secretarial Council 行中書省, 行省

Regional Secretariat (pre-Qubilai) = Regional Secretarial Council
行中書省

chief of the - (=regional commander) 行省

registrar 簿

resident commissioner (Imperial -) 達魯花赤 (Mo. *daruqači*)

chief - 都達魯花赤 (Mo. *yeke daruqači*)

Right chancellor see chancellor

Runners' chiliarchy 貴赤 (= *güigči*) 千戶

Sagacious and Martial (S.) 獻武

Salt Administration 鹽政

salt commissioner 鹽使

school superintendent see superintendent of schools

scribe-secretary 令史, 中書侍郎 (Mo. *bičēči*)

seals secretary 符寶郎

second secretary see secretary

secretarial censor 治書侍御史

Secretarial Council 中書省 see Regional Secretarial Council

chief of the - 中書令

Secretariat (before Qubilai) 中書省 see Regional Secretariat

chief of the - 中書令

secretary (court -) see scribe-secretary

first - 郎中

second - 員外郎

assistant - 都事

secretary(-scribe) see scribe-secretary, recording officer

security officials of the Four Wards 四隅譏察官

senior academician see academician

senior clerk see clerk

senior official 達魯花赤 (Mo. *daruqači*) see office head

Senior Venerable 老長

sheriff 尉

Signatory official of the Department of Military Affairs 簽書樞密院事
 Silver and Blue Great Officer of Eminent Dignity 銀青榮祿大夫
 Silver Superintendency 銀場提舉司
 Six Ministries 六部
 special (government) envoy 國信使 see envoy
 Stabilization Treasuries 平准庫
 State Finance Bureau 制國用司
 steward 寶兒赤 (Mo. *bawurči*)
 student (at National University, etc.) 生
 Superintendency 提舉司
 - for the printing of exchange notes see Exchange Notes Superintendency
 superintendent 主事, 提舉
 superintendent of the arsenal 軍資庫使
 superintendent of Buddhist Affairs 掌釋教事
 superintendent of Confucian studies 儒學提舉
 superintendent of Maritime Trade (Sung) 提舉市舶使
 superintendent of schools 提舉學校官,
 superintendent of studies 學政
 superintendent of waterways for the various districts 提舉諸路河渠
 superior (in a temple) see abbot
 supervising combat commissioner 監戰達魯花赤
 supervising combat myriarch 監戰萬戶
 supervisor of the Buddhist Religion 釋教總統
 supervisor of the Imperial Treasury 太府監
 supervisory commissioner [管內]觀察使
 Supreme General of the Dragon and Tiger Guard 龍虎衛上將軍
 Supreme Pillar of State see Pillar of the State
 Surveillance Bureau [肅政]廉訪司
 surveillance commissioner [肅政]廉訪使
tammači see garrison commander
 Tax-collection Bureau 權課所, (徵收)課稅所
 chief of the - 權課所長官
 tax commissioner see chief of the Tax-collection Bureau
 Tea Monopoly commissioner 茶運使
 Three Dukes (= Three Excellencies) 三公
 Three Excellencies see Three Dukes
 Three Ministries of the Left 左三部
 Transport Bureau(x) 轉運司
 Transport commissioner 轉運使, 運使
 tutor 師
 tutor to the Heir Apparent see grand instructor
 vice- 副 see also deputy and deputy chief
 vice-censor see censor
 vice-commissioner see commissioner

vice-commissioner of Waterways 副河渠使

vice-director of Waterways see director of Waterways

vice-marshal see marshal

vice-minister see minister

vice-prefect see prefect

wan-hu see myriarch

yeke daruqači see resident commissioner

yeke ĵarquči see grand judge

3. PROPER NAMES

'Abd al-Rahmān 奧都剌合蠻
 Aḥmad 阿合馬
 A-ho-ma see Aḥmad
 *Ai Dō'en 唆脫顏
 Ai T'o-yen see *Ai Dō'en
 Ai-tsung (Chin) 哀宗
 'Alī Beg 阿里伯(-必)
 A-li Hai-ya see Ariq Qaya
 *Altinga 安天合
 Ananda 安難答
 An Hsi 安熙
 An-p'u 安普
 An-t'ien-ho see *Altinga
 An-t'ung 安童
 An Yu 安祐
 Ao-tu La-ho-man see 'Abd al Rahmān
 Ariq Qaya 阿里海牙
 Bayan 伯顏
 Bōl 孛魯
 Bujir 布智兒, 不只兒
 Buyruq Qaya 布魯海牙
 Cha-la-erh see *Jalar
 Chai Wen-pin 翟文彬
 Chang 張, f. of Ch'ih-ch'eng
 Chang 張 (née), w. of Hao Ching
 Chang 張 (née), w. of Liu Jun
 Chang 張 (née), w. of Shih Ping-chih
 Chang 張 (née), m. of Yao Shu
 Chang Ch'eng 張澄
 Chang Ch'i-yüan 張啓元
 Chang Chih 張致
 Chang Chih-ching 張志敬
 Chang Chin-heng 張晉亨
 Chang Chiu-ssu 張九思
 Chang Chu 張翥
 Chang Ch'u 張礎
 Chang Chung-an 張仲安
 Chang Chung-shun 張中順
 Chang Chün-heng 張鈞衡
 Chang Fang 張昉
 Chang Fei-jan 張斐然
 Chang Fu 張甫

- Chang Fu-shou 張福壽
 Chang Han 張韓
 Chang Heng 張衡
 Chang Hsing-hsin 張行信
 Chang Hsiung-fei 張雄飛
 Chang Hsü 張旭
 Chang Hsüan 張瑄
 Chang Hsüeh-ch'eng 章學誠
 Chang Hui 張惠
 Chang Hung 張宏
 Chang Hung-cheng 張弘正
 Chang Hung-chi 張弘基
 Chang Hung-ch'ing 張弘慶
 Chang Hung-fan 張弘範, T. 仲疇, 張九
 Chang Hung-kuei 張弘規
 Chang Hung-lüeh 張弘略
 Chang Hung-yen 張弘彥
 Chang I 張易
 Chang Jou 張柔, T. 德剛
 Chang Ju-chi 張汝楫
 Chang Jung 張榮
 Chang Jung-shih 張榮實
 Chang Kao 張杲
 Chang Keng 張耕
 Chang Kuei 張珪
 Chang K'ung-sun 張孔孫
 Chang Kuo 張果
 Chang Liang 張良
 Chang Lin 張林
 Chang Pang-chih 張邦直
 Chang Po-ta 張伯達
 Chang Po-tuan 張伯端
 Chang Sheng 張昇
 Chang Shih-chieh 張世傑
 Chang Te-hui 張德輝
 Chang T'iao-shan 張條山
 Chang T'ien-kang 張天綱
 Chang Tsai 張載
 Chang-tsung (Chin) 章宗
 Chang Tzu-chen 張子真
 Chang Wang 張旺
 Chang Wen-ch'ien 張文謙, T. 仲謙; H. 頤齋
 Chang Yen 張晏, s. of Chang Wen-ch'ien
 Chang Yen 張延

- Chang Yen-jan 張晏然
 Chang Ying 張英
 Chang Yung 張庸
 Chang Yü 張羽, d. 1275
 Chang Yü 張瑜
 Ch'ang-ch'un chen-jen 長春真人 see Ch'iu Ch'u-chi
 Chao 趙, Sung imp. clan
 Chao 趙 (née), w. of Chang Hung-fan
 Chao 趙 (née), w. of Chang Jou
 Chao Chih 趙贇
 Chao Chin 趙童
 Chao Feng 趙颯
 Chao Fu 趙甫, 1165-1202
 Chao Fu 趙復, fl. 1235-1257
 Chao Hung 趙珙
 Chao Jen-jung 趙仁榮
 Chao K'o-chi 趙克基
 Chao K'o-kang 趙克剛
 Chao K'uang-yin 趙匡殷
 Chao Kuei 趙貴
 Chao-kung 召公
 Chao Liang-pi 趙良弼
 Chao Meng-fu 趙孟頫
 Chao Ming 趙明
 Chao Pi 趙璧
 Chao Ping 趙炳, 1222-1280
 Chao Ping 趙昺, Sung prince
 Chao Ping-wen 趙秉文, 1159-1232
 Chao Ping-wen 趙秉溫, 1222-1293
 Chao Shih 趙 昱, Sung prince
 Chao T'ien-hsi 趙天錫
 Chao Tzu 趙滋
 Chao Yao 趙瑤
 Chao Yen 趙衍
 Chao Yü-jui 趙與芮
 Ch'ao Hai 晁海
 Ch'e Hsi 車璽
 Chen-chin 真金 see Jingim
 Chen-hai see Cinqai
 Chen Te-hsiu 真德秀
 Ch'en 陳, painter
 Ch'en Cho 陳焯
 Ch'en Han-kuei 陳漢歸
 Ch'en Hsien-chang 陳獻章

Ch'en I-chung 陳宜中
 Ch'en K'ai 陳埏
 Ch'en Keng 陳賡
 Ch'en Liang 陳亮
 Ch'en Shih-k'o 陳時可
 Ch'en Shu-ta'o 陳叔陶
 Ch'en Ssu-chi 陳思濟
 Ch'en T'ien-hua 陳天華
 Ch'en Yen 陳巖
 Ch'en Ying 陳膺
 Ch'en Yu 陳祐
 Ch'en Yüan 陳垣
 Ch'en Yüan-k'ai 陳元凱
 Cheng Chung 鄭忠
 Cheng Ssu-hsiao 鄭思肖
 Ch'eng 澄, monk
 Ch'eng brothers see Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I
 Ch'eng 程 (née), m. of Yang Huan
 Ch'eng Chü-fu 程鉅夫
 Ch'eng-hai see Činqai
 Ch'eng Hao 程灝
 Ch'eng I 程頤
 Ch'eng-ming-chung tzu 誠明中子
 Ch'eng P'eng-fei 程鵬飛
 Ch'eng Ssu-lien 程思廉
 Ch'eng Ta-wei 程大位
 Ch'eng-tsung (Yüan) 成宗
 Ch'eng Yü 成玉
 Chi Li-an see Stumpf, Bernard Kilian
 Chi Yü-hsi 冀禹錫
 Ch'i Fu 齊福
 Ch'i Jung-hsien 齊榮顯
 Ch'i Kuei 齊珪
 Ch'i Kung-chih 綦公直
 Ch'i Lü-ch'ien 齊履謙
 Chia Chü-chen 賈居貞
 Chia Fu 賈輔
 Chia Hsien 賈憲
 Chia I 賈誼
 Chia-ku Ch'ang-ko 夾谷常哥
 Chia-ku Chih-ch'i 夾谷之奇
 Chia She 賈涉
 Chia Ssu-tao 賈似道
 Chia Sun-chih 賈損之

Chia T'ing-yang 賈庭楊
 Chia Wen-chien 賈文兼
 Chia Wen-pei 賈文備
 Chia Yü 賈瑀
 Chia Yü-ch'ing 賈餘慶
 Chiang Chou 蔣周
 Chiang Fang 姜房
 Chiang I-kuei 蔣一葵
 Chiang P'ing-chieh 蔣平階
 Chiang-shan 絳山
 Chiang Ts'ai 姜才
 Chiao Hsün 焦循
 Chiao Te-yü 焦德裕
 Chiao Yu-chih 焦友直
 Ch'iao Wei-chung 喬惟中
 Chieh Hsi-ssu 揭傒斯
 Chieh-lieh 揭烈
 Ch'ieh-lai see Kerait
 Ch'ieh-lieh 怯烈
 Ch'ieh-po see Kibek
 Ch'ien Hsi-tso 錢熙祚
 Ch'ien-lung (Ch'ing) 乾隆 (= 高宗)
 Ch'ien Pao-tsung 錢寶琮
 Ch'ien Ta-hsin 錢大昕
 Chih-lang 智朗 (= K'o-an Lang 可庵朗)
 Chih-lu-ku 直魯古
 Chih Yü 智迂
 Chin (dynasty) 晉
 Chin (dynasty) 金
 Chin 靳 (née), m. of Wang Yün
 Chin Jung 靳榮
 Ch'in (dynasty) 秦
 Ch'in Ch'ang-ch'ing 秦長卿
 Ch'in Chih-ts'ai 秦之才
 Ch'in Chiu-shao 秦九韶
 Ch'in Chung 秦仲
 Ching Hsüan 敬鉉
 Ching 敬 (née), w. of Hsü Heng
 Ching K'o 荆軻
 Ching Yu-chi 荆幼紀
 Ch'ing-ho 清河 see Yin Chih-p'ing
 Ch'ing-yang Meng-yen 青陽夢炎
 Ch'iu Ch'u-chi 丘處機, T. 通密; H. 長春(真人)
 Ch'iu Chün 丘濬

