
MONGOL IMPERIALISM

THE POLICIES OF THE GRAND QAN MÖNGKE
IN CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE ISLAMIC LANDS,
1251-1259

THOMAS T. ALLSEN

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*For my mother
Marjorie Nadine Allsen
and
in memory of my father
Theodore Charles Allsen*

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Abbreviations Used in Notes

JOURNALS

AOASH:	<i>Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
CAJ:	<i>Central Asiatic Journal</i>
HJAS:	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
JA:	<i>Journal Asiatique</i>
JAOS:	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
JESHO:	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i>
JRAS:	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
MIA:	<i>Materialy po issledovanii arkheologii SSSR</i>
MS:	<i>Monumenta Serica</i>
PFEH:	<i>Papers on Far Eastern History</i>
TP:	<i>T'oung Pao</i>
ZDMG:	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft</i>

BOOKS

Bar Hebraeus:	Bar Hebraeus. <i>The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj . . . commonly</i>
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- known as Bar Hebraeus. Vol. 1.*
Translated by E. A. Wallis Budge.
London: Oxford University Press,
1932.
- Brosset, Géorgie: Brosset, M., trans. *Histoire de la Géorgie. Part 1, Histoire ancienne, jusqu'en 1469 de J.C.* St. Petersburg, 1850.
- Doerfer, TMEN: Doerfer, Gerhard. *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen. Vol. 1.* Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963.
- DTS: *Drevnetûrskii slovar.* Leningrad, 1969.
- Galstîān: Galstîān, A. G. *Armîānskie istochniki o Mongolakh.* Moscow, 1962.
- HYS: K'o Shao-min. *Hsin Yüan shih.* Erh-shih-wu-shih ed.
- Juvaynî/Boyle: 'Atā-Malik Juvaynî. *The History of the World Conqueror.* 2 vols. Translated by John Andrew Boyle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
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- MWESC: T'u Chi. *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi*. Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chū, 1962.
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- PSRL: *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*. 27 vols. St. Petersburg/Leningrad, 1841-1962.
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mamālik al-amṣār*. Edited and
translated by Klaus Lech. Asiatische
Forschungen, vol. 22. Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1968.
- YCMCSL: Su T'ien-chüeh. *Yüan-ch'ao ming-ch'ien
shih-lüeh*. Shanghai, 1936.
- YS: *Yüan shih*. Taipei: National War
College ed., 1966.

- YSLP:** Shao Yüan-p'ing. *Yüan-shih lei-pien*.
Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1968.
- YWL:** Su T'ien-chüeh. *Yüan wen-lai*. Taipei:
Shih-chiai shu-chü yin-hsing, 1967.

1. Introduction

The Problem

In the sixth decade of the thirteenth century, the armies of the Mongol Empire were on the march in Poland, Galicia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kashmir, southern China, Tibet, the Indochinese peninsula, and Korea. These operations were launched by Grand Qan Möngke (r. 1251–59) in an attempt to implement the mandate of Chinggis Qan “that the Tatars should conquer every country in the world.”¹ These campaigns were undertaken on a gigantic scale, in some cases involving hundreds of thousands of men and enormous quantities of supplies. Behind each campaign lay months or years of careful preparation. Tactical, topographical, and logistical problems were first subjected to careful investigation, and then specific and detailed orders were issued to the responsible military commanders. Hülegü’s west-Asian campaign provides an example of the scale and character of Mongol military operations of this era.

The decision to extend Mongol control into Iran and Iraq was taken at the assembly of Mongol princes and high officials, called a *quriltai*, which enthroned Möngke in 1251. Hülegü, the new emperor’s younger brother, was assigned the task, and Ked Buqa was designated to lead the advance guard. The latter

1. R. A. Skelton, trans., *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 90. See also the parallel passage in Carpini, *Mongol Mission*, p. 18.

departed from Mongolia in the summer of 1252, and Hülegü, with the main body, left in the fall of 1253. Hülegü reached the Amu Darya in the fall of 1255 and in the spring of the following year he and his armies finally arrived at Tūs in Khurāsān. The length of time taken up by the march has sometimes been ascribed to the leisurely pace set by Hülegü, who stopped frequently to enjoy elaborate parties with his entourage and generals. But such an explanation ignores the time required to make the extensive and complex preparations necessary to assemble and move Hülegü's armies and their equipment.

First of all, troop strength had to be built up. This was accomplished by drawing upon the armies of other Mongol princes, high officials, and imperial sons-in-law, each of whom was required to contribute one-fifth of the men under his command to the enterprise. Additional troops were provided by west-Asian client states such as lesser Armenia and Georgia, and by Mongol contingents that previously had been stationed in northern Afghanistan, the Transcaucasus, and Asia Minor. Initially, the total number of troops mobilized was approximately one hundred fifty thousand. About half of these, including one thousand Chinese crews to man the siege equipment, accompanied Hülegü.² Obviously, the movement of this number of men, together with siege machinery and large herds of slow-moving sheep and goats, from Mongolia to Iran necessitated both a measured pace and meticulous planning. Forage for the cavalry mounts and accompanying herd animals was ensured by setting aside all of the pasturage from Qara Qorum, the Mongol capital, to Khurāsān.³ Additional provisions, mainly flour and wine, were laid out at regular intervals, i.e., the distance of one day's march. Roads were built over

2. Naṣanī, *Muntakhab*, p. 133. See also Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), pp. 403-4 and n. 2.

3. When large numbers of horses were concentrated for military operations, predictable and abundant sources of fodder were necessary, because free foraging by individual animals, the usual nomadic practice, was simply not possible under such circumstances. See Denis Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," *Oriens Extremus* 19 (1972): 171-82.

rough ground to accommodate the army and its bulky siege machinery. When unfordable rivers were encountered, bridges were constructed⁴ or a ferry service organized from among local boatmen, as was done during the crossing of the Amu Darya in 1255. All of this was the responsibility of the Mongol officials and local rulers in charge of the territories through which the army passed. Notification of the march routes and the preparations to be put in hand had been distributed in advance by imperial messenger (*elchi*).⁵

Once assembled in Khurāsān, Hülegü's contingents moved against the Order of the Assassins (Ismā'īlīs), who controlled an extensive network of fortifications in the mountains of northern and western Iran. By early 1257, after much hard fighting, most of the Order's castles had been reduced and its leadership eliminated. The Mongol forces, strengthened by new recruits, now converged on Baghdad, the seat of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate. In late 1257, the city was put under close siege and encircled by palisades to contain the sallies of its garrison and to prevent the escape of its populace. In February of the following year, the walls were successfully breached and the hapless inhabitants put to the sword. After a brief respite, the armies of Hülegü began the subjugation of upper Mesopotamia and Syria. The westward advance continued until September of 1260, when the Egyptian Mamlūks crushed the Mongol vanguard, capturing its commander, Ked Buqa, at the battle of 'Ain Jālūt.⁶

Simultaneously with this undertaking, the Mongols initiated

4. See Li Chih-chang, *The Travels of an Alchemist*, trans. and ed. Arthur Waley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 90-92, for data on Mongol bridge building during the western campaigns of 1219-24.

5. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 92-96; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 608-10; and Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 686-89. On road building, see the account in *Nation of Archers*, p. 325.

6. Detailed accounts of these campaigns are available in John Andrew Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Il-khāns," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 5, *The Seljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 340-51; and R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 333-55. On the Mongols' defeat at 'Ain Jālūt, see John Masson Smith, "'Ain Jālūt: Mamlūk Success or Mongol Failure?" *HJAS* 44/2 (1984): 307-45.

a major military operation against the southern Sung dynasty. This campaign, designed to turn the flank of their Chinese opponents by establishing a bridgehead in Yünnan, was under the nominal command of another of Möngke's brothers, Qubilai. Departing from Kansu in the fall of 1253, Qubilai's armies first forced passage through the Sung-controlled province of Szechwan. Once in Yünnan they launched an attack on the Nan-chao kingdom, an independent state situated along the Sung dynasty's weakly defended southwestern frontier. The Mongols reached and besieged the capital, Ta-li, in late 1253, compelling the Nan-chao ruler to capitulate early the next year. In the meantime, another Mongol army continuously pressured the Sung garrisons in Szechwan in order to secure Qubilai's lines of communications to the north.⁷

With the collapse of Nan-chao resistance, Qubilai returned north, leaving behind his field commander, Uriyangqadai, to carry out further operations in the south. By 1257, most of the tribal peoples of Yünnan had been pacified and Uriyangqadai next turned his attention to Annam (in northern Indochina), which, after perfunctory resistance, decided upon submission.

At this juncture, the emperor himself took to the field, leading several columns into Szechwan in the spring of 1258 to clear out the remaining Sung garrisons in the region preparatory to a final assault on southern China. As previously planned, by the summer of 1259 three large Mongol field armies were in action along the Sung frontiers: one, under Qubilai, struck south from Shensi; another, under Uriyangqadai, moved north from Annam; and Möngke's troops pressed westward from Szechwan. However, before the Mongol armies made any significant headway, Möngke died suddenly on August 12, 1259, and the gigantic three-pronged attack on the Sung was called off.⁸

This series of campaigns against the Sung involved, as did

7 *Sung shih*, chap. 43, pp. 845, 847, and 851.

8 Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Yüan Hsien-tsung (Meng-ku Han) ti ta-chü cheng shu yü 'ta ts'ai' Ho-chou T'iao-yü cheng-ti chan-ssu," *Wen-shih-chen hsüeh-pao* 14 (1964): 61-85.

the west-Asian venture, several hundred thousand men.⁹ Supporting the armies in China likewise entailed elaborate preparation and effort, as evidenced by the large number of fortifications, bridges, assault boats, and rammed-earth roads constructed in the course of these operations.¹⁰

Although the other campaigns carried out in the 1250s, those against Kashmir,¹¹ Tibet,¹² and the western Rus principalities¹³ were on a smaller scale, they were by no means minor operations, particularly the attempts to subdue the Koreans, who tenaciously resisted the invading Mongol armies until 1259.¹⁴ All in all, the quantity of human and natural resources needed to sustain the various campaigns was certainly tremendous. When one considers that the Mongols were not a numerous people—perhaps seven hundred thousand in all, in Chinggis Qan's day—and that as pastoral nomads (in the steppe zone) and hunter-gatherers (in the forest zone) they commanded only limited resources, essentially just their herds and a few personal possessions,¹⁵ the question naturally arises: how did the Mongols acquire the needed manpower and matériel?

The Thesis

Initially, of course, the Mongols were able to expand their demographic and resource base by bringing some of the

9. The size of Mongol field armies will be analyzed in greater detail in chap. 7.

10. *YS*, chap. 3, pp. 16–17, and chap. 148, p. 1576. See also N. I. Svislunova, "Gibel gosudarstva Yuzhnykh Slonov," *TMAE*, pp. 274–81.

11. Karl Jahn, "A Note on Kashmir and the Mongols," *CAJ* 2 (1956): 176–80.

12. What little is known of Mongol operations against Tibet in the reign of Möngke is discussed by János Szerb, "Glosses on the Oeuvre of Bla-ma 'Phags-pa: II. Some Notes on the Events of the Years 1251–1254," *AOASH* 34 (1980): 272–80.

13. Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of the Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 108–11.

14. See W. E. Henthorn, *Korea: The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963), pp. 111–49, and Gari Ledyard, "The Mongol Campaigns in Korea and the Dating of the 'Secret History of the Mongols'," *CAJ* 9 (1964): 1–22.

15. On the size of the population, see N. Ts. Munkuev, "Zametki o drevnikh mongolakh," *TMAE*, p. 367. For a discussion of the differences between the steppe and forest economies, see B. Vladimirov, *Le régime social des Mongols* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1948), pp. 39–56.

nomadic and sedentary populations of northern China and central Asia under their control through military means. Mongol armies were simply better led, organized, and disciplined than those of their opponents. This is most apparent in the control that Mongol generals were able to exercise over their armies and subunits during the course of battle. In general, medieval military practice placed great emphasis on the skills of the individual soldier and on small-unit maneuvers. Comparatively little attention was paid to the movement and coordination of large formations. The Mongol military machine, however, laid as much stress on the latter skills as on the training of individuals and small units. Their superior ability to control the movements of the major unit (the *tümen*, composed nominally of ten thousand men) is well illustrated by the battle fought in 1223 along the Kalka River, in which the outnumbered Mongol army, through a series of feigned retreats and well-coordinated counterattacks, administered a crushing defeat to the disorganized forces of the Rus princes and their Qipchaq allies.¹⁶

The Mongols' tactical supremacy was achieved through frequent exercises that took the form of immense hunting parties in which the army participated as units. Coordination was accomplished in various ways: careful plans were made and distributed among the participants; communications were maintained between units by various means, for example, special messengers or whistling arrows; and finally—perhaps most important—discipline in the Mongol armies was exceedingly strict. No excuse was accepted for failure to carry out one's part of the plan. Individuals or units who failed to appear at the right place at the right time were subject to severe punishment.¹⁷

16. For a description of this battle, see George Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 235–39; and John Fennell, "The Tatar Invasion of 1223: Source Problems," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 27 (1980): 18–31.

17. On the Mongol military, see H. Desmond Martin, "The Mongol Army," *JRAS* (1943), pp. 46–85; Denis Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors," *JOAS* 101 (1981):


The excellence of the Mongol military was, then, the main factor in the Mongols' early successes. But to bring the large sedentary societies of eastern and western Asia fully and permanently under their control required troops, provisions, and siege equipment in quantities that Mongol society could not by itself supply. Their expansion soon would have come to an end, no matter how well-trained and disciplined their armies, if the Mongols had not been able to make effective use of their newly acquired resources. Therefore, an essential and often overlooked factor in the Mongols' long-term success was the efficiency of the "Mongol" administrative system, which, as we shall see, was in fact an amalgam of Chinese, Muslim, Turkic, and native elements.

This work will defend the thesis that the Mongols succeeded in creating the largest contiguous land-based empire in human history because they were able to mobilize effectively the human and material resources of the areas under their control.¹⁸ As new territories were added to their domain, their resources were quickly harnessed to facilitate the next phase of conquest. All of their subjects—nomadic tribesmen, urban dwellers, and agriculturists—were required to help further Mongol imperial ambitions. Thus, when Hülegü's armies encamped before the walls of Baghdad in the winter of 1257–58, it was not simply an encounter between the Mongols and the 'Abbāsid Caliphate, but a confrontation of the human, financial, material, and technological resources of northern China, central Asia, Russia, the Caucasus, and Iran against those of Iraq.

133–44; and Denis Sinor, "On Mongol Strategy" in *Proceedings of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference*, ed. Ch'en Chieh-hsien (Tainan, 1975), pp. 238–49. For a discussion of hunting as a form of military training, see Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 19–23; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 27–30; and S. Jagchid and C. R. Bawden, "Notes on Hunting of Some Nomadic Peoples of Central Asia," *Die Jagd bei den altaischen Völkern* (Asiatische Forschungen, vol. 26; Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1968), pp. 94–95.

18. To use S. N. Eisenstadt's terminology, the Mongols were masters at creating and controlling "free-floating resources." For a discussion of this concept, see Eisenstadt's *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 27–28.

GRAND QANS AND RULERS OF CHINA



REGIONAL QANATES




FIGURE 1. MONGOL RULERS

The Methodology

In order to test this hypothesis, I have selected the reign of Möngke (1251–59) for detailed study.¹⁹ This period was chosen because it was a time of expansion and conquest during which Mongol techniques of resource mobilization were fully deployed and thoroughly tested.

Inasmuch as the issue of access to, and control of, resources is always greatly affected by the allocation of political power within a given society, political conditions in the Mongol Empire will first be discussed in some detail. Chapters 2 and 3 outline Möngke's rise to power and the consolidation of his rule. As will be shown, the degree of centralization attained in his reign is directly related to the circumstances surrounding his enthronement. Chapter 4 then takes up Möngke's economic "reforms" and political goals, and the administrative measures designed to implement them; in short, the "intentions" of the central government will be established, against which their actual performance can later be gauged.

Chapters 5–8 deal in turn with specific facets of resource mobilization: census-taking, assessment and collection of taxes, issuance of new currency, and military and labor recruitment. These sections measure the success of the center in carrying out its policies by carefully verifying whether or not its demands were met at the local level. Positive verification is achieved when sources, particularly those of a local character—such as regional and city histories, private writings of officials, and the like, emanating from all parts of the empire—show a consistent pattern of compliance with the center's demand.

19. The most complete western-language accounts of Möngke's reign are those of C. d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu'à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan*, vol. 2 (The Hague and Amsterdam: Les Frères van Cleef, 1834), pp. 245–377; René Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 272–84; and W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3d ed. (London: Luzac, 1968), pp. 478–87. Although these works present generally accurate descriptions of his reign, none deals specifically with the issues analyzed in the present work.

This procedure has the additional advantage of providing a larger framework in which to compare the frequently fragmentary, cryptic reports encountered in these local sources. In many cases, isolated or unclear data become comprehensible or take on new meaning when aligned chronologically with related information culled from documents and narratives originating in other parts of the empire.²⁰ This is best exemplified by the treatment of the census carried out in the Rus principalities in 1257-59, discussed in chapter 5. In this instance, essential information on the preparation, timing, and management of the census not found in the Rus chronicles is provided by various foreign sources.

This methodology necessitates a departure from the usual piecemeal approach to the history of the Mongol Empire, in which sinologists study the Yüan dynasty, Islamicists the *Īl-khāns*, and Russian historians the Golden Horde.²¹ This parceling out of Mongol history among various academic fields has had several undesirable effects. First, events are often evaluated only in the light of local conditions, when in fact they are related to developments in other parts of the empire. Secondly, there is a strong tendency to view matters solely from the standpoint of the subject population. Mongol policies frequently are analyzed in terms of their impact on the Chinese, the Rus, and others, and only rarely in terms of Mongol motives and goals. Therefore, my approach will be to look at events from the perspective of the empire as a whole and from the standpoint of the Mongol leadership.

To a large extent, this compartmentalization of Mongol

20. The Soviet scholar L. N. Gumilev has frequently used this method to establish and explain causal links between widely separated and seemingly unconnected events in the history of the Eurasian steppe. His latest work, *Poiski vymyshlennogo Tsarstva: Legenda o gosudarstve Presbitera Ioanna* (Moscow, 1970), makes extensive use of this technique. See especially chap. 14, pp. 346-80.

21. The Chaghadai qanate has been little studied; only a few Soviet and European orientalists have published on the subject.

history is a result of the language problem. Data on the medieval Mongols is widely scattered in various sources—Latin, Byzantine Greek, Old Russian, Arabic, Syriac, Persian, Armenian, Georgian, Chinese, Tibetan, Uighur, and Mongol, to name the most important. Although no one could be expected to master all of these, in my opinion it is still possible to study Mongol history in its broadest context with a knowledge of several critical languages (in this case, Chinese, Persian, and Russian) and by relying on the available translations of sources one cannot read in the original.

It is my hope that this work will demonstrate both the feasibility of studying the Mongol Empire in its entirety and the benefits to be derived from a holistic approach to its history.

The Sources

In general, the reign of Möngke is relatively rich in source material. The emperor's political and economic initiatives affected the lives of all the settled peoples of the empire, and consequently attracted the attention of numerous historians and chroniclers. The following, however, is intended only as a brief survey of the chief sources of the era. No attempt will be made to discuss all of the materials utilized in this study, nor to explore in detail the various textual and historiographical problems connected with these sources.

Of the Chinese sources, the most important is the *Yüan shih*, the official history of the Yüan dynasty, which was compiled in 1369 on orders of the emperor of the newly founded Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Like all the Chinese dynastic histories, the *Yüan shih* is divided into three major sections: the basic annals (*pen-chi*), which narrate the major events in the reigns of all the Yüan rulers; the monographs (*chih*), which provide outline histories of governmental institutions and programs;

and the biographies (*lieh-chuan*), in which can be found accounts of the lives of significant political and military leaders.²²

Despite its undeniable importance for his reign, the *Yüan shih*'s data on Möngke are somewhat meager in comparison with those available on later Mongol emperors. Two reasons can be cited for this lack. First, systematic record keeping in Chinese for historical purposes was not instituted until Qubilai's reign (1260-94), so that the "veritable records" (*shih-lu*), which normally underlie the annalistic sections of the dynastic histories, are absent for the first four rulers of the Mongol Empire—Chinggis Qan, Ögödei, Güyüg, and Möngke. Efforts to assemble such records began under Qubilai, but by that time much historical material on the early emperors had already been lost and the resulting compilation, the *Wu-ch'ao shih-lu*, submitted to the throne in 1303 was a less-than-adequate substitute for "veritable records" based upon extensive, contemporary documentation.²³ In consequence, the space devoted to Möngke's reign in the *Yüan shih* is fairly brief. Nevertheless, these annals, which constitute chapter 3 of the work, provide a basic chronological framework for Möngke's tenure in office, the names of prominent associates, and certain factual data not found elsewhere.²⁴ The same lack of record keeping also accounts for the fact that Möngke is infrequently mentioned in the monograph section of the *Yüan shih*. In many cases, his reign is referred to only in passing or, more often, ignored completely. The compilers of the history frequently complained of the absence of data for the period before Qubilai.

22. For a chapter-by-chapter breakdown of the *Yüan shih*, see Bretschneider, vol. 1, pp. 183-91.

23. On the compilation of the *Wu-ch'ao shih-lu*, see William Hung, "The Transmission of the Book Known as the 'Secret History of the Mongols,'" *HJAS* 14 (1951): 473-79 and 490-91; and Hok-lam Chan, "Wang O, 1190-1273," *PFEH* 12 (1975): 54-56.

24. Chap. 3 of the *Yüan shih* is now available in translation. See Waltraut Abramowski, "Die Chinesischen Annalen des Möngke: Übersetzung des 3. Kapitels des *Yüan-shih*," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979): 8-71.

Information on Möngke is relatively more abundant in the biographical section of the official history, but still not comparable to the amount of data available on Qubilai and his successors. This brings us to the second reason for the paucity of data on his reign in the Chinese sources—the fact that few Chinese achieved high office under Möngke. Biographical writing was practiced extensively in China during this era, and under normal conditions biographies were prepared for all high-ranking civil and military officials. In the later Yüan it is not uncommon for a major figure to be the subject of two or three independently written biographies. These would then form the basis of that individual's official biography in the *Yüan shih*. Because, however, most of Möngke's advisers and officials were Mongols or Turks, not Chinese scholars, this practice was not widely followed. Consequently, the biographies of the principal personages in Möngke's reign are brief and often vague as to chronology. In many instances, too, important individuals—for example, Maḥmūd Yalavach—have no biographies at all.

As for official documents, the situation is again disappointing for his reign. Very few of Möngke's edicts have been preserved. The major collections of the Yüan period, such as the handbooks of administrative law and procedure—for example, *Yüan tien-chang* and the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*—are concerned with the period after his reign. Occasionally, however, imperial decrees or *jarlighs* from later reigns, particularly Qubilai's, refer back to decrees of Möngke, and some idea of the contents of the latter can be obtained in this indirect manner. The writings of Chinese scholar-officials (*wen-chi*) contain some important references to Möngke's reign, but these are scanty, often fragmentary, and scattered through the hundred or so extant collections from the Yüan period. Again, this can be explained by the dearth of Chinese officials among the emperor's inner circle of advisers.

On the whole, the Persian histories provide the most coher-

ent and detailed picture available of Möngke's administration of the Mongol Empire, and Juvaynī's account of the rise of the Mongols, *The History of the World Conqueror* (*Ta'rikh-i Jahāngushā*), completed in about 1260, is undoubtedly the single most important source for the period. As a contemporary of the events and as a middle-level bureaucrat in the Mongol government in western Asia, Juvaynī was intimately familiar with economic and political programs instituted by Möngke. Moreover, this author's knowledge of the Mongol administration was by no means limited to Iran, for he traveled widely in central Asia and Mongolia. Although statements of fact made by Juvaynī are usually reliable, the motivations he attributes to his Mongol superiors are often open to question. This is understandable, for he was in the difficult position of trying to justify Mongol rule to his fellow countrymen and coreligionists, who had suffered heavily at the hands of the conquerors. Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that Juvaynī was a partisan of the descendants of one particular Chinggisid prince, Tolui, and that his portrayal of the political struggles within the Mongol royal house loyally and consistently reflects the official Toluid line.²⁵

Another important account of the period is contained in the *Collected Chronicles* (*Jāmi' al-Tavārikh*) of Rashīd al-Dīn, a historian and high government official, who prepared his work at the request of the Mongol ruler of Iran, Ghazan (r. 1296–1304). Information on Möngke can be found in the volume on the immediate successors of Chinggis Qan, in which a chapter is devoted to his reign, and in the volume on the Mongol and Turkic tribes, which contains brief biographical sketches of many of the emperor's chief officials. To a large extent, Rashīd al-Dīn relies on Juvaynī for data on the Mongol emperors before Qubilai, frequently citing long passages verbatim from his predecessor's work. However, in many instances Rashīd al-

25. David Ayalon, "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan: A Reexamination," *Studia Islamica* 32 (1971): 134.

Dīn augments Juvaynī's account with data drawn from now-lost Mongol chronicles (concerning which, see below). Thus, the works of Juvaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn complement one another and should always be consulted together on any problem regarding the reigns of the first four rulers of the empire.²⁶

Rashīd al-Dīn's *Shu'ab-i panjgānah* (Five Genealogies) is also of considerable value. Prepared as a supplement to his *Collected Chronicles*, this work, which survives in a single manuscript, contains valuable information on the wives, sons, ministers, and generals of the early Mongol rulers. A unique feature of this work is that it renders the names of Mongol princes in both Arabic and Mongol (that is, Uighur) scripts.²⁷

Some of the local histories in Persian, particularly the *History of Harāt* (*Ta'rīkh-i nāmāh-i Harāt*), written in the latter part of the fourteenth century, are quite useful, in that they describe in some detail the implementation of Möngke's financial and administrative measures on the local level. The Armenian and Georgian chronicles also are helpful in following the implementation of Mongol policies in a specific region. Some of these sources, moreover, such as the *History of the Armenians* by Kirakos of Ganjak (d. 1271), a contemporary account of the era of Mongol expansion in western Asia, and the anonymous *Georgian Chronicle*, which covers the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, supply at times critical information on areas outside the Transcaucasus.²⁸ Another useful characteristic of these sources is that they were written by individuals unconnected

26. John Andrew Boyle, "Juvaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn as Sources on the History of the Mongols," in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 133-37.

27. The *Shu'ab-i panjgānah* was discovered by A. Zeki Validi Togan in 1927 in the Topkapı Sarayı Museum (cat. no. 2932). For further details on its contents, see A. Zeki Validi Togan, "The Composition of the History of the Mongols by Rashīd al-Dīn," *CAJ* 7 (1962): 68-71. I should like to thank Bruce D. Craig, Curator of the Middle East Collection of the University of Chicago Library, for procuring a microfilm of this manuscript for me.

28. For full bibliographic particulars, see the Abbreviations Used in Notes, under Brosset, *Géorgie*, and Kirakos.

with the Mongol administrative machinery and do not bear the impress of the official point of view.

As regards the Rus chronicles, they are, on the whole, relatively uninformative for the period that concerns us. They are composed in a laconic style that merely strings together unrelated facts in a rough chronological order, a method of presentation quite similar to that adopted in the annalistic section of the *Yüan shih*. On rare occasions, however, a given event will be described from beginning to end in a connected narrative. Fortunately, one such example is the account of the Mongol census of 1259 in northern Rus, found in the *Chronicle of Novgorod*. A further difficulty with these chronicles is their extremely parochial outlook. Seldom do the chroniclers stray beyond the bounds of the Rus lands and eastern Europe. On the basis of these sources alone, it is not at all apparent that the Rus principalities were part of a much larger political entity stretching from Korea to Asia Minor.²⁹ Mongol policies in Rus are not fully intelligible without reference to non-Slavic sources and without knowledge of Mongol practices elsewhere in the empire.

European travel accounts long have served as an important source of information on the Mongol Empire. For Möngke's reign, there is the work of William of Rubruck, a Franciscan missionary who visited the Mongol court in 1254-55. His account, which in my opinion has a value second only to Juvaynī's history as a source for this period, contains unique data on the workings of the Mongol administrative machine, the personalities and attitudes of leading Mongol officials, and the relationships between various Mongol princes. Rubruck's description of the imperial capital at Qara Qorum is unequaled.

Lastly, some mention should be made of the Mongol sources. Although the major historical compendium of the Mongols, the so-called *Secret History*, does not go beyond the

29. The filiation of the Russian chronicles is a complex problem, which I have not attempted to deal with in this study.

time of Ögödei (1229-41), it is nonetheless essential for establishing the political background to Möngke's reign. The institutions that Möngke built upon and modified were laid down originally during the reigns of Chinggis Qan and Ögödei, and the *Secret History* supplies a unique picture of these institutions in their formative stages. Obviously, too, this source presents matters from the standpoint of the Mongols, a perspective that deserves more attention than it has hitherto been given.

Aside from the *Secret History*, no Mongol narratives of the thirteenth century are extant. From non-Mongol sources, however, it is known that other chronicles, related to but distinct from the *Secret History*, were maintained by the Mongol courts in China and Iran. Of these, the *Altan Debter* (Golden Book) appears to be the most important. Although no longer available in the Mongol version, this source still can be consulted indirectly through Rashīd al-Dīn's history and the Chinese chronicle entitled *The Record of the Personal Campaigns of the Holy Warrior* (*Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*), both of which drew heavily on this now-lost work.³⁰

Although there is clear evidence that record keeping in Mongolian and several other languages was extensively practiced during Möngke's reign, none has come down to us. Fortunately, however, some Mongol documents have been preserved in Chinese and Persian translations incorporated into the texts of narrative histories. These are not numerous, but they contain valuable information and provide an insight into the administrative style of the Mongols.

30. For a discussion of the relationship between the *Altan Debter*, Rashīd al-Dīn's work, and the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*, see Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, ed. and trans., *Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan*, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951), pp. xiii-xv.

2. The Rise of Möngke

The Empire on the Eve

In 1219, on the eve of the Khwārazm expedition, and then again in 1227 just prior to his death, Chinggis Qan named his third son, Ögödei,¹ to be his successor.² A *quriltai* was convoked to act upon this matter shortly after the emperor's funeral. Despite his father's deathbed injunction, Ögödei's candidacy was not uncontested, and the assembled Mongol princes and officials deliberated at length. Chinese, Persian, and Mongol sources all report that there was some support for the candidature of the deceased emperor's fourth son, Tolui, the regent of the empire during the interregnum.³ But Chinggis Qan's clear (and undisputed) instruction on the succession could not easily be ignored so soon after the passing of the "holy warrior," and in 1229 Ögödei was duly elected qaghan, or grand qan,⁴ of the Empire of the Great Mongols (*Yeke Mongghol Ulus*).

1. Besides the four sons (Jochi, Chaghadaï, Ögödei, and Tolui) of Börte, his senior wife, Chinggis had two other sons by secondary wives. Neither of the latter two offspring were ever considered eligible for the office of grand qan.

2. *SH*, pars. 253–254, pp. 189–97; Juvaynî/*Qazvinî*, vol. 1, pp. 142–44; and Juvaynî/*Hoyle*, vol. 1, pp. 180–83.

3. Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *MS* 14 (1965): 196–97 and n. 46.

4. During Chinggis Qan's lifetime his title was "qan." At his succession, Ögödei took the title "qaghan," literally, "qan of qans," in order to distinguish himself from his brothers, Chaghadaï and Tolui, who had acquired their own territories and the title "qan" upon the death of their father. See Igor de Rachewiltz, "Qan, Qa'an and the

Tolui accepted his defeat gracefully and afterwards actively cooperated with Ögödei in the final destruction of the Chin dynasty, which controlled northern China and Manchuria until its collapse in 1234. Several years later, in the period 1236-41, two of Tolui's sons, Möngke and Böchek, at the order of Ögödei, assisted in the conquest of the Rus principalities and the Qipchaq steppe. Although some disappointment must have been occasioned by the election of Ögödei, the Toluids, from motives of political calculation, made a great show of supporting the new qaghan in his plans for military expansion and in his attempts to regularize the administrative and taxation systems of the empire. Content for the moment to wait upon events, neither Tolui nor any member of his family ever openly challenged the authority of Chinggis Qan's chosen successor, once the *quriltai* had reached its decision.

But other divisions and rivalries did develop between the Chinggisid lines during Ögödei's reign, and these came to the surface as soon as the emperor died in 1241.⁵ These tensions were most pronounced between descendants of Jochi, Chinggis Qan's eldest son (d. 1227), and those of Ögödei. The chief representatives of these two lines (*urugh*), Batu, the son of Jochi, and Güyüg, the son of Ögödei, openly despised one another. The source of their enmity was a series of personal and political disputes that first arose in the course of the Rus and Qipchaq campaign of 1236-41. The situation was further exacerbated when Güyüg hastened back to Mongolia upon his father's death, to press his own claims to the throne.⁶

In direct defiance of her deceased husband's instructions that

Seal of Güyüg," *Documenta Babarorum: Festschrift für Walter Heissig zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. K. Sagaster and M. Weiers (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), pp. 272-81.

5. On these tensions, see P. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *CAJ* 22 (1978): 196-201; and Paul Buell, "Sino-Khitai Administration in Mongol Hukhara," *Journal of Asian History* 13 (1979): 143-46.

6. Rashid/Karimī, vol. 1, pp. 523-34, 561-62, and 567; Rashid/Boyle, pp. 120-21, 170, and 180; and *SH*, pars. 275-76, pp. 215-17.

the succession was to go to his grandson Shiremün,⁷ Töregene, Ögödei's widow and regent, convened a *quriltai* in the hope of securing the quick election of her son Güyüg.⁸ But Batu, now the acknowledged leader of the senior Chinggisid line, refused to attend the *quriltai*, forcing a delay of several years in the proceedings. Töregene, however, finally engineered the election of Güyüg without Batu's participation or approval. Greatly angered at this personal affront and political setback, Batu declined to participate in the ceremonies celebrating the enthronement of the new qaghan, which took place at Kökö Na'ur on the Kerülen River in the summer of 1246.

The author of the *Tartar Relation* reports that Güyüg had been elected "by a majority of one."⁹ The statement, of course, is not literally true, but nonetheless it accurately reflected the growing political division within the Mongol Empire. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that for the first time one of the unsuccessful claimants for the throne was made to pay with his life for challenging the victor. Otchigin, a brother of Chinggis Qan, was put to death because, as Carpini phrases it, "he wanted to rule without an election."¹⁰ This, as it turned out, was but a foretaste of the massive blood purges that were to attend the selection of subsequent qaghans.

Although successful in gaining the throne, Güyüg soon proved to be an ineffectual ruler. The Persian sources indicate that he was "chronically ill," but it is equally evident that he was chronically drunk. He paid little attention to the affairs of state, allowing his supporters to issue decrees (*jarligh*), official seals, and badges of authority (*p'ai-tzu*) at will. Güyüg also

7. Shiremün, the Mongol and Turkic form of Solomon, was the eldest son of Ögödei's third son, Köchü. For further details, see Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 2, pp. 16-17; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 21-22; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 206; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 251; and MWESC, chap. 37, 4b.

8. For a brief biography of Töregene, see YS, chap. 114, p. 1109; and YSLP, chap. 29, 2a.

9. *Tartar Relation*, p. 82.

10. *Mongol Mission*, p. 25; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 199 and 210; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 244 and 255.

soon exhausted the imperial treasury by lavishing gifts and cash grants on all who had backed his rise to power. Moreover, he spent huge sums buying goods, mainly luxury items, from the merchant companies (*ortaq*) that dominated trans-Eurasian trade in the thirteenth century. After Güyüg's death, it was determined that the late emperor had incurred debts totaling five hundred thousand silver ingots (*balish*) in his dealings with these merchants.¹¹

To add to the woes of the empire, Güyüg's relations with Batu continued to deteriorate. Conflict over control of the Transcaucasus further sharpened their differences.¹² By 1247, the year after the new qaghan's enthronement, tensions had reached such a pitch that the author of the *Tartar Relation* predicted that "if this [discord] proceeds further the Christians (that is, Europe) may have a respite from the Tartars for many years."¹³ In other words, the divisiveness engendered by Güyüg's election was pushing the Mongol Empire toward the brink of civil war.

Enthronement of a New Qaghan

In the spring of 1247, Güyüg announced an "inspection tour" of his personal lands (*yurt*) in Jungaria in order to position himself for a surprise attack on the rival Jochid line. Throughout the summer and fall the emperor busied himself building up the strength of the elite shock troops (*ba'atud*) attached to the imperial guard.¹⁴ His plans perfected, Güyüg set out west-

11. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, pp. 208–11, and vol. 3, pp. 84–85; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 254–55 and vol. 2, p. 604; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 570–71 and 573; and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 184–85 and 188.

12. Kirakos, p. 195.

13. *Tartar Relation*, p. 82.

14. My evidence for the mobilization of additional shock troops (*ba'atud*) at this time is based upon my understanding of a decree issued by Güyüg in the summer of 1247, which I translate as follows: "From the Mongol households, one man in every hundred is to be enrolled as a *pa-tu-lu* (i.e., as a *ba'atur*, singular of *ba'atud*, 'braves')." YS, chap. 2, p. 14. However, in Waltraut Abiamowski's translation of this passage, "Die Chinesischen Annalen des Ögödei und Güyük: Übersetzung des 2. Kapitels des

ward from Jungaria in the spring of 1248 with a large army, intent on forcing a showdown with Batu. Güyüg's destination, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, was the area of Emil Qochin, evidently a reference to the region between the Emil and Qobaq rivers in eastern Jungaria. Batu at that time was in Ālā Qamāq, an unidentified place described only as one week's march from Qayaliq, a city south of Lake Balkash and to the west of Jungaria. Batu, therefore, was directly in the line of march of Güyüg's massed troops.

Sorqaghtani Beki, the widow of Tolui (d. 1233), sent a messenger to warn Batu of Güyüg's approach, clearly intimating that the qaghan's intentions toward the house of Jochi were hostile. Taking heed of the warning, Batu remained where he was and "awaited the arrival of Güyüg Qan with vigilance and caution."¹⁵ An armed clash between the lines of Jochi and Ögödei appeared imminent when Güyüg suddenly died, some distance from Besh Baliq (a city on the northern slopes of the T'ien-shan), and the seemingly inevitable confrontation was thus averted.

When news of Güyüg's death reached Batu, he called for a *quriltai* to be held in Ālā Qamāq to select a successor to the deceased qaghan.¹⁶ As was the usual Mongol custom, Batu suggested that Oghul Qaimish, Güyüg's widow, be named

Yuan shih," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 10 (1976): 152 and n. 23, p. 154, she takes *pa-tu-lu* not as a type of soldier, a member of the *ba'atur*, but as the personal name of the commander (whom she identifies with the famous general Sübētei) under whose authority the newly recruited troops were supposedly placed. In my view, this interpretation is faulty. First, the term *ba'atur*, understood as "shock trooper," makes perfect sense in the context of the decree (a possibility she does not consider), whereas *Ba'atur* as a personal name is a somewhat forced interpretation. Secondly, her identification of the *Ba'atur* of the decree with Sübētei is extremely doubtful. No other source mentions Sübētei in this connection, for the very good reason that he was almost certainly dead by that time. For a discussion of *ba'atur* and *ba'atur* as technical military terms, see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 36.

15. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 524, and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 120.

16. The YS, chap. 3, p. 15, gives A-la To-hu-la-wu as the site of this *quriltai*. Pelliot and Hamblin, *Campaignes*, p. 52, reconstruct the name as *Ala-toghraq.

regent and that she run the affairs of the empire, with the help of the late emperor's chief ministers, until the *quriltai* had reached its decision on the succession.¹⁷

Despite Batu's stature as the elder brother (*aga*) of all the princes, and his kindly gestures toward her, Oghul Qaimish had no intention of giving him a free hand to select the next qaghan. Together with most of the princes from the lines of Chaghadaï and Ögödei, she refused to attend the *quriltai* at Ālā Qamāq,¹⁸ arguing that the election of a new qaghan had to take place in the area of the Onan-Kerülen rivers where Chinggis Qan first had been proclaimed emperor in 1206. Fortunately for Batu and the Toluids, the family of Ögödei did not immediately join ranks behind a candidate of their own choice. Oghul Qaimish and her two elder sons, Qoja and Naqu, each set up a court and refused to cooperate with each other, or with Batu—a situation aptly summarized in the *Yüan shih*: "The dynasty did not have a sitting monarch for quite a while. Within and without [the realm] there was great tumult."¹⁹

After some hesitation, Qoja and Naqu finally were persuaded to send representatives to the *quriltai*, but adamantly refused to come in person. Their representatives, however, had been instructed to go along with any decision that was agreeable to the other attending princes.²⁰ On this basis, the *quriltai* began to deliberate the matter at hand. The proceedings, held in the summer of 1250, were dominated by the lines of Jochi and Tolui. Batu left no doubt in the minds of the participants that he considered Möngke, the eldest son of Tolui, as the best-qualified candidate for the throne, and he unhesitatingly

17. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 217; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 263.

18. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 571–72, and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 200–1, this *quriltai* took place at Batu's court on the Volga, but this seems highly unlikely. Both Juvaynī, who was a contemporary of the event, and the YS place the *quriltai* in the area of Jungaria. See Paul Pelliot, *Les Mongols et la papauté* (Paris: Librairie Auguste Picard, 1923), vol. 3, pp. 198–99.

19. YS, chap. 2, p. 13.

20. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 218–20; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 262–66; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 571; and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 200.

urged his immediate election. At this critical juncture, Oghul Qaimish (Hai-mi-shih) belatedly sent a representative, Bala (Pa-la),²¹ to propose the Ögödeid's own candidate, Shiremün. According to the dramatic account in the *Yüan shih*, their spokesman rose to address the assembled princes:

Formerly T'ai-tsung (Ögödei) ordered that his grandson, Shiremün (Shih-lich-men), was to be the heir. The princes of the blood and senior officials all heard this. At present Shiremün is still alive and yet you consider and desire another arrangement. What are you going to do about [Shiremün]?

In response, Möngke's brother Möge (Mu-ko)²² said:

[As for] T'ai-tsung's orders, who dared disobey them? Formerly [while] we were deliberating about the throne, Ting-tsung (Güyük) was made emperor by Empress Töregenc (T'o-hu-lich-ni) and you. In that instance you were the ones who disobeyed [Ögödei's] orders. Now on whom do we place the blame?²³

Bala, unable to refute Möge's rhetoric, was silenced. This seems to have been the turning point of the debate, for the *Yüan shih* account goes on to report that Batu, with the support of Uriyangqadai (Wu-liang-ho-t'ai), the son of Sübētei, Chinggis Qan's ablest general, then ordered the assembled throng to give their assent to the selection of Möngke as qaghan, and that they did so without further discussion.²⁴ The other princes having agreed to Batu's proposal, Naqu and

21. An Uighur secretary (*hichēchi*), long in the employ of the Ögödeids. Carpini met him at Güyük's court in Mongolia. See *Mongol Mission*, pp. 66-67.

22. Möge was the eighth son of Tolui. For biographical data, see *MWESC*, chap. 33, 5b; and *HYS*, chap. 10, 9a.

23. *YS*, chap. 3, p. 15. It is interesting to note that many other supporters of Möngke have been credited with demolishing Oghul Qaimish's arguments in favor of Shiremün by pointing out that Güyük's enthronement was itself a violation of Ögödei's orders. Among the most prominent are Qubilai, another of Möngke's brothers, and Menggeser, a family retainer of the Toluids who rose to great power under Möngke. See Rashid/Alizade, vol. 1, pp. 140-41; and *YS*, chap. 124, p. 1351, the biography of Menggeser.

24. See *YS*, chap. 3, p. 15, and chap. 121, p. 1310, the biography of Uriyangqadai

Qoja, who had given written undertakings through their representatives that they would abide by the decision of the *quriltai*, had in effect agreed to the election of Möngke.

The new grand qan, after showing appropriate reticence by issuing several refusals, finally accepted the decision of the princes. Soon thereafter, it was decided to hold the formal enthronement ceremonies the next year in the Onan-Kerülen area, the seat of Chinggis Qan's original camp (*ordo*). Meanwhile, both Batu and Sorqaghtani made every effort to induce disaffected members of the imperial clan to attend the proposed ceremonies and to recognize Möngke's election in the interest of the unity of the empire. Their efforts achieved mixed results: some members of the lines of Chaghadai and Ögödei agreed to come, but most, despite blandishments and later threats, continued to reject the invitations repeatedly delivered by special messengers.²⁵ Because of these attempts of Batu and Sorqaghtani to win over the opposition, the *quriltai* to reaffirm Möngke's election was postponed for some time. However, seeing that the opposition was interested only in forcing further delays, Batu finally ordered the assembly to reconvene with or without the recalcitrant members of the imperial clan. The new *quriltai* was held in June and July of 1251 at Köde'ü Aral (K'uo-t'ich-wu A-lan), a frequently mentioned locality along the Kerülen River.²⁶

Batu did not attend, but sent his brother Berke and his son Sartaq with three *tümens* of troops to ensure the security of the participants. Others in attendance included Qubilai, Hülegü, Arigh Böke, and Möge, the brothers of Möngke; a number of the sons of Chinggis Qan's brothers; and various prominent military and administrative leaders who had served both Ching-

25. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 20-23; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 561-63; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 582-84; and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 202-4.

26. YS, chap. 3, p. 15; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 29; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 567, agree on this date. Rashīd al-Dīn, Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 585, and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 205, mistakenly place the date in February and March. On the location of Köde'ü Aral, which is mentioned in the *SH*, par. 269, p. 209, see Pelliot, *Papauté*, p. 200, n. 2.

gis and Ögödei. Qoja, Naqu, and Shiremün from the line of Ögödei, and Yesü Möngke, the reigning Chaghadaï qan, all boycotted the proceedings. But Qara Hülegü, a grandson of Chaghadaï, and Qadan, a son of Ögödei, attended, providing the *quriltai* with some semblance of unity, for the supporters of Möngke could now plausibly claim that all branches of the imperial clan were represented.

To no one's surprise, the gathering reaffirmed Möngke's selection as grand qan without a word of dissent. Möngke was installed in office with the various princes and officials standing before him, aligned in a previously agreed-upon order of precedence. Following the ceremonies, the participants congratulated the new qaghan amid much feasting and, as was usual among the Mongols, hard drinking.²⁷ For his part, Möngke was careful to reward his supporters, especially Qadan and Qara Hülegü, who had broken with their respective families when they embraced his cause. At the same time, the new emperor made it clear that he expected obedience from all, regardless of their rank or role in his enthronement.²⁸

Those who had boycotted the ceremony, having been presented with a *fait accompli* by the *quriltai*, were now forced to take some positive action on their own behalf, or simply acquiesce to Möngke's election. The descendants of Ögödei and their Chaghadaï supporters accordingly came to an agreement among themselves, deciding upon desperate measures. Naqu and Shiremün, under the guise of coming to congratulate Möngke, in other words, to acknowledge his right to the throne, plotted to assassinate the new qaghan and all of his backers. To this end, Shiremün and Naqu had weapons secreted in their wagons and in those of their troops, and then approached the imperial encampment in an outwardly

27. See Rashîd/Karīmî, vol. 1, pp. 524-25 and 584-86; Rashîd/Boyle, pp. 121 and 204-7; Juvaynî/Qazvînî, vol. 1, pp. 22-39; and Juvaynî/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 563-73.

28. Rashîd/Karīmî, vol. 1, pp. 594-95; Rashîd/Boyle, p. 217; Juvaynî/Qazvînî, vol. 3, pp. 69-71; Juvaynî/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 594-95; and YS, chap. 124, p. 1351.

friendly manner. Unfortunately for the conspirators, before they reached their destination a supporter of Möngke discovered their true intentions by chance. While out searching for a lost camel, *Kesege (K'o-hsieh-chieh),²⁹ a falconer (*qushchi*) in Möngke's guard, came across one of Shiremün's wagons that had broken down. By examining the wagon and skillfully questioning the driver, the falconer learned the real purpose of Shiremün's and Naqu's visit, and he hurried back to warn his sovereign of the plot against him. Although not taken seriously at first, *Kesege finally convinced Möngke and his senior officials of the impending danger. The emperor then ordered the guard around the *ordo* reinforced and dispatched troops under the command of Möge and his chief judge, Menggeser, to meet Shiremün, Naqu, and their followers. The conspirators, unaware that their plans had been exposed, were surprised by Möngke's troops and quickly taken into custody. Thus, through a bizarre but unquestionably historical series of events, the last serious opposition to the enthronement of Tolui's eldest son was successfully turned aside.³⁰

When the new emperor took office in 1251 he was forty-two years old. Like most Mongol princes of his day, he had no extensive administrative training or experience, except that obtained on campaign. Möngke, or Hsien-tsung, was born January 10, 1209, the first son of Sorqaghtani Beki, Tolui's senior wife. As a child he was a particular favorite of Ögödei, whose second wife, Ang-hui (*Angqui) played a prominent

29. *Kesege, the Mongolian word for "warner," is obviously not his original name, but an honorific bestowed upon him after he "warned" Möngke. On the form of this name, see Francis W. Cleaves, "Aqa Minu," *HJAS* 24 (1962-63): 73, n. 65.

30. Accounts of *Kesege's adventures, which agree in all essentials, can be found in three contemporary and uncontested independent sources: Juvayni/Qazvini, vol. 3, pp. 19-46, and Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 574-79; Jüzjāni/Lees, pp. 411-12, and Jüzjāni/Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 1182-86; and *Mongol Mission*, pp. 147-48, in the travels of Rubruck. Moreover, the *YS*, chap. 3, p. 15, and chap. 124, p. 1351, the biography of Menggeser, confirms various points, although it does not provide a full account of these events. See also Cleaves, "Aqa Minu," pp. 72-74, for translated extracts from Menggeser's biography relating to the discovery and suppression of the princes' plot.

role in his upbringing. When Möngke reached maturity, Ögödei selected his senior wife.³¹ Möngke's initial military experience also was gained under the tutelage of Ögödei, whom he accompanied on the final campaign against the Chin. Because of their close relationship, Möngke, although a much younger man, had considerable influence upon Ögödei. It was he who finally dissuaded Ögödei from personally participating in the planned conquest of the Rus principalities and the Qipchaq steppe by urging him to remain in Mongolia, where he would be more comfortable and where he was better placed to watch over the interests of the empire as a whole.

When the proposed expedition was launched in 1236, Möngke and his half brother Böchek took part as representatives of the house of Tolui. In the course of this operation, which was designed primarily to carve out a territory for the family of Jochi, Möngke distinguished himself on several occasions. At the outset, in the fall of 1236, he successfully tracked down and captured the eastern Qipchaq leader, Bachman (Pach'ih-man), who had eluded the Mongol armies for some time.³² He then took part in the assault on Râzan (Yeh-lieh-tsan), which fell in December of 1237.³³ During the next two years he campaigned in the northern Caucasus and was instrumental in forcing the capitulation of the Alan capital, *Magas.³⁴ In the fall of 1239, Möngke rejoined the campaign in Rus, where he helped direct the attack on Kiev.³⁵

31. See HYS, chap. 104, 82 and 102.

32. See Thomas T. Allsen, "Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217-1237," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 3 (1983): 18-20. The Qipchaqs were a loosely organized confederation of Turkic-speaking nomads who occupied the steppe regions between western Siberia and the frontiers of Danubian Europe.

33. The Chinese transcription reflects the Mongolian pronunciation. Mongols always place a vowel before foreign words beginning in "r." For example, the Mongolian word for "Rus" is "Oros," which is transcribed into Chinese as Wo-lu-su.

34. L. I. Lavrov, "Nashestvie mongolov na Severnyi Kavkaz," *Istoriia SSSR*: 5 (1965), 98-99. The Alans, an Iranian-speaking people, inhabited the central part of the Caucasian Range. Their present-day descendants, the Ossetians, still reside in the same region.

35. According to the west-Rus chronicles, George A. Perfecky, trans., *The Hypatian Codex, II: The Galician and Volynian Chronicles* (Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies,

When Güyüg left the campaign in 1241 to return to Mongolia, Möngke was detailed to accompany him in order to look after the interests of his family in the event of a change in the Mongol leadership. When Güyüg came to power, Möngke and his family, although not enthusiastic supporters of the new qaghan, accepted the decision without demur and again made a point of loyally obeying all orders emanating from the throne. While maintaining a correct posture toward Güyüg, Möngke, on the advice of his mother, Sorqaghtani Beki, was careful to remain on intimate terms with Batu, the reigning grand qan's arch enemy. Möngke continually made inquiries concerning Batu's failing health and visited him whenever possible. When Batu summoned the *quriltai* at Ālā Qamāq following the death of Güyüg, it was Möngke, characteristically, who was the first to answer the call.³⁶

As a personality, Möngke stands in sharp contrast to his predecessor. Whereas Güyüg was profligate to an extreme, Möngke was very frugal, with a great distaste for waste and excess. The only known extravagance that can be laid at his door is a great fountain that brought forth four different alcoholic beverages, which Möngke had had built at Qara Qorum by the Parisian artisan Guillaume Boucher.³⁷ In general, Möngke emerges from the sources as a dour, severe individual, intent upon the business at hand, finding no detail too insignificant for his attention. He is always pictured as being hard at work on whatever task lay before him, be it hunting, administering, campaigning, or drinking. In his relations with subordinates, Möngke was demanding, quick to criticize, impatient with failure, and grudging with praise. According to the *Yüan shih*, Möngke once issued a decree to his officials

vol. 16, pt. 2; Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1973), p. 47. Mengü (Möngke) appeared before Kiev in 1237. This, however, is a mistake for 1239. See Martin Dimnik, *Mikhail, Prince of Chernigov and Grand Prince of Kiev, 1224-1246* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1981), pp. 86-87 and n. 23.