- Ch'iu-ko 丘哥 see Ch'iu Ch'u-chi
 Cho Weng 拙翁
 Chou (dynasty) 周
 Chou Chih-kang 周之綱
 Chou Hsiang 周祥
 Chou Shu-hsüeh 周述學
 Chou Ti 周砥
 Chou To 周鐸
 Chou Tsu 周祚
 Chou Tun-i 周敦頤
 Chou Yüeh 周鉞
 Chu Chih-fu 祝直夫
 Chu Ch'ing 朱清
 Chu Hsi 朱熹
 Chu-hu Kao-ch'i 朮虎高琪
 Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮
 Chu Pao-ch'en 朱寶臣
 Chu Shih-chieh 朱世傑
 Chu Ssu-sun 朱祀孫
 Chu Ti 朱棣
 Chu Yün-ming 祝允明
 Chuang Chou 莊周 see Chuang-tzu
 Chuang-tzu 莊子
 Chung-ho 中和
 Chung-ko 眾哥
 Chung-kuan 中觀
 Chung Ming-liang 鍾明亮
 Chung Ssu-ch'eng 鍾嗣成
 Ch'ü-t'an Hsi-ta 瞿曇悉達
 Čingai 鎮海, 稱海, Hs. 田
 *Čingai see Čingai
 Dam-pa Kun-dga'-grags 臚巴
 *Dharmadāsa 答麻刺答思
 Dinnu 斗奴
 Dojñpu 朵真普
 'Eliśu' 野里朮
 Fa-teng 法燈
 Fan T'ien-shun 范天順
 Fan Wen-hu 范文虎
 Fei Yin 費寅 (= Fei Cheng-yin 費正寅)
 Feng Chih-heng 馮志亨
 Feng-lung san-lao 封龍三老
 Feng-lung shan-jen 封龍山人
 Feng Tzu-chen 馮子振

- Feng Yün-hao 馮雲濠
 Five Dynasties see Wu-tai
 Fu Chien 苻堅
 Fu Chin-ch'üan 傅金鉉
 Fu Hsi 伏羲
 Fu Lin 傅霖
 Fu Yü 福裕
 Gau Fin'jan = Kao P'ing-chang 高平章
 Hai-ling wang 海陵王
 Hai-yün see Sung Yin-chien
 Han (dynasty) 漢
 Han Shih-an 韓世安
 Han Yü 韓愈
 Hao Chen 郝禎, fl. 1280
 Hao Chen 郝震, a. of Hao Ching
 Hao Chih-wen 郝至溫, H. 普安
 Hao Ching 郝經, T. 伯常
 Hao I 郝儀, a. of Hao Ching
 Hao I 郝彝, b. of Hao Ching
 Hao Kuan 郝綰
 Hao-li 好禮
 Hao Ssu-wen 郝思溫, H. 靜直處士
 Hao Ta-t'ung 郝大通, H. 廣寧
 Hao T'ien-t'ing 郝天挺
 Hao Ts'ai-feng 郝采鳳, T. 阿長
 Hao Ts'ai-lin 郝采麟
 Hao Ts'ai-yün 郝采雲, T. 阿寶
 Hao Tsu 郝祚
 Hao Yung 郝庸
 Hao Yüan 郝元
 Hindu 忻都
 Ho 賀 (née), w. of Hsü Heng
 Ho Bayan 賀伯顏 see Ho Sheng
 Ho Jung-tsu 何榮祖
 Ho Po-hsiang 何伯祥
 Ho Sheng 賀勝 see Ho Bayan
 Ho-shih-li 紇石里
 Ho-shih-lieh Chih-chung see Hu-sha-hu
 Ho-shih-lieh Ya-wu-t'a 紇石烈牙吾塔
 Ho-ssu-mai-li 曷思麥里 (*Hesmaïl = Esmāïl/Ismaïl)
 Ho-t'ung 和童
 Ho Wei 何瑋
 Ho Yüan 何源
 Hou Chou (dynasty) 後周

- Hou Jen 侯仁
 Hou K'o-chung 侯克中
 Hou T'ang (dynasty) 後唐
 Hou Tso-hsien 侯佐賢
 Hsi Chieh-chieh 奚徹徹
 Hsi-Hsia (dynasty) 西夏
 Hsi-li Ch'ien-pu see *Širi Gambu
 Hsi Shih-ch'en 席世臣
 Hsi-yün An 西雲安
 Hsia (dynasty) 夏
 Hsia Kuei 夏貴
 Hsia-li see *Sariq
 Hsiang-ko see Sangha
 Hsiang-mai 祥邁
 Hsiang-wei see Sang'ui
 Hsiao Cha-la-erh 蕭札刺兒
 Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing 蕭啓慶
 Hsiao Fu-tao 蕭輔道
 Hsiao I 蕭儀
 Hsiao Ming-feng 蕭鳴鳳
 Hsiao Po-tieh 蕭勃迭 (= Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh 石抹孛迭兒)
 Hsieh 謝, Sung empress dowager; see Hsieh Tao-ch'ing
 Hsieh Ch'eng 解誠
 Hsieh Hsien-tzu 謝憲子
 Hsieh Ju-chi 解汝楫
 Hsieh Tao-ch'ing 謝道清
 Hsien-chien 線真
 Hsien-tsung (Hsi-Hsia) 獻宗
 Hsien-tsung (Yüan) 憲宗
 Hsin Yüan 辛愿
 Hsing Tse 邢澤
 Hsü 許 (née), w. of Hao Ching
 Hsü-chao 虛照
 Hsü Chi 許揖
 Hsü Chün-fu see Qurqosun
 Hsü Hao 徐浩 (= Hsü Chi-hai 徐季海)
 Hsü Heng 許衡, T. 仲平; H. 魯齋
 Hsü Hsi-chi 徐希(希)稷
 Hsü K'an 許衍
 Hsü Kuo-chien 許國禎
 Hsü Shih-ching 許師敬
 Hsü Shih-fu 許師孚
 Hsü Shih-hsün 許師遜
 Hsü Shih-k'o 許師可

Hsü Shih-lung 徐世隆
 Hsü-shih-tai 勛實帶, M. 士希; T. 及之
 Hsü T'ing 徐霆
 Hsü T'ung 許通
 Hsü Wang-jung 徐王榮
 Hsü Yen 徐琰
 Hsü Yu-jen 許有壬
 Hsüan-ni 宣尼 (Confucius)
 Hsüan-tsung (T'ang) 玄宗
 Hsüan-tsung (Chin) 宣宗
 Hsüeh Chün-sheng 薛軍勝
 Hsüeh Hsüan 薛玄
 Hsüeh(-yen)-man 雪(巖)滿
 Hsüeh Yu-liang 薛友諒
 Hsün-tzu 荀子
 Hu An-kuo 胡安國
 Hu Chih-yü 胡祇遹
 Hu Chin 胡進
 Hu-sha-hu 胡沙虎 (= Ho-shih-lieh Chih-chung 紇石烈執中)
 Hu Wang 胡王
 Huai-su 懷素
 Huang Ch'un 黃淳
 Huang-fu Chung-ho 皇甫仲和
 Huang T'ing-chien 黃庭堅
 Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲
 Hui-lin 惠琳
 Hui-tsung (Sung) 徽宗
 Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou 洪承疇
 Hung-yen 洪彥
 Hung-ming 宏明 see Hsü-chao
 I-hsing 一行
 I-la P'u-a 移刺蒲阿
 *Irişenbal (?Irinjinbal) 也里審班
 Jen Hsün 任詢
 Jen-tsung (Yüan) 仁宗
 Juan Hsien 阮咸
 Juan-nu-wang-chu 軟奴汪朮
 Juan Yüan 阮元
 Jung 榮 (née), w. of Tou Mo
 *Jalar 札刺兒
 Jingim 真金
 K'ang Yeh 康晔
 K'ang Yu-wei 康有爲
 Kao 高, monk

- Kao Chih-yao 高智耀
 Kao Chu 高翥
 Kao Chü-shih 高居實
 Kao Hsi 高觿
 Kao K'uei 高夔
 Kao Liang 高諒
 Kao Ming 高鳴
 Kao P'ing-chang 高平章 (Gau Finjan)
 Kao T'ai-hsiang 高泰祥
 Kao Tao-ning 高道凝
 Kao T'ao 高翽
 Kao-tsu (Han) 高祖
 Kao-tsung (T'ang) 高宗
 Keng Jen 耿仁
 Kerait 怯來
 Kereit see Chieh-lieh
 Kibek 怯伯
 Ko T'ieh-ch'iang 葛鐵鎗
 K'o-an Lang see Chih-lang
 K'o Shang-ch'ien 柯尙遷
 K'o Shao-min 柯劭忞
 K'o Ts'ung-liang 葛從亮
 Kou Meng-yü 苟夢玉
 Kou Tsung-tao 苟宗道
 K'ou Yüan-te 寇元德
 Köten (Ködön) 闊端
 Ku Ssu-li 顧嗣立
 Ku Ying-hsiang 顧應祥
 Kuan Ssu-i 關思義
 Kuan-tzu 管子
 Kun-dga'-bzañ-po 昆哥臧不
 K'un-ko tsang-pu see Kun-dga'-bzañ-po
 Kung-ti (Sung) 恭帝
 K'ung Chin 孔晉
 K'ung Kuang-sen 孔廣森
 K'ung Ts'ung-tao 孔從道
 K'ung Yüan-ts'u 孔元措
 Kuo 郭, district assistant
 Kuo 郭 (née), w. of Liu Yin
 Kuo An-yung see Wan-yen Yung-an
 Kuo Ang 郭昂
 Kuo Hao 郭鎬
 Kuo-ho 國和
 Kuo Jung 郭榮

- Kuo Kuan 郭貫
 Kuo Kuei 郭貴
 Kuo p'an-kuan 郭判官
 Kuo Shou-ching 郭守敬, T. 若思
 Kuo Shu-yün 郭叔雲
 Kuo Ts'ung 郭琮
 Kuo Tzu-i 郭子儀
 Kuo Yu 郭佑
 *Lālāci 刺刺吉
 Lai-man 賴蠻
 Later Chou see Hou Chou
 Later T'ang see Hou T'ang
 Lao-tzu 老子
 Lei Ying 雷膺
 Li 李 (née), imp. concubine
 Li 李 (née), w. of Shih T'ien-tse
 Li 李 (née) w. of Tung Chün
 Li 李 (née) w. of Yao Shu
 Li Ch'ang 李昶
 Li Ch'e 李澈
 Li Chen 李楨
 Li Ch'eng 李極
 Li Ch'i 李玘
 Li Ch'i-ko see Li Shou-hsien
 Li Ch'i-shan 李齊山
 Li Ch'ien 李謙
 Li Chih 李治 (Yeh 治), T. 仁卿; H. 敬齋, 封龍山人
 Li Chih-ch'ang 李志常, H. 通玄
 Li Chih-shao 李之紹
 Li Chin 李進
 Li Chin 黎近
 Li Ching 李靖
 Li Ching-shan 李景山
 Li Ch'un-fu 李純甫, T. 之純; H. 屏山
 Li Ch'ung-shan 李崇山
 Li Chü-shou 李居壽
 Li Ch'üan 李全, H. 李鐵槍
 Li Ch'üan-i (or Ho-i) 李全(合)義
 Li Chüeh 李玨
 Li Ch'üeh-lu 李癩驢
 Li Chün-min 李俊民
 Li Fang 李昉
 Li Fen 李汾
 Li Feng-shan 李鳳山