36. Rashid/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 562, and Rashid/Boyle, p. 170.

37. See Leonardo Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher, a French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (New York: Greenwood, 1969), pp. 45-106.

stating: "Supposing you were to obtain an edict [containing] my praise. You would then become ambitious and disobedient. If you are ambitious and disobedient, how could disaster not follow you?"³⁸

However unappealing he may appear as an individual, he was undeniably a talented man who proved to be a most able ruler. His critical eye, drive, discipline, and attention to detail made him a skilled administrator despite his limited experience. Although Rashīd al-Dīn's claim that Möngke solved some of the problems of Euclid³⁹ can be dismissed, it is evident that he was both intelligent and perceptive, and, though a traditionalist at heart, with an abiding attachment to old Mongol customs and ways, he was nonetheless a flexible and sensible leader. When policies of his own making were found to be deficient, he did not hesitate to adjust them, particularly on the advice of officials who actually had tried to carry them out, only to find them wanting in some respect.

As I shall attempt to show in subsequent chapters, the administration that ruled the empire under Möngke, was, like the emperor himself, hard-working, efficient, and successful.

Purge of the Opposition

Once in power, the new qaghan's first order of business was to dispose of the opposition. Initially, the judicial inquiries (*jarghu*), which had been instituted by imperial command, focused on those directly involved in the assassination plot. But as others were implicated, the scope of the investigations quickly widened. To ensure that none of the accused princes' accomplices should escape punishment, the troops of Batu and Möngke, organized into huge search parties, were sent to various locations in Mongolia, Jungaria, and central Asia with

38. YS, chap. 3, p. 19

39. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 718

orders to track down and arrest all suspected conspirators.⁴⁰ In the end, everyone thought to have opposed the enthronement of Möngke was brought to trial and thoroughly, often brutally, interrogated. Most were tried at the imperial camp, but others who had refused to answer the summons to court were dealt with by special "traveling" *jarghus* which were dispatched throughout the empire.

Möngke personally tried the princes accused of plotting his assassination. Shiremün and Naqu, who had been arrested in the vicinity of Möngke's *ordo*, were the first to be examined. A short while later Qoja, together with two of Chaghadai's grandsons, Büri and Yesün-to'a, was summoned to court by special messengers and ordered to stand trial. Despite the princes' initial professions of innocence, the inquiries, not unexpectedly, resulted in guilty verdicts. In the *Yüan shih's* account, the sentences meted out to the princes were not too severe, at least initially. Shiremün and Büri were exiled, and Qoja, Naqu, and Yesün-to'a were "confined to military camps," presumably a form of house arrest.⁴¹ The more detailed Persian sources state that Yesün-to'a was sent to the Golden Horde, Naqu to China, and Qoja to the Selenge River in Mongolia. According to these same sources, which are confirmed by Rubruck, Shiremün and Büri were in fact executed after a brief period of exile. Shiremün, sent to China, was put to death on orders from Qubilai, and Büri, against whom Batu had a long-standing personal grudge, was executed in the Golden Horde. Another Mongol prince, Yesü Möngke, was dismissed as head of the Chaghadai qanate and subsequently killed by command of Möngke. The sources do not make clear if he was tried in person or in *absentia*.⁴²

40. Rashid/Karimi, vol. 1, pp. 592-93; Rashid/Boyle, pp. 213-14; Juvayni/Qazvini, vol. 3, pp. 51-54; and Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 585.

41. *YS*, chap. 3, p. 16.

42. Rashid/Alizade, vol. 2, pp. 16-17; Rashid/Karimi, vol. 2, pp. 535-36; Juvayni/Qazvini, vol. 3, pp. 50-58 and 64-65; Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 583-88 and 591-92; and *Mongol Mission*, p. 135.

Other members of the imperial family, including sons-in-law and the wives and mothers of the convicted princes, were also tried and executed.⁴³ Most prominent among the latter category was Oghul Qaimish. After at first refusing to answer Möngke's summons, Oghul Qaimish finally came to court and was immediately sent to Sorqaghtani's *ordo* for trial. Together with Shiremün's mother, Qadaqach, she was subjected to great humiliation and abuse, and closely questioned about her part in the conspiracy. Both were put to death, or, according to the *Yüan shih*, allowed to commit suicide, on the ground that they had endeavored to use black magic against Möngke.⁴⁴

While the emperor was proceeding against the princes of the blood, their underlings were brought before another tribunal, headed by Menggeser, the chief judge (*yeke jarghuchi*) of the empire. After several days of "extremely subtle" questioning, as Rashīd al-Dīn expresses it, the officials and military officers confessed to their complicity in the plot and, in most instances, received the death penalty. Qadaq and Chinqai, senior members of both Ögödei's and Güyüg's administrations, were among the victims. The only senior official to escape with his life was Bala, the representative of Oghul Qaimish, who had argued Shiremün's cause at the *Ālā Qamāq quriltai*. In lieu of the death penalty, he was sent on a dangerous mission to Egypt.⁴⁵

In addition to the trials convened in Mongolia, special tribunals were sent to China and central Asia to ferret out dissidents in the army and in the administrative apparatus.⁴⁶ Operating as far afield as Iraq, these tribunals purged all of-

43. Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, p. 227.

44. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 219, and vol. 3, pp. 58-59; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 265, and vol. 2, p. 588.

45. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 589-90; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 211-13; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 38-39, and vol. 3, pp. 47-54; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 53, and vol. 2, pp. 580-85.

46. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 593-94; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 216; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 62; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 590.

ficials thought to be hostile to the new regime and replaced them with Möngke's selections. In Harāt, for example, a certain Sharāf al-Dīn, a secretary (*bitigchi*)⁴⁷ in the employ of the Chaghadaids, was arrested, tried, and executed by Möngke's resident (*darughachi*) at the court of the Kart dynasty, a local ruling house in northern Afghanistan.⁴⁸

The purge also was extended to various local dynasts who were clients of the Mongols. The ruler of the Uighurs and the shāh of the Qara Khitai dynasty of Kirmān both died at the hands of the executioner. This phase of the purge, however, will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.

The total number of those who fell victim to the purge is not known, but the sources leave the impression that it was quite large. Rubruck, for instance, reports that in addition to Shiremūn and his immediate confederates, three hundred "Tartar (that is, Mongol) nobles" perished at Möngke's orders.⁴⁹ Rubruck further reports that Möngke told him that Oghul Qaimish, because of her folly, "had destroyed her *whole family*."⁵⁰ Similarly, Jūzjānī claims that Möngke "carried out his measures so that not a trace of the tribe of Chaghadaï remained upon the face of the earth, with the exception of one or two of Chaghadaï's sons."⁵¹ The Armenian historian Kirakos of Ganjak also affirms that the line of Chaghadaï very nearly was extinguished.⁵² Although these sources may overstate the case to some degree, there is no doubt that the ranks of the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids were thinned substantially.

As for officials and military commanders, Rashīd al-Dīn informs us that seventy-seven were executed in Mongolia following Menggeser's investigations.⁵³ Many must have died as

47. This is the Turkic form; *bichēchi* is the Mongolian.

48. Sayf/Siddiqī, pp. 172-81.

49. *Mongol Mission*, p. 149.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 203. My italics.

51. Raverty's translation, Jūzjānī/Raverty, vol. 2, p. 1186. See also Jūzjānī/Lees, p. 412.

52. Kirakos, p. 236.

53. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 591, and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 212.

a result of trials held elsewhere in the empire, and still others were merely banished or discharged from office. In any event, only a few of Möngke's adversaries survived the massive purge unscathed.

Although the trials were an effective means of eliminating the political opposition, the same end could have been accomplished by more direct means. Suspected conspirators could have been exiled or summarily executed without benefit of trial. But these judicial inquiries were not merely a way of isolating or liquidating politically unreliable elements. In my opinion, they were designed primarily as a forum from which the legitimacy of the new regime could be affirmed and certified. These trials were in fact one of the cornerstones of the effort to justify Möngke's accession to power.

The Problem of Legitimation

Mongol custom provided that emperors were to be selected by the "elder and younger brothers" (*aqa* and *ini*)—the senior representatives of the Chinggisid lines—acting in concert.⁵⁴ No formal vote was taken; the matter was discussed and debated until a consensus was reached. Once this occurred, the alternate candidates and their supporters were expected to join the majority in congratulating, and thereby acknowledging, the new qaghan as the legitimate ruler of the empire.

For purposes of political legitimation, it was therefore important to demonstrate that the adherents of Möngke had followed the prescribed methods in selecting him as the new qaghan, and that consequently his accession was unquestionably legal and proper. To do this, his backers needed to show that his candidacy enjoyed broad-based support; they had to

54. For an enlightening discussion of the structure and dynamics of the *quriltai*, see Elizabeth Endicott-West, "Aspects of Decision-Making and Personnel Management in the Early Yüan," unpublished paper presented to the Joint American-German Conference on the "Evolution of Imperial Governance in China, 10th-14th Centuries," Schloss Reichartshausen, Bavaria, August 1982.

show that in addition to the Jöchids and Toluids, who supported him to a man, many Chaghadaids and Ögödeids also had agreed, either in person or through representatives, to his enthronement. Conversely, it was equally important to establish that the opposition had consciously violated the Mongol law code (*jasagh*) by repudiating the will, or the consensus, of the *quriltai*s that had elected and enthroned Möngke, and that they had then compounded their crime by attempting to assassinate their rightful sovereign. In this instance, Möngke's supporters could point out that Naqu and Qoja reneged on their freely given agreements to support the choice of the Ālā Qamāq *quriltai* (Möngke) and that Shiremün, who had made no such agreement, had nevertheless refused to acknowledge the new qaghan once the consensus had been reached and the decision announced. In the view of Möngke and his backers, such conduct by itself was a serious breach of the *jasagh*, to say nothing of the attempted assassination.

The trials were thus a dramatic way of making the point that Möngke was indeed the legitimate ruler of the empire. To make this point absolutely clear, it was desirable that the accused confess to their wickedness and openly acknowledge Möngke's right to the throne. To encourage such behavior, those who were quick to make the desired admissions, for example, Qoja, fared much better than did their associates who persisted in "error."

Because the trials were such a critical part of the legitimization efforts, the hearings were conducted with all due regard for form. All those charged with crimes were tried and sentenced by their peers. The princes were dealt with by Möngke, and the officers in their employ stood before Menggeser, the chief judiciary of the empire. Even Oghul Qaimish and Shiremün's mother faced their ordeal in the presence of a peer, Sorqagh-tani Beki. In a speech to Menggeser's children, the emperor himself vigorously defended the proceedings and penalties as just, not harsh or inequitable. Möngke repeatedly insisted

that both he and Menggeser had "applied the law without partiality."⁵⁵ It was Möngke's position that the trials had arrived at the truth judiciously and fairly, and that this truth fully confirmed his right to rule.

In addition to their contention that the new qaghan had been selected "constitutionally," the Toluids advanced other arguments to strengthen Möngke's claim to the throne. Specifically, they laid particular stress on their family's reverence for and fidelity to national traditions, a propaganda line that is neatly summed up in Möngke's proud declaration: "I follow the laws of my ancestors; I do not imitate other countries' ways."⁵⁶ The historian Juvaynī, a partisan of the Toluid cause, develops this theme further, insisting repeatedly that Sorqaghtani and her sons had no equals in their zealous regard for the letter and spirit of the *jasagh*. He approvingly relates that during Töregene's regency and Güyüg's reign, when, in the absence of firm central authority, everyone else was issuing self-serving *jarlighs* that contravened the *jasagh*, only "[Sorqaghtani] Beki and her sons held their heads high, for no one could produce any document of theirs that was contrary to the *jasagh*."⁵⁷ Moreover, many officials who had exceeded their authority were exposed and severely punished on Sorqaghtani's initiative. Such steadfast defense of the *jasagh* even brought praise from Güyüg, who Juvaynī claims frequently held up Sorqaghtani and her sons as examples worthy of emulation.⁵⁸ The Toluids also advanced the claim that they had always faithfully abided by the decisions of the great *quriltais*, whereas others had not. Tolui, for example, accepted the decision of the *quriltai* that elected Ögödei without rancor.

55. YS, chap. 124, pp. 1351-52.

56. YS, chap. 3, p. 19. See also the comments of Abramowski, "Annalen des Möngke," p. 8.

57. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 155. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 211.

58. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 6-7; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 551-52.

And Möngke had done the same when Güyüg was chosen. They could favorably contrast their conduct with that of the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids, who had repudiated the will of the *aqā* and *ini* to raise Möngke to the throne.⁵⁹

Naturally, these pious claims of strict adherence to the *ja-sagh*, repeated *ad nauseam* by Juvaynī,⁶⁰ are not to be taken at face value, but at the same time, it must also be remembered that as a matter of political calculation the Toluids had long been cultivating just such an image and that this posturing provided some measure of credibility to their propagandistic assertions of unswerving loyalty to the Chinggisid legacy.

To emphasize further their family's fitness for, and right to, the office of qaghan, the Toluids, once in power, made every effort, after Tolui's death, to enhance his stature. They advertised the fact that he had served as regent of the empire in 1227–29 and that he had acquitted himself well by preserving good order in the realm during the interregnum.⁶¹ Moreover, Tolui's somewhat questionable claim to the throne as the youngest son of Chinggis Qan's senior wife was widely publicized by the family. In Juvaynī's account of the *quriltai* of 1228, Ögödei is made to say that "in accordance with Mongol custom, it is the youngest son from the eldest *ordo* (the camp of the senior wife) that is the heir of his father, and Ulugh Noyan (one of Tolui's posthumous titles) is the youngest son of the eldest *ordo* and was ever in attendance on Chinggis Qan day and night, morning and evening, and has seen, heard, and learned all his *jasaghs* and customs."⁶² Hence, even according

59. For these and other violations of the *jasagh* laid at the door of the Ögödeids, see Rashīd/Ahẓade, vol. 2, p. 8; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 564 and 567–68; and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 19, 176, and 180–81.

60. See the comments of David Ayalon, "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan: A Reexamination, part B," *Studia Islamica* 33 (1971): 151–52.

61. YS, chap. 115, p. 1124.

62. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 186; and Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 146.

to the rival line, Tolui, and therefore his descendants, had a legitimate claim on the throne.⁶³

To honor his father's service to the empire, Möngke bestowed upon him the posthumous title of the Brave, Martial Emperor (*Ying-wu huang-ti*) and the temple name of Sagacious Ancestor (Jui-tsung). That is to say, Tolui was retroactively made an emperor, a qaghan.⁶⁴ Equally important, when Möngke established official ceremonies to venerate Chinggis Qan at Jih-yüeh Mountain,⁶⁵ Tolui's ancestral tablet was placed next to that of the first emperor. Their enshrinement in the ancestral temple occurred on September 13, 1252, and was accompanied by solemn ceremonies in their honor. The ceremonies were repeated in subsequent years and continued after Möngke's death by the founder of the Yüan dynasty, Qubilai.⁶⁶ During the latter's reign, Sorqaghtani's tablet was placed with that of Tolui.⁶⁷ The efforts of Möngke and his successors to elevate Tolui and to associate him in the minds of the Mongol people with Chinggis Qan was obviously an attempt to appropriate for their own use some of the charisma attached to the name of the founder of the empire. That this attempt was to some degree successful is evidenced by the fact that Tolui's name, but not those of his brothers, was still invoked after his father's in the cults devoted to the memory of Chinggis Qan which flourished among the Mongols as late as the twentieth century.⁶⁸

63. This argument, however, cut in two directions. Although it strengthened Tolui's claims to the throne, it undercut Möngke's, for the latter was not the youngest son, but the eldest.

64. YS, chap. 115, p. 1125.

65. This place is unidentified, but was probably situated in the vicinity of the Onan-Kerülen region.

66. YS, chap. 3, p. 16, chap. 67, pp. 631-32, chap. 68, pp. 642-43, chap. 72, p. 673, and chap. 78, p. 732. See also YCMCSL, chap. 12, 11b; MWESC, chap. 6, 6b; and Paul Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult am Hofe der Grosskhane in China," *Mongolian Studies*, ed. Louis Ligeti (Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1970), pp. 417-44.

67. YS, chap. 116, p. 1181. In 1265 she was given the posthumous title of Sedate and Holy Empress (*Chuang-sheng huang-hou*).

68. See T. Z. Zamiatano, "Kult Chingis Khana v Orduse," *GAJ* 6 (1961): 194.

Despite the Toluids' well-orchestrated efforts, the Ögödeids could still, and in fact did, claim that regardless of Möngke's fitness for office and the "constitutionality" of the selection process, his enthronement was unwarranted in any event, inasmuch as Chinggis Qan had intended by the choice of his third son as successor to reserve the office of grand qan for the family of Ögödei.⁶⁹ As this assertion, if unchallenged, would completely undercut the Toluids' claims on the throne, plausible counter arguments were necessary. One ploy was to spread the story that Ögödei not only had seen in Tolui the makings of an emperor, but had made the same observation with regard to Möngke.⁷⁰ If Ögödei had uttered such statements, he clearly did not believe that the office belonged exclusively to his own family. Why then should his descendants be surprised at Möngke's election and cast doubts on its propriety? Obviously their case against Möngke was baseless and self-serving.

Although the Toluids could attribute these statements to the long-dead Ögödei, they were still merely claims that were also obviously self-serving and not amenable to proof or disproof with absolute certainty. Moreover, the heart of the issue was not Ögödei's attitude, but Chinggis Qan's intentions when naming his third son as heir. Did he or did he not intend to entrust the office of qaghan to the Ögödeids on a permanent basis? The answer of the Toluids, of course, was that Chinggis Qan never had any intention of reserving the qaghanate for any particular branch of his descendants. To validate their contention in the eyes of the Mongol people, they could direct attention to a statement of Chinggis Qan that unequivocally confirmed their position in the succession controversy. To the medieval Mongols, the most authoritative account of Chinggis Qan's life and record of his statements was the *Chinggis Qaghan-u huj'a'ur*, known in English as *The Secret History of the*

69. Juvayni/Qazvinī, vol. 3, pp. 21–22; and Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 562.

70. YS, chap. 124, p. 1351.

Mongols (SH). This work, an amalgam of stories, myths, and historical fact, was compiled by an unknown hand (or hands) in the thirteenth century. The first section (paragraphs 1-268), devoted to the origins of the Mongols and the rise of Chinggis Qan, was almost certainly compiled in 1228, at the *quriltai* that elected Ögödei.⁷¹ It is in this first section that the Toluids found, or what is more likely, fabricated, a statement attributed to Chinggis Qan, that clearly indicated that the family of Ögödei was not to be considered as permanent custodians of the office of qaghan.

In paragraph 255, the founder of the empire states that if Ögödei's offspring prove unworthy, some capable descendant of another line must be considered for the throne.⁷² This statement, which so precisely anticipated subsequent historical events and so conveniently served the needs of the Toluids, has been the focal point of scholarly debate on the textual history of the SH. The French historian René Grousset, who first drew attention to the significance of this passage with respect to the political controversy surrounding the enthronement of Möngke, took it as evidence that the whole of the SH was prepared in 1252, a year after Möngke's enthronement, as a kind of political pamphlet designed to justify the change in lines.⁷³ Others, however, still maintain that the first section of the SH was completed in 1228, and view Chinggis Qan's statement as an interpolation introduced into the text at a later date. In either case, of course, there is a strong presumption that the Toluids fabricated the statement in question to meet a pressing political need.

71. de Rachewiltz, "Dating of the *Secret History*," pp. 185-205. The colophon dates the completion of the work according to the twelve-year animal cycle. The year indicated, that of the Rat, fell in 1228, 1240, 1252, 1264, and so on. It is de Rachewiltz's opinion that the date in the colophon refers to the completion of the first section (pars. 1-268), and that the second section (pars. 269-81) was written later by a different hand.

72. For a translation, see SH, pp. 194-97.

73. René Grousset, *L'Empire Mongol (1^{re} phase)* (Histoire du Monde, vol. 3 (3), Paris: de Boccard, 1941), pp. 230 and 303.

This latter presumption is strengthened by a further piece of textual evidence. The *SH* is available in two versions.⁷⁴ One is a transcription in Chinese characters of the original Mongol text, and contains both the first section on Chinggis Qan and the second section (paragraphs 269–81) dealing with the events of Ögödei's reign. The other version, which is in the Uighur script, was copied into a later Mongol chronicle, the *Altan Tobchi*, a work compiled in the seventeenth century by Blo-bzan bstan-'jin. The latter version includes only the first section (paragraphs 1–268) and makes no mention of Ögödei's reign. Although the texts of both versions are quite similar and the sequence of paragraphs the same in most other respects, the *SH* text incorporated into the *Altan Tobchi* lacks not only the specific statement of Chinggis Qan favorable to the Toluids' position on succession, but all other remarks touching on this issue. In fact, paragraph 255 is missing in its entirety, together with those portions of paragraph 254 that allude to the leadership potential of Chinggisid lines other than Ögödei's.⁷⁵ One of the two versions of the *SH* obviously has been tampered with, but which one? Although it is possible that the Ögödeids excised the damaging passages in order to picture Möngke and his supporters as usurpers, on the whole it seems far more likely that the Toluids manufactured paragraph 255 and parts of 254 as justification for their assumption of the throne.⁷⁶

But whether one sees the allusions to a possible change in the ruling line as an authentic expression of Chinggis Qan's own

74. An abbreviated Chinese translation of the *SH* is also extant.

75. See Louis Ligeti, ed., *Histoire secrète des Mongols: Texte en écriture ouigour incorporé dans la Chronique Altan Tobči* (Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae Collecta, vol. 6; Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974), p. 188. See also Ligeti's introductory remarks, pp. 5–10.

76. The textual history of the *SH* is complex and still subject to debate. There is a growing consensus among philologists and historians that pars. 1–268 should be dated 1228, but the question of the authenticity and origin of par. 255 and the associated parts of par. 254 is still unresolved. For additional comments, see G. Doerfer, "Zur Datierung der Geheimen Geschichte der Mongolen," *ZDMG* 113 (1963): 87–111; and Paul Ratchnevsky, "Šigi-qutuqu, ein mongolischer Gefolgsmann im 12.-13. Jahrhundert," *CAJ* 10 (1965): 87–110.

views, or as a politically motivated manipulation of the historical record, the effect is the same: the Toluids were provided the "evidence" they needed to counter the Ögödeid claim of an exclusive right to the throne.

Lastly, in their quest for legitimation, Möngke and his adherents willingly conformed to, and made extensive use of, the traditional nomadic conceptions of sovereignty. These political ideas, which can be traced back to the time of the Türk qaghanate, were in all likelihood transmitted to the Mongols by the Uighur Turks.⁷⁷ In the Mongol adaptation of this ideological system it was held that Eternal Heaven (*Möngke Tenggeri*), the sky god and chief deity of the steppe nomads, bestowed upon Chinggis Qan a mandate to bring the entire world under his sway. This grant of universal sovereignty gave the Mongols the right, or perhaps more accurately, placed upon them the obligation, to subjugate and chastise any nation or people refusing to join the Empire of the Great Mongols on a voluntary basis.⁷⁸ The power and protection of Eternal Heaven of course guaranteed the ultimate success of the venture and this in Mongol eyes accounted for the extraordinary good fortune—narrow escapes, last-minute warnings and advantageous changes of weather on the battlefield—that attended Chinggis Qan's rise to authority in the steppe. This special good fortune, moreover, identified the Mongol qaghan as a ruler endowed by heaven with universal sovereign power on earth.⁷⁹

Möngke, naturally, pictured himself as a worthy successor to the great Chinggis Qan, striving ceaselessly to transform the heavenly mandate into an earthly reality. The massive cam-

77. Peter B. Golden, "Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Chinggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982): 37-76.

78. E. Voegelin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to the European Powers," *Byzantion* 15 (1941), pp. 402-25, was the first to identify and analyze the Mongols' pretensions to universal sovereignty.

79. Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire," *PFEH* 7 (1973): 26-28.

paings of conquest launched during his reign certainly gave substance to this claim. The Toluids also bent every effort to paint Möngke as a ruler possessed of special good fortune. Two incidents in his life were emphasized in this regard. First, during his pursuit of Bachman in 1236, the Qipchaq leader and his followers took refuge on an island in the Volga estuary. Momentarily stymied, Möngke was pondering his next move when suddenly and miraculously the river water level dropped, allowing the Mongol cavalry to ford the stream and descend upon the unwary Bachman.⁸⁰ Möngke's narrow escape in the princes' plot was also cited as an indication of his luck. The conspiracy, it will be recalled, was discovered at the very last minute by pure chance. Clearly the circumstances of the case demonstrated in a most dramatic and convincing fashion that Eternal Heaven favored Möngke over his rivals. The fact that Möngke's good fortune was so widely advertised—by word of mouth,⁸¹ in Toluid-inspired historical sources, and on some of the emperor's coins⁸²—indicates the weight that he and his supporters attached to this matter in their search for legitimacy.

To summarize, the legitimacy of the new qaghan's enthronement hinged upon four interdependent arguments: First, Möngke had been elected by a consensus of the *aqqa* and *ini* in a properly constituted *quriltai*; secondly, because Möngke, as well as his family, had always conformed in word and deed to the customs and usages of Chinggis Qan, he was uniquely qualified for the office; thirdly, Chinggis Qan had never intended to limit the candidates for the throne to the family of

80. YS, chap. 3, p. 15, chap. 50, p. 409, and chap. 63, p. 600; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 9–11; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 553–54; Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 2, pp. 129–33; and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 57–58.

81. Rubruck, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 147–48, heard all the details of this affair during his stay in Mongolia.

82. Coins minted in Tbilisi in the mid-1250s contain the Persian inscription "By the power of God, by Good Fortune (*iqbāl*), Universal Sovereign (*l'ādshāhī-i Jahān*), Mūnkū Qān." See M. E. Drouin, "Notice sur les monnaies mongoles," *JA* 7 (1896): 650–56; and E. A. Pakhomov, *Monety Gruzii* (Tbilisi, 1970), pp. 133–34.

Ögödei—on the contrary, he had foreseen the possibility that a better qualified candidate from another line would be placed on the throne; and fourthly, that Möngke fitted the Chinggisid mold as a true universal sovereign, endowed with heaven's favor and protection.

Even though all of the Toluids' arguments in this regard were obviously tendentious, their campaign to legitimize Möngke's accession was both carefully thought out and vigorously implemented, and seems to have met the needs of the day.

3. The Politics of Centralization

Mongol Princes and the New Qaghan

At Chinggis Qan's death in 1227, the empire was formally partitioned among his eldest sons. Jochi received the Qipchaq steppe and the Rus principalities,¹ Chaghadai most of western Turkestan, Ögödei Jungaria, and the southern Altai, and the youngest son, Tolui, in conformity with Mongol customary law, inherited his father's original territory (*yurt*), the Mongolian homeland. Although the empire had been divided territorially, supreme political authority still was concentrated, in principle at least, in the hands of the qaghan, Ögödei.

The grand qan continued to enjoy an exclusive right to conduct relations with foreign states on behalf of the empire. No regional qan or military commander could initiate or maintain such relations without the knowledge and approval of the qaghan. As regards internal affairs, the qaghan's prerogatives were somewhat less extensive. Each of the regional qanates was governed through joint administrations that included representatives of the families of Chinggis Qan's four eldest sons.² In any given qanate, naturally, the influence of the

1 Jochi, who predeceased his father by several months, was given his territory before any of his brothers, but failed to conquer the designated lands before his death. Batu, Jochi's second son, succeeded him and was the actual founder of the Golden Horde.

2. To the best of my knowledge, Paul Buell, "Sino-Khitai Administration," p. 147, was the first to point out the collegial character of the regional administrations, which he calls "joint satellite administrations." See chap. 4 for further discussion.

family of the reigning regional qan was greater than that of the other qans. While sharing some of his authority with other princes, Ögödei still retained considerable power over such vital matters as the collection of taxes, investiture of dependent rulers, and the disposition of military forces.

His authority was derived, institutionally, from his right to name the senior officials of the joint administrations and many of the local officials as well. Of particular importance was the qaghan's right to appoint the Mongol residents, called *darughachi* or *basqaq*,³ who were stationed in all major population centers and at the courts of all local dynasts. These officials, who commanded wide administrative, police, and military powers, were key figures in the control and exploitation of the subject populations. So long as they were appointees of the central authorities, it proved difficult for the regional qans to institute significant administrative or financial measures without the emperor's knowledge, consent, and cooperation.

However, as the Mongol Empire continued to expand at a rapid pace, the regional qans increasingly began to assert their independence at the expense of the grand qan. There is, for example, no evidence that a joint administration was set up in Batu's territory (which was brought under Mongol control only at the very end of Ögödei's reign). This is perhaps one of the reasons why Güyüg decided to force a military showdown with Batu in 1248. Even in territories closer to the imperial capital, princely independence was clearly manifested. Chaghadaï succeeded in ridding himself of Maḥmūd Yalavach, Ögödei's chief minister in Turkestan, just before the emperor's death.⁴

3. This word and its alternate form, *darughha*, are derived from the Mongol stem *daru-*, "to press." The *darughha* or *darughachi* was, then, one who presses, i.e., one who presses the seal or acts on behalf of the qaghan. In the Persian and Russian sources the term *darughachi* is replaced by *shahnah* or *basqaq*. The latter is a Turkic word, derived, like its Mongol counterpart, from the stem *bas-*, "to press." See Doerfer, *TMEN*, vol. 1, pp. 319-23. See also István Váry, "The Origin of the Institution of *Basqaqs*," *AOASH* 32 (1978), pp. 201-6.

4. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 548-50, and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 154-56.

Because the deepening tension between the qaghan and the regional qans had made possible his own rise to power, Möngke was fully cognizant that these confrontations between the senior Chinggisid lines, if allowed to continue, might also spell disaster for his own regime. Such confrontations could bring about the complete collapse of his power or so limit his authority that the implementation of his policies would be rendered impossible. To prevent this, Möngke not only had to destroy those princes who had openly opposed his enthronement, but also had to ensure that his own backers accepted his authority without serious qualification, or at a minimum, voluntarily supported his programs. Having disposed of his enemies, Möngke now faced the equally important task of dealing with his friends.

Immediately after the *quriltai* of 1251, Möngke, according to Rashīd al-Dīn:

Put one of his brothers, Qubilai Qaghan, in charge of the countries of Khitāi (northern China), Māchīn (southern China), Qarājāng (Yünnan), Tangut, Tibet, Jurche, Solanga (northern Korea), Kūli (Kao-li, or Korea) and that part of Hindustan which is contiguous to Khitāi and Māchīn,⁵ and to Hülegü he assigned the countries of the west [such as] Iran, Syria, Egypt, Rum, and Armenia, so that each of them, with the armies that they would have, would be his right and left wings.⁶

In essence, Möngke, on his own initiative had created two new regional qanates, a measure that strengthened his hand vis-à-vis the imperial princes.

The immediate task of these two new qans being the extension of Mongol power in eastern and western Asia, Möngke was thus able to expand the population and resource base under direct Toluid control. At the same time, the new geopolitical alignment resulting from the formation of the addi-

5. YS, chap. 3, p. 15, and chap. 4, p. 19, also alludes to Qubilai's new assignments.

6. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 685.

tional qanates was to the emperor's advantage. The Chaghadaï qanate was now entirely surrounded by territories controlled by Möngke's brothers and supporters. By the creation of the *Īl-khān* dynasty, Möngke succeeded in projecting his power, in the person of Hülegü, all along the southern flank of the Golden Horde. Obviously, the success of this course of action would depend on the degree of control the grand qan exercised over the newly formed qanates. The available evidence does, in fact, show that Möngke, throughout his reign, successfully maintained his authority within the two qanates.

Hülegü's subordination to the qaghan was proclaimed conspicuously in his title, "*il-qan*," a term that also was used to designate the dynasty he founded. *Il-qan*, or in its Persian form, *īl-khān*, meant literally "subservient qan," that is, subservient to the grand qan. The term *il*, also written *el*, is a Turkic word that originally signified "tribe," "people," or "administration." By the Mongol period, however, the word had acquired the meaning of "submissive," "subservient," or "subordinate," and is frequently used in this sense in Persian and Mongol sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.⁷ Hülegü and his successors, therefore, formally and publicly acknowledged their subordinate status in both their personal and dynastic titles.⁸

As a subservient qan, Hülegü did not have the same stature as did the Chinggisids, who had received their allotted territories and titles through Chinggis Qan's original dispensation. Al-ʿUmarī, a fourteenth-century Mamlūk historian, remarks that after Möngke died and the *Īl-khāns* and the Golden Horde became embroiled in a series of military confrontations, the Jochids took great pleasure in deriding Hülegü as "merely

7. DTS, pp. 168-69 and 207. In Persian sources, *il*, with an appropriate Persian auxiliary verb, is repeatedly used to denote the act of submitting.

8. In Arghun's reign (1284-91) the term *il-qan* was still employed in diplomatic documents issued by the court. See Louis Ligeti, *Monuments préclassiques, XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*, vol. 1 (*Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae*; Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972), pp. 245 and 248.

the representative (*mandūh*) of his brother," that is, Möngke.⁹ Elsewhere in the same source, it is stated that Hülegü reigned "not as an independent ruler, but only as a representative (*nā'ib*) of his brother, Möngke qaghan."¹⁰

In view of Hülegü's acknowledged subordination to the grand qan, it is significant that in the passage from Rashīd al-Dīn quoted above, Qubilai and Hülegü are bracketed together as Möngke's left and right wings, respectively.¹¹ The pairing of the two brothers in this fashion indicates, in my opinion, that both were considered *il-qans*. Although I have found no source that uses this title with reference to Qubilai, there is other evidence that Möngke in practice treated both as subservient qans.

The similarity of their status is signalled in numerous ways. Although both were allowed to have advisers of their own choosing—primarily Chinese scholars in the case of Qubilai and Muslim learned men in the case of Hülegü¹²—all major administrative posts were filled by Möngke's appointees.¹³ In the military sphere as well, Möngke selected the senior commanders. In western Asia, Baiju, Ked Buqa, and Sali Noyan, who led the main Mongol contingents against the Assassins, Baghdad, and Egypt, were all named by the grand qan.¹⁴ Likewise, in China, Uriyangqadai, the commander-in-chief (*maqaddam-i lashkar*) of the Yünnan campaign, together with

9 al-Umarī/Lech, p. 91, German translation, and pp. 1-2, Arabic text.

10. Ibid., p. 103, German translation, and p. 19, Arabic text.

11. Although the passage in question indicates that Qubilai is the right wing and Hülegü the left, Rashīd al-Dīn in fact reverses the proper order. In the Mongols' system of orientation, west is right and east left; therefore Qubilai is properly Möngke's left wing and Hülegü his right.

12. Rashīd al-Dīn, Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 706, points out that even some of Hülegü's personal advisers were assigned by Möngke.

13. The Persian chronicler Jūzjānī, Jūzjānī/Lees, p. 271, and Jūzjānī/Raverty, vol. 2, p. 784, indicates that the *shahnah* (*darughachi*) of Sind was an appointee of Hülegü. This is one of the few instances in which a *darughachi* was appointed by someone other than Möngke. Of course, Jūzjānī, an outsider, might have been mistaken in attributing this appointment to Hülegü, or failed to mention that the assignment had the full approval of the qaghan.

14. Rashīd/Alhazade, vol. 1, pp. 188-89; and YS, chap. 3, p. 16.

various local commanders, was under the control of the central authorities.¹⁵

In addition to the formal institutional arrangements, Möngke's day-to-day relations with his two brothers also demonstrate that his authority, though occasionally tested, was vigorously enforced. Persian, Chinese, and Armenian sources all report that when Hülegü captured Baghdad he immediately took steps to ensure that the grand qan should receive his rightful share of the fabulous booty. At the same time, he submitted detailed reports to the qaghan on the progress of the campaign to date and on his plans for future operations.¹⁶ Furthermore, the administrative personnel in Iran and the Transcaucasus were under the direct supervision of the emperor and his court. When rumors of irregularities in the revenue system spread, Möngke, without consulting Hülegü, recalled certain senior officials to Qara Qorum, where they were required to defend and document their actions.

Qubilai, harboring imperial ambitions of his own, exhibited a more independent turn of mind, and from time to time he and his brother clashed sharply over personnel and policy matters in northern China.¹⁷ In 1251, for example, Qubilai lodged complaints against Maḥmūd Yalavach, the newly appointed head of the regional secretariat of northern China.¹⁸ The following year a bitter quarrel erupted between Qubilai and Bujir, another of Möngke's senior officials in the north.¹⁹ In both cases, however, the emperor ignored the complaints and continued the two in office.

15. Rashīd/Ahizade, vol. 1, pp. 383-84; and YS, chap. 3, p. 15, and chap. 121, p. 1310.

16. Jüzjāni/Lees, p. 431; Jüzjāni/Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 1255-57; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 716-17; *Nation of Archers*, p. 337; and YS, chap. 3, p. 18. For an account of one of the embassies that passed between Möngke and Hülegü, see Bretschneider, vol. 1, pp. 109-56.

17. Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Hu-pi-lieh yü Meng-ku Han chih-li Han-ti ti ch'i-chien," *Wen-shih-che hsüeh-pao* 16 (1967): 223-36, provides a general discussion of these disputes. Yao is particularly informative on the role played by Qubilai's Chinese advisers in the various confrontations.

18. Hsiao Ch'í-ch'ing, *Hsi-yü-jen yü Yüan-ch'u cheng-chih* (Taipei, 1966), p. 48.

19. YS, chap. 4, p. 19.

Much more serious was Möngke's investigation of the administration of Qubilai's personal appanage (*fen-ti*), Ching-chao, located in Shensi and western Honan. The inquiry, initiated ostensibly by charges of fiscal corruption, but in reality instituted as a means of curbing Qubilai's ongoing quest for autonomy, was launched without warning in 1257. Conducted with extreme ruthlessness by 'Alamdār,²⁰ a member of Möngke's entourage, the investigation resulted in the dismissal of Qubilai's chief pacification commissioner (*hsüan-fu-shih*) in Shensi and the execution of the latter's underlings.²¹ As another punitive measure, extraordinary taxes—ten thousand rolls of cloth, three thousand piculs of rice, and three thousand rolls of silk—were levied against Ching-chao. Shang T'ing, an official of Qubilai's, was able to negotiate a less burdensome method of transporting the grain than the one originally stipulated by the central authorities, but Ching-chao paid in full as ordered.²² In the face of these unexpected actions, Qubilai had no choice but to seek out his brother and humbly beg his forbearance.²³ Thus, although Qubilai was willing to challenge imperial authority on occasion, in each instance it was the qaghan's will that prevailed.

From these examples it is apparent that both in theory and in practice the new regional qans created by Möngke to increase his leverage in his dealings with the Chaghadaids and Jochids were firmly under the control of the grand qan and his agents.

Möngke's other brothers were given suitable military commands and territories sufficiently large to support them in a manner appropriate to their rank. Arigh Böke, Tolui's sixth son, for instance, inherited the *ordo* of his mother, Sorqaghtani

20. Despite his name, which is the Persian *'alam-dār*, "standard bearer," he appears to have been a Mongol.

21. This incident is mentioned frequently in the Chinese sources. See YS, chap. 3, p. 17, chap. 126, p. 1365, chap. 155, p. 1662, and chap. 163, p. 1742; and YCMCSL, pp. 93–94, 100, and 128. For a summary of this episode, see Otto Franke, *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. 4. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1948), p. 321.

22. YCMCSL, p. 181.

23. Hok-lam Chan, "Yao Shu, 1201–1278," *PFEH* 22 (1980): 26–28, discusses events leading to Qubilai's capitulation.

Beki (d. 1252), and remained in Mongolia with the emperor. When Möngke left Mongolia in 1257 to campaign in southwestern China, Arigh Böke stayed behind in charge of Qara Qorum.²⁴

To his supporters among the Chaghadaids and Ögödeids, Möngke was especially generous. Qara Hülegü, Chaghadai's designated successor, had been deposed by Güyüg in 1246 after a four-year reign, and Yesü Möngke, Chaghadai's fourth son, had been elevated to the throne in his stead. As a victim of the Ögödeids, Qara Hülegü was, understandably, one of the early supporters of Möngke. Following his enthronement, Möngke restored Qara Hülegü to the rulership of the Chaghadai qanate and sent him to Yesü Möngke's *ordo* with orders to execute the latter. On his way to carry out this commission Qara Hülegü unexpectedly died.²⁵ The grand qan then named the deceased ruler's young son, Mubārak Shāh, as successor, and appointed *Orghana,²⁶ Qara Hülegü's widow, as regent until the heir apparent reached his majority.

*Orghana, on Möngke's instructions, completed her late husband's mission, putting Yesü Möngke to death. She established her main *ordo* in the vicinity of Almaliq, a city on the Ili River near Lake Balkash,²⁷ and ruled in the name of her

24. Bar Hebraeus, vol. 1, p. 439; *Mongol Mission*, p. 185; and YCMCSL, p. 101. When Möngke died in 1259, Arigh Böke challenged Qubilai for the throne, claiming that he had been designated as Möngke's successor. al-'Umarī accepts Arigh Böke's claim as Möngke's designated heir, listing him as the fifth grand qan (1259-64) and Qubilai, the final victor in the struggle for the throne, as the sixth. al-'Umarī/Lech, p. 104, German translation, and p. 21, Arabic text.

25. YS, chap. 3, p. 16, reports the death of the imperial prince Qara (Ho-la), and a few lines later records the demise of the imperial prince Hülegü (Hsü-lich). No day or month is given, but as the year, 1252, corresponds with the Persian reports of Qara Hülegü's death, there is little doubt that these two reports refer, in actuality, to a single event. Such confusion on the part of authors of the *Yuan shih* concerning the names and relationships of Mongol princes and officials is not unusual.

26. The form of her name is uncertain. I have used the tentative reconstruction suggested by Paul Pelliot in his *Recherches sur les chrétiens d'Asie Centrale et d'Extrême-Orient* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1973), p. 114, n. 3.

27. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 688, reports that she entertained Hülegü there in 1254 while the latter was on his way to Iran.

son throughout Möngke's reign.²⁸ This situation, though not entirely of his own making, was no doubt pleasing to the emperor, for the regent and her son were less likely to assert themselves against the power of the central authorities than Qara Hülegü, who originally had reigned in the name of Chaghadaï and Ögödei, and who had been an experienced ruler of the same generation and age as Möngke.

The qaghan rewarded the Ögödeïd princes in his camp with appanages in Jungaria and adjoining regions. Qadan (Ho-tan), Ögödei's sixth son, received the Uighur capital, Besh Baliq (Pieh-shih Pa-li); Melik (Mieh-li), his seventh son, obtained the Irtysh region (Yeh-erh-ti-shih), and Qaidu (Hai-tu), a grandson, was given Qayaliq (Hai-ya-li).²⁹ Besides the allotment of lands, some of Ögödei's personal troops were distributed among them.³⁰ Although given the means to lead a comfortable existence, the military and financial resources at the disposal of the surviving Ögödeïds were limited, and certainly insufficient to mount an effective challenge to the grand qan's authority. So far as we know, their only act of defiance occurred in 1256 or 1257, when Qaidu, for unexplained reasons, forcibly detained an emissary whom Möngke had sent to him.³¹ The qaghan's failure to take immediate steps to punish this insubordination is perhaps explained by his preoccupation with the forthcoming campaign against the southern Sung. In any case, Qaidu's refractory behavior was an isolated incident and posed no imminent threat to the emperor. It was only after Möngke's demise that Qaidu rose to prominence as the new champion of the Ögödeïd cause.

28. On Qara Hülegü's return to power and *Orghana's regency, see Juvaynî/Qazvîni, vol. 1, pp. 210-11, 229-30, and vol. 3, p. 70; Juvaynî/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 255, 273-74, and vol. 2, p. 595; Rashîd/Karîmî, vol. 1, pp. 539, 544, and 569; and Rashîd/Boyle, pp. 142-43, 149-50, and 182.

29. YS, chap. 3, p. 16.

30. Juvaynî/Qazvîni, vol. 3, pp. 69-70; Juvaynî/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 595; Rashîd/Karîmî, vol. 1, p. 595; and Rashîd/Boyle, p. 217.

31. YS, chap. 153, p. 1643; and Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, (Paris: Librairie Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959-63) vol. 1, p. 126.

Ironically, in his dealings with the princes of the blood, his relations with Batu, the earliest and strongest of his supporters, posed the greatest problem for Möngke. Although the house of Jochi had initiated the move to depose the line of Ögödei, it was the Toluids who profited most from their ruin. As beneficiaries of the head of the senior Chinggisid line, Möngke and his family, not unnaturally, were inclined to show Batu some deference.³² In fact, many contemporary chroniclers picture Batu as the kingmaker and Möngke as his protégé. Kirakos states that Möngke "sits on the throne by his (that is, Batu's) order,"³³ and Rubruck, in an almost identical statement, says "Mangu (Möngke)³⁴ was elected by Baatu's (Batu's) desire."³⁵ Jūzjānī goes further, saying that the qan of the Golden Horde openly boasted to his fellow princes that though he would place Möngke on the throne, "in reality I [Batu] shall be the sovereign."³⁶

These statements and others in the same vein have led some historians to conclude that Möngke was subordinate to Batu, or that the two shared power equally within the empire. The noted Russian and Soviet orientalist V. V. Bartol'd was the leading exponent of the latter view.³⁷ Bartol'd argued that the empire had been divided, *de facto* if not *de jure*, between the

32. Even before the enthronement of Möngke, Batu was regarded as the most influential figure in the empire after the qaghan. Carpini remarks that "Batu (Batu) is the most powerful of all the princes of the Tartars, with the exception of the emperor whom he is bound to obey", *Mongol Mission*, p. 55. Orda, his elder brother, was content to let Batu direct the fortunes of their family.

33. Kirakos, p. 218.

34. Mangu, or Mengü, is the Turkic form of his name, which means "eternal," "eternally," "everlasting."

35. *Mongol Mission*, p. 147. Juvaynī also uses the term "kingmaker" (*shāh khustaw-nishān*) with reference to Batu. See Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 3, p. 69; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 594.

36. Raverty's translation. Jūzjānī/Raverty, vol. 2, p. 1181. See also Jūzjānī/Lees, p. 410.

37. See, for example, *Istoriia Turkestana*, reprinted in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1963), p. 148. Franke, *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, p. 48; John Andrew Boyle, "The Mongols and Europe," *History Today* 9 (1959): 340; David Ayalon, "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan: A Reexamination, Part B," *Studia Islamica* 33 (1971): 165, 175; and Jackson, "Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 207-8, have come to similar conclusions.

two, and that Batu enjoyed complete autonomy within his own realm. As evidence for this claim, Bartol'd frequently cited two passages from the travel accounts of the Franciscan missionary, William of Rubruck. In one, Rubruck notes that when Batu's men met Möngke's, the latter showed greater respect than the former: Möngke's men always clapped and sang upon greeting Batu's, whereas the qan's retainers were less diligent in this regard.³⁸ In Bartol'd's view, this behavior indicated that Batu's followers felt themselves to be superior to those serving Möngke. Such a pattern of behavior was unlikely, Bartol'd believed, unless Batu's position vis-à-vis the qaghan was one of ascendancy or at least equality. Data of this kind, however, are difficult to interpret accurately. What did the clapping and singing really signify? To an outsider such as Rubruck such customs could easily be misconstrued. Even if their conduct made it seem that Batu's men possessed greater prestige than Möngke's, some other factor, independent of the two princes' relative status, might provide a better explanation. For instance, might not Batu's retainers have been of a higher rank than those of Möngke? In which case, the latter, regardless of their ties to the qaghan, would still have been expected to show deference to those senior to themselves.

Bartol'd's second piece of evidence is a speech Möngke made to Rubruck, in which the emperor said "just as the sun spreads its rays in all directions, so my power and the power of Baatu is spread everywhere."³⁹ This passage, if taken at face value, certainly indicates that Möngke and Batu shared power, but there are good grounds for questioning its accuracy and significance. In the first place, as Rubruck admits, both Möngke and his interpreter were intoxicated at the time of the speech and the friar had difficulty understanding what was being said. Secondly, this statement should not be isolated from all of Rubruck's remarks that bear on the relationship

38. *Mongol Mission*, p. 136.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

between Möngke and Batu; there are numerous other passages (to be discussed below) that provide support for the view that the qaghan, not the qan of the Golden Horde, was the dominant figure in the empire. Bartol'd's thesis, therefore, is not argued on the basis of all the available evidence. It is also relevant to note that Bartol'd was not primarily interested in the Golden Horde, but was concerned mainly with the boundaries between the various qanates, as this was an issue that touched directly on the history and geography of Turkestan, the central focus of his scholarly pursuits.

Although Soviet specialists on central Asia generally have followed his lead in this matter,⁴⁰ their colleagues working on the Golden Horde have found much evidence that runs counter to Bartol'd's argument.⁴¹ In the field of foreign relations, for example, there are ample data showing that Möngke's prerogatives were in no way circumscribed by Batu. When Hct'um I, the king of lesser Armenia (Cilicia, located on the southeastern coast of Asia Minor) went to Batu in 1254 and expressed a desire to submit to the Mongols, he and his entourage were dispatched to Qara Qorum to negotiate their entry into the empire.⁴² Moreover, in the treaty resulting from the discussions held at the Mongol capital, which established guidelines for relations between the empire and its new dependent state, only Möngke's name is mentioned.⁴³

The narrative of Rubruck's travels, which Bartol'd relies on for his thesis, contains further data that confirm Möngke's exclusive powers in the sphere of foreign affairs. The friar, who entered Mongol territory through eastern Europe, was told by Batu himself that he could not stay in the territory of

40. See, for example, the collective volume, *Istoriia Uzbezkoi SSR*, vol. 1 (Tashkent, 1955), pp. 305-6.

41. G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 50-54.

42. Galst'ian, p. 26; and Kirakov, p. 223.

43. For the text of the treaty in Russian translation, see Galst'ian, pp. 67-70.

the Golden Horde without Möngke's permission.⁴⁴ When Rubruck reached Qara Qorum his request for permanent residence in Batu's realm as a missionary was denied by Möngke, who wished him to carry a message back to his sovereign, the French king, Louis IX.⁴⁵ On his return trip, the friar came across Sartaq, Batu's son and heir apparent, who was on his way east to see Möngke. Rubruck reports that when he told Sartaq, who was a Christian, that he desired to remain in the Jochids' territory, but that the qaghan had ordered him to return to Europe, the prince in response merely said "that Mangu Chan's wishes must be carried out."⁴⁶

Möngke's own view of his relationship to Batu is expressed in the aforementioned letter to the French monarch, Louis IX. By way of explaining the origin of the letter and its carrier, Möngke states that "the two monks (Rubruck and his companion, Bartholomew of Cremona) came from you (King Louis) to Sartach (Sartaq): Baatu, however, seeing that Mangu Chan is chief of the Mongol people, sent them to me."⁴⁷ Certainly, then, Möngke did not feel himself to be a mere equal, much less a subordinate, of Batu. And if no foreigner could remain in Jochid lands without the qaghan's consent, Batu's authority within his own domain was not unrestricted.

Although Möngke paid Batu the respect due a senior prince and helpmate, he did not hesitate to adopt a stern position on issues he considered important. Batu, like his rival, Güyüg, was given to extravagance. Juvaynī reports that on one occasion Batu, being in a generous mood, grandly doubled the prices of the goods offered to him by a group of Muslim merchants.⁴⁸

44. *Mongol Mission*, p. 128.

45. On the purpose of Rubruck's journey to the East, which was religious rather than diplomatic, see Igor de Rachewiltz, *Papal Envoys to the Great Khans* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 125-28.

46. *Mongol Mission*, p. 207.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

48. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 222; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 267.