- Li Fu 李福
 Li Hao 李浩
 Li Heng 李
 Li Hsien-ch'ing 李獻卿
 Li Hsien-fu 李獻甫
 Li Hsien-neng 李獻能
 Li Hsin 李信
 Li Hung-chang 李鴻章
 Li Jui 李銳
 Li K'ai 李愷
 Li Kan 李滄
 Li K'o-hsiu 李克修
 Li Nan-shan 李南山
 Li Niu-shan 李牛山
 Li P'an 李槃
 Li Pi 李泌
 Li Po 李白
 Li Po-yu 李伯祐
 Li Shan-ch'ang 李善長
 Li Shan-lan 李善蘭
 Li Shang-yin 李商隱
 Li Shou-chung 李守忠
 Li Shou-hsien 李守賢 (= Li Ch'i-ko 李七哥)
 Li Sung-shou see Li T'an
 Li Ta-chieh 李大節
 Li T'an 李璫, T. 松壽
 Li Te-hui 李德輝
 Li Te-wang 李德旺 see Hsien-tsung (Hsi-Hsia)
 Li T'e-li 李特立
 Li T'ing 李庭
 Li T'ing-chih 李庭芝
 Li-tsung (Sung) 理宗
 Li Tzu 李滋
 Li Wei 李微
 Li Wen-i 李文一
 Li Wen-t'ien 李文田
 Li Yen-chien 李彥簡
 Li Yu-chih 李祐之
 Li Yü 李遯
 Li Yüan 李元
 Li Yüan-li 李元禮
 Liang 梁 (née), w. of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai
 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啓超
 Liang Tung 梁棟

- Liao (dynasty) 遼
 Lieh-tzu 列子
 Lieh Yü-k'ou 列禦寇 see Lieh-tzu
 Lien Fu 廉孚, M. 怡; T. 公惠
 Lien Hsi-hsien 廉希憲, M. 忻都, T. 善甫
 Lien Hsi-hsien 廉希賢 (1247-75)
 Lien Hsi-kung 廉希貢
 Lien Tun 廉惇
 Lin-chi 臨濟 (義玄)
 Lin Ling-su 林靈素
 Liu 劉, ruling f. of Shu
 Liu 劉 (née), w. of Chang Wen-ch'ien
 Liu 劉 (née), w. of Li Yü
 Liu Ang-hsiao 劉昂霄
 Liu Ch'ang 劉昌
 Liu Cheng 劉整
 Liu Chi 劉基
 Liu Ch'i 劉祁
 Liu Chieh 劉岳
 Liu Chih 劉致
 Liu Chih-chung 劉執中
 Liu Chin 劉進
 Liu Ch'u-hsüan 劉處玄, H. 長生
 Liu Chung 劉中
 Liu Chung-hui 劉仲晦
 Liu Erh-tsu 劉二祖
 Liu Fang 劉昉
 Liu Fu 劉福
 Liu Hsiang 劉向
 Liu Hsüan 劉宣
 Liu Hui 劉徽
 Liu Jen-chieh 劉人傑
 Liu Ju-hsieh 劉汝諧
 Liu Jun 劉潤
 Liu K'an 劉侃
 Liu Kuei 劉珪
 Liu Kung-ch'üan 劉公權
 Liu Kung-liang 劉公諒
 Liu Kuo-pao 劉國寶
 Liu Lan-chang 劉蘭璋
 Liu Man 劉滿
 Liu Mao-chih 劉茂之
 Liu Min 劉敏
 Liu Min-chung 劉敏中

Liu Ni (alias Hei-ma) 劉嶷 (黑馬)

Liu Ping-chung 劉秉忠, M. 侃; T. 仲晦; H. 子聰, 聰書記, 藏春, 藏春散(上)人

Liu Ping-shan 劉秉善

Liu Ping-shu 劉秉恕, T. 長卿

Liu Po-hsi 劉伯熙

Liu Po-lin 劉伯林

Liu *Quturma 劉忽篤馬

Liu Shu 劉述

Liu Su 劉肅

Liu T'ai-p'ing 劉太平

Liu T'ien-lu 劉天祿

Liu T'ing-yü 劉庭玉

Liu Tsung-yüan 柳宗元

Liu T'ung 劉通

Liu Wen 劉溫, T. 仲祿

Liu Yin 劉因, orig. M. 駟, T. 夢驥, 夢吉; H. 靜修, 雷溪真隱, 牧溪翁, 樵翁, 汎翁, 雪翠翁

Liu Yü 劉俟, a. of Liu Yin

Liu Yü 劉郁, author of Hsi-shih chi

Liu Yü 劉豫, 1074-1143

Liu Yüan 劉元

Liu Yüeh-sheng 劉岳申

Lo K'uei 樂夔

Lo-p'an-tien (tribe) 蘿槃甸(蠻)

Lo T'ien-i 羅天益

Lu Chia 陸賈

Lu Chih 盧摯

Lu Chiu-yüan 陸九淵

Lu Chuan-lin 鹿傳霖

Lu Chung-lien 魯仲連

Lu Hsiu-fu 陸秀夫

Lu Shih-yung 盧世榮

Lü Tung-pin 呂洞賓

Lü Wen-huan 呂文煥

Lü Wen-te 呂文德

Ma 馬 (née), w. of Liu Jun

Ma 馬氏 (née), w. of Yang Chü-kuan

Ma Heng 馬亨

Maḥmūd Yalavač 牙魯(-刺,老)瓦赤

Ma Ko 麻革

Ma-ma 禡禡

Ma-pi hsien-sheng see Wu-ku-lun

Ma Shao 馬紹

Ma Te-lin 馬德麟
 Ma Tsu-ch'ang 馬祖常
 Ma Yü 馬鈺, H. 丹陽
 Maidi 買的
 Mai Kuei 麥歸
 Mai-ti see Maidi
 Manggala 忙哥刺
 Mang-ko-la see Manggala
 Mao 毛 (née), w. of Chang Jou
 Mao Chang 毛璋
 Mao Chū-chieh 毛居節
 Mao Wen-pao 毛文豹
 Mei Ku-ch'eng 梅穀成
 Mencius see Meng-tzu
 Meng-cheng 夢正
 Meng Ch'i 孟祺
 Meng Hung 孟珙
 Meng-ku Kang 蒙古綱
 Meng P'an-lin 孟攀麟
 Meng-tzu 孟子
 Miao Ch'üan-sun 繆荃孫
 Miao Tao-jun 苗道潤
 Miao Yüeh 繆鉞
 Mo-nien 抹撚 (née), w. of Shih T'ien-tse
 Mo-nien Ch'in(Chin)-chung 抹撚秦(盡)忠
 Mo Ti 墨翟 (= Mo-tzu 墨子)
 Mu-hua-li see Muqali
 Mu-tsung (Liao) 穆宗
 Mu-yen Temür 慕顏鐵木
 Muqali 木華黎
 Na-ho 納合 (née), w. of Shih Ping-chih
 Na-ho Sung-nien 納合松年
 Na-mo 那摩
 Nai-hsien 迺賢
 Nan-kung Yüeh 南宮說
 Nan Sung (dynasty) 南宋
 Nan T'ang (dynasty) 南唐
 Nang-chia-t'ai see Nanggiadai
 Nanggiadai 囊家臺
 Nei-tsu Po-sa 內族白撒
 *Nerbi 捏里必
 Nieh Fu-chien 聶福堅
 Nieh Kuei 聶珪
 Nieh-li-pi see *Nerbi

- Nien-ho Ch'ung-shan 粘合重山
 Nien-ho Nan-ho 粘合南合
 Niu 牛, maternal u. of Hao Ching
 Niu 牛 (née), m. of Chang Fu-k'uan
 Niu-erh-chieh 紐兒傑
 Niu Hsien 牛顯
 No-cha 哪吒
 Oros 幹羅思
 Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修
 Ou-yang Hsüan 歐陽玄
 Pa-chi (or Pa-chi-yu) 八吉(由)
 Pa-ch'un 八春
 'P'ags-pa 八思巴, 八合思(-斯)巴
 Pa-ssu-pa, Pa-ho-ssu-pa see 'P'ags-pa
 P'an Kung-po 潘拱伯
 Pao Ting-po 鮑廷博
 P'ei Sung-chih 裴松之
 Pen-wu Hsüan 本無玄
 P'eng I-pin 彭義斌
 P'eng Ta-ya 彭大雅
 P'eng Tse 彭擇
 Pi Shu-hsien 畢叔賢
 Ping (Sung prince) see Chao Ping
 Po Hsieh-chü 白絜矩
 Po Hua 白華
 Po-lan 孛蘭
 Po-lu see Bôl
 Po P'u 白樸
 Pu-chih-erh see Buġir
 Pu-lu Hai-ya see *Bulur Qaya
 Pu-san An-chen 僕散安貞
 P'u-an see Hao Chih-wen
 P'u-ch'a Kuan-nu 蒲察官奴
 P'u-hsien Wan-nu 蒲鮮萬奴
 P'u Shou-keng 蒲壽庚
 Qurqosun 忽魯火孫 (= Hsü Chün-fu 許君黼)
 Qurumši (T'ou-lien-ko 頭輦哥)
 Rin-chen-dpal see *Irišenbal
 Rin-chen-skyabs(?) see Yang Lien-chen chia
 *S'ad Midir 撒的迷底里
 Sa-fa-li see Safaliq
 Safaliq 薩法禮
 Sangha 桑哥⁴, 桑葛², 相哥, 僧格
 Sang'ui 相威

San-kuo 三國
 San-la 三刺
 Sa-pa-erh 撒八兒
 *Sariq 厦里
 Sa-ti-mi-ti-li see *S'ad Midir
 Schall von Bell, Johann Adam (T'ang Jo-wang 湯若望)
 Seki Takakazu (Kōwa) 關孝和
 Shan Chung 單仲
 Shang (dynasty) 商
 Shang Ch'i 商琦, T. 德符
 Shang Heng 商衡
 Shang Hu 商琥, T. 臺符
 Shang Huan 商璣
 Shang Kang 商岡
 Shang Lin 商璘
 Shang T'ang 商塘
 Shang T'ing 商挺, T. 孟[夢]卿; H. 左山老人
 Shang Wen 尙文
 Shang Yüan 商援(or Lung 隴)
 Shao Yung 邵雍
 Shen Shih-hsing 申時行
 Shen-tsung (Ming) 神宗
 Shen-t'u Chih-yüan 申屠致遠
 Shen Wei-jung 沈衛榮
 Shih 石 (née), w. of Shih T'ien-tse
 Shih (Sung prince) see Chao Shih
 Shih Chang 史樟
 Shih Ch'eng-kuei 史成珪
 Shih Chi 史吉
 Shih Chi 史楫, s. of Shih T'ien-ni
 Shih-ch'i Ch'eng-chih 侍其乘之
 Shih-ch'i Chu 侍其軸
 Shih Chin-tao 史進道
 Shih Chiu-san-hsien 史九散仙
 Shih Chou-ch'ing 史周卿
 Shih Ch'üan 史權
 Shih Hsin-tao 石信道
 Shih Hsün 史壘
 Shih Huai-te 史懷德
 Shih Jung 史榮
 Shih Kang 史杠
 Shih Ko 史格
 Shih Kuei 石珪
 Shih Kuo-ch'i 施國祁

- Shih-li Ch'ien-pu see *Širi Gambu
 Shih Lun 史倫
 Shih-mo 石抹 (née), w. of Buyruq Qaya
 Shih-mo Hsien-te-pu 石抹咸得卜
 Shih-mo Ming-an 石抹明安
 Shih-mo Po-tieh-erh 石抹孛迭兒 (= Hsiao Po-tieh 蕭勃迭)
 Shih-mo Yeh-hsien 石抹也先
 Shih Pi 史弼
 Shih Pin 史彬
 Shih Ping-chih 史秉直
 Shih Shu 史樞
 Shih T'ien-an 史天安
 Shih T'ien-hsiang 史天祥
 Shih T'ien-lu 史天祿
 Shih T'ien-ni 史天倪
 Shih T'ien-tse 史天澤, T. 潤甫
 Shih-tsu (Yüan) 世祖
 Shih Tsu-chung 石祖忠
 Shih-tsung (Liao, Chin) 世宗
 Shih Yao 史耀
 Shih Yüan-heng 史元亨
 Shun 舜, sage king
 Shun-ti (Yüan) 順帝
 Shun-tsung (T'ang) 順宗
 Southern Sung see Nan Sung
 Southern T'ang see Nan T'ang
 Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju 司馬相如
 Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光
 Stumpf, Bernard Kilian (Chi Li-an 紀理安)
 Su 蘇 (née), w. of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai
 Su Kung-pi 蘇公弼
 Su Shih 蘇軾
 Su T'ien-chüeh 蘇天爵
 Su Tung-p'o 蘇東坡 see Su Shih
 Sui Shu-sen 隋樹森
 Sun Ch'i-feng 孫奇逢
 Sun Hu-ch'en 孫虎臣
 Sun K'o-k'uan 孫克寬
 Sun Min-hsien 孫民獻
 Sun Pu-erh 孫不二, H. 清淨
 Sun-tzu 孫子
 Sun Wu 孫吳
 Sung (dynasty) 宋
 Sung 宋 (née), w. of Yao Shu