Such profligacy left the qan short of ready money from time to time. In the summer of 1253, Batu, temporarily out of cash, sent a messenger, Tobichagh (T'o-pi-ch'a),⁴⁹ to Qara Qorum to apply for ten thousand ingots of silver for the purpose of buying pearls. Möngke, however, gave him only one thousand, along with a patronizing lecture on economy sent via Batu's ambassador:

As for T'ai-tsu's (Chinggis Qan's) and T'ai-tsung's (Ögödei's) wealth, if this is expended, how shall I confer princely grants?⁵⁰ [You] Prince [Batu] ought to think carefully about this. This silver, therefore, is in lieu of the amount of a future annual grant.⁵¹

These remarks, which accurately mirror Möngke's loathing for excess, sound very much like the criticisms he frequently directed at his own court officials.⁵²

On another issue, the disposition of military forces, the evidence again supports the contention that Möngke's authority was respected within the Golden Horde. When the grand qan ordered Hülegü to advance on western Asia, Batu faithfully contributed the required number of troops. Tutar, Quli, and Balaghai (or Balaqan),⁵³ all nephews of Batu, appeared on schedule with their contingents and formed part of the right wing of the Mongol army that converged on Baghdad in 1257.⁵⁴

49. *Tobichagh* is Turkic for a type of Turkmen horse. SH, par. 274, p. 219, uses the word in its Mongol plural form, *tobicha'ut*. Abramowski, "Annalen des Möngke," p. 22, restores the name as *Tobchar, which is theoretically possible, but in my opinion, unlikely. For a discussion of the term *tobichagh* in its Mongol and Turkic dress, see Nicolas Poppe, "On Some Military Terms in the *Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih*," MS 26 (1967): 515.

50. Senior Chinggisid princes annually received stipends in varying amounts. Most were derived from specially designated properties in north China.

51. YS, chap. 3, p. 16.

52. *Ibid.*

53. On the form of these names, see John Andrew Boyle, "Some Additional Notes on the Mongolian Names in *The History of the Nation of Archers*," in *Researches in Altaic Linguistics*, ed. Louis Ligeti (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975), pp. 36, 41, and 42.

54. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 707; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 91; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 607-8.

Finally, with regard to the disposition of territory within the empire, the qaghan's authority was also decisive. In 1251, following his enthronement, Möngke granted Berke the rich and populous province of Georgia as a reward for services rendered.⁵⁵ Several years later, however, the emperor turned the administration of this province over to Hülegü. Although the emperor's decision planted the seeds of future discord between the Golden Horde and the *Īl-khāns*, Hülegü's jurisdiction over this valuable territory was never overtly challenged during Möngke's tenure in office.⁵⁶

Möngke's relations with Batu reflect the balance of power that then obtained in the Mongol world. The Toluids commanded great resources; the most advanced sedentary populations of the empire, those of northern China, eastern and western Turkestan, and Iran were under their direct control.⁵⁷ Batu was simply not in a position to dictate to the qaghan; he could only negotiate certain matters which affected the administration of the Golden Horde. Batu certainly had facilitated the rise of the Toluids, but he was not the most important reason for their success.

Even before coming to power, this family had available to it considerable resources and skills that they could use in their own behalf. In terms of political influence and know-how, the Toluids had an invaluable asset in the person of Sorqaghtani Beki, the mother of Möngke. Her stature among the Mongols

55. The granting of Georgia to Berke is reported in the YS, ch. 3, p. 16. In this passage, Georgia is transcribed as Ch'ii-erh-chih, which represents Gurj, the Persian spelling of the name. For further discussion, see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, vol. 2, pp. 738-39.

56. Jackson, in his valuable study, "Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 208-10, argues that it was not Möngke, but Chinggis Qan himself who granted the Jochids special rights in Transcaucasia. There is, however, no direct textual evidence in favor of this argument. Moreover, Jackson is not aware of the passage found in the YS, cited above, n. 55, which indicates that Möngke granted Georgia to Berke.

57. Prior to the advent of Hülegü, the Jochids had extensive interests and enjoyed wide influence in Khurāsān. See Jackson, "Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 212-21. Once, however, Hülegü came on the scene in the early 1250s, both administrative affairs (census taking, tax collection, and the issuance of coinage) and military operations, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, came under firm Toluid control.

was second only to that of Batu. Carpini already speaks of her renown and power during Güyüg's reign.⁵⁸ More than anyone else, it was Sorqaghtani who laid the political foundations of Toluid power. She was at the center of all the efforts to rally disgruntled Chinggisids around Möngke's banner. Her political acumen and powers of persuasion are repeatedly mentioned by Muslim historians as key ingredients in Möngke's successful drive for the throne.⁵⁹ To the Mongols' sedentary subjects, unaccustomed to the direct involvement of women in the affairs of state, Sorqaghtani's political stature and abilities were a source of great wonderment. Many paid her compliments, but none more glowing than the words of the unnamed poet whom the Syriac historian Bar Hebraeus quotes with approval: "If I were to see among the race of women another woman like this / I should say that the race of women was far superior to that of men."⁶⁰

Besides possessing considerable political prestige and talent of their own, the Toluids were well supplied with military power. It is often overlooked that Chinggis Qan not only provided each son with his own territory, but gave each a share of his army as well. Jochi, Chaghadaï, and Ögödei each received 4,000 men. Tolui, however, inherited the bulk of the forces, 101,000 men. These, it should be noted, were among the best troops in the Mongol army, the original core of Chinggis Qan's armed forces, including the emperor's "personal thousand," an elite unit of the imperial guard (*keshig*). When Tolui died, control of these units passed to Sorqaghtani Beki and her sons.⁶¹ Because the main arena in the struggle for the

58. *Mongol Mission*, p. 26.

59. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 4-9 and 21; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 550-52 and 562; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 561-62 and 580: 81; and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 170 and 199-200. For a sketch of her remarkable career, see Morris Rossabi, "Khubilai Khan and the Women in His Family," in *Studia Sino-Mongolica: Festschrift für Herbert Franke*, ed. Wolfgang Bauer (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1979), pp. 158-66.

60. Bar Hebraeus, p. 398.

61. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 399-408.

imperial throne was the Mongolian homeland, where these troops were concentrated, it was the Toluids' own armies and not Batu's security forces that were the decisive factor.

It is not surprising to find, therefore, that in the eyes of the Toluids Batu was not considered a kingmaker to whom they owed the possession of the throne. On the contrary, Möngke believed that Batu was indebted to him, because the qaghan had been instrumental in the creation of the Golden Horde through his role in bringing the Rus, Qipchaq, and Alan lands under Mongol sway.⁶² Psychologically, the Toluids felt themselves to be responsible for their own success, and saw in Batu only a respected and valuable ally whose long association with them had proved advantageous to both parties.

It is true, however, that within the confines of the Golden Horde Batu enjoyed greater freedom of action than did the Chaghadaï qan or Möngke's own brothers within their respective territories. Care always was taken to consult the Jochids on all matters affecting their own domain. Although there is every evidence that Möngke's major political and financial measures were fully implemented in Batu's territory, this was done with Batu's approval and cooperation. In essence, the administration of the Jochid realm was a form of joint rule, in which both qan and qaghan had a voice. Theoretically, this method of governance was in force in the other qanates as well, but in actuality it was only fully operative in the Golden Horde, owing to Batu's special standing among the Mongol princes.

As soon as Batu died, Möngke moved quickly to install a candidate of his own choosing as head of the Jochid line. When news of Batu's death, which occurred sometime in the latter half of 1255 or the early part of 1256, reached the imperial court, Sartaq, the eldest son of the deceased qan, was in Mon-

62 YS, chap. 124, p. 1351. Rubruck credits Möngke with the conquest of the Alans and remarks that the qaghan had his own territories in that area; *Mongol Mission*, p. 211.

golia consulting with Möngke. The grand qan designated Sartaq successor to his father, "recognizing him as the second ruler after himself."⁶³ The newly named qan immediately set out for his territory, but died before reaching his *ordo*. Möngke thereupon sent a delegation of officials to the Volga to invest Sartaq's young son⁶⁴ Ulaghchi as the new qan, with Boraqchin, Batu's senior wife, acting as regent.⁶⁵ These developments, which paralleled events in the Chaghadaï realm, must have been welcomed by Möngke, for now no adult Mongol prince reigned in any of the regional qanates except the qaghan's own brothers. The situation, however, did not prevail for long. According to the Rus chronicles, Ulaghchi (spelled "Ulavchii" in the transcription of the Cyrillic script) reigned only through 1257, or perhaps into early 1258.⁶⁶

When Ulaghchi also died, Batu's younger brother Berke replaced him. Although the exact circumstances surrounding Berke's accession are not clearly disclosed in the sources, there are various indications that he came to power through his own efforts and without Möngke's support or blessing. But though his elevation undoubtedly represents a reassertion of Jochid autonomy, a return to the principle of joint rule, it should not, in my opinion, be construed as a successful drive for independence.⁶⁷ To be sure, the rise of Berke foreshadowed a major

63. Galst'ân, p. 27. See also Kirakos, p. 226.

64. There is confusion concerning Ulaghchi's parentage. Some sources say he was Sartaq's son, others that he was Sartaq's brother, that is, Batu's son. Rashîd al-Dîn records that Sartaq had no children; Rashîd/Karimî, vol. 1, p. 514, and Rashîd/Boyle, p. 108. This, however, is in error, for Rubruck, an eyewitness, mentions that Sartaq had several sons; *Mongol Mission*, p. 117. Juvaynî, a contemporary of the events, says explicitly that Ulaghchi was Sartaq's son, and even Rashîd al-Dîn, in one place, follows Juvaynî in this matter. For further details, see Paul Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or* (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1950), pp. 34-44.

65. Juvaynî/Qazvinî, vol. 1, p. 223; and Juvaynî/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 268.

66. PSRL, vol. 9, p. 256.

67. On the rise of Berke, see Jackson, "Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 223-25. Jackson, it should be noted, views the rise of Berke as a kind of coup through which the Jochids reestablished their virtual independence. His arguments do not, however, take into consideration the role played by Möngke's agents in the administration of the Golden Horde following Berke's accession.

rift in the Mongol Empire, but there is good evidence that the new Jochid qan continued to recognize Möngke's sovereign rights during the remaining two years of the latter's reign. Troops from the Golden Horde assisted the Toluids in their conquest of western Asia, despite Berke's displeasure over the loss of his rights in Georgia. Moreover, as will be shown below, Möngke's name appears on Jochid coinage of the era and, more important, the emperor's agents registered the population and collected taxes in the Rus principalities *after* Berke's assumption of office.⁶⁸

It is apparent from this survey of his relations with Mongol princes that Möngke's authority was absolute in the realm of foreign relations and predominant in the area of domestic affairs. Only in the Jochid realm, during the reigns of Batu and Berke, was Möngke forced to share some of his power with another Chinggisid prince. However, as Batu cooperated with the emperor, and as Berke complied (though perhaps unwillingly) with his directives, Möngke was able to implement his political and economic programs throughout the vast empire.

Investiture of Dependent Rulers

In addition to the princes of the blood, there was another group whose obedience and cooperation were essential to Möngke's success—local dynasts who were dependents of the Mongols. The sedentary population of the empire, which formed a substantial majority of the total, was in part ruled directly by the qaghan and his agents and in part indirectly through local ruling houses, whose right to existence was recognized by patents of investiture issued by the Mongols.

Native dynasts were allowed to retain their thrones and territories as subjects of the qaghan for two main reasons. By

68. One author, the fourteenth-century Arab encyclopedist Jamāl Qarshī, by no means a Toluid partisan, even refers to Berke as an *il-khān* upon his accession to the throne. *Mulḥaqāt al-ṣurāḥ*, text available in V. V. Bartol'd, *Turkestan v epokhu mongol'skogo nashestviia*, pt. 1, *Teksty* (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 136.

giving rulers of foreign states an alternative to armed resistance, the Mongols often brought about their capitulation without the expenditure of military force. Therefore, prior to the commencement of hostilities with a foreign state (*qari-irgen*), the Mongols always issued orders of submission that offered its ruler physical and institutional survival in return for acknowledging the suzerainty of the qaghan.⁶⁹ Even if the ruler did not in the end surrender, such offers were still a valuable means of weakening an enemy's resolve and a diplomatic tool for detaching his clients and allies.⁷⁰ In most cases, states or tribes that submitted (called *il-irgen* by the Mongols) were spared, but those who rejected the offer were considered "rebellious people" (*bulgha-irgen*) and treated accordingly.⁷¹ In Mongol terms, this usually meant the destruction of the offending state and the partial annihilation of its people.⁷²

Another and perhaps more compelling reason for the toleration of dependent states was the Mongols' lack of experienced administrative personnel. Inasmuch as very few of the Mongols' estimated population of seven hundred thousand were literate and still fewer were familiar with the "customs and laws of cities,"⁷³ retention of a local dynasty and its attendant

69. Voegelin, "Mongol Orders of Submission," p. 406.

70. See Carpini's warnings concerning the Mongols' methods of "making peace" and their cunning use of offers of submission, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 37-39.

71. For examples of the use of the terms *il-irgen* and *bulgha-irgen*, see A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves, "Trois documents mongols des archives secrètes vaticanes," *HJAS* 15 (1952): 485, 492-93. In some Persian texts *il*, "subordinate," is paired with the Turkic *yaghi*, "enemy." See John Andrew Boyle, "The Death of the Last 'Abbāsid Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 6 (1961): 151-52. The Persian text in question, Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī's account of the fall of Baghdad, is printed in Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 280.

72. The state of Nan-chao (Ta-li) in Yunnan rejected the Mongol orders of submission and then killed the Mongol ambassadors. Conquered by military force, the ruler, Tuan Hsing-chih, was nonetheless pardoned by Möngke and given the title Mahārāja (Mu-ho-lo-ts'o). This, to my knowledge, is one of the few instances in which ruling houses were left in place after having challenged Mongol arms. See *Nan-Tchao Ye-che: Histoire particulière de Nan-Tchao*, Camille Sainson, trans. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1904), pp. 108-10.

73. In the *SH*, par. 263, pp. 203-4, there is an open admission by Chinggis Qan of the Mongols' ignorance of the "laws and customs of cities" (*balaghasun-u törö yosun*).

administrative apparatus was frequently the most practical method of controlling and exploiting the population and resources of a newly surrendered territory. In several instances, to be noted later, the Mongols even established new dynasties headed by families familiar with local languages, conditions, and governmental practices.

By the time of Möngke's reign, a number of sedentary states had become dependents of the Mongols. These were generally, but not exclusively, situated on the frontiers of the empire and ranged in size from the Koryŏ kingdom of Korea to the tiny sultanate of Mārdīn, a town in upper Mesopotamia.⁷⁴ The total territory and population ruled through such regimes is not readily calculable, but it is clear that collectively such dependent states possessed both economic wealth and manpower reserves crucial to Möngke's plans. The emperor, therefore, jealously guarded his prerogative to invest dependent rulers and to name the Mongol *darughachi* stationed at their courts.

Möngke, as had Güyüg before him, required dependent rulers to come in person to court to renew their investiture.⁷⁵ In response to this command, kings, princes, sultans, maharajas, and *atabegs* from all parts of Eurasia made the long trip to Qara Qorum. For the Mongols, the presence of so many rulers at the imperial court was direct confirmation that their pretensions to world domination were being realized, and they were not unaffected by the experience. When Rubruck arrived in the capital on a religious mission, everyone assumed that he had come on a diplomatic assignment to make peace, in other words, to submit on behalf of the French king. When the friar told them that his sovereign only wanted to make contact with the Christian Sartaq for religious purposes, "they were amazed and kept on repeating 'why have you come if you do not wish

74. For a description of Mārdīn, see Guy Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), p. 96.

75. Carpini notes that many princes from the east and the west attended Güyüg's enthronement. See also the remarks of Benedict the Pole, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 62 and 81.

to make peace?" The Mongols, Rubruck continues, "are so puffed up with pride that they believe the whole world is anxious to make peace with them."⁷⁶

Despite the Mongols' expectations, the French monarch never came to "make peace," but many others did. Among the more important were the rulers of Nan-chao (Ta-li),⁷⁷ Trebizond,⁷⁸ Annam (Indochina),⁷⁹ lesser Armenia,⁸⁰ Kirmān,⁸¹ Harāt,⁸² Uighuristan, Korca, Shabānkārah (in eastern Fārs),⁸³ Danubian Bulgaria,⁸⁴ Shīrvān, Kashmir, and the various Rus principalities. Besides reigning heads of state, the call for dependent rulers also attracted a few pretenders, such as Jalāl al-Dīn, son of the ruler of the Delhi sultanate, who hoped to gain the qaghan's assistance in his quest for the throne.⁸⁵

If, for any reason, a ruler himself could not appear, representatives were sent in his place. The sultans of the Seljuqs of Rum, who had recently been to Mongolia, were not required to make a return trip. The embassy they sent to obtain their patents of investiture is mentioned in both European and Chinese sources.⁸⁶ The rulers of Georgia also had returned

76. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 144-50. See also Klaus Sagaster, "Herrschafts ideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen," *CAJ* 17 (1973): 223-42.

77. *YS*, chap. 3, p. 17, and chap. 166, p. 1784.

78. *Mongol Mission*, p. 91; and Spuler, *Iran*, p. 65.

79. *YS*, chap. 3, pp. 17 and 18; and *YWL*, chap. 41, p. 252-b.

80. Galst'ian, pp. 49-50; and Kirakos, p. 33. For more details, see M. Danard, "Le royaume d'Arménie-Cilicie et les Mamelouks jusqu'au traité de 1285," *Revue des études arméniennes* 4 (1967), pp. 217-21; and A. G. Galstyan, "The First Armeno-Mongol Negotiations," *The Armenian Review* 29 (1976): 29-34.

81. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 215-18; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 480-82.

82. On the formation of the Kart dynasty, see V. M. Masson and V. A. Romodin, *Istoriia Afganistana*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1964), pp. 291-302.

83. Natanzi, *Muntakhab*, p. 5; and Le Strange, *Eastern Caliphate*, pp. 288-89.

84. The Danubian Bulgars were certainly vassals of the Mongols by 1253, and it seems likely that they first submitted in 1242 when the Mongols passed through northern Bulgaria on the way back from the campaign in central Europe. See P. Nikov, "Tatarobŭlgarski otnosheniia prez' srednite vekove s' ogled' kŭmŭ tsaruvaneto na Smiletsa," *Godishnik' na Sofiiskiiŭ Universitet, Istoriko-Filologicheski Fakultet* 15-16 (1919-20), pp. 3-5.

85. Aziz Ahmad, "Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land," *CAJ* 6 (1961): 183.

86. *YS*, chap. 3, p. 17, refers to the arrival of the representatives of the *su-tan*, (sultan), and Rubruck, *Mongol Mission*, p. 202, alludes to the ambassadors of the sultan of Turkey.

from Qara Qorum just prior to Möngke's accession, and were probably excused for the same reason. Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', the prince of Mosul, was another who was allowed to send an ambassador in lieu of personally attending court; it is quite likely that he was exempted from the arduous journey to Mongolia because of his extreme age.⁸⁷

The interregnum between the reigns of Güyüg and Möngke was a trying time for many dependent rulers. Both factions put pressure on these princes to side with their candidate. For example, the Kart ruler of Harāt, Shams al-Dīn, found himself at the court of Yesü Möngke at the height of the struggle between the Ögödeids and Toluids. The Chaghadaï qan tried to force Shams al-Dīn to come out against Möngke by threatening to press an investigation into a dispute that had arisen between the Kart ruler and his Mongol advisers. Shams al-Dīn wisely refused to bow to the pressure, and later joined forces with the Toluids, thereby saving both his crown and his head.⁸⁸ Those who had succumbed to Ögöeid pressure or were suspected of having favored the opposition in any way were deposed and punished.

Salindi,⁸⁹ the *iduq-qut*⁹⁰ of the Uighurs, was the most prominent of the dependent rulers to fall victim to the purge. The Uighurs, who spoke a Turkic language, had been the first sedentary people to come under Mongol domination. In 1209, the father of Salindi, Barchuq Art Tegin, had broken with his overlord, the ruler (*gür qan*) of the Qara Khitai, and had voluntarily submitted to Chinggis Qan.⁹¹ Because of their cul-

87. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 576; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 191. Badr al-Dīn was excused in 1258 from personal participation in the campaign in Syria because of his age. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 718-19.

88. Sayf/Siddiqī, pp. 162-68.

89. On this name, see DTS, p. 482.

90. The Uighurs borrowed the title *iduq-qut*, or *iduqut*, which means "possessor of holy fortune" or "luck," from the Basmil, another Turkish-speaking people. See R. Rahmet, "Der Herrscherntel *Iduq-qut*," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 35 (1964): 150-57.

91. On the incorporation of the Uighurs into the Mongol Empire, see Thomas T. Allen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the Thirteenth Century," in *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, Tenth-Fourteenth Centuries*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 243-53.

tural attainments, high rate of literacy, and administrative and commercial skills, the Uighurs played an important role in the formation of the Mongol Empire.⁹² Their most significant contribution to Mongol culture and statecraft was their alphabet, which remained until this century the most widely used script in the Mongol world.⁹³ As the earliest and most useful sedentary subjects of the Mongols, the Uighurs ranked first among the empire's many dependents.⁹⁴ Barchuq was named Chinggis Qan's "fifth son" and given one of the emperor's daughters in marriage. When Barchuq died, late in the reign of Ögödei, his son *Kesmes went to court and was installed as *idug-qut*. Shortly thereafter, *Kesmes also died, and by order of the regent, Töregene (r. 1241-46), another of Barchuq's sons, Salindi, replaced him. According to the Persian sources, Salindi became a powerful and much honored figure at the Mongol court during Güyüg's reign.⁹⁵

In the course of the trials that followed Möngke's enthronement, it became known through an informer that Oghul Qaimish, the regent in the period 1248-51, had obtained Salindi's agreement to support Shiremün's candidacy with fifty thousand troops. The *idug-qut* was immediately ordered to the emperor's camp, where he was brought before a tribunal headed by Menggeser. Salindi at first refused to admit his complicity in the plot against Möngke, but in the end acknowledged his guilt when confronted with the confessions of his coconspirators. Returned to his capital, Besh Baliq, together with several other Uighur noblemen who had been party to his understanding with Oghul Qaimish, the *idug-qut* was beheaded before the entire populace in 1252. Salindi's brother and successor, Ögrünch, the Yü-ku-lun-ch'ih of the Chinese

92. See A. A. Semenov, "Ocherk kul'turnoi roli uigurov v mongol'skikh gosudarstvakh," in *Materialy po istorii i kul'ture uigurskogo naroda* (Alma Ata, 1978), pp. 22-48.

93. The Uighurs borrowed their alphabet from the Soghdians, who had adapted theirs from the Syriac.

94. YS, chap. 7, p. 46.

95. Juvayni/Qazvini, vol. 1, pp. 33-34; Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 47-48; and Rashid/Alizade, vol. 1, p. 342.

sources, served as his executioner. To carry the story through Möngke's reign, Ögrünch also soon died and his son Mamuraq (Ma-mu-la)⁹⁶ was named his successor, probably in 1257.⁹⁷

Another ruler to run afoul of the Mongols' succession disputes was Rukn al-Dīn, the shāh of the Qara Khitai dynasty of Kirmān.⁹⁸ The founder of this ruling house, Bāraq Hajib, a Khitan, had been a chamberlain at the court of the Khwārazm-shāhs. By the time of the Mongols' initial incursions (1219) into Khwārazm, he had been elevated to the post of governor of Kirmān. As soon as the armies of Chinggis Qan appeared in that area, he tendered his submission and was recognized as a dependent ruler with the title Qutlugh Qan, (Fortunate Qan). Bāraq died in 1234 and Quṭb al-Dīn, a nephew, replaced him. After two years on the throne, Quṭb al-Dīn was dismissed by Ögödei, and Rukn al-Dīn, a son of Bāraq, was installed in his stead. Quṭb al-Dīn was then attached to the retinue of Maḥmūd Yalavach and served with the latter in northern China. When Möngke came to power, Quṭb al-Dīn made a request of the new emperor that his throne be restored. On the recommendation of Yalavach, Möngke agreed, and Quṭb al-Dīn returned to Kirmān in 1252. After purging the local administration of elements hostile to himself and Möngke, Quṭb al-Dīn came back to the Mongol court in 1253-54 and brought charges against Rukn al-Dīn. The latter was tried and convicted of illegally attempting to unseat Quṭb al-Dīn and was subsequently turned over to his accuser for execution.⁹⁹ There is no

96. This name, previously known only in Chinese transcription, is now attested in an Uighur text. See Geng Shimin and James Hamilton, "L'inscription ouigour de la stèle commémorative des Iduq Qut de Qoto," *Turica* 13 (1981): 26.

97. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 34-39; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 48-53; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 593; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 215; YS, chap. 122, p. 1321; and Geng and Hamilton, "Inscription ouigour," p. 26.

98. For a brief outline of the history of this dynasty, see Karl Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, *History of Chinese Society, Liao (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., vol. 36: Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 655-57.*

99. Kirmānī/Iqbāl, pp. 31-35. When Quṭb al-Dīn died in 1257 his young son Hajjāj was named to succeed him, with Qutlugh Tarkhan, the widow of the deceased ruler, serving as regent—a political arrangement much favored by Möngke. See also Naṭānī, *Muntakhab*, p. 23.

certain evidence that Rukn al-Dīn actively opposed Möngke's enthronement, but his appointment by the Ögödeids and his known friendship with the Ögödeid minister, Chinqai, made him suspect in the eyes of the qaghan. Conversely, the fact that Quṭb al-Dīn had suffered at the hands of the Ögödeids made him a politically more reliable choice from the standpoint of the Toluids.

Dependent rulers who succeeded in retaining their thrones did so by convincing Möngke of their loyalty in face-to-face interviews. This is why personal attendance at court was in most cases compulsory. Once convinced of their reliability, the emperor personally invested these rulers with the regalia of office. The ceremonies accompanying the investiture are briefly described on the occasion of the installment of Shams al-Dīn as the Kart ruler. According to the *History of Harāt*, the exercise took place in a large tent, which apparently served as the armory or treasury of the imperial camp. The emperor first placed upon Shams al-Dīn the robes of office and then gave him his patent of investiture (*jarligh*) and three badges of authority (*bā'izah*, that is, *p'ai-tzu*).¹⁰⁰ From other sources it is known that very similar procedures were used to invest both Quṭb al-Dīn of Kirmān and the sultans of Rum.¹⁰¹ Although this is not mentioned in any of the above accounts, vassal rulers were always given seals, whose imprint on all official documents was mandatory.¹⁰²

Financial awards and assistance in the form of cash or lands were a normal accompaniment to submission. Möngke gave the Qarluq ruler of Qayaliq, who ranked second to the Uighur

100. Sayfī/Šiddīqī, pp. 170–71. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only detailed description of a Mongol investiture ceremony available, although Rubruck, *Mongol Mission*, p. 175, remarks on the practice in general terms.

101. On Quṭb al-Dīn's investiture, see Naṣanzī, *Munakhab*, p. 23. For the sultans of Rum, see Ibn Bībī, *Mukhtaṣar-i Saljūq-nāmah*, text available in Muḥammad Jand Mushkūr, ed., *Ākhbar-i Salājiqah Rūm* (Tehran, 1971), p. 293; and Herbert W. Duda, trans., *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bībī* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard), p. 297.

102. Kirakos, p. 224.

idug-qut among the Mongol tributaries, the town of Özkend, a city on the Syr Darya.¹⁰³ The ruling house of Shabānkārah received six thousand gold *dīnārs* per year for their administrative services and the sultans of Rum once obtained a loan of four hundred gold ingots (*balish*) to tide them over a difficult period.¹⁰⁴ Shams al-Dīn Kart was even more fortunate: while he was at the imperial camp in 1251, Möngke bestowed upon him as an outright grant a total of sixty thousand *dīnārs*, and when he reached Tūs, the governor of Khurāsān, Arghun Aqa, gave him an additional fifty thousand.¹⁰⁵ This sum was probably rather larger than the normal grant. Möngke's generosity on this occasion is in all likelihood explained by the fact that the Kart dynasty, which derived from a family long in the service of the Ghūrids (who ruled Afghanistan from 1148 to 1215), had come into being only a few years prior to Möngke's enthronement and needed supplemental support, or more properly, "seed money," to establish itself on a firm basis. In a real sense, this dynasty, like the Sa-Skya rulers of Tibet, was a creation of the Mongols.¹⁰⁶

The Mongols not only fabricated new dynasties when convenient, but also on occasion extended the administrative responsibilities of established dependent states into "underdeveloped" neighboring territories where the existing machinery of government was deemed to be inadequate to meet Mongol needs. A case in point is the Nan-chao kingdom of southwestern China. In 1255, following the Mongol occupation,

103. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 58, and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 77. The Qarluqs, a Turkic-speaking people, inhabited the Ili River region. Originally nomads, the Qarluqs had undergone considerable sedentarization by the time of the Mongol conquests.

104. Naṣanẓī, *Muntakhab*, p. 5; Ibn Bībī, *Saljūq-nāmah*, p. 294; and Duda, *Seltschukengeschichte*, p. 281.

105. Sayf/Siddiqī, pp. 171-72.

106. On the situation in Tibet, see Turrell Wylie, "The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted," *HJAS* 37 (1977): 103-33; and Luciano Petech, "Tibetan Relations with Sung China and the Mongols," in *China among Equals*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 180-86.

Tuan Hsing-chih, the sovereign, visited Möngke to receive his formal investiture. Thereupon he returned to his capital, Ta-li, and soon submitted to the throne a map (*t'u*) of his domain and a set of administrative and financial proposals for the emperor's scrutiny. Pleased with the program, Möngke then ordered Tuan to assume jurisdiction over his own subjects, as well as the neighboring tribal peoples of Yünnan, the Mans and Lolos, who in the meantime had been added to the Mongol realm through military action.¹⁰⁷ In this instance it was simply easier for the Mongols to build upon an existing administrative structure than to create a new one where none was present before.

The qaghan's power of investiture was the principal institutional means of guaranteeing a dependent ruler's faithfulness. As a further check on their behavior, political residents, *darughachis* or *basqaqs*, were posted to the courts of the tributaries.¹⁰⁸ These officials, usually Mongols or central Asian Turks, had the general responsibility of ensuring that the orders and policies of the grand qan actually were carried out on the local level. In many cases, the *darughachi* had a body of troops under his command to enforce his authority. Moreover, no document generated at a vassal court was considered valid unless authenticated by the *darughachi's* seal (*gerege*).¹⁰⁹

The chief resident at the Kart court was a certain Chaqu (*Jāhū*),¹¹⁰ whose title, according to the author of the *History of Harāt*, was "great *basqaq*" (*bāsqāq-i mu'ẓam*).¹¹¹ After Shams

107. YS, chap. 166, p. 1784. For a translation of the relevant passage, see Ed. Chavannes, "Inscriptions et pièces de chancellerie chinoises de l'époque mongole; deuxième partie," *TP* 6 (1905): 15-16.

108. Although the sources only note the presence of a *hsüan-fu-shih*, "Pacification commissioner," at the Nan-chao court, there undoubtedly was a *darughachi* on the scene as well, for as Hsia Kuang-nan points out, *Yüan-tai Yün-nan chih-ti ts'ung-k'ao* (Taipei, 1968), p. 65, every *hsüan-fu-ssu*, or "pacification office," had attached to it both a commissioner and a *darughachi*.

109. Francis W. Cleaves, "Daruga and Gerege," *HJAS* 16 (1953), pp. 237-59.

110. *Chaqu* is Mongolian for a kind of knife. See Doerfer, *TMEN*, vol. 1, pp. 303-4.

111. Sayf/Shiddiqi, p. 196. This could also be read *bāsqāq-i mu'ẓam*, "honored or exalted *basqaq*."

al-Dīn and his resident arrived at Harāt, the two traveled throughout the Kart territory, holding audiences with local officials and notables.¹¹² At each stop, Chaqu "displayed a copy of the *jarligh* of the Badshāh¹¹³ (i.e., Padshāh) Möngke Qan and the orders of the amirs of Khurāsān and the decree of Malik Shams al-Dīn."¹¹⁴ This was done, of course, to establish the credentials of the new ruler and his officials, and to acquaint the populace with the desires of the government. To further enhance their authority, *darughachis* were allowed to communicate directly with the emperor on any matter of moment. For instance, when a clique of officials was investigated in Harāt on charges of tax fraud, Chaqu cleared the removal of one senior official with the qaghan.¹¹⁵

Hostages were an additional measure designed to assure the fidelity of the Mongols' dependent rulers. Carpini reports that all tributaries were required to send sons or brothers to the imperial court. As examples, he notes that Yaroslav of Vladimir, the chieftain of the Alans, and the Korean king had sent relatives as a pledge of their good behavior.¹¹⁶ For the most part, such hostages were enrolled in the imperial guard for safekeeping. The *Secret History*, for instance, notes that after the Mongols captured the Chin capital of Chung-tu (Peking) in 1215, Chinggis Qan ordered that one of the sons of the defeated Jurchen ruler was to be enlisted in the day guard (*turgha'ud*).¹¹⁷ In Möngke's time, this procedure was still being followed, for the west-Asian sources relate that the sons of Armenian, Georgian, and Lur nobles were systematically ap-

112. It was common practice for a dependent ruler to return from his audience at court in the company of a *darughachi*. Qutb al-Dīn, the ruler of Kirmān, was accompanied by a *hasqaq* named Qūndūghāi Qūrchī (*Qundaqai Qorchi). See Kirmānī/Iqbāl, p. 33; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 216-18; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 480-82.

113. The orthography of this chronicle reflects the Afghan pronunciation of Persian in which the letter "p" is always replaced by "b," and "ch" by "j"; e.g., Jāhū/Chaqu.

114. Sayf/Šiddīqī, p. 198.

115. Ibid., pp. 181-86.

116. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 34-40.

117. *SH*, par. 253, p. 188.

pointed to positions in the guard.¹¹⁸ The practice was, in fact, so widespread that in the Chinese sources the term "dayguard army" (*tu-lu-hua chün*) was usually glossed as "hostage army" (*chih-tzu chün*).¹¹⁹

In the Mongol system of hostage taking, however, it was not always the possibility of the hostage's execution that kept a dependent ruler in line, but rather the threat of being deposed and replaced by the hostage at the first sign of disloyalty. That is to say, a hostage who had spent much time in the imperial court was often considered more reliable than his relative on the throne. This was certainly the case in Kirmān, where Quṭb al-Dīn was held in reserve for sixteen years. Threats against the latter's life would not have had much effect upon his bitter rival, Rukn al-Dīn.

During the reigns of Güyüg and Möngke, the technique of allowing rival claimants to bid for a throne by trying to outdo one another in demonstrating their fidelity to the qaghan was developed and refined. Dual rulerships were established, in which relatives, usually brothers, shared sovereignty within a given dependent state. In Georgia, the "two Davids," David Narin ("the Slender") and David Ulugh ("the Large"), competed for Möngke's support,¹²⁰ and in Rum the brothers Rukn al-Dīn and 'Izz al-Dīn vied for imperial favor.¹²¹

In greater, that is, Transcaucasian, Armenia the number of competitors for Möngke's favor was even larger. Prior to the conquest Armenia had been ruled by a handful of regional "lords" (*naxarars*), most of whom recognized, at least nomi-

118. *Nation of Archers*, pp. 343 and 345; Brosset, *Géorgie*, p. 590; and Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab*, p. 59. The Lurs are a nomadic people who still live in southwestern Iran.

119. See Lien-sheng Yang, "Hostages in Chinese History," in his *Studies in Chinese Institutional History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 53-54 and n. 36. See also Paul Pelliot, "Les mots mongols dans le *Korye Sa*," *JA* 217 (1930): 265.

120. See W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), pp. 113-17.

121. See Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* (New York: Taplinger, 1968), pp. 269-78.

nally, the sovereignty of the Georgian monarch.¹²² The Mongols, quite typically, were content to leave the *naxarars* in place, continuously playing one family off against another. Those who demonstrated their loyalty, such as the Orbelian family of Siwnik' (the area between the Araxes and Lake Sevan), the Mongols rewarded with proclamations of praise and, more substantially, with widely advertised guarantees of their territorial possessions.¹²³ Great benefits, so this message clearly conveyed, were to be derived from willing collaboration with the conqueror.

Ultimately, of course, Mongol military power and the threat of annihilation were the major deterrents to disloyalty on the part of tributaries. As Möngke's tenure in office was a period of conquest and expansion, most dependent rulers, once invested and established in their territories, were soon called upon to support Mongol arms. This was usually made a major test of a new ruler's reliability.¹²⁴ When called, each ruler was given explicit instructions regarding preparations to be made and his particular responsibilities in the forthcoming campaign.¹²⁵ In some cases, the troops of the dependent state were stiffened with a contingent of Mongol regulars, as was done when Shams al-Dīn Kart was ordered to pacify Sīstān in 1254-55.¹²⁶ The Mongols also used such occasions to remind their dependent states, in unmistakable terms, of the impor-

122. On the *naxarar*, see R. H. Hewsen, "The Meliks of Eastern Armenia: A Preliminary Study," *Revue des études arméniennes*, n.s. 9 (1972): 283-87 and 293.

123. Stephannos Orbelian, *Histoire de la Sioune*, trans. M. Brusset (St. Petersburg, 1864), p. 228. On the history of the Orbelian family, see R. H. Hewsen, "The Meliks of Eastern Armenia, Part II," *Revue des études arméniennes*, n.s. 10 (1973-74), pp. 281-86, and "Part III," 11 (1975-76): 220-23.

124. See Boyle, "Death of the Last 'Abbāsīd Caliph," pp. 151-52; and *Mongol Mission*, p. 38, for contemporary statements to this effect.

125. Kirmānī/Iqbāl, p. 35.

126. Sayf/Shiddiqī, p. 225; *Ta'rik-i Sīstān*, ed. Malīk al-Shu'arā Bahār (Tehran, 1935), pp. 398-99; L. P. Smirnova, trans., *Istoriā Sīstāna* (Moscow, 1974), p. 370; and Shāh Husayn ibn Malik Ghiyath al-Dīn Maḥmūd, *Ihyā'al-Mulūk*, edited by Manūchīr Sutūdah (Tehran, 1344/1966), p. 78.

tance of their obligations to the empire, and of the dire consequences of failing to fulfill these duties. Hülegü, for example, caused the following order, issued in the name of Möngke, to be sent to the ruling houses of western Asia on the eve of the Mongol campaign against the Assassins:

If you come of your own accord and support our army with men and supplies, your countries, armies, and households will remain with you and your efforts [on our behalf] will be looked upon with favor. But if you are negligent and cultivate remissness in carrying out the order, then as soon as we, with the help of God, finish with them (the Assassins), we, without fail, will head in your direction and deal with your households and countries in the same manner we dealt with them.¹²⁷

In response to this particular command, dependent rulers from Rum, Fārs, Ārrān, Shīrvān, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia heeded the call to join the armies of the emperor's brother. By the time of Möngke's reign, noncompliance with such orders was a rare event. The local dynasties of Iran, Asia Minor, and the Caucasus had learned by hard experience that declarations of this kind were not idle threats.

127. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 688. See Chinggis Qan's remarks to the people of Nishāpūr, Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 114; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 145.

4. The Tools of Centralization

New Orientations

While still in the process of sorting out his relations with the princes of the blood and establishing his authority with rulers of client states, Möngke also was busy formulating new policies and erecting the administrative structure needed to carry them out. With typical energy and ambition, he endeavored to initiate a program of internal reform simultaneously with the launching of new campaigns of conquest.

Mongol armies, as noted in chapter 1, had been commanded to push forward the frontiers of the empire in all directions save the north. Möngke's aims in ordering this new phase of expansion after a ten-year lull were various:¹ first, as previously indicated, to solidify his hold on the throne by extending the territory under Toluid domination; secondly, to fulfill the command of Chinggis Qan to bring the known world under Mongol sway; and thirdly, to focus the attention of the Mongol ruling class on external affairs by keeping them continuously involved in the preparation and execution of military operations while the emperor instituted his domestic programs.²

1. In the decade between Ögödei's death and Möngke's enthronement there was little expansion of the empire's frontiers, owing to the domestic squabbles among the imperial family.

2. I. N. Gumilev, *Poiski vymyshlennogo Tsarstva. Legenda o gosudarstva Presbitera Ionna* (Moscow, 1970) pp. 209-17, argues that the Mongol campaigns in western Asia during

It would have been very difficult for any prince or high-ranking military commander to challenge the qaghan's authority at a time when the empire was busily engaged in subduing "rebellious people." To have done so would have been readily construed as a violation of Chinggis Qan's mandate to his people. Moreover, regardless of the "holy warrior's" endorsement of further conquest, most princes and military commanders had a vested interest in additional expansion that promised rich rewards in terms of advancement in rank and the acquisition of wealth in the form of booty, grants of land, and increased annual stipends.³

Although the program of expansion served Möngke's interests well on the practical, political level, it should not be assumed that the qaghan was cynically manipulating the words of Chinggis Qan. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that Möngke genuinely felt duty-bound to implement his grandfather's mandate. As an old campaigner, who had spent most of his life in military camps, and as the self-proclaimed champion of the Chinggisid legacy, the emperor was personally as well as politically committed to further conquest.

In initiating economic and institutional reforms—reforms in the sense of systematizing and regularizing the administration and finances of the empire—Möngke had two objectives: to maximize his access to the resources necessary to support his program of expansion and to ensure that the administrative

this period were motivated by the anti-Muslim attitude of many of Möngke's senior advisers, some of whom were Nestorian Christians. Although this may have been a factor for some individuals, overall it was political, economic, and strategic considerations that were decisive.

3. Joseph Fletcher, among others, has noted that external war served as an essential counterweight to the centrifugal tendencies inherent in nomadic life, and as a means of binding anarchic tribes together under a supreme chief, a qaghan. See his "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4, pt. 1 (1979-80): 237-38.

apparatus on the central, regional, and local levels was efficient and loyal to him. Möngke's external and internal policies were thus intimately linked. Without an effective and responsive administrative system capable of procuring and delivering the sinews of war, military conquest on the scale contemplated could not take place. On the other hand, the program of expansion provided both a justification and an opportunity for domestic reorganization. By tying the two closely together, Möngke made it hard for individuals or factions in favor of one of the policies to reject the other. Administrative specialists recruited from the sedentary populations of the empire who had been arguing for regularization of the revenue system for several decades had to go along with the qaghan on the issue of external expansion if they ever hoped to see their reforms adopted. Similarly, Mongol princes and military leaders, many of whom were extremely leery of political centralization and concessions to the empire's settled subjects, had to embrace, or at least tolerate, domestic reform in order to assure further conquest.

Möngke's expansionist policy served as a rallying point for all of the Mongol leadership. Whatever their particular political and social orientation, or their personal attitude toward the accession of Möngke, they all were agreed upon one essential point: the principal and proper business of the Yekc Mongghol Ulus was conquest.

Reforms

At the end of 1251, shortly after his enthronement, Möngke announced a series of administrative and financial reforms designed to restrict and equalize the burdens falling on the subject population. The basic thrust of these measures, of which there are consistent and coherent accounts in both the Chinese and the Persian sources, was to make it difficult, though not impos-

sible, for princes and high officials to exact goods and services from the populace for their personal use.⁴

To this end, the emperor first recalled all of the badges of authority, seals, and *jarlights* that had been issued by court officials and imperial princes since the time of Chinggis Qan. This step, besides serving as a reminder of the qaghan's ultimate power in such matters, effectively stripped those guilty of committing excesses of the means to continue their depredations, for without the seals and documents they had no way of establishing their authority with local populations and officials.

Next, Möngke placed severe restrictions upon the use by princes and officials of the imperial postal system, the *jam*. Both groups were admonished to avail themselves of the transportation and communication network only when conducting official business, and even then they were to limit themselves to a specified number of horses and quantity of provisions. Under no circumstances were users of the system to leave the established routes or the relay stations to enter towns or villages in which they had no official duties to perform. Moreover, merchant companies (*ortags*), which were in the habit of utilizing the *jams* when conducting trade in partnership with princes and high officials, were barred altogether from using the postal system. These restrictions not only reduced the hardships upon the families who were responsible for maintaining and provisioning the relay stations, but also made life easier for the inhabitants of nearby population centers, who had been victimized frequently by "official" ambassadors and messengers demanding unauthorized goods or services in the name of the government.

A third measure was intended to circumscribe the power of the imperial princes within the confines of their own appanages (*fen-ti*). Thenceforth, these princes could neither summon their

4. The basic measures are enumerated in the YS, chap. 3, pp. 15-16; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 75-78; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 598-99; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 596-97; and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 219.

subjects on their own authority nor issue any orders concerning financial matters without first conferring with officials of the imperial court. In short, within the appanage both the corvée and tax obligations of the attached population were to be in the hands of the central authorities.⁵ Furthermore, Möngke instituted a new, unified system of assessing and collecting taxes throughout the realm, to which the entire population, regardless of status, was subject.

Another measure, though mentioned separately from the above reforms, deserves note in its own right and as a revealing illustration of Möngke's views on financial matters. It has been recorded previously that Möngke's predecessors had been extremely liberal in their dealings with the *ortaq* merchants: Ögödei's and Güyüg's lavishness had left the imperial coffers nearly empty.⁶ When merchants approached the new qaghan claiming monies owed them by previous reigns, Möngke's chief advisers recommended that he refuse payment on the principle that one monarch was not responsible for another's debts. The emperor, however, disregarded this advice and paid the *ortaqs* in full from fresh revenues. At the same time, he made it clear that further extravagance and special treatment could not be expected from his regime. Thereafter, merchants, even those working on commissions from the central government, were to be inscribed in the census rolls and made subject to the same taxes and restrictions as those imposed on all the emperor's subjects. Goods would still be bought, but only items actually needed and only at reasonable, that is, market, prices.⁷ Möngke, ever the fiscal conservative, met to the penny

5. The *T'ung-chih P'iao-ko* (Peking, 1930), chap. 2, 32-b, contains a summary of a *jarligh* issued by Möngke prohibiting the summoning of appanage households by imperial princes. For a translation, see Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, vol. 2 (Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, vol. 4; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 72-73.

6. See also Juvayni/Qazvinī, vol. 1, pp. 167, 170-71 and 214; and Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 209-10, 213-15 and 259.

7. Juvayni/Qazvinī, vol. 3, pp. 83-88; and Juvayni/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 602-6.

whatever he considered to be the empire's legitimate obligations, but persistently refused to fritter away the wealth of the empire for the benefit of special interests.

Finally, as a gesture of good will to mark his accession, Möngke pardoned many captives and prisoners throughout the empire. No particulars are given on the individuals involved, but it appears likely that the beneficiaries were common criminals and prisoners of war rather than any of Möngke's political opponents who had been exiled or incarcerated.⁸

Möngke's efforts to bring under control the worst abuses that were inflicted on the settled population naturally were not effected immediately or fully. The old habits died hard, but the emperor continued to insist that surrendered populations be subject only to the established exactions of the state and freed from the demands of greedy officials and the spoliation of ill-disciplined troops. Möngke clearly was interested in rebuilding and repopulating previously devastated areas. In his parting message to Hülegü on the eve of the latter's departure for western Asia, the qaghan commanded his brother: "In all circumstances be alert and prudent and make the agricultural population safe and secure from unjustified molestation and harassment and bring back despoiled provinces to a habitable condition."⁹ The same injunction also was placed upon Shams al-Dīn when he was invested as the Kart ruler.¹⁰ In China, too, the emperor encouraged efforts to rehabilitate areas in decline. Liu Ping-chung, an adviser to Qubilai, recommended to his master that Hsing-chou in Hopei ought to be restored and rebuilt, and suggested Chinese officials for the job. Qubilai agreed and then memorialized Möngke to this effect. The emperor readily consented to the proposal and assigned the suggested officials, Chang Keng and Liu Su, to the task.¹¹

8. Rashid/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 597; Rashid/Boyle, p. 220; YS, chap. 3, p. 16.

9. Rashid/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 687.

10. Sayf/Siddiqī, pp. 169-70.

11. YCMGSL, pp. 87-88; YS, chap. 160, p. 1704; and HYS, chap. 229, 6a.

In areas where military operations were under way, Möngke demanded that destruction be kept to a minimum. Troops and officers assigned to campaign against the Sung were commanded to leave peaceful populations entirely alone, and in the event of armed resistance, to refrain from unnecessary killing and destruction. Plunder was restricted and, whatever their rank or station in life, those who defied this ban or in any way disturbed the peasants' agricultural labors were liable to harsh punishment.

There was, however, one major exception to the ban on indiscriminate pillaging—the sacking of Baghdad, which had the approval of the highest Mongol authorities.¹² The reason for the departure from established procedure in this instance is twofold. First and most important, the 'Abbāsīd caliph, whose seat of government was Baghdad, had refused to take advantage of the opportunity to surrender that was proffered him by the Mongols in conformity with their standard diplomatic practice. Having been rebuffed, Hülegü had no recourse but to follow the instructions given to him by Möngke: "If the caliph of Baghdad submits and hastens to show obedience, cause him no harm, but if he is arrogant and his heart and tongue do not coincide, treat him as you would [any] other [enemy]." ¹³ The Mongols, intent on further conquests in western Asia, for example, in Syria and Egypt, were not willing to abide the long delays necessitated by siege warfare. Towns that decided to fight it out were taken by storm and sacked as a warning to others contemplating resistance.

Aleppo in northern Syria and Wāṣīt in southern Iraq joined Baghdad in rejecting the Mongols' orders of submission, and suffered the same fate as did the 'Abbāsīd capital. Damascus,

12. On the disaster at Baghdad, see Boyle, "Death of the last 'Abbāsīd Caliph," pp. 151–56; G. M. Wickens, "Naṣīr ad-Dīn Tūsī on the Fall of Baghdad: A Further Study," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 7 (1962): 23–35; and Joseph de Somogyi, "A Qaṣīda on the Destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental [and African] Studies* 7 (1933–35): 41–48.

13. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 687.

on the other hand, accepted Mongol terms and was spared.¹⁴ In short, Hülegü, on Möngke's orders, was following a long-established Mongol tactic that frequently gave the Mongols a psychological advantage over their opponents and equally often yielded valuable diplomatic results. By Mongol calculation, the losses occasioned by the assault and sacking of Baghdad were offset by the many bloodless victories the invasion forces obtained when towns capitulated without a fight or put forth only half-hearted resistance.

But this does not provide a complete explanation for the massacre at Baghdad. This act, one of the Mongols' most infamous deeds, cannot be comprehended fully without reference to the religious situation then prevailing in western Asia. Numerous Christian groups, sometime subjects of the 'Abbāsids, used the Mongol invasions as an opportunity to free themselves from Muslim rule, or to avenge past wrongs. The Mongols, of course, were quite willing to utilize this religious tension for their own ends. That many Christians enthusiastically collaborated with the Mongols and that their attitude toward the sufferings of the Muslim community was less than charitable is clearly indicated in a number of sources.¹⁵ Bar Hebraeus, himself a Christian, admits in his chronicle that it was the Muslim population of Baghdad that bore the brunt of the butchery, and that it was the Christian contingents among the Mongol armies that were the most bloodthirsty, as this passage shows:

And the Mongols drew their swords and slew the people of Baghdad—tens of thousands of men—the Iberians (i.e., the Christian Georgians) especially effected a great slaughter. And the Catholicus collected all the Christians

14. Ibid., pp. 715 and 719–20.

15. See J. M. Fiey, *Chrétiens syriaques sous les Mongols (Il-khanat de Perse, XIII^e–XIV^e s.)* (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, vol. 362, subsidia 44; Louvain: Secrétariat du Corpus SCO, 1975), pp. 18–37, for a survey of Christian attitudes and actions during the period of Hülegü's conquests in western Asia. See also the remarks of Kirakos, Kirakos, p. 231.

into the Church of the Third Bazaar and there protected them, and none of the Christians were injured.¹⁶

Muslim historians, too, assign the Christians partial responsibility for the events surrounding the fall of Baghdad. Jūzjānī, who was violently anti-Mongol, asserts that Christians within the 'Abbāsid capital conspired with Hūlegü to effect the destruction of the caliphate.¹⁷ In other locations, Aleppo, for example, Christians also suffered at the hands of the Mongols but this seems to have been a result of chance rather than design.

Thus, Mongol diplomatic practice and indigenous religious strife combined to bring about the disaster at Baghdad. Although this event clearly runs counter to Möngke's basic policies, it should not be viewed in isolation from the rest of the campaign. The final establishment of Mongol rule in western Asia entailed numerous military operations over a large extent of territory—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Asia Minor, and Iran. In terms of the broader perspective, relatively little additional damage was done to the productive capacities of the area as a whole.

To recapitulate, Möngke's reforms had four major objectives: (1) to limit and equalize the burdens borne by the empire's sedentary subjects, (2) to reassert imperial authority within the princely appanages (*fen-ti*), (3) to minimize destruction and population dispersal in active war zones, and (4) to restore the economic vitality of previously devastated areas. The success achieved in each of these spheres is impossible to assess in a precise fashion, but general estimates can be made.

In the first area, a concerted effort was made to peg tax rates and corvée obligations at high but nevertheless tolerable levels, and considerable success was achieved in eliminating the irregular and illegal exactions of corrupt officials and

16. Bar Hebraeus, vol. 1, p. 431.

17. Jūzjānī/Lees, p. 425; and Jūzjānī/Raverty, vol. 2, pp. 1234–36.

grasping princes. These measures will be dealt with at length in chapter 6.

The problem of the princely appanages was a politically delicate one for the emperor. The outright abolition of the system of *fen-ti* in China and elsewhere was simply out of the question. Such an action undoubtedly would have precipitated a princely rebellion, because these grants constituted one of their major sources of income. In fact, far from eliminating the system, Möngke extended it to some degree. Although less generous than Ögödei, who had given out 780,809 households in northern China during his reign, Möngke nonetheless added 142,409 to the total between 1252 and 1258. For the most part, this series of grants was limited to members of the Toluid line and to the emperor's high officials.¹⁸ In 1256, Möngke also made grants of Muslim households in the Amu Darya region to princes and high officials. Unfortunately, in this case neither the number granted nor the names of the recipients are known.¹⁹

Although Möngke, by force of circumstance, left the system intact and even expanded it, he soon introduced measures designed to alleviate conditions within the appanages, often the scene of grinding exploitation, and to bring these territories under the effective control of the central authorities. To this end, according to the Chinese sources, Möngke first of all removed the tax collection from the hands of the princes themselves. Under the new system, a specified amount of the revenue from a district (*chou*) or county (*hsien*) was set aside for the assignee in question. The latter could place a personal representative in the granted area to look after his own interests, but this agent was prohibited from personally collecting the revenue. Instead, the local population brought their taxes to

18 These figures are derived from data contained in the YS, chap. 95, pp. 911-23, which lists individual annual grants (*suu-tz'u*)

19 YS, chap. 3, p. 17. See also the comments of Juvaynī, Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 31; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 42.

an official appointed by the central government; he in turn handed over the appropriate amount to the prince or his designated representative.²⁰ Additionally, the emperor decreed that the civilian households in an appanage, called "five households silk" (*wu-hu-ssu*) in the Chinese sources, were to pay nothing beyond their established silk quotas, that is, there were to be no additional taxes in kind or in coin collected from them.²¹

The extent to which the new measures worked is hard to judge, there being few data on the internal history of particular appanages in this period. What information we do possess suggests, however, that Möngke's efforts met with some success. We know, for example, that it was the emperor who determined the amounts of the annual grants (*sui-tz'u*).²² Inasmuch as a prince's *sui-tz'u* derived in part from the production of his assigned appanage households, it is certainly arguable that the central government must have exercised some authority over these territories. Furthermore, it should be recalled in this connection that in 1257 Möngke intervened at will in Qubilai's *fen-ti* when the latter's behavior aroused the emperor's suspicions.

The situation with regard to princely appanages outside of northern China is even less well understood. The limited information we do have, which relates exclusively to the Jochid territory in Khurāsān, is, however, instructive. Around 1255, Balaghai and Tutar, Batu's nephews, made demands on Shams al-Dīn Kart for supplies and monies from Harāt which the Jochids had traditionally extracted from the city. Shams al-Dīn refused their requests and his action was fully supported by Möngke's brother Hülegü.²³ The Jochids, despite their high standing and their indignant protests, were nonetheless denied a free hand in what they considered to be one of their assigned

20. *YWL*, chap. 40, 23a-b.

21. *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, chap. 2, 23b.

22. *YS*, chap. 3, p. 17, *sub anno* 1256.

23. Sayf/Šiddiqī, pp. 228-33.

territories. Taken together, these data (though certainly not definitive) leave the general impression that a prince's access to and authority within his appanage had been reduced and that of the central authorities increased.

As to the matter of eliminating unnecessary death and destruction during military operations, it is generally conceded that, despite the outrage at Baghdad, Mongol methods of warfare were less destructive in Möngke's time than in that of Chinggis Qan. It has been mentioned previously that in China, Mongol army personnel who committed excesses faced disciplinary action. In the fall of 1256, for example, the emperor launched an investigation in Shantung, where army commanders had reportedly seized people, sheep, and hogs. As a result of this inquiry, the *Yüan shih* relates, perhaps somewhat optimistically, that "all the army was without transgressors."²⁴ Two years later, officers and men found guilty of disrupting Chinese peasants' agricultural labors were flogged, and others were beheaded.²⁵ Blatant and unauthorized acts of violence brought swift retribution in Iran as well. The most dramatic expression of this policy is the case of Hindu Chaq. This individual, a Sönid Mongol long in the service of the empire, was commander of a *tümen* in Khurāsān. For unexplained reasons, he killed a Tāzīk (Persian) civilian. By order of Möngke, Hindu Chaq was turned over to Arghun Aqa, the regional governor, who put him to death before the gate of Tūs, i.e., he was executed in front of the local populace. In addition, his household and all of his property were confiscated and distributed among senior Mongol princes.²⁶ Murder, plunder, and terror were still acceptable political tools for the Mongols of Möngke's era, but, as was the case at Baghdad, they were to be used only at the qaghan's discretion and only on his instructions.

There is good evidence that the efforts made to revive dev-

24. YS, chap. 3, p. 17.

25. Ibid., p. 18.

26. Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, p. 154.

astated and depopulated areas met with some success, particularly in Turkestan, which had been under Mongol rule since 1221. Juvaynī says that Samarkand and Bukhara were flourishing economic and cultural centers in his day as a direct consequence of Mongol restoration efforts. He goes on to state that "the prosperity and well-being of these districts have in some cases attained their original level (that prior to the Mongol invasions) and in others closely approached it."²⁷ Ch'ang Te, an imperial envoy who passed through Samarkand in 1259 on his way to Iran, confirms Juvaynī's claims. Ch'ang describes the city as large, prosperous, and populous, with rich farmlands outside its walls.²⁸ Even Soviet historians, who usually are loath to admit any positive achievement on the part of the Mongols, concede that trade and urban life revived in central Asia during Möngke's reign.²⁹

It should be noted, however, that this rehabilitation, though wide-ranging, was nonetheless selective; as a conscious policy the Mongols set aside certain areas of Turkestan as a permanent nomadic preserve. Rubruck, describing his travels through the Chu River valley in 1253, states that the former cities of the region had "all been destroyed so that the Tartars could feed their flocks there, for it is very fine pasturage."³⁰ This area, which before its conquest and destruction in 1218-19 had had a well-developed urban and agricultural life, was never rebuilt and remained for the next several centuries a bastion of pastoralism.³¹

27. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 96-97 and 108-9. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 75 and 84-85.

28. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng tu-ch'üan chi*, chap. 94, 52-b.

29. B. G. Gafurov, *Tadzhiki: drevneishaia, drevnaia i srednevekovaiia istoriia* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 457-59. He bases his conclusions on both literary and numismatic evidence.

30. *Mongol Mission*, p. 136.

31. See the discussion of K. I. Petrov, *Ocherki sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Kirgizii, V1-nachala XIII vv* (Frunze, 1981), pp. 222-30. For similar preserves established in Azerbaijan (the Mughān steppe) and in Khurāsān, see Vladimir Minorsky, "Mūkhān," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1st ed., vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 710-11, and Jean Aubin, "Réseau pastoral et réseau caravanier: Les grands routes du Khurāsān à l'époque mongole," in *Le monde iranien et l'Islam (Hautes études islamiques et orientales d'histoire comparée)*, vol. 4, Paris: Librairie Droz, 1971), pp. 107-8.

Less spectacular results were obtained in western Asia, but here, too, the Mongols devoted some energy to the work of rehabilitation. In Khurāsān, the city of Khabūshān, badly damaged in the 1220s, was fully restored in the mid-1250s: mosques, buildings, the bazaar, and the irrigation system were refurbished or constructed anew. It is doubtful, however, whether this particular effort was at all typical, because the historian Juvaynī, a member of Hülegü's entourage, owned a fourth of the city and made special representations to the *il-khān* for its restoration.³² In Armenia, which was ravaged throughout the 1220s and finally conquered in 1236,³³ more systematic measures are in evidence. According to Grigor Akanc', Hülegü "began to rebuild devastated places; . . . from each inhabited village he selected householders, one from a small and two or three from large villages . . . and sent them to all destroyed places to undertake rebuilding."³⁴ For those so selected, taxes were remitted. Baghdad, too, was ordered rebuilt upon the conclusion of hostilities in early 1258; on Hülegü's instructions the dead were removed, bazaars opened, and reconstruction initiated.³⁵

Although Mongol success in this instance was limited, it must be borne in mind that, unlike Turkestan, western Asia was a theater of war throughout Möngke's reign, and there was limited opportunity for reconstruction projects.³⁶ The basic challenge here was to keep, so far as possible, the productive capacity of the area intact for future development and exploitation.

32. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 105; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 617. The reconstruction of Khabūshān is also noted by Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, ed. Guy Le Strange (E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. 23, pt. 1; London: Luzac and Co., 1915), p. 150.

33. A. G. Galst'yan, "The Conquest of Armenia by the Mongol Armies," *The Armenian Review* 27 (1975): 356-64.

34. *Nation of Archers*, p. 345.

35. Boyle, "Death of the Last 'Abbāsid Caliph," p. 160; and Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 292.

36. I. P. Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Irane, XIII-XIV vekov* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1960), p. 72.

With regard to eastern Asia, there is a paucity of data by which to gauge the degree of restoration. There are the aforementioned projects designed to revive particular districts in northern China, but the results are not certain. The same can be said of restorative measures ordered for Korea. When hostilities in the peninsula came to an end in the spring of 1259, local Korean officials were instructed "to lead those who had fled disorder back to the mainland³⁷ to plow and plant,"³⁸ but again the practical effects of the directive cannot be ascertained. The only explicit information available on the results of such programs concerns the one instituted in Honan and Shensi—the territories assigned to Qubilai. Here, under the guidance of the prince's Chinese advisers, sustained efforts were made to reinvigorate the economy: in 1252, with the emperor's permission, a pacification office (*hsüan-fu-ssu*) was set up to promote agriculture, establish military colonies and issue exchange notes (*chiao-ch'ao*). In consequence of these measures, conditions in the two provinces are said to have improved markedly.³⁹

Although the success of Möngke's reforms cannot always be determined with certitude, there is no doubt that in general he succeeded in curbing the more flagrant abuses perpetrated by princes and officials, and in limiting the destructiveness of military campaigns. Moreover, though results varied from area to area, the emperor was able to improve, or at least stabilize, the economic life of the most devastated areas of the empire. In judging this matter, however, one should not measure Möngke's success entirely from the standpoint of the welfare of the subject populace. After all, Möngke's purpose in initiating these "reforms" was not to render the peasants' or artisans' lot a happier one, but to gain unfettered access to the resources of the empire. To maximize his take, however, he needed to restore the productive forces of the empire and to protect the

37. The phrase "back to the mainland" refers to the fact that many Koreans had fled to off-shore islands to escape the Mongol onslaught.

38. Koryŏ Sa (Yenching University ed., 1956), chap. 24, 41b.

39. For details, see Hok-lam Chan, "Yao Shu," p. 25-27.

populace from unauthorized exactions, which generated social ills and economic decline. Those who unlawfully exploited the empire's subjects were censured and punished by Möngke not because he considered their actions morally reprehensible, but because these people were in competition with the qaghan for vitally needed goods and services. The populace was to be given security and allowed to retain sufficient wealth to maintain themselves on a continuing basis, but all excess production was to be appropriated for the use of the empire. Möngke's goal was to obtain the maximum amount of resources without depriving the people of their minimum needs. Governmental exactions were intended to be heavy, hence continual complaints that the population's obligations to the state were burdensome are only to be expected and cannot automatically be accepted as evidence that Möngke's "reforms" were a failure. The real measure of Möngke's success is that he was able to press these extensive demands on his subjects without precipitating a serious social and economic crisis.

The Chinese sources and modern sinologists often given Qubilai and his Chinese advisers credit for initiating and promoting these reforms, particularly those concerned with efforts to curtail the destructiveness of military campaigns.⁴⁰ In my view, this line of argument is misleading. Chinese scholars attached to Qubilai were not alone in advocating this course of action. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, the famous astronomer and theologian, who was part of Hülegü's retinue, urged similar reforms. He warned Hülegü that the peasants' needs and their security were very important. Those who forgot this, he asserted, courted disaster.⁴¹ Other non-Chinese officials, such as Maḥmūd Yalavach, who actually had the ear of the emperor, also

40. Franke, *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. 4, p. 322.

41. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 717. On Ṭūsī's life and service under the Mongols, see Rudolf Strothman, *Die Zwölfer-Schi'a: Zwei Religionsgeschichtliche Charakterbilder aus der Mongolenzeit* (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1926), pp. 24-41; and A. J. Arberry, *Classical Persian Literature* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 253-63.

were partisans of reform. In any event, the lesson that in the long run the indiscriminate killing of taxpayers was counter-productive already had been assimilated by part of the Mongol leadership before Qubilai became immersed in Chinese affairs. Möngke's decision to institute these reforms was arrived at through cold, hard political and economic calculation, and was not solely the result of the beneficent influence of Confucian ethics emanating from the camp of Qubilai.

The Administrative Apparatus

Möngke moved quickly to form a new government for the empire after his selection as qaghan. The choice of key personnel apparently was made following the *Ālā Qamāq quriltai*. The Persian sources report that his senior officers were arrayed in order of precedence before the new emperor on the occasion of the ceremonies celebrating his inauguration, an event that took place immediately after his "second election" on the Kerülen.⁴²

Overall direction of the empire's administrative and financial affairs was entrusted to a central secretariat based in Mongolia. Initially, the senior official in this body was Menggeser, a Mongol of the Jalayir tribe, long in the service of the Toluids.⁴³ His family had attended the Chinggisids for three generations. Menggeser himself had been in charge of Tolui's princely establishment and had exercised control over the sedentary population attached to this prince's appanage. Following Tolui's death, he continued in Sorqaghtani Beki's service, and when Möngke departed from Mongolia to campaign in the Rus principalities and Qipchaq steppe, Menggeser ac-

42. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 37; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 571-73.

43. Both Chinese and Persian sources indicated Menggeser's seniority among the officials of the central secretariat. See Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi*, chap. 13, 8a (where his name is transcribed Meng-k'o-sa-le); Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 44; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 578; and *Shur'ah-i panjgānah*, fol. 129R.

accompanied him, acting in various military and administrative capacities. Upon his return to Mongolia, Möngke placed the management of his household in Menggeser's hands.⁴⁴

Once in power, the new qaghan named Menggeser chief judge (*yeke-jarghuchi*)⁴⁵ and senior minister of state. As previously related, his first duty was to conduct a purge of Möngke's political opponents, a task that he carried out with ruthless efficiency. In his capacity as chief judge it was his duty to adjudicate all legal matters and to deal with the complaints of the people. He also was responsible for the security of the emperor's person. For this purpose he commanded the qaghan's personal guard, a body which at times functioned as a kind of secret police.⁴⁶ As the senior minister of state (*ch'eng-hsiang*), he acted as Möngke's second-in-command. Menggeser's personal relationship with the emperor was intimate, and he was able to consult with him on any matter of importance. Menggeser bore ultimate responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the imperial government. Through his subordinates, he managed the religious communities, princely appanages, and the treasury, and was responsible for the receipt of memorials, the issuance of imperial edicts, and the conduct of official ceremonies and sacrifices. In Chinese administrative terminology, he was head of the *chung-shu-sheng* (the central secretariat).⁴⁷

Second in seniority behind Menggeser was Bulghai,⁴⁸ a Kereyid Mongol who professed Nestorian Christianity. His family had served Chinggis Qan as scribes and he, like the chief judge,

44. For biographical data, see YS, chap. 124, pp. 1350-51; and Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, pp. 142-43. See also Pelliot and Hambis, *Campaignes*, pp. 367-69.

45. In Persian garb, *yarghiji-i buzurg*; in Chinese, *ta-tuan-shih-kuan*, literally, "great-decide-affairs official."

46. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 86; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 605; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 586; and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 206-7.

47. YS, chap. 3, p. 15, chap. 124, p. 1351; and Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi*, chap. 13, 9a.

48. In the Chinese sources his name is transcribed as Po-lu-huan, Po-lu-ha and Po-lu-hai. For biographical details, see HYS, chap. 133, 9b-10a; and MWESC, chap. 50, 4b-5b.

had been part of Tolui's household establishment, originally as an officer in the night guard. At Möngke's accession, Bulghai was put in charge of the secretaries and chamberlains, assumed direct responsibility for issuing imperial orders and scheduling audiences (that is, announcing petitioners), received tribute, and recorded memorials concerning internal and external affairs. He also ran the *se-mu* office,⁴⁹ which recruited and controlled the many foreigners in the service of the Mongols.⁵⁰

In the fall of 1253, Menggeser was made commander of a *tümen*, and soon thereafter he died. Bulghai, an intimate of both Möngke and Menggeser, then was made right (senior) minister of state (*yu-ch'eng-hsiang*) and, according to his biography in the *Yüan shih*, "subsequently . . . became responsible for state policy."⁵¹ In rising to the "premiership," Bulghai retained his former duties as head of the secretaries and also acquired Menggeser's responsibilities as chief judge. Rubruck, who arrived at the Mongol court in 1254, describes Bulghai as "chief scribe (*yeke bichēchi*) and judiciary (*yeke jarghuchi*)."⁵² Elsewhere, the friar says that Bulghai "is the chief scribe of the court and tries those guilty of capital offenses."⁵³ From Rubruck's testimony, it is obvious that Menggeser's responsibilities in the area of security and counter-intelligence also were transferred to Bulghai. Because of the possibility of an attempt on the emperor's life, owing to hostility between the Assassins and the Mongols, security at the

49. Yanai Wataru in his *Yuan-tai Meng-han se-mu tai-yü k'ao*, trans. Ch'en Chieh and Ch'en Ch'ing-ch'üan (Taipei, 1963), p. 5, argues that this, the first reference to the *se-mu* office in the *Yüan shih* is the result of a corruption in the text and that the office was not actually established until Qubilai's reign.

50. YS, chap. 3, pp. 15 and 16; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 86-87; and Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 605, give precise and consistent accounts of his duties upon assuming office.

51. YS, chap. 3, p. 1447. Bulghai's biography records that his promotion was a result of a secret agreement with Menggeser. Apparently Menggeser recommended Bulghai as his replacement prior to his death. No further details are given.

52. *Mongol Mission*, p. 184.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

imperial court was extremely tight. Prior to their audience with Möngke, Rubruck and his companions were questioned and searched by Bulghai, who was on the lookout for four hundred Assassins who, it was rumored, were coming to kill the qaghan.⁵⁴

Combining, as he did, control over the administrative, financial, and security organs of the state, Bulghai was the most powerful official in the empire. He had a great deal of influence with the emperor, who usually followed his advice in most matters.⁵⁵ His salary, according to the *Yüan shih*, was derived from an appanage in Su-lu, a locality in Hopci. In 1252 the appanage comprised 415 households, and in 1257 the number had been increased to 1,100.⁵⁶ Möngke obviously was satisfied with the performance of his chief minister. Bulghai survived Möngke and subsequently supported Arigh Böke's claim to the throne. When Arigh Böke finally surrendered to his rival, Qubilai Qan, Bulghai was put to death on charges of having incited the prince to "rebellion."

Under the regimes of both Menggeser and Bulghai, the central secretariat was divided into a series of subsections, each formed to treat specific facets of administration. There was an office in charge of the postal service, headed by a certain Jir-wōdai. The *ortoqs* (*wo-t'o*) working for the imperial court were under the management of two officials, Boral (Po-lan) and Qarasun (Ho-la-sun). A special office dealing with sacrifices, shamans, and fortune-tellers also was established.⁵⁷ The duties of its director, Aqcha (A-hu-ch'a), and his assistant, Alagh Buqa (A-la Pu-hua), were probably related to the officially sponsored veneration of Chinggis Qan initiated by Möngke.

54. Ibid., pp. 153, 162, 172-73, and 184. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 684-85, mentions a warning given to Möngke by an orthodox Muslim, who pointed out the Assassins' success in killing important personages who opposed them.

55. *Mongol Mission*, p. 150.

56. YS, chap. 95, p. 919, and chap. 134, p. 1447.

57. On the organization and importance of soothsayers at Möngke's court, see Rubruck's comments, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 197-201.

The imperial treasuries and arsenals were directed by a Uighur, Tekechük (T'ieh-ko-ch'ou). This same individual was also responsible for the administration of princely appanages in various parts of eastern Turkestan.⁵⁸

Each of the senior officials had many aides and clerks to assist him in his duties. Bulghai, for instance, was assisted by two senior Muslims and a number of Mongols.⁵⁹ The support staff was large, for detailed records were kept of all government business. Rubruck reports that he was queried at length at the imperial court concerning his reasons for coming to the Mongols, and that court scribes, a Mongol and several Muslims, carefully wrote down everything he said.⁶⁰

The volume of paperwork was increased further because of the number of languages in use throughout the empire. Juvaynī states that scribes knowing "Persian, Uighur, Chinese, Tibetan, Tangut, etc.," were employed "so that to whatever place a decree has to be written, it may be issued in the language and script of that people."⁶¹ That all these languages actually were used in the secretariat is evidenced by the fact that in consequence of his stay at the imperial camp, Rubruck was able to describe with great accuracy the writing systems of the Chinese, Tibetans, Mongols, Tanguts, Uighurs, and "Arabs."⁶² Government documents, in whatever language, were written in a simple, direct style, unadorned with superfluous titles and formulas. According to Juvaynī, the Mongols

58. YS, chap. 3, p. 16. Abramowski, "Annalen des Möngke," p. 21, reads this name as T'ieh-ko-hsiu and incorrectly reconstructs the name as *Tekshi. In his biography, YS, chap. 133, p. 1426, Tekechük's name is transcribed T'ieh-ko-chu.

59. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 87; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 605.

60. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 188-90. Records were preserved by the government in an archive. Juvaynī notes that a *farligh* on taxation issued by Möngke was stored in "the archives" (*khazāyin-i adrāj va aurāq*, literally, "the treasuries of scrolls and documents"), Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 75; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 598.

61. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 607. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 89.

62. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 171-72. By "Arab" Rubruck probably meant Persian, which is written in the Arabic script.

in preparing their correspondence used only the "simple name, making no difference between sultan and commoner."⁶³

The qaghan himself on occasion wrote his own edicts, and he maintained close contact with the work of the secretariat: "The emperor," according to the *Yüan shih*, "made drafts [of *jarlighs*] in his own hand, changing them over and over. Afterwards he instituted them (i.e., the *jarlighs*) and supervised his court officials very strictly."⁶⁴ Record-keeping and administrative procedures were well developed and centrally controlled during Möngke's reign.

Owing to the large numbers of administrative personnel, a sizable part of Qara Qorum was set aside for their use. The "capital," in Rubruck's description, was divided into a Muslim section, which housed the bazaar; a Chinese section, where the artisans and craftsmen worked; and a third section, fitted out with large palaces, which was inhabited exclusively by court scribes.⁶⁵ It should be remembered, however, that as Möngke still followed a largely nomadic life style, he was in the capital for only part of the year. The emperor spent the rest of the time in various "satellite" camps and hunting grounds that surrounded the imperial capital.⁶⁶ When he was on the move, a large portion of the imperial court and government traveled with him. In essence, the administrative center of the empire was any place where the qaghan decided to camp.

In concluding this discussion of the central government, two points deserve special emphasis. First, with the exception of an Uighur or two, the senior officials of the secretariat were ex-

63. Boyle's translation. Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 27. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 19.

64. YS, chap. 3, p. 19.

65. *Mongol Mission*, p. 184. For further information on the layout of the imperial court, see the fine article with maps by the Soviet archeologists S. V. Kiselev and L. A. Evstūkhova, "Dvorets Kara-Korumā," in *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 138-66.

66. For more details, see John Andrew Boyle, "The Seasonal Residences of the Great Khan Ögödei," in *The Mongol World Empire* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977), pp. 145-51.

clusively Mongol. Chinese were conspicuous by their absence.⁶⁷ Although Chinese (for example, Chang T'ing-chen) did serve as scribes at Möngke's court, none were to be found at the decision-making levels.⁶⁸ Möngke had been persuaded by the noted scholar Kao Chih-yao to free the *ju* (the Confucians) from corvée and to make more extensive use of them in the administration of Chinese territory, but the emperor saw no need to employ them in responsible positions in the central secretariat.⁶⁹ The Mongols had gained a certain amount of administrative experience by that time and Möngke apparently felt that the governance of the Mongol Empire, so far as practicable, should be in Mongol hands. His decision indicates a growing confidence on the part of the Mongol leadership in its ability to rule as well as conquer.

A second point, which reveals a great deal about the nature of the imperial administration, is that the personnel of the central secretariat, so far as their backgrounds can be traced, were all long-time servitors of the Toluids. In many cases, they not only served Möngke but had attended Tolui and Sorqagh-tani Beki as well. Even in the lower echelons this was true. Chang Shan and his son Chang Li-tao, who were *bichēchis* at the imperial court, had held similar positions in Tolui's household.⁷⁰ Möngke simply drew on his own and his father's household establishment for key personnel.

Such an establishment was built around the personal bodyguard (*kesbig* in Mongolian, *su-wei* in Chinese) which each prince of the blood was permitted to form. The core of

67 Huao Ch'ī-ch'ing, *Hsi-yü-jen*, pp. 48 and 53.

68 YS, chap. 167, p. 1790. A son of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai also served in Qara Qorum, YS, chap. 180, p. 1938.

69 Ibid., chap. 125, p. 1358; and Ch'ien Yüan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols: Their Transformation into Chinese*, trans. Ch'ien Hsing-hai and L. Carrington Goodrich (Monumenta Serica Monographs, vol. 15; Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 19-20. Liu Ping-chung made a similar recommendation. See Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung, A Buddhist-Taoist Statesman at the Court of Kubilai Khan," *TP* 53 (1967): 120-22.

70 YS, chap. 167, p. 1788.

this detachment normally consisted chiefly of the sons and relatives of Mongol noblemen and military commanders, but included other individuals of different ethnic backgrounds who possessed some talent or skill useful to an aspiring prince. In time of war, the guard functioned as an elite military unit and in time of peace it provided the personnel to see to the prince's economic interests and to the maintenance of his household.⁷¹ Consequently, the kinds of duties assigned to the *keshig* were varied. According to the *Yüan shih*, the guard handled matters relating to archery, falconry, and storage of weapons, and provided heralds, scribes, stewards and cooks, gatekeepers, equerries, herders, teamsters, musicians, and the people who maintained the regalia of office and garments.⁷² When one compares the description of the *keshig* in the *Yüan shih* with Juvaynī's chapter on the "pillars of the state,"⁷³ that is, Möngke's central secretariat, one finds that most of the offices and services enumerated in each are common to both. The imperial administration was, therefore, essentially an extension of the prince's household establishment in terms of organization, function, and personnel. It is for this reason that the Mongol Empire in general, and Möngke's reign in particular, have a pronounced patrimonial flavor.⁷⁴

Below the central secretariat there were three, and possibly four, regional secretariats, or administrations, whose main responsibility was to govern the sedentary populations of the

71. Hsiao Ch'ü-Ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 34 and 38.

72. See *ibid.*, pp. 93-94, for a complete translation of the section on the guards in chap. 99 of the *YS*.

73. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 85-89; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 604-6.

74. For a more extensive analysis of the patrimonial character of the Mongol system of government, see Thomas T. Allsen, "Recruitment and Utilization of Central Government Personnel in the Reign of the Grand Qan Möngke, 1251-59," unpublished paper presented to the Joint German-American Conference on the "Evolution of Imperial Governance in China, 10th-14th Centuries," Schloss Reisensburg, Bavaria, August 1982.

empire. There were secretariats for northern China, Turkestan, Iran, and, apparently, for the Rus principalities. In terms of their territorial jurisdiction, these bodies were roughly coterminous with the qanates headed by Qubilai, Qara Hülegü/*Orghana, Hülegü, and Batu/Berke. They were not, however, exact equivalences, as the Turkestan administration had responsibility for Khwārazm, which was part of the Golden Horde, and for Uighuristan, which was a client state directly dependent on the grand qan.

The administrations of northern China, Turkestan, and Khurāsān, first established by Ögödei, were taken over intact by Möngke.⁷⁵ The new qaghan carefully interviewed office holders previously employed in these regional governments, dismissing some and reinstating others. The purpose of these interviews was not only to weed out politically undesirable elements, but to dismiss incompetents as well.⁷⁶ Employment in previous regimes was not a hindrance to continued service so long as the applicant possessed useful skills and had not taken an overt stand against the Toluids. In fact, Möngke's selections to head the three original regional secretariats had held the same posts under the Ögödeids.

The emperor's choice for governor of northern China was Maḥmūd Yalavach, a Khwārazmian merchant who had served Chinggis Qan in various administrative and diplomatic capacities.⁷⁷ Ögödei had placed him in charge of Turkestan at the beginning of his reign and just before his death had transferred him to a similar position in northern China. Maḥmūd had been dismissed from this post by Töregene, but later reinstated by Güyüg. When the latter died, Maḥmūd Yalavach had quickly aligned himself with the Toluids and gained their con-

75. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 503; and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 92.

76. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 85–89; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 603–6. See also Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, p. 158.

77. Maḥmūd was first used as an ambassador by Chinggis Qan, hence his name. Yalavach, which means "ambassador" in Turkic, DTS, p. 228.

fidence.⁷⁸ As an experienced administrator and "old China hand," he was a natural choice for the governorship of northern China, which was headquartered in Peking.⁷⁹ According to Jamāl Qarshī, Maḥmūd Yalavach died in the spring of 1254, a statement that finds indirect confirmation in the failure of the Chinese sources to mention him after that time.⁸⁰

It is not explicitly so stated in any source, but it appears likely that Maḥmūd Yalavach's replacement was Bujir, a Mongol whom Möngke had named as an assistant to Maḥmūd in 1251.⁸¹ The evidence for this suggestion is that in an edict of 1255 concerning religious affairs in northern China, Möngke refers to his recent appointment of Bujir (Pu-chih-erh) as chief judge (*t'ou tuan-shih-kuan*), the title Maḥmūd himself usually bears in the Chinese sources.⁸² Bujir, whose tribal affiliation is unclear, was in Möngke's service by 1247 and perhaps even attended the future qaghan during the Qipchaq campaign of 1236-41. He lived into Qubilai's reign, and he seems to have favored, as did most of Möngke's followers, the claims of Arigh Böke over those of Qubilai.⁸³

Möngke's selection for the governorship of Turkestan was Mas'ūd Beg, Maḥmūd Yalavach's eldest son. When Ögödei transferred Maḥmūd to China in 1241, Mas'ūd replaced his father. Like his father, Mas'ūd had run afoul of Törege, been

78. HYS, chap. 133, 4a; and MWESC, chap. 46, 2b. Maḥmūd Yalavach and his descendants served the Mongols for four generations in China, Turkestan, and Iran. For a brief study of this family, see Thomas T. Allsen, "Maḥmūd Yalavach (Ya-lu-wa-ch'ih)," forthcoming in *Yüan Personalities*, vol. 1, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz and Hok-lam Chan (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz).

79. YS, chap. 134, p. 1435; YWV, chap. 62, 12a; and Chang Chih-han, *Hsi-yen chi*, chap. 19, 7b.

80. Jamāl Qarshī, *Mulhaqāt al-sūrah*, p. 139.

81. YS, chap. 3, p. 15.

82. Ts'ai Mei-piao, *Yüan-tai pai hua pei-chi-lu* (Peking, 1955), pp. 101 and 103. For a translation, see Ed. Chavannes, "Inscriptions et pièces de chancellerie chinoises de l'époque mongole," *TP* 5 (1905): 378-79, n. 4, and 391-92.

83. YS, chap. 122, p. 1328, and chap. 124, p. 1352; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 225; and Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 601, where his name is restored as Qūchū. See also Pelliot and Hambis, *Campaigns*, pp. 5-7; and Thomas T. Allsen, "Bujir (Pu-chih-erh)," forthcoming in *Yüan Personalities*.

reinstated by Güyüg, and joined the Toluid camp at an early date. He remained at his post in central Asia throughout Möngke's reign and later he, and subsequently his sons, served the Chaghadaid and Ögödeid rulers of Turkestan.⁸⁴

The governorship of Khurāsān, centered at Tūs,⁸⁵ was bestowed upon Arghun Aqa, an Oyirad Mongol. Having mastered the Uighur script,⁸⁶ Arghun soon gained entrance into the imperial administration as a secretary. He was first named governor of Iran by Törcgene, but despite this, in Toluid eyes, unholy association, he managed to convince the new emperor of his competence and loyalty and was reaffirmed in office. He headed the Khurāsān administration throughout all of Möngke's reign, although on several occasions he was recalled to Qara Qorum and subjected to close scrutiny on charges of corruption. After Möngke's death, Arghun continued in the service of Hülegü, but with diminished powers, and died in 1275.⁸⁷

As already mentioned, within the confines of the Golden Horde no regional administration of this type seems to have been established in either Ögödei's or Güyüg's reigns. Ögödei, of course, died while the Jochids still were consolidating their hold on eastern Europe, so there was little opportunity to set up a regional secretariat during his tenure in office. Given the brevity of Güyüg's reign and the animosity that existed between the qaghan and the Jochid leader, it is not surprising that there is no mention of one being introduced at that time, either.

Neither the Chinese nor the Persian sources, which record in

84. For a brief sketch of his career, see V. V. Bartold's, *Istoriia Turkestana*, in his *Sochinieniia*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 148-49.

85. Dawlatshāh, *Tagkirat al-shurā*, ed. E. G. Browne (London and Leiden: Luzac, 1901), pp. 157-58.

86. On the importance of knowing the Uighur script in Möngke's reign, see Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 4-5; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 7.

87. See Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, pp. 483-86 and 565; Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 72-75 and 177; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 242-62; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 505-25.

some detail the appointments of Maḥmūd Yalavach, Mas'ūd Beg, and Arghun Aqa in 1251, make any reference to a similar appointment with regard to the Golden Horde.⁸⁸ Apparently, no such regional administration, staffed by and controlled from Qara Qorum, existed there until 1257, after Batu's death. The *Yüan shih* records that in that year Möngke selected Kitai (Ch'i-tai) to be the *darughachi* (*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) of Russia (Wo-lu-ssu). Not much is known about Kitai except that he was a Qonggirad Mongol, a descendant of Dei Sechen, who was the father of Börte, Chinggis Qan's senior wife, and that Kitai's father, Nachin or Lachin,⁸⁹ was an imperial son-in-law.⁹⁰ Although information on Kitai's activities in the Golden Horde is lacking, it is significant that chronologically, the date of his appointment to the office and the dates of the institution of the census, the imposition of taxes, and the formation of *tümens* in the Rus principalities coincide exactly. These being the principal tasks assigned to the regional administrations in China, Turkestan, and Iran, it is reasonable to assume that Kitai headed an equivalent organization within the Jochids' realm.

In theory at least, these governors were jointly appointed by the senior Chinggisid lines acting in concert. They were, in other words, supposed to be the representatives of the entire royal family, not personal agents of the grand qan. The collegial character of this office is indicated by the fact that the governors served several masters simultaneously. For example, Rashīd al-Dīn, in the *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, lists Arghun Aqa as a minister (*amīr*) of both Möngke and his brother Hülegü, and Maḥmūd Yalavach as a minister of both Möngke and Qubilai.⁹¹

88 YS, chap. 3, p. 15; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 73-74; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 505-25.

89 Lachin (La-chen) and Nachin (Na-ch'en) are, respectively, the Turkic and Mongolian words for "falcon."

90 YS, chap. 3, p. 17, and chap. 63, p. 600. For further information on this family, see Louis Hambis, *Le chapitre CVIII du Yüan che* (Monographies du T'oung Pao, vol. 3; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), pp. 17-20; and Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, pp. 394-401.

91 *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 129R, L, 131L, and 137R.

Even though Möngke was careful to retain the principle of collegiality as a matter of form, there is good evidence that whenever possible he ignored it in practice, as, for instance, when he appointed Maḥmūd Yalavach to China despite Qubilai's reservations. Obviously, Maḥmūd's selection can hardly be considered a joint appointment. In actuality, then, the governors owed their positions to the emperor and were ultimately answerable to him. As we shall see, Möngke kept these officials under continual and close surveillance lest they take the collegial aspects of their duties too seriously.

The primary responsibility of these regional secretaries was the assessment and collection of taxes in the territories under their jurisdiction. This is made abundantly clear in the sources. The *Yüan shih* describes Yalavach (Ya-lu-wa-ch'ih), Buḥir (Puchih-erh), and others as being "charged with the collection of taxes in China (T'ien-hsia)," ⁹² and Rubruck identifies Argon (Arghun Aqa) as the individual "in charge of tribute" in Iran. ⁹³ In addition to their control over revenue matters and the census, the heads of the regional administrations settled disputes among local officials and dynasts. When Shams al-Dīn Kart and Sayf al-Dīn, the ruler of Gharjistān, had a dispute over the extent of their respective jurisdictions, Arghun Aqa intervened to settle the matter. ⁹⁴

To accomplish their tasks, these governors were granted wide powers. A Chinese source characterizes the extent of the authority enjoyed by the chief judge (*ta tuan-shih-kuan*), Yalavach, in the following words:

At the beginning of the dynasty, there was no leisure to establish offices and regulations. All urgent military and civilian affairs were decided entirely by the *tuan-shih-kuan*. The *tuan-shih-kuan* conducted the government in Yen (Peking) [while] the imperial carriage still halted at Ho-ning (Qara Qorum). The administration of the units

92. YS, chap. 4, p. 19.

93. *Mongol Mission*, p. 212.

94. Sayf/Šiddiqī, pp. 186-89.

of ten, units of a hundred,⁹⁵ and the *chous* of the central plain (that is, China) were vested in it (the office of *luan-shih-kuan*).⁹⁶

In the Chinese sources, as noted previously, these governors usually are called chief judges. This title, however, is never applied to them in the west-Asian sources. Rashīd al-Dīn calls Mas'ūd Beg *sahib-i Turkīstān* (minister of Turkestan),⁹⁷ and Jūzjānī calls him *jumlat al-mulk* (minister of state).⁹⁸ Arghun Aqa is titled *amīr-i buzurg* (great *amīr*) in some Persian sources,⁹⁹ and *pashkaq* (*basqaq*) in an Armenian chronicle.¹⁰⁰ It is apparent that there was no single title in use throughout the empire for holders of this office.

The organizations these governors headed were basically branches of the central secretariat (with which they worked closely) set over designated areas to oversee and direct the activities of the local authorities in accordance with the wishes of the qaghan. For example, Arghun Aqa's organization was, therefore, the *dīvān* (secretariat) for Khurāsān,¹⁰¹ and Mas'ūd Beg's the *dīvān* for Turkestan. Given the size of their jurisdictions, it was necessary for the governors and their staffs to travel continually to discharge their duties effectively. Juvaynī, who was attached to Arghun Aqa's *dīvān*, complained that his scholarly activities had been curtailed greatly by the constant travel, saying that he could only "snatch an hour or so when the caravan halts" to work on his history.¹⁰² With great appro-

95. As will be discussed later, the Mongols organized the sedentary population into administrative units of ten, one hundred, one thousand, and ten thousand.

96. Ma Tsu-ch'ang, *Ma Shih-t'ien wen-chi*, chap. 14, 12b. For other comments on the wide powers enjoyed by the *jarghuchis* in the early years of the empire, see YS, chap. 125, p. 1357; and YW/L, chap. 67, 12a.

97. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 688.

98. Jūzjānī/Lee, p. 398; and Jūzjānī/Raverty, vol. 2, p. 1147.

99. Sayf/Šiddiqī, p. 173.

100. Orbelian, *Histoire de la Sionne*, p. 232.

101. Sayf/Šiddiqī, p. 170, uses the term *dīvān-i Khurāsān*.

102. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 152. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 118.

priateness, the *Yüan shih* in one place refers to administrations headed by Maḥmūd Yalavach, Maṣ'ūd Beg, and Arghun Aqa as *hsing-shang-shu-sheng*, literally, "mobile secretariats."¹⁰³

Each governor had a large staff to assist him. Among Maḥmūd Yalavach's immediate associates were several Mongols, some Muslims, and a Chinese, Chao Pi, who provided advice on local matters and represented Qubilai's interests at Peking. From Chao Pi's biography in the *Yüan shih*,¹⁰⁴ it is evident that there was a certain amount of friction between him and Yalavach, which mirrored, no doubt, the ongoing conflicts between their respective masters, Qubilai and Möngke. Other Chinese also attended Yalavach and his successor, Buḥir. Liu Min, who had assisted (and quarreled with) Yalavach during Ögödei's reign, was reassigned to the governor in 1251. In 1255 Liu Min requested that his son be allowed to succeed him, and this was granted.¹⁰⁵

The same pattern of staffing was common to other regional administrations. Arghun Aqa had several Muslims in his employ to provide the governor with special knowledge of local conditions and administrative procedures, among them the historian Juvaynī and his father. The chief scribe (*ulugh bitigchi* in Turkic) of Arghun's secretariat was Fakhr al-Dīn, a Khwārazmian with long service in Iran. When the latter died, his son Ḥusam al-Dīn, who knew the Uighur script, replaced him. There were also representatives of the various Chinggisid lines on Arghun's staff. Najm al-Dīn, a *bichēchi*, represented Batu's interests in the administration of Iran. Sorqaghtani, likewise, had a spokesman, Sirāj al-Dīn, in Arghun Aqa's retinue.¹⁰⁶ Even the qaghan had his own liaison officers, Turumtai and

103. YS, chap. 3, p. 15. See the remarks of Chin-fu Hung, "China and the Nomads: Misconceptions in Western Historiography," *HJAS* 41 (1981): 608.

104. See his biography in the YS, chap. 159, pp. 1697-98. He was a member of Qubilai's entourage.

105. YS, chap. 153, p. 1640.

106. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 246, 250-51, 258 and 260; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 509, 513, 514, 521, and 523. Both Fakhr al-Dīn and Najm al-Dīn are mentioned in the YS, chap. 3, p. 15, under the transcriptions Fa-ho-lu-ting and Ni-chih-ma-ting.

Naimadai, attached to the Khurāsān secretariat. Such agents appear to have been selected from among a prince's closest associates, the members of his household establishment. At least, those of Möngke are referred to as "companions" (*nököd*), a title which indicates that the bearer held high rank in the guard/household establishment.

The extent of the influence of the representatives of the princely lines in the regional administrations is not clear. There is no available information on their exact duties and prerogatives. It is my belief, however, that these representatives were concerned primarily with their prince's holdings in the territories to which they were assigned. The Jochids, for example, enjoyed revenues from properties in Khurāsān, Möngke had rights in certain areas of the northern Caucasus, and almost all princes of the blood had appanages of various sizes in northern China.¹⁰⁷ It seems likely, then, that these representatives, usually called *bichēchis*, were assigned to guarantee that a given prince's income from an appanage in a qanate other than his own should be delivered on time and in full. This interpretation is perfectly consistent with Möngke's edict cited above, concerning the collection of taxes within princely appanages. In any event, there is no suggestion in the sources that these representatives ever successfully interfered with or blocked the implementation of Möngke's political and economic program.

On the local level, most governing officials were selected from the native population. Knowledge of local conditions, languages, and administrative traditions was essential for those working in direct contact with the settled population of the empire. The Mongols themselves had neither the numbers nor the cultural background to provide personnel of this type.

Within China, Chinese scholars and administrators were attached to Qubilai as advisers, and many others were employed

107. See Jūzjāni/Lees, p. 406; Jūzjāni/Raverty, vol. 2, p. 1172; *Mongol Mission*, p. 211; and *YS*, chap. 2, p. 13.

by the emperor and his agents.¹⁰⁸ Yüeh-ho-nai, an Önggüd Turk who assisted Bujir, utilized numerous Confucian scholars as local leaders in Honan.¹⁰⁹ The emperor, too, was responsible for appointing Chinese to positions in the local administration. Some, like Hsü Shih-lung, who was named customs officer in Yen-ching (Peking), refused, but many others accepted.¹¹⁰ Those who did accept the appointments were listened to by the emperor. Chou Hui, who was made transportation commissioner for Honan in 1252, suggested various improvements and reforms in the system, all of which were approved by the court.¹¹¹ A few Chinese even were given the post of *darughachi*, an office normally reserved for Mongols and Turks. In 1258, shortly after its capture, the emperor named P'eng T'ien-hsiang as *darughachi* for O-ting Pao, a city in Szechwan, and another Chinese, Wang Chung, as his assistant.¹¹² Chinese also were appointed as pacification officials (*an-fu-shih*) for appanages with the express purpose of rehabilitating these areas. In 1251, two *darqad* (singular, *darqan*)¹¹³ complained of the depopulation of their appanages (*fen-ti*) in Hsing-chou, an administrative subdivision of Hopei. In response, Chinese officials were sent to the area, and significant improvements were said to have resulted.¹¹⁴

Within the confines of the Golden Horde, local administrative personnel, except for those already attached to the retinues

108. The practice of using native officials in northern China had begun much earlier. In fact, many Chin civil and military officers were left in place as the Mongols extended their control over the area. For a detailed study, see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period," *JESHO* 9 (1966): 88-144.

109. YS, chap. 134, p. 1435. The latter source gives his name as Yüeh-nai-ho. The proper form of his name is Yüeh-ho-nai, i.e., the Christian name "John." See YWL, chap. 67, 11b-12a.

110. YCMCSL, 12, 11b; and YS, chap. 152, p. 1634.

111. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'uan chi*, chap. 54, 12a.

112. YS, chap. 3, p. 18.

113. Individuals given tax immunity in consequence of some important service rendered the empire.

114. YS, chap. 4, p. 19. See also Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung," pp. 24-25.

of Rus princes, were not in the main drawn from the native Slavic population. A tax collector of Slavic origin, not apparently part of any prince's entourage, is mentioned in one source,¹¹⁵ but in general, Khwārazmian Turks, the *Bessermīn* of the Rus chronicles, were recruited for this purpose.

In the *Īl-khānīd* realm, the pattern of staffing on the local level of government was similar to that of China. After the city of Baghdad was taken, Muslim officials were assigned to various localities in Iran and Iraq. Three Persians, for instance, were named to assist the Mongols in governing the province of Damascus, which as previously noted, had surrendered to the armies of Hülegü without resistance. And in Baghdad itself, the historian Juvaynī was made governor.¹¹⁶ For the most part, those recruited for such duties in the *Īl-khān* realm were natives of the province of Khurāsān.¹¹⁷

As regards dependent states, local dynasts built up their administrations with family members and native officials. Quṭb al-Dīn, the ruler of Kirmān, selected his staff from a pool of local Muslim learned men and bureaucrats, many of whom had served him previously. To this the Mongols added five *basqaqs*, all Mongols or Turks, to judge by their names.¹¹⁸ These *basqaqs*, recruited from the emperor's household, watched over and reported on the activities of the locally recruited officials. On this level there was in effect a dual administration: one native, to carry out the day-to-day chores of government, and the other Mongol (or at least nonindigenous), that continually monitored the work of the former on behalf of the central authorities. From the standpoint of personnel, as one moves from the upper echelons of the imperial administration to the lower, the number of Mongols em-

115. Perfecky, trans., *Hypatian Codex*, p. 68.

116. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 714-15; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 25; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 34.

117. On the importance of Khurāsānīs in Mongol service in the decades after the conquest, see Hāmid-Allāh Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, pt. 1, p. 147.

118. Kirmānī/Iqbāl, pp. 36-37.

played declines markedly and the role of individuals from the local population increases substantially.

Just as the activities of local administrations were monitored by the regional administration and the *darughachi* on the spot to ensure that the programs of the emperor were not undercut by local interests, so the emperor, his central secretariat, and his liaison officers kept a close surveillance on the activities of the regional administrations. So far as can be determined from the sources, all orders of the qaghan, of whatever importance, were transmitted to the regional secretariats as written directives. Rubruck records that when the petition of an Armenian monk, who had requested two hundred ingots to rebuild a church, was approved by the emperor, Möngke ordered that a letter be "addressed to the official who receives the tribute in Persia and greater Armenia (that is, Arghun Aqa) telling him to pay him (the monk) the said sum of money."¹¹⁹ Similarly, when Hindu Chaq, the Sönid commander was executed (see above), the order was carried out on the basis of signed instructions from the emperor.

To make sure that the directives actually were implemented according to instructions of the central authorities, the records of the regional administration, particularly those that related to financial matters, were checked periodically by the central authorities. Arghun Aqa's handling of the affairs of Khurāsān was carefully scrutinized by Bulghai in 1252, and in 1256-57 the governor again was required to journey to Qara Qorum for another assessment of his performance. On this occasion, Arghun's revenue accounts (*muhāsibāt*) were gone over with great care, the auditors being Chinese scribes (*kitbah-i khitāi*).¹²⁰ And when Möngke found it necessary to check the financial affairs of the regional administration of northern China, which was staffed by Mongols, Turks, and Muslims, he used a sinicized Khitan, Yeh-lü Chu, the son of Yeh-lü Ch'u-

119. *Mongol Mission*, p. 116.

120. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 259; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 522.

ts'ai, to conduct the investigation.¹²¹ Thus, like the local administrations that were monitored by superior bodies—the *darughachis* and the regional administrations—the latter in turn were monitored by the central secretariat. This, as indicated, took the form of periodic investigations conducted by *ad hoc* groups of trusted officials whose ethnic affiliations differed from those undergoing scrutiny.

Despite the emphasis placed on centralized control, initiatives from below still were possible. Recommendations for action on the part of local officials are reported frequently in the Chinese sources. These often originated with Chinese officials attached to Qubilai, who then passed his advisers' memorials on to the emperor with an indication of his approval. The subjects covered in the recommendations ranged from the cancellation of taxes in particularly impoverished areas to the establishment of military colonies as a means of easing supply problems.¹²²

When one looks at the overall structure of the imperial administrative system, it is apparent that there were multiple chains of command and considerable sharing of responsibility. *Darughachis*, regional governors, dependent rulers, and *il-qans* all played a role in the administrative system of the empire, and all on occasion had an opportunity to communicate directly with the emperor. To have circumvented the qaghan's orders for their own benefit, these various authorities would have had to conspire together, an unlikely occurrence in view of the fact that they were most often antagonistic toward one another. When, for example, Arghun Aqa took the census in Georgia and Armenia in 1254, Muslim scribes, *darughachis*, probably of Turkic and Mongol origin, Jochid liaison officers, and local rulers, all with divergent interests, participated.¹²³ Any major infraction of orders committed by one party certainly would

121. YS, chap. 180, p. 1938.

122. *Ibid.*, chap. 155, p. 1658, and chap. 158, p. 1683.

123. Kirakos, p. 221

have been reported by another. Although it is obvious that the constant backbiting and bureaucratic infighting generated by ethnic rivalries and disputes over jurisdiction made a certain amount of inefficiency inevitable, this system of governance nonetheless provided the central authorities with a greater measure of control over their underlings than would have been possible under a system with a more rationally defined chain of command and delimitation of responsibilities. A certain vagueness and duplication of authority may have been deliberately built into the system so as to encourage individuals, interest groups, and administrative units to watch over and report on one another. Given the size of the empire and the slowness of communications, it seems unlikely that a better system, measured in terms of control, could have been devised.

In the military sphere, the emperor had, as noted in chapter 3, the right to nominate commanders for major field operations. To maintain his authority within the military machine he quite naturally named only his closest associates to such posts: Ked Buqa, who led the advance guard into Iran; Uriyangqadai, who commanded the Mongol forces in southwestern China; Chaghan, in charge of Mongol and Chinese armies in Liang-hui; and Sali Noyan, the commander of imperial armies on the Afghan-Indian frontier, were all members of Möngke's guard/household establishment.¹²⁴ This accounts for the seemingly humble titles, such as steward (*ba'urchi*), often carried by high-ranking military officers.

The Pattern of Resource Mobilization

From the foregoing it is evident that in consequence of the circumstances surrounding his accession and the policies he had pursued upon coming to power, Möngke successfully concen-

124. YS, chap. 3, p. 15, and chap. 121, p. 1310; Juvaynî/Qazvîni, vol. 3, p. 72; *Shirab-i panjgāhī*, fol. 129R; and Jean Aubin, "L'ethnogenèse des Qaraunas," *Turcica* 1 (1969) 72-73 and 79.

trated a great deal of political and administrative power in the office of qaghan. Additional evidence for this conclusion will be presented in the following chapters, which show that the center's demands for resources were met on the regional and local levels.