Sung Ching 宋京, Sung envoy
 Sung Ching 宋璟, 663-737
 Sung Chiu-chia 宋九嘉
 Sung Hsü-ching 宋虛靜
 Sung T'ing-tso 宋廷佐
 Sung Tzu-chen 宋子貞
 Sung Yen 宋演
 Sung Yin-chien 宋印簡, H. 海雲
 Šigi Qutuqu 失吉忽都忽
 Širi Gambu 昔里鈐部
 Ta-ma-la-ta-ssu see *Dharmadāsa
 T'a-ssu see Tas
 T'a-t'a T'ung-a see *Tatar Toṛa
 T'ai-tsung (Liao) 太宗
 T'ai-tsu (Liao, Chin, Yüan, Ming) 太祖
 T'ai-tsung (T'ang, Sung, Liao, Yüan) 太宗
 Tan-pa see Dam-pa Kun-dga'-grags
 T'an Ch'u-tuan 譚處端, H. 長眞
 T'ang (dynasty) 唐
 T'ang (Shang) 湯 (= Ch'eng T'ang 成湯)
 T'ang Chien 唐儉
 T'ang Jo-wang see Schall von Bell, Johann Adam
 T'ao Ch'ien 陶潛
 T'ao Tsung-i 陶宗儀
 T'ao Yüan-ming 陶淵明
 Tas 塔思
 *Tatar(?) Toṛa 塔塔統阿
 Three Kingdoms see San-kuo
 Ti Chieh 邸浹
 Ti I (Shang) 帝乙
 T'ieh-le 鐵勒 see Töles
 T'ien 田, Hs. of Čin'ai
 T'ien Chung-liang 田忠良
 T'ien Ho-ch'ing 田和卿
 T'ien P'ien 田駢
 T'ien Po-jung 田伯榮
 Ting-tsung (Yüan) 定宗
 To-chen-p'u see Doḡinpu
 T'o-hu-lu see *Toqur
 T'o-lieh see Töles
 T'o-t'ieh-erh 脫迭兒
 T'o-t'o-li-t'ai 脫脫里台
 *Toqur 脫忽魯
 Tou Lū 寶履

Tou Mo 寶默, orig. M. 傑; T. 子聲, 漢卿

Tou-nu see Dinnu

Tou Wang 寶旺

T'ou-lien-ko 頭犖哥 (= Qurumši)

Tōles 鐵勒

Ts'ai Chung-ying 蔡仲英

Tsan Wan-shou 咎萬壽

Ts'ao 曹, ruling f. of Wei

Ts'ao Chen-kuei 曹震圭

Ts'ao Chi 曹楫

Ts'ao Chū-i 曹居一

Ts'ao Meng-yen 曹夢炎

Ts'ao Pin 曹彬

Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操

Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩

Tseng-tzu 曾子

Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠

Tsou Jung 鄒容

Tsu I 祖頤

Ts'ui 崔 (née), w. of Li Yü

Ts'ui Li 崔立

Ts'ui Ming-yüan 崔明遠

Ts'ui Pin 崔斌

Ts'ui Yü 崔彧

Tu 杜, f. of Ch'ang-ch'ing

Tu 杜 (née), w. of Yen Shih

Tu Fu 杜甫

Tu Jen-chieh 杜仁傑

Tu Kao 杜杲

Tu Ssu-ching 杜思敬

TuYing 杜瑛

Tu Yü 杜預

T'u Chi 屠寄

T'u-lieh Yang-ho see *Türe Yangqa

T'u-tan Kung-lü 徒單公履

T'u-yü-hun 吐谷渾

Tuan Chen 段貞

Tuan Chi-ch'ang 段繼昌

Tuan Hsing-chih 段興智, king of Ta-li

Tuan T'ien-yu 段天祐

Tuan Shao-hsien 段少先

Tuan-tsung (Sung) 端宗

Tuan Yu 段佑

T'ui 推 (née), w. of Wang Yün

- Tung Chung-shu 董仲舒
 Tung Chün 董俊, T. 用章
 Tung Shih-heng 董士恆
 Tung Shih-hsüan 董士選, T. 舜卿
 Tung Shih-piao 董士表, T. 晉卿
 Tung Shih-yüan 董士元, T. 長卿
 Tung Tso-pin 董作賓
 Tung Wen-chih 董文直, T. 彥正
 Tung Wen-chung 董文忠, T. 彥誠
 Tung Wen-i 董文毅
 Tung Wen-ping 董文炳, T. 彥明
 Tung Wen-wei 董文蔚, T. 彥華
 Tung Wen-yung 董文用, T. 彥才; H. 野莊老人
 Tung-yüan 洞淵
 T'ung Chi-hsien 同繼先
 T'ung-mi 通密
 *Türe Yangqa 禿烈羊呵
 Wan-sung 萬松, H. 行秀
 Wan-yen 完顏 (née), w. of Lien Hsi-hsien
 Wan-yen 完顏 (née), w. of Yao Shu
 Wan-yen Ch'eng-hui 完顏承暉
 Wan-yen Ch'eng-lin 完顏承麟
 Wan-yen Ch'ing-shan-nu 完顏慶山奴
 Wan-yen Chung-te 完顏仲德
 Wan-yen Fu-chao 完顏復昭
 Wan-yen Fu-hsing 完顏福興
 Wan-yen Ho-ta 完顏合達
 Wan-yen Hsiang 完顏襄
 Wan-yen I 完顏彝
 Wan-yen Ts'ung-yü 完顏從愈
 Wan-yen Yung-an 完顏用安 (= Kuo An-yung 國安用)
 Wang 王 (née), m. of Hai-yün
 Wang 王 (née), w. of Li Yü
 Wang 王 (née), w. of Li T'an
 Wang 王 (née), w. of Tou Mo
 Wang 王 (née), w. of Yao Shu
 Wang 王, physician
 Wang and Hsieh 王謝, f.
 Wang An-kuo 王安國
 Wang Ch'ang-ling 王昌齡
 Wang Che 王 嘉 (喆), H. 重陽, 王害風
 Wang Chen 王珍
 Wang Ch'eng 王成
 Wang Ch'eng 王偁, d. ca. 1200

- Wang Chi 王楫, T. 巨川; H. 紫岩翁
 Wang Ch'i 王圻
 Wang Chien 王堅
 Wang Chih-chin 王志謹
 Wang Chik 王禎 (= Wŏnjong 元宗)
 Wang Ching 王經
 Wang Chu 王著
 Wang Ch'u-i 王處一, H. 玉陽
 Wang Chū-chi 王巨濟
 Wang E 王鶚, T. 百一 (~翼); H. 慎獨
 Wang Hai-feng see Wang Che
 Wang Hao 王顥
 Wang Hsi-chih 王羲之
 Wang Hsiao-t'ung 王孝通
 Wang Hsien 王顯
 Wang Hsien-chih 王獻之
 Wang Hsien-tsu 王顯祖
 Wang Hsün 王恂
 Wang Hui-chih 王徽之
 Wang I 王倚 (1240-92)
 Wang I 王儀
 Wang I-shen 王義深
 Wang Jao 王堯
 Wang Jen 王仁
 Wang Jo-hsü 王若虛
 Wang Ju-ming 王汝明
 Wang Jui 王銳
 Wang Ko 王笥
 Wang Kou 王构
 Wang Kou 王構 (1245-1310)
 Wang Kung-i 王公儀
 Wang Kung-ju 王公孺
 Wang Kung-yüeh 王公說
 Wang Kuo-wei 王國維
 Wang Li 王立
 Wang Li-yung 王利用
 Wang Liang-ch'en 汪良臣
 Wang Liang-pi 王良弼
 Wang Liu 王鏐
 Wang Meng 王猛
 Wang P'an 王磐
 Wang P'eng-yün 王鵬運
 Wang Pi 王弼
 Wang Ping-i 王秉彝

Wang Po-ying or Chung-ying 王伯英 (仲英)
 Wang Shen 王琛
 Wang Shih-chung 王時中
 Wang Shou-ch'ien 王守謙
 Wang Shou-tao 王守道
 Wang Sim 王諶 (= Ch'ungyǎi 忠烈王)
 Wang Ssu-lien 王思廉
 Wang Sun 王綽
 Wang Ta 王達
 Wang T'ai-p'an 王臺判
 Wang Te-su 王德素
 Wang T'ien-to 王天鐸
 Wang T'ing-yün 王庭筠
 Wang Tsui 王粹, M. 元亮; T. 子正
 Wang Tsung-jen 王宗仁
 Wang Tzu-ch'ang 王子昌
 Wang Tzu-ts'ai 王梓材
 Wang Wei-cheng 汪惟正
 Wang Wen-kan 王文幹
 Wang Wen-t'ung 王文統, T. 以道; H. 雲叟
 Wang Yü 王宇
 Wang Yü-ju 王玉汝
 Wang Yüan-k'ai 王元凱
 Wang Yüan-li 王元禮
 Wang Yün 王惲, T. 仲謀; H. 秋澗
 Wei Ao 韋澳
 Wei Cheng 魏徵
 Wei Ch'u 魏初
 Wei Fan 魏璠
 Wei-shao wang (Chin) 衛紹王
 Wen T'ien-hsiang 文天祥
 Wen-wang (Chou) 文王
 Wo-lo-ssu see Oros
 Wu 吳 (née), w. of Yang Huan
 Wu 吳 (née), w. of Tou Wang
 Wu Ch'ang-shou 吳昌綬
 Wu Ch'eng 吳誠
 Wu Ch'ung 烏冲
 Wu Hsien 武仙
 Wu K'ang 武亢
 Wu-ku-lun 烏古論, H. 麻岐先生
 Wu-ku-lun Chü-chen 烏古倫居貞
 Wu-ku-lun Hao 烏古論鎬
 Wu-ku-sun Chung-tuan 烏古孫仲端

Wu-ku-sun Tse 烏古孫澤

Wu Kuei-ch'eng 吳貴誠

Wu Ming 吳明

Wu-ming Kung 無名公

Wu Na 吳訥

Wu Sheng 吳升

Wu-tai 五代

Wu-tsung (Yüan) 武宗

Wu-wang (Chou) 武王

Wu Wo-yao 吳沃堯

Ya-la-wa-ch'ih see Maḥmūd Yalavač

Ya-lao-wa-ch'ih see Maḥmūd Yalavač

Ya-lu-wa-ch'ih see Maḥmūd Yalavač

Yang 楊 (née), w. of Liu Shu

Yang 楊氏 (née), w. of *Saqis Buqa

Yang 楊氏 (née), w. of Yen Kuei

Yang 楊 (née), m. of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai

Yang An-erh 楊安兒 (= Yang Kuo-an 楊國安)

Yang Chen 楊振

Yang Ch'eng 楊誠

Yang Chi-sheng 楊繼盛

Yang Chu 楊朱

Yang Ch'un-ch'ing 楊春卿

Yang Chü-k'uan 楊居寬

Yang Hsiung 揚雄

Yang Hu 羊祜

Yang Huan 楊奐, M. 知章, 英; T. 煥然, 煥若; H. 紫陽, 關西夫子, 奉天老民

Yang Hung-tao 楊弘道

Yang Kung-i 楊恭懿

Yang Kuo 楊果

Yang Kuo-an see Yang An-erh

Yang Lien-chen-chia 楊璉真伽 (?Rin-chen-skyabs)

Yang Miao-chen 楊妙真 (= Yang Ssu-niang 楊四娘)

Yang Pao-tung 楊保童 (= Yang Yüan-ssu 楊元嗣)