The basic demands that the Mongols imposed on all of their sedentary subjects are clearly summarized in Qubilai's order of 1267 to the ruler of Annam: (1) the ruler must come personally to court, (2) sons and younger brothers are to be offered as hostages, (3) the population must be registered, (4) militia units are to be raised, (5) taxes are to be sent in, and (6) a *darughachi* is to take charge of all affairs.¹²⁵ Another set of instructions to surrendering states, directed to the Korean monarch in 1262, contains the same demands, but also requires the establishment of postal relay stations, *jams*.¹²⁶ Although these two decrees transcend the chronological limits of this study and deal specifically with client states, they nonetheless provide a basic blueprint of the methods of controlling and exploiting the sedentary population of the empire that were used during Möngke's reign. Obviously, the first two demands, concerning attendance at court and hostages, are not appropriate when discussing areas directly under Mongol control, but the remaining points apply without qualification. There was, in fact, no difference between the obligations of the subject populace directly subordinate to Mongol rule and those living in dependent states. A farmer in Georgia or in the Uighur kingdom bore the same burdens as the Chinese peasant in Hopci or his counterpart in Khurāsān. Even the administrative structure was basically the same. In all cases, native officials who knew the local languages and customs worked alongside Mongol-appointed residents, usually foreigners, who looked after the interests of the qaghan.

125. YS, chap. 209, p. 2196.

126. The text of this order is given in the *Koryŏ Sa*, chap. 25, 26a–27b, and translated by W. E. Henthorn, *Korea: The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963), p. 194.

As Henthorn indicates, the orders of submission consistently attribute these "instructions" to Chinggis Qan. Although it is true that he is responsible for the basic elements, there is good reason to suppose that two of the requirements, namely, the submission of population registers and the establishment of postal relay stations, ought to be credited to his successor, Ögödei.¹²⁷ Möngke, therefore, took over an already developed system from his predecessors. He did introduce some notable refinements, such as the monetization of taxation, but his real achievement, as viewed from the standpoint of Mongol imperial interests, is that he managed to implement the system throughout the vast empire in a fairly uniform manner. Considering the fact that by Möngke's reign the Mongol Empire embraced a multitude of peoples and states differing widely in language, administrative practices, cultural traditions, and forms of social and economic organization, his success in imposing a measure of order in the face of such diversity is all the more remarkable.

127. Henthorn, *Korea*, p. 194.

5. Population Registration

The Technique

Census taking is an important instrument of social control and resource mobilization in all modern nation states, and was so in many premodern imperial regimes.¹ This is certainly true in the Mongol case, where population registration was the key institution in the empire's efforts to regulate and exploit its subjects, whether nomads, agriculturalists, or urban dwellers.

Soon after the proclamation of the empire in 1206, Chinggis Qan ordered the Tatar foundling, Shigi Qutuqu, who was his brother (or son) by adoption, to take charge of the judicial affairs of the newly founded state, and to supervise the apportionment of subject peoples among the imperial family. These matters, the emperor further ordered, were to be recorded with care in a book, the "blue register" (*kökö debter* in Mongolian and *ch'ing-ts'e* in Chinese) for future administrative use.² The purpose of this directive was twofold: to establish precedents for legal decisions and to maintain a record of peoples and lands (appanages, or *qubi* in Mongolian) assigned to various princes and military commanders.

1. See Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 30-52.

2. On the "blue register," see *SH*, par. 203, pp. 142-44; Ratchnevsky, "Shigi Qutuqu," pp. 95-98; Paul Pelliot, "Les *kökö dabter* et le *hou-k'ou ts'ing ts'eu*," *TP* 27 (1930): 194-98; and Liu Ming-shu, "Yüan-tai chih hu-k'ou ch'ing-ts'e," *Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu hui-k'ou* 7 (Sept. 1947): 101-6.

Evidence that such records actually were kept can be found in paragraph 222 of the *Secret History*, which reports that Chinggis Qan ordered that "Degi, the shepherd, assemble the *unregistered* and command them as [a military unit of] a thousand."³ To judge from this passage, military recruitment was one of the primary aims of population registration in the period of the early empire. Moreover, because the Mongols as yet had few sedentary subjects, those carried on the rolls were mainly nomadic peoples. It was not until Ögödei's reign that a systematic registration of the sedentary population was attempted.

No census having been taken in northern China since 1206, the date of the last Chin registration,⁴ Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Ögödei's chief Chinese minister, urged that one be initiated as soon as possible. A limited census was carried out in 1234, and in the same year the emperor directed that plans for a more comprehensive survey of the population be prepared. This registration, supervised by Shigi Qutuqu, was begun in 1235 and completed the following year.⁵

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's purpose in advocating a new census and the Mongols' reasons for following his advice differed appreciably. The minister, whose major objective was the restoration of the traditional Chinese administrative order in northern China and a concomitant reduction of the power of the appanage princes, viewed population registration as an essential administrative tool to help facilitate the hoped-for transition to

3. My italics. In the Mongol text the term for "unregistered" is *bukde'ul*, a word unattested elsewhere. Apparently it has the basic meaning of "concealment." The Chinese text of the *SH*, however, translates this word with the phrase, "the people who are not entered in the register." See Pao Kuo-yi, *Studies on the Secret History of the Mongols* (Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 58; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 36 and 62, and n. 82. Cf. Cleaves's translation, *SH*, par. 222, p. 161.

4. For Chin censuses, see Ho Ping-ti, "An Estimate of the Total Population of Sung-Chin China," in *Etudes Song*, ser. 1, pt. 1, ed. Françoise Aubin (n.p., Mouton & Co., 1970), pp. 34-45.

5. Ratchnevsky, "Shigi Qutuqu," pp. 108-11; and N. Ts. Munkuev, *Kitaiskii istochnik o pervykh Mongol'skikh khanakh* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 43-47.

Chinese-style government.⁶ The Mongols, on the other hand, saw the census in a much different light; to them the major goal of population registration was the increase of revenues and the expansion of the appanage system in China. And, in fact, this is what happened. In 1236, by imperial decree, new appanages were granted to all senior princes of the blood.⁷ According to one contemporary estimate, nearly half of the total population of northern China came under the power of these princes.⁸ Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's endeavors at political and social reform had received a sharp rebuff. The Mongols, however, had come to appreciate fully the potentialities of population registration as a means of extracting goods and services from their subjects.

The next attempt at a comprehensive census was initiated by Möngke in 1252.⁹ On this occasion, the population of the entire empire was to be registered.¹⁰ This, of course, was an enormous and unprecedented undertaking, but, as we shall see, it was successfully completed before the end of the emperor's reign.

Juvaynī records that "for the purpose of assessing taxes and registering the names of the people, [Möngke] appointed governors (*hākīmān*), *darughachis* (*shahinagān*), and secretaries (*kitbah*)."¹¹ From this and other testimony, it is apparent that

6. Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai: Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman," in *Confucian Personalities*, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 203-5. On the Chinese tradition of population registration and its role in the Chinese system of governance, see Hans Bielenstein, "The Census in China during the Period 2-742 A.D.," *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities* 19 (1947): 125-63, and Michel Cartier and Pierre Etienne Will, "Démographie et institutions en Chine: Contribution à l'analyse des recensements de l'époque impériale (2 ap. JC-1750)," *Annales de démographie historique* (1971): 161-235. Although the latter work covers the era of Mongol rule in China, the authors do not discuss the censuses initiated by Möngke.

7. YS, chap. 2, p. 13.

8. YWL, chap. 57, 16a-b.

9. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 74-75; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 598.

10. Ed. Dulaurier, "Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens," *JA* 166 (1860): 288-89, from the "Universal History" of Vartan.

11. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 596. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 72.

the regional secretariats, local *darughachis*, and a host of scribes (*bichēchi*) were made primarily responsible for accomplishing this task. Local dynasts and regional qans in all areas of the empire—China, the Rus principalities, Iran, and the Caucasus—were required to provide whatever additional support, whether administrative or military, that was necessary to fulfill Möngke's directive.¹² The actual counting was done mainly by the scribes. The census in Diyār Bakr (upper Mesopotamia), for example, was conducted by a certain Sharāf al-Dīn, a secretary (*bīlikjī*, Turkic *bitigchi*), on orders of Arghun Aqa.¹³ Likewise, as will be discussed below, the enumeration in Russia was headed by a scribe.

The data collected in the course of registering the population was "inscribed on the books."¹⁴ In the Chinese sources of Möngke's time, these census rolls were still called "blue registers" (*ch'ing-ts'e*), as they had been in Chinggis Qan's day.¹⁵ Of the internal arrangement of these registers, nothing is known. Nor is there any explicit information as to the languages in which they were kept. It seems likely, however, given the importance of the census, that results would have been recorded in several languages: one copy in the local language of administration (for example, Chinese in China) and another in Mongolian or Uighur for the use of the emperor and the central secretariat. The ethnic composition of the census-taking teams in western Asia certainly hints that this was the case.

The basic unit of accounting was the household, as can be seen from the population figures in the *Yüan shih*, which are always presented in this fashion. The account of the census in the *Chronicle of Novgorod* also confirms that this was true: "And the accursed ones (the Mongol officials) began to ride through the

12. YS, chap. 163, p. 1742, mentions Qubilai's involvement in the census. See Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 2, pp. 256–57; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 519–20.

13. Sayfī/Šiddiqī, pp. 174–75.

14. *Nation of Archers*, p. 125.

15. *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, chap. 3, 102.

streets, writing down the Christian houses."¹⁶ The adoption of this method of calculation continued the Mongols' traditional practice of expressing the size of a tribe by referring to the number of tents.¹⁷

But, although the household was the basic unit of accounting, it was still important for the Mongols to know something of the structure of the individual family in terms of sex and age. The Armenian sources indicate that the names of individual males above a certain age (either ten or fifteen) were entered into the rolls, women being excluded.¹⁸ The reason, of course, was that for the purpose of distributing military service and corvée duties among the population the imperial administration required precise figures as to the number of adult males in each household. This was not just a matter of making an equitable distribution of obligations within a particular region, but, more important, of utilizing available manpower in a rational manner: how many men could be spared for military duty, and how many should be retained for agricultural labor and other productive pursuits? That such questions were a matter of governmental concern is indicated by a directive promulgated by Möngke in 1252, in which he ordered that the family backgrounds of all recent draftees in China be checked to make sure that those inducted came from the larger families, that is, households that could be expected to absorb the loss of

16. PSRL, vol. 4, p. 223; and *The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471*, trans. and ed. Robert Michell and Neville Forbes (Hattiesburg, Miss.: Academic International, 1970), p. 97.

17. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 175.

18. Kirakos, p. 221, indicates ten as the minimal age, and the *Nation of Archers*, p. 325, states that men between the ages of fifteen and sixty were recorded. The exclusion of women from the census rolls poses a further problem. Inasmuch as only one source, Kirakos, notes this exemption, I am not at all certain that this was a standard practice. But if, indeed, the Mongols uniformly excluded women, this represents a major divergence from Chinese procedure in population registration (upon which the Mongols drew so heavily), for in T'ang and Sung household registers, wives, and in some cases children, were listed together with adult males. See Ikeda On, "T'ang Household Registers and Related Documents," in *Perspectives on the T'ang*, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 129, 135, and 137-43; and Ho Ping-ti, "An Estimate of the Total Population of Sung-Chin China," p. 46.

an able-bodied field hand.¹⁹ The emperor was simply balancing out the manpower needs of the economy against those of the military, a problem that sooner or later plagues all rulers in time of war.

The only category of adult males exempted from inclusion on the rolls was the clergy. Not being registered, these individuals were freed from *corvée* and military obligations, and received at least partial and in some instances total immunity from taxation.²⁰ The exemption applied not only to all of the major religions of the empire—Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and Christianity—but also to certain other categories of learned men, for example, the adherents of Confucianism, who are not usually viewed as forming a religious community.²¹ This extensive immunity, first proclaimed by Chinggis Qan and subsequently reaffirmed by Ögödei,²² also was granted by Möngke; Chinese, Russian, Armenian, and Georgian sources all make note of the clergy's exemption in his reign.²³

The special treatment accorded the clergy reflected the Mongols' rather eclectic religious tastes and general tolerance in such matters,²⁴ but it was also a useful political tool, a means of persuading local religious elites to cooperate with the occupying power. For example, Cyril, the Metropolitan of Kiev, who at first supported the anti-Mongol princes of Galicia and Volynia, in the end (1252) threw his considerable weight behind Alexander Nevsky, the prince of Novgorod and

19. YS, chap. 134, p. 1438.

20. The Mongols always exempted the clergy from the poll tax, but not necessarily from agricultural and commercial taxes. In China, for instance, some churchmen were obliged to pay the latter levies while others were freed of this obligation. Examples of both kinds of immunities can be found in Nicolas Poppe, *The Mongolian Monuments in H'pags-pa Script* (Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, vol. 8; Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1957), pp. 47, 50, 55.

21. YS, chap. 134, p. 1435.

22. Chinggis Qan issued the first of these exemptions to the Taoists in 1223. See Ts'ai, *Yüan-tai pai-hua*, p. 1. For a translation, see Ed. Chavannes, "Inscriptions et pièces de chancellerie chinoises de l'époque mongole," *TP* 5 (1904): 370.

23. See, e.g., Kirakos, p. 222; Bruxet, *Georgie*, p. 552; Ts'ai, *Yüan-tai pai-hua*, p. 17; and *PSRL*, vol. 18, p. 71.

24. For a good example of the Mongols' laissez-faire attitude toward religion, see Möngke's remarks to Rubruck, *Mongol Mission*, p. 195.

champion of accommodation. As Joseph T. Fuhrman notes, the Mongol practice of granting tax immunities to churchmen helped to "ease" Cyril's transition into the camp of accommodation.²⁵

Because the census was the mechanism by which the populace's major obligations to the state were assigned, it is not surprising that individuals attempted to evade registration whenever possible.²⁶ To discourage this, the Mongols imposed harsh penalties, including execution, upon those caught fleeing or hiding from the census takers.²⁷

A further measure of the importance that the Mongols attached to population registration is that it was standard practice for the results of a census in a specific region to be dispatched to Qara Qorum immediately after completion, often in the hands of the official who had carried out the enumeration.²⁸ In the case of Harāt, the registration was conducted by a team of officials consisting of two Mongols, Lablaqa²⁹ (Lablaqāī) and Merkidei (Markitāī), and two Muslims, Majd al-Ārkān and Shihāb Mu'ayyad, who had been dispatched there by Möngke. As soon as they completed their assignment, Merkidei, who was the senior official, returned to the imperial court to report the results to the emperor.³⁰ It is not difficult to see why the qaghan insisted that the census results be treated in this way. So long as the population figures in the possession of the central

25. Joseph T. Fuhrman, "Metropolitan Cyril II (1242-1281) and the Politics of Accommodation," *Jahrbucher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 24 (1976): 161-71, especially p. 166.

26. See the remarks of Juvaynī, *Juvaynī/Qazvinī*, vol. 1, p. 25; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 33-34.

27. *Nation of Archers*, p. 325.

28. In giving the orders to conduct the census, Möngke admonished his officials that when they finished they were "to turn back and proceed in haste to court." Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 3, p. 75; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 598.

29. This name is attested in the *SH*, par. 225, p. 164.

30. Sayf/Şiddiqī, p. 249. Although not so stated in this source, it is likely that the Mongol court received only an extensive summary of the results, the complete census rolls, because of their bulk, being retained at the local level. This, in any event, was standard Chinese practice. See So K'ee-long, "The System for Registration of Households and Population in the Sung Dynasty: An Institutional Analysis," *PFEH* 25 (1982): 7-9.

secretariat were up-to-date and accurate there was little opportunity for local officials and rulers to withhold monies or men from the imperial administration for their own benefit. With current data on hand, the emperor and the central secretariat were able to make a fairly reasonable estimate of the quantities of taxes and the number of military recruits they could expect from a given province or client state. Local interests still could (and no doubt did) line their pockets to a certain extent, but no major deception was possible under these conditions.

Besides registering the civilian population, the census was used to ascertain and maintain the manpower levels of the military establishment. Rashīd al-Dīn reports that in 1253 Arghun Aqa and his associate, 'Alī Malik, who had been entrusted with the territories of Isfahān and Nīshāpūr, "were ordered to carry out a new census of the *ulus* and the army (*lashkar*) . . . and when they had finished these tasks, to return to court."³¹ No further explanation is offered by the Persian historian, but there are good grounds for supposing that the census of the *ulus* (the Mongolian word for "people")³² refers to the registration of the general population, whereas the census of the army refers to some kind of muster to determine if units on active duty were at their authorized strength, that is, to see whether military households actually were providing the recruits demanded of them. What is known of Mongol practice in China clearly supports this interpretation of Rashīd al-Dīn's statement. The *Yüan shih* in one place states that in 1252, the year that a general registration was ordered, Möngke directed a Merkid tribesman named Kōkō (K'uo-k'uo) to verify (literally, endorse, *ch'ien*) the military registers (*chün-chi*) throughout China.³³ In another place, this same source makes reference to the verification of the "civilian" registers (*min-chi*) generated by the 1252 census.³⁴ The implication of these data

31. Boyle's translation, Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 218-19. See also Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 596.

32. See Doerfer, *TAMEN*, vol. 1, pp. 175-78. See also *DTS*, p. 611.

33. *YS*, chap. 134, p. 1438.

34. *Ibid.*, chap. 99, pp. 953-54.

is that in China, as well as in Iran, there was one set of registers for the general population (the civilian households), and another set for those subject to military service (the military households).

In addition to monitoring the strength of military units and keeping track of military households, the "census of the army" had another important function: to record the ranks and establish the seniority of military officers. This seems to be the meaning of Juvaynī's statement that the commanders of *tümen* and lesser units received gifts at the coronation of Güyüg "in due order . . . according to the census."³⁵

In the broadest sense, the census was an inventory of the talent and wealth of the empire, the means by which skilled craftsmen were identified and economic resources surveyed.³⁶ The larger goal is reflected in a statement in the *Georgian Chronicle*, which relates that Arghun Aqa recorded everything "from men to animals, from cultivated fields to vineyards, from gardens to orchards."³⁷ It was for this reason that the Mongols customarily included a demand for a census in their instructions to surrendered states. In their view, the surrender of a foreign state was not just an admission of military defeat and of political subordination, but a pledge that the surrendering state would actively support the Mongols in their plans for further conquest. To fulfill this pledge, the surrendered state had to place its entire resources at the disposal of the empire, and because a census was needed to identify and utilize these resources effectively, the Mongols came to consider submission and the acceptance of the census as synonymous acts.³⁸

One further point should be made. The fact that Möngke

35. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 254. See also Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 209.

36. Kirakos, p. 221, speaks of the obligations imposed on artisans, miners, metalworkers, dyers, and others.

37. Brosset, *Géorgie*, p. 551.

38. Sayf/Siddiqī, p. 208. On occasion, the invitation to submit to a census was used as a *ruse de guerre* to lure the unsuspecting to their deaths. See Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 712, and *Mongol Mission*, p. 37.

made such a heavy administrative investment in population registration is a good indicator of the basic orientation of his political and economic policies.³⁹ Census taking on this vast scale is the best evidence we have that imperial policy was geared toward long-term, systematic exploitation of the subject populace, and not toward the short-term and one-time-only benefits of massive pillaging.

The Census in China

In the winter of 1247, some years after the registration of 1235-36, Güyüg commanded that yet another be undertaken.⁴⁰ Nothing is known of this census, but it appears either to have been ordered on a limited basis or, which is more likely, never completed because of the emperor's brief reign. In any event, five years later, in 1252, Möngke found it necessary "to examine the rise and fall of the population [and] again an order was handed down to register them (the inhabitants of northern China)."⁴¹ The management of this census was in the hands of Bujir and his staff. Specific areas were made the responsibility of different officials. For example, the Önggüd Yüeh-ho-nai (who, it will be recalled, was an assistant to Bujir) was put in charge of registering the people of the Honan area (Chung-yüan).⁴²

Thereafter, registration and reregistration were more or less continuous. There are references to a census in 1255, and to another in 1257.⁴³ And in the fall of 1258 the emperor directed a certain Liu T'ai-p'ing to determine the population of Hsing-yüan, a locality along the Shensi-Szechwan border.⁴⁴ The rea-

39. Whenever possible, the Mongols made use of the census rolls of defeated states. After the capture of Ta-h in 1253, for example, Qubilai ordered that a search be made for registers; YS, chap. 4, p. 20.

40. Ibid., chap. 2, p. 14. For a general summary of census taking in the Yüan, see Huang Ch'ing-hen, *Yuan-tai hu-chi chih-tu yen-chiu* (Taipei, 1977), pp. 131-34.

41. YW/L, chap. 40, 15b-16a. See also YS, chap. 3, p. 16.

42. YW/L, chap. 67, 11b-12a; and YS, chap. 134, p. 1435.

43. YS, chap. 98, p. 948, and chap. 160, p. 1703.

44. Ibid., chap. 3, p. 18.

son for these ongoing efforts was to fix the obligations of the inhabitants of recently surrendered areas and, of equal importance, to enroll the "floating" population that had escaped the previous registrations held in territories already under Mongol control.⁴⁵ The census of 1257 seems to have been devoted largely to reregistering households with the object of isolating and recording this migrant population. No figures on the total number of new registrants are available, but the sources indicate that as a result of these efforts, some success was achieved. The biography of Pu T'ien-chang, for instance, records that he managed to register three thousand migrant households in Honan in 1257.⁴⁶

According to the geographical monograph of the *Yüan shih*, the census of 1235-36 registered 873,781 households in northern China, and the census of 1252 added over 200,000 to this total.⁴⁷ (In actual fact, as will be shown below, these figures do not represent the total population of northern China.) The indicated increase cannot be ascribed solely to natural population growth. Nor can it be attributed to the acquisition of additional population through conquest, since the frontiers of the Mongol territories in China (basically the old Chin lands) did not undergo any change of consequence in the period 1235-52, and Möngke's campaigns in southwestern China did not commence until after the census was under way. A substantial portion of this increase certainly resulted from a more determined registration effort.⁴⁸ Not only were hitherto unregistered migrant households picked up, but additionally, new categories of people were placed on the census rolls for the

45. During the 1252 census, many people ran away to avoid being counted, and others, with the connivance of local Chinese officials, arranged, illegally of course, to have their names stricken from the population registers. See Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi*, chap. 24, 6b.

46. *YS*, chap. 191, p. 2043.

47. *Ibid.*, chap. 58, p. 527, and *YWT*, chap. 40, 15b-16a.

48. Efforts were made, for instance, to identify and register defrocked Buddhist monks. See *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, chap. 2, 21a-22a; and Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, vol. 2, p. 86.

very first time. For example, Wang Yün, a scholar in the service of Qubilai, reports that in some areas of northern China, Muslims (Hui-hui) did not have to register until 1252. Thereafter, he indicates, they were included and were required to pay taxes.⁴⁹

The figure of 1,000,000-plus households supplied for Möngke's reign should not, however, be taken as the total population of northern China at that period. Besides an unknown quantity of the floating population that was able to evade the initial registration and the subsequent reregistrations, there is good reason to believe that by government design certain sizable categories of the population were not included in the reported figure. This is obvious from the fact that in Ögödei's time the total number of households in north China actually had been in the neighborhood of 1,830,000, not the 873,781 reported in the geographical monograph of the *Yüan shih*.⁵⁰ There being no reason to believe that the population of northern China declined by nearly half between 1236 and 1252, there are good grounds for supposing that the figure of 1,000,000-plus shown for Möngke's reign represents only part of the total population. But how is one to account for the "missing" households?

In the first place, the population figures reported in the geographical monograph for Möngke's reign do not include those households subject to military service, since the military monograph of the *Yüan shih* states specifically that the number of the military households counted in the registrations of 1252,

49. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan chi*, chap. 88, 5b. For further information on the Muslims in northern China, see Paul Pelliot, "Une ville musulmane dans la Chine du nord sous les Mongols," *JA* 211 (1927): 261-79.

50. The figure 1,830,000 is arrived at by combining the results of the 1234 census, which numbered 730,000-plus, the so-called "old households," with the 1,100,000-plus, the so-called "new households," numbered in the registration of 1235-36. These figures are given in the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*, text available in Wang Kuo-wei, ed., *Meng-ku shih-liao sui-chung* (Taipei, 1975), pp. 213 and 215. The *Yüan shih*, chap. 2, the basic annals of Ögödei, pp. 12 and 13, repeats the figures from the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*. See also the discussion of Franz H. Schurmann, *The Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 67.

1271, and 1274 was kept secret for reasons of security.⁵¹ But the bulk of the "missing" households must certainly belong to yet another category, namely, those attached to princely appanages, called in the sources "five households silk" (*wu-hu-ssu*). It is evident from the great discrepancy between the population figures for Ögödei's time given in the *Sheng-wu ch'in cheng lu* (1,830,000) and those given in the geographical monograph of the *Yüan shih* (873,781) that some major category of the populace was left out of the latter. This can only be the "attached" populace, who were said to have made up half of the population of this period.⁵² It is, therefore, likely that the figures provided in the geographical monograph for Möngke's reign (1,000,000-plus) also included only those households directly subordinated to the government (*hsi-kuan-hu*), the so-called *ta-shu-mu*, or "great majority category," and excluded the "attached" categories. The only other alternative is to hypothesize a catastrophic decline in the population between 1236 and 1252, for which, however, there is no evidence.

Although this is probably a correct surmise, the corollary argument, propounded by Otagi Matsuo, that the census of 1252 covered only those categories of the population not attached to appanages—that is, that no census was taken in the territories allotted to the Mongol ruling class—runs counter to the available evidence.⁵³ In the first place, a memorial of 1271, preserved in the *Yüan tien-chang*, recommended to the throne a thorough reexamination of the household register (*hu-chi*) of the appanages (*fen-chien*), arguing that various discrepancies in the registers compiled during the census of 1252 were now the

51. YS, chap. 98, p. 947; and Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 74.

52. YWL, chap. 57, 16a b.

53. This is the argument of the Japanese scholar, Otagi Matsuo, "Mōkōjin seiken jika no kanchi ni ikeru hanseki no mondai," in *Haneda hakushi shōju kinen toyo-shi ronso* (Kyoto, 1950), pp. 381-429. My understanding of his argument is based on the English summary of this article, pp. 9-10, and the discussion in Schürmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 93-94.

cause of "serious inconvenience."⁵⁴ In chapter 95 of the *Yüan shih*, which deals with the annual grants, stipends, and salaries bestowed on Mongol princes, military commanders, and high officials, there are frequent references to appanages held by various individuals during Möngke's reign, and in every instance the locality of the allotment and the precise number of attached households are provided.⁵⁵ Census figures obtained in 1252 are given for forty-one different appanages. We know, for example, that in this year a certain Al-li-k'an (?Arghun) enjoyed the revenues from 305 households in Chi-ning, an administrative subdivision in Shantung.⁵⁶ The results of the 1257 census are reported for twelve appanages. Hülegü (Hsü-lieh), the emperor's brother, had rights on 25,056 households in Chang-te, a subdivision in Honan.⁵⁷ These data clearly show that the central government did, in fact, register the population within the appanages, even though it seems certain that these allotted households are not included in the 1,000,000-plus figure.

To summarize, it is probable that there were three distinct population categories in China during Möngke's reign: one for civilian households, one for military households, and one for appanage households.⁵⁸ In all likelihood, the figure of 1,000,000-plus reported in the *Yüan shih* for Möngke's reign refers, as does the figure of 873,781 for Ögödei's reign, only to the first category, namely, the civilian households directly subordinated to the central government. As for the number of households in the two remaining categories, I have been unable to find any explicit data for Möngke's reign. I estimate,

54. *Yuan tien-chang*, chap. 17, 1b.

55. *YS*, chap. 95, pp. 911-23

56. *Ibid.*, p. 917

57. *Ibid.*, p. 913

58. There is possibly a fourth category as well, for the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, chap. 2, 8b, mentions that war captives (*ch'u-hu*) were placed on separate registers in the 1252 census. This, however, is the only reference to this group that I have encountered in the sources, and I have no further data on their status or numbers.

however, that there may have been around 500,000 military households⁵⁹ and perhaps 800,000 to 900,000 appanage households.⁶⁰ Whatever the total population of northern China and the actual percentage of households in each of the three categories, there were fairly extensive records available on the numbers and whereabouts of the Mongols' Chinese subjects in Möngke's time, records that continued to be used in the first decade of Qubilai's reign.⁶¹

Elsewhere in eastern Asia, the Mongols made frequent demands on the Korean court for a census, but no comprehensive registration was ever carried out owing to the continuous warfare in the peninsula between 1231 and 1259.⁶² And according to an imperial edict preserved in the writings of 'Phags-pa bla-ma, a census was ordered for Tibet in 1252. No certain evidence exists, however, that any registration was conducted there during Möngke's reign. In the opinion of Luciano Petech, the first and only Mongol census in Tibet took place in 1268.⁶³

The Census in Iran

What appears to be the first census (*shumārah* in Persian, literally, number or computation) attempted by the Mongols in western Asia took place in 1240. In that year, Körgüz (George), the Uighur governor of Khurāsān and the predecessor

59. This estimate is based on the fact that in 1268 the combined quota of Han and Mongol military households in northern China was set at 720,000. This matter will be discussed more fully in chap. 7.

60. I arrived at this estimate by calculating the total number of appanage households distributed between 1236 and 1258. According to figures provided in the *Yuan shih*, chap. 95, pp. 911–23, Ögödei granted 780,809 and Möngke 142,409, for a grand total of 923,218.

61. *YS*, chap. 99, pp. 953–54.

62. Henthorn, *Korea*, pp. 75, 76–77, and 104.

63. János Szerb, "Glosses on the Oeuvre of Bla-ma 'Phags-pa, I: On the Activity of Sakya Pandita," in *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, ed. Michael Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1980), pp. 291–92, and Luciano Petech, "The Mongol Census in Tibet," in *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, pp. 233–38, especially p. 237.

of Arghun Aqa, carried out a "new census" in Iran. Although the wording "new census" may imply that there was a Mongol-inspired population count prior to the one conducted by Kōrgūz, I can find no evidence for this. According to Juvaynī, this enumeration was limited to Khurāsān and to Māzandarān, an area to the south of the Caspian Sea.⁶⁴ Another registration was ordered in Güyüg's time, but it too, seems to have been carried out on a limited basis.⁶⁵

The next census, which was undertaken in a much more comprehensive manner, dates from Möngke's reign. Despite the assertion in the *Georgian Chronicle*⁶⁶ that this enumeration was initiated on Batu's orders, it is clear from other sources that Möngke was in fact responsible. The Persian and Armenian sources are unanimous in affirming the qaghan's lead in this matter.⁶⁷ The erroneous claim of the Georgian source may be related to the efforts of the Georgian ruling house to obtain Batu's support in their disputes with the officials whom Möngke had stationed in their realm.⁶⁸

The census in western Asia, originally ordered in 1252, was under the general direction of Arghun Aqa. The governor and his retinue reached Khurāsān, after a long journey from Mongolia, in the fall of 1253, and immediately set about making arrangements for the registration. Prominent among Arghun's associates were two Mongol *amīrs* (*noyad*, singular *noyan*), Naimadai and Turumtai,⁶⁹ who were attached to the governor's entourage as the personal representatives (*nököd*) of the

64. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 229; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 492-93. There is also a report of a registration in Asia Minor around 1241. See *Nation of Archers*, p. 313.

65. Sayf/Šiddiqī, p. 175, dates this registration in 1248, but this source is frequently in error regarding chronology.

66. Brosset, *Georgie*, p. 550.

67. See, for example, Orbelian, *Siounie*, p. 232; and Galst'ān, p. 26, the *Chronicle of Sebastiatsi*.

68. Allen, *History of the Georgian People*, pp. 113-14, notes Batu's long-time involvement with the Georgian princes.

69. Naimadai means "he of the Naiman (a Mongol tribe)," and Turumtai is the Mongolian word for "sparrow hawk." On the latter name, see *SH*, par. 85, p. 28.

qaghan. It was their duty to monitor the activities of Arghun and his staff on behalf of the emperor during the course of the registration. For the actual enumeration, the territory under Arghun's jurisdiction was divided into sections, as was done in China, and teams were assigned to survey the population of each. Naimadai and Bahā al-Dīn, Juvaynī's father, took responsibility for western Iraq; Fakhr al-Dīn, the chief scribe of the *dīvān* of Khurāsān, and several unnamed Mongol amirs were given Khurāsān and Māzandarān; Arghun Aqa and Najm al-Dīn, Batu's representative in Khurāsān, took Georgia, Ārrān, and Azerbaijan; and, finally, Turumtai and several Muslim officials were assigned an unspecified region.⁷⁰ In each team of census takers there were representatives of the princes of the blood. In addition to Najm al-Dīn,⁷¹ who, as mentioned above, accompanied Arghun Aqa to the Caucasus, another representative of the Jochids, a certain Töre Aqa, later joined the governor in Armenia.⁷² Möngke's brothers also had *nököd* attached to the various counting teams. Qubilai, Hülegü, and Möge were represented, and when Sorqaghtani died, Arigh Böke, who had inherited her *ordo*, also inherited her interests in western Asia, along with her personal agent, Sirāj al-Dīn.⁷³

In most areas, the registration was completed in the following year or two. The census in Armenia was conducted in 1254, as was the enumeration in Iran. The *History of Harāt*, however, puts the date of the census in Afghanistan somewhat later. In this particular instance, the date of the census is in-

70. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 255–58; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 517–21.

71. In the *Chronicle of Stepanos Episkop*, in Galst'ān, p. 35, it is stated that the census of 1254 in Armenia was conducted by Arghun Aladin. Such a name, however, is not possible, since the element "Arghun," which is of Turkic origin, could not be put in construct with the Arabic "al-Dīn," "of the faith," an element forming part of many Muslim names. The most likely solution is that this is a combination of the names of Arghun Aqa and Najm al-Dīn. I do not know if this is incorrect association of Arghun with al-Dīn is a printer's error, a mistake on the part of the Russian translator, or a corruption in the original Armenian text.

72. Kirakos, p. 221.

73. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 255 and 256; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 518 and 519.

licated by referring to the "aforementioned" (*maẓkūr*) year, which can be traced back to 1258.⁷⁴ But under this same year the *History of Harāt* relates the circumstances surrounding the conflict between the ruler of Sīstān and Shams al-Dīn, the ruler of Harāt, an event that the anonymous *History of Sīstān* dates to the year 1255.⁷⁵ Inasmuch as the *History of Harāt* is weak on the chronology of Möngke's reign—dates provided are consistently off by two or three years—it seems quite likely that 1255 was the actual date of the census in eastern Khurāsān.

There is confusion, too, over the timing of the census in Georgia. Armenian and Persian sources⁷⁶ record that Arghun Aqa conducted the registration there in 1254, but the *Georgian Chronicle* puts that event in 1258.⁷⁷ This apparent contradiction is, however, easily resolved. Arghun did begin his enumeration of Georgia in 1254, as reported in the Armenian and Persian sources, and then left the area to attend to other business. After traveling in 1256–57 to Qara Qorum, where he successfully defended himself against charges of corruption, he returned to western Asia in 1258, consulted with Hülegü, and then proceeded to finish the census in Georgia.⁷⁸ In short, the registration in Georgia was carried out in two distinct phases, one in 1254 and the other in 1258.

Considering the size of the Khurāsān administration and the speed with which the census was completed in most regions, the enterprise was carefully planned and well executed. An adequate staff was obviously needed. The number of low-level clerks and counters is nowhere indicated, but it must have been sizable.

74. Sayf/Šiddiqī, p. 249.

75. *Ta'rikh-i Sīstān*, ed. Bahār, p. 398; and Smirnova, *Istoriā Sīstāna*, p. 370. Further confirmation that 1255 is the correct date can be found in Rashīd al-Dīn. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 692, which in 1256 refers to Merkidei, the chief census taker in Harāt as the *shahnah* of Harāt, a post he did not obtain until after he returned to Harāt from Qara Qorum, whither he had gone with the census results.

76. Kirakos, p. 221; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 258; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 521.

77. Brosset, *Géorgie*, p. 550.

78. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 261; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 524.

Lastly, mention again should be made of the ethnic makeup of the census teams, which in all cases included both Mongols (or central-Asian Turks) and Muslims. As argued previously, this strongly suggests that population registers, or abstracts thereof, were kept in several languages: in the indigenous language for local use, and in Mongolian or Uighur for the use of officials at the imperial court.

As regards the census in central Asia, of which little is known, it will be convenient to make a few comments here. In 1252, Mas'ūd Beg was directed to register the population under his jurisdiction, which included Uighuristan, Farghana, and Khwārazm.⁷⁹ Although there is no direct confirmation of this in the local sources, there being none extant for the period of the Mongol domination, it is fairly certain that the census was carried out as ordered.⁸⁰ We know, for instance, that the head tax was collected in Turkestan at that time, and as its assessment was intimately connected with the census, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the registration, too, had been implemented. Moreover, given the attention the emperor usually paid to the work of his subordinates and the importance he attached to the census, Mas'ūd Beg could hardly have retained his post, as he did throughout Möngke's reign, if he had failed to comply with this order.

The Census in Russia

In the Rus chronicles, the census taken by the Mongols is always designated by the term *chislo*.⁸¹ Like its counterpart *shumā-*

79. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 73–75; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 597–98.

80. D. I. Tikhonov, *Khoziāistvo i obshchestvennyi stroi uigurskogo gosudarstva*, X XIV vv. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1966), pp. 100–101, indicates that a census, with households as the counting unit, was taken in Uighuristan in 1252. The author does not provide a source for this statement.

81. For general accounts of census taking in Russia during the Mongol period and later, see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongol Census Taking in Rus', 1245–1275," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5 (1981): 32–53, which draws heavily on this chapter; and Henry L. Eaton, "Cadasters and Censuses of Muscovy," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 54–69.

rah in Persian, the word *chislo* in Russian has the basic meaning of "number." The Mongol term for a census is not precisely known, but it, too, seems to have been the word for "number" (*togha*, *to'a*, or *to'o*). In several Mongol texts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, *togha*, or one of its variants, is used in connection with the counting of people, civilians as well as military personnel.⁸²

The first census reported in the Rus principalities is that of 1245. The *Chronicle of St. Sophia* records that in that year the population of Kiev was registered and tribute (*dan*) was imposed, on orders from Batu.⁸³ Carpini, too, alludes to a Tatar census during his stay in Rus, but without indicating the locality. These two reports are sometimes viewed as referring to the same event.⁸⁴ There are, however, chronological difficulties. Carpini was in the Rus principalities twice—in the winter of 1246 when he first arrived in Mongol territory, and in the late spring and early summer of 1247 after he had returned from the imperial court in Mongolia and was on his way back to Europe. Carpini indicates that the census he had heard of had been ordered by Cuyuc Chan (Güyük Qaghan) and Bati (Batu). Inasmuch as Güyük was not elevated to the throne until the summer of 1246, it appears that Carpini had in mind his second stay (during the summer of 1247) when he states that a census occurred "when we were in Russia."⁸⁵ Evidently the two sources refer not to one but to two different registrations. This being the case, the census of 1247 is perhaps connected with registration efforts initiated during Güyük's reign in other areas of the empire, namely, in China and Iran

82. See Antoine Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol du 'Houa i i iu' de Houng-wu*, (1389), ed. Igor de Rachewiltz (*Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, vol. 18; Brussels, 1977), pp. 12 and 29. In the Tibetan documents of the Mongol period, the Tibetan word for "number" also is used to denote a census. See Yu. N. Rerikh, "Mongol-Tibetan Relations in the 13th and 14th Centuries," *The Tibet Society Bulletin* 6 (1973): 48.

83. *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 231.

84. B. Grekov and A. Yu. Iakoubovskii, *La horde d'or et la Russie* (Paris: Payot, 1961), p. 208 and n. 1.

85. *Mongol Mission*, p. 39.

(concerning which, see above). In any event, these two enumerations (or possibly two phases of a single registration) were conducted on a fairly restricted basis. As in Iran, it was not until Möngke's reign that a systematic registration of the population was carried out within the confines of the Golden Horde.

The *Yüan shih* reports that in 1253 the emperor "sent the *bichēchi* (*pi-she* [*ch'ih*])"⁸⁶ Berke (*Pieh-erh-ko*) to ascertain the population of Russia (*Wo-lo-ssu*)."⁸⁷ During the next several years, traffic between the Golden Horde, the imperial court, and Möngke's agents in the field was heavy as preparations were made for the ordered registration. In late 1253 or early 1254, Arghun Aqa, who had just organized the census in Iran, set out for the court of Batu on the Volga. The matters discussed on this occasion are not disclosed in the sources, but Juvaynī relates that they "were transacted in accordance with Möngke Qaghan's edict and [Arghun's] own improvisation."⁸⁸ After he left Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde, Arghun Aqa conducted a census in Armenia in the company of one of Batu's men.⁸⁹ Taking into account the timing of Arghun Aqa's visit and his experience in population registration, it is not unlikely that the question of the census in Russia was the subject, at least in part, of the governor's discussions with Batu.

The activities of Sartaq, Batu's eldest son, at this same period also appear to be connected with preparations for the census. To understand fully the possible implications of his movements, it is necessary to describe his role in the administration of the Jochid realm. Although the information available is scanty, it seems probable that Batu named Sartaq as his successor in the late 1240s and then put him in charge of the Rus

86. The usual transcription of this term in Chinese texts is *pi-she-ch'ih*.

87. *YS*, chap. 3, p. 16.

88. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 521. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 258.

89. Kirakos, p. 221.

principalities.⁹⁰ After that time, decrees to the Slavic population were on occasion issued in the names of both Batu and the heir apparent, as when, for instance, "governors" (*vlastelei*) were ordered to be placed in all the towns of Russia.⁹¹ Furthermore, from 1248 on, Rus princes going to the "ordo" (that is, the court of the Golden Horde) all conducted their business with Sartaq.⁹² Batu is infrequently mentioned in this connection.

Rubruck's remarks concerning the location of the camps of Batu and Sartaq provide additional evidence to show that the Rus lands had been entrusted to the care of the latter, a Christian. Rubruck notes that Batu's *ordo* was on the eastern side of the Volga (Etilia) and that Sartaq's was on the western. Because of this arrangement, he continues, Sartaq was "on the route of the Christians, that is to say, of the Russians, Blaci (Vlachs), the Bulgars of lesser Bulgaria (those on the Danube), the people of Soldaia (in the Crimea), the Circassians, and the Alans, all of whom pass his way when going to his father's court."⁹³ This testimony further confirms that all of the Jochid possessions west of the Volga were under the immediate supervision of Sartaq. It is significant that Sartaq, as an individual directly concerned with the administration of the Christian population of the Golden Horde, traveled east to see Möngke shortly after Arghun Aqa left the Golden Horde for Armenia.⁹⁴ Again, there is no indication of the precise purpose of the visit, but the

90. Rashīd al-Dīn already speaks of Sartaq as Batu's heir apparent at the time of Möngke's enthronement in 1251.

91. *PSRL*, vol. 10, p. 143. The *Nikon Chronicle* puts this event in 1262, a chronological impossibility, because by that time both Batu and Sartaq had been dead for at least five years.

92. See, for example, *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 472, vol. 7, p. 159, and vol. 9, p. 135, for an enumeration of the Russian princes visiting Sartaq in this period.

93. *Mongol Mission*, p. 124. See also p. 126.

94. Sartaq left his *ordo* for Mongolia in the fall of 1254 (*Mongol Mission*, p. 207; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 268) and Arghun Aqa departed from Iran for the lower Volga in late 1253 or early 1254.

conviction that the forthcoming census was a major topic of conversation is hard to dismiss.

Sartaq, as previously stated, was at the imperial camp when news of his father's death reached him. Confirmed as the new ruler of the Golden Horde, he returned to the Volga, where he in turn died. Ulaghchi, Sartaq's young son, was then elevated to the throne, and an intensive period of meetings between the Rus princes and the advisers of the new qan followed. Included in this round of talks were Grand Duke Andrei of Vladimir and Alexander Nevsky.⁹⁵ While these individuals journeyed to Sarai, another prince, Gleb Vasil'kovich of Rostov, went to see the "kaan," that is, the qaghan Möngke, in Mongolia, returning from his travels with a new wife, a Mongol princess.⁹⁶ The renewal of princely patents was no doubt part of the reason for these trips to court, which took place in 1256-57, but the question of the census also played a role. This is evident from the fact that Andrei's domain, the province of Vladimir, was one of the first to be registered, and that Alexander Nevsky, as will be related shortly, was deeply involved in the census in northern Russia.

Some chronicles mention Tatar census takers in the Rus lands in the winter of 1255,⁹⁷ but it appears that the counting was not actually begun until two years later, a delay no doubt occasioned by the deaths of Batu and Sartaq. The *Voskresensk Chronicle* reports that in 1257 the Tatars ordered "a census of all the Russian lands."⁹⁸ The Mongol officials in charge, called *chislenitsi* (counters) in the chronicles, began registering the population of Suzdal, Rîazan, and Miûrom. In the following

95. *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 474, and vol. 9, p. 256.

96. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 474, vol. 7, p. 161, and vol. 9, p. 141.

97. The *Chronicle of St. Sophia*, *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 240, states that the census began in 1255, a tradition followed by later compilations: *PSRL*, vol. 20, p. 163, vol. 25, pp. 142-43, and vol. 26, p. 87.

98. *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 161. See also *PSRL*, vol. 2, p. 342, vol. 3, pp. 55-56, vol. 5, p. 240, and vol. 15, pp. 398 and 400.

year they extended their activities to Vladimir.⁹⁹ The region of Novgorod was counted in 1259. Vernadsky states that western Russia was surveyed in 1260 by the military commander, Burunday (Boroldai is the correct Mongol form), but he cites no source for this assertion. The *Galician-Volynian Chronicles*, moreover, make no mention of any Mongol census at that time or later.¹⁰⁰

Although the chronicles note only the *chislo* instituted among the Christian (Slavic) population, it is known from other sources that in actuality this census embraced the whole of the Jochid realm. The *Georgian Chronicle* states that in addition to the Rus principalities the enumeration in question was carried out in Khazaria (the Crimea),¹⁰¹ Oseth (Alania), Qipchaq, and in the "countries of darkness," a reference to Jochid possessions farther to the north, such as Bulghar on the middle Volga and the Siberian territories east of the Urals.¹⁰² The chronicle provides no further information as to the registration in these areas, but from the *Yüan shih* we know that the enumeration of the Alans (A-ssu) occurred in 1254,¹⁰³ a circumstance that further connects the mission of Arghun Aqa to Batu with the beginnings of the census within the confines of the Golden Horde.

The date indicated in the *Yüan shih* for this census is consistent with other data found in the same source regarding the formation of Alan military units in the Far East. The biography of one Alan military officer, Nich-ku-la (Nicolas?), states that he submitted along with others of his countrymen

99. *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 474-75, vol. 5, pp. 188-89, and vol. 9, pp. 141-42. The Mongolian equivalent of *chislenitsi* was undoubtedly *toghachi*, also meaning "counters." See Doerfer, *TAMEN*, vol. 1, pp. 260-64.

100. Vernadsky, *Mongols and Russia*, p. 215; and Perfecky, *Illyrian Codex*, pp. 74-84.

101. Rubruck also refers to the Crimea as Khazaria (Cassaria). See *Mongol Mission*, p. 90.

102. Brosset, *Géorgie*, p. 550.

103. *Y.S.* chap. 63, p. 600.

during Möngke's reign, and that he subsequently accompanied the emperor on the campaign in southwestern China in the period 1257-59.¹⁰⁴ Inasmuch as Nieh-ku-la and other Alans already had been formed into units and transported to China by 1257, the year of the introduction of the census in the Rus principalities, they must have been conscripted, that is, registered, several years prior to this time. Thus, on the basis of internal evidence, the date of the census in the Alan land, 1254, provided by the *Yüan shih* seems to be reliable.

With respect to the *chislo* in the Rus principalities, only the census in Novgorod is reported in any detail.¹⁰⁵ The news of the impending registration reached the north in 1257 and had an unsettling effect on the populace. When the Tatar officials and their extensive entourages arrived in Novgorod in the winter of 1259, the agitation among the people increased to the point where the would-be census takers, led by an individual named Berkai, began to fear for their lives. They demanded that Alexander Nevsky provide for their security, which he did by assigning to them military contingents officered by local noblemen (*boyars*). The next day, the Tatar officials and their escorts, headed by Alexander Nevsky, rode through the streets of Novgorod. Following this show of force, the lower classes, who had been in the forefront of the opposition, bowed to the Mongols' demands and the registration commenced. Upon completing their mission, the census takers departed in the company of their protector, Alexander Nevsky.¹⁰⁶

Several aspects of the census in the territory of the Golden Horde merit further consideration. First, on the basis of the

104. *Ibid.*, chap. 123, p. 1343. See also chap. 135, p. 1454, the biography of A-ta-ch'ih.

105. *PSRL*, vol. 4, pp. 222-23; and *Chronicle of Novgorod*, pp. 95-97.

106. Guntsev, *Poiski*, p. 202, argues that Berke, the qan of the Golden Horde, was behind this agitation because he wished to undercut the power of the qaghan's officials in his domain, but there is no evidence to support this contention. Furthermore, such a tactic would have been a very dangerous game for Berke to play, a popular uprising against Mongol rule could easily have gotten out of hand and undermined the qan's own power.

dates given for the registration in various regions, it appears that the enumeration began in the southern portions of the Golden Horde, namely the northern Caucasus, in 1254, and then slowly moved north, ending in Novgorod in 1259. The registration thus took approximately five years to complete, a longer period than in other areas of the empire. The length of time needed, as already suggested, was due in part to the deaths of the three qans, Batu, Sartaq, and Ulaghchi. Another factor that accounted for this slow pace is that within the confines of the Golden Horde there was no counterpart to the pool of experienced administrative personnel that was available locally in China and Iran. Given the vast extent of the Jochid realm, obtaining sufficient personnel must have presented a problem.

The second point is that the chief census taker in Novgorod bears the same name, Berke, as the official whom Möngke dispatched to Russia in 1253 with orders to determine the size of the population. The suggestion, first offered by Emil Bretschneider,¹⁰⁷ that the Berkai of the *Chronicle of Novgorod* is the same individual as the *pi-she* (*bichēchi*), *Pieh-erh-ko* of the *Yüan shih*, is in my opinion quite correct. However, alternative interpretations also have been advanced. Two Chinese historians, K'o Shao-min and T'u Chi, have put forward the hypothesis that *Pieh-erh-ko* should be identified with the qan Berke, and *Pi-she* should be identified with Batu!¹⁰⁸ *Pi-she*, however, is not a transcription of the name "Batu," but a truncated form of the title *bichēchi*. In any case, the Berkai of the *chronicle* is definitely not a qan, but an official.

The French sinologist, Paul Pelliot, has interpreted these data in yet another way.¹⁰⁹ He suggests that both Berkai and *pieh-erh-ko* represent titles, not personal names. *Pieh-erh-ko*, he claims, renders the Mongol **berke* or **berge*, a kind of tax collector, transcribed elsewhere in the Chinese sources as *pieh-*

107. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches* vol. 2, p. 80, and n. 840.

108. HYS, chap. 106, 106; and MWESC, chap. 6, 7b.

109. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, vol. 1, p. 93

li-ko. Thus, in Pelliot's view, the *Yüan shih* text should not read, the emperor "sent the *bichēchi* Berke," but rather, he "sent a *bichēchi* and a *berke*." The *berkai* of the *Chronicle of Novgorod*, therefore, represents a title that has been understood as a man's name. Although Pelliot's authority usually stands high in such matters, his explanation is faulty in this instance. The reconstruction of *pieh-erh-ko/pieh-li-ko* as **berke* or **herge* has been discarded. Most specialists feel that this transcription actually answers to the Mongol word *belge*, an administrative term which means a "patent," a "document," or an "identification sign or card."¹¹⁰ There being no such title as **berke*, signifying a tax collector, the simplest explanation is that *Pieh-erh-ko* and *Berkai* are both transcriptions of the very common personal name, Berke, and, for sound historical reasons, in this particular instance refer to one and the same individual. This argument is on sound philological grounds, too, because the *Yüan shih*'s rendering of the names of Berke, the qan, and Berke, the *bichēchi*, correspond exactly. The same is true of the Rus chronicles, in which the names of both individuals are transcribed as *Berkai*.

Moreover, it should be noted that the census taker, Berke/*Berkai*, was accompanied by another official, *Kasachik* by name. Nothing is known of the latter, but it is quite conceivable that if Berke, the census taker was, as seems certain, an agent of Möngke, then *Kasachik* was a representative of Berke, the qan of the Golden Horde. Although there is no direct evidence for this argument, it is certainly consistent with the pattern of operation followed by the Mongols elsewhere in the empire, particularly in Iran, where representatives of both the grand qan and the regional qans always were assigned to census-taking teams.

The last point requiring comment is that the Rus chronicles report that the censuses of 1257, 1258, and 1259 all were con-

¹¹⁰ See Pao Kuo-yi, *Studies*, p. 41; Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, vol. 2, p. 97 and n. 2; and Doerfer, *TMEN*, vol. 1, pp. 216-17.

ducted in the wintertime. So far as can be determined, this was the case in China and Iran as well.¹¹¹ The obvious reason for preferring winter as the time of registration is that in agrarian societies this would be the slack season; in consequence, the enumeration would not interfere with essential field work. Furthermore, a larger percentage of the populace would be found at home during this season, thereby facilitating the work of the census takers and enabling these officials to compile much more complete population rolls.

111. The dates of the census in eastern and western Asia are not always given with precision, but late fall or winter seem to have been the usual starting times for registration.

6. Taxation

The Evolution of the Mongol Revenue System

By the middle of the thirteenth century, the imperial revenue system had become extremely complicated, a combination of traditional local taxes (Chinese, Muslim, and Turkic), new levies introduced by the Mongols, and endless extraordinary exactions, some of which were sanctioned by the government, but many of which were imposed illegally by princes and officials for their personal aggrandizement. Not only were the taxes numerous and ever multiplying, but often they were imposed two or three times a year, in other words, collected for two or three years in advance. To prevent the economic ruin and flight of the empire's settled subjects, and to guarantee that the imperial court should obtain its rightful share of the revenues, Möngke carried out a major reform of the existing program of taxation.

Under the new system, two basic categories of taxes were authorized: the Mongol-inspired tribute, to which all adult males were subject; and the traditional taxes, which can be divided into two subcategories, agricultural taxes, from which the nomadic peoples were exempt, and duties on trade, commerce, and certain kinds of commodities, which fell mainly on the urban population. In addition to limiting the authorized tax categories to two, these reforms established fixed schedules of rates for each category and, of equal importance, placed the assessment and collection of all revenue in the hands of

agents of the central government. Although, in practice, extraordinary taxes, despite claims to the contrary, were never eliminated, they were now collected by the qaghan's agents and the proceeds used to further specific imperial policies, not private interests. Once instituted, this set of authorized taxes remained in force throughout Möngke's reign and later formed the basis of the revenue systems of the regional qanates that emerged as independent polities in the latter half of the thirteenth century.

To understand adequately the evolution of the new program of taxation, we must first look at Mongol tributary practices in the early days of the empire. In that period, besides simply seizing goods they wanted as booty, the Mongols often levied on newly conquered territories a general tribute, which frequently took the form of a tithe. According to Carpini, this demand for "a tenth part of everything" from the subject populace included "men as well as possessions."¹ The accuracy of his statement is confirmed by Rus chronicles, which record that in 1237 Batu sent emissaries to the city of Rīāzan demanding a tenth of that city's men and horses. With regard to the request for mounts, it is interesting to note that the color of the horses desired was carefully specified.²

To meet immediate needs while on campaign, the Mongols customarily imposed extraordinary, or supplemental, levies on their subjects. In 1232, for example, the Mongols insisted that the Koreans provide them with stated quantities of clothing, horses, skins, and other goods, explaining that their own gear had worn out as a result of long campaigning.³ Similarly, the famous Mongol general Jēbe (Yeme) demanded provisions of food from Nishāpūr in 1220, in order to maintain his forces in the field during the campaign in Khurāsān.⁴ In Mongol terminology, all of these levies, whether regular or extraordinary,

1. *Mongol Mission*, 38-39.

2. *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 514.

3. Gian Ledyard, "Two Mongol documents from the *Koryū Sa*," *JAOS* 83 (1963): 234.

4. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 136; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 173.

were subsumed under the heading of *alba-qubchiri* (the Chinese equivalent is *ch'ai-fa*). In fact, all obligations to the state—the corvée and military service as well as taxes in kind and in coin—were covered by this term. However, because the set of obligations borne by nomadic peoples differed substantially from those of sedentary subjects, the Chinese sources sometimes made a distinction between the “*ch'ai-fa* of the steppe” and the “*ch'ai-fa* of the land of Han (northern China).”⁵

It was not until Ögödei's reign that efforts were made to introduce some measure of consistency and order into the tax system, and to impose limits on the number and amount of exactions taken from the sedentary populace. The best-known and most-often-studied of these attempts was initiated and implemented by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, who was Ögödei's chief minister (*chung-shu-ling*) in China. Beginning in 1229, he introduced a series of fiscal reforms in northern China that culminated in a new tax system in 1236. In place of the irregular and irrational exactions of the preceding period, four categories of taxes, with fixed rates, were instituted: (1) a land tax assessed on the basis of the quality and quantity of the cultivator's holding; (2) a poll tax on all adult males, paid at a flat rate in grain; (3) a household tax paid in silk; and (4) various tolls and duties imposed on trade, commerce, and the production of certain commodities, such as salt. This new system significantly reduced the burdens of the Chinese populace for a time, but as the political influence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai waned, conditions again worsened. By the end of Ögödei's reign, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai had been replaced altogether by 'Abd al-Rahmān, a central-Asian tax-farmer.⁶

There are few data on the situation in northern China during Töregene's regency and Güyüg's reign, but it appears likely that as a result of the political decentralization that charac-

5. Franz Schurmann, "Mongol Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," *HJAS* 19 (1956): 312–21, particularly p. 313.

6. Schurmann, "Tributary Practices," pp. 364–65; and de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," pp. 203–8.

terized this period, and the accompanying resurgence of the power of appanage princes and Muslim tax farmers, the population must have been subject to much the same kind of exploitation that they had faced prior to the introduction of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's reforms. The restrictions that Möngke had to impose on princes and officials when he first came to power point to this conclusion.

At about the same time that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was implementing his measures in China, the Khwārazmian merchant, Maḥmūd Yalavach, was busily instituting a somewhat similar series of tax reforms in the Mongol possessions in the west, primarily central Asia. The importance of these measures is that Möngke, according to Juvaynī, decreed soon after his accession that Yalavach's method of assessing and collecting taxes, theretofore limited to central Asia, was to serve as the basis of the imperial revenue system.⁷ Yalavach's role in the evolution of Mongol taxation is sometimes perfunctorily acknowledged, but so far as I am aware, no special study has yet been made of the matter.⁸ The failure to recognize his contribution to Möngke's revenue reforms is due largely to the absence of local sources for the history of central Asia in the Mongol era. But despite this lack, the available information, though fragmentary, fully sustains Juvaynī's assertion that Yalavach developed new revenue measures during his tour of duty in central Asia and that later these were applied on the imperial level.

From the *Campaigns of the Holy Warrior*, a thirteenth-century account of Chinggis Qan and Ögödei, written in Chinese, but undoubtedly based on a Mongol original, we know that Yalavach was placed in charge of tax collection in the "western regions" (*hsi-yü*) in 1229 and remained there until about 1239 or 1240, the year before he was transferred to northern China.⁹

7. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 254; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 517.

8. See, for example, Schurmann, "Tributary Practices," pp. 369 and 371.

9. *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng lu*, pp. 203 and 219.

It was during this period that Yalavach introduced his program of taxation, one more attuned to the requirements of a sedentary economy than the irregular, essentially nomadic pattern of exactions that had theretofore prevailed in Turkestan. The new method, as was true of the one later adopted by Möngke, involved two fundamental categories: the *qubchir*, a poll tax on adult males paid once a year in cash, and the *qalan*, basically an agricultural tax, collected for the most part in kind. Although there are no extant local records to substantiate Juvaynī's claim that these taxes were levied in western Turkestan at the time, there are definite references to their collection in Afghanistan and Sīstān, which throughout the reigns of Ögödei and Güyüg were administered from the Chaghadai qanate, where Yalavach's activities were centered.

Information contained in the *History of Harāt* clearly shows that during Ögödei's and Güyüg's time the local population regularly paid *qalan* (*qalān*) and *qubchir* (*qu[b]chūr*), although the subjects of one influential Mongol official, with the latter's connivance, successfully evaded payments entirely. Not until Möngke's agents arrived on the scene in the early 1250s was the guilty official punished and his followers made to contribute their fair share.¹⁰ The *History of Sīstān* also reports that *qalan* and *qubchir* were assessed in Sīstān in 1241–42 on orders of "Qā'ān" (Ögödei).¹¹ Admittedly, this follows Yalavach's tenure in office in central Asia, but it should be remembered that his successor was his son and former assistant, Mas'ūd Beg. Without doubt, this report refers to a continuation of measures originally instituted by Yalavach before his departure for China. Finally, the Chinese sources verify that in the "western regions," the head tax, or *qubchir*, was the main levy at this time. This is brought out clearly in Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's debate with members of the conservative wing of the Mongol court in the mid-1230s concerning the issue of the basic unit of

10. Sayf/Šiddiqī, pp. 182–83.

11. *Ta'rikh-i Sīstān*, p. 397; and Smirnova, *Istoriā Sīstāna*, p. 369.

taxation to be used in China. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was in favor of the household, the traditional Chinese basis for assessing taxes, whereas his Mongol opponents argued for the individual adult male (*ting*) as the basic unit, pointing out that this was the practice "in the western regions."¹²

From these various sources,¹³ it is apparent that Juvaynī is correct in crediting Yalavach with developing a new program of taxation in central Asia, the basic outlines of which are, in fact, identical to those that Möngke adopted for the empire as a whole. This raises the important question of how Yalavach came to devise this particular system. Was it created *de novo*, or did he have a specific model in mind when formulating it? In general, scholars who have addressed this issue favor the latter alternative.

The Soviet turkologist D. I. Tikhonov, for example, posits a Uighur model for the tax system, arguing that the key terms *qubchir* and *qalan* can be found in two Uighur documents¹⁴ that, he claims, predate the Mongol era by at least a century. As a corollary to his chronological arguments, Tikhonov then concludes that both terms are Turkic in origin and that they were later borrowed into Mongolian.¹⁵ If true, this would provide strong circumstantial evidence that Yalavach's tax sys-

12. YWL, chap. 57, p. 162. The YS, chap. 2, p. 11, also notes that a poll (*ting*) tax was collected in the western regions in 1229 under Maḥmūd the Khwārazmian, i.e., Maḥmūd Yalavach.

13. In W. Radloff's edition of the Uighur civil documents (*Uigurische Sprachdenkmäler* [Leningrad, 1928], pp. 30-31) there is also a reference to the collection of *qalan* in eastern Turkestan during Ögödei's reign, but the accuracy of Radloff's reading of the passage in question has recently been challenged. In all likelihood, the name Radloff transcribes as "(Ögödei)" should be read as "[Eljigidei]." See Larry V. Clark, *Introduction to the Uyghur Civil Documents of East Turkestan (13th-14th cc.)*. Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1975, pp. 110 and 198-99, n. 4. Inasmuch as Eljigidei was a Chaghadaï qan who ruled in 1326, this passage can no longer be invoked, as I have done in a previous work (Allsen, "Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan," pp. 252 and 264), to show that *qalan* was collected in eastern Turkestan while Maḥmūd Yalavach was Ögödei's chief official in central Asia.

14. Radloff, *Uighurische Sprachdenkmäler*, docs. nos. 77 and 78, pp. 130-32 and 143-46.

15. D. I. Tikhonov, "K voprosu o nekotorykh terminakh," *Sirany i narody vostoka* 11 (1971): 77-83.

tem was probably based upon Uighur practice. Such an hypothesis is indeed attractive, particularly in light of the fact that the Uighurs were the first sedentary peoples to submit peaceably to the Mongols and that they undoubtedly exercised great cultural influence on their nomadic masters. Given these circumstances, it would not be surprising if the Uighur Turks, who were under Yalavach's jurisdiction, had in fact provided the Khwārazmian, himself a Turkic speaker,¹⁶ with the inspiration for his own system. The difficulty, however, is that neither Tikhonov's chronological deductions nor his reading of the text bear close scrutiny. In his critique of Tikhonov's arguments, Larry V. Clark has convincingly demonstrated that the two documents in question do not date from the pre-Mongol period and that in any event neither text contains the term *qubchir*.¹⁷ As a result of Clark's findings, the circumstantial case in favor of a Uighur model collapses.

In the absence of an historically attested prototype for the Mongol system of taxation, one can only fall back on the philological evidence for guidance. As Franz Schurmann has shown, the Uighur word *qubchir* is most certainly a borrowing from the Mongol *qubchiri*, for in Turkic, *qubchir* is used only as a tax term, whereas in Mongolian there is a very productive verbal stem, *qubchi-*, which has the basic meaning "to collect." However, Schurmann's further efforts to derive a Mongolian etymology for *qalan*, and therefore a Mongol origin for Yalavach's system, have not met with acceptance.¹⁸ The origin

16. Yalavach was a native of Khwārazm. According to Carpini, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 28-29, the inhabitants of this region, whom he calls Bessermians, spoke Cuman (i.e., Qipchaq). On the Khwārazmian Turkic language, see A. Bodrogligeti, "The Fragments of the *Čavāhiru'-Asrār*," *CAJ* 16 (1972): 290.

17. Clark, *Uyghur Civil Documents*, pp. 103-4.

18. Schurmann, in his effort to etymologize this term, pairs *qalan* with *alhan* and derives both from a common form, **alwan*, **qalwan* or **halwan*, which in his opinion is Altaic or Mongolian. He further suggests that the Uighurs may have borrowed *qalan* from the Mongols through the Qara Khitai, who are presumed to have been a Mongolian-speaking people. See Schurmann, "Tributary Practices," pp. 337-38. For a critique of Schurmann's arguments, see Doerfer, *TMEN*, vol. 2, pp. 488-90, who doubts this equation on various grounds.

of the word *qalan* remains obscure and it may in reality be a borrowing from a non-Altaic language. All that can be said with assurance is that *qalan*, whatever its derivation, is first attested in the Mongol period, primarily in the Persian sources.¹⁹

On the basis of available, albeit limited, evidence I would conclude that Maḥmūd Yalavach's program of taxation was not lifted *in toto* from some preexisting system, but rather that it appears to have arisen through a process of improvisation and experimentation in which Mongol and non-Mongol elements were fitted together to meet the exigencies of the day. In the early Mongol Empire such institutional adoption and blending was by no means uncommon.

To summarize and conclude these various arguments, it is clear that Möngke's revenue system, based upon two basic categories of taxes, *qalan* and *qubchir*, was derived from the one pioneered in central Asia by Yalavach during Ögödei's reign. The financial administration of the empire had fallen into a chaotic state during Töregene's and Güyüg's tenures in office and it had become imperative that an alternative and workable method of taxation be found. It seems likely that Möngke chose Yalavach's system over the other major possibility, the one devised by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, because the former already had proved its worth in central Asia and, of equal importance, because of its Turkic authorship; the emperor, in general, was mistrustful of things Chinese.

According to Juvaynī, the immediate problem with the financial system inherited by Möngke was the uncontrolled growth of miscellaneous and extraordinary levies, which were causing the populace to disperse in the face of these unbearable burdens. Yalavach's tax categories had the advantage of being relatively uncomplicated, yet comprehensive, covering as they did all segments of the empire's settled population. Under the

19. See Clark's discussion of the term in his *Uyghur Civil Documents*, pp. 149-51.

scheme, it was intended that the authorized taxes, which were to be collected but once a year, would replace all other assessments. Once having paid their authorized taxes, the populace could not be approached again by the government until the following year.²⁰ The annual character of this program of taxation is mentioned in other sources, for instance, the *History of Harāt*, which emphasizes that basic taxes were collected yearly (*sālīyānah*) during Möngke's reign.²¹

Besides abolishing unauthorized levies, certain traditional assessments also were repealed. In western Asia, inheritance taxes were eliminated on orders of Hülegü, and Juvaynī mentions specifically that he carried out this directive in Baghdad.²² Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, in his financial treatise, comments on the fact that such taxes always had been disliked by Chinggis Qan and his descendants.²³ This may be related to the fear that Mongols held for a dead man's legacy, an attitude noted by Carpini in his travelogue.²⁴

The problem posed by multiple and irregular levies was not the only one facing Möngke in the area of financial administration. Official corruption was also a matter of great concern. In describing the chaos prevailing in the financial administration of Armenia in the years before Möngke's reign, Kirakos of Ganjak indicates that the main source of difficulty was corruption among the Mongol-appointed officials. Particularly blameworthy was a revenue officer by the name of Buqa, who had been sent there by Güyüg; examples of Buqa's avarice and cruelty are provided in some detail. Kirakos states, too, that Arghun Aqa was partially responsible for the deplorable con-

20. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 75, and vol. 2, p. 254; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 97, and vol. 2, p. 517.

21. Sayf/Shiddiqī, p. 208.

22. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 25; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 34.

23. Tūsī/Minorsky, pp. 72-73. Tūsī's treatise on finances, which briefly categorizes and describes the taxes and financial administration of Iran, was drawn up on orders from Hülegü sometime in the early 1260s.

24. *Mongol Mission*, p. 14.

ditions.²⁵ As noted previously, Möngke, after his accession, made many personnel changes, purging some, including Buqa, and executing others. His vigorous action apparently had a beneficial effect upon those who retained their positions. Arghun Aqa, for one, seems to have become more circumspect in his behavior during Möngke's reign. The *Georgian Chronicle*, speaking of this era, refers to him in rather positive terms.²⁶

Before going on to discuss individual tax categories and their assessment and rates, a few additional comments on terminology are in order. Given the size of the Mongol Empire and the multiplicity of languages in use, it is not surprising that tax terminology differs from source to source. Often it is difficult to identify with certainty equivalent terms in these records. Even the basic terms are used in varying ways. *Qubchir* has at least three distinct meanings in thirteenth-century sources: (1) taxes and levies in general, (2) poll tax, or tribute, imposed on the sedentary population, and (3) tax on cattle imposed on the nomads. *Qalan* also has multiple meanings. In one sense it encompasses all the traditional taxes that were imposed on the sedentary sector of the empire prior to the advent of Mongol rule and continued by the latter after they had established their authority. In its widest application, *qalan* includes agricultural taxes as well as tolls on trade and production. *Qalan* in this sense can be opposed to *qubchir*, the former denoting traditional non-Mongol taxes retained by the conquerors, and the latter denoting those taxes, particularly the tribute, imposed by the Mongols once in power.

In Persian sources *qubchir* (spelled *qubchūr*) and *qalan* often are paired to indicate that both categories of taxes, Mongol and traditional, are involved.²⁷ On other occasions, however, *qubchūr* is paired with *mal*, an Arabic term meaning "property" or

25 Kirakos, pp. 193-94.

26 Brosset, *Georgie*, p. 550.

27 Sayf/Siddiqī, p. 185.

"wealth."²⁸ *Mal* in such cases is simply a Perso-Arabic substitute for *qalan*, as can be seen in Naṣīr al-Dīn's treatise, which places all the traditional Muslim imposts on agriculture, trade, and manufacturing under the general heading of *mal*.²⁹ In its narrowest sense, *qalan* (and *mal*) also has the meaning of agricultural tax. This is understandable, because taxes paid by cultivators were the most important source of governmental income among the traditional, pre-Mongol revenues. Finally, *qalan* is used from time to time to signify the sedentary population's military obligations to the empire. This usage is especially prevalent in Armenian sources.

In schematic form, we have the following terminological equivalences:³⁰

	<i>Traditional taxes and levies</i>	<i>Mongol-imposed tribute</i>
MONGOL	<i>alban</i>	<i>qubchiri</i>
UIGHUR	<i>qalan</i>	<i>qubchir</i>
PERSIAN	<i>qalān/mal</i>	<i>qubchūr</i>
CHINESE	<i>ch'ai-fa</i> (Han)	<i>ch'ai-fa</i> (steppe)

With this in mind, we can now attempt to deal with each category of taxes individually.

Traditional Taxes—Agricultural

Relatively little information is available on the traditional taxes collected during Möngke's reign. The chroniclers of the

28. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 706.

29. Tūsi/Minorsky, pp. 69–71. To complicate matters further, *mal* is also a Mongolian word meaning "property," "cattle," or "herd." It seems to be a loan word in Mongolian, but its origin remains obscure. See Francis W. Cleaves, "The Mongolian Names and Terms in the *History of the Nation of Archers* by Grigor Akanc'," *HJAS* 12 (1949): 438.

30. For an extensive discussion of these categories and the terminology used in different sources, see John Masson Smith, "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," *HJAS* 30 (1970): 46–60. I concur fully with Smith's conclusions and have followed them throughout this chapter.

period, naturally, concern themselves primarily with the new, Mongol-inspired levies (the *qubchir*), and mention only in passing those taxes, the agricultural and commercial, which were more familiar to them. As a result, the method of assessment and schedule of rates for these latter taxes are not known in any detail.

We are best informed on China's agricultural taxes (*shui-liang*).³¹ In this part of the Mongol Empire the system in force was that developed by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai on the basis of T'ang and Chin models.³² In the early years of Ögödei's reign, the agricultural tax was levied at a flat rate of two *shih*³³ (bushels) of grain per household. After Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's reforms, the flat rate was abolished and a new system was introduced whereby the quality and quantity of land and the number of oxen and agricultural implements owned determined the rate of taxation.³⁴

According to the biography of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in the *Yüan wen-lei*,³⁵ agricultural land was classified under four headings, with different tax rates for each: top-quality land (*shang-t'ien*) was assessed at three and one-half *sheng*³⁶ of grain per *mu*,³⁷ middling land (*chung-t'ien*) at three *sheng* per *mu*; low-quality land at two *sheng* per *mu*; and irrigated land (*shui-t'ien*) at five *sheng* per *mu*. How the number of oxen and agricultural implements owned were figured into the calculation of an individual's agricultural tax is nowhere explained. The assessment and collection of the tax was in the hands of tax-collection offices (*k'o-shui-so*), which were established in 1230 in all ten circuits (*lu*) of

31. Also called *ti-shui* in some sources. Ts'ai, *Yüan-tai pai-hua*, p. 17.

32. It should be remembered that Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was originally an official of the Chin dynasty and that he drew heavily on Chin institutions in formulating his reforms under Ögödei. For details on the Chin tax system, see M. V. Vorob'ev, *Chzhurchzhenni gosudarstvo Tsin (X v. - 1234 g.)* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 257-87, especially pp. 262-65.

33. *Shih* is a dry measure for grains, which varied, according to time and place, between 120 and 160 pounds, roughly a bushel.

34. Y.S. chap. 93, pp. 892-93, and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 75.

35. YBL, chap. 57, 172.

36. A *sheng* is one-tenth of a peck.

37. A *mu* is about one-sixth of an acre.

northern China.³⁸ The new system represented a substantial reduction in the tax load and certainly improved the economic condition of the hard-pressed peasantry. So far as can be determined, this method of assessing and collecting agricultural taxes was retained by Möngke and continued under Qubilai.³⁹ The only known modification introduced by Möngke was one designed to make it easier for the populace to deliver their agricultural taxes to the government. In the fall of 1251, a decree was issued in the emperor's name stating that thereafter, "people who have to transport [their] grain from afar shall be allowed to transport it to the nearest granary."⁴⁰

In west-Asian sources, the agricultural tax is designated by the terms *mal*, *qalan*, or *kharāj*.⁴¹ Although this tax frequently is mentioned by name as one of the taxes collected in Möngke's reign, specific information on the methods of assessment and the rates is scarce. What little is known, however, suggests that, like the system in China, quality of the land was one of the factors used in establishing tax rates. In this case, of course, the principles employed were drawn from traditional Islamic practice.

On the basis of the passage in the *Georgian Chronicle*, which states that Arghun Aqa counted everything "from men and animals to cultivated fields and vineyards, gardens, and orchards," it is evident that those responsible for registering the population also conducted some kind of cadastral survey that was used in assessing agricultural taxes. According to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, "for the provincial *kharāj*, special registers (*qānūn*) are kept in each province, and in accordance with them action is taken. At each place [the register] is such as to suit [the

38. YWL, chap. 57, 133; and de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai," pp. 201-2.

39. YS, chap. 93, p. 893; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 76.

40. YS, chap. 3, pp. 17-18. Because the grain tax was normally turned in at government granaries, the Mongol texts call this tax *chang*, from the Chinese word for "granary" (*ts'ang*). See Poppe, *The Mongolian Monuments in hPags-pa Script*, pp. 46-47, the "Edict of Mangala," dated 1276.

41. In the Armenian chronicles, *mal* is used to indicate the agricultural tax. See Kirakos, p. 27.

conditions of | the province. These taxes (*mal*) are considered [to be] for the welfare of the kingdom.”⁴² The number of categories into which cultivated land was classified and the principles on which the classification was founded are formulated in very general terms. For good land in a good year, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī indicates that the tithe or ‘*ushr*’ was the appropriate rate of assessment. This, of course, is the percentage sanctioned in early Islamic times as the government’s legitimate share of all produce of the earth.⁴³ But this also happens to be the same percentage that the Mongols customarily demanded from their sedentary subjects. As was the case in the Rus principalities, the peoples of western Asia were liable to exactions levied at this same rate. Kirakos reports that in Güyüg’s time a tithe was levied on “the Persians, Muslims (Arabs?), Turks, Armenians, Georgians, and Albanians (of the Caucasus).”⁴⁴ Inasmuch as the two systems coincide in this respect,⁴⁵ it is likely that the basic rate for agricultural taxes in Möngke’s reign was in fact 10 percent of the yearly harvest. Provision also was made for adjusting rates downward for poor lands and for poor years. In these circumstances, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī recommended that the half-tithe, that is, one-twentieth, serve as the government share of the crop.⁴⁶ Again, this percentage was established in the early Islamic period as the sanctioned rate for poor and artificially irrigated land.

The tithe also may have been the rate at which agricultural taxes were levied within the Golden Horde. The Rus chronicles speak of the *desiatina*, “tithe,” being demanded from the population of Novgorod in 1257 (but not actually collected

42. Ṭūsī/Minorsky, p. 70. Note the use of *kharāj* and *mal* as interchangeable terms.

43. See A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 20–26, and glossary, p. 442.

44. Kirakos, p. 193. It should be remembered, however, that the Mongol tithe applied to everything—men, animals, and products—whereas the Islamic ‘*ushr*’ had a more limited application.

45. In my view, the fact that the Mongols and the Muslims both used a tithe is a matter of coincidence and not borrowing. The tithe, after all, is a widely used and convenient method of assessment.

46. Ṭūsī/Minorsky, p. 69.

until 1259).⁴⁷ Although it is not certain that this term refers to an agricultural tax in this instance, it does seem to be a reasonable possibility, for it is obviously not the commercial tax, which is mentioned separately from the *desiatina*, and apparently not the tribute, or *qubchir*, which was levied in a different manner. The specific term for agricultural taxes in thirteenth-century Rus sources is *popluzhnoe*, literally, "[tax] according to the plow (*plug*)."⁴⁸ This term is mentioned in the *jarligh* Mengü Temür issued in 1267 to the Orthodox clergy, reaffirming their tax immunity. In the same document, the official responsible for collecting this tax is called the *popluzhnik*.⁴⁸ Although neither term is met with in the chronicles for the period of Möngke's reign, it seems highly unlikely that the Mongols would have failed to levy this tax, inasmuch as agriculture was the most important economic activity among the Slavic population of the Golden Horde.

In concluding this section, it should be stressed that with regard to agricultural taxes, local terminology and, to a large extent, pre-Mongol practices prevailed. No attempt was made to impose a unified "Mongol" system upon the diverse agricultural societies that made up the bulk of the empire's population and produced most of its wealth. This is only to be expected, for the Mongols, as a pastoral nomadic people, had no experience in agricultural matters. Trusted officials from sedentary backgrounds, such as Maḥmūd Yalavach, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, were largely responsible for formulating policy in this area and, for the most part, they based it on traditional local models.

Traditional Taxes—Commercial

The other traditional taxes levied in Möngke's reign were a tax on commercial transactions and one on the production of cer-

47. PSRL, vol. 4, pp. 222-23, and *Chronicle of Novgorod*, p. 96.

48. *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1955), pp. 467-68.

tain commodities. Information as to the rates of these taxes and the system of assessment and collection is scanty, even more so than in the case of agricultural levies.

In all the sources, with the exception of the Chinese, the tax on merchants and craftsmen is called the *tamgha*. The fundamental meaning of this word, which is Turkic in origin, is "sign," "mark," "emblem," or "brand" (as on an animal). By extension, *tamgha* also has the meaning of "seal," and it is from this usage that the tax on trade came to be called by this term, because goods upon which the tax had been paid were stamped with a special seal to safeguard the merchant or manufacturer from double levies.⁴⁹

As was the case with agricultural taxes, data on the *tamgha* are most abundant in the Chinese sources, where it is termed the *shang-shui*, or "tax on merchants."⁵⁰ This levy first was introduced in northern China in Ögödei's time as a consequence of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's debate with the conservative Mongol element at court over the future direction of Mongol imperial policy. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai argued that a program of regular and equitable taxation would, in the long run, better serve the interests of the empire than the one proposed by the extremist Begder, who advocated exterminating or deporting the inhabitants of northern China and turning the vacated land into pasture! In pressing his argument on Ögödei, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai promised to produce five hundred thousand *liang* (ounces) of silver, eighty thousand *p'i* (rolls) of silk and four hundred thousand *shih* (bushels) of grain if his program were adopted.⁵¹ When Ögödei gave his assent in 1229, one of the taxes proposed by the chief minister was a levy on commerce. This tax, however, was not actually assessed until 1234. In that year, the "government set up tax-collection bureaus (*cheng-*

49. For a discussion of this term, see Doerfer, *TMEN*, vol. 2, pp. 554-65, and *DTS*, p. 530.

50. Ts'ai, *Yüan-tai pai-lua*, p. 17.

51. *YWL*, chap. 57, 12b-13a.

shou k'o-shui so) to collect taxes on merchants."⁵² As indicated earlier, the *k'o-shui so* were originally established in 1229, but apparently the department designated to collect the *tamgha* was not created until four years later. The officials recruited to oversee this operation were to be selected from among propertied individuals noted for their upright character. Each month these officials turned in their receipts to the tax-collection bureaus. Those who used the proceeds for personal gain or who engaged in trade themselves were liable to two years of exile and a severe beating.⁵³

To what extent these measures were applied to *ortaq* merchants (those working with capital provided by government officials or Mongol nobles) in Ögödei's time is not indicated, but in general it appears that these organizations were subject to few government imposts and restrictions. By Güyük's time, in any event, the *ortaqs* were treated as a privileged class and freed from most of the standard obligations to the state. Möngke, however, soon terminated their special status. Previously, the *ortaqs* had been given badges of authority (*p'ai-tzu*) and treated much like government officials. Möngke recalled the badges, ordering that *ortaqs* no longer be considered on a par with the officials of the central government. In consequence of this measure, *ortaq* merchants could no longer use the *jam* while conducting trade. The requirement that they foot the bill for their own transportation costs must have cut deeply into their profit margins. Möngke further ended their immunity from taxation. He decreed that "since merchants are constantly employed in their own gain, each of them should, in the place (i.e., locality) where they had been numbered in the census, undertake his share of the contributions on an equal footing with [other] subjects and not lay claim to any special status."⁵⁴ Thenceforth, the *ortaqs*, together with private traders and

52. *Ibid.*, chap. 40, 22b.

53. *YS*, chap. 94, pp. 906-7; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 217.

54. Boyle's translation, *Juvaynī/Boyle*, vol. 2, p. 606. See also *Juvaynī/Qazvīnī*, vol. 3, p. 88.

craftsmen were subject to the *tamgha*. To see that the *ortaqs* met their obligations to the empire in full, a special office was set up to monitor their activities (see chapter 4).

The rates paid by merchants in their business transactions are not stipulated for the reigns of Ögödei and Möngke in any source known to me. However, the *Yüan shih* states that in Qubilai's reign one-thirtieth was the established rate.⁵⁵ In Iran, the *tamgha* was assessed at the rate of the half-tithe, that is, one-twentieth, during Ghazan's reign; it is clear that this figure, in conformity with Ghazan's program of reforms, represents a reduction of the rate that prevailed in the preceding period.⁵⁶ What that rate was is not indicated. Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, too, speaks of the *tamgha* in his treatise. He, however, understands the term in the sense of a tax on capital taken at the rate of one *dīnār* out of two-hundred forty *dīnārs* per annum.⁵⁷ This obviously does not cover those taxes collected on day-to-day business transactions, which provided the government its major source of revenue from the urban areas.

Although the exact rates in force in western Asia during Möngke's time are not known, there is every evidence that the *tamgha* was collected aggressively in this period. Kirakos reports that fishermen, craftsmen, miners, and manufacturers were heavily taxed after 1254. As for merchants, he states that the Mongols "made profit at the expense of the traders, collecting [from them] great wealth in gold, silver, and precious stones."⁵⁸ The *Georgian Chronicle* also comments on the imposition of the *tamgha* (*thamga*). From this account it is evident that a tax was assessed on *every item* sold in the bazaar, even the "lambs and sheep bought for the table of the king himself (that is, David Narin)."⁵⁹

55 Y.S., chap. 94, p. 907, and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 217.

56 Rashīd al-Dīn, *Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī*, ed. Muḥammad Shafī (Lahore, 1947), p. 121; and Rashīd al-Dīn, *Percepiska*, trans. A. I. Falina (Moscow, 1971), p. 178.

57 Tūsī/Minorsky, p. 71.

58 Kirakos, p. 221.

59 Brosset, *Géorgie*, p. 556.

In the Rus principalities, the commercial tax is mentioned for the first time following the census of 1257-59. The Rus sources specifically note the *tamghia* as one of the taxes collected in Novgorod in 1259.⁶⁰ Again, it is not known at what rate it was assessed.

As in the case of the rates, there are only meager data on the administration of this tax in Möngke's reign. On the basis of the passage in the *Georgian Chronicle* quoted above, it is apparent that the officials responsible for collecting the commercial tax, called *tamghachi* in the sources,⁶¹ were stationed in the bazaars of all major towns and cities. Further, the *Yüan shih* states that merchants were checked upon entering town to see if they had the proper licenses and stamps.⁶² This indicates that an *octroi*, or toll booth, was set up at the main gate of a city as an additional control over the movement and activities of traders.

Although technically not a tax, official monopolies were an important source of government income and can be discussed conveniently here. In China, monopolies on various natural and man-made commodities were a well-established practice, and the Mongols followed suit. The Yüan dynasty established monopolies on the production of salt and liquor and on the mining and smelting of gold, silver, and iron. Among these, only the monopolies on salt and liquor were of significance prior to Qubilai's reign. In both cases they were instituted as a result of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's reforms. Control over the production and sale of salt was inaugurated in 1230, and the liquor monopoly, which covered vinegar and yeast as well, was put into effect in 1234. Of the two, the salt monopoly was by far

60. PSRL, vol. 4, pp. 222-23; and *Chronicle of Novgorod*, p. 96.

61. See I. O. Babafan, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskai i politicheskai istoriia Armenii v XIII-XIV vekakh* (Moscow, 1969), p. 174, quoting an Armenian inscription dated 1263 from Ani. See also the *Jarigh of Mengü Temür*, qan of the Golden Horde (r. 1267-90), dated 1267, available in *Pamyatniki russkogo prava*, vol. 3, p. 468, where these officials are called *tamozhnytsi*.

62. YS, chap. 94, p. 907, and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 217. In this passage, the *Yüan shih* is speaking of the years 1263-64.

the most important. In 1252, Möngke assigned 1,085 additional households in northern China to the production of salt, profit from the sale of which was expected to be three thousand ingots of silver annually. At the same time, the salt monopolies were placed under the control of regional salt commissariats (*yen-shih-so*).⁶³

In western Asia, the Mongols also established monopolies on the production and sale of salt. Kirakos reports that in 1254 most of the salt mines in the Transcaucasus were seized by Mongol officials.⁶⁴ In the Golden Horde, the salt lakes near the Sea of Azov became a government monopoly and all persons coming thither for salt had to pay a tax to officials stationed there.⁶⁵ Although further data are lacking, there is a good possibility that control over such vital commodities was widely practiced throughout the empire.

Mongol Tribute—Qubchir

The most important of the Mongol-inspired levies was the *qubchir*, or tribute.⁶⁶ Originally a tax on cattle taken from the nomadic populace, the *qubchir*, under the influence of Yalavach's usage, later came to signify a tax in cash collected from all adult males among the settled population. In contrast to the situation that obtained with respect to agricultural and commercial taxes, we are relatively well-informed on the rates of the poll taxes that were established for various parts of the empire during Möngke's time. In conformity with the principles of assessment established by Maḥmūd Yalavach in cen-

63. YS, chap. 94, pp. 902, 903, and 906 7, and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 175, 177, 180, and 209.

64. Kirakos, p. 221.

65. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 93 and 112.

66. The Mongol form of the word is *qubchiri*, final *i* being dropped in Uighur and Persian texts. See Paul Pelliot, "*Qubḥir-qubḥir et qubḥir-qubḥir*," *TP* 37 (1942-43): 151-64. In the *SH*, par. 151, p. 80, the phrase *qubchiri qubchiri* is used to mean a levy of taxes in kind, as when Chinggis Qan levied such contributions in favor of Öng-qan's brother, who had lost his worldly possessions as a result of political misfortunes.

tral Asia, these rates were levied on an individual adult male "according to his wealth and ability to pay."⁶⁷ At the outset, Juvaynī says, the rates for China and central Asia were set at eleven *dīnārs* for a rich man and one *dīnār* for a poor man. In Iran the rate was seven (later, ten) *dīnārs* for a rich man and, again, one for a poor man. Others paid the *qubchir* at a rate proportional to their individual circumstances.⁶⁸

This schedule of rates, which was arrived at by the emperor in consultation with the officials responsible for financial matters, did not, however, prove to be very long-lasting. In several regions of the empire, the *qubchir* rates soon had to be adjusted to bring them into line with people's capacity to pay. In Chinese sources the *qubchir* levied on the settled population is called the *k'o-ch'ai*, a synonym for *ch'ai-fa*.⁶⁹ In distinction to the *qubchir* of the western portions of the empire, which was levied on all adult males, in China this tax was assessed on the basis of households in accordance with traditional Chinese practice.

In China, the *k'o-ch'ai*, or *qubchir*, consisted of two distinct elements, the *ssu-liao*, or the part paid in silk, and the *pao-yin*, the part paid in silver. The *ssu-liao* was simply the household tax established by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in the 1230s as part of his program of revenue reforms. Those directly subject to the central government, the "great-majority category," paid at the rate of one *chin* (pound) of silk per two households, and those subject to the appanage princes, the "five-household silk household," paid one *chin* of silk per five households.

When Möngke was enthroned, the *pao-yin*, or tax on silver, was added as the second element of the *k'o-ch'ai*. On Yalavach's

67. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 517. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 254.

68. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 261, and vol. 3, pp. 78–79; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 524 and 600. Bar Hebraeus, vol. 1, p. 418, puts the *qubchir* at fifteen gold *dīnārs* for China, but this is mistaken.

69. For a discussion of these two terms, their various applications and meanings, see Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 103, n. 1.

recommendation, this was set initially at six *liang* (ounces) of silver per individual household per year.⁷⁰ But this rate soon proved to be too burdensome to be maintained. In 1251, Chang Chin-heng, who had served the Mongols in various administrative and military posts since the days of Chinggis Qan, argued before the emperor that the rate had been set too high for the people to pay, and that it should be lowered by a third.⁷¹ Wang Yü-ju, another official with long service among the Mongols, advanced the same argument, also recommending a one-third reduction in the rate.⁷² After further discussions with officials concerned with revenue and finance matters, in which he again admonished them regarding irregularities and excessive expenditures, Möngke announced new, reduced rates in the fall of 1255.⁷³ The rates established at that time incorporated the recommendations of the two Chinese officials: the original six *liang* were reduced to four, and in accordance with a suggestion of Chang Chin-heng, half of that amount could be paid in silk.⁷⁴ Although a welcome relief, the new rates still constituted a considerable hardship, and many people, in order to pay their taxes, had to borrow money from Uighur or Muslim (Hui-hui) merchants at usurious interest.⁷⁵ Flexible to a degree, Möngke was nevertheless determined to peg the tax schedules at the highest possible levels.

To recapitulate, in China the *qubchir*, or tribute, was levied at the rate of six (later four) *liang* of silver and a half-*chin* of silk per household per year. The figures given in the *Yüan shih*, however, refer only to the maximum rates to which the wealthy were subject and not to schedules established for the poor. Although these lower rates are not mentioned, the *Yüan*

70. Ou-yang Hsüan, *Kuei-chai wen-chi*, chap. 9, 46a.

71. *YS*, chap. 152, p. 1631.

72. *Ibid.*, chap. 153, p. 1642.

73. *Ibid.*, chap. 3, pp. 16 and 17.

74. *Ibid.*, chap. 93, p. 894, and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 98.

75. Yao Sui, *Mu-an-chi*, ch. 25, 5a-b.

shih makes it clear that the *k'o-ch'ai* was assessed differentially "on the basis of the grade (*shang-hsia*) of the household."⁷⁶ Thus, like the *qubchir* in western Asia, the schedule of rates for the tribute in China took into account economic status and ability to pay.

As noted previously, the rate originally set for Iran was a maximum of seven *dinārs* for the rich, which scaled down to one for the poor. This schedule was established following an interview that Möngke held with Arghun Aqa, in which the governor admitted to his sovereign that the financial affairs of Khurāsān were in a pitiful state, and indicated further that some kind of reform and regularization of the tax system was urgently needed. After hearing his governor out, the emperor instructed Arghun and those members of his staff who had accompanied him to Mongolia that they "should each write a statement explaining what was right or wrong with the country (jurisdiction), and how it had been caused, and how it might be remedied, so that he (the emperor) might order the necessary reforms."⁷⁷ Möngke studied these reports for some time and then announced his decision concerning the rates in the winter of 1252.

However, as was the case in China, this schedule of rates soon proved to be beyond the capacity of many people to pay. An Armenian source records that the head tax collected in 1254 was a great hardship on the populace and that it was levied even on women and children, who supposedly were exempt from this tax.⁷⁸ Because of the continuing turmoil in the financial administration of Khurāsān, Arghun Aqa was recalled again to the imperial court in 1256 to account for his actions and to have his financial records audited. Arghun

76. YS, chap. 93, p. 894; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 98.

77. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 516. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 253-54.

78. Galst'ān, p. 26, the *Chronicle of Sebastia's*. Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī indicates that children, but not women, were exempt from the *qubchir*. Tūsī/Mimorsky, p. 73.

answered the complaints against him by explaining that the original schedule of rates was such that the tax quotas that the central authorities had set for each administrative region could not be met (which may account for the fact that the *qubchir* had been levied on women and children in Armenia). Finding that Argun Aqa's explanation for the difficulties was reasonable and his proposals for corrective action suitable, Möngke continued him in office and sent him back to Khurāsān in 1258 with instructions to implement the agreed-upon measures. Essentially, Arghun's recommendation was a "soak-the-rich" scheme. The governor argued that whereas one *dīnār* might be a burden for a poor man, the seven *dīnārs* demanded of the wealthy caused them in most cases little or no embarrassment. Therefore, the seven-*dīnār* maximum was raised to ten. When, however, it was discovered that even this amount could be borne easily by the well-to-do, Arghun obtained permission to raise the maximum to five hundred *dīnārs*, while still maintaining lower rates of one or two *dīnārs* for the poorer classes. It was on the basis of this schedule of rates that the *qubchir* was assessed in western Asia during the final years of Möngke's reign, a schedule that allowed the tax quotas to be met.⁷⁹

As a sidelight, it is interesting to note that not only was the *qubchir* disliked as an economic burden in western Asia, but that in the minds of many Muslims it was equated with the *jizah*, the poll tax imposed by Islamic states upon their non-Muslim subjects. For this reason it was particularly resented in Iran. In his financial treatise, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī is quick to remind Hülegü "that nothing used to be levied as a poll tax (*bar-sar-hā-i ishān*)" by the kings of old, that is to say, the former Islamic rulers of Iran.⁸⁰ Despite this none-too-subtle

79 Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 261, and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 524.

80 Ṭūsī/Minorsky, p. 73. In the Islamic sources, the *qubchir* is sometimes called *sar Jūmār* or *sarānah*. See I. P. Petrushevskii, "K istorii podushnoi podati v Irane pri mongol'skom vladychestve," in *Issledovaniia po istorii kul'tury narodov Vostoka: Sbornik v chesti Akademika I. A. Orbeli*, ed. V. V. Struve (Moscow-Leningrad, 1960), pp. 413-

protest, however, the *qubchir* continued to be collected from Muslims until the very end of the Īl-khānid state.⁸¹

In central Asia, the *qubchir* rate, according to Juvaynī, ranged from eleven *dīnārs* for a wealthy individual down to one *dīnār* for the poor. At the end of Möngke's reign this schedule was still in effect, only minor adjustments having been necessary. Ch'ang Te, who traveled through central Asia in 1259 on his way to see Hülegü, reports that the inhabitants of Transoxania "pay ten gold coins tax per head per year as a maximum; a difference, however, is made between the rich and the poor."⁸² Thus, the calculations of the emperor and his advisers as to what the population of central Asia could afford to pay as *qubchir* were reasonably accurate from the beginning.

With respect to the poll tax within the confines of the Golden Horde, there are but meager data. Although this tax is not specifically mentioned in any of the Rus chronicles for the period that concerns us, we know from later sources, principally the tax immunity issued by Mengü Temür in 1267, that the poll tax was called *dan*, "tribute" in Slavic, and that it was collected by a *danshchik*.⁸³ That the *qubchir* was in fact levied in the Golden Horde during Möngke's reign is certain, for a *farligh* of 1397, promulgated by Temür Qutlugh, then ruler of the Jochid realm, notes that the poll tax, called *qubūr yasāgh* in this text,⁸⁴ was first introduced in the time of "Sain Qan," the posthumous title of Batu.⁸⁵ Of the manner and rate of its assessment nothing further is known.

81. For a survey of the later development of the *qubchir* in Iran, see Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie*, pp. 360-69.

82. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan chi*, chap. 94, 3b.

83. *Pantudouki ruskogo prava*, vol. 3, p. 467.

84. On occasion the *qubchir* goes under the name of *jasagh* in the *farlighs* of the Golden Horde. See Smith, "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," pp. 48-49.

85. The *farligh* in question is written in Turkic and was translated and published by I. N. Berezin in his work *Tarkhannye farlyki Tokhtamisha, Timur Kutluga i Saadet-gireia* (Kazan, 1851); see p. 5 for the Turkic text and p. 11 for the Russian translation. Besides being a bibliographical rarity, the work of Berezin referred to here is also a bibliographical nightmare, because it was published under very strange circumstances. For further details, see Keith Scott, "Two Published Collections of Golden Horde *Zarlighs*: A Bibliographical Note," *Canada Mongolia Review*, 1, no. 1 (1975): 45-56.

Besides signifying the poll tax, or household tax, on the sedentary population, *qubchir* continued to be used in its older meaning of a tax on the herds of the nomads. The nature and rate of the *qubchir* in the sense of a tax on animals is fully and consistently reported in various sources. The tax on animals was established in 1234 by Ögödei at the rate of one sheep per hundred.⁸⁶ According to a *farligh* preserved in a collection of documents relating to the horse administration (*ma-cheng*) of the Yüan dynasty, that rate was increased substantially during the regency of Oghul Qaimish. This decree, dated July 9, 1250, states:⁸⁷ "Of every category of people: for herds of ten horses, cattle, or sheep, one will be taken. Those who conceal [their animals] will be punished." When Möngke came to the throne he quickly rescinded this decree, ordering a return to the schedule established in Ögödei's day. His *farligh*, dated November 14, 1253, also has been preserved in this same collection, and deserves citation in full as an example of the unadorned chancellery style in use during that period:

To all people who raise [animals], one of a hundred will be taken. Those who hide [their animals], officials who take bribes, those who, because of indulgence, do not acquire sufficient wealth [to pay the tax] and those who make trouble, all of these [are guilty] of a crime.⁸⁸

Möngke's reduction of the *qubchir* rate is noted in many other sources.⁸⁹ From these it is known that herders with fewer than a hundred animals paid no tax at all. Although it is not so stated, it appears likely that this tax was levied not only on the Mongol and Turkic nomads of the Eurasian steppe, but also upon the Persian-speaking nomads of western Asia, such as the Kurds and Lurs. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's reference to the tax on

86. Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 2, p. 120; Rashīd/Boyle, p. 55, and *SH*, par. 279, p. 224, and par. 280, p. 226.

87. *Ta-yüan ma-cheng chi*, 302.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *YWL*, chap. 41, 67a; Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 3, p. 79; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 600, and Bar Hebraeus, vol. 1, p. 41.

cattle (*marā'ī*) seems to encompass all herders within the confines of the Īl-khānid realm.⁹⁰

The *qubchir*, as applied to the sedentary population in Möngke's reign, had several interesting features. In the first place, it was a graduated tax on two distinct levels. On the one hand, rates were adjusted to take into account the capacity of each individual or household to pay, and on the other, the schedule of rates was adjusted on a regional basis to reflect variations in the economic well-being of the major administrative divisions of the empire. Thus, central Asia, owing to its strong economic recovery, initially paid the highest rates, which, moreover, required little subsequent adjustment because of the stable conditions prevailing there.⁹¹ This leads into another point. The original schedules, arrived at through discussions between the central authorities and responsible regional officials who were familiar with the situation at the local level, were readjusted when necessary to meet changing circumstances. Such a practice corroborates one of the central arguments of this work: that the administrative and financial system of the Mongol Empire was effective, adaptable, and in tune with local conditions. This is not to say that Möngke's revenue system was equitable or just, for this was not the goal, but rather that it was based upon a fairly accurate assessment of what was possible. In economics as in politics, Möngke was a realist.

In appraising the tax system as a whole, one further conclusion is warranted. Möngke was not an innovator; as in other areas of administration, he drew upon the experiences and institutions of his predecessors in developing his revenue system. Essentially, the emperor based his measures on the reforms

90. Tūsi/Minorsky, p. 71. For other obligations borne by the nomads, see N. Ts. Munkuev, "O formakh ekspluatatsii mongol'skikh aratov v XIII-XIV," *Trudy buriat'skogo kompleksnogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta*, vol. 16 (Ulan Ude, 1965), pp. 68-86.

91. See the remarks of Juvaynī on conditions in central Asia and Khurāsān, Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 75; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 96-97.

of Maḥmūd Yalavach in central Asia and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai in China that had been carried out in Ögödei's reign along roughly similar lines.⁹² Möngke's accomplishment was in applying these measures on the imperial level with, of course, various adjustments to accommodate local conditions and traditions.

The Monetization of Taxes

Vasilii Bartol'd, in his *History of Turkestan*, first published in 1922, remarked that "until Möngke, the name of the Mongol qan was stamped on coins only on rare occasions; it seems likely that the appearance of such coins in large quantities [in Möngke's reign] is connected with a transition, at this particular time, from a system of collecting taxes in kind, which predominated under Ögödei, to [one of collecting] taxes in coin."⁹³ The numismatic evidence that has accumulated in the sixty-odd years since Bartol'd made this statement fully substantiates his analysis. Silverplated copper coins bearing the name of Chinggis Qan struck in Samarkand in 624/1226-27⁹⁴ and silver coins bearing the name of Güyüg struck in Tiflis in 1247⁹⁵ are the only known examples of coins minted in the name of the grand qan prior to Möngke's time. For the latter's reign, however, coins minted in the qaghan's name are much more numerous; money was struck or printed under his authority in all four of the regional qanates, and in many client states as well.

On the basis of both literary and numismatic data, it is clear that, as Bartol'd argues, Möngke's reign did indeed form a

92. The major difference in the two schemes was that in Yalavach's the tribute, or *qubchir*, was collected in money or precious metal from adult males, whereas in Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's, it was collected in silk from individual households.

93. V. V. Bartol'd, *Istoriia Turkestana*, p. 149.

94. E. A. Davidovich, *Denezhnoe khoziästvo Srednei Azii posle mongol'skogo zavoëvaniia i reforma Ma'süd-Beka (XIII v.)* (Moscow, 1972), p. 16.

95. Pakhomov, *Monety Gruzii*, pp. 128-29.

period of transition in which taxes in kind were replaced partially by taxes collected in cash. This is not to say that a greater portion of the taxes levied in Möngke's time actually was collected in coin, but rather that a substantial start was made in that direction.

The advantage, of course, of collecting revenues in the form of money is that its weight-to-value ratio is such that it can be transported over much greater distances than is normally the case for levies in kind, as for instance, grain. For this reason, the imperial court greatly preferred taxes in cash, for the latter could be transported to court (in other words, placed directly under the emperor's control), whereas taxes in kind, for the most part, had to remain in the provinces because it was not economically feasible to ship them over great distances. In short, taxes in coin could be placed at the immediate disposal of the court, whereas taxes in kind could not. A further advantage of collecting revenue in the form of money is that it allows for the acquisition of a greater variety of goods (via trade channels) than do exactions in kind. Even under circumstances where grain could be brought to court, it had to be utilized in the form in which it arrived. It was not generally possible to convert it into some other type of goods or service.⁹⁶ In the Mongol case, for example, cash collected in Armenia could be used to pay for some service in China, but it is highly unlikely that grain collected in Armenia could be converted in this manner. From Möngke's point of view, therefore, the monetization of the revenues had two desirable effects: first, it gave him direct control over a greater portion of the tax receipts; and secondly, but of equal importance, it provided him with a measure of economic flexibility that facilitated the mobilization of the empire's resources.