Yang Shih 楊湜

Yang Shu 楊恕

Yang Ta-yüan 楊大淵

Yang Ts'un-chung 楊存中

Yang Wei-chung 楊惟中(忠), T. 彥誠

Yang Yüan-chen 楊元禎

Yang Yüan-ssu 楊元嗣

Yang Yün-i 楊雲翼

Yao 堯, sage-king

Yao Ch'ing 姚勗

- Yao Chung-hung 姚仲宏
 Yao Kuang-hsiao 姚廣孝, T. Tao-yüan 道淵
 Yao Shu 姚樞, T. 公茂; H. 雪齋
 Yao-shu-mu see Yašmüt
 Yao Sui 姚燧
 Yao T'ien-fu 姚天福
 Yao Ts'ung-wu 姚從吾
 Yao Wei 姚煒, T. 光甫
 Yašmüt 要束木
 Yeh Li 葉李
 Yeh-li-shen-pan 也里審班 see 'Irišenbal
 Yeh-li-shu see 'Elīšu
 Yeh-lü A-hai 耶律阿海
 Yeh-lü A-pao-chi 耶律阿保機 see T'ai-tsu (Liao)
 Yeh-lü Chu 耶律鑄, T. 成仲; H. 雙溪醉隱
 Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚材, T. 晉卿; H. 湛然居士, 從源, 玉泉, 五(兀)圖撒罕
 (~合)里
 Yeh-lü Hsi-liang 耶律希亮, T. 明甫; H. 懷軒
 Yeh-lü Hsüan 耶律鉉, T. 不明
 Yeh-lü K'ai 耶律楷
 Yeh-lü Liu-ch'i 耶律柳溪
 Yeh-lü Liu-ko 耶律留哥
 Yeh-lü Lou-kuo 耶律婁國
 Yeh-lü Lü 耶律履
 Yeh-lü Mien-ssu-ko 耶律綿思哥
 Yeh-lü Mo-ko 耶律末哥
 Yeh-lü Te-kuang 耶律德光 see T'ai-Tsung (Liao)
 Yeh-lü Te-yüan 耶律德元
 Yeh-lü T'u-hua 耶律禿花
 Yeh-lü T'u-yü 耶律突欲, M. 倍; 東丹王
 Yeh-lü Yu-shang 耶律有尙
 Yeh Tzu-ch'i 葉子奇
 Yen 顏, monk
 Yen 嚴, f.
 Yen Chen 閻珍
 Yen Chen-ch'ing 顏真卿
 Yen Chung-chien 嚴忠貞
 Yen Chung-chi 嚴忠濟
 Yen Chung-fan 嚴忠範
 Yen Chung-ssu 嚴忠嗣
 Yen Fu 閻復
 Yen Hui 顏回
 Yen Kuei 嚴珪
 Yen Mi-chien 硯彌堅

Yen Pin 嚴彬

Yen Po-chien 硯伯堅

Yen Shih 嚴實, T. 武叔

Yen Su 燕肅

Yen Tun-chieh 嚴敦杰

Yin 殷, f.

Yin Chih-p'ing 尹志平, H. 清和

Yin Huai-ch'in 殷懷欽

Ying Ch'un-chih 應純之

Ying-tsung (Yüan, Ming) 英宗

*Yuhanai 月合(=哈)乃

Yung-lo (Ming) 永樂(=成祖)

Yü 禹, sage-king

Yü Chi 虞集

Yüan (dynasty) 元

Yüan Chüeh 袁桷

Yüan Hao-wen 元好問, T. 裕之; H. 遺山

Yüan Ming-shan 元明善

Yüan Yung-chen 元永貞

Yüan Yü 元裕

Yüeh Ch'en 岳忱

Yüeh-ho-nai see *Yuhanai

Yüeh Hsüan 岳鉉

Yüeh Ts'un 岳存

4. PLACE NAMES

If a locality no longer exists as such, the present area in which it has been incorporated is given in parenthesis

Geographical Terms and Place Designations

ai 隘, pass, defile
an 庵, hut, retreat
chai 寨, fortress
chen 鎮, commandery
ch'eng 城, fortified town, city
ch'i 旗, Banner
chiang 江, river (R.)
ch'iao 橋, bridge
ch'ih 池, pond, lake
chou 州, prefecture
chou 洲, islet, island
ch'uan 川, river, river valley
chuang 莊, village
ch'ü 渠, canal
ch'üan 泉, spring
chün 軍, commandery
fang 坊, ward
feng 峰, mountain peak
fu 府, administration
hai 海, lake, sea
ho 河, river (R.)
hsiang 鄉, village
hsien 縣, county
hu 湖, lake
kang 崗, crest of a hill
ko 閣, pavilion
k'ou 口, pass, mouth (of a river)
ku 谷, valley
kuan 觀, Taoist temple
kuan 關, frontier pass or gate
kung 宮, temple, palace
li 里, village, hamlet
ling 陵, mound

ling 嶺, mountain range, ridge
lou 樓, tower
lu 路, district, province (Sung)
men 門, gate
miao 廟, Confucian temple
pao 堡, fort, fortress
po 泊, marshes, = *po* 澤
po 澤, (expanse of) stagnant water
sai 塞, pass, frontier
shan 山, mountain(s) (Mt., Mts.)
sheng 省, province
shu-yüan 書院, private academy
shui 水, river, stream
ssu 寺, Buddhist temple
t'ai 臺, terrace
t'an 壇, altar
t'an 灘, beach, rapids
t'ang 塘, pond, embankment
tao 道, circuit
tao 島, island
t'ang 堂, hall
tien 店, inn
t'ing 亭, pavilion
tse 澤, marsh
tsui 嘴, spur of a hill
ts'un 村, village
wan 灣, bay
yai 崖, cliff
yü 峪, enclosed valley
yüan 原, plain
yüan 源, spring, source
yüan 園, garden, park
yüan 院, court, college

Ai-shan see Yai-shan

An-ch'ing 安慶 (Anhwei)

An-chou 安州 (Hsin-an 新安, Hopei)

An-feng 安豐 (Shou-hsien 壽縣, Anhwei)

An-hsi 安西 (Shensi)

An-hua 安化 (Ch'ing-yang 慶陽, Kansu)

An-lu 安路 (Hupei)

An-p'ing 安平 (Hopei)

An-shan 安山 (Shantung)

*Bekeči Mts. see Pieh-ch'ieh-ch'ih shan

Cha-p'u 乍浦 (Chekiang)

Ch'a-po-wu-lang 查泊兀郎 (Wu-liang-su 烏梁素, Inner Mongolia)

Chang-chia k'ou 張家口 (=Kalgan, Hopei)

Chang-chou 漳州 (Fukien)

Chang-ho 漳河

Chang-te 彰德 (An-yang 安陽, Honan)

Ch'ang-an 長安 (Hsi-an 西安, Shensi)

Ch'ang-an chen 長安鎮 (Hai-ning 海寧, Chekiang)

Ch'ang-chi 昌吉 (Sinkiang)

Ch'ang-ch'ing 長清 (Shantung)

Ch'ang-chou 常州 (Kiangsu)

Ch'ang-ch'un kuan 長春觀

Ch'ang-ch'un kung 長春宮 (Po-yün kuan 白雲觀, Pei-ching)

Ch'ang-lu 長蘆 (Ts'ang-hsien 滄縣, Hopei)

Ch'ang-p'ing 長平 (Honan)

Ch'ang-p'ing 昌平 (Hopei)

Ch'ang-yüan 長垣 (Hopei)

Chao-yang 朝陽 (Liaoning)

Chao-yüan kung 朝元宮

Ch'ao-chou 潮州 (Chao-an 潮安, Kwangtung)

Ch'ao-yang 潮陽 (Kwangtung)

Che-chiang, Chekiang 浙江

Che-hsi 浙西

Che-tung 浙東

Che-tung-hsi 浙東西

Chen-chiang 鎮江 (Kiangsu)

Chen-chou 眞州 (I-cheng 儀徵, Kiangsu)

Chen-chou 鎮州 (Mongolia)

Chen-chou 鎮州 (Ting-hsien 定縣, Hopei)

Chen-ting 眞定 (Cheng-ting 正定, Hopei)

Ch'en-chou 陳州 (Huai-yang 淮陽, Honan)

Cheng-chou 鄭州 (Honan)

Cheng-lan ch'i 正藍旗 (Inner Mongolia)

Cheng-yang 正陽 (W of Shou-hsien 壽縣, Anhwei)

Ch'eng-fu 城父 (Pao-feng 寶豐, Honan)
 Ch'eng-kao chen 城皋鎮 (Honan)
 Ch'eng-tu 成都 (Szechwan)
 Chi-chou 吉州 (Shansi)
 Chi-chou 吉州 (Chi-an 吉安, Kiangsi)
 Chi-chou 薊州 (Hopei)
 Chi-chou 濟州 (Chi-ning 濟寧, Shantung)
 Chi-chou ho 濟州河
 Chi-hsien 汲縣 (Honan)
 Chi-nan 濟南 (Shantung)
 Chi-tse 雞澤 (Hopei)
 Chi-yin 濟陰 (Shantung)
 Ch'i 齊 (feudal state)
 Ch'i-ao 淇澳 (Ch'i-shui 淇水, Honan)
 Ch'i-hsien 杞縣 (Honan)
 Ch'i-chou 蘄州 (Ch'i-ch'un 蘄春, Hupei)
 Ch'i-hsien 蘄縣 (Su-hsien 宿縣, Anhwei)
 Ch'i-t'ai 奇台 (Sinkiang)
 Ch'i-yang 祁陽 (Ch'i-hsien 祁縣, Shansi)
 Chia-chou 葭州 (Shensi)
 Chia-hsing 嘉興 (Chekiang)
 Chia-ling Chiang 嘉陵江
 Chia-ting 嘉定 (Lo-shan 樂山, Szechwan)
 Chia-ts'un 賈村 (Hsing-t'ai 邢臺, Hopei)
 Chia-tzu men 甲子門 (Lung-feng 隆豐, Kwangtung)
 Chiang-chou 江州 (Chiu-chiang 九江, Kiangsi)
 Chiang-chou 絳州 (Hsin-chiang 新絳, Shansi)
 Chiang-Han 江漢
 Chiang-hsi 江西
 Chiang-Huai 江淮
 Chiang-ling 江陵 (Hupei)
 Chiang-nan 江南
 Chiang-ning 江寧 (Nan-ching 南京, Kiangsu)
 Chiang-pei 江北
 Chiang-tung 江東
 Chiang-yin 江陰 (Kiangsu)
 Chiao-hsi 膠西 (Chiao-hsien 膠縣, Shantung)
 Chiao-shan 焦山 (Kiangsu)
 Chieh 解 (Shansi) see Hsieh
 Chien-k'ang 建康 (Nan-ching 南京, Kiangsu)
 Chien-kuo men 建國門 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Ch'ien-chou 乾州 (Shensi)
 Ch'ien-t'ang 錢塘 (Hang-chou 杭州, Chekiang)
 Ch'ien-yüan ssu 乾元寺

- Chih-ku 直沽 (Hopei)
 Chih-shan t'ang 止善堂
 Ch'ih-ch'eng 赤城 (Hopei)
 Ch'ih-chou 池州 (Kuei-ch'ih 貴池, Anhwei)
 Chin-chou 錦州 (Liaoning)
 Chin-k'ou 金口 (Hopei)
 Chin-lien ch'uan 金蓮川 (on the Shan-tien 閃電 R., Inner Mongolia)
 Chin-ling 金陵 (Nan-ching 南京, Kiangsu)
 Chin-ming ch'ih 金明池 (K'ai-feng 開封, Honan)
 Chin-shan hsien 縉山縣 (Inner Mongolia)
 Chin-t'ai (shan) 金臺(山) (Szechwan)
 Chin-t'an 金壇 (Chin-ling 金陵, Kiangsu)
 Chin-yüan 金源 (Right Qaračın Banner, Inner Mongolia)
 Ch'in 秦 (feudal state)
 Ch'in-chou 秦州 (T'ien-shui 天水, Kansu)
 Ch'in-ho 沁河
 Ch'in-Shu 秦蜀
 Ch'in-yang 沁陽 (Honan)
 Ching-chao 京兆 (Hsi-an 西安, Shensi)
 Ching-chou 景州 (Hopei)
 Ching-chou 荊州 (Hupei)
 Ching-chou 淨州 (Inner Mongolia)
 Ching-e 荊鄂 (Wu-ch'ang 武昌, Hupei)
 Ching-i t'ang 敬義堂
 Ching-Hu 荊湖 (Hunan, Hupei)
 Ching-nan 荊南 (Chiang-ling 江陵, Hupei)
 Ching-nan chün 靜難軍 (Pin-hsien 邠縣, Shensi)
 Ching-shan 荊山 (Anhwei)
 Ching-tung 京東
 Ch'ing-chou 青州 (Lin-tzu 臨淄, Shantung)
 Ch'ing-chou 清州 (I-tu 益都, Shantung)
 Ch'ing-chü shan 青居山 (Szechwan)
 Ch'ing-feng ko 清風閣
 Ch'ing-ho 清河
 Ch'ing-hua 清化 (Ch'in-yang 沁陽, Honan)
 Ch'ing-liu ho 清流河
 Ch'ing-shan chi 青山磯 (Wu-ch'ang 武昌, Hupei)
 Ch'ing-shou ssu 慶壽寺
 Ch'ing-yai ku 青崖崗 (Ch'ang-ch'ing 長清, Shantung)
 Ch'ing-yang 慶陽 (Kansu)
 Ch'ing-yüan 慶元 (Ning-po 甯波, Chekiang)
 Chiu-li kuan 九里關 (Lo-shan 羅山, Honan)
 Ch'iu-chou 瓊州 (Ch'iu-chang-shan 瓊山, Kwangtung)
 Ch'iu-chua tao 瓊華島 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)