In what follows, I shall outline Möngke's efforts to place sufficient currency in circulation to enable the populace to pay

96. John Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 68.

the poll tax, or *qubchir*, in cash. This does not, however, pretend to be a thorough examination of the numismatic history of his reign, a task for which I lack both the necessary data and the proper training. In brief, this discussion has as its basic goal the elucidation of the revenue system, not the monetary system *per se*. I shall also use the opportunity to discuss the political and administrative significance of the inscriptions found on these coins.

Of the territories that came under Mongol domination, China had by far the most sophisticated monetary system. Paper money had been developed there in the early part of the eleventh century, and by the Mongol era it was a well-established form of currency.⁹⁷ Although paper money had been issued by local officials in Chinggis Qan's time, it was not until the reign of Ögödei that notes (*chiao-ch'ao*) were issued by the central government.⁹⁸ On the advice of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the volume of paper money issued at that time was carefully restricted.

In Möngke's time, the issuance of paper money was resumed. The *Yüan shih* records that in 1253 "the superintendency of paper money (*chiao-ch'ao t'i-chü-ssu*) was established to print paper money in order to facilitate public finance."⁹⁹ The individual charged with that task is not named on this occasion, but elsewhere in the same source it is stated that Möngke ordered Bujir to supervise the issuance of the "precious notes" (*pao-ch'ao*).¹⁰⁰ Although no specimens are known to have survived, Rubruck has left a brief description of these notes: "The ordinary money of Cathay," he remarks, "is a

97. For a brief survey of paper money in China, see Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China, a Short History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 51-70. For the Yüan dynasty see Franke, *Geld und Wirtschaft*, pp. 34-119.

98. For example, in 1236 Ögödei granted paper money, *ch'ao*, to the family of Dei Sechen, the father of Börte, Chinggis Qan's principal wife; YS, chap. 118, p. 1223. For a translation of this passage, see Francis W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1338 in Memory of Jiguntei," *HJAS* 14 (1951): 17.

99. YS, chap. 4, p. 20.

100. *Ibid.*, chap. 123, p. 1332.

piece of paper made out of cotton, a handbreadth in width and length, and on this they stamp lines like Mangu's seal."¹⁰¹ As will be shown below, Möngke's seal, or *tamgha*, is found frequently on the metal coinage of the western parts of the empire.

The paper money issued at that time was backed by silver and silk.¹⁰² Beyond this, however, little is known of Möngke's "precious notes." The section in the *Yüan shih* that describes the monetary system begins its discussion with Qubilai's reign, stating that although paper money existed in the early Yüan, "there are no records [available] that would allow one to investigate its regulation."¹⁰³ As a result, we are left without any data regarding the denominations into which the currency was divided, nor any clear idea of the extent to which it was circulated in Möngke's reign. Some Chinese sources leave the impression that the paper money of Möngke's reign was issued solely by local governments or appanages, and that it could not be used outside the jurisdiction of the issuing agency.¹⁰⁴ This information, however, cannot be considered definitive, for in some cases it clearly refers to the period before 1253, when Möngke established the superintendency of paper currency, whereas in others the chronological application of the data is unclear.

The location of the boundary between the paper currency of China and the metallic currency of central Asia is another question that cannot be answered with confidence. The only clue we have is the remark of Ch'ang Te, Möngke's ambassador to Hülegü, who says that "going west from Po-lo (Pülād, a town to the southeast of Lake Balkash), gold, silver, and copper are used as money; [the coins] have inscriptions but

101. *Mongol Mission*, p. 171.

102. *YSLP*, chap. 2, 1b.

103. *YS*, chap. 93, p. 896; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 138.

104. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'uan chi*, chap. 34, 8a-9b; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 133; Franke, *Geld und Wirtschaft*, p. 36; and Chan, "Liu Ping-chung," pp. 125 and 135-36.

do not have square holes."¹⁰⁵ This passage, although not explicit, nonetheless implies that the monetary system in use in the territory to the east of Pūlād—the Uighur kingdom—differed in some way from that of central Asia. This at any rate was certainly the case in the period immediately after Möngke's reign, when paper money circulated widely in the Uighur kingdom.¹⁰⁶

To summarize, Möngke first established an agency to issue paper money on behalf of the government in 1253. It is not clear, however, whether the notes issued by this body constituted a "national" currency, or whether it issued various notes, each of which was intended to be circulated in a different locality.

In the Chaghadaid realm, the first coins minted in Möngke's reign date from 651/1253–54. These silver-plated copper *dirhams* were struck in Bukhara, Samarkand, and Ūṭrār. All bear the Arabic inscription "Mangū Qā'ān" or "Mangū Qā'ānī."¹⁰⁷ The Soviet numismatist Elena Davydovich argues that the latter form of the inscription should not be read "Möngke Qaghan," as most of her predecessors have done, but "money of the qaghan." She bases her argument on the fact that there is a Mongol word, *menggü*, meaning "money," that would be transcribed into the Arabic script in the same manner as "Mengü," the Turkic form of Möngke's name, and that the final *ī* in *qā'ānī* indicates possession in Persian, and thus should be read "of," or "belonging to the qaghan."¹⁰⁸ But

105. Wang Yiin, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'uan chi*, chap. 94, 52.

106. For details, see my article, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th Century," pp. 256–57.

107. K. A. Akishev, K. M. Baipakov, and L. B. Erzakovich, *Pozdnesrednevekovyi Otrar* (Alma-Ata, 1981), pp. 305 and 329–30.

108. Davidovich, *Denezhnoe khoziâstvo*, pp. 11–12, 23–27, and 37–38. Kenneth Luther rejects Davidovich's interpretation of the inscription, *Mangū qā'ānī*, stating that it can legitimately be read "of, like, or relating to Möngke Qaghan." See his "Notes on 'Alā al-Dīn Muhammad's Coinage of Transoxania,'" *The American Numismatic Society, Museum Notes* 10 (1962): 134–35.

however the inscription is read, it is evident that the coins in question date from Möngke's reign and were issued under his authority.

Gold *dīnārs* also were struck in the Chaghadai qanate during Möngke's time. These coins, also from Bukhara, Samarkand, and Ūṛār, all date from the latter part of his reign (1257 on) and, in most cases, are anonymous or simply read *qā'ān*, that is, Möngke. The purity of these *dīnārs* is uniformly low, being on the average about 66-percent gold.¹⁰⁹ Of the one hundred forty-five gold *dīnārs* found near Tashkent in 1955, the seventy-six dating from Möngke's reign are only 50- to 58-percent pure.¹¹⁰

Prior to the formation of the *Īl-khān* state, only a few coins were minted under Mongol sponsorship in western Asia. The first of these was a silver half-*dirham* struck in 642/1244-45 in various localities throughout the Transcaucasus—Ganjak, Tabrīz, Nakhchivān, and Tiflis. The inscription on these coins, issued at a time when there was no reigning qaghan, is of considerable interest. On the obverse is the standard Muslim formula, "There is no God but Allāh and Muḥammad is his prophet," but on the reverse, also in Arabic script, is the Turkic phrase "*ulugh manqul ulus bek*," that is, "Beg of the Empire of the Great Mongols." Clearly, *ulugh manqul ulus* is the Turkic equivalent of the Mongol *yeke mongghol ulus*, and *bek* (governor) can be equated to the Mongol *noyan* (commander or governor). But who is the *bek/noyan* in question? M. A. Seifeddini argues that the reference is to Arghun Aqa, who had been appointed by the regent Töregene to the governorship of Khurāsān and the Transcaucasus in the year previous, 641/1243-44.¹¹¹ Although the phrase "Beg," or "Noyan of the

109. Davidovich, *Denezhnoe khoziāstvo*, pp. 29-36.

110. For a complete description, see G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, "Klad Zolotykh monet XIII v. iz Srednei Azii," *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 2 (1960): 118-40, especially pp. 138-40.

111. M. A. Seifeddini, "Monety s nadpis'iu 'ulugh manqul ulus-bek'," *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 9 (1971): 115-21.

Great Mongol Empire," is never used in the literary sources, it is entirely possible that such was Arghun Aqa's title. The only other candidate is the Besüd Mongol Baiju (also titled *noyan*), who had been appointed chief military commander of western Asia in 1242. It seems more likely, however, that the title of Arghun Aqa would appear on the coinage, inasmuch as he was head of the civil administration and was therefore more directly concerned with fiscal matters.

In 643/1245-46, after Güyüg comes to power, this inscription is altered. The *ulus bek* remains, but the *ulugh manqul* is replaced by *qā'ān*, that is, Güyüg.¹¹² In the following year the formula again changed. A silver coin struck in Tiflis in 1247 bears the inscription "By the power of God / the authority of Güyüg (Kūyūk) / *qā'ān* [his] slave (*bandah*) / David Malik (that is, David Narin of Georgia)."¹¹³ The practice of allowing each client state to issue its own currency was to be continued under Möngke.

According to the Arabic historian al-ʿUmarī, *dirhams* and *dīnārs* "were not minted in [Hülegü's] name, but in the name of his brothers (Möngke and Qubilai)."¹¹⁴ The available numismatic data substantiate this statement.¹¹⁵ Before Hülegü's arrival in Persia, his name does not appear on coins at all; after 1257, the *īl-khān*'s name begins to appear with some frequency, but always below that of Möngke.

The earliest coinage issued in western Asia during Möngke's reign is from the Georgian kingdom. Silver and copper coins in the emperor's name were minted first in 652/1254-55 and continued to be struck there with considerable regularity until the year after his death, 1260. In the year 653/1255-56, for

112. Ibid., p. 117.

113. Pakhomov, *Monety Gruzii*, p. 128.

114. al-ʿUmarī/Lech, p. 19. Arabic text, and p. 103. German translation. Although Qubilai's name does not actually appear on any *īl-khān* issues, his title, "qaghan," is regularly found on such coins in the 1270s and 1280s.

115. The only exception known to me is an undated copper coin which bears Hülegü's name alone, but with the title *īl-khān*, i.e., "subservient qan." See R. Burn, "Coins of the Īlkhānīs of Persia," *JR.AS* (1933): 834.

example, coins struck in eight different months have been found. All of the Georgian coins were minted in Tiflis and all bear the inscription "Mūngkā Qā'ān / the supreme / the just." Between his name and his attributes is the qaghan's personal seal, or *tamgha*:



On the reverse is the Muslim formula, "There is no God but Allah."¹¹⁶

In the state of the Shīrvānshāhs, which was situated to the south of Darband along the western littoral of the Caspian,¹¹⁷ the first Mongol coins, of silver and copper, were issued in 653/1255–56. There is no indication of place. During the first few years of issue, the formulas resemble in all essentials those on the coins of Georgia. After 1258, however, the inscription was changed to accommodate Hülegü's name: "Qā'ān / the supreme / Mūnkkā Qā'ān / Hūlākū Khān." On this latter type of coin, Möngke's personal *tamgha* no longer appears.¹¹⁸ The purity of the silver coins minted in Georgia and in the state of the Shīrvānshāhs is not indicated, but it is known that the silver coins struck in Tabrīz in 1254 and 1259 were of high quality, over 90-percent pure.¹¹⁹ Gold coins are not much in evidence in western Asia at this time. The only known example bearing Möngke's name was minted in Harāt and is undated.¹²⁰

116. M. A. Seifeddini, *Monety Il'khanov. XIV veka* (Baku, 1968), pp. 39–43; E. A. Pakhomov, *Monety Gruzii* (Tbilisi, 1970), pp. 138–47; and David M. Lang, *Studies in the Numismatic History of Georgia in Transcaucasia* (American Numismatic Society, Notes and Monographs, no. 130; New York, 1955), pp. 39–41.

117. On the complicated history of this dynasty and its predecessors, see A. M. Buniatov, *Gosudarstvo atabekov Azerbaidzhana (1136–1225 gody)* (Baku, 1978), pp. 138–71.

118. Seifeddini, *Monety Il'khanov*, pp. 17–22.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

120. Fedorov-Davydov, "Klad zolotykh monet XIII v iz Srednei Azii," p. 118. See also B. V. Lunin, "K topografii i opisaniiu drevnikh monetnykh kladov i otdel'nykh monetnykh nakhodok na territorii Uzbekistana," *Istoriia material'noi kul'tury Uzbekistana* 8 (1969): 178.

Before turning to the coinage of the Golden Horde, it should be pointed out that the ostentatious titles sometimes bestowed upon Möngke on the coins of western Asia are an Islamic convention, not a native Mongol or Turkic one. A title such as "Mānkū Qā'ān / the supreme / possessor of the world / emperor (*padshāh*) of the face [of the earth],"¹²¹ which is found on an undated copper coin minted by the *atabeg*, Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu', has no counterpart in the Mongol tradition. In the only extant Mongol inscription dating from his lifetime, Möngke is merely referred to as "qaghan."¹²²

Within the territory of the Golden Horde, all of the coins issued in Möngke's name were struck in Bulghar, that is, "Great Bulgaria," on the middle Volga. In fact, until the latter part of the thirteenth century, when the minting of coins began in Sarai and Khwārazm, Bulghar is the only known mint site in the Jochid realm.¹²³ Furthermore, it appears that the circulation of this currency was restricted to the lands of the Volga Bulgars, for all known examples of these coins have been found within the territories formerly occupied by these people.¹²⁴ Both the silver and copper coins carry the same inscription, "Mankū Qā[ān] / personal *tamgha* / the supreme." The reverse reads "Minted in / personal *tamgha* / Būlgār." No dates are provided, but it is usually assumed that these coins were issued while Berke was on the throne, and thus can be dated to the period of 1257–59, because the reigns of Berke (1257–66) and Möngke (1251–59) overlapped only during

121. I. Ghalib Edhem, *Catalogue des monnaies turcomanes du Musée Impérial Ottoman* (Bologna: Arnaldo Forni Editor, [1894]), p. 113.

122. See the inscription of 1257, at Qara Qorum. Translation and text available in Nicholas Poppe, "Notes on the Monument in Honor of Möngke Khan," *CAJ* 6 (1961): 14–18.

123. The Bulgars began minting coins of their own in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. See A. G. Mukhamadiev, *Bulgaro-Tatarskaia monetnaia sistema, XII–XV vv* (Moscow, 1983), pp. 29–35 and 136.

124. G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, "Klady Dzhuchidskikh monet," *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 1 (1960): 94–103.

those three years. This assumption is based on the fact that the inscriptions on these coins are in Arabic, and it is therefore probable that they were struck under Berke, the first Muslim ruler of the Golden Horde.¹²⁵

On the basis of this survey, it is evident that Möngke restricted his efforts at reviving monetary circulation to areas with a well-established minting tradition; no attempt was made, for instance, to introduce coinage into the Rus principalities, where there was none.¹²⁶ Moreover, it is obvious that during Möngke's reign various currencies were circulating in different parts of the empire. Not only were there differences between the regional qanates (for example, paper money in China and various metallic currencies elsewhere), but in the case of the *Īl-khāns* there were internal differences as well; Georgia, for instance, had silver coinage, whereas Harāt had gold. On the surface it appears that such diversity would have complicated greatly the work of those concerned with the financial administration of the empire as a whole. This was not the case, however, for above all the regional and local variations in currency there was an imperial monetary unit employed everywhere, a silver ingot (*yastuq*) weighing, according to Rubruck, ten marks.¹²⁷ The terms used to denote these ingots varied from area to area. In Iran they were called *balīsh* (pillow); in central Asia, *yastuq* (pillow); in Mongolia, *sūke* (axe); in China, *ting* (ingot); and in Rus *slitok* (ingot). *Balīsh*

125. S. A. Īnina, "Dzhuchidskie monety iz raskopok i sborov Kuibyshevskoi ekspeditsii v Bolgarakh v 1946-1952 gg.," *MIA*, vol. 42 (1954), pp. 427 and 429-30. See also the follow-up articles for 1953-54, *MIA*, vol. 61 (1958), pp. 397-99 and 403; for 1957, *MIA*, vol. 80 (1960), p. 215; and for a general overview, see *MIA*, vol. 111 (1962), p. 163.

126. The Rus princes issued a limited stock of coins between the late tenth and late eleventh centuries, thereafter ensued a coinless period which lasted into the fourteenth century. See I. G. Spassky, *The Russian Monetary System: A Historico-Numismatic Survey* (Amsterdam: Jacques Schulman, 1967), pp. 51-56 and 62-69.

127. *Mongol Mission*, p. 144. In Rubruck's text, *yastuq* is rendered as *iascot*. See Paul Pelliot, "Le prétendu mot 'iascot' chez Guillaume de Rubrouck," *TP* 27 (1930): 190-92.

could also be divided into smaller units, the names of which are as follows:¹²⁸

	Persian	Uighur	Chinese
1 INGOT	<i>balīsh</i>	<i>yastuq</i>	<i>ting</i>
1/10 INGOT	<i>sūm</i>		
1/50 INGOT		<i>baqir</i>	<i>liang</i>
1/500 INGOT	<i>miṣqāl</i>	<i>satir</i>	<i>ch'ien</i>

Any particular currency could, of course, be equated to these units for purposes of conversion. Juvaynī, for instance, says that one silver ingot was equal to about seventy-five gold *dīnārs*.¹²⁹ In China and Uighuristan, the terms *ting* and *yastuq* were used in counting large amounts of paper money. In the Chinese sources, such a sum is always expressed as, say, "five hundred *ting* worth of paper money (*ch'ao*).¹³⁰ For lesser sums, *liang/baqir* or *ch'ien/satir* were used.¹³¹ Thus, from the standpoint of "central accounting," the silver ingot could be used as a medium of exchange to equate the multiform currencies of the realm. Besides serving as a currency of account, *balīsh* was employed in all major governmental transactions. Rubruck records that fees paid to artisans for work done on behalf of the qaghan and a grant bestowed upon a clergyman for construction of a church were tendered in *iascot* (*yastuq*).¹³²

In Chinggis Qan's day, both silver and gold *balīsh*¹³² were

128. For these terms, see DTS, pp. 82, 245, and 491; Francis W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1335 in Memory of Chang Ying-jui," *HJAS* 13 (1950): 74, 98, and 118, n. 123; and *Mongol Mission*, p. 171. In Boyle's translation of Juvaynī, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 23, the *balīsh* is mistakenly equated with fifty *miṣqāl*s. See Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 16, where the text reads "500." *pānṣad*.

129. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 16; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 23.

130. For a Uighur example, see DTS, p. 157, under *chung* III.

131. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 166 and 184.

132. Although both gold and silver *balīsh* are mentioned in the sources, it is clear that silver was much more common and served as the major medium of exchange.

used to purchase goods, but it was only under Ögödei that this system became an integral part of imperial finance.¹³³ By Möngke's reign, it had become necessary for each of the regional qanates to have substantial reserves of *balīsh* on hand in order to transact government business. This is the implication of Hülegü's order to Majd al-Dīn Tabrizī to take all of the ready money recovered from the treasuries of the Assassins and the 'Abbāsids and melt it down "and make it into *balīsh*." ¹³⁴

The basic features of the Mongol monetary system in Möngke's time having been outlined, it is now possible to assess the success of the emperor's efforts to monetize revenues. From the numismatic evidence alone, it is apparent that much more coinage was put into circulation during Möngke's period on the throne than in all previous reigns combined. Prior to his reign, only a few minting sites in central Asia and the Transcaucasus issued coins under Mongol auspices. After his enthronement, mints were reestablished in Bukhara, Ūṣṛār, Bulghar, Harāt, Mosul, and other locations, and older sites such as Tiflis continued to produce with great regularity. But despite these efforts, it is evident that in several areas of the empire the volume of money in circulation was still not sufficient to permit the *qubchir* to be paid exclusively in the currency of the realm. Certainly this was the case in China. The *Yüan shih* explicitly states that half of the *qubchir*, assessed at the rate of four *liang* per household, could be tendered in silk.¹³⁵ That many Chinese made use of this option is perhaps reflected in Rubruck's statement that every day the Chinese "give the Mongols fifteen hundred *iascot* (*yastuq*) . . . not counting the silk materials and foodstuffs which they receive from them." ¹³⁶

133. See Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 39; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 78; *SH*, par. 274, p. 214; and M. A. Seifeddini, "K voprosu o denezhnoi sisteme na territorii Irana i Zakavkaz'ia v XIII v.," *Numizmatika i epigrafika* 10 (1972): 163.

134. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 716-17. Majd al-Dīn had assisted Arghun Aqa in the census of 1254 in Iran.

135. *YCMCSL*, p. 94.

136. *Mongol Mission*, p. 144. Although Rubruck's data on the medium of payment are undoubtedly true, the amount indicated for ingots, 1,500 per day, is difficult to credit,

If China, with its sophisticated monetary system, was unable to pay the tribute entirely in cash, it is highly doubtful that areas such as the Rus principalities could have done so.

As noted above, the only known mint in the territory of the Golden Horde during Möngke's reign was in Bulghar. Moreover, it is doubtful whether coins from this mint ever circulated outside of "Great Bulgaria." Obviously, these coins could not and did not meet the currency needs of the Jochid realm. How, then, did the sedentary population, in particular the eastern Slavs, pay the tribute? No clear and unequivocal answer can be given, but it is a reasonable assumption that furs played an important role. Carpini testifies to the fact that in the late 1240s the Mongols customarily demanded and received from the eastern Slavs pelts of various kinds—including white sable and black fox—as tribute.¹³⁷ There is evidence, too, that in Möngke's reign such pelts continued to be a staple tribute item, for Rubruck on one occasion numbers the Rus principalities among the different regions of the Golden Horde that regularly sent "valuable furs of many kinds" to the "Tartars."¹³⁸ And the friar's assertion, found elsewhere in his relation, that "the ordinary currency of the Ruthenians (Rus) is squirrel and ermine skins" lends additional weight to this line of argument.¹³⁹

As to the role of precious metals in the tribute relations

for, assuming Rubruck's figure is accurate, the annual tribute exacted from China would then amount to 547,500 *yastuq*! This sum challenges credulity because it is known that in 1239 the entire quota for northern China was only 44,000 *ting* (ingots); YH'L, chap. 57, 202, and YS, chap. 2, p. 13. That Möngke upped the 1239 quota is, of course, possible, but that the quota for 1254, the time of Rubruck's visit, was twelve-and-a-half times higher is hard to accept, especially in light of the fact that the 44,000 figure was considered in its time as excessive and a ruinous burden on the Chinese populace. As a weekly total, 1,500 ingots is perhaps conceivable, but not as a daily figure. In my opinion, either Rubruck misunderstood the data of his unnamed informant or the Mongols consciously misled the friar in an effort to impress him with the empire's great wealth and power.

137. *Mongol Mission*, p. 39. See also p. 80.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

139. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

between the eastern Slavs and their Mongol masters, we have only Rubruck's general statement to the effect that Saracens in Tartar employ took much gold and silver from the "Ruthenians."¹⁴⁰ The relative importance of these metals in tribute payments is nowhere indicated nor is there any explicit statement as to the form in which the silver and gold reached the Mongols. All that can be said with assurance is that in the absence of a developed monetary system in the Rus territories, it seems likely that the precious metals in question were tendered to the Saracen tribute collectors in the form of ingots (*slitok*), not coin.

Viewing the Golden Horde as a whole, it appears probable that the tribute was collected in various forms—furs, ingots (*slitok*), and, to some extent, coin. The form of the tribute payment no doubt varied widely from region to region. The Bulgars may have paid mostly in cash, but other subjects of the Jochids, such as the Finno-Ugric peoples of the Urals, must have paid largely, if not entirely, in furs. The Slavic population, on the other hand, though in what proportions we do not know, paid partly in furs and partly in silver and gold ingots. Again, the evidence is murky at best, but these assumptions are compatible with what is known of the general economic conditions within the Golden Horde territory, and, moreover, are consistent with Mongol practice elsewhere in the empire.

Although it is certain that the *qubchir* was not collected exclusively in cash, there are solid grounds for asserting that Möngke's tax and currency measures substantially increased the amount of ready cash at the disposal of the imperial government. In the first place, some regions of the empire, Iran and central Asia in particular, did meet a substantial portion of their tribute obligation in coin—at least, the sources mention no other form of payment in those areas. And in the second place, even in those parts of the empire where the *qubchir* was

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.

not paid in coin, it was collected in readily negotiable and easily transported commodities such as silk and furs; although not money in the narrow sense, such goods still possessed some of the attributes of currency.¹⁴¹

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the effort made during Möngke's reign to place new coinage in circulation was closely tied to the policy of collecting the tribute, or *qubchir*, in cash. Therefore, because the assessment of the *qubchir*, as Juvaynī indicates,¹⁴² took place in conjunction with the census, it is not surprising that we find a close chronological relationship between the issuance of new coinage and the imposition of the census in any given area. In all cases where firm dates for both these events are available, we find that new coins were minted either in the year of the census or the year following. In China, for instance, registration was ordered in 1252 and paper notes were first printed in 1253. In western Asia, this correspondence also holds true. In Georgia, the census began in 1254, the same year in which coins first were minted in Möngke's name. The census was taken in Azerbaijan and Ārrān (Agvank) in 1254 or perhaps 1255,¹⁴³ and coinage in the emperor's name was struck initially in 653/1255–56.

This chronological pattern being stable for both eastern and western Asia, it seems probable that a similar pattern existed in other parts of the empire as well, for example, in central Asia. In this case, the chronological and institutional relationship

141. Rubruck reports, *ibid.*, p. 181, that the stipend given to a group of Nestorian priests by the emperor was paid in silk and silver.

142. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 2, p. 258; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 521. There is also an interesting poetic allusion to the close relationship that existed between census taking and the levying of the *qubchir*; see Vladimir Minorsky, "Pūr-i Bahā and his Poems," reprinted in his *Iranica: Twenty Articles* (Publications of the University of Tehran, vol. 775; Herford: Stephen Austin, 1964), p. 299.

143. Both the Persian and Armenian sources seem to indicate that Azerbaijan was registered after Armenia and Georgia. See Kirakos, p. 221; Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 2, p. 258; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 521. This being the case, it seems likely that Azerbaijan and Ārrān were counted in late 1254 or early 1255. In any event, it is known that Arghun Aqa, who conducted this census, met Hülegü in Khurāsān sometime in 1255, after having completed his work in Azerbaijan.

between census-taking, the fixing of the *qubchir* and the issuance of new coinage confirms, at least circumstantially, that Möngke's order to Mas'ūd Beg to conduct a census in central Asia was in fact carried out; inasmuch as two of the elements, the assessment of the *qubchir* and the minting of new coinage, are in evidence, it seems highly unlikely that the third element, the imposition of the census, would be missing from the pattern. Furthermore, the timing of the census in central Asia can be inferred, tentatively, of course, from the year (651/1253-54) in which the new coinage was issued. If China and Iran are any guide, then the registration in Turkestan took place in 650/1252-53 or 651/1253-54.

In areas where the date of the census is known but the coins are undated, it would be possible to reverse this procedure and establish the approximate time when the new coins were issued. Unfortunately, in the case of the Golden Horde, we have neither the dates for the coins struck in Great Bulgaria during Möngke's reign nor any firm information as to when the census was taken in the area of the middle Volga. However, because the registration in the northern regions of the Rus principalities took place during Berke's reign, it may well be that Great Bulgaria was also counted at this time. If true, this would tend to support the theory that the Bulghar coins struck in Möngke's name should be dated to the period 1257-59, a conclusion reached by Soviet numismatists on other grounds (see above, this chapter).

Extraordinary Levies—Taghar

In addition to the triune of regular taxes discussed above, Möngke's regime often imposed upon its hard-pressed sedentary subjects special levies, called *taghar* in the west-Asian sources, to sustain the imperial army while on campaign. A word of disputed origin, *taghar* was borrowed into Turkic with the basic meaning of "bag" or "sack," from which it

developed a secondary meaning of a dry measure equal to one-hundred *man* (the Anglo-Indian *maund*).¹⁴⁴ Its use as a technical term, in the sense of a special tax in kind, seems to have arisen only in Mongol times.¹⁴⁵

Juvaynī states that by imperial order it was the responsibility of Möngke's officials and local rulers to collect and deliver the *taghar* to the troops.¹⁴⁶ The method of assessment is variously and contradictorily reported in the sources. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, when Hūlegü's army was en route to Iran, each of the *Īl-khān*'s soldiers had to be provided with one *taghar*, or one-hundred *man*, of flour and one "skin of wine."¹⁴⁷ In the *Armenian History* of Kirakos, however, it is said that each individual (male) inscribed on the census rolls had to supply one-hundred *man* of flour and fifty *man* of wine, not that each soldier received that amount. Kirakos indicates that beyond the flour and wine, two *man* of rice were demanded as well, along with certain quantities of silver coin, ropes, arrowheads, horse-shoes, and sacks!¹⁴⁸ In Georgia, this obligation was met in a somewhat different manner. Here, each village had to provide each *mingghan* (unit of one thousand) raised in Georgia with one lamb and one gold coin, and each Georgian *tūmen* received two sheep and one gold coin. The *Georgian Chronicle* goes on to say that this same rate also applied in Rum (Asia Minor) and in Baghdad (Iraq).¹⁴⁹

Besides coin and immediately consumable commodities such as flour and arrows, the Mongols also demanded from their subjects raw materials that could be transformed into

144. E. V. Sevort'ian, *Ėtimologicheskii slovar t'ürksskikh iazykov*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1980), pp. 120-22; Cleaves, "Mongolian Names and Terms," pp. 438-39; and DTS, pp. 526-27. In Arabic, *taghar* is a dry measure equalling 2,000 kilograms.

145. *Taghar* as a levy is first mentioned under Ögödei. See Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 2, p. 120, and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 55.

146. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 3, pp. 93-94 and 112-13; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 609 and 621-22.

147. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 686.

148. Kirakos, p. 227.

149. Brosset, *Géorgie*, pp. 551-52.

implements of war. Rubruck's statement that Tartar officials taxed the population between the Tanais (Don) and the Danube one axe "and all the unwrought iron which they found," provides a dramatic example of this type of exaction.¹⁵⁰

Although the term *taghar* is not encountered in the Chinese sources, exactions of this kind were not unknown in eastern Asia. The special taxes levied against Qubilai's appanage in 1257 were earmarked for troops fighting against the Sung and most certainly represent an eastern equivalent to the western *taghar*.

The frequency of this imposition cannot be calculated, but, given the number and scale of the campaigns that Möngke launched in the course of his reign, it seems safe to conclude that the collection of the *taghar* and its analogues was by no means a rare occurrence.

150. *Mongol Mission*, p. 91.

7. Recruitment of Manpower

Mongol Military Organization

By any standard of measurement, the series of military victories gained by the Mongols in such rapid succession during the thirteenth century was a most remarkable performance and, at first glance, not readily explainable. How did such a relatively small group of people bring so much territory under their control in so little time?

One possibility can be eliminated immediately: Mongol armies did not enjoy technological superiority over their enemies.¹ Their weaponry did not differ appreciably from that of their sedentary adversaries, nor for that matter, from the basic pattern of armament that had prevailed in the Eurasian steppe since the first centuries of the Christian era.² Rather, Mongol success was due to the fighting qualities of their soldiers and to the tactical, logistical, and organizational abilities of their leaders. But in addition to possessing a qualitative advantage over their opponents, they had a quantitative one as well: "The Mongol conquests," as John Masson Smith ex-

1. Claude Cahen, "Les changements techniques militaires dans le Proche Orient médiéval et leur importance historique," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. J. V. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 119-20.

2. Catherine Uray-Köhalmi, "La périodisation de l'histoire des armements des nomades des steppes," *Etudes Mongoles* 5 (1974): 145-55.

presses it, "were a product of the irresistible combination of skill and numbers."³

Leaving aside the qualitative aspects of the matter, which have been dealt with elsewhere,⁴ let us turn to the question of numbers. Where did the Mongols find the manpower to field such large armies? Certainly not from their own ranks, for their demographic base was quite limited. The answer, of course, is that the Mongols relied on subject peoples to meet their ever-growing manpower needs. The author of the *Tartar Relation*, writing in the latter half of the 1240s, was well aware of their reliance on this expedient. In tracing the rise of the Mongol Empire, he remarks that Chinggis Qan "had the invariable habit of conscripting the soldiers of a conquered army into his own, with the object of subduing other countries by virtue of his increased strength, as is clearly evident in his successors, who imitate his wicked cunning."⁵ This procedure is not in itself unique, but the scale on which it was carried out by the Mongols was without precedent.⁶ It should be noted too, that although Mongol armies were international in character, the mercenary and slave soldiers so common in earlier empires were nowhere in evidence. The great size and ethnic diversity of Mongol field armies was achieved in the main by imposing something akin to a "national-service obligation" on all subject peoples immediately upon their incorporation into the empire.⁷ Initially, the troops conscripted in this manner

3 John Masson Smith, "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population," *JESHO* 18 (1975): 272.

4. See chap. 1, n. 17, and the literature cited there.

5. *Tartar Relation*, p. 56.

6. The conscription of defeated armies played a prominent role in the fortunes of the early Islamic state. See David Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks on the *Mamlūk* Military Institution," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. J. V. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 44-45.

7. Juvaynī remarks on the advantages of the Mongol military system over those that rely on slaves and mercenaries. See Juvaynī/*Qazvīnī*, vol. 1, pp. 23-24; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 31-32.

were almost entirely Mongol and Turkic nomads, the followers of rival tribal chieftains who had submitted to Chinggis Qan out of political calculation or as the result of military defeat. The Mongol ruler's *levée en masse* of the "people who live in felt tents" established the pattern; thereafter, his successors applied this same technique to the sedentary regions of the empire, which contained vast reserves of manpower.

It is true that in Chinggis Qan's day, surrendering Chinese armies, which had been fighting under the banner of the Chin dynasty, were incorporated into the imperial forces, but no systematic draft of the settled population took place until the middle years of Ögödei's reign. From that time on, however, sedentary auxiliaries were raised on a regular basis and assumed an important place in the Mongol military establishment. Besides supplying additional manpower, which formed the empire's infantry arm, these auxiliaries also provided the Mongols with technical assistance in siege warfare.⁸ As the Mongols pushed farther and farther into the sedentary regions of Eurasia, where they encountered walled cities and elaborate fortifications with increasing frequency, the need for such specialists grew, because the core of their army, the Mongol and Turkic nomads, had knowledge of neither the technology nor the tactics of siege warfare. Clearly the Mongol's success in mobilizing their sedentary subjects for military service is one of the major reasons why they were able to push forward the frontiers of the empire at such an astonishing pace.

In discussing the Mongol military machine, it is essential to bear in mind that the armies were composed of these two elements—nomadic tribesmen and sedentary auxiliaries. Not only did the two perform different military functions—the former fought as cavalrymen, the latter as infantrymen/artillerymen—but owing to the fundamental ecological and

8. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 17

organizational differences between nomadic and sedentary societies, each element had to be recruited on a separate basis. In a nomadic society, it is possible to mobilize nearly every adult male for military service.⁹ When on campaign, a soldier's family and his herds (which are the basic form of wealth among pastoralists) could accompany him. As a result, economic production within a nomadic community need not stop, nor even be substantially reduced, despite an almost total call-up of adult males. In labor-intensive agricultural societies, however, this is not the case. Large-scale military mobilization invariably disrupts economic production to some extent.¹⁰ For this reason, careful calculations had to be made to determine the proper proportion of the sedentary populace that should be called up. In some parts of the empire, one in ten was drafted, and in others only one in twenty.¹¹ The remainder of the populace was of course required to provide for the economic needs of the army while it was in the field. But before discussing the implementation of their recruitment policies throughout the empire, some comment on the organization and nomenclature of the Mongol army is called for.

Auxiliary forces manned by the Mongols' sedentary subjects are called *cherig* (*charīk*) in the Persian sources to distinguish them from the Mongol and Turkic troops.¹² *Cherig*, as used in the Mongol sources, has the general meaning of "army" or "troops," but is also used in a narrower sense to mean the number of recruits a given locality or tribal group was obliged

9. Juvaynī records that all Mongols "great or small, noble or base, in time of battle [become] swordsmen, archers and lancers." Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 30. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 22. The early Arab conquests also were dependent upon a *levée en masse* of Bedouin tribesmen. See C. E. Bosworth, "Recruitment, Muster and Review in Medieval Islamic Armies," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. J. V. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 59.

10. See Owen Lattimore, *Mongol Journeys* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1941), p. 126.

11. Brasset, *Géorgie*, pp. 551–52; and YS, chap. 98, p. 947.

12. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 75, and vol. 2, p. 197; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 97, and vol. 2, p. 465.

to raise on behalf of the central authorities.¹³ It is from this latter sense of the term—a quota of recruits—that *cherig* came to be used as a general designation for sedentary auxiliaries. Although the troops themselves were called *cherig*, in some sources, particularly the Armenian, the obligation to provide these troops went under the term *qalan*.¹⁴

The organization of the auxiliaries was identical to that of the nomadic troops. Both were based on the decimal system, a tradition with a long history in the Eurasian steppe.¹⁵ Chinggis Qan first applied the principle to his own army between 1203 and 1206, naming leaders of units of ten thousand *tümen-u noyan*; of one thousand, *mingghan-u noyan*; of one hundred, *ja'un-u noyan*, and of ten, *harban-u noyan*.¹⁶ It should not be assumed, however, that these units actually contained a full complement of troops. The Chinese sources make it clear that the size of a *tümen* (*wan-hu*) was always well below its authorized strength of 10,000. Because they were consistently undermanned, *tümens* were graded officially into three categories: an upper, with a minimum of 7,000 troops; a middle, with a minimum of 5,000; and a lower, with a minimum of only 3,000.¹⁷ In less-populous areas, not surprisingly, the gap between nominal and actual strength was even greater. In central Tibet, the eleven units of ten thousand (*k'ri skor*) formed after the 1268 census ranged in size between a maximum of 5,850

13. See Vladimirtsov, *Régime social des Mongols*, p. 131; and *SH*, par. 100, p. 34. *Cherig* is a Mongolian borrowing from the Turkic. According to the *DTS*, p. 144, the Turkic was in turn borrowed from the Sanskrit, *ksatrika*, meaning "soldier." Nicholas Poppe, however, denies a Sanskrit etymology, arguing that *cherig* is derived from the Turkic verbal stem, *cher-*, "to fight." See his "On Some Military Terms in the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-chih*," *MS* 26 (1967): 512-13.

14. Babafian, *Armenii*, pp. 250-51.

15. There are clear references to the decimal system of organization among the nomads of the eastern steppe (the *Hsiung-nu*) from the time of the Earlier Han (202 B.C.-9 A.D.). See Omeljan Pritsak, "Die 24 *Ta-ch'en*: Studie zur Geschichte des Verwaltungsaufbaus der Hsiung-nu-Reiche," *Oriens Extremus* 1 (1954): 180-81.

16. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 9-10; and *SH*, pars. 191, pp. 119-20, and 202, pp. 141-42.

17. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 170-71 and n. 27.

and a minimum of 500, the average being a mere 2,818 troopers per *tümen*.¹⁸ And although we have no equivalent numerical data on the size of the *tümens* recruited from the nomadic population, there can be little doubt that these units, too, were below their paper strength, for P'eng Ta-ya, a Sung emissary who traveled to Ögödei's court in 1233-34, says, with specific reference to the Mongol units (*Hei-ta wan-hu*), that "none had a full [complement of] 10,000."¹⁹

As remarked previously, the military obligations of the settled populace to the state were established by means of the census. Juvaynī states that the census "classified everyone into tens, hundreds, and thousands."²⁰ This does not mean, of course, that everyone was required to serve in the army. From both Persian and Chinese sources it is apparent that, although the populace was divided into decimal units, only a certain portion of the registered households actually were required to provide troops.²¹ Those not designated as military households were responsible for supporting those conscripted while they were in the field. In other words, a *tümen* was both a military formation and a territorial/administrative unit. As a territorial/administrative unit, the *tümen* had to be sufficiently large and populous to raise and subsequently maintain such a military formation.

Military Recruitment in China

In northern China, Mongol military recruitment began in earnest following the census of 1235-36. Prior to that time,

18. The breakdown of the individual strengths of the eleven units of 10,000 is as follows: 5,850, 3,892, 3,700, 3,630, 3,001, 3,000, 2,348, 2,250, 1,990, 750, and 500. These data, derived from native Tibetan sources, are available in Giuseppe Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, vol. 1 (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1949), pp. 13-14, n. 36, pp. 251-52, and n. 40, p. 252.

19. P'eng Ta-ya and Hsü T'ing, *Hei-ta shih-lüeh*, in Wang Kuo-wei, ed., *Meng-ku shih-liao ssu-chung* (Taipei, 1975), p. 515.

20. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 34 (my italics). See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 25.

21. See YS, chap. 134, p. 1438; Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 596, and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 218.

Chinese had been incorporated into the imperial forces, but usually as members of defecting Chin units. In the Chinese sources of the period, these troops are usually referred to as the "Black Army" (*Hei-chün*).²² The first major draft of Chinese civilians came in 1236, when the Salji'ud Mongol commander Ta-pu-yeh-crh was ordered to conscript individuals from certain specified administrative subdivisions and then "lead them on campaign." Another draft, far more comprehensive, occurred in 1241. In that year, the Chinese general Liu Hei-ma was instructed to survey the civilian population registers for additional military recruits. The troops called up at this time, 97,575 in all, were formed into a new command and designated, appropriately, the "New Army" (*Hsin-chün*). Together with those Chinese units that had gone over to the Mongols earlier, the *Hei-chün*, they constituted the "Chinese Army" (*Han-chün*), an important component of the imperial armed forces.²³ Like their Mongol and Turkic counterparts, these Chinese units were organized on the decimal principle: units of ten thousand were called *wan-hu* (literally, "ten thousand households"); units of one thousand *ch'ien-hu* (literally "one thousand households"); and so on. The same terms also were used to designate the commanders of such units. Thus, the Chinese equivalent of *tümen-u noyan* was simply *wan-hu*.

After the call-up of 1241, no further drafts are mentioned in the Chinese sources until Möngke's reign. During the census of 1252, military registers were compiled as a preliminary to an extensive mobilization.²⁴ The first call for troops came in 1254, followed by another in 1255. It is clear from the *Yüan shih*'s discussion of the recruitment process that not all of the individuals placed on the military registers at this time were

22. The *Hei-chün* were also called the *Han-chün* (Chinese Army) on occasion. Concerning the terminology, see Sun K'o-k'uan, *Meng-ku Han chün yü Han wen-hua yen-chiu* (Taipei, 1958), pp. 44-65.

23. YS, chap. 98, p. 947; Gunter Mangold, *Das Militärwesen in China unter der Mongolen-Herrschaft* (Bamberg: Fotodruck, 1971), p. 59; Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 12-13 and 75; and de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," pp. 106-10.

24. YS, chap. 98, p. 947.

actually inducted. Some were not activated until the early years of Qubilai's reign.²⁵

According to the *Yüan shih*, the recruits and officers called up in 1254 were made part of the "New Army."²⁶ There are, however, somewhat confusing references in the *Yüan shih* to an "Old Army" (*Chiu-chün*) in Möngke's reign.²⁷ No explanation is offered, but this may have been a means of distinguishing Chinese armies recruited before Möngke's reign—the "New Army" formed by Ögödei—from those recruited after Möngke's enthronement—the "New Army" of 1254. In other words, there may have been an "old" New Army and a "new" New Army.

Although the Chinese sources occasionally report the number of soldiers recruited from specific areas, for example, the 20,000 inducted in Shantung in 1255,²⁸ the total number of troops available for operations in eastern Asia during Möngke's reign is not stated. The reason for the absence of such data is spelled out in some detail in the *Yüan shih*:

Because the military registers contained important matters [pertaining to] military affairs, the Chinese were not [allowed to] read their figures. Even among the ministers of the Privy Council (*Shu-mi [yüan]*),²⁹ who were intimately associated with [these matters] and solely in charge of the armies, only one or two of their leaders knew them (that is, the numbers). Therefore, during the [entire] one hundred years of the dynasty, nobody knew the figures of the inner and outer armies.³⁰

But though the Chinese sources yield no specifics on the Mongol order of battle in eastern Asia during Möngke's reign, we

25. *Ibid.*, p. 948.

26. *Ibid.*, chap. 3, p. 16.

27. *Ibid.*, chap. 149, p. 1590.

28. *Ibid.*, chap. 148, p. 1585.

29. The *Shu-mi yüan* was the chief agency in the Yüan government concerned with military affairs.

30. *YS*, chap. 98, p. 947.

are not without some guideposts. Rashīd al-Dīn, for instance, offers a summary accounting of troop strength, according to which ninety *tūmens* were available to the Mongols when they moved against the Sung in the late 1250s; sixty of these accompanied Möngke as the right wing of the army; and thirty were attached to Qubilai as the left wing.³¹ Admittedly, Rashīd al-Dīn's figure seems excessively high and as, moreover, it stands quite alone, one is tempted at first glance to dismiss his assertion out of hand. But despite these objections, there are grounds for giving his numbers careful consideration as a point of departure for estimating Mongol strength in the east.

In the first place, Rashīd al-Dīn's informant can be traced, and this individual, it turns out, was indeed in a position to know facts such as these. In preparing his history of the world, the *Jāmi' al-Tavārīkh*, or *Collected Chronicles*, Rashīd al-Dīn had as his principal collaborator Bolad Ch'eng-hsiang (Pūlād Chīnksānk), a Dörben Mongol who had been sent to Iran in 1285 as Qubilai's chief representative at the *Īl-khān* court. Bolad was famed as an expert on the history and traditions of the Mongol and Turkic tribes, and contributed significantly to those sections of Rashīd al-Dīn's history dealing with the rise of the Mongol Empire. All of this is widely known, but what has been little appreciated is that Bolad had long served in China and was well informed on the political and military affairs of the Yüan dynasty. At the time of Möngke's campaign against the Sung, Bolad was a high-ranking officer in Qubilai's personal guard (*keshig*) and was on intimate terms with the future emperor. After Qubilai's rise to power, Bolad was transferred to the Privy Council (*Shu-mi yüan*), where he served for a number of years before being sent to Iran. As an eyewitness to the events, a confidant of Qubilai's, and a high official with access to secret military records, Bolad was certainly in a position to give Rashīd al-Dīn accurate figures on

31 Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 601, and Rashīd/Boyle, pp. 224-25.

Mongol troop strength in China. Indeed, we know of several instances where the Persian chronicler received data of this kind from Bolad.³² Thus, Rashīd al-Dīn's assertion that the Mongol order of battle in the east numbered ninety or so *tūmens* by the end of Möngke's reign rests on information supplied by a very credible witness.

This is not to argue, however, that the Mongols put anything like 900,000 men into the field against the Sung. To begin with, it must be kept in mind that the *tūmen* was never at full strength, so that ninety such units would yield, in the aggregate, 500,000 troops at best. But even this figure is too high for a field army. It is extremely doubtful, in my view, that all ninety *tūmens* were actually committed, as Rashīd al-Dīn avers, to the assault on the Sung. In other words, it is far more likely that the Persian historian's figure of ninety *tūmens* represents the total number of units then available (at least on paper) to the Mongols in the east-Asian theater of operation, not the number committed to battle. The figure "ninety" should then be understood as encompassing two distinct categories of *tūmens*: (1) the active units assigned to the field and to garrison duty, and (2) the units held in reserve, such as Chinese *wan-hu* formed by the Mongols but not actually called up for service.

Scaled down thusly, Rashīd al-Dīn's count of ninety *tūmens*, nominally 900,000 men, resolves itself into an army of 500,000, of which a sizable portion were reservists. Although considerably reduced, the final figure of one-half million, whatever the ratio of regulars to reservists, remains high for a premodern army and may still give rise to doubts without corroborating

32. See, for example, Rashīd al-Dīn, *Die Chinasgeschichte des Rashid ad-Din*, trans. and ed. Karl Jahn (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. klasse, vol. 105; Vienna: Hermann Böhlau Hachf., 1971), pp. 19-20. To date, no study has been made of Bolad, who played such an important role in the political and cultural relations between China and Iran in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. My remarks are based on a preliminary investigation of Bolad's life drawn from both Chinese and Persian sources, which I hope to rework and publish in the future.

evidence. Fortunately, such evidence, though indirect, is available. In 1268, according to contemporary documents preserved in the *Yüan tien-chang*, the combined quota of Han and Mongol military households in northern China was set at 720,000.³³ This figure, of course, should not be construed as the number of soldiers on active duty, but it does provide us with a means of gauging the *combined* strength of the Mongols' active and reserve manpower in the east just a decade after Möngke's reign. And if northern China could supply something in the neighborhood of 700,000 men in the 1260s, then it is certainly conceivable that the same territory could provide 500,000 (again counting both regulars and reservists) in the 1250s.

As to the number of troops on active service by the end of Möngke's reign, only an estimate can be made. Although it is a rough figure, to be sure, I would calculate that the field and garrison troops mobilized in eastern Asia at this time numbered around 200,000. To begin with the Chinese contingents, we know that in Ögödei's time the New Army (*Hsin-chün*) by itself contained 97,000 men. Inasmuch as this figure represents but part of the Chinese troops mobilized under Ögödei and as, moreover, we know Möngke initiated further call-ups in the mid-1250s, there is every reason to suppose that the strength of the Chinese formations during the latter's reign continued to approach, if not exceed, 100,000. To this must be added the Mongol units. Here all we can do is to assume that of the 101 *mingghans* (units of 1,000) that Chinggis Qan bequeathed to Tolui, and that subsequently were inherited by the latter's sons, many were retained in the east (though some assuredly went west with Hülegü). As a total for the Mongol troops active in eastern Asia during the 1250s, 50,000 does not seem out of line. Finally, there are the contributions from other ethnic groups known to have been serving in China in the mid-thirteenth

33 *Yüan tien-chang*, chap. 34, 6b and 21a. For additional comment on the 1268 quota, see Hung, "China and the Nomads," pp. 621-22.

century. With reference to the composition of the Mongol armies in eastern Asia, Rashīd al-Dīn reports that besides the Mongols and the Chinese, Tangut, Jurchen, and Korean (Sol-angqa) troops were available to Möngke in some numbers.³⁴ The Chinese sources confirm this, and note the presence of various other "ethnic" contingents as well: Nan-chao, for instance, raised two *tūmens* for service in the campaign against Annam, the Uighur kingdom sent at least one *tūmen* to Szechwan, and the Alans of the northern Caucasus provided another *tūmen* (as well as two smaller units of indeterminate size) for the same operation.³⁵ Although no comprehensive numerical breakdown of these "ethnic" units is possible, it does appear probable that the formations listed above, taken in conjunction with unknown quantities of Tangut, Jurchen, and Korean troops, provided the Mongols with another 50,000.

The proportion of the Chinese populace called to arms varied greatly according to time and place. On occasion, one adult male in ten or one in twenty was called. At other times, the basis of recruitment was the household, not the individual. In such instances, one recruit was taken from a given number of households; for example, one household out of three had to provide a recruit, and those not required to contribute were called "auxiliary military households" (*t'ieh chün-hu*).³⁶ But whether actually inducted or merely liable to call-up, those households and individuals on the military registers were attached to, and under the supervision of, a specific *tūmen/wan-hu*, or its components. As noted before, each of these auxiliary formations, whether active or in reserve, also functioned as a territorial/administrative unit. This is borne out by the Chinese sources, which indicate that in Möngke's time detachments of the "New Army" were raised within a specific administrative

34. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 601; and Rashīd/Boyle, p. 255.

35. YS, chap. 122, p. 1321, chap. 123, p. 1343, chap. 135, pp. 1454 and 1456, chap. 154, p. 1648, chap. 166, p. 1784, and YWL, chap. 26, 2b.

36. YS, chap. 98, pp. 946-47.

subdivision, which then gave its name to the military unit conscripted there. Thus, there was a *ch'ien-hu* (unit of one thousand) raised in and named after Feng-chou, an administrative subdivision of Shensi,³⁷ and a *wan-hu* (unit of ten thousand) corresponding to the circuit (*lu*) of Tung-p'ing.³⁸

In this connection, it is interesting to note that one Chinese source speaks of administrative units of ten, of one hundred, and of *chous* (districts). If, as seems likely from the context, the author is listing these units sequentially, in an ascending order, then units of one thousand, *ch'ien-hu*, are equivalent to *chous*.³⁹ In such a system, the next higher administrative division, the circuit (*lu*), could be equated with a unit of ten thousand, a *wan-hu*. Even though examples (as above) can be found to substantiate these correspondences, it would be a mistake to assume that there was always a one-to-one correlation between *lu* and *wan-hu*, and between *chou* and *ch'ien-hu*, that is, that each administrative unit supported a similarly named military formation. Given variations in population density, it is hardly likely that administrative units would always contain the proper number of people. In some cases, several administrative units might need to be joined in order to raise the desired military formation, and in others the population density might be such that several military units could be raised from one administrative subdivision. Frequent references to the creation of new *chous* and to the enlargement of existing *chous* in Möngke's time is perhaps evidence of the fact that the population of many administrative units had to be augmented before corresponding military units, either *wan-hu* or *ch'ien-hu*, could be formed.⁴⁰

37. Ibid., chap. 146, p. 1571.

38. Ibid., chap. 3, p. 18, and chap. 148, p. 1585.

39. Ma Tsu-ch'ang, *Ma Shih-t'ien wen-chi*, chap. 14, p. 12b.

40. YS, chap. 58, pp. 532, 533, 535, 537, and 540. Because the names of some of the "New Army" units raised in 1254 and 1255 correspond to the names of some of the *chous* reorganized during this same period, it is a fair assumption that military recruitment and administrative reorganization were closely connected.

As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the Mongols' interest in recruiting sedentary auxiliaries was not limited to a desire for increased numbers; the need for technical specialists, particularly in the field of siege warfare, was an equally important factor. In Chinggis Qan's time, craftsmen of various sorts were conscripted, if successfully identified, when a new area fell under Mongol control. Those conscripted were forced to labor in government workshops or to serve as sappers with the army. By Möngke's reign, the system of recruiting craftsmen had been considerably refined, nothing being left to chance. In 1252 the emperor ordered that all metal workers, carpenters, and gunpowder makers were to be registered as "catapult operators" (*p'ao-shou*).⁴¹ This explains how the Mongols obtained the services of the one thousand crews of Chinese artillerymen who accompanied their armies to Iran in 1253.⁴² When it was determined that Hülegü would require catapults and other types of siege machinery for his campaign against the Assassins and 'Abbāsids, Möngke and his advisers only had to consult the census rolls to identify qualified individuals, send out messengers to northern China to notify those selected, and instruct them to proceed to Mongolia, where Hülegü's forces were being assembled. The complete destruction of the Assassins' forts in 1256-57 and the successful breaching of the walls of Baghdad in 1258 are not just further examples of the proficiency of the Mongol military machine, but also rather impressive demonstrations of the effectiveness of their administrative apparatus.⁴³

41. Ibid., chap. 98, p. 949.

42. It should also be noted in this connection that Möngke, in 1253, ordered the Mongol's most experienced artilleryman, Ambughai (An-mu-hai), who had held the title of *Darughachi* of Catapult Operators of all Circuits (*Sui-lu p'ao-shou ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) since Chinggis Qan's day, to accompany Hülegü to the west. It therefore seems likely that the 1,000 crews of Chinese catapult operators fought under his direction when they reached the Middle East. On Ambughai, see YS, chap. 122, p. 1327; and S. A. Shkol'niĭ, *Kitaiskaiia doognestrel'naia artilleriia* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 283-84.

43. Rashid/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 686.

Military Recruitment in Iran

In 1253, when Hülegü set out for Iran, about 75,000 troops accompanied him. In addition, by command of the qaghan, Möngke, an equal number of troops, composed of local auxiliaries and Mongol regulars previously stationed in the area, awaited the *Īl-khān*'s orders in Iran. By the end of Möngke's reign, however, there is every indication that the number of troops at the disposal of Hülegü had nearly doubled. When Ked Buqa, Hülegü's commander-in-chief, fell into the hands of the Mamlūks in 1260, the defeated general boasted to his captors that there were 300,000 more like him.⁴⁴ And Marco Polo states that when Ulau (Hülegü) went out to meet Berke's army in the vicinity of Darband in 1262, the *Īl-khān* had with him 300,000 well-equipped soldiers.⁴⁵ Although the numbers reported in the sources for the Mongol armies generally have been discounted as highly inflated, John Masson Smith recently has argued that the figures claimed by Ked Buqa (via Rashīd al-Dīn) and Marco Polo represent a reasonably accurate count of the forces then available to Hülegü.⁴⁶

In Smith's accounting, approximately half of the total, fifteen to seventeen *tūmens*, were Mongol and Turkic regulars. These included the Toluid contingents that Möngke had assigned to Hülegü as the core of his force, units already garrisoning Asia Minor, the Transcaucasus, and Afghanistan, and those formations contributed by the Golden Horde and the Chaghadaï qanate.⁴⁷ Most of these units were cavalry, their personnel conscripted from the nomadic sector of the empire. Some, however, were urban in origin and probably fought as infantrymen. There was, for example, a *tūmen* commanded by a certain Salar Beg, a Sönid Mongol, which was composed of

44. *Ibid.*, p. 724.

45. Marco Polo, *The Description of the World*, vol. 1, ed. and trans., A. C. Moule and Paul Pelliot (London: Routledge, 1938), p. 478.

46. Smith, "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population," pp. 271-78.

47. For a list of the Mongol commanders, see Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, pp. 707-8.

Qarluqs, Uighurs, and inhabitants of Kashgar and Kucha, both cities in eastern Turkestan.⁴⁸ The other half of the 300,000 total were locally impressed auxiliaries, according to Smith, fourteen *tümens*. This sedentary component first began to play a significant role in the course of the operations against the 'Abbāsids. Kirakos notes that when Hülegü marched on Baghdad in 1257 he was accompanied "by innumerable contingents from all of the subject peoples."⁴⁹ In consequence of this massive call-up of auxiliaries, the army deployed for the assault on the 'Abbāsid capital, though considerably short of the 200,000 reported by Jūzjānī and by the fourteenth-century Iraqi historian Ibn Kathīr,⁵⁰ was nonetheless a formidable force.

For the most part, the auxiliaries committed to this operation had been conscripted following the census of 1254.⁵¹ According to the *Georgian Chronicle*, the proportion of the adult male population inducted at that time was one in ten,⁵² a ratio which, it will be remembered, is mentioned also in the Chinese sources. Once formed, the auxiliary formations, like their Mongol counterparts, were subjected to periodic musters and inspections, and were liable to call-up at a moment's notice. When mobilized, the unit and its personnel had to report promptly to the designated assembly area or face harsh penalties.⁵³

No figure on the total number of local auxiliaries raised in this period is available in the contemporary sources, but the fact that individual units are occasionally mentioned makes a

48. Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, p. 154.

49. Kirakos, p. 229.

50. Jūzjānī/Lees, p. 427; Jūzjānī/Raverty, vol. 2, p. 1245; and Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), *al-Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah*, vol. 13 (Beirut, 1966), pp. 200–201.

51. As Juvaynī clearly indicates, one of the chief tasks of the census was to form the populace into tens, hundreds, and thousands. See Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, pp. 258 and 261, and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 521 and 524.

52. Brosset, *Géorgie*, p. 552.

53. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 22–23; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 31. See also the fragment of the *ḥisāb* preserved by Maqrīzī, available in Valentin Riasanovsky, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law* (Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 43; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 84.

rough accounting possible. In Iran proper, it is known that *tūmens* were raised in Tūs, Nīshāpūr, Isfahān, Qum, and Kāshān.⁵⁴ In Azerbaijan there was another Persian *tūmen* (*tūmān-i tāzīk*), commanded by Atabeg Šadr al-Dīn of Tabrīz. This unit later fought in the Syrian campaign of 1260.⁵⁵ Afghanistan, or more exactly, the territories of the Kart dynasty—Balkh, Sīstān, and Harāt—contributed a total of seven *tūmens*.⁵⁶ When Hülegü attacked Alamūt, the main citadel of the Assassins, in 1255–56, two Georgian *tūmens* participated.⁵⁷ By 1258, after the completion of the census in its territory, the Georgian kingdom was able to field a combined total of nine *tūmens*.⁵⁸ Adding up these various units, we find that between 1254 and 1260 at least twenty-two auxiliary *tūmens*, nominally 220,000 men, had been raised in western Asia to support the Mongol campaigns against the Assassins, ‘Abbāsids, and Egyptians (Mamlūks).

But even this figure cannot be considered complete; there are some obvious and major omissions. Armenian units, for instance, are not reflected in this enumeration. Although the size and the number of the formations mobilized in Armenia are nowhere indicated, it is known from Kirakos and other local chroniclers that after their subjugation in 1236 the Armenians frequently were called upon to contribute troops to the Mongols: between 1239 and 1243, Armenian princes accompanied Baiju on his campaign against the Seljuqs of Rum; Armenian troops were also present at Baghdad and later took

54. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 255; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 518.

55. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 248; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 511; and Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 2, p. 729. D. O. Morgan, "The Mongol Armies in Persia," *Der Islam* 56 (1979): 88–91, has argued that *tūmens* formed by the Mongols in Iran were essentially territorial entities or districts not engaged in active campaigning. The deployment of the Persian *tūmen* from Azerbaijan in Syria provides, however, unambiguous evidence that sedentary *tūmens* rendered military service to the Mongols. In fact, as was the case with the Chinese *wan-hu*, the Persian *tūmen* was both a territorial and a military unit which from time to time saw active service.

56. Sayf/Siddīqī, p. 189.

57. Brosset, *Géorgie*, pp. 529–30 and 544.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 551.

part in Mongol operations in Iraq (1259) and Syria (1260).⁵⁹ Allowance must also be made for the contingents from lesser Armenia (Cilicia). In consequence of his military pact with Möngke, Het'um, the ruler of that state, accompanied Hülegü against Aleppo (early 1260) with an unknown number of troops.⁶⁰ Furthermore, there are references to the formation of *tümens* in Iraq, but again no figures are provided.⁶¹ Lastly, contingents from Mosul, Māzandarān, and Luristān, all of which were present at Baghdad, must be added to the Mongol order of battle in western Asia.⁶² Therefore, besides the twenty-two *tümens* specifically named in the sources, there certainly were several others as well.

Smith, as noted above, calculates that of the 300,000 troops, half were Mongol regulars and half were local auxiliaries. By his count, the latter were contained in fourteen or so *tümens*, whereas my count turns up eight more, or twenty-two in all (essentially, the difference between our two totals is the seven *tümens* of Afghanistan, which Smith failed to pick up). Despite the obvious discrepancy with respect to the number of auxiliary *tümens*, our calculations are nonetheless still compatible, at least in terms of the number of individual soldiers. In his calculations, Smith assumes that each unit was up to strength, so that his fourteen *tümens* yield 140,000 men. I, on the other hand, assume that each *tümen* was at only 60 percent of its nominal strength. On this basis, twenty-two *tümens* at 60-percent strength would be equivalent to 132,000 men, not far from the figure reached by Smith. Considering the fact that the "missing units," for example, those of Armenia and Iraq,

59. Kirakos, pp. 178, 229, 231, 232, and 233-34; and *Nation of Archers*, pp. 297, 307-11, 333, and 335.

60. Galst'ān, pp. 53 and 68.

61. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 262; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 525. In the fourteenth century, at any rate, there were nine *tümens* in Persian Iraq. See Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, *Nuẓhat al-Qulūb*, pt. 1, p. 47.

62. Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah*, vol. 13, p. 200, and Naṣṭanzī, *Munakhab*, pp. 42-43.

are not included in my calculations, the difference between our two figures is further reduced.

To sum up, by 1260 Hülegü commanded around 300,000 troops, half of whom were Mongol and Turkic cavalymen, the remainder, for the most part, being locally recruited in the period after 1254.⁶³ Again, this figure, like the 500,000 estimated for China, should not be understood as the real strength of the standing army, but as the sum total of the military manpower then available to the *Īl-khān*, including, of course, a sizable number of troops on the reserve list.

Military Recruitment in Russia and Central Asia

There being few details available concerning the Mongols' efforts to mobilize manpower in the Jochid and Chaghadaid realms in our period, it will be convenient to discuss the two areas together.

Although data on the total numerical strength of the Jochid forces are extremely sparse, the manner by which they progressively increased their military manpower is clearly discernible and is illustrative of practices followed elsewhere in the empire. During his lifetime, Chinggis Qan granted Jochi 4,000 Mongol troops, the nucleus around which his eldest son was expected to build up his own army.⁶⁴ This Jochi did with considerable success, for shortly after his death in 1227, the eldest of his fourteen sons, Orda, alone received more than 10,000 troops.⁶⁵ When the Mongols began their campaigns against western Eurasia in 1236, virgin recruiting grounds were opened and newly conquered populations were quickly

63. Morgan, "Mongol Armies in Persia," p. 88, concludes that an army of two to three hundred thousand was possible within the *Īl-khān* realm. He, however, believes that this figure represents the number of nomadic (Mongol and Turkic) troops alone, whereas Smith and I calculate our totals by combining both sedentary and nomadic troops.

64. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 408.

65. Vaṣṣāf, *Kirāh-i mustaṭāḥ-i vaṣṣāf* (Bombay, lithograph ed., 1269/1852-53), p. 578

pressed into Jochid service. The eastern Qipchaqs, for example, who submitted to the Mongols in 1236 or 1237, soon found themselves fighting alongside their overlords in the northern Caucasus.⁶⁶ The experience of the Moksha, a branch of the Uralic-speaking Mordvins who inhabited the territory between the Volga and Oka rivers, was identical. Overwhelmed in 1237, Moksha units subsequently accompanied the Mongols into Hungary and Germany, where, compelled to fight in the vanguard, they sustained heavy casualties.⁶⁷ Other peoples, too, must have been impressed in this way, so that by Möngke's reign, Jochid military strength, if unknown, was certainly substantial.

In 1256, contingents from the Golden Horde arrived in Iran via Darband to assist Hülegü in the assault on Baghdad. Quli, the son of Orda, and Balaghai, the son of Shiban (Jochi's fourth son), were in command of these troops.⁶⁸ The ethnic composition of the Golden Horde's contribution is not indicated, but it seems fairly certain that the bulk of these troops were of Mongol and Turkic origin, with perhaps a smattering of northern Caucasians; Alans, as we know, were being mobilized at this time to fight in China. Later on, the armies of the Golden Horde would include Slavic contingents,⁶⁹ but it is unlikely that many accompanied Quli and Balaghai to Iran in 1256, because the Slavic population had not yet been registered and could not, therefore, be drafted for military service in large numbers. In fact, with the possible exception of Berke's campaign against Poland in 1259, it is doubtful whether eastern Slavs participated in any of the Mongol campaigns of Möngke's reign.

66. Yen Fu, *Ching-hsiem chi*, chap. 3, 172-b.

67. *Tartar Relation*, p. 80; and *Mongol Mission*, pp. 115-16. In Rubruck's account, the Moksha are called Moxel. On the identity of these two names, see *Hudūd al-'alām*, ed. and trans. Vladimir Minorsky, 2d ed. (London: Luzac, 1979), pp. 463-64.

68. Kirakos, p. 227; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 42; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 607-8.

69. Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. 1, p. 409.

Military recruitment on a systematic basis did not begin in the Rus principalities until after the census of 1257-59, when the Mongols first established leaders of ten (*desiâtskie*), leaders of one hundred (*sotniki*), leaders of one thousand (*tysiâtskie*), and leaders of ten thousand (*temniki*).⁷⁰ As in China and Iran, the sedentary population had been formed into military/administrative units on the decimal principle. According to *Jarligs* issued in the fourteenth century by rulers of the Golden Horde, the *tümen* as an administrative unit corresponded to the Russian *volost*, or "district."⁷¹ Unfortunately, the number of *tümens* (Russ., *t'ma*; pl., *t'my*) formed between 1257 and 1259 is not indicated. Vernadsky, however, estimates that as of 1275 there were twenty-seven *t'my* in the eastern Rus principalities (roughly the territory registered in 1257-59) and an additional sixteen *t'my* in the western Rus principalities (which, so far as I can determine, were not counted during Möngke's reign).⁷² Although Vernadsky's calculation of the total number of *t'my* seems reasonably accurate, his assumption that each administrative unit of ten thousand supplied a corresponding quota of troops to the Mongol armies is open to considerable doubt.⁷³ If Mongol practice elsewhere is any guide, the number of troops required from each *t'ma* should be reduced by 30 or 40 percent.

Less is known of the Mongols' recruiting efforts in central Asia. Tegüder, a grandson of Chaghadaï, led the central-Asian contingents in support of Hülegü, but when and where these

70. PSRL, vol. 1, pp. 474-75, and vol. 5, p. 188.

71. István Vásáry, "The Golden Horde Term 'Darugha' and its Survival in Russia," *AOASH* 30 (1976): 189-90.

72. George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 215-19.

73. See Michael Roublev, "The Mongol Tribute According to the Wills and Agreements of the Russian Princes," in *The Structure of Russian History*, ed. Michael Cherniavsky (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 30-31, who seems to doubt that the *desiâtsk* and *t'ma* contributed any troops to the Mongols. Although it is true that the Rus chronicles never explicitly state that troops were raised from such units, there is little doubt, in my opinion, that *t'my* contributed troops to the Mongols. This was one of their principal functions in China, Iran, and the Caucasus.

were recruited is not indicated.⁷⁴ Even the existence of the *tümen* system in Turkestan cannot be demonstrated for Möngke's reign; the earliest mention is from a *vaqf* deed dated 1299.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, it appears to me likely that *tümen* were formed there during Möngke's reign, if not before. Turkestan having been under Mongol control from the 1220s, it seems strange that the Mongols should have failed to introduce this system there when they had done so in China, Russia, and Iran, all of which fell to the Mongols after central Asia had been conquered. Data on the number of troops raised in central Asia are lacking, except for the area of Uighuristan. According to Juvaynī, by 1250 the Uighur ruler could put fifty thousand men into the field.⁷⁶ As we have seen, some of the Uighurs fought in southwestern China under their own leaders, and others, drafted into ethnically mixed units, campaigned in western Asia. There is mention also of a Uighur unit of one thousand (*hazārah*), officered by Mongols, stationed in Asia Minor during Möngke's reign.⁷⁷

The Recruitment of Labor and Technical Specialists

The Mongols, as indicated in the foregoing sections, made heavy demands on their subjects for military recruits. Their demands for corvée were equally extensive. Besides soldiers, the military campaigns undertaken in Möngke's reign required large numbers of laborers; roads and bridges had to be built to accommodate bulky equipment, boatmen were needed to ferry troops across the major rivers of China and central Asia, and supplies for the troops in the field had to be hauled over long distances. From the available accounts of the Mongols' campaigns in southwestern China and northwestern Iran in

74. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, p. 91; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 608.

75. See O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty XV-XVI vv.* (Pamiatniki ps'mennosti Vostoka, vol. 31; Moscow, 1974), p. 380, n. 14.

76. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 34; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 48.

77. Rashīd/Alhazade, vol. 1, p. 155.

our period, it is evident that Möngke was able to procure laborers in the numbers desired, and to deploy them as needed.

Projects such as the construction of roads and bridges, of course, required both common laborers and skilled craftsmen. In most cases, laborers could be recruited locally, but experienced engineers and other technical specialists frequently had to be brought in from distant regions of the empire. In the 1220s, for instance, a Chinese engineer, Chang Jung, was employed to bridge several rivers in western Turkestan.⁷⁸

In general, the Mongols manifested a real talent for identifying and utilizing individuals or groups possessing skills that could be put to practical use. Their employment of the Bekrin, a tribe living in the mountains of eastern Turkestan, well illustrates this point. The tribe in question, described by Rashīd al-Dīn as neither Mongols nor Uighurs, were famed as mountaineers (*qīāchī*, literally, cragsters). For this reason, they were sent to Iran during Hülegü's reign to serve as government messengers in mountainous regions of the *Īl-khānid* realm.⁷⁹ The Bekrin obviously adapted well to their new environment, for they are still mentioned in the sources of the Temürid period as skilled climbers inhabiting the mountains of Georgia.⁸⁰

According to Juvaynī, corvée duties, which were assigned by means of the census, were a heavy burden on the empire's subjects, including the Mongols themselves. He notes that even while on campaign, a Mongol soldier had to meet his corvée obligations: "If work be afoot in which a man has his share of forced labor (*bīgār*) and if the man himself be absent, his wife goes forth in person and performs that duty in his stead."⁸¹ In the sedentary regions of the empire, the corvée was no less onerous. The *Yüan shih* states that following the census of 1252

78. See Li Chih-chang, *Travels of an Alchemist*, p. 120. Chang Jung has a biography in the *YS*, chap. 151, p. 1625.

79. Rashīd/Alizade, vol. 1, p. 345.

80. On the Bekrin, see Pelliot, *Recherches sur les Chrétiens*, pp. 31-33.

81. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 31. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 22.

a majority of the people of northern China were subject to some type of corvée obligation.⁸²

One of the most widespread and distasteful of the labor duties was associated with the maintenance of the imperial postal service. The postal system, which connected all parts of the empire with the capital, Qara Qorum, consisted of an extensive network of relay stations. Each station (*jam*) provided food and lodging for official travelers and fresh mounts for the relay riders. Because of its importance in disseminating orders, reports, and intelligence in time of war, the postal system was closely tied to the Mongol military establishment.⁸³

In western Asia during the period of Möngke's reign, military units and specially designated peasant households shared responsibility for maintenance of the relay stations. The obligation to supply the relay horses (called *ulagh* in Mongolian)⁸⁴ fell mainly on the nomads, but the agricultural population had to provide fodder for the animals, repair the station houses, and serve and feed the endless stream of ambassadors and messengers.⁸⁵ An Armenian source indicates that in the Transcaucasus one household from a small village and two or three from a large village were made responsible for the upkeep and provisioning of the relay stations. Those so assigned paid no taxes, but the burden was still considered oppressive.⁸⁶ In an effort to lessen their burden, Möngke placed strict limits on the use of, and access to, the postal system.⁸⁷ These measures were

82. YS, chap. 155, p. 1662.

83. For a detailed discussion of the working of the postal system, with special reference to China, see Peter Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, vol. 1; Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1954).

84. *Ulagh* is a Turkic word meaning a "packhorse," DTS, p. 608. See also Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 22; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 30.

85. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, pp. 24–25; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 33.

86. *Nation of Archers* p. 345.

87. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 3, pp. 76–77; Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 599; and YS, chap. 3, p. 15.

intended to help ease the pressure not only on those assigned to the *fams* but also on those living in the near vicinity, who frequently were harassed by authorized travelers, as well as by individuals trying to pass themselves off as such.

The *corvée* obligations falling upon craftsmen and technicians were as oppressive as those borne by the peasantry, if not more so. In the early days of the empire, artisans captured in the course of a campaign usually were sent back to the Mongol homeland and made the slaves of princes and military commanders. In the Mongol sources, such dependents were known as "sons of the *yurt* (*ger-ün köbegüd*)."⁸⁸ Realizing their economic and military value, the Mongols always took care to separate the craftsmen before putting the general population to the sword. When, for example, Marv was captured in 1221, the entire citizenry was slain except for four hundred artisans.⁸⁹

Those spared because of their skills were set to work on various state-sponsored projects. Referring to Qara Qorum, Juvaynī remarks that "hither artisans of every kind were brought from Khitāī (China), and likewise craftsmen from the lands of Islam."⁹⁰ The colony at the imperial capital was so large that a third of the city had to be given over to them. Rubruck describes this quarter in his travelogue, and recently Soviet and Mongol archeologists have made a detailed study of its remains.⁹¹ Similar colonies of artisans were collected by the regional qans. Not only did these workshops make things on demand for the court, but in addition, it appears that they sold some of the items manufactured there commercially, for Naṣīr

88. See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 199, n. 312. The Chinese transcription of this term, *ch'ieh-lien-k'ou*, follows the colloquial Mongolian form, *ger-ün k'e'u*.

89. Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 127; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 162. See also the comments of Carpini, *Mongol Mission*, pp. 37-38 and 43.

90. Boyle's translation, Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 236. See also Juvaynī/Qazvinī, vol. 1, p. 192.

91. *Mongol Mission*, p. 184, and S. V. Kiselev and N. Ia. Merkur, "Remeslenno-torgovye kvartaly Kara-Koruma," in *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* pp. 173-82.

al-Dīn Ṭūsī refers to the kingly incomes that accrued from the profits of the workshops (*kārkhānah*) and of the artisans (*ūzūn*).⁹²

By the period of Möngke's reign, the identification and utilization of craftsmen had become much more systematic. As noted above, by imperial command, artisans in northern China were registered in 1252 and those in certain categories entered on the census rolls as catapult operators. In western Asia, too, all artisans—whether living in cities or in small villages—were entered on the census rolls.⁹³ As could be expected, craftsmen tried to escape registration and the attendant burdens whenever possible. In 1255, just as preparation for the census began in central and northern Rus, numerous artisans fled these regions seeking and receiving sanctuary in Kholm, a city in western Volynia that remained independent of Mongol authority. Happily, the chronicler of this incident specifies the kinds of artisans who arrived in Kholm in such great numbers: saddle-, bow-, and quiver-makers, and iron-, copper-, and silver-smiths.⁹⁴ As all the specialists on this list would have made useful contributions to Mongol armaments production, their flight was well advised. Had they remained in occupied territory, their skills would have immediately invited the unwanted attention of the empire's ubiquitous counters and recruiters.

Craftsmen not called up for military service as sappers and engineers worked under the control of special Mongol-appointed officers. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, in his account of the capture of Baghdad, states that soon after the city fell, Hülegü named a certain Ibn Darnūs to be the chief of the local artisans.⁹⁵ Similar posts were established in other urban centers; in Tabriz, for instance, the resident craftsmen worked under

92. Ṭūsī/Minorsky, p. 72.

93. Kirakos, p. 221.

94. Perfecky, trans., *Hypatian Codex*, p. 75.

95. Boyle, "Death of the Last 'Abbāsīd Caliph," p. 160. For the Persian text, see Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 1, p. 292.

the direction of Mengü Bolad, a Mongol of the Naiman tribe.⁹⁶ In China, too, artisans were called upon frequently to use their skills in aid of the Mongols. One source states that more than half of those performing *corvée* were craftsmen.⁹⁷ Given the high percentage of the general population (over half) on *corvée*, it would appear that most artisans must have worked from time to time on government projects. These included such jobs as effecting repairs on public buildings, fabricating weapons of war, and making various luxury items. The *Yüan shih* reports that two thousand men were working on Qara Qorum and other imperial camps during Möngke's reign.⁹⁸ The Mongols also benefited from the skills of a number of European craftsmen, most of whom were taken as prisoners of war during Batu's western campaign of 1237-41. Rubruck relates that in Bolac (Pülād),⁹⁹ a city in western Turkestan, a group of German miners were engaged in digging precious metals and manufacturing armaments.¹⁰⁰ And it will be recalled that Guillaume Boucher, a Parisian metal-smith, constructed Möngke's huge "drinking" fountain in Qara Qorum.¹⁰¹

No one with a usable skill was overlooked. All of the Mongols' subjects, from the Alan metal workers who produced chain mail for the army to the Chinese physicians who tended Hülegü's health when he came west, were required to place their particular abilities at the disposal of the empire.¹⁰² Thus,

96. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, vol. 2, p. 247; and Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. 2, p. 511.

97. YCMCSL, p. 94.

98. YS, chap. 3, p. 16, and Francis W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1346," *HJAS* 15 (1952): 29 and 79.

99. In Persian, *pülād*, or *fulād*, means "steel."

100. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 135-36, 187, and 196. Gy. Györffy, in his "Système des résidences d'hiver et d'été chez les nomades et les chefs hongrois du X^e siècle," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 1 (1975): 52-53, notes that nomadic rulers frequently maintained or established settled communities for purposes of exploiting a particular resource or producing particular commodities.

101. Leonardo Olchki has devoted an entire monograph to this individual. See his *Guillaume Boucher, A French Artist at the Court of the Khans*.

102. *Mongol Mission*, p. 210, and Rashīd al-Dīn, *Die Chinasgeschichte*, p. 21.

in addition to extracting large quantities of men, money, and matériel from their domain, the Mongols successfully mobilized the technological know-how of the empire as well. And as their state controlled most of the major centers of civilization in Eurasia, the Mongols were able to call upon the talents of the best scientists, engineers, and craftsmen in the world.

8. Summary and Conclusion

In the summer of 1256, Möngke Qaghan made known his decision to open a new, large-scale campaign against the Sung. For the next two years, the emperor busied himself preparing and deploying the three large invasion armies assigned the task of conquering southern China. In the fall of 1258, Möngke entered Szechwan by way of Kansu at the head of one of these field armies. Once in Szechwan, he divided his forces into three columns and began reducing the numerous Sung garrisons stationed in the province.

Leading one column, the emperor moved against Ya-chou (now Ya-an) in western Szechwan. Following its capitulation in January of 1259, Möngke turned back east and besieged Ho-chou (now Ho-ch'uan), a formidable walled city on the banks of the Chia-ling River. The city was frequently assaulted throughout the spring and summer, but the Sung garrison offered a stout defense and tenaciously held on to the fortress. In July, Möngke detached the bulk of his forces for an attack on Ch'ung-ch'ing in southern Szechwan. The emperor himself remained behind with three thousand troops to enforce a close blockade of Ho-chou. It was here in the Tiao-yü Mountains, overlooking Ho-chou, that he died on August 12, 1259, either from an illness contracted in those miasmatic climes or in consequence of wounds suffered when struck by a metal projectile

discharged from a Sung catapult.¹ Operations against the Sung were quickly halted, and Möngke's body was taken back north for interment in Mongolia.

With Möngke's demise the great age of the Mongol Empire came to an end. In the decades that followed, four independent Chinggisid states—the Yüan dynasty, the *Īl-khāns*, the Golden Horde, and the Chaghadai qanate—emerged, and Mongol military energies increasingly were turned inward in a complex series of bloody and destructive civil wars. Only in 1304 were these internecine struggles halted by a truce signed among the major Mongol princes. But the cessation of hostilities achieved at that time was at best temporary, and efforts at political reintegration, even in the form of friendly and voluntary co-operation among the four sovereign qanates, produced no tangible results.²

As the last qaghan to rule over a unified and rapidly expanding empire, Möngke is usually evaluated in positive terms by modern historians, who picture him, quite justly, as an extremely able and determined leader.³ To arrive at a balanced judgment, however, it should be kept in mind that Möngke, through errors of omission and commission, bears considerable responsibility for the breakup of the empire following his reign. Foremost among his errors was his failure to ensure an uncontested succession to the throne.⁴ This led to a struggle for

1. For a discussion of the cause of Möngke's death, see S. A. Shkol'iār, *Kitaishkaia doognestrel'naiā artilleriia* (Moscow: 1980), pp. 251–52 and n. 18, pp. 336–37.

2. On the truce of 1304 and its objectives, see the letter of Öljeitü, the Mongol ruler of Iran (1304–16) to Philippe the Fair, the king of France. Translation available in Antoine Mostaert and Francis W. Cleaves, *Les lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Arghun et Öljeitü à Philippe le Bel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 56–57. In this letter, it is interesting to note, Öljeitü recognized that conflict among the Mongol princes had been continuous for "forty-five years," i.e., since the end of Möngke's reign.

3. See, for example, Grousset, *Empire of the Steppes*, p. 275, and Denis Sinor, *Inner Asia: A Syllabus* (Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 96; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 173.

4. Joseph Fletcher, in his "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," argues that the nomad possessed no system of succession other than armed struggle between eligible members of the imperial clan, a phenomenon he calls "bloody

power between two of the deceased qaghan's brothers, Qubilai and Arigh Böke, in the years 1260–64, and this in turn gave other disaffected Chinggisid lines the opportunity to restore their lost political fortunes or to advance claims on neighboring princes' territories.⁵ Berke, the ruler of the Golden Horde, greatly angered by Hülegü's disregard of his rights in Georgia, used the occasion of the Toluid civil war to attack the *Īl-khān* in 1262 in an unsuccessful bid to seize the Transcaucasus. And Qaidu, the grandson of Ögödei, who first challenged Möngke's authority in 1256, began building up a coalition of anti-Toluid princes in central Asia who were later (1269) to make a serious and sustained effort to topple Qubilai, the victor in the contest with Arigh Böke, from the imperial throne.

Yet, despite these failures, so costly in the long term, Möngke's achievements while on the throne, measured in terms of Mongol imperial interests and goals, were nonetheless real and substantial. By the final years of his reign, Möngke had at his command a huge amount of resources, more perhaps than any previous ruler in history. Of equal importance, he was able to bring these resources to bear at any place along the empire's long frontiers. Manpower, economic resources, or technological know-how available in one part of the domain could promptly be mobilized and deployed to meet a need in some other part of the far-flung empire. Hülegü's campaign in western Asia again can be used to illustrate this point. Troops for his assault on the Assassins and 'Abbāsids came from Mongolia, Turkestan, Iran, the Transcaucasus, and the Golden Horde. Food to sustain these armies came from Armenia,

tanistry." In the Mongol case, I would argue that there was an attempt, at least, to establish a less disruptive system—succession by nomination. Chinggis Qan tried to institute this principle of succession, nomination by the ruler in power, when he chose Ögödei, on the basis of personal qualities, as his political heir. Ögödei, in his turn nominated his grandson Shiremün, but this was overturned by his own family and the succession then became the free-for-all described by Fletcher.

5. For an account of this struggle, see Chuluunyn Dalai, *Mongoliā v XIII–XIV vekakh* (Moscow, 1983), pp. 34–39.

Georgia, and central Asia. Technical specialists to operate the catapults and siege equipment were sent from China to undertake the difficult task of neutralizing the mountain strongholds of the Assassins and destroying the formidable fortifications of Baghdad. In short, as Juvaynī noted with approval and admiration, the regional qanates centered in China, western Turkestan, Iran, and Russia were mutually supportive and interdependent.⁶

None of this, of course, would have been possible had Möngke not been able to concentrate a great deal of power in his own hands. The emperor succeeded in revitalizing the fragmented empire he had inherited because he formulated a political program that attracted wide support among the Mongols and their closest allies. For those of his constituents who advocated political centralization and internal reform, the emperor offered regularization of the revenues and tightened controls over the princely appanages. For the proponents of additional expansion, a party which counted amongst its numbers both the officer corps and the rank-and-file Mongol warriors—what might be called the “general public”—he set in motion large-scale campaigns of conquest in eastern and western Asia.

By combining internal reform with external expansion, Möngke kept the conservative nomadic faction, who traditionally opposed political centralization and reform, busily fighting on the frontiers, thereby leaving the partisans of administrative regularization and a strong central government a relatively free hand to pursue their objectives. Moreover, the administrative and financial measures introduced by Möngke successfully generated the resources needed to fuel the new campaigns of conquest. This, and the fact that the highest administrative organs of the state were manned for the most part by Mongols, seems effectively to have disarmed the con-

6. Juvaynī/*Qazvīnī*, vol. 1, p. 32; and Juvaynī/*Boyle*, vol. 1, p. 43.

servative critics of reform and centralization. In any event, after the purge of the dissident Ögödeid and Chaghadaid princes in the first year of his reign, opposition to Möngke's rule from within the ranks of the army and the Mongol nobility was isolated and did not seriously inhibit the implementation of his policies.

Soviet scholars such as I. P. Petrushevskii and N. Ĭs. Munkuev have argued that the qans of the early Mongol Empire can be divided into two distinct groupings on the basis of their general policy orientation. In one category are those qans—Chinggis Qan, Chaghadaid, and Güyüg—whom they describe as steppe traditionalists, the enemies of agriculture and city life, who pursued policies uniformly detrimental to their sedentary subjects; on the other are those rulers—Ögödei, Möngke, and Qubilai—whom they regard as champions of centralized imperial authority and advocates of some measure of accommodation with the sedentary population under their control.⁷ Although their classification scheme is sustainable in broad outline, their placement of Möngke exclusively within the ranks of the centralizers is seriously misleading. Möngke, perhaps alone of the early qans, cannot be placed neatly into one or the other camp; he had a foot solidly planted in each. Indeed, as argued above, Möngke's ability to attract support from both factions was one of the major reasons for his successes as emperor.

Considering the size and cultural diversity of the empire, it is not surprising that the administrative system fashioned by the emperor and his associates was composed of widely diverse elements. The revenue system combined Mongol and central Asian Turkic practices, population registration followed

7. I. P. Petrushevskii, "Rashid al-Din i ego istoricheskii trud," introduction to Rashid al-Din. *Sbornik letopisei*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), pp. 12-15; and N. Ĭs. Munkuev, "O dvukh tendentsiakh v politike pervykh mongol'skikh khanov v Kitae v pervoi polovine XIII veka," in *Materialy po istorii i filologii Tsentral'noi Azii* (Trudy buriat'skogo kompleksnogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta, vol. 8, Ulan Ude, 1962), pp. 49-50.

Chinese techniques, and the military machine was patterned after long-established steppe traditions. Although the administrative system had a certain symmetry, it was by no means uniform throughout the empire, particularly at the lower levels. Some accommodation to local practice and tradition was unavoidable. Because the Mongols lacked both the skills and the numbers to supply the requisite bureaucratic personnel from within their own ranks, they were forced to rely upon subject peoples familiar with local conditions and languages to fill essential administrative posts. Although this inevitably resulted in the adoption of varied local administrative procedures, it was in most cases the only practicable means of controlling and exploiting newly conquered territories. Consequently, Möngke's approach to the governance of the realm had to be flexible. This can best be seen in the revenue system. Basic categories of taxes were established, but the rates and even the bases of assessment differed among major administrative regions. In China, for example, the tribute was assessed on individual households, as was the Chinese convention, not on adult males, as was done elsewhere in the empire.

The administrative system also had to accommodate certain Mongol practices, some of which were clearly antithetical to bureaucratic efficiency and the quest for political centralization. For example, Möngke continued the policy of allotting territories and their inhabitants to Mongol princes and officials, despite the problems the central government always had encountered in trying to control these appanages. The emperor even extended the practice by granting land to some trusted Chinese supporters.⁸ Whatever his personal feelings on the matter, politically Möngke had little choice but to maintain such grants as a concession to the Mongol ruling class. Any attempt to end this system of rewards would have precipitated considerable unrest and might even have led to a serious chal-

8. For example, Shih T'ien-tse, a Chinese general long in Mongol service, received an appanage of five towns (*ch'eng*) from Möngke in 1252. *YS*, chap. 135, p. 1662.

lenge to the qaghan's authority. All Möngke could do was to try to minimize the damage by keeping as tight a rein as possible on the financial administration of the territories so granted.

The Mongol tradition of hereditary succession to office was another practice that, to some degree, limited the central government's freedom of action. Thirteenth-century sources abound in examples of sons succeeding fathers, or brothers succeeding brothers, in both military and civil offices. Möngke made no attempt to stop this practice, and on the whole, seems to have been content with this Mongol way of doing things. It should be remembered, however, that even though one could gain access to office through inheritance, this was no guarantee that one would retain it for long if he were incompetent or disobedient. In Möngke's reign, for instance, the commander of a *tümen* in Iran was executed for a serious breach of discipline and then replaced by his brother. When the latter proved to be less than steadfast as a combat leader, he, too, was put to death. The possessions of the two brothers' descendants and heirs were confiscated and the command of the *tümen* given over to a nonrelative.⁹

Finally, it should be observed that the emperor also preserved the collegial character of the regional secretariats. Senior members of the Toluid house, as well as the leaders of allied lines, continued to post personal representatives (*nököd*) to the staffs of the regional administrations. Here again, the emperor deferred to established Mongol practice. As a devoted and self-proclaimed champion of Mongol ways, Möngke was not by nature an innovator; whenever feasible, he preferred to stay within the bounds of convention and to exert his authority by traditional means through traditional institutions.

Although the administrative system was not perfectly uniform and had to accommodate practices that ran counter to

9. Rashid/Alizade, vol. 1, pp. 154-55.

efforts toward administrative centralization and regularization, it was nonetheless effective and responsive to the commands of the central authorities. The basic components of Möngke's program of resource mobilization—introduction of the census, imposition of the *qubchir* and *qalan*, conscription of large new armies, and issuance of new currency—were realized everywhere in the empire. Moreover, the resources generated by these measures were largely under the control of the central authorities. We know that Möngke's agents organized the census and assessed taxes in China, Iran, the Transcaucasus, and the Rus principalities. The disposition of the new armies raised at this time also was determined by the emperor.

With regard to the effectiveness of the administrative system, it is significant that in some cases the Mongols felt free to begin military operations well before all the necessary resources were actually in their hands. When Hülegü set out in 1253 on his campaign against western Asia, many of the troops required for this operation had not yet been conscripted. Only after the census of 1254–55 were large numbers of local auxiliaries raised—auxiliaries that supplied Hülegü with one-half of the ultimate strength of his armies. In this instance, it clearly was assumed that the administrative system would meet on schedule the army's projected manpower needs. The Mongol leadership must have had great confidence in the reliability and efficiency of the administrative machinery if they were willing to base military plans on such assumptions.

Viewed from a broad comparative perspective, Mongol methods of warfare have a character that is undeniably akin to the modern concept of total war. Mongol warfare had a political, economic, and psychological, as well as purely military, dimension. The Mongol people and their nomadic allies were fully mobilized. Under Möngke, the sedentary sector of the empire was placed on an equivalent footing. The magnitude and intensity of the effort to identify and exploit the empire's vast human and material resources likewise invites comparison

with modern total wars. So, too, does the scale of Mongol operations in the 1250s, which in terms of the number of troops engaged and the distances involved was not again equaled until the wars of the Napoleonic era and not surpassed until the World Wars of the twentieth century.

Glossary of Terms

<i>alba-qubchiri</i>	The tax and service obligations Mongol subjects owed the empire.
<i>aga and ini</i>	"Elder" and "younger brothers"—the Mongol princes collectively.
<i>balīsh</i>	"Pillow" in Persian—an ingot of silver or gold.
<i>basqaq</i>	The Turkic equivalent of <i>darugha[chi]</i> (q.v.)
<i>bichēchi</i>	Mongolian for "secretary."
<i>bitigchi</i>	Turkic for "secretary."
<i>bulgha-irgen</i>	A rebellious tribe or state, i.e., any polity not recognizing Mongol sovereignty.
<i>ch'ai-fa</i>	The Chinese equivalent of <i>alba-qubchiri</i> (q.v.)
<i>cherig</i>	Auxiliary troops raised from the sedentary regions of the empire.
<i>ch'ien-hu</i>	"1,000 households"—the Chinese equivalent of <i>mingghan</i> (q.v.).
<i>ch'ing-ts'e</i>	The Chinese equivalent of the <i>kökö debter</i> (q.v.).
<i>chislo</i>	"Number"—the Russian term for a census.
<i>chislenitsi</i>	"Counters"—the Russian term for the Mongol census-takers.

<i>chou</i>	A Chinese administrative unit subordinate to a <i>lu</i> , or "circuit."
<i>chün-chi</i>	Military registers in China.
<i>dan</i>	Russian for "tribute," or <i>qubchir</i> (q.v.).
<i>danshchik</i>	The collector of the tribute, <i>dan</i> , in Russia.
<i>darugha[chi]</i>	A governor or resident whom the Mongols stationed in all population centers and at the courts of all dependent states.
<i>fen-ti</i>	The Chinese equivalent of the Mongol <i>qubi</i> (q.v.), an appanage.
<i>iduq-qut</i>	Title of the Uighur ruler, meaning "possessor of holy fortune" or "luck."
<i>il-irgen</i>	A tribe or state that has submitted to Mongol authority.
<i>il-qan</i>	A subservient qan, e.g., the <i>Īl-khāns</i> of Iran.
<i>jam</i>	Postal relay station.
<i>ǰarghu</i>	A judicial inquiry or hearing.
<i>ǰarghuchi</i>	"Judge"—a high official with wide administrative and fiscal authority.
<i>ǰarligh</i>	A decree or rescript of a Mongol qan.
<i>keshig</i>	The personal bodyguard of a Mongol prince, which also managed his household establishment.
<i>kharāj</i>	The traditional Islamic agricultural tax.
<i>k'o-ch'ai</i>	The Chinese equivalent of <i>qubchir</i> (q.v.).
<i>kökö-dehter</i>	The "blue book" in which the Mongols recorded population figures and legal decisions.
<i>k'o-shui-so</i>	The regional tax-collection offices originally established in northern China by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai.

<i>liang</i>	The Chinese "ounce."
<i>lu</i>	"Circuit"—the chief administrative unit in northern China during the reigns of Ögödei and Möngke.
<i>mal</i>	"Property" or "wealth"—the Arabo-Persian equivalent of <i>qalan</i> (q.v.).
<i>min-chi</i>	Civilian-population registers in China.
<i>mingghan</i>	A military unit nominally numbering one thousand men.
<i>nökör</i>	A retainer or representative of a Mongol prince.
<i>noyan</i>	The Mongol title of nobility, often borne by high-ranking military and civil officers.
<i>ordo</i>	The camp of a Mongol prince, normally managed by one of his wives.
<i>ortaq</i>	"Partner" or "comrade"—a Muslim or Uighur merchant in partnership with a Mongol prince or high official and operating with the capital of the latter.
<i>p'ai-tzu</i>	A tablet or badge of authority issued by a Mongol qan to an official.
<i>pao-yin</i>	The part of the <i>qubchir</i> (q.v.) paid in silver in northern China.
<i>popluzhnik</i>	The collector of the agricultural tax in Russia.
<i>popluzhnoe</i>	The agricultural tax in Russia.
<i>qaghan</i>	The "qan of qans," the Mongol emperor.
<i>qalan</i>	In contrast to the tribute, or <i>qubchir</i> (q.v.), the traditional taxes imposed by the Mongols on their sedentary subjects, particularly the agricultural taxes, which were collected in kind.

<i>qan</i>	A Mongol prince ruling an <i>ulus</i> (q.v.).
<i>qari-irgen</i>	A foreign tribe or state not yet part of the Mongol Empire.
<i>qubchir[i]</i>	The Mongol tribute; the sedentary populace paid this in cash, the nomadic in cattle.
<i>qubi</i>	An appanage—land granted by the emperor to a prince or high official. Lit., a “share” in Mongolian.
<i>quriltai</i>	An assembly of Mongol princes and high officials.
<i>shahnah</i>	The Arabo-Persian equivalent of <i>darugha[chi]</i> (q.v.).
<i>shang-shui</i>	The Chinese equivalent of the <i>tamgha</i> (q.v.).
<i>shui-liang</i>	The agricultural tax collected in northern China.
<i>shumārah</i>	“Number”—the Persian term for a census.
<i>slitok</i>	Russian for “ingot.”
<i>ssu-liao</i>	The part of the <i>qubchir</i> (q.v.) paid in silk in northern China.
<i>sūke</i>	“Ax”—the Mongolian equivalent of <i>balīsh</i> (q.v.)
<i>taghar</i>	An Arabic measure; also, a levy of supplies on behalf of the army.
<i>tamgha</i>	An official seal or a tax on commerce and manufacturing.
<i>tamghachi</i>	A collector of the commercial taxes.
<i>temnik</i>	The Russian equivalent of <i>tūmen-u noyan</i> (q.v.)
<i>ting</i>	Chinese for ingot of silver.
<i>t'ma</i>	Plural <i>t'my</i> —the Russian equivalent of <i>tūmen</i> (q.v.).

<i>tuan-shih-kuan</i>	The Chinese equivalent of <i>jarghuchi</i> (q.v.).
<i>tümen</i>	The number ten thousand; also a military/administrative unit nominally fielding ten thousand troops.
<i>tümen-u noyan</i>	The commander of a <i>tümen</i> (q.v.).
<i>ulus</i>	Used in different contexts to mean "population," "state," "people," or "empire." In general, the subjects of a Mongol prince.
<i>'ushr</i>	The Islamic "tithe"—the traditional portion of the crop owed to the government.
<i>wan-hu</i>	"10,000 households"—the Chinese equivalent of <i>tümen</i> (q.v.).
<i>wu-hu-ssu</i>	"Five-household silk"—i.e., those attached to princely appanages in northern China.
<i>yastuq</i>	"Pillow"—the Turkic equivalent of <i>balish</i> (q.v.).

Glossary of Chinese Characters

A-erh-ssu-lan	阿兒思蘭
A-hu-ch'a	阿忽察
A-la Pu-hua	阿剌不花
A-lan-ta-erh	阿蘭答兒
A-li-k'an	阿里侃
A-ssu	阿思
A-ta-ch'ih	阿答赤
an-fu-shih	安撫使
ch'ai-fa	差發
Chang Chin-heng	張旻亨
Chang Jung	張榮
Chang Keng	張耕
Chang Li-tao	張立道
Chang Shan	張善
Ch'ang Te	常德
Chang-te	彰德
Chang T'ing-chen	張庭珍
Chao Pi	趙璧
ch'eng	城
ch'eng-hsiang	丞相
cheng-shou k'o-shui so	徵收課稅所
Chi-ning	濟寧
Ch'i-tai	乞得

chiao-ch'ao	交鈔
chiao-ch'ao-t'i-chü-ssu	交鈔提舉司
ch'ieh-lien-k'ou	怯憐口
ch'ien	錢
ch'ien	簽
Chih-erh-wo-tai	只兒斡帶
chin	斤
Ching-chao	京兆
ch'ing-ts'e	青冊
chou	州
Chou Hui	周惠
Chuang-sheng-huang-hou	莊聖皇后
chün-chi	軍籍
chung-shu-ling	中書令
chung-shu-sheng	中書省
chung-t'ien	中田
Chung Yüan	中原
Fa-ho-lu-ting	法合魯丁
fen-ti	分地
Feng-chou	豐州
Hai-mi-shih	海迷失
Hai-tu	海都
Hai-ya-li	海押立
Han chün	漢軍
Ho-la	合剌
Ho-la-sun	合剌係
Ho-tan	合丹
hsi-kuan-hu	係官戶
Hsi-shih chi	西使記
Hsi-yü	西域
hsia-t'ien	下田
hsien	縣
Hsien-tsung	憲宗

Hsin-chün	新軍
Hsing-chou	邢州
Hsing-yüan	興元
Hsü-lieh	旭烈
Hsü Shih-lung	徐世隆
hsüan-fu-shih	宣撫使
hsüan-fu-ssu	宣撫司
Hui-hui	回回
Jih-yüeh shan	日月山
Jui-tsung	睿宗
Kao Chih-yao	高智耀
k'o-ch'ai	科差
K'o-hsieh-chieh	克薛傑
k'o-shui-so	課稅所
K'uo-k'uo	闊闊
K'uo-t'ieh-wu A-lan	闊帖兀阿蘭
La-chen	刺真
liang	兩
Liu Ping-chung	劉秉忠
Liu Su	劉肅
Liu T'ai-p'ing	劉太平
ma-cheng	馬政
Ma-mu-la	馬木剌
Meng-k'o-sa-le	蒙克薩勒
Mieh-li	蔑里
min-chi	民籍
Mo-ho-lo-ts'o	摩合羅嵯
mu	畝
Mu-ko	木哥
Na-ch'en	納陳

Nan-chao	南詔
Ni-chih-ma-ting	匿只馬丁
Nieh-ku-la	捏古剌
O-ting Pao	鵝頂堡
Pa-ch'ih-man	八赤蠻
Pa-la	八剌
p'ao-shou chün	砲手軍
pao-yin	包銀
P'eng T'ien-hsiang	彭天祥
pi-shc-[ch'ih]	必闔[赤]
Pieh-erh-ko	別兒哥
pich-li-ko	別里哥
Pich-shih Pa-li	別石八里
Po-lan	李闐
Po-lu-hai	李魯海
Po-lu-ho	李魯合
Po-lu-huan	李魯歡
Pu-chih-erh	不只兒
Pu-chih-erh	布只兒
Pu T'ien-chang	卜天璋
Se-mu	色目
shang-hsia	上下
shang-shui	商稅
shang-t'ien	上田
Shang T'ing	商挺
sheng	升
shih	石
Shih-lich-men	失烈門
Shu-lu	束鹿
shui-liang	稅糧
shui-t'ien	水田
ssu-liao	絲料

su-tan 素丹

su-wei 宿衛

Ta-li 大里

ta-lu-hua-ch'ih 達魯花赤

Ta-pu-ych-erh 答不葉兒

ta-shu-mu 大數目

ta tuan-shih-kuan 大斷事官

T'ai-tsu 太租

T'ai-tsung 太宗

t'ieh chün-hu 貼軍戶

T'ieh-ko-ch'ou 帖哥紬

T'ieh-ko-chu 帖哥朮

T'ien-hsia 天下

ting 丁

Ting-tsung 定宗

T'o-hu-lieh-ni 脫忽烈尼

T'o-pi-ch'a 脫必察

t'ou tuan-shih-kuan 頭斷事官

ts'ang 倉

Tuan Hsing-chih 段興智

Tung-p'ing 東平

Wang Chung 王仲

Wo-lo-ssu 斡羅思

Wo-lu-ssu 斡魯思

wo-t'o 斡脫

wu-hu-ssu 五戶絲

Wu-liang-ho-t'ai 兀良合台

Ya-lu-wa-ch'ih 牙魯瓦赤

Yeh-lich-tsan 也烈贊

Yeh-lü Chu 耶律鑄

Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚材

yen-shih so 鹽使所

Ying-wu huang-ti	英武皇帝
yu ch'eng-hsiang	右丞相
Yü-ku-lun-ch'ih	玉古倫赤
Yüeh-ho-nai	月合乃

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