- Cho-chou 涿州 (Hopei)
 Cho-lu ai 涿鹿隘 (Hopei)
 Chu-ch'eng 諸城 (Shantung)
 Chu-chiang 珠江
 Chu-lin ssu 竹林寺
 Chu-lin yüan 竹林院
 Chu-yai 朱崖 (Ch'iung-shan 瓊山, Kwangtung)
 Ch'u-ch'iu 楚丘 (Ts'ao-hsien 曹縣, Shantung)
 Ch'u-chou 滁州 (Ch'u-hsien 滁縣, Anhwei)
 Ch'u-chou 處州 (Li-shui 麗水, Chekiang)
 Ch'u-chou 楚州 (Huai-an 淮安, Kiangsu)
 Ch'ui-shan 圖山 (Kiangsu)
 Ch'un-ling 春陵 (Nan-yang 南陽, Honan)
 Chung-ch'ing 中慶 (K'un-ming 昆明, Yunnan)
 Chung-hsing 中興 (Yin-ch'uan 銀川, Inner Mongolia)
 Chung-nan (shan) 終南(山) (Shensi)
 Chung-shan 中山 (Ting-hsien 定縣, Hopei)
 Chung-tu 中都 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Chung-yung chün-ying 忠勇軍營 (Yang-chou 揚州, Kiangsu)
 Ch'ung-ch'ing 重慶 (Szechwan)
 Ch'ung-ming tao 崇明島 (Kiangsu)
 Ch'ung-te 崇德 (Chekiang)
 Chü-chou 洵州 (?, Hopei)
 Chü-chou 莒州 (I-shui 沂水, Shantung)
 Chü-lu 鉅鹿 (Hopei)
 Chü-yung kuan 居庸關 (Hopei)
 Ch'ü-chou 曲周 (Hopei)
 Ch'ü-chou 衢州 (Chekiang)
 Ch'ü-fu 曲阜 (Shantung)
 Ch'ü-hsien 衢縣 (Chekiang)
 Ch'ü-shan 朐山 (Shantung)
 Ch'ü-yang 曲陽 (Hopei)
 Ch'üan-chou 泉州 (Chin-chiang 晉江, Fukien)
 Chün 鈞 (Yü-hsien 禹縣, Honan)
 Chün-chou 濬州 (Chün-hsien 浚縣, Honan)
 Čam Baliq see Ch'ang-chi
 Čila'un Mt. see Tu-shih k'ou
 Daidu see Ta-tu
 E-chou 鄂州 (Wu-ch'ang 武昌, Hupei)
 En 恩 (En-ch'eng 恩城, Shantung)
 En-chou 恩州 (Te-chou 德州, Shantung)
 Fa-yüan ssu 法源寺
 Fan-ch'eng 樊城 (Hsiang-yang 襄陽, Hupei)
 Fei-hsiang 肥鄉 (Hopei)

Fen-chou 汾州 (Fen-yang 汾陽, Shansi)
 Fen-shui 汾水
 Fen-yang 汾陽 (Shansi)
 Feng-chou 豐州 (Inner Mongolia)
 Feng-hsiang 鳳翔 (Shensi)
 Feng-hsien fang 奉先坊 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Feng-lung shan 封龍山 (Hopei)
 Feng-t'ien 奉天 (Ch'ien-hsien 乾縣, Shensi)
 Fu-chien, Fukien 福建
 Fu-chou 福州 (Fukien)
 Fu-chou 復州 (Mien-yang 沔陽, Hupei)
 Fu-chou 撫州 (Chang-pei 張北, Hopei)
 Fu-ho 滏河
 Fu-li 符離 (Su-hsien 宿縣, Anhwei)
 Fu-yüan, 孚遠 (Sinkiang)
 Gobi see Han-hai
 Grand Canal see Ta-yün ho
 Hai-chou 海州 (Tung-hai 東海, Kiangsu)
 Hai-feng 海豐 (Hui-chou 惠州, Kwangtung)
 Hai-k'ou 海口 (Shantung)
 Hai-wai ssu-chou 海外四州 (Hainan)
 Hai-yün ch'an-ssu 海雲禪寺
 Han-hai 瀚海 (Gobi)
 Han-k'ou 漢口 (Wu-han 武漢, Hupei)
 Han-shui 漢水
 Han-tan 邯鄲 (Hopei)
 Han-yen 漢延 (Kansu)
 Han-yang chün 漢陽軍 (Wu-han 武漢, Hupei)
 Han-yen (ch'ü) 漢延(渠) (Kansu)
 Hang-chou 杭州 (Chekiang)
 Hao-chou 濠州 (Feng-yang 鳳陽, Anhwei)
 Hao-hsiang 郝鄉 (T'ai-yüan 太原, Shansi)
 Hao-t'ien kuan 昊天觀
 Hao-t'ien ssu 昊天寺
 Heng-shan 恆山
 Heng-yüeh 衡岳 (Heng-yang 衡陽, Hunan)
 Ho-chien 河間 (Hopei)
 Ho-chou 合州 (Ho-ch'uan 合川, Szechwan)
 Ho-chou 和州 (Anhwei)
 Ho-chung fu 河中府 (Yung-chi 永濟, Shansi)
 Ho-hsi 河西
 Ho-hsi li 河西里 (Chi-hsien 汲縣, Honan)
 Ho-lin 和林 (Qara Qorum, Mongolia)
 Ho-nan, Honan 河南

Ho-nei 河內 (Ch'in-yang 沁陽, Honan)
 Ho-nei li 河內里 (Ting-hsing 定興, Hopei)
 Ho-pei, Hopei 河北
 Ho-p'ing 河平 (Wei-hui 衛輝, Honan)
 Ho-shuo 河朔
 Ho-tse 荷澤 (Shantung)
 Ho-tung 河東
 Ho-wei 河衛 see Wei-chou 衛州
 Ho-yang 河陽 (Meng-hsien 孟縣, Honan)
 Hsi-ching 西京 (Ta-t'ung 大同, Shansi)
 Hsi-chou 息州 (Honan)
 Hsi-chou 隰州 (Shansi)
 Hsi-ho 西和 (Kansu)
 Hsi-hsia 西夏 (kingdom)
 Hsi-hsia 棲霞 (Shantung)
 Hsi-hu 西湖 (Hopei)
 Hsi-hua 西華 (Honan)
 Hsi-liang 西涼 (Wu-wei 武威, Kansu)
 Hsi-pien men 西便門 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Hsi-shan 西山 (nr. Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Hsi-yü 西域 (Western Region)
 Hsi-yüan 西原 (Wan-p'ing 宛平, Hopei)
 Hsia-kuan t'ing 遐觀亭
 Hsiang 相 (An-yang 安陽, Honan)
 Hsiang 襄 (Yeh-hsien 葉縣, Honan)
 Hsiang-ch'eng 襄城 (Honan)
 Hsiang-ch'üan ssu 香泉寺
 Hsiang-ch'üan yüan 香泉院
 Hsiang-shan 香山 (Hopei)
 Hsiang-yang 襄陽 (Hupei)
 Hsiao-kan hsien 孝感縣 (Hupei)
 Hsiao-shih t'an 硝石灘 (Hsiang-yang 襄陽, Hupei)
 Hsiao-wang ts'un 小王村 (Hopei)
 Hsieh 解 (P'ing-lu 平路, Shansi)
 Hsin 信 (Ch'ang-shan 常山, Chekiang)
 Hsin-an 信安 (Pa-hsien 霸縣, Hopei)
 Hsin-cheng 新鄭 (Honan)
 Hsin-ch'eng 新城 (Hupei)
 Hsin-hsien 忻縣 (Shansi)
 Hsin-hui 新會 (Kwangtung)
 Hsin-lo 新樂 (Hopei)
 Hsin-ying 新郢 (SW of Chung-hsiang 鍾祥, Hupei)
 Hsing-an 興安 (Ch'eng-te 承德, Hopei)
 Hsing-chou 興州 (Ch'eng-te 承德, Hopei)

Hsing-chou 邢州 (Hsing-t'ai 邢臺, Hopei)
 Hsing-ho 興和 (Inner Mongolia)
 Hsing-hua 興化 (P'u-t'ien 莆田, Fukien)
 Hsing-kuo 興國 (I-hsien 易縣, Hopei)
 Hsing-kuo ssu 興國寺
 Hsing-lung li 興隆里 (Hopei)
 Hsing-p'ing 興平 (nr. Lu-lung hsien 盧龍縣, Hopei)
 Hsing-t'ai 邢臺 (Hopei)
 Hsing-yüan 興元 (Nan-cheng 南鄭, Shansi)
 Hsiu-chou 秀州 (Chia-hsing 嘉興, Chekiang)
 Hsiung-chou 雄州 (Hopei)
 Hsü 徐 (Hsü-shui 徐水, Hopei)
 Hsü-chou 徐州 (Kiangsu)
 Hsü-chou 許州 (Hsü-ch'ang 許昌, Honan)
 Hsü-ch'ang 許昌 (Honan)
 Hsü-p'u 許浦 (Ch'ang-shu 常熟, Kiangsu)
 Hsüan-sheng miao 宣聖廟
 Hsüan-te 宣德 (Hsüan-hua 宣化, Hopei)
 Hsüeh-chai shu-yüan 雪齋書院
 Hu-chou 湖州 (Wu-hsing 吳興, Chekiang)
 Hu-Kuang 湖廣
 Hu-nan, Hunan 湖南
 Hu-t'o ho 滹沱河
 Hu-t'ou kuan 虎頭關 (Ma-ch'eng 麻城, Hupei)
 Hu-t'u-pi 呼圖壁 (Sinkiang)
 Hua-chou 滑州 (Honan)
 Hua-t'ing 華亭 (Sung-chiang 松江, Kiangsu)
 Hua-yen ssu 華嚴寺
 Huai-an 淮安 (Kiangsu)
 Huai-chou 懷州 (Ch'in-yang 沁陽, Honan)
 Huai-ch'ing 懷慶 (Ch'in-yang 沁陽, Honan)
 Huai-ho 淮河
 Huai-hsi 淮西
 Huai-Meng lu 淮孟路
 Huai-nan 淮南
 Huai-tung 淮東
 Huan-chou 桓州 (To-lun 多倫, Inner Mongolia)
 Huan-chou yü 桓州峪 (To-lun 多倫, Inner Mongolia)
 Huan-erh tsui 獯兒嘴 (Hopei)
 Huang chia-wan pao 黃家灣堡 (Ching-chou 荊州, Hupei)
 Huang-chou 黃州 (Huang-kang 黃岡, Hupei)
 Huang-ho 黃河 (Yellow River)
 Huang ling kang 黃陵岡 (Shantung)
 Huang-p'i 黃陂 (Hupei)

- Hui-chou 輝州 (Honan)
 Hung-chou 弘州 (Yang-yüan 陽原, Hopei)
 Hung-shan chai 洪山寨
 Hung-shui shan 洪水山 (Sinkiang)
 Huo-lu 獲鹿 (Hopei)
 Hutubi see Hu-t'u-pi
 I 嶧 (Kun-chou 袁州, Shantung)
 I-chen 儀真 (I-cheng 儀徵, Kiangsu)
 I-chou 易州 (Hopei)
 I-chou 沂州 (Lin-i 臨沂, Shantung)
 I-chou 義州 (Liaoning)
 I-chou 懿州 (Hei-shan 黑山, Liaoning)
 I-ch'uan 伊川 (Honan)
 I-ho yüan 頤和園
 I-mu-ch'üan 一畝泉 (Man-ch'eng 滿城, Hopei)
 I-tu 益都 (Shantung)
 Jen-ch'eng 任城 (Jen-hsien 任縣, Hopei)
 Jao-chou 饒州 (P'o-yang 鄱陽, Kiangsi)
 Jen-chih ssu 仁智寺
 Jimsa see Fu-yüan
 Ju-nan 汝南 (Honan)
 Ju-shui 汝水
 Ju-yang 汝陽 (Honan)
 Jui-chou 瑞州 (Chin-chou 錦州, Liaoning)
 Jung-ch'eng 容城 (Hopei)
 K'ai 開 see K'ai-chou
 K'ai-chou 開州 (Pu-yang hsien 濮陽縣, Honan)
 K'ai-p'ing see K'ai-p'ing fu, Lung-kang, Shang-tu
 K'ai-p'ing fu 開平府 (To-lun 多倫, Inner Mongolia) = Shang-tu
 K'ai-yüan ssu 開元寺
 Kalgan see Chang-chia k'ou
 Kan-chou 甘州 (Chang-yeh 張掖, Kansu)
 Kan-p'u 澈浦 (Hai-ning 海寧, Chekiang)
 Kan-su, Kansu 甘肅
 Kang-ch'eng 綱城
 Kang-chou 岡洲 (Kwangtung)
 Kang-shui 港水
 Kang-t'ou 岡頭 (Hopei)
 Kao-ch'eng 棗城 (Hopei)
 Kao-chou 高州 (P'ing-ch'üan 平泉, Hopei)
 Kao-li 高里 (Kao-ch'eng 棗城, Hopei)
 Kao-li, Korea 高麗
 Kao-liang ho 高梁河
 Kao-liang ssu 高良寺

- Kao-ling 高陵 (Shensi)
 Kao-t'ing shan 皋亭山 (Chekiang)
 Kao-yu 高郵 (Kiangsu)
 Kao-yüan 高苑 (Huan-t'ai 桓臺, Shantung)
 Korea see Kao-li
 Ku-an 固安 (Hopei)
 Ku-ch'eng 鼓城 (Chin-hsien 晉縣, Hopei)
 Ku-su 姑蘇 (Su-chou 蘇州, Kiangsu)
 Ku-yüan 固原 (Inner Mongolia)
 Kua-chou 瓜州 (Chiang-tu 江都, Kiangsu)
 Kua-chou 瓜州 (An-hsi 安西, Kansu)
 Kuan-chung 關中
 Kuan-chung shu-yüan 關中書院
 Kuan-hsi 關西
 Kuan-hsien 冠縣 (Shantung)
 Kuan-shih 冠氏 (Shantung)
 Kuan-tzu t'an 灌子灘
 Kuang-chou 光州 (Huang-ch'uan 潢川, Honan)
 Kuang-chou 廣州 (Kwangtung)
 Kuang-hsi, Kwangsi 廣西
 Kuang-hua 光化 (Hupei)
 Kuang-hui ssu 廣慧寺
 Kuang-ning 廣寧 (Pei-chen 北鎮, Liaoning)
 Kuang-p'ing 廣平 (Yung-nien 永年, Hopei)
 Kuang-te 廣德 (Anhwei)
 Kuang-tung, Kwangtung 廣東
 Kuang-yu 廣右
 Kuei-chou 貴州 (Kwangsi)
 Kuei-lai t'ang 歸來堂
 Kuei-te 歸德 (Shang-ch'iu 商丘, Honan)
 K'uei-chou 夔州 (Feng-chieh 奉節, Szechwan)
 Kun-chou 袞州 (Shantung)
 K'un-ming 昆明 (Yunnan)
 K'un-yü shan 崑崙山 (Shantung)
 Kung-an 公安 (Hupei)
 Kung-ch'ang 鞏昌 (Lung-hsi 隴西, Kansu)
 Kung-ch'eng 共城 (Hui-hsien 輝縣, Honan)
 K'ung-t'ai shan 孔臺山
 K'ung-t'ung shan 崆峒山 (Kansu)
 Kuo-chou 崞州 (Yen-men 雁門, Shansi)
 Kuo-hsien 虢縣 (nr. Feng-hsiang 鳳翔, Shensi)
 Lai-chou 萊州 (I-hsien 掖縣, Shantung)
 Lai-yang 萊陽 (Shantung)
 Lan-chou 嵐州 (Shansi)

Lan-ku 嵐谷 (Shansi)
 Lang-shan 狼山
 Lang-shan chai 郎山寨 (I-hsien 易縣, Hopei)
 Lang-ya ling 狼牙嶺
 Lao-ts'ang k'ou 老倉口 (Shantung)
 Lei-chou 雷州 (Hai-k'ang 海康, Kwangtung)
 Li-chia chuang 李家莊 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Li-feng ts'un 李封村 (nr. Ho-nei 河內, Honan)
 Li-ho 澧河
 Li-yang 溧陽 (Kiangsu)
 Liang-Che 兩浙
 Liang-ching 涼涇 (Inner Mongolia)
 Liang-chou 涼州 (Wu-wei 武威, Kansu)
 Liang-Kuang 兩廣
 Liao-chou 遼州 (Hsi-yang 昔陽, Shansi)
 Liao-shui 潦水
 Liao-tung 遼東
 Liao-yang 遼陽 (Liao-ning 遼寧, Liaoning)
 Lien 漣 see Lien-shui
 Lien-chou 連州 (Kwangtung)
 Lien-hua ch'ih 蓮花池 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Lien-shui 漣水
 Lin-an 臨安 (Hang-chou 杭州, Chekiang)
 Lin-chi ssu 臨濟寺
 Lin-ch'ing 臨清 (Shantung)
 Lin-chou 林州 (Honan)
 Lin-ch'ü 臨朐 (Shantung)
 Lin-huang 臨潢 (Lin-hsi 林西, Inner Mongolia)
 Lin-i 臨沂 (Shantung)
 Lin-p'ing chen 臨平鎮 (Hang-hsien 杭縣, Chekiang)
 Lin-t'ao 臨洮 (Kansu)
 Lin-tzu 臨淄 (Shantung)
 Lin-yü ho 蘭榆河
 Ling-chou 陵州 (Te-hsien 德縣, Shantung)
 Ling-chou 靈州 (SW of Ling-wu hsien 靈武縣, Inner Mongolia)
 Ling-ch'uan 陵川 (Shansi)
 Ling-wu 靈武 (Inner Mongolia)
 Ling-yen 靈岩 (Shantung)
 Ling-ying wan-shou kung 靈應萬壽宮
 Liu-ch'eng 柳城 (Hsi-hua 西華, Honan)
 Liu-chiang ts'un 劉蔣村 (Chung-nan 終南, Shensi)
 Liu-lin 柳林 (Hsi-an 西安, Shensi)
 Liu-lin 柳林 (SE of Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Liu-p'an shan 六盤山 (Kansu)

- Liu-t'ang 柳塘
 Lo-ho 洛河
 Lo-hsi shu-yüan 洛西書院
 Lo-ning 洛寧 (Honan)
 Lo-pan tien 蘿槃甸 (Yunnan)
 Lo-yang 洛陽 (Honan)
 Lu-chai shu-yüan 魯齋書院
 Lu-chou 潞州 (Shansi)
 Lu-chou 廬州 (Ho-fei 合肥, Anhwei)
 Lu-chou 瀘州 (Hsi-ch'ang 西昌, Szechwan)
 Lu-chü ho 廬朐河 (Kerulen R., Mongolia)
 Lu-erh 鹿兒
 Lu-kou ch'iao 蘆溝橋 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Lu-kou ho 盧溝河 (also called Yung-ting ho 永定河)
 Lu-lung 盧龍 (Hopei)
 Lu-men shan 鹿門山 (Hupei)
 Lu-shan 魯山 (Honan)
 Luan-ch'eng 樂城 (Hopei)
 Luan-ho 灤河 (Inner Mongolia)
 Lun-ho 淪河
 Lun-t'ai 輪臺 (Sinkiang)
 Lung-chou 隴州 (Shensi)
 Lung-hsi 隴西 (Kansu)
 Lung-hu shan 龍虎山 (Kiangsi)
 Lung-hu t'ai 龍虎臺 (Hopei)
 Lung-kang 龍岡 (Inner Mongolia), see K'ai-p'ing fu
 Lung-kang 龍岡 (Sui-hsien 睢縣, Honan)
 Lung-men shan 龍門山 (Shensi)
 Lung-shan shu-yüan 龍山書院
 Lung-wan 龍灣 (Chiang-ning 江寧, Kiangsu)
 Lü-liang 呂梁 (Shansi)
 Ma-yü ts'un 麻峪村 (nr. Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Man-ch'eng 滿城 (Hopei)
 Mei-chou 鄆州 (Shensi)
 Meng-chou 孟州 (Honan)
 Mi-chou 密州 (Chu-ch'eng 諸城, Shantung)
 Mi-yün 密雲 (Hopei)
 Mien-yang 沔陽 (Hupei)
 Min-hai 閩海 (Fukien)
 Ming-chou 明州 (Yin-hsien 鄞縣, Chekiang)
 Ming-chou 洺州 (Yung-nien 永年, Hopei)
 Ming-shui 洺水 (Wei-hsien 威縣, Hopei)
 Nan-chao 南詔 (Ta-li 大理, Yunnan)
 Nan-chien 南劍 (Nan-p'ing 南平, Fukien)

- Nan-ching, Nanking 南京 (Kiangsu)
 Nan-ching 南京 (K'ai-feng 開封, Honan)
 Nan-hai 南海 (Kwangtung)
 Nan-hua 南華 (Shantung)
 Nan-k'ang chün 南康軍 (Hsing-tzu 星子, Kiangsi)
 Nanking see Nan-ching
 Nan-li 南里 (nr. Pao-chou 保州, Hopei)
 Nan-p'ing shan 南屏山 (Inner Mongolia)
 Nan-t'ang ssu 南堂寺
 Nan-yang 南陽 (Honan)
 Nei-ch'iu 內丘 (Hopei)
 Ning-chin 寧晉 (Hopei)
 Ning-hai 寧海 (I-hsien 掖縣, Shantung)
 Ning-kuo 寧國 (Anhwei)
 Ning-yüan 寧遠 (Wu-chai 五寨, Shansi)
 Niu-hsin 牛心 (Inner Mongolia)
 Ou-ma kang 漚麻岡 (nr. Ch'ang-yüan 長垣, Honan)
 Pa-chou 霸州 (Hopei)
 Pai-chang k'ou 百丈口 (Anhwei)
 P'an-ch'i 礮溪 (S of Pao-chi 寶雞, Shensi)
 Pao-chi 寶雞 (Shensi)
 Pao-chou 保州 (Pao-ting 保定, Hopei)
 Pao-en ssu 報恩寺
 Pao-ning 保寧 (Tien-po 電白, Kwangtung)
 Pao-ting 保定 (Hopei)
 Pao-tu chai 抱犢寨 (T'ai-hang shan 太行山, Shansi)
 Pao-ying 寶應 (Kiangsu)
 Pao-ying chün 寶應軍 (Kiangsu)
 P'ao-tzu ho 泡子河 (in Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Pearl River see Chu-chiang
 Pei-ching, Peking 北京 (Hopei)
 Pei-ching 北京 (Ta-ming 大名, Hopei)
 Pei-hai 北海 (Wei-hsien 濰縣, Shantung)
 Pei-shan 北山 (Hopei)
 P'ei-hsien 沛縣 (Ts'ao-hsien 曹縣, Shantung)
 Peking see Pei-ching
 P'eng-lai 蓬萊 (Shantung)
 Pi-shui 泌水 (Pi-yang 泌陽, Honan)
 P'i-chou 邳州 (Kiangsu)
 P'i-yang 毗陽
 Pieh-ch'ieh-ch'ih shan 別怯赤山 (*Bekeçi Mts., Central Asia, unident.)
 Pien(-ching, -liang) 汴(京, 梁) (K'ai-feng 開封, Honan)
 Pin-chou 濱州 (Shantung)
 Pin-tu 濱都 (Ch'i-hsia 棲霞, Shantung)

- P'ing-chi 平棘 (Chao-hsien 趙縣, Hopei)
 P'ing-chiang 平江 (Wu-hsien 吳縣, Kiangsu)
 P'ing-chou 平州 (Liao-yang 遼陽, Liaoyang)
 P'ing-liang 平涼 (Ku-yüan 固原, Kansu)
 P'ing-luan 平灤 (Wan-hsien 完縣, Hopei)
 P'ing-ting 平定 (Shansi)
 P'ing-yang 平陽 (Lin-fen 臨汾, Shansi)
 P'ing-yin 平陰 (Shantung)
 Po 博 (Liao-ch'eng 聊城, Shantung)
 Po-chih-la shan 白只刺山
 Po-chou 亳州 (Anhwei)
 Po-fu chüan 白浮泉 (Ch'ang-p'ing 昌平, Hopei)
 Po-hai 渤海
 Po-hu shan 白虎山 (Hupei)
 Po-kung miao 白公廟
 Po-lu chi 白鹿磯 (E-ch'eng 鄂城, Hupei)
 Po-yün kuan 白雲觀
 P'u-chi ch'an-ssu 普濟禪寺
 P'u-chi ch'an-yüan 普濟禪院
 P'u-chou 濮州 (Yün-ch'eng 鄆城, Shantung)
 P'u-t'ai 蒲臺 (Pin-hsien 濱縣, Shantung)
 Purple Mountain see Tzu-chin shan
 Qara Qorum see Ho-lin
 San-feng shan 三峰山 (Yü-hsien 禹縣, Honan)
 San-hsien t'ang 三賢堂
 San-pu-la(lo) 三不刺(落) (SW of Shang-tu/To-lun, Inner Mongolia)
 San Wen-chen kung tz'u 三文貞公祠
 Sha-chou 沙州 (nr. Tun-huang 敦煌, Kansu)
 Sha-ho 沙河
 Sha-wu ho 沙蕪河
 Sha-wu k'ou 沙蕪口 (Hupei)
 Sha-yang 沙洋 (SE of Ching-men 荊門, Hupei)
 Shan-ch'an 善闡 (Yunnan)
 Shan-chou 單州 (Shantung)
 Shan-hsi, Shansi 山西
 Shan-nan 山南
 Shan-tien ho 閃電河 (upper reaches of Luan-ho 灤河, Inner Mongolia)
 Shan-tung, Shantung 山東
 Shan-yang 山陽 (Huai-an 淮安, Kiangsu)
 Shang-tang 上党 (Ch'ang-chih 長治, Shansi)
 Shang-tu 上都 (To-lun 多倫, Inner Mongolia) = K'ai-p'ing fu
 Shang-tu ho 上都河 see Shan-tien ho
 Shao-hsing 紹興 (Chekiang)
 She-yang hu 射陽湖 (Kiangsu)

- Shen-chou 申州 (Hsin-yang 信陽, Honan)
 Shen-chou 深州 (Hopei)
 Shen-hsi, Shensi 陝西
 Shen-tse 深澤 (Hopei)
 Sheng-an ssu 聖安寺
 Shih-ching shan 石景山 (Hopei)
 Shih-chou 石州 (Li-shih 離石, Shansi)
 Shih-mu-wen-tu 石木溫都 (Šimultu Lake, Mongolia, unident.)
 Shih-tzu feng 獅子峰 (Chekiang)
 Shih-yang hu 射陽湖 see She-yang hu
 Shou-ch'ang 壽昌 (Wu-ch'ang 武昌, Hupei)
 Shou-ch'un 壽春 (Shou-hsien 壽縣, Anhwei)
 Shou-yang 壽陽 (Shansi)
 Shu 蜀 (Szechwan)
 Shuang-t'a ssu 雙塔寺
 Shun-te 順德 (Hsing-t'ai 邢臺, Hopei)
 Shun-t'ien 順天 (Pao-ting 保定, Hopei)
 Ssu-an 四安 (nr. Ch'ang-hsing 長興, Chekiang)
 Ssu-chou 泗州 (Anhwei)
 Ssu-ch'uan, Szechwan 四川
 Ssu-hsien t'ang 四賢堂
 Ssu-k'ung shan 司空山 (Hupei)
 Ssu-shui 泗水 (Shantung)
 Ssu-wen 泗汶 (Shantung)
 Su-chou 宿州 (Anhwei)
 Su-chou 肅州 (Chiu-ch'üan 酒泉, Kansu)
 Su-men 蘇門 (Hui-hsien 輝縣, Honan)
 Su-men shan 蘇門山 (Honan)
 Sui-chou 隨州 (Hupei)
 Sui-ho 睢河
 Sui-yang 睢陽 (Shang-ch'iu 商丘, Honan)
 Sung-chiang 淞江
 Sung-p'u 松鋪 (Hopei)
 Šimultu (Šimultai) Lake see Shih-mu-wen-tu
 Ta-hsing 大興 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Ta-hsing-chiao ssu 大興教寺
 Ta-hung shan 大洪山 (Hupei)
 Ta-huo ch'üan 達活泉 (Hsing-t'ai 邢臺, Hopei)
 Ta-k'ou 大口 (Hopei)
 Ta-ku shan 大孤山 (Kiangsi)
 Ta-li 大理 (Yunnan)
 Ta-ming 大名 (Hopei)
 Ta-ming ch'uan 大明川 (Shansi)
 Ta-ming hu 大明湖 (Shantung)

- Ta-pei ko 大悲閣
 Ta-sheng kuan 大勝關 (Lo-yang 洛陽, Honan)
 Ta-tu, Daidu 大都 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Ta-t'ung 大同 (Shansi)
 Ta-yün ho 大運河 (Grand Canal)
 Tai-chou 代州 (Shansi)
 T'ai-an 泰安 (Shantung)
 T'ai-chi shu-yüan 太極書院
 T'ai-chou 台州 (Lin-hai 臨海, Chekiang)
 T'ai-chou 泰州 (Kiangsu)
 T'ai-hang shan 太行山
 T'ai-hsü kuan 太虛觀
 T'ai-hu 太湖 (Anhwei)
 T'ai-pao chuang 太保莊 (Cheng-ting 正定, Hopei)
 T'ai-p'ing chou 太平州 (Tang-t'u 當塗, Anhwei)
 T'ai-p'ing hsing-kuo ssu 太平興國寺
 T'ai-shan 泰山 (Shantung)
 T'ai-shan chai 台山寨 (Huang-an 黃安, Hupei)
 T'ai-yüan 太原 (Shansi)
 Tan-ho 丹河
 T'an-chou 檀州 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 T'ang 唐 (Honan)
 T'ang-lai (ch'ü) 唐來(渠) (S of Ning-shuo 寧朔, Kansu)
 Tao-hui ku 倒回谷 (Shensi)
 Te 德 (Te-chou 德州, Shantung)
 Te-an 德安 (An-lu 安陸, Hupei)
 Te-an fu 德安府 (Kiangsi)
 Te-hsing 德興 (Cho-lu 涿鹿, Hopei)
 Tenduc see T'ien-te
 Teng-chou 登州 (P'eng-lai 蓬萊, Shantung)
 Teng-chou 鄧州 (Honan)
 T'eng 滕 (Shantung)
 T'eng-hu 藤湖 (Hupei)
 Ti-chou 棣州 (Hui-min 惠民, Shantung)
 Ti-hua t'ang 棣華堂
 Tiao-yü ch'eng 釣魚城 (Ho-ch'uan 合川, Szechwan)
 Tiao-yü shan 釣魚山 (Szechwan)
 T'iao-k'o an 蛟殼庵
 T'ieh-fan kan 鐵幡竿 (Hopei)
 T'ieh-fo ssu 鐵佛寺
 Tien-ch'ih 滇池 (Yunnan)
 Tientsin see T'ien-chin
 T'ien-ch'ang kuan 天長觀
 T'ien-ch'eng 天城 (T'ien-chen 天鎮, Shansi)

- T'ien-chin 天津 (Hopei)
 T'ien-ning ssu 天寧寺
 T'ien-shan 天山
 T'ien-te, Tenduc 天德 (Tung-sheng 東勝, Inner Mongolia)
 Ting-an 定安 (NE of Wei-hsien 蔚縣, Hopei)
 Ting-chia chou 丁家洲 (NE of T'ung-ling 銅陵, Anhwei)
 Ting-hsing 定興 (Hopei)
 Ting-t'ao 定陶 (Shantung)
 To-lun, Dolon 多倫 (Inner Mongolia)
 T'o-k'o-t'o 托克托 (Inner Mongolia)
 Ts'ai-chou 蔡州 (Ju-nan 汝南, Honan)
 Ts'ai-tien 蔡店 (W of Han-yang 漢陽, Hupei)
 Tsan-huang 贊皇 (Cheng-ting 正定, Hopei)
 Ts'ang-chou 滄州 (Hopei)
 Tsao-yang 棗陽 (Hupei)
 Ts'ao(-chou, -hsien) 曹(州, 縣) (Shantung)
 Ts'ao-wu 曹武 (Ching-shan 京山, Hupei)
 Tse-chou 澤州 (Chin-ch'eng 晉城, Shansi)
 Tso-i men 左掖門 (Ta-tu/Pei-ching)
 Tsou-hsien 鄒縣 (Shantung)
 Ts'u-lai shan 徂徠山 (Shantung)
 Tu-shih k'ou 獨石口 (Hopei)
 Tu-shu t'ang 讀書堂
 Tu-sung kuan 獨松關 (Chekiang)
 Tu-sung ling 獨松嶺 (Chekiang)
 T'u-fan 吐蕃 (Amdo, Tibet)
 Tun-hsien 惇縣
 Tung-a 東阿 (Shantung)
 Tung-ch'ang 東昌 (Liao-ch'eng 聊城, Shantung)
 Tung-ching 東京 (K'ai-feng 開封, Honan)
 Tung-ching 東京 (Liao-yang 遼陽, Liaoning)
 Tung-hai 東海 (Kuan-yün 灌雲, Kiangsu)
 Tung-kuan 東館 (Shantung)
 Tung-liu ku 東流壩 (T'ai-hang shan 太行山)
 Tung-ming 東明 (Shantung)
 Tung-p'ing 東平 (Shantung)
 Tung-sheng 東勝 (T'o-k'o-t'o 托克托, Inner Mongolia)
 Tung-tan (kuo) 東丹(國) (= Po-hai 渤海)
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 T'ung-hui ho 通惠河
 T'ung-kuan 潼關 (Shensi)
 T'ung-ling 銅陵 (Anhwei)
 Tzu-chin shan 紫金山 (Purple Mountain, Hopei)

- Tzu-ching kuan 紫荊關 (Hopei)
 Tzu-chou 淄州 (Tzu-ch'uan 淄川, Shantung)
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 Wan-chu t'ang 萬竹堂
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 Wan-mu ts'ao-t'ang 萬木草堂
 Wan-ning kung 萬寧宮
 Wan-p'ing 宛平 (Pei-ching 北京, Hopei)
 Wan-shan 萬山 (Hupei)
 Wan-shou shan 萬壽山 (nr. Pei-ching, Hopei)
 Wan-sui shan 萬歲山 (Ching-shan 景山, Pei-ching, Hopei)
 Wan-t'ou 灣頭 (N of Chiang-tu 江都, Kiangsu)
 Wei 渭 (P'ing-liang 平涼, Kansu)
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 Wei-ho 渭河 (Kansu, Shensi)
 Wei-ho 衛河 (Honan, Shantung)
 Wei-hui 衛輝 (Chi-hsien 汲縣, Honan)
 Wei-ning 威寧 (Chang-pei 張北, Hopei)
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 Wu-chou 婺州 (Chin-hua 金華, Chekiang)
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 Wu-sha pao 烏沙堡 (Chang-pei 張北, Hopei)
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 Yang-ch'eng 陽城 (Chi-ning 濟寧, Shansi)
 Yang-chou 揚州 (Kiangsu)
 Yang-i tien 陽驛店 (Ning-ling 寧陵, Honan)
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